


THE MILITARY AND DEMOCRATISATION IN INDONESIA:
THE DEVELOPING CIVIL-MILITARY DISCOURSE
DURING THE LATE SOEHARTO ERA

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I hereby declare that this thesis is my own work and has not been submitted for any other degree in the same or other form to any other university.



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~ CONTENTS ~

Abstract	page	vi
Acknowledgments		vii
Glossary & Abbreviations		ix
Chapter 1		
Introduction		1
Setting Puzzles	3	
Thesis Structure	4	
Chapter 2		
The <i>Dwifungsi</i> Debate in the Late New Order Polity: Political Power and Democratic Movement		7
Military Domination and Regime Contradictions before <i>Keterbukaan</i>		8
<i>Keterbukaan</i> and <i>Dwifungsi</i>	13	
Breaking Old Taboos	17	
Back-to-Basics and Professionalism	20	
ABRI Representation in the DPR	25	
Golkar-ABRI Relations Revisited	31	
The July 27 Riot and Red-Purge	44	
Reflections of the PDI Affair in the <i>Dwifungsi</i> Debate	48	
The 1997 General Elections: <i>Dwifungsi</i> as 'Destabilisor' and the End of New Order Corporatism	54	
The 1998 MPR Sessions and Declining Cohesion within the Military		57
Conclusion	64	
Chapter 3		
<i>Dwifungsi</i> as Military Role Belief: Doctrinal Evolution and Interpretative Adaptation		67
Laying the Doctrinal Foundations, 1966-1982	68	
Infusing the Concept of Professionalism	80	

Back-to-Basics and the Awakening of Corporate Interests	89
Seskoad Officers' Search for <i>Dwifungsi's</i> New Paradigm	95
The 1996 Army Seminar: Designing <i>Dwifungsi</i> for Democratisation	106
Conclusion	112
Chapter 4	
Confronting a New Political Paradigm: Human Rights Accountability	115
Shooting Civilians and the Security Approach	115
Dialogue with Komnas HAM	126
Formulating Human Rights Assessment within ABRI	136
Conclusion	140
Chapter 5	
The Hardline Military Ideology in the Age of Globalism: The Development of the <i>Kewaspadaan</i> Mind-Set	142
Tarpadnas and the Ideological Setting of Military <i>Kewaspadaan</i>	143
The Hardline Military Thinking on Globalisation	149
Transformation of Soeharto-ABRI Relations	153
<i>Kewaspadaan</i> Political Programs during the Final Years	156
The Loss of Military Cohesion and the Rise of Dissent	164
World View, Domestic Threat Perceptions and the Perceived Role of ABRI in the Age of Globalism	167
Chapter 6	
The Structure of <i>Dwifungsi</i> Discourse: Approaches, Arenas, and Non-Debate	173
Approaches of Delegitimation	174
Responses to Counter-Discourses	182
Anreas: Military Involvements in Legislatures	191
Territorial Management as Non-Debate	200
Conclusion	204
Chapter 7	
Comparative Implications: Doctrinal Change and Democratic Transition	206

The Formulation of DSN	207
The DSN and 'New' Professionalism	209
Variants of DSN Interpretation	214
The DSN and Antipolitics	216
Extrication Problem I: Approaches	221
Extrication Problem II: Analytical Questions	225
Extrication Problem III: Dilemmas of Incomplete Transition	230
Crafting Internal-External Doctrinal Transformations	235
ABRI and Civilians: Establishing the Procedure?	242
Chapter 8	
Conclusions	245
Answering Puzzles	245
Post-Soeharto Reflections	250
Appendixes	253
Bibliography	257

Abstract

Questions about the political role of the military in democratisation constitute a central theme in comparative politics of developing countries. Scholarship on Indonesian politics is no exception. It has focused on this problem particularly after the late 1980s when social demands for democratisation become increasingly assertive. How has the military responded to these new challenges threatening the dominant role of the military in politics during the last decade? This study aims to investigate this issue.

It analyses various dimensions of military adaptation to the new political circumstances. It focuses on five arenas of adaptation—political power, military doctrine, policy, ideology, and civil-military discourse—in order to elucidate military responses in a comprehensive way. The study also takes into account comparative perspectives, especially the case of the Latin American military in which officers developed a doctrine of political activism—like in Indonesia—to legitimise their "permanent" involvement in politics. Their response to democratic pressure provides a perspective in drawing a boundary between Indonesian particularities and common attributes of a political military.

The study argues that military adaptation cannot be explained by a simple linear continuum of negative-positive adaptations to democratic pressures, and also cannot be judged by looking at only one arena. Adaptation was in progress in all arenas above, albeit with differences in direction, pace and scope. Military responses were mixed, as certain military officers became reform-minded while others took hardline approaches in the face of democratic pressures. As the demand for change increased, initiatives of adaptation in doctrinal and discursive arenas were gradually taken by reform-minded officers who saw the need for reviewing the role of the military in order to ensure its institutional survival in society. However, this phenomenon—which was discernible in intra-military and civil-military discourses—was unable to overcome negative adaptation in other arenas. The primary reason for this lay with President Soeharto who attempted to strengthen control over top military leaders to preserve his political interests against growing demands for regime opening. It was these top officers who initiated negative adaptation in some arenas. The study details the development of such contradictory responses of the Indonesian military, and its reflections in the civil-military discourse on the political role of the military.

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J.H.

Glossary & Abbreviations

ABRI	<i>Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia</i> (Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia)
Akabri	<i>Akademi ABRI</i> (Military Academy)
AMD	<i>ABRI Masuk Desa</i> (ABRI in the village—civic mission program)
AMN	<i>Akademi Militer Nasional</i> (National Military Academy)
Asrenum	<i>Asisten Perencanaan Umum</i> (Assistant for General Planning to ABRI Commander)
Assospol Kassospol	<i>Asisten Sosial Politik Kassospol</i> (Assistant for Sociopolitical Affairs to Kassospol)
BAIS	<i>Badan Intelijen Strategis</i> (Strategic Intelligence Agency)
BAKIN	<i>Badan Kordinasi Intelijen Negara</i> (State Intelligence Coordination Agency)
Bakorstanas	<i>Badan Kordinasi Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional</i> (Coordinating Agency for the Maintenance of National Stability)
Balatkom	<i>Bahaya Laten Komunisme</i> (Danger of latent communism)
BIA	<i>Badan Intelijen ABRI</i> (ABRI Intelligence Agency)
CDEK	<i>Catur Dharma Eka Karma</i> (Four Missions, One Deed—ABRI's integral doctrine adopted in 1966)
Cilangkap	ABRI HQ is located in Cilangkap, East Jakarta.
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
DKM	<i>Dewan Kehormatan Militer</i> (Military Honour Council)
DKP	<i>Dewan Kehormatan Perwira</i> (Officers' Honour Council)
DSN	<i>Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional</i> (National Security Doctrine)
DPR	<i>Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat</i> (Parliament)
<i>Dwifungsi</i>	Dual Function—ABRI doctrine stipulating a dual role of defence and politics
F-ABRI	<i>Fraksi ABRI</i> (ABRI fraction in the parliament)
FKPPI	<i>Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia</i> (Communications Forum for Sons and Daughters of ABRI Veterans)
G30S/PKI	<i>Gerakan 30 September/PKI</i> (September 30th Movement—abortive 'communist coup' on 30 September 1965)
GBHN	<i>Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Nasional</i> (Broad Outlines of State Policy)
GDN	<i>Gerakan Disiplin Nasional</i> (National Discipline Movement)
Golkar	<i>Golongan Karya</i> (Functional Groups—the government party)
Hankam	<i>Pertahanan Keamanan</i> (Defence and Security— <i>Dwifungsi</i> 's first function)
Hankamnas	<i>Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional</i> (Doctrine of National Defence and Security)
ICMI	<i>Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia</i> (Association of Indonesian Muslim Intellectuals)
Kapuspen	<i>Kepala Pusat Penerangan</i> (Chief of ABRI's Information Centre)
Kassospol	<i>Kepala Staf Sosial Politik</i> (ABRI's Chief of Social and Political Affairs)

KBA	<i>Keluarga Besar ABRI</i> (ABRI's Big Family)
KBG	<i>Keluarga Besar Golkar</i> (Golkar Big Family)
KEEM	<i>Kecil tetapi Efisien, Efektif dan Modern</i> (Small but Efficient, Effective and Modern—ABRI's slogan of professionalism)
<i>Kekaryaan</i>	Sending ABRI personnel to non-military posts
<i>Ketahanan Nasional</i>	National Resilience—Indonesian national doctrine which encompasses security-political-social-economic fields of national development to maintain Indonesia's autonomy in international society
<i>Keterbukaan</i>	Political Openness
<i>Kewaspadaan</i>	Vigilance
Kodam	<i>Komando Daerah Militer</i> (Military Area Command)
Kodim	<i>Komando Distrik Militer</i> (Military District Command)
Komnas HAM	<i>Komisi Nasional untuk Hak Asasi Manusia</i> (National Human Rights Commission)
Kopassus	<i>Komando Pasukan Khusus</i> (Special Forces Command)
Kopkamtib	<i>Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban</i> (Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order)
Koramil	<i>Komando Rayon Militer</i> (Military Subdistrict Command)
Korem	<i>Komando Resort Militer</i> (Military Resort Command)
Kostrad	<i>Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat</i> (Army Strategic Reserve Command)
KSAD	<i>Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat</i> (Army Chief of Staff)
Lemhannas	<i>Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional</i> (National Resilience [or Defence] Institute)
LIPI	<i>Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Institute of Sciences)
LPSI	<i>Lembaga Pengkajian Strategis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Institute for Strategic Studies)
Menhankam	<i>Menteri Pertahanan Keamanan</i> (Minister of Defence and Security)
Menko Polkam	<i>Menteri Kordinator Politik dan Keamanan</i> (Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs)
MPR	<i>Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat</i> (People's Consultative Assembly)
NU	<i>Nahdlatul Ulama</i> (the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia)
OTB	Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk (Formless [Communist] Organisation)
Pancasila	The Indonesian national ideology consisting of five principles
Pangab	<i>Panglima ABRI</i> (Commander-in-Chief of ABRI)
Pangdam	<i>Panglima Kodam</i> (Kodam Commander)
PDI	<i>Partai Demokrasi Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Democratic Party)
<i>Pemadam Kebakaran</i>	Fire Brigade—argument saying that ABRI today has no independent mind to promote national interests and merely plays the repressive security role when ordered by the government
<i>Pembangunan</i>	Development
<i>Pendekatan Keamanan</i>	Security Approach
Pepabri	<i>Persatuan Purnawirawan ABRI</i> (Retired Soldiers' Association)
Petisi 50	Petition of 50 Group—an opposition group consisting of fifty members involving retired officers and civilians
PKI	<i>Partai Komunis Indonesia</i> (Indonesian Communist Party)
PPP	<i>Partai Persatuan Pembangunan</i> (United Development Party)
PRD	<i>Partai Rakyat Demokrasi</i> (People's Democratic Party)
<i>Rakyat</i>	the People

Seskoad	<i>Sekolah Staff dan Komando Angkatan Darat</i> (Army Staff and Command College)
Sesko ABRI	<i>Sekolah Staff dan Komando ABRI</i> (ABRI's Joint Staff and Command College)
SDM	<i>Sumber Daya Manusia</i> (Human Resources)
Sospol	<i>Sosial Politik</i> (Socio-political— <i>Dwifungsi</i> 's second function)
Tarpadnas	<i>Penataran Kewaspadaan Nasional</i> (National Vigilance Refresher Course)
TUÇ	<i>Tri Ubaya Çakti</i> (Three Sacred Vows—ABRI's doctrine first adopted in 1965 [revised in 1966])
<i>Tut wuri handayani</i>	A Javanese expression to describing how a father supports his young children from behind as they learn to walk.
UUD45	<i>Undang-Undang 1945</i> (the 1945 Constitution)
YKPK	<i>Yayasan Kerukunan Persaudaraan Kebangsaan</i> (the Foundation for National Brotherhood Harmony)

CHAPTER 1

Introduction

This is a study about the Indonesian military in politics during the last decade of Soeharto's authoritarian government (1988-1998). It is concerned with how the military—which had established the authoritarian polity—responded to the growing social demand for democratisation during this period.

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War in the late 1980s set the scene for challenges to right-wing authoritarian regimes in developing countries, which had legitimised their rule by insisting on the need for strong government both to defend the nation from the threat of communist subversion and to provide maximum political support—i.e. stability—for economic modernisation. Authoritarian polities in Latin America, Asia and Africa faced similar societal challenges to open up the political system, as the principle premises of authoritarianism were significantly undermined. Scholarship on third-world democratisation has spent the last decade examining the process in which authoritarian regimes are eroded by such pressures for change. One particular focus in this scholarly attempt is civil-military relations in democratisation; investigating the response of the military—a part of the authoritarian old guard—to the demands for political liberalisation and 'civilianisation.' This thesis attempts to contribute to this scholarly endeavour by examining the case of the Indonesian military under the late Soeharto regime.

Until his resignation in May 1998, Soeharto—who had replaced former President Sukarno in the chaotic political situation in the mid-1960s—dominated Indonesian politics for more than thirty years. With significant backing provided by the military, or ABRI, which justified its day-to-day political intervention in the name of securing political stability, General Soeharto established his authoritarian political system, named the New Order.¹ As the antithesis of Sukarno, who favoured

¹ The Indonesian military before the New Order consisted of three services—the army (TNI-AD), the navy (TNI-AL) and the air force (TNI-AU). When the Soeharto regime was launched in 1966, the police force was integrated into the military and the new four-service military forces were named as ABRI, an abbreviation of *Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia* (Armed Forces of Republic of Indonesia). In April 1999, under President Habibie, however, the police was again separated from the military, as a part of political reform in the post-Soeharto era. The name, ABRI, was also abolished and replaced with TNI, or *Tentara Nasional Indonesia*. In this study, which covers the Soeharto era, I use the term "ABRI" to refer to the military. I also

nationalist adventurism and radical mass mobilisation, the new system led by Soeharto claimed that economic modernisation was the key for prosperous national life and required political stability for its implementation. Based on this logic, ABRI formulated the doctrine of "dual function," or *dwifungsi*. This doctrine insists that, apart from its normal defence function, the Indonesian military has a sociopolitical mission to promote national development. This doctrine has legitimised the involvement of soldiers in non-military fields—legislature, bureaucracy, regional government, to name but a few—and also encouraged the repression of government critics. Three decades of New Order stability might not have been achieved without the military's political control being rationalised by the idea of *dwifungsi*. *Dwifungsi*—a euphemism for military surveillance of non-military affairs—has, however, been challenged as the rising middle class and a growing popular political movement have started to demand democratic reforms, including military withdrawal from politics. A segment of the government elite also began to see the need for promoting political deregulation in order to accelerate economic development in the era of the global economy. Moreover, since the end of the Cold War, international criticism of the military's abuse of human rights has increased. ABRI was therefore under strong pressure to diminish its political involvement since the late 1980s.² How did ABRI respond to these demands during the late New Order era, and what were the dynamics behind these responses? These are the core questions of this study.

In seeking to answer them, we examine the changing patterns of civil-military discourse concerning military involvement in political affairs. The 32 years of the Soeharto polity were authoritarian in essence; space for party politics was highly restricted by the government and regime critics were repeatedly repressed by the military. However, this does not mean that there was no change in the perceptions of civilian and military elites regarding the authoritarian practices of the regime, including military domination of politics. Ignoring this point not only prevent accurate understanding of everyday political life under the authoritarian rule but also leads us to simply conclude that the regime had been static since its foundation. Even if the fundamental regime structure seemed to remain unchanged, political actors' perceptions of regime practices may not be static. Only by investigating these aspects can provide a basis for analysing dynamic interactions of political tension, conflict and adaptation in the reproductive process of a political system. Under authoritarianism, regime maintenance involves continuous governmental efforts to (re)legitimise the system in the face of changing social circumstances that may undermine the regime's rationale. In the late New Order, this aspect was most clearly reflected in the enlarging public discourse on 'political openness;' a demand to democratise the political

use the term "military" as interchangeable with the army because of its dominant power among the four services and its inclination to speak as if it were ABRI during the New Order period.

² Consult Chapter 2 for references to the factors encouraging democratic demands.

structure. One core target of this movement was military involvement in politics under the doctrine of *dwifungsi*. The interaction of civilian and military elites on this issue is the focus of our analysis in this study.

Setting Puzzles

In pursuing the study, the following questions will be investigated:

- (1) How has the unintended political impact of economic development—such as the rise of the middle class, student movements and NGOs—contributed to the strengthening of critique of the regime? Why—and in what ways—did the criticism of *dwifungsi* develop in the public political arena during the final decade of the New Order?
- (2) How had *dwifungsi* been legitimised under the Soeharto polity, and in what ways has ABRI attempted to adjust its doctrinal interpretation to maintain its legitimacy in facing growing democratic pressures?
- (3) How had the political change (or new political paradigms) in the late New Order shrunk the room for the traditional *dwifungsi* practice institutionalised in the early period of the Soeharto polity, and in what ways has ABRI attempted to adapt—positively and negatively—*dwifungsi* practice to the changes in political environment?
- (4) How has civil-military communication regarding *dwifungsi* been structured—i.e. what approaches have been developed by critics to effectively delegitimise *dwifungsi* and what theories have been invented by military officers to counter the critical discourse? What were the discursive obstacles for constructing a viable dialogue among political elites regarding the future relevance of *dwifungsi*?
- (5) In what ways, should the *dwifungsi* problem be assessed in comparison with third-world militaries which had similarly developed their doctrines of political activism but finally been forced to abandon them after civilians took the control of the government? What are the lessons and implications of the experiences of these countries for the case of Indonesia?

These questions require indepth examination of officers' perceptions of both ABRI's role and the political environment. Here, we need to look at the discursive marketplace of *dwifungsi*-democratisation problems developed by the military officers. My study, which deals with this intra-military communication, is based primarily on the materials I have collected during fieldwork in Indonesia. They include internal

military documents, officers' writings, and my interviews with military and civilian elites.³

Thesis Structure

To examine the above questions, the thesis is organised in a thematic rather than a chronological way. Historical development is of course significant but my main focus is not on the historical outcome itself. Unlike studies which are primarily concerned with the description of the political process, my interest lies in clarifying the dynamics of institutional adaptation to the changing environment. This standpoint focuses on the entire process of how an institution perceives challenges arising from environmental change and how it attempts to survive by adapting institutional practices. Therefore, chapters are arranged to cover the arenas of adaptation, namely political power, military doctrine, policy, ideology, and discourse. Arguments in each chapter are intended to illustrate the development of such challenge-adaptation interaction. Indonesianists may be attracted by the details of developments within ABRI while comparativists may discover that certain Indonesian features are relevant to the study of civil-military relations in the third-world democratisation more generally.

The focus of Chapter 2 is on the development of the political power game. This chapter examines the politics of escalating *dwifungsi* criticism in society. Why did *dwifungsi* become a central topic of open critical debate in political society? How could such political space be expanded under the authoritarian New Order regime? As we will show, societal demands for democratisation were not sufficient open up of *dwifungsi* criticism. Several factors—both within the regime and society—contributed to the breaking of the taboo *dwifungsi* debate which had been in place during the first twenty years of the New Order.

The third chapter details ABRI's doctrinal adaptation during the New Order, especially after the demand for democratisation was intensified in the final decade. Doctrinal analysis is helpful to simultaneously examine individual officers' perceptions and the military's institutional political thinking.⁴ We will discuss how ABRI institutionalised its political activism by attempting to strengthen the legitimacy of *dwifungsi* doctrine, and how its legitimation has been adjusted and manipulated in order to maintain the relevance of *dwifungsi* in the changing society.

Chapter 4 examines policy adaptation. Among various practices in which ABRI has been involved, the shooting of civilians—or human rights violations—illustrates the

³ Interviews were conducted mostly in Jakarta during 1996-1998. Because of the sensitivity of the issues, some quotations from my interviews will be provided without identifying the name and the date.

⁴ See Chapter 7 for the utility of doctrinal analysis in current study of civil-military relations.

most militaristic face of *dwifungsi* which guides ABRI's primary mission to the conduct of internal security. We will examine how this issue, which had neither been discussed openly in society nor investigated transparently before, gradually became a legitimate issue in public debate since the late 1980s. The growing concern for human rights was encouraged by the changes in the international political system—i.e. the end of the Cold War and the subsequent trend toward respect for universal values. How did ABRI respond to such a new political paradigm under the New Order regime? We will discuss the civil-military struggle over the policy accountability concerning ABRI's human rights abuses, and the ways in which ABRI adapted its organisational procedures to incorporate human rights values.

Chapter 5, on the other hand, looks at ABRI's ideological development during the late Soeharto era, and particularly examines the adaptation of hardline military ideology in a way that justified the repression of popular democratic movements. Political society had insisted that, in the age of globalism, ABRI's permanent control of politics was irrelevant as the threat of communist subversion had disappeared. We seek the how and why of ABRI's reformulation of old vigilance ideology to rationalise military repression of the popular democratic movements which emerged since the late 1980s. We find the factors in the contexts of both Soeharto-ABRI relations and ABRI's institutional inertia.

Based on the analysis in the previous chapters, Chapter 6 attempts to clarify the structure of *dwifungsi* discourse developed among the New Order elites. Our focus is on elite criticism, rather than popular protest, as the popular demand for the elimination of *dwifungsi* was generally perceived by military officers as unacceptable, at best, and as a security disturbance, at worst. However, 'debate' on the *dwifungsi* problem continues between civilian elites and serving officers, and we will highlight the function of this political space—which is generally seen as too limited in the eyes of outer-regime activists—in undermining ABRI's claim for the permanency of *dwifungsi*. We analyse several systematic approaches employed by elite critics to delegitimise *dwifungsi* and ABRI's counter-theories against them. Exploring these discursive styles also leads us to assess the characteristics of intra-military communication on *dwifungsi* problems. In what ways have serving officers discussed the issues within their circles, and how are reformist views presented among them—if not aired in the public? Understanding the discursive structure may help us think about the problems of New Order civil-military dialogue and the future prospects for the construction of mutual trust between civilian and military elites.

Chapter 7 attempts to understand *dwifungsi* problems in a comparative context. We particularly look at the case of Latin America where various militaries also developed a doctrine of political activism—the so-called National Security Doctrine (DSN)—which played a significant role in the processes of military intervention in, and extrication from, politics. I point to significant similarities between

dwifungsi and DSN in terms of officers' role perception, doctrinal missions, political orientations, and modes of doctrinal legitimation. Various lessons and implications for the Indonesian military are thus derived from the Latin American experience, promoting our understanding of civil-military relations coloured by the military doctrine of political activism like *dwifungsi*.

Based on this examination, the concluding chapter provides answers to each question listed above. It also discusses the reflection of our arguments in the current transition to the post-Soeharto regime.

Throughout the thesis, we examine military responses to democratic pressures during the late Soeharto era by focusing on the role of the *dwifungsi* doctrine which became a central topic for civil-military debate during that time. The study also hopes to provide a basis for analysing post-Soeharto civil-military relations.

CHAPTER 2

The *Dwifungsi* Debate in the Late New Order Polity: Political Power and Democratic Movement

The debate about *dwifungsi* was a major element of New Order political discourse during the period of so-called *keterbukaan*—political openness—which started in the late 1980s. Intellectuals and regime critics took advantage of the opportunity that *keterbukaan* provided to discuss the question of ABRI's involvement in politics. In this chapter, we examine the growing scope and depth of *dwifungsi* criticism in society and attempt to show how political events in the last decade strengthened the political autonomy of critical discourse on *dwifungsi* under the authoritarian New Order polity.¹ To this end, this chapter chronologically investigates the pattern of interaction between the development of the *dwifungsi* debate and the process of political change—namely the political power struggle and emerging democratic movements.

We first provide an overview of the authoritarian model of the early New Order and describe the established practice of *dwifungsi* in order to assess the background of *keterbukaan*. Then, the process by which the demand for political opening gradually incorporated the *dwifungsi* issue is examined. It is generally understood that *keterbukaan* encouraged public criticism of *dwifungsi*. But, as we will show, it was not a simple co-evolution that linked societal demands for democratisation and criticism of *dwifungsi*. How has political space for the open *dwifungsi* criticism been produced, suppressed, and strengthened during the period of *keterbukaan*—and why? These are the working questions of this chronological chapter. In-depth contextual analysis of each major issue in the *dwifungsi* debate will be the focus of Chapter 6 which examines the discursive problems in a thematic way.

¹ By political autonomy of critical discourse, I refer to the viability of political 'space' available for critics to express regime criticism under the authoritarian system without being subjected to intervention by the regime administrators. Weak autonomy means that the space is not sustainable due to its dependence on external factors—such as inner-regime contestations. In this chapter, this concept is frequently employed to evaluate the strength of *dwifungsi* criticism as a democratic movement.

Military Domination and Regime Contradictions before *Keterbukaan*

The structure of military rule in Indonesia was established in the early period of the New Order.² The abortive coup in September 1965 resulted in the concentration of power in the hands of Maj-Gen Soeharto (the Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command, or Kostrad) who had led the army troops which crushed the coup attempt. Soeharto's military accused the communist party (PKI) of leading the coup and encouraged students and Muslims to join in the army-orchestrated anti-PKI campaign throughout the archipelago. Pressured by the military which claimed that the political order could not be restored under the current situation, President Sukarno finally authorised Soeharto to take any necessary measures to restore law and order in March 1966.³ The PKI, which had exercised considerable political influence under the Sukarno regime, was quickly eliminated. It was the military which had the dominant power in determining the direction of post-1965 Indonesian politics. Following the official transfer of the presidency from Sukarno to Soeharto in March 1968, Soeharto consolidated military rule by emphasising 'stability and order' as the necessary preconditions for economic recovery and development—that had long been sidelined by Sukarno in pursuing his anti-Western foreign policies.

Unlike the previous regime led by Sukarno who—as the leader of national independence—favoured populist mobilisation of political forces to consolidate national integration and pursue his radical domestic/foreign policies, Soeharto's Indonesia made economic modernisation the primary goal of the government in order to 'save' the nation from the disastrous economic situation during the final years of Sukarno. The military's political control was justified as necessary to safeguard national stability as the foundation for economic development and modernisation. It was against this background that the concept of *dwifungsi* was created by ABRI to legitimise its involvement in non-military affairs, which was seen as an embodiment of ABRI's 'historical mission' to protect national unity since the independence war.⁴ Since

² For an account of civil-military relations during the first decade of the New Order, see Crouch (1988).

³ Sukarno's 'instruction' to Soeharto was conveyed through a letter, dated 11 March, which was called Supersemar (Presidential Letter of 11 March). The letter authorised Soeharto to handle the political situation. However, Supersemar is still a controversial issue because of a suspicion that Sukarno wrote the letter under duress. Regardless of the truth, Soeharto banned the PKI on the day after the issue of the letter. PKI supporters became political prisoners, if they were arrested, or became the victims of military-supervised killing. The most commonly accepted estimate of the death toll was between 250,000 and 500,000 (Crouch 1988:155).

⁴ The Indonesian army had played a political role since the revolutionary war (1945-1949) against Dutch colonialism when the demarcation between political and military affairs was obscure. During this period, the army cultivated its self-image as the 'national guardian' which fought for "100 percent independence," contrary to civilian leaders who tended to negotiate with the Dutch to achieve partial independence. Although the military was not directly involved in the government during the parliamentary democracy period (1949-1958), it became one of the most powerful political forces during Sukarno's Guided Democracy period (1958-1965). But it was during the New Order that the military dominated the political process. Soeharto's military emphasised that its political control was inevitable as it had played the role of

Dwifungsi's primary goal in the New Order polity was the maintenance of national stability for economic development, several political programs were introduced to this end.

Political repression and ideological surveillance were the major tools of constructing and maintaining the New Order regime. Soon after the 1965 coup attempt, the army established a security agency, the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib)—headed by Soeharto himself—which conducted a wide range of internal security activities, including the ideological screening of party candidates and government employees, elimination of communist remnants, and suppression of campus and labour activists. With this 'military within the military' as the core of ABRI's repressive apparatus, everyday politico-ideological surveillance was institutionalised in the country's social life.⁵ Kopkamtib's activities were backed by the military area commands which controlled political life in each geographic territory.⁶ In remote areas of the archipelago—like Aceh, Irian Jaya, and East Timor (annexed in 1975)—security operations against separatist elements became standard practice which terrorised many local residents. In urban areas, military repression targeted the press, students, intellectuals, Islamic groups and labour and legal activists, who were often labelled as anti-Pancasila.⁷ Mass demonstrations were repeatedly repressed by security forces. The 1974 Malari Affair, the 1977-8 student movements and the 1984 Tanjung Priok incident were notable cases.⁸ In the name of establishing a stable

national guardian since independence, and that *dwifungsi* was the doctrinal reflection of such a military mind. We will examine the detailed process of *dwifungsi's* doctrinal formulation in Chapter 3.

⁵ Regarding Kopkamtib's techniques of surveillance, see Tanter (1990).

⁶ There are ten area commands (Kodams) in the ABRI structure and they control their responsible territories. See Appendix 1 for the territorial command map. Under each Kodam, there are several Korems (regional commands)—except Kodam Jaya/Jakarta—and each Korem supervises Koramils (district commands) in its own territory. This territorial system enabled ABRI's everyday control of political affairs throughout the archipelago.

⁷ Pancasila is a set of five principles declared by Sukarno in 1945 to oppose to the idea that Indonesia should be an Islamic nation. It consists of belief in God, humanitarianism, national unity, Indonesian democracy based on consultation and consensus, and social justice. The first principle refers to God rather than Allah, thus implying that the 'Pancasila state' guarantees Indonesia as a multi-religious nation. The fourth principle, however, can be exclusionary if the state identifies the opposition as not based on 'Indonesian democracy.'

⁸ In 1974, the largest street demonstration since the establishment of the New Order took place. Student activists opposed the government policy of introducing massive foreign investment, which they thought might undermine the opportunity for indigenous businesses and only benefit Chinese Indonesians who had close ties with Soeharto. Street demonstration in Jakarta (on 15 January) during the visit of Japanese Prime Minister, Kakuei Tanaka, led to a huge riot which was repressed by ABRI. This event was called the Malari Affair. See Crouch (1974) for details. The large student demonstrations in Jakarta during 1977-8 to oppose Soeharto's reelection in 1978 and demand the elimination of government corruption and ABRI's *dwifungsi* were also repressed by ABRI. After this incident, the government introduced the so-called Normalisation of Campus Life (NKK) which banned student political activities on campus and strengthened state control over the university administration. The Tanjung Priok incident occurred in September 1984 when security troops shot Muslim demonstrators and killed at least dozens of them in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta. Muslim groups believed that the repression was part of anti-Islam operations led by the Catholic ABRI Commander, General Benny Moerdani, and the death toll was several hundreds.

political system, ABRI relied on repressive political control with the doctrinal backup of *dwifungsi*.

Together with the repression of opposition, social participation in the formal political structure was tightly restricted. To ensure the regime's stability, the influence of the existing political parties was reduced drastically by establishing a governmental party, Golkar (Golongan Karya, or Functional Group), which all public servants were forced to join and support. Since the first New Order election in 1971, Golkar always held a large parliamentary majority, while other political parties were compelled to merge into two—the PPP (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, or United Development Party) consisting of the old Islamic parties, and the PDI (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia, or Indonesian Democratic Party) which integrated secure-nationalist and Christian parties.⁹ ABRI members were also 'appointed' to the parliament (DPR) where they sat as members of the ABRI "fraction" (F-ABRI) both at national and regional levels as part of the *dwifungsi* mission to ensure political stability in the legislative sector. ABRI members also penetrated non-military administrative bodies, occupying key positions from Department Ministers to village heads. Sending officers to non-military sectors, called *kekaryaan*, was justified as a necessary measure to secure the smooth implementation of the government's development projects and to overcome alleged civilian incompetence in handling government tasks.¹⁰ The implementation of *dwifungsi*—namely the backing for Golkar, *kekaryaan* penetration, and military representation in the parliament—tightly restricted political participation.

The development of the New Order regime was, however, not free from internal conflict. First, within the elite structure, the rivalries between officers frequently undermined the regime's cohesion. In the early 1970s, the antagonism between Maj-Gen Ali Moertopo, who had served Soeharto as his personal adviser since the 1950s, and General Soemitro who had led Kopkamtib culminated in the Malari Affair.¹¹ In the early 1980s, several prominent retired officers, including Gen (ret) A.H. Nasution, to whom the *dwifungsi* concept is often attributed, accused Soeharto and ABRI of

⁹ The history of New Order elections can be traced by consulting Crouch (1971), Liddle (1978), Suryadinata (1982), Silalahi (1988), and King (1994). No comprehensive analysis of the 1997 election has been published.

¹⁰ Regarding the *kekaryaan* practice, see MacDougall's (1982) (1986) empirical study. In 1971, for example, among higher central bureaucracy, 44 percent of cabinet members, 41 percent of Secretary Generals, and 73 percent of Inspector Generals were active-duty officers. Regional governments were also penetrated by military members. In 1977, 78 percent of provincial governors were army men, and more than half (155) of Indonesia's 294 *bupati* (regent) and mayors were ABRI men (Jenkins 1984:47).

¹¹ Soeharto had relied heavily on a group of personal advisors (Assistant Pribadi, or Aspri) for his early New Order policy-making, including the annexation of East Timor. Officers in Aspri, like Ali Moertopo and Maj-Gen Sudjono Humardhani, with their think-tank, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), provided enormous input to Soeharto. The dominant role of the Aspri was resented by many officers outside their circle, including Soemitro. Soemitro was said to be unhappy with the Aspri officers' business links to Chinese and foreign partners, and was sympathetic towards student demands in the Malari Affair. Soemitro was replaced just after the incident. Soemitro's suspicions of Ali Moertopo and CSIS are described in his biography (Ramadhan 1996:286, 307-311).

misleading the nation and established a critical group consisting of fifty members—including retired officers and civilian intellectuals—calling themselves Petisi 50 (Petition of 50).¹² Soeharto's inner circle of officers—such as Admiral Sudomo, Lt-Gen Yoga Sugomo and Maj-Gen Benny Moerdani—labelled these retired officers as *sakit hati* (sick at heart) generals.¹³

Intra-regime friction re-emerged in the late 1980s. From 1983 to 1988, Moerdani, as ABRI Commander (Pangab), consolidated his power base by establishing the Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS), subsuming the role of Pusintelstrat and many of the intelligence functions of Kopkamtib. Soeharto's reliance on Moerdani's hardline ABRI was significant for the strengthening of political controls during 1984-1985 in which the government forced all social organisations to accept Pancasila as their sole ideological basis in 1984 and imposed five political laws to further restrict political participation in 1985.¹⁴ Soeharto, however, began to find that he had become too dependent on ABRI and started to widen his power base by relying less on ABRI in non-security affairs. Under Soeharto's Fourth Development Cabinet (1983-1988), Sudharmono, the head of the state secretariat (Sekneg), was given increased presidential trust. Sekneg had authority over development allocations and allocated

¹² Petisi 50 was found in 1980 in response to Soeharto's speech at Pekanbaru which said that ABRI would continuously support Golkar in the next election in 1982. Petisi's members included Ali Sadikin, a retired navy admiral and the popular ex-Governor of Jakarta. They openly criticised Soeharto's arbitrary use of Pancasila as a tool of repressing anti-regime opinions, and demanded that ABRI, as the 'national' guardian, return to the 'original intention' of *dwifungsi*, which was—according to them—to be neutral in conducting its political mission and 'stand above all groups' in elections. Petisi 50 called for the 'purification of *dwifungsi*.' See Kelompok Kerja Petisi 50, *Melihat Kembali: Pernyataan Keprihatian—5 Mei 1980*, Seri Mencerdaskan Kehidupan Bangsa No.7, 1991. Nasution was a former Army Chief who declared in 1958 that the Indonesian military would take a middle way (*jalan tengah*) between the military rule and an apolitical role. This speech is said to be the origin of the concept of *dwifungsi*. For the emergence of the critical retired officers, see Jenkins (1984), especially pp.171-187 on Petisi 50 and ABRI's severe pressure on these retired officers since then.

¹³ All of these Soeharto loyalists served in intelligence-security sectors within ABRI. Sudomo had been running Kopkamtib after Soemitro since 1974, and had been deputy commander of ABRI since 1978. Yoga had been the head of the State Intelligence Coordination Agency (BAKIN) which was directly responsible to the President since 1974 and served as Kopkamtib Chief from 1978 to 1980. Moerdani was the head of the Strategic Intelligence Centre (Pusintelstrat)—ABRI's intelligence body—since 1977 and deputy head of BAKIN since early 1978.

¹⁴ The Pancasila project was resented by Muslim groups which could not accept the idea of placing Pancasila over Allah. It was a big blow for the PPP whose constituency was mainly in the Muslim population. ABRI led by Moerdani, a Catholic, was viewed by many Muslims as antagonistic to them. This suspicion was encouraged by the Tanjung Priok incident above. On the other hand, the 5 political laws concerned (1) general election, (2) composition of the DPR and the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR) (the nation's highest legislative body—consisting of all DPR members plus additional members appointed by the President—which meets once every five years to elect the president and vice-president), (3) political parties and Golkar, (4) referendum, and (5) social organisations. Among other things, the laws: (1) banned debate over Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (UUD45) during election campaigns, and limited discussion to issues related to national development; (2) decided to allocate 100 appointed seats (previously 75) for ABRI in the DPR, while the total number of the DPR rose to 500 (from 460) and 1000 (from 920) for the MPR; (3) determined Pancasila as the sole fundamental principle for parties and Golkar; (4) set several requirements which made it almost impossible to hold a referendum to revise the UUD45; and (5) authorised the government to dissolve any social organisation which disturbed law and order or promoted ideas contrary to Pancasila and UUD45 in whatever form.

much of it for the strengthening of the business activities of indigenous Indonesians, or *pribumi*, with the resulting decline of budget allocations to ABRI's business activities. Also, as the Golkar Chairman during 1983-1988, Sudharmono attempted to make Golkar more independent from ABRI, by recruiting new cadres from the ranks of business who might provide financial support for Golkar, which would in turn reduce ABRI's influence in Golkar administration.¹⁵ Against this background, Moerdani moved to block Soeharto's attempt to appoint Sudharmono as the vice-president in 1988, as seen in the 'interruption' of the MPR meeting by a F-ABRI member, Brig-Gen Ibrahim Saleh, who openly objected Sudharmono's vice-presidency.¹⁶ This move was not successful and exacerbated the cleavage between Soeharto and Moerdani. In this context, Soeharto's decision to abolish Kopkamtib in late 1988 was widely seen as his attempt to weaken ABRI's institutional power base. The period between 1988 and 1993 saw a deepening conflict between Moerdani's group and Soeharto's Palace circle now led by Sudharmono.¹⁷

Apart from elite contradictions, the New Order faced the need to accommodate historical and social change. Two decades of the Soeharto polity since the mid-1960s produced an environment which delegitimised authoritarian practices. First, the very 'success' of economic development had created a new middle-class layer which embraced critical intellectuals and legal activists who became the base of the critical sector in political society. Second, in the mid-1980s, Indonesia was required to implement a series of deregulation policies as its economy moved from resource-export and import-substitution to export-oriented industrialisation.¹⁸ This process inevitably demanded that Indonesia facilitate political transparency to attract more foreign investments for further economic growth. Third, it was ironic that Soeharto's 'successful' implementation of his political program in 1984-1985 undermined the rationale for prioritising 'security' in political life because it now seemed irrelevant to rely on the regime slogan of 'threat to Pancasila' in repressing political groups which had already accepted that philosophy. Finally, military officers who had participated in the independence war gradually reached their retirement age in the mid-1980s, and ABRI was inherited by post-revolutionary generation officers, like Try Sutrisno, who became Pangab in 1988. Since *dwifungsi* had been largely legitimised as ABRI's historical right to participate in national affairs arising from its role in the independence war, the change in generation inevitably raised a reasonable question in society about ABRI's continuous dominance in politics; why should the younger

¹⁵ About the rise of Sudharmono, see Pangaribuan (1995:58-59).

¹⁶ We will discuss ABRI's other tactics in the anti-Sudharmono campaign in Chapter 5.

¹⁷ Moerdani was replaced by his ally, Try Sutrisno (Army Chief), as Pangab but remained a powerful force as Minister of Defence and Security in the 1988-1993 Cabinet. About their cleavage with Soeharto, see Crouch (1992). It coloured the development of *keterbukaan* as we discuss in the following sections

¹⁸ For the political impact of this industrial transformation, see Robison's (1986) vivid work.

generation officers who did not participate in the independence war also enjoy the political 'privileges' given to the 1945-generation officers.

These social changes all contributed to the erosion of the legitimacy basis of New Order authoritarianism. Growing social demands for political democratisation resonated with the intra-elite conflict above and led to the genesis of *keterbukaan* in the late 1980s. How did the *keterbukaan* slogan evolve in political society, and how did it incorporate criticism of *dwifungsi* in its scope? We will scrutinise the first phase of the interaction between *keterbukaan* and the *dwifungsi* debate in the next section.

Keterbukaan and Dwifungsi

The *keterbukaan* era was sparked by a comment in May 1989 by the retiring US ambassador to Indonesia, Paul Wolfowitz, who said that Indonesia would need openness in politics commensurate with the success of economic openness and deregulation.¹⁹ Surprisingly, Wolfowitz's comment was quickly taken up by some members of the DPR from the ABRI and Golkar fractions who called on the DPR to discuss the need for political openness. They invited the outspoken former Kopkamtib Commander, General (ret) Soemitro, to a hearing of Commission II (Internal Affairs) of the DPR, led by Maj-Gen Samsuddin from F-ABRI, to talk about the openness idea on 21 June and again the following week.²⁰ This signalled that permissible political discourse now included regime criticism in public, creating a new and uncharted political space in the New Order polity, especially when Samsuddin said that he had not received a warning from ABRI Headquarters, implying a tolerant posture of the ABRI leadership towards this debate.²¹ It was widely believed that Defence Minister (Menhankam) Benny Moerdani and Pangab Try Sutrisno intended to use this new development in the DPR to put pressure on Soeharto, from whom they had become increasingly estranged. For the next few months, media coverage of *keterbukaan* dominated political discourse.

Initially the demand for political openness was not linked directly to the role of ABRI. Perhaps this was one reason why several officers contributed to the opening up of political space to discuss critical issues in the public. An indication of military thinking was revealed in December 1989, when the Army Chief of Staff (KSAD), General Edi Sudradjat, addressed the military academy (Akabri). Reflecting the new

¹⁹ "Paul Wolfowitz: Keterbukaan Politik Semakin Diperlukan," *Pelita*, 11 May 1989; "Keterbukaan Sama Dengan Stabilitas: Paul Wolfowitz Tidak Merasa Memuji Indonesia Berlebihan," *Suara Pembaruan*, 13 May 1989. On the development of *keterbukaan* in general, see Lane (1991) and Schwarz (1994).

²⁰ The invitation to Soemitro followed his well-circulated article published the previous month in the *Far Eastern Economic Review* (FEER), which openly insisted on the need for political reforms to end authoritarian practices. See his "Aspiring to Normal Politics," *FEER*, 6 April 1989. Maj-Gen Samsuddin was the Chairman of F-ABRI.

²¹ "DPR Akan Terus Bicarakan Keterbukaan dan Pembaruan," *Suara Pembaruan*, 2 July 1989.

mood of political debate, he emphasised that unilateral decisions imposed by the government on the public were becoming counter-productive, and argued that ABRI officers in the current context needed the ability to accommodate the exchange of views and to conduct a rational political debate.²² Two months later the *Jakarta Post* wrote in an editorial that "some of the DPR members thought General Sudradjat's statement represented a new policy line that had been agreed upon within the army."²³ As if emphasising ABRI's new policy line, an ABRI intellectual, Maj-Gen Z.A. Maulani, the Commander of the Kalimantan Military Command (Kodam VI/Tanjungpura), said that even debating *dwifungsi* was not taboo.²⁴ This approach was echoed by the Interior Minister (Mendagri) Gen (ret) Rudini who endorsed the initiative of F-ABRI in the ongoing political debate by saying "F-ABRI's vocal role is due to its commitment to the Constitution (UUD45) and ABRI's *dwifungsi*."²⁵ These comments were all viewed as messages indicating that ABRI was not against the escalation of 'regime' criticism.

The new trend was well reflected in a dialogue between top ABRI leaders and intellectuals in mid-May 1990.²⁶ In this two-day forum, both ABRI and the intellectual participants insisted on the need to give attention to the widening social gap between the rich and the poor. This consensus was well publicised in the media and seemed to confirm that reform-minded officers were now in leadership positions. From the perspective of the Soeharto-ABRI antagonism at that time, it was understandable that the Moerdani group tried to popularise the problem of the social gap (*kesenjangan sosial*) which implied that Soeharto's policy management should be criticised. Some commentators even regarded these officers as "intellectuals in uniform" whose perceptions were not so different from civilian intellectuals.²⁷ The dialogue aired two new ideas which resonated powerfully in the political society. First, that open civil-military communication could be institutionalised, and second, that the new 'intellectual' officers were revisionists regarding the country's political-economic life. It was only after this that the political marketplace was opened for a public debate about *dwifungsi*.

President Soeharto did not remain passive as the ABRI leaders encouraged public criticism directed at the regime. In early November 1990, Soeharto gave an

²² FEER, 18 January 1990. Edi Sudradjat was regarded as loyal to Benny Moerdani.

²³ "Dual Function Pep Talk," *Jakarta Post*, 12 February 1990.

²⁴ "Pangdam VI: Bicarakan Dwifungsi Tidak Tabu," *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 28 March 1990.

²⁵ "Kevokalan ABRI Karena Komitmen Pada Demokrasi," *Suara Karya*, 10 April 1990. Rudini served as Army Chief during 1983-1986 under Moerdani's period of ABRI Commander. In the Fifth Development Cabinet (1988-1993), Rudini was appointed as Mendagri.

²⁶ This dialogue had been held annually between the military leadership and intellectual figures since 1988. In the 1990 meeting, the ABRI side was represented by Try Sutrisno and Lt-Gen Harsudiono Hartas (Chief of ABRI's Social and Political Staff, or Kassospol). The intellectual figures were, among others, Christianto Wibisono (business consultant and columnist) and Kwik Kian Gie (a prominent economist affiliated with the PDI). Both were Chinese Indonesians and regarded as outspoken intellectuals. The meeting was covered by several newspapers but the names of other participants were not provided. Like Sutrisno, Hartas was a close ally of Moerdani.

²⁷ See "Dialog Pimpinan ABRI dan Cendekiawan," *Suara Pembaruan* 16 May 1990.

important speech in which he turned the spotlight onto ABRI. Receiving a visit from high-ranking officers following an ABRI Leadership Meeting (Rapim ABRI), he emphasised that ABRI's role in society should be *tut wuri handayani*.²⁸ Although ABRI repeatedly said that *tut wuri handayani* was not a new term because it was already part of ABRI's ethical codes, critics kept asking whether or not Soeharto wanted ABRI to 'return to the barracks' and to what extent ABRI was actually changing its current posture in line with the President's request. Since it was Soeharto, as President and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, who seemed to be implying a need to shift ABRI's posture, it inevitably gave critics some ammunition to question ABRI's implementation of *dwifungsi*. For them, whatever the interpretation of *tut wuri handayani*, it at least contained a suggestion that ABRI should somehow reduce its presence in the political arena. From the perspective of critics, Soeharto's statement allowed them to seek visible changes in the ABRI-dominated political structure. A place to legitimately argue about the *dwifungsi* problem was provided in the country's public political discourse.

The demand for ABRI to practise *tut wuri handayani* reflected Soeharto's strategy of relying more on civilian support. A month after his speech, Soeharto sponsored the formation of the Indonesian Association of Muslim Intellectuals (ICMI) in December 1990.²⁹ The ABRI leaders were very suspicious of ICMI partly because of their ideological concern that political mobilisation of Islamic forces could undermine the Pancasila-based state system, but mainly due to (1) a suspicion among Moerdani's circle that Soeharto was attempting to counterbalance ABRI by creating ICMI for the securing of his political power, and (2) their concern that the chairman of ICMI, Professor B.J. Habibie (Minister of Research and Technology), Soeharto's long-time associate, would consolidate his independent power base outside of military control and challenge ABRI in the presidential and vice-presidential elections in 1993. Soeharto's *tut wuri handayani* statement was followed by his overt rapprochement to Islam in 1991. Shortly after ICMI's establishment, President gave permission to Muslim school girls to wear the *jilbab* (religious veils) to classes. Then, in June, Soeharto himself made the pilgrimage to Mecca and became a *haji*, and in November, an Islamic bank—the Bank Muamalat—was established. In the eyes of the military leadership, led by Moerdani and Try Sutrisno, these actions were a clear indication that Soeharto no

²⁸ A Javanese expression to describing how a father supports his young children from behind as they learn to walk. This is one of three educational principles introduced by Ki Hadjar Dewantara who was the founder of *Taman Siswa*, an educational institution established in 1924. Together with *tut wuri handayani*, there are: *ing madya manguk karsa* which respectively means "to be a driving force of children when in their midst" and *ing ngarsa sung tuladha* which means "to lead from the front." These concepts constitute part of ABRI's 11 Leadership Principles (see Appendix 2). See, also, Soeharto's autobiography (1989:426) about his understanding of them.

²⁹ According to Hefner (1993:24), Try Sutrisno is said to have advised Soeharto to turn down the approval. About ABRI's negative response to the creation of ICMI, see Ramage (1995:132-149).

longer wanted to rely fully on them in securing his political power and was trying to find a base outside ABRI.

Soeharto's attempt to undermine the Moerdani-Sutrisno influence was also apparent after ABRI troops fired on thousands of demonstrators in Dili, East Timor, on 12 November 1991.³⁰ One day after the incident, Try Sutrisno condemned the demonstrators for causing chaos and claimed that the troops were forced to shoot when the mob attacked soldiers brutally. However, Soeharto—as ABRI's Supreme Commander—quickly decided to dismiss two officers, Brig-Gen Warouw and Maj-Gen Sintong Panjaitan, who, although not directly involved in the shooting, were considered formally responsible for violations taking place within their areas of command.³¹ It was the first time in the New Order period that general-ranking officers were held responsible for the shooting of civilians by their troops. In addition, soldiers directly involved in the shooting were court-martialled. Soeharto's measures were resented by many ABRI officers who believed that the shooting was proper. As a result, officers began to feel that Soeharto was not willing to protect ABRI's institutional interests.³² It was also noted that the two dismissed senior officers were both Christians and regarded as aligned with Moerdani.

The Dili incident was a perfect opportunity for political society to question the military's repressive behaviour. In the DPR's Commission I, this problem was quickly raised by the Interior Minister, Rudini, and Marzuki Darusman, an outspoken young Golkar parliamentarian. Rudini argued that ABRI's repressive approach could destroy political awareness in society. This comment by the Interior Minister was welcomed at the DPR meeting and Marzuki likewise stressed that it was time to end the repressive approach in conducting *dwifungsi*.³³ The comments by the reform-minded retired general and the Golkar member of parliament—who were both supporters of *keterbukaan*—showed that although ABRI had encouraged the move toward more political openness, the new atmosphere could also be used to criticise ABRI itself. Reacting to the new turn in the debate, Moerdani's Chief of Staff for Social and Political Affairs (Kassospol), Lt-Gen Harsudiono Hartas, insisted on the irrelevance of 'Western' human rights concepts applied in Indonesia where the cultural background was different.³⁴ The enlarging critical discourse continued to target ABRI as was

³⁰ The demonstration was planned to coincide with a visit of the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture. Marchers were shot as they approached the Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili. Human Rights Watch/Asia (1994:22) assessed the death toll as nearly 100, while Amnesty International (1994:50) estimated that the number was around 270, while the Indonesian official account was at least 50. For the international pressure over Indonesia's repression in East Timor, see, for example, Feith (1993).

³¹ Warouw was the Commander of East Timor Operations (Pangkolakops) and Sintong Panjaitan was Commander of Kodam IV/Udayana.

³² We will discuss this perception in detail in the next chapter.

³³ "Perlu Konsensus untuk Ubah Model Pendekatan Keamanan," *Pelita*, 10 December 1991. We will fully discuss the development of debate over ABRI's repressive approach—or so-called *pendekatan keamanan* (security approach)—and human rights perception in Chapter 4.

³⁴ "Hendaknya Kita Tak Terpengaruh Oleh Hak Asasi Versi Barat," *Suara Pembaruan*, 14 December 1991.

apparent in a conference held by the Indonesian Youth Forum (Forum Pemuda Indonesia) soon after the Dili incident. Despite the title of the conference, "ABRI's Regeneration and National-State-Social Life," media reports indicated concern about ABRI's repressive practice.³⁵ It seemed that, following his *tut wuri handayani* statement, Soeharto's decision to punish ABRI for the Dili case again gave an opportunity for political society to openly criticise *dwifungsi* and bring it up as a central issue for the *keterbukaan* movement.

Above all, the evolution of *keterbukaan* in the early stage (1989-1991) was largely a function of the deepening antagonism between Soeharto and Moerdani's ABRI. The weakening regime cohesion had effectively provided a space in political society to conduct critical debates under the slogan of *keterbukaan*. As long as criticism was considered to undermine Soeharto's political legitimacy, for example, the increasing gap between the rich and the poor, or more generally the regime's authoritarian structure, ABRI had allowed critics to express their views. On the other hand, Soeharto had played the leading role in bringing *dwifungsi* problems into the scope of *keterbukaan*. His attempt at marginalising Moerdani's ABRI was reflected in his statement about *tut wuri handayani* and decision to sack two generals in the Dili incident, which both contributed to the opening up of the *dwifungsi* question in the public as a legitimate theme in the current *keterbukaan* atmosphere. In this way, the early development of *keterbukaan* was principally a result of Soeharto-ABRI friction as each side encouraged public criticism of the other. This was the characteristic of this first phase of the *dwifungsi-keterbukaan* interaction.

Breaking Old Taboos

The Soeharto-ABRI antagonism was reflected in the June 1992 general election in which ABRI reduced its support to Golkar whose vote fell from 73 percent in 1987 to 68 percent. The ABRI leadership also 'tolerated' retired officers giving support to the PDI.³⁶ While ABRI's reduced commitment to Golkar was explained by ABRI leaders as the embodiment of *dwifungsi*'s ideal to perform as the 'national guardian'—who should be neutral towards all political parties—and its respect for parliamentary life, it was also an effective reminder to Soeharto that the established New Order political system could not be maintained without ABRI's active support.

³⁵ *Kompas*, in three related articles, noted that the conference was timely because of the Dili shooting (3 January 1992).

³⁶ Interview with Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib, former Chief of Staff of Defence Ministry (1973-75) and Ambassador to the United States, 9 August 1996. However, it certainly did not break ABRI's ties with Golkar, as many retired officers still became the Golkar candidates and several provincial leaders came from ABRI. Although Golkar obtained the majority votes in the 1992 election, what was prominent was the rise of the PDI which increased from 10 percent in 1987 to 14 percent in 1992. The PPP also increased its votes from 16 percent in 1987 to 17 percent in 1992. See Appendix 3 for the electoral result.

However, there was an unintended consequence. ABRI's appeal for 'neutrality' during the election encouraged political society to argue about the way to promote ABRI's neutrality in parliamentary life. In June, a vocal politician from the PPP, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, proposed that ABRI's dual function should be reviewed every five years in the parliament. The DPR's Commission II brought the ABRI issue up for internal discussion. On 8 July, a long-standing critic of the New Order, Arbi Sanit (a political scientist at the University of Indonesia [UI]), was invited to the commission's hearing. He argued that 100 ABRI members in the legislative body were too many, and asserted that, even without members of parliament, ABRI could still be a pressure group and thus maintain *dwifungsi*. Professor Miriam Budiardjo, also from UI, argued at the same hearing that the phased reduction in the number of ABRI members in the DPR would represent progress in the democratisation process.³⁷ Their statements were welcomed by the media at large, enabling them to broach a taboo political issue in the country's political discourse.³⁸

Military officers reacted negatively to these demands. Brig-Gen (Police) Roekmini, one of the reform-minded officers in F-ABRI, who had strongly supported *keterbukaan* in general, this time raised an objection. She stressed that debating *dwifungsi*, including ABRI's involvement in the DPR, was not relevant and not realistic. The Coordinating Minister for Political and Security Affairs (Menko Polkam), retired Admiral Sudomo, maintained that it was not impossible to reduce ABRI's seats in the DPR, but added that strong reasons and agreement among all four factions in the DPR would be needed first. In his view, if the purpose of the reduction was just to encourage democracy, that would *not* constitute a strong reason.³⁹ Stimulated by these statements, the debate on F-ABRI reactivated the broader *dwifungsi* discourse, albeit in a more cautious manner.

In this process, Soeharto was an active participant and again intervened to curb the debate. Speaking at the 19th anniversary of the National Youth Committee (KNPI) on 22 July, the President said that ABRI's participation in the DPR and MPR was intended to involve ABRI in the policy-making process in order to avoid a situation where ABRI might raise their guns against unwelcome policies.⁴⁰ This primitive threat was more a warning against the escalating critical debate in society, than a defence of ABRI's position in the parliament. In fact, in his independence day address a month later, Soeharto reopened the issue by suggesting that the number of F-ABRI could be adjusted.⁴¹ These messages from above were soon deciphered in many ways by intellectuals and political elites. State Secretary (Sekneg) Maj-Gen (ret) Moerdiono

³⁷ "Jumlah Anggota DPR yang Diangkat Sudah Waktunya Ditinjau Kembali," *Kompas*, 9 July 1992.

³⁸ For example, *Jakarta Post* devoted its editorial to this event with the title "Breaking old taboos", 10 July 1992; *Suara Pembaruan* (10 July 1992) in its editorial suggested that it was a sign of democratisation.

³⁹ "Reaksi Pro dan Kontra Soal Pengurangan ABRI di DPR," *Media Indonesia*, 10 July 1992. *Italic added.*

⁴⁰ "Lagi, Soal ABRI," *Media Indonesia*, 24 July 1992.

⁴¹ "Jumlah Wakil ABRI di DPR/MPR Bisa Disesuaikan Lewat Konsensus," *Kompas*, 16 August 1992.

decoded Soeharto's signal as a response to questions in society about the size of F-ABRI. He added that the important thing in ABRI's dual function was to maintain its socio-political role, not the practical number, implying a possible cut in the number.⁴² Sabam Sirait, a vocal PDI politician, then responded by saying that ten percent, i.e. 50 seats, would be enough for F-ABRI while Marzuki Darusman of Golkar pushed this line further, by arguing that ABRI's representation should eventually be limited to the MPR.⁴³

The debate about ABRI's representation in the parliament was not new. The essence of this argument could be found in the criticisms made by the Petisi 50 group in the early 1980s. Yet, this time, there were telling differences in the surrounding political environment. First, the practice of *dwifungsi* was being debated in the national legislative body under the name of the government-endorsed *keterbukaan* program. Second, the critical campaign was not led by a single group, such as Petisi 50, but had widespread support. Third, the debate was seemingly converted to technical issues, rather than matters of principle and thus effectively prevented the debate being labelled as anti-*dwifungsi* by ABRI. Fourth, but most importantly, it was Soeharto himself who gave the first go-sign after the 1992 election to 'break the taboo,' by suggesting the reduction of the F-ABRI. For ABRI, escalation of the criticism during this period revealed that: critical actors were no longer limited to certain small groups, which made it difficult for ABRI to pinpoint its counter-attack, as it had in the past against Petisi 50; and the DPR's initiative in support of *keterbukaan*—which had also been supported by ABRI—now involved a 'legitimate' movement against ABRI's traditional political interests. Significantly, such developments reflected Soeharto's counter-use of *keterbukaan* in his attempt to undermine the political influence of the military.

A few months later, ABRI's response to Soeharto was highlighted in the vice-presidential election at the MPR session in March 1993. In February, Kassospol Let-Gen Harsudiono Hartas announced ABRI's nomination of the Pangab, General Try Sutrisno, as the next vice president. In facing ABRI's high-profile challenge, Soeharto—who is said to have favoured Habibie—finally accepted the *fait accompli*, choosing Try as his running mate for the Sixth Development Cabinet. This event, which illustrated ABRI's challenge to President, was another 'breaking of a taboo,' as it had been a New Order practice for ABRI to wait for Soeharto to nominate his own vice-presidential candidate. Thus two taboos were broken during this short period, reflecting the Soeharto-ABRI cleavage. Meanwhile the *dwifungsi* issue was largely initiated by Soeharto in his contest with ABRI.

⁴² "Soal Jumlah Wakil ABRI di DPR: Berhak, Masih Perlu, Jumlah Tak Soal, Sebagai Demokratisator," *Suara Pembaruan*, 16 August 1992.

⁴³ "ABRI di DPR Cukup 10%," *Media Indonesia*, 18 August 1992; "ABRI di DPR/MPR: Yang Penting Peranan, Bukan Jumlah," *Suara karya*, 18 August 1992.

However, ten years of Moerdani's domination within the military ended in March 1993 when Soeharto reshuffled his Cabinet. Soeharto quickly moved to install loyal officers to the top military positions, which resulted in a massive personnel reshuffle in early 1993. This reshuffle was marked by the long-anticipated rise of an academy (AMN)-generation officer to the highest position in ABRI when Edi Sudradjat, a graduate of AMN in 1960 (Class 1), replaced Try Sutrisno as Pangab. This marked the beginning of a new phase in the *dwifungsi* debate—one generated by 'internal change' within ABRI and not just the product of Soeharto-ABRI antagonism.

Back-to-Basics and Professionalism

When Edi Sudradjat was promoted to Pangab in February 1993, he still held his current position as KSAD. Then he took Moerdani's post of Menhankam too in March after the Cabinet reshuffle. Not only did the coupling of Pangab and Menhankam posts recall the pre-1983 situation before Moerdani became Pangab, but even more surprising was the fact that a single person occupied the three top military posts—Pangab, Menhankam and KSAD. Edi's pre-eminence, however, did not last long. On 8 April, General Wismoyo Arismunandar (AMN 63), a brother-in-law of Soeharto's wife, was appointed as the new KSAD and in May General Feisal Tanjung (AMN 62) succeeded to the post of Pangab. Edi was thus reduced to the function of Menhankam.⁴⁴ Both were seen as closely allied to Soeharto. These leadership transfers in a very short time provided further stimulus to public debate regarding the new outlook of ABRI represented by new-generation officers.

A noted reform-minded military intellectual, Lt-Gen (ret) Sayidiman, recognised that "changes happening these days have a special colour in that it is the first time that all the command and staff functions from the Minister of Defence downward are occupied by the 'young generation' of officers who graduated from Army, Navy, Air Force and Police academies." Regarding *dwifungsi*, he pointed out that "it is indeed possible that there may be a certain change in the implementation of *kekaryaan* (posting officers to non-military jobs) as the modernisation process of society requires more and more specialisation and differentiation."⁴⁵ It was also suggested in an editorial of the

⁴⁴ Thus, Edi was kicked 'upstairs' from KSAD to the less-powerful post as Menhankam within this short time. This was a part of Soeharto's efforts to eliminate Moerdani's men from the top military structure. Feisal's promotion was said to be recommended by Habibie to Soeharto. Feisal had known Habibie for a long time. Feisal's Islamic orientation also met with Habibie's desire to cultivate support for his ICMI. We discuss this issue later in this chapter.

⁴⁵ "Change of ABRI Personnel Healthy Move," *Jakarta Post*, 10 April 1993. In April, three other service chiefs were replaced. Vice Admiral Tanto Koeswanto became the new Chief of Staff of the Navy, replacing M. Arifin. Air Vice-Marshal Rilo Pambudi became the new Chief of Air Force, replacing Marshal Siboen, and Lt-Gen Banurusman became the new Chief of the National Police, succeeding Gen Kunarto. Sayidiman himself was an advisor of ICMI.

ICMI-affiliated *Republika* that: "with their professionalism, today's officers are capable of anticipating the change of the era. They are more prepared to face future challenges which are far more complicated than in the past and, by their nature, impossible to be handled by the military. This generation also understands civilian language and ways of thinking because they have grown up with peers who are now in civilian jobs. Thus we have no obstacle to mutual dialogue as Indonesians are no longer oriented to past merit, but to professionalism. This will purify the practice of *dwifungsi* that is still questioned by outsiders [non-ABRI]."⁴⁶ This comment cautiously expressed 'hopes' about the new-generation officers, but its essential purpose was to downgrade any privileges ABRI had claimed in the past, by emphasising the new officers' similarity with their civilian counterparts. Here, the concept of professionalism which has long been associated with ABRI's self-esteem is tactically borrowed by civilians and reinterpreted to limit ABRI's special position in sociopolitical life.

Defending itself from this attempt to neutralise *dwifungsi*, ABRI's newspaper quickly responded: "ABRI is professional military plus. The 'plus' consists of its high consciousness that we are called on to defend the nation not only in the military field, but also in *ipoleksosbud* areas. ABRI formulates this role in the doctrine of dual function."⁴⁷ ABRI's localised conception of professionalism represented an effort to reassert control of the public debate which was threatening to erode ABRI's interpretation of its role.

The *dwifungsi* debate took a new turn when Edi Sudradjat introduced his "back-to-basics" concept. Officially the concept first appeared in 1992 when Army Chief Edi Sudradjat received Lt-Gen Wismoyo as his new deputy on 22 August.⁴⁸ It was formally adopted as part of Edi's campaign to launch a moral movement aiming to refocus the army on its basic professional tasks and to correct several deviations within the army structure.⁴⁹ Media reactions, however, produced a new opportunity for extending the debate about ABRI's role by discussing the meaning of back-to-basics. A cover story in *Tempo* (29 May 1993), for example, began as follows. "All key posts in ABRI Headquarters were occupied by new people, and the concept of 'back to basics' became popular. What is 'back to basics' and how should it be practised?" A noted ABRI watcher, Dr Salim Said, argued that "the concept implied a declining direct political role for ABRI. Edi Sudradjat has proposed the idea to develop ABRI as a security tool and it seems to follow the ideas of retired General A.H. Nasution who

⁴⁶ "Profesionalisme dan ABRI Pasca-45," *Republika*, 10 April 1993.

⁴⁷ "ABRI dan Demokrasi," *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 13 April 1993. *Ipoleksosbud* is a military term combining five terms; ideology, politics, economy, society and culture.

⁴⁸ *Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Tentang Pengegakan Norma Dasar Keprajuritan TNI-AD (Back to Basics)*, TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1993, p.41. Deviations ranged from the declining work ethic and discipline of the officer corps to the coordination of the command system. This classified document is hereafter called the Edi Paper. We will fully examine this project in the next chapter.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.41.

claimed soldiers should not intervene in all fields."⁵⁰ The press also adopted the technique of locating this issue in a gray zone of hinted criticism. *Kompas* commented, for example, that "as depicted in ABRI's self-motto that 'we are loved by the people' (rather than scared by people), ABRI is nothing without the people. And because ABRI is a fully armed group, it has to have strict discipline. Without this, ABRI is nothing more than a gang which intimidates the people. This is the 'basic' of ABRI."⁵¹

The back-to-basics idea raised two central questions: what was the purpose of this campaign?, and; what was the implication for *dwifungsi* practice? Regarding the purpose, the new Pangab, General Feisal Tanjung, answered defensively in an interview that "'back to basics' means refunctionalisation of ABRI as freedom fighters and professional soldiers. It does not mean we now have deviations from basic norms."⁵² This assessment illustrated there was no single interpretation about its purpose, even within ABRI's top echelon since the Edi Paper clearly mentioned that there were certain deviations within the military. Reflecting this, Soeharto warned in September that differences of opinion within ABRI, if aired publicly, would give the impression of conflict or tension which could create unrest among the people.⁵³ The second question about the implications for *dwifungsi* was raised again by Soeharto who repeated his *tut wuri handayani* instruction.⁵⁴ The coupling of *tut wuri handayani* and the back-to-basics concept was perceived in political society as a signal that Soeharto wanted ABRI to curtail its political role.

The escalation of the *dwifungsi* debate in this period—involving regeneration issues, the question of professionalism, and the back-to-basics concept—finally prompted ABRI to rein in the debate. Police Brig-Gen Roekmini, a prominent advocate of *keterbukaan* in the DPR, provided an interpretation which reflected ABRI's official approach.⁵⁵ She stated, in a long article in *Angkatan Bersenjata*, that the recent critics could be divided into three groups. The first group consisted of those who viewed ABRI's extra-defence role as unconstitutional military intervention. They considered *dwifungsi* as a political concept to legitimise and defend ABRI's political power, and they always placed ABRI in opposition to democracy, arguing ABRI's presence limits democratic life. The second group consisted of those who were similarly unhappy with *dwifungsi*, stemming from their confusion about *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan* in the extra-

⁵⁰ "Dua Jenderal dari Lembah Tidar," *Tempo*, 29 May 1993.

⁵¹ "ABRI Kembali ke 'Basic,'" *Kompas*, 17 May 1993.

⁵² "Setelah Pelajaran yang mahal Itu," *Tempo*, 29 May 1993. The freedom-fighter refers to the role played by the military during the independent war. It is a symbol of ABRI's nationalist orientation.

⁵³ "Soeharto Wants Common Stand on ABRI's Dual Role," *Jakarta Post*, 28 September 1993.

⁵⁴ "ABRI Harus Tahu Menempatkan Diri," *Merdeka*, 12 July 1993; "ABRI Diminta Lapangkan Jalan Wujudkan Aspirasi yang Sah," *Pelita*, 12 July 1993.

⁵⁵ "Peran Sosial Politik ABRI: Motivasi dan Perkembangannya," *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 5 October 1993. *Angkatan Bersenjata* is an ABRI-owned newspaper.

military field.⁵⁶ From their perspective, *kekaryaan* disturbed their careers, and could not be accepted in terms of professionalism. The third group accepted *dwifungsi* as a concept which could not be separated from the Pancasila democratic system. They not only located ABRI in the context of national history, but also considered ABRI's presence as a 'must' to prevent national disintegration in this plural society. She then went on to claim that the first and second groups had recently interpreted back-to-basics as if it meant "back-to-the-barracks," a concept associated with the military in Western democracies. Having denied the alleged decline of ABRI's political commitment, her article clearly articulated the ABRI view that back-to-basics was not intended to question *dwifungsi*.⁵⁷

The questions of ABRI's political role, however, continued to be highlighted in two events. First, the Golkar Congress was held in late October 1993. In accordance with Soeharto's wishes, the Congress elected Harmoko as its first civilian chairman. This civilianisation of Golkar invited an extraordinary attack by the Deputy Head of F-ABRI, Maj-Gen Sembiring Meliala, who said that Harmoko and Habibie were nothing without the President and when the President was no longer in power, they would vanish.⁵⁸ The emergence of Harmoko certainly created a controversy regarding the prospects of the civilian sector in countering ABRI. *Kompas*, for example, argued that neither civilians nor ABRI today had revolutionary experience. Their ability was equal in their respective professional fields; thus the newspaper concluded that rethinking of ABRI's political role was needed.⁵⁹

Second, in January 1994, ABRI's central intelligence agency, BAIS, which had been developed by Benny Moerdani, was liquidated and replaced with the less

⁵⁶ ABRI had insisted that *kekaryaan* was one form of *dwifungsi* implementation and, therefore, public criticism should not be directed at *dwifungsi* as a whole. We will discuss this interpretative problem in the next chapter.

⁵⁷ Roekmini's counter-argument was also followed by a claim by ABRI that the concept of professionalism as used by civilian critics in the recent debate was only applicable in western societies. This had led to misunderstanding in judging ABRI's case. See "Profesionalisme ABRI Jangan Sampai Tidak Dimengerti Rakyat," *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 6 October 1993; "Prajurit Pejuang dan Pejuang Prajurit, Memberi Makna Bagi Profesionalisme," *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 6 October 1993.

⁵⁸ For Sembiring's comment, see "Mayjen TNI RK Sembiring Meliala: 1000 Orang DPR/MPR Jangan Dianggap Togog," *DeTik*, 27 October - 2 November 1993. Rudini also claimed that the procedures of the Congress led by Habibie were not transparent and democratic. The Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs (Menko Polkam) Soesilo Soedarman soon responded that Sembiring's and Rudini's comments were only individual opinions. "ABRI Tak Persoalkan Hasil Munas," *Suara Merdeka*, 30 October 1993. More directly, Brig-Gen Syarwan Hamid (Head of ABRI's Information Centre: Kapuspen) rebutted Sembiring's assessment as wrong and said that it exceeded the limits of the individual's right to free speech. See "Pernyataan RK Sembiring Dinilai Keliru," *Kompas*, 31 October 1993. Syarwan was a close ally of Feisal Tanjung. Against this, Professor Juwono Sudarsono at UI saw Sembiring's comment as representing ABRI's main-stream view. See "Army General's Comment Whips Up Indonesian Storm," *Reuters*, 1 November 1993.

⁵⁹ "Kilas Balik Hubungan ABRI-Sipil Dalam Golkar," *Kompas*, 20 October 1993. A similar argument was made by *Merdeka's* two-day special issues. "Sipil Tak Perlu 'Minder' Dengan Generasi ABRI," *Merdeka*, 5 October 1993; "Kalangan Sipil Sudah Menyadari Kekeliruannya," *Merdeka*, 6 October 1993. In assessing the implication of Harmoko's leadership of Golkar, however, it should be remembered that whether a leader is civilian or military is far less important than whether he is close to the President.

powerful BIA (Badan Inteligen ABRI: ABRI Intelligence Agency). The end of BAIS saw the dismantling of the 'military within the military,' in an institutional sense, and of Moerdani's powerful personal network. Justifying the charge, Sudomo said that "it was time to reconstruct the intelligence sector which has deviated from its 'basic' task as seen in its direct involvement in land disputes, granting permits for fisheries and manipulation of sociopolitical organisations."⁶⁰

ABRI's previous attempt to depoliticise and reinterpret the concept of back-to-basics was not successful as unwelcome aspects of the *dwifungsi* debate continued. Backed both by the Golkar civilianisation and the BAIS liquidation, the concept of back-to-basics started to provide a legitimate way to talk about the downsizing of ABRI's political role, regardless of ABRI's attempts to derail this possibility. Sri Bintang Pamungkas, for example, borrowed this concept to express his strong criticism of *dwifungsi*: "considering today's very peaceful situation [in politics], back-to-basics of course equals back-to-the-barracks, because the basic function of the military is national defence."⁶¹ Retired military officers also called for a reduction of ABRI's political role. Lt-Gen (ret) Suhardiman, a member of Golkar's Central Leadership Council, called for the virtual abolition of ABRI's political role when he argued that "the debate on back-to-basics, whether you like it or not, brings up the problem of *dwifungsi*. I think the sociopolitical function of ABRI should be conducted via Pepabri, and will not require Kassospol any more in the structure of ABRI."⁶² A less radical interpretation was proposed by retired Lt-Gen Soebijakto, former governor of the National Defence Institute (Lemhannas), who insisted that the Indonesian military under its first Commander, General Sudirman, only engaged in politics at the national level, and was not concerned with such posts of governor, regent (*bupati*) or ambassador. According to him, this was the meaning of 'basic' in the context of back-to-basics.⁶³ Retired Lt-Gen Hasnan Habib also rejected an interpretation which limited back-to-basics to an internal technical adjustment, and insisted it was rather a policy statement concerning *dwifungsi* practice, responding to the problems evident in the Dili incident and other cases of military repression.⁶⁴

Reflecting this tendency to utilise the back-to-basics concept as an opening to limit *dwifungsi*, General Edi Sudradjat himself finally claimed in February 1994 that "the concepts of back-to-basics and *tut wuri handayani* today are manipulated by certain groups of people for their own interest."⁶⁵ He regretted that some people were deliberately misreading the term "back-to-basics" as if it was "back-to-the-barracks"

⁶⁰ "Bais ABRI Perlu Restrukturisasi," *Kompas*, 18 January 1994.

⁶¹ "Konsensus Peran Sospol ABRI?," *Forum Keadilan*, 17 February 1994. *Forum Keadilan* in this issue provided a special coverage on back-to-basics.

⁶² *Ibid.* Pepabri is the Association of Retired Soldiers.

⁶³ "ABRI Modern Tak Perlu Peran Sospol," *Forum Keadilan*, 17 February 1994.

⁶⁴ "Back to Basics," *Forum Keadilan*, 17 February 1994.

⁶⁵ "Manipulasi 'Back to Basic' dan 'Tut Wuri Handayani' Menyesatkan," *Kompas*, 22 February 1994.

and particularly mentioned the name of Sri Bintang Pamungkas, whose outlook he deemed too westernised.⁶⁶ Edi's posture was soon adopted as ABRI's official answer to the recent back-to-basics debate. ABRI's official history, *50 Tahun ABRI*, recalled the dispute and also endorsed Edi's line that "the concept developed outside of ABRI and reflected the interests of certain groups [*pihak tertentu*]."⁶⁷

For the ABRI leadership, back-to-basics had no implications for limiting ABRI's political role. Nonetheless, the use of the term "back-to-basics" had opened opportunities to extend the debate over *dwifungsi*. The concept not only provoked a political debate regarding its interpretation, but also supplied a useful umbrella for the media and society to use this opportunity to introduce wider criticisms concerning ABRI's role in the current political scene. The same could be said about *tut wuri handayani*, the new generation, and professionalism which also became common concepts in the recent civil-military dialogue. The societal 'takeover' of these concepts in the evolving *dwifungsi* debate during this period effectively expanded the arena of permissible political debate concerning the proper role of ABRI in the polity. Although Soeharto still played a role in triggering the *dwifungsi* debate, the development of the debate was largely carried by political society which had sought effective ways to pressure ABRI since the early *keterbukaan* period.

ABRI Representation in the DPR

The next major phase in the *dwifungsi* discourse can be found after the MPR decision to reduce F-ABRI seats from 100 to 75 in June 1995. This stage showed the increasing autonomy of *dwifungsi* criticism as a social movement. As seen above, the reduction of the F-ABRI was a product of the 1992 debate in which Soeharto and the ABRI leadership had concluded that F-ABRI was still needed, but the number could be reconsidered. Before discussing this development, it is important to assess the political background leading to the decision to scale down F-ABRI which represents one of the strategic pillars of ABRI's political engagement.

General Edi Sudradjat's statement in February 1994 regarding the manipulation of the back-to-basics and *tut wuri handayani* concepts was a response to the growing influence and assertiveness of the political media which had enjoyed partial freedom under the *keterbukaan* phenomenon. For regime leaders, however, the amount of political leeway accorded to the media was still a function of regime stability as determined by them. Subsequent events in 1994 indicated that they had decided to put the media on a shorter leash. It was symbolic that Soeharto on 16 August, the eve of

⁶⁶ "Antara Basic dan Barrack," *Editor*, 3 March 1994.

⁶⁷ Pusjarah ABRI, *50 Tahun ABRI*, Jakarta: Mabes ABRI, 1995, n.p..

independence day, declared that "*keterbukaan* surely has a limit."⁶⁸ Soeharto's desire to re-regulate political life had been evident two months earlier when three major weeklies—*Tempo*, *Editor* and the tabloid *DeTik*—were banned by the Minister of Information (and Golkar Chairman) Harmoko who cancelled their printing permits (SIUPP).⁶⁹

The banning of the three magazines on 21 June resulted in demonstrations in Jakarta, demanding the reissue of the SIUPP for the banned magazines. Demonstrations were, however, soon repressed by security forces. Since then, Soeharto seemed to replace his *keterbukaan* rhetoric with the more familiar *ketertutupan* (closeness) style. This was the background of his speech on 16 August, and it was followed by three events which indicated a further tightening of political control. First was the recalling from parliament of two outspoken politicians, Bambang Warih Kusuma from Golkar and PPP's Sri Bintang Pamungkas in January and February 1995.⁷⁰ Secondly, three journalists from *Independen*, an underground magazine published by the newly created association of sacked journalists, AJI, were arrested in March—two of them former *Tempo* journalists. Shortly thereafter, PWI, the sole legal journalists union, decided to expel thirteen PWI members associated with AJI, warning that any media group which continued to employ AJI members would lose its SIUPP.⁷¹ Thirdly, in May, a soothsayer Permadi—who the previous year had allegedly predicted that Soeharto would be replaced by Megawati in 1997—was arrested on the charge of insulting the Prophet Mohammed by describing him as a dictator, in an academic seminar at Gajah Mada University (UGM) in April.⁷²

This series of actions illustrated that the state still held the capacity to resort to repressive measures—without risking an intra-regime split—against democratic movements, regardless of growing criticism from the international arena and domestic civil society. In an attempt to wrongfoot his critics, Soeharto shrewdly moved to soften

⁶⁸ Even during the 1992 general elections and 1993 MPR session, two key events with potential for stirring political instability, Soeharto did not refer to the need to retreat from *keterbukaan*.

⁶⁹ The official reason was provocation of instability in the case of *Tempo*, without mentioning any particular article, and administrative problems at the other two magazines. However, it was widely believed that *Tempo*'s article which revealed the conflict between Habibie and Finance Minister Mar'ie Muhammad over the budget to purchase 39 German warships became the trigger. See "Jerman Punya Kapal, Indonesia Punya Beban," *Tempo*, 4 June 1994. This story was soon taken up by other magazines while Edi Sudradjat was reported as saying Habibie's demands were too high. This media-exposed picture of intra-regime conflict between Habibie, on the one hand, and Mar'ie and Edi with the backing of a segment in ABRI, on the other hand, was said to have made Soeharto angry, leading to his order to punish the three magazines.

⁷⁰ The recall was decided by the party leadership councils, undoubtedly under pressures from the government.

⁷¹ Among those expelled were Goenawan Mohamad, managing editor of the banned weekly *Tempo*, Fikri Jufri, former *Tempo* editor-in-chief and editor of the monthly *Matra*, and Eros Djarot, managing editor of *Detik*.

⁷² Megawati Sukarnoputri—a daughter of Sukarno—had been the chairperson of the PDI since December 1993. We discuss the issues of Megawati's PDI later in this chapter.

his image by making concessions in a liberal direction. The F-ABRI reduction in June was therefore in fact made in the context of re-regulating politics.

It is worth noting that the bill to cut the number of ABRI representatives in parliament, which was submitted on 23 April 1995 and passed by the DPR on 15 June, was not in response to pressure from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences (LIPI) whom Soeharto, on 21 February, had publicly assigned the task of conducting research on ABRI's representation in the DPR and the electoral system in general. Without waiting for the research results which were finally announced in 1997, Sekneg Moerdiono, Interior Minister Yogie S. Memet and Pangab Feisal Tanjung submitted the bill, undoubtedly with Soeharto's approval. Actually, in February and March, when the idea was still under consideration, Kassospol Let-Gen Moh. Ma'ruf had stated—possibly as a delaying tactic—that it would be necessary to wait until LIPI produced its results.⁷³ This indicated that the decision came from the highest levels just before the submission of the bill, rather than from any consensus within the ABRI leadership, and it gave rise to speculation that there was a gap between Soeharto's loyalist officers and ABRI's corporate interests.⁷⁴ If the aim was to create an image that the regime was still committed to the promotion of democracy, the timing of the bill was quite rational even though LIPI was left behind.

The reduction of F-ABRI provoked an active debate in the mass media. When the idea first appeared in February, Moerdiono reiterated that it was not intended to review *dwifungsi*, but was just a technical review concerning the proper number of F-ABRI seats.⁷⁵ This attempt to prevent a possible spillover of the debate and stifle critical views on *dwifungsi* was, however, easily side-stepped by the media which provoked a *tsunami* of *dwifungsi* debate. In response, the new Army Chief, General Hartono, who was installed in the post in February 1995, quickly warned the public not to link ABRI's sociopolitical role with the number of F-ABRI seats.⁷⁶ Remarks made by Moerdiono and Hartono well reflected their anxiety about the increasing autonomy of the public debate over ABRI's role in society.

⁷³ "LIPI Akan Minta Pendapat Orsospol dan Pakar ABRI Siap Wakilnya di DPR Dikurangi," *Republika*, 24 February 1995; "Menyoal Lagi Sistem Distrik," *Tirias*, 16 March 1995.

⁷⁴ About such speculation, see *Gatra's* report "Dua Puluh Lima Kursi untuk Demokrasi," in the May 6 Edition. The existence of this gap was evident in an August 1995 poll conducted by *Forum Keadilan* which showed only 47 percent of ABRI respondents supported the reduction of F-ABRI members. See "ABRI Bicara Demokrasi," *Forum Keadilan*, Edisi Khusus 50 Tahun Indonesia Merdeka, August 1995.

⁷⁵ "Presiden Instruksikan LIPI Teliti Sistem Pemilu Terbaik: Perlu Dipikirkan Jumlah Anggota ABRI di DPR," *Kompas*, 22 February 1995.

⁷⁶ "Sorotan Terhadap Peran Sospol ABRI Jangan Dikaitkan Dengan Jumlahnya," *Merdeka*, 11 March 1995. Hartono's promotion to KSAD, replacing Wismoyo, was followed by a reshuffling of top posts during February and March, affecting more than 160 officers. Like Feisal Tanjung, Hartono was also a *santri* (devote Muslim) officer, and his promotion was seen as indicating Soeharto's inclination to place loyal Muslim officers in ABRI's leadership positions in the process of reconstructing the ABRI structure after the Moerdani era.

Indeed, on April 25, two days after the bill was submitted, YLBHI's Mulyana W. Kusumah circulated a press release on the F-ABRI problem.⁷⁷ He argued, *inter alia*, that the plan to reduce the number of ABRI appointees in the DPR should also cover the regional parliaments. He went on to assert that although such a reduction in ABRI representation in the DPR certainly would not decrease ABRI's bargaining power in real politics, it surely would push forward the idea of redefining *dwifungsi* practice. On the same day, Gen (ret) A.H. Nasution cynically stated that: "it looks as if ABRI now recognises that getting seats in the DPR without being elected is unconstitutional, and is also alien to the concept of *dwifungsi*."⁷⁸ A critical view was also presented, before the bill's submission, by Arbi Sanit who suggested that reducing the military presence in the DPR was vitally needed, arguing that the higher the number of appointees, the lower the level of democracy. He also proposed that the reduction could be made incrementally, so eventually, after four or five elections, there would be no appointed members in the DPR.⁷⁹ The idea of limiting ABRI's participation to the MPR was also expressed by Afan Gaffar, a political scientist at the Gajah Mada University, who urged that—in return for reducing the number—it would be possible to give ABRI a veto-power in the MPR, which could be used to thwart efforts to replace Pancasila and also assure the military that it could continue to protect its vital interests.⁸⁰

The idea of liquidating ABRI from the DPR was of course challenged by both moderates and conservatives in ABRI. Gen (ret) Rudini represented a middle-of-the-road position. Although reform-minded on most issues, as a former Army Chief, he also defended traditional ABRI positions. He argued that abandoning ABRI's presence in the DPR was not acceptable because ABRI, which also consists of 'citizens' had already given up (*melepaskan*) its voting rights in return for holding seats in the DPR. But if the voting rights were restored for ABRI, that would invite a return to the negative situation witnessed in 1955 when the army was split along partisan lines.⁸¹ Rudini's interpretation of F-ABRI's *raison d'être*, that is to avoid intra-ABRI conflict, seemingly strayed from official ideology which insists that ABRI's sociopolitical function is legitimised in order to safeguard the nation, i.e. UUD45 and Pancasila, not for the sake of avoiding in-house conflict. However, this point was further elaborated by the ABRI spokesman, Brig-Gen Syarwan Hamid (Kapuspen), who emphasised practical rather than historical reasons for not restricting ABRI. He argued that F-ABRI was needed to fight against any threat to Pancasila, and in order to perform this

⁷⁷ *Siaran Pers Yayasan LBH Indonesia Menanggapi Usulan Pengurangan Anggota ABRI di DPR-RI* (No. 010/SP/YLBHI/IV/1995).

⁷⁸ "AH Nasution: ABRI Tak Pernah Minta Diangkat," *Kompas*, 26 April 1995.

⁷⁹ "Fraksi yang Diangkat dan Dikritik," *Forum Keadilan*, 30 March 1995. Some members in the two opposition parties also showed a similar line of thinking. See comments of B.N. Marbun of PDI and Yusuf Syakir of PPP in "Politicians Debate ABRI seats in the House," *Jakarta Post*, 26 February 1995.

⁸⁰ "Fraksi yang Diangkat dan Dikritik," *Forum Keadilan*, 30 March 1995.

⁸¹ "AH Nasution: ABRI Tak Pernah Minta Diangkat," *Kompas*, 26 April 1995

function effectively, the reduction in seats should not be too much.⁸² Similarly, Maj-Gen (ret) Samsuddin, a *keterbukaan* advocate in the F-ABRI who subsequently lost his position, emphasised the legal justification of the F-ABRI system which he saw as based on the National Consensus in 1967 Law No. 20/1982 and the 1985 political law.⁸³ These ideas were also supported by the 'civilian incompetence' theory. The political scientist, Amir Santoso of UI, also a director of the military-linked Centre for Policy and Development Studies (CPDS), noted the recent critical mood toward *dwifungsi* and the presence of F-ABRI, and argued that the demand to reduce ABRI's *kekaryaan* role was not the will of every social stratum, since the grass-roots people still needed ABRI because the authority and level of professionalism of civilians was still too weak. Moreover he pointed to the fact that the attendance of F-ABRI members in the DPR was higher than the other three fractions, thus contributing more to parliamentary life.⁸⁴

The varying opinions above certainly illustrate that even an essentially technical issue like cutting the number of F-ABRI seats could easily be transformed into a matter of principle as the *dwifungsi* debate developed. This implied that even after 30 years of *dwifungsi* institutionalisation, there was still a large gray zone in interpreting its legitimacy. Perhaps reflecting this fact, the mass media frequently brought A.H. Nasution, the founder of *dwifungsi*, into the debate to judge whether or not the current situation met with the original intent. This time, Nasution contributed to the debate by reiterating his views in an article entitled *Tut Wuri Handayani*.⁸⁵ His argument could be summarised as follows.

First, there is no restriction for ABRI to enter the DPR—since UUD45 recognises that all citizens have the right to vote and be elected. Recalling Indonesia's first election in 1955 where he himself was a member of the Preparatory Committee, Nasution emphasised the fact that he rejected Sukarno's proposal to appoint military representatives in parliament because, according to him, it was the people who should nominate and elect the parliamentary members. Thus if military men want to be parliamentarians, they should be non-active during the campaign and go through the electoral procedure. If elected, they should give up their commissions and become politicians, but if not, they could return to active military service. However, the MPR is different since the UUD45 provides for functional group representation in the MPR.

⁸² "Menyoal Lagi Sistem Distrik," *Tirias*, 16 March 1995.

⁸³ "Mayjen (purn.) Samsudin: Jangan Buat Pressure Terhadap MPR," *Tirias*, 16 March 1995. The so-called National Consensus—which was adopted by the People's Provisional Consultative Assembly (MPRP) in 1967—allowed the military to have representatives in the DPR. Law No.20/1982 legalised ABRI's *dwifungsi* doctrine, and,—as seen above—the political law (Law No.2/1985) determined 100 seats for F-ABRI.

⁸⁴ "Yahya Muhaimin: Sipil harus Peduli Dwifungsi," *Republika*, 7 March 1995. However, even though attendance is high, their participation is rare because—according to Muchtar Pakpahan, a prominent labour activist—the fraction's majority—middle-ranking officers—hesitates to speak in deference to higher-ranking officers. See Muchtar Pakpahan, *DPR RI Semasa Orde Baru*, Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 1994, p.148.

⁸⁵ *Gatra*, 17 June 1995.

Thus ABRI should only involve itself in big political issues ("P" *besar*) in the MPR, but not small ones ("p" *kecil*) in the DPR.⁸⁶ The two important points here are: rejection of ABRI's 'appointed' seats in parliament; and approval of 'semi-active' military personnel—whose status is non-active during the election but can be re-activated if not elected—participating in elections. In the evolving debate on *dwifungsi*, the former was often raised by military critics. Yet the latter has never enjoyed large support in either critical circles or among *dwifungsi* old guard supporters.⁸⁷ It should be noted here that despite his symbolic presence as the *dwifungsi* creator-critic, Nasution's ideas did not become a major force in the ideological marketplace.

Even so, the fact that Nasution—now the only senior military officer who had ever exercised command over Soeharto during his military career—energetically contributed to the critical side in the debate provoked Soeharto's negative reaction and counter-interpretation concerning F-ABRI's rationale. In his address at the leadership meeting of FKPPPI, on June 18, Soeharto censured *dwifungsi* critics as follows.⁸⁸

There are some individuals who still raise the question of ABRI representation in the DPR. They wrongly interpret *dwifungsi* as if it is enough to be in the MPR, but ABRI's presence in the DPR is also a 'must' because Indonesia is based on *Ketahanan Nasional* which is strongly linked with development programs formulated on the basis of the cooperation between the government and the DPR. Thus if ABRI were to be excluded from the DPR, *Ketahanan Nasional* would also be in trouble. Those who insist that it is sufficient for ABRI to be represented in the MPR forget the fact that today's interpretation of *dwifungsi* is different from that of the pre-New Order period. Today, ABRI is recognised as a sociopolitical force equal to other sociopolitical forces in society, whereas in the past ABRI was just called on to play a sociopolitical role.⁸⁹

Here, Soeharto turned to *Ketahanan Nasional* as the source of legitimacy for ABRI's institutional involvement in the legislative body. Though this logic seems to lack a plausible explanation for the link between occupying parliamentary seats and securing *Ketahanan Nasional*, F-ABRI is interpreted here as being an organic part of *Ketahanan Nasional*, and therefore an unquestioned national doctrine. It in effect implied that Soeharto read the criticism of F-ABRI as aimed at undermining the basic national doctrine or the national foundation, alarming critics who had developed different versions in deciphering F-ABRI's *raison d'être* and the art of *dwifungsi*. Needless to say, the main target was Nasution, the original interpreter of *dwifungsi*.

As seen above, the decision to reduce F-ABRI seats inevitably raised the question of ABRI's legitimacy in conducting its non-military role. This stimulated a

⁸⁶ However, political manoeuvring between Sukarno and Nasution at that time should be noted. If military representatives were appointed by Sukarno, his influence would be maintained among officer-politicians.

⁸⁷ We will further examine the discourse of ABRI's electoral participation in Chapter 6.

⁸⁸ "Ajakan Mulat Sarira," *Media Indonesia Minggu*, 25 June 1995. FKPPPI (Forum Komunikasi Putra-Putri Purnawirawan Indonesia) is the Communications Forum for Sons and Daughters of ABRI Veterans.

⁸⁹ *Ketahanan Nasional* (National Resilience) is a national doctrine of Indonesia which encompasses security-political-social-economic aspects to maintain Indonesia's autonomy in international society.

vigorous public political debate and finally invited Soeharto's reactive defence of ABRI. What was perceivable in this period was the growing autonomy of *dwifungsi* criticism in the country's political discourse. The F-ABRI debate in 1995 indicated that the *dwifungsi* issue had already developed to the point which could not be handled by ABRI without Soeharto's backup. By now, of course, Soeharto had rid himself of Moerdani and appointed a military leadership of his own choosing.

Nevertheless, in real politics, it was commonly understood that F-ABRI's numerical reduction would not affect ABRI's actual political power. Since ABRI's institutional power basis—largely originating from its territorial security structure, intelligence network, and sociopolitical command line extending from ABRI Headquarters down to the village level—remained untouched, critical intellectuals were generally pessimistic about curbing military influence in the political arena.⁹⁰ Though ABRI's share of the parliamentary seats would formally decline after 1997, it was not difficult to suspect that ABRI might try to compensate for the loss by channelling its efforts through Golkar. In fact, Golkar-ABRI relations soon become a central political issue and invited another round of *dwifungsi* debate.

Golkar-ABRI Relations Revisited

The empowered critical segment in political society then found a target in ABRI when the new military leadership under Feisal Tanjung overtly sided with Golkar in the 1997 election. ABRI's support to Golkar in the post-Moerdani era brought about a significant change in the constellation of elite politics.

Golkar's Supremacy over ABRI?

In the midst of the F-ABRI debate, Harmoko, the first civilian chairman of Golkar, seemed to disparage ABRI's role in Golkar. He claimed that his own political success demonstrated that the civil-military distinction was not valid in Golkar by maintaining that "once one becomes a Golkar candidate, he/she is a member of the Golkar Big Family (KBG), and no longer with ABRI."⁹¹ However, some significant mass organisations—such as FKPPi, Pepabri and Pemuda Panca Marga (the Youth of Five Duties, or PPM)—belonged to both KBG and the ABRI Big Family (KBA). Apart from

⁹⁰ We will fully discuss the issue of territorial command in the *dwifungsi* discourse in Chapter 6.

⁹¹ "Wawancara Harmoko: Tidak Ada yang Terpukul, Tidak Ada yang Kalah," *Forum Keadilan*, 25 May 1995. The concept of Big Family (Keluarga Besar) is an expression of Indonesian political culture. Political organisations often express their links with subordinates (organisations and individuals) by using the term "family." Therefore, the Golkar Big Family refers to the aggregation of Golkar-affiliated organisations in the government and society. The same can be applied to ABRI which has its own Big Family. On the political culture of the Big Family, see Shiraishi (1997).

this overlap in membership between the two Big Families, ABRI had been eager to influence non-KBA mass organisations in KBG by placing KBA members in leadership posts.⁹² From these facts, Harmoko's statement could not easily be accepted by the ABRI side.

As seen above, the civilianisation of the Golkar chairmanship in 1993 was a hard fact for ABRI. In response, ABRI strove to have KBA members elected as heads of Golkar Regional Leadership Councils, both at provincial (Tingkat I) and prefectural (kecamatan/kotamadya: Tingkat II) levels. This strategy was successful and resulted in seventy-eight percent of Tingkat I and seventy percent of Tingkat II leaders being KBA members.⁹³ Under such circumstances, it was not difficult to imagine that Harmoko's leadership might be threatened from below. It was in this context that Harmoko emphasised the independence of Golkar from ABRI.

Harmoko's remark soon stimulated a debate. At the end of June 1995, a well publicised panel discussion was held in Jakarta and attended by a huge number of DPR politicians from Golkar, PPP and PDI. On this occasion, Gen (ret) Soemitro insisted that ABRI refrain once again from backing Golkar in the 1997 general elections, as it had in 1992. Of course it was not the first time that outspoken retired officers, including Soemitro, had spoken against ABRI's traditional commitment to Golkar. However, considering the timing and occasion of his comment, his remark was picked up by the mass media.⁹⁴

Harmoko quickly reacted at a meeting of Golkar cadres where he insisted that ABRI itself did not support Golkar in any case because its members were individuals.⁹⁵ His implication was that ABRI as 'an institution' had no role in supporting Golkar. He argued that active ABRI members could not join Golkar unless they retired first, but ABRI-affiliated mass organisations, such as Pepabri, FKPPi, LVRI (the veterans' legion), could channel their political aspirations through Golkar as members of KBG. Such an interpretation placed KBA between Golkar and ABRI and also distinguished between ABRI and KBA. By denying ABRI's direct support for Golkar, Harmoko's argument was intended not only to rebut Soemitro but also to protect the autonomy of the Golkar leadership which could be questioned if it admitted ABRI's strong support for Golkar. Ironically, Harmoko's argument echoed an ABRI-created interpretation intended to rebut criticism that Golkar was a tool of ABRI. This time it was reproduced by Harmoko to defend Golkar's independence. In early July, Harmoko

⁹² For the details of this strategy to place KBA individuals in KBG organisations, see Badjoeri Widagdo (Letkol Inf), "Pendayagunaan Keluarga Besar ABRI dalam Memantapkan Demokrasi Pancasila," *Widya Dharma* (Majalah Sesko ABRI), No.16, 1991, pp. 21-61. A well-known example is Pemuda Pancasila (PP) which is a Golkar-affiliated organisation that also defines itself as a "moral" member of KBA, whereas FKPPi and PPM are seen to be "biological" members of KBA. See "PPM: Menampik Eksklusivisme," *Pancasila Abadi*, 15 January 1995. *Pancasila Abadi* is PP's official magazine.

⁹³ "Turun Naik Hubungan ABRI-Golkar," *Gatra*, 8 July 1995.

⁹⁴ See *Gatra*'s report, "Untuk Apa Soemitro Menggebrak," in the 8 July edition.

⁹⁵ "Harmoko: ABRI Tidak 'Back Up' Golkar," *Suara Merdeka*, 25 June 1995.

reinforced his previous comment in an interview with a weekly magazine.⁹⁶ By emphasising the difference between ABRI as 'organisation' and 'individuals,' Harmoko firmly denied the link with the military as an organisation and stated that Golkar had only been backed by its cadres. Obviously the cadres included organisations under KBA, but he implied the supremacy of Golkar vis-a-vis ABRI in Golkar's management.

The military side soon raised objections. The Secretary-General of Pepabri, retired Maj-Gen Abdul Kadir, in an official letter, showed his distaste for Harmoko's explanation. Kadir claimed that it was baseless to see Pepabri as a unit of Golkar. Similarly, Achmad Tahir, head of LVRI, told Harmoko directly that not all members of LVRI channel their political aspirations through Golkar, as around ten percent of its 800,000 members (or 11 million if their families are included) supported other political organisations.⁹⁷ From the active military side, KSAD General Hartono further complicated the debate by saying that Pepabri as a mass organisation (*ormas*) was not part of any political organisation (*orsospol*), because only individuals in *ormas* may become cadres or members of *orsospol*.⁹⁸ At this stage Harmoko claimed that it was legitimate to say that the *ormas* in KBG supported Golkar in elections and therefore they were Golkar cadres. For Hartono, however, it was not *ormas*, but just individuals (*orang-orang*) within the *ormas* who supported Golkar and became its cadres—so the *ormas*, in this case Pepabri and others in KBA, were not subordinated to Golkar. Hartono's remark did not deny ABRI's commitment to Golkar, but only rejected Golkar's control over KBA organisations affiliated to the KBG. It was in these circumstances that the dispute between Harmoko and KBA became apparent.⁹⁹

This Harmoko issue encouraged a more general debate on Golkar-ABRI relations. Afan Gaffar of UGM branded the recent argument regarding ABRI's link with Golkar as superficial, since it was common public knowledge that ABRI had strong commitment to Golkar.¹⁰⁰ He labelled ABRI and Golkar as *loro-loring atunggal*, a Javanese expression for 'two but one.' Referring to Harmoko's statement that Golkar had never been backed by ABRI, Afan suggested that this was only for campaign purposes. Yahya Muhaimin at UGM also believed that it was impossible for Golkar to win elections without ABRI's backing at the Korem and Koramil levels.¹⁰¹ Up to this stage, a large portion of the intellectual participation in the debate seemed to be governed by a cynical view of Harmoko's statements. The mood changed, however, after Maj-Gen Syarwan Hamid (Assistant to the ABRI Chief of Sociopolitical Affairs,

⁹⁶ "Harmoko Menjawab Tuduhan," *Gatra*, 8 July 1995.

⁹⁷ Both comments are from "'Diskusi' Harmoko dan Para Jenderal," *Media Indonesia Minggu*, 25 June 1995.

⁹⁸ "KSAD Jenderal TNI R. Hartono: ABRI Akan Siapkan yang non-ABRI untuk Meneruskan Karya ABRI," *Forum Keadilan*, 17 July 1995.

⁹⁹ In the above interview, Hartono insisted that certain people in Pepabri were not satisfied with Harmoko's management of Golkar. It should be noted that, unlike Feisal, Hartono had no role in placing Harmoko as the Golkar chairman in 1993.

¹⁰⁰ "Golkar dan ABRI," *Forum Keadilan*, 17 July 1995.

¹⁰¹ See "Ada Apa di Sekitar Hubungan Golkar-ABRI?," *Forum Keadilan*, 17 July 1995.

or Assospol Kassospol) shifted the focus of debate from the Harmoko issue to the principle of *dwifungsi* in late September.

Syarwan's Initiative

The lingering speculation that many ABRI officers were not satisfied with Harmoko's leadership of Golkar was clouded by the perception that General Feisal Tanjung had been close to the Habibie-Harmoko line. Before the Golkar Congress of 1993, Feisal had announced that ABRI would not nominate a candidate for Golkar Chairman—a comment supporting Habibie's effort to promote Golkar civilianisation, and reversing General Edi Sudradjat's previous statement that ABRI was ready to provide ten to twelve candidates for the race for the chairman's post.¹⁰² It was in September 1995, when disharmony between ABRI and Golkar emerged in the public spotlight, that the ABRI Headquarters in Cilangkap, East Jakarta, again pursued rapprochement with Golkar under Harmoko. At a seminar entitled 'ABRI and Golkar,' held by the Discussion Forum for Political Journalists on 28 September, Maj-Gen Syarwan Hamid insisted that ABRI could not be neutral in politics because ABRI as a sociopolitical force needed to choose a partner to promote national well-being, and for this reason, ABRI's position was close to Golkar.¹⁰³ Five days later, Kapuspen Brig-Gen Suwarno Adiwijoyo, who inherited this post from Syarwan the previous March, asserted that: "if ABRI is asked to be neutral, it would mean that ABRI should abandon its principles (to maintain stability) and that is impossible."¹⁰⁴ On the same day, just after a meeting with Soeharto, Feisal Tanjung further pushed the position taken by his staff by saying that "KBA surely sides with Golkar, so ABRI, through the KBA, must channel its aspirations to Golkar."¹⁰⁵

Assessing ABRI as a whole, this rapprochement could be seen as an adjustment by Cilangkap—no doubt on Soeharto's instruction—to overcome the apparent gap between ABRI and Golkar. Feisal's statement effectively reversed Hartono's previous explanation on the KBA-Golkar relationship. So too the comments of Syarwan and Suwarno rejected ABRI's standard claim to 'stand above all groups.' Whatever their intentions, one obvious risk of proclaiming ABRI's proximity to Golkar was that it would raise the question of *dwifungsi*. This time, the dispute focussed on two

¹⁰² "Mencari Ketua, Menyiapkan Sukses," *Tempo*, 8 May 1993.

¹⁰³ "ABRI Tidak Bisa Netral Sebagai Kekuatan Sospol," *Kompas*, 30 September 1995. Syarwan was promoted to Assospol Kassospol in June 1995, replacing Maj-Gen Hari Sabarno. Hari was then appointed to F-ABRI together with Maj-Gen Haris Sudarno, East Java Military Commander (Pangdam V/Brawijaya) and Maj-Gen Theo Syafei, the Commander of ABRI's Staff and Command College (DanSesko ABRI). Haris was replaced by Maj-Gen Imam Utomo, a close ally of Hartono, while Theo's post was taken by Maj-Gen Yunus Yosfiah, a figure close to Feisal. Theo, a Protestant officer, had close links with former Menhankam Benny Moerdani and Edi Sudradjat, and was therefore a target of Feisal and Hartono who were installed in the ABRI leadership as part of Soeharto's de-Moerdani-sation program.

¹⁰⁴ "ABRI tak Berprinsip Jika Netral," *Kompas*, 4 October 1995.

¹⁰⁵ "Pangab: ABRI Salurkan Aspirasinya ke Golkar," *Bernas*, 4 October 1995.

dimensions. One was the old argument about ABRI's neutrality in conducting *dwifungsi*. The other was the concern about a sectarian tendency in the ABRI leadership.

Neutrality in Question

For many political observers, Syarwan's statement recalled Soeharto's famous speech at Pekanbaru in 1980—similarly two years before an election—when he said that as a defence force ABRI was neutral, but as a sociopolitical force it should side with forces which defend Pancasila and UUD45.¹⁰⁶ Since Syarwan's and Feisal's comments were made just before the 50th ABRI Anniversary on October 5, the argument exploded in the mass media and invited a huge outpouring of criticism from intellectuals.

The PDI and PPP reacted immediately. In the DPR Commission II, led by Maj-Gen Hari Sabarno of F-ABRI, Subagyo from the PDI strongly criticised Syarwan's comment as contradicting Law No.20/1982 which stated the official stance of ABRI on the dual function.¹⁰⁷ "If ABRI cannot be neutral and only wants to work with a force which really respects Pancasila and UUD45," he asked, "does it mean PDI and PPP are not Pancasilaist and Constitutionalist?" He warned that Syarwan's comment would not only confuse people, but also invite social unrest. The PDI Head, Megawati Sukarnoputri, also showed her displeasure by warning that ABRI's stabilising and dynamising role should not end with merely becoming the implementor of government policy.¹⁰⁸ A similar criticism arose from PPP members who claimed that *dwifungsi* would lose its principles if it sided with Golkar, since all political parties already accepted Pancasila as their sole principle in the mid-1980s.¹⁰⁹

Apart from the political parties, which would be directly harmed by ABRI's siding with Golkar, the mass media also focused on the issue. Soon after Syarwan's statement, *Suara Merdeka*, the leading Semarang newspaper, accused him of arbitrarily dichotomising ABRI as a defence force and a sociopolitical force. Its editorial cynically argued that, "however ABRI defines its role, it does not change the reality that ABRI was born from the *rakyat* (people), and thus must be neutral toward Golkar, PDI, and PPP, which all represent the people."¹¹⁰ Riswanda Imawan of UGM also stressed that

¹⁰⁶ See *Amanat Presiden Pada Pembukaan Rapat Pimpinan ABRI Tanggal 27 Maret 1980 Di Pekanbaru*, Jakarta: Departmen Penerangan, 1980, pp.6-7. The debate over Soeharto's speech is vividly analysed in Jenkins (1984).

¹⁰⁷ The law stated that "ABRI—as a social force—shall work together with other social forces in performing its tasks of safeguarding national independence and people's welfare..., and promoting Pancasila democracy and constitutional life based on UUD45" (Article 28/Law No.20/1982).

¹⁰⁸ For Subagyo's comment, see "Aspirasi Politik Keluarga Besar ABRI Tetap ke Golkar," *Suara Merdeka*, 4 October 1995. Megawati's account is from "ABRI tak Berprinsip Jika Netral," *Kompas*, 4 October 1995.

¹⁰⁹ A comment of Matori Abdul Djalil, the former Secretary-General of the PPP, quoted from "Langkah Mundur Jika ABRI Tetap Memihak Golkar," *Bernas*, 1 October 1995.

¹¹⁰ "ABRI Tak Bisa Hanya Memihak Salah Satu Kekuatan Sospol," *Suara Merdeka*, 1 October 1995.

the PPP and PDI were the products of the New Order just like Golkar, and claimed that Syarwan's announcement further blurred the legitimacy of *dwifungsi* which should be implemented in a neutral way as a tool for the state, not for the ruling political party.¹¹¹ Concern was also expressed in *Kompas* which ran four long articles in its October 5th edition, based on a panel discussion entitled "Reflections on the 50th-anniversary of ABRI." *Kompas* concluded that: "ABRI has already abandoned its neutrality, but given the fact that every political party now accepts Pancasila as its sole ideology, ABRI should reconsider its siding with one party and maintain the neutrality that is crucial to deter sectarian politics."¹¹²

From revolutionary generation officers, the 'deviation' argument was typically heard. Navy Lt-Gen (ret) Ali Sadikin, the head of the critical Petisi 50 group, declared that ABRI today was not the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia but the Armed Forces of Golkar (AB-Golkar), and insisted on the need to return to the spirit of Indonesia's first Army Commander Gen Sudirman who said: "the politics ABRI supports is the politics of the nation, not politics of the government."¹¹³ More direct censure came from Lt-Gen (ret) Kemal Idris, a man widely believed to have been one of the founders of the New Order political system in the mid-1960s under Soeharto. For him, Syarwan's comment was unacceptable and illustrated the arrogance of power which made power-holders believe "I can do no wrong." According to this former Commander of Kostrad (the army's elite strategic reserve command), Syarwan's view was not in accord with the intention of *dwifungsi* as officially formulated at the second Army Seminar in 1966, in which he himself had been deeply involved.¹¹⁴

The opposition point of view was argued by a respected ABRI intellectual, Maj-Gen (ret) Z.A. Maulani, former Pangdam VI/Tanjungpura (1988-1991) and former secretary-general of the Ministry of Transmigration, who was now Habibie's advisor on ABRI and defence-security issues.¹¹⁵ Appearing in *Kompas*, his argument questioned the current tendency to assume that ABRI-Golkar segregation would automatically promote democracy. He argued that ABRI was badly needed by Golkar to function as a binding force (*pengikat*) to hold together the various elements and factions within Golkar. He feared that Golkar's sectarian politics might explode if it freed itself from ABRI, which in turn would undermine the prospects for democracy.¹¹⁶

¹¹¹ "ABRI's Political Stance a Setback, Scholar Says," *Jakarta Post*, 6 October 1995.

¹¹² Diskusi Lima Pulu Tahun TNI/ABRI: Kredibilitas ABRI adalah Segala-galanya," *Kompas*, 5 October 1995. The Panelists were: Gen (ret) Rudini, Lt-Gen (ret) Soebijakto Prawirasubrata (former governor of Lemhannas), Syarwan Hamid, Juwono Sudarsono (vice governor of Lemhannas), Yahya Muhaimin, Marzuki Darusman, Indria Samego and Mochtar Pabottingi (the latter two from LIPI).

¹¹³ "Yang Terbaik Bagi Rakyat, Terbaik Bagi ABRI," *Forum Keadilan*, 23 October 1995.

¹¹⁴ "Kemal Idris: ABRI Terlalu Terlibat di Segala Bidang," *Forum Keadilan*, 23 October 1995. About the significance of the 1966 Army Seminar in formulating the *dwifungsi* doctrine, see Chapter 3.

¹¹⁵ Maulani's Golkar assessment might be not unrelated to the Habibie-Golkar tie.

¹¹⁶ See "ABRI Emas dan Tantangannya," *Kompas*, 6 October 1995.

While these opinions were essentially aimed at the operational problem of ABRI's political role, Arbi Sanit commented on principles. "There is nothing wrong with Syarwan's abandoning of neutrality because it is a natural consequence of having the dual function idea." The simple fact, according to Arbi Sanit, was that as long as *dwifungsi* existed, ABRI could not be neutral.¹¹⁷ His approach was to seek the cause of the problem in the existence of *dwifungsi* itself, rather than in its implementation. His analysis reflected the voice of civilian reformers who disagreed with those who argued that it was implementation, not principle, which was the source of the problem.

As the Golkar-ABRI debate fostered a critical mood in political society, General Feisal Tanjung returned to a simple pragmatic attitude. In a magazine interview, he asserted that there was no political activity without having partners; thus 'ABRI-Golkar' was a practical concept from this perspective. Asked further about how to distinguish between sociopolitical and defence forces, the ABRI Commander declared that they were overlapping and hardly distinguished.¹¹⁸ Despite frequent voices from ABRI leaders saying that ABRI as a sociopolitical force sides with Golkar whereas ABRI as defence force remains neutral, Feisal's statement suggested that the distinction had no meaning in the practical world, and ABRI's backing of Golkar would continue regardless of doctrinal niceties. In the public eye, this amounted to ABRI's rejection of self-defined legitimacy of *dwifungsi*.

Concern about the Sectarian Politics

Another aspect of ABRI's rapprochement with Golkar in 1995 was the growing influence of ICMI led by Habibie. This was related to what seemed to be the ongoing Islamisation of ABRI and its potential to erode the basis of Pancasilaism in the New Order's secular political practice. The top three men in ABRI, i.e. Feisal, Hartono and Syarwan, were widely seen as ICMI-affiliated figures.¹¹⁹ It is significant that they openly promoted closer ties to Golkar which was led by Harmoko who was also a member of ICMI's Advisory Board. This network of connections was enough to boost suspicions among secular officers within ABRI and in society about further Islamisation and ICMI-isation of political life and the threat this might pose to their political position. Such a concern was reflected in the creation of a new political association, the Foundation for National Brotherhood Harmony (YKPK), soon after ABRI's rapprochement with Golkar. On 23 October 1995, Lt-Gen (ret) Bambang Triantoro (former Kassospol [1985-87] under Moerdani), in his capacity as the general

¹¹⁷ "Arbi Sanit: Memiliki Tanggungjawab Penuh," *Bisnis Indonesia*, second week, October 1995.

¹¹⁸ "Feisal Tanjung: Dwifungsi Lestari Sepanjang Masa," *Forum Keadilan*, 23 October 1995.

¹¹⁹ Hartono was East Java Kodam Commander when ICMI was established in Malang (East Java), December 1990, and since then he was viewed in ICMI circles as an ICMI activist. He himself acknowledged ICMI as a national political organisation equivalent to the PDI. See his interview with *Forum Keadilan*, "Aku Bukan Satu-satunya yang Islam di ABRI," 2 March 1995.

chairman, announced the establishment of YKPK and explained at a press conference that it was motivated by growing concerns about national unity and integration.¹²⁰ This new grouping attracted much attention in political society, partly because it was seen as opposed to the sectarian ICMI and partly due to its high-profile participants.¹²¹ The establishment of YKPK was of course welcomed by the secular military officers, with General Edi Sudradjat describing it as "excellent because they are very much concerned with building up the national spirit."¹²² It was also publicly endorsed by MPR Chairman, Lt-Gen (ret) Wahono, Minister of Transmigration Siswono and Minister of Environment Sarwono, who were all commonly regarded as being in the 'nationalist' camp within the Cabinet. Equally interesting was the emerging prominence of senior officers who retired in the age of *keterbukaan*, such as Bambang Triantoro, Kharis Suhud and Samsuddin. The presence of these discontented officers significantly boosted the political role of retired offices in the organised public arena which had long been dominated by Petisi 50 figures. This phenomenon was encouraged by the growing concern about the split between ICMI and non-ICMI in political life, which was most recently facilitated by the ABRI-Golkar fusion led by Feisal and Syarwan.

It was not the first time for Edi Sudradjat to express his nationalist concerns during that year. In facing the visible decline of ABRI's credibility in society, Edi had stressed three times during the preceding three months the need for strengthening nationalism within ABRI—thus demonstrating his concerns about the sectarian tendencies within the military and its overt alliance with one particular political party. In July and again in August 1995, Edi warned that ABRI was now thought of as a "tool of the rich" given the reality that some ABRI members had close ties with business tycoons and therefore conveyed the impression that ABRI was not above manipulation.¹²³ On 8 September, addressing an ABRI Seminar, entitled "Actualisation of Struggle Values on the Occasion of Indonesia's Golden Anniversary and 50 Years of ABRI," Edi reiterated the need to cleanse ABRI and set it above suspicion in both the economic and political fields.¹²⁴ Edi's demand for housecleaning and heavy emphasis

¹²⁰ See *Tiras's* special report, "Dari Hotel Aryaduta Sampai ke Enteos Club," in its 2 November edition.

¹²¹ They included, for example, Lt-Gen (ret) Kharis Suhud (former Speaker of DPR/MPR, 1988-1993), Maj-Gen (ret) Samsuddin (former Head of F-ABRI), Gaffar Rachman (former Secretary General of Nahdlatul Ulama, or NU, the biggest Islamic organisation in Indonesia), Hasjim Wahid (brother of Abdurrahman Wahid, the NU Chairman), Marzuki Darusman (former Golkar politician now Deputy Chairman of National Human Rights Commission, or Komnas HAM, established by Soeharto after the Dili incident), and Kwik Kian Gie (prominent PDI economist).

¹²² "Menhankam: YKPK Sudah Lama Dinanti," *Kompas*, 25 October 1995.

¹²³ "Kredibilitas ABRI Tergantung Sikap ABRI Sendiri," *Kompas*, 21 July 1995; "ABRI: Berdagang, Jangan Berdagang," *Forum Keadilan*, 28 August 1995. Golkar had been backed by many business tycoons, including the Soeharto family.

¹²⁴ "ABRI Harus Bersih dan Berwibawa," *Bernas*, 9 September 1995. The proceedings of this seminar were later documented with a different title, "Aktualisasi Nilai-Nilai Kejuangan Bangsa dalam Rangka Menyukkseskan Pembangunan Nasional Jangka Panjang Kedua" (Makalah Hasil Seminar Nasional 50

on nationalism and probity apparently signalled his displeasure with the current leadership style in ABRI.

The Islamisation of the ABRI leadership itself was already a political topic since Hartono replaced General Wismoyo—a brother-in-law of Soeharto's wife—as KSAD in February 1995. The appointment of Hartono established the 'Feisal-Hartono duet' with the blessing of ICMI. Nevertheless, the concern about sectarian politics became somewhat more visible and intensified after the ABRI-Golkar rapprochement and the launching of YKPK with its counter-emphasis on nationalism unaffiliated with a particular religion.¹²⁵ Interestingly, Golkar members who joined YKPK were apparently among those marginalised by Harmoko due to their closeness with former Golkar chairman, Wahono. Of course in public, YKPK Chairman Bambang Triantoro denied the alleged intention to curb the runaway influence of Habibie and his ICMI, but in an interview he admitted that his 68-member grouping shared the thinking of Gen (ret) Moerdani—a leading anti-ICMI figure—though he was not involved directly in the establishment of YKPK.¹²⁶

Bambang's movement which was endorsed by Edi and 'shared' by Moerdani was soon viewed as an anti-ICMI rainbow group (*kelompok pelangi*). In response, Syarwan Hamid questioned the significance of YKPK. When asked about ABRI's perception of ICMI, he said that many in ABRI hoped that ICMI could bring Muslims—who comprised eighty-eight percent of the Indonesian population—into the mainstream of national development. At the same time, in replying to a question about the emergence of YKPK which enjoyed support from a group within ABRI, Syarwan warned that if it did not contribute to the national interest, the system would ostracise it and cause it to fade away before it could develop.¹²⁷ The gap in Syarwan's assessments of ICMI and YKPK was quite contrary to that of Defence Minister who saw the establishment of YKPK as fulfilling a 'need' to deepen the comprehension of the Archipelagic Concept, or *Wawasan Nusantara*, which respected national integration rather than group interests. According to Edi Sudradjat, *Wawasan Nusantara* was of the utmost value, but was now in question due to the manoeuvring of certain interest groups.¹²⁸ An actual attempt of the ABRI leadership to stifle YKPK occurred in connection with the First National YKPK Discussion held in Surabaya on 8-9 January in 1996, with the opening ceremony chaired by Wahono. Maj-Gen Iman Utomo, a close

Tahun ABRI, 6-8 September 1995, Sesko ABRI, Bandung). The content of this document will be examined in Chapter 4 for our analysis of ABRI's nationalist perception in the age of international interdependence.

¹²⁵ For the social backgrounds of YKPK members, see "Profile YKPK: Merah, Kuning, Hijau, di Langit YKPK," *Tiras*, 2 November 1995.

¹²⁶ "New Group to Counter Habibie Influence," *Reuters*, 25 October 1995. Bambang explained that both he and Moerdani were concerned about some groups in the regime which put religious interests before national causes (Interview, 16 December 1996).

¹²⁷ "Mayjen Syarwan Hamid: Yang tak Bermanfaat akan Layu Sebelum Berkembang," *Republika*, 9 December 1995.

¹²⁸ See his interview in "Ini Kan Suatu Kebutuhan," *Tiras*, 2 November 1995.

ally of Hartono, who had commanded Kodam V/Brawijaya, East Java, appealed to his soldiers, veterans, and Golkar members not to attend the discussion. All this showed that the emergence of YKPK reflected different perceptions and policy stances within ABRI, especially between the heads of two organisation, the Defence Ministry (Dephankam) and ABRI, and this gap was basically rooted in their contrary views on, and links with, ICMI.

After all, two issues discussed above, i.e. neutrality and sectarian problems, provided major themes in the debate as ABRI's rapprochement with Golkar became apparent. The rejection of neutrality by Syarwan and Feisal reinvigorated a political debate on ABRI's *dwifungsi* legitimacy. Moreover, a concern for the sectarian resurgence—which is examined here as the second dimension of ABRI's approach to Golkar—led to the formation of a new political movement countering ICMI's growing influence. Both provided perfect opportunities to expand political space for the concerned retired officers who became very assertive in the debate about the ABRI problem.

ABRI as a Golkar Cadre

If the divergence in perception between Menhankam, on the one hand, and the ICMI-aligned Pangab and KSAD, on the other hand, became increasingly apparent from early 1995, it was soon followed by signs of another gap, this time between Feisal and Hartono. In March 1996, when addressing a Golkar meeting in Central Java, where Siti Hardijanti Rukmana, or Mbak Tutut, the President's oldest daughter and a Chairperson of Golkar's Central Leadership Council, was also present, Hartono made a controversial statement in front of 5,000 Golkar cadres. He said: "every ABRI member is a cadre of Golkar and there is no need for them to be dubious about stating their allegiance to Golkar." Giving extraordinary praise to Mbak Tutut, he further said that: "as a Golkar cadre, my duty is to receive advice and instruction from Mbak Tutut."¹²⁹ Next day, on 14 March, at the Sabilil Muttaqien Pesantren (Islamic School) in Magetan, East Java, this former Commander of East Java again expounded his theory of ABRI-Golkar relations. After a speech by Mbak Tutut, Hartono, who was wearing a Golkar yellow jacket, declared in front of Golkar supporters that "Kodim commanders and regional police chiefs are members of Golkar's regional advisory council, which means that all their staff are also Golkar members." Since not only local

¹²⁹ "KSAD: Setiap Anggota Abri Kader Golkar," *Kompas*, 14 March 1995. Officially Siti Hardijanti was only one of eight chairpersons (*Ketua-Ketua*) under General Chairperson (*Ketua Umum*) Harmoko. Thus Hartono's statement which bypassed Harmoko in declaring ABRI-Golkar fusion could also be understood as a statement of his personal loyalty to Siti.

commanders, but even the ABRI Commander was a member of the Supervisors' Council, he concluded that all ABRI members were in fact Golkar cadres.¹³⁰

Although ABRI leaders often pointed out that ABRI had established Golkar, Hartono's remarkable statement was the first in which a high-ranking military officer had implied ABRI's subordination to Golkar in such an explicit way. It was also quite contrary to Hartono's own previously expressed views which, as seen above, had rejected Harmoko's statement—that the KBA was an organisation of Golkar cadres—by insisting that only individuals in the KBA were Golkar cadres. However, this re-interpretation of Golkar-ABRI relations was quickly corrected by the Cilangkap circle in the following days, indicating that Hartono had overstepped ABRI's standard civil-military theory, and also exceeded his capacity as Army Chief by talking as if he represented all four services within ABRI.

The next day General Feisal Tanjung explained that ABRI members who joined Golkar did so to 'supervise' it, meaning he rejected Hartono's view on subordination, and it was only the KBA—not ABRI as a whole—that was affiliated with Golkar.¹³¹ Hartono's apparent eagerness to receive instructions from one of the Golkar Chairpersons and his view that ABRI members from top to bottom were cadres of Golkar was thus neutralised by Feisal who felt it necessary to restore the KBA to its position as an intermediary between Golkar and ABRI. Then on 17 March, Syarwan Hamid, who was recently promoted to Kassospol ABRI, replacing Lt-Gen Moch Ma'ruf, made an official announcement on behalf of the Pangab.¹³² The military spokesman for sociopolitical affairs firmly announced that it was the KBA which became a Golkar cadre, and said that Hartono's statement was made in his personal capacity, not as Army Chief.¹³³ Such dissociation from Hartono's statement that

¹³⁰ "Hartono: Frivolous Questions About Golkar Allegiances Cause of Concern," *Kompas Online*, available [http: <http://www.kompas.com/>](http://www.kompas.com/), 15 March 1996.

¹³¹ "Feisal Tanjung: ABRI Tetap ABRI," *Kompas*, 16 March 1996.

¹³² Along with Syarwan's promotion, a large scale personnel change was conducted during January and February 1996 which affected about a hundred officers. Prior to this major personnel rotation, replacement of the Special Force Commander (DanKopassus) occurred in December 1995. Presidential son-in-law Brig-Gen Prabowo Subianto (Deputy Commander of Kopassus) replaced Maj-Gen Soebagyo as the Commander of Kopassus, while the latter moved to Pangdam IV/Deponegoro. Both Prabowo and Soebagyo were said to be closer to Hartono than to Feisal. Prabowo and Hartono jointly operated a political think-tank, CPDS. According to Feisal, ABRI would have no major reshuffle until the general elections in May 1997. However, there were subsequent waves of personnel rotation in March and August 1996, contradicting Feisal's earlier statement. These changes generated a concern about ABRI's weakening cohesion. It was Maj-Gen Theo Syafei who openly questioned this issue. At a DPR meeting in March, this anti-ICMI general pointed out the growing distortion in the current personnel management caused by political influence; he was referring to Soeharto's political manoeuvring, which had placed loyal officers to top military posts. Theo insisted that the recent reshuffling resulted in the "inflation of generals" (*inflasi jenderal*) and a shortage in the number of posts available for the general-ranking officers. See *Forum Keadilan's* special report on this issue, "Bila Gerbong Mutasi Macet di Atas," in the 25 March edition. Edi Sudradjat responded to Syafei by saying that the question now was whether the pace of transfer was too fast or not, admitting the problem in personnel management. See "Pangab Mengenai Tiga Letjen tak Punya Jabatan," *Kompas*, 6 March, 1996. Maulani also agreed that the pace of transfer during this period was abnormal. See his "Regenerasi ABRI 1995-1996," *Profile Indonesia* (Jurnal Tahunan CIDES), No.2, 1996, p.139.

¹³³ "ABRI Sebagai Kekuatan Sospol dan Hankam," *Suara Pembaruan*, 18 March 1996.

"ABRI members are Golkar's cadre from Pangab to Kodim" gave rise to two questions in the political community. First was speculation about the gap between the Habibie-Harmoko-Feisal-Syarwan line and the Siti-Hartono line. The other was the fact that Hartono's extreme statement consequently allowed Cilangkap to drop its inhibition about declaring its backing for Golkar. In other words, by correcting Hartono's extreme theory, both Feisal and Syarwan obtained a chance to adopt a position somewhere between Hartono and their own previous stance. Now there was no hesitation to declare openly that ABRI supported Golkar, though denying its subordination to Golkar.

This new position, however, soon alarmed the Defence Minister. When asked about Hartono's controversial statement and the subsequent explanation by Syarwan Hamid, Edi Sudradjat implied his disagreement by saying that ABRI should work with other sociopolitical forces and not just Golkar to help develop the nation.¹³⁴ Referring to the Law No.20/1982, Edi stressed ABRI's neutral attitude towards all political parties and the supremacy of the law over any other considerations.¹³⁵ Edi's critical stance was also backed by several retired generals and civilian leaders. For example, Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib argued that: "if ABRI sides with one group, it does not need F-ABRI any more." "Law No.20/1982," Hasnan continued, "neither allows civilian nor military supremacy, so ABRI can never be a cadre of the civilian Golkar."¹³⁶ A YKPK activist, Maj-Gen (ret) Samsuddin, also stressed the inconsistency with ABRI's official doctrine, by maintaining that ABRI's triple commitment—Pancasila, Constitution and "people's security and prosperity"—was the basis of ABRI's dynamising role in society, thus precluding ABRI from siding with one group whatever it was.¹³⁷ Criticisms were also aired in the PDI which had actually experienced ABRI's heavy intervention in its East Java Chapter in regard to the leadership split between pro- and anti-Megawati factions. PDI legislator Marcel Beding voiced concern that if Hartono's statement became official policy, a whole range of political laws would have to be overhauled, and F-ABRI would have to be scrapped because ABRI would be able to channel its aspirations through Golkar. Sophan Sophian of the PDI added that if Hartono's view prevailed, the PDI would withdraw its support for ABRI's *dwifungsi*.¹³⁸ The Petisi 50 soon sent a letter to the DPR, saying that Hartono's stance contradicted

¹³⁴ "ABRI tidak Hanya Berjuang dengan Golkar," *Suara Pembaruan*, 25 March 1996.

¹³⁵ Edi's comment, however, should be interpreted in the context of power struggle with the pro-ICMI forces, rather than as a simple legal argument. Note that he had suggested the nomination of ABRI candidates for the position of the Golkar Chairman in 1993, which would work to secure ABRI's influence in Golkar.

¹³⁶ "Sekadar Menghebohkan Hubungan ABRI-Golkar," *Forum Keadilan*, 8 April 1996.

¹³⁷ *Ibid.*

¹³⁸ "Army Stance on Golkar Draws Fire," *Jakarta Post*, 15 March 1996.

the spirit of ABRI as codified in Sapta Marga and Sumpah Prajurit, and asking that the DPR demand that Soeharto review Hartono's position as Army Chief.¹³⁹

Responding to these criticisms, Syarwan and Hartono finally restored an interpretation which technically segregated 'individual' from 'institutional' participation. It is obvious, according to Syarwan, that Law No.20/1982 required ABRI to work together with other sociopolitical forces to develop the nation, thus making the relations among them like a family where every family member should be treated equally. However, variations exist within the family, as if it has a father, mother, brother and so on. It was in reference to this family metaphor that Syarwan justified ABRI's right to choose, *primus inter pares*, a partner (*mitra*) such as Golkar, whereas in the family as a whole there is impartiality.¹⁴⁰ Hartono's reasoning was more direct, as seen in his interview with the weekly *Tiras* a few months later. In defending his earlier position, Hartono argued that ABRI as an institution and the members of ABRI should be understood as separate and distinct. "The former cannot differentiate one group from others, but the latter can do so; thus Hartono as an individual is a cadre of Golkar."¹⁴¹

These interpretations differentiating between individuals and institutions seemed to reflect ABRI's determination to acquiesce in Soeharto's political program involving Golkar-ABRI cooperation to ensure that the coming general election could run smoothly and predictably as a necessary step to secure his presidential re-election in 1998. However, ABRI's pursuit of this Soeharto project, led by Feisal, Syarwan and Hartono, was inevitably accompanied by the built-in cost of highlighting the *dwifungsi* problem in society. Since ABRI officers had rationalised *dwifungsi* as necessary to safeguard the 'national' interest and therefore required it to stand 'above all groups,' ABRI's declared siding with Golkar during this period was seen as an implicit rejection of *dwifungsi* legitimisation. As we have seen, debate on this issue exploded and expanded discursive space in political society to legitimately—and directly—criticise the core principle of *dwifungsi*.

Furthermore, ABRI's overt backing for Golkar under the Feisal-Hartono leadership had three consequences: (1) it exacerbated the split within the elite (namely between ICMI and secular-nationalist camps); (2) it strengthened ABRI's public image as a mere tool of Soeharto's private interests; and (3) it brought to the surface the cleavage within the military leadership—respectively between Feisal and Hartono, who had different partners in Golkar, and between them and Edi Sudradjat. From this moment, a visible trend in the *dwifungsi* discussion was its growing focus on the second

¹³⁹ "Petisi 50 Menggugat Hartono," *Indonesia-L* (Online Mailing List), Available E-mail: <apakabar@clark.net>, 29 March 1996. Literally, Sapta Marga is ABRI's Seven Pledges to dedicate itself for the national interest, and Sumpah Prajurit is the Soldiers' Oath. Both are ABRI's traditional ethical codes. See Appendix 2 for details.

¹⁴⁰ "Debat: Dalam Sospol, ABRI Netral atau Tidak?," *Forum Keadilan*, 22 April 1996.

¹⁴¹ "Kasad Jenderal (TNI) R. Hartono: Pakai Jaket Kuning, Itu Hak Saya," *Tiras*, 7 November 1996.

aspect, while the first and third aspects resulted in an increase in the number of elite actors—especially retired officers—who publicly criticised policy deviations by the military leadership. This contributed to the maintenance of autonomous space for critical discourse in the Soeharto regime. Facing these movements, the ABRI leadership was totally unable to control the deepening and widening of *dwifungsi* criticism. One result of this was the dogmatisation of ABRI's response to critics.

The July 27 Riot and Red-Purge

ABRI's dogmatic response to critics was very apparent in the so-called '27 July Affair' which saw ham-fisted and praetorian state intervention in the affairs of the leading opposition party, the PDI, which involved the ouster of Megawati as leader of the party. This event illustrated Soeharto's political strategy to defeat the charismatic daughter of Sukarno in preparing for the 1997 general election and the 1998 presidential election. We will see how ABRI's obvious subordination in this scenario reignited the debate on *dwifungsi* and how ABRI responded in a dogmatic way. In order to assess these developments, this section investigates the 27 July Affair and the next section examines the critical debate.

Megawati was elected as the PDI chairperson at the end of 1993. It was Soeharto who had ordered the overthrow of the former party chair, Soerjadi, whose achievement of boosting PDI votes in the 1992 general election encouraged him to be assertive in demanding several reforms to the electoral system and presidential selection procedure (from 'consensus' to voting) at the 1993 MPR sessions. Having received orders from Soeharto, Pangab Feisal Tanjung intervened in the party congress at Medan in July 1993 but it failed to dislodge Soerjadi. ABRI then pressured the PDI's regional councils to put forward an alternative candidate for the party chairperson. Ironically, they nominated Megawati and ABRI soon reacted to prevent the party officially endorse Megawati as the party chairperson. The struggle continued until December 1993 when ABRI finally approved a party conference in Jakarta which decided on Megawati as the new head of the PDI.¹⁴²

It was three years later that another PDI Congress was set up in Medan by General Feisal Tanjung, clearly under the instruction of Soeharto—this time to topple Megawati and reinstate Soerjadi. This congress was held on 20-22 June and officially backed by the Interior Minister Yogie SM and Feisal Tanjung who insisted that the PDI leadership conflict was still unsolved. The rebel congress elected former PDI chairman

¹⁴² Main officers who were involved in this affair were Brig-Gen Agum Gumelar (Director of Internal Affairs' Section in BAIS and simultaneously Kopassus Commander), Maj-Gen Hendropriyono (Pangdam Jaya) and Colonel Zacky Anwar Makarim (Assistant of Intelligence at Kodam Jaya). See footnote 39 in Chapter 5 about Agum's prominent role in this event.

Soerjadi to replace Megawati, and soon received government endorsement. Megawati then filed legal suits against senior government and military officials, including Yogie and Feisal, alleging they manipulated the congress in order to divide the party. She also launched a daily 'free speech forum' (*mimbar bebas*) at the party headquarters in central Jakarta. The forum was joined not only by Megawati's PDI supporters, but also student groups and NGOs which demanded democratisation. Bambang Widjojanto of the Indonesian Legal Aid Institute (YLBHI) defined the movement as "people's power"—suggesting an analogy with the anti-Marcos movement in the Philippines—and formed an alliance named MARI with other noted democratic activists.¹⁴³

As the free speech forum developed from an intra-party protest to an anti-Soeharto grass-roots movement, the ABRI leadership started to view the problem in security terms, warning Megawati supporters to stop the forum. Having received a request from Soerjadi to gain control of the PDI headquarters, Pangdam Jaya Maj-Gen Sutyoso announced on 25 July that any political action which disturbed law and order would be repressed. The following day, Syarwan warned that the forum had already evolved beyond a free speech meeting and was manipulated by an anti-government movement.¹⁴⁴ The next morning around 800 government-supported Soerjadi cadres and other unidentified men—with the help of security forces, possibly including elite Special Forces (Kopassus) personnel in mufti—physically took over the PDI building, sparking a two-day mass riot and clashes with military troops. Brig-Gen Zacky, as the Director of BIA's Internal Affairs Section, was also in charge of cleaning up Megawati-supporters in Jakarta. Nearly 200 people were arrested during the first day of the riot, and many of these remain missing.¹⁴⁵ A few days later, Maj-Gen Sutyoso issued a 'shoot-on-sight' order to his soldiers.

It was Cilangkap's interest to shift public attention from the ABRI-manipulated Medan Congress to the alleged masterminds (*dalang*) of the riot. At a special meeting held on 29 July, Feisal and Police Chief Dibyso Widodo reported to Soeharto that it was the PRD (People's Democratic Party) which had plotted the riot.¹⁴⁶ This was followed by an intense campaign to link PRD with communism, the *bête noire* of the

¹⁴³ MARI's (Majelis Rakyat Indonesia: People's Council of Indonesia) founding members included Muchtar Pakpahan of SBSI, the unofficial trade union; Mulyana W. Kusmah of FLBHI, another legal aid institute, and also the secretary general of the newly established independent election monitoring group, KIPP, led by former *Tempo* editor, Goenawan Mohammed; Budiman Sujatmiko of PRD, a student NGO which had recently declared itself to be a political party, and Yulius Usman of PUDI, another unofficial political party led by Sri Bintang Pamungkas. MARI soon declared its anti-*dwifungsi* manifesto.

¹⁴⁴ "Pangdam Jaya: Ganggu Kamtibmas, Aksi Politik akan Dihentikan," *Kompas*, 26 July 1996; "Kassospol ABRI: Aksi-aksi Akhir-akhir ini Merupakan Gerakan," *Suara Pembaruan*, 26 July 1996.

¹⁴⁵ *Harian Terbit*, extra-edition, 28 July 1996. According to the final report of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), the riot resulted in 5 deaths, 149 injured, and 23 missing. For the full Komnas document, entitled "Pernyataan Komnas Mengenai Peristiwa 27 Juli," see Santoso (coordinator), *Peristiwa 27 Juli*, Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi (ISAI) and Aliansi Jurnalis Independen (AJI), 1997, pp.59-65. The government banned this book on 14 February, 1997.

¹⁴⁶ The PRD was one of the most active participants in the *mimbar bebas*. The PRD had escalated its anti-New Order campaigns since the previous year and also led several labour-student demonstrations.

New Order government. Syarwan Hamid and his assistant, Maj-Gen Suwarno Adiwidjojo, explained that the riot had nothing to do with the Megawati-Soerjadi conflict, but was engineered by a third party (*pihak ketiga*)—identified as the PRD, whose political manifesto, organisational structure and action strategy resembled those of the banned PKI.¹⁴⁷ Internal dissemination of this theory within ABRI was conducted in more intense and direct ways. Kapuspen Brig-Gen Amir Syarifuddin wrote that previous riots and demonstrations—Irian Jaya in March, Ujung Pandang and West Kalimantan in April, Surabaya in July, and of course Jakarta on 27 July—had all been instigated by the communist PRD, while ABRI's Territorial Staff (Ster ABRI) concluded its analysis by insisting on the need to tighten regional security surveillance in anticipation of counter-actions by the underground members of the ultra-left PRD.¹⁴⁸ It seemed that ABRI was presenting the incident as a security disturbance led by the communist PRD in order to counter widespread perceptions that the incident was a consequence of ABRI following Soeharto's order to topple Megawati, the only politician with a chance to threaten Soeharto's stranglehold on Indonesian politics. Armed with this justification—saving the nation from communism—ABRI launched a security operation to crush the *hantu PKI* (PKI ghost).

Initially criticism of ABRI was mainly focused on this dogmatic ghost-hunting and the use of extreme military means as reflected in Maj-Gen Sutiyoso's order. A day after the riot, on 31 July, MPR/DPR Speaker, Lt-Gen (ret) Wahono, asserted that ABRI should limit its repressive behaviour because *dwifungsi* only succeeds when ABRI has public support.¹⁴⁹ Former KSAD Gen (ret) Rudini also insisted that the time had passed when ABRI could invoke the spectre of communism to justify repressive measures, and ABRI—if it wanted to do so—had to show strong evidence to support its accusations. Otherwise, he said that ABRI and the government would lose the people's trust.¹⁵⁰ Rudini's point was seized on by government critics who openly wondered why, if ABRI claimed to have known for some time that the PRD was communist, it waited until 27 July to smash the group. It was widely perceived that ABRI had acted in response to a request from the President who wanted to overthrow the *mimbar bebas* because it was talking about corruption at the nation's highest level.

The ghost-hunting strategy, however, generated new problems. Probably relying on a report in the weekly *Sinar*, the spokesman for East Java's Brawijaya regional military command, Lt-Col Soebagio, announced that ABRI had found that 25 percent

¹⁴⁷ See "Pemerintah akan Tindak Pelaku Kerusuhan 27 Juli" and "Gerakan Destruktif Ditunggangi Marxisme," both in *Kompas*, 31 July 1996.

¹⁴⁸ See Amir Syarifuddin, "Mewaspadaai Bangkitnya Kembali Gerakan Komunis di Indonesia," *Darma Putra*, Vol.37, 1996, pp.24-29; Staf Teritorial ABRI, *Tinjauan Teritorial*, No. Triwulan II, T.A. 1996/1997, pp. 11-19. *Darma Putra* is Kostrad's internal magazine, and *Tinjauan Teritorial* is the quarterly report of Ster ABRI (ABRI Headquarters' Territorial Section). Ster was headed by Territorial Assistant (Aster Pangab) Maj-Gen Arie J. Kumaat at that time.

¹⁴⁹ "Ketua DPR/MPR: ABRI Harus Kurangi Reaksi-reaksi Represif," *Kompas*, 1 August 1996.

¹⁵⁰ "Rudini: Semua Pihak Harus Menahan Diri," *Kompas*, 2 August 1996.

of the PRD's key activists were the offspring of people who had links with the outlawed PKI. He also referred to ABRI's ongoing investigation of the PRD's alleged connection with the Australian Labor Party (ALP), which he suspected had financed them.¹⁵¹ The following day, however, Syarwan Hamid revised this allegation by indicating that the PRD was supported by some Australian labour organisations without mentioning the ALP. Although backed by Soeharto's public announcement that the PRD resembled the PKI, the inaccuracy of ABRI's accusations was undeniable and strongly condemned by government critics.¹⁵² Moreover, the immediate replacement of Lt-Gen Soeyono, Chief of General Affairs (Kasum), who was hospitalised during the riot, following a motorcycle accident, suggested that the military might not have been united on the matter of 27 July. Soeyono, a former presidential adjutant, implied in his interview with a weekly magazine that a gap existed within ABRI about its role in the government-manipulated political infighting.¹⁵³ Clearly, the July 27 incident and the subsequent security operation revealed ABRI's internal problems both in terms of information gathering and operational conduct, which were naturally interpreted by mass media as reflecting ABRI's internal disharmony.

Meanwhile, the ABRI-launched anti-communism campaign began to be exploited in intra-elite political manoeuvring. The report on the PRD—which was sent from CIDES and reprinted in *Sinar*—attempted to verify the communist nature of the PRD, but it seemed to backfire when the director of CIDES, Adi Sasono, himself was rumoured as being involved in the PRD and communist activities, which he of course denied.¹⁵⁴ The invisible war still continued as a theory linking the PRD and Liberation

¹⁵¹ "Australian Labor Party's Link with PRD Studied," *Jakarta Post*, 5 August 1996. *Sinar*, in its August 3 edition, printed an organisation map of the PRD, which showed the ALP's indirect link with the PRD via Amnesty International. This allegation, however, ignored the fact that the ALP government was headed by Keating who was very sympathetic to Soeharto. The map was not the original work of *Sinar*, but a reprint of a paper sent to some press centres by a fax from the Centre for Information and Development Studies (CIDES), the think-tank of ICMI. This CIDES paper emphasised the PRD's links with the PKI, by suggesting the PRD's closeness to Sabron Aidit, a nephew of an ex-PKI leader, D.N. Aidit. However, D.N. Aidit, who died 30 years ago, only had a younger brother (no nephew) whose name was Sobron (not Sabron) who lives in Paris.

¹⁵² YLBHI, for example, declared in a statement that ABRI allegations about ex-PKI offspring in the PRD, such as Budiman Sudjatniko, Garda Semiring, and Andi Arief were inaccurate because none had fathers linked with the PKI. In fact, their fathers were, respectively, an activist in the Hisbullah Moslem movement during the independence war, a retired army officer, and a member of the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). See "Soeharto Labels PRD Insurgent," *Jakarta Post*, 8 August 1996. Inaccuracy of ABRI information, especially the BIA source, is suggested in *Peristiwa 27 Juli*, p.39.

¹⁵³ Soeyono, replaced by Lt-Gen Tarub on 8 August, recalled that he was informed by Police Chief Dibyo Widodo that Soeharto was angry with him, and that he was not considered supportive of the operation of July 27. When asked about why an ardent anti-communist campaigner, who had alerted attention to alleged communist infiltration in society earlier in the year, would have his loyalty questioned, he answered that it was perhaps related to the "killing the sitting duck games." This was a popular expression to describe a trend to exclude officers close to the former ABRI leadership during the Edi Sudradjat and Benny Moerdani eras. See "Ini Killing the Sitting Duck Games," *Tiras* 22 August 1996. It was also alleged that Soeyono rejected a request for funding (around 500 million rupiah) from Maj-Gen Sutiyoso to conduct the July 27 operation. "Dan Letjen Soeyono pun Diganti," *Tiras*, 22 August 1996. *Tiras* experienced severe pressure from ABRI's information section when this edition was published.

¹⁵⁴ "Adi Sasono: Dageelan Kalau Saya Diisukan Ikut PRD," *Media Indonesia*, 23 August 1996.

Theology—which was allegedly introduced by radical Catholic groups—soon spread. This theory implied that the PRD's activity was a product of cooperation between left-wing and radical Catholic elements.¹⁵⁵ It was also in this context that YLBHI, in mid-September, received insistent demands from some Islamic groups to reopen the investigation of the Tanjung Priok incident in 1984, in which hundreds of Muslim people were killed at the time when ABRI was under the leadership of General Benny Moerdani, a Catholic. ABRI's political project was quickly exploited by civilian political struggle, and this greatly complicated the issue, as it blurred the origin of the problem—i.e. ABRI's intervention in the PDI.

The PRD case revealed that the politics of symbolism was a shared method in the political game regardless of ABRI or non-ABRI affiliation. In celebrating Pancasila day on 1 October, Jakarta's main street, Jalan Soedirman, was decorated with large colourful posters warning of *Bahaya Laten Komunisme* (danger of latent communism) presenting a chronological portrait of alleged communist insurgencies; Madiun 1948, G30S/PKI 1965, and PRD 27 Juli 1996.¹⁵⁶ From ABRI's perspective, it was hoped that invoking the powerful symbol of a resurgent communism would allow it to neutralise any civilian activist who still insisted on the removal of severe political regulations and the *dwifungsi* system. For civilian democratic forces, this situation was a major setback for democratisation.¹⁵⁷

Reflections of the PDI Affair in the *Dwifungsi* Debate

In terms of the *dwifungsi* debate, the PDI incident provided ammunition for the critical retired generals whose role was spotlighted in the Golkar-ABRI debate earlier in

¹⁵⁵ The fact that the PRD leader, Budiman Sudjatmiko, was arrested at the house of Romo Sandyan, director of a Catholic-linked NGO, Jakarta Social Institute, became the basis of this theory. It was argued that Romo was a follower of Liberation Theory which took a Marxist approach to social problems. See "Bayang bayang Teologi Pembebasan," *Gatra*, 31 August 1996. Din Syamsuddin of the CPDS argued that the situation of East Timor could be the fertile soil for liberation theology in Indonesia, and criticised Romo's backing of Budiman. See "Romo Sang Pelindung," *Gatra*, 31 August 1996. Amir Santoso, the director of the CPDS, more broadly argued: "many Muslims now believe that the coalition between left-wing and secular groups is aimed at undermining the political influence of Islam and replacing Soeharto-ABRI which is thought to give an opportunity to Islam." See his article "Kegeraman 27 Juli," *Forum Keadilan*, 9 September 1996. They saw the shadows of CSIS—a think-tank led by Chinese Indonesians (many of whom were Catholics)—and Benny Moerdani, who associated with the CSIS after retirement, in the recent emergence of secular-nationalist groups.

¹⁵⁶ Personal observation, Jakarta, 1 October 1996. Note that the posters put the PRD next to the 1965 event, deliberately omitting other cases during the last 30 years, which were claimed by ABRI as communist-led events. This was to make a propaganda that says the current issue is as serious as the attempted coup in 1965. We will examine ABRI's ideological projects in Chapter 5.

¹⁵⁷ Both Buyung Nasution and Goenawan Mohammad believed that, under the anti-PRD campaign, ABRI could easily arrest them regardless of possible international criticism. Buyung also said that KIPP's activity to enlighten people about the need for fair conduct of the 1997 election virtually stopped due to these pressures, whereas Goenawan insisted that KIPP just decided to take a low-profile approach. Interviews with Buyung Nasution, 11 September 1996; Goenawan Mohammad, 5 December 1996.

the year. Throughout the affair—from the Medan congress to the 27 July operation, the shoot-on-sight order, and the red-purge campaign—the old soldiers had voiced concern about what they saw as ABRI's deviation from its doctrinal origins. It was during this short period that society firmly witnessed the intensifying conflict between various retired officers and the current military leadership. Under these circumstances, civilian intellectuals led by LIPI publicised the first systematic demands in the history of New Order for *dwifungsi* reform. This demonstrated that *dwifungsi*'s critics not only enjoyed an autonomous political space to conduct their campaigns under the authoritarian system but that they were now also capable of turning the civil-military debate in a way that prevented ABRI from reacting dogmatically.

Prominence of Retired Generals

It was soon after the Medan congress that the high-profile YKPK with Abdurrahman Wahid in attendance held a press conference on 1 July 1996 to announce their statement of concern, entitled 'Return to the Glorious Ideals of the Nation.' The statement was signed by 24 public figures, including civilian activists from mass organisations, and submitted to Wahono, Speaker of the DPR/MPR. A few days later, General Edi Sudradjat backed the move by stating that national stability could never be built on authoritarianism.¹⁵⁸ Criticism from retired officers grew louder following the subsequent repression and red-purge during July and August. In response, Soeharto was said to have complained that retired officers often voiced ideas opposing Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution, and that they made statements which were not consistent with their actions and views when they were on active duty.¹⁵⁹

It was Edi Sudradjat who first responded to Soeharto's reported remarks by insisting on the need for constructive criticism from retired officers to fertilise democracy, whereas Lt-Gen (ret) Solichin GP, former Akabri Governor, defended outspoken figures such as Bambang Triantoro, Kharis Suhud, and A.H. Nasution by saying, "...they criticise for the well-being of the nation, so the regime should not consider those who criticise as the enemy; it will be a loss for everyone in the country." Nasution himself defended the criticism by retired officers, arguing that if one is still committed to Pancasila and UUD45, being critical is quite logical.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁸ "Menhankam: Stabilitas Nasional tak Dibangun di Atas Kekuasaan yang Otoriter," *Kompas*, 6 July 1996.

¹⁵⁹ Soeharto's comment was not announced by himself, but through Tanyo AP Sudharmono, son-in-law of former vice president Sudharmono and the head of youth wing in MKGR, one of three founding organisations of Golkar, who had just had a meeting with Soeharto and quoted his words at a press conference. However, those who knew Soeharto questioned the credibility of Tanyo's comment. Gen (ret) Benny Moerdani, for example, argued that "such a comment could never come from Soeharto because it was totally against his political style." Interview, 23 September 1996.

¹⁶⁰ For the above comments, see "Criticism from Retired Officials Needed, Edi Says," *Jakarta Post*, 13 September 1996; "Letjen TNI (Purn) Solichin GP: Sikap Kritis Semata-mata Membantu," *Kompas*, 25 September 1996; "AH Nasution: Ketidakadilan Sosial Musuh Paling Besar," *Suara Pembaruan*, 28 September 1996.

In response, Menko Polkam Lt-Gen (ret) Soesilo Sudarman, who also headed Pepabri, supported Soeharto's remarks by maintaining that some retired officers tended to behave in inconsistent ways if judged from Pepabri's view. Sudomo also showed his annoyance, saying, "... if retired generals want to correct the nation and its development, they should direct their views to the president rather than advertise their problems in the mass media, as I have suggested to Petisi 50." General Feisal Tanjung echoed this stance toward outspoken retirees. Recalling the 27 July riot, he saw the real problem as arising from the ideological distortion generated by the so-called "rainbow alliance" (*aliansi pelangi*) with the communist PRD as its rising-star. He then blamed recent political-security fluctuation on the PRD which he branded as radical and anti-New Order-ABRI; thus he concluded, in a dogmatic way, that the group was trying to replace Pancasila and UUD45. He stated that this unfavourable political condition was facilitated by individual retired officers, stressing that they were deviating from military discipline and loyalty.¹⁶¹

Feisal's remarks, however, invited harsh reactions from retired officers.¹⁶² As if challenging Feisal, retired generals became more assertive in criticising *dwifungsi*, not only in the media but particularly at ABRI's internal meetings. In early September, the 1996 ABRI Seminar was held. The seminar was designed by Cilangkap to receive *masukan* (input) from several experts regarding ABRI's policy preparation for the Seventh Development Cabinet starting from 1998. Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib objected to a statement written in ABRI's draft paper for the Broad Outlines of State Policy (GBHN) and requested its revision. Pointing to the original statement that said that the emerging criticism of *dwifungsi* in society was caused by a dichotomy between civilians and the military, Hasnan asserted that the real reason was not the dichotomy, but rather ABRI's obvious domination of national life, which restricted people's political participation. *Dwifungsi*, he continued, cannot stand on legal legitimacy alone but should be based on the legitimacy given by the hearts of the people. Furthermore, objecting to a section that claimed that Pancasila ideology was now threatened by communism, he contended that the threat was rather due to the government's arbitrary interpretation of Pancasila.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ For above comments, see "Di Depan Presiden Soeharto, Soesilo Akui Ada Purnawirawan Kurang Konsisten," *Republika*, 26 September 1996; "Ketua DPR Sudomo: Bila Ingin Melakukan Koreksi, Lebih Baik Langsung ke Presiden," *Kompas*, 26 September 1996; "Pangab, Soal Purnawirawan tak Konsisten: Mereka Ekstradisiplin dan kontraloyalitas," *Republika*, 27 September 1996. Feisal, however, did not identify the retired officers.

¹⁶² Special coverage on this issue can be found, for example, in "Aksi dan Reaksi Para Mantan Jenderal," *Forum Keadilan*, 7 October 1996, and in the weekly tabloid, *Swadesi*, "Tuding-menuding Siapa yang Tidak Konsekuensi Melaksanakan UUD45 dan Pancasila" (4-10 October 1996). For the next few months, interviews of outspoken retired generals—who all condemned Feisal's statement—appeared in the media.

¹⁶³ See Hasnan Habib, "Pembangunan Nasional Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita-VII (Tanggapan)," paper prepared for ABRI Seminar, Jakarta, 3 September 1996. This ABRI seminar is discussed in the following chapters in detail.

Two months later, ABRI's Staff and Command College (Sesko ABRI) held a seminar, entitled 'Actualisation of ABRI's Sociopolitical Role,' to which noted retired officers and civilian intellectuals were invited. Gen (ret) Rudini, who had established the private Indonesian Institute for Strategic Studies (LPSI), on this occasion claimed that the concept of *dwifungsi* should be renewed to cope with new social developments.¹⁶⁴ Lt-Gen (ret) Harsudiono Hartas, former Kassospol, also argued that *dwifungsi* now deviated from its ideal. If such deviation continued, he concluded, it might also undermine ABRI's traditional value as a freedom-fighter.¹⁶⁵

On the same day as the Sesko ABRI seminar, the Army Staff and Command College (Seskoad) in Bandung also held a panel discussion on *dwifungsi*. One of the panelists, Maj-Gen (ret) Z.A. Maulani, presented a critical approach to the current conduct and interpretation of *dwifungsi*, but from a different angle. He argued that ABRI's role as stabiliser and dynamiser in national life should be redefined because the former was no longer the monopoly of the military in present stable conditions, and the latter was needed to realise *tut wuri handayani*. Moreover, he pointed to the influence of business-capitalist groups in ABRI as, for example, in land conflicts and industrial relations where ABRI sided with capitalist groups. He warned that the coalition between ABRI and various business and conglomerate interests had created a condition which was far from the army's original ideal, and undermined popular acceptance of *dwifungsi*.¹⁶⁶ Ironically, judging from the patterns of previous debates, if these arguments by Hasnan, Rudini, Hartas, and Maulani had been presented by civilian critics and NGOs, ABRI might have accused them of being too westernised, ignoring history, or possibly anti-*dwifungsi* and thus anti-Pancasila and subversive. These retired generals played an important role in countering in the growing dogmatism of the ABRI leadership. Responding to the intensive criticism at ABRI-sponsored seminars, Feisal Tanjung merely claimed that it was an irony of *dwifungsi* that its success invited criticism.¹⁶⁷

The LIPI Report: Civilian Control of the Dwifungsi Debate

As if to confirm Feisal's remark, a civilian group led by LIPI completed a 2-year research project concerning the political role of ABRI, and held a seminar in the end of February 1997. This event can be assessed as the second stage of the evolving *dwifungsi* debate after the Jakarta riot, following the series of internal military meetings.

¹⁶⁴ See Rudini, "Legitimasi Sosial Peran Sospol ABRI," paper presented at Sesko ABRI Seminar, Bandung, 4-5 November 1996.

¹⁶⁵ "Penerapan Dwifungsi ABRI Masih Sering Menyimpang," *Kompas*, 5 November 1996.

¹⁶⁶ See Z.A. Maulani, "Implementasi Fungsi Sospol ABRI pada Masa Kini dan Masa yang Akan Datang," paper presented at the panel discussion, Forum Kajian Dwifungsi ABRI, Seskoad, Bandung, 5 November 1996.

¹⁶⁷ "Pangab Tentang Dwifungsi: ABRI Dipaksa Tanggung Beban dari Keberhasilannya Sendiri," *Kompas*, 23 November 1996.

When it was announced in February 1995 that LIPI had been asked by President Soeharto to conduct the research, public reaction was basically cynical because LIPI, a civilian organisation operating under the government, was hardly expected to produce any drastic reform proposal.¹⁶⁸ Despite such speculation, the LIPI report—edited by a research team coordinated by Dr Indria Samego—soon became a focus of *dwifungsi* discourse by proposing that F-ABRI should be abolished by the year 2007. This was the first official voice from 'within' a governmental organ that proposed total dismantling of military representation in the DPR by setting definite time limit.

The report compiled civilian views of *dwifungsi*, not only at the national level, but also including regional political elites as the target of research. The result provided an extensive analysis of current *dwifungsi* problems approached from various perspectives.¹⁶⁹ Backed by empirical data which distinguished it from typical petition-style papers, this civilian study presented systematic reform proposals. Among other things, the proposal to totally demilitarise parliaments both at the national and regional levels by 2007 attracted the attention of political society because of its similarity to the ideas of outspoken retired officers. Indria Samego promptly explained that: "in almost all regions we surveyed, members of F-ABRI were too numerous and they are assessed by the people as lacking regional commitment due to their prior loyalty to the military command structure."¹⁷⁰ In legitimising its proposal, and presumably to avoid possible attack, LIPI emphasised two points. One, the study was conducted on the direct orders of *orang nomor satu* (No.1 man: Soeharto), and two, it was empirically oriented and *melihat dari dalam* (viewed from within), asserting LIPI's objectivity and apolitical stance.¹⁷¹ LIPI's approach aimed to prevent ABRI from employing its usual dogmatic approach to shutdown communication.

Here, one interesting aspect was that, to defend its proposal, Indria actively borrowed ABRI's own conceptual distinction between *kekaryaan* and *dwifungsi*, which was originally invented to blur criticism of ABRI's takeover of non-military jobs, as we saw earlier in a statement by Brig-Gen Roekmini concerning "back-to-basics." Now using ABRI's own weapon, the LIPI team emphasised that *kekaryaan* was not ABRI's sociopolitical role and therefore it was not *dwifungsi* that was being questioned, but

¹⁶⁸ "Presiden Instruksikan LIPI Teliti Sistem Pemilu Terbaik: Perlu Dipikirkan, Jumlah Anggota ABRI di DPR," *Kompas*, 22 February 1995. When the project was announced by Sekneg Moerdiono, he emphasised the point that LIPI was a government body which should behave in responsible ways.

¹⁶⁹ For the contextual analysis of the report, see Chapter 6.

¹⁷⁰ Author's observation at the seminar, entitled "Seminar Hasil Penelitian 1996/1997: Pengkajian Masalah-Masalah Strategis di Bidang Politik dan Sosial Budaya," LIPI, Jakarta, 26 February 1997.

¹⁷¹ See Indria Samego (coordinator), "Peran Sosial Politik ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya," paper presented at the Seminar Hasil Penelitian 1996/1997 Pengkajian Masalah-Masalah Strategis di Bidang Politik dan Sosial Budaya, LIPI, Jakarta, 25-27 February 1997. In the evolving *dwifungsi* discourse, critical opinions from civilians had frequently been attacked by ABRI as the 'outsider's view,' implying that such criticisms were not based on Indonesian values, and thus could be interpreted as anti-Pancasila and thus a legitimate target of security operations. As seen above, such an 'interpretational overstretch' was most recently applied in the case of the PRD which overtly criticised *dwifungsi* in its political manifesto.

kekaryaan as a structural reality.¹⁷² Carefully managing the debate in order to avoid being labelled as anti-New Order, LIPI castigated the real institutional impediment which in fact resulted from *dwifungsi*. In other words, *dwifungsi* language was reproduced to criticise *dwifungsi*. In the developing *dwifungsi* debate since the beginning of *keterbukaan* in the late 1980s, civilians now seemed to have established a discursive technique to criticise ABRI in a way that did not initiate a dogmatic response. For the first time, it seemed that civilians were controlling *dwifungsi* discourse.

In fact, military reactions to the proposal were mostly technical, moderate and defensive. Z.A. Maulani, who participated in the seminar as a panelist, commented in a weekly magazine that LIPI's study was generally acceptable but he regarded setting a time-limit as unviable. Maj-Gen Hari Sabarno, Deputy Head of F-ABRI, emphasised his group's contribution to the DPR by pointing to social demands that ABRI remain in the parliament.¹⁷³ Maj-Gen Prabowo Subianto, Kopassus Commander, also responded by saying that whether *dwifungsi* should be limited or not depends on the people, not ABRI, but regarding the LIPI study, he questioned the validity of the methodology which did not include the voices of non-elites. Brig-Gen Slamet Supriyadi, who replaced Amir Syarifudin in the Kapuspen post in March, echoed ABRI's official rebuttal of this type of criticism. It was predictable, he said, that society would become more and more critical of the role of ABRI in the future, but whatever the situation, political power was neither dominated by civilians nor the military because ABRI's participation was adjusted in a proportional way.¹⁷⁴ From the civilian side, a noted ABRI watcher, Dr Salim Said, joined the criticism. Mentioning a point in the LIPI study that called on ABRI to encourage better governance, he questioned how it would be possible to play such a role if ABRI was—as suggested by LIPI—restricted to the defence-security field.¹⁷⁵

Regardless of the feasibility of the reform proposal, the fact that the LIPI team provoked an open debate on military withdrawal from the parliament put sufficient pressure on the Cilangkap circle for it to disseminate a 'correct' interpretation of *dwifungsi* prospects. Another seminar at Lemhannas regarding the future role of ABRI was held one month after the LIPI seminar. Let-Gen Hendropriyono argued that it was a fact that reorientation and redefinition of ABRI's political role were needed as ABRI, in facing globalisation, experienced the erosion of traditional values, especially *semangat perjuangan* (spirit of struggle). However, *dwifungsi* should remain because it aimed to promote democratic practice in national political life where societal

¹⁷² See Indria's interview, "Peran Itu Harus Jelas," *Gatra*, 8 March 1996.

¹⁷³ See, for Maulani's comment, "Gugatan Baru Untuk Dwifungsi ABRI," and Hari's interview "Perlu Reformasi Kultural," both in *Gatra*, 8 March 1997.

¹⁷⁴ Both comments are from "Dwifungsi Jalan Terus," *Tiras*, 24 April 1997.

¹⁷⁵ See his article, "Mengakhiri Dwifungsi?," *Gatra*, 8 March 1996.

democratic forces were still weak and fragmented.¹⁷⁶ This well-publicised seminar proposed an official version of the adaptation of *dwifungsi* to growing democratic demands, as if in response to LIPI's challenge, although it avoided reference to the year 2007 and only provided a conceptual explanation. This seminar marked ABRI's final acceptance of the need for reforming *dwifungsi*, but the questions of scope, pace and degree of reform remained.

The next major stage of the *dwifungsi* debate could be seen after the fall of Soeharto in May 1998. As we will see later, ABRI faced tremendous pressures to eliminate *dwifungsi* from ABRI's organisational practice. *Dwifungsi* would not only become an open topic for political discussion but became the principal target of political reform under the Habibie government. Why did it become so? In order to understand this development, we need to look at political events between the general election in May 1997 and the last day of Soeharto's rule on 21 May 1998. ABRI's internal unity was threatened and some elements turned to terror in handling the political situation. 'Disunity and terror' significantly weakened the military 'capacity and legitimacy' to lead the pace and direction of the post-Soeharto political reconstruction. The demand to abolish *dwifungsi* soon become a dominant discourse in political society. In the final two sections, we scrutinise developments up to Soeharto's presidential re-election in March 1998 in order to elucidate why *dwifungsi* was on collision course.

The 1997 General Elections: *Dwifungsi* as 'Destabilisor' and the End of New Order Corporatism

The general election of 1997 required military backing for the purpose of securing Golkar's landslide victory in the face of the growing public discontent with the regime's ouster of Megawati. ABRI's subordination to this project, as alluded to earlier, was accompanied by the intensification of *dwifungsi* criticism and a certain dogmatisation of the military response to democratic movements. Public criticism now included the demand for substantial reform of *dwifungsi*. The military's apparent inability, and even unwillingness, to maintain political stability during the eight months prior to the election day on 27 May resulted in an unprecedented series of mass riots spread around the archipelago.¹⁷⁷ Political society strongly suspected ABRI of

¹⁷⁶ Cited from Hendropriyono, "ABRI Sebagai Prajurit Pejuang Menghadapi Era Globalisasi," paper presented at the seminar "Perspektif Peranan ABRI Memasuki Abad 21," Lemhannas, Jakarta, 11 March 1997. For media coverage on this seminar, see "Dwifungsi Masih Relevan Untuk Dikaji," *Suara Pembaruan*, 3 April 1997. Hendropriyono at that time held a civilian post, Secretary for Operational Control of Development (Sekretaris Pengendalian Operasional Pembangunan, or Sekdalopbang) which was directly under Soeharto, but he was still on active-duty. He participated the seminar on behalf of Syarwan Hamid.

¹⁷⁷ Notable riots are as follows: Situbondo (10 October 1996), Dili (24 December), Tasikmalaya (26 December), Sanggau Ledo (30 December - 2 January 1997), Tanah Abang (9, 27 January), Pontianak (29

engineering some of the riots, and two cases in particular were confidently described by the media as being provoked by the military. This inevitably reinforced the public distrust of 'dwifungsi as stabilisor;' the very rationale of the New Order military in politics.

First, following the riots in Situbondo and Tasikmalaya, which were both known as NU strongholds, the NU leader and a major opponent of ICMI, Abdurrahman Wahid, claimed that riots had been instigated as part of what he called *Operasi Naga Hijau*, or Operation Green Dragon (green referring to Islam), which—according to Wahid—was a government attempt to discredit the NU and Wahid himself. This operation was portrayed as the next step after *Operasi Naga Merah* (Operation Red Dragon, referring to the PDI's symbolic colour of red) that had already toppled Megawati. In countering such pressure, Wahid publicly stated that he would form a coalition with the 'professional' side of the military to counter the 'political' side, implying ABRI's partial involvement in the riots.¹⁷⁸ A few days after the Tasikmalaya case, he insisted that: "there is an indication that the two riots were engineered by officers who used their staff in Korems to discredit my NU."¹⁷⁹ Of course such a conspiracy theory was denied by Lt-Gen Syarwan Hamid who asserted that Indonesia was no longer employing methods characteristic of the Kopkamtib era.¹⁸⁰ Instead, he suggested that the riots were masterminded by intellectuals, but avoided mentioning the names which were, according to him, already known to intelligence staff.¹⁸¹ Despite these measures, no one was actually identified as the *dalang* and the rioting broke out in other places after Tasikmalaya. Suspicion about ABRI's riot engineering also grew in political society.¹⁸²

January), Rengasdengklok (30 January), Rancaekek (31 January), Bandung (2 February), Sungaikunyt, near Pontianak (18 February), Pekalongan (24-26 March, 6 April), Temanggung (6 April), Rembang (6 April), Warung Buncit and Bekasi (20 May) Ciputat (23 May) Banjarmasin (23 May).

¹⁷⁸ For Wahid's covert operation scenario, see special reports in *Sinar* (11 January 1997), *Forum Keadilan* (10 February 1997), and *Tiras* (23 January 1997). See his comment on a coalition in "Gus Dur Predicted Presidential Election Will be Influenced," *Jakarta Post*, 30 January 1997.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Abdurrahman Wahid, 30 January 1997. It was not surprising if ICMI-linked generals found interest in discrediting Wahid. Situbondo, for example, was in the territory commanded by Maj-Gen Imam Utomo (Pangdam Brawijaya) and his chief-of-staff, Brig-Gen Muchdi Purwo Pranyoto at that time. Apart from Imam's closeness to Hartono, Muchdi was later known as Prabowo's partner. The anti-Wahid posture of the Hartono-Prabowo line was also strongly reflected in the orientation of their think-tank, CPDS, which saw Wahid as undermining Islamic aspirations by keeping ties with CSIS and Benny Moerdani (communication with a CPDS staff member, 18 September 1996).

¹⁸⁰ This comment implied that Syarwan identified Kopkamtib as an organisation which had instigated social riots to achieve certain political goals. This was the implicit criticism of Moerdani and his followers who had developed Kopkamtib until the late 1980s.

¹⁸¹ See "ABRI tak 'Main Api,'" *Kompas*, 17 January 1997. Sudomo, former commander of Kopkamtib, then expressed his opinion that Tasikmalaya could have been instigated by the group of extreme right (Islamic fundamentalists), such as younger generation of Darul Islam which was destroyed in 1960s. Syarwan denied this account since it was against his image-making that those who were involved in the riot were not Muslims but the radical left. See "Ekstrem Kanan tidak Terlibat," *Republika*, 22 January 1997.

¹⁸² After field research, Komnas HAM also concluded that *pihak ketiga* (third party) instigated the riots in Tasikmalaya and Sanggau Ledo in West Kalimantan. See "Third Party Masterminded Riot, Rights Body Says," *Jakarta Post*, 9 January 1997. These facts invited a view among Jakarta-based journalists that "the

Second, in the case of riots in Tanah Abang, Jakarta in January, Syarwan's earlier comment that ABRI was not involved in the riot was questioned by the mass media when local *preman* (hoodlums) living in the crowded Tanah Abang district spoke about their closeness to one of the rising generals, Maj-Gen Prabowo—although he denied the allegation in a national daily.¹⁸³ However, when another riot happened in Ambeno, 300 kilometres from Dili, in mid-February, Prabowo's link with the rioters was again publicised, because it was *pemuda* members of Garda Paksi Timor Timur, a Kopassus-established pro-integration organisation, who started the riot. This time, he was forced to explain his relationship with the youth organisation and announced that Kopassus never gave them military education or training, but only trained them in discipline and nationalism.¹⁸⁴ Whatever the relationship was, the disclosure that one army agency had an overt link with rioters in one case and a possible tie in the other sufficiently clouded Syarwan's efforts to eliminate the impression that elements in ABRI were *main api* (playing with fire).

Repeated announcements—during the eight months prior to the election—that riots were instigated by *pihak ketiga*, without successfully identifying the actor, posed questions about ABRI's principal role as the political stabilisor. Reflecting such an assessment, Christianto Wibisono, a critic of *dwifungsi* who also signed the YKPK-led "Statement of Concern on 1 July," wrote a lengthy article in which he concluded that: "it is nothing more than a myth to think that *dwifungsi* is a system unique to Indonesia, as always emphasised by ABRI. Rather it is not different from the military's political involvement typically seen in other praetorian military regimes."¹⁸⁵ His argument which labelled *dwifungsi* as a myth was surely a reflection of the reality that political society no longer accepted ABRI's claim to be the national stabilisor.

In the wake of continuing riots, the general elections of 1997 resulted in a victory for Golkar which got 74 percent of the votes (325 seats in the DPR), up from 68 percent in 1992. The PPP also increased its share to 23 percent (89 seats) from 17 percent in 1992, whereas the PDI, badly hit by a leadership battle between the ousted Megawati and government-backed Soerjadi, saw its share drop dramatically to 3 percent (11 seats) from 14.9 percent in the last election (Appendix 3). As a result, the

plotters' "hit-and-run" tactics were more professional than ABRI's territorial staff. "If we think of who could make such a job, there is only one answer; the special unit within the military." Communications with anonymous journalists, January-February 1997.

¹⁸³ "Danjen Kopassus: Saya Paling Anti-Preman," *Suara Pembaruan*, 26 January 1997. The Tanah Abang case was one of inter-gang conflict. Hercules, gang known as one of the largest *preman* groups in Jakarta, embraced many *pemuda* (youth) from East Timor, allegedly overlapping with those who were brought from East Timor by military officers to conduct pro-integration Timorese campaigns in Jakarta. Eagle Unit or *Ninja* is their code name in East Timor (*Tempo*, 7 March 1992). About Hercules, Timorese *pemuda* and their connection with the security apparatus, see "Preman Menguasai Tanahabang," *Kompas*, 2 February 1997.

¹⁸⁴ "Danjen Kopassus: Ada Kelompok yang Sengaja memicu Huru-hara," *Kompas*, 27 February 1997. Beyond such training, Garda Paksi Chairman, Marcal de Almeida, admitted that the organisation was set up with financial assistance from Prabowo to help find decent jobs. See "Viqueque Street Brawl Arrests Rise to 109," *Jakarta Post*, 15 February 1997.

¹⁸⁵ "Mitos Dwitunggal-Dwifungsi," *Suara Pembaruan*, 12 December 1996.

New Order polity was transformed to a *de facto* two-party system which consisted of the governmental alliance, Golkar and F-ABRI, which together occupied 80 percent of the DPR seats and one weak opposition party, the PPP. The election results also signified the virtual elimination of the PDI whose seat-share was only 2.2 percent. Therefore, the 1997 elections succeeded in securing the victory of Golkar but failed significantly to retain the New Order's traditional 'corporatist strategy' in which the political opposition was represented in the parliament by two tiny parties.¹⁸⁶ The government's failure to neutralise the opposition power of Megawati circles—due to the simple exclusion of them from parliamentary politics—resulted in the further expansion of opposition 'outside' formal political channels. Subsequent growth of the student movement strongly reflected public distrust of formal political mechanisms. It was in this process that street politics, which was confronted by the military's security operations, began to give priority to the elimination of *dwifungsi* as the core target of the movement, together with the removal of Soeharto. The elite demand for *dwifungsi* reforms in recent years was now in synergy with the expanding student movement which raised the clear slogan of abolishing *dwifungsi*. The 1997 general election, in this sense, provided significant momentum to such dynamics.

The 1998 MPR Sessions and Declining Cohesion within the Military

Once the election was over, Soeharto's military now focused on a new assignment with new players. Soeharto's command was obvious: securing his presidential re-election at the general session of the MPR in March 1998. The President made leadership changes to this end, but they significantly diminished ABRI's capacity to cope with the mounting social distrust of its political role.

The first wave of personnel transfers came soon after the 1997 election, when Hartono was replaced as KSAD by the Kostrad Commander and former presidential adjutant, Lt-Gen Wiranto, on 6 June.¹⁸⁷ Wiranto was succeeded at Kostrad by another ex-adjutant, Maj-Gen Soegiono, who had commanded the Presidential Security Squad (Paspampres). Finally, Pangdam IV/Depongoro Maj-Gen Soebagyo, a close associate of Hartono and a former Presidential bodyguard, was elevated to Deputy Army Chief (WaKasad) under Wiranto. Two significant facts could be perceived in this first post-election reshuffle.

First, through the transfers, Soeharto-loyalists, or Palace generals, dominated key positions in the security apparatus of ABRI: Wiranto as Army Chief, Widodo as

¹⁸⁶ About the New Order's long attempt to establish a corporatist network of interest articulation and political control, see, for example, King (1982) and MacIntyre's (1988:17-20) theoretical review.

¹⁸⁷ Hartono was appointed to replace Harmoko as Minister of Information whereas the latter became Minister for Special Affairs, a post newly created by Soeharto, while retaining the Golkar Chairmanship. In October, he was appointed as Speaker of DPR/MPR.

Police Chief, Prabowo as Kopassus Commander, and Soegiono as Kostrad Commander. Except for Prabowo, who was a son-in-law of Soeharto, all were former adjutants/bodyguards of Soeharto.¹⁸⁸ The leadership change within ABRI was Soeharto's final step to personalise the military command in order to secure his presidential re-election. It was perceived as a signal that *dwifungsi* practice would further become a tool of preserving Soeharto's personal political interests.

Second, Wiranto's promotion effectively smoothed the way for Akabri-graduates, as represented by Soebagyo (Akabri 1970) who became the first Akabri officer with a three-star rank, followed by Soegiono (Akabri 1971) whose promotion also made him a three star-general.¹⁸⁹ These officers only knew Soeharto as national leader, since their military schooling began after 1967 when Soeharto was already acting president. The rise of Akabri officers was also seen when Lt-Gen Syarwan Hamid and another 53 general-rank officers from all four services were transferred to F-ABRI for the DPR 1997-2002.¹⁹⁰ This move, which replaced the top two sociopolitical staff and four Kodam Commanders, was followed by a massive overhaul of ABRI's strategic posts, affecting nearly 300 officers. What attracted the attention of political society was the new sociopolitical leadership consisting of Lt-Gen Yunus Yosfiah (an AMN graduate of 1965) who replaced Syarwan and Maj-Gen Bambang Yudhoyono (Akabri 1973) who succeeded Budi Harsono. Bambang's function as the eventual spokesman for ABRI's future political program was generally welcomed in the political community, as an indication of Cilangkap's willingness to deepen civil-military communication.¹⁹¹ It was the largest wave of personnel change

¹⁸⁸ Maj-Gen Prabowo is the husband of Soeharto's second oldest daughter, Siti Hedijat Hariyadi. Soeharto relied much on Prabowo in handling internal military affairs—e.g. personnel transfers—especially after the fall of Moerdani. As we will discuss in later chapters, the rise of Prabowo, who had special access to the President, since the mid-1990s had created uncertainty in the promotion system within the army and become a major source of internal friction.

¹⁸⁹ The National Military Academy (Akademi Militer Nasional: AMN) was established in 1958 as a 3-year school. Since 1969, however, the program extended to 4 years with the new name, the Military Academy (Akademi Militer: Akabri). So the graduates after 1970 are called the Akabri generation. Wiranto graduated from the last AMN class in 1968.

¹⁹⁰ Among others, Maj-Gen Arifin Tarigan (Seskoad Commander), Maj-Gen Budi Harsono (Assospol Kassospol), Maj-Gen Sedaryanto (Pangdam I/Bukit Barisan), Maj-Gen Namoeni Anoem (Pangdam VI/Tanjungpura), Maj-Gen Tayo Tarmadi (Pangdam III/Siliwangi), Maj-Gen Imam Utomo (Pangdam V/Brawijaya), Maj-Gen Ahmad Rivai (Pangdam IX/Udayana). For the complete list, see "54 Jenderal Akan Isi Kursi F-ABRI DPR-RI," *Media Indonesia*, 12 July 1997. Syarwan was the only three-star general among them, implying that he would eventually lead F-ABRI in the MPR session in March 1997.

¹⁹¹ See Salim Said, "Dari Syarwan ke Yunus dan Yudhoyono," *Republika*, 16 July 1996. Bambang Yudhoyono, during his stint as Korem Commander in Yogyakarta, established contact with academic circles and intellectuals. Yunus was viewed as a temporary bridge to Bambang, given the fact that Yunus's promotion was against the direction of generation change, or *regenerasi*, which was insisted on by the ABRI leadership in explaining this reshuffle. Syarwan was an AMN graduate of 1966. Apart from the generation change, significant political aspects of this massive transfer were: (1) the replacement of six of the ten regional commanders and eight of the ten regional chief-of-staffs; and (2) the total reshuffle of Kostrad's top six positions. The former implied the elimination of Hartono-appointed officers while the latter worked to undermine the substantial power of Wiranto who was the Kostrad Commander before being promoted to KSAD.

since Hartono became KSAD in 1995. In August, Maj-Gen Zacky Anwar Makarim (Akabri 1971) became the head of BIA (KaBIA) and in September, Brig-Gen Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin (Akabri 1974)—a close associate of Prabowo—replaced Sutiyoso as Pangdam Jaya. These post-election personnel changes reinvigorated the debate on the declining legitimacy of *dwifungsi*, as the Akabri graduates had even less claim to historical legitimacy than the AMN graduates.

The hard fact was that the leading generation had changed and a group which had not been involved during the national crisis of the mid-1960s when the New Order regime was established was now in charge of the army. This invited further questions about the legitimate role of ABRI in future political life and the rationale of *dwifungsi*. As Indonesia's political community emphasised the professionalism and modernity of this Akabri group and distinguished it from preceding military generations, the changing of the guard could in turn be an opportunity for dismantling ABRI's historical legitimisation of *dwifungsi*. It was Gen (ret) Rudini who drew attention to the nature of the new generation of leaders in ABRI. He wrote that the Akabri-generation lacked 'basic principles,' namely a historical commitment which justified the privileges of the preceding generations to play a dominant role in politics.¹⁹²

In the view of the Minister of Defence and Security, such privileges were not limited to the broadly defined right of political intervention, but also included many opaque organisational practices. General Edi Sudradjat stressed to the succeeding generation that ABRI officers and their families were forbidden to conduct any business activity. "If there is one who is doing business," he said, "the commander should discipline him." "If he is not disciplined, the commander will instead be disciplined, as written in the military discipline rules."¹⁹³ Whether or not Edi's comment had any specific target was not clear, but the perception that the officers of the new generation should gradually relinquish social privileges was well reflected in Edi's unusual remark which resonated widely in society. Since one of the features of the Akabri generation officers was their high educational level, and some in key posts even held overseas Master's degrees, it was expected that their approach to *dwifungsi* management would be less dogmatic and more responsive to social change than their predecessors.¹⁹⁴ One observer of ABRI politics, Josef Kristiadi, head of the political

¹⁹² "Kolom Rudini: Angkatan 70-an Tanpa Prinsip Pokoknya," *LPSI Online*, available <http://www.lpsi.org/>, Edisi No.2, 21 August 1996. For the media coverage of Akabri-generation officers, see "Bintang-bintang ABRI Zaman Baru," *Gatra*, 25 November 1995; "Empat Mutasi di Tubuh ABRI dalam 50 Hari," *Republika*, 18 March 1996; "Meneropong Bintang Yang Kian Kemilau," *Forum Keadilan*, 9 September 1996

¹⁹³ "Perwira ABRI dan Keluarganya Tetap Dilarang Berbisnis," *Media Indonesia*, 16 July 1997. Perhaps having felt the need to defend his fellow soldiers, Pangab Feisal Tanjung soon responded by saying they can do business "if" they have special permits both from Pangab and Menhankam. See "Pangab: Perwira ABRI Boleh Berbisnis Dengan Izin Khusus," *Suara Pembaruan*, 22 July 1997. It was not, however, a strong argument since Edi had already rejected such a possibility.

¹⁹⁴ Overseas Masters degree holders were, for example, Feisal's adviser, Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo (Akabri 1970) (MAs, Georgetown University and Manchester University); Maj-Gen Bambang Yudhoyono (Akabri

department in CSIS, noted that figures around Wiranto—such as Bambang and the two Aguses—recognised a need to redefine *dwifungsi*, and such a mood had been getting stronger within ABRI.¹⁹⁵ It was perceived that not a small number of ABRI officers recognised the danger of the increasing personalisation of military commands by Soeharto, which weakened ABRI's capacity to protect its 'corporate' interest—i.e. promoting social legitimacy of *dwifungsi*. The rise of new intellectual officers, therefore, involved a potential challenge to the current Soeharto-ABRI relations constructed under the Feisal-Hartono leadership.

The possibility of such a move within ABRI was of course acknowledged by Soeharto himself. His balancing strategy had typically been implemented in a manner both to avoid ABRI as a whole becoming a cohesive challenger, and to keep every actor dependent on him. Quick personnel transfers and the continuing recomposition of ABRI's leadership had been the means to achieve this end. The recent series of reshuffles between 1995 to 1996, and tactical switching from the non-Islamic Moerdani-Edi line to the ICMI-affiliated Feisal-Hartono line, and then the less controversial Wiranto-led middle-way represented Soeharto's style. Even in this last case, Soeharto did not forget to put Soebagyo—a friend of Prabowo—directly under Wiranto.¹⁹⁶ For those who were concerned about Prabowo's political ambitions backed by Soeharto, Wiranto—who was regarded as a more professionally oriented officer—was the man to support, although he was a former Presidential adjutant. Soeharto, the master of 'divide-and-rule' strategy, let the intra-military competition go on in order to create the power balance which would make both sides rely on him. The new military leadership was arranged by Soeharto, based on this strategy, to ensure the smooth presidential and vice-presidential elections in March 1998.

Two lessons from the last two elections (in 1988 and 1993) were also reflected in this leadership change. First, Syarwan's move to F-ABRI seemed intended to ensure that F-ABRI did not take any independent action against Soeharto as happened in 1988 when—as seen above—a F-ABRI member, Brig-Gen Ibrahim Saleh, openly objected to Soeharto's choice of Sudharmono as vice-president at the MPR session. Second, Yunus's appointment as Kassospol was also seen as following a similar

1973) (MA in Management, Webster University); and Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah (Akabri 1973), nephew of former vice president Umar Wirahadikusumah, who assisted in ABRI's strategic planning, as Deputy Assistant for General Planning (Waasrum Pangab) (MA in Public Policy and Management, Harvard University). They worked together to design the back-to-basics curriculum in 1993, whereas Bambang and Agus Wirahadikusumah also coordinated the 1996 Army Seminar which formulated the Army's strategic plan for the next GBHN. We will fully examine their roles in the next chapter.

¹⁹⁵ "Wawancara J. Kristiadi: ABRI Sangat Tergantung pada Pangti," *Tempo Interaktif*, Online, available <http://www.tempo.co.id/min/07/utama2.htm>, Edisi 07/02, 19 April 1997.

¹⁹⁶ The relationship between Soebagyo and Prabowo was cultivated when they served as Commander and Deputy Commander of Kopassus. Also an officer who had a link with CPDS, Brig-Gen Robik, Head of Army Information Service (Kadinaspem AD), soon announced that the new leadership under Wiranto would continue Hartono's policy line. See "Tidak Ada perubahan Kebijakan di TNI-AD," *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 17 June 1997.

tactical line. In 1993, as mentioned earlier, Kassospol Lt-Gen Harsudiono Hartas announced Try Sutrisno as ABRI's candidate for vice-president, virtually ensuring Soeharto's reluctant endorsement. In contrast to Hartas who was an anti-Habibie general, Yunus was considered a Habibie supporter, especially after expressing his admiration for Habibie in a magazine interview.¹⁹⁷ Thus he was most unlikely to mobilise ABRI to resist Soeharto's wishes by opposing Habibie. As a result, Habibie was now guarded by military allies, i.e. Feisal, Syarwan and Yunus, which reflected Soeharto's calculations in regard to the vice-presidential race. These moves showed Soeharto's approach of *alon-alon asal kelakon* (slow but sure) to avoid the kind of ABRI-Soeharto antagonism that had been experienced in the vice-presidential elections in 1988 and 1993. Other conditions being equal, Soeharto's control of Kassospol and F-ABRI ensured that his wishes would be respected.

Together with these arrangements, ABRI was also given a direct order by Soeharto regarding its desired posture. The Supreme Commander asserted that *dwifungsi* needed to be carried out with full caution because the Indonesian people were now enjoying political stability and economic development.¹⁹⁸ This was viewed as a sign that Soeharto would not allow ABRI a free hand, and would pay special attention to keeping ABRI quiet and united in the run-up to the MPR event.

These developments well illustrated Soeharto's preparation to use ABRI as a tool for his political interests. Key ABRI figures who worked for Soeharto's blueprint to endorse Habibie as vice-president—along with Soeharto's re-election—were Feisal Tanjung, Syarwan Hamid, Yunus Yosfiah, Prabowo and Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin. It should be noted that officers like Wiranto and Bambang Yudhoyono adopted a very low-profile during this period.

The disastrous currency crisis, which started in Thailand in July 1997, soon affected Indonesia. The value of Rupiah dropped dramatically. Amid the economic meltdown, it was reported that CSIS—which had shown its support for re-election of the incumbent vice-president, Try Sutrisno—expressed strong opposition to Habibie. Key ABRI figures quickly responded to the move to renominate Try Sutrisno. Pangab Feisal Tanjung attacked Sofyan Wanandi—an ethnic Chinese businessman who sat on the Board of CSIS—by saying Sofyan was not interested in helping the government to solve the national crisis because he did not join the "I Love Rupiah" movement.¹⁹⁹

Further pressure came from Sjafrie when Kodam Jaya 'accidentally' found an alleged PRD document after a bomb blast in the apartment of a young radical activist.

¹⁹⁷ He said that his idol is Habibie whom he believed capable of leading the nation. See Yunus' interview, "Wawancara: Dari Suksesi Hingga B.J. Habibie," *Tiras*, 14 July 1997.

¹⁹⁸ "Dwifungsi ABRI Dilaksanakan dengan Hati-hati," *Media Indonesia*, 29 July 1997.

¹⁹⁹ This movement was a scheme in which Feisal had asked conglomerates to bring their overseas U.S. dollars back to Indonesia and convert them to devalued Rupiah to prove their sense of nationalism. For details, see "Kontroversi Sofjan Setelah Ledakan," *Forum Keadilan*, 23 February 1998. For an English source, see Human Rights Watch (1998a).

The document—an e-mail message—stated that Sofyan had offered financial support to the group's activities. Sjafrie's Kodam Jaya interrogated Sofyan and suggested the possibility of calling in other CSIS associates, which in turn led to speculation that Benny Moerdani would also be questioned.²⁰⁰ Meanwhile, Sofyan's interrogation led to a series of Muslim youth demonstrations in front of CSIS, asking for the dissolution of the think-tank and the re-interrogation of Sofyan and his brother, Yusuf Wanandi, whose name was also said to be mentioned in the above document. However, it was widely believed that the demonstrations were not spontaneous but mobilised by the security apparatus and possibly by Sjafrie and Prabowo, who had been eager to organise radical Muslim youth under Kopassus authority. Perhaps such high-profile political manoeuvring was not unrelated to Wiranto's elevation to Pangab in February, which—in the eyes of Prabowo circles—would reinforce the consolidation of Wiranto's leadership against the Prabowo group.²⁰¹ Actively backing Soeharto's project was one way to show loyalty to the Supreme Commander, which in turn might be helpful to underline one's competitor's relative lack of loyalty. Prabowo seemed to take this strategy. Three days after Wiranto's installation ceremony, Prabowo broke the Muslim Ramadan fast along with about 5,000 guests, including many representing radical Islamic groups, and warned them that a political conspiracy of certain groups was behind the current economic crisis. He distributed a list of Chinese-owned Asian business groups, and asked these Muslims to fight with ABRI against this conspiracy.²⁰² One of Sutrisno supporters, Lt-Gen (ret) Bambang Triantoro, stressed that the pressure on the CSIS could hardly be separated from the conflict over the vice-presidency.²⁰³ At the same time, the pressure could not also be separated from

²⁰⁰ Sjafrie quickly denied the speculation and Moerdani himself—in front of many press reporters at the ceremony to install Wiranto as the new Pangab in February 1998—frankly asked Zacky (KaBIA) of such a possibility. He confirmed that it was baseless speculation. See "Kali Pertama L.B. Moerdani Terbuka Kepada Wartawan," *Jawapos*, 21 February 1998. Both Moerdani and Zacky have excellent connections with the South Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA), in developing BAIS and BIA.

²⁰¹ Feisal Tanjung became Menko Polkam, replacing Soesilo Sudarman. Wiranto's promotion to Pangab was followed by the promotion of Soebagyo as KSAD. It was also announced that Prabowo would become Kostrad Commander and Bambang Yudhoyono would take the post of Kassospol after the MPR session in March. Meanwhile, Wiranto's attempt to consolidate his power could be seen, for example, in the replacement of Lt-Gen Tamlicha Ali by Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo as Assistant for General Planning to Pangab (Asrenum Pangab) in January. Widjojo's previous position as the political-security adviser to Pangab was occupied by his friend, Maj-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah.

²⁰² See "Soal Permainan Politik di Balik Krisis Rupiah Mereka Pengkhianat," *Republika*, 24 January 1998. "Us' and 'Them': Muslim Activists Say It's Time to Seize Economic Power," *FEER*, 12 February 1998. On 8th of February, a large Muslim meeting was held at the Al Azhar Mosque in Jakarta. Anti-CSIS speeches were given and it was labelled as a 'conspirator' or traitor of the nation. Speakers called for a closing of the ranks of Islam and ABRI against them. See "Dibentuk Front Solidaritas Nasional Muslim Indonesia," *Kompas*, 9 February 1998. As mentioned in the above *FEER* article, Prabowo, in particular, had a close link with one of these radical groups at the meeting, the Indonesia Committee for World Muslims (KISDI), which was actually involved in the CSIS demonstrations. For KISDI's anti-CSIS declaration in which the think-tank was named as a Frankenstein and a Vampire which should be kicked out from the land of Indonesia, see an article in its internet homepage, "Kebohongan Liem Bian Koen," *KISDI Interaktif*, Online, available <http://www.kisdi.com/edisi1/aktual1.htm>, 8 February 1998.

²⁰³ "Kontroversi Sofjan Setelah Ledakan," *Forum Keadilan*, 23 February 1998.

Prabowo's effort to demonstrate his ability to achieve Soeharto's goals in the ongoing patrimonial competition with Wiranto.

Amidst the escalating attack on anti-Habibie circles, Wiranto made a public statement, insisting that society should not be influenced by those who tried to bring up ethnic-religious sentiments.²⁰⁴ The Muslim bandwagon, however, did not stop. It was just a day after Wiranto's announcement that the Indonesian Ulemas Council (MUI), a key government-appointed Islamic body, declared *jihad* against "a group of irresponsible people who dominate 70 percent of country's economy even though they are only four percent of the total population, in order to prevent their political conspiracy to topple the government and Islam."²⁰⁵ The target was obviously the Chinese minority. This series of events was enough to bury the possible emergence of a call to re-nominate Try Sutrisno.

Then, the day after the *jihad* declaration, Feisal announced that ABRI already had a candidate for vice president even it was still too early to disclose his name. On the same day, Kassospol Lt-Gen Yunus Yosfiah stressed that ABRI would not repeat the past 'mistake'—referring to Kassospol Lt-Gen Harsudiono Hartas' nomination of Try Sutrisno as ABRI's vice-presidential candidate before the MPR session in 1993—which he said did not follow the constitutional mechanism.²⁰⁶ It was Yunus who also pushed aside the possibility of any 'interruption' by a F-ABRI member at the forthcoming MPR session, like that of Maj-Gen Ibrahim Saleh who objected to Sudharmono's nomination as vice-president in 1988.²⁰⁷ Instead, Yunus stated that ABRI's criteria for the vice-president were the same as those of Golkar, while the ABRI spokesman Brig-Gen Abdul Wahab Mokodongan ultimately took the approach of *asal bapak senang* (as long as the boss is happy) by insisting that even if Soeharto picked Amien Rais, ABRI would follow this.²⁰⁸ With the full backing of the palace generals, Habibie was finally selected as the vice president for 1998-2003. However, ABRI as a whole had to bear the price of the deepening social suspicion towards ABRI which now seemed to only function as a tool for preserving Soeharto's political interests. The growing internal split within ABRI—especially between Prabowo and Wiranto—which

²⁰⁴ See, for example, "Jangan Sebarkan Sentimen SARA," *Kompas*, 10 February 1998.

²⁰⁵ "MUI Serukan Jihad Nasional," *Republika*, 11 February 1998. The ICMI newspaper, *Republika*, also conducted a campaign which linked such a conspiracy theory with CSIS, by fully using its editorial for three days to write about the role of CSIS in manipulating politics during the Ali Moertopo era.

²⁰⁶ See "ABRI Has Candidate In Mind for Veep, Feisal Says," *Antara*, 12 February 1998 and "Soal Calon Wapres ABRI Tidak Ingin Ulangi Masa Lalu," *Media Indonesia*, 12 February 1998.

²⁰⁷ See, for example, "Kassospol Tepis Kemungkinan Anggota F-ABRI Interupsi," *Kompas*, 27 February 1998.

²⁰⁸ "Kassospol ABRI: Stabilitas Tidak Ditentukan oleh Wapres yang ABRI," *Republika*, 26 January 1998. "ABRI's Trust in Soeharto Part of a 'Strategic Plan,'" *Jakarta Post*, 3 February 1998. Amien Rais, chairman of Muhammadiyah (the country's second largest Muslim group), was a popular opposition leader who had publicly insisted on the need for presidential succession since the early 1990s. It was, of course, inconceivable that Soeharto would nominate Amien Rais.

was fuelled by Soeharto's divide-and-rule strategy effectively incapacitated both sides to emphasise ABRI's commitment to an independent role in political life.

In conducting Soeharto's major regime projects since 1996—i.e. removal of Megawati, Golkar's electoral victory, Soeharto's re-election and Habibie's election to the vice-presidency—ABRI's role had been sharply criticised as *pemadan kebakaran* (a fire brigade) and as *alat mati pemerintah* (a dead tool of the government). Both phrases suggested that the military had no independent mind to promote 'national' interests and merely played the security role when ordered by the government. Such perceptions particularly accumulated during the Feisal era, but even after the leadership change, the split among top generals effectively blocked ABRI from taking the initiative to meet the demands of society, although there were now several reform-minded officers in the top ranks.²⁰⁹ The cost of this was high. ABRI lost the final chance to restore *dwifungsi* legitimacy. Wide public demands for the total eradication of *dwifungsi* spread around the country soon after the fall of Soeharto on 21 May, following the wave of student demonstrations which played a key role in ending the three decades of the New Order.²¹⁰

Conclusion

The period of *keterbukaan* was one in which ABRI was forced to adapt its doctrine to meet new challenges, but the process was not smooth. The debate over the proper implementation of *dwifungsi* was initially a by-product of a struggle between President Soeharto and ABRI under the leadership of General Moerdani but is soon led to widespread questioning of *dwifungsi* by members of political society. We saw the arguments about back-to-basics, *tut wuri handayani*, the rise of AMN-Akabri generation officers, and the military relinquishing 25 parliamentary seats, on the one hand, which all contributed to the breaking of taboos in the *dwifungsi* debate with implications of possible change in ABRI's political involvement. But, on the other hand, cases such as the media crack down, Golkar-ABRI fusion, the attack on vocal retired

²⁰⁹ Their activities and political thinking since the early 1990s are discussed in the following chapters.

²¹⁰ The political process leading to the fall of Soeharto involved various complex factors and the description of these is beyond the scope of our discussion here. However, it should at least be noted that the nation-wide student movement demanding the resignation of Soeharto escalated after his presidential re-election. ABRI responded to it with two contradictory approaches—i.e. 'dialogue' led by the Wiranto circle and 'terror' (including kidnapping of activists) led by the Kopassus circle. The latter approach also involved the provoking of riots, like that in Jakarta during 13-15 May 1998, which allegedly intended to prepare the ground for the reimposition of Martial Law and reinstatement of Kopkamtib—with Prabowo as its commander—as the last measure to protect Soeharto. This scenario was scrapped as Soeharto finally decided to resign from the presidency on 21 May. Pangab Wiranto immediately removed Prabowo supporters from their commands, but the issues of kidnapping and riot-provoking contributed to the total breakdown of ABRI's credibility in society, and the social demand for the elimination of *dwifungsi* became predominant in the post-Soeharto Indonesia. See Chapter 5 (footnote 74) for the student abduction by Kopassus. For a detailed observation of the final days of Soeharto, see Mietzner (1999).

officers, the shoot-on-sight order, and the red-purge campaign all suggested a degree of continuity with ABRI's long-time hardliner approach before the *keterbukaan* era. There was a degree of institutional inertia at work here and an inclination to rely on the established praetorian methods that had worked in the past. However, it is in this context that the series of new approaches (emerging in the 1990s) can be assessed as a reflection of the declining utility of ABRI's simple reliance on such methods.

The debate about *dwifungsi* was largely started by President Soeharto. Our discussion revealed that, in the early stage, the trigger of the debate was mostly Soeharto's statements. Kopkamtib's abolition, *tut wuri handayani* and the reduction of F-ABRI were initiated by Soeharto, and thus effectively legitimised political society to expand political space for critical discourse on *dwifungsi* under the authoritarian regime. However, it was also Soeharto who preserved *dwifungsi*'s traditional approaches such as intervention in opposition party affairs, repression of popular political movements, support for Golkar, and the elimination of elite opponents to secure Soeharto's presidential re-election. From Soeharto's standpoint, these two directions were not contradictory as they were both aimed at consolidating his political power. However, viewed from the perspective of *dwifungsi* legitimation, the two involved a serious institutional contradiction, as the former implied the decline of military's political influence in general while the latter suggested an increasing—or at least an unchanging—role of ABRI in protecting Soeharto's political interests. Both tendencies contributed to the *dwifungsi* dispute in the public arena.

In this chapter, we have seen how the *dwifungsi* criticism in political society gradually reached point where ABRI could no longer curb its direction. Prior to *keterbukaan*, especially when the New Order was still in the process of establishing a political system based on ideological conformity to Pancasila, regime criticism—including attacks on *dwifungsi*—was easily identified as anti-Pancasila (i.e. anti-national philosophy), or ideological subversion which should be defeated by security operations. Under these circumstances, any social movement to criticise *dwifungsi* was regarded as taboo and could not be durable, except the one by the disenchanted 45 generation officers—such as Ali Sadikin, A.H. Nasution and Soemitro—who claimed that the *dwifungsi* created by their generation had been 'misconducted' by the current officers. This strictly limited political space for *dwifungsi* criticism was, however, gradually opened in the *keterbukaan* era.

Public criticism under *keterbukaan* originally aimed to activate the role of the DPR as a democratic check on the government's power. ABRI, led by Moerdani, supported this movement because it could be used for attacking Soeharto. On the other hand, Soeharto countered ABRI's manoeuvres by raising issues which would initiate public argument about ABRI's *dwifungsi* in the context of *keterbukaan*. In this way, the first step to incorporate *dwifungsi* criticism under the scope of *keterbukaan* was largely a 'by-product' of the contestation between Soeharto and Moerdani's ABRI. However, this

process effectively widened elite participation in *dwifungsi* criticism in the public arena. It was in this process that respected intellectual officers—such as Gen (ret) Rudini, Lt-Gen (ret) Sayidiman, Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib, and Maj-Gen (ret) Z.A. Maulani—began to participate actively in the public discourse on *dwifungsi*. As an unintended consequence of the antagonism that encouraged both Soeharto and ABRI to give—obviously with different reasons—legitimacy to the *keterbukaan* campaign, the *dwifungsi* criticism gradually began to enjoy larger autonomy and ABRI found it increasingly difficult to curb the escalating critical debate and demands for *dwifungsi* reform. Two events further helped promote political autonomy of *dwifungsi* criticism under the authoritarian New Order polity. One was the rise of a new generation of officers and the other was ABRI's total subordination to Soeharto's personal interests during the final few years.

Critics in the 1990s increasingly questioned the legitimacy basis of *dwifungsi*, since the new generation (especially the Akabri generation) had no role in the 'struggle history of nation-building' which had legitimised earlier military involvement in politics.²¹¹ They claimed that political privileges should not be given to the current military officers who were no longer superior to civilians in service to the nation. In addition, Soeharto's elimination of Moerdani's influence within ABRI and the resulting subordination of the military leadership to Soeharto also strengthened the autonomy of critical discourse on *dwifungsi* in the public arena. Like the case of generation change, the legitimacy basis of *dwifungsi* was seriously challenged by political figures who argued that *dwifungsi* was now no more than *pemadam kebakaran*. The development of this argument—notably since the toppling of Megawati in 1996—also did not rely on the free political space created by the conflict between Soeharto and ABRI, as in the early stage of the *keterbukaan* movement.

Throughout these developments, we examined how the previously tabooed *dwifungsi* criticism had been transformed into a popular political debate under the New Order regime, with the growing capacity for civilian critics to control the direction of the debate. Our next focus is on ABRI's internal process of developing *dwifungsi* doctrines, in order to clarify the foundation of ABRI's organisational political thinking which has directed officers' response to the critical discourse of *dwifungsi*. How has ABRI's mind-set been shaped and influenced the pattern of *dwifungsi* interpretation? In what ways have changes—both internal and external to ABRI—been perceived and reflected in ABRI's *dwifungsi* re-interpretation? How have *dwifungsi*'s 'historical privileges' been challenged, eroded, manipulated, maintained and reproduced by the 'non-privileged' generation of officers in their attempts to secure the legitimacy of *dwifungsi*. These are the major questions we will examine in the next chapter.

²¹¹ The history of struggle refers to the pre-New Order Indonesia which experienced the independent war (1945-49), a communist upheaval in Madiun (1948), a series of separatist movements (1957-59), and the failed communist coup in 1965.

CHAPTER 3

Dwifungsi as Military Role Belief: Doctrinal Evolution and Interpretative Adaptation

The previous chapter examined the political process in which the legitimacy of *dwifungsi* had been questioned in line with escalating societal demands for democratic *keterbukaan*. Our next focus is on ABRI's internal manufacturing of *dwifungsi* legitimation. Whether a political activity is perceived as legitimate or not (both by the subject and object) is a significant factor which influences political behaviour, and ABRI has endeavoured to expand the modes of legitimation as it faces changes both in ABRI and society. By examining this process, we can assess not only the manner in which ABRI has legitimised its doctrine of political activism but also the types of resources ABRI has mobilised for this end, and how it has become difficult for ABRI to secure these resources since the mid-1980s and particularly the 1990s.

This chapter first examines the making of *dwifungsi*'s doctrinal framework which reflected and fortified ABRI's role in the New Order, especially up to the mid-1980s. We then analyse how the established interpretation of *dwifungsi* faced an internal challenge—namely the generation change of the officer corps—which forced ABRI to seek further legitimation of *dwifungsi*, and how new logics were introduced to this end. Here, the notion of professionalism played the significant role. We then look at the process in which the adjusted *dwifungsi* legitimation gradually awakened the officers' perception about the gap between ABRI's corporate interests and Soeharto's political interests. Such an assessment was officially presented in the early 1990s under the initiative of General Edi Sudradjat who promoted the intra-military program called "back-to-basics." In the following two sections, we examine how ABRI officers—especially those who had been affiliated with the military education sector—endeavoured to reconstruct interpretations of both *dwifungsi* and the political situation, in their attempt to produce a viable legitimation of ABRI's political role in response to the growing social pressure for democratisation. This process also illustrated how the reform-minded officers identified contradictions between ABRI's long-term institutional interests and Soeharto's short-term political strategy in the final years of the New Order. Throughout the chapter, we investigate the evolution of ABRI's role perception and the way in which factors both internal and external to

ABRI influenced its pattern as reflected in *dwifungsi's* doctrinal and interpretative formulas.

Laying the Doctrinal Foundations, 1966-1982

The New Order's civil-military relations model was first designed at the second army seminar of 1966, when ABRI leaders systematically fused several military doctrines based on anti-Communism, Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution (UUD45). ABRI's ideological and doctrinal foundation was further developed and virtually completed by 1982 when the ABRI leadership published a guidebook which provided the first comprehensive official explanation of *dwifungsi*.¹ In subsequent doctrinal writings, ABRI modified and strengthened the established framework of 1982 according to the needs of the time, but its core was invariable during the New Order period. Let us examine developments until 1982.

The second army seminar in August 1966 revised the doctrinal format adopted by the first seminar in April 1965 during the Soekarno era. This 1965 doctrine was largely coloured by the radical and revolutionary concepts favoured by the President. It, for instance, defined the role of the army as an "instrument of revolution" which constituted part of the national progressive-revolutionary forces integrated under the *Golongan Karya* (Functional Groups)—led by President Soekarno—in establishing a Pancasila-based socialist nation in Indonesia.² The army also identified itself as both a sociopolitical force and a military force, insisting on the construction of a socialist nation based on Pancasila as the primary goal of the former function.³ Thus the first army seminar distinguished between sociopolitical and defence roles of the army and also claimed that the former role was performed as a member of *Golongan Karya*.

Needing to formulate a new posture after the defeat of the PKI and the subsequent fall of Soekarno, General Soeharto, in November 1966, formally abolished

¹ According to Dr. Kristiadi of CSIS, no equally comprehensive work appeared after the 1982 guidebook, and *dwifungsi* indoctrination within ABRI was conducted based on this material in the late New Order. Interview, 25 March 1997. The guide book is entitled *Buku Petunjuk Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Tentang Dwi Fungsi ABRI*, Jakarta: Dephankam, 1982.

² *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI "Tri Ubaya Çakti"* (Hasil Seminar Angkatan Darat Tgl 2 s/d 9 April 1965 di Seskoad, Bandung), Departmen Angkatan Darat, 1965, pp.4, 11. This doctrinal paper is the product of the first army seminar. The concept of *Golongan Karya* was depicted in UUD45 which stated that all functional groups had rights to participate in politics. It was introduced into the political system by Soekarno when he formed the National Council (Dewan Nasional) in 1957, aiming to consolidate his political power and limit the space for party politics which was seen as a cause of instability. *Golongan Karya* consisted of several 'functional' groups and the army was given this status with the resulting expansion of its formal role in politics. For details, see, for example, Sundhaussen (1982:134-135) and Suryadinata (1989:8).

³ *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI "Tri Ubaya Çakti,"* p.11.

the doctrinal format designed at the first army seminar and adopted the results of the second seminar as the army's official doctrine.⁴ Old revolutionary military doctrines under the rubric of *Tri Ubaya Çakti* (TUÇ) were revised and ABRI's total commitment to all fields of national 'modernisation' was asserted.⁵ The new TUÇ doctrine illustrated ABRI's perception of its political engagement at the beginning of New Order, when no other political force could counter ABRI's political dominance. It remained the foundation of ABRI's political role perception during the New Order period.

The first chapter of the new TUÇ, entitled "Conceptual Foundations for the Army's Struggle," depicted ABRI's commitment to the New Order. Among other things, it insisted that "the military possesses basic tasks in the defence field and also in all areas of social life, and it wishes to play a vital role in the process of modernisation."⁶ Moreover, it stated that "the military's role-expansion (*meluaskan peranannya*) was forced (*terpaksa*) by conditions leading to the national crisis, and consequently the military became a strategic social force in national politics." The doctrine, however, stressed that the military did not seek unlimited power because: "it—as a freedom-fighter—always desires to be a constitutional force and a champion of democracy."⁷

In clarifying the subsequent development of ABRI's ideology, four aspects revealed in the New TUÇ should be noted here. First, since the beginning, or more precisely since the first army seminar, the military described itself as both a defence force and a non-military (or social) force, thus laying the basis for the *dwifungsi* conception which was not yet devised.

Second, the perception that ABRI's role-expansion in the New Order resulted from the national crisis was obviously aimed at cultivating its legitimacy, but it simultaneously left room for the logical loss of legitimacy once the crisis was over. The concept of role-expansion used in the doctrine indicated that the role played by ABRI in the New Order would not be the same as its original role. This, in effect, provided space for subsequent criticism of *dwifungsi*. 'Crisis legitimacy' and consequent 'role-expansion' were used to justify military involvement in politics at the first stage of the New Order, but they were highly vulnerable to changed circumstances when the crisis

⁴ See Surat Keputusan Men/Pangab Nomor: KEP-1169/11/1966 tanggal 11/Nopember 1966, in *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD "Tri Ubaya Çakti"* (Hasil Seminar AD ke-II Tanggal 25 S/D 31 Agustus 1966), Seskoad, Bandung, 1966, pp.13-14. Hereafter called the New TUÇ Paper.

⁵ *Tri Ubaya Çakti* literary means Three Sacred Vows, consists of three sub-doctrines in the 1965 (1st Seminar) version—Doktrin Kekaryaan TNI-AD (Doctrine of the Non-Military Function of the Indonesian Army), Doktrin Perang Revolusi Indonesia (Doctrine of Indonesian Revolutionary War), and Doktrin Pembinaan Potensi Perang Revolusi Indonesia (Doctrine of Fostering Potential for Indonesian Revolutionary War). The New TUÇ in 1966 is based on three renewed sub-doctrines, i.e. Doktrin Pertahanan Darat Nasional (National Land Defence Doctrine), Doktrin Kekaryaan (Non-Military Functional Group Doctrine), and Doktrin Pembinaan (Fostering Doctrine) plus, as their practical doctrine, Doktrin Perang Rakyat Semesta (PERATA), or People's Total War Doctrine. This doctrinal package effectively relinquished revolutionary terminology which accompanied the image of left-wing radicalism (*Ibid.*, pp.10-12).

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.17.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.17-21.

had passed.

Third, the military, however, claimed long-term legitimacy for its involvement in non-military affairs by insisting on the need of political stability for economic development—a national goal. It was argued that the military had no choice but to take responsibility for building the New Order. "Without it, economic stability would never be achieved, and the military's role was demanded by the historical need (*panggilan sejarah*)."⁸ Here, ABRI insisted on its total commitment to the New Order project of national economic development, and since it was a long-term goal, the military found it legitimate to engage in non-military affairs on a permanent basis, not just during the emergency. This 'permanency' was a notable characteristic of the New Order military thinking standardised in the 1966 doctrine, that could not be found in the 1965 version. The new doctrines also interpreted the military's new role as the New Order builder by employing the concept of *panggilan sejarah*, in order to emphasise the strong legitimacy of such a role as a continuation of its nation-building role since the independence war. That the leading officers in the military at that time had participated in the independence war in fact encouraged them to stress this rationale. These two aspects—developmentalism and historicism—therefore backed the military assertion of the long-term legitimacy of its political involvement, while the 'crisis legitimacy' could only provide a short-term justification.

Finally, the original army perception that its political engagement was 'forced' by national conditions showed that ABRI's political involvement was not motivated by professional concerns, but by the alleged lack of alternative civilian forces capable of handling national affairs. Lt-Gen Panggabean—the deputy army commander and the head of the seminar organising team—strongly emphasised that ABRI was forced to act by the lack of civilian political capacity.⁹ There was also no single reference to military professionalisation in this new TUÇ document consisting of 126 pages, even in the section on military education. This fact should be noted before we later discuss the nature of the argument about professionalism in the 1990s, which proposed an interpretation insisting that ABRI's political role was motivated by its professional commitment.

Based on this posture, the new TUÇ document presented four sub-doctrines as follows:

- *Doktrin Pertahanan Darat Nasional* (Hanratnas) or National Land Defence Doctrine. This doctrine defined the army's basic defence burden which emphasised the twin use of purely military operations and social mobilisation (social weapons system, or *sipersos*) in conducting internal/external security missions, especially to

⁸ Ibid., p.20.

⁹ Panggabean, the deputy army commander at that time, later succeeded Soeharto as the army commander in 1968 and ABRI commander in 1971. The comment cited above is from Panggabean, "Pidato Pembukaan Ketua Seminar AD ke-II/1966," in *Amanat/Pidato Pra-Saran Dalam Seminar AD ke-II/1966*, Bandung, Seskoad, 1966, p.61.

counter internal subversive actions and security disturbances;¹⁰

- *Doktrin Kekaryaan* or Non-Military Function Doctrine. This doctrine manifested ABRI's non-military function in a quite basic way without mentioning actual programs. It argued that ABRI—as a functional group (*golongan karya*) of a social force (*kekuatan sosial*) based on Pancasila—was eager to involve itself in constructing democracy inspired by UUD45 to fight against dictatorship and autocracy. In implementing this task, it said, ABRI provided security for both the executive and legislative branches to defend Pancasila ideology in the ideological, religious, cultural, political, social, economic, and military fields;¹¹

- *Doktrin Pembinaan* or Fostering Doctrine. This doctrine fostered the above two doctrines. It stated the necessity for Pancasila education in all governmental and private educational institutes, indoctrination of mass organisations, political organisations and Golkar, and the utilisation of the mass media. It was also argued that *kekaryaan* (sending army personnel to non-military posts) should be implemented to benefit national economic development and the people's prosperity.¹²

- *Doktrin Perang Rakyat Semesta* (Perata) or People's Total War Doctrine. This doctrine implemented the above three doctrines comprising the new TUÇ. It emphasised, among others, the weak national economy and geographical diversity which made the army's defence strategy dependent on low-technology intensive social mobilisation of the "total people" and territorial activities led by Kodams (Military Area Commands) to fight against infiltration and subversion.¹³

In addition, the new TUÇ renewed the Doctrine of National Defence and Security (*Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional*, or Hankamnas) which was the trans-service and mother doctrine of Hanratnas. It first stated that the PKI and its supporters were still active and that the major internal threats were infiltration and subversion, both in the mental and physical senses, conducted by social groups which were reluctant to accept Pancasila and UUD45, and opposed to the transformation from Old Order to New Order.¹⁴

In this way, the threat perceptions mentioned in Hankamnas during this embryonic period of the New Order clearly illustrated that the goal of military

¹⁰ *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD*, pp.40-41. Sipersos was designed to mobilise two non-military organisations; People's Resistance (Wanra) and Civil Defence (Hansip). However, this army doctrine remained essentially unchanged since the first seminar, given the basic continuity of the defence environment and the army's available resources.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp.45-46. For the *Golongan Karya* role under the New Order, the doctrine stated that the army needed to restructure its organisations to penetrate its programs in ideological, religious, sociocultural, political, and economic fields. See *Buku Petunjuk Tentang Pokok-Pokok Doktrin Kekaryaan*, Jakarta: Mabesad, 1966, p.16.

¹² *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD*, pp.52-60.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp.65-115. Perata was based on the concept of Territorial War which was applied during the war of independence for the total mobilisation of resources in a given territory to conduct guerrilla warfare against the Dutch force. Later, the guerrilla strategy was transformed to anti-guerrilla operations for internal security surveillance. For details, see Nasution (1970).

¹⁴ *Doktrin Perjuangan TNI-AD*, pp.31-38. Under Hankamnas doctrine, each service had its own defence doctrine, namely the army's Hanratnas, the navy's *Pertahanan Maritim Nasional* (National Maritime Defence, Hanmarnas), the air force's *Pertahanan Udara Nasional* (National Air Defence, Hanudnas), and police's *Keamanan dan Ketertiban Masyarakat* (Security and Social Order, Kamtibmas). Hankamnas coordinated the all four doctrines.

operations was essentially political, i.e. a smooth transition to the Soeharto regime. Significantly, the doctrines described above were all intended to back up Hankamnas' political goal. In this doctrinal environment, ABRI's defence structure was easily transformed into a political control mechanism. Maj-Gen Soemitro—the head of the syndicate formulating New Order military doctrines—clearly stated at the seminar that all doctrines in the new TUÇ were intended to deal with the PKI and its Marxist-Maoist ideology.¹⁵ This doctrinal characteristic should be noted in light of our discussion of the current *dwifungsi* interpretation.

It was just three months later that the four army doctrines were rearranged under the over-arching military doctrines of Hankamnas and *Doktrin Perjuangan ABRI* (ABRI's Struggle Doctrine) at a nine-day seminar held by the Department of Defence and Security (Dephankam) in November 1966. The two ABRI doctrines are jointly called *Catur Dharma Eka Karma* (CDEK), forming ABRI's integral doctrine under the New Order.¹⁶ Therefore, the army version of Hankamnas in August was reframed in this CDEK scheme. More systematised explanations and definitions were given in Hankamnas, but the basic threat perception expressed in the previous version of this doctrine was replaced by a more abstract and hypothetical one.

In the August version, the PKI was clearly depicted as the main doctrinal target, as seen above, but this time, there was no reference to the PKI in the explanation of the Hankamnas objective—instead, the threat was defined as any challenge to the Pancasila ideology.¹⁷ It was obviously a revision intended to make the doctrine more durable in the anticipated PKI-free political environment of the next decades. What was also interesting was that the second doctrine in CDEK, i.e. *Doktrin Perjuangan ABRI*, was not explained in the CDEK document, but was replaced by *Doktrin Kekaryaannya ABRI* which took up nearly half the space, as if it was identical with *Doktrin Perjuangan ABRI*. Thus, the actual contents of the CDEK document consisted of the Hankamnas and Kekaryaannya doctrines, which could be understood as statements of ABRI's military and sociopolitical roles. Though the term *dwifungsi* had not yet been invented, this scheme was the basis of the New Order's concept of *dwifungsi* which

¹⁵ Soemitro was also army commander in East Java at that time. For his speech, see "Sambutan Ketua Sindikat Tri Ubaya Cakti," in *Amanat/Pidato Pra-Saran Dalam Seminar AD ke-II/1966*, Bandung, Seskoad, 1966, pp.261-273. General Nasution, at that time the Head of MPRS (the provisional version of the MPR) also argued that the new TUÇ was to wipe out PKI supporters who emerged through Nasakom (the doctrine to fuse nationalist, religious, communist forces advocated by Soekarno) which he said contradicted Pancasila and Sapta Marga. See A.H. Nasution, "Sambutan Ketua MPRS Pada Seminar AD ke-II/1966," in *Amanat/Pidato Pra-Saran Dalam Seminar AD ke-II/1966*, Bandung, Seskoad, 1966, p.168. This document—composed of 18 articles written by the major seminar participants, including civilian intellectuals—is extremely helpful to assess the personal views (rather than institutionally adopted views) during the building stage of New Order regarding the future role of ABRI.

¹⁶ CDEK (Four Missions, One Deed) meant that four services were joined by one doctrine. This first Dephankam seminar in November 1966 later produced a doctrinal paper, *Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional dan Doktrin Perjuangan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, "Tjatur Darma Eka Karma," Staf Pertahanan Keamanan, 1967. Hereafter called the CDEK document.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.35.

proposed two functions in a non-zero-sum fashion, a perception only attainable under a military-led political regime.¹⁸ The up-graded Kekaryaan doctrine confidently argued that the non-military role was not a trade-off with ABRI's capacity as a military force, since ABRI was after all the foundation of all state power.¹⁹

In this way, ABRI's official stance in politics was formulated during the first two years of the New Order. ABRI manifested its commitment to everyday political life to ensure political stability for economic development, while the actual programs were not provided at the two seminars in 1966 and 1967. ABRI inevitably faced challenges as the political society soon perceived that the reality of *dwifungsi* was little other than political domination, given the appointment of ABRI personnel to many key non-military posts at the national and regional levels, even though party politics was formally restored after the 1971 election. This was the birth of *kekaryaan* criticism. By 1977, more than 20,000 ABRI members were posted to the civilian sector, occupying 53 percent of the top posts in the central government and 76 percent of all governorships.²⁰ Although the parliament in 1967 affirmed ABRI's commitment in daily political life, it did not legitimise ABRI's domination of the executive branch.²¹ These developments illustrated the process in which ABRI—which declared its formal political involvement without mentioning actual political projects at the second army seminar—had gradually revealed the real shape of its political engagement in the subsequent years. Once the projects became apparent, criticism inevitably emerged within ABRI and society. To cope with the rising criticism, the ABRI leadership intensively developed *dwifungsi* doctrines during 1977 to 1982, resulting in at least five internal works on *dwifungsi*.

First, in March 1977, Defence Minister/ABRI Commander (Menhankam/Pangab) General Panggabean ordered his staff to formulate the Doctrine of Sociopolitical Operations, "as guidance for the successful conduct of *kekaryaan*."²² The doctrine advocated that ABRI's sociopolitical operations should be based on the "prosperity approach" rather than "security approach."²³ On the other hand, ABRI's

¹⁸ Maynard (1976:156) also saw CDEK as in fact embodying the *dwifungsi* concept.

¹⁹ The CDEK paper, p.57.

²⁰ Details of the posts in the central government are as follows: Ministers/Heads of High State Institutions (42%); Secretaries General (73%); Inspectors General (29%); Directors General (78%); Heads/Chiefs of Non-departmental Institutions (44%); and Ministerial Secretaries/Assistant Ministers (84%). Data is from Notosusanto (1984:378-379). Percentages of ABRI governors were: 73% (1968-73); 76% (1973-78); 59% (1978-83); 51% (1983-88); 44% (1988-93); and 48% (1993-98).

²¹ In the 1967 negotiation to establish new laws on elections, composition of the MPR/DPR, political parties and functional organisations, it was argued by the Deliberation Committee (Panitia Musyawarah Kelompok)—consisting of the main groups in the parliament—to reaffirm the appointment of ABRI members to the MPR/DPR in what was called the 'National Consensus of 1967.' The Consensus finally became a decision of the Speaker of the Parliament on 16 December 1967. About the process, see Notosusanto (1984:136-138).

²² Keputusan Menhankam/Pangab Nomor: KEP/04/III/1977 Tanggal 5-3-1977 in *Doktrin Operasi Sosial Politik*, Dephankam, 1977.

²³ *Doktrin Operasi Sosial Politik*, pp.10, 23. The concepts of security and prosperity approaches had no

organic cooperation with each member of ABRI's Big Family (KBA) was first depicted in the doctrinal format.²⁴ KBA was expected to consistently support ABRI's conduct of *kekaryaan* activities. The doctrine's emphasis on the increasing role of KBA was aimed at promoting indirect measures in order to alleviate the growing public suspicion about *dwifungsi*.

Second, in October 1977, another attempt was made to provide legal justification of the conduct of *dwifungsi*. The document, "The Legal Basis of *Dwifungsi* and Identity of ABRI," first noted that the influx of western political literature now encouraged the Indonesian people to view ABRI's role in politics critically, and warned that this would result in ABRI being seen as a foreigner (*orang asing*) in its own society.²⁵ In responding to this tendency, the document mobilised cultural relativism. It said every country had its own culture which influenced its political style, although terms like democracy, representative, election, and the military were universally used. Unlike the West, the document continued, which was based on the dualism of individual and society, Indonesia saw them in harmony due to the culture of *Bhineka Tunggal Ika* (Unity in Diversity) which could only be attained by *gotong-royong* (mutual help), *musyawarah* (deliberation) and *kekeluargaan* (family atmosphere). Thus the military role should be assessed in this context too.²⁶ Such an insistence was not new in the thinking of ABRI but was now more frequently used in facing the visible linkage of foreign criticism and domestic complaints about *dwifungsi*. Then, apart from the cultural legitimation, the document listed several presidential instructions and MPR decisions which 'ordered' ABRI to play a bigger role since 1945, repeating the established interpretation that it was responding to the needs of the people rather than being motivated by ABRI itself. On legality, it admitted that *dwifungsi* could not be found in UUD45 in an explicit way, but neither could the existence of political parties and elections be found there. The document also attributed weaknesses in the implementation of *dwifungsi* to society. "If there is anything wrong with *dwifungsi* conducted by ABRI members," the document concluded, "it is a reflection of social

clear definitions, but they roughly referred to the ways ABRI responded to sociopolitical change. The security approach saw it in terms of security, thus tried to repress any change which might threaten status quo. The prosperity approach, on the other hand, looked at the change as a reflection of national development, which should not be treated as a threat but as a positive social dynamism. Criticism of security approach late became a topic of popular political discourse in the late 1980s, as we will discuss in the next chapter.

²⁴ Ibid., pp.14-15. About ABRI's Big Family (Keluarga Besar ABRI—KBA), see Chapter 2. For example, the Organisation of Wives of Soldiers, Bureaucrats in the Defence Department, Pepabri (Association of Retired Soldiers), FKPPI, and the League of Veteran are the members of KBA.

²⁵ *Dasar Hukum Dwi Fungsi dan Identitas ABRI*, Dephankam, 1977, pp.6-7.

²⁶ Ibid., pp.7-8.

problems because excessive activities of *karyawan* are not the policy of ABRI.²⁷

Though ABRI's culturalism was apparently adopted in this document, it was not enough to explain the reasons for maintaining the current style of military intervention. In fact, civilian criticism that claimed that the implementation of *dwifungsi* was nothing more than militarism still enjoyed considerable support within political society.

In order to counter such an argument, ABRI—more specifically the *karyawan* section in Dephankam (Skar Hankam) headed by Let-Gen Daryatmo—then moved to strengthen the official rationale of current *kekaryaan* activities in 1978.²⁸ This time, ABRI responded to criticism by saying that ABRI's involvement in legislative bodies both at the national and regional levels, and its filling of jobs, such as governors, regents and village heads, were all based on the "trust" (*kepercayaan*) given by the people to ABRI in order to foster security, effectiveness, and efficiency needed for national development.²⁹ This 'social-contract' legitimation was followed by a historical legitimation—as seen in the new TUC—which insisted that *de facto dwifungsi* had existed since the birth of the military in 1945 to safeguard the nation, as if emphasising that its current position was an expression of ABRI's 'natural right'.³⁰ This was to replace the concept of role-expansion explained at the time of 1966.

Coupled with these social-contract and historical-right emphases, the document stressed that ABRI's *kekaryaan* was not militarism—interestingly by employing 'western literature' on politics.³¹ In this line, what was also notable in this document, compared with previous versions of *kekaryaan* papers, was that ABRI formally adopted the technical separation of *dwifungsi* from *kekaryaan*, envisaging that the latter could be withdrawn in certain circumstances without risking the former.³² Though these references were not new in public speeches by officers at that time, it was probably the first time that this distinction was codified in an official instruction paper. In facing nearly a decade of criticism of *dwifungsi*, ABRI finally established an interpretation which detached the problematic *kekaryaan* from the over-arching

²⁷ Ibid., p.18.

²⁸ *Kekaryaan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, Dephankam, March 1978. It said at the beginning that the purpose was to rebut the growth of criticism toward *kekaryaan* of ABRI within society (p.4). The doctrine regarding *kekaryaan* was exceptional among several ABRI doctrines, because it was repeatedly upgraded or supplemented during the previous decade. This 1978 version was the fourth attempt following the August 1966, November 1966, and November 1975 versions. The 1975 version was *Doktrin Kekaryaan ABRI* (Kep. Menhankam/Pangab 40/XI/1975 tanggal 17-11-1975), Dephankam, 1975. Such frequent revisions certainly indicated the high sensitivity of this political doctrine to public criticism.

²⁹ *Kekaryaan Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia*, p.10.

³⁰ Ibid., p.11.

³¹ The sociologist, Morris Janowitz, defined two types of militarism, i.e. designed-militarism and reactive militarism. The document insisted that neither were applicable to the case of Indonesia where ABRI's involvement was from the beginning (Ibid., pp.20-26). As seen below, along with Janowitz, ABRI officers—even among Akabri generation officers—selectively make use of western political scientists, such as Huntington, Amos Perlmutter and others from the functionalist school, to back up *dwifungsi* legitimation.

³² Ibid., pp.42-43.

dwifungsi ideology as a way to meet such criticism.

This interpretation, however, did not effectively respond to demands for an actual reduction of *kekaryaan* appointments and the excesses of *dwifungsi*. During this period, as discussed in the previous chapter, major criticism was expressed by a group of retired officers including A.H. Nasution, Ali Sadikin, Dharsono, and other disenchanted generals who had in the past contributed to the creation of the New Order in the mid-1960s.³³ This new development became a central issue in ABRI's annual leadership meeting (Rapim ABRI) in March 1980, held a few months before the birth of Petisi 50.

Before to the meeting, which was led by Pangab/Menhankam Gen Yusuf, ABRI prepared a document to be used for the discussion at the Rapim. It asserted that some individuals (*oknum-oknum*) within ABRI had jeopardised ABRI's *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan*, encouraging misunderstanding among ABRI members that *dwifungsi* was solely the responsibility of *karyawan* officers.³⁴ Regarding the problem of retired officers, the document insisted on the need to make these officers supportive of ABRI's current policies, and for this end, called for the strengthening of control over retired officers through Pepabri.³⁵ The document branded the activities of LKB as an attempt to discredit *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan* by criticising the presence of F-ABRI.³⁶ In defending the *kekaryaan* activity, the ABRI leadership explained that the total number of active officers being sent to *kekaryaan* posts during the Second Defence Strategic Plan (Renstra Hankam II) 1979-1983 was originally set to be 10,000 but was actually only 6,879 in February 1980, thus indicating the declining *kekaryaan* role according to the need of the time.³⁷ Finally, the Rapim document listed some policy priorities, among which were: (1) to produce further materials on *dwifungsi/kekaryaan* for officer education; (2) to enhance civic-mission programs of *kemanunggalan ABRI-Rakyat*

³³ In response, Fosko-AD (the Army's Communication Forum) was formed by the army to establish a communication channel for retired officers who became increasingly critical of the ABRI leadership. Another grouping, LKB (Institute for Constitutional Awareness), was not Army-sponsored but was led by Nasution as the advisor, Ali Sadikin, and Dr. Hatta, the country's first vice president who declared Indonesia's independence together with Soekarno in 1945, as well as several of the most prominent retired officers and civilians. For details, see Jenkins (1984:102-112) and also Sundhaussen (1981). Later in 1980, Petisi 50 was established.

³⁴ *Pelaksanaan Kebijakan Kekaryaan ABRI Tahun 1979/1980 dan Kebijakan Kekaryaan ABRI Tahun 1980/1981* (Pada Rapat Pimpinan ABRI 1980), Dephankam, March 1980, p.4, 19. This document was signed by Lt-Gen Kharis Suhud, ABRI's Chief of Kekaryaan Staff (Kaskar Hankam), who—as seen in the previous chapter—later became a critical figure in YKPK.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.10, 25. Pepabri's role included its mobilisation of members to support Golkar during the elections. All retired officers are automatically registered as the member of Pepabri, but their commitment varies. Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib, for example, argues that channelling government instructions via Pepabri cannot be accepted, and this is a reason for not joining Pepabri himself. Interview, 9 August 1996.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p.13.

³⁷ *Ibid.*, p.16. However, according to the data mentioned in this report, in Renstra Hankam I 1973-1978, the total number of posted serving officers was 8,107, revealing the fact that ABRI set the higher target at the beginning of the Second Strategic Plan. If both active and retired personnel (organic and non-organic, in ABRI terms) are included, the total number of *kekaryaan* posts during the First Renstra was 22,245 whereas at the time of this meeting, it was 17,167.

(integration of ABRI and the people) for the dissemination of the *dwifungsi* principle; and, interestingly, (3) to avoid providing candidates for regional governmental heads from F-ABRI and give these opportunities to the Golkar faction.³⁸ We discuss the second and third decisions before coming back to the first.

The emphasis on *kemanunggalan ABRI-Rakyat* clearly reflected the growing criticism that ABRI had become a tool of the government and its *dwifungsi* was merely implemented in the form of *kekaryaan*. This perception conflicted with ABRI's role belief as the people's military. It was in this context that Pangab/Menhankam Gen Yusuf launched a new program called 'ABRI Masuk Desa' (ABRI in the village, or AMD) in 1980. This annual civic-mission project sent ABRI units to the villages to assist community development in various fields.³⁹ Apart from the perceived need for doctrinal adjustment, AMD was a significant attempt to indoctrinate younger-generation soldiers who had entered the military not as freedom-fighters but for career reasons, and thus lacked spiritual commitment to *dwifungsi* management. AMD was intended to provide an opportunity for them to communicate with the *rakyat*. Moreover, it was also notable that AMD was designed to support the Total People's Defence System as a channel to mobilise the *rakyat*. It was also easily transformed into a grass-roots surveillance tool, given the political control aspect of this doctrine.

On the other hand, the decision adopted by the Rapim document to avoid providing F-ABRI candidates for the positions of local governmental heads was a significant decision which could drastically cut the quantity of *kekaryaan* activity if fully implemented. This decision too reflected Yusuf's attempt to respond to the recent criticism of *kekaryaan*-heavy *dwifungsi* practices. Giving up ABRI's occupancy of regional government heads implied that ABRI—more specifically Kaskar Hankam Lt-Gen Kharis Suhud—already perceived Golkar as a reliable tool for maintaining local political stability as it seemed to imply that ABRI's civilian allies could replace ABRI officers. This itself indicated a significant perceptual change concerning New Order civil-military relations, but in this document it was still not clear how ABRI would deal with Golkar. The above description, on the one hand, suggests that ABRI began to see Golkar as an independent force, which in effect allowed ABRI to 'stand above all political groups.' However, on the other hand, it could also be understood as ABRI's re-emphasis of its backing for Golkar in regional political management.

This raised the issue of whether ABRI 'stood above all groups' or linked itself

³⁸ Ibid., pp.22, 24, 26. Concerning the third decision, it did not however eliminate the possibility that the Golkar faction would nominate ABRI member as the candidate.

³⁹ The project carries out many labour intensive works such as digging tertiary irrigation canals, making new village paths and erecting bridges, schools, village meeting halls, religious centres. However, it also aimed at disseminating information and conducting public discussions concerning ideology, and Yusuf's ABRI believed that AMD, under the slogan of *kemanunggalan ABRI-Rakyat*, was very essential for the preservation of ABRI's *dwifungsi*. See *Kemanunggalan TNI-ABRI Dengan Rakyat Menghadapi Dasa Warsa 1980-an*, Dephankam, 5 October 1980, pp.22-24.

directly with Golkar. Given Yusuf's general outlook, the former possibility seemed strong. During this time, Pangab/Menhankam Gen Yusuf was regarded as a *dwifungsi* revisionist who insisted on ABRI's solidarity with the people and its stance as 'above all groups,' which, according to Jenkins, was regarded by Soeharto and his closed military advisors as unrealistic.⁴⁰ It seems, therefore, that Yusuf's influence was strongly reflected in these policy initiatives. However, the new approach which was to have been formally adopted at the Rapim was largely neutralised by Soeharto's "Pekanbaru" speech at the opening of the Rapim.⁴¹ Soeharto declared that ABRI as a defence force should stand above all social groups whereas as a social force it should choose partners who truly defend Pancasila.⁴² Moreover, he insisted that *dwifungsi*'s task was to ensure a successful election in 1982 and, in this context, that ABRI should acknowledge when to behave as a defence force and when to act as a sociopolitical force.⁴³ This was to encourage ABRI to side with Golkar in the 1982 election, in its capacity as a sociopolitical force. Yusuf's attempt was therefore rejected by Soeharto. As seen in the previous chapter, Lt-Gen Syarwan Hamid—in facing criticism of his speech backing Golkar in 1995—referred to the Pekanbaru speech to justify himself.

Coming back to the first decision in ABRI's Rapim document, the most comprehensive internal guidebook of *dwifungsi* was prepared under the leadership of Gen Yusuf in 1982.⁴⁴ It was comprehensive in the sense that all major doctrinal papers in the past 16 years were integrated in this 131-page book, and also instructions and explanations for the wide range of *dwifungsi* activities were given to each command level in a systematic way. In light of our discussion, the following points are important.

First, the source of *dwifungsi* legitimation was now widened. The guidebook argued that there were five approaches to understand the root of *dwifungsi*—namely historical, philosophical, legal, *wawasan nusantara* (i.e. geostrategic), and *ketahanan nasional* (i.e. national defence)—and asserted that they were mutually reinforcing.⁴⁵ The key concepts in each legitimacy source were: revolutionary war and the PKI's coup attempt (historical); Pancasila, Sapta Marga and *keluarga* (philosophical); Articles 2 and 30[1] in UUD45, MPR decisions, and laws on elections/DPR members (legal); national integration in a plural society (*wawasan nusantara*); total defence (*ketahanan nasional*).⁴⁶ All were asserted as the factors encouraging ABRI to actively involve itself

⁴⁰ See Jenkins (1984:138-159).

⁴¹ ABRI's Rapim 1980 document was prepared on 10 March 1980, and the decisions above were supposed to be adopted during the Rapim. Soeharto's speech was made on 27 March, the first day of the Rapim.

⁴² See *Amanat Presiden Pada Pembukaan Rapat Pimpinan ABRI Tanggal 27 Maret 1980 di Pekanbaru*, Departmen Penerangan, 1980, pp.6-7.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, pp.8-9.

⁴⁴ *Buku Petunjuk Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Tentang Dwifungsi ABRI* (No. SKEP/614/VI/1982 Tanggal 1 Juni 1982), Dephankam, 1982. Hereafter the guidebook.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.15-30.

⁴⁶ Article 2 in UUD45 referred to the functional group representatives in the MPR, while article 30[1] stated that all citizens had rights and duties to participate in national defence. Here, ABRI interpreted national defence as including political management.

in non-military affairs. During the past 16 years of the New Order, ABRI had developed its doctrinal interpretation to strengthen *dwifungsi* legitimation. This institutional effort was aimed at maintaining the 'permanency' of *dwifungsi* commitment which was first set by the new TUÇ doctrine in 1966 by emphasising the need of political stability for the rescue of national economy. After 16 years of New Order development, ABRI needed to diversify the sources of *dwifungsi* legitimacy in order to insist on its relevance and counter—in various ways—the critical discourse in the public.⁴⁷

Second, the implementation of *kekaryaan* was distinguished from *dwifungsi*, endorsing an interpretation adopted in the 1978 *kekaryaan* doctrine. However, the goals of the two were explained as the same, leaving the nature of the distinction between the two vague. This conceptual uncoupling became ABRI's standard interpretation and it convinced the officers that social criticism of *kekaryaan* did not undermine the relevance of *dwifungsi*'s permanent political engagement.

Throughout the book, it seemed obvious that ABRI's *dwifungsi* doctrine tried to oversee all fields of social activity for the fulfilment of ABRI's institutional role-belief as the guardian of Pancasila and stabiliser-dynamiser of national development. This was the perception first formulated in the 1966 doctrine, which now seemed to have various logics to defend it. *Dwifungsi*'s doctrinal framework was virtually completed by this time. As discussed below, the subsequent internal development of *dwifungsi* was largely on the level of interpretation, absorbing numerous criticisms and re-inventing various logics to counter these critical arguments. Such a conceptual involution of *dwifungsi* was practised by post-revolutionary officers who inherited the leadership of ABRI after the mid-1980s, and it was they who were in charge of managing the legitimacy of *dwifungsi* in the face of expanding social pressure for democratisation. In this process, two phenomena significantly coloured the nature of *dwifungsi* interpretation. One was the implantation of the professionalism concept and the other was the global trend toward democratisation which required ABRI to defend *dwifungsi* in facing the challenge of universalism. We discuss them in the following sections.

⁴⁷ In Chapter 6, we will examine how ABRI strategically employs these different sources in the *dwifungsi* discourse depending on the context. The growing social criticism was reflected in the 1982 report of the National Defence and Security Council (Wanhankamnas), a presidential advisory body, which recommended the ABRI leadership to review the implementation of *dwifungsi*. The Council stated that there was still a worry in society that *dwifungsi* would some day become militarism and totalitarianism, and, although *dwifungsi* was already accepted in the GBHN (Broad Outlines of State Policy) in 1978, such a concern would remain as long as the *dwifungsi* implementation was not strictly regulated by laws. See *Perkiraan Strategik Nasional Jangka Pendek 1983-1985: Aneka Bidang Politik*, Sekretariat Jenderal, Dewan Pertahanan Keamanan Nasional, 1982, p.24. The weight of the recommendation from the Council can be assessed by the fact that Wanhankamnas' prime role is to prepare the GBHN, including broad defence and security considerations, which become the president's policy directive issued by the MPR (Lowry, 1996:16).

Infusing the Concept of Professionalism

As seen earlier, the creation of the New Order and the legitimation of *dwifungsi* were the product of military officers who had participated in the independence war during 1945-1949. Having emphasised their historical role as the defender of the nation, the second army seminar at Seskoad in 1966 declared that the military role-expansion under the New Order was a *panggilan sejarah*. The rise of a new post-revolutionary generation in ABRI, therefore, could potentially undermine the basis of *dwifungsi* legitimation. It was particularly in the early 1970s that Seskoad acknowledged the necessity to fill the gap between the two generations after conducting a survey which targeted all students of Seskoad who had joined the Regular Course of the Year 1971-1972 (KR IX). This KR IX was the first time that the proportion of younger generation students reached nearly 50 percent of the total number of Seskoad students. The survey—which was soon expanded outside of Seskoad under the full responsibility of Z.A. Maulani (at that time, Major and himself a member of the younger generation)—found that there was a big gap between the two generations. The younger side was said to have the following problems: (1) their motivation to join the army was economically-financially oriented; (2) mentality was too formalistic, risking ABRI's identity as 'freedom-fighter;' (3) the 1945 values were only thought as the legacy of the older generation; (4) they were easily directed (*terarah*) by non-ABRI groups, so possibly influenced by conflicting ideologies; (5) their career path was different from the older generation, which might produce immature leaders in the near future.⁴⁸ Based on the result of this research, the third army seminar was held in 1972 to bridge the perceptual gap between 1945-generation and academy-generation officers, and to transfer the spirit of the freedom-fighter to the post-revolutionary generation of soldiers. Try Sutrisno was one of the representatives of the younger generation officers at the seminar, and earned a good reputation as the leading new generation officer.⁴⁹

It was since the early 1980s that these academy-generation officers had started to occupy several key military positions. Along with this process, ABRI launched internal projects to rationalise the military system. Leading to the rationalisation, *dwifungsi* was also first codified in the form of law. By securing *dwifungsi*'s legal status under the Law No.20/1982, the ABRI leadership could avoid

⁴⁸ See *Sejarah Seminar TNI-Angkatan Darat III dan Lahirnya Dharma Pusaka 45*, Dinas Sejarah TNI-AD, 1973, pp. 27-28.

⁴⁹ For the very detailed process of the seminar, the above document is valuable. For a brief explanation, Notosusanto (1974) is useful. When Try became KSAD in 1986, the spirit of 1972 Seminar was again confirmed. See Try Sutrisno, "Ceramah Proses Perumusan Dharma Pusaka 45," *Yudhagama*, No.27, 31 October 1986, pp.5-18. Here, by providing a detailed map of how the 1945 values had been transferred, he insisted that the process was going well. As we see later, some other leaders had an opposite view.

giving the impression that the process of rationalising ABRI would risk undermining its political commitment. The "Operation Rationalisation" was largely handled by General Benny Moerdani, who had succeeded Yusuf as Pangab in 1983.⁵⁰

The split of functional responsibility between Dephankam and ABRI Headquarters, and the consolidation of power under Moerdani were soon explained by the ABRI leadership as the process of reorganisation (*reorganisasi*), aiming at dismantling the top-heavy, politicised, and inefficient command structure which was a legacy created by the 1945 Generation officers. This project was followed in 1985-1986 by the replacement of the existing territorial military structure with a simplified ten-Kodam system. Before this reorganisation, ABRI had sixteen Kodams and they were under the command of four Kowilhans (Area Defence Commands). Moerdani's streamlining project abolished the Kowilhan system and merged sixteen Kodams into ten, enhancing the strategic importance of lower level commands, especially at the Korem level which was now given major combat forces for the first time (at least one infantry battalion). It was inevitable that Moerdani's policy package generated a fear of unemployment among the officer corps who found that the rationalisation reduced the number of posts and higher ranks available for them. As anticipated, ABRI's total number of general-grade officers decreased by about 200 in 1985 from nearly 500 at its mid-1970s peak.⁵¹

Recalling this time, Gen (ret) Rudini—the Army Chief during this period—claimed that those who were displeased with the reorganisation were persuaded by an explanation that *reorganisasi* was not rationalisation but professionalisation.⁵² Moerdani also took every opportunity to explain that his reform was intended to

⁵⁰ When Moerdani was promoted to Pangab, the dual-posting of Pangab and Menhankam and the integrated Hankam/ABRI structures were all abolished based on the Law No.20/1982. Dephankam, headed by the Minister Gen Poniman, was mainly in charge of administrative matters whereas ABRI, led by Pangab Moerdani, inherited all of the command and operation responsibilities, formerly held by Dephankam, which gave the levers of power and authority to the Pangab. In this new configuration, Hankam—unlike every other ministry of importance—lost its own independent eyes and arms outside the capital and across the vast territory of Indonesia. See The Editors (1984:146). As a result, Dephankam was clearly relegated to a secondary position (Haseman 1986:892).

⁵¹ FEER, 24 October 1985. See also *Indonesia Reports* (No.1, November 1984, p.3) for the officers' concerns about their post-retirement jobs affected by the reorganisation. Reorganisation of the military had a special meaning in the Indonesian history as seen in the cases of 1948, 1950 and 1956 where the officers to be discharged reacted violently against the army authority. For these events, see Sundhaussen (1982). Utrecht's detailed study (1980:21-105) argues that the reorganisations and rationalisations (*re-dan-ra*) until the end of the 1950s failed mainly due to the strong patrimonial tradition within the army, especially the *bapak-anakbuah* (father-children) relationship.

⁵² Interview with Rudini, 4 September 1996. In ABRI, the term rationalisation had a negative connotation as it was associated with demobilisation and a reduction in senior positions. Rudini's emphasis on professionalisation aimed to counter this. Before the reform was implemented, however, Rudini had clearly explained that the planned reorganisation was intended to streamline ABRI, revealing his shifting interpretation of reorganisation after facing internal questions. See Rudini's earlier speech in 1984, "Ceramah Pembekalan Kasad bagi Siswa Sekolah Staf & Komando Gabungan ABRI Susreg ke-X dengan Judul 'Reorganisasi TNI-AD,'" *Yudhagama (Media Komunikasi Pembinaan TNI-AD)*, No.17, 31 March 1984, pp.4-11.

create an "efficient and professional ABRI."⁵³ Indeed, the reorganisation was packaged with slogans such as KEEM (*kecil tetapi efisien, efektif dan modern*: small but efficient, effective, and modern) and PEEM (*profesional, efisien, efektif dan modern*: professional, efficient, effective, and modern), which matched the self-identity of the academy-generation officers whose military schooling at the AMN produced a sense of professionalism which could not be shared with the 1945 Generation officers. By emphasising this point, Moerdani and Rudini attempted to transform ABRI into a compact organisation without risking internal cohesion. In this process, the concept of professionalism was apparently implanted into the organisational values of ABRI, and it inevitably influenced the subsequent interpretation of *dwifungsi* doctrine.

The way in which the concept of professionalism was infused into the interpretation of *dwifungsi*, however, had some variations. For Gen Moerdani, who started the professionalisation movement, "the new generation officers are—unlike the 1945 Generation—trained as the 'soldier-with-*dwifungsi*' so the nature of ABRI is inevitably *prajurit pejuang Indonesia modern* (modern Indonesian warrior-soldier)."⁵⁴ Although this only added adjectives to the standard notion of *prajurit pejuang* (warrior-soldier), Moerdani's emphasis on the modernity was aimed at professionalising the officer corps.⁵⁵ Recalling his leadership period, Moerdani argued that "professionalisation was to improve the quality of ABRI personnel and organisation in order to effectively conduct its defence function," therefore "it is wrong to link professionalism and *dwifungsi* because professionalism is the *hankam* concept, nothing to do with the *sospol* role."⁵⁶

This perception indicated that the former Pangab clearly saw the boundary between the two functions, and professionalism was only attached to the former side. For Moerdani, however, "it does not mean that the process of professionalisation undermines *dwifungsi* because the latter is based on the logic of politics, not something affected by military training."⁵⁷ What should be noted here is the point that Moerdani believed that professionalism did not weaken *dwifungsi*, not because the former strengthens the latter but because the two are totally different matters. If we suppose that this perception was projected at least initially during Moerdani's ABRI leadership, we could see some changes in interpretation regarding the relationship between the two

⁵³ See Moerdani's biography written by Pour (1993:479).

⁵⁴ Moerdani (1992:69). Italic added.

⁵⁵ The term *pejuang* literally means a fighter for a principle, implying the freedom-fighters' spirit, whereas *prajurit* refers to the soldier as profession. So in the ABRI language, the term *prajurit pejuang* emphasises ABRI's self-esteem as "soldiers with the spirit of warrior" to distinguish themselves from other militaries. Similarly, the term *pejuang prajurit* was used to stress ABRI's traditional mentality that soldiers were warriors first before being professional soldiers. These concepts have always been utilised when ABRI denies the perceptual gap between the two generations and asserts the continuing legitimacy of *dwifungsi* regardless of the generational change. About the interaction of two concepts, see Notosusanto (1984:171-173) which became the established reference of *dwifungsi* theory among ABRI officers.

⁵⁶ Interview with Gen (ret) Benny Moerdani, 23 September 1996.

⁵⁷ Interview, 23 September 1996.

concepts in the subsequent development.

In August 1986, a well-publicised ABRI seminar was held under the chairmanship of Lt-Gen Try Sutrisno, the leading post-revolutionary generation officer at that time who had replaced Gen Rudini as KSAD. The theme of the seminar was "Based on the Fighting Spirit of the 1945 Generation, the Next Generation is Determined to Make National Development Successful" and the conclusions were intended to be reflected in GBHN 1988 as ABRI's contribution.⁵⁸ Regarding *dwifungsi*, the seminar stated that "it was built into the ABRI system from the beginning and its quality has been improved until today to encourage ABRI's professionalism both in the fields of defence-security and social-politics."⁵⁹ Here *dwifungsi* and professionalism were linked and the latter was conceptually fused with the conduct of the sociopolitical role.

Such an interpretation was further strengthened by Try in December when he expounded his ideas about professionalism at Seskoad.⁶⁰ Quoting Huntington's classic work, Try argued as follows:

There is a universality of military professionalism, since its aspects such as management of violence, commitment to the nation, and *esprit de corps* are the fundamentals of any military institution.... However, as the characteristic of the nation varies, the form of military commitment to the nation also differs.... In ABRI which also shares such universality, its commitment to the nation is expressed in Sapta Marga in order to devote ABRI's spirit to Indonesia's national unity based on Pancasila and UUD45... and it is in this context that ABRI is different from other militaries.⁶¹

Based on this logic, he further explained

I think improvement of professionalism is the most important thing in today's ABRI because through this process we can strengthen the leadership capacity which forms ABRI's posture as *pejuang prajurit* and *prajurit pejuang*.... In facing various challenges of national development which become more and more complex, we have no choice but to professionalise ourselves in conducting the second function (along with the first function)... and today's situation requires professionalism of *karyawan* staff and other ABRI members in the sociopolitical field.⁶²

These assessments illustrated how ABRI started to utilise the concept of professionalism to tackle the problems concerning *dwifungsi*.

Try's views were supported by a report aimed at improving standards of Akabri. The report—which compared domestic and foreign military educations—noted

⁵⁸ The seminar published a document, *Pokok-Pokok Pikiran ABRI untuk Menyukkseskan Pembangunan Nasional*, Mabes ABRI, 1986.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.67. Moerdani was still Pangab at that time. Presumably he agreed with this assessment. The conflicting interpretation is not a matter for us as we now attempt to see the evolving process.

⁶⁰ See Try Sutrisno (Letjen TNI) "Ceramah KASAD Tentang Kepemimpinan dan Profesionalisme ABRI," *Yudhagama*, No.28, 31 January 1987.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, pp.6-7.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p.10.

that, "like ABRI, the civilian-controlled Japanese Self-Defence Forces (JSDF) has a strong loyalty to the nation, making JSDF the tool of the state power (*alat kekuasaan negara*) but unlike ABRI whose commitment is toward Pancasila, UUD45, and Sapta Marga, JSDF's commitment is only to the constitution, and as a result, there is no *dwifungsi*."⁶³ The ideas underlying this were: (1) the military commitment to the nation is a universal phenomenon but its character varies depending on the nation (in this case, Indonesia and Japan); (2) as Indonesia is based on Pancasila and UUD45, it is this fact that produces *dwifungsi* when the military shows its commitment to the nation; and (3) since the commitment to the nation is the key to any military institution, professionalisation of ABRI would not undermine *semangat kejuangan* and *dwifungsi*.

In this way, the comparison of ABRI—which was politically active and "less-professional"—and a civilian-controlled but professional military did not provide negative implications for the former, but rather fortified ABRI's established self-esteem inherited from the revolutionary generation, while at the same time appealing to the professional identity of the new generation in ABRI. In this sense, the succeeding generation established the notion that *dwifungsi* and professionalism were mutually compatible and did not involve a trade-off. This replied to earlier civilian hopes that professionalisation would somehow modify ABRI's commitment to *dwifungsi*.

Once the concept of professionalism was incorporated into the language of *dwifungsi*, it was then employed to explain *dwifungsi*'s prospects in facing new social demands. This was reflected in the assessment of Mabes ABRI's *sospol* sector regarding the problem of generation change, which was expressed soon after Try's promotion to Pangab in 1988.⁶⁴ This report stated, among other things, that "the spirit of service (*semangat pengabdian*) possessed by the 1945 Generation has enabled it to develop *dwifungsi*, but it is in this context that the problem of regeneration has a special meaning for *dwifungsi*, especially for the *sospol* function, and its preservation becomes one of the most difficult matters for the following generation."⁶⁵ The success of *dwifungsi*, the report continued, could be judged by whether or not *karyawan* tasks were performed successfully in non-*hankam* institutions, including both executive and legislative bodies. In this sense, excesses in its implementation should be corrected, the placing of ABRI *kekaryaan* had to be selective, and their conduct should also be more professional.⁶⁶ Coupled with the *karyawan* problem, "today's social environment which

⁶³ See G. Simanora (Kol Czi), "Laporan Studi Banding Tim Akabri ke Jepang, Korea Selatan dan Muangthai (Proyeksi Akabri Tahun 2000)," *Yudhagama*, No.24, 31 January 1986, pp.15-16.

⁶⁴ *Laporan Perkembangan Sosial Politik* (No.06/Lapbangsos/VII/1988), Mabes ABRI, August 1988. This is a monthly report of Ssospol (Staf Sospol), signed by Assospol Kassospol Maj-Gen Muchtar, providing analysis on the latest political developments. It is notable that regeneration was covered in this issue, implying its political significance perceived by the *sospol* sector within ABRI.

⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.1-2.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.4.

is getting modernised requires ABRI personnel to become more professional in order to be capable of managing *dwifungsi* in a sophisticated way, particularly in the *sospol* field and other non-*hankam* areas."⁶⁷

These assessments all indicated that professionalism was becoming a kind of panacea for the *dwifungsi* issues of the time, both in conceptual and practical terms. Conceptually, professionalism was said to form the identity of the new-generation ABRI and also to facilitate the indoctrination of the 1945 spirit inherited from the older-generation officers, as if re-legitimising *dwifungsi*'s eternal relevance regardless of revolutionary experience. At the practical level, professionalism was interpreted as: the means to achieve better *kekaryaan-sospol* conduct; the means to overcome the "excesses;" the key to maintain ABRI's leadership role in society; and the basis for claiming that *dwifungsi* implementation would be adjusted depending on the level of national development. The expanding utilities of the concept of professionalism obviously contributed to the interpretative management of *dwifungsi* within ABRI.

Further development of ABRI's adaptive professionalism could be seen when the concept of national discipline was apparently absorbed into this professionalism-*dwifungsi* paradigm. The National Discipline Movement (*Gerakan Disiplin Nasional*—GDN) itself was a government's social policy campaign which attempted to tackle the increasing crime rate and the perceived decline of social norms and morality, apparently resulting from rapid economic growth and urbanisation.⁶⁸ Since GDN provided a perfect opportunity for ABRI to project its self-image as the most professional-disciplined group in society, this program was not unrelated to *dwifungsi* in the eyes of the ABRI leadership and allowed it to demonstrate its leadership role in society. A book was soon published by ABRI's Information Centre (Puspen) with the title "ABRI's *Dwifungsi* and National Discipline" in 1990.⁶⁹ This material consisted of ABRI's explanation of the link between *dwifungsi* and national discipline, and included 32 interviews conducted by Puspen with noted intellectuals, ministers, business leaders, and local administrators regarding their opinions about the two concepts.

In the introduction, Pangab Try Sutrisno insisted that "*dwifungsi* is permanently needed as long as Indonesia exists on the earth and ABRI is committed to its professionalism. To illustrate its work, ABRI plays a role in improving national discipline and it is the motivation of this book."⁷⁰ Interestingly, however, despite Try's outward-looking posture in linking *dwifungsi* and national discipline, many of the interviewees in this book essentially linked the two issues in an inward-looking manner, i.e. emphasising the need of further discipline within ABRI. For example,

⁶⁷ Ibid., p.5.

⁶⁸ This campaign involves programs such as neighbourhood watch, rehabilitation of criminals, moral regulation of car drivers, and promotion of other public morals.

⁶⁹ *Dwifungsi ABRI dan Disiplin Nasional*, Jakarta: Puspen ABRI, Mabes ABRI, 1990.

⁷⁰ Ibid., p.8. Italic added.

Interior Minister Gen (ret) Rudini, who was replaced by Try as KSAD in 1986, argued that ABRI still needed to improve internal-moral discipline (*disiplin bathiniah*), which might prevent behaviour like corruption.⁷¹

Whatever the source of indiscipline, the discipline campaign soon became a theme of *dwifungsi* implementation, both for the national project and the internal reform program.⁷² The former was well reflected in the 1990 Army Seminar and the following ABRI Seminar. The latter was crystallised in the back-to-basics movement, led by Try's successor, General Edi Sudradjat, in 1993, and the subsequent study initiative taken by Seskoad with Akabri-generation officers. Through these developments, the professionalism argument under the *dwifungsi* concept further expanded its scope—as notably seen in its new commitment to the management of human resources (*sumber daya manusia*: SDM) in non-military sectors.

The 1990 Army Seminar at Seskoad was regarded as one of the major seminars held by the army leadership, following those in 1965, 1966, and 1972. The seminar discussed the most outward-looking theme in the history of army seminars—the Strategy for the Development of Human Resources in the Second Long-Term Development Plan.⁷³ This, to some extent, reflected the changing patterns of civil-military relations in the last 25 years. ABRI had originally been pre-occupied with establishing its institutional posture in the state and society, but was gradually compelled to shift its attention to broader developments in society in order to catch-up with the multiple impacts of capitalist development. Although this issue was obviously beyond the capacity of the military profession in a normal sense, it was incorporated in ABRI's all-encompassing doctrinal design due to the nature of the *dwifungsi* thinking which had pushed ABRI into a role for which it was not professionally prepared. Under these circumstances, it seemed inevitable that the military's policy initiative became conceptual rather than practical, and even tended to insist on traditionalism as reflecting the fear of losing leadership in society.

Such aspects were visible at the 1990 army seminar. In the opening session, Pangab Try Sutrisno maintained that:

As we anticipated at the ABRI seminar in 1986, the world is now in transition, mainly due to the development of transportation, telecommunication and information, which leads to the post-industrial society characterised by the era of information.... As a result of this development, change in one country easily affects other countries, making it hard to avoid the influx of foreign influence (experiences and thoughts) into our society.⁷⁴

⁷¹ Ibid., p.43.

⁷² For the public dissemination of ABRI's discipline campaign, see, for example, "Pangab Jenderal Try Sutrisno: Tingkatkan Kadar Disiplin di Lingkungan Satuan ABRI," *Kompas*, 18 January 1990; "SMA Taruna Nusantara: Membina Disiplin dan Wawasan Kebangsaan," *Kompas*, 13 July 1990; "Disiplin Nasional Merupakan Tuntutan Kebutuhan Masyarakat," *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 9 November 1990.

⁷³ See *Buku Petunjuk Seminar TNI-AD Tahun 1990 "Strategi Pembangunan Sumber Daya Manusia Dalam Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Tahap ke-Dua,"* TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1990.

⁷⁴ See *Pengarahan Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata Republic Indonesia Pada Acara Pembukaan Seminar TNI*

In facing these challenges, Try insisted on the need for building strategic values to improve human-social quality, particularly in eight areas—struggle motivation, knowledge of science, professionalism, creativity, discipline and responsibility, physical health, and harmony with the natural environment.⁷⁵

Needless to say, these targets were essentially far from defence policy. However, by emphasising struggle, professionalism, and discipline, which were all said to be the pillars in defending national values from the invasion of foreign values in the era of free information flow, the ABRI leadership was reinventing a space for further *dwifungsi* missions. It was in this context that *dwifungsi* was linked with SDM in the seminar. Try asserted that: "as a logical consequence, *dwifungsi* (which is based on struggle motivation) becomes a 'service' (*pengabdian*) of ABRI in our efforts to defend Indonesia's national aspirations and direction."⁷⁶ In developing this argument, he further emphasised that: "the national aspirations are realised in the forms of Pancasila and UUD45 which provide the philosophy of harmony and equilibrium for our society, based on *kekeluargaan* and *gotong-royong*, to avoid confrontation and domination. Therefore, in developing SDM, our social structure does not distinguish civilian and military matters in a dichotomous way."⁷⁷ Try, in this way, relied on traditionalism in order to construct a new logic that *dwifungsi* would have a significant role in promoting SDM.

His remarks reflected ABRI's concern during this period that the improvement of SDM in the industrialising society would inevitably invite a conclusion which emphasised rational allocation of human resources and functional specialisation of social sectors, which would hardly fit with the image of *dwifungsi*. The foreign-value threat and the mythification of national character became ABRI's linguistic weapons in meeting this challenge. In this communication pattern, terms such as "declining nationalism" and "negative influence of foreign values" were fully mobilised.⁷⁸

Based on the result of this army seminar, Mabes ABRI held an armed forces seminar in 1991 in order to produce the basis of ABRI's policy stance for the GBHN 1993 and the second 25-year long-term development plan (PJPT II). The army seminar's arguments were used to incorporate the concept of SDM into ABRI's long-

AD Tahun 1990 di Bandung, Tanggal 15 Desember 1990, TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1990, pp.5-9. In this 5-day seminar, 20 papers were discussed but there were only 4 papers arguing political aspects. These were presented by Alfian (from LIPI), Sarwono Kusumaatmadja (Minister of Reform of State Apparatus), Harry Tjan Silalahi (Director of CSIS), and Juwono Sudarsono (UI). Feisal Tanjung was Seskoad Commander at that time.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.9-10.

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p.12.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.*, p.16.

⁷⁸ At the closing session, Try emphasised that these aspects were the major themes of discussion during the seminar. See *Sambutan Pada Penutupan Seminar TNI Angkatan Darat Tahun 1990*, Seskoad, Bandung, 18 December 1990, pp.9-10.

term doctrine and to face the perceived *tantangan globalisasi* (challenges of globalisation). The major arguments were as follows.

First, ABRI's own SDM condition was explained. It was claimed that an efficient ABRI could not be fully realised due to budgetary constraints, which led to the deterioration of ABRI's six basic capacities—i.e. intelligence, defence, security, territorial, sospol, and back-up system.⁷⁹ Second, the seminar assessed that the security challenges in PJPT II would still be the latent extreme-right or extreme-left movements and GPK (security disturbance movements) in remote areas, whereas the political problems centred on issues concerning human rights, *keterbukaan*, legal justice, freedom of expression and association, and democratisation.⁸⁰ In facing these two challenges, the seminar emphasised the significance of improving ABRI's SDM and concluded that it would need to have a higher level of professionalism which should be integrated with leadership ability, national discipline, *dwifungsi*, and *kemanunggalan ABRI-Rakyat*.⁸¹ The concepts of *dwifungsi*, professionalism, and discipline were all juxtaposed—as seen in the previous sentence—and formulated as ABRI's posture to counter the problems in the next few decades.

Given the new assessment in the environmental shift, ABRI's place in it, and ABRI's internal tasks, Menhankam Gen (ret) Benny Moerdani then moved to finetune ABRI's doctrinal position by introducing the doctrine of Hankamneg (Pertahanan Keamanan Negara—National Defence and Security) the following year. This doctrine standardised the military interpretation that: globalisation would provide threats to Indonesian nationalism; SDM needed to be improved to counter this; 'professionalism and discipline' in society are the keys to improve SDM; and thus ABRI's *dwifungsi* could contribute to the promotion of these two abilities.⁸² In this way, ABRI's external projection of its professionalism began to involve the concept of SDM which emphasised the threat of foreign-values and the need for up-holding "Indonesianness" through the "disciplined" *rakyat*. Importantly, in the eyes of the ABRI leadership, this SDM scheme secured the place of *dwifungsi* as a tool for managing social transformation pushed by the global wave of capitalist development. Such aspirations were actually reflected in ABRI's official 5-year Strategic Plan (Rencana Strategi—Renstra), as SDM was placed as the prime goal during the period of 1989-1993

⁷⁹ See *Pokok-Pokok Pikiran ABRI Tentang Pembangunan Jangka Panjang Tahap Kedua (Hasil Seminar ABRI 1991)*, Mabes ABRI, September 1991, p.40. These six components are the basis of Hankamnas doctrine designed in Law No.20/1982.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, p.64. ABRI's evolving threat perception will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.112.

⁸² *Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Negara Republik Indonesia*, Jakarta: Dephankam, 5 October 1991. Moerdani also split the responsibilities of doctrinal developments between Menhankam and Pangab in 1992. Now, the new doctrine of Hankamneg (*Pertahanan Keamanan Negara: National Security and Defence*) was defined as the basic doctrine authorised by Menhankam, and CDEK which was renewed in 1988 became ABRI's main doctrine for which the Pangab was responsible. See *Keputusan Menteri Pertahanan Keamanan (No: KEP/17/X/1991) Tentang Doktrin Pertahanan Keamanan Negara Republik Indonesia*.

(Renstra IV), following themes such as "Regrouping" (Renstra I 1974-1978), "Kemanunggalan ABRI-Rakyat" (Renstra II 1979-1983), and "KEE and Professionalism" (Renstra III 1984-1988).⁸³

As we have seen, all of these strategic targets linked to the *dwifungsi* management, and the concept of professionalism had played the important role particularly since the mid-1980s in the process of reproducing the legitimacy of *dwifungsi* missions. As mentioned earlier, however, such an externalisation of the professionalism concept ran parallel to ABRI's internal reform programs. We now shift our attention to them, among which the most notable was the back-to-basics campaign which also provoked a public debate on *dwifungsi*.

Back-to-Basics and the Awakening of Corporate Interests

The first systematic attempt made by an academy-generation officer to delineate internal problems with the potential seriously to undermine the army's institutional integrity in conducting military operations, including sociopolitical ones, was issued in 1993, following the decision in the Rapim ABRI 1992 to improve the moral standard of the officer corps. Based on this, KSAD Edi Sudradjat formed a task force which formulated a document, entitled "Basic Ideas about the Maintenance of Fundamental Norms for Soldiers," with its campaign name of "Back-to-Basics."⁸⁴ This 43-page paper consisted of four parts, namely: basic ideas about back-to-basics; environmental factors influencing the army; identification of problems; and the conceptual measures to tackle these problems.⁸⁵ Edi explained that there had been certain deviations (*penyimpangan*) from the army's basic norms which had resulted in the urgent need for therapy (*terapi*).⁸⁶ The main external factor which had caused deviations, according to the paper, was the shortage of budgetary allocations to the defence field. Before describing the budgetary problem, however, the paper emphasised the significance of the current security situation to back up Edi's claim for

⁸³ *Revisi Program Lima Tahun Pertahanan Keamanan Negara 1989-1993*, Dephankam, 1992, pp.7-8. This document was also a revision of ABRI's strategic design following the above ABRI seminar and the tightening budgetary allocation for ABRI's operational tasks, though it did not significantly affect budgets for *sospol* and territorial operations, which consisted of less than one percent in the total annual budget.

⁸⁴ *Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Tentang Penegakan Norma Dasar Keprajuritan TNI-AD (Back to Basics)*, TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1993. Hereafter called the Edi Paper.

⁸⁵ The previous moral-improvement campaign was more inclined to emphasise historical values, especially the importance of Sapta Marga, rather than the problem-solving approach employed by the Edi Paper. For example, a Seskoad educational document at that time was devoted entirely to the reiteration of Sapta Marga as a guide for army officers to behave in efficient, effective, and moral ways; rather than dealing with the problems. See *Naskah Departemen Tentang Kode Etik TNI-ABRI untuk Kursus Reguler Staf Umum dan Komando TNI-AD* (No:52-07-B1-F1301), Seskoad, 1991. The Edi Paper therefore illustrated a quite unusual approach.

⁸⁶ *The Edi Paper*, p.4. Deviations were said to be caused both by environmental and internal factors.

a budget increase. The Edi paper argued that:

The global change in recent years effectively ended international antagonism between Eastern and Western blocs..., but it certainly raised an international campaign coloured by issues such as democracy, human rights and environmental preservation.... No country, including Indonesia, can avoid being influenced by this international campaign... and its domestic reflection can actually be seen in our current process of transition from a traditional-agrarian society to a modern-industrial one, which is accompanied by changes in the social system and order.... To mention an example, the widening socioeconomic gap has an obvious impact on politics in this heterogeneous society.⁸⁷

The emphasis on current political vulnerability was followed by a call for the balanced allocation of the national budget between prosperity and security aspects. The paper argued:

The annually increasing national budget is not accompanied by an increase in the defence budget, rather the allocation for the Hankam sector is declining.... This has always caused a perception gap—regarding prosperity and security—between technocrats and military circles.... It is often not recognised that development throughout the New Order was due to ABRI's successful maintenance of national security.... Some non-ABRI circles instead take security as a given thing without recognising the big contribution ABRI has made.... If the defence budget continues to decline, it will surely affect the security aspect which cannot be separated from prosperity in national development..., leading to an inequilibrium (*ketidakseimbangan*) between prosperity and security.⁸⁸

The paper emphasised several political challenges. It argued that although Pancasila ideology had been disseminated in society, issues of democratisation and political change were emerging every year, as were the issues of the socioeconomic gap and related rioting. Under these conditions, the paper concluded, people could be manipulated politically in ways that would lead to security problems.⁸⁹

The declining budgetary allocation was also identified as the main obstacle to improving ABRI's professionalism. It was argued that, over the previous ten years, the insufficient budget had had a negative impact on various programs, notably the maintenance of military bases, educational quality, military exercises, and the maintenance of weapons.⁹⁰ These difficulties had resulted in a shift in values relating to *kejuangan* (struggle) in today's society.

In the past, becoming a soldier was considered prestigious among the youth population. Now, however, people's willingness to join the army has declined. For example, among nearly 900 students who entered Akabri, those who had 45 points or higher in the NEM (Real Score of the Final Examination) were less than 10%, while the majority had points between 30 and 39. Moreover, according to a survey, 60% of them choose the army merely to find a job, and most are those who could

⁸⁷ Ibid., p.11.

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp.11-12. The defence-security budget had declined as follows: 14.8% (1974/75); 11.3% (1979/80); 11.1% (1984/85); 7.4% (1989/90); and 6.6% (1992/93).

⁸⁹ Ibid., p.13.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p.14.

not pass the Sipenmaru (Entrance Examination for State Universities).⁹¹

If the declining budgetary allocation was coupled with the declining SDM in the army, it could result in a serious threat to ABRI's institutional integrity. The *Edi Paper* saw such conditions as the cause of certain deviations. The following five deviations were discussed.

First, illegal behaviour was apparent—for instance, going to prohibited places, breaking traffic rules, and even conducting criminal activities.⁹² Second, the perceptual gap between old and current generations regarding the understanding of *kejuangan* was also suggested as a case of deviation. The paper warned of the current tendency to assess *kejuangan* as identical with *kepejuangan* (warriorship) during the revolutionary war; this was not true because *kejuangan* consisted of "love" and "spirit of sacrifice" for the nation, and were thus eternal as long as Indonesia existed.⁹³ Third, it was admitted that the problem of low salaries had motivated soldiers to find extra jobs even during office-hours.⁹⁴ In this light, the paper criticised a tendency for those in positions of authority (*atasan*) to be reluctant to discipline deviations by their staff (*bawahannya*), which was clearly in conflict with the army's slogan that asserted: "there is no soldier who is wrong, but if there is, it is officers who have responsibility for what is done by their staff."⁹⁵ These deviations, the paper claimed, had been assessed by several reports and evaluations, as well as in forum discussions and daily conversations, proving the decline of professionalism as a central problem of the army.⁹⁶ Fourth, related to the third case, the paper mentioned a tendency for officers to dislike being posted to combat units and to positions outside of Java, because of their expectations that non-combat and Java postings could provide more

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, p.14. NEM (Nilai Ebatanas [evaluasi belajar tahap akhir nasional] Murni) is an integrated examination for high school students who want to go to university. Sipenmaru is the abbreviation of Seleksi Penerimaan Mahasiswa Baru. According to an Akabri document, one requirement since 1993 to apply for Akabri was the attainment of at least 35 points in the NEM, so on paper, applicants with 30 points are no longer able to apply. See *Sejarah Akademi Angkatan Bersenjata RI (1972-1993)*, Buku II, Mako Akabri, 1993, p.95. The declining quality of Akabri students is also discussed in Kristiadi (forthcoming) which instead emphasises the growing alternative job opportunities rather than the declining value of *kejuangan* in society. Some also argue that the declining quality is due to the patronage factors in recruitment, especially for the children of ABRI officers. Bribe-giving is also mentioned.

⁹² *The Edi Paper*, p.17. The paper did not mention these prohibited places, but according to a previous document, they included night clubs, public steambaths, and other places which might harm the image of ABRI. See *Instruksi Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (No: INS/03/IX/1986) Tentang Pelaksanaan Pola Hidup Sederhana di Lingkungan ABRI*, Mabes ABRI 1986, pp.39-40. This document, compiled under Moerdani's leadership, also imposed strict regulations on their interaction with society.

⁹³ *The Edi Paper*, pp.24-25. This claim revealed that the project of the third army seminar in 1972 was still incomplete. According to Brig-Gen (ret) Abdulkadir Besar, former Deputy Commander of Seskoad (1976-78) and author of the 1972 seminar document, the intent of the seminar had virtually failed and *dwifungsi* already had become *dwiporsi* (dual portion), meaning merely seeking a wider role in politics without virtue. Interview, 30 July 1996.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, p.18.

⁹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.21-23.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.24.

opportunities for material well-being (*kesejahteraan*).⁹⁷ One suggested reason was again the low level of salaries. The fact that salaries were hardly sufficient to cover basic needs had brought about a deterioration in military discipline and work ethic, which in turn further undermined professionalism.⁹⁸ Finally, the paper implied the negative impact of a politically oriented career system by suggesting that "the declining spirit of *kejuangan* is often caused by the reality of uncertainty in career paths."⁹⁹

In conducting "therapy," the back-to-basics campaign put the priority on improving "kepemimpinan" (leadership) and "manajemen" (management) capacities in the organisational mechanism. For example, given the difficulty in increasing the soldiers' welfare budget, better management of Primkopad (Primer Koperasi AD: the army's cooperative association) was suggested, while at the same time, leaders should punish erring soldiers in strict ways. It was also hoped that the defence budget would be increased in a proportional way with the rise of the national budget.¹⁰⁰ These two concepts of leadership and management were also intended to overcome some shortcomings resulting from the 1984 reorganisation.¹⁰¹

In this way, the back-to-basics movement seemed to be an attempt to overcome problems which arose in part from reduced budgetary allocations. It directly pointed out major problems in all three levels of civil-military relations, i.e. the environment surrounding ABRI, civil-military interactions, and internal military affairs. In other words, the paper identified the trouble in the environment (national budget allocation) as the prime source of this snowballing problem which disturbed both civil-military interactions (deviations/declining prestige) and internal military matters (delayed professionalisation). Since the deviations affected civil-military interactions, they could easily spill over to the controversial issue of *dwifungsi* legitimacy.

Gen (ret) Moerdani, for example, understood back-to-basics as meaning a move to give higher priority to the defence function above ABRI's sociopolitical role,

⁹⁷ Ibid., p.27.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p.28.

⁹⁹ Ibid., p.34. As seen in the previous chapter, the process of de-Moerdani-sation created concern among many serving officers about their career uncertainty. Edi's assessment might reflect this reality. Lt-Gen (ret) Soebijakto expected that such distortion in promotion practice would only be normalised after Soeharto (Interview, 8 January 1997).

¹⁰⁰ *The Edi Paper*, pp.38-42.

¹⁰¹ The Edi Paper explained some problems which emerged from Moerdani's reorganisation package. Among others, the elimination of Kowilhan reduced the effectiveness of the army's line-structure; dissolving of infantry brigades caused major problems in maintaining infantry battalions in Korems due to lack of training and readiness; the structure, capacity and tasks of all army organisations were too uniform (*diseragamkan*), especially in territorial commands, due to the failure to consider demographic, geographic and social factors, thus making it difficult for many organisations to conduct their tasks well (p.20). After 9 years of Moerdani's reorganisation, Edi revealed technical problems, apart from concerns about the job reductions we discussed earlier. The uniformity of the Kodams could also be found in the fact that their *hankam-sospol* conduct was designed to be based on the Pangab's directions and, again at least on paper, some flexibility was only given in the case of combat, logistic and education policies. See, for the official tasks of Kodam, *Penyempurnaan Pokok-Pokok Organisasi dan Prosedure Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (TNI-AD) (KEP:08/X/92)*, Mabes ABRI, 1992, pp.102-104.

such as occupying *bupati* posts.¹⁰² Lt-Gen (ret) Sayidiman insisted that the movement was to go back to the real intention of *kekaryaan*, which meant abandoning the current dictatorial style.¹⁰³ Lt-Gen (ret) Soebijakto saw the issue more critically. "Back-to-basics is intended to return to the ideal of 1945 values which are represented by Sapta Marga, but it still could be interpreted in various ways, as some people say it is back-to-barracks. It is in part the responsibility of Edi who provided such an unclear concept."¹⁰⁴ More fundamentally, Gen (ret) A.H. Nasution, the father of *dwifungsi*, insisted that: "I totally agree with Edi's back-to-basics idea that ABRI should return to the basics of the struggle-soldier (*tentara pejuang*) who is totally a tool of nation, not of a certain group."¹⁰⁵

However, in the eyes of serving officers who participated in formulating the back-to-basics project, it had no direct link with *dwifungsi*. Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo for example argued: "it was a micro-managerial problem, and the movement was to re-functionalise each part of the organisation to play its designed role, which had been undermined by a tendency within ABRI to avoid risk and responsibility. So it is basically self-evaluation to enhance professionalism, which has no link with civil-military relations."¹⁰⁶ Another intellectual officer, Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah, who also contributed to the concept building of back-to-basics, endorsed a concern reflected in the paper which was shared by a majority in the ABRI circle. "There is a huge salary gap between ABRI and civilian sectors, which inevitably raises a question in the minds of soldiers—'being professional and loyal to the nation for what?'"¹⁰⁷ This general of Akabri's 1973 Class argued that this psychological problem contributed to the erosion of the *semangat kejuangan* (struggle spirit) among ABRI members.

¹⁰² Interview, 4 March 1997.

¹⁰³ Interview, 4 July 1996.

¹⁰⁴ Interview, 8 January 1997.

¹⁰⁵ Written Interview with Gen (ret) Nasution, 4 January 1997.

¹⁰⁶ Interview, 30 September 1996. Widjojo was an Advisor to the Pangab, Feisal Tanjung, in Political and Security Fields (Sahli Pangab bidang Polkam). Earlier, he had produced an article which was selected as the best working paper in the Sesko ABRI Regular Course XVIII 1991/1992. Sesko ABRI is the Joint Staff Command College, which is open for officers who have graduated from an appropriate service Staff and Command College (for example, Seskoad for army officers) and have a good record in their duties. Widjojo's working paper discussed various impacts of internal problems in conducting *dwifungsi*, as we discuss below. See Agus Widjojo, "Upaya Peningkatan Kualitas Personil ABRI Sejalan Dengan Upaya Peningkatan Kaulitas Sumber Daya Manusia," *Widya Dharma (Majalah Sesko ABRI)*, No.18, 1992, pp.47-89. Widjojo (Class 1970) is a son of Brig-Gen Sutojo, who was one of six generals killed in the abortive coup of 30 September 1965.

¹⁰⁷ Interview with Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah, Deputy Assistant for General Planning to Pangab (Waasrenum Pangab), 24 January 1997. Wirahadikusumah—who was the Korem Commander in Denpasar, Bali, before his current post—was a member of the same Akabri class as Bambang Yudhoyono. This first Harvard MPA holder in ABRI is a nephew of the former vice president Umar Wirahadikusumah who commanded the Jakarta region during the coup in 1965. That Gens Sutojo and Umar were key players in the formation of the New Order army and their relatives were now involved in its reform project illustrated the ongoing generational change within the New Order. The two Aguses were transferred at the same time in January 1998. The former became Assistant to General Planning for Pangab (Asrenum Pangab) and the latter inherited Widjojo's previous position of Sahli Pangab Bidang Polkam and was promoted to Maj-Gen.

As seen in the above paper, the concern was not basically directed to the limited allocation of the national budget in itself, but to its growth rate which did not match the increasing national budget. This point was very important in facing a possible question that ABRI was only concerned with its self-interest. Edi himself later, as Menhankam, insisted that this was not the case, maintaining that "we have to develop professionalism with a very limited budget, because we know that the largest portion must be used for the improvement of the people's prosperity."¹⁰⁸ Clearly the limitation of the budget itself was not the central issue. On the contrary it matched ABRI's nationalist/heroic self-perception of *mengorbankan diri bagi bangsa* (sacrificing self for the nation). Instead, the concerns expressed regarding this issue at that time focussed on the relative gaps between: security and prosperity in national policy; the increase in the defence budget allocation compared to other sectors; the salaries of officers and those of middle-class civilians. In this regard, although the budget shortage itself had already been mentioned since the early days, as seen most recently at the 1991 ABRI Seminar, Edi's claim in his paper provided a new dimension to this old theme.

Assessing these features, there are several implications of the back-to-basics program for our analysis of ABRI's *dwifungsi* management during this time. First was its impact on the *dwifungsi* debate in society. As mentioned by Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, back-to-basics was no doubt primarily an exercise to rejuvenate the army's organisational life and thus not directly concerned with civil-military relations in the eyes of program promoters. Despite this, the back-to-basics program easily merged with the debate in political society over *dwifungsi* excesses, as we discussed in the previous chapter which, according to Edi, was manipulated by certain groups to express their political interests. This indicated that the *dwifungsi* discourse in political communication had already reached the point where ABRI could not maintain a hegemonic interpretation of its self-role perception.

Second, negative connotations involved in the Edi Paper regarding national policy revealed that the back-to-basics promoters were concerned about the declining institutional integrity of the army resulting from Soeharto's state administration which had reduced the defence-security budget. Such a perception was inherited by Edi's successor, Wismoyo, as KSAD, who not only energetically proceeded with Edi's back-to-basics program but was also said to be active in protecting the army's own financial sources through business activities, and thus distancing himself from the Palace—despite his earlier image as a "palace general."¹⁰⁹ The back-to-basics idea, therefore,

¹⁰⁸ Interview with Gen (ret) Edi Sudradjat, Menhankam, 19 February 1997.

¹⁰⁹ The Editors (1995:104-105) assessed that Wismoyo was eager to protect army business interests against the encroachment of Presidential crony Bob Hasan in order to show that he was not a puppet of Soeharto. However, soon after Hartono replaced Wismoyo as KSAD in 1995, he scrapped Wismoyo's plan to restrict entrance to Seskoad to the holders of college degree (S1) in order to improve officer quality. This move was seen as a setback to the back-to-basics trend. Interview with a general-ranking army officer, October 1998.

coincided with the reality that the army's institutional interests were not necessarily synchronised with Soeharto's political interests. Together with the budget issue, the problem of political promotion within ABRI—as mentioned in the Edi Paper—also reflected the army's concern about Soeharto's disregard of its corporate interests.

In sum, there were at least two unintended political consequences of the back-to-basics program. One was the boosting of critical space given to the *dwifungsi* debate in public political discussion. The other was the awakening of the army's organisational concerns about Soeharto's policy stance. In other words, if the project was to tackle ABRI's internal problems and to promote professionalism, discipline and SDM, it also had to pay the dual cost of opening up social pressure on *dwifungsi* and objecting to some of Soeharto's policies.

Seskoad Officers' Search for *Dwifungsi*'s New Paradigm

In parallel with the back-to-basics movement, there was the initiative of Seskoad-linked officers to support the Edi project, as if to revive the reputation of Seskoad as the *dapur pemikiran* (idea-kitchen) of ABRI in the early period of the New Order.¹¹⁰ The re-emergence of Seskoad indicated that ABRI, especially the army, was searching for a new format for its role in the changing society. A year after the Rapim ABRI 1992 which promoted the issue of back-to-basics, Seskoad introduced a program to promote leadership capacity among officers. As seen above, the need for leadership (*kepemimpinan*) skill was one of the conclusions in the Edi Paper, and Seskoad's educational curriculum supported this orientation. In 1993, it produced the first material which warned of the declining discipline among the officer corps by insisting that officers should not be "salon officers" (*perwira-perwira salon*) who only enjoyed having parties and ceremonies.¹¹¹ The document called for "authoritative leadership" at all command levels to uphold strong discipline, because without it the military organisation would simply become an "armed gang." Such authoritative leadership was described as necessary within ABRI, especially in conducting its *hankam* role. On the other hand, in implementing its *sospol* role, the paper insisted that officers had to improve "democratic leadership" in order to accommodate the people's political aspirations.¹¹² Although ABRI's emphasis on leadership was not new, it was the first time for it to be introduced as an internal education program for the officers.

Disregarding the simple question of how a body organised along authoritarian

¹¹⁰ As seen earlier, Seskoad was the institute which held major army seminars in the 1960s and 1970s to formulate core political doctrines of the military.

¹¹¹ See *Naskah Departemen Tentang Kepemimpinan ABRI Untuk Kursus Regular Staf Umum dan Komando TNI-AD* (No.52-07-B1-F1201), Seskoad, 1993, p.21. The paper also noted that officers often failed to show their respect for higher-ranking officers by dropping "siap" (yes sir) in conversation at meetings.

¹¹² This description of authoritarian and democratic leadership is from *ibid.*, pp.7-8.

lines could democratically lead others, these arguments distinguished between the two functions in the *dwifungsi* doctrine. This dichotomous approach was soon revised by Mabes ABRI which also produced a document on ABRI's leadership in 1993. This Mabes ABRI version argued that the *dwifungsi* leadership—without the distinction between *hankam* and *sospol* aspects—would be greatly needed in the era of globalisation in order to defend Indonesian values from the influx of individualistic foreign concepts such as human rights.¹¹³

Seskoad took further initiatives to promote its internal program along with Edi's back-to-basics. The Study Forum was newly established within Seskoad under the leadership of Maj-Gen Herman Musakabe, DanSeskoad, with full support from Edi (Menhankam) and Wismoyo (KSAD). On the occasion of the 42nd anniversary of Seskoad in 1993, the Forum published a collection of working papers written by noted intellectual officers. The book was entitled "Challenges of Development: Dynamic Thoughts of Seskoad."¹¹⁴ In his introductory note, Edi stressed that this work should begin a new tradition of Seskoad to improve the intellectual quality of the officer corps, while Wismoyo claimed that the book proved Seskoad's constant role as the conceptual centre of the army. In fact, the articles ranged from internal problems of ABRI to international relations, and all were written by active officers. We only focus on the ABRI issues here, but before looking at each article, it is worth examining the ideas of Agus Widjojo who was not only involved in Edi's back-to-basics movement but was also recruited by the Study Forum as the sole source of intellectual input from outside Seskoad. Among both active and retired officers, it was widely understood that Widjojo's contribution in developing the two programs was critical.

Widjojo published a working paper in Sesko ABRI in 1992, which was—as mentioned earlier—selected as the best paper in the annual regular course. In his analysis of national trends, he pointed out that young people aged 25-35, who had no experience of serious political conflict in the nation, would dominate the population by the year 2000; inevitably they would not understand the background of ABRI's political commitment.¹¹⁵ Because these young people, especially in the urban areas, would receive a higher level of education than now, he continued, it was demographically predictable that more people would become critical and outspoken

¹¹³ See *Kepemimpinan ABRI dalam Pembangunan Negara-Bangsa: Masa Lalu, Masa Kini, dan Masa Mendatang*, Mabes ABRI, 1993, p.52. Pangab Try Sutrisno explained that this 64-page document was the latest reference for ABRI officers to improve professionalism of *dwifungsi* in order to take the leadership in guarding Indonesia from foreign ideologies.

¹¹⁴ See *Tantangan Pembangunan: Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1992-1993*, Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, 1993. Agus Wirahadikusumah, who had just come back from Harvard University in 1992 and joined Seskoad's teaching staff with lieutenant-colonel rank, was the Secretary of the Forum. In producing this book, the Forum selected several key contributors, all from Seskoad, except one who had been posted to Kodam III/Siliwangi as Assistant for Operations to Kasdam. That was Agus Widjojo (Col) whom Agus Wirahadikusumah evaluated as the best intellectual officer among the Akabri generation officers. Interview with Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah, 2 October 1996.

¹¹⁵ See Agus Widjojo, *op.cit.*, p.55.

about the role of ABRI. For him, this trend was coupled with the change in political culture from the current traditional-paternalist one to a more modern-rational one. In facing these challenges, he argued that ABRI needed to abandon its conservative military culture, represented by such features as: lack of respect for pluralism and difference of opinion; tendency to see society as monolithic like the military; lack of tolerance to different ideas within the military, which had made officers unfamiliar with the persuasive approach in politics.¹¹⁶ He argued that these aspects did not suit modern political culture—which was open, rational, argumentative, and dynamic—and the current officers' general lack of curiosity to read books had encouraged such a gap.

Regarding *dwifungsi*, Widjojo mentioned Juwono Sudarsono's view—which was usually welcomed by other officers—that saw "ABRI as the only institution capable of creating nation-wide concepts and interests; therefore *dwifungsi* should not be challenged." According to Widjojo, Juwono's view was too static and failed to consider current social changes which had seen the establishment of many social institutions capable of managing fields which had been dominated by ABRI over the last 25 years since the second army seminar in 1966.¹¹⁷ In his view, there were various factors which would influence ABRI's *dwifungsi*. Among external factors, he identified: the perceptual change in society regarding ABRI; the rise of the educated middle class; the growing complexity of the modern nation; the erosion of the paternalistic society due to modernisation; and problems and challenges posed by economic development. On the other hand, the internal factor he mentioned was the increasing professionalism within ABRI. This was quite contrary to the mainstream interpretation that professionalism would not influence *dwifungsi*. Instead, he saw the possibility of perceptual change within the professional circle (*kalangan ABRI profesional*), which would influence *dwifungsi* and the role of ABRI in general.¹¹⁸ On the conduct of *dwifungsi*, Widjojo warned of the growing tendency of dogmatisation in implementing *dwifungsi*. "Ideology [of *dwifungsi*] has to be adjustable to the times, and guided by the rational, open, and discussable methods rather than dogmatic indoctrination."¹¹⁹

Widjojo then analysed various shortcomings in ABRI's organisational and personnel policies. He pointed out the uncertain career system which was also one argument in the Edi Paper. The need to establish a predictable career system, which was not affected by the 'external' factors such as politics and patronage, was strongly emphasised. He said this was important to encourage officers' work motivation, rank-prestige, and self-confidence, as well as to prevent both indifference (*masa bodoh*) and

¹¹⁶ Ibid., p.56.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., p.65. Above quotation of Juwono is provided without the source.

¹¹⁸ Ibid., p.66.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., p.71.

the seeking of short-cuts.¹²⁰ As discussed in the previous chapter, the uncertainty in the career system at that time was largely due to Soeharto's political manipulation of ABRI in making ABRI amenable in the midst of his conflict with Menhankam Gen (ret) Benny Moerdani. Widjojo also made a pragmatic suggestion aimed at improving the quality of personnel. "We should be brave enough to decide the priority between the two functions in *dwifungsi*, because ABRI does not have enough time to produce personnel who are competent in both functions simultaneously."¹²¹ ABRI's priority was no doubt the defence role, not *sospol*. Such a progressive suggestion was followed by his argument calling for the transformation of officers' values from traditional to rational ones in order to improve ABRI's SDM, and—as argued in the Edi Paper—the acquisition of leadership and management skills.¹²²

Widjojo's paper had two significant implications. First, it revealed that there was no single assessment within ABRI regarding the linkage between *dwifungsi* and professionalism, and the latter was now legitimately used as a foundation to express criticism of the current situation within ABRI. In explaining the need for professionalism which had already been recognised in ABRI, one could describe what should be corrected, and this in effect opened the space to legitimately raise concerns about the current system. Perhaps without using the umbrella of professionalism and SDM, Widjojo might have been taking a risk in describing ABRI as paternalistic, irrational, dogmatic, uncertain, and therefore less capable of performing two functions at the same time. As we saw above, the concept of professionalism had been widely used to expand the scope of *dwifungsi* legitimation since the mid-1980s, but Widjojo's paper illustrated that it could also be used by ABRI officers to question the current conduct of *dwifungsi*. However, a question which still remained was: how much support could be expected for Widjojo's line of thinking? According to a general-ranking officer close to him, "we are still a minority within ABRI; the majority is not even willing to communicate with civilian intellectuals because they do not want to feel inferior."¹²³ However, in ABRI as a whole, this was not to deny the potential support of the silent majority of lower-ranking officers who were naturally concerned about uncertain career paths.

Second, the fact that he was employed both in the back-to-basics and the Seskoad project also revealed that Widjojo's ideas and stances were at least welcomed by certain groups within the military leadership in conducting internal reform programs. Widjojo's ideas were basically reflected in the Edi Paper, though some of the more drastic elements were hardly visible. As we will see below, his contribution was also apparent in the Seskoad project, although his critical perspective was balanced by

¹²⁰ Ibid., p.85.

¹²¹ Ibid., p.85.

¹²² Ibid., p.88.

¹²³ Confidential interview, January 1997.

the outward-looking approach provided by Lt-Col Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono—a close friend of Widjojo.

Looking back to the Seskoad book, three articles are relevant here. The one written by Let-Col Heru Sukmadi discussed the challenges facing ABRI's ethics.¹²⁴ Heru argued that ABRI's current organisational culture was not yet fully based on the *Sapta Marga* principle. According to him, largely due to the influx of business values within ABRI, the military ethic was in serious danger of being replaced by a commercial ethic among ABRI officers.¹²⁵ Heru elaborated further on the problem of military ethics by arguing that the formation of the DKM (Military Honour Council) in the wake of the Dili affair in November 1991 highlighted ABRI's lack of proper ethics. However, he asserted that the cause of the incident was not entirely on the ABRI side.¹²⁶ As discussed in the previous chapter, this assessment reflected a general concern within the officer corps about Soeharto's disregard of military voices.

Heru's paper was followed by Lt-Col Agus Wirahadikusumah who argued about the professionalism of ABRI from a critical perspective.¹²⁷ Quoting Edi's previous speech on back-to-basics, Agus called for its urgent implementation, due to the shared concern that the level of professionalism was declining. As if to reinforce the Edi Paper, he noted: the perceptual gap between the two generations regarding the understanding of *kejuangan*; the growing deviations from ABRI's standard norms; the lack of financial support to improve the quality of professionalism; and the rapid economic growth which had a negative influence on ABRI in that it tended to erode the discipline of military officers. Like Heru, Agus also regarded the Dili affair as an example of lack of professionalism in conducting security operations, but again, he believed that the blame could not be solely attributed to ABRI.¹²⁸ For Heru and Agus, the Dili affair contributed a significant momentum to the professionalism campaign within ABRI, while at the same time causing concern that ABRI's corporate interest was not properly protected by the national leaders when they faced international pressure.

In terms of Soeharto-ABRI relations, therefore, the Dili incident provided a significant momentum for young officers in Seskoad—who had studied the army's 'long-term' strategic plans—to discuss the problems of the state leadership whose interests did not resonate with those of ABRI. In the military campaign for professionalisation, these officers developed an intra-military communication space to

¹²⁴ Heru Sukmadi was a 1974 graduate of Akabri and a member of the teaching staff of Seskoad at that time. He was then posted as Edi's advisor (Staf Ahli Menhankam).

¹²⁵ See Bambang Heru Sukmadi (Letkol), "Tantangan Etika Militer ABRI Dalam Era Pembangunan," in *Tantangan...*, pp.34-35.

¹²⁶ *Ibid.*, p.35. We will further examine the impact of the Dili affair and the DKM on the subsequent civil-military relations in the next chapter.

¹²⁷ Agus Wirahadikusumah (Letkol), "Kejuangan dan Profesionalisme Prajurit TNI AD: Suatu Tinjauan dan Analisis Kritis," in *Tantangan...*, pp.43-71.

¹²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.54.

discuss such perceptions within the officer corps. In this sense, the concept of professionalism, which was first used to legitimise *dwifungsi* practice for post-revolutionary officers, but was later used to express problems of ABRI's internal/external policy orientations, now provided officers with a lens to identify the gap between ABRI's corporate interests and Soeharto's private interests.

Agus' article was followed by a reprint of Bambang Yudhoyono's writing on professionalism. It is difficult to find any recent Seskoad paper on professionalism which does not quote Bambang's paper, first circulated within Seskoad in 1990.¹²⁹ Unlike the previous two articles, Bambang's argument was largely centred on prospects and hopes rather than problems. As he identified ABRI's central concern today as the actualisation of professionalism in facing the complex challenges of social change, his argument was all-encompassing in nature, insisting on the prospective role of the professionalised ABRI in the next decades. This aspect seemed to be the major factor which made his writing so popular within ABRI whose legitimate place in society had been in question since the *keterbukaan* movement.

In starting his argument, Bambang rejected the views of Guy Pauker, Ulf Sundhaussen, Harold Maynard and Harold Crouch which he labelled as the liberal presumption of civilian supremacy over the military. In understanding the legitimacy of ABRI's sociopolitical role, he insisted that western notions were not suitable. His concept of military professionalism was distinguished from the western approach which tended to limit the utility of a profession to a certain field. He argued that in the case of ABRI, the Law No.2 in 1988—which claimed that ABRI should be professional in military affairs with the spirit of Sapta Marga—embodied the essence of ABRI's professionalism. "With *dwifungsi*," he argued, "ABRI is expected to have two dimensions of professionalism, i.e. *hankam* and *sospol* fields. Therefore, all ABRI officers have to be professional in conducting their tasks in regard to defence and social-politics."¹³⁰ This approach was different from that of Agus Widjojo who reacted to such an interpretation by saying that: "I personally do not believe that professionalism can be adopted in ABRI's sociopolitical role."¹³¹

Bambang also saw the issue of democratisation as the major challenge to Indonesia. The world-wide wave of democratisation, according to Bambang, would

¹²⁹ Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono (Letkol), "Profesionalisme Perwira ABRI Masa Kini dan Masa Depan," in *Tantangan...*, pp.91-149.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p.101-102. He suggested six points which comprised the characteristics of ABRI's professionalism: high moral quality based on ABRI's codes of ethics; expertise in *hankam* and *sospol*; being leaders and managers with a sense of justice; having deep insights, awareness and responsibility in national life; a strong spirit of solidarity and compactness; solidarity with people in national life. As we have seen earlier, these slogans were not new in ABRI's thinking. Interestingly, Bambang integrated them all under his conception of professionalism in a new way.

¹³¹ Interviews with Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, 30 September 1996. A serving general-ranking officer also asserted that "ABRI can never be professional since it plays politics." Confidential interview, January 1997.

have a negative impact on Indonesian society—which was still in transition—because of the possibility that radical political ideas from abroad could easily gain popular support in domestic society.¹³² Quoting foreign media which placed Indonesia's country risk on the same ranking with China, mainly due to the uncertainty of national leadership succession, he insisted on the importance of ABRI's continuing role in providing maximum security and order in society to maintain investors' confidence.¹³³ Moreover, Bambang supported an opinion of Harold Maynard which noted ABRI as the only institution in Indonesia which was capable of handling security, stability, and development in an effective way—despite his earlier comment on western-biased studies. In discussing how ABRI should fulfil these "hopes of society," the concept of professionalisation again played a key role. It was argued that ABRI officers were expected to be professional as patriots, experts, leaders, managers, and thinkers.¹³⁴

Among these professional capacities, Bambang emphasised leadership and management. In order to improve the quality of SDM in Indonesia, according to him, it was important to promote discipline, efficiency, productivity and the work-ethic in society, and it was in these areas that ABRI's social leadership would be needed. Regarding management, he said this ability was crucial in peace time. "With good management, we are not only able to utilise limited resources effectively and efficiently but also to arrange organisations, weapons, facilities, and exercises in optimal ways."¹³⁵ In sum, Bambang claimed that leadership and management were the key capacities of ABRI's professionalism, and it was in this context that he concluded that professionalisation would promote ABRI's role in society rather than becoming a *pemadam kebakaran* (fire brigade).¹³⁶ Bambang's catch-all conception of professionalism, therefore, provided a military discourse to counter any attempt in society to diminish the utility of *dwifungsi* in response to the perceived threat of social change.

The new concepts recently established in the *dwifungsi* language by Seskoad officers—namely, professionalism, SDM, discipline and leadership—were in fact reflected in ABRI's subsequent policies. For example, F-ABRI, according to Maj-Gen Hari Sabarno, now focused on SDM and national discipline issues after the *keterbukaan*

¹³² Ibid., pp.108-109.

¹³³ Ibid., p.120.

¹³⁴ Ibid., p.125. Bambang with Agus Wirahadikusumah also wrote another chapter in *Tantangan Pembangunan*, which focused on international politics concerning the Non-Block movement and the role of Indonesia in it. This highly academic writing gave the impression that they themselves embodied the "officer as thinker," which Bambang mentioned here.

¹³⁵ Ibid., pp.135-136.

¹³⁶ Ibid., p.147. As seen in the previous chapter, the term *pemadam kebakaran* has been used by critics to describe ABRI's role in reality as a mere watchdog of stability, despite its proclaimed role as the dynamisor of development. In this context, the term is used to criticise ABRI's shortcoming in implementing *dwifungsi*. However, the term is also used to criticise ABRI's day-to-day involvement in non-military sectors. In this context, critics insist that ABRI's prime role should be like a fire extinguisher, which is only needed in an emergency situation.

campaign in the early 1990s.¹³⁷ So too in territorial operations, the internal magazine of as Kodam Jaya—then under the command of Maj-Gen Wiranto—asserted that the National Discipline Movement reflected ABRI's role as *ing ngarsa sung tuladha* in carrying out *dwifungsi's* second function.¹³⁸ Above all, Bambang's contribution was crucial in the making of this theory which integrated perceived needs in ABRI and society—such as SDM, discipline, and professionalism—and linked them with the viability of *dwifungsi*. Though there were subtle differences between Agus Widjojo's and Bambang's focuses, the latter's catch-all paradigm was soon adopted as the *de facto* official interpretation of *dwifungsi*.

The Forum's first *Tantangan* project enabled Seskoad to institutionalise the series in the following years. Up to 1996, the *Tantangan* series was conducted every year, although the documents were only circulated within ABRI from the second edition in 1994. In the 1994 edition, which mainly focused on the strategic issues of Hankamneg, the Forum took a different approach by inviting civilian intellectuals for the five-day discussion.¹³⁹ The aim was to promote communication between Seskoad and civilian intellectuals, which would strengthen the image of Seskoad as the leading idea-maker in civil-military relations.

The Forum strongly linked *dwifungsi* to the presidential succession. On the assumption that President Soeharto would remain in power, the Forum said: "by the year 2003, ABRI will still behave as it does today. But if succession takes place [in 1998], ABRI—at least for the following five years—will lead domestic politics. Then if the political situation in 2003 is satisfactory, ABRI will review its *kekaryaan* role, which is distinguished from the *sospol* role of *dwifungsi*. Despite the possible reduction of *kekaryaan*, the quality of ABRI's *sospol* role will be improved as Seskoad's new admission policy—which limits candidates to those who hold university degrees—will be implemented after 1997."¹⁴⁰

These assessments were important in two ways. First the succession problem

¹³⁷ Interview with Maj-Gen Hari Sabarno, Deputy Head of F-ABRI, 5 February 1997. Hari then became the Head of F-ABRI in September 1997, was given the task of leading F-ABRI in the March MPR session in 1998.

¹³⁸ See *Gema Jayakarta (Media Komunikasi Kodam Jaya/Jakarta)*, edisi VI, December 1995, p.37. The role of ABRI was generally interpreted to be *tut wuri handayani* during this period, but ABRI saw some programs like GDN gave *dwifungsi* a chance to perform the role of *ing ngarsa sung tuladha*. Consult Chapter 2 for these Javanese concepts.

¹³⁹ This year's Study Forum members were different from the previous year. However, noted officers included Col Rizal Nurdin—who later became Kasdam I/Bukit Barisan and Pangdam in the same Kodam in the 1997 July reshuffle—and Lt-Col Syarifudin Tippe who was the best graduate (*lulusan terbaik*) in the Seskoad 1989-90 class and became the Coordinator of Pangab's Personal Staff (Korspri Pangab) under Feisal Tanjung. The 1994 edition is *Tantangan Pembangunan: Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1993-1994*, Edisi Kedua, Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, 1994. The articles included issues regarding: Local Development and AMD; Implementation of Security Approach; Revitalisation of Nationalism; Orsospol and Pancasila Democracy; The Role of Religion as the Unifying Doctrine; and The Relevance of Family Principles in Socioeconomic Transformation.

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.231-233. As mentioned above, however, this admission policy was reversed by Hartono when he became KSAD in 1995.

was discussed internally within ABRI and it was perceived as the major turning point for ABRI's political management. Here, Seskoad indicated ABRI's possible claim to lead the nation after the Soeharto regime. Given the fact that this book was circulated within ABRI, it seemed understood that ABRI was preparing for the succession, even if this was usually denied in official public comments. Second, Seskoad's distinction between *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan* implied that in the post-Soeharto politics—where ABRI would lack a strong military leader who could claim his dominant role as the national-crisis solver and ABRI would merely become 'one among equals' in the political arena—a plausible policy taken by ABRI would be the reduction of *kekaryaan* which was no longer regarded as the essence of *dwifungsi* in the eyes of the Seskoad circle.¹⁴¹ The Seskoad assessment in the second *Tantangan* project provided some important insights concerning *dwifungsi* in the regime transformation.

In contrast to previous editions, the third edition in 1995 focused on the economy, particularly the role of ABRI in developing cooperative associations (*koperasi*).¹⁴² This theme also provided new ideas on *dwifungsi*. As suggested in the Edi Paper, *koperasi* management was seen as one way to overcome the problem of declining budgetary allocations for ABRI. However, in the Seskoad thinking, the *koperasi* development was now regarded as an expression of ABRI's increasing role in the economic field and it was manifested as the actualisation of the dynamising role embodied in the *dwifungsi* concept. Seskoad insisted that Primkopad, whose management had gradually become more professional, effective, and efficient, could contribute to the development of other *koperasi* in ABRI and the KBA, as well as in non-ABRI organisations at the local level. By doing so, ABRI's *koperasi* could strengthen the nation-wide small business groups, and would help consolidate the national economy in facing the challenge of a free-trade global economy.¹⁴³ Moreover, it would also help prevent exploitation of resources and opportunities by big business groups at the expense of small business, which could cause political instability.¹⁴⁴ In this way, Seskoad's recent initiative to establish new strategic concepts now covered ABRI's dynamising role in the economy, and—in the eyes of Seskoad—it added another virtue for *dwifungsi* in the face of criticism that ABRI disregarded the interests of the people. Despite a general feeling that the free-trade economy required international competitiveness and would force ABRI to take a back seat in the economic field,

¹⁴¹ We will further analyse the details of *kekaryaan* discourse in Chapter 6.

¹⁴² *Tantangan Pembangunan III—Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1994-1995: Strategi Pembangunan Koperasi dalam Menghadapi Era Perdagangan Bebas pada Awal Abad ke-21*, Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, 1995. The promotion of *koperasi* was a major national policy since 1993.

¹⁴³ See Imam Maksudi (Kol), "Peran ABRI Sebagai Kekuatan Sosial Politik Dalam Mempercepat Kemajuan Usaha Koperasi," in *ibid.*, pp.239-265. These claims were also aimed at improving ABRI's image in society which viewed ABRI as an agent of big business. As seen in the previous chapter, Menhankam Edi Sudradjat publicly warned of the danger of becoming a tool of the rich in 1996, reflecting a concern of the third *Tantangan* project.

¹⁴⁴ *Tantangan Pembangunan III...*, pp.266-268.

Seskoad provided a counter-assessment.¹⁴⁵

Finally, the fourth edition of *Tantangan* series in 1996 focused on the democratisation issues—including the role of ABRI.¹⁴⁶ Seskoad attempted to systematise ABRI's views on democratic prospects in preparing for the formulation of GBHN 1998. In the 1996 edition, Maj-Gen Arifin Tarigan, DanSeskoad, first discussed the problems of national disharmony.¹⁴⁷ Arifin called on the government to be more clean and ready to accept criticism from any direction, in order to prepare for the era of *keterbukaan*-democracy.¹⁴⁸ He emphasised how globalisation would bring to the surface the problem of the current socioeconomic gap between the rich and poor, and how it could threaten national cohesion. From this security perspective, Arifin anticipated the increase of the number of mass riots and insisted on the need for preparing civilian militia (Rakyat Terlatih—Ratih) to support the task of the Police in maintaining security and order.¹⁴⁹ The Seskoad Commander believed this was important to make society understood that 'security and order' were not a matter of the preservation of ABRI's *dwifungsi* but a very essential common good in society.¹⁵⁰ At the same time, civilian leaders in the government, he demanded, also needed to establish consistent measures for the lessening of the economic gap, without prioritising their factional interests in the government.

The article by the DanSeskoad was followed by that of another Major

¹⁴⁵ In the light of free-trade economy, there is also a view which emphasises the increasing role of the Police (not the army) because of the sophistication of criminal economic activities, such as money-laundering, bank corruption, and drug dealing. The former National Police Chief (1991-1993) said that "today, the Police and BPK (Supreme Auditorial Board) can hardly check these activities, and they are the real threat for the rational economic planning, especially in facing globalisation. Therefore, the Police is now expanding its function to create the Cyber-Police." Interview with Police Gen (ret) Kunarto, Deputy Head of BPK, 23 January 1997.

¹⁴⁶ *Tantangan Pembangunan—Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1995-1996 (Edisi ke-IV): Semangat Mepedomani Pancasila dan UUD 1945 Dalam Setiap Gerak dan Langkah Menjamin Adanya Harmonisasi Pembangunan Politik Pada Pelita VII*, Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, 1996. This edition was the result of a seminar held by the Study Forum in May 1996.

¹⁴⁷ Maj-Gen Arifin Tarigan (AMN 65) also played an important role in the LIPI project we discussed in the previous chapter. As mentioned earlier, the LIPI project consisted of two studies—one on *dwifungsi* and the other on the electoral system—and Arifin was a key ABRI informant who provided input regarding the electoral system. His proposals, which opposed the single-seat district system, can be found in Arifin Tarigan (Mayjen), "Kajian Tentang Sistem Pemilu," *Yudhagama*, No.50, Vol.17, July 1996, pp.14-33. We will discuss this issue later in Chapter 6. In the July 1997 reshuffle, he was replaced by Brig-Gen Affandi, Deputy Commander of Seskoad, and became a member of F-ABRI. In June 1998, he became the Chairman of Wanhankamnas.

¹⁴⁸ See Arifin Tarigan, "Visi Tentang Globalisasi dan Perubahan pada Aspek Poleksosbud Serta Pengaruhnya pada Ketahanan Nasional," in *Tantangan Pembangunan—Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1995-1996...*, p.49.

¹⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p.53.

¹⁵⁰ In November 1998, under the Habibie government, ABRI decided to formulate Ratih in order to strengthen security maintenance in preparing for the general election in June 1999. An assistant of Gen Wiranto (ABRI Commander) insisted that—apart from the said purpose—civilian participation in security maintenance was important to socialise the value of security in the public and, in turn, alleviate social criticism of *dwifungsi* (interview with a general-ranking officer, October 1998). Seskoad's study in 1996 is reflected here.

General, Tayo Tarmadi, Pangdam III/Siliwangi.¹⁵¹ His argument was highly conceptual but supported ABRI's slogan of "*memberdayakan masyarakat*" (empowering society) as *dwifungsi's* major aim in future political development. At first, he distinguished between super- and infra-structures, insisting on the need for empowering the latter for the creation of a viable political system. The dichotomy of superstructure and infrastructure can roughly be equated with: the state and society; government and people; or the executive and legislative bodies. It was argued that since the early 1990s, Indonesia had faced political issues such as *keterbukaan*, democratisation, human rights and civil society which were all new for the political system. The new trends were accompanied by limited social participation and bureaucratic dominance in the political system. It was against this background that the civil society issue emerged, involving the promotion of the bargaining position of society vis-a-vis the state and government.¹⁵² Although he pointed to the potential danger of a weak superstructure and a too-strong infrastructure, he insisted on the need for empowering the infrastructure, considering the current situation. In the future *dwifungsi* should be aimed to encourage this process, he concluded. The super- and infrastructures were further conceptualised by Lt-Col Ade Djamhuri, Chief of Information in Kodam III, who emphasised the importance of improving mutual communication between the two structures in order to maintain harmony and equilibrium in their interactions.¹⁵³

Overall, Arifin provided Seskoad's assessment regarding the political threats in the coming decades, whereas both Tayo and Ade attempted to formulate a new framework for assessing current political distortions by employing the state-society approach.¹⁵⁴ The *Tantangan* project—which Seskoad hoped would rejuvenate its prestige as a *dapur pemikiran* as envisaged by Edi and Wismoyo in the first edition—was successful in the sense that it institutionalised the army's internal discussion about future political problems and *dwifungsi's* response to them. As seen in the previous chapter, the ABRI leadership under Feisal and Hartono had become dogmatic in its responses to the growing social criticism during this period, but Seskoad's Study Forum, which consisted of a small intellectual circle, seemed to envisage the practical need for adjusting *dwifungsi* in the changing society without resorting to the dogmatism

¹⁵¹ Tayo Tarmadi, "Pembangunan Politik, Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dan Masa Depan Pembangunan," in *Tantangan Pembangunan—Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1995-1996...*, pp.57-70. In the July 1997 reshuffle, Tayo (Akabri 71)—like Arifin—was transferred to F-ABRI.

¹⁵² *Ibid.*, pp.62-66.

¹⁵³ See Ade Djamhuri (Letkol), "Komunikasi Politik Antar Infra dan Suprastruktur Politik untuk Memelihara Stabilitas Keamanan yang Mantap dan Dinamis," in *Tantangan Pembangunan—Dinamika Pemikiran Seskoad 1995-1996...*, pp.199-227. Ade, who worked under Tayo's Siliwangi Command, is an Akabri classmate of Bambang Yudhoyono and is a holder of an MA from UI.

¹⁵⁴ Before the state-society approach, ABRI writings tended to employ a systems approach which blurred the aspect of power relations in real politics. According to Brig-Gen (ret) Soedibyo, a senior researcher at Rudini's LPSI, early writings of New Order ABRI were strongly influenced by Karl Deutsch, who had contributed to the development of the systems approach in political science and international relations since the early 1960s. Interview, 22 July 1996.

adopted by the ABRI leadership. The Army Seminar at Seskoad in 1996—which was held amidst the deepening of government intervention in Megawati's PDI—further reflected such postures shared among these officers who were involved in the designing of ABRI's 'long-term' political interests.

The 1996 Army Seminar: Designing *Dwifungsi* for Democratisation

For ABRI, the 1996 Army Seminar was significant in two ways. First, it was the first army seminar totally managed by the academy-generation officers to prepare for the army's inputs to a GBHN. Menhankam Edi Sudradjat, Pangab Feisal Tanjung, and KSAD Hartono were all AMN graduates whereas the seminar's working committees were largely led by Akabri graduates, or the New Order-generation officers who entered the academy after the army took power under the New Order.¹⁵⁵ Second, as retired General Soemitro put it, "this seminar, like it or not, needed to calculate a possible scenario of presidential succession and this factor might influence ABRI's medium-term political stance, provided that ABRI already knows its role will change positively after Soeharto."¹⁵⁶ Though the succession issue was still uncertain at that time, Soemitro's assessment was plausible in the sense that the seminar was primarily intended to formulate ABRI's medium-term political vision which would be included in the 1998 GBHN. Thus it was not strange for the 'professional' military group to anticipate the national leadership change, take into account its impact and determine ABRI's place in relation to other political forces. We now examine the result of the army seminar—which was the final one in the New Order—and the ways in which such aspects were reflected in it.

The seminar was held on June 18-19, on the theme "Perspectives on the Construction and Development of the Political Arena for the Seventh Five-Year Development Plan."¹⁵⁷ The seminar produced three documents which would become the army's inputs to the subsequent ABRI Seminar in September and to the GBHN

¹⁵⁵ AMN graduates were those who finished the 3-year course at the military academy (AMN) during 1961-1968. In 1969, the course was extended to 4 years and AMN was renamed as Akabri. Thus, Akabri graduates were those who entered the academy after the army became the dominant power in 1966 and graduated after 1970. In our discussion, I often call them the New Order generation officers, or third-generation officers. The second-generation officers are AMN graduates who entered the academy during the Sukarno period, and followed the 1945 Generation.

¹⁵⁶ Interview with Gen (ret) Soemitro, 23 July 1996.

¹⁵⁷ The seminar's Steering Team was headed by Brig-Gen Bambang Yudhoyono, Kasdam Jaya; the Discussion Team was led by Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah, Deputy Assistant for General Planning to Pangab (Waasrenum Pangab). The material preparation was under the responsibility of Maj-Gen Adang Ruchiatna, Dan Pusterad (Commander of Army Territorial Centre) whose leadership in East Timor as Pangdam IX/Udayana had boosted his reputation within ABRI as a professional territorial manager. All of them worked under the Chief Organiser, Maj-Gen Arifin Tarigan. Bambang and Agus were also the moderators of seminar discussions which had four speakers; Rudini, Juwono Sudarsono, Sayidiman, and Gen (ret) Awaludin Djamin.

1998-2003. The first document, the core paper, contained the army's political guidelines for the period 1998-2003, while the second described the major differences with the GBHN 1993, and the last explained the background of formulating the army thinking presented in the first document.¹⁵⁸ The central statement was that ABRI should play the role of improving the communication between political superstructure and infrastructure—a framework of reference adopted by Seskoad's internal discussion which we discussed above. It was assessed that, in order to respond to the complex challenge of globalisation, the improvement of communication between the two sides—which could be equated with state and society, or government and people—would be crucial as a way to avoid mutual misunderstanding and antagonism. ABRI thus does not seem to have identified with the state or government but saw itself as standing between state and society. Based on this core assumption, the seminar raised three issues: problems currently existing on both sides; the need to encourage the role of the *masyarakat menengah* (middle society), a concept newly introduced to define the group of people situated between political elites and political mass; and ABRI's role. We examine them one by one.

The political superstructure—which could be viewed as a euphemism for the government—was criticised in various ways. The seminar evaluated the state apparatus as inconsistent in policies, lacking discipline, corrupted, feudalistic, egoistic and nepotistic.¹⁵⁹ Moreover, the documents criticised the intervention of the executive branch in the problems of the infrastructure and, in order to empower the latter, called on the former to reduce its dominance through open-democratic communication.¹⁶⁰ In this light, the seminar stated that the recent governmental interventions in Golkar and the two political parties had been too explicit, suggesting that it use opaque methods (*jangan terlalu transparan*)—if it really had to (*terpaksa*) intervene—in order to avoid cultivating negative social feelings.¹⁶¹

Criticism was also directed at the Department of Information (Deppen).

¹⁵⁸ The three documents were: *Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Politik pada Pelita VII* (Hasil Seminar TNI-AD, Bandung, 18-19 Juni 1996), TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1996; *Bahan Perbandingan GBHN 1993 Dengan Konsep GBHN 1998 Bidang Politik* (Hasil Seminar TNI-AD, Bandung, 18-19 Juni 1996), TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1996; and *Suplemen Substansi Materi Dalam Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Politik pada Pelita VII* (Hasil Seminar TNI-AD, Bandung, 18-19 Juni 1996), TNI-AD, Mabes ABRI, 1996. Each document was also presented in summary version, thus there were six documents in all. They were brought to the ABRI Seminar in September to finally formulate the thinking of ABRI as a whole.

¹⁵⁹ See *Perspektif...*, pp.50-52; *Suplemen...*, p.38. The summary version of *Perspektif* also referred to a tendency of power arrogance (*arogansi kekuasaan*) in the superstructure, which resulted in the erosion of trust in national leaders. Interestingly, this point was not mentioned in the complete version of *Perspektif*, implying that the summary version (*Narasi*) was not a mere summary of the full text.

¹⁶⁰ *Perspektif...*, p.18.

¹⁶¹ *Suplemen...*, p.11. As seen in the previous chapter, there was a government-engineered PDI conference in Medan—which dismissed Megawati as the party chairperson—one day after this army seminar. Considering the timing, the seminar seemed to express the concern about the negative political impact of the government's attempt to overthrow Megawati.

Mentioning the banning of three magazines in 1994, the seminar claimed that "because the current SIUPP system was handled by one organisation, it established the dominance of that organisation, and such a condition has diminished objectivity." Thus it was recommended that an impartial institution handle press cases.¹⁶² Regarding the press, the seminar also asserted that because the bureaucracy had given "bland information" (*komunikasi dingin*) to the press, journalists were motivated to expose "off-the-record" comments; thus the government was criticised here rather than the press.¹⁶³ Needless to say, the initial target of criticism was Harmoko who—as the Minister of Information—had withdrawn the printing permits of the three magazines, but the claim also confirmed the existence of dissatisfaction within ABRI concerning the handling of the 1994 event which was originally caused by the conflict between ABRI and Habibie regarding the procurement of German warships, as we discussed in the previous chapter. That such an assessment was officially adopted in the seminar documents was a significant sign that the army's concept-makers viewed critically the distortions caused by some of Soeharto's political decisions.

Moreover, regarding the growing international pressures on Indonesia over the issues of democratisation, human rights, and the East Timor problems, the seminar acknowledged that there was a gap between the ideal and practice; in other words, between the ideal of an active-independent foreign policy and the practical national interest. Using the case of the Dili incident, the seminar questioned the attitude of the government which bent the ideal for practical reasons, especially in order to obtain foreign economic investment and aid.¹⁶⁴ ABRI's dissatisfaction with the government handling of the Dili case was formally expressed in this way. It also implied that many officers believed that ABRI had been humiliated by the Dili solution—in which ten soldiers were sentenced—and it was the government, or more precisely Soeharto, who had encouraged the process.

Finally, the seminar claimed that it was mainly due to the expanding number of civil servants that the problems of corruption, bureaucratic inefficiency and arrogance of power never seemed to disappear both at the national and local levels.¹⁶⁵ As the number increased, their salaries decreased, and their work incentives and professionalism declined, the seminar insisted. In this regard, it was strongly suggested that the government adopt a "zero growth" policy, and that it should promote quality

¹⁶² *Ibid.*, p.28.

¹⁶³ This reference is from the *Narasi* version of *Perspektif*, p.16.

¹⁶⁴ *Suplemen...*, pp.14-15.

¹⁶⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.36-40. It was claimed that among 4.5 million civil servants, nearly 2 million were teachers who belonged to educational institutions controlled by the Department of Education and Culture (Depdikbud). According to official statistics, the number of civil servants was 3.9 million in 1994 and 4 million in 1995. See *Statistik Indonesia 1995*, Biro Pusat Statistik, 1996, p.67. The seminar claimed 4.5 million in 1996 but the official data for 1995 was just published in September 1996; thus the official account of 1996 could not be checked at the time of the seminar.

through training and education.¹⁶⁶ This suggestion again touched on an aspect of Soeharto's political management since the early days of the New Order. As many previous studies have shown, Soeharto has controlled political participation channels and ensured Golkar's victory in general elections by forcing civil servants to join the Golkar-affiliated Korpri (civil servants' corporative) under the slogan of *monoloyalitas* (mono-loyalty). Therefore, the increasing number of civil servants was partly a by-product of this corporatist interest-representation mechanism. The seminar's suggestion implied that the army now saw the risks of maintaining this system as outweighing benefits. It was a signal which hinted at a demand for the revision of the New Order political framework.

Linked with this, the seminar pointed out that the political representation system—namely legislative and electoral mechanisms—was not properly functioning, causing several problems in the political infrastructure. Two tendencies were mentioned here. On the one hand, the DPR was seen by society as incapable of representing the aspirations of the people in law making.¹⁶⁷ On the other hand, the rise of NGOs and new social groups such as KIPP and PUDI was explained as a reflection of social dissatisfaction with the current representation system which was seen as having existed for the sake of political parties rather than for the people.¹⁶⁸ The poor reputation of political parties was criticised as the cause of people seeking extra-system channels to present their political aspirations. Given this assessment, it was argued that the vital task of ABRI would be to empower these components within the formal political infrastructure in order to absorb the complex demands of society in facing the global phenomena of democratisation and *keterbukaan*.

The army seminar therefore attempted to locate the primary role of ABRI as the dynamiser to facilitate the interaction between the political superstructure and infrastructure. Here, a new concept of *masyarakat menengah* was introduced. It was defined as "the group of people who have influential roles in society and give advice to policy-makers; for example, high-ranking bureaucrats, big business circles, the industrial world, bankers, leaders in various interest groups, and consultants."¹⁶⁹ They were expected to have the ability to analyse government policies and support national development from the bottom as opinion-makers in society and as the bridge between the *Elite Politik* (political elites) and *Masyarakat Bawah* (lower or mass society) whose mutual communication was not always good.¹⁷⁰ It was suggested that in order to

¹⁶⁶ *Perspektif...*, p.42; *Suplemen...*, p.40. KIPP—the Independent Election Monitoring Group—was established in March 1996 by former *Tempo* editor, Goenawan Mohammed, to watch out for possible manipulation of electoral procedures by government officials in the coming general elections in 1997. PUDI was a newly formed unofficial political party led by Sri Bintang Pamungkas, a vocal Muslim parliamentarian who was expelled from parliament.

¹⁶⁷ *Suplemen...*, p.8.

¹⁶⁸ *Perspektif...*, pp.11, 20.

¹⁶⁹ *Suplemen...*, p.4.

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp.4-5. It is not clear whether the middle society is identical to the middle-class in the seminar

promote democracy, the *Masyarakat Menengah* could play a bridging role, and ABRI's sociopolitical role was defined as to encourage the formation of such a "middle-society." Therefore, *dwifungsi's* dynamising role would be highlighted here.¹⁷¹ The seminar argued that this was the point which was not mentioned in GBHN 1993 but should be adopted in GBHN 1998. It was suggested that "it [GBHN 1998] needs to present ABRI's new policy of promoting its sociopolitical function in order to realise democratic society and middle-class society (*masyarakat kelas menengah*) which will play active and constructive roles in political development."¹⁷²

In sum, the army seminar in 1996 clarified ABRI's *dwifungsi* design with three conceptual pillars: ABRI would bridge two structures in politics; ABRI as dynamiser supports the rise of the "middle-society;" and ABRI would promote its sociopolitical function.

Having examined the seminar results, we can detect ABRI's critical stance to the political conduct of the current government, although it was expressed in very conceptual terms. However, the seminar also revealed the gap in civil-military discourse during this period. At least the following three aspects were apparent. First, military and civilian perceptions differed in defining the components of the political infrastructure, especially the place of Golkar. Golkar was defined in the ABRI view as the major player in the infrastructure but it was widely seen in society as a tool of the state, therefore a part of the superstructure. In this regard, the seminar's slogan of "empowering the infrastructure" could be interpreted by critical civilians as ABRI's attempt to empower a tool of the state—making the slogan tautological. For them, the same logic applied to the position of ABRI itself.

Second, some of the political phenomena such as NGOs, KIPP and PUDI were recognised in the seminar as a consequence of the malfunctioning infrastructure. However, it could be argued—perhaps more convincingly—that these phenomena arose in response to problems in the state authority, or superstructure, thus undermining ABRI's unilateral blaming of the political infrastructure.¹⁷³

documents. From the above context, it may be vaguely described as a group of people in the middle and upper classes who have influential roles in political society.

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp.5-6.

¹⁷² *Bahan...*, p.1, 11. Here, the term middle-class was used, instead of middle society, thus indicating that ABRI supports both middle-class and middle-society.

¹⁷³ According to a telephone poll conducted by *Kompas*, nearly 50 percent of 928 "middle-class" respondents in Jakarta supported the group. See "Hasil 'Polling' Mengenai KIPP: Sekitar 50 Persen Mendukung," *Kompas*, 27 March 1996. On the other hand, ABRI's territorial staff produced its report on KIPP, suggesting that it was unconstitutional but hard to ban because of the possible attack from foreign countries which would brand Indonesia's election as unjust. The report instead ordered the territorial apparatus to carefully observe KIPP's activities and report them to ABRI Headquarters. See Staf Teritorial ABRI, *Tinjauan Teritorial*, No. Triwulan II, 1996/1997, pp.10-11. One of the NGOs, PRD, openly declared anti-"superstructure" slogans: abolition of *dwifungsi* and the five political laws of 1985 (Siaran Pers PRD, No.40/c/Sta/PRD/VII/1996). PUDI in its greeting card for the Islamic holiday in 1997, listed its agenda: boycott the election in 1997; boycott nominating Soeharto for the next President; prepare for the new order after Soeharto in 1998. Sri Bintang was soon arrested on the charge of insulting the President.

Finally, in searching for a legitimate conceptual place for *dwifungsi* in the growing demands for political openness, ABRI found it unavoidable to refer to democratisation and, in effect, attempted to incorporate the middle-class/society in its doctrinal scope. Though it was possible for ABRI to claim that *dwifungsi* would encourage the rising middle-class, the fact that ABRI's security preoccupation had always been aimed at compressing the interests of the middle-class—for example, free press and free speech—further confirmed the existing gap between concept and practice, leading to public scepticism about ABRI's language of political discourse.

Turning back to ABRI's *dwifungsi* interpretation, we can see that the 1996 army seminar determined to locate ABRI in the middle of the state and society. This might be the answer to our earlier question about the extent to which ABRI synchronised its corporate interests with Soeharto's political blueprint. The seminar leaders' criticism of the Soeharto-led government's projects showed that although ABRI was hardly independent from Soeharto, who was after all its Supreme Commander, this did not mean that there was no independent thinking in ABRI concerning its corporate interests.

Apart from this, we could also conclude that the seminar completed its formulation of a new conceptual link between *dwifungsi* and democratisation. A notable feature of the new interpretation adopted in the seminar was its dichotomous structural perspective. This could not be seen in the previous arguments based on stability-alarmism, the uncoupling of *kekaryaan* from *dwifungsi*, professionalism, discipline, and SDM, which were all oriented toward policy perspectives. Now ABRI invented an interpretation to bring all these perspectives into a total picture of political reform in the New Order, with the resulting emphasis of *dwifungsi*'s dynamising role. In doing so, the use of the dual-structure in depicting the country's political system was quite effective. Employing vague terms—infrastructure and superstructure—helped ABRI both to argue about the need for broader political participation and criticise the misconduct of the government. For ABRI, these postures could be justified in the name of promoting mutual communication which was believed to be needed in the era of globalisation. It was in this framework that the seminar decided to criticise Harmoko's SIUPP management, the overstretched bureaucracy, the rubber-stamping DPR, nationwide corruption and the arrogance of governmental power. In the eyes of the army's concept makers, it was hoped that these claims would counter ABRI's popular image as the *alat mati pemerintah* (dead tool of the government).

As if reflecting the new approach adopted by the seminar, ABRI's internet homepage (ABRI-NET) circulated an article written by Lt-Col Herman Ibrahim, the head of the information section in the Siliwangi Division, with the title "Empowering Society Through the Implementation of *Dwifungsi*."¹⁷⁴ The article endorsed what we

¹⁷⁴ Herman Ibrahim, "Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Melalui Implementasi *Dwifungsi* ABRI yang Antisipatif

discussed above, insisting that *dwifungsi* would be the bridge between government policies and social demands. Having emphasised this consensus, however, he argued that ABRI should push the government not to side too much with big capitalists. By mentioning the example of the Marcos regime in the Philippines which he saw had collapsed due to corruption and hypocrisy, the article insisted that ABRI officers should learn from such history, thus indirectly identifying Soeharto with Marcos. Moreover, regarding the increasing mass riots (including one at Situbondo) in 1996-1997, he asserted that "the optimisation of the role of legislative bodies is significant both in order to restrain mass movements and anarchic situations such as the July 27 incident and the Situbondo riot, so that ABRI is not always made the fire brigade."¹⁷⁵

Herman's assessment was to some extent shared by other Seskoad-linked officers. It was directly argued that "the current *dwifungsi* under Pak Harto (Soeharto) is not independent, compared with the Bung Karno (Sukarno) era, but after this regime, *dwifungsi* will become more autonomous and based on UUD45."¹⁷⁶ All this illustrated that *dwifungsi*'s new slogan, "empowering the political infrastructure," was at least perceived by some ABRI officers as a way to make *dwifungsi* practice more independent under the current regime which had widely been described in society as the Soeharto empire.

Conclusion

We can now summarise the development of ABRI's *dwifungsi* interpretation since 1966. Our arguments in this chapter showed that there were broadly six stages until 1997. First, between 1966 and 1969, ABRI endeavoured to consolidate its basic doctrinal design for the launching of the New Order regime, led by Gen Soeharto. The primary goal of doctrinal formulation was the management of political stability and the standardisation of modes of political involvement. Pro-Sukarno and PKI-affiliated elements within ABRI were purged, the new TUÇ was formulated, *kekaryaan* was intensified, and ABRI seats in the parliament were secured. Building on its historical legitimacy arising from its role in the national revolution, ABRI's political domination was explained as the need to restore the political order destroyed by the coup attempt

dan Sesuai dengan Tuntutan Zaman," *ABRI-Net*, available <http://www.abri.mil.id/index5/>, 1997.

¹⁷⁵ Emphasis added. It is still hard to judge whether he is just warning of such a possibility or describing the current reality. However, since he uses the term "always," we could assess that his warning includes the latter too. Also the phrase "ABRI is not always made..." seems to have a connotation that ABRI was "pushed" to be the fire brigade, implying a perception within ABRI that the failure of the government's political management had forced ABRI to take costly actions. The term fire brigade here indicated a less-independent security tool of the government, a role which ABRI had rejected. Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah, who was involved in the maintenance of ABRI-Net, evaluated Herman's article as one of the best writings on *dwifungsi* he had recently read (Interview, 24 January 1997).

¹⁷⁶ Confidential interview with a general-ranking officer, January 1997.

in 1965 and its stability programs promised future economic well-being.

Second, after experiencing the first election in 1971, ABRI faced growing criticism of *kekaryaan* in society. Although "1945 values" as the ideal of *dwifungsi* were symbolically asserted at the third army seminar in 1972 to emphasise the continuity of *dwifungsi*'s values, the Doctrine of Sociopolitical Operations (*Doktrin Operasi Sosial Politik*) in 1977 officially moved on to deal with the negative image of *kekaryaan* by placing KBA in the front line of the *kekaryaan* policy. This aimed to emphasise indirect intervention measures in order to counterbalance the growing criticism of *dwifungsi*. Also through the debate with outspoken retired officers, ABRI seemingly established the conceptual distinction between *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan* at the end of 1970s, as officially adopted in the 1978 *kekaryaan* doctrine.

Third, after 1980, following the critical debate in previous years, ABRI started to re-emphasise its unity with the people, under the doctrine of *Kemanunggalan ABRI-Rakyat*, while at the same time it completed the legalisation of *dwifungsi* in the Law No.20/1982. Then the first comprehensive guidebook was prepared to systematically explain the various legitimacy bases of *dwifungsi*—namely historical, philosophical, legal, cultural, geostrategic, and national defence. The diffusion of legitimacy arguments was expected to counter any type of *dwifungsi* criticism.

The above process could be assessed as the construction phase. After this, ABRI seemed to enter the adjustment phase. First, in the mid-1980s, ABRI faced a major structural change, both in terms of personnel and organisation. Regeneration of the officer corps inevitably led to the loss of *dwifungsi*'s historical legitimacy, thus raising the question of *dwifungsi*'s future relevance, while the reorganisation/rationalisation of ABRI required the explanation of its new institutional orientation. To meet these two demands, the professionalism movement was launched and it was soon built into the concept of *dwifungsi* as a means of strengthening legitimacy. A widely proliferated interpretation argued that ABRI would be a professional organisation in order to effectively conduct the missions expected by society. The key was that these missions included the sociopolitical aspect. The concept of professionalism was infused in the *dwifungsi* language in order to claim that with professionalism, ABRI could better manage *dwifungsi*—an interpretation which uncoupled *dwifungsi* from historical legitimation.

Second, after the successful inclusion of professionalism in official *dwifungsi* interpretation, ABRI found that social policies themselves could be the source of *dwifungsi* legitimation, as seen in the cases of the national discipline movement and SDM improvement. Although such ideas were based on an assumption that ABRI had ability to strengthen discipline and SDM, they involved an interesting development in terms of *dwifungsi*'s goals and means. The New Order ABRI—since the early days—had insisted that political stability and national development were the goals and rationales of *dwifungsi*. With this logic, ABRI's involvement in social policies was

stressed as the means to achieve these goals and to legitimise the virtue of *dwifungsi*. Now, we saw a new tendency in that the means itself was transformed to be the source of *dwifungsi* legitimation. This assessment was formalised in the doctrine of Hankamneg 1991. It however reflected the erosion of *dwifungsi*'s original scheme for justification.

Finally, in the early 1990s, a group within ABRI started an internal revision program under the code name of back-to-basics. This implied that ABRI's institutional interests were not necessarily identical with the recent political projects of Soeharto. Our examination of ABRI's internal documents concretely confirmed this point which was previously only known through the personal comments of officers. Furthermore, the New Order-generation officers began to be posted to the leadership positions within ABRI, and it was they who needed to establish a viable interpretation of *dwifungsi* legitimation in response to the incremental demands for political liberalisation. Such a threat perception was reflected in the series of Seskoad studies which produced some of the fundamentals of the new interpretation applied in the 1996 army seminar. In the eyes of army intellectuals, the *dwifungsi* interpretation was now reshaped to incorporate a theory of political change toward democratisation. It was a fact that since the early days ABRI had insisted on *dwifungsi*'s support for 'democracy,' but it took more than three decades for ABRI to formally locate *dwifungsi* in a perceived scenario of 'democratisation.'

It should, however, be noted that the doctrinal reinterpretation of *dwifungsi* in the face of growing social pressures for political democratisation was the product of army concept-makers, especially those who had been associated with the education sector within ABRI. Their perspective did not necessarily lead ABRI's political role since it was, to large extent, controlled by the President via his loyalist officers in the political, combat and territorial sectors. Nevertheless, the ways in which ABRI's doctrinal managers had attempted to adapt the *dwifungsi* legitimacy to the changing social-political environment should be clarified from the historical perspective in order to understand why ABRI—as an institution—thought *dwifungsi*, or military involvement in non-military affairs, was eternally relevant in Indonesia. We have examined how various sources of legitimation had been invented and mobilised in order to establish a network of *dwifungsi* legitimacy for the countering of criticism from any direction. The internal adaptation of *dwifungsi* doctrine—which had fortified ABRI's role-belief under the New Order—however showed how it had become a laborious everyday effort to seek the rationale of *dwifungsi* even 30 years after its launching.

CHAPTER 4

Confronting a New Political Paradigm: Human Rights Accountability

In the last two chapters, we have discussed the politics of the evolving *dwifungsi* debate and ABRI's internal adaptation of *dwifungsi* doctrines. We argued how the eroding Soeharto-ABRI cohesion since the end of 1980s had provided a space for open public criticism of *dwifungsi* and how ABRI's concept-makers had responded by adjusting their interpretation of *dwifungsi* legitimacy. Now our focus is shifted to the policy-institutional aspects of the changing civil-military relations by examining the issue of ABRI's human-rights abuses. In what ways had the military's internal security operations been conducted during the late New Order? How had social forces and new institutional arrangements attempted to regulate military behaviour? How had ABRI responded to these challenges? Since *dwifungsi*'s core legitimation is the maintenance of political stability, the issue of repression is easily seen as an excess of *dwifungsi* which most directly undermines the credibility of ABRI's role in the regime. In what ways had ABRI's human-rights abuses shaped the direction of *dwifungsi* debate and how had the military officers perceived human-rights issues under the Soeharto polity? Examining these questions are the aims of this chapter.

We first investigate the issue of the shooting of civilians and the way in which the so-called "security approach" was debated both in society and ABRI. Second, we look at the major institutional development related to human rights—i.e. the establishment of Komnas HAM—and analyse its impact on ABRI's political stance. Third, some human rights projects introduced within ABRI are examined in order to assess the way in which ABRI had coped with the new political paradigm and the extent to which such pressure was diffused in the military's organisational thinking. Throughout the chapter, we attempt to clarify how ABRI's internal security policies had been challenged in the late New Order by the growing demand for political democratisation, and how ABRI's defensive postures were adopted. In the next chapter, however, we turn to the offensive side of ABRI's response to the problem.

Shooting Civilians and the Security Approach

The shooting of civilians constitutes the first major focus of this chapter for the following reasons. First, such shooting not only represents ABRI's "military face" in the most visible way but also directly reinforces ABRI's social image as a force supporting the status quo, despite its attempt to present itself as a democratic dynamiser. Second, this issue falls into an area where the demarcation between *dwifungsi's* security and political functions are hardly distinguishable. ABRI is inclined to say that such shooting has nothing to do with *dwifungsi*, since it is a security problem, but civilians bring up the issue of *dwifungsi* to criticise ABRI's harsh conduct. For ABRI, it is the main area where the practice of *dwifungsi's* first function (*hankam*) is criticised. Third, compared with ABRI's policies such as *kekaryaan* and support for Golkar, which have long been debated since the early New Order period, the civilian-shooting issue has recently entered into popular debate about so-called "security vs. prosperity" approaches, particularly since the late 1980s. Given these issues, we attempt to clarify the development of ABRI's response to the problem of shooting civilians, and the ways in which the issue constituted a civil-military struggle in the light of political democratisation. Based on this assessment, this section first looks at the genesis of the security approach debate, and then at four cases of the shooting—namely Lampung (1989), Dili (1991), Haur Koneng (1993) and Nipah (1993)—which took place before the launching of Komnas HAM in 1993.

Since the early days of the New Order, social criticism of excessive security conduct had of course existed. Before the *keterbukaan* movement, however, social demands for investigation and accountability were generally repressed. As seen in Chapter 2, there was no official investigation into the Tanjung Priok incident in 1984, in which many believed that hundreds of Muslim demonstrators were shot to death by security forces although the official estimate was only dozens. The demand for investigations of military shooting of civilians did not become an established theme for open public discussion until the late 1980s, thanks largely to ABRI's efforts to suppress the rise of this sensitive issue and the unwillingness of high-ranking officers to participate in such a public debate.¹ As we have seen earlier, the emergence of *keterbukaan* and the accompanying *dwifungsi* debate significantly contributed to the opening up of previous taboo issues linked with ABRI. In particular, Soeharto's decision to scrap Kopkamtib in 1988 encouraged society to legitimately debate ABRI's repressive measures—including its shooting of civilians—in the public sphere.

Kopkamtib was officially dismantled by the Presidential Instruction (Kepres) No.29/1988 issued on 5 September and actually implemented in November. The Instruction did not make clear why the organisation was abolished at this particular

¹ For example, Gen (ret) Benny Moerdani argued that the recent escalation of debate on the "ABRI problem" was encouraged by the tendency of current officers to speak too much. He said, during his period as Pangab and Menhankam, ABRI was not interested in responding to each criticism. Interview, 4 March 1997.

time but only stated vaguely that "there was a necessity to maintain national stability in a proper way to reflect the level of social development."² The former Kopkamtib Commander, Gen (ret) Soemitro, interpreted the Kepres' vague explanation as an attempt by Soeharto to remove an unnecessary political apparatus in the face of growing demands to speed up economic growth—which in effect diminished the long-time priority given to security—and to open up the political system.³ From a political perspective, however, it was widely believed that the liquidation of Kopkamtib was primarily intended to diminish the power of General Benny Moerdani who had dominated the body since 1983. As seen earlier, the abolition of Kopkamtib was also viewed as an attempt by the Presidential Palace to counter ABRI's growing disenchantment with Soeharto, which was revealed when F-ABRI's Maj-Gen Ibrahim Saleh openly disagreed with the nomination of Golkar Chairman, Sudharmono, as vice-president at the MPR session in March 1988.⁴

In facing mixed reactions from society which welcomed the decision but also doubted its impact due to its replacement with the new security agency, Bakorstanas, Soeharto emphasised that it was time to replace the security approach with the "prosperity approach" (*pendekatan kesejahteraan*) in the country's political life.⁵

Kopkamtib was originally established by Soeharto to restore security and order immediately after the coup attempt in September 1965, but the mission was soon expanded by a Presidential Decision in December to include the restoration of the authority and integrity of the government through military and non-military operations. Then in 1969, having crushed the PKI, Soeharto broadened the definition of Kopkamtib's task "to surmount other extreme and subversive activities in order to safeguard Pancasila and UUD45."⁶ It was through Kopkamtib that the regime arrested and detained those which it considered as "subversives" such as students, journalists, Muslim leaders, and even dissident military officers. According to Gen (ret) Daryatmo, former Chief of Staff for Karyawan Affairs (Kaskar) in 1970s and later the Speaker of the DPR, "the name of Kopkamtib had terrified society; the people became feverish even just hearing the name."⁷ The dissolution of this military agency inevitably raised a

² See presidential consideration "c" (*menimbang c*) in *Keputusan President Republik Indonesia No.29 Tahun 1988 Tentang Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional*.

³ See "Sumitro: Gagasan Untuk Hapus Kopkamtib Sudah Lama," *Kompas*, 13 September 1989.

⁴ Also a few days before the Golkar Congress in October 1988, Kopkamtib had announced that a head of a Golkar branch in West Sumatra had been involved in PKI activities, thus effectively discrediting Sudharmono's management of Golkar. This ideological project of ABRI is discussed in detail in Chapter 5.

⁵ "Prosperity, Bukan Security," *Tempo*, 19 November 1988. Bakorstanas relies on the civilian and military regular staffs in Kodams, BAKIN and BAIS, and is nominally a civilian advisory body to the President. However, its operational chain of command is linked with the army's territorial system and each Kodam Commander heads Bakorstanas' regional body (Bakorstanasda). Thus, the disbanding of Kopkamtib in effect reinforced the power of the ten Kodam Commanders.

⁶ "Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No.19/1969," articles 1-2. Based on the expanded role, Kopkamtib conducted covert action in sociopolitical fields.

⁷ "Fungsi Kopkamtib Sebaiknya Ditentukan oleh Pendirinya," *Suara Pembaruan*, 21 March 1989.

question of ABRI's future political stance, and Soeharto's remark about the security-prosperity 'dichotomy' provided momentum to intensify public debate on this issue.⁸

In the ABRI newspaper, Lt-Col Syarwan Hamid wrote a lengthy article in 1989 in which he argued that ABRI's sociopolitical role was not oriented to the use of force but to persuasion, emphasising the image that ABRI's stance was in line with Soeharto's recent rejection of the security approach.⁹ However, the message was received with scepticism by society as it appeared only a week after military operations which revealed ABRI's continuing harsh handling of security problems.

In the so-called Lampung incident, ABRI troops attacked an alleged militant Islamic sect and killed 27 civilians, according to the official account. The operation was conducted by Col Hendropriyono, the Commander of Korem 043 in Lampung, South Sumatra, against a group called Mujahidin Fisabilillah on 7 January 1989. Hendropriyono commented that "they screamed 'Allah is great' and it was really painful for me as a Muslim, so we also called 'Allah is great' during the operation"¹⁰ This comment conjured up the image of sectarian Islam as a threat to national stability, and seemed intended to justify ABRI's attack which killed unarmed villagers. Since the incident happened a few months after the formal liquidation of Kopkamtib in November, the military leadership under Moerdani (Menhankam) and Try Sutrisno (Pangab) may have been creating an impression that Islamic extremism might re-emerge with the end of Kopkamtib. However, Soeharto attempted to mollify this concern by insisting that "the activity of a small group should not harm the name of Islam in which a large number of Indonesians believe."¹¹ It soon became clear that the core of the problem was the government's transmigration policy and land disputes, especially from November 1988 when the local government started to burn the houses of villagers who had ignored an agreement with the government to move off the land. By January 1989, almost a thousand houses had been burnt or torn down to make way for a government plan to use the land for a development project.¹² Despite the outburst of

⁸ As if to emphasise the reduced reliance on the security approach, Soeharto then decided to abolish East Timor's status as a "special territory" and open up the region for foreign visitors while providing easier access to Indonesians in January 1989.

⁹ "TNI-AD Dengan Fungsi Sospolnya Tak Mengenal Pendekatan Kekerasan," *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 13 January 1989.

¹⁰ "Sebuah Letupan di Lampung Tengah," *Tempo*, 18 February 1989.

¹¹ Ibid..

¹² See "Islam's Hidden Warriors," *FEER*, 23 February 1989; "Lampung villagers' Home Burnt," *Tapol*, February 1989. It was said that the actual death toll was more than a hundred. Similar cases emerged in other areas, for example in Central Java where the government-World Bank project to construct the Kedung Ombo dam was launched in January 1989. In the process, peasants were forced to move. It was said that Korem and BAKIN threatened to put ex-prisoner's (ET) stamps on the residential cards (KTP) of those who resisted and even to carry out extra-judicial killing in the night. See ELSAM, *Revealing Tortures by Public Officers*, Jakarta: ELSAM, 1996, pp.89-97. The background of these incidents in recent years was the increasing demands for land to further accelerate economic development projects, which coincided with (1) the lack of legal system to clarify land possession, (2) inadequate compensation for the local people asked to move, and (3) the authority's forceful (rather than persuasive) approach to the local people.

student demonstrations against the military shooting in Lampung, the government showed no intension to further investigate the case.

Two years later, however, another shooting incident occurred. Dili, the capital of East Timor, attracted international attention on 12 November 1991 when ABRI troops opened fire on two thousands marchers who were commemorating the killing of a pro-independence activist. As mentioned in Chapter 2, ABRI officers in general claimed that the troops fired because the mob attacked soldiers brutally. Initially ABRI announced that the death toll was nineteen. Facing international pressure, however, Soeharto quickly decided to establish the National Commission of Inquiry (KPN) on 18 November, which later concluded that at least 50 people were killed, reversing ABRI's official account. Then, Soeharto—as ABRI's Supreme Commander—dismissed two officers, Brig-Gen Warouw (Commander of East Timor Operations: Pangkolakops) and Maj-Gen Sintong Panjaitan (Commander of Kodam IV/Udayana), neither of whom were directly involved in the shooting but were considered responsible for the incident taking place within their areas of command. Soeharto also ordered KSAD Edi Sudradjat to form the Military Honour Council (DKM) and appointed Maj-Gen Feisal Tanjung (DanSeskoad) to investigate ABRI members who had been involved in the massacre.¹³ The DKM finally dismissed nineteen officers from their posts. Among ten officers prosecuted and convicted by military courts, the longest sentence was eighteen months for firing into a crowd.

It was the first time in the New Order period that general-ranking officers were held responsible for the shooting of civilians and also one of the rare cases where soldiers were court-martialled. This experience of the DKM caused dissatisfaction among military officers but also encouraged political society to question ABRI's repressive behaviour by referring to Soeharto's remarks about the security approach. Gen (ret) Rudini, for example, called on ABRI to follow Soeharto's appeal to end the security approach, as it was no longer the right time to use Kopkamtib methods.¹⁴

¹³ Warouw and Panjaitan were both close to Benny Moerdani, and the former—a Menadonese Protestant—was said to have conducted a disciplinary campaign, including the charging of over 300 ABRI personnel since he took office in December 1989. For their background, see "Dunia Menuding Kita Berdua," *Tempo*, 4 January 1992. This "clean up" campaign was said to be opposed by local Mafia with military links (called *ninja*), and by Lt-Col Prabowo Subianto—Soeharto's son-in-law—who had served for some time in East Timor. See The Editors (1992:98-99). Many believed that Prabowo had established a strong tie with *ninja* especially after he was rescued by a gang led by a man called Hercules when kidnapped by pro-independent guerrillas (Fretilin) in the mountains. For the conflict between the Moerdani and Prabowo groups in the Dili incident, see, for example, Feith (1992:70). It is also suggested that the order to shoot demonstrators was certainly not from the sacked two generals in East Timor, but possibly from an officer with the rank of lieutenant colonel in Jakarta. For this account, see Shiraishi (1995:119). It has, therefore, been suspected that the shooting order came from Prabowo himself in order to discredit Warouw and to speed up the elimination of Moerdani-linked officers from ABRI's top positions. Prabowo's close friend, Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, was the commander of Kopassus' Intelligence Unit in East Timor at that time—a unit in charge of conducting covert operations outside the Kodam's command hierarchy.

¹⁴ See "Cara-Cara Kopkamtib Sudah Tidak Zamannya," *Tempo*, 28 December 1991.

The lesson of the Dili affair and the consequent establishment of the DKM was critical for ABRI. News of the shooting of civilians had spread quickly around the world, regardless of its accuracy, and this increased pressure on ABRI's handling of internal security. At the same time, the DKM opened up political space to demand further inquiry into military shootings and to criticise ABRI's military activities. It was Kapuspen Brig-Gen Syarwan Hamid who quickly sensed the 'debate trend' in society which identified the security approach as a fundamental cause of problems. In another long newspaper article, he insisted that there was a gap between civilians and ABRI over their understanding of the security approach concept—as the former saw it as something which should decline while the latter regarded it as a 'must' in securing the process of development. Syarwan asserted that the problem did not lie with the military but with mass behaviour which forced ABRI to use repressive methods.¹⁵ Syarwan's explanation clearly clouded his earlier assertion in January 1989—which emphasised ABRI's declining use of the security approach—but it seemed to be a common assessment within ABRI at that time. However, a few months later, or nearly a year after the Dili incident, a military shooting of civilians again provided hot news—this time on the island of Java—because of the two events: Haur Koneng in July and the Nipah dam in September 1993. Furthermore, the murder of woman labour activist, Marsinah, in May highlighted systematic torture conducted by ABRI members and became a symbol of human rights abuse. These incidents significantly influenced the direction of civil-military interactions regarding ABRI's human rights violations.

Four people, including a 12-year boy, in a small (15-member) religious community, known as Haur Koneng (Yellow Bamboo) in West Java, were shot and killed on 29 July when troops—a joint force of more than 100 police and army personnel—attacked their meeting place in a village in the district of Majalengka. The police announcement claimed that troops had fired when the group's leader, Abdul Manan, and his followers tried to resist arrest, following an incident on the previous day in which a local police chief was stabbed and killed. The police accused the group of promoting a "deviant sect" (*aliran sesat*) which had posed a threat to security, and justified the shooting as a necessary step to maintain order. However, the legal aid institute (LBH) in Bandung independently investigated the case and claimed that the group was not an extreme sect but that the incident resulted from a land dispute between the village head and the group. The LBH accused ABRI of the excessive use of force against a tiny religious group and asked the government to appoint another KPN, like in the case of Dili.¹⁶ In response to public pressure, the police started its

¹⁵ Syarwan Hamid, "Pendekatan Keamanan Dalam Proses Pembangunan Bangsa," *Suara Pembaruan*, 2 June 1993.

¹⁶ See "Setelah Mereka Belajar dari Peristiwa Dili," *Tempo*, 16 October 1993. It was revealed that the angered village head, due to the land dispute with the group, reported to the local security apparatus that the group was a deviant sect which would threaten the government. ABRI's raid occurred after receiving this report. *Tempo* also reported that, having noted the process of establishing the KPN in the Dili incident,

investigation but the central government rejected the demand to establish a KPN and no ABRI members were charged, while it was the surviving group members who were sentenced to jail.

This incident again invited an intense debate on the security approach which soon escalated into a debate about *dwifungsi* as a political system. Soon after the incident, Soeharto warned that "ABRI should wisely apply the security approach when the national life is not in crisis," implying that the approach had not been exercised wisely in the recent past.¹⁷ The next week, however, Menhankam Edi Sudradjat seemed to be responding to the President when he insisted on the continuing need for the security approach in the process of national development.¹⁸ Rudini, on the other hand, referred to the incident and insisted on the need for gradually reducing the weight of the security approach in the face of the democratic movement, arguing that otherwise it would be difficult for ABRI to overcome the growing criticism of *dwifungsi*.¹⁹ Here, the conceptual issue of the security approach was linked to the legitimacy of *dwifungsi*, and for Rudini, the security approach was no longer merely a policy issue but a matter of the total system of *dwifungsi*. Following Rudini, Edi—replying to a question at the DPR's Commission I about the Haur Koneng incident—argued that the security approach should be adjusted but it could never be removed because it was essential for national stability. In fact, he said, ABRI troops had tried a persuasive approach at first in the case of Haur Koneng but it had failed so they then employed the security approach.²⁰ Similarly, vice-president Try Sutrisno claimed that many people had started to argue about the irrelevance of security approach in promoting democratisation, but he insisted that without it national prosperity would be devastated.²¹ Try's explanation was rebutted by Gen (ret) Soemitro who insisted that the security approach was unnecessary today and ABRI should go "back to normal" if it wanted to maintain *dwifungsi* legitimacy.²² The different views on the security approach and *dwifungsi* among retired officers and their increasing role in public political discourse finally made the ABRI leadership invite them to Cilangkap to discuss the issue on 27 September. Coincidentally, this was just two days after another

people started to demand reopening investigation of the Tanjung Priok case in 1984, in which many Muslim demonstrators were shot by soldiers under the command of Try Sutrisno (Pangdam Jaya). This was clearly an institutional impact of the KPN-DKM in 1991, which gave political society a weapon to publicly pressure ABRI and the government concerning excessive military operations.

¹⁷ "Presiden: Kita Harus Pandai Menerapkan Pendekatan Hankam," *Suara Pembaruan*, 3 August 1993. Here, he emphasised the need for reviewing the functional relations among ABRI commands, governmental bodies, and social sectors. This comment too reflected the Haur Koneng incident in which ABRI only relied on the report by the village head and then conducted an repressive operation.

¹⁸ "Menhankam: Pendekatan Keamanan Tetap Diperlukan," *Suara Karya*, 11 August 1993.

¹⁹ "Rudini: Pendekatan Keamanan Harus Dilakukan Proporsional," *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 5 September 1993.

²⁰ "Menhankam di Depan Komisi I DPR: Pendekatan Keamanan Berubah Menurut Waktu," *Merdeka*, 10 September 1993.

²¹ "'Mau Tenteram, Tertib Dulu...' Wapres: Pendekatan Keamanan Komitmen Nasional," *Jawa Pos*, 17 September 1993.

²² "Fungsi Polisi Sebagai Penegak Hukum, Perlu Dikedepankan," *Kompas*, 24 September 1993.

military shooting of civilians, known as the Nipah case which we will examine next. As seen in Chapter 2, Soeharto on this occasion emphasised the danger of having different views on *dwifungsi* among retirees because it could invite social instability.²³

In the middle of this debate over ABRI's security handling, the news of a new military shooting was aired on 25 September, this time in a village in Sampang on Madura island, East Java, where troops opened fire on villagers who had refused to move from their lands to make way for the Nipah dam. As a result, four people were killed, and three were wounded. Student activists across Java immediately called for a new KPN while the legal aid institute (LBH) in Surabaya conducted an independent inquiry which rejected ABRI's claim that civilians were armed and the shooting was unavoidable to protect the security of soldiers.²⁴ Under pressure, the Brawijaya Command started its own investigation, interrogating those who opened fire and calling some twenty soldiers to the Kodam Headquarters. It finally decided to transfer four officers, and later in May 1996 a military court sentenced four soldiers—who actually did the shooting—to prison terms of up to 28 months.²⁵ Contrary to Haur Koneng, Pangab Feisal Tanjung admitted that the handling of the problem by ABRI troops was wrong and not professional. Similarly, a Madurese officer and Lemhannas

²³ Nine retired officers were invited, including Soemitro, Moerdani, Rudini, Sayidiman and Moerdiono. State Secretariat Moerdiono, in his paper, insisted on ABRI's need—in conducting *dwifungsi*—for understanding the fact that society was not based on "instruction/order," as was ABRI, but on "rights." He warned about ABRI's attitude in handling social problems. Moreover, he claimed that ABRI's concept of *rakyat* was very general and abstract; it needed to respect the diverse characteristics of the *rakyat*, and avoid a monolithic attitude toward *rakyat* in the field. These claims were directed at the recent security approach problems. See Moerdiono, "Bagaimana Mengaktualisasikan Dwifungsi ABRI Dalam Zaman Yang Berubah Cepat: Misi, Kebijakan, Strategi, Tolok Ukur," paper presented at Sarasehan Sesepuh ABRI, Mabes ABRI, Jakarta, 27 September 1993, p.8. Menko Polkam Soesilo Soedarman in his comment concerning the meeting revealed that the security approach was a hot topic in society and there was new input about this, though the details could not be disclosed because the meeting was not open to the public. He further said that active and retired sectors in ABRI should consolidate their opinions. "ABRI dan Purnawirawan Harus Terus Konsolidasi," *Kompas*, 28 September 1993. However, Edi Sudradjat denied the gap between the two sides. "Tak Persoalkan Makna Dwifungsi: Menhankam Jelaskan Lagi Pertemuan Sembilan Jenderal," *Jawa Pos*, 30 September 1993.

²⁴ See "Ny'on Odik, Lalu Robohlah Mereka," *Tempo*, 9 October 1993 and "Priok, Sampang, Apa Lagi," *Tempo*, 16 October 1993. The LBH reported that one soldier on the previous day threatened the protesting villagers by saying that "if you don't give up, you will see many people die tomorrow" ("Harga Satu Nywa dan Sepuluh Waduk," *Tempo*, 16 October 1993). ELSAM also stressed that the troops were prepared to shoot the demonstrators (ELSAM, *op.cit.*, p.85). Virtually all leading *kiai* (Muslim religious leaders) in Madura signed petitions to Soeharto, demanding a full inquiry and prosecution of responsible soldiers, which was backed by the East Java branch of NU. It seemed obvious that ignoring the demand would further harm ABRI-Islam relations which were said to have become closer after Feisal—a devout Muslim general—was installed as Pangab in May. Especially the East Java Military Command (Kodam V/Brawijaya) was one of the traditionally influential commands and so lingering confrontation with leaders of Muslim communities would not support Feisal's image of the desirable ABRI-Islam relationship.

²⁵ Those who were transferred were the commanders of Koramil Banyuates (subdistrict of Sampang), Kodim Sampang, Sampang police, and the chief of the Banyuates police. In addition to the four, at least six others in the subdistrict military command were reported to have been transferred. See "Setelah Pertemuan dengan Jenderal Tanjung," *Tempo*, 23 October 1993. Because the question of impartiality of the Kodam's investigation still remained, and the official reasons of transferring four officers were not the killing of civilians, many still claimed the need to establish KPN. See "Perlu atau Tidak Dibentuk Tim Pencari Fakta?" *Forum Keadilan*, 11 November 1993. However, it seemed obvious that they took responsibility for the event.

Governor, Maj-Gen Hartono, emphasised his good relationship with the local communities in East Java during his term as Pangdam Brawijaya and commented that the security apparatus made mistakes in the case of Nipah.²⁶

Though the response of ABRI was not satisfactory in the eyes of democratic advocates, ABRI's approach was changing. At least the following three aspects became apparent in the events of 1993. First, the fact that the KPN and the DKM had been formed in the case of Dili seemed to offer a new tool to the civilian sector in pressuring ABRI over its policy accountability. In both cases, legal aid institutes, student activists, and Muslim leaders demanded further inquiry into the incidents by establishing a KPN and a DKM, and the ABRI leadership—which rejected the demand in the case of Haur Koneng—was now forced to respond. ABRI established its investigation team which consequently had to show some results in order to cool down the protest seeking the appointment of KPN-DKM. Finally some officers were transferred and four soldiers were court-marshalled in the case of Nipah. This by no means eliminated military abuses in the field but it certainly established a new political rule which impelled ABRI to demonstrate its policy accountability to the public in the aftermath of shootings. As we will see later, it was significant that routinisation of this ABRI-public interaction finally pushed the military leadership to officially introduce a standard reference on human rights.

Second, the use of the term 'security approach'—popularised by Soeharto when he disbanded Kopkamtib—was taken up by grassroots political movements as a tool with which to criticise ABRI. During the previous ten years, it had been rare to see obvious anti-*dwifungsi* slogans in street politics, especially after the introduction of the campus-normalisation policy in 1978 which had marginalised student political movements.²⁷ After a decade, student activists—who recognised that anti-*dwifungsi* campaigns were easily labelled by ABRI as 'subversion' and 'anti-Pancasila,' thus the target of repression—began to echo Soeharto's use of the term 'security approach' in a way that allowed them to effectively express anti-ABRI slogans without giving ABRI an excuse to crack down on the protests.²⁸ This development illustrated how the term

²⁶ For Feisal's comment, see "Pangab: Aparat Keamanan Terbukti Salah," *Suara Merdeka*, 15 October 1993. Hartono's interview is in "Karena Tak Paham Orang Madura," *Tempo*, 16 October 1993. Also an intellectual police officer, Anton Tabah, referred to the Nipah incident as a very expensive lesson for ABRI because not only the relevance of the security approach was questioned in society, but also the human rights issue was highlighted and ABRI's lack of professionalism was revealed. In the cases of Tanjung Priok, Lampung, Dili and Nipah, he saw the source of problem as almost the same, i.e. ABRI's handling of crowds, and suggested the need to improve professionalism to defend ABRI's credibility. See Anton Tabah, "Profesionalisasi ABRI," *Republika*, 6 October 1993.

²⁷ The policy was called NKK (Normalisasi Kehidupan Kampus—Normalisation of Campus Life) and banned political activity on university campus. As *Tempo* argued in 1989, student movements after the introduction of NKK seemed to avoid raising issue such as *dwifungsi* in order to prevent ABRI's dogmatic responses. See "Aksi Mahasiswa: Dengan Isu Lokal Membentuk Opini Nasional," *Tempo*, 22 April 1989.

²⁸ For example, in the demonstration by FAMI (Forum Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia: The Action Forum for Indonesian Students) at the DPR on 14 December 1993 where twenty-one students were arrested for "insulting the President" (under the Dutch criminal code 134), the students' demand was to meet Wahono, the

"security approach" was used by grass-roots political sectors as a way of mobilising anti-ABRI forces from the bottom. Unlike *dwifungsi*, which ABRI had claimed as a part of Pancasila values and which therefore could not be criticised without running the risk of being accused as anti-Pancasila, the security approach—as a policy problem—could be criticised, at least on the surface, without inviting ABRI's traditional strategy of labelling the critics as "anti-national" and so on. The events in 1993 suggested that bringing the "security approach" to the front line of mass protests could provide more leeway for critical movements than direct criticism of *dwifungsi*, even when the target of the criticism was in fact the same.

Third, apart from street politics, debate about the security approach expanded the elite discourse on *dwifungsi*, by strengthening the basis of the critical approach to the interpretation of *dwifungsi*. Between the two 1993 incidents of ABRI's firing on civilians that we examined above, a political seminar was held at CIDES in September, which was attended by former Interior Minister, Rudini, and prominent intellectuals. One of the main themes of discussion was about the security approach. It was Rudini who started the argument by insisting that the security approach today was seen in society as an obstacle to democratic development with the result that its relaxation was strongly demanded.²⁹ Rudini's view was welcomed but further explanation was demanded by Dewi Fortuna Anwar, a prominent political scientist at LIPI and CIDES. She replied to Rudini by arguing that the major question today was how the security approach should be replaced with a more suitable one. She sceptically asked whether the correction would be possible without changing the entire political system, because any reform by ABRI—which monopolised power—could easily fail if the rules of the game themselves were untouched.³⁰ Rudini responded that: "it is true that the reorganisation (*perombakan*) of the security approach is needed—meaning that the security approach should be restricted both at the national and the local levels. Nationally, it has already been done by abolishing Kopkamtib, but at the lower levels, we need to formulate rules and also reorganise ABRI members' mental attitudes and

Speaker of the DPR, to protest to him about the security approach. Regarding the arrest, Maj-Gen Hendropriyono (Commander of Kodam Jaya) commented that in the recent case of the anti-SDSB (state lottery) demonstration, ABRI was quiet because they did not break the law, but this time, FAMI exceeded the limit. The F-ABRI Head, Abu Hartono, also explained that talking about the security approach was no problem but their speech at the lobby room in the DPR was beyond a tolerance. See "Demo di Luar Koridor," *Tempo*, 25 December 1993. However, according to Aspinall (1995:38), it was only when the students began to abuse the military that they were immediately attacked. For the detailed process of developing student movements during this period, see YLBHI, *Catatan Keadaan Hak Asasi Manusia 1994*, YLBHI, 1995, pp.67-81. There were more than fifteen large-scale student demonstrations in 1994 alone.

²⁹ Rudini, "Peran ABRI Dalam Pengembangan Kehidupan Demokrasi," paper presented at Seri Dialog Pembangunan Politik 1993/1994, CIDES, Jakarta, 4 September 1993, p.6.

³⁰ See the seminar paper, *Dialog Pembangunan Politik 1993/1994: 2 Aspek Pertahanan dan Keamanan dalam Pengembangan Demokrasi*, Seri Dialog Pembangunan, CIDES, 1993, p.28. Dewi became the Presidential advisor for foreign policy under the Habibie government.

behaviour, because they still use the old approach, *pendekatan kecurigaan* (suspicion approach).³¹

In facing the visible rise of the "security approach" issue in open political debate, ABRI intellectuals attempted to combat the possible escalation of the critical atmosphere. It was Lukman Saksono, Feisal's civilian adviser, who insisted on the need for having a clear understanding of the security approach. According to him, the security approach could only be attributed to ABRI's first role (*hankam*) and should never be seen as a part of the *sospol* function. It was the prosperity approach which had directed ABRI's role as *kekuatan sospol*, thus its sociopolitical involvement was not repressive.³² However, Soeharto himself further encouraged the debate about the security approach. On ABRI's anniversary in 1993, he reemphasised his previous stance that ABRI should not always adopt military means in handling threats and challenges.³³

As the security approach issue spread, prominent officers—notably Try, Syarwan, and Edi in the above examples—put emphasis on the need for continuous utilisation of this approach. While critics tended to see the security approach in terms of the democratisation process, these officers were inclined to insist on the need to maintain stability and order. While critics warned about current security handling in the light of *dwifungsi* legitimacy, ABRI leaders rejected the idea of linking the two. Lukman's initiative to 'free' ABRI's *sospol* role from the controversy about the security approach was an interpretative attempt to delink *dwifungsi* from the security approach for the sake of the former—a logic adopted in facing criticism of *kekaryaan* in the late 1970s, as seen in the previous chapter.³⁴

Moreover, the spread of criticism of the security approach—which was one form of expressing resentment toward ABRI's shooting of civilians—provided some new dilemmas for ABRI's *dwifungsi* management. First, the "anti-security approach" slogans in the streets could not be branded by ABRI as anti-Pancasila, in contrast to anti-*dwifungsi* slogans. Only when more fundamental causes were identified, for example when the President was insulted, could ABRI move to smash such protests. Secondly, the security-approach criticism could easily mobilise street demonstrations, and thus caused problems for ABRI in two ways. On the one hand, if ABRI responded in a repressive way, this could simply accelerate the vicious circle of the security approach. On the other hand, the popular mobilisation against the security approach could critically erode the basis of ABRI's self-image as "people's military," providing a

³¹ Ibid., p.37.

³² See Lukman Saksono, "ABRI Profesional dan Profesionalisme ABRI," *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 5 October 1993.

³³ See, for example, "Amanat Presiden Pada Peringatan Hari ABRI ke-48: Jangan Selalu Pakai Cara Militer," *Media Indonesia*, 6 October 1993.

³⁴ However, this time, the attempt was partly counter-productive since it in effect allowed critics to say that it was therefore the *hankam* aspect which caused the problem for *dwifungsi*. This contradicted ABRI's long-established claim that the *hankam* role had no problem in the conduct of *dwifungsi*.

space within ABRI and society to further question the cohesiveness of ABRI's identity. ABRI's frequent rejection of the description of its role as a 'fire brigade' also reflected such an identity problem generated by the security approach. Third, but most obviously, the ABRI leadership was concerned that any downgrading of the security approach might not only undermine ABRI's capacity to maintain political stability but also directly influence ABRI's political power in practice; since de-emphasising the security approach would allow non-ABRI actors to play a relatively bigger role in handling political problems, and also give more opportunities for the civil society to raise the issue of ABRI's policy failures. After all, it was these dilemmas which became apparent in this initial stage of the debate about the security approach—i.e. from the disbanding of Kopkamtib to the series of shootings which happened during the early years of the *keterbukaan* period. In the next section, we will discuss further cases of shooting which coincided with the launching of Komnas HAM—a governmental body established by Soeharto in June which fully started its activities in December 1993. Komnas HAM provided a significant momentum in ABRI's response to the issue of firing on civilians.

Dialogue with Komnas HAM

The establishment of Komnas HAM was the first attempt in the New Order polity to set up an internal mechanism to promote human rights accountability, reflecting the growing criticism of repression in recent years as Indonesia became more open to the international media. The Commission was deliberately modelled on the KPN established to investigate the Dili shooting. It was widely acknowledged that the vast international pressure after the Dili incident was the primary factor pushing Soeharto to set up the Commission.³⁵ Since then, Komnas HAM has become ABRI's major counterpart in dealing with controversial security operations. Although the Commission's power was limited to investigation and advocacy, which invited some sceptical opinions concerning its efficacy, its relatively easy access to the Pangab and other high-ranking officers highlighted its significant role compared with non-official human rights organisations such as LBH.³⁶ A few months after the appointment of its members, the Commission produced a report which refuted ABRI's account of the Marsinah case, claiming that those who were arrested on suspicion of involvement in

³⁵ Human Rights Watch/Asia (1994:126) also sees the ongoing ABRI-Soeharto antagonism as another factor which encouraged Soeharto to create a tool to publicise other military abuses that would be used to his political benefit.

³⁶ Interview with Marzuki Darusman, Deputy Chairman of Komnas HAM, 31 March 1997. For example, Komnas HAM's contacts during 1995 included Pangab, DPA, Kodam Jaya, Menko Polkam, Department of Labour, and Kapolri. For details, see Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, *Laporan Tahunan 1995*, Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 1995, Chapter 7.

Marsinah's murder had been tortured by security officers and suggesting the high possibility that "other parties" had murdered Marsinah.³⁷ Also in 1994, Komnas HAM was engaged in high-profile activities when it denounced the violation of human rights in the Medan riot in April and in the banning of three magazines in June.³⁸ Coupled with these expressions of concern, which were highly publicised in the media, the Commission started to investigate cases involving the shooting of civilians since January 1995. We will look at two cases below: Liquisa (January 1995) and Timika (May 1995).

When it was announced that military troops killed six people in Liquisa, East Timor, on 12 January 1995, ABRI's security approach once again attracted wide public attention. ABRI claimed that those who had been shot were anti-integration Fretilin guerrillas involved in what ABRI called the "security disturbance movement" (GPK). Moreover, it was claimed that of the six, two were killed in the exchange of gunfire with ABRI troops and four were shot to death when they tried to escape after being captured. However, since it became apparent that no soldier was injured in the alleged fire contact and those who were killed were actually unarmed, domestic and international concerns about ABRI's possible misconduct were expressed. In response,

³⁷ See "Keterangan Ketua Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia" (Komnas HAM, Jakarta, 2 April 1994), in Saafroedin Bahar, *Hak Asasi Manusia: Analisis Komnas HAM dan Jajaran Hankam/ABRI*, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1996. Marsinah, a woman labour activist, was killed in May 1993 during a dispute at a factory in East Java. When the nine people originally convicted of murdering Marsinah were released by the High Court in May 1995, Komnas HAM requested ABRI to establish a DKM to investigate ABRI members suspected to be involved in the incident. The East Java Police Chief, Maj-Gen Roesmanhadi, rejected the Commission's request but promised to reopen its own investigation, and ABRI Headquarters also formed an inquiry team. However, neither of them could provide new evidence and they finally announced the closure of the investigation in February 1996. See *Republika's* special reports: "Marsinah, Sampai Kapan Riwayatmu Jadi Misteri," "Tenten Masduki, Ketua Divisi Perburuahan YBHI: Akan Ada Pihak Yang Tercoreng," "Clementino Dos Reis Amaral, Anggota Komnas HAM: Mungkin Mereka Tidak Berani Mengungkap," all in the 12 February 1996 edition.

³⁸ In the Medan case, an estimated 15-20,000 workers took to the streets in Medan, North Sumatra, demanding higher wages. This large-scale demonstration, which was led by the independent labour union, SBSI (Indonesian Welfare Trade Union), turned into an anti-Chinese riot on 14 April, resulting in the death of a Chinese businessman. ABRI crushed the riot and arrested hundreds of workers and Muchtar Pakpahan, Chairman of SBSI, who was accused of instigating the riot. However, as SBSI claimed, and was widely believed, the labour demonstration was manipulated by local *preman* (gang members) who were said to have been instructed by the local military command to provoke riots to give an opportunity for ABRI to crackdown. Muchtar himself stressed that it was SBSI which planned the demonstration but the riot was instigated by the *preman* (*Reuters*, 24 April 1994; *Financial Times*, 17 May 1994). *Preman* were also said to have been used in the June demonstration against the banning of magazines, which was also smashed by the security apparatus. According to Buyung Nasution, one of those who led the June demonstration, this tactic went back to the Malari affair in 1974 in which he—as a legal activist—recognised some of these gangsters paid by the military (Interview, 14 March 1997). In 1994, when the June riot broke out, Yorrys Raweyai was the head of Pemuda Pancasila's Jakarta branch and declared his active support for *Operasi Bersih 1994* (cleaning up operations targeted against those who might disturb public security) conducted by Maj-Gen Hendropriyono, Pangdam Jaya. See his article, "Meningkatkan Kewaspadaan," *Pancasila Abadi*, January-February 1994. Hendropriyono himself, in his regular three-monthly meeting with PP, also asked for the support of PP in conducting Kodam Jaya's security maintenance projects. "Pangdam Jaya: Kekuatan Pengamanan Berada di Pihak Rakyat Lemah," *Pancasila Abadi*, December 1993. The riot in Jakarta on 27 July 1996 was also allegedly conducted according to this established procedure. In the free speech forum held by Megawati's PDI, some faces of the PP, including Yorrys', were recognised.

ABRI decided to form its own fact-finding team and started its investigation on 7 February, while Komnas HAM also entered East Timor for the inquiry. A few days before the report of the ABRI team was published, State Secretary Moerdiono mentioned that Feisal Tanjung had reported to the President that the actions of several soldiers had breached legal procedures, resulting in the death of six villagers in East Timor.³⁹ However, Feisal changed his explanation soon after he received the field report. He insisted that all the victims were shot during fire contact with security troops and were obviously members of the GPK.⁴⁰ He did not deny misconduct at the lowest command level but defended the circumstances of ABRI's security operation. When the result of ABRI's investigation team was announced on 24 February, four days after Feisal's comment, it became clear that at least some soldiers had deviated from the proper military procedure in handling the case and, based on the findings, ABRI determined to start another investigation led by the 36-member Officer's Honour Council (DKP).⁴¹ It was against this background that the conclusion of the Komnas HAM team attracted wide public attention. Komnas HAM claimed that the six victims were ordinary citizens with no GPK links, and they were possibly tortured before being shot.⁴² Komnas HAM's findings were surprisingly tough given its official position, and openly challenged investigations carried out by Mabes ABRI.

Since then, until the announcement of DKP findings in April, pressure on ABRI's security policy was further intensified. On the same day as Komnas HAM's press release, 50 academics and students in Jakarta signed a letter urging ABRI to drop its security approach in dealing with East Timor and demanding the appointment of an alternative inquiry team in place of the DKP, directly under the President, to secure the independence of the investigation. Similarly, LBH, which fully supported the Komnas HAM report, further demanded an inquiry based on the Komnas HAM findings, calling for the establishment of a KPN as in the case of Dili.⁴³ The scope of criticism then escalated when a Muslim organisation, HMI, also called on ABRI to

³⁹ Pangab Feisal Tanjung, according to Moerdiono, explained that immediate measures would be taken based on military regulations, including the possibility of a court martial. See "Soldiers Said Out of Line in East Timor Killings," *Jakarta Post*, 12 February 1995; and "DKM untuk Liquisa," *Gatra*, 18 February 1995.

⁴⁰ "Penjelasan Pangab: Tindakan ABRI Sudah Tepat," *Tiras*, 9 March 1995. He then defended the conduct of Kodim Liquisa which had dispatched a 30-soldier team to conduct the operation on 12 January.

⁴¹ For details, see "Tim Pencari Fakta Mabes ABRI Temukan Penyimpangan Prosedure Operasi Militer," *Kompas*, 25 February 1995. The DKP (Dewan Kehormatan Perwira), according to Kapuspen Syarwan Hamid, was functionally the same as the DKM appointed in the Dili case. He also asserted that "it is a problem if ABRI is always put into a corner by the human rights concerns; who can guarantee the security of social life there?" "Kapuspen ABRI Tentang Kasus Liquisa: Lumrah Kalau Terjadi Perbedaan Hasil Temuan Tim ABRI dan Komnas HAM," *Kompas*, 23 February 1995.

⁴² The team also insisted that ABRI should reduce its presence in East Timor for the solution of the East Timor problem. See "Wawancara TIM Komnas HAM: Temuan Kami Bisa Berbeda dengan ABRI," *Tiras*, 9 March 1995. Komnas HAM's inquiry result was announced on 1 March. See "Keterangan Pres Tentang Peristiwa Liquisa, Timtim Pada Tanggal 12 Januari 1995," Komnas HAM, Jakarta, 1 March 1995, appended in Saafroedin Bahar, *op.cit.*, pp.146-148.

⁴³ *Reuters*, 2 March 1995; "Kasad: Tak Ada Prajurit Salah, yang Salah Perwiranya," *Republika*, 10 March 1995.

establish a DKM to investigate cases in Aceh, demanding that Syarwan Hamid—a devout Muslim officer newly appointed as Assospol Kassospol—institutionalise the fact-finding system whenever Muslims became the victim of ABRI's shootings.⁴⁴ These demands clearly caused ABRI to worry about establishing a DKM or DKP in East Timor, because not only would they uncover ABRI's misconduct in the field but also provide two other spillover effects. On the one hand, social pressure to open other DKMs would increase, and on the other hand, Muslim communities would legitimately claim that they were not equally treated with Christians who were the majority in East Timor. For the ABRI leadership at that time, which included senior devout Muslim officers, the second effect might be as serious as the first which was more a general threat to ABRI as an institution. Moreover, the international community also called for a further inquiry into the incident. Attempts were made to bring the issue to the United Nations' General Assembly and to the "All-Inclusive Intra-East Timor Dialogue," which a UN-led meeting on 9 January—three days before the Liquisa killing—between Foreign Ministers of Indonesia and Portugal had agreed to hold in Austria in June 1995.⁴⁵

Amidst these pressures, ABRI's second inquiry—the DKP's investigation—was completed and its findings announced on 3 April. As if to follow Komnas HAM's report, the DKP admitted that there had been a few procedural mistakes in the conduct of troops sent from Kodim Wiradharma. Thus two soldiers would be sent to the military court.⁴⁶ This was the official closure of the Liquisa investigation. However, from the perspective of developing civil-military communications, it was during this dialogue between societal sectors and the military during the previous months that ABRI demonstrated a set of techniques to turn criticism aside. Facing enormous criticism from society, the ABRI leadership responded as follows. First, confronting

⁴⁴ See "Pangab: Stabilitas Keamanan Bukan Untuk Pertahankan Kekuasaan," *Kompas*, 3 April 1995. This call was made at the national alumni meeting of the HMI (Islamic Student Association) held on 2 April. In fact, unlike the case of East Timor where international attention was high since its annexation, ABRI's heavy security operations against Aceh's rebel movements were rarely publicised. ABRI in 1989 decided to declare Aceh as a Military Operations Area (Daerah Operasi Militer—DOM) in order to intensify the security operations against the separatist movements. Under that status, everyday human-rights abuses had been made by the security forces.

⁴⁵ The dialogue was the first official meeting between pro-integration and pro-independence East Timorese groups (the latter were the overseas activists—including some Fretilin leaders) since the annexation of East Timor. It was held on 3 June and, as anticipated, ABRI's over-presence in the region became a central issue. Following the dialogue, the 52th UN General Assembly considered a written report on the East Timor issue, describing the heavy-handed security pressure of ABRI, including the use of *ninja* groups to terrify society. For details, see The United Nations Secretariat, "East Timor," working paper prepared by the Secretariat for the Special Committee on the Situation with Regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, A/AC.109/2026, 22 June 1995, pp.2-20.

⁴⁶ "DKP Laporkan Hasil Penyelidikan Kasus Liquisa: Dua Orang Diserahkan ke POM ABRI," *Republika*, 4 April 1995. Marzuki said that "it showed the DKP result was to endorse Komnas HAM's conclusion." "Mengadili Siasat Jeremias dan Raimundo," *Forum Keadilan*, 27 April 1995. The two soldiers were First Lieutenant Jeremias Kasse—a former intelligence officer of the Kodim 1638/Liquisa—who had led the operation in the incident, and Private First Class Rusdin Maumere. Kasse was sentenced to four years and six months in jail and dismissed from the military service, while Maumere received four years jail at the end of June 1995 (*Reuters*, 21 June 1995).

student activists who demonstrated on the Liquisa case, Feisal revived an old theme when he warned that the recent student movement should not be exploited by "other parties" for their benefit.⁴⁷ This assessment about the emerging student movement illustrated ABRI's increasingly hard stance towards *keterbukaan* and was expressed repeatedly during the next two years. Second, ABRI was concerned about the escalating criticism of the security approach and its anti-ABRI posture. Menhankam Edi Sudradjat regretted that the current political debate was coloured by the Western notion of civilian supremacy over the military, which implied the abolition of *dwifungsi* and the security approach.⁴⁸ It was a warning from Edi that criticism of the security approach could now be interpreted as criticism of *dwifungsi* which, from his perspective, was also criticism of Pancasila. Third, together with these general views on politics, Maj-Gen Adang Ruchiatna, Pangdam IX/Udayana, who was responsible for the East Timor area, asserted that there was nothing wrong with his soldiers because the victims were *celula* (cells in towns, meaning the invisible supporters of GPK). Moreover, explaining how ABRI had disagreed with the plan to open up East Timor in the early 1990, this general—who had a reputation as a strict professional soldier—declared that the quickest way to solve East Timor's problems was simply to increase the number of ABRI personnel in the region. He was in effect challenging Komnas HAM's suggestion.⁴⁹ ABRI's vague definition of GPK was not something new, but it was after Komnas HAM's report that ABRI started to refer to the activities of *celula* and clandestine members, who were allegedly hiding in towns and hard to identify. This interpretation replaced ABRI's original explanation that the Liquisa victims were armed GPK guerrillas.⁵⁰

In sum, three approaches could be seen in ABRI's response to the growing pressure for policy accountability, which was effectively legitimised by Komnas HAM's findings. Student movements were now openly described as possibly

⁴⁷ "Pangab: Keterlibatan Mahasiswa di Bidang Politik Akhir-akhir Ini Disinyalir Menggelisahkan," *Kompas*, 29 March 1995.

⁴⁸ "Evaluasi Dwifungsi Diintensifkan," *Republika*, 25 February 1995.

⁴⁹ See his interview, "Kalau Dianggap Salah, Saya Siap, Silakan Tindak," *Forum Keadilan*, 16 March 1995. Also in the lower command, Korem Wiradharma, its commander Col Kiki Syahnakri asserted that his soldiers were "200 percent correct" during the operation, based on the military procedures. "Melacak Enam Nyawa di Liquisa," *Forum Keadilan*, 16 March 1995. Although the definition of military procedure was not given in these interviews, Adang—who later became Commander of the Army Territorial Centre: Danpusterad—explained it in the light of the ideal function of ABRI's territorial system which was: (1) to have high ability to detect local trends negative to national development; and (2) to bring analysis and information quickly to the upper commands (Written interview with Maj-Gen Adang Ruchiatna, Danpusterad, 18 December 1996). From this perspective, it seemed normal for him and Kiki to assert that his command line had no problem in the case of Liquisa. Whether it was related or not, Kiki was transferred in the month after the announcement of the DKP findings. Adang was succeeded by Maj-Gen Abdul Rivai in September, three months after the military court held heard charges against two of his soldiers.

⁵⁰ The new Army Chief Gen Hartono, who was in charge of conducting the DKP, explained that clandestine members were more dangerous than GPK because they had two faces and could live anywhere, not only in East Timor but also in other major cities. See "Mengadili Siasat Jeremias dan Raimundo," *Forum Keadilan*, 27 April 1995.

manipulated by "other parties;" criticism of the security approach was treated as criticising *dwifungsi*; and the emphasis was shifted from the visible GPK to less discernible clandestine actors in identifying the threat target. These arguments were reflected in the opinions of ABRI leaders in regard to subsequent events. Towards students, ABRI reiterated the existence of a third party in facing Ujung Pandang demonstrations in April 1996, while PRD-SMID movements during 1996 were similarly branded as being manipulated by PKI-sympathisers, as we examined in Chapter 2.⁵¹ About criticism of *dwifungsi*, the dogmatic response of ABRI leaders was evident. For example, in an air force seminar in May 1996, Maj-Gen Tamlicha Ali, Assistant of General Planning for Pangab, asserted that the current criticism of the "*dwifungsi*-security approach" was used by certain groups to discredit ABRI and could lead to national instability. Also the army seminar in June 1996 insisted that some people still questioned *dwifungsi*, wished to end it and tried to change Pancasila democracy. Furthermore, in a private seminar held at Surabaya in November 1996, Gen Hartono warned about the influx of liberal thoughts into Indonesia—due to the globalisation—and labelled the current negative social view of ABRI's political role as based on a different framework of thinking, which was easily translated as anti-Pancasila in the ABRI language.⁵² Finally, regarding the threat of clandestine rebels, Hartono further tried to disseminate alarm by insisting that they were using the government's facilities for their underground activities.⁵³ Three days later, as if to show the proof, the controversial mystic-psychic Permadi—who was alleged to have made blasphemous remarks about Prophet Muhammad—was actually labelled as a clandestine activist by a top-ranking army general.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Student demonstrations in Ujung Pandang (the capital of South Sulawesi) were originally protests against a government decision to increase public bus fares. They developed into a large-scale protest with thousands of demonstrators, including mini-bus drivers, who finally clashed with the security apparatus. Among them, hundreds were wounded and six were killed, according to the student side, while the military insisted that the death toll was three. ABRI interpreted the incident as having manipulated by the unidentified "agents of chaos." Later, after the 27 July 1996 incident, ABRI identified the PRD—with its student wing, SMID—as the mastermind of Ujung Pandang riot.

⁵² Tamlicha Ali's assessment is found in Mayjen TNI Tamlicha Ali, "Prasaran Asrenum Pangab Pada Pra Seminar Tentang Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita VII," paper presented at Pra Seminar TNI Angkatan Udara Tentang Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita VII, Mabes ABRI, TNI-AU, 29-30 May 1996, p.9. The *dwifungsi* assessment in the 1996 army seminar is cited from *Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Politik...*, p.74. For Hartono's remarks at the Surabaya seminar, entitled "The Role and Position of ABRI in National Political Life," see Hartono (Jenderal TNI), "Peran dan Posisi ABRI dalam Format Politik Nasional," in Selamat Ginting, et al., eds., *ABRI dan Demokrasi*, Jakarta: Dharmapena Nusantara, MIZEN, 1997, p.4. We will further discuss ABRI's hardline mind-set in the next chapter.

⁵³ Hartono's remarks about clandestine activists were delivered at the launching ceremony of ABRI's AMD program for 1995/96 on 7 April. He added that: "we have received reports about their existence and we are working together with related government agencies to combat the group which threatens stability." See *Reuters*, 11 April 1995; "Rapat Paripurna ABRI AMD XV Dibuka: Kopassus Diminta Ikuti Perkembangan Politik," *Media Indonesia*, 8 April 1995. He made the same warning at Akabri two days later when he attended a ceremony to install the new governor (*Antara*, 5 April 1995).

⁵⁴ The accusation against Permadi was made by Lt-Gen Soeyono, Kasum (Chief of General Affairs), who accused Permadi of conducting clandestine activities behind his soothsayer's cloak. "He is a dangerous

Although it was not the sole factor, the political function of Komnas HAM—i.e. to permit criticism from within and provide legitimate political space for social sectors to express criticism—was very important for assessing the process by which ABRI's dogmatic response had developed in the mid-1990s. Moreover, Komnas HAM's international link, especially with the United Nations, also seemed to make a contribution to the increase in international pressure, thanks largely to the widening of access to information via Komnas HAM.⁵⁵ Such external pressure then provided a direct input to Soeharto's decision-making, on the one hand, and also feedback to domestic society for legitimatising its critical approach toward ABRI's lack of policy accountability, on the other hand. The Liquisa case showed that this structural flow was now in formation.

We now look at another case of political contention between ABRI and Komnas HAM. The Timika shooting on 31 May 1995 provided some important insights in regard to the civil-military struggle. Komnas HAM received complaints from 5 prominent NGOs concerning recent human rights abuses in the area of Timika, Irian Jaya, and called on Komnas HAM to investigate the case. The NGOs' request was based on the investigation conducted in cooperation with Bishop Munninghoff of the provincial capital, Jayapura, who had read a report published the previous April by the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), which exposed a series of human rights violations by the security apparatus during the period from June 1994 to February 1995.⁵⁶ After the 31 May incident in a village of Hoya in Timika, he compiled a Catholic Church report at the end of August, which endorsed ACFOA's earlier findings, described the 31 May killing, and urged Komnas HAM to conduct an independent inquiry.⁵⁷ According to the Church report, which was made public on 29 August, soldiers from the 572th Trikora battalion came into a Protestant Church in Hoya and started to shoot the people there when they prayed, including the minister of the Church, without any warning. Eleven civilians, among them 5-6 years old

clandestine member using tactics that could endanger the stability and security of the nation, and have clear targets—these are ABRI, the President, Golkar, and Islam," Soeyono added. See "Permadi Engaged in Clandestine Activities: ABRI," *Jakarta Post*, 11 April 1995.

⁵⁵ For Komnas HAM's international activities, see Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, *op.cit*, chapter 4.

⁵⁶ ACFOA is the coordinating body for some 100 Australian NGOs. Its April document is entitled, *Trouble at Freeport: Eyewitness Accounts of West Papuan Resistance to the Freeport-MacMoRan Mine in Irian Jaya, Indonesia and Indonesian Military Repression, June 1994 - February 1995*, Canberra: ACFOA, April 1995. This 11-page report listed the names of 22 civilians killed by ABRI during the six months (p.10).

⁵⁷ The Catholic Church's August report is entitled, "Violations of Human Rights in the Timika Area of Irian Jaya, Indonesia: A Report by the Catholic Church of Jayapura," *Online*, available [http: <http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/boyer/fp/bishop-irian-jaya.html>](http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/boyer/fp/bishop-irian-jaya.html). The report (Section 4, Executive Summary) stated that the people had been interrogated and tortured by the security apparatus for allegedly giving food and other supplies to the anti-Indonesian rebels, or OPM (Organisasi Papua Merdeka: Free Papua Organisation), sometimes in containers owned by the Freeport copper mine and at the security post of this US-based giant company. This report was brought to the Indonesian Bishops Conference to disclose the fear in Timika to the wider public.

children, were killed.⁵⁸ Having received the report from NGOs, Komnas HAM started its investigation, led by Marzuki Darusman, and the Army Headquarters also sent its team to Timika to obtain further information.

The ABRI leadership reacted to this Church report in various ways. A few days before the report became public, Kapuspen Brig-Gen Suwarno Adiwijoyo insisted that the cooperation between ABRI and the Freeport was there to develop society, not to intimidate the local people, and he warned of certain overseas groups who tried to discredit ABRI, the government as well as the nation—thus this kind of report had to be treated with vigilance.⁵⁹ Maj-Gen I Ketut Wirdhana, Pangdam VIII/Trikora, accused the Bishop of distorting the facts, denied that the May incident had taken place, and asserted that the happening was just a military operation against GPK members of the OPM, while KSAD Gen Hartono said that the Church needed to show proof about the allegations in its report, and reiterated that the event of 31 May was merely an exchange of fire between the security apparatus and the GPK. To push further, Hartono applied his clandestine theory, saying that: "the GPK in both East Timor and Irian Jaya is almost the same, thus it is clandestine groups which are more dangerous and need to be watched."⁶⁰ However, these assertive postures were soon neutralised by other officers who showed a more accommodative stance in facing the popular criticism. Kasum Lt-Gen Soeyono, on 17 September, stated that ABRI would form a DKM at the Kodam level in order to solve the Timika case, and two days later, this was endorsed by Menhankam Edi Sudradjat at the Commission I of DPR.⁶¹ Pangab Gen Feisal Tanjung then announced that he had received a report from the army team sent to Timika, which indicated some procedural and legal deviations by ABRI members in the Timika incident. He asked Hartono to take legal action against those who had made mistakes.⁶²

It was the next day that Komnas HAM released its Timika investigation results. Based on information provided by 40 witness and 14 sources, the statement of Komnas HAM concluded that from October 1994 to June 1995, there were 6 patterns

⁵⁸ For details, see Report 1 in *ibid.*

⁵⁹ "Komnas HAM Kirim Tim ke Timika, Kapuspen: Tak Benar ABRI Lakukan Pelanggaran," *Jawa Pos*, 21 August, 1995.

⁶⁰ For Wirdhana's comment, see "Laporan dari Timika," *Gatra*, 2 September 1995. He also said in a magazine interview that the Church report relied on wrong informants. "Pangdam Trikora, Mayjen I Ketut Wirdhana: "Saya Akui, Penembakan Untuk GPK Memang Ada,"" *Forum Keadilan*, 11 September 1995. Hartono's remarks are from "KSAD: Langkah ABRI di Timika Tak Salah Aturan," *Republika*, 31 August 1995. In facing these reactions, Bishop Munninghoff cynically commented that "for them [ABRI], I am one who discredits the name of ABRI, and maybe they think I am also the OPM. But as a Bishop, I had to report this problem of human rights." See "Kasus Timika: Laporan Uskup, Komnas HAM, dan ABRI," *Forum Keadilan*, 11 September 1995.

⁶¹ For Soeyono's comment, see "Komnas Sambut Upaya ABRI Bentuk DKM Kodam Trikora," *Kompas*, 18 September 1995. At the DPR meeting, a youth group in Irian Jaya demanded that Edi not form the DKM at the Kodam level but at the Mabes ABRI level. See "Menhankam Soal Timika: Di Sana Memang Ada GPK," *Republika*, 20 September 1995.

⁶² "Pangab Tentang Kasus Timika: Ada Pelanggaran Prosedur," *Kompas*, 21 September 1995.

of clear human rights violations inflicted by elements of ABRI—namely indiscriminate killings, torture and inhuman treatment, unlawful arrest, disappearances, excessive surveillance, and destruction of property.⁶³ As a result of these activities, the statement continued, 16 citizens were murdered and 4 people were missing. Regarding Freeport, it reported that since ABRI's operations in the area were to control GPK and protect the mining enterprise which had been identified as a vital project by the government, Freeport had an automatic responsibility to participate in solving the problem. Given this assessment, Komnas HAM called on ABRI to investigate these events and to take disciplinary measures and legal action against those involved in human rights violations.⁶⁴ This statement largely endorsed the Church report on ABRI's human rights violations, but since there was no clear explanation about the linkage between Freeport and human rights abuses and also because the Commission's recommendations were general in nature, the report created the impression that the investigation was not enough.

In response, Hartono soon announced that ABRI would not establish a DKP. When asked why a DKP was formed in the case of Liquisa and not this time, Hartono answered: "we had concluded that the level of deviation [from the military procedure] and the scale of the incident was not as big as the Liquisa case, thus there is no need for a DKP."⁶⁵ Hartono—who had just promoted Brig-Gen Dunidja (Deputy Commander of Army Territorial Centre) to replace Maj-Gen I Ketut as Pangdam Trikora earlier in the month—seemed to have full confidence to apparently overrule the remarks made by Soeyono and Edi a few days earlier. It was against this background that a public statement was released by the five NGOs which originally brought the case to Komnas HAM the previous August.⁶⁶ The group of NGOs announced that Komnas HAM's conclusions were indeed worthy of respect and support, but there were still many things which needed to be done by the Commission, including the investigation of Freeport and further pressure for a DKP.⁶⁷

⁶³ See Paragraphs 1 and 2 in Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, "Keterangan Pers Hasil Pemantauan dan Penyelidikan Atas Lima Peristiwa di Kecamatan Timika dan Satu Peristiwa di Desa Hoesa, Irian Jaya, Dalam Masa Antara Oktober 1994 - Juni 1995," Jakarta, 22 September 1995, attached as Appendix 5 in Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia, *Laporan Tahunan 1995*, Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 1996.

⁶⁴ These points are from Paragraphs 4, 5, and 10 in *ibid.*. For the press conference, see "Temuan Komnas HAM Soal Kasus Timika: ABRI Lakukan Enam Pelanggaran HAM, 16 Tewas dan Empat Hilang," *Suara Merdeka*, 23 September 1995.

⁶⁵ "KSAD: Tidak Perlu Bentuk DKP," *Kompas*, 23 September 1995.

⁶⁶ They were the Institute for Social Research and Development (LPPS: Lembaga Penelitian dan Pembangunan Sosial), the International NGO Forum for Indonesian Development (INFID), ELSAM, YLBHI, and the Indonesian Environmental Network (WALHI: Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia). Their statement was entitled, "Response to the Results of Komnas HAM's Report on the Human Rights Violations in Timika, Subdistrict of Fak-Fak, Irian Jaya," signed on 27 September 1995 in Jakarta. The full text is available on internet at <<http://www.cs.utexas.edu/users/boyer/fp>>.

⁶⁷ The statement especially insisted that: Freeport surely knew of these violations of human rights and allowed its facilities to be used by ABRI, so Komnas HAM should take a firm stand on Freeport's involvement in these events; there was an urgent need for Komnas HAM to push for the formation of DKP at Mabes ABRI as the authoritative body to handle the matters that occurred in Kodam Trikora.

From the perspective of the political process, rather than the standpoint of human rights, the NGOs' demands seemed to have twofold implications for Komnas HAM. On the one hand, the demand was clearly an expression of dissatisfaction in the grass-roots community with Komnas HAM's ambivalent stance which largely resulted from its nature as a governmental instrument. However, on the other hand, having assertive constituents was an obvious advantage for the Commission's bargaining power in dealing with ABRI since the Commission's designed role—as a built-in regime mechanism—was to legitimately convey selected social pressures to ABRI. In fact, from the viewpoint of ABRI, claims made by NGOs and Komnas HAM were both the same in terms of attacking ABRI's misuse of power and arbitrary killing of civilians, and Komnas HAM's endorsement of the Church report, which ABRI had already rejected, in effect provided a legitimate space for these NGOs to play an assertive role in revealing ABRI's lack of policy accountability. Marzuki Darusman himself regarded the NGO's growing assertiveness as a positive sign for necessary political restructuring. He argued that: "the NGOs are virtually taking over the function of political parties, which is to mobilise social movements from the bottom, so they play a significant role for national integration," dismissing ABRI's frequent claim that NGOs could be a destabilising factor.⁶⁸

It was a few days later that Maj-Gen Dunidja announced a compromise measure to finalise the Timika case. He repeated Hartono's earlier remarks that ABRI would not form a DKP, thus rejecting the NGOs' demand, but stated that his Trikora Command would instead establish an investigation team to bring the responsible soldiers to a military tribunal which would be formed in January the following year.⁶⁹ On 28 October, four soldiers were arrested and Kodam Trikora formed the Timika Case Resolution Team to prepare for the military court. At the end of January 1996, these four soldiers were sentenced at the court. Second Lieutenant Mardjaka—who was mentioned in the Bishop's report as ordering his soldiers to shoot a Protestant minister even after he had raised his hands—was sentenced to 16 months jail for intentional disobedience and giving false information to his superiors, which damaged the image of ABRI and the nation. The other three who had actually shot civilians received 2-3 years jail for making "procedural mistakes" leading to human rights abuses.⁷⁰ The Timika affair was virtually closed by this event.

⁶⁸ Interviews, 27 March 1997; 31 March 1997. A prominent sociologist and democratic activist, Arief Budiman, says that there are informal contracts between Komnas HAM and NGOs. "If the Commission [members], as a state institution, can not work in the formal way, they may pass operations to the NGOs." "Human What?," *Inside Indonesia*, No.46, March 1996, p.7.

⁶⁹ "Pangdam Trikora: Kasus Timika Akan Dituntaskan Secara Hukum," *Suara Pembaruan*, 4 October 1995.

⁷⁰ See "Three Soldiers Tried for Killing," *Jakarta Post*, 30 January 1996; *Reuters*, 15 February 1996. Needless to say, NGOs claimed that the term "procedural mistake" was too vague. Also, due to the frequent disciplinary measures taken against ABRI members in recent years, the relevance of the existing military law was more often discussed even within ABRI. One of the military law experts in ABRI, retired Brig-Gen Amiroeddin Sjarif who served as the head of the Army Legal Service (Dinas Hukum TNI-AD) for three years from 1980, insists that ABRI's existing disciplinary laws (*hukum disiplin militer*) are unsuitable in

Throughout the Liquisa and Timika cases, the ABRI-Komnas HAM interaction was the focus of attention. From ABRI's perspective, the institutionalisation of the Komnas HAM mechanism was a new challenge to its political control, since ABRI's lack of policy accountability was more openly and legitimately disclosed in the domestic and international arenas. Needless to say, Komnas HAM's modest role of questioning ABRI's procedural errors did not prevent the error itself, but the sociopolitical cost of being labelled as "*salah*" (mistaken) was undoubtedly boosted in the era of Komnas HAM. For ABRI, ignoring Komnas HAM would only risk its social credibility. It is this respect that Komnas HAM acquired bargaining power vis-a-vis ABRI and expected to gain ABRI's cooperation in the long-run. Marzuki Darusman argued that: "if they [ABRI] really assess their own 'ethics and interests,' they may cooperate with us. Ethically, ABRI puts the highest value on being integrated with the people; thus respecting human rights is a legitimate claim even within ABRI circles. At the same time, it is also ABRI's political interest to prevent a decline in its popularity in society."⁷¹

Although these ethics and interests are matters of principle, we could also note the practical-operational interests. For ABRI, Komnas HAM's stance was more acceptable than the claim usually made by grass-roots activists, whom ABRI perceived as always confrontative. Contrary to Komnas HAM's approach to ABRI's human rights problem, the former editor of the banned *Tempo* and the chairman of KIPP argued that: "no consideration can stand before the fact that the people are killed by ABRI, and in order to stop this, we must consolidate grass-root forces, challenge the power, and fight for justice."⁷² If Komnas HAM's approach could be assessed as the elite-persuasive one, Goenawan's—and many NGOs'—approach represented the grass-roots-confrontative one. For ABRI, the case of Timika showed that there was a practical interest—together with the above principled commitment—in preserving Komnas HAM and cohabiting with it. As an effect of this, ABRI's internal promotion of its human rights program proceeded after the Timika case, and Komnas HAM's involvement was apparent in some stages of that. It challenged the security approach as ABRI-mind and expanded ABRI's internal communication space for discussing issues regarding human rights abuses. We now examine this process and its implications below.

Formulating Human Rights Assessment within ABRI

current social conditions and also do not meet the standard of a modern legal system, as seen in the example of their unclear explanations about deviations [from discipline]. See Amiroeddin Sjarif, *Hukum Disiplin Militer Indonesia*, Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 1996, pp.9-11.

⁷¹ Interview, 27 March 1997.

⁷² Interview with Goenawan Mohammad, 5 December 1996.

First of all, Maj-Gen Dunidja (the Trikora Commander) prepared a guidebook on human rights protection after the arrest of four soldiers and the formation of the Timika Case Resolution Team. This was the first time for the New Order ABRI to attempt to codify human rights violations, based on the UN standard, and explain ways to avoid such violations.⁷³ The guidebook first stated that ABRI soldiers had to respect the UN Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibited acts of punishment without legal process. Thus ordering subordinates (*bawahan*) to commit human rights violations would be punished with a penalty equal to, or heavier than, the penalty given to the subordinate who conducted the order.⁷⁴ The guidebook explained that "if it is hard for the field soldiers to report the violation to their immediate superior (*atasan langsung*), for example in the case that he is also involved in the abuse, they must report to the next-highest authority or directly to either Kodam Police or Kodam Legal Service (Kumdam); and once it is received, the receiver has to report it to the higher authority in the command structure."⁷⁵ About murder, rape, torture and the use of excessive force, the instruction clearly said that they were crimes, and even if GPK members were captured, they had the rights to appeal to a court based on the existing laws. Moreover, torturing to obtain confessions or information was a legal violation, and such a confession could not be used for the prosecution of a suspected person at the court. Furthermore, the book insisted that military interest, national security and other reasons could not justify acts of torture.⁷⁶

Clearly the book was a response to the Timika incident, as torture and murder were present in this case, but it was also notable that: (1) ABRI's customary dogmatic emphasis of national security and the GPK threat was downgraded in this matter; and (2) ABRI employed the UN standard of human rights which ABRI had long been reluctant to accept, claiming that the Pancasila society, based on the *keluarga* philosophy, had its own mode of respect for human rights. The above two points implied that ABRI's traditional political language—which was coloured by particularism and cultural relativism—was virtually abandoned in the face of the practical need for introducing an internal reform program aimed at raising the conduct of soldiers to international standards. Perhaps having sensed these new features in the guidebook, Komnas HAM—in its letter to Pangab Feisal Tanjung—praised Kodam Trikora for providing a positive sign for future cooperation between ABRI and Komnas

⁷³ The guidebook is *Petunjuk (Direktif) Pangdam VIII/Trikora Tentang Hak Asasi Manusia* (No. SKEP/96/XII/1995), Markas Komando Daerah Militer VIII/Trikora, 1995. An English extract of this 21-page document is in *Inside Indonesia*, No.46, March 1996, pp.6-7.

⁷⁴ *Petunjuk...*, pp.4-5.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, pp.5-6. Soldiers in the field are also instructed in the book to ask for an explanation from a commander who has issued the order, and if there is a possibility of human rights abuses, they are expected to show disagreement with it (p.7).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, pp.11-12. Soldiers were also instructed not to violate individual rights such as freedoms of thought, expression, and association.

HAM in protecting human rights, and also called on the Pangab to use the book as a standard reference for all ABRI members in the archipelago.⁷⁷

Coupled with this project targeted to the field-operation level, human rights became one of the central topics for ABRI's internal studies at the higher level, and contributed to the expansion of the scope for debating *dwifungsi* within ABRI. It was a few days after the release of the Church report on Timika that ABRI held a major national seminar to celebrate its contribution to national development. The seminar was held at Sesko ABRI and its two-day discussion focused on the management of ABRI's fundamental values for the next 25 years.⁷⁸ Within this context, the human rights issue was discussed as a trend in the era of globalisation. The seminar concluded that, like the call for democratisation, the growing demand for improving human rights was an unavoidable consequence of globalisation, thanks to the prevailing notion of international solidarity, forcing many authoritarian governments to shift their policies.⁷⁹ Unusually, the seminar provided no cultural arguments to counter this apparent global trend towards respect for human rights.

Contrary to these two events—the human rights guidebook and the seminar—which illustrated ABRI's institutional effort to cope with the new political paradigm, there was also an attempt to defend ABRI's traditional thinking based on a particularistic world view. At a seminar held the next year by the air force headquarters to formulate ABRI's defence policy for the government's next 5-years development plan, the human rights issue was labelled as a significant obstacle. The seminar asserted that: "the human rights problem became a popular global issue because of the Western nations which attempted to bring up the issue in order to pressure other countries. However, human rights cannot be implemented in the same way because each country has its own national interest and culture."⁸⁰ In this light, the seminar also concluded that the NGOs—as pressure groups for human rights and democratisation—were obstacles in Indonesia's strategic environment.⁸¹ While some officers accepted the need to respond to global concepts of human rights, others clearly saw them as a threat to ABRI's security management.

⁷⁷ Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia Indonesia, "Petunjuk Pangdam VIII/Trikora tentang Hak Asasi Manusia," No.95/TUA/III/96, 11 March 1996. This is a letter from Ali Said, Chairman of Komnas HAM, to Pangab Feisal Tanjung.

⁷⁸ The seminar paper was entitled, *Aktualisasi Nilai-Nilai Kejuangan Bangsa Dalam Rangka Menyukseskan Pembangunan Nasional Jangka Panjang Kedua*, Makalah Hasil Seminar, Bandung, Seskoabri, 6-8 September 1995.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, pp.42-43.

⁸⁰ *Perspektif Pembangunan dan Pengembangan Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita VII* (Naskah Awal Pra Seminar), Mabes TNI-AU, April 1996, p.24. This air force seminar was parallel with the army seminar of 1996 which we examined in Chapter 3. The former discussed defence issues while the latter identified political issues. Both results were brought to the ABRI seminar in September to finally formulate ABRI's input to the GBHN 1998.

⁸¹ *Ibid.*, p.33.

However, it should be noted that this traditional thinking now openly faced criticism within ABRI. At the 1996 ABRI seminar held in September, the view to assess new societal forces and new global values as threats was strongly challenged by the seminar participants. Among them, retired Lt-Gen Hasnan Habib argued that human rights were not a weapon of the Western nations, but universal interests of all human beings. Mentioning the example of the 1992 Non-Block Movement Meeting in Jakarta, Hasnan claimed that Indonesia had already confirmed the "Jakarta message" of the meeting which stipulated the universal validity of human rights and thus negated the cultural particularism applied by some current officers.⁸²

Furthermore, in November, a two-day seminar was again held at Sesko ABRI about ABRI's sociopolitical role and human rights. We have already examined the former subject in Chapter 2. For the human rights aspect, the discussion was led by some prominent figures, including Lt-Gen (ret) Sayidiman and Marzuki Darusman.⁸³ Marzuki warned against ABRI's deepening suspicion of NGOs and argued that they represented new public aspirations resulting from New Order economic development.⁸⁴ About current human rights practice, he claimed that it was still limited to policy adjustments and proposed that it was necessary to be diffused as a national moral concept, insisting on the need for introducing an MPR decision to secure the nation's enduring commitment to *universal* human rights.⁸⁵ On the other hand, Sayidiman defended the traditional views. He thought there was certainly foreign intervention in domestic affairs and cited the human rights problem as an example. For him, activating Pancasila philosophy was the most urgent task in order to reject such foreign pressure because human rights values were already built into Pancasila. Thus, he continued, domestic liberal groups who were influenced by foreign thoughts would have no opportunity if Pancasila were truly implemented.⁸⁶ At the same time, he attributed the growing NGO activities to the impact of Western-value penetration, and again proposed that activating Pancasila philosophy was the key for ABRI to overcome the threat.⁸⁷

In this way, the conflicting interpretations on human rights could be seen in ABRI's internal discussions, which indicated that the process of change was in process.

⁸² Hasnan Habib, "Pembangunan Nasional Bidang Hankam Pada Pelita VII (Tanggapan)," paper prepared for Seminar ABRI, "Pokok-Pokok Pikiran ABRI Tentang Pembangunan Nasional Pada Pelita VII," Mabes ABRI, 3 September 1996, p.3.

⁸³ Presentations were also made by Edi Sudjana, Head of the Human Rights and Environment Department at CIDES, Indria Samego of LIPI, and Professor Muladi, a law professor at the University of Diponegoro.

⁸⁴ Marzuki Darusman, "Konsepsi Peningkatan Hak Azasi Manusia dan Demokrasi Pancasila," paper presented at Sarasehan Sesko ABRI Tentang Aktualisasi Peran Sospol ABRI, Bandung, Sesko ABRI, 5 November 1996, p.3.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, p.4. Italic added.

⁸⁶ Sayidiman Suryohadiprojo, "Hak Azasi Manusia dan Demokrasi di Indonesia," paper presented at Sarasehan Sesko ABRI Tentang Aktualisasi Peran Sospol ABRI, Bandung, Sesko ABRI, 5 November 1996, pp.1-2.

⁸⁷ Interview, Lt-Gen (ret) Sayidiman, former Lemhannas Governor, 5 December 1996.

Whatever the assessment, ABRI's attempts to bring human rights issues into the process of organisational learning illustrated a new phenomenon in the era of Kopkamtib-free politics, the reemergence of student demonstrations, assertive NGOs, and Komnas HAM. ABRI's human rights discussion was its response to the new political paradigm since the late 1980s. It did not simply add another topic to the conceptual debate within ABRI but also provided both a source of critical thinking in the developing *dwifungsi* debate in society and a larger place within ABRI for those officers who had endeavoured to formulate viable visions of *dwifungsi* conduct in the era of *keterbukaan*.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the case of ABRI's adaptation to the new political paradigm (i.e. human rights accountability) in conducting internal security operations. Since this field exemplified the overlapping of *dwifungsi*'s first and second functions, we expected our investigation to clarify an important part of ABRI's political thinking and its application. Our discussion started from the analysis of the shooting of civilians. We attempted to elucidate the way in which the events have affected the debate over ABRI's security approach which emerged in conjunction with the elimination of the extra-judicial security body, Kopkamtib. Then we argued that, reflecting the *keterbukaan* movement and the revival of the student movement, the security approach debate became a major theme in the opposition's demand for policy accountability on ABRI's part. This criticism seemed to become relatively entrenched in the New Order civil-military discourse, since—unlike direct criticism of *dwifungsi*—it alone could hardly be interpreted by ABRI as attacking Pancasila and UUD45. The Dili incident at the end of 1991 also provided new institutional tools, namely KPN and DKM, for the critics of ABRI. We also focused on the role and impact of Komnas HAM as the first legitimate mechanism within the regime which checked ABRI's excessive use of force. As seen in the case of Timika, Komnas HAM virtually became a bridge between ABRI and the NGOs which first revealed the series of civilian killings. Though ABRI's recognition of 'procedural errors' was not satisfactory in the eyes of NGOs which gave high priority to human rights values, it could also be concluded—from the perspective of the political process—that Komnas HAM's endorsement of the NGO/Church report eventually made grass-root voices accepted as legitimate pressure within the regime's political process. As we examined, ABRI also had rational reasons to cohabit with Komnas HAM, thus showing that some degree of policy accountability had become a standard procedure for ABRI, in contrast to the 1970s and 80s. As if to prove this, ABRI demonstrated its willingness to adopt human rights values within its organisational practice, as seen in the creation of its first human rights manual for field

soldiers—based on the UN standard—and a series of internal seminars, focusing on the promotion of human rights.

These processes all indicated that ABRI's traditional framework for internal security conduct had started to erode and be subjected to some institutional restrictions—again in comparison with the pre-*keterbukaan* period. This development was promoted through various steps—namely the spread of the security approach debate, the adoption of DKM/DKP as a new measure to handle ABRI's human rights abuses, and the legitimate role of Komnas HAM in challenging ABRI's earlier one-sided explanations about military shooting of civilians. All contributed to the diminishing military control over civil-military communication in the era of *keterbukaan*.

What should be noted, however, was that ABRI's perception of the human rights issue was linked in the minds of officers to the issue of globalisation. ABRI's traditional approach thus identified that it had been pushed by environmental pressures rather than by an awareness of its own misconduct in the field arising from the excessive security approach. This subjective view was interesting not so much because it could affect ABRI's behaviour but because it allowed ABRI to seek a rationale which could revive its autonomous posture, when ABRI felt the necessity to defend itself. The concept of "foreign-value penetration" was, in fact, interpreted as the influx of liberal thinking which was then easily stamped as anti-Pancasila ideas veiled by human rights and NGOs.

It was in this context that we can assess ABRI's dual use of globalisation language. On the one hand, as discussed in this chapter, the term was employed to present ABRI's accommodative posture in the coming decades; saying that the security approach and human rights assessment were being revised in the era of globalisation. On the other hand, the term provided a weapon for ABRI to attack domestic critics, by arguing that globalisation allowed the inflow of negative foreign-values destructive to national stability, and then identifying certain groups promoting these values. It was notable that this cognitive structure seemed to run in tandem with the growing civilian use of globalisation terminology—which clearly backed activities of Komnas HAM, students, NGOs, and critical intellectuals—to question ABRI's paternalistic political control and traditional security approach in dealing with societal demands for wider political participation. Therefore, although we have seen ABRI's accommodation to the new political paradigm, its traditional approach should not be ignored for our understanding of ABRI's response to democratic demands during the late New Order period. The purpose of the next chapter is to investigate the development of such hardline military thinking—their ideological projects and political reflexivity—aimed at repressing the demand for political democratisation.

CHAPTER 5

The Hardline Military Ideology in the Age of Globalism: The Development of the *Kewaspadaan* Mind-Set

This chapter discusses ABRI's ideological adaptation in the face of growing democratic pressures during the late Soeharto era.¹ As discussed in the previous chapters, political society in the age of *keterbukaan* insisted on the need for improving human rights accountability, eliminating ABRI's praetorian political intervention, and—more generally—broadening space for political participation. It is in this process that the mass media and political figures introduced such concepts as globalisation (*globalisasi*) and civil society (*masyarakat madani*) into New Order political discourse to support these demands as inevitable historical and global trends that cannot be reversed.² Backed by the concept of globalism, democracy advocates both within the regime and in society stepped up pressure for the elimination of authoritarian practices long adopted by Soeharto and ABRI.

In Chapter 4, we investigated how ABRI defensively accommodated such pressures for human rights accountability. This chapter, on the other hand, examines ABRI's counter-offensive against these democratic challenges by reshaping its ideological framework in a way that identified them as a national "threat"—a legitimate target of security operations. The concept of *globalisasi* has played a decisive role in this ideological reformulation aiming to rationalise a hardline military approach to democratic movements. Our empirical question, therefore, is the how and why of such developments. We seek the answers in the contexts of both Soeharto-ABRI relations during the final decade of the New Order regime and the institutional inertia of ABRI's ideological reproduction since the beginning of the regime.

¹ For a more extensive version of the argument of this chapter, see Honna (1999).

² Although it is hard to trace exactly when the popular usage of these terms started in Indonesia, we can suspect that, as elsewhere, these concepts were widely used after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union during 1988-1991. One of the earliest discussions in Indonesia can be found in late 1990. A leading evening newspaper demanded ABRI's adjustment of its role in facing globalisation. See "Tugas ABRI dan Era Globalisasi," *Suara Pembaruan*, 5 October 1990. ABRI, in its own newspaper, reacted to this by insisting that the role played by ABRI to safeguard the national ideology was crucial to prevent national disintegration as happened in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. See "Dalam Era Globalisasi, Ideologi Tetap Diperlukan," *Angkatan Bersenjata*, 12 November, 1990.

We first look at ABRI's organisational attempts to standardise its ideological format within the military and society during the decade since the late 1970s. The next section focuses on ABRI's internal efforts since the late 1980s to adjust the established framework of hardline military thinking to the changing environment—such as the collapse of Soviet Union and the rise of social pressure for regime opening. We argue that such ideological reshaping was coloured by the shift in Soeharto-ABRI relations—from antagonistic under Moerdani's ABRI leadership to amenable under the Feisal-Hartono leadership—in the early 1990s. The way in which the reshaped ideological setting was translated into actual political programs during the final years of the Soeharto government is also examined. The range of politico-ideological dissent that emerged in this process is investigated next, followed by my attempt at categorising three different mind-sets among the military officers which reflected the diversification of military thinking during the final years of the New Order. Throughout the chapter, the significance of both political and institutional factors in evolving New Order military ideology is argued.

Tarpadnas and the Ideological Setting of Military *Kewaspadaan*

As seen earlier, ABRI's *dwifungsi*, which was officially adopted at the beginning of the New Order, claimed a "permanent" role in the defence and sociopolitical fields. We showed in Chapter 3 that this permanency was a notable characteristic of the officers' role belief derived from developmentalist ideology. However, this ideological framework needed frequent reproduction to justify continuing military control of politics as stability was not yet fully achieved. The military thus claimed that it had the ability to maintain stability, but at the same time needed to say that it had not achieved complete stability. To this end, since the launching of the regime, continuous efforts were made to construct an image of instability. After 1978 this was formally programed and routinised within ABRI on the initiative of Lemhannas. This high-level military educational institute established a program, the so-called National Vigilance Refresher Course (Penataran Kewaspadaan Nasional—Tarpadnas), for the indoctrination of both officers and civilians about "potential" political threats to national stability. According to Lemhannas, this vigilance (*kewaspadaan*) indoctrination program was almost completed by February 1988.³ Assessing the content and development of this program during the period of 1978-1988 is helpful to clarify ABRI's standard threat image before the *keterbukaan* period.

³ "Surat Keputusan Gubernur Lemhannas No: SKEP/07/II/1988, Tanggal 24-2-1988, Tentang Penggunaan Buku Materi Penataran Kewaspadaan Nasional dan Kegiatan Semacamnya," in *Materi Balatkom*, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Mabes ABRI, 1988.

Tarpadnas was a joint project of Lemhannas and Kopkamtib and was open to ABRI members and staff of other Departments.⁴ It was not coincidental that the program started in June 1978, following the regime crackdown on the 1977-1978 student movement opposing Soeharto's presidential re-election.⁵ One document prepared for the Tarpadnas 1979 asserted that the "New Left" had taken over communist activities after the banning of the PKI in 1966, through the medium of students and intellectuals. The development of the New Left in the campuses had encouraged the extreme left which used labour and land disputes to attract supporters and had also infiltrated various mass organisations and government institutions.⁶ Regarding the extreme right, or Islamic fundamentalism, the document claimed that it had become fanatic and militant because they had no attractive propaganda to expand their organisation except by using religious means.⁷

From another angle, the Tarpadnas course in 1980 claimed that, in order to alleviate the latent danger of these extremes, it was very necessary to reduce the increasing economic gap between the rich minority and the poor majority, and to minimise government manipulation of power and authority—thus admitting the regime's and ABRI's own failures as a factor encouraging extremism.⁸ However, in response to the government policy to gradually release PKI political prisoners, Lemhannas warned that about 105 of them were still "diehards" who were unwilling to drop communist ideology, including the authors, Pramudya Ananta Toer and Rivai Apin. Therefore, the paper concluded, ABRI should not relax its *kewaspadaan* against them.⁹ This alarmism was encouraged by the notion of "organisation without

⁴ The program was launched following a leadership change within the military in June 1978. Lemhannas had been headed by Lt-Gen Sayidiman who was widely believed to be critical of Soeharto's inner-circle officers who had dominated ABRI's intelligence sector, such as Admiral R. Sudomo, Gen Yoga Sugomo and Maj-Gen Benny Moerdani. In the 1978 reshuffle, which placed General Mohammad Yusuf as the new ABRI Commander, Sudomo became Kopkamtib Commander while he held concurrently the post of Deputy Commander of ABRI. Yoga, the Head of BAKIN (State Intelligence Coordination Board) who was directly responsible to the President, was posted as the Chief of Kopkamtib in October without losing his BAKIN position. Similarly Moerdani held the posts of Assistant for Intelligence in the Defence Ministry, Head of the Strategic Intelligence Centre (Pusintelstrat) in the Defence Ministry, Assistant for Intelligence at Kopkamtib and, since 1978, Deputy Head of BAKIN. Soon after the implementation of Tarpadnas, Sayidiman was transferred to an ambassadorship (Japan) in October 1978. The new governor of Lemhannas was Lt-Gen Sutopo Juwono, former Head of BAKIN. Thus, the Tarpadnas project reflected the ongoing dominance of the intelligence sector within ABRI.

⁵ On nation-wide student demonstrations, see The Editors (1978:151-182).

⁶ *Naskah Induk Tentang Subversi dan Penanggulangannya*, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1979, pp.23-27. The definition of New Left was not provided in this document, but it should be noted that, as Anderson argues, people who had been with the Left before the New Order were rarely university-educated (Anderson 1998:290). Thus, perhaps ABRI identified the increasing role of universities as a new development for the Left.

⁷ *Naskah Induk Tentang Subversi dan Penanggulangannya*, p.26.

⁸ *Pengamanan Ideologi Pancasila Terhadap Pengaruh Ideologi-Ideologi Besar di Dunia*, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1980, n.p..

⁹ *Perkembangan Bahaya Laten Ex-Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI)*, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1980, pp.23-24. This document was also part of the Tarpadnas material. There is, however, no explanation of how "105" people could be a threat to national security.

organisation" (*organisasi tak terbentuk*). The construction of a network of cell members without formal organisation, Lemhannas insisted, had been the strategy of PKI supporters under the New Order. They had tried to undermine national unity based on the Pancasila ideology by attempting to infiltrate the "floating-mass" and looking for opportunities among labour, agrarian, student, women's, legal, and cultural movements which had emerged in the process of national development (*pembangunan*).¹⁰ Such *kewaspadaan* thinking, which saw the latent danger of communist resurgence in the changing society, reflected the legacy of military mind-sets cultivated during the 1966-7 elimination of PKI. They were formally standardised for officer indoctrination during the first few years of the Tarpadnas program.

In 1985, the indoctrination target was expanded to include lower-level governmental bodies and official organisations such as the National Journalists Association (PWI), National Youth Committee (KNPI), Chamber of Commerce and Industry (Kadin), and so on. At the regional level, Kopkamtib officers (Laksuswil) conducted the program for the members of the regional branches of the above organisations and also for provincial parliamentarians. Moreover, at the lower level, Kopkamtib officers (Laksusda), in cooperation with Korems, coordinated meetings of Tarpadnas alumni to maintain the *kewaspadaan* indoctrination for those who had previously joined it.¹¹ The stretching of this indoctrination program into society was instructed in August 1984 by General Benny Moerdani who became Pangab and Kopkamtib Commander in March 1983.¹² As Soeharto's right-hand man and as the New Order intelligence czar, Moerdani endeavoured to expand the military's ideological surveillance in society for the further fortification of New Order political control.¹³ Moerdani's program was implemented by Maj-Gen Soebijakto—another intelligence officer and a close aide to Moerdani—who was installed as the Lemhannas Governor two months after Moerdani's promotion to Pangab.¹⁴ The *kewaspadaan* project, which was first intended to standardise the military's (and the government's) threat perception regarding national stability, was now transformed into ABRI's security-intelligence project aiming to control political ideas in society. This move

¹⁰ *Taktik-Taktik Komunisme*, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1981, pp.1-2, 5. The concept of the floating-mass was introduced in the early New Order period. It required that the mass of the people should express their political preferences only in general elections held every five years, so that their daily activities could be spent fully on economic development. The major advocate of this theory was Maj-Gen Ali Moertopo. See Ali Moertopo (1973).

¹¹ For details, see *Pengarahan Aster Kasum ABRI Pada Rakorter ABRI Tahun 1985 Tanggal 1 Agustus 1985 Tentang Kebijakan Pembinaan Teritorial*, Jakarta: Staf Teritorial, Mabes ABRI, 1985, pp.25-32.

¹² "Surat Telegram Pangkopkamtib No:STR. 61/Kopkam/1984 Tanggal 18 Agustus 1984 Tentang Pelaksanaan Tarpadnas dan Kegiatan Semacamnya."

¹³ About Moerdani's intelligence power, see The Editors (1984:149-152).

¹⁴ Significantly, Soebijakto was a former military attaché to Moscow (1977) and regarded as a "communist expert" within ABRI.

resonated perfectly with the Soeharto regime's program to enforce all social organisations to adopt Pancasila as their sole philosophical foundation.¹⁵

The *kewaspadaan* formula, however, provided some interesting insights into the mode of development of New Order military ideology. First, regime concepts, such as *pembangunan* and floating-mass, had been presented since 1966 as the antithesis of the communist-influenced Old Order led by President Sukarno. However, they were now perceived as sources of vulnerability which would provide the basis for underground extremist activities. This assessment reflected the process in which ABRI's original scheme of threat theory had been broadened to cover the "consequences" of *pembangunan* after the first decade of the New Order. ABRI's long-term political involvement had been rationalised by a developmentalist ideology which insisted on the military's role in safeguarding the ultimate national goal (i.e. *pembangunan*). The established *kewaspadaan* doctrine—which now saw *pembangunan* as a source of threat—enhanced the ideological rationale for military domination.

Second, ABRI's internal study of the latent communist danger (*Bahaya Laten Komunisme—Balatkom*) revealed an interesting contradiction in approach. In a February 1988 document which was formulated by Maj-Gen Soebijakto as a standard material for the subsequent Tarpadnas, the history, thought, and activities of the PKI were described in detail with the conclusion that Marxist ideology—whether it was implemented by communist or other groups—was destructive to Pancasila society. However, this 100-page paper at the same time rejected liberal capitalism by using the neo-Marxist perspective on capitalism and the world-system to argue that capitalism had made the rich richer and the poor poorer because the rich were the owners of capital. The paper asserted that the recent rise of multi-national corporations also resulted in the accumulation of capital in industrial countries and this had strengthened the structural dependency of the poor countries.¹⁶ Logically, there was no conflict between concern about communism and concern about capitalism, since both could undermine the ideological basis of Pancasila.¹⁷ But what should be noted is that Balatkom was juxtaposed with neo-Marxist language in the perception of Lemhannas officers who had developed the *kewaspadaan* ideology. Soebijakto—the communist expert—seemed to know the utility of Marxist ideas.

¹⁵ Soeharto had proposed this plan in his Independence Day speech in August 1982 and the legislation was formally adopted in 1985. This was widely perceived as Soeharto's attempt to undermine the influence of political Islam. A month after Moerdani's instruction above, violent riots broke out in Tanjung Priok, North Jakarta, where hundreds of angered Muslims were killed by security forces. This event encouraged a growing perception among Muslim groups that Gen Moerdani, a Catholic, had been aiming to de-Islamise Indonesia. Regarding this series of developments, see, for example, Bresnan (1993:218-244).

¹⁶ *Materi Balatkom*, pp.3-5.

¹⁷ As Weinstein's vivid study illustrated in 1976, one shared world-view among political elites since the time of the Revolution was the fear of dependence on the capitalist countries—as an expression of imperialism. Thus the officers' suspicion of capitalism was not new. See Weinstein (1976).

All the Lemhannas papers examined above implied that in order to construct this Pancasila dialectic, both communism and capitalism-liberalism were "needed" as the thesis and antithesis. ABRI's standard assessment can be found in the following comment.

When we adopted our political system, there were two mainstreams in the world, i.e. Western democracy based on individualism and the Communist regime based on class. However, they were not suitable for Indonesia where the sense of "togetherness" (*kebersamaan*) in society transcended both individual and class [interests]. This was the foundation of our Pancasila democratic system.¹⁸

This perception was held by both ABRI officers and the state administrators, and it was against this background that, with or without a real threat, Balatkom gradually became a built-in ritual of hypernationalism which upheld Pancasila as the absolute value.¹⁹ In the history of New Order anti-communist thinking, this was a major development, as the ritualisation no longer needed "real" threats—since the maintenance of the ritual itself became the end of organisational activity—and enabled ABRI to adopt Balatkom as a weapon against any societal element branded as "anti-Pancasila."²⁰

It was, however, notable that the completion of Lemhannas' Balatkom study was soon followed by Soeharto's decision to abolish Kopkamtib in September 1988. In terms of military ideology, the loss of Kopkamtib was unlikely to undermine ABRI's established Balatkom thinking which had already become a standard aspect of Lemhannas courses. The Tarpadnas project was also preserved in post-Kopkamtib civil-military relations. Nevertheless, in the political context, the disbanding of Kopkamtib and the completion of Balatkom had significant reflections in the growing inner-regime contestation. As seen in Chapter 2, it was widely believed that the

¹⁸ Interview with Gen (ret) Edi Sudradjat, Minister of Defence and Security, February 19, 1997.

¹⁹ Maj-Gen Soebijakto, Lemhannas Governor, at the opening of Tarpadnas meeting in 1988, explained that the PKI had revolted three times, so a fourth attempt might be possible. But he said it was difficult to detect. See "Mewaspadai yang Keempat," *Tempo*, 5 November 1988. Such a threat assessment was far from professional but well represented the ritualised nature of this *kewaspadaan* campaign. For a similar account which stresses the ritualisation of the anti-communist campaign, see Goodfellow (1995). It should also be noted that the three revolts start with the famous 1926-27 uprising against the Dutch colonial government. This suggests that the New Order (and ABRI) sub-consciously identify themselves as a late reincarnation of Dutch colonial rule. For an account which suggests this point, see Anderson (1983:492-493).

²⁰ As if to maintain the ritual, Pangab Try Sutrisno, again at Lemhannas, explained that Balatkom's present target was "non-formal" social groups which were supposed to have links with PKI sympathisers. "Inti Amanat Pangab: Waspadai Kegiatan-Kegiatan Politik Praktis dan Kelompok Non Formal," *Mimbar Kekaryaan ABRI*, Edisi 213, September 1988, pp.7, 63. Regarding the developing anti-communism campaign, Goodfellow sees four historical phases. The first three were between 1965 and 1971, namely the physical annihilation of the PKI, the consolidation of army dominance in central politics, and the use of the campaign as a weapon of coercion against any individual or group which objected to the New Order. The fourth phase was from the late 1980s when the campaign was mainly utilised as a means of suppressing popular political expression by NGOs and students. See Goodfellow (1995:1-15). Our focus is, however, on how the military has reshaped its ideological framework to legitimise the transformation of the campaign from one target to another.

liquidation of Kopkamtib was primarily intended to diminish the power of Moerdani who was unhappy with Soeharto's choice of Lt-Gen (ret) Sudharmono as vice president for 1988-1993. Moerdani was eased out of the Pangabship by Soeharto and transferred to the Department of Defence as Minister just before the presidential (and vice-presidential) elections at the MPR in March 1988. The growing disenchantment of Moerdani's officers with the President was evident when Brig-Gen Ibrahim Saleh of F-ABRI interrupted a session in the MPR by openly objecting to the nomination of Sudharmono as vice president. ABRI's unhappiness was expressed in other places too.

Gen Try Sutrisno, a close ally of Moerdani, who had replaced the latter as Pangab, spoke to his officers just after the MPR session:

This time, the atmosphere [of the MPR] was different from the past cases. There was a tendency of a certain group to force its wishes in such a way as to endanger Pancasila democracy. We have to watch out for this. Recalling the MPR session which just finished, we are almost ready to conclude that ABRI's sociopolitical activities for securing the purity and consistency of Pancasila and the Constitution will be significantly difficult in the future.²¹

In July, Sutrisno again expressed his opinion at a meeting of officers who were to be posted to non-military positions. This time, he stressed that:

Indonesia should have a healthy and dynamic Pancasila democracy in which we can nominate more than two candidates for the vice presidency and vote to decide on one of them at the MPR. This is important to improve the professionalism of all sociopolitical forces.²²

These two statements by the new ABRI Commander indicated the objection of the ABRI leadership toward Soeharto's selection of Sudharmono. These statements were also rare cases of the ABRI Commander openly showing his dissatisfaction with Soeharto's political projects. It was also the first time that ABRI accepted the idea of competition for the vice presidency and implicitly for the presidency. Resonating with such frustration among the ABRI leadership, the established *kewaspadaan* approach—armed with the Balatkom doctrine—was mobilised against Sudharmono who may have still intended to seek re-election as chairperson of Golkar at its 1988 Congress.

Kopkamtib was mobilised to identify 'communist penetration' in the Sudharmono-led Golkar. During the period between the March MPR session and the Golkar Election in October, an intensive campaign was conducted to discredit Sudharmono by alleging his involvement in the activities of communist organisations in the late 1940s, presumably reflecting Moerdani's roll-back strategy against Soeharto

²¹ Try Sutrisno, "Amanat Panglima ABRI Pada Upacara Penutupan Susyawan ABRI Angkatan ke-XIV di Bandung Tanggal 14 March 1988," *Mimbar Kekaryaannya ABRI*, Edisi 208, April 1988, p.47.

²² Try Sutrisno, "Amanat Panglima ABRI Pada Acara Pertemuan Dengan Pakokar dan Karyawan ABRI Eslon-1 di Markas Besar ABRI Tanggal 15 Juli 1988," *Mimbar Kekaryaannya ABRI*, Edisi 211, July 1988, p.44.

and Sudharmono.²³ Soeharto's September decision to abolish Kopkamtib was made under these circumstances. From the perspective of ABRI's *kewaspadaan* development, these events showed how the intra-military program of ideological standardisation had been transformed into a tool of security surveillance in society and was finally developed into ABRI's weapon to challenge Soeharto's political blueprint. It was ironic that the project, which was intended to secure the stability of Soeharto's regime based on Pancasila conformity, unintendedly turned into a military means to undermine inner-elite cohesion and threaten Soeharto. The evolving *kewaspadaan* doctrine during the decade up to 1988 strongly reflected the pre-eminence of the intelligence sector within ABRI which had long been dominated by Moerdani. It was remarkable, in this sense, that the completion of the Balatkom project was accompanied by the decline of Moerdani's power.

However, the fall of Moerdani did not mark the end of the *kewaspadaan* ideology within ABRI. It was ABRI's institutional inertia that had sustained ritualised *kewaspadaan* thinking by seeking new targets since the late 1980s. The New Order military had needed to struggle continuously to maintain the legitimacy of its permanent political involvement as derived from the developmentalist ideology—as if pumping the heart to keep sending blood into the body of the living dinosaur. It was in this context that the growing democratic movements and their frequent use of the globalisation concept attracted the eyes of ABRI's doctrine managers.

The Hardline Military Thinking on Globalisation

Globalisation was a concept originally popularised by the media and democratic movements in their attempts to question the legitimacy of military control of politics and to expand democratic space in the country's political discourse. This new weapon for advocates of democratisation—including students, legal activists, NGOs, and elite critics consisting of retired generals and civilian politicians—had asserted that regime opening, or *keterbukaan*, was an irresistible global demand as it was no longer relevant for ABRI to emphasise the threat of communism after the fall of the USSR and the dissolution of the Communist Bloc commencing in 1988. ABRI's

²³ A few days before the Golkar Congress in October, Kopkamtib announced that a head of a Golkar branch in West Sumatra had been involved in PKI activities, thus effectively discrediting Sudharmono's management of Golkar. This Balatkom campaign was also encouraged in April by retired Lt-Gen Sarwo Edhie Wibowo who announced his resignation from the DPR/MPR in protest against what he believed were ex-PKI figures in key governmental posts. Sarwo's action was widely seen as an attempt to label Sudharmono as communist. Then, for the rest of the year, the latent danger campaign was conducted under the name of *bersih diri* (clean-self) and *bersih lingkungan* (clean-environment) to look for those in the government who (and whose family) had any link with past PKI activities. Sudharmono finally decided not to run for the Golkar chairmanship. For details of this extraordinary campaign, see "The Latent Danger of the PKI," *Tapol Bulletin* 87 (June 1988); "The 'Clean-Self' and 'Clean-Environment' Witch-Hunt," *Tapol Bulletin* 90 (December 1988); and Goodfellow (1995:15-28).

established *kewaspadaan* doctrine faced an unprecedented challenge as its principal resource for ideological reproduction was cut off. However, as seen below, ABRI's ritualised practice invented an "opportunity" in this new social trend to reassert the supremacy of *kewaspadaan* thinking and expand the political territory in which ABRI could enjoy relative freedom in projecting this ritual into its actual political program. This dynamic had nothing to do with the ongoing Soeharto-ABRI friction but reflected ABRI's corporate interest in preserving its dominant political power rationalised by its long-standing role beliefs. Institutional inertia was, therefore, at work in driving the transformation of ABRI's *kewaspadaan* doctrine into a tool of popular repression since the late 1980s. However, it was the changing Soeharto-ABRI relations that had characterised the "style" of the doctrinal application. We will look at these two spiralling developments and how the globalisation discourse provided ABRI with a critical opportunity to synchronise its old ideological structure with the new social discursive trend in such a way as to strengthen ABRI's hardline approach to popular democratic movements.

To assess this indication in the early stage of the *keterbukaan* movement in society, ABRI's strategic paper in 1988 is helpful. ABRI's basic strategic planning consisted of three pillars, i.e. long-term (25 years), medium-term (5 years), and short-term (annual) assessments. The Defence Department headed by Moerdani formulated the annual strategic assessment in 1988 which was full of *kewaspadaan* concerns. It stated, among other things, that for the next few years in the 1990s, when international communication would become easier and wider, special vigilance would be needed in response to the infiltration of foreign values into Indonesia—especially communism and liberalism—which might threaten the values of Pancasila and UUD45, and these alien values would penetrate in places where excessive economic development had caused a widening of the social gap between the rich and the poor.²⁴ Therefore, the internal security threat in the early 1990s, the document concluded, would be in the form of "new-style communism" (*komunisme gaya baru*—KGB) infiltrated into the government and society. And *kewaspadaan* would be urgently required to monitor the activities of: (1) social organisations which in the past had shown hesitation in accepting Pancasila as the sole principle for all social organisations, and later accepted it in a doubtful way; (2) the fourth-generation communist group which based its tactics on the new-style communism, that is, no longer using physical means but constitutional methods, intellectual activities, government administration, and other means in order to "depoliticise ABRI;" (3) extreme groups which would try to use extra-constitutional ways—such as instigating mass riots—to further their political interests based on racial and separatist motivations; and (4) a certain group of people (*pihak tertentu*) who wanted liberal democracy with unlimited freedom, and whose activities spread

²⁴ *Analisa Lingkungan Strategi Pertahanan Keamanan Negara 1988-1989*, Jakarta: Direktorat Jenderal, Perencanaan Umum dan Penganggaran, Dephankam, 1988, pp.126-127.

through academic forums, discussions and seminars as well as via the mass media.²⁵ In order to counter these "dangers threatening Pancasila, UUD45, national integration and development," this short-term strategic study advocated the vital need to uphold the *kewaspadaan* level with the aim of eliminating any idea in society which might contradict Pancasila and the national interest.²⁶ Though the term "globalisation" was not yet used, the paper emphasised deepening international relations as the key factor which would activate these threats.

ABRI's intermediate-term strategy for 1989-1993 paid special attention to security management during the 1992 election and the presidential election at the general session of the MPR in 1993. The policy guideline for the territorial apparatus stated that there were certain groups which tried to stir up emotional issues in society, such as land disputes, and encouraged demonstrations and riots oriented toward racial-religious issues in order to achieve their political interests linked with the general elections and the presidential election.²⁷ In response to these threats, the territorial commands were instructed to sustain the *kewaspadaan* effort, scrutinise the activities of former political prisoners, manage political conditions for the election and the MPR session, neutralise the negative impact of economic development and new advanced technology, and combat any effort by certain groups to manipulate religion for political interests.²⁸ This guidance showed that the concept of "vigilance against certain groups" was not only a tool of ideological indoctrination but a core part of ABRI's territorial operations in practice.

ABRI's security conduct during the election and handling of the MPR, however, gave legitimacy to demands in society to relax the tight security practices of previous years.²⁹ ABRI responded on the 28th anniversary of the failed 'communist' coup of 1965 (G30S/PKI) in September 1993, when Lemhannas published a thick document about *kewaspadaan* and *Balatkom* under the instruction of Lemhannas Governor, Maj-Gen Hartono.³⁰ One of Hartono's contributions to ABRI's *kewaspadaan* discourse was his view that communist tactics were no longer the monopoly of communists but had

²⁵ Ibid., pp.128-130. The second point here showed how ABRI had perceived the criticism of *dwifungsi* as an attempt to depoliticise ABRI, which could be interpreted as anti-Pancasila and anti-national integration; thus, in short, possible subjects of security operations. Also reflecting the third point, the government and ABRI decided to place on Aceh in 1989 the status of Military Operation Area (Daerah Operasi Militer—DOM) in order to intensify the security operations against the separatist movements. The other two areas which also had this status were Irian Jaya and East Timor.

²⁶ Ibid., p.166. Emphasis added.

²⁷ *Pokok-Pokok Kebijakan Pembinaan Teritorial Tahun 1989-1993* [No: Kep/04/VII/1990], Jakarta: Mabes ABRI, 1990, pp.10-11.

²⁸ Ibid., pp.20-23.

²⁹ We discuss the events in the 1993 MPR in the next section.

³⁰ The document is *Sekitar Padnas, Bahaya Latent & Tapol G.30.S./PKI*, Jakarta: Lemhannas, Dephankam, 1993. Hartono had been appointed to this position since February 1993. As discussed in Chapter 2, he was an ICMI-linked officer and his promotion was widely seen as Soeharto's tactical shift from the military to Islam in ensuring his political power base. This move resonated with Soeharto's alienation of Moerdani-linked officers.

now been "borrowed and adapted" by "certain groups for certain political interests."³¹ By distinguishing the method from the ideology, Hartono argued that non-communists also utilised communist methods in their attempts to topple the government. Needless to say, this interpretation was quite useful when condemning popular political movements in which it was hopeless for ABRI to try to find a scent of communist ideology. Also, since the term "certain group" was open-ended, any political trouble-maker in the eyes of ABRI could be brought into this category if necessary. To support this approach, the document developed an argument which can be summarised as follows.

It first countered the idea claiming that the communist threat was an illusion after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The document explained that, with the closing of the Cold War, the world entered an era of globalisation and free flow of information which had a great impact on Indonesia's development because the boundary between the domestic and international systems was rapidly becoming meaningless. This phenomenon brought a new spectrum of threats in every fields of national life. In politics, globalism encouraged the penetration of capitalism, liberal thought and other foreign ideologies which contradicted the Pancasila philosophy and jeopardised the Indonesian defence system based on the Total People's Defence (Hankamrata).³² In the economic field, the free market economy had an impact on Indonesia's Pancasila economy based on *kemitraan* (partnership), while in religious life, globalisation facilitated the influx of foreign values which would meet with a negative reaction from religious groups. The document thus concluded that these threats would damage social harmony and national resilience (Ketahanan Nasional).³³ It was against these perceived challenges that the *kewaspadaan* campaign had to be conducted and, significantly, Lemhannas repeatedly emphasised the campaign's synchronisation with Ketahanan Nasional as the total defence policy. This was the invention of ABRI which thought that the umbrella of Ketahanan Nasional—an indisputable national concept—could be useful to rejuvenate the ritual of Balatkom and *kewaspadaan* which was, to a large extent, a historical legacy. By attaching the *kewaspadaan* project to Ketahanan Nasional, ABRI found an interpretative technique to resist its declining historical legitimacy after the 28 years of regime stability.

Hartono, who was promoted to Kassospol with the rank of lieutenant general in January 1994, again wrote his views on the national threat in a more systematic way in a Lemhannas journal.³⁴ This time, he stressed the threat from capitalism-liberalism

³¹ *Ibid.*, p.III. Emphasis added. As a logical consequence, Hartono insisted that such a new trend became the target of *kewaspadaan* in the ideological, political, economic, sociocultural, and defence fields.

³² Despite such a worry about capitalism in the early 1990s, it was a reality that the regime had invited massive foreign investment by Western capitalists since the mid-1960s.

³³ Above explanations are from *ibid.*, pp.V, 1-10.

³⁴ R. Hartono (Letjen TNI), "Pengaruh Perkembangan IPTEK Terhadap Aktualisasi Pengabdian Generasi Penerus ABRI," *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No.60, 1994, pp.43-56. As seen in the next section, Hartono's appointment to this position—which commands ABRI's political policies—reflected the rise in fortunes of

which accompanied globalism, rather than his previous emphasis on communism. For Hartono, the rapid development of science and technology (IPTEK) in the era of globalisation greatly influenced the ideological-political-economic-sociocultural-military (*ipoleksosbudmil*) areas of national life so it was the task of "professional" ABRI officers to anticipate its negative influences. The idea that the global change was a threat to the nation was underlined. He argued that:

... the bipolar international system under the Cold War had ended and been replaced by a tendency to form a uni-polar system under Western capitalism-liberalism. [As a result], the global economy speeded up the penetration of foreign culture through advanced information/communication technology and made Westerners think that their cultural values were universal. They then started to push other countries over the issues of human rights and environmental protection.³⁵

Hartono's assessments were not unique and were widely shared by the state administrators. However, as seen in the Lemhannas document on national vigilance, this shared perception effectively opened discursive space for ABRI to assert the need for strengthening ideological-political control under the flag of "latent danger." Hartono's promotion to the position of Army Chief of Staff in February 1995 facilitated ABRI's inclination to adopt this approach in political practice. The foundation of this should be sought in the context of the changing Soeharto-ABRI relations since the 1988 MPR session which was, as discussed earlier, coloured by ABRI's overt frustration with Soeharto's choice of Sudharmono as vice president.

Transformation of Soeharto-ABRI Relations

The lingering antagonism between Soeharto and the ABRI leadership had been reflected in events such as the dissolution of Kopkamtib and the creation of ICMI. For Soeharto, both would work to undermine the influence of Moerdani-linked officers and make sure that ABRI was fully under his control. These attempts were accompanied by his move to limit the conducts of *dwifungsi* led by the current ABRI leaders, as implied in his *tut wuri handayani* instruction in November 1990. Soeharto's handling of the Dili shooting was also understood as part of this political struggle.³⁶ Moreover, as seen earlier, the vast international pressure after the Dili killing became the primary factor pushing Soeharto to set up Komnas HAM in December 1993, which was also seen as

Muslim officers typified by the promotion of Gen Feisal Tanjung who had replaced Try Sutrisno as ABRI Commander in March 1993.

³⁵ Ibid., pp.43-45.

³⁶ As discussed in Chapter 4, both the sacked generals—Brig-Gen Warouw and Maj-Gen Sintong Panjaitan—were thought to be Moerdani's men, and it has been suspected that Lt-Col Prabowo, who had a special access to the President and was helping the purge of Moerdani-linked officers, engineered the incident in Dili to encourage the process.

an attempt by Soeharto to create a tool to help him publicise military problems that would be used to his political benefit.

The military leadership under Moerdani and Try Sutrisno was not silent. In the June 1992 general election, ABRI adopted a "neutral" attitude toward Golkar and also "tolerated" retired officers who supported the PDI. It was ABRI's reminder to Soeharto that the established New Order political system could not be maintained without ABRI's active support. ABRI's response was highlighted in the vice-presidential election at the MPR session in March 1993. As seen previously, Moerdani's aide, Lt-Gen Harsudiono Hartas (Kassospol), announced ABRI's nomination of the Pangab, Try Sutrisno, as the next vice president. This was a high-profile challenge to Soeharto—who is said to have favoured Habibie. In the finale of this Soeharto-ABRI antagonism, officers such as Moerdani, Sutrisno and Hartas were all removed from the military structure.

This 1993 event was a turning point in Soeharto-ABRI relations. From Soeharto's perspective, it was urgent to reconstruct the military so that it would be amenable to him. Dismantling the legacy of Moerdani's ABRI and recruiting loyalist officers were the two major goals. Soeharto's political survival rested largely on how he could transform ABRI within the next five years before the 1998 presidential election. Whether he wanted to stay in office or not, establishing an amenable military was necessary for a smooth succession scenario. A structural impediment faced by Soeharto to this end was the generation gap. As a remnant of the revolutionary generation, Soeharto seemed to have been less capable of judging loyalist officers of the new generation—except for his military aides. Inevitably, Soeharto started to accept the advice of reliable circles in selecting officers who would occupy strategic positions. The role of his family, including Habibie whom Soeharto had known since Habibie was a child, became increasingly apparent in military promotion practices.³⁷ It was against this background that Prabowo's rise toward the top military position at the time of the 1998 MPR was widely perceived as inevitable, although it deviated from the standard promotion procedures.³⁸

³⁷ Apart from Feisal Tanjung, Wismoyo Arismunandar who replaced Edi Sudradjat as Army Chief in May 1993 was a brother-in-law of Soeharto's wife. In February 1995, Wismoyo was replaced by Hartono who had been close to Prabowo and Siti Hardijanti Rukmanan, or Mbak Tutut, Soeharto's eldest daughter.

³⁸ Such a trend was already apparent in December 1995 when Prabowo was promoted as Commander of Kopassus and became a brigadier general. According to the codified promotion standard, it normally takes 20-25 years after graduation from the military academy to reach the rank of colonel and a minimum of 23 years to become a one-star general. *Buku Petunjuk Dasar Tentang Pembinaan Prajurit ABRI* [Kep/06/X/1991], Mabes ABRI, 1991, pp.81, 96. Prabowo, who was a graduate of Akabri in 1974 was clearly deviating from the norm. One retired officer put it as follows. "Prabowo has a toll-road ticket—meaning he can bypass the jam of waiting officers. We are concerned about the impact of his case on lower-ranking soldiers. ... I am not surprised if young soldiers dream of Prabowo and gradually disregard the moral disciplines they have believed until today." Confidential interview, August 1996. Such concerns are reflected in the comment by a serving two-star general who insisted that "... today's ABRI faces declining independence from the President, and ABRI can never be professional under the current situation" (interview, September 1996).

The ABRI leadership under Feisal Tanjung, who replaced Edi Sudradjat in May 1993, further adapted itself to the direction of Soeharto's shifting political preference, as indicated by two events: Golkar civilianisation and ICMI-sation in October 1993; and liquidation of BAIS in January 1994. The end of BAIS further encouraged the dismantling of the personal network of Moerdani, while at the same time it diminished the organisational basis of autonomous military power that could evolve beyond Soeharto's control.³⁹

Through these processes, the transformation of ABRI's high command in the post-Moerdani period was conducted. Soeharto's urgent need to reconstruct the President-ABRI relations on a new basis, and his search for loyalist officers to this end, were increasingly mediated by Habibie and Feisal and also by Prabowo. When Hartono was promoted to Army Chief of Staff in February 1995, it was seen as being on the initiative of the latter.⁴⁰ The renewed ABRI leadership led by Feisal and Hartono was pro-ICMI and amenable to the First Family. It was this military leadership that Soeharto relied on to prepare for the smooth conduct of both the 1997 general election—which was expected to face a serious opposition movement centred on Megawati—and the 1998 presidential election which was required to avoid repeats of 1988/1993 happenings, i.e. Ibrahim Saleh's interruption in the MPR and Harsudiono Hartas' early nomination of the vice president.

Against this political background, the new ABRI leadership was inclined to seek a rationale to legitimise political repression against the widening popular criticism of the Soeharto regime and the growing societal demands for democratic *keterbukaan*. Here, relying on the routinised *kewaspadaan* approach which was institutionalised by the previous ABRI leadership was not bizarre as it had been regarded as a legitimate

³⁹ Admiral (ret) Sudomo, who was Moerdani's old ally and was still in Soeharto's inner circle, explained the scrapping of BAIS as a necessary step because it had deviated from its original task as seen in its manipulation of sociopolitical organisations. See "Bais ABRI Perlu Restrukturisasi," *Kompas*, January 18, 1994. Perhaps, the deviation here only meant activities which were perceived as not reflecting Soeharto's vision. In this light, the PDI Congress which elected Megawati Sukarnoputri, a daughter of Sukarno whom Soeharto overthrew, as the new chairperson in December 1993 was interesting. Moerdani's trusted man in BAIS, Brig-Gen Agum Gumelar (Director of Internal Affairs' Section in BAIS and later Kopassus Commander), was one of the army officers handling the case. ABRI issued permission to the PDI to hold the Congress in Jakarta which was almost certain to elect Megawati—a popular opposition figure—as the chairperson. The liquidation of BAIS was just after this event, and Gumelar (Kopassus Commander) was also sidelined to the post of Chief of Staff of the North Sumatra Division in September 1994. This was commonly seen as reflecting Soeharto's unhappiness with Gumelar's role in the PDI issue. However, according to an officer who has known Gumelar well, Gumelar told him: "how was it possible for me to act without Soeharto's order?" Soeharto, at that time, told Gumelar to settle the PDI's leadership problem, so he interpreted Megawati's elevation as acceptable. It was then Prabowo who informed the President that the operation was unfavourable, and Soeharto decided to sideline him (personal communication, 1998). Agum's successor as Kopassus Commander was Brig-Gen Soebagyo Hari Siswoyo, whose promotion was also said to be recommended by Col Prabowo (Deputy Commander of Kopassus at that time). This promotion was seen as a part of Prabowo's factional consolidation within ABRI.

⁴⁰ Both Hartono and Prabowo established a political think-tank, Centre for Policy and Development Studies (CPDS) in 1995, which had a strong Muslim and anti-Moerdani orientation. As mentioned earlier, Hartono also cultivated a very close relationship with Tutut.

practice within the military. Perhaps it was perceived as a painful task, since ABRI's social trust would undoubtedly fall. But the new military leaders found a hope; their *kewaspadaan* approach might appeal to Muslims if it used the Islamic cause—as Soeharto did in the mid-1960s when the army mobilised Muslim masses to eliminate PKI supporters under the flag of *Jihad*.⁴¹

***Kewaspadaan* Political Programs during the Final Years**

The Feisal-Hartono leadership therefore adapted the established mode of *kewaspadaan* doctrine. As discussed earlier, the negative impact of *pembangunan*—as providing an opportunity for communist resurgence—was already a part of the standard interpretation of Balatkom. Under the new military leadership, the content was frequently adjusted to cultivate Islamic sympathy. The problem of the widening social-economic gap, which was also raised by democratic advocates as critique of New Order developmentalism, was instead emphasised to focus on Chinese-Indonesians. Reference to the gap was often code for appealing to Islamic sentiments against rich Chinese. Although the use of the simple dichotomy between the rich-Christian-minority-Chinese and the poor-Muslim-majority-*pribumi* could be dangerous by stirring up ethnic disharmony, the political usefulness of this approach was still considerable. If this approach was coupled with hardline thinking on globalisation, as officially formulated by Lemhannas under Hartono, the missing link between the Islamic cause and support for the regime could be found in the eyes of ABRI's doctrine promoters. Gen Hartono's close associate, Brig-Gen Farid Zainuddin, for example, wrote in a Lemhannas journal as follows:

The West is always antagonistic to Islam. This is not unrelated to the recent international campaign for political liberalisation [by the West]... which has also been promoted in Indonesia as the revival of Islam becomes apparent.... It is globalisation that facilitates this [campaign]. It [globalisation] also strengthens the international network of non-*pribumi* business which has dominated the Indonesian economy since the beginning [of the New Order].⁴²

This threat perception adopts the concept of globalisation to emphasise the "Chinese problem" in economic life. It is expected to promote Islamic "nationalism" and demonstrate ABRI's sympathy to it. Then, it opens space to argue that the democratic movement—which is allegedly manipulated by Western anti-Islamism—should be treated with suspicion by Muslims.

⁴¹ See, for example, Robinson (1996:127, 140) and Cribb (1990).

⁴² Brig-Gen Farid Zainuddin, "Reaktualisasi Peran Sospol ABRI Dalam Rangka Memantapkan Kemandirian Bangsa," *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No.63, 1995, p.109. Non-*pribumi* refers to ethnic Chinese Indonesians. Zainuddin was Hartono's assistant for political-security affairs, and then promoted as the Head of BIA in August 1997.

The military leadership also strove to invent a new logic to link evolving democratic pressure from society to the need for upholding the Balatkom campaign. The opportunity arrived in July 1995, when Soeharto decided to release some G30S-related political prisoners, including Soebandrio, Omar Dhani and Soetarto.⁴³ The release of former political prisoners had been strongly demanded by the Komnas HAM from a human rights perspective. When Minister of Justice, Oetoyo Oesman, announced Soeharto's plan to give amnesties to these figures, ABRI Commander Feisal Tanjung—who had claimed before that there were still more than 300 PKI supporters in society—responded by showing his discontent and insisted that this issue had to be handled carefully and would take time.⁴⁴ At the same time, the military leadership reintroduced the latent danger theory to combat the opinion in society that ABRI's vigilance was no longer relevant in the current stable situation. Maj-Gen Syarwan Hamid—who had been promoted to Assistant of Sociopolitical Affairs to Kassospol (Assospol Kassospol) in March—stated that:

... communism has in fact become bankrupt, but its "teaching" is still alive today. For example, when we listen to the music, ABRI does not see the singer but listens to the song, and tries to recognise whether or not the melody comes from the old song even though the musical instrument is different from the past."⁴⁵

Having insisted that the communist song could be played on new instruments, Syarwan asserted that current political issues such as *keterbukaan* and human rights provided excellent opportunities for singing the song.

As seen above, the detachment of the "method" from the "ideology" of communism seemed to have become an established interpretation of Balatkom, and the concept of globalisation had greatly helped ABRI in developing this technique of discursive manipulation. ABRI's effort to link the foreign threat to domestic political instability was nothing new, as it had been repeated since the beginning of the New Order.⁴⁶ What could be seen in mid-1995, however, was the renewal of its method and target. Now, in the age of the post-Soviet world order, the alleged "outside threat" shifted from the communist doctrines to communist-type activities via the penetration of universal values, not communist values. The target of repression was no longer limited to communist supporters, but was expanded to the popular movements conducting anti-regime activities, by identifying them as similar to the communist ones.

⁴³ Soebandrio was former deputy prime minister and Omar Dhani was former Air Force Commander, while Soetarto was a police intelligence officer during the Sukarno era. None of the three were PKI members.

⁴⁴ "Silang Pandangan Mengampuni PKI," *Gatra*, 22 July 1995. However, there was no explanation of how 300 people could threaten national stability.

⁴⁵ See Syarwan's interview in "Dengar Lagu, Bukan Orangnya," *Gatra*, 22 July 1995. Emphasis added.

⁴⁶ For example, soon after the launching of the New Order, a BAKIN-sponsored weekly, *Chas*, conducted a campaign to link the Wall Street Journal—which had published a series of articles on military corruption—and the Soviet KGB as the "outside threat" to Indonesia's domestic stability. Then the remnants of the PKI were regarded as the hypothetical domestic agent of the threat. I am indebted to Professor Ben Anderson in making this point.

The political operationalisation of this technique soon became apparent. In late 1995, political society was occupied with the issue of "formless [communist] organisation" (*Organisasi Tanpa Bentuk*, or OTB), raised by ABRI's Chief of General Staff (Kasum), Lt-Gen Soeyono, who pointed his finger at 15 government critics as OTB figures. He publicly explained that there were two groups of communists—one consisted of former PKI supporters and the other consisted of those who had been influenced by the first group and now tried to discredit the government by using the issues of human rights, democratisation and environmental protection.⁴⁷ Furthermore, Soeyono insisted that the PKI had used "agitation and propaganda" (*agitprop*) in the past, which were now used by these figures to criticise the government, and therefore they were identified as OTB. In our analysis of the developing *kewaspadaan*-Balatkom discourse, Soeyono's interpretation seemed to be the ultimate model which opened the way for ABRI to claim that virtually any demonstration against government policy used communist methods. Linking the OTB issue and the alleged impact of globalisation, his theory attacked both the Internet and NGOs, asserting that current indications of communist emergence were almost the same as in 1965, except that the method was different as they could infiltrate via the Internet.⁴⁸ Regarding the NGOs, which—as seen in Chapter 4—had already become important political actors in lobbying the government and international society to blame ABRI's frequent human rights abuses, he warned that "we now know their colour and will scrutinise them to reveal many of their grey activities," insisting on the possible link between the transnational human rights movement and the latent danger of communist infiltration.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ See "ABRI Names Faces Behind Incidents," *Jakarta Post*, 17 October 1995 and "Letjen TNI Soeyono: Cara-Cara PKI Sudah Dilakukan Terang-Terangan," *Forum Keadilan*, 23 October 1995. Soeyono was a former Presidential adjutant. The alleged fifteen critics consisted of: five academics (George Adicondro, Arief Budiman, Kuwat Triyanto, Harsono, Lie Sing Tew—all had links with the Christian University of Satya Wacana); a labour activist (Mochtar Pakpahan); an anti-regime novelist, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, who received the Roman Magsaysay Award in 1995; a vocal Muslim parliamentarian who was kicked out parliament (Sri Bintang Pamungkas); human-right lawyers (Mulyana Kusumah and H.J.C. Princen); a former Minister during the Sukarno period and long time political prisoner (Oei Tjoe Tat); a Chinese student living in Canada and active in internet (Paul Salim); a hugely popular public speaker and supporter of Megawati (Permadi); a retired general purged after 1965 for his links with Moscow and his leftist past (Soehario Padmodiwirio), and an undergraduate student (Petrus Hariyanto). Many of them were prominent democratic-reform advocates, and those who had conducted popular political activities outside the regime were now easily labelled as potential threats to the regime stability by utilising the OTB concept.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.* ABRI's concern about the Internet—which was beyond the state's control of information—led to the establishment of a special Internet unit in ABRI headquarters. This was announced a few days after Soeyono's OTB statement on 16 October. See "Perangi Info Sampah ABRI Masuk Internet," *Republika*, 20 October 1995. On the political impact of the Internet "revolution," see Hill and Sen (1997). It was thought that the main objective of this unit was the collection of information about anti-government activities and—as described by an officer involved in this project—"counter-information" on the Internet (interview, October 1996).

⁴⁹ Quotations are from his above interview in *Forum Keadilan* (23 October 1995). This view was supported by Syarwan Hamid who insisted that Liem Soei Liong, an activist of Amnesty International in London and general secretary of *Tapol* magazine, was an OTB figure who had tremendous influence on all NGOs in Indonesia. According to Syarwan, ABRI had already identified 13 NGOs which exploited the issues of

The OTB concept was carried further by other officers who followed the Soeyono-Syarwan approach. Maj-Gen Yusuf Kartanegara, the Commander of the Central Java Kodam, announced that five ex-PKI figures in Purwokerto had attempted to gather forces to plot the establishment of *negara Islam* (Islamic state), while Colonel Mat Ishak, Korem Commander in Padang, Central Sumatra, asserted that a recent riot in Jambi had been *didalangi* (manipulated) by former PKI members, and Maj-Gen Imam Utomo, East Java Kodam Commander, rode on the wave by stating that a recent riot in his command area, which targeted the house of a local parliamentarian, was possibly led by OTB members. He also claimed that East Java was a "storehouse" (*gudang*) of OTB. Similarly in the West Java Kodam, its Commander, Maj-Gen Tayo Tarmadi, warned that OTB figures had benefited from the current economic gap in society and penetrated into religious organisations to conduct dangerous activities.⁵⁰ None of the three Kodam Commanders in Java provided any explanation about the dubious link between Marxist atheism and religious fanaticism. But they publicly adopted this new version of old regime language, which now included the globalisation concept as a tool to strengthen military pressure on democratic advocates. In effect, many of the major issues of the civil-society movement—such as human rights, democracy, NGOs, labour-land rights, and economic injustice—were incorporated in the scope of *kewaspadaan*-Balatkom discourse under the Feisal-Hartono ABRI leadership.

Several critics responded to ABRI's ghost-hunting by arguing that it was merely a repetition of old language in order to promote ABRI's political bargaining power vis-à-vis the emerging democratic forces.⁵¹ Also it was interesting to note that the former

human rights and democratisation. See his interview in "Assospol ABRI Syarwan Hamid: PKI Kini Sedang Bermetamorfosa," *Forum Keadilan*, 6 November 1995. The prominence of NGOs in the late New Order politics reflected the growing wave of labour strikes that started about 1990. These strikes had been supported and encouraged by many human rights NGOs. Details are analysed, for example, in Hadiz (1993). ABRI's hostility to these NGOs might be enhanced by the fact that military personnel were often hired by enterprises as their security guard, i.e. strikebreakers. See Lambert's (1993) study about this issue.

⁵⁰ All comments are from "Mewaspada Lawan Baru: Tanpa Bentuk," *Forum Keadilan*, 6 November 1995.

⁵¹ Many critics also saw that the campaign had political goals. A human rights activist, H.J.C. Princen argued that the campaign was ABRI's effort to emasculate government critics before the 1997 general elections, while Paul Salim, an Internet commentator, saw that the government—which had been relying on repressive measures—needed the campaign to legitimately insist that stability was endangered. Both Princen and Salim were included in Soeyono's list of 15 OTB members, as seen above. For their responses to the campaign, see "Curiga Lima Belas Dalam OTB," *Forum Keadilan*, 6 November 1995. In January 1996, as if to sustain the campaign, the ICMI-sponsored newspaper, *Republika*, published an article (5 January 1996) which indicated that many children of ex-PKI figures had a tendency to vote for the PDI in elections. This obviously aimed to discredit the PDI—particularly Megawati. The growing pressure on the grass-roots movement was soon rebutted by a group of 16 NGOs which published "A Joint Statement on the New Order Culture of Violent Approach Toward Indonesian Citizens," (English) in May 1996. The statement strongly condemned Soeyono and Syarwan Hamid for their OTB labelling of NGOs, and insisted that NGOs' activities were based on the constitution.

vice president Sudharmono, who had earlier been the target of rumours branding him as communist, responded negatively to the OTB campaign, by warning against "instantly labelling certain people as OTB or having an 'unclean [family] environment' (*tidak bersih lingkungan*)."⁵² The Minister of the Environment, Sarwono Kusumatmadja, a reformist Minister, similarly showed his unhappiness by saying that the campaign was reminiscent of the 1970s.⁵² The father of the Tarpadnas project, Lt-Gen (ret) Soebijakto, also asserted in 1997 that: "today's ABRI insists on the latent danger of PKI, or formless [communist] organisations (OTB), and always claims that there is a PKI-ghost behind democratic movements. But they are nonsense, there is no threat from the PKI any more."⁵³ As widely believed, the campaign might have been motivated by practical political calculations relating to the coming general election in 1997. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of ABRI's institutional routine of *kewaspadaan* maintenance, the OTB campaign in 1995 seemed to be the final step to "free" its doctrinal utility from the bounds of history.

In facing these criticisms, the military leadership responded in two ways. First, it reiterated the established interpretation of Balatkom. Lt-Gen Moetojib, who had replaced Hartono as Lemhannas Governor, wrote in his house journal that the current issues of democratisation, human rights and *keterbukaan* had all been strongly influenced from abroad, and encouraged the formation of critical public opinion—including criticism of ABRI's political role—which in effect threatened national stability.⁵⁴ Here, without referring to Balatkom, civil-society concepts were all automatically regarded as impediments to stability and the object of *kewaspadaan*. ABRI's interpretative consolidation was also suggested by the territorial staff section in ABRI headquarters. In its regular report internally circulated in early 1996, the OTB issue became a special focus of attention.⁵⁵ After describing the chronological events leading to the emergence of public debate over the OTB in the previous year, the report claimed that OTB members believed in the communist technique as the most effective tool. The alleged technique referred to the "theory of contradiction" [*sic*] encouraging conflict between groups, for instance between the rich and the poor, between religious groups, between ABRI and labourers, and between old and young people. By using

⁵² The comments of Sudharmono and Sarwono are from "Mewaspadai Lawan Baru: Tanpa Bentuk," *Forum Keadilan*, 6 November 1995. Komnas HAM—a 'government' body to monitor human rights abuses—also complained at a meeting with the Coordinating Minister of Political and Security Affairs (Menko Polkam) Soesilo Sudarman and Lt-Gen Soeyono, and warned of the baseless argument developed in the OTB polemic. "Komnas HAM Minta Klarifikasi Soal OTB Pada Menko Polkam," *Kompas*, 26 October 1995.

⁵³ Interview, 8 January 1997. Soebijakto's rejection of OTB seemed to be derived largely from his antipathy—strongly shared by former Moerdani allies—to Soeharto and the new ABRI leadership.

⁵⁴ Moetojib (Letjen TNI), "Stabilitas Nasional Sebagai Landasan Kokoh Bagi Pembangunan Politik dan Ekonomi," *Telstra*, No.38, January-February 1996, p.10. Since March 1996, Moetojib served as the head of BAKIN until replaced by Lt-Gen (ret) Zein A. Maulani in September 1998.

⁵⁵ Staf Teritorial ABRI, *Tinjauan Teritorial*, Jakarta: Mabes ABRI, No. Triwulan I 1996/1997. *Tinjauan Teritorial* is the quarterly report of ABRI Headquarters' Territorial Section (Ster ABRI).

this, the report continued, these OTB elements created antagonistic conditions and conflicts of interests in society, which would lead to rioting and political instability.⁵⁶

Coupled with these attempts by ABRI to consolidate the established interpretation, the second response to criticism was a search for evidence—or the construction of the reality of Balatkom in the current situation. First, academics became the target. In October 1995, Brig-Gen Djoko Subroto, Chief of Staff of the Central Java Kodam, announced that the Kodam's investigation found proof that three academics in the Christian University of Satya Wacana had been involved in communist activities in the distant past. Asked about possible action to be taken against these three, Djoko suggested that the University Rector had the power to act, thus placing the case beyond ABRI's direct responsibility.⁵⁷ The pressure on campus politics continued as Lt-Gen Soeyono in November warned that he could bring a military tank to any university if necessary, even without a formal request to come.⁵⁸ His threat was a response to the growing number of student demonstrations in recent years. This high-profile warning to students was followed in December by the arrest of Petrus Hariyanto, a prominent student activist and Secretary General of SMID (Students in Solidarity for Democracy in Indonesia) who was included in Soeyono's list of 15 OTB figures and was suspected of leading a recent petition movement to the Dutch Embassy.

Second, together with the academic sector, NGO activists became the target of ABRI's effort to bring Balatkom into reality. In May 1996, a book published in December the previous year was banned by a Supreme Court decision. The title of the book was "Bayang-Bayang PKI," or Shadows of the PKI, which was edited by Stanly, a young political activist. The banning was suggested at first by the Publications Investigation Team of Bakorstanas which concluded in March 1996 that, despite the stated purpose of the book as a general reference for young people about G30S/PKI, the content was full of historical distortions, attempting to discredit ABRI and the national leadership.⁵⁹ As seen in the report's conclusion, ABRI labelled this book as

⁵⁶ Above references are from *ibid.*, p.3. Theory of contradictions is Mao's contribution to modern political language.

⁵⁷ See "Kodam IV Teliti Dugaan Tiga Dosen UKSW Sebagai Eks PKI," *Suara Merdeka*, 26 October 26 1995. The three faculty members were Kuwat Triyanto, Harsono and Lie Sing Tew. They faced this accusation in October 1994 when the faculty conducted a 'democratic' strike against the dismissal of Dr Arief Budiman—a sociologist and long-term New Order critic—who had protested against the unclear process in selecting the University's new rector. The allegations against the three re-emerged in the military's attempt to seek evidence for Soeyono's OTB approach.

⁵⁸ "Saya Bisa Bawa Tank ke Kampus," *Kompas*, 28 November 28 1995.

⁵⁹ The assessment by Bakorstanas is in Staf Teritorial ABRI, *op.cit.*, pp.5-12, with the title, "Hasil Penelitian Tim Karya Tulis Bakorstanas Terhadap Buku 'Bayang-Bayang PKI.'" The report demanded that the Supreme Court immediately ban the book, and also asked ABRI's territorial apparatus to watch out (*mewaspada*) for the circulation of this book in society. In branding the book as a "historical distortion," Bakorstanas pointed to some remarks in interviews with old political figures conducted by the project team of this book. For example, Manai Sophiaan, former Secretary General of the pro-Sukarno Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), recalled the situation in 1965, and insisted that Soeharto surely knew about the coup attempt because one of the plotters, Colonel Latief, was an old friend of Soeharto and let him know the

extremely dangerous if read by younger people who had never experienced the G30S/PKI incident. After this, ABRI's surveillance of NGOs via the territorial apparatus from Kodam to Koramil was tightened. As seen in Chapter 2, it was in the midst of such tension between NGOs and ABRI that Megawati's PDI was toppled and a physical clash between the two sides triggered a large riot on July 27th in 1996, followed by ABRI's purge of NGO activists, especially targeting the People's Democratic Party (PRD)—a student NGO which had recently declared itself to be a political party.

To effectively conduct this campaign and sustain the high pressure on the anti-regime political movement for the smooth implementation of the general election in May 1997, what was crucially needed for the Feisal-Hartono leadership was solidarity within ABRI in its interpretation about the PRD and the support of the Islamic sector. The former goal was, for example, evident in the report produced by ABRI spokesman, Brig-Gen Amir Syarifuddin, for the elite green beret unit—Kostrad—whose role was significant in successfully conducting any political-security project by ABRI.⁶⁰ He insisted that it was after the liquidation of Kopkamtib that the communists saw the opportunity to revive their activities in society and the PRD was the final product. According to him, the PRD should be seen as a communist group because: (1) its manifesto was clearly anti-Pancasila, and its behaviour resembled the PKI's attempted coup in Madiun in 1948; (2) its organisation was formed in the communist way, by gathering many labour, peasant, artist, student, intellectual organisations, which were often led by ex-PKI figures; and (3) its tactics were nothing more than communist-oriented because they organised labour-agrarian strikes and mass demonstrations in Irian Jaya, West Kalimantan, Ujung Pandang, Bogor, Surabaya, Solo, and Semarang during 1996 with posters demanding "remove *dwifungsi*." Following the established *kewaspadaan* doctrine, anti-*dwifungsi* was dogmatically identified as an expression of communist language. Syarifuddin's clarification was circulated to the territorial commands throughout the archipelago, which were instructed to tighten regional

plan a day before it happened. See Stanly, ed., *Bayang-Bayang PKI*, Jakarta: Institut Studi Arus Informasi, 1995, p.90. In his auto-biography, Soeharto himself admits that Latief came to see him, but there is no description about the talk between the two (Soeharto 1989:118). This work also discussed a survey conducted by the team of Institut Studi Arus Informasi (the Institute for the Studies on Free Flow of Information)—a research and publishing house established by Goenawan Mohamad, editor of *Tempo* which was banned by the government in 1994—in Jakarta. Among 100 respondents (not randomly selected as many of them were students), more than 70 percent disagreed with the government policy of broadcasting its semi-official G30S/PKI film every year, showing that the Balatkom program was rejected by those who were born in the 1970s. These points might be one of the reasons which made Bakorstanas decide to ban the book.

⁶⁰ See Amir Syarifuddin (Brigjen: Kapuspen), "Mewaspadai Bangkitnya Kembali Gerakan Komunis di Indonesia," *Darma Putra*, No.37, 1996, pp.24-29. *Darma Putra* is Kostrad's internal media.

security surveillance in anticipation of counter-actions by the underground members of the ultra-left PRD.⁶¹

On the other hand, the latter goal was the mobilisation of Islamic support for PRD-bashing as a warning against still-active "atheist" communism. This "theory of contradiction" applied by ABRI was expected to work under the current military leadership which had included top-ranking officers with strong Muslim backgrounds. Among them, Lt-Gen Syarwan Hamid seemed to be the most active in conducting this operation.⁶² The "contradiction theory" adopted by Cilangkap was aimed at shifting the nature of the political event from an authoritarian crackdown of the popular movement to the Islamic struggle against the communist remnants.

In this way, the "Crush PRD-Mega" campaign, which was carried out by Feisal's ABRI, heavily relied on the *kewaspadaan* approach established under the previous military empire of Gen Moerdani—with fine adjustments of threat definition and target population for counter-mobilisation. Although the colour of the two leaderships was very different, and each was antagonistic to the other, the institutional inertia was at work in rationalising ham-fisted and praetorian military intervention in politics.

Such continuity was significantly rooted in the developmentalist ideology of the New Order military which viewed economic modernisation as the indisputable national interest and the military's "permanent" political commitment as an effective measure to ensure the preconditions to achieve that end. This ideology necessitated the invention of discursive techniques to produce "national" threats which required ABRI to provide its "professional service" to eliminate them. Routinisation of this ideological

⁶¹ Staf Teritorial ABRI, *Tinjauan Teritorial* (No. Triwulan II, T.A. 1996/1997): 11-19.

⁶² A week before the July 27 riot, Syarwan had a meeting with 61 pro-government youth organisations, including many Islam-oriented ones such as MDI (Majelis Dakwah Indonesia) and Pemuda Muslim Indonesia, urging them to watch out for OTB activities and condemning the free-speech forum held by Megawati's wing of the PDI as illegal. These organisations publicly announced their support for ABRI to take action against the PRD and PDI-Mega. See "Kassospol ABRI: ABRI Minta PDI Hentikan Mimbar Bebas," *Kompas*, 21 July 1996. Also on July 30, Syarwan held a meeting with a delegation of Islamic youth groups, such as Pemuda Ansor, AMII (Angkatan Muda Islam Indonesia), and Pemuda Tarbiyah. On the next day, they declared their willingness to fight against communism and condemned the PRD as a dangerous element which instigated the riot. More Muslim organisations, such as Pemuda Muhammadiyah, HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), and the government-sponsored MUI (Majelis Ulama Indonesia) also released statements endorsing ABRI's red-purge campaign after the riot. For details, see "Terlalu Naif, Kalau Anggap ABRI Jadikan PRD Sebagai Kambing Hitam," *Kompas*, 1 August 1996; "Pernyataan Bersama dan Trauma Ormas Islam," *Forum Keadilan*, 26 August 1996. Furthermore, on August 6, Syarwan had a 3-hour talk with the key figures in the PPP regarding the July 27 riot. This was his first meeting with a political party after the riot, indicating the heavy weight put on Muslim organisations in mobilising support for ABRI's PRD-bashing. The Head of PPP, Ismail Hasan Metareum, expressed his full backing for ABRI's effort. "Syarwan: Kita Sudah Ingatkan Tetapi Dituduh Mengada-ada," *Suara Pembaruan*, 7 August 1996. Finally on August 11, more than 10,000 people from major pro-government mass organisations gathered in Jakarta to release an official declaration of support for the government and urged ABRI to ban the PRD as communist. Syarwan-led ABRI delegates at the meeting insisted that the declaration was spontaneous and not requested by ABRI, but emphasised the danger of the communist PRD and the need for promoting close cooperation between ABRI and Islam. "Apel Kebulatan Tekad Dukung Orde Baru," *Suara Pembaruan*, 12 August 1996, and personal communication with an anonymous journalist who attended the meeting, August 1996.

activity was the role of Lemhannas, and both Soebijakto and Hartono—two very different figures—similarly made contributions to this organisational task. The former completed the standard material for Balatkom and also propagated the concept of fourth-generation communism, while the latter invented a theory which made the popular democratic movement as "legitimate" object of the *kewaspadaan* approach, by infusing the idea of globalisation—which was interpreted as the primary source of ideological deviation in society—into its doctrinal scope. This theory "freed" ABRI to identify the movement as inspired by communism although it did not present communist ideology, because the penetration of foreign values in the era of globalisation allegedly allowed the entry of the ideology in various forms. This thinking opened a space for arguing that once the movement displayed methods resembling those of the communists, it could be identified as communist, and thus a legitimate target for military operations to ensure political stability for economic development. In repressing the PRD, this legitimisation was applied. These ideas were, of course, viewed in society as a tendency toward dogmatisation in ABRI's response to growing democratic demands. For the military leadership under Feisal and Hartono, however, the effort could be justified as consistent with ABRI's long-run institutional activity to reproduce the legitimacy of developmentalist ideology, which had faced a serious challenge since the loss of USSR—the principal source of Balatkom legitimisation.

The Loss of Military Cohesion and the Rise of Dissent

Whether or not the adapted *kewaspadaan* approach in the mid-1990s reflected ideological cohesion among the officer corps was, however, a different question. As discussed earlier, the transformation of Soeharto-ABRI relations after the fall of Moerdani produced issues which could accentuate cleavages within the military—for instance, the question of ABRI's autonomy vis-à-vis Soeharto, the rise of Prabowo, links to ICMI, the mobilisation of Islamic issues in conducting military policies, and dogmatisation of the military response to popular movements. Although the reproduction of *kewaspadaan* ideology was a corporate interest of the military as a whole, this did not mean that implementation measures were unquestioned and always welcomed by the officer corps at large. The development of intra-military cleavages which were centred on these issues contributed to the rise of reform-minded officers who were concerned about the direction of the Feisal-Hartono leadership. Since any military organisation respects discipline and command, as a part of professionalism, it is difficult to find public statements by serving officers about internal problems—which would no doubt put their careers at risk. But their voices were somehow represented by retired generals who had become increasingly critical in the public arena as they perceived the military leadership failing to eliminate the

sources of unhappiness. As seen in Chapters 2 and 3, such developments during the final years of the Soeharto polity facilitated the perception that reshaping the role of the military in political life—including President-ABRI relations, Golkar-ABRI relations, and more generally society-ABRI relations—was crucial to prevent ABRI's further loss of social trust.

In private, a serving brigadier general at Cilangkap argued that: "many of us are concerned about today's political role of ABRI which is being used only to support Pak Harto (Soeharto). Who will pay the price of being unpopular among the *rakyat* (people)? It is the next generation officers who will inherit the leadership in the near future."⁶³ In intra-military communication, however, expressing internal criticism openly risks officers' careers, thus the wording was cautious. Even so, several concerns could be identified in officers' internal writings.⁶⁴

For example, in mid-1995, Maj-Gen Hari Sabarno, in his graduation thesis at Lemhannas, wrote that ABRI's support for Golkar should be reviewed to make ABRI more neutral in dealing with all political forces.⁶⁵ The problem of personnel management was also discussed. Syarwan's assistant, Maj-Gen Suwarno Adiwijoyo (Assospol Kassospol) expressed a concern about the growing uncertainty about tours-of-duty, especially at the top level of the army. "After getting a new position, a general needs at least one year to settle into the position and should not be replaced in a haphazard way at least during the 5-year cycle of one ABRI Commander." He believed

⁶³ Confidential interview, December 1996.

⁶⁴ I am indebted to a retired officer who suggested to me the importance of understanding *kromo* in officers' writings, as a technique to read "read words" behind the established formality. *Kromo*, or *krama*, is the Javanese language form characterised by politeness, officiality and formality which was used by *priyayis* (indigenous civil servants) during the colonial period. Opposite to *krama* is *ngoko* which represents informality, proximity, and emotionality used in the daily social life. Anderson describes *krama* as like a mask whereas *ngoko* is like the heart. See Anderson (1990:131-132). Apart from cultural habit, there seem to be two practical factors which push serving officers to be highly formalistic in publishing their articles in ABRI journals. First, journals like *Ketahanan Nasional* of Lemhannas and *Yudhagama* of the Army Headquarters are the arenas for many officers to demonstrate their level of mental discipline and ideological conformity designed by the military education program, which have a say in determining promotion. Second, it is clearly mentioned in these journals that editors reserve the right to edit submitted papers without obtaining the permission of the authors in order to "meet the purpose of the journal"—which is no doubt indoctrination. Considering these, prospective intellectual officers who are given the opportunity to present their opinions there immediately judge the limit of acceptance—which fluctuates along with the civil-military relations of the time—and determine the balance between "mask" and "heart," or the way to infuse the latter into the former.

⁶⁵ Mayjen Hari Sabarno, *Reaktualisasi Fungsi Sosial Politik ABRI Dalam Perspektif Indonesia 2020*, Jakarta: Kertas Karya Perorangan [Taskap] Kursus Singkat Angkatan V Tahun 1995, Lemhannas, 1995, p.71. The summary version of this 82-page thesis was soon published in a Lemhannas journal, but the above reference to Golkar could not be seen here, indicating that he perceived it was not following ABRI's *krama*. Interestingly, Hari's concern for neutrality was expressed in 1995 when—as seen in Chapter 2—Feisal was preparing to back Golkar and Syarwan Hamid openly stated that ABRI could not be neutral. Although it was extremely rare for an officer not to follow an order from above, limited space for individual thinking made it possible to produce an internal communication arguing the negative impact of policies adopted by the military leadership. Hari was replaced by Syarwan Hamid as Assospol Kassospol in March 1995 and joined the Lemhannas course. After the course, he moved to be deputy head of F-ABRI, then became the head of F-ABRI, and, under the Habibie government, he got the post of deputy chairman of DPR/MPR.

that this ideal had been distorted by non-objective ways of deciding on promotion which had contributed to the accumulation of dissatisfaction among ordinary officers. Suwarno stressed that the job criteria should be codified more clearly and personnel data should be computerised in order to avoid subjective promotions.⁶⁶ The fact that Suwarno had a strong Islamic orientation indicated that the concern did not arise from the cleavage along religious lines, but between officers close to the Presidential Palace and those who were not.⁶⁷ Finally, the army seminar of 1996 should be noted. As discussed in Chapter 3, the seminar—which was held a day before the Soeharto-engineered Medan Congress of PDI in June 1996—criticised the state apparatus in general as inconsistent in policies, lacking discipline, corrupted, feudalistic, egoistic and nepotistic. Seskoad-linked army intellectuals also questioned the intervention of the executive branch in the problems of the political infrastructure—such as sociopolitical organisations—and called on the former to reduce its dominance through open-democratic communication. In this light, the seminar stated that the recent governmental interventions in Golkar and political parties had been too overt. One of the seminar participants described these statements as "an expression of concern among future-looking officers."⁶⁸

These suggestions provided at the final army seminar under the Soeharto polity were, however, soon buried in the subsequent repressive approach taken by the government and the army to eliminate the popular Megawati force from the formal political arena in line with Soeharto's political blueprint for his succession in 1998. Among those who were involved in the Seskoad seminar, such behaviour—which ignored concerns expressed in the seminar papers—was perceived as undermining ABRI's long-term corporate interests.⁶⁹ Revisionist views within the military were further strengthened during the next two years until Soeharto's last day on 21 May in 1998. Disenchanted officers were motivated to be 'reformists' either by: (1) their deepening concern about the eroding credibility of the military in society; or (2) their power struggle with rival officers placed in Soeharto's patrimonial structure—or both.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ Mayjen Suwarno Adiwidjono, "Pemandu Bakat Kepemimpinan Perwira TNI-AD Yang Handal di Era Globalisasi," *Yudhagama*, No.59, July 1996, p.61. He was later replaced by Maj-Gen Budi Harsono after serving 8 months as Assospol Kassospol. After the fall of Soeharto, the retired Suwarno joined the party executive of PAN (Partai Amanat Nasional—National Mandate Party), headed by Dr Amien Rais, a popular Muslim opposition leader.

⁶⁷ An interesting remark was made by Feisal Tanjung in August 1998 when he said that during his term as ABRI Commander, no one—even himself, a four-star general—could freely visit the Kopassus sites controlled by Prabowo, a major general. See "Feisal: Saya Tidak Terlibat Kasus Penculikan Para Aktivistis," *Media Indonesia*, 25 July 1998. This showed how ABRI's command structure had been distorted by Soeharto's special preference given to his son-in-law.

⁶⁸ Interview with a brigadier general, October 1996.

⁶⁹ For example at Seskoad, which studies ABRI's long-term political strategy, an instructor (colonel) said that the Kassospol today did not represent ABRI's institutional interests as he was preoccupied with the political game (personal communication, October 1996).

⁷⁰ For convenience, I use the term "reformists" to refer to the officers who were concerned about the direction of the military leadership at that time. However, their views were not necessarily synchronised with the reform visions of civilian democratic activists, especially for officers who were preoccupied with

World View, Domestic Threat Perceptions and the Perceived Role of ABRI in the Age of Globalism

It is not surprising that the friction within the military, perceived distortions in Soeharto-ABRI relations, and the escalating social criticism of ABRI all contributed to the erosion of ideological projects led by the Feisal-Hartono leadership. Let us examine this point and assess the diffusion of ABRI's ideological orientation in the late New Order. The applied *kewaspadaan* doctrine since the early 1990s mainly consisted of three components—i.e. the world view, the domestic threat, and the military's role perception—and they were linked in a way to construct a discursive technique for neutralising democratic pressures. We summarise the structure of this hardline approach first, and then look at two other approaches developed within the military.

In the eyes of democratic activists who had tried to promote civil society in the country's everyday politics, the globalisation concept was one of the weapons to legitimately claim the need for regime opening after the collapse of the Cold War environment and the 30 years of New Order authoritarianism. However, ABRI's hardline approach found an opportunity in this concept to expand the category of "political enemy" to include elements not covered in their traditional framework of threat assessment. As the issue of democratisation had constantly forced ABRI to take a defensive posture in political society, the reshaping of threat targets allowed the military leadership to re-assert itself and tighten its social surveillance policy.

The adaptation of Balatkom language and the *kewaspadaan* ideological project were aimed to maintain discursive political power through which ABRI had dominated since the mid-1960s. We examined the way in which the Balatkom campaign developed to neutralise new political phenomena—such as democratisation and human rights—by assuming that globalisation encouraged the influx of dangerous ideas from abroad. In the advanced form of this campaign, not only the international environment but problems in government too were utilised in order to expand the sphere of *kewaspadaan*. Now, the widening socioeconomic gap, government corruption, religious disharmony, industrial disputes, and the decline of society's trust in ABRI were all emphasised as the "opportunity" to invite dangerous communist activities—rather than as problems in themselves. The OTB approach taken by the hardliners implied that those who might raise such issues could become campaign targets, and their possible conduct of demonstrations could be interpreted as *agitprop* which was

the second type of reform motivation. Although the boundary between the first and second types was not clear, as both are significantly overlapping, the distinction should not be ignored because it was reflected in the officers' different attitudes toward social demands for political *reformasi* (reform) under the Habibie government.

identified as the method of communism. In this framework of assessment, proving a person's communist ideology was no longer necessary. This separation of method and ideology was necessary for the hardliners to reshape the discourse on the communist threat—which was a legacy of 1965—in the face of growing democratic pressure and a widening critical base.

This process resonated perfectly with the self-image of current military officers who believed that their political mission was oriented by professional military concerns. As seen earlier, Hartono insisted that anticipating, preventing and—if necessary—suppressing the negative impact of foreign-value infiltration were the task of "professional" officers.⁷¹ It was against this background that ABRI's search for "*pihak tertentu*" (certain parties) could provide the operational guidance for territorial commands to mobilise the entire technology of their profession to combat the invisible threat target. Brig-Gen Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin argued that:

ABRI's commitment to the defence of national unity based on Pancasila and the Constitution is to be actualised through the preventive strategy (*strategi penangkal*) which employs the methods of early detection and deterrence. They are to encompass all individuals in this country as our informants. [I]n terms of norms and policy, such a system is well established, though it is not yet perfect at the operational level.⁷²

The established norm of *strategi penangkal* had allowed the territorial apparatus to conduct intelligence operations which targeted students and activists as "informants" to identify invisible or latent subversives.⁷³ The strategy exemplified how professional officers transferred their military techniques and knowledge to the conduct of political missions, although it was accompanied by the risk of public criticism when imperfect operations led to illegal activities, such as abduction and disappearance of citizens.⁷⁴

⁷¹ It should, however, be noted that many of the elite officers had been trained in the US, receiving benefits from foreign ideas.

⁷² Written interview with Brig-Gen Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin, Chief of Staff of Kodam Jaya, 23 December 1996. Sjafrie was then promoted to the Commander of Kodam Jaya in September 1997, but was transferred to the less-influential post of Assistant of Territorial Affairs to the ABRI Commander in June 1998, probably to take responsibility of the May 13-15 riots in Jakarta in which the new Pangab, Gen Wiranto, in August 1998, admitted the involvement of military elements. It was however commonly suspected that the riots were indeed engineered by the key army officers around Prabowo, including Sjafrie himself. See, for example, "Teka-Teki Jenderal Sjafrie," *Tajuk*, 1-3 September 1998.

⁷³ About the practice of the on-campus intelligence activities, see Human Rights Watch (1998b: Chapter 9). The idea that "the people" consists entirely of "informants"—i.e. people who give information about the others—comes straight out of the occupation of East Timor where kidnappings, executions and tortures were commonplace. These East Timor practices seeped into Indonesia in the 1990s.

⁷⁴ The Kopassus Commander, Maj-Gen Prabowo, was promoted to the Kostrad Command with three-star rank, just after the presidential re-election of Soeharto—with Habibie's promotion to vice-president—at the MPR's general session in March 1998. In conducting security operations to 'prevent instability' at this MPR event, Prabowo and his aides in Kopassus, since February 1998, conducted abductions of student activists who had staged anti-Soeharto demonstrations. Most of them were Megawati supporters and PRD activists. Under the Habibie government, which was formed on 21 May, Gen Wiranto ordered an investigation and Prabowo admitted in front of the Officers' Honour Council (DKP)—held in August—his involvement in the abduction of nine activists who had already been released. The DKP discharged Prabowo from the military

Furthermore, in legitimising the search for Balatkom and invisible subversives, reformulation of ABRI's world-view was decisive. The ideology of *kewaspadaan* now targeted global change in its perceptual scope and identified it as a source of domestic instability after the fall of the Communist Second World. This broad paradigm, however, provided only a very vague definition of how the foreign penetration would take root domestically and who would be the principal sponsors. A space for arbitrary interpretation existed here, providing a license for the hardliners to flexibly label their own political enemies as national security threats. The ideological fortification of *kewaspadaan* via this approach reflected the desire to control the pace and degree of political change. Moreover, the military's frequent call for Islamic solidarity could be the tactical measure to blur the conflict between regime preservation and social demands for democratic opening. The human-rights activist, Marzuki Darusman, recognised that: "the *bahaya* (hazard) campaign is an attempt to slow down the speed of *keterbukaan*, and it is not really *bahaya* for the right, left and others, but *bahaya* for the change itself. They [ABRI and government] cannot say that they do not want the change, thus they use the *bahaya* language to protect themselves from the change."⁷⁵ It is in this context that we may conclude that these political orientations constituted the core aspect of *kewaspadaan* doctrine applied by military hardliners during the late Soeharto era.

Among ABRI circles, however, less dogmatic approaches to the link between global change and domestic threat were also developed, with resulting differences in the perceived role of ABRI. There is a set of views which emphasises the emergence of political threats resulting from globalisation and insists on the need for ABRI to expand its scope of political control. However, Balatkom connotations were not built into this discourse. Maj-Gen Budi Harsono, for example, explained that:

[T]he gap between the OKB (*orang kaya baru*: the new rich) and the OMB (*orang miskin baru*: the new poor) in big cities is becoming serious. The OMB are far poorer than the people in the village.... and globalisation encourages this phenomenon.

organisation. However, there are still many who are missing, at least 14 as reported, and Sjafrie's involvement was also suspected. See, for details, "Melilah-Milah Komando Penculikan," *Tajuk*, 1-3 September 1998. Kopassus had received professional military training from the US and Australia. Even after the official ban in 1992—due to the Dili incident—more than twenty instances of US training had been reported, the latest one conducted just before the 1998 MPR. The training was said to have specialised in torture, disappearance, urban combat techniques, psychological warfare, and night raids on civilian homes—all sugar-coated by the term "counter-terrorism." For details, see "U.S. Aids Killers in Indonesia," *Sacramento Bee*, 29 March 1998 and "Jakarta Opposition Leader Decries U.S. Role in Troop Training," *Chicago Tribune*, 25 March 1998. More details are described in Nairn (1999). It is easy to suspect that such training contributed to the professionalisation of disappearance and abduction.

⁷⁵ Interview with Marzuki Darusman, Deputy Chair of Komnas HAM, 27 March 1997.

ABRI needs to carefully watch out for this tendency and promote professionalism in order to overcome such an impact of globalisation.⁷⁶

Another intellectual officer, Col Syarifudin Tippe, also saw the new challenge in the global and domestic political arena, and described ABRI's increasing role as a democratiser. He wrote:

Globalisation... facilitates the linkage between democratisation in foreign countries and the demands for political opening (*keterbukaan*) in our society. One obvious dimension [of this phenomenon] is the increase in accusations against the military's dominant role. This happens everywhere in the world, including Indonesia. Coupled with the wave of democratisation, demands for improving human rights and civil rights in politics have become stronger. All these demands ask ABRI to share power with other [non-ABRI] parties... and to play the *demokratisator* (democratiser) role.⁷⁷

Absorbing social demands, rather than rejecting them, and transforming ABRI into a democratising force are Tippe's answer to the question of the political impact of globalisation. But democracy here, in the common ABRI language, is a democracy based on Pancasila—the state ideology of anti-liberalism. ABRI's alleged responsibility as the promoter of democracy, therefore, does not necessarily reduce its role in politics. It is in this context that the ideas presented by Budi Harsono and Syarifudin Tippe can be assessed as having the same orientation, that is the perception that ABRI should play a more active role in facing the globalisation problems. Their emphasis was slightly different from the hardline approach which employed the distorted world view to assert the resurgence of the old threat—communism—in order to rationalise the military repression of popular movements. This second type of approach, which does not use dogmatism but still conforms with ABRI's traditional paternalistic self-image, can be categorised as the moderate school of thought.⁷⁸

Among ABRI circles, however, there was also another set of views which basically put weight on the declining social space for ABRI to carry out its political role. The view that the nature of the threat is changing in a way which reduces the role

⁷⁶ Interview, 31 January 1997. Maj-Gen Budi Harsono was Assospol Kassospol at that time, serving the hardline Syarwan Hamid. He was replaced by Maj-Gen Bambang Yudhoyono in July 1997 and posted to F-ABRI. Bambang's entry to ABRI's sociopolitical section might reflect a willingness of Gen Wiranto—who had replaced Hartono as Army Chief in June 1997, after the general election—to consolidate his power base with reform-minded intellectual officers against the hardline group around Prabowo.

⁷⁷ Syarifudin Tippe, *Peran Sosial Politik ABRI Dalam Meningkatkan Kualitas Pengamalan Wawasan Kebangsaan di Tengah Kecenderungan "Global Paradox"* (Narasi), Bandung: Forum Pengkajian Seskoad, Orasi Ilmiah Pada Ulang Tahun Seskoad Ke-44, 25 May 1995, p.6. Tippe, at that time, served Gen Feisal Tanjung as Personal Staff Coordinator for the ABRI Commander, and was also a devout Muslim. As if reflecting the anti-Moerdani posture of many ICMI-linked officers, this Feisal follower (graduate of Akabri in 1975) criticised the old intelligence policy in the 1980s which compelled officers to obtain permission before writing in the mass media, which he thought had killed the officers' intellectual creativity. See his interview in "Syarifudin Tippe: Banyak Perwira yang Pinter," *Forum Keadilan*, 3 July 1995.

⁷⁸ This is by no mean to attribute the idea to the individual officer and judge his entire political views based on the category. Rather, the classification is intended to systematically assess the existing perceptions within ABRI. Thus, it is not a problem if one expresses different opinions on different occasions.

of the military is presented, for example, by Maj-Gen (ret) Maulani who argues as follows.

In the past, until the 1980s, the threat was dominated by ideological conflicts, physical insurgencies, and political party conflicts.... Reflecting these, ABRI's management of stability was oriented by political and military approaches. However, the current threat is coloured by the economic gap between the rich and poor and social injustice as represented by land disputes. It is globalisation which has brought these issues to the surface. In order to respond to these threats to stability, ABRI's previous politico-military approaches are useless. What is required is the improvement of distributive economic policy and a strong judicial system to implement consistent and impartial decisions, which result in a reduced role for ABRI and broader participation of social sectors.⁷⁹

A similar view was provided by Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo who emphasised the multi-dimensional impact of globalisation and insisted on the need for a rational division of labour, arguing that:

[T]he current wave of globalisation pushes social values in one [universal] direction... and Indonesia is not an exception. This invites the question of the military's place in a modern society.... ABRI should not believe that it can solve all problems. That would be counter-productive. Rather, non-ABRI sectors should be empowered and, in this process, the political centre will move to the Interior Ministry [from ABRI], while security matters, especially in the big cities like Jakarta, should be handled by the Police. Thus, ABRI has to change its way of thinking... but the problem now is: who wants to lose the power? Still there are many conservatives within ABRI.⁸⁰

These two ideas link the nature of the threat and the role of ABRI to societal change. Their emphases differ as Maulani sees the main threat shifting from politics to economics, while Widjojo insists on the convergence of global values. They, however, similarly minimise the need to defend the country from globalisation and also recognise the necessity of decreasing the role of the army in facing global-domestic pressures for change. In the triple interaction between world view, domestic threat, and ABRI's role perception, these ideas seem to constitute a progressive approach which emerged during the late New Order period.

The growing diffusion of ideological orientation among officers was, in this way, reflected in their different perceptions about ABRI's future prospects. The first approach—the hardliner doctrine—was, to a large extent, the product of Soeharto's political interests, involving the transformation of military leadership from the Moerdani-Try line to the more amenable Feisal-Hartono line in order to secure his

⁷⁹ Interview with Maj-Gen (ret) Zein Maulani, Adviser for Military Affairs for B.J. Habibie, Minister of Research and Technology, 28 November 1996. Maulani became Chief of Staff of the Vice-Presidential Office when Habibie was elected as vice president in March 1998, and, in September, was appointed as the head of BAKIN—a body directly responsible to President Habibie. His claim for the lesser role of ABRI may reflect his support for the civilian Habibie.

⁸⁰ Interview, 15 January 1997. Widjojo was Feisal's adviser for political and security affairs at that time. The term "conservatives" here may be identical to hardliners.

political succession in 1998. As discussed above, the two leaderships were mutually antagonistic, but in the formulation of counter-democracy discourse under Feisal's ABRI, which was aimed at supporting Soeharto's political goals, the established framework of *kewaspadaan* thinking during the Moerdani period greatly contributed, although its application mode was not the same. This ideological orientation during the Feisal period, however, had been eroded within the officer corps, as its policy projection was accompanied by the dual risk of damaging social trust in ABRI and demoralising organisational life of the military—notably nepotistic and politicised personnel transfers. However, this does not mean that ABRI's *kewaspadaan* mind-set has been abandoned. Since the developmentalist ideology still predominates ABRI's organisational thinking, its desire for permanent-everyday involvement in the political area is preserved, and it provides an institutional incentive for the officers to rely on the *kewaspadaan* approach when they feel the necessity of legitimising such political involvement.

CHAPTER 6

The Structure of *Dwifungsi* Discourse: Approaches, Arenas and Non-Debate

Our investigations of ABRI's adaptation in the late New Order polity have focused on: the political reflections of the developing *dwifungsi* debate; *dwifungsi*'s doctrinal foundation and its interpretative change within the military; civil-military struggle over the human rights problem; and ABRI's ideological reshaping in facing democratic pressure. We have argued that since the late 1980s, criticism of ABRI in open political debate became increasingly common, and in response, ABRI adjusted its interpretation of its political doctrines to defend their continuing legitimacy. At the same time, development of civilian institutions in the age of globalism shrank the political space in which ABRI could freely conduct internal security operations. In facing such challenges, ABRI responded in two contradictory ways—accommodation and dogmatisation: the former was represented by adopting human-rights values in organisational thinking, while the latter could be seen in the new hardline ideology encompassing the identification of globalisation as a source of national threat. ABRI's responses to democratic challenges, in this way, could not be described in a simple linear continuum of change and continuity. In some areas, where reform-minded intellectual officers could take initiatives, such as doctrinal development, coping with new social demands became the major goal, while in other areas, such as combat and territorial sectors, the military relied more on its traditional mind-set and behaviour, as if resisting political change.

ABRI's mixed responses to democratic pressures during the late New Order era, however, did not imply that there were officers who wished to end *dwifungsi*. As seen before, *dwifungsi* constituted the core organisational identity of the New Order military and was thus a primary corporate interest which had to be preserved in the eyes of serving officers. Regardless of the hardliner-softliner distinction within ABRI in its response to democratic demands, ABRI—as an institution—has endeavoured to maintain the legitimacy of its involvement in non-military fields as programmed by its doctrine of political activism. From the perspective of democracy advocates in society, this effort by ABRI needed to be undermined in order to expand the political space free from military intervention. The New Order civil-military debate on *dwifungsi*,

therefore, represented a struggle for legitimising and delegitimising *dwifungsi*. This chapter examines the structure and patterns of this contest in the late Soeharto regime. How have the critics developed counter-discourses in order to undermine military thinking? How has ABRI developed theories to counter them? In what ways was the *dwifungsi* dialectic structured and what was not debated? From these perspectives, this chapter deals with the thematic analysis of *dwifungsi* discourse involving both critics and ABRI. Our attempt is to analyse the contextual characteristics of this political communication which should be clarified not only to see the eroding military hegemony in national political discourse but also to understand the inherent gaps in political perception between the military and democratic advocates in promoting regime transition after the fall of Soeharto.

We first discuss several counter-discursive approaches developed by "insider" critics to delegitimise the permanency of *dwifungsi*. Second, ABRI's response to these and its efforts to develop standard theories to counter the critical discourse will be examined. Third, two particular arenas of the discourse—i.e. ABRI's appointed seats in the parliament and its backing for Golkar—will be investigated as they represented the most established patterns of ABRI's involvement in the formal political process (i.e. legislative process). We will see the increasing diversification of opinions within the military on these issues and discuss how ABRI's modes of involvement reflected its organisational vulnerability to the changing society. Finally, assessing the structure of current *dwifungsi* discourse, we will focus on one theme—*dwifungsi*'s first function, i.e. defence—which was not embraced in the discursive scope. Problems of this will be investigated.

Approaches of Delegitimation

In the early stages of *keterbukaan*, ABRI Commander Gen Try Sutrisno explained his understanding of the concept.

Recent development of *keterbukaan* may boost demands for further openness but it is natural given the rising educational level in society. Demanding more openness is an indication of our successful political development.... [B]ut it does not mean that we can express anything we want. For example, pornography and national secrets cannot be published freely since they are prohibited by laws.¹

The reform-minded police officer, Brig-Gen Roekmini, recalling her activities as a *keterbukaan* promoter in the DPR, argued at a private seminar in 1993:

Why did I and my friends in F-ABRI promote the *keterbukaan*?... At that time, an open debate was hardly accepted in the DPR. You may not believe it but there was

¹ Try Sutrisno, "ABRI dan Keterbukaan Politik," *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No.51, 1989, p.55.

an atmosphere which did not allow politicians to raise tough questions with Cabinet members. This had to be broken to promote dialogue in the DPR, and we tried to do so by disseminating the idea of *keterbukaan*.²

As discussed in Chapter 2, the *keterbukaan* movement opened the window for legitimately expressing the problems of *dwifungsi* in the public sphere, although for the campaign promoters, like Roekmini, the movement was originally intended to activate the function of the DPR. Indeed, the Roekmini speech, as quoted above, invited a comment from the seminar coordinator, Shobirin Nadj, who insisted that "if ABRI truly wishes to promote democracy, it has to accept the natural result, that is the reduction of the military's political role. For the last 25 years, the people have talked in many ways but the conclusion is always the problem of military domination. Why could we not widen political participation? The thing is whether or not ABRI is ready to reduce its role."³ Try Sutrisno's attempt to adopt a tolerant posture towards the growing demand for more open politics was, in this way, finally interpreted by critics as an opportunity to legitimately castigate ABRI—as such criticism could not be categorised as exposing a "national secret."

The New Order's experiment of *keterbukaan* generated a debate on the need to reduce ABRI's political presence, but approaches differed as to how this could be done. Students and activists conducted street demonstrations against ABRI's security approach and *dwifungsi* excesses, while outspoken intellectuals (both civilian and retired officers) criticised ABRI's conduct. Active officers usually expressed their concerns either by endorsing the moderate criticism emerging in society or by insisting on the need for adjustment in the new sociopolitical circumstance. As seen above, ABRI's human rights abuses, repression of student-labour demonstrations, support for Golkar, and personnel changes all provided opportunities to air critical opinions about ABRI's *dwifungsi* orientation. Slogans such as: 'ABRI should go back to the spirit of UUD45 and Sapta Marga;' 'ABRI should stand above all groups;' or '*dwifungsi* should utilise persuasive rather than repressive-security approaches' became almost ritualistic in public protests.

ABRI has also been confronted by less-publicised "everyday modes of criticism" after the *keterbukaan* movement began.⁴ This criticism is posed by people who are

² Roekmini's speech at the seminar, "Democracy and Problems of National Integration," held at the Institute for Social and Economic Research, Education and Information (LP3ES), Jakarta, 21 September 1993. Quoted from *Laporan Seminar: Demokrasi dan Masalah Integrasi Nasional*, CESDA-LP3ES, 1993, pp.6-7.

³ Citations are from *ibid.*, pp.13-14. Shobirin Nadj is a researcher at LP3ES.

⁴ In the analytical framework of this chapter, everyday modes of criticism is an operational concept to distinguish the nature of criticism which we examine here from criticisms based on particular 'events' of the time. The concept is taken from the classic study of Scott and Kerkvliet (1986) which developed the notion of "everyday forms of resistance" in suggesting the need for assessing various types of hidden peasant opposition to the state, which were usually ignored or disregarded in the traditional conceptions of peasant revolt and rebellion. Although the subject of analysis is different, the concept of 'everyday form' provides a significant analytical perspective in assessing various modes of *dwifungsi* criticism which we tend to ignore by only following well-publicised big political events.

regarded by ABRI as sympathisers (or insiders) and who constantly exchange ideas with those in military circles. One of the features of this communication is that it—regardless of events—emphasises the declining legitimacy of *dwifungsi* in the changing sociopolitical structure. Unlike its response to event-oriented criticism, ABRI officers express more varied opinions in this context, probably because they feel relieved from the immediate task of presenting a unified answer. For the study of political communication under an authoritarian regime in which open critical debate is usually restricted, finding topics which invite divergent opinions from military circles is crucial for assessing the changing pattern of regime discourse/counter-discourse. In the case of ABRI, the legitimacy question is the topic under discussion here.

The counter-discourse conducted by sympathetic 'insider' critics of *dwifungsi* legitimacy can be divided into three broad types. The first is the most modest approach which does not directly criticise *dwifungsi* but merely emphasises the way in which social change throws up challenges that tend to undermine the legitimacy of current *dwifungsi* conduct. The second approach goes further by challenging the current interpretation of *dwifungsi* itself and standard justifications for ABRI's political role. Finally, the third approach is one which does not explicitly oppose *dwifungsi* but acts as a 'messenger' by conveying negative public perceptions of *dwifungsi*. These three approaches in fact often overlap but all aim to support the counter-discourse on *dwifungsi* legitimacy. Each approach has its own strengths which need to be delineated in order to illustrate the entire structure of *dwifungsi* discourse.

Implicit Criticism

The first approach highlights the implications of social change without explicitly questioning *dwifungsi*. For example, in 1993, Lemhannas published in one of its house journals a lengthy article written by a retired colonel, Saafroedin Bahar. His key concept was the rising middle-class. The article argues that the role of middle-class people has become more and more important. Even though they accept military involvement in politics as a matter of fact, they are getting sick of ABRI's heavy-handed repression of human rights and democratisation.⁵ He argues that although *dwifungsi* is legally protected, middle-class people now strongly question its legitimacy because they are alienated by younger-generation officers who also come from middle-class backgrounds but enjoy special political privileges derived from *dwifungsi*. By discussing the long-term social change that has produced the middle class and the new-generation ABRI, Saafroedin provides a strong argument to counter ABRI's standard claim that minor adjustments to 'implementation' provide a way of

⁵ See Saafroedin Bahar, "ABRI dan Proses Demokratisasi: Pengalaman, Prospek dan Strateginya," *Persepsi*, Edisi Khusus, 20 May 1993, pp.71-112. Bahar has served as an official of the State Secretariat since 1989, and from 1995 also works as a Komnas HAM member.

maintaining the *dwifungsi* legitimacy. Whatever the implementation, Saafroedin's logic insists that the rise of the middle class and a new generation in ABRI officers undermines the legitimacy of *dwifungsi*. The major weakness of this argument, however, is its difficulty in identifying the political orientations of the middle class whose commitment to political reform is not necessarily strong.⁶

Another example is an article by Juwono Sudarsono who emphasised the changing nature of national problems which inevitably reduce space for ABRI to play its current role. In the Army Headquarters' periodical, he described the following points in 1994, before he was installed as Lemhannas' vice-governor. His approach was to 'criticise by praising' ABRI, arguing that: "25 years of ABRI's political role in the New Order have helped national development but the success now raises many questions about its role in the future." He insisted that: "because of national development and rapid population increase, social problems are now mainly concerned with land and labour issues, as seen in the fact that these issues dominate more than 70 percent of problems brought to the parliaments during 1984-1994." Juwono stressed that these problems could not be solved by *dwifungsi*. It was, therefore, ironic to see that ABRI's success would require it to reduce its involvement in sociopolitical areas.⁷ Juwono also asserted that *dwifungsi* was doomed to lose its legitimacy as the managerial ability of civilians become acknowledged.⁸ As seen in the approaches adopted by Saafroedin and Sudarsono, the everyday mode of *dwifungsi* criticism constitutes one stratum in the current discourse on *dwifungsi* with its focus on the changing environment, challenging ABRI's claim for the 'permanent' legitimacy of *dwifungsi*.

⁶ Scholarly debates on the role of the middle class under the New Order have been popular since 1984 when a social science journal, *Prisma*, published a special issue in its February 2nd edition. Crouch (1984:5) then compared Southeast Asian countries and generalised that if the number of middle class was too small, it could neither be an effective pressure group nor a supporting base for the state. In 1986, Monash University held a symposium on this topic (Tanter and Young 1990). Here, Lev (1990:48) saw that the notion of 'private' had emerged within the middle class and thus they were likely to raise the issues of political access, social equality and control over state power. Liddle (1990:50-51) argued that they were rather responsive to state paternalism and could easily be included in the corporatist network of the government. Budiman (1990:134-136) underlined the state's effort to keep 'disorganising' civil society led by the middle class. Most recently, Robison (1996:85, 98) endorsed Liddle's position and insisted that the middle class was rather conservative in political reform due to their economic benefits in preserving authoritarianism. These pessimistic opinions seem to be dominant in the study of the Indonesian middle class, and is shared by the domestic society in general, as reflected in the title of a book, *Kelas Menengah Digugat* [Middle-Class Accused] (Jakarta: Fikahati Aneska, 1993), published a year after the 'middle-class' revolution in Thailand in 1992. However, it is not to deny their deepening dissatisfaction with the New Order's "implementation" of authoritarianism as seen in many opinion polls conducted by the media (see, for example, footnote 173 in Chapter 3). The increasing possession of private telephones in the middle-class layer, for example, seems to have made it much easier to survey public opinion immediately after any political event—which could not be done before due to the lack of sampling numbers.

⁷ Above explanations are from pp.34-35 and pp.37-39 in Juwono Sudarsono, "Peranan Sosial-Politik ABRI: Perkiraan ke Depan," *Yudhagama*, No.46, 31 October 1994, pp.33-39.

⁸ Interview with Juwono Sudarsono, Vice-Governor of Lemhannas, 17 June 1996.

Explicit Challenges

A second approach directly challenges ABRI's *dwifungsi* discourse although from a sympathetic position. This critical dialectic—which is also presented regardless of 'events'—can be found in the argument by Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib in his paper at a private seminar entitled "The Role and Position of ABRI in the National Political Format," held at Surabaya in November 1996, and attended by some powerful serving officers, including the Army Chief Gen Hartono and his security assistant, Maj-Gen Zacky Anwar Makarim.⁹ Hasnan first attacked ABRI's customary arguments which emphasised the need for *kewaspadaan* (vigilance) in facing globalisation and the influx of western-liberal democracy. He asserted that there was no country which could isolate itself from globalisation. As Indonesia participated in global economic competition, its political system also had to be in harmony with today's global wave of democratisation. Since many developing countries already had joined this wave, it was wrong to say that liberal democracy was Western democracy. Hasnan also rejected ABRI's paternalistic claim to lead the pace and degree of democratisation, as he stressed that "since the international system has become more and more interdependent, ABRI's role in the process of democratisation is no longer self-determined, because international actors significantly influence this process."¹⁰

He asserted that democracy required the abandonment of the dominant influence of the military, and ABRI—which was a non-democratic institution operating under command-and-order rather than consensus—could hardly play a political role in the democratic environment.¹¹ Given this assessment, he warned that: "the world trend has shifted to respect for free trade, democracy and human rights." Thus, "if Indonesia wants to reject these three tendencies, its [international] reputation will change from being an 'influential player' in Southeast Asia to being the 'biggest patient' in the region." ABRI's standard interpretation of democratisation, which placed Indonesia in the spectrum of cultural particularism, was totally rejected in the argument of this intellectual retired officer. Hasnan then shifted his focus to *dwifungsi* itself.

First, in an attempt to 'decommodify' ABRI's interpretation of its 'glorious' role during the independence war, which was used as a historical basis for legitimising the perpetuation of *dwifungsi*, Hasnan claimed that *dwifungsi* was not a 'right' given by history. Rather it was merely a historical 'fact' that ABRI had fought for independence, but ABRI could not assert such a commitment as a monopoly of ABRI.¹² Second, given the global change mentioned above, Hasnan insisted that it was time for ABRI to

⁹ Seminar papers were later published as a book, entitled "ABRI and Democracy." The following citations are from his chapter in it. Hasnan Habib, "ABRI dan Demokrasi Politik," in Selamat Ginting, et al., eds., *ABRI dan Demokrasi*, Jakarta: Dharmapena Nusantara, MIZAN, 1997, pp.15-48.

¹⁰ Above citations are from *ibid.*, pp.16, 19, 21.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp.28-30.

¹² *Ibid.*, p.48.

concentrate its role on its defence function, while social security and order should be handled by the Police and the civilian governmental apparatus (namely the Interior Department). This suggestion meant the virtual end of *dwifungsi*. In doing so, laws should be formulated to 'normalise' the functional boundary between the military and the Police, and to abolish Bakorstanas which he labelled as an extra-constitutional institution.¹³ He believed these normalisation processes should eventually lead to the appointment of a civilian defence minister.

Hasnan's arguments are not far from those of civilian democratic activists who similarly call for democratisation and criticise *dwifungsi* both in principle and implementation. As seen in the previous chapter, such civilian activists, however, are easily labelled as 'Westernised' or 'anti-Pancasila' by military hardliners who suddenly cut the channels of communication with them. As typically seen in the case of the argument above, the attempts of some retired officers' to produce counter-discourses on the *dwifungsi* legitimation must be seen as significant examples of the everyday mode of criticism. As respected retired officers, they could explicitly focus on ABRI's declining legitimacy without giving ABRI an excuse to condemn their argument as non-Indonesian or subversive. It is in this context that criticisms made by Hasnan, Rudini and Maulani—to name a few—seem to have had an impact in de-hegemonising the ideological projects of *dwifungsi*.

Gen (ret) A.H. Nasution performed the same function in de-hegemonising *dwifungsi* discourse. ABRI's ideological claim that *dwifungsi* is a historical 'right' was undermined when the former army leader and *dwifungsi* concept-maker presented an opposite argument. "As KSAD, I made the so-called *Jalan Tengah* (Middle-Way) speech in 1958 in order to declare the political position of the military and it later became the basis of the *dwifungsi* concept. However, today's *dwifungsi* is not what we [army leaders of the time] intended to create. Under the New Order, extra-constitutional institutions—such as Kopkamtib and later Bakorstanas—have played the most influential role in politics, thus society believes this is the form of *dwifungsi*. This is not the *dwifungsi* I tried to develop before."¹⁴ In the structure of New Order civil-military discourse, ABRI's manipulation of historical interpretation for the maintenance of *dwifungsi* legitimacy seemed to face a fundamental obstacle as long as Nasution was considered as a primary source of army history. To the extent that he was regarded by ABRI as the father of *dwifungsi*, this not only confirmed a 'historical fact' but could also be used by critics to delegitimise ABRI's hegemonic interpretation of *dwifungsi*.

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp.44-45. Emphasis added.

¹⁴ Written interview with Gen (ret) A.H. Nasution, 4 January 1997. His 1958 speech declared that the army would neither become a direct political force like in Latin American states nor be a dead tool of the government as in the European states. See, for the speech and its background, Penders and Sundhaussen (1985:133-134).

'Messenger' Approach

The third approach attempts to bring out criticisms emerging in society and then deliver these voices to ABRI. By adopting—whether explicitly or not—the role of 'messenger' or 'carrier' of wider opinions in society, the critical civilian may avoid being labelled as Western-contaminated at best or anti-Pancasila at worst. As an example of this approach, LIPI's *dwifungsi* study should be examined here. As mentioned in Chapter 2, this was the result of LIPI's research project in the year 1996-1997, which had been commissioned by Soeharto in February 1995. The research was almost completed by the end of 1996, and following the seminar which disclosed its main conclusions to the public, LIPI produced a final report in March 1997.¹⁵ LIPI's research had two special aspects which made its report unique in comparison to preceding studies. First was the fact that it was commissioned by Soeharto, the Supreme Commander of ABRI, and second was its research method based on a wide range of interviews with national and local political leaders. It was the first time in New Order civil-military relations that civilians were given such wide official space to present civilian views on *dwifungsi*. As the messenger of these voices, LIPI emphasised its objectivity, neutrality and empiricism. This "apolitical" gesture was effective in limiting ABRI's dogmatic reaction to its critical conclusions. ABRI officers could disagree with them but it was difficult to openly accuse the research as "anti-nationalist." The following is the main argument of the LIPI report.

Indria Samego, the project coordinator, claimed that ABRI frequently explained the misconduct of its sociopolitical role as the responsibility of few individual soldiers (*oknum*). This had become ABRI's way of avoiding further criticism. He argued that, if there are many such individuals who deviate from the rule, ABRI leaders should share society's view that ABRI's entire sociopolitical role should be critically examined.¹⁶ As an example of a common viewpoint, Indria suggested that: "although ABRI keeps saying that it has never 'played with fire' [provoking social riots], it is hard for society to believe this because of its long-standing political intervention. In fact, many people believe that ABRI has contributed to the outbreak of riots in Ujung Pandang, the July 27th Affair, Situbondo, Tasikmalaya and Sanggau Ledo."¹⁷ For Indria, ABRI's role as a 'fire brigade' is hardly unrelated to its structural involvement in politics, and he thinks that it has brought about a negative impact for ABRI itself; for instance, it has

¹⁵ According to a LIPI staff, the research result was first submitted to Moerdiono, Secretary of the State, at the end of 1996 but because the content was so critical, the report was stopped at the level of Sekneg (State Secretariat) for further consideration and it took several months before it was finally delivered to the hand of Soeharto. Moerdiono also told LIPI not to publicise the report before the President accepted it. See Indria Samego, "Penelitian Peran Sosial Politik ABRI," *Studi Politik*, LIPI, No.1, 1996, p.160. A book—based on a LIPI discussion of the report—was printed in March 1997. See Indria Samego, et.al., *Peranan Sospol ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya*, Jakarta: LIPI, March 1997.

¹⁶ Indria Samego, "Demokratisasi Peran Sosial Politik ABRI: Catatan Pendahuluan," in *ibid.*, p.15.

¹⁷ Quotations are from *ibid.*, pp.18-19. About these riots which broke out in 1996-1997, see Chapter 2.

institutionalised repressive behaviour, curtailed military professionalism, weakened military discipline, and made an alliance between ABRI and particular social groups.¹⁸

Distortions of *dwifungsi* were further suggested in this report, as if evident in all fields of military engagement. The report criticised ABRI's ideological projects which easily identified those who had different opinions from ABRI/government, as subversive and communist.¹⁹ In the political field, the report stressed that ABRI's intervention had deepened social disharmony. This was seen in the case of the Medan Congress held by the Surjadi-PDI, which—as admitted by the PDI staff—was fully backed by ABRI in finance and support mobilisation. In the economic field, ABRI was portrayed as far from solving labour-land disputes, because it had always backed crony business, thus spreading ABRI's social image as a 'public enemy' (*musuh rakyat*). Furthermore, the report presented opinions of interviewees who criticised the poor financial condition of state enterprises led by ABRI and concluded that ABRI's economic intervention was one reason why Indonesia was not ready to welcome the ASEAN Free-Trade Agreement (AFTA).²⁰ From the perspective of ASEAN's regional security balance, it was also suggested that ABRI, like it or not, should be forced to stop focusing on the internal security problem in order to build up conventional defence capacity corresponding to the level of neighbouring countries, and which requires a review of the current ascendancy of army vis-a-vis other services.²¹

All these arguments were said to be reflecting the voices of civilian political figures at national and local levels with whom the project team had conducted interviews. To emphasise the nature of the report as a policy paper, some recommendations were made for the President. Among other things, LIPI suggested that ABRI's political role should be limited to participation in the legislative branch, preferably only in the MPR, in order to enhance ABRI's political disengagement, and this process should be completed by the general election of 2007. This, the authors claimed, was no more other than the realisation of ABRI's slogan declared at the 1995 ABRI Anniversary: "what is good for the people is the best for ABRI."²² As seen in Chapter 2, this recommendation was widely questioned by ABRI officers. Most claimed that it was unrealistic and lacked a historical perspective. Such defensive reactions illustrated that the messenger approach could have a direct role in bringing

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p.27.

¹⁹ Riza Sihbudi, "Dampak Perubahan Lingkungan Domestik Terhadap Peran Sosial Politik ABRI," in Indria Samego, et.al., *op.cit.*, p.129. Needless to say, this criticism strongly reflected ABRI's OTB theory and its implementation in the PRD affair in July 1996.

²⁰ Above points are from *ibid.*, pp.128-131. ASEAN is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations.

²¹ Dewi Fortuna Anwar, "Lingkungan Internasional, Demokratisasi dan Peranan Sosial Politik ABRI," in Indria Samego, et.al., *op.cit.*, p.165. Dewi became the Presidential advisor for foreign policy under the Habibie government.

²² See Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, "Masa Depan Peran Sospol ABRI," and Indria Samego, "Kesimpulan dan Rekomendasi Penelitian," both in Indria Samego, et.al., *op.cit.*, pp.191, 212, 231.

public voices into the discourse arena without inviting ABRI's dogmatic response, which was apparent whenever public protests raised the same criticism.

The three approaches above have their own strengths in the conveying the elite counter-discourse on *dwifungsi*. In the eyes of political activists situated outside the regime, these approaches adopted by elite insiders were not enough to dismantle the *dwifungsi* system. However, the utility of insider criticism, as seen above, was to open the communication channel with ABRI and develop a mutual discourse under the authoritarian polity. This function should not be ignored in assessing the development of *dwifungsi* thinking within the military. It is only in this elite discursive space that the military officers endeavoured to defend *dwifungsi* legitimation. For the study of a military's political thinking, investigation should target this arena. In our study of ABRI under the late New Order, insider criticism of *dwifungsi* was mainly via the three approaches we have examined above. Let us, then, examine the responses of ABRI officers to the critical discourse on *dwifungsi*.

Responses to Counter-Discourses

ABRI's discursive responses seemed to have three elements—labelling critics and criticism, perceiving problems and developing standard theories to defend *dwifungsi* legitimacy.

Classifying Criticism-Critics

At the most highest level, ABRI responded to criticism by first classifying and labelling critics and criticism in order to provide a conceptual lens for ABRI officers to interpret and rebut such criticism. At the beginning of the *keterbukaan* period in 1989, the Pangab, Gen Try Sutrisno, summarised three major lines of criticism directed at ABRI's *dwifungsi*.

In formal procedures, ABRI's role as a sociopolitical force no longer has a problem. But we should not close our eyes to the fact that in society there are still certain people who do not accept such a role of ABRI..., and they can be classified into three groups. The first group thinks that *dwifungsi* is only linked to the 45 Generation, so it should decline when the generation changes. The second group believes that *dwifungsi* is ABRI's domination of civilian posts, asserting that since civilians have become capable [of state management], these posts should be passed onto them. The third group claims that ABRI is willing to adopt militarism.²³

²³ Try Sutrisno, "Amanat Panglima Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia Pada Pembukaan Sussospol ABRI Angkatan-1 1988/1989 di Sesko ABRI Bandung," *Mimbar Kekaryaan ABRI*, Edisi 222, June 1989, pp.68-69.

Later, in 1993, Try identified three sources of civilian response—two of which were critical while the third was supportive. The first group was made up of those who were influenced by liberal democratic ideas, and were mostly associated with the university campuses. They believed that the professional military should limit its role to the defence field. The second group accepted *dwifungsi* but hoped that *kekaryaan* would not close civilian career paths. The third group consisted of those who welcomed *dwifungsi* as an effort to establish the family state (*negara kekeluargaan*).²⁴

General Try's statements hardly acknowledged that *dwifungsi* legitimacy was facing serious challenge and he apparently saw no need for ABRI to adjust its position. Critics were simply categorised into two groups. One group was identified as "liberal" and thus automatically labelled as "western" and unacceptable. The other group was accused of confusing *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan* and therefore drawing wrong conclusions. For ABRI officers, these classifications were one way to respond to the counter-discourse on *dwifungsi* and were commonly used by officers to claim that critics were wrong and their criticisms based on misunderstanding.

Perceiving Dilemmas

Within ABRI, however, some officers acknowledged that they were facing a problem in response to the *dwifungsi* counter-discourse. Maj-Gen Abdul Rivai, for example, acknowledged in the Kostrad journal that *dwifungsi* gave rise to a structural dilemma. He pointed out that *dwifungsi*'s first function—i.e. defence—was part of the state's security policy, but in performing its second function, ABRI was expected, like other sociopolitical organisations, to supervise governmental policy. He thought that if ABRI was preoccupied with performing its function as a part of governmental apparatus, it would risk *dwifungsi*'s second function, while at the same time its first function would not be implemented properly if ABRI was too busy performing the second function.²⁵ Describing ABRI's position as dilemmatic itself implies that he perceived the current position as not holding a desirable balance between the first and second functions of *dwifungsi*. He also understood that ABRI's second function was to supervise governmental policy. As discussed previously, there was a growing concern within the officer corps about ABRI's loss of independent stance vis-a-vis Soeharto during that time. It is therefore plausible to see that Rivai's concern was directed at *dwifungsi*'s perceived inability to properly perform its second function, due to its preoccupation with the first function as a tool of the government.

²⁴ *Kepemimpinan ABRI Dalam Pembangunan Negara-Bangsa: Masa Lalu, Masa Kini, dan Masa Mendatang*, Mabes ABRI, 1993, pp.52-53.

²⁵ A. Rivai, "Aktualisasi Peran dan Sikap Mental Aparatur Pemerintah dalam Era Pembangunan," *Darma Putra*, Edisi Khusus, No.32, 1995, p.77. Rivai is a graduate of AMN's class 1965, who served as Pangdam IX/Udayana until the July 1997 reshuffle. He then became a member of F-ABRI at the DPR.

We can see a similar theme in the writing of Maj-Gen Hari Sabarno. He suggested that ABRI's current role as *pejuang* (warrior) and *prajurit* (soldier) contained clear contradictions and dilemmas, especially in a situation where governmental policies did not meet the aspirations of the people.²⁶ If ABRI behaved as a governmental tool, it would harm its spirit as *pejuang*, but if officers merely followed the demands of the public, this would risk a deterioration of ABRI's internal discipline.²⁷ Hari believed this dilemma to be increasingly serious in the face of growing democratic demands, and urged that ABRI should re-evaluate the following questions to overcome this challenge. Was ABRI ready to give support to the emerging new groups in society which would result in the reduction of ABRI's role? Could ABRI really become a dynamiser in the process of democratisation, or did it still want to persist in its role as stabiliser even though other social forces were willing to play the dynamising role? Wasn't it true that the new-generation officers trained in internal security management tended to have a negative view of social change? And weren't they overacting in response to emerging social movements?²⁸

The arguments of Rivai and Hari Sabarno indicate one direction of ABRI's internal discussion in the face of growing social demands for political openness. This expression of the dilemma was obviously not for public consumption but it implied that the current situation was not regarded satisfactory by some officers. The dilemma described above led to concern about either (1) ABRI's excessive responsiveness to social demands, which would incapacitate its functional role in the state apparatus, or (2) its identification with state activity vis-a-vis society, which would undermine not only ABRI's corporate identity as a people's army but also its everyday *dwifungsi* rationale. Judging from Rivai's reference to the need for supervising the government and Hari's questions which are commonly asked by civilians, the two generals' concerns were focused on the latter, i.e. ABRI's dissociation from the *rakyat*. In other words, in response to the critical discourse on *dwifungsi*, some serving ABRI leaders admitted the existence of a gap between ABRI's proclaimed role as a promoter of social interests and its practical role as a tool of the government. This perception did not necessarily propel these officers into action, for example by resisting Soeharto's political blueprint, since—as in any social organisation—such a dynamic depends on other calculations in real politics. Rather, what is demonstrated in the above cases is one of the ways in which ABRI officers, who perceived the declining legitimacy of *dwifungsi*, expressed their concerns through the medium of intra-military communications. Their assessment of the dilemma, however, did not seem to meet the criticisms launched by non-ABRI critics who saw the problem in ABRI's excessive use of force and arbitrary ideological

²⁶ About the concepts of *pejuang* and *prajurit*, consult Chapter 3.

²⁷ Hari Sabarno, "Tantangan Demokrasi dan Sikap ABRI," *Yudhagama*, No.46, October 1994, pp.19-20.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p.21.

operations, which could not be explained by the mere fact that the military was a tool of the government—a universal phenomenon.

Reformulating Theories

Another way of responding to the *dwifungsi* counter-discourse is the reinvention of the logic to legitimise the relevance of *dwifungsi*. Two theories are commonly employed to this end. One is 'culturalism' and the other is 'developmentalism.'

In the former, it is interesting to note that a booklet written by Brig-Gen (ret) A.S.S. Tambunan, a prominent *dwifungsi* theorist, was published in 1995 as an attempt to re-emphasise the legitimate foundations of *dwifungsi*.²⁹ Tambunan's work is comprehensive in the sense that several resources are mobilised in order to insist on the durability of *dwifungsi*. However, regarding democratisation, his approach emphasises culture. He claims that democracy takes various forms in the world and the Indonesian way includes the *dwifungsi* system. He therefore stresses the irrelevance of the civil-military dichotomy in promoting democracy in Indonesia and argues that Indonesian society recognises no functional boundary between military and civilian tasks. Thus ABRI should participate in any social activity in accordance with social needs. This interpretation is a response to the criticism which attempts to limit ABRI's non-military activity to the MPR and reduce ABRI's *kekaryaan* practice. The rationale for this, according to Tambunan, is the culture of familism (*kekeluargaan*) rooted in Indonesian society which respects mutual assistance and organic solidarity among all social components. This conception of society is asserted by Tambunan as a prime reason for rejecting the distinction between civilian and military affairs, with the resulting justification of ABRI's perpetual involvement in non-military sectors.³⁰

Significantly, this ideology of civil-military fusion also helps ABRI to reject *dwifungsi* criticism based on the social-change approach which emphasises the emergence of post-revolutionary generation officers and the rise in civilian competence. It is in this context that we can see ABRI's increasingly strong rejection of civil-military dichotomy in the recent debate on *dwifungsi* legitimacy, which is coloured by the growing demand for 'civilian empowerment.' This argument is not intended to replace ABRI's traditional emphasis of historical, stabilising and legal justifications. Rather, it

²⁹ The booklet is A.S.S. Tambunan, *Socio-Political Functions of the Indonesian Armed Forces: An Effort to Outline the Issues*, Jakarta, Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1995. The original text was written in 1980 but the publisher, in the Introduction to the book, stresses that it is still highly relevant in the contemporary context and it soon became a standard reference among ABRI intellectuals. In my conversations with ABRI officers, many—though not all—nominated the book as one of four writings they recommended civilians to read. The other three are Notosusanto (1984), Soebijono, et.al. (1992), and Said (1991). Since Tambunan's work was revised in 1995, we will look at this 'latest' work which discusses issues of *dwifungsi* in democratisation.

³⁰ Above citations are from Tambunan, *op.cit.*, pp.31-34. However, it does not provide an answer to the counter-discourse which says civilians, in that case, should also take part in military organisations, such as occupying the post of Menhankam.

reflects the relative shift of emphasis in defending *dwifungsi* against the counter-discourse.³¹

For example, a prominent ABRI thinker, Brig-Gen (ret) Abdulkadir Besar, declined to assess the Law No.20/1982 as a valid source of *dwifungsi* legitimacy because he considered it to be only a confirmation of *dwifungsi* and not its source. For him, Nugroho's argument in 1984 was also less relevant in today's society because it was strongly inclined to a historical explanation. In facing the demand for democratisation which is pushed by globalisation, Abdulkadir regards historical emphasis as backward thinking. For him, it is the cultural legitimacy of *kekeluargaan* which is the fundamental basis of *dwifungsi*.³² Indeed, as an ultimate rejection of the strict civil-military boundary applied in many western countries, one officer insisted that it was even a mistake to translate ABRI as the Armed Forces or the military in English.³³

ABRI's cultural approach is essentially static and used against any criticism which insists on the need for ABRI—which composes only 0.25 percent of the total population—to hand over its political power to civilians under stable political conditions. As a built-in New Order regime discourse, *dwifungsi* has long been explained in the four-step logical flow based on culturalism: democracy has variations; Indonesia is based on *kekeluargaan*; democracy based on *kekeluargaan* asks all social member to participate in every field of national life with a result that the civil-military dichotomy is invalid; thus *dwifungsi* has eternal legitimacy. Tambunan's argument seems to be the simple reproduction of this logic.

However, this justification does not meet the argument which stresses declining *dwifungsi* legitimacy as a result of ABRI's constant repressive behaviour against political movements. Because of this limitation, although seeking a cultural source has seemingly become the central approach in ABRI's current *dwifungsi* discourse, there are other attempts to develop a more convincing explanation which can respond to the multi-dimensional criticism of today. The utility of cultural approach is suspect here. A reform-minded officer in ABRI Headquarters, for example, argues:

³¹ In the author's interviews with the serving officers, there was not one who did not mention this denial of civil-military dichotomy in explaining the place of *dwifungsi* in democratisation, though a variety of opinions were expressed regarding the strategy to manage the military commitment to the political process.

³² Interview with Brig-Gen (ret) Abdulkadir Besar, 30 July 1996. Criticism of Nugroho's work in 1984 was also posed by the late Lt-Gen (ret) Simatupang, a prominent 45 Generation army intellectual, who saw *Pejuang dan Prajurit* as not paying attention to the reason why *dwifungsi* would not be geared towards militarism, but would encourage Pancasila democracy in the future. See T.B. Simatupang, "Renungan Atas Tempat dan Peranan TNI/ABRI," *Teknologi & Strategi Militer*, No.2, 1987, p.17. Abdulkadir's former student at AMN, the Defence Minister Gen (ret) Edi Sudradjat, also emphasised *kekeluargaan* culture as the strongest basis of *dwifungsi* existence (Written and oral interviews, 19 February 1997). In this line of thinking, there is also an argument stressing the need for academics to develop a social science theory of *negara kekeluargaan* as the basis of *dwifungsi*'s legitimacy. See Achmad Roestandi, "Masa Depan *Dwifungsi* ABRI," *Persepsi*, No.1, 1990, pp.24-25.

³³ Interview with First Admiral Joost Mugho, Expert Staff for Navy Chief-of-Staff in the Field of National Zone (Staf Ahli KASAL bidang Wilayah Nasional), 3 October 1996.

There is a trick in the explanation that *dwifungsi* is a reflection of *kekeluargaan* because if it is true, we should have consultation and consensus [regarding *dwifungsi* policies]. The reality, however, is the rule of the king who thinks his legitimacy comes from his own cosmos rather than from consensus made with his followers.³⁴

For these officers who believed that ABRI's institutional interests had been distorted by Soeharto's private interests, the cultural approach was obviously not sufficient to respond in a practical way to the massive pressure posed by critics. One of the popular alternatives among younger generation officers was the approach emphasising different levels of development, rather than static, cultural and legal foundations.

As a counter to democratisation without *dwifungsi*, an Air Force intellectual, Vice Marshal Graitto Usodo, provided the following theory:

Indonesia consists of four different social layers. They are stone-age, agrarian, industrial and information societies.... Inevitably ABRI's stance towards society has to be adjusted depending on the layer. For example, ABRI knows globalisation is good for the information society but distractive for the stone-age society in Irian Jaya. Under these circumstances, political change has to be managed by those who can represent the interests of all layers, and it is ABRI.... *Dwifungsi* maintains its legitimacy as ABRI fulfils this coordinating role.³⁵

Similarly, Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, political adviser of ABRI Commander, argued that:

Memberdayakan sipil (empowering civilians) is the adopted posture of ABRI in the era of democratisation, but whether it reduces ABRI's role or not may depend on the quality of people's life. We still have huge gaps between eastern and western parts of the archipelago, and between cities and rural areas. In facing these horizontal and vertical gaps, I think *dwifungsi* should be *tut wuri handayani* in places where the development is satisfactory, such as Jakarta, but other approaches should be used where the development is insufficient.³⁶

Contrary to the cultural approach which emphasises the inadequacy of democratic concepts as applied by many critics and seeks perpetuation of *dwifungsi* legitimacy in the regime ideology of *kekeluargaan*, the 'level-of-development' theory envisages political ramifications of economic change. It also tries to formulate an alternative justification for the military engagement in the civilian sector in the coming decades of rapid social mobility. Regarding previous forms of *dwifungsi* legitimation, Widjojo further explained, as follows:

How should ABRI develop the legitimacy of its sociopolitical role? A historical explanation is weak and cannot be insisted on in the future, the same as the constitutional justification which can be amended in the future. Culture? It also

³⁴ Confidential interview, October 1996. Obviously this is an attack on Soeharto.

³⁵ Interview with Vice Marshal Graitto Usodo, Expert Staff for ABRI Commander in the Field of Industrial Development (Staf Ahli Pangab bidang Inbang), 26 November 1996.

³⁶ Interview, 15 January 1997.

changes. In like manner, the legal basis is not strong since it can be revised. Now we need to develop a social legitimacy which totally relies on the needs of society.³⁷

In contrast to the "culturalists" who seem less concerned with the developing counter-discourse and more inclined to interpret criticism as a misunderstanding or 'false consciousness' of critics, the flexible level-of-development theory is more communicative and less deterministic in its response to criticism. It is largely a product of certain ABRI intellectuals who at least believe that rational discussion should be held with critics in order to halt the growing scepticism about the future utility of *dwifungsi*. As the information-communication technology dramatically develops and the media network expands in time and space around the world, there are natural concerns among military officers about ABRI's need for promoting dialogue with society in order to avoid being considered as a living dinosaur in the eyes of domestic and international communities.

However, this is not to argue that the pragmatic proponents of the flexible approach are ready to accept the critical discourse aiming at challenging the legitimacy of *dwifungsi*. An intellectual brigadier general, who supported the level-of-development approach, stressed that: "figures like Sri Bintang Pamunkas, Amien Rais and George Aditjondro are all popular, smart and have ideals. To defend *dwifungsi*'s legitimacy from their arguments, we need to develop our communication skills in domestic and international societies to let people know that their ideals are too premature to be adopted in today's society."³⁸ The level-of-development approach, which attempts to 'rationally' counter the criticism linked with democratisation demands, discounts the static cultural approach, but also tends to distrust civilian institutions which ABRI thinks *a priori* are not capable of representing the diverse interests of the whole society. This perception is evident in the fact that ABRI's intellectual circles who stress the need for *dwifungsi* reforms simultaneously emphasise the inadequacy of civilian institutions. Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, for example, sometimes questions the loyalty of civilians to the nation, whereas Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah believes that the frequent intellectual arrogance of civilians has disturbed mutual communication between the civilian and the military.³⁹ ABRI's distrust of civilians seems to be deeply entrenched, regardless of differences in approach that they take in defending the legitimacy of *dwifungsi*.

ABRI's distrust of civilians has not yet been a major theme in the debate over *dwifungsi*. However, some critics envisage this issue as a fundamental problem which curtails ABRI's rejuvenation of *dwifungsi* legitimacy. It was retired Lt-Gen Bambang Triantoro, the chairman of YKPK, who insisted that ABRI leaders should not talk as if

³⁷ Interview, 15 January 1997.

³⁸ Confidential interview, February 1997.

³⁹ Interviews with Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, 30 September 1996; and Brig-Gen Agus Wirahadikusumah, 24 January 1997.

challenges came from foreign cultures or new political and economic development, but should recognise that it was the aspiration of civilians which had challenged ABRI's dominant role. ABRI was inclined to forget this point due to its biased view of civilians, he asserted.⁴⁰ Moreover, former Police Chief, General (ret) Kunarto, argued that: "comparing soldiers—who totally grow up within the military organisation—with civilians with college degrees, the latter actually know much more about politics and are far closer to the *rakyat* than soldiers. This is well reflected in ABRI's ignorance and distrust of civilian aspirations, as proved in the Megawati case in which ABRI overthrew a popular political leader."⁴¹

It is against this background that critics have frequently suggested the need for reviving civil-military dialogue even at the stage of cadet training, in order to alleviate mutual distrust between future military and civilian leaders.⁴² ABRI's hesitation in accepting this idea is, of course, due to its concern for effective military schooling which needs an intensive initiation period for cadets. It is during this period that ABRI first indoctrinates ideologies of the regime, including *dwifungsi* and *kekeluargaan*, to the succeeding generations. Therefore, any noise from society should be eliminated in order to secure ideological consistency among generations within ABRI. This concern was well reflected in ABRI's strategic manual which emphasised a fear that generational change could be manipulated by certain elements in society to undermine solidarity within ABRI.⁴³ Thus, ABRI's current slogan to promote open communications with civilians can be clouded by its latent fear of eroding the military value-system. ABRI's perceived limits in encouraging mutual dialogue also indicate that ABRI has fundamentally seen rapid social mobility—resulting from economic development—as a threat to the maintenance of military ideology and *dwifungsi* legitimacy.

The *dwifungsi* counter-discourse we examined earlier provides criticisms from various perspectives focusing on international, social, and intra-ABRI problems. In response, ABRI has developed explanations—mainly through the two approaches discussed above—about the current relevance of *dwifungsi*, as summarised in Table 6-1. Making a provisional conclusion from our examination in this section, we must note that most of these explanations are aimed at the interpretation (and reinterpretation)

⁴⁰ Interview with Lt-Gen (ret) Bambang Triantoro, 16 December 1996.

⁴¹ Interview with Gen (ret) Kunarto, Vice-Chairman of BPK, 23 January 1997.

⁴² At Seskoad, formal communications with civilian intellectuals were closed down in 1969 and replaced by informal ones. At Akabri, there were formal opportunities to exchange political views with university students, but again they were abolished. For details, see "Komunikasi ABRI dengan Para Cendekiawan (Wawancara Khusus dengan Wakil Gubernur Lemhannas oleh Alex Dinuth)," *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No.51, 1989, pp.57-58, 61. Maj-Gen Arifin Tarigan, Seskoad Commander, admitted that since the closure of communication, the gap between civilian and officers' thinking had widened (Interview, 17 October 1996). In Akabri, the ABRI side noticed that the dialogue with university students was not productive because Akabri cadets were trained by doctrines while students had free minds (Interview with Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, 30 September 1996). Today, Akabri cadets only have a few opportunities to exchange views with civilian students at the AMD-like village camp organised by Akabri once a year. About this camp, see "Marching to a Crossroad," *FEER*, 3 September 1992.

⁴³ *Telaahan Strategik Nasional 1983-1993* (Slide), Lemhannas, n.d., p.23.

of social conditions rather than of *dwifungsi* itself. In other words, ABRI's major efforts in the current discourse on *dwifungsi* legitimacy are mainly focused on defining the direction of ongoing social change, as if to demonstrate the conditions for asserting that *dwifungsi* is still relevant under the given situation. That ABRI's essential focus in the discourse is on society—rather than *dwifungsi*—reflects the nature of current civil-military debate which is occupied with the argument about democratisation. As critics have continuously brought forward the issue of democratisation in emphasising the declining nature of *dwifungsi* legitimacy, ABRI is forced to counter the argument by showing alternative views on society which can explain the inapplicability of liberal democracy in the current social condition and the resulting need for maintaining the *dwifungsi* system. In doing so, ABRI has mobilised the cultural approach, which is based on *particularism* and which interprets society in a static way, blurring the ongoing social change. At the same time, some elements within ABRI have employed a more pragmatic level-of-development approach, based on *relativism*, which claims that certain social sectors still need to receive *pengabdian*, or 'services,' through *dwifungsi*.⁴⁴

Table 6-1: Major Patters of Communication in Cultural and Level-of-Development Approaches

<i>Sources of Delegitimation</i>	<i>Methods of Relegitimation</i>	
	<i>Cultural Approach</i>	<i>Level-of-Development Approach</i>
Global wave of democratisation brings universal values.	Indonesia is based on Pancasila democracy with <i>kekeluargaan</i> values.	Democratic needs depend on particular circumstances which vary according to place and time.
Regeneration removes ABRI's revolutionary legitimacy.	Indonesia is based on <i>kekeluargaan</i> which has no civil-military dichotomy.	Compared with others, ABRI has ability to lead the nation and represent all interests in society.
Middle-class civilians are tired of ABRI's dominant role.	ABRI is a part of <i>negara kekeluargaan</i> and represents interests of all family members, including the middle-class.	ABRI supports middle-class people. They still wish ABRI to maintain stability which is needed for their economic activities.

⁴⁴ Ramage (1995:124-130) already pointed out that ABRI's emphasis of Pancasila and its integralistic ideology became apparent in its effort to maintain *dwifungsi* legitimacy. Our examination of current officers' thinking suggests that ABRI has also found an approach less reliant on the culture-oriented integralism. As just discussed, this is a consequence of ABRI's growing need to strengthen its interpretation of the current social change process, and which cannot be carried out by a cultural explanation alone.

ABRI is merely a 'tool of the government.'

Traditionally, ABRI as *hankam* is a part of the government, but ABRI as *sospol* is a part of society. ABRI as a whole is always for the *rakyat*.

ABRI's *sospol* role is flexibly implemented depending on the needs in society.

ABRI always resorts to the security approach so is nothing more than a 'fire brigade.'

The security approach is only a part of the *hankam* role required to defend Pancasila. ABRI is not a 'fire brigade' because its *sospol* role provides many services.

Security and prosperity approaches are used in a balanced way, and depend on the situation. For example, in the near future, security should be mainly handled by the Police.

Arenas: Military Involvements in Legislatures

In their critical discourse aimed at delegitimising the permanency of *dwifungsi*, critical elites have often targeted particular policies of ABRI. However *dwifungsi* is interpreted, its 'policy' problems have been widely noted in political society.⁴⁵ This fact has made many critics see the practical implementation of *dwifungsi* as the main obstacle to political development rather than the inadequacy of social-cultural conditions as alleged by ABRI.⁴⁶ Since the *keterbukaan* movement began, several critical figures have insisted on the need for reforming the formal political mechanism by redesigning institutional settings. For these 'institutionalists,' civilian supremacy, human rights and democratisation are not obstructed by cultural incompatibility or inadequacy, but by structural defects in the current political system which can be solved, to a large extent, by renovating political institutions.

From this perspective, attention was given to ABRI's formal channels of political participation in the legislative branch; the arena of 'politics.' The first target was ABRI's appointed members in legislatures both at the national and regional levels. The second was ABRI's backing for Golkar during the elections in order to secure ABRI's influence in the legislative body. We examine discourses on these two issues below and see that they are not merely a technical issue of seat numbers or the principle of ABRI's alleged neutrality in politics, but reveal ABRI's institutional vulnerability in its long-established political involvement.

⁴⁵ ABRI's backing for Golkar during elections, and its policy of *kekaryaan* are notable cases raised by the civilian elites. In fact, despite ABRI's long-time claim that *kekaryaan* had decreased, the 1987 Kekaryaan Seminar concluded that it would be imperative for ABRI to immediately increase its personnel in legislative, executive and judicial branches as well as in social sectors in order to prevent a vacuum after the 1987 election. As the result, the total number of *kekaryaan* staff became 15,680 in the end of 1987, which was a slight increase from 14,819 in 1984. See "Hasil Seminar Susyawan ABRI Legislatif III Tentang Strategi Pembangunan Politik dalam Sistem Demokrasi Pancasila," *Widya Dharma*, No.9, 1987, pp.69-70; Try Sutrisno, "Amanat Panglima ABRI pada Acara Pertemuan dengan Pakokar dan Karyawan ABRI Eselon-I di Markas Besar ABRI Tanggal 15 Juli 1988," *Mimbar Kekaryaan ABRI*, Edisi 211, July 1988, p.41.

⁴⁶ Interview with Marzuki Darusman, Vice-Chairman of Komnas HAM, 27 March 1997.

F-ABRI and ABRI's Non-Participation in the Elections

In the mid-1990s, it was already standard for ABRI to argue that the strengthening of legislative bodies is crucial in promoting democratisation. Kassopol Lt-Gen Syarwan Hamid presented this idea when he said that: "ABRI, in its political role, has a strong commitment to democratisation and what we do at first is to encourage political institutions, namely legislative institutions, to function in optimal ways."⁴⁷ This commitment, however, would be doubted by critics if it were not followed by the actual reduction of ABRI's representation in legislative institutions. To achieve this, critics have supported LIPI's proposal to demilitarise the DPR in 2003. ABRI members would no longer be appointed to legislatures and they would be allowed to vote in elections.⁴⁸

In the development of the debate concerning ABRI representatives in the national and regional parliaments, several retired officers in the 1990s argued in favour of a return to the 1955 situation. Lt-Gen (ret) Soebijakto argued that the National Consensus conflicted with UUD45 and criticised ABRI's arbitrary interpretation of the National Consensus to legitimise F-ABRI, which he thought was just a temporary rule made more than 30 years ago. This logic led him to conclude that "ABRI should participate in voting at elections and withdraw from its appointed seats in the DPR in order to correct the major distortion of *dwifungsi* both in principle and in practice."⁴⁹ Similarly, Brig-Gen (ret) Soedibyo also drew attention to F-ABRI's lack of legitimacy because ABRI did not have a constituency to represent people's interests, and therefore, it should participate in elections if it wanted to be represented in the legislative process.⁵⁰

The arguments of Soebijakto and Soedibyo to allow ABRI to restore its voting rights illustrate an unique case in the *dwifungsi* counter-discourse which criticises ABRI's participation in the formal political structure by encouraging the removal of a self-restriction. Gen (ret) Nasution, who actually experienced the 1955 elections, took this stance too. "Since the UUD45 guarantees the rights of all citizen to vote, it is better

⁴⁷ See his interview in "ABRI Punya Komitmen Terhadap Demokrasi tapi Tidak Mau Dijadikan Hanya Sebagai Alat," *Sintesis*, No.15, May-June 1996.

⁴⁸ In the political history of Indonesia, the members of the military were permitted to vote in the first general elections in 1955. But this right was abolished in the second election conducted in 1971 under the Soeharto regime, following the so-called "National Consensus" that provided appointed seats for ABRI in parliament. The rationale for this at that time was to secure political stability, Pancasila and UUD45 in the parliamentary process, and it was widely claimed by officers as a *quid pro quo* for giving up their right to vote.

⁴⁹ The references above are from an interview with Lt-Gen (ret) Soebijakto, Chief Executive of Indonesian Institute for Strategic Studies (LPSI), a think-tank headed by Gen (ret) Rudini. 8 January 1997. The principle he refers to here is ABRI's identity as the people's military. He believes that such an identity is distorted by taking over the legislative place which should be filled by political parties.

⁵⁰ Interview, 22 July 1996. Soedibyo was also affiliated with LPSI.

for ABRI to participate in elections as we experienced in 1955 with my IPKI (League of Upholders of Indonesian Freedom). Although this system was abolished by President Soekarno, I thought it was much better than having appointed seats in parliaments. If ABRI has to be 'appointed,' it has be limited to the MPR."⁵¹

The claims made by Soebijakto, Soedibyo and Nasution were basically aimed at overcoming perceived contradictions in ABRI's current political participation channels. In response to such an argument, ABRI's claim—which seems to have been shared by most active officers and many retired officers—was that, if ABRI participates in elections, it runs the risk of being split by the intervention of civilian political parties and, as seen during the parliamentary democracy period in the 1950s, a split within the military might risk the country's political stability.⁵² The fear of civilian intervention in the military sector not only poses a question to ABRI's rejection of the civil-military dichotomy, but also undermines the 'self-sacrifice' argument long claimed by ABRI, which insists that ABRI gave up its right to vote in the elections in order to 'stand above all groups' and to play the role of 'national guardian.'

This point was raised by Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib who argued:

In democratic countries, soldiers can vote in elections. But in Indonesia, the National Consensus has prevented them from doing so. The time has come to review it. If there is still a concern within ABRI that participating in elections may split ABRI, as soldiers vote for different parties, it reveals that ABRI leaders do not trust their members and it proves the failure of current management within ABRI. [What are they scared about?] Isn't it Pak Harto who said communism was no longer active and all political parties accepted Pancasila...? I see ABRI's appointed seats in the DPR as political discrimination.⁵³

All these arguments suggest that ABRI's paternalistic political involvement in the legislature is a reflection of its institutional vulnerability rather than its proclaimed role as a national guardian. It also implies that ABRI still fears being influenced by civilian political forces, as in the 1950s, thus leading to an assessment that ABRI has failed to develop professionalism and internal cohesion. This critical discourse, therefore, uncovers ABRI's hidden problems in civil-military relations.

⁵¹ Written interview with Gen (ret) Nasution, 4 January 1997. IPKI was a political party which nominated 73 officer-candidates for the 1955 election. Officers affiliated with Petisi 50, such as Lt-Gen (ret) Mokoginta and Maj-Gen Azis Saleh, were Nasution's partners in establishing IPKI. When Soeharto instructed LIPI to conduct research on *dwifungsi*, Petisi 50 lobbied LIPI to make a proposal beyond the simple reduction of F-ABRI numbers. See Kelompok Kerja Petisi Limapuluh, *Demokratisasi Politik: Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Untuk Perubahan dan Penyempurnaan Paket Per Undang-Undang tentang Kehidupan Politik Nasional*, Seri Mencerdaskan Kehidupan Bangsa, No.9, May 1995, pp.41-43.

⁵² For example, interviews with Gen (ret) Rudini, 4 September 1996; Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, 30 September 1996; Maj-Gen Arifin Tarigan, 17 October 1996; Maj-Gen Budi Harsono, 31 January 1997.

⁵³ See Hasnan Habib, *op.cit.*, p.47. Ruslan Abdulgani, former chairman of Pancasila Propagation Board (BP-7)—the agency in charge of disseminating the state-ideology of Pancasila—also stressed that "ABRI should now participate in the election because there was no longer a threat to Pancasila. ABRI's ideological-political functions to safeguard Pancasila were already unnecessary (*menguap*). So the ABRI seats should be reduced or simply dismantled." Cited from Pakpahan (1994: 204).

As seen in the legitimacy argument, ABRI's distrust of civilians is also apparent in this debate over F-ABRI and electoral participation. Hasnan insisted that: "I introduced this idea [relinquishing F-ABRI and allowing soldiers to participate in elections] to Lemhannas and Seskoad and they understood the logic, but they were really worried about the possibility of civilian political leaders conducting an anti-*dwifungsi* movement in the legislative branch, especially people around Megawati."⁵⁴ The coupling of 'distrust' and 'fear' not only builds up ABRI's negative view of social evolution but also strengthens its determination to oppose attempts in society to erode ABRI's institutional solidarity.

Another ABRI argument insists that the non-participation of soldiers in elections is an insurance against military repression. If ABRI members participate in the election, it is argued, they may be tempted to force people to vote for a certain party by using guns. Therefore, the appointment of ABRI members to the legislatures and their non-participation in elections are intended to avoid such a situation.⁵⁵ The ultimate argument in this line of thinking further insists that if ABRI is not represented in the legislatures and is excluded from formal participation in the political process, it may be motivated to take over power directly. By being represented in the legislatures, on the other hand, ABRI feels that it is already participating in government affairs and is therefore less likely to feel the need to assert itself by carrying out a coup.⁵⁶

Resorting to the danger of a military coup seems to be the most primitive approach in the current *dwifungsi* discourse that we have examined in this study, and contradicts ABRI's official rejection of military coups in Indonesia. It has been repeatedly claimed by ABRI that although it had several opportunities to take over the government—as seen in the cases of Madiun in 1948, 17 October in 1952, Martial Law in 1958, and G30S/PKI in 1965—it did not do so because the military placed its primary interest in national development and prosperity rather than self-interest.⁵⁷ Most recently, Lt-Gen Prabowo, Kostrad Commander, declared that ABRI never had, and never would include the word 'coup' in its dictionary.⁵⁸ In this way, the coup issue has been used, on the one hand, to assert that ABRI has no intention of dominating political life, but also on the other hand to threaten society by saying that a coup is

⁵⁴ Interview with Lt-Gen (ret) Hasnan Habib, 9 August 1996. Aberson Marel Sihaloho, a PDI politician in the Megawati-side, embodied the fear of ABRI. He stressed that Megawati wanted to implement Pancasila and UUD45 in a pure way, which would result in the liquidation of F-ABRI and *dwifungsi* because they were clearly in contradiction to UUD45. See his interview in Santoso (coordinator), *Megawati Soekarnoputri: Pantang Surut Langkah*, Jakarta: ISAI, 1996, pp.141-143. Megawati herself vaguely explained in 1994 that *dwifungsi* became a problem if it deviated from the basics—i.e. the fact that it was only a 'fish' which could live in the 'water' (*rakyat*). See Megawati Soekarnoputri, *Bendera Sudah Saya Kibarkan! Pokok-Pokok Pikiran Megawati Soekarnoputri*, Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 1994, pp.33-35.

⁵⁵ Interviews with Gen (ret) Benny Moerdani, 4 March 1997; Maj-Gen (ret) Z.A. Maulani, 28 November 1996.

⁵⁶ See Chapter 2 for Soeharto's use of this argument in justifying the existence of F-ABRI.

⁵⁷ See, for example, *Dasar Hukum Dwifungsi dan Identitas ABRI*, pp.11-12; Notosusanto (1984:215-216); and Tambunan (1995:41).

⁵⁸ "Jangan Ada kudeta di Indonesia: Pesan Pak Nas Kepada Prabowo," *Jawa Pos*, 21 March 1998.

possible if ABRI is not represented in the institutions of government. A similar dualism can be seen in the explanation of the non-participation of soldiers in elections. As described above, it was first argued that ABRI had sacrificed the voting rights of soldiers as 'compensation' for F-ABRI. This interpretation was then adjusted to argue that non-participation was intended to avoid the risk of intra-military disunity, which was exclusively ABRI's own responsibility. The logic was further developed to insist that there was a danger of ABRI dominating both guns and ballots, if it was permitted to participate in elections.⁵⁹

In this way, although the problem of F-ABRI has generally been discussed in terms of New Order authoritarian practice which puts ABRI into parliament to control the legislative process, a close look at the current critical discourse on this issue highlights ABRI's vulnerability in its interaction with society. This means that ABRI has perceived its potentially weak institutional cohesion even after the three decades of military ascendancy in politics, by preserving a traditional fear of being fragmented. Needless to say, such a thesis is not acceptable to ABRI which has firmly stressed that the problem of F-ABRI is a matter of ABRI's commitment to national development and stability. This may be true but the goal and performance of F-ABRI are not the focus of our discussion here. Rather we pay attention to the fact that the F-ABRI issue has a strong link with the problem of military non-participation in elections, and that the debate concerning the two issues provides a significant insight into ABRI's perceptions of self and society.

The Proper Size of F-ABRI

Apart from the principle of whether ABRI members should be appointed to legislatures, a second issue involved the number of seats. As seen in Chapter 2, many critics viewed the reduction of F-ABRI from 100 to 75 seats—which was announced in 1995 and implemented in 1997—as an insignificant reduction in ABRI's accumulated political power. In countering such an argument, ABRI turned to the idea of *tut wuri handayani*. For the military leadership, the F-ABRI reduction was a rare opportunity to propagate its commitment to visible reform of ABRI's political instruments, following the cases of Kopkamtib in 1988 and BAIS in 1994. Unlike these cases, which were replaced by new bodies (Bakorstanas and BIA), the reform of F-ABRI was a physical downsizing of a formal political channel, and thus provided a better chance for the military to claim that the F-ABRI reduction illustrated ABRI's reformist posture.

⁵⁹ Judging from the logical resemblance, we may also think of one hypothesis in explaining ABRI's opposition to coups in Indonesia—i.e. the hidden message is that it is not ABRI's sense of national interests but its fear of internal splits that has deterred its takeover of the government in the alleged opportunities above.

However, as seen below, intra-military debate on this issue revealed ABRI's perceived vulnerability in effectively managing the military's organisational life.

Since 1995, ABRI's official stance was that the number itself had no significance, provided that ABRI's seats were guaranteed in the legislative mechanism, meaning that LIPI's 'zero-option' was not acceptable. The Defence Minister Gen (ret) Edi Sudradjat stressed that: "although the number is flexible, it is impossible to cut all seats because—unlike ABRI governors and mayors who are selected by society—ABRI members are sent to the DPR as a part of military duties."⁶⁰ This assessment, which was fully shared by many officers, reflected ABRI's attempt to defend its autonomous organisational activity (i.e. F-ABRI) from social pressure. From a strategic point of view, the F-ABRI circle also believed that 75 seats was the limit of tolerance. Maj-Gen Hari Sabarno insisted that: "F-ABRI of less than 75 is unacceptable because we will no longer be able to conduct effective parliamentary activities in all eleven committees in the DPR."⁶¹ In this sense, although the focus was different, both Edi and Hari had similar concerns about the effective functioning of ABRI's role in the parliament. In the late New Order, this was the standard argument within the military regarding the issue of the proper size of F-ABRI.

On the other hand, among the serving officers, some suggested that drastically cutting ABRI's parliamentary involvement would be needed to normalise the military's organisational life. This view was expressed in an article circulated in an internal military journal in 1994 which was soon widely read by intellectual officers. The writer was Brig-Gen Mulchis Anwar, an adviser of KSAD Gen Wismoyo Arismunandar.⁶² Mulchis argued that the proper number of F-ABRI seats in the DPR was 30. The number of thirty came from the calculation that 27 members should represent each of Indonesia's 27 provinces plus 3 more who might work as fraction and parliamentary leaders—such as Head/Deputy Head of F-ABRI and the DPR Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson.⁶³ Also at the regional levels, he continued, it was enough for six to seven ABRI members to be appointed at the DPRD I (provincial parliaments), and two to three at the DPRD II (regency parliaments).⁶⁴ He stressed that a reduction would not only enhance the quality of F-ABRI but also solve the problem of the current tour-of-duty which had a tendency to disregard posts in parliament.⁶⁵ To solve the problem,

⁶⁰ Interview with Gen (ret) Edi Sudradjat, Menhankam, 19 February 1997.

⁶¹ Interview with Maj-Gen Hari Sabarno, Deputy Head of F-ABRI, 5 February 1997.

⁶² Mulchis Anwar (Brigjen), "Aktualisasi Dwifungsi ABRI Pada Era PJP II," *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No.61, 1994, pp.39-49. I am indebted to a Lemhannas staff who informed me of the existence of this article. Mulchis was then promoted to Maj-Gen and served as KSAD Hartono's assistant for personnel affairs and, in July 1997, became coordinator of expert staff for Pangab Feisal Tanjung.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p.44.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, p.45.

⁶⁵ In the current practice within ABRI, parliamentary positions are regarded as the end of one's career. Except positions such as F-ABRI head and deputy head, other officers only become "politicians-in-uniform," and their status is regarded as lower than those who have the same military rank but become Governors or Regents. For example, a major general who becomes governor after retirement is more prestigious than a

he suggested cutting the number of F-ABRI and provision for officers who had served in DPRDs to return to military service as Danrem (Korem Commander) or Kasdam (Chief-of-Staff, Kodam), while ABRI personnel in the DPR must be given a chance for promotion to the position of Kasdam or Pangdam.⁶⁶ For him, the drastic reduction of F-ABRI would help to revitalise ABRI's organisational life, especially the coordination between *kekaryaan* and military sectors.

The fact that the possibility of drastic F-ABRI reform had been discussed within ABRI before Soeharto's initiative in 1995 illustrated the lack of consensus within ABRI about the desirable number of F-ABRI. More significantly, however, it also revealed that some officers perceived *tut wuri handayani* projects as not primarily responses to democratic pressure, but means to solve internal vulnerability—notably the disparity between political (*kekaryaan*) and professional sectors within the military. If ABRI's move to curtail its formal political participation channel is derived from internal military problems rather than external pressures, it shows us the relevance of Nordlinger's classic theory where he argues that a praetorian military's voluntary decision to disengage is the result of internal desire to restore the rationality of the military command hierarchy.⁶⁷ Mulchis indicated that there was a concern within ABRI to look at the problem of F-ABRI in line with Nordlinger's thesis rather than merely in response to external political pressure.

We have begun our argument about F-ABRI by examining the debate over ABRI's proper channel for formal political participation, i.e. the DPR or MPR. We then focused on two related issues; the military abandoning its electoral rights and the implication of reduced F-ABRI seats. To strengthen our analysis, it is also important to pay attention to the link between ABRI's direct and indirect channels, such as its backing for Golkar.

Intra-Military Debate on Golkar

During the New Order, ABRI's engagement in Golkar basically had two modes, i.e. internal and external. The former was through retired officers who became Golkar candidates or were associated with social organisations under the control of either ABRI's Big Family (KBA) or Golkar's Big Family (KBG).⁶⁸ The latter was through

major general who serves as a DPR politician with his active-duty status. Mulchis saw this career pattern as a problem of diminishing work incentive for serving officers who are sent to parliaments, producing negative influences for the entire officer corps.

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, p.46.

⁶⁷ See Nordlinger (1977:145).

⁶⁸ In establishing Golkar in 1969, mass organisations under the KBG were placed in seven Main Organisational Groups, or KINO (Kelompok Induk Organisasi). One of them was Ormas Hankam (Mass Organisations under Department of Defence and Security). KINO was dissolved after the 1971 election but since then, it has been understood that the Golkar Family has three streams—i.e. ABRI, Bureaucrats and Functional Groups. Technically, soldiers in service were not allowed to join the ABRI stream which was

ABRI's measures to secure the victory of Golkar during elections. This includes: intelligence screening of electoral candidates which was conducted in a discriminatory way against opposition parties; Kodam 'guidance' given to the regional leaders of social organisations to mobilise Golkar votes; measures taken by territorial commands to disturb the electoral campaigns of PDI and PPP; and ABRI's intervention in the internal affairs of opposition parties to prevent the rise of popular leaders. These internal and external modes of engagement were aimed, on the one hand, at ensuring that ABRI's voice was heard in the legislative process—via the dominant party in the parliament—and on the other hand, at maintaining the virtual one-party system under the authoritarian polity which needed elections but did not need a parliament challenging government policies. However, ABRI's use of Golkar for its parliamentary engagement was accompanied by the risk of highlighting its abandonment of one of the principles of *dwifungsi*—i.e. 'standing above all groups.'

In facing this dilemma, ABRI has developed various 'shock-absorbing' interpretations. For example, as seen in Chapter 2, Lt-Gen Syarwan Hamid's dichotomisation of ABRI's *sospol-hankam* functions and Gen Hartono's citizen-institution dichotomy were the most recent cases which stressed that ABRI's backing for Golkar was justifiable and did not endanger its proclaimed neutrality in politics.⁶⁹ Undoubtedly, denial of the apparent contradiction between support for Golkar and insistence on neutrality was a mainstream interpretation within the late New Order ABRI. However, there was also internal debate which attempted to counter this official interpretation. As we saw in the case of the F-ABRI debate above, in which Brig-Gen Mulchis Anwar insisted on the need to drastically reduce ABRI's direct involvement in the DPR, there was also an argument stressing the need to limit ABRI's indirect engagement through Golkar. Such a view, of course, signified the obvious contradiction between ABRI's backing for Golkar in reality and the virtue of its doctrinal neutrality. We will see two examples below.

Lemhannas is the highest educational institute for all army officers who have successfully graduated from the military academy (AMN or Akabri), Seskoad, and Sesko ABRI, and who have good records in carrying out military duties. A graduation thesis is required to pass the Lemhannas study program, and it is interesting to note that one of the popular thesis topics since the early 1990s is about *dwifungsi*'s future prospects. Among many writings which merely reiterate the official legitimisation of *dwifungsi*, there are some which try to touch on controversial issues and question current interpretations, including the ABRI-Golkar relationship. A thesis written by

under the control of Pangab. For the organisational development of Golkar, see DPP Golkar (1994:93-126) and Suryadinata (1989).

⁶⁹ On the question of ABRI's siding with Golkar, there was also a criticism of the style of these two generals. For example, Gen (ret) Benny Moerdani argued that "Hartono's way [to approach Golkar] is too overt. ABRI's support for Golkar should not be done in such an open way" (Interview, 4 March 1997).

Maj-Gen Hari Sabarno, who entered Lemhannas in 1995 when replaced by Brig-Gen Syarwan Hamid as Assospol Kassospol, is an example.

For Maj-Gen Hari Sabarno, it is not necessary to continue ABRI's current heavy commitment to Golkar (i.e. indirect intervention) in the future if F-ABRI's role (direct intervention) is secured in the parliament. He insists that ABRI's cooperation with Golkar should be reviewed in order to enhance Golkar's independence and to make ABRI more neutral in dealing with all political forces. Although it is difficult to completely detach the two political institutions, he continues, ABRI's support for Golkar should be restricted to the level of strategic policy formulation and should not extend to field operations because this only damages ABRI's position in society.⁷⁰ Interestingly, this concern of Hari's for neutrality was expressed in 1995 when Pangab Feisal Tanjung was preparing to back the Habibie-influenced Golkar leadership in the 1997 election and Syarwan Hamid openly stated that ABRI could not be neutral—a comment which provoked public criticism, as seen in Chapter 2. Although it is extremely rare for an officer not to follow an order from above, the limited space for individual thinking makes it still possible to produce an internal communication arguing the negative impact of ABRI-Golkar fusion on ABRI's neutrality doctrine, and therefore providing a premise in legitimising the presence of F-ABRI. Needless to say, Hari's reference to the strategic policy cooperation with Golkar included election of the President, while his concern for neutrality was directed at the general election. In theory, having the same policy with Golkar by no means undermines ABRI's autonomy and neutrality, whilst siding with Golkar during the election clearly deviates from the neutrality principle. In assessing ABRI's perceptions of self-autonomy and political neutrality, the above differences should not be ignored or confused.

Earlier, after the 1987 election when Golkar won 73 percent of the votes, Colonel Ishak Prawiradilaga, a Lemhannas officer, also raised a question about the future Golkar-ABRI alliance. He stressed that ABRI's role as a political force was to safeguard the equilibrium between Golkar and other political parties because a too-dominant Golkar would only distort Pancasila democracy. For Ishak, Golkar should not have won more than two-thirds of the total votes in the election.⁷¹ The problem which he believed was evident in the last election was the fragility of PPP and PDI, which somehow was inconsistent with the culture of Pancasila democracy. He thus concluded that ABRI, which stood above all groups, would have to intervene in

⁷⁰ Above citations are from Hari Sabarno, *Reaktualisasi Fungsi Sosial Politik ABRI Dalam Perspektif Indonesia 2020*, Kertas Karya Perorangan (Taskap) Kursus Singkat Angkatan V Tahun 1995, Lemhannas, 1995, p.71. The summary version of this 82-page thesis was soon published in a Lemhannas journal, but the above reference to Golkar can not be seen here, indicating that he perceived it as not following ABRI's official line. See Hari Sabarno, "Reaktualisasi Fungsi Sosial Politik ABRI Dalam Perspektif Indonesia 2020," *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No.63, 1995, pp.115-123.

⁷¹ The sentences above are from Ishak Prawiradilaga, "Peranan ABRI dalam Pembangunan Politik," *Majalah Ketahanan Nasional*, No.52, 1990, p.59. Two-thirds of the total votes means 66 percent. This, therefore, is a direct criticism of Golkar, which got 73 percent in the previous election under Sudharmono.

overcoming this problem, in order to secure fair play for all three contestants in the next election.⁷²

The arguments made by Hari and Ishak warn against excessive siding with Golkar as it puts at risk *dwifungsi's* legitimacy based on the neutrality principle. However, we should also note a significant difference in emphasis between Hari and Ishak. The former puts weight on ABRI's non-commitment in the electoral process while the latter sees a need for ABRI to intervene in the process in order to strengthen the two opposition parties for the sake of promoting Pancasila democracy. This gap between the two provides an interesting aspect for our examination of *dwifungsi* discourse within the officer corps. It illustrates that even though officers use the same language, such as criticising ABRI's backing for Golkar and respect for the neutrality doctrine, the implications differ. One can stress the need to decrease commitment to the electoral process while the other may use the same terms to support such commitment.

Overall, we have examined some of the reformist debates within ABRI. Observers may understand them as a partial reflection of ABRI's growing internal inconsistency in the face of multi-dimensional pressures for political change, and also partly as a mirror of the political game at that time. However, from a different angle, it is also possible to see reformist thinking as a reflection of ABRI's growing sense that even without heavily relying on F-ABRI and Golkar—or ultimately without having deep involvement in the formal political structure—ABRI's primary role of political surveillance can be maintained. Several indications back up this interpretation, as we will see below. How are the debates on formal political channels linked with informal political processes handled by ABRI?

Territorial Management as Non-Debate

Returning to the basic fact that *dwifungsi* is a military ideology which effectively removes the functional boundary between security and political operations, the developing counter-discourse on *dwifungsi* needed to incorporate ABRI's security perception into the scope of its criticism, if it was to fully control *dwifungsi* and modify ABRI's organisational mission in such a way as not to interfere with the process of 'opening-up' the regime. As widely proposed in the literature of third world democratisation, the redesigning of security doctrine is critical in order to incorporate the military into the process of political liberalisation.⁷³ For Indonesian democracy

⁷² Citations from *ibid.*, pp.61-62. These opinions also confirm the cleavage between ABRI, led by Moerdani and Try Sutrisno, and Sudharmono at that time.

⁷³ See, for example, Stepan (1988:45-54); Pion-Berlin (1988), (1989a); and most recently, Desch (1996). We will examine this dynamics by comparing ABRI with other militaries in the next chapter.

advocates, this process may also require bringing *dwifungsi*'s security function into the public discourse and breaking into the sanctuary of ABRI's territorial doctrine. Intellectual critics appreciate that the mere dismantling of *dwifungsi* in formal politics at the national level would not be sufficient to remove ABRI's political influence, as ABRI would still be able to utilise security operations conducted by its territorial forces to control the political process.⁷⁴ ABRI's territorial doctrine is still an area of "non-debate." Here, we attempt to clarify its designed political functions in order to understand ABRI's routine political missions under its territorial doctrine.

In terms of organisation, the army's territorial doctrine involves four institutions—i.e. the Army Headquarters' Territorial Affairs Section (Sterad), the Kodams, the Army Centre of Territorial Affairs (Pusterad) and trans-territorial elite troops (Kostrad and Kopassus). First, at the central level, Sterad coordinates the basic territorial policies to be conducted by Kodams. A listing of the nine specified territorial roles shows a significant overlapping of security and political missions, since eight are overtly political tasks, as seen below.

- Design and formulate policies for territorial and *sospol* management.
- Organise and coordinate activities for territorial management and help develop education and exercises in territorial and *sospol* fields.
- Make technical policies for regional security management.
- Design and coordinate technical activities for the army and KBA to conduct *sospol* roles.
- Supervise staff for the procedural/conditional improvement of *sospol* management.
- Organise and coordinate activities for the management of doctrines, regulations and goals in territorial and *sospol* fields.
- Promote relationships with government departments which can be used for territorial and *sospol* management.
- Conduct analysis and evaluation of territorial and *sospol* management.
- Analyse trend and formulate proposals for matters related to above tasks.⁷⁵

Based on this doctrinal setting which removes the demarcation between politics and defence in territorial management, officers have developed a perception that

⁷⁴ Interviews with Kristiadi, Head of Political Department at CSIS, 25 March 1997; Marzuki Darusman, Deputy Chairman of Komnas HAM, 27 March 1997. The security approach debate, discussed in Chapter 4, was a case of raising the problem of ABRI's security function during the late New Order era. However, the debate was limited to the level of policy rather than challenging the utility of territorial doctrine.

⁷⁵ See *Penyempurnaan Pokok-Pokok Organisasi dan Prosedur Tentara Nasional Indonesia Angkatan Darat (TNI-AD)*, KEP/08/X/1992, Mabes ABRI, 1992, pp.36-38. In a broader doctrinal design, the army's territorial operation is defined as one of four pillars—along with intelligence, combat and social order operations—constituting the System of Internal Security Operation (Pola Opskamdagri) which is one of two pillars—together with the System of Defence Operation (Pola Opshan)—in ABRI's designed role as a 'defence' force, not as a *sospol* force. Thirty years of ABRI's political involvement in the New Order polity resulted in the expansion and differentiation of cell defence doctrine (Hankamnas) which now has an enormous number of functional, coordinating and operational doctrines. In the mid-1990s, KSAD Gen Hartono finally felt the necessity to draw a clear map of this complicated network of doctrines, and instructed his staff to write a reference book, *Kapita Selekta Sosial Politik ABRI* (Mabes ABRI, 1994). See especially pp.185-191 for the above doctrines.

military techniques and knowledge are transferable to the conduct of political missions.⁷⁶ Maj-Gen Adang Ruchiatna, the Commander of Pusterad, insisted that early detection and prevention is a key to strengthen the territorial management.⁷⁷ Since territorial management involves political surveillance, this preventive strategy of early detection provides an example of how ABRI's professional military mind transfers military techniques to the conduct of political management. Among many operations based on this strategy at the Kodam level, the biggest is the handling of political stability during the general election and the MPR sessions. It is therefore worth noting how the preventive strategy of early detection is implemented in this context.

According to an internal newsletter owned by Kodam Jaya, territorial officers are given the heavy task of keeping watch over prominent individuals, religious leaders, and youth leaders who are not associated with KBA. They are instructed to approach these people and, by using techniques of surveillance and penetration, influence them to become partners of KBA or supporters of ABRI's sociopolitical mission.⁷⁸ In this way, a strategy is devised to enable military activity to penetrate into any social field and detect the source of political disturbance. ABRI has been practising this mode of political involvement during national elections over the last 30 years but this does not seem to have become a major topic in the recent elite debate on the relationship between *dwifungsi* and elections—a debate which is largely limited to such issues as ABRI's appointed seats in the parliament and its backing for Golkar.

The Kodam's territorial activities are significantly supported by two elite trans-territorial forces. Kopassus' everyday intelligence operations are designed to enable its agents to penetrate areas where the adversary force is apparent, in order to secretly 'create' a situation useful for the subsequent conduct of a military operation.⁷⁹ Covert operations are designed to 'create situations,' such as the manipulation of student/labour demonstrations to create circumstances allowing intervention by

⁷⁶ See a reference made by Brig-Gen Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin on the political use of *strategi penangkal* (preventive strategy) which treats all individuals in the country as ABRI's informants, as discussed in Chapter 5.

⁷⁷ Written interview, 18 December 1996.

⁷⁸ See "Peranan Koter Dalam Menyukkseskan Pemilu 1997 dan Sidang Umum MPR 1998," *Gema Jayakarta (Media Komunikasi Kodam Jaya/Jayakarta)*, October 1995, pp.33, 58. KBA is based on clear membership while Supporters of ABRI's Sociopolitical Missions (Pengemban Misi Sospol ABRI, or called PMS) is a concept to categorise the people who are—in the eyes of ABRI—cooperative to ABRI's *sospol* conduct. They include intellectuals, government officials, religious leaders, journalists, people in business circles and other informants and followers of ABRI in society. The recruitment of PMS is said to be made either by organisational units within ABRI or at the discretion of individual officers.

⁷⁹ "Sejarah Singkat Korps Baret Merah Kopassus," *Cahaya Chandraca*, No.1, 1987, p.23. *Cahaya Chandraca* is Kopassus' internal newsletter. The most prominent example of this was the operation before the annexation of East Timor in December 1975 when red beret troops (at that time the name was Kopassandha) were giving training to Apodeti, a pro-integration party of Portuguese Timor, before the formal invasion by Kostrad and Kodam troops. For details, see McDonald (1980:189-215). Jenkins also suggested that Kopassandha had played a central role in the so-called 'mysterious killings' in the early 1980s when 3,000-4,000 suspected criminals were killed in extrajudicial ways to curb a rising crime rate. See his "SAS Dares But Do We Win?," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 15 July 1993.

Kodam forces at a later stage.⁸⁰ ABRI's internal security operations—including covert missions—have become more sophisticated over recent decades due to professional training and the development of information/military technology. However, in the current *dwifungsi* debate, it is rare to see an argument aimed at establishing a transparent examination of this mode of political intervention. These practices of territorial management are inherited by succeeding generations of officers through military education and indoctrination, and are considered by them as 'national defence'—an untouchable military sanctuary.

As discussed above, the development of counter-discourse on *dwifungsi* during the late New Order period reflected decline of ABRI's relative autonomy in society and the diminishing legitimacy of *dwifungsi* ideology. However, on the other hand, ABRI's territorial management became more and more autonomous in establishing mechanisms of political surveillance. It is in this context that the absence of debate on territorial management has—in a paradoxical way—affected ABRI's response to the growing criticism of *dwifungsi*. Based on the assessment that ABRI's core political role can be maintained solely by consolidating the territorial system, with or without the concept of *dwifungsi*, a view is emerging within ABRI which envisages that the concept of *dwifungsi* may possibly be scrapped as a way to alleviate the pressure on ABRI if social criticism reaches an unmanageable level. Rear Marshal Sunardi, for example, indicated this assessment by insisting that:

[W]e have noticed that *dwifungsi* is not a proper concept, causing many troubles. *Dwifungsi* has been criticised as ABRI's lack of adaptability to the changing society, but it is just a criticism aimed at ABRI's *sospol* capability which is only a small part of ABRI. *Sospol*, or *dwifungsi*, is only one of six capabilities ABRI possesses in conducting its expected role, along with intelligence, territorial, security, defence, and logistic capabilities. Therefore, *dwifungsi* is not what we want to preserve, but what we want is the total defence role to serve the nation and state.... It is such a simple matter.⁸¹

Thus, Sunardi's interpretation is aimed at de-emphasising the concept of *dwifungsi*, which defines ABRI's role in terms of its defence and sociopolitical functions, by placing the latter as only one of ABRI's six functions. This self-dismantling of the *dwifungsi* concept seems to make up a progressive interpretation which goes beyond merely re-interpreting *dwifungsi*. However, this suggestion of irrelevance of the *dwifungsi* concept becoming less relevant may be based on the assumption that elimination of the second function of *dwifungsi* would not significantly limit ABRI's practical political role, since the diverse capabilities used by ABRI in conducting its defence function provide enough capacity to take measures to maintain

⁸⁰ As seen previously, cases such as the Medan riot in 1994 and the 27th of July 1996 Affair in Jakarta are said to have involved Kopassus operations.

⁸¹ Interview with Rear Marshal Sunardi, Expert Staff for Minister of Defence and Security, 13 December 1996.

its high level of political engagement. It is in this context that the function of non-debate cannot be ignored if we wish to fully examine the officers' response to the criticism of *dwifungsi*.

Conclusion

This chapter has examined the structure of *dwifungsi* discourse during the late New Order period. We have focused on three areas—legitimacy, political participation channels, and territorial management. We first discussed various critical attempts by elite circles which had developed several approaches to delegitimise the permanency of *dwifungsi*. Our examination showed that they had contributed to the institutionalisation of *dwifungsi* criticism—a role which could hardly be accomplished by non-regime critics. This is the latent function of elite criticism that is usually seen as too moderate in the eyes of political activists who take a position to confront ABRI by demanding a total dismantling of *dwifungsi*. We suggested that different characteristics of moderate and progressive criticism did not undermine the pressure on ABRI. They should be understood as 'one goal, two necessary approaches.'

In the late New Order polity, ABRI, which only engaged in open communication with the 'moderate' side, responded to the elite counter-discourse broadly in a threefold way—by manipulating criticism, admitting dilemmas and reshaping the framework for re-legitimation. In Chapter 3, we discussed how ABRI had expanded the sources of legitimising *dwifungsi*, and in this chapter, our examination showed that ABRI also reinvented techniques to counter critical discourse by consolidating cultural and pragmatic frameworks of political thinking. However, we emphasised that ABRI continued to fear social mobility, which was thought to erode *dwifungsi*'s social acceptability.

Such vulnerability was also apparent when we assessed ABRI's political participation channels. We have argued that although ABRI has justified its parliamentary engagement via F-ABRI as a compensation for the surrender of its voting rights, its fear of recognising the natural rights of citizens is quite evident. Many officers can imagine how easily internal military cohesion could collapse once soldiers start to participate in elections—the most legitimate political activity in a modern nation-state. 'Desuperficialisation' of the F-ABRI debate also reveals a very fragile aspect of *dwifungsi* commitment as represented by the growing concern about the disparity between professional and political duties in the officers' military life. In tandem with this, we have seen the serving officers' own concerns about the declining neutrality of ABRI's role in the formal political structure, mainly due to its overt channelling of influence through Golkar. On the other hand, however, we underlined ABRI's growing conviction that it could control the political process without relying on

formal political channels. We paid attention to the political tasks designed under ABRI's territorial management, and suggested that, despite lack of debate, these aspects of ABRI's political role had to be included in the scope of open discourse in order for civilian elites to comprehensively question *dwifungsi's* political engagement. All these aspects seemed to have constituted the structure of *dwifungsi* discourse during the late New Order era.

CHAPTER 7

Comparative Implications: Doctrinal Change and Democratic Transition

We have seen ABRI's frequent claim that Indonesian civil-military relations are unique, as *dwifungsi* is deeply rooted in the nation's history and culture. It is implied that ABRI's political engagement should be understood as a commitment to the development of Pancasila democracy, and thus cannot be compared with the political roles played by military regimes in other developing countries. ABRI's claim may be partly true, but it still invites comparison with other Third World militaries which have developed doctrines to justify their political intervention, and the way in which these have been eroded in the face of democratic pressures.

Although culture and history produce particular patterns of civil-military relations in a society, they do not eliminate cross-national commonalities, due largely to similarities in the military's organisational environment and status in the modern nation-state. Thus, the development of *dwifungsi* may be further understood through comparing civil-military relations in the process of democratisation.

Our target parameter here is the military doctrine of political activism—how it has been shaped, reproduced, and finally revised as the military faces the political demand for democratisation.¹ From this perspective, we will primarily—but not exclusively—examine the cases of Latin America where militaries have developed a political doctrine, the so-called the National Security Doctrine (DSN: *Doctrina de Seguridad Nacional*). In all cases there, the militaries which had once governed experienced a retreat from politics with the reinstallation of civilian governments. In what ways has the DSN played a significant role in the processes of military intervention and withdrawal? And what are the lessons and implications for the *dwifungsi*-democratisation issue?

In order to answer these questions, the first four sections of this chapter examine the genesis and application of the DSN. Then, in the following three sections,

¹ Among various cross-national comparative strategies, Riggs (1994) provides a useful framework which focuses on formal political concepts that are used homogeneously in different countries but implemented heterogeneously. Using the concept of presidentialism, his work systematically integrates the variants of presidential regimes and generalises the patterns of country-particular reflections. Our analysis in this chapter follows his methodological model.

the general dynamics of military disengagement from politics and related theoretical problems are discussed. Finally, we will come back to the DSN and attempt to clarify some major aspects of crafting military doctrines to marginalise military influence and consolidate democratic transition. The implications for *dwifungsi* are also examined.

The Formulation of DSN

Many students of military regimes in Latin America have noted new features of military intervention in the mid 1960s. Especially in Brazil (1964), Peru (1968), Chile (1973) and Argentina (1976), 'new' military regimes were established not only to solve problems of short-term political instability, but also to achieve far-ranging projects of political, economic, social and cultural reform. These coups were no longer revolts by lower-ranking commanders but were decisions of military headquarters; they were the product of professional officers who had formulated the DSN in higher educational institutions within the military, for example at the Superior War College (ESG) in Brazil and the Centre for Higher Military Studies (CAEM) in Peru. This doctrine linked internal security and economic development as the professional tasks of the military. Given the economic stagnation experienced since the 1950s, which showed the structural limitations of Latin America's domestic markets in making the transition from import-substitution industrialisation to self-sustained economic growth, these countries faced the rise of populist forces and radical politics as the masses were mobilised for wider political participation.² The DSN was intended to counter these challenges and to set internal security as a precondition for further economic development, thus providing the necessary rationale for the military's political domination.

The genesis of this doctrine, its inclination to see security and development as a coherent whole, and the logic of legitimising military involvement in political life, are quite similar to ABRI's *dwifungsi*. It was the rise of the PKI and Soekarno's radical-populist policies which created political and economic concerns among army generals. Seskoad had conducted studies of economic development, collaborating with US-trained economists. In the Second Army Seminar in 1966, as we have seen in Chapter 3, the army declared its commitment to internal security and economic development, and defined itself as the guardian of Pancasila and the dynamiser of national life. ABRI's self-perception of its role was soon formulated as the doctrine of *dwifungsi*.

Similarity can also be seen in the evolution of the two doctrines. The DSN was presented by Latin American military thinkers as a doctrine derived from the social sciences, especially from political science and geopolitics; this—it was thought—might

² On the political and economic background of the DSN, see Calvo's excellent summary (1979:69-72).

make it scientific, technical, and therefore politically neutral.³ As seen previously, ABRI officers—especially the young generation—rationalised *dwifungsi* by employing a systems approach from political science, with its functionalist description of political order, presented, for example, by Huntington and Janowitz. Geopolitics and geostrategy were also emphasised in consolidating threat perceptions which led to the conclusion that the national environment had forced ABRI to accept internal security and economic development as inseparable goals, in turn legitimatising the military's political role in society.⁴ In both the DSN and *dwifungsi*, emphasis on objectivity in defining threat environments is an important means to internalise doctrinal legitimacy in both the military and society. This doctrinal arrangement shows a commonality in the ways that the military attempts to institutionalise its access to the political arena.

Pion-Berlin argues that DSN had three components: security/development, geopolitics, and counterinsurgency (CI).⁵ CI developed in the late 1950s and early 1960s in France and the US, respectively, in response to revolutionary warfare in Algeria and Vietnam. The French and American CI theorists took the writings of Mao Tse Tung seriously, believing that revolutionary efforts were successful only where they cultivated popular support through a politically informed strategy that combined political, military, economic, societal and psychological aspects. The DSN's operational design was greatly influenced by the French counter-revolutionary doctrine and the US civic mission program—practised, for example, in the Philippines—which involved psychological operations to 'win the hearts and minds of the people,' improve the popular image of the government, and gather information about subversive elements from local residents.⁶ It was in this context that internal security missions defined in the DSN encompassed military, political, social, economic, cultural and ideological defence as a coherent whole, creating the Latin American version of *Ipoleksosbudmil*. In its doctrinal formulation, CI against Maoism was reinforced by Clausewitz's dictum that "war is the continuation of politics by other means." The fusion of CI and Clausewitz contributed to the blurring of the boundary between military and non-military aspects of national life.⁷

³ Ibid., p.73.

⁴ ABRI's geopolitical concept is exemplified in Wawasan Nusantara, and its geostrategy in Ketahanan Nasional. Both are explained as absolute values defining Indonesia's defence environment objectively. See, for example, ABRI's first Defence White Paper published in 1995 (Department of Defence and Security, *The Policy of the State Defence and Security of the Republic of Indonesia*, Jakarta: Department of Defence and Security, 1995, pp.12-15). Hereafter The White Paper. For the 'scientific' and 'technical' approach to Ketahanan Nasional, Lemhannas produced mathematical and socio-technological models, as seen in *Bunga Rampai Ketahanan Nasional (Konsepsi & Teori)*, Himpunan Lemhannas, Jakarta: PT Ripres Utama, 1980, chapters 48, 49.

⁵ Pion-Berlin (1988:386).

⁶ Pion-Berlin puts equal weight on the influence of French and US armies in the formulation of DSN. Nunn (1995:6) argues, however, that the basic doctrinal model was French although encouraged by the US army.

⁷ Pion-Berlin (1988:386-387). Among *dwifungsi* theorists too, Clausewitz's famous aphorism has frequently been employed, for example in Notosusanto (1984:208). Here Clausewitz's thesis is similarly misinterpreted or manipulated. The DSN and *dwifungsi* advocates use the dictum to conclude that military and political

In this way, the DSN's basic pillars—i.e. convergence of internal security and economic development, its geopolitical platform, and counterinsurgency—seem to be compatible with *dwifungsi*'s components. Another issue is the self-image of Latin American armies before the formulation of the DSN. This is significant in assessing the ideological incentive to create such an all-encompassing military doctrine. Nunn's study describes their self-images as centred on being creators, defenders and integrators of the nations.⁸ These are all familiar terms for the student of the Indonesian military. The officers in Brazil and Chile, however, further attempted to synchronise these self-images with constitutional legitimacy, by revising constitutions and legally assigning the military to protect the 'constitutional order' and serve as the 'guarantor' of the constitution. Thus, the revised constitutions in Latin America in the 1970s and 1980s generally acknowledged the military's legitimate political role and justified military participation at all levels of policy making and administration.⁹ 'Constitutionalisation' of the military's political mission and self-image was a necessary step to secure the implementation of the DSN and to diversify its basis of legitimacy. In Indonesia, where the constitution was not revised under the New Order, ABRI's self-image as the defender of UUD 45 has not been given such constitutional status, but—as discussed in Chapter 3—*dwifungsi*'s political mission was formally legalised in 1982, providing an alternative legitimisation in the eyes of ABRI officers.

ABRI's traditional claim that *dwifungsi* is uniquely Indonesian seems, therefore, to be superficial. ABRI shares significant similarities in doctrinal settings and legitimacy-building measures with many of the politically active militaries in Latin America. What, then, of the impact of doctrine? Doctrine has impact both internally and externally on the military. The main focus of discussion in scholarship on the Latin American military regarding the internal aspect has been on the impact of DSN on military professionalism; in regard to the external aspect, the main concern has been the assessment of policy variants under the common doctrine. We will examine the two below.

The DSN and 'New' Professionalism

Alfred Stepan greatly contributed to the study of Latin American military politics by providing a controversial argument about the changing pattern of military professionalism after the formation of the DSN.¹⁰ His argument can be summarised as

matters cannot be distinguished, thus the military should have a say in politics. However, Clausewitz's own intent was to argue that it is politics that controls the military, not the other way around.

⁸ Nunn (1992:113-150).

⁹ Loveman (1997:138-139). On the ideological premises for such constitutional settings, see also Pion-Berlin (1989b) which examines cases in Argentina and Peru.

¹⁰ Stepan (1973).

follows. Samuel Huntington's classic conception of military professionalism presumes that the military's primary mission is the conduct of external warfare, thus its professionalisation inevitably leads to the specialisation of military skills in a way that is incompatible with any other significant social and political roles. Therefore, according to Huntington, professionalisation depoliticises the military. Stepan accepted this argument in part but developed the thesis that, in Latin America, where the primary mission of the military is internal warfare, the skill-specialisation of military officers is not limited to narrow military affairs but expands to the wider social, economic, and political spheres. Thus, when internal security is the military's chief concern, professionalisation politicises the military and encourages its role expansion. This is what he called 'new professionalism,' in contrast to Huntington's 'old professionalism.' In his model, Stepan emphasised the role of DSN which requires economic development for the maintenance of internal security. He paid particular attention to the processes through which the doctrine had been studied and socialised in the ESG and CAEM since the 1950s, and concluded that such military schooling changed the professional orientation of the Brazilian and Peruvian militaries.¹¹ By defining this new trend as the 'new professionalism of internal security and national development,' Stepan introduced a landmark concept in the literature on modern Latin American civil-military relations.¹²

Here, our comparative study should pay attention to the linkage of five factors: doctrine, internal security, economic development, professionalism and political activism. Stepan's assumptions flow as follows: a change in *threat target* (from external to internal) leads to the modification of *doctrinal content* (from conventional warfare to security-development fusion) [Step 1]; a change in doctrinal content alters the *type of professionalism* (from 'old' to 'new') [Step 2]; and a change in professional orientation shifts the *military's role in society* (from a moderator of the political game to the director of the political system) [Step 3]. Before examining how this thesis fits ABRI's case, it is worth looking at major critiques of Stepan.

First, the new professionalism thesis has been criticised from a historical perspective. McCann, for example, argues that: "if you study the Brazilian military role in politics from the perspective of the post-1964 political arena, Stepan's 'new professionalism' seems reasonable. If you approach it from a historical analysis of the military institution, it begins to lose its newness and the situation of the last fifteen years appears as the logical outcome of long-range evolution."¹³ McCann insists that

¹¹ Above descriptions are from *ibid.*, pp.48-62.

¹² O'Donnell's influential book, published in the same year as Stepan's article, endorsed the politicisation impact of professionalism by using the case of Argentina. He argued that enhanced military professionalisation had two effects: (1) raising the threshold of political turmoil that would result in systematic military intervention in politics; and (2) encouraging a far greater degree of political involvement by the military (O'Donnell 1973:166).

¹³ MacCann (1979:506-507).

since the 1930s the Brazilian army has been committed to internal security to fulfil its historical responsibility as guardian of national unity and order.¹⁴ His argument supports Nunn's extensive historical study, published a year before Stepan's article. The criticism based on historical continuity seems to be understandable even in the eyes of non-Latin American experts, since Stepan's argument posits a historical break of the mid 1960s. Nunn asserts:

that the military profession exists in Brazil in a context different from that of some other parts of the Western world is no longer in doubt. That the profession now exists in Brazil in a different context than in that country's past is, however, questionable. The army has changed radically since 1870, but within the parameters of change, especially since 1920, the professional army has maintained its role as 'defender of national honour.'¹⁵

What is unchanged since the early twenty century, according to Nunn, is that "the professional officer has a sense of responsibility toward the *nation* (ethnic aggregation) and the *state* (the political domain) and the society or community. When the state does not serve the interests of the national and societal totality, however, it is in danger of being opposed by the one who sees himself as truly representative. In Brazil it is the *professional* soldier who sees himself in this role."¹⁶ Arguments of McCann and Nunn, therefore, question the 'newness' of professionalism suggested by Stepan.

Secondly, from an institutional perspective, an objection was posed by Markoff and Baretta. Their detailed study suggests that Stepan exaggerates the role of the ESG. Long before the ESG was established, the army vainly attempted to govern Brazil. Also concerning the shift of the type of professionalism, they believe that the ESG had concerns for economic development and internal security from early days. They therefore conclude that "Stepan's new professionalism is actually old professionalism in the Brazilian context."¹⁷

For students of comparative civil-military relations, these criticisms, based on historical and institutional perspectives, and directed at Step 3 (see above)—i.e. the impact of professionalism on the military's role in society—carry some conviction, as Stepan tends to dismiss the gradual historical process in which rival perspectives compete for predominance, a process natural in any institutional change.¹⁸ However, in terms of Stepan's broader argument, including Step 1 and Step 2, the critiques are less

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.519-520.

¹⁵ Nunn (1972:54). For a description of the historical development of professionalism in the Brazilian military, see also Nunn (1983).

¹⁶ Nunn (1972:47). *Italic added.*

¹⁷ See Markoff and Baretta (1985:179, 182). They also support Nunn's study which emphasises continuity rather than change, insisting that one of the roots of the military activism of the 1920s throughout Latin America was the growing professionalism of the armed forces.

¹⁸ According to organisation theory, this coexistence of competing perspectives is due to the dynamism whereby, in the early stage of institutional transformation, the transaction cost of altering an entire system is so large that it demands a cushion by selectively introducing new values into the established system. See Powell and DiMaggio (1991:4).

convincing. Both Nunn and McCann identify concerns within the military regarding internal security and economic development from the 1930s. They argue that both professionalism and messianic self-images resulted in "professional militarism" (Nunn). But these points do not deny Stepan's argument that internal security and economic development became the military's simultaneous 'professional missions' after the formation of the DSN.¹⁹ In other words, internal security and economic development were 'concerns' before the 1960s, but not yet defined as primary professional missions. As Stepan emphasises, it was the new doctrine in the mid 1960s which institutionally established and legitimised internal security as the primary mission of the already highly professionalised Brazilian military, and systematically linked economic development as a prerequisite for the attainment of internal security. Stepan's argument in Step 1 and Step 2, therefore, survives. It is not sufficient for his critics to reject his new professionalism argument by simply objecting to the final point, Step 3.²⁰

Other scholars have applied Stepan's concept to third-world militarism elsewhere, including the Indonesian military. Casper, for example, describes the new professionalism as one of the sources of political activism in the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). She suggests that: "the nation-building programs taught at the National Defence College and the Command and General Staff College brought institutional change within the AFP and it was clearly an important factor in explaining its willingness to intervene to put an end to the Marcos regime." Moreover, "in both Brazil and the Philippines, the military schools introduced or expanded nation-building and administration classes. This training led the officers to see themselves as equal to bureaucrats and politicians, whereas previously they had been willing to defer in nonmilitary areas."²¹ In terms of Step 3, this argument seems to fit the new professionalism since it shows that professional socialisation of domestic affairs leads to political activism. But it is not clear, first, whether economic development and internal security were built into the primary professional mission, or,

¹⁹ Markoff and Baretta (1985:186) admit that Brazilian officers in the 1930s often regarded internal security as an unprofessional mission.

²⁰ Apart from these main points, McCann (1979:506) doubts the relevance of 'new' professionalism, since the 'old' one is not applicable to the pre-1960s Brazil. He says that "Stepan marshalled his data so adroitly that one nearly forgets to ask if the first premise is correct. Does Huntington's description of the 'old professionalism' apply to the Brazilian army?" However, this criticism is weak because Stepan never claimed that old professionalism fitted the Brazilian military. He uses Huntington's thesis in order to contrast it with his new idea derived from his examination of changing patterns in Brazil and Peru. If Stepan is to be criticised in terms of old professionalism, a point should be made, instead, about his 'acceptance' of Huntington's paradigm in building his theory. Stepan's concept of new professionalism is the anti-thesis of Huntington's professionalism but this undermines the coherence of a causal relationship between professionalism and politicisation, because Huntington does not envisage the possibility that 'external' security concerns also facilitate military politicisation. Needless to say, the strategy of total warfare which mobilises all national resources for external defence frequently leads to military politicisation. Our Indonesian case is an excellent example. However, again, this is a criticism linked only to Step 3.

²¹ Casper (1991:197, 200, 206). However, as seen in Nunn's description above, it is more accurate to say that Brazilian officers inspired by the DSN see themselves 'above' politicians and bureaucrats.

secondly, whether there was a visible 'change' in the schooling program. If the political activism merely resulted from the military's anxiety about the corrupt dictatorship and the inefficient state administration, and if its goal was to overthrow the national leader, and if the 'contextual' change in the education is not presented, the argument does not accurately fit Stepan's thesis. It is, rather, close to Nunn's argument—that professionalisation tends to lead to politicisation—which supports the classic studies of Finer and others.²²

The core argument in Stepan's new professionalism, therefore, is not whether a professional military thinks internal security is a part of its task. As Stepan's critics have shown, such a concern certainly existed long before the mid 1960s. What makes Stepan's thesis interesting is the introduction of a new doctrine encompassing internal security and economic development as a coherent whole, with the resulting shift in the primary professional mission from a normal defence role—whether concerned with external defence or internal security—to that of state manager.²³ If the military merely expands its role while receiving professional training, without change in professional orientation from one type to another, the case better fits one or other of the professionalisation-politicisation schemes presented by Huntington's critics for the analysis of Third World military intervention in politics.

To emphasise the significance of the role of the doctrine, Stepan interestingly mentioned the case of Indonesia, where Seskoad had formulated a development and security doctrine in the early 1960s that was later implemented under the New Order government.²⁴ However, as examined in Chapter 3, Seskoad's emphasis on economic development and internal security was—unlike their Latin American counterparts—*not* derived from professional concerns. There was not even a single sentence in the official

²² The classic debate is as follows. Against Huntington (1957:84), who argues that "a highly professional officer corps stands ready to carry out the wishes of any civilian group which secures legitimate authority within the state," Finer (1962:25-27) argues that professionalism cultivates a high sense of nationalism among the officer corps that may encourage an interventionist orientation. Janowitz (1964:40-49) also insists that professionalisation promotes officers' administrative capacity with the result that skill differentiation between military and political management becomes blurred, in the eyes of officers, leading to the development of an interventionist military in the developing countries. Moreover, Abrahamsson (1972:17-18), from an organisational theory perspective, argues that professionalisation strengthens the military's sense of corporate interests and may facilitate military intervention in politics once it is threatened by civilian politics. Sarkesian's (1984) vivid comparison of Huntington and Janowitz minimises their differences but stresses their complementary nature in many respects. Needless to say, it is impossible to deduce from the degree of professionalism an explanation for political commitment without assessing the country's political environment. However, understanding how the process of professionalisation influences the political orientation of the military itself is still a significant task in political science.

²³ As if avoiding a claim of historical continuity, Stepan emphasises that the Latin American military came to redefine its mission primarily in terms of dealing with threats to internal security, especially after the defeat of the conventional army in Cuba by Castro's guerrilla force. Then, highly professionalised militaries in Brazil and Peru developed doctrines and training techniques to prevent or crush insurgent movements, leading to a focusing of energies on the 'professionalisation' of their approach to internal security and national development. See Stepan (1973:50-51). These processes should be seen as a whole in order to defend Stepan's thesis from criticism based on the historical perspective.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p.51, fn.5.

document of the 1966 Second Army Seminar at Seskoad about the professional mission of ABRI in the coming decades. In the early New Order, both stability and economic development were certainly built into ABRI's Hankamrata doctrine, but their link with professionalism was thin. This was understandable given the fact that politicisation of the officer corps came first and professionalisation followed, in the history of the Indonesian military. Thus, Step 3 in Stepan's thesis is not applicable in the case of ABRI. ABRI's professionalisation of internal security and national development—which proceeded after ABRI had secured its dominant role in politics—only reinforced what was already there under the New Order. As we have discussed previously, professionalism is a key concept among the AMN-Akabri generation officers in referring to the better management of *dwifungsi*, and it is in this context that the concept has been reinterpreted to incorporate the second, sociopolitical, mission of *dwifungsi*. Thus it cannot be said that the change in professional orientation politicised ABRI—the thesis argued by Stepan; rather, an already-politicised military promoted the idea of new professionalism in adaptive ways.²⁵

Finally, in contrast to the Latin American military, which identifies itself in the first place as a professional institution and secondly as a political actor, ABRI—as expressed in the *dwifungsi* declaration—defines itself first as a freedom-fighter which has a right to participate in politics, and secondly as a force of professional soldiers. This difference again demonstrates that ABRI's political commitment is not primarily derived from professional concern.

We have seen that ABRI and Latin American political militaries share many characteristics, such as components in their doctrines and professional education which focuses heavily on the value of political stability. Nevertheless, what Stepan sees as the 'new' dynamics, i.e. the way in which the change in professionalism politicises the military, does not fit ABRI's experience. What, then, of the interpretation of the doctrine, and what does the comparison imply?

Variants of DSN Interpretation

Scholarship on DSN acknowledges the variety of doctrinal interpretations among military regimes. First, in terms of the influence of geopolitics in doctrinal assessment, the case of Peru is often distinguished from Brazil, Argentina and Chile. Pion-Berlin points out that, relative to these three countries, the Peruvian military regime between 1968 and 1975 gave less weight to geopolitical theories in its rationale

²⁵ MacFarling's study of *dwifungsi* argues that ABRI is an instructive example of new professionalism because "officers are members of a cohesive, well trained organisation that has focused its corporate energies on achieving and maintaining national stability" (1996:188). This view identifies a phenomenal similarity but does not pay attention to any causal relationship in Steps 1-3. If the military is simply professional and plays the role of national stabiliser, it rather fits Finer's old model.

for the authoritarian national security state. Rather, DSN was modified by military thinkers associated with the reformist military regime to pay more attention to national development. Although the weighting is a matter of degree, the Peruvian style is often described as 'soft-line' in contrast to the geopolitical emphasis of the 'hard-line' approach seen in Brazil, Argentina and Chile.²⁶

In the hard-line school, DSN advocates associated emerging 'subversive' activities (mainly but not exclusively communist) in the domestic arena with the geopolitical rivalry between the two superpowers. They asserted that the repression of progressive social and political change was imperative to maintain national security. Within this broad paradigm, the geopolitical thinking said little about how the national security threat would take root domestically, nor who would be its principal sponsors. A space for arbitrary interpretation existed here, and the ambiguity was manipulated by an aggressive military that felt free to choose its own enemies. As Pion-Berlin suggests, this vagueness provided a licence for unbridled state power and militarisation of society.²⁷ 'Ideological subversion' then became the invented subject of military operations.²⁸

ABRI's threat perception and *dwifungsi* legitimisation have shared a similar logic. Wawasan Nusantara, which is defined as an unalterable 'national' geopolitical doctrine, sees subversion as the main threat to security, which may be enlarged through foreign ideological penetration. The subversion takes the form of anti-Pancasila and anti-UUD 45 ideology, according to the Indonesian geopolitical theory. In defining subversive actors, ideologies and activities, this doctrinal vagueness has provided ABRI with interpretative power to label certain groups as subversive agents. As democratic pressure grew under the late New Order, this frequently became ABRI's dominant approach. Military concepts of KGB, OTB, GPK, and liberalism, for example, allowed ABRI to paint government critics as subversives, as seen in previous chapters. By doing so, ABRI created a 'buffer zone' between the government and legitimate social demands, absorbing 'excessive' demands and transferring them to the area of non-politics—i.e. military operations. The 'flexible' geopolitical doctrine also produced a rationale for the military to conduct *Ipoleksosbudmil* missions to safeguard national sovereignty. *Dwifungsi* was built into this formula as an embodiment of ABRI's commitment to national security and development.

²⁶ Pion-Berlin (1989a:421-425). See also Atkins (1997:168-169). This does not mean that regime repression was 'soft' in Peru, but reflects a general feeling that geopolitics is a primary military concern while development is a social matter.

²⁷ Pion-Berlin (1988:390).

²⁸ In the countries of the Southern Cone, a dominant interpretation emerged in the 1970s which asserted that groups which failed to uphold 'Western Christian values' were the active, or unwitting, accomplices of subversive forces trying to undermine noncommunist regimes and attack the moral and spiritual foundations of the nation. For details, see Fitch (1993:23-24). Fitch's article provides an excellent description of the detailed process whereby foreign doctrines were introduced and localised in Latin America.

Apart from geopolitics, the DSN's economic-development aspect should be noted. The hard-line approach interpreted the link between security and development in terms of orthodox strategies of modernisation and the need to remove the political obstacles for economic growth. Typically, officers favoured closing channels to mass mobilisation that encouraged populist politics and 'unreasonable' labour demands.²⁹ However, in Peru reformist and radical officers developed an alternative 'soft-line' interpretation which stressed economic dependency, socio-economic inequality, and elite-dominated political systems as the principal causes of domestic insurgency. They also advocated socialist reform. The Peruvian experience made scholars aware of the breadth of possible interpretation of DSN. There, a professionalised and politically active military in the 1960s found that the principal threat to national security and development lay in exploitation by the oligarchy and its foreign accomplices, leading to the emergence of radical reformist military regime.³⁰

Peru's left-wing variety of DSN not only illustrated the indigenisation of a common doctrine but also indicated that commitment to particular policies was extremely weak. Similarly our study of *dwifungsi* indicates that differences over the interpretation and actual policy implementation of the doctrine within particular militaries is hardly avoidable. In the case of the DSN, Fitch argues that the general acceptance of the DSN did not prevent serious internal splits over specific policies in Brazil.³¹ Also Stepan—who in 1973 emphasised the significant role played by Peru's CAEM in socialising the new professional doctrine—later revised his assessment, insisting that CAEM circles were actually not the core ruling group which implemented the radical reform project.³² It can be concluded that both *dwifungsi* and the DSN provide a coherent ideological lens through which military officers can look at the state of the nation, their expected missions, and how economic development is imperative for internal security, but it does not necessarily help unify the officer corps or cultivate consensus on policy implementation.

The DSN and Antipolitics

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p.23.

³⁰ The regime was the revolutionary military government headed by General Juan Velasco Alvarado between 1968 and 1975. Velasco's revolutionary projects involved land reform and nationalisation of enterprises in several industrial sectors. For successes and failures of the left-wing DSN projects under Velasco, see two continuous works—Lowenthal (1975) and McClintock and Lowenthal (1983). Becker (1982) stresses the rise of the 'new bourgeoisie' under the regime, although its structural dependence on the state prevented the emergence of liberal-democratic ideology among the new middle class.

³¹ Fitch (1986:29).

³² Stepan (1978:144-146) argues that none of key radical officers who initiated the reform project was a graduate of CAEM. All, however, had strong connections with the intelligence sector which had investigated several corruption cases linking local elites and foreign actors during the previous Belaúnde administration. Philip (1980:427-429) suggests that CAEM graduates were instead prominent in the technocratic faction that supported reform from above, but opposed mass mobilisation in support of those reforms.

Despite variations in interpretation and policy implementation, the military regimes under DSN influence shared a common structure of political control. A major attempt to generalise this commonality can be found in the work of Loveman and Davies, who insist that the basic paradigm of these regimes—'military antipolitics'—applies to both leftist and rightist variants.³³ For them, the left-right gap was bridged by a common perception among professional officers who rejected the political process, seeing it as the source of underdevelopment, corruption and evil.

It [antipolitics] is antiliberal and anti-Marxist. It assumes repression of opposition, silencing or censoring of the media, and subordinating the labor movement to the objectives of the regime.... It does not willingly tolerate strikes by workers.... It places high priority on economic growth and is usually little concerned with income distribution except insofar as worker or white-collar discontent leads to protest and disorder.... It can use elections, pseudopolitical parties, and plebiscites in order to give a veneer of "democratic" legitimacy to authoritarian direction of the state and society.³⁴

The Peruvian revolutionary project (1968-75) adopted mobilisational inclusionary strategies of economic modernisation but the left-wing military antipoliticians did not see themselves as being dedicated to class interests. Contaminated by DSN, officers found the principal enemies in the Peruvian landed oligarchy and allied US capitalists, but this was a reflection of their nationalism, not Marxism. In this context, the radical revolution took the form of authoritarian statism to command the direction of social empowerment. Here, antipolitics was adopted to maintain the supremacy of the state over society, and thus not different from right-wing regimes inspired by the DSN.

Antipolitical techniques also provided similarities. In Brazil, the military's political project involved the development of the industry of torture, aiming to eliminate 'subversives'—often by summary murder of suspects—in order to 'atomise' Brazilian society.³⁵ Rabid anti-Marxism was also a feature of the military regimes of Chile and Uruguay, where terror became an official instrument to accomplish the 'public' policy of social cleansing. The DSN-inspired Proceso government in Argentina (1976-83) also launched a notorious campaign of state terror against its internal threats—politicians and subversives. This 'dirty-war' left thousands dead as well as disappearances of 'subversives' in the late 1970s and early 1980s.³⁶

Importantly, once DSN emerged as the dominant belief, military rulers in these countries concluded that security and development could only be achieved by a long-

³³ Loveman and Davies (1989).

³⁴ *Ibid.*, p.12-13.

³⁵ Zirker (1988:592) and Epstein (1984:39).

³⁶ The Argentine National Commission on the Disappeared called the DSN "the doctrine behind the repression" in the country. See Pion-Berlin (1988:383). It is said that 8,960 people disappeared under the regime. In Brazil, 125 people disappeared while in Uruguay the number was 25 (Stepan 1988:70).

term military regime, thus relieving them from insisting—in the traditional way—that intervention in politics was temporary or undesirable in principle. Under these circumstances, whatever their differences over economic management, the construction of an antipolitical environment was soon recognised as imperative to achieving security and development. As if to reflect their role perception as the national guardian, ambitious and aggressive military programs of political control were generally justified as 'defensive' missions to rescue their nations from the threat of subversion and chaos.³⁷

These characteristics of the 'new professionalism of military antipolitics' (Loveman and Davies), commonly seen in the Latin American professional militarism, are nothing new for students of ABRI. As we have repeatedly discussed in previous chapters, ABRI's antipolitical officers during the Soeharto period were anti-liberal and anti-Marxist. They supported measures to censor the media. Intervention in labour affairs was a part of the mission of Kopkamtib/Bakorstanas. They relied primarily on the 'trickle-down' growth strategy, while concerns about the widening socio-economic gap in society were assessed in security terms. Pseudo-democratic institutions—such as elections, party-politics, parliaments and constitutionalism—were supported to give a 'democratic face' and legitimacy to the regime, but 'political society' had been subjected to intervention, quite frequently by using both formal and informal channels and direct and indirect measures. Extra-judicial killings of citizens, systematic torturing of suspected 'subversives,' and abduction of political activists—including teenager students—had been conducted in highly professional ways, often by ABRI's best-trained unit, Kopassus.³⁸

However, for our comparative study, it is not enough merely to recognise these similarities in the external outcomes of military antipolitics. It is also necessary to see the pattern of perceptual development before and after the introduction of the DSN. Military intervention in politics surely existed in pre-DSN Latin America, but, as seen above, the engagement was essentially *ad hoc*.³⁹ The military at that time often targeted internal threats in its combat operations, while concerns about economic underdevelopment also existed. If these two factors—internal security and economic development—were present both before and after the introduction of the DSN, why did the military seek its enduring involvement in politics only in the latter period? One answer lies in the nature of the DSN.

³⁷ Loveman and Davies (1989:307).

³⁸ As seen earlier, this unit has been trained by the US; training of Kopassus officers also took place in Australia.

³⁹ More precisely, Latin American militaries, with few exceptions (e.g. Venezuela and Mexico), traditionally believed that they—as 'guardians' of national interests—had a legitimate *short-term* political role when these interests were threatened in crises where civilian institutions were weak, fragmented and ineffectual (Fitch 1993:21). See also Bacchus's (1985) work which analyses the ideological basis of this orthodox short-term intervention by the Brazilian army and the rise of disputes when it adopted a long-term version after the Brazilian revolution in 1964.

There was little fundamental change in the military's 'ways' of attacking internal subversive elements, namely by mobilising intelligence, paramilitary units and special anti-terrorist troops. What changed, however, after the DSN phenomenon was the military's 'definition' of these elements. The doctrine had systematically incorporated modernisation economics into the professional internal-security mind-set. The military's old 'concerns' about underdevelopment were now elaborated with the inclusion of the concepts of the open world economy and latecomer modernisation. Having packed these economic theories into its arsenal, the military reached two conclusions. First, successful implementation of development projects could not be achieved through traditional short-term access to the government. Secondly, 'catch-up' economic modernisation—which required low wages and disciplined labour to attract foreign investments (or to facilitate capital accumulation in the case of left-wing regimes)—needed strong state control over society. It was against this background that repressive antipolitics became the logical outcome of the military's commitment to these two ends. To secure the long-term military control of the government, regime critics had to be eliminated. To control society, 'politics'—which is uncertain and disturbs social harmony—had to be buried and replaced by 'administration' with a high discipline. Definitional expansion of 'subversion' (or more broadly deviance from state projects) had its roots here, aiming to justify the military's elimination and surveillance activities.⁴⁰

Therefore, in answering the question above, it can be argued that, in terms of internal military dynamics, the *prime mover* in the transition between 'traditional' and 'new' militaries was *not* the aspect of internal security but that of economic development. If the DSN had only carried concerns about internal security, neither permanent takeover of the government nor establishment of an antipolitical environment was crucial or justifiable. Many developing countries assign their soldiers to counterinsurgency missions without leading to military takeover of the government. It was the infusion of economic development thought (or ideology) into the professional doctrinal arena that gave birth to a military which sought perpetual involvement in politics and the adoption of antipolitics.⁴¹

These reflections on the doctrinal origin of antipolitics provide some hypotheses for our study of the Indonesian military. It seemed obvious that the New Order military desired to permanently involve itself in politics. It had said that there was no 'back-to-the-barracks' in ABRI's dictionary. Its maximum concession was the

⁴⁰ This assessment owes much to Giddens' inspiring work (1987) which describes how the development of administrative technology in the modern state changed the definition of social 'deviance' and adapted the modes of its surveillance and control. See especially chapters 7, 8, and 12.

⁴¹ We limit our argument here to the impact of doctrine on political activism of the military. Needless to say, however, political orientation cannot be explained solely by doctrine or ideology. Zagorski (1992:54,72-74) argues that the DSN provided a ready rationale to legitimise permanent military involvement. But he does not clarify what aspect of the DSN did this.

adoption of the concept called *tut wuri handayani*, which was said to be applied in the age of *keterbukaan*. Since the New Order was not a military regime in a strict sense, a simple comparison with hard-core militarism in Latin America should be avoided. However, it can be argued that ABRI's claim for permanent involvement in politics—and its antipolitical attitudes—was similarly derived from its built-in economic development ideology. When the retired 1945 generation officers say that ABRI should retreat from everyday intervention, their motive is not only to earn popularity in society but, to some extent, reflects their belief in the traditional role perception of ABRI. As in Latin America before DSN, the Indonesian military's core role perception was that of guardian, believing intervention was the result of civilian failure to protect national interests. Importantly, as was obvious in the Latin American case, this traditional perception itself did not necessarily oblige the military to permanently intervene in politics. It would at most lead the military to having a permanent veto power. As if following such traditionalism, Indonesia's retired generals have often claimed that if General Sudirman—the first army commander who led the revolutionary war—were still alive, he might oppose the current implementation of *dwifungsi*.⁴²

On the other hand, the AMN-Akabri generation's self-image was cultivated through education. In this process, traditional perceptions were surely inherited, but officers were also indoctrinated in the economic modernisation ideology. From our comparative perspective, this suggests the hypothesis that the socialisation of the post-1966 officers has had a major impact on the officers' perceptions of the desirable level of military commitment in everyday political life. This level—we assume—is much higher than that of the traditional role-perception, because the development mission provides far more areas of military concern related to stability maintenance.⁴³ Of course, not a small number of current officers may think that economics is too complex to be handled by soldiers. However, in assessing ABRI as an institution, this indoctrination process has no doubt encouraged the officer corps to regard everyday and permanent engagement in the non-military sector as legitimate.

In this regard, we may conclude that, although there is a generally accepted view that the introduction of professionalism has distinguished AMN-Akabri officers from the revolutionary generation, it is more precisely their professional commitment to modernisation ideology that has marked these younger generation officers. If we accept a claim by many officers that *dwifungsi* has existed since the early days of the Republic, we can also argue that this 'old' *dwifungsi* was already replaced by 'new' *dwifungsi*. The new version under the New Order has favoured everyday involvement

⁴² Interview with Ali Sadikin, 30 July 1996; written interview with Gen (ret) A.H. Nasution, 4 January 1997.

⁴³ The testing of this hypothesis would require relational analysis of educational programs and officers' perceptions. It could be conducted, for example, by observing quantitative-qualitative changes in education materials in Seskoad and matching them with content analysis of officers' writings.

in all levels of politics to constantly provide the professional 'service' of stability maintenance for the realisation of long-term economic development—a 'national interest.' Some self-images derived from the old version, such as 'self-sacrifice,' and ABRI's role as 'defender' and 'integrator' of the nation, have backed up both internal legitimation of the new *dwifungsi* and external fortification of antipolitical projects.⁴⁴

Our comparative doctrinal analysis implies that many of the *dwifungsi*-related phenomena are not unique to Indonesia. If so, what of the process and dynamics of doctrinal erosion in the face of the growth of democratic pressure? In many Latin American military regimes inspired by the DSN, political change in the 1980s led to military disengagement from politics and the resurgence of civilian government. Civilians have endeavoured to trim aggressive military doctrines in order to secure military subordination to democracy. Their aim has been to neutralise the implications of modernisation ideology from officers' professional military concerns, while not threatening their traditional loyalty to the nation. What is the problem of crafting military doctrine in this new way? What implications are there for Indonesia? In order to examine these questions, we need first to look at the general dynamics of the military extrication process and scholarly attempts to conceptualise civil-military relations in democratic transition. We will examine these issues of extrication in the next three sections—discussing approaches, analytical difficiencies, and political dilemmas—before returning to the questions raised above.

Extrication Problem I: Approaches

Beginning in 1979, South American military governments gradually relinquished power to civilians, for example in Ecuador, Bolivia, Peru and Brazil. Economic crisis had undermined the position of the ruling military, encouraging divisions within the military institution—always a key factor in motivating a military seizure of power—and provoking the overthrow of military government. Needler's timely study found common attitudes among the officer corps in some of these countries. Military presidents, who had come to power as institutional representatives of the military, were seen as using the armed forces to build a personal power base independent of the military institution and for self-interested purposes that the institution itself did not share.⁴⁵ The increasing gap between the ideal of being the guardian of national interests

⁴⁴ We will come back to this old-new distinction in the concluding chapter where we think about the direction of ABRI's internal reform in the post-Soeharto era.

⁴⁵ Needler (1980:622). The most prominent cases were Ecuador's General Guillermo Rodríguez Lara, Argentina's General Levingston, and Bolivia's General Juan Pereda Asbún. The overthrow of Preda was plotted by what was called 'the generational group' within the military, a set of younger officers, academy trained, more professionally oriented, who were tired of the continual factionalism and political meddling of the top echelons of the officer corps (*ibid.*, p.618).

and the reality of being a tool of a self-interested and unpopular president made it possible for military officers to perceive the transfer to civilian government as an acceptable choice. This perception was encouraged by the deepening economic crisis which showed day after day the government's inability to defend the 'national interest.' As seen previously, similar attitudes can be found among Indonesia's military during the late New Order period.

Apart from the collapse of the president-military relationship, many studies of regime change also recognise internal military conflicts in the process of polity transition. Fitch's comparative study in 1986 emphasised that, for a decade prior to military extrication, a visible common feature among military regimes in Latin America had been the conflict between the faction in power and those who performed normal military functions.⁴⁶ This assessment was reflected in O'Donnell and Schmitter's influential theoretical work, published in the same year. They argued that:

[A] factor encouraging a withdrawal from government concerns the agencies of repression. Whenever this 'instrument' is used protractedly and indiscriminately, and whatever the initial formal engagement of the military, the units specially responsible tend to develop an increasing autonomy and capacity to command resources. This exacerbates old rivalries between service branches and leads to skirmishes over jurisdictions and methods.... [F]aced with the growth of security agencies, professionally minded officers may become willing to support a civilianization of authority which can deal effectively with such excesses.⁴⁷

Emphasising the role of intra-military conflict—namely between the security unit's hardliners and moderate professionals—O'Donnell and Schmitter concluded that: "there is no transition whose beginning is not the consequence of important divisions within the authoritarian regime itself, principally along the fluctuating cleavage between hard-liners and soft-liners."⁴⁸

This assessment sees the primary cause of democratic transition as a 'contingent' result of a game among authoritarian agents. Transition, therefore, is random, uncertain, unplanned, unpredictable and shaped by their strategic choices. This view challenges structural explanations which have tried to find causes in the socio-economic and political structure—i.e. the lack of regime adaptability to the growing political, economic and international pressures on the authoritarian regime.⁴⁹ The new emphasis was on the action aspect rather than structure. Reflecting this tendency, current theories of military disengagement from politics involve a set of different approaches between action and structure. It seems reasonable to assert that the structural approach may not explain the direct trigger of military extrication,

⁴⁶ Fitch (1986:34).

⁴⁷ O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:35).

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p.19.

⁴⁹ Application of game theory, for instance by Przeworski (1992), represents a distinct challenge to the structural approach. On the contest between the structural and contingent analyses, see, for example, Bratton and van de Walle (1997:19-27).

because it only describes the environment in which decision-makers operate. However, this does not undermine the significance of structural analysis, especially when we look at the entire event of withdrawal as a 'process.'

By 'process,' we mean a set of three steps: the pressure for change, the decision to withdraw, and the institutionalisation of the new civil-military relationship. In explaining the decision, the action focus is useful, but to explain the pressure for, and the subsequent institutionalisation of, withdrawal, there is no doubt that the structural focus is indispensable. For example, attention has to be paid to political structure which determines the availability of civilian leaders to whom the military may hand over government responsibility (or make partners in a new coalition). The economic aspect is also significant: the process by which economic crisis delegitimises the military's claim for better economic management under authoritarianism, and the way in which social mobilisation and the rise of a middle-class—as the result of economic growth—increases the demand for demilitarising the political system.⁵⁰ Even the aspect most unlikely to be the direct trigger to withdraw—i.e. the international system—is important in assessing the way in which the influx of international values, such as human rights and democracy, undermines the legitimacy of military rule.⁵¹ The action approach, on the other hand, explains things not covered by structural approaches, such as the military's motivation and rationale to disengage and its optimal timing. Thus, in understanding the entire process of military disengagement, both structure and action are indispensable and mutually supporting rather than conflicting. This

⁵⁰ The relationship between economic change and the military has been a controversial issue. José Nun's (1970:329) classic thesis—first presented in 1967—insists that professional armies in Latin America have middle-class origins and have acted as representatives of middle-class interests, compensating for that class's inability to establish itself as a well-integrated hegemonic group. Huntington (1968:222) elaborates this insight and concludes that the military's historic role is to open the door to the middle class and to close it to the lower class. However, this Nun-Huntington hypothesis does not show how the officers of middle-class origin protect middle-class political demands such as for wider political participation and freedom of the mass media. Regarding Indonesia, there is also an argument that *dwifungsi*'s claim to be a social dynamiser is an idea representing the middle-class interest (*Indonesia Reports* [Political Supplement], No.19, December 1986, pp.7-8). But we have repeatedly seen that ABRI views the rise of the middle class as a political threat. Apart from the middle-class argument, Putnam's (1967:97) quantitative cross-national analysis stresses that socio-economic mobilisation in general undermines the military's role in politics, because it may increase the number of political actors and diffuse political resources available to the military. Huntington (1968: Chapter 1), on the contrary, argues that, as social mobility increases, the political system may fail to absorb social demands, resulting in political disorder which invites praetorian military intervention. O'Donnell's (1973) influential study concludes that the most likely consequences of modernisation (with high social mobility) in Latin America are bureaucratic-authoritarian military regimes, due to the increasing demand for wage repression to encourage capitalist economic growth. Ruhl (1982), who retested Putnam's analytical indicators, also rejected Putnam's thesis on empirical grounds. More recently, Danopoulos (1988:4) insists on the positive correlation between high levels of socio-economic development and the degree to which the military is disposed to let go of political power. But a causal relationship is not provided here.

⁵¹ Welch (1993:75,86,88) argues that civil-military relations in Third World countries are facing serious fundamental challenges due to the collapse of the Second World in 1989. The collapse of communist regimes affected the Third World through diminished military aid and greater emphasis on peace-keeping. The legitimacy of military rule may also be undermined by the loss of rationale in the form of the threat of international communism.

assessment resonates with general scholarly efforts to conceptualise how the structure regulates the action and how the action reproduces the structural environment.⁵²

This general interest among social scientists in the structure-action interaction has inevitably influenced the study of democratisation and military disengagement from politics. One recent approach has been to place an analytical unit between action and structure—namely institution. This approach, generally referred to as the 'new institutionalism,' tries to bridge actions and structure by analysing the mediating role of institutions both in regulating action patterns and in producing policies that affect the structural pattern.⁵³ Although this has not yet become the mainstream approach in scholarship on democratisation, there now seems to be a consensus about the need for a balance between structural and action explanations.

It is in this theoretical context that our doctrinal focus in the analysis of military extrication process should be located.⁵⁴ One characteristic of doctrinal study is that it can potentially bridge different analytical levels. For example, it can cover state-military relations and the individual officer's political perception. It can also bridge the gap between the military's corporate identity and internal cleavage within the officer corps. Moreover, our focus mediates the analyses of 'universal' military values—such as professionalism—and their 'indigenous' applications.

Given these analytical ranges, the doctrinal study encompasses two processes of military extrication from politics: the process in which democratic demand (i.e. structural pressure) is perceived by individual officers and reflected in the doctrine's interpretative change; and the process in which military officers—based on their

⁵² Skocpol (1985:21) suggests that "organisational configurations, along with their overall patterns of activity, affect political culture, encourage some kinds of group formation and collective political actions, and make possible the raising of certain political issues." In civil-military relations, the structure-action (S-A) interaction was presented, for example, by Suh (1987: Chapter 2). However, his model presents the S-A flow in a simple linear direction, excluding the feedback process of how actions regulate actors and structure. One of the influential works which successfully included the feedback loop in S-A analysis was Giddens' 'structuration theory.' However, one criticism of Giddens' theory is its lack of attention to the role of intermediators in the process by which individual actions influence the structural reconfiguration. See Thompson's (1989) vivid evaluation and criticism of structuration theory. In more recent civil-military relations studies, the S-A issue is often presented in terms of organisation-behaviour interaction. See Crouch (1997) for an attempt to analyse the interaction of organisational structure, ideology, culture, and political behaviour in comparing Southeast Asian militaries' reactions to democratisation.

⁵³ See O'Neil (1996) and Bratton and Walle (1997:41-45) who employ this neo-institutional approach in their analysis of democratic transition. Bratton and Walle argue that it can overcome the major weakness of the contingency approach to democratisation, that is 'excessive voluntarism' which creates a problem of 'presentism'—by heavily discounting the past—and a lack of predictive power as a comparative political theory. Both these studies are strongly inspired by the study of DiMaggio and Powell (1991). For an excellent overview of 'new institutionalism' and its differences with 'old' studies of political institutions, a recent work by Selznick (1996), who is labelled by DiMaggio and Powell as a representative of the 'old institutionalists,' is helpful. The term institution does not refer to formal organisation, but is defined as "a social order or pattern that reveals a particular reproduction process and owes its survival to relatively self-activating social process." This includes, for example, rituals, cultures, ideologies, laws and social beliefs. See Jepperson (1991:145).

⁵⁴ In making this point, I am indebted to Professors Philip Selznick, John O'Neil and Fred Riggs, who have suggested the validity of examining military doctrines as institutions and analysing the changing military roles mediated by doctrinal change.

doctrinal re-interpretations—conduct policies (i.e. actions) which encourage democratic space in the political structure. In other words, the doctrinal focus is helpful to mediate the S-A analysis, while at the same time it relieves us from borrowing a psychological approach to assess officers' political perceptions. As seen in the previous sections, our study of the DSN bridges the analysis of the individual officer's belief-system and the construction of military regimes in Latin America. The process of regime demilitarisation should be examined in the same framework.

Extrication Problem II: Analytical Questions

We have argued that the process-centred view of military extrication treats different approaches as mutually supportive. However, in the scholarly attempt to understand the changing patterns of civil-military relations, there are some analytical problems which are still unsolved. In this section, we examine three of them—namely, intervention level, culture, and the role of professionalism—which are related to the problem of *dwifungsi* discourse in Indonesia.

Danopoulos suggests that there are four factors determining military withdrawal: (1) the nature of intervention—whether the military functions as a praetorian moderator, a guardian, or a ruler; (2) the performance of soldiers as political governors—the degree and pace of legitimacy deflation; (3) professional military concerns—institutional incentives to go back to the normal military function; and (4) the availability of acceptable alternatives—whether the military can find reliable civilians or not.⁵⁵ Regarding (2), although legitimacy deflation is a significant indicator, there are many cases in which the military dominates politics without public legitimacy. This implies that the 'loss of legitimacy' is too vague to be regarded as a determinant of military extrication.⁵⁶ Concerning (4), presence or absence of the civilian alternative largely depends on the military's preference, thus it is hard to reduce it to the level of comparative generalisation. Factors one and three have been subject to more extensive debate.

Levels of Intervention

Any attempt, like that of Danopoulos, to conceptualise the nature of military involvement tends to be categorical or typological. Welch, for instance, argues that military involvement should be assessed along a spectrum, marked at one pole by unquestioned dominance of military officers over all political decisions and at the other pole by untrammelled control by governmental officials. He then distinguishes

⁵⁵ Danopoulos (1988:7-13).

⁵⁶ A similar assessment is presented in Stepan (1986:77).

three 'levels of intervention,' namely military influence in politics, military participation in politics, and military control of government.⁵⁷ The aim of identifying these levels is to characterise the changing position of the military in politics. This kind of approach follows Finer's classic description of four levels of intervention—*influence, blackmail, displacement of the civilian cabinet, and supplantment of the civilian regime.*⁵⁸

Criticism may be derived from at least three perspectives. First, as Luckham asserted, Finer's typology would make it difficult to account for the structural and behavioural similarities of the military in countries where military intervention has been pushed to different levels, such as Haiti, Batista's Cuba, and the Dominican Republic and Paraguay, but where the military *role* in society and politics is very similar.⁵⁹ In other words, the typological approaches adopted by Finer, Danopoulos and Welch look only at the different political status of the military at a given time, and makes it more difficult to perceive the similarities or 'likeness' which undoubtedly exist between certain levels of military intervention. As we will see later, this question of likeness becomes a central issue in understanding the problem of incomplete extrication, which cannot be covered adequately by the 'level' analysis.

Secondly, from a political process perspective, Lovell and Albright recently have argued that the notion of the civil-military distinction failed to take account of the behaviour of the military as an interest group.⁶⁰ This point is applicable to the typological approach to the level of military intervention, which makes it difficult to deal with the dynamics of change—for example, movement from 'participation' to 'influence'—which can activate lobbying (overt or covert) or political assertiveness on the part of the military. Since intervention analysis treats the position (or status) of the military in politics as the dependent variable, military politics resulting from a shift in the level cannot be covered within this framework. Thus, in facing the problem of military re-intervention in politics, level analysis can say little about its dynamics.

Thirdly, typologies of intervention levels become useful cross-national indicators *only* in comparing militaries where boundaries between military and political roles are sufficiently clear. If the boundary is blurred, distinctions between the 'ruler' and the 'moderator' or between 'participation' and 'influence'—that try to identify the military function in the government—are insufficient for grasping the potential power of the military which still engages in far-ranging political activities.⁶¹ Analysis of this sort can unintentionally mix two types of militaries (boundary-clear and boundary-blurred) and place potentially different militaries at the same intervention level. From this perspective, it should be noted that LIPI's *dwifungsi* study in 1996-7 employed this

⁵⁷ Welch (1993:74-75). The same distinction is presented in his famous previous work (1987:13).

⁵⁸ Finer (1962:86-90).

⁵⁹ Luckham (1971:21).

⁶⁰ Lovell and Albright (1997:7).

⁶¹ Hanneman's (1985) cross-national quantitative measuring of the level of intervention shows that existing typologies of the military role in politics are insufficiently detailed.

framework by arguing that ABRI should reduce its political role to the level of 'participation' from the current level of 'dominance,' and should gradually decrease it to 'influence.'⁶² As a political platform, this study expressed a collective demand for demilitarising the Indonesian polity. However, viewed from the standpoint of extrication theory, the typology does not seem to be appropriate to the case of ABRI, which has traditionally rejected the boundary in accordance with its *dwifungsi* doctrine. ABRI may interpret 'influence' as synonymous with *tut wuri handayani*, which—according to official interpretation—has already been manifest and implemented since the early 1990s. The level analysis, therefore, may employ a framework unsuitable for the military, which sees no clear boundary between military and political roles.

Above all, the approach which sees the extrication phenomenon as movement along a continuum of civilian and military influence cannot deal with the problem of blurred political-military boundaries shaped by a country's experience.⁶³ Because of this limitation, some scholars employ cultural approaches in the study of military extrication.

Culture

Rebecca Schiff's theory of cultural concordance rejects the current tendency of emphasising the separation of civil and military institutions and the authority of the civilian sphere over the military to prevent domestic military intervention and secure military withdrawal. By contrast, the theory of concordance highlights dialogue, accommodation, and shared values or objectives among the military, political elites and society, in order to prevent domestic military (re)intervention. Schiff identifies long-standing cultural values as the prime source of determining the type of mutual accommodation.⁶⁴

This approach is insightful in the sense that—unlike the intervention-level analysis—it does not presuppose a clear boundary between political and military affairs and it recognises military decisions as the product of political consensus. However, the cultural approach invites methodological questions. Once we see culture as the determinant of the concordance style, we are turned away from the perspective

⁶² Indria Samego, "Kesimpulan dan Rekomendasi Penelitian," in Indria Samego, et.al., *Peran Sospol ABRI: Masalah dan Prospeknya*, Jakarta: LIPI, March 1997, p.231.

⁶³ A similar problem can be found in the study of democratisation in general, which tries to categorise the level of democracy or the degree of authoritarianism in developing countries, by using a continuum between democracy and authoritarianism. Several concepts such as pseudo-democratic, semi-democratic, soft-authoritarian are placed along the continuum but, viewed from a country-specific stance, some cases show that democratic-authoritarian, or 'responsive-repressive' characteristics are not contradictory but mutually supportive for regime maintenance. See Crouch (1996: Chapter 1) which advocates this perspective by examining the case of Malaysia.

⁶⁴ See Schiff (1995:7-9, 12); (1997:120, 122-123).

of power. In other words, concordance, or a political pact, often reflects a state of uneven equilibrium enforced by the powerful military. Civilian acceptance of this equilibrium is not always driven by 'cultural values' but often by a fear of coercion or, at best, a pragmatic calculation of political strength. There is no doubt that a country's civil-military interaction is influenced by cultural factors, but if we make culture the independent variable in the explanation of military (dis)engagement, rational-choice aspects of political decision making tend to be left aside, and this is not consistent with dominant paradigms in contemporary social science.⁶⁵

Apart from the methodological problem, our doctrinal study of *dwifungsi*—and, to lesser extent, the DSN—leads us to see culture as a political tool of domination rather than as a mediator, or a 'shared value,' for the making of elite agreement. As seen in previous chapters, manipulating culture and tradition is one mode of military legitimation of its political involvement in Indonesia. Both the concordance theory and our doctrinal study respect the important role played by culture in determining the pattern of civil-military relations. However, the former emphasises its role in formulating collective consensus among elites, whereas the latter underlines the military's tactical interpretation of indigenous culture to control political discourse in favour of military engagement in non-military affairs. Perhaps both aspects can be seen in a single military regime, so that the difference is not a matter of significance. However, as a comparative analytical tool, our approach to culture seems to be less abstract and more user-friendly, since it enables researchers to adopt the 'official' description of culture to analyse how it is used to justify military intervention.

Professionalism

Returning to Danopoulos' four factors motivating the military to disengage, let us now focus on the third factor—professionalism. Danopoulos argues that "the disposition or motivation to disengage refers to a situation in which the military becomes convinced that the time has come to return to its prescribed professional mission."⁶⁶ This view provides a significant theme in the scholarly analysis of how

⁶⁵ King, Keohane and Verba's brilliant study suggests that the concept of culture can be a hindrance to empirical *evaluation* of theories and hypotheses. Therefore it should be avoided in constructing causal theories. For details, see King, Keohane and Verba (1994:99-114). A similar evaluation can be applied to Huntington's (1984:210) interesting argument that: "countries that have relatively stable authoritarian rule are more likely to evolve into relatively stable democracies than countries that have regularly oscillated between despotism and democracy. In the latter, neither democracy nor authoritarian norms have deep roots among the political elites, while in the former a broad consensus accepting authoritarian norms is displaced by broad consensus on or acceptance of democratic ones." Here, 'consensus' and 'norms' are treated as independent variables, but, like culture, they are too abstract and unobservable to form the basis of a concrete causal hypothesis. Another case is Pinkney's (1990:163) cross-national study which concludes that, with few exceptions, right-wing military regimes have generally fewer objections in principle to withdrawing from politics than those on the left. This is not a cultural approach, but an example of using unclear independent variables.

⁶⁶ Danopoulos (1988:7). Here, professional mission refers to external defence tasks.

domestically-involved militaries are transformed into externally-oriented ones—or, borrowing Stepan's terms, shift from 'new' to 'old' professionalism. However, at a different level of discussion, of relevance to ABRI, it remains a question whether or not it is relevant to link professionalism with the military's 'motivation' to withdraw. It should be noted at the outset that neither non-professionalism (i.e. lack of corporate loyalty to the nation) nor hyper-professionalism (i.e. overloyalty to the nation and overconfidence in its managerial ability) motivates extrication, since the former may undermine the top leadership's decision to disengage for the sake of the nation, while the latter confirms the officer corps' distrust of civilians.⁶⁷ Although we may exclude these extreme cases, we still have to accept—in order to see professionalism as a motivation to disengage—an argument that the military decides to withdraw because it wants to be a professional military. Needless to say, this is a weak thesis because the term 'professionalism' here already contains apolitical connotations. The argument defining professionalism as the 'disposition' to extricate, therefore, tends to be tautological.⁶⁸ If the motivation has to be found, it is usually the desire of the military to improve its public image, or to end internal military splits.

This assessment is, of course, not to dismiss the link between professionalism and extrication. Characteristics attached to professionalism—such as autonomy, cohesion, corporate interests, and loyalty to the nation—may influence the 'pattern' of withdrawal. For example, a degree of institutional cohesion helps explain the difference between chaotic and organised withdrawal. Maniruzzaman's data-rich study suggests that abrupt military withdrawal from politics is common in the case of non-professional militaries, whereas professional militaries maintain an effective chain of command and tend to plan their withdrawal.⁶⁹

Institutional autonomy is also a significant factor influencing disengagement patterns. Bratton and van de Walle found that African soldiers—relative to Latin American—were reticent about handing power back to civilians and initiating managed transitions.⁷⁰ The reason for this was the weak autonomy of the military vis-a-vis social structure. They argue that, instead of professional training, nationalistic sentiments, and shared *esprit de corps*, African militaries in general are riven by political factionalism and patronage systems based on ethnic solidarities in the ranks. Thus

⁶⁷ For a similar assessment, see Lissak's (1976:19) classic study of Third World military role-expansion.

⁶⁸ We can rephrase Danopoulos's above quotation as follows. "The motivation to *stop playing politics* refers to a situation in which the military becomes convinced that the time has come to return to an *apolitical military*." The right question here is why the military wishes to be apolitical, and the answer to this becomes the motivation to withdraw. A similar problem can be found more generally in the literature—for instance, Finer (1983)—which emphasises 'preconditions' for military withdrawal—such as presence of alternative civilians and the need for civil-military pacts. These 'prerequisites' are treated as factors of extrication, but they are also the consequences of withdrawal; thus one ends up saying that civilianisation needs civilians. Among many criticisms of this 'precondition approach' to military extrication, see Pion-Berlin (1995) for one suggesting its tautological nature.

⁶⁹ See Maniruzzaman (1987: Chapters 3 and 4).

⁷⁰ Bratton and van de Walle (1997:171).

military reinterventions are usually driven by a defence of patrimonial material privilege.⁷¹ In this sense, the lack of institutional autonomy—or high social permeability—of African armies makes it difficult for them, in comparison with Latin American counterparts, to adopt stable disengagement plans through the command structure.

In sum, professionalism is a significant focus not because it explains the motivation to disengage, but because it illustrates the (in)ability of the military to arrange the transformation of its 'institutional' orientation in an organised way. Without this ability, any withdrawal attempt may face disruption. Viewed from this standpoint, ABRI's relative position can be found somewhere between less-professional African and historically-professional Latin American cases. Although ABRI's professional standards were undermined by Soeharto's (and Sukarno's) neopatrimonial manoeuvring, as discussed previously, this has not penetrated as deeply as it has in African armies. ABRI's professional identity is much stronger and its sense of 'national interest' is entrenched. Its command structure is well established and—in comparison with African cases—its ethnically diverse officer corps largely shares the profession's corporate values. ABRI officers themselves have also insisted on these aspects. If so, it is safe to judge that ABRI at least possesses sufficient professional capacity to transform its institutional role orientation via the decision of the top leadership—if it so decides. Confirming this point through the comparative perspective is important because it now appears that, unlike African cases, ABRI's accommodation to managed withdrawal is therefore not unlikely if there is a will on the part of the current ABRI leadership. This assessment undermines one primitive justification of *dwifungsi*: that ABRI may use guns if it is segregated from politics.⁷²

Extrication Problem III: Dilemmas of Incomplete Transition

In the previous two sections, we have discussed the general dynamics of the extrication process and some problems in its theoretical terrain. Our final focus is on the question of incomplete withdrawal, which reveals some common dilemmas in the process of democratic transition and implies the importance of revising military doctrines in order to prevent military reintervention. Our attempt at employing the lesson of the DSN for the better assessment of the prospects for *dwifungsi* needs to clarify the 'dilemmas' and problems of doctrinal rewriting.

The term 'withdrawal' is a concept to explain a 'characteristic' of military behaviour, but it cannot encompass the 'degree' of that behaviour because of its

⁷¹ Ibid., pp.215-216. Their empirical study concludes that the most anti-democratic military reinterventions fit this pattern in Africa.

⁷² See Chapters 2 and 6 for this rationale.

relativist nature. Viewed from the military, its abandoning of direct government 'responsibility' is obviously a withdrawal phenomenon, but in the eyes of civilian democratisers such a step may be perceived merely as alleviation of political control without disturbing military ascendancy.⁷³ The difference in standpoint leads to different assessments of the same event. Thus, it should first be noted that when we discuss the issue of incomplete extrication we deal primarily with the perspective of those who want to civilianise the polity and establish a strong civilian control mechanism.

Incomplete extrication typically may be found in the struggle over two issues—(1) the handling of past human-rights abuses by the military, and (2) the revision of professional military missions. When the military abandons government responsibility, civilian successors are almost doomed to face the popular demand for prosecuting the military that has committed human rights violations during its rule. Absorbing the demand is decisively important in consolidating the political legitimacy of the new civilian government.⁷⁴ The dilemma, however, is that the military's instincts of self-preservation may provide a motive for reintervention when it finally understands the government's inability to let the 'patriot' military withdraw with 'honour.' A common feature in Latin America, Fitch suggests, is that total withdrawal is unlikely without guarantees that human rights abuses and other crimes committed during the previous government will not be prosecuted.⁷⁵

The other dilemma is in choosing between the need to revise the military's professional mission, and the need to avoid threatening its institutional autonomy (and the possible backlash from doing so). However, the new government needs to ensure that the military's autonomy is not too great, as this may allow some civilians—who are unsatisfied with the new government leaders and seek to advance themselves

⁷³ The concept of 'government responsibility' is borrowed from Sundhaussen (1984). Although he himself does not emphasise it, the concept greatly contributes to the study of Third World military politics. It gives us an analytical lens to examine the military which has given up government control but still plays a very active role in the process of political decision making—a phenomenon which cannot be covered by the dichotomous view of withdrawal and intervention.

⁷⁴ Prosecution is especially important to show the new government's commitment to democratic principles, social justice and the rule of law. See Huntington's (1991:213-214) listing of the reasons. On the political strategy of the civilian authority using the human-rights issue to strengthen its bargaining power vis-a-vis the military, and its limitations, see Zirker's (1988) study in the case of Brazil.

⁷⁵ Fitch (1986:35). Argentina is suggested here as exceptional. But a year after Fitch's publication, a military coup was attempted to oppose prosecution of human rights. In 1988 two additional military uprisings were attempted. Although civilian governments led by Alfonsín and later Carlos Menem suppressed all of them, the government decided to pardon those officers who had been charged with human rights violations and even with coup attempts. Huntington's (1991:231, 252) well-know policy advice to Third World democratisers was: if [regime] transformation occurs, do not attempt to prosecute authoritarian officials for human rights violation. The political costs of such an effort will outweigh any moral gains. But, he says, if prosecution is morally and politically desirable, do it promptly against the authoritarian leaders, not against middle- and lower-ranking officials. Against 'new' coup attempts, however, he recommends to ruthlessly punish the leaders of coups against your new government. Thus, he distinguishes between 'past and present,' and between 'human-rights and coups.' Our focus in this section is, of course, on past human-rights abuses.

in the 'democratic' competition—to 'knock on the door of the barracks.' Moreover, it is argued that a 'moral' institutional status and a creditable/honourable role in accomplishing (but not setting) national goals must be provided for the military, within a functioning political democracy, while at the same time its messianic self-image has to be modified.⁷⁶

Such balancing of policies to minimise the dilemma is not easy, but the goals are very clear—i.e. to segregate the military from the political arena *and* to depoliticise the military institution. Scholars have argued that these can be achieved by infusing, or restoring, apolitical professional missions. In other words, as Huntington puts it, the emphasis is on rewriting doctrines and revising curricula in service academies.⁷⁷ To use a familiar concept in our study, military doctrines have to be reshaped to define the clear boundary between military and political affairs and exclude the latter from the professional mission of the military. It is in this process of restructuring missions and establishing strong control mechanisms that conflict may intensify between the new civilian government and the military, as the latter sees such policy initiatives as threatening.⁷⁸ After all, the legacy of human-rights violations and the revision of military missions are the two issue-areas of greatest potential conflict between the new civilian government and the military, and contain serious dilemmas for democratic civilians. Because of this, many regimes have experienced a long period of incomplete military extrication.⁷⁹

Incomplete withdrawal is, therefore, a situation in which the military has transferred government responsibility to civilians but retains ambitions and significant power resources to threaten the new civilian authority. It reflects demilitarisation of the government while maintaining the militarisation of the political system.⁸⁰ Thus, the fundamental change in the military's political perception is scarcely recognised at this stage. At the height of its rule, the military rejected participatory democracy for the achievement of 'national objectives' as determined by professional officers. When faced with democratic pressures later, the military relaxed its political control or, in other

⁷⁶ See O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:32, 35). They also emphasise that, in order to achieve these ends, the military spirit of professionalism has to be secured by democratic civilians. According to them, professionalisation is often disturbed by civilian leaders who want to install officers loyal to their aspirations in high military office, even if that means jumping ranks or appointing less professionally competent candidates.

⁷⁷ Huntington (1996:6). We fully discuss the way to rewrite doctrines in the next section.

⁷⁸ See Stepan (1988: Chapter 6). To emphasise the danger of a threatened military, Danopoulos (1992:20) suggests that the crafting of civilian control should include "group participation and a sense of involvement in the definition of the broad methods and means of governing, conflict resolution, leadership selection, foreign and security policy goals, and the ways of distributing wealth." However, giving such broad participation may undermine a new civilian effort to demarcate the political-military boundary.

⁷⁹ Zagorski's (1992:46) empirical study suggests that the incomplete period took 18 months in Argentina, 5 years in Brazil, 7 years in Chile, 6 years in Peru, and 5 years in Uruguay. Indonesia's transition from the Soeharto to the Habibie government has been in progress for a year, but similar dilemmas are already visible.

⁸⁰ Rouquié (1987:375).

words, deregulated the political market.⁸¹ The decision to extricate itself was most unlikely to have been the outcome of the military's commitment to civil-society values, but largely of the assessment that it was the safest way to restore the internal cohesion of the military. Looking at these developments, Nunn concludes that Latin American officers under the civilian authority still endanger (re)democratisation, as they view the growing civilian political culture as a threat to military nationalism and to 'national values.' When threatened, he continues, they tend to fall back on tradition, national values, geopolitics, and national security to justify their continued existence.⁸² The reality of imperfect withdrawal has led many scholars to conclude that it is 'prerogatives' retained by the military which have left civil-military relations unchanged in essence and have hindered civilian governments in their efforts to consolidate new democratic regimes.⁸³ The 'prerogative approach' has become a major tool for analysing the problems of incomplete extrication.

However, this approach essentially assumes the *status quo*. Is it true that civil-military relations have not been advanced? If so, can we deduce an explanation exclusively from the fact that the military still 'holds' these prerogatives, as Zaverucha insists? Explaining the scope and depth of prerogatives can certainly help us understand the perceived corporate interests of the military, but we should note that these prerogatives are not identical with military influence in politics. What is more crucial is the 'using' of the prerogatives. For example, in ABRI's case, what makes ABRI influential in the legislative process is *not* the holding of the prerogative, i.e. appointed military seats in the DPR, but the lobbying by F-ABRI. If F-ABRI does nothing, the prerogative is not a source of influence. Similarly, *kekaryaan* is a prerogative of ABRI—officers instead call it 'service'—but it has to be 'used' effectively in order to control politics. If ABRI merely has such a prerogative but lacks resources, legitimacy, and capacity, the intended purpose of the prerogative cannot be achieved. In this sense, the

⁸¹ See, for example, Black's (1980) study of military perceptions during the Brazilian version of *keterbukaan*, which started in 1979 and was called political decompression (*distensão*) or opening (*abertura*). According to Black, democratisation was perceived by Brazilian officers as allowing political participation by those who accepted the military's own interpretation of its 'moderating role' (p.635). Zirker (1986) found a growing nationalist inclination among the hard-line officers during *abertura*.

⁸² Nunn (1995:27).

⁸³ For the best analysis of military prerogatives, see Stepan's (1988:93-127) extensive study of incomplete extrication under the civilian president, José Sarney, in Brazil (1985-90). He lists 11 areas in which the military seeks prerogatives—i.e. in the constitution; in its relationship with the chief executive; in coordination of the defence sector; in its allocation of cabinet members; in the legislature; in appointment of senior civil servants; in the intelligence sector; in the role of the police; in military promotions; in state enterprises; and in the legal system. Stepan's model was modified and updated by Zaverucha (1993:299), who concluded that: "civil-military relations did not advance, and particularly nothing substantial was done to curtail military prerogatives. Indeed the military continued openly challenging the constituted civilian authorities. Leaders of the democratic transition opted out of confronting the military over its scope for autonomy. In those rare cases when the Executive and Legislature tried to impose their will, the military threatened to disrupt the transition and the civilians simply resigned themselves to the continuation of military prerogatives."

prerogative approach—which analyses 'conditions' rather than 'process'—does not allow us to draw conclusions about the actual military influence in the polity.

In fact, the *status quo* assumption of the prerogative approach is challenged by scholars who favour the political-process approach. Fitch, for example, argues that the recreation of political space and the diminished threat of violent repression has encouraged the re-politicisation of previously demobilised civilian sectors more rapidly and explosively than anticipated by most regimes. Despite the efforts of military leaders to control the selection of their civilian successors, the return to elections has typically produced unwanted results which cannot be repudiated.⁸⁴ Similarly, Wendy Hunter's rational-actor approach leads her to conclude that: "over time, democratically elected politicians [in Brazil] have successfully contested the power of the military over a broad range of issues and narrowed its sphere of influence."⁸⁵ Civil-military relations, therefore, are not stagnant. The structure may remain the same, but the rules of the political game have greatly changed. Although the civilian authority may face difficulties in prosecuting military officers for past human-rights abuses, and may allow the military to retain its politicised professional missions, this does not mean that incomplete withdrawal results in political decay. The two most common dilemmas for the new civilian authority are no doubt critical to the politics of civil-military relations, but they are not everything. The practice of antipolitics is no longer legitimate and democratic civilians freely compete to mobilise the masses.

In sum, as with our earlier discussion of structure-action (S-A) approaches to the understanding of extrication, the condition-process approaches in the analysis of incomplete withdrawals should not be seen as contradictory but as complementary in explaining different aspects of the same event. A problem emerges only when one approach oversteps into the territory of the other and tries to generalise about the entire event. Such an 'obtrusive' conclusion may cloud the original merit of the approach. In analysing dilemmas of incomplete extrication, this has to be remembered. We have seen that past human rights abuse by the military poses a major dilemma. But, does this allow us to say—as Huntington and others say—that making human rights abuses a non-issue is a prerequisite for successful transition? It can be argued that if the military is divided during the extrication process, human rights issues can be used by military softliners to purge the hardliners, which may smooth the transition.⁸⁶

⁸⁴ Fitch (1986:30).

⁸⁵ Hunter (1995:427). Her detailed case studies of labour-rights, budgetary allocation, and development projects leads her to conclude that military prerogatives are not necessarily translated into effective influence over policy outcomes. See Hunter (1997:71).

⁸⁶ There is likely a scholarly consensus to look at the different interests involved in the process of authoritarian breakdown which is characterised by internal division within the military between hard- and soft-liners. However, the literature seems to have favoured a dichotomy of 'civilian vs. military' in the handling of past human-rights abuses. Here, the role of the continuing internal split is less focused. The military, which retains old prerogatives, is said to become defensive in the face of civilian attempts at undermining its corporate interests and institutional autonomy. However, this perspective limits our observation of the pluralistic political process. When the key officers in the new military leadership—

In Indonesia's transition to the post-Soeharto regime, past human-rights issues have been needed, to some extent, in consolidating the new ABRI leadership under Gen Wiranto who used these issues to weaken the power base of his rival, Lt-Gen Prabowo, in Kopassus and Kostrad.

Crafting Internal-External Doctrinal Transformations

We have examined major issue-areas of military extrication and concluded that: (1) our doctrinal focus provides a middle-range perspective to fill the gap between structural and action explanations; (2) neither intervention-level nor cultural explanations sufficiently cover the problem of the blurred politico-military boundary set by doctrines; (3) the degree of professionalisation may influence the extrication pattern, but is less likely to be its primary motivation (this is evident when the military is unwilling to be apolitical after the disengagement); and (4) civilian dilemmas about reducing military prerogatives are discernible, but they do not determine the entire civil-military power balance because the growing domain of civilian initiatives leaves the military unable to use certain prerogatives in the political process. Based on these assessments, this final section brings the DSN back into our discussion and examines the ideological-institutional problem of doctrinal transformation in consolidating political control of the military.⁸⁷ Broadly speaking, the doctrinal transformation has two dimensions—external and internal. External transformation is concerned with the relative (or absolute) shift of military roles in society. Its focus is on military missions. Internal transformation refers to the change in corporate military perception and thought. We will consider these two dimensions—missions and thought—as the target of doctrinal reform for democratic civilians who endeavour to subordinate the military to government authority.

External Transformation

usually the softliners—endeavour to restore internal unity which has deteriorated as a result of their conflicts with the hardline group, they may endeavour to deal with the civilian authority on the issue of human rights, both in order to facilitate (and legitimise) the purging of the hardline faction and to strengthen the internal legitimacy of the current military leadership, by cultivating external support from the civilian elite in the government. If that is the case, the degree of the military's cooperation in the handling of past human rights abuses still depends on the logic of the internal military split, not the dichotomy of civil-military conflict. The new military leaders may find a technique to sideline human rights pressures by explaining the violations as the conduct of hardliners who deviated from the military disciplinary codes. The 'professionally'-oriented softliners may think that, in order to defend the 'institutional' position of the military in the transition process, and to regain its internal cohesion, purging hardliners is a necessary step. Coping with democratic civilians is a rational choice if it helps to achieve that end.

⁸⁷ Welch suggests that there is a commonality in the literature on Latin American militaries in that the new doctrine of national security has changed the military's professional role and stimulated its political role expansion, but reasons for muting the 'new' professionalism remain unexplored in detail in the literature (1992:327). Doing so requires us to examine at least three aspects: mission, professionalism and doctrine.

To begin with missions, current scholarship seems to have reached a grand consensus that the military's political duties under the DSN should be removed from the scope of professional military missions. In addition to military control of formal political institutions, the DSN also provided a rationale for the use of military intelligence to conduct missions quite different from those associated with external defence, for example infiltrating businesses, universities, labour unions and political parties.⁸⁸ It is not enough for the new government to prohibit these activities if the military retains incentives to engage in them. The 'loss of mission' may simply confuse the military profession and stimulate its political reintervention. As seen earlier, what is said to be important is the provision of alternative but credible missions which do not harm democratic life.

Welch suggests that physical movement of troops to border areas, or outside the country for international peace-keeping efforts, facilitates transformation. According to him, the 'appropriate' mission would include relatively limited direct involvement in internal development or civic action.⁸⁹ In regard to limited involvement in development projects, O'Donnell and Schmitter cynically state that the military's role in running state and parastate enterprises *can* be useful in occupying the time and interests of officers who might otherwise find little else to do. Even at the risk of increasing the danger—and cost—of corruption, it exposes those officers to a range of nonmilitary contacts wider than those provided by the civilian 'coup-inducers.'⁹⁰ Except for the latter, which merely tries to keep the military out of political activity, these proposals are all aimed at redirecting the military's professional missions. Border defence, peace-keeping operations and, more ambiguously, civic action are typically suggested in this context.

Problems are easily found in both reality and theoretical assumption. The former raises the question of feasibility and the latter focuses on the dubious linkage between these missions and military depoliticisation. The feasibility problem can be seen, for example, in Brazil. There, although civilian leaders considered shifting the military orientation to external defence missions, at the same time they knew that such diversion was not necessary in post Cold War Latin America, where social and economic issues loom large. Under these circumstances, President Franco guided the military to expand its civic-mission programs since 1992; deploying troops for civic action is far less costly than training them for external missions. However, this tends to

⁸⁸ On the relationship between the DSN and internal intelligence, see Zagorski (1992:55-58).

⁸⁹ Welch (1987:22-23). Huntington (1996:10) similarly suggests peace-keeping missions because, although not conventional warfighting, they do involve the deployment of armed forces abroad in situations where they could be called upon to fire or be fired upon. Moreover, the involvement of the military in new international alliances and collaborative relationships can provide military establishments with constructive and demanding missions.

⁹⁰ O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986:32).

aggravate civil-military tensions because the officer corps regards the greater civic-mission role as less appropriate for soldiers who are professionally trained for national security.⁹¹ A simple but important question here is: why are its corporate interests thought to be threatened? A part of the answer lies on the officers' growing sense of gap between their role perceptions and newly assigned missions. Arranging new missions does not solve the fundamental problem if the military retains the mental legacy of the DSN. This leads us to discuss the second issue mentioned above—the assumption that new missions may distance the military from politics.

In the post Cold War international environment, the proposed new missions are no doubt helpful to give credible and honourable roles to the professional militaries *with* a civilian-control philosophy. It is, however, too early to expect the same outcome in the case of professional militaries *with* the DSN legacy. Their perceptual universe may even identify these missions as a source of strengthening commitment to their long-term doctrinal beliefs, resulting in a growing gap between their self-image and the real situation. The case of ABRI—a professional military *with* the *dwifungsi* mentality—may contribute to the understanding of this.

ABRI has been involved in peace-keeping missions organised by the United Nations since 1957. Its troops—called Garuda Contingents—have been deployed to various places seventeen times, half of them during the 1990s. Officers like Lt-Gen Bambang Yudhoyono and Brig-Gen Edi Budianto—a close ally of Prabowo—earned good reputations for their leadership during such operations.⁹² For ABRI, involvement in peace-keeping missions not only provides a rationale for claiming its good relationship with the international community and for maintaining its 'professional' capacity judged by international standards, but also reinforces ABRI's long-term commitment to *dwifungsi* practices. When asked about his experience in Cambodia, a navy intellectual, Rear Admiral Kustia, insisted that:

[O]ne reason why ABRI earned a high reputation among foreign military observers was that it was only ABRI personnel who got close to the *rakyat* [people] in Cambodia. Other foreign soldiers asked the local people not to come inside the fence of their camps. Our soldiers were the opposite. They welcomed locals to visit them and sometimes gave medicines which were prepared for their own use.... Although other foreigners were surprised, it was not something special for ABRI because they had been trained with *dwifungsi* and AMD. They just did what they had done in Indonesia. ABRI's motto is that "what is good for the *rakyat* is what is

⁹¹ For details, see Hunter's (1994) cross-national comparison of civilian initiatives in redirecting military missions and their problems. In Brazil, reducing the military budget also worked negatively as officers became unable to maintain their living standards and many started to find second jobs. Thus, these civilian attempts are generally seen as serious threats to the corporate interest of the Brazilian military. See *ibid.*, p.643. In New Order Indonesia, a similar concern was expressed by ABRI in the Back-to-Basics document we saw in Chapter 3.

⁹² Bambang Yudhoyono was the leader of Garuda Contingent 7 to Cambodia (1991), while Edi Budianto—a classmate of Prabowo and Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin at Akabri—led Garuda Contingent 14 to Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993.

good for ABRI." Our experience in Cambodia showed that the *dwifungsi* mission was universally applicable.⁹³

Similarly, Air Vice-Marshal Graitto Usodo, who was involved in the Cambodia mission, recalled that:

Success in Cambodia was the product of *dwifungsi* which trained soldiers with the spirit of professionalism and self-dedication. Giving medicines to the local people is a common activity designed by Opster [territorial operations]. We just used it in Cambodia and we just got a high reputation. There is nothing special.⁹⁴

ABRI's participation in peace-keeping missions has demonstrated its professional capacity to international society, but has not revealed any contradiction between internal and external security missions. Indeed, the peace-keeping mission encourages ABRI to retain its traditional political doctrine. Military thinkers can argue that *dwifungsi* missions have proved ABRI's appropriateness in the international arena, and thus reinforce the process of *dwifungsi* re-legitimation.

ABRI's civic missions have similar effects. They include disaster relief, family planning, reforestation, rural food productivity, AMD, and more broadly defined socio-cultural development.⁹⁵ There is no doubt that these civic missions have contributed to the improvement of national life, but along with their overt purposes, these missions have provided ABRI with a constant basis for the internal socialisation of its messianic role self-perception. Regarding civic missions, ABRI has insisted that: "it is not influenced by cultural-based peculiarities but is united in its nationalism. ABRI officers, therefore, are in a good position to assist the government in maintaining social harmony."⁹⁶ This standard perception easily translates into the idea that ABRI is an agent of national integration and modernisation, while civilians are self-interested; or that ABRI dedicates itself to the national interest, while civilians care only about their sectional interests. Needless to say, these organisational self-images have been at the core part of *dwifungsi* legitimation and therefore have motivated broader political activities.

Under these circumstances, the peace-keeping and civic missions may be ineffective in keeping the military out of politics. Rather, it is highly probable that if the mission shift is attempted by civilians, the officers' messianic self-image will identify the gap between their broad national concerns and the limited role given to them. This

⁹³ Interview with Rear Admiral A.A. Kustia, Coordinator of Expert Staff for Navy Chief-of-Staff, 3 October 1996. During the UN peace-keeping operations in Cambodia, Japanese Foreign Minister, Koji Kakizawa, who visited the country, commented that among foreign military observers, Indonesian troops seemed to be the best disciplined and most friendly towards the local people.

⁹⁴ Interview with Air Vice-Marshal Graitto Usodo, Expert Staff for ABRI Commander in the Field of Industrial Affairs, 26 November 1996.

⁹⁵ See *The White Paper*, pp.48-54.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.54.

gap may open the officers' eyes to the civilians' inability to protect the 'national interest' and their lack of understanding of the military's competence to do so. Such a perception encourages military resentment towards the civilian authority, as in the case of Brazil. It is in this context that the argument stressing external warfare, border defence, peace-keeping and civic actions as alternative professional missions to secure military non-intervention cannot be accepted without substantial reservation.⁹⁷ The argument only becomes relevant where the military does not see any serious contradiction between its self-image and the reality. Perhaps it is limited to professional militaries which are *inspired* by the civilian-control doctrine.⁹⁸

Internal Transformation

This is not to deny the significance of mission transformation, but to insist on its likely failure if not accompanied by internal doctrinal transformation, that is counterbalancing the military's self-image as embodied in the DSN or *dwifungsi*. This transformation is crucial in the process of democratic transition in order to prevent the military from developing an interpretation of democratisation which is quite different from that of the civilian authority. The gap in civil-military perceptions becomes an impediment to formulating the target and means of democratic reform—including the degree of military extrication and the assignment of alternative military missions.

In the case of Brazil, according to Stepan, the professional military, with the mental legacy of the DSN, accepted that democratisation was a necessary process but believed that it required 'self-guards' (or control mechanisms) in order to be accomplished. Here, the interpretation of national security was tactically adapted to emphasise the military's leading role in promoting the 'principle of self-defence of democracy.' It was in this process that the military attempted to neutralise the emerging political opposition—the legitimate expression of dissenting opinion about government policy—by labelling it as 'contestation,' and seeing it as a systematic attack on the regime itself and thus illegitimate and subject to repression according to the self-defence principle.⁹⁹ Similarly, in Indonesia, the military—which accepted the need for democratisation—developed techniques to neutralise democratic pressure

⁹⁷ Regarding external warfare in general, Odetala's case study illustrates that the mission may even undermine the professional standard in the cases of African militaries. He suggests that the conduct of wars created the necessity for rapid crash-training as well as 'quick' promotions within the military because of manpower needs to prosecute such wars. Premature promotions of more junior officers to act in more senior positions adversely affected organised growth of the professional military institutions (Odetala 1982:24). This may be an extreme case, but it casts doubt on the assumption that the external defence mission promotes professional orientations.

⁹⁸ We intentionally avoid using the term 'Western professionalism,' which is often used by scholars in explaining the non-interventionist military, to avoid the cultural-value orientation contained in the terminology which inclines to the 'excessive universalism' of linking it to democratisation and 'Western' values.

⁹⁹ See Stepan (1988:50-51).

under the late New Order regime. As examined previously, *dwifungsi* employed the *kewaspadaan* approach, which incorporated the concept of globalisation in order to delegitimise the opposition in the name of defending the principle of Pancasila democracy.¹⁰⁰

In these circumstances, the core military thinking has a commonality—i.e. the fusion of the sanctified image of 'national interests' and messianic self-role perception. Here, the *nation* is recognised as an organic entity whose interests are embodied in the *state* in which the *government* only handles its daily activities while the *military*—as a national representative—is expected to be the 'direct' guardian of the sacred national interest.¹⁰¹ This set of perceptions, which motivates the military to ignore the government is the target of internal doctrinal transformation. In this regard, Zagorski insists that "the strategy includes the redefinition of armed forces' sphere of competence, [so] as to induce them to alter both their technical and nationalist conceptions." Reformers, he continues, must promote a view of nationalism that links loyalty to the nation with loyalty to the democratic regime.¹⁰² This idea resonates with Stepan's assessment of educational problems in the Brazilian military. He relates how, in the war college courses, social and political conflicts were not accepted as a constituent element of a democracy. The recurrent assumption was that conflicts are dangerous. Then the DSN implanted a perspective of the state as the agent for structuring civil and political society so as to dissuade the articulation of conflict where possible, and to repress such articulation when necessary. Thus, Stepan continues, the democratic leadership of the state has to play a role in creating new doctrines of national defence that provide positive alternatives to these ideas and

¹⁰⁰ More fundamentally, the New Order military's interpretation of democratic pressures tended to use the systems approach to neutralise criticism. The 1995 White Paper argues that "the range of domestic political problems has expanded basically because the rate of growth of political aspirations has far outstripped the rate at which the practice of democracy has matured. Imbalance between these two factors can disturb political stability" (p.10). This interpretative model—which seems to borrow Huntington's (1968) political order thesis—allowed ABRI to view criticism as a matter of system disequilibrium, obscuring the aspect of policy failure of the regime (and ABRI) as the cause of growing political aspirations.

¹⁰¹ These are common perceptions of political militaries in developing countries. Lissak (1976:20) argues that their role perception stems from the distorted development of an otherwise legitimate distinction between the nation and the state. This distortion is manifested by an officer corps which considers itself the exclusive embodiment of the will of the nation and views all other functional groups as expressing only partial and temporary interests. Their self-image as guarantor of the permanent interests of the nation provides (in their eyes) the necessary legitimacy for them to assume the right to rule. Finer (1962:26) also discusses that: "the moment the military draws the distinction between nation and the government in power, they begin to invent their own private notion of 'national interest' and from this it is only a skip to the constrained substitution of this view for that of the civilian government." These self-images are strengthened by military professionalisation in two ways: first, the indoctrination of national loyalty; second, the paradoxical reality that the profession's life-style gradually alienates officers from the rest of society. Feld's (1968:65-66) excellent study suggests that this alienation inclines the officer corps to assert that it is bound by a unique allegiance to the state, the constitution or a national tradition rather than to any particular regime (government).

¹⁰² Zagorski (1992:82).

should include a curriculum with more serious attention by social scientists to the inevitable role of conflict in any polity.¹⁰³

Limiting the professional sphere of competence, reorienting the content of nationalism, and introducing the idea that political conflicts are needed for a viable political system are, therefore, considered necessary for transforming military thinking under democratic transition. The question thus becomes how civilians can initiate this process of internal transformation. The institutional redesigning of civil-military burden-sharing is central to this. Stepan, for example, suggests the need for establishing new national-defence colleges under a civilian Minister of Defence and the systematic professional incorporation of the military into a civilian-led national-security council. For him, the latter may reduce the military's sense of isolation, create a more effective system of mutual exchange of information and grievances, and thus enhance the capacity for democratic control.¹⁰⁴ Zagorski further insists on the need for consensus—within the council—that doctrinal change does not assume civil-military politics to be a zero-sum game and presupposes mutual dialogue about national security and the military's role in attaining it. The next step, according to him, is to institutionalise civil-military burden-sharing in formulating four layers of military doctrine—namely the grand strategy, strategy, tactics and policy.¹⁰⁵

The significance here is that the civilian authority is expected to have full control over 'entrance' and 'exit,' i.e. grand strategy and policy, while the military retains autonomy in the two fields in the middle. This division of labour is considered to be helpful in neutralising DSN thinking and institutionalising check mechanisms. Although no doctrine has yet fully supplanted the DSN in Latin America, these new institutional settings have neutralised officers' incentive to displace civilian rule under the flag of DSN.¹⁰⁶ These programs designed for the internal transformation of military doctrine are expected to reduce the perceived gap between new missions and the military's self-image, and, in effect, smooth the process of external transformation in the long-run.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰³ Stepan (1988:143-145).

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, pp.144-145. Similar institutional reforms are recommended by Christopher Donnelly, special adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs to NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organisation] Secretary-General, in referring to the cases of Eastern European militaries which faced a wave of political demilitarisation (Donnelly 1996).

¹⁰⁵ For details, see Zagorski (1992:83). The grand strategy—identification of primary enemies and threats—should be formulated by civilians with military advice. The strategy—how to combat them—should then be developed by the military with the approval of the civilian authority. Tactics—how weapons and organisations are to be used—should be almost entirely under military direction. The policy—the provision of manpower, material and other military resources—should be almost entirely under civilian control.

¹⁰⁶ The erosion of DSN has diversified political and ideological positions within the officer corps. From a rational-choice perspective, Pion-Berlin (1997:18) argues that, with the military institution less sure about its central missions guided by the doctrine, officers calculate that the costs to resistance far outweigh the cost to cooperation.

¹⁰⁷ Our argument here is not aimed at generalising the direction of military reform which is, to a large extent, determined by country-particular factors. Rather, the attempt is to clarify the configuration of the transformation process which is applicable to many civil-military patterns under democratic transition. It

ABRI and Civilians: Establishing the Procedure?

Based on this assessment, what can be said about ABRI's possible path to internal transformation? We have discussed four major procedures:

- (1) shrinking the professional sphere of competence;
- (2) revising the content of nationalism;
- (3) socialising the idea that political conflicts are normal, and indeed necessary, for any stable polity; and
- (4) institutionalising civil-military burden-sharing in formulating the defence-security framework.

These programs seem to be applicable to ABRI's case too, though, of course, special attention should be paid to Indonesian particularities. The following discussion considers procedural direction rather than the program's contemporary feasibility.

Concerning (1), ABRI's professional competence has incorporated *dwifungsi* management, as discussed in Chapter 3. Limiting this ultimately means clearly demarcating the defence and political fields and having ABRI personnel retreat from all political assignments. It requires comprehensive approaches. But even, say, confining and overseeing the role of intelligence—BIA and intelligence sectors in territorial commands, Kopassus and Kostrad—may greatly shrink ABRI's professional competence in influencing daily political life, because information is the dynamo of professional military operations. Therefore, the reform procedure may involve the establishment of an intra-military norm that sees domestic intelligence—such as surveillance of labour movements and campus life, as well as the manipulation of political party affairs—as a deviation from the professional criteria of the security apparatus.

Second, regarding (2) and (3), the role of Pancasila must be considered. Although this vague national ideology has been frequently used as an exclusive doctrine against regime critics under the Soeharto regime, its literal content recognises social plurality and harmony. It can therefore be utilised by future civilian leaders who may try to induce ABRI to review its perception in such a way as to recognise political conflict as a necessary aspect of the political process—not as a threat to security. Such reform requires two steps: (a) formulating an explicit interpretation of Pancasila that does not see political conflict as a threat to national unity; and (b) (re)defining the relationship between ABRI's role and Pancasila. The first of these steps should be accomplished exclusively by civilian initiatives, while the second can be left to ABRI's

is beyond our focus to formulate catch-all alternative missions, partly because our analytical focus is not on grand theory, and partly because it is too early to evaluate this issue in the context of Indonesia's rapidly evolving civil-military relations.

professional prerogative.¹⁰⁸ Once the political use of Pancasila is to a certain extent confined, ABRI's commitment to the nationalist symbols (Pancasila and UUD45) is less likely to become a source of political repression. A reform-minded officer, Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, actually envisaged the need to eliminate the dogmatic political views often presented by ABRI officers, in order to conduct the military's internal reform smoothly in the post-Soeharto Indonesia.¹⁰⁹ This process should involve the reassessment of ABRI's very organisational identity as guardian of Pancasila.

Finally, (4) refers to civilian involvement in the formation of the defence-security doctrine and burden-sharing at each policy level. In the current Indonesian context, the National Defence Security Council (Wanhankamnas)—a presidential advisory body—may be identified as the place to initiate doctrinal change at the top level. This inevitably requires its functional expansion—from the current one of formulating the GBHN—under civilian initiative. Appointing civilians to the posts of Menhankam, Menko Polkam, Mendagri and Lemhannas governor also falls within the scope of new institutional designing. In terms of doctrinal revision, both Wawasan Nusantara and Ketahanan Nasional—as grand strategies—can become civilian fields with military advice, while the middle-range strategies based on Sishankamrata and Hankamneg are left for military autonomy. In policy implementation, the Council oversees policies at the national level—for example, *kekaryaan*, F-ABRI, dispatch of special forces, and defence intelligence—whereas at the regional level, the conduct of various territorial operations could become subject to the governor's authority. By controlling 'entrance and exit,' the future civilian authority may initiate the internal transformation which is needed for civilians to neutralise ABRI's distorted political views as reflected in *dwifungsi's kewaspadaan* approach. Justification and implementation of this hardline mode of *dwifungsi* can, to a large extent, be regulated by the initiatives of democratic civilians to redefine military threats at the level of grand strategy and prevent such operations at the policy level.

ABRI's political extrication is of course a different question. Up till now, ABRI has not indicated a wish to disengage from politics. What is publicly advocated by some officers is the need for *dwifungsi* adjustment. However, when/if the time of the

¹⁰⁸ As seen in Chapter 6, ABRI may insist that there is no civil-military dichotomy under Pancasila. However, our discussion here focuses on the strategy of non-military forces which want to reduce the influence of ABRI in politics. From this perspective, the distinction between ABRI and others, or the military and civilians, is inevitable. Although Pancasila and UUD45 have been used by Soeharto and ABRI as tools of exclusion, civilian empowerment of these regime symbols has been an effective critical activity in the sense that it uses the regime's own language to criticise military policies as deviations from Pancasila and UUD45 and directly attack the very core of the regime's ideological project. See Rasyid (1994:349) and Liddle and King (1996:29-30) for vivid evaluations of this mode of resistance. Rasyid was recruited by the Habibie government as the chairman of the Study Team for Political Laws (Tim Pengkajian UU Politik) which was formed to revise the notorious five political laws. It is possible that his assessment of Pancasila will become a tool for engineering future civil-military relations, and he himself admits the efficacy of the approach (Interview with Professor Ryaas Rasyid, 29 October 1998).

¹⁰⁹ Interview with Maj-Gen Agus Widjojo, Assistant to ABRI Commander for General Planning (Asrenum Pangab), 27 October 1998.

generals passes away in the near future, Indonesia's civil-military relations will enter a transition phase like that in many of the DSN-inspired states discussed above. The manner in which *dwifungsi* is adjusted or even abandoned can take many paths, but all will at least involve the four procedures of internal transformation noted above in order to eliminate the doctrinal basis of possible military re-intervention and to incorporate ABRI into the process of regime democratisation.

CHAPTER 8

Conclusions

Today's interpretation of dwifungsi is different from that of the pre-New Order period. Today, ABRI is recognised as a sociopolitical force equal to other sociopolitical forces in society, whereas in the past ABRI was just called on to play a sociopolitical role.

— Soeharto, at the leadership meeting of FKPPPI, 18 June 1995

Answering Puzzles

We have examined ABRI's responses to the growing democratic pressure during the late Soeharto era. It was in the context of the *keterbukaan* movement that ABRI problems began to be discussed openly and the criticism of *dwifungsi* became a central political issue in public debate. As discussed in Chapter 2, political space to discuss this previously taboo issue was at first a by-product of contestation between Soeharto and Moerdani's ABRI, as each side used this space to put pressure on the other. However, the space was gradually seized by political society following the initiative taken by outspoken newly retired generals who had contributed to the consolidation of the New Order in the early period. The *dwifungsi* criticism gradually became less restrained and officers found it increasingly difficult to curb the escalating critical debate and demands for *dwifungsi* reform. Criticism of *dwifungsi* was also facilitated by the rise of a new generation of officers who had made no actual contribution to the struggle for national independence, and who could, therefore, claim no special political legitimacy from that struggle. Together with this, ABRI's total subordination to Soeharto's personal interests during the final few years became another important factor. Discussion in Chapter 2 detailed these developments and helps to answer the first working question raised in the Introduction. Facing democratic pressures, the New Order ABRI attempted to defend its *dwifungsi* legitimacy in two contradictory ways: either by accommodating its stance, or by identifying the pressure as a national threat which should be eliminated.

For example, in its doctrinal development, *dwifungsi*'s sources of legitimation have been diversified in order to seek a stronger rationale. ABRI's first systematic

doctrine under the New Order—i.e. the new *Tri Ubaya Çakti* which intended both to standardise ABRI's new mode of political involvement and to eliminate PKI supporters—was legitimised by the restoration of political order following the coup attempt. ABRI's political activism was also explained as legitimate due to the historical commitment of soldiers toward nation-building since the independence war. This legitimisation scheme was, however, challenged as *kekaryaan* was institutionalised and it could no longer be claimed as a measure to restore political stability; it was rather increasingly perceived by civilians as political domination. In facing the growing criticism, ABRI established the doctrinal distinction between *dwifungsi* and *kekaryaan* at the end of 1970s, aiming to safeguard the former from the criticism directed at the latter. As the criticism intensified in the early 1980s, thanks largely to the disenchanted revolutionary-generation officers who launched Petisi 50, ABRI moved to further expand the sources of *dwifungsi* legitimacy. The 1982 guidebook was prepared to systematically explain the various legitimacy bases—namely historical, philosophical, legal, cultural, geostrategic, and national defence. The diffusion of legitimacy arguments was expected to counter any type of *dwifungsi* criticism. Then, following the regeneration of the officer corps in the mid-1980s, the concept of professionalism was infused into the *dwifungsi* language as a means of strengthening legitimacy. It was argued that, with professionalism, ABRI could better manage *dwifungsi*—an interpretation which uncoupled *dwifungsi* from the historical legitimisation that had been questioned by critics after the retirement of most of the revolutionary-generation officers.

The 'infusion' of the professionalism concept, however, showed a different face, as a small group of officers developed a campaign called "back-to-basics" in the early 1990s. This movement, presenting itself as an effort to professionalise ABRI, implied a concern about the growing gap between ABRI's institutional interests and Soeharto's political orientation, and also implicitly warned about ABRI's declining autonomy from Soeharto, including its political role. Younger-generation officers who had been involved in this movement finally declared more explicit concerns in the mid-1990s, when the final army seminar under the New Order identified the problems of the current government, amidst the Soeharto-orchestrated crackdown on the popular political force led by Megawati. In referring to the arrogance of governmental power and insisting on the need for alleviating state control over society, the reform-minded officers who led the seminar now defined *dwifungsi* as a tool for restoring the distorted state-society relationship. Our examination in Chapter 3 identified such doctrinal developments during the New Order, which would provide an answer to the second question we raised in the Introduction.

Chapter 4 analysed a policy arena—internal security operations—and tried to assess how the civil-military struggle over human rights accountability had developed and how ABRI's response to it had been changing. It was soon after the

dissolution of powerful security apparatus, Kopkamtib, that ABRI's abuse of human rights became an issue for open public debate through the emergence of criticism and protest against the 'security approach.' This theme could hardly be interpreted by ABRI as attacking Pancasila and the Constitution—a logic ABRI had used to repress popular protest demanding *dwifungsi* elimination. This new social space for criticism of the military was institutionally entrenched by the creation of the National Human Rights Commission (Komnas HAM), the first legitimate mechanism within the regime which checked ABRI's excessive use of force and challenged ABRI's earlier one-sided explanations about military shooting of civilians. It was this organ that politically protected the role of NGOs in pressuring ABRI's traditional internal security practice. Pressures from NGOs—which were seen by ABRI as a storehouse of radical leftists—might not have been brought into the formal political process without the bridging role of Komnas HAM. This new political paradigm promoted a new political institution, i.e. ABRI's adoption of disciplinary measures (the Military Honour Council/Officers' Honour Council) for the handling of human rights abuses. As a result, it gradually became a standard procedure for ABRI to show some degree of policy accountability, in contrast to the 1970s and 80s. These processes all indicated that ABRI's traditional framework for internal security conduct had started to erode and be subjected to some institutional restrictions since the late 1980s, and they contributed to the diminishing military control over civil-military communication in the age of *keterbukaan*. Our examination of this development provides a half-answer to the third question we posed in the Introduction.

The other half was examined in Chapter 5. We discussed how ABRI's perception of human rights was linked in the minds of officers to the issue of 'globalisation.' Although—on the one hand—ABRI had responded to the domestic reflection of this international phenomenon by endorsing the need for revising the security approach and human rights assessments, there was—on the other hand—a move within ABRI to revive the utility of its traditional vigilance doctrine to maintain the autonomous political power ABRI had enjoyed since the beginning of the New Order. The ideology of communist threat (Balatkom) was reproduced for this purpose, rationalising military repression of regime dissent as a necessary measure to defend the Pancasila state. For military hardliners, the concept of globalisation provided a perfect opportunity to claim that the penetration of 'foreign-values,' with the influx of liberal/radical thinking, would endanger Indonesia's political stability based on Pancasila values. Our analysis showed that the incentive for such ideological adaptation came from ABRI's institutional inertia which—since the early days of the New Order—had routinised its organisational efforts to produce a logic for legitimising the relevance of *dwifungsi* permanency in the changing society. However, it was ABRI's total subordination to Soeharto—especially since the mid-1990s under the Feisal-Hartono leadership—that characterised the application of this ideological project for

the repression of popular democratic movements. We examined the details of these developments which provide the other half of our answer to the third question asked in the Introduction. The resulting dogmatisation of ABRI's social communication, however, encouraged the emergence of revisionist views within the officer corps, and it contributed to the diversification of military thinking in the face of democratic pressure during the final years of the New Order.

The diffusion of military thinking was reflected in our contextual analysis of *dwifungsi* discourse which attempts to answer the fourth question in the Introduction. Chapter 6 illustrated the development of critical views on the current conduct of *dwifungsi* within the military. We saw the emergence of an opinion which insisted that the current representation of ABRI in legislative bodies had produced a disparity between the professional and political duties in the officers' military life. A concern about the declining neutrality of ABRI's political role—due to its backing for Golkar—was also discussed within the officer corps. We emphasised, however, that although these reformist views are significant in themselves in understanding officers' professional concerns, they are not necessarily synchronised with the views of civilian democracy advocates. Revisions were sought in terms of political programs, not of *dwifungsi* principles. As we repeatedly discussed, *dwifungsi* was the core of ABRI's organisational identity and was thus a principal corporate interest which had to be preserved in the eyes of serving officers. Regardless of the hardline-softline distinction within ABRI in its response to democratic demands, ABRI—as an institution—has endeavoured to maintain the legitimacy of its involvement in non-military fields as programmed by its doctrine of political activism. How has society tried to undermine ABRI's position? Apart from public protest, we have examined the role of 'insider' criticism in opening up a dialogue with ABRI and in spreading awareness of *dwifungsi* criticism within ABRI—a role which could hardly be accomplished by non-regime critics. This political space has provided a fertile ground for reform-minded intellectual officers to play a bigger role in civil-military relations during the late New Order. The contest over *dwifungsi* (de)legitimation was largely shaped by the interactions between three critical approaches and two defending theories. Through the analysis of these, this study clarified ABRI's discursive techniques to (re)interpret social conditions in favour of *dwifungsi* perpetuation by inventing (and proliferating) culturalist and level-of-development approaches. The former was largely an adjustment of the traditional mode of legitimation while the latter was a product of younger-generation officers who wanted to avoid dogmatic response but were still committed to the organisational effort to defend *dwifungsi* legitimacy via rational communication with *dwifungsi* critics. ABRI's adaptation in the arena of civil-military discourse was one of three highlights in this chapter.

The second highlight was ABRI's distrust of the civilian capacity to handle national politics and its own fear in regard to intra-military cohesion. ABRI's claim

that its political involvement is a reflection of its practical role as a 'national' guardian in the context of its distrust of civilian politicians was long standing. However, this claim was weakened by ABRI's own concern about its internal cohesion which, it said, would be undermined if soldiers were permitted to vote in elections. ABRI's 'privilege' of appointing representatives in F-ABRI to legislative bodies, therefore, seemed less concerned with the national interest than with preserving its own unity.

The third highlight was the aspect of 'non-debate.' We have examined how ABRI's territorial system has become more and more autonomous in establishing mechanisms of political surveillance, by transforming military technologies into political missions designed in accordance with the concept of territorial management. The failure to incorporate this problem into the scope of *dwifungsi* discourse represented a 'defect' of New Order civil-military communication which consequently permitted the emergence of a pragmatic view within ABRI that envisaged the possible scrapping of the *dwifungsi* concept as a measure to alleviate the pressure on ABRI if social criticism were to reach an unmanageable level. The evolving discourse on *dwifungsi* provided ABRI thinkers with the prospect of maintaining ABRI's core political role solely by consolidating the territorial system, with or without the concept of *dwifungsi*. As democratic pressure intensifies in the post-Soeharto era, this new thinking can potentially become a norm within the military elite. For democratic critics aiming to undermine the military's political influence, it is essential to incorporate the territorial system into the scope of open debate by demanding the establishment of a civilian check mechanism.

This assessment was further strengthened when we observed authoritarian regimes in Latin American where the military developed a politico-military doctrine to justify its permanent, everyday, and all-fields political involvement but was later forced to extricate from politics in the face of growing democratic pressures. Discussion in Chapter 7—which deals with the fifth question in the Introduction—revealed that, despite ABRI's customary claim that *dwifungsi* is unique to Indonesia and thus should not be seen as parallel to military meddling in political affairs in other countries, there are significant similarities in officers' role perceptions, political beliefs, doctrinal targets, modes of legitimation for political involvement, and the practice of political intervention. The fate of the DSN (National Security Doctrine)-inspired militaries provided two lessons in regard to the Indonesian military. One was the problem of 'incomplete transition' to civilian rule, and the other was the need for a tactical crafting of internal doctrinal transformation in a way that would guide military minds to support democratisation. We saw how Latin American nations preserved military prerogatives during the transition period and how these became impediments—if used effectively—to the civilian effort to proceed with democratic reforms. Transition to the post-Soeharto regime may also involve this problem, especially in handling the case of past human rights violations. Politicians who seek

political advantage by using this issue may strengthen officers' distrust of civilian leaders and provide an incentive to block democratic transition. It is in this context that—as seen in the case of DSN—we emphasised the need for internal doctrinal transformation to neutralise the military's motivations to reverse the reform movement. This must involve the redirection of officers' professional commitment from one that aims at political surveillance to one which values smooth transition to a more participatory polity as a premise for national stability. The concept of 'democratic professionalism' may be attractive for ABRI officers whose elitist identity and paternalistic self-image as "national dynamisers" now seek a new noble commitment to the nation in order to restore their damaged social credibility in the post-Soeharto era.¹

The assessments above are all presented with equal weight. Rather than providing a single conclusion about ABRI's response to democratic pressure, I have tried to depict its various responses in different fields. This study's thematic approach provided a set of independent analyses with different focuses in each chapter. This enabled me to elucidate the arenas in which civil-military contests developed and provide a systematic description of complex military responses to democratic pressures. As my interest lies in this point, it should be emphasised that ABRI's struggle with democratic pressure is reflected in all arenas we have examined, not just in the arena of frequent media coverage related to daily political events. Empirically proving this point is the principal goal of this study as a contribution to scholarship on Indonesian civil-military relations.

Post-Soeharto Reflections

Finally, what are the implications of our assessments for the transition to the post-Soeharto regime? The emergence of reformist views among the officer corps had been encouraged by a growing perception that Soeharto's pursuit of private political interests had brought negative impacts on both civil-military relations and the military's organisational life during the late New Order period. As we discussed, such perceptions were found primarily among officers who had been affiliated with the education sector, such as Seskoad, Sesko ABRI and Lemhannas. Institutionally, this phenomenon might have been expected as it is a manifested organisational goal of these bodies to study and propagate the long-term corporate interests of the military institution. The deterioration of the military image in society and the declining

¹ I borrow the term "democratic professionalism" from Fitch's recent study on DSN during and after the civilian takeover of governments in Latin America (1998:175-213). Consult Chapter 2 for the events facilitating the rapid decline of social trust in ABRI since the mid-1990s until the fall of Soeharto. ABRI's problems in the past soon became the central issue in the mass media which was 'empowered' by the formal removal of press censorship by the new government under President Habibie. This triggered the total collapse of ABRI's credibility in society.

organisational coherence within the military—due to institutionally irrational personnel transfers and promotion practices—were inevitably major concerns for those officers who were in the positions to pursue the above tasks. And if the problems were perceived to have originated from an external factor, i.e. Soeharto's personal interests, it was not surprising to see a growing complaint within the officer corps about ABRI's unconditional subordination to Soeharto, which was most apparent during the Feisal-Hartono leadership. As we examined, such a perception was presented repeatedly within the military community via its internal media. Concepts like 'ABRI's dilemmas' and the 'need for professionalisation' often became hidden transcripts to express officers' concerns linked with this problem. Assessing this intra-military atmosphere is significant for our understanding of the origin and orientation of ABRI's reform projects after the fall of Soeharto in May 1998. Military reform is not simply the reaction to the social demands for democratisation in the post-Soeharto Indonesia, but is largely a reaction to Soeharto's control of the military going back to the early 1990s. The reform incentives had been accumulating for nearly a decade.

It is in this context that the orientation of post-Soeharto military reforms should be understood. The assessment that ABRI was 'used' by Soeharto for his personal agenda is dominant among current military elites. However, this effectively leads them to think that *dwifungsi* should be 'reformed' to 'normalise,' or, using their terms, to 'reposition' and 'reactivate' ABRI's political role.² Of course these postures may somewhat reduce military engagement in political affairs, but what should be noted is that the military's "return to the barracks" is still far from their minds. Student movements which demand total elimination of *dwifungsi* are still resisted by ABRI which identifies them as the radical left, or communist-inspired—and thus a target of military *kewaspadaan* (vigilance).³ Instead, a gradual reduction of ABRI's political role has been advocated by the Wiranto leadership, but the goal is 'normalisation,' not elimination, of *dwifungsi*. This 'normalisation' is not aimed at abandoning ABRI's belief in its traditional 'guardian' role—a belief that soldiers always possess political responsibility for national development. Thus, the military's 'permanent' political commitment is still seen as relevant. This point should be noted first.

However, this perceptual continuity itself does not necessarily constitute a threat to democratic prospects. As discussed in Chapter 7, military doctrines like *dwifungsi* and DSN have provided incentives for officers to conduct political activities on a permanent, everyday, and all-fields basis. If two of these settings—i.e. everyday

² These were insisted by the Wiranto leadership at the first post-Soeharto ABRI seminar held in September 1998 under severe pressure from society to reform ABRI's political role in the direction of regime democratisation. The seminar committed ABRI to the 'redefining,' 'repositioning,' and 'reactivating' of *dwifungsi*. See the seminar paper, *Peran ABRI Abad XXI: Redefinisi, Reposisi dan Reaktualisasi Peran ABRI dalam Kehidupan Bangsa* [Makalah Awal Seminar ABRI], Bandung: Sesko ABRI, September 1998.


³ Wiranto's use of this *kewaspadaan* approach was prominent in September 1998; the month traditionally used to emphasise the danger of the Communist resurgence during the Soeharto era. About its adoption by the Wiranto leadership, see "'Hantu' PKI di Era Reformasi," *Tajuk*, 1 October 1998.

and all-fields commitment in political affairs—were to be dismantled, the continuation of their messianic role belief which insists on their 'permanent' right to engage in politics may not seriously disturb the development of a democratic system, if the permanency is limited, let's say, to military participation in the MPR. If it is true—as frequently claimed by old generation generals—that the original *dwifungsi* never committed ABRI to day-to-day political activities, the 'new' *dwifungsi* which was interpreted, for example, by Soeharto (see his quotation above) is the real target for reform. For civilian leaders who may envisage the dilemma of incomplete transition, a pragmatic arrangement might be the tactical endorsement of ABRI's self-dignity as the national protector, while rigidly defining the target of protection. It is the democratic political system that has to be emphasised as the target, not such vague concepts as Pancasila and the Constitution.

Therefore, two types of transformation are required for civilian leaders to incorporate the military into their effort to democratise the political system.⁴ One is to derive a consensus from military leaders that the 'normalisation' of *dwifungsi* is aimed at replacing the 'new' version with the 'old' one, not just returning to the version that was first adopted at the beginning of the New Order and based on developmentalist ideology. The other is to provide a clear definition of the target that the officers' guardian self-image is intended to protect. National ideology—i.e. Pancasila—and the Constitution are too broad for this purpose as they only motivate the military to involve itself in all fields of national life. The military mind should be transformed from one committed to these values into one which sees the creation of a democratic system as an urgent need for national stability and development in the age of globalism. This study hopes to appeal to both civilian and military elites to recognise the significance of such a transformation of military thinking for the future prosperity of Indonesia's political life.

⁴ Note that we argue about 'incorporation,' which should be distinguished from the civilian 'struggle' to win democracy over military resistance. My discussion here is only limited to the former side, but it does not mean to disregard the view based on the latter stance. In observing regime change, both are important aspects. Also, I do not deny the possibility of civilian leaders becoming preoccupied with the political game and using the military for their political advantage. Our discussion below is only applicable in a situation free from such a development, as reflecting my 'trust' of many respected civilian and military leaders in Indonesia.

Appendix 1: Military Area Commands, 1985-1998



- Kodam I Bukit Barisan (North Sumatra)
- Kodam II Sriwijaya (South Sumatra)
- Kodam III Siliwangi (West Java)
- Kodam IV Diponegoro (Central Java)
- Kodam V Bravijaya (East Java)
- Kodam VI Tanjungpura (Kalimantan)
- Kodam VII Wirabuana (Sulawesi)
- Kodam VIII Trikorra (Irian Jaya and Maluku)
- Kodam IX Udayana (Nusa Tenggara)
- Kodam X Jaya (Jakarta)

Appendix 2: ABRI's Ethic Codes

PANCASILA (FIVE PRINCIPLES)

1. Belief in the One God
2. A just and civilised humanity
3. Indonesian unity
4. Populism guided by wisdom in consultation and deliberation
5. Social justice for the whole Indonesian people

SAPTA MARGA (SEVEN PLEDGES)

1. We are citizens of the unitary Republic of Indonesia based on Pancasila.
2. We are Indonesian patriots, bearers and defenders of the state ideology, who are responsible and know of no surrender.
3. We are Indonesian knights who are devoted to the One God, and who defend honesty, truth and justice.
4. We are soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces, guardians of the Indonesian state and nation.
5. We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces uphold discipline, are obedient and observant to our leadership, and uphold the soldier's attitude and oath.
6. We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces set ourselves to perform our task with courage, and are always ready to devote ourselves to state and nation.
7. We soldiers of the Indonesian Armed Forces are loyal and keep our word and the Soldier's Oath.

SUMPAH PRAJURIT (SOLDIER'S OATH)

1. Be loyal to the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia which is based on Pancasila and UUD45.
2. Be loyal to the laws and maintain military discipline.
3. Be obedient to laws and maintain military discipline.
4. Execute duties with a full sense of responsibility to the military and the Republic of Indonesia.
5. Firmly preserve military secrets.

11 ASAS KEPEMIMPINAN ABRI (ELEVEN LEADERSHIP PRINCIPLES OF THE INDONESIAN ARMED FORCES)

- | | |
|------------------------------------|---|
| 1. <i>Taqwa:</i> | To believe in and obey the One God |
| 2. <i>Ing ngarsa sung tuladha:</i> | To give the right example and lead from the front |
| 3. <i>Ing madya mangun karsa:</i> | To be a driving force from the middle |
| 4. <i>Tut wuri handayani:</i> | To guide from behind |
| 5. <i>Waspada purba wisesa:</i> | To supervise subordinates and have the courage to correct them if necessary |
| 6. <i>Ambeg parama arta:</i> | To be able to decide priorities |
| 7. <i>Prasaja:</i> | To be modest and to avoid excess |
| 8. <i>Satya:</i> | To be loyal to superiors, colleagues and subordinates |
| 9. <i>Gemi nastiti:</i> | To live frugally |

10. *Belaka*:

To have responsibility for one's behaviour

11. *Legawa*:

To be willing to hand responsibilities and positions to the next generation when the time comes

Appendix 3: DPR Seats and the New Order Elections 1971-1997

		<u>1971</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1982</u>	<u>1987</u>	<u>1992</u>	<u>1997</u>
<i>Golkar</i>	vote (%)	62.8	62.1	64.3	73.1	68.1	73.4
	seats	236	232	246	299	282	325
	seat (%)	51.3	50.4	53.4	59.8	56.4	65.0
<i>PPP</i>	vote (%)	27.1	29.3	27.8	16.0	17.0	23.6
	seats	94	99	94	61	62	89
	seat (%)	20.4	21.5	20.4	12.2	12.4	17.8
<i>PDI</i>	vote (%)	10.1	8.6	7.9	10.9	14.9	2.8
	seats	30	29	24	40	56	11
	seat (%)	6.5	6.3	5.2	8.6	11.2	2.2
<i>F-ABRI</i>	seats	75	75	75	100	100	75
	seat (%)	16.3	16.3	16.3	20.0	20.0	15.0
<i>Non-ABRI*</i>	seats	25	25	25	-	-	-
	seat (%)	5.4	5.4	5.4	-	-	-
Total	seats	460	460	460	500	500	500

* Civilian representatives appointed by the President.

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<i>Telstra</i>	Lemhannas
<i>Persepsi</i>	Lemhannas
<i>Yudhagama</i>	Army Headquarters
<i>Gema Jayakarta</i>	Kodam X/Jaya
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