Labor Union Locals, Radical Politics, and Sympathetic Views of Social Movement Organizations

Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for Graduation with Research Distinction

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2016

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Abstract

Although there are thorough bodies of literature which focus on the different organizational structures of social movement organizations and how organizations cooperate with one another, the American Labor Movement is frequently seen as homologous. While challenged frequently in sociological literature, treating labor unions as interchangeable ignores the various motivations held by union locals. As members of national unions, it is assumed that labor union locals naturally have similar levels of participation both in internal campaigns and in their participation with other national social movement organizations. Operating on this assumption, the study conducted for this article surveyed locals from the Service Employees International Union, UNITE HERE, and the Communication Workers of America. Rating these different unions as conservative, liberal, and politically radical, this study argues that politically radical labor unions are more sympathetic of feminist SMOs. However, this study also suggests that the differences in political opinions and the organizational structures of broad social movements and social movement organizations do not incite different levels of sympathy among labor union locals. Supporting the call to action put forth by Lott, this article suggests that there is a large body of literature not yet published concerning the psychology of labor unions.

<u>Literature Review</u>

Introduction

The United States has a history of being uniquely conservative when compared to other industrialized countries. The idea of 'American exceptionalism' presents itself politically and socially as the United States has been less receptive of social movements that encourage international justice, economic equality, peace, and other progressive ideals (Kelly and Lefkowitz 2003, Welch 2003, Sarkees 2003, Carty 2006). This has been documented in a country that is both the wealthiest on the planet (Stierli 2015, IMF 2016) and the only industrialized nation to have a two-party electoral system (Simmons and Simmons 2003). American exceptionalism has expressed itself in the public mind as the belief that the United States has achieved "higher levels of human rights" despite the stifling of social movements such as the human rights movement and organized labor (Welch 2003).

While researchers have done a thorough job of illustrating how economic sanctions and political actions have repressed organized labor, there is only a small body of research that has given predictive results the labor movement's future. For example, Swarts and Vasi (2011) have shown that social grievances, such as high income inequality and racial segregation, are not significantly correlated with a city's likelihood of adopting a higher minimum wage. Hogler et. al. (2014) show a significant correlation between "collective/egalitarian psychology" and less stratified income distributions. As an answer to multiple calls (Lott 2013) for more focused research on Labor Unions in the United States, this study seeks to find the political aspects of a Labor Union that make its members more likely to organize both for its constituents and for the general public.

American Labor and Economic Inequality

Interestingly, high levels of economic inequality are also uniquely American when compared to other industrialized western countries (Jacobs and Myers 2014). Numerous researchers have identified a correlation between the current low unionization rate and for the current high level of wealth inequality in the United States (Hogler et. al. 2015, Western and Rosenfeld 2011, Jacobs and Myers 2014). This is not surprising when looking at the history of organized labor in the United States.

At the height of the Labor Movement in the early 1960's nearly 1 in 3 workers in private industry were unionized (Hogler et. al. 2015, Weeden et. al. 2007, Ness 2003), with certain industries like the garment industry having over nearly half of its workers unionized (Carty 2006). However, since this peak there has been a steady decrease in the union membership rates and a steady increase in economic inequality to the point that earnings fell for 90% of Americans between 2010 and 2013 (Hogler et. al. 2015).

While the decline of organized labor has been ongoing since the 1960's, the rise of income inequality in U.S. has increased at a singular rate since the 1980's (Jacobs and Myers 2014). This suggests that the rise of Neoliberalism (beginning with the policies of the Reagan Administration) poses a serious threat to the already wounded Labor movement. Tope and Jacobs (2009) found that once the Reagan administration entered the White House that union recognition elections fell sharply due to the notorious PATCO layoff, and Piketty and Saez (2007) found that progressive tax policies have been declining in the U.S. federal tax system since 1970. Jacobs and Myers (2014) found that macroeconomic policies since 1983 have stressed curbing inflation of the dollar at the cost of raising the unemployment rate.

Linking the labor movement to the general public makes logical sense. After all, researchers such as Jacobs and Myers (2014) find that Labor unions not only decrease earnings differences between employees in the same firm, but are also strong advocates for public policies that benefit the poor. In fact, it is disputed whether the SEIU helped to create or simply adopted the Fight for Fifteen minimum wage campaign (Gupta 2013). This supports the idea that organized labor unions are social advocates, because contrary to popular belief, Easton (2001) finds that non-unionized, less educated workers benefit the most from increases in the minimum wage.

Unions, Fear, and Sympathy

An ethnographic analysis done by Hodson et. al. (2013) shows private companies today have a tendency to follow a 'Kafkaesque model of bureaucracy' instead of Weber's traditional bureaucratic model. This Kafkaesque bureaucracy is characterized by strict adherence to policies that indirectly encourage elite control, the proliferation of specific and contradicting policies that confuse and ultimately disenfranchise workers, the unquestionable and indisputable goal of profit maximization, the subjugation of low level employees through abuses of legitimatized power, and the instilling of fear of punishment. While the main finding of Hodson et. al.'s (2013) study is not surprising, it is important to emphasize the fear aspect of Kafkaesque bureaucracy, because fear of termination is a major deterrent in unionization elections (Lott 2014, Cooper and Sureau 2008, Carty 2006, Jacobs and Myers 2014).

In fact, Western and Rosenfeld's article "Unions, Norms, and the Rise in U.S. Wage Inequality" (2011) makes a thorough case that privatization and fear naturally lead to the concentration of wealth. Western and Rosenfeld's study (2011) shows that declining unionization rates explain roughly 20% to 33% of the rise of wage inequality between 1973 and

2007, and also suggests that unions established "norms of equity that claimed the fairness of a standard rate for low-pay workers and the injustice of unchecked earnings for managers and owners." Because they establish these norms, Labor Unions are also arguably the most important advocates for redistributive public policies that benefit the less affluent.

Scare tactics are as common as dandelions when it comes to employers fighting the unionization of their employees, but employers are not the only people that utilize these forms of anti-unionization. In *There is Power in a Union: The Epic Story of Labor in America* (2010) public historian Philip Dray gives numerous historical accounts of how the Labor Movement came into being in the United States, and how the movement has been fought against by the wealthy and the political elite outside business management. Beginning this history with the Lowell Mill Girls strikes of 1834 and 1836 Dray (2010) gives many examples of how fear has been used since the 1850's to resist Labor efforts in America; in fact, from the various accounts that Bray cites only one does not mention scare tactics used to stifle organizational tactics. Bray's 674-page text does not limit itself to employers using these scare tactics, but on the contrary refers to mass media, government officials, and even fellow employees who instill fear.

Cooper and Sureau's article "Teacher Unions and the Politics of Fear in Labor Relations" (2008) addresses the use of fear in stifling collective action not in privatized companies, but within public education. Addressing how teachers used tactics of striking and appealing to the general public Cooper and Sureau's (2008) case study on teachers unions not only demonstrates the benefits that teachers won through collective action, but also suggests that unions are ethically beneficial organizations (see also Western and Rosenfeld 2011). This shows that employees both in the public and the private sectors of the economy benefit from unionization, despite public sector organizations not being marked by Kafkaesque bureaucracies.

Cooper and Sureau's article (2008) emphasizes that the Wagner Act of 1944 outlawed public servants to unionize and that despite this public employees frequently unionize. Martin (2008) suggests that because union members understood that they were violating NLRB sanctions by forming new AFT chapters teachers strengthened their efforts and improved their chances of making long-lasting, effective change. Along with this, Shepard (2003) illustrates how social movements are regularly successful when their constituents identify their movement as being related not only to future potential benefits, but to feelings of pleasure.

As such, we assume that radical labor union locals are likely to be less intimidated by and more frequently organize against/collectively bargain with their employers. I define "radical labor union" as a union that radically organizes both for the interests of its members and the general public. This definition borrows from Day (2004), who defines radical political organizing as "mobilizing in opposition to political and social institutions, as well as the laws supporting them, through organized resistance and noncompliance."

Using past literature (Day 2004, Carty 2006, Wessler 2013, Greenhouse 2015) we identify the Communication Workers of America (CWA) as a radical labor union. I also consider CWA to be a more radical union due to its democratically determined endorsement of "outsider" political candidate Bernie Sanders (Merica 2015), its frequent worker organization campaigns (CWA 2013, CWA 2014), and its activism for people outside of its general membership (*InformationWeek* 2007, CWA 2016).

Additionally, for comparative measures I identify UNITE HERE as less politically radical (or as a 'moderate' union) based on its presidential endorsements (Ellis 2008, Wheeler 2016), its issues with its membership base (Ellis 2009), and its previous potential merger with the SEIU (Maher 2009(1), Maher 2009(2)). I also identify the Service Employees International

Union (SEIU) as a comparatively conservative union with its recent history of association with/contributions to the United States Democratic Party (Wessler 2013, Opensecrets.org 2016, Lonardo 2016), its revolving door employment practices (Early 2012), and its recent wage dispute with Fight for Fifteen organizers (Moberg 2016).

Social Movement Organizations and Coalitions

Traditionally labor unions and social movement organizations (hereafter abbreviated SMOs) have been studied as separate structures from one another and only recently have the two been discussed as entities that share any qualities. In the article "Resource Mobilization and Social Movements: A Partial Theory" (1977) McCarthy and Zald define a social movement as "a set of opinions and beliefs in a population which represents preferences for changing some elements of the social structure and/or reward distribution of a society." Therefore, an SMO is a formalized group of people who act on the beliefs presented by a social movement; such as how the Student Labor Action Project (an SMO) takes action motivated by their beliefs in the Labor Movement (See Carthy 2006).

Social movements vary in terms of structure, from social movements that centralize around a few choice SMOs and social movements that are decentralized with constituents being involved in multiple coalitions. Not only this, but SMOs themselves are often sorted into the categories of internal structure that range from the traditional view of SMOs to more pacified, formally structured interest groups (Berg 2003).

One structure of a social movement is not necessarily better than another. Meyer's *The Politics of Protest: Social Movements in America* (2014) suggests that decentralized movements rarely achieve their initially stated goals because of pacification brought on by the lack of attention, assimilation into governmental bodies, and the lack of communication inherent to

decentralized structures. However, Shepard (2003) shows the problems of centralization by explaining how the 'Professionalization of Reform' often leads to non-effective professional groups and how centralized organizations are at high risk of internal fissures.

Researchers have identified certain conditions that must be met by a social movement for it to achieve significant change or its stated goals. Amenta et. al. (2010) identify that while greater political influence is not directly correlated with more rank-and-file membership a certain number of rank-and-file members are necessary for political influence to be attainable. Along with this, other researchers (Tope and Jacobs 2009, Meyer 2004) suggest that a social movement's political success rests on it taking advantage of mutual opportunities with 'insiders' who hold governmental office.

Coalitions are the main unifying force between SMOs within the same social movement, and more importantly between different social movements themselves. Often coalitions are decentralized in structure, and rarely does a single SMO determine the goal or goals of all the members of a coalition. In fact, the 'battle in Seattle' is exemplary of coalition action as many different SMOs from various social movements came together to protest negotiations of the World Trade Organization (WTO). This coalition formed what later came to be called the second wave of the antiglobalization movement (Hayduk 2003). While the protests were successful in stifling the WTO convention they also illustrate how contradictory coalitions usually are. Describing the protests, Meyer (2014) points out that "Teamsters, 'black block' anarchists, environmentalists, vegetarian fundamentalists, lesbian feminists, and white nationalists marched together in an alliance that must have been uneasy."

However, Hayduk (2003) points out that coalitions are often short lived when its members do not share any ideological views. Many of the coalitions between the various

protesters in the 'Battle in Seattle' ended when the protests themselves ended. As such, I assume that groups who are part of the same social movement (such as a CWA local and an SEIU local) are more likely to form coalitions and sympathize with each other. However, what is unclear about this is how much of a variance of sympathy there is among different labor movement organizations. As such, my first hypothesis can be stated as:

> *Hypothesis 1: Radical labor union locals will have more sympathetic views of social movements and social movement organizations that seek goals that are different from the goals of the labor movement.*

Social Movement Unionism

Because social movements regularly have informal and decentralized structures researchers tend to view the SMOs of 'traditional' movements (such as organizations who define their ideology and goals) as opposite in structure to special interest groups (Hayduk 2003). However, because Labor Unions are commonly centralized by a national office they are popularly characterized as formally structured conglomerates akin to special interest groups (Ness 2003).

Social Movement Unionism has emerged as a middle ground between unions and SMOs. This new form of Unionism combines militancy, union reform, and alternative forms of organizing with traditional methods of addressing labor struggles, and also urges workers in various industries to work in solidarity with SMOs, community groups, and activists for better working and living conditions (Carty 2006).

Today, Social Movement Unionism is the growing trend for most unions in the United States, and as such the traditionally recognized distinction between 'traditional' unions and social movement unions is becoming more and more obsolete (Martin and Dixon 2010).

However, this is further complicated by the fact that social unionism is not an entirely new concept. For example, Pfeiffer (2003) explains how the first organizers of the disability movement were trained by SMOs of the labor movement.

Carty (2006) stresses the need for collective identity for organizing campaigns. While various organizations create the body of a social movement, what is important is that these SMOs set to achieve similar goals to try and influence public opinion (Olson and Davis 2003). However, social unionism is needed in the context of the labor movement because many labor unions are seen as exclusive organizations that require their member's time, energy, and permeate various aspects of their daily lives (Haussman 2003). As such, I assume that both 'radical' and 'moderate' union locals will be more sympathetic towards social movements than 'conservative' locals due to the decentralized structure's inclusivity. Therefore, my second hypothesis is:

> *Hypothesis 2: Radical Labor Unions will be more receptive of decentralized social movements than they are of SMOs.*

Methodology

My study involved two "rounds" of data collection. The first round of data collection was an electronic survey with nonprobability sampling of Presidents[1] of labor union locals. For convenience, I limited the sample to the states of Ohio, Michigan, Indiana, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia. These states were picked under the assumption that less distance between questionnaire and respondent would result in a higher chance of response.

Before data collection began, contact information was required to distribute the survey via e-mail. Over the course of four months I talked to 213 separate labor union locals

asking for their president's email address. After four months of contact information collection, surveys were sent to 172 email addresses of local presidents and local representatives[1]. 59 of the 172 subjects took the online survey within the allotted month, and of those 11 decided to not agree to the initial consent script form required for participation.

Before taking the survey, respondents were given a consent details form that outlined the goals of my research, their rights as a research participant, and the estimated time it would take them to complete the survey. As stated previously, 11 potential survey respondents decided to back out after reading this consent details form.

The survey questions that were distributed via email can be divided into the categories of personal or local. Composed of 17 listed questions, responding to every question creates data for 33 different variables that may be used for testing my hypotheses.

Personal questions are those that ask the respondent to give their own beliefs or life experiences. While other questions fall into this category, question four ("How favorably do you view the following?") is the main measure used to test my first hypothesis. Question four used a simple Likert scale to measure respondent's opinions on different social movements including both centralized SMOs (i.e. National Organization for Women (NOW)) and decentralized social movements (i.e. Black Lives Matter (BLM)). Using this Likert scale, I compared opinions about movements and SMOs with Kruskal-Wallis H tests. These comparisons are shown in figures 1-8.

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[1] Due to their internal structures, contacts at UNITE HERE and SEIU came from 'local representatives' whose roles in their local meetings was roughly equivalent to the role of local presidents in other unions.

Figures 1-8: Kruskal-Wallis H tests for social movements and SMOs[2].

. kwallis blm_personal, by(union_name)

Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test

union_name	Obs	Rank Sum
SEIU	10	194.50
UNITE HERE	16	429.00
CWA	22	552.50

Figure 1

chi-squared =   1.780 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.4107

chi-squared with ties =   1.879 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.3908

. kwallis ff15_personal, by(union_name)

Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test

union_name	Obs	Rank Sum
SEIU	9	253.50
UNITE HERE	13	271.50
CWA	22	465.00

Figure 2

chi-squared =   2.205 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.3320

chi-squared with ties =   2.632 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.2682

. kwallis hrc_personal, by(union_name)

Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test

union_name	Obs	Rank Sum
SEIU	10	112.00
UNITE HERE	15	305.00
CWA	15	403.00

Figure 3

chi-squared =   10.780 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.0046

chi-squared with ties =   11.909 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.0026

. kwallis naacp_personal, by(union_name)

Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test

union_name	Obs	Rank Sum
SEIU	10	164.00
UNITE HERE	16	431.50
CWA	22	580.50

Figure 4

chi-squared =   4.244 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.1198

chi-squared with ties =   4.945 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.0844

. kwallis now_personal, by(union_name)

Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test

union_name	Obs	Rank Sum
SEIU	8	108.00
UNITE HERE	15	271.00
CWA	19	524.00

Figure 5

chi-squared =   9.242 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.0098

chi-squared with ties =   10.345 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.0057

. kwallis pp_personal, by(union_name)

Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test

union_name	Obs	Rank Sum
SEIU	10	145.00
UNITE HERE	16	354.50
CWA	21	628.50

Figure 6

chi-squared =   9.016 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.0110

chi-squared with ties =   9.608 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.0082

. kwallis sas_personal, by(union_name)

Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test

union_name	Obs	Rank Sum
SEIU	7	99.00
UNITE HERE	13	288.50
CWA	17	315.50

Figure 7

chi-squared =   2.568 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.2769

chi-squared with ties =   2.843 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.2413

. kwallis wa_personal, by(union_name)

Kruskal-Wallis equality-of-populations rank test

union_name	Obs	Rank Sum
SEIU	8	162.50
UNITE HERE	15	310.00
CWA	18	388.50

Figure 8

chi-squared =   0.081 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.9605

chi-squared with ties =   0.096 with 2 d.f.
probability =   0.9533

Local questions make up the bulk of the survey's queries, and ranged from how long has their union local existed to how often their local holds member elections.[2] Specifically question five ("Has your union chapter participated in events or associated with any of the following social organizations?") and question 11 (which asks about the local's number of events with Fight for 15 since 2014) give useful indications of how frequently each union local organizes. However, I decided not to use data taken from question 11 because the SEIU has a number of explicit links to the Fight for Fifteen movement in their social campaigns.

It is important to note that my second hypothesis specifies *radical* union locals as a subpopulation to be tested. So to test my second hypothesis, I used STATA to test two specific populations against each other (CWA members and non-members). These mean comparison tests are given in figures 9-16.

The last question of the survey simply asked whether or not the respondent was willing to participate in the second wave (interview portion) of the study. Of the 48 respondents that reached this point nine responded that they would be willing to participate in interviews. However, four of these nine respondents decided to not participate in the interview process. Over the course of a month five interviews were recorded and transcribed, but two respondents later requested that their interviews not be used. Due to the low number of interviews (three), no data was pulled from interviews for qualitative analysis.

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[2] It should be noted that the personal opinions concerning the Bonnie Labor Union Skills (BLUS) organization were not included in the reported Kruskal-Wallis tests due to a sample of less than 30; only 23 respondents gave a their opinion of BLUS. However, despite this sample size of less than 50% of respondents it should be noted that a KW test for "blus_personal" resulted in a probability of roughly 58% (54% with ties) and thus failed to reject independence from respondent's Union Affiliation.

Figures 9-16: Mean comparisons for social movements and SMOs by CWA membership

Figure 9

```
. ttest blm_personal, by(cwa)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

    Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   Member |      22    3.409091    .2519112    1.181568    2.885213    3.932969
 Non Memb |      26    3.269231    .2515043    1.282426    2.751248    3.787214
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
 combined |      48    3.333333    .1769855    1.226192    2.977284    3.689382
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
     diff |            .1398601    .3584541               -.5816705    .8613908
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =   0.3902
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       46

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.6509         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.6982          Pr(T > t) = 0.3491
```

Figure 10

```
. ttest ff15_personal, by(cwa)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

    Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   Member |      22    4.045455    .2229017    1.045502    3.581905    4.509004
 Non Memb |      22    4.227273    .2175405    1.020356    3.774872    4.679673
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
 combined |      44    4.136364     .154533    1.025056    3.824718    4.448009
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
     diff |           -.1818182    .3114628               -.8103755    .4467391
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =  -0.5838
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       42

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.2813         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.5625          Pr(T > t) = 0.7187
```

Figure 11

```
. ttest hrc_personal, by(cwa)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

    Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   Member |      15    4.466667    .1918994    .7432234    4.055083     4.87825
 Non Memb |      25        3.52    .2244994    1.122497    3.056656    3.983344
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
 combined |      40       3.875    .1724168     1.09046    3.526254    4.223746
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
     diff |           .9466667     .326484                .2857343    1.607599
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =   2.8996
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       38

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9969         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0062          Pr(T > t) = 0.0031
```

Figure 12

```
. ttest naacp_personal, by(cwa)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

    Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   Member |      22    4.181818    .2042446    .9579921    3.757068    4.606568
 Non Memb |      26    3.923077    .2069788    1.055389    3.496796    4.349358
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
 combined |      48    4.041667    .1457383    1.009705    3.748479    4.334854
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
     diff |           .2587413    .2931846               -.3314088    .8488913
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =   0.8825
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       46

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.8090         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.3821          Pr(T > t) = 0.1910
```

Figure 13

```
. ttest now_personal, by(cwa)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

    Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   Member |      19    4.315789    .2170056    .9459053    3.859878    4.771701
 Non Memb |      23    3.391304     .233034    1.117592    2.908021    3.874587
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
 combined |      42    3.809524     .174568     1.13133    3.456977    4.162071
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
     diff |           .9244851    .3236049                .2704552    1.578515
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =   2.8568
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       40

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9966         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0068          Pr(T > t) = 0.0034
```

Figure 14

```
. ttest pp_personal, by(cwa)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

    Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   Member |      21           4    .2390457    1.095445    3.501359    4.498641
 Non Memb |      26    2.961538    .2510334    1.280024    2.444526    3.478551
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
 combined |      47    3.425532    .1893186    1.297903    3.044453     3.80661
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
     diff |           1.038462    .3525125                 .328465    1.748458
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =   2.9459
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       45

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.9975         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0051          Pr(T > t) = 0.0025
```

Figure 15

```
. ttest sas_personal, by(cwa)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

    Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   Member |      17    3.882353    .2695633    1.111438    3.310904    4.453802
 Non Memb |      20         3.9    .2704772    1.209611    3.333885    4.466115
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
 combined |      37    3.891892    .1889746    1.149487    3.508634     4.27515
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
     diff |          -.0176471     .384565               -.7983556    .7630615
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =  -0.0459
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       35

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.4818         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.9637          Pr(T > t) = 0.5182
```

Figure 16

```
. ttest wa_personal, by(cwa)

Two-sample t test with equal variances

    Group |     Obs        Mean    Std. Err.   Std. Dev.   [95% Conf. Interval]
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
   Member |      18    4.111111    .2270713    .9633818    3.632033     4.59019
 Non Memb |      23    4.043478    .2035093    .9759965    3.621426    4.465531
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
 combined |      41    4.073171    .1497569     .958912    3.770501    4.375841
----------+--------------------------------------------------------------------
     diff |           .0676329    .3054185               -.5501344    .6854001
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    diff = mean(Member) - mean(Non Memb)                          t =   0.2214
Ho: diff = 0                                     degrees of freedom =       39

    Ha: diff < 0                 Ha: diff != 0                   Ha: diff > 0
 Pr(T < t) = 0.5870         Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.8259          Pr(T > t) = 0.4130
```

Analysis

Hypothesis 1

Hypothesis 1: Radical labor union locals will have more sympathetic views of social movements and social movement organizations that seek goals that are different from the goals of the labor movement.

The Kruskal-Wallis tests shown above can be separated into social movements and SMOs. The subjects shown in figures 1-8 above are Black Lives Matter (movement, fig. 1), Fight for 15 (movement, fig. 2), Human Rights Campaign (SMO, fig. 3), National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (SMO, fig. 4), the National Organization for Women (SMO, fig. 5), Planned Parenthood (SMO, fig. 6), Students Against Sweatshops (SMO, fig. 7), and Working America (SMO, fig. 8). I decided to ask respondents about these specific movements and organizations due to their various levels of connection to labor unions. While the details of these organization's relationships differ, I use Working America (fig. 8), Students Against Sweatshops (fig. 7), and the Fight for 15 (fig. 2) as control measures due to their close affiliation with labor unions.

Surprisingly, figures three, five, and six present a statistically significant ($p < 0.05$) correlations between union affiliation and personal opinion. However, these figures do not suggest that radical labor union locals are more likely support all social organizations, but social organizations concerned with Women's rights and civil rights.

In terms of women's rights organizations, the CWA showed a noticeably positive difference of opinion compared to UNITE HERE and the SEIU. I extrapolate this idea from the Kruskal-Wallis tests concerning the National Organization of Women (fig. 5) and Planned Parenthood (fig. 6). What's important to note is that these two organizations should not be considered as one in the same. Specifically, Planned Parenthood is usually associated with women's healthcare (Rosenbaum 2015) and NOW is associated with feminist movements (Haussman 2003). Although the CWA respondents in my sample found both of these groups more favorable than respondents from UNITE HERE and SEIU, it would be reductionist (and rather bold) to simply say that members of the CWA are more likely to

form coalitions with women's organizations. Instead, these results suggest that union local presidents from the CWA find these organizations to be more agreeable in their personal opinions. This is not surprising considering that CWA is the only union in this study that has an active public campaign for women's rights (CWA 2016).

What is also interesting about this finding is that figures 17 and 18 illustrate that CWA, the union with the highest reported male membership rates (with a mean of 56%), is more supportive of women's organizations than SEIU, the union with the lowest reported male membership rates (with a mean of 30%). Taking these findings into account can result in two different conclusions. One either concludes that there is a spurious relationship between a local's gender makeup and its organizing campaigns, or that measuring the views of a union local's president is spurious with that local's affiliations. Unfortunately, my study cannot give an accurate measure of either of these hypotheses because question five only asks if the respondent's local has participated in an event with the other SMOs, instead of asking how many times it has done so.

Secondly, the CWA respondents found the Human Rights Campaign (HRC) more agreeable than respondents from other unions. This suggests that the CWA respondents were more sympathetic in terms of civil

```
. ttest membership_male, by(cwa)

Two-sample t test with equal variances
```

Figure 17

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]
1	22	56.22727	6.434126	30.17872	42.84678 69.60777
2	26	40.23077	4.810664	24.52967	30.32302 50.13852
combined	48	47.5625	4.061682	28.14016	39.39145 55.73355
diff		15.9965	7.89508		.1045326 31.88847

```
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                           t =   2.0261
Ho: diff = 0                        degrees of freedom =       46

   Ha: diff < 0              Ha: diff != 0                Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.9757     Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0486       Pr(T > t) = 0.0243
```

```
. ttest membership_male, by(seiu)

Two-sample t test with equal variances
```

Figure 18

Group	Obs	Mean	Std. Err.	Std. Dev.	[95% Conf. Interval]
1	10	30.3	7.474475	23.63637	13.39156 47.20844
2	38	52.10526	4.49637	27.71748	42.99475 61.21577
combined	48	47.5625	4.061682	28.14016	39.39145 55.73355
diff		-21.80526	9.584553		-41.09797 -2.512559

```
    diff = mean(1) - mean(2)                           t =  -2.2750
Ho: diff = 0                        degrees of freedom =       46

   Ha: diff < 0              Ha: diff != 0                Ha: diff > 0
Pr(T < t) = 0.0138     Pr(|T| > |t|) = 0.0276       Pr(T > t) = 0.9862
```

rights or LGBTQ rights, because of the ambiguous wording in the name "Human Rights Campaign." One would naturally think that labor organizers such as local presidents would be informed about various SMOs, but since the HRCs goals are not apparent in their organization's name I cannot confidently say this.

What complicates all of this is that the Black Lives Matter movement (fig. 1) nor the NAACP (fig. 2) were significantly different among the labor unions surveyed. This as well suggests that all three unions in my sample are supportive of racial liberation movements or that all three are not significantly supportive of said movements. Whatever the case, the fact that difference of support was not significant for Working America (fig. 8) and the Fight for 15 movement (fig. 2) provides a counter-argument to the common assumption that labor unions are exclusively white.

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2: Labor Unions will be more receptive of decentralized social movements than they are of SMOs.

Unfortunately, the two means T-tests illustrated in figures 9-16 are inconclusive for all but three SMOs. This means that both of the social movements that I had asked about in my survey did not give me any results that fall into a 95% confidence interval ($p < 0.05$). The groups that did have statistically significant means comparison tests were the three SMOs that were discussed in hypothesis one: the Human Rights Campaign, Planned Parenthood, and the National Organization of Women.

However, before admitting some sort of defeat with these test results it should be noted that the results of the Black Lives Matter and the Fight for 15 movements suggest that not only are social movements unagreed upon, but that they are polarizing in terms of

opinion. There are a few possible explanations for this, but they all involve not only an insignificant sample size but also a skewed sample. This is due to the fact that the Fight for 15 is a social movement primarily hosted by the SEIU through several different social campaigns.

Discussion

The results of this study suggest that there is a level of difference in opinion concerning the Human Rights Campaign, Planned Parenthood, and the National Organization of Women. There are many ideas that can be inferred from these results, but the most intuitive of these is that radical labor union locals are more (or more likely to be) sympathetic of progressive SMOs that do not deal with issues of race.

Along with this, while the results of my study failed to reject my second null hypothesis, the two social movements measured did not give a specific pattern. In fact, the Black Lives Matter and Fight for 15 movements comprised the lowest and highest Likert means from this study.

The results of my study do not give evidence that the CWA (nor radical labor unions in general) are not sympathetic to movements and SMOs that deal with issues of race in the United States. In fact, there is a recent body of literature that suggests that the rising tide of social unionism has resulted in an increase of coalition action between labor unions and a whole range of different SMOs. From the United Steelworkers working with Black Lives Matter to divestment campaigns on university campuses it is reasonable to question the inconclusive results of this study.

The biggest hole in my research is my lack of interview data. This lack of data it is impossible to determine a sociological or psychological link between representative opinions and employer influence. Lott (2014) points out that this lack of understanding is pervasive in I/O psychology as it is in sociological literature.

The findings of this study are questionable, and this is due to my study's small sample size. Not only that, but the different organizational structures of the SEIU, UNITE HERE, and the CWA make for imperfect comparisons between one another. Lastly, the unequal number of respondents from each union distorts the results of the two means comparison tests. Despite these issues, the fact that my results concerning the Human Rights Campaign, Planned Parenthood, and the National Organization of Women fall within a 99% confidence interval suggests that there is an untapped body of literature involving the intersection of the labor and feminist movements.

Overall, this study supports a body of literature of social movement unionism. Although various obstacles were met during data collection the results from my data suggest that there is a significant difference in opinion when it comes to the feminist movement. Future sociological and psychological study focusing on these sympathies could result in a deeper insight into the study of social movement coalitions.

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