

The Gezi Park Protests and the Escalation and De-escalation of Political Contention

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Abstract: This study argues that escalation and de-escalation processes lie at the heart of protest campaigns. These processes are largely determined by the interactions between protesters and governments, as well as the timing and types of strategies and tactics employed. The study examines the dynamics between the Turkish government and the protesters during the 2013 Gezi Protest Campaign. This campaign escalated quickly by generating massive support from different segments of the Turkish society in its earlier days, and then de-escalated and eventually demobilized without securing major concessions. By using original data collected from a Turkish newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*, the study illustrates how the trajectory of the Gezi campaign changed in response to the interactive dynamics between the government and the dissidents.

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Introduction

Protest campaigns are occurring more frequently around the world. Between 2006 and 2013, there were a total of 843 protests in all regions of the world and across all national income levels. While there were 59 reported protest events in 2006, there were 160 in 2012 and 111 alone in the first six months of 2013.¹ This upsurge in world-wide protests is an important reason why peace studies scholars have started paying closer attention to them, especially when these events have the potential to bring down regimes and escalate into full scale civil war.² Regardless of their outcomes, protest campaigns provide us with rich information about the escalation and de-escalation dynamics of political conflicts. Protests often increase or decrease in intensity during their lifetimes even if they do not bring down regimes or transition to armed conflicts.

This study examines the interactive dynamics between the Turkish government and the protesters during the Gezi Protest Campaign in 2013 to explain the escalation and de-escalation phases. The campaign escalated quickly by generating massive support from different segments of Turkish society in its early days, and then de-escalated and eventually demobilized without securing major concessions. I use the Gezi campaign to shed light on how tactical interactions between the protesters and the government, the timing and types of government responses, and different types of protest tactics determine the escalation and de-escalation processes. Moreover, by using original data collected from a Turkish daily newspaper, *Cumhuriyet*, I illustrate how the trajectory of the Gezi campaign changed in response to the interactive dynamics between the government and dissidents.

My objectives in this article are twofold. First, I show how and why escalation/de-escalation processes are influenced by government repressive strategies. In particular, I argue that the tactics, timing and targeting of state responses as well as tactical adaptation and innovation in government-dissident interactions are important factors that influence protest dynamics. Second, through a detailed examination of the Turkish government's strategies to respond to the Gezi protesters' tactics, I highlight

the interactive dynamics of protest campaigns, a topic which has not attracted much scholarly attention among civil resistance scholars in International Relations.³

In the next section, I define the phenomenon of protest campaigns and explain the centrality of treating them as a unit of analysis for studying escalation/de-escalation processes. In the subsequent section, I theorize and illustrate how and why government repressive strategies and tactical interactions between governments and dissidents influenced escalation/de-escalation processes during the Gezi campaign. In the conclusion, I draw out the theoretical implications associated with the connections between repressive strategies and escalation/de-escalation processes.

Definition of Protest Campaigns

In social movement research, a protest campaign is a “sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on targeted authorities.”⁴ It always links at least three parties: a group of self-designated claimants acting on behalf of a constituency, some target of their claim-making (usually governmental authorities), and a general public. A protest campaign grows out of a single protest event and evolves into a broader set of protest events. In peace studies research, protest campaigns are referred to as civil resistance campaigns.⁵ A civil resistance campaign reflects a series of observable, continuous nonviolent tactics by dissidents in pursuit of a political objective. Such a campaign can last anywhere from days to years. It has a discernible leadership and is often identified by a name with relatively clear beginning and ending points.⁶ Both the social movement and peace studies definitions converge to identify a self-contained unit of analysis that we will refer to as protest campaigns in this article.

Escalation and De-escalation Processes in Protest Campaigns

In nonviolent resistance research, the approach to studying protest campaigns has generated important empirical findings that have centered on two major themes: short and long term outcomes of protest campaigns and tactical shifts from nonviolence to violence.⁷ Short term outcomes are associated with the success or failure to bring about regime change in this research program. Key factors that affect success are participation size, military defections, the breakdown of nonviolent discipline, movement fragmentation, and tactical diversity.⁸ Long term outcomes of protest campaigns are linked to greater or lesser democracy. Nonviolent strategies of protest are more likely to lead to democratic transitions, while violent strategies are more likely to lead to greater autocratization.⁹ Regarding the second focus – tactical shifts from nonviolence to violence in protest campaigns, important causal explanations have centered on state repression, military crackdowns and the absence of promised political reforms.¹⁰

Yet, rarely have we seen studies of protest campaigns that focus on the escalation and de-escalation processes of political contention. As sociologists have long stated, the escalation process occurs as dissidents mobilize their supporters in ever growing numbers of nonviolent protest demonstrations, while the de-escalation process typifies the situation where dissidents, their supporters and their participation in demonstrations wanes and eventually ends. Hence, protest campaigns have a life cycle of expanding and contracting political contention.¹¹ How and why these patterns of expansion and contraction occur is an important phenomenon that remains understudied.

Perhaps the most difficult challenge to studying protests is that they are complex processes that are characterized by dynamics, endogeneity, and spontaneity. Dynamics means that political contention changes through time and space.¹² Endogeneity signifies that the escalation and de-escalation of contention are the result of the interdependent interactions of multiple actors (states, challengers, third parties and bystanders).¹³ Finally, spontaneity refers to events or happenings that were not planned, intended, or organized in advance. Due to the dynamic, endogenous, and spontaneous characteristics

of protest campaigns, identifying generalizable patterns and causal relationships has been difficult.¹⁴ For example, the diversity of regime types, economic conditions, the strength of the militaries, or the religious composition of the Middle Eastern regimes that were challenged by mass uprisings makes it hard for us to understand why only a few of them led to regime change while many protests were successfully demobilized.

What is, however, common in every protest campaign is that every single one has phases of escalation and de-escalation, which are generated by the interactive relationships between state actors and dissidents. Their actions combine together sequentially and simultaneously to produce processes of escalation and de-escalation.¹⁵ If we can observe how “specific repertoires and practices of protest” interact with and lead to specific government responses (and vice versa) in waves of escalation or de-escalation,¹⁶ we might get a better idea as to when and how these processes are triggered. Therefore, rather than focusing on structural conditions that predict protests and their outcomes, investigating the actions and reactions of state actors and dissidents might give us better leverage in terms of identifying common patterns among protest campaigns.

State Repressive Strategies during Protest Campaigns

Studying escalation and de-escalation as an interactive process requires us to examine the actions of dissidents, state actors, and their responses to each other. When dissidents first take to the streets to voice their grievances, governments respond one way or another. How governments respond to dissidents during protest campaigns is central to understanding the dynamics of escalation and de-escalation. In particular, governments often have a full arsenal of repressive measures that can be utilized to demobilize protesters, but we have little empirical and nuanced evidence to explain why some governments are more successful at it than others. We know little about when and why

governments repress at different levels and in combination with other strategies that include accommodation.

Yet, much of the empirical evidence on tactics in civil resistance research has focused heavily on dissident behavior at the expense of studying the variety of tactics that state actors employ against dissidents which, in turn, influences their behavior. For instance, scholars have investigated why nonviolent dissidents are likely to achieve their political objectives rather than their violent counterparts,¹⁷ why the discipline of nonviolence breaks down into violence,¹⁸ and why dissidents who pursue a diverse array of tactics are likely to be more successful than those who rely on a narrower set of devices.¹⁹ These findings are indeed important. However, this one-sided approach to dissident behavior overlooks the dyadic relationship between state-dissident interactions. Not only do dissidents deploy a range of tactics but so do states in their efforts to demobilize protesters. In turn, dissident tactical behavior is influenced heavily by the counter-measures that state actors employ. Therefore, in order to understand nonviolent tactics, we should also pay attention to the possible differential effects that certain types of repressive strategies are likely to have on dissident tactics. For instance, policing strategies can escalate protests while, at other times, they can deter protesters from taking to the streets.

I argue that governments pursue intermittent strategies of demobilization that evolve over time as leaders learn which ones are effective (or ineffective) through trial and error.²⁰ Demirel-Pegg and Rasler have identified five basic strategies governments typically use to respond to mass protests: accommodation, counter-mobilization, policing, targeted arrests, and crackdowns.²¹ *Accommodation* refers to government concessions that range from negotiations to symbolic reforms to deeper serious reforms that may even involve regime change. A *counter-mobilization* strategy reflects efforts by state actors to initiate the mobilization of opposition groups that are threatened by or adversely affected by protesters' political demands. Although this is a subtle tactic,²² it has the potential to delegitimize

protesters by demonstrating to bystanders that a significant proportion of the public does not share their political goals. A *policing* strategy is reactive repression, an effort to suppress protests as they are occurring.²³ Its tactics typically involve the cordoning off of areas from protesters, using teargas, rubber bullets or water cannons for dispersal, as well as curfews and arresting and/or beating protesters. *Targeted arrests* refer to the state's efforts to target activists in order to weaken the resilience of protesters, their organizations and networks. The state identifies activists and arrests them by raiding their homes or work places. This tactic also includes the termination of government employees' positions. It is implemented outside of protest sites and, therefore, is different from onsite arrest. A *crackdown strategy* involves the use of lethal force by firing at protesters, killing them indiscriminately or conducting siege operations against wide swaths of urban territory or executing activists, their families and neighbors indiscriminately.²⁴ The significance of the crackdown strategy is that the coercion is disproportionate to the actions of the protesters.²⁵

State actors do not necessarily deploy all these five strategies at the same time or even sequentially. Likewise, dissidents will rely on a range of actions that can be deployed strategically and in response to state policies: demonstrations, boycotts, sit-ins, strikes, blockades or occupation and even violence. This endogeneity requires us to look at the full array of tactics that both actors utilize during these campaigns. Seeing how state and dissident actions intersect gives us a better picture about how and why certain state repressive tactics, as well as the timing of these tactics, accelerate, sustain, contain or decelerate dissident mobilization. I argue below that tactical adaptation and learning are crucial mechanisms for understanding these effects.

How tactical adaptation and learning affect escalation and de-escalation processes

Since escalation and de-escalation processes are central to protest campaigns, we must pay particular attention to tactical adaptation and how it drives the direction, intensity and outcomes of

protest campaigns.²⁶ By tactical adaptation, I rely on McAdam's understanding that it emerges out of a "chess-like" interaction based on the efforts of governments and dissidents to offset the moves of the other. Specifically, governments adopt counter-measures designed to neutralize protest mobilization. In turn, dissidents shift their tactics in response to these counter-measures. How well each side learns to adopt innovative measures and counter-measures will influence the escalation as well as the de-escalation process in protest campaigns. If dissidents are able to adapt by innovating new tactics of collective action that governments are unable to respond to, they are better positioned to sustain their movement, expand it to more participants and allies, and gain bargaining leverage over the government. If, however, governments are able to adjust their repressive tactics vis-à-vis dissident actions successfully, they are better situated to disperse and eventually demobilize dissidents and their supporters, especially if dissident organizations are weak or factionalized.²⁷

What little empirical evidence that strategic nonviolence studies have produced on tactical adaptation relies heavily on the "substitution" mechanism: how and when dissidents shift (or substitute) from nonviolent tactics to violent ones. The "substitution" mechanism, as advanced by Lichbach rests on the premise that as the government represses a dissident tactic, thereby raising the costs of that tactic, dissidents will switch to an alternative tactic. The presumption is that governments motivate dissidents to shift to violent tactics by increasing the costs of non-violence through repression and vice versa.²⁸ However, past studies on these mechanisms have relied heavily on whether and how much repression affects protest activity in a one-step sequential process, as opposed to identifying how repression shifts dissident tactics and how dissident tactics shape government responses over multiple sequences (and vice versa) in an interactive way.²⁹ Moreover, theorizing about the substitution mechanism rests mostly on understanding how repression drives the tactical shifts from nonviolence to violence as opposed to how various types of repressive strategies influence the change in dissident tactics across an array of nonviolent tactics. For instance, if we look at the Egyptian January 2011

uprising that brought down the Mubarak regime, dissidents started out using marches, rallies and demonstrations, but shortly thereafter, they shifted their efforts to include the occupation of public squares such as Tahrir Square, and then by the end of the campaign, dissidents engaged in civic and working class strikes that brought the government and the economy to a standstill. There was a distinct evolutionary process over the course of this short campaign, which involved the shifting from one type of nonviolent tactic to another, instead of from nonviolence to violence. When and why Egyptian protesters used different nonviolent strategies is an interesting empirical question. How and whether state repressive strategies influence these dynamic shifts is something that strategic nonviolence studies have yet to pursue systematically.³⁰

Finally, since tactical adaptation between state and dissident actors is central to processes of escalation and de-escalation in protest campaigns, it has the potential to contribute to our understanding about why some protest campaigns escalate and evolve into full scale civil war. Such a dynamic occurred in Kashmir as the non-violent protest waves in the mid-1980s evolved to an insurgency in 1988.³¹ Reactionary governmental repression of nonviolence subsequently led to more violent protests, producing a spiraling of conflict as the number of deaths multiplied. Meanwhile, external military support in the forms of arms and training encouraged Kashmiri dissidents to increase their use of violence, which in turn redoubled the Indian state's use of repression. The spiraling conflict between these actors would ultimately evolve into a full scale insurgency.³² This pattern of state-dissident interactions reinforces Tarrow's argument that separating lesser forms of contention from civil wars is likely to mask significant escalatory processes.³³

The Dynamics of Escalation and De-escalation during Gezi Protests (May – August 2013)

The above discussion suggests that the types of strategies states use to respond to protests, the response of protesters to repression, and the timing of these interactions play a major role in

determining escalatory and de-escalatory processes. I argue that looking at a full range of government and dissident tactics over the course of protest waves and tracing both sides' tactical shifts and interactions will provide us with a more nuanced understanding of civil resistance than using aggregate measures of repression and protest only. To illustrate my arguments, I examine the behaviors of the Turkish government and the protesters during the Gezi campaign in 2013 by using original events data collected from a national daily newspaper in Turkey. The quantitative and qualitative analysis of this case shows that a disaggregated measure of state repressive strategies yields a deeper explanation for the de-escalation and the eventual demobilization of the campaign than relying on a single over-aggregated measure of repression. The analysis also demonstrates that state-dissident interactions evolved over the course of the campaign and reflected tactical adaptation and innovation by both parties. These dynamic interactions were important factors that drove the direction, the intensity and the outcome of escalatory and de-escalatory processes of the protest campaign.

The 2013 Gezi protest campaign lasted 10 weeks with 2.5 to 3.5 million people participating in protests across 79 cities in Turkey.³⁴ When the campaign ended, seven deaths, 8,000 injuries and approximately 5,000 arrests were reported.³⁵ The initial protests began in reaction to the government's attempt to replace Istanbul's green space in Gezi Park with an urban development project, which included a multi-use complex modelled on a 19th century Ottoman barracks that would include residential units, a shopping mall, and a mosque. Taksim Solidarity, a coalition of local activists, business groups, and environmentalists opposed this redevelopment project.³⁶ Prime Minister Erdoğan moved forward with the construction on May 27. In response, protesters began a sit-in and occupied the park. As police entered the park, they used teargas to disperse the protesters and set fire to their tents. Protests quickly spread throughout parts of Istanbul and other cities as images of the heavy police response were broadcast across the nation particularly via social media.³⁷ Thousands of demonstrators carried "ResistGezi" signs to demonstrate their solidarity with the protesters in Istanbul. Although

Prime Minister Erdoğan's reactions to protest movements against foreign governments during the Arab Spring had been supportive of democratic rights and freedoms,³⁸ when facing domestic protests, he responded differently. Rather than an exercise of freedom of expression, Prime Minister Erdoğan perceived these demonstrations as a coup attempt and authorized a heavy-handed police response.³⁹ In turn, the police response changed the scale and the scope of the campaign as demonstrators began to call for Mr. Erdoğan's resignation.⁴⁰

The Gezi campaign was exceptional in that its participants came from broad segments of the society – much broader than any previous protests in Turkey.⁴¹ A majority of the participants were in their 20s, with little affiliation to any political party and no prior protest experience.⁴² The government's heavy-handed policing tactics inadvertently expanded and consolidated the protesters' support base to include the educated middle class (students, businessmen, teachers, academics, doctors and lawyers) as well as working class groups who joined the campaign within a few weeks of the park protests. In addition, a variety of social and ideological groups across the left-right spectrum as well as gays and lesbians, Kurds, nationalists and secular and religious Muslim groups also participated.⁴³ In short, the Gezi resistance campaign reflected broad popular discontent against the decade-long rule of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and Prime Minister Erdoğan. This discontent centered on several issues: the growing Islamist conservative and authoritarian rule which threatened societal secularism,⁴⁴ the increasing lack of press freedom,⁴⁵ and the escalation of arrests and prosecutions of journalists, students and human rights activists for alleged terrorism.⁴⁶ Moreover, for critics of AKP, the remodeling of Gezi Park was unacceptable because it symbolized AKP imprinting its political Islamic ideology on Taksim Square, which had been a symbol of cosmopolitanism and the leftist ideology for several decades.⁴⁷

I use original data collected from *Cumhuriyet*,⁴⁸ a national daily newspaper in Turkey to illustrate the interactive dynamics of the Gezi protest campaign. The dataset covers both nonviolent and violent forms of protest (such as demonstrations, strikes, and clashes with the police) and

government responses (such as the use of teargas, imposition of bans, and arrests). Events were coded for the date, actor, location, target, number of participants, number of injured and number of deaths. In total, 1,416 events were hand coded based on a list of events found in Krain's scale of repression, accommodation and dissent actions in post-revolutionary states and Moore and Lindstrom's Violent International Conflict Data Project.⁴⁹ The data were aggregated in daily intervals to capture the rapidly evolving dynamics of the campaign.

Tactics, Timing and Targeting of State Responses during the Gezi Protests

During the Gezi campaign, the Turkish government relied heavily on policing and targeted arrest strategies, with little to no counter-mobilization, crackdown, or accommodation strategies. Teargas, water cannons, pepper spray and plastic bullets were the main tools of policing.⁵⁰ Targeted arrests involved a series of raids and police operations that resulted in the arrests and detainments of thousands of organizers and leading activists within the campaign, along with their immediate allies.

The plot of the total numbers of protests and repressive events is shown in Figure 1. At first glance, this suggests that the levels of protests and repressive events follow parallel trajectories throughout the campaign. Figure 1 also shows that during the first three weeks of the campaign, protests and repression moved closely together although the protest series is consistently higher than the repression series. In the fourth week, around June 20, 2013, however, both protests and the repression series decline dramatically and they start to intersect as the frequency of protest and repressive events become more evenly matched. If we relied solely on the levels of protest and repression, the data would indicate that when protests began and escalated rapidly within the first weeks of the campaign the government's response was relatively restrained since the number of protests exceeded the number of repressive events. In addition, the data suggests one of two possible interpretations: the government appeared to be successful in demobilizing the protest campaign at the

start of the fourth week as the number of protests declined significantly, or the protest campaign could not sustain itself for reasons only partly related to the repression. The historical record suggests that the latter explanation is indeed important. Activists were unable to build an organizational infrastructure that could unite diverse protesters around a unifying set of political objectives.⁵¹ Therefore, one would conclude from both the data and the historical narrative that the policing strategy and dissident organizational weakness were key explanations for the de-escalation and decline of the protest campaign.

/ Figure 1 here /

Nonetheless, the story becomes more nuanced when we disaggregate repression into specific government strategies as depicted in Figure 2. In this graph, the decline in the levels of protest events coincides with a switch in the government's repressive strategy which would have been overlooked if we had stayed with an aggregated variable of repression. Instead, the disaggregated repression data in Figure 2 show that the government pursued a combination of policing and targeted arrest strategies – a shift from the previous strategy of policing alone which failed to curtail the protests. Targeted arrests appear to be responsible for the demobilization of the protest campaign as demonstrated by the significant de-escalation of protests by the fifth week of the campaign. In short, the government pursued a policing strategy during the first few weeks of the campaign which was associated with an escalation of protests, indicating a backlash effect against the brutal tactics of policing.⁵² Nonetheless, once the government started to implement the targeted arrest strategy, protests declined.

The historical narratives during this period also support this interpretation. As the images of police brutality in the Gezi park protest diffused to the rest of the country through social media, the protests expanded rapidly in Istanbul and other cities.⁵³ Despite confronting teargas, water cannons and plastic bullets, people poured into the city streets making broader demands for human rights, democracy and the end of the authoritarian policies of the AKP government.⁵⁴ The Gezi Park

confrontation inadvertently led to the coalescence of a wide range of groups that cut across social and ideological strata. At the end of the first week of protests in Gezi Park, more than 100,000 people demonstrated in Ankara on June 1, 2013.⁵⁵ This was followed by a nationwide strike as workers, civil servants, architects, engineers, doctors, and dentists joined the protesters in the streets.⁵⁶

/ Figure 2 here /

Beyond documenting the government's ineffective policing strategy at the start of the protest campaign, Figure 2 also shows that the government's shift to arresting and detaining activists and leaders of the protest campaign appears to have been successful in choking off the protests during the second half of the ten-week campaign. The data demonstrate that starting on June 18, 2013, the beginning of the fourth week of the campaign, the level of protests dropped considerably and never recovered. For instance, the average number of all protest events was 211 for the first three weeks, but by the fourth week, that number dropped to 75 events (a 64% decline) and, in the subsequent weeks, the protest events gradually declined each week. The historical narrative again reinforces the evidence. Beginning on June 18, 2013, the government conducted four major waves of arrests throughout the country. The first wave started on June 18th and concentrated on activists located in Istanbul and Ankara.⁵⁷ The next major wave of arrests and detentions happened on July 5th as the government continued to target activists and student dorms in cities across Turkey. The third wave of arrests transpired during the week of July 8-15, 2013, as activists in the major cities of western Turkey were targeted. Meanwhile, the government also arrested 48 members of Taksim Solidarity Platform, an umbrella group of dissidents that were initially behind the Gezi Protest.⁵⁸ Finally, the last wave of arrests occurred on July 22 with 20 more arrests in Ankara.⁵⁹ Over the course of these operations, the government targeted not just activists but also their networks of support, including their attorneys and medical personnel who treated their injuries. Journalists were especially targeted, 81 of whom were fired or forced to resign over the course of the protest campaign.⁶⁰

The disaggregated repression data show that the Turkish government pursued not one but two strategies, one of which (the policing strategy) generated a backfire effect and the second of which was successful in demobilizing the protesters. It was the second strategy – targeted arrests – that changed the dynamics of the protest campaign. While still pursuing policing tactics at protest sites, the government introduced massive police operations that arrested key activists and protesters in the major urban areas of the country. The shift from the single strategy of policing to a dual strategy of policing and targeted arrests made it possible for the government both to evacuate the occupied spaces in the parks and squares and detain activists before they could recruit new participants.⁶¹ The strategy of targeted arrests was especially effective in compressing the time frame, allowing activists little time to overcome their organizational deficits.

Moreover, disaggregating repression data also highlights the important role of timing in the effectiveness of different repressive strategies. The Turkish government's use of the policing strategy early in the campaign was not only ineffective in deterring protesters from taking to the streets, but it also contributed to the escalation of protests by motivating people who were outraged by the images of police brutality to participate. However, after the government implemented the targeted arrests strategy, the escalatory effect of the policing strategy vanished. Even though the police continued to respond to nonviolent demonstrations with excessive force, protests did not escalate at this stage of the campaign. In sum, this disaggregated approach to repression provides a more nuanced understanding about how the timing and type of repressive strategies affects dissident behavior.

Tactical Adaptation and Learning between Dissidents and the State

In addition to tactics, timing, and targeting of repressive strategies, tactical adaptation and learning also influence whether states are able to demobilize dissenters or whether dissenters are able to outwit state actors by sustaining, escalating and even expanding their protests with new participants.

A central dynamic that shapes the patterns of contention in protest campaigns is the “iterative, trial-and-error character” of actions and counter-actions among internal groups. Actors will shift toward tactics that were successful in past interactive sequences and away from those that failed.⁶² The Turkish government shifted from a policing to a tactical arrest strategy as a response to the spread of demonstrations across Turkey – a clear example of strategic adaptation. So, the question is how did dissidents respond to this strategy? The analysis below shows that protesters attempted to innovate at about the same time the Turkish government switched to a combination of a targeted arrests and policing strategy. However, massive arrests and harsh policing tactics were able to blunt the spread of these tactics. The lack of organizational leadership and cohesion among the dissidents also aided the government’s effort to counteract these tactics.

An examination of Figure 3 indicates that at the height of the protest campaign during the first three weeks, protesters relied on three main tactics: demonstrations, nonviolent disruptive actions (labor strikes, sit-ins and boycotts) and, to a much lesser extent, violence (primarily actions involving property damage). All three of these tactics declined significantly as massive arrest operations were instituted. At this point, dissidents shifted to more passive forms of nonviolence during the latter part of the campaign – the aggregate numbers of which are displayed in Figure 4.⁶³ Shifting from their traditional repertoire of demonstrations, rock throwing, strikes and boycotts, dissidents opted mainly for two types of actions: “standing man” protests and open discussion forums.

/ Figure 3 here /

/ Figure 4 here /

The “standing man” protests started with a young activist, Erdem Gündüz, who spontaneously stood quietly for nine hours near Gezi Park after the government’s brutal clearance of the area two days earlier on June 17, 2013. Coverage of this action via Facebook and Twitter encouraged hundreds of activists to join him.⁶⁴ In response, the government arrested 17 of the dissidents. Within 24 hours,

inspired by Gündüz' spontaneous innovation of a new tactic, thousands of protesters organized similar "standing man" protests across major urban areas of Turkey.⁶⁵ There were even variations of these protests with activists either holding flowers, silently reading books or covering their mouths with duct tape to renounce the government's restrictions on freedom of speech.⁶⁶ In addition to the "standing man" protests, activists in Istanbul organized evening public discussion forums at local parks so that the public could express their political opinions. For instance, Taksim Solidarity organized a forum in Maçka Park that attracted 400 participants. In another city, Çorum, approximately 3,000 people gathered at a local park to make demands on the government.⁶⁷ Unfortunately for the dissidents, the government's massive arrests operations began during the same period and blunted the spread of their new tactics. Figure 4 shows that there is a short-lived upsurge in these new tactics from June 18 until June 25, 2013, but they taper off fairly quickly.

Theoretically, activists can overcome repressive policies through tactical innovation. Such strategic adaptation makes it possible for activists to expand dissident participation and sustain high levels of protests.⁶⁸ But, the Gezi protest campaign shows that innovative tactics alone cannot substitute for an organizational infrastructure.⁶⁹ In the initial stages of the campaign (during the first three weeks), the activists were successful in building momentum for confronting the Turkish government, largely as a result of the backfire effect. In this instance, activists were able to disseminate the evidence of police brutality and garner greater national support among protesters in other major cities. However, they were unsuccessful in maintaining that momentum largely as a result of the government's massive arrest and detention operations. Even in their efforts to shift to new tactics associated with "standing man protests" and "forums in public spaces," activists were unable to sustain and expand public participation in such protests. In this instance, the Turkish government was able to marginalize dissidents from the general population by removing their leaders and labeling them as subversives who were trying to undermine an Islamic-based government.⁷⁰ In sum, the rapid escalation

of the protests and the participation of too many groups with competing political agendas impeded the formation of an alternative organization that could continue to challenge the government. When protesters innovated their tactics to re-galvanize public support, their efforts also failed because without an organizational infrastructure, they were unable to unify and channel their actions into a sustained campaign.⁷¹ At the same time, the government's ability to switch to an effective targeted arrest strategy hampered the activists' capability to build an infrastructure, peel off support from the government and establish an effective counter-narrative for their own political platform.

The analysis of the Gezi protest campaign demonstrates that a disaggregated measure of state repression yields a nuanced explanation of how the campaign de-escalated in contrast to an over-aggregated measure. Tactical adaptation and learning occurred on both sides of the government-dissident divide which reinforces the proposition that strategic decision-making during protest campaigns is "not a one-off process without history."⁷² In other words, actors' responses to each other's actions affect each actor's next move, creating a dynamic of its own. Therefore tactical adaptation and learning are central underlying processes of both escalation and de-escalation and they should be studied dynamically. In the Gezi case, the government had to switch to a strategy of targeted arrests because government elites learned that heavy-handed policing brought more people out on the streets instead of deterring them. The activists also shifted to more passive tactics as conventional forms of protests such as marches and processions attracted violent police responses. In the end, the government's adaptation proved to be more successful as the targeted arrest strategy successfully demobilized the dissidents.

Conclusion

The dynamics of the Gezi campaign are a good illustration of how a state's repressive strategies can increase dissident mobilization at one time while decreasing it at another. The same story goes for

dissenters who employ a range of anti-government tactics – some of which will be successful in circumventing state repression while others will not. This campaign also shows that central to the story of escalation and de-escalation is the role of tactical adaptation, learning and innovation. State actors who learn and adapt quickly to their lack of success in demobilizing protesters are likely to manage and survive protest campaigns. Dissidents, on the other hand, must also innovate in the face of state repressive policies in order to sustain and expand their participation base; otherwise, they will eventually be defeated.

These dynamic interactions open up new questions for civil resistance research. Namely, what types of repression and/or dissent do initiators and their targets use and when do they use them? What are the consequences of these state-dissident interactions for escalation and/or de-escalation of the protest campaign itself? The answers to these questions will significantly add to our understanding of how the repression-protest relationship drives the life cycle of protest campaigns.

From a policy standpoint, the analysis sends a clear, yet unfortunate message to dissidents that consistent and strategically applied repression works. Even if a government's initial responses backfire and escalate protests, a successful outcome for the dissidents is not guaranteed. Governments have a variety of different strategies available to them and by using them strategically they can still successfully demobilize protesters. Continuously learning, adapting tactics, and investing resources to build organizational capacity and increase resilience are potential measures dissidents can take to counteract government repression.

Figures

Figure 1. State Repression and Protests, May – August 2013




Figure 2. Repressive Strategies, May – August 2013




Figure 3. Repertoires of Collective Action, May – August 2013





Figure 4. Standing Man, Park Forums, and Targeted Arrests, May – August 2013



Notes

- ¹ These data have been compiled by I. Ortiz, S. L. Burke, M. Berrada, H. Cortés, 'World Protests 2006-2013', *Initiative for Policy Dialogue and Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung New York Working Paper*, 2013.
- ² Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 2011.
- ³ In comparison, sociologists and comparative politics scholars have focused on interactive dynamics of contention more than scholars of civil resistance in International Relations. See, for example D. McAdam, 'Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency', *American Sociological Review*, 48(6), 1983, pp. 735-754; R. Koopmans, 'Dynamics of Repression and Mobilization: The German Extreme Right in the 1990s', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 2(2), 1997, pp. 149-165; Mark R. Beissinger, *Nationalist Mobilization and the Collapse of the Soviet State*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2002; Charles D. Brockett, *Political Movements and Violence in Central America*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2005.
- ⁴ Charles Tilly and Sidney Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, Second ed., Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2015.
- ⁵ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works : The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, op. cit.
- ⁶ In fact, Chenoweth and Stephan have created a dataset comprised of 106 nonviolent civil resistance campaigns in NAVCO 1.0 with updated data on these campaigns in NAVCO 2.0. E. Chenoweth and O. A. Lewis, 'Unpacking Nonviolent Campaigns Introducing the Navco 2.0 Dataset', *Journal of Peace Research* 50(3), 2013, pp. 415-452; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, op. cit.
- ⁷ Sharon Erickson Nepstad, *Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, and Dynamics*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2015.
- ⁸ E. Chenoweth and K. Schock, 'Do Contemporaneous Armed Challenges Affect the Outcomes of Mass Nonviolent Campaigns?', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 20(4), 2015, pp. 427-451; Nepstad, *Nonviolent Struggle: Theories, Strategies, and Dynamics*, op. cit.; Wendy Pearlman, *Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2011; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, op. cit.
- ⁹ M. Bayer, F. S. Bethke, and D. Lambach, 'The Democratic Dividend of Nonviolent Resistance', *Journal of Peace Research*, 53(6), 2016, pp. 758-771; M. R. Celestino and K. S. Gleditsch, 'Fresh Carnations or All Thorn, No Rose? Nonviolent Campaigns and Transitions in Autocracies', *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(3), 2013, pp. 385-400; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works : The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, op.cit.; P. G. Johnstad, 'Nonviolent Democratization: A Sensitivity Analysis of How Transition Mode and Violence Impact the Durability of Democracy', *Peace & Change*, 35(3), 2010, pp. 464-482; Adrian Karatnycky and Peter Ackerman, *How Freedom Is Won: From Civic Resistance to Durable Democracy*, Freedom House, New York, NY, 2005.
- ¹⁰ G. M. Maney, 'The Paradox of Reform: The Civil Rights Movement in Northern Ireland', *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change*, 34, 2012, pp. 3-26; Pearlman, *Violence, Nonviolence, and the Palestinian National Movement*, op.cit; S. M. Shellman, B. P. Levey, and J. K. Young, 'Shifting Sands: Explaining and Predicting Phase Shifts by Dissident Organizations', *Journal of Peace Research*, 50(3), 2013, pp. 319-336.
- ¹¹ Sidney G. Tarrow, *Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965-1975*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, UK, 1989; Koopmans, 'Dynamics of Repression and Mobilization: The German Extreme Right in the 1990s', op. cit.
- ¹² 'Protests in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention', in D. A. Snow, A. Soule, and H. Kriesi (eds), *The Blackwell Companion to Social Movements*, Blackwell Publishing, Malden, MA, 2004.
- ¹³ M. Beissinger, 'Mechanisms of Maidan: The Structure of Contingency in the Making of the Orange Revolution', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 16(1), 2011, pp. 25-43.

- ¹⁴ Tilly and Tarrow, *Contentious Politics*, op. cit.; C. Davenport and M. Inman, 'The State of State Repression Research since the 1990s', *Terrorism and Political Violence*, 24(4), 2012, pp. 619-634; C. Davenport, 'State Repression and Political Order', *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10, 2007, pp. 1-23.
- ¹⁵ Koopmans, 'Dynamics of Repression and Mobilization: The German Extreme Right in the 1990s', op. cit.; S. M. Shellman, 'Process Matters: Conflict and Cooperation in Sequential Government-Dissident Interactions', *Security Studies*, 15(4), 2006, pp. 563-599.
- ¹⁶ Joshua Rogers, 'Shooting Citizens-Saving Regimes?', in *Working Paper der Arbeitsstelle Politik des Vorderen Orients*, Arbeitsstelle Politik des Vorderen Orients, 2011.
- ¹⁷ Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, op. cit.
- ¹⁸ Jonathan Pinckney, *Making or Breaking Nonviolent Discipline in Civil Resistance Movements*, International Center on Nonviolent Conflict Monograph Series, ICNC Press, Washington, DC, 2016.
- ¹⁹ Robert J. Burrowes, *The Strategy of Nonviolent Defense: A Gandhian Approach*, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1996; Chenoweth and Stephan, *Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict*, op. cit.; W. Pearlman and K. G. Cunningham, 'Nonstate Actors, Fragmentation, and Conflict Processes', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 56(1), 2012, pp. 3-15; K. Cunningham, M. Dahl, and A. Fruge, 'Strategies of Resistance: Diversification and Diffusion', *American Journal of Political Science*, 61(3), 2017, pp. 591-605; Kurt Schock, *Unarmed Insurrections: People Power Movements in Nondemocracies*, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 2005.
- ²⁰ Governments also learn about tactical adaptation through their observations of protest campaigns that occur in neighboring countries, especially if these campaigns occur together. See G. Lawson, 'Revolution, Nonviolence, and the Arab Uprising', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 20(4), 2015, pp. 452-470.
- ²¹ T. Demirel-Pegg and K. Rasler, 'Protests under the Gun: Under What Conditions Do States Manage Backfire Effects Successfully?', in *Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association*, Baltimore, MA, 2017. Earl and Soule delineate comparable policing strategies that the New York City police used against protesters from 1960-1990, referring to them as 'Do Nothing', 'Nothing to See Here', 'Legal Eagle', 'Dirty Harry', and finally, the 'Calling all Cars' strategy. See J. Earl and S. Soule, 'The Impacts of Repression: The Effect of Police Presence and Action on Subsequent Protest Rates', *Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change*, 30, 2010, pp. 75-113.
- ²² It may be subtle because the government's role in generating counter-movements is not always observable due either to the use of clandestine operations or the reliance on third parties to mobilize them.
- ²³ Koopmans, 'Dynamics of Repression and Mobilization: The German Extreme Right in the 1990s', op. cit.; J. Earl and S. Soule, 'Seeing Blue: A Police-Centered Explanation of Protest Policing', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 11(2), 2006, pp. 145-164.
- ²⁴ Francisco refers to these crackdowns as 'state massacres' which involve the killing of 30 or more people Ronald A. Francisco, 'After the Massacre: Mobilization in the Wake of Harsh Repression', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 9(2), 2004, pp. 107-126. See also Rogers, 'Shooting Citizens-Saving Regimes?', op. cit.
- ²⁵ Although we typically think of the crackdown strategy being implemented by a regime, it is entirely possible for the crackdown to be executed by an external third party, in an 'externalization of repression.' This type of crackdown was implemented in the Bahrain Arab Spring protest campaign. See E. Alimi and D. S. Meyer, 'When Repression Fails to Backfire: Movement's Power, State's Power, and Conditions Conducive to International Intervention', in E. Alimi, A. Sela, and M. Sznajder (eds), *Popular Contention, Regime, and Transition*, Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2016.
- ²⁶ Social movement scholars have studied tactical adaptation and innovation in driving the pace of protests but even in this research program, more attention could be paid to their roles. See McAdam, 'Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency', op. cit.; Donatella Della Porta and Sidney Tarrow, 'Interactive Diffusion the Coevolution of Police and Protest Behavior with an Application to Transnational Contention', *Comparative Political Studies*, 45(1), 2012, pp. 119-152; D. Moss, 'Repression, Response, and Contained Escalation under 'Liberalized Authoritarianism in Jordan',

Mobilization: An International Quarterly, 19(3), 2014, pp. 261-286; Kevin J O'Brien and Yanhua Deng, 'Repression Backfires: Tactical Radicalization and Protest Spectacle in Rural China', *Journal of Contemporary China*, 24(93), 2015, pp. 457-470.

²⁷ For instance, McAdam's empirical investigation of the US civil rights movement between 1955 and 1970 revealed that peaks in protest activity corresponded to the introduction and spread of tactical innovations, while troughs in protest activity reflected that local police forces were able to deploy effective tactical counter-measures. McAdam, 'Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency', op. cit.

²⁸ M. I. Lichbach, 'Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 31(2), 1987, pp. 266-297; Will H. Moore, 'Repression and Dissent: Substitution, Context, and Timing', *American Journal of Political Science*, 42(3), 1998, pp. 851-873. This substitution effect of violence replacing nonviolence is also conditioned by the government's accommodation and the consistency of both repression and accommodation during the course of a protest campaign.

²⁹ Davenport and Inman, 'The State of State Repression Research since the 1990s', op. cit., p. 624. Exceptions to the rule are McAdam, 'Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency', op. cit.; Karen Rasler, 'Concessions, Repression, and Political Protest in the Iranian Revolution', *American Sociological Review*, 61(1), 1996, pp. 132-152; L. Titarenko, J. McCarthy, C. McPhail, and A. Boguslaw, 'The Interaction of State Repression, Protest Form and Protest Sponsor Strength During the Transition from Communism in Minsk, Belarus, 1990-1995', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 6(2), 2001, pp. 129-150; D. Moss, 'Repression, Response, and Contained Escalation under 'Liberalized Authoritarianism in Jordan', op. cit.; Neil Ketchley, *Egypt in a Time of Revolution: Contentious Politics and the Arab Spring*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2017.

³⁰ A noteworthy exception to this pattern is Cunningham, Dahl, and Fruge, 'Strategies of Resistance: Diversification and Diffusion', op. cit.

³¹ T. Demirel-Pegg, 'From the Streets to the Mountains: The Dynamics of Transition from a Protest Wave to an Insurgency in Kashmir', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly* 19(3), 2014, pp. 309-329.

³² Rogers' analysis of the 20 month long protest campaign in Algeria in the early 1990s shows a similar pattern. Tactical interactions between government and dissidents transformed from nonviolence into a cycle of violence and eventually civil war, largely as a result of the government's indiscriminate repression that targeted the general public. Rogers, 'Shooting Citizens-Saving Regimes?' op. cit.

³³ S. G. Tarrow, 'Inside Insurgencies: Politics and Violence in an Age of Civil War,' *Perspectives on Politics*, 5(3), 2007.

³⁴ I selected the Gezi protest campaign to illustrate our central arguments because it offers two advantages. First, the campaign was relatively short but yet long enough to observe cycles in innovation and tactical interactions between government actors and the protesters. Second, the absence of an insurgency or civil war in Turkey rules out the government's heightened use of repression in general.

³⁵ Gökçeç Ayata, Pınar Çağlı, İdil Elveriş, Sevinç Eryılmaz, İdil I. Gül, Ulaş Karan, Cansu Muratoğlu, Ezgi Taboğlu, Lami B. Tokuzlu, and Burcu Yeşiladalı, *Gezi Parkı Olayları*, İstanbul Bilgi Üniversitesi Yayınları, İstanbul, 2013; Ali Ekber Ertürk, *Güneşin Evlatları*, Tanyeri Kitap Yayıncılık, Ankara, 2013; '2.5 Million People Rode the Streets,' *Milliyet*, 23 June 2013.

³⁶ Y. Elicin, 'Defending the City: Taksim Solidarity', *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 19 (2), 2017, pp. 105-120.

³⁷ Müjde Koca-Atabey, 'Gezi Park Protests in Turkey: How Can Death Be Related to the Protests?', *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 18(4), 2016 pp. 422-430; S. Ozturkcan, N. Kasap, M. Çevik, and T. Zaman, 'An Analysis of the Gezi Park Social Movement Tweets', *Aslib Journal of Information Management*, 69(4), 2017, pp. 426-440.

³⁸ Ö. Pala and B. Aras, 'Practical Geopolitical Reasoning in the Turkish and Qatari Foreign Policy on the Arab Spring', *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 17(3), 2015, pp. 286-302.

³⁹ N. Moudouros, 'Rethinking Islamic Hegemony in Turkey through Gezi Park', *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 16(2), 2014, p. 184.

⁴⁰ Emre Kongar and Aykut Küçükaya, *Gezi Direnişi*, Cumhuriyet Yayınları, İstanbul, 2013; A. Anisin, 'Repression, Spontaneity, and Collective Action: The 2013 Turkish Gezi Protests', *Journal of Civil Society*

12(4), 2016, pp. 411-429; S. E. Aytaç, L. Schiumerini, and S. Stokes, 'Protests and Repression in New Democracies', *Perspectives on Politics*, 15(1), 2017, pp. 62-82.

⁴¹ E. Yörük, 'The Long Summer of Turkey: The Gezi Uprising and Its Historical Roots', *South Atlantic Quarterly*, 113(2), 2014, pp. 419-426.

⁴² Amnesty International, 'Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey', Amnesty International, London, UK, 2013, p. 7.

⁴³ H. Özen, 'An Unfinished Grassroots Populism: The Gezi Park Protests in Turkey and Their Aftermath', *South European Society and Politics*, 20(4), 2015, pp. 533-552

⁴⁴ B. Esen and Ş. Gümüşçü, 'Rising Competitive Authoritarianism in Turkey', *Third World Quarterly*, 37(9), 2016, pp. 1581-1606. For a discussion of the AKP government's institutionalization of a conservative Islamic political and social transformation, see H.E. Tombuş and B. Aygenc, '(Post-)Kemalist Secularism in Turkey', *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 19(1), 2017, pp. 70-85.

⁴⁵ Susan Corke, Andrew Finkel, David J. Kramer, Carla A. Robbins, and Nate Schenkkan, 'Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey', Freedom House, Washington D.C., 2014, p. 9.

⁴⁶ B. Saatçioğlu, 'AKP's "Europeanization" in Civilianization, Rule of Law and Fundamental Freedoms: The Primacy of Domestic Politics', *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 16(1), 2014, pp. 86-101; Human Rights Watch, 'World Report 2013: Turkey', Human Rights Watch, New York, NY, 2013.

⁴⁷ N. Moudouros, 'Rethinking Islamic Hegemony in Turkey through Gezi Park', op.cit.

⁴⁸ *Cumhuriyet* is the oldest national newspaper in Turkey and has nationally based correspondents.

Given the public attention the protest campaign received, we believe that underrepresentation of events is not a serious problem. To avoid validity issues caused by overreporting of violence and underreporting of nonviolence as well as selective reporting, we used secondary sources to check the accuracy of the reporting Ayata et al., *Gezi Parkı Olayları*; Ertürk, *Güneşin Evlatları*, op. cit; Kongar and Küçükkaya, *Gezi Direnişi*, op. cit.

⁴⁹ Matthew Krain, *Repression and Accommodation in Post-Revolutionary States*, St. Martin's Press, New York, NY, 2000; Will H. Moore and Ronny Lindstrom, *The Violent International Conflict Data Project (VICDP) Codebook*. Department of Political Science, University of California – Riverside, 1996.

⁵⁰ These police responses were executed in an a brutal and disproportionate manner, as evidenced by the use of 130,000 gas canisters or the mixing of chemical irritants in water cannons to inflict more injuries. See Amnesty International, 'Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey', op. cit.

⁵¹ Özen, 'An Unfinished Grassroots Populism: The Gezi Park Protests in Turkey and Their Aftermath', op. cit.; Zeynep Tufekci, *Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 2017. For a discussion of how the European Union's support to strengthen the civil society has failed to lead to increased rights and freedoms, see H. Mühlenhoff, 'Funding Democracy, Funding Social Services? The European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights in the Context of Competing Narratives in Turkey', *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 16(1), 2014, pp. 102-118.

⁵² Anisin, 'Repression, Spontaneity, and Collective Action: The 2013 Turkish Gezi Protests', op. cit.; Aytaç, Schiumerini, and Stokes, 'Protests and Repression in New Democracies', op. cit.

⁵³ Özen, 'An Unfinished Grassroots Populism: The Gezi Park Protests in Turkey and Their Aftermath', op. cit, p. 541; Tufekci, *Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest*, op. cit.

⁵⁴ Anisin, 'Repression, Spontaneity, and Collective Action: The 2013 Turkish Gezi Protest', op. cit.; Özen, 'An Unfinished Grassroots Populism: The Gezi Park Protests in Turkey and Their Aftermath', op. cit.

⁵⁵ Kongar and Küçükkaya, *Gezi Direnişi*, op. cit., p. 8.

⁵⁶ *Cumhuriyet*, June 2-5, 2013.

⁵⁷ The police arrested 64 activists in Istanbul and 26 in Ankara during this first wave Amnesty International, 'Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey', op. cit.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 43.

⁵⁹ While a majority of the activists were eventually released, some of them were arrested under anti-terrorism laws which carried harsher penalties than were used in the past to prosecute critics of the state. See *Ibid.*, p. 64. According to the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, as of the end of July, 134 of 3,699 detained still remained under arrest Ayata et al., *Gezi Parkı Olayları*, op. cit., p. 56.

⁶⁰ Amnesty International, 'Gezi Park Protests: Brutal Denial of the Right to Peaceful Assembly in Turkey,' op. cit., pp. 49-50.

⁶¹ Özen, 'An Unfinished Grassroots Populism: The Gezi Park Protests in Turkey and Their Aftermath', op. cit.

⁶² Koopmans, 'Protests in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention', op. cit.

⁶³ This shift to an even more passive form of nonviolence goes against Lichbach's argument that protesters will shift from nonviolent to violent forms of tactics in the face of severe repression. See Lichbach, 'Deterrence or Escalation? The Puzzle of Aggregate Studies of Repression and Dissent', op. cit.

⁶⁴ Koca-Atabey, 'Gezi Park Protests in Turkey: How Can Death Be Related to the Protests?', op. cit.

⁶⁵ 'Standing man' protests were reported in major cities such as Adana, Ankara, Antalya, Izmir, Muğla, Samsun, and Sivas.

⁶⁶ S. B. Gümrükçü, 'The Rise of a Social Movement: The Emergence of Anti-Globalization Movements in Turkey,' *Turkish Studies*, 11(2), 2010, pp. 163-180.

⁶⁷ *Cumhuriyet*, June 20, 2013.

⁶⁸ McAdam, 'Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency', op. cit.; Koopmans, 'Protests in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention', op. cit.

⁶⁹ For the importance of the role of dissident organizations in persistent anti-government challenges, see J. C. Franklin 'Persistent Challengers: Repression, Concessions, Challenger Strength, and Commitment in Latin America', *Mobilization: An International Quarterly*, 20(1), 2015, pp. 61-80.

⁷⁰ The Turkish government capitalized on the secular (Kemalists) and Islamists/conservatives divide in the country by identifying the dissidents as 'Kemalist' protesters who were trying to overthrow a government elected by the conservative masses. This discourse helped to isolate the dissidents from bystander support. See Özen, 'An Unfinished Grassroots Populism: The Gezi Park Protests in Turkey and Their Aftermath', op. cit., p. 547.

⁷¹ Tufekci, *Twitter and Tear Gas: The Power and Fragility of Networked Protest*, op. cit.

⁷² Koopmans, 'Protests in Time and Space: The Evolution of Waves of Contention', op. cit.