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ZIMBABWEANS WHO MOVE:
PERSPECTIVES ON
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
IN ZIMBABWE

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IN ZIMBABWE

DANIEL TEVERA AND LOVEMORE ZINYAMA

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PROF. JONATHAN CRUSH

SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRATION PROJECT

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EDITORIAL NOTE:

Between 1997 and 2001, SAMP conducted three representative national surveys of Zimbabwean citizens in order to provide insights into the attitudes, perceptions and migration behaviours of ordinary citizens. This publication brings together the results from two of these surveys (the 1997 Public Opinion Survey and the 2001 National Immigration Policy Survey). The results of the third survey, on the Zimbabwean brain drain, will be published shortly by SAMP. This policy paper also contains an overview of the major migration trends in Zimbabwe since independence, written by Professor Lovemore Zinyama, formerly of the University of Zimbabwe. SAMP wishes to express its sincere thanks to Dr Zinyama for his contribution, in difficult circumstances, to the set-up and early work of the Project. Thanks are also due to the many student researchers who participated in the surveys, to Abel Chikanda for his help, and to Wade Pendleton, David McDonald and Don Taylor for their technical assistance in survey design. The National Immigration Policy Survey was directed by Dr Daniel Tevera of University of Zimbabwe, who is co-editor of this publication. The editors wish to thank Christina Decarie for her editorial assistance and CIDA who funded the research through its generous support of SAMP.

INTRODUCTION: ZIMBABWEANS WHO MOVE

The movement of people across political boundaries has generated considerable debate in Southern Africa. There is a compelling need for Southern African countries to harmonise regional migration policies and to ensure the freer movement of people across the region. However, it must be noted that disparities in levels of development are still evident in the economies of the region. There are fears in countries such as South Africa and Botswana that the freer movement of people will flood them with migrants from the less developed countries. There are also concerns in all the countries of SADC that freer movement will not be well received by citizens, leading to intolerance and xenophobia.

As Southern Africa moves towards a more globalised future, there is need for African governments to have the best information on which to make policy decisions. Migration policy is not static but undergoes constant modification as a country's experiences with and perceptions of migrants change. Immigration policy is often a divisive issue on domestic political agendas. In times of economic recession, immigrants are unjustifiably blamed for high unemployment rates, increasing crime, and land and housing shortages. Politicians often give high priority to migration issues, sometimes alienating ethnic groups and substantially affecting immigration programmes. Immigrants in pursuit of work have often become pariah citizens in a global order in which, paradoxically, old borders are rapidly dissolving.

Rising xenophobia and violence against foreigners are sobering and sad reminders of the negative effects of globalisation. National governments have also been blamed for fuelling xenophobia by perpetuating stereotypes against foreigners, describing them as a 'flood' and stereotyping them as criminals. Invariably the way the government treats foreigners also determines the attitude of the local population towards the foreigner. This has also set the tone for a negative representation of foreigners in local newspapers. For example, it has been shown that anti-immigrant sentiments are widespread in South African print media which can also have an impact on the way the local population view foreigners. This has also set the tone for a negative representation of foreigners by officials in local media.

The Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) conducts basic research for policy-making on the dynamics of international migration to and within the SADC region. SAMP maintains that a well-informed policy-maker or migration manager is more likely to appreciate the viability of different policy choices and to develop policies that are workable,

democratic and consistent with principles of good governance and regional cooperation. Policies based on outdated or misleading information will not only fail but have damaging consequences. From a human rights standpoint, such decisions could violate constitutional guarantees and exacerbate hostility towards non-citizens.

SAMP is also committed to conducting such research at a regional scale. Research results from one country, such as Zimbabwe, can be compared with those from the other SADC states. This helps to highlight similarities and differences in national migration regimes but also helps define areas of potential cooperation and harmonization between states. SAMP therefore believes that the collection of reliable and accurate data on the dimensions, causes, impacts and trends in migration is an essential first step. Only then can there be informed debate and movement forward on regional harmonization.

Within the Southern African region, Zimbabwe's migration history is unusual. Historically, countries were either recipient or sending countries for migrants. Zimbabwe was always in the unusual position of being both. Over the years, many Zimbabweans went to work, primarily in South Africa. SAMP research shows, for example, that almost a quarter of adult Zimbabweans have parents and grandparents who have worked in South Africa at some point in their lives. On the other hand, Zimbabwe was a recipient of labour migrants from countries such as Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique. At the time of the 1951 census, there were 246,000 foreign Africans in Zimbabwe (40% of them from Mozambique). Zimbabwe was a source, a destination and a corridor.

Since independence, Zimbabwe has experienced considerable shifts in the inherited colonial migration pattern:

- Internal rural-urban migration and urbanization has increased dramatically, although the true extent of this trend will not be evident until the results of the latest census are available.
- Zimbabwe has become a far more significant exporter of migrant labour as economic conditions in Zimbabwe have deteriorated. Zimbabwe, unlike Mozambique and the BLS countries, has no international bilateral treaty facilitating such movements. As a result, there are only limited opportunities for Zimbabweans to work legally in South Africa. Significant undocumented migration began in the late 1980s and has increased ever since.
- Zimbabwe is no longer a major recipient of migrant labour except, perhaps, along the border with Mozambique.
- The volume of ordinary cross-border traffic between Zimbabwe and its neighbours has escalated dramatically over the last decade. Many more Zimbabweans are looking outside the country for the means of livelihood. In a 1997 SAMP survey,

Zimbabweans were asked the purpose of their last visit to South Africa. Over 70% had an economic purpose for migrating with 29% going to work or look for work and 42% going to trade or to shop.

Documentation and analysis of these trends and their importance for policy-makers has been relatively limited. As a result, in 1996 the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP) entered into a partnership with the Department of Geography at the University of Zimbabwe to generate the research data that is urgently needed. This publication presents some of the results of that partnership.

The first chapter provides a general overview of post-independence migration to and from Zimbabwe based on official and other published information sources. The author, Professor Lovemore Zinyama, begins by pointing out that Zimbabweans are a nation of migrants although international migration accounts for only a very small proportion of the total Zimbabwean population movements in any one year. Less than 5% of the total population is estimated to be non-Zimbabwean. In terms of immigration to Zimbabwe, Zinyama notes the shift in sources from Britain and the rest of Europe during the colonial era, to a much wider global catchment dominated by the African continent after independence. A second major shift has been in government policy away from active encouragement of permanent residence to the granting of time-limited residence and employment permits to expatriates. These trends are well documented although both have slowed in the late 1990s. Zimbabwe has also continued to be a recipient of undocumented migrants from its neighbours.

The main shift identified by Zinyama is in patterns of migration from the country. Zimbabwe has become a significant brain exporter. The process has occurred in two waves; immediately after independence when skilled whites fled south and more recently, in the 1990s, with growing numbers of black Zimbabweans leaving in search of other pastures. The latter process has in some sense been slowed by the post-1994 hostility of the South African government towards skilled immigrants from Africa. However, skilled Zimbabweans are now globally marketable and are leaving the country in growing numbers. The 2001 SAMP survey reported by Dr Dan Tevera in Chapter 3 asked a sample of urban Zimbabweans how much consideration they had given to leaving Zimbabwe. Seventy six percent of the respondents reported having considered leaving Zimbabwe, a sign of the times perhaps. The Zimbabwean brain drain is the subject of a forthcoming SAMP policy paper.

Parallel with a growth in cross-border informal trading, there are indications that undocumented and unauthorized cross-border migration

from Zimbabwe into neighbouring countries has increased markedly since the 1980s. Zinyama identifies two categories of undocumented migrant. The first are Zimbabweans who enter neighbouring countries, mostly Botswana and South Africa, through official exit ports, but then over-stay. The second category comprises those who leave Zimbabwe without valid travel documents and do not use official exit points. This includes individual “border hoppers” and those relying on trafficking syndicates. The numbers are impossible to ascertain with any degree of accuracy although surveys can and do provide important insights into the intentions, behaviours and strategies of the migrants.

The second chapter in this publication provides important verification of this claim. As the author points out, the types, patterns, causes and impacts of the various forms of regional cross-border migration are complex and little understood. For instance, little is known as yet about who travels outside the country, why and how often. A great deal more is now known because of a SAMP public opinion survey amongst migrants conducted in 5 Southern African countries. The results of that regional survey have been exhaustively detailed and analysed in other SAMP publications. Here we include a paper by Lovemore Zinyama which focuses on the migration behaviour of Zimbabweans, as revealed in their answers to the standardized survey.

Zinyama argues that in the last decade there has been a qualitative shift in the nature of migration between South Africa and Zimbabwe, accompanying changes in the political and economic conditions of both countries. Migration of young single men for work has continued and even grown. But economic crisis and decline in Zimbabwe have prompted a diversification of household survival strategies. Cross-border migration has become one in a basket of such strategies for many. Formerly, only young single men would migrate for economic reasons. Now growing numbers of women have joined the migration stream. Informal cross-border trade has become dominated by women seeking to supplement their family incomes, to clothe and educate their children. Money obtained while in South Africa is used to purchase goods for importation back to Zimbabwe and subsequent resale of those known to be in short supply at home. More recently, female Zimbabwean cross-border traders have been going to Mozambique, Zambia and even as far afield as Tanzania to purchase and bring home second-hand clothing and goods for resale.

The new Zimbabwean migrant is typically a middle-aged family person who uses cross-border migration as one strategy for the survival of her/his family, particularly where this is an urban household. The majority of these people are engaged in a purpose-specific circulatory migration process, but one in which they are only spending very short periods

of time in South Africa. In the second chapter, Zinyama provides a detailed demographic and behavioural profile of these new and old migrants from the SAMP survey. In addition, he shows that the migrants have become the target of extreme hostility from South Africans, particularly since 1994. Levels of intolerance are at an all-time high in South Africa, leading to the charge that South Africa is the most xenophobic population in the world. Zimbabweans (and Mozambicans) have been the usual targets of xenophobic sentiment and action on the ground. All Zimbabweans have come to be stereotyped as a social, economic and criminal threat to South Africans. These are clearly stereotypes with little basis in fact or appreciation of the benefits of increased trade and economic interaction between South Africa and Zimbabwe.

Apologists for the xenophobic tendencies of South Africans have argued that South Africans are not unique, that similar views and attitudes are found throughout the SADC. Even if true, this does not exonerate South Africans. It simply means that the task of public and official education is that much greater. SAMP therefore set out to test this hypothesis, and to provide SADC governments with baseline information on their own citizens' attitudes to migration, immigration and refugees. In 2001, SAMP implemented the National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS) in five SADC countries, including Zimbabwe. The results of the Zimbabwean NIPS are reported in the third chapter by Dan Tevera.

The survey showed that, in general, ordinary Zimbabweans are more tolerant and welcoming than South Africans, have a greater appreciation of the benefits of migration to their country and have a much more developed understanding of the necessity for refugee protection. However, there is certainly no room for complacency. In the South African case, levels of hostility were high regardless of the race, age, education, economic status or gender of the respondent. In Zimbabwe, marked differences emerged around the variable of economic and employment status.

Of the random sample of urban adults, 38% were engaged in formal employment and 18.5% in informal sector activities. A further 43.2% were unemployed. The answers to questions designed to test attitudes and knowledge consistently broke down along the employed/unemployed divide. They also broke down along the middle-class/poor divide. In other words, Zimbabweans fit the more classical profile in which middle-class, educated and economically-secure people are likely to be more tolerant and accepting of outsiders than the poor and unemployed. This would be a cause for concern given Zimbabwe's economic crisis and the growth of poverty and unemployment. However, there is

little evidence that Zimbabweans explicitly blame migrants and immigrants for this state of affairs (again in stark contrast to South Africans).

Zimbabwean migration patterns are currently in a state of flux. It is commonly assumed that the country's economic and political conditions over the last decade and more recently are influencing out-migration. However, it would be incorrect to suggest that the correlation is simple or direct. More skilled Zimbabweans are leaving but not all are able to do so and many choose to stay, hoping for a turnaround. The unemployed and retrenched are more restless and mobile and South Africa and Botswana are a definite draw card. However, as the South Africans have yet to appreciate, most are circular migrants and would much prefer that Zimbabweans had the same legal mechanisms of access to the South African labour market as do Mozambicans, Botswana, Swazi and Basotho. It is ironic that apartheid-era labour agreements, still in force, shut out Zimbabweans but welcome the others. Zimbabwe needs to seek a general bilateral labour agreement with South Africa, as well as working within the structures of SADC to encourage greater cross-border mobility in the region as a whole.

The other major shift of the last decade, requiring a rational policy response on the part of both governments, is the massive growth of informal cross-border trade. Zimbabwe sits at the center of regional informal trade networks. Yet, despite the passage of a SADC Free Trade Protocol, there is still no framework in place for legal informal traders. They are shut out once again in the new South African Immigration Act. This is a gap which urgently requires attention, not least because it discriminates unfairly against women migrants. It is also obstructive of the new emphasis on trade and regional cooperation in SADC. The benefits of freer trade should not be confined to large companies, but to ordinary people as well.

Jonathan Crush and Dan Tevera

CHAPTER ONE

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION AND ZIMBABWE: AN OVERVIEW

LOVEMORE ZINYAMA

1.1 INTRODUCTION

The population of Zimbabwe grew from an estimated 713,000 at the turn of the twentieth century to 10.41 million at the time of the last census in 1992. By the late 1990s, the population had grown to approximately 12.5 million. Urbanisation has increased rapidly since the mid-1970s, fuelled by internal rural-to-urban migration.

International migration accounts for only a very small proportion of the total Zimbabwean population movements in any one year. But the modest numbers underplay the crucial role of international migration in the political and economic history of the country.¹ Citizens and residents of Zimbabwe have engaged in international migration for a century now, although the predominant racial and economic groups in this process have changed since independence in response to changing political and economic conditions. It is generally better-educated and skilled people who have, since the turn of the twentieth century, been involved in documented permanent migration into and out of the country. For a long period, the majority of these migrations were dominated by whites either entering or leaving the country. But in more recent years, black Zimbabwean professionals and other educated and skilled people have been leaving to work outside the country while immigrants from other African countries have been arriving to take up employment within Zimbabwe.

It is thus important to note the shift in immigration source and destination regions for Zimbabwe, from Britain and the rest of Europe during the colonial era, to a much wider global catchment dominated by the African continent after independence.² Another major shift attributed to the change in immigration policy of the government after independence has been from the active encouragement of permanent residence to the granting of time-limited residence and employment permits to immigrants (the new phenomenon of expatriate worker).

Besides these documented international movements of skilled

migrants, there are also large but unknown numbers of people who enter and leave the country through unofficial ports of entry and whose movements go unrecorded. Many of these people cross international borders between Zimbabwe and its neighbouring countries especially South Africa, Botswana and Mozambique. Zimbabweans continue to engage in unrecorded cross-border movements to and from South Africa and Botswana in search of employment and for purposes of informal trading in those two countries. On the eastern border, it appears to be primarily undocumented Mozambicans who come into Zimbabwe.

1.2 LEGAL IMMIGRATION TO ZIMBABWE

The 1992 census showed that of the 10.41 million people enumerated, 9.96 million were born in Zimbabwe while 453,405 (4.4%) were born outside the country. Of those, two special categories deserve mention: (a) children of Zimbabweans who had left the country to live abroad or in neighbouring countries during the war of liberation in the 1970s and returned home with their families after independence in 1980; and (b) Mozambicans who were still living in refugee camps and elsewhere in 1992 while waiting for the re-establishment of peace within their country. Of the 247,013 non-Zimbabweans recorded, 164,824 (66.7%) were Mozambicans, 38,203 (15.5%) were Malawians and 10,003 (4%) were Zambians. There were 10,654 British and 6,169 South African citizens recorded in the census. Many of these Mozambican refugees have since been repatriated or gone back home on their own.

It is therefore reasonable to infer that lifetime migrants to Zimbabwe constitute a very small proportion of not more than 3-4% of the total population. The largest proportion of foreign born residents are people from neighbouring Mozambique, Malawi and Zambia, some of whom came as labour migrants to work on the mines and commercial farms in Zimbabwe during the colonial era.

Today, two streams of people legally enter the country from outside through official ports of entry: those intending to live in the country for extended periods of time (immigrants) and those visiting for a limited period (visitors). The Department of Immigration Control and the Central Statistical Office define an "immigrant" broadly to include (a) new residents intending to remain in Zimbabwe for at least twelve months; (b) temporary residents taking up employment for a limited period; and (c) returning former residents who had declared themselves as emigrants when they left the country and/or had remained outside the country for more than twelve months.

Visitors are defined as (a) residents of other countries who visit Zimbabwe for periods not exceeding twelve months for any reason other

than taking up employment; and (b) people in transit who enter the country *en route* to other destinations and who spend less than two nights in passing through the country. Emigrants are defined as (a) residents who, on departure, declare that they are leaving the country for more than twelve months; and (b) persons who recorded themselves as visitors on departure but stayed for more than twelve months.

Table 1.1 shows the trends in migration into and out of Zimbabwe through official ports since 1980. Overall, the last two decades have been characterized by annual net migration losses, especially in the years immediately after independence. The country experienced net migration losses in 13 of the 18 years from 1980 to 1997. In the early 1980s large numbers of whites were leaving the country. Between 1980 and 1984, there was a net migration loss of over 10,000 people per year. The peak net migration loss in the history of the country was experienced in 1981, a year after independence, when 20,536 people left against 7,794 arrivals, a net loss of 12,742. The number of emigrants each year declined to below 7,000 in the mid-1980s and to below 3,000

Table 1.1: Numbers of Immigrants and Emigrants Recorded Through Official Ports of Entry, 1980-1997

Year	Number of Immigrants	Number of Emigrants	Net Migration (+gain/-loss)
1980	6,407	17,240	-10,833
1981	7,794	20,536	-12,742
1982	7,715	17,942	-10,225
1983	6,944	19,067	-12,123
1984	5,567	16,979	-11,412
1985	5,471	6,918	-1,447
1986	4,897	3,787	1,110
1987	3,925	5,330	-1,405
1988	2,915	4,305	-1,390
1989	3,342	4,565	-1,223
1990	2,964	4,224	-1,260
1991	3,583	4,031	-448
1992	3,191	2,615	576
1993	3,461	3,056	405
1994	2,921	3,474	-553
1995	2,901	3,281	-380
1996	3,250	1,629	1,621
1997	2,483	1,821	662

Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics

in the 1990s. The decline in emigration from the mid-1980s was in part because the population base for potential emigrants - mostly the white community - had been greatly reduced in number and those who wanted to leave had already done so.

The number of immigrants entering the country through official ports of entry reached its peak during the early 1980s when over 5,000 arrivals were recorded each year between 1980 and 1985. Some of these were Zimbabweans who had been living abroad during the colonial period and were now returning home from political exile. Since the late 1980s, the number of immigrants has declined to not more than 3,500 per year. They include expatriate workers on 2-5 year work contracts in fields where local skills are unavailable in both the public and private sectors including medicine, engineering, architecture, accountancy and tertiary education.

During the first few years after independence, returning residents comprised as much as 20% of the total immigrants each year (Table 1.2). From the mid-1980s, the proportion of temporary residents (i.e. expatriate workers and their dependents) increased to as much as 80% of the annual inflow of migrants. The decline in numbers of immigrants overall from over 7,000 per year in the early 1980s to around 3,000 or less per year since the mid-1980s is consistent with the government policy of not actively promoting new permanent residents from abroad. Only those with specialist skills or investment capital have been admitted, in contrast to the immigration promotion policies of the colonial government before 1980.³ Today, temporary residents (expatriates) make up 75-80% of the total annual immigrant population while new immigrants coming to settle permanently account for 15-20%, and returning residents the remaining 5% (Table 1.2).

Table 1.3 shows that the principal source regions for migrants to Zimbabwe since independence are Africa and Europe. Since 1980, Africa has accounted for 40-55% of the immigrants into Zimbabwe while Europe has contributed 30-40% (Table 1.3). In the early 1980s, the United Kingdom, Zambia and South Africa contributed the largest proportion of the immigrants. Many were returning Zimbabweans who had been living in political exile. However, immigration from South Africa was short lived as, from about 1982, its share dropped from about 20% to 10-12%. The decline was in part because of the political tensions that characterized relations between the two countries over the apartheid system and the political destabilization by South Africa of its neighbours.⁴ However, in the early 1990s, there was a slight increase in the proportion of immigrants from that country, although the actual numbers were much smaller than before. The increase, though small, was in part precipitated by the political uncertainty and insecurity in

Year	Returning Residents	Temporary Residents	Permanent Immigrants	Total %	Total Immigrants
1980	38.4	5.9	55.7	100	6,407
1981	29.0	4.1	66.9	100	7,794
1982	19.5	2.4	78.1	100	7,715
1983	17.9	29.9	52.2	100	6,944
1984	13.0	58.5	28.5	100	5,567
1985	23.3	51.8	24.9	100	5,471
1986	22.3	38.0	39.7	100	4,897
1987	13.4	41.4	45.2	100	3,925
1988	9.1	53.4	37.5	100	2,915
1989	4.7	70.7	24.6	100	3,342
1990	3.0	82.5	14.5	100	2,964
1991	8.1	77.3	14.6	100	3,583
1992	1.8	87.5	10.7	100	3,191
1993	2.1	85.7	12.2	100	3,461
1994	2.8	88.9	8.3	100	2,921
1995	8.0	78.9	13.1	100	2,901
1996	5.3	76.5	18.2	100	3,250
1997	3.6	80.4	16.0	100	2,483

Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics

that country prior to the coming to power of the African National Congress in 1994. On the other hand, the immigrant stream from Zambia continued throughout the 1980s and only dropped below 10% of the total number of immigrants in the early 1990s.

After the first flow of returning Zimbabweans, the United Kingdom maintained a steady proportion of 15-20% of the immigrants to Zimbabwe each year. The United Kingdom, as the former colonial power, has long and strong cultural and political ties with Zimbabwe. Immigrants to Zimbabwe include white Zimbabweans who had left the country before or shortly after independence and subsequently decided to return, as well as British expatriates on work contracts.

As with immigrant flows, Africa and Europe have been the major destinations for emigrants from Zimbabwe (Table 1.4). Economic sanctions and travel restrictions imposed on the government of Rhodesia by the international community from the early 1960s, coupled with the civil war in Mozambique after that country attained its independence from Portugal in 1975, presented difficulties for migrant workers who had been recruited from Malawi to work on local commercial farms and

Region and Country	1980-1981	1982-1983	1984-1985	1986-1987	1988-1989	1990-1991	1992-1993	1994-1995	1996-1997
Africa Total	53.1	50.2	45.3	58.7	44.2	40.2	37.6	44.4	41.8
South Africa	20.4	10.3	12.2	15.5	9.5	11.5	15.9	20.9	19.3
Zambia	20.3	22	16.6	29.7	18.4	15.0	8.1	8.4	7.3
Malawi	6.1	8.6	5.9	5.4	6.1	4.0	4.1	4.6	4.9
Mozambique	0.7	1.2	1.0	0.8	1.8	1.6	1.3	2.0	2.5
Elsewhere	5.6	8.1	9.6	7.3	8.4	8.1	8.2	8.5	7.8
Americas Total	5.2	5.2	6.7	5.7	8.1	6.9	8.0	6.4	7.1
USA	4.2	3.1	4.4	3.2	5.4	4.3	5.0	4.5	5.2
Canada	0.7	1.9	1.9	2.1	1.9	1.8	1.9	1.3	1.5
Elsewhere	0.3	0.2	0.4	0.4	0.8	0.8	1.1	0.6	0.4
Asia Total	3.5	8.5	13.6	7.1	10.1	14.3	11.9	11.5	13.3
India	1.6	5.3	7.4	3.6	3.5	5.4	3.8	2.3	3.1
Elsewhere	1.9	3.2	6.2	3.5	6.6	8.9	8.1	9.2	10.2
Europe Total	36.4	34.2	32.8	26.7	35.9	36.2	39.5	35.6	35.4
UK	29.7	23.9	17.9	14	13.4	17.5	18.7	18.2	19.7
Germany	0.8	1.9	2.8	2.2	6.2	2.7	3.6	3.4	2.2
Elsewhere	5.9	8.4	12.1	10.5	16.3	16.0	17.2	14.0	13.5
Oceania Total	1.8	1.9	1.6	1.7	1.7	2.4	3.0	2.1	2.4
Australia	1.5	1.7	1.3	1.5	1.2	1.8	2.2	1.5	1.7
Elsewhere	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.5	0.6	0.8	0.6	0.7
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total #	14,201	14,659	11,038	8,377	6,257	6,547	6,652	5,822	5,733

Note: Figures for Germany up to 1989 refer to West Germany alone
Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics

mines. After 1980, many of these Malawians were able to return home for the first time after many years, resulting in an increase in the proportion of emigrants to that country, from 8% during 1980-81 to over 20% per year during the period 1984-1989. While Zambia was a major source of immigrants to Zimbabwe (many of them returning residents), there has been very little movement in the opposite direction, with less than 5% of the emigrants going to that country each year. Shortly after independence when large numbers of whites were leaving the country, the vast majority were going to South Africa, with over 50% per year during the first four years. Thereafter, as the pool of potential emigrants became smaller, the proportion of people going to South Africa dropped to below 20%. The majority of emigrants to Europe went to the United

Table 1.4: Emigrants from Zimbabwe by Region and Country of Destination Declared on Departure, 1980-1997 (%)									
Region and Country	1980-1981	1982-1983	1984-1985	1986-1987	1988-1989	1990-1991	1992-1993	1994-1995	1996-1997
Africa Total	78.2	76.6	70.6	52.8	59.2	38.7	33.8	40.0	48.4
South Africa	62.4	52.6	40.9	16.3	20.4	13.1	7.7	12.5	15.7
Zambia	3.7	2.8	4.3	5.3	3.3	2.4	3.5	2.0	5.2
Malawi	8.1	17.1	21.2	24.8	27.5	7.7	10.3	8.0	11.4
Mozambique	1.1	1.6	0.8	0.9	0.8	1.3	1.5	1.6	1.9
Elsewhere	2.9	2.5	3.4	5.5	7.2	14.2	10.8	15.9	14.2
Americas Total	3.0	2.6	3.7	9.9	6.7	13.4	17.1	15.5	11.7
USA	1.9	1.6	2.6	4.7	4.2	7.6	9.5	9.9	10.4
Canada	0.8	0.8	1.0	1.7	2.1	2.6	2.7	1.7	1.0
Elsewhere	0.3	0.2	0.1	3.5	0.4	3.2	4.9	3.9	0.3
Asia Total	0.6	1.2	2.7	4.2	3.4	5.7	6.0	3.2	4.2
India	0.2	0.4	1.3	2.4	2.2	1.3	1.9	0.6	0.7
Elsewhere	0.4	0.8	1.4	1.8	1.2	4.4	4.1	2.6	3.5
Europe Total	13.7	14.8	19.1	28.6	25.3	35.0	38.2	36.0	31.8
UK	11.0	11.4	14.2	20.1	17.8	23.8	26.8	25.3	22.1
Germany	0.6	0.8	1.0	1.6	1.7	2.3	3.0	2.2	2.1
Elsewhere	2.1	2.6	3.9	6.9	5.8	8.9	8.4	8.5	7.6
Oceania Total	4.3	4.7	3.3	4.3	5.1	6.7	4.7	4.8	3.5
Australia	3.9	4.2	2.8	3.5	4.4	6.1	3.8	3.8	3.0
Elsewhere	0.4	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.7	0.6	0.9	1.0	0.5
Not Stated	0.2	0.1	0.6	0.1	0.3	0.5	0.1	0.5	0.4
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total #	37,774	37,009	23,897	9,117	8,870	8,255	5,671	6,755	3,450
<i>Note: Figures for Germany up to 1989 refer to West Germany alone</i>									
<i>Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics</i>									

Kingdom. In fact, since 1990, the United Kingdom has been the principal destination for emigrants from Zimbabwe, taking about 20-25% of the annual total.

The so-called “brain drain” has been a major migration issue in Zimbabwe during the past three decades. Table 1.5 shows the losses and gains in skilled personnel classified according to major occupational categories of economically active emigrants and immigrants respectively between 1980 and 1997. Overall, the country had a net loss of almost 23,500 economically active persons over the period 1980 to 1997. The largest losses took place in the early years after independence when, for

instance, there was a net loss of 16,083 economically active people in the four years 1980-83. The largest numbers of movements over the period were among the professional and technical category where some 19,300 people emigrated. However, an almost equal number came to work in the country for varying periods of time. The occupational categories to experience the largest net losses were production and related workers, with a net loss of 8,375, followed by clerical and related workers where there was a net loss of 7,571 workers.

Government has made various attempts to curtail the loss of skills, including the bonding of graduates from local and foreign universities and technical colleges, but to no avail. Initially, whites who had enjoyed substantial educational and training benefits during the colonial period, left in large numbers from the late 1970s, primarily for South Africa. Their positions in the public and private sectors of the economy were usually taken over by well-educated but less experienced blacks (some of whom were returning residents) and by expatriate workers from other regions of the world such as the United Kingdom, India, East and West Africa.⁵ More recently, black Zimbabweans, especially highly qualified professionals, have been leaving the country for work in South Africa and Botswana where salaries are much higher than at home and inflation is lower. While there is circumstantial evidence that many of these professional people eventually return to work in Zimbabwe after a few years, they nonetheless represent a loss to the country during the time that they are away, and often they have to be replaced temporarily with more expensive expatriate professionals.

1.3 VISITORS TO ZIMBABWE

By the late 1990s some 80% of visitors came on holiday, while around 10% came on business (Table 1.6). Throughout the 1980s, the number of business visitors ranged between 40,000 and 50,000 per year. In the 1990s, the number of business visitors increased quite considerably, from 67,994 in 1992 to reach 93,525 in 1994 and 249,669 in 1997.

The fluctuations in the numbers of visitors coming on holiday over the past two decades illustrate the sensitivity of the tourism industry to political and civil disturbances and economic downturns. Overall, annual tourist arrivals increased from 22,7195 in 1980 to well over one million by the late 1990s, but the growth has been uneven from year to year.⁶ For instance, the immediate post-independence growth in tourist arrivals received a major setback when, in 1982, a party of six foreign tourists were abducted between Bulawayo and Victoria Falls and subsequently killed by a gang of anti-government dissidents. Over the period to 1987, the western half of the country in particular was plagued by

Table 1.5: Occupations of Economically Active Migrants by Major Occupational Categories, 1980-1997

Occupational Category ¹	1980-1983			1984-1987			1988-1991			1992-1995			1996-1997			Total 1980-1997		
	Immi-grant	Emi-grant	Net Change	Immi-grant	Emi-grant	Net Change	Immi-grant	Emi-grant	Net Change	Immi-grant	Emi-grant	Net Change	Immi-grant	Emi-grant	Net Change	Immi-grant	Emi-grant	Net Change
Professional & technical ²	5,475	7,001	-1,526	4,630	4,474	156	4,045	372	318	3,533	3,349	184	1475	790	685	19,158	19,341	-183
Administrative & managerial	855	2,059	-1,204	442	881	-439	466	543	-77	769	688	101	461	209	252	2,993	4,380	-1,387
Clerical & related workers	1,387	6,029	-4,642	471	1,951	-1,480	227	1,157	-930	247	671	-424	53	148	-95	2,385	9,956	-7,571
Sales workers	353	1,109	-756	140	352	-212	49	177	-128	181	215	-34	182	78	104	905	1,931	-1,026
Service workers	318	1,428	-1,110	141	708	-567	81	235	-154	91	222	-131	32	69	-37	663	2,662	-1,999
Agricultural workers	312	1,055	-743	193	552	-359	128	244	-114	113	117	-4	44	58	-14	790	2,026	-1,236
Production workers ³	2,307	7,158	-4,851	1,111	3,340	-2,229	427	1,452	-1,025	405	639	-234	148	184	-36	4,398	12,773	-8,375
Armed forces	n.a.	n.a.	n.a.	48	165	-117	19	81	-62	11	64	-53	493	289	204	571	599	-28
Inadequately or not stated	547	1,798	-1,251	148	525	-377	146	172	-26	333	356	-23	7	10	-3	1,181	2,861	-1,680
Total	11,554	27,637	-16,083	7,324	12,948	-5,624	5,588	7,788	-2,200	5,683	6,321	-638	2,895	1,835	1,060	33,044	56,529	-23,485

Note:

1. The figures show the reported occupations of the migrants. They are subject to error where migrants did not state their occupations correctly

2. Includes scientists, engineers, architects and related technicians, medical, dental and related workers, accountants and teachers

3. Includes production and related workers in manufacturing, mining and construction industries

Sources: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics

political and civil unrest which in turn was combined with negative foreign media publicity about the country. Consequently, the number of foreign visitors arriving on holiday fell by 28%, from 327,261 in 1981 to 23,5726 in 1983. From the late 1980s, the numbers of arrivals began to rise again, except for 1988 following the severe drought of 1987-88.

Table 1.6: Visitors to Zimbabwe by Purpose of Visit, 1980-1997

Year	On Business	On Holiday	In Transit	Educational	Total Visitors
1980	40,766	227,195	4,953	457	273,371
1981	44,318	327,261	10,920	857	383,356
1982	39,993	290,681	19,306	1,066	351,046
1983	40,022	235,726	21,177	1,116	298,041
1984	33,022	277,577	23,055	944	339,598
1985	41,074	319,826	27,819	746	389,465
1986	48,512	345,640	38,281	939	433,372
1987	47,838	405,842	32,937	1,099	487,716
1988	53,642	395,593	37,118	2,609	488,962
1989	52,074	411,243	38,087	2,844	504,248
1990	52,932	527,190	53,190	2,480	635,792
1991	46,093	587,129	59,983	3,454	696,659
1992	67,994	629,466	62,251	6266	765,978
1993	136,647	732,645	93,419	8,828	971,539
1994	93,522	937,212	100,078	8,243	1,139,055
1995	130,135	1,268,580	166,111	16,820	1,581,646
1996	133,122	1,410,847	196,189	52,727	1,792,885
1997	249,669	1,075,573	213,888	10,338	1,549,468

Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics

By far the majority of visitors come from within Africa, and especially from South Africa and Zambia (Table 1.7). South Africa, together with Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland, accounts for between 30% and 40% of the visitors to Zimbabwe each year, followed closely by Zambia. In recent years, Mozambique has grown in importance as a source of visitors to Zimbabwe, and now contributes up to 10% of the annual total. Its growing significance since the late 1980s may be attributed to the cessation of civil war in that country which has promoted freer movement of people.

Outside Africa, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland have been the leading sources of visitors to Zimbabwe. This is explained by the long historical, socio-cultural, political and economic ties

Region & Country	1980-1981	1982-1983	1984-1985	1986-1987	1988-1989	1990-1991 ²	1992-1993 ²	1994-1995	1996-1997
Africa Total	83.4	78.7	78.7	80.3	79.0	82.2	85.1	85.1	76.5
Southern Africa ¹	41.4	38.1	39.6	31.6	36.7	39.1	47.7	38.5	33.4
Zambia	36.3	33.2	30.0	38.6	30.2	29.6	26.8	35.0	28.1
Mozambique	0.9	1.9	3.6	4.6	6.5	7.3	5.2	6.6	10.0
Elsewhere	4.8	5.5	5.5	5.5	5.6	6.2	5.4	5.0	5.0
Americas Total	2.9	4.3	4.9	3.8	3.6	2.7	2.4	2.5	3.8
USA & Canada	2.7	4.1	4.6	3.5	3.4	2.6	2.1	2.2	3.2
Elsewhere	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.6
Asia Total	0.9	1.2	1.0	0.9	0.7	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.2
Europe Total	12.0	14.5	13.7	13.2	14.3	12.0	10.2	9.9	15.8
UK & Ireland	6.7	7.3	6.7	6.6	6.6	6.2	4.8	4.3	6.6
Germany ³	1.6	2.0	2.1	1.9	2.2	1.7	1.9	2.0	3.4
Elsewhere	3.7	5.2	4.9	4.7	5.5	4.1	3.5	3.6	5.8
Oceania Total	0.8	1.3	1.7	1.8	2.4	2.5	1.7	1.8	2.7
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total No.	640,854	608,604	676,029	849,870	918,005	1,332,451	1,737,517	2,720,701	2,932,276
<i>Note:</i>									
1. Includes South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland									
2. Figures for the three years 1990/91, 1992/93 and 1994/95 include visitors in transit									
3. Figures for Germany up to 1989 refer to West Germany alone									
Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics									

between Zimbabwe and the United Kingdom. The two European countries account for 6-7% of the total number of visitors each year. Other leading source countries in Europe are Germany, the Netherlands and Switzerland.

1.4 ZIMBABWEANS VISITING ABROAD

For Zimbabwean residents going abroad for periods not exceeding 12 months at a time, Africa is by far the dominant destination, accounting for some 90% of documented departing residents. Within the continent, South Africa is the most popular destination for Zimbabwean residents. Each year, some 40-60% of Zimbabwean residents travelling abroad go to South Africa. This is due to the long historical, political, economic and socio-cultural links that have existed between the two countries. South Africa is Zimbabwe's leading trading partner in the world, hence there is a lot of movement for purposes of trade by the commercial and industrial sectors of the country. Both black and white Zimbabwean residents have

close relations across the border and this also explains some of these movements (Table 1.8).

Since the late 1980s, there has developed a large flow of informal cross-border trading by low-income people, especially women, who travel to South Africa to purchase goods for subsequent resale when they return to Zimbabwe.⁷ This cross-border informal trade has developed against a background of deteriorating economic conditions in Zimbabwe during the past decade. The economic decline has forced many low and middle income households to engage in informal trading in order to supplement their family incomes, despite attempts by the South African authorities to curtail this traffic by imposing stringent conditions on those applying for entry visas into that country. A recent study showed that two-thirds of the Zimbabwean women who had visited South Africa during the past five years went there for the purpose of trading (i.e. taking goods for sale and buying goods for subsequent resale when they returned home).⁸ Almost two-thirds of the female respondents in the survey had stayed for up to two weeks and 87% said they had spent up to four weeks on their visits to South Africa. On the other hand, men tended to go to South Africa less often, their average stay was somewhat longer, and 20% said they had been looking for a job or had actually worked there, compared with one-third who said they had gone there for the purpose of trading.

Other popular destinations within Africa for Zimbabwean residents travelling abroad are Zambia and Botswana, while Mozambique has grown in popularity during the past few years. The latter country has now become a destination for some 7% of the local travellers, from less than 3% a decade ago. Some of the movements to Botswana, Mozambique and Zambia are also for purposes of informal trading, the two latter countries being popular for trading in second-hand clothing and foodstuffs.

Outside Africa, Europe is the most popular destination, with the largest proportion of the travellers going to the United Kingdom. Destinations in Asia, the Americas and Oceania account for only a very small proportion of Zimbabwean travellers, partly because of the large distances and high costs of air travel involved. The few residents going to destinations in Oceania mainly go to Australia. Some of these travellers are white Zimbabweans visiting their relatives who emigrated to that country especially during the 1970s and 1980s at a time of major political change in Zimbabwe.

Table 1.8: Zimbabwean Residents Visiting Abroad by Region and Country of Destination, 1980-1997									
Region & Country	1980-1981	1982-1983	1984-1985	1986-1987	1988-1989	1990-1991	1992-1993	1994-1995	1996-1997
Africa Total	90.1	90.8	91.3	88.9	87.2	88.1	89.4	87.5	85.8
South Africa	63.8	52.8	48.3	56.8	52.5	58.7	70.3	38.1	34.4
Zambia	6.9	7.9	6.6	11.2	10.1	7.2	5.1	12.6	21.1
Malawi	3.3	4.5	5.5	7.5	10.1	4.9	5.1	4.7	10.1
Mozambique	0.8	0.9	0.9	2.4	4.7	4.2	4.1	7.7	7.4
Botswana	13.9	22.8	28	8.1	6.8	8.8	1.9	20.5	8.8
Elsewhere	1.4	1.9	2.0	3.0	3.0	4.3	2.9	3.9	4.0
Americas Total	0.7	0.7	0.7	1.1	1.5	0.9	0.7	1.0	1.9
USA	0.5	0.5	0.6	0.8	1.2	0.6	0.5	0.8	1.4
Canada	0.1	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.4
Elsewhere	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.05	0.03	0.05	0.02	0.02	0.1
Asia Total	0.5	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.7	1.0	0.3	0.6	0.5
Europe Total	7.2	7.3	6.9	8.8	9.4	9.3	9.3	10.6	11.4
UK	5.2	5.2	4.9	6.3	6.8	7.3	8.4	8.1	9.4
Germany	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.3	0.7	0.6
Elsewhere	1.8	1.8	1.6	2.0	1.8	1.4	0.6	1.8	1.4
Oceania Total	0.3	0.4	0.4	0.5	0.7	0.6	0.3	0.4	0.4
Australia	0.2	0.4	0.3	0.4	0.6	0.5	0.3	0.3	0.3
Elsewhere	0.06	0.04	0.03	0.1	0.1	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.04
Not Stated	1.2	0.2	0.1	0.04	0.5	0.1	0.01	0.01	0.01
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
Total No.	651,831	682,807	538,104	331,282	280,785	551,313	952,657	430,613	192,634
<i>Note: Figures for Germany up to 1989 refer to West Germany alone</i>									
<i>Source: CSO Migration and Tourist Statistics</i>									

1.5 UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATION

Parallel with the growth in cross-border informal trading, there are indications that undocumented and unauthorized cross-border migration from Zimbabwe into neighbouring countries has increased markedly since the 1980s. Unauthorized migrants fall into two categories. The first are those Zimbabweans who enter neighbouring countries, mostly Botswana and South Africa, through official exit ports, but then overstay after expiry of their entry visas. The second category comprises those who leave Zimbabwe without valid travel documents and do not use official exit points. Not only do these over-staying and undocumented

migrants seek to secure employment in the host countries, but some even manage to obtain South African or Botswana citizenship and other official documents fraudulently.⁹ Initially, most of the unauthorized migrants came from the southern and western districts of Zimbabwe, areas prone to recurrent droughts and severe food shortages. Civil unrest during the 1980s also drove many young people from their rural homes. Today the migrants come from all parts of the country, including the northern districts that are considerable distances from South Africa.

There are no reliable statistics on the numbers of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants staying in South Africa and Botswana.¹⁰ The magnitude of this migration stream can only be inferred indirectly from the available official sources. The best available data are statistics compiled by the South African government as follows: (a) the number of over-stayers, defined as those who entered the country legally but for whom there are no records of their subsequent departure, and (b) the number of people deported from South Africa either because they had over-stayed their entry permit or because they had entered illegally in the first instance.

The number of Zimbabwean overstayers still in South Africa increases steadily the closer we get to the present (Table 1.9). There was a marked increase in the number of over-stayers in the mid-1990s, probably associated with the political changes in South Africa and the resultant greater willingness among foreigners to seek their fortunes in that country. The number of people deported has remained fairly constant during the past few years at between 15,000 and 20,000 each year (Table 1.10). As a proportion of the total number of deportees from South Africa, Zimbabwe's share has also remained stable at around 10% of total deportations per annum.

It is necessary to qualify these statistics by noting that some of the deportees return to South Africa and Botswana almost as soon as they have paid their deposit fines with the Zimbabwean police. Thus, there is a lot of circulatory movement by the same people such that the actual number of people who are entering legally and staying illegally in South Africa or Botswana may well be lower than the numbers of deportations given in Table 1.10. The numbers of over-stayers in Table 1.9 are also similar to the estimate given by the South African High Commission in Harare which reported in 1998 that about 75,000 Zimbabweans were believed to be staying in South Africa illegally after their temporary residence visas had expired.¹¹

People who leave Zimbabwe other than through official exit ports, on being deported by the South African or Botswana authorities, risk a fine which stands at Z\$100. This is apparently not a sufficient deterrent

and the Department of Immigration Control has recently recommended that the fine should be increased to Z\$1000. A report in a local newspaper illustrates the failure of the current fine to serve as a deterrent. It was reported that many Zimbabweans living in South Africa had failed to cross the flooded Limpopo River shortly before Christmas of 1998:¹²

Unperturbed, many sauntered across the bridge (at the Beitbridge border post) carrying their gifts, turned themselves in to the police, paid \$100 deposit fines and went home. Now they want to go back to work and have to do it the hard way, by sneaking across the river and walking through the Kruger National Park. Already hundreds of border jumpers are strung along the northern bank of the river waiting for it to subside.

Commenting on the returning undocumented migrants, a senior police officer at Beitbridge had earlier been quoted as saying: "It seems most of them are prepared because they are coming with their fines ready which they pay before proceeding home."¹³

Length of Time in South Africa	Number of Overstayers
< 1 year	27,909
1-2 years	18,507
2-3 years	12,554
3-4 years	10,888
4-5 years	8,421
> 5 years	495
Total	78,774

According to local media reports, unauthorized cross-border migration reaches a peak towards the end of the year when those people who have been living and working in South Africa or Botswana return home for Christmas.¹⁴ After spending a few weeks with family and friends at home, they make their journey across the border again. Unfortunately, this period coincides with the rainy season and some of them have attempted to cross the flooded Limpopo River, often with tragic consequences from the floods and crocodiles.¹⁵ One newspaper reported that at least 33 people, including several women, had died while attempting to cross the Limpopo River during the 1997-98 rainy season.¹⁶

Table 1.10: Zimbabwean Deportees from South Africa, 1990-1997

Year	Deportations Zimbabwean Deportees	Total Deportees	Zimbabwean Deportees as % of Total
1990	5,363	53,445	10.0
1991	7,174	61,345	11.7
1992	12,033	82,575	14.6
1993	10,961	96,697	11.3
1994	12,931	90,682	14.3
1995	17,549	157,075	11.2
1996	14,651	180,704	8.1
1997	21,673	176,349	12.3

Source: Southern African Migration Project database (SAMP)¹⁷

1.6 GOVERNMENT POLICIES TOWARDS MIGRATION

After independence in 1980, the black majority government adopted a policy of selective immigration whose basic tenet was to ensure that black Zimbabweans were not disadvantaged in terms of employment in favour of white immigrants. Issues of immigration and citizenship in independent Zimbabwe are governed by three principal pieces of legislation, namely the Immigration Act (Chapter 4:02), the Refugees Act (Chapter 4:03) and the Citizenship of Zimbabwe Act (Chapter 4:01). Section 41 of the Immigration Act empowers the Minister of Home Affairs to promulgate regulations to govern the entry and exit of people into and out of Zimbabwe and to determine the conditions under which non-Zimbabweans can stay in the country. Current immigration regulations were gazetted in August 1998 as Statutory Instrument 195 of 1998.

Persons wanting to come to Zimbabwe for purposes of employment are normally allowed entry only if the prospective employers can show to the satisfaction of the Foreign Recruitment Committee that the required skills are not available locally and that they have been unable to recruit from within the country. The prospective immigrant is then granted a residence permit and temporary employment permit allowing them to work only for that particular organization and for a limited period of time (usually 2-3 years in the first instance). The temporary employment permit will normally not be granted for a period exceeding five years, including any periods of renewal. The holder of a temporary employment permit is not allowed to change occupations or employers during the period specified in the permit. In the meantime, the employing organization is expected to put in place a training programme for a Zimbabwean resident to understudy the expatriate worker. This policy

of “immigration control” explains the significant increase in the category of immigrants classified as temporary residents from the early 1980s when they constituted less than 10% of the annual number of immigrants to over three-quarters by the late 1990s. Permanent residence is normally not granted until a person has been resident in Zimbabwe for at least five years. Citizenship is granted upon application to persons who have been resident in Zimbabwe, whether continuously or as an aggregate of the number of periods, for at least five years. Dual citizenship is not permitted and therefore those intending to become Zimbabwean citizens must renounce any other citizenship that they may hold.

In order to attract foreign direct investment, immigration regulations give special consideration to people who invest substantial sums of money in projects approved by the Zimbabwe Investment Centre. Thus, a permanent residence permit will be granted with immediate effect to an applicant who has transferred US\$1 million or more into Zimbabwe for the purpose of investment. A three-year residence permit may be issued to a person who invests US\$300,000 or more and, after a successful viability study, a permanent residence permit may be issued just before the expiry of the original three-year residence permit.

The government also has bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries to facilitate the movement of people who are resident in border regions. These bilateral agreements exist with Botswana in the west, South Africa in the south, Mozambique in the east and with Zambia in the north. In essence, residents in the border regions are registered and issued with temporary passes that enable them to cross the border to visit friends and relatives on the other side and, in the case of the border with South Africa, to seek employment in the Northern Province of that country. The residents are allowed to travel up to a distance of 20 km into the interior of the host country on these temporary passes. Many Mozambicans and Zambians who are resident in the border regions of their respective countries also enter Zimbabwe in the east and north respectively in order to shop for commodities that are unavailable in their own countries. Other bilateral agreements with neighbouring countries pertain to matters of joint security and defence.

Zimbabwe is one of the founding members of the Southern African Development Community which was originally established in 1980 as the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC). During the 1980s, the principal objective of the SADCC was to dismantle apartheid and to reduce the economic dependence of the member countries on South Africa. Following the end of apartheid and the ascent to power of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa in 1994, the role and long term objectives of SADCC were transformed from being political (i.e. disengagement from

apartheid South Africa) to economic development and regional integration of the member countries. In pursuit of this new economic goal, the organization changed its name to the Southern African Development Community (SADC). One of the initial goals of the re-constituted regional grouping was to develop a common policy regulating the movement of nationals between SADC member countries. To this end, a Draft Protocol on the Free Movement of Persons in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) was submitted for consideration by the governments of member countries in early 1996. The short-term objectives of the protocol were to facilitate for citizens of the member states (a) entry without a visa into the territory of another member state for a period of three months at a time; (b) residence in the territory of another member state; and (c) establishment of oneself and working in the territory of another member state. The long-term objective was to develop policies aimed at the progressive elimination of obstacles to the movement of people of the region generally into and within the territories of the member states.¹⁸

The Zimbabwean government was generally in agreement with the protocol and would have liked to have seen its provisions implemented as proposed at the earliest opportunity. It had already implemented some of the provisions of the protocol ahead of its potential adoption by the regional group as a whole. For instance, a separate “SADC desk” at the major ports of entry to process holders of passports issued by member states has been in existence for a few years now. Secondly, there are already no entry visa requirements for holders of most SADC passports except South Africa and Mozambique. Discussions with Zimbabwean government officials indicate some dissatisfaction with the South African attitude towards the issue of entry visas. The South African government tightened its immigration control regulations on Zimbabwean passport holders from October 1996.¹⁹ In contrast, from February 1996, South African passport holders were able to obtain entry visas into Zimbabwe at the port of entry instead of having to apply for them prior to departure. Thirdly, in December 1998, a new “technologically sensitive” passport with improved security features was introduced, in compliance with Article 11 of the revised (May 1998) draft protocol.²⁰

However, despite Zimbabwe’s support for the Draft Protocol, it has never been ratified. Opposition from South Africa, Botswana and, to a lesser extent, Namibia accounts for that. Even a watered-down version of the original protocol failed to move the opponents of free movement.²¹ Free movement therefore continues in practice but a regionally-coordinated approach to migration management seems as elusive as ever.

1.7 CONCLUSION

This chapter has provided an overview of population movements in Zimbabwe, both within and outside the country, with particular focus on the post-independence years. It has described these various migration patterns and sought to provide explanations for these movements. It is hoped that a better understanding of these population movements, particularly cross-border or regional migrations between Zimbabwe and its neighbours, will contribute towards the formulation of a more humane and more progressive (im)migration policy regime not only for Zimbabwe but for all the member countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) as they strive towards economic integration and the freer regional movement of their citizens.

CHAPTER TWO

CROSS-BORDER MOVEMENT FROM ZIMBABWE TO SOUTH AFRICA²²

LOVEMORE ZINYAMA

2.1 INTRODUCTION

The past decade has seen growing numbers of Zimbabweans going to South Africa, Botswana and, to a lesser extent, Mozambique and Zambia, some to engage in small-scale trading and others in search of employment. The types, patterns, causes and impacts of the various forms of regional cross-border migration are complex and little understood. For instance, little is known as yet about who travels outside the country, why and how often. This chapter seeks to address some of these questions based on the results of a nationwide survey of a large, randomly selected population of Zimbabweans.

The chapter begins by outlining the current harsh economic conditions affecting many in Zimbabwe and the range of strategies which people, especially in lower-income households, use to cope with these difficulties. A brief description of methodology is then followed by a presentation of the data, with a focus on those respondents who have been to South Africa in the past. While the number of people who have travelled to South Africa in the past is relatively small compared to the total sample size, it is shown that, among those who have been, trade is a primary reason. The report then discusses differences in cross-border activity among those who have previously travelled to South Africa, addressing questions such as who goes (in terms of age, marital status, education, etc.), frequency of travel and length of stay in South Africa, modes of transport used, and why they go there.

It is suggested that a better understanding of the nature of cross-border movement between Zimbabwe and South Africa would assist in the adoption of a more enlightened policy in South Africa than is envisaged in the atmosphere of xenophobia that has prevailed for the past few years.

2.2 COPING WITH ECONOMIC HARDSHIPS IN ZIMBABWE

Cross-border migration between Zimbabwe and South Africa has historically been only a male activity. This was partly because it was deemed both too far and too risky for women in pre-independence Zimbabwe to travel to South Africa on their own, and partly because migration was strictly regulated by the requirements of the South African mines for labour from north of the Limpopo River.²³ But during the past decade, political and economic conditions have changed considerably in both countries. In South Africa, the pariah apartheid state is no more and the country is now a full member of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and of the Commonwealth.²⁴ In Zimbabwe, economic conditions have deteriorated so much that people, especially those from lower- and middle-income households, are finding it necessary to adopt a wide range of strategies for coping with these hardships. As a result, women can no longer remain recipients of their husbands' wages while staying at home and are having to go out to look for work in the formal and informal domestic sectors, while others travel to South Africa and elsewhere in an effort to support their families.

Economic growth since the mid-1980s has been slow and erratic in Zimbabwe, with high and growing levels of unemployment. Apparently under pressure for balance of payment support from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the government reluctantly abandoned the socialist policies which it had pursued since independence in 1980 and started in 1991 to implement liberalization policy reforms under the economic structural adjustment programme (ESAP).²⁵ Under the reform programme, the government undertook to reduce public expenditure by, among other things, removing subsidies on basic foodstuffs, reducing budgetary allocations even to essential social services such as education and health care, and downsizing the public service. According to the ESAP policy document, the objectives of the programme were to ensure higher medium- and long-term economic growth, to reduce poverty and improve living conditions especially for the poorest groups, and to address the problems of burgeoning unemployment.²⁶

Ten years after the start of ESAP, unemployment continues to worsen and has in fact been compounded by retrenchments in both the public and private sectors. Both local and foreign investment have not been forthcoming as initially envisaged; many large firms have closed down and there is strong evidence of de-industrialization due to increased competition from imports. Price inflation has also spiralled. Over 50,000 people were retrenched by private sector companies alone with the approval of the Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social

Welfare during the period 1991-1997.²⁷ Many other firms were retrenching labour without reporting to the ministry. During the same period, the government cut the number of public service employees by over 23,000.²⁸ In a country of about 12.5 million, where less than one million people are in formal employment, these reductions represent significant losses in family incomes. Not surprisingly, the umbrella Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) reported that its membership had dropped from 1.5 million in 1992 to less than one million by 1998.²⁹

According to most commentators, Zimbabweans are worse off today than they were at independence in 1980. Available evidence suggests that the economic reform programme has brought little but economic hardship, not only for the poorest groups, but also to middle-income households, in both rural and urban areas.³⁰ ESAP has failed to deliver on the economic benefits that it promised. For instance, the country has seen the considerable advances made in social service delivery during the 1980s eroded as the government has implemented cost recovery measures in such sectors as education and health care even for the poor. From a position of offering free primary education for all children and free health care for the poorest during the 1980s, the re-introduction of high user charges has led to a denial of access to these services for many households in both rural and urban areas. For the growing army of these vulnerable groups, the deterioration in their economic situation has been compounded by the recurrent droughts that have hit the country, and indeed the whole of Southern Africa, since the early 1980s.

The people of Zimbabwe, particularly the lower-income groups, have devised a variety of strategies for coping with these economic hardships. In urban areas, the most apparent coping strategy is seen in the massive expansion of informal sector activities such as petty commodity trading and manufacturing, and the provision of services such as public commuter transport. Cultivation on any available undeveloped piece of urban public land is now widespread as both low- and middle-income households seek to supplement their food supplies and family incomes.³¹ Many in formal employment now commonly resort to “moonlighting” in order to supplement their wages. Homeowners let out “rooms” or put up additional structures on their properties to accommodate rent-paying lodgers. The latter phenomenon has become widespread in all urban centres, affecting not only low-income residential areas but also middle-income suburbs.

Another coping strategy involves cross-border travel for informal trade in neighbouring countries. Since the mid-1980s, large numbers of Zimbabweans have been going to Botswana and South Africa with various items, notably crotchet ware, for sale in those countries. This cross-border trade has increasingly become dominated by women seeking to

supplement their family incomes, to clothe and educate their children.³² The money obtained while in South Africa is used to purchase goods for importation back to Zimbabwe and subsequent resale of those known to be in short supply at home. During the 1980s, before the relaxation of foreign currency controls by the government as part of the economic reform programme, these cross-border traders are known to have been key players in supplying commerce and industry with scarce requirements such as spare motor vehicle parts for electrical appliances and small items of machinery. More recently, female Zimbabwean cross-border traders have been going to Mozambique, Zambia and even as far as Tanzania to purchase and bring home for resale secondhand clothing, some of it reportedly brought into those countries by European charitable organizations for distribution to the needy.

While some people choose to engage only in circulatory cross-border trading, others migrate for varying periods of time to seek employment in South Africa or Botswana. This migration includes both the poorly educated without skills as well as highly qualified professional people. A 1998 ILO study, quoting the Zimbabwe High Commission in Pretoria, gave an estimate of 60,000 migrants working in South Africa in professional positions such as teachers, university academics, doctors, nurses, engineers, and accountants.³³ On the other hand, some of the unskilled migrants can only hope to get jobs as exploited and underpaid domestic workers and farm labourers in areas like the Northern Province of South Africa. They cross the border legally, if they have valid passports, entry visas and work permits; or they may enter South Africa without valid entry documents. Likewise, they return home to their families at Christmas and New Year either legally or “illegally.” Such cross-border migration is thought to be common especially in the southern and western districts of the country, close to the border with South Africa and Botswana.

While the governments of Zambia and Mozambique have not publicly expressed concern about the movement of people from Zimbabwe and have not taken any actions to curtail such movements where these are done legally, this has not been the case with South Africa or, to a lesser extent, Botswana. In South Africa, the years since the end of apartheid in 1994 have seen growing xenophobia within the local press and the general public directed at foreign nationals, particularly those from Mozambique and Zimbabwe. This xenophobia has often culminated in physical violence directed against foreigners and their property.³⁴

Common stereotypes are that these foreigners are coming in vast numbers, both legally and “illegally”, and that they are a threat to the economic prosperity and security of the country.³⁵ Zimbabweans and others are seen as taking away jobs from South Africans, thereby adding

to the unemployment of South African nationals and, by accepting lower wages, depressing remuneration for local labour.³⁶ This stereotyping extends to trade in the informal sector where foreigners are accused of taking away business from South African hawkers and vendors through increased competition. Foreigners, particularly undocumented migrants, have also been accused of gunrunning and drug trafficking, and being responsible for the increased level of violent crime in South Africa. They are accused of placing a burden on South Africa's health and educational services because those in their own countries have been allowed to collapse by their own national governments.³⁷

Another common stereotype in South Africa is that foreign nationals are coming to the country because of political repression, civil unrest and economic chaos in their home countries, or because they want to enjoy the benefits of the most enlightened and democratic constitution in Africa.³⁸ In the words of the former Deputy Minister of Home Affairs, Penuel Maduna, "hunger and fear are driving forces that are much stronger than even the most sophisticated aliens control measures ... South Africa has become the country of survival for many people from countries within Africa, and also from other parts of the world".³⁹ According to the South African Minister of Home Affairs, not only do foreign men take South African women and engage in marriages of convenience, but they also bring in diseases, notably STDs and HIV.⁴⁰ These misleading assertions about foreigners in South Africa have been well documented by SAMP.⁴¹

Estimates of the number of undocumented foreigners in South Africa vary from 500,000 to 8 million. According to the South African High Commission in Harare, about 75,000 Zimbabweans were believed to be staying "illegally" in South Africa after the expiry of their temporary residence permits during 1997, while an additional unknown number had entered and remained there without legal documentation.⁴² This figure is very close to the figure of 78,774 supplied by the South African Department of Home Affairs (Table 1.9). The Zimbabwean High Commission in Pretoria estimated in 1997 that some 400,000 Zimbabweans, including both legal and undocumented migrants, might be working as domestics, farm labourers and in the construction industry, sectors known to employ large numbers of foreign workers.⁴³ The figure seems exaggerated and certainly the South African police cannot find them, judging by the deportation figures (Table 1.10).

In order to counter the inflow of foreigners, the South African government has tried to impose stringent controls on their entry into the country, particularly of the less educated and unskilled, and only selectively allows entry to those with skills and capital for investment in the country.⁴⁴ Undocumented migrants, either because they entered the

country unlawfully in the first instance or because they overstayed the time stipulated in their original entry permits, are rounded up and deported. This public perception of foreigners as parasites appears to have substantial support among senior politicians and officials within the Department of Home Affairs, the police, and other arms of government responsible for implementing the country's immigration policies and border control. But it remains unclear how true these fears are that Zimbabweans, together with other foreigners, are queuing to enter South Africa in large numbers and causing considerable harm to that country's prosperity and security. We therefore need to get a clear sense of the numbers of Zimbabweans who are entering South Africa, their reasons for going there, how long they remain there and what their long-term intentions are with regards to permanent settlement in that country.

Unfortunately, objective assessment of these issues in South Africa has been clouded by press hysteria that the country is about to be run over by an army of "illegal aliens" who are waiting across the border in Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and other countries north of the Limpopo River, or who are already in the country.⁴⁵ This paranoia is illustrated by the tightening of immigration control regulations by the South African High Commission in Harare on Zimbabwean passport holders from October 1996, supposedly to curtail the numbers of people who were overstaying upon the expiry of their entry visas. Applicants for entry visas into South Africa are now required to produce proof of confirmed and paid hotel accommodation or a letter of invitation from a business associate, friend or relative legally resident in South Africa. The letter would include detailed information on that person, including his/her national identity number, physical address in South Africa, and the length of the intended visit. Zimbabwean visitors are also required to provide acceptable proof that they are able to sustain themselves while in South Africa (e.g., bank statement or travellers' cheques); produce a letter from their employers to confirm that they are gainfully employed in Zimbabwe and that they will return immediately upon completing their business; and, for unemployed persons, proof of marriage in Zimbabwe or an affidavit from a spouse. The last requirement is particularly harsh and discriminatory against female travellers, especially single women who are trying to support their families through cross-border informal trading. (It is also of interest to note that immigration from Europe and North America into the Cape Town area in recent years has not been seen as a problem by South African officials). In contrast, from February 1996, South African passport holders are now able to obtain entry visas at the port of entry instead of having to apply to the Zimbabwean High Commission in Pretoria before departure.

2.3 SURVEY METHODOLOGY

The survey results presented in this chapter are based on interviews conducted in February-March 1997. Thirty-two survey areas were randomly selected from a list of national population census enumeration areas, 17 of them in rural areas and 15 in urban areas. There were somewhat more male (56%) than female respondents (44%) in the sample. A profile of the sample population is provided in Table 2.1. All the respondents were Africans by race. This is not surprising for two reasons. First, the

Number of interviews	947
Gender (%)	
Male	56
Female	44
Race (%)	
African	99
White	-
Coloured	-
Age (%)	
15 - 24	26
25 - 44	50
45 - 64	17
65+	6
Urban or Rural (%)	
Urban	55
Rural	45
Marital Status (%)	
Married	66
Separated/divorced/abandoned	5
Widowed	3
Unmarried	25
Household Status (%)	
Household Head	34
Spouse	26
Child	20
Other family	7
Other	13
<i>Note: Figures in tables may not add to 100% due to rounding. A single dash (-) signifies a value of greater than zero but less than 0.5%.</i>	

size of the non-African population in Zimbabwe is very small, a mere 1.2% of the total population according to the results of the 1992 national population census. Second, the sample areas that were randomly selected did not include the urban high-income suburbs or rural large-scale commercial farms, the two areas where non-Africans generally live in Zimbabwe.

The sample obviously did not include those people who have already moved to South Africa permanently or temporarily, and were therefore not available for an interview. This caveat is important because it limits the conclusions that can be drawn about why Zimbabweans go to South Africa and what they do while they are there. In other words, one cannot assume that the resident population of Zimbabwe has had the same experiences as those Zimbabweans currently out of the country. Nevertheless, the sample is drawn from a large, representative survey of resident Zimbabweans and provides invaluable information about previous cross-border activities from one of South Africa's largest neighbours.

2.4 WHO GOES TO SOUTH AFRICA?

Analysis of the data shows that only 22% of the respondents had been to South Africa (210 people out of a total sample of 947). Of those who had been to South Africa, men were only slightly more likely to have visited than women. Thus, 23% of the males in the sample said they had been to South Africa at least once in their lives, compared with 19% of the women. This result contradicts a public perception widely held in Zimbabwe that it is now predominantly females who are participating in periodic cross-border movements for purposes of informal trading. However, there was a significant difference between males and females in terms of usual place of residence. Urban women were almost twice as likely to have been to South Africa than either their rural counterparts or the male respondents. Two thirds of the females who said they had visited South Africa were from urban areas, compared with only 40% of the males.

For both males and females, the largest proportion of those who had been to South Africa were in the 26-35 age group (Table 2.2). However, 87% of the females were under 45 years whereas males tended to be more widely spread across all age groups. Almost three quarters of the females were in the 26-45 category compared with only 49% of the males. Among the older men who had been to South Africa are those who had been there a long time ago as migrant mine workers and had since returned home either because of old age or upon expiry of their contracts. In the current situation of high unemployment and rampant inflation, it is the younger age categories - both males and females, but

more so females - with young families to support, who are likely to be most hard hit and therefore to seek amelioration in many varied ways, including cross-border migration.

Age Group	Males (%)	Females (%)
Up to 25	23	17
26 – 35	32	44
36 – 45	17	26
46 – 55	10	6
56 – 65	7	2
Over 65	10	1
Age unknown	1	4
N=264		

Three quarters of both male and female respondents who had been to South Africa were married (Table 2.3). Another 3% of the males and 9% of the females were either separated, divorced or widowed. Similar results were obtained in a study of a rural community in southwestern Zimbabwe with a high level of cross-border labour migration to South Africa, where 72% of the migrants were married.⁴⁶ Cross-border travel is thus being done by persons with family responsibilities at home. This is an important consideration for immigration policy formulation by the South African and Zimbabwean authorities. Family responsibilities at home are likely to weigh heavily against long-term or permanent migration to South Africa. As will be shown later, of crucial importance are the length of stay in South Africa and the reasons for going there. Twenty-six percent of the males and 15% of the female respondents who had been to South Africa were single. Permanent or semi-permanent migration, whether through legal or non-legal means, is more likely to occur among this unmarried group with fewer social and family responsibilities at home.

Marital Status	Males (%)	Females (%)
Married	71	75
Separated/divorced	2	5
Widowed	1	5
Never married	26	15
N=264		

The questionnaire also sought information about the educational qualifications of the respondents. Migration of educated people constitutes a loss of human resources for the sending country; conversely, it represents a significant economic gain to the receiving country. On the other hand, if migration is only short-term or circulatory, there is no detrimental transfer of human resources between the countries, although it may have other socio-economic impacts on both sending and receiving countries such as the trade balance or foreign exchange transfers. The results from the survey show that the largest proportion of both male and female respondents who had been to South Africa had received some secondary school education (Table 2.4). Half the males and 61% of the females had been educated up to secondary school level; a further 8% and 2% respectively had been educated to tertiary level. Not unexpectedly, a larger proportion of males than females had been educated to tertiary level. Clearly, cross-border movement involves a relatively well-educated segment of the Zimbabwean adult population who are not only able to access the bureaucratic process of getting the necessary travel documents before departure, but will be able to negotiate their way in a foreign country.

Education Level Reached	Males (%)	Females (%)
No schooling	9	9
Some primary schooling	15	12
Completed primary school	19	16
Some high schooling	38	49
Completed high school	12	12
University/other tertiary	8	2
N=209		

There were notable differences between males and females in terms of their employment status in Zimbabwe at the time of the survey. One third of the males said that they were employed in the formal sector, compared with only 10% of the females (Table 2.5). A little over half of the males were unemployed, with nearly one quarter not actively looking for work. On the other hand, almost 80% of the females were unemployed and a little over half were not looking for work (including homemakers). However, not more than 10% in both groups were employed in the informal sector. Those people engaged in cross-border export/import presumably do not see themselves as falling in the same category as vendors and hawkers who spend the day selling their goods from fixed or mobile stalls respectively.

Employment Status	Males (%)	Females (%)
Employed – formal sector	35	10
Employed – informal sector	7	10
Unemployed – looking for work	31	27*
Unemployed – not looking for work	23	52*
Others e.g. pensioners/students	4	1
N=200		
* includes homemakers		

2.5 TIMES OF TRAVEL

The mean number of lifetime visits by Zimbabweans to South Africa was six, with a maximum of 50 visits. Those who had been to South Africa were then asked how frequently they had visited that country during the past five years. A little over one third (35%) said that they visited South Africa once every few months or more frequently. This high frequency of visiting is not necessarily an indication of intent to migrate - legally or otherwise - but, as will be shown later, is related to the purpose of the visits.

Females had made more frequent visits than males over the previous five years (Table 2.6). Some 45% of the women reported that they visited South Africa at least once a month and another 34% visited at least once a year. In contrast, only 10% of the males travelled every month and another 41% at least once a year. Nearly half of the men (but only 21% of women) had visited only once a year or less in the previous five years. Thus, involvement in cross-border movement to South Africa has become a regular way of life for many women.

Further evidence that much of the cross-border movement from Zimbabwe to South Africa is circulatory in nature is provided by the fact that the average length of stay per visit was less than two weeks for 45% of all the visitors during the previous five years. Up to 70% stayed

Frequency	Males (%)	Females (%)
More than once a month	2	12
Once a month	8	33
Once every few months	10	14
Once or twice a year	31	20
Less than once a year	22	9
Only once	27	12
N=166		

for less than one month. Only 6% stayed for more than one year, the longest reported stay being 5.5 years. In general, women stay for much shorter periods in South Africa than men (Table 2.7). Almost two thirds of the females stayed for less than two weeks, compared with only one third of the males. Almost 90% of the females returned to Zimbabwe within one month. In contrast, a little over two fifths of the males stayed for over one month. At the other end of the scale, almost 9% of the males who had been to South Africa said that they had stayed an average of one year or more during the past five years.

Length of Stay	Males (%)	Females (%)
Up to 2 weeks	33	62
3 to 4 weeks	24	25
1 to 3 months	14	6
3 to 6 months	3	1
6 months to 1 year	17	3
More than 1 year	9	3
N=174		

Those respondents who said that they had been to South Africa were asked how they had got there on their most recent visit. Public transport was the most frequently used mode of transport by both males and females, notably buses, trains and “combis” (i.e., 10-15 seater minibuses) (Table 2.8). However, there seems to be a difference between males and females in terms of the preferred modes of public transport. Choice of transport mode for females appeared more restricted than for males, with two thirds of the women using either buses or trains. Males on the other hand, used a wider range of transport, including on foot (21%), by private car (10%) and by plane (7%).

Mode	Males (%)	Females (%)
Bus	37	32
Train	12	35
“Combi”	12	23
On foot	21	5
Private car	10	4
Plane	7	1
Bus/train and on foot	2	0
N=200		

Overall, public transport by bus, train and “combi” was used by 72% of the travellers. Those are the preferred modes of transport by low-income groups because of the lower fares. Expanding cross-border transport services are regulated by the state in both countries to some extent through the granting of permits and the requirement for some form of passenger insurance cover. They also operate from known points within urban areas, and they pass through official border crossing points. Most of the respondents would have passed through Beitbridge (Zimbabwe) and Messina (South Africa), the only official direct crossing point for overland travellers between the two countries.

From the viewpoint of the immigration and border control authorities, it is those who walked part of or the entire journey from their areas of origin into South Africa who would be cause for concern (the “on foot” category in Table 2.8). Most of the respondents in this category were males. Twenty-one percent of them said they went on foot while another 2% used either bus or train for part of their journey and then walked across the border. Five percent of the female respondents said that they had also walked across the border. The data does not reveal whether these people used legal crossing points or not when they crossed the border on foot. During 1996 immigration authorities of the two countries agreed to open two informal crossing points in addition to Beitbridge, one west and the other east of the town. The two crossing points were intended to facilitate the movement of rural people and farmworkers living in districts along the border. Under the visiting system, temporary permits valid for up to 21 days are issued even to non-passport holders, allowing the permit holder to travel up to 50 kilometres on the other side of the border. Most of the people who use the informal crossing points are visiting relatives on the other side. Others are going to work as labourers on commercial farms in South Africa’s Northern Province under a local system involving the issue of temporary work permits at the border.⁴⁷ Sixty-one percent of the respondents who had walked across the border came from the two districts of Beitbridge and Chiredzi which are adjacent to the Limpopo River. The other eleven also came mostly from districts in the south of the country, notably Chipinge, Gwanda and Zaka, suggesting that at least some of this pedestrian traffic was authorized.

Monitoring of press and police reports over the past few years supports the finding in this survey that it is mostly males who cross the border in this way and that it reaches its peak around December-January. This is the time when those Zimbabweans staying “illegally” in South Africa want to come home for Christmas and go back after New Year.⁴⁸ Tragically, this is also the time when the Limpopo River may be running high, resulting in some of these “border-jumpers” being drowned or

attacked by crocodiles, with such incidents being widely reported in the press.

2.6 WHY DO THEY GO TO SOUTH AFRICA?

Asked about the purpose of their most recent visit to South Africa, the most frequently cited reason by the majority of the female respondents (65%) was shopping or to sell and buy goods for importation into Zimbabwe (Table 2.9). Visiting family or friends was the only other noteworthy reason for travelling to South Africa, given by 16% of the female respondents. These two factors alone accounted for 81% of the responses from females. It has already been noted that the majority of women stayed in South Africa for up to two weeks only at a time. This gender difference is in keeping with the primary reason for travel, namely informal trading. A fortnight provides sufficient time for them to dispose of whatever wares they have brought with them, and then purchase those goods they want to take back to Zimbabwe. The results also confirm a public perception in both countries that it is mostly women who engage in informal cross-border trading.

In contrast, although informal trading was also the principal reason given by the male respondents (32%), those who had gone to South Africa either to look for work or to work were well represented as well (Table 2.9). Reasons pertaining to work in South Africa were given by 41% of the male respondents, compared with only 4% of the females. A potential permanent or semi-permanent migration stream, legal or otherwise, would only come from these two work-related categories. All the other reasons given in Table 2.9 for the most recent visit represent short-term circulatory transborder movements, primarily for small-scale informal trading, or for family and other personal reasons.

Purpose of Visit	Males (%)	Females (%)
Shopping/buying and selling goods	32	65
Work	20	3
Look for work	21	1
Visit family/friends	11	16
Business	8	8
Holiday	3	4
Medical treatment	2	1
School/college/university	3	1
N=191		

2.7 CONCLUSION

It is clear from the results presented in this study that the typical Zimbabwean man/woman who has been going to South Africa during the past few years does not fit the public stereotype that has been portrayed in that country. She/he is typically a middle-aged family person who uses cross-border migration as one strategy for the survival of her/his family, particularly where this is an urban household. The majority of these people are engaged in purpose-specific circulatory migration in which they are only spending very short periods of time in South Africa.

These findings raise the question of what policy alternatives South Africa should adopt in the future, alternatives that range from a draconian policy that seeks greater closure of national boundaries (rigidly enforcing controls and expulsion and running contrary to the SADC proposal for greater freedom of movement for people within the region), to a humane option that takes cognisance of the issues raised in this chapter and seeks to facilitate better living conditions in the home countries of the migrants. This latter option will not take away South Africa's right to deal effectively with undocumented immigrants who cross national boundaries "illegally" or overstay and break the conditions of their original entry permits regarding employment. The point has been made elsewhere that "it is important to distinguish between short-term, purpose-oriented cross-border migration of the sort described by most respondents in this research, and long-term permanent immigration", making it possible to regularize those short-term cross-border migrants who might otherwise be forced to use illegal means of getting into and/or staying in South Africa.⁴⁹ It is also important to recognize that any new (im)migration policy should be framed in a manner consistent with South Africa's current and future role within the region, and include related issues such as the quest for balanced regional trade and development between SADC member countries, and regional economic integration.

Finally, this chapter has attempted to contribute towards a better understanding of the population geography of Zimbabwe by profiling the persons that have been involved in cross-border movements between this country and South Africa. More research is clearly needed in this area. For instance, it has been suggested that the majority of those who travel to South Africa are going to sell and buy goods for subsequent resale back home. But we do not as yet know the significance of this trade to the economies of the two countries. We do not know, for example, the benefits, if any, of this trade to South Africa in terms of export earnings over and above those reported in the standard

national accounts statistics, or the extent of the benefits to Zimbabwe in terms of the social support that the affected households get from such trade which would otherwise be borne by the state. Another issue that requires further investigation is the extent to which cross-border trade is contributing towards the economic empowerment of women and reducing their dependence on the wage incomes of their spouses.

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CHAPTER THREE

ZIMBABWEAN ATTITUDES TO IMMIGRANTS, MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

DAN TEVERA

3.1 INTRODUCTION

Previous SAMP surveys have documented the hostile attitudes of the South African population towards foreign citizens in the country.⁵⁰ The question which SAMP has recently tried to address is whether these attitudes are confined to South Africa or occur across the region at large. This is an important exercise. The increasingly globalising economies of Southern Africa are inevitably becoming more interdependent resulting in increasing flows of people within the sub-region. Policy-makers and human rights groups need to know how these movements will be received by citizens, what happens to their own citizens when they move to other countries in the region, and what public education strategies are necessary to educate the public against xenophobia and about the values of freer movement.

This chapter presents the findings of the SAMP National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS) conducted in Zimbabwe in mid-2001. The chapter begins by outlining the research methodology and proceeds to give an overview of international migration patterns into Zimbabwe. The results of the survey are then presented and appropriate policy recommendations made.

3.2 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

A total of 738 questionnaires were administered in three major urban centres of Zimbabwe, namely Harare, Bulawayo and Gweru. The bulk of these interviews (449) were conducted in Harare, the capital city. Two hundred and thirty nine questionnaires were administered in Bulawayo and 50 in Gweru. The total number of respondents in each city was decided on the basis of the populations of the cities based on the results of the Zimbabwe 1992 census.

To determine the number of questionnaire interviews that would be conducted in each of the cities as well as the actual selection procedure

of respondents within the cities, each town was initially divided according to its residential density. These residential areas served as primary sampling units (PSUs) from which the surveyed suburbs were randomly selected. Stratified random sampling was used to select the suburbs which were surveyed. Once the suburbs were identified, systematic sampling was used to select the households where every 5th house was interviewed. About 60% of the respondents in Harare were drawn from the high-density residential suburbs of Mbare and Glen View. The other residential suburbs from which the respondents were drawn included Sunningdale, Vainona/Borrowdale, Mount Pleasant and the Avenues. The same sampling procedure was used in Bulawayo where the following suburbs were selected for the interviews: North End, Queens Park East and West, Pelandaba, Makokoba and Mzilikazi. In Gweru the respondents were drawn from Mkoba and Riverside. One person was interviewed in each target household and the respondents were alternated on the basis of age and gender.

A two-day workshop was held for the training of undergraduate student interviewers at the University of Zimbabwe. The interviewers were organised into three groups and were assigned to different suburbs in the three cities. However, the interviewers experienced problems particularly in the high-income areas where the residents were reluctant to be interviewed and quite often were unwilling to open their electric gates. There were also problems in interviewing members of the white community who were reluctant to respond to the questionnaire at a time when the political climate was so charged.

3.3 PROFILE OF THE SAMPLE

In order to determine whether Zimbabwean attitudes vary by race, gender, age, socio-economic status or travel experience, it is first necessary to provide a profile of the sample population.

RACIAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE

Four major racial groups were included in the sample, namely, Blacks/Africans; Whites/Europeans; Coloureds and Indians/Asians. Table 3.1 shows the population distribution of Zimbabwe by ethnicity according to the results of the 1992 census.⁵¹ The majority of the country's population (98.8%) is black. Europeans comprise the second largest group (0.8%) followed by those of mixed colour (0.3%) and Asiatic origin (0.1%). This distribution was taken into consideration in sample selection.

Ethnic Group	Total Number	Percentage
African	10,284,345	98.77
European	82,797	0.80
Asiatic	13,386	0.13
Mixed	30,063	0.29
NS	1,957	0.02
Total	10,412,548	100.00

Source: Central Statistical Office

The majority of the survey respondents (94.1%) were black, 3.8% were coloured, 1.9% were white, while 0.1% belonged to other races (Table 3.2). There is also a good gender balance in the distribution of the respondents, with 53.6% of the respondents being male, and 46.4%

Race	Percentage
White	1.9
Black	94.1
Coloured	3.8
Other	0.1
N=735	
Sex	Percentage
Male	53.6
Female	46.4
N=715	
Age	Percentage
16-24	36.8
25-34	27.7
35-49	23.0
Above 50	12.5
N=736	
Highest educational level	Percentage
None	2.3
Grades 1-7	10.4
Forms 1-6	68.4
Post-Graduate/Diplomas	18.9
N=734	

Note: Percentages may not add up to 100 in this and subsequent tables due to rounding.

female. The sampling procedure produced a youthful sample, with 36.8% of the respondents aged below 25 years and 27.7% of the respondents aged between 25 and 34. Twenty-three percent of the respondents were between 35 and 49, while only 12.5% of the respondents were over 50 years. About 88% of the respondents were therefore aged between 16 and 50, which represents the working population. Only 2.3% of the respondents reported not having received any formal education, while 10.4% had not managed to go beyond primary school. As many as 68.4% of the respondents had received secondary school education, while 18.9% had diplomas and degree qualifications. This probably reflects the great strides that Zimbabwe has made in making education available to most of its citizens.

The household incomes of the respondents varied, with 28.4% earning less than Z\$5,000 which is way below the poverty datum line (Table 3.3). Another, 22.2% earn between Z\$5,001 and Z\$10,000 which is also below the poverty datum line for a family of four. A notable proportion (21.6%) of the sample earn between Z\$10,001 and Z\$20,000 while 27.8% earn more than Z\$20,000 per month. This reflects the skewed income distribution in the country's urban centres where only a few individuals have higher earnings and the majority are poor.

About 38% of the respondents have formal jobs and 18.5% engage

Table 3.3: Economic Profile	
Income	Percentage
Less than Z\$5,000	28.4
Z\$5,001-Z\$10,000	22.2
Z\$10,001-Z\$20,000	21.6
Above Z\$20,000	27.8
N=676	
Work Status	Percentage
Formal employment	38.3
Informal employment	18.5
Unemployed – looking for work	15.5
Unemployed – not looking for work	27.7
N=736	
Class	Percentage
Poor	46.8
Working class	18.8
Middle class	29.0
Upper middle class	5.3
N=713	

in informal sector activities. Furthermore, 43.2% of the respondents were unemployed (with 27.7% looking for work). The relatively low level of formal employment could be attributed to the effects of the country's economic crisis. This has increased the number of people engaged in the informal sector as a way of cushioning themselves against the negative effects of economic shrinkage.

A considerable proportion of the respondents viewed themselves as being poor (46.8%), while another 18.8% simply described themselves as being in the working class. Twenty-nine percent of the respondents viewed themselves as middle class while only 5.3% considered themselves upper middle class.

The dominant language among the respondents was Shona, spoken by 67.4% of the respondents at home, whilst 22.2% of the respondents spoke Ndebele (Table 3.4). Ndebele is mostly spoken in the southern and western parts of the country while Shona is spoken by the majority of the country's population.

Table 3.4: Linguistic Composition and Religious Affiliation	
Language	Percentage
Shona	67.4
Ndebele	22.2
English	8.4
Kalanga	0.6
Tonga/Shangaan	0.4
Venda	0.3
Afrikaans	0.1
Zulu	0.1
Xhosa	0.1
Tswana	0.1
Other	0.1
N=725	
Primary religious affiliation	Percentage
Christian	70.1
Christian Independent	14.1
Traditional	11.0
Atheist	2.1
Other	1.9
Muslim	0.1
Hindu	0.1
N=730	

PREVIOUS MIGRATION EXPERIENCE

It is generally assumed that people who have travelled and lived outside their home country are more likely to be accommodating towards foreigners than those who have not. About 56% of the respondents had never travelled outside Zimbabwe, 28.2% had done so, while 16% had lived outside Zimbabwe at some point in their life.

Table 3.5 shows that South Africa (20%) was the most popular destination followed by Botswana (14.6%), Zambia (8.5%) and Europe and America (5%). Geographical proximity explains this pattern as very few people can afford to travel to destinations outside the region. The most popular destinations are the countries that Zimbabweans generally have strong trade ties with.

Country	Frequency	Percent
South Africa	220	20.0
Botswana	160	14.6
Zambia	93	8.5
Mozambique	60	5.5
Europe and North America	58	5.3
Malawi	36	3.3
Namibia	15	1.4
Africa (outside Southern Africa)	12	1.1
Angola	10	0.9
Swaziland	10	0.9
Lesotho	7	0.6
Asia, India and China	7	0.6
Never travelled outside home country	411	37.7
Total	1,099	100.0

Total is total response since the question is multiple choice.

Only 18.9% of the respondents had lived outside Zimbabwe for more than six months (Table 3.6). The most popular countries included South Africa (6.7%), Botswana (2.8%), Zambia (2.4%) and Europe and North America (4%). The majority had been to these countries as migrant workers or refugees.

ECONOMIC PERCEPTIONS

Information was sought from respondents regarding their perceptions of present economic conditions in Zimbabwe and their opinions about the

Country	Frequency	Percent
South Africa	50	6.7
Namibia	2	0.3
Botswana	21	2.8
Mozambique	7	0.9
Malawi	5	0.7
Zambia	18	2.4
Swaziland	3	0.4
Lesotho	1	0.1
Africa (outside Southern Africa)	2	0.3
Europe and North America	30	4.0
Asia, India and China	2	0.3
Never	606	81.1
Total	747	100.0
Total is total response since question is multiple choice.		

future. This is because low-income groups are often perceived as being more xenophobic and hostile towards migrants since they view them as competitors in the job market.

The majority of the respondents were clearly not satisfied with their personal economic conditions; 82.4% being dissatisfied or very dissatisfied (Table 3.7). These sentiments are probably a reflection of the present

Opinion about present personal economic condition	Percentage
Very satisfied	1.4
Satisfied	9.5
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	6.8
Dissatisfied	35.0
Very dissatisfied	47.4
N=737	
Opinion about personal economic condition in one year's time	Percentage
Much better	3.5
Better	17.2
Same	10.8
Worse	28.8
Much worse	39.7
N=715	

economic situation in the country which is characterised by high inflation (in excess of 50%), the high cost of living and low remuneration given to workers.

The respondents were pessimistic about their future personal economic conditions. Nearly 70 percent of the respondents anticipate that these would be worse or much worse in a year's time. Most of the respondents therefore do not foresee an immediate end to the current economic crisis in the country.

Table 3.8 shows that there is widespread dissatisfaction with current economic conditions in the country, with 92% being dissatisfied or very dissatisfied (Table 3.8). The respondents were also gloomy about future general economic conditions. Nearly 80% of respondents expect economic conditions to be worse or much worse in a year.

Table 3.8: Satisfaction with Economic Conditions in Zimbabwe	
Satisfaction with present economic conditions in Zimbabwe	Percentage
Very satisfied	0.8
Satisfied	2.7
Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied	4.5
Dissatisfied	33.8
Very dissatisfied	58.2
N=734	
Expectation of economic conditions in Zimbabwe (in one year)	Percentage
Much better	1.8
Better	10.1
Same	9.9
Worse	28.3
Much worse	49.9
N=720	

PERSONAL IDENTITY

Race, class, language and religion are important variables in defining the identity of socio-economic and cultural groups. They may also impact on the treatment of outsiders. Hence, respondents were asked to indicate the importance of these four variables to the way they view themselves. Over 60 percent see race, language and religion as being important or very important to the way they see themselves (Table 3.9), with religion the strongest marker of identity (73.5% important/very important).

The vast majority of respondents also considered being

	Race	Class	Language	Religion
Very important	38.0	16.9	38.8	49.7
Important	23.5	24.4	29.8	23.8
Neutral	16.2	22.6	14.2	11.1
Not important	17.7	27.2	13.9	11.0
Very unimportant	4.6	8.9	3.3	4.3
	N=722	N=717	N=725	N=718

“Zimbabwean” as an important part of their personal identity. Table 3.10 shows that 70% of the respondents strongly felt that their nationality constituted an important part of the way they viewed themselves, with only 13% finding it unimportant. Similar numbers wanted their children to think of themselves as Zimbabwean. These results show that there is still a strong sense of Zimbabwean identity.

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
Being Zimbabwean is an important part of how you see yourself	46.3	34.1	6.8	10.1	2.7
You want your children to think of themselves as Zimbabwean	46.9	34.6	7.7	9.2	1.6
It makes you proud to be a Zimbabwean	48.6	26.4	8.6	11.3	5.1

Only 39.1% of the respondents considered being black as essential or important in the definition of Zimbabwean identity (Table 3.11). Similar proportions saw speaking an African language and loyalty to Africa as important determinants of Zimbabwean identity. Many more (66.6%) considered it essential or important to have been born in Zimbabwe in order for someone to be considered Zimbabwean. There was also a consensus that it is essential or important to have one’s parents and grandparents born in Zimbabwe (60.6% and 56.1%).

The respondents were also asked about dual citizenship. The constitution of Zimbabwe does not allow dual citizenship but the survey showed that 53.8% of the respondents do not regard it important/essential that Zimbabweans renounce other citizenship claims.

The respondents were then asked whether support of the Zimbabwean constitution is essential. The majority of the respondents

	Essential	Important	Not very important	Not at all important
Being black	19.2	19.9	30.3	30.7
Speaking an African language	14.6	26.4	34.9	24.1
Owing your ultimate loyalty to Africa	24.8	37.2	21.6	16.4
Being born in Zimbabwe	32.9	33.7	20.5	12.9
Having parents who were born in Zimbabwe	28.0	32.6	23.9	15.5
Having grandparents who were born in Zimbabwe	29.9	26.2	26.5	17.5
Speaking a Zimbabwean language	27.3	31.1	25.1	16.6
Being willing to fight in a war for Zimbabwe	24.4	25.1	20.2	30.3
Supporting non-racialism	33.3	34.6	16.8	15.4
Being willing to give up citizenship in any other country	20.8	25.4	25.9	27.9
Supporting the Zimbabwean Constitution	31.1	30.8	18.0	20.1
Working and contributing to the Zimbabwean economy	52.3	30.2	7.1	10.5

(61.9%) saw this an essential or important part of being a Zimbabwean. Noteworthy, though, were the remaining 38.1% who do not believe that it is important for true Zimbabweans to support the constitution.

The respondents demonstrated a strong feeling of belonging to the Zimbabwean nation. They are proud to be Zimbabwean (78.8% agree/strongly agree) and view their nationality as an important part of their identity (81.7% agree/strongly agree). They would also want their children to see themselves as Zimbabweans (83.8% agree/strongly agree) and feel strong ties with people who call themselves Zimbabwean (77.1% agree/strongly agree). The respondents have a strong desire to create a unified Zimbabwean state (81.9% agree/strongly agree) and believe it is possible to create such a state (71.6% agree/strongly agree). An overwhelming majority of the respondents (92.5%) are of the opinion that all people in the country should work together towards national development (Table 3.12).

Most of the respondents said they enjoy interacting with different people (90% agree/strongly agree) (Table 3.13). They also indicated that they do not dislike meeting new people (84.3% disagree/strongly disagree) and they believe that exposure to different cultures enriches one's life (72.1% agree/strongly agree). While the majority would not easily trust a person from a different culture they could generally accept these people into their societies (69.6% agree/strongly agree).

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
It makes you proud to be a Zimbabwean	49.0	29.8	9.6	7.1	4.5
Being a Zimbabwean is an important part of how you see yourself	48.2	33.5	7.9	7.4	3.0
You would want your children to see themselves as Zimbabweans	50.4	33.4	8.4	5.8	2.1
Do you feel strong ties with people who call themselves Zimbabweans?	36.2	40.9	11.9	8.2	2.8
It is desirable to create one unified Zimbabwean nation	43.5	38.4	8.2	7.6	1.3
It is possible to create such a unified Zimbabwean nation	35.4	36.2	12.0	12.1	4.3
People should realise that we are all Zimbabweans	59.3	33.2	3.6	2.3	1.6

	Strongly agree	Agree	Neither agree nor disagree	Disagree	Strongly disagree
You enjoy interacting with people who are different from you	42.8	47.2	3.3	5.5	1.2
You dislike meeting new people	4.9	7.3	5.4	53.6	28.7
Exposure to different cultures enriches one's life	30.0	42.1	11.4	10.6	6.0
It is easy to trust a person from a different culture	10.0	18.0	18.0	33.7	20.5
You can usually accept people from other cultures	21.1	48.5	11.9	10.9	7.6

3.4 INTERACTION WITH MIGRANTS

WHY MIGRANTS COME TO ZIMBABWE

Zimbabwean perceptions of why migrants come to Zimbabwe include both push factors in country of origin and pull factors in Zimbabwe (Table 3.14). Most migrants are seen as visiting Zimbabwe on holiday or social reasons (23%), to escape political conditions in their countries (10.6%) and because economic conditions are perceived to be better in Zimbabwe (10.3%) and/or worse at home (7.3%). Other significant

responses included a better quality of life in Zimbabwe (9.3%) and hunger/famine in the migrant's home country (8.2%).

Table 3.14: Perceived Reasons Why People from Other Countries Come to Zimbabwe

	Frequency	Percent
Visit, holiday, meet people	531	23.0
Political conditions in foreigner's home country	246	10.6
Better economy here	239	10.3
Better health care etc. and quality of life here	215	9.3
Hunger/famine in foreigner's home country	189	8.2
Better environment/population conditions here	172	7.4
Worse/bad economy in foreigner's home country	168	7.3
Worse/bad environment in foreigner's home country	151	6.5
To develop our country	128	5.5
Move here permanently/to immigrate	116	5.0
Political conditions here	79	3.4
To commit crimes/cause trouble	71	3.1
Other	5	0.2
Total	2,310	100.0
<i>Total is total response since the question is multiple choice</i>		

ACCEPTANCE OF MIGRANTS

Migrants have generally been welcomed into Zimbabwe in the past but their foreign identity is emphasized by the various names coined to describe them. For example, Malawians are called *mabhurandaya* (a term meaning those from Blantyre, once the capital city of Malawi), *MaNyasaland* (a term derived from Nyasaland, the former name of Malawi) and *Mabwidi* (a derogatory term). Mozambicans are commonly referred to as *Moskens* - a corruption of the term Mozambicans.

Does the nationality of migrants affect the degree of acceptance? The research findings show that migrants from the rest of Africa are slightly more acceptable to Zimbabweans than those from other continents (Table 3.15). Migrants from Southern Africa enjoy marginally greater acceptance than those from other parts of Africa.

CONTACT WITH MIGRANTS AND VISITORS

The research findings reveal that urban Zimbabweans have frequent contact with foreign citizens. Table 3.16 shows that they have the greatest level of contact with people from South Africa (with 77.2% reporting

	Yes		No	
	No.	%	No.	%
Europe and North America	414	58.1	299	41.9
Other countries in southern Africa	486	68.2	227	31.8
Other parts of Africa	460	64.3	255	35.7
Asia	395	55.5	317	44.5

some or a great deal of contact). Contact with non-citizens from the rest of Africa and from outside Africa was much lower but by no means insignificant.

	Great deal		Some		Hardly at all		None	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%	No.	#
People from other countries in North America and Europe	101	14.0	261	36.1	89	12.3	272	37.6
People from southern African countries	122	17.0	326	45.3	61	8.5	210	29.2
People from other countries in Africa	96	13.4	303	42.1	79	11.0	241	33.5
People from Asia	77	10.7	216	30.1	107	14.9	318	44.3
People from South Africa	206	28.4	354	48.8	42	5.8	124	17.1

The research showed that the nature of contact with foreigners varies (Table 3.17). Economic contact was most significant, primarily buying and selling goods, probably in connection with the tourism and retail industries. Economic interaction is also important in the workplace. Social interaction, particularly friendship, is also relatively significant. Unlike South Africans, therefore, Zimbabweans have much more personal interaction with foreigners in the country.

On the whole, the respondents view their interactions with foreigners positively. Table 3.18 shows that as many as 73% of the respondents found their interactions with foreigners from Europe and North America to be positive/very positive. The equivalent figure was 80.6% for foreigners from other countries in Southern Africa; 72.4% for foreigners from other parts of Africa; 67% for foreigners from Asia and 82.9% for foreigners from South Africa. Generally, therefore, respondents felt that they had benefited more from their interactions with foreigners from Africa than those from elsewhere.

Table 3.17: Type of Personal Contact with Migrants (%)					
	North America/ Europe	Southern Africa	Other parts of Africa	Asia	South Africa
Work for/ with them	23.4	16.2	16.8	16.4	13.1
Live next to them	11.3	17.0	12.4	7.9	16.8
Are friends with them	23.9	26.0	24.8	15.0	26.1
Children go to school with them	10.7	9.3	9.9	9.2	7.1
Buy things from, or sell things to them	28.2	30.2	34.8	51.1	34.0
Other	1.5	0.6	1.3	—	0.5
Relatives/ Family	0.9	0.7	0.1	0.4	2.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N=786	N=906	N=710	N=532	N=1,150
<i>Total is total response since the question is multiple choice</i>					

Table 3.18: Interactions with Migrants (%)					
	North America/ Europe	Southern Africa	Other parts of Africa	Asia	South Africa
Very positive	18.6	14.8	12.9	11.5	24.5
Positive	54.4	65.8	59.5	55.5	58.4
Neither positive nor negative	15.0	13.9	20.5	19.5	11.1
Negative	7.7	4.2	5.3	8.9	4.7
Very negative	4.1	1.3	1.8	4.6	1.2
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	N=413	N=474	N=435	N=348	N=575

3.5 STEREOTYPES OF MIGRANTS

PERCEIVED NUMBERS

The respondents consistently overestimated the numbers of foreign nationals in the country. For example, they estimated the median proportion to be 25% of the total population (Table 3.19). Younger Zimbabweans tended to overestimate to a greater extent than their elders. There were also significant variations in the estimates by level of income. Respondents who earned low incomes estimated the population of foreigners to be higher. However, the differences were not large with all age and income groups tending to exaggerate the numbers.

The respondents believe, quite correctly, that most migrants living in the country are from Southern African countries. They also estimated on average that 30% had entered the country illegally. Here the estimates varied significantly with a number of parameters. Firstly, those with less education believed the numbers to be higher. Second, there was a significant gender difference. Males estimated that undocumented migrants constitute 34.4% of all migrants in the country, while females estimated the proportion to be 40.8%. Third, the estimates varied slightly by the level of income of the respondents. Respondents who earned below ZW\$5,000 believed the proportion to be 37% as opposed to 34% for those earning more than ZW\$20,001. Fourth, the estimate of the proportion of undocumented migrants in the country varied with the travel history of the respondents. Respondents who have never travelled out of the country thought the proportion was slightly higher than those who had (39% v 35%).

The respondents believe that 40% are in the country temporarily, 30% intend to remain permanently and 20% are refugees. Those with no formal education believed that as many as 47% intended to remain permanently while respondents with post-graduate degree/diplomas estimated the proportion at 35%. Furthermore, respondents in formal employment estimated the proportion at 40.4%, while the unemployed estimated it at 43.5%.

The estimates of the proportion of refugees amongst all foreign

	Frequency	Mean	Median
Share of people living in this country who are:			
Nationals	645	73.2	75.0
Foreign	645	26.8	25.0
Share of foreign nationals coming from:			
Southern Africa	581	49.9	50.0
The rest of Africa	581	18.1	15.0
Europe/North America	581	18.1	15.0
Asia/Pacific	581	14.0	10.0
Proportion of foreign nationals who are:			
Here legally	603	62.7	70.0
Here illegally	603	37.3	30.0
Share:			
Who intend to remain permanently	537	34.4	30.0
Who intend to remain temporarily	537	42.7	40.0
Who are refugees	537	22.9	20.0

nationals in the country also varied by income and level of education. Poor respondents estimated the proportion of refugees to be 24.5%, while respondents in the upper middle/upper class estimated this proportion at 17.2%.

Nearly half of the respondents believed that less than 20% of the foreigners in the country are genuine refugees (Table 3.20). Zimbabweans therefore feel that the majority of refugees resident in the country are, in fact, economic migrants. This finding is crucial as it helps in predicting the treatment of refugees by the local population.

Percentage of refugees	Frequency	Percentage of Respondents
10-20	305	47.4
30-40	127	19.7
50-60	87	13.5
70-80	82	12.7
90-100	43	6.7
Total	644	100.0

ECONOMIC COMPETITION

Migrants have been accused of stealing jobs from local people. The respondents were therefore asked whether they had heard of anyone being denied a job in favour of a foreign migrant. A sizable 69% had no personal knowledge of any Zimbabwean being denied a job that went to a foreign national (Table 3.21). An even higher 79% did not personally know anyone who had been denied a job and more than 90% said they themselves had never been denied a job because it went to a foreigner.

COMMON STEREOTYPES

The respondents were asked to consider a list of impacts which are sometimes associated with foreign migrants. They ranked these impacts on a scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 meant none of them do this while 10 meant all of them do this (Table 3.22). The majority of the respondents believed that migrants from the region send earnings out of Zimbabwe (mean 6.7). They also thought that migrants bring diseases to Zimbabwe (6.3) and that they use Zimbabwean welfare services (5.9). They were also accused of committing crimes in Zimbabwe (5.6) and taking jobs from Zimbabweans (5.4), contradicting their limited knowledge of this ever happening. (Most of these respondents were unemployed (5.9), have not received any form of formal education (7.2) and

Table 3.21: Competition on the Job Market		
	Frequency	Percent
Ever heard of anyone who has been denied a job because it went to a foreign national?		
More than once	127	18.6
Once	83	12.2
Never	472	69.2
Total	682	100.0
Personally know someone who has been denied a job because it went to a foreign national?		
More than once	68	10.2
Once	73	10.9
Never	528	78.9
Total	669	100.0
Been denied a job because it went to a foreign national?		
More than once	33	4.7
Once	33	4.7
Never	634	90.6
Total	700	100.0

their incomes are below ZW\$5 000 (5.7).) However, the respondents also commented positively on the contributions of foreign migrants to the economy, including bringing in needed skills (5.8) and creating jobs in Zimbabwe (5.4).

Table 3.22: Southern Africans Who Are Presently Living in Zimbabwe		
	Frequency	Mean
Take jobs from Zimbabweans	733	5.4
Commit crimes in Zimbabwe	731	5.6
Send earnings out of Zimbabwe	732	6.7
Use Zimbabwe's welfare services	727	5.9
Bring diseases to Zimbabwe	728	6.3
Create jobs for Zimbabweans	733	5.4
Bring skills needed by Zimbabwe	734	5.8
<i>Scale: "0" means none of them do this and "10" means all of them do this.</i>		

ACTION AGAINST MIGRANTS

Respondents were asked to indicate whether they would take action if they become aware of the presence of someone illegally in the country. Sixty two percent indicated that they would do nothing while 26.8% indicated that they would report them to the police, 4.9% to the local

community association and 2.2% to their employers (Table 3.23). Only 1.7% of the respondents said they would get people together to force them to leave while 1.4% of the respondents said they would use violence to do so. These figures suggest quite high levels of tolerance of foreign migrants, even those illegally in the country.

	Frequency	Mean
Nothing	479	62.0
Report them to the police	207	26.8
Report them to community association	38	4.9
Report them to employer	17	2.2
Get people together to force them to leave	13	1.7
Use violence	11	1.4
Other	5	0.6
Talk and advise	3	0.4
Total	773	100.0
<i>Total is total response since the question is multiple choice.</i>		

This was confirmed by responses to a related series of questions. Firstly, as many as 73.6% of the respondents indicated that it was unlikely/very unlikely that they would take any action to prevent other Southern Africans moving to their neighbourhood (Table 3.24). Furthermore, 77% had no objection to them operating a business in their area and 77.3% indicated that they would not take any action to prevent them from becoming co-workers.

	Very likely	Likely	Unlikely	Very Unlikely
Moving into your neighbourhood	7.4	19.1	43.3	30.3
Operating a business in your area	7.4	15.6	41.7	35.3
Sitting in the same classroom as your children	6.4	13.7	40.2	39.7
Becoming one of your co-workers	6.4	16.4	40.0	37.3

3.6 IMMIGRATION POLICY ATTITUDES

TYPES OF IMMIGRANTS

The research findings show that most Zimbabweans do favour a tightly

controlled immigration policy (Table 3.25). As many as 68.9% said the government should place strict limits on the number of foreign citizens who can enter Zimbabwe. When probed further, they revealed a preference for people with scarce skills and those who could create jobs. Only 12.3% were in favour of an open door policy allowing anyone into the country. On the other hand, only 4.2% wanted the government to prohibit people from entering Zimbabwe altogether (compared to 25% in South Africa).

Government should:	Frequency	Mean
Let anyone into the country who wants to enter	86	12.3
Let people into the country as long as they are jobs	102	14.6
Strictly limit the number of foreigners who can enter Zimbabwe	480	68.9
Prohibit people from entering Zimbabwe	29	4.2
Total	697	100.0

The majority would prefer it if migrants came temporarily and then returned home (65.9% support/strongly support) although support for permanent settlement was not insignificant (Table 3.26). Opposition to permanent residency varied with the level of education of the respondents, with the more educated respondents supporting the policy. Likewise, the poor, the unemployed and those who have never travelled outside the country expressed strong opposition to the granting of permanent residence to foreigner nationals.

Most Zimbabweans also clearly favour an immigration policy tied to the creation of economic value. An overwhelming majority (94.6%) would support a policy which encouraged immigration of people who would invest and create jobs. Again, nearly 90% would support a skills-based policy where immigrants who had skills not possessed by locals should be given preference.

The respondents were also asked to indicate their views about foreign migrants living legally in the country. Fifty-seven percent of the respondents said they would support or strongly support a policy making it easier for families of contract workers to come and live in Zimbabwe (Table 3.26). The majority of these respondents had post-graduate/diplomas, were upper middle/upper class and had lived outside the country. However, there was no general consensus among the respondents on whether contract workers should qualify for permanent residence after completing their contracts with 43.5% in favour and 44.4% opposed. Respondents in favour had high levels of education, high incomes and were employed.

The respondents would also support/strongly support a policy to make it easier for traders and hawkers from other Southern African countries to sell and buy things in the country (80.6%). The poor and females were particularly supportive of such an initiative. Nearly 79% of the respondents would support a policy making it easier for people from other Southern African countries to start small businesses in the country.

	Strongly support	Support	Neither support nor oppose	Oppose	Strongly oppose
Making it easier for families of contract workers to come and live in Zimbabwe	12.3	44.8	11.6	18.5	12.8
Making it easier for contract workers to qualify for permanent residency after the completion of their contracts	7.7	35.8	12.1	23.8	20.6
Making it easier for people from Southern African countries to sell and buy things in this country i.e. hawkers and traders	31.0	49.6	9.9	6.3	3.2
Making it easier for people from Southern African countries to start small businesses in this country	38.9	39.6	10.0	8.0	3.4

	Strongly support	Support	Neither support nor oppose	Oppose	Strongly oppose
Who want to come here legally to work as permanent residents, and possibly become citizens	13.5	37.0	12.5	23.3	13.6
Who want to come legally to work for a specific period and then return home	20.8	45.1	13.0	13.8	7.3
From North America and Europe	14.6	33.8	22.3	18.0	11.4
From Southern African countries	12.4	41.9	26.6	13.1	6.0
From other African countries	13.4	40.9	26.3	13.7	5.6
With skills not possessed by Zimbabweans	58.4	30.6	7.0	2.5	1.5
Who will invest money in the Zimbabwean economy and create jobs	73.7	20.9	3.2	0.8	1.5

UNAUTHORIZED MIGRATION

While Zimbabweans therefore have a very positive outlook on legal immigration, they still want government to control unauthorized entry (Table 3.28). A considerable proportion of the respondents (48.1%) said they would support/strongly support border electrification to control the flow of unauthorized migrants. Most who supported that policy were young (16-24 years) with low incomes (ZW\$1,000-5,000). About 43% of the respondents said they would oppose/strongly oppose such a move.

About half of the respondents (51.2%) would oppose a policy of allocating more money from the national budget to border protection. Most of these earn low incomes. While 62.6% thought the army should be used to patrol the borders, a massive 77.6% rejected any increase in their tax levels to cover the expenses of increased border patrols. Again, opposition was greatest amongst the poor and those earning low incomes.

Again indicative of the hostile climate, 67.8% of the respondents would support a policy requiring foreigners to carry identification documents with them at all times and 74.3% wanted the police to have the right to detain suspected “illegal immigrants”. Not surprisingly, 59% of the respondents supported the imposition of penalties on businesses or persons who employ “illegal immigrants”. Whites were less supportive of such a policy. The picture that emerges from this analysis is that most Zimbabweans do not welcome undocumented migrants and would like

	Strongly support	Support	Neither support nor oppose	Oppose	Strongly oppose
Turning on the electric fence at the border	23.5	24.6	9.2	21.8	20.9
Allocating more money from the national budget to border protection	12.7	27.7	8.4	29.1	22.1
Using the army to patrol Zimbabwe's borders	21.6	41.0	8.7	15.0	13.8
Increasing taxes to cover the expense of increased patrols	5.1	9.6	7.6	28.2	49.4
Requiring foreigners to carry identification with them at all times	25.6	42.2	16.5	9.0	6.8
Giving police the right to detain suspected “illegal immigrants”	34.0	44.3	10.1	6.6	5.0
Penalising businesses or persons who employ “illegal immigrants”	29.6	29.4	16.6	14.5	9.9

the government to adopt strict measures to limit the inflow into the country. However, they do not favour measures which draw state resources from elsewhere.

The majority of the respondents (79%) indicated that they would oppose a blanket deportation policy (Table 3.29). However, 46.4% would support the deportation of foreigners who do not contribute to the economy compared to 41.8% who would oppose such a move. Support of the policy came from those who have never left the country, who earn low salaries, have received little or no formal education and are in the 16-24 age group. The vast majority (90.1%) would support a policy of deportation of all foreigner nationals who have committed crimes. Additionally, 78.4% of the respondents would support the deportation of all undocumented migrants from the country. Poor and unemployed respondents were most strongly in favour of deportation. Given this, it is perhaps surprising that 43.4% would support the government offering amnesty to people in the country illegally.

	Strongly support	Support	Neither support nor oppose	Oppose	Strongly oppose
Deporting all foreign workers even if they are here legally	6.0	8.1	7.0	44.0	35.0
Deporting all who do not contribute to the economy	21.7	24.7	11.9	26.9	14.9
Deporting all who have committed crimes	68.3	21.8	2.9	3.4	3.7
Deporting all who live here without permission	54.6	23.8	9.8	8.3	3.4
Offering amnesty to people who are here illegally	16.6	26.8	21.9	18.4	16.3

THE BRAIN DRAIN

Two pertinent issues that were also raised in the research related to the emigration of skilled personnel from the country and the problem of people taking resources out of the country. The respondents had indicated that they would support the government if it were to allow in people who had capital to invest in the country. A follow-up question related to the repatriation of profits and other resources. About half of the respondents (49.8%) opposed the imposition of measures which would make it more difficult to send money out of the country compared to 42.2% who supported such a move (Table 3.30). Neither did they

want to see the imposition of measures which would make it more difficult for skilled workers to leave the country (58.4% oppose/strongly oppose). The government has recently proposed that community service be mandatory for those who want to register at tertiary institutions of learning. About half of the respondents opposed the policy. Almost 80% of the respondents supported the use of tax incentives to encourage people to stay.

Table 3.30: Attitudes Towards the Brain Drain (%)

	Strongly support	Support	Neither support nor oppose	Oppose	Strongly oppose
Make it more difficult to send money out of the country	16.0	26.2	8.1	33.5	16.3
Limit the amount of capital one can send out of Zimbabwe	20.3	28.9	9.5	26.9	14.9
Make it more difficult for skilled people to leave	11.8	22.4	7.4	36.4	22.0
Make community service mandatory for completion of degrees	13.3	25.6	10.6	29.7	20.9
Make community service mandatory for state bursaries	16.4	34.1	10.8	21.1	17.7
Offer tax incentives to those who remain	44.6	33.3	10.1	6.5	5.4

3.7 REFUGEE POLICY ATTITUDES

A series of questions were asked about government refugee policy. There was a general consensus that people who are being persecuted in their countries deserve protection (79.8% support/strongly support). However, there was also general agreement (62.1%) that it is impossible to determine whether someone is a refugee or not.

Zimbabweans are accommodating towards refugees and would support giving asylum to people escaping war and persecution in their home countries (Table 3.31). They expressed reservations about increasing the number of refugees who enter Zimbabwe (85.5% oppose/strongly oppose) and rejected granting permanent residence to refugees who have been in the country for more than 5 years (72.6% oppose/strongly oppose). The majority would like to see refugees sent back to their home countries (90% support/strongly support) when the situation in their home country stabilises. They would also prefer that refugees stay in special camps (67.1% support/strongly support) but were not supportive of

the government using money from the Zimbabwean budget to shelter refugees (55.5% oppose/strongly oppose).

	Strongly support	Support	Neither support nor oppose	Oppose	Strongly oppose
Giving asylum to people escaping war and persecution	24.0	52.2	8.2	9.8	5.8
Increasing the number of refugees who enter Zimbabwe	2.9	9.0	12.7	41.5	34.0
Granting permanent residence to refugees (5 years and above)	4.0	11.4	12.0	37.9	34.7
Sending refugees back to their own countries	49.7	40.3	3.6	3.7	2.7
Requiring all refugees to live in special camps	27.1	40.0	16.5	10.2	6.2
Using money from the Zimbabwean budget to shelter the refugees	9.9	21.3	13.3	22.3	33.2

3.8 RIGHTS FOR MIGRANTS AND REFUGEES

The respondents were asked a series of questions on rights for foreign nationals while in Zimbabwe. Firstly, they were asked to indicate who should have the right to say what they wanted (for instance criticising the government). Most felt that this right should always be granted to citizens of the country (80.9%), but not to temporary workers/visitors (50.3%), refugees (64.5%) and “illegal immigrants” (82.9%) (Table 3.32). The responses certainly indicate that Zimbabweans feel that outsiders should not interfere in the day to day running of the government and the internal affairs of the country, which they consider as the sole privilege of the citizens of the country. Secondly, the majority (97.3%) felt that the right to vote in Zimbabwean elections should only be given to the country’s citizens. Thirdly, they felt that the right to legal protection, such as not being detained without a trial, or having a lawyer when one goes to court should always be provided to Zimbabwean citizens (93.4%) as well as temporary workers/visitors (56.3%) and refugees (48.9%). Fourthly, the right to be protected by the police, to be free from illegal searches and having one’s property protected should always be given to Zimbabwean citizens (95.5%) as well as temporary workers/visitors (66.7%) and refugees (59.6%). However, nearly half (50.4%) felt that this right should also be granted to undocumented migrants.

Finally, they felt that the right to social services, such as education, health and water, should be granted to Zimbabwean citizens, as well as temporary workers/visitors (70.2%) and refugees (67.2%). Interestingly, nearly 40% felt that undocumented migrants should also enjoy full access.

		Should always be granted	Depends on circumstances	Never be granted
The right to say what you want, for instance, criticise the government and society	Citizens	80.9	14.2	4.9
	Temporary workers/visitors	15.8	33.9	50.3
	Refugees	10.0	25.5	64.5
	Illegal immigrants	5.8	11.3	82.9
The right to vote in Zimbabwean elections	Citizens	97.3	2.0	0.7
	Temporary workers/visitors	7.1	20.8	72.1
	Refugees	4.8	14.9	80.4
	Illegal immigrants	3.9	5.7	90.4
The right to legal protection, such as not being detained without a trial, or having a lawyer if you go to court	Citizens	93.4	5.7	0.9
	Temporary workers/visitors	56.3	30.3	13.3
	Refugees	48.9	30.8	20.3
	Illegal immigrants	31.5	18.1	50.4
The right to be protected by the police, to be free from illegal searches, and to have your property protected	Citizens	95.5	4.1	0.4
	Temporary workers/visitors	66.7	24.5	8.8
	Refugees	59.6	26.9	13.5
	Illegal immigrants	31.5	18.1	50.4
The right to social services such as education, housing, health care and water	Citizens	98.6	1.1	0.3
	Temporary workers/visitors	70.2	20.7	9.1
	Refugees	67.2	20.4	12.4
	Illegal immigrants	36.8	16.7	46.5

3.9 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

The report has attempted to document the attitudes of Zimbabweans towards foreign migrants in the country. The survey findings show that Zimbabweans believe that the central criterion for Zimbabwean identity is not colour or language but being born in Zimbabwe. Zimbabweans are generally accepting of people from other African countries and feel they have benefited from their interactions with them. Yet they feel that non-citizens should not vote in elections and criticising the government should be the sole privilege of Zimbabweans. However, they do agree that foreign migrants, including “illegal immigrants”, have the right to police and legal protection.

Given this scenario, it is important to ask how xenophobic Zimbabweans are. The situation in Zimbabwe is certainly not as serious as that in other countries.⁵² Zimbabweans are not likely to engage in violence even when they become aware of the presence of foreign migrants who are illegal. Firstly, it has to be noted that Zimbabweans are wary of unauthorized migrants and want them to be kept out of the country. However, they are against the use of any measures which draw resources from the government budget. Second, they are divided on the permanent settlement of contract workers. The farmers in the northern and eastern parts of the country are allowed to engage contract workers especially from Mozambique. Many respondents would like to see the contract workers going back to their home countries after the expiry of their contracts. Third, they are in favour of immigrants who possess scarce skills or have capital to start business ventures which will help develop the country. Fourth, with regard to refugee policies, they support government granting protection to those fleeing political persecution in their home country. However, the respondents would like to see them housed in special camps prior to repatriation to their home countries once the situation becomes tenable. Fifth, they are unlikely to engage in violent confrontations with foreign migrants, as the majority of them reported that they would do nothing or would simply report unauthorized migrants to the police. However, there are various stereotypes associated with foreigners including the widespread belief that they use local welfare services and bring diseases to the country.

An important theme that also emerges from the research is the rights of foreign migrants. When migrants cross borders, they do so as bearers of human rights. The portable nature of these rights implies that all states are obliged by international law to protect them. A considerable number of respondents in the survey showed ignorance of the rights of foreigners.

The survey showed that Zimbabweans are not well informed about

the numbers of foreign migrants currently working in the country. Such ignorance forms the basis of fears that lower-income and uneducated respondents expressed towards foreign nationals who they view as job stealers or being responsible for committing crimes in the country. The contribution of foreign migrants to economic development has also been highlighted in the research. Whilst the fears that were expressed by the respondents regarding “illegal immigrants” are well-founded, there is need for a co-ordinated immigration policy which ensures that certain sectors which rely on immigrant labour (such as the agricultural sector) are not affected.

Finally, the Zimbabwean public needs to be educated about the contribution of foreign migrants towards the economic development of the country. The survey has documented the role they play in the economic development of the country. It is also important to educate the public in this increasingly globalising world that society is becoming more cosmopolitan and dynamic. It is hoped that this research will contribute to that goal.

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