

Development and Political Party Cleavage: A Turkish Story

Research Thesis

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by

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I. Introduction

Turkey's Justice and Development Party, known as the AKP in Turkish, has been the majority party of Turkey's parliament and government since it first contested Turkish elections in 2002. The AKP party follows a conservative, Islamist platform and is especially popular with Muslim businessmen from Central Turkey. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the party's initial Prime Minister now-turned President, has been the main decision-maker and leader, increasing the responsibilities and role of Turkey's President in the national and international context. He has been a source of concern for Turks and other governments around the world, from his numerous corruption scandals, violent suppressions of protests and limitations of freedom of press and speech. Yet, through all of his internationally known disasters and mess-ups, the AKP continues to be a flourishing party in Turkey.

The major social cleavage in Turkey, represented through political divisions, is between the more developed, secular, Western Turkey and the less developed, less secular, Eastern Turkey. The CHP (Republican People's Party), the liberal, secular opposition party in Turkey, very clearly follows this cleavage. As seen in the CHP support map below, Figure 1, the majority of their support is located in Western Turkey, where the population is generally more liberal and secular. The AKP, though, does not follow this traditional cleavage, as shown in Figure 2. They have support in every region of Turkey, ranging from western cities to eastern towns. This in turn is in quite severe contrast to the geography of support for the CHP.

Figure 1:





Figure 2:



The objective of this thesis is therefore to understand a problem in the geography of voting in Turkey: why support for the AKP is seemingly indifferent to region while that of the CHP is highly concentrated geographically. Otherwise put, why is it that the secularizing forces in Turkey are so limited in their geographic support while the more traditional, Islamic opposition enjoys a more widespread support base. To answer these questions, I will be addressing many issues of Turkish social life including rural to urban migration and East to West migration, the Anatolian Tiger phenomenon, various degrees and statistics of development across the Turkish regions, and support for the other three main Turkish political parties: CHP, HDP, and MHP. I hypothesize that there are three reasons for the puzzling degree of national support for the AKP, and why, as one would expect from a traditional conservative, mildly-Islamist party, they have no relationship with under developed regions:

Reason 1. HDP Support in Eastern Anatolia

Reason 2. The Anatolian Tiger Phenomenon

Reason 3. The Politics of Difference in Western Cities

In the first section of this thesis, I describe Turkey's party political relationships with development, and which regions are more developed over others and why, through a development index that I created. I also explain why the AKP does not have a concentration of support in under-developed regions, unlike what one would expect from a conservative, mildly-Islamist party. HDP support in Southeastern Anatolia, is a large reason for this, and I will explain further why one can assume this. The second section will address the Anatolian Tiger phenomenon, and I will provide my reasoning for their high levels of support for the AKP, which

will be evident in the maps and data that I provide. In the third section of the thesis I will explain why the politics of difference in Western cities increases AKP support in areas of Turkey where one would otherwise not expect them to do well.

II. Uneven Development and Turkey's Electoral Geography

Turkey is a land of quite severe uneven development. Differences between the Western cities and the Eastern towns are extreme, and obvious through the statistics of the NUTS¹ regions. Because development is usually a major political stake, there is an association between the support for different parties and levels of development. Electoral geography and uneven development have had a long, historical relationship in Turkey.

Development in Turkey:

Development is first and foremost an economic process, a matter of developing people's capabilities to produce. This economic process created today's modern economy, originally an agricultural centric world that gradually shifted to industry and then to the expansion of the service sector through the increase of technology. The overall tendency is for people's ability to produce to increase over time through technical innovation. Goods and services being produced all enter the competitive economic market, where jobs and product

¹ Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS)

markets are fiercely fought over. In turn, wages and incomes rise for those who create, produce and sell the goods.

In Turkey, a traditional social view preceded the development process. Based on traditional gender, age, and nobility roles connected to religion, people were assigned ranked roles within their society and community. Traditional society functioned through the reinforcement of these ranked roles, which kept everyone in their “place” doing their assigned job, like a woman as a caretaker and housewife or an African slave as subordinate to their master. Turkish traditional society also functioned on the belief and practice of religion, and this was a significant influence over the daily lives of the majority of Turks. In other words, the social order of genders, ages and the nobility/commoner relationship was as it was because religion endorsed it. Because of the effect religion had on people’s lives, the society was static, leaving traditional values in place for generations to help some and hurt others.

When faced with the development process, this type of society quickly dissolves. While some members of the traditional society are able to adapt to their new and modern society, others struggle. A change to an increasingly modern society threatens the lives of those who have a stake in traditional values and society, and who benefit from religion being practiced and followed by all. Not only does the development process dissolve the traditional societal relations and values, it also provokes a counter reaction from those who will be losing the most from the societal change: the men, the old, the religious hierarchy, the nobility or traditional land-owning class whose land ownership was legitimated by ideas of societal superiority. What is at stake is not just material or a matter of men wanting women to wait on them but also a matter of status and preserving traditional manners of respect (Ex. “respect your elders”).

Changes in the economy are fundamental to developing a society. To promote the development process, technological changes and expansions must occur. These technological changes require an advanced scientific knowledge and skillset. The increase in scientific understanding leads to skepticism towards religion and other traditions. The constant competition for jobs, employees, and product markets in the modern economic system leads to inequality between different groups of people, a social hierarchy of people dependent on race, gender, sexual orientation, ability, etc. This inequality creates a counter movement, one for equality for all, leading to the devaluation of the traditional social hierarchy. As an employer or seller of goods and services, this move towards equality will only benefit your cause. The employer wants anyone who would be able to do the job, regardless of race or gender, and the seller only wants his product to be bought.

To accurately portray levels of uneven development across Turkey, I have created a development index of various variables that are related to the level of development of an area. This index was created by calculating the z-score, a statistical measurement of a variables relationship with the mean (in this case, the mean is zero), combining all of the z-scores for each variable in each region, and comparing the regions overall z-scores. This index allows for a numerical analysis of levels of development across Turkey and the ability to compare two regions easily and quickly. Below is an analysis of the variables used in the development index, why they were used and what their relationship to development is. The variables for the development index are as follows:

Income Per Capita:

Economic development is absolutely crucial when creating a development index, allowing the index to address all aspects of society. Income Per Capita is informative of a society's level of economic development, with high averages exhibiting a more developed society. A person with higher levels of education, living and working in a competitive, industrialized society will have higher income levels than one working in the agricultural sector of a society that struggles with low education levels.

Net In-Migration:

The more developed a region is, the more immigrants it will receive from other regions. This is because there are more jobs available due to high industrialization, better education opportunities, and a diverse culture from previous migrants.

Labor Force Participation:

This variable is relevant to creating a development index that encompasses all aspects of society. The bigger the percentage of citizens involved in formal labor sectors, the more industrially advanced the region is. This is because there are fewer people participating in the agriculture sector, which is only needed if industrialization hasn't yet taken place in the society and food importation and mass production are not being implemented.

Fertility Rate:

It is very common to see less developed countries with demographic charts that look like pyramids, with a large section of their population aged 20 and below. This is because

people need more children to work their land for agriculture. The more industrialized an area grows, though, the less profitable it becomes to have more children. School is expensive and land does not need to be harvested. Therefore, the higher the fertility rate of a region, the less developed the region is.

Bride Age:

Using Bride Age as a variable on Turkey's development index is useful in determining the level of modernization that a certain society has reached. The younger the average bride age for a province, the more traditional, conservative, and usually Islamic the people living in the specific region are. Young brides are women who normally do not have a choice of who they are marrying and do not receive high levels of education, which reflect under-development in the regions where the average bride age is low.

Divorce Rate:

A region's average divorce rate is an informative way to analyze women's rights in the area. The higher the average divorce rate is, the more say women have in their marriage and the more choice they have to stay in it or not. Higher divorce rates show high levels of development.

Bride Price:

The simple presence of this variable within a development index exhibits a traditional, conservative society, that looks at women as objects to be sold and bought. This variable gives the reader perspective into the daily lives, cultural, and social norms of conservative Turkey.

Religious Weddings:


While religious weddings take place regularly in states that are considered highly developed, the higher the percentage of religious weddings to non-religious weddings a region has, the more likely it is to be less developed. This variable shows that traditional values are still important to the citizens of the area being analyzed.

Marriage to Close Relatives:

A high percentage of this variable present in a region's development index shows a very traditional and under-developed society. Marriage to family happens in very conservative areas, usually located in Central and East Anatolia.

Below is a map of the development levels for each region. After finding regional data for all of the above variables, I used an equation to make each stat a z-score, so they would all have the same levels of measurement. Then, I added all the z-scores for each variable up for each province to create a development score. This score was then mapped. One can see a very clear relationship in Figure 3 between development and geography, with Western Turkey scoring higher and the scores getting lower as you move East.

Figure 3:



Political Parties in Turkey:

Turkish political parties are unlike the typical left/right division found in the United States and around the world. The parties are much more closely associated with cultural divisions within the Turkish population, and they fight to represent the values, religion, rights, and wants of the cultural group that supports them. This is evident in the CHP party, which supports a secular government that benefits the Western, urban Turks. These cultural divisions are clearly geographic, and CHP party support is geographically concentrated in their predicted base of support, the West (see Figure 1 above.)

The nature of Turkish party politics has changed very little since the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. As mentioned above, political parties represent cultural cleavages. Cultural cleavages include: secular / Islamic, gender equality / gender inequality, and Westernizing/traditional. These cleavages have been present in Turkish party politics since the formation of the Republic, stemming from the Young Turk movement and the rapid, forced Westernization of the new country.

The Young Turks, a group formed in 1889 in the Ottoman Empire, were the first group of people to call for a Westernized, nationalistic, and industrialized empire. They heavily disagreed with Sultan Abdulhamid II, an authoritarian leader who ran the empire through policies of extreme censorship, Islamic values and relationships, and used a secret police force to scare Ottomans into following his rules. The Young Turks began to plot a revolution, and in 1908 started an empire-wide rebellion and forced the empire to reinstate the constitution and call Parliament back to session. Then, in 1913, the Young Turks gained control of Ottoman

politics, eventually leading to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire after its weakening in the wake of defeat in World War I, and the creation of a secular Turkish Republic.

Mustafa Kemal, a Young Turk and general in the Turkish army, carried out the Young Turks' goals for a Turkish Republic, and in 1919 started a rebellion against Western control of Turkey after their World War I loss. After numerous victories, Mustafa Kemal created a provincial government in Ankara and formed the Republic of Turkey a year after in 1923. As a Young Turk, Mustafa Kemal, later called Ataturk ("Father of Turks"), wanted a secular, Western, and modern Republic. He rapidly Westernized Turkey by emancipating women, abolishing all Islamic institutions, and forcing Western codes, dress, education, and calendar. He also called for a new Turkish language, one that used the Latin alphabet and less Arabic and Persian words. Because Ataturk was a general in the army, the army became the enforcers of his Kemalist policies. The relationship between the army and Kemalism is still alive today, as historically they have deposed leaders and parties that they regarded as unsecular or Anti-Kemalist.

While Ataturk was in control of Turkish politics, many parties were shut down and censored. Ataturk wanted to ensure that his modernization mission would succeed and refused to let any other party impede it. From this party censorship grew the Anti-Kemalism political movement. This movement has lasted since the formation of the Republic, because not everyone benefitted from Turkey's intense Westernization. Today's modern parties are perfect examples of the social cleavages long affecting Turkey's political parties.

Since Turkey has been a democratic country, the CHP and the Turkish army have always represented the liberal, secular, wing of party politics, carrying on Ataturk's legacies and

Kemalist policies. This is obvious from the table below, which shows a steady representation of Kemalist political attitudes by the CHP, often referred to as the party of Ataturk. The Anti-Kemalist parties, on the other hand, are consistently changing throughout Turkish party politics history. This is due to repeated interventions from the Turkish army (a Kemalist ideal-enforcing agency) and then forced rebirth to a more moderate voice.

Table 1: Political Party History in Turkey

PERIOD	MODERNIZING	CONSERVATIVE
1940s	CHP	DP, MP
1990s	CHP, HADEP	RP, DP
POST-2000	CHP, HDP	AKP

Today’s Kemalist and Anti-Kemalist parties are also starting to divide along the lines of economic intervention by the government. The Kemalist party (CHP) supports a strong state role in the economy because their supporters are entrepreneurs and businessmen running already highly industrialized companies who have benefitted from government intervention in the past. The Anti-Kemalist party (AKP) are, of course, on the opposite side. They support the relaxation of state control of the economy. Because many of the Islamic Calvinists living in the Anatolian Tiger provinces support the Anti-Kemalist party, provinces which are not yet fully industrialized, they support deregulation to increase economic efficiency and success.


The Kemalist and Anti-Kemalist parties are not the only parties in Turkey. There are cleavages other than that between the more secular and Westernized and the more Islamic, traditional and patriarchal that affect the party system. The Kurds, an ethnic group in Southeastern Anatolian Turkey, have been fighting and negotiating for autonomy and independence from Turkey, Syria, Iraq and Iran, the four countries that hold the majority of the world's Kurds. To attempt to gain a political voice, the Kurds have consistently been represented by Kurdish political parties. Historically, they have not succeeded in getting many votes outside of the Kurdish region and they have been consistently shut down by the army and government. But, they add a new cleavage to Turkish party politics. Instead of the typical Turkish secular vs. Islamic cleavage, the Kurds add a national vs. separatist division. To try to gain national support from their Turkish counterparts, they also support other causes; like HADEP's support for green industrialization and environmental protection and HDP's support of increased equality for women. For these reasons, HADEP and HDP are placed in the Modernizing column of the above table. For the first time, a Kurdish party, the HDP, won enough votes in both the June and November 2015 elections to have representation in Parliament, a major victory for the Kurdish separatist movement and a blow for nationalistic Turks. These party political differences do indeed relate to Turkey's geography of uneven development, as we will now see.

Turkey's Contemporary Electoral Geography:

In Turkish politics today, there are 4 parties that receive votes across the country. The AKP, a conservative, mildly Islamist party, is the main party and has been since its 2002 debut on the national political stage. They have had major political victories and usually gain such a large majority that they have the ability to change the constitution alone. Next, the CHP, a secular and liberal party is the main opposition and have not won a major victory since the AKP gained national support. The MHP, a nationalistic, fundamentally conservative party, and the HDP, a Kurdish nationalist party, pick up the remainder of the votes and because of their relatively small support base and percentages of votes gained, they will only be briefly included in this analysis. Per usual, the majority of these Turkish parties have a specific geographic support base. The CHP gains most of their votes from the Western cities of Turkey, the MHP in Central South Anatolia, and the HDP dominates in the Kurdish regions of East and Southeast Anatolia.

The AKP, though, is the outlier from the traditional electoral geography of Turkey. It has a large support base across the country, even in the areas where the other three parties have strongholds. As listed above in other sections, this is because of the presence of the Anatolian Tiger provinces and the Islamic Calvinists that these provinces produce and migrants from rural Turkey who move to the Western cities and bring their traditional values with them.

Figure 4: AKP % vs. CHP %



Overall, the AKP party does remarkably well in every region of Turkey compared to the CHP. Notice the numbers on each axis, both x and y, on the above graph. One can see that the CHP axis starts at 10% and stops at 50%, even though none of the regions actually reach that high of a percentage in support. The AKP, on the x axis, shows a much different story. Their axis starts at 30%, with every region supporting the AKP with at least 35% of their votes, and ends at 60%. Even the HDP's support is evident on this graph. The group of three at the

bottom left corner of the graph (Southeast, Northeast, and Central East Anatolia) are the strongholds of HDP support, and while they still give the AKP a large percentage of support, they complicate the party politics of Turkey.

HDP Support in Southeastern Anatolia:

As stated above, the HDP is the ethnic Kurdish party, and after having passed the 10% threshold to gain seats in Turkey's parliament, has a growing political voice and power in the country. In the Southeast Anatolian, Northeast Anatolia, and Central East Anatolia regions, Kurdish party support is extremely high due to the high percentage of ethnic Kurds. These regions also score the lowest on the development index and if they were to vote for the AKP in large numbers, then a stronger relationship between AKP support and development would be apparent. But how can one assume that AKP support in the Kurdish regions would grow if the HDP did not exist? There are a number of reasons. First, Kurds are conservative, traditional Muslims, and many of their Islamic values are present in the AKP's platform. Second, by comparing CHP and AKP support in the Kurdish regions in Turkey's 2015 elections, the AKP still manages to get 30% more votes than the CHP does. Therefore, one can assume that if the HDP did not exist, the AKP's vote percentage in the Kurdish regions would rise, and thereby strengthening the relationship between the AKP and development.

In order to test these statements to be true, we plotted the development indexes for all twelve of the NUTS regions of Turkey and party support. Below are three graphs exhibiting party support and levels of development for the CHP, the AKP, and the AKP + the HDP, the two

conservative parties of 2015 Turkish politics. Combining the vote percentage for the two parties in one analysis then provides a look at the conservative Turkish party vote and support base and the level of development for the regions that voted conservatively, either AKP or HDP, in the November 2015 elections.

Figure 5:





Figure 6:


CORRELATION: 0.905



The above graph exhibits the almost perfect relationship between level of development of a region (determined by using the development index) and CHP party support. As CHP support grows higher, the level of development does as well. The graph supports the claims made earlier in the section, that the CHP has a very geographical support base of Western, urban Turks.

Figure 7:


CORRELATION: 0.206



The graph above is evidence for the claim made that the AKP's support base is not geographically concentrated and is strong across the various regions. The AKP has a strong support with regions of varying development levels and, as pictured, does not receive lower than 30% of the vote in any region of Turkey. The AKP is extremely successful in gaining

support across the country, yet because of the presence of Kurdish separatist parties like the HDP, they lose in the less developed regions. This leads to a lack of a relationship between underdevelopment and AKP support.

Figure 8:
CORRELATION: -0.880



The above graph gives one a view of the total conservative vote in Turkey, and how it correlates to levels of development in the NUTS regions. As seen from the graph, the more conservative support a region has, the less developed it is on the development index. This also proves the prediction of uneven development, and that Turkish development is geographical and relevant to conservative party support.

III. The Anatolian Tiger Phenomenon

The purpose of this thesis is to explain why the AKP is successful across different regions of Turkey. In the regions of Central Turkey, Anatolian Tiger provinces provide large percentages of support for the AKP, as noted in voting statistics. Others have noted a connection between the AKP and the Tigers, but this section aims to explain why this connection occurs.

An Anatolian Tiger, contrary to its name, is not a Turkish member of the big cat family. Instead, an Anatolian Tiger is the name for any of the rapidly industrializing Central Turkish cities and regions. According to one site's definition, the term also refers to large numbers of entrepreneurs and a growing middle class in these newly industrializing regions (Investopedia.com). Their origin goes back to Turkey's 1980's policy changes toward economic liberalization. This created a space for investment and growth in regions that were still dominated by an agrarian way of life. Since these changes in economic policy, some of Turkey's Central Anatolian regions are industrializing, the economy and middle class are growing, and urbanization is expanding. The populations of the Tiger provinces are also quickly growing, a consequence of the industrialization and urbanization that they are experiencing. This population increase is obvious in Table 2, located below. This table analyzes populations of the capital cities of the Tigers in 1990 and 2014 and then calculates the percent increase. This reflects the growth experienced in the Tigers, as one can see that the province to experience the lowest percent increase of growth still grew by 48.46%. One can also see that the population growth of the Tigers' capital cities helped increase the urban population of Turkey as a whole. The businesses that have succeeded in the Tiger provinces since the 1980's are being run by a new class of Muslim entrepreneurs called the "Islamic Calvinists". These

businessmen assist in the industrialization of the Tiger provinces and continue the use of the Islamic values in their businesses and communities. They contribute their economic success to these Islamic values, therefore taking a name a played off of Protestant Calvinism of the 18th century. But they also express a non-secular business practice that Western Turks and other countries have not seen from Turkey; something contrary to the Western idea of the secular business person.

Table 2: Tiger Capital Cities' Population Increases from 1990-2014

Anatolian Tigers:	Capital Cities:	Population 1990:	Population 2014:	Population Increase:
Denizli	Denizli	203,741	557,300	173.53%
Gaziantep	Gaziantep	603,434	1,510,270	150.28%
Kayseri	Kayseri	425,776	904,699	112.48%
Balikesir	Balikesir	170,011	272,569	60.32%
Konya	Konya	513,346	1,174,536	128.80%
K. Maras	Kahraman	228,129	475,793	108.56%
Ordu	Ordu	102,107	154,895	51.70%
Samsun	Samsun	304,176	541,330	77.97%
Çorum	Corum	116,810	243,698	108.63%
Trabzon	Trabzon	161,886	240,333	48.46%
Kütahya	Kutahya	130,944	232,123	77.27%
Nigde	Nigde	55,035	127,980	132.54%
Adiyaman	Adiyaman	100,045	230,630	130.53%
Afyon	Afyon	95,643	209,406	118.95%
Çankiri	Cankiri	45,496	76,490	68.12%
Giresun	Giresun	67,604	105,748	56.42%
Isparta	Isparta	112,117	207,266	84.87%
Karaman	Karaman	76,525	148,362	93.87%
Kocaeli	Izmit	190,741	310,973	63.03%
Malatya	Malatya	270,412	438,000	61.98%
Turkey Total	Ankara	59% Urban	73% Urban	23.72%

Table 3: AKP vs. CHP Support in the Anatolian Tiger Provinces

Anatolian Tigers	%AKP	%CHP	Ratio CHP to AKP
Denizli	39.78	34.76	87.38%
Gaziantep	47.03	16.37	34.81%
Kayseri	52.35	12.54	23.95%
Balikesir	39.12	33.67	86.07%
Konya	65.09	9.91	15.22%
K. Maras	60.76	8.72	14.35%
Ordu	52.92	28.21	53.31%
Samsun	52.86	22.99	43.49%
Çorum	54.28	22.28	41.05%
Trabzon	55.29	17.01	30.76%
Kütahya	54.49	12.01	22.04%
Nigde	47.9	21.29	44.45%
Adiyaman	58	11.49	19.81%
Afyon	52.3	16.75	32.03%
Çankiri	59.2	6.9	11.65%
Giresun	53.46	21.91	40.98%
Isparta	44.24	22.15	50.07%
Karaman	55.4	15.55	28.07%
Kocaeli	46.38	24.24	52.26%
Malatya	58.42	16.61	28.43%

The Tigers tend to have high AKP voting percentages, especially relative to the CHP. Why does this connection occur? There are two possible reasons for AKP popularity in the Tigers. First, rapid economic growth in these provinces has been associated with a period of AKP rule and the Tigers' see AKP policies as beneficial to their success. Second is an Islamic form of

integration of the people moving from the countryside to the Tigers that has been promoted by the Islamic Calvinists. This is referred to here as Islamic urbanization. While this new type of urbanization has benefitted the Islamic Calvinists in their promotion of Islamic values in their communities and businesses, it also assists the AKP, as it is seen as a mildly Islamist party. As seen in Table 3 above, the Tigers' average AKP vote percentage is also higher than Turkey's entire average, suggesting that the AKP and the Tigers have a strong connection. The CHP, though, is clearly lacking this connection. In 8 of the 19 provinces listed in the table below, the ratio of CHP percentage to AKP percentage is less than 30%: a large difference between the two parties, therefore. This again exhibits the significance of the AKP/Tiger connection

When the Turkish Republic was founded in 1923, a state run economy and strict control over the private sector were used to induce the development of infrastructure and to promote economic prosperity. These did not succeed as planned, though. Things started to change with Democratic Party rule in the early 1950's: agricultural development was emphasized, taxes lowered, and major road and other infrastructure projects were implemented. The agriculture tax decrease allowed farmers to spend more money and mechanize their farming techniques, while newly constructed roadways connected villages and cities spurred growth that unindustrialized areas had not yet seen. Import-substitution policies were implemented to assist with development and protect new businesses and industries against foreign competition. But when private investment did not increase as the party had hoped, and inflation increased due to growth in the money supply, the Turkish economy suffered and the Democratic Party lost control after a 1960 military coup. The Turkish economy then suffered throughout the 1960s-70s due to the failure of the import-substitution program to speed up

development across the country, until complete economic liberalization and internationalization were implemented in the 1980s. Small-scale Anatolian businesses may have been the biggest beneficiaries from the emphasis of these internationalization and liberalization policies on the export of manufactured goods. The cities that would become known as the Anatolian Tigers were particularly advantaged: “dynamic, highly computerized and newly equipped...” with flexible production patterns to meet demand (Karakaya).

The AKP has embraced these economic policies, and accordingly assisted in opening up foreign markets for Turkish business; the same internationalization that the Islamic Calvinists are in favor of and see as crucial for the continued growth of the Tigers. The AKP’s support for Turkish membership in the European Union exhibits their commitment to the internationalization of the Tigers’ markets, since membership would eliminate the barriers which currently limit entry of Turkish products into the EU.

These economic policy positions, though, deepen the divide between the AKP and the CHP. This division has its origins in the Kemalist development and Westernization policies instituted after the formation of the Turkish Republic. These policies forced a Westernization, secularization and modernization of Turkey’s citizens, which the city residents tended to support and the more traditional Anatolian residents struggled to implement. The CHP, known as a Kemalist party, carries with it the consequences of the Kemalist policies implemented at the Republic’s formation. This divides the AKP, supported in large part by the more traditional Anatolian Turks, from the CHP, the party known to have complicated their livelihoods. The CHP has also had difficulties gaining popularity in the Tigers due to their support of economic policies that benefit Western cities. These cities, already industrialized and economically

prosperous support industry protectionist policies. Because their goods and services are mainly produced for Turkey's domestic market and tourism industries, they also do not support the same internationalization policies and EU integration that the AKP and the Tigers do. The CHP did not adapt their economic policies to support the business wants of the newly risen Islamic Calvinists, who are not in favor of and do not benefit from protectionist policies. The CHP followed this strategy because they did not want to lose their Western urban support.

AKP support for free trade has been a threat to the industries of Western Turkey as well. These free trade agreements with other countries require quid pro quos which open up Turkey's market to foreign competition. The older, longer established industries of Western Turkey stand to be hurt by this because of their markets' historical roots in Turkey itself. These industries do not want cheaper products from other countries undercutting their prices. Now, the AKP and CHP are divided by both a secular/Islamist cleavage, and an economic one.

This economic divide is apparent in the structure of business associations in Turkey. There are two main business associations, TUSIAD and MUSIAD. TUSIAD (Turkish Industry and Business Association) supports their members, the majority of whom are located in Western Turkish cities, by fighting for the protectionist economic policies that Western industries and companies benefit from. They also claim to be representatives of Turkey's secular elite. These policies, though, do not support the rising Anatolian Tigers and the values or wants of the Islamic Calvinists, and TUSIAD did not adapt themselves to include the Anatolian businesses. In response to their exclusion, the Islamic Calvinists and other Anatolian businessmen formed the Independent Industrialists and Businessmen Association, MUSIAD. While it is not inherently a religious organization, MUSIAD is commonly referred to as the Muslim Industrialists and

Businessmen Association, due to the religious preferences and business practices of many of its members. MUSIAD gives the previously excluded Anatolian businessmen a voice in Turkey's economic and labor policies.

The AKP have been prominent supporters of MUSIAD since its formation in 1990. Because the AKP and MUSIAD support economic liberalization and Islamic business practices, MUSIAD's formation gave the AKP another platform for political success. While TUSIAD businesses are largely supporters of the CHP, the AKP gives MUSIAD members a way to counteract TUSIAD's influence on national economic policy. The AKP and TUSIAD have also gotten into public disputes, like in January 2014. In a speech to TUSIAD's 44th General Assembly, the Chairman commented that due to Turkey's recent stray from the rule of law and use of tax penalties to pressure companies to support certain policies, foreign investment will decrease and Turkey will lose money. Erdogan, President of Turkey and the leader of the AKP, reacted to this statement by accusing the Chairman of treason and said "From now on, we won't assist you, but will impede you" (Gursel). Table 3 below shows the percentage of TUSIAD and MUSIAD members in provinces around Turkey. This is an important table, because it portrays a greater diversity of MUSIAD members from a range of provinces in all regions of the country. It also gives the ratio of MUSIAD members in a province to TUSIAD members, reflecting differences in business practices and party support based in provinces. Where the ratio is above 1, TUSIAD membership is greater than MUSIAD. Below 1 is the opposite. The provinces with a ratio above 1 are largely located in Western Turkey, including Adana, Eskisehir, Izmir, Ankara, and, most of all, Istanbul. Most of TUSIAD's members are located in Istanbul, Turkey's main industrial center, but there is still a large MUSIAD representation in the city as

well. This suggests that there are industries and businesses in Istanbul that benefit from the AKP's economic policies. Judging from the ratios below 1, MUSIAD support is higher than TUSIAD in Central Anatolian provinces, including the Tigers.

Table 4: TUSIAD vs. MUSIAD in Turkish Provinces

Province:	%TUSIAD Members	%MUSIAD Members	TUSIAD / MUSIAD
Adana	2.95	1.63	1.81
Ankara	5.07	10.19	0.49
Antalya	0.42	0	
Balikesir	0	4.83	
Bilecek	0.63	0	
Bolu	0	0.06	
Burdur	0	0.06	
Bursa	1.06	5.77	0.18
Çankiri	0	1.63	
Çorum	0	0.99	
Denizli	0	4.37	
Erzurum	0	0.06	
Eskisehir	1.06	0.06	17.67
Gaziantep	0	3.55	
Isparta	0	0.06	
Hatay	0	0.12	
Istanbul	68.29	28.42	2.40
Izmir	12.9	6.64	1.94
K. Maras	0	3.15	
Karaman	0	0.35	
Kayseri	0	6.52	
Kirklareli	0.42	0	

Kocaeli	0.85	5.18	0.16
Konya	3.59	8.91	0.40
Malatya	0	2.04	
Manisa	1.27	1.46	0.87
Sakarya	0.21	0	
Samsun	0	1.28	
Sanliurfa	0	0.93	
Sinop	0.21	0	
Tekirdag	0.21	0.12	1.75
Tokat	0	0.06	
Yozgat	0	0.12	
Zonguldak	0	1.46	

There is nevertheless some geographic difference in TUSIAD and MUSIAD support due to their association with certain types of businesses. TUSIAD, whose members are mainly long established Western Turkish businesses that follow the secular business policies, has members mainly located in the major Turkish cities of Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, and some in other Western Turkish provinces. MUSIAD, on the other hand, has a more diverse membership, ranging from businesses in Western Turkey to the Tiger provinces. Below you will find two maps of TUSIAD and MUSIAD membership in provinces across Turkey, and which of the provinces in both maps are Tiger provinces. These maps also are evidence of MUSIAD's relationship with the Tiger provinces, if a somewhat nuanced relationship, and reflect the economic divide between the AKP and CHP.

In conclusion, Table 5 below divides the AKP and CHP by their economic policy, main support base, and business association connection. The AKP is so popular in Central Turkey and the Tiger provinces because of their economic policies, and therefore is also supported by the Tigers' business association, MUSIAD.

Figure 9:




Figure 10:




Table 5: Economic Policy and Party Support in Turkey

	AKP	CHP
Economic policy	Free trade	Protectionist
Heartland of support	Central Turkey	Western Turkey
Major business association	MUSIAD	TUSIAD

Islamic Urbanization:

The Islamic Calvinists, though, are not the only reason that AKP support is so high in the Anatolian Tiger provinces. There are noticeable trends that are important to discuss when acknowledging the high percentages of votes for the AKP in these provinces. First, living standards have increased rapidly in the Anatolian Tigers as a result of their economic growth. These living standard upgrades have taken place during the AKP's tenure, potentially leading these Turks to vote with their pocket-books and follow the "why fix what isn't broken?" mindset. Second, rapid economic growth has led to rapid urbanization of Anatolian Tiger cities. This urbanization has created higher levels of in-migration to the cities on the part of Turks living in less urbanized and developed towns and regions. These migrants are, on average, more religious and traditional, and therefore would be more likely to vote for an Islamist party. Third, the Islamic practices of imece and himaye help spread AKP support throughout their employees and community members. Imece refers to the "collaboration and support within a social group, originally the village community" while himaye is "a vertical principle of protection by and loyalty to the family, the religious group or brotherhood, or the region of origin"

(Joppien). These values are practiced for a sense of comradery between Muslims in a community or workplace. Employers in Islamic Calvinist businesses regularly take on a paternal role towards their employees, and through these roles, they spread traditional values and, therefore, make the masses more sympathetic to the AKP's Islamist cause. Brotherhood is not the only goal of imece and himaye, though. They are also used to preempt labor unrest by creating a sense of dependency and friendship.

III. The Politics of Difference

In any society, people carry with them understandings of how their society is structured. Often there is a dominant view that people incorporate, a view which gives a privileged position to some in respect to others. An example of this is gender. Men are considered the dominant gender: they are considered as stronger, smarter, and the major bread winners, leaving women to be the weaker, more emotionally driven of the two genders and who exist primarily as homemakers – and should! These understandings have been constructed over time, often in such a way as to work to the advantage of those who have been able to prevail in their construction. These privileges then get normalized and so perpetuate advantage and disadvantage between groups.

This can generate what is called a politics of difference. This is usually experienced in two movements. The first movement is the creation of the “other”. Here, a group in power, usually with better education and money, defines a group of people in a negative way. The “other” is considered to be, for example, lacking, uneducated and backward. This definition is

used as a justification of the privilege that one group experiences over the “other”. Members of this privileged group attributes their success to, for example, their hard work, and claims that if the “other” had worked as hard, they too would be successful. Social constraints and discriminations are not taken into account in explaining the economic and social disparities between the two groups; rather some fundamental ‘difference’ attributable to personal shortcomings, like race, is used to justify that discrimination.

The second movement in the politics of difference is the empowerment of the “other”. In this movement, the “other” stigmatized group defines a new identity for itself and uses the traits and values that the privileged group stereotyped them for as a way to prompt pride and a creation of a new, counter identity. This identity is based on a redefinition of who they are, denying the claims of the privileged group about them. They provide a different explanation for why they are not the privileged group themselves, placing the blame on the exploitive and discriminatory actions of the privileged. The stigmatized group demonstrates their own worthiness in terms of their past and present contributions to society: artists, businessmen, politicians, etc.

Turkey’s modern day politics of difference stems originally from the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923. The Young Turks, a group of young, nationalist, liberal, secularists staged a revolution against the Ottoman Empire after its defeat in World War I. They formed a new government and eventually banned the Ottoman caliphate. This banning also led to the dissolution of many Islamic institutions in Turkey, from schools to law courts. The new, secular government, run by a general named Mustafa Kemal, also banned Islamic dress in public places, created a new Turkish language with the Roman alphabet, and changed Turkey’s calendar

system to Gregorian. These were influential, rapid changes that had large effects on the Turkish society.

After the banning of many Islamic institutions, conservative rural Muslims across Turkey were forced to adapt to the secular, modernizing policies. Very suddenly, they could not speak, educate, or dress as they had previously been doing. They were stigmatized by the urban, secular Turks for resisting the westernizing changes that Mustafa Kemal enforced while long-term city residents, on the other hand, easily adapted to his policies. The changes created a difference between two groups of people: conservative rural Muslims and urban, secular Turks. The urban, secular Turks were thereby placed at an advantage and justified this in terms of Western virtues that others lacked: enlightenment, rational, even civilized.

The politics of difference creates two movements. The first is stigmatization of one group by another, as shown above. The second is the stigmatized group's counter-movement. This counter-movement was present in Turkish society through the formation of Islamic, conservative political parties. Because Mustafa Kemal and the Young Turks based the Republic on secular policies, successive Islamist political parties were often shut down by the (Kemalist) military. But the AKP has been a part of the Anti-Kemalist counter-movement, and because of its economic and political success, has not been banned.

Long-term Residents vs. Rural migrants in Western Turkish cities:

The politics of difference and the creation of the “other” are widely apparent in the Western, industrialized cities of Turkey. There are two distinct groups at play in these politics: the long-term residents who have lived in the cities for generations, or migrants who adapted quicker than the average rural migrant does; and then the rural migrants or the children of rural migrants. There are a few ways that these groups experience separation, all to the advantage of the urban Turks. The rural Turks are seen as uneducated, conservative, traditional, and backwards by the long-term city residents, who thereby justify their economic and social privilege. The urban context exaggerates the stereotypes that the groups give to others due to their extremely close contact. The rural Turks see the urban Turks as cut-throat, value-less, and pretentious capitalists. Both groups want a degree of separation, both material and symbolic, from each other, and through housing locations, job options, and politics, they achieve it.

Another expression of the politics of difference in Western Turkish cities is between the White Turks and Black Turks. This deepens the sense of difference between the rural migrants and long-term residents, and the AKP and CHP, in Western Turkish cities. While racist connotations are clearly present in these name choices, and “Black Turk” is used to create a social class association for the people who are awarded the label, both are considered negative depending on who is using it. “White Turks” are usually urban people who are considered by the opposite group pretentious and arrogant, while “Black Turks” are rural Turks thought to be uneducated and unlawful. Because “White Turks” are normally the long-term residents of the Western Turkish cities and the “Black Turks” are Anatolian and rural migrant Turks, the AKP and

CHP make use of these racist stigmatizations to mobilize their constituencies. Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the President of Turkey and a prominent leader of the AKP, recently stated:

“According to them we don’t understand politics. According to them we don’t understand art, theatre, cinema, poetry. According to them we don’t understand aesthetics, architecture. According to them we are uneducated, ignorant, the lower class, who has to be content with what is being given, needy; meaning, we are a group of negroes” (Ogret).

This quote exemplifies the significance of the differences between the rural and urban Turks in Western Turkish cities and the existence of a counter-movement, where so-called Black Turks are challenging the dominant politics of difference in Turkey that has been constructed by the White Turks.

Housing and neighborhood locations are a major way in which the rural and urban Turks are separated within the Western cities. When migrants first move to Western cities, they have a tendency to settle in a neighborhood with other migrants from their own town, villages, or province of origin. This allows for a degree of comfort, assistance, and support for them migrants after their move to a city, where a culture different than their own dominates. Traditional values, cultures, and practices are still used in business and social interactions, giving one a sense of home. These migrant neighborhoods, though, construct a barrier, whether purposeful or not, between their neighborhoods and the rest of the city, where the long term urban Turks are located.

The migrant communities addressed above are traditionally called Gecekondus, meaning “built at night”. This is because, due to a loophole in an old Turkish law, building a home on a property that was not the builder’s own was only defined as illegal while the sun was up. After discovering this loophole, new migrants would move to government-owned land, build their house overnight, and move in the next morning before the government could knock it down. Millions of people now live in Gecekondu neighborhoods, which are not built in the same way anymore, but are still associated with the negative connotations assigned to the original Gecekondus. The migrants who lived in the original Gecekondu settlements were those who could not afford normal, legal housing, and today’s Gecekondu residents are continued to be thought of as uneducated, poor, unlawful, and backwards by the urban Turks. Because of the negative connotations attached to Gecekondus, urban Turks do not care to associate with the people living in them, leading to increased separation between the migrants and locals. Many migrants living in the Gecekondus have reported feeling lesser and stigmatized by the urban Turks for their housing location (Erman). The Gecekondu residents have brought with them or adopted some of the traditional values and practices for business and social interactions, creating more difference between the migrants and urban Turks. These indicators suggest that housing location is a critical arena for the politics of difference between rural migrants and urbanites in the cities of Western Turkey. Below is a picture of an Ankara Gecekondu. As one can see, the Gecekondu community is slum-like, considered an eye-sore by the long-term city residents.

Figure 11: Ankara Gecekonu (Smith)



The differences created through housing locations and the subsequent consequences of separation between rural and urban Turks also reflects itself in Turkish politics. The CHP, a liberal, secular Turkish party has had a large support base in the Western Turkish cities. The CHP also supports a purely secular and Westernized Turkey, one that challenges the traditional views of the Anatolian Turks. The AKP, a conservative, mildly Islamist, economically liberal party, provides a political voice to these migrants who feel negatively affected by CHP policy. Because the population of rural migrants in Western cities is growing, and becoming a large proportion of respective urban populations, their political voice is making a huge difference in politics there. The CHP's support is still very strong with the urban Turks, but is being quickly overshadowed by migrant support for the AKP. This gives the AKP a support base across the country.

Clientelism and the policies of imece and himaye also play a role in voter support in the Western Turkish cities, where the AKP reaches out to migrant communities and provides goods and services. The AKP has practiced clientelism in a different way than past parties have, by using the TOKI, Turkey's Mass Housing Administration. TOKI builds government housing, normally occupied by lower-income Turks. The AKP increased TOKI's power by having it report straight to the Prime Minister and giving it a seat in the Turkish cabinet and decreasing restrictions on its operations. TOKI now has more power in picking the contractors, types of housing being built, and where the housing is built. The majority of contractors selected are pro-AKP and AKP supporters are usually chosen first for construction jobs. Not only do TOKI employees have more decision-making power and AKP supporters have more jobs, the local municipalities that are chosen for TOKI housing projects have a stimulated economy. This stimulated economy keeps residents happy with the AKP government.

The AKP also provides goods and services directly to migrant communities in Western cities. Here, an AKP representative for the migrant community takes care of problems that arise. The migrants get the idea that the AKP cares about them, and takes care of them like the CHP does not. Through these actions, the AKP creates a community of loyal, trusting voters.

Overall, the AKP provides a counter-identity for the migrants living in Western Turkish cities. After being stigmatized by the long-term residents of these major urban centers, the AKP allows the migrants to have political voices and power, and affect change in their community. These migrants provide a major support base for the AKP in Western cities, where one would not originally expect AKP support to be so high. This also affects the AKP's relationship with

under-developed regions, because of the Western regions' high development index scores. The migrants in Western cities are a very important group of AKP's support base.

V. Conclusion

The AKP ruins every assumption that one would have about the usual political party in Turkey. As a conservative, mildly-Islamist party, they manage to gain high levels of voter support in all provinces and regions of Turkey and across all levels of development. This is not what one would expect would happen, considering the traditional cleavages of Turkey's political parties that the CHP follows. This happens, as seen above, because of the Anatolian Tigers and Islamic Calvinists in Central Turkey, the politics of difference in Western Turkish cities, and HDP support in Southeastern Anatolia that decreases the AKP's relationship with development.

As time passes though, it seems that Turkey's political party cleavages are beginning to change. There are signs of a shift from secular / Islamic and developed / under developed divisions towards one of class. Differences in social class are becoming much more significant, leading left wing parties to have more of an appeal. The future of the AKP, because of their numerous corruption scandals, repression of freedoms of press, assembly, and speech, and a hint of a shift in party cleavages, is unknown. As Turkey's global importance and influence rises, the world should be watching.

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