


W. GREGORY MONAHAN



YEAR of SORROWS

*The Great Famine of
1709 in Lyon*



Year of Sorrows draws upon an extensive array of archival sources to chronicle the famine crisis of 1709 in Lyon and its surrounding provinces.

Combining a traditional narrative of human struggle and desperate improvisation with contemporary analysis, Monahan takes his readers from the court of Versailles through the city of Lyon into the hovels of French peasants who resisted the city's demand for their grain. Monahan goes on to analyze the political, social, economic, and demographic impact of the famine on an early modern city and explores the many conflicts created by the crisis between city and monarchy, city and countryside, and among various groups within Lyon. According to Monahan, the famine of 1709 serves as a prism to refract the interactions between royal finances and food shortages, between elites and the powerless, and between competing factions and power centers, and redefines the nature of the "absolute" monarchy of the Sun King.

This dynamic study of human struggle and its political and social dimensions sheds new light on a host of issues and problems in France before the Revolution and on the role that such crises have played in human history.

W. Gregory Monahan is associate professor of history at Eastern Oregon State College and has published articles on the struggles in Lyon during the crisis of 1709.

Jacket design: James F. Brisson

Jacket illustration: Lithograph of the Pont de Saône over the Saône River in the eighteenth century

YEAR of SORROWS



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*The Great Famine of
1709 in Lyon*

W. GREGORY MONAHAN

Ohio State University Press

COLUMBUS

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Monahan, W Gregory, 1953-

Year of sorrows : the great famine of 1709 in Lyon / W. Gregory
Monahan.

p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.

ISBN 0-8142-0608-5 (alk. paper)

1. Famines—France—Lyon—History—18th century. 2. Food supply—
France—Lyon—History—18th century. I. Title.

HC280.F3M66 1993

363.8'0944'5823'09033—dc20

92-45193

CIP

Text and jacket design by James F. Brisson.

Type set in Dutch Janson by

Connell-Zeko Type & Graphics, Kansas City, MO.

Printed by McNaughton & Gunn, Saline, MI.

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for
permanence and durability of the Committee on
Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the
Council on Library Resources. ©

9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

FOR

RITA SHORT MONAHAN, R.N., M.S.N., Ed.D., c.t.p.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It must be said that no book is an island, and that no author ever truly writes one all by himself. My debts to those who have aided and encouraged me in completing this project are many and varied. The Institute for International Education and the Franco-American Commission for Educational and Cultural Exchange provided a Fulbright Research Grant, which supported a year of research in France. While there, I enjoyed the advice, counsel, and friendship of Jacqueline Hecht of the Institut National d'Études Démographiques, which institution also graciously made available work space and its own considerable library. Jacques Dupâquier, Jean-Noel Biraben, and Jean-Pierre Bardet of the École des Hautes Études in Paris made valuable suggestions and helped acquaint me with the techniques of historical demography. Bernard Barbiche of the École des Chartes guided me through the mazes of institutional history and helped me to decipher some particularly recalcitrant documents.

In Lyon, I benefitted from the resources of the Centre Pierre Léon of the Université de Lyon II, and particularly from the suggestions of Maurice Garden, Dominique Dessertines, and Alain Bideau. In the archives, Henri Hours, Marie Charné, and Jacqueline Roubert all listened patiently, joined me in searching out the materials I required, and often located records I knew nothing about, but ended up needing very much.

I owe great personal debts of gratitude to those in France who made my stay not only professionally successful, but personally pleasant. Gordon Golding and Corinne Pujol were always there, always willing, and often needed. Madame Paul Ehrmann in Paris and Pierre and Madeleine Vialettes in Lyon endured the presence in their homes of an American abroad and made him love France all the more.

On this side of the Atlantic, John Super, Thomas Knight, and Robert Blobaum read the manuscript in various stages of development. Their many comments and suggestions helped me to become a better historian and, I hope, a better writer. A special debt is owed to Dennis O'Brien, as advisor and friend, who cleared many hurdles from the path of a young graduate student and offered endless encouragement when the task seemed beyond reach. Gary McCollim lent his unparalleled knowledge of the intricacies of Old Regime finance and helped clear away many webs in that area. The anonymous readers for the Ohio State University Press offered a host of suggestions for final revisions that helped to enrich the scope and context of the book. I am grateful to the editors of *French Historical Studies* for permission to reprint portions of my article "Lyon in the Crisis of 1709: Royal Absolutism, Administrative Innovation and Regional Politics," which appeared in the Fall 1990 issue of that journal.

Dawna Flanagan helped with last-minute word processing glitches, and I am grateful to Alex Holzman of the OSU Press and copyeditor Robert Marcum for their perseverance in seeing the book through. Finally, my parents, William and Jane Monahan, lent not only parental support, but also monetary support in the publication of the work, as did my wife, Rita. To her goes the last and most significant of thanks. She has suffered through the famine of 1709 far longer than any Lyonnais silk worker ever did. Her endurance, her support, and the challenge of her intellect are a continuing inspiration to me, and the book is therefore dedicated to her, with great and lasting affection.

PROLOGUE

Providence did not abandon the people of Saint-Germain-au-Mont d'Or in 1709.¹ Though the great winter of that year destroyed their vines and froze their crops, and peasants from the surrounding countryside refused to sell them even the most meager grains of wheat, though hunger stalked their village day and night, all was not irretrievably lost. On the thirteenth of April in that terrible year, a lone grain boat was making its way slowly down the Saône, when it was suddenly struck by a strong wind and beached upon the river's bank.

The news brought the inhabitants of Saint-Germain rushing to the boatman in hopes of buying his grain. Their inspection of the boat found it half full of oats bound for the stables of the royal intendant in Lyon. Underneath the oats, however, the boatman had stashed a supply of wheat and peas, purest gold in the food-starved hills of the Beaujolais. After confirming that the oats were indeed bound for the intendant, the villagers shifted them carefully to another boat and sent them on their way. The abbot of nearby Masso then agreed to journey to Lyon to inquire after the going price for wheat and peas so that the village could buy them. Until his return, Antoine Prost, Philibert Archer, and his brother Jean-Baptiste joined other villagers in guarding the boat. Arming themselves with an assortment of weapons, they watched day and night lest an effort be made to steal this gift of life that God himself had deigned to provide.

News of the boat and its contents spread quickly through the countryside and soon reached the town of Neufville only a few kilometers southward. There, in the dark of night on 17 April, unknown to the villagers of Saint-Germain, thirty hungry townsmen gathered and armed themselves with guns, sabers, and bayonets. They boarded small river boats and made their way upstream toward the covered

prize. At eleven minutes before midnight, Antoine Prost bolted to his feet. He had heard a noise, perhaps a mutter of voices or a swishing of paddles. He sent the Archer brothers and two others to investigate. Bricitte, one of the band from Neufville, spotted the four scouts from Saint-Germain descending toward his group along the bank and ordered his followers to open fire. As bullets sailed about them, the Archer brothers turned and beat a hasty retreat toward the boat, but their attackers had taken the land and were on them in an instant. Prost and his friends joined the battle and managed gradually to push the attackers back. Prost himself was so badly beaten that he had to be carried back to his house afterward, but the defense was successful. The Neufville raiders failed to seize the grain and had to content themselves with taking as their prisoners the hapless Archer brothers. Prost later testified that he watched them all disappear into the darkness. Luckily for the Archers, Bricitte did not make good on his threat to drown them in the river, and they managed to escape once the group had returned to Neufville. They made their way back to Saint-Germain, where they brought charges against those who had kidnapped them. In the meantime, on 18 April, the treasured grain was carried triumphantly into the village and sold to a grateful population at the price then current in Lyon. In Saint-Germain-au-Mont d'Or, for a brief time, people ate bread while the terrible famine of 1709 raged about them.

The image of desperate townspeople fighting in the dark for a few sacks of grain makes a good metaphor for the crisis of 1709. Like all subsistence crises, it bred a wide variety of conflicts, and like all such crises it also bred desperation. Townspeople fought in physical darkness, but also in the darkness of administrative chaos and a lack of reliable information about the location and availability of grain. Indeed, no events reveal the nature of the Old Regime more clearly than the subsistence crises that plagued it. No wars or treaties or reforms or royal acts help better to expose the economic, geographic, and political structures, to understand the real administrative power and reach of the monarchy, or to grasp the condition of the people and their relationships to their institutions.

This is particularly the case with general crises like that of 1709. In a given year, one or another region of France always suffered bad crops and food shortages. Other regions were usually able, if not always willing, to make up the difference. In 1709, however, as in

1662 and 1694, the shortage was general, and provinces, cities, and towns became competitors for meager supplies.² While it might be assumed that the monarchy of Louis XIV, so legendarily absolute, would have coordinated the movement of supplies to even out the impact, such royal efforts were at best sporadic. At the very moment Antoine Prost battled Bricitte for his wheat, the merchants of Lyon were locked in a high-level battle of influence and patronage to force local officials in surrounding provinces to give up meager supplies of grain so that France's second city would survive the famine. Manipulating a variety of clientage networks through such court powers as the *Maréchal Duc de Villeroy* and the controller general *Nicolas Desmaretz*, the officials of Lyon labored through a flood of interlocking administrative correspondence, gifts, and bribes to ensure the cooperation of the monarchy in their effort. Thus, as will be seen, royal efforts in crises such as that of 1709 were most often the product of individual influence and local power rather than attempts at a just or efficient distribution.

The continuity and pervasiveness of grain shortages in the Old Regime tended to develop specific administrative responses, but also created a culture of subsistence, a developing set of attitudes and corresponding behaviors directly related to the causes and cures of famines. As crisis followed crisis, the peasants gradually learned to foresee a bad harvest and to take action to protect their reserves. Suspicious activity on the part of the peasants motivated many grain merchants to hoard supplies. Officials responded by arresting those merchants, forcing inspections of their granaries, or coercing them to supply more. These actions in turn led to increasing panic among the populations of cities and towns and hostility between those towns and surrounding regions. Panic and hostility made the crisis worse, reinforcing fears of starvation, multiplying conflicts among officials, worsening suspicions of peasants and grain merchants. Fear and conflict reduced the alternatives open to everyone, and violence often resulted.

It is not surprising, given their obvious value as tools for analyzing and interpreting the Old Regime, that subsistence crises have attracted the attention of historians. Since the turn of the century, when the works of *Georges Afanassiev*, *A. P. Usher*, and *Joseph Leraconnoux* broached the question, the study of subsistence has taken many directions.³ *Jean Meuvret* pointed to the importance of grain prices

and demographic methods for gauging the impact of crises.⁴ Louise Tilly and Olwen Hufton, among others, charted the causes and patterns of collective violence bred by food shortages.⁵ Steven L. Kaplan explored the mechanics of the grain trade, efforts by eighteenth-century physiocrats to revolutionize old paternalistic notions about its regulation and control, and the extraordinarily complex provisioning system of Paris in the eighteenth century.⁶ A large group of historians, led by George Rudé and Richard Cobb, charted the vital role of subsistence crises in the Revolution.⁷ Yet, in this large and growing literature, relatively few works have concentrated on a single crisis in a single city.⁸ Those that have, published either as articles in French journals or as small parts of large *thèses*, have tended to suffer generally from a narrow range of questions and methods.⁹ What follows is as complete a history as can be written of a single subsistence crisis in a defined region.

I have chosen to study Lyon, the destination of the grain boat at Saint-Germain, the greatest city in France after Paris, a city famous for its commercial wealth and charitable institutions, and yet a city both blessed and crippled by its own geography. Lyon sat then and now astride two of France's great navigable rivers, the Saône and the Rhône, and anchored a network of roads linking Paris and the north to Provence, Savoy, and the cities of northern Italy. These routes endowed the city with great commercial vitality and considerable wealth. But Lyon was also cursed by its location, cursed by the sterility of its own mountainous provinces, which spilled out their populations in ever-increasing numbers to find food and work in the city without yielding any grain with which to feed them. In times of plenty, their wealth and power enabled the Lyonnais to reach far into neighboring provinces for sustenance, and thus to maintain a balance between the positive and negative features of their location. In time of dearth, however, with grain dear and the need great, neighboring provinces could quickly close the doors of their granaries, stranding the city with ever-increasing mouths to feed and steadily decreasing supplies to feed them.

The Great Winter and Famine of 1709 laid bare the perils of the city's awkward geographic position and required the men who ruled it to use every means at their disposal to forestall disorder. The records of their struggle and those of the people they worked for and against relate an intense drama of personal and institutional survival.

In the process, the crisis of 1709 becomes a prism, refracting into stark visibility the networks of clientage and power, of trade and regulation, of society and authority, and of poverty and wealth. Moreover, Lyon suffered special problems in 1709. As home to the greatest money market in France, the city watched its economy increasingly held hostage to the financial instability of the crown, and to royal bankers such as Samuel Bernard, who borrowed more money in the city than they could afford to repay. The ensuing financial crisis toppled Bernard in 1709 and smashed the city's economy at the very beginning of the food crisis. Survival for all classes in Lyon pitted them against each other and pitted the city against other towns and provinces in the region. These battles tore, in turn, at a crown weakened by years of war and at a king increasingly burdened with old age.

At Versailles, the crisis marked the nadir of a reign for which everything seemed to have gone wrong. Louis XIV had been almost continuously at war for twenty years, and the strain had done much to destroy the financial machine so finely crafted by Colbert. Efforts at peace in this last war were unavailing, and so crown and country dragged themselves from campaign to campaign. Taxes remained chronically high, and the crown resorted to all manner of financial subterfuge to support its operations. The burden was heavy and showed no sign of growing lighter. Certainly, the crisis of 1709 brought no relief.

Indeed, the Great Winter and Famine of 1709 made the burden worse. Since the crisis was national in scope, the struggles of the magistrates and people of Lyon represented only a part of a wider series of actions and conflicts. From the crowded salons of Versailles to the smallest hovels of the Burgundian countryside, men and women great and small struggled with the awful threat of dearth. Though some of the great might profit from high prices and the opportunities afforded by the war economy, most undoubtedly feared the withered incomes that resulted from both a disastrous harvest and a bankrupt state. Worse yet, they feared the inevitable epidemics of violence and disease that issued from a desperately poor population threatened by starvation. If the mighty and the small struggled for a very different kind of survival, it was for survival nonetheless.

My effort to chart these contrasting struggles for survival begins by introducing and analyzing the various structures that contributed to the crisis: the city itself, with its fiercely independent government

and its host of institutions designed to maintain order in time of dearth; the provisioning system centered in Burgundy, Lyon's primary provincial granary and its most reluctant benefactor; and the chaotic state of the royal finances, which brought about the collapse of the city's economy. The narrative follows, illustrating the disastrous conjuncture of the food and financial crisis in 1709 and efforts by the city to overcome the dogged resistance to its demands in its customary supply areas. The final section analyzes the human and institutional cost of the crisis of 1709 and seeks to place it in the broader context not only of subsistence problems during the Old Regime but of the very nature of that regime itself.

Indeed, the struggles of the Lyonnais to provision their city reveal much about the larger problem of absolutism. Like the problems of subsistence, absolutism too has drawn a considerable literature, as historians have sought to qualify and clarify the exact relationship between the monarchy of Louis XIV and the network of local and regional power centers. The tired paradigm of a king smashing noble opposition and destroying traditional authorities has been reversed. Sharon Kettering has demonstrated the overriding importance of patronage networks and the extent to which royal officials enmeshed themselves within them, cooperating with rather than undermining traditional authorities.¹⁰ William Beik proved that local officials had a vested interest in the monarchy and argued that the key to Louis XIV's "absolutism" lay in his ability to *empower* certain noble authorities in such a way that local officials found themselves wanting more royal influence, not less.¹¹ In two meticulous studies, Albert Hamscher showed how the power of the *parlements* over other courts was actually increased by the king even as their tendency to political obstruction dissipated.¹² Finally, Roger Mettam has argued that the king used his great nobility to mediate between regional authorities and the crown, and that the king was perfectly content to work within the constraints of the aristocratic and hierarchical society of which he was so much a part.¹³

As the subsequent analysis will show, the merchants of Lyon did work through patronage and clientage networks. They were in a sense empowered by their relationship to the crown. Yet, the reach and power of the monarchy was so ephemeral in 1709 as to make even the use of such a term as "absolutism" questionable. If anything, the merchants of Lyon manipulated the crown in the same

way that Louis XIV allegedly manipulated others. Of course, the issue of royal power was entirely secondary to them. The monarchy was little more than a means to a more important end as they struggled with the visceral dilemmas of order and disorder, survival and starvation, discipline and charity.

No reality was harsher, no fear closer to the hearts and minds of eighteenth-century Frenchmen and Frenchwomen, than the dreadful menace of a *disette*. No event drew them closer together or threw them farther apart. For after all the analysis is finished and the numbers have been placed neatly into tables and graphs, the story of the Great Winter and Famine of 1709 in Lyon remains a tale of basic human struggle, of desperate improvisation, of the misery that comes of failure, and the exhausted elation that accompanies success.


PART



ONE

Setting:

Lyon before the Crisis



Parish boundaries of Lyon in 1709



The Structures of Order

To early eighteenth-century travelers approaching Lyon by water for the first time, the paradoxes and contrasts of its geography were not immediately apparent. The Saône was the preferred highway to the city, and merchants and their barges plied its waters and entered its port towns in every season of the year. From Gray to Auxonne, from Pontailier to Saint-Jean-de-Losne, from Chalons, Mâcon, and Villefranche southward, boats brimming with people and goods floated serenely past the sunbaked hills of the Beaujolais. Only as they passed the old monastery tower of the Île-Barbe just north of the city did the rural scenery give way on the right bank to the inns and boathouses of Vaize, Lyon's northern *faubourg*, or suburb. On the left bank, the steep hillside of the Croix Rousse arose to obscure the view of the city around the river's bend ahead.

Once around that bend, travellers' eyes rose sharply to the royal fortress towers of Pierre Scize perched ominously on the cliff to the right, and then fell to the houses crowded in between the bottom of the cliff and the river below. The visual suddenness of the city was matched by the shock of its odor, since the phlegmatic current of the Saône failed entirely to carry off the chemicals of the dyers, the harsh soaps of the laundry boats, the carrion of the butcher shops, or the human excrement emptied into it with a regularity enforced by years of regulations.¹ Gradually, as they passed through the *octroi* chains of Bénin, travellers could begin to study the ceaseless activity on and around the river. Ferryboats full of goods moved busily back and forth. On either bank, at those points where houses did not crowd the river's edge, dockworkers loaded and unloaded supplies under the watchful eyes of officials busily calculating the *octrois* and *droits* that formed the greater part of municipal revenues. Continu-

ing their voyage, our passengers floated beneath three bridges linking the right and left banks. Of the three, two were of wood and in constant need of repairs to buttress the ramshackle supports that took such a pounding during the annual spring flooding of the river.² Only one was of stone, the old "Pont de Saône," and it was so narrow that only two small wagons at a time could cross it. Yet this bridge, with its tiny chapel in the center and buildings piled onto its arches from either end, linked Lyon's most important sections.

On the right bank, only a short distance from the towers of Saint-Jean Cathedral, lay the Place de Change. There, four times yearly, France's greatest money market flourished in the costume of a Renaissance fair, and merchants from all over Europe gathered to settle their accounts and make new loans. Across the bridge on the left bank, hidden behind the single spire of the canon church of Saint-Nizier, lay the seat of power in the city, its magnificent, baroque Hôtel de Ville. Travellers could not continue much farther by boat, for beyond the last bridge linking the archepiscopal palace and the city's largest square, the Place Bellecour, the Saône disappeared into the swirling currents of the Rhône.

As a highway, the Rhône contrasted sharply with the quiescent Saône. Its current flowed so fast that doctors at the *Hôtel-Dieu* dangled the insane in it once yearly in hopes its force would strip away their confusion.³ Navigating the river required expensive teams of horses and men to keep barges tightly bound and close to the banks. The task was best undertaken from late spring to early fall. In winter, when the wind shifted hard to the north, the Rhône defied all navigation, and only foolishness or ample wages could drive a boatman to the attempt.⁴

Water travel was not the only way to approach Lyon. Five gates, three on the right bank of the Saône and two on the left, opened the city to land-bound travellers. The busiest of the right bank gates, the Porte de Vaize, lay beneath the fortress of Pierre Scize and welcomed travellers from Paris and Burgundy into the large merchant-dominated parish of Saint-Paul. The Porte Saint-Just on top of the hill of Fourvière to the west opened to travellers from the hills of the Lyonnais and the Auvergne, who had upon entering the city to descend steeply and quickly toward the Cathedral and the Law Courts by the river below. Still on the right bank but at the southern tip of the city lay the Porte Saint-Georges. Travellers from the Vivarais and

Languedoc entered here to be enveloped by the bustle of silk workers and day laborers in Lyon's poorest quarter, the parish of Saint-Georges. On the left bank of the Saône, at the top of the vine-strewn hill that pushed and crowded the city's population down into the narrow peninsula between its two rivers, was the small Porte Saint-Sebastian. This gate welcomed those from the northeast, from the Dombes and the region around Bresse and Bugey and from the small faubourg of Croix Rousse, which lay just outside the walls. Down the hill from Saint-Sebastian, on the eastern side of the peninsula that the Lyonnais still call the "Presqu'île," only one bridge dared span the torrent of the Rhône. The Pont de la Guillotière, with its twenty-one great stone arches, its draw tower in the center and its constant stream of travellers from Dauphiné, Provence, and Savoy to the southeast, connected the city with its faubourg of La Guillotière. "La Guille," in the argot of the eighteenth century, was a village of small farmers and vine growers dotted by inns catering to the Dauphinois who worked across the river during the day.

Like arteries and veins, its rivers and gates pumped life into Lyon, connecting the city with the life beyond its walls. Indeed, the flow of people and goods in and out was constant. Maurice Garden, in his great study of Lyon's demographic and social structure, estimated that at any time during the eighteenth century, 70 percent of the city's residents were born outside its walls, mostly in the Lyonnais and provinces to the east and south.⁵ This constant circulation of people, as well as a shortage of census or tax data from the period, makes any estimate of the city's total population difficult.⁶ Contemporaries ranged in their estimates from Lambert d'Herbigny's low count of 90,000 in 1697 to the Abbé d'Expilly's high count of 124,086 for 1708.⁷ After careful analysis of every source, Garden settled on a population of 100,000 in 1700, 110,000 including the faubourgs of Vaize, La Guillotière, and Croix Rousse.⁸ Of this population, fully four-fifths labored as artisans, silk workers, day laborers and domestics. Merchants, nobles, and ecclesiastics made up the other fifth, constituting the bourgeois elite of the city.⁹ Rich and poor alike crowded into an area of less than 364 hectares (approximately 900 acres) in buildings averaging five stories in height.¹⁰ The height of its buildings and crush of its population made Lyon a dense city of narrow winding streets, imposing stone facades, and hidden inner courtyards.¹¹ The city's density did not prevent some trades from concentrating in cer-

tain quarters. The elite, the merchants, bankers, judges, ecclesiastics, and the domestics they employed, all tended to crowd the center on either side of the Pont de Saône. Thus, the parishes of Sainte-Croix, Saint-Paul, and Saint-Nizier enjoyed a large proportion of the city's wealth.¹² Boatmen, wagoners, and dockworkers naturally preferred the riverside parishes of Saint-Vincent and Saint-Paul; printers, binders, and booksellers traditionally concentrated around the rue Mercier in the parish of Saint-Nizier.¹³ Day laborers, peddlers, and beggars plied their trades throughout the city during the day but returned at night to the poor quarters in the parish of Saint-Georges on the right bank and those around the two great hospitals of the *Hôtel-Dieu* and the *Charité* on the left.¹⁴ The silk workers, who anchored Lyon's foremost industry, were scattered throughout the city because of their need for rooms of sufficient size and light to accommodate their large looms. Only later in the eighteenth century were they to stake out as their own the hillside of the Croix Rousse, which in 1709 was still covered mostly in vines worked by growers in the parish of Saint-Vincent.¹⁵

This urban population, dominated by artisans, day laborers, domestics and shopkeepers, could at times become quarrelsome and unruly, and was given like other urban populations in the Old Regime to occasional episodes of collective violence. Only over some two hundred years of constant effort did the city's elite improvise urban institutions that ultimately constituted the city's structures of order. As in other cities, the magistrates of Lyon developed and maintained tools of coercion such as judicial courts and armed guards, but the expense of such tools was great, and the rulers of the city had long recognized the need to prevent disorders by attending to their causes. Thus, the structures of order in Lyon also included tools of charity in the form of hospitals and tools of sustenance, which included the strict regulation of bread prices and markets and urban institutions designed to procure grain from fields far away. An understanding of the evolution, condition, and function of these institutions is instructive if one is to comprehend their vital role during the crisis of 1709.

In 1700, the Lyonnais installed their government in one of Europe's loveliest buildings, its rooms decorated with a sumptuousness worthy of Versailles itself.¹⁶ Every Tuesday and Thursday morning, in a gilded chamber of marble bas-reliefs and silk tapestries on the second floor of this building, five men assembled as the city's Consulate. As

reconstituted by Henri IV in 1603, the Consulate was composed of four *échevins* and a *prévôt des marchands*. By law, the *prévôt* had to be a resident of the city for at least twelve years and own property there worth at least 10,000 livres.¹⁷ Election as an *échevin* brought an automatic patent of nobility (with an exemption entitling the newly ennobled to continue in commerce) as well as a variety of other privileges and honors. The elaborate ceremony of election took place each year on the Sunday before the feast of Saint-Thomas when representatives of the city's guilds met to select two *échevins* for two-year terms.¹⁸ If a new *prévôt* was to be elected, the same group nominated three candidates and set their names before the king, who nearly always chose the one with the most votes. The two *échevins* not leaving office joined the assembly and chaired it with the electoral title of *terrier*.¹⁹ Since the representatives of each guild were carefully selected each year by the Consulate, and since members of the Consulate chaired the electoral assembly, each Consulate effectively controlled the nature of its successor. Such a system enabled the great merchants of Lyon to maintain a remarkable stability in their governance of the city.

The men of affairs who served as *échevins* pledged their credit and standing to their city. Service could be both expensive and time consuming, and not all of Lyon's great merchants agreed to don the rich blue robes of office.²⁰ Those who served fought long and hard during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries to maintain and expand their control of the city in competition with crown officials and other local authorities. Wealth constituted their most effective weapon, and they brought it to bear repeatedly on the battlefield of venality, buying newly created royal offices in order to scuttle them and thereby avoid any diffusion in their power. Examples of this practice abound.²¹ In 1632 the Consulate purchased new offices of "intendant" and "receveur des denrées communaux" for 180,000 livres to ensure that they would never be filled.²² In 1639 came the purchase of newly created "gaugers" for 63,000 livres, and in 1674, of "mesureurs du vin" for 40,000 *écus*.²³ None of these offices survived to threaten consular authority, but these and other purchases exacted a heavy price. By 1677, the magistrates of Lyon had spent over 6,000,000 livres buying offices, incurring a huge floating debt of 2,400,000 livres.²⁴ Though Colbert granted the Consulate a surtax on wine in 1677 to help reduce the debt, the resulting period of relief was cut

short by a string of new exactions during the costly War of the Spanish Succession.²⁵

The extent to which these efforts brought any degree of independence is arguable, since the very fact of purchase demonstrated a consistent subservience to the crown. Yet, it is also true that the Consulate managed to retain its governance of the city undiluted and uncorrupted by layers of useless offices and venal officeholders. As far as was possible in the framework of the Old Regime, the bourgeois of Lyon controlled their own affairs.

The Consulate did not always purchase offices simply to get rid of them. Occasionally, a new office might help the magistrates to enhance their authority. Such was the case in their longrunning and ultimately successful effort to supersede Lyon's oldest law court, the *Sénéchaussée*, by creating a new city criminal court. The *Sénéchaussée* formed a part of the network of *parlements* whose political pretensions had so provoked the kings of France for many years. Louis XIV had succeeded in stalling these pretensions and turning the *parlements* into more acquiescent partners in royal government, but he was not averse to maintaining competing authorities to insure against any revival in parliamentary rebelliousness.²⁶ The Consulate thus found consistent support from the crown for its efforts to create a competing court. Though the struggle had begun early in 1633, when the Consulate purchased the right to name judges to a *bureau de police*, it did not begin in earnest until 1699 with the acquisition of the office of lieutenant of police.²⁷ The old *bureau* was transformed into a new *Tribunal de Police*, and the *Sénéchaussée* immediately challenged the authority of the new court with an order blocking its power to issue judgments. The Consulate appealed to Versailles, and a royal *arrêt* quickly quashed the order, restricting the *Sénéchaussée* to merely processing appeals directly from the new tribunal to the *parlement* of Paris.²⁸ When in 1701 the *Sénéchaussée* tried to force two of its own councillors onto the new court, it was again rebuffed by the crown.²⁹ Thrice more from 1702 to 1704 the court tried to block or hinder its dangerous competitor, and each time the crown quickly struck it down.³⁰ By 1709, as a result of this struggle, the Consulate enjoyed a virtual monopoly of judicial authority within the city as well as the support of the royal power at Versailles. As usual, that support had not come cheaply. From 1698 to 1706, at the same time that they were battling the *Sénéchaussée*, the magistrates of Lyon pur-

chased the suppression by edict of new royal offices and exactions whose value totalled 1,429,000 livres.³¹ For Louis XIV, the Consulate of Lyon obviously possessed a double value. Not only could it prove a successful ally in his longrunning effort to balance the pretensions of the sovereign courts, but it was also a valuable source of revenue. This alliance of royal and consular authority thus served to create a bond of mutual interest that was to prove of incalculable value during the crisis of 1709.³²

For the *échevins* of Lyon, the new tribunal represented simply an added measure of judicial authority, the third court of law that they controlled. The first met every Wednesday morning when the Consulate formed itself into a court to decide disputes and receive petitions from the guilds, with whose regulation and governance it had long been charged.³³ On Monday and Friday afternoon, the magistrates moved from the consular chamber through a great wooden door into a larger room to be joined by six additional judges in a second court, the *Conservation des Privilèges Royaux des Foires de Lyon*. Through the *Conservation*, they ruled the city's commerce. Any merchant signing a note during one of the four seasonal fairs held in the city fell under its jurisdiction. If a debt rested unpaid, the plaintiff had only to appear before the court to bring charges. If the debtor did not then appear in person or by proxy within three days, he could be arrested anywhere in France without recourse to any other judicial body.³⁴ Only after the *Conservation* passed sentence could that sentence be appealed, and then only directly to the *parlement* of Paris.³⁵ After 1669, the *Conservation* gradually widened its scope to include disputed letters of exchange, liquidations of partnerships, conflicts between merchants and carriers, and a multitude of disputes involving the exchange and theft of merchandise and deadlines for shipment.³⁶ Its power grew with the increasing success and influence of the Lyon money market, which was by 1709 one of the most important sources of credit in France. As widening circles of French and foreign merchants used the fairs to borrow money, their actions came within the power of the *Conservation* and its parent, the Consulate of Lyon.

The judicial powers the magistrates of Lyon derived from these criminal and civil courts represented important tools of coercion. Every individual in the city, from the lowest pickpocket to the highest merchant, fell into one judicial category or another, guaranteeing the Consulate at least some measure of social control.

In the streets, however, where coercion was most often a matter of muskets and bayonets, the city was pitifully ill equipped. Of the 200 armed *arquebusiers* who supposedly formed the heart of the police force, 150 served only during the annual election ceremony.³⁷ The 50 who actually patrolled did earn grudging respect in the streets (the poor nicknamed them the "garots" after their rather unfortunate habit of garrotting prisoners), but because of the need to rotate shifts only 25 were on duty at any single moment—hardly a formidable deterrent.³⁸ The only other force of note was the *Compagnie Franche* of the Lyon Regiment. Commanded by the Consulate in the absence (permanent under Louis XIV) of the royal military governors, the *Compagnie* guarded the city gates and patrolled the faubourgs. As with the *arquebusiers*, however, the 50 men of the *Compagnie* split into two shifts, and thus only 25 ever patrolled at one time.³⁹ While the city also technically possessed a watch of 50 men, it had become purely ornamental by 1709, a display for public ceremonies and processions.⁴⁰ The result was almost ludicrous. A total combined force of 50 men patrolled a city and its suburbs with a population approaching 110,000 at any given moment of the day or night.

Contemporaries were painfully aware of the inadequacy of the police. When, later in the century, there was a riot by silk workers, the intendant Pallu wrote, "they are presently the masters. They dictate to us and we are in no state not to submit to them. . . . Our lack of strength . . . makes the authority confided to us useless because we are not in a state to enforce the orders of the king."⁴¹ The woeful inadequacy of its armed force threw the Consulate into reliance on an even older institution for enforcement of its ordinances and decrees. In each of the city's thirty-five quarters, the Consulate appointed three officers—a captain, a lieutenant, and an ensign—who together with at least one *sergent* and one *caporal* per quarter composed the city's *penons*, its medieval bourgeois militia.⁴² Far from playing the purely ceremonial roles to which they would be reduced later in the eighteenth century, the *penons* served an important function during the reign of Louis XIV. They were the eyes and ears of the Consulate throughout the city. Whenever granaries had to be inspected, bakeries watched, censuses or registrations taken, or vagabonds and drifters reported, the job inevitably fell to the *penons*. The men who served as officers in this system were without fail the city's elite, and many merchants who refused election to the Consulate itself served

willingly in the *penons*.⁴³ The *prévôt des marchands* himself carried the title of *Capitaine Penon Colonel*, serving also as captain of his own quarter, and the Consulate took care to fill all vacancies in the system quickly.⁴⁴ Through the *penons* merchants, bankers, and notables in Lyon actively aided their colleagues in the Consulate in ruling and administering the city.

Even with its *penons* in working order, Lyon's meager "armed forces" could not hope to stem serious disorders. As far back as the sixteenth century, therefore, the city's magistrates had searched for ways to prevent such disorders without having to resort to force or the threat of judicial action. When sixteenth-century humanists urged them to the reform of charity, they discovered an entirely new form of social control.⁴⁵ The church of Lyon raised little objection to the municipal expropriation and reform of charitable institutions, perhaps because relations between the municipality and the clergy were so poor in this period.⁴⁶ Municipal control led to the application of mercantile efficiency in finance and operation so that by the early eighteenth century, charity in Lyon had been neatly centralized into the city's two great hospitals, the *Hôtel-Dieu* and the *Charité*.

Of the two, the *Hôtel-Dieu* was much the older, and while not as yet graced by the beauty and ample space of Soufflot's midcentury architecture, the hospital managed nonetheless to accommodate over 7,000 patients per year from 1711 to 1720.⁴⁷ Administered by a revolving committee of fourteen rectors (plus the Consulate, whose members served on a *de facto* basis), the *Hôtel-Dieu* employed over fifty servants as well as a fulltime baker, butcher, mason, and carpenter.⁴⁸ Among the wealthiest landlords in Lyon (rents on its various properties constituted almost one-fifth of its revenues), the hospital's chief function was to serve the sick, though it had other functions as well.⁴⁹ The saddest was the acceptance and housing of children abandoned at its doors or in the churches and streets of the city.⁵⁰

Here, as with other urban institutions in Lyon, Italian models played an important role. Florence in particular had possessed founding hospitals since the fourteenth century, accepting abandoned infants, baptising them and sending them to wetnurses in the countryside.⁵¹ Like its Florentine forbears, the *Hôtel-Dieu* kept meticulous records of their discovery and fate, also dispatching infants to wetnurses in the provinces, who were paid 7 livres, 10 sous per month for their services.⁵² Abandoned children were joined in the hospital

by those born to unwed mothers, since the *Hôtel-Dieu* served also as Lyon's chief center for illegitimate births. These children were treated exactly as were the others: baptised in the hospital and dispatched to the surrounding provinces for sustenance.⁵³ Mortality among all children sent to the provinces remained chronically high, and only 45 percent on the average lived to age 7, when they were handed over by the *Hôtel-Dieu* to Lyon's other great hospital, the *Cbarité*.⁵⁴ The rhythm of abandonments from month to month and year to year was a tragic but important barometer of the depth of misery within and without the city walls. It was to reach awful proportions during the crisis year.

The *Cbarité*, where those surviving the rigors of early childhood arrived, was itself an amalgam of various institutions—an orphanage for the very young, a hostel for the very old, a workhouse for the very poor. It represented the best and worst of poor relief in the Old Regime. On the one hand, again following the Italian model, male orphans were often apprenticed at the expense of the hospital to various trades in the city, while females were usually dowered, also at hospital expense.⁵⁵ The very old (the hospital could accommodate some 200 of them) who were too feeble or disabled to care for themselves were taken in, fed, and clothed, and no vacancy remained long unfilled.⁵⁶ Yet, the *Cbarité* also played a central role in the general seventeenth-century movement to "enclose" the poor, to isolate them from the rest of society and to give them work so that they might not cause trouble by begging or stealing.⁵⁷ Most of those "enclosed" in Lyon worked at the spinning and reeling of silk thread, which the hospital subcontracted to various merchants.⁵⁸ The number of poor imprisoned in this fashion appears to have remained fairly constant, from a population of 1,200 to 1,300 at the beginning of the seventeenth century to an average of approximately 1,300 from 1711 to 1713.⁵⁹ Beyond their number, information on who they were, their origin, or their fate is virtually nonexistent in the archives of Lyon.

Of course, the *Cbarité* of Lyon was not so well known for those it housed or imprisoned as for those it fed each Sunday through the institution of the *Aumône-Générale*. From its beginnings in 1534, the *Aumône* had endowed the city with an international reputation for generosity.⁶⁰ At 6:00 A.M. each Sunday during the long days, 7:00 A.M. during the short, those of the city's poor who had applied

for aid and been approved by the rectors would gather at five distribution points to hear their names called out and receive their twelve-pound loaves of "pain à tout," or rough black bread. Pilgrims and foreigners found deserving could receive the *passade*, a single loaf of bread and a sou, to continue on their way to their destination.⁶¹ Not surprisingly, such an institution acted from the beginning like an enormous magnet, and its history during the seventeenth century was one of proliferating restrictions and limitations.

Already before 1600, the *Aumône* had been forced to establish a seven-year residency requirement for the weekly distributions. In 1602, the resident poor in the faubourgs were permanently excluded from the rolls, while catechisms, suggested as early as 1615, were made mandatory in 1648 under the influence of the Company of the Holy Sacrament.⁶² Their effect was, of course, to exclude Protestants. Efforts to reduce fraud increased in the course of the century, though the very frequency of those efforts suggests a lack of success. In 1628 each person receiving the *aumône* was required to wear a red and blue cross sewn into his or her clothing to assure recognition.⁶³ When the practice of wives going in place of their husbands to receive the *aumône* became too widespread, the rectors ruled that husbands must be present.

Despite the restrictions, the number of recipients on the rolls continued to rise, and sometime during the century, the size of loaves was cut from twelve to six pounds. A reckoning of sorts came in 1694, when the rectors of the *Aumône* undertook a thorough investigation of recipients and found many and varied forms of fraud.⁶⁴ Some recipients were managing to get from one distribution point to another on the same day so as to double or even triple their assigned amount. Others used the names of deceased recipients which had not yet been stricken from the rolls. Yet others lied about the size of their families in order to receive a greater number of loaves. The investigation ended in a purge that reduced by 1,000 the number of loaves distributed each week.

Like the weekly distributions, the *passade* also experienced changes. When, during the famine of 1598, the *Aumône-Générale* was swamped by poor peasants from the countryside requesting the *passade*, it was suppressed altogether.⁶⁵ Though it had returned by 1632, it no longer consisted of a loaf and a sou, but rather of 3 sous alone.⁶⁶ Further, it could now be distributed only after the supplicant had been inter-

viewed personally by a single official, and even if granted, it was not dispensed until the recipient had been accompanied to a city gate by one of the six Swiss soldiers who guarded the hospital.⁶⁷ This procedure made it more difficult to leave by one gate and reenter by another to receive a second *passade* since the same official, and only that official, personally interviewed the individual supplicant. These measures ensured that the *passade* would seldom exceed 200 livres in any given year, an amount which still amounted to some 1,400 gifts.⁶⁸

Did all of these restrictions, investigations, and purges of the rolls reduce the number of recipients? If so, the *Aumône-Générale* continued to distribute considerable amounts of bread—an average of 4,600 six-pound loaves per week from 1711 to 1713, the only years for which a register of distributions has survived.⁶⁹ Each Thursday the rectors continued to receive supplicants seeking aid, to ask them (gently, if they followed the guidelines) about their work, their families, and their incomes. And each year the expenses of the *Aumône* continued to account for as much as 50 percent of the total expenses of the *Cbarité*.⁷⁰ Though its records are less complete than one would like for 1709, those that survive speak volumes of the heavy weight it bore during the crisis, and of the succor it provided.

Threats of coercion and offers of charity were often effective in stemming disorder, but neither dealt directly with its cause. Most disorders in the history of the city up to the Revolution could be traced directly to the price, quality, and availability of bread. Certainly, no other subject assumed greater importance for Lyon's magistrates, for whom the regulation of markets, milling, baking, and sale was a deadly serious matter requiring constant vigilance. Such vigilance seemed imperative given the city's peculiar geographic position. It remains, therefore, to explore the unusually fragile provisioning system that attracted so much official attention.

An Ungrateful Province

“**T**he Lyonnais is an ungrateful province which yields only wine. The Forez has only enough for itself, and the Beaujolais has even less than the Lyonnais.”¹ Such was the dismal assessment of Lyon’s surrounding provinces by one of the city’s *prévôts*, an assessment shared and corroborated by others. The Parisian *commis-saire de police*, Nicolas Delamarre, noted that “there is very little arable land in the Lyonnais,” and one of the province’s intendants, Lambert d’Herbigny, wrote in 1698, “the mountains of the Beaujolais are for the most part untilled, and there is very little to support livestock.”² The merchants who ruled Lyon had no better opinion of the province than their officials. Garden noted that few bothered to purchase estates in the region surrounding the city, while those lands they did acquire tended to be small and unimpressive, always the first assets liquidated in time of trouble.³

This lack of mercantile interest in the surrounding countryside, somewhat unusual for the bourgeois of early modern French cities, had three important consequences for the provisioning of the city. First, the merchants of Lyon seldom fled the city in time of trouble, be it food crisis or epidemic, since they possessed no country estates to which to flee. Second, they had no recourse to the sort of private grain supplies that such estates might otherwise have provided. This tended to leave them as dependent as their poorer neighbors on imported grain and helps to explain why they worked especially hard to keep the city provisioned in time of crisis. The third consequence of the barren and unattractive nature of the Lyonnais was its minor role in supplying grain. While grain and flour did arrive by land nearly every day, the total was always very small in proportion to water-borne arrivals. Though data are scarce, it seems that no

more than 28 to 30 *anées* of wheat ever entered the city's gates in any month.⁴ By contrast, in October of 1708 alone, 2,707 *anées* of wheat were unloaded on the docks of the Saône.⁵

Most of that grain came from Burgundy. As our *prévôt* noted, "complete liberty has always been accorded in drawing grain from Burgundy, which is the only place from which it can be obtained."⁶ Burgundy, with its valleys full of wheat and its navigable river system, was indeed the natural food source for Lyon. Such had been the case since the rise of the city to mercantile predominance in the sixteenth century.⁷ By the time of Louis XIV, Burgundian grain merchants such as Tremollet of Auxonne and Martin of Gray had founded family dynasties to control much of the city's provisioning system. Tremollet alone supplied all the needs of the *Aumône-Générale* from 1706 through 1708 with a volume of at least 12,000 *anées* worth some 120,000 livres.⁸ Martin of Gray sold some 2,000 *anées* in the single year of 1708 at a price of over 30,000 livres.⁹ Other merchant houses operated from as far away as Nancy and Besançon, but most concentrated their activities among the river towns on the Saône where they could more easily and cheaply store and transport supplies.¹⁰

This long-term dependence on a distant province produced several peculiarities in the marketing of grain in Lyon, the most visible of which was the relatively small role of Lyonnais merchants in feeding their own city. Garden mentions not a single grain merchant in his exhaustive study of the city's social structure, and in my own analysis of crisis mortality, only 5 individuals out of 5,029 for whom occupations were listed had any association with that trade.¹¹ At the Grenette, Lyon's central food market, only the old Halle behind St. Nizier was set aside for Lyonnais merchants selling grain. The remainder, stretching all the way across the Presqu'île, was given over mostly to Burgundians.¹² Of course, Lyonnais merchants did occasionally buy and sell grain, but there was no specialized community of grain merchants as there was, for example, in Paris.¹³ Individual Lyonnais merchants dabbled in the trade as a sideline, but it required a crisis such as that of 1709 to create a body of local grain merchants under official sanction.

While such a situation might seem unusual in a city so precariously dependent on outsiders, it was not at all peculiar in the grain-poor Mediterranean, where chronic instabilities in the price and transport of grain made that trade unattractive to traditionally con-

servative merchants.¹⁴ Here again, Italian models and patterns of behavior are useful for understanding Lyon and its merchants, since it was in Italy and with Italian merchants that the Lyonnais conducted much of their business. Raw silk for the city's primary industry came from there, and Italian merchants continued to exercise enormous influence on the city's economic and political life.¹⁵

That Italian merchants seldom if ever sold grain in Lyon was less a matter of mentality, however, than of cost. The Rhône proved a powerful obstacle to the transport of goods in bulk. It cost at least 7 livres to move a single *année* of grain up the river from Arles to Lyon, not counting the cost from any given Mediterranean port to Arles.¹⁶ There were, in addition, twenty-seven separate tolls on the river that totalled 4 livres per *année*. Thus, the cost of one *année* purchased in Arles for 12 livres nearly doubled by the time it reached the city, and once in Lyon, measurers, carriers, and granary costs had yet to be met. In contrast to the expenses on the Rhône, the total cost on the Saône from the river's northernmost port, Monthureux-sur-Saône, averaged only 4.3 livres per *année* including tolls.¹⁷ Cost, tradition, geography, and mercantile habits combined, therefore, to make Burgundy the overwhelming choice.

Unfortunately for the people of Lyon, Burgundy was not always a willing provider. It is true that the province's large landowners benefited most from the trade, whether they were great nobles, urban bourgeois who had purchased estates around towns and cities, or institutional landholders such as monasteries and hospitals. It is true also that these large landowners enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the most fertile land by 1709, but their predominance did not preclude a great number of small holders from working that land as renters and *censitaires*.¹⁸ These small holders persisted also in the less fertile areas of Bresse and Bugey in the south and in the mountainous regions to the west. They tended to be consumers of grain as often as producers, since they usually had to surrender their harvests immediately in September for taxes, rents, or debt payments. The loss of their grain in the autumn left them at the mercy of the local market for the remainder of the harvest year.¹⁹ Together with consumers of the towns, they constituted Lyon's major competitors for Burgundian grain.

The growing dependence of small holders on public markets exacerbated tensions between Burgundy and Lyon in the seventeenth

century, since any grain shipped to Lyon inevitably portended a lower supply and a higher price on local markets. Other factors, however, also contributed to friction between city and province. One was the expansion of vine cultivation. Opposed at every turn by the Estates of Burgundy throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, grapes displaced wheat at the very locations where high fertility and proximity to the river traditionally kept the latter's price low and supplies accessible.²⁰ The expansion of land purchases by the bourgeois of the towns also caused friction. As large holders, they were more likely to hold their grain off the market to gain a better price. They were more likely also to ignore local markets in favor of buyers such as the Lyonnais, who were willing to pay higher prices and buy larger quantities.²¹ Yet another source of friction were the Lyonnais themselves, who so depended on Burgundian grain that they attempted to monopolize it. Efforts by Burgundian grain merchants to supply the Rhône towns south of the city encountered stringent and stubborn resistance from the Consulate, and the Estates of Burgundy complained repeatedly of Lyonnais efforts to tax or simply to impound grain destined further downriver.²² Finally, both the Lyonnais and the Burgundians encountered an unwelcome competitor for the resources of the province late in the seventeenth century in the government and armies of the king.

Burdens imposed by the crown on the province were numerous. The *taille* in Burgundy increased by 36 percent from 1685 to 1695 alone.²³ Munitioners for royal armies in Flanders and Dauphiné purchased large volumes of Burgundian grain and regularly afflicted the province with the passage of troops. Royal monetary manipulations, devaluations, and paper inflation combined to starve the province of specie.²⁴ Paradoxically, a series of good harvests from 1705 through 1707 collided with these monetary problems to produce a serious depression in grain prices, forcing many small producers further into debt or off their land entirely.²⁵ Low prices also stifled any initiative on the part of large holders to move more land into cultivation.²⁶ As a result of these many and varied conjunctures in Burgundian agriculture, less land, not more, was committed year by year and season by season to grain cultivation, while much that was planted fell into fewer and fewer hands. In the resulting competition for food between the Lyonnais and the people of Burgundy, each brought its own advantages to bear. On one side the city had access to substan-

tial wealth, influence at court, and the desire for profit on the part of the region's large holders. On the other, the small farmers and townspeople of Burgundy had the advantage of proximity. They could at any time and with sufficient provocation rise up in a paroxysm of collective violence to keep their grain at home.²⁷

As if they did not have enough problems, the Burgundians also suffered from a dearth of protectors and influence at court in the latter reign of Louis XIV. The Condé family, which had virtually ruled the province in the seventeenth century, suffered in the early eighteenth from the debilities of its heirs. The death of the Grand Condé in 1686 left a relative void in the person of his weak and delicate son, Henri-Jules, who lived most of his life at Versailles and was to die there in April of 1709. His son, Louis, Duc de Bourbon-Condé, survived him by less than a year.²⁸ The province had also lost its greatest intendant, Claude Bouchu, in 1683. Bouchu had served nearly thirty years in his office. Armed with the local prestige of his family—his father served as first president of the *parlement* of Dijon from 1638 to 1653—he had helped guide the province away from rebellion during the Fronde toward loyalty under Louis XIV. Though Bouchu's son, Étienne-Jean, became a valued army intendant under Louis XIV, his duties carried him far from the province of his birth. He did not return until his retirement, in 1705, though he remained until his death in 1715.²⁹ The Estates of Burgundy, once among the most independent and powerful provincial assemblies in France, had gradually fallen victim to the increasing power of the crown. Though they continued to meet every three years, they were reduced for the most part to collecting whatever amount the king demanded of them. Their meeting in 1709 was to provide only a fleeting whiff of resistance to the various demands of the city.³⁰

Bereft of its traditional protectors, the province passed from intendant to intendant like an orphan child. In October 1705, the position was filled by one Anne Pinon, vicomte de Quincy. Pinon was by then well travelled, having served as intendant in Pau, Alençon, and Poitiers. He seems to have enjoyed virtually no links with his new province, and his prior experience prepared him little for the trials of a subsistence crisis.³¹ He and the Burgundians delivered into his hands were to suffer great tribulations in the years to come.

Despite these problems, Burgundian grain did, at least in normal times, travel constantly down the Saône to the city's market. There,

it entered into a regulatory apparatus designed, like so many such systems in the Old Regime, to keep supplies in the public eye. Unlike other cases, however, the attitude of regulators in Lyon remained more ambiguous with respect to transactions, especially those conducted outside the walls of the city. This is not altogether surprising in a city ruled by competing and often secretive merchants, but it does pose frustrating difficulties for the historian who wants to know exactly how its market functioned. With the exception of purchases by city-owned and -operated institutions, there are no documents and few regulations to explain exactly who purchased grain, how much they purchased, or where and for how long it was stored. We do have the regulations, but as will be seen, they seldom present a complete picture.

The regulatory apparatus primarily targeted three groups: merchants, millers, and bakers. Merchants dealing even occasionally in grain were required to register with the Consulate and were prohibited from forming any "association" since, in the context of the period, any pairing of "grain" merchants automatically constituted a conspiracy to hoard and speculate. They were prohibited, too, from storing grain outside the city and had to declare the location of all storage facilities within its walls.³² Non-Lyonnais merchants, by contrast, were barred by law from storing any grain within the city. Once their grain entered the walls, it had to be taken directly to the public market and could not be stored in any interim facility.³³ No merchant, whatever his origin, could legally purchase grain within five leagues distance of the city, a measure designed to ensure at least some competition on the market from local peasants.

Most of these same regulations applied equally to the bakers. Like the merchants, they were prohibited from buying within the five-league zone and from associating for the purpose of storage. They were additionally barred from storing more than one month's supply at a time and from buying on the public market before 3:00 P.M.³⁴

The market was itself the object of some regulation and supervision. Stretching from the church of Saint-Nizier across the peninsula to the Place des Cordeliers, it consisted, as we have seen, of three parts, reserved in turn to local merchants, "foreign" (Burgundian) merchants, and local peasants.³⁵ No one was allowed into the market before 9:00 A.M. save sellers, and regulations repeatedly attempted to forbid interference with wagons and boats on their way into the

city.³⁶ Interestingly, there were very few regulations regarding the protection of grain in storage, save for efforts by the city to convince boatmen to cover the grain to protect it from the elements.³⁷ Unfortunately, the regulations do not indicate the actual mechanisms of the market itself. From the very scanty sources available, it appears that the city's bakers bought much of their grain directly from Burgundian merchants, but there is no evidence that they were required to report these transactions.³⁸

Of course, the regulatory apparatus did not stop with storage and sale. Millers also felt its weight. At their mill boats anchored securely in the powerful currents of the Rhône, they were required to accept, mill, and return the grain the same day they received it for a fixed fee of 18 sous per *année*.³⁹ Grain and flour were to be weighed by a *commis des poids des farines* (at a fee of 10 deniers per *année*) to ensure against skimming by the miller, and express prohibitions barred him from mixing "earth, sand, chalk, or any other substance" with the flour to increase its weight.⁴⁰ To ensure enforcement each miller was required to paint a red line on the keel of his mill boat. If the line disappeared at night, officials could assume that some suspicious substance was aboard and investigate for possible violations.⁴¹

From the mill boats, the flour journeyed to the bakeries, accompanied by more regulations. The bakers of Lyon had by ordinance to bake three kinds of wheat bread: a white bread from which virtually all bran had been filtered, a bread with some bran, and a *pain à tout* from which no bran was filtered. The Consulate fixed the price of each type of bread on an ascending scale linked to the current price of grain on the market. Since the bakers probably did not purchase all or even most of their grain on that market, it was to their advantage to get the best price possible below that current in Lyon. Unfortunately for the bakers, it would not seem that they were always successful, since they appealed four times during the reign of Louis XIV to the Consulate to revise the price scale upward—in 1664, 1690, 1697, and 1707.⁴² Each time they pleaded an increase in costs due to difficulties in finding help or increases in the prices of wood and salt. Since bread prices were fixed according to weight, the bakers also were required to have their balances checked and stamped by a *bilancier* to insure against fraud.⁴³

Because city officials deemed the corps of bakers in Lyon insufficient to meet demand, they allowed and encouraged the presence of

forains. These were bakers from outside the city, who wheeled their carts and wagons into certain locations each morning to hawk bread baked outside the walls. Efforts to regulate them appear to have proved singularly unsuccessful. Despite rules confining them to certain "places" in Lyon, they insisted on setting up shop in the middle of narrow streets, in front of doors, and especially around the entrance of Saint-Nizier, where their yelling drove the canon priests to distraction.⁴⁴ They insisted too on using small hooks called *crocbets* instead of proper balances to weigh their bread, producing the sort of inaccuracies that inevitably "weighed" in their favor, and often sold rye bread or bread made from a mixture of wheat and rye flour, all contrary to a host of ordinances.⁴⁵ The bakers of Lyon complained ceaselessly about them, citing these abuses as well as their habit of selling bread at higher prices than those fixed by scale, but the consistent policy of tolerance and protection of them by the Consulate gives eloquent testimony to the need for their product.⁴⁶

In all its regulations, the Consulate tended to concentrate on the *price* of grain. Every Tuesday without fail, the magistrates received a detailed report on prices and activities the preceding Saturday at the Grenette, watching carefully lest this sensitive thermometer of social unrest rise too high.⁴⁷ They were joined in this activity by the people of Lyon, for whom the slightest rise in prices could be potentially disastrous.

Just exactly how disastrous a price rise could be is not easy to determine, because data on wages in early eighteenth-century Lyon are not plentiful. Some information can be gleaned from the city's hospitals, which hired men in the construction trades, especially masons, keeping detailed records of their wages. The silk workers, when they petitioned for an increase in wages in 1709, gave a good idea of their daily earnings.⁴⁸ If one computes the mean price of a given grain during the period (excluding, of course, the crisis year and those on either side of it) and utilizes the city's official fixed price scale for bread, it is possible to gain some idea of the proportion of a day's wages that went for bread.⁴⁹ A master mason, for example, earned 18 sous per working day, but since neither he nor any other artisan worked every day (there were at least eighty-two Sundays and feast days in a given year), his real wages for every day of the year were lower.⁵⁰ Even if he worked every possible working day, which is again unlikely given the haphazard nature of contracts and weather conditions, his real

earnings, spread over every day of the year, could have amounted to only 14 sous per day. If neither his wife nor his children worked, those 14 sous would have represented the family's total income.

As an example one can assume a relatively small family with two children in which the average daily consumption of bread was a minimal one and one-half pounds per person per day or a total of six pounds for the family.⁵¹ One can assume also a mean price of wheat (the most expensive grain) of 3 livres, 9 sous per *bicbet*.⁵² If the family ate the cheapest of the three wheat breads that bakers were required to make, the price of bread would have been 1 sou, 3 deniers per pound, or a total for our mason's family of 7 sous, 6 deniers per day.⁵³ Bread alone would, therefore, have accounted for over 53 percent of the real family income of 14 sous. If on the other hand, our mason bought rye on the market and had it baked at home, the cost would have been nearer 35 percent of his income.⁵⁴ Did he eat rye bread? Jean-Pierre Gutton, Lyon's foremost historian of the poor, argues in the affirmative, but without substantial documentation.⁵⁵ The hospitals used wheat for both those incarcerated and those receiving distributions from the *Aumône* on Sundays, and there is additional evidence that the Lyonnais much preferred wheat bread. When, during 1708, the intendant of Languedoc offered the city substantial quantities of rye, the *prévôt des marchands* rejected the offer, writing that "the artisans and people of this city do not eat rye. That kind of food to which they have never accustomed themselves would lead to disorder among them and could cause sickness."⁵⁶ It seems unlikely that the *prévôt* would have been incorrect in his appraisal of the dietary habits of his fellow Lyonnais, especially since the purchase of less expensive rye could have saved the city a considerable sum of money.⁵⁷

It remains nevertheless that rye, barley, and buckwheat were seldom absent from the Grenette. Their prices show up regularly on the weekly reports to the Consulate, and it seems obvious that someone must have bought them. Could it have been our mason's unskilled helper? He earned only 10 sous per working day, or a maximum of 7 sous, 3 deniers for each day of the year.⁵⁸ Given a family of four and the same circumstances as his master, wheat bread would have consumed 97 percent of his salary, leaving nothing for rent, wood, clothing, or any other essential. Even rye would have taken 59 percent. As for the silk workers, they maintained in 1709 that they earned at most 13 sous, 6 deniers per working day or at best 10 sous,

6 deniers per day over the year.⁵⁹ A taste for wheat bread would have cost them 71 percent of their earnings, rye only 43 percent. All these figures assume a small family. The cost in wheat of additional children would have been nearly 2 sous per day per child, the cost in rye just over one. It seems probable, therefore, that the poorest people of Lyon—the day laborers and peddlers who ranked with our mason's helper—ate rye bread or even barley or buckwheat bread despite the *prévôt's* statement. Furthermore, since the bakers were not constrained to make barley or buckwheat bread, these grains were almost certainly home treated. By contrast, more highly skilled artisans from silk workers and masons to tailors, metalworkers, and goldsmiths, likely chose between wheat and rye on the basis of the cost of the individual grain and the size of their families.⁶⁰

Whichever grain they consumed, the price remained the supreme factor in their calculations. If wheat climbed, rye would surely follow as those who ordinarily consumed wheat now switched to rye. Behind rye, in dominolike fashion, followed barley and buckwheat.⁶¹ Thus, the price of wheat carried significance all out of proportion to its consumption.

Inevitably, Lyon's fragile provisioning system occasionally collapsed, boosting all prices. When crops failed, not even the most resourceful Burgundian merchant could meet the city's demand. Lacking any organized community of local grain merchants, surrounded by a barren province in which its own citizens took little interest, the Consulate faced a host of unpleasant alternatives. Like their colleagues in other cities, the magistrates of Lyon generally turned first to repeated inspections and forced declarations of supplies with an eye to rooting out suspected hoarders and speculators. A few such villains could always be found, and Old Regime officials often grumbled that they had only scratched the surface of a giant conspiracy to starve the people and undermine proper authority in the name of usurious profit.⁶² Whether the cause was accidental or contrived, however, a high price was still a high price and a shortage still a shortage. Officials could thus either search out grain and buy it at inflated prices to sell to the population at a loss, or they could try to ride out the violence of bread riots and pillaging of bakeries and officials' houses that might follow. Through much of the sixteenth century, the Consulate of Lyon chose the second alternative. Though it occasionally tried subsidizing the purchases of private merchants, it mostly

gambled on the ability of the *Aumône-Générale* to act as a safety valve in warding off starvation. Only on a few occasions did the city choose to buy grain at municipal expense to feed a restive population.⁶³

In the seventeenth century, however, the first alternative gained favor, and the core of an urban institution began to take shape. In 1630 the Consulate chose "directors of abundance" and secured royal licenses permitting them to buy grain anywhere in the realm, an experiment that was repeated in 1636.⁶⁴ Each time, the city sold most of its grain on the public market in an effort to support a lower price, but each time too not all the grain was sold. In 1630 the city ended up selling its surplus to the bakers at a loss to keep it from spoiling in storage. After the crisis of 1636, the Consulate endeavored to force the bakers to buy assigned amounts of grain at prices higher than those on the market. Angry bakers appealed to the *Sénéchaussée*, which quashed the consular action.⁶⁵ In neither instance was it the intention of the magistrates to establish a permanent institution. That decision came in 1643 when the city suffered its third major crisis in only thirteen years.

This time the city established a *Chambre d'Abondance* with eight directors and a code of regulations.⁶⁶ Italian models were once again influential. The very name of the new institution recalled the "Abbondanzas" of Genoa and Florence, while its goals and function resembled those of the Venetian Grain Office and the *Annona* of Rome.⁶⁷ Italian cities had long suffered from supply shortages and a fiercely competitive market, and city governments in Italy regularly directed and coordinated the purchase and distribution of grain.⁶⁸ While the proximity of Burgundy and the influence of its merchants had made the creation of a strong and constant institution in Lyon unnecessary, Italian models proved useful when food crises began to strike the city with bewildering frequency in the seventeenth century.

The regulations of the new *Chambre d'Abondance* in Lyon made the purpose of the new institution clear: to maintain a constant reserve that could at any time be dumped on the market to drive down the price of grain. The directors were instructed to buy in provinces other than Burgundy and those close to the city in order to avoid competition with Lyonnais and Burgundian merchants. The Consulate promised additionally to reimburse the directors for any losses incurred in the purchase, transport, or sale of grain.⁶⁹ In practice, merchants were named as directors under the occasional supervision

of an *échevin*. During a crisis, individual directors travelled to cities such as Marseilles, Arles, and Tarasçon in the south or Dijon, Nancy, and Besançon in the north, where they dealt directly with local grain merchants and boatmen in the city's behalf. Service as a director required a healthy personal credit, since purchases were made by the individuals on their own accounts or as correspondents with their colleagues in Lyon. Only occasionally during a crisis or afterwards did directors charge their expenses to the account of the treasurer, who then reimbursed himself from institutional revenues such as those received from sales to the bakers. Since those receipts seldom matched outlays, the treasurer ended by charging the city.⁷⁰ In this way, the city managed to make efficient use of the substantial credit of its merchant elite.

Unfortunately, neither good credit nor the best of intentions were sufficient in the face of several crippling difficulties. First and foremost among these was the problem of storage. Even in dry, well-ventilated granaries, a large volume of grain could be expected to mildew and spoil within two years.⁷¹ Lacking space of its own, the new *Chambre d'Abondance* was forced to rent space, mostly in the granaries of various religious establishments scattered throughout the city. The lack of any central urban granary boosted costs, and the *Abondance* lacked the resources to have its grain regularly shifted in order to keep it dry.⁷² As a result, the institution could not maintain any kind of steady reserve, and found itself repeatedly forced to sell old grain of indifferent quality to the bakers at a substantial loss.

A second problem involved the cost of transportation. If, as instructed, the directors restricted themselves to purchases outside the usual grain procurement areas, they faced the considerable cost of transporting that grain over great distances. The three most likely target provinces were Lorraine to the north and Languedoc and Provence to the south. Transportation from Lorraine entailed carting by wagon over abysmal roads to the northern port towns of the Saône and river transport from there to Lyon. Alone, land transport from Nancy to Monthureux-sur-Saône cost 3 livres per *année* in a good year.⁷³ The cost from Monthureux to Lyon, as seen above, added another 4.3 livres per *année* for a total from Nancy to Lyon of 6 livres per *année*. If the *Abondance* managed to get an average price in Lorraine (12 livres per *année* from 1700 to 1709), transport alone increased that price by 50 percent. Transport on the Rhône from Languedoc

and Provence was even more expensive, and all these figures reflected the relatively low cost of grain during a normal year. In a bad year, when the price of the grain skyrocketed and the institution found itself trying to transport large quantities in poor weather, all costs could easily rise out of sight.

These difficulties proved insurmountable through most of the seventeenth century, and the *Chambre d'Abondance* became at best an occasional institution, buying quantities too small to make a difference in a bad year and too large to store during a good year. The crisis of 1653 was typical. The directors bought a great deal of grain at high prices, only to find themselves saddled with a large surplus once the crisis had ended. Efforts to force the bakers to buy the surplus at a price substantially higher than the market price were successful, but resulted in lingering high bread prices and a serious bread riot.⁷⁴ The irony that the *Abondance* had accomplished precisely what it was designed to prevent was not lost on the Consulate, and no new directors were named for over fourteen years. When the institution was revived in 1667, it appears to have acted as little more than a source of income for its directors, who received interest at 5 percent on their advances for its support.⁷⁵ Caught with virtually no reserves again in the awful famine of 1693, the *Chambre d'Abondance* was again reorganized the following year by a Consulate determined to make a success of it.⁷⁶

The stated goal had not changed: to purchase reserves during years of plenty at relatively low prices that could be utilized in a bad year to moderate bread prices. Difficulties with storage were alleviated somewhat by the purchase in 1672 and 1676 of two large, well-ventilated houses in the parish of Saint-Paul along the Saône for use as permanent granaries.⁷⁷ Grain might still rot, but at least the costs of rental and transportation would be reduced as a result of the reduction in the number of granaries and their proximity to the Saône. To deal with the high cost of transportation, the Consulate now committed a constant balance of 120,000 livres to the accounts of the institution and placed a senior *échevin* permanently at the head of an eleven-member board of directors. The institution was directed henceforth to maintain a steady reserve of 10,000 *anées* of grain, roughly enough to supply the city for six weeks. With one brief lacuna, such a reserve was maintained for seven years. After 1700, however, supplies began to slide again, and by 1707 there were barely 1,000 *anées* in storage.⁷⁸

It would not seem from the brief history outlined thus far that the institution of the *Cbambre d'Abondance* boded well for the crisis year of 1709. Yet, despite its hit-and-miss past, the *Abondance* had managed to achieve a certain institutional permanence. Its directors met regularly in a room constructed specifically for them in the Hôtel de Ville under the guidance of an *échevin*.⁷⁹ They operated with a substantial budget, had access to two relatively large granaries, and already enjoyed a long if not altogether successful experience at buying and moving significant quantities of grain over large distances. The *Abondance* represented a structure in place, an institution that, given sufficient resources and impetus, could play an important role in supplying the city during the crisis year.

Together with their tools of coercion and charity, these instruments of sustenance constituted the weapons with which the magistrates of Lyon hoped to fell the dark forces of violence and disorder. Few other magistrates in France had access to so many administrative mechanisms of control, or to an economy as vital and wealthy as that of Lyon. Even the Lyonnais, however, found all their resources taxed to the limit during the difficult last years of the Sun King's reign. The desultory War of the Spanish Succession wrought misery and instability throughout the realm, creating havoc in royal finances, and stretching France's primitive network of credit and banking dangerously thin.

Because Lyon became a center of French credit and banking during the reign of Louis XIV and because the economy of the city depended heavily on the credit system of the four seasonal fairs, the financial condition of the crown was of vital importance both to the city's merchant bankers and to the artisans they employed. While the financial crisis that was to swamp Lyon in 1709 was largely unrelated in its causes to the famine of the same year, the conjuncture of the two proved disastrous for the city and its people. Having explored the structures of order in Lyon, it remains, therefore, to explore the structures of disorder at Versailles.

Time of Troubles

On or about the afternoon of 6 May 1708, Nicolas Desmaretz, controller general of finances, invited Samuel Bernard, the richest and most powerful banker in France, to Marly for dinner.¹ The controller general's avowed purpose was to squeeze more money from Bernard for the endless demands of the war. With the sort of timing that bespoke precision planning, Louis XIV happened by the pavillion where the two men were in conference, spoke to Bernard, and to the latter's delight and surprise, invited him on a tour of the gardens. According to the king's most famous contemporary chronicler, Saint-Simon, "during the entire walk the king spoke only to him, took him everywhere and showed him everything, with the charm which he knew so well how to assume when he had some object in view." Upon his return Bernard was "so delighted that . . . he said he would prefer ruin rather than leave in difficulties a prince who had shown him so much honor." He pledged an additional 900,000 livres to the crown.² Saint-Simon marvelled that the great king should "so prostitute himself" as to show such favor to a mere "homme d'affaires," a former Protestant who derived much of his credit from other Protestants who had fled the realm in 1685.

Had Saint-Simon been as well informed about royal policy as he wished, he would not have been so taken aback. The purpose of the tour was not, in fact, to squeeze additional funds from a resistant banker. In all his dealings with the crown both before and after 1709, Samuel Bernard virtually never resisted. The tour was actually a reward rather than an entreaty, a publicity stunt rather than a public admission of need, and it was certainly not an isolated incident. It constituted a small but important link in a long chain of events stretching back to the 1690s and the War of the League of Augsburg.

It was at that time that the crown first began the risky and laborious task of transferring the burden of a rising royal debt away from the nearly bankrupt *financiers* within the framework of the government to such great merchant bankers as Bernard outside it.³ This transferral was to have disastrous results for the city of Lyon in 1709. To grasp the nature of the crisis, it is vital to understand the process by which the Lyonnais were dragged into the sinkhole of royal indebtedness. That process resulted from the very nature of the royal financial system.

As every royal minister recognized to his dismay, France possessed no true central treasury. *Le Trésor* existed only as an optimistic abstraction in the official correspondence, referring more to the collective assets of the monarchy than to any organized central exchequer for processing them. Like an enormous coral reef, the royal financial machine resulted from accretions over time, from countless improvisations by French kings dating back to the fourteenth century.⁴ It counted layer upon layer of officials, each one charged with the collection and disbursement of funds, each with his own small royal treasury and his own accounts. Tax farmers at various levels collected the indirect taxes, the *aides*, the *octrois*, and the *gabelles*. Receivers-general amassed the *taille* and the *capitation*. *Financiers*, in their official guise of *traitants*, subcontracted the sale of royal offices, honors, exemptions, annuities, increased *gages*, and whatever else an inventive minister might conceive to increase revenue. When money was to be spent, orders went to a given official to pay, and that official then issued an *assignation* allotting revenue to the payee. When, in the seventeenth century, expenditures rapidly outdistanced revenues, the crown found it expedient to borrow from its own officials at interest in anticipation of those revenues. Thus, a growing mountain of *assignations* and promissory notes from a variety of official sources rapidly became a dreary administrative burden for those poor souls charged with the care of the king's accounts. In time of war, when the demand for funds escalated far beyond collected or expected revenues, this volume of paper grew to alarming proportions, reducing the value of a normally shaky royal credit and increasing the cost of borrowed money. The longer the war lasted, the worse the problem.

The need to find funds to support the War of the League of Augsburg and that of the Spanish Succession resulted in the gradual emer-

gence of a twofold strategy, both portions of which affected Lyon in 1709. The first part of this strategy involved shifting the debt burden from *financiers* to bankers; the second, the creation of paper money, chiefly in the form of *billets de monnaie*, or mint bills, with which the crown hoped by turns to bribe and coerce both old and new holders of its debt.⁵ The main architects of this strategy were Michel Chamillart, controller general of finances since 1699 and secretary of state for war since 1701, and Nicolas Desmaretz, nephew and heir to the financial acuity of Jean-Baptiste Colbert.⁶ Some historians have suspected Desmaretz of guiding much of royal policy during this period, citing Chamillart's preoccupation with his war duties and his supposed incapacity and incompetence.⁷ Certainly Chamillart seems to have delegated the supervision over monetary manipulations and relations with the various bankers to Desmaretz, and it is true that the latter attended the Council of Commerce, whose deputies represented and spoke for the men of affairs upon whom the crown was increasingly dependent.⁸ Yet Chamillart's correspondence demonstrates a continued, close supervision of affairs and a tendency occasionally to act in opposition to his director of finances. It would be unwise, therefore, to conclude categorically that Desmaretz conducted royal policy from the shadows. The ministerial environment in the last years of the reign tended to be remarkably collegial as crisis after crisis and defeat after defeat brought on the sorts of shared miseries that draw any group together.⁹ Until 1708, it seems likely that Chamillart and Desmaretz worked in tandem.

The decision to turn to the great bankers for help in funding the war followed logically from the old royal habit of depending on their expertise in exchange rates to move money to the king's armies in foreign countries. Paradoxically, the Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 advanced this effort by dispersing French Protestant bankers into Switzerland, Germany, and the United Provinces. This allowed men such as Bernard, who conveniently renounced his Protestantism in 1685, to profit from his connections with these émigré Protestant banking houses.¹⁰ The crown attracted Bernard, the Hogguer brothers, and others with the promise of enormous profits and the sort of prestige that derived from such incidents as the tour of Marly. For a man like Samuel Bernard, the son of a court painter, who had risen to become first a merchant of silks and fine clothing and then a rich banker, the status afforded by such actions together with the

promise of rich returns proved irresistible.¹¹ Profits in lending to the crown derived from a complex combination of sources, including money made on exchange rates, profits from currency devaluations, and commissions. While the effective return on investment that the bankers might obtain varied from transaction to transaction, it seems that Bernard and his colleagues rarely amassed less than 25 percent on their royal loans and often collected even more.¹² Of course, the risk was equal to the reward. In return for supplying hard currency to the crown which they themselves borrowed at interest, the royal bankers received royal paper in the form of *assignments*, *rentes*, and *billets* of every type and description.¹³ To remain solvent, they had to depend on the desperate need by an increasingly insolvent crown to maintain their own credit. They calculated that the king's ministers could not afford to let them default lest the government itself lose all means of continuing the war. For the crown, the bankers represented the only possible opportunity for transforming increasingly worthless royal paper into the only kind of paper with real value—the private letter of exchange.

For the crown, the world of the private letter of exchange represented a largely alien set of mentalities. Merchants and bankers in the Old Regime lived by the "culte de la parole." As Raymond Moulins, merchant of Lyon, wrote to his son, "I live by one inviolate law, to be direct, frank, and sincere, and I am persuaded that all those who know me will not think me otherwise."¹⁴ Moulins and others prospered on the basis of their reputations and built those reputations upon a stern belief in moderation and prudence. They liked to have quick access to their money and felt uneasy when it was tied up in long-term transactions. Their credit was no less than a synonym for their personal prestige. Melchior Philibert, one of Lyon's richest and most highly respected merchants, was able to demand a lower interest rate on his letters of exchange simply because of the impeccability of his reputation.¹⁵

As far as most Lyonnais merchants were concerned, the role of the crown in commerce was to "protect the liberty of commerce" by which they inevitably meant their commerce.¹⁶ The merchants of Lyon saw no inconsistency in battling against the mercantile privileges of other cities while defending their own. While they might hope that the crown would keep trade routes open, internal tolls low, and currency manipulations to a minimum, such hopes were futile

during the latter reign of Louis XIV.¹⁷ For its part, the royal government so lacked these mercantile virtues of regularity, constancy, and stability that their great attraction to His Majesty's ministers is hardly surprising.

Fortunately for the royal government and the bankers, regularity, constancy, and stability were the hallmarks of the Lyon money market where Samuel Bernard and his colleagues increasingly conducted their affairs. The four seasonal fairs of Lyon dated back to 1420, but had by the eighteenth century lost all resemblance to fairs in the medieval or Renaissance sense.¹⁸ Products of all kinds no longer flooded the city every three months as they had in the past. While the city maintained the pretense of seasonal fairs beginning in January, May, August, and November, these fairs had in fact become ceremonial shells, entirely superseded by the Payments, or settlements of debts, which historically concluded them. Thus, the Fair of Kings, beginning officially in January, concluded with the more important Payment of Kings in March. The Easter Fair in May gave way to the Easter Payment in June, the August Fair to the August Payment in September, and the Fair of All-Saints in November to the Payment of Saints in December.¹⁹ The regularity supplied by the three-month interval between Payments, in conjunction with the stability in their structure, offered a near-perfect framework for making and paying loans.

Each Payment period of four weeks began with a six-day period of *acceptations* in which letters were presented by holders to their issuers for payment. On the third day of the first week, the rates of exchange were fixed by a committee of six merchants (two from each "nation": France, Italy, and Germany, though the last were inevitably Swiss) chaired by Lyon's *prévôt des marchands*. The second week began a two-week *virement des parties*, involving the construction of complex balance sheets by which loans might be transferred between debtors and lenders without recourse to any actual exchange of coin. The fourth and last week witnessed the *écritures* or writing of new loans. Outstanding debts were often rescheduled at interest during this last period to the next Payment, though any merchant had the right after any Payment to demand his due in coin. No coin could be exchanged legally, however, until the first three days of the month following the Payment. Such a delay allowed debtors the time to arrange the difficult and precarious transport of specie.

Should any problems arise, creditors had recourse to Lyon's powerful *Conservation*, which helped to ensure the reliability of the market.²⁰ Lyon's silk merchants, among others, depended on the Payments to finance all their operations. The market not only supplied the coin with which they paid their subcontracting silk workers every Saturday, but also the raw silk itself, which they purchased on credit from Italian merchants. The Consulate always worked assiduously to court these Italian merchants in order to maintain their attendance in person or by proxy at the Payments. Consequently, both the great merchants and the thousands of silk workers who anchored the city's economy depended directly on the constancy and regularity of these Payments for income and materials.²¹

Until the latter reign of Louis XIV, the Payments of Lyon enjoyed a largely regional importance.²² Lyon had long ceased to be the great Renaissance center of European money markets, and the Genoese in particular had transferred their operations elsewhere. The complex mechanisms of balance sheets and strict stages in payment were far too cumbersome to bear too great a load of debt. Yet, this relatively small money market soon attracted the attention of Samuel Bernard and his colleagues in Paris. That it did is hardly surprising. Not only were the Payments regular, but their geography was perfect. The Revocation of the Edict of Nantes in 1685 had driven a large number of Protestant merchants up the Rhône from Lyon to Geneva, where many established citizenship and then returned to Lyon as Genevan citizens.²³ Because of past efforts to place the success of the fairs above religious conflicts, Genevan citizens enjoyed legal protection in Lyon and found the Payments an excellent means of transferring capital between the two cities. The occasional presence there of wealthy Italian merchants and the reputation of the Payments as secure vehicles of credit also made them attractive, given the persistent need by the royal bankers of new funds to feed the voracious appetite of the crown. In addition, the royal paper with which Bernard and his colleagues were inundated by the royal government could be more easily negotiated in a French money market than in a foreign one, and the relatively small scale of the Lyon market made it potentially more submissive to the pressures and lures offered by the royal bankers.

The merchants from whom Bernard, the Hogguer brothers, and other bankers to the crown borrowed this money recognized the risks, and some of them gradually came to insist on some form of

security for their loans. Bernard in particular supplied such security in the form of mint bills, the first paper currency ever issued in France, and the second part of Chamillart's and Desmaretz's improvised strategy to sustain royal solvency.

As was the case with the shifting of the debt burden to the bankers, so too the crown came to realize the utility of paper currency only gradually. Mint bills were at first only a byproduct of another tried and true revenue source, the manipulation of the coinage. The crown officially changed the value of its coin over forty times from 1686 to 1709, generally by means of a simple *arrêt*.²⁴ It actually reminted the coinage five times during this period (in 1689, 1693, 1701, 1704, and 1709), each time requiring that all old coin be surrendered to the royal mints. Occasionally, if a delay in exchange of new coin for old was anticipated at an individual mint, a receipt would be issued by the mint director promising reimbursement within a short time. In October 1701, citing a general shortage of coin, the crown elected to systematize these receipts into credit instruments at an interest rate of 4 percent. By December 1703, 6.7 million livres in these *billets de monnaie*, or mint bills, had passed into circulation. The crown's relative consistency in reimbursing these bills, as well as the modest number in circulation, made them popular enough to convince Chamillart and Desmaretz of their potential. The reminting of 1704 witnessed an enormous increase in the number of bills in circulation.²⁵

These new bills, the exchange of which was soon confined to Paris, carried an interest rate of 7.5 percent. Unfortunately, the defeat of the French armies at Hochstedt in August 1704 so shook mercantile confidence in the royal government that there was a rush to exchange the bills for coin. Taken by surprise and finding itself short, the crown was forced to adjourn payment on the bills to 1708 and attempted to lighten the blow by raising the interest rate to 10 percent. This subterfuge failed to conceal the default, and the value of the bills fell precipitously. Desmaretz and Chamillart were now forced to launch what became a four-year campaign to restore their value, issuing new bills at various rates of interest, forbidding discounting, and requiring that they be used as one-quarter of all payments on letters of exchange in Paris. As a result of these efforts there were, by the end of 1706, over 173,000,000 livres of mint bills in circulation, and Paris merchants grumbled at having to bear the total burden of their support.²⁶

For merchants outside the capital, mint bills simply constituted another low-value royal credit instrument to trade, discount, or speculate upon. That Parisian merchants had now to count the bills as a substantial portion of their assets merely lowered the value of Parisian letters as credit instruments in other cities.²⁷ The Parisians demanded the diffusion of the forced use of bills in payments to other cities, including Lyon, where it was rumored that speculation in them was particularly lively.

Their argument was given powerful impetus in 1706 by the mounting troubles of one of the kingdom's wealthiest merchant houses.²⁸ The Hogguer brothers, Daniel, Marx Friedrich, and Johanne Jacob, had supplied some 17,600,000 livres in coin to the crown in return for a variety of privileges, including the right to mint coins in Strasbourg. They had been reimbursed 31,352,000 livres, an effective interest rate of 82 percent, but they had borrowed most of their money at Lyon where the mint bills with which the crown paid them were nonnegotiable. Finding themselves unable to meet their obligations, they were forced to ask for several extensions of the Payments of Lyon while they attempted to cash their mint bills. With the value of the bills falling and the crown unable to redeem them, the Hogguers suffered losses of between 30 and 60 percent on their bills. In addition, the very act of such desperate transactions helped to doom their efforts, since it quickly became apparent to all their creditors that most of their assets were tied up in increasingly worthless mint bills. The value of their paper began to fall until, by 1708, letters from the Hogguers were worth no more than the mint bills that backed them.

Chamillart was sympathetic to the complaints of Parisian merchants, worried by the mounting collapse of the Hogguers, and angered at Lyonnais merchants whom he suspected of profiteering. Accordingly, on 12 April 1707, he drafted a declaration to require use of the bills as a proportion of all exchanges throughout the realm.²⁹ He could not, alas, have been prepared for the storm that swept over him. Commerce slowed to a crawl as hard currency, never a plentiful commodity in the Old Regime, began to disappear altogether, its holders hoarding it for fear of amassing royal paper in its place. The merchants of Lyon wrote through their Chamber of Commerce that no coin was available to pay the silk workers and that as many as 20,000 could be unemployed within a few weeks. They warned that

no foreign merchant would accept the mint bills in payment of any letter at the fairs and that the whole money market might well collapse. "We must tell you," they concluded, "that the shops of our silk merchants and all others are closed, that no one is bringing in any merchandise and that all of our merchants have written to all their correspondents to say that they have finished with all commerce."³⁰ Chastened by such reactions, Chamillart was forced to withdraw the declaration the following month and again to restrict the official circulation of mint bills to Paris.³¹

Careful study of the relevant documents shows the extent to which Chamillart acted alone. Desmaretz, in a memoir on mint bills dated 3 May 1706, had specifically opposed their imposition on Lyon, fearing for the stability of the Payments.³² Samuel Bernard, given an advance look at the proposed declaration, wrote in vehement opposition on 11 March 1707. "Very far from doing the treasury any good," he wrote, "this is going to ruin everything. We can only find coin here [Paris] in exchange for letters on the provinces; when forced to pay in mint bills, we will not find one denier in coin." He warned that "you can no longer count on my ability to render service to you after such a blow."³³ Not coincidentally, of course, such a declaration might have served to save the Hogguers from ruin. Bernard was unlikely to support a move that would benefit his only serious competition. It is probable, however, that his concern for the survival of his credit in the provinces and especially in Lyon played the more important role in his thinking. Certainly, Bernard was himself in no immediate danger of default. He owed his strong position to the complex methods by which he borrowed money, methods that did, however, put him at great long-term risk. His operations came increasingly to dominate the Lyon Payments, making his potential default a threat to the economy of the whole city. It is important, therefore, to explore briefly how and from whom Samuel Bernard borrowed the money to keep the armies of Louis XIV in the field.

Samuel Bernard had by 1704 nearly monopolized the war financing of the French crown. Only the Hogguers, charged with the supply of French troops in Italy, represented any competition. Luethy estimates Bernard's monthly loans to the crown in 1704 alone at 35.7 million livres and his monthly reimbursements at 41.4 million, an effective interest rate of 16 percent per month.³⁴ To support such a mammoth volume, Bernard tapped into money markets in Paris, Amster-

dam, Geneva, and Lyon. Like the Hogguers he received much of his payment in mint bills, but unlike his less fortunate competitors, his cash flow from other sources was sufficient to assure payment in Lyon, at least for a time. At the end of 1706, in order better to tap resources in Geneva, Bernard took as his partner a Genevan merchant named Jean Nicolas, who was in turn a close associate of one of Geneva's richest merchant bankers, Jean-Antoine Lullin.³⁵ Lullin enjoyed extensive operations in Turin and had access there to a large volume of Italian *piastres*, the sort of hard currency of which Bernard was in chronic need. Lullin also enjoyed a reputation for extracting every sou possible in negotiations with borrowers.³⁶ Using the Lyon Payments, Bernard and Nicolas borrowed from Lyonnais and Genevan merchants through a correspondent in Lyon named Bertrand Castan. They employed two methods. One was simply to borrow coin in exchange for their letters at an average interest rate of 3 to 4 percent per Payment (an effective annual rate of 12 to 16 percent).³⁷ Such loans were unsecured. The lender had only the letters of Bernard and Nicolas on Castan promising repayment in coin at the next Payment. In practice, when that Payment arrived, these loans generally were rescheduled to the next Payment with Bernard and Nicolas either paying the interest or borrowing a larger amount with new letters from one set of creditors to pay another. Of course, lenders did not necessarily hold these letters but often traded them or themselves borrowed from other merchants in order to lend to Bernard and Nicolas. With each Payment, the circle of merchants involved in the debt of Bernard and Nicolas grew ever larger.

The other method, called the "quart au-delà," secured loans with mint bills.³⁸ This was the method by which most of the Genevan loans were made, again using the Lyon Payments as a base. Luethy, who successfully deciphered the "quart au-delà," has supplied an example that may prove instructive.³⁹ If Bernard and Nicolas wished to borrow 45,000 livres in coin from Lullin, they would give Lullin, in exchange for the coin to be delivered elsewhere, 45,000 livres in letters of exchange on Castan and 15,000 additional livres in mint bills, an effective interest rate of 33 percent (making the "quart" into a third). Technically they would owe Lullin 60,000 livres in coin at the next Payment, at which time he would hand over both letters and bills. At that next Payment, lacking the coin, Bernard and Nicolas would reschedule the loan. Lullin would return to them the

45,000 livres in letters, but keep the 15,000 in mint bills as securities on repayment of the original loan. They in turn would give Lullin another 60,000 livres in letters and another 20,000 livres in mint bills. Lullin's total security on loans to Bernard and Nicolas would now amount to 35,000 livres in mint bills. Even if Bernard and Nicolas defaulted on the 60,000 in letters, Lullin could hope to cash the mint bills. At the next Payment, Bernard and Nicolas would owe 80,000 livres to Lullin. They would again "roll over" the loan, giving Lullin 80,000 livres in new letters and an additional 26,666 livres in mint bills. At the following Payment, owing a total of 106,666 livres, they would render that amount in letters plus 35,555 livres more in mint bills. After one year, Lullin would hold 97,222 livres in mint bills and 106,666 livres in letters of exchange on an original cash loan of only 45,000 livres. Since mint bills carried an effective interest rate by 1707 of 4.3 percent, their total value would now be 101,422 livres. Even assuming a loss of 50 percent due to the large volume and declining value of bills in circulation, Lullin could be assured of over 50,000 livres in coin on his mint bills alone.

Thus, in a worst-case scenario, even if Bernard and Nicolas defaulted on their letters and the value of royal mint bills tumbled by half, Lullin could hope to recover his original 45,000 livres and make a 5,000-livre profit, or 11 percent in one year's time. If, however, Bernard and Nicolas did not default, Lullin stood to make a fabulous profit at the extraordinary rate of 132 percent on the year. Bernard could afford to make such deals because, even as early as 1704, his effective monthly gain from the crown of 16 percent gave him an annual profit of 192 percent on his loans.⁴⁰ This method also supplied him with an excellent way to use the mint bills that the crown was showering upon him.

The above example helps to explain the mechanics of Bernard's borrowing, but in no way reflects the volume. As Bernard and Nicolas rescheduled and reshuffled their loans from Payment to Payment in the years from 1704 to 1709, merchant after merchant found himself investing in their debt, either directly or indirectly. There are no statistics on the total volume of transactions at Lyon for a given Payment, but it seems certain that the 20 to 30 million livres owed and reborrowed by Bernard and Nicolas in the Payments leading up to those of 1709 constituted a very large proportion of the total volume. Luethy notes that that volume had become so great by 1708

that the old methods of listing and shifting loans among merchants, the *virement des parties*, were no longer adequate; better simply to reschedule the loans than to sort them out for repayment.⁴¹

As long as Bernard continued to have influence at court, influence that his tour of Marly was designed to display, merchants could feel assured of his continued solvency. Like all credit, that of Samuel Bernard was built on the intangibles of reputation and confidence. It could disappear all too quickly with a fractured promise or a minister's slight. Bernard himself was fully aware of the risks and never tired of warning the crown of the consequences of a default. As early as August 1704, he wrote that "from the moment I fail to pay, my calamity will overwhelm an infinity of others causing more than forty bankruptcies immediately throughout the realm and absorbing whatever credit remains for the state and several individuals."⁴² In case his own protestations failed to suffice, his creditors also made the situation clear to the crown. The Lyonnais merchant banker Antoine Saladin wrote in July 1705 that "the health of the State depends on the manner in which Bernard's credit is sustained since that credit influences heavily that of other merchants in the realm."⁴³

Together, the rising tide of mint bills and letters on Bernard and Nicolas threatened to wash the city of Lyon into a sea of royal debt. As unwelcome as they were, however, these new problems only capped a whole series of crises and disasters that had plagued the city's economy since 1700. The war itself threatened constantly to cut off the vital flow of raw silk from Italy, and Lyon's merchants worked feverishly through the Consulate and the Chamber of Commerce to maintain open trade routes through otherwise hostile kingdoms such as the duchy of Savoy.⁴⁴ They worked also to quash efforts by other cities on the Saône and the Rhône to increase the *octrois* and *droits*, efforts that could force suicidal price increases on products and materials essential to the city.⁴⁵ In fighting these various and sundry battles, the city made full use of its allies at court. These men played a vital role in securing the city's interests and protecting its privileges.

In pressing their case on these and other issues at Versailles, the Lyonnais depended largely on the court connections and loyalty of three men. The first was the city's deputy to the royal Council of Commerce, Jean Anisson, who seldom wavered in his efforts on Lyon's behalf, meeting constantly with Chamillart and Desmaretz to present the city's case and defend its interests.⁴⁶ Anisson was the

second son of Laurent Anisson, *marchand libraire* of Lyon. He had already served as director of the *Imprimerie Royale* in Paris and had worked with the Farmers General on tariff problems. He was to serve the city on the Council until 1722.

The second man was Charles Trudaine, royal intendant of the Lyonnais. Saint-Simon described him as "hard, exact, without tact or politesse, but molded in honor and justice, and universally recognized as such."⁴⁷ Trudaine enjoyed some connections at court, since his sister was the remarkably astute and ambitious wife of Daniel François, comte de Voysin, later minister of war and close friend to the king's powerful wife, Madame de Maintenon.⁴⁸ The Lyonnais was Trudaine's first intendency. By 1708 he had served almost five years, taking part in the city's ceremonies, attending meetings of its Chamber of Commerce, and growing year by year more sympathetic to its plight. As Lyon's economic and financial health became increasingly interlinked with that of the crown, Trudaine found himself defending the city under the guise of reporting its activities. Both Chamillart and Desmaretz were soon to remark on his apparent loss of objectivity.

More important than either of these two men, however, was the third, Lyon's patron at Versailles, François de Neufville, Maréchal Duc de Villeroy, royal governor of the Lyonnais. Villeroy was as close a friend to Louis XIV as the king could permit a man to be. The two had played together as boys when Villeroy's father served as the young king's governor, and Villeroy was the only courtier ever to merit the term "favorite" from the king.⁴⁹ They remained close after Louis XIV took the reins of personal power, and the king honored his old friend with the command of several armies from 1695 through 1706. Unfortunately, Villeroy was a better courtier than a general, and his incompetence in the field sometimes reached mind-boggling proportions. He derived infamy from his capture by the enemy at Cremona in 1702, after which his army, once delivered of its inept general, had won a great victory.⁵⁰ When Louis XIV persisted in his loyalty to his friend, Villeroy was again disgraced by defeat at Ramillies.

Despite his defeats, the last of which he chose to blame on the secretary of state for war, Michel Chamillart, Villeroy remained a powerful man with many influential friends. Not only was he a close personal friend of the king—one of the three or four men present at

the *premières entrées* when the king arose in the morning—he was also very close to Madame de Maintenon.⁵¹ Through his daughter-in-law, the old Marshal was connected to the popular Duchess of Burgundy and through his son to Ponchartrain and the descendents of the powerful Marquis de Louvois. He was close also to the other French marshals, particularly Berwick, Tallard and Boufflers, and later on to the minister of war, Voysin.⁵²

In addition, unlike several of the old noble governors who seem to have abandoned their traditional duties during the second half of the reign, Villeroy took his very seriously. Indeed, he seems to have regarded his governorship as a sacred duty and the city of Lyon in particular as his “fidèle,” his corporate client. He maintained close contact with the city both directly through his correspondence with the Consulate and indirectly through his lieutenant “commanding for the King in the Lyonnais,” Charles de Châteauneuf, Marquis de Rochebonne.⁵³ The city reciprocated this attention, turning to him again and again for help at court, lavishing money, gifts, and praise on him and the members of his family.⁵⁴ For the Consulate, a large investment in Villeroy obviously represented an investment in his considerable connections at court. These connections gave him the sort of power and influence that paid back every sou given so generously by the merchants of Lyon. Yet, there was also something more to the relationship than a simple exchange of favors. Though official letters from this period often brim with apparently artificial praise and gratitude, those between Villeroy and his city hint at real affection. When the old duke died in 1730, his funeral in Lyon produced an outpouring of grief unlike any ever before witnessed.⁵⁵

It was particularly unfortunate, given Lyon's ties to Villeroy and rumors of speculation by the city's merchants on mint bills, that Michel Chamillart should have been Louis XIV's controller general. Despite Chamillart's own connections to Madame de Maintenon, he was no friend to the old Marshal, and the two were not even on speaking terms after the latter's defeat at Ramillies. Thus, the city had to depend largely on Anisson and Trudaine to protect its interests.⁵⁶ Unfortunately, both men apparently exhausted their influence in the battle over the declaration of 12 April 1707, by which Chamillart had attempted to force mint bills on the entire country. Forced to withdraw the declaration in May, Chamillart grumbled that the king should have the right to issue any form of money he pleased. By

October, with Parisian merchants still in an uproar and the Hogguers near bankruptcy, Chamillart determined to try again. He issued a declaration on 18 October virtually identical to that of 12 April.⁵⁷

The merchants of Lyon were outraged. Referring to the decision of 24 May not to force the bills on other cities, they stormed that "it was on that assurance of the royal word given after many meetings . . . that our merchants again took heart and revived their commerce. They sent copies of the declaration [of 24 May revoking that of 12 April] to all the states and foreign kingdoms in order to show that foreign merchants could continue to have confidence in French merchants. This succeeded so well that commerce revived quickly and continued despite the other difficulties of these times." They warned that, as a result of the new declaration, "foreign commerce will cease absolutely, that our Payments, so wisely established, will be abolished and extinguished, that huge sums in coin will be necessary to pay debts because there will be no Payments, that shops and manufactures will perish, that our workers will leave the country or die of misery, that the destruction of our industry will aid that of other countries, that the Provinces will be reduced to destitution, that the entire state, in a word, can only suffer in ways which we leave to the Council to imagine."⁵⁸

Anisson met quickly with Chamillart to remonstrate against the new declaration, but he found the controller general in no mood to retreat again. His account of the meeting, given to the Chamber of Commerce in Lyon "word for word" on the admonition of Villeroy, portrayed a controller general brimming with hostility toward the city. After assuring Anisson that the bills would soon recover their value as a result of the new declaration, Chamillart said that, as for Lyon, "it is better that the commerce of Lyon should suffer a little than that the whole realm should perish, that he [Chamillart] knew this business better than I did. He charged me to write the Lyonnais to execute peacefully the declaration and warned that if they did not the king was resolved to send an army." His temper evidently rising, Chamillart charged that the "usurers" of Lyon had speculated on mint bills, that more "evil deals" were made in Lyon "than in all the other cities of the realm," that he had heard of widespread counterfeiting in the city, and that the only reason the Lyonnais opposed the declaration was that it would prevent them "from making a monopoly and usury on these bills."⁵⁹

Chastened and no doubt somewhat taken aback by Chamillart's outburst, the Chamber wrote to Anisson, and both Trudaine and the *prévôt des marchands* wrote directly to the controller general. The *prévôt* calmly summarized the difficulties the city had faced in the past several years—hostile naval blockades in the Mediterranean, restrictions placed by their princes on Italian merchants, the choking off of vital materials from Italy. Gently, he explained how coin would disappear as a result of the new declaration; how it would be hoarded by foreigners and by Frenchmen; how foreign merchants would insist on payment in coin, but would insist on paying French merchants one quarter in depreciated mint bills; how, without coin, the silk workers who counted on pay every Saturday would suffer and die.⁶⁰ Trudaine, who had opposed the original declaration of 12 April, wrote to Chamillart and Desmaretz on 29 October in terms similar to those of the *prévôt*. Desmaretz answered on 9 November, having just returned from his estates at Maillebois where he had quietly absented himself prior to 18 October.⁶¹ In reference to Chamillart, he wrote, "I will not conceal from you that he appeared somewhat irritated that you had taken sides against the declaration. He even told me that he had written you strongly on this and that he was not content that you seem to defer too much to the sentiments of the Lyonnais. . . . It is necessary that you be instructed that M. Chamillart is presently resolved to sustain the last declaration, that he is so firm, that I cannot believe he will change his mind."

While gently urging the intendant to be cautious in his letters to the controller general, Desmaretz urged Trudaine to keep him well informed. "Make no difficulties, I pray you, about explaining the situation to me *with total confidence*; I am only too persuaded that the declaration can cause disorder in commerce, but it was not possible to do otherwise [emphasis mine]." The last line of the letter leaves Desmaretz's own role slightly ambiguous. Did he think the declaration inevitable because of the collapse of the mint bills or because Chamillart had determined to carry it through no matter what the consequences? The tone of the letter hints that Desmaretz had opposed it, and his later actions were to confirm that opposition. What is clear is that he had already established a separate and secret channel of communication with Trudaine. For the intendant, opposition to the declaration and a secret correspondence with Desmaretz could both prove dangerous, and he made sure to write humbly to the

controller general that "I will always follow your orders exactly in all things . . . I hope that the bills succeed in the provinces. I will do all that is possible."⁶²

For its part, the Chamber of Commerce wrote Anisson that if there was usury in Lyon it was the Genevans who were responsible, complaining that their market power was so great that "we are all obliged to pass through their hands." The Lyonnais were hurt and surprised to hear that the "true Lyonnais, these ancient houses, these depots of fidelity and of right, should be accused without pity of disorders which they are the first to condemn."⁶³ Certainly someone was speculating on mint bills in Lyon, but Luethy's investigation and those by Sayous tend to support the Chamber's contention that Genevans were most active in this area.⁶⁴ Of course, many so-called Genevans were only French Protestants once removed, and Chamillart could not have cared less which merchants in Lyon were guilty; they were all usurers as far as he was concerned. For the Lyonnais, the future looked increasingly bleak as they contemplated a possible collapse in credit, the total disappearance of specie, and the arrival *en masse* of the dreaded mint bills. Commerce and trade declined steadily as winter descended over the city, and Trudaine wrote Desmaretz on 15 November that "coin has become so rare and expensive here that the affairs of the king and those of commerce cannot be sustained."⁶⁵ As Chamillart continued to harden in his support of the declaration, merchants and officials alike looked forlornly for some kind of change in the ministerial climate at Versailles.⁶⁶ As luck would have it, that change was not long in coming. Michel Chamillart was beaten down and sickened by the crushing burden of his twin offices. By February of the new year, he had finally convinced the king to relieve him of half his burden. A new controller general heralded a spring of prosperity for the city of Lyon. Nicolas Desmaretz was at last to receive the office that he had coveted for over twenty-five years.

The coming of Desmaretz to power on 20 February 1708 was greeted with unrivaled joy in Lyon. Trudaine wrote the new controller general, "I dare not describe to you the joy of the Lyon market at the news, but I hope you will soon see the effects by the renewed confidence with which those who handle royal affairs are treated."⁶⁷ Unlike Chamillart, Desmaretz enjoyed an excellent reputation as a friend and supporter of merchants and bankers. He liked

to equate their well-being with that of the realm, writing in 1689, "It is necessary that men of affairs make honest profits and that the public be persuaded of the king's wish that they prosper."⁶⁸ The Lyonnais had particular reason to be pleased. Desmaretz was an old and trusted friend of Villeroy; the new controller general's *premier commis*, Clautrier, enjoyed a similar relationship with Jean Anisson; and it has already been shown how Desmaretz had begun to form a working relationship with Trudaine.⁶⁹ When, only five days after taking office, Desmaretz rescinded the unpopular declaration of 18 October which had so incensed the Lyonnais, his popularity was assured.⁷⁰

Unknown to the merchants of Lyon, the new controller general faced a crippling task. As he was later to note, the expected revenues for 1708 had been almost entirely pledged in service to the debt.⁷¹ Revenue from the General Tax Farms was consumed in annuities already issued on them, the *taille* was yielding barely half the total collected to the crown, and most of that was already pledged in debt to collectors. The crown was finding it increasingly difficult to sell offices because it could no longer afford to pay the *gages*, the salaries of those offices.⁷² Worse yet, the Payment of Saints in 1707, seriously weakened by the declaration of 18 October, had had to be prolonged because of the mounting collapse of the Hogguers and the increasing volume of loans by Bernard and Nicolas. The controller general's move to liberate letters of exchange from mint bills on 25 February thus represented a desperate effort to bolster the Lyon Payments, which had effectively become a vital royal revenue source. Desmaretz may have hoped in addition to attract new coin into the realm for a possible reminting later in the year.

Whatever its salutary effects on the commerce and credit of Lyon, the new declaration sank the Hogguers, whose letters collapsed completely at the Easter Payment in June 1708. Desmaretz was now forced to rely almost wholly on Samuel Bernard for the hard cash to pay the soldiers of the king in Flanders and Dauphiné. Yet, not all was well with Bernard. Increasingly pressed by the growing volume of his own transactions, he was forced to request an extension of the Easter Payment of 1708 after he came up 2 million livres short in rescheduling his loans.⁷³ These extensions of the once sacrosanct Payments boded ill for their stability and reliability. Bernard could not reschedule his loans forever, and his fall threatened to bring down not only the Payments of Lyon, but many Lyonnais merchant houses

as well. While the presence of Nicolas Desmaretz at last restored some semblance of mercantile confidence in the crown, the essential problems remained and could only grow worse as long as the war continued.

Given such a dire situation, one is surprised not to see any great credit crisis in 1708. That such a crisis was postponed owed a great deal to the seeming inexhaustibility of Samuel Bernard's resources as well as to the determination of the new controller general. It was not bankers who fell in the spring of 1708, but rain. Through most of the month of May, the people of rural France watched and waited nervously while the rains soaked the fields. The all-important winter wheat crop had reached a fragile stage. Too much rain at this moment could mean serious trouble for the fall harvest.

1708: The Rehearsal

The rains that pelted the fields of Burgundy in May foretold trouble for Lyon in September. Of the men who confronted that trouble as *échevins* on the Consulate of Lyon during the crisis period, we can trace only the barest outline. In 1708, Pierre Trollier and André Aussel were the senior *échevins*, having been elected the previous year. Both came from the families of silk merchants, and Trollier in particular had already served in other positions of municipal authority, including a term as a director of the *Aumône-Générale*.¹ The two *échevins* elected for the first time in 1708 were Jean Estival, a sixty-two year old merchant draper, and Annibal Guillet, a fifty-eight year old *avocat*, doctor in law, *procureur* for the king, and himself the son of a merchant draper. When Trollier and Aussel retired in December 1708, they were replaced by Jean Posuel, a printer and book merchant, and François Yon, a *secrétaire du roi* and son of a former *échevin* (and *épicier*).²

Of the man who led them through the crisis, somewhat more is known. Louis Ravat was fifty-three years of age upon his election as *prévôt des marchands* in 1708. He was the product of a marriage alliance between two notarial families, and had invested in properties sufficient to garner a long list of titles. In 1708 he was an *écuyer*, count of Baneins, seigneur of Clemencia, Dampierre, les Mazes, Monthellet "and other places," councillor of the king in the *Sénéchaussée* and *Présidial* of Lyon. Ravat had already served as an *échevin* in 1685–1686 and married the daughter of another *écuyer* in 1694. He was to be Lyon's *prévôt des marchands* until 1715.³ Few men ever served a city with more energy or devotion.

Ravat and his colleagues first suspected a potential grain shortage in the summer of 1708, though it was not the rains of May that alerted them. Rather, they remarked nervously on the frenetic activities of

the king's munitioners in Burgundy. "From the month of June in the year 1708," they later wrote, "it was perceived in Burgundy that the considerable removal of grain for the subsistence of the army of the king . . . began to cause a rise in price. This circumstance combined with the export of a gross quantity for the army of M. the duke of Savoy and with the avarice of several grain merchants caused a daily rise in price and determined the *Chambre d'Abondance* of Lyon . . . to send several persons into Burgundy in order to begin making contracts."⁴ Altogether in the next three months, the directors of the *Abondance* contracted to spend nearly 300,000 livres to reserve grain from the forthcoming harvest for the city. Thus, the *Chambre d'Abondance*, which had lain virtually moribund for several years, was suddenly and rapidly catapulted into major activity.

Rising prices, ever the supreme administrative barometer in France, signalled the possibility of a subsistence crisis in Burgundy. With large-scale purchases taking place throughout the province and the mediocre state of the harvest becoming ever clearer, the intendant Pinon came under intense pressure to limit or halt exports of grain. He resisted all but the inhabitants of Bresse and Bugey, one of Burgundy's poorest regions already burdened with detachments of the army of Dauphiné. He ordered exports from that region halted in August.⁵ Ravat complained immediately to Desmaretz that such an interruption where the Lyonnais had evidently made sizable purchases "will oblige us to raise the price of bread above twelve deniers the pound even though it is already too expensive for the artisans and the poor." He feared that Pinon was about to cut off the whole province.⁶ Pinon defended himself, noting the poverty of the region and the need to feed troops there, but Desmaretz judged that such prohibitions "suffered great inconveniences." On 29 August he ordered the intendant to restore "liberty of commerce."⁷

Fear, however, had already ignited panic. Jean Perrin, a merchant from Lyon acting as a buyer for the *Abondance* in Burgundy, reported in late August that "the terror of a shortage is great throughout the countryside." Rumors were spreading that Pinon had forbidden all exports and that the fine for exporting grain from the neighboring Franche-Comté was 3,000 livres and confiscation of grain. Worse, wrote Perrin, the harvest appeared to be "only half that of the year before," and he was having no luck finding sellers of grain.⁸ He urged the Consulate to look to the south.

The situation was no better in Provence. The intendant Le Bret noted in late August that "the harvest has been bad in Provence."⁹ With enemy English ships hindering imports by the Mediterranean and the Genoese making large purchases in Italy, Le Bret feared for the survival of his own province. "I do not know the situation in Languedoc, but I think it is our only resort." Despite such gloomy prospects, rising unrest both in Burgundy and at home forced the Lyonnais to search down the Rhône. On 25 August, 200 *anées* of grain bound for Lyon on the Saône were forcibly stopped and distributed by a crowd at Chalons.¹⁰ In Lyon itself, a crowd gathered in the poor parish of Saint-Georges on the same day and began pelting the closed shops of several bakers with stones. Ravat quickly launched an investigation to discover why these particular bakers had closed early but warned Desmaretz that "a frightened population is difficult to contain."¹¹ Pierre Barthalon, a director of the *Abondance*, was quickly dispatched down the Rhône to Marseilles to begin negotiations for grain purchases in the south.

The decision by the city to purchase grain in the south demonstrated the seriousness with which the Consulate already regarded the situation. The expense and difficulties of purchase and transport have already been shown, and the city very rarely made purchases there. The presence of Barthalon in Marseilles, busily making contracts with local grain merchants, importers, boatmen, *laboureurs*, and landlords, proves that Ravat and his colleagues had already decided in the summer of 1708 to spare no expense and leave no granary untouched in their effort to provision the city.

At Versailles the controller general was confronted by a problem he had not before encountered. Having never served during a grain shortage, he sought the advice of an old and trusted advisor. Henri Daguesseau, one of the king's most respected administrators, had served as intendant in Bordeaux and Languedoc, advised on numerous councils, and supervised much of royal policy during the famine of 1694.¹² Daguesseau delineated the finer points of crisis mentalities and administrative policy in a letter to Desmaretz on 22 August. Above all else, he wrote, all actions by the controller general must be taken in secret. Public proclamations could easily provoke panic and create a real crisis out of nothing. Daguesseau cautioned specifically against a public declaration barring exports from the realm, writing that "it would do more harm than good by the worry and

alarm it would arouse everywhere. . . . It is necessary to be content with restraining it [export] through secret orders." He urged the controller general to solicit regular grain price reports from his intendants in Burgundy, Alsace, Lorraine, Provence, and Languedoc, to write forbidding the *parlements* to issue any public orders that might cause panic, and to write discreetly to Danzig and Ireland inquiring after the price, quantity, best shipping time of grain, and availability of neutral vessels to carry it. He remarked specifically on the problems of the Lyonnais "which is the most difficult place to sustain" and suggested that Desmaretz get some of his most trusted munitioners to buy for the city in secret. Under all circumstances, he concluded, orders such as those of Pinon restricting the trade must be countermanded "since they will have an effect contrary to what is intended."¹³

Daguesseau's influence was to be heavily felt in the coming months as Desmaretz struggled to keep the grain trade moving. Unfortunately, his admonitions to discretion were already too late, as the Lyonnais were learning to their sorrow in Burgundy. Yet, Daguesseau did supply powerful reinforcement to the Consulate's own arguments about the precarious position of the city and its need for constant support at court. In contrast, Pinon suffered from Daguesseau's indirect charge of lack of foresight. The intendant had erred in making his modest prohibition on exports from Bresse and Bugey public, and had therefore helped to induce panic in his province. As autumn fell over the Burgundian fields, the tone of Desmaretz's letters to Burgundy became increasingly impatient, terse, and even rude.

September broke upon an increasingly nervous Consulate. The records of the *Abondance* show no substantial grain arrivals in that month.¹⁴ No doubt peasants in Burgundy already had begun paying the rents and fees that would soon make their way into the granaries of grain merchants with whom the Lyonnais had contracted. But the delay caused Ravat to worry about the reliability of the Saône and Rhône when the weather grew worse. He stressed to Desmaretz the urgency of rapid, unhindered transportation, and requested passports for free passage of grain up the Rhône.¹⁵ To reinforce the urgency, the Consulate appealed for the first time to Villeroy, and the duke quickly added his voice to that of the city. He complained to Desmaretz of continued moves by Pinon in Burgundy and now by Le Guerchois in the neighboring Franche-Comté to curtail the trade. Neither would cooperate, he warned, "unless you give them

precise orders."¹⁶ By 8 September, Villeroy was more worried than his clients in Lyon. By November, he wrote, "Lyon will run out of grain and boats will find it nearly impossible to travel up the Rhône in winter. In the name of God, Monsieur, do not lose a moment in restoring calm to our city."¹⁷

Desmaretz, perhaps judging it more important to restore calm to Villeroy, reacted by sending copies both to Lyon and to the worried duke of all the various letters he had written to numerous officials explicitly ordering them to keep the routes and the trade open. He also dispatched passports to the city that guaranteed free passage up the Rhône, and prepared an *arrêt* that would suspend all *octrois* and *droits* on grain on both rivers for the duration of the crisis.¹⁸ Finally, he assured Ravat in a remarkable passage, that "if you again have need of some new order, I will give it as soon as you need it."¹⁹ The Lyonnais could hardly hope for better cooperation at court. In contrast to his beneficence toward the city, Desmaretz wrote with irritation to Pinon. "After all the letters that I have written you on the importance of facilitating the transport of grain . . . to Lyon, it would seem useless for you to write me again. . . . You will give total preference to those who act for the city of Lyon."²⁰ Such actions in their favor drew effusive gratitude from the Consulate. "It is to you alone," they wrote, "that this great city owes its salvation."²¹

All was not so well in the south. Le Bret worried about Lyonnais purchases in grain-poor Provence, and those acting for the city began also to attract the attention of the powerful intendant of Languedoc, Nicolas de Lamoignon de Bâville.²² Bâville had governed Languedoc since 1685. Saint-Simon referred to him variously as "the powerful," "tyrant of the province," and "king of Languedoc," a man for whom the ends inevitably justified the means.²³ He was an old ally of Madame de Maintenon, veteran of many an administrative battle, one of the king's most experienced, intelligent, and tenacious intendants. In Bâville the Consulate of Lyon confronted a formidable adversary. He had already been in touch with Desmaretz through the summer of 1708 on the problem of Genoese buying in the province, and the two had conspired by various means to limit such exports. Though their concerns were more of a strategic than a subsistence nature (they suspected the Genoese of selling to the Habsburgs and the duke of Savoy), the very act of working together drew them closer.²⁴ Desmaretz may have been curt and rude to Pinon. Not so Bâville.


It was with respect, therefore, that the controller general received Bâville's complaints that Lyonnais "agents" were crawling all over eastern Languedoc. With anxieties and prices rising, the intendant feared a shortage and warned that he would not be able to supply the needs of Provence if such untrammelled behavior was allowed to continue. On 16 September he pleaded for some kind of number. "Please inform me what quantity I must allow for Lyon."²⁵ Desmaretz relayed these complaints to Lyon on 27 September, ordering the Consulate to communicate directly with Bâville on their precise needs.²⁶

Bâville was almost certainly justified in his complaints. Barthalon had been in the south barely two months by the end of September and had already contracted to spend some 214,000 livres on grain at an average price of 36 to 37 livres per *année*.²⁷ Such prices, 38 percent higher than those which the *Abondance* was paying in Burgundy, must have been very attractive to sellers. Yet, Barthalon was the only "agent" of the *Abondance* in the south, and those giving Bâville so much trouble were almost certainly local grain merchants and boatmen who may or may not have been acting under contract to Barthalon. Ravat could only respond evasively that Barthalon was his only agent, and that Bâville was hearing unsubstantiated rumors.²⁸

It was probably in hopes of distracting the Lyonnais from the south that Desmaretz now informed them of the availability of grain in Lorraine. Contest, intendant of Metz, had informed the controller general of the availability of 12,000 to 15,000 *sacs* of wheat (roughly equivalent to 6,000 to 7,000 *années*), and Desmaretz relayed the information to Ravat on 25 September.²⁹ On the twenty-eighth he also wrote to Trudaine, telling him to use his influence with the Consulate in favor of Metz.³⁰ Desmaretz had already worried in an "observation" about the crisis on the twenty-seventh that Languedoc might be unable to supply Provence, and particularly Marseilles, if the Lyonnais purchased too much there.³¹ Ravat wrote immediately to Contest agreeing to a price of 15 livres per *sac* (approximately 30 livres per *année*) for 15,000 *sacs* and dispatched de Roquement, one of the *Abondance* directors, to oversee the transaction.³² Though the negotiations dragged on for a month, Contest eventually agreed to have the grain in the Saône port town of Auxonne by the end of December.³³

Desmaretz was unsuccessful in diverting the Lyonnais from the south, if indeed that was his intention. Though grain began arriving in

FIG. 4.1 Grain prices on the Grenette of Lyon, May–December 1708, in livres per *anée*.



Source: *Deliberations of the Consulate*.

the *Abondance* granaries in October (over 2,700 *anées* for the month), the institution found itself turning over increasing quantities to the bakers.³⁴ As figure 4.1 demonstrates, the price of wheat on the public market had doubled since the beginning of August, rising from 18 livres per *anée* to 36.³⁵ The *Abondance*, however, was selling its Burgundian grain to the bakers for only 24 livres per *anée*, a 33 percent savings over the market price, but a loss of only 2 to 3 livres per *anée* over the original purchase price of 26 to 27 livres.³⁶ As a result of its willingness to accept a loss on sales, the *Abondance* came increasingly to dominate the sale of grain by the middle of October, and the Consulate worried increasingly about reserves and the approaching winter.³⁷ On 11 October, Ravat announced a total grain reserve of only 5,000 *anées*, barely enough for one month. "Time," wrote the *prévôt*,

"is precious." Desmaretz must force the intendants of Provence and Languedoc to untie Barthalon's hands and allow more grain up the Rhône.

Le Bret was having none of it. He wrote to Ravat on the sixth of October that "I cannot consent to this contract [by Barthalon to buy in Provence] because this province is very sterile and does not produce enough to feed its inhabitants for three months out of the year." He told the *prévôt* that he had written the controller general asking him to "revoke the authorization that he has given."³⁸ Ravat countered on the eleventh with rumors from Barthalon of Genoese grain exports from Provence and asked the controller general why the foreign Genoese should be favored over Lyon.³⁹ Desmaretz responded on the seventeenth ordering Le Bret "not to place any obstacle in the way" of the 6,000 *anées* of grain that Barthalon had just purchased. When Le Bret persisted, Desmaretz became vehement. Provence would get its grain from Languedoc. He must let the Lyon grain go.⁴⁰

In Languedoc, too, Lyonnais influence at court began gradually to make itself felt. Though he grumbled that the Lyonnais wanted their grain all at once and too fast, Bâville reluctantly allowed 1,300 *anées* up the Rhône in early October. He worried, however, about the Vivarais, the region of eastern Languedoc along the Rhône where the city insisted on buying its wheat. "Bread is going there for two sous per pound," he warned. There had already been unrest at Puy.⁴¹ If Lyon wanted wheat, he urged that the city procure it in Carcassonne and Narbonne where it was more plentiful. Ravat answered that shipments from far away southern Languedoc would be prohibitively expensive and again insisted that the controller general clear the city's path.⁴²

By the end of the month, both Bâville and Le Bret had been forced to surrender. The former noted Desmaretz's apparent concern for the city, assuring him that "in order to quiet the concern that you have for this great city, I will allow them to take all that they wish."⁴³ Le Bret agreed to halt resistance by the magistrates of Marseilles to Barthalon's transactions, including several with the *Compagnie du Cap Negre*, the royal trading company that dominated trade with Africa.⁴⁴ Though the battle was by no means over by the first of November, the Consulate had assured itself of the support it needed to put aside further opposition. Le Bret continued to oppose Barthalon's efforts to purchase grain in the Rhône valley and from merchants at

Marseilles, but Desmaretz repeatedly held his ground, ordering the reluctant intendant not to oppose Lyonnais purchases and transport.⁴⁵ Bâville ceased even to complain, turning his attention to the provisioning of Guyenne and Nice.⁴⁶ Released from official interference, Barthalon managed from October to December to spend another 132,335 livres for wheat.⁴⁷ Though actual arrivals of grain from the south continued to be negligible (751 *anées* in November, 727 in December), the Consulate blamed a shortage of transportation on the Rhône.⁴⁸ On 9 December, Ravat and his colleagues barred, for the duration, any Lyonnais boatman on the Rhône from carrying any merchandise except grain.⁴⁹

In Burgundy and the north, also, there was cause for optimism. D'Harouys, intendant of Champagne, saw no problems on 3 October in selling the Lyonnais 3,000 *anées* of wheat, and Pinon had wilted under the constant pressure from the controller general.⁵⁰ Only Le Guerchois in the Franche-Comté continued to complain at being overrun by Lyonnais "agents."⁵¹ Ravat answered as he had when Bâville made the same charge. The *Abondance*, he wrote, had made only two contracts in the Comté for a total of 2,250 *anées*. Le Guerchois, like Bâville, was probably confusing those acting for the *Abondance* with local grain merchants and Lyonnais bakers, who, Ravat admitted, "have spread out into the County of Burgundy and . . . have even helped themselves to our name."⁵²

Ravat was now increasingly concerned about getting to the next harvest. In his letter to Desmaretz of 4 December, he calculated the weekly consumption of the city at 1,500 *anées*. With eight months remaining to the next harvest, the city would require 48,000 *anées* of wheat.⁵³ On the fifteenth Desmaretz responded with his own calculations. The city would get 10,000 *anées* from Metz (some by way of Champagne), 6,000 from Languedoc, 1,000 from Avignon, 6,000 from Provence, and 5,000 from Burgundy. Desmaretz estimated that the city could probably scrape up another 13,000 in Burgundy and another 7,000 in Languedoc.⁵⁴ That both men had begun to look ahead to the coming year suggests that the immediate crisis had passed. Ravat was reassured at the end of December by the arrival of over 4,000 *anées* from Burgundy and Metz.⁵⁵ Additional such arrivals would at last give the city some breathing space. Other factors also gave cause for optimism. The price of wheat on the Grenette fell on 22 December for the first time in over two months from 36 to

33 livres per *année*, suggesting an expansion in supply and a corresponding decline in crisis mentalities in the countryside.⁵⁶ The weather also continued to cooperate. Though shifting winds on the Rhône caused the loss of one grain barge late in December, temperatures remained remarkably moderate throughout the fall and early winter, and both rivers remained navigable.⁵⁷ Best of all, the city continued to bask in the light of support from Versailles. Desmaretz had not hesitated to discipline the intendants in keeping the doors open to the city's lifelines.

To show its gratitude, and no doubt also to insure continued support, the Consulate gave the controller general what he most needed on Christmas Eve 1708: a "free gift" to his majesty's government of 1,040,000 livres.⁵⁸ Negotiations for this *don gratuit* actually had been in process for some time. As with most such "gifts," this one was a disguised loan. The Consulate agreed to act as a royal banker, borrowing the money (mostly at Genoa) and lending it to the king at 6 percent annual interest over a fifteen-year period. To pay back the principal, the king agreed to a continuation of a surtax on wine collected by the city. To pay the interest, the royal government signed over a larger proportion for the city from several other taxes that the two traditionally divided between them. The king agreed also to the revocation of three separate edicts that had threatened the city with a mass of new venal officials.⁵⁹ Desmaretz can only have been well pleased with the transaction, since it promised a needed boost in royal revenue at a very low interest. The timing of the loan, coming as it did at the end of a crisis in which the controller general had acceded to virtually every consular request, simply demonstrates how well the city wielded its wealth to secure cooperation from the court.

Compared to the financial transactions of Samuel Bernard, the one million livres "given" by Lyon to the king paled into insignificance. To get through the Payment of August, Bernard and Nicolas had to turn over a debt of 30 million livres. No one, least of all Bernard, expected his creditors to keep rescheduling the debt forever. Indeed, several of the more prudent Genevans appear to have withdrawn at this time.⁶⁰ Total escape from his debt burden would have required immense sums of cash, and even Bernard could not locate 30 million livres in coin. A method had to be found to improve the value of the paper that he and his creditors held in such abundance. As early as the end of 1707, therefore, he urged the creation of a royal bank.⁶¹

Bernard was not the first to advocate the formation of a royal bank, nor, as historians of John Law's *Système* are well aware, was he the last.⁶² But his project came closer than that of any predecessor to reality, largely because he proposed to capitalize the new bank with private funds rather than royal revenues.⁶³ His plan was fairly simple. Backed by a proposed initial investment of 12 million livres in coin, the new bank would issue notes with a minimum denomination of 100 livres. These notes could be exchanged for coin at the bank for a fee of 5 percent. Holders of mint bills would be allowed to exchange them for the new bank notes at a loss of 5 percent off their face value.⁶⁴ Thus, mint bills could be exchanged for coin, via the bank, at a combined loss of only 10 percent, considerably better than the discount of 25 to 30 percent at which they were being negotiated through most of 1708. The new bank would allow Bernard to turn his mint bills into bank notes backed by specie and enable the crown to retire a form of money with which it had never been comfortable. In the process, the new bank might also strengthen Bernard's credit a thousandfold if it could be established alongside that of Amsterdam as one of the world's foremost financial institutions. The possibilities seemed limitless.

Desmaretz, however, was not at first enthused. Such is the conclusion one draws from his lack of action on the project, for despite repeated urgings from Bernard and Nicolas, he refused either to permit or to reject it.⁶⁵ To be sure, the bank had its opponents. The Council of Commerce, upon which Samuel Bernard served, opposed it strenuously as a dangerous improvisation, the collapse of which could bring ruin on all who touched it.⁶⁶ Other *financiers* and bankers busily making small fortunes by speculating on mint bills and coin opposed it for less altruistic reasons.⁶⁷ Desmaretz himself probably dreaded the addition of yet another complication in the awful confusion of royal finances.

Whatever his reservations, the controller general was gradually brought round by Bernard's growing indebtedness and fears of a default. As December approached, it became increasingly clear that Bernard might not be able to scrape together the 38 million livres needed to get through the Payment of Saints in Lyon.⁶⁸ Desmaretz decided to turn the bank project over to Caumartin, one of his intendants of finance, who subjected it to intense scrutiny and gave it his approval in late December. On the twenty-ninth a projected edict was drawn

up creating the bank with Bernard, Nicolas, and the Fayard brothers of Lyon as directors.⁶⁹ On the thirty-first Bertrand Castan, Bernard's correspondent in Lyon, asked Louis Ravat for a "prolongation" of the Payment of Saints. "I am obliged," he wrote, "to request this extension in order to sustain the credit of M. Bernard."⁷⁰ Acting on the advice of Trudaine, Ravat elected to keep the reasons for the extension secret so as not to arouse panic among Bernard's creditors. "M. Bernard and his correspondents can be assured that although they are the cause of this extension, no one will be so informed by me, and that I will keep it in strictest confidence."⁷¹ According to Trudaine, Ravat successfully made it appear as if several merchants and not one had requested the extension.⁷²

All concerned had embarked on a dangerous game. The extension of the Payment of Saints gave Samuel Bernard and Jean Nicolas breathing space and time to bring their bank project to fruition. If the bank could be established—and prospects at the end of the year looked promising—they might yet make good on their obligations in Lyon and increase their wealth many times over. Yet, they had now involved the Consulate of Lyon in a conspiracy to cover up their own potential default and had thrown their last resources and hopes into the bank. That the gamble might fail was a prospect few wished to contemplate.

Louis XIV kept Christmas that year at Versailles. The king was well pleased with his new controller general and optimistic about the upcoming campaign. Dangeau reported great expectations for the bank project "which promises to render the mint bills nearly as good as hard currency."⁷³ Hope and optimism reigned as well in Lyon, optimism that at last the city would escape the weight of Samuel Bernard and restore the Payments to their former health, hope that the city might enjoy a steady grain supply before a bountiful harvest. Louis Ravat was encouraged. The winter had been sweet, grain had been arriving in the *Abondance* granaries, and he could write on 27 December that "we are not in a pressing necessity."⁷⁴ Officials and people alike had every reason to believe that 1709 would be a good year.



PART TWO

1709:

Year of Trial



The Day of Kings

The night of 5 January 1709 began like any other. Butchers closed their shops, leaving their everpresent dogs to bark at passersby. Hawkers deserted their booths on the Place Bellecour for hovels close to the *Hôtel-Dieu*. Bakers set to work on the next day's bread and the small cakes from which Lyonnais children would soon extract small wooden monarchs to celebrate the Day of Kings. Below the great stone towers of the Guillotière bridge, the men of the guard stood talking to each other or quietly contemplating the wild currents of the Rhône flying by beneath their feet. They probably took little notice of the gusts of icy wind that began to dart across the old arches of the bridge sometime during the night. No doubt they gathered the collars of their greatcoats up around their necks and sought refuge closer to the walls. There was nothing particularly unusual about the north wind in Lyon. The Lyonnais had long doubled their windows on the northern side to protect against this *bize*, which regularly travelled down upon the city by its river highways. Nevertheless, this wind on this night in this year was different, for it heralded a winter so fierce that it would quickly pass into legend as the worst in living memory.

Contemporaries invariably pinpointed the exact moment of the arrival of the Great Winter of 1709, and virtually every witness differed from every other in the details.¹ Most did manage to agree that it began sometime on the eve of the Day of Kings. All agreed on its ferocity. The curé of Saint-Vincent in Lyon called it "so harsh, so cold, and so violent, the likes of which had not been seen nor heard of since the world was created."² The curé of Vaize testified that "the winter began all at once the sixth of January, Day of Kings, but of such strength that the river was entirely frozen before the morning

of the following day, and [the ice] of a thickness so extraordinary that it could be crossed by a loaded wagon."³ Claude Bernard, a lieutenant in Mâcon, concurred in these facts, adding that the ground, unprotected by any snow cover and drenched by three days of continual rain, was frozen "to a depth of three feet," the Saône frozen "nearly to the bottom."⁴

Measurements of temperature were in their infancy during this period, but some primitive thermometers were in use. Philippe de la Hire, a member of the Royal Academy of Sciences, employed a scale similar to that soon devised by Fahrenheit to measure the ferocity of the winter. Given the testimony of contemporaries, his measurements may seem too moderate. If he can be believed, the temperature in Paris dropped from 48° on 4 January to 30° on the sixth, then to 22° the seventh, 9° the tenth and 5° the thirteenth. There it rested ten days without respite.⁵ On 22 January, Raymond Moulins of Lyon complained that he was "having trouble continuing this letter because the ink freezes on the plume. We have never seen such a harsh winter. Since the Day of Kings, the cold has been so great that the shops have closed and none can work. As a result, there is no demand for merchandise."⁶ At Versailles the cold became a royal inconvenience. Louis XIV insisted upon his usual promenade on the seventh, but the cold so overwhelmed those endeavoring to walk with him that he decided not to go out again until the weather improved.⁷ For two weeks he remained inside, increasingly irritated at his forced confinement. A stubborn effort at escape to Marly on the seventeenth was again cut short by the cold.⁸ His courtiers huddled close to their fires, but even the largest fire seemed incapable of protecting them against the drafts of the palace. Madame, the king's sister-in-law, wrote to the Electress Sophie in Germany, "I am sitting by a roaring fire, have a screen before the door, which is closed, so that I can sit here with a sable fur piece around my neck and my feet in a bearskin sack, and still I am shivering with cold and can barely hold the pen. Never in my life have I seen a winter such as this one." Saint-Simon, who described the weather in similar terms, marvelled that the cold caused liquids to freeze and bottles to break even when stored next to fireplaces.⁹

From all over France came reports of people found frozen to death, of limbs and fingers lost to frostbite, of commerce and industry entirely halted.¹⁰ The Rhône was soon blocked by large chunks of ice,

and the Marseillais beheld the rare sight of ice in the salty Mediterranean. Agriculture suffered paralysis. Vincent, an estate manager for Châteauneuf de Rochebonne in Lyon, wrote to his master from the latter's estates in the Vivarais that "it is impossible as long as the cold lasts for any of our people to work on the land. I hardly know what to do with them."¹¹ In Beaune, a canon of the cathedral remarked that "voyagers died in the countryside, livestock in the stables, wild animals in the woods; nearly all the birds were killed, wines frozen in casques, and public fires were lit to warm the poor."¹² Throughout France, prayers united in hopes that the winter would not last.

As if in answer to such prayers, the winds vanished on the night of 24 January, replaced by rain. Yet the thaw that followed proved nearly as harmful as the freeze. The sudden rise in temperature broke the Saône into a huge ice flow, and the river flooded the low-lying valley around Vaize, marooning blocks of ice "the size of two men."¹³ Whole trees were washed down and abandoned on the river's banks, while walls built along its edge were smashed to pieces. Lyon's three bridges suffered damage so serious that the Consulate was forced to restrict traffic.¹⁴ Any boats left tied on the bank were either carried downstream or smashed by the ice. Louis Ravat could not report the rivers free of ice and safely navigable until 2 February.¹⁵ Even then the respite lasted only four days, for the cold returned on 4 February, and by the sixth the Saône was again blocked by ice.¹⁶ This time, the cold was not as severe as it had been in January, but it lasted longer and was accompanied by heavy snows. Not until the first days of March did the Great Winter of 1709 at last recede, though it still left temperatures as cold as 24° in its wake.¹⁷

Mortality caused by the winter was much higher than normal throughout much of France, but it was only slightly so in Lyon. In my investigation of mortality in the city, I have drawn on a range of data from 1703 through 1715 in the urban parishes of Saint-Nizier, Saint-Paul, Saint-Georges, and Saint-Vincent, the faubourgs of Vaize and La Guillotière, and the hospital of the *Charité*. For comparative purposes I have employed the years 1703 and 1715, which stand equidistant from the crisis period, and which come as close as any to testing "normal" in a period when such an adjective is at best difficult to define. In fact, mortality was slightly above average in 1715 and slightly below average in 1703, making a combination of the two years a useful tool in gauging and measuring the crisis itself. From 5 January to 1 March 1709,

TABLE 5.1 Mortality of individual occupational groups as a percentage of total mortality

	<i>Great Winter</i>	<i>Winters of 1703/1715</i>
Street People	1%	1%
Day Laborers	7%	5%
Domestics	2%	2%
Agricultural Trades	6%	4%
Silk Workers	13%	18%
Artisans	51%	49%
<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>80%</u>	<u>79%</u>
Clerks and Guards	2%	2%
Professionals	2%	2%
Merchants	8%	11%
Nobles and Clergy	6%	4%
Other	2%	2%
<u>Subtotal</u>	<u>20%</u>	<u>21%</u>
<u>Total</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

Source: Parish registers of Lyon

352 people were buried in these parishes. Fifty-seven percent of the dead were adults aged 18 or older. By comparison, only 41 percent of those who died during the relatively more normal winters of 1703 and 1715 were older than 18.¹⁸ Thus, the great winter did kill the old in greater numbers than the young, but it did not pick out the poor. As table 5.1 shows, the proportion of artisans and daylaborers who died in January and February of 1709 was not markedly different from that during the winters of 1703 and 1715. Indeed, the silk workers, ever at the mercy of an uncertain economy, mysteriously suffered fewer deaths in the winter of 1709 relative to other groups. The great winter did not, therefore, alter normal mortality patterns among social groups in Lyon.

Mortality, of course, is only the most extreme measure of suffering, and we can be sure that the winter branded itself in a variety of ways on the lives and minds of those who survived it. It also made its mark on the land. Olives, fruits, and chestnuts in the south were all but destroyed.¹⁹ Vines either died or lay barren for one or more years, leaving growers destitute and forcing many off the land altogether.²⁰ Domestic animals lay dead in herds, their carcasses rotting in the fields.


As awful as these losses were, however, they hardly compared to the loss of the winter wheat crop. Caught without any protective layer of snow, the ground around them drenched and then frozen by the arctic cold, the seedlings died where they lay. With memories of the shortage of 1708 still fresh, peasants searched with increasing panic in March for signs of a harvest that would never come.²¹

While it killed the new grain in the earth, the winter also impeded efforts to move old grain to cities in need. Marseilles was reduced to an eight-day supply by 14 January, and its merchants worked feverishly with Le Bret to transport grain overland from Languedoc.²² The *Abondance* of Lyon received its last shipment on the Saône on 5 January; the river did not again yield to the passage of grain barges until mid February.²³ Southern grain continued to arrive by the Rhône until 17 January, but the combination of wind and ice hurtling southward soon made the river too treacherous for even the hardiest of boatmen. Barges would not again climb the Rhône until 8 February.²⁴

Contrary to what might be expected, the Consulate was not unduly worried by these interruptions in arrivals. Ravat announced in his letter of 2 February that "we are not so pressed right now for grain as to restrict the commerce of boats on the Rhône."²⁵ He assured Desmaretz that the consular order of 9 December 1708 confining Lyonnais boatmen to grain shipments had been lifted. He may have been buoyed somewhat by activities on the Grenette. There, as figure 5.1 demonstrates, prices remained virtually unchanged through January and early February despite the cold.²⁶ Indeed, the major issue for the Consulate during the winter arose not from grain shortages, but from a large fire that destroyed the city's customs house. Letters to Versailles haggled energetically over the issue of who should pay to rebuild it.²⁷ The only evidence of consular concern for the effects of the winter was an effort, ultimately successful, to persuade Lyon's archbishop to lift dietary restrictions during Lent.²⁸

This relative lack of consular concern over the grain shortage disappeared in March. The price of grain on the public market, which had remained stable at 34 livres, 10 sous per *anée* through the winter, jumped to 39 livres the first week of March. By the twenty-third it had reached 42 livres.²⁹ On 6 March, Vincent wrote Rochebonne of violence in the countryside. A mob had pillaged several private granaries in Saint-Laurent, not far from Rochebonne's estates. While the

FIG. 5.1 Grain prices on the Grenette of Lyon, June 1708–February 1709, in livres per *anée*.



Source: *Deliberations of the Consulate*.

agent assured his master that "they are not so bold as to come here," he worried nevertheless about two cellar windows "which are only of wood."³⁰

Letters reached Versailles with news of increasing panic at the delay of the winter wheat crop. D'Angervilliers of Dauphiné reported fears of a crop lost to the cold on 9 March.³¹ Le Bret of Provence reported the same on the twelfth, acknowledging in the same letter that the cities of Arles and Tarasçon on the Rhône had refused to allow the shipment of grain purchased by Barthalon for Lyon.³² Bâville wrote from Languedoc on 15 March that grain "has been absolutely frozen in nearly all of lower Languedoc."³³ Peasants there were already plowing their fields under to plant barley, which, like oats and buck-

wheat, could mature in only five months. With increasing signs of panic throughout his province, Bâville had begun in deepest secrecy to investigate the extent of available reserves.

The timing of the Great Winter of 1709 could hardly have been worse for the *Abondance* of Lyon. Much of the grain purchased by its directors was caught by the cold in transit. Supplies from Metz and Champagne were forced to winter at granaries in port towns such as Gray and Auxonne on the Saône. Supplies from Languedoc and Provence had to be stored in Arles, Tarasçon, and Beaucaire to the south. With the passing of the cold, the Lyonnais quickly discovered that it was one thing to store their grain in these cities, quite another to remove it. Even when at last they managed to pry a few barges loose in the south, their troubles were hardly over. The climb up the Rhône was a slow and tortuous process, easily blocked by any crowd large enough to overpower the men driving teams of horses with barges in tow. Should such efforts receive official sanction, the city would be lost.

For officials in these other cities and towns, however, the grain often proved a temptation they could not resist. In Valence, several kilometers south of Lyon on the Rhône, the situation in early March was desperate. The plains of lower Dauphiné from which the town ordinarily drew sustenance had proved particularly infertile in 1708. Royal munitioners had taken any meager surpluses that remained.³⁴ Desmaretz concentrated his attention on Lyon to the north and Provence to the south, leaving Dauphiné to fend for itself. At Valence, the arrival of three grain barges bound for Lyon on 17 March must, therefore, have seemed a gift from God. Citing "the pressing necessity to have grain in this city for the nourishment of the largest part of inhabitants who have absolutely none," the consuls of the town elected to "stop at once" the three barges, to "discharge all grain," and to distribute it to the population.³⁵ Delegations were sent to the intendant d'Angervilliers in Grenoble and to Lyon to explain the action. One M. de Brizeaux, a canon in the cathedral of Valence and a consul, was selected to go to Lyon.

The canon from Valence appeared before the Consulate of Lyon on 19 March. He assured the astonished *échevins* that the consuls of Valence would pay for the confiscated grain and hoped that they would accept his word on the matter. According to Ravat, the Consulate was momentarily left speechless, first that the officials of Valence or any other town would steal their grain, and second, that they

should send a representative to announce it.³⁶ When they recovered, the canon found himself imprisoned and writing to Desmaretz to plead for his release.³⁷ Valence, however, was not alone in its desperate act. At nearby Tournon, two barges had been stopped and emptied of their contents, while Arles, Tarasçon, Beaucaire, and Auxonne all refused to allow any grain to be transhipped from their granaries.³⁸ Ravat professed amazement that such actions would receive the sanction of officials in the offending towns. He warned the controller general that such acts would starve the city, which was already reduced to a one-month supply.³⁹

At Versailles, far away from the terror taking hold in the provinces, Desmaretz considered the crisis a fraud. "Most of the counsels I receive lead me to believe that the damage caused to seedlings by the cold is not nearly so great as the people fear."⁴⁰ Harking back to the advice of Daguesseau, he insisted that the enemy was the fear itself. "There are nonetheless just reasons to fear that the trouble will become real and considerable if we do not oppose strongly the thoughtless haste of several farmers to plow their fields already planted with wheat in order to plant barley or other small grains." In an effort to restore confidence and stem panic, the intendants were instructed to prohibit any reseeded of fields already planted in wheat or rye. D'Angervilliers of Dauphiné issued the order on 1 April, and Trudaine and Pinon soon followed suit.⁴¹

The royal command not to reseed met with indifferent success. The curé of Vaize reported later that there was some compliance, but that many peasants secretly plowed and reseeded under cover of night.⁴² Bernard of Mâcon observed that many terrorized peasants ignored the order altogether while the cleverest plowed and planted fallow fields, which had not been mentioned in the order.⁴³ The curé of Feurs probably reflected the general reaction to this and other such decrees from the court when he complained that "the remedies that come from there are always too late and often have to be repealed. One can say in general that those who govern do not know what they are doing."⁴⁴ Bâville reported on 7 April that such orders were too late in Languedoc. Peasants there had already plowed their wheat under.⁴⁵ Grain prices in Lyon provide further evidence that the order had little effect. The price of barley rose steeply in March from 28 livres, 10 sous per *anée* to 45 livres, a 58 percent rise that raised it far above the price of rye.⁴⁶ Such a price rise can only be explained by

the actions of peasants and *laboureurs* buying all the seed they could find to plant in place of ruined wheat and rye.

The order enjoyed no better success in reducing the rising tide of panic. Bâville wrote on the twenty-sixth that fears of shortage were already taking hold. Grain was disappearing from the trade routes, commerce slowing, and Languedoc's usually lively grain exporting cities of Narbonne, Beziers, and Agde were pleading with him to restrict exports.⁴⁷ Closer to Lyon, there was unrest in the Forez and also in the Beaujolais, where the notables of Villefranche assembled on 28 March to pool their resources in an effort to buy grain.⁴⁸ The worst trouble, however, came in Lyon itself. The city suffered its first serious rioting on 25 March.

Ravat gave a meticulous account of the trouble. It started when a "young man" appeared before the closed shop of a baker at "nine or ten o'clock" the night of the twenty-fourth and loudly demanded bread.⁴⁹ The baker answered that it was too late. His spurned customer reacted by throwing stones at the door. He was soon joined in this activity by a sizable crowd. The baker, "pressed and without any assistance, fired a gunshot which injured the young man in the arm." Alerted, Ravat rushed personally to the scene and arrested the baker for firing the gun, an action which pleased and calmed the crowd even if it did little for the baker. The *prévôt* then went home to bed in hopes he had seen the last of such disturbances. He awoke the next morning to news of crowds before several other bakeries in the city. Hurrying toward the Grenette, he encountered over 1,500 women besieging the shop of yet another baker. "I told all the women who cried for bread that I would get them some." Finding a neighboring shop open the *prévôt* "gave bread to all those who wanted it." Meanwhile, on the rue Le Plâtre, a carpenter at the head of another crowd chopped his way into a bakery with a hatchet. Ravat and his *arquebusiers* arrived in time to arrest him "coming out of the bakery with his hatchet in one hand and bread in the other." Once more, the *prévôt* distributed bread to the crowd, and once more it dispersed. He was too late, however, to stop the last crowd that gathered that day. Arriving at a bakery on the rue Bouneaux in late afternoon, "I found the poor baker, a very honest man, from whom everything had been stolen up to the mattress on his bed." Two "unhappy persons" were caught carrying his dishes, candles, and copper kettles and were arrested for theft.⁵⁰

On each occasion, Louis Ravat's primary objective was to forestall violence. For the most part, his actions consisted of giving the crowds exactly what they wanted, while at the same time endeavoring to demonstrate some measure of authority by arresting someone on the scene, be it an armed baker or an angry carpenter. Each time, too, he talked to the crowds, attempting to calm them and channel their demands into one which he as *prévôt* could supply. While he might improvise on the scene, his goal remained entirely consistent with that of every other magistrate in France: the maintenance of order at almost any cost.

Ravat blamed this particular disorder on "beggars and vagabonds who have fallen upon this city."⁵¹ He announced the resolve of the Consulate to place additional guards at the gates to keep them out. Such "beggars and vagabonds" were regularly blamed for disorder during subsistence crises under the Old Regime, and the veracity of this charge will be further explored in the next chapter. Ravat, however, also hinted at other possible causes. He noted "great misery" in the city and informed the court that the *Abondance* would begin distributing an additional 500 *anées* per week to the bakers to ensure a steady supply of bread. This last action suggests inequities in distribution that must have left some bakers short of bread. Customers used to purchasing in a single bakery might therefore find it closed and, fearing a general shortage or a case of hoarding, seek to open it by force. In addition, some who did not usually shop at bakeries, preferring to bake barley or buckwheat bread at home, must now have been forced to buy bread due to the inflated price of their usual grains at the Grenette. The rise in demand caused by these new customers could only aggravate problems of distribution.

Of course, the misery of which Ravat spoke was not confined to outsiders who crowded the city. The price of bread had increased from 1 sou per pound in the fall of 1708 to 1 sou, 6 deniers by the beginning of March.⁵² Given the wages described in chapter 1, such a price amounted to 100 percent of the effective daily wages of a silk worker with a family of four and more than 100 percent for a mason's helper. For the mason himself, bread at that price consumed 71 percent of his daily wages.

Such figures assume that all had been working regularly. Yet, as we have seen, work virtually halted during the great winter. The silk workers petitioned in February for an increase in wage rates, asking

the Consulate to take notice of "the quantity of their men with their wives and children who have requested the *aumône* even though they only arrive at that extremity after having sold most of their belongings."⁵³ They complained that work had been irregular, that they had fallen into debt to their merchants, and that these were all reasons why "very often they abandon their children and carry away their furniture without paying any rent." Their request for a 30 per cent increase in pay was turned down, however, by a Consulate painfully aware of the critical condition of the industry and of merchant houses close to bankruptcy as a result of their involvement in the debts of the royal bankers.⁵⁴ Louis Ravat may, therefore, have blamed foreign beggars for the violence of 25 March, but it seems more likely that the rioters were his own people.

The violence of late March did have the effect of galvanizing Desmaretz into action. Though he remained convinced that this was a *crise de peur* rather than a real shortage, he recognized the essential truth in the Old Regime that a crisis was a crisis no matter what the cause. He decided to make an example of Valence. Writing officially to the bishop of that town on 30 March, he announced that "the king has resolved that all grain taken by force and violence will be restored immediately."⁵⁵ Further, the consuls were "condemned to pay damages and interests" and were ordered to "present themselves immediately before the Council to give account of their conduct." The controller general counselled the officials of Valence "to obey the orders of His Majesty promptly" if they hoped for "any grace."⁵⁶ Only by making immediate restitution to Lyon and by writing obsequious letters of apology to the court, the Consulate, and the intendant of Dauphiné did the consuls escape the onerous and dangerous prospect of a trip to Versailles and public humiliation before the king.⁵⁷ Ravat was somewhat mollified by this action, but unconvinced that such an example would suffice.⁵⁸

Desmaretz, however, was occupied by problems other than the failure of crops and the growing paralysis in the grain trade. Samuel Bernard and his bank project had come to occupy most of the controller general's attention, and in this he was by no means alone. The merchants of Lyon also were watching closely as the energetic banker attempted to establish his bank while at the same time rescheduling his loans in the prolonged Payment of Saints. Unfortunately, Lyon-nais and Genevan merchants were so nervous about the advent of

the bank that Bernard suffered more than his usual problems in borrowing new funds to pay back old loans. The Payment was prolonged a total of three times and did not officially close until 3 April, one month after the next Payment, that of Kings, was scheduled to begin.⁵⁹ For each extension the Consulate publicly cited the weather, which it blamed for detaining couriers and agents.⁶⁰ In private, Ravat and Desmaretz knew that Bernard was the one and only cause, and Ravat complained that his indebtedness was ruining the Payments.⁶¹

With the additional time, Bernard and Nicolas managed gradually to reschedule their debt. To do so, however, they had to agree to extraordinary interest rates, and to promise repayment in good coin regardless of a possible devaluation. Lullin, to whom Bernard already owed 4 million livres at Saints, rescheduled his debt and lent an additional 1 million in coin in January, this time at an interest rate of 50 percent on the *quart-au-delà*. Including that transaction, he had amassed a total in mint bill securities by early February 1709 of 6,915,725 livres to go with letters from Bernard and Nicolas totalling 7,555,000.⁶² Given such an enormous sum, it is not surprising that Lullin became an ardent supporter of the bank project, even travelling to Paris to press it personally on Desmaretz.

At Versailles, Dangeau reported in his *Journal* on 15 January that an edict for the bank had been read in the Council and approved.⁶³ On the eighteenth he noted that six councillors of state had been named to sign the new bank notes on behalf of the crown and to keep a register of mint bills exchanged for bank notes.⁶⁴ In Lyon, merchants virtually ceased business in anticipation of the bank. Trudaine reported on the twenty-fourth that no one wished to lend money "because they fear reimbursement in bank notes upon which there will certainly be a loss."⁶⁵ Raymond Moulins wrote to his friend Meissonnier, "Keep hold of your money. I will sell nothing under these conditions. There are 9,000 livres due me in this payment which I plan to keep in hand whenever it arrives."⁶⁶ David Ollivier wrote to Desmaretz on the twenty-ninth that "the suspension of commerce while awaiting the royal bank is so great that there has not been a single transaction here."⁶⁷ He noted fears among merchants that the new notes would be forced upon them just as mint bills once had been, a development that could effectively kill the all-important silk trade with Italy. The only good news for debtors and creditors alike lay in the rising value of mint bills. The promise

that they might be exchanged for paper of at least marginally greater worth led to an increase in their selling price from 64 to 78 percent of their face value.⁶⁸

Few of Bernard's letters from this period have survived, but there can be little doubt of his activities. The center of his attention in late January can only have been the decision by one of his backers, the merchant Fayard of Lyon, to withdraw from the bank. Fayard had pledged 2 million of the initial 12 million livres in cash for the capitalization of the bank. Given the volume of Samuel Bernard's transactions, it is difficult to understand how such a relatively small amount could have ruined so important a scheme. Perhaps the withdrawal of Fayard symbolized a loss of confidence in the bank project of far greater import than the cash, or perhaps Bernard was so short of actual hard currency that Fayard's money was truly vital to the establishment of the bank. Whatever the reason, the news filtered into the court on 30 January when Dangeau remarked obliquely on some "difficulties" with the bank to be discussed in the Council.⁶⁹ News of Fayard's withdrawal struck Versailles on 3 February, and on the fourth, the Council of Finances shelved the project and withdrew royal sponsorship.⁷⁰

Bernard refused to give up. He continued to press Desmaretz on the bank through early February, but the controller general proved unresponsive and distrustful, and demanded to inspect the banker's accounts.⁷¹ Bernard dispatched them on the eleventh accompanied by a letter tinged with bitterness.⁷² The bank, he maintained, would have been "an infallible means to facilitate your affairs and maintain mine." Now, he warned, "my credit will suffer infinitely if you have not the goodness to find some device for putting me in a state to sustain it." As before, he predicted the ruin of "an infinity of others" should he default.

For Bernard's creditors in Lyon, the snows of February could hardly match the chill they felt when they inspected their own accounts. Rumors were rife through the month that the bank would not be established, and worse, that Desmaretz had elected to abandon Samuel Bernard to his fate.⁷³ Trudaine worried on the twelfth about a further decline in the value of both Bernard's letters and the mint bills that backed so many of them.⁷⁴ He warned that the banker's fall would cause "the fall of many good houses and ruin the credit of the king" not to mention a "great disorder to manufactures

and all sorts of commerce" in Lyon. The upcoming Payment of Kings, he wrote, "causes me to tremble." He dispatched several detailed plans to the controller general proposing to repay the banker over a series of years from royal revenues in the Lyonnais and pleaded for some sort of public declaration of confidence in Bernard from the crown.⁷⁵ Aware that his beloved bank project was dead for the foreseeable future, Bernard worked with his Lyonnais correspondent, Castan, to see how he could get through the Payment of Kings, then scheduled to begin the first of March.

Castan's absence from Lyon so close to the opening of the Payment caused consternation in the city. Trudaine wrote on 26 February that Castan must be present to accept Bernard's letters if total disaster was to be averted.⁷⁶ As the Payment approached, however, it became clear to Bernard and Castan that they could not make good on their loans. On the twenty-fifth, only four days before the payment was to begin, they requested that it be put off for one month.⁷⁷

This extraordinary request arrived in Lyon on the last day of February. While the Consulate had been willing, albeit reluctantly, to grant extensions of payments, it had very seldom been asked to postpone one altogether. That such a request should arrive at the eleventh hour only irritated the *échevins* all the more. Ravat called the Consulate into session at nine o'clock in the evening on the twenty-eighth, reporting to the controller general that they had agreed to the postponement.⁷⁸ "We are assured," he grumbled, "that you did not desire this assistance for M's. Bernard and Nicolas without being certain of funds." Once again the weather was the official public culprit, but no one was fooled. When Ravat addressed the merchants at the ceremony on 1 March to tell them of the postponement, he spoke to men who knew the situation only too well.

One can imagine the tension, the desperation of many merchants and bankers as they gathered for the ceremony in the Place de Change to hear the *prévôt* speak. "I spoke to them a long time. I told them that it was their interests which had moved us to this act . . . that I knew that the largest part of those listening to me were in no condition to make loans."⁷⁹ After his speech, which Trudaine termed "very wise and prudent," Ravat reported that an old *syndic* of the merchants approached him, "thanked me, and told me of the confidence that all had in you, Monseigneur." The old man told the *prévôt* "that they had to be persuaded that the postponement . . . was

only to make things easier and that they hoped that those who had no money to lend at present would not lack funds the following month." "There is no one," he concluded, "who is not directly or indirectly engaged with Bernard, some for large sums." Even those like Raymond Moulins, who had not involved themselves in the royal debt, knew perfectly well why the payment had been put off. "The rarity of money is a cause as well as the royal bankers who owe considerable sums in this payment for which they lack the funds."⁸⁰ Only the Italians were upset by the postponement, and some threatened to demand payment in March anyway. Trudaine believed, however, that they could be mollified.⁸¹

The postponement cannot have fostered much hope that Bernard could be saved. Confidence in his credit depended on his influence at court. The failure of his bank project eroded that confidence, and Desmaretz did little to restore it. Villeroi and others pleaded with the controller general to give the banker some kind of aid, while Trudaine supplied detailed proposals for repayment from various royal revenues. Desmaretz decided, however, to give the banker only the barest minimum that he deemed necessary to help Bernard to get through the Payment of Kings.⁸² He promised 10 million livres in *assignments* but at the same time appointed royal commissioners to examine the banker's accounts. It was hardly an overwhelming signal of confidence.

As Desmaretz turned his back, so too did Bernard's major creditors. Lullin began busily selling both his mint bills and his letters from Bernard in late February, reducing his totals of 7.5 million in letters to 3.5 million and 6.9 million in bills to 2.4 million.⁸³ Unfortunately for Samuel Bernard, Lullin made no effort to sell letters and bills together. By separating them, he effectively separated loans from the securities that backed them, creating an imbalance which was to have catastrophic consequences in April. Castan also speculated on mint bills from Bernard, selling short in hopes of buying greater quantities at a lower price. Such behavior on the part of his major creditors only confirmed others in their determination to demand full payment at Kings without any rescheduling or restructuring. So sure, however, were many bankers of receiving payment in mint bills rather than in coin, that they engaged in a form of speculation called "*Roix pour Roix*," promising bills they did not yet have to other bankers in exchange for coin at a loss on the bills of between 20 and 25 per-

cent.⁸⁴ It never occurred to them that Bernard might not even be able to make good with mint bills.

Bernard meanwhile prepared to do exactly that. Armed only with the 10 million livres in *assignments* given him by Desmaretz, he assumed that he could make good after he received the mint bills connected as securities to his letters. *Assignations* and mint bills together would suffice to get him through as long as his creditors agreed to accept paper in payment. He believed that his creditors would have little choice but to accept whatever he offered. On 23 March he wrote confidently to Desmaretz, "I have worked without respite with M. Castan, my correspondent in Lyon, to settle my accounts. We finished them today and he will depart tomorrow for Lyon in order to be present at the opening of the payment."⁸⁵

The Great Winter of 1709 had abated, but the crisis had only begun. A severe grain shortage, with all its attendant terrors and miseries, stretched ominously before the people and officials of Lyon. Ravat and his colleagues faced the task of prying grain loose from populations at the edge of starvation, of flushing a rising tide of rural peasants from their city, of feeding an increasingly restive citizenry. As if such a challenge were insufficient, they were soon to experience a severe financial crisis, entailing a collapse in the city's economy, high unemployment, and a severe blow to Lyon's financial resources and power. The two crises were like two trains hurtling toward each other in the dead of night. April promised a collision that would shake the city to its foundations.

Crisis of Collision

Bertrand Castan arrived in Lyon in time for the opening of the delayed Payment of Kings on 3 April.¹ As the first phase of the payment, the *acceptations* got under way, he was deluged by creditors demanding cash payment on their loans to Bernard. Castan instantly terrorized them by refusing to accept any letter on Bernard until the arrival of Lullin.² According to the plan hatched by Castan and Bernard in Paris, the mint bills attached to Lullin's letters were to form a substantial portion of the paper assets that would be forced on creditors in a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. Having been so long in Paris, Castan and Bernard seem both to have been totally unaware that Lullin had been busily divesting himself of the very mint bills upon which both bankers were depending.³

If Lullin's arrival on 7 April provided any comfort to those awaiting him, it was short lived. We can only imagine Castan's horror when he met with the Genevan banker and realized the scope of the disaster. In selling Bernard's letters and securities to various buyers, Lullin had separated them. Those holding mint bills that had been separated from letters felt no obligation to present them to Castan at the Payment. The bills were simply royal credit instruments. Their holders lacked any financial link to Bernard. Creditors holding letters, however, presented them *en masse*, demanding coin and refusing to reschedule. Without the mint bills, however, Castan lacked any means of paying the immense sums now demanded. On 8 April, having procrastinated as long as he could, Bertrand Castan declared himself unable to accept and sign any letter of exchange on Samuel Bernard.⁴ The greatest banker in France, the draper who had toured the gardens of Marly with the king himself, who had boasted of main-

taining singlehandedly the solvency of the royal government and the royal war effort, had defaulted.

The Payment of Kings collapsed. Ravat reported "a disorder so great that it is nearly impossible to describe. . . . The credit of Lyon is absolutely ruined inside the realm and in foreign countries."⁵ Mint bills immediately tumbled to half their face value. No official exchange rates could be fixed because there was no money to be had at any price.⁶ Demands for payment from Castan and Bernard multiplied so fast that one of Lyon's notaries had forms printed especially for the purpose. Trudaine was soon forced to issue a two-month moratorium on prosecutions until the mess could be disentangled.⁷

Bernard insisted that the whole business could be cleared up if those holding his mint bills would surrender them, since in his opinion they held them fraudulently.⁸ Those who had not separated letters and bills could be paid with the bills they held as securities, while merchants holding letters unsecured by mint bills could be paid with the royal *assignments* Bernard had secured from Desmaretz.⁹ Unhappily for Bernard, his creditors wanted no paper of any kind and continued to press for payment in coin. Many looked to Versailles, hoping that the royal government would bail out the banker upon whom so many of them assumed it was totally dependent. Couriers carrying letters from Desmaretz to the Consulate were followed to the Hôtel de Ville by anxious creditors.¹⁰ The controller general offered little solace, however, and contented himself with advising the need for time, consultation, and negotiation.¹¹ While Ravat attempted to negotiate with Bernard's creditors, Trudaine left for the capital to consult personally with Desmaretz.¹²

The expected string of defaults by merchants began almost immediately. Lacking payment from Bernard, house after house suspended payments, widening the circle of those affected by Bernard's default. The effect was particularly severe in Geneva, where the magistrates were forced to suspend negotiations in April rather than suffer a mass of bankruptcies that might destroy the city's economy.¹³ In Lyon, one of the merchants wounded by the default, Sieur Archembaud, wrote Desmaretz of the disastrous impact on the city's economy and industry. There was, he wrote, no credit and no cash. Merchants dependent on the Payments for both could neither buy materials nor pay their workers. Merchants who had come to buy finished silk and other products could not do so. The result, wrote

TABLE 6.1 Comparison of wine imports during 1709 and 1703-1706, in *anées* of wine

	1703-1706 ^a	1709
January	30,606	10,102
February	6,761	5,672
March	9,555	9,289
April	27,591	44,755
May	15,871	7,455
June	5,080	3,822
July	4,877	4,335
August	11,566	12,328
September	4,727	2,849
October	11,333	2,300
November	46,491	14,553
December	10,923	2,726
Total	185,381	120,186

^aNumbers are mean amounts for the four-year period
Source: Accounts of the Hôtel-Dieu

Archembaud, "is the almost total ruin of producers, workers, artisans and others."¹⁴

As the financial crisis converged with the food shortage, a collapse in demand for any product save bread exacerbated the economic debacle. "There is no demand, nor will there be for a long time," wrote Raymond Moulins. "All think only of bread. Since my last letter I have sold only two balls of silk."¹⁵ With no demand and no credit, the merchants of Lyon were forced to abandon their contracting artisans. Ravat concluded sadly, "Artisans and people have fallen into such misery that they fill the streets as if it were a feast day. There is no work at all. The merchants who employ them have nothing with which to pay them."¹⁶


The mounting misery in the city manifested itself in many ways. Some were as subtle as a decline in Lyon's usually hefty wine consumption, others as overt as an increase in criminal behavior. Evidence for both comes from the accounts of the hospitals, which collected 3 sous for every *anée* of wine imported into the city and one-third of all fines levied by the *tribunal de police*.¹⁷ As table 6.1 demonstrates, the volume of wine imported into Lyon was below normal in January and February (a symptom of the Great Winter), normal

in March, and high in April. April arrivals reflected orders placed earlier, before the rivers cleared of ice and in anticipation of the usual post-Lenten demand. In May, however, the numbers fell off severely and continued well below normal for the remainder of the year.¹⁸ Lyonnais artisans obviously could not afford wine when every sou had to be saved for bread.

The increased volume of fines levied by the city suggests that criminal activity increased. The *Charité* listed its third of all municipal fines in the accounts as six-month totals. The mean amount collected by the city for the first six months in the noncrisis years, 1704–1707 and 1711–1714, was 414 livres. From January to June 1709, by contrast, the city collected 1,386 livres in fines, triple its normal amount.¹⁹ While such a number is admittedly a rough and ambiguous measure—the dearth of judicial records from the city during this period prevents any detailed analysis of the crimes committed or the criminals who committed them—a rise in such behavior is nevertheless indicated.²⁰

Another and far more telling measure of the misery induced by the crisis can be found in the registers of the *Hôtel-Dieu*. Each morning infants and small children abandoned at the door of the hospital were taken in and inscribed in its “Journal de Réception.” Others were carried in by notables at whose doors they had been exposed, and they too were processed into the hospital. In each case, the meager wrappings were carefully described and any attached notes just as carefully copied. The notes were themselves microcosms of the crisis. “This girl is called Claudine, aged three years. Necessity obliges me to expose her. I hope when the times change to get her back.”²¹ Another, attached to a one-year-old baby, was briefer. “Jean-Baptiste, son of a master silk worker. The charge of six children obliges me to leave him.”²² Claudine was rebaptised under the name Josette Jorjard and sent to foster parents in the rural parish of Saint-Cire de Valorge. One of the lucky ones, she survived to be turned over to the *Charité* in 1713. Little Jean-Baptiste was rebaptised as Louis Danger. He died on the last day of August in the crisis year.²³ They were but two of hundreds abandoned during the Great Winter and Famine of 1709 in Lyon. Some of those abandoned in Lyon were not from the city at all, but had been carried in by rural parents desperate for food. It is one of the most extraordinary ironies of the crisis that these children were immediately dispatched back into the barren countryside to foster parents or wetnurses where many died for lack of sustenance.²⁴

FIG. 6.1 Number of children abandoned each month in Lyon, 1708-1710.



Source: Archives of the Hôtel-Dieu.

Figure 6.1 illustrates this atrocity, showing a steady climb in the numbers of abandoned children leading to an explosion in April and a peak in July. Based on these figures alone, it would be entirely appropriate to mark 3 April 1709 as the last "good day" of the crisis year. That night no children were abandoned in the dense alleys and dark corridors of Lyon. It was to be the last such night for seven terrible months.²⁵

Indeed, the misery in Lyon did not approach that in the country. In a pattern nearly as old as agriculture itself, large numbers of peasants deserted barren fields in late March and April and hit the roads in search of food. Many came to Lyon and sought out the intendant. Wrote Trudaine:

Troops of peasants come every day to my house from different parishes near and far to beg for bread. . . There appears in the minds of the peasants a design to abandon all because there is little hope for the harvest and because they fear high taxes. It pierces the heart to see and hear them, and everything they say is true. They are already gathering into crowds in several places and are breaking down the doors of houses to take food. Soldiers of the *maréchaussée* are all in the countryside [but] they lack the strength to calm the disorders.²⁶

Rumors of violence in the countryside inspired terror in the towns, for it was upon the towns that the rural poor fell in great numbers. Only there might they find food in some form, perhaps at a market or from the charitable hands of a kindly bourgeois. As the deluge descended upon them in April, officials in towns all over Burgundy and the southeast acted to stop it with whatever means they possessed. For them, the rural poor were not simply miserable wretches in search of food, but a dark and dangerous mob who brought nothing but violence and disease. Worse, they threatened to swamp the meager resources available to those poor who were properly town residents.²⁷

The difference in perspective between town and country could be quite striking. When eight peasants gathered before the closed gates of Belleville on 6 April, they were arrested and charged with gathering into a mob armed with pitchforks, clubs, and guns. One of those arrested, a 45-year-old vinegrower named Étienne du Riz, was interrogated after arrest. Had he gathered with the others and armed himself to steal in the town? "Answered that having neither bread nor flour he went with several others to Belleville to buy grain but not to steal it and that he had not entered the town; said he had no gun or a pitchfork; said he had only a staff. Asked why he was arrested, said that while awaiting the opening of the gates of Belleville the *prévôt* arrived and took him with seven or eight others and made them prisoner."²⁸ To the officials of Belleville, Étienne du Riz constituted a threat.

Everywhere the reaction was similar. The inhabitants of Feurs,

Gray, Charlieu, Villefranche, Bresse, and many other towns moved to repair their walls and post guards at the gates.²⁹ Chalons enacted a 10:00 P.M. curfew and arrested as a vagabond anyone found in the streets afterward.³⁰ Every town made efforts to expel the rural poor, warning them of dire consequences should they try to return. The magistrates of Gray ordered that every individual expelled from the town be "marked" so that he or she might be identified upon any attempt to return.³¹ Officials at Mâcon carried out their threat with dreadful ferocity. Twelve peasants convicted of fomenting disorder were executed there in late April, and their bodies were hung at intersections in the roads leading to the town as a warning against others.³²

As they repaired their walls and closed their gates, the towns of France came to resemble fortresses in a desert of despair. Beyond the walls, the roads became unsafe as the line between begging and extortion faded, then disappeared. Not even the great were secure. Dangeau reported that the Dauphin himself was accosted on the roads by a crowd begging for bread. "He threw them a great deal of money," wrote Dangeau, "and hurried on his way."³³ The small also suffered the fear of violence. Those peasants who did not flee their land often were forced to arm themselves against those who sought to take their dwindling reserves, leading the bishop of Chalons to write Desmaretz of "the beginning of a civil war" in the countryside.³⁴ The curé of Thisy reported the disappearance of cats and dogs to feed an increasingly ravenous hunger. Other curés and officials were horrified to see children grazing in the fields like cattle.³⁵ Makeshift villages sprang up in woods along the routes and became centers for the spread of disease. Creeks and ditches used both for the elimination of human wastes and the quenching of thirst came alive with the bacteria of typhoid fever. Just as town officials feared, the epidemic arrived with the poor. Bodies were strewn in the streets of Mâcon in April, and the fever spread southward into the Beaujolais and the Forez.³⁶ Like many of his colleagues, the curé of Thisy was overwhelmed by the death of his parishioners. "Being on foot night and day for the administration of the sacraments, I was unable to inscribe the names of 150 who had died."³⁷

As they tried to shut out the misery beyond their walls, the towns had yet to cope with their own poor and destitute. Since formal institutions for poor relief were relatively rare, the practice in many towns was to collect the poor and divide them among their more


comfortable citizens. Each of the "gens aisés" would then be responsible for feeding and protecting his assigned group. This became the dominant pattern after a royal declaration of 27 April, the first public recognition by the royal government of the suffering, required that the bourgeois of every town tax themselves to aid the poor.³⁸ Inevitably, the number of those requiring aid overwhelmed those able to give it.

Bernard of Mâcon reported that the poor of that town were distributed in late April, but that there were still over 150 in need after every bourgeois had taken his maximum. A special fund had to be established to try to feed them.³⁹ In Charlieu, efforts to distribute the burden were unsuccessful. In a postscript to the order assigning each citizen his share, the secretary wrote that "instead of doing that which was required of them . . . they [the bourgeois] not only refused to receive the poor and give them food, but even mistreated them."⁴⁰ In Villefranche, the magistrates simply threw up their hands. With the price of bread at 3½ sous per pound, the bourgeois had little for themselves and their families, let alone enough for over 600 of the destitute.⁴¹

Even where there were institutions designed to help, they were quickly swamped in a sea of desperation. A small register of bread distributions survives from the *Charité* of Saint-Étienne, a town several kilometers southwest of Lyon. In orderly fashion, it notes the number of pounds of bread distributed to the poor each week beginning early in 1704 and continuing into the crisis year. As figure 6.2 illustrates, the amount of bread distributed rose steadily from January through March 1709, then jumped in April to three times its January level. In May the *Charité* began special distributions for those who had fallen upon the town from the countryside, but the strain was too great. Running out of grain, the hospital was forced to distribute only money in August, and when that too was exhausted, there was nothing left to give. The numbers toward the end of the register, marked down quickly and smeared by errors and corrections, simply stop after 14 August, abandoning the reader to the stark eloquence of blank pages.⁴²

With the towns closing their gates and threatening trespassers, with institutions and individuals unable or unwilling to provide any relief, more and more of the rural poor streamed toward the great city. Famous for its *Aumône-Générale*, for its commercial wealth, for the size and quantity of its granaries, Lyon could not avoid acting as

FIG. 6.2 Pounds of bread distributed each month by the *Charité de Saint-Étienne*, 1708-1709.



Source: Archives of the *Charité de Saint-Étienne*.

a huge regional magnet. Ravat had already blamed the rising tide of "beggars and vagabonds" for the disorders of 25 March, and the Consulate had already reacted by resuscitating the usually ceremonial watch and increasing its number from fifty to sixty men, all of them posted at the gates.⁴³ On 3 April the controller general urged the city "to hold fast in preventing the entry into the city of Lyon of beggars

from outside" and ordered that they be "sent back to their original residence."⁴⁴ While the magistrates hardly needed such tardy advice, they may have appreciated this tacit promise of royal support for whatever measures they might deem fit.

On Sunday, 7 April, the directors of the *Abondance* met with the *échevins* and several former officials at the home of the *prévôt* to set a strategy for dealing with the crisis. A document in the records of the *Abondance* lists the issues discussed and the decisions made.⁴⁵ Unfortunately, it does not detail the discussion itself, which might at times have been heated. The issues were clearly stated in the form of propositions: Should the city allow bread to be taken outside the walls? Should the bakers be restricted to baking only one or two types of bread? What should be done to bakers who sell their *Abondance* grain for profit or who make bread of inferior quality? Should declarations of private grain stocks be required? What penalties should be exacted on those attempting to take grain beyond the walls? If the harvest is as bad as expected, what should be done about ensuring supplies over the long term? Finally, what measures should be taken to protect the security of the city and "get rid of strangers and above all vagabonds and beggars?"⁴⁶

The assembled notables decided to leave the question of bread exporting to the discretion of the *prévôt*. Before restricting the bakers to any one type of bread, they elected to conduct an experiment to see which kind of bread utilized the available grain most efficiently. Bakers selling their grain or making "bad" bread were to be fined 100 livres for the first offense, a larger fine and corporal punishment for the next. Any grain taken outside the walls was to be confiscated. A committee of four was appointed to study the problem of long-term grain procurement and report to the Consulate with a plan. Finally, the foreign poor would be ordered out. The rectors of the *Charité* would be charged to send their Swiss daily "into the churches and into the streets in order to seize all the foreign poor and take them to the *Charité*. On the next day they would be put out of the city with warnings not to come back under penalty of being judged as vagabonds."⁴⁷ The assembly deemed it appropriate to pay the *Charité* 5 sous per head for this service.

The discussions of the seventh led directly to the consular *ordonnance* of 10 April. Complaining explicitly that the rural poor "consume a part of the food of the poor of this city," the Consulate gave

them twenty-four hours to leave. The city further prohibited innkeepers from housing anyone "of this quality" on pain of a 100-livre fine, ordered all boatmen to chain their boats from 6:00 P.M. to 6:00 A.M. on pain of prison, and commanded the officers of the *penons* to arrest unknown strangers of either sex, day or night, and conduct them to the *Cbarité*. Finally, the magistrates ordered a census taken of the city and a full declaration of all grain supplies, including those of all religious establishments.⁴⁸ In outline, the strategy of the Consulate as it emerged at the beginning of April was twofold. Non-Lyonnais would be expelled and the city cleared. Lyonnais would then be identified and counted along with their grain. Armed with both security and hard data, the Consulate could then more competently plan the city's survival.

The good intentions of the *ordonnance* of 10 April collided immediately with the realities of a porous city. Lyon had never—could never—close its gates. For a city founded upon the movement of people and goods, such a proposition was impossible. Ravat himself admitted as much in a letter of 4 May. Noting the failure to keep out the rural poor, he regretted that it was something "we cannot stop without closing our gates, and that would cause a scandal in foreign countries which would not be advantageous to the realm"—or, he might have added, to the already wounded economy of Lyon.⁴⁹ With the gates open, those desperate to enter used every possible subterfuge to get by the clerks and watchmen. Most entered, according to Ravat, "under the pretext of carrying in goods." Others simply scrambled over the often low and easily scaled walls. "Desolation in the country is so frightful that it is not necessary to punish these unhappy people when they are caught lying."⁵⁰ It was enough punishment, concluded Ravat, simply to throw them out.

If the city could not keep out all of the rural poor, it could at least try to deny them the food they sought. All through April, the officials of the *penons* drew up the census upon which future procurements and distributions would be based. On 18 April, directors of the *Abondance* watched while the bakers of the *Cbarité* carefully experimented with two *bichets* of grain, one from Burgundy, the other from Provence. They found, not surprisingly, that more bread could be made if no bran and no rough wheat flour were excluded from the process; one *bichet* from either region could then make approximately eighty pounds of bread divided into thirteen six-pound

loaves.⁵¹ By 23 April the census was complete. It showed a total population of 87,689, of whom 20,529 had access to private grain stocks of varying quantities. Not counting the stocks of the *Abondance*, there were 5,803 *anées* of grain and flour in the city, enough to feed the counted population for thirty-one days at one pound per day per person.⁵² Armed with this new information, the notables again assembled on 23 April for another strategy session. They decided this time to restrict all bakers save five to making "pain à tout," Lyon's famous dark bread, and to raise the price to 2 sous per pound to defray their own mounting costs.⁵³ The five bakers exempted from this regulation would be allowed to make white bread for those who wished to provide the grain or pay the market price, but would receive no *Abondance* grain. To make sure that only residents received the bread, each family would receive a ration card entitling each family member to one pound of bread per day to be purchased from an assigned baker. Once again, the notables determined to "speak to Messieurs of the *Charité*" about rounding up the rural poor. This time, unaccountably, they decided to pay only one sou per head.⁵⁴

The session of 23 April, like that of the seventh, was codified into an *ordonnance* issued the thirtieth. The city printed ration cards and delivered them to each family. Henceforth, no more than eight persons at a time would be allowed to congregate before any one bakery, and none after 7:00 P.M. For their part, the bakers were strictly ordered not to mix or weight their flour or to sell the bread warm, when it was heaviest and therefore most expensive.⁵⁵ The mills were locked in an effort to keep millers from filtering bran out of the flour, thus ensuring that only black bread would be produced. A police *ordonnance* of the same date ordered those with private stocks of grain to exhaust those and give eight days prior notice before tapping into the rationing system.⁵⁶

In rationing their bread at 2 sous per pound, the magistrates of Lyon placed great faith in the *Aumône-Générale* to forestall disorder. Even for a skilled mason earning 18 sous per working day, bread at that price for a family of four consumed 85 percent of his daily wages. If, as he was bound to do, he reduced his family's consumption to the rationed amount of one pound of bread per person per day, his cost could be reduced to 60 percent. That was manageable as long as he was working, but as we have seen, few were working. With the credit market in chaos and demand for products near zero, merchants

could not afford to pay artisans, and municipal employers such as the hospitals were overwhelmed by the tide of native and rural poor. The only answer for skilled and unskilled alike lay with the *Aumône*.

Unfortunately, there are no specific records of bread distribution by the *Aumône* for this period.⁵⁷ Records of correspondence from the *Charité* are likewise thin, but a letter from the hospital to Desmaretz late in May begging for his help in procuring grain does supply a number. The rectors announced that there were 1,800 enclosed within the hospital, and that they were distributing 59,000 to 60,000 pounds of bread per week through the *Aumône-Générale*.⁵⁸ Such an amount would have been sufficient to support anywhere from 10,000 to 15,000 supplicants per week depending on the number of children in various families and the amount allowed by the *Charité* for each.⁵⁹ When exactly the deluge began can be gleaned from the records of grain purchases. The *Charité* habitually purchased its grain from a small group of Burgundian grain merchants. The hospital contracted for each year's supplies in the autumn, supplementing those with additional purchases when they became necessary. In 1709, the *Charité* was able to get by with supplies purchased in 1708 until April. In that month, however, it began quite suddenly and feverishly to buy grain wherever it could be found and at whatever price.⁶⁰ For the people of Lyon, April truly inaugurated a spring of discontent.

How much of this "free" bread made its way to the rural poor cannot be known. The safeguards discussed in the first chapter probably sufficed to limit the number of non-Lyonnais receiving aid, though some who lived close enough to the city to know it well and speak with its accent might have escaped the scrutiny of the hard-pressed rectors. The *passade*, the small measure of charity distributed to outsiders, did increase during the crisis year. It nearly doubled from its average of 1,353 offerings in the noncrisis years 1703-1706 to 2,353 in 1709. Yet, such a rise is hardly comparable to that experienced by the *Charité* of Saint-Étienne for the same period and almost certainly indicates successful efforts to restrict the number of those receiving it.⁶¹

The sudden demand on the *Aumône-Générale* in April inspired a feverish search for grain. Likewise, the decision by the city to ration bread was not entirely the result of a need to confine supplies to proper residents, but was also a reaction to continuing paralysis in the grain trade. Never had Lyon's geographic isolation from grain-

rich provinces proven so severe, and never had the need for grain by urban and charitable institutions alike been so great.

Grain procurement had already brought the city into direct conflict with neighboring towns and provinces at the end of 1708 and the beginning of 1709. The seizure of grain at Valence and Tournon was only the first of several incidents. Ravat complained repeatedly in early April of rumors that stoppages were imminent the length of the Saône.⁶² He was particularly worried about the situation in Auxonne and Gray to the north, where several thousand *anées* of grain from Metz were stored. The problem, as always, was to load and move the grain without interference, and the city kept up a constant pressure on Desmaretz to insure cooperation from the intendants.

Unfortunately, their cooperation was seldom adequate. An *ordonnance* issued 3 April by the intendant Le Guerchois prohibiting interference with the movement of grain in Franche-Comté offers a good example. Upon seeing the *ordonnance* posted in Gray, a crowd of women stormed the house of the royal subdelegate who, according to an observer on the scene, "would have been killed if he had not hidden in the house of a friend."⁶³ From there they went to the house of one Demonçeau, the *lieutenant-général* who hastily promised to procure grain for them if they would wait until the next day. Unsatisfied with the delay, they charged directly to the docks by the river where they hurled insults and threw rocks at a small detachment of soldiers guarding the granaries. The officials of Gray finally surrendered to the ever-increasing number of townspeople, agreeing to unload a barge bound for Lyon and distribute the grain to the crowd.⁶⁴ Such violence set the authorities of Gray on a firm course of procrastination about liberating any more grain for Lyon. Further orders from Le Guerchois only provoked delegations from the town pleading with him to change his mind.⁶⁵

In Auxonne also, boatmen attempting to load and move grain were "threatened by armed people."⁶⁶ The town sent an *échevin* to plead its case with the intendant Pinon, but the latter reacted by arresting the official and determined to go himself to Auxonne to oversee the loading of the grain. Unhappily, such laudable courage abandoned the intendant once he arrived to confront the angry Auxonnois. Bernard of Mâcon, whose city also had grain stranded in Auxonne, reported that Pinon "went himself to reestablish the trade,

but left quickly because of the fear, or so they say, of not being safe; the grain was not dispatched."⁶⁷ Stern recriminations and orders from the controller general were insufficient to send Pinon again to Auxonne.⁶⁸

The refusal of Burgundians inside their towns and out to allow the export of grain was hardly surprising given the suffering and misery engendered by the crisis. Their resistance was given special force, however, by the fact that it was Lyonnais grain they were holding. Traditional resentments towards the city reenforced popular determination to prevent the export of grain, and this hostility was mirrored in the attitudes of Burgundian officials. All complained ceaselessly about the city's avarice, its apparent greed, and the supposed plenty in its granaries. "We see many grain boats pass by here bound for the *Abondance* of Lyon," wrote the bishop of Mâcon. "I have stopped a large number of peasants who wanted the grain, but I cannot promise to contain them again; I know, Monsieur, that the granaries of the *Abondance* are full of grain, and it is hard to see them laying in stock beyond their needs when we have none."⁶⁹ The bishop of Chalons concurred in this opinion, writing on the twelfth that

this one city [Lyon] has twice the grain it needs for several years. The granaries of the hospital and those of the *Abondance* are full. . . . This rich city which does not lack men seeking profit, has carried off all the grain from Bassigny, from Lorraine, from all of Burgundy, and from the city of Chalons. . . . Meanwhile, all the cities and villages of Burgundy suffer.⁷⁰

Though Desmaretz reacted to these and other complaints by defending the city and its needs, though Lyon itself dispatched former *échevins* to lobby the relevant intendants, none could possibly have convinced the Burgundians that they should starve so that Lyon might eat.⁷¹


The south told a similar story. Explicit orders from Le Bret to officials in Arles and Tarasçon in early April to release stocks of grain stored for Lyon met with procrastination and haggling over the exact amounts.⁷² Barthalon, the city's agent in Provence, had to agree to sell some of its grain in Arles in order to move any up the river.⁷³ Only in Beaucaire did the Lyonnais have any luck. An effort by officials there to stop a boat bound for Lyon met with swift action from

Bâville, who arrested the first consul of the town and saw to it that the barge was reloaded and sent on its way.⁷⁴

Ravat would have been surprised by the statements of the bishops of Mâcon and Chalons concerning the city's supposed wealth in grain. Through April, the *Abondance* managed to retain a reserve large enough to last one month.⁷⁵ Given the situation in both north and south, such a cushion gave no comfort at all to the Consulate, and reports from the Grenette were even less consoling. On 6 April the price of wheat rose to 60 livres per *anée*. One week later, it had risen to 72 livres. On the twentieth it reached 84 livres. By the end of May, as figure 6.3 illustrates, the public market price peaked at 102 livres per *anée*, a 500 percent increase over the mean in the noncrisis years, 1703–1707 and 1711–1715. Since the price of rye and other grains lagged only slightly behind the price of wheat, the Lyonnais had no choice but to depend on the *Abondance* for most of their bread.⁷⁶ Of course, while high prices certainly indicated difficulties suffered by merchants in procuring grain, they more clearly represented the intrusion of the *Abondance* into the provisioning system. Those Burgundian merchants with available stocks were selling most of their grain to the institution. The *Abondance* in turn subsidized lower prices to the bakers, all of which made the Grenette an unprofitable market, especially given the dangers and difficulties of transporting any grain at all to the city. No private merchant could possibly afford the losses incurred by the city on every *anée* of grain it purchased, and few bothered to compete by selling grain in its market. Thus, the impact of the public market price was for the most part psychological. Only Lyon's richest citizens would or could pay such a price.

Worrisome though they may have been, skyrocketing prices at the Grenette did not occupy nearly as much attention at the Hôtel de Ville as the increasing pessimism of the controller general. Desmaretz had continued stubbornly to believe through early April that the winter wheat crop would arrive more or less intact, but his intendants subjected him to a constant, daily barrage of letters arguing the opposite point of view. Their correspondence bulged with accounts of riots and disorders, of empty markets, of starving peasants and desperate towns, of a crop lost and gone forever. By mid April, he had begun to believe them. When Trudaine wrote him what had become a standard letter from Lyon asking his help again in liberating the city's grain from various places, he wavered in his support.

FIG. 6.3 Prices of wheat and rye on the Grenette of Lyon, February-October 1709, in livres per *anée*.



Source: *Deliberations of the Consulate*.

"You will easily understand the little support that your department can expect from neighboring provinces." Pinon of Burgundy and d'Harouys of Champagne were both pleading with him to prohibit any exports "and indeed the shortage is even greater in several districts of Burgundy than it is in the Lyonnais."⁷⁷ By the twenty-third

he had abandoned hope of the winter wheat crop and finally lifted his order barring reseeding in small grains—barley, buckwheat, and oats.⁷⁸

The Lyonnais knew full well how bad the situation was in neighboring provinces. Their correspondents kept them well informed, but they could never admit the misery of the provinces upon which they depended for grain, especially to the controller general. Such an admission could only have reenforced the actions and opinions of those who wished to freeze the movement of grain, dooming the city to isolation and starvation. Indeed, the Consulate had depended on the controller general's chimerical belief in a hidden grain crop, because they knew it motivated him to keep the trade moving. Desmaretz's increasing "loss of faith" on top of paralysis in supply, the continued flooding of the city by the rural poor, and the misery induced by unemployment, all threatened Lyon with a real famine.

That danger was so real, in fact, that Louis Ravat invoked it in his most anguished letter to Versailles. "The intendants act against the orders of the court distributing grain to the people even though we did not even buy the seized grain in their provinces. It is no longer a question of discussing rights, Monseigneur; we do not have the time. We are in famine if you have no pity for us. The hardship is great and it increases every day." The actions of royal officials, he warned, "will destroy the second city of the realm; and I dare say it is not to the good of the state to suffer that event."⁷⁹

Villeroy, through whom most of the Consulate's correspondence with Versailles was channelled, watched all this with rising anger. The time had come, he believed, for military action. If unadorned royal authority as exercised by the controller general and his intendants was insufficient to get the city its grain, then royal bayonets might prove more effective. He appears to have reached this conclusion sometime around 18 or 19 April.⁸⁰ On the twentieth he wrote Rochebonne with crisp orders: "The Lyon Regiment departs tomorrow for Lyon. Detach 300 men with the two companies of grenadiers to compose this number." He ordered Rochebonne to divide the detachment, sending one part down the Rhône, the other up the Saône. He instructed him also to write the intendants in the targeted provinces with requests for supplies.⁸¹ Villeroy wrote the same day to Desmaretz, informing him of his decision and announcing that he had established a special courier service to speed correspondence

between city and court.⁸² Desmaretz raised no objection to the use of force.⁸³

Ravat and his colleagues were revived by this apparent deliverance. The regiment had no sooner arrived in Lyon on the twenty-sixth than it was dispatched the next day to its destination.⁸⁴ Its purpose was to prevent or suppress any efforts on the part of native populations in the towns along both rivers to block the loading and shipment of the city's grain. In only two days the soldiers reached Gray, where flustered officials dipped into *Abondance* grain to feed them and sent yet another delegation to the intendant in Besançon asking to keep the grain.⁸⁵ Le Guerchois ordered it liberated forthwith, and the *quittances* releasing it were finally signed by the consuls of the town on 5 May.⁸⁶ By that time, part of the detachment had already travelled to Auxonne, whence it accompanied some 1,200 *anées* of wheat down the Saône to Lyon.⁸⁷ Including the grain from Gray, the city was able to move 9,218 *anées* down the Saône in late April and early May, enough to feed the Lyonnais for at least six weeks.⁸⁸ Troops in the south, however, were less successful. Only 1,500 *anées* climbed the Rhône in April and May despite the presence of soldiers.⁸⁹ Given the amounts upon which Desmaretz and Ravat had agreed at the beginning of April, there still remained over 6,700 *anées* in various Saône ports, and at least 9,800 on the Rhône.⁹⁰ Villeroy's soldiers had given the city some breathing space, but they had not succeeded in liberating all the city's grain.

For the hospitals, the problem in April was not so much the liberation of old grain as the acquisition of new supplies. As was their habit, they sent their own buyers into Burgundy in a vain search for wheat while at the same time requesting the various directors of the *Abondance* to act for them. How difficult that search could be was expressed with great anguish by one of those buyers, sieur Chazel, in a letter that captures better than most the essence of the crisis mentality in the countryside:

I am obliged to tell you that it is useless at present to think of buying grain in Burgundy, Franche-Comté and Champagne. Those who have grain fear to offer a price because they do not wish to sell. If you offer them 40 *écus* for a load they want 50, and if you offer them 50 *écus* they say that they will sell but under several conditions, which are first that you have to have an express order from the intendant of the

province that permits you to export the grain, that you remove the grain from the granaries at your own risk, that you come armed and try to force open their doors which they hold closed so that the people think it is being taken from them by force and thus save themselves from the fear of having their houses burnt down, and on condition that you pay for the grain before taking it from the granaries. On top of all that they do not wish to make any sale nor contract in writing because they fear the *impôts* and so it is necessary to depend on their word which many do not keep.⁹¹

Chazel concluded, with considerable understatement, that "these conditions appear difficult to execute." One wonders after reading such an account how many incidents of violence in the countryside were merely methods of disguising legitimate oral contracts.

From agents in the provinces, from the controller general himself, the message was the same. Lyon could expect to procure very little grain in France until the barley and buckwheat crops, planted in such abundance through late March and April, could be harvested in the fall.⁹² The directors of the *Abondance* realized as early as 7 April that a new source had to be found outside of France. Trudaine suggested that Lyonnais and Marseillais merchants pool their resources to buy grain in the Levant, and the controller general expressed great enthusiasm for the idea.⁹³ Yet, neither city shared in the enthusiasm, and Barthalon's efforts to deal with the *Compagnie d'Afrique* continued to be hampered by the Marseillais.⁹⁴ Italy seemed a more likely possibility. Indeed, it is possible that the city had agents in Genoa as early as the end of April, though the men who purchased grain there for the city at that time may simply have been there on other business.⁹⁵

Unfortunately, the grain they purchased had the disadvantage, like all grain from the south, of being expensive to buy and even more expensive to ship. Rising prices and the accompanying losses in subsidized sales to the bakers forced the *Abondance* on 8 May to raise the price of bread from 2 sous to 2½ sous per pound, a 25 percent increase in an already high price.⁹⁶

This rise in price resulted in Lyon's second incidence of violence on the twelfth. Ravat reported a "tumult which began yesterday at noon by several women who assembled in front of my house, crying that they did not want the price to go up. We took two men from amongst these women who were inciting them to make this disorder and one of the more animated women who spoke only of killing and

burning, [after which] the crowd dissipated and the noise ceased suddenly." After a time, the *prévôt* attempted to have his prisoners moved to jail. "That renewed the commotion. The *arquebusiers* were not the strongest, and the people showered them with stones. They were obliged to give up and abandon these three rebels in order to save their own lives." Fortified by their victory over the "garots," the crowd reassembled in front of Ravat's house and again began violently protesting the price rise. "In front of them was a silk worker with stones in his pocket and a knife in his hand." He was arrested and taken into the *prévôt*'s house for questioning while a larger detachment of *arquebusiers* charged the crowd and dispersed it "by force of arms."⁹⁷

This time Ravat made no effort to blame the rural poor for the disturbance. Misery engendered by lack of work was the cause, and prompt and severe punishment was necessary in order to "hold them to their duty." The *prévôt* urged the controller general to give Trudaine judicial authority over those arrested in the disturbances, because he feared that the judges of the *Sénéchaussée* would intervene and prove too lenient.⁹⁸ This attitude of severity was by no means unusual for magistrates of the Old Regime, nor was it necessarily inconsistent with feelings of sympathy and pity. Ravat believed that only harsh examples would keep the misery from overwhelming and destroying all semblance of order, society, and authority.

Interestingly, nowhere in any letter did he or any other magistrate from Lyon bother to remark on the preponderant role of women in all these disorders. That women should dominate bread riots in the Old Regime was hardly surprising. The purchase of bread for the family was their responsibility. They knew the bakers, knew the proper price and quality of bread. The nutritional maintenance of the family was for them a point of pride as well as of necessity, and a measure of status. Authorities in Lyon and elsewhere were reluctant to arrest women fighting for the survival of their children, as long as they did not destroy property.⁹⁹ Certainly, the magistrates of Lyon downplayed their role, consistently looking for those few men in the crowds whom they firmly believed responsible for leading the women.

Such disorders, piled on top of the inability to procure grain in either north or south, forced the Consulate to study seriously a *mémoire* prepared and submitted late in May by a Milanese merchant resident in Lyon, Jean-Baptiste Castigliony. Despite his Italian

origin, or perhaps because of it, Castiglioni had been a member of the merchant community in Lyon for several years and had served as a judge on the *Conservation*.¹⁰⁰ In his *mémoire*, the Italian merchant reviewed Lyon's unenviable situation, noting the impossibility of drawing grain from the city's "accustomed sources" and the need to procure supplies overseas. He argued that the city needed to ensure its subsistence beyond 1709 up to the harvest of 1710, since that of 1709 promised only "small grains," if that. He argued further that Italy was "the best country for furnishing the necessary amount, not only because of its proximity but also because of a promising harvest there." An individual "whose integrity, spirit, and good temperament are recognized" should be chosen and sent with full authority. This individual, he argued, "must not be French," because of difficulties in travel for a Frenchman due to the war, and because of the need to speak Italian fluently. Castiglioni closed his *mémoire* by urging the need for quick action before another fall and winter worsened the chances and increased the price of transport.¹⁰¹

The magistrates of Lyon accepted every argument in the *mémoire*. Castiglioni was deputized on 23 May as an agent of the city and authorized to travel wherever the search for grain might take him. The Consulate conferred "full power to write letters of exchange in the names of the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* on Matthieu Delafont, former *échevin* and presently a director of the *Abondance*." They promised "to agree to and ratify all that he might do in consequence of the present deputation."¹⁰² It was a blank check. Castiglioni set out for his native Italy with a self-made mission to feed a city of 100,000 for two years. No one in Lyon in the spring of 1709 could possibly have predicted the mixed blessings that this all-important mission would bring in the months to come.



Crisis of Delay

Castiglioni departed a city in the throes of economic collapse. Efforts to restore the economy were delayed by the refusal of Samuel Bernard and his creditors to come to terms and by a continued lack of demand for manufactured goods. This last owed much to the crisis itself, which made food the only imperative. Food, in turn, proved as difficult to obtain as it had throughout the year. Officials on both rivers continued to resist the passage of grain, to postpone shipments, to write endless appeals to Versailles. Though Castiglioni wasted no time once he reached Italy, the distance was great, and the grain had yet to be collected, boats hired, or arrangements made. The late spring and summer of 1709 were times of waiting, worrying, and suffering in Lyon. A crisis that had begun with a sudden gust of icy wind lingered endlessly in the summer heat.

For his part, Samuel Bernard had but one goal in 1709: to extricate himself from his default in Lyon at no personal cost. On the opposite side of this goal stood his creditors, anxious to prosecute him for the full value of his debt in hard cash. Bernard enjoyed two advantages over his creditors. He could count on royal support in quashing any effort at judicial recourse, and he could argue that he had been robbed by men such as Lullin and Castan, who had speculated fraudulently in his paper and thereby, in his opinion, caused his default. His creditors counted on two advantages of their own. They believed in his need to restore his reputation in order to restore his credit, and they had, in writing on every letter of exchange, his signed promise to pay in coin on demand.¹ As events soon made clear, Bernard's advantages far outweighed those of his creditors.

Bernard's first advantage was brought home to his creditors almost

immediately when Trudaine declared first a two-month, and then a three-month moratorium on all prosecutions for debts incurred in the Payments of Kings and Easter, 1709.² Without recourse to the *Conservation*, Bernard's creditors could not hold him to the stipulations in his letters that he must pay in coin. They were forced to negotiate. Negotiations entailed delays in restoring the Payments, and by extension, the economy of the city. Indeed, they entailed delays in the Payments themselves. The Payment of Kings was prolonged twice, from 1 to 20 May, and from 21 May to 20 June. The Payment of Easter, scheduled to begin in June, was delayed to 25 August, and the Payment of August was delayed to the end of October.³ Since no coin could be exchanged until after a Payment, merchants found themselves unable to procure cash. Without hard currency they could neither pay nor make contracts with their workers.

The negotiations dragged despite the best efforts of Trudaine to accelerate them. His trip to Versailles after the default in April bore fruit in May when he managed to pry another 14 million livres in *assignments* from Desmaretz to help in paying off Bernard's loans.⁴ The intendant returned to Lyon on 14 May and immediately summoned Lullin to his residence for a confrontation lasting eleven hours.

Trudaine accused the Genevan banker of holding or fraudulently alienating a total of 6.7 million livres in mint bills once attached as securities to Bernard's letters, and threatened to arrest him if he did not turn them all over. Lullin, however, had no intention of giving up the bills. Bernard owed him a great deal of money. If he simply surrendered the mint bills he held, not to mention those he had sold and might have to recover, he might then be forced to accept them back at face value as payment on the debt he held in Bernard's letters. He had already rendered those letters to his solicitor, Clapeyron, in preparation for a threatened lawsuit. The bills represented his insurance. He believed that, sooner or later, Bernard would have to negotiate their return. Lullin intended to wait him out and try to press him in the courts as soon as the moratoria were lifted.⁵

Trudaine, largely to placate Bernard, placed Lullin under the supervision of two merchants so as to block any effort at escape to Geneva. In reporting his action to the controller general, the intendant pleaded with Desmaretz to send someone with the power to negotiate in Bernard's name, preferably the banker himself.⁶ Without such an individual present, Trudaine argued, negotiations by correspondence

could drag on endlessly. Bernard, of course, had no intention of coming to Lyon, where he feared he would be ensnared by the *Conservation*. Delay in negotiations could only help him and hurt his creditors, many of whom were in dire straits. When Desmaretz pressed him on the matter, he suddenly and most conveniently took ill "with fever and dysentery."⁷ His doctor confined him to bed, from which he could continue to procrastinate and observe the anguish of his creditors at a safe distance.

Some of their anguish resulted not from Bernard's illness, nor even from his refusal to negotiate, but rather from a less-than-welcome royal intervention in the negotiations. Desmaretz had planned to remint and devalue the coinage as far back as the spring of 1708. The fortuitous arrival in spring 1709 of a French fleet from America bearing millions in silver supplied a wonderful opportunity not only to remint and devalue the coinage, but also to retire millions in mint bills. On 14 May, the royal government decreed that all old coin must be surrendered to the mint. Old *louis d'or* worth 16 livres, 10 sous were to be replaced by new ones valued at 20 livres. Old *écus* at 4 livres, 8 sous, would yield new coins at 5 livres.⁸ The weight of the coin would not change substantially. Desmaretz decreed in addition that one-sixth of the total rendered to the mint could be in mint bills. In devaluing the two major coins of the realm by one-fifth and one-seventh respectively and by allowing one-sixth of the "coin" to be in mint bills, the controller general hoped to retire millions in bills at no cost whatsoever to the royal government.

As the following example helps to illustrate, merchants holding mint bills had little choice but to comply. Let us suppose that merchant *A* has 60 old *louis d'or* worth 990 livres and 2 *écus* worth 8 livres, 16 sous. He renders them to the mint together with 200 livres in mint bills. He has surrendered a total of close to 1,200 livres in coin and paper with the bills as one-sixth of that total. When the new coins are made, he receives a total of 60 new *louis d'or* from the mint, each one worth 20 livres, for a total value of 1,200 livres. He has lost 2 *écus* and 200 livres in paper in the devaluation. Merchant *B*, on the other hand, has no mint bills. He renders 72 old *louis d'or* (value: 1,180 livres) and 3 *écus* (value: 13 livres, 4 sous) to the mint for a total of just over 1,200 livres. Like merchant *A*, however, he receives only 60 new *louis d'or*. He has lost 12 *louis d'or* (old value: 198 livres; new value: 240 livres). Given the mentalities of French merchants—their abso-

lute horror of paper and great affection for coin—it is not at all surprising that Desmaretz managed to retire 43 million livres in mint bills, while netting the treasury 11 million in new revenue.⁹ What is surprising is that some 30 million livres in mint bills remained outstanding, most of them probably in the hands of foreigners lacking the coin and therefore the need to surrender them—but some of them, of course, in the hands of Bernard's creditors.

The reminting further delayed and complicated negotiations between Bernard and his creditors and caused a further decline in the money supply. Those merchants who could afford the cost exported their money, exchanging it for coin of other states or turning it over to counterfeiters who promised a better exchange. Bernard's creditors demanded that he make good in coin at the old rate as, indeed, he had promised to do during many negotiations when he last re-scheduled his debt in January and February.¹⁰ The reminting also threw the question of mint bill values into confusion. Bernard continued to insist that his creditors accept them in payment on his debt at face value without any discount, a demand that only succeeded in enraging them. He demanded too that three of them—Lullin, Castan, and Fizeau, another Genevan—should be arrested for fraud in selling his mint bills. Lullin in particular was singled out for special vituperation in the banker's letters. "Lullin is a wicked man who lights a fire under the belly of all Lyon and who stirs up all the emotions while appearing outwardly peaceful."¹¹ Trudaine successfully resisted these demands for a time, arguing that arrests would be counterproductive in bringing negotiations to a successful conclusion.¹²

Most of Bernard's creditors faced a host of equally unpalatable choices towards the end of May. They could agree to accept payment from him in mint bills at face value, but then would have to write them off in the reminting. They could accept payment in the *assignations* Trudaine had brought from Paris. These, however, would not mature for two to three years, and any merchant stuck with them would effectively see a large proportion of his assets frozen for that period. Few could stay in business under such conditions. Like Lullin, they could try to wait and hope that Bernard would be forced to bargain on the rate of his mint bills, calculating that no banker could afford to keep such an oversupply of his paper in circulation lest it lose all value. Yet, even those who chose to wait it out (and Luethy argues that many gave up in May and chose the first alternative)

were not greatly rewarded.¹³ Bernard showed no signs of bending until 3 June, and then he offered a discount of only 10 percent on his bills.¹⁴ Even Trudaine judged the offer "unacceptable."¹⁵

The delays and procrastinations of high finance paralyzed the Payments and extinguished credit. Not even the state was immune. When Trudaine was unable to borrow a mere 40,000 livres in Lyon to buy grain for the army of Dauphiné, he had to pay for it from his own pocket.¹⁶ Moulins wrote Meissonnier late in June that "debtors don't have a sou. The strongest houses pay nothing. The little coin being made by the mint goes to the army and to a few individuals who will loan it at 24 percent [on the year]."¹⁷ Indeed, 24 percent was a good rate. By the middle of July, Trudaine reported a rate varying between 28 and 32 percent per annum, a height unheard of in the usually stable Payments of Lyon.¹⁸

No merchant could afford such rates, and few if any borrowed money. The lack of activity in their accounts translated directly into misery on the streets of the city. Trudaine wrote in mid June that the "cessation of silk manufacture [has] produced an infinite number of mendicant workers in the city who are no longer employed. . . . The number of these workers without work is so great on the streets of Lyon that they cannot even be sustained by charity. . . . The merchants cannot find money. They are forced to lay off their workers and shut down their looms." Trudaine believed that "only demand can reestablish manufactures in the present situation, and it is greatly feared that demand will not revive soon."¹⁹

There was some debate in late July and early August about whether the collapse in the city's economy was not due more to a declining demand than to negotiations to restore the Payments. Certainly by 1 August Bernard had managed to reclaim some 20 million livres of the 38 million total he owed, partly by increasing his offer to discount the mint bills from 10 to 15 percent, partly by depending on the desperation of his creditors to extricate themselves and return to business. Yet, Lullin "and his cabal" still held out, and the Payment of Easter had to be prolonged to 26 August.²⁰

Those, including the merchants of Lyon's Chamber of Commerce, who argued that demand was the chief culprit, pointed to the dismal failure of the Beaucaire fair in July.²¹ The fair at Beaucaire, unlike those of Lyon, was a real commercial fair where goods of all kinds were normally displayed and orders placed. Ravat reported on

2 August that "the fair at Beaucaire was deserted. Those who went to receive deliveries found a drought so great that they returned without having accomplished anything."²² Bâville and Le Bret reported in similar terms.²³ The Chamber argued that if the demand existed, "the price of money would not prevent production because on rich and precious cloth, this increase would be imperceptible."²⁴ With remarkable disregard for their hard-pressed colleagues, the deputies of the Chamber argued further that those who had been compromised in the affairs of Bernard deserved their fate. "There are only a certain number of ambitious people who find themselves in trouble." Rejecting all efforts at outside interference, the Chamber argued that the best road to restoration of the Payments was one of quiet, private negotiation.²⁵

Merchants negotiated, workers suffered. Through the summer and into the fall, the poor continued to fill the streets. "They fill our streets from end to end," wrote Ravat. "When one gives alms there are a hundred hands there to receive it." He reported that many had sold everything to buy bread and pay rent. Failing in the latter, they had no recourse but the streets. There they begged "at first with modesty," but after several days, "they become insolent."²⁶ On 13 September, the *prévôt* noted the "closing down of work, the total shortage of wine, of wood, of coal, and of all things necessary to life."²⁷ The only news that could have proven worse than the continued depression in the economy would be a continuing failure to procure grain. With a sort of inevitability that palled over the city through the long summer of 1709, such failures became a regular feature of life in Lyon. The summer of discontent stretched beyond the walls of the city into the provinces and beyond.

The great hopes that accompanied Castigliony on his mission dissipated through June and July in the frustrations of delay. This was not Castigliony's fault. He appears to have been diligent in his efforts, but his task was substantial. No regular seaborne trade existed between Lyon and northern Italy. The raw silk that supplied the city's manufactures travelled overland through Savoy and the mountain passes of Dauphiné, often arriving by wagon over the Guillotière bridge.²⁸ Overland transport of large quantities of grain was, however, utterly impractical, even given the inflated prices of 1709. Castigliony thus faced a daunting task. He had first to locate and con-

tract with various Italian merchants and landholders simply to collect the grain. Then he had to find and contract with boatmen willing to carry the supplies along the coasts of Italy and France and up the Rhône. It was a hazardous and arduous journey, fraught with the additional perils of potentially hostile English warships.²⁹

On the French side, the Consulate began work in early June to procure passports freeing the Italian grain from import duties and fees and to find a French port where the grain could be processed quickly. Marseilles was out of the question. The Lyonnais feared the same problems there that they had suffered in towns throughout the region; they also dreaded the quarantine requirement on all incoming grain designed to protect against plague. This problem was solved when city and crown agreed on a small, little-used port at the mouth of the Rhône, Tour de Bouc. Tour de Bouc appeared perfect for the needs of the city. It lacked any quarantine facilities and was legally open to Italian grain.³⁰

Having procured passports and a suitable port, the city had still to insure against stoppages on the Rhône. The magistrates of Lyon, painfully aware of how easy such stoppages could be, appealed to Desmaretz to discipline the intendants accordingly. The controller general responded with a series of stern letters to Bâville, Le Bret, and d'Angervilliers through June and July, warning them that the grain bound for Lyon "must not be troubled or delayed . . . because the least mishap . . . would reduce the city to famine and cause terrible disorder there."³¹ Le Bret answered that he had sent the strictest orders to the cities involved not to interfere, and Bâville reminded the controller general that he still had the mayor of Beaucaire incarcerated. He would brook no interference.³²

While they waited and worked to prepare for their Italian grain, the Lyonnais continued to chip away at supplies still retained in Burgundy. Though the soldiers dispatched in April by Villeroy had not enjoyed as much success as all had hoped, they had at least procured some supplies. Late in May, the Lyonnais decided to try force again. Desmaretz wrote to Chamillart in the latter's capacity as secretary of state for war to request the redetachment of the Lyonnais Regiment for convoy duty on the Saône.³³ Chamillart hesitated. He wrote on the thirtieth that the king thought it better to detach troops from a garrison at Gray for the task.³⁴ Desmaretz agreed on 3 June, but again Chamillart hesitated.³⁵ The reason soon became clear. On the

seventh he was summarily ordered by Louis XIV to retire to his estates in disgrace. For reasons unrelated to the grain crisis, the city's old adversary had at last been removed from office.³⁶ Villeroy exulted in Chamillart's disgrace. Writing in his own hand to Rochebonne, he erupted, "Thanks to God we are suddenly delivered from Chamillart!"³⁷ For the Lyonnais, the new secretary of state for war, Daniel François, comte de Voysin, represented a considerable improvement. Villeroy counted himself "very much a friend of Monsieur Voysin," and the new minister was related by marriage to both Desmaretz and Trudaine.³⁸ Unfortunately, the change in ministers portended a further delay in sending troops while Voysin settled into his new office. Orders did not go out to the garrison at Gray until 14 June, and the troops did not depart the town until the twenty-second, almost a month after the idea had first been suggested.³⁹

The relative success or failure of this second effort at military coercion is difficult to determine. Four hundred twenty soldiers did arrive in Auxonne on 25 June, but the records of the *Abondance* do not mention how much grain was delivered in that month.⁴⁰ Some 1,561 *anées* arrived on the Saône in early July, but it is possible that by that time most of the troops had been diverted to the Rhône to protect Italian barges, which, it was hoped, would soon arrive.⁴¹ If indeed the Consulate hoped to procure further supplies from Burgundy after the initial arrivals in early July, such hopes were soon dashed by the Burgundians themselves.

The Estates of Burgundy were soon to convene in their triennial session.⁴² Desmaretz was aware in advance that the Estates would strenuously oppose Lyonnais demands on the province. He warned Ravat on 20 July to muzzle the city's agents in Burgundy. "In the present state of affairs, I predict that you will have much trouble, above all during the session of the Estates of Burgundy, in obtaining restitution [of grain]."⁴³

Indeed, on that very same day, the governor of Burgundy, Louis, duc de Bourbon-Condé, wrote the controller general at the behest of the Estates. "I pray you not to permit the export of any more [grain]. Please write to the intendant and forbid him to allow further exports, for without this order there will not be enough for seed."⁴⁴ It was one of the duke's very few interventions on behalf of his province during the crisis. For their part, the Estates had already complained of the damage done the province by the great winter and of the inabil-

ity of most to pay the *taille*. They argued that royal demands would have to be met, if at all, from receipts on the *gabelle*, the salt tax.⁴⁵ Their concern about the export of grain derived chiefly from worries about revenues. In his letter of the twentieth, the duc de Bourbon asked that Desmaretz restore the *octrois* on grain on the Saône that had been suspended in 1708.⁴⁶ Since these excise taxes constituted one of the principal sources of income for most of the Saône port towns, their suspension bred considerable financial hardship.

The controller general probably responded to these requests in the negative. While there are no copies of his responses in the archives of his office, there are the repeated requests of the Burgundians, and it is evident that they went unfulfilled.⁴⁷ It does appear, however, that the Estates enjoyed at least temporary success in reducing grain exports. There is virtually no mention at all of Burgundy in Ravat's correspondence from mid July to mid August, and the records of the *Abondance* show only 425 *anées* arriving from Burgundy in the latter month, the lowest total of the entire crisis period.⁴⁸ Once the Estates had disbanded, of course, buyers from the city again infiltrated the province, searching this time to purchase large portions of the soon-to-be-harvested barley crop. Ravat argued that such "small grains" could help to fill the gap until the arrival of the Italian wheat.⁴⁹ Desmaretz acquiesced in this renewed Lyonnais invasion of Burgundy on 21 August, encouraging the city with news that "freedom of trade is being reestablished day by day."⁵⁰ The Estates had managed no more than to buy a month's respite for the province and to force further delays on the city.

The controller general's sudden optimism about the grain trade (which contrasted sharply with his pessimism about royal finances) may have stemmed from efforts to draw large supplies from overseas.⁵¹ In southern France, Trudaine's project to import large quantities of grain from the Levant had been underway for some time.⁵² The controller general had latched on to it with great fervor, writing to the Consulate of Lyon, the intendants of Dauphiné, Languedoc, Provence, and the Estates of Burgundy to encourage them to take part. In essence, the plan involved sending agents to Constantinople to purchase Black Sea grain that would then be convoyed to Marseilles by royal frigates. The cost of the latter would, in turn, be borne by beneficiaries of the grain.⁵³ All who were asked, including the Lyonnais, sent agents to Marseilles, but the Consulate remained very

cool to the plan. The magistrates objected to the predominant role assigned the merchants of Marseilles and worried about possible delays caused by quarantines. They complained also about the high cost of the convoy.⁵⁴

Though they gave those arguments to the controller general, the more likely reason for their refusal to commit to the Levantine project was that they had already placed all their bets with Castiglioni in Italy. Antoine Bouchage, the *Abondance* director who was sent to Marseilles to collaborate on the project, spent only 67,800 livres between June and December 1709. Castiglioni, by contrast, spent 746,200 livres in the same period. Sacerdoty, his Genoese subcontractor, spent an additional 212,600 livres for a total of 958,800 livres.⁵⁵ For the *Abondance*, which had collected a total of 57,552 livres in revenues during the noncrisis year of 1707, such expenses constituted a mammoth burden.⁵⁶ That the magistrates of Lyon committed any money at all to the Levantine project is surprising and probably amounted to little more than an effort to humor the controller general.

To support the enormous financial burden of the *Abondance*, the Consulate had publicly to guarantee all its expenses and interests at whatever loss "without any consequence for the future," and transferred 120,000 livres directly to the *Abondance* accounts in mid July.⁵⁷ Even this transfusion failed to stem the financial hemorrhage. In order further to insure the solvency of the institution, the magistrates of Lyon appealed to the city's elites for private loans at an interest of 2 percent per Payment, a rate far below that generally being offered. The merchants of Lyon responded with three separate collective loans of 777,534 livres in August, 597,119 in November, and 470,000 in December. All of the great merchant houses took part, and one finds names such as Melchior Philibert, Gacon, Trollier, Ollivier, and Anisson on the lists. Even the *prévôt* himself contributed some 70,000 livres.⁵⁸ Ravat complained of the cost in his letters to Desmaretz. (The enormous impact of these and other financial exertions on the city's institutions is explored more fully in chapter 9.)

With Burgundy as barren and resistant as ever and the southern provinces increasingly occupied with the Levantine project, the city looked forlornly through June and July for its Italian grain. Only at the end of the latter month did seven barges arrive at Tour de Bouc to begin the climb upriver. These originated not with Castiglioni,

however, but with Melchior Philibert, who had purchased the grain in early May.⁵⁹ Not until 27 July did news reach Ravat of seven more barges, sent this time by Castiglioni, which were in transit from Toulon. Eight more were soon to reach Toulon.⁶⁰ Castiglioni sent word at the same time that 38,000 additional *anées* of wheat were available, but at the extremely high cost of 74 livres per *anée*.⁶¹ Ravat asked Desmaretz his opinion of the price, and the latter answered on 6 August that while the price was high, he saw little alternative "in the present circumstances."⁶² Castiglioni was ordered to purchase the additional grain.

By 15 August, fifteen barges filled with Italian grain finally lay at anchor at the mouth of the Rhône, ready to begin the voyage to the city. There they remained, for yet another exasperating obstruction had arisen to delay the city's Italian deliverance. This one was neither financial nor institutional, but physical. Red coral, with its sharp, boat-ripping tentacles, had somehow moved in to block the mouth of the Rhône near Tour de Bouc. Ravat exhibited laudable self-control in patiently asking the controller general to have this new obstruction cleared.⁶³ Desmaretz acknowledged the problem in his letter of 21 August, implying that royal ships would soon take care of it.⁶⁴ They did not. On the twenty-seventh Ravat again wrote the controller general. There were now eighteen barges at Tour de Bouc, and the coral was still there. Worse, the *Abondance* granaries were nearly empty, and the ration was being cut to three-quarters of a pound of bread per person per day.⁶⁵ As if to underline the seriousness of this new shortage, news arrived from Burgundy that Pinon had once again forbidden the export of all grain from Bresse and Bugey northeast of Lyon.⁶⁶ Desmaretz reacted far differently than he had in the fall of 1708 when Pinon had issued the same order; this time, he acquiesced in the intendant's action. He accepted Pinon's argument that, without such restrictions, the intendant would be unable to feed the troops soon to winter in the region.⁶⁷ The controller general did not ignore the plight of the city, however, but wrote twice to Pontcharrain, minister of the navy, on 31 August and 5 September, pressing him to clear the coral and free the passage of the boats.⁶⁸

At last the coral was cleared, and on 13 September, six weeks after they had arrived at Tour de Bouc, Castiglioni's barges began their two-week struggle against the currents of the Rhône.⁶⁹ They made Lyon on 28 September, four months almost to the day after Jean-

Baptiste Castiglioni had departed on his mission.⁷⁰ This was to be the first of many shipments of Italian grain; by December, the granaries of the *Abondance* were so full that the Consulate had to store some grain in the church of Ainay at the foot of the Presqu'île.⁷¹ By January, the city had acquired so much that it was actively selling supplies to the royal government for the army.⁷²

For the Consulate, the struggle to procure a steady grain supply had been a long and expensive one. For the working and nonworking poor of Lyon, it had been much too long. The delays of spring and summer wore down the once lively crowds of the city, leaving men, women, and children silenced both by hunger and by life in the streets. Ravat was fully aware of the suffering; it filled his letters to Versailles as he beseeched royal aid again and again. Only once, however, did the magistrates of Lyon make any effort to alleviate the essential problem of unemployment. On 23 July, they prepared a *mémoire* for the controller general's consideration in which they put forward an idea of the *prévôt* for a two-tiered price for rationed bread. They proposed "to sell bread to the rich at a slightly higher price than that of the poor, that is to say three deniers per pound more."⁷³ The extra money would be used either to feed those who had been thrown out of work or could be "turned over to the merchants to give them work."⁷⁴

The method by which this plan was announced was unusual. Throughout the crisis, the Consulate had acted independently on such issues, informing rather than consulting Versailles. That they now chose to consult, and that they attributed the plan explicitly to the *prévôt* rather than collectively to the Consulate as a whole, suggests the possibility of disagreement over it. Ravat was not himself a merchant as were the other *échevins*, and their opposition may help to explain why this plan was never adopted. Certainly, Desmaretz reacted negatively, judging the plan "difficult to carry out," and some merchants in Lyon evidently considered the amount that might be collected from such an operation insufficient to begin operations.⁷⁵ The plan remains of interest nevertheless for its striking modernity. Not only was Ravat proposing a progressive price scale for bread, but he proposed to use the extra funds as an early form of unemployment insurance tax to subsidize industry and boost employment. It was another, if overly ambitious, sign of the willingness of local officials to improvise in the face of daunting problems.

Lacking work and any plan to put them to work, Lyon's unemployed were left to the rationing system, assuming they could come up with the money, or to the charity of the *Aumône-Générale*. The latter institution managed to keep grain supplies coming, writing repeatedly to Villeroy for his help and pressing agents such as Chazel to keep up the search.⁷⁶ The extent of assistance the hospital supplied after May is not known until November, when Villeroy himself put the number of those receiving aid at between seven and eight thousand.⁷⁷ By that time, however, the harvest in barley and buckwheat had arrived, and the grain crisis had ended.

Even for those receiving the *Aumône* the hardship was great. The Consulate judged the amounts received to be "insufficient," and many searched to supplement their meager rations. For those in Lyon who could scrape together a few sous by selling whatever belongings they retained or by begging, the only alternatives to the *Aumône* were either the bakers of Lyon or the *forains* who came from outside the city. Most of the former were tightly confined by the consular ordinances of 10 and 30 April, which forbade them from making any but black bread, fixed the price, and imposed regular, hostile inspections by quarter officials.⁷⁸ The bakers had brought such controls on themselves by such acts as selling their *Abondance* grain to individuals at a profit, using all their grain to make expensive white bread, or mixing in all manner of stuff to stretch out supplies and incomes.⁷⁹

They chafed under the restrictions, and in early fall 1709, petitioned the Consulate to lift them. In their petition, they complained especially about the five bakers exempted from the rationing system. The five were accused of using all their grain to make black bread, which they then sold at a price 33 percent higher than that fixed for the rest of the community. They complained in addition that the *Abondance* grain gave their bread a peculiar taste which drove away customers. Interestingly, this is the only time that such a complaint appears in the record, and it is difficult to judge its veracity without further evidence. As for the *forains* "all the poor artisans to whom are given the ration cards no longer buy but instead purchase bread that is carried in from outside and which is sold at a price lower than that fixed by the police."⁸⁰ Whether this petition resulted in the end of the rationing system is not known, since no document indicates any date for its conclusion. It does serve, however, to fix our attention on the *forains*.

The role of the *forains* in the crisis remains one of its most fascinating mysteries. They emerge from the records only once, at the end of July, when the rate of disease in Lyon began to climb, and rumors spread that poison in the bread of the *forains* was at fault.⁸¹ The Consulate reacted swiftly to the rumors, appointing four "commissioners of health" to investigate and forbidding any "seditious discourse" or "false rumors" about the "entry into the city of bread from neighboring towns."⁸² The Consulate further ordered that no one was to interfere in any way with the entry into the city of any grain or any bread on pain of a 150-livre fine and "exemplary punishment."⁸³

The double standard applied in favor of the *forains* was never made more explicit. While strict supervision and regulation applied to the bakers of Lyon, the peddlers who rolled their carts into Lyon each day suffered virtually no supervision at all. It is entirely possible, therefore—even probable—that some of the "bread" they hawked to the poor was indeed poisonous. Certainly they must have carried in some concoctions such as fern bread or bracken bread that officials in the countryside blamed for so many deaths there.⁸⁴ It is likely too that the poor of Lyon had little choice but to buy their product and risk the sorts of illnesses and diseases it might entail. Not to do so could mean starvation.

That illness increased in the city there is no doubt. Mortality began to increase in Lyon in August and remained high for the remainder of the year, despite increasing supplies of grain. The Lyonnais only began to pay the ultimate price for the Great Winter of 1709 the following autumn. They continued to pay through the beginning of the new year.



PART THREE

Victims and Victors


The Dying Time

The dying time in Lyon always began in August. In a given year, burials from that month through October, only one-quarter of the year, constituted better than one-third of the city's annual deaths.¹ Mortality normally swelled over 62 percent from July to August alone, rising from an average of 117 deaths in the former to 190 in the latter month. Figure 8.1 illustrates this increase, and a corresponding decline in the average number of marriages and conceptions during these same months.

During the crisis period, the rhythm of conceptions, marriages, and deaths differed from the average mostly in degree. Figure 8.2 confirms that conceptions and marriages rose and fell with their usual monthly rhythms from August 1708 through March 1710. The fall in conceptions in June and July was, however, far more pronounced than usual, and the number of babies conceived in September was only half the usual number for that month. The number of marriages likewise remained lower than normal through most of the crisis year, and the usual increases before Lent and Advent were not so pronounced as during a normal year. Mortality also followed its usual monthly pattern during the crisis (figure 8.3), but with two exceptions. One was a slight rise during the great winter, already discussed in chapter 4. The other was a dramatic rise in August continuing through November and December of 1709 and into the new year. Indeed, burials did not again regain normal levels until March 1710. By that time, Lyon had suffered a serious mortality crisis.

Figure 8.4 combines all three factors for the crisis period, 1708–1710. For six months, from August 1709 through January 1710, deaths far surpassed conceptions in Lyon. September represented the height of the demographic imbalance. In those parishes studied, 366 people


FIG. 8.1 Average number of conceptions, burials, and marriages in Lyon, August through March, 1703-1707 and 1711-1715.



Source: Parish registers of Lyon.


died in that month alone, while only 100 were conceived. In all six months, 1,644 people died, more than twice the average of 659 in 1703 and 1715. This period obviously is of greatest interest in analyzing the demographic impact of the crisis and presents several interesting questions. Did people die at the same age during the period of high mortality as during a more normal year? Did death come to one sex

FIG. 8.2 Average number of conceptions and marriages in normal years compared to actual number of conceptions and marriages from August 1708 to March 1710.




Source: *Paris registers of Lyon.*

FIG. 8.3 Average number of burials in normal years compared to actual number of burials from August 1708 to March 1710.



Source: *Parish registers of Lyon.*

FIG. 8.4 Actual number of conceptions, marriages, and burials in Lyon from August 1708 to March 1710.




Source: *Parish registers of Lyon.*

more than to another or to one occupation group more than another? Was there some difference between the city's urban parishes and its faubourgs or between Lyon and towns in its region? Only by answering those questions and by searching out those groups in the population who were most affected can one hope to gauge the social impact of the crisis.

The parish registers of baptisms, marriages, and burials supply the data. In many parishes, the city's priests were remarkably thorough, detailing the age at death among newborns down to the number of hours. They also generally gave some occupation for virtually every male or for the husband or father of every female. Unfortunately, the wealth of these registers is such that no single researcher can hope to gather all the information contained there. Sampling techniques, which have been successfully employed in surveying patterns over the whole of the eighteenth century by Maurice Garden and his students in Lyon, would be of little use for the shorter period covered here because the numbers would be too small. Given the need for a manageable data base, I have chosen to concentrate my own inquiry around questions of mortality, since it was the rise and duration of mortality that was the most striking aspect of the demographic crisis of 1709. This has permitted me to examine fully data from six parishes in Lyon. These include Saint-Nizier, the city's largest parish, which alone counted nearly half its total population in the early eighteenth century; Saint-Paul, one of Lyon's wealthiest parishes; Saint-Georges, one of its poorest; and Saint-Vincent, home to a variety of artisanal trades. Also included are the city's two largest faubourgs, La Guillotière and Vaize, as well as the hospital of the *Charité*.² As with the figures cited in chapter 4, the years 1703 and 1715 have been used for comparisons.

As the age pyramids (figures 8.5 and 8.6) indicate, the highest proportion of those dying at any time in Lyon, crisis or not, were children. In a normal year, those under age 10 contributed over two-thirds of total deaths. Even that proportion must be judged too low given the Lyonnais habit of sending newborns to the countryside to be nursed. Garden demonstrated the prevalence of this practice among all classes in Lyon and estimated that two-thirds of the infants sent to be nursed did not survive the ordeal.³ Figure 8.6 illustrates this practice by breaking down child mortality into smaller age groups. It shows a relatively high mortality for newborns not yet sent


FIG. 8.5 Mortality rates by age and sex in Lyon during crisis and noncrisis years.



to wetnurses, followed by a decline in the deaths of children aged 1 month to 1 year, which represents their absence from the city. Once they returned, mortality again ballooned upward, only to fall gradually as they grew older.

It is important to remember that the use of percentages masks a higher mortality for all groups. A great many more children died in 1709 than in normal years, but the crisis was *proportionately* kinder to

FIG. 8.6 Mortality rates by age and sex for children in Lyon during crisis and noncrisis years.



them, or at least to males. Those aged less than 18 constituted only 56 percent of the total number of burials during the crisis, 10 percent less than in normal years. Age at death among females barely changed at all, however, and baby girls continued to die at the same terrible rate as usual. Thus, the only change in mortality when measured by age was a slight proportional increase in death among adult males between the ages of 20 and 70.

TABLE 8.1 Marital status of adult women dying in 1703/1715 compared to the fall and winter of 1709-1710


	1703/1715	Fall/Winter of 1709-1710
Married	44%	35%
Widows	30%	35%
Unknown, Presumed		
Single	25%	29%
Nuns	1%	1%
Total	100%	100%

Source: Parish registers of Lyon

While age at death among women did not change, death among single women did increase. This conclusion rests in part on speculation, since one cannot be entirely sure that an adult woman not assigned a spouse in the registers (and for whom the only occupation listed was that of a father) was necessarily single. It is certain that widows were single, and death among them as a proportion of the total did increase. Table 8.1 tells the tale. If those whose married status is "unknown" were mostly single, then mortality among women without a male partner increased by nearly 10 percent during the crisis. Given the vulnerability of single women to economic disasters at any time in the Old Regime, increased mortality during a subsistence crisis is hardly surprising.⁴

What is surprising about mortality in Lyon is the relative proportion of rich and poor. Even defining such terms poses perilous methodological problems, since the curés of Lyon classified their dead with over 270 different occupations. In gathering various occupations into defined groups, I have relied upon socio-professional categories delineated in the works of Maurice Garden, Adeline Daumard, and Louis Henry.⁵ Even with such guidance, however, the process is fraught with difficulties, since the terminology employed by the curés could vary from parish to parish, or even from priest to priest in the same parish. Where there has been substantial doubt about the status of an individual, I have judged it better to exclude the case altogether. Likewise, the curés of some parishes sometimes grew careless, especially during periods of high mortality, and neglected to mark occupations for some individuals. How much this practice may skew the results of analysis, and in what direction, cannot be known.

FIG. 8.7 Mortality rates by occupation group in Lyon during crisis and noncrisis years.



These qualifications aside, there is nevertheless a wealth of reliable information. When divided into eleven separate groups, the data yield figure 8.7. It shows only a slight proportional increase in deaths among the "working poor" of Lyon (those in the first six groups) during the crisis, with silk workers absorbing the largest increase and merchants enjoying a corresponding diminution. The proportion of deaths among artisans other than silk workers, who constituted much

the largest proportion of the population in all years, hardly changed at all. If, however, the artisans are themselves divided into eight categories for analysis (figure 8.8), they present a different picture. Textile workers suffered more relative to other trades, while the proportion of deaths among tailors and those in the construction and printing trades actually declined slightly from normal during the crisis. The various textile trades, in combination with the silk workers, constituted Lyon's largest and, in 1709, its hardest-hit group. That they suffered a proportionately higher mortality can be expected. That the total increase relative to other groups was so small—approximately 5 percent—is unexpected, and suggests that efforts by the city to sustain them may have enjoyed some success. Once again, the proportions do mask large numbers. The artisans of Lyon did not increase their proportion relative to other groups, but they did maintain it in a period of much higher mortality.

Since the greatest change between crisis and noncrisis periods occurred within two well-defined groups, silk workers and merchants, a more detailed examination of these groups is possible. Figures 8.9 through 8.12 break down each group by age and sex and show proportional changes between crisis and noncrisis mortality. The silk workers share many of the same trends with the general population, save for a more pronounced mortality among children. As with the general population, older males suffered a higher mortality rate relative to younger ones during the crisis. In contrast to the remainder of the population, however, mortality among women in the families of silk workers was actually reversed, with baby girls dying in greater proportion to older women. Figure 8.9 breaks down child mortality among silk workers and shows that this increase among baby girls was spread fairly evenly through their first year. Whether this difference can be traced to differing decisions about whether to send female babies to wetnurses is difficult to assess. Male children of silk workers between 1 month and 1 year of age also suffered higher mortality relative to older children. Since those who died at these ages died at home, they likely suffered from the malnutrition of their mothers. Given a ration of one pound of bread per day, nursing mothers (or wetnurses within the city, for that matter) probably could not produce enough milk to feed one infant, let alone more than one. That any infants at all survived in poor households in Lyon during the crisis is extraordinary.

FIG. 8.8 Mortality rates by artisanal occupation group in Lyon during crisis and noncrisis years.






FIG. 8.9 Mortality rates by age and sex for silk workers in Lyon during crisis and noncrisis years.



The merchants tell a different story. Death among children of both sexes decreased as a proportion of the total, and the slack was taken up by both males and females aged 20 to 50. Younger merchants tended to involve themselves more than their older, more conservative colleagues in the morass of Bernard's debts; they were more likely also to be less wealthy and more active than the old and therefore to suffer from greater degrees of stress. Whether these factors necessarily


FIG. 8.10 Mortality rates by age and sex for children of silk workers in Lyon during crisis and noncrisis years.



left them more open to disease or poor enough to suffer malnutrition is a difficult question. The issue of what caused the mortality of 1709 is explored below.

It might be argued that this apparent lack of a proportionately higher mortality among the poor can be traced to their not dying in their own parish. Richard Gascon and Claude Latta, in their brief analysis of mortality in Lyon during the crisis of 1693–1694,

FIG. 8.II Mortality rates by age and sex for merchants in Lyon during crisis and noncrisis years.



noted a dramatic increase in the number of those admitted to and dying at the *Hôtel-Dieu* in Lyon. They assumed that many of these patients were poor, but they offered few figures to support their argument.

Registers of entry for the hospital are unfortunately lacking for 1709, and we must rely for information on a document drawn up long after the crisis, which gives only the total number admitted.⁶

FIG. 8.12 Mortality rates by age and sex for children of merchants in Lyon during crisis and noncrisis years.




Table 8.2 summarizes this information. It shows that mortality among the greater number admitted in 1709 was higher than normal, and that the crisis lingered into 1710. Unfortunately, it is impossible to analyze the totals by month, so that comparisons with other data cannot be made. Lack of data does not, however, conceal an essential weakness in the argument that the poor dying at the *Hôtel-Dieu* represent a lost cohort that might somehow make the entire mortality picture more

TABLE 8.2 Number of sick admitted to and dying at the *Hôtel-Dieu* of Lyon in normal and crisis years


	<i>Mean, 1711-1720</i>	1709	1710
Number Admitted	7,031	13,106	10,966
Number Deceased	762 (11%)	2,481 (19%)	1,583 (14%)

Source. Archives of the Hôtel-Dieu

comforting to historians convinced that they must have died in greater numbers than the rich during a subsistence crisis. There is simply no proof that those who died at the *Hôtel-Dieu* were buried there. Indeed, regulations concerning burial in one's resident parish were seldom more rigidly enforced than during a food crisis, and the close proximity of the city's parishes to the hospital makes it all the more likely that the Lyonnais who died at the *Hôtel-Dieu* were buried by their own curés near their own churches with families and friends in attendance.

Thus, while analysis of age, sex, and social patterns of mortality reveals differences between crisis and noncrisis periods, these differences are not very striking. The number of wealthy merchants did decline as a proportion of the total during the crisis, but that decline was slight, and a great many more merchants died in 1709 than died in a normal year. The crisis was not, in short, very selective about its victims. Mortality patterns in 1709 differed from normal mostly in degree.

The death of small children in the homes of silk workers does serve to make the rising tide of abandonments more comprehensible. As was shown in chapter 6, abandonments began to rise in the spring and reached their peak in late summer.⁷ Naturally, the anonymity of the practice precludes any social analysis, but information is available about the age of those taken in by the hospital. Such data are necessarily approximate, since the rectors of the *Hôtel-Dieu* had to estimate the age based upon the size and condition of the child. Certainly, the ample practice offered by the crisis must have improved their accuracy. Figure 8.13 illustrates the distribution of abandoned children by age over three selected months during the crisis. In April 1709, when abandonments first began to rise, children below age 3 constituted 90 percent of the total. By July, however, older children

FIG. 8.13 Actual number and age of children abandoned to the *Hôtel-Dieu* in Lyon in April, July, and September 1709.

Source: Archives of the Hôtel-Dieu.

TABLE 8.3 Percentage of survivors and nonsurvivors among children abandoned in Lyon in April, July, and September, 1709

	Age	Number and Percentage Of Survivors	Number and Percentage of Nonsurvivors
April	0-1	33 (37%)	57 (63%)
	1-3	36 (67%)	18 (33%)
	3-7	13 (81%)	3 (19%)
July	0-1	42 (31%)	93 (69%)
	1-3	42 (64%)	24 (36%)
	3-7	39 (72%)	15 (28%)
Sept	0-1	31 (34%)	61 (66%)
	1-3	47 (60%)	32 (40%)
	3-7	23 (74%)	8 (26%)
Totals:	All Ages	306 (50%)	311 (50%)

Source: Archives of the Hôtel-Dieu

found themselves abandoned in greater numbers, and those between 3 and 7 years of age had expanded to make up 21 percent of the total. By September, older children and newborns had both declined in proportion to those aged 1 to 3.

Such numbers cannot begin to describe the agony of decision by parents too poor to support their own children. In the beginning, parents apparently abandoned their youngest children, many of them newborns for whom an attachment borne of months or years of childrearing had not yet been formed. As the crisis lengthened, the decisions grew harder, and older children were abandoned. It seems that the worst times for such decisions must have passed by September, since the age of those turned over to the *Hôtel-Dieu* declined slightly. It is possible that the larger number of children between ages 1 and 3 abandoned during that month were those returning from wet-nurses to parents who could neither afford to pay the nurses further nor feed them themselves. The hospital was the last, and for many, the only resort.

Of those abandoned in the crisis year, the proportion who survived remained fairly constant. As table 8.3 demonstrates, only one-third of those abandoned before their first birthday survived no matter when the abandonment took place. The odds of survival naturally increased with age as maturing gastrointestinal systems became


better able to adapt to a variety of foods. Yet, the percentage of older abandoned children who died increased from April to September, a sign either that they were weaker at the time of their exposure or that the foster parents to whom they were sent could not support them.

At any rate, the decision of the poor to abandon their children was not taken lightly, nor was it the product of ignorance about the *Hôtel-Dieu*. Given that children below age 10 constituted 56 percent of all deaths when kept at home during the crisis, their chances were not that much worse when abandoned. Indeed, the odds of survival may even have been marginally better, at least for older children. The charitable institutions of Lyon made no secret of the care they provided to children in the city, and orphans were constantly paraded about to request alms and inspire greater giving among the city's citizens.⁸ When the poor abandoned their children, they did so in the not entirely unfounded belief that those children might be better off, or at least no worse off than if they stayed at home. It was the sort of harsh life and death decision that became all too common in 1709.

The inference of some historians that the abandonment of children was so regular as to be the most effective method of family limitation seems altogether too accepting of the idea that the poor were generally hardened to the death of their children.⁹ In that sense, such an interpretation is at best too sanguine and at worst condescending. The many notes attached to children abandoned in Lyon during the crisis year testify to the great sadness and desperation that drove Lyonais families to this extremity.¹⁰ That their confidence in the hospitals may sometimes have been justified does not make the decision less tragic.

Only a very few of these children were ever recovered by their parents. Of the 451 abandoned before the crisis in 1708, only 7 (1.5 percent) are listed as having been returned to their natural parents. Of 1,973 abandoned in the crisis year, 42 (2.1 percent) were recovered. In 1710, as the crisis passed, only 10 (1.6 percent) of 610 were reclaimed. The hospitals required some proof of identity for reclamation, and may also have demanded compensation for expenses. Either requirement would have made reclamation difficult if not impossible for poor families. Those who were not recovered and who managed to survive were surrendered to the *Charité* after age 7. The records of that institution (illustrated in figure 8.14) show the delayed impact of

FIG. 8.14 Actual number of abandoned children yielded by the *Hôtel-Dieu* to the *Charité*, 1709-1720.



the crisis as younger children abandoned in 1709 matured in 1713, 1714, and 1715.¹¹

Some of those who were abandoned probably came from outside the city walls, for mortality in some rural parishes and small towns reached astronomical proportions. In the parish of Thisy, the priest

buried 13 people in an average year from 1703 through 1708. In 1709, he buried 120.¹² In the town of Feurs from April 1709 to April 1710, the curé buried 305 out of a total population of 1,700, or 18 percent of his parishioners in a single year.¹³ In the town of Villefranche, only a few kilometers north of Lyon, 415 were buried from January through December 1709, compared to an average of 120 in each of the preceding eight years.¹⁴ Mortality was naturally uneven in the countryside depending on the presence or absence of epidemic disease, and with a population in motion, sources are not always very reliable. A great many must have died on the roads, unknown and unregistered by any parish priest, buried by family members or travelling companions, lost forever in the massive movement of the rural poor.

We can be sure that the rural poor constituted a substantial portion of those who died in the towns. In his study of Charlieu, a small town near Lyon in the Forez, Dontenwill discovered that at least one-fourth of all those who died were outsiders. The priest listed them variously as "errants," "vagabonds," and "*étrangers*."¹⁵ In Lyon, it is more difficult to assess the proportional mortality of the rural poor. The number of those identified by curés as residing elsewhere remained very small—a total of only 50 during the entire crisis period. The number of those for whom no occupation or place of origin was listed, many of whom might have been outsiders, did increase substantially during the crisis. In 1703 and 1715, in the six parishes studied, 367 people (15 percent of the total for those years) were buried in this anonymous fashion. In the entire crisis period, the number rose to 697, 19 percent of a much higher total.

More interesting than the number, however, was the seasonal distribution of these deaths over the crisis year. During the great winter, those without occupations constituted 20 percent of the total (61 people), but during the spring months of March, April, and May, when mortality in the city as a whole was relatively low, those without occupations numbered 157, or 36 percent of the total buried in those months. Spring, of course, represented the real beginning of the crisis, when Ravat complained most vociferously about the influx of the rural poor.¹⁶ In addition, the relatively low level of mortality during these months reduces the probability that priests were simply too busy to identify occupations. During the period of highest mortality (August 1709 to February 1710), the relative proportion of those


without any occupation declined to 14 percent. Once again, that was 14 percent of a much higher number, or 258 people. If those marked in the registers for burial without any occupations were indeed from outside the city, then their increased numbers supply further evidence of a city under siege.

If registers were available from the *Hôtel-Dieu* for the crisis, they would surely be of assistance in gauging mortality among the rural poor, since the origin of those admitted was usually noted. Even without those registers, it is likely that many of those admitted to the hospital came from outside the city, and that some found their way into the cemeteries of the city's parishes.

Thus far, in analyzing mortality, Lyon and its faubourgs have been considered as a single entity. Yet there were substantial differences. The faubourgs did not enjoy the benefits of the *Abondance*, did not partake of the rationing system established by the Consulate in early May, and received no assistance from the *Aumône-Générale*. Despite these evident debilities, the faubourgs did not suffer a terrible mortality in 1709. As figure 8.15 illustrates, mortality did exceed the average in Vaize and La Guillotière, but the numbers remained relatively small. If the percentage by which mortality exceeded the average in each month in the faubourgs is compared to that by which it exceeded the average within the city, the result is figure 8.16. It shows that mortality in the faubourgs was comparatively higher than that inside Lyon, that is, that the faubourgs lost a higher number compared to their usual rate than did the parishes within the walls. This figure also shows that the faubourgs tended to anticipate trends within the city by one or more months. Thus, the crisis did affect mortality in Vaize and La Guillotière, and the impact was both greater and quicker than that within the city, but it did not kill nearly the percentage suffered by some of the surrounding rural parishes.

The figures for the faubourgs, like those for the rest of the city, beg the question. What was the cause of death? How and why did the crisis of 1709 kill more people than usually died during these periods? It is the most difficult question of all, because there are so few sources. The curés almost never noted the cause of death in the registers unless it was accidental or violent—a drowning or a gun shot—and even these notations were rare. J. Rousset, in his article on the causes of death and disease in early modern Lyon, bemoaned the dearth of medical theses, autopsy reports, or medical observations

FIG. 8.15 Average mortality by month compared to crisis mortality in the faubourgs of Vaize and La Guillotière.




Source: *Parish registers of Lyon*.

on cases in the city despite the excellent reputation of the *Hôtel-Dieu*. He was forced to draw most of his conclusions from a few scattered medical treatises.¹⁷

Fortunately, the question is not new, and several historians investigating mortality in various regions of France have made an effort to answer it. Some have focused the question of causality on the two

FIG. 8.16 Percentage by which crisis mortality exceeded the mean average (1703-1707, 1711-1715) in Lyon and its faubourgs from August 1708 through March 1710.



interrelated categories of malnutrition and "environmental deprivations," while others have preferred to contrast the effects of hunger and disease. Efforts to differentiate causes are themselves somewhat artificial, however, since nutritional, environmental, and pathogenic factors all affected each other and conspired together to murder a large number of people.

Since the crisis of 1709 was first and foremost a food crisis, it might be useful to begin by dismissing starvation as a probable cause of death. There was some food available to nearly everyone, either by way of the rationing system from the bakers, from the *Aumône*, or from the *forains* who hawked their concoctions in the streets. Actual starvation probably would have inspired notice from the curés, at least in their brief accounts of the crisis, and neither the curé of Vaize nor the curé of Saint-Vincent testified to such an occurrence. The lack of real starvation did not, however, preclude widespread malnutrition. From the end of April until at least the middle or end of September, the majority of Lyonnais subsisted on one pound of bread per day. The Lyonnais pound weighed approximately 419 grams, 30 less than the corresponding pounds of Paris and Geneva. If 450 grams of wheat bread contained close to 1,050 calories, then the Lyonnais pound would have contained less, somewhere between 950 and 1,000 calories.¹⁸ Without any supplements, such an amount was one-third less than the minimum judged necessary by most modern nutritionists to sustain any degree of health, or indeed, life itself. In normal times, the Lyonnais could hope to boost their caloric intake with small amounts of meat, lysine-rich lentils, or the wine they liked to drink in such prodigious quantities. Unfortunately, such supplements were in short supply in 1709 and completely beyond the reach of many who could not even afford the smallest amounts of rough bread.¹⁹

Paradoxically, inadequate amounts of wheat bread may have been more harmful than no food at all. Wheat is low in the protein required by the body for cell and tissue replacement and for glucose production. With no food at all, the body ceases to break down its own proteins and instead switches to ketones produced by the kidneys to maintain minimum life support. An adult can thus survive for a long period without food.²⁰ But if the body continues to receive an inadequate supply of food (such as wheat bread) high in carbohydrates and low in proteins, this physiological safety switch fails to function, and the body continues to break down its own proteins—

to feed on itself—in a desperate effort to supplement a useless diet. Malnutrition could lower overall body temperature, hindering the action of enzymes and the entire immune system and thereby contributing to an increased risk of infection. The presence of infection could drastically increase the need for protein because of a greater need of new cells and tissue, causing further malnutrition. Such a truly vicious cycle easily becomes lethal. As the weeks and months wore on in Lyon, as delay followed delay in restoring the city to economic and alimentary health, the population grew gradually weaker. Lassitude, anemia, and a steady decline in the ability to resist disease combined in a deadly mixture with environmental factors.²¹

The foremost environmental problem was the lack of hygiene.²² Chamber pots were emptied into the streets, and the refuse was swept from house to house, seeping into the wells that supplied the city's drinking water.²³ Typhoid fever and bloody dysentery thrived under such conditions, and the spread of typhoid was further aided by the seasonal flooding of the polluted Saône and the lack of quais in the city to hold it back.²⁴ Additionally, with the price of wine inflated by shortages, those who might ordinarily drink wine instead drank ever greater quantities of polluted water.²⁵ Water was not the only villain, however. Artisans lived packed together in one room, often sleeping in the same bed, itself made of rough feathers or straw covered by sheets that were never changed.²⁶ Body lice flourished there and in clothing that was carefully and fatally passed on from person to person. Typhus fever travelled with the lice or took to the air in the feces of lice, the dust of which seldom escaped the badly ventilated rooms.²⁷ Poor ventilation and smoke from fires added a variety of respiratory diseases to the mix.²⁸

Artisans never washed, and the working poor lived with varicose veins and skin ulcers that worsened with the lack of food and could easily become infected.²⁹ As private granaries emptied and increasing numbers of people turned to the supplies of the *Abondance*, the rats that ordinarily occupied the granaries sought sustenance elsewhere, moving closer to people, to whom they could transmit a variety of diseases. The filth and bacteria increased the threat to newborns, who must have died of umbilical tetanus or from various birth defects induced by the malnutrition of their mothers.³⁰ That same malnutrition surely contributed to the drop in conceptions as famine amenorrhoea and male sterility increased.³¹

Typhoid and typhus were only two among the many diseases that invaded and attacked the Lyonnais. Children succumbed in normal years to endemic smallpox, diarrhea, and dysentery, conditions that no doubt worsened in the crisis year.³² Malnutrition alone could be lethal to the very young because of their greater need of protein for rapid growth. Their parents fell victim in autumn to malaria, as mosquitos swarmed in from the backwaters of the Saône and the marshes below the Presqu'île.³³ Influenza took its share of the weak, as did tuberculosis, which was endemic in all its visible and invisible forms throughout France.³⁴ Bacterial dysentery became particularly virulent in the fall, especially among those who insisted, as they did in 1709, on picking and eating various fruits before they were ripe.³⁵ Dysentery could be extremely contagious, transmitted by touch, on clothing, or on bedding. Like all gastrointestinal infections, it prevented the absorption of even the most meager sustenance, killing its weakened victims with deadly velocity.

These environmental and pathological factors became even more dangerous with the influx of the rural poor. Natives of the city might be expected to have built up a marginal resistance to local bacteria. The invasion of new bacteria, of new and different strains of disease, could expect deadly success among a virgin population, especially one battered, as the Lyonnais were, by a shattered economy and unemployment. The loss of hope, evidenced by the enormous tide of abandonments, must easily have crippled the very will to live. Indeed, the cost of the crisis in lives could not match the psychological cost, the loss of livelihoods, the endless varieties of brain damage to old and young alike from fevers and lack of food, the agonizing decisions by families to stay or leave, to feed one child and starve or abandon another. No number can communicate, no graph can detail these terrible costs. They were borne silently, heavily, and with enormous sadness by the people of Lyon.

The problem of mortality in the crisis of 1709 is not, therefore, an issue of simple cause and effect. Mortality was rather the result of what some historians have called "synergy," a combination of inter-related cycles in which various diseases, chronic malnutrition, environmental detriments, and psychological factors all acted as mutual catalysts.³⁶ The actual causes of death in 1709 were no different from those for any other year in the dangerous, risk-filled environment of the Old Regime. Greater malnutrition, overcrowding, and unem-

ployment simply strengthened the usual causes of death and provided them with far more than their customary number of victims.

This synergistic argument helps to answer the nagging question of greater mortality among the rich. Diseases were not particularly selective, and many, such as typhus and typhoid fevers, did not require malnutrition as a prerequisite. Environmental factors were probably sufficient to explain the greater number of deaths among the elite. The merchants of Lyon could, of course, have fled the city, though their relative lack of country estates made that option less attractive. Certainly, had there been a single, visible epidemic, they would have left, but no such monster reared its head in Lyon. The merchants stayed and paid their grim share of the cost.³⁷


There was another cost. The crisis not only burdened individuals and families, it also pressed hard on institutions. Hospitals pushed their budgets deep into deficit to care for the sick and abandoned in 1709. The city spent enormous sums to buy expensive grain and sell it at a substantial loss to the bakers. Ironically, the arrival at long last of Castiglioni's Italian grain only worsened matters for the Consulate of Lyon. The crisis of shortage mutated into a crisis of surplus. Louis Ravat and his colleagues had now to confront the bill for their effort to feed the city.

The Accounting

The accounts of the *Chambre d'Abondance* began to hemorrhage as early as the summer of 1708. From a debt of only 35,700 livres at Easter, the institution leapt 522,558 livres into the red by August. Twelve months later, that debt had tripled, and by March 1710 it stood at a staggering 2,059,974 livres. Such a debt exceeded by 300,000 livres the average annual revenue for the entire city government from 1701 to 1707.¹ Figure 9.1 illustrates the debt of the *Abondance* as it rose from Payment to Payment from 1707 through 1713, and contrasts it with the institution's expenses and revenues for those years. It shows that while the debt declined slightly in March 1710, it remained high until the end of 1711, and that it far outdistanced revenues during the period.

As the *Abondance* continued to purchase wheat at enormous prices and sell it at a loss to the bakers, the resulting flow of red ink threatened to drown the city. The arrival *en masse* of Castiglioni's grain barges should have brought relief. Instead, this supposed deliverance quickly developed into a mixed blessing. At the very moment that expensive Italian wheat climbed the Rhône, the peasants of Burgundy began harvesting fields rich in barley, and enterprising *forains* descended upon Lyon with loaf upon loaf of cheap barley bread.² Ravat had argued in 1708 that the Lyonnais would not eat such bread, and he may have been correct at that time, but months of hunger and high prices had intervened to temper the stubbornness of the city's artisans. By October, they were buying cheaper barley bread and deserting the bakers in droves.³ The bakers stared at shelves filled with expensive wheat bread and began to cut their purchases from the *Abondance*. The cut came in October, just as arrivals from Italy reached their peak. The *Abondance*, which had supplied over 1,500 *aneës* per week

FIG. 9.1 Revenues, expenses, and debt of the *Chambre d'Abondance*, 1707-1713, in livres.



Source: *Accounts of the Abondance*.

throughout the crisis, now found itself selling only one-third that amount. Its granaries filled to overflowing, and the Consulate faced the consequences of its own miscalculations. The magistrates had underestimated the barley crop; indeed, they had both underestimated the ability of the Burgundians to rebound from the crisis and

overestimated the demand for wheat. By January of the new year, with both deficits and grain stocks rising about them, they faced the ultimate irony: a crisis of plenty.

They turned first to Villeroy, who quickly transformed himself into a wily grain merchant. Making remarkable use of his court connections, especially those with the minister of war Voysin, the duke managed to convince the crown to buy over 20,000 *anées* for the army at 56 livres per *anée*, 5 livres more than the *Abondance* was then charging the bakers.⁴ Trudaine, whose sister was Voysin's wife, joined this effort, persuading a reluctant Desmaretz that the price was fair, which in fact it was on the first of January.⁵ By mid February, however, before a single sack of grain had been delivered to the army, the price of wheat on the Grenette had dropped to 51 livres. The fall in price represented an effective loss to the crown of 100,000 livres. When the Consulate had the gall to complain to Villeroy on 7 February that 68 livres would have been a better price, the duke replied coldly that it required all his "savoir faire" to achieve the agreed-upon price, and that it was the best possible under the circumstances.⁶

Though the *échevins* entered the grain business with great determination, they recognized that such purchases could neither clear their overflowing granaries nor reduce their towering debts. As they had so often in the past, therefore, the magistrates decided to coerce the bakers. In a session of 6 January 1710, one year to the day after the arrival of the great winter, they noted their forbearance in "allowing" the bakers to reduce by two-thirds their purchases from the *Abondance*. They concluded, however, that such a reduction was unjustifiable given the kindness they deemed to have shown to the bakers by selling wheat to them at such a loss. "As they [the bakers] are insensitive to all the advantages that have been provided to them, and as it is assumed that the resistance to all orders to which they have been inclined for three months can only be due to their bad intentions and to the spirit of a cabal which it is time to repress," it was decided to force them to purchase the grain.⁷ A list was ordered drawn that would require each baker to buy his share of a total of 539 *anées* per week at 51 livres per *anée*.⁸

The resulting list showed 137 bakers spread out through the city's thirty-five quarters.⁹ The weekly amounts assigned varied from 1 to 7 *anées* depending on the condition of each baker, but the final total came to only 384 *anées* and not 539 as originally intended.¹⁰ It appears

that someone, probably the bakers themselves, must have intervened in making up the list to decrease the amount.

Even that amount was too much for some, especially with the ready availability of other sources. To lower their costs and reduce their own debts, several bakers resorted to illegal schemes, most involving the secret purchase and resale of grain on the market. Some bakers established lookouts at the gates, watching for wagoners bringing in supplies for the market. Alerted to such arrivals, the conspiring bakers journeyed furtively to the inn where the seller and his grain had put up for the night and there made a deal to buy it. Buyer and seller then stole out into the darkness, lanterns in hand, to measure the grain in the stable. The next day, when the wagoner sold the grain on the market, he did so not as a seller but as a secret agent for the baker, who pocketed the profit.¹¹ On 12 March the city attempted to prohibit such practices, maintaining the rule against any purchases by the bakers (other than from the *Abondance*) within the five-league limit, and against any purchases at all outside the Grenette.¹² The practice continued, however, for the prohibitions had to be repeated in early April when two innkeepers of La Guillotière were fined for allowing such sales in their inns.¹³

No consular coercion could change the economic facts of life. The Lyonnais were not about to buy wheat bread made expensive by the *Abondance* when cheaper bread was available on every street-corner. Citing "low consumption," the bakers petitioned the Consulate on 1 April to reduce their assigned weekly amounts.¹⁴ Hopeful of improved baker compliance, the magistrates reduced the total from 384 to 219 *anées* per week and decreased the maximum individual allotment from 7 to 3 *anées*.¹⁵

The bakers would have liked to prohibit the activities of the *foirains* altogether, but Ravat and his colleagues were not prepared to go that far. They did agree that bread selling had gotten out of hand. An *ordonnance de police* of 7 April noted "that many persons neglect their natural profession in order to sell bread," and that it was being sold everywhere—in alleys, streets, squares, even in the open hallways of houses.¹⁶ The *ordonnance* attempted to restrict the trade only to authorized bakers and *foirains* and to confine them to specific locations. Bakers were also prohibited from mixing wheat flour with barley or buckwheat as part of the city's effort to force them to use *Abondance* wheat.¹⁷

This *ordonnance* appears to have enjoyed no more success than the others. Stockpiles in the *Abondance* granaries remained stubbornly high throughout the spring, and the Consulate worried increasingly about the dangers of spoilage. By early June, over 12,000 *anées* still remained, and the magistrates decided on one last desperate measure to unload it.¹⁸

If the bakers could not be forced to buy the grain, the bourgeois of Lyon would have to take it. On 17 June, the Consulate prepared an *ordonnance* that would force the citizens of the city to buy an assigned share. In the preamble to the *ordonnance* the magistrates reviewed the sad situation of the *Abondance* and admitted the reality of the situation. "It has pleased God to put an end to all our fears by the extraordinary quantity of bread that the *forains* bring daily to this city, by the abundance of small grains that were harvested last year, and by the increasingly certain probability of a harvest [in 1710] which will leave nothing to be desired."¹⁹ They argued that the assessment of grain on the citizens was the only method "to avoid a loss that our citizens would be obliged to bear in one way or another." A list was ordered drawn allotting some 9,235 *anées* among individuals and even among religious houses in the city. The price was to be 58 livres per *anée*, higher than any price ever charged the bakers or the crown. The penalty for not purchasing one's assigned share was fixed at 500 livres and loss of privileges as a bourgeois.²⁰

Never before in the history of the city had such a forced sale been attempted on the population. Anticipating resistance, the magistrates kept the *ordonnance* secret while they worked to win royal support. A copy of the *ordonnance* travelled to Villeroy, who carried it personally to the controller general.²¹ On 28 June, Desmaretz wrote the city in the king's name. "The king has ordered me to write you of his intention that your *ordonnance* be executed." The list was to be made and obeyed. Desmaretz gave permission that his letter be made public and ended with a threat. "If anyone resists to conform to your *ordonnance*, and to the lists that will be made, I am ordered to render account of it to his majesty, and to receive his orders."²² As so often during the crisis, the crown had done as it was instructed to do by local officials, lending royal authority to local actions. The magistrates printed the letter and posted it beside the now-public *ordonnance*.²³

There is no evidence of active resistance by the bourgeois to the *ordonnance* of 17 June. They resisted, of course, but passively. When officers of the *penons*, themselves bourgeois, finished the lists on

10 July, they accounted for only 6,926 *anées* of wheat instead of the 9,235 originally intended. Of that total, individuals eventually purchased 2,482 *anées*, only one-quarter of the original amount and one-third of the listed allotment.²⁴ There are no records or indications of any prosecutions for failure to comply, nor were there further efforts at such public forced sales. The Consulate contented itself with the result, however unsatisfying.

More active resistance to the *ordonnance* did come from one quarter. Claude Saint-Georges, archbishop of Lyon, had proven very cooperative during the crisis. He had dropped dietary restrictions during Lent, allowed several churches to be used as granaries, and given his blessings, if not his money, to extraordinary efforts at poor relief.²⁵ That the magistrates of the city should, however, attempt to force the clergy to get them out of debt was simply too much. The church had surrendered much to the secular city over the years, from rights over bridges and hospitals to its responsibility for charity, but it would not surrender its most sacred privilege. "No one," declared the archbishop, "may tax the clergy but the clergy itself."²⁶ The archbishop condemned this "tax" as a "dangerous novelty" and appealed to the crown to quash it. Ravat responded that it was not a tax but a simple "distribution of grain," and noted that the religious houses had not deigned to refuse *Abondance* grain during the crisis.²⁷ Confronted by a rather touchy conflict between local authorities, Desmaretz forced a compromise. The church won on form, but the Consulate captured the substance. The *ordonnance* was not officially to apply to the church, but the archbishop was ordered himself to distribute 400 *anées* of *Abondance* grain among the various religious houses at 58 livres per *anée*.²⁸ Saint-Georges resisted, but the Consulate had won the battle. The clergy had to pay its share.

Unfortunately, the victory over the clergy did little to solve the essential problem. By December 1710, the *Abondance* granaries were still not empty, and the magistrates were forced finally to prohibit all bread selling by the *forains*.²⁹ The bakers at last obtained the monopoly they had always coveted. It was an ironic end to the crisis of 1709. The same Consulate that had so feverishly sought bread from every source, that had practically bankrupted the city to import grain from great distances, now sought to restrict the very trade it had fought so hard to encourage. The crisis had moved to the account books, and there it stubbornly remained.


The forced sale of grain failed to balance the books of the *Abondance*, but the sale to the crown did have an impact on the debt. The city sold over 24,000 *anées* to the royal armies, providing 1,337,000 livres in revenues.³⁰ That was enough to cut the debt in half, to 1,321,815 livres.³¹ The *Abondance* carried this debt with interest from Payment to Payment until December 1711, when the city transferred 1,000,000 livres directly from the main consular account into that of the *Abondance*.³² The final debt of 257,501 livres was cleared in October 1714 with another transfusion from the city.³³

Transferring the debt from one set of books to another hardly extinguished it, but such an action did act to diminish its importance. Of all the accounts kept by various institutions in Lyon, that of the city itself was the healthiest. The Consulate worked hard to ensure that expenses seldom outdistanced revenues in any given year. When deficits did occur, the magistrates looked to extinguish them by reducing spending or by taking out long-term loans of different sorts. The "gifts" given by the city to the royal government in 1708 and 1711 were invariably accompanied by promises of increased revenues from the crown and financed by loans (many of them made in Genoa) with repayment schedules designed to match those revenues. Figure 9.2 illustrates the success of this strategy.

The Consulate counted the debt as a part of its expenses, but as with the *Abondance* accounts shown in figure 9.1, the debt has been detached in order to reveal trends in real spending. The debt certainly did increase in 1710 as bills for the crisis came due, but revenues outdistanced spending from 1711 to 1714. The city was thereby able to reduce its debt to precrisis levels by the end of 1714. Only one entirely new source of income accrued to the city as a result of the crisis, an excise tax on raw silk granted by the crown in 1713.³⁴ Like all such taxes, this one was inevitably passed on to consumers of rich silk cloth, most of whom lived not in Lyon but in Paris or at Versailles. To a certain extent the crown, by supplying the armies, and the courtiers, by purchasing silk stockings, could both be said to have paid for the expensive grain imported into Lyon in 1709.

The *Abondance* was not the only Lyonnais institution to suffer the burden of debt. The hospitals also were hard pressed. The rectors of the *Charité* wrote anguished letters to Villeroy and the controller general complaining of high expenses and diminished revenues.³⁵ Their accounts support their claims. Combined income to the *Charité* from

FIG. 9.2 Revenues, expenses, and debt of the city of Lyon, 1701-1720, in livres.



Source: Archives Municipales of Lyon.

the sale of pensions and annuities, direct loans, rents on properties, and the wine tax declined approximately 50 percent during the crisis from the average in the five-year period 1703–1707.³⁶ By contrast, the cost of grain increased, from an average of 55,833 livres per year in 1703–1707 to 125,353 livres in 1709 and 176,136 livres in 1710.³⁷ Thus, the hospital's costs increased by over 100 percent just as its usual sources of revenue declined by half.


Yet, the real debt, as illustrated in figure 9.3, did not increase substantially due to a stroke of morbid luck. In October of the crisis year, the Lyonnais merchant Henri Archembaud died, naming the *Cbarité* as guardian for his children of a fortune exceeding 116,000 livres.³⁸ This infusion of capital enabled the institution to stretch out its debt until it was able to hold a lottery in 1714.³⁹ The lottery, of the same type the hospital had held several times before, reduced the debt to precrisis levels. Henri Archembaud had unwittingly helped to feed the poor of Lyon in the crisis year.

No such precision can be obtained in analyzing the situation of the *Hôtel-Dieu*. That hospital was even more dependent than the *Cbarité* on income from rents and the wine tax, so it can be assumed that revenues suffered similarly to those of the *Cbarité*. Unfortunately, the accounts of the institution were maintained in such a haphazard fashion by its treasurers that they yield little reliable information. Only the debt can be ascertained with any accuracy and then only for two-year periods when the books changed hands.⁴⁰ As is shown by figure 9.4, the debt did increase, but it did not remain high indefinitely. Georges Durand, in his book on the institution, argues that the hospital ran a surplus in 1728, so it would seem that here, too, the crisis threw the accounts into temporary, but not permanent, disarray.⁴¹

The overall picture that emerges from analysis of these institutional accounts is one of organizations strained but not broken by their financial exertions during the Great Winter and Famine of 1709. Most recovered within a few years, returning to whatever condition they had enjoyed or suffered prior to the crisis.


The same cannot be said for the treasurers and rectors who guided them. In fact, the debts that piled up during the crisis were not actually borne by institutions at all, but rather by the individuals who kept the books. It was the treasurer of the *Abondance*, Pierre Balme, who advanced money from his personal accounts to maintain the institution.

FIG. 9.3 Revenues, expenses, and debt of the hospital of the *Charité*, 1703-1716, in livres.



Source: Archives of the *Charité*.

While he made sure to repay himself as revenues arrived, the task proved a great strain on his personal finances. When he turned over the books to a successor in 1711, he awarded himself an additional 15,000 livres "for the extraordinary pain and care that I have taken to make payments and receipts, for the purchase of chests to keep coin

FIG. 9.4 Debt of the *Hôtel-Dieu*, 1704-1715, in livres.

Source: Archives of the *Hôtel-Dieu*.

secure, for the bad money, the lack of revenues, the theft of silver twice in 1709, the cessation of my commerce for four years, and for the extraordinary taxes which have been imposed upon me in connection with the *Abondance*."⁴² The rectors of the hospitals also carried great burdens, meeting constantly, lending money, worrying about grain stocks and the onrushing tide of the poor.

The crisis made service as a rector singularly unattractive. When Nicolas Léry, merchant of Lyon, was asked to serve a two-year term as rector of the *Cbarité* in January 1710, he refused. He gave as his reasons "his indispositions and lack of health," but also offered a 3,000-livre contribution to the hospital "on condition that he be exempted absolutely and forever from entering said hospital as rector."⁴³ Luckily for the hospitals, not all of Lyon's elite shared Léry's lack of enthusiasm, and both hospitals continued their functions through the eighteenth century and well into the modern era.

The *Abondance* continued as well, making grain purchases in its usual sporadic manner through the 1760s. Indeed, the Consulate invested a large sum in 1722 to build a new municipal granary for the institution, one of the first large buildings constructed by the city in the eighteenth century.⁴⁴ Though it has since been converted into a barracks for the *gendarmérie*, the old granary still stands on the banks of the Saône, the horn of plenty of the *Abondance* over its entrance, its many large windows at the ready to ventilate grain stocks long since vanished. It stands in silent testimony to the commitment by past city governments, motivated partly at least by the experience of 1709, to provision the city in time of shortage—no matter what the cost.



In Perspective

On Sunday, 15 June 1710, the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* of Lyon marched in grand procession to the College of the Trinity to celebrate the anniversary of the school's founding. During the crisis of 1709, they had cancelled this same ceremony, judging it inappropriate amid the general suffering. This time, however, they celebrated in grand style, for the procession symbolized more than just the founding of a college. It represented an end to the time of trial. The director of the College, Father Galiffet, used his welcoming speech to the Consulate as an opportunity to look back. As his words made clear, he suffered no doubts about the performance of the city's magistrates during the crisis:

Lyon, Messieurs, this great and flourishing city, which counts in its care as many inhabitants as an entire province, had more to fear than any other from these terrible extremities. And it never could have avoided them if providence, which watches over and conserves it, had not upheld and maintained for the duration of the calamity magistrates of a foresight so just, an activity so generous, an application so constant, a vigilance so exact, and above all a heart so great. . . . You predicted the evil that threatened the city far enough in advance to prevent it. You sent agents everywhere there was hope of finding grain within the realm and outside the realm. You collected it from everywhere with great care and at incredible expense. The measures that you took were so just that one could see with admiration that although bread was beyond price in the capital and though there was none in many other places, in Lyon the people never bought it at so low a price.¹

Not only had they supplied and fed the city, Galiffet declared, but they also had managed to maintain order:

You knew always how to keep the people to their duty. Twice we saw them in danger of mutiny; but what did it take to calm them? I say this to the chief of the Consulate. His presence alone sufficed. He appeared at the beginning of the unrest without arms, without soldiers. His authority alone, joined with his moderation, his gentleness, and his love of the people, dissipated the crowds that formed.

Galiffet returned in his speech to marvel at the sheer volume of grain that had been imported:

It would have been difficult to believe it if it had not been public and constant; you had enough to supply your city; you had enough to supply the armies . . . enough to supply neighboring provinces. One witnessed with astonishment grain leaving Lyon to climb the Saône and be distributed in provinces that normally supply it.

The reverend father ended by noting that the king too had taken notice of the Consulate's accomplishments and especially of the achievements of the *prévôt*, whom he had decided to reappoint for another term. Now quoting the king, Galiffet read "in this continuation we follow less a habit that has been often practiced than our own desire to mark how we are content with the service he has rendered to us and to the public." Galiffet closed to general applause.

When Ravat gave his answering address, he was brief and modest. After a short summary of the tasks that had been successfully accomplished, he turned to himself. "If I filled for myself this multiplicity of duties, it is for the public to judge. Its approbation will always be a fixed reward." He added, however, that Galiffet could have done him no greater honor than to cite the words of the king.²

Such laudatory judgments were not unusual in the aftermath of the crisis. The curés of Saint-Vincent and Vaize both wrote in nearly identical terms of the accomplishments of the Consulate, and two years later, Brossette wrote the following in his history:

But in the midst of so much pain, the city of Lyon found resources in the vigilance and indefatigable cares of its magistrates, who provided for its pressing needs by a considerable quantity of grain that they purchased in far away lands; and these provisions were sufficient to maintain the citizens in a state of abundance in the middle even of the horrors of the famine.³

The Consulate and many Lyonnais as well obviously judged their performance in 1709 an unqualified success. They had foreseen the crisis, planned for it, implemented their designs, and brought forth the horn of plenty. This perception was as important, if not more so, than the sterner reality we have explored thus far. It reenforced the elite of Lyon in their devotion to the efficacy of the paternalistic model. They had found that the grain trade could be controlled, bread prices could be moderated, the behavior of bakers and merchants could be regulated, the people could be disciplined, and the city could be guided through the crisis. The mechanisms of paternalistic control were no mere ideals. They had worked. The city had made it. The king had said so.

If any contemporaries dissented from such rosy assessments, their accounts have not survived.⁴ To be sure, the Consulate did accomplish many of its goals, but the cost of its success was very high. In analyzing the degree and cost of success in 1709, it is necessary first to fix upon the goals of the officials and then to see how these goals differed from the needs of the Lyonnais in whose name they were pursued, and from the goals and aspirations of neighboring cities and towns.

The overriding priority of the Consulate was to feed the people of Lyon, and to feed them at prices that would not drive them to violence. This directive necessitated other goals: to maneuver the crown into crushing the resistance of grain-supplying areas, to keep order in the city, to institute and administer a rationing system by defining the deserving population and disciplining the bakers, to import grain from great distances, to find money for such purchases where there appeared to be none. Side by side with provisioning goals went the need to restore the city's economy by rebuilding its money market and its manufactures. Only then could the Consulate hope to restore the ability of the city's artisans to pay nonsubsidized prices for bread. All these ends had to be accomplished simultaneously if the magistrates were to be successful in saving the city.

The Consulate was remarkably successful in manipulating the crown. In 1708, the magistrates used the attraction of the "free gift" to win the cooperation of a royal government desperate for cash, then stretched out the payments through the crisis year as a subtle reminder of their generosity.⁵ They used influence, too, passing their letters to the court through Villeroy, who always attached brief cover

letters reinforcing their desires. Moreover, the duke met personally and constantly with the controller general, and these meetings offered the opportunity for added personal pressure to insure royal compliance with the city's wishes. It would be surprising too if Villeroy did not enlist his many and varied allies at court in the city's cause. Even if he did not do so explicitly, his ability to enlist such aid was always implicit. Desmaretz certainly recognized the duke's power in the web of court connections and clientage systems, and treated him with the respect such connections demanded. Trudaine also took up the city's cause, travelling to the capital on its behalf after the collapse of the Payment of Kings, and Anisson was ever busy lobbying in favor of its mercantile privileges.

Lyon, however, influenced the crown in more subtle ways than through simple bribery and personal influence. Its officials sought constantly to place themselves and their city in the mainstream of royal policies, to the extent that such royal policies could be identified. When Desmaretz wished to keep the grain trade moving, the city portrayed itself as the victim of those who wished to stop it. When Desmaretz believed the crisis to be a fraud perpetrated by hoarders and speculators, the city depicted itself as their helpless prey. When the controller general expressed outrage at the official sanction of violence, such as the seizure of grain at Valence, the magistrates shared and encouraged that outrage. When Desmaretz sought to exercise royal authority through the intendants, the city tried to insure that such authority would be exercised in its behalf.

Manipulation of the crown was important to the magistrates of Lyon. They recognized in the royal government a very powerful and useful tool. They used that tool in the form of the Lyonnais Regiment, they used it in the form of Desmaretz's public letter of 28 June 1710 reinforcing their *ordonnance*, they used it to pressure and coerce other towns and provinces. Indeed, the city did not resist royal power in 1709, but competed for its use with other local authorities in France. In this, the crisis demonstrates that the French state of the Old Regime was not by definition opposed to local privileges or to local power. Rather, it was built upon their foundations. It sought not to undermine them, but rather drew sustenance from them both literally and figuratively.

Louis XIV had gained the loyalty of the magistrates of Lyon by empowering them.⁶ With such acts as the establishment of the *tri-*

bunal de police against the *Sénéchaussée*, the creation of the lieutenant of police, and a myriad assortment of deals over the sharing and distribution of revenues, the king established the Consulate as a local authority constructed at least in part by royal power.⁷ Yet, this empowerment could work in both directions. If Louis XIV increased the power of the Consulate, it needs to be remembered that the magistrates drew power from other sources as well. The wealth of the merchants of Lyon enabled their Consulate to dominate the surrounding region with a power quite apart from that endowed upon them by the king, and their traditional contacts with Genevan and Italian bankers gave them the financial leverage to move and manipulate a monarchy desperate for money. In a very real sense, their access to hard cash helped them to empower Desmaretz. That he returned favor for favor was to be expected in a system built upon the interlocking synergy of patronage and clientage. Mutual dependence governed political relationships, and therefore political power, in the Old Regime.⁸

Yet, even given their special relationship to the monarchy, there was very little that the royal government could actually do for them or for other local officials in 1709. In the end, the state of Louis XIV was neither omnipresent nor omnipotent; it was seldom even present at all. Many localities wished for more royal control and coordination rather than less in 1709, and only powerful ones such as Lyon managed to pull the state to their side and make it work for them. The object of the Lyonnais in using the power of the crown was to force cities and towns holding their grain to give it up or let it pass. Toward this end, as we have seen, they enjoyed only mixed success. Burgundian towns like Gray and Auxonne proved singularly tenacious in hanging on for dear life to grain supplies, the legal status of which they never questioned. For them, as for such towns as Arles and Tarasçon on the Rhône, Lyonnais grain represented the difference between survival and starvation, between civic order and social chaos. They held on despite the will of the crown as expressed through its intendants, despite even the presence of soldiers. When they let it go, they did so only grudgingly and never completely, believing that once that grain was gone, there would be no more.

The substantial court influence possessed by Lyon could not forever resist the efforts of these many towns and provinces to convince royal officials of their plight. The increasing success of such efforts

through the summer of 1709 threatened to isolate the city from its supplies. As the tide turned against it, the Consulate relied increasingly on the incoming Italian grain for deliverance and concentrated its influence with the crown on clearing the path for its arrival. When the magistrates discovered how badly they had miscalculated the demand for that grain, they again manipulated the crown, this time into buying their expensive wheat or into helping them force others to buy it. The means were the same even if the ends had changed.

Unfortunately for the Lyonnais, attempts to force grain from towns in the region did little to endear the city to those towns. The bishops of Mâcon and Chalons only mirrored the long- and short-term hostility of their townsmen when they condemned Lyon as a hoarder of grain. That their perception of its needs and real reserves was wholly inaccurate did not diminish their anger or resentment. Though the role and attitudes of surrounding towns toward Lyon during the Revolution have never been adequately explored, it would be surprising if some at least did not rejoice at the intention of the Committee of Public Safety to tear it down brick by brick.⁹ Certainly, many would not have objected to such a plan in 1709.

Grain did, of course, reach Lyon throughout 1709, and the city managed for the most part to maintain a constant one-month reserve. Galiffet and others marvelled that, having imported the grain, the magistrates then managed its equitable distribution among the population by way of the rationing system implemented by the *ordonnance* of 30 April. Here, the degree and definition of success enjoyed by the magistrates is problematic. The system was undoubtedly an administrative triumph. The census taken in 1709 came close to an accurate count, and ration cards were regularly printed and distributed. Yet, the ration itself, consisting of only one pound of bread per day, was hardly adequate to sustain health without supplements that few could afford. In addition, many unemployed artisans could not even afford bread at the rationed price of 2 sous, 6 deniers. It made little difference to them that that price was less than half that of bread in surrounding towns and villages. They had to depend for survival either on weekly distributions by the *Aumône-Générale* or on foodstuffs of wildly varying quality carried in daily by the *forains*. To their credit, the magistrates encouraged both these sources, and it seems on the whole that this combination of baker, *aumône*, and *forain* was at least marginally adequate. The poor of Lyon did not die in gross

disproportion to their usual number in 1709, though many were forced to abandon their children, their houses, and their property to survive. They owed their survival partly to official help, but mostly to their own dogged perseverance.

The efforts of Ravat, Trudaine, and others to restore the Payments and economy of Lyon in 1709 largely failed. They foundered on the decline in demand for goods engendered by the crisis and on the stubbornness of Samuel Bernard and his creditors in coming to terms. Lullin did not initial an agreement until he lay on his deathbed in October of the crisis year. He ended up accepting a 25 percent discount on Bernard's mint bills in finally rendering his letters. No one got a better deal.¹⁰ Others, however, took even longer to settle their accounts, and the economy of the city only revived gradually in 1710 as demand picked up slightly and the Payments recovered. The magistrates had little to do with either development and could only hope that their city would not again be inundated by royal indebtedness.

The financial crisis remains important in its own right, of course, for having sown the seed for a royal bank and the use of paper currency, ideas that returned in the guise of John Law and his *Système*. Interestingly, the crisis of 1709 also witnessed the first renunciation by the crown of strictly private finance, as the king's ministers rejected Samuel Bernard and his colleagues in favor of the *financiers* within the framework of the royal fisc. The collapse of the *Système* thus represented the second such failure, and a crown twice burnt was loath to return again to the use of private finance in the form of a bank. The lack of such a bank limited the financial options open to an increasingly burdened monarchy in the eighteenth century and had no small role in its destruction in 1789.

As for Lyon, if its magistrates could not revive their city's economy in 1709, they did manage at least to finance their grain purchases. They found the funds by appealing to the city's merchants for loans, and by effectively putting up the city itself as collateral. It is a sign both of the security that many merchants continued to feel in their control of and confidence in the Consulate, and of their own desire to maintain order, that they lent it money at the very moment they refused loans to each other. When the bills came due, the magistrates ingeniously deflected many of them onto the crown, thereby gaining a measure of subtle revenge for the trials of Samuel Bernard. Whether Nicolas Desmaretz, whose mind was as sharp and quick as

any that ever served the crown, recognized this turnabout is not known. If he did, he acquiesced.

Having imported their grain and paid for it in 1709, the magistrates took great pains to restrict it to their own citizens. When efforts at the physical expulsion of the rural poor failed, they employed the rationing system. Likewise, rectors of the *Aumône-Générale* worked hard to deny bread to those who could not prove residence in the city. Only the *forains* were free to serve the rural poor, but one wonders if any of the latter could afford the prices charged. This pattern of expulsion and rejection was repeated in towns throughout the region. Shut out of the towns, shut off from supplies, pursued and prosecuted as vagabonds and beggars, the rural poor wandered the desolate roads. Some joined criminal bands to steal from travellers and passersby.¹³ Most simply drifted into oblivion. They were the true victims of 1709.

The presence of the rural poor helped to reinforce the values, attitudes, and behaviors that came to constitute a collective subsistence culture during the Old Regime. This culture was not exclusively "popular." It was not confined to the popular classes, and the behaviors that characterized it were only occasionally directed against the elite. It was shared by people from all orders in France, by both landlords and tenants, merchants and artisans, government and governed. An individual's role in this culture was defined not by his or her social and economic status, but rather by his or her relationship to the food chain. What mattered in subsistence culture was not whether one was noble or bourgeois, but whether one was a producer or a consumer of food. Hence, the collective violence that characterized subsistence crises tended to be directed against those trades specifically associated with the creation and sale of bread—grain merchants, millers, and bakers. The motivations behind such violence resulted from certain values that characterized the culture.

Chief among those values was loyalty to and priority for one's community or town. While such loyalty is characteristic of most cultures, it took on special significance during food crises such as that of 1709. Hostility to outsiders and to "other" communities became a matter of both popular action and official policy. Officials throughout France demonstrated the strength of this idea when they passed laws and posted guards to exclude outsiders, whom they labeled as vagabonds and criminals. This was the case not only in Lyon and the

cities and towns of the south, but elsewhere as well. At Dieppe, for example, officials filled their walls, while in Paris and Bordeaux, *parlements* issued orders expelling noncitizens on pain of imprisonment. In Rouen, the *Baillage* posted armed guards at the gates.¹² If officials failed in their repeated efforts to plug their respective dikes, they were not dissuaded from the effort.

Inevitably, lesser citizens also acted in their own fashion to protect their community and themselves. Their activities took the form of an endless series of *entraves*, popular, often violent efforts to block grain exports. Preceding chapters have indicated many instances of such movements along the Saône and Rhône rivers, and they were prevalent throughout the country. In Poitou, towns and villages blocked exports for Bordeaux, and the Rouennais were particularly active in their vain efforts to slow the constant hemorrhage of grain to the capital.¹³ These movements of smaller towns together with the efforts of larger cities to crush them all represented explicit manifestations of community loyalty.

For the royal government, this apparent magnification of community solidarity during a crisis posed a miserable conundrum. Even as the king's ministers attempted to keep the trade moving, local officials made every effort on their end to freeze it. At the same time, those same officials appealed constantly to the crown for justice, which they defined simply as royal pressure to force other officials in other towns to undermine the survival of *their* communities by allowing the export of grain. The extraordinary fragmentation of the grain trade in France, so ably demonstrated by Jean Meuvret in his posthumously published *thèse*, reinforced the power of local communities to resist any nationalization of the trade.¹⁴ The government of Louis XIV, bankrupted by war and immersed in debt, could not even define justice on a national level and could not thus fulfill even this, its oldest and most legitimate role. No king could mete out justice in a crisis that was self-evidently injustice incarnate.

Given its impossible position, the behavior of the crown during the crisis was at best ambiguous and at worst arbitrary. By aiding some towns, it automatically hurt others. Mostly, of course, it left them to themselves. The one general royal declaration aimed at mitigating the suffering, that of 27 April, enjoyed at best a limited influence in such towns as Mâcon, at worst no influence at all. Left to their own devices, cities such as Lyon used all the resources available

to them to insure their own survival without care or thought for the effect their policies might have on other regions. Like Antoine Prost and Bricitte at Saint-Germain-au-Mont d'Or on that April night in 1709, they fought mostly in the dark for uncertain supplies, but they fought for their own communities, and for no others.

Another value central to subsistence culture lay in the general acceptance of the idea and practice of "police." As many writers then and now have noted, "police" in the context of the Old Regime defined the entire regulatory apparatus as well as the various administrative entities charged with its enforcement.¹⁵ Both officials and people held tight to the fundamental correctness of these regulations as a bulwark of justice and community welfare. The regulations themselves epitomized a hardy belief in the existence of secret grain supplies, the constant search for which was a common element of most food crises. Thus, few official actions merited greater public approval than the arrest of a hoarding merchant or a greedy baker. Naturally, the same values that accepted the system of regulations also supported the authority that enforced it. When the Lyonnais rioted, they seldom moved against their officials, but rather turned against individuals such as those specific bakers whom they judged guilty of violating the rules.¹⁶

This basic loyalty to authority helps to explain Louis Ravat's apparent success in breaking up several disturbances with a very small force of policemen. One finds it in Paris as well, where Marc-René d'Argenson, Lieutenant-General of Police, enjoyed the same success. On those occasions, evidently numerous, upon which his carriage was blocked by angry crowds, he noted, "my habit is to descend first from my carriage and to talk with them, to listen to their complaints, to sympathize with their troubles, to promise them some relief."¹⁷ Ravat and d'Argenson could pacify their crowds because the people in those crowds believed in the ability and necessity of their officials to succeed, to supply their cities as a whole and themselves individually with bread. Only when people judged the officials themselves guilty of violating the rules did they move against them. Thus, Pinon was driven from Auxonne for trying to "steal" its grain for the greedy Lyonnais. The intendant of Rouen, Courson, came under siege when rumors spread that he was aiding and abetting the export of grain to Paris, and officials everywhere, including Lyon, suffered popular violence when they attempted to raise the price of bread.¹⁸

The belief among the poor in a "fair price" of bread was entirely consistent with their endorsement of the whole regulatory apparatus. Complex systems of price controls such as those in Lyon, the dumping of municipal supplies on local markets to force down the price, or actions to allow mixing of cheaper grains with wheat, all served to reinforce and give official sanction to the idea of a "fair price." Violence resulted from disagreements between the people and their officials over the price itself and not over the shared belief that it must be kept low.

Of course, support for the efficacy of "police" went further than mere anger at hoarders or concern for low prices. It expressed itself also in a lively respect for certain public institutions, especially the hospitals. Children were abandoned at an awful rate in 1709 throughout much of France.¹⁹ Paradoxically, it seems probable that abandonments would not have been so high in Lyon had the hospitals not enjoyed success in demonstrating their competence. Parents abandoned their children in the belief that these public institutions would be able to feed them. That they were often tragically wrong takes nothing away from their obvious trust in the hospitals as part of the paternalistic system of "police."

If the people believed in the various codes of regulations and the institutions that administered them, so, obviously, did their officials. Virtually all the efforts of magistrates in Lyon and other cities outlined in the preceding chapters demonstrated their definition of and belief in their own responsibility for subsistence. They accepted that responsibility without question and strained all their resources to fulfill it. The *Cbambre d'Abondance* was by definition a symbol of the idea of "la police de subsistance" in pre-Revolutionary France. Its entire structure, its every action, hewed to the ideals of regulating levels of subsistence so as to maintain order and stability.

Yet, in the structure and efficiency of its institutions, Lyon differed markedly from other cities in France. While there is some evidence that cities like Arles and Marseilles improvised *bureaux* of abundance to supervise limited municipal grain purchases, the similarities end there. No other French city in 1709 possessed a semipermanent institution such as the *Abondance*. No other city attempted a total census of its population, and none even dreamed of a system of public rationing. By and large, officials in other French cities confined their efforts to selling municipally purchased grain on public

markets to force down the price.²⁰ In a very few cities, such as Paris and Rouen, large public works projects were attempted to feed the poor, but they failed for lack of resources and themselves led to serious disorders.²¹ Bordeaux managed to construct public ovens that baked some 12,000 pounds of bread per day. Unfortunately, this amount was not nearly sufficient to meet the demand, and the magistrates of Bordeaux did not share the success of their brethren in Lyon in forcing supplies out of surrounding Poitou.²²

Unfortunately, there are no demographically detailed studies of other large cities during 1709 with which to compare the relative success or failure of Lyon. As has been shown, smaller towns did suffer far higher rates of mortality in 1709, but whether the city enjoyed a similar success in relation to cities like Paris or Bordeaux remains to be discovered.

Why was Lyon so unusual? The complex answer to so simple a question could well constitute a separate study of respectable length, but much of the preceding discussion has been directed towards its resolution. Lyon's special mercantile and institutional relationship to the cities of northern Italy, the overwhelming municipal control of charity, the peculiarities of the city's geographic position and its dependence on Burgundy, the cohesion among its merchants and their attachment to and control of their Consulate—all of these factors combined to give the city its special character. Yet, they did not prevent it from sharing in the same culture of subsistence that held other cities so firmly in its grip.

That grip in and of itself surely constituted the final and most powerful value in subsistence culture, for the purest definition of that culture is to be found in its brutal priority. Nothing was or is more basic to survival than nourishment, and nothing was more important in 1709. Merchants defied their own bankruptcy to lend money to the *Abondance*, the Consulate spared nothing, nor did officials in towns large and small all over the country. No matter what their other concerns, the food crisis came first. The priority was cruelest, however, for those least able to afford it. Parents abandoned children, surrendering their families to the crisis. Men and women abandoned their native towns and villages, surrendering the security of their homes and their work. Many abandoned their very futures by turning to crime on the roads. They recognized that, at its extreme, subsistence culture was a culture not only of privation and disease, but finally, of death.

That death could come to anyone in a famine was known by all, and all therefore shared in the values, beliefs, and corresponding behaviors that gave this culture of subsistence both meaning and significance. Officials and people of France and elsewhere were to practice the politics of food well into the nineteenth century, as they still do now at the close of the twentieth. Food crises have abated in France, but they continue to plague much of the world. Communities still compete with each other, officials still appeal to central authorities, regulatory agencies large and small still exert themselves to the limits of their resources, and the problem continues to exert its undiminished priority. The rural poor, of course, still take to the roads, and all too often, they still meet the same fate as those who wandered the royal roads of France in 1709.

In that year of sorrows, the battle for survival stripped the Old Regime to its essentials—to wealth and influence, to local power and personal privilege, to the mutual desperation of rich and poor. The crisis of 1709 was not an aberration of the Old Regime. It was rather more like a confession, as if by their every act, contemporaries laid bare their most basic motivations and deepest values. That is, perhaps, why subsistence crises remain of such great interest to historians, why they continue to merit closer study and analysis. Given the concentration of thought, activity, and emotion that they unleashed, scholars can never be at a loss for further inquiry.



Epilogue

The lives and careers of those who grappled with the Great Winter and Famine of 1709 did not come to an end with the bountiful harvest in the autumn of the crisis year. Most continued in their positions, while others moved on. Nicolas Desmaretz served as controller general until the old king's death in September 1715. Unlike others who suffered dearly at the hands of the Chamber of Justice, held in 1716 to punish those who had "defrauded" the government by handling its finances, Desmaretz successfully defended himself and retired to his estates at Maillebois. He lived long enough to witness the crash of Law's *Système*, dying on 4 May 1721 at age 73.¹ Samuel Bernard emerged from the crisis virtually unscathed, transferring the base of his operations to the Amsterdam money market. He continued to lend large amounts to the crown and became heavily involved in the 1720s in the northern grain trade, upon which, no doubt, he garnered substantial profits.² He died after a long illness in 1739, at age 88, his default in Lyon a distant and fading memory.

Of the intendants, Bâville governed in Languedoc until 1718, when deafness and the hostility of the regency forced him, at age 70, to retire to his estates. He died there six years later. He had dominated the province for 33 years, so long that most of its people could remember no other.³ Anne Pinon never recovered from his poor performance during the crisis and was unceremoniously recalled from Burgundy in March 1710. He was replaced by none other than Trudaine. Pinon died in October 1721, without ever holding another intendency.⁴ Trudaine served in Dijon until August 1714, when he won election as *prévôt des marchands* of Paris. He held that office until 1720, but did not depart before presiding over ceremonies in which bank notes from Law's *Système* were publicly burnt.⁵ It must have

given him great satisfaction at last to throw worthless paper money into the flames, and we may well imagine his thoughts wandering back to other bits of worthless paper from another, earlier crisis.

The duke of Villeroy courted his way back into favor with an old and dying king in 1715, and managed to become governor to a very young Louis XV two years later. For five years, from 1717 to 1722, he regaled the young king with tales from the old days and advice on the proper royal attitude toward inferiors. "You must hold the chamber pot for your ministers, sire, as long as they are in office; then you can empty it over their heads once they are out of office."⁶ Villeroy himself was turned out in 1722, but scrambled back to court in 1724 and endured until his death at age 86 in July 1730. His funeral service in the chapel of the *Charité* in Lyon drew a great outpouring of grief from a city he had held close to his heart for over 70 years.⁷

Louis Ravat retained his office until 1715, but his retirement from service to his native city was only temporary. In 1728, Lyon lost its first lieutenant of police, Louis Dugas, and Ravat was called to the office at age 73. There he served for five more years, issuing a steady stream of *ordonnances de police*, keeping the people to their duty and the city in order. He even managed to guide it through one more small grain shortage in 1732. He died on 27 September 1733, at age 78, in service to the last.

For the people of Lyon, the silk workers and tailors, the masons and booksellers, the bakers and beggars, there is no epilogue. Most had survived the Great Winter and Famine of 1709, and it now passed into memory. No doubt, the old told of the wind and the ice, the barren fields and the ragged poor, the ration cards and the hunger. The young probably listened, shivered, and went about their work, hoping that they would not have similar stories to tell their own sons and daughters. Most of them did suffer through grain shortages of varying severity in their lives, but none lived to see the return of the "grandes crises" that had marked the reign of the Sun King. France would not suffer another crisis like that of 1709 until the Revolution, when failing crops and soaring debts would again collaborate to create a crisis of legend.

ABBREVIATIONS

ACC	Archives of the Chamber of Commerce, Lyon.
ACL	Archives of the Hospital of the <i>Charité</i> , Lyon.
AD Côte d'Or	Archives Départementales of the Department of the Côte d'Or, Dijon.
AD Drôme	Archives Départementales of the Department of the Drôme, Valence.
AD Haute Saône	Archives Départementales of the Department of the Haute Saône, Vesoul.
AD Loire	Archives Départementales of the Department of the Loire, St. Étienne.
ADR	Archives Départementales of the Department of the Rhône, Lyon.
AHDL	Archives of the <i>Hôtel-Dieu</i> , Lyon.
AM Auxonne	Archives Municipales, Auxonne.
AM Chalons	Archives Municipales, Chalons-sur-Saône.
AM Valence	Archives Municipales, Valence.
AM Villefranche	Archives Municipales, Villefranche.
AML	Archives Municipales of Lyon.
AN	Archives Nationales, Paris.
BML fC	The "fonds Coste" manuscript collection in the Bibliothèque Municipale of Lyon.
BN	Bibliothèque Nationale, Paris.
Bois. Corr.	Arthur de Boislisle, ed., <i>Correspondance des controleurs généraux des finances avec les intendants des provinces</i> , 3 vols. (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1874-1897).

NOTES

Prologue

1. The story of the battle over the grain boat at Saint-Germain-au-Mont d'Or comes from the court case that followed, the records of which are in ADR 2 B 414, Justice de Saint-Germain-au-Mont d'Or.
2. The crisis of 1662 was the subject years ago of an article by Paul Bondonis, "La misère sous Louis XIV: La disette de 1662," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale* 13 (1924): 53-118. Patrice Berger studied the crisis of 1693-1694 in *The Famine of 1692-94 in France: A Study in Administrative Response* (Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago, 1972), from which he also published an article, "French Administration in the Famine of 1693," *European Studies Review* 8 (1978): 101-27.
3. Georges Afanassiev, *Le commerce des céréales en France au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1894); A. P. Usher, *The History of the Grain Trade in France, 1400-1700* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1913); Joseph Letaconnoux, "La question des subsistances et du commerce des grains en France au XVIIIe siècle," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 8 (1906-1907): 409-45.
4. Meuvret published over thirty articles during a distinguished career. See especially "La géographie des prix des céréales et les anciennes économies européennes: prix méditerranéens, prix continentaux, prix atlantiques à la fin du XVIIe siècle," *Revista de Economica* 4 (1951): 63-69; "Les mouvements des prix de 1661 à 1715 et leurs répercussions," *Journal de la Société de Statistique de Paris* 85 (1944): 109-19; "Les crises de subsistance et la démographie de la France d'Ancien Régime," *Population* 1 (1946): 634-50; and his posthumously published *thèse*, *Le Problème des subsistances à l'époque Louis XIV: La Production des céréales dans la France du XVIIe et du XVIIIe siècles* (Paris: Mouton, 1977), *Le Problème des subsistances à l'époque Louis XIV: II, La Production des céréales et la société rurale* (Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1987), and *Le Problème des subsistances à l'époque Louis XIV: III, Le Commerce des grains et la conjoncture* (Paris: Éditions de l'École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1988).
5. Tilly summarizes much of the bibliography in "The Food Riot as a Form of Political Conflict in France," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 1 (1971): 23-57. Hufton, whose work on the poor is well known, has also explored the seasonal

- rhythms of conflict in "Social Conflict and the Grain Supply in Eighteenth-Century France," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 14 (1983): 303-31.
6. Steven L. Kaplan, *Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV*, 2 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976); *The Famine Plot Persuasion in Eighteenth-Century France* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1982); and his magisterial *Provisioning Paris: Merchants and Millers in the Grain and Flour Trade during the Eighteenth Century* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984). See also his articles "Religion, Subsistence and Social Control: The Uses of St. Genevieve," *Eighteenth-Century Studies* 18 (Winter 1979-80): 142-68; and "Lean Years, Fat Years: The Community Granary System and the Search for Abundance in Eighteenth-Century Paris," *French Historical Studies* 10 (Fall 1977): 197-230.
 7. Rudé's *The Crowd in the French Revolution* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959) and Cobb's *The Police and the People: French Popular Protest, 1789-1820* (London: Oxford University Press, 1970), have attained the stature of classics in the literature on the Revolution.
 8. Cobb's work on Paris during the Revolution is a notable exception. See especially his *thèse*, *Les armées révolutionnaires: Instrument de la terreur dans les départements*, 2 vols. (Paris, 1961-1963) translated as *The People's Armies: The armées révolutionnaires: Instrument of the Terror in the departments, April 1793 to Floréal Year II* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), and an excellent article on Rouen, "Disette et mortalité: La crise de l'an II et de l'an IV à Rouen," *Annales de Normandie* (1956): 267-91. Kaplan also has published on a specific crisis in Paris, "The Paris Bread Riot of 1725," *French Historical Studies* 14 (Spring 1985): 23-56; and there is an old but still useful monograph by Commandant Herlaut on Paris, "La disette de pain à Paris en 1709," *Mémoires de la Société de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Île de France* 45 (1918): 5-100.
 9. They are valuable nonetheless for the problems they do explore. See the *thèses* of Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Les paysans de Languedoc*, 2 vols. (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1964), and René Baehrel, *Une Croissance: La Basse-Provence rurale* (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1961). Many articles have concentrated on demographic aspects. See Serge Dontenwill, "Les crises démographiques à Charlieu et dans la campagne environnante de 1690 à 1720," *Cahiers d'histoire* 14 (1969): 113-40, for a good example.
 10. Sharon Kettering, *Patrons, Brokers and Clients in Seventeenth-Century France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
 11. William S. Beik, *Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France: State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).
 12. Albert N. Hamscher, *The Parlement of Paris after the Fronde, 1653-1673* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1976) and *The Conseil Privé and the Parlements in the Age of Louis XIV: A Study in French Absolutism* (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1987).
 13. Roger Mettam, *Power and Faction in Louis XIV's France* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).

Chapter 1

1. AML FF, ch. V, pp. 121-22: "Ordonnance et règlement général sur le fait de la police de la ville et faux-bourgs de Lyon" (Lyon, 1700), articles LIV-LIX. Maurice Garden, *Lyon et les Lyonnais au XVIIIe siècle* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1970), p. 8, remarks that its odor and perpetual fog made the Saône an unpopular place to promenade.
2. Marie Vanario, "Chronologie des ponts et passerelles sur le Rhône et la Saône" in *Lyon au fil des fleuves*, eds. Pierre Plattier, E. Alphonso, and Charles Bisson (Chatillon-sur-Chalaronne: Imprimerie Multitude, 1982), p. 84.
3. Jacqueline Roubert, "L'Hôtel-Dieu et le Rhône" in *Lyon au fil des fleuves*, p. 97.
4. Evelyn Brochier, "Les métiers des rives" in *Lyon au fil des fleuves*, pp. 187-88.
5. Garden, *Lyon et les Lyonnais*, pp. 55-57. The most common provinces of origin other than the Lyonnais were the Dombes to the east and Dauphiné and Savoy to the south.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-26. Garden notes that the census of 1709 was the only one taken in the whole of the eighteenth century up to the Revolution and that there are no registers extant for the *capitation*, *vingtième*, or *dixième*, the major royal taxes of the period.
7. François Lambert d'Herbigny, "Mémoire sur le gouvernement de Lyon (1697)," published in *Revue d'histoire de Lyon* 1 (1902): 75; Jean-Joseph, Abbé d'Expilly, *Dictionnaire géographique, historique et politique des Gaules et de la France* (Paris: Desaint et Saillant, 1762-1770), T.III, p. 945. Louis Messance, in his *Récherches sur la population des généralités d'Auvergne, de Lyon, de Rouen et de quelques provinces et villes du royaume* (Paris: Durand, 1766), p. 39, estimated a population of 105,000 in 1700.
8. Garden, *Lyon et les Lyonnais*, p. 31.
9. *Ibid.*, table XII, p. 198 and table IV, p. 228.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 7 and table II, p. 19.
11. On the physical formation of the city, see Auguste Kleinclausz, *Lyon des origines à nos jours: La formation de la Cité* (Lyon: Pierre Masson, 1925).
12. This was the conclusion of H. Muheim in "Une source exceptionnelle: Le recensement de la population lyonnaise en 1709. Les domestiques dans la société," *Actes du 89e Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes: Section d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* (1965): 207-17.
13. Kleinclausz, *Lyon des origines à nos jours*, p. 161.
14. Jean-Pierre Gutton, *La société et les pauvres: L'exemple de la généralité de Lyon, 1534-1789* (Lyon: Centre lyonnais d'histoire économique et sociale, 1970), p. 60. These two areas of the city also experienced the highest incidence of crime according to an unpublished *Mémoire de Maîtrise* of Marc Laleix, "La criminalité à Lyon dans la première moitié du XVIIIe siècle" (Lyon, Centre Pierre Léon, 1972).
15. Justin Godart, *L'ouvrier en soie. Monographie du tisseur lyonnais* (Paris: E. Nichols, 1899), pp. 55-56.

16. On the construction of the Hôtel de Ville see Kleinclausz, *Lyon des origines à nos jours*, pp. 202-3.
17. Marc Guyaz, *Histoire des institutions municipales de Lyon avant 1789* (Lyon: H. Georg, 1884), p. 248.
18. A complete account of the ceremony is in "Abrégé du cérémonial public de l'inauguration de la ville de Lyon," *Almanach de Lyon* (1715): n.p.
19. *Ibid.*, and Guyaz, *Histoire des institutions*, pp. 249-50. See also an old but still useful dissertation by Henry Dater, *Municipal Administration of Lyon, 1764-1790* (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1936), pp. 42-43.
20. Melchior Philibert, one of the city's richest merchants, refused election throughout his life, and he was not alone. See Maurice Garden, "Le grand négoce lyonnais au début du XVIII^e siècle: La maison de Melchior Philibert," *Colloque Franco-Suisse d'histoire économique et sociale* (1967), pp. 85-86.
21. On the system of venality the literature is extensive. For background on the system see especially Gaston Zeller, *Les institutions de la France au XVI^e siècle* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1948), and two fundamental works of Roland Mousnier, *La vénalité des offices sous Henri IV et Louis XIII* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1971) and *Les institutions de la France sous la monarchie absolue*, 2 vols. (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1974-1980). For a more recent assessment, the work of David Bien is essential, especially "Offices, Corps, and a System of State Credit: The Uses of Privilege under the Ancien Régime," in *The Political Culture of the Old Regime*, ed. Keith Baker, vol. 1 of *The French Revolution and the Creation of Modern Political Culture* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), pp. 89-114; and "Manufacturing Nobles: The Chancelleries in France to 1789," *Journal of Modern History* 61 (September 1989): 445-86.
22. Guyaz, *Histoire des institutions*, p. 260.
23. *Ibid.*
24. *Ibid.*, p. 263. The debt was refinanced into longer term *rentes*.
25. Sebastian Charléty, in "La ruine de Lyon sous Louis XIV," *La revue de Paris* 9 (1902): 620-50, analyzed in some detail the multitudinous exactions made on the city during the reign of Louis XIV. While various taxes, gifts, and purchases of office burdened the city heavily, however, they can hardly be said to have "ruined" it.
26. On the king's policies and attitudes towards the sovereign courts, see the previously cited works of Albert Hamscher, *The Parlement of Paris after the Fronde* and *The Conseil Privé and the Parlements in the Age of Louis XIV*.
27. On the *bureau de police* see Guyaz, *Histoire des institutions*, p. 252. An *arrêt du Conseil* confirming the latter purchase is in BML fC A597704. Eugene Courbis, in *La municipalité lyonnaise sous l'ancien régime* (Lyon: Mougin-Rusand, 1900), pp. 98-99, noted that the purchase included ten offices of *commissaire de police* for a combined total of 180,000 livres. The literature on venality has not sufficiently shown the occasionally positive aspects of the system. Lyon's lieutenant of police was quite active, and the office had already proven extremely effective in Paris. See Jacques Saint-Germain, *La Reynie et la police au grand siècle* (Paris: Hachette, 1962); Marc Chassaing, *La Lieutenance Général*

de Police de Paris (Paris: Librairie nouvelle de droit et de jurisprudence, 1906); Alan Williams, *The Police of Paris, 1718-1789* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979); and Harold Anderson, *The Police of Paris under Louis XIV: The Imposition of Order by Marc René de Voyer de Paulmy d'Argenson, Lieutenant Général de Police (1697-1718)* (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1978).

28. BML fC A597704, *Déclaration du Roi*, 28 December 1700.
29. Ibid., *Déclaration du Roi*, 6 December 1701.
30. Ibid., *Arrêt du Conseil*, 6 November 1702; *Arrêt du Conseil*, 17 March 1703; *Arrêt du Parlement de Paris*, 4 September 1704. The last, issued directly by its superior court, appears to have quieted the *Sénéchaussée* for several years. It is interesting to note that the king was personally present in council at the issuance of the *arrêts* of 1702 and 1703, a fact that gave those *arrêts* added weight and testified to Louis's personal interest in balancing the powers and authorities of the sovereign courts.
31. AML CC320 lists the loans undertaken to pay the bill. Courbis, in *La municipalité lyonnaise*, pp. 98-99, lists the various offices.
32. As Beik in *Absolutism and Society* and Mettam in *Power and Faction* have indicated, such alliances were not only not unusual, but vital to Louis XIV's effort to buttress royal authority.
33. Dater, p. 43, mentions this court briefly, and there are several *sentences* in the series FF of the municipal archives.
34. On the structure and authority of the *Conservation*, see M. E. Fayard, *Étude sur les anciennes juridictions lyonnaises* (Paris: n.p., 1863), pp. 27-28 and Joseph Vaesen, *La juridiction commerciale à Lyon sous l'ancien régime: Étude historique sur la Conservation des Privilèges Royaux des Foires de Lyon* (Lyon: Mougin Rusand, 1879), pp. 171-78. The structure of the *Conservation* in 1709 followed a reform of the court in 1669 that broadened its powers and scope.
35. Debtors who had escaped the realm could be condemned in absentia, and any assets still in France could be confiscated. See Jeanne-Marie Dureau et al., *Papiers d'industriels et de commerçants lyonnais: Lyon et le grand commerce au XVIIIe siècle* (Lyon: Centre d'histoire économique et sociale, 1976), p. 14.
36. Ibid.
37. Eugene Vial, *Gens et choses de Lyon: Série posthume* (Lyon: Au siège de la Société, 1945), p. 64. For a more detailed examination of this issue, see W. Gregory Monahan, "Popular Violence and the Problem of Public Order in the Old Regime: The Case of Lyon in 1709," *The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850: Proceedings, 1989* (Tallahassee: Institute on Napoleon and the French Revolution, 1990), pp. 653-60.
38. Ibid. Reforms in 1714 increased the wages of the *arquebusiers* but left their number unchanged (AML EE36).
39. Eugene Vial, *Institutions et coutumes lyonnaises* (Lyon: Mougin Rusand, 1903-1909), p. 147.
40. Gutton, *La société et les pauvres*, p. 353.
41. Cited in Garden, *Lyon et les Lyonnais*, p. 587. Unless otherwise stated, all translations throughout this book are by the author.

42. Vial, *Gens et choses*, p. 121. Rolls of the *penons* are in AML EE10 and EE12.
43. Melchior Philibert, who refused service as an *ébévin*, served as captain of his quarter (AML EE120).
44. AML BB270, Deliberations of the Consulate of Lyon, 1709. Appointments appear throughout this series for this period. On the decline of the system later in the eighteenth century, see Garden, *Lyon et les Lyonnais*, pp. 524-26.
45. On the establishment of the *Aumône-Générale* in the sixteenth century, see Natalie Zemon Davis, "Poor Relief, Humanism and Heresy" reprinted in her *Society and Culture in Early Modern France* (Stanford, 1975), pp. 17-64.
46. Philip Hoffman, *Church and Community in the Diocese of Lyon, 1500-1789* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984), pp. 25-31.
47. The average is computed from totals given in an uncatalogued *statistique* in the archives of the *Hôtel-Dieu* communicated to me by Mademoiselle Jacqueline Roubert: "Extrait des registres tenus dans l'hôpital général de Notre Dame de Pitié du Pont du Rhône et grand hôtel Dieu de la Ville de Lyon" (1767).
48. The administrative structure is summarized by Lambert d'Herbigny, *Mémoire*, p. 326. AHDL E762 lists the number of servants and their wages, which may seem somewhat low unless it is recalled that the hospital also supplied room and board. On the history of the institution as a landlord, see Georges Durand, *Le patrimoine foncier de l'Hôtel-Dieu de Lyon, 1462-1721* (Lyon: Centre d'histoire économique et sociale, 1974).
49. AHDL E145, E147: Accounts of the *Hôtel-Dieu* for 1703, 1706, and 1707. While accounts exist for other years, the various treasurers seldom categorized receipts as they did for these three years.
50. The hospital accepted an average 280 children per year in the noncrisis years from 1703 to 1715 (AHDL G6, G7, G8, G9, G10: "Journal de réception des enfants exposés et abandonnés," 1703-1707, 1711-1715).
51. See especially Philip Gavitt, "Charity and Children in Renaissance Florence: The Ospedale degli Innocenti, 1410-1536" (Ph.D. diss., University of Michigan, 1988); Richard Trexler, "The Foundlings of Florence, 1395-1455," *The History of Childhood Quarterly* 1 (1973): 259-84; and John Boswell, *The Kindness of Strangers: The Abandonment of Children in Western Europe from Late Antiquity to the Renaissance* (New York: Pantheon, 1988), pp. 410-23. Italian merchants played a dominant role in Lyonnais politics during the sixteenth century, a fact that helps to explain Italian influence in the city's institutions. See Richard Gascon, *Grand commerce et vie urbaine au XVIe siècle: Lyon et ses marchands*, 2 vols. (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1971).
52. AHDL E1653, E1654: "Comptes des enfants mis en nourrice, 1708-1710." Payments to wetnurses averaged 20 percent of the total expenses of the hospital in a given year (ADHL E145, E147).
53. They are listed along with the abandoned in the "Journal de réception" (AHDL G6, G7, G8, G9, and G10).
54. AHDL E1653, Accounts for January through June, 1708. Garden found the same percentage of survival for children sent to the provinces in the years 1716-1717 (*Lyon et les Lyonnais*, p. 127).

55. ACL H219: "Institution de l'Aumosne Générale de Lyon: Ensemble de l'économie et règlements qui s'observent dans l'hôpital de Notre-Dame de la Charité, ou sont les Pauvres renfermés de ladite Aumône" (Lyon, 1699), pp. 93-94.
56. ACL E97. Applicants had to have been residents of the city for at least seven years. The names and ages of those accepted are in ACL F6: "Régistre d'inscription des vieillards de 5 janvier 1690 au 17 septembre 1738." The entry nearly always ends with the phrase, "Pour entrée dans la maison à la première place vacante."
57. Gutton, *La société et les pauvres*, pp. 295-362, discusses the history of this movement, as does Wilma J. Pugh in two articles, "Social welfare and the Edict of Nantes: Lyon and Nîmes," *French Historical Studies* 8 (1974): 349-76, and "Catholics, Protestants and Testamentary Charity in Seventeenth-Century Lyon and Nîmes," *French Historical Studies* 11 (1980): 479-504.
58. Gavitt's discussion of this practice in Renaissance Florence ("Charity and Children in Renaissance Florence," pp. 438-66) indicates that the Lyonnais practice might have been yet another borrowing from the Italian.
59. The figure for 1711-1713 is a mean computed from the weekly census in ACL E1475: "Journal de distribution et consommation de pain." The total number of poor resident in the *Charité* was closer to 1,600 from 1711 to 1713, but this number included some 200 of the old and 100 children who cannot properly be said to have been interned. Pugh argues that efforts to "check begging had broken down by the 1690's" ("Catholics, Protestants and Testamentary Charity," p. 492). It would be more accurate to ascribe a temporary lull after the large number interned during the crisis of 1693-1694. Efforts revived handily after 1700 when the *Charité* hired two men for the purpose of rounding up beggars (ACL E84).
60. See Davis, "Poor Relief, Humanism and Heresy."
61. ACL E89, "Extrait des Délibérations du bureau de l'hôpital général de la Charité."
62. *Ibid.* The faubourgs had first been excluded in 1592, readmitted, and again excluded. Pugh argues that the catechism did not become obligatory until 1672, but the deliberations mark it at the earlier date (ACL E89, p. 41).
63. *Ibid.*, p. 38. Again, the *Aumône* had attempted to require a "red and blue patch" as early as 1582, but only began issuing the crosses in 1628. I have been unable to locate a sample of the cross.
64. *Ibid.*, p. 49. Deliberation of 11 November 1694.
65. ACL E94. Deliberation of May 1598.
66. *Ibid.*, Deliberation of August 1632. The *passade* is mentioned as being distributed at 3 sous per person, but the deliberations offer no exact date for its return.
67. ACL H219, "Institution de l'Aumosne Générale de Lyon" (1699), pp. 80-81. The official was a priest who held the title of *Oeconome*. Since the *passade* was primarily intended for pilgrims, the rectors probably judged a priest best able to distinguish a true pilgrim from a fraud.
68. The amount distributed was listed by month in the accounts of the *Charité* for 1703-1706 (ACL E308, E309) but given thereafter only as a yearly total

(ACL E310). The monthly mean, or the average amount of the *passade* given out each month from 1703 to 1706, was 17 livres, 10 sous, which amounted to 116 individual offerings at 3 sous per person in a given month or just under 1,400 in a given year.

- 69 ACL E1475: "Journal de distribution et consommation de pain (1711-1713)."
 70. The rectors held court each Thursday to receive applicants (ACL H219, pp. 86-88). The percentage cost is computed from the accounts of the *Charité* for the years 1703-1715 (ACL E308, E309, E310, E311, E312, E313, and E314).

Chapter 2

1. AN G7 1645, f.96, Ravat, *prévôt des marchands*, to Desmaretz, controller general of finances, 18 August 1708.
2. Nicolas Delamarre, *Traité de la police* (Paris: Brunnet, 1713-1738), 2:443; Lambert d'Herbigny, "Mémoire," p. 69.
3. Garden, *Lyon et les Lyonnais*, pp. 362-63.
4. One *anée* was traditionally the amount that could be carried on the back of an ass. In 1709 it equalled six *bichets*, or 205.66 liters (Ronald E. Zupko, *French Weights and Measures before the Revolution*, [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978], p. 4). Figures on arrivals by land are computed from AML GGo45 and AML CC2983, respectively "comptes" and "droits de mesurage" for the St. Georges, Vaize, and St. Just gates from portions of the years 1708 and 1710.
5. AML GGo42, Accounts of the *Chambre d'Abondance*.
6. AN G7 1645, f.96, Ravat to Desmaretz, 18 August 1708.
7. Richard Gascon discussed the early conquest and continued dominance of the Lyon trade by Burgundian merchants in his *Grand commerce et vie urbaine*, 2:784-93.
8. ACL E1526, f.190, Accounts of the *Aumône-Générale*.
9. AML GGo42, Accounts of the *Abondance*.
10. *Ibid.*
11. For a complete discussion of the specific parish registers consulted, see chapter 8, note 1.
12. Adrien Rambaud, *La Chambre d'Abondance de la ville de Lyon* (Lyon: J. Poncet, 1911), p. 153.
13. Kaplan, *Provisioning Paris*, pp. 122-221. Jean Meuvret, throughout his great work, *Le problème des subsistance à l'époque Louis XIV*, stresses the parttime nature of grain selling and the extraordinary variations in the trade, which made it so unattractive.
14. Fernand Braudel noted that Italian merchants "found little profit in the risky and restrictive [grain] trade," (*Structures of Everyday Life: The Limits of the Possible* [New York: Harper and Row, 1981], p. 129). Jan de Vries argued that even Sicily, that traditional Mediterranean grain basket, "ceased being a dependable granary for anyone" by the late seventeenth century (*The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600-1750* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], p. 160).

15. As noted in chapter 1, the theme of Italian influence runs throughout Gascon's *Grand commerce et vie urbaine*, and Garden cites some continued influence in *Lyon et les Lyonnais*, p. 504.
16. AML GG0119 has the cost of transport. Rambaud tallied the cost of tolls from a variety of sources in *La Cbambre d'Abondance*, pp. 118–19.
17. AML CC4050. Boatmen paid the duties all at once at the first toll house, receiving a certificate they then rendered at their destination to prove payment.
18. Pierre de Saint-Jacob, *Les paysans de la Bourgogne du Nord au dernier siècle de l'Ancien Régime* (Paris: Société les Belles Lettres, 1960), pp. 46–47, 169.
19. *Ibid.*, p. 153.
20. *Ibid.*, pp. 154–55.
21. Olwen Hufton argues that this was the case for virtually all large holders in "Social Conflict and the Grain Supply in Eighteenth-Century France," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 14 (Autumn 1983): 320–26.
22. Gascon, *Grand commerce et vie urbaine*, 2:789. On the complaints of the Estates, see Alexandre Thomas, *Une province sous Louis XIV: Situation politique et administrative de la Bourgogne de 1661 à 1715* (Paris: Joubert, 1844), pp. 212–15.
23. Saint-Jacob, p. 175.
24. These monetary manipulations and devaluations are discussed in chapter 3.
25. Saint-Jacob, pp. 192–93.
26. This problem led to one of the first calls for decontrol of the grain trade by an important precursor of the physiocrats, Pierre de Boisguilbert, in his "Traité de la nature, culture, commerce, et intérêt des grains, tant par rapport au public, qu'à toutes les conditions d'un état," in Jacqueline Hecht, ed., *Pierre de Boisguilbert ou la naissance de l'économie politique*, 2 vols. (Paris: Institut National d'Études Démographiques, 1966), 2:829–78.
27. Violent action to halt movements of grain was called an *entrave* and was a common form of collective violence in the Old Regime. See Louise Tilly, "The Food Riot as a Form of Political Conflict in France," *Journal of Interdisciplinary History* 2 (Summer 1971): 23–57.
28. *Biographie universel* (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1875–1897), 9:395–97.
29. *Dictionnaire de biographie française* (Paris: Letouzy, 1954), 6:1239–40.
30. Thomas, *Une province sous Louis XIV*, pp. 29–42. For the meeting of the Estates in 1709, see chapter 7.
31. Saint-Simon, *Mémoires*, 17:201, note 2.
32. BML fC A507705, *Ordonnance de police*, 2 August 1701, and AML FF ch. V, pp. 121–22: "Ordonnance et règlement général sur le fait de la police de la ville et faux-bourgs de Lyon" (Lyon, 1700), article XII. (Hereafter referred to as "Ordonnance et règlement général").
33. "Ordonnance et règlement général," article X. Off-market transactions were the bane of Old Regime regulators.
34. *Ibid.*, articles XXXI through XXXIV. The regulation restricting the bakers to a one-month supply also was designed to insure against spoilage.
35. Rambaud, *Cbambre d'Abondance*, p. 153.
36. "Ordonnance et règlement général," article XIX, restricted access to the

- market. Articles XIII and XVI barred interference, but those prohibitions had to be repeated in September 1701 (BML fC 507705), due to the bakers' fondness for making advantageous bargains with suppliers entering the city.
- 37 BML fC A507705, *Ordonnance de police*, 27 June 1701. The "Ordonnance et règlement général" is curiously silent about the issue of storage, stating only that holders should keep their grain in "dry and well-ventilated granaries."
 38. That does not mean there were no such requirements. The extreme scarcity of records from the community of bakers inhibits study of the market in Lyon as a whole.
 - 39 This regulation went back to 1573 and had been reprinted several times, most recently in 1662 (BML fC 452650: *Ordonnance de police*, 3 June 1662). There may have been other types of mills in Lyon, though rapid changes in wind direction on the Rhône made windmills unlikely. For a thorough description of milling technology and practice see Kaplan, *Provisioning Paris*, pp. 221-339.
 40. *Ordonnance de police*, 3 June 1662. The regulations also strictly prohibited any collusion between the miller and the *commis*, a sign that such collusion may occasionally have occurred.
 41. Brochier, "Les métiers des rives," p. 185. Lyon enjoyed virtually no flour trade of the kind that later developed in Paris (Kaplan, *Provisioning Paris*, pp. 339-75).
 42. AML HH22 lists each scale and the arguments of the bakers for an increase in prices.
 43. "Ordonnance et règlement général," article XXXIV. When, in 1701, it was found that the balance frames, and not the weights themselves, were being stamped, the lieutenant of police ordered that the weights themselves be inspected to ensure against the possibility of duplicate (false) weight plates (BML fC A507705, *Ordonnance de police*, 4 February 1707).
 44. "Ordonnance et règlement général," article XXXV.
 - 45 BML fC A507705, *Ordonnance de police*, 4 February 1701 and 13 November 1702.
 46. "Ordonnance et règlement général," article XXXV and BML fC A507705, *Ordonnance de police*, 13 November 1702.
 - 47 AML BB270. Each report began, "François Balmont pour avoir l'oeil et prendre garde les jours de marché à la grenette à ce qu'il ne s'y commette aucun monopole ou autres abus a raporté"
 48. The wages paid by the *Hôtel-Dieu* are in AHDL E762. The petition of the silk workers and the reply from the merchants are both in AML HH509 and are discussed by Godart, *L'ouvrier en soie*, pp. 249-50.
 - 49 Grain prices for 1703-1707 and 1711-1715 are in AML BB262, BB264, BB265, BB266, BB267, BB272, BB273, BB274, BB275, and BB277. The price scale used was established by an *Ordonnance de police*, 21 October 1707 (BML fC A507705).
 50. Gutton, *La société et les pauvres*, p. 75.
 - 51 The 1½-livre daily total originated in the sixteenth century calculations of the *Aumône-Générale* and continued to be used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. See Davis, "Poor Relief Humanism and Heresy," p. 74.

52. See note 49 above.
53. See note 48 above.
54. The price of rye bread is derived as a ratio to the price of wheat bread based on the difference in the mean price of each grain, assuming that the grain: bread price ratios are the same for both wheat and rye. The mean price of rye grain used was 2 livres, 2 sous per *bicbet*, giving a price of rye bread of 9 deniers per *livre*. Such a figure is, of course, speculative, and it is possible that the real price of rye relative to wheat was lower, since baking at home might not entail some of the costs borne by professional bakers.
55. Gutton, *La société et les pauvres*, p. 70. Because the word *blé* was used to label all grains arriving in Lyon, there are no figures on the proportion of various cereals.
56. AN G7 1645, f. 135, Ravat to Desmaretz, 31 October 1708.
57. Lyon was not alone in its taste for wheat. Kaplan notes that Parisians also insisted upon it, and for similar reasons (*Provisioning Paris*, pp. 44-46).
58. ADHL E762.
59. AML HH509.
60. It is probable that much of the rye sold on the market was purchased by those from surrounding towns and villages.
61. See Chapter 6, figure 6.3. Oats were also sold on the Lyon market at a very low price, but it is almost certain that the Lyonnais used oats only for animal feed, even at the height of the crisis.
62. Nicolas Delamarre, Commissaire de police in Paris, was an ardent believer in the "pacte de famine." It runs throughout his great work, the *Traité de la police*. The most recent treatment of this subject is Kaplan, *The Famine Plot Persuasion*.
63. The city bought direct in 1556 and 1573 (Pierre Clerjon, *Histoire de Lyon depuis sa fondation jusqu'à nos jours*, 6 vols. (Lyon: Théodore Laurent, 1837), 5:75-79).
64. AML BB178, ff. 202-4, and AML BB189, ff. 126.
65. AML GG0124, Deliberations of the *Chambre d'Abondance*, 25 January 1638.
66. The regulations are printed in Rambaud, *La Chambre d'Abondance*, pp. 54-58.
67. In his *Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 1:329, Braudel discusses the general Italian pattern. On Florence, see Ferdinand Schevill, *Medieval and Renaissance Florence* (Boston: Harcourt, Brace, 1936), 1:236-37. On Venice, see Frederick Lane, *Venice: A Maritime Republic* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), p. 306. On Rome, see Jacques Revel, "A Capital City's Privileges: Food Supplies in Early Modern Rome," translated in Robert Forster and Orest Ranum, eds., *Food and Drink in History: Selections from the Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 37-49.
68. This was especially the case with Venice and Rome.
69. Rambaud, pp. 54-58.
70. See chapter 9.
71. On the general problem of storage and spoilage, see Kaplan, *Provisioning Paris*, pp. 66-79.

72. Rambaud, *La Chambre d'Abondance*, p. 132.
73. AML GGo47 and GGo50 are accounts of agents contracted to purchase and transport grain for the *Abondance* from Nancy.
74. AML BB207, ff. 254-67
75. AML BB222, f. 179.
76. AML BB251, ff. 55-56; AML BB252, f. 22, "Assemblée des notables de la ville de Lyon," 9 January 1694.
77. AML GGo123, Deliberations of the *Chambre d'Abondance*. AML DD288 pinpoints the location of the new granaries in the parish of Saint-Paul.
78. AML GGo42, Accounts of the *Chambre d'Abondance*, 1707-1708.
79. The horn of plenty, symbol of the *Chambre d'Abondance*, still decorates the brick chimney over the mantel in the "salle de l'Abondance" of Lyon's Hôtel de Ville.

Chapter 3

1. The story of Samuel Bernard's tour of Marly has been retold many times since Saint-Simon's version. I have relied on Arthur de Boislesle's edition, *Mémoires de Saint-Simon*, 43 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1879-1930), 16:34-37. Sourches indicated the exact date in his *Mémoires du marquis de Sourches sur le règne de Louis XIV*, 12 vols. (Paris: Hachette, 1882-1893), 11:75.
2. The figure is from Jacques Saint-Germain, *Samuel Bernard, le banquier des rois* (Paris: Hachette, 1960), p. 162.
3. The financial history of the Old Regime has produced an abundant literature. For the seventeenth century as a whole see especially Julian Dent, *Crisis in Finance: Crown, Financiers, and Society in Seventeenth-Century France* (London: David and Charles, 1973). For the latter reign of Louis XIV, see the fine dissertation by Gary B. McCollim, "The Formation of Fiscal Policy in the Reign of Louis XIV: The Example of Nicolas Desmaretz, Controller General of Finances (1708-1715)" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1979). And, on the financial crisis of 1709, I am indebted for much that follows to André Sayous, "La crise financière de 1709 à Lyon et à Genève," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale* 24 (1938): 57-86, 163-77; and especially to the formidable *thèse* of Herbert Luethy, *La banque Protestante en France de la révocation de l'édit de Nantes à la Révolution*, 2 vols. (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1959). (The initial citation in each chapter will be "Luethy, *La banque Protestante*." Subsequent citations will be "Luethy" only.)
4. This was the case from the beginning. See John Bell Henneman, *Royal Taxation in Fourteenth-Century France: The Development of War Financing, 1322-1256* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971) and Martin Wolfe, *The Fiscal System of Renaissance France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972).
5. For my discussion of mint bills, I have depended heavily on Luethy and on an older but still valuable work by Armand Seligmann, *La première tentative d'émission fiduciaire en France: Étude sur les billets de monnaie du trésor royal à la fin du règne de Louis XIV (1701-1718)* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1925).
6. There is no satisfactory biography of Chamillart, but much can be gleaned

from the various memoirists of the reign, chiefly Saint-Simon, Sourches, and Dangeau. Some of Chamillart's papers were published by the Abbé Esnault as *Michel Chamillart, contrôleur général des finances et secrétaire d'état de la guerre (1699-1709): Correspondance et papiers inédits*, 2 vols. (Paris: Alphonse Picard, 1885), but they have proved of little use here. For Desmaretz the best source is McCollim's dissertation cited in note 3 above, though there is an older biography by René Dumas, *La politique financière de Nicolas Desmaretz: Contrôleur général des finances (1708-1715)* (Issoudun: Imprimerie du Centre, 1927), which is still useful. On the "Affaire des Quatre Sous" through which the Le Telliers engineered Desmaretz's disgrace in 1683 (an exile that did not end until Chamillart named him director of finances in 1703) see Arthur de Boislisle, "Desmaretz et l'affaire des pièces de quatre sous," Appendix XI in the same author's edition of Saint-Simon's *Mémoires*, 6:521-91.

- 7 Both Dumas, *La politique financière*, p. 27, and Seligmann, *La première tentative d'émission fiduciaire*, pp. 51-52, made the argument in favor of Desmaretz as shadow controller general. Pierre Goubert followed Saint-Simon in denigrating Chamillart's capacity in *Louis XIV et vingt million français* (Paris: Fayard, 1966), p. 244, as did John C. Rule in *Louis XIV and the Craft of Kingship* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1969), p. 86.
8. The Council of Commerce counted deputies from all of France's great cities, including Jean Anisson from Lyon and Samuel Bernard from Paris. It was chaired by the influential Henri Daguesseau. See Thomas J. Schaeper, *The French Council of Commerce, 1700-1715: A Study of Mercantilism after Colbert* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1983).
- 9 This particular aspect of the ministerial environment under Louis XIV has not been sufficiently investigated, but it is evident from any reading of the administrative correspondence in the series G7 of the Archives Nationales. Historians have preferred to concentrate on factions at court, and the best such studies are John C. Rule, "King and Minister: Louis XIV and Colbert de Torcy" in Ragnhild Hatton and J. S. Bromley, eds., *William III and Louis XIV: Essays 1680-1720 by and for Mark A. Thomson* (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1968), pp. 213-36, and Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, "Versailles Observed: The Court of Louis XIV in 1709," in the same author's *The Mind and Method of the Historian* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), pp. 149-73.
10. Luethy, I:111. Whatever resentment the émigré Protestant bankers may have felt against Bernard's hypocrisy was probably overcome by his usefulness as a correspondent and consistent source of profit.
- 11 Saint-Germain, *Samuel Bernard*, p. 17
12. *Ibid.*, pp. 145-55.
- 13 Luethy, I:113.
14. Raymond Moulins to Jean Moulins, 20 June 1700, cited by Michelle Marguin, "Une entreprise marchande lyonnaise à la fin du XVII^e et au début du XVIII^e siècle: La maison de Raymond Moulins" (*Mémoire de Maîtrise*, Centre Pierre Léon, Université de Lyon II, 1965), p. 18. Marguin's citations are the only surviving examples of Moulins's correspondence from this period.

The archival *liasse* was lost during recataloging at the Archives départementales du Rhône, and concerted efforts have failed to recover it.

15. Maurice Garden, "Le grand négoce lyonnais," p. 91.
16. ACC Lyon, "Deliberations," 3 August 1709.
17. *Ibid.* See also Jean Anisson's memoir to the Council of Commerce dated 4 March 1701, published in Bois. Corr. 2, Appendix IV: 479-82.
18. On the origin of the fairs and their prosperity in the sixteenth century see Gascon, *Grand commerce et vie urbaine* and Jacques Savary des Bruslons, *Dictionnaire universel de commerce*, 3 vols. (Paris, J. Estienne, 1723-1730).
19. Luethy, 1:53-54, analyzes the structure and practice of the Payments. There are several contemporary accounts in the various *Almanachs de Lyon* beginning in 1713, but the most accessible is in Herbigny's *Mémoire*, pp. 331-32.
20. See chapter 1.
21. Vaesen, *La juridiction commerciale à Lyon*, p. 147.
22. See Marie-Thérèse Boyer-Xambeu, Ghislain Deleplace, and Lucien Gillard, *Monnaie privée et pouvoir des princes. L'exemple des relations monétaires à la Renaissance* (Paris: Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1986).
23. Luethy, 1:36-51.
24. *Ibid.*, 1:98-99. The crown followed a pattern of devaluing the currency by reminting followed by successive edicts revaluing the coinage upward. Gradual revaluations enabled the crown to maximize the benefits accruing from the inevitable devaluation to follow.
25. Seligmann, *La première tentative d'émission fiduciaire*, pp. 69-74.
26. *Ibid.*, pp. 75-77. *Arrêts* changing the value and interest on various bills tumbled upon each other in chaotic fashion from 1704 to 1709. Many of them are published in Charles Florange, ed., *Curiosités financières sur les emprunts et loteries en France depuis les origines jusqu'à 1873* (Paris: n.p., 1929), pp. 22-44.
27. The intendant of Flanders wrote Chamillart in May 1707 that "no one wants any letters on Paris. Those that have them will lose a part of their capital because the third they will receive in mint bills can never be worth as much as they have lent in coin." (Bois. Corr. 2: 1236). Desmaretz felt the pressure from Parisian merchants when he was intendant of finances in 1706, writing to Lyon in that year that "their [Paris's] commerce . . . cannot long support such excessive losses. Lyon merchants will soon have to share a part of this loss with the merchants of Paris." (Bois. Corr. 2: 1081).
28. Luethy, 1:169-87, discusses this affair. Because it followed so quickly on the heels of the bankruptcy of Jean-Henri Huguétan, it represented a severe blow to the general confidence in the royal bankers. On Huguétan, see Luethy, 1:149-68, and André Sayous, "Jean-Henri Huguétan, financier à Amsterdam et à Genève," *Bulletin de la Société d'histoire et d'archéologie de Genève* 6 (1936).
29. A copy of the declaration of 12 April is in ACC Lyon, "Deliberations," 7 May 1707.
30. *Ibid.*
31. The declaration was repealed by an *arrêt* of 24 May 1707, a copy of which is in ACC Lyon, "Deliberations," 24 May 1707.

32. Bois. Corr. 2:513-18.
33. AN G7 1120, Bernard to Chamillart, 11 March 1707. Bernard's only other letter on this subject concerned the unfairness of requiring mint bills as a proportion of letters of exchange while at the same time refusing to accept them in payment of royal taxes. (Bois. Corr. 2, Appendix IX:510).
34. Luethy, 1:152.
35. *Ibid.*, p. 188. Nicolas was in fact a former Huguenot who had emigrated to Geneva in 1685 and gained citizenship there in 1691.
36. On Lullin see Sayous, "La crise financière," pp. 65-66, and Luethy, 1:188-90. He derived much of his wealth as heir to the Italian Calandrini fortune.
37. Sayous, "La crise financière," p. 68.
38. *Ibid.*, p. 69. As securities, mint bills were called *nantissements*. Sayous confuses them with other forms of private and public paper, and his confusion tends to obscure his discussion of the crisis. Luethy discusses the error and explains the system of securities on 1:201.
39. Luethy, 1:201-3.
40. By 1705, according to Luethy, Bernard's monthly profit from the crown was nearer 41 percent (p. 152).
41. *Ibid.*, p. 204.
42. AN G7 1120, Bernard to Chamillart, 24 August 1704.
43. Antoine Saladin to Chamillart, 2 July 1705, cited by Boislisle in his edition of Saint-Simon's *Mémoires*, 17, Appendix IV, "La banqueroute de Samuel Bernard," p. 548.
44. ACC Lyon, "Missives," Chamber of Commerce to Anisson, 9 February 1708. Getting silk through Savoy required a complicated system of passports to ensure against the smuggling of contraband. See also Jean Peyrot, "Impératifs commerciaux et raison d'état: Les difficultés du commerce de la soie à Lyon à la fin du règne de Louis XIV, 1700-1710." *Actes du 89e Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes: Section d'histoire moderne et contemporaine 2* (Paris, 1965): 189-202.
45. The Lyonnais especially resented the *droit* levied in Dauphiné and were to complain strenuously against efforts to increase it during the winter of 1708-1709 (ACC Lyon, "Missives," Chamber of Commerce to d'Angervilliers, intendant of Dauphiné, 11 March 1709).
46. Schaeper, *The Council of Commerce*, p. 50. Anisson's brother, Jacques, served as a rector and treasurer of the *Aumône-Générale* from 1705 to 1706 and as an *écbevin* from 1711 to 1712 (ADR fonds Frécon, 1, n.p.).
47. Saint-Simon, *Mémoires*, 37:338.
48. Saint-Simon, *Mémoires*, 12:452, note 9.
49. *Ibid.*, 6:28.
50. John B. Wolf, alone among the historians of the reign, has credited Villeroy with being a "good detachment commander under Luxembourg" (*Louis XIV* [New York: W. W. Norton, 1968], p. 218) but also has noted that the Marshal's humiliating capture at Cremona by Eugene should have alerted the king to his incompetence. After that incident, the courtiers at Versailles indulged in a verse that, according to Wolf, "has followed Villeroy ever since":

Français rendez grace à Bellone
 Votre bonheur est sans égal
 Vous avez conservé Crémone
 Et perdu votre général (p. 519)

51. François Bluche, *Louis XIV* (New York: Franklin Watts, 1990), p. 355. On Villeroy's connections at court, see Le Roy Ladurie, "Versailles Observed: The Court of Louis XIV in 1709," pp. 151, 154.
52. Le Roy Ladurie, "Versailles Observed," pp. 151, 154.
53. Saint-Simon remarked spitefully on the intimacy between Villeroy and the city and suspected the duke of bleeding it dry (*Mémoires*, 13:258-59). Villeroy's correspondence with Châteauneuf de Rochebonne is in ADR 2C24. Robert Harding, in his *Anatomy of a Power Elite: The Provincial Governors of Early Modern France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), noted that many governors had renewed their Renaissance role as brokers in the seventeenth century, and that "delegates of towns addressed their requests not to the king directly, but to their governor at court, who was their institutionalized protector" (p. 202).
54. AML BB270. All the deliberations of the Consulate attest to the city's affection for Villeroy, an affection which the Consulate expressed to the tune of over 50,000 livres per year in gifts and tributes.
55. BML fC 6211: "Description de la pompe funèbre de Monseigneur le maréchal duc de Villeroy, faite dans l'église de l'Aumône-Générale et hôpital général de la Charité de Lyon, le 15 septembre 1730."
56. According to Saint-Simon (*Mémoires*, 14:18-19) relations between Villeroy and Chamillart were so bad that the duke lost favor with the king and stayed away from court through most of 1707. If so, he was back by January 1708, when, according to Dangeau (*Journal du marquis de Dangeau*, 19 vols. [Paris: Didot Frères, 1854-1860] 12:45-49), he and Chamillart enjoyed a superficial rapprochement.
57. ACC Lyon, "Deliberations," 22 October 1707. Chamillart had complained in May that "it has been established throughout time that sovereigns can introduce into their states whatever coins and moneys they wish, and can give them whatever value it pleases them to give" (Bois. Corr. 2:1250).
58. *Ibid.*, Chamber of Commerce to Anisson, 22 October 1707.
59. ACC Lyon, "Lettres de Anisson," Anisson to the Chamber of Commerce, 4 November 1707.
60. ACC Lyon, "Deliberations," copy of a letter from the *prévôt des marchands* to Chamillart, 12 November 1707.
61. Bois. Corr. 2:1344, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 29 October 1707. Desmaretz's response of 9 November 1707 is #1344n.
62. *Ibid.*, 2:1340, Trudaine to Chamillart, 8 November 1707.
63. ACC Lyon, "Missives," Chamber of Commerce to Anisson, 14 November 1707.
64. Luethy, 1:209, notes in his discussion of Bernard's finances that while Genevans held approximately one-third of his letters on Lyon, they held two-

thirds of his *nantissements*, or mint bills, making them the foremost marketers for mint bills in the city.

65. Bois. Corr. 2:1340n, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 15 November 1707
66. *Ibid.*, 2:1357, Chamillart to Desmaretz, 1 December 1707. Chamillart ordered Desmaretz to execute the declaration and declared angrily that "the first man taken in violation, even if the proof would be insufficient to prosecute, will be put in a harsh prison and expelled from business for the rest of his days."
67. Trudaine to Desmaretz, 25 February 1708, cited in Seligmann, *La première tentative d'émission fiduciaire*, p. 54.
68. Cited in Dumas, *La politique financière*, p. 22. Desmaretz wrote in the same document that "the principal care of the man to whom the king confides his finances is to maintain the richest men with the highest standing."
69. Schaeper, *French Council of Commerce*, p. 41, remarked on the relationship between Clautrier and Anisson. The former became one of the most powerful and long-lived clerks of the Old Regime. See Boislisle's introduction to the correspondence of the intendants (Bois. Corr. 1:xviii). The friendship between Villeroi and Desmaretz may have dated from the "Affaire des Quatre Sous," but whatever its origin was welcome news in Lyon (ACC Lyon, "Lettres de Anisson," Anisson to the Chamber of Commerce, 24 February 1708).
70. Dumas, *La politique financière*, p. 56. Desmaretz also launched a series of revaluations of the coinage in preparation for a major devaluation to come the following year. It seems possible that Chamillart may have left office at this time at least in part to permit his successor to withdraw the unpopular declaration of 28 October. He himself could not have done so without a serious loss of face. Certainly he was aware of his unpopularity with merchants. Dangeau noted that Chamillart refused the king's offer of a continued place on the Council of Finances in order "to hear nothing of financial affairs so that men of affairs can not accuse him of involving himself again." (*Journal*, 12:83).
71. "Compte rendu de M. Desmaretz au Régent (1716)," Bois. Corr. 3:673.
72. McCollim, "The Formation of Fiscal Policy," pp. 36-48. McCollim analyzes the state of royal finances during this period in arguing that the *dixième*, the famous income tax inaugurated by Desmaretz in 1710, was a last resort caused by the utter exhaustion of other revenue sources.
73. AN G7 362, Bernard to Desmaretz, 24 June 1708.

Chapter 4

1. ADR fonds Frécon: Familles consulaires, vol. 10, n.p.
2. *Ibid.*, vols. 6 and 10.
3. *Ibid.*, vol. 12. Ravat was survived by only one daughter who married into the de la Gardes, a family of the high Parisian robe nobility. Her daughter, Ravat's granddaughter, married a Polignac, completing a rapid ascent up the aristocratic ladder.
4. AML GGo4, "Mémoire envoyé à M. d'Argenson contenant le détail de ce qui

s'est passé dans la ville de Lyon au sujet des bleds." D'Argenson was lieutenant of police in Paris.

- 5 AN G7 1645, fol. 96, Ravat to Desmaretz, 18 August 1708.
- 6 Ibid.
- 7 Bois. Corr. 3:137, Pinon to Desmaretz, 19 August 1708. The controller general's responses are in AN G7 16 "Bourgogne," Desmaretz to Pinon, 23, 27, and 29 August 1708.
- 8 AN G7 1645, fols. 105 and 107, Perrin to Ravat, 28 and 30 August 1708.
- 9 AN G7 1648, fol. 1, Le Bret to Desmaretz, 28 August 1708.
- 10 AN G7 1645, fol. 98, Ravat to Desmaretz, 25 August 1708.
- 11 Ibid.
- 12 *Dictionnaire de biographie française*, 1:825-27.
- 13 Bois. Corr., 3:142, Daguesseau to Desmaretz, 22 August 1708.
- 14 AML GGo42, Accounts of the *Chambre d'Abondance*.
- 15 AN G7 1645, fol. 104, Ravat to Desmaretz, 2 September 1708.
- 16 AN G7 1645, fol. 278, Villeroy to Desmaretz, 6 September 1708.
- 17 AN G7 1645, fol. 279, Villeroy to Desmaretz, 8 September 1708.
- 18 A copy of the *arrêt*, dated 22 September 1708, is in AML GGo9. It was renewed on 8 December 1708, 1 January 1709, and regularly thereafter until October 1710.
- 19 AN G7 16 "Lyon," Desmaretz to Ravat, 8 September 1708.
- 20 AN G7 16 "Bourgogne," Desmaretz to Pinon, 8 September 1708.
- 21 AN G7 1645, fol. 110, Ravat to Desmaretz, 18 September 1708.
- 22 AN G7 1648, fol. 3, Le Bret to Desmaretz, 14 September 1708.
- 23 Saint-Simon, *Mémoires*, 6:287; 11:66, 81, 147.
- 24 Bois. Corr. 3:31, Bâville to Desmaretz, 29 March 1708. AN G7 16 "Lanquedoc," Desmaretz to Bâville, 24 April and 3 September 1708.
- 25 AN G7 1644, fol. 178, Bâville to Desmaretz, 16 September 1708.
- 26 AN G7 16 "Lyon," Desmaretz to Ravat, 27 September 1708.
- 27 AML GGo42. The accounts of the *Abondance* are not as precise as one would like. While giving total amounts spent and some notion of the prices paid, they do not detail individual transactions.
- 28 AN G7 1645, fol. 112, Ravat to Desmaretz, 2 October 1708.
- 29 AN G7 16 "Lyon," Desmaretz to Ravat, 25 September 1708.
- 30 Ibid., Desmaretz to Trudaine, 28 September 1708.
- 31 G7 15, fol. 126, "Observation," 27 September 1708.
- 32 AN G7 1645, fol. 114, Ravat to Contest, intendant of Metz, 4 October 1708.
- 33 AN G7 1645, fol. 127, Ravat to Desmaretz, 23 October 1708. Ravat enclosed a copy of his contract with Contest.
- 34 AML GGo42, Accounts of the *Abondance*.
- 35 AML BB268, Deliberations of the Consulate, August through October, 1708.
- 36 AML GGo42, Accounts of the *Abondance*.
- 37 AN G7 1645, fol. 121, Ravat to Desmaretz, 11 October 1708.
- 38 AN G7 1645, fol. 122, Le Bret to Ravat, 6 October 1708 and AN G7 1648, fol. 5, Le Bret to Desmaretz, 6 October 1708.
- 39 AN G7 1645, fol. 121, Ravat to Desmaretz, 11 October 1708.

40. AN G7 16 "Provence," Desmaretz to Le Bret, 17 and 24 October 1708.
41. AN G7 1644, fols. 184 and 186, Bâville to Desmaretz, 14 and 21 October 1708.
42. AN G7 1645, fol. 128, Ravat to Desmaretz, 25 October 1708.
43. AN G7 1644, fol. 188, Bâville to Desmaretz, 28 October 1708.
44. AN G7 1648, fols. 11 and 11 bis, Le Bret to Desmaretz, 28 and 31 October 1708.
45. AN G7 1648, fols. 13 and 47, Le Bret to Desmaretz, 3 November and 26 December 1708. AN G7 16 "Provence," Desmaretz to Le Bret, 11 and 12 November 1708.
46. That Bâville ceased to quibble is evident from the controller general's letters to him in late fall (AN G7 16 "Languedoc," Desmaretz to Bâville, 11 November and 6 December 1708).
47. AML GGo42, Accounts of the *Abondance*.
48. *Ibid.*
49. AML BB268 has the discussions leading up to the consular *ordonnance* of 9 December as well as the text. Ravat announced the city's action to Desmaretz on 11 December (AN G7 1645, fol. 139.)
50. AN G7 1642, fol. 380, d'Harouys, intendant of Champagne, to Desmaretz, 3 December 1708. AN G7 16 "Bourgogne" has copies of Desmaretz's letters to Pinon in this period.
51. AN G7 16 "Lyon," Desmaretz to Ravat, 26 November 1708.
52. AN G7 1645, fol. 137, Ravat to Desmaretz, 4 December 1708.
53. *Ibid.*
54. AN G7 16 "Lyon," Desmaretz to Ravat, 15 December 1708.
55. AML GGo42, Accounts of the *Abondance*.
56. AML BB268, fol. 167, Deliberations of the Consulate.
57. AN G7 1645, fol. 141, Ravat to Desmaretz, 27 December 1708.
58. AML AA128 has the official correspondence on the subject; AML CC320 has the financial details of the loan.
59. AML CC320. A copy of a royal *arrêt* dated 5 January 1709 that withdrew several of the offending venal offices is in BML fC 335339.
60. Luethy, *La banque Protestante*, 1:203.
61. Colonel Herlaut dated the project at the end of 1707 in "Projet de création d'une banque royale en France à la fin du règne de Louis XIV (1702-1712)," *Revue d'histoire moderne* 8 (March-April 1933): 150 (hereafter cited as "Herlaut"). The earliest hard evidence I have discovered is in a letter from Bernard to Desmaretz on 7 July 1708 (AN G7 1120).
62. Herlaut, pp. 146-49, summarizes earlier efforts. Some of those are documented in Bois. Corr. 3, Appendix III, pp. 636-50.
63. Herlaut, pp. 150-52, and McCollim, "The Formation of Fiscal Policy," pp. 245-47.
64. *Ibid.*
65. AN G7 1120 has Bernard's correspondence with Desmaretz. Nicolas joined his colleague in pressing for the bank in a letter dated 21 August 1708.
66. Bois. Corr. 3:641-46. "Mémoire des députés du commerce sur la proposition de l'établissement à Paris d'une Banque générale et royale, semblable à celle d'Amsterdam, dont le fonds sera formé par des effets en papier."

- 67 Herlaut, p. 154, and McCollim, "The Formation of Fiscal Policy," p. 257.
- 68 Luerhy, 1:204.
- 69 Herlaut, p. 153.
- 70 AN G7 363, Bertrand Castan to Ravat, 31 December 1708.
- 71 Ibid., Ravat to Desmaretz, 1 January 1709.
- 72 Ibid., Trudaine to Desmaretz, 3 January 1709.
- 73 Dangeau, *Journal*, 12:297
- 74 AN G7 1645, fol. 141, Ravat to Desmaretz, 27 December 1708.

Chapter 5

1. Jean Canard gathered meteorological observations by contemporaries, most of them parish priests, in his *Météorologie ancienne: 500 textes datent de 1534 à 1832* (Lyon: n.p., n.d.). Those for 1709 are on pp. 34-45.
2. AML GG243, fol. 30.
3. AML GG265 is the parish register of Vaize in which the curé's account is written. It was also published by Eugene Vial as "Relation véritable de ce qui s'est passé dans l'année de grace 1709 par Messire J. B. Persin, curé de Vaize," *Revue d'histoire de Lyon* (1909): 58-66.
4. Bernard's "Mémoire sur la famine de l'année 1709" was published by Armand Benet as "Le grand hiver de 1709 à Mâcon: Relation du lieutenant Bernard," *Bulletin du comité des travaux historiques et scientifiques: Section d'histoire et de philologie* (1884): 163-75.
5. Boisisle explored the meteorological aspect in his "Le grand hiver et la disette de 1709," *Revue des questions historiques* 73 (1903): 456-57.
6. Cited in Marguin, "Une entreprise marchande lyonnaise," p. 81. See chapter 3, note 14 on the correspondence of Raymond Moulins.
7. Dangeau, *Journal*, 12:303-4. The winter caused the king personal discomfort as well, since his physicians refused him his daily "purgations" as long as the cold lasted (J. A. Le Roy, ed., *Journal de la santé du roi Louis XIV de l'année 1647 à l'année 1711 écrit par Vallot, d'Aquin, et Fagon, tous trois ses Premiers-Médecins* [Paris: Auguste Dumand, 1862], pp. 309-10).
8. Ibid., 12:309.
9. Elisabeth Charlotte, duchesse d'Orléans to Electress Sophie of Hanover, 10 January 1709, in Elborg Forster, trans., *A Woman's Life in the Court of the Sun King: Letters of Liselotte von der Pfalz, 1652-1722* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1984), p. 170. Saint-Simon's account is in the *Mémoires*, 17:195-96.
10. The curés in particular were explicit in their descriptions of the winter. See Canard, *Météorologie ancienne*, pp. 34-45.
11. ADR Papiers de Rochebonne, fol. 293, Vincent to Rochebonne, 14 January 1709.
12. AD Côte d'Or G2545.
13. AML GG265, Memoir of the curé of Vaize.
14. AML BB270, fols. 29-30. The wooden Bellecour bridge nearly collapsed, and the ice battered the old stone supports of the Pont de Saône.

15. AN G7 1645, fol. 142, Ravat to Desmaretz, 2 February 1709.
16. AML GG265, Memoir of the curé of Vaize.
17. Boislisle, "Le grand hiver," p. 457.
18. For a complete discussion of the specific parish registers used to calculate these figures, see chapter 8, note 1. Exact data for various age groups, while available, reveal little of interest. Gathering cases into two larger groups roughly equivalent to minors and adults permits the use of burial notations for which no exact age is given, but which do indicate age status. The priests of Lyon were remarkably consistent in allotting adults either an occupation, a spouse, or a marital status, depending on sex. Likewise, a breakdown of individual artisan crafts shows no significant change in winter mortality patterns.
19. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, *Les paysans de Languedoc* (Paris: S.E.V.P.E.N., 1966), 1:48.
20. The canon of Beaune wrote that "it was necessary to join together the grapes of 14 to 15 growers . . . in order to make one vatful of wine" (AD Côte d'Or G2545).
21. The freezing of the seed was the unanimous choice of contemporaries for the most likely cause of the crop failure.
22. AN G7 1648, fol. 305, *Échevins* of Marseilles to Desmaretz, 14 January 1709.
23. AML GGo42, GGo43, Accounts of the *Abondance*.
24. *Ibid.*
25. AN G7 1645, fol. 142, Ravat to Desmaretz, 2 February 1709. The granaries of the *Abondance* were so full at this time that the Consulate found it necessary to pay the captain of its *arquebusiers* 300 livres per month to live elsewhere so that his house could be used as a granary (AML BB270, fols. 27-28).
26. Grain prices are derived from the weekly reports to the Consulate between 1703 and 1715 contained in AML BB262, BB264, BB265, BB266, BB267, BB268, BB270, BB271, BB272, BB273, BB274, BB275, and BB277.
27. AML AA128, fols. 315-16, contains letters to Desmaretz and Villeroy on this subject.
28. AML BB270, fols. 18-23.
29. *Ibid.*
30. ADR Papiers de Rochebonne, fol. 293, Vincent to Rochebonne, 6 March 1709. Vincent's notion that the crowds would not dare touch the estates was based on Rochebonne's position as commander of the *maréchaussée*, the provincial police. Bâville confirmed in a letter to Desmaretz on 15 March that there had been "émotions" in the Vivarais (AN G7 1644, fol. 218).
31. AN G7 15, fol. 196, "Observations sur la situation en Dauphiné," 9 March 1709.
32. AN G7 1648, fol. 70, Le Bret to Desmaretz, 12 March 1709.
33. AN G7 1644, fol. 218, Bâville to Desmaretz, 15 March 1709.
34. Letters from d'Angervilliers, intendant in Dauphiné, detailing the sad state of the province are in AN G7 1643.
35. AM Valence BB28, Deliberations of 17 March 1709.
36. AN G7 1645, fol. 143, Ravat to Desmaretz, 19 March 1709.

37. *Ibid.*, fol. 301, Brizeaux to Desmaretz, 24 March 1709.
38. Ravat summarized the situation in the south in his letter of 19 March. In Auxonne to the north, the consuls accused a grain merchant, Jacques Vacher, of having sold grain to Lyon without their permission and sued to keep it. Though the Lyonnais eventually got the grain, the lawsuit dragged on into 1711 (AM Auxonne, liasse 103).
39. AN G7 1645, fol. 143, Ravat to Desmaretz, 19 March 1709.
40. Bois. Corr. 3:342, Desmaretz in a circular letter to the intendants, 25 March 1709.
41. D'Angervilliers's order, dated 1 April 1709, is in AD Drôme C6. I have been unable to find copies of similar orders by Trudaine and Pinon, but the curé of Vaize and Bernard of Mâcon confirm respectively that the orders were issued.
42. AML GG265, Memoir of the curé of Vaize.
43. Benet, "Le grand hiver de 1709," p. 167.
44. Victor Durand, ed., "Mémoire inédit de l'abbé Jean-François Duguet, curé de Feurs, suivi de l'histoire de la famine de 1709," *Recueil de mémoires et documents sur le Forez* 6 (1880): 315.
45. AN G7 1644, fol. 232, Bâville to Desmaretz, 7 April 1709.
46. AML BB270, Deliberations of the Consulate.
47. AN G7 1644, fol. 222, Bâville to Desmaretz, 26 March 1709.
48. AN G7 1645, fol. 280, Villeroy to Desmaretz, 31 March 1709. The deliberations of the consuls of Villefranche are in AM Villefranche BB8.
49. AN G7 1645, fol. 150, Ravat to Desmaretz, 26 March 1709. This was one of the few of Ravat's letters to be marked "pour lire au Roy." Louis XIV appears to have had standing instructions that all letters detailing serious disorders be read to him personally. Whether such royal attention benefitted the city by reinforcing the seriousness of its situation or hurt it by making it seem a chronic source of disorder is difficult to assess. Desmaretz's replies give virtually no indication of any particular royal direction in policy toward Lyon.
50. *Ibid.*
51. *Ibid.*
52. AML GGo4, Memoir to d'Argenson, lieutenant of police in Paris.
53. AML HH509. The petition was signed by 336 silk workers claiming to represent 5,000 heads of households.
54. *Ibid.* In their response, the silk merchants cited the dearth of demand for cloth as well as a lack of coin due to problems with mint bills and the Payments. They argued also that they had fallen into the habit of allowing workers to render cloths larger than requested so as to pay more. Whether such an effort at professed altruism swayed the Consulate more than the harsh economic realities is not known.
55. AN G7 16 "Lyon," Desmaretz to Ravat, 30 March 1709. Desmaretz boasted of the "exemplary punishment" he had exacted on Valence.
56. The *arrêt* with a cover letter from d'Angervilliers is in AM Valence BB28, Deliberations of 11 April 1709. Desmaretz reinforced the *arrêt* with a letter to the bishop of Valence on 30 March (AN G7 16 "Dauphiné").
57. AM Valence BB28, Deliberations of 14 April 1709.

58. AN G7 1645, fol. 162, Ravat to Desmaretz, 9 April 1709. Ravat was happy with the royal action against Valence but wanted Tournon punished as well.
59. Luethy, *La banque Protestante*, 1:204.
60. AN G7 363, Ravat to Desmaretz, 17 January 1709. A printed *ordonnance* accompanied the letter, which formalized the coverup.
61. *Ibid.*
62. Luethy, 1:206. Lullin was in Paris as late as 20 February pushing the bank. Villeroy attempted to get him an interview with the controller general (AN G7 363, Villeroy to Desmaretz, 20 February 1709).
63. Dangeau, *Journal*, 12:308.
64. *Ibid.*, 12:311.
65. AN G7 363, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 24 January 1709.
66. Marguin, p. 82, Moulins to Meissonnier, 28 January 1709.
67. AN G7 363, Ollivier to Desmaretz, 29 January 1709.
68. Luethy, 1:210.
69. Dangeau, 12:320. Fayard's withdrawal is discussed in Sayous, "La crise financière," pp. 75-76.
70. Dangeau, 12:323. Boislisle noted the official rejection of the project in "La banqueroute de Samuel Bernard," Appendix V to his edition of Saint-Simon's *Mémoires*, 17:550.
71. AN G7 1121, Bernard to Desmaretz, 11 February 1709.
72. *Ibid.*
73. Trudaine reported the rumors in his letters of 2, 8, and 12 February to Desmaretz (AN G7 363).
74. *Ibid.*, letter of 12 February.
75. *Ibid.* Trudaine's letters of 14, 15, and 16 February contain his plans for reimbursing Bernard over periods of 20 and 30 years (AN G7 363).
76. *Ibid.*, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 26 February 1709.
77. The request came by a letter from Desmaretz to Trudaine dated 25 February. We know of it only through the intendant's response (AN G7 363, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 28 February 1709).
78. *Ibid.*, Ravat to Desmaretz, 28 February 1709.
79. *Ibid.*, 2 March 1709.
80. *Ibid.*
81. *Ibid.*, and Trudaine to Desmaretz, 2 March 1709.
82. *Ibid.*, Villeroy to Desmaretz, 5 March 1709; Trudaine to Desmaretz, same date. We learn of the controller general's decision in a letter from Bernard to Desmaretz on 8 March 1709 (AN G7 1121).
83. Luethy, 1:207-8.
84. Sayous, "La crise financière," p. 170.
85. AN G7 1121, Bernard to Desmaretz, 23 March 1709.

Chapter 6

1. AN G7 1645, fol. 281, Villeroy to Desmaretz, 7 April 1709.
2. *Ibid.*

3. There is no concrete evidence to show that Bernard was aware of the divestment, but he did have an extraordinary network of correspondents. If they informed him, then he either refused to believe them, or else carried on as if he did not know. Given Bernard's habits and behavior, we cannot ignore the last possibility. Nor is it difficult to believe that he would deliberately have left Castan uninformed.
4. AN G7 363, Ravat to Desmaretz, 8 April 1709.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *Ibid.*, Ravat to Desmaretz, 11 April 1709.
7. The forms are discussed by Sayous in "La crise financière," pp. 77-78.
8. AN G7 1121, Bernard to Desmaretz, 11 April and 16 April 1709.
9. *Ibid.*, letter of 16 April.
10. AN G7 363, Ravat to Desmaretz, 18 April 1709.
11. *Ibid.*
12. Dangeau reported the intendant's arrival in his *Journal*, 12:398.
13. Sayous, "La crise financière," pp. 77-78.
14. AN G7 363, Sieur Archembaud to Desmaretz, 23 April 1709.
15. Cited in Marguin, "Une entreprise marchande lyonnais," p. 83. Raymond Moulins to Meissonnier, 20 April 1709.
16. AN G7 1645, fol. 177, Ravat to Desmaretz, 21 April 1709.
17. The *Hôtel-Dieu* maintained detailed records of its wine revenues, which are in AHDL E145, E146, E147, E148, and E149. Records of fines collected by the *Charité* are in ACL E308, E309, E310, E312, E313, and E314.
18. *Ibid.*
19. *Ibid.*
20. The substantial body of criminal records in the series "B" of the departmental archives (the records of the *Sénéchaussée*) are of little help here, since the *Tribunal*, and not the *Sénéchaussée*, had criminal jurisdiction in Lyon. The records of that body, housed in the series "FF" of the municipal archives, are virtually nonexistent for this period.
21. AHDL G8, "Journal de réception des enfants exposés et abandonnés," entry for 12 May 1709.
22. *Ibid.*, entry for 3 May 1709.
23. AHDL E1653, "Comptes des enfants mis en nourrices."
24. The patterns of mortality for these children are explored in greater detail in chapter 7. It is worth noting that this pattern of abandonments and resulting mortality was not unusual to Lyon. It forms a substantial part of Boswell's arguments in his erudite *The Kindness of Strangers*.
25. AHDL G8 and G9. At least one child was abandoned every night in Lyon from 3 April to 9 November. There was not another lacuna in abandonments until 26 November.
26. AN G7 363, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 6 April 1709.
27. The magistrates of Gray were so sensitive to this problem that they prohibited their own bourgeois from purchasing bread and giving it to the rural poor (AD Haute Saône, 279 E Suppl. 100, fol. 15, Deliberations of consuls of Gray).

28. ADR BP4122, "Jugement de compétence," 10 April 1709.
29. On Feurs see the "Mémoire" of the curé of Feurs, p. 308; on Gray, the deliberations cited in note 25 above; on Charlieu, AD Loire B1358; on Villefranche, AM Villefranche BB8, Deliberations for 14 April 1709; on Bresse, François Delessart, "L'assistance aux indigents en Bourgogne pendant l'hiver de 1709," *Mémoires d'académie de sciences, arts et belles lettres de Dijon* 115 (1965): 228.
30. AM Chalons, BB27, Deliberations of the Consulate of Chalons, 18 April 1709.
31. AD Haute Saône, 279 E Suppl. 100, fol. 25, Deliberations of 8 May 1709. What type of "mark" was given, or how it was given, is not stated.
32. Benet, "Le grand hiver de 1709," p. 173.
33. Dangeau, *Journal*, 12:404.
34. AN G7 1641, fols. 240 and 241, Bishop of Chalons to Desmaretz, 12 and 21 April 1709.
35. Leon Missol quoted several curés in his *La famine et l'épidémie de 1709 dans le Beaujolais d'après les archives de la commune et de l'Hôtel-Dieu de Villefrance* (Lyon: Mougín-Rusand, 1885).
36. *Ibid.*; Benet, "Le grand hiver de 1709," pp. 173-74; and the "Mémoire" of the curé of Feurs, p. 309.
37. Cited in Missol, *La famine et l'épidémie*, p. 19. The extent and nature of mortality in 1709 is discussed in chapter 8.
38. Copies of the royal *déclaration* are in AML GGo9 and AN G7 162. Once again, Henri Daguesseau was instrumental in the formation and implementation of royal policy. See his letter to Desmaretz in Bois. Corr. 3:380, 24 April 1709.
39. Benet, "Le grand hiver de 1709," pp. 171-72. Bernard himself took in four.
40. AD Loire B1358.
41. AM Villefranche, BB9, Deliberations of 2 June 1709.
42. AD Loire, *Charité* de Saint-Étienne. The records of the *Charité* of Saint-Étienne have not been inventoried. There are some deliberations extant that show serious financial problems beginning in February of the crisis year with the nonpayment of rents on properties owned by the *Charité*. This was a problem that the institution shared with its larger sister institution in Lyon, and one that will be explored more fully in chapter 9.
43. AML BB270, Deliberations of 8 August 1709, during which provision was made to pay the salaries of those hired the first of April.
44. AN G7 16, "Lyon," Desmaretz to Ravat, 3 April 1709.
45. AML GGo4.
46. *Ibid.*
47. *Ibid.* The job of watching over the bakers was assigned to the *penons*.
48. AML BB270, fols. 43-46, Deliberations of 10 April 1709.
49. AN G7 1645, fol. 185, Ravat to Desmaretz, 4 May 1709.
50. *Ibid.*, fol. 160, Ravat to Desmaretz, 11 April 1709.
51. AML GGo4, "Mémoire au sujet de l'essaye de bled de Bourgogne et de Provence que l'on a faite à la maison de la Charité le jeudi 18 avril 1709."

One *bichet* was equal to $\frac{1}{4}$ of one *anée*. The decision to leave in the bran did have the effect of boosting the nutritional value of the bread. See chapter 8.

52. The results of the census for all the various quarters of Lyon are in AML GGo8. It is discussed by H. Muheim in "Une source exceptionnelle: le recensement de la population lyonnaise en 1709. Les domestiques dans la société," *Actes du 89e Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes: Section d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* (1964): 207-17.
53. AML GGo4, "Pour l'assemblée du 23 avril 1709."
54. *Ibid.* By contrast with Paris, which lacked an institution like the *Aumône-Générale*, Lyon inaugurated no public works programs to support the poor during the crisis. On the Parisian effort, see Pierre Clément, *La police sous Louis XIV* (Paris: Didier, 1866), pp. 355-57, and Herlaut, "La disette de pain à Paris," pp. 62-76.
55. AML BB270, fols. 59-62, Deliberations of 30 April 1709.
56. BML fC A507705, *Ordonnance de police*, 30 April 1709.
57. Only one such record has survived, and it covers the years 1711-1713. See chapter 1.
58. ACL E110, Rectors of the *Charité* to Desmaretz, May 1709. The exact date is not given. According to Gutton, in his *La société et les pauvres*, no beggars were enclosed in 1709, and he cites a letter from 1712, in which the rectors wrote that "all those who were enclosed were there voluntarily" (p. 453). This appears to be confirmed by a document in the archives of the *Charité* (ACL G348) listing the amounts received from the Consulate "for the nourishment of the poor of the city and of strangers who have been brought into this hospital by order of MM. the *prévôt des marchands* and *échevins* of this city." It lists exact amounts for every year between 1702 and 1714, save 1709. There, it simply noted, "N'a este emmené personne." The misery was obviously such that the poor were waiting in line to get into the *Charité*. Does this mean that the hospital did not *process through* any of the rural poor as the strategy sessions of April had proposed? If so, I have found no evidence of it. The rectors may have refused, but if so, why did the notables repeat their intention on 23 April?
59. On the regulatory practice and restrictions placed on the *Aumône* in this period, see chapter 1.
60. ACL E1526 and E311 detail most of the grain purchases of the *Charité* in 1709.
61. On the *Charité* of Saint Étienne, see pp. 94-95. The *passade* was given as a part of expenditures in ACL E308, E309, E310, E311, and E312. It is possible that not that many attempted to obtain it because of its relatively small amount. Three sous bought only one to two pounds of bread in Lyon in 1709.
62. AN G7 1645, fols. 157 and 159, Ravat to Desmaretz, 3 and 4 April 1709.
63. AN G7 1645, fol. 163, M. Rudé, voiturier, to Ravat, 5 April 1709.
64. *Ibid.* The participation of women in bread riots is discussed at the end of this chapter. See also note 99.
65. AD Haute Saône 279 E Suppl. 100, Deliberations of consuls of Gray, 7 and 12 April 1709.

66. AN G7 1645, fol. 160, Ravat to Desmaretz, 11 April 1709.
67. Benet, "Le grand hiver de 1709," p. 171. Pinon must have stayed long enough to eat. The Auxonnois allocated 14 livres for his visit (AM Auxonne, liasse 103). Later, when the town appealed a case to the intendant involving a merchant who had sold produce against the town's wishes, Pinon got his revenge by ordering Auxonne to make restitution (AD Côte D'Or C2930).
68. AN G7 16, "Bourgogne," Desmaretz to Pinon, 19 April 1709.
69. AN G7 1641, fol. 242, Bishop of Mâcon to Desmaretz, 5 April 1709.
70. *Ibid.*, fol. 239, Bishop of Chalons to Desmaretz, 12 April 1709.
71. AN G7 16, "Bourgogne," Desmaretz to Bishop of Mâcon, 12 April 1709; AN G7 15, fol. 77, Desmaretz to Bishop of Chalons, 28 April 1709. The city dispatched special emissaries to Le Guerchois and Pinon on 14 April (AML BB270, fol. 47).
72. Desmaretz himself ordered the consuls of Arles to liberate their grain on 1 April (AN G7, "Lyon," Desmaretz to Ravat, 2 April 1709). Le Bret ordered the consuls of Tarasçon to give up 1,300 *charges* they had on 4 April (René Pillorget, *Les mouvements insurrectionnels de Provence entre 1596 et 1715* [Paris: Pédone, 1975]: 974). The consuls of Arles argued that they had only 143 *années* of Lyon grain, prompting an angry letter from the controller general to Ravat (AN G7 15, fol. 32, Desmaretz to Ravat, 29 April 1709) demanding to know the truth. The *prévôt* answered on 21 May that Arles did indeed have 143 *années* purchased in Narbonne in addition to 6,293 purchased in Provence in August 1708 (AN G7 1645, fol. 195, Ravat to Desmaretz, 21 May 1709). Le Bret could be forgiven for not giving his total attention to the problems of Lyon. Marseilles ran completely out of grain during the first week of April and suffered serious rioting on the seventh (Edouard Baratier et al., *Histoire de Marseille* [Toulouse: Privat, 1973]: 193-94).
73. AN G7 1645, fol. 165, Ravat to Desmaretz, 9 April 1709.
74. AN G7 1644, fol. 237, Bâville to Desmaretz, 9 April 1709.
75. AN G7 1645, fols. 160 and 171, Ravat to Desmaretz, 11 and 16 April 1709.
76. AML BB270.
77. AN G7 15, fols. 248-49, Desmaretz to Trudaine, 14 April 1709. There is another copy of this letter in AN G7 16, "Lyon."
78. The royal *déclaration* of 27 April referred to the order allowing reseedling as having been issued the twenty-third (AML GGo9).
79. AN G7 1645, fol. 172, Ravat to Desmaretz, 18 April 1709.
80. The marshal wrote Desmaretz on the nineteenth suggesting he urge the intendants to use troops to accompany grain shipments and mentioned to Rochebonne on the same date that he had urged Ravat to detach several *arquebusiers* toward the same end (AN G7 1645, fol. 283, Villeroy to Desmaretz, 19 April 1709, and ADR 2C24, Villeroy to Rochebonne, 19 April 1709).
81. ADR 2C24, Villeroy to Rochebonne, 20 April 1709.
82. AN G7 1645, fol. 285, Villeroy to Desmaretz, 20 April 1709.
83. Desmaretz indicated his support for the action in a letter to Ravat on 24 April (AN G7 15, fol. 37).
84. AN G7 1645, fol. 182, Ravat to Desmaretz, 27 April 1709.

85. AD Haute Saône, 279 E Suppl. 100, Deliberations of the consuls of Gray, 29 April 1709.
86. Ibid., Deliberations of 2 and 5 May 1709.
87. AN G7 1645, fol. 188, Ravat to Desmaretz, 7 May 1709. The Auxonnois kept careful watch over the troops who travelled through their town, as well as a record of the cost of feeding them (AM Auxonne, liasse 103, "État des troupes qui ont logés et séjournés à Auxonne au sujet des bleds destinés pour l'Abondance de Lyon en 1709").
88. AML GGo4, Accounts of the *Abondance*.
89. Ibid.
90. AN G7 16, "Lyon," Desmaretz to Ravat, 30 March 1709, and AN G7 1645, fol. 162, Ravat to Desmaretz, 9 April 1709.
91. ACL E126, fol. 123, Chazel to the Rectors of the *Charité*, 9 May 1709. Chazel seems to have been a *commis* in the employ of the hospital. The records show him employed for a variety of missions, including the purchase of various supplies and the management and sale of properties willed to the hospital through individual testaments.
92. Ibid. Chazel noted, in contrast to the availability of old grain, that "the harvest of barley, peas, oats and small grains promises much in this country."
93. AN G7 16, "Lyon," Desmaretz to Villeroy, 1 May 1709. When exactly Trudaine suggested the idea is not known since no letter is extant. Ravat agreed to the idea in principle on 7 May (AN G7 1645, fol. 188).
94. Letters pertaining to this effort at cooperation are in AML AA128, fols. 320-21. Le Bret resisted the effort, as evidenced by letters to the controller general in early May (AN G7 1648).
95. AML GGo4, Accounts of the *Abondance*.
96. The price was increased by an *ordonnance de police* dated 8 May 1709 (BML fC A507705).
97. AN G7 1645, fol. 190, Ravat to Desmaretz, 13 May 1709.
98. Ibid. Desmaretz concurred, and Trudaine maintained the judicial authority given to him after the disturbances of 25 March.
99. The best discussion of the role of women in grain disturbances comes from Olwen Hufton, "Women in Revolution, 1789-1796," *Past and Present* 53 (November 1971): 94-95, 104. On the judicial leniency often exercised towards women in the Old Regime, see Hufton, *The Poor of Eighteenth-Century France*, pp. 252-53.
100. AML BB270, fol. 69, Deliberations of 23 May 1709.
101. AML GGo4 has the *mémoire*.
102. AML BB270, fol. 69, Deliberations of 23 May 1709.

Chapter 7

1. Stipulations requiring payment in coin were not unusual. Bernard made many such promises through Castan. One example is in AN G7 363, in a letter from one of the city's merchants, Sartine, to Desmaretz dated 9 June

1709. Sartine encloses one of Bernard's many letters in which the latter promises to pay "Toutes en espèces sans billets."
2. Luethy, *La banque Protestante*, 1:212. The moratorium was later extended to three years, making judicial recourse effectively impossible. (AN G7 1121 has a copy of the *arrêt*. Bernard's request for it is in AN G7 364, Bernard to Desmaretz, 7 September 1709.)
 3. AN G7 363, Ravat to Desmaretz, 1 May, 21 May, and 2 August 1709; AN G7 364, Ravat to Desmaretz, 1 October 1709.
 4. Dangeau, *Journal*, 12:415.
 5. AN G7 363 Trudaine to Desmaretz, 16 May 1709. See also Luethy, 1:213.
 6. *Ibid.*, and another letter from Trudaine to Desmaretz, 19 May 1709.
 7. AN G7 363, Bernard to Desmaretz, 23 May 1709.
 8. Desmaretz summarized the history of the reminting in his "Comte rendu au Régent" in 1716, published in Bois. Corr. 3:675.
 9. *Ibid.*
 10. Sartine pointed to such a promise in his letter of 9 June cited in note 1 above. Bernard argued that Castan had made such deals without his knowledge.
 11. AN G7 363, Bernard to Desmaretz, 22 May 1709.
 12. *Ibid.*, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 27 May 1709. Pressure from Bernard and Desmaretz did force Trudaine to issue arrest orders later, but by that time most negotiations had been concluded and the orders only succeeded in driving Castan and Fizeau out of the country. (Luethy, 1:214-21)
 13. Luethy, 1:213.
 14. AN G7 1121, Bernard to Desmaretz, 3 June 1709.
 15. *Ibid.*
 16. AN G7 363, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 20 June 1709. Desmaretz wrote the intendant on the twenty-eighth promising to reimburse him as quickly as possible (Trudaine to Desmaretz, 6 July 1709).
 17. Marguin, p. 82, Raymond Moulins to Meissonnier, 29 June 1709.
 18. AN G7 363, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 11 July 1709.
 19. *Ibid.*, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 13 June 1709.
 20. The phrase was obviously Bernard's in a letter to Desmaretz on 21 July 1709 (AN G7 1121).
 21. ACC, Deliberations of the Chamber of Commerce, 3 August 1709.
 22. AN G7 363, Ravat to Desmaretz, 2 August 1709.
 23. Bois. Corr. 3:196; Bâville to Desmaretz, 29 July 1709; Le Bret to Desmaretz, 17 August 1709.
 24. ACC, Deliberations of the Chamber of Commerce, 3 August 1709.
 25. *Ibid.*
 26. AN G7 363, Ravat to Desmaretz, 23 July 1709.
 27. AN G7 1645, fol. 219, Ravat to Desmaretz, 13 September 1709.
 28. Jean Peyrot, "Impératifs commerciaux et raison d'état: Les difficultés du commerce de la soie à Lyon à la fin du règne de Louis XIV, 1700-1710," *Actes du 89e Congrès National des Sociétés Savantes: Section d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, 1:192-93.
 29. Several of Castiglioni's contracts with individual boatmen are in AN G7

- 1645, fol. 293. The whole issue of trade and commerce during the reign of Louis XIV has been the subject of recent revision. On the older, more pessimistic view, see Sir George Clark, "War, Trade and Trade War, 1701-1713," *English Historical Review* 1 (1927): 262-80, and Clark, "Neutral Commerce in the War of the Spanish Succession," *The British Yearbook of International Law* (1928): 69-83. Clark's pessimism has given way recently to a more optimistic assessment. See Thomas J. Schaeper, "The Economic History of the Reign," in Paul Sonnino, ed., *The Reign of Louis XIV: Essays in Celebration of Andrew Lossky* (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 1990), pp. 27-43, and Thomas J. Schaeper, *The Economy of France in the Second Half of the Reign of Louis XIV* (Montreal: Interuniversity Centre for European Studies, 1980).
30. The Consulate proposed Tour de Bouc in a *mémoire* enclosed with Ravat's letter to Desmaretz on 31 May (AN G7 1645, fol. 201bis). Desmaretz dispatched it to Pontchartrain, minister of the navy, on 7 June. Pontchartrain acknowledged the letter, sent the passports and agreed to the use of Tour de Bouc on 12 June (AN G7 1656, fol. 37).
31. AN G7 16, "Provence," Desmaretz to Le Bret, 7 July 1709. See also the letters of the controller general to Bâville, 5 June 1709 (AN G7 15, fol. 69) and 7 July (AN G7 16, "Languedoc,"), and one to d'Angervilliers on 7 July (AN G7 15, fol. 142).
32. AN G7 1648, fol. 163, Le Bret to Desmaretz, 17 June 1709; AN G7 1644, fol. 301, Bâville to Desmaretz, 18 July 1709.
33. AN G7 15, fol. 90, Desmaretz to Chamillart, 27 May 1709.
34. AN G7 1656, fol. 189, Chamillart to Desmaretz, 30 May 1709.
35. The controller general indicated his agreement in a letter to Ravat on 3 June (AN G7 16, "Lyon").
36. It appears that Chamillart's incapacities finally alienated all of the king's marshals at once (Dangeau, *Journal*, 12:435) and that he also lost the support of Madame de Maintenon, who had been his strongest supporter. She wrote the Princesse des Ursins on 17 June that Voysin would be "plus actif et plus vigilant" in handling the office (*Lettres de Maintenon*, p. 95). It did not hurt Voysin that his wife was one of Madame de Maintenon's closest friends at court.
37. ADR 2C24, Villeroy to Rochebonne, 10 June 1709. Villeroy's turn of phrase derived from a verse making the rounds in Paris:

Notre père qui ctes à Versailles
 Votre nom n'est plus glorifiés!
 Votre royaume n'est plus si grand!
 Votre volonté n'est plus faite sur la terre ni sur l'arde!
 Donnez-nous notre pain qui nous manque de tous côtés!
 Pardonnez à nos ennemis qui nous ont battus
 Et non à vos généraux qui les ont laissez faire!
 Ne succombez pas à toutes les tentations de la Maintenon
 Mais délivrez-nous de Chamillart!

38. ADR 2C24, Villeroy to Rochebonne, 10 June 1709. Voysin's sister was the wife of the controller general's brother, Jean-Baptiste Desmaretz de Vaubourg, and as has already been noted, he himself was married to Trudaine's sister (Saint-Simon, *Mémoires*, 12:452, note 9).
39. AN G7 1656, fol. 191, Voysin to Desmaretz, 14 June 1709; AN G7 1645, fol. 291, Villeroy to Desmaretz, 22 June 1709.
40. AM Auxonne, liasse 103, lists dates for the arrival and departure of the troops. Desmaretz did write to Pinon on 22 June urging him to cooperate in the effort (AN G7 16, "Bourgogne").
41. AML GGo43, accounts of the *Abondance*. That troops were dispatched to the Rhône we know by an order from Voysin to Rochebonne to withdraw them on 12 February 1710 (ADR 2Cl3).
42. On the various provincial assemblies, see J. Russell Major, *Representative Government in Early Modern France* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980); for the Estates of Burgundy in particular, see pp. 80-88, 536-37, and 640-41.
43. AN G7 15, fol. 175, Desmaretz to Ravat, 20 July 1709.
44. AN G7 1641, fol. 203, Louis, duc de Bourbon to Desmaretz, 20 July 1709.
45. AN G7 162, Estates of Burgundy to Desmaretz, 10 and 18 July 1709.
46. Letter cited in note 44 above.
47. The duke repeated his appeals in another letter of 5 August (AN G7 1641, fol. 205).
48. AML GGo43, accounts of the *Abondance*.
49. AN G7 1645, fol. 215, Ravat to Desmaretz, 15 August 1709.
50. AN G7 15, fol. 233, Desmaretz to Ravat, 21 August 1709.
51. Grain for the north was imported in bulk from Poland. See Boisisle, "Le grand hiver et la disette de 1709," pp. 519-25.
52. AN G7 16, "Lyon," Desmaretz to Trudaine, 31 May 1709; AN G7 15, fols. 34 and 38, Desmaretz to Trudaine, 12 and 14 June 1709.
53. A copy of the plan is in AN G7 1648, fol. 145. The controller general never tired of urging it on officials in the south: AN G7 16, "Dauphiné," Desmaretz to d'Angervilliers, 31 May 1709; AN G7 16, "Languedoc," Desmaretz to Bâville, same date; AN G7 15, fol. 73, Desmaretz to Le Bret, same date. The Estates of Burgundy came late to the plan, but agreed to send a deputy (AN G7 162, Louis, duc de Bourbon to Desmaretz, 19 and 29 July 1709).
54. The *Abondance* expressed doubts and complaints in a *mémoire* to the Consulate early in June (AML GGo4). Ravat communicated these and other objections to Desmaretz on 25 June (AN G7 1645, fol. 205). As if to confirm the fears of the Consulate, Le Bret wrote on 19 June that there was plague in the Levant (Bois. Corr. 3:458).
55. AML GGo43, accounts of the *Abondance*.
56. AML GGo42, accounts of the *Abondance*.
57. AML BB270, fols. 90-94, Deliberations of the Consulate, 12 July 1709.
58. AML GGo122, accounts of the *Abondance*. Even Bertrand Castan, deeply immersed in the morass of Bernard's debts, contributed 30,000 livres.
59. AN G7 1645, fol. 213, Ravat to Desmaretz, 27 July 1709.

60. *Ibid.*
61. *Ibid.*
62. AN G7 15, fol. 205, Desmaretz to Ravat, 6 August 1709.
63. AN G7 1645, fol. 215, Ravat to Desmaretz, 15 August 1709.
64. AN G7 15, fol. 233, Desmaretz to Ravat, 21 August 1709.
65. AN G7 1645, fol. 217, Ravat to Desmaretz, 27 August 1709.
66. AN G7 1641, fols. 177–78, Pinon to Desmaretz, 28 August 1709.
67. This is evident from the fact that Pinon wrote again on 10 September to say that the restriction was working (AN G7 162).
68. AN G7 15, fol. 241, Desmaretz to Pontchartrain, 31 August and 5 September 1709.
69. AN G7 1645, fol. 219, Ravat to Desmaretz, 13 September 1709.
70. AN G7 1645, fol. 222, Ravat to Desmaretz, 26 October 1709.
71. AML GGo4 has a letter from the Archbishop of Lyon to the Consulate on 23 December consenting to allow storage of the grain.
72. AN G7 364, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 1 January 1710. The issue of grain surpluses and sales to the crown is explored more fully in chapter 9. Presumably, Ainay was not alone. With its regular granaries full, the *Abondance* probably reverted to its practice of utilizing religious houses all over the city. The records of the institution are silent on this issue, as they are on the relative success or failure of efforts to protect these scattered supplies from spoilage.
73. AN G7 1645, fol. 209, *Mémoire* of the Consulate of Lyon to Desmaretz, 23 July 1709.
74. *Ibid.*
75. Desmaretz expressed his reservations in a letter of 12 August (AN G7 15, fol. 221). Ravat mentioned the reservations of his own merchants much later, on 13 September, in regretting the misery of the poor (AN G7 1645, fol. 219).
76. Letters from the *Charité* to Villeroy and others are in ACL E110 and E126.
77. AN G7 364, Villeroy to Desmaretz, 2 November 1709.
78. The ordinances are in AML BB270.
79. *Ibid.*, and BML fC A507705, *Ordonnance de police*, 29 March 1709. AML GGo8 has orders to quarter officials directing which bakers they were to inspect. Unfortunately, given the dearth of sources on the bakers, one simply cannot gauge the extent of these practices. The issue of whether most or only a few of Lyon's bakers regularly or only intermittently violated the regulations remains open.
80. AML HH23, petition of the bakers to the Consulate of Lyon.
81. AML BB270, fols. 98–101, Deliberations of the Consulate, 28 and 29 July 1709.
82. *Ibid.*
83. *Ibid.*
84. Curés in particular complained constantly of the habit by the poor of making various "pains de fougères" with which they sickened themselves. See Jean Canard, *Météorologie ancienne*, pp. 34–46.

Chapter 8

1 The parish registers of Lyon are collected in the Archives municipales. For figures 8.1 through 8.4, I have employed data from seven parishes and the hospital of the *Charité*. The seven, delineated below, include Sainte-Croix, one of the city's wealthiest parishes, which helps to balance the weight of the poor in Saint-Nizier, Lyon's largest parish. Unfortunately, the priests of Sainte-Croix neglected to note ages or occupations for most of their dead, and it has been necessary to exclude that parish from specific analyses of mortality. The registers are:

Saint-Nizier:	GG56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 148, 149, 150, 151, and 152.
Saint-Paul:	GG463, 464, and 465.
Saint-Georges:	GG544, 545, and 546.
Saint-Vincent:	GG242, 243, and 244.
Saint-Croix:	GG410, 411, 412, and 413.
Vaize:	GG264 and 265.
La Guillotière:	GG515 and 516.
<i>Charité</i> :	GG706 and 707.

- Garden, *Lyon et les Lyonnais*, pp. 40–41, analyzes the relative population of each parish. Altogether, the seven parishes analyzed here accounted for 69.2 percent of total baptisms in the city in 1700. Without Sainte-Croix, the number is still 65.1 percent. Figures from the *Charité* have been added so as better to represent the elderly, who were sometimes buried there rather than in their own parishes. Garden confirms (pp. 100–103) that Saint-Georges was by far the city's poorest parish.
- Ibid.*, pp. 150–60, 167.
- Hufton pointed to this vulnerability in *The Poor in Eighteenth-Century France*, pp. 20, 115, 311–17.
- I have borrowed my classification mostly from Garden, who devotes a major portion of his book (*Lyon et les Lyonnais*, pp. 173–399) to this problem. I also have benefitted from Adeline Daumard, "Une référence pour l'étude des sociétés urbaines en France aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles: Projet de code socio-professionnel," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 10 (1965): 185–210; and Louis Henry, *Techniques d'analyse en démographie historique* (Paris: Institut National d'Études Démographiques, 1980), pp. 22–23.
- Richard Gascon and Claude Latta, "Une crise urbaine au XVIIIe siècle. La crise de 1693–1694 à Lyon: Quelques aspects démographiques et sociaux," *Cahiers d'histoire* 8 (1963): 371–404. The statistical "extrait" for the *Hôtel-Dieu* is in AHDL.
- In analyzing specific data on child abandonment, I have employed the mammoth registers of "Comptes des enfants mis en nourrice" (AHDL E1653, 1654) in which the payments for and fate of each child are detailed.
- The *Charité* paraded the poor (especially orphans) regularly, but the largest "Procession of the Poor" took place on the third Sunday of the Easter Fair,

when rich merchants had gathered in Lyon for the Payment and could be expected to contribute to the cause. The order of procession was carefully prescribed, and the poor of various sexes and ages were carefully dressed in humble grey habits, and given crucifixes and small loaves of bread to carry. It must have been an impressive and sobering sight for everyone in the city, both rich and poor (ACL HH-219, pp. 111-15).

9. See especially Boswell, *The Kindness of Strangers*, pp. 410-11. In fairness, Boswell is tentative in this argument and sensitive to the role of crises in the tide of abandonments.
10. See chapter 6.
11. AHDL, "Extrait des registres tenus dans l'hôpital général de Notre Dame de Pitié du Pont du Rhône et hôtel-dieu de la Ville de Lyon."
12. Léon Missol, *La famine et l'épidémie de 1709 dans le Beaujolais d'après les archives de la commune et de l'Hôtel-Dieu de Villefranche* (Lyon: Mougin-Rusand, 1885), p. 19.
13. "Mémoire" of the curé of Feurs, pp. 309-11.
14. Missol, *La famine et l'épidémie*, p. 18.
15. Serges Dontenwill, "Les crises démographiques à Charlieu et dans la campagne environnante de 1690 à 1720," *Cahiers d'histoire* 14 (1969): 126.
16. See chapter 5.
17. J. Rousset, "Essai de pathologie urbaine: Les causes de morbidité et de mortalité à Lyon aux XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles," *Cahiers d'histoire* 8 (1963): 73. The best recent synthesis on the whole topic is John Post, *Food Shortage, Climatic Variability and Epidemic Disease in Preindustrial Europe: The Mortality Peak in the Early 1740s* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985).
18. Zbigniew Zabinski put the Parisian pound at 450 grams and analyzed its caloric content in "The Biological Index of the Buying Power of Money," translated in Robert Forster and Orest Ranum, eds., *Biology of Man in History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), p. 184. On Geneva, see Anne-Marie Puiz, "Alimentation populaire et sous-alimentation au XVIIIe siècle: Le cas de Genève et de sa région," in Jean-Jacques Hemardinquer, ed., *Pour une histoire de l'alimentation* (Paris: Cohn, 1970), pp. 129-45. For the weight of the Lyonnais pound, see Ronald E. Zupko, *French Weights and Measures before the Revolution: A Dictionary of Provincial and Local Units* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1978), pp. 97-100.
19. Vernon Young and Nevin Scrimshaw, "The Physiology of Starvation," *Scientific American* 225 (1971): 14-21; Young and Scrimshaw, "The Requirements of Human Nutrition," *Scientific American* 235 (1976): 51-64; Hugues Neveux, "L'alimentation du XIVe au XVIIIe siècle," *Revue d'histoire économique et sociale* 51 (1973): 336-79; R. J. Bernard, "Peasant Diet in Eighteenth-Century Gevaudan," translated in Elborg and Robert Forster, eds., *European Diet from Pre-Industrial to Modern Times* (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp. 19-46; Maurice Aymard, "Toward the History of Nutrition: Some Methodological Remarks," translated in Robert Forster and Orest Ranum, eds., *Food and Drink in History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), pp. 1-16. Lentils increased in price by over 500 percent in 1709 and were often entirely absent from the Grenette (AMI, BB270-71).

20. Michael Meguid et al., "Uncomplicated and Stressed Starvation," *Surgical Clinics in North America* 61 (June 1981): 529-43.
21. Young and Scrimshaw, "Physiology of Starvation," p. 21, and Nancy Stotts and Laura Friesen, "Understanding Starvation in the Critically Ill Patient," *Heart and Lung* 11 (September-October 1982): 473-74.
22. This is Jean-Pierre Peter's argument in "Malades et maladies à la fin du XVIII^e siècle," *Annales: Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations* 22 (1967): 711-51, translated as "Disease and the Sick at the End of the Eighteenth Century" in Robert Forster and Orest Ranum, eds., *Biology of Man in History* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975), pp. 81-124.
23. The *Hôtel-Dieu* complained strenuously of this practice to the city in November 1708, noting that as each householder swept refuse to the house of his neighbor, it ended up in a large pile in front of the hospital entrance. There "it can contribute to thickening and infecting the air in a manner very noxious to the recovery of the sick" (AHDL E1596).
24. François LeBrun noted the importance of the lack of quais for spreading waterborne diseases in his *Les bommes et la mort en Anjou aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles: Essai de démographie et de psychologie historiques* (Paris: Mouton, 1971), p. 193. Unfortunately, LeBrun offered few statistics on actual mortality in Anjou.
25. The danger of high wine prices was suggested by Dr. Jean-Noel Biraben in a 1963 colloquium dealing with issues of mortality, *Actes du Colloque International de Démographie Historique: Liège, 1963: Problèmes de mortalité, méthode, sources, et bibliographie en démographie historique* (Liège: Université de Liège, 1965), p. 26.
26. J.-P. Peter, "Disease and the Sick," pp. 120-21.
27. John Post, *Food Shortage, Climatic Variability and Epidemic Disease*, pp. 230-33.
28. *Ibid.*, pp. 211-13.
29. J.-P. Peter, "Disease and the Sick," p. 120.
30. LeBrun, *Les bommes et la mort*, p. 186.
31. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie explored the problem of female sterility in his now classic "L'amenorrhée de famine (XVII^e-XX^e siècles)," *Annales: Économies, Société, Civilisations* 24 (1969): 1589-1601, translated as "Famine Amenorrhoea (Seventeenth-Twentieth Centuries)," in Forster and Ranum, eds., *Biology of Man in History*, pp. 163-178. Rose Frisch extended the problem of sterility induced by hunger to men in "Population, Food Intake and Fertility," *Science* 199 (6 January 1978): 22-30. Malnutrition also destroyed the ability of nursing mothers to lactate, and Hufton noted that in that event, newborns were "fed" from dirty rags soaked in polluted water, an almost certain death sentence (*Poor in Eighteenth-Century France*, p. 331).
32. LeBrun, *Les bommes et la mort*, p. 280, and Claude Bruneel, *La mortalité dans les campagnes: Le Duché de Brabant aux XVII^e et XVIII^e siècles* (Louvain: Éditions Nauvelaerts, 1977), pp. 339-42.
33. Rousset, "Essai de pathologie urbaine," pp. 86-88. Rousset noted that typhoid fever was also prominent in the autumn months.
34. *Ibid.*, p. 100. Pierre Deyon, *Amiens capital provinciale: Étude sur la société urbaine au XVII^e siècle* (Paris: Mouton, 1967), pp. 11-13. The presence of

tuberculosis is considered to have been especially likely by historians in the field, but all are forced into speculation by the ability of the disease to conceal itself (save in its pulmonary form) behind a host of different symptoms. Ann Carmichael explores this problem briefly in "Infection, Hidden Hunger and History," in Robert Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabb, eds., *Hunger and History: The Impact of Changing Food Production and Consumption Patterns on Society* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), p. 65.

- 35 LeBrun noted the connection between fruit and dysentery in his *Les hommes et la mort*, p. 279, as did Bruneel in *La mortalité des campagnes*, p. 342. That the problem existed in Lyon is known from an *ordonnance de police* of 2 August 1709, which cited the consumption of unripe fruits "which could cause sickness among the people." The sale of all "autumn fruit" was prohibited on pain of fine and confiscation before 15 September (BML fC A507705). Given the lack of regulation of the *forains*, it seems unlikely that this particular *ordonnance* was well enforced.
36. The concept of synergy is explicit in both Carmichael, "Infection, Hidden Hunger and History," pp. 51–60; and in Carl Taylor, "Synergy Among Mass Infections, Famines and Poverty," in Rotberg and Rabb, eds., *Hunger and History*, pp. 285–303. It is implicit through much of Post, *Food Shortage, Climatic Variability and Epidemic Disease*.
- 37 Massimo Livi-Bacci supplies other examples of deaths among elites in the midst of food crises in "The Nutrition–Mortality Link in Past Times: A Comment," in Rotberg and Rabb, eds. *Hunger and History*, pp. 95–100.

Chapter 9

1. AML GG042, Accounts of the *Abondance*; AML CC2961, CC2874, CC2887, CC2901, CC2916, CC2930, CC2939, Accounts of the city of Lyon.
2. AML BB271, fols. 24–29, Deliberations of 6 January 1710.
3. *Ibid.*
4. AML AA128, Consulate to Villeroy, 7 February 1710. This letter summarizes negotiations that had been in progress since December 1709.
5. AN G7 364, Trudaine to Desmaretz, 1 January 1710. This issue dominated the correspondence between the intendant and the controller general through April.
6. AML AA128, Consulate to Villeroy, 7 February 1710; AML AA64, fol. 73, Villeroy to the Consulate, 9 February 1710.
7. AML BB271, fols. 24–29, Deliberations of 6 January 1710.
8. *Ibid.*
9. There are two copies of the list, one in AML BB271, Deliberations of 6 January 1710, and another in AML GG04.
10. *Ibid.*
11. BML fC A507705, *Ordonnance de police*, 12 March 1710.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *Ibid.*, *Sentence de police*, 5 April 1710.
14. AML GG04.
15. *Ibid.*

16. BML IC A507705, *Ordonnance de police*, 7 April 1710.
17. *Ibid.*
18. AML GGo44, GGo45, *Comptes de mésurage* of the *Abondance*.
19. AML BB271, fols. 94–96, Deliberations of 17 June 1710.
20. *Ibid.*, *Ordonnance* of 17 June 1710.
21. Adrien Rambaud, *La Chambre d'Abondance*, p. 175.
22. AML AA80, Desmaretz to the Consulate, 28 June 1710.
23. There is a printed copy of the letter in AML GGo4.
24. Rambaud, pp. 176–77. It is likely that some of Lyon's merchants may have chosen to leave the city at this time "on business" to avoid the onerous grain tax. If there was such an exodus, however, it merited no official mention.
25. A thorough search through the capitulary acts of the Lyonnais church for this period has turned up only one effort by the clergy at poor relief. This was a gift by the canons of Saint-Nizier of 100 livres to be distributed after 9 March 1709 (ADR 15 G 59). The records of the cathedral chapter, particularly rich for this period, show no such actions (ADR 10 G). Such a dearth of attention to the poor from the Church in Lyon demonstrates the extent to which the city dominated charity. This contrasts strikingly with the role of the clergy in the diocese outside the city (Philip T. Hoffman, *Church and Community in the Diocese of Lyon*, pp. 116–18).
26. AML GGo4, Claude Saint-Georges, Archbishop of Lyon, to Villeroy, 12 July 1710.
27. *Ibid.*, *Mémoire* of the Consulate sent to Villeroy, 20 July 1710. The duke acted as intermediary in this issue, as he had in so many others.
28. *Ibid.*, Declaration of the Consulate, 19 August 1710. The magistrates noted Saint-Georges's resistance during a consular session of 4 September (AML BB271, fols. 170–71), but also noted that the controller general had written ordering the Archbishop to comply on 4 August.
29. AML BB271, fols. 177–78, *Ordonnance* of 30 December 1710.
30. AML GGo42, Accounts of the *Abondance*.
31. *Ibid.*
32. *Ibid.*
33. AML BB275, Deliberations of 25 October 1714.
34. The new tax was fixed at 7 sous, 6 deniers per pound of imported cloth and 2 sous, 6 deniers on native products, and was to remain in effect for six years (AML BB272). In 1714, it yielded 500,364 livres to the city but thereafter declined by half. The total collected for the six years, 1714–1719, was 1,491,723 livres, a considerable sum.
35. Copies of the correspondence are in ACL E110: *Charité* to Villeroy, 13 August 1709; *Charité* to Desmaretz, 5 September 1709; *Charité* to Villeroy, 7 September 1709; *Charité* to Desmaretz, 16 November 1709.
36. ACL E308, E309, and E310, Accounts of the *Charité*.
37. The cost of grain in 1710 reflected bills incurred during the crisis (ACL E311).
38. *Ibid.*
39. ACL E312, E313. The rectors first requested a lottery in one of their letters to Villeroy, dated 13 August 1709 (see note 35 above), but disagreements over the

issue of whether the hospital could sell tickets outside Lyon delayed it until the end of 1711.

40. AHDL E145, E146, E147, E148, E149, E150, and E151, Accounts of the *Hôtel-Dieu*. Expenses and revenues were seldom totalled at the same time each year, nor were they broken down by categories, especially during the crisis.
41. Georges Durand, *Le patrimoine foncier de l'Hôtel-Dieu Lyon*, pp. 228–29.
42. AML GG042, Accounts of the *Abondance*.
43. ACL E70.
44. Documents relative to the new granary are in AML DD288.

Chapter 10

1. The Consulate thought so highly of Galiffet's speech that it was printed word for word in the Deliberations (AML BB271, fols. 84–87).
2. *Ibid.*, fols. 87–88.
3. Claude Brossette, *Histoire abrégée de la ville de Lyon* (Lyon: J.-B. Girin, 1711), p. 198.
4. The one exception is Castiglioni, who billed the Consulate for 30,000 livres, but had to settle after a bitter two-year battle for 12,000 (Rambaud, *La Chambre d'Abondance*, p. 108.)
5. AML CC320 shows payments through May 1709.
6. The concept of empowerment in the context of the Old Regime belongs to William Beik from a paper, "Louis XIV and the Aristocracy" delivered at the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in December 1989.
7. Beik, in *Absolutism and Society*, pp. 331–32, discussed the importance to local officials of shared tax revenues. This theme also runs through Daniel Dessert, *Argent, pouvoir et société au Grand Siècle* (Paris: Fayard, 1984) and James B. Collins, *The Fiscal Limits of Absolutism: Direct Taxation in Early Seventeenth-Century France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988).
8. This, again, is in part the argument of Sharon Kettering in her *Patrons, Brokers and Clients*, where she argues that the monarchy manipulated and exploited the clientage system to enhance its power. The actions of the Consulate prove that such manipulation could work in the other direction.
9. The best account of Lyon under the Terror is still in Robert R. Palmer's great book, *Twelve Who Ruled: The Year of the Terror in the French Revolution* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1941), pp. 153–76. The Committee ordered the city's destruction after it had rebelled. Upon the ruins, a column was to be constructed with the famous words, "Lyon made war on Liberty. Lyon is no more." Fortunately for the city, the task proved too expensive and the Committee too short-lived to carry through with any more than the demolition of buildings around the Place Bellecour. Lyon was not the only city to inspire regional enmity—it was a general pattern. One can follow the uneven battle between Rouen and Paris in 1709 in Bois. Corr. 3:384, 392, 395, 396, 435, and 475.
10. Luethy, *La banque Protestante*, 1:214–21.

11. On one of these criminal bands and the conflict it caused between two towns in the Lyonnais, see Henri Hours, "Émeutes et émotions populaires dans les campagnes lyonnaises au XVIII^e siècle," *Cahiers d'histoire* 9 (1964): 137-53.
12. On Dieppe and Rouen, see Guy Lemarchand, "Crises économiques et atmosphère sociale en milieu urbain sous Louis XIV," *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine* 14 (July-September 1967): 252, 257-58. On Bordeaux, see M. Labuchelle, "Bordeaux il y a 200 ans: La misère à Bordeaux de 1709 à 1713," *Revue historique de Bordeaux et du département de la Gironde* 2 (1909): 120-31; and on Paris, Arthur de Boislisle, "Le grand hiver et la famine de 1709," p. 493.
13. On the *entrave* as a form of collective violence, see Louise Tilly, "The Food Riot as a Form of Political Conflict in France," pp. 23, 47-57. On Bordeaux, Labuchelle, "Bordeaux il y a 200 ans," p. 125; and on Rouen, Lemarchand, "Crises économiques et atmosphère sociale," p. 254.
14. Jean Meuvret, *Le Problème des subsistances à l'époque Louis XIV: Volume 3, Le Commerce des grains et la conjoncture* (Paris: École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales, 1988). Meuvret argues throughout this third volume that the trade was so fractionalized and weak that any kind of centralized coordination was doomed to fail.
15. The classic contemporary treatment is Nicolas Delamarre, *Traité de la police*, 4 vols. (Paris: Brunnet, 1713-1738). The best recent treatment is Alan Williams, *The Police of Paris, 1718-1789* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979); see also Harold Anderson, "The Police of Paris under Louis XIV" (Ph.D. diss., Ohio State University, 1978).
16. Popular trust in and support of the authorities vanished in the eighteenth century as officials of the crown became associated in the public mind with hoarders and speculators. The point at which this fundamental and vitally important change transpired is the subject of Steven Kaplan's excellent *Bread, Politics and Political Economy in the Reign of Louis XV*, 2 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976).
17. Cited in Pierre Clément, *La police sous Louis XIV* (Paris: Didier, 1866), p. 355.
18. Courson was guilty, of course, as every intendant of Rouen had to be to maintain his position. See Lemarchand, "Crises économiques et atmosphère sociale," pp. 252-54.
19. On Rouen, see Lemarchand, "Crises économiques et atmosphère sociale," p. 258. On Paris, see Boislisle, "Le grand hiver," pp. 488-89.
20. René Pillorget indicates several cases in his *Les mouvements insurrectionnels de Provence entre 1595 et 1715* (Paris: Pédone, 1975), pp. 976-77, but this was the common response in virtually every case.
21. On the effort in Rouen, see Lemarchand, "Crises économiques et atmosphère sociale," p. 260. The best account of the fiasco in Paris, which resulted in a riot so fierce it had to be quelled by the army, is in Herlaut, "La disette de pain à Paris en 1709," pp. 62-76.
22. Labuchelle, "Bordeaux il y a 200 ans," pp. 48-51.

Epilogue

1. Desmaretz fared so well in the review that he was awarded a 350,000 livre gift. See René Dumas, *La politique financière de Nicolas Desmaretz*, pp. 111–16.
2. Steven L. Kaplan discusses Bernard as a grain supplier and accused hoarder in *The Famine Plot Persuasion*, pp. 9–11.
3. Saint-Simon, *Mémoires*, 2:223, note 2.
4. *Ibid.*, 17:201, note 2.
5. *Ibid.*, 31:21, note 4.
6. The citation comes from Jacques Levron, "Louis XIV's Courtiers," in Ragnhild Hatton, ed., *Louis XIV and Absolutism* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1976), p. 153.
7. BML fC6211, "Description de la pompe funèbre de Monseigneur le Maréchal duc de Villeroy."

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This account is drawn largely from archival sources in Paris, Lyon, and the towns of the Saône valley. In Paris, I have relied heavily on the wealth of administrative correspondence in the series G7 at the Archives Nationales, though I have consulted other series there as well, including the F12 on Lyon's silk and other industries. In Lyon, I have consulted five separate archival depositories. The departmental archives of the Rhône hold the records of the intendency, the military governor, the church, the *Sénéchaussée*, and other courts in the province. They also hold private family papers, including those of a number of prominent Lyonnais merchants and a wealth of genealogical sources. The municipal archives contain the correspondence, accounts, and assorted records of the Consulate, *Chambre d'Abondance*, all the city's courts and police agencies, its parish registers, and the archives of its guilds. The hospital archives at the *Hôtel-Dieu* contain the records of both hospitals, including accounts, registers, and correspondence, while the private archives of the Chamber of Commerce hold the deliberations of the Chamber and its correspondence with Anisson in Paris. In addition to those collections, there is also a substantial manuscript collection in the Bibliothèque Municipale of Lyon catalogued as the "fonds Coste," and including several records "borrowed" from the municipal archives by its archivists in the nineteenth century.

Outside Lyon, I have consulted the departmental archives of several departments, including those of the Loire at Saint-Étienne. This department formed part of the original Lyonnais, and its archives hold a wealth of judicial records as well as those of the *Charité* of Saint-Étienne. The records of Auxonne and Valence are still in the municipal archives of those towns, while the records of Gray have been deposited at the departmental archives in Vesoul. In consulting these and other municipal records, I have searched out the deliberations of the various municipal governments as well as their correspondence. A list of the specific classification numbers of all folders I have consulted follows, categorized by archive.

Archival Sources

PARIS. Archives nationales

F12 762, 764, 767.

G2 175-76, 177-80.

G7 15-16, 162-63, 247-48, 272, 283, 311-12, 362-64, 472-74, 532-40, 833,
1119-21, 1127-31, 1641-45, 1648, 1656, 1693-94.

HI 1124, 1588.

X2B 1090.

LYON. Archives départementales du Rhône

1C 2, 13, 17, 34, 37, 40, 42, 47-48, 50-52, 55-56, 88, 90, 159, 177, 231-32, 269, 297, 303, 308.

2C 2, 6-7, 13-16, 27, 32-34.

3C 4, 12, 30, 94-97

8C 100, 380, 400, 414-15.

BP1272, 1693, 1765, 2516, 2966-77, 3543, 3583, 3597, 3599, 3611, 3633, 4122.

2B Justices seigneuriales.

10G 210, 281, 586, 612, 732, 819.

11G 29, 147, 313.

12G 418, 454.

15G 59.

Fonds généalogique Frécon.

Papiers de famille:

fonds de Carcenac et Corbiere; Chalut-Lamure; Châteauneuf de Rochebonne; Moulins; Saladin; Seilhade; Specht et Gonzebat; Vitte.

LYON. Archives municipales

AA13, 21, 26, 53-54, 67, 70-73, 76, 80-81, 128, 174.

BB178, 189, 207, 222, 251-52, 262-77.

CC183-84, 320, 2887, 2901, 2916, 2930, 2939, 2954, 2968-71, 2981, 2983-84, 2995, 2998, 3008, 3020, 3032, 3044, 3056, 3060, 3064, 3068, 3080, 3102, 3127, 3202, 3309, 3391, 3482, 3592, 4050, 4318, 4400.

DD288.

EE4-6, 10, 12, 36, 40, 52, 89, 120.

FF V: 121, 143, 209, 213, 223, 257

FF IX: 463.

FF XIII.

FF XX: 155.

GG01-0108, 0129-0148.

GG56-58, 60-68, 148-52, 242-43, 264-65, 410-13, 463-65, 515-16, 544-46, 706-7

HH1-5, 16, 22-24, 34, 91, 106, 147, 159, 165, 301-2, 336, 500, 509-10, 597-604.

LYON. Archives hospitalières: *Cbarité*

A7

C17

D6-8.

E3, 48, 70, 84, 87, 89, 94, 97, 110-36, 308-14, 519-42, 1164, 1175, 1205-6, 1232, 1371, 1473, 1475, 1526.

F6.

G2, 26, 27, 47, 147, 149, 155, 238, 285-337, 347-48, 646-75.

H219.

- LYON. Archives hospitalières: *Hôtel-Dieu*
 A7, 12, 13.
 B16-17.
 C7.
 E55, 99, 145-49, 321-24, 376, 378, 454, 456, 566-70, 761-66, 1596, 1601, 1627,
 1629, 1652-54, 1896.
 F17, 101-2.
 G6-10, 38.
- LYON. Chambre de Commerce
 Deliberations, 1682-1789.
 Correspondance d'Anisson, 1700-1712.
 Missives, 1706-1740.
- SAINT-ÉTIENNE. Archives départementales de la Loire
 B401, 474, 795-96, 958, 1358.
 C68.
 H Supplément: *Charité de Saint-Étienne*.
 Deliberations, 1682-1789.
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 Distributions de pain, 1704-1709.
 Dépenses et recettes, 1644-1888.
- DIJON. Archives départementales de la Côte d'Or
 C80, 1852, 2545, 2930.
- VESOUL. Archives départementales de la Haute-Saône: Archives communales de
 Gray
 279É Supplément 100, 148, 160, 504, 518, 572, 662, 818, 742.
- AUXONNE. Archives municipales
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- CHALONS-SUR-SAÔNE. Archives municipales
 BB27.
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