

THE 1974 PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION IN PENINSULAR MALAYSIA:

A STUDY IN ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY

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Abstract

Communalism is the dominant factor in Peninsular Malaysia's plural society and influences every aspect of the electoral process. This is the theme of the present work. The objective is not to attempt a study of the 1974 election per se but rather to observe how considerations of race influenced the electoral system, party organization and appeal, and finally the electorate's response.

This approach necessarily demands an examination of the formal aspects of the electoral system, not merely to act as the backcloth for examining the election of 1974, but also to determine how it influences and is influenced by considerations of race. The laws and regulations governing elections are studied and their implications to communal representation and organization examined. Particular emphasis is given to the apportionment of seats to the various states, and the delineation of constituencies. The implications of these for communal representation are established.

Political party evolution, organization and appeal are visualised as attempts to mobilise support from a divided society, and the operation of three conflicting modes of party organization, i.e. communal parties, multi-communal parties and inter-communal coalitions, are examined. This in turn calls for an examination of the evolution of political parties to note the origin of the three modes of organization. Aspects of communal discrimination by these parties are noted so as to establish the basis of their appeal and to present a theoretical rationale and empirical support for the identification of the several parties as having an appeal to and representing the interests of particular communities. In all, four aspects of discrimination are viewed - membership requirements, party branch establishment, candidate selection and candidate placement.

The campaign itself is then seen as a logical outcome of the plural society, the electoral system utilized and the evolution and organization of political parties. The manner in which parties act and interact in the spotlighted arena of the campaign is studied and special attention is paid to the appeal to particular communities as the basis of electoral victory.

The results are then assessed as the response of the various communities to these appeals. Success and failure are seen to be the consequences of two factors: the biases introduced by the system and the perception of members of society as to the communal disposition of the parties. Finally, the electoral results are examined to establish the regional variations in support, and to identify the implications for the several parties that contested the election.

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I N T R O D U C T I O N

The Setting

The Malayan state which became independent on August 31, 1957, had seen significant changes in its internal political organization. By the end of the eighty-three years¹ of only briefly interrupted British colonial rule the independent petty riverine sultanates were forged into a federation with a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. So successful did this system appear that within six years of its gaining independence the young state became the senior partner in an even larger federation encompassing Sabah, Sarawak and Singapore.² Such developments were the evident outcome of British colonial rule.

Colonialism also transformed Peninsular Malaysia (as the former Federation of Malaya is now known) from an almost wholly homogeneous Malay society into a plural one, with no community having a numerical majority in the total population. At the time of the latest census in 1970 the population numbered 8,810,348 comprising thirty-two distinct communities. (Table 1) For purposes of political bargaining, however, these communities are reduced to three widely accepted major groupings: the Malays, the Chinese and the Indians. Thus viewed the Malays form 53.19%, the Chinese 35.44% and the Indians 10.59% of the total population; all other groups not included in these broad categories comprise a mere 0.78%.

Statistical pluralism in itself may be regarded as insignificant were it not that the several ethnic groups in Malaya identify themselves, perceive interests, and define issues in a manner that tends towards conflict rather than consensus. Religious differences, linguistic

1 British control of Penang began in 1786 but it is the 1874 intervention in Perak that is generally regarded as the date of the beginning of British colonial rule of the Malay states.

2 This was in 1963. In 1965 Singapore was forced out of the federation. The federation currently comprises the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur, the States of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak. (Figure 1)




Fig. 1

Table 1

Population by Community Groups - Peninsular Malaysia, 1970

Community Group	Number	Percentage	
Malay	4,392,203	93.73	49.85
Indonesian	222,698	4.75	
Negrato	1,969	0.04	
Jakun	7,639	0.16	
Semai	15,312	0.33	
Semalai	3,050	0.07	
Temiar	10,769	0.23	
Other Orang Asli	13,710	0.29	
Other Malays	18,488	0.39	
Total Malay	4,685,838	100	53.19
Hokhien	1,068,803	34.23	
Cantonese	617,588	19.78	
Khek (Hakka)	690,821	22.13	
Teochew	387,048	12.40	
Hainanese	145,758	4.67	
Kwongsi	77,577	2.48	
Hokchiu	57,095	1.83	
Henghua	16,924	0.54	
Hokchia	9,039	0.29	
Other Chinese	51,697	1.66	
Total Chinese	3,122,350	100	35.44
Indian Tamil	754,256	80.88	
Telegu	29,531	3.17	
Malayali	41,974	4.50	
Punjabi	33,479	3.59	
Other Indian	35,796	3.84	
Pakistani	9,497	1.02	
Ceylon Tamil	24,436	2.62	
Other Ceylonese	3,660	0.39	
Total Indian	932,629	100	10.59
Thai	27,114	39.00	
Other Asian	6,106	8.78	
European	13,918	20.02	
Eurasian	14,007	20.14	
Others	8,386	12.06	
Total Other	69,531	100	0.78
West Malaysian total	8,810,348		100

Source: Malaysia, Jabatan Perangkaan, 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, Community Groups, 1972, pp 82-86.

dissimilarities, social and kinship affinities, and economic specializations all reinforce the division of Peninsular Malaysian society into Malays, Chinese and Indians. Indeed the major process of acculturation has been the creation of common bonds and culture within these three primary groupings. The regional differences between the Malays of the various part of the peninsula as well as the distinctions between the local Malays and the recent immigrants from Indonesia and South Thailand are only secondary to the differences between Malays and non-Malays. The diverse dialect and clan groups of the Chinese are similarly bonded together by the dictates of communal bargaining. Similarly, those from the Indian subcontinent - India, Pakistan, Bangla Desh and Sri Lanka - may speak different languages and profess distinct religious faiths but for political purposes they view themselves, and are certainly regarded by the other Malaysians, as "Indians".

Most Peninsular Malaysian communities, including the vast majority of those classified as Malays, are migrants or the descendants of migrants to the country, but the Malays make a special claim to the land by virtue of their longer occupancy. This claim was reinforced by the existence of political organizations in the Malay states in the form of sultanates¹ with which the British colonialists entered into treaty agreements. Throughout British rule the special status of the Malays was acknowledged and the Malays appeared content with this arrangement. But when in 1946 the British Government proposed the Malayan Union which, it was argued, failed to preserve the special status of the Malay, Malay nationalism blossomed. The Malays rapidly came to dominate political life and successfully demanded the withdrawal of the

1 Gullick, J.M., Indigenous Political Systems of Western Malaya, 1958 provides an authoritative account of the Malay political system prior to British rule.

Malayan Union proposal. Malay special rights and privileges were written into the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948, the 1957 Malayan Constitution and the 1963 Malaysian Constitution. The special rights and privileges accorded the Malay community were held as a condition for the granting of the 'legitimate interests of the non-Malays'. The words 'Malay special rights and privileges' and 'legitimate interests of the non-Malays' are of overwhelming importance, and form an essential part of the Malaysian political vocabulary. They are at one and the same time the basis of any claim advanced on the part of one community, and the basis for the rejection of that by others.

The provisions of the Constitution concerning Malay special privileges and rights involve preferences in four different fields:

- (i) reservation of land for Malays;
- (ii) quotas for admission to the Public Service;
- (iii) quotas in respect of the issuing of permits or licences for the operation of certain businesses; and
- (iv) the granting of scholarships, bursaries, and other forms of aid for educational purposes.¹

No specific time limit was set for the duration of these provisions guaranteeing the special privileges for Malays. In the case of the 'land reservations', the respective State Legislatures and both Houses of the Federal Parliament had to indicate the need for any changes by a vote of the majority of their total membership and by a vote of at least two-thirds of the members present and voting for such a change. The provisions as regards the other rights and privileges are

1 A discussion of the compromise effected as regards the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of the non-Malays is included in Ratnam, K.J., Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, 1965, pp 102-117.

amendable only after the consent of the Yang di Pertuan Agong (the Head of State) is secured. In 'exchange' for these special privileges and rights, the non-Malays were granted rights of citizenship, freedom to pursue their own religious faiths and use of their languages for non-official purposes. As enacted, the provisions involving this compromise were weighted in favour of the status-quo.

The Malays thus regard themselves as Bumiputra, literally 'sons of the soil', with a natural right to political control. Non-Malays are regarded as aliens who are there by sufferance of the Malays; their rights to citizenship and a place in Malaysian society are grudgingly conceded only because the Malay special privileges are recognized. Even so, the Malays resent the perceived economic prosperity of the non-Malay, and most particularly, the Chinese. The popular belief that the Chinese 'control' the economy is cast into doubt by data published in the Third Malaysia Plan.¹ These reveal the ownership of share capital of limited companies and, ownership and participation in key sectors of the economy by community and nationality. The statistics establish that there is a clear dominance of foreign interests in the ownership and control of the Malaysian economy. (Table 2) Nonetheless, the statistics confirm the view that of all the Malaysian communities, the Chinese are the most privileged economically. Even if the Chinese community does not control the economy, and the Indian community also comprises an underprivileged group, most Malaysians accept that the Malay community is economically less privileged than the other communities. Consequently, the Malay regards the fundamental and immediate function of his political strength as the instrument by which he can promote his own economic advancement. The non-Malay's hope for political equality is not

1 Government of Malaysia, Third Malaysia Plan, 1976-1980, 1976, p. 183.

Table 2

Ownership and Participation¹ in Key Sectors of the Economy,
Peninsular Malaysia, 1972/73 (percentage share in each sector)

Sector	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Others ²	Foreign
Modern agriculture ³ (planted acreaage, 1973)					
Rubber and oil palm	21.0	26.3	2.6	7.9	42.2
Coconut and tea	0	19.9	10.8	0.4	68.9
Industry (value of fixed assets, 1972)					
Mining	0.7	35.2	0.1	9.5	54.5
Manufacturing	6.9	32.5	0.8	14.0	45.8
Construction	2.4	85.6	1.4	3.8	6.8
Trade (turnover value, 1972)					
Wholesale	0.8	55.0	2.7	0.6	40.9
Retail	3.6	75.6	6.5	0.2	14.1
Transport (value of fixed assets, 1972)					
Taxi	40.6	39.7	18.0	1.7	0
Bus	18.0	54.3	1.6	16.5	9.6
Haulage	15.3	70.6	5.2	5.8	3.1
Professional establishments ⁴ (annual revenue, 1973)					
	5.3	51.0	11.4	18.4	13.9

1 In corporate and non-corporate sectors. Establishments are categorized on the basis of majority ownership. Government ownership is added to the Malay category as most of it is held in trust by public enterprises and agencies. In rubber and oil palm, Government ownership, excluding FELDA, is 0.9% and manufacturing, 5.0%.

2 Includes other Malaysians as well as establishments where no particular group owns more than 50% of the assets.

3 Includes FELDA which had a planted acreage of 526,900 in 1973 of which 96.2% was classified as Malay-owned and the balance as non-Malay, with Chinese holding 2.1% and Indians 1.6%.

4 Private establishments only. It includes doctors, dentists, lawyers, accountants, architects, engineers, surveyors and veterinary surgeons.

Source: Government of Malaysia, Third Malaysia Plan 1976-1980, 1976, p. 183.

considered negotiable until the Malay has at least reached economic parity.

Even if the first generation non-Malay Malaysians were willing to accept a secondary role in national politics, for those non-Malays who were born in Malaysia and know no other home, Malay special rights and privileges imply inferior status. Despite the majority of these conceding that some form of special assistance is necessary for the economic betterment of the Malay, their own frustrations and failures to advance satisfactorily in their careers are held to be the consequence of the Government's pro-Malay policy. Inter-communal competition and conflict thus forms the motif of Malaysian politics, and political parties have tended to represent and exacerbate these primordial loyalties and conflicts.

The communal composition of the country, with no community comprising a clear majority, created problems for political parties wishing to gain electoral majorities. The problems were overcome prior to independence by the formation of an intercommunal Alliance, a coalition of three communally based political parties - the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC). For a while it appeared that this formula would suffice to counter the centrifugal forces that threatened to destroy the viability of the state itself. Election campaigns, however, provided a forum for the expression of the frustrations of the various ethnic groups, and the polls an opportunity to register their own claims and even challenge those of others. The euphoria of independence and the Alliance's role in achieving it, retained for the Alliance Party, majority support in the first election held in independent Peninsular Malaysia. The artificial unity concomitant with the external threat posed by Indonesian

confrontation¹, even gained the Alliance increased support in the second parliamentary election in 1964. Communal issues nonetheless dominated the election campaigns. The 1969 parliamentary and state elections, however, provided the first clear opportunity for the Alliance formula to be challenged. The Malay opposition was united under the PAS, and the only non-Malay opposition remained fragmented.

Immediately before the election the non-Malay based opposition parties achieved an understanding amongst themselves, the consequence of which was a series of straight contests between Alliance candidates and opposition candidates. At the 1969 election the Alliance formula of compromise was rejected by the majority of Peninsular Malaysians. More significantly, the unrestrained airing of communal sentiments and the uncertainty as to whether the Alliance or the non-Malay opposition parties would form the governments of several states, particularly Selangor, invoked increased communal tension.

On May 13, 1969 intercommunal violence erupted in the capital city, Kuala Lumpur. Severe rioting and looting continued for almost a week, more than two hundred people were killed, about five hundred were wounded and almost nine thousand were arrested.² At the height of the rioting, two days after the outbreak of violence, the Yang di Pertuan Agong proclaimed a state of emergency and suspended the uncompleted parliamentary and state elections.³ Abdul Razak bin Hussein,

1 The formation of Malaysia in 1963 resulted in Indonesian hostility. The Alliance Government represented the principal issue of the election being one of unity in the face of external threat. This is discussed in some detail in Chapter III which deals with political party evolution.

2 Official estimates were 196 deaths, 180 injured by firearms, 259 injured by other weapons, 9,143 arrested. These data are provided in Malaysia, The National Operations Council, The May 13 Tragedy, 1969, pp 88 - 96. Unofficial estimates place the figures considerably higher. See for instance Slimming, J., Malaysia: Death of a Democracy, 1969, pp 29-48.

3 For a discussion of the measures adopted and the legal consequences of these see Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim, Tun, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, 1976, pp 228-232.

Deputy Prime Minister in the Alliance Government, was made Director of Operations and held solely responsible for exercising the executive authority of the Federation. He was subject to only two restrictions - he had to act on the Prime Minister's advice and was to be assisted by a National Operations Council consisting of persons appointed by himself. The functions of the federal cabinet were discharged by the National Operations Council and those of the state cabinets by the State Operations Committees whose members too were appointed by the Director of Operations. The ethnic composition of the National Operations Council comprised seven Malays, one Chinese and one Indian. Parliamentary government, many believed, had come to an end, and one commentator held that there had been:

"... a breakdown of parliamentary democracy in Malaysia, a breakdown which may prove to be permanent in terms of any meaningful representation of non-Malay elements in Malaysia's political system".¹

The events of May 1969 shocked the nation and provoked bitter communal animosity and paranoia. After the immediate task of containing the violence had been completed, the National Operations Council directed its efforts to seeking a strategy by which to curtail the tensions generated. A Department of National Unity to study, evaluate and implement economic and social programmes designed to promote national integration, was established. The Department was, under the leadership of Ghazalie Shafiee, charged with the task of formulating a "national ideology" which would "serve as the nexus uniting the people of Malaysia".² A National Consultative Council, comprising sixty-five members, representing the National Operations

1 Snider, N.L.; "Race, Leitmotiv of the Malayan Election Drama", Asian Survey, December 1970, p. 1080.

2 The Straits Times, July 18, 1969.

Council, the State Governments, political parties, religious organizations, professional associations, the Press, trade unions, teachers organizations and representatives of minority communities was established in January 1970.¹

The National Consultative Council met periodically over the next year and a half and, to avoid any public disquiet on the sensitive communal issues being discussed, held its meeting in camera. On Independence day the following year, August 31, 1970, the Yang di Pertuan Agong formally promulgated a statement of the national ideology of Malaysia, entitled "Rukunegara", which was to bind all Malaysians together and form the basis for the government's strategy for creating communal understanding. The introduction to the Rukunegara begins:-

"Malaysia is a land of many races. The diverse social, cultural and economic values which exist in our multiracial society are complicated by the identification of certain economic groups with particular racial communities and geographical locations ... Our nation-building efforts were marred by the activities of destructive elements. These elements are to be found in all communities. From time to time latent racist attitudes and racial prejudices were exploited on various pretexts leading to racial incidents. The most serious racial incident was the riot of May 13, 1969, in the Federal capital ... Activities in political, economic, educational, social and cultural fields must be geared towards the objective of national unity ... In our endeavour to achieve these ends we shall be guided by certain principles which have evolved in the course of a common history, signifying a synthesis of thoughts and feelings, and which have been enshrined in our Constitution. These ends and these principles, acceptable to all, will serve as the nexus which will bind us together. These ends to which our Nation is committed and the principles which will guide our actions will together constitute our RUKUNEGARA."²

The Declaration itself reads:-

OUR NATION, MALAYSIA, being dedicated
to achieving a greater unity of all her peoples;
to maintaining a democratic way of life;
to creating a just society in which the wealth
of the nation shall be equitably shared;

1 Means, G.P., Malaysian Politics, 1976, pp 413-414.

2 Malaysia, Ministry of Information, Rukunegara, 1970, p. 1.

to ensuring a liberal approach to her rich
and diverse cultural traditions;
to building a progressive society which shall
be oriented to modern science and technology;

WE, her peoples pledge our united efforts to attain
these ends guided by these principles:-

Belief in God
Loyalty to King and Country
Upholding the Constitution
Rule of Law
Good Behaviour and Morality.¹

The Rukunegara was an indication of the developments to come.

The commentary on 'Beliefs' elucidates 'A Democratic Society' thus:-

We are dedicated to maintaining a democratic way of life
in which ultimate power lies with the people acting through
a constitutionally elected Parliament. All of us regard
ourselves as Malaysians irrespective of race or creed.

In our system the national interests must prevail.
The interests of the whole must come before the interests
of any sectional group, because otherwise the stability
and security of the Nation will be jeopardised.

Fundamental liberties and freedom of political activity
consistent with the laws of the country are guaranteed by
our Constitution, but these rights shall not be abused, in
the name of democracy, to promote racialism or to destroy
democracy itself.²

With the promulgation of the Rukunegara Prime Minister
Tunku Abdul Rahman announced the Government's intentions to reconvene
Parliament in February 1971.³ A White Paper was issued and proposed
a series of amendments to the Malaysian Constitution designed to
achieve two principal objectives:-

" ... to remove sensitive issues from the realm of public
discussions so as to allow the smooth functioning of
parliamentary democracy; and to redress the racial
imbalance in certain sectors of the nation's life and
thereby promote national unity."⁴

1 Ibid., p. 6.

2 Ibid., pp 8-9.

3 The Straits Times, August 31, 1970.

4 Government of Malaysia, Towards National Harmony, 1971, p. 2.

The Constitution (Amendment) Bill which proposed to make these amendments was the first order of business for Parliament which was reconvened on February 21, 1971; indeed the adoption by Parliament of the amendments was held to be the precondition for parliamentary government.¹ The provisions of the proposed Bill² sought to:-

- 1 Amend Article 10 of the Constitution and give power to Parliament to pass any law prohibiting the questioning of any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of
 - a) Part III of the Constitution which contains provisions relating to citizenship, its acquisition and rights;
 - b) Article 152 relating to the National Language (Malay) and the languages of the other communities;
 - c) Article 153 relating to the special position of the Malays and the legitimate interests of the other communities; and
 - d) Article 181 relating to the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers.
- 2 Modify Articles 63 and 72 of the Constitution with regard to the privilege of the Members of Parliament and the State Assemblies not being liable to any judicial proceedings in respect of anything said in any proceeding of Parliament and State Assemblies or in a Committee thereof. The defence of privilege was made no longer available.
- 3 Define the term 'official purpose' in Article 152 relating to the National Language. The Constitution had hitherto provided that Malay should be the National Language without preventing or prohibiting the use of other languages except for official purposes. Official purpose was now defined to mean "any purpose of Government, whether Federal or State, including any purpose of a public authority".
- 4 Provide the Yang di Pertuan Agong powers to, in his exercise of the responsibility entrusted to him under Article 153 of the Constitution to ensure the reservation

1 Lim Kit Siang, DAP Member of Parliament for Bandar Melaka said in Parliament " ... we strongly deplore the Sword of Damocles which the Government has hung over the reconvening of Parliament with their oft-repeated threats that Parliament will be disbanded if it does not provide the necessary two-thirds majority vote to amend the Constitution". Government of Malaysia, Parliamentary Debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill 1971, 1972, p. 11.

2 Ibid., pp 8-9.

for Malays and natives of the Borneo States of a reasonable proportion of places in universities, colleges and institutions providing post-secondary education where there are more qualified candidates than there are places.

- 5 Amend Article 159 (5) of the Constitution by providing that these amendments be themselves not amended in future without the consent of the Council of Rulers.

The amendments were indeed far reaching and in proposing the Bill in Parliament Tun Abdul Razak, who had taken over as Premier from Tunku Abdul Rahman, held:

"Our nation has gone through the most dangerous crisis in her history. Deep emotions of fear and bitterness, of anger and mistrust have been aroused ... Let us remember that the democratic system we are working has to bear the stresses and strains of a multi-racial society. ... shall we return simply to the ways of the past when, in the name of democracy and freedom of speech, irresponsible elements were at liberty to foment and exploit racial emotions until we were brought to the very brink of national integration?"¹

The position of the non-Malays in the Government as regards the Bill was reflected in the statement of the MCA President, Tun Tan Siew Sin, who seconded the Bill:-

"I readily concede that, in theory, what we are advocating is not what one would regard as a model of parliamentary democracy ... but our multi-racial society is so unique that it is probably the most complex and complicated plural society in all history. Conditions are, therefore, anything but ideal for a full fledged democracy ... in the last analysis, it is better to have something less than one hundred per cent democracy than no democracy at all."²

The Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the People's Progressive Party (PPP), two principally non-Malay based opposition parties, rejected the contention that the May riots were caused by the discussion and debate of the 'sensitive issues' during the parliamentary and state elections. They considered that the scope of the amendments were so vague that they could cover criticism of, or, opposition to, government policy and action, and that they were aimed at Opposition members and critics. They argued that these constitutional changes represented a

1 Ibid., p. 7.

2 Ibid., p. 11.

political move to bolster the fortunes of the ruling Alliance and its component parties which had suffered a loss of support at the 1969 election.¹ The Act was nonetheless passed by 126 votes to seventeen - all political parties represented in Parliament, except the Democratic Action Party and the People's Progressive Party, voted for the Bill.

With the sensitive issues removed from public discussion, the Government turned to the medium and long term corrective measures aimed at overcoming what it regarded as the principal causes of inter-communal strife - economic imbalance between the communities and the identification of race with economic function. The New Economic Policy, as this was termed, became the guideline for the Second Malaysia Plan and was essentially two pronged in its aim:

- 1 to reduce and eventually eradicate poverty, by raising income levels and increasing employment opportunities for all Malaysians, irrespective of race; and
- 2 accelerating the process of restructuring Malaysian society to correct economic imbalance, so as to reduce and eventually eliminate the identification of race with economic function. This process involved the modernization of rural lives, rapid and balanced growth of urban activities and the creation of a Malay commercial and industrial community in all categories and at all levels of operation so that Malays and other indigenous people will become full partners in all aspects of the economic life of the nation.²

The amendments to the Constitution pertaining to intercommunal arrangements, the national philosophy as contained in the Rukunegara, and the New Economic Policy were each introduced with an air of finality. It was not for society at large to discuss these issues and arrive at a consensus; whatever discussion there was of these issues was behind closed doors and the issues were presented as a

1 Speeches of Lim Kit Siang, DAP Secretary General and S.P. Seenivasagam, PPP President, during the parliamentary debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill 1971, Ibid., pp 13-20 and pp 40-44.

2 Government of Malaysia, Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975, 1971, p.1.

fait accompli, the minimum that all 'loyal' Malaysians had to subscribe to. With this as the foundation of agreement the Alliance, principally its dominant partner UMNO, attempted to enlarge the coalition. In 1971 and 1972, a number of opposition parties, which had hitherto been amongst the principal adversaries in the political arena, agreed to join the UMNO, MCA and MIC in a larger coalition. The entry of each of these opposition parties - the PAS, the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia and the PPP - was certainly dictated by a number of different priorities, but the post-1969 political climate provided the nexus for such co-operation. The new style politics called 'consensus politics', and the enlarged coalition provided the structure for working out an internal settlement to politically divisive issues. The future of parliamentary democracy as practised previously and the semblance of a multi-party system that had existed since independence, both appeared to be coming to an end.

The 1974 parliamentary election was thus of fundamental importance to Malaysian society. It was the first opportunity that Peninsular Malaysians had to go to the polls since the debacle of 1969 and the subsequent developments. Malaysians, and the world at large, viewed it as of momentous importance and a mirror reflective of public opinion, particularly of the opinion of the various communities, on the fundamental changes that had been witnessed since 1969. At issue lay the crucial question - whether the communally divided Malaysian state could long endure.

Objectives of the study

The principal objective of this study of the 1974 parliamentary election is to examine the role of the communal factor in the electoral process in Peninsular Malaysian society. Elections are infinitely complex events and thus it is necessary to limit the discussion to selected aspects of them. The approach utilized here is to regard

the electoral process as comprising three primary interconnected components - the electoral system, the political parties, and the electorate. This allows for the electoral process to be viewed as involving an electoral structure or system which sets the bounds or stage within which the political parties as the actors appeal to the electorate. The electorate's response itself may be likened to that of an audience reaction. The numerous aspects that comprise an election are all subsumed into these three broad components so as to allow for a structured approach in the treatment of the material in order to fulfil the primary aim of this study.

The electoral system, comprising the body of rules that define competition may unwittingly, or by conscious design, introduce biases favouring particular segments of society. The system is not indifferent to the groups whose interests are affected by it, and the enquiry therefore begins with an examination of the formal aspects of the electoral system and the administration of elections. Examined are the implications of plurality voting in single member territorial constituencies, the franchise rules, the machinery and procedure adopted for the administration of elections, the compiling of electoral registers, the nomination of candidates, the campaign, polling, the counting of the votes, the regulation of election expenses, election offences and lastly, petitions. The objective here is to ascertain whether the system itself is adequate for the conduct of an equitable election and to assess the discrimination if any introduced by the body of rules governing elections.

The thesis then examines the delimitation of constituencies with reference to the principles laid down in the Constitution for this. The apportionment and delineation principles, the changes effected to these, and the implications for representation of the principles and the changes effected are examined. Particular emphasis will be given to the 1974 apportionment and delineation of constituencies and the

spatial biases these evoke. An attempt is made to represent in quantitative form the discrimination that is introduced for or against each community by the franchise rules and the delimitation of constituencies.

The section on political parties will, it is hoped, provide some light towards understanding the institutional, spatial and population bases of political parties so as to appreciate the manner in which these political parties attempt to mobilise support in Peninsular Malaysia's plural society. This is done by first tracing the evolution of party politics and establishing the dominance of communal considerations throughout. The state of the parties and their respective positions at the 1974 election is established by examining political developments since the 1969 election. The enquiry then seeks to examine aspects of communal discrimination by the political parties. The procedure adopted is to define political party openness as evidenced by the membership requirements stipulated in the respective constitutions of the parties, and then classify the parties according to these theoretical parameters for membership. The parties, having thus been differentiated the spatial distribution of party branches, candidate selection and candidate placement are examined for communal discrimination. Indices of dissimilarity between the parties are then presented in tabular form. Such an examination presents a theoretical rationale and some empirical support for the identification of political parties as having an appeal to and representing the interest of particular communities. Party organization for the election, election manifestos and the issues raised are then viewed as a concerted attempt to mobilise support of the various communities. Hence the focus of the examination in the section on the 'Appeal for the Votes' is essentially to discern the manner in which each party attempts to mobilise support from an anticipated ethnocentric electorate.

The final part of the thesis aims to examine the electorates' response to these appeals. The election results analysis is aimed at examining the implications of the voting for several aspects. More directly it examines the victory in terms of seats. Analysis at this level reflects more the nuances of the system utilized than the actual basis of support for the parties. Hence the rest of the analysis is in terms of the votes polled by the parties. The state-wise and rural-urban distribution of the votes, and the communal bases of support are examined. Turn-out and rejected votes are analysed for their implications.

Examination of the above aspects of the 1974 parliamentary election, and the electoral process at large, would serve not only to satisfy the principal objective but also to shed light on a broader issue. In the political wrangling, competition and consensus that is being evolved, will the electoral system truly allow for equitable representation, or would the minorities tend to suffer? Without explicitly formulating a hypothesis, it is still feasible that an election study of the kind attempted here will provide data for at least some preliminary conclusions on this question.

Methodology

Especially since the Second World War there has been no dearth of geographical studies of elections. So rapid has this development been that it has led some geographers to contend that electoral geography is the very core and substance of political geography.¹ Semantics aside, such contentions at least serve to establish that the geographer's contribution to the study and analysis of election data is valuable, and has already been substantial. Indeed the geographer's

¹ Cox, K.R., "A Spatial Interaction Model for Political Geography", East Lakes Geographer, Vol. 4, 1969, p. 58.

interest in elections has seen no bounds and virtually every aspect of elections has been dealt with. Thus geographical studies of electoral systems, the spatial organization of electoral areas, the regional basis of party organization, appeal and support, and the analysis of election results have all been attempted; recently several excellent articles and books on the theory and practice in geographical studies of voting behaviour have appeared.¹ It is not proposed here to attempt a survey of geographical works on elections - the present study covers too broad a spectrum of inquiry and makes any meaningful concentrated survey here impossible. In discussing the treatment of the data in the various chapters, however, appropriate reference is made to other works so as to aid in the classification of the material and in the choice of appropriate methodology. The dichotomy that has arisen in the approaches to the analysis of election results, however, makes it imperative for the approach adopted in this work to be explained.

Initial works in electoral geography assumed that people vote in accordance with what they perceive to be in their best interests, and therefore explored the characteristics of voters which might give a clue to the nature of this self-interest. Hence areal variations in social and economic class, religion, nationality and race were among the prime factors considered. On the basis of these, geographers explained the foundations of voting patterns, for whole countries or

1 Prescott, J.R.V., "The Functions and Methods of Electoral Geography", Annals of the Association of American Geographers, Vol. 49, pp 296-304;

Prescott, J.R.V., "Electoral Studies in Political Geography" in Kasperson, R., and Minghi, J.V. (eds.), The Structure of Political Geography, 1970, pp 376-383;

McPhail, I.R., "Recent Trends in Electoral Geography", Proceedings of the Sixth New Zealand Geography Conference, Vol. 1., pp 7-12, New Zealand Geographical Society Conference Series, No. 6, 1971.

Prescott, J.R.V., Political Geography, 1972, pp 75-91.
Busteed, M.A., Geography and Voting Behaviour, 1975.

large sections of them. This approach has been criticised on the grounds that by concentrating upon generalised voting patterns of groups, geographers overlook individual behaviour, or even more seriously, that on the basis of such aggregate data individual behaviour is falsely explained.¹ The alternative approach suggested is one which is essentially process oriented and examines the stages whereby spatial patterns of voting are seen as the end result of a mass of individual decisions and actions.² The individual decisions and actions are themselves viewed as the result of attitude formation after an evaluation of the information that an individual receives from his environment. Such an approach allows for a link to the voluminous body of studies of perception. Examined for their significance to individual decisions and actions are spatial processes such as contagion and contextual influences. The polemical sting that has emanated from the proponents of both these views appears to be conducted with a view to regarding them as mutually exclusive alternatives. For instance, in questioning the relevance and value of much of the earlier work in electoral geography Muir contends that they have been

"... rather marginal, and if electoral geography is to be considered a part of political geography there is a definite need for approaches which will demonstrate the links between environment and voting behaviour; if such links do not emerge as being significant, the case for electoral studies outside the other social sciences is weak."³

Prescott however criticises the new approach and states

"If geographers follow the advice of Reynolds and Archer and Cox and concentrate on these spatial processes, they will be abandoning a road of proven reliability for a track which may lead into regions of sociology where they are ill-equipped to survive."⁴

1 Cox, K.R., op. cit., p. 58.

2 Cox, K.R., "The Voting Decision in a Spatial Context", in Chorley, R.J., Hagget, P., and Stoddart, D.R., Progress in Geography, Vol. 1, 1969, pp 96-117.

3 Muir, R., Modern Political Geography, 1975, pp 207-208.

4 Prescott, J.R.V., Political Geography, 1972, p.87.

Clearly each approach directs itself to different aspects of concern to the geographer and hence they are best regarded as complementary approaches within the wider field of concern of electoral geography. The approach that is to be selected for any particular study will have to depend on the aspect that is to be examined and, as importantly, on the data that are available for study.

The data that presents itself as useful and appropriate for this study of the 1974 parliamentary election is the one that attempts to correlate aggregate data on ethnicity with voting patterns, at the constituency level. The utilization of aggregate data offers a number of advantages for reasons best articulated by Austin Ranney:

"the availability and inexpensiveness of aggregate data invite replicative and comparative studies on a wide scale ... [Aggregate election data] ... are the "hardest" data we can get, in the sense that their meaning and comparability vary less from area to area, from time to time, and from study to study than do most survey data ...

Whatever complex socio-psychological processes may underlie the voters' decisions to make particular allocations, the votes themselves constitute a basic medium of political exchange. Thus their relative "hardness" as much as their accessibility, makes election returns a significant body of data for political analysis."¹

Other factors also dictate the utilization of the aggregate approach, as distinct from the behavioural approach for this study. Operationalization of the behavioural approach ideally relies on survey material. Unfortunately survey analysis, involving the compilation of questionnaires and the interviewing of a sample of electors is - in the Peninsular Malaysian context - a highly inappropriate form of political analysis. Selection and training of interviewers and translation of questionnaires and replies into at least four languages - Malay, Chinese, Tamil and English - are, to say

¹ Ranney, A., "The Utility and Limitations of Aggregate Data in the Study of Electoral Behaviour" in Ranney, A., (ed.) Essays on the Behavioural Study of Politics, 1962, p. 96.

the least, particularly formidable undertakings. More importantly, formal enquiry into political attitudes and opinions will hardly bring forth candid and honest answers. Ratnam and Milne, who made the first authoritative and academic study of elections in Peninsular Malaysia, commenting on an opinion poll on politics attempted in the Kuala Lumpur area in March and April 1964 observe:-

"Respondents were asked what they liked best, and least, about the government. ... Less than half the respondents answered the question of what they liked least ... The limitations of public opinion polls at elections, already indicated by the reluctance to criticize Alliance policy were confirmed by the answers to the question: 'If a general election was held tomorrow, for which party would you vote?' 44 per cent refused to answer, 46 per cent said 'Alliance', only about 10 per cent named a party other than the Alliance. Yet in the Kuala Lumpur area the opposition parties won about 60 per cent of the vote. In the absence of any evidence that there was a late swing of support away from the Alliance, it must be concluded that only about one in six of the opposition party voters was willing to state his preferences openly."¹

This was in 1964 when the political climate was infinitely more relaxed. The communally charged political atmosphere, the perceived fear of the retributive wrath of those in power against those withholding support, and the 1971 amendments to the Constitution barring discussion of 'sensitive issues' all make a candid discussion of political issues difficult, if not impossible, via the medium of a questionnaire. The unwillingness of Malaysians in general to discuss what must remain the focal point in a questionnaire survey for this study, impedes the conduct of any such questionnaire and would make suspect, if not invalidate, any conclusions drawn on the basis of such a survey.

The other form of operationalization of the behavioural approach relies on aggregate data, but here the technique has been to relate aggregate electoral returns to census material over very small tracts

¹ Ratnam, K.J., and Milne, R.S., The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964, 1969, pp 3-4.

of the constituency.¹ Such a technique compromises the benefits of sample surveys because it generalises on individual acts on the basis of the collective behaviour of very small groups. In countries like the United States of America and France where the voting returns at each polling district are made available and access to unpublished census material is possible, this technique may be employed. In Malaysia, the ballot papers from each of the polling districts that comprise a constituency are all mixed before the votes are counted and hence the voting data available are the aggregate for the whole constituency. Unpublished census material, especially data pertaining to communal composition and characteristics of particular areas, are treated as classified and even material pertaining to the number of persons of voting age by community for the respective communities was not made available to the writer.²

The data utilized in this thesis are essentially aggregate data, they describe collective behaviour, not individual acts; the interest here is to discern and describe the collective behaviour of particular communities and not the individual acts of its members. This remains the basis of analysis and discussion throughout this study of the 1974 Parliamentary election in Peninsular Malaysia.

1 Reynolds and Archer utilized detailed analysis of "block statistics" aggregated to the precinct level in their pioneering work and suggest that such analyses provided "within-precinct" homogeneity is assessed, should prove a valuable research contribution to electoral geography. Reynolds, D.R., and Archer, J.C., An Inquiry into the Spatial Basis of Electoral Geography, 1969, p. 31.

2. Attempts to obtain data by community for each of the constituencies from the Statistics Department proved unsuccessful. The writer was referred to the Election Commission for this. The Election Commission, for its part, denied that it compiled any data by community.

C H A P T E R O N E

The Electoral System and the Administration of Elections

Manhood suffrage is not itself a sufficient condition but it is invariably regarded as an important condition of democracy. The physical act of voting occupies the voter for only a few minutes once every four or five years, and the role cannot be said to be a demanding one. But possession of the right to vote transforms the great mass of citizens from being a captive audience of the political drama to being at least occasional participants themselves. Audience they may be for the most part, but when their turn comes they have the power to replace the entire cast if the performance is found wanting, and the knowledge of this power is bound to make the full-time actors more sensitive to audience reactions. Such a conception of the power of the ballot assumes, however, that the electoral system performs the fundamental function of translating the wishes of the ordinary voter into an elected chamber of representatives and in the process provides for freedom of choice, avoids at least the grosser forms of corruption and secures general acceptance as a fair way of choosing between rival claimants to political office. Clearly, electoral forms may be existent but the substance may be totally absent.

Writing in 1966, Dahl notes that of the 113 members of the United Nations in 1964, only about thirty had, during the previous decade, political systems in which legal party opposition had existed.¹ The New Encyclopaedia Britannica observes

"In a purely formal sense, the great majority of the approximately 130 contemporary nations have what are called "elections", but probably only a third of these have more or less competitive elections; perhaps a fifth have one-party elections; and in some others the electoral situation is highly ambiguous." 2

Emphasising the importance of an appreciation of the mechanism of the

1 Dahl, R.A., (ed.), Political Oppositions in Western Democracies, 1966, p. x.

2 The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, Vol. 6, 1974, p. 529.

elections before geographers should venture into electoral studies, Prescott suggests that there were 71 countries in which elections were sufficiently open to repay detailed analysis and 57 where, due to various constraints, it would be fruitless.¹ Prescott did not oblige by listing the states concerned. Malaysia, however, receives mention in Weiner's essay on political participation and political development, and Weiner considers that Malaysia numbered among the developing nations that did not place major limitations on political participation.² In 1970, however, Blair, in his doctoral work on Caste, Politics and Democracy in Bihar State, India: The Elections of 1967, in noting the changes that had occurred since Weiner's work, holds:

"In May of 1969, severe restrictions were placed upon political participation in Malaysia: so severe that it would not be unreasonable to conclude that democracy has been extinguished there, at least for the time being."³

Blair in 1970 had been slightly more optimistic than the then Malaysian Minister of Home Affairs had been in 1969. Shocked by the communal riots that ensued from the elections of 1969, the Minister had declared "Democracy is dead in Malaysia".⁴ In 1971, however, Malaysia made a comeback to parliamentary democracy but restrictions were placed on certain aspects of electioneering and party politics. An examination of the formal aspects of the Malaysian electoral system thus becomes even more vital for this study of the 1974 election. This chapter aims to examine the formal aspects of the electoral system and the administration of elections in Malaysia so as to appreciate their

1 Prescott, J.R.V., "Electoral Studies in Political Geography", in Kasperson, R.E., and Minghi, J.V., (eds.), The Structure of Political Geography, 1970, p. 378.

2 Weiner, M., "Political Participation and Political Development", in Weiner, M., (ed.), Modernization: The Dynamics of Growth, 1966, p. 206.

3 Blair, H., Caste, Politics and Democracy in Bihar State, India: The Elections of 1967, 1970, p. 2.

4 The Straits Times, May 14, 1969.

historical evolution and the extent to which they serve to influence the nature of representation of the Malaysian people. Such an examination will also serve as a backdrop against which the rest of the chapters may be usefully considered.

The Electoral System

The electoral system in use in Malaysia today is structured largely along the lines recommended by the committee appointed on July 15th, 1953 to examine the question of elections to the hitherto wholly nominated Federal Legislative Council. The committee's terms of reference were wide and read:

- "i) To examine the questions of elections to the Federal Legislative Council and constitutional changes in the Federal Government arising therefrom; and
- ii) To make recommendations and submit a report at the earliest possible date consistent with the importance of the task." 1

In the absence of any previous elections at the federal level the committee had no guidelines or precedents to adopt. Yet the task, undertaken by a working party of twenty from amongst the forty-six member committee, was completed in a third of the year. The committee "mindful of the fact that constitutional development in the Federation of Malaya presents problems that in their entirety find little parallel in other countries",² regarded the uncritical application of patterns which have been evolved elsewhere as not necessarily advantageous to this country. The system adopted, however, was wholly structured along the lines of the British electoral system. Hence, the committee recommended that plurality-voting, more commonly known as the Anglo-American first-past-the-post system, based on

1 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Question of Elections to the Federal Legislative Council, 1954, p. 1. (Hereinafter referred to as the Report of the Election Committee.)

2 Ibid., p. 2.

single-member territorial constituencies and having a common roll, should form the basis of the country's electoral model.

In accepting the first-past-the-post system, the committee conceded that the system would tend to emphasize and in a measure exaggerate the advantage to large parties and thereby compromise the principle of fair representation. But it considered this disadvantage less consequential than the disadvantage that would accrue from a weak government that would emerge from a large number of small parties attempting to form a coalition government. Rather contentiously, the committee considered that proportional representation would result in a multiplicity of small parties, and that the coalition governments which result are "sometimes so unstable as to make difficult the application of long-term policies or the introduction of radical but necessary measures which are unpopular with any part of the coalition".¹ What the committee could not foresee was that, despite their recommendations, from the very first election the government has been in the hands of coalitions.

Another important consideration of the committee was to establish a form of election that would not make it difficult for the average voter to grasp the precise significance of the electoral process and his participation in it. For these reasons the committee did not recommend the "limited vote" and "alternative vote" systems.² The assumed qualities of strong government and simplicity determined the choice of the first-past-the-post system.

It is impossible to predict with precision the composition of the Malaysian House of Representatives should another electoral system be adopted. The truth is that any electoral system reflects a delicate balance of its undoubted mechanical effects, its more questionable

1 Ibid., p. 14.

2 Ibid., p. 14.

psychological effects, the nature of political conflict and the history of the evolution of party and voting systems. In Malaysia, as elsewhere, the effect of utilizing the first-past-the-post system has been to exaggerate the relative strength of the ruling coalition, i.e. the Alliance Party and its successor the Barisan Nasional. Such is the mechanical effect of utilising the system. Table 3 lists the percentage of votes won by the Alliance Party and the percentage of seats it obtained at each of the parliamentary elections held in Peninsular Malaysia. In no election, except the first held in 1955, did the Alliance share of the votes exceed two-thirds of that polled, and in the 1969 election its share of the votes actually dropped to less than half that polled. Clearly the Alliance share of the votes being less than two-thirds since 1959, it would not have been able to alter the Constitution were it not for the exaggerated number of seats awarded it by the first-past-the-post system. This seems a particularly relevant consideration since the constitutional changes introduced by the Government to alter aspects of the electoral system were all done in the years when its share of the popular vote was less than two-thirds.

Presumably because it is the only system Malaysians are used to, and it is not envisaged that the ruling coalition would concede any electoral reform in this area, there has been no significant call for a change in the system. None of the political parties has dwelt on the issue with any sense of urgency; nor has any one of them included it as part of their election manifesto or party policy. But change being unlikely has not hindered opposition party leaders from referring to the "inbuilt inequity in our electoral system where vote percentages do not necessarily have to tally with seat percentages"¹ in explaining

1 Fan Yew Teng, DAP National Organising Secretary, at the Great Economic Debate on "The 1974 General Election: A Post-Mortem", organized by the University of Malaya Economics Society on September 20, 1974.

Table 3

Votes and Seats won by Government Coalition in Peninsular Malaysian
Parliamentary Elections 1955-1974 *

Year	% Votes	Total No. of Seats	No. of Seats won	% Seats won
1955	79.6	52	51	98.1
1959	51.8	104	74	71.2
1964	58.5	104	89	85.6
1969	48.6	104	66	63.5
1974	61.5	114	104	91.3

Smith, T.E., op. cit., 1955, and
* Source: Election Commission reports on parliamentary elections of
1959, 1964, 1969 and 1974.

their poor performances in the elections. Dr. Tan Chee Koon, whose Partai Keadilan Masyarakat gained only one parliamentary seat despite winning 5.3% of the popular vote in Peninsular Malaysia in the 1974 election, specifically recommends the "German system where fifty per cent of the seats are elected under the first-past-the-post system and fifty per cent by proportional representation".¹ What is clear is that with the increased domination of the political arena by the Government coalition, and in this aided greatly by the electoral system, opposition parties are likely to look for changes, and it is probable that the first-past-the-post system will be subjected to increased scrutiny and criticism.

Administering the system

The principal component in any electoral system is the body established to administer the elections, for few governments would, if left to administer the elections by themselves, resist the temptation of 'fixing' the outcome. Again, an election conducted by the government, it being one of the contending parties, would serve to diminish the legitimacy conferred on it. The administration of elections inevitably devolves on three elements of society, namely the elected assembly itself, the civil service and the judiciary. It is from any one or a combination of these elements that a body to administer elections is usually evolved.

The first federal-level election in the country was held on July 27, 1955, only eighteen months after the publication of the report of the committee appointed to examine the question of elections to the Federal Legislative Council. Prior to that, even state and settlement level elections had been held in Johore, Trengganu and Penang only,

1 Tan Chee Koon, Pekemas President, at the debate mentioned in the footnote above.

though numerous municipal, town council and local council elections had been held in different parts of the Federation.¹ Indeed, the mass of the electorate living in rural areas voted for the first time at the election held for the Federal Legislative Council. Of the electorate registered for this election only some twenty-five per cent had had the opportunity to vote on any previous occasion.² There existed no machinery to conduct elections and as a temporary measure the responsibility for the arrangements for the first federal level election was given to the Chief Secretary to the Federal Government. A Supervisor of Elections working under the Chief Secretary was appointed on June 23, 1954. In December 1954 a committee, consisting of eight members of the wholly nominated Legislative Council, selected from the main political parties, two State Secretaries and one Settlement Secretary, and three other officials were appointed to advise the Chief Secretary. Election departments were created at headquarters in Kuala Lumpur and in the several states and settlements. The 1955 election was conducted with such arrangements.³

Soon after the election, the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission was established to consider the constitution that independent Malaya should have and, as part of its recommendations, the Commission called for the establishment of an Election Commission of three members independent of the Government. Such election commissions had been established in virtually all the British colonies that had hitherto become independent. The Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission had envisaged that

"In appointing members of the Election Commission the Yang di Pertuan Besar shall have regard to the importance of securing an Election which enjoys the confidence of all

1 Smith, T.E., Report of the First Election of Members to the Legislative Council of the Federation of Malaya, 1955, p. 1.

2 Ibid., p. 1.

3 Ibid., p. 2.

democratic parties and of persons of all communities."¹

The final draft of the Malayan Constitution of 1957, which was a result of the Alliance Party's influence, was less specific and merely read that the Commission should enjoy "public confidence".

To ensure that the Election Commission cannot be interfered with by the Government, Article 114(3) of the 1957 Malayan Constitution provided that:

"A member of the Election Commission shall cease to hold office on attaining the age of sixty-five years or on becoming disqualified under Clause (4) and may at any time resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Yang di-Pertuan Agong, but shall not be removed from office except on the like grounds and in the like manner as a judge of the Supreme Court."

The said Clause (4) of Article 114 read

"A person is disqualified for appointment as a member of the Election Commission if he holds any other office of profit or is a member of either House of Parliament or of the Legislative Assembly of any State."²

Though obviously the Yang di Pertuan Agong was required to consult the Government in appointing the Election Commission, once appointed the Election Commission was guaranteed sufficient safeguards to operate as an independent and impartial authority.

The Election Commission appointed under the provisions of Article 114 of the 1957 Constitution consisted of a Chairman and two other members. The initial appointments were wholly in the spirit of the 1957 Constitution and even of the recommendations made by the Constitutional Commission. A prominent and respected Malay, Haji Mustapha Albakri, was appointed Chairman and a Chinese, Lee Ewe Boon, and an Indian, Ditt Singh - both retired civil servants - were appointed as the two other members. The new Chairman's standing in society was indeed

1 Great Britain, Colonial Office, Report of the Federation of Malaya Constitutional Commission, 1957, Appendix II, Article 106(3), p. 160.

2 The establishment and functioning of the Election Commission are governed by articles 113-120 of the Constitution of the Federation of Malaya.

high¹ and it was his efforts that went a long way to earn the Commission its early good reputation. He, though once a member of UMNO, the principal partner in the coalition Alliance, had resigned it to join Party Negara, which too he resigned from in disagreement with its shift towards an increasingly anti-non-Malay stand. He had served as acting-Chief Minister of Perak State, Keeper of Rulers Seal, Secretary of the Conference of Rulers and as a member of the pre-independence cabinet. The Alliance Government's appointment of him as Chairman was generally welcomed.

In 1960 the Commission presented its report on the revised delimitation of constituencies which the Alliance Government considered unsatisfactory. An attempt was made by the Government to remove Haji Mustapha Albakri as Chairman by amending Article 114(4) of the Malayan Constitution to read:

"Notwithstanding anything in clause (3) the Yang di Pertuan Agong may by order remove from office any member of the Election Commission if such member
 (a) is an undischarged bankrupt; or
 (b) engages in any paid office or employment outside the duties of his office; or
 (c) is a member of either House of Parliament or the Legislative Assembly of a State."

The Chairman, Haji Mustapha Albakri, though not holding "any other office of profit" as defined by the Constitution, held business interests yielding remunerations. The attempt to remove him, however, failed since the Chairman was able to fall back on Article 114(6) of the Constitution which provides that "the remuneration and other terms of office of a member of the Election Commission shall not be altered to his disadvantage after his appointment." In the event he continued to serve as Chairman till his retirement in 1967 at the age of sixty-five.

In 1964 the Chinese member, Lee Ewe Boon, retired and in 1965 the

1 Morais, J.V. (ed.), Leaders of Malaya and Who's Who, 1957-58, 1958, p. 50.

Indian member, Ditt Singh, retired - both on reaching sixty-five years. The new appointments, though also a Chinese and an Indian, were both Alliance Party members. Tan Cheng Leng was a Malayan Chinese Association stalwart and his appointment was objected to by the Election Commission, but the Commission's views were overruled. The new appointee on being appointed to the Commission resigned his membership in the Malayan Chinese Association. R. Sathiah, the replacement for Ditt Singh, was ex-president of the Klang branch of the Malayan Indian Congress. The fourth member of the Commission, appointed according to the Malaysia Constitution of 1963 and the Inter-Governmental Committee Report¹ that preceded it, was also an active member of the Alliance Party. He is Abang Haji Marzuki, an ex-member of BARJASA, a component of the Sarawak Alliance and an unsuccessful Alliance Party candidate for the Kuching Rural District Council election of 1963.

The new Chairman, Dato Ahmad Perang, has no known party connections and, like his predecessor, served in high office in the civil service. Tan Cheng Leng was succeeded by Ong Beng Chye, a retired legal officer from the Attorney-General's chambers, and in turn by Boey Kok Keat, a retired senior police officer. The practice adopted in appointing members to the Commission has continued to be on the basis of nominations made by the three communal based component parties of the Alliance - UMNO, MCA and MIC.

The Election Commission's functions as envisaged by the 1957 Constitution were to

- (a) delimit constituencies;
- (b) prepare and revise electoral rolls;
- and (c) conduct elections to the House of Representatives, the Legislative Assemblies of the States, the Municipal Council of the capital city and any other elections that may be authorised by federal or state law.²

1 Malaysia, Election Commission, Report on the Parliamentary (Dewan Rakyat) and State Legislative Assembly General Elections 1964 of the States of Malaya, 1965, p. 2. (Hereinafter referred to as 1964 Elections Report.)

2 Federation of Malaya Constitution, Article 113 (1).

Also included was a provision which charged the Commission with the responsibility of organizing and conducting elections to the Senate when according to the provisions of the Constitution direct popular election of representatives of the States in the Senate are made. This provision is also included in the Malaysian Constitution of 1963 but has yet to become operative. In 1960 Parliament enacted the Local Government Elections Act, entrusting the Commission with the conduct of the local government elections. In 1963, however, local government elections were suspended and are yet to be resumed; consequently this power became inoperative.

The Commission's power to delimit constituencies was withdrawn in 1962 after the Alliance Government, probably fearing its own electoral chances, found the Commission's 1960 delimitation exercise unsatisfactory.¹ The Commission's now curtailed powers in this area were to "recommend" changes and Parliament became the final arbiter of any delimitation proposals. In effect, of course, this meant the government of the day.

As a means of ensuring the Commission's independence and preventing any imperious intervention by Parliament, the remuneration of the members of the Election Commission is charged to the Consolidated Fund and thus not subject to annual scrutiny, debate and approval by Parliament. The Constitution also guarantees that the remuneration may not be altered to the disadvantage of the commissioners after their appointment.

The Commission is empowered to employ such number of persons, on such terms and subject to such conditions, as it may with the Yang di Pertuan Agung determine. Elections are, however, periodic events normally held every five years; thus to maintain a large and continuous staff is neither desirable nor even economically feasible.

¹ A detailed discussion of this is included in Chapter Two which deals with constituency delimitation in Peninsular Malaysia.

Accordingly the Commission employs a very small staff consisting of five officers as secretary and assistant secretaries, fourteen supervisors of elections, eleven deputy-supervisors and other secretarial, clerical and support staff.¹ The secretary and assistant secretaries of the Commission have always been drawn from the 'general pool' of the Malaysian civil service and posted to their positions in the Commission. They are liable to be withdrawn from the service at any time as part of the routine civil service transfers. A case in point is Hassan bin Ibrahim who served as secretary to the Election Commission during the final stages of the 1974 constituency delimitation review and the period when the 1974 election was held. He served in several capacities in the civil service, including being a district officer, prior to being appointed secretary to the Election Commission. Soon after the 1974 election he was transferred to the Prime Minister's department. The supervisors, deputy supervisors and other secretarial, clerical and support staff are civil servants who are appointed by the Public Services Commission. Prior to 1974 these categories of staff were appointed specifically to the Election Commission and regarded as being in a "closed service" and thus not subject to transfers to posts outside the Election Commission. In 1974 even these categories of staff became part of the 'general pool' and thus liable to transfer to and from other government departments, though the Commission still retains control over them while they are with the Commission. This change from a 'closed service' arrangement to that of the 'general pool' led some observers to suggest that it was yet another attempt by the Government to bring the Commission under government control, but such a criticism is certainly less fair. The relative inability of the Election Commission staff to obtain

1 Information as regards staffing derived from a personal interview with Tan Sri Ahmad Perang, Chairman of the Election Commission on August 21, 1975.

promotions in their 'closed service' vis-à-vis their colleagues in the 'general pool' had led to considerable discontent in their ranks. In view of the fact that the secretary and assistant secretaries have always been part of the Malaysian civil service and the fact that major decisions, particularly policy decisions, are not made at the level of the junior ranks of the Election Commission's staff, this change in their status cannot be held to be sinister or even significant.

During periods of registration of electors, and, just prior to, during, and after elections, the need for extra staff is particularly acute. The Commission then utilizes the constitutional provision providing that all public authorities must, on the Commission's request, give the Commission such assistance in the discharge of its duties as may be practicable. Accordingly, federal and state government officials are recruited. When assisting the Commission, federal and state officers are paid a small honorarium and are to take their orders from the Commission and not the Government. For the 1974 election a total of 32,276 temporary polling staff were appointed to carry out the election and most of these were employees of the federal and state governments or quasi-government organizations.¹

An allocation of M\$ 4.2 million was approved by the Government to conduct the 1974 parliamentary and state elections which were held simultaneously. However, only M\$ 3,312,800 was utilized - a consequence of the large numbers of seats where candidates were returned unopposed. Peninsular Malaysian parliamentary and state elections incurred the major share of the expenses and this amounted

1 Malaysia, Election Commission, Report on the Parliamentary (Dewan Rakyat) and State Legislative Assembly General Elections 1974 of the States of Malaya and Sarawak, p. 33. (Hereinafter referred to as 1974 Elections report.)

to M\$ 2,673,600.¹

The Franchise

Whilst all parliamentary democracies function on the principle of rule by consent of the governed, they do differ as to whose consent amongst the governed the government should seek. Definitions, or at least applications of the concept of universal adult suffrage, even to-day vary from country to country and are often the consequence of conditions unique to the countries concerned. Citizenship is a generally accepted criterion, but nevertheless even here exceptions do exist. In the United Kingdom, for instance, for historical reasons any citizen of any country in the Commonwealth can vote if present in the United Kingdom on registration day. Again for largely historical reasons, citizens of the Republic of Ireland, which country is no longer a member of the Commonwealth, are given the franchise provided they are similarly resident in the United Kingdom on registration day.² Variations also exist as to the definition of 'adult'. In some countries the qualifying age is 21 years, and in an increasing number of others it is 18 years. The precise definitions adopted will necessarily affect differently the chances of victory of each of the parties concerned.

Adult suffrage for both men and women and a common register for all communities was instituted for even the first election conducted in Peninsular Malaysia. Article 119 of the Malaysian Constitution sets out the requirements of a would-be elector. All Malaysians who are citizens, are above twenty-one years of age and resident in that constituency on the qualifying date are, with a few exceptions,

1 Ibid., p. 38.

2 Wilson, G., Cases and Materials on Constitutional and Administrative Law, 1976, p. 99.

entitled to register as electors. The exceptions include persons detained as of unsound mind or serving a sentence of imprisonment or who have before the qualifying date been convicted in any part of the Commonwealth for an offence and sentenced to death or imprisonment for a term exceeding twelve months, and persons who remain liable on the qualifying date to suffer any punishment for such a proven offence. Also exempted are persons who may be disqualified under any law relating to offences committed in connection with elections. Read in conjunction with the Election Offences Act such persons remain barred from participation in elections for five years from conviction or release from prison, whichever is the later.¹

The utilization of the citizenship requirement has significant implications in the Malaysian context. The concept of federal citizenship itself was introduced by the British colonial government as part of the Malayan Union proposals after the second world war. Till then, persons in the Malay States were subjects of the respective Malay rulers and those in the Straits Settlements were British subjects. The proposals aroused the fears of the Malays that they would be overwhelmed by the non-Malays and this led to the mobilization of the Malays in a massive show of strength against the Malayan Union proposal and the citizenship provisions. The proposal was abandoned and in its stead the Federation of Malaya Agreement of 1948 adopted. The citizenship regulations adopted in this later agreement were more stringent for the non-Malays.² These citizenship regulations were included with minor alterations in the 1957 Malayan Constitution and the 1963 Malaysian Constitution. Since the Malayan

1 Election Offences Act, 1959 (No. 9 of 1954).

2 Means, G.P., Malaysian Politics, 1976, pp 51-67 deals in detail with the developments mentioned here.

Union proposal, however, the citizenship question has remained a divisive issue in Malaysian politics - the Malays resenting the granting of citizenship to the non-Malays and the non-Malays seeking even more relaxed conditions for acquiring citizenship. Following the 1969 communal riots, Parliament enacted the Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, No. 45, 1970 amending the Sedition Act, 1948, thus making it seditious for any person to question the provisions of the Constitution pertaining to a number of issues including that of citizenship. The Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971 even removed the privilege of parliamentarians to discuss these issues and it now became possible even to prosecute parliamentarians under the Sedition Act on the basis of their discussions in Parliament.¹

Basically, Malaysian citizenship may be gained by one of four ways - by the operation of law, by incorporation of territory, by registration or by naturalization.² Citizenship by operation of law is principally for children of citizens or those born in Malaysia of parents who are permanently resident in Malaysia and are not citizens of any other country. In these cases citizenship is automatic. Citizenship by incorporation of territory occurs when Parliament by law determines what persons are to be citizens by reason of their connection with the incorporated territory. Persons who do not qualify by operation of law or by incorporation of territory may apply for citizenship by registration or by naturalization, it being easier to obtain citizenship by the former than the latter.

1 Malaysia, Parliamentary Debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill 1971, 1972, p. xii.

2 Tun Mohamed Suffian bin Hashim, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, 1976, p. 255. The author is the Lord President of the Malaysian Judiciary and is regarded as the principal authority on Malaysian citizenship laws and deals in detail with the citizenship laws in Chapter 17 (pp 251-283) of his book.

Citizenship by registration is open to wives and children of citizens, persons born in the Federation before independence day August 31, 1957, and persons resident in Sabah or Sarawak on Malaysia day. The provisions for naturalization are intended for all other categories of persons seeking Malaysian citizenship. Citizenship by registration and naturalization in all cases call for residential qualifications. This varies from two continuous years in the case of wives and children of citizens seeking citizenship by registration, to ten out of the twelve years, including the last twelve months, in the case of those seeking naturalization. In addition to the residential requirement is a language qualification for all persons seeking citizenship by registration or naturalization, excepting wives and children of citizens. Again, the proficiency required in the Malay language varies for each category of applicant - the gradations being 'elementary', 'sufficient' and 'adequate' and assessed by language boards appointed by the Minister. Besides the residential and language qualifications the applicants are of course required to be of 'good character'. The law states that certain categories of these applicants are, on possession of the necessary requirements, 'eligible' for citizenship, whilst others are 'entitled' to it. In the case of the former it is clearly a matter of executive discretion, but even in the case of those entitled to it, it is not clear what the position of the courts will be should they be denied citizenship. No such case has ever reached the courts but it is relevant to note that the Lord President of the Courts has observed "that as the court is reluctant to interfere with an executive discretion it is unlikely that it will compel the Federal Government to register a citizen about whose qualification it is not satisfied".¹

At the time of the 1974 election there were an estimated

1 Ibid., p. 259.

100,000 persons, mainly Chinese and Indians, who though permanently resident in the country were ineligible for the franchise because they had not obtained citizenship.¹ It is interesting to note that the committee appointed to examine the question of elections to the Federal Legislative Council on July 15, 1953, had considered the status of these persons as regards the franchise and had decided that non-federal citizens should not be entitled to the vote.² The decision had, however, not been unanimous, and fourteen of the forty-six members of the committee,³ many of them later leaders of independent Malaya, had argued that the following categories of persons other than federal citizens should also be entitled to the franchise:

- "1) any person born in any part of the territories now comprising the Federation of Malaya and ordinarily resident in the Federation of Malaya for the last five years immediately preceding the election; and
- 2) British subjects born in Singapore and ordinarily resident in the Federation of Malaya for the last seven years immediately preceding the election."⁴

A partial attempt to accommodate the minority view was made by way of special arrangements for the first general election in 1955. Before the beginning of the period of registration on October 18, 1954, a considerable number of persons had submitted applications to be naturalised as federal citizens or to be registered as subjects of a ruler of any of the component states of the Federation (a subject of a ruler became automatically a federal citizen). Many thousands of these applications were still under consideration by the authorities on October 17, 1954, which was the date set for satisfying the qualifications which electors had to possess. For the benefit of

1 Personal interview with Tan Sri Ahmad Perang, Chairman of the Election Commission on August 21, 1975.

2 Report of the election committee, p. 18.

3 Ibid., p. 48.

4 Ibid., p. 18.

these persons, the Registration of Electors (Supplementary Registration) Regulations, 1954 were approved by the High Commissioner in Council. A special supplementary period of registration lasting nine days was held in January 1955 for the benefit of those persons who had applied for naturalization or registration as federal citizens or as subjects of a ruler before October 17, 1954 and who satisfied the age and residential requirements for electoral registration on that date.¹ No such accommodation was provided in the 1957 Malayan Constitution and its successor, the 1963 Malaysian Constitution. Eligibility for citizenship and even application for citizenship are now not sufficient to procure the franchise; citizenship has first to be granted before the franchise is granted.

Literacy, possession of property or payment of taxes have never served as criteria for exclusion from voting rights in the country - the report of the election committee and both the 1957 Malayan Constitution and the 1963 Malaysia Constitution rejecting these. A recommendation of the committee initially included in the 1957 Malayan Constitution was a condition requiring the voter to have resided in a constituency for a period of six months immediately prior to his registration as an elector. Electoral registers, which are prepared annually, are normally ready only six months after the actual procedure of registering voters, and elections may be held up to a year after these have been prepared. With the high degree of migration within the country such a regulation would disenfranchise a large number of persons; the residential requirement is no longer called for.²

The practice of the individual racial communities voting

1 Smith, T.E., op.cit., p. 10.

2 Federation of Malaya, Constitution Amendment Act, 1960, Section 14.

separately on communal rolls for communal candidates practised in some countries, notably New Zealand and Fiji, was considered and rejected by the committee.¹ Adoption of communal rolls would perhaps have been recognizing the obvious in the context of the country where 'community' forms the overriding political consideration. The committee and the 1957 and 1963 Constitutions, however, opted to be optimistic rather than realistic and ruled that voting should be on the basis of territory rather than community. It was argued that communal elections strengthen communal feeling and would have seriously impaired any possibility of working towards a cohesive and united society.² Elections in Malaysia are thus conducted on a common basis and candidates are elected by individual territorial constituencies and not by individual communities.

The Electoral Register

Although all adults who are not disqualified are legally entitled to vote, they can only actually do so if their names appear on the Register of Electors. In Malaysia, registration is neither compulsory nor automatic. Hence the machinery maintained and the ease with which voters can register are of prime significance.

Each parliamentary constituency comprises a separate registration area and each polling district within a parliamentary constituency is a separate registration unit and has its own separate portion of the register.³ Polling districts are devised by the state election offices so as to give the electors practicable distances to travel to vote. The number of electors per polling district may vary from a handful in some rural hamlets to over five thousand in

1 Report of the election committee, p. 12.

2 Ibid., p. 13.

3 Elections (Registration of Electors) Regulations, 1959, Reg. 3(1).

densely populated urban areas. The growth of new housing projects in formerly sparsely populated areas and the building of high-rise flats present large changes in the number of electors in some polling districts. Consequently the Election Commission is constantly reviewing polling districts, in some cases subdividing and in others combining them to make them as practicable units as possible. At the time of the 1974 election there were some 4,500 polling districts and hence as many portions of the electoral register in Peninsular Malaysia. Within each polling district's register, streets are listed in alphabetical order, and the electors' names listed according to their identity card numbers. This practice replaced the system of names being listed according to house numbers and streets. The use of identity card numbers, the Election Commission believes, makes duplication and double registration impossible.¹

The procedure for the registration of electors is contained in the Elections (Registration of Electors) Regulations 1959. These regulations stipulate that those eligible to apply for registration as an elector have to do so during the period allocated for this purpose. The regulations further stipulate that the registration period shall be not less than thirty days and not more than sixty days. The revision of the registers, which occurs every year, is required by regulation 13(i) to be for a minimum of twenty-one days and a maximum of forty-two days. In practice the Election Commission opens the register for revision for the maximum forty-two days stipulated and this is normally from September 1st to October 12th. The practice of political parties registering electors, though never encouraged by the Election Commission, was allowed prior to 1972, but since then the Commission has, by denying the political parties the necessary forms, stopped this

1 Personal interview with Tan Sri Ahmad Perang, Chairman of the Election Commission on August 21, 1975.

practice. The Election Commission now merely announces the date of registration by way of Gazette notification, the mass media and public posters, and, the public are intended to take the responsibility of registering. The publicity given the revision exercise has frequently been criticized as being inadequate, especially by the smaller political parties. Clearly, despite the Election Commission stopping the political parties registering electors, the system of registering where the onus of responsibility for registration rests with the voters offers a premium to the larger and well-organized parties which ensure that their supporters get on the register.

No legal provision is made to register those below the qualifying age of twenty-one years, even where they would reach voting age during the period the revised electoral roll is in effect. Such an omission inevitably disenfranchises new voters. Assume that an individual becomes twenty-one years of age on September 1 of a year and assume that the qualifying date for registration, which is the day before registration commences, is August 31 of that year. Such an individual will not be able to vote for approximately seventeen months after he has reached the qualifying age of twenty-one years - this includes the twelve months till the next revision and five months for that revised register to come into effect. With elections normally due every five years this could, though admittedly in few cases, result in a person not participating in the voting process till he is twenty-six years or so. Such disenfranchisement could be avoided by registering those whose twenty-first birthday falls later than the qualifying date for registration but still within the course of the prospective register. The date on which they become eligible to vote - that is their twenty-first birthday - could be entered on the register immediately next to their name.

The electoral register is compiled in three parts - List A is

the register in force at the beginning of the period of revision, List B contains the names of applicants for entry in the register and List C contains the names of persons who have died or have ceased to be qualified for inclusion in the electoral register of that constituency. At the end of the period of revision the revised register is prepared and open for inspection by the public to lodge claims or objections within a period of fourteen days from the date of publication of the draft registers. After the disposal of the claims and objections the rolls are certified and remain in force till the next revision in the following year. The regulations, it would appear, are adequate for the maintenance of an accurate register.

Table 4 lists the growth in the Peninsular Malaysian electorate by states from 1967/68 to 1973/74. Throughout, a steady growth in electors is noticeable, except for the year 1973/74, when there was a drop in the number of electors; in all 330,864 names were removed from the electoral registers and this assuming that there were no new electors registered! There was a decline in the number of electors for each state. The decline was greatest in Selangor (including the Federal Territory) where it was 92,466. Perak, Kelantan and Johore also witnessed heavy declines in the number of electors. The Chairman of the Election Commission attributed this to

"the removal from the rolls of the names of persons who have died or migrated and cases of double registration. The latter was detectable because the Commission is now utilizing computers and working on the basis of Identity Card numbers." 1

On election day, August 24, 1974, however, thousands of electors were unable to find their names on the electoral register and thus unable to exercise their vote. Omitted from the register were even the names of a cabinet minister and his wife! 2

1 Ibid.

2 The Straits Times, August 28, 1974.

Table 4Number of Electors by States, Peninsular Malaysia, 1967/68 - 1973/74¹

State	1967/68	1968/69	1971/72	1972/73	1973/74	Aug 1974 ²
Perlis	52,971	56,060	59,808	61,420	58,244	58,721
Kedah	373,435	388,167	411,998	424,272	395,854	400,285
Kelantan	318,512	333,754	362,048	373,120	310,406	311,608
Trengganu	168,840	179,365	195,539	200,096	183,340	183,769
Penang	272,305	282,399	298,378	312,934	286,680	289,140
Perak	585,549	613,572	666,735	675,115	625,987	626,565
Pahang	162,041	176,768	202,484	207,337	196,057	199,478
Selangor (including Federal Territory)	473,564	516,984	592,558	601,911	509,445	511,299
Negri Sembilan	163,373	170,728	183,950	191,744	177,335	178,717
Malacca	140,125	147,765	163,770	160,807	151,535	151,699
Johore	414,140	436,620	480,695	511,909	494,918	495,380
Peninsular Malaysia	3,123,855	3,302,182	3,617,963	3,720,665	3,389,801	3,406,661

1 No registration exercise was undertaken during 1969 and 1970.

2 As in the electoral registers utilised for the 1974 election.

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission.

No official estimate of the number of electors unable to find their names in the electoral register has been released, but the number must indeed be high. The registers utilized for the 1974 election, the Commission claims, "were revised in 1973 and certified on July 31, 1974, after which they were rearranged according to new constituencies", and there were for the "States of Malaysia 3,523,681" electors.¹ A count of all the electoral registers for the states of Malaya utilized for the 1974 election reveal that there were only 3,406,661 names on the register. The latter figure is also that obtained when the total electorate for each of the 114 parliamentary constituencies in the states of Malaya listed in Appendix H of the Election Commission's 1974 elections report are added.² The difference between the two figures, both of which are from the same report of the Election Commission, it is believed represents the number of persons omitted from the electoral register. By this estimate a total of 117,020 electors were unable to vote in the 1974 election because their names had been omitted from the electoral register.

The Election Commission understandably came under severe criticism from both government ministers and members of the opposition.³ Unsuccessful candidates found in it a convenient excuse. The inferred reasons for the omission are disturbing, but given the communal nature of politics in the country not wholly unexpected. For instance, David Loh Kee Peng, the unsuccessful Barisan Nasional candidate for the Bandar Melaka parliamentary constituency, complained

1 1974 Elections report, p. 31.

2 Ibid., pp 144-158.

3 Reports in The Straits Times, The Malay Mail and The Star, August 24 - September 10, 1974.

"More than eight hundred of my Chinese supporters have lost their votes. The Election Commission people went around to the houses and asked where each voter was and when told they were not in they just cut-off their names." 1

Similarly, Bernard Sta Maria, State Assemblyman and the D.A.P.'s campaign organiser in Malacca claimed

"A lot of my Chinese voters have been left out. The Election Office sent young Malay school children to the houses. The question asked was 'Mana ini orang' /Where is this person?/ and when the answer was 'taada' /'Not in' or 'Not here' / their names were struck off the list." 2

These claims, in all fairness, have to be regarded as not proven, but they are indicative of the fears harboured by candidates and electors and serve to emphasize the necessity for the Commission to be not only an unbiased and independent authority, but also to appear to be so.

In the face of heavy criticism the Election Commission attempted to vindicate itself and its secretary, Hassan bin Ibrahim, explained that the electors names were missing from the register because voters did not re-register after changing their addresses and that people had incorrectly assumed that their names would automatically be transferred to the register of the constituency they had moved to.³ It was subsequently shown that this was not all there was to it, and that in some instances persons who had not moved homes had also been deleted from the register; in other instances the names of some members of the family had been deleted while those of others remained on the register.⁴ Even more alarming was the secretary's rather restricted conception of the role of the Election Commission in registering electors. The secretary held

1 Personal interview with David Loh Kee Peng on August 19, 1974.

2 Personal interview with Bernard Sta Maria on August 20, 1974.

3 The Straits Times, August 24, 1974.

4 Ibid., August 29, 1974.

"The public should know that registration is an individual responsibility and should be done by all loyal citizens who believe in the principles of democracy. It is incorrect to assume that the Commission is responsible for the registration of new voters. The Commission is more concerned to see that those ineligible to vote are not registered in any constituency." 1

As a result of the complaints received as regards disenfranchisement by omission of names from the electoral register, the Election Commission appointed a committee to investigate the matter. Affected members of the public were asked to forward their complaints to this investigating committee.² Despite the obvious lack of enthusiasm and sense of urgency amongst the public after an election - especially since they are appreciative that the next election is some five years away and thus at least four revision exercises hence - about 2,000 persons wrote in. This involved the names of about 4,000 electors.³ Their names have since been reinstated on the electoral register. The report of the investigating committee was delivered to the Prime Minister but never made public and this served to further arouse the fears of the public. It is, however, believed that one of the causes of so many names being omitted from the register was the removal of the names in certain states of all persons who had their old identity card numbers rather than the new ones listed on the electoral register. The omission of names on an electoral register, especially when it involves as many as it obviously did for the 1974 election, is indeed a grievous error. To a degree, at least, it encourages speculation about the validity of the election. It is encouraging to note that the Commission holds that

1 Ibid., August 24, 1974.

2 Ibid., August 31, 1974.

3 1974 Elections report, p. 40.

"In order to avoid similar cases recurring in the future a new procedure relating to the register of electors and revision of rolls has been devised." 1

It is not, however, clear what this will entail.

The combined effect of the enfranchisement limitations occasioned by the citizenship laws and the procedure adopted for the registration of electors, has resulted in the communal composition of the electorate being different from that of the total population. Table 5 indicates the communal composition of the Peninsular Malaysian electorate for each of the federal level elections held. Table 6 indicates the electoral advantage or disadvantage accruing from differential enfranchisement to each community at each of the elections. In 1955 the Malay community had a very significant advantage but over the years this has been reduced and the Chinese and Indian communities have obtained an increasingly proportionate share of the franchise. This development was brought about by increasing numbers of Chinese and Indians acquiring citizenship. In 1974 however the trend towards parity in the share of the franchise was reversed, and the percentage of Malays in the electorate increased. This increase cannot be accounted for in terms of any change in citizenship laws. Hence it has to be assumed that the differential in the rate of registration of electors amongst the various communities has become markedly in favour of the Malay community, or alternatively, that more non-Malays than Malays were omitted from the electoral register in 1974. For Malay-based political parties this was certainly welcome but for the non-Malay-based parties this meant reduced chances of victory at the polls.

Nomination of Candidates

The Malaysian Constitution requires that whenever Parliament

1 Ibid.

Table 5

Communal Composition of Peninsular Malaysian Electorate in Parliamentary Election Years

Year	Malays		Chinese		Indians ¹		Total
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	
1955	1,077,562	84.2	142,947	11.2	60,356	4.6	1,280,865
1959	1,244,827	57.1	752,846	34.5	184,665	8.4	2,182,338
1964	1,503,836	54.4	1,039,264	37.5	223,431	8.1	2,706,531
1969	1,835,908	55.7	1,055,958	36.3	264,890	8.0	3,296,256
1974	1,971,305	57.9	1,176,361	34.5	258,995	7.6	3,406,661

1 Includes all communities except Malays and Chinese

Source: 1955, 1959 and 1964 data obtained from Barisan Nasional Office, Jalan Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur.
1969 and 1974 figures based on data in Appendices 3 and 4.

Table 6

Discrepancies between Communal Composition of Electorate and Communal Composition of Total Population, Peninsular Malaysia, in Parliamentary Election Years.¹

Year	Malays	Chinese	Indians ²
1955	+ 34.4	- 25.9	- 8.5
1959	+ 7.1	- 2.5	- 4.6
1964	+ 4.4	+ 0.6	- 5.0
1969	+ 2.8	+ 0.7	- 3.5
1974	+ 4.7	- 1.0	- 3.7

1 Derived by percentage community in electorate minus percentage community in total population.

2 Includes all communities except Malays and Chinese.

Total Population data as estimated by Chief Statistician, Malaysia.

is dissolved an election shall be held within sixty days in the States of Peninsular Malaysia and ninety days in the States of Sabah and Sarawak. In accordance with the provisions of Section 12 of the Election (Conduct of Elections) Regulations 1959, an election notice is made by the Election Commission in the Gazette and in one or more daily newspapers circulating in the states of Malaysia. The notice will specify the date, time and place for the nomination of candidates for election, the date being no less than seven days after the publication of the notice. Also specified in the election notice will be the polling date which will be at least fourteen days after the specified nomination day.

The whole procedure for nomination, which is usually on a Saturday, takes some three and a half hours (9 a.m. to 12.30 p.m.) and is handled by the returning officer who is normally at least a division one officer of the Malaysian civil service. The first two hours are for the submission of nominations and the next one and one-half hours are reserved for any objections to the nomination. The nomination time itself is observed by reference to the Radio Malaysia time signal and a strict observance of not accepting nominations after the appointed time has expired is made by the returning officers.

The qualifications for election to Parliament are set out in Article 27 of the Malaysian Constitution and, except for a few differences, are substantially the same as those that apply for registration as electors. Malaysian citizens above the age of 21 years and resident in the Federation on nomination day are, with a few exceptions, eligible to seek election. Unlike electors who have to be resident in that constituency to be eligible to vote, there is no requirement for candidates to be from the constituency in which they seek election to the House of Representatives. In the case of election to the State Assemblies, however, residence in the state is

required. Ability to read and write the Malay or English language with sufficient proficiency to participate in the proceedings of the House, had been required for election to the Federal Legislative Council prior to independence.¹ The 1957 Malayan Constitution and the 1963 Malaysia Constitution dispensed with this requirement. Articles 48 and 49 of the Malaysia Constitution list the grounds for disqualification from membership of the House of Representatives. By these articles, undischarged bankrupts, holders of public office and office of profit are excluded. By public office is meant the armed forces, the judicial and legal services, the general public services of the Federation or any State, the police force, the railway services and a number of named statutory authorities. By office of profit is meant the office of any judge of the Federal Court or of a High Court, the office of auditor-general and the office of a member of the Election Commission. Holders of public office and office of profit may, however, seek election should they so choose, provided they resign from their office. Those convicted of offences are disqualified from seeking election as long as they are barred from being electors.

The actual nomination procedure itself is governed by the detailed provisions of the Election (Conduct of Election) Regulations, 1959. Nominations are made on specified forms and supported by one proposer, one seconder and four supporters, and the witness to the candidate's signature. The signature of the witness is required since candidates now need not personally present their nomination papers. The amendment to the regulations to allow for this was the result of State Assembly elections and the House of Representatives elections being held simultaneously as from 1964. The amendment allows for candidates to present themselves for election to the State

¹ Smith, T.E., op. cit., p. 18.

Assemblies of their own State, and yet seek election to the House of Representatives in a constituency in some other part of the Federation - there being no locality rule for election to the House of Representatives. In practice, a large number of candidates - almost exclusively from the opposition - have taken benefit of this provision. Accompanying the nomination forms must be a statutory declaration signed in the presence of a commissioner for oaths or a magistrate establishing the eligibility of the candidate for the office he seeks. Also to be submitted is a letter from the candidate to the returning officer on the appointment of his 'agent'. This allows for an agent to deal on the candidate's behalf on all matters pertaining to the election. Like the candidate, the agent need not be a voter of the constituency but the correspondence address for the purpose of the election is required to be within the constituency. The candidate may, however, act as his own agent. Candidates are also required to let the returning officer know how they wish their names to be written in the ballot papers should they want to utilize abbreviations and the like. Failure to provide any request in writing allows the returning officer to use the name as stated on the nomination forms.

All candidates seeking election are given a symbol which is printed next to their names in the ballot paper. Candidates of political parties which have already been officially registered with the Registrar of Societies and with the Election Commission are allowed to utilize their respective party symbols. The system is still largely one of requiring the support of only six local registered electors to be nominated. Cognizance is, however, given to the fact that parties do exist and therefore there is a need for resolution of conflicts between rival candidates, each of whom may claim to be the official candidate of the same party. Political

party candidates wishing to utilize the approved party symbol have to present a letter of authorization from the central committee of the political party concerned, to the returning officer at the time of nomination. All candidates not having such authorization letters are treated as independent candidates and are allocated a symbol from an approved list of 'independent' symbols for use during the election. These symbols are of neutral design and are intended to be without religious, racial, political or sentimental significance and are distributed by lot to the candidates. (Plate 1)

Regulation 5 of the Election (Conduct of Elections) Regulations, 1959, calls for the payment of an election deposit payable in cash or by an official receipt from an approved treasury as an alternative by all candidates seeking election. The deposit is forfeited if the candidate obtains less than one-eighth of the total valid votes cast during the election. The object of the deposit is to discourage frivolous candidates and those whose cause is unlikely to receive support, as it is held that their inclusion would lengthen the ballot paper to no good purpose. It should be noted that the deposit is a successful deterrent only when there is lack of money in Malaysian politics. If politics were "big business" a small sum like M\$ 1,000 would not deter potential candidates from seeking nomination. On the other hand, a large deposit would defeat its own ends by acting as a deterrent to candidates who are perfectly honest and serious, but poor. The election deposit itself has often been criticised as an odious regulation which serves to restrict candidates to the wealthier segments of society. In these circumstances some other kinds of deterrent might be thought appropriate, such as the petition signed by so many hundred electors. However, a deterrent of this kind is administratively complicated since signatures cannot readily be verified; it is also open to political objections since

Political party symbols



Barisan Nasional



Pekemas




DAP



Partai Marhaen




Partai Rakyat



IPPP

Symbols for Independents



it is a difficult hurdle to overcome, especially for new candidates. By comparison the present system of requiring an election deposit is convenient and works exceptionally well.

What proved odious was the manner in which the deposits were raised prior to the 1974 election. The Election Commission, in reviewing the regulations governing the conduct of elections, sought the Government's permission to increase two-fold the election deposit for the state and parliamentary elections which till then were M\$ 250 and M\$ 500 respectively.¹ The consultation is a matter of practice since, though the Commission has the right to change the regulations regarding the conduct of elections, the changes would have to be tabled and approved by Parliament as soon after as possible.² Any measure that the Commission adopted without government sympathy would no doubt be denied passage through Parliament. The Government met the Election Commission's suggestion by increasing the deposit three fold to M\$ 750 for state elections and M\$ 1,500 for parliamentary elections. This decision was made on July 9, 1974³ but even the House of Representatives' meeting from July 17 to July 26, 1974 was denied knowledge of this decision. Only after Parliament had been dissolved and the nomination and polling dates announced did the Chairman of the Election Commission announce the threefold increase in election deposits.⁴ The decision to raise the deposit came under severe criticism from opposition parties and student unions which represented it as an attempt to prevent competition by the poor and the opposition

1 1974 Elections report, p. 28.

2 Elections Act, 1958, clause 17.

3 1974 Elections report, p. 28.

4 The Star, July 30, 1974 and The Malay Mail, August 1, 1974.

parties. The DAP's Publicity Secretary, Lee Lam Thye, held that

"With the threefold increase in deposits, politics now becomes a business risk and money raising proposition and an investment to make bigger risks."¹

The threefold increase would have stood had not the DAP challenged the legality of the decision to raise the deposits. In a letter to the Chairman of the Election Commission, the DAP Secretary General, Lim Kit Siang, pointed out that clause 16 of the Elections Act, 1958 did not give the Commission the legal power to raise the deposit of any candidate beyond M\$ 1,000.² The Government then rescinded its decision and agreed to the Election Commission's earlier suggestion to raise the deposit to M\$ 500 for the state elections and M\$ 1,000 for the parliamentary elections.³

At the end of the two hours for nomination one copy of the nomination paper and the candidate's agent's appointment letter are posted for public examination. Objections may be made to the nomination of any candidate by any person who is a registered elector in that constituency and by other competing candidates on any of the following grounds:

- a) that the description of the candidate is insufficient to identify the candidate;
- b) that the nomination paper does not comply with or was not delivered in accordance with the provisions of the regulations governing elections;
- c) that it is apparent from the contents of the nomination papers that the candidate is not capable of being elected a member of parliament;
- d) that the provisions pertaining to election deposits have not been observed; and

1 The Star, July 30, 1974.

2 The Star, August 4, 1974.

3 1974 Elections report, p. 28.

- e) that the candidate is disqualified from being a member under the provisions of the Constitution of Malaysia. ¹

No objection to a nomination paper is allowed unless it is made to the returning officer within the one and one-half hours set aside for this purpose, and all objections are required to be in writing. The returning officer is required to decide as soon as possible but not necessarily at once. This is to allow him opportunity to verify his decisions by way of reference to the Election Commission itself or to the Attorney General's chambers.

The returning officer may himself lodge an objection on any of the grounds listed. The returning officer's decision is final and conclusive for the purposes of the election, in respect of which the proceedings are being held, and cannot be called in question except by way of an election petition on the grounds set out in paragraph (b) of Section 32 of the Election Offences Act, 1959. The said section merely declares the election of a candidate void on an election petition on the grounds of

"non-compliance with the provisions of any written law relating to any election if it appears that the election was not conducted in accordance with the principles laid down in such written law and that such non-compliance affected the result of the election."

The powers of the returning officer at nomination are clearly considerable. No irregularity in the acceptance of nominations for either the state or parliamentary elections held in Peninsular Malaysia in 1974 is believed to have taken place. The DAP candidate for the Johore State Assembly seat of Tiram was disqualified following objections from Barisan Nasional supporters that he was a hospital assistant and thus a holder of public office, and that he had not resigned from his post as required by the law. The candidate claimed that he had tendered a 24-hour resignation and

¹ The Election (Conduct of Elections) Regulations, 1959, Reg. 7 (i).

paid a month's salary as required, before the close of nominations at 11 a.m. on nomination day. The DAP threatened court action but no election petition resulted.¹

The law governing nominations is precise and indeed the penalty for non-observance is high. Forging, fraudulently defacing or destroying any nomination papers, or even delivering to a returning officer any nomination paper knowing that it is forged makes the offender liable to imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding M\$ 2,000, or to both.² In addition, the offender may be debarred from being a candidate or an elector in any election for a period of five years from the date of conviction or release from imprisonment, whichever is the later.³ The nomination procedures are strictly observed and enjoy the general confidence of the public in Peninsular Malaysia.

The Campaign

Election campaigns, which in practice begin well before nomination day, officially end the day before polling day and no permits for public meetings and rallies are issued after this.⁴ An authorization letter is required to be issued by the candidate or his agent to all persons canvassing on behalf of the candidate or addressing public rallies, and three copies of these authorization letters, referred to as "Form E", are required to be lodged with the Election Commission within forty-eight hours of it being issued. All public rallies have further, to have the approval of the officer in charge of

1 The Straits Times, August 10, 1974.

2 The Election Offences Act, 1959 (No. 9 of 1954).

3 Ibid.

4 Ibid., Section 26.

the local police district and are governed by all limitations governing all public meetings. The names, addresses and identity card numbers of all speakers at public meetings have to be submitted to the Election Commission and the local police before a permit can be obtained. As a matter of practice the police record in full all speeches at public meetings to watch for any break of the law.

Personation, treating, undue influence and bribery are the four categories of corrupt practices identified under the Election Offences Act 1959. Each of these is a seizable offence within the meaning of the Malaysian Criminal Procedure Code and punishable by imprisonment for twelve months and to a fine of between M\$ 250 to M\$ 1,000. It further involves suspension from being a candidate, counting agent or even an elector for five years after conviction or release from imprisonment, whichever is later. A recent addition to the section on undue influences is paragraph 2 of Section 9 of the Act, which reads:

"A person shall be deemed to interfere with the free exercise of the electoral rights of a person within the meaning of this section who induces or attempts to induce such person to believe that he, or any person in whom he is interested, will become or will be rendered an object of divine displeasure or spiritual censure."

The significance of the paragraph is more that there is official recognition of the problem of such practices and the possible deterrent value it affords, rather than the possibility of any actual trials and conviction. As will become apparent in the discussion in the chapter on the 1974 campaign, the offences are so committed that they would make conviction in an open court of law difficult and thus unlikely.

Of special significance to the campaign in the 1974 election are the amendments to the Constitution effected by the Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1971 which became effective from March 10, 1971. The vigorous campaign that had taken place during the election of

1969 had witnessed the inflaming of communal tensions, and the subsequent shock gains made by the opposition parties and the stalemate that resulted in the Selangor State Assembly, in particular, led to communal rioting. Parliamentary government¹ was suspended and executive authority of the Federation was delegated to a Director of Operations whose power was virtually absolute except that he had to act on the Prime Minister's advice and be assisted by an Operations Council appointed by himself.² Parliament was convened on February 20, 1971 and amongst its first order of business was the adoption of the Constitution (Amendment) Bill 1971. The amendment makes it seditious for any person to question the rights and privileges established or protected by those provisions of the Constitution that relate to citizenship, to Malay as the national language, to the use of other languages for non-official purposes, to quotas for Malays and natives of Borneo and to protection of the 'legitimate interests' of other communities, and to the sovereignty of the Rulers. There is, however, no restriction to any person questioning the implementation of the said provisions of the Constitution. Though these amendments to the Constitution have been criticised in some quarters as stifling freedom of speech, it is generally accepted that they served in 1974 to an extent reduce the crass appeal to communal sentiments that previous elections in Peninsular Malaysia had witnessed.

In an attempt to ensure that elections would be carried out in an orderly and peaceful manner, the Election Commission normally invites before each election all political parties and the police to a meeting to formulate an electoral code of conduct. The meeting

1 Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, No. 1, 1969.

2 Emergency (Essential Powers) Ordinance, No. 2, 1969.

for the 1974 election. was attended by members of the Barisan Nasional, the DAP and Pekemas. Subsequently the Partai Rakyat issued a statement assuring that it would abide by the Code.¹ The Code (refer Appendix 9) itself is merely obligatory and not legally binding, but it must be conceded that much can be achieved by mutually agreed codes of conduct rather than by placing reliance on statutes and regulations.

Election Expenses

The functions and mechanisms of political finance constitute inevitable links of influence between economic structures and political processes. This is especially so where the governmental system involves popular elections. The problem is much broader than just corruption in the narrow sense of 'bribery', whether of public officials, or voters or party influence. The question broadly involves the relation between social groups with vastly differing financial resources, the cost of getting candidates nominated and elected, and, very importantly, the obligations of parties and elected public officials to their source of financial support. An associated consideration involves the relation between elected officials and their ability to exact financial support from various financial groups and organizations, especially if their chances of being returned are indeed abundantly clear as has been the status of the Alliance Party, and its successor, the Barisan Nasional, since the first national election was held in independent Peninsular Malaysia. Though, the transmutation of economic power into political power and the associated access of those in political power to financial support is of great significance, in Malaysia, no efforts have been made to discern and

1 The Straits Times, August 13, 1974.

interpret the political roles of those engaged in funding candidates and political parties.¹

The Election Offences Act, 1959, prohibits and punishes with fines and imprisonment the personal bribery and intimidation of voters. It further requires the candidate to appoint an election agent (the candidate himself could act on his own behalf) who is legally responsible for disbursing all funds and reporting all contributions and expenditures on the candidate's behalf. It imposes a legal maximum on amounts spent by the candidate, and establishes the methods and timing of the reports of candidates or their agents are to be submitted. The maximum limitation is a flat fixed amount and makes no allowance for type or size of constituency. The specified amount has, however, been raised over the years. Prior to the 1964 election the expenditure permissible to candidates was increased from M\$ 5,000 to M\$ 10,000 in the case of parliamentary elections, and M\$ 2,500 to M\$ 7,500 in the case of state elections.² Again, prior to the 1969 elections the allowable expense was doubled to M\$ 20,000 for parliamentary elections and M\$ 15,000 for state elections.³ No further increase was made for the 1974 parliamentary and state elections.

On receipt of the declaration respecting election expenses within the stipulated thirty-one days after the publication of the result of an election in the Gazette, the Elections Commission causes a notice of the date on which the return and statements in question

1 Milne, R.S., and Ratnam, K.J., 'Politics and Finance in Malaya', Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, Vol. III, No. 3 (1965) pp 182-198, is the only significant study of political finance in Peninsular Malaysia. Though based on the 1964 election it provides a valuable insight to political finance in Peninsular Malaysia for even the 1974 election.

2 1964 Elections report, p. 15.

3 Malaysia, Election Commission, Report on the Parliamentary and State Legislative Assembly General Elections 1969 of the States of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak, 1972, p. 32.

must be received and the time and place at which they can be inspected, to be published in the Gazette. The returns are retained for six months after this date and then returned to the candidate or destroyed. No attempts are made by the Election Commission to analyze, tabulate or publish the returns of the candidates and interested persons have to analyze the separate reports themselves.

The adequacy and functioning of the Act leave much to be desired. The law makes no prohibition of certain organized groups, e.g. corporations, or persons engaged in gambling enterprises; etc. from contributing to party treasuries or political campaigns; nor does it impose limitations on amounts contributed by individuals or organizations for political purposes.

The amount stipulated as allowable expenditure by candidates is indeed small compared with election expenditure in many other countries, but Malaysian elections are usually short and simple by comparison. In practice, most candidates spend somewhat less than they could. However, the machinery is not sufficient to exercise any control over those candidates who spend more. Appendix 8 lists the actual expenditure incurred by two parliamentary candidates during the election campaign of 1974. The expenditure involved by the candidates themselves, excluding material and other support provided by the political party, amounted to, in one case, M\$ 19,850 and in the other to M\$ 70,492.30. The latter seat was regarded as marginal by the candidate concerned - hence the large amount spent. The candidate concerned won the seat. Another candidate claimed he spent between M\$ 75,000 and M\$ 80,000 in his constituency where he was the incumbent, but lost his election to the opposing candidate.¹ The large expenditure incurred, so it was explained, was because the

1 The actual expenditure incurred by all three candidates referred to here were divulged in confidence to the writer by the respective candidates. For obvious reasons their identity cannot be disclosed.

constituencies concerned were large. As noted above the allowable expenditure is a flat maximum. This insensitivity of the law to the size of the constituency can be remedied by making the maximum limitation flexible by applying a fixed amount plus an amount per voter in the constituency. The amount per voter can again be varied according to the type of constituency - rural or urban - should it be felt that the cost of campaigning varies depending on its type.

The control of expenditure by candidates during the official campaign period is currently not paralleled by any control of expenditure by the political parties, regardless of whether this is linked to any particular candidate or constituency. For the control of expenses, the machinery is oblivious to the existence of, and expenditure made by, the political parties. Often, expenses that larger parties make have, in the case of independent candidates or candidates from financially weaker parties, to be borne by the candidates themselves and therefore to be declared in their statements. It appears, therefore, that any control on the expenditure of candidates without a control on expenditure of the political parties totally defeats the purposes of the Act. If the system of the election expense control is to be made effective then some form of control of party expenditure is necessary.

The question of whether some general and continuous control of expenditure for political purposes should be made is indeed outside the scope of this study. However it is relevant to note that whilst it may generally be conceded that it is a democratic virtue for citizens to be well informed about politics, and recognized that exposure to conflicting views is an essential part of political life in a democratic country, the present rules are clearly in favour of large party organizations. The general complaint is that larger parties, and particularly the party in power, get a disproportionate share of publicity. With respect to this objective of providing

equal access to publicity for all candidates, such devices as limited subsidies for advertising and publicity, equal access to radio and television, and use of mails might be explored. Government parties, especially in newly independent countries, are often guilty of abusing governmental authority over the mass media and do grab a disproportionate share of the publicity. The Alliance Party and the Barisan Nasional have in Malaysia shown similar tendencies. The distribution of radio time by the Ministry of Information between the parties contesting the 1974 election will serve to indicate this.

The Election Commission entered into discussions with the Ministry of Information for campaign time on the wholly state-owned radio and television networks in the country. On August 3, 1974 the Minister of Information promised that radio time to campaign would be allotted in a "fair and responsible manner" but would not disclose any further information.¹ Eventually it was agreed to campaign time for the parties on the radio but not on television. The time allotted the parties was even more revealing. The Barisan Nasional got 104 minutes, comprising eight 13 minute broadcasts. The series was begun and ended by the Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak himself. Each component party leader of the Barisan Nasional utilized the remaining six broadcasts. In contrast, the DAP, . . . Pekemas and Partai Sosialis Rakyat obtained one 13 minute broadcast each.² The DAP decided to boycott the broadcast and the party's Secretary General declared:

"This is a real farce. The National Front has about twice as many parliamentary candidates as the DAP, but it is given air time eight times over our allotted time. This again does not take into account all the radio and television time the National Front leaders and candidates get on other programmes." ³

1 The Star, August 4, 1974.

2 The Straits Times, August 13, 1974.

3 The Straits Times, August 14, 1974.

Polling and Counting

The printing of the ballot papers is undertaken by the Government Printing Department and all the ballot papers for the parliamentary election of 1974 in Peninsular Malaysia were printed centrally in Kuala Lumpur. Those for the State Assembly elections were, however, printed at the State printing departments in Alor Star, Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur and Johore Bharu.¹ This decentralization, though increasing the number of persons dealing with the ballot papers and thus theoretically increasing the possibility of irregularities, was inevitable, given the short period of time between nomination day and polling day. Moreover, postal ballot papers had to be distributed to the returning officers sufficiently early for mailing. Again, a very large number of ballot papers had to be printed, for, the 1974 parliamentary and state elections were held simultaneously making a total of seven million ballot papers.²

The ballot papers contain the names of the candidates in an order determined by lot at nomination time, the candidates' symbols and a blank space for the voters to indicate their choice by marking an 'X'. To differentiate the ballot papers utilized for the parliamentary and state elections they were printed in different colours, the parliamentary ones in white and the state ones in yellow. Each ballot paper carries a serial number and is attached to a counterfoil, carrying the same serial number; the voter's number is recorded on the counterfoil when he is given a ballot paper. It is the presence of these serial numbers that has been the subject of criticism and accusations that the ballot is not secret. It is suggested that the ruling party could trace through the serial number

1 1974 Elections report, p. 32.

2 Ibid.

the choice of any voter and the fear of the retributive anger of the ruling party prevents voters from choosing opposition candidates. The practice of having serial numbers is common in other countries, notably Singapore and the United Kingdom, and is a practice maintained to prevent any stuffing of the ballot boxes with forged papers and to allow for election petitions. The printing of serial numbers appears to be a necessity and the secretness of the ballot has to be ensured by regulations and procedures governing the safe keeping and eventual destruction of the ballot papers after the counting. In Malaysia between 39% and 51% of the voters have in each election voted against the ruling party and this must serve as sufficient indication of the popular acceptance of the secrecy of the ballot.

Provisions exist for certain categories of voters who have registered as absent voters in their respective constituencies to be provided with postal votes. The categories that qualify to register as absent voters are:

- a) a serving member of any regular naval, military or air force of the Federation or the Commonwealth;
- b) a person in the federal or state public service or in the service of any local authority or statutory body exercising powers vested in it by federal or state law and who is on duty outside the Federation;
- c) a person engaged in full time study at an educational establishment outside the Federation; and
- d) the wife/husband of a person in any of the three above mentioned groups living with him/her at the date of application for registration. ¹

Malaysians abroad for any other purpose, including those employed in foreign countries, are not given postal ballots.

For the 1974 election a total of 48,861 postal ballot papers for the parliamentary election and 46,528 for the state election were

1 Election (Postal Voting) Regulations, 1959. The regulations also empower the Election Commission to designate by Gazette notification any category of persons as postal voters.

issued.¹ It has not been possible to verify the number who returned their ballot papers. Nomination day was on August 8, 1974 and polling day on August 24, 1974. The ballot papers had to be printed, distributed to the returning officers, sent to the electors concerned and returned by them, in both cases by post, by polling day for them to be valid. Hence it is difficult to envisage that those residing outside the Federation did indeed have the opportunity to exercise their franchise - a sacrifice they were forced to make because the Election Commission found it expedient to set polling day so close to nomination day.

The procedure observed at polling stations is strictly governed by election ordinances,² Polling stations, usually in public buildings or schools, are established in each polling district. Outside the polling station is affixed prior to the commencement of the poll, a notice showing the name and symbol of each candidate. No persons other than the polling station staff, the candidates, the election agent of the candidates and one polling agent for each candidate are allowed into the polling station. As each voter applies for a ballot paper, his identity is established by checking his identity card, and his number, name and description as stated in the electoral register is called out. As a practice each candidate's polling agent marks this off in his own copy of the electoral register. The number of the elector is written on the counterfoil of the ballot paper and the ballot paper is perforated and stamped or initialled by the presiding officer.

If a person representing to be a particular elector named in the electoral register applies for a ballot paper after another person

1 1974 Elections report, p. 35.

2 The Election (Conduct of Election) Act 1959, (No. 9 of 1954) and The Polling Station, 1964.

has been recorded as having voted as such elector, the applicant is made to take an oath of identity and vote on a "tendered ballot paper". The tendered ballot papers are of a different colour and a record of them is maintained. They are, however, not counted for the returns of a candidate at the counting of votes after polling. Their significance is only that they would be counted after adjudication by an election judge if an election petition arose. Unlike the problem faced in many other countries in establishing the identity of voters, in Malaysia the existence of an identity card system greatly facilitates polling. The tendered ballot papers are thus rarely utilized.

On the closing of the poll the presiding officer is required to make up and seal in separate packets the unused and spoilt ballot papers placed together, the marked copy of electoral rolls and counterfoils of ballot papers, and the tendered votes list. Candidates are invited to place their own seals as well. These are returned to the returning officer, who keeps them unopened for a period of six months and in the absence of any election petitions destroys them, also unopened, after giving notice of the place at which he is going to destroy them. As a matter of practice the candidates are invited to be present when these are destroyed. These measures are regarded as an important means of ensuring public confidence in the secrecy of the ballot, as it has often been suggested that recording the elector's number on the counterfoil of the ballot paper destroys the secrecy of the ballot and may influence the vote of those who fear governmental reprisal.

The counting itself is done in the presence of the candidates and their election and counting agents. The number of ballot papers from each polling station is counted to verify if the number of votes is correct, then mixed with that of the other polling districts, sorted for each candidate, and counted. A recount is

allowed on request by the candidate or his agents if the number of votes for all candidates together with the rejected votes varies from the number of ballot papers found in the ballot boxes by one per cent or more, or if the number of votes cast for the leading candidate and the number of votes cast for the next leading candidate is two per cent or less of the total number of votes cast. The returning officer may, however, order a recount on his own discretion.

Rejected ballot papers are of importance and are held to indicate under various circumstances a number of different conditions. In some cases they may be an expression of protest or, especially in compulsory voting systems, spoilt votes may be an indication of the voter's perceived lack of alternatives to choose from. In single party states they may even represent a negative vote against the candidate presented. Where voting is voluntary, however, spoilt votes are generally held to be due to voter ignorance of the voting procedure. In Malaysia the following category of ballot papers are rejected; namely any ballot paper

- a) which is not stamped or perforated with the official mark, or initialled by the presiding officer except where it is deemed that such was due to an oversight by the polling staff;
- b) on which more votes are given than there are candidates to be returned;
- c) on which anything is written or marked by which the voter can be identified;
- d) which is unmarked or marked other than in the place or manner provided, or,
- e) which does not clearly indicate the intention of the voter. 1

The discretion of the returning officer is held final except that aggrieved candidates may cause an election petition on the grounds that there were irregularities. On completion of the count the

1 The Election (Conduct of Election) Act 1959 (No. 9 of 1954).

ballot papers are sealed and retained in safe custody by the returning officer for a period of six months, after which they are destroyed. The election results become official when announced by the returning officer at the end of the counting. However, it is the date of publication in the Gazette that becomes the date by reference to which election petitions are made.

Election Offences and Election Petitions

Election offences are tried in the ordinary courts of the country and in pursuance of the procedures laid down for criminal offences. However, the election of any representative can be made invalid only by way of an election petition to an election judge who is a judge of the High Court. An election petition can be made on the grounds that non-compliance with the provisions of any written law relating to any election by any individual or group led to the election of a candidate. Unlike normal court procedures, there is no appeal from the decision of an election judge, this being held by the Federal Court in the case of *Tunku Abdullah v Ali Amberan*.¹ Only two election petitions were filed after the 1974 election, one in Perak State and the other in Selangor.² The petition in Perak was based on the claim that Daeng Ibrahim bin Othman, the successful opposition DAP candidate for the State Assembly seat of Pasir Puteh, was not a resident of Perak and thus having not met the locality rule, was not eligible to contest the state election. The petition in Selangor was on behalf of Goh Hock Guan the Barisan Nasional's unsuccessful incumbent for the parliamentary seat of Petaling, on the grounds that the counting of votes was incorrect. Both

1 [1971] Malayan Law Journal, p. 25.

2 1974 Elections report, p. 38.

petitions were dismissed by the courts. This meant that the two opposition candidates whose election was questioned were held elected - a measure of the freedom of the courts from governmental pressure.

Conclusion

The system of elections utilized in Malaysia is structured wholly along the lines of the British electoral system of plurality voting in single member territorial constituencies. No steps were taken by the framers of the Malaysian system and the country's Constitution to allow for any guaranteed equitable representation of the various communities in Malaysia. The assumed inherent characteristic of the system introduced - namely that it would provide for a stable government by way of advantaging the larger parties - held sway. No mention is made in the relevant sections of the Constitution and the laws enacted as regards their implications to communal representation, and this omission appears to be based on the presumption that to accommodate communal representation would have the effect of perpetuating communal differences and would counter any efforts towards building a united Malaysian society.

The key element in the administration of an equitable and free election in Malaysia is the existence of an independent Election Commission. It appears, however, that the hitherto largely independent Election Commission is coming under increasing pressure from the party in power which is able to utilise its power in Parliament to influence the Commission's actions. The manner in which the election deposits were increased for the 1974 election, the failure of the Commission to fix a polling date sufficiently after nomination day so as to allow for adequate time for the handling of postal votes: both are indications of a possible yielding to governmental pressure. The Commission was again seriously compromised by the omission of several thousand names from the

electoral register; the fact that the inquiry conducted into this was not made public only served further to arouse the fears of Malaysians.

Nevertheless the discussion in this chapter, which has been confined essentially to the formal and institutionalized aspects of the electoral system, indicates that, by-and-large, there is an adequate system of ground rules on which to conduct a relatively fair and equitable election. However, no amount of statutory stipulations, both primary and derived, could by themselves ensure a fair and equitable election. It is on the formal aspects of the system that the informal aspects, like a tradition of fair-play by the administrators, candidates, voters and the judiciary, interact to result in a just or unjust election. One principal area where a sense of fair-play is of particular importance in an electoral system of plurality voting in single member territorial constituencies is, the delimitation of the constituencies itself. And it is to the implications of constituency delimitation in Peninsular Malaysia, that the next chapter addresses itself.

CHAPTER TWO

Constituency Delimitation and its Implications
for Communal Representation

The ideal spatial organization of electoral areas, that is the subdivision of a state for purposes of representation, should be such that the common body of interests predominating in particular areas would be given representation. Inadvertently or by conscious design, however, the common body of interests predominating in particular areas could be masked. Indeed the delimiting of electoral areas can be so tampered with as to result in partisan advantage. This form of chicanery in political cartography is popularly termed 'gerrymandering', after Governor Eldridge Gerry of Massachusetts, United States of America, who in 1812 carved out an electoral district reminiscent of a salamander.

Gerrymandering may manifest itself in several forms and nearly two centuries of political ingenuity have contributed to a highly sophisticated art. Clearly, the manner in which constituencies are delimited can determine the result of elections, and those in power have not always been averse to changing the 'rules of the game' when their own performance has been found wanting. Hence decisions pertaining to the apportionment and delineation of constituencies are primary determinants of the quality of representative government. This chapter, therefore, aims to examine the delimitation of constituencies in Peninsular Malaysia with reference to the principles laid down in the Constitution for such delimitation - and to assess the implications of these for communal representation in the political structure. Particular emphasis will be given to the 1974 delineation review exercise which resulted in the number of parliamentary constituencies in Peninsular Malaysia being increased from 104 to 114. It was on the basis of the 114 constituencies that the 1974 election was conducted.

Forms of Gerrymandering

Classifications of the forms of gerrymandering abound. Orr, for instance, provided a five-fold classification based on the manner in which the constituencies are delimited and the community disadvantaged.¹ Prescott, citing Glanville, differentiates two types of spatial bias and this is on the basis of whether the gerrymander brings about an advantage to the gerrymandering party by reducing the representation of the 'opposition', or by increasing its own representation.² In relative terms, of course, there is in each case an advantage to the party administering the gerrymander.

For the purposes of this chapter a four-fold classification of spatial bias in constituency delimitation may be conveniently adopted. The basis for this classification is the manner in which the advantage accrues and is largely based on Orr's classification. The four types of spatial bias may be summarized as follows:

1 Excess Votes - This involves drawing the constituencies in a manner so as to concentrate in as few constituencies as possible the votes of those whose representation it is sought to minimize. In these seats the 'opposition' will gain impressive majorities; the number of seats won, however, remains small.

2 Wasted Votes - This occurs where the constituencies are so carved out as to dilute the opposition vote by separating into several constituencies a concentrated area of opposition support. A prime example of such a gerrymander is to split up urban areas and include parts of them with rural areas, ensuring that the urban vote is in each case less than the rural vote. The constituencies that

1 Orr, D.M., The Persistence of the Gerrymander in North Carolina Congressional Redistricting, Southeastern Geographer, Vol. IX, No. 2, 1969, p. 40.

2 Prescott, J.R.V., Political Geography, 1972, p. 76 cites Glanville, T.G., Spatial Biases in Electoral Distributions, unpublished thesis, University of Melbourne, 1970.

eventuate in such a gerrymandering are so drawn as to result in a large number of constituencies in which one's own candidates win by small majorities.

3 Sinuous Constituency - Here the aim is to concentrate one's own support and is achieved principally by gathering within a wandering, sinuous constituency one's own scattered electors and thereby achieve a majority that would have been otherwise sacrificed.

Governor Eldridge Gerry's Massachusetts gerrymander was of this form.

4 Weighted Constituencies - The first three forms may be utilized even where the constituencies delimited are not required to be of equal electorate size. In systems which impose no such restrictions constituencies may be drawn of any size and thus it becomes possible to apportion a lesser number of seats to political sublimits which are opposition strongholds. Where no apportionment takes place it is still possible to delineate a large number of seats with small electorates in one's own area of support, and a small number of seats with large electorates in areas of opposition strength. The resultant constituencies are invariably of greatly varying sizes, the net effect of which is to increase the value of the vote of one's own supporters vis-à-vis that of the opposition. Such weighted constituencies may also arise by population movement; rural-urban migration for instance, causes the electorate size of rural constituencies to become progressively smaller by comparison to those of urban constituencies. The value of the rural vote increases relative to that of the urban vote.

Constituency Delimitation

The first national election in Peninsular Malaysia was conducted for the fifty-two Federal Legislative Council seats on July 27, 1955. No constituency delimitation had been attempted before, and the committee appointed to examine the question of elections to the

Federal Legislative Council on July 15, 1953 held that the delimitation of constituencies "will be a task of some difficulty calling for careful study by an individual or body which is patently impartial".¹ The committee accordingly recommended that a constituency delineation commission should be established consisting of three clearly impartial persons, of whom the chairman should come from outside Malaya, to make recommendations regarding the delimitation of constituencies.² The three-man commission under the chairmanship of Lord Merthyr was obliged to have its recommendations ready in time for the 1955 election, and hence, the constituencies were delimited in considerable haste. The terms of reference of this commission required that there should be a measure of weightage for area given to rural constituencies, and that the constituencies, whilst attempting to lie within whole administrative districts, should not in any case cross state boundaries. The terms of reference were silent as to whether the constituency delineation commission should pay any regard to the spatial distribution of the various ethnic communities. The commission held this to be in accord with the then policy of disregarding communal considerations in the formulation of an electoral system and thus "wholly ignored racial considerations".³ No effort was made to ensure equitable representation of the several ethnic communities.

The commission's task was by all counts an unenviable one. There had hitherto been no registration of voters and hence it was obliged to work with only total population statistics. The latest census had been conducted as early as 1947 and therefore was by 1954

1 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Question of Elections to the Federal Legislative Council, 1954, p. 13. (Hereinafter referred to as the Report of the Election Committee.)

2 Ibid.

3 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Constituency Delineation Commission, 1954, p. 4.

to a measure inaccurate, this being largely brought about by the voluntary migration of peoples, particularly from the rural to urban areas, and by the forced regrouping in the early 1950s of rural dwellers into 'new villages' in an attempt to overcome the communist insurgency that had begun in 1948. The constituencies that eventuated were contained entirely within the boundaries of individual states, and the range of population of the constituencies was such that the most populous contained as much as over two and one-half times the number of the least populous. Fifty of the fifty-two constituencies delimited had a Malay majority and two a Chinese majority; none had even as much as fifteen per cent Indian electorate.¹ The enthusiasm for immediate elections prevailed and the commission's report was accepted in toto. Criticism was, however, not wanting and one critic referred to the report as "a rather pedestrian and unimaginative document" and as evidence of the "ostrich-like belief in Malaya that communalism can best be scotched by refusing to recognize its existence ..."²

The 1957 Malayan Constitution emplaced the responsibility for the delimitation of constituencies and the conduct of elections on an independent election commission. Article 46 of the Constitution stipulated that there should be one hundred parliamentary constituencies, and Article 116 and the thirteenth schedule of the Constitution included the principles by which the constituencies were to be delimited. For the purposes of the first election to the newly constituted House of Representatives however, Article 171 of the Constitution suspended these provisions and merely required that

1 Ratnam, K.J., Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, 1965, p. 185.

2 Carnell, F.G., 'Constitutional Reform and Elections in Malaya', Pacific Affairs, Vol. 27, 1954, p. 230.

"the Federation shall be divided into constituencies by dividing into two constituencies each of the constituencies delimited for the purpose of the elections to the Legislative Council ..."

This provision was obviously in recognition of the fact that the delimitation attempted in 1954 required a thorough review which, it was unlikely would be completed in time for the first post-independence election. In pursuance of Article 171, therefore, the Election Commission in 1958, merely divided into two the fifty-two constituencies delimited in 1954.¹ The thus delimited 104 constituencies were utilized for the 1959 election.

The constitutional intention of the 1958 delimitation was clearly that the 104 parliamentary constituencies should be used for the 1959 election and the subsequent bye-elections only, and that a completely fresh delimitation would be made in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Immediately following on the election of 1959, the Election Commission proceeded to apportion amongst the several states the one hundred seats stipulated by Article 46 and to delineate these constituencies. The Commission's report was presented in 1960² and the delimitation presented was to be effective for the next election scheduled for 1964.

The Constitution bound the Government to accept the report, but the Alliance Government took advantage of its more than two-thirds majority in the House of Representatives to amend the Constitution in 1962, and thus, made the delimitation inoperative.³ The

1 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Election Commission on the Delimitation of Constituencies for the first Elections to the House of Representatives and the State Legislative Assemblies, 1958, p. 1.

2 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Election Commission on the Delimitation of Parliamentary and State Constituencies under the provisions of the Constitution of the Persekutuan Tanah Melayu, 1960. (Hereinafter referred to as 1960 Constituency Delimitation Report.)

3 Constitution (Amendment) Act, 1962, Section 31.

reasons for the Government's actions were not stated, though observers generally held that it was due to the Government's fear that the delimitation would be disadvantageous to its own electoral performances.¹ The 1960 delimitation, it will be noted, came soon after the 1959 election. The Alliance majority in terms of votes had been reduced from 79.6% in 1955 to 51.5% in the 1959 election; the percentage of seats won had dropped from 98.08% in 1955 to 71.15% in 1959. The Commission's 1960 apportionment of seats amongst the states was such that, by and large, it tended to increase or retain unaltered the apportionment to the states in which the Alliance had fared badly in 1959, but to decrease the number of seats apportioned to the states in which it had fared well (Table 7).

The effect, among others, of the amendment to the Constitution was:

- 1 Parliament assumed the powers of apportionment and delineation of constituencies. The Election Commission's powers were now restricted to merely recommending changes. The idea of an independent, non-partisan delimitation of constituencies was in one stroke removed and apportionment and delineation of constituencies became in effect the prerogative of the government of the day;
- 2 the rural weightage charge in the delineation of constituencies was further accentuated and rural constituencies could now be as little as half the urban constituencies. This contrasted with the requirements of the 1957 Constitution which required that there should be at most a fifteen per cent deviation from the average sized constituency; and

1 Smith, T.E., The Administration of the Election, in Ratnam, K.J., and Milne, R.S., The Malayan Parliamentary Election of 1964, 1967, p. 65.

Table 7

Seats Apportioned in 1958, and 1960, and Percentage Votes Won by Alliance Party in 1959 Election, by States.

State	Seats Apportioned ¹		Difference in 1960	Alliance ² vote 1959 %
	1958	1960		
Perlis	2	2	0	59.6
Kedah	12	12	0	65.3
Kelantan	10	10	0	31.4
Trengganu	6	5	- 1	37.4
Penang	8	9	+ 1	44.0
Perak	20	19	- 1	49.6
Pahang	6	5	- 1	66.9
Selangor	14	14	0	44.3
Negri Sembilan	6	5	- 1	51.9
Malacca	4	5	+ 1	58.9
Johore	16	14	- 2	65.7
Total	104	100	- 4	

1 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Election Commission on the Delimitation of Constituencies, Kuala Lumpur, 1960, p. 3.

2 Compiled from: Election Commission, 1959 Election Report, 1960.

3 the number of parliamentary constituencies was retained at 104, making the Commission's 1960 delimitation of one hundred seats inoperative. Thus the 104 constituencies delimited in 1958, and intended for the 1959 election, could now be used for subsequent elections as well.

The new provisions occasioned by these 1962 amendments to the Malayan Constitution were incorporated into the 1963 Malaysian Constitution, and the constituencies were utilized for the 1964 general election and subsequent by-elections.

The apportionment of seats now being a government prerogative, the Election Commission in 1966 sought the Government's intentions as regards any changes it might wish to make. The Government, anxious to retain what was to it a highly favourable situation, was unwilling to make any amendments. The inequitable apportionment of seats between the states continued. The Commission nonetheless undertook to prepare recommendations for the delineation of constituencies but was unable to rectify the malapportionment of seats between the states. The Commission failed to complete its review in time for the 1969 election and the review was postponed until after the 1969 election.¹ In the event, the 1969 election was also held on the basis of the constituencies drawn in 1958. By now the constituencies were greatly disproportionate in total population or electorate size, and as the territorial basis of electoral representation, were grossly inadequate. The election results of 1969 proved disastrous for the Alliance party and it gained less than fifty per cent of the valid

1 Malaysia, Laporan Suruhanjaya Pilihanraya Malaysia atas Persempadan Bahagian - Bahagian-Pilihanraya Persekutuan dan Negeri bagi Negeri - Negeri Tanah Melayu (Semenanjung Malaysia), 1974, p. 1. (Hereinafter referred to as 1974 Constituency Delineation Report.)

votes polled in Peninsular Malaysia but, aided greatly by the delimitation of constituencies that prevailed, the party was able to gain 63.5% of the seats. In the state elections held simultaneously, the shock to the Alliance was even greater. It had not only lost Kelantan but also Penang, and had difficulties in forming the state governments in Selangor and Perak. In Selangor the Alliance had gained only fourteen of the twenty-eight seats and in Perak only nineteen of the forty seats.¹

It has already been noted that communal rioting and clashes followed the 1969 election and parliamentary government was suspended. For this reason the Commission also suspended any constituency review. With the restoration of parliamentary government on February 20, 1971 the Commission resumed its review of constituencies and completed its task in May 1973. In accordance with the provisions of section 9, part II of the thirteenth schedule of the Constitution, the Commission submitted its report to the Prime Minister.² But even before the Election Commission's 1973 report was tabled in the House of Representatives, Parliament approved the creation of the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. The creation of the Federal Territory required constitutional amendments for the transfer of Kuala Lumpur from the State Government to the Federal Government. Along with the amendments occasioned by this transfer, the Government increased the number of seats in the House of Representatives from 104 to 114, apportioned the additional seats between the States and the Federal Territory, and again changed the principles governing the delineation of constituencies.³ The Election Commission was thus again obliged

1 Malaysia, Election Commission, Report on the Parliamentary (Dewan Ra'ayat) and State Legislative Assembly General Elections 1969 of the States of Malaya, Sabah and Sarawak, 1972, Appendix D, p. 115. (Hereinafter referred to as 1969 Elections Report.)

2 1974 Constituency Delineation Report, p. 2.

3 Malaysia, Act 206 of 1973. The Act came into force on February 1, 1974.

to undertake a fresh review of constituencies and have it ready for the election due before 1976. It was obvious to observers, however, that political developments indicated that the Government was aiming for an early election, though the House of Representatives could continue to serve till 1976.

The new review exercise begun in June 1973 was carried through in tremendous haste. Whilst the Commission in the past has been unable to complete delimitation exercises in even two years, it now managed to complete its task in thirteen months. The recommendations were presented on July 20, 1974 and adopted by Parliament after two days of discussion, on July 24, 1974. A report completed in such a hurry could hardly be expected to be adequate and, as it turned out, was subjected to considerable criticism by members of the opposition. It was saved from any further criticism only because of the lack of time given members of parliament to both examine and discuss the report.

The report was remarkable for its failings. No individual constituency maps were available, these being presented only when the electoral registers were being revised in late 1975 and early 1976.¹ Indeed more detailed maps showing the electoral districts within parliamentary constituencies were in some cases still in the process of being drafted as late as August 1977.² At the time of the adoption of the report, the only maps available to Parliament merely indicated the constituency boundaries on otherwise blank state maps

1 Malaysia, His Majesty's Government Gazette, February 19, 1976, P.U. (B) 87 - P.U. (B) 101.

2 Attempts were made to obtain these maps for Negri Sembilan State in August 1977. The Survey Department, Negri Sembilan, which was responsible for preparing the maps, was able to provide only some of them, because, some maps had not been completed and yet others had been completed but not yet gazetted.

of the scale of five miles to an inch. The report, however, listed all the polling districts that comprised a constituency, and interested persons could, by obtaining the old constituency maps, piece together a detailed map of each constituency.

The electoral register used for the purpose of the delineation according to the Commission's report was

"the electoral roll of 1972/73 which was updated, that is after the deletion of recurring names, of names of persons who have died, relinquished or lost their citizenship and so forth, as completed and reaffirmed in February of 1974".¹

The procedure for the registration of electors is governed by the Election (Registration of Electors) Regulations, 1959, and was discussed in chapter one. Gazette notifications are made of the qualifying date by which the revision is made, the dates for registration and of the certification of the electoral registers. Any electoral register prepared without regard to these provisions as required by the Election (Registration of Electors) Regulation, 1959, would be deemed unconstitutional. Table 8 lists the figures derived after the procedure for the registration had been observed for the registration exercises of 1972/73 and 1973/74, and, the figure utilized by the Election Commission for its 1974 review exercise. A search of the gazette publications did not reveal any additional exercise having been undertaken between that of 1972/73 and 1973/74. As such, it has not been possible to verify where the figures utilized by the Election Commission for its 1974 delineation were derived from. Compared to the figures of 1972/73 it would appear that the Election Commission disregarded more than a quarter of a million electors in its delineation exercise. Compared to the 1973/74 figures, it would appear that the Commission had delineated the constituencies with regard to 80,003 non-existent electors!

1 1974 Constituency Delineation Report, p. 4.

Table 8

Electorate by States as in the 1972/73 and 1973/74 Revised Rolls, and the 1974 Constituency Delineation Report.

State	1974 ¹ Delineation Report	1972/73 ²	Difference	1973/74 ²	Difference with 1974 Report
Perlis	57,885	61,420	3,535	58,244	+ 359
Kedah	397,320	424,272	26,952	395,854	- 1,466
Kelantan	336,843	373,120	36,277	310,406	- 26,437
Trengganu	183,725	200,096	16,371	183,340	- 385
Penang	293,973	312,934	18,961	286,680	- 7,293
Perak	630,893	675,115	44,222	625,987	- 4,906
Pahang	207,792	207,337	- 455	196,057	- 11,735
Selangor Federal Territory	341,258 210,835	601,911	49,818	509,445	- 42,648
Negri Sembilan	181,009	119,744	10,735	177,335	- 3,674
Malacca	153,011	160,807	7,796	151,535	- 1,476
Johore	475,260	511,909	36,649	494,918	+ 19,658
Total	3,469,804	3,720,665	250,861	3,389,801	- 80,003

Source: 1 Election Commission, 1974 Constituency Delineation Report, 1974, p. 82.

2 Data obtained from Election Commission.

The report prepared by the Election Commission and dated July 20, 1974, and that presented for approval by Parliament, were the same for all states except Johore. Members of Parliament themselves were unaware of the extent of the changes introduced,¹ the changes were merely marked on a blank map of the State of Johore on the scale of one inch to five miles and included as an appendix to the report by the Commission. No indication of even the polling districts that comprised the newly amended constituencies of Johore were presented, though such information was included for all other states. This was, however, subsequently provided in the gazette notification which announced the holding of elections.²

Opposition politicians were unable to do more than voice their indignation at what appeared to be a shoddy and inadequate delineation of constituencies. The Government's majority in Parliament, however, assured the safe passage of the amended report of the Commission. The government-controlled radio and television, and the newspapers were silent on the implications of the changes introduced by the Commission's initial report and the amendments made to it - the news was focussed on the dissolution of Parliament and the holding of elections. What was already a fait accompli received scant attention. After sixteen years, and two elections more than that intended by the 1958 delineation exercise, Parliament adopted a new set of constituencies. The delineation adopted was of momentous implication to the representation of the several communities in Peninsular Malaysia's plural society, and was to alter greatly the fortunes of the several parties at the 1974 election.

1 Personal interview with Fan Yew Teng, DAP Member of Parliament for Kampar on August 10, 1974, and, V. Veerapan, Pekemas Member of Parliament for Nibong Tebal on August 11, 1974.

2 Malaysia, His Majesty's Government Gazette, August 15, 1974, P.U. (B) 372 - P.U. (B) 384.

Apportionment

A problem particularly associated with federal structures, though not wholly exclusive to them, is the question of apportionment which is ordinarily defined as the allocation of seats to subordinate units of government. In apportioning seats to the several component units of a state, factors other than just population numbers may be taken into consideration. Hence, when viewed in terms of representation of people, the apportionment may appear to disadvantage certain units. This form of malapportionment, referred to as constitutional malapportionment, was occasioned by the Constitution adopted in 1963 when the Federation of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah and Sarawak, together formed the larger Federation of Malaysia. Sabah and Sarawak were afforded forty seats - sixteen for Sabah and twenty-four for Sarawak. This placed Sabah and Sarawak at a considerable advantage, a compromise that the other states were willing to make to allay the fears of these new states that they may be joining the Federation as junior partners. Singapore, on the other hand, conceded an even greater electoral disadvantage than the Federation of Malaya, in exchange for greater self-government. (Table 9) When Singapore separated from the Malaysian Federation the number of seats in the Malaysian Parliament was reduced from 159 to 144. The advantage accruing to Sabah and Sarawak was now solely at the expense of Peninsular Malaysia, thereby further accentuating the disadvantage to the Peninsular Malaysian states. This was to an extent rectified when Parliament in 1973 increased the number of Peninsular Malaysian seats from 104 to 114, but left unchanged at a total of forty the seats for Sabah and Sarawak. (Table 10) For the apportionment of seats between the Peninsular Malaysian states no explicit constitutional guarantees exist and Parliament reserves the exclusive right to apportion seats, such powers having been assumed from the Election Commission by the constitutional amendment of 1962.

Table 9

Discrepancies between Total Population of Component Units of the Malaysian Federation and Apportionment of Seats, 1964.

	Peninsular Malaysia	Singapore	Sabah	Sarawak	Malaysia
Population	7,919,055	1,844,200	506,628	819,808	11,089,691
Population as percentage of Malaysian total	71.4	16.6	4.6	7.4	100
Seats	104	15	16	24	159
Seats as percentage of Malaysian total	65.4	9.4	10.1	15.1	100
Discrepancy	- 6.0	- 7.2	+ 5.5	+ 7.7	-

Source: Malaysia, Official Year Book, 1970.

Table 10

Discrepancies between Total Population of Component Units of the Malaysian Federation and Apportionment of Seats, 1974.

	Peninsular Malaysia	Sabah	Sarawak	Malaysia
Population ¹	8,819,928	654,943	977,438	10,452,309
Population as percentage of Malaysian total	84.4	6.2	9.4	100
Seats	114	16	24	154
Seats as percentage of Malaysian total	74.0	10.4	15.6	100
Discrepancy	- 10.4	+ 4.2	+ 6.2	-

¹ Population statistics are those for 1970.

Source: Malaysia, 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, Community Groups, 1972, pp 45-46.

Most crucial in apportionment is the decision as to the principles of representation. If population, the most frequently mentioned principle, is to be adopted, then several population measurements are available. Total population, permanent residents, citizens, eligible electors, or simply the registered electors can each separately, or in varying combinations, serve as the basis of apportionment. The choice of the exact population criteria utilized can have a considerable effect on the final pattern of representation.

In the absence of any accurate figures as regards the number of citizens, and in the absence of any previous registration of electors, the Merthyr Commission of 1954 had been obliged to utilise the total population measure.¹ The 1957 Malayan Constitution had, however, altered the principle utilized and stipulated two criteria to be jointly utilized - the total population and the total electorate (i.e. registered electors) of the component states. The relevant clause in the Constitution read:

"Constituencies shall be allocated to the several States in such manner that the electoral quota of each State is as nearly equal to the electoral quota of the Federation as it can be without causing undue disparity between the population quota of that State and the population quota of the Federation."²

It should be noted that 'electoral quota' means the number, obtained by dividing the number of electors in the Federation by the total number of seats; and 'population quota' means the number, obtained by dividing the total population of the Federation by the total number of seats. The phrase "without causing undue disparity between the population quota of that State and the population quota of the Federation" contained in the above-cited clause of the

1 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Constituency Delineation Commission, 1954, p. 2.

2 Federation of Malaya Constitution, Article 116 (3).

Constitution, however, is not sufficiently precise. It thus made it incumbent upon the Election Commission to attempt an interpretation. The emphasis clearly had to be on electorate size, but total population was not to be entirely discounted - but what was to be the extent of the weightage given the former? For its 1960 delimitation review, the Election Commission decided to place a double emphasis on the figures based on the electoral quota, and, a single emphasis on the figures based on the population quota. The formula used by the Commission was as follows: the exact number (i.e. to three places of decimals) of constituencies which each state should receive was calculated firstly on a population basis, and secondly on an electorate basis. The result of this calculation was multiplied by two in the case of that by electorate basis, and, added to that by population basis. This figure was then divided by three and the result of the division, calculated to the nearest whole number, gave the number of seats to be apportioned to each state.¹ In 1962 the Government amended the Constitution, and the apportionment of seats now became solely on the basis of the number of electors in each state.

In a state with a relatively homogeneous population such a step would leave little cause for concern, for it may be assumed that the total electorate would be a fair representation of the total population and be almost all of the total adult population. Indeed, in a homogeneous state a constant relation is more likely to exist between the different population classifications, and hence, a change in the population principle utilized may not be of great significance. In the context of Malaysia's plural society, however, the omission of the total population consideration has significant ramifications on the relative electoral strength of the various communities. This problem

1 1960 Constituency Delimitation Report, p. 2.

had been envisaged by the Election Commission in its 1960 delimitation report, and the report reads:

"The allocation of Parliamentary seats in a country which has ... somewhat complicated provisions with respect to citizenship constitutes a problem that is by no means simple."¹

The combined effect of the citizenship regulations and the registration of electors was seen to advantage the Malay community at the expense of the Chinese and Indian communities.² The utilization of the total electorate principle rather than the total population principle therefore tends to translate the Malay community's advantage into a similar advantage in the apportionment of seats.

Regardless of the population principle, the apportionment of seats to component units prior to the delineation of constituencies inevitably introduces a degree of deviation from absolute parity in numbers. This is occasioned by the Constitution requiring a whole number of seats to be apportioned to each state, thus precluding the possibility of constituencies lying athwart state boundaries.³ Such discrepancies become marked in the case of small states, since the fractional increase or decrease in apportionment in proportion to their population is more significant than in the case of large states. Such a deviation, being an inherent feature of apportionment itself, would therefore result regardless of which population principle is utilized. Table 11 indicates the extent of deviation from absolute parity that apportionment would cause each Peninsular Malaysian State. Three different population criteria have been utilized to illustrate the point:

1 Ibid., p. 1.

2 Refer Chapter 1, p. 69.

3 Schedule 13 of the Malaysian Constitution sets out the principles by which the constituencies are to be delimited.

Table 11

Apportionment of Parliamentary Seats by various population principles.

State	Total Population (A)	No. of Seats (B)	Population Quota (C)	% Deviation (D)	Total Electorate (E)	No. of Seats (F)	Electorate Quota (G)	% Deviation (H)	$\frac{A+2E}{3}$ (I)	No. of Seats (J)	Quota (K)	% Deviation (L)
Perlis	121,010	1,566 (2)	60,505	+ 21.7	58,721	1,965 (2)	29,261	+ 1.7	79,484	1,740 (2)	39,742	+ 13.0
Kedah	954,969	12,357 (12)	79,581	- 3.0	400,285	13,395 (13)	30,791	- 3.0	585,180	12,810 (13)	45,014	+ 1.5
Kelantan	684,842	8,862 (9)	76,093	+ 1.5	311,608	10,428 (10)	31,161	- 4.3	436,019	9,545 (9)	48,447	- 6.1
Trengganu	405,386	5,246 (5)	81,077	- 4.9	183,769	6,150 (6)	30,628	- 2.5	257,641	5,640 (6)	42,940	+ 6.0
Penang	776,148	10,043 (10)	77,615	- 0.4	289,140	9,676 (10)	28,914	+ 3.2	451,476	9,883 (10)	45,148	+ 1.2
Perak	1,569,142	20,305 (20)	78,457	- 1.5	626,565	20,967 (21)	29,836	+ 0.2	940,757	20,594 (21)	44,798	+ 1.9
Pahang	504,975	6,534 (7)	72,139	+ 6.7	199,478	6,675 (7)	28,497	+ 4.6	301,310	6,596 (7)	43,044	+ 5.8
Selangor	982,111	12,708 (13)	75,547	+ 2.2	337,353	11,289 (11)	30,668	- 2.6	552,272	12,089 (12)	46,023	- 0.7
Federal Territory	648,310	8,389 (8)	81,039	- 4.9	173,946	5,821 (6)	28,991	+ 3.0	332,067	7,269 (7)	47,438	- 3.8
Negeri Sembilan	481,629	6,232 (6)	80,272	+ 11.0	178,717	5,981 (6)	29,786	+ 0.3	279,688	6,122 (6)	46,615	- 2.0
Malacca	404,174	5,230 (5)	80,835	- 4.6	151,609	5,073 (5)	30,322	- 1.5	235,797	5,162 (5)	47,159	- 3.2
Johore	1,277,269	16,528 (17)	75,133	+ 2.8	495,380	16,577 (17)	29,140	+ 2.5	756,010	16,549 (16)	47,251	- 3.4
Total	8,809,965	114	77,280		3,406,661	114	29,883		5,207,762	114	45,682	

- A Total population figures utilized here are as indicated in the 1974 delineation report and differ slightly from those shown in Table 2. The differences are small and do not affect the validity of the discussion based on this table. These statistics instead of that in Table 2 have been used because the 1970 Population and Housing Census was conducted prior to the creation of the Federal Territory and therefore the Census reports do not provide data separately for Selangor and the Federal Territory.
- B Total population of state divided by Population Quota for Peninsular Malaysia. Figures within brackets indicate whole number of seats apportioned.
- C Population Quota of each state obtained by dividing the Total Population of each state by the whole number of seats apportioned in 'B'.
- D Percentage deviation of Population Quota of State from Population Quota of Peninsular Malaysia. Plus signs indicate electoral advantage and minus signs indicate disadvantage.
- E Total Electorate figures as in Appendix 4.
- F Total Electorate of State divided by Electorate Quota for Peninsular Malaysia. Figures within brackets indicate whole number of seats apportioned.
- G 'E' divided by whole number of seats apportioned in 'F'.
- H Percentage deviation of Electorate Quota of State from Electorate Quota of Peninsular Malaysia. Plus signs indicate advantage to the state and minus signs indicate disadvantage to the state.
- I Single weightage to total population and double weightage to total electorate.
- J Seats apportioned in similar fashion to that adopted in 'B' and 'F'.
- K Quota obtained by dividing figure in 'I' by whole number indicated in 'J'.
- L Deviation of state quotas in 'K' from Peninsular Malaysian Quota in 'K'. Plus signs indicate advantage to the state and minus signs indicate disadvantage to the state.

- 1 the total population;
- 2 the total electorate; and
- 3 a single emphasis for total population and a double emphasis for total electorate.

Table 11 illustrates that, regardless of the population principle, absolute parity will be sacrificed by apportionment, but what is significant is that the amount of deviation from absolute parity varies depending on which population principle is adopted. Some states have an electoral advantage regardless of the criteria utilized, though the extent of the advantage itself varies. Perlis and Pahang are examples of this. Other states have an electoral disadvantage regardless of the criteria utilized but again the extent of the disadvantage is dependent on the criteria used. Johore and Malacca belong to this category. In the case of all other states the choice of any particular criterion would determine whether the state has an advantage or disadvantage. Undoubtedly the population criteria employed is of immense significance to representation.

In 1973 Parliament increased the number of seats for Peninsular Malaysia from 104 to 114, and apportioned these seats to the eleven states and the Federal Territory. This apportionment formed the basis for the delineation exercise of 1974.¹ In apportioning the seats, however, Parliament made no indication of the exact population criteria utilized. Table 12 indicates, the apportionment made by Parliament and the apportionment that would have resulted had the criterion utilized been any of the three population criteria discussed above - i.e. total population, total electorate, and a combination of both total population and total electorate. Kelantan, Trengganu and Pahang are seen to have been apportioned more seats than that warranted by any of the three population criteria. Conversely, the Federal

1 1974 Constituency Delineation Report, p. 2.

Table 12

Parliament's Apportionment of Seats 1973, and, Apportionment that would have resulted by various population criteria.¹

State	Parliament	By Total Population	By Total Electorate	By Total Population and Total Electorate ²
Perlis	2	2	2	2
Kedah	13	12	13	13
Kelantan	12	9	10	9
Trengganu	7	5	6	6
Penang	9	10	10	10
Perak	21	20	21	21
Pahang	8	7	7	7
Selangor	11	13	11	12
Federal Territory	5	8	6	7
Negri Sembilan	6	6	6	6
Malacca	4	5	5	5
Johore	16	17	17	16
Total	114	114	114	114

1 Refer Table 11 for basis of calculation.

2 Single emphasis for total population and a double emphasis for total electorate.

Territory, Penang and Malacca are seen to have been apportioned less seats than they would have gained had any of the three population criteria been used. A measure of the actual advantage or disadvantage accruing to each state by Parliament's malapportionment of the seats is exemplified when adjustments are made for the deviations inherent in apportionment itself, i.e. the deviation that was seen to result because of the necessity of apportioning a whole number of seats to each state. The method adopted here is to note the percentage deviation from the absolute parity principle that the apportionment introduced by Parliament occasioned, and to deduct from this the deviation that was seen to result because of the necessity of apportioning a whole number of seats to each state. (Table 13)

The implications of Parliament's apportionment to communal representation becomes apparent when the communal composition of the electorate of the several states and the Federal Territory at the time of the 1974 election is noted. (Table 14) The states that were seen to be advantaged by Parliament's malapportionment of the seats - Trengganu, Kelantan and Pahang - are predominantly Malay. The states that are disadvantaged are predominantly Chinese and non-Malay. Consequently, Parliament's apportionment of seats results in an electoral advantage for the Malay community. The correlation apparent from a comparison of Tables 13 and 14 may not, in itself, be sufficient evidence that the apportionment was deliberately introduced. Suffice it to note that the apportionment does in fact result in a relative advantage to the Malay community, and that significant principles of representation can easily escape a Parliament which can indulge in the luxury of a sufficient majority to alter the Constitution.

Table 13

1973 Apportionment of Seats to Peninsular Malaysian States and Percentage Deviation from various population criteria.¹

State	1973 Apportionment	Percentage Deviation ²		
		By Population Quota	By Electorate Quota	By Population and Electorate Quota
Perlis	2	0	0	0
Kedah	13	+ 7.9	0	0
Kelantan	12	+ 24.7	+ 17.4	+ 26.6
Trengganu	7	+ 30.0	+ 14.6	+ 13.4
Penang	9	- 11.2	- 10.7	- 11.0
Perak	21	+ 4.8	0	0
Pahang	8	+ 11.6	+ 12.0	- 11.8
Selangor	11	- 17.8	0	- 9.2
Federal Territory	5	- 62.9	- 19.4	- 41.6
Negri Sembilan	6	0	0	0
Malacca	4	- 26.2	- 25.3	- 25.8
Johore	16	- 6.1	- 9.5	0

1 Percentage Deviation from various population criteria introduced by 1973 apportionment after disallowing for deviation that would have been introduced by the need to apportion whole number of seats to states (Refer Table 11). Basis of calculation here is:

Deviation introduced by 1973 Apportionment minus deviation introduced by need to apportion whole number of seats to states.

2 Plus signs indicate advantage introduced, and minus signs indicate disadvantage introduced.

Source: Based on calculations shown on Table 11.

Table 14

Ethnic Composition of the Electorate of Peninsular Malaysian States, 1974, by Percentage.

State	Total State Population	Malay %	Chinese %	Indian %
Perlis	58,721	83.87%	14.15%	1.98%
Kedah	400,285	75.95%	17.40%	6.65%
Kelantan	311,608	94.19%	5.19%	0.62%
Trengganu	183,769	94.12%	5.30%	0.58%
Penang	289,140	34.17%	56.11%	9.72%
Perak	626,565	45.04%	44.75%	10.21%
Pahang	199,478	63.57%	31.51%	4.92%
Selangor	337,353	46.47%	38.88%	14.65%
Federal Territory	173,946	27.79%	60.22%	11.99%
Negri Sembilan	178,717	47.56%	40.32%	12.12%
Malacca	151,699	54.78%	38.75%	6.47%
Johore	495,390	54.58%	40.46%	4.96%

Source: Compiled from data in Appendix 4.

Delineation

Malaysian constituencies are currently delineated in accordance with the principles set out in the thirteenth schedule to the Constitution which reads as follows:

- a) While having regard to the desirability of giving all electors reasonably convenient opportunities of going to the polls, constituencies ought to be delimited so that they do not cross state boundaries and regard ought to be had to the inconveniences of state constituencies crossing the boundaries of federal constituencies;
- b) Regard ought to be had to the administrative facilities within the constituency for the establishment of the necessary registration and polling machines;
- c) The number of electors within each constituency in State and the Federal Territory ought to be approximately equal except that, having regard to the difficulty of reaching electors in country districts and the other disadvantages facing rural constituencies, a measure of weightage for area ought to be given to such constituencies; and
- d) Regard ought to be had to the inconveniences attendant on alteration of constituencies, and to the maintenance of local ties.

These principles are largely based on the recommendations of the committee appointed by the pre-independence Federal Legislative Council to examine the question of elections to that council in their report dated January 21, 1954. Two clauses have, however, undergone significant changes.

Omitted from clause (a) as it currently appears are the words "... endeavour to define constituencies so that they would embody complete administrative districts ..."¹ Clause (b), however, has been retained substantially as in the earlier requirement and calls for regard to be paid to the availability of administrative facilities for registration of electors and polling. The Election Commission,

1 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Question of Elections to the Federal Legislative Council, 1954, p. 13.

it was noted in chapter one, has neither the staff nor the required financial resources to maintain full time officers to register electors and conduct elections. Hence, it is the district officers and their supporting staff who are frequently relied upon to assist in the registration of electors and the conduct of elections. In interpreting clause (b) of the thirteenth schedule, the Election Commission in its 1974 delineation report observes:

"Registration, the conduct of elections and the voting machinery should be under the control of the chief administrative officer. However due to the unequal distribution of the electorate a constituency may include more than one administrative district ..."¹

Clearly, the Election Commission itself believes that constituencies are ideally situated within one administrative district. The hazards of gerrymandering are reduced if there is preservation, of such common delineation rules as maximum preservation of political subdivision lines, for instance, district boundaries, in delineation. Although such rules are not necessarily anti-gerrymandering rules, their general thrust is in the direction of channelling the work of the delineating body against possible gerrymanders. They also serve to act against the creation of artificial constituency boundaries, and thus, serve to preserve local ties as required in clause (d) of the thirteenth schedule of the Malaysian Constitution. The preservation of such ties, and the representation of such interests, are after all amongst the more persuasive reasons for territorial representation. As such the removal of the provision requiring constituencies to embody complete administrative districts is surely regrettable.

Clause (c) of the thirteenth schedule presents the most contentious and tampered-with principle in the Malaysian context. The clause provides a measure of weightage for area to rural

¹ 1974 Constituency Delineation Report, p. 5.

constituencies, and this involves allocating to rural areas greater representation than they would acquire by a strict application of the population parity principle. Weightage for rural areas is almost invariably questioned but nevertheless grudgingly conceded in most countries where the electoral system involves the utilization of territorially based constituencies.¹ Thus in the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand a measure of weightage for rural areas is provided. In the United States of America, however, the courts, after initial hesitation to enter the thicket of political squabbles about "rotten boroughism", have, since the famous Baker v Carr decision of 1962, forced the legislatures to delimit constituencies with a strict emphasis on the population parity principle.²

Rural weightage is defended principally on two grounds.³ The first is that, this sort of weightage is a traditional and necessary part of representative government because, not only people, but also places have to be represented in a legislature. This is regarded as especially important, since the relative voting strength of the industrial city areas have tended to outvote agricultural and small town interests which play a significant role in the nation's economy. The second ground for defending rural weightage is that, the sparse distribution of population in the rural constituencies calls for candidates and representatives in these rural constituencies to spend more time and effort, than those in urban areas do, in campaigning and in representing their constituents. It is worth examining the validity

1 See for instance Finer, S.K. (Ed.), "Adversary Politics and Electoral Reform, 1975, p. 10; Rogaly, J., Parliament for the People, 1975, pp 13-15, and, Pulzer, P.G.J., Political Representation and Elections in Britain, (3rd edition), 1975, pp 33-35.

2 McKay, R.B., Reapportionment: The Law and Politics of Equal Representation, 1965, p. 6.

3 See for instance Perrin, N., 'In Defense of Country Votes', The Yale Review, Volume 52, Fall 1962, pp 16-24.

of these contentions in the Peninsular Malaysian context.

The Malaysian Constitution, though showing a marked tendency to encourage the concentration of power in the Federal Government, does offer significant guarantees to the State Governments. Hence the legislature of each state has exclusive powers to make laws with respect to land, including land tenure, colonization, improvement and soil conservation, permits and licences for prospecting for mines, compulsory acquisition of land, agriculture and forestry, local government and a number of other matters.¹ It is to be expected that the interests of the rural areas would need to be specially defended in the State Legislatures rather than in the Federal Parliament. Furthermore, the Federal Parliament itself consists of two chambers, the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate comprises twenty-six elected members and thirty-two members appointed by the Yang di Pertuan Agung. The twenty-six elected members, provisions for whose election by direct vote exists in the Constitution, are currently elected by the legislative assemblies of each state. Each state, irrespective of size and population, elects two senators. This is intended to give equal representation to state interests in Parliament. The thirty-two senators appointed by the Yang di Pertuan Agung on the Government's advice, are required to be persons who have rendered distinguished public service or achieved distinction in the professions, commerce, industry, agriculture, cultural activities or social service, or are representatives of racial minorities or are capable of representing the interest of aborigines. The Senate is thus structured so as to allow for

1 Tun Mohamed Suffian bin Haship, An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia, 1976, Chapters 12 and 13, pp 159-202, deal with relations between the Federation and the States, and, the financial provisions made for each by the Constitution of Malaysia.

representation of interests other than population numbers. In view of these accommodations in the Constitution, it would appear that there is no cause to depart from the population parity principle when delineating constituencies for representation in the House of Representatives. This contention is especially cogent in the Peninsular Malaysian context where it is the rural population, by virtue of its greater numbers, that commands a greater voting strength - the percentage of the population living in urban centres of larger than 10,000 inhabitants was, at the time of the latest Census in 1970, only 28.7.¹

The second reason for providing rural weightage, and indeed the one given by the framers of the Constitution is that of population distribution and the increased time and effort called for in campaigning and representing the rural constituencies as compared with urban constituencies. Impressions gained by looking at the size of constituencies on a constituency map not depicting the distribution of population are often deceptive. In most cases the areal size of the constituencies is not a consequence of the distribution of population, but rather, of the inclusion within the constituency of mountainous terrain, forested areas, and even, national parks which are not populated at all. Add to this the impact of rural-urban migration. Of the constituencies delineated in 1958, the increase in electorate over the years has been greater in the urban constituencies with large electorates than in the rural constituencies with small electorates.

1 Malaysia, Jabatan Perangkaan, 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, Community Groups, 1972, p. 30.

Of the total Peninsular Malaysian population of 8,810,348 in 1970, 16.8% lived in Metropolitan areas with populations in excess of 75,000 persons, 11.9% in large towns between 10,000 and 74,999 persons, and 11.9% in small towns with between 1,000 and 9,999 persons. The remaining 48.1% lived in settlements of less than 999 persons.

However, much of this increase was due to an increasing percentage of the non-Malays gaining the franchise - there being a larger number of non-Malays living in the larger urban constituencies than in the rural constituencies. The bulk of the non-Malays have, however, already gained the franchise and any significant increase in the electorate from further of their numbers gaining the franchise is no longer possible. Due to the non-availability of data to distinguish the increase in electorate brought about by rural-urban migration and by enfranchisement of the non-Malays, the growth in the electorate size of the constituencies of differing sizes cannot be utilized to establish that population movements alone result in the larger constituencies recording larger increases in electorate than the smaller constituencies. Instead census data have been used, though the utilization of these also presents problems. Due to urban boundary changes between the census periods, the data presented in the 1947, 1957 and 1970 census reports, are not strictly comparable. However, even given these limitations, they indicate in broad terms the extent to which there have been changes in the numbers living in areas termed urban and rural. (Table 15) The Peninsular Malaysian population living in urban areas, i.e. centres having more than 10,000 persons, rose from 15.9% in 1947 to 26.5% in 1957 to 28.7% in 1970. The population growth of Kuala Lumpur, the federal capital, has been estimated to be currently in excess of ten per cent per annum.¹

1 Saw Swee Hock, 'Patterns of Urbanization in West Malaysia, 1911-1970', The Malayan Economic Review, Vol. XVII, No. 2., October 1972, pp 114-120.

Table 15

Degree of Urbanization, Peninsular Malaysia.

Year	No.	Urban ¹	Rural
1947	4,908,000	15.9%	84.1%
1957	6,278,758	26.5%	73.5%
1970	8,819,928	28.7%	71.3%

1 Urban-centres with more than 10,000 persons.

Source: Malaysia, Jabatan Perangkaan, 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, Community Groups, 1972, p. 33.

Since the Constitution requires the review of constituencies at intervals of between eight and ten years only, and indeed the Malaysian experience hitherto has been for the reviews to be adopted only much later than that required by the Constitution, regard must logically be paid to population movements. This the Election Commission claims to have observed in the delineation exercise presented in 1974.¹ The rural weightage principle necessarily runs counter to this consideration.

An even more cogent consideration is that it is in rural areas which have smaller constituencies that electoral registration is higher. Table 16 lists the smallest ten and the largest ten constituencies delineated in the 1974 delineation exercise, and, calculates the registered electors of 1974 as a percentage of the population of voting age. In the rural constituencies the percentage is in some cases well in excess of 95% whilst in the larger urban constituencies the percentage drops as low as 63.24%. For the ten largest

1 1974 Constituency Delineation Report, p. 9.

Table 16

Percentage of those above 20 years of age who have registered as electors in the ten largest and ten smallest constituencies, 1974 election.

Largest 10 Constituencies*	Total above 20 years	Total Registered Number	%
Menglembu	57,735	49,038	84.94
Ipoh	66,272	48,062	72.52
Petaling	75,792	47,929	63.24
Kinta	52,734	46,663	88.49
Kota Melaka	55,439	44,370	80.03
Jelutong	63,075	42,804	67.86
Tanjong	63,300	41,409	65.42
Shah Alam	58,716	41,231	70.22
Bukit Bendera	51,782	40,895	78.98
Selayang	48,420	40,863	84.39
Total	593,565	443,264	74.68
Smallest 10 Constituencies			
Grik	21,226	17,280	81.41
Kuala Kerai	18,596	17,332	93.20
Tenggaroh	20,507	17,379	84.75
Ulu Kelantan	20,409	17,959	88.00
Tanah Merah	21,894	20,002	91.36
Larut	21,379	21,014	98.29
Kuala Kangsar	22,421	21,456	95.70
Pekan	28,463	21,970	77.19
Rantau Panjang	22,429	22,014	98.15
Sabak Bernam	25,088	22,343	89.06
Total	222,412	198,749	89.36

* Data for Population above twenty years of age for Johore Bharu, the largest constituency, and Muar, the eighth largest constituency were not available. Hence Bukit Bendera and Selayang have been included.

- Sources:
- 1 Data (unpublished) for population above twenty years obtained from Statistics Department, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
 - 2 Election Commission, 1974 Election report, 1975, Appendix 11, pp 144-157.

constituencies as a whole only 74.68% of those above twenty years were registered as electors as compared with 89.36% in the ten smallest constituencies. Hence Parliament, in rejecting the total population criterion and in using exclusively the total electorate criterion in the apportionment and delineation of constituencies, has thereby already built in a system of rural weightage. If the member of parliament's task is viewed as one of representing the interests of, and serving the whole of the population residing in the constituency, rather than only those who have been registered as electors, then to impute a further rural weightage would certainly be to err in the direction of excess weightage.

The principle of rural weightage is contentious, but what is not contentious and is conceded by even the most ardent supporters of the principle of rural weightage, is the need for some form of restriction on the amount of such weightage conceded. In Malaysia, however, clause (c) of the Constitution's delineation guide lines, which allows for the rural weightage, has been amended frequently and at each juncture a greater and greater weightage has been introduced. The Merthyr Commission's guidelines had included that:

"the number of inhabitants within each constituency should be approximately equal except that ... the Committee would not regard such 'weightage' as unreasonable if in some instances a rural constituency should contain as little as one-half of the constituents in the more populous urban areas."¹

The 1957 Malayan Constitution, a document very much reflecting the 'bargain' entered into between the Alliance leaders of the various communities in their quest for independence, restricted and specified the weightage. Article 116 (4) of the Constitution thus read:

1 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Committee Appointed to Examine the Question of Elections to the Federal Legislative Council, 1954, p. 13.

"Each State shall be divided into constituencies in such manner that each constituency contains a number of electors as nearly equal to the electoral quota of the State as may be after making allowance for the distribution of the different communities and for differences in density of population and the means of communication; but the allowance so made shall not increase or reduce the number of electors in any constituency to a number differing from the electoral quota by more than fifteen per cent."

The 1962 Constitution Amendment Act reinstated the guidelines used by the Merthyr Commission of 1954 and the relevant clause of the Constitution was made to read:

"The number of electors within each constituency in a State ought to be approximately equal, except that, having regard to the difficulty of reaching electors in country districts and the other disadvantages facing rural constituencies, a measure of weightage for area ought to be given to such constituencies to the extent that in some cases a rural constituency may contain even as little as one half of the electors of any urban constituency." /Emphasis mine/

This amendment was included in the 1963 Malaysian Constitution. No constituency delimitation was adopted whilst this amended clause remained in force. In 1973 the Government, whilst ushering through Parliament Act 206, which created the Federal Territory, made further changes to this clause and repealed the words underlined in the above citation. It now became possible for rural constituencies to have even less than half the electors of any urban constituency. It was with this new guideline that the Election Commission delineated the constituencies in 1974. Table 17 sets out the seats with the largest and smallest electorate in each state as at the 1974 election. The amount of rural weightage provided is so marked that in many states the value of the rural vote is seen to be more than twice that of the urban vote. In Johore it is even more marked and reaches 2.97 times the value of the urban vote.

Rural weightage in constituency delimitation is traditionally opposed on the grounds that it defeats the all-important principle in democracy of one man one vote, by imputing different values to each vote. In Peninsular Malaysia the implication of rural weightage goes

Table 17

Constituencies with the smallest and largest electorate,
Peninsular Malaysian States, 1974 Election.

State	Smallest Constituency		Largest Constituency		Ratio largest to smallest
	Name	Electors	Name	Electors	
Perlis	Kangar	29,256	Arau	29,465	1.01
Kedah	Padang Serai	24,236	Alor Setar	37,178	1.53
Kelantan	Kuala Kerai	17,332	Kota Bharu	35,954	2.07
Trengganu	Dungun	25,202	Kuala Trengganu	32,391	1.29
Penang	Permatang Pauh	22,663	Jelutong	42,804	1.89
Perak	Grik	17,280	Menglembu	49,038	2.84
Pahang	Pekan	21,970	Kuantan	27,800	1.27
Selangor	Sabak Bernam	22,343	Petaling	47,929	2.15
Federal Territory	Kepong	32,282	Sungai Besi	40,489	1.25
Negri Sembilan	Jelebu	25,512	Seremban	40,731	1.60
Malacca	Jasin	33,727	Kota Melaka	44,370	1.32
Johore	Tenggaroh	17,379	Johore Bharu	51,534	2.97
Peninsular Malaysia	Grik	17,280	Johore Bharu	51,534	2.98

Source: Election Commission, 1974 Election report, 1975,
Appendix H, pp 144-157.

beyond that, and has significant ramifications for the comparative electoral strength of the different communal groups. This is due to the differences in the degree of urbanisation of the various communities - the Chinese and Indian communities are more urbanised than the Malay. In 1970, of the 28.7% of Peninsular Malaysia's population that lived in urban centres with more than 10,000 persons, 58.5% were Chinese and 12.8% were Indians; only 27.6% were Malays. (Table 18) On the other hand, of the 71.3% of the population that lived in the rural areas - that is centres with less than 10,000 persons - only 26.2% were Chinese and 9.7% were Indians; but here the Malays formed 63.5%. Expressed in another way, only 52.6% of the Chinese and 65.3% of the Indians lived in the rural areas as compared with 85.1% of the Malays.¹ The manner in which the electoral advantage manifests itself is apparent when it is noted that, during the 1974 election, of the sixty-nine seats smaller than the Peninsular Malaysian electoral quota of 29,883, there were fifty-seven seats with a Malay majority; of the forty-five seats larger than the electoral quota only twenty-two had a Malay majority.² The advantage to the Malay community becomes even more apparent when expressed in a different form - of the seventy-nine seats with a Malay majority only twenty-two (27.85%) were larger than the electoral quota, whereas of the thirty-five seats with a non-Malay majority twenty-three (65.71%) were larger than the electoral quota. (Table 19) Rural weightage in the Peninsular Malaysian context thus means a weightage for Malay electoral strength, and Parliament, by progressively increasing the amount of rural weightage, has provided for a corresponding increase in the Malay's electoral dominance.

1 Malaysia, Jabatan Perangkaan, 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, Community Groups, 1972, p. 33. Of the category 'others' only 59.2% live in the rural areas.

2 Refer Appendix 4.

Table 18

Ethnic Composition of Urban and Rural Population of Peninsular Malaysia by Percentage, 1970.

Type of Area	Malays	Chinese	Indians
Urban (more than 10,000 persons) N = 2,530,433 (28.7%)	27.6	58.5	12.8
Rural (less than 10,000 persons) N = 6,279,915 (71.3%)	63.5	26.2	9.7

Source: Malaysia, Jabatan Perangkaan, 1970 Population and Housing - Census of Malaysia, Community Groups, 1972, p. 30.

Table 19

Ethnic Composition of Constituencies by size categories, Peninsular Malaysia, 1974 election.

Category	Number	Malay Majority	Malay Plurality	Chinese Majority	Chinese Plurality	Non-Malay Majority
Less than 20,000	4	4				
20,001 - 25,000	24	21	1	1	1	3
25,001 - 30,000	41	32	2	3	4	9
30,001 - 35,000	21	13	1	6	1	8
35,001 - 40,000	10	7	0	3		3
40,001 - 45,000	9	1	1	6	1	8
More than 45,000	5	1		4		4
Total	114	79	5	23	7	35

Source: Compiled from data included in Appendix 4.

The above discussion established the significance of the principles utilized in apportionment and delineation to communal representation. It also examined the effects brought about by the changes to the principles utilized; each change, it was noted, resulted in an increased advantage to the Malay community at the expense of the Chinese and Indian communities. Further disadvantage to non-Malay electoral representation was brought about by Parliament when, first, it created the Federal Territory in 1973, and, secondly, when it adopted the Government's amendments to the constituency delineation report submitted by the Election Commission.

The Creation of the Federal Territory


By Act 206 of 1973, which came into effect on February 1, 1974, Parliament declared the creation of a Federal Territory of ninety-four square miles of land in Selangor State. This included the whole of the thirty-six square miles of the former municipality of Kuala Lumpur and parts adjoining it. As a result of this, 173,946 electors of the Federal Territory who otherwise would have been able to participate in the voting for the Legislative Assembly seats in Selangor State, were at the 1974 election unable to do so. This disenfranchisement had not been recompensated by the creation of any elective body for the Federal Territory. Act 206 of 1973, had also reapportioned the House of Representative seats to the various states and the newly created Federal Territory, and in this the Federal Territory was noted to have been the most disadvantaged. (Table 13, page 119) The communal composition of the 173,946 electors of the Federal Territory at the time of the 1974 election was 27.79% Malay, 60.22% Chinese and 11.99% Indian.¹ The disenfranchisement and the electoral

1 Refer Appendix 4.

disadvantage to the Federal Territory clearly affects the various communities differently, the non-Malay communities being more disadvantaged than the Malay community.


At the time of the 1969 election the communal composition of the electors in Selangor State had been 35.49% Malay, 50.38% Chinese, and 14.13% Indian.¹ This had resulted in a Malay absolute majority in only five of the total of fourteen parliamentary constituencies, and eight of the total of twenty-eight state assembly constituencies. (Figure 2) Principally due to the exclusion of the 173,946 electors from Selangor State by the creation of the Federal Territory, the composition of the electors in Selangor State at the time of the 1974 election became 46.47% Malay, 38.88% Chinese, and 14.65% Indian. The thirty-three Selangor State Assembly constituencies delineated in 1974 thus had a Malay absolute majority in twenty-one seats and a non-Malay absolute majority in twelve seats. The increase in the percentage of Malay majority seats in the Legislative Assembly of Selangor was from 35.71% in 1969 to 63.64% in 1974. The percentage of parliamentary seats, in which the Malay community comprised an absolute majority in Selangor and the present Federal Territory together, increased from 35.71% in 1969 to 37.50% in 1974. (Figure 3) The implications of this to communal representation are emphasised when it is noted that in the 1969 election the DAP and the Gerakan, principally non-Malay based parties, and an independent, had together obtained fourteen of the twenty-eight Selangor State seats. The uncertainty thus created as regards which party would form the State Government in Selangor, had been one of the principal factors that had resulted in communal violence and the suspension of parliamentary government till 1971. The creation of the Federal Territory and the resultant disenfranchisement of 34.02% of the electors, 72.21% of whom were non-Malay, who

1 Refer Appendix 3.



Parliament

PERCENT	
	55 and over
	45 - 50
	Below 45





- 1 SENTUL
- 2 PENCHALA
- 3 KAMPONG BAHRU
- 4 BUKIT NANAS
- 5 SALAK
- 6 PANTAI

State

0 20
Kms

PERCENTAGE OF MALAYS IN THE ELECTORATE IN SELANGOR
CONSTITUENCIES, 1969.

Fig. 2



PERCENT

	55 and over
	50 - 55
	45 - 50
	Below 45

PERCENTAGE OF MALAYS IN THE ELECTORATE IN SELANGOR CONSTITUENCIES, 1974

Fig. 3

would otherwise have voted in the Selangor State Assembly election meant that no non-Malay based party could hope to form the State Government in Selangor unless it was able to win a sizeable number of Malay votes. However, the creation of the Federal Territory ensured that a Malay-based party with the support of the Malay community alone could obtain a majority of seats in the Selangor State Assembly.

Amendments to the Election Commission's Report

The constituency delineation report dated July 20, 1974 was presented to Parliament without changes in the case of all constituencies save those in Johore. The amendments made were done in extreme haste and, as noted earlier, the boundary changes were merely recorded on an otherwise blank map of the scale of one inch to five miles. Even the polling districts within the bounds of the amended constituencies were not indicated in the report presented to Parliament, though such information was provided in the case of all other constituencies. Also lacking was any explanation as to why this hasty amendment had been necessitated; but though the reason for the changes made may be lacking, the effects of the changes are clear.

The communal composition of the electorate in Johore at the time of the 1969 election was 51.54% Malay, 43.65% Chinese and 4.81% Indian.¹ In the constituencies utilized for the 1969 parliamentary election the Malay electors formed an absolute majority in eight of the sixteen constituencies; the thirty-two state assembly seats had a Malay majority in nineteen (Figure 4). Since 1969 there has been no appreciable change in the communal composition of the Johore electorate, there being at the 1974 election 54.58% Malays, 40.46% Chinese and 4.96% Indians.² Yet, the constituencies recommended by the Election

1 Refer Appendix 3.

2 Refer Appendix 4.

Parliament









Fig. 4

PERCENTAGE OF MALAYS IN THE ELECTORATE IN JOHORE CONSTITUENCIES, 1969

State



PERCENT

 55 and over	 45 - 50
 50 - 55	 Below 45

Parliament





Fig. 5

PERCENTAGE OF MALAYS IN THE ELECTORATE IN JOHORE CONSTITUENCIES, DELINEATION REPORT, JULY, 20, 1974

State



PERCENT

- 55 and over
- 45 - 50
- 50 - 55
- Below 45





Fig. 6

PERCENTAGE OF MALAYS IN THE ELECTORATE IN JOHORE CONSTITUENCIES, 1974



Commission in its 1974 delineation report greatly increased the number of Malay majority seats in Johore for both Parliament and the State Assembly. Had these constituencies been used for the 1974 election there would have been a Malay majority in twelve of the sixteen parliamentary seats and twenty of the thirty-two state seats.¹ (Figure 5) Changes had been made to virtually all the constituencies utilized for the 1969 election and the constituencies thus delineated varied even more in size than those utilized in 1969 - the Dauer-Kelsay Index² for the sixteen parliamentary seats of 1969 is 50.09 as compared with 48.35 for those presented in the Commission's report (Table 20). The Election Commission's changes cannot for these reasons be held to be an improvement over those of 1969.


Changes were, however, made to the Commission's report before they were presented to Parliament for approval - the effect was not to redress the imbalances introduced but rather, to further accentuate them (Figure 6).

The delineation approved by Parliament paid little regard to the existing constituency boundaries and the new constituencies drawn up in some cases thwart more than two constituencies. The case of the Sri Gading parliamentary constituency is most remarkable. This


1 Refer Appendix 5.

2 Dauer, M.J. and Kelsay, R.G., 'Unrepresentative States', National Municipal Review, Vol. 44, 1955, pp 571-575 and p. 587. The index is defined as 'the smallest percentage of a state's population which could theoretically elect a majority of the lower house' (*ibid.*, p. 571). The index is calculated in the following manner: The electorates are arranged in ascending order of numbers of voters; then starting with the smallest electorate, the votes in successive electorates are totalled until a majority of the electorates is achieved. That total is expressed as a percentage of the total number of electors in all the constituencies. The figure so obtained is the 'Index of Representatives', here referred to as the Dauer-Kelsay Index. Table 20 presents the index for Johore State.

constituency with its long and sinuous boundary was carved out of parts of four parliamentary constituencies as they had been at the time of the 1969 election and of five parliamentary constituencies as they had been delineated by the Election Commission in its 1974 report (Figure 7). The Sri Gading constituency at the time of the 1974 election had the highest percentage of Malay electors of the sixteen parliamentary constituencies in Johore, there being 78.28% Malay electors. By comparison with the 1969 constituencies and with those prepared by the Election Commission, that approved by Parliament was even more marked in terms of variations in electorate size, the Dauer-Kelsay Index for these sixteen parliamentary seats now being 46.08 (Table 20). The size of the Johore Bharu parliamentary constituency was increased from 49,392 electors as it would have been by the Election Commission's initial delineation to 51,534 electors by that approved by Parliament. This made Johore Bharu the largest parliamentary constituency in Peninsular Malaysia. The smallest parliamentary constituency in Johore was, however, left unchanged and the electorate here at the time of the 1974 election was 17,379. By no objective measure can the amendments made to the Election Commission's delineation report be held to be an improvement, but they had one significant effect: they increased the Malay electoral strength and conversely reduced non-Malay electoral strength. The number of parliamentary constituencies, of the total of sixteen in Johore State, in which Malay electors formed a majority increased from eight in 1969 to twelve in the Election Commission's report of July 20, 1974, to thirteen in the delineation approved by Parliament. In the case of the thirty-two State Assembly seats the increase was even more dramatic - there were nineteen in 1969, twenty in the Election Commission's report of July 20, 1974, and twenty-six in the delineation approved by Parliament. (Figure 6)



PARTS OF 1969 CONSTITUENCIES
COMPRISING SRI GADING



PARTS OF 1974 CONSTITUENCIES
COMPRISING SRI GADING

SRI GADING CONSTITUENCY

Fig. 7

Table 20

Electorate Size of Parliamentary Constituencies in Johore State, 1969, 1974 Delineation Report and 1974 election.

1969	1974 Delineation Report	1974 Election
Constituency Electorate ¹	Constituency Electorate ²	Constituency Electorate ³
Johore Tenggara	Tenggaroh	Tenggaroh
13,821	17,379	17,379
Johore Timor	Panti	Panti
18,319	23,561	23,561
Segamat Utara	Segamat	Pagoh
21,893	23,597	24,280
Kluang Utara	Semerah	Labis
25,334	25,326	25,469
Batu Pahat	Yong Peng	Ledang
26,999	28,810	25,850
Johore Bharu Barat	Pagoh	Ayer Hitam
27,169	28,839	26,040
Pontian Selatan	Ledang	Sri Gading
27,920	30,362	26,645
Muar Dalam	Pontian	Semerah
28,529	30,496	28,871
Johore Bharu Timor	Pulai	Segamat
28,754	31,153	30,152
Segamat Selatan	Benut	Batu Pahat
29,742	31,889	33,714
Pontian Utara	Kluang	Pulai
29,663	32,163	34,344
Kluang Selatan	Labis	Kluang
30,254	32,658	34,755
Muar Utara	Kulai	Rengam
30,269	33,893	35,599
Muar Pantai	Batu Pahat	Pontian
30,358	36,218	35,665
Batu Pahat Dalam	Muar	Muar
32,661	39,644	41,522
Muar Selatan	Johore Bharu	Johore Bharu
34,964	49,392	51,534
Smallest Nine	218,738	239,523
		228,247
Total	436,649	495,380
Dauer-Kelsay Index	50.09	48.35
		46.08
Malay Majority	8	12
Non-Malay Majority	8	4
		3

1 Election Commission, 1969 Election Report, 1972, Appendix H, pp 122-134.

2 Refer Appendix 5.

3 Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendix H, pp 144-157.

Cumulative Effect of Delimitation Principles and Practices on
Communal Representation

Electoral studies have seen the development of a number of measures to assess the adequacy of delimitation exercises. Each measure is based on a value assumption and the deviation from this assumed 'ideal' is noted for comparisons. Hence, measurements of compactness work on the assumption that constituencies are ideally compact in form.¹ The introduction of shape criteria in any delimitation problem has sprung from both positive and negative motives. The positive aspect is that compact constituencies allow for easier contact and hence foster a sense of community and identity within the constituency by both party organizations and electors. The negative aspect of compactness is that it acts as a means of hindering gerrymandering. Compactness is a question of shape. Thus measures of compactness are essentially shape measures. Several shape measures have been utilized to determine the compactness of constituencies. One of the basic approaches of political scientists has been to compare areal shapes to geometric shapes whose properties are known, and thus make shape measures at a ratio level. Reock, for instance, suggests a shape measure that relates a shape's area to that of a specified circle.² Schwartzberg presents a measure which relates a shape's perimeter to a specified circle's circumference as a measure of compactness.³ More general measures of shape based on

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- 1 Taylor, P.J., A New Shape Measure for Evaluating Electoral District Patterns, The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXVII, No. 3, September 1973, pp 948-
 - 2 Reock, E.C., Jr., 'Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative Apportionment', Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 5, February 1961, pp 70-74.
 - 3 Schwartzberg, J.E., 'Reapportionment, Gerrymanders, and the Notion of Compactness', Minnesota Law Review, Vol. 50, January 1966, pp 443-452.

aggregate diverseness from a centre of gravity have also been utilized to determine the quality of any delineation.¹ The advantage of these measures of compactness is that they direct themselves to the principal reason for territorial representation, which is ensuring representation of the common body of interest predominating in particular areas of a polity.

An alternative set of measures has been directed to the assumption that constituencies are ideally equal in electorate size. The usefulness of this second set of measures is that they direct themselves to the majoritarian principle in democracy and seek to highlight the compromise effected to this principle by territorial representation. Two prominent measures developed on the basis of this are the Dauer-Kelsay Index and the Kaiser Index. The Dauer-Kelsay Index seeks to measure the minimum number of electors who could elect sufficient representatives to bring about a 'majority decision' in a parliament elected on the basis of single member constituencies.² The main limitation of the Dauer-Kelsay Index is that it can only be used as a basis of comparison for legislatures with an equal number of constituencies. The Kaiser Index³ overcomes this latter limitation but in the words of Kaiser himself:

"It must be admitted that the calculation ... by hand, is troublesome and tricky, requiring the informed use of logarithms."⁴

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- 1 Kaiser, H.F., 'An Objective Method for Establishing Legislative Districts', Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 10, May 1966, pp 200-223.
 - 2 Dauer, M.J., and Kelsay, R.G., 'Unrepresentative States', National Municipal Review, Vol. 44, 1955, pp 571-575.
 - 3 Kaiser, H.F., 'A Measure of the Population Quality of Legislative Apportionment', The American Political Science Review, Vol. LXII, No. 1, March 1968, pp 208-215.
 - 4 Ibid., p. 212.


He, however, obligingly offers those using the index the use of his Fortran version of a programme to calculate it and indeed assistance in any computational problem involving the measure for any particular set of data.

Both the above sets of measures - those determining compactness and those measuring the unequal sizes of constituencies - are, however, inadequate when it is attempted to assess the implication of any delimitation exercise of the representation it affords particular segments of society. For instance, their applicability to plural societies where the advantage or disadvantage accruing to particular communities is to be measured is limited. The measures discussed above do not specifically direct themselves to this latter problem. Hence, for the purposes of this chapter, which principally aims to measure the effect of the delimitation of constituencies on communal representation, these measures have not been utilized. Instead, the communal predominance in each of the constituencies is determined and then the percentage of constituencies in which each community predominates is noted and compared with the percentage that community comprises of the total population. The assumption in such a measure is that constituencies are ideally so delimited that the percentage of constituencies in which a particular community predominates is equal to the percentage that the community comprises of the total population. The deviation from this assumed ideal provides a measure of the advantage or disadvantage accruing to each community.

In utilising this measure in the Peninsular Malaysian context, however, it must be noted that there is a difference between the percentage that each community comprises of the total population, and the percentage it comprises of the total electorate. The rules and procedure governing enfranchisement were noticed to have already resulted in a degree of electoral advantage or disadvantage to the

different communities (Refer Tables 5 and 6). This is here referred to as enfranchisement induced advantage or disadvantage. Thus, in the Peninsular Malaysian context, the difference in the percentage that each community comprises of the total population and the percentage of constituencies in which the community comprises a majority is, in effect, the cumulative advantage or disadvantage that accrues to that community - the cumulative of the enfranchisement induced advantage or disadvantage, and the delimitation induced advantage or disadvantage. Hence, to assess the delimitation induced advantage or disadvantage, it is necessary to deduct the percentage the community comprises of the total electorate from the percentage of the constituencies the community comprises a majority. Alternatively, the delimitation induced advantage or disadvantage may be calculated by deducting from the cumulative advantage or disadvantage the enfranchisement induced advantage or disadvantage.

Table 21 sets out the communal predominance amongst the electorate of the parliamentary constituencies for each of the parliamentary elections held in Peninsular Malaysia, including that for the pre-independence Legislative Assembly election of 1955. The Indian community though comprising 10.53% of the total population at the latest census in 1970, and 7.6% of the electorate at the time of the 1974 election had, due to its spatial distribution, been in no constituency in excess of twenty-six per cent of the electorate. Hence the community does not form an absolute majority or even a relative majority (here referred to as plurality) in any of the constituencies, a predicament it has found itself in since the introduction of elections and along with it the plurality system of voting (Figures 8 and 9). Such was also the case at the time of the 1974 election. The communal predominance in Peninsular Malaysian constituencies has therefore to be viewed in terms of Malay predominance and Chinese



Percent



PERCENTAGE OF INDIANS IN THE ELECTORATE, PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES, 1969

Fig. 8




Table 21

Communal Predominance in the Electorate of Parliamentary Constituencies,
Peninsular Malaysia, 1955-1974

Year	No. of Seats	Malay Majority		Chinese Majority		Indian Majority		Non-Malay Majority	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
1955	52	50	96.2	2	3.8	0	0	2	3.8
1959	104	60	57.7	25	24.0	0	0	44	42.3
1964	104	58	55.8	31	29.8	0	0	46	44.2
1969	104	58	55.8	28	26.9	0	0	46	44.2
1974	114	79	69.3	23	20.2	0	0	35	30.7

Source: 1 Data for 1955, 1959, and 1964 obtained from Barisan Nasional Office, Jalan Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

2 Data for 1969 compiled from Appendix 3.

3 Data for 1974 compiled from Appendix 4.

predominance, or alternatively, as the predominance of any one of the two as against that of all other communities combined.

Malay predominance in the electorate during the 1955 election led to ninety-six per cent of the constituencies having a Malay absolute majority. Independence and the increased franchise of the non-Malay communities, however, saw Malay dominance being progressively whittled down and in 1969 the community had an absolute majority in fifty-six per cent of the constituencies and a plurality in a further 5.6 per cent. (Refer Figure 10 for the percentage of Malays in the electorate of the parliamentary constituencies in 1969.) The Chinese community saw a concomitant increase in its electoral strength and from an absolute majority in just four per cent of the seats in 1955 it, by 1969, had an absolute majority in twenty-seven per cent of the seats and a relative majority in a further 11.4 per cent. Viewed in terms of Malay and non-Malay predominance it meant that the seats where the Malays had a majority declined from ninety-six per cent to fifty-six per cent and that of the non-Malay communities increased from four per cent to forty-four per cent. This was the situation till the 1969 election.

The 1973 apportionment of seats by Parliament and the delineation of constituencies on the basis of this approved by Parliament in July 1974, however, saw a reversal of the above trend. The number of constituencies in which Malays formed an absolute majority increased to sixty-nine per cent and in a further four per cent of the seats the community had a plurality. The Chinese community's electoral strength declined, it now having an absolute majority in twenty per cent of the seats and a plurality in six per cent. In terms of Malay predominance as opposed to non-Malay predominance it meant that the Malay community had a majority in sixty-nine per cent of the seats and the non-Malays a majority in thirty-one per cent of the seats. The

effect of the 1974 delimitation exercise was to increase the number of Malay majority seats from fifty-eight out of a total of 104 in 1969 to seventy-nine out of a total of 114 in 1974. The non-Malay majority seats declined from forty-six to thirty-five, and this, despite there being an increase of ten seats in Parliament. (Figures 14 and 15)

Table 22 sets out the ethnic composition of the constituencies utilized for the 1969 election by groupings of ten per cent for the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities, and the non-Malay communities as a whole. Table 23 sets out the similar distribution for the constituencies used for the 1974 election. A comparison of both tables provides a valuable indication of how the increase in Malay majority seats was achieved. The seats in each category where Malays formed more than fifty per cent increased in 1974, but in each category where Malays formed less than fifty per cent of the electorate there was a decline. (Also compare Figures 10 and 11). The trend is reversed for the Chinese and Indian communities, there being a decline in the category of seats where the Chinese formed more than fifty per cent of the electorate, and an increase in the category of seats where the Chinese or the Indians formed less than fifty per cent of the electorate. (Also compare Figures 12 and 13) A similar trend is apparent when the distribution of the non-Malay electorate as a whole is studied - there is a decrease in the number of seats in the categories where non-Malay electors form more than fifty per cent and an increase in the categories where they form less than fifty per cent. Most marked is the increase in the seats where Malays comprised 50% - 59.9% of the electors - the increase being from 10% - 58% of the seats in 1969 to 18.42% of the seats in 1974. The category of seats where non-Malays formed 40% - 49.9% increased from 10.58% to 18.42%. (Also compare Figures 14 and 15) Clearly the constituencies utilized for the 1974 election had been so delimited as to result in a dilution

Table 22

Ethnic Composition of Peninsular Malaysian Constituencies, 1969

Percentage Community in Electorate	Malays		Chinese		Indians		Non-Malays	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
90 - 100	15	14.42	0		0		1	0.96
80 - 89.9	13	12.5	1	0.96	0		7	6.73
70 - 79.9	11	10.58	6	5.77	0		9	8.65
60 - 69.9	10	9.62	6	5.77	0		16	15.38
50 - 59.9	11	10.58	14	13.46	0		11	10.58
40 - 49.9	11	10.58	17	16.35	0		11	10.58
30 - 39.9	16	15.38	14	13.46	0		10	9.62
20 - 29.9	9	8.65	13	12.5	3	2.88	11	10.58
10 - 19.9	7	6.73	14	13.46	35	33.65	13	12.5
0 - 9.9	1	0.96	19	18.27	66	63.46	15	14.42
Total	104	100	104	100	104	100	104	100


Source: Compiled from data included in Appendix 3.

Table 23


Ethnic Composition of Peninsular Malaysian Constituencies, 1974.

Percentage Community in Electorate	Malays		Chinese		Indians		Non-Malays	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
90 - 100	18	15.79	0		0		3	2.63
80 - 89.9	15	13.16	2	1.75	0		6	5.26
70 - 79.9	12	10.53	6	5.26	0		7	6.14
60 - 69.9	13	11.40	7	6.14	0		9	7.89
50 - 59.9	21	18.42	8	7.02	0		10	8.77
40 - 49.9	10	8.77	16	14.04	0		21	18.42
30 - 39.9	9	7.89	21	18.42	0		13	11.40
20 - 29.9	7	6.14	15	13.16	3	2.63	12	10.53
10 - 19.9	6	5.26	18	15.79	34	29.82	15	13.16
0 - 9.9	3	2.63	21	18.42	77	67.54	18	15.79
Total	114	100	114	100	114	100	114	100

Source: Compiled from data included in Appendix 4.





PERCENT



PERCENTAGE OF MALAYS IN THE ELECTORATE, PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES, 1969

Fig. 10







PERCENT

□ 0 - 19.99	▨ 20 - 39.99	▩ 40 - 49.99
▤ 50 - 59.99	▧ 60 - 79.99	■ 80 - 100

**PERCENTAGE OF CHINESE IN THE ELECTORATE,
PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES, 1969**


Fig. 12





ETHNIC DOMINANCE IN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES
1969

Fig. 14



Constituency Number 36
 State Boundary
 Parliamentary Constituency Boundary

ETHNIC DOMINANCE IN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES 1974

- Malay Majority
- Chinese Plurality
- Malay Plurality
- Chinese Majority

Fig. 15

of non-Malay electoral strength, the non-Malay electors being distributed amongst a large number of constituencies, in each of which they form a minority.

Table 24 sets out the enfranchisement induced advantage or disadvantage, the delimitation induced advantage or disadvantage, and, the cumulative advantage or disadvantage accruing to the Malay, Chinese and Indian communities at each of the parliamentary elections held in Peninsular Malaysia, including that for the Legislative Assembly in 1955. The Malay community is noted to have been advantaged by the enfranchisement rules and procedures and the delimitation principles and practices at each of the elections held. Consequently there is a cumulative advantage accruing to the Malay community at the expense of the Chinese, and particularly the Indian, communities. The increased enfranchisement of especially the Chinese community resulted in this electoral advantage being progressively diminished till the 1969 election. However at the time of the 1974 election the Malay community is seen to have again improved upon its advantage in terms of enfranchisement and delimitation at the expense of the Chinese and Indian communities. Clearly this improved electoral status of the Malay community is the result, as indicated in the discussion earlier in this chapter, of the deliberate and systematic amendments brought about to the 1957 Malayan Constitution's provisions for constituency apportionment and delineation, the creation of the Federal Territory, and, the amendments made to the Election Commission's delineation report of 1974.

Conclusion

The discussion in this chapter raises a number of fundamental issues. Reapportionment and delineation invite fresh analysis of bicameralism, the single-member constituency system, the possible role

Table 24

Electoral Advantage/Disadvantage Accruing to various Communal Groups from Enfranchisement and Delineation of Constituencies, 1955-1974

Year	Malays			Chinese			Indians			Non-Malays		
	Enf. ¹	Del. ²	Cum. ³	Enf.	Del.	Cum.	Enf.	Del.	Cum.	Enf.	Del.	Cum.
1955	+34.4	+12.2	+46.4	-25.9	- 7.4	-33.3	-8.5	-4.6	-13.1	-34.4	-12.2	-46.4
1959	+ 7.1	+ 0.6	+ 7.7	- 2.5	-10.5	-13.0	-4.6	-8.4	-13.0	- 7.1	- 0.6	- 7.7
1964	+ 4.4	+ 1.4	+ 5.8	+ 0.6	- 6.5	- 7.1	-5.0	-8.1	-13.1	- 4.4	- 1.4	- 5.8
1969	+ 2.8	+ 0.1	+ 2.9	+ 0.7	- 8.0	- 8.7	-3.5	-8.0	-11.5	- 2.8	- 0.1	- 2.9
1974	+ 4.7	+11.4	+16.1	+ 1.0	-14.3	-15.3	-3.7	-7.6	-11.3	- 4.7	-11.4	-16.1

- 1 Enfranchisement induced advantage - Percentage Community in electorate minus percentage community in total population (Refer Table 6).
- 2 Delimitation induced advantage - Percentage of Constituencies in which community has an absolute majority minus percentage community in electorate. (Table 21 lists the communal predominance in the electorate of parliamentary constituencies 1955-1974)
- 3 Cumulative advantage - i.e. Enfranchisement induced advantage plus Delineation induced advantage.

Source: Compiled from data in Tables 6 and 21.

of such devices as cumulative voting, limited voting, and modified forms of proportional representation which may allow for minority groups to obtain adequate representation. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to attempt answers to these difficult questions. However, the discussion also raises basic questions concerning conditions of allegiance and modes of expression of public will and opinion in the Peninsular Malaysian political arena. It calls for an analysis of the institutional, spatial and population bases of political parties and the manner in which political parties attempt to mobilise support to obtain electoral successes. The subsequent three chapters address themselves to these questions.

CHAPTER THREE

The Evolution of Communal Party Politics

Party politics in Peninsular Malaysia, at least successful party politics, remains largely a matter of mobilising communal support. Such has been the pattern since the early attempts at party formation in the post World War II days. However, the introduction of popular elections in 1952 emphasised the all-important consideration of winning parliamentary majorities. This presented the political parties with the dilemma of retaining communal support and gaining parliamentary majorities - a task which appeared impossible because of the peculiar communal composition of the Malayan population, where no community has a clear majority. Two alternatives presented themselves - either to attempt party formation along non-communal lines, or to form inter-communal coalitions. Both alternatives have been tried with the latter having more success. Indeed, the country has since the first election been dominated by the Alliance and its successor the Barisan Nasional - both essentially inter-communal coalitions.

Given the communal composition of the country, however, it is to be expected that the success of the smaller parties who are content, or the circumstances under which they are forced to be communally based, would, by highlighting communal issues, present serious opposition to non-communal parties or inter-communal coalitions. This has been the trend since the first election in 1952, but in 1969 their challenge was sufficient for the first time to reduce the popular support of the inter-communal Alliance to less than 50%. The ensuing communal clashes resulted in the suspension of parliamentary democracy and the introduction of the Emergency Government by a National Operations Council. The Council made the removal from public discussion of a number of politically sensitive communal issues, the condition for reconvening Parliament. A number of Opposition parties capitulated and party politics and parliamentary government resumed. The 1974 election was thus the first to be held under the as it were newly defined 'limits of the game'.

Party politics in Malaysia can therefore be divided into three phases: phase one comprising the period prior to the introduction of elections in 1952; phase two from 1952 to the suspension of parliamentary government in 1969; and phase three comprising the period since then. By an examination of each of these three phases the present chapter attempts to trace the evolution of party politics in Peninsular Malaysia with the aim of establishing the dominance that communal considerations had throughout. It also seeks to explain the state of the parties and their respective positions at the 1974 election.

The Pre-1952 period

Party politics as witnessed today in Peninsular Malaysia originate from the response in general of the Malayan population, and in particular the Malay community, to the British Government's 1946 proposal for a Malayan Union scheme in the Malay peninsula. The proposed scheme sought to create a more unified and centralized government in the Union by including all the Malay states plus the former settlements of Penang and Malacca - leading as a consequence to a severe reduction in the power of the Malay rulers. Political rights for the non-Malays were to be enhanced, for the relevant White Paper stated " ... all those who have made the country their homeland should have the opportunity of a due share in the country's political and cultural institutions".¹ This in effect meant the termination of the privileged status enjoyed by the Malay community. Citizenship proposals were particularly favourable to the non-Malay communities for it called for the inclusion as citizens of all persons born in Malaya or Singapore or residing therein for ten out of the preceding fifteen years with the occupation period disregarded. More

1 United Kingdom Government, Malayan Union and Singapore, Cmnd. 6724, 1946, p. 1.

significantly, naturalized citizenship could be acquired after a residence of five years in Malaya and Singapore.

These provisions struck at the very basis of Malay communal feelings and proved the occasion for the rude awakening of the Malays from their political lethargy. Malay nationalist organizations were formed in nearly every state by the end of 1945 - the strongest of these being Onn bin Jaafar's Johore based National Movement of Peninsular Malays which soon gained a 100,000 strong membership. Onn's subsequent call for the uniting of Malay organizations to fight the Union led to the All-Malay Congress in Kuala Lumpur on March 1, 1948, with representatives of 40 Malay organizations attending. Here was formed the United Malay National Organisation (UMNO) with Onn as President, and with the specific task of fighting the communal battle that the Malayan Union implied for the Malays. Within a year UMNO had organized itself into a mass party with extensive grass-roots support. Kampong (village) branches, mukim branches and state divisions were formed within each state. Where there was more than one division in a state, State Liaison Committees were set up to co-ordinate their activity. This careful organization together with the united front presented by UMNO and the Malay Rulers gave it a supremacy over any existing organization.¹

Due almost wholly to the efforts of UMNO, the British Government agreed to review the Constitution and announced the formation of a committee to seek an acceptable agreement.² This Working Committee consisted of six Government members, four Malay Rulers and two UMNO representatives. Clearly the drafting of the Constitution was in the hands of the Malay elite. This caused alarm amongst the

1 Silcock; T.H. and Ungku Aziz, 'Nationalism in Malaya' in Holland, W.L. (ed.), Asian Nationalism and the West, 1953, p. 277.

2 The Straits Times, July 26, 1946, quoted in Means, G.P., Malaysian Politics, 1976, p. 55.

non-Malay communities who feared a return to the openly pro-Malay policies of pre-War Malaya. Non-Malay organizations like the Chinese Associations and Guilds and the Malayan Indian Congress submitted their views on citizenship, immigration and the political rights of the non-Malays. No strong united front existed. Due to this lack of organization non-Malays were unable to exert any significant degree of influence. In December of 1946, however, under the leadership of the Malayan Democratic Union (MDU) a Council of Joint Action (eventually coming to be known as the All-Malaya Council of Joint Action or AMCJA) was formed.¹ It was through this Council that non-Malay opposition to the UMNO-backed Federation of Malaya Agreement was channelled. The AMCJA, being an uneasy coalition of too varied a composition ranging from communist organizations to purely communal groups, could hardly challenge the highly cohesive UMNO which for added strength enjoyed a common front with the Malay Rulers. The AMCJA's efforts were to little avail and the procedure adopted by the British Government in securing an agreement with the various groups was first to negotiate a formula which the Malay Rulers and UMNO would be willing to support, and then to give the domiciled non-Malay populations an opportunity to criticize and support changes, provided they did not seriously alienate Malay opinion. The tenor of communal bargaining was established and was to form the basis of political relations among the different Malay communities.

The Federation of Malaya Agreement meant political competition between the various ethnic communities in Malaya. The significance of this was not lost on Onn bin Jaafar who now aimed at a multi-racial approach to Malayan politics. Onn had been greatly

1 Means, G.P., Malaysian Politics, 1976, p. 55.

influenced by the deliberations carried out at the Communities Liaison Committee (CLC).¹ The CLC, which began as a Malay-Chinese Goodwill Committee on the initiative of the British Commissioner General, had developed into a body with six Malays, six Chinese, one Eurasian, one Indian, one Ceylonese and one European; and reached a consensus on a number of divisive issues. Convinced of the CLC's formula for citizenship Onn attempted to force it on UMNO. He resigned as UMNO's President; UMNO capitulated and re-elected him as President. The following year Onn again attempted by a similar step to get UMNO to open its doors to non-Malay membership. UMNO's decision was unequivocal. It was prepared to lose Onn rather than have its membership 'adulterated' by non-Malays. Onn left to form the Independence of Malaya Party (IMP) and UMNO chose Tunku Abdul Rahman as its leader.²

Onn's newly formed non-communal IMP seemed to appear at an opportune moment, for the AMCJA had disintegrated with the beginning of the communist insurgency in 1948. The AMCJA's constituent associations returned to their spate of communal politics. Even Tan Cheng Lock, the AMCJA's President, had on February 27, 1949 in conjunction with a number of other Chinese leaders formed the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA).³ The formation of the IMP presented an apparently viable alternative to the communal politics of UMNO.

1 It has been claimed that the CLC was the result of a meeting of twenty-one leaders from various communities held at the initiative of Onn bin Jaafar at his home on December 31, 1948. See Ishak bin Tadin, 'Dato Onn and Malay Nationalism, 1946-51', Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1960, p. 81.

2 Moore, D.E., The UMNO and the 1959 Elections: A study of a Political Party in Action in a Newly Independent Plural Society, 1960, p. 7.

3 Soh Eng Lim, 'Tan Cheng Lock, His Leadership of the Malayan Chinese', Journal of Southeast Asian History, Vol. 1, No. 1, March 1960, pp 29-55.

The initial support given the IMP by all the members of the CLC, leaders of all the major communal organizations (excepting UMNO) and the Trades Union Congress seemed to suggest that the new party would certainly dominate Malayan politics.¹ The support of the non-Malay communities at least seemed certain, for the IMP's objectives were to provide and maintain an efficient non-communal national organization. Then in 1952 was held the Municipal Council election for Kuala Lumpur. The organization of political parties to act merely as pressure groups was no longer sufficient, and parties and their leaders had to gain sufficient electoral support if they were to gain credence. The announcement of the forthcoming election brought about a flurry of activity, manoeuvring and bargaining, and properly marks the beginning of the second phase of Malayan political party formation and development.

The 1952-1969 phase

The Kuala Lumpur Municipal election of February 1952 was not the first election in the Federation. Election for the Municipal Council of George Town on Penang Island had been held in December 1951. However it was the capital city's election that was regarded as most significant - here the IMP would be able to test its non-communal approach to Malayan politics and do so on grounds that were most favourable to it. Kuala Lumpur's Malay, Chinese and Indian populations had lived together in harmony and were probably more liberal in their attitudes. Also, significantly, it was in Kuala Lumpur less than five months earlier that the IMP had been founded, attended by great pomp and ceremony. Decisive victory for the IMP and non-communal politics seemed imminent.

1 Vasil, R.K., Politics in a Plural Society, A study of non-communal political parties in West Malaysia, 1971, p. 50.

On January 9, 1952 a shock announcement appeared in the local press - the UMNO had entered into an electoral understanding with the MCA by which both parties would not contest each other but instead would field joint UMNO-MCA candidates - UMNO in the Malay-dominated constituencies and the MCA in the Chinese-dominated ones.¹ The agreement seemed particularly surprising since MCA President Tan Cheng Lock had been the Chairman of the inaugural meeting of the IMP and a member of its Organizing Committee. Further, several MCA leaders were also leaders of the IMP. The reasons for the UMNO-MCA agreement were, however, to be seen from the immediate aims of the two organizations. The MCA had been formed by conservative Chinese leaders with the backing of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the behind-the-scenes-support of the British Government, essentially to serve as an alternative to the communist influence over the Chinese community.² All sixteen of the Chinese members of the Federal Legislative and Executive Council were members of the formative committee of the MCA and, despite the Chinese community's initial opposition to the Federation of Malaya Agreement (Tan Cheng Lock had been President of the AMCJA), the MCA accepted the Agreement and pledged full support for the Government; in return the British Government gave it unofficial recognition as the principal representative of the Chinese community. Its continued status as such called for a measure of electoral support. The IMP had however been unwilling to enter into an electoral understanding with the MCA, though it was willing to accommodate MCA candidates within the IMP ticket. For UMNO the alliance meant the opportunity of beating its immediate rival, the IMP, both by gaining financial support from the MCA for election expenses and by gaining Chinese support at the polls.

1 The Malay Mail, January 9, 1952.

2 Means, G.P., op. cit., p. 120.

The UMNO-MCA agreement was, however, not the consequence of deliberations at the national level, and had been entered into by the President of the Selangor State branch of the MCA, and the Chairman of the UMNO election sub-committee for the Kuala Lumpur branch - not even the Kuala Lumpur branch of UMNO had been consulted.¹ So successful was this arrangement that MCA won six seats, UMNO three and IMP only two of the twelve seats contested. The success in Kuala Lumpur led to similar arrangements elsewhere and liaison committees between UMNO and MCA branches were set up at all levels throughout Malaya to exploit the advantages of this compromise. In December of 1952 thirty-seven municipal council seats were contested in six cities - UMNO and MCA captured twenty-six and the IMP only one.

This workable arrangement and apparent united front of the Malay and Chinese communities paved the way for discussions for Federal Legislative Council elections and eventually for independence. The only disagreements arose over details and these essentially, because the IMP, which lacked popular support, had a greater influence in the hitherto wholly nominated Legislative Council. Having received a great setback in the local council elections, the IMP hoped to delay Legislative Council elections so as to gain time to recoup and consolidate its support. The UMNO and MCA were, however, eager to press for speedy elections in an attempt to capitalize on their victories. The delaying tactics of the IMP served only to make it appear less intent on gaining independence and thus lose even more support.

Unable to gain support for the non-communal IMP Onn bin Jaafar announced the formation of the Party Negara - and in February 1954 the new party was launched. The membership qualifications of the new

¹ Vasil, R.K., Politics in a Plural Society, p. 11.

party, however, severely restricted non-Malay participation and the party began to adopt an increasingly Malay-oriented position.¹ Thus had failed the first serious attempt at non-communal party formation.

The Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), which had withdrawn from the AMCJA, now viewed the UMNO-MCA combination with interest and on October 17, 1954 the Executive Committee of the MIC decided to link itself with the UMNO-MCA alliance.² The MIC itself had been established in August 1946 after the Indian Prime Minister, Mr Nehru's, visit to Malaya and his urging Indians in Malaya to strengthen their organization so as to play an active role in Malayan politics. The party's constitution was patterned along the lines of the Congress Party of India and in its early years the party showed a great concern for the status of Indians overseas and their relations with India. Despite its links with the AMCJA and opposition to the Federation Agreement, the party never received any significant support from the Indian community and even as late as March 1950 the Assistant Registrar of Societies, Selangor/Negri Sembilan, wrote:

"Even though the Congress claims to represent the Indians in this country, I do not think even a fraction of Indians will follow [the] ideology. Indians who are members of the Federal and State Councils are not members of the Congress."³

In 1950 the Congress claimed 10,015 members but the Assistant Registrar noted "I don't think even 10% of the people are paying subscription regularly".⁴ The MIC's importance derives essentially from its membership in the Alliance. For the Alliance, too, the MIC's liaison has been of little electoral significance, for in no constituency do

1 Ibid., p. 82.

2 Means, G.P., Malaysian Politics, 1976, p. 108.

3 Assistant Registrar of Societies, Selangor/Negri Sembilan, Inspection Report on the MIC, March 23, 1950. Document included in Registrar of Societies, Malaysia, File No. 456/49.

4 Ibid.

the Indians represent more than 25% of the electorate. The MIC's inclusion, however, gave the Alliance a more Malayan appearance and thus increased legitimacy, for it now had the facade of representing all three major communities in Malaya.

By the time of the holding of the 1955 Federal Legislative Council election, the Alliance was the only party capable of contesting all fifty-two seats. The Party Negara, after its failure to stop the Alliance from winning all 46 of the seats it contested in the 1954 State Legislative Council elections, was in no position to offer serious competition. It nevertheless fielded thirty candidates for the 1955 election.¹ The Alliance's other challenge came from more extreme Malay-based organizations like the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party, National Association of Perak, and the Perak Malay League. Also in the contest were two hitherto non-communal organizations, the Labour Party and the Perak Progressive Party, but these were too small and disorganized to present any effective challenge. (Table 25 lists the classification of candidates by party and by community and the party performances for the 1955 election.) In the event, the Alliance made a virtual clean sweep at the polls. The only seat it lost, was not won by the Party Negara, but rather by the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party in a constituency which comprised a more than 90% Malay electorate. The inter-communal Alliance and its pattern of politics had received an overwhelming endorsement and the Alliance was established as the dominant party in the Malayan political arena.

The 'equal-partnership Alliance' of the 1955 election, however, progressively gave way over the years and UMNO began to assert a dominant position. The MCA and MIC found themselves in an increasingly difficult dilemma. During the constitution-drafting

1 Vasil, R.K., Politics in a Plural Society ..., p. 86.

Table 25

1955 Legislative Assembly Election:
Candidates by Party and Community and Party Performances.

P a r t y	Candidates				Seats won	Votes won	
	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Total		No.	%
Alliance	35	15	2	52	51	818,013	79.6
Party Negara	29	1	-	30	-	78,909	7.6
PAS	11	-	-	11	1	40,667	3.9
Labour Party	-	2	2	4	-	20,996	2.0
National Association of Perak	8	1	-	9	-	5,433	0.5
Perak Malay League	3	-	-	3	-	4,786	0.4
PPP	1	-	1	2	-	1,081	0.1
Independents candidates	16	1	1	18	-	31,642	3.0
Total	103	20	6	129	52	973,527	100

Source: Ratnam, K.J.; Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, 1965, pp 191 and 196.

years of 1956 and early 1957, in particular, the MCA and MIC were forced to make substantial concessions to UMNO and away from the positions that the bulk of their respective communities clearly wanted them to adopt. The option that presented itself to the MCA and MIC leaders then and since has been "if we insist ... we may well have to part company from UMNO. This [we] cannot afford to do."¹

In 1959 the Alliance faced its major crisis. The MCA had in 1958 been taken over by a younger group which deposed Tan Cheng Lock and replaced him with Lim Chong Eu as President. The new group aimed at a more equal partnership of the MCA with UMNO and the Chinese community with the Malay community. The issue finally boiled down to the sharing of seats for the 1959 election. The MCA asked for an increased share of seats to be contested, and based its claim on the increased percentage of the Chinese electorate as from 1955. UMNO flatly refused the MCA request for "about forty of the 104 seats" and allotted the MCA only thirty-one seats. The new leaders, frustrated by their inability to seek an equal partnership quit the party, and the MCA again fell under the leadership of the old guard, now led by Tan Cheng Lock's son, Tan Siew Sin. The party, however, was severely weakened and its membership dropped from 299,250 in 1957 to 59,500 in 1961.² Never again was the party, at least in membership, to reach its 1957 stature.

The Alliance as a political organization was integrated only at the summit and even that only via the principal leaders. The rank and file remained apart and agitated for the interests of their respective races. No attempt was made to integrate or even allow a modicum of interaction between the lower level leaders. Thus the MIC resolutions urging the Alliance leadership "to hold an annual or biennial

1 Tan Siew Sin's now famous comment to the MCA Central Working Committee meeting of April 7, 1957 included in the minutes of the same meeting.

2 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. 1047/50.

conference of delegates of all the organizations forming the Alliance with the aim of their knowing each other better and facilitating the eventual formation of a single party" were never acted upon.¹ Given this state of affairs, the Alliance came under challenge from two fronts - the more communal parties in the form of the Muslim-Malay PAS and the non-Malay PPP, and the left-wing Socialist Front.

The Partai Islam Semenanjung Malaysia (PAS) had evolved from the ineffective Malayan Muslim Party of 1948. It initially operated as the All-Malaya Islamic Association. But in 1955, at the insistence of the Registrar of Societies, it changed its name to the Pan-Malayan Islamic Party.² The PAS campaigned for a Muslim theocratic state with a Malay nationality, more stringent citizenship laws and more restrictive immigration laws for the non-Malays. Its initial success at the 1955 election, when it won the only seat lost by the Alliance, had been largely due to the support given it by Malay organizations and Islamic groups disenchanted with the UMNO's co-operation with the MCA and MIC and with UMNO's alleged selling-out of Malay interests. With the election of Dr. Burhanuddin as its new President, PAS entered a more dynamic phase and campaigned for the creation of Malay states in the former Straits Settlements of Penang and Malacca and the selection of Sultans there to ensure the special privileges of the Malays, the immediate enforcement of Malay as the sole official language, the expansion of the Malay educational system, and, the eventual establishment of a Melayu Raya encompassing all the Malay people of Southeast Asia. The strength of such an extreme Malay communalist appeal amongst the Malay electorate, particularly in the

1 Resolution adopted unanimously at the Seventeenth Annual Delegates Conference of the MIC, November 30, 1963 and December 1, 1963. Similar resolutions were also adopted in previous years.

2 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. 26/52.

predominantly Malay and isolated states of Kelantan and Trengganu, was not to be underestimated.

At the other end of the political continuum, representing communal appeal, was the Peoples Progressive Party (PPP), initially known as the Perak Progressive Party.¹ It had been formed in Ipoh in January 1953 by D.R. Seenivasagam and a number of eminent non-Malays.² In December of 1953 the party entered into co-operation with the UMNO-MCA alliance and in the 1954 Town Council election for Ipoh, D.R. Seenivasagam was elected on a joint UMNO-MCA-PPP ticket. In mid-1955 the PPP quit the Alliance, primarily because it was unable to influence the choice of candidates for the 1955 election. It fielded two candidates for the 1955 election and campaigned on a moderate non-communal platform. Indeed its policy position was identical to the Alliance and the party was willing to accept Malay as the national language with multi-lingualism for a limited period of ten years; the party even promised special assistance for the Malays. However, both its candidates lost their deposits. Disenchanted with the lack of support for its basically moderate and non-communal approach, the party swung to a more non-Malay communal appeal. In March 1956 the party changed its name to the Peoples Progressive Party and demanded for the principle of jus soli in citizenship provisions for non-Malays. It further capitalized on Chinese discontent over the Razak education report of 1956 and the attendant legislation of 1957.³ With the support of the Perak Chinese Chamber of Commerce,

1 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. 21/53.

2 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. 21/53.

3 Federation of Malaya, Report of the Education Committee, 1956 (Dato Abdul Razak, Chairman), No. 21 of 1956.

D.R. Seenivasagam won the 1957 bye-election for the Federal Legislative Council in the predominantly Chinese, Ipoh-Menglembu seat - the same seat for which he had lost his deposit two years previously campaigning on a non-communal platform. The party's instant success on adopting a communal approach encouraged it to formulate a more blatantly Chinese chauvinist stand. Early in December 1958 the party succeeded in capturing all the four seats it contested in the Town Council election in Ipoh. It used the control it thus gained of the Council to secure approval for multi-lingualism in the Council's deliberations. The PPP's 1959 election manifesto was termed "Blue print for equality and progress" and represented the shift the party had made from its 1955 policy positions.¹ The party campaigned for Chinese and Tamil as official languages, citizenship laws based on the full application of jus soli, equal privileges for all Malaysians and the amendment of the immigration and education provisions so as to favour non-Malay communities rather more - positions in direct conflict with the PAS on each of the major issues on which Malayan society is divided.

In marked contrast to the other parties in policy orientation and approach, was the Socialist Front (SF) - an ideological alliance of the Labour Party (LP) and the Partai Rakyat (PR). The Labour Party had begun as essentially independent regional parties in Penang, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Perak in 1951. The early initiators were the English-educated and leaders of the colonial government-sponsored Malayan Trade Union Congress. In June 1952 these regional parties formed a Pan-Malayan Labour Party and adopted an anti-communist democratic socialist stand. Even at the end of 1953 the party was "as yet little more than a discussion club of

1 Vasil, R.K., Politics in a Plural Society ..., Chapter VI, pp 221-251 provides an excellent and detailed analysis of the development of the PPP.

social democratic intellectuals deriving scant support from the trade union movement".¹ At the second annual conference in June 1954 the party was renamed the Labour Party of Malaya, adopted a new constitution and a more radical position. It called for immediate self-government, union of Malaya and Singapore, a measure of public ownership of the means of production, and collective farming. At the 1955 election the party lost all the four seats it contested. The party, however, continued to adhere to its socialist demands and presented to the Reid Constitutional Commission a report calling for a republican government with an elected President as head of state. Perhaps most radical was its position as regards the Sultans whom it proposed to phase out in time. The party objected to special Malay privileges but accepted Malay as the national language. It also called for the continued use of English, Chinese and the Indian languages in the Federal and State Legislative Councils and the teaching of these languages in schools. In December 1956 all the party's five candidates won the George Town Municipal Council election and from then till 1966, the party controlled the said council.

In the meantime, Ahmad Boesterman, the colourful leader of the Malay leftist organizations of the immediate post-war years, fresh from his release from detention, launched the Partai Rakyat.² From its commencement, however, the Partai Rakyat was an essentially pro-Indonesian Malay-based organisation distinctly more radical than the Labour Party. The Partai Rakyat adopted Marhenism, a political philosophy initiated by President Sukarno of Indonesia as its

1 Carnell, F.G., 'Communalism and Communism in Malaya', Pacific Affairs, Vol. XXVI, No. 2, June 1953, p. 108.

2 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. 326/55 includes numerous documents prepared by the party in the early years which provide valuable insight into the party's initial ideology and organisation.

ideology and subscribed to the concept of Melayu Raya - a Malay homeland comprising Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, North Borneo and Brunei with close links with Indonesia. The Labour Party, unable to gain Malay support, joined the Partai Rakyat to form an Alliance-like and ideologically-oriented Socialist Front in July 1957. As strategy, the Labour Party and Partai Rakyat undertook to cultivate different constituents - the Labour Party the largely urban-based non-Malay workers, and the Partai Rakyat the predominantly rural-based Malay peasants. It is a measure of the communal nature of Malayan politics that essentially non-communal ideological parties should be forced to operate along communal lines. For the 1959 election the ranks of the Socialist Front had been swollen by the influx of MCA dissidents and the party posed a serious threat to the Alliance.

The election campaign manifested itself as a campaign on essentially communally divisive issues and the results indicated a severe erosion of political support for the inter-communal Alliance.

Table 26

1959 Parliamentary Election:
Candidates by Party and Community and Party Performances

P a r t y	Candidates				Seats won	Votes won	
	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Total		No.	%
Alliance	69	31	4	104	74	800,944	51.8
Party Negara	10	-	-	10	1	32,578	2.1
PAS	58	-	-	58	13	329,070	21.3
Socialist Front	11	20	7	38	8	199,688	12.9
PPP	1	9	9	19	4	97,391	6.2
Malayan Party	-	1	1	2	1	13,404	0.9
Independent candidates	7	17	2	26	3	74,194	4.9
Total	157	79	23	259	104	1,547,269	100

Source: Ratnam, K.J.; Communalism and the Political Process in Malaya, 1965, pp 202 and 204.

The main challenge came from the PAS, which had absorbed almost half the Malay electoral strength. Non-Malay support still remained largely intact, though the Socialist Front and the PPP were making inroads.

In May 1961 the Malayan Prime Minister proposed a closer understanding between Malaya, Singapore, North Borneo, Sarawak and Brunei. This Malaysia proposal, and the opposition to it by both the Indonesian and Philippines governments, dominated Malayan politics for the next few years and created particular problems for the opposition parties.

The Socialist Front, now enlarged to include the National Convention Party of Abdul Aziz bin Ishak, opposed the formation of Malaysia and represented it as a neo-colonial plot, criticizing in particular, the manner in which it had been formed. The Malaysian Government was held responsible for alienating Indonesia and thereby causing Indonesian opposition. The Front's peace plan - calling for a Borneo ceasefire, the withdrawal of British and Indonesian troops, the release of all political prisoners and a referendum in Borneo to ascertain the wishes of the people there - was presented as anti-national and aiding the interests of Malaysia's enemies. The PAS's position was less ideologically motivated and indeed rested on the party's fear of a dilution of Malay society by the incorporation within Malaysia of the Chinese population of Singapore. The earlier sympathies of PAS leaders for a Melayu Raya encompassing the Malay world in Southeast Asia once again appeared feasible in the current political situation. The Socialist Front and the PAS were singled out by the Alliance Government and the People's Action Party Government in Singapore, as having direct links with Indonesia and were accused of supporting Indonesia's aggression towards Malaysia. Of singular embarrassment to the Socialist Front and PAS was the

support given them in the Indonesian radio broadcasts beamed to Malaysia, and the Alliance Government's accusations that they had received financial support for their activities from the Indonesian Government.¹

The United Democratic Party (UDP), formed by the MCA dissidents who left the MCA with Lim Chong Eu in 1958, and the PPP, also initially opposed the Malaysia proposal. However, they accepted Malaysia as a fait accompli and supported the Government in condemning Indonesian confrontation. Of all the opposition parties it was the PPP which took the most militant position in its denunciation of Indonesia and conducted virulent attacks on the Socialist Front and the PAS, accusing them of selling out to the Indonesians. The party thereby hoped to capitalize on the Chinese fears of a Melayu Raya whilst at the same time not losing out by the "support Malaysia vote" that the Alliance was calling for.

Of greater significance to subsequent developments was the role played by the People's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore, whose entry into Malayan politics was announced just prior to the 1964 election. The PAP's aim was clearly to replace the MCA in the Alliance. Concentrating its attention on the non-Malay majority urban areas, it directly challenged the MCA and SF but carefully stayed away from challenging UMNO. Indeed, when on nomination day the PAP discovered it was contesting two UMNO candidates it withdrew its candidates in these two constituencies.²

Despite the 1964 election being dominated by the "Malaysia issue", the perennial communal issues received their share of prominence. Thus the positions adopted as regards the special

1 Federation of Malaysia Government, A Plot Exposed, Cmd. 12 of 1965, pp 4-5.

2 Vasil, R.K., The Malaysian General Election of 1969, 1972, pp 7 - 8.

privileges of the Malays, the citizenship privileges of the non-Malays and the status of the Chinese and Tamil languages by the respective parties in the 1959 election, continued to be emphasised. But clearly the 1964 election results are least reliable as an indicator of the divisions in Peninsular Malaysian society deriving from "communal issues". More accurately it represented a "support Malaysia vote" and in the event the Alliance was returned with a decisive victory, greatly improving on its 1959 record. All opposition parties lost seats to the Alliance, and the PAP and the newly formed UDP only won one seat each. (Refer Table 27.)

Table 27

1964 Parliamentary Election:
Candidates by Party and Community, and, Party Performances

P a r t y	Candidates				Seats won	Votes won	
	Malay	Chinese	Indian	Total		No.	%
Alliance	68	33	3	104	89	1,204,340	58.5
Party Negara	4	-	-	4	0	7,319	0.4
PAS	53	-	-	53	9	301,187	14.6
Socialist Front	30	28	5	63	2	330,898	16.1
PPP	1	4	4	9	2	69,898	3.4
UDP	8	18	1	27	1	88,233	4.3
PAP	1	8	2	11	1	42,130	2.0
Independent candidates	3	3	2	8	0	13,509	0.7
Total	198	94	17	279	104	2,057,514	100

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission The 1964 Elections Report, 1965.

The PAP entry into Peninsular Malaysia politics and its particular brand of politics greatly affected the political climate and the conduct of the other political parties. The PAP's attempts to woo the UMNO and displace the MCA in the Alliance had received a strong rebuff from UMNO leaders. The Tengku had declared in no

uncertain terms the position of the UMNO:

"I have said before that the MCA have served the Chinese and the country so well that even if there are only five members of the MCA left, I will still support this organisation because of its achievements and its commendable objectives." 1

Clearly, the UMNO was unwilling to take on new partners and it was this unwillingness to have a realignment that was the cause of many of the developments following the 1964 election. In February and March 1965, the PAP leader, Lee Kuan Yew, formulated the idea of a Malaysian Malaysia. The fundamental principles on which this was founded were:

- a) Malaysia should be a democratic society where legitimate differences of views provided they accept undivided loyalty to the Malaysian nation should be permitted and where individuals and political parties should have full freedom to persuade its citizens, by constitutional means, to their particular point of view.
- b) Malaysia being a multi-racial and multi-cultural society must show respect and tolerance for legitimate diversity provided they do not weaken Malaysian unity or hamper loyalty to Malaysia.
- c) Malaysia was conceived as belonging to Malaysians as a whole and not to any particular community or race. 2

This apparently innocuous idea of a Malaysian Malaysia at once became a rallying point for the non-Malays and roused the fears of the Malays. The PAP's subsequent attempt to organize and unite the pro-Malaysian Malaysia parties into the Malaysian Solidarity National Conference further aggravated the situation and the Alliance leaders forced Singapore out of Malaysia on August 9, 1965. The PAP's brief period in Malaysian politics served once again to highlight the issues of the political role of the non-Malays and the position of the Chinese and Indian cultures and languages in Malaysian society, thereby bringing to the fore communal tension. On Singapore's exit the remnants of the PAP in Malaysia attempted to continue functioning under the name

1 The Straits Times, April 24, 1964.

2 Vasil, R.K., The Malaysian General Election of 1969, 1972, p. 13.

of the People's Action Party; on failing to receive registration they continued the vanguard action for a 'Malaysian Malaysia' under the name of the Democratic Action Party (DAP). Uninhibited by any immediate plans for a coalition with any Malay-based party, the DAP's concept of a 'Malaysian Malaysia' went significantly further from that adopted by the PAP. As defined in The Setapak Declaration it represented a frontal attack on Malay special privileges and political dominance.¹ It particularly rejected the division of Malaysian society into bumiputra (son of the soil) and non-bumiputra.

Communal tension was further aroused by the passage through Parliament of the 1967 National Language Bill. The 1957 Malayan Constitution, whilst recognizing Malay as the national language, had allowed for the continued use of English in both Houses of Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies of each State and for all other official purposes for a period of ten years after independence, and thereafter until Parliament otherwise provides.² UMNO ultras, led by Syed Nasir bin Ismail, had set up the National Language Action Front (Barisan Bertindak Bahasa Kebangsaan) in early 1965 with the primary aim of implementing Malay as the official language by 1967. In response to this, MCA branches insisted on the continued liberal use of Chinese. The Alliance set up an action committee to resolve the issue. The National Language Bill of 1967 was hence a compromise in the Alliance style. The Bill allowed the Federal Government or any State Government to use any translation of official documents or communications in the English language as may be deemed fit in the public interest. It further allowed the Yang di Pertuan Agong to permit the use of English for such official purposes as he deemed fit, and for the continued use of English in the Courts,

1 Democratic Action Party, The Setapak Declaration, July 1967.

2 Federation of Malaysia Constitution, Article 152.

Parliament and the Legislative Assemblies and in the texts of laws.

Malay reaction, particularly in the PAS and large sections of UMNO, considered this a betrayal, and demonstrations, including the burning of the Prime Minister's effigy, occurred. Despite the concessions won for the non-Malays by the MCA, the opposition PPP and DAP, deemed the formula as inadequate seizing the opportunity to present themselves as the champions of the non-Malay communities.

The Labour Party in the meantime was facing particular problems. Since the MCA split in 1959 the Chinese-educated had swollen the ranks of the Labour Party and gained increased prominence and power though willing to retain the more moderate English educated leaders. However, differences between the Labour Party and the Partai Rakyat - principally over their differing positions on communal issues, but also over party organization and selection of candidates for elections - led to the Partai Rakyat unilaterally withdrawing from the Socialist Front in late 1965.¹ Unrestrained by the need for a compromise with the predominantly Malay Partai Rakyat the Labour Party adopted a more extreme position on the issues of interest to non-Malays, particularly the Chinese. This shift to a more extreme position on communal issues was paralleled by a shift to an increased left-wing position. Indeed, as early as 1959 communist infiltration of the Labour Party rank and file had begun. The formation of Malaysia and the influence of the extreme left wing Barisan Socialis of Singapore amongst the Chinese-educated in the Labour Party, made the position of the English-educated moderates increasingly untenable. The extreme anti-Malaysia stand brought things to a head. By 1967 the Chinese-educated felt strong enough to abandon operating within the constitutional

1 Vasil, R.K., Politics in a Plural Society..., Chapter V, pp 183-221.

framework and called for 'mass struggle' as the avenue to political power. The moderates were finally alienated.

These moderates, together with the UDP, which in itself was making no headway in gaining mass support, together with some intellectuals from the University of Malaya, attempted to seek co-operation with the DAP. The DAP was, however, hesitant to lose its own identity. Though prepared to accommodate a number of senior leaders of this group into the Central Committee, it was unwilling to accept the rank and file members en bloc. It proposed to consider each application for membership on its own merits. After several months of unsuccessful negotiations the group formed its own party - the Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) - in March 1968.¹ The new party attempted to present a worker-oriented and non-communal approach to Malaysian politics and included several senior trade union leaders amongst its leadership.² The Chairman of the party was a respected Malay, Professor Syed Hussein Alatas, and its sixteen-member pro tem Committee included five Malays.

Despite the failure to achieve a single united opposition party, several of the opposition parties were able to work out an electoral understanding for the 1969 election. The rationale for this was essentially twofold. Aware that there was not even the remotest possibility of gaining power, they were willing to ignore differences in their political ideologies so as to best capitalize on the anti-Alliance votes by not splitting these votes. This consideration was given added emphasis, as the Gerakan began to acquire sufficient momentum and support to rival the DAP in its

1 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. 226/68.

2 Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, Workers' Charter (mimeographed), November 3, 1968.

appeal in the urban areas. The second consideration that was given added public emphasis and proved effective at the election hustings was to prevent the Alliance from securing its two thirds majority in Parliament, and thereby denying it the power to make constitutional changes. The electoral pact entered into, by bilateral arrangements between each of the three parties - the Gerakan, DAP and PPP - was to allocate both parliamentary and state constituencies to each of the three parties.¹ Though no formal agreement existed between these parties and the PAS, it is believed that some measure of understanding was present, at least in some constituencies.

The picture of electoral competition was thus greatly simplified. The Alliance-UMNO candidates were challenged in predominantly Malay areas by the PAS. In areas with predominantly non-Malay constituents, the challenge was from one of the three parties in the Gerakan-DAP-PPP group. In areas with a plurality electorate the competition came from both the PAS and the Gerakan-DAP-PPP group. In these constituencies the Alliance fielded candidates from any of its three constituent parties - the UMNO, MCA and MIC.

The election results came as a surprise to even opposition party leaders. Though all observers had considered it probable that the opposition would improve its performance over that of 1964, few expected it to be of the magnitude that it turned out to be. For the first time since elections were introduced the Alliance actually polled less than 50% of the votes, and gained less than two-thirds of the seats in Peninsular Malaysia. Several senior Ministers and Alliance stalwarts lost their seats. Most severely dealt with were the MCA candidates. (Table 28.)

1 A copy of these agreements with this writer.

Table 28

1969 Parliamentary Election:
Candidates by Party and Community, and, Party Performances.

Party	Candidates			Total	Seats won	Votes won	
	Malay	Chinese	Indian			No.	%
Alliance	68	33	3	104	67	1,025,144	48.6
PAS	62	-	-	62	12	501,123	23.7
Party Rakyat	6	-	-	6	0	27,110	1.3
PPP	0	3	3	6	4	80,756	3.8
Gerakan	3	7	4	14	8	178,971	8.5
DAP	1	20	3	24	13	286,606	13.6
United Malaysian Chinese Organisation	-	3	-	3	0	1,808	0.1
Independent candidates	3	1	-	4	0	9,764	0.4
Total	143	67	13	223	104	2,111,282	100

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, The 1969 Election: Report, 1972.

The post-1969 period

Since independence there has undoubtedly been increased politicization in Peninsular Malaysia, and, the political parties have ventured to involve larger and larger numbers of the people. However, the consequent politicization has been integrative within ethnic communities but wholly disintegrative within the larger multi-ethnic Malaysian society. Paradoxical as it may seem, this has been largely due to the existence of the Alliance. Since its inception the Alliance has remained a coalition of inter-communal parties. Each of these component parties operated for all purposes, save that of elections, as a separate party. Their membership was communal and their success was measured in terms of their ability to achieve the essentially parochial demands that their constituents made. In

itself this was a difficult task, for almost without exception, the demands made were conflicting. This was made possible only by the senior leaders being willing to work out in private a compromise, and then convincing their respective junior leaders and constituents to accept these as the maximum attainable. In large measure, the personal popularity and appeal that the senior leaders had, made this workable, but in time a number of developments occurred which made this situation increasingly untenable.

UMNO had succeeded in converting the Malays of the component states of Malaya from thinking of themselves as subjects of the individual Sultans into viewing themselves as members of the Malay race living in the land of the Malays. This increased politicization created strong and effective ties based upon well defined and shared political interests. It linked the grass-roots members with their state and national leaders. The resultant Malay political loyalty and commitment are essentially restricted to the Malays as a distinct ethnic, social, cultural, and, importantly, religious group rather than to a multi-ethnic Malaysian state. The effectiveness of UMNO and its continued popular support from the Malays was possible only by UMNO not only succeeding but also being seen to succeed in championing Malay political supremacy, the preservation of Malay special rights and privileges and the favouritism shown them in the formulation and execution of government policies. Yet UMNO, by its appeal to Malay cohesiveness and by being the vanguard of the Malay in his attempts to retain his dominant political status, whilst at the same time achieving economic and educational parity with non-Malay, had created the conditions in which its own supremacy could be challenged. Moderate UMNO officials could be challenged by more extreme ones, and indeed, UMNO itself could be threatened by more extreme parties - the Malay electorate had built an appetite for the

very thing it had been fed with. Thus as long as loyalties tended to be primordial and not to the nation as a whole, more extreme leaders and more extreme parties could, and did, pose as viable alternatives.

The dilemma that UMNO and its moderate leaders faced was felt to a greater degree by the other component parties of the Alliance and their leaders. Increasingly, as UMNO became the dominant member of the coalition Alliance, the MCA and MIC began losing their support to other more communal parties, thus indicating to the non-Malays a path of increased primordial loyalties. Perhaps the most tragic aspect of these developments has been that many of these in effect extreme communal parties began as genuinely non-communal parties. Yet the Alliance pattern of politics, with the dominance of UMNO and the relegation of the MCA and MIC to a state of relative ineffectiveness, meant that the opposition parties could seek their support only amongst those who were disenchanted with the MCA and MIC. Electoral support for these opposition parties was guaranteed if they would succumb to the temptation of representing increasing primordial loyalties. Political realism demanded it, the willing succumbed, and the unwilling lost their support or opted out of politics altogether.

The election results of May 10, 1969 depicted precisely the above-mentioned state of affairs. UMNO had been successfully challenged by the PAS, the MCA and MIC were virtually devastated by the DAP, Gerakan and PPP. What remained of the Alliance following the 1969 elections was clearly a coalition that was unable to muster majority support amongst the Malaysian electorate. The communal riots following the elections, the suspension of parliamentary government and the price called for by the Alliance to resume parliamentary government served, however, to greatly alter the modus operandi of the respective parties. The Alliance was willing to resume parliamentary government

only if the other parties were willing to abstain from discussing the communally sensitive issues, and thereby, not increase communal tensions nor pose as effective alternatives to it. The new political climate was conducive and indeed called for modification of policies and strategies.

On the part of the Alliance, in particular UMNO, it provided an opportunity to seek new partners and enter a new coalition. Under the leadership of Tunku Abdul Rahman the preservation of the Alliance in its original form, that is as an inter-communal coalition of UMNO, MCA and MIC had been a cardinal policy. Indeed the expulsion of Singapore from the Malaysian Federation and the 1969 election debacle was a consequence of UMNO being unwilling to accept new partners in its coalition. In 1969 the opposition parties had succeeded in demonstrating that it was they and not the MCA and MIC that could muster non-Malay support. MCA itself had been so alarmed by this that it initially considered withdrawing from the Government and the new leadership of UMNO was willing to acknowledge what had been denied earlier. The legitimacy of the Government itself depended on including at least a semblance of non-Malay participation. Under the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak, UMNO was thus willing to attempt more expedient partnerships than that offered by MCA and MIC.

The willingness of UMNO to accept new partners came at a time when the opposition parties themselves had grave doubts as to the effectiveness with which they could operate. In an attempt to arrest the rioting that followed the 1969 elections and establish a return to a state of relative calm, the National Operations Council had issued an emergency decree amending the Sedition Ordinance. The amendments restricted freedom of speech and press by making it a

1 The Straits Times, May 14, 1969.

"seditious tendency" to question any matter, right, status, position, privilege, sovereignty or prerogative established or protected by the provisions of Part III, and Articles 152, 153, or 181 of the Federal Constitution.¹ In effect it became sedition to question the rights and privileges established or protected by those provisions of the constitution relating to citizenship, to the use of the Malay language as the national language and the use of other languages for non-official purposes, to guaranteed quotas for the Malays and natives of Borneo, to the protection of the 'legitimate' interests of the other communities, and, the sovereignty of the Malay Rulers. This meant the exclusion from debate of all communally sensitive matters which hitherto had proved particularly effective at the election hustings. Any question of such matters was deemed to be seditious, even if an attempt was made "to procure by lawful means the alteration of any such matter ..." or if the act, speech or publication had a "tendency to produce feelings of ill-will and enmity between different races".² By the Constitution (Amendment) Act 1971, Parliament had made these provisions an integral part of the Constitution. The provisions were also extended to Members of Parliament. Most importantly, Parliament abrogated its own powers to amend the new provisions and any laws passed under Article 10 of the Constitution, for any amendments to these now required the consent of the Conference of Rulers.³ These amendments and the new Sedition Ordinance empowered the Government to greatly curb opposition political activity. It was in this milieu that a

1 Federation of Malaysia, Ordinance No. 45 of 1970.

2 Ibid.

3 Ahmad Ibrahim 'Introduction', in Malaysia, Parliamentary Debates on the Constitution Amendment Bill, 1971, 1972, p. xv.

number of opposition parties agreed to join the Alliance in a greater coalition.

The Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia which had captured the Penang State Government had run into troubled waters. The party had had a clash of personalities, leading to an acrimonious attempt by each faction to oust the other - the outcome being that Lim Chong Eu and his supporters retained control of the Gerakan. The ousted group, largely led by the former English-educated moderate leaders of the Labour Party, initiated the Partai Keadilan Masyarakat (Pekemas) which moved into the opposition in the State Assembly. Lim Chong Eu's continuance as Chief Minister seemed extremely nebulous. In the twenty-four member Penang State Assembly, Lim Chong Eu's Gerakan had thirteen seats, whilst the Alliance had four, the DAP three, Pekemas two and Partai Rakyat one. The remaining member was an independent. After a series of secret negotiations between Prime Minister Abdul Razak and Lim Chong Eu, it was announced that the Gerakan would join the Alliance in a coalition government at the federal level, while the Alliance would be admitted as a partner in the Gerakan controlled State Government in Penang.¹ To placate MCA fears and rumblings, MCA President Tun Tan Siew Sin was included, along with Tun Razak and Lim Chong Eu, in the three-member Co-ordinating Council.² This Council was established in order to formulate policies for Penang and to facilitate co-operation between the State and Federal Governments.

Two months later the Alliance succeeded in attracting the PPP into a coalition. Non-Malay representation in the State Government in Perak was minimal and the image of the Perak State Assembly was essentially one of a Malay-government and a non-Malay opposition.

1 The Straits Times, February 14, 1971.

2 The Straits Times, February 16, 1971.

The forty-member Assembly had twenty-two Alliance members, whilst there were ten PPP, five DAP, one Gerakan, one PAS and one independent member. To the Alliance which hitherto was accustomed to large comfortable majorities this seemed inadequate and to absorb one of the opposition parties appeared advantageous. The principal consideration that faced the PPP leaders was the fear that failing to enter into a coalition could result in the Alliance using its powers to have the State Government suspend the PPP controlled-Municipal Council and assume its functions. The PPP leaders, aware that it was their control of the Municipal Council that gave them a continued political base in the Ipoh area, were faced with Hobson's choice.¹ In April 1972 the PPP, too, entered into a coalition with the Alliance.² The coalition involved PPP participation in the Alliance State Government in Perak, and, Alliance participation in the PPP controlled Ipoh Municipality. In time the PPP extended its participation in the coalition to the federal level.

The absorption process was not restricted to the non-Malay parties, and in time was extended to the PAS as well. In September 1972 the terms of agreement were concluded by Prime Minister Abdul Razak with Asri bin Mohammad, the PAS leader. The Gerakan and PPP, being at this stage largely parties of personage, had little difficulty in convincing their membership of the coalition idea. In the PAS, however, there was considerable opposition and the terms of the coalition agreement were approved at the PAS annual congress by a vote of 190 to ninety-four with nineteen abstentions.³ The terms

1 Personal interview with Datuk S.P. Seenivasagam, President of the Peoples Progressive Party on August 8, 1974.

2 The Straits Times, April 17, 1972.

3 The Straits Times, December 22, 1972.

of the agreement were substantially more favourable to the PAS than had been the earlier agreements to the Gerakan and PPP. The PAS leader Asri bin Mohammed was made Minister of Land Development in the federal cabinet, a number of other PAS leaders were appointed to lesser federal posts, and the PAS gained representation on a wide variety of government boards and councils. Coalition governments by the two parties were established in Alliance controlled Trengganu State, and PAS controlled Kelantan State.

On June 1, 1974 a new coalition comprising of UMNO, MCA, MIC, PAS, Gerakan and PPP in Peninsular Malaysia, and the Sabah Alliance, Sarawak Alliance and the Sarawak United Peoples Party was registered as a new party, the Barisan Nasional.¹

What the Alliance had failed to gain in the 1969 elections had thus been achieved by absorption. Despite the obvious 'carrot and stick' techniques utilized to bring the Gerakan, PPP and PAS into a coalition with the Alliance, the appeal of such an agreement appeared compelling. Each of the political party leaders concerned explained their stance by defining the situation that created the riots of May 13, 1969 - communalism. The indignation aroused by such definitions provided the people with a powerful stimulus for co-operative activity. The Barisan Nasional was presented as an antidote against communal sectarianism, but above all as the outcome of the recognition that practical politicking calls for the body politic to be taken as it is and not as the avowedly non-communal parties would like it to be. The situation is thus paradoxical. The Barisan Nasional, as the Alliance before it, provided a powerful motive to unite in one organisation and under one leadership, elites and masses who would otherwise have spent their energies in conflict.

1 Malaysia, Registrar of Societies, File No. 320/74.

The formation of the Barisan Nasional greatly diminished the significance of the identifiable opposition. In Parliament there was the DAP whose own ranks had been depleted by defections to the government. Whereas at the end of the 1969 election the party had won thirteen seats, it had on the eve of the 1974 election only nine. Part of its membership and support had been alienated by leadership conflicts and the expulsion of two of its Vice Presidents - Goh Hock Guan and Soorian. The DAP was further embarrassed by the revelation of the secret MCA-DAP merger talks of 1971. This seriously damaged any pretence the party had of being a genuinely non-communal party and created a credibility gap among its non-Chinese supporters. The Pekemas as a newly established party lacked the organization and support that even the DAP had. Its conscious efforts to appear non-communal in leadership and appeal, forfeited it a following. Not represented in Parliament was the essentially Malay based Partai Rakyat dedicated to a socialist solution to Malaysian problems. The party continued to organize itself in the predominantly urban areas. Also amongst the Malay opposition were the PAS dissidents who had disagreed with the party's decision to join the Barisan Nasional.

The changed political climate spurred on a number of opposition parties to endeavour some form of co-operation. An initial meeting was sponsored by the Pekemas and attended by representatives of Pekemas and DAP in Peninsular Malaysia and the Sarawak National Party (SNAP) together with the United Sabah Action Party (USAP) to discuss the formation of a United Opposition Front on January 24, 1973. From the inception the Partai Rakyat spurned the idea¹ of any such co-operation. The meeting agreed to the submission of a minimum programme of

1 The Straits Times, January 25, 1973.

objectives for agreement by each of the parties concerned for their consideration. For immediate effect, they agreed to the appointment of the DAP Secretary General Lim Kit Siang, as Leader of the Opposition in Parliament, with the tacit understanding that James Wong of the Sarawak National Party would succeed him for the latter half of the remaining term of Parliament. The programmes submitted by the parties indicated the very divergent interests and approaches of this heterogeneous group. The SNAP and USAP's programmes stressed issues relating specifically to their respective states, in large part dealing with state and federal government relations. The USAP programme bluntly concluded:

"it is a known fact in Sabah that the Opposition is protruded by the ruling party as an enemy of the Nation. Hence ours is more concerned on State level in view of its unique peculiarity." 1

The Pekemas presented a comprehensive document covering such topics as parliamentary democracy and human rights, language and culture, finance and economy, education, morality, labour, wages and social security, defence, racial unity, and foreign affairs. As a party whose Constitution accepted the new code Rukunegara as its guideline, its position on race relations was tame. Its section on racial unity merely read:

"We are determined to direct all our efforts towards achieving racial unity which is vital for peace and harmony in multi-racial Malaysia. We shall oppose any action or policy that will lead to racial tension and conflict." 2

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- 1 United Sabah Action Party, Minimum Programme of the United Sabah Action Party for consideration of other parties as agreed during a round table conference held on January 24, 1973. (Undated, mimeographed) Copy with this writer. Also similar document of the Sarawak National Party (undated, mimeographed) Copy with this writer.
 - 2 Partai Keadilan Masyarakat, Minimum Programme for consideration of Opposition Parties, (undated, mimeographed). Copy with this writer.

Much of the Pekemas programme was based along the policy lines adopted by the Labour Party in the late 1950s, the section on education being virtually lifted out of a document entitled "Our Education Policy" submitted by the Labour Party for consideration by the Socialist Front in 1961.¹ This is not surprising, for many of the current leaders in Pekemas were from the Labour Party and V. Veerapan was the principal author of the Labour Party document as well as the Pekemas minimum programme.

The DAP's submission was entitled 'DAP's programme for Malaysia - the democratic socialist approach' and was subdivided into three parts - Political Democracy, Socio-Economic and Industrial Democracy, and Cultural Democracy. In tenor it was more daring than the Pekemas document, and especially so on the issue of race relations:

"The campaign against poverty and backwardness must accordingly be a national campaign, based on the criteria of need and not on that of race. Unfortunately, the Alliance government have managed to give a racial twist and bias to all their social, economic and educational programmes. Socio-economic and industrial democracy means, among other things: (1) The abandonment of the racial and dangerous fallacy that there is a so-called 'racial economic imbalance' in Malaysia, ... An equal multi-racial society presupposes that no one race exercises political, social and cultural hegemony over the others ... The DAP will strive for ... Development of a Malaysian culture from the free interplay and interaction of the diverse cultural elements in Malaysia and not proceeding from the hegemony of any one culture." 2

To those familiar with the Malaysian political arena this could represent nothing but a tacit attack on the special rights and privileges of the Malays.

1 Personal interview with V. Veerapan, August 11, 1974.

2 Democratic Action Party, DAP's Programme for Malaysia - the democratic socialist approach. (Undated, mimeographed.) Copy with this writer.

The difference in policy approach however did not hinder progress and for a time a United Opposition Front seemed a probability. But the DAP and the Pekemas soon fell out with each other. In February 1974 the DAP issued a press-statement calling off talks with Pekemas for a United Opposition Front and gave as its reasons, not any differences in policy orientation, but, rather, an alleged breach of good faith on the part of Pekemas.¹ The party cited three reasons for this:

- 1 Pekemas leader V. Veerapan's alleged issuing of a press statement purporting Pekemas willingness 'to fight it out with the DAP'.
- 2 The acceptance into Pekemas of Soorian and Samuel Raj, two expelled members of the DAP, in contravention of an agreement between SNAP, DAP and Pekemas leaders that no party would adopt any person expelled by another party, including putting him forward as a candidate in the next election; and
- 3 The alleged malicious rumours and smear campaign conducted by the Pekemas against the DAP. In a statement issued a week later² the DAP accused Pekemas President Tan Chee Koon of delivering a statement to a Malay daily³ alleging a leadership crisis in the DAP.

Pekemas leaders, aware of their failure to make any impact in the two years since their party's formation, made strenuous efforts to placate

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- 1 Press statement by Daing Ibrahim bin Othman, Vice-Chairman, DAP Malaysia on February 5, 1974. Mimeographed copy of the text of the statement issued by the DAP with this writer.
 - 2 Press statement by Daing Ibrahim on February 11, 1974. Similar copy as in footnote above with this writer.
 - 3 Berita Harian, February 7, 1974.

the DAP and seized the opportunity to point out that the report in the press was erroneous. As evidence, the Pekemas sent the DAP the actual text of the press release and Veerapan's letter to the Straits Times Press calling for a correction of its report. As regards the taking in of expelled members, the Pekemas claimed that there had not been

"any categorical or tacit agreement either oral or written ever made ... The matter was stated in the Coffee House of Parliament by, I think, Fan Yew Teng [DAP Organising Secretary] and that was all".¹

The DAP, however, had by then lost all interest in any co-operation with the Pekemas and the principal reason for this appears to be the inclusion of Soorian and Samuel Raj into the Pekemas. The expulsion of Soorian from the Vice-Presidency and membership of the DAP had been after much personal antagonism between him and the Secretary-General, Lim Kit Siang, it being generally acknowledged that there was no love lost between the two. Soorian's anti-DAP, and in particular anti-Kit Siang comments, prior to and immediately following his admission to the Pekemas, further aggravated the situation. Kit Siang's ire was raised and his hold on DAP policy is regarded as virtually complete - that Kit Siang held sway in the decision of the DAP not to co-operate with the Pekemas is certain. It has also been suggested that the DAP having obtained what it desired from an understanding with the other opposition parties, namely, the appointment of its Secretary-General as Opposition Leader in Parliament, was now keen on contesting the Pekemas at the election.² The DAP, according to this view, worked on the presumption that Pekemas being a new party with insufficient grass-root support could not pose a threat to the DAP's appeal for the

1 Copies of V. Veerapan's letter to the DAP dated February 11, 1974, and Lim Kit Siang's reply dated February 18, 1974 are with this writer.

2 Personal interview with V. Veerapan, on August 11, 1974.

opposition vote. However, entering into an electoral understanding with the Pekemas and thereby gaining a few additional seats would serve to strengthen the Pekemas which was by all indications a potential foe. The choices open to the DAP were essentially two - either to gain a few extra seats by an electoral pact with the Pekemas and in the process help the Pekemas to also gain seats, or, to sacrifice the marginal seats but emerge from the election as the principal opposition party. The DAP, it was suggested, chose the latter.¹ It is likely that such considerations also played their part in the DAP's decision.

The Pekemas nonetheless, continued pursuing the possibility of an agreement, and in April 1974 urged James Wong, then Leader of the Opposition in Parliament, to arrange for a meeting with the DAP.² Having had no response, the party tried again on the eve of the election to come to some form of an agreement with the DAP and was willing at this stage to, "as far as Soorian is concerned we can 'request' him not to stand for any parliamentary seat".³ The attempts failed and the opposition parties entered the election as much to take on each other as to challenge the Barisan Nasional.

Conclusion

Malaysian party politics had come a full circle. With the avowedly leftist parties banned or seriously handicapped by government measures, the effective parties and political groups were again grouped along the same communal lines as they had been in the early

1 Ibid.

2 Letter to James Wong from V. Veerapan dated April 25, 1974. Copy of letter with this writer.

3 Letter to James Wong from V. Veerapan dated July 8, 1974. Copy of letter with this writer.

years of independence. The inter-communal government coalition was represented by the Barisan Nasional. Also occupying a centrist position was the opposition Pekemas. Extreme Malay opinion was expressed by the dissidents from the PMIP who had banded together to form a loose group known as the Bebas Bersatu. Non-Malay extremism was symbolised by the DAP.

Whether the Barisan Nasional could hold together during the 1974 election and the years after would depend on a number of variables, not least of which was whether the respective party leaders and their members were able to work out amongst the larger number of parties representing a broader extent of the political continuum, compromises on conflicting interests. Most importantly, however, it was essential for each of the Malaysian communities to feel that their vital interests were not being severely jeopardised; otherwise the parties in the coalition would sacrifice a larger and larger number of their supporters to those parties occupying the extreme fringes of the continuum, and thereby, lead to a possible replay of those tragic events that followed the 1969 election. The task was formidable, yet vital.

CHAPTER FOUR

Communal Discrimination by Political Parties

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Communal discrimination is a key aspect of political party organization in Peninsular Malaysia. It is not only a manifestation of political party structure but, as a form of discrimination itself, directly affects the nature of political interaction and exchange. Communal discrimination by political parties is properly conceived as being multi-dimensional - parties which are not discriminatory in one characteristic may be so in others, and indeed, may generate different degrees of discrimination in each of these characteristics. Consequently, no one, or unique combination of characteristics can sufficiently depict the complexity of the communal discrimination exercised. It is, however, not the purpose of this chapter to examine the dynamics of discrimination. This chapter attempts first, to define political party openness as evidenced by the membership requirements stipulated in their respective constitutions, and then to classify the parties according to these theoretical parameters for membership. Having so differentiated the parties, the chapter attempts to discern the discrimination employed by the different classes of political parties in their attempts to carve out electoral support. In all, four aspects of communal discrimination are examined:

- 1 The membership qualifications of the parties in order to examine the extent to which all communities are allowed to become members;
- 2 The distribution of party branches so as to assess the preference shown for areas in which particular communities predominate;
- 3 Party candidate selection by which to determine the extent to which the party's selection of candidates reflects the communal composition of the country; and
- 4 Party candidate placement, in order to assess the extent to which the party's candidates are placed in constituencies

in which the candidate's community predominates.

The first three aspects examined will also serve to present a theoretical rationale and some empirical support for the identification of political parties as having an appeal to, and representing the interest of particular communities. It will also aid in highlighting the nature of the appeals made by, and the electoral performances of, the respective parties - aspects to be considered in the two subsequent chapters.

Indices of dissimilarity between the parties for each of the aspects examined are presented in tabular form. The distinction is determined on the basis of their dissimilarity from a previously selected standard - the standard in each case being the representativeness of the total population. The applicability of the standard for each of the aspects examined is discussed in the relevant sections of the chapter.

For the purposes of this chapter, only the political parties that contested the 1974 election are being considered. Two definitional problems have, however, to be dealt with at the onset. The first is, whether the component parties of the coalition Barisan Nasional are to be regarded as individual parties, or whether the coalition itself is to be treated as the real party and the component parties as mere pressure groups within it. Several criteria may normally be utilized to distinguish between real parties and pressure groups, for example, party identification by members, distinctiveness of party policy and exertion of it, distinctiveness of party organization and branches, and, distinctiveness of party candidates. Given the Malaysian coalitions, however, such an attempt leads to no conclusive identification. Each of the component parties and the coalition subscribe to all the characteristics of a real party. Hence for the purposes of this analysis both, the component parties and the coalition, have been included separately. This treatment seems especially warranted

because, the wider coalition (Barisan Nasional) does not, as in the case of the Alliance, confine itself to component parties which maintain mutually exclusive communal membership, but also contains open parties. Hence, a distinction between these component parties with disparate organizational forms would prove useful.

The second problem is raised by the Bebas Bersatu (United Independents), an association of independent candidates who had defected from PAS in disagreement over PAS' participation in a coalition government with the Alliance and eventual membership in the Barisan Nasional. Is the Bebas Bersatu to be considered a political party and included in the analysis that follows? Duverger, distinguishes between political parties and pressure groups on the basis of their participation in political conflicts and their membership base.¹ Political parties, it is held, have as their primary goal the conquest of power or a share in its exercise - they try to win seats at elections and take control of the government. Pressure groups, on the contrary, do not seek to win power themselves. Again, political parties draw support from a broad base whereas pressure groups represent a limited number with a particular or private interest.

If the criteria provided by Duverger are utilized the Bebas Bersatu qualifies to be considered a political party. At the time of the election, and particularly in its campaign, it indicated all signs of being a cohesive political force that would attain the formal status of a political party aimed at displacing PAS - its candidates had a common symbol, presented a manifesto and campaigned as members of a political organization. However, at the time of the election it neither had a formal organizational structure, nor, party branches; neither had it been registered, nor, had it even sought registration

1 Duverger, M., Party Politics and Pressure Groups; A Comparative Introduction, 1972, pp 1-2.

as an official political party. For the purposes of this chapter, therefore, the Bebas Bersatu has been regarded as merely a pressure group. This is requisite because the absence of a constitution defining membership requirements, and the absence of party branches, makes its inclusion for analysis here incongruous.

Membership Qualifications

The qualifications stipulated by the political parties for membership provides an expedient method of classifying them. By using such a criterion, parties may be classified into open, restricted and closed parties, thus facilitating the measurement of the discrimination employed by them against particular communities. Closed parties are here defined as parties confining their membership exclusively to one particular community. Restrictive parties are parties that extend membership rights to more than one community, but nevertheless, exclude members of at least one community from membership. Open parties are classified as those which are open to all Malaysians regardless of race, colour, creed or sex.

The United Malay National Organisation (UMNO), formed in 1948, from the outset confined its membership to the Malay community. So marked is this insistence that an attempt to have its membership extended to the other communities by the founder President led to his resignation from UMNO. In the years following independence the constitutional definition of a Malay - that is a Muslim who speaks the Malay language and habitually observes Malay custom and practice¹ - served to define the party's membership. The existence of 45,900² aboriginal peoples in Malaya who spoke little or no Malay, had their own language, and whose religious practices were other than

1 Federation of Malaya Constitution, Article 153.

2 Based on the Orang Asli Census. Estimate for 1965 provided by Jabatan Orang Asli, Malaysia.

Islam, had posed little problem for UMNO. Indeed, the treatment of these aboriginal peoples as a distinct group would have greatly embarrassed the Malay claim as 'native peoples' and hence UMNO undertook to ignore their separate identity and chose instead, to pretend that the government policy of ultimately absorbing them within the Malay community was already complete. This was facilitated by the absence of any cohesiveness or political organization amongst the Malayan aboriginal groups. Hence, they were conveniently ignored. The 1963 Federation of Malaysia Agreement, however, posed definitional problems that could not be disregarded. The native populations of Sabah and Sarawak not only differed from the Malays but also asserted their essential distinctiveness. More importantly, they had not forgotten their subjugation by the Malays in the days of the Brunei Sultanate's hegemony. They spoke different languages and were for the most part, non-Muslims. Yet the need to include them as natives and to acknowledge their status was imperative.¹ To overcome this, the term 'Bumiputra' (literally 'son of the soil') was coined and gained wide political currency. After September 1964 UMNO granted full membership privileges and status to all Bumiputra i.e. all native populations including non-Muslim groups. The party's constitution currently lists its qualifications for membership as being confined to Malays and Bumiputras of the age of sixteen or more.² In the Peninsular Malaysia context, however, the party in effect remains a closed party. The Malayan Chinese Association (MCA) formed on February 27, 1949, and the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC) - the other two components of the Alliance -

1 Racial arithmetic played a very important role in the formation of Malaysia. Were the native peoples to be linked with the non-Malay groups the Malay community would have been relegated to a minority status. Hence a definition that would allow for them to be counted with the Malays had to be sought.

2 United Malay National Organisation, Constitution approved at the 25th UMNO General Assembly, June 29 and 30, 1974, Articles 4 and 5.

are also closed parties. The MCA confines its membership to members of the Chinese community and the MIC to members of the Indian community.

The term 'Indian', however, raises definitional problems. Are Indians to be regarded as those who came from, or whose forefathers came from India as it exists today, a national state, or India as it existed as a geographical and political entity at the time when the bulk of the Indian population or their forefathers migrated to Malaysia? Again, in some usage the term 'Indian' has been utilized as an essentially cultural term to include even those who trace their origins to Sri Lanka - the 1970 Census of Malaysia being an example. The MIC's constitution itself provides no guidelines as to the definition of the term 'Indian'. Those who trace their origins to the territories now classified as Pakistan, Bangla Desh and Sri Lanka, have often felt alienated from the mainstream of MIC politics. The predominance of the Tamil, Telugu and Malayali peoples amongst the Malaysian 'Indian' population (however defined) has led to their prominence in MIC politics.¹ There is, however, no known instance where members of any of the afore-mentioned groups, i.e. Pakistani, Bangla Deshi or Sri Lankian, have applied and were denied membership on grounds of their origin. The existence of the Peoples Republic of China and Taiwan has not created similar problems for the MCA and the local Chinese population.

The UMNO, MCA and MIC confine their discrimination to ordinary membership only and allow associate membership to all Malaysians irrespective of race. However, this is a mere window-dressing device, carrying extremely limited rights of participation in party organization and function. Associate membership in each of these parties has involved a handful of people and is not taken seriously

1 Refer Table 1.

by party officials - it is to be doubted if the associate members themselves regard their role as anything other than insignificant. The UMNO, MCA and MIC therefore commenced and remain today as essentially closed parties, each confining their membership to only one communal group.

The Alliance Party, which began as an electoral arrangement between UMNO and MCA in 1952, had by 1954 also included the MIC and was registered in 1957 as a political party. Its membership then was restricted to the three component parties; individual membership at this stage was possible only via one of its closed party components. Despite frequent calls on the component parties to surrender their separate identities and merge into a unitary Alliance Party, the possibility of such a move has, over the years, become increasingly remote. The major objection has come from UMNO, but, the apprehensions of some MCA and MIC leaders and members that they would be swamped by UMNO in any unitary party, has also served as an impediment. In so far as the Alliance was confined to the Malays, Chinese and Indians, it remained a party with restricted membership. Excluded from its ranks were Eurasians, Thais and a number of small minority groups who together form 0.78% of the Peninsular Malaysian population.¹

From December 1965 the Alliance, in an attempt to accommodate minority participation, created the qualifications for a new category of membership - membership via the Alliance Direct Membership Organisation (ADMO).² ADMO branches were established in most

1 The figure of 0.78% is from the 1970 census. The 1947 and 1957 census included those of Sri Lankian origin in the 'others' category. The 1970 census included them with the 'Indians'.

2 Alliance Party of West Malaysia, Constitution and Rules, October 28, 1966. Article 6(e) reads "Direct individual membership is open to any Malaysian citizen who is over the age of twenty-one and whose application for membership has been approved by the Membership Committee appointed by the National Council".

states, usually as an adjunct to the Alliance state branches. The number of Malays, Chinese and Indians who have preferred to seek direct membership instead of membership via UMNO, MCA and MIC has been insignificant. Nor have senior UMNO and MCA leaders genuinely encouraged membership in ADMO; some have even been hostile - one UMNO State Chief Minister, it is claimed, unkindly referred to ADMO as being the vehicle for Eurasians, Ceylonese and social climbers.¹ ADMO remained extremely small in membership and was never allotted a single seat in the 1969 election. By 1974 the Alliance gave way to the Barisan Nasional and ADMO lost even the little significance it had.

The Partai Islam Semenanjung Malaysia (PAS) originating in the Malayan Muslim Party and registered in 1955, from its inception maintained exclusive membership to Muslims only² - in theory, including all Malays, Indian Muslims, Pakistanis, Bangla Deshis and those amongst the other communities who had been converted to the Islamic faith. The other two Peninsular Malaysian component parties of the Barisan Nasional are by their membership qualifications essentially open parties. The Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan), formed in 1971, specifically undertakes to dispel any restrictions to membership on sectarian grounds and the relevant clause in its constitution reads that "Membership of the party shall be open to all persons who are Federal citizens and over the age of eighteen irrespective of race, colour, creed or sex".³ Similarly the People's Progressive Party (PPP) defines its membership as being open to any person, of either sex, who is a Federal citizen not less than eighteen years of age.⁴

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- 1 David Loh Kee Peng in a personal interview on August 19, 1974.
 - 2 Partai Islam Se Malaysia (PAS), Constitution, approved February 27, 1973, Article 9.
 - 3 Partai Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia, Constitution (undated), Clause IV (4).
 - 4 People's Progressive Party of Malaya, Rules, September 1, 1966; Rule 3.

The Barisan Nasional, defined in its constitution as basically "a confederation of political parties which subscribe to the objects of the Barisan Nasional",¹ confines its membership only to political parties.² There is no allowance for direct individual membership as had been allowed in the Alliance - the inclusion of the Gerakan and PPP removed the need for such an apparatus. The inclusion of the Gerakan and the PPP allows the Barisan Nasional to be classified as an open party.

With PAS joining the UMNO, MCA, MIC, Gerakan and PPP in the Barisan Nasional the opposition was made up of essentially 'open party' organizations. The Democratic Action Party (DAP), the Partai Keadilan Masyarakat (Pekemas) and the Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (PSRM) - the three larger opposition parties - all extend membership to all Malaysians. The Kesatuan Insaf Tanah Air (KITA) and the Independent People's Progressive Party - the other two parties which fielded candidates in the 1974 election - are also open to all Malaysians irrespective of race or creed.

The above discussion allows for a computation which can serve as a measure of the discrimination exercised by each political party. Table 29 sets out the potential membership - here defined as the population that can seek membership - of each of the parties considered. For purposes of the table, however, the age qualifications for membership required by the respective parties have been ignored.

Analysis of party membership requirement and restrictiveness, however, establishes only the theoretical bounds of party openness and closeness and communalism may be practiced in a number of other aspects. The other three criteria will attempt to reflect these..

1 Barisan Nasional of Malaysia, Constitution and Rules, 1974; Clause 2.

2 Ibid; Clause 6.

Table 29

Potential Membership of Political Parties, Pensinsular Malaysia,
1970. 1

Party	Membership	Number	As Percentage of total
UMNO	Malays	4,685,838	53.19
MCA	Chinese	3,122,350	35.44
MIC	Indians	932,629	10.59
Alliance ²	All	8,810,348	100
PAS ³	Muslims	4,685,838	53.19
PPP	All	8,810,348	100
Gerakan	All	"	"
Barisan Nasional	All	"	"
DAP	All	"	"
Pekemas	All	"	"
Partai Rakyat	All	"	"
KITA	All	"	"
IPPP	All	"	"

1 Age qualifications disregarded.

2 Assuming membership for Malaysians other than Malays, Chinese and Indians via ADMO - this category total 69,531 and comprise 0.78% of the total population.

3 Excluding non-Malay muslims.

Source: Based on 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, Community Groups, 1972, pp 28-29.

Distribution of Party Branches

A political party's strength at the political centre is determined by the number of seats it wins and thus ultimately the territorial base under its control. It therefore implies that parties in their attempt to gain this territorial base and to hold it, must establish the groundwork for the capture of the territorial units, i.e. the constituencies. A major step towards establishing such a groundwork is the establishment of new branches so as to challenge the supremacy of other parties in future elections - the geographical tactic is the gradual attrition of the existing parties' control over specific portions of the state itself. The geographic aspect of location and spread of political party branches thus provides a useful criteria for classifying parties as either national parties or essentially regional parties. Such a classification is based on the premise that the distinction between national parties and regional parties is not in their objectives, but rather in their involvement of the population.

The location and spread of political party branches also serves as a useful method for assessing the communal discrimination employed by parties. This is because despite the political parties being anxious to extend their territorial base to encompass the whole state, they are in the immediate term restricted by practical considerations - essentially on their own perceived political cost-benefit analysis. Hence party branches are established in areas where the party is most likely to succeed in the short term. It is this discrimination in the selection of areas for location of party branches that allows for an analysis of the communal bias of political parties.

Appendix 6 sets out the number of branches each party has in each of the 114 constituencies in Peninsular Malaysia and Table 30 sets out the branches by state. On the strength of this it will be clear that only UMNO, PAS, MCA and to a lesser degree MIC can claim

Table 30

Political Party Branches by State, 1974

State	PAS	UMNO	MCA	MIC	Alliance	Gerakan	PPP	Barisan Nasional Parties	DAP	Pekemas	Partai Rakyat	KITA	IPPP
Perlis	93	142	11	5	0	1	0	252	0	0	8	0	0
Kedah	356	469	67	21	6	8	0	927	1	1	4	0	0
Kelantan	647	497	26	5	10	1	0	1186	0	0	5	0	0
Trengganu	164	328	27	2	3	0	0	524	0	0	8	0	0
Penang	35	117	90	34	11	56	0	343	13	19	15	2	0
Perak	356	616	173	126	25	45	30	1371	56	6	8	0	0
Pahang	108	280	72	23	23	2	0	508	6	1	12	0	0
Selangor	82	258	114	80	14	24	0	572	16	20	7	1	0
Federal Territory	6	65	41	30	5	8	1	156	11	9	4	1	0
Negri Sembilan	47	180	82	69	8	10	2	398	19	2	4	0	2
Malacca	77	216	56	25	8	8	0	390	13	18	6	0	0
Johore	57	540	156	69	17	11	0	850	30	8	11	0	0
Total	2028	3708	915	489	130	174	33	7477	165	84	82	4	2

Source: Compiled from data obtained from Registrar of Societies, Malaysia.

Refer Appendix 6.

to be truly national parties. Each of them has branches in almost all the 114 constituencies - UMNO in all 114, PAS in 109, MCA in 111 and the MIC in ninety-seven. However, all these parties, as stated earlier, restricted their membership to only one community each, thereby seeking to mobilize only 53.19%, 53.19%, 35.44%, and 10.59% respectively of the total population.

UMNO with a total of 3708 branches, ranks as the party with the largest number of branches. This superiority is maintained even when the number of branches the several parties have is related to their potential membership. Hence for Peninsular Malaysia as a whole UMNO has one branch per 458 Malay electors as compared to one branch per 972 Malay electors in the case of PAS; the MIC has one branch for every 530 Indian electors and the MCA one branch per 1,286 Chinese electors (Table 31). UMNO's superior organizational network is perceived in every state except Kelantan where PAS has a larger number of branches. The extensive network UMNO retains throughout the countryside and urban areas has its origin in the days when UMNO leaders and party-workers conducted a nationwide campaign against the Malayan Union proposal. Since independence the prestige of UMNO as the party in government has provided an added impetus for grass-roots support. The keenness to become UMNO branch officials and thereby attain a measure of power and influence is indeed great.¹ UMNO's numerous branches are co-ordinated at the constituency level by a 'division headquarters' and each parliamentary constituency is regarded as a division. The activities of the several divisions in each state are co-ordinated by the State Liaison Committees, but as the name implies, the function of these state bodies, is merely to co-ordinate and liaise between the branches. It is the division that is the important unit of organization and which sends representatives

1 Syed Husin Ali, Malay Peasant Society and Leadership, 1975, p. 134.

Table 31

Number of Electors from Communities Represented by Closed Parties
per Party Branch, by State, 1974.

State	Malay electorate per PAS branch	Malay electorate per UMNO branch	Chinese electorate per MCA branch	Indian electorate per MIC branch
Perlis	530	347	755	232
Kedah	854	648	1040	1268
Kelantan	454	601	624	386
Trengganu	1055	527	361	535
Penang	2823	845	1803	827
Perak	793	458	1621	508
Pahang	1174	453	873	427
Selangor	1912	608	1150	618
Federal Territory	8057	744	2555	695
Negri Sembilan	1809	472	8788	314
Malacca	1079	385	1050	393
Johore	4744	501	1285	356
Peninsular Malaysia	972	458	1286	530

Source: Party branch data compiled from data obtained from
Registrar of Societies, Malaysia.
Refer Appendix 6.

Communal Composition of the electorate compiled from
electoral registers.
Refer Appendix 4.

to the national body. The establishment of a large number of branches, averaging fifty members each, is also due to the attempts of the respective divisions to thereby increase their membership - this is regarded as important since representation at the National Congress is, subject to a maximum, determined by the number of members each UMNO division can enrol.

It is not to be assumed however, that UMNO's branches are evenly distributed. In reality the branches vary greatly in number from constituency to constituency - from two in Lumut, Perak, to one hundred in Pasir Puteh, Kelantan. These variations are due largely to the size of the potential membership of UMNO in each constituency. In establishing branches UMNO appears to have not favoured constituencies where Malay electorates are sufficiently large to yield at least a relative majority in votes at the elections. This is due, in part, to UMNO's coalition with the MCA and MIC, and more recently the Gerakan, PPP and PAS, which calls for the mobilization of the Malay electorate even in constituencies where UMNO itself does not field candidates.

Like UMNO, the MCA and MIC place great emphasis on organization along constituency lines - hence the proliferation of branches within each constituency. The branches are linked to the division level and ultimately to the national headquarters. The MIC has a larger number of branches in relation to the Indian electorate than the MCA does to the Chinese electorate - the national average being 530 Indian electors per branch for the MIC and 1,286 Chinese electors per branch for the MCA (Table 31). Both have far fewer branches in relation to their potential membership than does UMNO, and this, despite these two parties enjoying the same position as UMNO in being members of the ruling coalitions. The number of branches again differs greatly from division to division, but as in the case of UMNO, the percentage that the potential membership of these parties comprise of the total

electorate in these constituencies does not appear to influence the location of branches. This is also due largely to their membership in the coalition and hence the need to mobilize support even in constituencies where they do not field candidates.

UMNO, MCA and MIC branches operate at the constituency level as purely 'closed parties' cultivating their mutually exclusive potential memberships. A degree of co-ordination of their activities is sought by the Alliance constituency and State level branches, but, excepting the election period the influence of the Alliance branches is but little, and the respective parties are left much to their own discretion.

PAS's organisation, number of branches, and its claim to have a comprehensive network of these branches throughout the country, are second only to UMNO - PAS has a total of 2,028 branches spread over all but five of the 114 constituencies in the country. However, despite PAS having branches in 109 constituencies its strength lies clearly in the states and constituencies where the Malay electorate predominates (Table 30). Hence it is in Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Trengganu that PAS branches abound; in Kelantan State it has a larger number of branches than even UMNO. It is PAS emphasis on these states that made PAS pose serious threats to UMNO, and, control the Kelantan State Assembly from 1959 to the present, and the Trengganu State Assembly from 1959 to 1964. When analyzed in terms of branches per electorate in constituencies according to their communal composition, PAS is seen to clearly emphasize areas where Malays again have a clear majority (Table 31). This is the consequence of PAS being a closed party and till late 1973 not being in coalition with any other party - its policies would have definitely led to its rejection by non-Malays; hence establishing branches amongst Malay constituents in non-Malay predominant constituencies, would result in no electoral returns.

All other political parties, in spite of their claims to being national parties and their open membership, have emerged as regional parties - the Gerakan has branches in fifty-six constituencies, the DAP in sixty-one, the PPP in sixteen, the Pekemas in thirty-eight and the Partai Rakyat in forty-nine. Only the Partai Rakyat has branches in every state, the Gerakan having none in Trengganu and the DAP none in Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu. The PPP's branches are confined mainly to Perak, the Federal Territory, and Negri Sembilan. (Table 30)

The Gerakan had at the time of the 1974 election a total of 174 branches. The party's mixed fortunes since its inception are borne out by the growth of its branches. Its initial popularity and 1969 electoral victories following its formation in 1967, led to the party establishing a total of 95 branches by 1971. The internal rivalry and split in the party in mid-1971 led to fourteen of these branches being deregistered. Following the 1973 coalition with the Alliance and its subsequent membership in the Barisan Nasional, the party established another ninety-three branches and these were distributed in all the states except Trengganu - for the first time the party established branches in Perlis and Kelantan. The attempt was clearly aimed at establishing the Gerakan as a national party so as to claim an increased share when it came to sharing seats with its coalition partners. Analysis of the distribution of Gerakan branches however show that the party remains an essentially regional party with its core area in Penang. (Table 30). Despite its emphasis on open membership and its attempt to incorporate Malays in its leadership, the party after the 1969 election and its membership in the Barisan Nasional has become identified as primarily a non-Malay political party. The distribution of branches shows a marked correlation with areas of non-Malay dominance. (Tables 32 and 33) In constituencies with more than eighty per cent non-Malay electorate it has an average of 3.33 branches per constituency. The average

Table 32

Party Branches in Constituencies of Differing Communal Composition, 1974.

Constituencies with non-Malay electorate comprising	Number of Constituents	Gerakan branches	PPP branches	Partai Rakyat branches	DAP branches	Pekemas branches
0% - 20%	33	6	3	16	0	2
20% - 40%	25	24	4	12	31	21
40% - 60%	31	45	11	31	54	16
60% - 80%	16	61	7	17	46	21
80% -100%	9	30	13	8	37	15

Source: Refer Appendix 4 and Appendix 6.

Table 33

Party Branches per Constituency in Constituencies of Differing Communal Composition, 1974.

Constituencies with non-Malay electorate comprising	Branches per Constituency				
	Gerakan	PPP	Partai Rakyat	DAP	Pekemas
0% - 20%	0.18	0.09	0.49	0	0.06
20% - 40%	0.96	0.16	0.44	1.24	0.84
40% - 60%	1.45	0.35	1.00	1.74	0.52
60% - 80%	3.81	0.44	1.06	2.88	1.31
80% -100%	3.33	1.44	0.89	4.11	1.67

Source: Refer Appendix 4 and Appendix 6.

drops significantly till it reaches only 0.18 branch in constituencies with less than twenty per cent non-Malay electorate.

The other 'open party' in the Barisan Nasional coalition, the PPP, has its branches primarily in the state of Perak - Table 30. Only three of its branches were outside Perak - two in Negri Sembilan and one in the Federal Territory. The two in Negri Sembilan were due to the efforts of J. Nadchatiram, the brother-in-law of the PPP founder member and President, S.P. Seenivasagam. At the onset of the 1974 election these two branches had become non-functional as a result of the formation of the Independent People's Progressive Party (IPPP) by J. Nadchatiram. The PPP branches were located in constituencies where there was a heavy dominance of the Chinese electorate - twenty-four of the party's thirty branches being established in the Chinese New Villages of Perak.

Of the parties that remained in opposition after the formation of the Barisan Nasional, the DAP had the largest number of branches. Till the 1969 election the party had only seventy-one branches and it was not until the resumption of parliamentary government and active party politics in 1971 that the party sought to increase the number of its branches. The party began in 1966 essentially as the remnant of the People's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore, which in its brief interlude in Malaysian politics, had won the Bungsar constituency which comprised a portion of the largely middle-class suburb of Petaling Jaya and part of Kuala Lumpur town. The constituency was overwhelmingly non-Malay and the attraction of the PAP had been its virulent and effective electioneering style backed by the image of the effective government that it provided for Singapore. With the expulsion of Singapore and the PAP from Malaysia, and the DAP's registration, the former's caucus of support in Selangor, Penang, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Johore Bharu was inherited by the latter. Lacking the organizational and financial strength the PAP was able to bring to Malaysian politics, the DAP was slow in establishing

branches. Only twenty-eight were established in 1967 and twenty-six in 1968. Almost all the branches established were in the urban areas and in the Chinese New Villages of the West coast states of Peninsular Malaysia - Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Johore.

The strategy employed by the DAP was to drive home the advantage of its image which carried the Malaysian Malaysia banner. If the 'Malaysian Malaysia' slogan and the DAP's association with the PAP provided an immediate advantage, it was also to serve to circumscribe the DAP's ultimate membership potential. In so far as the Malaysian Malaysia concept was a challenge to Malay supremacy, and thus an affront to the Malay community at large, the DAP was restricted to being an essentially non-Malay organization. Its branches accordingly were established in non-Malay dominated areas. The initial problem of the DAP was the existence of the Gerakan and the PPP, which had carved out their own areas of support - the former principally in Penang, and the latter, in the Kinta district of Perak. The DAP accordingly chose to establish itself in the other states with substantial non-Malay populations - Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Johore. The decision of the Labour Party to quit electoral politics had created a vacuum in these states which the DAP attempted to fill. With the death of D.R. Seenivasagam, founder member and principal organiser of the PPP, prior to the 1969 election, the DAP was presented with an opportunity to eventually expand into Perak State. By 1969 the party was a significant force in the non-Malay dominated urban constituencies, nevertheless it was not yet sufficiently confident to challenge the Gerakan and the PPP and therefore for the 1969 election entered into electoral arrangements with the two.

The Gerakan's unwillingness to co-operate with the DAP in the State Assemblies of Selangor and Perak after the 1969 election poised the two parties on collision course. The Gerakan's subsequent

coalition with the Alliance and membership in the Barisan Nasional meant that there now existed a vacuum for an opposition party in Penang. The already debilitated PPP's entry into a coalition with the Alliance created a similar situation in Perak. The DAP lost no time in opening branches in areas where the Gerakan and the PPP had held sway. At the time of the 1974 election the party's branches were established principally in the predominantly non-Malay states of Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. Even in these states the emphasis was clearly on areas with substantial numbers of non-Malays. Though constituency boundary changes make detailed analysis of the distribution of party branches difficult, the general trend becomes obvious when the number of branches the DAP has in the several constituencies is correlated to the communal composition of the electorate. In August 1974, the party had an average of more than four branches in constituencies with more than eighty per cent non-Malays, descending rapidly to no branches in constituencies with less than twenty per cent non-Malays. (Table 33)

The Pekemas, formed by the Gerakan dissidents in 1972, began by establishing its branches initially in the areas where the dissident Gerakan State Assemblymen and members of Parliament were. By 1974 the party had had only two years to make its impact. The great insistence placed by Tan Chee Koon, President and prima donna of the party, on a communally balanced executive and moderate policy made the establishing of branches more difficult. Nevertheless, the national level leaders worked hard at party organization and at approach of the 1974 election. The party already had eighty-two branches. The party presented itself as the group still conforming to the ideals of the Gerakan and regarded the post-1969 election conduct of Lim Chong Eu and his supporters as betraying these principles - the Gerakan's entry into a coalition with the Alliance was held as testimony to this.

The rationale for party branch establishment was thus simple - at the 1974 election the Pekemas was going to challenge the Gerakan in each of the constituencies the latter was contesting, and accordingly, branches were established in constituencies where the Gerakan had its branches. A further consideration in the choice of constituencies for establishing branches was the attempt to tap the residue of support ^{which} the Pekemas leaders, a larger number of whom were former Labour Party members and leaders, had in the areas where the Labour Party had been particularly effective. This included the non-Malay dominated urban areas of Penang, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Johore.

Analysis of the Pekemas branches as at the 1974 election shows a marked concentration in the states of Penang, Selangor and Malacca and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. (Table 30) Even in these states its emphasis was more on constituencies with non-Malay majorities than on those which had a Malay majority. This is however not as marked as in the case of the DAP, Gerakan and PPP. (Tables 32 and 33)

The Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (Partai Rakyat) had from its inception in 1965 till December 1967 established 154 branches in all the states of Peninsular Malaysia - five of these had however not been approved by the Federal Government. During 1970 and 1971 a total of seventy-five branches were deregistered because they no longer maintained effective organizations. With the handful of new branches that were established in 1973, the party had a total of eighty-two branches at election time 1974. An analysis of the distribution of these branches shows that the Partai Rakyat maintains its branches in each of the states of Peninsular Malaysia, and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur - the only truly open party to do so. The party, in establishing its branches distinguishes in favour of the states of Perlis, Pahang, Penang and Trengganu where it has one branch per 7,340,

16,623, 19,276 and 23,971 electors respectively - the national average being only one branch per 42,763 electors. (Table 34) The party also does not appear to appreciably discriminate in favour of establishing branches in constituencies where any particular community predominates - there appear to be as many branches in constituencies with large Malay electorates as where there are large non-Malay electorates.

The only two other parties that contested the election were KITA and the IPPP. KITA had four branches - three in constituencies with a non-Malay majority (Bukit Bendera, Nibong Tebal, Kepong) and one in a Malay majority constituency (Sepang). The IPPP's two branches were both in areas with a non-Malay majority - Seremban and Telok Kemang.

The analysis above establishes that only the coalition Barisan Nasional can be considered to be a national party by virtue of its component party branches being established in all the constituencies. UMNO, PAS, MCA and MIC, though they have branches in almost all constituencies, by confining their membership to particular communities, seek to involve only portions of the total electorate and cannot therefore be classified as national parties. None of the open parties have branches in more than half the total number of constituencies and, except for the Partai Rakyat and to a lesser degree the Pekemas, discriminate in favour of constituencies with non-Malay majorities.

Party Candidate Selection

Closed parties, by being so, face no problems in their selection of candidates; understandably their candidates are from the community to which their membership is limited. Restrictive and open parties are not similarly confined and can select candidates from the various communities. This analysis therefore assumes that political

Table 34

Partai Rakyat Branches, and,
 Malay Electorate and Total Electorate per Branch, by State, 1974.

State	Branches	Malay Electorate per Branch	Total Electorate per Branch
Perlis	8	6,157	7,340
Kedah	4	75,998	100,071
Kelantan	5	58,699	62,322
Trengganu	8	21,619	23,971
Penang	15	6,587	19,276
Perak	8	35,280	78,321
Pahang	12	10,567	16,623
Selangor	7	22,396	48,193
Federal Territory	4	12,086	43,487
Negri Sembilan	4	21,250	44,679
Malacca	6	13,850	25,283
Johore	11	24,580	45,035
Total	82	24,040	42,763

Source: Refer Appendix 4 and Appendix 6.

parties not practising any communal discrimination would, in their selection of candidates reflect the communal composition of Peninsular Malaysian society - referred to in this analysis as the 'perfect slate'. In practice, however, political parties do not present this perfect slate and do discriminate for or against particular communities. It is here attempted to measure the deviation from the perfect slate and thus the discrimination against each community so exercised. The measure adopted here is similar to that utilized in chapter two where the communal advantage or disadvantage produced by the enfranchisement rules and constituency delimitation were examined. In this analysis, the percentage that the number of a party's candidates from a particular community comprise of the total number of candidates, is subtracted from, the percentage that community represents of the total population of Peninsular Malaysia.¹ This will present an indication of the extent to which a party discriminates against any particular community. The aggregate of the discrimination for, or against, each community, will present an indication of the amount of discrimination that the party exercises in its selection of candidates. Tables 35 and 36 set out the above tabulations for each of the political parties that contested the 1974 parliamentary election.

The above tabulations indicate that each of the political parties deviates significantly from the perfect slate. As expected, each of the closed parties - UMNO, MCA, MIC and PAS - were by far most discriminatory, confining their candidates to their respective communities. It will be noted that, despite each of the closed parties allowing membership of individuals from only one community

1 For example, to assess the discrimination against the Malay community, the percentage Malays comprise of the total population (i.e. 53.20%) minus, the percentage Malay candidates comprise of the party's total number of candidates.

Table 35

Party Allocation of Seats by Community, 1974.

Party	Total No. of Candidates	Malay Candidates		Chinese Candidates		Indian Candidates	
		No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
UMNO	61	61	100	0	0	0	0
MCA	23	0	0	23	100	0	0
MIC	4	0	0	0	0	4	100
Alliance	88	61	69.31	23	26.14	4	4.55
PAS	14	14	100	0	0	0	0
Gerakan	8	0	0	7	87.50	1	12.50
PPP	4	0	0	2	50.00	2	50.00
Barisan Nasional	114	75	65.79	32	28.07	7	6.14
DAP	46	9	19.56	29	63.04	8	17.40
Pekemas	35	12	34.29	18	51.43	5	14.28
Partai Rakyat	22	15	68.18	6	27.27	1	4.55
KITA	4	2	50.00	2	50.00	0	0
IPPP	1	0	0	0	0	1	100

Source: Compiled from Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975. Appendix H., pp 144-157.

Table 36

Communal Discrimination in Party Allocation of Seats¹, 1974.

Party	Malay Community	Chinese Community	Indian Community	Aggregate ² Discrimination
UMNO	- 46.80	+ 35.40	+ 10.60	92.80
MCA	+ 53.20	- 64.60	+ 10.60	128.44
MIC	+ 53.20	+ 35.40	- 89.40	178.00
Alliance	- 16.11	+ 9.26	+ 6.05	31.42
PAS	- 46.80	+ 35.40	+ 10.60	92.80
Gerakan	+ 53.20	- 52.10	- 1.90	107.20
PPP	+ 53.20	- 14.60	- 39.40	107.20
Barisan Nasional	- 12.59	+ 7.33	+ 4.46	24.38
DAP	+ 33.64	- 27.64	- 6.80	68.08
Pekemas	+ 18.91	- 16.03	- 3.68	38.62
Partai Rakyat	- 14.98	+ 8.13	+ 6.05	29.16
KITA	+ 3.20	- 15.40	+ 10.60	29.20
IPPP	+ 53.20	+ 35.40	- 89.40	178.00

1 Percentage community represents of the total population of the country minus percentage community represents of party's candidates.

2 Sum of the discrimination for or against each community. In the table this is represented by adding the discrimination figures for each community after disregarding the minus and plus signs.

Malays comprise 53.20%, Chinese 35.40% and Indians 10.60% of the total population of Peninsular Malaysia. Other communities represent 0.80% (to one decimal point).

Source: 1970 Population and Housing Census, Community Groups, 1972.

each, the tabulations record different aggregate discrimination figures - the MIC having the largest 178.00, the MCA with 128.44 and lastly UMNO and PAS with 92.80 each. The measure here adopted, is to assess the amount of the Peninsular Malaysian population discriminated against, and it follows that a party confining itself to candidates from a smaller community exclusively, is thereby discriminating against a larger proportion of the total population. It will therefore aggregate a larger discrimination figure. Consequently the MIC confining its candidates to Indians, who comprise only 10.6% of the total population has a greater discrimination aggregate than the MCA (Chinese 35.4%) or UMNO and PAS (Malays 53.2%).

The coalition party slates also show discrimination - albeit to a lesser degree. The Alliance (comprising the UMNO, MCA and MIC) has only a 31.42 discrimination aggregate. The Barisan Nasional (comprising the Alliance partners, and PAS, Gerakan and PPP) has an even lower discrimination aggregate of 24.38 - the lowest recorded by any political party. The discrimination of both the coalitions has been in favour of the Malay community at the expense of the Chinese and Indian communities - the Barisan Nasional's relatively lower discrimination against the Chinese and Indian communities having been made possible by more than off-setting the fourteen seats allocated to the Malay community via PAS, by the nine seats allocated to the Chinese, and three seats allocated to the Indians via the Gerakan and the PPP. The remarkable feature of the coalition Barisan Nasional is that although it comprises the six political parties that are most discriminatory in their selection of candidates, it still manages to record the lowest discrimination aggregate.

Of the open parties it is the Partai Rakyat that presented the least discriminatory slate (discrimination aggregate 29.16) - a slate even less discriminatory than the Alliance slate and only marginally more discriminatory than that of the Barisan Nasional. The party's

slight discrimination was, like that of the coalitions, in favour of the Malay community. All other open parties of significance discriminated in favour of the Chinese and Indian communities, particularly the former, at the expense of the Malay community. The open parties, the Gerakan and PPP, both members of the coalition Barisan Nasional, had particularly large discrimination aggregates - the largest amongst the open parties. It must be noted, however, that this was as much imposed on them as their own choice, their membership in the Barisan Nasional being principally to win the Chinese support the MCA had lost in the 1969 election. The DAP and Pekemas, the two largest parties in the opposition in terms of the number of seats contested, both discriminated in favour of the Chinese and Indians. In this the DAP was more so, having a discrimination aggregate (68.08) almost twice that of the Pekemas (38.62).

The analysis above establishes that closed parties are wholly discriminatory in their selection of candidates, each restricting themselves to a particular community but in coalition with each other, they field a mix of candidates as close to the perfect slate as possible. In contrast, the open parties, are less discriminatory than the closed parties but, as it turns out, are without exception more discriminatory than the Barisan Nasional. All the open parties, with the exception of the Partai Rakyat, discriminate in favour of the non-Malay communities, and in this the DAP is particularly discriminatory. The analysis bears out the contention that the open parties hold a greater attraction for non-Malay participation than Malay participation.

Party Placement of Candidates


An aspect of the communal discrimination exercised by the electorate is to vote for candidates of one's own community. Political parties therefore, in an attempt to maximize their opportunities of

winning a seat, take cognizance of this perceived discrimination by the electorate. It is attempted in this section to assess the extent to which political parties match their candidates with constituencies where the candidates' respective communities predominate and thus assess another aspect of communal discrimination by the political parties.

The analysis proposed here is open to objection on four principal counts. Firstly, it may be argued that the membership of a party, especially when it is a representative cross-section of the electorate in a constituency, will show a dominance of a particular community if that particular community also forms a majority in the electorate of the constituency. Hence even where no communal considerations are present in the selection of candidates from the party's local branch membership, the party is more likely to select a candidate of the majority community. Secondly, it may be also plausibly argued that local community leaders, who would be preferable as candidates, will also be more likely to be from the predominant community and their selection as candidates cannot be a measure of a party's attempts to place candidates on communal grounds. Thirdly, political parties, especially open parties, in their attempt to present an image of a non-communal approach to politics may field candidates not belonging to the majority community especially in the constituencies that they expect to lose. Finally, political parties anticipating voting along communal lines will tend to place their party-leaders in "safe constituencies" even when the predominant community of the electorate is different from that of the candidate fielded. This will be in constituencies where the party expects that its image as a party championing the cause of the predominant community of the electorate will tend to balance out any tendency of the electorate to vote for candidates of their own community but from a different party.

In theory, the above four objections are indeed significant. It is felt, however, that in practice they do not serve to sufficiently challenge the validity of the analysis to be undertaken. The foregoing analysis in this chapter has already shown that political parties do gauge the predominance of particular communities in establishing branches and have a marked tendency to select candidates of those particular communities - this being the pattern for closed, restrictive and open parties. Matching candidates to the constituency's predominant community is a natural extension of the above considerations. Furthermore, the Malaysian electoral regulations do not impose a 'locality rule' and in practice a large number of candidates do indeed come from outside the constituency. Finally, the attempt of political parties to field candidates for purposes of creating a favourable image, and the fielding of party leaders in "safe constituencies" where they are from different communities than that of the predominant community in the electorate can be noted. These anomalies are indeed exceptions, exceptions employed by the respective parties to overcome the dilemma presented by the Malaysian polity, that is, to win seats for which the party has to take cognizance of the electorate's tendency to vote along communal grounds, and at the same time, maintain a non-communal image so as to not too seriously circumscribe the party's support to particular communities. The anomalies are considered not sufficiently significant to obviate the analysis to be undertaken, and especially when this analysis is read along with the other three criteria already utilized, it will be a valuable indicator of party communal discrimination.

The Barisan Nasional's seventy-five Malay candidates were from two Malay based closed parties - fourteen from PAS and sixty-one from UMNO (Figure 16). Each of the PAS candidates were placed in constituencies with a predominantly Malay electorate - all but one of these constituencies had less than eighty-five per cent Malay



**PARLIAMENTARY SEATS CONTESTED
BY BARISAN NASIONAL'S
COMPONENT PARTIES, 1974**

- | | | |
|------|---------|-----|
| UMNO | PAS | MCA |
| PPP | Gerakan | MIC |

Fig. 16

electorates; the only exception being the Bagan Datok constituency with a 64.42% Malay electorate. UMNO's sixty-one candidates were also placed in constituencies with Malay majorities. Sixty of these had absolute Malay majorities, the only exception being the constituency of Batang Padang and even here the Malay electorate had a relative majority - the electorate composition being 45.35% Malays, 44.65% Chinese and ten per cent Indians and others. Clearly then, the Malay candidates of UMNO and PAS all contested in constituencies with a Malay majority. (Tables 37 and 38)

The Barisan Nasional's thirty-nine non-Malay candidates came from two closed parties, (the Chinese based MCA and the Indian based MIC) and two open parties (the predominantly non-Malay based Gerakan and the PPP). The allocation of seats between these parties was twenty-three for MCA, four for MIC, eight for Gerakan and four for the PPP. In analyzing the placement of these candidates an important consideration must be borne in mind. The MCA as the only Chinese based party in the Alliance had been afforded all constituencies with a Chinese majority in the 1969 election. The MCA had however been trounced by the opposition parties in that election and it is this that led to the inclusion of the Gerakan and the PPP in the Barisan Nasional. In the 1969 election the MCA, Gerakan and PPP had in total contested fifty-three parliamentary seats - the MCA thirty-five, the Gerakan fourteen and the PPP six.¹ Most significantly, these parties had contested against each other, the MCA being challenged in five constituencies by the Gerakan, in another five by the PPP and in one by both the PPP and the Gerakan.² The incumbents from these parties were thus allocated the seats they already held. The only

1 Malaysia, Election Commission, 1969 Election Report, 1972.

2 Ibid.

Table 37

Matched Placement of Candidates in Constituencies¹, 1974

Party	Malay Candidates	Chinese Candidates	Indian ² Candidates	Mean Aggregate
UMNO	61/61	-	-	61/61
MCA	-	15/23	-	15/23
MIC	-	-	4/4 (4/4)	4/4
Alliance	61/61	15/23	4/4 (4/4)	80/88
PAS	14/14	-	-	14/14
Gerakan	-	7/7	1/1 (0/1)	8/8
PPP	-	2/2	1/2 (0/2)	3/4
Barisan Nasional	75/75	24/32	6/7 (4/7)	105/114
DAP	6/9	23/29	6/8 (5/8)	35/46
Pekemas	12/12	17/18	5/5 (4/5)	34/35
Partai Rakyat	14/15	5/6	0/1 (0/1)	19/22
KITA	1/2	1/2	-	2/4
IPPP	-	-	1/1 (1/1)	1/1

1 Party's candidates placed in constituencies where the candidate's community predominates. Denominator indicates number contesting and nominator indicates number matched.

2 Two criteria utilized - (a) where candidate is placed in constituency with non-Malay majority and Indians form more than 10.56%; (b) where candidate is placed in constituency with plurality constituency and Indians form more than 10.56%. Latter results are entered within brackets. For 'mean aggregate', only first criteria utilized.

Source: Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975.

Table 38Matched Placement of Candidates in Constituencies¹, by Percentage, 1974.

Party	Malay Candidates	Chinese Candidates	Indian Candidates	²	Mean Aggregate ³
UMNO	100	-	-		100
MCA	-	65.22	-		65.22
MIC	-	-	100	(100)	100
Alliance	100	65.22	100	(100)	90.90
PAS	100	-	-		100
Gerakan	-	100	100	(0)	100
PPP	-	100	100	(0)	75.00
Barisan Nasional	100	75.00	85.71	(66.67)	92.11
DAP	66.67	79.31	66.67	(62.50)	76.09
Pekemas	100	94.44	100	(80)	97.14
Partai Rakyat	93.33	83.33	0	(0)	86.36
KITA	50	50	-		50.00
IPPP	-	-	100	(100)	100

1 Percentage of party's candidates placed in constituencies where the candidate's community predominates.

2 As in Table 37.

3 As in Table 37.

Source: Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975.


seats that were available for re-allocation were seats held by the opposition DAP and Pekemas members of Parliament, and whatever additional non-Malay majority seats that may have been created by the 1974 delineation exercise which increased the total number of seats from 104 to 114. However, as noted in chapter two, the delineation exercise actually reduced non-Malay majority seats from forty-five to thirty-five. Hence there was an increased number of parties and potential candidates amongst whom, an actually reduced number of seats had to be allocated. The Barisan Nasional partially overcame this by conceding to the non-Malay based parties five Malay majority seats. The Barisan Nasional's thirty-nine non-Malay candidates were therefore placed in thirty-four constituencies with non-Malay majorities and in five constituencies with Malay majorities. The mismatched placement of some of the Chinese candidates of the MCA, the Gerakan and the PPP (Tables 37 and 38) is due principally to there being insufficient Chinese majority seats available - there being only twenty-three constituencies with absolute Chinese majorities and seven with relative Chinese majorities, and, there being thirty-two Chinese candidates and seven Indian candidates to share them.

An analysis of the placement of the seven Indian candidates further emphasizes the communal discrimination employed. Six out of the seven candidates were allotted constituencies in which the Indians formed more than 10.6% of the electorate, i.e. where the Indians are more numerous than they are in the total population of Peninsular Malaysia. Especially the MIC's four candidates were placed in constituencies with relatively large Indian electorates - Sungei Siput (13.64%), Pelabohan Kelang (15.59%), Telok Kemang (19.34%) and Damansara (20.20%). The first three of these seats have for each of the elections held in independent Peninsular Malaysia been allocated by the Alliance to the MIC candidates. As a result of the 1974 delineation, a further ten seats were created and the MIC's claim for an increased

share of seats had to be met. Consequently the choice revolved around the three seats with the largest Indian electorates by the new delineation exercise - Shah Alam (25.43% Indians), Kuala Selangor (23.47%) and Damansara (20.20%). The creation of the Federal Territory meant that Kuala Lumpur was no longer included for representation in the State Assembly of Selangor. Five parliamentary constituencies were created within the Federal Territory and the communal composition of the electorate at the time of the 1974 election was 66.22% Chinese, 27.79% Malays and 11.99% Indians. The Barisan Nasional, anxious to have representation of all three communities, distributed three seats to Chinese candidates, one to a Malay candidate and one to an Indian candidate. The choice of Damansara for the MIC therefore met both requirements admirably, that is, of allocating the MIC a seat with a large Indian electorate and allowing Indian representation in the Federal Territory.¹ Another characteristic perceived in the placement of Indian candidates is, they are more often than not placed in constituencies where no community has an absolute majority - i.e. in constituencies with a plurality electorate - and where Indians form a substantial minority. This is true of all the four candidates of the MIC. This practice, it will be observed, is also adopted by the opposition parties in fielding their Indian candidates.

Figure 17 shows the ethnic origin of the 114 candidates of the Barisan Nasional at the 1974 parliamentary election. A comparison of this map with Figure 15 which shows the ethnic dominance in the parliamentary constituencies at the time of the 1974 elections is instructive. For convenience of comparison Figure 15 has been again included in this chapter and placed adjacent to Figure 17.


1 Personal interview with S. Subramanian, MIC Secretary General and candidate for Damansara, January 8, 1977.



ETHNIC DOMINANCE IN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES 1974

- Malay Majority
- ▤ Chinese Plurality
- ▨ Malay Plurality
- ▬ Chinese Majority

Fig. 15




Clearly there is a marked correlation between the ethnic predominance in the constituency and the ethnic origin of the candidate fielded. The anomalies are only in the case of a number of non-Malay candidates. The reasons for this have already been suggested in the preceding discussion.

The DAP fielded its forty-six candidates - twenty-nine Chinese, nine Malays and eight Indians - in each of the thirty-five constituencies with non-Malay majorities and in eleven Malay majority constituencies. The discrimination employed by the DAP, in theory an open party, in seeking constituencies with non-Malay majorities becomes even more clear by a comparison of Figure 18 and Figure 15. Figure 18 shows the ethnic origin of the DAP's candidates for the 1974 parliamentary election and Figure 15 shows the ethnic predominance in the constituencies at the time of the election. To facilitate comparison Figure 15 has been presented again and placed adjacent to Figure 18.

The party's candidates in the twenty-three constituencies having an absolute Chinese majority comprised twenty-one Chinese candidates and only one Malay and one Indian candidate. The Malay candidate was Encik Daing Ibrahim, the Party's National Vice-President, and the Indian candidate was the National Assistant Secretary, Peter Paul Dason. The election of Encik Daing Ibrahim was considered vital to dispel the party's image as an essentially non-Malay party. In the event the party felt that fielding him in Beruas (52.88% Chinese, 11.13% Indians, and 35.99% Malay) would be advantageous not only would the party's non-Malay image gain him the bulk of the non-Malay vote, but also, being a Malay he would be able to obtain a portion of the Malay vote as well and thus ensure his victory.¹

1 Personal interview with Fan Yew Teng, DAP Organising Secretary, August 14, 1974.



ETHNIC DOMINANCE IN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES 1974

- Malay Majority
- ▨ Chinese Plurality
- ▧ Malay Plurality
- ▩ Chinese Majority

Fig. 15




Fig. 18

The Indian candidate, Peter Paul Dason, was the party's Penang State Secretary and member of the National Executive Committee. Dason, as a Penang leader, had to be allocated a seat in Penang. During the 1969 election, as a result of the electoral understanding that existed with the Gerakan, Dason was placed in the Penang Utara seat. Having won the election in 1969, and having nursed it in the subsequent five years, his claim to be placed again in the same constituency (renamed Bukit Bendera in 1974) was naturally strong.¹

The party's eight other Malay candidates were all placed in constituencies with a Malay majority electorate or with a plurality electorate. The rationale for this was basically the same as that employed in placing Daing Ibrahim in Bervuas - the Malay candidates would be able to retain the bulk of the non-Malay vote on the basis of the party's non-Malay image whilst hopefully gaining a number of Malay votes on the strength of their being Malay. The DAP never seriously believed that any of these candidates would stand any chance of being elected. Their inclusion in the party slate was primarily for creating a non-communal image.

The DAP's eight Indian candidates were placed in one constituency with a Chinese absolute majority, two with Malay absolute majorities, and, five with plurality electorates. The case of the candidate in the Chinese majority constituency, has already been considered above. The two candidates in Malay absolute majority constituencies were Karpal Singh in Alor Star (37.23% Chinese, 6.40% Indians, and 56.37% Malays) and Ms. Ganga Nayar in Setapak (64.18% Malays, 26.94% Chinese and 8.88% Indians). Karpal Singh is a prominent lawyer from Alor Star and particularly sought to contest his home

1 Personal interview with Peter Paul Dason, DAP National Committee Member, August 10, 1974.

2 Ibid.

constituency.¹ The DAP Organising Secretary explained Ms. Ganga Nayar's placement in Setapak as being unavoidable, since the DAP was contesting all five constituencies in the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur and that at least one non-Chinese candidate had to be included.² Ganga Nayar herself explained it as the efforts of the DAP Secretary-General, Lim Kit Siang, to ensure her defeat in the election and rejected the Organising Secretary's explanation as spurious. She pointed out that Damansara, also within Kuala Lumpur with a non-Malay majority and 20.20% Indians, would have been a better seat for her.³ If nothing else, the above underlines the importance candidates and parties place on matching candidates to constituencies where their own community predominates. All the other five Indian candidates were placed in constituencies with non-Malay majorities, but where no community had an absolute majority (i.e. plurality electorate) and where Indians formed a substantial minority - Shah Alam (45.84% Chinese, 28.73% Malays, and 25.43% Indians), Nibong Tebal (41.58% Malays, 43.68% Chinese, 14.74% Indians), Sungai Siput (37.23% Malays, 49.13% Chinese, 13.64% Indians), Ulu Selangor (40.74% Malays, 40.06% Chinese, and 19.20% Indians) and Mantin (47.28% Malays, 36.10% Chinese and 16.62% Indians).

Clearly the DAP discriminates along communal lines in its placement of candidates. The discrimination employed has been to, as far as possible, place candidates in areas with non-Malay majorities. Chinese candidates were placed in constituencies with absolute Chinese majorities, Malay candidates in Malay absolute majority constituencies or seats with plurality electorates with Malay relative

1 Personal interview with Karpal Singh, August 13, 1974.


2 Personal interview with Fan Yew Teng, DAP Organising Secretary, August 14, 1974.

3 Personal interview with Ms. Ganga Nayar, August 20, 1974.

majorities, and Indian candidates in constituencies with plurality electorates and substantial Indian minorities.

Figure 19 shows the ethnic origin of the Pekemas candidates. Figure 15, which shows the ethnic dominance in the constituencies has again been presented and placed adjacent to Figure 19. A comparison of these, highlights the discrimination employed by the Pekemas in the placement of candidates. The party fielded thirty-five candidates - twelve Malays, eighteen Chinese and five Indians. Ten of the twelve Malay candidates were placed in constituencies with Malay majorities, the other two were placed in constituencies with a plurality electorate but relative Malay majorities. The party's twenty-three non-Malay candidates were placed in twenty-two seats with a non-Malay majority and only one seat with a Malay majority. The exact placement of these twenty-three candidates further evidences the communal discrimination employed. The party's eighteen Chinese candidates were placed in thirteen seats with absolute Chinese majorities (the party contesting only fourteen such seats), four seats with relative Chinese majorities and one seat with an absolute Malay majority. The five Indian candidates were all placed in constituencies with non-Malay majorities and substantial Indian minorities - Nibong Tebal (58.42% non-Malays, 14.74% Indians), Shah Alam (71.27% non-Malays, 25.43% Indians), Telok Kemang (60.46% non-Malay, 19.34% Indians), Port Kelang (52% non-Malay, 15.59% Indians) and Jelutong (79.02% non-Malay, and 11.48% Indians). All except the last are also constituencies with plurality electorates.

The Partai Rakyat fielded twenty-two candidates, comprising fifteen Malays, six Chinese and one Indian. Fourteen of the fifteen Malay candidates were placed in constituencies with an absolute Malay majority - the exception being placed in a Chinese majority constituency. Five of the six Chinese candidates were fielded in constituencies with absolute Chinese majorities and the sixth placed




ETHNIC DOMINANCE IN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES

1974

- Malay Majority
- Chinese Plurality
- Malay Plurality
- Chinese Majority

Fig. 15



ETHNIC ORIGIN OF THE PEKEMAS' PARLIAMETARY CANDIDATES 1974

Not contested
 Malay
 Indian
 Chinese

Fig. 19


in a constituency with a plurality electorate. The sole Indian candidate was placed in his home constituency Kuantan, a constituency with an absolute Malay majority. (Compare Figures 15 and 20)

The KITA fielded four candidates - two Chinese and two Malays. There appeared no discrimination in the placement of these candidates - one Chinese and one Malay candidate were placed in constituencies with absolute Malay majorities, and the other two in constituencies with Chinese majorities. The IPPP's sole candidate, an Indian, contested in Telok Kemang - a constituency with a plurality electorate and a substantial Indian minority (39.53% Malays, 41.12% Chinese and 19.34% Indians).

The analysis above shows the importance placed by the respective parties in the placement of candidates, and, the care taken to match the candidates with constituencies where their community predominated. This is seen to be the rule rather than the exception with all parties including those which in their selection of candidates attempted to allocate seats as close to the "perfect slate" as possible. The hard facts of Malaysian politics demand such considerations.

Conclusion


Political parties in Peninsular Malaysia may be classified as open parties or closed parties on the basis of their membership requirements, i.e. the discrimination, if any, employed towards restricting membership to particular communities in the Malaysian population. Hence UMNO confining its membership to Malays, PAS limiting its membership to Muslims (in effect Malays), the MCA to Chinese and the MIC to Indians, are all essentially closed parties. Each of the closed parties is, however, a member of the coalition Barisan Nasional, which by the inclusion of these and two open parties - the PPP and the Gerakan - achieves an 'open party' status. All other political parties are - at least in theory - open parties.



ETHNIC DOMINANCE IN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES 1974

- | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|
| □ Malay Majority | ▣ Chinese Plurality |
| ▨ Malay Plurality | ▤ Chinese Majority |

Fig. 15



ETHNIC ORIGIN OF THE PARTAI RAKYAT'S PARLIAMENTARY CANDIDATES 1974

- Not contested
- ▨ Malay
- ▬ Indian
- ▧ Chinese

Fig. 20

It would nevertheless be artificial to separate categorically considerations as to 'theory' and 'practice'. Many striking ambiguities are readily identifiable between the theoretical bounds of membership and the actual practice of mobilising support, whether this be viewed primarily as a determinant of practice or merely as its reflection and rationalisation. The 'open parties' excepting the coalition are thus seen to actually cater more to the interest of particular communities than to others. This is borne out by the composite picture that emerges from the analysis of the communal discrimination exercised by the open parties in party branch location, candidate selection and candidate placement in constituencies. Thus the DAP, theoretically an open party, discriminates in each of the other aspects examined in favour of the non-Malay communities in general, and in particular, the Chinese community. Such is also the case with the Pekemas, though less so than with the DAP. The Partai Rakyat' presents a lesser degree of discrimination, whatever discrimination it employs favouring the Malays. In contrast to the opposition parties, the wholly discriminatory UMNO, PAS, MCA, MIC, and, the Gerakan and PPP which are the more discriminatory of the open parties, are able, by way of a coalition, to present a less discriminatory image. The process is best seen as one in which the discrimination exercised by the component parties is without exception in excess of any that is practised by the open parties, but where, due to a coalition with each other a 'balance in discrimination' is attained - a balance achieved by the discrimination in favour of one community by one component party 'off-setting' the discrimination in favour of another community by another component. In comparison to this balance, the discrimination of the open parties appears indeed high. The differential in discrimination between the various parties in Peninsular Malaysia serves in part to determine their appeal and their performances at the polls.

CHAPTER FIVE

The Appeal for the Votes

The raison d'être of political parties is essentially the assumption of power. In electoral democracies, therefore, there is an element of campaign for electoral support in virtually all activities undertaken by political parties. However, prior to each election there is an intensification in campaigning, and the momentum so gathered peaks at a feverish pitch on polling day. Campaigns may often be confined to the formal campaign period - i.e. from the dissolution of parliament to polling day - but, the expectation of an election may give an electoral atmosphere to much longer periods. The latter was the case in Peninsular Malaysia for the election of 1974.

Dissolution of Parliament

Though Members for the third Malaysian Parliament had been elected on May 10, 1969, nearly two years elapsed before the third Parliament was convened, due to the declaration of emergency and suspension of parliamentary democracy following the May 13, 1969 communal clashes. The third Parliament having been convened only on February 20, 1971, it could function till February 19, 1976, for the Constitution provides Parliament with a maximum five-year life span from the date of its first meeting. The formation of coalition governments between the Alliance and the Gerakan, the PPP and the PAS in the states of Penang, Perak and Kelantan respectively, and the eventual inclusion of these opposition parties into the Barisan Nasional, created great enthusiasm amongst Malaysians. With the initiative clearly in the hands of the Government, it was apparent that an election well before the date of prorogation of Parliament was likely.

But this was not going to be a routine election for the Government - at issue being the Government's handling of the communal violence, the subsequent rule of the National Operations Council, the

constitutional amendments and the concept of the Barisan Nasional itself. Every effort and preparation was made, every detail attended to, and every opportunity utilized to ensure victory. By the time Parliament was dissolved the Prime Minister himself had toured the country twice - ^{twice} once, beginning on April 21, 1974, to explain the concept of the Barisan Nasional;¹ and again, after his return from his visit to China² - on each occasion addressing mass rallies in principal towns. On both occasions the state governments and the component parties of the Barisan Nasional made tremendous efforts to ensure a massive turn-out.³ In addition, maximum mass media coverage was given by the government-owned Radio, Television and Department of Information and the wholly sympathetic press. By early 1974 an election in that year was apparent and speculation was rife as to the possible date.

Intending to retain the initiative it had gained, the Government continued to deny the possibility of an early election. On April 20, 1974, the Prime Minister declared:

"Wherever we go today people are talking about the issue and the election fever is fast spreading throughout the country ... rumours saying that the elections would be held in July, August, September or October are not true."⁴

An important factor seemed to lend weight to the Prime Minister's contention. The constituency delineation exercise was incomplete

1 The Straits Times, April 22, 1974.

2 The Prime Minister's visit to China was from May 28 to June 2, 1974. The timing of the visit was clearly of benefit in improving the Government's image among Chinese electors in Malaysia.

3 In Alor Star, Kedah, for instance, the State Government arranged for bus companies to run extra services and charge half-price fares for those attending the rally. Special bus services were also arranged for from 11 p.m. to 2 a.m. after the rally to take home villagers from the outlying areas. The Straits Times, May 1, 1974.

4 The Sunday Mail, April 21, 1974.

and not expected to be ready for a while. Experienced observers, however, discounted this as insignificant, arguing that if need be the Barisan Nasional would hold parliamentary elections on the basis of the constituency delimitation that was currently in use. As late as June 29, 1974, the Prime Minister, even in urging UMNO to prepare for the election, still kept the nation guessing. All he would concede was "The election is not as far away as some say, and not as near as many expect".¹ On July 30, 1974, a proclamation dissolving Parliament was signed by the Yang di Pertuan Agong and a statement from the Prime Minister's office stated that the dates for nomination and polling would be announced by the Election Commission.² The regulations provide that elections for Peninsular Malaysia should be held within sixty days after the dissolution of Parliament and that nomination day can be seven days after the dissolution at the earliest, and polling day two weeks after nomination day at the earliest.³ On August 1, 1974, the Election Commission declared nomination day to be August 8, 1974, and polling day to be August 14, 1974. Opposition parties immediately protested that the haste with which nominations and polling were to take place were clearly to the advantage of the Barisan Nasional. They further pointed out that as late as July 13, 1974, the electoral rolls were not ready and that detailed maps of the newly delimited constituencies approved by Parliament only on July 23, 1974, were as yet unavailable.⁴ Nevertheless, the ending of the prevailing uncertainty was generally welcomed.

1 The Straits Times, June 30, 1974.

2 The Straits Times, July 31, 1974.

3 Malaysia, Constitution, Article 54.

4 The Straits Times, August 1, 1974.

The Government's efforts to pretend that the election was not to be held as soon as it was, were not regarded by the opposition political parties seriously, for they had been anticipating and preparing for a considerable time. Beginning in March 1974, the Partai Rakyat had commenced its public rallies, as had the DAP and the Pekemas.¹ On April 21, 1974, the DAP Secretary General had declared that

"the DAP would not be caught napping in the coming general elections. We have gone into top gear in preparation for the coming elections especially in Perak ... I believe that although, technically, Tun Razak has not yet taken a decision to advise the Yang di Pertuan Agung to dissolve Parliament there is no doubt that the Alliance have made advanced preparations for the general election to be held shortly."²

The Barisan Nasional's Advantage

As noted in Chapter 4, the Barisan Nasional's component parties, especially UMNO, PAS, MCA and MIC, had party branches in almost every constituency; just prior to the 1974 election even the Gerakan had undertaken the opening of branches in several constituencies. Thus, of the Barisan Nasional's component parties, only the PPP had a poor ground-level organization. The Barisan Nasional conducted its electoral campaign by setting up liaison bodies between its component parties at state and constituency levels.³ The election organization was under the supervision of Encik Ghafar Baba as Director of Elections, and an Election Committee with an Operations Room at UMNO headquarters in Kuala Lumpur. This Operations Room, the highest in a hierarchical network stretching to the constituency level, served as the nerve centre of campaign planning and execution. Several secretaries were appointed, each in charge of a separate function -

1 Utusan Malaysia, March 6, 1974.

2 The Straits Times, April 22, 1974.

3 Mingguan Malaysia, March 17, 1974.

transport, rallies, publicity, legal affairs, police liaison, etc. It was at the national level operations room that the printing and distribution of posters, banners, badges, transport vehicles, public address system equipment and all the other paraphernalia requisite for an effective campaign were made. Here also were carefully planned the speaking tours of national leaders. Charts and graphs were continually drawn, the progress in each state and constituency constantly updated. The national level operations room was linked to the state level operations room by a hot-line telephone. As at the national level, the state operations rooms, too, had their own secretaries handling separate campaign functions. Next in the hierarchy was the constituency level operations room which was linked by hot-line telephone to the state level. All operations rooms were manned round the clock and the daily assessments of the village and polling district level campaigners were regularly passed up the hierarchy and formed the basis of decisions for the deployment of resources to the various constituencies and the planning of strategy. Behind each Barisan Nasional candidate was the assistance of this powerful election machinery.

The Barisan Nasional, with enormous financial resources at its command, was able to provide its candidates with the kind of cash and material support that none of the other parties could hope to compete with. Each candidate was able to receive from the National Operations Room alone vast amounts of posters of party symbols in various sizes¹, party badges, party manifestos, several files on speaking points, and three public-address systems. Also distributed

1 One million copies of posters of party symbols in various sizes were despatched to Perak State alone (626,565 electors).
The Straits Echo, August 13, 1974.

freely were posters of various sizes with the words "Together we support the leadership of our Prime Minister Tun Haji Abdul Razak". These posters appeared in three languages - Malay (in the Rumi and Jawi scripts), Chinese and Tamil (Plate 2). Further support for the Barisan Nasional's candidates came from their own respective parties but this varied greatly from party to party, UMNO, MCA and MIC candidates on the whole being better served than their counterparts from Gerakan, PPP and PAS. The PPP, for instance, supplied its candidates with their deposit and M\$ 5,000, besides paying for the electors cards and the first thousand personal posters. The party also printed 160,000 posters with party symbols.¹ Further resources depended on the financial standing and influence of individual candidates - the total election expenditure of a large number of Barisan Nasional candidates is thought to be in many cases well in excess of the stipulated maximum of M\$ 20,000.²

The Barisan Nasional, as the government party, was also able to bring to bear on the election its control of the Radio and Television and the services of the Department of Information both at the federal and state levels. The Prime Minister's visit to China before the election, provided the opportunity for a wholly pro-government propaganda campaign to be meted out by the Radio, Television and the Department of Information, lauding the efforts of the Prime Minister and the Barisan Nasional. Prior to and during the campaign period,

1 Personal interview with Dato Sri S.P. Seenivasagam, President of the PPP on August 8, 1974.


2 Appendix 8 sets out the breakdown of the actual expenditure incurred by two Barisan Nasional candidates totalling in one case M\$ 19,850 and in another M\$ 70,492.30. Another candidate, though unable to provide a breakdown of the expenses incurred, estimated his actual total expenditure to be between M\$ 75,000 and M\$ 80,000. These expenditures were over and above expenses incurred on behalf of the candidate by the party like providing party posters, public address equipment, landrovers, etc.

KAMI

TELAH BERSATU MENDUKUNG
BARISAN NASIONAL
BAWAH PIMPINAN
TUN HJ. ABDUL RAZAK B. HUSSEIN
PERDANA MENTERI KITA



SIMBOL BARISAN NASIONAL IALAH DACING



Matlamat kita:
Masyarakat Adil, Perpaduan, dan Kemakmuran Rakyat.

Diterbitkan oleh Ibu Pejabat Barisan Nasional Kuala Lumpur, dan dicetak oleh Perchetakan Mas Sendirian Berhad Kuala Lumpur.

the Department of Information displayed throughout the country 20" by 26" posters with the Prime Minister's photograph and just the words "Together we support the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak". (Plate 3) The similarity in wording of this poster and that issued by the Barisan Nasional (Plate 2) could hardly be missed. The Barisan Nasional also distributed to its candidates via its National Operations Room hundreds of copies of the Department of Information, Malaysia publication entitled Masyarakat Baru and its English translation The New Society.¹ The publication, obviously intended to serve as election campaign material, explained in rather glossy fashion the "two prongs of the New Economic Policy, namely, eradicating poverty irrespective of race and accelerating the process of restructuring society so as to eliminate the identification of race with vocation". Also distributed to candidates and speakers was another Department of Information, Malaysia effort - fact sheets entitled "Talking Points". Each of these fact sheets presented background information and statistics that candidates could utilize during their campaign speeches, there being fact sheets on Foreign Policy, Labour and Manpower, Progress of the New Economic Policy, Towards Self-sufficiency in Rice, Education, Domestic and Foreign Loans, RISDA (Rubber Industry Smallholders Development Authority) and Industrial Development. All were neatly placed in two pockets - one for those in the Malay language and the other for those in English - in a convenient white folder. The assistance from the Department of Information did not terminate there. In at least one state, official departmental vehicles were utilized to convey Barisan Nasional State Operations Room workers and Barisan Nasional posters.² In Tumpat, Kelantan,

1 Malaysia, Ministry of Information, The New Society, 1974.

2 This was in Alor Star, Kedah and was witnessed by the writer.



**BERSAMA
KITA MENYOKONG
PIMPINAN
TUN ABDUL RAZAK**

DI TERBITKAN OLEH JABATAN PENERANGAN MALAYSIA, KEMENTERIAN PENERANGAN DAN BUKU OLEH JABATAN MALAYSIA, BERHAD. 11 & 12, LALUAN GUNUNG, DE UJIAN, LALUAN SOK, 110, KUALA LUMPUR.

Plate 3 Department of Information, Malaysia, poster.

Translation: Together we support the leadership of Tun Abdul Razak.

a Department of Veterinary Services landrover was used to distribute money to campaign workers. It is not here suggested that the Barisan Nasional made systematic use of government vehicles during the election campaign, and in all probability such misuse was the result of the over-enthusiasm of particular party officials and government servants. However, as the government party and the party that was certain to be returned to power, the Barisan Nasional was the chief, if not sole, beneficiary of such excesses. Perhaps the saddest aspect of this blatant abuse of governmental authority is that it was accepted, though grudgingly, by the opposition as a normal feature of elections.

The sharing of radio time for political party broadcasts during the campaign period, it has already been noted, was to the advantage of the Barisan Nasional - it obtained eight 13-minute broadcasts as compared to one 13-minute broadcast each for the DAP, Pekemas and Partai Rakyat.¹ None of the political parties was given television time, but broadcasts over Radio and Television Malaysia² were obviously slanted to advantage the Barisan Nasional. During the campaign period, for instance, Radio and Television Malaysia continually broadcast in between regular programmes excerpts from Tun Abdul Razak's speeches under the heading Kata-Kata Perdana.³ The DAP protested

1 Chapter One, page 85.

2 All mass media activities are co-ordinated by the Ministry of Information. The Ministry has two main divisions - Radio Television Malaysia, and the Department of Information. Adhikarya, R., et. al., Broadcasting in Peninsular Malaysia, 1977, pp 5-10 provide an up-to-date outline of the guidelines for government communicators and broadcasters and the functions of the two divisions of the Ministry of Information.

3 Kata-Kata in Malay means 'Sayings' and 'Perdana' means 'chief', 'principal', or 'important'. 'Perdana' is also used in the term Prime Minister (Perdana Menteri).

pro-Barisan Nasional bias on the part of the Election Commission in programmes purportedly put out over Radio and Television Malaysia by the Election Commission to encourage voters to exercise their franchise in the election. As an example of this, the DAP pointed out that

"the television appeal headed 'Pilihanraya Nasional' [national election] is slanted to promote the name 'nasional' used by the National Front [Barisan Nasional]. The correct form should be 'Pilihanraya Umum' meaning general election - a term used throughout the years".¹

Newspapers in Peninsular Malaysia² have been generally sympathetic to the Government and this, it is believed, is due to two principal reasons - ownership patterns and legislative control. The Printing Presses Act (1948) was amended in January 1974 to ensure that Malaysian investments in newspapers exceeded those of non-Malaysians and gave the Home Affairs Minister power to refuse, suspend, or revoke the annual licence where necessary.³ The Internal Security Act (1960) and the Sedition Act (1948) as amended by the Constitution Amendment Act (1971) impose further limitations on the Press - the general effect of these Acts is to ensure that the Press does not bring into hatred or contempt, or excite disaffection against any Ruler, or against the Government. As a result, the newspapers have generally played safe and tended to be non-critical of government policy.⁴ During the 1974 election,

1 The Straits Times, August 13, 1974.

2 There were in 1974 thirty-two newspapers in Peninsular Malaysia publishing in five different languages - English (eight), Malay (six), Chinese (ten), Tamil (seven) and Punjabi (one). The largest circulations in 1973 were recorded by The Straits Times (140,800) and The Sunday Times (174,000) - both English language newspapers. Leader, Malaysian Journalism Review, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1974, p. 22.

3 Malaysia, Printing Presses (Amendment) Act, 1974.

4 Lent, J.A., until December 1973 Head of the Communications Programme at the Universiti Sains Malaysia, Penang, observed in 1974 "Mass media are controlled ... it is difficult to determine where government interference stops and media self-restraint commences." Lent, J.A., 'Malaysia's Guided Media', INDEX (London) Vol. 3, No. 4, Winter 1974.

politicians interviewed generally conceded that the Malaysian Press was especially more partisan and pro-Barisan Nasional than it had ever been in previous elections. One Opposition leader bluntly declared:

"When one translates news stories in the mass media into advertising, the Barisan runs a billion-dollar campaign."¹

One feature of the election preparations, however, served as a disadvantage to many Barisan Nasional candidates. Though the party itself was extremely well organized, its candidates were not in many cases as well prepared for the election as candidates from the opposing parties. The final selection of candidates was left to the Prime Minister himself and not the component parties.² This measure, was in accordance with the procedure adopted by Tengku Abdul Rahman in the previous elections. But in the 1974 election, the rivalry between the component parties and the numerous potential candidates, meant that an early announcement could result in defections and opposition by the unsuccessful aspirants. Consequently, many Barisan Nasional candidates only knew of their selection and the constituency they were contesting, the day before nominations for the election.³ Even then, numerous Barisan members entered the contest as Independents challenging the official Barisan Nasional candidates. But the party still had a tremendous advantage over the other parties. There never was any doubt that the Barisan Nasional would form the national government even before the nominations closed - at issue only was the size of the majority.

The Barisan Nasional's relative strength became apparent at the

1 Fan Yew Teng, at a public rally in Menglembu on August 9, 1974.

2 The Sunday Times, May 12, 1974.

3 Goh Cheng Teik, the Barisan Nasional candidate for Nibong Tebal constituency claimed he was certain of his nomination only the day before nomination day. Personal interview with Goh Cheng Teik on August 10, 1974.

close of nomination - it was returned unopposed in thirty-two parliamentary constituencies out of a total of 114 in Peninsular Malaysia. In Sabah and Sarawak, the Barisan Nasional gained fifteen of the total of forty seats without contest. It needed a mere thirty-one of the eighty-two Peninsular Malaysian and twenty-two Sabah and Sarawak seats for which polling was to be held, to form a majority in Parliament. DAP, Pekemas and Partai Rakyat leaders were not surprised; but they were certainly disheartened. The DAP Secretary General, Lim Kit Siang, expressed the Opposition's hopes when he held "The 47 unopposed parliamentary seats do not spoil our strategy as we merely want to deny them a two-thirds majority".¹ Pekemas President, Tan Chee Koon, voiced the Opposition's fears - "It is a sad commentary that the seats are unopposed and God help the people of this country if it becomes a one-party State".²

The Issues and the Campaign

A general election elicits a great flood of propaganda for the parties - the manifestos and major speeches of the national party leaders, the addresses and speeches of the candidates, broadcasts and articles, leaflets, cartoons and posters. It is difficult, if not impossible, to encompass this mass of material easily in formal analysis. What is attempted here is merely to present the main trends of the campaign and thus the general impression obtained by reading the vast literature poured out, by attending political rallies and house-to-house campaigns, by talking to candidates and their campaigners - in short, by having experienced the general election alive.

1 The Barisan Nasional gained forty-seven seats without contest - thirty-two seats in Peninsular Malaysia and fifteen in Sabah. The Star, August 11, 1974.

2 Ibid.

The Party Manifestos

Much of the significant electioneering went on at the national level. Each party produced a manifesto which presented its outlook and policies in vague but attractive language. These documents represented as firm a commitment to a programme as may reasonably be expected, while going beyond the interests and understanding of most electors! Though the manifestos themselves clearly had little direct impact, they provided an agenda for the rest of the campaign and to a large measure reflected the issues that were to be emphasized by the respective parties.

The Barisan Nasional's manifesto, itself a compromise document between its nine component parties, was entitled 'The People's Front for Happier Malaysia'.¹ The manifesto was marked by three important characteristics. Firstly, the emphasis on the personality and image of Tun Abdul Razak as Prime Minister. The previous five years had seen him take over the running of the country as Director of the National Operations Council, and then, with the forced retirement of Tengku Abdul Rahman, as Prime Minister. Initially, the non-Malay community had apprehensions about his pro-Malay image, but his efforts at forming the new Barisan Nasional and thereby including non-Malay representation in the Government, and his visit to Communist China as the first Southeast Asian leader to do so, had all gone towards remedying this. UMNO, and the other Barisan Nasional leaders, helped by the state-controlled Radio and Television and a wholly sympathetic press, had helped develop a massive personality cult. The party's manifesto accordingly, carried not the party's symbol on its cover, but an approximately 4" by 4" coloured photograph of Tun Razak. The

1 The Barisan Nasional, Manifesto 1974, The People's Front for Happier Malaysia, 1974.

manifesto also began with a personal letter from Tun Razak signed as "Prime Minister of Malaysia and Barisan Nasional Chairman" calling for support for the Barisan Nasional and himself, and expressing his willingness "to shoulder the responsibility of continuing our efforts to:

- (i) maintain peace and security in the country and to protect the lives, property and rights of our people
- (ii) strengthen and consolidate social and political stability
- (iii) ensure the highly respected position of our nation in international relations by pursuing a free, neutral and active foreign policy
- (iv) implement fully the New Economic Policy, and
- (v) establish a just, united and prosperous society in accordance with the Rukunegara."¹

Secondly, the manifesto aimed at presenting the Barisan Nasional as attempting to include a broader participation in government and thus, by avoiding politicking and communal politics, achieving political stability. In this respect the manifesto read:

"The Barisan Nasional is a logical consequence of the growth and development of Malaysian political life. It is yet another milestone in our serious approach to consolidation in national politics. There is no place for the politics of racism and communal polarisation in this country ...

The Barisan Nasional is a single, effective political party which reflects a complete spectrum of views on Malaysian politics - enables a greater popular representation and greater participation in the Government ... enables the national interest and national unity to be placed above party and sectarian interests. We recognise that political stability is of utmost importance for our survival.

The Barisan Nasional - the confederation of nine political parties ... is the successful culmination of the people's efforts towards political unity which has no precedent in the history of our national struggle."²

The third characteristic was the emphasis on the government's economic progress. The manifesto claimed that since the launching of

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

the Second Malaysia Plan in 1971 there had been tremendous progress, and this certainly made impressive reading. There had been a rise in Gross National Product from M\$ 4 billion in 1957 to M\$ 16.8 billion in 1973 and there was a forecast of a seven per cent increase in real terms for 1974 over that of 1973. 450,000 jobs had been created under the plan, amounting to fifty-eight per cent of the five year target, with the prospect of another 140,000 new jobs to be created in 1974. 670,000 acres of uncultivated land had been developed and a further 200,000 acres of new land would be developed during the year. The manifesto then listed several major economic projects completed or underway, and then dedicated itself to a national programme, stressing in the process Agriculture, Industries, Timber, Petroleum, Roads and Communication, Electricity and Water, and Education. Also given mention were the strength of the Malaysian dollar, the need to beat inflation and encourage foreign investment, and the need to emphasize education. For good measure, and to allow for the expansion of appropriate themes at the appropriate constituencies, the manifesto included pledges to

- a) "improve the lot of Fishermen and Farmers by way of co-operatives and modern techniques" and
- b) "not neglect Hawkers and Petty Traders as they perform a useful role in our Society. A proper scheme will be introduced to assist them to improve their livelihood."¹

The last was, in particular, due to the efforts of the Gerakan, which along with the MCA and PPP, was contesting the essentially urban constituencies where Chinese hawkers have hitherto complained of victimisation by Local Government and police authorities.²

1 Ibid.

2 Personal interview with Goh Hock Guan, Barisan Nasional (Gerakan) candidate for Bungsar, January 15, 1975.

The DAP's manifesto was again marked by three principal characteristics. Firstly, the party placed great emphasis on rejecting the concept of coalition governments and the Barisan Nasional. The manifesto itself was entitled "Expose the National Fraud of the National Front".¹ In a lengthy introduction, the DAP presented the Barisan Nasional as an attempt by the Alliance Party to defraud the Malaysian public with a new name and symbol but no change in policies, and held that the Gerakan, PPP and PAS had surrendered their political beliefs and principles for position, office and profit. This, the party viewed, had been made possible only because it, itself, had by way of an electoral understanding helped the Gerakan and the PPP win seats in the 1969 elections. It claimed to be the only party that had stood true to its 1969 pledges.

The period, 1969 to 1974, the party argued, had been "A season of political opportunism and knavery"² and cleverly dismissed outstanding issues which it feared would represent liabilities in its image to the public - its unwillingness to form a United Opposition Front with the Pekemas, the internal conflicts, the rivalries, and the expulsion of a number of senior leaders from its ranks. The manifesto explained its unwillingness to join the United Opposition Front as being due to the Pekemas leader's betrayal of the people by voting for the 1971 Constitution Amendment Act, thereby curtailing the freedom of speech and political activity of Malaysians. This, the party held, was done despite Pekemas leaders having in 1969 "campaigned with the clarion call to the people to reduce the Alliance majority in Parliament in order to DENY THE TWO-THIRDS MAJORITY they need to abrogate our

1 Democratic Action Party, The 1974 General Election Manifesto of the DAP, Expose the National Fraud of the National Front!, 1974.

2 Ibid.

constitutional rights and guarantees".¹ It further, accused the Pekemas of holding talks with Barisan Nasional leaders in connection with some form of understanding in the general elections even while the United Opposition Front talks were in progress. The manifesto also skilfully explained away the DAP's own negotiations with the MCA for joining the Barisan Nasional, as being, "the efforts of arch-opportunist Goh Hock Guan" and justified its "great party purges of Goh Hock Guan, Walter Loh and Richard Ho", as efforts which returned the DAP to its original wholesomeness and integrity, thereby, enabling it to forge ahead in its struggle to create a democratic socialist Malaysia, where there is no exploitation of man by man, class by class, or race by race.²

A second characteristic of the manifesto, was the effort made towards presenting an image of the DAP as a party championing the cause of the non-Malays in the country. Though, not as blatant in this as it had been in its 1969 manifesto, the message could hardly be missed. The innuendo was made by first challenging the Government's New Economic Policy, which is based on the assumption that there is a disparity in incomes between the Malays and the non-Malays. The DAP argued that "The New Economic Policy planners talk about the myth of economic imbalance between the Malays and non-Malays, but ignore the reality of the economic imbalance between Malaysians and foreigners".³ Its proposal was for economic reform based on a redistribution of income favouring the have-nots. Such reform was not to be on the basis of community, but rather on a class basis, by way of:

- a) A Cheap Food Policy and a Fair Prices Tribunal as part

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 Ibid.

of a National Anti-Inflationary Policy,

- b) general wage increases and statutory minimum wages;
- c) overhauling the anti-labour laws;
- d) a review of Employees Provident Fund policies;
- e) Reformation of taxation policies by increasing the relief for individuals in the lower income group and raising the tax for the higher income groups;
- f) establishing a Ministry of Housing;
- g) a full employment policy; and
- h) a new deal for hawkers.

The manifesto then claimed that government policies had produced educational inequality and undermined national unity, and objected that "every year, tens of thousands of Malaysians fail the MCE Malaysian Certificate of Education because of failure in Bahasa Malaysia Malay language although they get a string of distinctions in other subjects".¹ The party called for

- i) the expansion of Higher School Certificate and University places so that all those with requisite qualifications and ability can get opportunities for higher education;
- ii) permit the establishment of private Universities and Colleges;
- iii) government financial subsidy to Independent Chinese Secondary Schools;
- iv) constitutional guarantees that Chinese and Tamil primary schools be not converted;
- v) compulsory teaching of the mother tongue of every student in every school; and

1 Ibid.

- vi) recognition of foreign degrees of international repute including those from Nantah, Taiwan, Indian and Indonesian Universities.

The above demands all held special appeal to the non-Malay communities. The appeal was, by 1969 standards, certainly restrained but nonetheless clear. For the bulk of Malaysians, disposed to viewing policies as being either pro-Malay or anti-Malay, the message was obvious.

The third characteristic of the manifesto was its campaign for human rights and civil liberties. It called for the repealing of a number of measures that the Government had imposed on the grounds of internal security. Thus the manifesto advocated, the repealing of the Constitution Amendment Act of 1971 which had served to curtail freedom of speech in a number of specified areas and had curtailed the parliamentary privilege of immunity of Members of Parliament and State Assemblymen; abolition of the Internal Security Act which allowed for detention without trial; abolition of the Universities and University Colleges Act which prevented university students from participating in politics; and an end to the annual licencing system imposed on the Malaysian press.

Perhaps of all the manifestos produced for the 1974 election, that of the Pekemas was most comprehensive in its coverage. There was hardly an aspect of Malaysian society and politics that the manifesto, entitled "Pekemas as Your Watch Dog", did not take a stand on.¹ The position adopted was, generally, in keeping with the moderate socialist policies advocated by the Labour Party in the years immediately following Malaya's independence. Such a stand was hardly surprising, since many of the Pekemas leaders had then led the Labour Party, and ever since the formation of the Pekemas, had consciously attempted to cultivate the residue of support they had in the former strongholds of

1 Parti Keadilan Masyarakat Malaysia, Platform for 1974 General Elections, Pekemas as Your Watch Dog, 1974.

the Labour Party. The manifesto thus called for the reduction of the wide imbalance between foreign and local ownership of assets in the country, restriction of the outflow of capital, nationalisation of selected enterprises such as the petroleum industry, mines and other vital industries, prevention of monopolies, and the strengthening of the co-operative system. The party's land reform policies, too, were reminiscent of the Labour Party's stance - the manifesto called for a ceiling on the ownership of land, eradication of absentee landlordism, control of landownership by foreigners, foreign corporations and firms, and the reintroduction of the right of adverse possession.

A number of the Pekemas founder members and top office bearers, notably Yeoh Teck Chye and V. David, are prominent Trade Union leaders. The party, even at its formation, had greatly emphasized its Labour and trade union sympathies. The manifesto therefore claimed that "the Alliance, supported by the SUPP, Gerakan, PMIP and the PPP has put LABOUR IN CHAINS, while still allowing Capital freedom to exploit our workers and giving every incentive to exploit the nation's wealth." It undertook to strive for the right of every worker to join a trade union, the revision of anti-Labour laws and the automatic recognition of trade unions, establishment of a State Social Security system, public housing for workers close to industries, a basic living wage, introduction of a National Health Service, and, the ratification of the International Labour Organisation's Conventions No. 87 and No. 98 pertaining to freedom of association and right to collective bargaining.

On issues pertaining to Culture and Education, the manifesto was in agreement with the DAP as regards its position on Chinese and Tamil schools, private universities and the recognition of Nanyang, Taiwan and Indian degrees. There was, however, a determined attempt to make its appeal appear non-communal. Unlike the DAP manifesto, that of the Pekemas committed the party to strive "to preserve and sustain the

growth and achievement of BAHASA MALAYSIA as the SOLE official language", and the acceptance of "the special privileges for the Bumiputras as laid down in Article 153 of the Federal Constitution".¹

The Partai Rakyat's manifesto entitled Program dan Manifesto Pilihanraya (Election Programme and Manifesto)² was reflective of the Party's non-communal socialist approach to Peninsular Malaysian politics. The lengthy introductory statement began with a call for action and an indictment of the Government:

"This country is currently at an important historical crossroad and the moment has arrived for all progressive groups and action-oriented people to pool their resources to determine the future of our people and nation. The group that was given power by the British in 1955 [a reference to the Alliance] has destroyed faith and become corrupt. It represents the interests of the foreign monopolists who control two-thirds of the economy, and the rich families from all races, who grab the wealth of this country for themselves and their minions."³

It alleged that the Government had used its authority and police power to harass the poor - prices had risen, homes of the poor were destroyed in the name of 'development' and their land confiscated and given to the foreign monopolists for the construction of hotels, casinos, business complexes and factories. The manifesto held that the country was drained of about M\$ 1,000 million yearly by foreign monopolists, and that government policy had resulted in a national debt in excess of M\$ 8,000 million.

The party regarded the May 13, 1969 communal riots, as a direct consequence of the Alliance policy, and held that the formation of the Barisan Nasional itself was merely an attempt to present the discredited Alliance under a new name and symbol. It accused the

1 Ibid.

2 Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya, Program dan Manifesto Pilihanraya, Julai 1974.

3 Ibid.

Barisan Nasional of utilizing government property for party purposes.

The principal objective of the party's efforts, the manifesto presented, as:

1. the creation of a genuine and fully independent state that has control over its political and economic life;
2. the forging of national unity by measures aimed at helping the masses, especially labour, farmers and fishermen, and the removal of poverty, corruption and nepotism;
3. the establishment of a modern nation and new society that is high in morals, has a scientific approach, new technology, and which maintains friendly relations and is sympathetic to the peoples of the world who are struggling to overcome imperialism; and the creation of a socialist nation.

This general statement of the party's philosophy, ideology and strategy, was supported by forty-three specific proposals of reform.

The measures suggested were grouped under six headings:

- (i) politics and administration;
- (ii) economics and finance;
- (iii) economic and social welfare;
- (iv) education and culture;
- (v) defence and foreign affairs; and
- (vi) religion and morals.

The specific proposals, like the general statement, were void of any communal appeal and again emphasized the party's socialist approach. It may be held that the most striking aspect of the Partai Rakyat's manifesto was its attempts to ignore the communal divisions in Peninsular Malaysian society, and indeed, attempt to take society more as it would like to visualize it. Hence, there was no reference to

Malay special privileges and rights, to citizenship, to language, to culture and to religion - these divisive issues of Peninsular Malaysian politics were totally ignored. This approach is indeed the antithesis of that adopted by the other parties. Regardless of the rewards that such an approach would provide on polling day, the party, as it will become apparent in the discussion that follows, was steadfast. Its electoral performance would indeed serve to indicate, to at least an extent, how much Peninsular Malaysians are able to divorce the concept of 'race' and accept the paradigm of 'class' as the basis of their problems.

The Electoral Contest

The contest may be conveniently viewed as two separate battles. The first, principally between the Barisan Nasional, DAP and Pekemas, was a contest for the non-Malay vote. In places the Partai Rakyat and a few independents also participated. Spatially this contest was confined to the non-Malay majority constituencies in the states of Penang, Perak, Selangor, the Federal Territory, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and parts of Johore. Here the battle quickly boiled down to being one of the DAP and the Pekemas, while not reducing their own invective at each other, challenging the essentially non-Malay based parties of the Barisan Nasional, i.e. the MCA, the MIC, the Gerakan and the PPP.¹ (Tables 39 and 40)

The second battle - the battle for the Malay votes - was in constituencies with Malay majority electorates and thus confined principally to the states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan, Trengganu, Pahang and parts of Johore. For the Barisan Nasional, this involved

1 Appendix 7 sets out the contest in each parliamentary constituency in the 1974 election.

Table 39

Parliamentary Seats Contested by Political Parties by State,
Peninsular Malaysia, 1974.

	Total No. of Seats	Barisan Nasional (a)	DAP	PEK	Partai Rakyat Malay	Independents Malay Non-Malay	Others
Perlis	2	2				2	
Kedah	13	13 (8)	1		1	4 ^(b)	1 (KITA)
Kelantan	12	12 (4)			1	8	
Trengganu	7	7 (1)				3	
Penang	9	9 (1)	7	8	6		1 (KITA)
Perak	21	21 (3)	14	11	6	5	6 2 (KITA)
Pahang	8	8 (3)	2				1
Selangor	11	11 (2)	6	5	4	2	1
Federal Territory	5	5	5	6			1
Nagri Sembilan	6	6 (2)	4	2	1	2	1 (IPPP)
Malacca	4	4	1	3	2	1	
Johore	16	16 (8)	6		1	2	
Total	114	114(32)	46	35		29	9 4 (KITA) 1 (IPPP)

(a) Figures within brackets indicate seats won without being contested

(b) Seats contested by 'Bebas Bersatu' (United Independents)

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975,
Appendix H, pp 144-158.

Table 40

Number of Malay and non-Malay Majority* seats contested by Political Parties, Parliamentary Election, 1974.

Party	Malay Majority (Total 79)	Non-Malay Majority (Total 35)
Barisan Nasional	79	35
- UMNO	60	1
- PAS	14	0
- MCA	5	18
- MIC	0	4
- Gerakan	0	8
- PPP	0	4
DAP	11	35
Pekemas	11	24
Partai Rakyat	15	7
IPPP	0	1
KITA	2	2
Independents		
- Malay	26	3
- Non-Malay	1	8

* Absolute majority - i.e. where community comprises more than 50% of the electorate.

Source: Compiled from data included in Appendix 4, and, Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendix H, pp 144-158.

two separate engagements, one with the UMNO and PAS dissidents and the other with the Partai Rakyat, the challenge in the latter being confined mainly to Trengganu and parts of Johore. (Tables 39 and 40)

The Battle for the non-Malay vote

Although the Barisan Nasional gave serious consideration to its battle for the Malay votes, it was clear from the preparations that led to the election and concentration of effort by the principal leaders, that the party viewed its battle for the non-Malay votes as the more difficult. A measure of the challenge was indicated by the fact, that of the thirty-two parliamentary seats in which the party was returned unopposed, none was a non-Malay majority seat. To win a mandate for the Barisan Nasional from the non-Malay population meant that the shift of the Gerakan and the PPP from the opposition to the Government be witnessed by a corresponding shift of their respective members and electoral support. For the Gerakan and the PPP the election was of special importance, for the outcome would decide the continued existence of these parties. The campaign for them was largely one of defending their decision to join the Barisan Nasional. Lim Chong Eu put his message across plainly. Referring to his own resignation from the Presidency and membership of the MCA over the status of the MCA vis a vis UMNO, he explained:

"In 1959 I broke away from the Government and Tun Razak. For ten years we went on separate paths. However the tragic events of 1969 brought us together again to work for a peaceful and united Malaysia. Tun Razak phoned me. And from there on we began to sit together once more to discuss ways to settle the national crisis."

He denied claims that the Gerakan had, by joining the Barisan Nasional, sold out the Chinese interests; he dismissed these as malicious

1 The Straits Times, August 10, 1974.

allegations by the opposition. The Barisan Nasional, he claimed, had in fact provided a broader base for the Chinese-based parties like the Gerakan, the PPP, the SUPP and the MCA to safeguard Chinese rights.¹ In Penang, the Gerakan stressed that "A State Government in the hands of an opposition party will never progress without support from the Central Government". As proof of the development brought to Penang by Federal Government assistance, the greatly publicised and much vaunted Penang Urban Centre, a M\$ 200 million project, and the proposed bridge replacing the ferry service and linking Penang Island with the mainland, were pointed out.² Lim Chong Eu and the Gerakan in Penang, were to a degree on safe grounds, for in Penang the Pekemas and the DAP appeared equally strong and it was thought that the opposition vote would be split between them. What was needed for the Gerakan candidates there was thus, merely to retain a portion of their electoral support from the 1969 election, and, with the help of the pro-Government vote, win the seats. With the help of its reasonably sound organization and network of branches, the Gerakan hoped to pull it off; besides, Lim Chong Eu had a moderately impressive record as Chief Minister in Penang.

In Perak, the PPP faced a far greater problem. Since the death of D.R. Seenivasagam, the PPP founder and prima donna, the six-pointed star³ had lost much of its lustre. The party had few members and poor ground-level organization. There was little that the party could prove as being advantages gained by entering into a coalition with the Barisan Nasional; certainly nothing that could mitigate its alleged betrayal of its electorate, who had for long been cultivated

1 Ibid.

2 Ibid.

3 The People's Progressive Party symbol is a six-pointed red star on a white background.

with an extreme anti-Alliance stand. Moreover, the change in political stance by the PPP, occurred at a time when the image of good administration in the PPP-controlled Ipoh municipality was itself being questioned. Nonetheless, the PPP campaigned very much along the lines of the Gerakan in Penang. The new political climate following the communal clashes of 1969, it was claimed, needed co-operation between the various communities. The coalition, it was held, had brought federal government finances for important projects for the people of Ipoh, namely, the M\$ 4½ million twenty-storey Kinta Heights which could house 300 families, a M\$ 1 million public library, the sewerage scheme, and the repossession and subdivision of mining land by the State Government for availability to the public.¹ The PPP regarded the election as a referendum on one issue - that of winning an endorsement for its decision to join the Barisan Nasional.²

The Gerakan and the PPP were to an extent handicapped by the lack of support, and in places definite obstruction, rendered their candidates by some divisions of the MCA. The reason for this stems from the MCA's apprehensions, and in some states, notably Penang and Perak, open hostility to the idea of coalitions with the Gerakan and the PPP. The admission of these parties meant that many MCA hopefuls were denied a party ticket for the election and were instead asked to support candidates who in the past had been their arch-rivals. In Perak, the Barisan Nasional's election co-ordinator urged the component parties to bury the hatchet:

"There were tussles over the selection of candidates before the nominations were finished. Now that these have been settled I hope the leaders and supporters of the various parties will pool their resources to win the elections." 3

1 The Straits Times, August 10, 1974. Also Utusan Malaysia, August 20, 1974.

2 The Straits Echo, August 12, 1974.

3 The Straits Times, August 10, 1974.

Many did not, and in places even sought election as Independents against official Barisan Nasional candidates. MCA Leader and Secretary-General of the Barisan Nasional, Michael Chen, even found it necessary to deny that he was supporting a number of these Independents.¹

The MCA was contesting seats that comprised a high proportion of Malay electors,² whose support for the Barisan Nasional was regarded as relatively certain. The MCA reasoned that with their support and a portion of the Chinese votes, many of its candidates would be returned. What the MCA was seeking was a mandate from the Chinese. Addressing Chinese guilds, clubs and associations in Segamat, Johore Acting MCA President Lee San Choon urged

"We will win, but we want to win with the full support of the Chinese. It is not so good for Tun Razak to say we had won mainly because of the Malay voters. All the Chinese must come out to show full support."³

The MCA leaders continually stressed the need for Chinese participation in government and urged the Chinese to ensure this by electing Chinese candidates from the Barisan Nasional.

The call by the Barisan Nasional's non-Malay based parties, the MCA, the Gerakan, the PPP and the MIC, urging the non-Malay voters to ensure non-Malay participation in the Government, was backed by UMNO leaders, especially the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister's style here was simply to present an ultimatum to the non-Malay population, particularly the Chinese - "Front or Nothing".⁴ Repeatedly throughout the campaign he

"urged all Malaysian Chinese to give their full support to National Front candidates like those from MCA, PPP and Gerakan. If they wanted representatives in the

1 The Straits Times, August 16, 1974.

2 Refer the section on 'Party' Placement of Candidates' in Chapter 4.

3 The Straits Times, August 18, 1974.

4 Star, August 5, 1974.

Government, Tun Razak added, then they would have to vote for those who represented the Front, because the Government would not take people from other parties like the DAP and Pekemas".¹

The message was simple and stressed each day in his campaign speeches

- "We do not accept Chinese from the DAP or Pekemas. We will only accept the Chinese in the National Front."² The Straits Times

editorial of August 12, 1974 entitled "Time to Choose" presented the case succinctly:

"The choice Tun Razak has placed before the non-Malay voter is clear: do you want a Malay Government or a national, multi-racial government? Massive Malay representation in government is guaranteed. All but two of the 47 MPs elected unopposed are drawn from UMNO and PAS, indisputable proof of their strength on the ground. With only Independents standing against them in Kelantan, a clean sweep can be expected. In fact the Front's Malay candidates in the rural constituencies in Peninsular Malaysia are unlikely to loose except in one or two areas. The Prime Minister has made clear he wants a national multi-racial government, not a Malay government. He will not get it and the non-Malay will not get the balanced representation he wants if the National Front's non-Malay candidates are not returned.

Tun Razak has stated again and again that he will not be prepared to take the DAP, Pekemas or Partai Rakyat into the National Front Government. UMNO and PAS on their own will have enough elected MPs to enable him to form a Malay Government. Every seat won by the Opposition parties from the Government's non-Malay candidates will be one seat less for the non-Malays in government."

This message was continually drummed home. The Press, Radio and Television assured that it would be.

To emphasize its challenge to the Gerakan and the PPP, the DAP fielded its Penang State Chairman, Yeap Ghim Guan, against the Gerakan President, Lim Chong Eu, in Tanjong, and its Organising Secretary, Fan Yew Teng, against the PPP President, S.P. Seenivasagam, in Ipoh. The tenor of the campaign was set by the DAP Secretary-General, Lim Kit Siang, when, on the eve of nomination day, he "challenged

1 Ibid.

2 The Straits Times, August 17, 1974. Also The Sunday Times, August 11, 1974.

Dr Tan Chee Koon, Dr Lim Chong Eu and Dato Sri Seenivasagam to stand against him for the Bandar Kuala Lumpur parliamentary seat".¹ He further added "For good measure, let Dato Lee San Choon and Tun Abdul Razak also come along so that the people can have a good choice of party leaders".² The choice of Kuala Lumpur Bandar is significant, it was a constituency with a sitting Pekemas Member of Parliament, Yeoh Teck Chye, but the Chinese comprised 82.65% of the electorate.


Throughout the campaign the DAP adopted an aggressive campaign style, thus appearing the more militant and domineering when compared with the Pekemas. It took the initiative by freely distributing at its meetings and rallies copies of its publication entitled "Coalition politics in Malaysia".³ (Plate 4) The arguments presented in the document were continually developed. It presented the Barisan Nasional as an expedient for principle-lacking, power-hungry politicians to get a share of the spoils, and pointed to the potential grave consequences. The Front, the DAP argued, far from representing a broader base and thus non-Malay participation, was a grand strategy by the Alliance, and in particular UMNO, to impose total Malay hegemony in the country. Once in the Front, the Gerakan and the PPP were bound by the terms of their agreement not to voice any opposition to policies and could be disciplined as 'wreckers' of unity if the need arose. The effects of such developments was, to suppress opposition by absorption, and in the final analysis form the basis for the establishment of a one-party dictatorship. Another fear, the DAP submitted, was in the admission of the PAS to the coalition. The DAP

1 The Malay Mail, August 7, 1974.

2 Ibid.

3 Democratic Action Party, Coalition Politics in Malaysia (undated).

coalition politics in MALAYSIA



20 cents

THE DAP VIEW


Plate 4 Cover of DAP publication 'Coalition Politics in Malaysia'.

speakers pointed out that PAS, long committed to a theocratic Islamic state and hitherto indifferent to the vicissitudes of opposing a Federal Government under the Alliance, would see little attraction in a coalition except for the possibilities that such a coalition would grant towards the ultimate attainment of their objectives. Already PAS, it was claimed, had bargained for, and obtained, control of key government positions and ministries. By contrast, the PPP and the Gerakan were said to have little to show as achievements for the people in joining the Barisan Nasional.

The DAP backed up its campaign with an extensive circulation of a large amount of printed handouts, back issues of its monthly publication 'The Rocket' and political cartoons at its rallies, house-to-house campaigns and street corner hustings. The street corner hustings involved DAP campaigners posting themselves at vantage points along principal streets and engaging groups of three or four people at a time, in discussions.¹ This in itself represented a novel and totally new style of campaigning in Malaysia. These steps, the party deemed necessary, in the face of what the party considered "hostile coverage by the Malaysian Press".² Also distributed were mimeographed copies of its daily press releases, little of which got into the Press. In Penang, a cartoon portraying Lim Chong Eu as hiding within the 'sarong' of the UMNO gained wide distribution. (Plate 5) In Perak, similar cartoons, and in particular one of S.P. Seenivasagam betraying the cause of Justice and Equality as represented by his brother, the late D.R. Seenivasagam, was also freely distributed. Similarly distributed in Perak were photographs of D.R. Seenivasagam with the words "Remember D.R., Vote for the DAP". In Selangor the

1 The Straits Times, August 12, 1974.

2 Personal interview with DAP Organising Secretary, Fan Yew Teng, on August 8, 1974.



Published by the D.A.P., 12 Green Hall, Penang and Printed at The Malayan Press (Pg.) Sdn. Bhd

Plate 5 DAP election cartoon.

DAP published a four-page document entitled Can You Trust this Chap Any More?¹ with a photograph of expelled DAP Vice President, Goh Hock Guan, who was contesting the 1974 election on a Gerakan ticket. The document carried contradictory statements passed by Goh Hock Guan, on Lim Chong Eu and the Gerakan, the Rukunegara, the coalition Government and Lim Keng Yaik - in each case, statements that Goh Hock Guan had issued when he was a DAP member, and statements he had made after he had joined the Gerakan. While the document was directed essentially at discrediting Goh Hock Guan, it did not miss the opportunity to drive home the point on political opportunism by the Gerakan and the PPP in joining the Barisan Nasional. By way of introduction and exemplifying the DAP's vituperative style, the document begins:

"The period between 1969 and 1974 saw many politicians indulging in opportunistic double-think and double-talk. They sold their political principles, pawned their political beliefs and mortgaged their political souls. In short, they literally turned 360 degrees roundabout to betray the interests and aspirations of the people in order to protect and promote their own selfish interests."²

Like the DAP, the Pekemas questioned the validity of coalition governments, and the Barisan Nasional claim that it was an attempt to accommodate non-Malay participation. Dr Tan Chee Koon, Pekemas President, reflected the Pekemas campaign approach when he said:

"It is gratifying to note that Tun Razak has at long last realized that he must have the support of the Chinese in the Government. Hence he has called on the voters to return National Front Chinese candidates. But does Tun Razak really and sincerely want the support of Chinese? Or does he want Chinese puppets whom he can manipulate at will? ... prove by DEEDS and not WORDS that the non-bumiputras in this country have a place under the Malaysian sun.

1 Democratic Action Party, Can You Trust this Chap Any More? 1974. Also by the DAP, Goh Hock Guan: Self-Claimed 'Born Leader' becomes Pathetic Born Follower, (mimeograph) which was distributed at Medan Selera, Petaling Jaya, on August 5, 1974.

2 Democratic Action Party, Can You Trust this Chap Any More, 1974.

Thus what are the job opportunities for non-bumiputras? Will he open the doors of both the police and the armed forces to reflect the racial composition of the country? It is well known that many jobs in the government service and statutory bodies as well have been frozen all because there are no bumiputras to fill them ..."¹

The Pekemas theme for campaigning against the Barisan Nasional was, that the Barisan Nasional represented an attempt to form a one-party state. Dr Tan Chee Koon again set the pace for his colleagues when he declared "If the Front does get the majority, they can do anything with the Constitution ... The National Front has shown that it cannot be entrusted with too much power".² The Pekemas took particular exception to Tun Razak's statement that "The Barisan was determined to see that all Opposition candidates lose their deposits". A strong, viable and healthy Opposition was essential for democracy to flourish, the Pekemas held, failing this, a one-party state leading eventually to dictatorial rule would inevitably result.³ (Plate 6)

With the progress of the campaign the battle for the non-Malay vote assumed a greater intensity and political stunts became a distinct feature. In non-Malay constituencies, the Barisan Nasional candidates began harping upon Tun Razak's visit to China, holding it up as convincing proof of his, and the Barisan Nasional's, genuine interest and concern for Chinese welfare. The trip itself had undoubtedly been so timed to be advantageous at the election hustings. Now Barisan Nasional candidates in non-Malay majority constituencies, began distributing photographs of Tun Razak shaking hands with Chairman Mao Tse Tung. The photograph was in many cases printed on the polling card sent out by candidates informing individual electors of their polling

1 Dr Tan Chee Koon, Pekemas President at a public rally in Kepong constituency, on August , 1974.

2 The Sunday Times, August 11, 1974.

3 The Malay Mail, August 13, 1974.



PEKEMAS

馬來西亞社會正義黨

மலேசிய சமூக நீதிக் கட்சி



THE ALLIANCE BIG—WIG PROUDLY PRESENTS HIS FOUR WIVES.

Published By Dr. Tan Chee Khoo for Parti Keadilan Masyarakat Malaysia, 316 Jalan Tuanku Abdul Rahman, Kuala Lumpur.
And Printed By Syarikat Chip Seng Trading Sdn. Bhd. Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

station and registration number. (Plate 7) Other candidates, included it in the handout alongside their personal bio-data, public service and the like. So widely was this distributed that it provoked Fan Yew Teng, the DAP's Organising Secretary and candidate for Menglembu, to declare "It appears that the DAP is contesting Mao Tse Tung and not the Barisan".¹

The DAP, for its part, was not to be outdone and posters reading "Vote for a Malaysian Malaysia. Vote for the Rocket" and yet others reading "The dacing²/Scales of justice⁷ destroys Chinese education; the Rocket protects Chinese culture - determine to oppose the dacing" (Plate 8) were plastered all over the predominantly Chinese constituencies. It is to be noted, that the election manifesto and other earlier publications for the 1974 election had avoided using the term 'Malaysian Malaysia' - the term being held by the authorities as causing communal antagonisms during the 1969 election. The Government reacted strongly to the posters and ordered them to be removed. The Acting Inspector General of Police (IGP), Encik Haniff Omar, held that a ruling had been obtained from the Attorney-General's chambers that there was sufficient evidence to warrant investigation under the Sedition Act, and instructed the DAP, to remove the posters within two days. The Acting IGP stated that the Police saw the posters put up by the parties and candidates, and taped their speeches for evidence of infringement of the Sedition Act as well as for blatant racialism and extremism.³ The DAP ignored the Acting IGP's orders and the police attempted to remove the posters, but throughout the campaign period the posters made their appearance. The incident

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- 1 Fan Yew Teng at a public rally in Menglembu on August 20, 1974.
 - 2 The Barisan Nasional's symbol is a golden scales of justice on a blue background.
 - 3 The Straits Times, August 16, 1974.


UNDI-LAH CALUN BARISAN NASIONAL

！歲萬誼友民人中馬



！交建中馬持支是就，票一人選候陣國投

(下撕線此沿請)



Nama: 姓名.....

Alamat: 地址.....

KOD No:

K/P:

Diterbitkan oleh Ibu Pejabat MCA, 67, Jalan Ampang, Kuala Lumpur,
dan dicetak oleh Malayan Thung Pau Daily News Berhad, 40, Jalan Lima, Off Jalan Chan Sow Lin, K. L.



Plate 8 DAP election poster.

Translation: The dacing destroys Chinese education,
 the rocket protects Chinese culture ...
 determine to oppose the dacing;
 the dacing changes the character of Chinese schools.

The Dacing (scales of justice) is the Barisan Nasional party symbol;
 that of the DAP is the rocket.

provided the Barisan Nasional's component parties with the opportunity for a fresh onslaught on the DAP on grounds of racialism, communalism and Chinese chauvinism. Prime Minister Tun Razak himself took the lead accusing the DAP of "irresponsible campaign" which could cause an eruption of sentiments and affect national security.¹ The UMNO and the MCA candidates reminded the public that the "tactics were similar to those used by elements responsible for arousing communal hatred and dissension during and after the 1969 election".² The Straits Times editorial of August 20, 1974 stated the Barisan Nasional's position:

"Do they know what they are doing these abrasive young men who seem prepared to gamble with the nation's life for a handful of seats? ... If the DAP can write on their posters the most crass appeals to chauvinist emotion, to what lengths are its men on the ground going - those who are moving from house to house, whispering from mouth to ear?"

Indeed, to what extents were the DAP men going? Why, for that matter to what length were the Barisan Nasional men, the Pekemas men and those from each of the parties going? If anything, the editorial was a sad commentary on the difficulty of supervising a campaign to ward off communal appeals. The DAP, however, appeared content for the rare publicity it received for one of its many initiatives.

The DAP and Pekemas for their part did not let up in their own scathing attacks on each other, both accusing the other of negotiating for a place in the Barisan Nasional and each denying that it itself had. The DAP took the offensive even at the outset and maintained the tempo throughout, never missing any opportunity for a broadside at the Pekemas. Pekemas leaders were accused of having connived with the Alliance in voting for the Constitution Amendment Act 1971, and this, it was held, made a sham of the Pekemas call on the people to vote for the

1 The Malay Mail, August 15, 1974.

2 Ibid.

party's candidates to deny the Barisan Nasional its two-thirds majority. Pekemas leaders were also accused of being political opportunists who fought each election on a different party ticket - a reference to the Pekemas leaders first having been in the Labour Party, and then helped to form the Gerakan, and again, on expulsion from the latter, having formed the Pekemas. The keenness expressed by the Pekemas to have a United Opposition Front with the DAP even in the eleventh hour, made its objections about the DAP appear rather hollow. The DAP leaders for their part, had carefully prepared the electorate by having continuously presented the failure of their talks with the Pekemas as a consequence of the lack of sincerity on the part of Pekemas leaders.

The DAP entered the campaign distinctly better organized than the Pekemas. The DAP, as a party in existence for no less than eight years, had a better and tighter ground level organization than the Pekemas which had been formed only two years prior to the election. The Pekemas had moved fast and in the two years had established numerous branches.¹ This in itself may be an impressive feat, but when the time came for these branches to present the campaign workers they were found wanting. Pekemas Treasurer, V. Veerapan, explained:

"What's the difficulty in opening branches, just catch a dozen fellows to be office bearers and register the branch. These fellows must be sufficiently interested to mobilise support. Anyway it takes time to gather support in an area and our branches were all new."²

The DAP allocated its national level leadership between the various states it was contesting, and these leaders each maintained a well co-ordinated organization throughout the campaign period. In Penang, the organization was headed by Yeap Ghim Guan, and Ex-Co member,

1 Refer Chapter 4, the section on political party branches.

2 Personal interview with Pekemas Treasurer, V. Veerapan, August 10, 1974.

Peter Dason; in Perak, by Organising Secretary, Fan Yew Teng, and Deputy Secretary, Lim Cho Hock; in the Federal Territory and in Selangor, by Publicity Officer, Lee Lam Thye; in Negri Sembilan, by President, Chen Man Hin, and Treasurer, Seevaratnam; and in Malacca by Bernard Sta Maria. Secretary General, Lim Kit Siang, maintained a firm supervisory control over all these state level organizations.¹ Detailed preparations had been undertaken months earlier. Bernard Sta Maria explained the type of organization that had been attempted

"The DAP in Malacca has been extremely well organized. We have maintained an office functioning for the past five years with paid staff. The people actually maintained it. Each year we go round collecting funds and have no problem collecting at least M\$ 2,000. It is a good psychological ally. It gives them a stake in the whole thing and they feel they must see the DAP win.

Previously it used to cost us between M\$ 100 and M\$ 200 per rally. Then, we got our own public address system and our own van. We erected our own platform on the van by building brackets, etc. Now it only costs us about M\$ 10 to M\$ 20 per rally. This gave us a good opportunity to train our speakers and candidates. Even four months before nomination day we started having rallies - as many as four per week. We started in the areas where we were not fielding candidates. Soon the candidates lost their stage fright and became eloquent. Then we moved into the areas we were contesting."²

The DAP leaders made a systematic effort to present their party as more militant, distinctly outspoken and fearless, and better organized. Much of this was conveyed in the campaign speeches and even the manner in which DAP candidates conducted themselves during the campaign period. For instance, all DAP candidates dressed in white and had short haircuts - one senior member of the party who had not done so, is said to have been given a stern telling-off by the party's Secretary General, Lim Kit Siang. Perhaps such uniformity is unimportant in the search for votes, but it is reflective of the effort and type of image that the

1 Personal interview with DAP Organising Secretary, Fan Yew Teng, August 8, 1974.

2 Personal interview with Bernard Sta Maria, August 20, 1974.

DAP attempted to convey. The Pekemas by comparison conducted a less organized campaign. Its party leaders were confined to the Federal Territory and Penang where they were each defending seats, victory in which was considered tenuous. Thus excluding those in Penang, the Federal Territory and Selangor, the Pekemas candidates were left very much to their own resources. Desperate attempts by some of the candidates to get national level leaders to speak at their rallies failed.

The Partai Rakyat also fielded candidates in non-Malay majority constituencies in Penang, Melaka and Pahang. The party's campaign was essentially on a non-communal socialist platform, but in view of the dominance of the Barisan Nasional-DAP-Pekemas battle, the Partai Rakyat received scant attention as a party that could mobilise non-Malay support. Pekemas treasurer, V. Veerapan, summed up the attitude of the other parties when he held, "The Partai Rakyat's support is very small but hardcore. They can convert few of ours and we can convert none of theirs".¹ The statement is a reflection of the gulf that exists between the Partai Rakyat and the other parties in terms of their approach to Malaysian politics. The Barisan Nasional, however, was delighted by the Partai Rakyat's participation in the non-Malay areas, reasoning that it would aid in further splitting the opposition vote.

The Battle for the Malay Votes

The Malay vote has traditionally been successfully contested by only the UMNO and the PAS. In some areas, other parties have managed to woo the Malay vote with limited success - notably the Partai Rakyat, and in the 1969 election the Gerakan. The formation of the Barisan

1 At a personal interview on August 10, 1974.

Nasional meant that excepting Partai Rakyat there was no Malay-based opposition party. Not surprisingly, therefore, thirty of the Barisan Nasional's seventy-five Malay candidates (seventy-four of whom were placed in Malay majority constituencies) were returned unopposed. Though in places the Barisan Nasional's Malay candidates were being contested by the DAP and the Pekemas, serious challenge for the Malay votes came from only the Partai Rakyat and the Malay Independents, the latter comprising essentially the UMNO and PAS dissidents who had been unable to obtain nomination via the UMNO or the PAS. In Kelantan, the dissidents quickly grouped together into the Bebas Bersatu (the United Independent Front), issued a ten-point manifesto¹, utilized a common symbol², and gave a semblance of organized and co-ordinated challenge. For the main part, the rest of the Independents lacked any organization or common policy and their challenge for the Malay votes proved nominal.

Many of the Independents cut a pathetic image and their only grouse against the Barisan Nasional remained that they had been denied nomination. In the event they hoped to stand as Independents and, should they prove successful, regain entry into the Barisan Nasional. The internal rivalry that occurred in many localities between the UMNO and the PAS officials, allowed for claims that the Independents were indeed being sponsored by either the UMNO, or the PAS leaders, in an attempt to weaken the position of the other, in a newly elected Barisan Nasional government. In Johore, Encik Mohammed bin Kassim (Batu Pahat) and Haji Abdul Hadi bin Mohammad Yassin (Semerah), both

1 Calun-calun Bebas Bersatu, Kelantan, 10 Garis Kasar dan Analisa, Manifesto Pilihanraya 1974, Bebas Bersatu, Kelantan, 1974.

2 All eight parliamentary candidates of the Bebas Bersatu utilised a white bus on a green background as their symbol.

PAS members, claimed that they were permitted to stand as Independents against Barisan Nasional candidates.¹ In several other instances, the rumour was effectively passed around and UMNO and PAS leaders found themselves in the embarrassing position of denying that they were indeed privately sponsoring independent candidates. In Selangor, the UMNO Youth President and Chief Minister, Dato Harun Idris, had to issue a press release denying such claims by some Independents.² The Barisan Nasional reacted to this challenge by expelling all party members who stood as Independents and those who supported them. Thus, twelve UMNO members were expelled in Sabak Bernam for having nominated UMNO dissident Datuk Taiban Hassan (Sabak Bernam) and two other candidates for the state election.³ Similarly, in Malacca, Haji Maidin bin Haji Manap, former Deputy-Chairman of the Bandar Melaka UMNO Division, who was contesting the Batu Berendam parliamentary constituency, and two other candidates contesting the state election were expelled.⁴ In Penang, UMNO's Sungei Tiram branch Chairman, Encik Suhaimi bin Ismail, was similarly expelled for contesting the Bayan Lepas state constituency.⁵ In Perlis, eight independent candidates for parliamentary and state seats, and forty of those who had supported their nomination, were similarly expelled.⁶ In Trengganu, UMNO's former Speaker of the Trengganu State Assembly, Datuk Abdul Rahman bin Long, was expelled for contesting the Kuala Nerus parliamentary constituency.⁷ The spate of expulsions continued and

1 Star, August 13, 1974.

2 The Straits Times, August 16, 1974.

3 Utusan Malaysia, August 12, 1974.

4 The Straits Times, August 12, 1974.

5 Ibid.

6 Star, August 10, 1974.

7 The Malay Mail, August 9, 1974.

greatly demoralized the independent candidates. In Kelantan, Tengku Razaleigh, who presided over the Barisan Nasional's election machinery made the message clear, "We will not only expel them, we will take away whatever privileges they enjoyed as party leaders and members"¹ and a party aide explained:

"We know them all - those who have licences as wholesale rice dealers, those who have taxi-permits, even those who have permits to keep shot guns and pistols. Poor chaps, they will not only lose their deposits but they might even lose their Mercedes Benzes."²

Such a move by the Barisan Nasional led to a progressive lowering of dissident morale and some even gave up their candidature and returned to their own parties.³

The Barisan Nasional, however, had to face a tougher challenge from the Bebas Bersatu in Kelantan than it had from the dissidents elsewhere, though even here, the battle appeared by all counts to be low-key - low-key by comparison with the battle for the non-Malay votes, and more so, by comparison with the previous engagements between the UMNO and the PAS. Lacking was the tension, the ugly bloody incidents between rival factions, groups of men, some armed, squatting around party arches, fights, kidnappings, stabbing incidents and buffaloes slashed in the padi-fields, that long marked Kelantan political campaigns - "there were no thugs brought from Patani" explained a party aide.⁴

1 The Straits Times, August 20, 1974.

2 Ibid.

3 For example, Ahmad bin Abdullah Manaf, who was earlier nominated as an independent candidate for the Mantin parliamentary seat, withdrew in favour of the Barisan Nasional candidate. The Straits Times, August 19, 1974.

4 Patani is a province of Thailand adjoining Kelantan state and is principally Malay in ethnic composition. The Straits Times, August 20, 1974.

During the 1969 election campaign between 600 and 700 reports were made to the police ranging from fist fights to armed attacks and assaults. The 1974 campaign saw no such activity, there being by August 16 only one report.¹ Even public rallies were few and these were virtually all organized by the Barisan Nasional. Kelantan in 1974 had by all previous standards a very quiet election campaign. This was a reflection of the state of the competing groups, their respective financial and manpower resources and the inability of the Bebas Bersatu to muster sufficient enthusiasm or raise burning issues that would excite the Kelantanese Malays' fervour. The reasons for this go back to the very organization and development of the Bebas Bersatu itself.

The Bebas Bersatu was a hurriedly formed grouping of individuals, led by the dissident PAS Youth Leader, Encik Fakhruddin bin Abdullah, who had served as the PAS Member of Parliament for Pasir Mas. The nucleus of the group was the Golongan Revolusi (Revolutionary Group), a group of PAS dissidents who in March 1974 demanded the resignation of the PAS Kelantan State Chief Minister, Datuk Ishak Lutfi. The Bebas Bersatu emphasized its Islamic leanings and campaigned for a "clean, honest and efficient government". The writer interviewed Encik Fakhruddin at his residence in Pasir Mas. The principal issue, he claimed, was the PAS's un-Islamic conduct by way of corruption, nepotism and, generally, the neglect of the poor. His group, he said, intended to "cleanse the government of corruption and nepotism of Asri and Ishak Lutfi."²

1 The Straits Times, August 17, 1974.

2 Personal interview with Encik Muhammad Fakhruddin, leader of the Bebas Bersatu, on August 23, 1974.

Pamphlets attacking the Mentri Besar and the State Economic Development Corporation, which had been earlier circulated by the Golongan Revolusi, were given even wider circulation by the Bebas Bersatu. Encik Fakhruddin himself gave the writer copies of it. One of the pamphlets alleged that the State Government had since 1959 sold a total of 1,186,703 acres of timber land, to principally Chinese companies, for a pittance. Included for circulation with the pamphlet were photostat copies of a purported agreement made on January 15, 1970 between the Kelantan State Development Corporation and two Chinese of Sharikat Kayuan Gunong Tahan of Temerloh, Pahang, and, a photostat copy of a Chartered Bank, Kuala Lumpur cheque dated January 27, 1970 to the value of M\$ 140,000 allegedly made out by this Gunong Tahan Enterprise to PAS State Ex Co member, Dato Nik Man bin Nik Mat, for arranging the timber concession. The pamphlet minced no words and linked the alleged corruption to the PAS President Dato Asri himself:

"Dato Nik Man who is in the Kelantan EXCO, was at one time the Timber Chairman in Asri's Government. In political terms Asri and Nik Man are Siamese twins. No surgeon would be able to separate them for they have a common lung, moreover if Nik Man were to eat, Asri would also feel satiated. Asri ... as Chairman of the SEDC gives away the timber entrusted to him by the EXCO and the people of Kelantan, amount by amount, to the timber 'towkays' who are willing to bribe him and his hangers on."¹

1 The original text in the Malay language reads:

"Ada pun Dato Nik Man in Exco Kelantan, pernah menjadi Pengerusi Balak dalam Kerajaan Asri. Maka dalam bahasa politi pula Asri dan Nik Man adalah KEYBAR SIAM. Ta'ada doctor bedah yang sanggup memisahkannya kerana mereka mempunyai Lanya satu jantung, tambahan pula kалан Nik Man makan Asri juga merasa kenyang.

Asri ... sebagai Pengerusi SEDC, beliau meyerahkan Balak yang di amakah deh EXCO dan Rakyat negeri Kelantan, banyak demi banyak kepada taukeh balak yang sanggup memberi ganjaran kepadanya dan juga kepada kuncu-kuncunya."

Golongan Revolusi, Siri Sastera Revolusi, Bil. 30, dated June 6, 1974. (Copy with this writer.)

Religion has always played a significant role in Kelantan and indeed Malay politics, and the ulamas (theologians), imams (leader of the congregation), penghulus (headmen) and bilals (persons in charge of the mosque) who are on the State Government's payroll had in the past campaigned for the PAS; but such support for the Bebas Bersatu - at least overt support - was not forthcoming. Even though the bulk of these religious leaders may have felt that the PAS should not have gone into the coalition, their own positions as servants of the State Government did not make them take the risks of going against the PAS. In any case, such risks appeared unwarranted because the Bebas Bersatu did not pose as an ideological alternative to the PAS, and its formation, though causing interest, presented no rallying point or burning issue for the cause of the religious leaders. Indeed the Bebas Bersatu leaders left the door open for their own participation in the coalition Barisan Nasional. Encik Fakhruddin himself conceded that several of the Bebas Bersatu candidates would join UMNO should they win the election and be accepted by UMNO.¹ In the face of such a lack of commitment on the part of the Bebas Bersatu candidates, their claim to "uplift and defend Islam as the official religion of the nation"² served little to ascertain the support of the religious leaders. The PAS and UMNO leaders for their part, made certain that the religious leaders would stay in line, and a directive was issued by the Mentri Besar to these leaders warning them against participation in the political campaign.³ The Bebas Bersatu, eager to represent the PAS as having betrayed the cause of Islam, retaliated by distributing

1 At the personal interview on August 23, 1974.

2 Calun-calun Bebas Bersatu, Kelantan, 10 Garis Kasar dan Analisa, Manifesto Pilihanraya 1974, Bebas Bersatu, Kelantan, 1974.

3 The Straits Times, August 20, 1974.

photographs of the PAS Mentri Besar of Kelantan allegedly performing the opening ceremony of a Chinese temple. (Plate 9)

The Bebas Bersatu's campaign was seriously handicapped by its lack of organization and financial resources. The group was not even registered as a party, and there existed no branches whose services the group could rely on. Encik Fakhruddin's residence itself served as the headquarters for the campaign. Posters were few, there were insufficient copies of the manifesto, and campaign workers could not be paid. Its campaign was devoid of the drive, consistency, and the stamina of a political party for it to be contended as a potent force. The difficulties faced, particularly the lack of financial resources, were to an extent overcome by holding a large number of majlis ceramah (dialogue sessions). The majlis ceramah, is a particularly adept form of campaigning in the essentially Malay rural areas, and Kelantanese innovativeness has developed this into an especially sophisticated campaign style. The majlis ceramah spearheads the penetration of a village. The sponsors are either party stalwarts or sympathisers who live in the village, and their role is essentially to organize the majlis ceramah and invite their friends, who often turn up for reasons of politeness, or a sense of neighbourliness. The numbers at such majlis ceramah range from between twenty to one hundred, or even more persons. The organizer introduces the campaigner who then begins a speech and then a dialogue with those present. The majlis ceramah are normally held at night after 'Isha' (the evening prayers) and can last well nigh into the early hours of the morning. The short campaign period, and the absence of resources for mass rallies, meant that numerous majlis ceramah had to be arranged for the same day. The writer persuaded Encik Fakhruddin to let him attend one of these and he agreed. This majlis ceramah was held after the noon prayers (Sembahyang Jumaat) on Friday, August 23, 1974, two miles from



Plate 9



Photographs distributed by the Bebas Bersatu in Kelantan.

- 'PAS Chief Minister of Kelantan performing the opening ceremony of a Chinese temple'.



Pasir Mas on the way to Lubok Tong, at the home of a Bebas Bersatu sympathiser. The room used was approximately twenty feet by twenty feet in size, with split bamboo walls roughly painted over with aluminium paint and an attap roof. The floor was merely beaten earth and rough wooden benches covered with newspaper sufficed for the seating. The audience comprising predominantly of aged males and numbering between sixty and seventy, was soon spilling over into the adjoining rooms. We were served tea, and the campaigner, a Malay school teacher, was introduced by the host. The campaigner explained how the PAS had always been an Islamic party, but now Datuk Asri and his cronies had betrayed the cause of Islam. As proof was held out the green flag with a crescent on it, which had long been the PAS symbol, and the Barisan Nasional's blue and gold colours. Photos of the Kelantan Mentri Besar inaugurating a Chinese temple were distributed. Then an emotional attack on Harami (illegitimate ones) and Kaffir (non-believer) followed. The Harami and Kaffirs were being allowed to exploit the poor Muslims, said the speaker. Here the sale of timber land to non-Malay companies provided a convenient example. Nepotism and lack of land for the poor were all masterfully woven into the theme of the PAS corruption and betrayal of the Islamic faith. Bebas Bersatu supporters had mingled with the crowd and interrupted with approving interjections. Soon the audience was nodding in approval, and the rapport was established for an effective majlis ceramah - the strained and formal atmosphere gave way to an intimate dialogue between the campaigner and the audience. A marked characteristic of this majlis ceramah, and indeed the Bebas Bersatu campaign as a whole, was that UMNO and the concept of the Barisan Nasional underwent little criticism, much of the invective being directed at the PAS. In Encik Fakhruddin's own words, the campaign was "one shot at UMNO, three shots at PAS".¹

1 At the personal interview on August 23, 1974.

The PAS and the UMNO, however, did not regard the challenge of the Bebas Bersatu lightly. For the PAS leaders, the battle presented the opportunity to nip in the bud the opposition to PAS supremacy. Any victory by the Bebas Bersatu candidates could mean the thin end of a wedge that could cut right through the PAS organization and support. Accordingly, the Barisan Nasional waged a determined and carefully planned campaign. Massive amounts of literature, posters and banners were distributed - the Barisan Nasional posters for Kelantan (twelve constituencies with 311,608 electors) weighed seventeen tons; the UMNO candidates in the state alone were allotted 4,000 full time election workers.¹ The Barisan Nasional headquarters in Kota Bharu, manned round the clock with the PAS and the UMNO officials, bustled with activity. Co-ordination Committees for all constituencies, polling districts and polling centres right down to the village level were effective.

The PAS and the UMNO leaders presented the union of the two parties as the ultimate unity of the Malay people. Tengku Razaleigh told a political rally "we were fighting bitterly against each other once, but now we have formed a common front".² The PAS leader, Datuk Asri declared that Malay unity was the political force that should be galvanised to form the backbone of Malaysian unity - "This is a great development, a phenomenon that will not possibly occur again in a thousand years".³ To the Kelantanese, long divided by UMNO and PAS conflicts, the appeal was best presented as the time for peace and unity:

1 The Straits Times, August 20, 1974.

2 The Straits Times, August 14, 1974.

3 The Straits Times, August 19, 1974.

"Remember how bitterly we fought each other since 1959? We not only fought with our 'lidah' [tongues] but some of us fought with our fists and our 'kapak kecil' [small axes]. Brother fought against brother; father against son; families became estranged and disrupted. Husbands lost their wives. Villages became split into bitter opposing camps. Our ulamas gave conflicting fatwas [declarations] because they represented different political factions. You were either a 'kafir' or you were not.

Now we are united, we have healed our wounds. We can have our kenduris [feasts] together. No man need fear being boycotted or ostracised by his neighbour just because he is a PAS man or an UMNO man."¹

Malay unity, and with it an assurance of political supremacy - the call was music to the Kelantanese ear.

The Barisan Nasional's challenge for the Malay vote in Trengganu and Pahang came essentially from the Partai Rakyat. In Trengganu the Partai Rakyat was contesting six of the seven parliamentary seats, and it was here that the principal party leaders were seeking election - President, Kassim bin Ahmad, Vice President, Datuk Kampo Radjo and Secretary-General, Satar bin Haji Dahan. The party was also making a concerted effort to capture the Trengganu State Government. It explained the choice of Trengganu for its emphasis as being because Trengganu was "the most neglected and the most exploited state in Peninsular Malaysia".² In adjoining Pahang, the party contested four of the eight parliamentary seats besides attempting to emerge as the principal opposition party in the State Assembly.

The challenge of the Partai Rakyat had always posed an enigma to the Alliance, and so it did in the 1974 election to the Barisan Nasional. To brand the party as communal, as was conveniently done in the case of the DAP and to a lesser degree the Pekemas, was impossible - the leadership was essentially Malay, but, unlike the other opposition parties, the Partai Rakyat contested in both Malay

1 The Straits Times, August 20, 1974.

2 The Sunday Times, August 11, 1974.

and non-Malay areas. More importantly, the party campaigned on an essentially non-communal platform, paying scant regard to the issues that have tended to divide Malaysian society along communal lines. Lacking in its printed literature, press releases and campaign speeches was any exploitation of the communal issue. Even in issuing a special manifesto for the Trengganu State Assembly election, the party declared, that it aimed at raising the standard of living of the people "irrespective of race".¹ An appeal on the grounds that it was to raise the standard of living of the Malay people would have been more effective in Trengganu, where Malays comprise 94.11% of the electorate. Alternatively, for the Barisan Nasional to brand the party as comprising frustrated individuals who had deserted the PAS and the UMNO on failing to be nominated as candidates for the election, as was done in the case of the Independents and the Bebas Bersatu, was again impossible. Undoubtedly, the Partai Rakyat leaders have formed a band, though small, of individuals who have shown consistent loyalty and dedication to their chosen cause. The party's National Treasurer claimed that he could have stood on an UMNO ticket in any constituency he chose, if he had agreed to join UMNO.² Like many of Partai Rakyat's national level leaders, he certainly had all the necessary qualifications to recommend him as a candidate.

Perhaps what ⁱerked the Barisan Nasional most was the disdain shown its formation by the Partai Rakyat leaders. All other political parties had allowed the formation of the Barisan Nasional and its implications for Malaysian society to become the main issue in the campaign. The Partai Rakyat, however, treated the formation of the Barisan Nasional with relatively little concern, regarding it merely as

1 The Star, August 11, 1974.

2 Utusan Malaysia, August 13, 1974.

an enlarged Alliance that had been hurriedly put together, because the Alliance had lost its credibility by the election reverses in 1969 and the pursuant communal violence. The party explained:

"What is the National Front? It is an enlarged Alliance; an association of bourgeois parties that are bankrupt but still power mad, and a group of opportunists who use the nationalist and Islamic slogan to deceive the people. Why do we regard it as a large Alliance? Because its basis is that of the Alliance. Why do we regard it as bankrupt? Because they are trying to sell goods that are no longer saleable with the use of new wrappings. Why do we regard them as opportunistic? Because they are willing to cheat and oppress the people in order to perpetuate their power. If the Alliance was destroyed by the racial riots of the 13th of May, the fate of the Barisan Nasional will certainly be no better than that!"¹

The principal issue as far as the Partai Rakyat was concerned was the neglect of the masses, the exploitation of the poor by the rich. In keeping with its socialist programme, the party called for 'land to all farmers', permanent land grants to those having temporary ones, the sponsoring of co-operative projects for fishermen, the reduction of fees for hawker licences and the nationalization of industries, businesses and banks owned by foreigners.² Corruption and nepotism

1 The original text in the Malay language read as follows:

"Apa dia Barisan Nasional? Barisan Nasional ia lah Perikatan yang di-perbesarkan, satu gabungan partai, borjuis yang sudah bangkerap tetapi yang tamakkan kuasa, satu pakatan oportunist yang menggunakan selogan: nasionalis dan Islam untuk mengabus mata rakyat. Mengapa kita sifatkan dia sebagai Perikatan besar? Kerana dasarnya dasar Perikatan. Mengapa bankerap? Kerana mereka cuba menjual barang, lama yang sudah tidak laku dengan menggunakan bungkus baru. Mengapa oportunist? Kerana mereka sanggup menipu dan menekan rakyat untuk mengekalkan kuasa mereka. Kalau Perikatan telah dihancurkan didalam kencana rusuhan perkauman Mei 13, nasib yang menanti Barisan Nasional tentu tidak lebih baik dari itu!"

Party President, Kassim Ahmad's speech to party cadres of the Kedah-Perlis division of the Partai Rakyat on July 12, 1974. Mimeographed copy of the text of the speech with this writer.

2 The Star, August 11, 1974.

in government circles was given special emphasis. In Johore, its lone parliamentary candidate Encik Abdul Razak (Pulai constituency) alleged unfair distribution of land by the State Government and demanded the release of a report completed in 1968 by the Raja Azlan Inquiry Commission into allegations of maladministration, malpractices and breach of law committed by the Johore Baru Town Council.¹ In Pahang, the party's candidate for the Kuantan parliamentary constituency, Siva Subramaniam, distributed photostat copies of documents to prove that relatives of high government officials received grants of land within two months of application for them - "the rakyat" (people) he claimed "have to wait for seventeen years. We want to show to the Malays that what is being done for them has benefitted only a handful of rich Malays".² Only a socialist government with socialist policies can cure Malaysia's ills was the message the party hoped to drive home in all the campaigns.

The Barisan Nasional's rebuttal to such challenges was essentially to highlight its own achievements in the field of economic development, and then, to ridicule Partai Rakyat's policies. The Malaysian Government's interest in foreign investment was to effect a transfer of technology and train the local people, explained the Barisan Nasional's Kelantan and Trengganu election chief, Tengku Razaleigh.³ He was rebutting the Partai Rakyat's charges, that foreign capitalists dominated the rubber, tin, palm oil and modern industries sector, and that, whilst 100,000 farmers were landless, foreigners owned more than 1.3 million acres.⁴ Tengku Razaleigh

1 Utusan Malaysia, August 13, 1974.

2 The Straits Times, August 12, 1974.

3 The Straits Times, August 19, 1974.

4 The Straits Echo, August 12, 1974.

held that the Partai Rakyat's method of "robbing the rich to help the poor" would not benefit anybody as "the rich will become poor and the poor become poorer".¹ Encik Khir Johari, a former Minister in the Federal cabinet, who had been returned unopposed, typified the Barisan Nasional's response to the Partai Rakyat's call for a socialist programme, when he declared:

"It means we have to stop buying tractors and instead supply our farmers with changkuls /hoes/, take back all the buffaloes and put them into a common pool so that everyone can use them in turn, stop giving loans to people who want to buy their own land or houses, withdraw all our bank notes and issue coupons for food, clothing and other goods."²

More damaging to the Partai Rakyat, were the attempts made by the Barisan Nasional to present the Partai Rakyat's socialist policies as being anti-Islamic. To the despair of the Partai Rakyat's candidates, copies of a poem written by party President Kassim Ahmad years earlier, entitled 'Sidang Ruh' (Meeting of the Souls) attained wide circulation. The last four lines of the poem were presented as conclusive evidence of Kassim Ahmad's and the Partai Rakyat's atheist and anti-Islamic beliefs. The said lines read:

"nanti akan padamlah dengan sendirinya
lampu dari menara tinggi
karena dibawahnya orang kian mabuk
dan Tuhan sudah mati."

/the torch from the high minaret
shall die by itself
because beneath it so many are drunk
and God is dead/ ³

The party had in previous elections too been seriously handicapped by its opponents imposing on it an anti-Islam label, and so, Kassim Ahmad attempted to dispel such an image at the onset of the election

1 The Straits Times, August 19, 1974.

2 The Star, August 18, 1974.

3 The original text is in the Malay language.

campaign:

"Is our party against religion as it is claimed by our enemies? No. Our party guarantees the freedom of religion for all peoples. Is our party against Islam as the national religion? I feel that in principle, no. Islam is in my opinion, a religion that advocates good and is against evil as well as having the intention of freeing mankind from nonsensical beliefs and from placing man in the position of Caliph on this earth. This also is the root of the socialist struggle. As such in our country the socialist struggle is compatible to the teachings of Islam."¹

To the academic this may have been mentally satisfactory, but to the lay Malay it was tantamount to equivocating with his basic belief.

It is difficult to assess the exact extent of the damage that the anti-Islam label did, except to note that the Malay is intimately linked to Islam for its perceived spiritual and temporal implications.

No aspect of his domestic, economic, social and political life is conducted outside the framework of such beliefs. The Malaysian rural scene may have changed, but the way of life of its people has barely been scratched; traditional values still play an overwhelming role in the outlook and thinking of the peasants. Thus, in the predominantly rural and Malay world of Trengganu, where Partai Rakyat's main challenge to the Barisan Nasional came, the effect of an anti-Islam label could not be anything but damaging.

To emphasize that Partai Rakyat's ideology was indeed anti-Islam and alien, the Barisan Nasional stated that funds from foreign sources

1 The original text in the Malay language reads as follows:

"Adakah Partai kita menentang agama, seperti yang ditohmahkan oleh musuh kita? Tidak. Partai kita menjaminkan kebebasan beragama bagi semua penduduk. Adakah Partai kita menentang Islam sebagai agama negara? Saya fikir, pada prinsipnya, tidak juga. Islam pada pendapat saya, adalah satu agama yang menyeru kepada kebaikan dan melarang kejahatan serta bertujuan membebaskan manusia dari segala kepercayaan karut dan mendaulatkan manusia sebagai khalifah di-dunia ini. Ini juga adalah tujuan pokok perjuangan sosialis. Dengan demikian, di negeri kita, perjuangan sosialis adalah sejar dengan ajaran Islam."

Party President, Kassim bin Ahmad's speech to party cadres of the Kedah-Perlis division of the Partai Rakyat on July 12, 1974. Mimeographed copy of the text of the speech with this writer.

were filling Partai Rakyat's coffers. The Partai Rakyat of course denied these charges, claiming that it was "only spending between M\$ 2,000 and M\$ 3,000 on each parliamentary candidate, and that includes the deposit of each candidate".¹ The party attempted to overcome its difficulties by a thorough house-to-house campaign, between 500 and 600 workers, almost all volunteers, were deployed to each of the parliamentary constituencies it was contesting in Trengganu. This house to house campaign was backed up by seventy-nine public rallies and hundreds of majlis ceramah.² A measure of support came from university students, who had travelled from their campuses in Kuala Lumpur and Penang, to assist in the campaign. The support lent the Partai Rakyat by university students provoked the ire of Barisan Nasional members. UMNO Supreme Council member Mahathir Mohammad declared:

"Students should be grateful to the government for the thousands of dollars spent on them each year. They should concentrate on their studies and not get involved in politics."³

The DAP and the Pekemas, too, fielded candidates in the Malay-majority constituencies and would have welcomed Malay support. But their image as principally non-Malay parties handicapped them. Their search for the non-Malay vote, especially as the campaign progressed, was marked by an increasingly communal appeal, thus reinforcing the Malay voters' fears. The DAP and the Pekemas were also greatly embarrassed by the withdrawal of some of their Malay candidates from the State Assembly elections being held at the same time. In Johore, the DAP's candidate for the Buloh Kasap State Assembly seat⁴, and in

1 The Sunday Times, August 11, 1974.

2 Ibid.

3 The Straits Times, August 19, 1974.

4 The Straits Times, August 14, 1974.

Negri Sembilan¹, its candidates for the Jempol State seat, withdrew from the election and urged the electors to vote for the Barisan Nasional. In Selangor, the Pekemas candidate for the Panglima Garang State Assembly seat, similarly withdrew, again urging the electors to give "full support and co-operation to the National Front for the sake of unity, peace and prosperity".² The withdrawal of these Malay candidates, and the publicity afforded them through the mass media, served to emphasize still further the DAP and Pekemas non-Malay image. The PAS and the UMNO, for their part, ensured this by stressing this point during their own campaigns in the Malay areas. The lack of any serious campaign by the DAP and the Pekemas in the Malay areas greatly aided the Barisan Nasional's cause.

Conclusion

The campaign ended with the usual flurry of activity and all parties held their last rallies on August 22, 1974, the police refusing permits for public rallies to be held during the twenty-four hours preceding polling. Other forms of campaigning, the ban on which are less readily supervised, continued, and house-to-house campaigns and majlis ceramah were held well into the early hours of polling day. Then the battle for the votes was over. The politicians and political parties had done their share in a campaign, marked in the main, by an appeal for support on communal lines.

1 The Straits Times, August 20, 1974.

2 The Straits Times, August 17, 1974.

CHAPTER SIX

An Analysis of the Election Results


As had been unanimously predicted, even prior to the election, the Barisan Nasional romped home to a massive victory. It won seventy-two of the eighty-two contested seats and, together with the thirty-two it had gained without contest on nomination day, it had a total of 104 of the 114 Peninsular Malaysian parliamentary seats. (Table 41) The task of forming a credible Parliamentary Opposition fell on the nine DAP and one Pekemas candidates elected. (Figure 21) The magnitude of the victory was unprecedented. Never before in an election in independent Peninsular Malaysia had the ruling party gained such a massive majority.

The victory was hailed as indicating overwhelming support for Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak and the Barisan Nasional. Unity and intercommunal government, it was held, had received an unquestioned mandate. To an extent, this mass media euphoria was justified. The victory, for which the mass media had worked tirelessly and of which it saw itself as a part, prevented any immediate sober analysis of the election results. In actuality, the Barisan Nasional's overwhelming majority in seats masked a number of poignant and important considerations.

The Result in Votes

The Barisan Nasional secured the Government the biggest majority in percentage votes gained in any election held in independent Peninsular Malaysia - 61.53% of the votes polled. This represented a 12.97% swing to the Government as compared with its worst showing in 1969 and even a 5.43% swing by comparison with its best-ever performance in 1964. (Table 42) The inclusion of the PAS, the Gerakan and the PPP achieved for the Alliance-based Government support of a kind that it had never before attained.

For the PAS, the Gerakan and the PPP, however, the results held



SEATS WON BY PARTIES, PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION, 1974

- Barisan Nasional (without contest)
- ▨ Barisan Nasional (with contest)
- ▣ DAP
- ▤ Pekemas

Fig. 21

Table 41

Seats won by Political Parties by State, 1974*

State	Total No. of Seats	Barisan Nasional			DAP	Pekemas
		Without Contest	With Contest	Total		
Perlis	2	-	2	2		
Kedah	13	8	5	13		
Kelantan	12	4	8	12		
Trengganu	7	1	6	7		
Penang	9	1	8	9		
Perak	21	3	14	17	4	
Pahang	8	3	5	8		
Selangor	11	2	8	10	1	
Federal Territory	5	-	2	2	2	1
Negri Sembilan	6	2	3	5	1	
Malacca	4	-	3	3	1	
Johore	16	8	8	16		
Total	114	32	72	104	9	1

* The Partai Rakyat, IPPP, KITA and the Independent candidates did not win any seats.

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendix D, p. 132.

Table 42

Government Coalition's Performance in Elections to Parliament, Peninsular Malaysia, 1959-1974

Year	Total Vote	Government		Opposition		Swing to Government from previous year
		Vote	%	Vote	%	
1959	1,564,575	800,944	51.19	763,631	48.81	
1964	2,146,608	1,204,340	56.10	942,268	43.89	+ 4.91
1969	2,111,282	1,025,144	48.56	1,086,138	51.44	- 7.54
1974	1,841,515	1,133,038	61.53	708,477	38.47	+ 12.97

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, Election Reports for the 1959, 1964, 1969 and 1974 elections.

out little cheer. A substantial portion of their support had been lost by their joining the Barisan Nasional. In the 1969 election these parties had between them mustered 36.04% of the valid votes cast. (Table 43) Thus in 1969, together with the Alliance 48.56%, the component parties of the Barisan Nasional had between them gained 84.60% of the valid votes. In 1974 the Barisan Nasional gained only 61.53%. The difference of 23.07% represents principally the votes lost by the PAS, the Gerakan and the PPP. Expressed as a percentage of their support in 1969 this amounts to 64.01%. By leaving their previously held positions in the opposition and by having joined the Alliance in the larger coalition, Barisan Nasional, the PAS, the Gerakan and the PPP between them lost close to two-thirds of their support.

The disillusioned Gerakan, PPP and PAS voter of 1969 shifted his support to the DAP, Pekemas, Partai Rakyat and the independent candidates. The DAP increased its support from 13.57% in 1969 to 21.06% in 1974 and the Partai Rakyat from 1.28% to 4.57%. The newly-formed Pekemas gathered 5.68% of the votes polled and, very significantly, the votes cast for independent candidates rose from a mere 0.46% in 1969 to 6.75% in 1974 - a 1974 total for the independent candidates higher than even that of the Pekemas and the Partai Rakyat.

The distribution of support for the several parties varied greatly from state to state. (Table 44) The Barisan Nasional performed better than its national average (61.53%) in all states except in Penang (55.9%), Perak (52.1%) and the Federal Territory (43.9%). It had an absolute majority in all the states; and even in the Federal Territory it had a relative majority, obtaining here 43.9% of the votes as compared to 37.4% polled by the DAP and 18.0% by the Pekemas. The DAP emerged as the principal opposition party in the Federal Territory and seven of the eight states where it contested.

Table 43

Votes Polled by Political Parties and Independent Candidates, 1969
and 1974 Parliamentary Elections

Party	1969		1974	
	Votes	%	Votes	%
Alliance	1,025,144	48.56		
PAS	501,123	23.74		
Gerakan	178,971	8.48		
PPP	80,756	3.82		
Barisan Nasional*	(1,785,994)*	(84.60)*	1,133,038	61.53
DAP	286,606	13.57	387,863	21.06
Pekemas	-	-	104,547	5.68
Partai Rakyat	27,110	1.28	84,206	4.57
KITA	-	-	6,228	0.34
IPPP	-	-	1,356	0.07
UMNO	1,808	0.09	-	-
Independents	9,764	0.46	124,277	6.75
Total	2,111,282	100	1,841,515	100

* Barisan Nasional figures for 1969 are the aggregate of those for the Alliance, PAS, Gerakan, and PPP.

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendices F and F1, pp 134-137.

Table 44

Votes polled by Political Parties and Independents by State
(by percentage) in Contested Seats, 1974

State	Electorate in Contested Constituency	Barisan Nasional	DAP	Pekemas	Partai Rakyat	IPPP	MUDA	Independ- ents
Perlis	43,348	66.9	-	-	6.5	-	-	26.6
Kedah	110,043	74.5	8.6	-	3.7	-	3.6	9.5
Kelantan	148,068	74.9	-	-	-	-	-	25.1
Trengganu	107,253	64.6	-	-	30.7	-	-	4.8
Penang	209,656	55.9	24.3	13.2	5.9	-	0.6	-
Perak	399,655	52.1	36.1	4.2	-	-	0.8	6.7
Pahang	90,844	68.2	13.1	-	15.7	-	-	2.9
Selangor	208,441	62.9	19.4	11.1	-	-	-	6.5
Federal Territory	113,850	43.9	37.4	18.0	-	-	-	0.6
Negri Sembilan	87,791	61.7	31.8	1.1	1.7	1.5	-	2.2
Melaka	113,841	62.5	15.5	11.3	9.0	-	-	1.7
Johore	208,725	71.7	20.6	-	2.9	-	-	4.9
Peninsular Malaysia	1,841,515	61.53	21.06	5.68	4.57	0.07	0.47	6.62

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendix F, pp 134-135.

Only in Pahang did the DAP take third place after the Barisan Nasional and the Partai Rakyat. The party performed its best in the Federal Territory (37.4%) and secured about a third of the votes polled in Perak and Negri Sembilan. The Pekemas fielded candidates in only five states and the Federal Territory. In every case the party was a poor third after the Barisan Nasional and the DAP. In Negri Sembilan the party obtained only 1.1% of the votes, performing worse than even the Partai Rakyat and the Independent People's Progressive Party. The Pekemas' better support was in the Federal Territory (18.0%) and in Penang (13.2%). The Partai Rakyat emerged most successful in Trengganu where the party obtained 30.7% of the votes polled and in Pahang where it obtained 15.7%. However, in Trengganu the party was the only party contesting the Barisan Nasional and in Pahang it contested the election as the opposition party with the largest number of candidates. The party did very poorly in every other state it contested, the support afforded the party being invariably less than that given to the DAP and the Pekemas. The Bebas Bersatu, the alliance of independents who comprised the only challenge to the Barisan Nasional in Kelantan, succeeded in gaining a quarter of the votes polled.

The same trend is evidenced in each state when the votes gained by the parties in the several states is compared with their performance in 1969. In each state there is a swing towards the government. In each state too, there is in 1974 a swing away from the aggregate support of the Barisan Nasional's component parties as at the 1969 election. (Table 45)

The Government had by the formation of the Barisan Nasional gained a majority in all the eleven states - only in the Federal Territory did its share of the votes drop below fifty per cent. In 1969 the Alliance Government had managed a majority vote in only

Table 45

Votes Gained by the Alliance and Barisan Nasional (by percentage)
By States, 1969 and 1974, Parliamentary Elections

State	Alliance 1969	Barisan Nasional 1974	Swing to Barisan Nasional	Barisan Nasional Parties	Barisan Nasional 1974	Swing Away from Barisan Nasional Parties
Perlis	51.1	66.9	15.8	93.2	66.9	26.3
Kedah	53.5	74.5	21.0	94.5	74.5	20.0
Kelantan	47.5	74.9	27.4	99.9	74.9	25.0
Trengganu	50.0	64.6	14.6	100	64.6	35.4
Penang	36.9	55.9	19.0	88.9	55.9	33.0
Perak	43.2	52.1	8.9	83.6	52.1	31.5
Pahang	60.8	68.2	7.4	85.2	68.2	17.0
Selangor Federal Territory	44.0	55.5	11.5	68.7	55.5	13.2
Negri Sembilan	46.4	61.7	15.3	62.7	61.7	1.0
Malacca	48.8	62.5	13.7	68.2	62.5	5.7
Johore	67.6	71.7	4.1	75.8	71.7	4.1
Total	48.6	61.5	12.9	84.6	61.5	23.1

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendices G2 and G3, pp 140-141.

five states and in three of these with only the barest margins - Perlis (51.1%), Kedah (53.5%), Trengganu (50%), Pahang (60.8%) and Johore (67.6%). The swing to the government was most in those states where, prior to 1974, the contest had been principally between the Alliance and the PAS. Thus in Kelantan, Kedah, Perlis and Trengganu, the Government gained increased support. The swing was least in Johore and Pahang, the two states in which it had already performed its best in 1969. The Barisan Nasional hence proved invaluable to the Alliance-based government in widening its base of support.

When observed in terms of the votes lost by the Barisan Nasional's component parties, it is Perak, Penang, Trengganu and Perlis that emerge as the states where there was a more than average loss. In Penang, the DAP, the Pekemas and the Partai Rakyat, had won a 33.0% swing away from the Barisan Nasional's component parties. This swing was obviously largely from the Gerakan. An even more marked swing, representing more than the PPP's share of the votes in 1969, had taken place in Perak, much of the gain, as in Penang, accruing to the DAP. In Kelantan and Trengganu, where the Alliance and the PAS had almost exclusively shared the votes before 1974, there was also a very marked swing. The 35.4% swing in Trengganu went principally to the Partai Rakyat (30.5%) and the independent candidates. In Kelantan the 25% swing went to the Bebas Bersatu.

Any analysis of rural-urban variations in support for the parties raises special problems. The Constituency Delimitation Report claims that constituencies were drawn on the basis of a four-fold classification ranging from Metropolitan Urban, Urban Large, Urban Small to Rural Areas. The Report itself gives no definition regarding these four categories. The 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaya, undertaken by the Survey Department Malaysia, which the Commission utilised in drawing up the constituencies, does, however, provide a

definition, as follows:

Metropolitan Urban - Any gazetted area with a population of 75,000 persons or more at the time of the Census;

Urban Large - Any gazetted area with a population of 10,000 to 74,999 persons at the time of the Census;

Urban Small - Any gazetted area with a population of 1,000 to 9,999 persons at the time of the Census; and

Rural - All areas gazetted or otherwise, that had a population of 999 persons or less at the time of the Census.¹

The weightage for area given to the sparsely populated rural districts has already been seen to result in rural constituencies in each state having smaller electorates than urban constituencies. However, due to the apportionment of seats to the various states not being strictly on the basis of their electorate size, the electorate in some urban constituencies in the states advantaged by the apportionment exercise are smaller than some rural constituencies in those states disadvantaged by the apportionment exercise. Hence a simple ranking of all the Peninsular Malaysian constituencies on the basis of size will not suffice for an analysis of the urban-rural distribution of support for the parties.

Another technique was utilized to attempt a classification of the seats into urban and rural. The gazetted areas of the four categories - metropolitan urban, urban large, urban small and rural - were located on a map of the parliamentary constituencies. Those constituencies comprising entirely of any one of these gazetted areas was classified accordingly. However, except for a few in the metropolitan urban and urban large categories, the bulk of the constituencies included a mix of areas from two or more of the categories. The difficulty arises from the fact that the delimitation was done in such a manner that the constituency boundaries hardly ever coincide with an obvious gazetted area. For this reason

1 Malaysia, Jabatan Perangkaan, 1970 Population and Housing Census of Malaysia, Community Groups, 1972, p. 291.

any classification of the constituencies into 'rural' and 'urban' has not been possible. Some general observations can, however, be ventured. In the urban centres of the states of Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu the Barisan Nasional's performance was not appreciably different from that in the rural areas of these states. In the remaining states - Kedah, Penang, Perak, Pahang, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Johore - the Barisan Nasional's performance was markedly better in the rural areas than in the urban centres. This pattern is further underlined by the Barisan Nasional performing worst in the wholly urbanized Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. Conversely, it is in the urban centres of Kedah, Penang, Perak, Pahang, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and Johore that the DAP did best. The party's nine seats were obtained in the urban constituencies. The Pekemas, too, did best in the urban centres, winning its only seat in the Federal Territory. The Partai Rakyat's performance shows no appreciable difference in the urban and rural areas: the party polled its best in constituencies where it had a straight contest with the Barisan Nasional, and worst in constituencies where it had to face the challenge of other opposition parties as well.

Communal Composition of Votes

In examining the performance of the Barisan Nasional it was found that it fared better in Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan, Trengganu, Pahang and Johore than it had in Penang, Perak, Selangor, Negri Sembilan, Malacca and the Federal Territory of Kuala Lumpur. It is also suggested that the Barisan Nasional showed no appreciable variation in performance in the urban centres of Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu; in the other states, however, its performance in the urban centres was significantly worse than in the rural areas of the respective states. These spatial variations in support for the Barisan Nasional and the other

parties seem to be due principally, to variations in the communal composition of the electorate.

Table 46 sets out the percentage of Malay electorate in the contested constituencies for each state and the percentage of valid votes gained by the several parties. The table shows the general trend of communal support for the various parties. The Barisan Nasional's share of the votes is higher in those states with a higher percentage of Malay electors. The DAP and the Pekemas did not field candidates in states with high percentages of Malay voters. The Pekemas candidates were confined to the Federal Territory and the five states with the highest percentage of non-Malay electors. The DAP fielded candidates in the Federal Territory and in the eight states with the highest percentage of non-Malay electors.

A cursory glance at Table 46 might suggest that the increase in the share of the votes of each of the DAP and Pekemas is not always consistent with an increase in non-Malay electors. However, when the votes of both the DAP and the Pekemas are read together, the pattern becomes more explicit. The DAP and Pekemas joint vote increases with a rise in the percentage of non-Malay electors. The Partai Rakyat did best in the predominantly Malay state of Trengganu and again in Pahang. Its share of the votes in all states, except in Trengganu, is far too small to indicate that it had greater support from any particular community. Its better performance in Trengganu can likewise be held to be the outcome of its greater emphasis here and, more importantly, to its being the only opposition party challenging the Barisan Nasional.

The support lent by the various communities to the several parties becomes even more apparent when the performance of the parties in seats of different communal composition is examined. (Table 47) The Barisan Nasional's share of the votes averages below fifty per cent

Table 46

Percentage Malay Electorate in Contested Seats and Percentage Vote won by Political Parties by State, 1974.

State	Malay Electorate	Barisan Nasional	DAP	Pekemas	Partai Rakyat	KITA	IPPP	Independ- ents
Kelantan	96.20	74.9						25.1
Trengganu	93.44	64.6			30.7			4.8
Perlis	83.87	66.9			6.5			26.6
Kedah	67.94	74.5	8.6		3.7	3.6		9.5
Pahang	56.72	68.2	13.1		15.7			2.9
Johore	55.57	71.7	20.6		2.9			4.9
Malacca	54.78	62.5	15.5	11.3	9.0			1.7
Selangor	42.68	62.9	19.4	11.1				6.5
Perak	41.87	52.1	36.1	4.2		0.8		6.7
Negri Sembilan	39.61	61.7	31.8	1.1	1.7		1.5	2.2
Penang	30.95	55.9	24.3	13.2	5.9	0.6		
Federal Territory	27.79	43.9	37.4	18.0				0.6
Peninsular Malaysia		61.53	21.06	5.68	4.37	0.34	0.07	6.75

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendix G1, pp 138-139.

Table 47

Average Percentage Vote Gained by Political Parties in Constituencies of Varying Non-Malay Electorate, 1974

Percentage Non-Malay Electorate	No. of Seats ₁	Barisan Nasional ₂	DAP	Pekemas	Partai Rakyat
90.01 - 100	3	35.7 (3)	56.37 (3)	7.07 (2)	4.84 (1)
80.01 - 90	6	40.94 (6)	42.39 (6)	15.64 (5)	6.70 (1)
70.01 - 80	7	51.53 (7)	39.75 (7)	10.73 (3)	5.30 (2)
60.01 - 70	9	54.57 (7)	32.12 (9)	10.28 (8)	5.76 (2)
50.01 - 60	10	64.19(10)	26.03(10)	13.11 (6)	7.64 (1)
40.01 - 50	14	70.11(14)	25.45 (7)	11.0 (3)	22.49 (4)
30.01 - 40	7	69.55 (7)	21.94 (4)	13.1 (5)	28.76 (1)
20.01 - 30	6	73.55 (6)		16.14 (2)	10.58 (1)
10.01 - 20	9	72.12 (9)		27.36 (1)	24.15 (5)
10 and less	11	71.17(11)			28.79 (4)

Source: 1 Compiled from data in Appendix 4.

2 Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendix 4, pp 144-158.
(Figures within brackets indicate number of seats in that category contested by the party.)

in seats with more than eighty per cent non-Malays, but increases steadily to exceed seventy per cent in seats where Malays also comprise more than seventy per cent of the electorate. (Also compare Figures 11 and 22) The DAP, on the other hand, has an average of 56.37% of the votes in the constituencies where non-Malays comprise more than ninety per cent of the electors. The party's share of the vote is seen to decrease consistently as the percentage of non-Malay electors decreases till it obtains only 21.94% in the category of seats where non-Malays comprise between thirty per cent and forty per cent of the electorate. (Also compare Figures 13 and 23) The party did not contest in seats where there were less than 30% of non-Malay electors.

The Pekemas' share of the votes is consistently low in all constituencies except those where the party's candidates had straight contests with the Barisan Nasional. On the basis of Table 47 it is not possible to determine the communal basis of the Pekemas support. However, the constituencies in which the party's candidates did well, even where there were three-cornered and four-cornered contests, are all non-Malay majority constituencies. (Compare Figures 15 and 24) Pekemas President Tan Chee Koon obtained 41.81% of the votes in a four-cornered contest in Kepong where non-Malays comprise 83.68% of the electorate. Similarly in Jelutong, with a 79.01% non-Malay electorate, V. David obtained 20.05% of the votes. In Mata Kuching, with 65.09% non-Malays, Ong Yi How won 33.18% of the votes polled, and this despite a three-cornered contest. In Pelabohan Kelang, A.V. Kathiah of Pekemas obtained 23.42% of the votes, also in a three-cornered contest. If it is assumed that the bulk of the Malay vote in these constituencies went to the Barisan Nasional, as it did in all the constituencies, then it follows that the Pekemas' relatively better performance in these constituencies was due largely to its ability to draw on the non-Malay vote. Unlike the DAP, which in no seat was able to win more votes than there are non-Malay electors, the Pekemas was able








Fig. 11









ETHNIC DOMINANCE IN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES 1974

- | | |
|-------------------|---------------------|
| □ Malay Majority | ▣ Chinese Plurality |
| ▨ Malay Plurality | ▤ Chinese Majority |

Fig. 15





Fig. 24

to do so in one constituency. In Hilir Perak, Ahmad Boestaman obtained 27.36% of the votes polled even when the non-Malay component in the electorate was only 18.49%. Ahmad Boestaman's performance, however, cannot be taken as an indication of the party's performance. Ahmad Boestaman's long history as an active and popular left-wing Malay nationalist politician apparently resulted in his ability to draw on a portion of the Malay vote in his constituency. But even here the bulk of the Malay vote remained with the Barisan Nasional. The Pekemas support, small as it was in most of the constituencies it contested, seems to have come predominantly from the non-Malay voter.



The Partai Rakyat's performance was poor in non-Malay majority constituencies. Its seven candidates contesting in non-Malay majority constituencies all obtained less than eight per cent of the valid votes polled and lost their election deposits. The party's performance in the Malay majority constituencies was, however, much better. (Compare Figures 15 and 25) It did best in Kuala Trengganu where Party President Kassim bin Ahmad obtained 38.20% of the valid votes in a constituency with 86.54% Malays. Also in Trengganu State, Siti Nor binti Abdul Hamid Tuah obtained 37.03% of the votes cast in the Ulu Nerus constituency which has 98.84% Malay voters. These successes and the party's better performance in the Malay majority constituencies indicate the party's greater ability to attract Malay support rather than non-Malay support. A note of caution must however be sounded. The party's better performance in the Malay areas is at least in part due to there being no organized Malay-based party contesting the Barisan Nasional. It is conceivable that in the event of a Malay-based party contesting, the party's performance in the Malay majority constituencies would have been as poor as in the non-Malay majority constituencies where there were essentially non-Malay based parties



ETHNIC DOMINANCE IN PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES 1974

□ Malay Majority ▣ Chinese Plurality
 ▨ Malay Plurality ▤ Chinese Majority

Fig. 15



PERCENTAGE OF VOTES POLLED BY THE PARTAI RAKYAT, PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES, 1974

Fig. 25

to rival its appeal for votes.

The above analysis allows for certain generalizations to be made as regards the support given the parties by the Malay and non-Malay communities. The Barisan Nasional obtained 61.53% of the votes in the eighty-two contested seats in Peninsular Malaysia. Of the Malay electorate, who comprised 52.32% of the total in these constituencies, the Barisan Nasional had the support of no less than seventy per cent. This is borne out by the performance of the Barisan Nasional in the predominantly Malay states of Perlis, Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu. This contention is lent further support when the Barisan Nasional's performance in constituencies where the Malays comprised more than seventy per cent of the electorate is studied. In these constituencies the party obtained on the average more than seventy per cent of the votes. In the constituencies where the Barisan Nasional did not face any competition from the Malay independent candidates, or the Partai Rakyat, its support from the Malay voters may be held to be virtually unanimous. The Barisan Nasional's support from the non-Malay votes was however wanting. Whenever the DAP and the Pekemas posed as alternatives, the Barisan Nasional was able to obtain on the average, only about thirty-five per cent of the vote. However, in constituencies where the choice was essentially between the Barisan Nasional and the Malay Independents, the Barisan Nasional may be held to have gained the bulk of the non-Malay votes.

Of all the parties, the DAP clearly enjoys the largest support amongst the non-Malay community. Whenever it posed as an alternative to the Barisan Nasional, more than fifty-five per cent of the non-Malay voters gave it their support. This contention is based on the performance of the Barisan Nasional and the DAP, in the predominantly non-Malay states of Penang, Perak, Selangor and the Federal Territory, and, their performance in constituencies where non-Malays

comprise more than seventy per cent of the electorate. Indeed the party was able to obtain 21.06% of the total votes polled in the 1974 parliamentary election, even though it had candidates in only forty-six of the eighty-two contested seats - the non-Malays comprised only 47.68% of the electors in all the eighty-two seats contested. Hence, if it is assumed that the DAP obtained the bulk of its votes from the non-Malays, then it can with certainty be asserted, that the party has greater support amongst the non-Malays than the Barisan Nasional. The Pekemas and the Partai Rakyat received too little support for any conclusive observations to be made, except to note that the Pekemas appears to have a greater appeal amongst the non-Malay voters than the Malay, and the converse seems to hold true for the Partai Rakyat.

The 1974 results, though revealing that the government still lacks the support of the majority of the non-Malays, represented for the government a significant improvement over its performance in 1969. In 1969 the Alliance lost the bulk of the seats where non-Malays comprised more than fifty per cent of the electorate. It fared worst in constituencies where non-Malays comprised more than ninety per cent of the electorate. In these constituencies the government was able to muster on the average only 22.95% of the votes. (Table 48) The Alliance's share of the vote increased with an increase in Malay electorate and reached an absolute majority in the constituencies where the Malays comprised between fifty per cent and sixty per cent of the electorate; it was at its highest in constituencies where there were sixty to seventy per cent Malay electorates. Beyond this point, the Alliance's share of the vote is seen to decline, and in the constituencies where there were more than ninety per cent Malay electorates its share of the vote dropped again to below fifty per cent of the votes polled. Table 48 indicates the Alliance's predicament in the 1969 election. In constituencies where there was a large percentage

Table 48

Average Percentage Votes Gained by Political Parties in Constituencies of Varying Non-Malay Electorate, 1969.

Percentage Non-Malay Electorate	No. of Contested Seats ₁	Alliance ₂	DAP Gerakan PPP ₂	PAS ₂
90.01 - 100	2	22.95	77.06	
80.01 - 90	6	24.99	72.49	
70.01 - 80	10	40.41	56.92	6.92
60.01 - 70	13	47.95	48.34	11.62
50.01 - 60	8	48.35		25.30
40.01 - 50	9	56.74		26.81
30.01 - 40	9	64.73		32.54
20.01 - 30	10	57.53		39.20
10.01 - 20	12	54.38		45.62
10 and less	15	49.97		49.98
Total	94	48.6	25.9	23.7

Source: 1 Compiled from data in Appendix 3.

2 Malaysia, Election Commission, 1969 Election Report, 1972, Appendix B, pp 52-64.

of non-Malay electors, non-Malay based opposition parties like the DAP, the Gerakan and the PPP were, by an electoral arrangement between themselves, able to win sufficient votes to capture the seats. In the predominantly Malay constituencies, the PAS was able to poll sufficient votes to gain the seats. The Government in 1974 can thus be held to have greatly improved on its support amongst the Malays, and marginally increased its support amongst the non-Malays - the majority of the non-Malays when they had the opportunity preferred to support the DAP, rather than the Barisan Nasional.

The PAS, Gerakan and PPP elements

The election results were of prime importance for the future of the new partners in the government coalition - the PAS, Gerakan and the PPP. These parties had campaigned for a mandate from their constituents for participation in the Barisan Nasional. The results in terms of seats were immediately seized upon as an indication of the varying endorsement given each of these party elements. The PAS won all its fourteen seats, the Gerakan five of the eight it contested, and the PPP only one of the four it contested. The victory in terms of seats, however, masked the actual mandate gained by each of these parties from their respective constituents.

(i) PAS was allocated fourteen parliamentary constituencies, three of which were won without contest on nomination day. An examination of the party's performance in the eleven contested seats is instructive of the extent of swing away from the PAS in 1974 as compared with its performance in 1969. The computation utilized here to assess this assumes that the increased support for the Government in these constituencies came solely from PAS participation. Such an assumption is possible because the areas where the eleven candidates from the PAS faced opposition are areas where the contest has

traditionally been between UMNO (the Malay component in the inter-communal Alliance) and the PAS itself - the two parties accounted for one hundred per cent of the total valid votes polled in 1969. It is also assumed that the coalition did not result in any loss in support for UMNO in 1974. This latter assumption is possible since in nine of the constituencies the candidates who contested the PAS candidates were PAS dissidents. In the remaining two the challenge came from the Partai Rakyat. There were no UMNO dissidents contesting in the eleven seats that PAS was contesting and even in their appeal for the votes, the PAS dissidents who grouped together to form the Bebas Bersatu, campaigned essentially on the grounds that the PAS had surrendered its Islamic traditions.

The change in electoral boundaries occasioned by the 1974 delineation exercise makes it difficult to compare the Alliance's 1969 performance with that of the Barisan Nasional's in 1974. To make the data comparable some form of standardisation is necessary. The method utilized here is first to determine the communal composition of the constituency concerned in 1974, and assume as the Alliance 1969 performance here, the average percentage vote the Alliance actually obtained in 1969 in constituencies of a similar communal composition. (Tables 48 and 49) The calculations made on the basis of these assumptions are presented in Table 49.

In each of the eleven contested seats there was a gain in votes for the Government compared with the Government's performance in 1969, the gain averaging 20.70%. In two of the constituencies, however, the PAS candidates contested Partai Rakyat candidates. If these two constituencies are discounted the Government's performance in 1974 indicates a 26.08% average gain over that of 1969. This latter figure is a more accurate indication of the gains made by the Government as a consequence of the PAS's participation in the Barisan Nasional. This

Table 49

Swing to Government Coalition in Seats Contested by PAS, 1969-1974

Seat	Percentage Malay ₁	Estimated Alliance 1969 vote ₂	Barisan Nasional ₃	Swing
P 5 Padang Terap	90.44	49.97	Uncontested	-
P 8 Kota Setar	88.28	54.38	86.37	31.99
P 9 Ulu Muda	85.93	54.38	Uncontested	-
P 17 Pengkalan Chepa	98.56	49.97	73.88	23.91
P 18 Pasir Mas	96.22	49.97	80.95	30.98
P 20 Bachok	98.39	49.97	Uncontested	-
P 21 Rantau Panjang	96.77	49.97	77.97	28.00
P 22 Nilam Puri	98.00	49.97	78.11	28.34
P 25 Pasir Puteh	97.23	49.97	69.95	20.18
P 26 Kuala Kerai	87.50	54.38	79.23	24.85
P 29 Ulu Nerus	98.84	49.97	62.97	13.20
P 32 Kuala Trengganu	86.54	54.38	58.94	4.56
P 33 Dungun	93.21	49.97	73.25	23.48
P 64 Bagan Datuk	64.42	64.73	87.73	23.00

Source: 1 Based on data in Appendix 4.

2 Based on Table 48, i.e. Alliance vote in 1969 in constituency of similar communal composition.

3 Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendix H, pp 144-158.

is held to be so since the Partai Rakyat's appeal, based on non-communal socialist policies and branded atheist by its opponents, is at least as likely, if not more, to have made headway amongst the Alliance supporters of 1969 as it did amongst the PAS' essentially Islamic and Malay-based support. The latter figure of approximately 26.08% is given further validity when the performances of the parties in the 1969 and 1974 elections for the state of Kelantan are examined. In the 1969 election, the Alliance and the PAS between them secured 99.9% of the valid votes polled in Kelantan - 47.5% Alliance and 52.4% PAS. In the 1974 election, the Barisan Nasional obtained only 74.9% of the votes. The difference of twenty-five per cent represents the support that the PAS brought the Barisan Nasional in Kelantan in 1974. The votes gained by the Barisan Nasional (25%), expressed as a percentage of PAS 1969 support (52.4%), indicates the PAS' mandate from its traditional support for its participation in the Barisan Nasional - 47.71%. On the basis of these calculations it may be assumed that at least half of the PAS supporters deserted the party when it joined the Barisan Nasional.

(ii) By a similar computation as that utilized for the PAS the Gerakan's performance may also be gauged. (Table 50) The Gerakan's participation resulted in the Government's share of the vote increasing from an average of 35.06% in 1969 to 44.68% in 1974. The shift of the Gerakan had witnessed a shift of only 9.62% of the votes instead of the average of 64.94% the Gerakan gained when it contested the Alliance in 1969. On the basis of this it may be presumed that only 14.81% of the Gerakan's 1969 voters supported its entry into the Barisan Nasional. In 1969, however, the Gerakan had contested the election having an electoral understanding with the DAP and the PPP. The average of 64.94% of the votes the Gerakan polled in 1969 could be held to include the DAP and PPP votes. Consequently, the above figures,

Table 50

Swing to Government Coalition in Seats Contested by Gerakan, 1969 - 1974

Seat	Percentage Non-Malay ₁	Estimated Alliance 1969 vote	Barisan Nasional ₂ 1974	Swing
P 42 Tanjong	95.04	22.95	45.99	23.04
P 39 Nibong Tebal	58.42	48.35	57.63	9.28
P 43 Jelutong	79.01	40.41	46.45	6.04
P 49 Taiping	68.25	47.95	53.18	5.23
P 62 Telok Anson	69.04	47.95	50.91	2.96
P 81 Petaling	80.15	24.99	36.87	11.88
P 84 Kepong	83.68	24.99	38.40	13.41
P 87 Kuala Lumpur Bandar	91.44	22.95	28.04	5.09

Source: 1 Based on data in Appendix 4.

2 Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendix B, pp 44-62.

though indicating the gain accruing to the Government by the inclusion of the Gerakan in the Barisan Nasional, do not provide an indication of the mandate the Gerakan obtained from its own share of the vote in 1969. For an estimation of this, an examination of voting patterns in Penang will have to be considered.

Penang is the state where the Gerakan placed its strongest emphasis in the 1969 election. Its greater share of the seats in the 1969 electoral understanding as compared with the DAP and the PPP was a recognition of the Gerakan's relative strength. Since the 1969 election the Gerakan has maintained control of the State Government of Penang and, especially since the expulsions in the party resulting in the formation of the rival Pekemas, the Gerakan's strength was concentrated principally in Penang State. An examination of the Gerakan's voting performance in Penang State will therefore serve as a reasonable indicator of the Gerakan's mandate from the party's own supporters for its participation in the Barisan Nasional.

In 1969, in Penang, the Alliance polled 36.9% of the votes, the PAS seven per cent, the PPP 0.4% and the Gerakan 44.6% - the aggregate vote of the Barisan Nasional's component parties had been 88.9% of the total votes. The remaining 11.1% of the votes went to the DAP. In 1974 the Barisan Nasional's share of the votes was only 56.0%. In the absence of any UMNO or PAS dissidents contesting the election it seems that the loss of 32.9% of votes in 1974 was almost wholly from the ranks of the Gerakan voters of 1969. If this contention is accepted, then 73.8% of the Gerakan's support of 1969 shifted to the DAP, the Pekemas and the Partai Rakyat in 1974 - close to seventy-five per cent of the party's supporters of 1969 rejected the party's participation in the Barisan Nasional.

A note of caution must, however, be sounded in accepting the above figure. The expulsions from the party and the formation of the

rival Pekemas would in any event have resulted in a loss of the Gerakan's support, and thus, it is difficult to assume that the Gerakan's loss of about three-quarters of its support as at 1969 is an ample indicator of the rejection of its policies by its supporters after the split in the party. For an estimate of this the Pekemas vote has to be discounted, though much of this was also gained by suggesting to the electors that the Gerakan had betrayed its original platform by its entry into the Barisan Nasional. However, discounting Pekemas votes would provide the minimum figure of rejection by the party's supporters for the Gerakan's participation in the Barisan Nasional. Thus, if it is assumed that from the 44.6% of votes the Gerakan secured in Penang in 1969 it would in 1974 have lost the 13.2% the Pekemas gained even without joining the Barisan Nasional, then it may be held that its support without joining the Barisan Nasional would have been 31.4% of the votes polled. On joining the Alliance in the Barisan Nasional the party was able to swing only 19.1% of the votes. The 19.1% expressed as a percentage of what the party would have polled without participation in the Barisan Nasional - i.e. 31.4% - expresses the upper limit of the extent of the mandate the party received from its supporters after the split in the party and the formation of the Pekemas. This amounts to 60.83%.

(iii) The PPP since its formation in 1952 has remained almost exclusively a Perak-based party, drawing its support essentially from the non-Malay electorate centred in the Kinta District. In 1969, the party gained only four parliamentary seats, which four it was allocated again in 1974. The boundaries of these constituencies, however, underwent alteration in the 1974 delineation exercise, resulting in a change in the communal composition of the electorate. Hence, any comparison of the PPP's performance in 1974 with that of 1969 again necessitates adjustments indicating the share of the vote the PPP would

have won in 1969 had the communal composition of the constituencies it contested been identical to that of 1974. The basis utilized for adjusting the PPP's 1969 performance to make it comparable with that of 1974 is discussed below.

It is first assumed that the PPP's support came exclusively from the non-Malay community, and support for the PAS came exclusively from the Malay community. The share of the PPP's support in the four constituencies contested in 1969 is therefore estimated as follows:

Constituency	% Malay Electorate	% Non-Malay Electorate	PMIP	Alliance	PPP
Ipoh	10.86	89.14	-	17.91 (10.86 Malay, 7.05 non-Malay)	82.09
Menglembu	13.10	86.90	-	34.14 (13.10 Malay, 21.04 non-Malay)	65.86
Kinta	35.80	64.20	-	41.49 (35.80 Malay, 5.69 non-Malay)	58.51
Beruas	41.02	58.99	19.87 (Malay)	38.91 (21.15 Malay, 17.76 non-Malay)	41.22

The share of the party's votes on the basis of the above assumptions would, if the communal composition in 1969 had been identical to that of 1974, be as follows:

Constituency	% Malay Electorate	% Non-Malay Electorate	PMIP	Alliance	PPP
Ipoh	4.96	95.04	-	12.48 (4.96 Malay, 7.52 non-Malay)	87.52
Menglembu	15.16	84.84	-	35.70 (15.16 Malay, 20.54 non-Malay)	64.30
Kinta	40.05	59.95	-	45.36 (40.05 Malay, 5.31 non-Malay)	54.64
Beruas	35.99	64.01	17.44 (Malay)	37.83 (18.56 Malay, 19.27 non-Malay)	44.73

In the 1974 election the voting in these four constituencies was as follows:

Constituency	Barisan Nasional	Independents	DAP	Pekemas
Ipoh	33.09	4.80	62.11	-
Menglembu	32.66	4.81	62.53	
Kinta	44.18	(4.11)(5.85)	45.86	
Beruas	42.95	11.48	37.69	7.88

The Independents who contested in these constituencies in 1974 were essentially Alliance dissidents - one from the MCA and one from UMNO. If on the basis of this it is assumed that the votes gained by these independent candidates came exclusively from the Alliance share of the votes in 1969, then the 1974 loss in the votes of the PPP in each of these four constituencies can be held to be those that accrued to the DAP and the Pekemas. The votes gained by the Barisan Nasional as a result of the PPP's participation can thus be assessed as the difference between the adjusted PPP vote in 1969 and the joint DAP and Pekemas share of the vote in 1974. This amounts to +25.41% in Ipoh, +1.77% in Menglembu, +8.78% in Kinta and -0.84% in Beruas; an average percentage gain of 8.78%. When this latter figure is expressed as a percentage of the PPP's 62.80% average vote in the adjusted 1969 result, an estimate of the support given by the voters of 1969 for its entry into the Barisan Nasional is obtained. This amounts to 13.98%. This suggests that more than 86% of the PPP's 1969 voters denied the party their support on its participation in the Barisan Nasional. In the Ipoh area - long the base of the PPP headquarters and where the PPP controls the Municipal Council and has done so for fourteen years - the party obtained greater support for its decision. Here close to 30% of its 1969 voters continued to support the party.

On the basis of the assumptions made above it can be held that 47.71% of the PAS, 26.2% of the Gerakan and 13.98% of the PPP's supporters who voted for these parties in 1969 supported their party's entry into the Barisan Nasional. In the case of the Gerakan, which would in any case have lost a portion of its support by the split in its ranks and by the formation of the Pekemas, it may be estimated that 60.83% of those who did not desert the party for the Pekemas continued to lend their support to the party even after it had entered the Barisan Nasional.

United Opposition Front

Commencing in 1973 and even up to the eve of the election, the Pekemas sought a United Opposition Front with the DAP in particular, and if possible also extending to include the Partai Rakyat. The Partai Rakyat showed disinterest from the start to any such negotiation; the DAP went along with the discussions but it eventually decided against unity. In 1969, the DAP, the Gerakan and the PPP had entered into an electoral understanding that had resulted in tremendous mutual gain for each of the parties concerned. The procedure suggested for the 1974 United Opposition Front was, as in the case of the DAP-Gerakan-PPP electoral understanding, an attempt to share the seats between the parties to the agreement so as not to split the opposition vote and thereby facilitate a Government victory in the marginal seats. This section seeks to assess what effects a United Opposition Front would have had on the election results.

Arguably, the lack of co-operation between the opposition parties and the campaign conducted by them against each other would have meant that a measure of their individual support might have been lost to the Barisan Nasional in the 1974 election. It is not possible in this analysis, however, to estimate for this loss, if any. Here the

assumption is made that the share of the votes of a United Opposition Front would have been the sum total of the votes polled in the 1974 election by the parties that would have been participating in it.

Seventy-three of the eighty-two contested seats in Peninsular Malaysia were won by the Barisan Nasional by an absolute majority. Hence the formation of a United Opposition Front would not have affected the results in these seats. In the nine seats that were won by relative majorities, five were won by the Barisan Nasional, three by the DAP and one by the solitary Pekemas candidate who obtained a seat. (Table 51) In four of the five seats won by the Barisan Nasional, a United Opposition Front comprising the DAP and the Pekemas would have resulted in the Barisan Nasional candidates losing their seats. In the fifth seat there was only a DAP candidate and an independent candidate. Here the effects of a United Opposition Front would not have been significant. Of the four seats that could have been taken by a DAP-Pekemas understanding, two were won by Gerakan candidates, one by the PPP and one by the MIC. The implications of a United Opposition Front would thus have been to further reduce the size of the non-Malay representation on the Government benches in Parliament.

Loss of the four marginal seats to the Barisan Nasional was of greater significance to the DAP and Pekemas than the number implies. In Tanjong, it would have meant that the Gerakan President and Penang Chief Minister, Lim Chong Eu, would have lost his seat, and in his place, the DAP's Deputy Chairman, Yeap Ghim Guan, would have been elected. In Jelutong, a United Opposition Front could have meant the defeat of Gerakan's R. Rajasingam and the election of Pekemas leader and veteran Trade Unionist, V. David. In Beruas, and in Sungei Siput, too, a United Opposition Front would have resulted in important victories for the DAP. In the former, it would have meant the election of the DAP's other Deputy Chairman, Daing Ibrahim bin Othman, and the defeat of the sole PPP candidate who won the 1974

Table 51

Votes won by Political Parties and Independents in Seats won by a minority vote (by percentage), 1974.

Seat	Barisan Nasional component contesting	Barisan Nasional	DAP	Pekemas	Partai Rakyat	Independents
P 42 Tanjong	Gerakan	45.99	41.69	7.48	4.84	
P 43 Jelutong	Gerakan	46.45	29.27	20.05	4.23	
P 49 Sungei Siput	MIC	49.09	45.59	4.75		0.57
P 56 Beruas	PPP	42.95	37.69	7.88		11.48
P 60 Lumut	MCA	43.35	38.37			18.28
P 53 Kinta	PPP	44.18	45.86			4.11 5.85
P 58 Batu Gajah	MCA	43.75	48.30	5.91		2.04
P 81 Petaling	Gerakan	36.87	40.41	17.08		5.64
P 88 Kepong	Gerakan	38.40	17.57	41.18		2.85

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendix B, pp 44-62.

parliamentary election. In the latter it could have resulted in the election of a DAP national committee member, P. Patto. Daing Ibrahim is a Malay, and P. Patto an Indian, and their election would have gone a long way in correcting the DAP's Chinese image - currently all nine DAP Members of Parliament are Chinese. It would also have altered the present picture of a largely Malay-based Government and a wholly Chinese-based Opposition in Parliament.

An electoral understanding between the DAP and the Pekemas would have meant that the three seats secured by the DAP and the solitary seat won by the Pekemas, by a minority vote, would have been retained by these parties with an absolute majority. Pekemas President, Tan Chee Koon, who scraped home to victory with a mere 41.18% of the votes polled and a 666 majority in a constituency where 29,379 voters voted, could have had a comfortable 58.75% of the votes, and a majority of 4,873 votes - certainly a more respectable and fitting margin for a dedicated and tireless opposition parliamentarian. The results exemplify that the participation of Partai Rakyat, which had from the start showed little interest in the United Opposition Front, would have had no effect on the contest for these marginal seats as long as there was an understanding between the Pekemas and the DAP. In Tanjong, however, the DAP could have defeated Gerakan's Lim Chong Eu even with an understanding with Partai Rakyat.

An electoral understanding would have resulted in the Barisan Nasional gaining only one hundred, instead of the 104, of the 114 seats contested - thus obtaining only 87.72% of the seats, instead of the 91.23% it secured despite having won only 61.53% of the votes.

Turn-Out

The electoral turn-out for Peninsular Malaysia as a whole in the 1974 parliamentary election was 75.1% and compares favourably with

72.9% in the 1969 parliamentary election. The 1974 turn-out was however lower than the turn-out of 1964 when 78.9% of the electors participated at the polls. A turn-out of 75.1% may seem, on the face of it, an adequate level of citizen participation in the democratic process. It must, however, be remembered that the figure of 75.1% represents only those who voted amongst those who had their names on the electoral register. A more accurate measure of citizen indifference must take cognizance of the adult citizens who had not registered as electors. So viewed, the turn-out of 75.1% leaves much to be desired.

Analysis of voter turn-out that goes beyond mere description is always fraught with difficulties. The indifferent elector who fails to vote may do so for a number of reasons - for reasons of ignorance, disillusionment or cynicism as to who governs. Thus voter turn-out may be a symptom of alienation or despair. Alternatively, it may reflect widespread acceptance of the way in which disputes are resolved or a belief that the political balance is in no danger of being upset. Whilst the former may have some validity in the Peninsular Malaysian context, it is difficult to think that the latter alternative could be applicable, especially for the 1974 election which involved the very central issues - the basic philosophy and policy directions of the state.

Turn-out may also depend on a number of other more mundane considerations, not least amongst which are the weather, the efficiency of the machinery of the several parties to mobilise voters, or even the discrimination employed by some parties in attempting to mobilise support from particular communities only. An example of the latter occurred in the Damansara constituency of the Federal Territory, where the Barisan Nasional candidate, anticipating almost unanimous support from the Malay community, deployed his workers and transport vehicles

to the predominantly Malay areas of his constituency, thus ensuring the maximum possible turn-out of the Malay electors. Similarly, the DAP candidates are known to concentrate on ensuring that the Chinese voter gets to the polls. Given such discrimination by the candidates, the turn-out of any particular community, and consequently the total electorate in a constituency, must to an extent rest on the differential strength of the respective candidate's party machinery.

Analyzing turn-out figures in Peninsular Malaysia also raises an additional problem: Elections for the State Legislative Assemblies and the Federal Parliament are held simultaneously and in the same polling stations. The Returning Officer offers the voter two ballot papers, each of a different colour, and, after having marked his choice, the voter places each ballot paper into the appropriate ballot box. Thus, unless a voter specifically refuses the ballot paper for one of the two elections held, he is given both ballot papers. Hence the turn-out for each election is to an extent influenced by the factors that influence turn-out in the other. An analysis of the turn-out for the state and parliamentary elections however suggests that the voters held the parliamentary election to be the more important. Voting was 75.1% for the parliamentary election and only 73.1% for the state election. In forty-three of the sixty-eight comparable seats, there was a higher rate of polling for the parliamentary election than there was for the state election; in twenty-four it was higher for the state election and in one identical for both the elections.

Voter turn-out being dependent on so many variables, any analysis of variations in the different categories of constituencies, especially when the difference is marginal, will be highly suspect. What has been attempted below is merely to suggest that a pattern may be discernible.

Analysis of the turn-out by states (Table 52) indicates that it

Table 52

Turn-Out by States, Parliamentary Election, 1974.

State	Turn-Out in %	Average Percentage	
		Larger Seats	Smaller Seats
Perlis	77.90	77.10	79.60
Kedah	69.80	69.85	71.20
Kelantan	74.12	73.23	75.93
Trengganu	73.36	72.11	75.56
Penang	82.02	83.50	82.07
Perak	75.30	74.99	74.03
Pahang	75.67	74.13	76.23
Selangor	74.22	76.62	77.00
Federal Territory	66.55	64.00	65.85
Negri Sembilan	76.07	75.80	70.85
Malacca	78.04	78.23	77.59
Johore	75.07	73.82	76.75

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendix H, pp 144-158.

was at its highest in Penang. Penang was where the contest was at its keenest. Here the DAP and the Pekemas, and to a lesser extent the Partai Rakyat, provided strong competition in almost all the seats contested. The turn-out was also higher than the national average in Perak, Pahang, Negri Sembilan and Malacca. In Kelantan, Trengganu, Johore, Selangor and the Federal Territory it was below that of the rest of Peninsular Malaysia. The low turn-out in the Federal Territory, the lowest by comparison with all the other states, is in keeping with the trend of previous years when constituencies in the Kuala Lumpur area consistently had a turn-out lower than elsewhere.

Two factors appear to have determined turn-out - size of the constituency and intensity of the political contest. The larger constituencies in each of the states except Penang, Perak, Negri Sembilan and Malacca recorded a lower turn-out than the smaller constituencies. (Table 52) Unlike the other states where the contest was as keen in the smaller constituencies as in the larger constituencies, in the larger constituencies of Penang, Perak, Negri Sembilan and Malacca the contest was far more keen than in the smaller constituencies - it was in these seats that the opposition managed to win the ten seats it gained.

An examination of the turn-out in constituencies of differing intensity of contest, as reflected by the winning margin of the candidates lends further weight to the contention that elector turn-out was more in constituencies where the contest was keenest. (Table 53) Even though the competition was at its keenest in many of the larger constituencies where electoral turn-out was generally lower than elsewhere, the turn-out averaged slightly higher here than in the constituencies where the competition was less keen. The trend becomes even more established when the traditionally low turn-out Federal Territory constituencies are omitted from the calculation. On doing

Table 53

Turn-Out in Constituencies of Different Intensity of Contest, 1974
(Average Percentage)

Seat where winning candidate polled	Peninsular Malaysia	Peninsular Malaysia excluding Federal Territory
Less than 50%	75.12%	77.12%
50% - 55%	73.72%	75.92%
More than 55%	75.04%	75.43%

Source: Based on Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975, Appendix H, pp 144-158.

this it was found that constituencies where the candidates won by a minority vote record an average turn-out of 77.12%, as compared with 75.92% in constituencies where the winning candidate obtained between 50% and 55% of the votes polled; in constituencies where the winning candidate obtained more than 55% of the vote the turn-out averaged 75.43%.

In the 1974 election it appears that the turn-out of the non-Malay community was higher in comparison with that of the Malay community. Table 54 lists the turn-out in the constituencies according to the communal composition of the electorate. In constituencies where the non-Malay communities predominate there is a generally higher polling average than in the Malay majority constituencies. This difference in the turn-out was probably again due to the keenness of the competition for the non-Malay vote. The competition extended the Barisan Nasional, and the amount of political campaigning in the Malay dominated constituencies, were generally lower than they were in non-Malay dominated constituencies.

Rejected Votes

The percentage of rejected votes would normally reflect the extent of ignorance regarding voting procedures amongst voters. In the first parliamentary election held in independent Malaya on August 19, 1959 the rejected votes constituted only 1.1%. (Table 55) The Election Commission, comparing the voting in that election with that for the State Legislative Assemblies held two months earlier stated that "the most satisfactory aspect of any comparison ... must be the fact that the number of spoilt rejected votes dropped from 2.5% to 1.1% - a sure indication of the capacity of the electorate to learn quickly".¹ Subsequent elections have, however, seen an increase in

¹ Federation of Malaya, Election Commission, Report on the Parliamentary and State Elections, 1959, 1960, p. 7.

Table 54

Turn-Out in Constituencies of Differing Communal Composition, 1974

Percentage Non-Malay Community ₁	Average Percentage Turn-Out ₂
More than 90.01%	78.34
80.01% - 90%	75.83
70.01% - 80%	77.11
60.01% - 70%	73.97
50.01% - 60%	78.87
40.01% - 50%	74.49
30.01% - 40%	71.96
20.01% - 30%	75.16
10.01% - 20%	72.87
Less than 10%	74.93

Source: 1 Based on data included in Appendix 4.

2 Based on turn-out figures included in:
Malaysia, Election Commission, 1974 Election Report, 1975,
Appendix H, pp 144-158.

Table 55

Percentage Rejected Votes by States, State Election: 1959,
Parliamentary Elections 1959 - 1974 and State Election: 1974

State	1959		1964	1969	1974	
	State	Parliament	Parliament	Parliament	State	Parliament
Perlis	2.1	0.8	4.1	3.5	8.1	5.3
Kedah	4.0	1.2	4.3	3.8	4.5	4.8
Kelantan	1.9	0.8	4.1	3.1	5.5	4.9
Trengganu	3.6	1.3	4.3	5.0	7.1	6.2
Penang	1.9	1.0	2.8	5.9	3.9	3.9
Perak	2.2	1.2	4.2	4.9	4.9	4.1
Pahang	2.4	1.0	4.9	5.8	5.8	5.3
Selangor					5.8	5.1
Federal Territory	2.5	1.1	4.8	5.6	-	1.7
Negri Sembilan	2.3	1.0	4.6	6.6	4.7	5.5
Melaka	1.8	0.9	3.0	4.8	4.8	3.8
Johore	2.5	1.2	4.4	6.0	5.2	4.5
Peninsular Malaysia	2.5	1.1	4.2	4.9	5.2	4.4

Source: Malaysia, Election Commission, 1959, 1964, 1969 and 1974
Election Reports.

the percentage of 'rejected votes.

From 1964 the parliamentary and state elections have been held simultaneously and it was explained that such a system, which involves giving the voter two ballot papers at the same time, caused difficulties and resulted in an increase in the percentage of rejected votes in 1964.¹ In the 1969 election there was a campaign by the Labour Party to have the voters cast a blank vote and the Election Commission reported "that there were indications that the majority of the rejected ballots had been spoiled on purpose, presumably as a sign of protest".² With the 1974 election the voters, had already voted three times in simultaneous elections for the parliamentary and state seats. There was also no campaign for the casting of blank votes. The percentage of rejected votes continued to stay high, amounting to 4.42% of the total votes cast. The Election Commission for its part has not in its 1974 election report ventured to suggest any reasons for the continued high percentage of rejected votes.

An examination of the voting for the parliamentary election and that for the state election may offer an explanation. The turn-out itself was noted to be higher for the parliamentary election, this national trend repeating itself in forty-three of the sixty-eight constituencies where such comparisons could be made.³ This greater

1 Malaysia, Election Commission, Report on the Parliamentary (Dewan Ra'ayat) and State Legislative Assembly General Elections 1964 of the States of Malaya, 1965, p. 16.

2 Malaysia, Election Commission, Report on the Parliamentary (Dewan Ra'ayat) and State Legislative Assembly General Elections 1969 of the States of Malaya, Sabah, and Sarawak, 1972, p. 48.

3 Each parliamentary constituency in a state comprises of the whole of a number of state constituencies. This allows for comparisons to be made. However in 1974 of the eighty-two contested parliamentary seats fourteen had at least one component state seat where candidates were returned unopposed. These fourteen seats thus do not allow for comparisons of the sort attempted here.

interest in the parliamentary election may thus account for the larger percentage of rejected ballot papers. In only six of the comparable sixty-eight parliamentary constituencies was the number of rejected ballot papers higher than in the corresponding state constituencies. This lends support to the contention that there was greater enthusiasm and participation in the parliamentary election and also suggests that voters, not desiring to vote for one or the other of the elections are likely, on being given both the ballot papers, to spoil the ballot paper for the election in which they do not wish to participate. Such intentional spoiling of the ballot papers will inevitably raise the percentage of rejected votes in each of the elections that are held simultaneously. This, it is felt, must be a contributory factor, if not the sole explanation, for the increased percentage of spoilt votes since 1964, when elections for Parliament and the State Assemblies have been held simultaneously.

The Significance of the Results to the Parties

For Tun Abdul Razak and the Government the election results were justifiable grounds for jubilation. The Government had in Peninsular Malaysia obtained more than ninety per cent of the seats - a majority that must be the envy of any government in a parliamentary democracy. From a Government that lacked the support of more than half the voters in 1969 it had emerged in 1974 with the consent of more than sixty per cent of the voters. Especially after the nation's traumatic years following the communal riots of May 1969 and the measures adopted to overcome them, which included drastic constitutional changes, such show of support for the Government was considered important, if not essential. It equally vindicated the Government from many of the criticisms levelled against it during the years between the 1969 and 1974 elections.

What must be of concern to Malaysians, however, is that voting continued to be dominated by communal considerations and that despite twenty-five non-Malay candidates from the Barisan Nasional being elected, the Barisan Nasional obtained less than fifty per cent of the non-Malay vote. The problem is compounded by the fact that all the opposition candidates elected are Chinese. What emerged was a principally Malay-based Government and a wholly non-Malay, indeed Chinese, Opposition. The implications of this to national unity cannot be underestimated. It is in the light of this that the failure of Pekemas, which represented a more moderate and multi-racial approach to Malaysian politics than the DAP, is to be regretted. The Pekemas policies were rejected by the Malays (who found in the UMNO-PAS coalition the dream of Malay unity) and by the majority of the non-Malays, who were obviously more convinced by the DAP's more aggressive style and approach. A measure of comfort for those sympathetic to the Pekemas is that the party's loss came perhaps as much from tactical error as from a rejection of its policies. As a party formed only two years prior to the election, the party had undoubtedly overstretched its organizational capacity and resources in fielding thirty-five candidates. The election of the Pekemas President Tan Chee Koon, though certainly a personal vote, is nonetheless as much a victory for those in the Malaysian political arena who believe that a multi-racial approach, backed by effective and dedicated service, is a workable alternative.

For the DAP the election results, though unsatisfactory in terms of the number of seats it obtained, were nonetheless grounds for satisfaction. The party had managed to retain as many seats as it had when Parliament was dissolved, and win more than half of the non-Malay votes and a fifth of the total votes polled. With the Pekemas and Partai Rakyat unsuccessful in making inroads, the DAP was

established as the principal opposition party. Not surprisingly, the DAP called for the formation of a two-party system - Secretary General Lim Kit Siang told a press conference

"the political battle in Malaysia for the next five years would be between the DAP and the National Front.

The leaders and members of other Opposition parties should realise that the most sensible political decision was to join the DAP to present and enable a clear development of a two-party system."¹

The chances of such a development are, however, bleak; even if the idea would hold some attraction for the trounced Pekemas, it is difficult to envisage the Partai Rakyat agreeing. The Partai Rakyat, though unsuccessful in gaining a single seat, had, however, proved that its policies are at least not repugnant to thirty per cent of the Malay voters of Trengganu. For a party presenting a non-communal approach, such a measure of support in rural and tradition-based Trengganu gives cause for hope. Cynics may point to the lack of an alternative opposition party contending for the anti-Barisan Nasional vote as the grounds for the Partai Rakyat's gains. This certainly was an important contributory factor; but that a party labelled atheist and anti-Islam could pick up thirty per cent of the votes, even if they were largely anti-Barisan Nasional votes, must give sufficient grounds for optimism.

The results are as significant for the position of each of the Barisan Nasional's component parties vis à vis the other component parties. UMNO emerged as the principal party, having sixty-one of the 104 seats, and, with the fourteen PAS seats, the Malay-based parties had just under two-thirds (65.83%) of the seats in Peninsular Malaysia and just under half (48.70%) the seats in the Malaysian Parliament. For the MCA the election results were a remarkable

1 The Straits Times, August 31, 1974.

improvement over its performance of 1969. The party won twenty of its twenty-three seats, as compared with a mere thirteen out of thirty-three it contested in 1969. Thus, by having conceded to share the non-Malay seats with the Gerakan and PPP, the MCA managed actually to improve its position in Parliament. The MIC was similarly able to win all the four seats it contested. The 1974 election results thus showed, that the formation of the Barisan Nasional had been of immediate value to the old Alliance partners - the UMNO, the MCA and the MIC. They had between them eighty-five seats, approximately three-quarters of the seats in Peninsular Malaysia, and more than fifty-five per cent of the seats in the 154 member Malaysian House of Representatives. The Barisan Nasional had served as a vehicle for the traditional Alliance partners to improve markedly their own positions. In 1969 the Alliance partners had had between them only sixty-seven seats in a 144 member Parliament - a mere 46.53%. Viewed in terms of increasing Malay dominance in Parliament, of establishing UMNO in an unassailable position as the premier party, and of improving the position of UMNO's traditional non-Malay partners, the formation of the Barisan Nasional, the allocation of seats and the consequent election victory represents an unqualified success, and is perhaps, the best testimony to the political acumen of the late Tun Abdul Razak.

What did the election results hold for the new partners in the Government coalition - the Gerakan, the PPP and the PAS? For the Gerakan it meant that it was able to obtain five seats in Parliament as compared with the four it had when Parliament was dissolved. The party had been seriously handicapped by the split in its ranks and the formation of the Pekemas. Its 1969 performance had been principally due to its electoral understanding with the DAP and the PPP. Especially with the extreme unlikelihood of an electoral understanding

with the Pekemas and the DAP, the party is likely to have lost its seats to the Alliance at least on a minority vote. For a party doubtful of its own strength, the results must have proven satisfactory. To the PPP, however, the results proved to be a total setback from which it is unlikely to recover. The party was totally demolished, losing even the Ipoh and Menglembu seats - long regarded as its impregnable fortress. The only seat it retained, it did so by a minority vote. The PAS won all the fourteen seats it contested. In 1969, however, the party contesting on its own platform had won twelve seats, and it is conceivable that, with the increase in the Malay-dominated constituencies resulting from the 1974 constituency delimitation exercise, the party would have in 1974 obtained more; in 1969 the party had obtained no less than 23.74% of the votes polled, almost all of which were certainly Malay votes. It is difficult to visualize that a party that rivals UMNO in organization and appeal, will remain content with fourteen seats compared with UMNO's sixty-one. The newly elected Malaysian Parliament is likely to be dominated by developments in the UMNO-PAS relationship.

C O N C L U S I O N

Communalism is the all pervading and determining factor in the Peninsular Malaysian electoral process and its manifestations are everywhere apparent.

Political party evolution, organization and appeal are dictated by the constraints set by a divided polity. The statistics of Peninsular Malaysian pluralism and the political necessity to achieve political victories in order to obtain parliamentary majorities have led to the development of several permutations, all designed to elicit support from the different communal segments of society. Basically these can be reduced to three formulae: the closed party, the theoretically open party, and the inter-communal coalition.

The success of each of these three variations has depended upon their ability to convince an ethnocentric electorate of their ability to represent the electorates' conflicting demands. This the political parties have done by an exercise of communal discrimination in their organization and appeal; indeed communal discrimination is an integral part of party organization and appeal in Peninsular Malaysia.

Examination of the discrimination employed by the various parties in four major aspects of their organization - party membership requirements, party branch establishment, candidate selection and candidate placement - provided the framework for identifying the parties as having an appeal to and representing the interest of particular communities rather than that of others. The closed parties discriminated in all four aspects studied and catered for one community exclusively. Even in the case of the theoretically open parties which granted party membership to all Malaysian citizens regardless of race, discrimination in the other three areas examined was invariably found to be the case, albeit to a differing degree in each party. The most significant aspect of the organization and appeal of political parties in Peninsular Malaysia is that closed parties could achieve a

"balance of discrimination" by means of an inter-communal coalition. This in effect involved discrimination in favour of a particular community by one component party being offset by the discrimination in favour of other communities by the other component parties. At the time of the 1974 election this branch of politics was termed "consensus politics", and the overwhelming stature of the coalition and its control of the mass media provided it with the opportunity to present this advantageously as the solution to inter-communal strife.

The campaign strategy of the political parties in Peninsular Malaysia is primarily a function of their organizational mode. For the closed parties not restrained by a coalition it is a straightforward task of attempting to outbid each other as the champions of their respective communities by exaggerated demands on their behalf. For the open parties the alternatives are essentially either to appeal along multi-racial lines and risk rejection by all communities, or to surrender their avowedly multi-racial approach and for the immediate term appear to represent the interests of one particular community. The strategy of the inter-communal coalitions is based on their 'balance of discrimination'. This appeal is two fold: first that the dictates of Malaysian pluralism demand co-operation and unity, and second, that the respective communally discriminating components would represent and safeguard the particular interests of each community. This provides a powerful stimulus for the co-operation of ethnocentric leaders and electorates. At the parliamentary election of 1974 this appeal received overwhelming support. Just over sixty per cent of those who voted gave their approval to this approach, thereby indicating that the inter-communal coalition allows for a successful form of political organization in Peninsular Malaysia's plural society.

There are, however, limitations to such a mode of organization. Parties representing, exclusively or principally, the interest of

particular communities can pose effective threats by presenting the inevitable inter-communal coalition compromises as jeopardizing the interest of the communities they represent. Consequently, each erodes the support enjoyed by the inter-communal coalition. Such was evidenced in 1969 and a repeat of those circumstances, the Sedition Act and the constitutional amendments barring discussion of communally sensitive issues notwithstanding, are a distinct possibility. Related to this is the fact that the coalition must at least appear to carry into effect compromises that are equitable and do not smack of one community being advantaged at the expense of any other. If this does happen, the component coalition parties representing the disadvantaged communities are likely to sacrifice an increasing share of their support to the communal parties outside the coalition. A vicious spiral of decreasing support leading to decreasing political influence within the coalition and hence even more disadvantageous compromises becomes likely. It would appear from the 1974 election results that the non-Malay electorate indeed view the coalition as being weighted in favour of the Malay community - more than half the non-Malays who voted withheld their support from the inter-communal coalition. The ideal of the coalition calls for a correction of this image.

A further limitation, and one which is convincingly presented by the proponents of the open party is that the inter-communal coalition itself institutionalizes and perpetuates the communalism that exists. The continued existence of a communally divided society preempts the success of the closed parties and the inter-communal coalition. It is thus not difficult to understand that the interests of the closed parties and the inter-communal coalitions are to perpetuate the current state of Peninsular Malaysian politics. Any alternative paradigm is likely to be considered an anathema. The Partai Rakyat's presentation of Peninsular Malaysia's woes as the result of divisions

along lines of class rather than of race are thus particularly rejected.

The question as to whether the communalism that exists should be officially recognized through the provision of parliamentary representation is the principal issue confronting those who seriously ponder the communal problems of Peninsular Malaysian society. The dilemma may be expressed thus: are the communal divisions in Peninsular Malaysian society to be officially recognized and some form of explicit guarantees provided for the representation of the various communities, or are the divisions to be ignored in the hope that they would in time be overcome? This had essentially been the dilemma faced by those who had the momentous task of choosing an electoral system. They had opted to be hopeful rather than realistic. Hence, the electoral system chosen and still in use, which is plurality voting in single member territorial constituencies with a common electoral register, was not intended, and does not provide, for communal representation.

The lack of sensitivity to the need for minority representation and the manner in which the system is operated in Peninsular Malaysia, has introduced inequities of a kind that seriously question the validity of continuing the system. The working of the system, the electoral code and the regulations show many ways in which the machinery may fail, and in failing, destroy the faith of the public, or at least a significant portion of it, in the whole concept of democratic government.

The idea of the "consent of the governed" and the principle of "one man one vote" are accepted features of the Malaysian democratic system. But the dictates of communal fears, bargaining and compromise have restricted the concept of universal suffrage to a category of Malaysian who met the requirements of and obtained citizenship. Hence, the question: Whose consent is it that successive governments have to seek? This may provide ample occasion for parsimonious

criticism of the system. However, it is well to remember that the qualifications for citizenship were adopted as a result of political struggle and compromise, and theoretical arguments are only one factor, and perhaps not the most important, in decisions about the franchise. Other inequities have also arisen which are however not the result of specific understanding and consequently are grounds for legitimate concern and criticism.

Limitations on the exercise of the vote have also been imposed by the requirement to register as an elector, the onus for such registration resting not on the state but on the individual. For the 1974 election administrative mishandling led to the loss of the franchise by an estimated 115,000 persons who had registered as electors. The rules governing registration play a role in the number registered and thus ultimately the number voting. The effect of the formal and legal limitations in the franchise affect the different communities differently - the Malay community being advantaged and the non-Malay communities being conversely disadvantaged. That administrative arrangements in themselves could, and have affected the different communities differently is witnessed by the fact that, though an increased proportion of the non-Malays in the country have with time acquired citizenship and thus eligibility for the franchise, Malay dominance in the electoral registers have since 1969 shown an increase. Clearly a greater percentage of Malays than non-Malays eligible for the franchise have their names included in the electoral registers.

Even as the principles of universal suffrage and one man one vote are subject to limited interpretation and application, the ideal of one vote, one value has been subjected to calculated and systematic erosion. Arrangements for translating votes into legislative seats almost always work to benefit the party that obtains the greatest share

of votes. That the politically rich get richer is nowhere more marked than in elections utilizing plurality voting in single member territorial constituencies. Such is the mechanical effect of the system. The principles adopted in the apportionment of seats to the various states and the delineation of constituencies in Peninsular Malaysia however further severely distort the value of the vote, and introduce a rank discrimination based on the elector's location in space - the value of the vote is greatly enhanced with rural residence and diminished with urban residence. Rural weighting has been progressively amended and each amendment has allowed for an increased appreciation in the value of the rural vote vis-à-vis the urban vote. The 1974 delineation of constituencies made some rural votes as significant as almost three votes in some urban areas.

The implications of such distortions in the value of the votes is greatly compounded by the spatial distribution of the various communities. The states advantaged in the apportionment of seats are predominantly Malay and the states disadvantaged are predominantly non-Malay. Rural areas are overwhelmingly Malay and urban areas overwhelmingly non-Malay. Such residential segregation also makes for easy identification and bias in the delineation of constituencies. Gerrymandering was evidenced in the examination of the delineation undertaken for Selangor and Johore states. The total effect of the franchise rules and procedure, and the delimitation of constituencies greatly exaggerates Malay electoral strength and diminishes the non-Malay. From this follows significant corollaries.

Malay based political parties are able to obtain a majority in parliament well in excess of what Malay population numbers would suggest. At the time of the 1974 election the Malay community had an electoral majority in seventy-nine of the 114 parliamentary constituencies. Malay representation in Parliament was swollen to

almost two-thirds the total number of seats, though Malays comprise only just over half the total population. This exaggerates the political strength of the Malay based parties in the coalition and places them in an advantageous position vis-a-vis the non-Malay based parties in the coalition. In the 1974 election the inter-communal coalition, which like the other parties places candidates in the constituencies where their community predominates, placed a number of candidates from the non-Malay based parties of the coalition in constituencies with a Malay majority. This was done for a semblance of equitable representation within the coalition. Such a dependence by the non-Malay, on the Malay based parties, only serves to diminish their bargaining power within the coalition. This once again has the effect of increasing the number of disadvantageous compromises they have to make and therefore diminishing the support from the communities they claim to represent. Even more serious, the exaggeration of political strength of one community could lead to a one community government. The possibility of this was held out by the leaders of the Malay parties in extorting the non-Malay communities to lend support to the non-Malay based parties of the coalition.

The Chinese are a large minority and, furthermore, are sufficiently spatially concentrated to be able to exercise local domination through the electoral process, despite being in an inequitable position in the political system as a whole. In the urban constituencies of the west coast states of Peninsular Malaysia Chinese domination is complete. The marked disparity in the size of the electorate of urban and rural constituencies and the creation of the Federal Territory has meant that, the Chinese community comprises the dominant community in the majority of the constituencies in only one state. The fate of the other communities is even more disadvantaged under the present system. They are widely dispersed and hence there are no distinct local areas

in which their collective ethnic identity may be expressed.

The electoral system currently employed therefore places the minority groups in a difficult dilemma. If the members of the minority want to participate as fully equal members of the state, they have to subsume their differences within the larger group and play the political game according to the rules laid down by the majority. Such a strategy necessarily involves sacrificing their identity and culture. An alternative strategy would involve their retaining their own group identity and solidarity, and acting as a cohesive unit. This latter approach will none the less accentuate their separateness from the larger society and involve their continued isolation and political impotence. The manifestations of this dilemma are apparent on several scales. The various communities that are broadly classified as 'Indians' have to play down their separate group identities in order to achieve a measure of political influence as a corporate group. Even being so classified the group lacks sufficient spatial concentration to form a majority of the electors in any one constituency. Hence the conflicting approaches of being an impotent and very junior partner in the inter-communal coalition, and in other circumstances further subsuming their identity to join the Chinese in the even broader classification 'non-Malay'. Both approaches have in the Peninsular Malaysian context yielded opportunities for Indians to gain election to parliament. Even more significant is the fact that Peninsular Malaysian parliamentarians, and all candidates presented for election in the 1974 were of the three large racial groups - Malays, Chinese and Indians. No member of any community not included in these three broad categories has even been a parliamentarian, or was presented as a candidate by the parties in the 1974 election. The study then indicates that in the political wrangling, competition and consensus that is perpetuated in the present system amongst the major

communities, not only will there arise inequities among these three communities but small minorities tend to suffer. This is another major flaw of the system. It can be generalised thus: when a predominant portion of a democratic society's population demands sectarian welfare rather than general welfare, the less privileged strata, particularly the smaller minority groups, will lack the political influence to secure their own objectives. Clearly the electoral system, indeed the whole political system, may be responsive only in the sense that it is alert to the demands of the majority group and the larger of the minority groups. The responsiveness becomes a function of the population numbers of each community.


The data and discussion presented in this thesis indicate the grave possibility that the Peninsular Malaysian system is consistent with this contention and that there exists in the Malaysian democracy permanently entrenched minorities whose needs are not met or met only minimally. If such inequities hold consistently over time, they will give rise to what must surely be viewed as a serious or even fatal flaw in the Malaysian democratic system.

The dilemma that faces the student of the electoral process in Peninsular Malaysia today is still basically the same as that faced by those who were responsible for formulating it. Should the system be adapted to provide for equitable representation, with the risks of institutionalizing and perpetuating the communal cleavages? Or should the communal divisions in society be ignored in the hope that the divisions will soon be overcome? Those responsible for adopting the system felt, in the absence of any evidence to the contrary, sufficiently confident to opt to be hopeful. The problem that faces the student today is compounded by the fact that he has before him sufficient evidence that their hopes have neither been realised nor are likely to be met in the foreseeable future. Indeed the failure

to provide for minority representation has resulted in and will perpetuate serious inequities.

In the existing order not only the results, but also the initial chances of the different communities and the parties representing them are very different; they are affected by regulations of the electoral system which are beyond their control and can be altered only by government action. The parties in government, however, are the principal beneficiaries of the system and it does not take much insight to observe that politically frozen systems do not yield to ordinary methods of change: beneficiaries of an existing system cannot be expected to vote themselves out of office. The eventual solution would be for the courts to hear cases where equitable principles have not been followed.

APPENDICES



PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES UTILIZED
FOR THE 1969 ELECTION

Fig. 26

Appendix 1Parliamentary Constituencies Utilised for the 1969 Election.

The 104 constituencies utilised for the 1969 parliamentary election are indicated in the map adjoining this page. The constituency numbers on this map and all the 1969 constituency maps used in the text of the thesis, correspond to the following constituencies:

Perlis

- 1 Perlis Utara
- 2 Perlis Selatan

Kedah

- 3 Jitra Padang Terap
- 4 Kubang Pasu Barat
- 5 Kota Star Utara
- 6 Alor Star
- 7 Kuala Kedah
- 8 Kota Star Selatan
- 9 Kedah Tengah
- 10 Jerai
- 11 Baling
- 12 Sungai Petani
- 13 Kulim Utara
- 14 Kulim Bandar Bahru

Kelantan

- 15 Tumpat
- 16 Kelantan Hilir
- 17 Pasir Mas Hilir
- 18 Kota Bharu Hilir
- 19 Bachok
- 20 Kota Bharu Hulu
- 21 Pasir Mas Hulu
- 22 Pasir Puteh
- 23 Tanah Merah
- 24 Ulu Kelantan

Trengganu

- 25 Besut
- 26 Kuala Trengganu Utara
- 27 Kuala Trengganu Selatan
- 28 Dungun
- 29 Kemaman
- 30 Trengganu Tengah

Penang

- 31 Bagan
- 32 Seberang Tengah
- 33 Seberang Selatan
- 34 Penang Utara
- 35 Penang Selatan
- 36 Tanjung
- 37 Dato Kramat
- 38 Seberang Utara

Perak

- 39 Ulu Perak
- 40 Larut Utara
- 41 Krian Laut
- 42 Krian Darat
- 43 Larut Selatan
- 44 Hilir Perak
- 45 Kuala Kangsar
- 46 Sungei Siput
- 47 Parit
- 48 Bruas
- 49 Sitiawan
- 50 Ipoh

- 51 Menglembu
- 52 Ulu Kinta
- 53 Batu Gajah
- 54 Kampar
- 55 Tanjong Malim
- 56 Telok Anson
- 57 Bagan Datoh
- 58 Batang Padang

Pahang

- 59 Raub
- 60 Bentong
- 61 Kuantan
- 62 Pekan
- 63 Temerloh
- 64 Lipis

Selangor

- 65 Kuala Selangor
- 66 Batu
- 67 Kapar
- 68 Rawang
- 69 Langat
- 70 Setapak
- 71 Bungsar
- 72 Bukit Bintang
- 73 Damansara
- 74 Klang
- 75 Kuala Langat
- 76 Sepang
- 77 Sabak Bernam
- 78 Ulu Selangor

Negri Sembilan

- 79 Kuala Pilah
- 80 Seremban Timor
- 81 Remban / Tampin
- 82 Port Dickson
- 83 Jelebu - Jempol
- 84 Seremban Barat

Malacca

- 85 Malacca Tengah
- 86 Bandar Malacca
- 87 Malacca Utara
- 88 Malacca Selatan

Johore

- 89 Muar Dalam
- 90 Segamat Selatan
- 91 Muar Pantai
- 92 Muar Selatan
- 93 Batu Pahat
- 94 Batu Pahat Dalam
- 95 Kluang Utara
- 96 Johor Tenggara
- 97 Pontian Utara
- 98 Pontian Selatan
- 99 Kluang Selatan
- 100 Johor Bahru Timor
- 101 Johor Bahru Barat
- 102 Johor Timor
- 103 Segamat Utara
- 104 Muar Utara



PARLIAMENTARY CONSTITUENCIES
UTILIZED FOR THE
1974 ELECTION

Fig. 27

Appendix 2Parliamentary Constituencies Utilised for the 1974 Election.

The 114 constituencies utilised for the 1974 parliamentary election are indicated in the map adjoining this page. The constituency numbers of this map and all the 1974 constituency maps used in the text of the thesis correspond to the following constituencies:

Perlis

- 1 Kangar
- 2 Arau

Kedah

- 3 Jerlun-Langkawi
- 4 Kubang Pasu
- 5 Padang Terap
- 6 Kuala Kedah
- 7 Alor Setar
- 8 Kota Setar
- 9 Ulu Muda
- 10 Baling
- 11 Jerai
- 12 Kuala Muda
- 13 Sungai Petani
- 14 Padang Serai
- 15 Kulim - Bandar Bahru

Kelantan

- 16 Tumpat
- 17 Pengkalan Chepa
- 18 Pasir Mas
- 19 Kota Bharu
- 20 Bachok
- 21 Rantau Panjang
- 22 Nilam Puri
- 23 Tanah Merah
- 24 Machang
- 25 Pasir Puteh
- 26 Kuala Kerai
- 27 Ulu Kelantan

Trengganu

- 28 Besut
- 29 Ulu Nerus
- 30 Ulu Trengganu
- 31 Kuala Nerus
- 32 Kuala Trengganu
- 33 Dungun
- 34 Kemaman

Pulau Pinang

- 35 Kepala Batas
- 36 Mata Kuching
- 37 Permatang Pauh
- 38 Bukit Mertajam
- 39 Nibong Tebal
- 40 Balek Pulau
- 41 Bukit Bendera
- 42 Tanjung
- 43 Jelutong

Perak

- 44 Grik
- 45 Larut
- 46 Parit Buntar
- 47 Bagan Serai
- 48 Sungai Siput
- 49 Taiping
- 50 Matang
- 51 Padang Rengas
- 52 Kuala Kangsar
- 53 Kinta
- 54 Ipoh

- 55 Menglembu
- 56 Beruas
- 57 Parit
- 58 Batu Gajah
- 59 Batang Padang
- 60 Lumut
- 61 Hilir Perak
- 62 Telok Anson
- 63 Tanjong Malim
- 64 Bagan Datok

Pahang

- 65 Lipis
- 66 Jerantut
- 67 Kuantan
- 68 Raub
- 69 Maran
- 70 Bentong
- 71 Pekan
- 72 Temerloh

Selangor

- 73 Sabak Bernam
- 74 Tanjong Karang
- 75 Ulu Selangor
- 76 Kuala Selangor
- 77 Selayang
- 78 Ulu Langat
- 79 Pelabohan Kelang
- 80 Shah Alam
- 81 Petaling
- 82 Kuala Langat
- 83 Sepang

Wilayah Persekutuan

- 84 Kepong
- 85 Setapak
- 86 Damansara

- 87 Kuala Lumpur Bandar
- 88 Sungai Besi

Negri Sembilan

- 89 Jelebu
- 90 Mantin
- 91 Seremban
- 92 Kuala Pilah
- 93 Telok Kemang
- 94 Tampin

Melaka

- 95 Alor Gajah
- 96 Jasin
- 97 Batu Berendam
- 98 Kota Melaka

Johor

- 99 Labis
- 100 Segamat
- 101 Kluang
- 102 Tenggaraoh
- 103 Ledang
- 104 Pagoh
- 105 Ayer Hitam
- 106 Muar
- 107 Rengam
- 108 Panti
- 109 Sri Gading
- 110 Semerah
- 111 Batu Pahat
- 112 Pontian
- 113 Pulai
- 114 Johor Bahru

Appendix 3Communal Composition of the Electorate by Parliamentary Constituencies, 1969 Election.

The data presented below was obtained from the UMNO headquarters in Jalan Ipoh, Kuala Lumpur.

Name of Constituency	Malay Electorate	Chinese Electorate	Indians and others	Total Electorate
<u>PERLIS</u>				
1 Perlis Utara	21,797	5,128	1,030	27,955
2 Perlis Selatan	21,212	4,180	580	25,972
<u>KEDAH</u>				
3 Jitra/Padang Terap	30,746	3,056	1,972	35,774
4 Kubang Pasu Barat	24,336	2,536	405	27,277
5 Kota Star Utara	26,630	2,367	669	29,666
6 Alor Star	20,371	15,370	2,899	38,640
7 Kuala Kedah	30,772	5,692	438	36,902
8 Kota Star Selatan	26,764	3,510	1,776	32,050
9 Kedah Tengah	27,163	4,532	3,560	35,255
10 Jerai	26,921	4,630	299	31,850
11 Baling	29,980	3,727	2,492	36,199
12 Sungai Petani	13,617	10,145	4,839	28,601
13 Kulim Utara	15,211	5,903	4,731	25,845
14 Kulim/Bandar Bahru	16,339	9,871	4,054	30,264
<u>KELANTAN</u>				
15 Tumpat	29,490	1,369	277	31,136
16 Kelantan Hilir	30,712	292	54	31,058
17 Pasir Mas Hilir	28,330	1,063	183	29,576
18 Kota Bharu Hilir	32,582	6,477	423	39,482
19 Bachok	30,884	433	32	31,349
20 Kota Bharu Hulu	34,016	588	86	34,690
21 Pasir Mas Hulu	24,194	1,125	113	25,422
22 Pasir Puteh	32,961	604	47	33,612
23 Tanah Merah	36,866	1,589	500	38,955
24 Ulu Kelantan	34,465	2,962	1,130	38,557
<u>TRENGGANU</u>				
25 Besut	34,924	569	63	35,556
26 Kuala Trengganu Utara	30,096	90	4	30,190

Name of Constituency	Malay Electorate	Chinese Electorate	Indians and others	Total Electorate
27 Kuala Trengganu Selatan	22,514	6,495	426	29,435
28 Dungun	21,426	1,748	234	23,408
29 Kemaman	20,715	2,935	324	23,974
30 Trengganu Tengah	30,315	980	26	31,321
<u>PENANG</u>				
31 Bagan	7,661	13,183	3,950	24,794
32 Seberang Tengah	18,584	19,618	3,138	41,340
33 Seberang Selatan	9,810	10,870	3,865	24,545
34 Penang Utara	10,532	31,261	5,211	47,004
35 Penang Selatan	16,187	28,401	2,864	47,452
36 Tanjung	2,263	28,065	3,341	33,669
37 Dato Kramat	4,697	23,247	3,119	31,063
38 Seberang Utara	23,949	6,958	1,467	32,374
<u>PERAK</u>				
39 Ulu Perak	15,803	8,141	1,511	25,455
40 Larut Utara	23,496	4,691	3,480	31,667
41 Krian Laut	21,587	7,345	1,559	30,491
42 Krian Darat	20,154	4,766	4,593	29,513
43 Larut Selatan	16,451	24,735	6,080	47,266
44 Hilir Perak	16,653	350	681	17,684
45 Kuala Kangsar	21,964	8,825	2,286	33,075
46 Sungei Siput	7,766	10,688	3,263	21,717
47 Parit	22,752	1,585	903	25,240
48 Bruas	12,068	13,904	3,450	29,422
49 Sitiawan	7,889	16,633	3,413	27,935
50 Ipoh	4,422	30,092	6,206	40,720
51 Meglembu	6,792	41,443	3,594	51,829
52 Ulu Kinta	8,766	12,707	3,010	24,483
53 Batu Gajah	5,842	17,667	3,574	27,083
54 Kampar	10,046	26,746	3,739	40,531
55 Tanjung Malim	9,840	11,680	4,776	26,296
56 Telok Anson	10,164	19,674	5,639	35,477
57 Bagan Datok	16,048	5,223	4,970	26,241
58 Batang Padang	8,208	9,422	2,294	19,924

Name of Constituency	Malay Electorate	Chinese Electorate	Indians and others	Total Electorate
<u>PAHANG</u>				
59 Raub	13,297	13,386	2,635	29,318
60 Bentong	9,411	16,428	2,352	28,191
61 Kuantan	16,915	11,642	1,636	30,193
62 Pekan	21,742	1,562	267	23,571
63 Temerloh	23,942	7,937	1,173	33,052
64 Lipis	21,939	8,968	1,492	32,399
<u>SELANGOR</u>				
65 Kuala Selangor	20,040	6,898	4,039	30,977
66 Batu	8,634	35,947	5,502	50,083
67 Kapar	13,216	9,989	3,165	26,370
68 Rawang	7,112	12,098	5,558	24,768
69 Langat	11,919	9,164	2,058	23,141
70 Setapak	24,039	26,577	7,393	58,009
71 Bungsar	10,927	58,285	11,809	81,021
72 Bukit Bintang	15,215	32,616	4,598	52,429
73 Damansara	7,156	25,633	8,499	41,288
74 Klang	11,911	14,897	8,388	35,196
75 Kuala Langat	14,846	6,405	3,741	24,992
76 Sepang	7,212	9,718	3,901	20,831
77 Sabak Bernam	24,507	3,990	1,049	29,546
78 Ulu Selangor	7,653	9,488	3,694	20,835
<u>NEGRI SEMBILAN</u>				
79 Kuala Pilah	20,154	6,104	869	27,127
80 Seremban Timor	8,224	18,613	5,418	32,255
81 Remban/Tampin	18,223	6,242	2,701	27,166
82 Port Dickson	9,892	11,777	4,964	26,633
83 Jelebu-Jempol	14,276	13,112	2,341	29,729
84 Seremban Barat	7,604	15,816	4,501	17,921
<u>MALACCA</u>				
85 Malacca Tengah	22,705	11,948	966	35,619
86 Bandar Malacca	6,688	32,180	3,839	42,707
87 Malacca Utara	23,428	7,683	2,111	33,222
88 Malacca Selatan	21,007	11,672	3,551	36,230

Name of Constituency	Malay Electorate	Chinese Electorate	Indian and others	Total Electorate
<u>JOHORE</u>				
89 Muar Dalam	17,449	10,026	1,054	28,529
90 Segamat Selatan	10,777	15,124	3,841	29,742
91 Muar Pantai	13,622	16,110	816	30,548
92 Muar Selatan	29,293	5,584	87	34,964
93 Batu Pahat	10,586	15,858	555	26,999
94 Batu Pahat Dalam	22,072	10,041	548	32,661
95 Kluang Utara	7,986	15,047	2,307	25,340
96 Johor Tenggara	8,213	4,718	838	13,769
97 Pontian Utara	23,397	6,098	51	29,546
98 Pontian Selatan	15,363	12,335	222	27,920
99 Kluang Selatan	9,680	18,223	2,351	30,254
100 Johor Bahru Timor	14,604	11,091	3,059	28,754
101 Johor Bahru Barat	13,449	11,542	2,178	27,169
102 Johor Timor	11,583	6,327	409	18,319
103 Segamat Utara	8,609	11,654	1,630	21,893
104 Muar Utara	14,572	13,887	1,810	30,269

Appendix 4Communal Composition of the Electorate by Parliamentary Constituencies,
1974 Election.

The data presented here is based on the electoral registers utilized for the 1974 election. The registers were from the Election Commission head office in Kuala Lumpur. The electoral registers themselves do not indicate the community of the elector. The elector's community was identified by the elector's name - Malay, Chinese and Indian names are generally easily distinguished. A small margin of error, however, is unavoidable when such a method is adopted. An increasing number of Indian Muslims have names identical to those of Malays. Hence when the name provided is listed as Abdul Halim s/o Mohamad a form of writing the name not adopted by Malays, then it was identified as an Indian name. When the name was provided as Abdul Halim bin Mohamad it was identified as a Malay name. This latter form, it must be noted, is also being increasingly adopted by Indian Muslims. When the name appeared as Abdul Halim Mohamad it was again identified as a Malay name.

There is also a problem of differentiating between the names of Indians and Eurasians who are Christians - John Mathew, for instance, is common to both communities. For this reason, and because those who are not Malay, Chinese or Indian comprise a very small percentage of the total population (in 1970 they comprised only 0.78%) they have been included with the category Indian.

Name of Constituency	Malay Electorate	Chinese Electorate	Indians and others	Total Electorate
<u>PERLIS</u>				
1 Kangar	23,560	4,894	802	29,256
2 Arau	25,692	3,415	358	29,465
<u>KEDAH</u>				
3 Jerlun Langkawi	28,306	2,321	325	30,952
4 Kubang Pasu	28,475	3,614	1,717	33,806
5 Padang Terap	26,269	1,499	1,279	29,047
6 Kuala Kedah	29,597	5,401	290	35,288
7 Alor Star	20,956	13,842	2,380	37,178
8 Kota Setar	24,970	3,156	159	28,285

Name of Constituency	Malay Electorate	Chinese Electorate	Indians and others	Total Electorate
9 Ulu Muda	21,702	1,948	1,604	25,254
10 Baling	28,989	3,049	1,293	33,331
11 Jerai	24,820	4,123	322	29,265
12 Kuala Muda	18,906	5,652	4,161	28,719
13 Sungai Petani	21,210	11,156	4,760	37,126
14 Padang Serai	13,963	5,688	4,585	24,236
15 Kulim Bandar Bahru	15,830	8,208	3,760	27,798
<u>KELANTAN</u>				
16 Tumpat	32,164	1,367	188	33,719
17 Pengkalan Chepa	26,847	341	51	27,239
18 Pasir Mas	28,507	1,039	81	29,627
19 Kota Bharu	28,779	6,694	481	35,954
20 Bachok	27,768	447	6	28,221
21 Rantau Panjang	21,302	684	28	22,014
22 Nilam Puri	27,953	565	7	28,525
23 Tanah Merah	18,681	889	432	20,002
24 Machang	22,543	853	17	23,413
25 Pasir Puteh	27,501	572	11	28,084
26 Kuala Krai	15,166	1,609	557	17,332
27 Ulu Kelantan	16,284	1,126	68	17,478
<u>TRENGGANU</u>				
28 Besut	27,349	539	56	27,944
29 Ulu Nerus	23,614	244	33	23,891
30 Ulu Trengganu	22,141	334	22	22,497
31 Kuala Nerus	25,391	213	28	25,632
32 Kuala Trengganu	28,031	3,983	377	32,391
33 Dungun	23,490	1,450	262	25,202
34 Kemaman	22,935	2,985	292	26,212
<u>PENANG</u>				
35 Kepala Batas	16,418	5,434	1,066	22,918
36 Mata Kuching	10,878	16,291	4,819	31,988
37 Permatang Pauh	18,103	4,011	549	22,663
38 Bukit Mertajam	9,035	18,148	2,838	30,021
39 Nibong Tebal	10,533	11,066	3,733	25,332

Name of Constituency	Malay Electorate	Chinese Electorate	Indians and others	Total Electorate
40 Balik Pulau	16,499	12,804	1,807	31,110
41 Bukit Bendera	6,304	30,333	4,258	40,895
42 Tanjong	2,054	35,229	4,126	41,409
43 Jelutong	8,983	28,909	4,912	42,804
<u>PERAK</u>				
44 Gerik	10,844	5,651	785	17,280
45 Larut	16,495	3,211	1,308	21,014
46 Parit Buntar	23,332	7,819	1,625	32,776
47 Bagan Serai	22,122	4,800	4,195	31,117
48 Sungai Siput	9,061	11,956	3,319	24,336
49 Taiping	11,531	19,605	5,183	36,319
50 Matang	15,749	8,445	2,699	26,893
51 Padang Rengas	16,707	4,874	1,114	22,695
52 Kuala Kangsar	13,304	6,554	1,598	21,456
53 Kinta	18,692	23,478	4,493	46,663
54 Ipoh	3,800	37,996	6,266	48,062
55 Menglembu	7,434	38,112	3,492	49,038
56 Beruas	8,295	12,189	2,566	23,050
57 Parit	19,650	8,851	1,019	29,520
58 Batu Gajah	6,783	25,797	3,856	36,436
59 Batang Padang	10,204	10,046	2,251	22,501
60 Lumut	8,316	16,514	3,299	28,129
61 Hilir Perak	22,149	4,033	991	27,173
62 Telok Anson	8,411	14,225	4,529	27,165
63 Tanjong Malim	11,151	11,300	4,220	26,671
64 Bagan Datok	18,212	4,875	5,184	28,271
<u>PAHANG</u>				
65 Lipis	15,060	8,115	2,782	25,957
66 Jerantut	19,193	4,977	670	24,840
67 Kuantan	16,444	10,010	1,346	27,800
68 Raub	12,430	9,068	1,140	22,638
69 Maran	18,288	3,803	478	22,569
70 Bentong	9,142	15,108	1,970	26,220
71 Pekan	20,676	1,176	118	21,970
72 Temerloh	15,569	10,592	1,323	27,484

Name of Constituency	Malay Electorate	Chinese Electorate	Indians and others	Total Electorate
<u>SELANGOR</u>				
73 Sabak Bernam	17,205	3,688	1,450	22,343
74 Tanjong Karang	20,127	4,200	330	24,657
75 Ulu Selangor	10,928	10,745	5,149	26,822
76 Kuala Selangor	15,429	5,462	6,406	27,297
77 Selayang	18,784	17,601	4,478	40,863
78 Ulu Langat	12,281	13,159	2,487	27,927
79 Pelabohan Kelang	16,061	12,182	5,216	33,459
80 Shah Alam	11,845	18,900	10,486	41,231
81 Petaling	9,512	32,686	5,731	47,929
82 Kuala Langat	12,753	6,401	3,278	22,432
83 Sepang	11,845	6,128	4,420	22,393
<u>WILAYAH PERSEKUTUAN</u>				
84 Kepong	5,430	23,461	4,391	33,282
85 Setapak	22,331	9,372	3,089	34,792
86 Damansara	10,959	15,423	6,680	33,062
87 Kuala Lumpur Bandar	2,766	26,714	2,841	32,321
88 Sungai Besi	6,856	29,776	3,857	40,489
<u>NEGRI SEMBILAN</u>				
89 Jelebu	15,447	8,864	1,201	25,512
90 Mantin	13,177	10,061	4,632	27,870
91 Seremban	8,679	25,901	6,151	40,731
92 Kuala Pilah	19,224	5,657	1,138	26,019
93 Telok Kemang	10,668	11,096	5,220	26,984
94 Tampin	17,805	10,484	3,312	31,601
<u>MALACCA</u>				
95 Alor Gajah	25,462	8,178	2,048	35,688
96 Jasin	21,429	9,037	3,261	33,727
97 Batu Berendang	25,147	11,591	1,176	37,914
98 Kota Melaka	11,067	29,968	3,335	44,370

Name of Constituency	Malay Electorate	Chinese Electorate	Indians and others	Total Electorate
<u>JOHOR</u>				
99 Labis	13,113	9,509	2,847	25,469
100 Segamat	12,963	15,478	1,711	30,152
101 Keluang	8,908	21,402	4,445	34,755
102 Tenggaraoh	10,528	6,426	425	17,379
103 Ledang	14,543	10,502	805	25,850
104 Pagoh	14,311	8,777	1,192	24,280
105 Ayer Hitam	15,648	9,488	904	26,040
106 Muar	23,240	17,445	837	41,522
107 Rengam	10,076	22,555	2,968	35,599
108 Panti	15,532	7,153	876	23,561
109 Sri Gading	20,858	5,395	392	26,645
110 Semerah	20,862	7,865	144	28,871
111 Batu Pahat	19,457	13,691	566	33,714
112 Pontian	23,151	12,194	320	35,665
113 Pulai	19,228	13,799	1,317	34,344
114 Johore Bharu	27,964	18,770	4,800	51,534

Appendix 5

Communal Composition of the Electorate, Johore Constituencies
Delineated by the Election Commission and Included in its Report
dated July 20, 1974.

The total electorate of these constituencies are as they would have been at the time of the 1974 Parliamentary and State Elections, and not as indicated in the Election Commission's report. This was calculated by totalling the electorate in each of the polling districts that comprised these constituencies as indicated in the electoral register utilized for the 1974 elections. The communal composition was also similarly calculated.

Parliamentary Seats - Numbered 99 - 114

State Seats - Numbered 1 - 32

		Total Electorate	Malay %	Chinese %	Indians and others %
99	Segamat	23,597	40.95	51.53	7.52
	1 Buloh Kasap	11,677	41.70	42.23	10.07
	2 Bandar Segamat	11,920	34.35	60.63	5.02
100	Labis	32,658	38.90	48.45	12.64
	3 Ayer Panas	18,709	50.65	42.03	7.32
	4 Bekok	13,949	23.15	57.07	19.78
101	Tenggaroh	17,379	60.58	36.98	2.44
	5 Endau	8,399	69.09	29.91	1.00
	6 Mersing	8,980	52.63	43.59	3.79
102	Ledang	30,362	50.67	44.06	5.27
	7 Tangkak	15,980	42.36	47.86	9.78
	8 Serom	14,382	59.90	39.83	0.26
103	Pagoh	28,839	63.23	33.08	3.68
	9 Bukit Serampang	15,490	66.01	30.86	3.13
	10 Jorak	13,345	60.01	35.66	4.32
104	Yong Peng	28,810	66.36	31.67	1.96
	11 Ayer Hitam	13,602	55.04	42.48	2.47
	12 Sri Gading	15,208	76.49	22.00	1.51
105	Kluang	32,163	35.37	55.18	9.45
	13 Lambak	17,231	23.75	65.34	10.91
	14 Sri Lalang	14,932	48.79	43.45	7.77

		Total Electorate	Malay %	Chinese %	Indians and others %
106	Muar	39,644	51.09	46.37	2.54
	15 Bandar Maharani	23,674	42.52	54.39	3.09
	16 Parit Bakar	15,970	63.79	34.48	1.72
107	Semerah	25,326	89.12	10.78	0.10
	17 Sri Medan	12,405	91.94	7.95	0.11
	18 Sri Menanti	12,921	86.41	13.51	0.09
108	Panti	23,561	65.92	30.36	3.72
	19 Kota Tinggi	12,506	63.14	32.30	4.56
	20 Johore Lama	11,055	69.07	28.16	2.77
109	Batu Pahat	36,218	52.74	45.84	1.42
	21 Peserai	15,156	75.32	24.49	0.20
	22 Bandar Penggaram	21,062	36.49	61.21	2.30
110	Kulai	33,893	32.19	56.71	11.10
	23 Simpang Renggam	18,032	40.49	44.61	14.90
	24 Senai	15,861	22.74	70.47	6.79
111	Benut	31,889	78.21	21.68	0.11
	25 Rengit	14,640	78.93	21.00	0.07
	26 Ayer Bator	17,249	77.60	22.26	0.14
112	Pontian	30,496	53.32	45.66	1.02
	27 Pekan Nenas	12,806	56.28	43.61	0.11
	28 Kukup	17,690	51.18	47.14	1.68
113	Pulai	31,153	51.91	41.42	6.67
	29 Glang Patah	10,923	42.83	49.85	7.32
	30 Tampoi	20,230	56.81	36.88	6.31
114	Johore Bahru	49,392	53.34	37.13	9.53
	31 Tiram	16,790	62.78	21.82	15.40
	32 Tanjung Petri	32,602	48.48	45.01	6.51

Appendix 6Political Party Branches by Parliamentary Constituencies, August 1974

The data included below was compiled from the files maintained by the Registrar of Societies, Malaysia. The branches listed here are those already officially registered. The files from which the data were derived are:

<u>Political Party</u>	<u>File Number</u>
Malaysian Indian Congress (MIC)	456/49
United Malay National Organisation (UMNO)	457/49
Malaysian Chinese Association (MCA)	1047/50
Persatuan Islam Sa. Malaya (PAS)	26/52
People's Progressive Party (PPP)	21/53
Partai Sosialis Rakyat Malaya (Partai Rakyat)	326/55
Democratic Action Party (DAP)	43/66
Gerakan Rakyat Malaysia (Gerakan)	226/68
Partai Marhaen (Marhaen)	589/68
Partai Keadilan Masyarakat (Pekemas)	876/71
Kesatuan Insaf Tanah Ayer (KITA)	99/74
Barisan Nasional	320/74
Independent People's Progressive Party (IPPP)	345/74

		UMNO	PAS	MCA	MIC	Alliance	Gerakan	PPP	Partai Rakyat	Pekemas	DAP	Marhaen	KITA
1	Kangar	64	39	6	4	1	1		5				
2	Arau	78	54	5	1				3				
3	Jerlun Langkawi	85	37	4	1								
4	Kubang Pasu	38	26	7	1	1	1		1				
5	Padang Terap	28	14	4	1								
6	Kuala Kedah	51	22	2									
7	Alor Star	58	44	9	5	1	2		1	1	1		
8	Kotar Setar	36	36	5									
9	Ulu Muda	30	18	2									
10	Baling	2	16	5	3	1							
11	Jerai	33	82	5	1		1		1			1	
12	Kuala Muda	32	7	2	1								
13	Sungai Petani	22	8	8	2	1	3		1				
14	Padang Serai	12	11	7	2								
15	Kulim Bandar Bahru	42	35	7	4	2	1						

		UMNO	PAS	ICM	MIC	Alliance	Gerakan	PPP	Partai Rakyat	Pekemas	DAP	Marhaen	KITA
16	Tumpat	41	57	2	1	1							
17	Pengkalan Chepa	33	43										
18	Pasir Mas	40	115	3		1	1						
19	Kota Bharu	36	100	5	2	2			3				
20	Bachok	31	43	1		1							
21	Rantau Panjang	49	16	2									
22	Nilam Puri	36	80	3		1							
23	Tanah Merah	37	43	3	1	1							
24	Machang	26	50	2		1							
25	Pasir Puteh	100	51			1			1				
26	Kuala Kerai	34	24	3		1			1				
27	Ulu Kelantan	34	25	2	1								
28	Besut	79	46	3					2				
29	Ulu Nerus	21	19	-									
30	Ulu Trengganu	49	26	2					1				
31	Kuala Nerus	55	5	5					1				
32	Kuala Trengganu	70	20	7	1	2			2				
33	Dungun	29	36	6	1				2				
34	Kemaman	25	12	4		1							
35	Kepala Batas	12	14	15	6	2	7			2	3		
36	Mata Kuching	16	4	11	5	2	6		2	2	1		1
37	Permatang Pauh	24	8	6	2	1	4		2	1	1		
38	Bukit Mertajam	19	5	13	3		10		5	2			
39	Nibong Tebal	15	1	7	4	2	3		1	3			
40	Balik Pulau	4	3	14	4		5		2	3	2		
41	Bukit Bendera	8		9	6	1	6		1	2	2		
42	Tanjong	10		7	2	1	6		1	2	2		1
43	Jelutong	9		8	2	2	9		1	2	2		
44	Grik	33	5	2	2		1						
45	Larut	52	44	3	4	1	1		2				
46	Parit Buntar	37	54	8	5	1		1					
47	Bagan Serai	36	60	5	5	1							
48	Sungai Siput	21	1	7	5	1	2	3			5		
49	Taiping	25	18	15	10	1	5			1	2		
50	Matang	18	7	3	1	1							

		UMNO	PAS	MCA	MIC	Alliance	Gerakan	PPP	Partai Rakyat	Pekemas	DAP	Marhaen	KITA
51	Padang Rengas	36	23	8	2	1	2	1			1		
52	Kuala Kangsar	30	24	8	2	1	4	1	2	1	3	1	
53	Kinta	33	12	16	13	1	5	4	1	1	7		
54	Ipoh	6	6	15	12	4	4	4	2	2	7		
55	Menglembu	7		7		1	3	4		1	5		
56	Beruas	19	4	7	5	1	2	1			2		
57	Parit	7	23	4	4	1		1			3		
58	Batu Gajah	11	4	14	5	2	4	4			6		
59	Batang Padang	26	3	10	5	1	2	2			1		
60	Lumut	2	1	10	7	1	1				2		
61	Hilir Perak	61	8	2	1	1		3				1	
62	Telok Anson	95	26	9	11	2	4	1			8	1	
63	Tanjong Malim	18	11	9	12	1	3		1		3		
64	Bagan Datok	43	22	11	15	1	2				1		
65	Lipis	49	9	14	6	1							
66	Jerantut	12	25	10	2								
67	Kuantan	22	27	9	1	1	1		1		1		
68	Raub	33	6	9	3	1			2				
69	Maran	31	4	4	1				2				
70	Bentong	23	1	12	4	1	1		1		1		
71	Pekan	49	30	4	2	2							
72	Temerloh	61	6	10	4	2			6	1	4		
73	Sabak Bernam	23	11	9	4	1					3		
74	Tanjong Karang	12	16	5	2		3				2		
75	Ulu Selangor	18	2	11	7				2	2	1		
76	Kuala Selangor	33	11	8	9						1		
77	Selayang	24	3	11	11	2	4				3	2	6
78	Ulu Langat	56	2	10	4	1	3		3	2	1	1	
79	Pelabohan Kelang	40	12	15	10	1	3				1	2	
80	Shah Alam	6	4	21	15	1	4				3	3	
81	Petaling	10	4	15	10	1	7		2	4	6		
82	Kuala Langat	28	16	3	4	1							
83	Sepang	8	1	6	4	1						1	1
84	Kepong	17		7	3		3				1	2	
85	Setapak	18		4	4	1	1				2	1	1
86	Damansara	18	1	6	6	1	1		2	3	1	1	

		UMNO	PAS	MCA	MIC	Alliance	Gerakan	PPP	Partai Rakyat	Pekemas	DAP	Marhaen	KITA
87	Kuala Lumpur Bandar	9	4	21	12	3	2	1	2	3	5		
88	Sungai Besi	3	1	3	5		1				2		
89	Jelebu	48	4	7	10	1					2		
90	Mantin	21	3	9	15	1			2		3		
91	Seremban	26	3	25	14	3	6	1	1	1	7		
92	Kuala Pilah	43	16	12	1	1	1		1		2		
93	Telok Kemang	19	7	18	15	1	2	1		1	3		
94	Tampin	23	14	11	14	1	1				2		
95	Alor Gajah	44	19	13	8	1			1	3	2		
96	Jasin	45	28	14	7	1	1		2	5	1		
97	Batu Berendang	55	26	13	5	1			1	4	3		
98	Kota Melaka	72	4	16	5	5	7		2	6	7		
99	Labis	19	2	6	6	1	2			1	4		
100	Segamat	43	2	10	7	1	1		1		6		
101	Kluang	26	1	11	7	1	1		3		2		
102	Tenggaroh	23	2	7	2	1				2	1		
103	Ledang	45	1	6	5	1							
104	Pagoh	17	1	5	4	1					2		
105	Ayer Hitam	19	3	5	1	1	1						
106	Muar	66	7	33	6	1	1		5		2		
107	Rengam	14		5		1							
108	Panti	33	2	8	1	1	1		1	2			
109	Sri Gading	15	1	12	8	1					3		
110	Semerah	14	8	2	1						1		
111	Batu Pahat	64	19	20	2	1	2			1	3		
112	Pontian	42	4	10	3	1					1		
113	Pulai	25	2	4	4	1				1	2		
114	Johore Bharu	34	2	13	12	3	2		1	1	3		

Appendix 7The 1974 Electoral Contest - Political Parties and Independents (Ind)
Contesting by Constituency

1	Kangar	BN - Partai Rakyat - Ind (Malay)
2	Arau	BN - Ind (Malay)
3	Jerlun-Langkawi	BN
4	Kubang Pasu	BN
5	Padang Terap	BN
6	Kuala Kedah	BN - Partai Rakyat - Ind (Malay)
7	Alor Setar	BN - DAP
8	Kota Setar	BN - Ind (Malay) - Ind (Malay)
9	Ulu Muda	BN
10	Baling	BN
11	Jerai	BN
12	Kuala Muda	BN
13	Sungai Petani	BN - KITA
14	Padang Serai	BN
15	Kulim - Bandar Bahru	BN - Ind (Malay)
16	Tumpat	BN - Bebas Bersatu
17	Pengkalan Chepa	BN - Bebas Bersatu
18	Pasir Mas	BN - Bebas Bersatu
19	Kota Bharu	BN
20	Bachok	BN
21	Rantau Panjang	BN - Bebas Bersatu
22	Nilam Puri	BN - Bebas Bersatu
23	Tanah Merah	BN
24	Machang	BN - Bebas Bersatu
25	Pasir Puteh	BN - Bebas Bersatu
26	Kuala Kerai	BN - Bebas Bersatu
27	Ulu Kelantan	BN
28	Besut	BN
29	Ulu Nerus	BN - Partai Rakyat
30	Ulu Trengganu	BN - Partai Rakyat - Ind (Malay)
31	Kuala Nerus	BN - Partai Rakyat - Ind (Malay)
32	Kuala Trengganu	BN - Partai Rakyat - Ind (Malay)
33	Dungun	BN - Partai Rakyat
34	Kemaman	BN - Partai Rakyat
35	Kepala Batas	BN
36	Mata Kuching	BN - DAP - Pekemas

37	Permatang Pauh	BN - Pekemas - Partai Rakyat
38	Bukit Mertajam	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Partai Rakyat - KITA
39	Nibong Tebal	BN - DAP - Pekemas
40	Balek Pulau	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Partai Rakyat
41	Bukit Bendera	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Partai Rakyat
42	Tanjong	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Partai Rakyat
43	Jelutong	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Partai Rakyat
44	Grik	BN
45	Larut	BN - Ind (Malay)
46	Parit Buntar	BN - Ind (Malay)
47	Bagan Serai	BN
48	Sungai Siput	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Ind (Indian)
49	Taiping	BN - DAP - Pekemas - KITA
50	Matang	BN - DAP - Pekemas - KITA
51	Padang Rengas	BN
52	Kuala Kangsar	BN - DAP - Pekemas
53	Kinta	BN - DAP - Ind (Malay) - Ind (Chinese)
54	Ipoh	BN - DAP - Ind (Chinese)
55	Menglembu	BN - DAP - Ind (Chinese)
56	Beruas	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Ind (Chinese)
57	Parit	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Ind (Malay)
58	Batu Gajah	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Ind (Malay)
59	Batang Padang	BN - DAP
60	Lumut	BN - DAP - Ind (Chinese)
61	Hilir Perak	BN - Pekemas
62	Telok Anson	BN - DAP - Pekemas
63	Tanjong Malim	BN - DAP - Pekemas
64	Bagan Datok	BN - Pekemas
65	Lipis	BN
66	Jerantut	BN
67	Kuantan	BN - Partai Rakyat - Ind (Chinese)
68	Raub	BN - DAP
69	Maran	BN - Partai Rakyat
70	Bentong	BN - DAP - Partai Rakyat
71	Pekan	BN
72	Temerloh	BN - Partai Rakyat
73	Sabak Bernam	BN - Ind (Malay)
74	Tanjong Karang	BN
75	Ulu Selangor	BN - DAP
76	Kuala Selangor	BN - Ind (Malay)

77	Selayang	BN - DAP - Pekemas
78	Ulu Langat	BN - DAP - Pekemas
79	Pelabohan Kelang	BN - DAP - Pekemas
80	Shah Alam	BN - DAP - Pekemas
81	Petaling	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Ind (Chinese)
82	Kuala Langat	BN
83	Sepang	BN - Pekemas
84	Kepong	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Ind (Chinese)
85	Setapak	BN - DAP - Pekemas
86	Damansara	BN - DAP - Pekemas
87	Kuala Lumpur Bandar	BN - DAP - Pekemas
88	Sungai Besi	BN - DAP - Pekemas
89	Jelebu	BN - DAP - Ind (Malay)
90	Mantin	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Partai Rakyat - Ind (Malay)
91	Seremban	BN - DAP
92	Kuala Pilah	BN
93	Telok Kemang	BN - DAP - Pekemas - IPPP
94	Tampin	BN
95	Alor Gajah	BN - Pekemas
96	Jasin	BN - Pekemas
97	Batu Berendam	BN - Partai Rakyat - Ind (Malay)
98	Kota Melaka	BN - DAP - Pekemas - Partai Rakyat
99	Labis	BN
100	Segamat	BN - DAP
101	Kluang	BN - DAP
102	Tenggaroh	BN
103	Ledang	BN
104	Pagoh	BN
105	Ayer Hitam	BN
106	Muar	BN - DAP
107	Rengam	BN - DAP
108	Panti	BN
109	Sri Gading	BN
110	Semerah	BN - Ind (Malay)
111	Batu Pahat	BN - DAP - Ind (Malay)
112	Pontian	BN
113	Pulai	BN - Partai Rakyat
114	Johor Bahru	BN - DAP

Appendix 8Election Expenses Incurred by Two Barisan Nasional Parliamentary Candidates

The election expenses accounts of the two candidates indicated below are not the ones submitted to the Election Commission as required by law. They were divulged to this writer in confidence and for that reason the identity of the candidates cannot be revealed. The expenses indicated below were in addition to any material support (posters of party symbols, public address systems, etc.) provided by the party.

Account A

Candidate - Sought election for the first time in 1974 and was successful.

Constituency - Urban with no community comprising an absolute majority of the electorate (plurality). Thus the non-Malays as a whole comprise an absolute majority.

Expenses -

1 Campaign Expenses for Party Members

(a) To UMNO branches and workers	RM 20,143.00	
(b) To MIC branches and workers	RM 6,140.00	
(c) To Chinese workers	RM 8,753.00	
		RM 35,036.00

2 Polling Day Expenses

(a) Polling agents, guides and helpers	RM 3,445.00	
(b) Transport expenses - petrol, drivers, and payments to drivers with cars	RM 8,968.00	
(c) Polling booths	RM 4,750.00	
		RM 17,163.00

3 Printing Expenses

(a) Handbills (30,000 copies)	RM 3,000.00	
(b) Personal posters - with candidate's photograph and party symbol (10,000 copies)	RM 3,000.00	
(c) Electors Card - 1 per elector	RM 909.00	
		RM 6,909.00

4 General Expenses

(a) Temporary drivers and vans rental	₹ 1,842.00	
(b) Temporary staff	₹ 215.00	
(c) Tea parties to meet voters	₹ 1,500.00	
(d) Public rallies	₹ 1,100.00	
(e) Rental of Hall	₹ 530.00	
(f) Office rental	₹ 300.00	
(g) Furniture rental	₹ 118.20	
(h) Refreshments for visitors, : campaign workers, etc.	₹ 4,613.55	
(i) Nomination deposit	₹ 1,000.00	

 ₹11,218.75
5 Miscellaneous Expenses

 ₹ 165.55

Total Expenditure

 ₹70,492.30

Account B

Candidate - Sought re-election and was unsuccessful.

Constituency - Urban with an absolute Chinese majority amongst electorate.

Expenses -

1 <u>Campaign Expenses for Party Members</u>	₹ 2,500.00
2 <u>Polling Day Expenses</u>	
(a) Polling Agents, guides and helpers	₹ 2,200.00
(b) Transport expenses (sixty cars for conveyance of voters at ₹ 40.00 each)	₹ 2,400.00
(c) Polling booths construction (40 booths at ₹ 30.00 each)	₹ 1,200.00

 ₹ 7,800.00

3 Printing Expenses

- | | |
|---|------------|
| (a) Handbills | ₹ 1,500.00 |
| (b) Personal posters - with
candidate's photograph and
party symbol | ₹ 2,000.00 |
| (c) Election cards (50,000) | ₹ 1,000.00 |

 ₹ 4,500.00
4 General Expenses

- | | |
|---|------------|
| (a) Staff for addressing and
distributing election cards | ₹ 1,500.00 |
| (b) Banners | ₹ 500.00 |
| (c) Public Rallies (forty rallies
at ₹ 75.00 each) | ₹ 3,000.00 |
| (d) Headquarters expenditure | ₹ 150.00 |
| (e) Badges for party workers | ₹ 400.00 |
| (f) Nomination deposit | ₹ 1,000.00 |

 ₹ 6,550.00
5 Miscellaneous Expenses

₹ 1,000.00

Total Expenditure

 ₹ 19,850.00
 =====

Appendix 9Electoral Behaviour Code

As has been customary for each election, the Election Commission in August 1974 invited all political parties to a meeting to formulate an electoral code of conduct. Only the Barisan Nasional, the Democratic Action Party and the Pekemas attended the meeting. The Police were also invited and were present. The Electoral Behaviour Code listed below was agreed to by the three parties. Subsequently the Partai Rakyat also pledged to abide by the Code.

- 1 Exemplary behaviour should be set by political leaders, candidates, their election and other agents, supporters, helpers and workers.
- 2 Personal criticisms levelled against any individual should be confined only to his political activities and views.
- 3 Political speakers should reply to their opponents from their own platforms.
- 4 The wearing of distinctive headgear and uniform clothing by persons collectively should be avoided.
- 5 The race or religion of any individual should not be mentioned with the intention of ridiculing, insulting or bring him into contempt.
- 6 The carrying of weapons by candidates, their election and other agents, supporters, helpers and workers should be considered to be wholly undesirable.
- 7 Political leaders, candidates, their election and other agents, supporters, helpers and workers should refrain from tearing down or defacing election posters and/or banners of rival parties or candidates.
- 8 Political leaders and candidates should ensure that all posters and/or banners put up on their behalf are removed immediately after the elections. It is preferable posters should be mounted on wooden frames or boards and hung or stuck to the ground as a placard.

- 9 Political leaders and candidates should avoid using or employing members of Secret Societies and other undesirable elements at assemblies/meeting or in house-to-house canvassing.
- 10 In a candidate's booth, only sufficient food and refreshments required for consumption by persons manning the booth, should be stored.
- 11 Political leaders, candidates, their election and other agents, supporters, helpers and workers should not take part in propagating their party platform at any function organised by Government Officers.

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