

archaic notions of property. The courts must provide the forum for the enforcement of these rights.

While the analysis of our modern society and of the functioning of collectivism presented by the work is admirable, the book can never be used as a textbook for a new social order. It is a strong criticism of existing and proposed economic systems but the suggested solution for the problems confronting society is such that the reader is not furnished with a unified concrete plan for the development of a finer and more stable political system. Perhaps it should not be criticized on that score since it was not presented as an outline of an Utopia. The book is well written, interesting, and the result of a great deal of research and thought. Despite the fact that it will never rank with "Das Kapital" and "Wealth of Nations", "The Good Society" is a distinct contribution to political philosophy.

GEORGE E. BAILEY

"HOW LAWYERS THINK" — *Clarence Morris. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1937. \$3.50*

Philosophers have evolved as many theories and definitions of law as there are authors who have written on the subject and these are legion. Regardless of what their conclusions have been, fundamentally the practice of law is based on logic. It is a rational process. No matter what problem is confronting the lawyer, he works with general rules and attempts to correlate facts under them. From the time he knows his facts until the final decision has been given in the Supreme Court, the lawyer, knowingly or not, is dealing in the field of logic. To briefly describe the methods of logic and how they may be applied by the lawyer and the law student is the purpose of Clarence Morris in writing this little volume.

This is no abstract philosophical treatise. It brings out methods of solving and simplifying difficulties. These, when one reads them, sound absurdly simple, but all too often they are forgotten when groping with knotty problems and the solution is stumbled upon only by chance. The author does not recommend or even suggest that one attempt to do all of his thinking in formal syllogistic manner. The chief value of a knowledge of logic, he points out, is to be able to check your thinking and discover unnoticed fallacies which may be pounced upon gleefully by your opponent if let pass. Then too, it is useful in that often it will suggest a different point of view from which to look at a problem which refuses to submit to your normal ratiocination.

For those who have had formal training in logic, or who are interested in the philosophy of law, or who are looking for new light on legal principles, there is nothing in the book. But for those who have had trouble in solving problems there may be much help. Yet, as the author says, these people may master the words of the text and still not be able to apply the principles therein.

Morris admits that reflective thought is not the only way to solve problems. There are at least two other methods: (1) reliance on authority; and (2) intuition. Both of these, however, are closely connected with logic. When the lawyer relies on authority, he is relying on the conclusion reached by someone else through a process of logic. When he relies on intuition, it is very likely that he has used a logical process which has been so rapid or subconscious that he is not aware of it. The author explains these methods and gives advice as to their use.

Philosophizing just a bit at the end of his book, Morris evaluates briefly the law. He sees it as an imperfect, but workable, system which will gradually change as each generation adds its small increment of wisdom, but which will probably never make a great break with its immediate past.

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