

## Silence Without Secrecy? What is Left Unsaid in Early Modern Japanese Maps

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J.B. Harley's pioneering work in the critical study of cartography, "Silences and Secrecy: The Hidden Agenda of Cartography in Early Modern Europe," now seems a bit dated, especially in its attacks on what was then a much more teleological history of cartography, and like most of Harley's work it focuses solely on the Western European experience.<sup>1</sup> Nevertheless, Harley makes a number of thought-provoking points, and here I want to reconsider his arguments and extend them to the context of early modern Japanese mapmaking. *Pace* Harley, the present article will discuss how scholarship published within the last five years, mostly in Japanese, shows that what is left unsaid in maps—who controls what appears on the map and what does not, and when and why such control is exercised—can tell us as much about power relations in early modern Japan as what is actually "there" on the printed page.

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\*Author's note: The "event" that occasioned my rereading of Harley's article was Phil Brown's invitation to speak at the Early Modern Japan Network session at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies. I would like to thank him for the initial invitation and for his extraordinary patience and persistence in seeing this article to print. I would also like to thank the three anonymous readers for EMJ, whose fully justified criticisms confirmed my own sense that an earlier version of this article was itself in dire need of strategic silencing.

<sup>1</sup> *Imago Mundi* 40 (1988): 57-76; reprinted in J.B. Harley, *The New Nature of Maps: Essays in the History of Cartography*, edited by Paul Laxton (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002), pp. 83-108. All citations are to the 1988 *Imago Mundi* version.

Harley makes the observation, now commonplace in recent critical spatial studies, that "cartography was primarily a form of political discourse concerned with the acquisition and maintenance of power."<sup>2</sup> Rather than analyze what early modern European map discourses articulate, he focused on what they excluded. Harley argues that there are two kinds of "cartographic silence": 1) silence due to politically motivated secrecy or censorship<sup>3</sup>, and 2) "indeterminate silences" arising from discursive or intellectual presuppositions that privilege certain types of knowledge or information over others.<sup>4</sup> The first category includes strategic secrecy, for example, state maps of boundaries or other map information potentially useful as military intelligence. By contrast, the second type of what he calls "indeterminate silence" is not caused by direct suppression or censorship but by "a sort of subconscious *mentalité* that mediates the knowledge contained in maps in order to maintain the political *status quo* and the power of the state."<sup>5</sup> Harley asserts that in early modern Europe the ascendance of scientific discourse to the status of truth led to assumptions that there was an objective world in which "the 'universal science of measurement and order' and the principle of classification or ordered tabulation," would always be able to represent the world accurately and unproblematically, and that this sort of standardization "with its Euclidian emphasis on space as uniform and continuous, generates the silences of uniformity."<sup>6</sup>

Insofar as Harley's category of "strategic secrecy" refers to the competitive and often combative relationships between nation states within early modern Europe, his arguments at first glance seem to apply poorly to early modern Japan. However, while it is true that the Tokugawa shogunal government did not map Japan in the context of international competition for power in the manner of contemporary European states, early modern Japanese domestic politics had its own internal tensions in which shogunal power

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<sup>2</sup> Harley, "Silences and Secrecy," p. 57.

<sup>3</sup> Harley, "Silences and Secrecy," pp. 60-61.

<sup>4</sup> Harley, "Silences and Secrecy," pp. 65-70.

<sup>5</sup> Harley, "Silences and Secrecy," pp. 57.

<sup>6</sup> Harley, "Silences and Secrecy," p. 65.

and prerogatives were often exercised with an eye to subordinating the daimyo and other local power holders, who in turn reacted to and retaliated against those measures if and when it was possible and politically advantageous to do so. As we shall see, mapmaking played a significant role in these contests for political power. With regard to Harley's second type of cartographic silence, the suppression of alternative or unorthodox discourses on the face of the map, the comparison again seems a poor fit, considering that the "universal science of measurement and order" did not attain the degree of orthodoxy in Japan that it did in Europe. Nevertheless, "official" map discourses did create the general intellectual and political climate in which non-state, privately produced maps and geographical writings were created and published.<sup>7</sup>

Harley's theoretical inquiry and its potential applicability to the early modern Japanese context lead us to pose two broad questions: first, what role did maps play in the competition for state power, at both shogunal and local levels, in the Tokugawa period? More specifically, how did the Tokugawa shogunate and the daimyo utilize and manipulate maps and mapmaking to gain and maintain political power? Secondly, what type of relationship existed between state-produced and commercial forms of map discourse? Were commercial mapmakers influenced by state mapmaking, and if so, how and to what degree? What effects (if any) did state mapmaking have on the substantial audience for published maps and geographical writings in the Edo period? Both these sets of questions—the first focusing more on a broadly political reading of maps, the second on a broadly cultural reading—have been engaged, elaborated upon, and debated in recent, largely Japanese historical scholarship. The remainder of this article will outline the principal arguments that have emerged. Although the authors cited below do not necessarily agree with one another, taken together their views give a well-rounded view of the forms and functions of mapping in

<sup>7</sup> Scholars disagree about the extent to which state mapmaking affected the makers of published maps; this debate is discussed in some detail below.

early modern Japan, and indicate areas of potentially fruitful future research.

### Mapmaking and Statemaking: Understanding the Tokugawa Bakufu *Kuniezu* (Provincial Maps) in Domestic and International Contexts

Most readers will be familiar with the broad contours of the Tokugawa shogunate's attempts to map Japan by ordering the compilation of *kuniezu* 国絵図 and their accompanying cadastral records (*gōchō* 郷帳), and then constructing from these sources three large-scale maps of all Japan (referred to by scholars as *Nihon sōzu* 日本総図).<sup>8</sup> To summarize briefly: the Bakufu initiated large-scale provincial mapping projects in 1604 (Keichō 9), 1644 (Shōhō 1), 1696 (Genroku 9), and 1835 (Tenpō 6).<sup>9</sup> For each *kuniezu* project, orders went out to daimyo to cooperate in the drawing and submission of province-level maps.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>8</sup> The most accessible general English-language introduction to the *kuniezu* and other premodern Japanese maps can be found in Unno Kazutaka, "Cartography in Japan," in *The History of Cartography: Cartography in the Traditional East and Southeast Asian Societies*, edited by J.B. Harley and David Woodward, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), pp. 346-477.

<sup>9</sup> During the Tenpō era the Bakufu ordered the submission of *gōchō* in 1831 (Tenpō 2), four years before it ordered the submission of maps.

<sup>10</sup> The Bakufu's decision to make provinces, and within them districts (*gun* 郡), the principal territorial units represented is significant in that it places the *kuniezu* within the traditions of both Japanese and Chinese imperial mapmaking. Although Funakoshi Akio 船越昭生 has examined the influence of Qing dynasty maps of China made the with Jesuit missionaries' assistance on Tokugawa mapmaking, the connection between early modern Chinese and Japanese state mapmaking certainly merits further examination; see Funakoshi, *Sakoku Nihon ni kita "Kōki zu" no chirigakuteki kenkyū* 鎖国日本にきた「康熙図」の地理学的研究 (Tokyo: Hōsei Daigaku Shuppanyoku, 1986).

Due to shifting technological and political climates, each *kuniezu* project differed slightly but significantly from those that preceded or followed it. Although the Bakufu issued increasingly specific instructions regarding the compilation and format of maps, there was considerable variation in the maps produced. By the Genroku period, however, a uniformly high level of standardization had been achieved.

These changes over time can be traced in the *kuniezu* themselves. For example, in some Keichō and Shōhō *kuniezu*, individual daimyo holdings (both their physical location and their value, as estimated in *kokudaka* 石高) occasionally are represented on the maps: in the *kuniezu* from Bungo 豊後 province dating from the Keichō (1596-1615) era shown here, each round circle symbolizes a village. Inside the circle one finds the village name as well as the name of the local *ryōshu* 領主, or lord, and the color of the circle also corresponds to the *ryōshu* domain in which the village is located (Figure 1). By looking at the map, one can see that the boundaries of *ryōshu* suzerainty did not always correlate with the boundaries of districts, for within each district—demarcated on the map by thick black lines—one finds villages controlled by several different *ryōshu*. In the Genroku-era Bungo *kuniezu*, by contrast, all references to daimyo governance were eliminated from the map in favor of depicting district and province boundaries exclusively: all villages are represented by uniform lozenge-shaped symbols, color-coded to the district, not the domain, in which they are located (Figure 2). Maps from other provinces show different types of discrepancies. For instance, the Shōhō-era *kuniezu* from Ōwari province reproduced in Figure 3 fails to conform to many of the Bakufu's carto-

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On state mapmaking under the Qing dynasty, see: Mark C. Elliott, "The Limits of Tartary: Manchuria in Imperial and National Geographies," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (2000): 603-46; Laura Hostetler, *Qing Colonial Enterprise: Ethnography and Cartography in Early Modern China* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001). For a broad survey, see Richard J. Smith, *Chinese Maps* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996).

graphic standards: in it, districts are demarcated by color, not by black lines as the Bakufu required; the village symbols (*muragata* 村型) are not color-coded by district, neighboring provinces are not set off in different colors, no sea routes appear, there is no legend, and the produce of




Figure 1. "Keichō Bungo no kuni Hachi-gun ezu," reproduced in *Kuniezu no sekai 国絵図の世界*, edited by Kuniezu Kenkyūkai (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 2005), p. 284, plate 2.



Figure 2. "Genroku Bungo kuniezu," reproduced in *Kuniezu no sekai*, op. cit., p. 285, plate 5.





Figure 3. “Shōhō yon-nen Ōwari kuniezu,” reproduced in *Kuniezu no sekai*, op. cit., p. 60, plate 2.

each village (*muradaka* 村高) is not precisely recorded.<sup>11</sup> In the case of the Shōhō-era Ōwari map, the Bakufu’s established standards of cartographic representation were all but ignored at the province level, but in the Genroku-era map, all these discrepancies were rectified and the *kuniezu* conformed completely to Bakufu standards (Figure 4).

In the Genroku period, as part of its cartographic standardization efforts, the Bakufu also forbade the use of the term “*ronchi* 論地” or “*ronsho* 論所” (“disputed land”) in provincial maps. These terms referred to areas where local disputes over territory, boundaries, and/or access to resources impeded the drawing of decisive boundaries, and they appeared frequently in provincial maps submitted to the Bakufu for ap-

<sup>11</sup> This map may be a draft map (which may explain its discrepancies), but no later map is extant.

proval. Banning the use of the terms was intended to compel daimyo and other local officials to settle disputes over land and territory locally, and not simply pass them up the ladder to higher authorities. It is tempting to interpret the erasure of



Figure 4. “Genroku jū-nen Ōwari kuniezu,” reproduced in *Kuniezu no sekai*, op. cit., p. 61, plate 3.

domain boundaries and the eradication of evidence of land disputes from the face of the map as a type of cartographic silencing particular to the Tokugawa context insofar as the provincial map became the medium for the negotiation of power relations between shogunate and daimyo, and local authorities became the objects as well as the agents of censorship from higher authorities. However, conflicts that were effectively suppressed on the face of provincial maps often continued on the ground. Thus, daimyo and other local officials devised ways to obscure rather than to resolve their disputes and thus cir-

cumvent Bakufu demands for resolution.<sup>12</sup>

Evidence of these and other changes effected in the Genroku period have led to a general scholarly consensus that the Genroku *kuniezu* were the most ambitious and comprehensive of the provincial mapmaking projects. There is significantly less consensus among scholars as to whether the maps succeeded in fulfilling the political and strategic goals of the Bakufu, on the one hand, and local powerholders on the other. Since the major scholarly debates over *kuniezu* often focus on the Genroku maps, I will briefly describe them here.<sup>13</sup>

For the Genroku map project, the Bakufu appointed a quartet of its highest officials to oversee the mapping project: the *ōmetsuke* (chief police inspector), the *jisha bugyō* (magistrate of shrines and temples), Edo *machi bugyō* (city magistrate of Edo), and the *kanjō bugyō* (finance magistrate) jointly assumed control of the enterprise at the highest level. At the local level, in provinces containing more than one domain, certain daimyo were selected to serve as provincial “map intendants” (*ezumoto* 絵図元). At the outset of the *kuniezu* project, Bakufu officials called the Edo representatives of all daimyo together and recited a list of detailed instructions for revising the previous *kuniezu* from the Shōhō era. At the same

<sup>12</sup> Sugimoto Fumiko 杉本史子 describes these conflicts in detail in “Kuniezu sakusei jigiyō to kinsei kokka 「国絵図作成事業と近世国家」, *Rekishigaku kenkyū* 歴史学研究, No. 586 (1988), reprinted in *Tenbō Nihon rekishi* 展望に本歴史 13: *Kinsei kokka* 近世国家, edited by Fukaya Katsumi 深谷克己 and Hori Shin 堀新 (Tokyo: Tōkyōdō Shuppan, 2000), pp. 217-223; a slightly different version of this article also appears in: Sugimoto Fumiko, *Ryōiki shihai no tenkai to kinsei* 領域支配の展開と近世 (Tokyo: Yamakawa Shuppansha, 1999).

<sup>13</sup> The most detailed survey of *kuniezu* in general and the Genroku *kuniezu* in particular in the context of Tokugawa statemaking is Sugimoto Fumiko, “Kuniezu sakusei jigiyō to kinsei kokka,” *op. cit.*; see also Sugimoto, *Ryōiki shihai no tenkai to kinsei*, *op. cit.* Other works on *kuniezu* are discussed in more detail below.

time, the Bakufu established a map clearinghouse (*ezugoya*) in Edo. Here, each provincial map intendant was required to submit his draft maps to a battery of inspections by Bakufu officials. Each intendant brought his draft map, a draft of the land registers for areas depicted on the map, a copy of the Shōhō *kuniezu* (for comparison to the new map), a record of changes made in the land registers, and a document attesting to agreement with neighboring provinces over boundaries. If the new maps met with Bakufu approval, the officials sent them on to the Bakufu’s designated artists (*goyō eshi* 御用絵師) from the Kanō school, who would then redraw the draft map in final form.

The comprehensive nature of the Genroku *kuniezu* marked a strategic and symbolic watershed in terms of Bakufu-han cooperation in state mapmaking. Previous *kuniezu* projects had been far less cohesive in terms of both organization and output; the maps produced were not nearly as standardized and uniform as the Genroku maps.<sup>14</sup> As we shall see below, the subsequent and final Bakufu *kuniezu* project undertaken in the Tenpō era differed considerably from the Genroku project in ways that reflected changes in the political context of Tokugawa mapmaking.

Considerable scholarly attention has been devoted to *kuniezu* in Japan; the first studies of these maps appeared as early as the late Meiji period.<sup>15</sup> However, in more recent years study of *kuniezu* has been dominated by two opposing

<sup>14</sup> This is not to say the Genroku maps were more “accurate” in the terms of modern cartographic technology; as Philip Brown has shown, surveying and measuring techniques remained flawed by modern standards throughout the Tokugawa period. See Brown, “The Mismeasure of Land: Land Surveying in the Tokugawa Period,” *Monumenta Nipponica* 42:2 (1987): 115-55; see also Brown, “State, Cultivator, Land: Determination of Land Tenures in Early Modern Japan Reconsidered,” *The Journal of Asian Studies* 56:2 (1997): 412-44.

<sup>15</sup> An article entitled “Honpō chizu kō 本邦地図孝” appeared in *Shigaku zasshi*, Vol. 6, Nos. 4-5, in 1895; cited in Sugimoto Fumiko, *Ryōiki shihai no tenkai to kinsei*, p. 154, p. 163, n. 2.

camps: on one side is Kawamura Hirotada 川村博忠, whose authoritative study *Edo bakufu-sen kuniezu no kenkyū* 江戸幕府選国絵図の研究 set the agenda for subsequent studies of Tokugawa mapmaking.<sup>16</sup> On the other side is the historian Kuroda Hideo 黒田日出男 and his colleagues and students, most notably Sugimoto Fumiko 杉本史子, at Tokyo University's Shiryō Hensanjo who have engaged in an exhaustive survey of Tokugawa *kuniezu* for more than a decade.<sup>17</sup>

Most *kuniezu* research, including that of Kawamura and Kuroda, focuses almost exclusively on the *kuniezu* as a strictly Japanese phenomenon, which is to say that aside from acknowledging the influence of Chinese imperial mapmaking in general and Qing cartography in particular, little consideration is given to what the Tokugawa mapmaking projects might mean in an East Asian or global context. In contrast, Ronald Toby recently has examined *kuniezu* for what they say about the formation of the boundaries of the early modern state vis-à-vis “borderland” regions like Ezo and Ryūkyū, and neighboring states, especially Korea.<sup>18</sup> Since the debate be-

tween the Kawamura and Kuroda camps as well as Toby's attempt to internationalize the analysis of the Tokugawa mapmaking projects all highlight the major issues in interpreting *kuniezu* and maps in general as historical sources, let us begin with outlines of these authors' main arguments.

The debate between Kawamura and Kuroda is difficult to summarize in part because it is based on the two scholars' differing interpretations of identical data drawn from their meticulously detailed analyses of individual *kuniezu* from each of the major Tokugawa mapping projects. It is important to stress that in addition to considering the maps as finished products, both scholars focus on the totality of the mapping process: from Bakufu edict through local execution of the surveying and mapmaking itself, to the submission of finished maps and *gōchō* and, ultimately to the compilation by the Bakufu of provincial maps into maps of all Japan. The major point of contention between the two sides centers on the degree to which the *kuniezu*—both the process of making them as well as the maps themselves—represented the successful exercise of Tokugawa Bakufu central authority over daimyo and others involved in mapmaking at the local level.

Kawamura tends to see the *kuniezu*, especially the penultimate mapping effort undertaken in the Genroku period, as a “symbol of the maturation of the bakuhan state.”<sup>19</sup> For him, the Bakufu's *kuniezu* hearkened back in a self-consciously symbolic manner to the *kokugunzu* 国郡図 of the classical imperial state, and were part of the Bakufu's attempt to create a “feudal social order within the framework of Confucian ideals.”<sup>20</sup> In general, he sees state mapmaking as part of larger process in which the shogunate, from the early seventeenth through the early eighteenth centuries, consolidated its ability to compel daimyo to submit to its authority in matters of land distribution and control.<sup>21</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Kawamura Hirotada, *Edo bakufu-sen kuniezu no kenkyū* (Tokyo: Kokon Shoin, 1984), p. 233; title hereafter abbreviated as *EBSKK*; a more reader-friendly version of Kawamura's main arguments can be found in his *Kuniezu* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1996). Most recently, a Kawamura-led team of researchers produced a lavishly illustrated large-format book containing numerous color reproductions of *kuniezu* from every province, accompanied by short explanatory essays: Kuniezu Kenkyūkai, ed., *Kuniezu no sekai* (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 2005).

<sup>17</sup> The most comprehensive and current bibliography of research on *kuniezu* and other types of maps and visual materials can be found on Sugimoto's page of the Shiryō Hensanjo website: <http://www.hi-u-tokyo.ac.jp/personal/fumiko/bunken.top.html>

<sup>18</sup> Ronald Toby ロナルド・トビ, “Kinsei-ki no ‘Nihon zu’ to ‘Nihon’ no kyōkai 近世期の「日本図」と「日本」の境界,” in Kuroda Hideo, Mary Elizabeth Berry, and Sugimoto

Fumiko, eds., *Chizu to ezu no seiji bunkashi* 地図と絵図の政治文化史 (Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai, 2001), pp. 79-102.

<sup>19</sup> Kawamura, *EBSKK*, p. 233.

<sup>20</sup> Kawamura, *Kuniezu*, p. 156.

<sup>21</sup> It should be said that Kawamura points out the conflicts that occurred as a result of the

Kuroda and Sugimoto, by contrast, see *kuniezu* as documents of ongoing conflict and compromise between Bakufu and daimyo in which mapmaking served as a “mediating force in the relationship between shogun and *ryōshu*” in matters of land distribution as well as in mapmaking. Each side gained and lost the upper hand in discrete incidents of conflict, Kuroda and Sugimoto maintain that each round of map-making must be analyzed in its specific historical and spatial context.<sup>22</sup>

Scholars on each side marshal formidable textual evidence drawn from their deep knowledge of the *kuniezu* and related documents. Perhaps what distinguishes the Kawamura and Kuroda approaches most is the former’s tendency to rely

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Bakufu’s attempts to impose uniform standards on mapmaking. He notes, for example, that in spite of repeated admonitions to settle boundary disputes definitively, local records show that the provinces of Chikuzen, Higo, and Iga had, respectively, six, eight, and five ongoing boundary disputes during the Genroku period. Of these nineteen disputes, only five were settled at the time the Genroku *kuniezu* were created; see Kawamura, *EBSKK*, pp. 204-205. One of the six disputes in Chikuzen involved a ten-kilometer stretch of the boundary that divided both Chikuzen and Chikugo provinces and Akitsuki and Kurumae domains; it proved so intractable that it took the Bakufu courts until 1854 to finally resolve it. See Kawamura, “Ezu ni egakareta kyōkai no fūkei 絵図に描かれた境界の風景,” *Chiri 地理* 37:12 (1992): p. 41. In the end, however, no trace of these conflicts appears on the Genroku *kuniezu* due to the aforementioned Bakufu decision to forbid the use of the term “*ronchi*” on maps. For Kawamura, this fact shows the power of the Bakufu to silence conflict cartographically, if not practically and thus enhances his argument for the Bakufu’s successful manipulation of the symbolic significance of maps.

<sup>22</sup> Sugimoto Fumiko summarizes the debate between Kawamura and Kuroda (albeit from her perspective from within the Kuroda “camp”) in Sugimoto, *Ryōiki shihai no tenkai to kinsei*, op.cit., pp. 155-158.

on a formalist analysis of maps, in which maps reflect quite directly the political goals of their makers. Kuroda and Sugimoto are more cautious about constructing general theories about Bakufu or *ryōshu* power based on map content alone, and rely instead on densely detailed analyses rooted in specific maps and in the times, places, and circumstances of their production.

A good example of the differences between the Kawamura and Kuroda approaches is the two sides’ interpretation of the Tenpō *kuniezu*, the last set of provincial maps made by the shogunate. Unlike in previous *kuniezu*, daimyo in the early nineteenth century refused outright to submit maps in response to the Bakufu’s demand and shogunal officials ended up drafting and compiling the maps themselves.<sup>23</sup> Kawamura, like many scholars of *kuniezu* before and after him, sees the Tenpō mapping project as a political failure, a sign of increasing weakness on the part of the Bakufu. By contrast, Kuroda and Sugimoto compare the Tenpō *kuniezu* to their predecessors in the Genroku period in order to see exactly what types of changes occurred in the mapmaking process. They show how in the Genroku period peasants (*hyakushō*) and their lands were surveyed by *ryōshu*, who would then draw up maps to be submitted for confirmation by local and, later, Bakufu officials. In the Tenpō *kuniezu*, however, the Bakufu bypassed uncooperative *ryōshu* and ordered villages to submit village maps (*mura ezu*) directly to Bakufu authorities, who then used them to compile *kuniezu* themselves. Kuroda and Sugimoto argue that this shift reveals a social and political change that took place between the Genroku and Tenpō eras, and that in the latter period the Bakufu was compelled to communicate more directly with the people, thereby creating new avenues for the exercise of power as well as new antagonisms between ruler

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<sup>23</sup> The major point of contention was the Bakufu’s shift to the use of *jitsudaka* (“actual” crop yield) in place of the “assigned” *kokudaka* previously in use. The daimyo perceived the potential political and economic disadvantages in acknowledging to the Bakufu any practical increases in productivity within their domains.

and ruled.<sup>24</sup> In other words, rather than evidence of simple political decline Sugimoto and Kuroda see an institution (the Bakufu) facing unprecedented challenges and attempting to craft new—if imperfect—solutions.

While both Kawamura's and Kuroda's analyses of *kuniezu* focus on the implications of Tokugawa state mapmaking for understanding domestic political relations in the early modern period, neither makes an extended effort to place *kuniezu* in a regional larger regional or global context. Ronald Toby undertakes this task in "Boundaries in 'Maps of Japan' and the Boundaries of 'Japan' in the Early Modern Era," published in Japanese as part of a collection of essays edited by Kuroda Hideo, Mary Elizabeth Berry, and Sugimoto Fumiko to mark the culmination of a three-year cooperative international research project on early modern Japanese maps and mapmaking.<sup>25</sup> Toby's aim is to discern the differences between the images of Japan as represented in Tokugawa maps and the "Japan" imagined by the greater community of map readers and users in the Tokugawa period. He compares the boundaries of Japan depicted in the Bakufu maps to the boundaries of Japan as depicted and described in published maps and encyclopedic geographical texts. Toby pays particular attention to the depiction of neighboring territories, especially the borderland regions of Ezo and Ryūkyū. He argues that the many discrepancies visible among Bakufu maps themselves, and between Bakufu maps and commercially published maps and geographical writings, indicates that the boundaries of Japan—as a geographical entity as well as an "imagined community"—were far from definitive or consistent. Instead, he emphasizes, they were literally and figuratively "ragged" (*giza giza*).<sup>26</sup>

According to Toby, the Bakufu repeatedly ordered Ezo and Ryūkyū to submit provincial maps

as part of the various *kuniezu* efforts, indicating that the Bakufu envisioned both regions as inferior sub-states ostensibly subject to its control (much as daimyo domains were) in theory, if not in practice. However, cartographically as well as politically, the assimilation of borderland territories was much more complicated. Toby points out that despite demanding *kuniezu* from Ryūkyū, the region appears only once, in the Genroku period, on a map of all Japan compiled by the Bakufu, and in official diplomatic relations the Bakufu treated Ryūkyū as a "foreign" country. As for Ezo, the Bakufu's maps of the region showed details only in the Wajinchi, the areas in the south controlled or dominated by mainland Japanese; everything else in Ezo was more or less unknown territory, mapped in a vague and highly abstract manner.<sup>27</sup> Such "ambiguous" (*aimai*) treatment of Ezo and Ryūkyū on the part of the Bakufu, Toby asserts, indicates a remarkably ambivalent official attitude toward what did and did not constitute the Japanese early modern state.<sup>28</sup>

The inconsistency between one Bakufu map and another is only part of the problem, however, for Toby points to considerable differences between the "Japan" depicted in Bakufu maps and that shown in published maps and encyclopedias. He points out, for example, that the *Fusōkoku no zu* 扶桑国之図 initially published by Nakabayashi Yoshibe in Kanbun 寛文 6 (1666) depicts Ezo as quite separate from the rest of Japan (**Figure 5**) and the widely disseminated maps of Ishikawa Ryūsen show the domain of Matsumae as an island separate from the rest of Ezo in a manner similar to the Meireki-era Bakufu map of the region (**Figure 6**). However, Ryūsen's maps, unlike their Bakufu-made predecessors, shows part of a large island representing Ezo looming to the north; it also depicts mythical lands from me-

<sup>24</sup> Sugimoto, *Ryōiki shihai no tenkai to kinsei*, pp. 157-158.

<sup>25</sup> See Ronald Toby, "Kinsei-ki no 'Nihon zu' to 'Nihon' no kyōkai," op. cit.; note that translations of Toby's title, and of all quotes from his article are mine.

<sup>26</sup> Toby, *Kinsei-ki no 'Nihon zu' to 'Nihon' no kyōkai*, pp. 86-87.

<sup>27</sup> Toby, *Kinsei-ki no 'Nihon zu' to 'Nihon' no kyōkai*, p. 84; Toby here acknowledges that he is citing the research of Brett L. Walker; see Walker, *The Conquest of Ainu Lands: Ecology and Culture in Japanese Expansion, 1590-1800* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001), pp. 44-45.

<sup>28</sup> Toby, *Kinsei-ki no 'Nihon zu' to 'Nihon' no kyōkai*, pp. 82-85.





Figure 5. “Fusōkoku no zu,” reproduced in Akioka Takejirō, ed., *Nihon kochizu shūsei: Nihon zenzu* 日本古地図集成：日本全図 (Tokyo: Kajima Shuppankai, 1971), plate 24.



Figure 6. Ishikawa Ryūsen, “Honchō zukan kōmoku 本朝図鑑綱目,” reproduced in *ibid.*, plate 30.

dieval lore (the “no-man’s-land” called “Gandō” 廣道 or “Kari no michi” to the north, and “Rasetsu-koku 羅刹国,” the “island of women” to the south) that never appear on Bakufu maps. Other maps show still other visions of Japan: as Toby notes, the *Shinsen Dai Nihon zuran* 新選大日本図覽 (author unknown, Enpō 延宝 6 [1678], collection of the Kobe City Museum) resembles Ishikawa Ryūsen’s map, yet does not show mythical lands and more consistently depicts the borderland regions of Ezo and Ryūkyū as distinct from the rest of the archipelago, not as an integral part of a visually unified whole.<sup>29</sup>

<sup>29</sup> Toby, *Kinsei-ki no ‘Nihon zu’ to ‘Nihon’ no kyōkai*,” pp. 88-91; curiously, Toby refers to the



Figure 7. Maps from *Wakan sansai zue* are reproduced in *Wakan sansai zue* (I), in *Nihon shōmin seikatsu shiryō shūsei* 日本庶民資料集成, Vol. 28, edited by Tanikawa Ken’ichi 谷川健一 (Tokyo: San’ichi Shobō, 1980), pp. 917-918.

*Shinsen Dai Nihon zuran* as being more “advanced” (*susunde iru*) (p. 90) than the maps of Ishikawa Ryūsen or other contemporary mapmakers, a description that seems at odds with his otherwise anti-teleological argument.

Published geographic encyclopedias, Toby argues, show similarly inconsistent treatment of Ezo and Ryūkyū. Nishikawa Jōken's 西川如見 *Ka'i tsūshō kō* 華夷通商考 does not consider Ezo at all, and places both Ryūkyū and Korea (Chōsen) in the category of *gaikoku* 外国, the middle of three categories of foreignness: *Chūgoku* 中国 (the Chinese empire and countries within the Sinocentric order); *gaikoku* (foreign, or outside countries), and *gai'i* 外異 (countries both "outside" and "foreign"). The maps in Tera-jima Ryōan's multi-volume *Wakan sansai zue* 和漢三才図絵 show Ryūkyū and Ezo as "*igoku*" 異国, a status shared by Korea, Ryūkyū, and the Indian subcontinent (Tenjiku 天竺), among others (Figure 7). In the *Wakan sansai zue*'s narrative description of relations between the three countries, however, Ryūkyū and Ezo are treated as part of "Dai Nihon" 大日本. Hayashi Shihei, the controversial expert on Japan's late-eighteenth century defense policies, grouped Ezo, Ryūkyū, and Chōsen together as the three "foreign" (*gaikoku*) countries with which the Bakufu should be most concerned to defend itself.<sup>30</sup>

The variety of opinions concerning who and what constitutes Japan in published texts, and their variance with respect to Bakufu maps leads Toby to conclude that the Bakufu vision of an integral Japan which ideally included Ezo and Ryūkyū, was not transmitted to the general populace. Indeed, the "ragged" official boundaries of Japan seem to be even less solid in published maps, and hence in the popular imagination. Toby argues that the Bakufu vision of Japan did not compel any sort of cartographic orthodoxy among commercial mapmakers because the shogunate jealously guarded map information as secret; he repeatedly invokes "Foucault's Panopticon" (*sic*) to propose that the shogunate wished to retain for itself the unique power to surveil and order the realm through maps.<sup>31</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Toby, *Kinsei-ki no 'Nihon zu' to 'Nihon' no kyōkai*," pp. 91-96.

<sup>31</sup> Toby, *Kinsei-ki no 'Nihon zu' to 'Nihon' no kyōkai*," pp. 85, 97; The Panopticon is not Foucault's creation; Foucault, in *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York:

Toby's arguments provide an opportunity to reconnect with Harley's theses regarding map secrecy and to address the important and difficult issue of how map information was disseminated in the Tokugawa period. One of Harley's principal arguments regarding the political functions of mapmaking is that "weak" states often keep map information secret, while stronger states tend to make map information public, in order to display cartographic knowledge as a symbol of the power of their own regimes.<sup>32</sup> In similar fashion, Toby argues strongly that the Bakufu kept its maps secret, and that this secrecy was a means of gaining and maintaining power. Toby takes issue with scholars (specifically, with Kawamura Hirota and me) who argue that there were both direct and indirect links between Bakufu-commissioned maps and commercially published maps.<sup>33</sup> Toby's main body of evidence is the many discrepancies between official and commercial maps, notably those outlined above. His argument rests on the premise that, had commercial mapmakers had access to Bakufu maps, they would have copied them, and done so in discernible ways. In the putative absence of Bakufu models, he reasons, commercial mapmakers envisioned the boundaries of "Japan" in various, contradictory and inconsistent ways. Toby presents these perspectives even though he explicitly acknowledges that there is "no way of knowing" for certain whether authors of published maps had access to Bakufu maps or other state-produced information, and if so, when and how.<sup>34</sup>

I concur that there is much that remains unknown about the details regarding the transmission of map information, but while Toby points to irrefutable concrete differences between Bakufu

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Vintage, 1995), is referring to Jeremy Bentham's famous invention.

<sup>32</sup> Harley, "Silences and Secrecy," *op. cit.*, pp. 60-61.

<sup>33</sup> Kawamura makes the argument for direct influence of Bakufu maps on commercially published maps numerous times, but does not give any evidence for his claims. My own arguments are explained below.

<sup>34</sup> Toby, *Kinsei-ki no 'Nihon zu' to 'Nihon' no kyōkai*," p. 99.



maps and commercially published maps, one can make a counter-argument using evidence of the direct and indirect influence of Bakufu maps on commercially published maps. I have argued elsewhere that the Bakufu did little to keep its maps of cities and of Japan secret, based on examples of what seem to me to be fairly clear incidences of commercial mapmakers borrowing information from Bakufu maps or even copying them directly. In one case, Fujii Hanchi, a Bakufu official who aided in the mapping of the city of Edo in 1658, subsequently gained permission from the Bakufu to publish the maps under the pseudonym Ochikochi Dōin.<sup>35</sup> A published 1666 atlas was made by copying, dividing, and reducing in scale the first Bakufu map of Japan, a practice that was repeated throughout the Tokugawa period and into the early Meiji, as *kuniezu* were copied and reprinted in woodblock form as published regional maps (Figure 8).<sup>36</sup> Aside from their differing treatment of Ezo, Nagakubo Sekisui's much-reproduced map *Nihon yochi rotei zenzu* 日本輿地路程全図 (Figure 9) bears a clear resemblance to the Bakufu map of Japan produced in the Kyōhō period (c. 1702, Figure 10).<sup>37</sup> The resemblance is more evident if one looks at the maps in outline form Figure 11. Finally, in what seems to me to be the most striking instance of lack of strategic cartographic secrecy,

<sup>35</sup> See Yamori Kazuhiko 矢守一彦, *Kochizu e no tabi* 古地図への旅 (Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha, 1992), p. 107; see also Marcia Yonemoto, "The 'Spatial Vernacular' in Tokugawa Maps," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 59, No. 3 (2000): 650-657.

<sup>36</sup> Numerous reproductions of such printed *kuniezu* can be found in Yamashita Kazumasa 山下和正, *Chizu de yomu Edo jidai* 地図で読む江戸時代 (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobō, 1998), pp. 58-96.

<sup>37</sup> Sekisui is known to have studied with disciples of Shibukawa Shunkai (1639-1715), an astronomer in the employ of the shogunate during the time the Kyōhō map of Japan was being made. See Marcia Yonemoto, *Mapping Early Modern Japan: Space, Place, and Culture in the Tokugawa Period (1603-1868)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 35-43.




Figure 8. "Nihon bunkeizu 日本分形図," Kanbun 6 (1666), reproduced in *Nihon kochizu taisei* 日本古地図大成, edited by Unno Kazutaka (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1972), p. 44 and p. 49, illustration no. 21.



Figure 9. Nagakubo Sekisui, "Kaisei Nihon yochi rotei zenzu 改正日本輿地路程全図," Bunka 文化 8 (1811), reproduced in Yamashita Kazumasa 山下和正, *Japanese Maps of the Edo Period* 地図で読む江戸時代 (Tokyo: Aki Shobō, 1998), pp. 50-51, plate 1.



Figure 10. “Kyōhō Nihonzu 享保日本図,” reproduced in *Kuniezu no sekai*, op. cit., pp. 22-23, plate 5.



Figure 8. Outline map of Nagakubo Sekisui's *Kaisei Nihon yochi rōtei zenzu*.



Figure 9. Outline of the Kyōhō map of Japan made by the Tokugawa shogunate.

Figure 11. Comparative outline maps are from: Marcia Yonemoto, *Mapping Early Modern Japan: Space, Place, and Culture in the Tokugawa Period (1603-1868)* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), p. 38.

the shogunate not only allowed its major rivals for power—the daimyo—access to cartographic information, it delegated the daimyo themselves to carry out the business of official mapmaking. Of course this ostensible privilege was in actuality a time- and resource-consuming obligation that daimyo fulfilled out of duty to the shogunate, and one to which daimyo sometimes gave short shrift.

### Harley Revisited

These debates return us to the questions posed at the beginning of this article regarding the role maps played in the competition for state power at both shogunal and local levels in the Tokugawa period and the type of relationship that existed between state-produced and commercial forms of map discourse. With regard to the former issue, for both shogunate and daimyo the politics of power witnessed in and through mapmaking was a succession of gains and losses, and of assertions of strength followed by evidence of weakness that makes labels like “strong state” or “weak state” oversimplified and inappropriate. Tokugawa Bakufu maps do not “symbolize” a single or simple set of ideas; they represent a process of negotiation between forms and levels of authority. Tokugawa mapmaking reveals the ways in which political power was generated, displayed, exercised, and contested, and shows the complexity and ambiguity of shogunal authority and daimyo autonomy alike. With regard to the latter issue, if in Bakufu maps the visual representation of the polity provided a framework for the articulation and negotiation of power, the same can be said about commercially published maps of Japan. The diversity of map images and their wide dissemination is a testament to the vitality of print and popular culture, and of the relatively free, heterodox intellectual climate in which such diversification and circulation took place.<sup>38</sup>

<sup>38</sup> This is in direct contrast to Harley’s claim of “indeterminate silence” in early modern European maps. On the wide circulation of many forms of “public information” in the early

Although consensus about the transmission of map information from “official” to “private” hands may be difficult to reach, in the end, the disagreements between the scholars discussed above are not as important as the complementary aspects of their scholarship. Kuroda’s and Sugimoto’s research on *kuniezu* focuses on the domestic political implications of Tokugawa state mapmaking. My own work on Tokugawa maps, too, generally looks inward, toward establishing links between maps and other forms of cultural production that manifested a distinctly spatial sensibility, a mapping impulse. Toby’s work, by contrast, looks outward to understand how and why early modern Japanese maps and encyclopedias reflect an insular, relatively weak Japanese “territorial consciousness” (*kokudo ninshiki*) vis-à-vis neighboring states or regions, a consciousness that is often at odds with the official diplomatic stance toward those same states or regions. This aspect of Toby’s argument is most instructive in that it shows how early modern Japan, as distinct from early modern European (and modern global) states, had a firm sense of itself as a cohesive cultural entity without having a correspondingly firm sense of exactly where its boundaries lay.<sup>39</sup>

An examination of mapmaking in early modern Japan shows us that maps constitute as well as contest the political status quo, and they do so through strategies of silence as well as those of representation, for when maps are ideologically deployed, they utilize suppression as well as expression in equal measure. We can productively read enforced silences in maps as a form of political discourse, and by doing so we can help bring maps and other visual materials more fully into the purview of intellectual, political, and cul-

tural history. Mapping doesn’t belong in some separate category, exempt from or inimical to the forms of analysis that we apply to other texts. We know we will have ceased to marginalize the map when we stop assuming that scholars who “do” maps are different from scholars who “do” political, cultural, or even literary history, of the early modern or other eras.

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modern period, see Mary Elizabeth Berry’s new book, *Japan in Print: Information and Nation in the Early Modern Period* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

<sup>39</sup> Further research comparing the early modern Japanese case to other non-European states (one such case being Siam, as discussed in Thongchai Winichakul’s *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-Body of a Nation* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1994) would be extremely useful.