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Implicature and argumentation

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IMPLICATURE AND ARGUMENTATION

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ABSTRACT

Since Paul Grice first proffered his theory of implicature, scholars have sought to apply it to different linguistic genres. A review of the literature, however, revealed that only a few studies have considered the use of implicature as a strategy in argumentation and none were found which analyzed its use as a strategy in spontaneous informal debate. This thesis therefore seeks to investigate the role, if any, that implicature plays as a strategy in this genre. To this end, I collected instances of spontaneous debate from television and radio public affairs talk shows. The transcripts of these dialogues were analyzed with a focus on the use of implicature as a strategic rhetorical tool to gain an advantage over an opponent in the argumentation process. A number of possible benefits of the use of implicature in this way were examined. Two of the most significant are that it can assist in framing the topic of a debate to the advantage of the implicature producer and that it can be used to call into question the credibility and therefore the validity of the argument of an opponent.

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CHAPTER ONE

THEORY OF IMPLICATURE

Introduction

It was one summer, while listening to the baseball scores on the evening news, I noticed that almost every night, the sports reporter said the same thing about the New York Mets: "Those amazing Mets have done it again; they lost!" Up until then, like most children, I was under the impression that each word had a specific literal meaning and intent. When entertainers, such as the Amazing Kreskin, placed the word amazing in their name, it was meant to be a good thing and to inspire admiration. However, the Mets were not a team who were admired by anyone; they were the worst of the worst. When I asked my father about the apparent inconsistency in what the reporter was saying, he explained that sometimes there is a difference between what people say and what they mean. In this case, he told me that the reporter meant that the Mets were really bad, but that if he said that every night, people might think that he was being mean, therefore, he choose a fun way to remind the audience of his meaning, without actually saying it.

Little did I know at the time that I was being introduced to Paul Grice's Theory of Implicature.

Implicature

Grice observed that it is a common practice in language to communicate through implication rather than through being direct and literal in our use of words. For example, consider the following exchange:

Alice: "How is the food in that restaurant?"

Bill: "It's quick and convenient."

The literal meaning of Bill's answer is not responsive to Alice's question as it does not address the quality of the food. There are two possible explanations for this: either he did not understand the question, or he feels that his answer was responsive. Since the literal meaning of Bill's words does not address the question, they would have to have meaning other than their conventional literal meaning. When there is a divergence between the literal meaning of the words we use and the meaning that we wish to convey, we could be using a linguistic device that Grice calls "implicature." In the above example, Bill's implied meaning is that the quality of the restaurant's food is not the reason that people eat

there. If it was the reason, then we can assume that he would have addressed the issue directly. Instead he talks about other qualities of the restaurant such as speed of service and convenience. From this Alice can reach the conclusion that if she is not in a hurry, she may find better food elsewhere.

Grice differentiates between two different types of implicature: conventional and conversational. In conventional implicature the recipient relies upon the literal meaning of the words used to interpret the meaning of the implicature. For instance, consider the following example which rephrases a well known quote from American humorist and philosopher Will Rogers:

> "I am a Democrat, therefore, I belong to no organized party."

In the above example the intended meaning is correctly conveyed by the literal meaning of the words used, and that is that the Democratic Party is by its nature, a disorganized institution.

In contrast to conventional implicature, conversational implicature requires the listener to work out the meaning within the context of the dialogue.

Conversational implicature was demonstrated in the example above in which Alice and Bill discuss the quality of a restaurant's food. Bill's answer did not relate directly to Alice's question which pertained to the quality of the restaurant's food, and he gave no literal indication in his reply that she might want to consider eating elsewhere if she had the time. As Bill gave her no guidance as to what meaning he was implying, she was required to work out the meaning.

It should be noted that implicature is not restricted to intelligible speech. Any mode of communication which transmits meaning may create an implicature. Hawley (2002) proposed that implicature can be created by means other than clearly discernable language utterances (non-verbal speech acts such as gestures, facial expressions, silent pauses, unintelligible utterances, etc.) and, as such, the meaning of some implicature does not necessarily depend on the meaning of words uttered, but on the context of the speech act. For instance, if in the course of a public debate one participant purposely overlaps the speech of another with mocking, unintelligible mumbling,

he or she is creating an implicature, even though there are no discernable words from which to work out the meaning. In the aforementioned example, a plausible interpretation of the implicature is that the speaker thinks that his or her debate opponent's comments are not on point.

The Cooperative Principle

Central to Grice's theory is that communication through language is a cooperative endeavor. This does not mean that participants in a communicative endeavor have to have identical objectives (they seldom do), only that they must observe rules of order which are required for an efficient exchange to take place. The Cooperative Principle views talk exchanges as rational human behavior. Grice explains:

> . . . that anyone who cares about the goals that are central to conversation/communication (such as giving and receiving information, influencing and being influenced by others) must be expected to have an interest, given suitable circumstances, in participation in talk exchanges that will be profitable only on

> the assumption that they are conducted in general accordance with the Cooperative Principle and the maxims. (Grice, 1989, p. 30)

What Grice means by this is that effective communication requires all participants to be desirous of the common goal of the dialogue and to limit their contributions to those which advance the agreed upon purpose of the exchange. Therefore contributions which do not efficiently promote the purpose of the exchange are considered to be uncooperative and inappropriate. For example, if I ask you how tall you are, it is not appropriate for you to respond by telling me what size shoe you wear unless, of course, by knowing your shoe size, I can ascertain your height.

Grice proposed that there are four categories of maxims under which participants would be required to operate in cooperative communication: Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner. When certain maxims of cooperation are violated, conversational implicature is created. As long as the maxims are being openly and knowingly violated it is assumed that there is a cooperative motive to the implicature and that the hearer will be able to

work out the purpose of the speaker's utterance. If, on the other hand, a maxim is being violated unknowingly the communication process can be confused. Finally, if a maxim is knowingly violated and the producer of the speech is attempting to keep this violation concealed, then it is possible that the intent of the violation is to deceive. Some suggest that this is often the case of violations of maxims found in some advertising.

Gricean Maxims

Maxims of Quantity

1) Make your contributions as informative as is required (for the current purpose of the exchange).
2) Do not make your contributions more informative than is required.

These maxims emphasize the effect on communication, both of giving too little information and of giving too much. Giving too little information may leave the recipient of the communication without the necessary input to properly interpret what the speaker is saying. Giving too much information has its drawbacks as well. Grice believed that "overinformativeness may be

confusing" and cited two concerns. Firstly he noted that there is the possibility that excess information may misdirect the discourse by raising side issues. Secondly he believed that if the recipient is forced to sift through excess information he or she may reach erroneous conclusions by placing importance on irrelevant information (Grice noted that in some ways, maxim 2 above overlaps the category of Relation which is discussed below).

Maxims of Quality

1) Do not say what you believe to be false.
2) Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Grice consolidates these maxims into what he calls a "supermaxim" as follows: "Try to make your contribution one that is true" (Grice, 1989, p. 27). By this he means that it is not necessarily a violation of the above maxims if the information you give is false, unless you know or believe it to be false. Additionally, even if you believe that the information you are providing is true, it may be a violation of maxim 2 above if you are

speculating and know that there is a reasonable chance that your information may not be true.

Maxim of Relation - Be relevant

Grice notes that the simplicity of this statement may be misleading in that the focus of relevance may shift during the course of a conversation. At this point, I believe that it would be helpful to borrow from the caveat for maxim 1 of Quantity by modifying the maxim of Relation as follows: Be relevant (for the current purpose of the exchange). By making this modification, we emphasize that the purpose of the exchange may be altered during the course of the conversation.

Maxims of Manner

1) Avoid obscurity of expression.

2) Avoid ambiguity.

3) Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).

4) Be orderly.

Grice clarifies the emphasis of the maxims above by grouping them under the following supermaxim: "Be perspicuous." By this he means that the Cooperative Principle requires clarity and that efficient

communication is hindered when the means of expression are inappropriate for the audience. Appropriateness may vary from recipient to recipient or group to group. For example, an expression which may be obscure and ambiguous to one individual may be highly illustrative to another. Maxim 3 above, "Be brief," does not necessarily mean that one should use the fewest number of words possible, but that the words that are used should be clear. Maxim 4 "Be orderly," emphasizes that organization of one's thoughts is important. That is, a speaker's contribution should logically lead the listener from one point to the next. A discourse which is rambling may confuse the listener and lead them to erroneous conclusions.

Maxim Violation and Implicature

Grice's maxims are violated on a regular basis, however, not all violations create implicature. Implicature requires that there be intent on the part of the implicature producer to create implied meaning. If the recipient, operating under the assumptions of the Cooperative Principle, perceives an implicature because of an unintentional violation of one or more maxims, then the result of the exchange can be misleading. An extreme

example of this is depicted in the 1979 Peter Sellers movie "Being There." In this movie, Peter Sellers portrays the character named Chance, a simple-minded man who has lived his entire life on the estate of a rich Washington D. C. resident where he is employed as the gardener. He has never left the estate, and his entire knowledge of the world comes from the trivial TV shows and cartoons that he watches constantly. When his benefactor dies, Chance no longer has a place to live and is forced to wander the streets. After suffering a leg injury caused by being hit by a limousine, he meets the rich and well connected Benjamin Rand. Chance has no clue about how to relate to people. When asked questions by Rand, he answers everything in terms of gardening and how plants are nurtured. Rand perceives that Chance is employing implicature to describe a genius philosophical view of the world through the use of poetic metaphor. Under our definition of implicature, however, Chance's utterances would not count as implicature as he did not intend to convey a meaning other than the literal meaning of the words he used. Because of this misunderstanding, Rand becomes Chance's new benefactor and introduces

Chance to his elite circle of Washington powerbrokers, and even the President, all of whom share Rand's view of Chance as a genius.

Grice noted four generalized categories of maxim violation as follows:

1) The speaker may 'quietly' violate a maxim. A quiet violation is one in which it is not obvious to the recipient of the communication that an implicature is intended. This can be done either unintentionally or intentionally. If done unintentionally, confusion in the communication may result. If the speaker is unaware that he or she has made a violation and the recipient assumes that the violation was intentional then the recipient may assume a meaning which was not intended by the producer. There may also be the case in which the speaker intentionally violates a maxim in order to enhance his or her meaning through the use of implicature, but the hearer fails to recognize the maxim violation and therefore fails to understand the intended meaning of the speaker. An intentional quiet violation, on the other hand, suggest something quite different than the above examples. If, as noted previously, implicature is in

concert with the Cooperative Principle, and to be such requires an open and knowing violation of one of Grices's maxims, then communication which conceals such a violation, is not a cooperative endeavor and has an alternative motive, such as the intent to deceive.

2) The speaker may opt out of both the maxim and the Cooperative Principle. There are many reasons why one might to choose to opt out, from the desire to avoid unpleasantness involved in discussing a certain topic, to the protection of one's rights. The best known example of this is the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, often expressed in the following way: "I refuse to testify on the grounds that the answer may tend to incriminate me."

3) The speaker may be faced with "clash" between maxims, being unable to comply with one maxim without violating another. For example, it is a common for cable TV companies to give a range of times between which the installer will arrive at the house. Using this example, consider the following exchange:

Customer: "What time will the installer be here?"

Cable Company
Representative: "Sometime between noon and 6 P.M."

The cable company representative is aware of the fact that the customer would like more specific information. If, however, the representative lacks the information then he is faced with a clash between maxims. The maxim of Quantity requires that contributions be made as informative as is required for the current purpose of the exchange (which in this case would be a more specific time frame). The maxim of Quality however, requires that the contributor not to say anything for which they lack evidence. Since the representative does not have the information that is required to give a specific time frame, he cannot simultaneously obey both the maxims of Quantity and Quality. The representative makes a choice that the maxim of Quality is more important and therefore violates the maxim of Quantity. By violating that maxim, the representative is implying that there is no way to ascertain a more precise time.

4) The speaker may flout a maxim. This is a situation in which the speaker overtly fails to follow the maxim even though he is fully capable of doing so and

he is not being limited by a clash (as noted in 3 above), nor is he opting out of the Cooperative Principle. Additionally, due to the overt nature of flouting he is obviously not trying to deceive. Let us return to a previous example:

Alice: "How is the food in that restaurant?"

Bill: "It's quick and convenient."

In the above example, Bill violates two maxims. Alice's question requires a response which addresses the quality of the food that the restaurant serves. Bill's response violates the maxim of Relation as it does not answer the question that Alice asked. The response also violates the maxim of Manner as it is intentionally ambiguous. It is obvious that Bill is familiar with the restaurant because he knows that it is "quick and convenient." Therefore, we can assume that he has the knowledge for a suitable response. If we assume that Bill is complying with the Cooperative Principle, we can reconcile his flouting the maxims in this manner through the concept of implicature in which Bill's communication assumes two things: first, that Alice recognizes that he is violating a maxim and second, that she can reasonably be expected to work out

the meaning that he intended with the information that she possesses.

Why We Use Implicature

Green (1987) proffered that "it is a commonly held belief that direct communication is more effective than indirect" and then asked the rhetorical question "why then is implicature so pervasive in natural discourse?" Noting that one survey of texts indicates that implicature accounts for approximately 11% of all words used, she argued that among the benefits of using implicature over strategies of "being direct" are that it can, at times, make communication quicker, safer, and more effective (pp. 77-78). With respect to quickness, implicature can be thought of as a type of shorthand for communication of meaning. For example, consider the following exchange which uses implicature in lieu of spelling out facts which are shared knowledge by both participants.

Alice: "Before we go on vacation, we have to make arrangements to board the dogs at the veterinarian."

Bill: "Their vaccinations are not current."

Alice: "Oh, that's right. I'll take care of getting their shots tomorrow."

Bill's reply is a time-saving implicature which recognizes an issue that must be dealt with before they can board the dogs. Without the use of implicature, Bill's response would have been much longer, something perhaps such as the following:

Bill: "The veterinarian will not allow dogs to be boarded that do not have current vaccinations. Our dogs do not have current vaccinations; therefore, we will have to take them in to get their shots first."

In the above example, the implicature used five words while the non-implicature alternative used thirty five words. Alice's reply to Bill's implicature makes it obvious that she completely understands the implication of the dogs not having current vaccinations, that is, that the veterinarian will not accept them for boarding without shots, as they could pass illnesses on to other animals in the kennel. Since the fact that the dogs must have current vaccinations to be boarded is shared knowledge between both Bill and Alice, Bill does not have

to spell out the facts and saves time by using implicature.

In addition, as Green noticed, implicature can be safer mainly due to the fact that it can be cancelled. Because implicature requires the hearer to work out the meaning, it is understood that there is a possibility of misinterpretation. As such, to avoid adverse consequences, the implicature can be cancelled and the implicature producer can maintain that the hearer's interpretation is incorrect. For example, consider the following exchange:

Alice: "Clark can sure stretch a dollar."

Bill: "Well he has always been generous to me."

Alice: "No, I didn't mean to imply that he is cheap in that way, I meant that he was a good shopper."

In the above example, Alice makes an observation about Clark's frugality. When Bill takes the comment negatively, Alice cancels the implicature and rephrases her comment.

An additional reason why implicature can be safer is that it can be used as a face-saving device for both the

speaker and the recipient (Brown and Levinson, 1987). Brown and Levinson define "face" as the image that an individual wishes to project to others (e.g. that he/she is considerate of others, generous, polite etc.) Any social interaction which may require an individual to act contrary to this image is called a Face Threatening Act. Politeness strategies such as implicature assist in avoiding such face threatening situations in conversational interaction. For example, in many situations, asking for a favor can be a socially uncomfortable situation for both the requester and the person of whom the favor is being asked. When asking for a favor, there is both the possibility that you may be embarrassed if you are turned down and that the person of whom the request is being made may be embarrassed if they have to turn you down. To avoid embarrassment, you could phrase your request in an implicature to provide both you and the person that you are making the request of a face-saving way out. For example, consider the following exchange:

Alice: "I don't know how I am going to get to work tomorrow. My car is in the shop."

Bill: "Well, I don't know if I would have the time to help you out. I have to take the kids to school, and that's in the other direction."

Alice: "No, no, I know that it would be too much of an imposition for you. I'm pretty sure that I can get my sister to give me a ride."

In the above exchange, Alice was hinting that she needed a ride to work, but since she did not ask Bill explicitly, she was able to cancel the implied request when Bill started offering reasons why it would be an imposition for him to assist her. She cancelled the request by indicating that Bill had misunderstood what she was saying, "No, no, I know that it would be too much of an imposition for you." By canceling the request Alice has created a face-saving way out for both her and Bill.

In an alternative scenario, Bill answers Alice with what could possibly be an implicature of his own.

Alice: "I don't know how I am going to get to work tomorrow. My car is in the shop."

Bill: "I hope you can find a ride."

In the above example, Bill either did not understand that Alice was hinting for a ride, or he could not or did not want to assist her. If Bill just did not pick up on Alice's hint, then his reply is not an implicature because the intent to create an implied meaning does not exist. If however, Bill did understand that Alice was making a request for assistance, then his answer is an implicature, because he is violating the maxim of Relation (in that his reply does not relate to Alice's implied request). The implied meaning of Bill's reply is that he either cannot or does not wish to assist her. Since Alice did not openly make a request, she is not embarrassed when Bill does not offer to assist her. Bill, on the other hand, saved face because he was not put in the awkward position of turning Alice down as his answer appeared to be nothing more than a polite wish for her well being. The difference between the two scenarios is that, in the first example, Alice actually cancelled her implicature and, in the second example, neither Alice's nor Bill's implicatures were cancelled. Thus it is noted that an implicature does not have to be cancelled in order to provide face saving.

Finally, there is some evidence that the use of implicature can make one's words more memorable. Green noted that a number of studies have made the connection between the mental effort it takes to understand a concept and the ability to recall it. "There is experimental evidence that the more one thinks about the meaning of what is being said, the deeper and more long lasting the impression it makes" (p. 29). Therefore it follows that because implicature requires the hearer to work for meaning, the information has a more lasting impact. This tactic is effectively used in persuasion in venues such as political debates and advertising. In 1984, during a Democratic primary presidential debate, Walter Mondale addressed Gary Hart regarding the substance of his platform. Mondale asked Hart, "Where's the beef?" This was a take off of a Wendy's Hamburger restaurant chain commercial which asked the same question about their competitor's hamburgers. Mondale's comment was a pointed accusation against Hart's platform, that is, that it had no substance. Mondale's comment is still referred to today, nearly twenty years later, in news analysis, political talk shows and political science

classes. His point regarding Hart's platform would probably have not caused the stir that it did, nor have been long remembered if he had been direct and said something like; "Senator Hart, your platform has no substance."

Chen (1996), also commenting on "motivations for using implicature," observed,

> An implicature is believed, for the most part, to require more mental effort for the speaker to produce and for the hearer to interpret than its literal counterpart. It also runs the risk of being misunderstood. Given that human beings are rational (a fundamental assumption in Grice's theory), there must be independent reasons for speakers to use implicature (pp. 32-33).

Chen (1993) looked at how the use of implicature benefited the speaker who produced it. He proposed that there were three basic motivations to use implicature which he labeled the Principles of Politeness, Self Interest and Expressiveness. In regards to the Politeness Principle, Chen notes that the desire to be polite "very

often conditions what you say" (Chen, 1993, p. 62). For example, consider the following exchange:

Alice: "Bill, what did you think of that movie? You've got to love it!"

Bill: "Well, I think the storyline went over my head."

In the above exchange, Bill was able to indicate that he did not share Alice's enthusiasm for the movie without saying anything directly negative which may have reflected poorly on Alice's taste in movies. Implicature, therefore, allowed Bill to get his meaning across, while still maintaining a polite regard for the fact that Alice had a different opinion.

In regards to the Self Interest Principle, Chen notes that the speaker's response is shaped by a consideration of how it would affect him personally. "In a given society, there are certain things that, if said, would produce undesirable consequences, regardless of whether that something is true or not" (Chen, 1993, p. 62). For example, consider the following exchange between Alice and Bill, a married couple who are shopping for clothes:

Alice: "I think this dress makes me look fat. Do you think I need to loose weight?"

Bill: "You know, some manufacturer's sizes are just cut small."

In the above example, Bill has implied that he agrees that the dress does not fit properly; however, in an effort to preserve domestic tranquility, he has violated the maxims of Quality and Relation because his answer did not address the question of whether or not his wife needed to lose weight. Chen explains behavior such as Bill's by explaining that "self interest makes us say things in vague, indirect, tentative or veiled ways" (Chen, 1993, p. 62).

Finally, the Expressiveness Principle is used when the speaker has strong emotions and wishes to pass on that emotion "forcefully and effectively, leaving as much impact psychological, aesthetic, or otherwise, is possible on the hearer" (Chen 1993, p. 62). This type of implicature is often found in political rhetoric. An example is this November 1956 statement of Soviet Union Premier Nikita Khrushchev speaking to a reception for Western diplomats in the Kremlin: "Whether you like it or

not, history is on our side. We will bury you." The phrase, "We will bury you," violates the maxim of Relation as it does not relate directly to the previous discussion regarding the global competition for influence between the communist system and the western democracies. The statement was not meant to be taken literally. It was designed to be emotion-packed, and it was. It scared a lot of people who had mental images of Russian troops actual burying American bodies after an actual war. Khrushchev, however, was speaking metaphorically of his belief that communism would succeed in its quest for global domination.

Previous Applications of Gricean Theory

A number of scholarly works have applied Implicature to analyzing aspects of spoken and written discourse. Some examples of genres in which the use of implicature have been examined are plays, poetry, written political discourse (published articles), advertising, political speeches and professional communications. Of particular relevance for this thesis are the uses of implicature in persuasive discourse.

In a Gricean study of literature, Chen (1996), for example, in his article "Conversational Implicature and Characterizations in Reginald Rose's Twelve Angry Men" examined the fictional characters in Rose's play and demonstrated how the personalities and character of individuals can be seen in "their violations of particular conversational maxims" (p. 31). Also analyzed by Chen are the motivations that the characters have for using implicature. Among these are that implicature is used as a strategy in argumentation.

Chen (1993) also looked at the use of implicature in metaphor. While he specifically looked at poetry, he concluded that since "metaphor works on the same principles regardless of where it occurs," (p. 70) it is safe to extrapolate the role of conversational implicature in metaphor to all forms of communication. In this examination, he noted that while Grice explains the mechanics of implicature, he did not explain why an implicature producer may prefer violation of the maxims over being direct. Chen proposed that one major motivation for the use of implicature through poetic metaphor is the desire of the poet to add impact and

emotion to his or her message. "As a result, the speaker uses language elaborate in structure and deviant from the norm, which might sacrifice clarity and easy understanding as specified by Grice's Cooperative Principle" (Chen, 1993, pp. 61-62).

The advantages that Chen ascribed to the poetic metaphor may be equally true when applied to argumentation in prose. For an example of this, refer back to the earlier example of Walter Mondale's comment, "Where's the beef?" Mondale's use of a metaphor to make his point that Senator Hart's platform lacked substance greatly increased its impact as it was widely reported in the press. As mentioned earlier, it is doubtful that a more direct phraseology such as "Senator Hart, your platform has no substance" would have attracted as much attention.

In another analysis of the use of implicature by fictionalized characters, Gautam and Sharma (1986) looked at the dialogue in the play, Waiting for Godot. The authors demonstrate how implicature (especially when it violates the maxim of Relation) can be used to reflect a general attitude (such as indifference or annoyance) that

the implicature maker has toward what another is saying. This view is interesting because it supports the theory that implicature can be used as a strategy in argumentation. In this play one of the characters uses this strategy to show distain for an opponent's arguments in an effort to minimize its effectiveness.

Drawing upon examples from written political discourse, Winn (2002) looked at how implicature is employed in political debate to intensify the emotional appeal of one's message. In this study, Winn analyzed articles from three contributors to Guns & Ammo Magazine. In these articles, all three writers--Charlton Heston, Jim Grover and Chuck Klien--are strong proponents of safeguarding rights enumerated in the Constitution of the United States under the Second Amendment. As this is a sensitive topic for both supporters of the Second Amendment and those who favor gun control laws, the rhetoric can be very emotional. Winn proffered that all three authors used aggressive writing styles in which implicature was used frequently to strengthen the force of their arguments, and she concluded that "Implicature often will enable writers to dispense vivid imagery to

strengthen a claim; instill fear in or establish a relationship with an audience; denigrate their opponents" (Winn, 2000, p. i).

In another example of how speakers can use implicature to manipulate their audience, Newstead (1995) suggested that an erroneous perception can be promoted by using syllogistic reasoning. A syllogism is:

> A form of deductive reasoning consisting of a major premise, a minor premise and a conclusion; for example, *All human beings are mortal*, the major premise, *I am a human being*, the minor premise, *therefore I am mortal*, the conclusion.(The American College Dictionary, 1993)

Newstead noted that errors in interpretation can arise when people perceive a relationship between two statements just because they occur within close proximity to each other. He explains, "It seems quite likely that the Gricean principle of relevance can explain why people are inclined to draw conclusions when none is warranted, since it is assumed that the speakers would not make two completely unrelated statements" (Newstead, p. 663). It

has been argued by some that what Newstead calls "Gricean errors" in reasoning are not always entirely accidental, but are actually promoted, as argued by Smith below.

Smith (1997) looked at how conversational implicature is used in advertising in the weight loss industry to argue the benefits of using the manufacturer's products and/or services. She found, much like Winn did in the example of the articles from Guns & Ammo Magazine above, that advertisers use implicature to strengthen claims, create imagery and to bond with their audience. She concluded, however, that there was an overwhelming propensity for this industry's advertising to quietly violate maxims in order to take advantage of cancellability. Smith contended that the motive was the intent to deceive.

> When an advertiser feels it is necessary to suggest things for which no substantiation exist, implication is a safe means of accomplishing his or her advertising goals. It is safe, because as Grice (1975) notes, what was implied can be cancelled by the speaker/writer at any time.(Smith, 1997, p. 68)

Such cancellation allows the advertiser to deny that the intention was to mislead and that the recipient simply misunderstood the message. While this study refers to print advertisement, the technique of canceling and subsequently denying nefarious intent is effectively used in oral debate. An example of this would be when a debate participant makes a charge which can not be substantiated and is challenged by his or her opponent. In this instance the speaker can cancel the charge, claiming that what was said was misinterpreted, therefore minimizing any damage to his or her own credibility.

Supporting the existence of this argument technique, Riley (1993) studied the use of implicature in professional communications such as found in business and government. She found that there can at times be a fine line between the violation of a maxim to create an implicature and the violation of a maxim for the purpose of deceit, noting that "problems can arise not just in deliberately deceptive documents, but also in those whose authors are attempting to remain noncommittal, to mitigate negative news or to show deference to unfamiliar or more powerful readers" (p. 194).

While the existing research suggests that implicature is used in various ways as a premeditated strategy in discourse, no studies to my knowledge have investigated the use of implicature as a tool of persuasion. Specifically, the thesis will study the possible motivations that informal debate participants may have for using implicature in structuring their arguments and the strategic benefits they gain from use of such implicatures.

The outline of the rest of the thesis is as follows: chapter two will provide a context for the present study by examining the theoretical foundations of rhetoric and argumentation and how they are applied to the talk show format, chapter three will consists of a close examination of transcripts recorded from talk shows, and chapter four will the present conclusions from this research.

CHAPTER TWO

ARGUMENTATION, IMPLICATURE AND ORAL DEBATE

Introduction

This chapter focuses on an exploration of argumentation from its theoretical roots to modern day theory and its practical application in everyday discourse. Some of the frameworks for analyzing argument reviewed in this chapter will be applied to the present study of implicature in current affairs talk shows. I begin with some current definitions of what argumentation is as it is employed in everyday discourse and then take a look back at the theoretical foundations of "formal" argumentation and reasoning as described by Aristotle. I then consider modern day scholars who have built upon Aristotle's foundations and expanded it to apply to informal debate (or everyday discourse). Special attention is paid to Toulmin's model put forth in his book The Uses of Argument (1958). Finally, I discuss oral argumentation specifically, exploring the unique characteristics of television and radio talk show debate programs, the goals and objectives of participants, and the rhetorical tactics used to gain advantage.

Some Current Definitions of Argumentation

One modern definition of the word "argument" is two or more people having an emotional disagreement, that is, "a quarrel; a dispute" (The American Heritage College Dictionary, 1993), such as in "Alice and Bill had a big argument, and they are not talking to each other now." While "hot, interpersonal dispute is among the commonest conceptions of argument" (Walton, 1985, p. 2), another definition, found in the study of logic, refers to the presentation of a deductively reasoned position on an issue under examination. According to Toulmin, Rieke and Janik (1979), "An argument, in the sense of a train of reasoning, is the sequence of interlinked claims and reasons that, between them, establish the content and force of the position for which a particular speaker is arguing" (p. 13).

It is important to note, however, that even in reasoned exchanges, arguments can be presented in passionate and emotional ways and, therefore, at times may in fact sound like or have the qualities of a quarrel. Toulmin, Rieke & Janik (1979) define the line

between quarreling and a "train of reasoning" by the rationality of the arguer:

> Anyone participating in an argument shows his rationality, or lack of it, by the manner in which he handles and responds to the offering of reasons for or against claims. If he is open to argument, he will either acknowledge the force of those reasons or seek to reply to them, and either way he will deal with them in a rational manner. If he is deaf to argument, by contrast, he may either ignore contrary reasons or reply to them with dogmatic assertions, and either way he fails to deal with the issues rationally. (p. 13)

Argumentation is one of the most common forms of both oral and written communication. In our everyday lives, we are constantly making arguments in an effort to influence others, and we are constantly exposed to the arguments of others in their efforts to influence us. Many college textbooks instruct students about the prevalence of argument in discourse. Among them, for example, Rybacki & Rybacki (2000) note that:

> To discover argumentation, all you have to do is observe the daily attempts to influence your beliefs and behavior. Some efforts will be aimed at your emotions, prejudices, and superstitions, but some will use information and reasoning in an attempt to influence you. Most people we encounter--friends, family, teachers, employers, the mass media, advertisers, editorialists and politicians--offer arguments embedded in persuasive appeals to encourage us to think as they do or behave as they wish us to. (p. 2)

Furthermore argumentation requires that there be a desire on the part of the arguer to influence decision making, behavior or beliefs. Without the intent to influence an audience, argumentation does not exist. Fahnestock and Secor (2002) note that rhetorical analysis is based on the assumptions that "speakers and writers have intentions or designs on readers and hearers" and that they seek to persuade the audience to "believe what the speaker believes, and to act as the speaker recommends" (p. 177).

Argument and Rhetoric

One tradition of the formal study of argumentation as a science began in the democratic institutions of ancient Greece where everyday citizens were called upon to participate in the functions of government (such as acting in the capacity of officers of the court and in the law making process). The study of rhetoric (communication skills) was therefore an important part of education in this society (Rybacki & Rybacki, 2000).

Aristotle proposed that there were three basic tactics of argument: pathos, ethos and logos. Pathos relates to arguments which appeal to the emotions of the audience. An example of this is found in Richard Nixon's 1968 speech at the Republican National Convention during which he accepted the party's presidential nomination. He ended this speech by making reference to the terminally ill former President Dwight Eisenhower when he said "Let's win this one for Ike!" By doing this, Nixon was not just speaking to the delegates, but he was making an emotional argument to the entire country, that by electing him, they would be honoring the former president. Ethos relates to persuasion which is

accomplished through the credibility accorded to the speaker or source of the information. This is especially important in deliberations in which the exact knowledge of the "truth" is not possible. According to Rapp (2002), Aristotle believed that in order to establish credibility a speaker must display (1) practical intelligence, (2) a virtuous character, and (3) good will. A speaker who is perceived by the audience to be lacking in some or all of these qualities will create doubt in the minds of the audience as to the veracity of the claims he or she is making. "But if he displays all of them, Aristotle concludes, it cannot be rationally doubted that his (or her) suggestions are credible" (pp. 6-7). Logos relates to persuasion which is accomplished through logic either through induction or deduction. Induction is a process in which a generality is derived from a particular set of facts. For example, consider the following argument: "It seldom rains in Orange County, California in the month of August. If we plan a trip to Disneyland in August, it is unlikely that it will rain on us." Deduction, by contrast, is a process in which one fact must follow because of the existence of another fact, such as in the

following argument: "All men are mortal. Aristotle was a man; therefore, Aristotle was mortal."

Toulmin's Model and Implicature

Perhaps the most widely studied and accepted modern model of argumentation is that put forth by Stephen Toulmin in his book, The Uses of Argument (1958). Toulmin rejected the constraints of formal logic and advanced the proposition that the traditional theories of rhetoric and logic did not sufficiently explain the processes involved in everyday modern informal debate. Toulmin opined that:

> . . . it begins to look as though formal logic has indeed lost touch with its application and as if a systematic divergence has in fact grown up between the categories of logical practice and the analysis given them in logicians' textbooks and treatises. (p. 9)

Traditional theories were based on either absolutism or relativism and focused on a search for "Truth." The modern study of rhetoric and argumentation, on the other hand, "attempts to explain and critically evaluate everyday disputations, adversarial and dialogical reasoning" (Saeedi & Sillince, 1999, p. 114). The goal of

this type of argumentation (informal logic) is not necessarily to search for truth but to "persuade the listener to choose the outcome he (the debater) prefers" (Glazer & Rubinstein, 2001, p. 158).

Toulmin's model is broken down into six components: claims, grounds, warrants, backing, modality and rebuttal (Toulmin, Rieke & Janik, 1979).

Claims: This is an assertion put forth by an arguer that he or she wishes to have accepted as a fact.

Grounds: These are facts put forward which support the validity of the claim.

Warrants: These are facts and assertions, either stated or unstated, that make a causal connection between the grounds and the claim.

Backing: These are facts and assertions, either stated or unstated, that support the validity of the warrant.

Modality: This is a qualifier used to indicate that there is a possibility that the grounds may not lead to the claim.

Rebuttal: This is an extraordinary circumstance which renders the logic of the warrant invalid.

To illustrate Toulmin's model, consider the following example:

Alice: "We should go out to dinner tonight. We've had a hard day, and it should make us feel better (in the past when we have had a hard day and we have gone out to dinner, it has made us feel better), providing we don't have to wait too long."

In the above example, the claim is the phrase "We should go out to dinner tonight," as this is the proposition that Alice would like to have accepted. The grounds are embodied in the phrase "we've had a hard day," as this is the support that Alice gives to justify her proposition that they should go out to dinner. The warrant is the phrase "it should make us feel better." This phrase makes the connection between the claim "We should go out to dinner" and the grounds embodied by the statement "we've had a hard day." The backing is the unspoken fact, noted within the parenthesis, which provides support for the

validity of the warrant. In the above example, the backing consists of the previous experience that Alice has had: that when she has had a hard day, going out to dinner has often made her feel better. It is significant, however, that going out to dinner does not make her feel better 100% of the time. This is indicated by the fact that there is a modality embodied in the word "should" in the warrant phrase "it should make us feel better." This indicates that there is a chance that going out to dinner will not make Alice feel better. Finally, the rebuttal is the phrase "providing we don't have to wait too long." This is a circumstance which would render the logic of the warrant invalid, as Alice knows that if she has to wait too long, her mood will not improve.

In Toulmin's model, when the warrant is unspoken, the gap of information between the claim and the grounds is bridged through the use of an implied argument. Krejci (2000) linked implicature to argumentation by comparing Grice's theory of conversational implicature to Toulmin's warrants. He noted that both "take into account a wealth of unstated assumptions which speakers, writers, audiences and readers carry in their minds and employ in

order to interpret language" (Krejci, 2000, p. 27). Krejci contends that both implicature and warrants rely upon making a leap between premise and conclusion. To do this, an assumption is made that there is shared knowledge between the parties which provides enough information to fill in the gaps where there are unstated assumptions of logic.

A claim may embody an implied meaning as well and can be used to form an implicature which attacks a debate opponent. One example is found in the September 26, 1960 Presidential Debate between John Kennedy and Richard Nixon. During his campaign, Kennedy had frequently used some form of the phrase, "We can do better," and in his opening statement of this debate, he did it again as follows:

> I think we can do a better job. I think we're going to have to do a better job if we are going to meet the responsibilities which time and events have placed upon us. (Kennedy-Nixon Debate, 9/26/1960)

Kennedy's comment, "I think we can do a better job," makes an implied claim that no matter how good a picture

Nixon may paint of the record of the Eisenhower-Nixon Administration, it has failed because even greater progress was possible. Nixon recognized this attack in the following statement from his opening remarks:

> I think we disagree on the implication of his remarks tonight and on the statements that he has made on many occasions during his campaign to the effect that the United States has been standing still. (Kennedy-Nixon Debate, 9/26/1960)

Oral Argumentation

The forums in which argumentation take place vary greatly from casual social settings to those which are extremely formal and highly regulated in every detail. Some examples of these venues include office break-rooms, barber shops, pubs, coffee shops, internet chat rooms, staff meetings, newspaper editorials, radio and television talk shows, PTA meetings, academic conferences, articles in scholarly journals, criminal and civil court proceedings, congressional debates, and sessions of the United States Supreme Court. Toulmin, Rieke & Janik (1979) note that, as the objectives of each

unique forum vary, "the procedural organization of the resulting discussion is correspondingly different, and the manner in which claims and arguments have to be presented and defended also differs" (p. 15).

Generally speaking, "broad rules apply to all forms of argumentation" but there are also "specific rules which apply only to certain forums" (Toulmin, Rieke & Janik, 1979, p.15). It is logical to assume that each format develops because it is thought to best serve the objectives of the discourse participants. For example, an oral or written format will have advantages and disadvantages for different argument objectives. The written format used in academic research papers, for instance, is well suited for the discussion of complicated theory and the presentation of large amounts of data. A permanent record allows for the luxury of unlimited time for colleagues to thoroughly examine an argument, test data and develop supporting or contrary arguments. Oral arguments, on the other hand, are well suited for situations in which time is limited and in which the standards of evaluating an argument are significantly lower than that noted in the example of

academic research above. Such is the case in radio and television public affairs debate programs in which the need to entertain the audience with a lively discussion outweighs the documentation of facts and the presentation of supporting data. When burden of proof standards are set low, this allows an arguer the opportunity to present as evidence unsupported, irrelevant or even false information in an effort to influence the audience.

Steering in Oral Debate

One area of interest in the study of oral argument is how participants cooperate in the roles they take on in driving the course of the debate. For any cooperative endeavor to be productive, participants are required to at least tacitly agree on some basic rules or organization to govern the activity. Sillince (1995) notes that "Discourse analysis assumes that coherence and sequencing are motivated by a cooperative and informative role with regard to discourse partners. One of the conversation partners (the 'steerer' - Scholtens, 1991) develops a plan and the other (the follower) follows" (p. 414). In cooperative dialogue, a switch in roles can naturally occur during the course of a conversation. This

realignment generally takes place as a collaborative effort between the discourse participants with the desire to make the transition as smooth as possible. It is important now to make a distinction between argumentation and the type of cooperative dialogue described above. While argumentation is a cooperative endeavor because it requires certain basic ground rules, participants may find it advantageous not to cooperate in sharing the role of being the steerer. In argumentation found in the genre of television and radio public affairs talk shows, for instance, all participants seek to seize and maintain the role as the steerer, because the steerer has the power to define the terms of the debate. Therefore, participants in argumentation "may find that surprise, deceit, distraction and complexity are useful weapons" (Sillince, p. 414) to accomplish this goal.

Hutchby (1996) studied such power struggles in oral argumentation roles in open-line talk radio programs (Note: An "open-line" program is one in which members of the listening audience are invited to call into the station and become participants with the host. This format is in contrast to programs in which the host

converses only with an invited guest). In his study, he argued that "asymmetries" of power existed in these conversations between the host and the callers (p. 9) and that participants take advantage of the "unequal distribution of resources" (p. 3) to control the course of the discourse. Using transcripts from talk radio conversations, he examined numerous rhetorical devices used by participants to exercise control over the topic of discussion. He studied how arguments develop and the techniques that are used by participants to create advantages by requiring an opponent to abandon his/her position as a proponent of a proposition in order to defend against an attack on his/her proposition or evidence.

Hutchby claimed that many of these asymmetries were built into the institutional setting of the talk radio format and that in some instances they uniquely favored the host over the caller. One example of this is that while the caller has the opportunity to speak first and therefore he or she chooses the topic and frames the debate, the host, going second, has the first opportunity to rebut and therefore steer the course of the dialogue.

A caller therefore can easily be made to abandon his or her position as a proponent of a proposition and be forced to defend his or her position from a framework that the host has constructed to his or her own advantage. Hutchby examined other rhetorical devices as well which are used by both hosts and callers to exercise control and steer the course of an argument. While implicature was not one of the devices that he examined, it is one purpose of the present study to determine if implicature can also be used as a strategy to steer argumentative discourse.

Persuasive Attack and Defense in Oral Political Debate

One way to control or steer dialogue in informal debate is to attack an opponent's credibility or argument. This is because such attacks most always require the person being attacked to respond to the issues raised in the attack. Failure to respond may be seen by the audience as an admission that the charges made in the attack are true. In an analysis of modern political rhetoric, Benoit and Wells (1996), in Candidates in Conflict: Persuasive Attack and Defense in

the 1992 Presidential Debates, looked at *persuasive attacks* and *persuasive defenses* in the presidential debates between George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton and Ross Perot. A persuasive attack seeks to depict an opponent in a negative light in the eyes of the audience through linkage to an undesirable act. "The disgraceful act may be an offensive deed, word or even an undesirable cognition (belief, value, attitude or opinion)" (p. 29). As such, persuasive attacks may take the form of a characterization of a debate opponent's character or logic in a way which is designed to diminish the credibility of the individual being attacked in the eyes of the audience. (This echoes the Aristotelian theory of ethos and logos). A persuasive defense is a reaction to a persuasive attack and is designed to repair or restore the image of an individual who is the target of an attack.

Benoit & Wells suggest that the use of persuasive attacks, especially on character, were common in the 1992 Presidential Debate series. They illustrated this fact through the observations of political columnist William Safire on Bush's strategy in the first debate.

"Commentators could hardly miss the fact that Bush pressed his attacks against Clinton in the first debate. Safire observed that judgment and character were 'the President's main shot at his challenger . . .'" (p. 107). Benoit & Wells' analysis of the three presidential debates categorized the topics of discussion into thirteen topic areas. Honesty and integrity was the third most common issue addressed (just behind the economy and federal fiscal policies, with Bush using this issue in persuasive attack more than two and a half times as much as Clinton did.

Persuasive attacks on ethos are not always directly stated, but can involve implicature as demonstrated by the dialogue between Alice and Bill below:

Alice: "If you really cared about the children, you would support the school bond issue."

Bill: "People who are really concerned about education are more interested in implementing the new curriculum that I have proposed than in throwing more money at outdated programs that don't work."

In the above exchange, Alice uses implicature to make a persuasive attack on Bill's ethos. She does this by violating the maxim of Relation in that "caring about the welfare of children" is not directly related to a school bond issue. Her implied meaning is that Bill does not care about children. Bill's reply is not only a persuasive defense but also a persuasive attack of the same kind that Alice made. In his defense, Bill first implies that he does care about "the children" because he has developed a new curriculum. This restores his ethos from Alice's attack. With the same statement, he is able to make an unusual maneuver in that he is able to launch a persuasive attack on Alice's ethos in the same way that she challenged his. His implication is that she does not care about children because she does not support his new curriculum.

It should be noted, however, that attacks do not always elicit a response. This is because the person under attack must perceive that the accusation will be believed and will be viewed negatively by the audience (Benoit & Wells, 1996). If the person under attack does not perceive the accusation as harmful to the image that

he or she is attempting to portray to the audience, then ignoring it may be an effective strategy and even an implicature in its own right. By ignoring an overt accusation, the person under attack may be implying that the charge is frivolous and not worthy of a rebuttal, thus attempting to minimize its effectiveness.

The Present Study

The present study explores the ways in which implicature plays an integral part of modern informal oral debate and is used as a purposeful technique by the speakers not only to display their own views in a positive way with increased impact, but to portray their opponents in an unfavorable light. This study provides an analysis of the effects of implicature in the arguments of talk show debates, paying attention to how implicature works in appeals to ethos and logos in persuasive attacks and defenses and in attempts to steer debate. The broad research questions which will be addressed are as follows:

1. Is implicature used as a strategy in argumentation?

2. If implicature is used as a purposeful strategy, what advantage does it provide to the arguer?

For this analysis, I obtained data samples of spontaneous, informal debate. The Sean Hannity Show on radio, the O'Reilly Factor television show, and the Hannity and Combs television show were selected for this purpose because they are notorious for producing a high volume of confrontational and argumentative discussions on controversial topics. This format is well suited for the study of argument strategies because the participants are acting as advocates (similar to trial lawyers) and view the encounter as a competitive process. The object of this competition is to win over public opinion. As advocates, the arguers may use different methods in communicating their positions, including implicature.

Shows such as these are distinct from mainstream news programs in that the hosts are well known political partisans and often conduct interviews with guests of opposing philosophies in a contentious and argumentative style. In the talk radio genre, the hosts also take calls from listeners. While most of these calls are friendly

to the hosts, there is also a significant number which become contentious and argumentative. Because of the free-wielding style of shows such as these, the participants place limited value on politeness and, in fact, want to place their opponents in face-threatening situations in order to question their credibility and show their opponents' arguments in an unflattering light.

The data collection process consisted of randomly recording ten complete programs of each television show and ten one-hour segments of the radio show. All of these recordings were reviewed and a total of four conversations within these segments were then selected and transcribed. The criteria for selection were that the conversations consist of confrontational argumentation, contain implicature and be of sufficient length (two to four minutes was found to be optimal) to obtain enough turn-taking in order for patterns of argumentation strategies to emerge.

The transcripts were examined for instances of maxim-breaking and implicature. Each instance of implicature was then analyzed for its possible meaning and for whether it was used as either an attack or

defense mechanism. An analysis was then made of the benefits that the speaker may hope to gain from the usage of the implicature, with close attention paid to the effects that the implied attack or defense have on the rhetorical appeals used and the steering of the argument.

CHAPTER THREE

IMPLICATURE AND TALK SHOW ARGUMENTATION

Introduction

In this chapter, I will examine the use of implicature in the informal debate genre of television and radio public affairs talk shows. The word debate as it is used in the present study is defined as any deliberative public dialogue meant to influence the opinions or actions of the audience. To understand the concept of informal debate, it is helpful to contrast it with the traditions of "formal" debate. The study and advancement of formal reasoned deliberative discourse is found in the academic field of Forensics. The use of formal deliberative dialogue in public affairs decision-making dates back to the ancient Greeks. This process of argumentation was so strongly revered that they:

> . . . organized contests for speakers that developed and recognized the abilities their society felt central to democracy . . . Because the training in this skill of public advocacy, including the development of evidence, found one of its important venues in

> the law courts, the term "forensic" has also become associated with the art of science of legal evidence and argument. (What is forensics, n.d., americanforensics. org)

Formal debate, as practiced by academic organizations such as the American Forensic Association and the National Forensic Association, is highly structured and involves strict rules on turn-taking and the type of evidence allowed. Most specifically, heckling and talking over an opponent are not allowed and any evidence which is used to support an argument must be thoroughly referenced and be of the highest reliability. (Code of forensic program and forensics tournament standards for college and universities, n.d. americanforensics.org; NFA code of ethics, n.d., National Forensics.org).

By contrast, informal debate, as defined by this study, is any type of deliberative dialogue which does not have established and enforced rules of turn-taking, decorum and evidence. This definition can apply to everyday conversations between family, and between friends and acquaintances, as well as quasi-institutional

settings such as town meetings and radio and television talk shows.

The Background of the Talk Show Format

The emergence of the talk radio format is chronicled by the Ken Mills Agency (a talk radio industry consulting firm) and Carla Gessell-Streeter (a talk radio researcher and instructor of speech at Cincinnati State Technical and Community College). Talk shows as an entertainment format have been in existence since the earliest days of commercial radio broadcasting in the mid 1920s. While music and dramatic presentations made up an overwhelming majority of programming in the 1920's and 1930's, talk formats such as news and informational programming (on a wide range of subjects such as cooking, farming, weather, etc,) were also considered a practical and popular use of the electronic media. In the early shows, due in large part to technical limitations, it was not possible to put phone calls from listeners directly on the air. On occasion, however, the hosts of some shows would take phone calls and then repeat what the caller said into the microphone. This was among the first attempts to make the electronic talk medium an interactive activity. In the

early 1940s, broadcasters like NBC Radio presented panel discussion shows such as the "University of Chicago Roundtable" and "America's Town Meeting." These shows proved to be popular with radio station network owners because they were popular with the audiences and were inexpensive to produce. By 1945 technology had advanced sufficiently to allow the broadcasting of voices from telephone lines directly onto the air. Taking advantage of this, an overnight disc jockey at WMCA radio in New York broadcasted a live, impromptu conversation with a caller, who just happened to be the well-known big band leader Woody Herman. Based upon the enthusiastic audience response to this program, Gray's show was transformed into one in which he regularly interviewed celebrity guests in the studio and took calls from listeners. The talk show format was refined throughout the 1950's, and in the early 1960's, some radio stations began to adopt a format known as "all talk, all the time." (A Quick History of Commercial Talk Radio From the Thundering Herd to the Thunder of Rush, n.d., kenmillsagency.com; Gesell-Streeter, n.d., radiotalk.org).

A perceived limitation of the talk radio format was a Federal Communications Commission policy issued in 1949 which became known as the "Fairness Doctrine." The philosophy of this doctrine was that broadcasters were "public trustees" and, as such, had an obligation to present balanced points of view on controversial topics of public discussion. As a result of this, if a program was considered to be one-sided, opponents could sue the broadcaster to provide equal air time for their points of view. As this would be expensive for the station owner, many issued guidelines to their hosts to avoid taking controversial positions on the air. (A Quick History of Commercial Talk Radio From the Thundering Herd to the Thunder of Rush, n.d., kenmillsagency.com).

In 1987, there was a broad deregulation of both the radio and television industries by the Reagan Administration, and the Fairness Doctrine was terminated. Taking advantage of this and combining it with new technology which enabled live radio shows to be nationally broadcasted, The Rush Limbaugh Show on radio became an enormous commercial success, combining an unabashed conservative philosophy with what some consider

to be an over-the-top, in-your-face style. (A Quick History of Commercial Talk Radio From the Thundering Herd to the Thunder of Rush, n.d., kenmillsagency.com).

In the mid 1990's the Fox News Channel brought the informal debate talk show format to national television with the Hannity and Colmes and the O'Reilly Factor television shows. These are one-hour nightly shows, similar in format to public affairs talk radio shows in their free-wielding debate styles. They differ from radio shows, however, in that they do not take listener calls. All debate opponents are public figures or newsmakers and are on camera. After their successes on television, both Hannity and O'Reilly launched nationally syndicated radio talk shows. Like on television, on radio, Hannity and O'Reilly interview public figures but also devote a significant amount of time to taking calls from the audience, and discussing their views. Like Limbaugh, both Hannity and O'Reilly have aggressive, in-your-face styles. Hannity is a self-declared Republican partisan, while O'Reilly is a former ABC News correspondent and a registered independent who prefers not to have a political label attached to him. (Sean

Hannity is a Media Superstar!, n.d., Hannity.com, Bill's Bio, n. d., Billoreilly.com)

It is from both the radio and television shows of Hannity and O'Reilly that I have selected the data for the current study. The reason that I selected these shows over that of the Rush Limbaugh program is that they devote a much greater percentage of their air time to interactive dialogue, while Limbaugh commonly engages in extended monologues and seldom interviews people.

The Analysis of the Data

The rest of this chapter presents my analysis of transcripts of spontaneous informal debate from the selected radio and television public affairs talk shows. This analysis will focus on examples of strategic uses of implicature (uses motivated by the desire to gain an advantage over an opponent in the argumentation process). This analysis will focus on examples of implicatures that participants use to make attacks on their opponents or to defend themselves and will examine how the use of implicature affects the course of the dialogue. The transcripts appear in full in the appendix.

It may be helpful at this point to present a brief context for each conversation: Conversation 1 was between Sean Hannity and Kevin, a listener who called into the radio program. Preceding this conversation, Hannity had been discussing the upcoming runoff election for the U. S. Senate Seat in Louisiana between the Democratic incumbent Mary Landrieu and the Republican challenger, Susan Terrill. Conversation 2 is from the Hannity and Colmes television show and features Sean Hannity and Jake McGoldrick, a San Francisco City/County Supervisor, discussing McGoldrick's opposition to the federal anti-terrorism legislation known as the Patriot Act. The final two transcripts are from The O'Reilly Factor television show. In conversation 3, Bill O'Reilly and Bob Filner, a Democratic congressman from San Diego, discuss the merits of the impending United States military action in Iraq. Finally, in conversation 4, Bill O'Reilly and Miles Solay, a youth organizer for the "Not in Our Name" anti-war group, discuss the philosophical foundations of that group.

In chapter one, I discussed the foundations of Grice's theory of Implicature and in chapter two I noted

the similarities between how implicature operated and the operation of Toulmin's unstated warrants and backings. Grice and Toulmin are describing similar phenomena but in different contexts. Grice concerns himself with the general mechanics and benefits of using implicature while Toulmin places this rhetorical device specifically into the framework of modern informal argumentation. He notes that much of the time the grounds and warrants that support claims are implied. This is possible because the speaker is relying on knowledge which is shared between him or her and the recipient of the communication. Another aspect of implied communication found in argument (which will be illustrated at length in the analysis which follows) is that implicature can function as a claim. This is clearly illustrated in the previous example of Walter Mondale's comment "Where's the beef?" In that instance, Mondale used a rhetorical question to make the claim, through implicature, that Senator Hart's platform was lacking in substance; and we will see in the following analysis that claims achieved through implicature also serve as persuasive attacks and defenses in public affairs talk shows.

Persuasive Attacks on Ethos

As noted in chapter two, a persuasive attack is a characterization of an opponent's character, values, motivations, actions, logic, etc. in an unfavorable light, in an effort to influence the audience. This echoes the Aristotelian view that the intellect, character and values of the speaker are essential elements that audiences consider in the evaluation of an argument and that, if these characteristics of a speaker are brought into question, then that speaker's credibility and therefore his or her argument may be damaged in the eyes of the audience. It is important to note that attacks on ethos through implicature are often very subtle. Rather than directly assaulting an opponent, the speaker may simply make claims which lead the audience to the conclusion that the opponent is lacking in credibility. For example, a speaker may challenge his or her opponent's credibility based on lack of experience or an association with others whose credibility is questionable.

An examination of the data showed that persuasive attacks on ethos were a common occurrence in each of the

four transcripts and often took the form of an implicature. In the two examples below, we see how each interlocutor uses implicature to attack the other's character in terms of honesty and credibility. These examples are taken from the Sean Hannity radio show. The participants are Hannity (the host) and Kevin (a caller), who claims to be an non-aligned voter. They are discussing the 2002 U.S. Senate race in Louisiana.

1-1 Hannity: "Alright now, Kevin, Louisiana, let's start with you on the Sean Hannity Show. What's up Kevin?"

1-2 Kevin: "Hello Sean, I'm just listening to you here describe the election in Louisiana and explain like what you think the differences between Landrieu and Terrill and it just doesn't match up with reality, and I was just wondering . . ."

1-3 Hannity: "Do you work for Landrieu?"

1-4 Kevin: "No I don't work, I don't work for either political campaign (unintelligible)."

1-5 Hannity: "Obviously voting for Landrieu."

1-6 Kevin: "Huh? Yeah, holding my nose and doing it. I'm not a member of either political party actually, so I am an independent."

After Hannity's greeting, Kevin begins the conversation by introducing the subject that he wants to talk about (Line 1-2). In his introduction, he uses an implicature to characterize as inaccurate comments that Hannity had made previously in the program. He created this implicature by violating the maxim of Manner "Avoid ambiguity." Kevin's comment, "it just doesn't match up with reality" implies what Hannity had previously told the audience was inaccurate and might even be deliberately deceitful. At the very least, Kevin is challenging Hannity's research on the subject and at worst, he is calling him a liar. If either charge were to be made directly (i.e., 'Sean, you don't know what you're talking about' or 'Sean, you're lying about this.'), Kevin risks coming off as abrasive and confrontational, thus possibly damaging his or her own credibility with the audience. By being ambiguous, he can still get his message across but project to the audience the image that he is reasonable. Hannity, however, takes such great

offense at even this veiled charge that he cuts Kevin's comments off mid-sentence and responds by using an implicature to attack Kevin's ethos by asking, "Do you work for Landrieu?" This is an example of a violation of the maxim of Relation as Kevin's employment situation is irrelevant to the question of Sean's accuracy in his previous comments regarding the Senate campaign. By asking this question, Hannity is suggesting to the audience that Kevin has an agenda and that his credibility should be scrutinized. By casting doubt on Kevin's character, Hannity marginalizes Kevin's attack and makes Kevin's credibility the focus of the discourse. Kevin, recognizing that his ethos is now under attack, immediately responds with a denial on line 1-4. Hannity pursues the attack in a similar but somewhat softened form of the same charge on line 1-5: "obviously voting for Landrieu." Again Kevin denies the charge and this time his response is more elaborate and emphatic.

In the above exchange there were three persuasive attacks on ethos, one by Kevin and two by Hannity. Each was perceived by the person under attack as an act which might diminish their credibility in the eyes of the

audience. The evidence of this is found in their responses. Hannity, for instance, could have ignored Kevin's attack, but instead he launched an aggressive attack of his own against Kevin's credibility. Hannity's attack on Kevin in line 1-3 was a bit more difficult to totally ignore, however, as it was a direct question. It was a question, however, which could have easily been answered with one word, "No," but Kevin felt the need to be more emphatic, most probably in an attempt to rebuild his ethos. When Hannity challenged him again with a similar charge in line 1-5, Kevin could have once again answered with one word, "Yes." However, once again, he felt the need to elaborate, qualify and minimize his support for Landrieu. This type of answer can only be justified if the speaker believes that allowing himself to be characterized as a campaign worker would damage his credibility in the eyes of those he wishes to influence.

In a second example from the same conversation between Hannity and Kevin, Hannity attacks the veracity of Kevin's claim that he is a non-aligned voter.

1-24 Kevin: "Well, why don't you tell, tell her record about constituent service. When

people come to her with, for, with problem they have, she works on it and solves it."

1-25 Hannity: "You know what you are, you're a plant. You work for her. You're campaigning for her."

1-26 Kevin: "No I don't."

1-27 Hannity: "And you're claiming you're objective?"

1-28 Kevin: "You're calling me a liar, I don't work for her."

In line 1-27, Hannity creates an implicature with the phrase "And you're claiming to be objective?" This phrase is a violation of the maxim of Manner "Avoid ambiguity" in that he is appearing to be asking a question, but in reality he is making a claim that he believes that Kevin is not an average caller, but a campaign worker who is trying to influence the audience by taking on a false persona. In line 1-28, Kevin recognizes the implicature and rebuts it by spelling it out in plain English, "You're calling me a liar." This statement is recognition by Kevin that Hannity's

implicature is damaging to his ethos in the eyes of the audience.

We see a similar pattern in the following example taken from the Hannity and Colmes (television show) that consists of Hannity's introduction of his guest Jake McGoldrick, a San Francisco City/County Supervisor.

2-3 Hannity: "I've been looking at a history. You guys have an incredible history of controversial bills that you have passed. First of all, before we get any further, what kind of anti-terrorism experience do you have, if any?"

In the sentence, "You guys have an incredible history of controversial bills that you have passed," Hannity creates an implicature by violating the maxim of Manner "Avoid Ambiguity." The word "incredible" has a neutral meaning in that it can be used in either a positive or a negative context. In the context of this conversation, Hannity is being negative. By using the word "incredible," to describe the Board of Supervisors' history of passing what Hannity describes as controversial legislation, Hannity is characterizing

McGoldrick and his fellow board members of being outside of the political mainstream, thereby casting doubt upon his credibility.

Finally, in an example found in conversation 4, O'Reilly and Solay are discussing the anti-war position of the "Not In Our Name" organization. First O'Reilly introduces the subject and then without giving Solay a chance to utter a word, uses implication to attack the credibility of his guest.

4-1 O'Reilly: "In the 'Impact' segment tonight, we told you in the 'Talking Points Memo' that the group 'Not in Our Name' apparently believes the Gulf War and the removal of Manuel Noriega in Panama can be compared to the terrorist attack on 9-11. With us now, spokesperson for that group, Miles Solay".

4-2 O'Reilly: "Um, How old are you?"

4-3 Solay: "I'm 21 years old".

4-4 O'Reilly: "21 years old, and what do you do for a living?"

4-5 Solay: "I'm an organizer for the anti-war movement and I travel around the country . . ."

4-6 O'Reilly: "OK (unintelligible). You look pretty young to be representing the likes of Howard Zen, and ah Susan Sarandon, and Jessie Jackson, Daniel Elsberg, but you're the spokesperson."

4-7 Solay: "I'm a, I'm a spokesman, yes for the 'Not in Our Name' project."

4-8 O'Reilly: "Alright now, you know my problem ah, in this ad in the New York Times today, which costs ah, had to cost more than $100,000, so you guys must be raising some pretty prime money there. Um, you basically say that America had committed terrorism as well."

In the above segment, O'Reilly creates a series of implicatures which questions Solay's intellectual maturity (and therefore his ethos) by making an issue of his age. The questions "How old are you?" in line 4-2 and "What do you do for a living?" in line 4-4 violate the maxim of Relation as Solay's age and employment are irrelevant to the philosophy of the group that he is a spokesperson for. O'Reilly's implied meaning is, however, that they are, and suggests that Solay does not have

enough life experience to fully understand this issue and should not be taken seriously. In line 4-6, O'Reilly confirms these implicatures by making the charge in a direct manner, "You look pretty young to be representing (this group)." And then he creates yet another implicature through a violation of the maxim of Quality by implying that Solay, by being a spokesman for this group, is also a spokesman for specific individuals (Howard Zen, Susan Sarandon, Jessie Jackson and Daniel Elsberg). This violates Quality because there is no evidence to support a connection between the individuals named and Solay's group. O'Reilly's implied meaning is not that Solay is actually a representative of these individuals, but that he shares their philosophies. The probable reason that O'Reilly did this was that he knows that the mere names of these individuals have negative connotations for a significant number of people in his audience.

In all of the above examples, an attack was made through implicature on the ethos of the implicature producer's opponent. The emphasis that the person under attack places on the response is an indication of the

perception that this person has of how the charge against his or her credibility will influence the audience. When the person under attack feels the necessity to respond, this suggests that they feel that the persuasive attack may be effective in influencing the judgment of an audience in regards to their credibility. In contrast, when they choose not to respond, this indicates that they do not believe that the attack will influence the audience.

Persuasive Attacks on Logos

Persuasive attacks were also found which challenge the logical foundations of an opponent's argument. In chapter two it was noted that Aristotelian theory placed a great deal of emphasis on how an argument was constructed, favoring logical arguments which were either inductive or deductive. Conversation 3 shows how debate opponents repeatedly challenge each other's logic through implicature.

3-12 Filner: "Well, you know, I think our young men and women and a whole lot of, by the way Bill, come from ah, San Diego which I represent; ah that's the center of deployment.

Ah they are put at a higher risk if we don't go ah, there with United Nations sanctions. We ought to give this process a bit more time, get the United Nations on our side and we pose less risk then to our young men and . . ."

3-13 O'Reilly: "Congressman, you can't believe that the Iraqi military is any threat at all to the United States military . . ."

While the above statement by O'Reilly sounds almost like a question, it is in fact an implied characterization of Filner's position as reflected in his previous statements. O'Reilly's tone is one of astonishment that Filner could be arriving at such an illogical conclusion. O'Reilly's attack claim is made by an implicature produced through a violation of the maxim of Quality: "Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence." In his statement, O'Reilly is extrapolating Filner's comments on line 3-12 (in which Filner is expressing concern for the increased risk of death and injury to American troops) to a characterization of Filner's overall opinion of what the outcome of the conflict might be between the two militaries. O'Reilly

was exaggerating Filner's comment in order to cast it in an unfavorable light.

Later in the same conversation we find another example of implicature used to attack logos. In the following example, O'Reilly and Filner are discussing possible scenarios in the post-Saddam Middle East political climate. Here, O'Reilly uses ridicule through implicature to suggest that Filner's logic is flawed because the scenario he is suggesting is far-fetched and unlikely to happen.

3-49 O'Reilly: "What happens in Pakistan? A few crazies will revolt and Musharraf will put them down. That's what always happens."

3-50 Filner: "And what if Musharraf doesn't, and what if Al Queda gets a nuclear bomb?"

3-51 O'Reilly: "OK, what if the Wizard of Oz takes over the State of California?"

3-52 Filner: "Now, we're looking at reasonable things Bill, don't take (unintelligible) . . ."

O'Reilly's reply in line 3-51 is an implicature created by a violation of the maxim of Relation in that

it does not address Filner's question in line 3-50 regarding the possibility of Al Queda obtaining a nuclear weapon. In line 3-52 Filner recognizes that O'Reilly's comment has attacked his logos by rebutting it with the comment "Now, we're looking at reasonable things Bill. . ."

While most of the persuasive attacks found in the transcripts evoked a defensive response from the person under attack, not all did. In contrast to the above example, if the person being attacked perceives that the accusation is not harmful to his or her image with the audience that he or she is attempting to influence, then the attack may be ignored. Two examples in which the person being attacked did not respond to implied attacks on credibility are detailed below.

The first example is found in conversation 3 in which O'Reilly and Filner are discussing the advisability of President Bush's plan to use military force to remove Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq.

3-11 O'Reilly: "But he (President Bush) can remove Saddam Hussein, and he will. However, you're

going to vote with Senator Kennedy not to remove him, right?"

O'Reilly creates an implicature here through a violation of the maxim of Relation by including the phrase "with Senator Kennedy," as there had been no previous mention of Senator Kennedy's position on the matter. The only possible explanation for including Senator Kennedy's name in the dialogue is to stir a negative emotional reaction in the minds of the audience. Senator Kennedy is a controversial leader of the left wing of the Democratic Party, and by linking Filner's vote to Kennedy, O'Reilly appears to be attempting to make Kennedy an issue and/or to associate Filner with Kennedy, thereby damaging his ethos in the eyes of conservative members of the audience. In this example, while the implicature might have had some negative effect in the minds of some audience members, it did not alter the course of the conversation. In this case, Filner deflects the implied linkage by simply ignoring it. Apparently he did not feel that it was detrimental to his argument to be linked to Senator Kennedy on this issue. This proves to be an effective strategy as O'Reilly

dropped this tactic and never brought up Kennedy's name again.

The second example is found in the previously discussed exchange between O'Reilly and Solay in which O'Reilly attacks Solay's credibility due to his age (or lack of life experience) and his associations with far-left political activists.

4-6 Reilly: "OK (unintelligible). You look pretty young to be representing the likes of Howard Zen, and ah Susan Sarandon, and Jessie Jackson, Daniel Elsberg, but you're the spokesperson."

4-7 Solay: "I'm the spokesman, yes, for the Not in Our Name project."

As with the previous example, Solay chooses to ignore O'Reilly's characterization of lacking life experience or being associated with left wing peace activists, because apparently he did not feel that these accusations hurt his credibility with those in the audience he wished to influence. Ignoring O'Reilly's attack proved to be an effective strategy as immediately after O'Reilly's initial attack, the dialogue concentrated on a discussion of the anti-war stance taken

by Solay's organization and avoided getting bogged down in side issues.

Persuasive Defense

The theory of persuasive defense entails the concept of image restoration following a persuasive attack. Benoit and Wells (1996) offer five broad categories of such defenses as follows: 1) Denial of the charge, 2) Evasion of responsibility, 3) Mitigation of the charge, 4) The promise to take corrective action, and 5) Confession and begging forgiveness. Such defenses can be accomplished by being direct, but also through the use of implicature as demonstrated below in the previously discussed exchange between Hannity and Kevin in which Hannity is questioning the veracity of Kevin's claim to be a non-aligned voter:

1-3 Hannity: "Do you work for Landrieu?"

1-4 Kevin: "No I don't work, I don't work for either political campaign (unintelligible)."

1-5 Hannity: "Obviously voting for Landrieu."

1-6 Kevin: "Huh? Yeah, holding my nose and doing it. I'm not a member of either political party actually, so I am an independent."

1-7 Hannity: "Look, I'm just, there's, there's I'm just pointing out the differences. Landrieu has voted, according to Senate role call votes 2001-2003, she voted with Hillary 84% of the time."

Kevin actually uses two of Benoit and Wells' persuasive defense tactics in the above exchange. The first is the unambiguous and straight-forward denial found in line 1-4. In responding to the second attack in line 1-5, Kevin in line 1-6 employs an implicature to mitigate, but not deny the entire charge. Kevin's phraseology "Yeah, holding my nose and doing it" is an example of the use of metaphor to create an implicature. All metaphors are by definition implicatures as they violate the maxim of Quality. This particular implicature is created through a violation of the maxim of Relation as well as Quality because the physical act of holding your nose while casting a vote is irrelevant to one's political affiliation. In this instance, Kevin is using this implicature to counter Hannity's claim that he is particularly supportive of Landrieu. While not denying the charge that he is voting for Landrieu, he mitigates

the allegation by implying that he is not happy about the choices he has.

Implicature and the Steerer's Position

As noted in chapter two, in the genre of television and radio public affairs talk shows, it is advantageous to seize and maintain control as the 'steerer' (the one who chooses the topic), because the steerer has the power to define the terms of the debate. There are a number of instances in the data where the speaker uses implicature in an attempt to alter the discussion topic.

In the dialogue below, for example, Filner successfully employs implicature (beginning in line 3-14) to seize and maintain control as the steerer. Up until this point (see 3-10 to 3-14), the conversation had been wandering without a clear focus. After the implicature in line 3-14, the conversation focused on nightmare scenarios that Filner implied might result from military action. This implicature comes in response to a bet that O'Reilly proposed in line 3-13 as shown in the dialogue below:

3-10 Filner: "But he (Bush) can't do it ("He acted as if we can have ah, our tax cuts, we could

help the economy and go into this war all at the same time, (line 3-2)) and he knows he can't."

3-11 O'Reilly: "But he can remove Saddam Hussein, and he will, however, you're going to vote with Senator Kennedy no to remove him, right?"

3-12 Filner: "Well, you know, I think our young men and women and a whole lot of, by the way Bill, come from ah, San Diego, which I represent, ah that's the center of the deployment. Ah, they are put at a higher risk if we don't go ah, there with United Nations sanctions. We ought to give this process a little bit more time, get the United Nations sanctions on our side and we pose less risk then to our young men and . . ."

3-13 O'Reilly: "Congressman, you can't believe that the Iraqi military is any threat at all to the United States military. I mean, I will bet you the best dinner in the Gaslight District of San Diego, that the military action will not

last more than a week. Are you willing to take that bet?"

3-14 Filner: "We got a bet, and it's the Gaslamp, but ah, we got a bet because, you know we'll get rid of Saddam in a week Bill, I'll grant you that. What's going to happen the day after as they say?"

3-15 O'Reilly: "I don't know; nobody knows."

3-16 Filner: "What's going to happen?"

3-17 O'Reilly: "You can't fight a war like that. We didn't know what was going to happen after World War II."

3-18 Filner: "You've got to have, you've got to have a realistic assessment of what's going to happen."

3-19 O'Reilly: "Alright let me give you an assessment (unintelligible) . . ."

3-20 Filner: "What's going to happen in the Middle East?"

3-21 O'Reilly: "Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa."

3-22 Filner: "Is Al Queda going to get ah, nuclear weapon?"

3-23 O'Reilly: "Congressman, let me give you a realistic assessment, then you can tell me where I'm wrong. They'll find a guy like Karzi, like they did in Afghanistan, they'll install him as the interim president. They'll retrain the Iraqi army, um . . ."

3-24 Filner: "And how long they going to do this in, a week? Two weeks?"

At the beginning of this segment in line 3-13, O'Reilly attacks Filner's logos by characterizing the congressman's opinion as holding to the belief that the Iraqi military could seriously challenge the United States military. At this point, O'Reilly is clearly in control of the topic selection as Filner must either agree to or rebut the accusation. Filner, in rebuttal, simply agrees with O'Reilly's premise by saying, "you know we'll get rid of Saddam in a week, I'll grant you that," and then he uses an implicature to attack O'Reilly by asking, "What's going to happen the day after, as they say?" This implicature created through a violation of the maxim of Manner, "avoid ambiguity." While it appears that Filner is asking a question, he is actually making

an attack on O'Reilly's logos, suggesting that O'Reilly has not thought out the consequences of the U. S. military action. Being ambiguous served Filner well in this case, because it allowed him to imply dire consequences, without spelling them out. If Filner had suggested specific events, O'Reilly may have attacked his logic as being far-fetched. This way, however, Filner creates a Pandora's Box and allows the audience to fill it with their imaginations. This rhetorical maneuver by Filner allows him to seize control of the topic in that it changes it from O'Reilly's characterization of Filner's position to O'Reilly having to defend his own thought processes. By his implication that O'Reilly has not thoroughly considered the consequences of the U. S. military action, Filner forces O'Reilly to either rebut this accusation or allow the audience to accept it as fact, which would damage his credibility.

O'Reilly's appears to be at somewhat of a loss in his response in line 3-15 ("I don't know; nobody knows") and leaves himself wide open for Filner to continue the attack, which he does in lines 3-16, 3-18, 3-20 and 3-22. In each of these four lines, Filner creates an

implicature through violations of the maxim of Relation, by ignoring what O'Reilly is saying and repeating variations of the same charge--that O'Reilly has not thoroughly thought out his position. By creating these implicatures which attack O'Reilly's logic, Filner continues as the steerer of the conversation by putting O'Reilly in a defensive position in which he must rebut the accusation made in the implied claims.

Finally, in line 3-23, O'Reilly uses implicature to set up a response which required that the topic be changed: "Congressman, let me give you a realistic assessment, and then you can tell me where I'm wrong." The phrase "and then you can tell me where I'm wrong" violates the maxim of Quality, "Do not say what you believe to be false." It is obvious that O'Reilly does not believe himself to be wrong. By saying so, however, he takes the steerer's position back, by implying that Filner must either rebut his assessment which followed or allow it to stand as an accepted fact in the eyes of the audience. Filner's response in line 3-24 is a direct response to O'Reilly's scenario, thereby proving that

O'Reilly's tactic was effective in regaining control of the topic selection.

The following segment demonstrates another attempt to seize the steerer's role through the use of implicature. This time the attempt fails and the maxim violation is turned against the implicature producer.

4-15 O'Reilly: "Boy, I love it. Let me stop you. What do you mean perpetrating violence? Ah, unless I'm wrong, Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, took over a sovereign country and we rescued that country. You see that as perpetrating violence?"

4-16 Solay: "Well then, let me ask you this, what do you say about Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld met with Saddam Hussein in 1984 as (unintelligible) . . ."

4-17 O'Reilly: "What do I have to say about it, I don't care. It's not germane or relevant to what we're talking about."

In Line 4-16 Miles Solay, the youth organizer for the Not in Our Name anti-war organization, violates the maxim of Relation in an effort to move the topic of the discourse

away from the deeds Saddam Hussein (being discussed by O'Reilly in Line 4-15) and turn to what he perceives as the culpability of Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld. Solay's implicature in line 4-16 is rejected by O'Reilly, who indicates that Solay is violating the Cooperative Principle by noting that Solay's question is irrelevant to the conversation. By doing this, O'Reilly feels justified in refusing to discuss the implied charge that Solay has made against Rumsfeld.

In this chapter, I have discussed a number of aspects of the use of implicature in informal debate. We have seen how implicature is used as a strategic rhetorical tool in the debate format found in the selected radio and television talk shows. In chapter four, I will summarize these findings, suggest possible motivations for the instances of implicature, and consider how the results relate to informal debate in general.

CHAPTER FOUR

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study was inspired by my lifelong interest in public affairs radio and television talk shows. One of the more interesting things I learned through the process of this study was that casual observations of a phenomenon can be misleading. I originally envisioned the focus of this study as how implicature assists a speaker in seizing and maintaining the steerer's position as the topic selector. While I found instances of this phenomenon, it was not as pervasive as I had anticipated in the data. Instead, the predominant patterns related to the use of implicature to make or challenge claims and/or defend against attacks made by an opponent.

I presented two research questions in chapter two: 1) Is implicature used as a strategy in argumentation? 2) If implicature is used as a purposeful strategy, what advantage does it provide to the arguer? The inspiration for the first question grew out of my causal observation that the host of public affairs talk shows almost always appeared to be the winner in debate. From this I theorized that there might be some rhetorical tools being

employed that the more successful talk show hosts naturally developed. While implicature was found to be used by the all hosts, it did not seem to be significantly more than we might expect in naturally occurring speech. Implicature was also found to be used strategically by the guests. In the analysis of the transcripts from both Hannity and O'Reilly it was demonstrated that implicature was used by various participants as an integral part of persuasive attacks, persuasive defenses and on occasion, attempts to seize and/or maintain control of the steerer's position.

In regards to the second question, the benefits which may to be sought by the talk show arguers appear to have their foundations in the Aristotelian strategies of rhetorical appeals and attacks based on pathos, ethos and logos. The question remains, however, about what advantages there are in using implicature as opposed to straight-forward unambiguous language. Recalling some of the Gricean literature in chapter one, one answer may be found in the concept of implicature as a face-saving device (Brown & Levinson, 1978). As discussed previously in chapter one, face is defined as the image that an

individual wishes to project to others. It is therefore logical that a speaker would consider it counterproductive to make an attack on an opponent's character or intellect which would reflect negatively on the speaker's own character or intellect. As overt claims, that are proved erroneous often reflect poorly upon the person making the false claim, attacks made through implicature provide the advantage that they can be cancelled or mitigated by the speaker. An example of this is found in chapter three in the analysis of the conversation between Hannity and Kevin. In this exchange, Hannity makes the claim through implicature that Kevin was a campaign worker by asking "Do you work for Landrieu?" When Kevin strongly denies Hannity's implied accusation, Hannity mitigates the claim charging that Kevin at least is supportive of her ("Obviously voting for Landrieu.") and therefore not the independent voter he claims to be.

Another related motivation for using implicature rather than straightforward language, which was found in the data, is that the person being attacked can use it as a defense mechanism to mitigate, but not entirely deny,

the offense being charged by the speaker. An example of this was found in chapter three in the analysis of the conversation between Hannity and Kevin. In this exchange, Hannity was implying that Kevin was a "planted" call and that he was actually a campaign worker just pretending to be an independent voter. In response to Hannity's claim, Kevin's reply indicated that while he intended to vote for Landrieu, he would be "holding his nose" while doing it. The phrase "holding my nose" implied that there are aspects of Landrieu that he finds distasteful. By making this negative remark about Landrieu, Kevin appears to be attempting to restore any damage done to his image as an independent voter caused by Hannity's attack.

Finally, expressiveness was found to be a motivation in using implicature in argumentation. Referring back to Chen (1993) which was discussed in chapter one, one motivation for the use of implicature is the speaker's desire to add impact and emotion to his or her message. An example of this is found in conversation 3 between O'Reilly and Filner where in line 3-13 O'Reilly says, "Congressman, you can't believe that the Iraqi military is any threat at all to the United States military." By

using this implicature, O'Reilly is conveying astonishment and disbelief that Filner could reach such a conclusion.

One of the limitations of this study is that the corpus of data was small. While this precluded reaching broad conclusions regarding common elements of rhetorical strategies, the data does indicate that implicature is a useful strategic tool in informal debate, especially in framing the topic of the debate and in making persuasive attacks and defenses.

APPENDIX

TRANSCRIPTS OF CONVERSATIONS

Conversation 1: Transcript of conversation from the Sean Hannity Radio Show (KABC,12-5-02) Participants are program host, Sean Hannity and caller, Kevin.

1-1 Hannity: Alright now, Kevin, Louisiana, let's start with you on the Sean Hannity Show. What's up Kevin?

1-2 Kevin: Hello Sean, I'm just listening to you here, describe the election in Louisiana and explain like what you think are the differences between Landrieu and Terrill and it just doesn't match up with reality, and I was just wondering . . .

1-3 Hannity: Do you work for the Landrieu?

1-4 Kevin: No I don't work, I don't work for either political campaign (unintelligible) . . .

1-5 Hannity: Obviously voting for Landrieu.

1-6 Kevin: Huh? Yeah, holding my nose and doing it. I'm not a member of either political party actually, so I am independent.

1-7 Hannity: Look, I'm just, there's, there's, I'm just pointing out the differences. Landrieu has voted, according to Senate role call votes 2001-2002, she voted with Hillary Clinton 84% of the time.

1-8 Kevin: Um, now what's, what, the statistic you know? You don't have a statistic.

1-9 Hannity: Eighty four.

1-10 Kevin: For Terrill, but I'm sure that there's Republicans that have voted for Clinton too.

1-11 Hannity: Terrill's not in the Senate.

1-12 Kevin: Yes I, I know, that's why I said there's no statistics like that for Terrill.

1-13 Hannity: But, but Mary Landrieu has been out there saying that, that, that Terrill is going to be a rubber stamp for President Bush.

1-14 Kevin: Which is true.

1-15 Hannity: Well, is she a rubber stamp for Hillary Clinton?

1-16 Kevin: No.

1-17 Hannity: Well, well look, I'm just saying for those of you in Louisiana, and let me tell you, this is an important seat, this, this . . .

1-18 Kevin: But you're just not, se you're not describing what's really happening in the State. You're up there, like somewhere far away from us . . .

1-19 Hannity: Far, far away.

1-20 Kevin: You've probably visited, you probably visited us maybe once or twice, stayed in a hotel for a day, a night or two, and you're not real . . .

1-21 Hannity: I was just down, I was just down in Baton Rouge during the Hannitization of America Tour, what are you talking?

1-22 Kevin: (unintelligible) So you saw like a little bit of Baton rouge (unintelligible) . . .

1-23 Hannity: So what does that have to do any, what does that. I'm telling you her record. What does me having been down there, how many times, how long I've been down there, what hotel I stayed in, what does that have to do with this?

1-24 Kevin: Well, why don't you tell, tell her record about constituent service. When people come to her with, for, with problem they have, she works on it and solves it.

1-25 Hannity: You know what you are, you are a plant. You work for her. You're campaigning for her.

1-26 Kevin: No I don't.

1-27 Hannity: And you're claiming you're objective.

1-28 Kevin: You're calling me a liar, I don't work for her.

1-29 Hannity: I absolutely don't believe you. I don't believe you.

1-30 Kevin: Well its true, I don't work for her and I don't work for Susie Terrill. I'm an independent.

1-31 Hannity: And who are you voting for?

1-32 Kevin: Huh?

1-33 Hannity: Who are you voting for?

1-34 Kevin: I told you, I going to vote, I'm going to hold my nose and I'm going to vote for Landrieu.

1-35 Hannity: Yeah.

1-36 Kevin: I disagree with most of what Landrieu ah, ah . . .

1-37 Hannity: Well here's what I can, I can tell you, here's what I can tell you about Landrieu's voting record, which, by the way is quite often at odds with John Breaux. Breaux was on TV with Hannity and Combs last night . . .

1-38 Kevin: Actually not, not quite often, they vote they vote together more often then they vote apart.

1-39 Hannity: Yeah and (unintelligible), he's telling me that he's not a campaign operative, OK, we'll play this game Kevin.

1-40 Kevin: No, what's wrong? I've gone and researched facts (unintelligible) . . .

1-41 Hannity: Kevin, you're a campaign operative.

1-42 Kevin: (Unintelligible) that's what voters suppose to do is go and research facts?

1-43 Hannity: I have, I have been in this business long enough to know when somebody is a campaign operative, calling in.

1-44 Kevin: Well, your instincts are wrong in this case.

1-45 Hannity: No they're not.

1-46 Kevin: Because, I'm not a campaign operative.

1-47 Hannity: Alright now, here's Landrieu voted to allow tax payer finding of drug, uh, user, needle exchange program in D. C.

1-48 Kevin: OK, I happen to think that's a good program.

1-49 Hannity: Hang on, can I, can I, can I finish this please. Let me, hang on, we'll give you time, she voted with Hillary Clinton on, for same sex partner health benefits in D. C., for city employees. She voted with Hillary to allow abortions for overseas military bases, voted numerous times to gut the Bush tax cut. Ah, voted against the marriage penalty and death tax relief. Um, she voted opposite of John Breaux to prohibit federal funding of abortions. She voted, ah, the opposite of Breaux on mandatory trigger locks and the federal funding of school distribution of morning after pills. And that's her record, that's where she stands, that's what I have researched.

1-50 Kevin (unintelligible) You're playing up the abortion factor here and that's a, that's a fair issue. But I' going to suggest to you that's not a, not a mainstream American issue, that most people in America view the abortion issue as, as, as only a minor component of a candidate.

1-51 Hannity: Hey Kevin, stay on the line alright, stay right there, don't hang up, OK? As a matter of fact, hang on, we're going to put, ah him, now let

me just do a quick pool. Paul in New York, does he sound like a Landrieu campaign operative to you?

1-52 Paul: Absolutely.

1-53 Hannity: Absolutely, alright. Ah, Phil in Berger County, does he sound like a campaign operative to you?

1-54 Phil: Absolutely, you're right Sean.

1-55 Hannity: Thank you. John, does he sound like a campaign operative to you?

1-56 John: Absolutely.

1-57 Hannity: Hey Chris in the Bronx, does he sound like a campaign operative to you?

1-58 Chris: (unintelligible).

1-59 Hannity: Hey Chris (Sean recognizes this caller as an acquaintance and bypasses the question) How are you, hang on buddy. Skip in New Jersey, does he sound like a campaign operative to you?

1-60 Skip: Sure does, but I'm not sure.

1-61 Hannity: Alright, there you go alright, well alright, there you go Kevin.

1-62 Kevin: OK Sean, here's what I'll do. You get me off the air, you take me off the air. I will give, I will give somebody my name, my address, my phone number and my Social Security number . . .

1-63 Hannity: Yeah . . .

1-64 Kevin: And you check with, with the Landrieu or anybody you like . . .

1-65 Hannity: Alright.

1-66 Kevin: I don't work for anybody (unintelligible).

1-67 Hannity: We'll take it at face value, but look, we're glad you called anyway, and next time I'm in New Orleans I'm going to look you up.

1-68 Kevin: I'm not in New Orleans, Shreveport, Sean.

1-69 Hannity: Ah, next time . . .

1-70 Kevin: We had Bush here yesterday, 5,000 people showed up, just turned out, just to see him. It was great.

1-71 Hannity: Well good, I appreciate you calling.

1-72 Kevin: OK, thanks.

1-73 Hannity: Alright buddy, thanks. (Sean, talking to the audience after Kevin has hung up) I've been at this too long, I, either too cynical, or my instincts are right.

Conversation 2: Transcript of conversation between Sean Hannity and Jake McGoldrick, a San Francisco Supervisor. (The Hannity and Colmes TV Show. 1/22/03. The FOX News Channel).

2-1 Hannity: Well, first, yesterday, the San Francisco Board of Supervisors passed a resolution opposing the Patriot Act on the grounds that it violates civil rights. Joining us, the man who introduced the resolution, Jake McGoldrick. Jake, how are you?

2-2 McGoldrick: Good evening.

2-3 Hannity: I've been looking at a history. You guys have an incredible history of controversial bills that you have passed. First of all, before we get any further, what kind of anti-terrorism experience do you have, if any?

2-4 McGoldrick: Ah, I suppose you'd want to figure out what anti-terrorism experience means. I have, first of all and foremost, the same kind of anti-

terrorism experience that everybody in America had on the 9-11, ah . . .

2-5 Hannity: I, I got that. What so you specifically. What training do you have? I mean you're gonna, you're gonna tell the federal government what to do and lecture them and pass this anti-patriot act.

2-6 McGoldrick: (Unintelligible).

2-7 Hannity: I want to know what experience you have, you can inform our viewers, you know, the level of expertise you have in this matter.

2-8 McGoldrick: Sure, we have a police department. We have a, an anti-terrorism unit in our police department, and that unit is cooperating with the federal government and any agencies and justice department.

2-9 Hannity: That's it? What have you done? What have you done?

2-10 McGoldrick: I'm here as a public official, I think the personalization is something you guys were just talking about on the previous program about Bush and personalization.

2-11 Hannity: Yeah.

2-12 McGoldrick: So I don't think . . .

2-13 Hannity: So the bottom line is that you have zero.

2-14 McGoldrick: I don't think we ought to go down that (unintelligible) . . .

2-15 Hannity: No, I think we should.

2-16 McGoldrick: I have a lot of experience.

2-17 Hannity: You have none.

2-18 McGoldrick: A, a legislator in the city and county of San Francisco, and if you don't recognize that

(unintelligible) then maybe we need to start over or something here.

2-19 Hannity: But you have no anti-terrorism experience. Alright, because this is the experts . . .

2-20 McGoldrick: Where are you going?

2-21 Hannity: Here's where I'm going?

2-22 McGoldrick: Try to take us there. Keep the audience and me involved with it.

2-23 Hannity: If you pay close attention, you may learn something.

2-24 McGoldrick: That's what I'm hoping for.

2-25 Hannity: The experts, the people that know, the people in law enforcement, the people that are on the front lines combating terrorism . . .

2-26 McGoldrick: (unintelligible).

2-27 Hannity: Will you let me finish, not you, you're a politician, who passes laws without experience.

2-28 McGoldrick: (Laughter).

2-29 Hannity: But these guys say that to do their jobs and to protect us, they need wiretaps, rov, roving wiretaps to follow people. They have, they have in every single case judicial oversight, so we have a check and balance in the system. Ah we have longer detention of terrorist suspects, these, ah, ways, to protect money laundering. So if you have your way, without any personal experience, you want to stop them from doing their jobs, that they are trained to do to stop terrorist and protect us. I find that amazing, sir.

2-30 McGoldrick: This is a very interesting type of lead question, so let's lead right into it. The fact of the matter is, and get it straight, I'm not just Jake McGoldrick, an individual who happens to be

standing on the corner out some place in San Francisco. I'm coming here from city hall, where we have as I said, a police enforcement that works with our federal government on terrorism. The whole point of what we and 27 other jurisdictions in the, in the whole country have done is to assert our patriotism by saying that the civil liberties, that are indeed the landmark of this particular culture that we have had for over 200 years are not to be jeopardized by ex, excesses in investigations.

Conversation 3: Transcript of conversation between Bill O'Reilly and Bob Filner, Democrat Congressman, representing San Diego. (The O'Reilly Factor TV show 1/29/03. The FOX News Channel.)

3-1 O'Reilly: So this vote was taken overwhelmingly in the House 296 to 133 ah, that Congress approve military action in October, Why should we take another vote?

3-2 Filner: Well a lot of things have changed ah, since then ah, you know ah, were ah, we got North Korea on the horizon, we got the economy in recession ah, and yet, you know what the President left off, out of last, what not speech that was so ah, as you say, approved by the American public? Once they start think about what he left off, they may have second thoughts. He did not tell us, he did not tell the American people, what are the costs and consequences of this war? What are the choices, the sacrifices we're going to have to make? He acted as if we can have ah, we can have our tax cuts, we could help the economy and go into this war all at the same time. Just can't do it, and you got to lay that out.

3-3 O'Reilly: Well, you can do it but you're going to run up a huge deficit, and we're going to talk that with an economist coming up behind you, Congressman.

3-4 Filner: I mean there's no way Congress would approve (unintelligible) . . .

3-5 O'Reilly: Look Congressman, you know what he did. He said, I'm going to give everybody everything, so everybody likes him and then you guys will tear it to pieces and ah (unintelligible) . . .

3-6 Filner: And when they realize, and they realize that he was, he was really defrauding them, or he was (unintelligible). . .

3-7 O'Reilly: Ahhh, he's not defrauding them he's just . . .

3-8 Filner: Sure he was.

3-9 O'Reilly: Basically saying this is what I want to do.

3-10 Filner: But he can't do it and he knows he can't.

3-11 O'Reilly: But he can remove Sadam Hussein, and he will, however, you're going to vote with Senator Kennedy not to remove him, right?

3-12 Filner: Well, you know, I think our young men and women and a whole lot of, by the way Bill, come from ah, San Diego, which I represent, ah that's the center of the deployment. Ah, they are put at a higher risk if we don't go ah, there with United Nations sanctions. We ought to give this process a little bit more time, get the United Nations on our side and we pose less risk then to our young men and . . .

3-13 O'Reilly: Congressman, you can't believe that the Iraqi military is any threat at all to the United States military. I mean, I will bet you the best dinner in the Gaslight District of San Diego, that the military action will not last more than a week. Are you willing to take that bet?

3-14 Filner: We got a bet, and it's the Gas Lamp, but ah, we got a bet because, you know we'll get rid of Sadam in a week Bill, I'll grant you that. What's going to happen the day after as they say?

3-15 O'Reilly: I don't know, nobody knows.

3-16 Filner: What's going to happen?

3-17 O'Reilly: You cant fight a war like that. We didn't know what was going to happen after World War II.

3-18 Filner: You've got to have, you've got to have a realistic assessment of what's going to happen.

3-19 O'Reilly: Alright, let me give you a realistic assessment (unintelligible) . . .

3-20 Filner: What's going to happen in the Middle East?

3-21 O'Reilly: Whoa, whoa, whoa, whoa.

3-22 Filner: Is Al Queda going to get ah, nuclear weapon?

3-23 O'Reilly: Congressman, let me give you a realistic assessment, then you can tell me where I'm wrong. They'll find a guy like Karzai, like they did in Afghanistan. They'll install him as the interim president. They'll retrain the Iraqi army, um . . .

3-24 Filner: And how long they going to do this in, a week? Two weeks?

3-25 O'Reilly: Ahhh, we're going to do the same thing we're doing in Afghanistan (unintelligible) . . .

3-26 Filner: Yeah, and we've completely lost interest there. We have not made any progress.

3-27 O'Reilly: That's not true at all (unintelligible) we've made a lot of progress in training that army.

3-28 Filner: Our guys are under a threat, total threat of a terrorist attack at all times, come on. You want to leave our boys in Baghdad for how long?

3-29 O'Reilly: I don't want to leave our boys anywhere. I don't want my family to be threatened by anthrax, OK?

3-30 Filner: Bill, that's what's going to happen.

3-31 O'Reilly: It happened in Bosnia. You guys didn't say anything about that. We had a regime change in Belgrade. You didn't say anything about. This is a selective deal.

3-32 Filner: No its (unintelligible) . . .

3-33 O'Reilly: Clinton did the Bosnia deal. Clinton did the Belgrade deal. You didn't say a word.

3-34 Filner: And you were against it, right?

3-35 O'Reilly: No I was for it (unintelligible) . . .

3-36 Filner: (unintelligible) All the Republicans in Congress were against it.

3-37 O'Reilly: But, I'm not a Republican, I'm an independent. I want to do what's best for this country. And what's best for the country and my family and your family is to remove this guy and stop making excuses for it.

3-38 Filner: Well, I'd like to get rid of this guy, but I think we've got to do it in a more measured fashion. I think we got to make sure (unintelligible) . . .

3-39 O'Reilly: Ahhhh, that's weakness, that's weakness. We're strong enough to remove him. We should remove him. He's violated the U. N. mandates and you're showing weakness. You're going to get killed on this Congressman, you and your party and going to get killed.

3-40 Filner: Well, we'll see. In the long run, strength, you know, sometimes you've got to be a little bit humble about the use of your power. And the United States, I think, will be the more powerful, more morally responsible . . .

3-41 O'Reilly: With all due respect . . .

3-42 Filner: If we take (unintelligible) with us and do it right.

3-43 O'Reilly: With all due respect, in a war on terror to protect American people from savages who will kill us, we don't have to be humble there, we (unintelligible) . . .

3-44 Filner: Let me tell you . . .

3-45 O'Reilly: If you're a terrorist enabler or a terrorist, we're going to come in and kick your butt. We don't need humility in that (unintelligible), not with terrorist.

3-46 Filner: But you need some smarts Bill, and listen, if we are going to increase the risk of terrorism by what we do, we shouldn't do it, right?

3-47 O'Reilly: That calculation is impossible to make, it's impossible to make, and you don't operate out of weakness. I'll give you the last word Congressman.

3-48 Filner: Let's take a, let's take a little bet. What happens the week after we take out Sadam, what happens in Pakistan?

3-49 O'Reilly: What happens in Pakistan? A few crazies will revolt and Musharraf will put them down. That's what always happens.

3-50 Filner: And what if Musharraf doesn't? And what if Al Queda gets a nuclear bomb?

3-51 O'Reilly: OK, what if the Wizard of Oz takes over the State of California?

3-52 Filner: Now, we're looking at reasonable things Bill, don't take (unintelligible) . . .

3-53 O'Reilly: you're operating out of fear, and I'm operating out of strength.

3-54 Filner: I'm operating out of some intellectual ah, assessment of the risks.

3-55 O'Reilly: Alright Congressman, we appreciate your point of view very much, and thanks for the lively debate.

Conversation 4: Transcript of conversation between Bill O'Reilly and Miles Solay, an organizer for an anti war group. (The O'Reilly Factor TV show 1/27/03. FOX News Channel).

4-1 O'Reilly: In the "Impact" segment tonight, we told you in the "Talking Points Memo" that the group "Not in Our Name", apparently believes the Gulf War and the removal of Manuel Noriega in Panama, can be compared to the terrorist attack on 9-11. With us now, spokesperson for that group, Miles Solay.

4-2 Um, how old are you?

4-3 Solay: I'm 21 years old.

4-4 O'Reilly: 21 years old, and what do you do for a living?

4-5 Solay: I'm an organizer for the anti-war movement and I travel around the country . . .

4-6 O'Reilly: OK (unintelligible). You look pretty young to be representing the likes of Howard Zen, and ah, Susan Sarandon, and Jessie Jackson, Daniel Elsberg, but you're the spokesperson.

4-7 Solay: I'm a, I'm a spokesperson, yes, for the Not in Our Name project.

4-8 O'Reilly: Alright, now, you know my problem ah, in this ad in the New York Times today, which costs ah, had to cost more than $100,000, so you guys must be raising some pretty prime money there. Um, you basically say that America has committed terrorism as well.

4-9 Solay: Well what we say in the "Not in Our Name" statement of conscience is that it precedes from a standpoint of internationalism, that American lives are not worth more than lives anywhere else around the world. And when we say that we also shared in the ah, horrific shock of September 11th and we also share in the grief that the people witnessed in Panama, in Vietnam, in September 11th, 1973 when ah United States had regime change in Chili and we say that we can't stand by while our, while our government is about to commit horrendous acts of injustice around the government, around the world.

4-10 O'Reilly: You point to Baghdad (unintelligible) are you basically saying that, that, that Gulf war was wrong?

4-12 Solay: What we are saying is that the 200,000 civilians that were killed in the first Gulf War, the 500,000 children who have died because of malnutrition were the (unintelligible) . . .

4-13 O'Reilly: Who's fault was that? I believe that's the fault of the leadership of Iraq, correct? Or would you have stood by and allowed them to take over Kuwait?

4-14 Solay: Well, We're, we're, we're holding responsible our government, a government who is perpetrating violence, a government who is now . . .

4-15 O'Reilly: Boy, I love it. Let me stop you. What do you mean perpetrating violence? Ah, unless I'm wrong, Sadam Hussein invaded Kuwait, took over a sovereign country and we rescued that country. You see that as perpetrating violence?

4-16 Solay: Well then, let me ask you this, what do you have to say about Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld met with Sadam Hussein in 1984 as (unintelligible) . . .

4-17 O'Reilly: What do I have to say about it, I don't care about it. Its not germane or relevant to what we're talking about.

4-18 Solay: Well, that was, that was when Sadam Hussein gasses the Kurds and Iranian troops in the Iran-Iraq war.

4-19 O'Reilly: What do I have to say about the war of 1812? It doesn't matter. What matters is that you are saying in this advertisement, signed by some very, very high profile people . . .

4-20 Solay: Thousands . . .

4-21 O'Reilly: That there are terrorist here.

4-22 Solay No, that's not we (unintelligible) . . .

4-23 O'Reilly: That we have no more, sure you are, you're basically saying that we shook our heads at the terrible scenes of carnage, even as we recalled similar scenes . . .

4-24 Solay: Um hm.

4-25 O'Reilly: You're comparing 9-11 alright, um hm . . .

4-26 Solay: The World trade Center and the Pentagon to Baghdad and Panama City, um hm.

4-27 O'Reilly: That's obscene, that is so, so offensive to clear thinking Americans. Don't you have any clue how offensive that is?

4-28 Solay: Well, in fact we are people who live in this country and you know as well as I know that, quiet as its kept, there are millions of people in this country, millions in this country, who are joining those internationally, who do not want to see an unjust, immoral and illegitimate war.

4-29 O'Reilly: Alright, and you have a right to that opinion and I'm not criticizing you for that opinion OK?

4-30 Solay: What I'm saying about the "Not in Our Name" statement of conscience is that its not that its un American, its a, it's a statement that's standing with the people of the world, we're not granting privilege (unintelligible) . . .

4-31 O'Reilly: You can saying that you're standing with the people of the world, but if they believe this, you're standing with the pinheads of the world, who don't know anything. To basically say that the United States Government, removing Manuel Noriega . . .

4-32 Solay: Who was an ally of the United States.

4-33 O'Reilly: I don't care, it doesn't, so was Stalin, OK. I mean, you have no idea how history unfolds and how it different. It fogs in, it fogs out. It depends on the circumstance. Manuel Noriega running a cartel, a drug distribution cartel out of Panama, and we don't have the moral right to go in there and remove him? That's insane.

4-34 Solay: What we're saying here in the "Not in Our Name" statement of conscience, again and what we're saying in the burgeoning anti war movement in this country and internationally, is that a country like our own, who is not only threatening to use weapons of mass destruction, but has, including nuclear weapons, and is now declaring to use it (unintelligible) . . .

4-35 O'Reilly: Of course it has, it ended World War II.

4-36 Solay: and is, and is threatening to use them as first strike, why is it that the United States going for regime change in Iraq, but not other countries in the region (unintelligible) . . .

4-37 O'Reilly: But, listen, I didn't hear a word from you, Miles, or any of your organization when

President Clinton initiated the regime change in Yugoslavia. You didn't say a word about it, and none of these pinheads would have signed it because they liked Clinton. What this is about is you don't like Bush, you don't like the Republicans, and you're going to use this shotty, cheap and denigrating propaganda, offensive to the families who lost people, to make your point (unintelligible) . . .

4-38 Solay: There are family members from September 11th who have signed.

4-39 O'Reilly: Nobody signed this ad on September 11th.

4-40 Solay: Jeremy Glick, Jeremy Glick, who lost his father in it, in September 11th has signed this statement.

4-41 O'Reilly: Well, let me see that.

4-42 Solay: As well as a group called (unintelligible).

4-43 O'Reilly: We'll get that guy, Jeremy Glick on tomorrow if that's the case (unintelligible) . . .

4-44 Solay: Let me just make that point right here.

4-45 O'Reilly: Go ahead.

4-46 Solay: We're, we're taking responsibility, like I said for the injustices that our own government is committing, and right now our government has dropped troops and assassins and commandos . . .

4-47 O'Reilly: We know that, and there's a reason they have . . .

4-48 Solay: In dozens of countries around the world.

4-49 O'Reilly: Alright, Jeremy Glick, OK, we're going to get him. Listen, again, you want to be against the war, fine, and I'll respect that dissent, alright? You want to say that we are the moral equivalent to terrorist . . .

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