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
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Prioritization before Risk Assessment: the viability of uncertain data on food contact materials

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The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of the authors.

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Abbreviations: ADI: applicability domain index; CMR: carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, reproductive toxicity; EDA: effect directed analysis; FCM: food contact material; (N)IAS: (non-)intentionally added substances; QSAR: quantitative structure-activity relationship; RA: risk assessment; TMC: total migratable content; TTC: threshold of toxicological concern.

12 Abstract

13 The shortage of data on non-intentionally added substances (NIAS) present in food contact
14 material (FCM) limits the ability to ensure food safety. Recent strategies in analytical method
15 development allow investigating NIAS by using chemical exploration; but this has not been
16 sufficiently investigated in risk assessment context. Here, exploration is applied on two paperboard
17 FCM samples followed by risk prioritization for chemicals that can potentially migrate to food.
18 Concentration estimates from exploration are converted into a tentative exposure assessment,
19 while predicted chemical structures are assessed using quantitative structure-activity relationships
20 (QSAR) models for carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, and reproductive toxicity. A selection of 60
21 chemical compounds from two FCMs is assessed by four risk assessors to classify chemical
22 compounds based on probable risk. For 60% of cases, the assessors classified compounds as
23 either high priority or low priority. Unclassified compounds are due to disagreements between
24 experts or due to a lack of data. Among the high priority substances were high concentration
25 compounds, benzophenone derivatives, and dyes. The low priority compounds contained e.g.
26 oligomers from plasticizers and linear alkane amides. The classification scheme was demonstrated
27 to provide valuable information based on tentative data, able to prioritize discovered chemical
28 compounds for pending risk assessment.

29 **Keywords:** *risk prioritization; FCM; structure assessment; semi-quantification; exposure*
30 *assessment; hazard assessment*


31 1. Introduction

32 An all-time debated source of human health risk is the chronic long-term exposure to chemical
33 compounds due to presence in food. One important source of chemicals in food is due their
34 migration from food packaging materials (Arvanitoyannis and Bosnea, 2004; Castle, 2006; Grob,
35 2014; Jickells, 2007). Investigations into the safety of food contact materials, especially those non-
36 harmonized in legislations affirm that thousands of possible chemicals may be present in paper
37 and board packaging alone (Bengtström et al., 2016; Biedermann et al., 2011; Biedermann and
38 Grob, 2013; Binderup et al., 2002; Ozaki et al., 2005; Triantafyllou et al., 2007), while only a minor
39 fraction of these chemicals have been successfully identified and risk assessed (Geueke et al.,
40 2014). In addition, some chemical compounds originating from paper and board have been shown
41 to have biological activity and therefore are of concern to human health (Bengtström et al., 2016;
42 Honkalampi-Hämäläinen et al., 2010; Rosenmai et al., 2017). As a result, packaging contaminates
43 food with uncharacterized chemicals that may exert significant adverse effects (Gallart-Ayala et al.,
44 2013), yet the extent or nature of the chemical migration is not well-defined because it depends on
45 many parameters, e.g., the packaging material, contact type, temperature, and food type (Barnes
46 et al., 2007; Hauder et al., 2013; Poças et al., 2011).

47 The regular approach to chemicals in food is to perform a specific risk assessment (RA) for each
48 individual chemical, see Figure 1. However, determining the risk character is convoluted when
49 there is a shortage of available data on migrating compounds (Skjevrak et al., 2005). For the
50 commonly investigated Intentionally Added Substances (IAS), there is often data available from
51 prior research or via accredited methods, but for the more elusive Non-Intentionally Added
52 Substances (NIAS), there is rarely relevant data (Driffield et al., 2016; Grob, 2014; Koster et al.,
53 2015; Pivnenko et al., 2015). In fact, most NIAS do not have assigned chemical structures,
54 concentration data, or characterization of hazards, and few methods are capable to obtain these
55 data for such a large group of chemicals. The sheer amount of possible compounds prohibits

56 performing a dedicated safety evaluation on each compound, and it significantly challenges
 57 analytical methods to provide adequate data to perform RA. Consequently, some researchers
 58 recently concluded that the existing frameworks RA are inadequate to ensure food safety (Muncke
 59 et al., 2017).

60 The knowledge gap for NIAS and other chemical compounds needs to be reduced in order to
 61 incorporate them in legislation. We recently investigated the use of explorative methods to discover
 62 chemical compounds in FCM and concluded that untargeted analytical strategies are useful and
 63 efficient to estimate the concentration and chemical structure of unknowns (Pieke et al., 2018,
 64 2017). However, it is unrealistic to perform comprehensive analysis on all compounds discovered
 65 via exploration (Biedermann and Grob, 2013), so some sort of risk prioritization is required to
 66 ensure resources are dedicated to compounds most likely to introduce adverse health effects
 67 (Barlow, 2009). One of the core requirements of risk prioritization is to determine a risk character of
 68 a chemical compound that is in line with common risk assessment (Guillén et al., 2012;
 69 Schymanski et al., 2014).



70 ¹⁾ absorption, distribution, metabolism, and excretion

70

71 *Figure 1: The characterization of risk is a result from highly specific data, which are combined into*
 72 *exposure assessment and hazard identification and characterization. Obtaining the data needed for these*
 73 *assessments is resource-intensive, especially for larger number of compounds with existing data gaps.*

74 The Threshold of Toxicological Concern (TTC) concept has been adopted within European Union
75 (EU) legislation as a tool to better deal with NIAS and other unknown chemical compounds (EFSA
76 and WHO, 2016; Kroes et al., 2004). The TTC concept uses tentative exposure data to assess if
77 intake is below an accepted threshold of no concern, defined by assigning a Cramer class based
78 on the chemical structure. Hence, TTC is an preliminary assessment tool. It has been applied in a
79 strategy for NIAS discovery by Koster et al. (2014), and may be viable for the exploration
80 approaches shown recently by Pieke et al. (2018, 2017). However, TTC requires compounds to
81 show no genotoxicity (e.g., mutagenicity) or do not exceed an exposure of $0.15 \mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$.
82 Hence, if the exposure exceeds $0.15 \mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$ genotoxicity testing is required, which is
83 problematic for the large number of compounds that may exceed this threshold. Quantitative
84 Structure-Activity Relationship (QSAR) modeling of chemical hazard may provide substitute toxicity
85 data if testing is prohibitive, which has successfully been applied to FCM for hazard-based
86 assessment and prioritization by van Bossuyt et al. (2017). However, a limitation in hazard-based
87 approaches is that these generally do not always consider occurrence, migration, and exposure.

88 In present article, we aim to develop a strategy for risk prioritization of chemical compounds in
89 FCM following their prior discovery by exploration strategies. For this, we aim to establish the link
90 between tentative data, e.g., semi-quantification and tentative identification, and existing hazard-
91 based and exposure-based assessment tools, e.g., TTC and QSAR, to perform qualitative risk
92 prioritization. The risk prioritization tool is designed to mimic conventional risk assessment,
93 identically obtaining exposure assessment and hazard assessment, followed by an expertise
94 decision on risk. The tool proposed here is not suggested as a definite method for performing
95 qualitative risk prioritizations, but emphasizes the need and possibility for using tentative data in a
96 risk assessment perspective.

97 2. Methods

98 2.1. Analysis

99 Analysis is performed as reported in two previous studies (Pieke et al., 2018, 2017). In brief:
100 UHPLC-MS was performed on an Agilent 1290 system (Agilent Technologies, Santa Clara, CA,
101 USA). Two UHPLC columns were used serially (Phenomenex Luna Omega Polar C18 100 Å, 1.6
102 µm, 100 x 2.1 mm (Phenomenex, Denmark) and Waters ACQUITY UPLC CSH C18 130 Å, 1.7
103 µm, 100 x 2.1 mm (Waters, Denmark)). Mass analysis post-UHPLC was performed using an
104 Agilent 6550 Quadrupole-Time of Flight (Q-TOF) mass spectrometer (Agilent Technologies, Santa
105 Clara, CA, USA) equipped with Agilent JetStream electrospray ionization (ESI) interface. The
106 optimization, operating conditions, data collection, and data interpretation are discussed in
107 previous studies (Pieke et al., 2018, 2017).

108 Semi-quantification was used to determine estimated concentration of chromatographically eluting
109 chemical substances within a threefold error (Pieke et al., 2017). The semi-quantification was
110 limited to the 1200 largest eluting peaks and to detectable analytes in the sample. The chemical
111 structures of compounds in the extract of the sample were tentatively identified by recording
112 fragmentation spectra and using structure correlations to propose a best matching chemical
113 compound (Pieke et al., 2018). The tentative identification results (five predicted chemical
114 structures) were later combined with the semi-quantification results by comparing exact mass and
115 retention times.

116 2.2. Construction and evaluation of a decision unit

117 The decision unit for risk prioritization and risk profile classification boundaries was designed by
118 discussing with various interdisciplinary experts at the “Risk assessment for substances and
119 processes submitted to human food regulation” panel at the French Agency for Food,
120 Environmental and Occupational Health & Safety (ANSES). Based on the feedback of the expert

121 panel, the decision unit was designed to involve automation (data-based decisions) and manual
122 assessing (expertise-based decisions).

123 To test the classification scheme the semi-quantification and tentative identification results of two
124 paper and board FCM samples were used. 30 identified compounds were selected per sample, of
125 which 20 from ESI+ and 10 from ESI-, resulting in a total test set of 60 chemical compounds. The
126 selected entries were evaluated to avoid including chemicals which would not produce a
127 meaningful classification, e.g., no predicted structures. The chemical compounds were gathered in
128 a single Excel-based program available as Supplementary Information. The file contained the
129 predicted structure(s), QSAR consensus and individual prediction by the QSAR models, estimated
130 intake compared to a defined threshold (TTC Excess), absolute estimated intake, and finally the
131 predicted Cramer class from the TTC methodology (Cramer et al., 1976).

132 The 60 entries were assessed by four individual assessors using the decision unit. Each assessor
133 was tasked with classifying 60 compounds via the decision unit into one of the three risk profile
134 classes: high expected risk ([A]), low expected risk ([B]), or insufficient data ([C]). Prior to
135 classification, each assessor obtained documented instructions on how to work with the Excel
136 program and decision unit. Following, each assessor individually classified the chemical subset.
137 The assessors were specifically instructed to use the decision unit as much as possible, but also to
138 deviate from the decision unit in case their opinion would conflict with the decision unit result.

139 **2.3. Quantitative Structure-Activity Relationship (QSAR)**

140 Possible adverse health effects of tentatively identified chemicals were predicted using
141 Quantitative Structure-Activity Relationship (QSAR) models and software. Three endpoints were
142 defined: Carcinogenicity, Mutagenicity, and Reproductive Toxicity; abbreviated as CMR. To predict
143 CMR activity, the VEGA-QSAR platform (Benfenati et al., 2013) was employed using the included
144 four models for carcinogenicity (CAESAR, ISS, IRFMN/Antares, IRFMN/ISSCAN-CGX), four Ames
145 models for mutagenicity (CAESAR, SarPy/IRFMN, ISS, KNN/Read-Across), and two models for

146 reproductive toxicity (PG Toxicity Library, CAESAR). The VEGA-QSAR platform predicted only the
147 likely activity of the chemical compound, not a dose-response relationship. The Applicability
148 Domain Index (ADI) was used as performance criterion to define the quality of prediction (Istituto di
149 Ricerche Farmacologiche Mario Negri Milano, 2017).

150 An in-house solution was applied to integrate the QSAR results from VEGA-QSAR into the
151 decision unit. For each prediction the result, active (+) or inactive (-), and the prediction
152 applicability domain index (ADI) were extracted. A QSAR consensus score was calculated from
153 each endpoint results and accompanying ADI score. Each QSAR model applied contributed a
154 fraction to the total consensus score, e.g., for carcinogenicity four models were used, so each
155 model contributed a maximum ± 0.25 score. The score was corrected for lower ADI (i.e. prediction
156 certainty) so that less certain prediction had lower weight in the consensus score. The consensus
157 was calculated by the biggest sum for either positive values (active effect) or negative values (no
158 active effect). Hence, the result of the consensus calculation was a value between -1 and $+1$, in
159 which a negative number indicated a predicted non-active effect and a positive number indicated
160 an active effect. Values closer to the extremes -1 or $+1$ were results of good agreement between
161 model predictions on the same endpoint; values close to zero indicated a poor agreement.

162 **2.4. Sample selection and preparation**

163 Two paper and board samples were analyzed. The first sample was a recycled unused carton
164 pizza box, similar to the sample used in (Pieke et al., 2018), because these are known to contain
165 many extractable compounds (Bengtström et al., 2016). The second sample was a carton sheet
166 part of the packaging of luxury chocolates. The sheet was folded in a way to compartment
167 separate chocolates, thereby being in contact with the chocolates on multiple sides. The sheet was
168 unfolded before preparing the sample. From each sample, a 10 cm x 10 cm (1 dm²) sample was
169 prepared using a clean knife.

170 Each of the 10 cm x 10 cm samples were cut into four identically sized pieces of 2.5 cm x 10 cm
171 and inserted into a glass vessel. The Total Migratable Content (TMC, see 3.1) was recovered by
172 adding 100 mL of warm (40–50 °C) Food Simulant D1 (50 v/v ethanol water) to the vessel. The
173 vessel was closed and sealed into a calibrated thermostat compartment at 40°C. The setup was
174 left to soak for 24 hours, after which the food simulant was removed from the vessel and allowed to
175 cool to room temperature. Proceeding, the food simulant was filtered and prepared for semi-
176 quantification and identification as described in recent work (Pieke et al., 2017).

177 **3. Results and discussion**

178 **3.1. The total migratable content (TMC)**

179 TENAX is frequently used for paper and board migration testing, but shows different behaviour for
180 polar and non-polar compounds depending on vapour pressure (Poças et al., 2011). In addition,
181 the use of TENAX implies limited direct contact transfer, but it has been shown that migration from
182 direct contact is not negligible for paper and board and migration can occur even for non-volatile
183 compounds (Biedermann-Brem et al., 2012; Triantafyllou et al., 2007). In addition, there are
184 examples of food contact by paperboard that question the assumption of exclusively dry indirect
185 migration like TENAX simulates, e.g., pizza boxes, snacks, fast food, or fruits (Binderup et al.,
186 2002; Bradley, 2006). Some of the test methods presented in Commission Regulation no. 10/2011
187 regarding plastic FCM might be used for paper FCM (European Parliament and Council of the
188 European Union, 2011). However, the usage pattern of paper and plastic is different: plastic is
189 often used in longer term storage of a wide array of products, whereas paper is used for shorter
190 contact times or for freezing boxes, e.g., fast food or prepared foods. To use the plastic migration
191 test conditions (10 days at 40°C) on paper materials may not be representative, and this
192 perception is supported by U.S. FDA recommendations proposing migration studies on uncoated

193 paper at 40°C for 24 hours (FDA, 2007). Therefore, here a smaller testing window of 24 hours was
194 used for paper and board FCM.

195 No migration tests exist for paper and board FCM, so the intended food simulant should ideally
196 have a broad extractable range and compatibility for further analysis by LC-MS. From the analytical
197 and investigative perception in this study these two criteria are met using water/ethanol mixtures.
198 However, using water/ethanol mixtures in contact with paper or board for 24 hours is not a
199 migration test. Noticeably compared to plastics, paper is porous, inhomogeneous, and poorly
200 resistant to liquids, which lead to large numbers of extractives (FDA, 2007). Hence, we consider
201 these testing conditions to be somewhat more severe than a migration test, yet less severe than a
202 complete extraction, as the material integrity is preserved. Instead, we defined the tests performed
203 here as Total Migratable Content (TMC). The TMC contains chemical compounds from the FCM
204 that can reasonably be expected to migrate into food, but is an overestimation of actual-use
205 migration levels. Consequently, TMC implies a thorough screening of extractable chemical
206 compounds, which when observed in the simulant can – but not necessarily will – migrate.

207 **3.2. Risk characterization of tentative data**

208 3.2.1. Tentative hazard identification

209 A recently published identification strategy allows high-throughput tentative elucidation of the
210 chemical structure of a potentially unknown compound, but does not provide an unambiguous
211 chemical structure, instead presenting several chemical candidate structures (Pieke et al., 2018).
212 Finding existing toxicity data on multiple structures is convoluted. Here, we applied predictive
213 hazard modeling by QSAR. Because QSAR assumes that similar molecules likely have similar
214 effects (Raies and Bajic, 2016), it is compatible with the concept of tentative identification: if the
215 structure prediction closely resembles the actual molecule, the QSAR prediction results will likely
216 be similar. A precaution in using QSAR is that the application of different models can produce
217 different and sometimes conflicting results. To minimize the leverage of a single model in cases

218 where the model performed inadequate, several models are used in parallel for the same endpoint
219 on the same molecule. This presented a battery of results for each prediction, of which the average
220 prediction can cancel the effect of single outliers or false predictions (Benfenati et al., 2013).
221 Consequently, the average prediction of these models (the QSAR consensus) is more likely to
222 contain accurate information than any model alone.

223 The in-house consensus model closely mimics those presented by the VEGA software (Benfenati
224 et al., 2013). To evaluate thresholds for consensus relevance, the consensus approach was
225 applied on chemical compounds of IARC's Group 1, 2A, and 2B of known, probable, and possible
226 carcinogens list (International Agency for Research on Cancer, 2017). To ensure a strict
227 consensus, the VEGA QSAR results were compared to the assumption chemicals on the extracted
228 carcinogen list ($n = 204$) are active carcinogens. The threshold for false negative prediction results
229 was set to 2.5%. The results indicated that a consensus score of at least +0.40 was required to
230 minimize the chance of a false negative prediction. This value can be logically evaluated to make
231 sense: +0.40 only be obtained by two or more models predicting the same results, considering the
232 best-case predictions can only contribute +0.25 per model.

233 Characterizing the hazard as demonstrated here is limited to interpretation of the QSAR evaluation
234 on Carcinogenicity, Mutagenicity, and Reproductive Toxicity (CMR) prediction models. However,
235 there are other toxicity endpoints that influence the probable risk of a substance, e.g.,
236 hepatotoxicity, neurotoxicity, or endocrine disruption, but these are not well-studied and few broad
237 range QSAR models exist for these. In addition, CMR is already incorporated in the TTC approach,
238 and a CMR substance has the most strict exposure limit ($0.15 \mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$). Consequently, a
239 reliable CMR alert from QSAR is sufficient to assign the hazard characterization of the substance
240 as a high priority substance.

241 3.2.2. Tentative exposure assessment

242 Semi-quantification reports a concentration per volume or per surface with a maximum uncertainty
243 of threefold (Pieke et al., 2017). The content per surface area cannot be directly used for assessing
244 exposure, because the contact factor of the FCM is usually unknown. According to European
245 regulations, it is usually considered that an average person has a body weight of 60 kg and
246 consumes 1 kg of food containing the substance daily in contact with a plastic FCM with 6 dm²
247 packaging (European Parliament and Council of the European Union, 2011). However, other
248 studies have shown that actual food contact is likely in the range of 10–14 dm² (Bouma et al.,
249 2003; Duffy et al., 2007; ILSI Europe Packaging Material Task Force, 1996), and in some cases
250 even higher at 30–40 dm² (Bouma et al., 2003). However, paper and board FCM constitute only a
251 limited fraction of 10–20% of the total used packaging materials (Duffy et al., 2007; FDA, 2007).
252 Hence, by applying a usage reduction factor of 10–20% on the worst-case estimate of packaging
253 results in an estimated contact range of 3–8 dm² person⁻¹ day⁻¹, which is close to EFSA
254 assumptions of 6 dm² person⁻¹ day⁻¹ and likely to be sufficiently conservative. Hence, by adopting
255 the standard used by EFSA, the semi-quantitative concentration data in µg dm⁻² can be converted
256 to µg person⁻¹ day⁻¹ by multiplying with 6 dm² person⁻¹ day⁻¹.

257 Due to the similarities of the data in this study with that needed in the Threshold of Toxicological
258 Concern (TTC) approach (EFSA and WHO, 2016; Kroes et al., 2004), parts of the TTC strategy
259 are applicable here. Notably, the division of chemical compounds into Cramer classes is useful,
260 because it provides an exposure limit below which likelihood of adverse effect is considered to be
261 very low: for Class I compounds max. 1800 µg person⁻¹ day⁻¹; Class II compounds max. 540 µg
262 person⁻¹ day⁻¹; and for Class III compounds max. 90 µg person⁻¹ day⁻¹ (Cramer et al., 1976; Kroes
263 et al., 2004).

264 It should be noted that the use of the TTC approach for risk assessment is not without criticism
265 (Bschir, 2017). A large number of uncertainties are propagated throughout the TTC approach,

266 where in this study these uncertainties are potentially larger. Hence, as the aim of the study is
267 provide a qualitative human risk ranking of discovered chemical substances, here the TTC is not
268 applied as a tool for preliminary risk assessment. Instead, the TTC approach is applied as means
269 to derive an exposure limit for a tentatively identified chemical compound rather than as risk
270 assessment method. This effectively makes use of the Cramer Class approach, which could be
271 debated as taking into account chronic low dose exposure insufficiently (Bschor, 2017), but
272 provides an estimated exposure limit in case where full identification is not available, as is the case
273 with the results used here. Essentially, other methods that provide exposure limits based on
274 structure may be used if these are found more appropriate, but currently few of these methods
275 exist and are used at the scale at which the TTC is.


276 Here, the exposure (in $\mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$) from semi-quantification is compared to the limit
277 imposed by the Cramer class assignment calculated from the tentative identification. The result is
278 the TTC Excess factor, which is the fraction of exposure compared to the threshold, i.e., TTC
279 Excess of 100% means the predicted intake is equal the threshold from the TTC approach.
280 However, not every structural prediction was successful where the structure of the chemical
281 compound was unresolved or largely uncertain. For those cases, we considered the worst-case
282 scenario excluding carcinogenicity by assigning Class III. Considering uncertainty of the
283 concentration estimate, worst case ± 3 -fold, TTC Excess above 300% would most probably
284 indicate that the TTC would be exceeded, whereas below 33% indicates that most probably the
285 TTC would not be exceeded. Values within this range are to be decided on a case by case basis.

286 **3.3. Risk Prioritization based on tentative data**

287 3.3.1. Risk profile classification

288 Prioritization based on semi-quantification and structure predictions is convoluted: even if a
289 complete “picture” of exposure and hazard is available, these still contain considerable uncertainty.
290 Consequently, it is not recommended to perform a quantitative risk assessment (RA) on these

291 data, and it should be more feasible to use qualitative risk prioritization, where all variables are
 292 evaluated stepwise in order to determine a likely risk profile of the chemical compound. While it
 293 would be convenient to classify chemical compounds into subgroups with well-described risk
 294 profiles and priority, it is practically less achievable. Here, prioritization is likely to produce only
 295 broad risk profiles of chemical compounds, because uncertainties in the estimated hazard and
 296 estimated exposure assessment do not support clear boundaries for risk profile classes. The
 297 concept for broad classification with uncertain data is not new, as the TTC approach effectively
 298 only uses two Cramer classes: Low (Class I) and High (Class III), supplemented by the highly
 299 specific Intermediate (Class II).




301 *Figure 2: Framework representing one of the possible approaches to incorporate tentative data from*
 302 *exploration in risk assessment principles. The chemical compounds are subdivided into three priority*
 303 *classes following a decision unit (DU), which is an expertise-driven decision tool. The resulting risk profile*
 304 *classes can be used to prioritize further risk assessments.*

305 Only three classes are used in this prioritization approach, shown in Figure 2: [A] — Compound of
 306 Direct Concern; [B] — Compound of Lesser Concern; and [C] — insufficient information available.
 307 It could be argued that a class between [A] and [B] is needed that defines moderate concern.
 308 However, more than two risk profile classes require the capability to define a clear distinction
 309 between classes. This is not straightforward due to uncertainty in the data, and a large number of
 310 substances might not be classified properly when too many classes are present, thereby making

311 the decision process much more complicated for the assessor. The ultimate goal of risk
312 prioritization is to categorize chemical compounds for probable risk, so a limited decision choice of
313 two risk profile classes was thought to be sufficient for this purpose, whereas for actual risk
314 assessment more classes would be desirable.

315 3.3.2. Design of a decision unit

316 To facilitate the assignment of a risk profile class to a chemical compound, a decision unit was
317 designed to incorporate all available data from the tentative exposure assessment and the
318 tentative hazard identification, as shown in Figure 2. The goal of the decision unit is to provide a
319 simple, unified, and reproducible workflow for risk assessors to evaluate input data from
320 exploration experiments into a risk profile classification. Input data for the decision unit consisted of
321 tentative exposure, i.e., estimated intake, Cramer Class exposure limit, and resulting TTC Excess;
322 and tentative hazard identification, i.e., predicted structures, structure correlation scores, QSAR
323 CMR predictions, and QSAR consensus. Due to the tentative nature of the data, the input data can
324 contain variations especially in structure predictions, which affect hazard predictions and intake
325 limit by Cramer class. Hence, it is important to note that small changes in chemical structure may
326 affect different Cramer classifications and exposure limits, so these values should always be seen
327 in context, e.g., evaluation of the actual intake in addition to the TTC Excess.



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Figure 3: Implementation of a decision unit for risk prioritization. The decision unit is designed as a decision tree that is evaluated by an expert for each node. The result from the decision unit is risk profile class: [A] high priority, [B] low priority, or [C] insufficient data. The risk profile can be determined either data-driven or via expert decision, in which an experienced assessor decides the class based on all available data.

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The decision unit was constructed like a decision tree, as shown in Figure 3, built up from the structure prediction by tentative identification (I), the hazard prediction by QSAR prediction (H), and the TTC Excess exposure prediction (E). The decision unit consists of 14 decision-nodes and 6 risk profile classification end-nodes. Decision nodes systematically evaluate all input data and provide a path to the most appropriate end-node. End-nodes within the decision unit result in the assignment of a risk profile to a compound (discussed in 3.3.1), but are always expert judgements. In some cases the end-node provides a non-binding advice for the most likely risk profile class

341 considering the data. In case no such advice is attainable, i.e., where data interpretation cannot
342 unambiguously result in classification, the final risk profile is a decision that needs to be made by
343 the assessor. Consequently, the decision unit is not designed as an automated data evaluation tool
344 although it contains decisions based purely on data, but more as a guide for assessors to stepwise
345 evaluate all available data.

346 3.3.3. Design of data-driven decision modules

347 The first nodes in the decision unit are to assess the quality and appropriateness of the predicted
348 structure(s) by tentative identification. The nodes in the tree (see Figure 3) evaluate structure and
349 quality parameters, but require assessor feedback and insight. As discussed in by Pieke et al.
350 (2018) at least one authentic prediction (I-1) or two non-authentic predictions with sufficient
351 prediction score are required (I-2). When there is insufficient chemical structure information, the
352 exposure (TTC Excess) should be evaluated for exceeding the TTC threshold (I-3). When there
353 are sufficient structural predictions, the predicted structures should be evaluated for chemically
354 unlikely features (I-4), molecular mass and similar chemical structure (I-5), and sufficient chemical
355 information (I-6). Finally, the polarity and molecular weight of the predictions should be
356 proportional to the chromatographic retention time (I-7).

357 Following, the predicted chemical structures are evaluated for exerting possible CMR activity. If
358 there is sufficient QSAR data that suggests CMR activity, the compound is immediately classified
359 as [A]. The QSAR results are checked for experimental data on possible carcinogenicity (H-1),
360 mutagenicity (H-2), or reproductive toxicity (H-3) evident from a maximum reliability score. In
361 addition, the prediction consensus for C and M — but not for R, only limited to two models — is
362 evaluated for exceeding the threshold >0.40 (H-2). The final node is an expert assessment on
363 concerns with the chemical structure regarding hazard, or below-threshold QSAR alerts that
364 promotes concern for safety and should therefore be classified as [A] (H-4).

365 Finally, the Exposure Module is evaluated by means of the Cramer class and TTC Excess. By
366 comparing the estimated intake with the intake threshold the acceptability of exposure can be
367 decided. First, the intake is assessed compared to the threshold beyond the uncertainty of the
368 exposure measurement, i.e., more than 300% TTC Excess, in which case it will be risk profile [A]
369 (E-1), or below the uncertainty, i.e., less than 40% TTC Excess, in which case it is risk profile [B]
370 (E-2). Next, there is a final expert evaluation node that confirms that the given substance is not
371 known for likely safety, like sugars or inert materials, because the derived TTC limit may be too
372 strict for these, especially since the Cramer classification is often Class III (High) if the structure
373 deviates slightly from a well-known Class I (Low) structure (E-3).

374 3.3.4. Incorporation of expert decisions

375 Several nodes in the decision unit are based on human evaluation by requiring expert input.
376 Expert-based decisions are included in the decision unit for two reasons: First, they are a result of
377 discussions with risk assessment expert panels, which summarized that the need for an expert to
378 control the final decision is critical. Second, a simple decision tree is not able to assess the
379 multiplicative effects of several parameters, or capable to assess the data as a whole instead of
380 individually. Hence, expert judgment is required for cases where data obtained by QSAR and/or
381 quantitative methods are inconclusive (Lester et al., 2018). The use of a human assessor within
382 the decision unit fulfills the need for control, but also mitigates the limitations of simplistically-
383 designed decision units, and can thereby help improve decisions. However, it also requires the full
384 attention of a trained risk assessor throughout the entire decision unit, which is problematic with a
385 very large number of substances. Advances in computer sciences, such as advanced machine
386 learning neural networks, may provide an outcome for this in the future (Ru et al., 2017).
387 Consequently, the outcome from the decision unit is codependent on assessor expertise, which in
388 fact closely resembles the methods for traditional RA.

389 Within the decision unit, the expert assessments are generally called upon in situations where
390 simple data evaluation did not result in a classification. In other words, most expert decisions are
391 needed when no immediate hazard or exposure of concern is detected. In those cases, a
392 comprehensive picture of all available data followed by an expertise decision is required. For
393 example, there may be stacked evidence for classification without exceeding any of the defined
394 thresholds in prior nodes, e.g., a QSAR consensus of 0.39 for both carcinogenicity and
395 mutagenicity. None of the nodes H-1 to H-3 will have marked this compound as a possible risk,
396 but the expertise decision node H-4 likely will via human evaluation. The expert decision nodes at
397 the end of the tree are needed in case iterating through single descriptors such as exposure or
398 hazard identity did not lead to a proper classification. It is impossible to model every likely scenario
399 into the decision unit and retain its accessibility. In addition, an automated decision unit cannot
400 effectively decide whether the available data is sufficient for classification. Expert decisions are
401 consequently the only decisions that can result into a [C] classification for a lack of information.

402 **3.4. Applying risk prioritization explorative data**

403 3.4.1. Application and results of the decision unit

404 The decision unit (Figure 3) was applied to a set of data obtained from exploration experiments on
405 two different paperboard FCM samples described in the Experimental section. Assessment results
406 of the 60 discovered chemical compounds are summarized in Table 1. The full dataset, which
407 includes all predicted chemical structures, QSAR predictions, and estimated exposure of these 60
408 compounds are given in the Supplementary Information. Note that the total number of chemical
409 compounds per sample targeted for structural elucidation was 249 for the pizza box sample and
410 161 for the chocolate box sample, 410 in total, so the 60 compounds represented here are only a
411 fraction of the total number of discovered compounds.

412 To convert the assessment into risk ranking, a score was calculated based on the assessors'
413 answers. The score is on a scale from -100, low priority, to +100, high priority. Scores near zero

414 were those either that showed no consensus between assessors or where data was inadequate for
415 classification. Calculation of the score is performed according to Equation 1, where n_x represents
416 the occurrence count of each classification $x = [A], [B],$ or $[C]$ per compound. The formula has
417 deliberately not been simplified for clarification: the first part penalizes differences between $[A]$ and
418 $[B]$, while the second part penalizes a lack of consensus. Hence, more contrast in the classification
419 results in a ranking score closer to zero.

$$420 \text{ Rank} = \frac{n_A - n_B}{n_A + n_B + n_C} * \frac{\max[n_A, n_B, n_C]}{n_A + n_B + n_C} \quad \text{Equation 1}$$

421 The threshold of priority and no consensus was set at a score of ± 30 . This marked the point where
422 above which at least three assessors assigned the same risk profile, but one assessor assigned a
423 conflicting profile or indicated insufficient data, e.g., AAAB or AAAC. If an assessment contained
424 two or more entries of $[C]$ these were marked as uncertain, since at least 50% of assessors
425 indicated that available data was not sufficient to take an appropriate decision.

426 The overall results from the assessment in Table C.1 reveal that approximately 60% of the
427 chemical compounds were eligible for prioritization as a result of the evaluation, while 40% of the
428 substances either have insufficient data for prioritization, or displayed conflicts in assignments by
429 different assessors. The results show an almost even distribution of cases between high priority
430 (29%), insufficient data (23%), no consensus (18%), and low priority (30%). A number of
431 compounds were unanimously ranked by all assessors as high risk or low risk for 13% and 13% of
432 the cases, respectively.

433 Some illustrative examples of each consensus result are discussed in order to understand some of
434 the choices behind the classification. For a visualization of the chemical structures discussed, the
435 reader is referred to the Supplementary Information.

436 **Table 1:** Assessments results of four assessors on 60 different chemical compounds from two different
 437 samples. Assessors were tasked to assign one of three risk profiles to the chemical substance. The
 438 ranking score is calculated from the ratio of the risk profiles reaching four different consensus results,
 439 where a score of at least ± 30 was considered consensus. When two or more assessors assigned [C], the
 440 entry was considered to be deficit in information.

ID.	Sample	ESI Polarity	Ret. time (min)	1	2	3	4	Ranking score	Consensus
10	Pizza	ESI-	18.582	A	A	A	A	100	High priority
13	Choc	ESI-	18.572	A	A	A	A	100	High priority
15	Pizza	ESI-	20.385	A	A	A	A	100	High priority
16	Pizza	ESI+	35.247	A	A	A	A	100	High priority
19	Pizza	ESI+	34.313	A	A	A	A	100	High priority
24	Pizza	ESI+	13.270	A	A	A	A	100	High priority
36	Pizza	ESI+	23.521	A	A	A	A	100	High priority
49	Choc	ESI+	2.088	A	A	A	A	100	High priority
1	Choc	ESI+	3.652	C	A	A	A	56.25	High priority
30	Choc	ESI+	24.146	A	A	C	A	56.25	High priority
32	Pizza	ESI+	8.989	A	A	A	C	56.25	High priority
34	Pizza	ESI-	22.801	A	A	C	A	56.25	High priority
45	Choc	ESI+	26.474	A	A	C	A	56.25	High priority
54	Choc	ESI+	15.071	A	A	C	A	56.25	High priority
5	Pizza	ESI+	34.689	A	B	A	A	37.5	High priority
53	Choc	ESI+	8.988	A	A	A	B	37.5	High priority
57	Choc	ESI+	19.585	A	A	B	A	37.5	High priority

ID.	Sample	ESI Polarity	Ret. time (min)	1	2	3	4	Ranking score	Consensus
39	Pizza	ESI-	27.602	C	A	C	A	25	Insufficient data
20	Pizza	ESI-	11.742	B	A	C	A	12.5	No consensus
40	Choc	ESI-	17.711	B	A	C	A	12.5	No consensus
6	Pizza	ESI+	27.600	B	C	C	A	0	Insufficient data
11	Choc	ESI+	27.018	C	C	B	A	0	Insufficient data
21	Pizza	ESI+	19.644	C	A	C	B	0	Insufficient data
23	Choc	ESI+	10.820	B	A	B	A	0	No consensus
27	Choc	ESI+	24.373	B	A	B	A	0	No consensus
35	Pizza	ESI-	17.712	B	A	B	A	0	No consensus
38	Choc	ESI-	3.473	C	C	C	C	0	Insufficient data
42	Choc	ESI+	30.173	C	C	C	C	0	Insufficient data
43	Choc	ESI+	33.504	C	C	C	C	0	Insufficient data
46	Choc	ESI-	30.398	C	C	B	A	0	Insufficient data
56	Pizza	ESI+	28.307	B	A	B	A	0	No consensus
58	Pizza	ESI+	10.831	B	A	B	A	0	No consensus
25	Choc	ESI+	13.095	C	A	B	B	-12.5	No consensus
26	Pizza	ESI+	3.283	B	B	C	A	-12.5	No consensus
50	Pizza	ESI-	24.446	B	B	C	A	-12.5	No consensus
52	Pizza	ESI+	36.131	B	B	C	A	-12.5	No consensus
2	Choc	ESI+	31.825	C	C	C	B	-18.75	Insufficient data
51	Choc	ESI-	29.098	C	C	C	B	-18.75	Insufficient data
3	Choc	ESI+	16.438	B	C	C	B	-25	Insufficient data

ID.	Sample	ESI Polarity	Ret. time (min)	1	2	3	4	Ranking score	Consensus
7	Choc	ESI+	14.272	B	C	C	B	-25	Insufficient data
12	Choc	ESI+	27.434	C	C	B	B	-25	Insufficient data
17	Pizza	ESI-	28.550	C	C	B	B	-25	Insufficient data
14	Choc	ESI+	17.416	B	A	B	B	-37.5	Low priority
22	Choc	ESI-	20.588	B	A	B	B	-37.5	Low priority
31	Choc	ESI+	13.335	B	B	B	A	-37.5	Low priority
44	Pizza	ESI-	2.790	B	A	B	B	-37.5	Low priority
60	Choc	ESI-	18.167	B	A	B	B	-37.5	Low priority
4	Choc	ESI-	19.438	B	B	C	B	-56.25	Low priority
28	Choc	ESI-	14.359	B	C	B	B	-56.25	Low priority
33	Pizza	ESI+	15.083	B	B	B	C	-56.25	Low priority
37	Pizza	ESI+	31.396	B	B	B	C	-56.25	Low priority
59	Pizza	ESI-	14.359	B	C	B	B	-56.25	Low priority
8	Pizza	ESI+	27.289	B	B	B	B	-100	Low priority
9	Choc	ESI-	20.881	B	B	B	B	-100	Low priority
18	Pizza	ESI+	26.490	B	B	B	B	-100	Low priority
29	Choc	ESI+	24.943	B	B	B	B	-100	Low priority
41	Pizza	ESI+	28.868	B	B	B	B	-100	Low priority
47	Pizza	ESI+	33.264	B	B	B	B	-100	Low priority
48	Pizza	ESI+	15.083	B	B	B	B	-100	Low priority
55	Pizza	ESI+	34.327	B	B	B	B	-100	Low priority

442 3.4.2. Compounds with high priority

443 One notable entry unanimously marked as risk profile [A] is ID 10 and ID 13, which is in fact the
444 same chemical compound observed in different samples. The chemical structure suggests a
445 benzophenone-like compound at relatively high exposure levels of 360–445 $\mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$,
446 excluding the three-fold semi-quantitative uncertainty, compared to the 90 $\mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$ TTC
447 limit of Cramer Class III compounds, with QSAR alerts that indicate carcinogenicity and
448 mutagenicity. There is another instance of a benzophenone-like compound among the high priority
449 compounds: ID 15, which has a less unambiguous predicted structure which occurs at nearby
450 retention time. The presence of benzophenone compounds in paper and board is known mostly
451 due to recycling of printed board (Anderson and Castle, 2003), so detection of benzophenone-like
452 substances is not unexpected; however, the concentration estimates indicate a relatively high
453 exposure potential. This potential can also be limited by the overestimation in the TMC, but it is
454 nevertheless a compound of concern.

455 Another entry clearly marked as risk profile [A] is ID 19, which strongly represents an azo dye
456 Pigment Red 2. The chemical compound could exceed TTC limits with an estimated intake of 50
457 $\mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$, excluding uncertainty, compared to 90 $\mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$ defined by Cramer
458 Class III. However, QSAR results clearly indicate a possible carcinogenicity and mutagenicity,
459 which would exempt the compound from Class III limits and instead impose the stricter limit of 0.15
460 $\mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$. The presence of pigments, especially pigment red, has been observed before
461 (Bengtström, 2014). Azo dyes are capable of breaking down into carcinogenic substances like
462 amines and aromatic amines, which can be cause for concern, e.g., in cosmetic products
463 (SCCNFP, 2002).

464 Compound ID 32 and ID 53, both marked as risk profile [A], represent an isothiazolinone fungicide
465 compound present in both samples at similar retention times. For the pizza box, it exceeds the
466 maximum exposure significantly: 700 $\mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$ excluding uncertainty, but for the chocolate

467 box semi-quantification was unsuccessful. When strictly following the decision unit, the presence in
468 the chocolate box would likely be marked as risk profile [B] or [C] because none of the thresholds
469 are explicitly exceeded, but since it was classified as risk profile [A] by most experts this
470 demonstrates the added value of an expert decision. Here, the expert decision rightly classified the
471 same chemical compound with the same priority, despite differences in available data. This
472 substance has been discovered and more extensively discussed in previous work (Pieke et al.,
473 2018).

474 3.4.3. Compounds with low priority

475 ID 47 and 55 represent two compounds marked as risk profile [B], and are chemically similar long-
476 chain amides originating from the pizza box. Estimated intake of these substances is significantly
477 below a TTC Class III compound at 33–38 $\mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$, excluding uncertainty, which is
478 unlikely to exceed 90 $\mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$ when including uncertainties. In addition, there are no
479 QSAR alerts for these compounds. These substances have previously been identified (Pieke et al.,
480 2018) in a similar sample, where these were also considered unlikely to pose a risk. The
481 consensus of the risk prioritization here emphasises that the previous assessment is probably
482 correct, and this type of compound is not anticipated to be at risk by different evaluators.

483 ID 31, ID 33, and ID 48 represent polyethylene glycol (PEG) oligomers, while ID 18 represents
484 dipropylene glycol dibenzoate. These are all commonly used plasticizers. The intake for these
485 compounds is relatively high compared to other compounds listed here, but these compounds are
486 not commonly associated with any hazardous effects. It was shown here that the expert decisions
487 play a critical role in ensuring the proper class assignment, e.g., ID 31 has large TTC Excess
488 values because the compound is marked as Cramer Class III. Despite that, three out of four
489 assessors marked the compound as risk profile [B] because the chemical structure was known to
490 them as a PEG oligomer, for which a Cramer Class I is more likely appropriate. All of these

491 compounds are relatively inert plasticizers with no QSAR alerts, and especially PEG oligomers are
492 unlike to pose a risk at these concentrations.

493 ID 4, ID 8, ID 37, ID 41, and ID 60 are a number of diverse, yet chemically similar and simple
494 structures that are each marked as risk profile [B] by most assessors, indicating a low priority.
495 These compounds are characterized by a generally low exposure estimate, simple chemical
496 structures composed predominantly of C, H, and O, and few carbon-rings, and rarely contain any
497 QSAR alerts for CMR. A number of the predicted chemical structures are classified as Cramer
498 Class I, which increases the exposure limit significantly to $1800 \mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$, but for most of
499 these compounds the $90 \mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$ is not exceeded.

500 3.4.4. Compounds with no assigned priority

501 The compounds that did not have a prioritization can be separated in two main groups: compounds
502 with insufficient data, or compounds with mixed information containing both elements of high
503 priority and low priority, which prevented consensus. Compounds with insufficient data are marked
504 if at least half of the assessors indicated that the available data is insufficient to assign a risk profile
505 [A] or [B], e.g., ID 51, ID 2, ID 38, and ID 43. These cases are not discussed extensively, but
506 reassessment should only occur upon obtaining additional or improved data.

507 Interesting cases of non-consensus compounds are ID 23 and ID 58. Some structure predictions
508 seem to indicate a polyethylene glycol (PEG) oligomer, similar to ID 31, ID 33, ID 48 previously
509 discussed. However, the exposure is significantly higher: $1240 \mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$ for ID 58 and 520
510 $\mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$ for ID 23. In addition, some of the predicted structures seem to be PEG
511 derivatives or unrelated structures, which have more severe QSAR alerts and TTC Excess due to
512 being Cramer Class III. Different assessors interpreted this information differently: two considered
513 this a high priority substance and two considered this a low priority substance. Based on the
514 exposure, it is sensible to consider these substances as high priority, but on the other hand the
515 knowledge of PEG oligomers can render these compounds as low priority. Consequently, the lack

516 of consensus can warrant the need for a discussion on the substances to clarify where differences
517 in opinion are originating from.

518 Another case where no consensus could be achieved is for ID 56. The predicted structures greatly
519 varied between the authentic and non-authentic databases, where structure predictions of the latter
520 appeared unlikely, but the predictions from the first were of relatively low confidence. The
521 estimated exposure was $83 \mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$, which is close to the limit of $90 \mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$ of
522 a Cramer Class III compound. There are no obvious QSAR alerts that indicated direct concern.
523 Here, the assessment of the compound was primarily based on expert decision, and assessors are
524 unable to agree. ID 56 is an example of a group of compounds that have very little information, or
525 where the information shows conflict between different predictions, so a decision for low- or high-
526 priority is not straightforward. Some other examples are ID 20, ID 26, ID 27, and ID 35. The proper
527 classification of these compounds may require additional information, a stricter decision unit, or
528 more assessors.

529 In a number of cases some assessors considered the information to be not sufficiently informative,
530 but others tried to give a classification. These cases are characterized by an equal distribution in
531 assessors indicating [C] and [A] or [B]. An illustrative case is ID 3, which initially does not appear to
532 lack information. However, the structure predictions are varying greatly and are accompanied by
533 low confidence, so no good structural image can be obtained. Because there is no structural
534 image, QSAR alerts cannot be considered reliable. Yet, the exposure to this compound is low: 12
535 $\mu\text{g person}^{-1} \text{ day}^{-1}$, which is including uncertainty well below the TTC limit for a Class III compound.
536 As a result, half the assessors indicated [B] for no likely risk due to the low exposure, but the other
537 half indicated [C] likely due to the poor quality of structure predictions. There are some other
538 examples where this occurred, e.g., ID 59, ID 6.

539 3.5. The implementation of risk prioritization tools

540 Based on the results in 3.4, a different course of action is required for each assigned priority and
541 rank score. Compounds that show the maximum rank score do not require much discussion, as
542 these are classified similarly by all assessors, so their priority for risk assessment is fairly
543 unanimous. For compounds that do not score maximally, but are still classified as low- or high-
544 priority (e.g., AAAC), it is suggested to discuss these entries briefly to understand the reason for
545 reaching a less than maximum consensus. Unless there is a good reason to deviate from the
546 advice of the consensus, it should be maintained. Results with rank scores close to zero need to
547 be investigated: either the available data is insufficient or has too many uncertainties, or the
548 assessors disagree on the risk profile. In the first case, insufficient data, more data will need to be
549 gathered or, as discussed in the next paragraph, the quality of results needs to be improved. The
550 latter case, no consensus, requires discussion and is cause for concern. In some cases, the
551 differences occur as a result of data weight: some assessors weigh the exposure heavier than
552 hazards. Disagreements between assessors will need to be better understood in order to improve
553 the decision unit.

554 Presently designed decision unit was found to be suitable for assessing a small to moderate
555 number of chemical compounds with tentative data. The decision unit is currently an expert-based
556 model in which the decision tree is a helpful tool for the experts to reach classification. The value of
557 the expert decision was shown throughout the data, e.g., in classifying ID 32 and ID 53. However,
558 for a larger number of compounds the workload on the assessors increases similarly, so the
559 current design may not be suitable for a very large number of chemical compounds. For this,
560 automation may be a solution, but discussions with risk assessment experts indicated caution to
561 changing the decision of risk to a fully automated process. In addition, automated decisions for
562 tentative data are complex since they require a multivariate approach that can incorporate multiple
563 uncertainties, whereas it also must be able to derive decisions from experience as humans do.

564 Hence, while automated decisions are desirable for many compounds, these should be developed
565 with caution to the human expertise needed to classify compounds.

566 Further needs are to improve the input data on which decisions are based, which will reduce the
567 number of non-consensus and insufficient data prioritizations. For example, the inclusion of more
568 and improved *in silico* models (e.g., Expert Model, QSAR, or hybrids) may allow a better decision
569 process, as more hazards can be included in the assessment possibly with higher prediction
570 certainties. Moreover, the current strategy assesses on a compound-to-compound basis without
571 including mixture effects. Mixture effects are highly complex and the assessment thereof not
572 strongly developed, which make them and this strategy currently incompatible, but may be an
573 interesting addition for future research. To enable the assessment of mixture effects, it could be a
574 possibility to incorporate Effect Directed Analysis (EDA) into the strategy, which could provide
575 toxicity data on mixtures based on chromatographic fractions. This would significantly improve the
576 toxicological basis of risk priority, but it would require substantial pre-decision work, which can
577 negate the speed of the strategy as currently presented.

578 In addition, a reduction in uncertainty originating from tentative data is beneficial, e.g., lower error
579 in concentration estimation or improved structure predictions. Suggestions for improving the
580 strategies for semi-quantification and tentative identification have been provided in the respective
581 research (Pieke et al., 2018, 2017). Both, however, highlight that these explorative methods are
582 relatively novel in applications, and will need substantial further developments. Finally, the
583 inclusion of more assessors can improve the classification results. More assessors permit more
584 combinations of risk profile assessments, which will improve the amount of ranks that are
585 available, as well as allowing a better investigation and discussion of compounds that did not reach
586 a risk prioritization consensus.

587 4. Conclusion

588 A strategy for risk prioritization based on tentative data is demonstrated for ranking the tentative
589 risk of discovered compounds. This tool is based on a simple and low cost approach. The
590 classification/prioritization of 60 substances was performed in a short time (less than 1h). The
591 strategy is demonstrated to be capable to discriminate sufficiently (>60%) within a test set of 60
592 compounds between low priority compounds expected not to be of concern, and high priority
593 substances expected to be of concern or demonstrating indications of concern. The tool is
594 validated on compounds previously reported in literature as being of concern, so the strategy is
595 able to sort relevant results. Consequently, the tool can easily be transposed on the total set of 400
596 compounds discovered by exploration to greatly improve the chemical knowledge on complex
597 samples from a risk assessment perspective.

598 Currently, the strategy is demonstrated with a limited number of hazard endpoints and assessment
599 is limited to the intake of a single compound at a time. A critical reason for this is the tools needed
600 to assess mixture effects or more advanced toxicity endpoints are currently not sufficiently
601 developed; therefore, these would likely be supported to a lesser degree by risk assessors. If
602 assessors do not trust the predictive models to be accurate, it would limit the effectiveness of the
603 decision tree model. As a result, the demonstrated strategy uses a limited set of QSAR models
604 known to be relatively reliable and focuses on single compounds; yet, this strategy is adaptable to
605 include more predictive models (e.g., endocrine disruption models, mixture toxicity models) and
606 experimental techniques (e.g., EDA) in the decision process, which makes it robust to future
607 developments in the field of structure-based hazard predictions.

608 Automation of part of the decision process may be needed to ensure more rapid decisions for
609 larger sets of data. However, implementation of automated processes is complicated because the
610 current presentation of data is reliant on interpretation and experience, for which dedicated *in silico*
611 models would be required. However, improving the quality of the tentative data, e.g., by reducing

612 uncertainties, will be helpful in reducing the number of compounds that remain unclassified after
613 prioritization, and will also assist in improving the quality of the decisions.

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623 **Supplementary Material**

624 The quantification, identification, expert assessment, and risk prioritization data results are
625 available as supplementary Microsoft Office Excel file (.x/sx).

626 **References**

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- A strategy for risk prioritization of FCM-borne chemical compounds is shown
- Application of a decision model utilizing both expert judgment and tentative data
- Non-target scope enables prioritization of NIAS and newly discovered compounds
- Compound priority constructed from expert-assigned risk profile consensus
- Strategy demonstrated on a subset 60 compounds from paper and board FCM

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