

Foundations of a Probabilistic Theory of Causal Strength: Proofs

Jan Sprenger*

November 2, 2017

Proof of Theorem 1: Suppose that for mutually exclusive $E, E' \in \mathcal{E}$, $p^*(E'|C) = p^*(E'|C')$. Then, we infer with the help of Generalized Difference-Making

$$\begin{split} \eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{E}) &= f(p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}')) \\ \eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{E} \lor \mathbf{E}') &= f(p^*(\mathbf{E} \lor \mathbf{E}'|\mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E} \lor \mathbf{E}'|\mathbf{C}')) \\ &= f(p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}) + p^*(\mathbf{E}'|\mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}') + p^*(\mathbf{E}'|\mathbf{C}')) \\ &= f(p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}) + p^*(\mathbf{E}'|\mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}') + p^*(\mathbf{E}'|\mathbf{C})) \end{split}$$

Applying Separability of Effects implies $\eta(C, E \lor E') = \eta(C, E)$ and leads to the equality

$$f(p^{*}(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}), p^{*}(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}')) = f(p^{*}(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}) + p^{*}(\mathbf{E}'|\mathbf{C}), p^{*}(\mathbf{E}'|\mathbf{C}') + p^{*}(\mathbf{E}'|\mathbf{C}))$$

Since we have made no assumptions about the values of these conditional probabilities, *f* satisfies the formula f(x, x') = f(x + y, x' + y) in full generality. It is then easy to see (e.g., by looking at the indifference curves of *f*) that there

^{*}Contact information: Department of Philosophy and Educational Sciences, and Center for Logic, Language and Cognition (LLC), Università degli Studi di Torino, Via Sant'Ottavio 20, 10124 Torino, Italy. Email: jan.sprenger@unito.it. Webpage: www.laeuferpaar.de

must be a function *g* such that f(x, x') = g(x - x'). Hence,

$$\eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{E}) = f(p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}')) = g(p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}) - p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}'))$$

showing the desired ordinal equivalence claim. q.e.d.

Proof of Theorem 2: By Generalized Difference-Making with $C' = \neg C$ we can focus on the function $f : [0,1]^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ such that $\eta(C, E) = f(p^*(E|C), p^*(E|\neg C))$. We would like to derive the equality

$$f(\alpha,\bar{\alpha}) \cdot f(\beta,\bar{\beta}) = f(\alpha\beta + (1-\alpha)\bar{\beta},\bar{\alpha}\beta + (1-\bar{\alpha})\bar{\beta})$$
(1)

for a causal strength measure that satisfies Multiplicativity. To this end, recall the single-path Bayesian network reproduced in Figure 1.



Figure 1: The Bayesian Network for causation along a single path.

We know by Multiplicativity that for $C \in C$, $E \in \mathcal{E}$, and $X \in \mathcal{X}$,

$$\begin{split} \eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{E}) &= \eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{X}) \cdot \eta(\mathbf{X}, \mathbf{E}) \\ &= f(p^*(\mathbf{X} | \mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{X} | \neg \mathbf{C})) \cdot f(p^*(\mathbf{E} | \mathbf{X}), p^*(\mathbf{E} | \neg \mathbf{X})) \\ &= f(p^*(\mathbf{X} | \mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{X} | \neg \mathbf{C}) \cdot f(p^*(\mathbf{E} | \mathbf{X}), p^*(\mathbf{E} | \neg \mathbf{X})) \end{split}$$

and at the same time,

$$\begin{split} \eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{E}) &= f(p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E}|\neg\mathbf{C})) \\ &= f\left(\sum_{\pm \mathbf{X}} p^*(\mathbf{X}|\mathbf{C}) p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{X}), \sum_{\pm \mathbf{X}} p^*(\mathbf{X}|\neg\mathbf{C}) p^*(\mathbf{E}|\neg\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{X})\right) \\ &= f\left(\sum_{\pm \mathbf{X}} p^*(\mathbf{X}|\mathbf{C}) p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{X}), \sum_{\pm \mathbf{X}} p^*(\mathbf{X}|\neg\mathbf{C}) p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{X})\right) \end{split}$$

Combining both equations yields

$$f(p^{*}(X|C), p^{*}(X|\neg C) \cdot f(p^{*}(E|X), p^{*}(E|\neg X))$$

= $f\left(\sum_{\pm X} p^{*}(X|C)p^{*}(E|C,X), \sum_{\pm X} p^{*}(X|\neg C)p^{*}(E|\neg C,X)\right)$

With the variable settings

$$\begin{aligned} \alpha &= p^*(X|C) & \beta &= p^*(E|X) \\ \bar{\alpha} &= p^*(X|\neg C) & \bar{\beta} &= p^*(E|\neg X) \end{aligned}$$

equation (1) follows immediately.

Second, we are going to show that for any extension of *f* to \mathbb{R}^2 ,

$$f(x,y) = -f(y-x,0)$$
 (2)

To this end, we first note a couple of facts about f.

- **Fact 1** $f(\alpha, 0)f(\beta, 0) = f(\alpha\beta, 0)$. Follows immediately from Equation (1) with $\bar{\alpha} = \bar{\beta} = 0$.
- **Fact 2** $f(0,1) \cdot f(\beta,\bar{\beta}) = f(\bar{\beta},\beta)$. Follows immediately from Equation (1) with $\alpha = 0, \bar{\alpha} = 1$.
- **Fact 3** f(1,0) = 1. With $\beta = 1$, Fact 1 entails that $f(\alpha,0)f(1,0) = f(\alpha,0)$. Hence, either f(1,0) = 1 or $f(\alpha,0) \equiv 0$ for all values of α . However, the latter would also imply $f \equiv 0$ and trivialize f.
- **Fact 4** f(0,1) = -1. Equation (1) (with $\alpha = \beta = 0$, $\bar{\alpha} = \bar{\beta} = 1$) and Fact 3 entail that $f(0,1) \cdot f(0,1) = f(1,0) = 1$. Hence, either f(0,1) = -1 or f(0,1) = 1. If the latter were the case, then the monotonicity requirement in Generalized Difference-Making would be violated. Thus, f(0,1) = -1.

These facts will allow us to derive Equation (2). Note that (2) is trivial if y = 0. So we can restrict ourselves to the case that y > 0. We choose the variable settings

$$\alpha = \frac{y - x}{y} \qquad \qquad \beta = 0$$

$$\bar{\alpha} = 0 \qquad \qquad \bar{\beta} = y$$

Then we obtain by means of Equation (1) and the previously proven facts

$$f(x,y) = f((y-x)/y,0) \cdot f(0,y)$$

= $f(y-x,0) \cdot f(1/y,0) \cdot f(0,y)$ (Fact 1)
= $f(y-x,0) \cdot f(1/y,0) \cdot f(y,0) \cdot f(0,1)$ (Fact 2)
= $f(y-x,0) \cdot f(1,0) \cdot f(0,1)$ (Fact 1)
= $-f(y-x,0)$ (Fact 3+4)

This implies

$$\eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{E}) = f(p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E}|\neg \mathbf{C})) = -f((-1) \cdot (p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}) - p^*(\mathbf{E}|\neg \mathbf{C})), 0)$$

Hence, $\eta(C, E)$ can be represented as a function of $p^*(E|C) - p^*(E|\neg C)$ only. From Generalized Difference-Making we infer that *f* must be non-decreasing in $p^*(E|C) - p^*(E|\neg C)$. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2. q.e.d.

Proof of Theorem 3: The proof relies on a move from the proof of Theorem 1 in Schupbach and Sprenger (2011). Consider three variables *C*, *E*₁ and *E*₂ with $E_2 \perp C$ and $(E_2 \perp E_1)|C$. Let $C \in C$, $E_1 \in \mathcal{E}_1$, and $E_2 \in \mathcal{E}_2$ be propositions about the values of these variables. Then, No Dilution for Irrelevant Effects implies that

$$p^{*}(E_{1} \wedge E_{2}|C) = p^{*}(E_{1}|C) p^{*}(E_{2}|C)$$

$$p^{*}(E_{1} \wedge E_{2}|\neg C) = p^{*}(E_{1}|\neg C) p^{*}(E_{2}|\neg C)$$

$$p^{*}(E_{2}) = p^{*}(E_{2}|\neg C) = p^{*}(E_{2}|C)$$

In particular, it follows that

$$p^{*}(E_{1} \wedge E_{2}|C) = p^{*}(E_{2}) p^{*}(E_{1}|C)$$

$$p^{*}(E_{1} \wedge E_{2}|\neg C) = p^{*}(E_{2}) p^{*}(E_{1}|\neg C)$$

According to Generalized Difference-Making with $C' = \neg C$, the causal strength measure η can be written as $\eta(C, E_1) = f(p^*(E_1|C), p^*(E_1|\neg C))$ for a continuous function f. From No Dilution and the above calculations we can infer that

$$f(p^{*}(E_{1}|C), p^{*}(E_{1}|\neg C)) = \eta(C, E_{1})$$

= $\eta(C, E_{1} \land E_{2})$
= $f(p^{*}(E_{1} \land E_{2}|C), p^{*}(E_{1} \land E_{2}|\neg C))$
= $f(p^{*}(E_{2}) p^{*}(E_{1}|C), p^{*}(E_{2}) p^{*}(E_{1}|\neg C))$

Since we have made no assumptions on the values of these probabilities, we can infer the general relationship

$$f(x,y) = f(cx,cy).$$
(3)

for all $0 < c \le \min(1/x, 1/y)$. Without loss of generality, let x > y. Then, choose c := 1/x. In this case, equation (3) becomes

$$f(x,y) = f(cx,cy) = f(1,y/x).$$

This implies that *f* must be a function of y/x only, that is, of the ratio $p^*(E|\neg C)/p^*(E|C)$. Generalized Difference-Making then implies that all such functions must be non-increasing, concluding the proof of Theorem 3. q.e.d.

Proof of Theorem 4: We write the causal strength measure η_{cg} as

$$\eta_{cg}(C, E) = \begin{cases} \eta^+(C, E) & \text{for positive causation} \\ \eta^-(C, E) & \text{for causal preemption} \end{cases}$$

We know from the previous theorem that $\eta^-(C, E)$ must be ordinally equivalent to $\eta_r(C, E)$. Now we show that all $\eta^+(C, E)$ -measures are ordinally equivalent to $\eta_g(C, E) = p^*(\neg E | \neg C) / p^*(\neg E | C)$. Since we have already shown that η_g and η_c are ordinally equivalent, this is sufficient for proving the theorem.

Because of Generalized Difference-Making, we can represent η^+ by a function f(x,y) with $x = p^*(E|C)$ and $y = p^*(E|\neg C)$. Suppose that there are x > y and $x' > y' \in [0,1]$ such that (1-y)/(1-x) = (1-y')/(1-x'), but $f(x,y) \neq f(x',y')$. (Otherwise η^+ would just be a function of η_g , and we would be done.) In that case we can find a probability space such that $p^*(E_1|C) = x$, $p^*(E_1|\neg C) = y$, $p^*(E_2|C) = x'$, $p^*(E_2|\neg C) = y'$ and C screens off E_1 and E_2 (proof omitted, but straightforward). Hence $\eta^+(C, E_1) \neq \eta^+(C, E_2)$. By Weak Causation-Prevention Symmetry, we can then infer $\eta^-(C, \neg E_1) \neq \eta^-(C, \neg E_2)$.

However, since η^- is ordinally equivalent to η_r , there is a function f such that

$$\eta^{-}(\mathcal{C},\neg \mathcal{E}_{1}) = f\left(\frac{p^{*}(\neg \mathcal{E}_{1}|\mathcal{C})}{p^{*}(\neg \mathcal{E}_{1}|\neg \mathcal{C})}\right) = f\left(\frac{1-x}{1-y}\right)$$
$$\eta^{-}(\mathcal{C},\neg \mathcal{E}_{2}) = f\left(\frac{p^{*}(\neg \mathcal{E}_{2}|\mathcal{C})}{p^{*}(\neg \mathcal{E}_{2}|\neg \mathcal{C})}\right) = f\left(\frac{1-x'}{1-y'}\right)$$

By assumption,

$$\frac{1-x}{1-y} = \left(\frac{1-y}{1-x}\right)^{-1} = \left(\frac{1-y'}{1-x'}\right)^{-1} = \frac{1-x'}{1-y'}$$

and so we can infer $\eta^{-}(C, \neg E_1) = \eta^{-}(C, \neg E_2)$, leading to a contradiction. Hence $\eta^{+}(C, E)$ can be represented by a non-decreasing function of $p^{*}(\neg E|\neg C)/p^{*}(\neg E|C)$, completing the proof of Theorem 4. q.e.d.

Proof of Theorem 5: By Generalized Difference-Making, we have that $\eta(C, E) = f(p^*(E|C), p^*(E|\neg C))$ for some continuous function $f : [0, 1]^2 \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$. Assume that $\eta(C, E_1) = \eta(C, E_2) = t$, that *C* screens off E_1 and E_2 and that $p^*(E_1|C) = p^*(E_2|C) = x$, $p^*(E_1|\neg C) = p^*(E_2|\neg C) = y$, for some $x, y \in \mathbb{R}$. By

the Conjunctive Closure Principle, we can infer

$$\eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{E}_1 \wedge \mathbf{E}_2) = \eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{E}_1) = f(x, y)$$

Moreover, we can infer

$$\begin{split} \eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{E}_1 \wedge \mathbf{E}_2) &= f(p^*(\mathbf{E}_1 \wedge \mathbf{E}_2 | \mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E}_1 \wedge \mathbf{E}_2 | \neg \mathbf{C})) \\ &= f(p^*(\mathbf{E}_1 | \mathbf{C}) \cdot p^*(\mathbf{E}_2 | \mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E}_1 | \neg \mathbf{C}) \cdot p^*(\mathbf{E}_2 | \neg \mathbf{C})) \\ &= f(x^2, y^2) \end{split}$$

Taking both calculations together, we obtain

$$f(x^2, y^2) = f(x, y)$$
 (4)

as a structural requirement on f, since we have not made any assumptions on x and y.

Following Atkinson (2012), we now define $u = \frac{\log x}{\log y}$ and define a function $g : \mathbb{R}^2 \to \mathbb{R}$ such that g(x, u) := f(x, y). Equation (4) then implies the requirement

$$g(x^2, u) = f(x^2, y^2) = f(x, y) = g(x, u)$$

and by iterating the same procedure, we obtain

$$g(x^{2n}, u) = g(x, u)$$

for some $n \in \mathbb{N}$. Due to the continuity of f and g, we can infer that g cannot depend on its first argument. Moreover, taking the limit $n \to \infty$ yields g(x, u) = g(0, u). Hence, also

$$f(x, y) = g(0, u) = g(0, \log x / \log y)$$

and we see that

$$\eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{E}) = h\left(\frac{\log p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C})}{\log p^*(\mathbf{E}|\neg \mathbf{C})}\right)$$

for some continuous function $h : \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$. It remains to show that h is

non-decreasing. Generalized Difference-Making implies that $\eta(C, E)$ is a nondecreasing function of $p^*(E|C)$ and a non-increasing function of $p^*(E|\neg C)$. So it must be a non-decreasing function of $\log p^*(E|C) / \log p^*(E|\neg C)$, too. This implies that *h* is a non-decreasing function. Hence, all measures of causal strength that satisfy Generalized Difference-Making and the Conjunctive Closure Principle are ordinally equivalent to

$$\eta_{cc}(\mathsf{C},\mathsf{E}) = \frac{\log p^*(\mathsf{E}|\mathsf{C})}{\log p^*(\mathsf{E}|\neg\mathsf{C})}. \qquad \text{q.e.d.}$$

Proof of Theorem 6: We know by assumption that any measure that satisfies Generalized Difference-Making with $C' = \Omega_C$ is of the form

$$\eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{E}) = f(p^*(\mathbf{E}|\mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E})).$$

Suppose now that there are $x, y, y' \in [0,1]$ such that $f(x,y) \neq f(x,y')$. In that case, we can choose propositions C, E_1 , and E_2 and choose a probability distribution p^* such that $x = p^*(E_1|C)$, $y = p^*(E_1)$ and $y' = p^*(E_2)$ and $C \wedge E_1 \models E_2$, and $C \wedge E_1 \models E_2$. Then, $p^*(E_{1,2}|C) = p^*(E_1 \wedge E_2|C)$ and

$$\eta(\mathbf{C}, \mathbf{E}_1) = f(p^*(\mathbf{E}_1 | \mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E}_1)) = f(p^*(\mathbf{E}_1 \wedge \mathbf{E}_2 | \mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E}_1))$$

= $f(p^*(\mathbf{E}_2 | \mathbf{C}), p^*(\mathbf{E}_1))$

and by Conditional Equivalence, also

$$\eta(C, E_1) = \eta(C, E_2) = f(p^*(E_2|C), p^*(E_2))$$

Taking both equations together leads to a contradiction with our assumption $f(p^*(E_2|C), p^*(E_1)) \neq f(p^*(E_2|C), p^*(E_2))$. So *f* cannot depend on its second argument. Hence, all causal strength measures that satisfy Generalized Difference-Making with $C' = \Omega_C$ and Conditional Equivalence must be ordinally equivalent to $\eta_{ph}(C, E) = p^*(E|C)$. q.e.d.

References

- Atkinson, D. (2012). Confirmation and Justification: A Commentary on Shogenji's Measure. *Synthese*, 184:49–61.
- Schupbach, J. N. and Sprenger, J. (2011). The Logic of Explanatory Power. *Philosophy of Science*, 78:105–127.