BUYING VOTES IN INDONESIA

PARTISANS, PERSONAL NETWORKS, AND WINNING MARGINS

Burhanuddin Muhtadi

February 2018

A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy of
The Australian National University

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STATEMENT OF ORIGINALITY

This dissertation is the result of original research and contains no material which has been accepted for the award or any other degree or diploma at any university or other institution.

To the best of my knowledge, it contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference is made in the text of the dissertation.

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

Burhanuddin Muhtadi

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This dissertation formally started when I was enrolled as a PhD student at the Department of Political and Social Change, Australian National University (ANU) in April 2013. Its actual genesis, however, dates back to a workshop in Bali co-sponsored by The Centre for Democratic Institutions, ANU, and Institute for Peace and Democracy (IPD), on 12–13 December 2011. Entitled “Money Politics, Vote Buying and Clientelism in Southeast Asia,” the workshop was initially aimed to design a cross-national study of money politics in Southeast Asia. A common lament voiced by most participants was that, despite vote buying having become central to electoral campaigns in Southeast Asian countries, particularly in Indonesia, most influential studies on clientelism have emerged from other world regions. This study therefore aims to fill the gap in the scholarship on electoral clientelism in Indonesia and to situate my findings about that country within the context of the wider academic literature on the field. Therefore, I am particularly grateful to Prof. Edward Aspinall for inviting me to participate in the workshop.

More importantly, as my dissertation chair, Prof. Aspinall has played a significant role in the evolution of this dissertation. Since the early stages of my journey, he has provided continuous encouragement, insightful comments and useful criticism. I have been deeply touched by his personal wisdom and truly enjoyed our collaborative research project in Indonesia. In particular, I am extremely fortunate to have had the opportunity to learn from the four-country study of “money politics” across Southeast Asia, initiated at that Bali workshop, in which Prof. Aspinall was one of the chief investigators. In the spirit of advancing academic research on this topic, Prof. Aspinall, along with other project principal investigators (Allen Hicken, Meredith Weiss, and Paul Hutchcroft), generously provided me some additional funding for conducting a nationally representative voter survey, and more importantly, allowed me to employ their measures of money politics and share the results for purposes of this study.

My special thanks and deepest appreciation also go to my dissertation co-supervisor, Assoc. Prof. Marcus Mietzner, whose guidance in my scholarly endeavours has made this project possible. I have benefited greatly from his uncompromising scholarly advice, valuable insights and criticism through all stages of this dissertation. I have learned a great deal from him and have been humbled by his academic advice and friendship throughout my years at the ANU. His combination of uninterrupted warm support, trenchant

criticism, and dedication to the study of Indonesia presented a model I will strive to emulate with my own students. Assoc. Prof. Mietzner, as well as Prof. Aspinall, also had time to provide editorial advice, highlighting inconsistencies or unclear expression, thereby making my thesis more readable. I must also mention my deep personal debt to Assoc. Prof. Greg Fealy for not only being my supervisory panel member, but also for his big role in bringing me back here to the ANU after finishing my Masters degree in 2008. Without his tremendous help, I probably would have never made it to Australia. Special thanks are also due to my panel member, Assoc. Prof. Juliet Pietsch, who provided invaluable insights in the early design stages of this study.

In addition to these academic advisors, this dissertation could never have been completed without the help and contribution of many people and institutions. First and foremost are my home survey institutes, The Indonesian Survey Institute (Lembaga Survei Indonesia) and Indonesian Political Indicator (Indikator Politik Indonesia). My polling organisations not only provided an additional budgetary support to cover the costs of my post-election survey of voters, they also allowed me to insert several questions relating to my dissertation topic into a series of nationwide surveys before the 2014 elections. In addition to these two survey institutes, my study was also enriched by the massive number of electoral district surveys and local election polls conducted by the Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC). Therefore, I would like to express my gratitude to my senior colleague, Dr. Saiful Mujani for introducing me to the tradition of empirical and statistically orientated social science research. I have learned much of what I know about quantitative methods from my bright colleague, Deni Irvani, and I have greatly benefited from discussions with him about experimental design and on how to interpret my results. My thanks also go to Rizki Rahmadian for his outstanding assistance in making many of the tables and figures in this dissertation. In addition, I wish to thanks my LSI and Indikator colleagues for their extremely helpful cooperation during my study: Dr. Kuskridho Ambardi, Dr. Hendro Prasetyo, Adam Kamil, Dudi Herlianto, Sarah Santi, Fauny Hidayat, Elang Mutaqin, and so many other researchers both in the headquarters and in the field. Although there are too many to mention them all by name, I am deeply thankful and indebted to everyone.

My study at the Australian National University (2013-2017) was also made possible by a generous Australian Awards Scholarship (AAS). I am heartily grateful to the Directors and staff of AAS, especially Elaine Ee and Rozana Muir, whose assistance and personal warmth to me and my family made my stay in Canberra more pleasant and productive than it would otherwise have been. My special thanks also go to my editor, Maxine

McArthur, who has been very kind in reading, editing and polishing my drafts. I would also like to express my gratitude to the Rector of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (UIN), Prof. Dede Rosyada, and the Dean of its Social and Political Science Faculty, Prof. Zulkifli, for allowing me to leave my teaching assignments. I am also indebted to my senior colleagues at UIN, Prof. Azyumardi Azra, Prof. Komaruddin Hidayat, Prof. Bahtiar Effendy, and Prof. Jamhari Makruf for their personal support and academic advice. During my study at the Department of Political and Social Change, I also benefited much from the academic environment, with staff and emeriti such as Tamara Jacka, Paul Kenny, Jong-sung You, Prof. James Fox, Prof. Anthony Reid, Prof. Virginia Hooker, Prof. Robert Cribb, Sally White and Nick Cheesman providing many useful inputs. I also thank Helen McMartin for her administrative support. I also thank my classmates who were very helpful and encouraging, among them Ahmad Muhajir, Bayu Dardias, Colum Graham, Danang Widoyoko, Dominic Berger, Eve Warburton, Haula Noor, Liam Gammon, Syamsul Rijal, Ronnie Holmes, Thomas Power, and Usman Hamid. Of course, I also extend my heartfelt appreciation to all of my interviewees who generously gave of their time in interviews and often lengthy discussions about their political strategies, opinions and practices.

Finally, I must extend my deepest thanks to my beloved wife, Rahmawati Madanih and children, Rayhan Adnan Musthafa, Avicenna Ananda Musthafa and Alexa Shakira Musthafa for their love, prayers and patience in accompanying me during my study abroad. This study required very costly methods, including the financing of unique, innovative surveys of brokers and politicians. When I was unable to get grants to fully cover all these activities, my wife did not object to spending our own money. I am also indebted to my parents, H. Muhtadi and the late Hj. Siti Mas'udah. Without their unfailing encouragement and support, I would not have been able to finish my study.

I have already published some findings of this thesis, most notably with regard to the level of vote buying in Indonesia, in *New Mandala* (16/11/2015). I am also fortunate to have had the opportunity to present some chapters at several conferences: Euroseas Conference in Vienna (August 2015), 11th Singapore Graduate Forum on Southeast Asia Studies (July 2016), and Asian Studies Association of Australia (ASAA) in Canberra (July 2016), and received helpful comments from discussants and participants. As is the rule in academic writing, I bear sole responsibility for any errors and inconsistencies in my dissertation.

ABSTRACT

How many voters sell their votes in Indonesia? My PhD research starts with this question that has haunted scholars for the last 15 years. Using data from a nationally representative survey, which included an experimental survey, my study demonstrates that vote buying has become central to electoral mobilisation in Indonesia. If we use the highest estimate, one out of three Indonesians was personally exposed to vote buying in Indonesia's most recent national election, making the country the site of the third-largest reported sum of exchange of money for votes in the world, as indicated by voter surveys taken over the last decade.

My nationwide survey and massive dataset of local election surveys also show that, among other things, partisanship is a significant predictor of vote buying. The closer the ties of a voter to a political party, the more likely that voter is to receive offers of vote buying (or to be accepting of the practice). Puzzlingly, however, the number of partisan voters in Indonesia is comparatively small. Only 15 percent of my national survey respondents admitted being close to any political party and this limited number of party loyalist are highly contested among candidates from the same party in the context of Indonesia's open-list proportional systems.

When we connect partisanship and distributive politics, we arrive at the centre of a lively scholarly debate that involves two competing camps: the so-called core- versus swing-voter models. The former says vote buying when parties or candidates try to mobilise their core supporters, viewing the practice as being above all about increasing turnout. The latter interprets vote buying as an electoral strategy to sway uncommitted voters. What types of voters do Indonesian politicians target?

At first glance, the data I collected from low-level candidates and brokers provide more proof in support of the core-voter strategy than in support of the swing-voter strategy. My in-depth interviews with high-level politicians also reinforce the notion that they prefer to target partisan voters in their vote buying operations. Yet my voter surveys clearly showed that although in *relative* terms such voters are more likely to be targeted, in *absolute* numbers vote buying mostly happens among non-partisans. How do we explain this combination of features —actors' insistence that they are targeting partisan voters with the reality that they are mostly providing cash and gifts to non-partisans?

This study proposes an addition to the scholarly debate between the core- versus swing-voter models by combining an emphasis on the core-voter strategy and reliance on

personal networks. It argues that in Indonesia, candidates and brokers actually intend to target partisan voters, but in reality they mostly distribute benefits to voters who are politically rather indifferent, but who are embedded in personal networks through which they are connected to the candidate and their brokers. This study offers the concept of 'personal loyalist' strategy, which targets people identified through personal networks. While the personal loyalist model still recognises the importance of partisan voters, it highlights that candidates seek voters who are not only loyal to the party, but who are also, or instead, loyal to the individual candidate within that party. However, given that partisan voters are not only limited in number but also highly contested among competing co-partisan candidates in the context of the open-list system, politicians seek to expand their electoral base by making use of personal connections mediated by non-party brokers.

Given their reliance on personal networks, most candidates and brokers typically misidentify non-partisans as loyalists because they misinterpret personal connections as partisan leanings. In addition, many of the people who are identified through personal networks mediated by brokers are in fact not even loyal to the candidate. Indeed, some of the brokers are themselves not particularly loyal. These two factors– confusion of personal connections with loyalty, and agency loss– in combination contribute to another element of vote buying in Indonesia which I identify in this study: the provision of payments to large numbers of uncommitted voters who receive benefits yet do not reciprocate with their votes.

If vote buying is tremendously inefficient, how can vote buying have an effect on electoral behaviour? Why do candidates still do it? Utilising multiple data sources and various methods, I provide strong empirical evidence that gifts of money 'only' influenced the vote choice of roughly 10 percent to 11 percent of the total electorate. In these seemingly low numbers, however, lie the key to understanding vote buying's attractiveness. Across Indonesia, the average margin of victory for successful candidates in legislative elections when defeating their party peers (i.e. candidates who were on the same party list) was only 1.65 percent. In this context of such highly competitive elections, candidates therefore enthusiastically pursued vote buying because they see that it can be critical for determining electoral outcomes. By showing that vote buying helps generate narrow but sufficient victory margins, my study explains how and why vote buying is so prevalent in Indonesia.

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GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

Abangan	nominal, less pious or syncretic Muslims, who often adhere to pre-Islamic spiritual beliefs
Aliran	socio-cultural streams or patterns of social and political organisation
BAPPILU	Badan Pemenangan Pemilu (Election Winning Body); each party usually has this special body, which is in charge of electoral strategy.
Basis	loyal social base; electoral base (usually not only based on partisan loyalty and past voting patterns, but also personal networks)
BAWASLU	Badan Pengawas Pemilu (Election Monitoring Body); whose role is to receive, investigate and report on violations of electoral laws and regulations during elections.
Bisyarah	keepsake; small gifts given by candidates to voters as a sign of love
BPS	Badan Pusat Statistik (Central Bureau of Statistics)
Bupati	district head; regent (head of rural district called *kabupaten*)
Dakwah	(Ar. *da'wa*): Islamic predication or missionary activity; proselytising
Dapil	Daerah pemilihan (electoral district)
DKPP	Dewan Kehormatan Penyelengara Pemilu (The Election Organisation Ethics Council)
Dewan Syuro	(Ar. *al-Majlis al-Shurah*): Consultative Council or Advisory Board; especially associated with PKB
DPC	Dewan Pimpinan Cabang (Branch Executive Board); party leadership body at district level
DPD	Dewan Pimpinan Daerah (Regional Executive Board); party leadership body at provincial level
DPP	Dewan Pimpinan Pusat (National Executive Board); party leadership body at national level.
DPRD I	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tingkat Provinsi (House of People's Regional Representatives I); provincial parliaments
DPRD II	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah Tingkat Kabupaten/Kota (House of People's Regional Representatives II) district parliaments; whose size varies according to the population of the district
DPR	Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (House of People's Representatives); national parliament; there are the 560-seat national parliament

DPD	Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (House of Regional Representatives); there are 128-seats in this second national chamber, which has essentially advisory functions
Figur	derived from the English term 'figure' which refers to the personal qualities of a candidate; similar to *ketokohan*
Gerindra	Gerakan Indonesia Raya (Greater Indonesia Movement)l; party founded by Prabowo Subianto in 2008 to serve as his political vehicle to run for presidential office
GMIM	Gereja Masehi Injili di Minahasa (Christian Evangelical Church in Minahasa)
Golkar	Golongan Karya (functional groups); a 'secular' political party founded by the Suharto regime
GOLPUT	Golongan Penerima Uang Tunai, roughly a recipient of cash transfer; the term was circulated widely pointing to the centrality of vote buying
Halal	(Ar. *ḫalāl*): permitted; lawful according to Islamic laws
Hanura	Hati Nurani Rakyat (People's Conscience Party); established and once headed by former Indonesian military commander Wiranto
Haram	(Ar. *ḫarām*): forbidden, sinful; that which is prohibited according to Islamic laws
Infak, *infaq*	(Ar. *infāq*): literally, 'expenditure, disbursement;' according to Islamic law, *infak* are charitable gifts for humanitarian purposes; the term is often used for covering vote buying operations
Jamaah, *jemaah*	(Ar. *jamāʿa*): congregation, community
Kabupaten	regency; the tier of government below the provincial level; usually called rural districts
Kiai	Islamic scholars
Kota	urban municipalities, the tier of government below the provincial level
Kecamatan	sub-district
Ketokohan	synonymous with *figur*; typically refers to a candidate's personal qualities which is combination of personal reputation, generosity and charisma
Kitab	Islamic textbooks written in Arabic; often studied in Islamic boarding schools
KPU	Komisi Pemilihan Umum (General Election Commission)

KTP	Kartu Tanda Penduduk (citizens' national identity cards)
LSI	Lembaga Survei Indonesia (Indonesian Survey Institute); one of Indonesia's prominent polling agencies, founded in 2003
MK	Mahkamah Konstitusi (Constitutional Court)
Mahar politik	"political dowry"; the term used by candidates for the payment made to bribe party elites in order to secure nomination, especially in local government elections
Majelis Syuro	(Ar. *al-Majlis al-Shurah*): Consultative Council associated with PKS
Majelis taklim	religious gathering
Marga	Batak kinship group (exogamous clan)
Masyumi	An Islamic political party often associated with modernist Muslims; the second largest political party prior to 1960
Mengikat	to tie; often used in the context of vote buying to describing the securing of loyalists with a payment so they would vote for a rival
MPR	Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (People's Consultative Assembly); whose members come from the DPR and DPD
Muhammadiyah	Modernist Indonesian Islamic organisation, founded in 1912
Nomor sepatu	literally meaning 'shoe numbers'; term us to describe lowly-placed candidates on a party list; reflecting the fact that shoes are used to cover the feet, the lowest part of the body; usually in contrast to *nomor topi*
Nomor topi	whose closest English equivalent is 'lucky number;' higher-ranked candidates on a party list who are placed in winnable slots
NPWP	Nomer Piro, Wani Piro, meaning what number on the ballot are you and how much are you brave enough to give?
NU	Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of Islamic Scholars); the largest socio-cultural Islamic organisation associated with the traditionalist *aliran*, founded in 1926
Ormas	Organisasi Massa (mass organisations)
Pahala	moral reward for a virtuous deed
PAN	Partai Amanat Nasional (National Mandate Party); a party linked to Muhammadiyah
PBB	Partai Bulan Bintang (Party of Moon and Star); an Islamist party
PD	Partai Demokrat (Democratic Party); founded by former President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono

PDI-P	Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (The Indonesian Democratic Party – Struggle); a major nationalist/pluralist party
PERSEPI	Perhimpunan Survei Opini Publik Indonesia (The Indonesian Association of Public Opinion Pollsters); Indonesia's polling association include more than 40 pollsters
Pesantren	Islamic boarding school
Pilkada	Pemilihan Langsung Kepala Daerah (direct local executive elections)
Pintu masuk	entry point (or an 'entry door'); an idiom used by candidates to describe collective patronage before distributing cash payments
PKS	Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (Prosperous Justice Party)
PKB	Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (Nation Awakening Party); a party associated with NU
PKK	Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (Family Welfare Guidance); community level women's welfare groups
PPIP	Program Pembangunan Infrastruktur Perdesaan (the rural infrastructure improvement program)
PPP	Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (United Development Party); a government fusion of Islamic political parties established in 1973
PNS	Pegawai Negeri Sipil (state civil employees)
Priyayi	Javanese aristocrats
Sangu	a Javanese word meaning pocket money; Indonesian: *uang saku*
Santri	devout Muslim; usually in contrast to *abangan*
Sarung	sarong, often warn by Muslim men when praying
Sedekah	alms giving
Sentuhan akhir	final touch; distribution of cash to voters a few hours leading up to the elections; sometimes called *serangan fajar*
Serangan fajar	dawn attack; material benefits to compensate for votes are sometimes distributed just after the dawn prayer on voting day
Serangan udara	air attack; voter mobilisation using local mass media, banners, and pamphlets
Tanda mata	souvenirs; gifts given by candidates on house-to-house visits; synonymous with *buah tangan* whose closest English equivalent is 'keepsake

Tarbiyah	(Ar. *al-Tarbiyyah*): education or training model employed by Jemaah Tarbiyah in learning its core teachings; associated with PKS' campus-based movement
Tim sukses	success team; the campaign team established by a candidate with the term often also being used to describe the brokers, intermediaries or local operatives who are its members
Uang duka	grief money
Uang saku	meaning pocket or travelling money; "gift" given to compensate voters for the time they lose by going to polling stations
Ulama	(Ar. *'ulamā'*): Muslim religious scholars; often informal leaders; sometimes called *kyai*
Wakaf	(Ar. *waqf*): endowment for religious or social ends; usually in the form of usufruct; a term used by candidates when distributing club goods
Zakat	(Ar. *zakāt*): obligatory alms tax which constitutes one of the five pillars of Islam; often used to camouflage vote buying exchanges

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

"Cut off my finger if there is a MP in Indonesia today who got elected without doing buying votes!"

—One time DPR member (Interview, 20 April 2014)—

1.1. Background and puzzle

With the rise of democratic regimes in many parts of the world over recent decades, vote buying —the exchange of material benefits for, or at least in the expectation of votes— has become a key component of electoral mobilisation in many young democracies (Jensen and Justesen, 2014: 220). For instance, using the 2005 Round 3 Afrobarometer survey, Andrews and Inman (2010), found massive evidence of vote buying in seven democratic countries in Africa,[1] and the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) released findings of the 2010 Americas Barometer surveys showing high levels of – and interesting variations in – vote buying behaviour across the Latin American and Caribbean regions (Faughnan and Zechmeister, 2011).[2] Similarly, politicians in Asian countries often opt to target poor citizens with offers of money, goods or other forms of compensation for their vote in elections. In the Philippines, for instance, vote buying has long been a major feature of the country's elections, with an estimated 22 percent of its total electorate having been offered money or goods in exchange for their votes during the May 2013 elections (Pulse Asia, 2013).

One country in Asia that has attracted particular attention in terms of its vote buying practices is Indonesia. It is difficult to find an analysis, either in the mass media or in the academic literature, of Indonesia's current electoral politics that does not mention vote buying, locally known as 'money politics' (*politik uang*). Despite its prominence, this issue surprisingly has not received much systematic and comprehensive scholarly attention. The

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[1]These seven countries included Ghana, Mali, Namibia, South Africa, Benin, Senegal, and Botswana.

[2]Among 22 countries across the region, according to the LAPOP, the Dominican Republic came out on top, with 22 percent of respondents claiming that they have been offered material benefits in exchange for their votes. Argentina was second, with 18 percent of those surveyed reporting having been offered money for their votes either sometimes or often; Panama followed with 17.8 percent. This big project involved a total of 37,642 individuals selected randomly to represent a population of eligible voters in 22 countries in the Latin American region.

few examples of scholarly works on this topic are based on qualitative approaches (e.g. Choi, 2007; Hidayat, 2007; Hadiz, 2010; Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). Although they have significantly contributed to our understanding about vote buying, this qualitative literature is unable to measure vote buying's scope, pattern, and effects on electoral outcomes (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012: 203). Equally, much of the existing literature on vote buying has relied on anecdotal evidence, often drawing from unproven rumors and claims (Corstange, 2012: 483). Consequently, little is known about how many voters actually sell their votes in Indonesia and whether cash handouts have discernible effects on turnout or vote choice. This dissertation deals with these key questions that have haunted scholars of Indonesian studies for the last 15 years.[3]

Indonesia is a compelling case study to illuminate the dynamics of vote buying in post-authoritarian societies. This is because of its significance as the fourth-largest democracy in the world, and because it belongs to a group of Southeast Asian nations that report offers of vote buying in higher numbers than most other countries (Schaffer, 2007b; Amick, 2016). Indeed, my study finds that vote buying is so widespread that it has become central to election campaigning in Indonesia (see Chapter 2). In addition to establishing the extent and effects of vote buying, this study also addresses broader questions in the comparative literature on clientelism, such as those regarding the determinants and targeting mechanisms of vote buying. Using survey data from Indonesia's most recent elections, I examine a large number of variables generally believed to be the determinants of vote buying at the individual level (such as income, civic engagement, and political attitudes). Surprisingly, my results suggest that, among other things, partisanship (i.e. strong emotional attachment to a particular political party) is a highly significant predictor of vote buying. Party identifiers were three times more likely to be targets of such practice than non-party identifiers.

This finding is striking, given that strong party supporters should be expected to vote for their party without material incentives. But this result is only one piece of the evidence in a jigsaw puzzle I put together through this dissertation. This finding cannot establish definitively whether voter partisanship attracts handouts, or whether the reverse is true: that these benefits cause people to identify with the party that hands out cash (see also, Stokes et al., 2013: 54). Despite such a potential endogeneity problem –which I discuss

[3]In addition, much has been written about Indonesian voting behaviour from the perspective of sociological context, party identification and rational choice (e.g. King, 2003; Ananta et al., 2004; Mujani et al., 2012; Liddle and Mujani, 2007).

later in this thesis– my finding challenges one strand of scholarship that suggests that partisanship encourages voters to voluntarily help their parties during campaigns (e.g. Dalton, 2016; Verba and Nie, 1972). Further complicating this picture is the fact that the aggregate level of political partisanship –as expressed in levels of party identification– is comparatively low in Indonesia, constituting only 15 percent of my survey respondents during the 2014 election. Given these conditions of low partisanship, one major problem for candidates and parties arises: how feasible is it for candidates in Indonesia to win only by targeting partisans?

The issue of partisanship is in fact at the heart of the scholarly debate about the logic of vote buying (Dunning and Stokes, 2008; Cox, 2010; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012). Efforts at vote buying incur high costs, caused by both the need to establish a structure of vote brokers to deliver benefits to the voters and, of course, the requirement to raise the cash for distribution. With limited resources in hand, and in an environment in which ballot secrecy is protected, candidates are concerned with the effectiveness of vote buying in determining voting outcomes. As a result, they focus on the distribution of electoral incentives to some voters, but exclude others (Stokes et al., 2013). The literature identifies two contrasting strategies in how they do so: the core-voter model and the swing-voter approach. The first posits that parties provide to core supporters in order to mobilise them to turn out on election day (Nichter, 2008; Stokes et al., 2013; Aspinall et al., 2015). The second sees vote buying as a strategy that attempts to sway uncommitted voters (Stokes, 2005). What types of voters, then, do Indonesian politicians target?

While the results of my voter surveys seem to provide evidence for the core-voter prediction in Indonesia, and my survey of politicians and brokers finds ample evidence of strong intentions among political actors to target partisan, loyalist voters, the picture is in fact complex. The data clearly show that although such voters are more likely to be targeted, in fact overall they only make up a tiny proportion of the electorate in Indonesia. How can politicians rely on targeting only party loyalists to win in an election, given the limited number of such voters? As the election draws nearer, how do they make choices on how to spend their money once they have exhausted party loyalists? This challenge becomes even more complicated as, under open-list proportional representation (hereafter: PR) systems such as that used in Indonesia, candidates from the same party have to compete for votes between themselves to gain a seat. The small number of party loyalists is thus highly contested among co-partisans desperately seeking personal votes.

Moreover, while party loyalists are more likely to be targeted in relative terms, in absolute terms the data show that vote buying in Indonesia mostly occurs among non-partisans. If candidates and brokers express such a strong desire to target loyalists, why do they largely end up distributing so much cash and goods to so many uncommitted voters, and what sort of people get targeted for those payments? Hence, the puzzle underlying this study revolves around the question of how politicians and brokers decide which voters to target –voters that they might deem 'loyal' but who are in fact emotionally unattached to any party or candidate. In addition, the principal-agent problems inherent in vote buying – with agents leaking money provided by their principals– are also common in Indonesia. Regardless of such challenges, my thesis shows that candidates still pursue this electoral strategy with enthusiasm, with the result that as many as a third of voters across Indonesia are exposed to vote buying.

Why is vote buying so widespread despite targeting being imprecise and leakage high? In the context of the secret ballot, as in Indonesia, how can parties and candidates be sure that their investment has an effect on voting behaviour? It is fair to assume that without a traceable effect of vote buying, parties and candidates would not engage in it –either in Indonesia or anywhere else. Indeed, despite all the problems of inefficient delivery, my study finds cash handouts are surprisingly effective in producing higher turnout and vote share. In particular, I show that is is particularly the small margin candidates need under an open party list system that makes vote buying effective, its high cost notwithstanding. I show that, despite all its inefficiency, vote buying has an effectiveness ratio that is more than enough to make the difference in the tight races that occur between candidates on a single party list. This helps explain the underlying logic behind candidates' insistence on running vote buying campaigns.

Overall, therefore, this study aims to explore the dynamics of vote buying in Indonesian electoral politics and in doing so to present systematic answers to many of the key questions that have arisen in the literature on clientelism. These questions concern the scope, patterns, determinants, targeting mechanisms, and effectiveness of vote buying as a form of clientelist exchange. My primary research question is: what logic determines the patterns of vote buying in Indonesia? Developing an answer will require answering a set of subsidiary questions. These include: first, how prevalent is vote buying in Indonesia? Here I aim to identify various forms and the intensity of this practice in Indonesia. Second, in order to explain the ubiquity of vote buying, I tackle questions such as: what kinds of

voters are most likely to 'sell' votes; what factors explain why some individuals are more likely than others to be targeted for vote buying; how are they targeted? A third set of questions focus on the impacts of vote buying. In particular, I ask: how effective is vote buying in boosting greater turnout or vote share?

The rest of this introduction first reviews the literature on vote buying, and particularly the debate on whether it mainly targets core or swing voters. It then proceeds by introducing my main arguments, which the thesis chapters substantiate. The subsequent section presents Indonesia's institutional framework, explaining how it has helped shape vote buying and other clientelistic practices during elections. This section helps distinguish the Indonesian case from the conventional patterns identified in literature that largely stems from Latin American cases. The chapter then explains the research methodology used, and concludes by offering an overview of the chapter structure.

1.2. Literature review

1.2.1. Electoral clientelism: vote buying and club goods

Following Nichter (2010), this study distinguishes electoral clientelism from the broader category of clientelism. Nichter (2010: 2) defines electoral clientelism as the distribution of material rewards to voters "exclusively during electoral campaigns." This runs contrary to the generic, classic definition of clientelism which typically involves ongoing relationships where politicians (or indeed, other social leaders) provide assistance and benefits *not only* during elections (Scott, 1969; Bobonis et al., 2017; Kitschelt, 2010). Hicken (2011: 290-294) lists a number of crucial aspects of clientelism, describing it as a form of relationship based on material exchange and involving contingency, hierarchy and iteration. Muno (2010) adds two important elements, insisting that clientelism is personal and voluntary.

Accordingly, if we stick to such key features of clientelism, not all payments made during elections are part of clientelist relationships. Hicken (2011: 295) reminds us that some instances of vote buying that scholars have documented around the world actually do not fit neatly into the classical category of clientelism. In many instances, vote buying is a one-off interaction rather than an example of an ongoing, or iterative, and mutually beneficial relationship of exchange (Kramon, 2011; Aspinall, 2014). In this study, therefore, vote buying can take the form of clientelist or non-clientelist exchanges. In order to capture

both clientelist and non-clientelist forms of vote buying, I follow Schaffer and Schedler (2007) in viewing vote buying as an act which does not need to involve an element of clientelism. Hence, I simply define vote buying as a last-minute effort to influence a voters' decision in an election, typically taking place days, or even just a few hours, before a poll, by providing the voter with cash, goods or some other material benefit.

Vote buying in this study is a part of a broader group of electoral clientelistic strategies. As well as the 'retail' strategy' of vote buying targeting individual voters, electoral clientelism may also involve the 'wholesale' strategy of distribution of club goods, which refers to the provision of *collective* benefits in the form of goods, services or donations to groups (or clubs) of voters. Examples include the building or renovation of houses of worship and schools, or the repair of roads, bridges and irrigation systems in a particular village of neighbourhood. In this study I cover both of these strategies of electoral clientelism, but my central focus is individual vote buying.

1.2.2. Targeting strategies

As indicated earlier, given the budgetary constraints candidates face, the question of how they determine the targets of their vote buying strategies has become a key theme in the literature. Much scholarly theorising on vote buying involves two competing camps, i.e. the core-voter vs. swing-voter schools. The former holds that when they distribute cash payments or goods, parties tend to target their own core voters in order to motivate them to vote and thus increase their turnout (e.g. Nichter, 2008; Stokes et al., 2013). This form of vote buying is often referred to as 'turnout buying'. The second school suggests the opposite. According to this camp, parties will not waste their limited budgets on core supporters, but instead expend it on swing voters or weakly opposed voters (e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Stokes, 2005). This argument is based on the underlying assumption that a core voter is already committed to support the party and hence needs no further incentive to vote for it.

In this study, I examine these two dominant streams to explain how Indonesian politicians and their intermediaries distribute benefits to voters. Cox and McCubbins (1986) were among the first to outline the core-voter hypothesis. They contend that in many settings political parties tend to allocate distributive benefits primarily to their core voters. The driving factor in the core-voter model is the assumption of *risk aversion* on the part of

politicians. Core voters are seen as being more responsive than swing voters because politicians are in “frequent and intensive contact with them and have relatively precise and accurate ideas about how they will react” (Cox and McCubbins, 1986: 379). In their model, risk-averse politicians are unlikely to target swing voters and supporters of their opponents because these two groups of the electorate are riskier bets. Cox and McCubbins coined the term *maintenance buying* to reflect the fact that channeling benefits to core supporters is a rational strategy for a party seeking to maintain a long-term relationship with supporters. Gans-Morse et al. (2014: 4), on the other hand, called it a *rewarding loyalists* strategy to lock in core voters who might otherwise defect.

Focusing on the individual level, Nichter’s (2008) study developed a strong rationale for Cox and McCubbins’ argument, but with a slightly different focus and argument. While Cox and McCubbins (1986) emphasised the role of risk aversion in this strategy, Nichter (2008) argued that passive supporters are substantially more likely to receive electoral incentives due to the primary goal of vote buying being voter mobilisation (as opposed to persuasion). In his model, vote-maximising politicians do not try to change voters’ preferences, but —and he uses the term *‘turnout buying’*—their goal is to increase turnout among their supporters, some of whom may not be sufficiently militant to go to the ballot box at all costs. In addition, Nichter (2008) argues that turnout buying is much easier to monitor for candidates and their intermediaries.

A study by Diaz-Cayeros and his colleagues (2012) also found empirical support for the core voter hypothesis. In their work, however, the focus is on the *endogeneity of partisan loyalties* to material benefits. They argue that parties, especially in Mexico where their study was developed, tend to target loyal supporters to maintain their electoral coalitions over time. They argue that party machines still find it in their interest to target party loyalists, particularly in the presence of fear that if ignored the loyalists might defect. Finally, Stokes and her collaborators (2013) brought a different emphasis to the debate by arguing that this party loyalist strategy is used neither for systematically buying votes nor for purchasing turnout, but it is simply a manifestation of *rent-seeking behaviour* by electoral brokers. They argue that broker predation is the driving force behind the tendency of targeting party loyalists, as this strategy allows brokers both to get a higher profit margin from the funds given to them, and to consolidate their position in their own patronage networks.

In contrast to such views, Lindbeck and Weibull (1987) proposed the swing-voter thesis. The main proponents of this strand suggest that distributive benefits will be more likely to be targeted at swing voters because it is these voters who determine the outcome of an election (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005). Parties need to address the short-term interests of voters outside of their ideological and social core constituency to expand their base at election time (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012). Core voters, by contrast, remain supportive of their party even if material benefits are cut off (Stokes, 2005). Therefore, the rationale behind the swing-voter strategy is simple: swing voters' electoral decisions might be affected by gifts, while core voters' are unlikely to be. In the swing-voter logic, to reward loyalists who are close to the party or candidate is to waste limited resources. In the same vein, the swing-voter hypothesis also predicts that politicians will not reward opposition supporters who are too ideologically distant from them to be persuaded by gifts to change their electoral choice.

In some of her earlier work, Stokes (2005) –in drawing from Dixit and Londregan (1996)– argued that parties avoid investing in core voters because the latter cannot credibly threaten to defect from the party. "Such a threat would lack credibility: the party knows that the loyal voter, even without rewards, is better off cooperating forever than defecting forever" (2005: 320). In her 2005 model, politicians predominantly favour swing voters, or even those swing voters who are slightly opposed to their party, because only these swing voters can credibly threaten to vote with their conscience if they are not swayed by the offer of material inducement. Alternatively, a typical element of the swing-voter hypothesis is the logic of vote maximisation, in which favouring swing voters over core voters increases the prospect of electoral victory. As Diaz-Cayeros and his colleagues (2012: 3) put it, for the swing-voter hypothesis, "swing voters are often equated with the closeness or margin of the victory." This is largely because in order to win elections, candidates cannot exclusively rely on their loyalist voters, but they also need to persuade swing voters who are indifferent to the rival candidates or parties. Hence, investing a large amount in gifts to swing voters, in this view, can be decisive in determining electoral outcomes.

So how does Indonesia fit into this debate between proponents of the core-voter and swing-voter models of vote buying? Or does Indonesia take a different path altogether? It is worth noting that despite stark differences between the swing-voter and core-voter arguments, both camps typically assume that it is the party that is doing the vote buying (Aspinall et al., 2015; Aspinall et al., 2017; Kramon, 2013). The problem with this sort of analysis in the Indonesian context is that, although political parties

still count in legislative elections, it is not parties but candidates with networks of informal brokers who play the key role in organising grassroots electioneering and, therefore, vote buying. Candidates not only campaign *for* their party but also *against* candidates of the same party. As I will show below, this circumstance has significant implications for the patterns of vote buying and the targeting mechanisms used.

In addition, many scholars of vote buying have assumed that the key parameter parties use to identify recipients when distributing benefits is voters' ideological or partisan proximity to the machine or to its opponents (Dunning and Stokes, 2008: 3). The Indonesia context, however, makes this assumption problematic. As noted above, the number of party loyalists is comparatively low and party organisation is not well-organised. Many of the parties are also not clearly ideological differentiated from their rivals. Thus, the Indonesian case displays significant differences from the context in which much of the the literature on vote buying was developed. This dissertation, therefore, attempts to go beyond just testing the two dominant positions –and beyond locating Indonesia in terms of a 'choice' in the swing versus loyalist targeting debate. It aims to do justice to Indonesia's complex electoral dynamics, and –in turn– use the findings to inform the comparative debate on vote buying.

1.3. The argument in brief

This dissertation argues that vote buying in Indonesia is high by international standards. It shows that party loyalists are disproportionately targeted in vote buying efforts, but that, in total numbers, given the relatively small number of party loyalists in Indonesia, vote buying hits more uncommitted voters. It also demonstrates that the effectiveness of vote buying on vote choice is in the 10 percent range, which is sufficient for many candidates to secure a seat and thus explains why they still engage in vote buying despite high levels of leakage.

My study demonstrates the centrality of vote buying to election campaigns in Indonesia. It shows that such practices are not only prominent in national legislative elections, but in local executive elections as well. Based on survey responses on all measures of vote buying, as will be thoroughly discussed in Chapter 2, the estimated proportion of people engaging in this activity lies between 25 and 33 percent of voters. These figures, however, define a range, rather than an accurate point-estimate, of vote buying incidents in Indonesian electoral politics. In the last legislative election in 2014, there were around 187 million registered domestic voters. Hence, the range of between 25 percent and 33 percent would mean an estimated 47 million to 62

million voters nationwide were offered material benefits in return for their vote. If we rely on the highest estimate, one out of three voting-age Indonesians was personally exposed to vote buying, making Indonesia the site of the third-largest reported frequency of vote buying in the world, as measured in recent surveys. High levels of patronage distribution are also pervasive in local executive contests. My local elections dataset measures vote buying in terms of its acceptability among voters, rather than its frequency, we can also use this measure as a proxy for those likely targeted by the practice. Utilising a rich vein of voter data from 2006 to 2015, I show that the acceptance level of vote buying is comparatively high, with four out of ten Indonesians finding it acceptable for politicians or their brokers to distribute cash or gifts as part of campaigning in local elections.

Given that vote buying is so widespread in Indonesia, it is crucial to identify the determinants of the practice. Specifically, whom do candidates target with their vote buying efforts? I show that the consistent findings of multivariate analysis based on pre and post-legislative election nationwide surveys and my sub-national election dataset suggest that party-based partisanship (or party identification) is among the strongest predictors of vote buying. Put differently, my study found that the closer the ties of a voter to a political party, the more likely her or she was to receive offers of vote buying (or to be accepting of the practice). On the surface, the underlying rationale seems to be simple, as suggested by many proponents of the core-voter school: by targeting party loyalists, candidates and brokers reduce the risks of vote buying such voters are the most reliable and have the greatest electoral potential. Clearly, the results from my individual data are in line with expectations from the literature on the core-voter model, suggesting that party loyalists are an attractive target of electoral clientelism in Indonesia.

But a closer look at the data in the framework of the specific Indonesian context raises more complex issues and questions. First, in the context of an open-list PR system, such as that in Indonesia, partisan voters are highly contested among co-partisans (that is, candidates of the same party). In a voting environment where securing seats does not so much depend on defeating candidates from different political parties but on winning against internal party competitors (Selb and Lutz, 2015: 335), the candidates need to translate a voter's partisanship –their support for their party— into a *personal* vote. The link to clientelist strategies is clear: in order to outdo their fellow intraparty candidates, candidates need to differentiate themselves and one way to do so is by buying votes (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016: 13). Thus, as the main

actors of vote buying, candidates focus on party loyalists because they are the real battleground in open-list systems –adding an important nuance to typical core-voter arguments such as risk aversion and turnout mobilisation.

Second, if it is true that party loyalists are more likely to be targeted for vote buying, how feasible is it for candidates to win only by targeting such partisans? It is important to note that the number of partisan voters in Indonesia is comparatively small. Only 15 percent of my national survey respondents admitted being close to any political party during the run-up to the 2014 election. Equally, the number of voters who voted for the same party in the 2014 and 2009 elections was only 22 percent of the total electorate. Conversely, the number of non-partisans, defined as those who do not feel close to any political party, is extremely large by any standard (85 percent). Given such limited mass partisanship, candidates can quickly exhaust the supply of voters if they decide to target only party loyalists with their vote buying efforts. Indeed, as noted above, my voter surveys showed that the vast majority of vote buying —in absolute terms— happens among uncommitted voters. Thus, despite actors' insistence that they are targeting partisan voters, the reality is that that they are mostly paying out benefits to non-partisans. This outcome appears to be a flow-on effect of the small number of voters with close emotional links to parties.

In its focus on understanding candidates' strategy of selecting targets of vote buying, this study offers an additional explanation to the scholarly debate between core- versus swing- voter models by combining an emphasis on the core-voter strategy with an emphasis on personal networks, such as are widely used by candidates in Indonesia. By doing so, this study captures the gap between the declared efforts and intent of candidates and brokers to target partisan voters, and the reality that most benefits are distributed to voters who do not in fact feel close to any party but who are instead embedded in personal clientelistic networks which are linked, often through long chains of personal connections, to the candidate. These networks, which include but often vastly exceed the constituency of deeply committed party loyalists, function as the primary target area of brokers and candidates, explaining how both core and swing voters receive benefits. This explanation contrasts with the assumptions that typically underlie both the swing- and core-voter models. In these models, particularistic rewards are distributed in a highly targeted way to specific types of voters guided by the *partisan preferences* of the recipients to the machine or its opponents (Dunning and Stokes, 2008: 3). In my analysis, *personal connections* are key. While my argument differs from the dominant literature on vote buying, it

complements earlier works on the significance of personal networks in facilitating clientelistic practices.[4]

This study calls the strategy used by Indonesian candidates a 'personal loyalist' strategy, insofar that it targets persons not on the basis of their partisan affiliations but as identified through personal networks. Though candidates using this approach will still target partisan voters (who will typically be connected to them through party or other personal networks), such voters have been personalised in the sense that what counts for the candidate is not only their loyalty to the party, but also their loyalty to the individual candidate within the party. The reliance on personal networks rather than party loyalties and linkages can be expected to be most prevalent in settings where political parties are largely absent in election campaigns and where partisan ties are weak. In Indonesia, the adoption of an open-list PR system played a significant role in encouraging the development of such a context. The open-list system shapes candidates' strategies in three ways: (1) they are forced to compete against internal competitors for personal votes; (2) they must rely on personal networks rather than the party structure; and (3) they only need to win a small slice of the voters to defeat their co-partisan rivals. With limited resources in hand and dealing with large constituencies, they are more likely to invest in areas that have traditionally been viewed as their party's strongholds –which they think would provide the largest pool for their personal votes too (Mahsun, 2016: 125). But given that party constituents are limited and highly contested among co-partisans, every candidate seeks to personalise their party constituents in the attempt to get the most intraparty votes. Although voters might have a sense of loyalty to a party, under open-list PR systems, they still can vote for different candidates within that party, meaning that their personal choice of a candidate is highly consequential for determining which candidate wins. Even voters who simply vote for a party without indicating any preference for an individual candidate, while helping to boost the chances of that party gaining a seat, will have no direct impact on determining an individual candidate's personal prospects of victory, since the open-list system requires parties to allocate the seat only to the candidate who receives the most personal votes. Accordingly, candidates define their so-called 'base voters' not only on the basis of past voting record, but also on the basis of personal connections. Such personal connections typically include a candidate's birth place, kinship, ethnic and religious

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[4]Among others, James Scott's (1972) "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia" is one excellent, classic work on clientelism that emphasised the importance of personal networks. The recent study by Cruz (2014) also finds that those with larger social networks (defined as more friendship and family ties) in the Philippines are more likely to be targeted for vote buying. Similarly, Wantchekon (2003) shows that in Benin, clientelistic goods are often distributed through personal networks.

networks, or even simply in terms of receipt of past patronage. Moreover, candidates tap into informal brokerage networks. In short, where personalised electoral systems focus the competition on intraparty contests, candidates try to personalise their party's captive voters, prioritising personal connections mediated by brokers.

In its implementation, however, this personal loyalist strategy runs into various difficulties. First, most candidates and brokers tend to overestimate the number of partisan, loyalist voters. This is in part because they view past voting patterns for parties as a predictor of partisan voting behaviour in the current campaign. The latter works in some cases (i.e. some parties do have clearly defined strongholds), but overall there are strong fluctuations in Indonesians' voting behaviour. Second, loyalty is an amorphous concept in the Indonesian context. It has multiple dimensions which include partisan terms, but also include kinship, religion and ethnic ties as well as patronage loyalties. Accordingly, candidates and brokers typically misidentify non-partisans as loyalist supporters because they misinterpret personal connections as partisan leanings. This confusion over which 'loyal' voters to pursue makes brokers dispense benefits to swing voters they falsely believe to be core voters. Third, brokers have strong incentives to shirk due to principal-agent problems between candidates and brokers (Aspinall, 2014). Many candidates pour cash handouts *en masse*, but invest little effort in monitoring and disciplining brokers. Lastly, in addition to the brokers' rent-seeking behaviour, the problem of targeting could partly be a story about agency loss between voters and brokers, and between voters and politicians. Many of the people who are selected through personal networks are in fact not even loyal to the candidate.

But if vote buying is often so misdirected and susceptible to broker predation, why do candidates invest so heavily in it? Recall that vote buying is ubiquitous in Indonesia. If such clientelist exchange is truly inefficient, how can it have an impact on electoral outcomes? In the comparative literature on vote buying, measuring the effect of vote buying on voting behaviour has two main dimensions: (1) it is assessed whether cash handouts are effective at producing higher turnout; and (2) it is measured whether they have an impact on determining voting choice. Despite the misdirected targeting and the unreliability of brokers, my study demonstrates that vote buying has a significant effect on voter turnout. My voter survey reveals that respondents who experienced a vote buying attempt were more likely to vote (81 percent) than those who did not (74 percent), and this difference is statistically significant at conventional levels ($p = 0.017$).

Similarly, my study shows that the estimated effect of cash handouts on vote choice lies between 10 percent and 11 percent, meaning that 10 to 11 percent of voters cast their vote as a direct response to a gift of cash or goods. My direct survey item found that offers of vote buying in legislative elections influenced the vote choice of an estimated 10.2 percent of total respondents. Likewise, receiving money during sub-national executive elections had an electoral effect on 11.1 percent of the voters. In these seemingly low numbers, however, lies the key to vote buying's attractiveness. As elaborated in more detail below, in a highly competitive open-list system like Indonesia's, where candidates only need small margins to beat co-partisans, that 10 to 11 percent can be a deciding factor in an election. Utilising official election statistics to assess the competitiveness of the 2014 legislative elections, the average winning margin for candidates when defeating party rivals was only 1.65 percent. Therefore, many candidates enthusiastically pursued vote buying because such a strategy could be a potential game changer. My dataset of electoral district surveys also shows that as electoral races grew tighter (marked by smaller margins of victory), the more likely a voter was exposed to vote buying, and vice versa. By proposing that vote buying is an effective instrument to chase a slim margin of victory, my study explains why such clientelist exchange is so widespread in Indonesia.

This finding further strengthens the conclusion that vote buying patterns in Indonesia differ from both the core- and swing-voter models. Core voters, in the sense of party supporters, are indeed primary targets of vote buying, but in total numbers uncommitted voters receive most of the benefits, whether intentionally or not. This is largely because of the institutional context that shapes the dynamics of vote buying in Indonesia. The conventional literature on the swing versus core targeting model is framed by a context that is quite different from that in Indonesia. The difference is particularly evident in the electoral system (Indonesia has an extreme version of an open party list system) and, correspondingly, the degree of party identification (which is extraordinarily low in Indonesia). This drift toward a more candidate-centred electoral system has personalised voting and vote buying, and has undermined parties' role in elections and eroded party loyalty among voters. Given that the high levels of vote buying in Indonesia are closely linked to the institutional setting that produced them, I suggest that vote buying will continue to be pervasive as long as the existing electoral framework and related socio-political settings persist.

1.4. The institutional framework: party system and electoral rules

As noted above, particular contextual factors matter tremendously in explaining the ubiquity of vote buying in Indonesia, as compared to other countries and regions. Candidates' decisions to launch vote buying needs to be examined and explained in relation to the institutional and structural context within which they operate. This section highlights such institutional and structural frameworks, notably as they relate to the party system and the open-list electoral system. Both have tended to encourage vote buying.

1.4.1. Political parties and party system

Indonesia's party system entered a new, post-authoritarian era after the resignation of the authoritarian ruler President Suharto in 1998. Political parties, of which there were previously only three because of heavy government regulations, could now form freely (with the exception of communist parties). Consequently, a highly competitive multiparty system emerged, which coincided with the simultaneous introduction of multi-level elections from legislative to direct presidential ballots.

All legislative elections ranging from those for the national legislature known as the People's Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat, DPR), the Regional People's Representative Councils (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah, DPRD) –both at the provincial and municipal/district levels– and the upper (but in practice only advisory) chamber known as the Regional Representative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Daerah, DPD) occur simultaneously. Up to and including 2014, they preceded the presidential election by approximately three months (Allen, 2015).[5] All legislative elections at different levels are held in multimember constituencies divided into multiple electoral districts known as *daerah pemilihan* (electoral districts). In 2014, there were 77 national districts that varied in size between three and 10 seats (the electoral system will be explained in more detail in the next section).

Early in the post-Suharto period there was an explosive growth of parties. The political elite has since then tried to reduce the number of political parties over time through various registration requirements, which have been gradually tightened. In 2014, only 12 national parties were allowed to compete in the national legislative election (down from 38 in 2009, 24 in 2004 and 48 in 1999). Further, the elite has closed the door to independent candidacies in legislative polls –persons who are not nominated by these

[5]From 2019 onwards, legislative and presidential elections will be held at the same time.

nationally registered parties are not allowed to run.[6] These limitations notwithstanding, at currently 12, the number of national parliamentary parties remains significant by international standards, and contributes to the competitiveness of the party system.

Political parties in the post-authoritarian Indonesia are diverse, and can be classified in various categories in terms of their religio-ideological orientation and political purpose. Perhaps the oldest binary category developed by Indonesia scholars is that of secular parties on the one hand and Islamic parties on the other (Liddle and Mujani, 2010). Among the 12 national parties in 2014, five parties can be viewed as Islamic, while the rest can be categorised as 'secular.'[7] Within these categories, parties are not homogenous, and there is a range of ideology and policy platforms. Islamic parties, for instance, can be defined as those that either explicitly claim Islam as their party ideology, or which do not do so but still draw most of their support from long-established Islamic organisations. Secular parties, likewise, have a range of historic and cultural differences.

Alternatively, but relatedly, Indonesian parties can be divided by their being part of a socio-cultural cleavage ('aliran'), or by their catch-all orientation (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016: 16-17; Mietzner, 2013). The former includes those which had their roots in the Islamic community or, by contrast, in historically developed nationalist groups. For example, Partai Amanat National (PAN, National Mandate Party) benefits from its close links to the largest modernist Muslim organisation, Muhammadiyah, and its once solid base among religious-minded urban middle-classes. Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (PKB, National Awakening Party) is associated with the biggest Islamic organisation, Nahdhatul Ulama, and draws on support especially among underprivileged traditionalist Islamic communities in rural Java. Despite profiting from close ties and associations with Islamic organisations, these two parties present themselves as pluralist. At the more conservative end of the spectrum, Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, Prosperous Justice Party) came out of the Tarbiyah, Muslim Brotherhood-inspired campus movement and draws its strongest support in major urban centres (Muhtadi, 2012). Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP, United Development Party) was formed as a result of Suharto's fusion of Islamic political parties in 1973, and has maintained an Islamist stance on important policy issues. On the other hand, Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan (PDI-P, Indonesian Democratic

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[6]The only exception is Aceh where –as a result of the 2005 Helsinki peace accord– candidates for provincial and district seats are able to compete through local parties.

[7]It is important to note, however, that all 'secular' parties reject the term 'secular' –given that the country's state ideology describes Indonesia as multi-religious– and prefer to call themselves 'pluralist' instead.

Party of Struggle) describes itself as 'nationalist', promoting pluralism and protection for minority groups. It therefore has particularly found acceptance among *abangan*, socio-economically lower-class nominal Muslims, and in areas with predominantly non-Muslim populations.

Contrary to the *aliran*-based parties, catch-all parties seek to maximise votes by attracting "as wide a variety of social interests as possible" (Gunther and Diamond, 2001: 26). This leads the catch-all parties not to appeal to any particular social group or constituency. The most-cited example is Golkar, the political machine of the Suharto regime. It claims to serve the interests of the entire nation and styles itself as "a non-*aliran*, non-sectarian and non-ideological party" (Hatta, 2000 quoted by Tomsa, 2008: 96). Furthermore, Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016: 17) mention the important and growing subcategory of 'presidentialist parties,' in which parties only serve as a political machine for their founders seeking presidential office (Samuels and Shugart, 2010; Ufen, 2006). The examples include Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's Democratic Party, Prabowo Subianto's Gerindra (Gerakan Indonesia Raya, Great Indonesia Movement Party), Wiranto's Hanura (Hati Nurani Rakyat, People's Conscience Party) and Surya Paloh's NasDem (Nasional Demokrat, National Democrat) Party. The presidentialist parties rely heavily on personalist appeals of their main figures – but this is often coupled with patronage delivery and populist policies to attract voters.

While presidentialist parties have often been described as lacking ideological commitment, this absence is not a monopoly of the presidentialist parties. Ideological divisions among political parties are generally not strong –with the exception of the schism between those who want a stronger role for Islam in state organisation and those who do not.[8] On most other issues, party positions are near-arbitrary, and shaped by vested rather than ideological interests. Thus, voters are often unable to differentiate political parties regarding policy positions or platforms. Given that parties tend not to compete on programmatic grounds, parties and office-seeking politicians are viewed primarily as personal distributors of private rather than public goods (Mueller, 2011). Confronted by these challenges, almost all politicians (at least those running for legislative seats) I encountered tried to focus voters' attention on personalities, instead of party, as a voting cue. To be fair, some parties or candidates attempted to go through the motions of presenting programmatic promises in the 2014

[8]Pepinsky, Liddle, and Mujani (2012) argue that Indonesian voters use Islam as a cue when party policy positions are not available.

elections, but their pledges commonly lacked credibility (Keefer, 2007). Instead, they typically quickly resorted to various clientelistic strategies to appeal to voters.

Another institutional factor that characterises political parties in Indonesia and contributes to the widespread practice of patronage politics is the weakening of the parties' roots in society as evidenced in the general decline of party loyalty. As will be discussed below, party affiliation has decreased significantly over the past 15 years from about 86 percent of voters who felt close with any party in 1999 to only 15 percent in 2014 –a low figure by international standards. These statistics correspond with the declining trend of party membership in Indonesia from 2004 to 2014 recorded by two polling institutes I am affiliated with, Indonesia Survey Institute (LSI) and Indikator Politik Indonesia. As shown in Figure 1.1, the trend reports just how steep the decline has been in Indonesia from around 10 percent in August 2004 to roughly 1.5 percent in mid-2014.[9]

Figure 1.1 Trend of party membership in Indonesia, 2004-2014 (%)



Sources: A series of surveys from April 2004 to September 2012 belong to LSI; While surveys in December 2013, August 2014, and October 2014 owned by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC); Surveys in January 2014, February 2014, April 2014, May 2014, June 2014 by Indikator.

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[9]The chart is based on the combination of those who reported being active and inactive members of a political party. During legislative elections, candidates typically ask their supporters to register to be party members in order to get benefits they offer such as a free ambulance service and 'grief money' [*uang duka* – i.e. life insurance] for the family should the holder pass away (Ace Hasan Sy, interview, 14 April 2014). Accordingly, party membership often increases during legislative elections.

Of course, the decline of party membership is not unique to Indonesia, and nor is the current level of party membership extraordinarily small by international comparison (Mietzner, 2013: 44-45). But the decline in both party identification and membership reinforces the notion that Indonesian elections are getting more candidate-centred, and provides another incentive for candidates to engage in private clientelist exchanges.

Some scholars maintain that the sharp decline of party identification and party membership correlates with electoral volatility, which denotes the extent of voters' inclination to switch their support between elections (Mujani et al., 2011; Mietzner, 2013; Tomsa, 2014). This electoral volatility, while not high compared to other new democracies, is significant. In 1999, the top five parties accounted for more than 80 percent of the vote, and PDI-P won the election gaining 33.74 percent. In 2004, the share of the five biggest parties dropped sharply to just 66 percent, and Golkar came out as the champion with 'only' 21.58 percent. The declining trend continued in 2009 with the top five parties at just 61 percent, and the winner Democrats received only 20.85 percent. In 2014, the share of the main parties increased somewhat to 62 percent, but the victorious PDI-P got only 18.95 percent. Thus, the socio-political and institutional setting of the party system –with its increased focus on catch-all appealas as well as highly competitive interactions between no less than a dozen parties and thousands of their candidates– has fuelled increasing personalisation and loosening ties between parties and voters.

1.4.2. Electoral rules and its implications

Indonesia's electoral institutions have also affected the extent of patronage politics, especially in terms of, candidates' choice of strategy. It is well established in the comparative literature that electoral system design can have a large impact on candidate strategies. As Hicken explains (2007a: 49), "all else being equal, where electoral systems limit voters to a single choice among parties, as in closed-list proportional representation systems, candidates are more likely to rely on party-centred strategies." And indeed, when in 1999 Indonesia adopted a fully closed-list system, competition took place primarily between parties. Voters cast a ballot for a fixed list, with the candidate ranking determined by the party. Candidates were therefore predominantly concerned with their positions on party lists because those positions would determine their electoral prospects. A universally recognised term to illustrate the significance of candidates' list positions was '*nomor topi*' (lit. 'hat number'), describing those who occupied high positions on the list and thus had a higher chance of winning. In

contrast, lower-ranked candidates were called '*nomor sepatu*,' (lit. 'shoe number'), denoting rankings at the bottom of the list. There were numerous reports of wealthy candidates purchasing winnable slots on party lists by bribing party leaders.[10]

Partly in response to these internal bribery dynamics, Indonesia in 2004 applied a semi-open proportional system, enshrined in Election Law No. 12/2003. Although voters were allowed for the first time to express their preference for a particular candidate, the law still allowed for heavy party control of candidates (Sherlock, 2009). In order to get elected outside their order of the party list, lower-ranked candidates had to receive an individual vote equal to or above the full party quota required to secure a seat in their respective electoral district (Allen, 2015). If they did not achieve this, the seat would go to the candidate placed highest on the party list (Sherlock, 2009: 6). Given the difficulty of meeting this requirement, only two out of 550 members of parliament were elected by achieving an individual vote which reached the quota; the rest entered the legislature via the party list.

As shown in Table 1.1, under the 2004 election law party votes and highly ranked slots on the lists counted a great deal in determining which candidates were elected. Again, this is largely because most candidates were unable to achieve the individual quota, handing the seat to those who attained highest positions on their party lists (Sherlock, 2009). Regardless of this limitation, Allen (2015: 76) called 2004 an "important moment of transition" since for the first time Indonesia introduced optional preference voting. Despite the difficulties candidates had in achieving the requirement of a full quota, the semi-open PR system began to drive candidates to get elected on the basis of personal vote.

Table 1.1 **Party list position of elected national parliamentarians**

Position on Ticket	The 2004-2009 DPR		The 2009-2014 DPR		The 2014-2019 DPR	
	Total	%	Total	%	Total	%
1	405	73.6	360	64.4	348	62.14
2	104	19	104	18.6	95	16.96
3	32	5.8	40	7.2	25	4.46
Equal or > 4	9	1.6	55	9.8	92	16.44

Source: assorted Indonesian Electoral Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU) documents relating to the 2004, 2009, and 2014 legislative elections.

[10]Even some scholars indicated that some parties simply auctioned their winnable positions off to the highest bidder (e.g. Rich, 2013: 75).

In reaction to the low numbers of candidates being elected in 2004 on a full quota, the law was changed to reduce the quota for the 2009 elections. Instead of having to obtain a full seat quota, candidates only had to achieve 30 percent of it to secure a seat independent of the party list (Butt, 2016: 8; Sherlock, 2009: 6). However, the Constitutional Court annulled the rule and introduced a fully open-list proportional system. According to the Court's verdict, seats won by a party had to be handed to that party's candidates who obtained the most individual votes. This new electoral system, introduced by the Constitutional Court, had strong repercussions for candidates and their strategies. In general, fully open-list PR systems provide a strong motivation for politicians to build personal appeals and networks since their victory (Hicken, 2007; Allen, 2015). Indonesia was no exception in this regard. Since 2009, many candidates have campaigned for personal votes without relying heavily on their positions on the party list, and an increasing proportion of lower-placed candidates have succeeded in being elected (see Table 1.1).

Given the short time between the Court's decision and the 2009 elections, however, candidates at that time did not have enough time to fully switch to a personality-centred campaign strategy. By contrast, in the 2014 elections –which also applied a fully open-list PR system– they had sufficient time to adjust to the system and prepare their strategies (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016: 13). In this context, it is important to note two patterns emerging under the fully open party list regime: first, despite the open-list system making elections more candidate-centric, all candidates are still concerned with party votes in their constituencies. As Aspinall argued (2014: 549), "the number of seats that each party wins in a district is in proportion to the combined votes for the party and all its individual candidates there." Accordingly, each candidate has an interest in enhancing (or at least stabilising) the party's overall vote and thus the number of expected seats. Doing so increases his or her prospect of winning one of those seats (Samuels, 1999: 495). Second, it is generally rare for each party to win more than two seats in any given electoral district. With many candidates believing –rightly or wrongly– that they can forecast the number of seats their party will win in a specific area, the focus of competition moves from an interparty contest to rivalry between candidates of one party over its expected number of seats (Richard Sualang, interview, 26 April 2014; Ibrahim, 2016: 96). As a result, the pressure to collect personal votes among co-partisans increases the incentives for individual candidates to differentiate themselves from rivals on their own party list, including by buying votes and establishing a personal campaign team.

Preference ballots generally increase the degree to which candidates are elected on the basis of individual votes (Carey and Shugart, 1995: 417). Indonesia has become a particularly prominent example of this trend. To gauge the extent to which Indonesian elections are candidate-centric, I compare total party votes and candidate votes between the 2004, 2009 and 2014 elections. Although in 2004 the electoral system had a more restricted open-list system in 2004 compared to 2009 and 2014, voters equally had the option of indicating a preference for individual candidates in the all of these last three elections (Sherlock, 2004; Sherlock, 2009; Butt, 2016).[11] The Electoral Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU), the body that organises elections in Indonesia, itself had no official results for the total share of votes collected by all candidates across political parties competing in 2004[12], but Kevin Evans (2004) manually collected the data by comparing the share of votes for both the party and candidates relative to those who voted for parties only. On average, 46 percent of voters cast their votes by marking both the party and a candidate, though the proportion of personal votes varied across the 24 parties competing in 2004.[13] Similarly, a nationwide survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (May-June 2008) estimated that of those respondents who were aware that in 2004 besides voting for a party, a voter could also vote for an individual candidate, 47.2 percent reported voting for party and candidate from the same party, 35.4 percent said they voted for the party only, and 17.4 percent had forgotten what they did. A post-election survey organised by the International Foundation for Electoral System (IFES) provides a slightly higher estimate: 52 percent of Indonesians during the 2004 legislative elections indicated a preference vote for individual candidates (Wall, 2004 quoted by Sherlock, 2009: 8).

In 2009, when a fully open-list system applied, according to the KPU's estimate, those who voted for candidates only or both the party and a candidate from the same party totalled 69 percent of all 104,099,785 votes. The LSI's exit poll after the 2009 election, in which 3,685 respondents were interviewed immediately after they exited the polling stations, showed that 38.1 percent of survey respondents reported having voted for a candidates only, while 34.7 percent voted for both a party and a candidate

[11]Another difference is that the electoral law for the 2004 elections stipulated that although voters were allowed to cast a vote for an individual candidate, they also had to vote for the candidate's party. In 2009 and 2014, in contrast, a vote would still be valid even if the voter opted to choose a candidate alone without voting for their party; the personal vote would then be counted for the candidate's party as well.

[12]Ferry Kurnia, Personal Communication, 3 October 2016.

[13]For example, Evans (2004: 201) estimated that candidates from PAN and PKS received more individual votes (59 percent each), compared to PDI-P which 'only' collected 49 percent of personal votes in total.

from the same party, producing a total of around 72.8 percent who reported using their ballot to mark a preference for individual candidates.[14] In 2014, with a similar electoral system, the KPU estimated that 70 percent of the 124,972,491 voters marked their ballots for individual candidates and 30 percent for party only. Clearly, then, over the period of 2004–2014, there has been an increasing trend among voters to vote on the basis of personal candidate preference rather than in response to political party appeals. This increase was particularly evident in the switch from the 2004 semi-open regime list to the 2009 open-list system, but continued in 2014.

The LSI's post-election survey conducted in June 2014 offered a more detailed picture of voters' greater inclination to vote for candidates over parties. In the national DPR election, 44.5 percent of survey respondents admitted marking the name of 'candidate only', and 22.5 percent voted for 'the party and a candidate from that party'. In the provincial and district DPRD elections, the 'candidate only' vote was even higher, at 47.5 percent and 52.1 percent respectively (see Table 1.2). It is therefore reasonable to argue that smaller constituencies incentivise candidates to campaign more on the basis of their individual profiles than do larger constituencies. I will elaborate on this point in later chapters.

Table 1.2 **Personal votes in national, provincial, and district legislative elections (%): The 2014 legislative election**

How Voters to Cast the Ballot	DPR Election	Provincial DPRD	District DPRD
Party Only	27.3	23.7	16.8
Candidate Only	44.5	47.5	52.1
Party and Candidate from Same Party	22.5	21.0	23.1
Multiple Party and Multiple Candidate	0.1	0.1	0.1
Intentionally Invalidate/Did not Cast	0.1	0.2	0.2
Refused	1.9	2.7	2.0
Forgot	3.6	4.7	5.6

Source: LSI post-election national survey conducted in June 2014

Obviously, a number of caveats are in order. Although candidates across parties uniformly chased personal votes relying on what Hicken (2007a: 48) termed "name and fame," this does not necessarily mean that the influence of political ideology and major political figures has disappeared. While trying to expand their electoral bases, most candidates sought to

[14]This data was not initially included in the LSI's exit poll report in 2009 (http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/357/efek-kampanye-terbuka-menjelang-pemilu-legislatif-2009), but was processed for this study.

maintain support from their party's existing religio-political and social constituencies. For example, PKB candidates, especially those running in East Java districts, often produced posters, banners and stickers that featured an NU logo and photos of influential *ulama*, in an obvious effort to highlight their roots in the traditionalist Islamic community (Fealy, 2014). Similarly, many candidates from PAN deliberately targeted the Muhammadiyah constituency, especially in its strongholds like Aceh and West Sumatra. In contrast, many PDI-P candidates presented themselves as 'nationalist' and sent their pluralist messages out to areas inhabited by less religiously observant Muslims and minorities. In short, many candidates presented themselves within the framework of their parties' popular images (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). Similarly, many candidates still tried to ride the coattails of their party's national leaders. Among presidentialised parties, for example, Gerindra candidates often produced publicity material that promoted their names and photos alongside those of Prabowo Subianto. Even candidates from the more socially rooted PDI-P enthusiastically displayed photographs of Joko Widodo (Jokowi) or Megawati in their advertising materials in 2014.

There is, then, clear evidence that the structural and institutional settings –as well as changes within them– are relevant to the patterns of electoral competition and vote buying in Indonesia. Compared to closed proportional systems, an open-list system provides more opportunities for candidates to determine electoral outcomes –and more incentives to engage in personal campaigning and patronage-based approaches. Declining party attachments and increasing intraparty competition likewise favours clientelist exchanges. The sharp decline of both party identification and party membership over time have further strengthened the move from the party-centric party system of early post-Suharto Indonesia to a more candidate-centred regime, with fundamental consequences for electoral strategizing.

1.5. Design and methods

In this study, I employ mixed methods by combining quantitative and qualitative approaches. For the study's main basis, I use survey data to test several hypotheses and conduct statistical analysis. I used qualitative methods to flesh out and explain the survey findings. While the scope of research and analysis focuses primarily on the national level, I also pay considerable attention to the dynamics of vote buying at sub-national levels. This section sets the scene for the interplay between quantitative

and qualitative that informs my study, and explains how I selected case studies at the sub-national level.

1.5.1. Approaches and methods

1.5.1.1 Quantitative approaches

This study draws data from six different surveys as the primary sources of my quantitative research. Most notably with regard to establishing the level of vote buying in Indonesia's population, some scholars argue that survey data provides a more sound basis for analysing clientelism than many other approaches, because it allows researchers to examine the extent to which vote buying is pervasive and draw inferences about causation (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012: 203). Survey methods allow us to test competing theories about the determinant factors of clientelist strategies.

But survey methods have their problems. Many scholars argue that quantitative methods are problematic, because they miss a lot of the nuance. In addition, using surveys to study vote buying, presents structural challenges since many individuals exposed to such practices may not admit to their behaviours (Brusco et al., 2004: 69). In most parts of the world, vote buying is not morally legitimate and thus attracts a negative social stigma (Hicken, 2007b; Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012; Corstange, 2015). There is, then, a potential social desirability issue in interviewing and surveying respondents on this topic.

In response to this problem, the first challenge in establishing the extent of vote buying in Indonesia is to minimise potential respondents' fear of expressing socially undesirable attitudes or admitting to stigmatised behaviours like vote buying. In order to do so, I used a number of survey items of varying degrees of directness (see Chapter 2). My own survey did not only rely on a direct question, but also used a neighbourhood question by treating respondents as an 'observer' to assess the prevalence of vote buying incidents in their community. More importantly, I employed a list experiment, an increasingly influential mode of quantitative research in studies of clientelism designed to reduce bias in survey questions.

Hence, this study is expected to offer strong empirical evidence of the extent and patterns of vote buying that is generally absent from the more anecdotal accounts that predominate in previous works on Indonesia's clientelism and electoral politics. This study therefore aims to fill a significant gap in the literature by providing original survey data on vote buying in Indonesia. Using probability-based samples, my surveys include voter-level, candidate-level and broker-level data.

As an executive director of a Jakarta-based polling organisation, I have extensive experience in organising surveys through face-to-face interviews in Indonesia. Given the sensitive nature of some questions, notably on vote buying, it was essential to secure trust from respondents. At the outset, my interviewers made clear that the survey institute was independent and non-partisan, and that they were not affiliated with either any government institution or a particular party. The six surveys that form the quantitative foundation of this study are the following:

1. *National pre- and post-election surveys of voters*: I conducted both pre- and post-election surveys.[15] These surveys asked respondents a variety of questions relating to vote buying, such as how prevalent it was; how effective and costly it was; which kinds of voters were susceptible to such exchanges; and how candidates and brokers monitored compliance. My first pre-election survey was administered January, 18–30, 2014; the second one was conducted February 26–March 6, 2014; and the third one was organised March 19–24, 2014, around two weeks before the election. My post-election survey was run between 22 and 26 April 2014, immediately after the legislative election which was held on 9 April, benefitting from voters' recent interactions with candidates and brokers. Some measures of vote buying and club goods employed in this study were generated from the 'Money Politics in Southeast Asia' Project.[16] In addition to these four surveys, I was also able to draw on the results of massive, multi-year national surveys conducted by the Indonesia Survey Institute (LSI), Indikator Politik Indonesia and Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting's (SMRC) in order to incorporate trend data —notably with regard to the aggregate levels of party identification and party membership. I have been deeply involved with LSI and Indikator, and have been granted permission to use SMRC's historical data.

2. *List-experiment*: Survey findings, however, must be treated with some caution due to the risk of a social desirability bias. To produce more valid estimates of the extent of vote buying and reduce possible errors that may be caused by such bias, this study employed survey experiments, embedded within my two nationally representative

[15]As will be further explained in Appendix A, I organised three pre-legislative election surveys. The first of the pre-election surveys involved 2,039 individuals selected randomly to represent the population of eligible voters in Indonesia. The second pre-election survey interviewed 2,050 respondents across Indonesia. The last pre-election survey covered 1,220 voters across the country. Meanwhile, the number of respondents in the post-election survey was 1,210.

[16]This multi-year project was a four-country study of money politics across Southeast Asia that included Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. My thanks to Edward Aspinall and other principal investigators of this project (i.e. Allen Hicken, Meredith Weiss, and Paul Hutchcroft) for allowing me to employ their measures and share the results for the purposes of this study.

surveys of the electorate, by splitting the sample into random halves: a treatment and a control group. The results of the list experiment allow for comparisons with direct and neighbourhood measures to investigate how prevalent vote buying is.

3. *Pre-election legislative electoral district surveys of voters*: I was also able to draw upon massive pre-election electoral district surveys in the lead up to the legislative election (mostly in 2013 and 2014) conducted by Indikator and SMRC in 73 out of 77 electoral districts across Indonesia. The total number of respondents involved in this massive project was 71,940 respondents. In this study, I used these surveys for sub-national case selection (as will be discussed in the next sub-section) and for examining the possible relationship between electoral competitiveness and vote buying in each electoral district (see Chapter 7).

4. Pre-election *local executive election surveys of voters*: My quantitative analysis is also based on extensive empirical data drawn from surveys administered in the lead up to local executive elections by the aforementioned pollsters. These surveys canvassed voter attitudes in the lead up to elections for regional government heads (*pilkada*) at the provincial and district level across Indonesia. The total number of surveys used in this study was 1,163 with the total number of respondents 725,890. Using several questions relating to vote buying that have been asked since 2006, my study can establish both longitudinal trends and inter-regional variations in levels of vote buying.

5. *Local post-election surveys of candidates*: In addition to drawing on the large national polls and multi-year surveys from local elections, I also designed and organised surveys with elected candidates in four selected provinces (for the selection of these provinces, see the following section). These surveys used face-to-face interviews to ask a set of questions relating to the use of clientelist strategies, recruitment of brokers, targeting strategies and similar issues. The sample was determined through the multistage random sampling method by grouping the populations in each province based on zones. I divided each province into four different zones, using criteria that varied depending on the geography, history and conditions of a particular region (for further explanation about the zones, see Appendix B). Each zone was a combination of provincial electoral districts. In each zone, a certain regency or city was picked randomly as sample by proportion. In total, the survey consists of roughly 300 randomly selected elected candidates for the DPRD at the provincial and the municipality/district level. As I elaborate in more detail in Appendix B, this rarely used approach enabled me to identify possible patterns in terms of candidate targeting strategies.

6. *Local post-election survey of brokers*: I also conducted surveys through face-to-face interviews with randomly selected brokers in the four targeted provinces. Drawing a probability sample of the candidate survey is unproblematic, given the easy availability of the sampling frame. However, we do not possess a ready-made sampling frame for low-level operatives from which one could generate a random sample. As explained further in Appendix B, the approach I chose in this context was that a sample was acquired and then estimated based on information received from the randomly selected candidates during the field interview process. Both candidate and broker surveys were supplemented with qualitative observations and interviews —notably on the reasons behind the responses, providing a basis for the valid interpretations of the collected data. The questionnaire I designed aimed to uncover the modes of organisation of brokers, the mechanisms of vote buying (who was targeted, when, how, and why) and the extent to which the recipients of cash handouts voted for the candidate associated with the benefit. Such data allow me to gauge the dynamics of vote buying as they were shaped and driven by grassroot brokers.

1.5.1.2. Sub-national case selection

The selection of the four provinces for the sub-national surveys of candidates and brokers was guided primarily by the findings of the wide-ranging electoral district surveys of voters conducted by Indikator and SMRC during the run-up to the 2014 legislative election.[17] I used these surveys to identify variation among provinces in voters' exposure to vote buying and their levels of party identification (which as already touched on above, I found to be one of the strongest predictors of vote buying). I used these two variables to select cases. My measure of partisanship was based on an additive scale derived from two items: whether respondents felt close to a party and the strength of that feeling. Meanwhile, vote buying also used an additive scale from two items: the extent to which vote buying is reported as acceptable by respondents, and the percentage of those who reported to have accepted an offer and voted for the giver.

I used a scatter plot to determine the case selection (Figure 1.2), selecting one case from each quadrant. I selected Central Java where voters exhibited relatively high levels of both partisanship and vote buying. My second case is North Sulawesi where partisanship is high, but the rate of vote buying is relatively low. The third case is East Java, where

[17]Given many densely populated provinces consist of several electoral districts, I combine all electoral districts in such provinces to get an additive scale of partisanship and vote buying.

voters were more accepting of vote buying, but unlike Central Java, partisan ties were comparatively low. The last case is West Sumatra as a control as the province exhibits relatively low levels of both partisanship and vote buying.

Figure 1.2 **Province selection for MP and broker surveys**



Source: Indikator and SMRC's pre-legislative election surveys in 73 electoral districts during the run-up to the 2014 legislative election.

Importantly, these four cases represent the three most populated islands in Indonesia: Sumatra, Java, and Sulawesi. There is also significant variation among the four provinces in critical aspects. As I will discuss later, they vary in the type of political players who are most influential, bases of power, party dominance, socio-economic levels, relative presence of religious leaders, and ethnic composition. These similarities and differences make the four provinces a suitable kaleidoscope through which to view Indonesia's electoral patterns and politico-cultural composition.

1.5.1.3. Qualitative approaches

After conducting public opinion and targeted group surveys, I integrated my survey results and my large and complex datasets with the insights gleaned from extensive qualitative fieldwork, which lasted for 13 months. By doing so, I was able to capture —in the context of micro-level analysis—variations, mechanisms, and motivations that characterise the actors and networks through which vote buying was distributed. In order to structure the fieldwork, I chose the case study approach –selecting the four

provinces mentioned above, for the reasons already explained. The fieldwork relied on qualitative methods using the same methods across four cases that allowed me to develop in-country comparisons. I spent considerable time in several districts in the four provinces. The criteria for district selection were again primarily guided by statistical findings. For example, in East Java, I travelled to Bangkalan, Sampang, and Pamekasan because, according to my historical data, more people in these areas thought that vote buying was a normal business compared to other regencies.

The qualitative approach relied on four primary tools of investigation: interviews, focus group discussions, close observation and media analysis and additional document collection. In conducting the interviews, I used a semi-structured format (Wengraf, 2011; Galletta, 2013). That is, I had certain core topics that I wanted to address in each interview, but I was also flexible in responding to specific cases brought up by each of the informants. Because I had already conducted the main surveys and produced preliminary analysis prior to the bulk of my qualitative research, I was able to zero in on issues of particular interest identified through the quantitative research. For example, given the quantitative result that party loyalists were more likely to be targeted by vote buying, I endeavoured to corroborate and explore this finding in greater detail by asking my interviewees about it. For instance, despite vote buying seeming to target party loyalists, little is known about the definition of loyalty in the Indonesian context, where party-based partisan ties are low by international standards. Thus, I asked my respondents about the meaning of partisanship in the context in which a lot of connections between voters and candidates are not mediated by political parties but by informal brokerage networks. And, of course, I had many other questions to ask in terms of the techniques and problems of vote buying, such as: How do politicians engage in vote buying operations? How do brokers identify their voters, and how do they try to persuade them to be responsive if given rewards? And how do they attempt to rely on their 'loyalists' if they are not given benefits?

In general, the interviews turned out to be highly effective because despite its illegality, many interviewees talked about vote buying openly, with little obvious sense of embarrassment or guilt. I guaranteed that I would not personally identify them in my research products if they mentioned sensitive matters, and in these circumstances most were willing to disclose the methods they used to carry out

vote buying, and explained in detail how they designed their strategies.[18] In the following, I describe my qualitative methods more comprehensively.

1. *In-depth interviews and informal conversations with politicians*: In the four case study areas, I interviewed 24 local candidates. In addition, I also interviewed 42 national politicians from the same four provinces and elsewhere, most of whom ran as candidates in the 2014 elections. Insights from candidates running for the national legislature were important since I had already gained a large amount of data from provincial and district candidates through the local politician surveys. By combining these data with material derived from interviews with national candidates I could get a sense of how coordination occurs across different levels of competition. Interview questions dealt with the networks and processes through which vote buying was organised, notably questions such as: what is the effect of open-list PR systems on the nature of electoral competition? How do politicians build personal brokerage networks? How do they determine which voters to target? How do they define base voters? How do they align themselves with existing social networks? And how do they monitor their brokers?

2. *In-depth interviews with brokers:* I also chose to interview seasoned brokers. The overall number of such interviews was 28. Given that my broker survey mentioned above was not held in every district of the selected four provinces, I held in-depth interviews with a range of brokers who were representative in terms of district origins. Interview questions probed matters such as what their primary motivations for joining campaign teams were; whether they generally had prior personal contact with candidates; how politicians extract services from brokers; which voters provided the most electoral returns after receiving benefits; how they developed a local following of voters; how payments were presented to voters —using language of gift-giving or as a binding transaction; how they defined voter loyalty and base areas; how they diverted resources for their personal benefits; and what measures they used to minimise risk of wastage. In addition, I conducted in-depth interviews with several academics, journalists, NGO activists and key bureaucrats about vote buying and its impact on electoral competition in Indonesia.

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[18]Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016) along with approximately 50 researchers involved in 'Money Politics and Clientelism' project also had similar experiences. Many candidates they interviewed were relatively open when discussing how the payments were delivered to the recipients.

3. *Focus group discussions (FGD) with local politicians and political consultants*: FGDs are becoming an increasingly popular qualitative research method to collect data from people with similar backgrounds or experiences by using the technique of an organized group interaction focused on a defined topic (Kitzinger, 1994). I organised two focus groups. The first was a group of local politicians from Bukit Tinggi, West Sumatra, held on 23 September 2014. Around 15 successful candidates from various backgrounds attended the event. I chaired the focus group using the Indonesian language and asked participants to reflect on their 2014 campaign, recruitment of brokers, and related matters. The second was a political consultant focus group, conducted on 15 September 2014. Given that the brokers' survey mainly targeted traditional grassroots brokers, I selected modern-type consultants based in Surabaya to attend the focus group in order to increase the diversity of the broker group I researched. Six participants attended and described their techniques of mobilising voters and the methods they used to monitor campaigns.

4. *Close observation:* This type of collection data is commonly used in qualitative approach aimed to gain a direct, close and intimate familiarity with a particular social group for period of time, "collect (detailed, comprehensive) field notes, and track systematic patterns to make inferences about social phenomena" (Weiss and Hutchcroft, 2012: 9). During my fieldwork conducted after the 2014 legislative election, around two months before the presidential election, I observed relevant events for the presidential campaign, including political gatherings, campaign rallies, broker meetings, and other important gatherings related to the campaign. Given the observations were conducted after the 2014 legislative election, and vote buying attempts were more likely to take place in the parliamentary election rather than in the presidential election, as I will show in the next chapter, I didn't have the opportunity to observe first-hand vote buying efforts. Virtually all local legislative candidates and their brokers I interviewed, admitted that such practices were more common during the parliamentary elections. However, as noted above, they didn't have any objections to discussing the vote buying strategies they had used during the legislative elections. Additionally, while conducting fieldwork in Central Java and East Java, I also got the strong sense that voters in these two provinces were more tolerant of such election-related bribery than those who lived in West Sumatra.

5. *Media content analysis and additional document collection*: My fieldwork did not rely exclusively on relatively common tools such as interviews and direct observation, but

I also collected local and national media reports on vote buying and analysed them qualitatively. Among other sources, the media provide a rich collection of information on the occurrence of vote buying, its location, its timing and its targets. To ensure a broader range of coverage, I also used 'triangulation of multiple sources' by taking advantage of the increasing popularity of online news websites in Indonesia as sources of data on clientelist strategies. In addition, I collected a number of official documents related to the subject under investigation. I also collected a large amount of official election statistics by the Indonesian Electoral Commission (KPU) and demographic data to enrich my quantitative findings.

1.6. Dissertation overview

My dissertation presents a wide-ranging study of the dynamics of vote buying in Indonesia's young democracy, exploring the nature, extent, determinants, targeting and effectiveness of this practice. My study addresses these central issues in the context of comparative studies of vote buying, arguing that although in *relative* terms, partisan voters are more likely to be targeted, in *absolute* terms, vote buying largely happens among undecided voters (given the relatively small number of party loyalists in Indonesia). Regardless of such a substantial amount of leakage, vote buying remains an attractive strategy for many candidates because the 10 percent range of vote buying effects on vote choice is high enough to secure victory.

Following this introduction, Chapter 2 discusses a central question of this study. It attempts to answer how extensive vote buying and club goods distribution are in Indonesian elections. Especially with regard to vote buying, I present estimates of these practices using various measures and techniques. This chapter compares the findings from Indonesia with the level of vote buying in other countries. The chapter focuses on vote buying in legislative elections, but also pays attention to evidence of extensive vote buying in local executive contests. Utilising a rich vein of data from 2006 to 2015, I identify inter-regional variation in levels of vote buying over time. The chapter concludes that vote buying has become an increasingly prominent feature of Indonesia's electoral politics both at the national and local level.

Chapter 3 identifies factors explaining why some individuals are more likely than others to be targeted with vote buying and club goods by political operatives. This chapter also provides a complete profile of the typical vote sellers. It rigorously tests

the patterns of vote buying and club goods based on two sets of polling data: one is based on a survey done after the 2014 legislative election; the other is a large dataset of surveys on local executive elections from 2006 to 2015. Interestingly, both data sources confirm that party identification is among the strongest predictors for explaining vote buying. Simply put, the closer the ties of an individual to a political party, the more likely he/she is to be exposed to, or to be accepting of, vote buying. However, partisanship has little predictive value in explaining club goods provision.

Building on this finding, Chapter 4 discusses the relationship between party-based partisanship and vote buying in the context of the debate on whether vote buyers are more likely to target swing or party loyalist voters. It discusses the levels of party identification and the demographics of party identifiers in Indonesia. Given the centrality of the finding that a high degree of party identification in a voter makes him or her more likely to be the target of vote buying, this chapter engages in further tests of this hypothesis with multiple sources of data. First, it reviews evidence from voter-level data which also indicates the greater likelihood of party loyalists being targeted. Moreover, the chapter presents evidence from a unique survey of politicians and brokers as well from as a list experiment which is strongly suggestive of the party loyalist strategy. After interrogating the evidence, the chapter comes to the conclusion that despite the fact that in *relative* terms party loyalists are more likely to be targeted, in *absolute* terms vote buying mostly happens among non-partisans – largely because the number of voters with high levels of party identification is small.

Chapter 5 explains the gap between politicians' intention of capturing party loyalists and the fact that it is undecided voters who most receive benefits. It offers an additional explanation to the conventionally more party-oriented literature by combining an emphasis on the core-voter argument with a stronger focus on candidates' and brokers' reliance on personal networks. I call this explanation the 'personalist loyalist' argument. I highlight that the concept of loyalty is ambiguous in the Indonesian context, leading many political actors to misidentify (and overestimate the number of) partisan voters. This chapter also emphasises that the problem of targeting could partly be a story about agency loss in which many of the people who are selected through personal networks are in fact weakly connected to the candidate. In this regard, institutional and structural contexts matter greatly in shaping the environment in which vote buying can thrive; thus, the chapter begins with a comparison between Indonesia and Latin American countries regarding institutional and contextual factors.

Chapter 6 puts flesh on the bones of my argument about the personal loyalist strategy. It demonstrates how personal networks feed the recruitment and organisation of brokers, and help define targeting strategies in settings where party-based partisan ties are weak. The chapter then addresses many of the unanswered questions in the study of electoral clientelism in Indonesia, such as those regarding the demographic profiles of brokers and the logistics of vote buying. Importantly, this chapter argues that the dual-track strategy employed by many candidates, in which they target both party loyalists and persons connected to them through personal networks strategy—not only suffers from misdirected targeting, but is also jeopardised by agency loss, that is leakage of the funds provided by candidates. The discussion shows that, despite reliance on brokerage networks, candidates typically develop weak monitoring and lack enforcement methods, encouraging brokers to engage in rent-seeking behaviour.

Given that the widespread leakage and failed targeting, it is crucial to investigate the effectiveness of vote buying. Chapter 7, therefore, begins with discussion of its impacts on both voter turnout and vote choice. It shows that despite targeting strategies being imperfect and despite the unreliability of brokers, vote buying produces greater turnout. This chapter also shows that while receiving money influences the vote choice of 'only' approximately 10 percent of voters, these 10 percent matter immensely in Indonesia's highly competitive election settings. It concludes that vote buying serves as an effective mechanism to produce narrow winning margins, and this in turns accounts for its attractiveness to politicians.

In the conclusion, I discuss the theoretical and policy implications of the findings and point to an agenda for future research. Overall, the comparative literature on vote buying and turnout buying have emerged in contexts different from that in Indonesia. This makes the dynamics of vote buying, especially its targeting, very distinctive.

CHAPTER 2
THE PREVALENCE OF VOTE BUYING IN INDONESIA: BUILDING AN INDEX

How prevalent is patronage distribution in Indonesia? Although there has been a burst of scholarly and non-scholarly writings on the topic in the last few years,[1] little is known about how many voters actually receive material incentives from politicians. This chapter offers a systematic answer to fundamental questions about the intensity of money politics in Indonesia that have vexed scholars for many years. It involves a complex study of patronage politics in Indonesian elections, which draws predominantly on surveys.[2] This chapter deals with two forms of patronage distribution: first, it briefly assesses the prevalence of club goods provision, which can be classified as the most important form of collective patronage distribution; and second, it discusses –in much more length– the intensity of vote buying, the most individualised form of patronage politics. As I show in the following pages, although club goods are also a widespread practice in Indonesia, the level of scholarly and legal controversy about this strategy is relatively small. Given that such collective patronage is often viewed as legally and socially more legitimate than vote buying, my analytical focus is on vote buying.

Concretely, I measure vote buying by constructing a vote buying index as the main dependent variable of this study. I argue that vote buying is central to election campaigns in Indonesia. Drawing from a wide range of survey methods, I estimate that the proportion of voters participating in vote buying during the 2014 legislative election was between

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[1]Among others, Choi (2007), Aspinall (2014), Nurdin (2014), Allen (2015), Aspinall and As'ad (2015), Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016), Aspinall et al (2017), Amick (2016) and Tawakkal et al (2017).

[2]I use a number of nationwide surveys in this chapter, including an April 2009 survey by The Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) and a December 2013 survey by Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC). The LSI survey took place from 20 – 27 April 2009, around one week after the legislative election. The sample was 2,000 voting-age adults with a margin of error of ±2.4 percent at 95 percent confidence level. Meanwhile, the SMRC survey interviewed 1,210 respondents, who, like the respondents in the LSI poll, were selected with multistage random sampling, with an estimated margin of error of ± 2.9 percent at 95 percent confidence level. This chapter also draws from a pre-election survey conducted March 19–24, 2014. The number in the sample was 1,220 voting-age adults who were selected with multistage random sampling proportionally distributed over the 34 provinces. The margin of error was around ±2.9 percent at 95 percent significance level. However, this chapter draws primarily from my post-legislative election survey conducted 22 – 26 April 2014, around two weeks after the legislative election. I timed of the surveys to take advantage of a simultaneous national and sub-national parliamentary election, held in April 9th 2014, which would mean that citizens' recent interactions with parties, candidates, and brokers were fresh in their minds. In addition to these national surveys, I also utilise a large amount of data drawn from 963 of local surveys conducted by LSI and Indikator Politik along with SMRC from 2006 to 2015.

25 percent and 33 percent (depending on the method and specific question used in the survey). For comparative purposes, I relate this figure of self-reported vote buying with rates from other countries in the world. It turns out that the range between 25 and 33 percent is comparatively high by international standards, with Indonesia's level of vote buying being the third-largest in the world (at least as measured in surveys within the last decade). As vote buying is illegal in most countries, including Indonesia, it is plausible to suspect that respondents directly asked about such exchanges are reluctant to provide truthful answers. However, despite this presumed desirability bias, my findings show that the list-experiment and the straight survey questions result in consistent estimates of the aggregate levels of vote buying. The chapter discusses this question extensively.

Finally, although this study puts greater weight on vote buying in national parliamentary elections, it also offers new insights into the underexplored nature of such practices in different election settings. In the last part of this chapter, I present historical survey data owned by my home institutions (LSI and Indikator Politik Indonesia), to identify inter-regional variation in levels of vote buying in executive elections at the local level. This chapter concludes that vote buying is not only widespread during national legislative elections, but that it has also become a central feature of local executive elections, where the prize is the position of district head, mayor or governor.

2.1. Club goods

2.1.1. Dimensions and measures

Before developing an index of the intensity of vote buying, let us turn to a more collective form of clientelist exchanges, namely club goods. Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016: 23) define club goods as "patronage that is provided for the collective benefit of bounded social groups rather than for individuals." In this study, the presence of club goods in the 2014 elections is measured by the responses to one specific survey question. That question was: "During the run-up to April 9th 2014 election, have you observed candidates or political parties offering people in the neighbourhood goods or gifts or assistance?" In terms of the available responses, a number of options were provided. If respondents gave an affirmative reply, they could point to the kind of club goods provision they observed, such as assistance in building/renovating houses of worship (mosque, church, etc.); assistance in building/renovating schools, *madrassahs*, religious boarding schools, or other educational institutions; assistance for certain community groups (e.g. religious groups, women's groups such as Pembinaan Kesejahteraan Keluarga (PKK, Family Welfare Guidance groups), youth groups, farmer/fishermen groups, etc.); assistance in

building/repairing roads, bridges, irrigation systems, etc.; and assistance in providing sports fields/equipment/uniforms.

In addition, respondents were free to mention other types of assistance that were not listed in the options. In analysing the data, I used a dichotomous measure of club goods. Based on this measure, respondents who responded affirmatively to the occurrence of club goods were assigned a value of 1, while 0 indicates those who responded negatively to such collective patronage in their neighbourhood.

2.1.2. Prevalence of club goods provision

Having discussed the definition and measure of club goods, we now turn to discuss the prevalence of such collective patronage distribution in Indonesia. Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016: 23) distinguish two sub-categories of club goods based on their targeted recipients: first, donations to community associations, and second, donations to communities living in particular low-level government units like villages, hamlets, neighbourhoods (RW, *Rukun Warga*), or sub-neighbourhoods (RT, *Rukun Tetangga*). Indeed, the provision of club goods seems to be an effective electoral strategy because Indonesia has a extremely dense and rich associational life (Grootaert, 1999: 24). The Local Level Institutions (LLI) Study[3] accounted for 14 different kinds of institutions in Indonesia, ranging from broad national level organisations with many local branches, including religious organisation such as NU and Muhammadiyah, to non-religious but nationally constituted bodies such as PKK and very local groups, such as a motor taxi group, motorcycle club community or animal lovel association (Grootaert, 1999). Using data from the World Values Survey 2005-2009 dataset, Lussier and Fish (2012: 74) conclude that the intensity of organisational membership in Indonesia is ranked fifth among all countries across the world and tops all Southeast Asian countries surveyed. Further, approximately 84 percent of Indonesians belong to at least one organisation (Lussier and Fish, 2012: 74).

Prior research also suggests that club goods are common because this type of patronage strategy is often viewed as possessing more social legitimacy than vote buying (Aspinall, 2016; Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016; Hamdi, 2016). A widely held view among candidates is that club goods are not considered as proscribed vote buying

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[3]The LLI Study is a series of comparative research organised by the World Bank's Social Development Department which aimed to investigate local level institutions and social capital in a number of developing countries, including Indonesia (Grootaert, 1999).

because this mobilisation tactic provides benefits for the public and does not collide with any legal rules (PKB's Hanif Dzakiri, Interview, 26 August 2014). The PPP's Arsul Sani explained the typical modus operandi of doing club goods (Interview, 31 October 2014). At the beginning, candidates identify respected figures in their own electoral districts who command a group of followers (*punya massa*). They then visit (*sowan*) the houses of such influential figures to seek implicit or explicit endorsement, while handing out standard gifts such as sarungs, batik shirts, or other gifts. To reinforce the support and to win the electoral support of their followers, candidates deliver club goods to the institution or group associated with such popular leaders, often framing the donations in religious and social assistance terms (Aspinall, 2016). In short, most candidates I encountered suggest that unlike vote buying which is legally proscribed and is often associated with negative social stigma, club goods in Indonesia are often seen in a positive light. Indeed, they are thought of them as religious alms (*sedekah*) or as part of community service rather than as bribes.[4]

Figure 2.1 **Club good practices in the 2014 legislative election (%)**



Question: During the run up to the last April 9th 2014 election, did you observe candidates or party workers offering people in the neighborhood goods or gifts or assistance in these forms? A list of examples were provided and the answer can be more than one: 1. Assistance in building/renovating houses of worship (mosque, church, etc); 2. Assistance in building/renovating schools, madrassahs, religious boarding schools, or other other educational institutions; 3. Assistance for certain community groups (e.g. religious groups, PKK, youth groups, farmer/fisherman groups, etc); 4. Assistance in building/repairing roads, bridges, irrigation systems, etc; 5. Assistance in providing sports fields/equipment/uniforms; and 6. Other types of assistance or donation (specify:......). Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014.

[4]For further discussion about club goods, see Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016) and Hamdi (2016).

This dominant discourse among politicians corresponds with the results of my voter survey. Of the 1,210 respondents surveyed, 27.4 percent stated that some candidates or brokers distributed donations or assistance for public benefit in their village or to community associations there during the campaign (Figure 2.1). This is a substantial figure, given that almost one out three Indonesians thus reported that their community had been targeted for the provision of club goods. Approximately 54 percent reported that their community had not received offers of club goods from candidates or parties, while 18.5 percent of them had no opinion or declined to answer.

In terms of which kind of assistance was provided most frequently, the two top-ranked club goods were donations to build, renovate or repair community infrastructure such as roads, bridges, or irrigation systems (11.9 percent), and the building or renovating of houses of worship, most typically mosques (10 percent). Provision of assistance for certain community groups such as religious groups, youth groups, and farmer/fishermen groups, was also common (4.3 percent), alongside similar assistance in providing sports fields, equipment or uniforms (2.6 percent) and repairing or renovating schools, religious boarding schools, or other educational institutions (2.5 percent). Also, 3.6 percent of respondents mentioned other types of donations or assistance such as sound systems, repairing water wells and so on. It is clear, therefore, that in addition to vote buying, club goods have become an important electoral campaign tool for candidates.

2.2. Vote buying

2.2.1. Dimensions and measures

Having briefly discussed club goods as this study's first dependent variable, we are now in a position to operationalise the second dependent variable as the main focus of my research: that is, vote buying. I created a series of questions about this individualised form of patronage distribution and asked subjects to respond on a various point Likert-type scale to capture attitudes and opinions with a range of answer choices. Given that vote buying is typically associated with negative stigma and thus is associated with social desirability bias, my research follows the methods developed by Brusco and her collaborators (2004: 69) to approach the targeted issue from several different directions. In the post-election survey (the one conducted from 22 to 26 April 2014), the questions used seven measures of vote buying with different degrees of directness. This was done in the expectation that

the response to any single question would not provide a completely accurate picture of such exchanges. Further, I categorised these seven measures into two dimensions: vote buying operations in the nationwide legislative elections, and vote buying attempts in the national and local executive elections.

In the survey, the dimension of vote buying in the parliamentary elections consists of four measures. The first is a four-point scale of all experiences with vote buying in legislative elections, without concretely mentioning the 2014 elections in the question (hereafter I referred to this a four-point scale of all vote buying experience in legislative elections). The question asked: “During the last couple of years, related to the legislative election campaign of national parliamentary (DPR) candidates, how often have candidates or success team members offered you food, household items, and/or other goods in order to influence your vote in the election?” I asked respondents to respond on a four-point Likert-type scale (very often, quite often, rarely, and never), which I then recoded into two categories (very often, quite often, and rarely = 1, rare and never = 0). I worded the question in this way to gather all experiences of vote buying, including in the currently ongoing campaign. The strategy of not explicitly mentioning the date was intended to capture greater vote buying reports. Given the survey was conducted when the election had just been held, I wanted to avoid making respondents feel they were being ‘interrogated’ on what they had just done in the 2014 election, remembering the vote buying is actually illegal in Indonesia. In addition, as noted above, this measure used a four-point scale to increase variation in this variable of interest and was expected to collect greater vote buying reports than a simple “yes-no” question.

Similarly, my second measure of vote buying in legislative elections did not concretely mention the 2014 election. The prompt was as follows: “These situations sometimes occur during every election in Indonesia. Have you ever experienced these situations below?” The relevant prompt was “Being offered money or goods in order to vote for a certain political party/DPR candidate”. The possible response were “no,” “yes, only once or twice,” to “yes, several times,” and they were recoded to be a two-point scale (yes, only once/twice and yes, several times = 1, no = 0). The main difference to the question above is that while the first measure used a four-point scale, the second used a three-point scale of vote buying experience (hereafter referred to as a three-point scale of all vote buying experience in legislative elections). We should expect a different outcome since different response options may generate different results. Additionally, the second measure was mixed with a number of other exposures to

vote buying offers in the different election settings that voters could point to, as will be discussed later.

The last two measures of vote buying in legislative elections are on a two-point scale, comprising a pair of questions that explicitly asked about these practices in the 2014 legislative elections. A key difference to the questions above is that respondents might have felt compelled to provide misleading answers in response to questions that directly asked about vote buying in 2014, because this event was still fresh in voters' minds and the questions were more specific. Though the question is appealing because it asks directly about the level of vote buying in 2014, it was also might drive some respondents to respond in ways that do not reflect their actual behaviour. The question does not allow respondents to disguise their answers in terms of past election events. Further, these last two measures are dichotomous scales that are different to the questions above, being a "yes-no" question which provides a clearer, binary response, but in which bias is more likely. [5]

In this study, the yes-no questions that explicitly mentioned the 2014 elections asked about individual and neighbourhood vote buying rates. Hence, the third measure inquiried about vote buying directed at respondents in 2014 (hereafter referred to as a two-point scale of individual vote buying in the 2014 legislative election). The question reads: "During the run up to the April 9th 2014 legislative election, did candidates or success team members offer you money, food, household items, and/ or other goods (excluding propaganda hats, shirts, and posters)?" The fourth focuses on vote buying offers witnessed by respondents in their neighbourhood (hereafter referred to as a two-point scale of neighbourhood vote buying in the 2014 elections). The question asked: "During the run up to the April 9th 2014 election, did you observe candidates or success team members offering people in your neighbourhood money, food, household items, and/or other goods (excluding propaganda hats, shirts, and posters)?" These yes-no questions were recoded to scale from 0 (indicating those who responded negatively to both such offers in 2014) to 1 (indicating those who responded positively to both questions).[6]

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[5]For more discussion about this, see Sarah Mae Sincero, "Survey Response Scales," (Jun 6, 2012). Available at Explorable.com: https://explorable.com/survey-response-scales accessed 28 September 2017.

[6]To measure vote buying, I prefer to use 'being offered' rather than 'received' material benefits. Of course, we cannot determine whether voters actually accepted electoral bribes. But such a question, as Jensen and Justesen (2014: 224) argued, allows us to measure which voters political machines tend to target. By using the word 'being offered,' I intended to avoid social desirability biases that may occur when asking questions about respondents' own behaviour.

Meanwhile, three questions focused on vote buying attempts in national and sub-national executive elections, as a comparison with the above second measure of general vote buying experiences in legislative elections. These measures of vote buying in the executive elections are on a three-point scale. The first question reads: "Have you ever experienced being offered money or goods in order to vote for certain presidential/vice presidential candidates?" (hereafter referred to as a three point-scale of vote buying in presidential elections). The second question asks: "Have you ever experienced being offered money or goods in order to vote for a certain gubernatorial candidate?" (hereafter referred to as a three point-scale of vote buying in governor elections). The third question was: "Have you ever experienced being offered money or goods in order to vote for a certain regent/mayoral candidate?" (hereafter referred to as a three point-scale of vote buying in regency elections). In each case, possible responses were "no", "yes, only once/twice," and "yes, several times". These answers were subsequently recoded to be positioned on a two-point scale ("yes, only once/twice" and "yes, several times" = 1, "no" = 0).

In my analysis of the data, I combined those seven measures described above into an aggregate index of vote buying. As indicated above, to facilitate substantive interpretation of these findings, I recoded each of the vote buying items from their original scale into dichotomous scales that took a value of 1 if the respondent was exposed to vote buying attempts or experienced being offered such electoral bribes.

2.2.2. How prevalent is vote buying?

How widespread is vote buying in Indonesia judged from the measures I have chosen? In this section, I present the main descriptive results of my findings on vote buying, divided into two dimensions: legislative elections and executive elections.

To begin, I demonstrate the findings based on the first dimension of vote buying generated from responses to a battery of four questions that asked about respondents' experiences of vote buying attempts in legislative elections. Using a four-point scale, as explained above, responses to the first question suggest that 33.1 percent of respondents reported that they had been offered electoral incentives "very often," "quite often," or "rarely." Although a substantial proportion of the sample (58 percent) reported having not been targeted at all, around one-third of the respondents admitting such an experience is a relatively high result (see international comparisons in section 2.2.4 below), suggesting that such practices have become a conventional strategy in electoral campaigning in Indonesia.

Figure 2.2 **All vote buying experiences in legislative elections (%)**



Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

The second measure of vote buying in parliamentary elections produced similar results. Using a three-point continuous scale, this indicated that 29 percent of respondents reported being offered cash or goods "once or twice" or "several times" during legislative elections. Using similar wording, surveys taken between 2009 and 2013 showed an increase in the rate of vote buying offers during legislative elections.[7] In the 2009 legislative elections, only 11.2 percent of respondents admitted being targeted for vote buying. The incidence increased in December 2013 (several months before the 2014 legislative elections) to 20.6 percent before rising again to 29 percent in April 2014 (Figure 2.3).

Figure 2.3 **Increasing rates of being targeted for vote buying, 2009-2014 (%)**



Source: The April 2009 data was drawn from LSI's survey, the December 2013 data was taken from SMRC's survey, and the April 2014 numbers were drawn from my post-election survey.

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[7]As indicated in footnote 2, surveys in April 2009 and December 2013 were conducted by LSI and SMRC respectively. Some of the April 2009 survey findings were reported at the LSI official website (http://www.lsi.or.id/riset/370/Diskusi%20LSI%20Kualitas%20Pemilu%202009). But the data cited in this study were not included in the report and were processed for purposes of this analysis. Similarly, the data quoted from the SMRC 2013 survey were initially not included in that organisation's official report, but I was able to analyse them for this study.

Likewise, a descriptive overview of the third and the fourth measures of vote buying in legislative elections, which point to direct individual and neighbourhood vote buying in the 2014 legislative elections, result in consistent findings. Using a dichotomous scale, overall, 25 percent admitted having been personally targeted by such exchanges during the 2014 campaigns (Figure 2.4). The fourth measure, the neighbourhood measure, showed a higher result of 28.9 percent.

Figure 2.4 **Individual and neighbourhood vote buying in 2014 (%)**



Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

Although the difference between the various measures is relatively small, ranging from 25 percent to 33 percent, one might question about the reasons for these differing results. One probable explanation is that different survey response scales may result in different responses. As noted earlier, individual vote buying in the 2014 legislative election was framed in a straightforward question, asking for a yes-no response, while the first question on overall vote buying in legislative elections was on a four-point Likert-type scale in which those who responded affirmatively ("very often," "quite often," and "rarely") were categorised into one category as recipients of vote buying offers. Similarly, the second question which asked all vote buying experiences was on a three-point scale, providing an option for respondents to report rarity (i.e. "once or twice") regarding the frequency of being offered vote buying. Perhaps, these greater ranges of responses captured more experiences than the sharply dichotomous scale. But why did the two-point scale used for neighbourhood estimates also result in a higher numbers? As Kramon (2013: 70) points out the neighbourhood measure is less obtrusive than direct, individual measures, because it asks respondents about others' actions.

Another possible interpretation is that asking about general vote buying experiences without specifically mentioning the 2014 elections would be likely to generate higher positive answers than questions that concretely point to 2014. As noted above, mentioning the concrete event can make a psychological difference in that voters may feel pressured to provide truthful answers in response to sensitive questions about a recent act which, in a context like Indonesia, is unlawful. Again, given the timing of the survey, even when posed a question on vote buying that did not concretely mention 2014, respondents would have included their 2014 experience in their answer. In fact, it was probably their main reference point. In short, mention of the 2014 elections apparently biased the responses of some respondents who were reluctant to report their recent illicit behaviours.

However, as will be explained in the following section, the results of the list-experiment, which is an increasingly influential technique aimed to minimise response bias in survey questions, show that the estimated percentage of people receiving money or gifts was around 27.4 percent. Thus, the 25 percent of those who experienced vote buying offers based on the estimate from a dichotomous scale of the vote buying experience in the 2014 election sounds about right. However, in order to give a sound estimate that reflects a number of different measures, this study suggests that between a quarter and a third of respondents reported having been targeted for vote buying in nationwide legislative elections.[8]

Considering that the percent difference in the final results between the first-placed and second-placed parties, PDI-P and Golkar, was only 4.2 percent, this incidence level of vote buying is significant. Moreover, the percentage difference between PDI-P in the first place and Hanura in the tenth place was just 13.69 percent –well below the vote buying levels (The Indonesian Election Commission [KPU], 2014). And as I will show later, the margin of victory for individual candidates was considerably smaller than the margin between parties, making the prevalence of vote buying even more consequential.

Compared to the pre-election survey carried out in March 2014, which captured only half the campaign period, vote buying incidents increased significantly from 10.7

[8]The findings from this nationwide survey of voters above generally correspond with the results from my broker surveys in four provinces. Compared with my findings from the broker survey, the proportion of respondents who reported receiving money from their candidates or campaign coordinators to distribute to voters was 16 percent, while 5 percent of respondents received staple foods from their patrons as a means of vote buying. Altogether, the total percentage of brokers who reported receiving and delivering benefits to voters was around 21 percent. I did find substantial heterogeneity by province where the proportion of brokers who reported in distributing cash was 22 percent in Central Java, 14 percent in East Java, 8 percent in North Sulawesi, and only 4 percent in West Sumatra (see Chapter 6).

percent. This increase suggests that vote buying was more concentrated in the days or hours before election day, or on election day itself. In the Indonesian context, this phenomenon is popularly known as *serangan fajar* (dawn attack), a term that reflect the fact that material benefits (especially cash) to compensate for votes are sometimes distributed just after the dawn prayer on voting day. Candidates and brokers assume that the closer to voting day they hand things out, the more effective vote buying is in shaping electoral behaviour. These issues, however, are not unique to Indonesia. The pace of vote buying accelerates as the election date approaches in other countries too, such as in Taiwan (Wang and Kurzman, 2007) or the Philippines (Pulse Asia, 2013).

In order to provide a complete picture of vote buying practices, those who reported having been offered benefits in the 2014 legislative elections were also asked to name the party or the party of the candidate involved in the transaction. Respondents were allowed to mention more than one party, because they might have been approached by candidates from different political parties (see Chapter 6). In their answers, respondents identified all political parties which ran in the 2014 elections, with varying degrees of involvement. This survey finding corresponds with my qualitative observations. "No party was innocent of vote trading. Even candidates from Islamic parties engaged in such practices," said a one-time national parliament member. "I dare you," he continued, "cut off my finger if there is a single MP in Indonesia today who gets elected without buying votes!" (Interview, 20 April 2014). Although vote buying was also common among Islamic parties, the big four vote buyers were non-Islamic in character: of voters who admitted being offered money or a gift, 32.2 percent mentioned having received such offers from candidates from Golkar, followed by PDI-P (26.5 percent), Gerindra (25 percent) and the Democratic Party (18.4 percent). Meanwhile, the most common item offered to voters was money (75.5 percent of all reported attempts), food products (12.8 percent) such as rice, sugar and noodles and household items (11.4 percent).

As noted earlier, the first three measures consisted of straightforward survey questions about whether individuals encountered offers of material rewards in return for their votes. The fourth measure, however, asked respondents to report whether they observed other people in their neighbourhood or village experiencing such encounters in 2014. Arguably, this question may be less accurate since it is based on perceptions, which can be accurate or not. Nevertheless, asking questions about illegal practices by treating respondents as an 'observer' is less vulnerable to response bias because the question does not require respondents to report on their own potentially illicit behaviour (Kramon, 2013: 70). The

results of this fourth measure showed that 28.9 percent of respondents had witnessed or knew that such practices occurred in areas where they lived (see Figure 2.4). These figures are only slightly larger than responses to the direct question (the third measure), in which 25 percent of respondents admitted being offered a vote buying exchange in the 2014 election. The gap between the two is within the margin of error used in this survey and is therefore statistically insignificant.

The results from both the neighbourhood and individual measures are also consistent in terms of the perpetrators and items of vote buying. Among those who reported that their neighbourhood was being targeted, Golkar again topped the list of most frequently mentioned vote buyers (35.5 percent), followed by PDI-P (30.6 percent), Gerindra (26.8 percent), and the Democratic Party (20.6 percent), repeating the order in the individual vote buying measure. Similarly, as among respondents who individually observed vote buying, all political parties were mentioned by at least some respondents as engaging in vote buying efforts in the neighbourhood measure. Money, food, and household items were also again the most frequent goods reported as being distributed in exchange for votes. Of those who witnessed their neighbourhood as having been targeted, 78.9 percent reported that people in their locations were given cash handouts, followed by food (12.8 percent), household goods (11.4 percent) and other items (14.8 percent). Note that the respondents were allowed to provide multiple answers.

In order to make a direct comparison of different election seasons, my 2014 voter survey also asked a number of questions about the 2009 legislative election, using wording nearly identical to the individual and neighbourhood items. The results confirm my earlier finding (based on 2009 and 2013 surveys) that vote buying was more pervasive in 2014 than in 2009. Only 10.1 percent of respondents reported having individually been the target of such handouts in 2009. In terms of the background of vote buyers, the vote market was again dominated by non-Islamic parties such as Golkar, PDI-P, and Democratic Party. The most common items distributed to voters in 2009 were also cash payments, foodstuffs and household goods. When asked about the extent to which vote buying in 2009 happened in their neighbourhood, though statistically insignificant, affirmative responses to this inquiry were a little bit higher (12.9 percent) than responses to the questions asked about the individual experiences of survey respondents (10.1 percent).

Having discussed vote buying in the legislative elections, we are now in a position to explore the second dimension of this form of patronage exchange: vote buying

in executive elections at the national and local level. Figure 2.5 demonstrates survey estimates of the proportion of voters who experienced being offered electoral incentives such elections. In terms of presidential elections, my survey in April 2014 (around three months before the presidential elections)[9] showed that only 8.1 percent of those surveyed reported having received vote buying offers either "once or twice" or "several times".[10] In addition, according to the same April 2014 survey, vote buying reports in the regency and gubernatorial elections were relatively similar, standing at 13.6 percent and 11.3 percent respectively. It is plausible to conclude, therefore, that vote buying attempts were more prevalent during parliamentary elections relative to presidential and sub-national executive elections (I will present additional data from an historical dataset on sub-national elections that confirms this finding at the end of this chapter).

Figure 2.5 **Vote buying offers at the national and local executive elections (%)**



Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

These results are in line with the research of other scholars who argue that constituency size matters in explaining the different levels of vote buying in multiple election settings. Stokes (2007: 86), for example, argues that vote buying decreases as constituency size grows, and vice versa. When the constituency is very large, as in presidential elections, it is difficult for politicians to buy the amount of votes necessary to make a nationwide difference. Presidential candidates instead rely more on the national media in attempting

[9]Unfortunately, this question was not asked in our surveys that were closer to the 2014 presidential elections, or after it.

[10]Although this figure was much lower than in legislative elections, based on the LSI post-election survey in April 2009, there has been a significant increase compared with 2009 when only 3.2 percent reported an acquaintance being offered such incentives (see footnote 2 above for more information about the LSI 2009 survey).

to reach out to a broad audience. By contrast, in direct local elections in smaller rural districts (*kabupaten*) and urban municipalities (*kota*), the cost of vote buying is less expensive and the practical challenges less daunting, thereby creating an incentive for candidates to engage in such practices. In national parliamentary elections –which comprise of the national-level DPR, or People's Legislative Council; 34 province-level DPRDs (Regional Legislative Councils); and DPRDs in 508 *kabupaten*/*kota* –vote buying is also widespread because the various electoral constituencies are manageable in size (being concomitantly smaller than the region-wide electorates in the relevant executive government head elections), and because candidates at different levels can coordinate their vote buying efforts. Aspinall and Sukmadjati highlight the point that since "*kabupaten* and *kot*a electoral districts are nested inside provincial electoral districts, which are in turn nested inside national electoral districts…. it is relatively easy for candidates running at different levels to coordinate their efforts in the hope of maximising their individual chances of success" (2016: 14-15).[11] This, in turn, increases the likelihood of vote buying in the legislative elections (see Chapter 6).

Another plausible explanation for why vote buying efforts are more common in legislative elections is that the number of candidates running for national, provincial, and district parliaments is much larger than that of competitors in presidential and regional head elections (see Mujani et al., 2011: 98). The number of seats contested in the 2014 legislative elections was 19,699, which were situated in the national, provincial, and district legislative assemblies. 6,608 candidates ran for the 560 seats in the DPR, around ten thousand candidates competed at the provincial level, and hundreds of thousands of candidates stood at *kabupaten/kota* level. In a single electoral district there could be as many as 144 candidates competing at each level of legislative elections. In addition to the DPR and DPRDs, candidates also competed for the 136-seat Regional Representative Council (DPD).[12] In the 2014 presidential elections, by contrast, there were only two presidential and vice presidential candidates in the race. Similarly, since 2005 (when direct local elections were introduced), there have never been more than eleven pairs of candidates in such a contest (Muhtadi and Irvani, 2017). Thus, the relatively limited number of candidates running for either presidential or local elections reduces the

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[11]The exception to this general rule is Java where national and provincial electoral districts share the same boundaries. For further discussion, see Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016).

[12]Detik.com, "200 Ribu Caleg yang Berebut 19 Ribu Kursi di 2014," 9 January 2014, available at https://news.detik.com/berita/2462640/200-ribu-caleg-yang-berebut-19-ribu-kursi-di-2014, accessed 3 March 2016.

incentive for them to engage in vote buying if compared to their legislative counterparts running in massive, more competitive elections.

2.2.3. The vote buying index

Having discussed the descriptive results, I can now develop an additive index of 'vote buying,' based on responses to the battery of seven questions summarised in the preceding section. The Cronbach's alpha coefficient for the variables that make up the vote buying index is 0.841, meaning that the variables have a high degree of internal consistency, and this suggests that the items in the test are highly correlated. As noted above, I differentiate vote buying into two dimensions: vote buying in parliamentary elections, and vote buying in the presidential and local executive elections.

Table 2.1 **Factor analysis of vote buying**

(Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalisation)

	DIMENSION	
	Vote buying in the legislative elections	Vote buying in the executive elections
A four-point scale of all vote buying experience in legislative elections	0. 745	0.216
A three-point scale of all vote buying experience in legislative elections	0.792	0.368
A three-point scale of vote buying in the presidential elections	0.216	0.650
A three-point scale of vote buying in the gubernatorial elections	0.208	0.826
A three-point scale of vote buying in the regency/mayoral elections	0.256	0.761
A two-point scale of individual vote buying in the 2014 legislative election	0.744	0.200
A two-point scale of neighbourhood vote buying in the 2014 legislative election	0.584	0.151

Extraction Method: Maximum Likelihood

In order to establish that vote buying comprises these two dimensions, I use a confirmatory factor analysis. As shown in Table 2.1, the variables that make up the vote buying index yield two components: (1) the four items related to vote buying in parliamentary elections constitute a single factor; and (2) the three items related to vote buying in the national and local executive elections produce another dimension. In other words, the variables that relate to vote buying experiences in executive elections are empirically distinct from those that for legislative elections. This factor

analysis reinforces the notion that the categorisation of vote buying based on the two distinct dimensions above is valid.

Hence, throughout this study, I apply the index of vote buying in statistical equations, including cross-tabulation, bivariate and multivariate analyses. I start this exercise by index-scoring the two dimensions of vote buying. First, the mean score of vote buying in parliamentary elections derived from the four measures mentioned above –which vary from 0 (did not engage) to 1 (engaged) was 0.3145. Importantly, the bivariate statistical analysis reveals the correlation pattern between all vote buying variables in the legislative elections (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 **Correlation between vote buying variables in parliamentary elections**

	Four-point scale of all vote buying experience	Three-point scale of all vote buying experience	Two-point scale of individual vote buying in 2014	Two-point scale of neighbourhood vote buying in 2014
Four-point scale of all vote buying experience	1	0.698***	0.551***	0.420***
Three-point scale of all vote buying experience	0.698***	1	0.643***	0.474***
Two-point scale of individual vote buying in 2014	0.551***	0.643***	1	0.565***
Two-point scale of neighbourhood vote buying in 2014	0.420***	0.474***	0.565***	1

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed)

Source: The correlational results are drawn from my post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

Second, the overall score of vote buying offers in national and local executive elections –normalised to vary between 0 (did not engage) to 1 (engaged)– was 'only' 0.1121. I also conducted a bivariate test with a Pearson Correlation to look at the relationship between all three primary variables that constitute the dimension of vote buying in elections for presidential and regional heads (Table 2.3). Based on this bivariate test, the relationship between vote buying in presidential elections, vote buying offers

in the gubernatorial elections, and vote buying in the regency/mayoral elections is substantial and statistically significant.

Table 2.3 **Correlation between vote buying variables in the national and local executive elections**

	Vote buying in presidential elections	Vote buying in governor elections	Vote buying in regency elections
Vote buying in presidential elections	1	0.613***	0.568***
Vote buying in governor elections	0.613***	1	0.708***
Vote buying in regency elections	0.568***	0.708***	1

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed)

Source: The correlational results are drawn from my post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

Recall again that the overall score of the vote buying index is an additive scale based on responses to a battery of seven measures that make up the two dimensions of vote buying described above. The scale runs from 0 (not exposed to vote buying) to 1 (exposed). The average of the vote buying index is relatively high, with a score of 0.2103. There is, however, substantial component variation. At the low end, people who were exposed to vote buying attempts during an election for national and regional government heads only make up a modest proportion of the total electorate, with a score of 0.1121. In particular, people were less likely to have experience of vote buying in presidential elections, with a score of 0.0841. At the top end, people were more likely to be targeted for vote buying in parliamentary elections, with a score of 0.3145. Therefore, as with the above descriptive analysis of the measures, it is safe to conclude from the index that among the two different election settings, vote buying is more common during parliamentary elections than during national and local executive elections. The reasons behind these different rates of vote buying have been already explained above: the effect of constituency size and the differences in competitiveness between these two types of elections.

Although the average of vote buying occurrence in parliamentary elections is higher than in executive elections, the bivariate model suggests that these two dimensions of vote buying have a positive correlation and are statistically significant in the expected direction (Table 2.4). It can be inferred, therefore, that those who have traditionally

benefited from clientelist exchanges in parliamentary elections are more likely to be targeted for vote buying in the national and sub-national executive elections as well. The correlation also exists the other way around. Those being exposed to vote buying attempts in presidential and regional head elections are more likely to be the target of such exchanges in legislative elections.

Table 2.4 **Correlation (Pearson's *r*) between vote buying variables in the parliamentary elections and executive elections**

	Vote buying in legislative elections	Vote buying in presidential and local executive elections
Vote buying in legislative elections	1	0.479***
Vote buying in the presidential and local executive elections	0.479***	1

*** Correlation is significant at the 0.001 level (2-tailed)

Source: The correlational results are drawn from my post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

What does this correlation suggest? Concretely, it implies that political machines are more likely over time to direct their vote buying efforts more heavily towards a group of voters for whom vote buying is a more common, repeat experience. This finding is in line with the concept of base voters, according to which loyalist voters are locked into long-term political relationships with parties or politicians based on patronage ties (see Chapter 5). In many cases, political agents (or brokers) assume that such voters are more responsive to clientelist exchanges, which in turn triggers an increase in vote buying targeting this group. Furthermore, as I elaborate in more detail in the following chapters, the logic of various elements of Indonesia's institutional framework, such as optional voting, open-list proportional system, and ballot secrecy, create strong incentives for candidates to target such voters because they are thought of as being more reciprocal, and thus a more predictable source of votes.

2.2.4. International comparability

I have explained at length the ubiquity of vote buying in Indonesian elections. To put these numbers into perspective, it is important to compare the rate of self-reported vote buying,

especially in parliamentary elections, with rates from other countries in the world. As indicated earlier, I used a number of questions in my surveys that are partially derived from and are comparable to similar questions that have been asked elsewhere. This allows me to make direct comparisons with vote buying levels in other countries, as presented in Table 2.5.

To that end, I use an estimate based on my first measure of all vote buying experience (it will be recalled that this was responses to the question: "During the last couple of years, related to the legislative election campaign of national parliamentary (DPR) candidates, how often have candidates or success team members offered you food, household items, and/or other goods in order to influence your vote in the election?"). This question was similar to questions asked by both LAPOP Americas Barometer and Afrobarometer. The data on vote buying levels in Latin American and African countries presented in Table 2.5 are all taken from the two polling associations. While the wording of questions varied slightly in some of studies, the questions were overall congruent. The LAPOP worded the question as follows: "In recent years and thinking about election campaigns, has a candidate or someone from a political party offered you something like a favour, food, or any other benefits or thing in return for your vote?" Respondents could indicate that they "never," "sometimes," or "often" have been offered electoral incentives in return for their vote. Responses were coded "yes," if they reported "often" or "sometimes" having been the target of such practice. The Afrobarometer asked the following question: "And during the last national election in [20xx], how often, if ever, did a candidate or someone from a political party offer you something, like food or a gift or money, in return for your vote?" Respondents responded on a five-point Likert-type scale, with responses ranging from "never," "once or twice," "a few times," "often" and "no experience in the past year." The main difference is that I used a four-point scale in the first measure, while the LAPOP Americas Barometer and Afrobarometer employed a three-point scale and five-point scale respectively. In the case of Malaysia and the Philippines, the frequency of vote buying in both countries was based on a dichotomous scale: whether or not respondents had been offered material benefits during the current/most recent elections.[13]

[13]The question reads: "During the run-up to the 2013 elections, did any political party offer you money, food, household items, and/or other goods (excluding propaganda hats, shirts, and posters)?"

Table 2.5 **Estimated proportion of direct vote buying by country**

COUNTRY	%	N	COUNTRY	%	N	COUNTRY	%	N
Uganda 2012	41	2,400	Mexico 2010	17	1,562	Cote d'Ivoire 2013	7	1,200
Benin 2012	37	1,200	Paraguay 2010	16	1,502	Ghana 2012	7	2,400
Indonesia 2014*	**33**	**1,210**	Burundi 2012	16	1,199	Malaysia 2013	7	NA
Kenya 2011	32	2,399	Colombia 2010	15	1,506	Nicaragua 2010	6	1,540
Liberia 2012	28	1,199	Cameroon 2013	14	1,200	Botswana 2012	6	1,200
Swaziland 2013	27	1,200	Malawi 2012	14	2,407	Cape Verde 2011	6	1,208
Mali 2012	26	1,200	Tanzania 2012	14	2,400	Jamaica 2010	6	1,504
Niger 2013	24	1,200	Guatemala 2010	14	1,504	South Africa 2011	6	2,399
Sierra Leone 2012	23	1,190	Brazil 2010	13	2,482	Guyana 2010	6	1,540
Dominican Rep 2010	22	1,500	Madagascar 2013	13	1,200	Uruguay 2010	6	1,500
Burkina Faso 2012	22	1,200	Zambia 2012	13	1,200	Chile 2010	6	1,965
Morocco 2013	22	1,200	Peru 2010	12	1,500	Trinidad/Tobago 2010	5	1,503
Philippines 2013	22	1,200	Venezuela 2010	12	1,500	Mozambique 2012	5	2,400
Egypt 2013	20	1,200	Guinea 2013	11	1,200	Honduras 2009	4	1,005
Nigeria 2012	19	2,400	Senegal 2013	11	1,200	Algeria 2013	3	1,206
Zimbabwe 2012	19	2,400	El Salvador 2010	10	1,550	Lesotho 2012	2	1,197
Argentina 2010	18	1,410	Togo 2012	10	1,200	Mauritius 2012	1	1,200
Panama 2010	18	1,536	Costa Rica 2010	9	1,500	Tunisia 2013	1	1,200
Belize 2010	17	1,504	Ecuador 2010	8	3,000			
Bolivia 2010	17	3,018	Suriname 2010	7	1,516	**AVERAGE**	**14.22**	

*Derived from the first measure of all vote buying experience in legislative elections.

Sources: The Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) Americas Barometer 2010 and the Afrobarometer Round 5, 2011–2012. The data from Malaysia was taken from Meredith Weiss, "General Election 2013 Survey Results" (2013), while the rate of vote buying from the Philippines was taken from Pulse Asia, "On the 2013 Elections: Observations and Select Survey Results" (2013).[14]

Turning to the comparison of vote buying levels, Table 2.5 shows that there is a wide variation in the level of self-reported vote buying transactions across in the continents of Asia, Latin America, and Africa, in surveys taken over the last decade. The average level of vote buying around the world is 14.22 percent, with some countries scoring well below the global average and some significantly above it. Vote buying intensity is greatest in the cases of Uganda (41 percent), Benin (37 percent), Indonesia (33 percent), Kenya (32 percent), Liberia (28 percent), Swaziland (27 percent), Mali (26

[14]The data from Malaysia and Philippines were presented at "Workshop of Money Politics, Patronage and Electoral Dynamics," Yogyakarta, 13–15 December 2013.

percent) and Niger (24 percent). Remarkably, the level of vote buying in Indonesia, when we use the higher estimate (33 percent), is more than double the global average.

In contrast, vote buying incidents were virtually non-existent in Lesotho (2 percent), Mauritius (1 percent), and Tunisia (1 percent). In general, consistent with the expectations from prior findings, offers of vote buying in many African and Asian countries are reported in higher numbers than in Latin America (Schaffer, 2007). Confirming this pattern, the study of De Jonge (2015) –which analysed survey data from 10 elections in eight Latin American countries– also found that vote buying incidence was not as high as in other parts of the world.[15] In contrast, it is clear that vote buying in Indonesia is comparatively prevalent, and that such practices are central in the country's electoral politics.

2.2.5. Little social desirability bias

Given that these data are entirely based on surveys, we must ask: how valid are estimates of vote buying based on direct individual measures established through polls? As noted above, vote buying is illegal in most countries, including Indonesia, and usually linked to a negative social stigma (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012; Hicken, 2007b). Therefore, some scholars have expressed suspicions that respondents directly asked about such practices are unlikely to report accurate information due to the problem of social desirability (Gallego and Wantchekon, 2012; Corstange, 2012). In order to address this concern, survey-based experiments are suitable instruments to evaluate the credibility of individual survey items and consolidate their overall validity. This is particularly the case for clientelism research, which has attracted renewed scholarly interest in recent years.

In the following, therefore, I present my findings on the estimated proportion of people receiving material benefits for their vote based on a list-experiment, embedded within two nationally representative surveys, conducted before and after the 2014 legislative elections. There were two underlying assumptions for conducting the list-experiment. First, we must assume that respondents give truthful answers to the sensitive item (Blair and Imai, 2012: 56). Second, we must assume that "the inclusion of a sensitive

[15]For my comparative overview, I chose the LAPOP Americas Barometer (2010) data –which provides a higher aggregate estimate of such incentives in the case of South American countries– because it used a more comparable direct survey item.

item has no effect on respondents' answers to control items" (Blair and Imai, 2012: 51).[16]

First of all, the list-experiment participants were divided into four random halves: one control group and three treatment groups.[17] Interviewers read the same question for each group. Respondents in each group were also provided with a show card for their response choices, which differed by group only in the number of response categories. These items were designed together with the project leaders of "Money Politics in Southeast Asia," while considering floor and ceiling effects that must be avoided.[18] The opening statement in the first list experiment was the following question:

"I am going to read you various activities, and I would like for you to tell me if they have been carried out by candidates or team success members during the run up to the last April 9th 2014 election? Please do not tell me which ones, only how many?" (one, two, or three).

For the control group, I listed the following campaign activities:

1. They put up campaign posters or signs in your neighbourhood/city;
2. They visited your home;
3. They placed campaign advertisements in television/newspaper/radio.

Among those activities, how many had been carried out by candidates or brokers? Respondents could pick one, two, or three (all of them). I also provided an option for the scenario that "none" of them had been carried out by candidates and their operatives. Meanwhile, each treatment group, which contained different sensitive issues, was presented a fourth different option, placed in the third response position.

1. They coerced you to vote for them (first treatment group).
2. They gave you a gift or did you a favour (second treatment group).
3. They offered you a job (third treatment group).

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[16]See also, Erick Kramon, "Vote Buying and Accountability in Democratic Africa," PhD Dissertation at UCLA, 2013.

[17]It must be noted that in the pre-election survey, the sample was only divided into two random halves: a treatment and a control group. Overall, although there is some modification, the list-experiment that this study implemented was largely guided by Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel, Chad Kiewiet de Jonge, Carlos Meléndez, Javier Osorio and David W. Nickerson, "Vote Buying and Social Desirability Bias: Experimental Evidence from Nicaragua," *American Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 56 (1), No. 1, January, 2012: pp. 202–217. My experimental survey is also inspired by Kramon (2013) and De Jonge (2015).

[18]The possible presence of floor effects has long been central in the discussion among scholars. Blair and Imai (2012: 49–50) detect that floor effects may appear "if the control questions are so uncontroversial that uniformly negative responses are expected for many respondents." Another possible 'floor effect' may result if respondents fear that answering "0" reveals their honest (negative) preference (Ibid). There is some debate on this is, because on the other side of the coin, there may be 'ceiling effects' referring to a condition where all of the items would be acceptable to many participants. See Graeme Blair and Kosuke Imai (2012), "Statistical Analysis of List experiments," *Political Analysis* 20(1), 47–77.

Participants were then asked not to mention *which* items were true for them. They were only required to indicate *how many* of the items were true for them (see Kramon, 2015). Respondents could choose one, two, three, four or all of them. Again, there was an optional answer for the scenario that "none" of them had been carried out by candidates or their operatives. Following Gonzalez-Ocantos and his colleagues (2012) and De Jonge (2015), interviewees were not asked to tell the field surveyor which particular activities they had experienced so that the surveyor would not realise whether the respondent was reporting the sensitive item (receipt of cash or gifts) or not. The goal was to reduce social desirability bias (De Jonge, 2015).

Having previously shown the descriptive findings of the individual and neighbourhood measures, I now start the analysis and interpretation of the results from the list experiment. The first column of Table 2.6 is the descriptive analysis to estimate people's experience of receiving handouts during campaigns. Table 2.6 shows the means for each experimental setting, namely one control group and three treatment groups. The list-experiment results found systematic differences in the means, providing a point estimate on the number of people reporting incidents of vote buying and coercion. The mean number of three campaign activities that include campaign posters or signs in the neighbourhood, party/candidate/broker visits and campaign advertisements in television/ newspaper/radio, reported by respondents in the control group is 1.393. The average number of items indicated by the first threatment group where subjects had the added option of "being coerced to vote for any political party or candidate" is 1.574. Subsequently, the mean number indicated by the second treatment group where the subject had the choice of "receiving money or gifts or favors" is 1.668. Finally, the average number of items by the third treatment group which provided the additional option of a job offer for voters is only 1.416.

Table 2.6 **Descriptive analysis**

Treatment	n	Mean
Control	272	1.393
Treatment I (coercion)	263	1.574
Treatment II (vote buying)	283	1.668
Treatment III (job offer)	267	1.416

Source: This list-experiment was embedded within the post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

Thus, an estimation of the percentage of people reporting the receipt of electoral incentives can be established by comparing the average number of items indicated by the respondents in each group. Table 2.7 shows the treatment minus control differences. As the average number of items indicated by the control group is 1.393 and the average number of items indicated by the first treatment group is 1.574, we can conclude that 18.1 percent of respondents experienced coercion (1.574 – 1.393 = 0.181, and 0.181*100 = 18.1 percent). Random assignment assures that the difference is owing to respondents admitting coercion during elections. This number is clearly statistically significant (sig. < 0.05). Meanwhile, the mean number shown by the second treatment group (vote buying) is 1.668, producing a result of 1.668 – 1.393 = 0.274, and 0.274*100 = 27.4 percent.

Table 2.7 **Estimated percentage of respondents reporting the receipt of vote buying**

	Estimated %	SE	sig.
Respondents were coerced to vote (Treatment I - Control)	18.1%	7.6%	0.018
Respondents were given money or gifts (Treatment II - Control)	27.4%	7.5%	0.000
Respondents were offered a job (Treatment III - Control)	2.2%	7.6%	0.769

Source: This list-experiment was embedded within the post-election survey 22 – 26 April 2014

Hence, importantly for this study, the estimation of the proportion of respondents receiving electoral incentives according to the list experiment is 27.4 percent, much higher than the proportion of those experiencing coercion (18.1 percent). The difference is highly significant (sig. < 0.05). By contrast, clientelist exchange that took the form of a job offer to voters is not statistically significant, with only a 2.2 percent difference between the control and treatment group. It can be concluded, therefore, that the practice of offering a job in exchange for a vote is rare in Indonesian electoral politics.

Interestingly, the estimated percentage of respondents reporting the receipt of handouts in this April 2014 list-experiment nearly tripled in comparison to a similar survey-based experiment carried out in March 2014, around one month before the election (see Table 2.8). Despite the sample being only divided into two random halves, the procedure of randomisation was exactly the same. In the pre-election survey, I also used a wording that was nearly identical to items employed in the post-election survey-based experiment. Table 2.8 reports the comparison between the results of the list experiment in pre- and post-election surveys. As explained earlier, the estimated percentage of people receiving

money or gifts according to the post-election survey-based experiment was 27.4 percent. Meanwhile, the mean number of campaign activities indicated by the control group with only four options in the pre-election experiment was 1.414, whereas the mean in the treatment group, where items had the additional option of picking the scenario of "receiving money or gifts", was 1.519. Hence, the intensity of vote buying that occurred about one month prior to the election was only 10.4 percent (Treatment – Control, 1.519 – 1.414 = 0.104, and 0.104*100 = 10.4 percent). The results from the pre- and post-election survey-based experiment are all statistically significant (sig. < 0.05).

Table 2.8 **Vote buying in both pre- and post-election survey-based experiments**

Treatment	March '14		April '14	
	n	Mean	n	Mean
Control	556	1.414	273	1.398
Treatment	561	1.519	284	1.674
Estimated % reporting the receipt of money or gifts	10.4% (sig.= 0.049)		27.4% (sig. 0.000)	

Source: The pre-election survey-based experiment was done March 19–24, 2014, while the post-election experiment was conducted April 22 – 26, 2014.

The results thus far have found that that the estimates gathered from direct individual measures do not differ much from what is found in the list-experiment. The estimates derived from each method are strikingly similar, suggesting that in Indonesia, direct survey questions about individuals' experience receiving cash handouts are not subject to response bias. My finding contrasts with that of Gonzalez-Ocantos and his colleagues (2012), who found substantial bias in a similar survey item asked in Nicaragua. My findings also contrast with those put forward by Corstange (2012) in his study of the 2009 Lebanese parliamentary elections and De Jonge (2015) in the case of the 2009 Honduran election. Both studies suggested that vote buying is found to be much more pervasive if detected via the list-experiment. My study, by contrast, confirms earlier work by Amick (2016: 1), who found that relative to a list experiment, "direct survey questions to [Indonesian] voters about accepting transfers from campaigns elicits mostly honest responses from respondents."

Accordingly, my findings indicate that the difference between the direct individual and neighbourhood measures and the list-experiment is not statistically significant. My list-experiment estimates about 27.4 percent of respondents actually sold their votes, compared to approximately 25 percent of respondents when asked directly about their

personal experience of the 2014 elections. In every category of the individual-level questions discussed above, the estimates were statistically similar to those recorded by the list-experiment. Even the neighbourhood measure only gives a slightly higher estimate (28.9 percent) than the list-experiment.

Hence, the direct individual measure is reliable enough to estimate attempts of vote buying. This conclusion is supported by the fact that in the pre-election nationwide survey (March 2014), I found almost exactly the same estimates in the list experiment and direct measure. In that survey, the list-experiment estimated that approximately 10.4 percent of respondents accepted electoral handouts, compared to 10.7 percent of respondents who answered in the affirmative through direct questioning. All of this suggests that analysis based on traditional obtrusive measures of vote buying is a valid and reliable approach in the Indonesian case. Both direct individual and neighbourhood measures are found not to understate the degree of such practices.

One plausible explanation for this lack of social bias is that Indonesian voters seem to be comparatively open about witnessing (and receiving offers of) vote buying. This openness, in turn, appears to be related to vote buying being less stigmatised than it was in the past (see Chapter 6). Despite its formal illegality, vote buying has increasingly become a normal transaction during election –and is rarely prosecuted. In the eyes of many voters, an election is no longer viewed as a window of opportunity to express their political preferences, but rather as, borrowing Corstange's term (2012: 483), a 'season of money.' During my 13-month fieldwork at the height of the 2014 election, most politicians lamented the increased pressure on them to engage in vote buying, and they argued that such exchanges have become a part of routine politics in Indonesia. They admitted that voters suspected that whoever was elected –regardless from which party he or she originated– was highly likely to quickly forget their constituents after the election. Elections, therefore, are mainly seen as a 'temporary opportunity' for ordinary people to recapture material benefits that politicians have stolen (Kerkvliet, 1991: 231). In the words of Schaffer and Schedler (2007: 26), recipients view offers as "amends for [politicians'] wrongdoings [committed against them] in the past."

However, the initiative to 'normalise' vote buying does not only come from voters demanding handouts. To please such voters, and to avoid competing on programmatic grounds, many politicians happily present themselves as personal distributors of patronage, and they find moral justifications to defend this approach. For example, many Islamic politicians justify doing so by quoting religious scholars (*kiai*). For

instance, one successful local candidate in Central Java relied on the advice given by an influential *kiai*. This *kiai* stated that if he did not distribute cash and lost as a result, all his other efforts to win office would be proven meaningless. The *kiai* reportedly quoted an Arabic script, taken from one of the major textbooks (*kitab*) studied in Islamic boarding schools, that in his view allowed vote buying. The passage reads: الرشوة حرام وخرج عن ذلك لأجل عدل (Bribing voters is basically unlawful, but it could be permitted for fairness). Additionally, the *kiai* – who sat on the advisory board of the candidate's moderate Islamic party – cited an Islamic jurisprudential premise: ما لا يتم الواجب إلا به فهو واجب (that without which an obligation cannot be fulfilled is itself obligatory). Based on this proposition, the ultimate goal is the election of a good candidate motivated by a religious cause. If good candidates are reluctant to spend money for vote buying – so the argument goes – and lose as a result, then parliament will be made up only of corrupt politicians (Interview, 12 August 2014). In this view, vote buying is simply an electoral strategy for winning and thus preventing corrupt politicians from taking office. Accordingly, it is not only justifiable but also necessary.

As a consequence of such efforts at 'normalisation' of vote buying, the stigma attached to it has weakened. During my research, most people talked about vote buying practices in an open way, indicating that there is little social desirability bias. As Agun Gunandjar Sudarsa of Golkar put it, "vote buying has become public knowledge in Indonesia, [and is] seen as part of a tradition during elections. Indeed, it is illegal on paper, but I am sure the police will not pursue it. Otherwise, the prisons would be full" (Interview, 23 April 2014). Terms such as "NPWP" (*Nomer Piro, Wani Piro*, representing the question "what number on the ballot are you and how much do you dare to give?") or GOLPUT (*Golongan Penerima Uang Tunai*, roughly a 'group of cash recipients')[19] circulated widely, pointing to the centrality of such clientelist exchanges. The famous but unsuccessful incumbent candidate from Golkar, Nurul Arifin, stated that in a context where the scale of vote buying is so extensive, the only way to beat co-partisans is by outspending one's internal party rival in terms of distributing cash to voters (Interview, 28 April 2014). Thus, vote buying appeared, borrowing the words of an independent researcher, to be "more massive, vulgar and brutal in the 2014 elections" than ever before (*Kompas.com,* 21 April 2014).

Far from being increasingly socially stigmatised, then, vote buying in Indonesia is deeply engrained in the society's fabric. As a result, as argued by Benedict Kerkvliet

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[19]In normal usage, NPWP is the acronym for 'tax file number', while GOLPUT denotes those citizens who deliberately abstain from voting.

(1991: 80), for the Philippines, voters see elections as a strategic transaction with power, showing that they too "as voters are not merely subjects of the seemingly powerful candidates or politicians".

2.2.6. Vote buying in local executive elections

To further gauge the extent and social acceptability of vote buying in Indonesia, and to compare how such practices play out in different settings, it is important to assess whether different data sets are consistent with the primary data source used in this study. As noted earlier, the previous sections relied heavily on the 2014 post-election, nationwide survey. In the remainder of this chapter, I present a large amount of data drawn from 963 local surveys conducted by my home institutions LSI and Indikator as well as by SMRC between 2006 and 2015. Over the entire period, these three preeminent polling organisations conducted surveys about regional executive elections (*pilkada*) in 34 provinces and 513 regencies/cities across Indonesia. Though not their primary focus, these surveys included common questions related to vote buying. The relevant question was: "As an effort to win the *gubernatorial/regency/mayoral* election, certain candidates or brokers typically give money or gifts for people to influence their vote. In your opinion, can the money/gift be considered acceptable or unacceptable?"[20] This wording is unobtrusive in that it does not inquire about whether vote buying took place or not. But, at least, it may serve to proxy the extent to which vote buying is viewed as acceptable in local executive elections.

My focus in analysing this data set is on inter-regional variation in sub-national elections, which I could not capture in the national surveys discussed thus far. Note that the population sizes at the district and provincial level are extremely varied, and the frequencies of the surveys were uneven, which could bias the sample to certain regencies/cities. In order to correct for this non-random geographic sampling, the weighting scheme is carried out in two stages. In the first stage, the weighting is applied proportionally at the provincial level. In the second stage, the weighting is made within each province to adjust for the over- or under sampling of voters from certain regencies/cities within provinces. By doing so, the sample is representative at

[20]The wording of the question was not always the same. The categories in italics changed according to the level of the territory in which the election took place (i.e. in a province, city, or district).

the regency/city level and enables me to generate district-level estimates. Put simply, the formula used to weight observations is:

$$W_{ij} = \pi_j / p_j$$

In which π_j = proportion of population in each regent/city j
p_j = proportion of sample in each regency/city j

Table 2.9 shows the degree to which vote buying was reported as acceptable by respondents in these local executive elections surveys through the 2006 to 2015 period. The acceptability of vote buying at the local level is relatively high, with, overall, four out of ten Indonesians finding it acceptable for politicians or their brokers to distribute cash or gifts as part of their campaigning. Although 60.2 percent thought vote buying was unacceptable, the average percentage of respondents who said such practices was acceptable is high. Using similar data from Timor Leste, for instance, 'only' 32.7 percent of the electorate in the country thought that vote buying was acceptable.[21]

Table 2.9 **Reported acceptance of vote buying, 2006 – 2015**

		Frequency	Percent
Valid	Acceptable	229,422	39.4
	Unacceptable	350,275	60.2
	Do not know/refused to answer	2,130	0.4
	Total	581,828	100

Source: LSI, Indikator, and SMRC historical dataset on sub-national executive elections

My study found substantial differences between regions. Those who lived in Java were more likely to consider voting buying to be acceptable. The data show that 46.3 percent of respondents from Java did not have a problem accepting cash or gifts from would-be regional heads. This compared to 'only' 31 percent of people from the outer islands who thought vote buying was acceptable. Further, Table 2.10 hints at some intriguing heterogeneity across regions. Relative to other outer island regions, people who lived in Sumatra were less accepting of vote buying in local executive elections.

There are interesting variations across provinces as well. The average percentage of Sumatrans who thought vote buying was acceptable is 28.1 percent. Some provinces

[21]Lembaga Survei Timor-Leste (The Timor-Leste Survey Institute) and Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI), "Exit Poll: Eleisaun Parlamentar Timor-Leste," 22 July 2017.

scored significantly above the average, such as Lampung (40.4 percent), Bengkulu (38.6 percent), and South Sumatra (32.3 percent). Meanwhile, some provinces exhibited well below the regional average, such as West Sumatra (13.1 percent) and Riau Islands (16.4 percent). Given that the data are representative at the district level, we can assess further which regency or city in each province has the highest levels of vote buying acceptability. In Aceh, for example, despite the province overall exhibiting acceptance levels well below the Sumatran average, the reported tolerance of vote buying was greatest in Pidie Jaya (70 percent), Aceh Singkil (50 percent) and East Aceh (36.7 percent).

Table 2.10 **Reported acceptance of vote buying by region (%)**

	Region	**Base**	**Acceptable**	**Unacceptable**	**Do not know**
% within regions	Java	55.10	46.30	53.40	0.30
	Sumatra	23.10	28.10	71.60	0.40
	Kalimantan	5.90	33.80	65.80	0.40
	Sulawesi	7.90	33.10	66.60	0.30
	Others	7.90	35.30	63.70	1.00
Total			39.40	60.20	0.40

Source: LSI, Indikator, and SMRC historical dataset on sub-national executive elections

There is also a wide variation in the degree of reported acceptance of vote buying in Java. Among all provinces in Java, voters who lived in Central Java were most likely to be tolerant of vote buying, with 50.9 percent of respondents considering vote buying as a normal practice during local elections. Following Central Java are Banten with 46.6 percent and East Java with 46.5 percent. At the other end of the spectrum, Jakarta is among those provinces in Java in which voters were less accepting of vote buying, with only 24.7 percent answering in the affirmative. Again, substantial heterogeneity was found within each province. Despite its notoriety as the province that is most tolerant of vote buying, Central Java was not homogeneous. Voters who lived in cities (*kota*) such as Surakarta, Semarang, and Magelang, for instance, were less accepting of vote buying than those in regencies (*kabupaten*) in that province.

Further, in some cases, my datasets include information on the acceptable price of the votes. Among those who thought vote buying was acceptable, I asked a follow-up question: "How much cash would a candidate need to give for you to find it

appropriate to vote for him/her?" As Table 2.11 shows, while responses were quite scattered, the most frequently given answer was "less than IDR. 50,000" (approx. US$4.40). Note that those who "do not know" or "refuse to answer," are not included in the analysis.

Table 2.11 **The price of a vote (%)**

No.	Price	Frequency	Percent
1.	Less than IDR. 50,000	12,951	38.7
2.	IDR. 50,000 to 100,000	8,665	25.9
3.	IDR. 101,000 to 200,000	5,315	15.9
4.	More than IDR. 200,000	6,551	19.6
5.	Total	33,481	100

Source: LSI, Indikator, and SMRC historical dataset on sub-national executive elections

Interestingly, expectations about the appropriate price of a vote in Java were much lower than in the outer islands. For instance, only 12.9 percent of respondents who live outside Java[22] saw it as appropriate to vote for a candidate if given less than IDR. 50,000, while a significant proportion of Javanese reported that small sums of money would be satisfactory. Only 9.4 percent of respondents in Kalimantan would be happy if given less than IDR. 50,000 (Table 2.12).

Table 2.12 **The price of votes by region (%)**

Region	Base (%)	Less than IDR. 50,000	IDR. 50,000 to 100,000	IDR. 101,000 to 200,000	More than IDR. 200,000
Java	61.1	55.5	22.20	9.60	12.70
Sumatra	21.50	12.60	30.60	28.00	28.90
Kalimantan	9.90	9.40	34.80	23.80	32.00
Sulawesi	4.70	17.30	33.80	21.80	27.10
Others	2.80	12.30	25.00	22.10	40.60
Total		38.70	25.90	15.90	19.60

Source: LSI, Indikator, and SMRC historical dataset on sub-national executive elections

[22]This is the number of the entirety of the outer islands calculated by adding together the rates of those who live in four regions (Sumatra, Kalimantan, Sulawesi and others) thought the acceptable price of the votes was less than IDR. 50,000 and then dividing this total by four.

As I will argue in Chapter 5, the smaller amount that a candidate must spend on 'buying' votes in Java should be largely read in terms of its specific moral economy of gift-giving, which is centred around the concept of *sangu*. In Javanese, *sangu* means pocket money or food that is usually taken on a journey as supplies. Applied to the context of vote buying, it is not necessarily the size of the payments that counts, but rather its symbolic appropriateness. As a one-time DPR member who ran in an electoral district in West Java put it: "If you are seeking people's votes, you have to have good understandings. People who are going to vote for me would be unable to work on voting day. I compensate them for that. It is not expensive, just souvenirs to 'tie' them so that they do not run to cashed-up rivals" (Interview, 24 April 2014).

In addition to the cultural context, the price of vote buying is greater in local elections where the constituency size is smaller. This helps explain why average expectations of the price of votes in the outer islands were higher because constituencies there are smaller than on densely populated Java. The smaller the population of the district or city, the more a candidate has to spend to buy a vote. The price escalates in some resource-rich, but sparsely populated districts on Kalimantan or in the eastern part of Indonesia. For instance, my study found that 82.1 percent of voters in Tana Tidung (North Kalimantan) would consider more than IDR 200,000 (approx. US$17.80) an appropriate price for a vote. This is one of Indonesia's most resource-rich districts, with significant production of oil, natural gas and coal, but its population is only about 14,899, escalating the vote buying rate for a single candidate to at least IDR. 1,000,000 (approx. US$89) (Aryo Djojohadikusumo, Informal Communication, 21 May 2014).

Put in a nutshell, the market for votes is huge in Indonesia and vote buying has been pervasive not only in national legislative elections but also in local executive elections. One broker who worked for a winning candidate during the 2017 direct election for regency head in Batang, Central Java, acknowledged that distributing cash handouts was part of his chief strategy because voters saw elections as a 'money harvest' (Interview, 23 January 2017). Prior to the first simultaneous local executive elections in December 2015, I interviewed a seasoned broker in East Java. He revealed two important indicators of the intensity of vote buying. First, because cash handouts are usually distributed in plain white envelopes, along with the name card of the candidate, the sales of envelopes in election times increase sharply.[23] For example,

[23]This observation is based on information he collected from big shops in each regency that sell envelopes on a large scale.

based on the information he received, the sale of envelopes in Sumenep during the 2014 legislative elections rose by 75 percent, in Sidoarjo by 65 percent, in Gresik by 60 percent, Mojokerto by 80 percent, Ponorogo by 70 percent, and Trenggalek by 80 percent. A second anecdotal indication of the prevalence of vote buying is a shortage of small banknotes as election day nears. According to the above broker, most candidates want to change money into smaller denomination banknotes at the bank because vote buying typically takes the form of small payments (usually around IDR. 10,000 to 20,000) (Interview, 5 December 2015).

Overall, as this section has shown, vote buying has been an integral part of Indonesian electoral politics, not only at the national level, but also at the local level. Complementing the 2014 national voter survey discussed in previous sections, the sub-national election dataset confirms that vote buying has played a key role in mobilising electoral support. Using the massive dataset of local election surveys that covers the period 2006 to 2015, I have shown that the level of reported acceptance of vote buying is high, with four out of ten Indonesians not having a problem accepting cash or a gift from candidates for regional government heads. All of this suggests that vote buying has become one of the main instruments of electoral mobilisation in local government contests.

2.3. Conclusion

This chapter has explored the prevalence of vote buying in Indonesian election campaigns. Elaborated from a wide range of methods –whether individual, observational or derived from the list-experiment– the results are mostly congruent with each other. The findings generated from the direct individual and neighbourhood measures as well as from the survey-based experiment are that 25 percent of Indonesian voters were exposed to vote buying in the 2014 legislative election when asked directly, 27.4 percent when asked via the list-experiment, and 28.9 percent when asked through the neighbourhood question. If we use the less obtrusive measure without concretely mentioning the 2014 election (as discussed in detail above), the level of vote buying rises slightly to 33 percent. Hence, the estimated proportion of people engaging in vote buying in Indonesia lies between 25 percent and 33 percent, considering that the difference between one measure to another is not statistically distinguishable.

In the 2014 legislative election, there were around 187 million registered domestic voters. A range of between 25 percent and 33 percent would mean an estimated 47

million to 62 million voters nationwide were offered cash or other material benefits in return for their votes. If we rely on the highest estimate, one out of three Indonesian voters was personally exposed to vote buying. It is noteworthy, however, that these figures define a range, rather than a precise point-estimate, of vote buying incidents. In addition, vote buying was not only a prominent feature of Indonesia's national legislative elections. My large dataset of local elections across the country found fewer than four out of ten Indonesians thought of vote buying to be an acceptable practice. However, my study found empirical evidence that such practice in general is ubiquitous in Indonesian electoral politics.

Such findings generate more questions. Most obviously, given that vote buying is common but not universal: which voters are targeted in vote buying exchanges? The next chapter provides a comprehensive profile of the typical vote sellers and presents more rigorous analysis to predict the likelihood of a person being offered benefits in exchange for a vote. It does so by testing large number of variables that are generally believed to be the determinants of vote buying.

CHAPTER 3

THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE BUYING AND CLUB GOODS: THE PROFILE OF TYPICAL VOTE 'SELLERS'

In the preceding chapter, I showed how prevalent vote buying and club goods provision are in Indonesian elections, even by international standards. The findings offered a systematic confirmation of thus far largely anecdotal accounts of political clientelism in Indonesia. Despite the ubiquity of such practices and a recent surge in publications on the topic (e.g. Aspinall, 2014; Allen, 2015; Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016; Amick, 2016; Aspinall et al., 2017; Tawakkal et al., 2017), surprisingly the question of what types of individuals are targeted by vote buying and club goods operations remains largely unexplored. Accordingly, this chapter focuses on the analysis of the individual-level determinants of targeting of vote buying and club goods, and provides a comprehensive profile of the typical vote 'sellers.' I examine a wide range of variables that are generally believed to be the determinants of such electoral strategies. The final part of this chapter then identifies the most striking aspects of vote buying and club goods provision in two different election settings: the national legislative elections and local executive contests.

One of the key findings of this chapter is that voter identification with political parties is consistently and significantly linked to vote buying. This correlation is calculated from the two data sources used in this study: the post-national legislative survey and sub-national election dataset. The closer the ties of a voter to a political party, the more likely that voter is to receive offers of vote buying or be accepting of the practice. My post-legislative election data also shows that, contrary to prior expectations, most of the variables associated with modernisation theory have little correlation with vote buying. The insignificance of socio-economic factors indicates that the targeting of vote buying in the national parliamentary elections can be best explained in terms of party identification rather than the modernisation paradigm. It is worth noting, however, that while those who self-identify with a political party are more likely to become a prime target of vote buying, party closeness has little effect in determining the provision of club goods. This means that the distribution of this form of collective patronage is more inclusive than vote buying, with the political preference of recipients seemingly not a major factor in target selection.

While the legislative election dataset is about vote buying experience, the local election dataset is about vote buying acceptability. Regarding the local executive elections, there is strong statistical evidence that a combination of the party identification and socio-economic profiles help explain the extent to which vote buying is viewed as acceptable. However, I found substantial heterogeneity among party loyalists: those who feel close to large nationalist parties such as PDI-P, Golkar, and Democratic Party as well as parties that draw on the traditionalist Islamic community like PKB and PPP, and a newly nationalist party NasDem were more likely to accept vote buying as a normal practice during local elections. In contrast, partisan alignment to the Islamist party PKS and the pluralist-oriented but largely modernist Islamic PAN were less accepting of vote buying. The effects of partisan lean toward other nationalist parties such as Gerindra and Hanura, were not significant. Unlike in vote buying experience in the legislative elections, the modernisation argument remains persuasive in the context of local executive races. I present compelling evidence that socio-economically vulnerable individuals and rural residents are more likely to be tolerant of vote buying in local elections.

3.1. Perspectives on electoral clientelism: vote buying and club goods

In comparative studies on electoral clientelism, discussion of the determinants of vote buying and club goods at the individual level typically focus on the issue of target selection. As discussed in Chapter 1, because they have limited budgets, political machines aim to efficiently spend their resources on those voters most likely to respond positively to vote buying attempts (i.e. voters who are most likely to commit their vote as a result of a vote buying operation). Additionally, since ballot secrecy prevents candidates and brokers from unequivocally verifying whether recipients of payments reciprocate with their votes, it is essential for them to identify those voters who are not only most likely to be influenced by vote buying or club goods provision, but are also most *reliable* in delivering a vote.

Broadly, the literature on electoral clientelism has identified three factors explaining why some individuals are more likely than others to be targeted with vote buying and club goods: socio-economic and demographic factors; levels of civic engagement; and citizens' political attitudes. The first school of thought focuses on a quasi-determinist view of electoral clientelism that is congruent with arguments made by modernisation theorists. According to this camp, clientelism is best described as a pre-modern form

of political and social relations, involving mostly lower class citizens (e.g. Lipset, 1959; Scott, 1972). Thus, it is an intrinsic element of 'third world' politics, affecting countries that are relatively poor and have low rates of literacy. They are not "modern," say Andrews and Inman (2009: 6). Flowing from this conception of clientelism is the inverse argument that successful democratisation is only possible in polities with sufficiently high levels of economic development. Accordingly, as Hicken (2011: 299) explains, "clientelism appears to be more prevalent in developing countries, and within nations, noting that poorer voters appear to be more susceptible to clientelist offers than richer voters."

Many scholars therefore draw a connection between different dimensions of socio-economic modernisation and the prevalence of clientelist exchanges (e.g. Jensen and Justesen, 2012; Brusco et al., 2004). Such scholars believe that poor people are more attracted by vote buying and club goods than wealthier citizens. With respect to vote buying, Stokes (2007b: 618) introduces the model of a high discount rate, explaining that "poor people are risk-averse and hence value more highly a bag of goodies in hand today than the promise of redistributive public policy tomorrow". The poor discount future programmatic benefits because future rewards are less certain and concrete than the ones they can collect now (Stokes 2007a: 94). The literature on electoral clientelism has also emphasised the effects of education, proposing that low education makes citizens more vulnerable to vote buying (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).

Still within this modernisation paradigm, some scholars have suggested that variation in patterns of vote buying can result from different places of residence. For example, Hicken (2007a: 56) argues that vote buying is less likely in urban areas, partly due to the diminishing role in such settings of traditional patron-client networks through which a candidate can deliver material benefits. In addition, according to Hicken (2007a: 56), people who live in rural areas are more likely to be prone to vote buying and club goods provision because income and education levels are higher in urban areas and there are greater demands for public goods in urban areas, where residents are concerned about issues such as traffic congestion, public transportation, and garbage collection.

Specifically with regard to club goods, the literature has also long supported the logic of the modernisation approach. Since the provision of such goods is of great importance to poor voters, it is plausible to assume that poor communities are far more likely to welcome gifts of club goods than wealthier ones. Recent literature on club goods in Indonesia also suggests that there is clear linkage between club goods

and rural settings (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016; Hamdi 2016). In an environment where there is a sizeable gap between rural and urban areas in the number and quality of infrastructure projects, political machines appear –in these authors' view– to deem their club goods efforts to be more effective if distributed in rural areas than in better developed urban locations.

The focus of many authors advancing the economic modernisation approach has been on the conceptualisation of the argument and case studies that support it (Hicken, 2011; Gellner and Waterbury, 1977; Scott, 1972; Jensen and Justesen, 2014). Based on these studies, as Hicken (2011: 297) put it, "clientelism was bound to disappear as countries modernised both economically and democratically." For that reason, vote buying (and this applies to club goods provision too) appears to be endemic in many developing countries –and almost exclusively limited to them too. Although the assumptions put forward by the modernisation camp seem to be plausible, the developmentalist argument fails to explain why clientelist networks remain influential in relatively wealthy and highly educated nations, such as Japan (Kitschelt, 2007), Belgium (Kitschelt, 2007), Austria (Kitschelt, 2007), Italy (Kitschelt, 2007) and France (Warner, 2001). Such cases challenge the conclusions of the modernisation school within clientelism studies.

A second group trying to explain which voters get targeted most by vote buying and other clientelist exchanges has concentrated on civic engagement. In order to facilitate clientelistic exchange, many politicians make use of informal and formal organisations with large numbers of members. As a result, people who are involved in mass organisations are expected to be particularly exposed to vote buying and club goods provision. In the Philippines, Cruz (2014) argues that voters who are actively engaged in social networks are disproportionately targeted for vote buying. Gonzalez-Ocantos and his colleagues (2012: 212) found a similar conclusion, showing that Nicaraguans who actively engage in meetings held by civic associations are "far more likely to report vote buying than those who never attend." This is partly because such social organisations provide norms of reciprocity that can be used to mobilise support through particularistic electoral mobilisation and to ensure that recipients of patronage actually reciprocate with their votes (Callahan, 2005b: 496).

Similarly, in the case of Thailand, Callahan (2005b) suggests that civic associations are responsible for the emergence of new forms of electoral corruption and vote buying practices at election times. As theoritised by Putnam (1993: 167), networks of civic engagement and norms of reciprocity are highly correlated since the two are an important

feature of social capital. In this concept, norms of reciprocity are one vital aspect of the social capital that can facilitate clientelist exchanges. Cultural norms of gift-giving, according to this approach, create a social atmosphere conducive to quid pro quo offers. This atmosphere, in turn, breeds a culture of mutual favours in which parties or candidates are happy to buy votes and voters are happy to 'sell' their vote in exchange for payment or other material benefits. Finan and Schechter (2012), therefore, argue that vote buying is inherently self-enforcing due to the existence of social norms of reciprocity.[1]

In the area of club goods, much of the literature also supports this civic engagement logic (Aspinall, 2016; Hamdi, 2016). As already explained in Chapter 2, candidates usually view club goods as a mechanism to gain or maintain support from influential local community leaders and establish links with their followers. Hence, candidates provide donations or assistance to these leaders and their supporters, in the expectation that this will cement their electoral support for the nominee. Accordingly, members of organisations or groups associated with such respected figures are more likely to experience offers of club goods. Further, Aspinall (2016) identifies two sorts of networks which candidates normally use for the distribution of club goods: networks of affect and networks of benefit.[2] Put simply, insertion into social organisations has an impact on the probability of being targeted by club goods.

A third camp of scholars has emphasised a potential link between electoral clientelism and political attitudes (e.g. Manzetti and Wilson, 2009; Banegas, 1998; Carreras and Irepoglu, 2013). Generally, political attitudes include components such as party identification, efficacy, political interest, political information, political trust, political participation, and support for democracy (Verba et al., 1995). Regarding party identification, scholars have offered no definitive conclusion on whether this component of political attitudes predicts the likelihood of receiving offers of vote buying and club goods. On the contrary, this issue is hotly debated. As we have seen, some scholars argue that payment for votes and club goods provision target swing, or ideologically indifferent, voters (meaning that strong party identification would be a negatively correlated with vote buying). As discussed thoroughly in Chapter 1, some even argue that providing private or small-scale club goods to those who are close to, or ideologically proximate to,

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[1]For more discussion about the norms of reciprocity model, see Chapter 8.

[2]According to Aspinall (2016: 4), networks of affect refer to religious, cultural or social organisations,while networks of benefit are largely associated to the income-generating, employment or other material needs of participants. The examples include relations between employers and employees, or between wholesale traders and suppliers, and so on.

any political party is wasteful (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Stokes 2005). In contrast, other authors suggest that political parties tend to focus their vote buying and club goods efforts on their partisan, loyal voters whose turnout can be maximised –which would mean that high levels of party identification should predict vote buying (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Nichter, 2008; Gans-Morse, Mazucca, and Nichter, 2014; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012; Stokes et al., 2013).

Another dimension of political attitudes that might be relevant to political clientelism is political efficacy, i.e. the citizenry's ability to influence government decisions, their belief that government cares what people think, and belief that government will respond to their demands. Reef and Knoke (1999: 414) define political efficacy as "an individual's sense of personal competence in influencing the political system." Political efficacy is adversely related to political alienation or political powerlessness, which refers to "a person's perceived inability to influence governmental policy" (Ibid, 414). Some scholars found a link between low levels of efficacy and clientelist exchanges, especially vote buying. In Benin, for instance, material rewards offered by parties during elections are seen as an expression of political alienation, in which vote sellers ware more likely to feel powerless about government and perceive politics as meaningless (Banegas, 1998: 78–79). Kerkvliet (1991: 231) found a similar pattern in the Philippines where villagers tend to receive material benefits as "practically their only opportunity to get anything from people in government." In this view, disempowered citizens view elections as a momentary opportunity to "stake a rightful claim to the resources of those higher up" (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007: 26).

A further political attitude dimension that potentially correlates with electoral clientelism is political information. Grossman and Helpman (1996) suggest that 'uninformed voters' will be the most likely targets of clientelist campaign strategies. Vicente and Wantchekon (2009: 302) come to a similar finding, arguing that informed voters are more likely to support politicians who run programmatic campaigns and will stay away from material, particularistic strategies.

The next potentially relevant component of political attitudes is political interest, defined as "the degree to which politics arouses a citizen's curiosity" (Van Deth, 1989: 278). Some scholars suggest that linkages may exist between such interest and exposure to clientelist exchanges (e.g. Carreras and Irepoglu, 2013). An interested citizen, according to this view, is likely motivated to participate in elections without material rewards. This psychological variable is therefore believed to have a negative

relationship with clientelist mobilisation. Moreover, an interested citizen is assumed to be efficacious and informed, linking political interest with other factors mentioned above. Generally, interested voters are expected to support parties or candidates who rely on public policy campaigns, while uninterested voters are expected to respond to vote buying and club good exchanges.

Another related component of political attitudes that has started to receive scholarly interest in clientelism is political trust (Manzetti and Wilson, 2009). Political trust is defined in the literature as a basic evaluative orientation toward the political system (Mujani, 2003; Citrin and Muste, 1999; Inglehart, 1999). While related to political efficacy, trust levels are more generally about the citizenry's evaluation of existing political institutions. In short, political efficacy is an input, while trust in institutions is an output of the political system (Almond and Verba, 1963). Manzetti and Wilson (2009) argue that clientelist politics and trust in political institutions are strongly related. They found that in countries where political and government institutions are weak and patron-client relationships are strong, voters tend to support corrupt leaders or parties from whom they expect to receive material benefits. Accordingly, voters with lower levels of trust towards political institutions are believed to build transactional relations with political parties and 'sell' their votes to candidates providing private goods and favours.

Electoral participation is another political attitude dimension that has become a matter of debate in the literature on clientelism. There has been a growing discussion about whether vote buying and club goods provision increases or decreases voter participation in elections. Using a field experiment in West Africa, Vicente (2013) found strong evidence that vote buying increases participation. Similarly, Carreras and Irepoglu (2013: 616) suggest that the distribution of electoral rewards is effective in mobilising voters in Latin America. In Egypt, Blaydes (2011) concludes that voters exercised their right to vote because they expected benefits (to be sure, she was describing elections under Mubarak's authoritarian rule). Nonetheless, other studies have produced contradictory findings. In Nigeria, Bratton (2008: 15), for instance, found that vote buying decreases individuals' electoral participation, suggesting that along with electoral violence, clientelist exchanges trigger disillusionment among the electorate, leading them to exit the political process.

A final attitudinal variable that might interrelate with political clientelism is support for democracy. It is generally held among scholars that clientelist exchanges are inimical to democracy (Stokes, 2005; Keefer, 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). Stokes

(2005: 316) argues that vote buying is undemocratic because it involves 'perverse accountability.' Instead of politicians being accountable to voters, she explains, where vote buying happens, voters are held accountable for their vote. Hence, it might be inferred that those who strongly support democracy would be less likely to engage in vote buying, and vice versa. A large literature also suggests that delivery of club goods in newer democracies undermines democratic principles (e.g. Keefer and Vlaicuu, 2008; Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Kopecky et al., 2008; Medina and Stokes, 2007). Lindberg (2012), on the other hand, argues that club goods do not necessarily undermine democracy, with voters who receive this form of patronage still largely making their vote choices on the basis of their perceptions of economic conditions and of the government's policies.

In sum, there are three broad conceptual frameworks that might affect the magnitude of clientelist exchanges: socio-economic factors; involvement in civic organisations; and political attitudes. In the next sections, I draw specific hypotheses from these three broad areas of inquiry and test them by analysing the datasets available to this study.

3.2. Hypotheses

3.2.1. Clientelist exchanges and modernisation theory

As noted above, many scholars believe that socio-economic factors such as income level and education shape how widespread vote buying (Brusco et al., 2004; Vicente, 2013) and club goods provision (Thachil, 2014) become. Poor voters are believed to be significantly more vulnerable to such practices than wealthier ones. If this is true, then I expect to find that *the poorer a voter, the more likely he or she is to experience vote buying and club goods provision*. Another important aspect of modernisation that is believed to correlate with exchanges of material benefits for votes is education (Vicente, 2013). Indeed, variables of education and income are often highly correlated: people with lower education usually generate lower incomes than those with higher education, and vice versa. Consequently, less-educated individuals are expected to be more intensively exposed to vote buying and club goods than well-educated people. The hypothesis is: *the less educated a voter, the more likely he or she is to experience vote buying and club goods provision*. Additionally, as we have seen, differences in voters' geographical location are also believed to influence the potential for electoral clientelism. Here, the hypothesis is: *a voter who lives in a rural area is more likely to experience vote buying and club goods provision than a voter residing in an urban area*.

3.2.2. Clientelist exchanges and civic engagement

As explained above, networks of civic engagement are typically used by clientelist actors to distribute patronage resources (Callahan, 2005b). Virtually everywhere in the world, clientelist exchanges, especially in the form of vote buying, are not legal. Therefore, politicians pursuing vote buying are forced to be discreet. However, it is difficult to engage large numbers of voters discreetly with vote buying attempts (Hicken 2007a; 2007b). Accordingly, they find ways to disguise their vote buying and club good attempts by, for instance, penetrating informal and formal organisations and packaging their clientelist offers in religious or social assistance terms. Such patterns have led to claims that social organisations –and their members— are more likely to be targeted by vote buying and club goods provision than individual voters without such links. If this is correct, *the more deeply involved a voter is in social organisations, the more likely he or she is to be offered vote buying and club goods.*

3.2.3. Clientelist exchanges and political attitudes

We have also seen that extant explanations for electoral clientelism also include political attitudes, comprising several components. Concerning party identification, some scholars believe that voters who do not identify with a particular party (i.e. swing voters) tend to receive more material rewards. If this proposition is true, I expect to find that *the more non-partisan a voter is, the more likely he or she is to accept vote buying and club goods*. A negative finding with regard to this hypothesis would direct us toward the core voter, turnout buying model. Another aspect of political attitudes is political efficacy. With respect to efficacy, much of the literature suggests that clientelist exchanges are an indication of lower efficacy or an expression of political alienation. The hypothesis for this study, then, is *the lower efficacy a citizen has, the more likely he or she is to engage in vote buying and club goods provision*.

Similarly, some literature claims that uninformed voters are more likely to be targeted by vote buying and club goods provision. If this claim is correct, we must hypothesise that *individuals with increased access to information are less likely to receive offers of vote buying and club goods*. The literature also suggests that voters with low levels of political interest are more susceptible to clientelist offers. If so, *the more uninterested a citizen in politics, the more like he or she will be experience vote buying attempts and club good operations*. With regard

to political trust, there is an increasing perception that low levels of trust in political institutions leads to higher levels of vote buying. If so, it is plausible to hypothesise that *the lower a voter's trust in political institutions, the more vulnerable s/he is to vote buying and club goods provision*. In addition, much of the literature on clientelism also claims that participation in elections increases the likelihood of being targeted clientelist offers. If so, *voters who participate in the election are more likely to experience vote buying and club goods*. Finally, a widely held view among scholars is that clientelism runs counter to democratic principles, implying that those who strongly support democracy will stay away from such exchanges. Thus, I expect to find that *those who support democracy are less likely to engage in vote buying and club goods operations*.

3.3. Measures of modernisation theory, civic engagement and political attitudes

In order to test the hypotheses developed above, this section introduces the independent variables needed to calculate the validity of the claims. As presented in Chapter 2, the dependent variables of my post-election survey in April 2014 are an *experience*: i.e., being targeted by vote buying and club goods.[3] The central independent variables, on the other hand, are drawn from separate data sources: first, the post-legislative election survey, and second, the local election datasets. The former data source is used to determine factors that explain why some individuals were more likely than others to receive offers of vote buying ahead of the 2014 legislative elections. In this regard, the covariates include socio-economic demographics, civic engagement and a set of political attitudes, including party identification. The latter dataset is designed to analyse the types of individuals that are being targeted with vote buying and club goods in the elections for government heads. The measures of independent variables in the local election dataset involve party identification, and are controlled by common predictors of voting behaviour, such as religion, gender, age, rural-urban domicile, ethnicity, level of income and education. Given that many of the central variables are similar, for reasons of simplicity, this section presents key independent variables applied in both the post-legislative election and local executive election datasets.

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[3]Regarding the dependent variable used in the local government election dataset, I will discuss this in the subsequent section along with its multivariate results.

3.3.1. Modernisation theory

In both data sources, I employ three common indicators of the modernisation argument: poverty, urban-rural domicile, and education. First, both datasets use a single twelve-point scale item to measure an individuals' income level. This measure asked: "On monthly average, how much is the gross income of your household?" Income is a continuous variable that reports the respondent's gross household income per month, coded on a scale from 1 to 12, where 1 indicates that the respondent's income per month is under IDR. 200,000.00 (approx. US$17.60) and 12 indicates over IDR. 4,000,000.00 (approx. US$352).

Second, both datasets identify respondents' domicile based on a simple rural-urban dichotomy. This dichotomy, in turn, is drawn from an official rural-urban category developed by Indonesia's Central Agency of Statistics (BPS, Badan Pusat Statistik). I measure rural-urban residence by constructing a dummy variable that indicates whether respondents live in a rural area (coded 1) or in an urban area (coded 0). Examining income level and urban/rural residence simultaneously is particularly important in Indonesia, since poverty is predominantly concentrated in rural areas; in the early 2010s, 16.6 percent of rural people were poor, compared with 9.9 percent of the urban population (Rural Poverty Portal, 2012). In my sample, which was based on the last census data from the government, 50.2 percent of respondents lived in rural areas, while 49.6 percent lived in urban areas.

Third, both data sources employ education as the final dimension of modernisation, asking respondents about the highest level of education they have completed. Education is coded 1-10, where 1 indicates that the respondent never attended school and 10 indicates that the respondent held a bachelor's or higher degree. A plurality of respondents (41.4 percent) reported that they only had a primary education, had not completed formal education, or had no formal education at all while 21.1 percent reported finishing junior high school, 26.3 percent reported finishing senior high school, and 11.1 percent reported having higher education.

In addition, both datasets include other demographic variables such as gender, age, ethnicity and religion.[4] First, both datasets control for the respondents' gender to capture any possible relationship between vote buying and gender. Gender is coded 1 if the respondent is a male; 0 if the respondent is a female. As described in Appendix A, the sample was constructed to include 50 percent of males and 50 percent of females, mirroring the last

[4]In the local election dataset, I also have a cluster of three questions that ask about the level of religiosity among Muslim respondents, as I will explain in the following section.

census data in 2010. Second, both datasets control the age of respondents to identify any bias in the tendency of vote buyers to particularly target young (or older) voters.[5] Age is a continuous variable that reports the respondent's age in years, ranging from the youngest to the oldest. In my post-legislative election survey, respondents who were aged 21 years old or less constituted only 4.3 percent of the sample, while 44.7 percent reported that ages ranging between 22 and 40 years. The percentage of those aged 41 to 55 years accounted for 34.7 percent, and 16.3 percent were older than 55 years.

Another potentially relevant factor predicting vote buying and club goods provision used in both datasets is ethnic identity. Because the the Javanese are the largest ethnic group in Indonesia (making up approximately 40 percent of the total population), ethnicity is therefore divided into two categories only: Javanese and others. Self-identification as Javanese was coded as 1, while others were coded 0. In my post-legislative election sample, 41 percent of respondents reported being of Javanese ethnicity, while nearly 15 percent described themselves as Sundanese. The rest of the respondents identified themselves as neither being Javanese nor Sundanese; rather, they were affiliated with a large number of small ethnic groups across the archipelago. The last demographic variable is religion, used in both in the post-legislative election and local election datasets. Since other religions are small relative to Islam,[6] religious affiliation is divided into two categories only: Islam and others. I constructed a dummy variable where respondents who identify as Muslim were coded 1, and 0 if from a different religion. In the legislative dataset, given that the sample drawn from the majority of provinces in outer islands was small relative to provinces located in Java, the regional variable is divided into two categories: Java and others.

3.3.2. Civic engagement

I examine the variable of civic engagement only in my post-legislative election data. Putnam (2002: 10) postulated that networks of civic engagement comprise informal as well as formal organisations. He suggested that such networks do not only take

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[5]Some scholars found evidence of a link between age and voters' susceptibility to vote buying (e.g. Brusco et al., 2004). In Argentina, the younger cohorts among low-income Peronists are more likely to receive vote buying offers than older cohorts. The rationale is that these differences could reflect life-cycle effects, whereby older voters are more likely to be more partisan and have higher party identification levels than younger ones. Their findings support the swing-voter argument, suggesting that political machines tend to target ideologically indifferent voters because they are more dependent on material rewards.

[6]Around 202.9 million people identify themselves as Muslim, which represents 87.3 percent of Indonesia's total population today. In my sample, 89.1 percent of respondents reported that they were Muslim, 8.4 percent were Christian/Catholic, and 2.4 percent others. See Appendix A.

the forms of civic associations, but also manifest in informal social engagements such as dinners with friends, gathering in a café, and so forth. Following Mujani (2003), this study examines the degree of civic involvement by establishing the level of respondent's engagement in religious and non-religious organisations. The prompt was the following question: "Allow me to inquire about your participation in any of the following organisations or groups below. Are you an active member, inactive member or non-member of these organisations?"[7] The available choices include religious organisations such as NU and Muhammadiyah in the context of Islam or churches in the case of Christianity or 'secular' associations, such as youth organisations and sport clubs; agricultural and fishermen's groups; and labour unions, political parties, youth community councils (*karang taruna*), regular social gatherings, cooperatives, art and cultural clubs, and others.

3.3.3. Political attitudes

In the post-parliamentary election dataset, measures of political attitudes include party identification, efficacy, political interest, political information, political trust, political participation, and support for democracy. In my local election data, however, the only variable of political attitude used is party identification. In the following sub-sections, I describe in detail the measures developed for each component in the broader area of political attitudes.

3.3.3.1. Party identification

Both my post-parliamentary election and local executive election datasets measure the degree of party identification by using two items. The first question regarding party attachment was: "There are people who feel closer to a certain political party and some who are not. How about you, do you feel there are any political parties who you feel closer to?" Those who responded affirmatively were asked a follow-up question, consisting of a three-point scale measuring the how they feel. The question was: "How close do you feel toward the party?" In the analysis, overall party identification is an additive scale from these two items which is then normalised to a scale of between 1 and 4, in which 1 indicates respondents who do not feel close at all to any

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[7]For coding and scaling purpose, each item of civic engagement comprises a three-point scale: non-member (0), non-active member (0.5), and active member (1). Scores for membership in the association are then added up and divided by twelve to create a three-point scale of networks of civic engagement.

party, 2 indicates those who feel somewhat close, 3 reflects those who feel quite close and 4 reflects those who feel very close.

3.3.3.2. Political efficacy

The literature on political behaviour divides political efficacy into two forms: internal and external. The former refers to the a citizen's belief that he or she is able to understand politics and influence government decisions, while the latter deals with how a person feels the government will respond to his/her demands (Reef and Knoke, 1999: 414). For internal efficacy, I use responses to the items: (1) "People like me cannot influence decisions by government"; and (2) "In general, political issues are too complex, so people like me cannot understand what is going on."[8] For external efficacy, I used a single item, asking whether it is true that "people like you are not heard by political leaders." Each of these items is a four-point scale, with responses ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree." Since all three questions were negatively keyed, I recoded them with reversed Likert scales.[9] By reverse-scoring all of the negatively keyed political efficacy items, I created consistency among the items. Adding the score of all three items and dividing the result by three produced a four-point scale of political efficacy, which ranged from not efficacious at all (1) to very efficacious (4).

3.3.3.3. Political information

Political information is measured by responses to five questions. The first question was "How often do you follow the news on politics or government?" with the provided responses ranging through "every day," to "several times in a week," "once or twice in a week," "once or twice in a month," and "never." This question was followed by four additional items that inquired about the intensity with which the respondents followed political news via four different media outlets: TV, radio, newspaper, and the internet. The overall score of measuring political information was drawn from initially reverse-scoring all five items and subsequently obtaining the mean of all of those items.

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[8]For further discussion, see Niemi, Craig, and Mattei on "Measuring Internal Political Efficacy in the 1988 National Election Study," *The American Political Science Review* Vol. 85, 4 (Dec., 1991), pp. 1407-1413.

[9]In statistical analysis, positively keyed items are understood as items that are worded so that an agreement with the item represents a relatively high level of the measured attribute. In contrast, negatively keyed items are defined as those that are worded so that an agreement with the item represents a relatively low level of the measured attribute. The objective of reverse-scoring is to make sure that all the items are consistent with each other –both the originally negatively keyed items and positively keyed items, with regard to the implications of an 'agree' or 'disagree' response. For discussion, see R. Michael Furr's note at http://psych.wfu.edu/furr/716/Reverse-scoring.doc.

3.3.3.4. Political interest

Political interest was measured through a four-point scale of interest in politics or governmental issues. I gauged the extent to which repondents were interested in politics or in governmental issues in general by employing two items. The first was: "How interested are you in politics or governmental issues in general?" Following that, I also asked: "How often do you talk/discuss government issues with other people (family, neighbour, colleague, etc.)?" Because of the nature of these questions, I needed to reverse-score the two items. Finally, I added the score of the two items and divided the result by two, leading a four-point scale of political interest, ranging from not interested at all (1) to very interested (4).

3.3.3.5. Political trust

To measure political trust in a comparable way, I used a four-point scale constructed from seven items that focused on respondents' level of trust in seven key political institutions. The main question was: "We will mention several institutions. Please rate your level of trust in these institutions: do you possess high trust, moderate trust, little trust, or no trust at all? For each one, please tell me how much trust you have in them: President, People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), People's Representative Council (DPR), judiciary, the armed forces, police, and General Electoral Commission (KPU)." Again, all seven items above were reverse-scored, added up and subsequently divided by seven, establishing a four-point scale of political trust, ranging from no trust at all (1) to high trust (4).

3.3.3.6. Political participation

For this study, a scale of electoral participation was constructed from a pair of items that indicated whether or not (and if not, why) a citizen participated in the last two legislative elections. The first question was "Did you vote during the 2009 legislative election?" The second was "Did you vote during the last legislative election on April 9, 2014?" Each of these two items provided a number of answer choices, varying from "Yes, I voted," "No, I did not vote," "could not vote," to "refused to vote." I established turnout as a binary indicator, taking on a value of 1 if the individual voted in the 2009 or 2014 elections, and 0 if the person did not vote in both elections. The overall political participation score is an additive 0 – 2 index, based on the two items described above.

3.3.3.7. Democratic support

This study used a single standardised item, which was adopted from similar international measures on support for democracy. The question was: "Do you strongly disagree,

disagree, agree or strongly agree with this following statement? Compared to other form of governments, democracy is the best form of government for our type of country." As in the original variable, the result is measured on a four-point scale, varying from strongly disagree (1) to strongly agree (4).

3.4. Results and discussion

Having introduced key hypotheses and the measures to verify or falsify them, it is now time to analyse the results. This section is divided into two sub-sections: the first discusses the survey results regarding the determinants of vote buying and club goods based on the post-legislative election survey in 2014; the second does the same for the determinants of vote buying based on the historical dataset on sub-national executive elections (2006-2015). In order to assess the impact of covariates at the individual level, I first present the results from the regression analysis, using individuals' self-reported experiences of vote buying, followed by a discussion of the determinants of experiences of club goods. Next, I present the results from the local executive election dataset. At the end of the section, I highlight the most striking factor emerging from both data sources as being a significant determinant in the targeting of vote buying: party identification. The summary statistics for both dependent variables and covariates used in my post-legislative election dataset are listed in Table 3.1.

Table 3.1 **Descriptive dependent variables and covariates (post-legislative election data)**

VARIABLES	MEAN	Std. Deviation	Min	Max	N
Vote buying	0.22	0.27	0	1	1,018
Club goods	0.34	0.47	0	1	988
Gender (1=male; 0=female)	0.5	0.5	0	1	1,212
Rural (1=rural; 0=urban)	0.5	0.5	0	1	1,212
Age	42.29	13.13	16	86	1,211
Education	4.94	2.47	1	10	1,210
Income	6.61	3.52	1	12	1,205
Javanese (1=Javanese; 0=otherwise)	0.41	0.49	0	1	1,212
Religion (1=Islam; 0=otherwise)	0.89	0.31	0	1	1,212
Region (Java)	0.58	0.49	0	1	1,212
Civic engagement	0.1	0.12	0	0.63	1,191
Party ID	1.29	0.73	1	4	1,210
Efficacy	2.36	0.5	1	4	979
Political interest	4.13	1.34	2	8	1,148
Political information	2.46	0.7	1	5	965
Political engagement	4.01	1.32	0.67	9.5	848
Political participation	1.81	0.45	0	2	1,199
Political trust	2.73	0.53	1	4	1,074
Democratic support	2.86	0.54	1	4	987

3.4.1. Post-legislative election survey data

3.4.1.1. The determinants of vote buying: who gets targeted?

Table 3.2 shows the regression results with respect to vote buying. The dependent variable is the vote buying index based on responses to all components of this practice (see Chapter 2). I estimated the model using linear regression analysis.[10] Model 1 of Table 3.2 allows us to assess the role of the modernisation hypothesis and other socio-demographic variables to explain the likelihood that an individual is targeted for vote buying. Contrary to the assumptions of numerous scholars, indicators normally advanced to support modernisation arguments about clientelism generally fail to predict the probability that respondents reported being offered benefits in exchange for their votes during the 2014 legislative election. Individual differences in terms of level of income, education and socio-geographical location did not make a difference in determining the likelihood that a respondent would be targeted.

Model 1 of Table 3.2 below clearly demonstrates that the estimates of these three important measures of modernisation theory (level of income, education and socio-geographical location) are not statistically significant in the strictest sense.[11] When I introduced controls for civic engagement (Model 2) and for a set of political attitudes (Model 3), the magnitudes of these variables remained insignificant.

[10]To be accepted as a multiple linear regression model assumption, it is first necessary to test the classical assumption, which at least includes a normality test. Based on the results of the normality test I conducted, as can be seen in Appendix D, the residuals were not normally distributed. Accordingly, I needed to conduct a logistic regression because it does not need many of the classic assumption tests (including a normality test) that are required in linear relationships between the dependent and independent variables. In the logistic model, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure that takes a value of 1 if the respondent received offers of vote buying once/twice, several times, rarely, quite or very often. The results from both the logistic and linear models are strikingly similar (see Appendix E), suggesting that the linear regression in this case fits just as well as the logistic regression. In this chapter, I decided to report the linear regression model rather than the logistic model for two reasons. First, given that the linear and logistic regression analyses end up with indistinguishable results, the linear model is justifiable. Second, compared to the logistic regression, the linear estimates are easier to interpret (Hellevik, 2007).

[11]It must be noted that bivariate statistics reveal that vote buying has apparently a significant association with the level of income. But this relationship is spurious given the non-significance of the income variable when controlled by other variables. For further discussion on the bivariate results, see Appendix C.

Table 3.2 **Linear regression analysis of the determinants of vote buying targeting**

	Model 1			Model 2			Model 3		
	Socio-demographics			And Civic Engagement			And Political Attitudes		
	b	S.E	Beta	b	S.E	Beta	b	S.E	Beta
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS									
Gender (Male)	**.036***	.018	.065	.032	.018	.058	.011	.022	.019
Rural	.019	.020	.033	.014	.020	.026	.047	.025	.081
Age	**-.002***	.001	-.083	**-.002****	.001	-.086	-.001	.001	-.052
Education	.008	.004	.072	.006	.004	.054	.005	.005	.042
Income	-.001	.003	-.010	-.001	.003	-.011	-.007	.004	-.088
Religion (Muslim)	**.080****	.030	.087	**.082****	.031	.090	**.089***	.038	.095
Ethnic (Javanese)	.025	.020	.044	.021	.020	.038	.044	.025	.075
Region (Java)	-.019	.021	-.033	-.024	.021	-.042	-.038	.026	-.064
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT									
Civic engagement				.069	.077	.029	-.075	.093	-.033
POLITICAL ATTITUDES									
Party identification							**.049*****	.014	.138
Political efficacy							**-.054***	.025	-.093
Political interest							**.036*****	.010	.163
Political information							.019	.019	.048
Political participation							-.002	.026	-.003
Political trust							-.001	.023	-.002
Democratic support							-.040	.023	-.074
Constant	.154**	.055		.168**	.056		.204	.144	
Adjusted R2	.017			.015			.063		
Valid N	1014			995			671		

Note: * p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001
b = Unstandardised Coefficients; Beta = Standardised Coefficients

As indicated above, the insignificance of income and educational factors as well as socio-geographical location tends to contradict the claims of vote buying scholars who use modernisation theory in their work. Scholars have long suggested that those with lower levels of education will be more likely to engage in quid pro quo exchanges before and during elections (eg. Kitschelt, 2000; Brusco et al., 2004; Çarkoglu and Aytac, 2015). Equally, it has been claimed that respondents with more education will be less vulnerable to such practices since "as education increases, the life prospects for individuals also increase through better employment and higher incomes" (Sugiyama and Hunter, 2013: 51). Similarly, it is also proposed in the literature that voters who reside in rural areas are more likely to sell their votes (Hicken, 2007a;

Jensen and Justesen, 2013; Finan and Schechter 2012; Vicente 2013). However, my survey results show that none of these arguments are supported in the case of Indonesia. Perhaps one explanation is that vote buying is so widespread in Indonesian electoral politics that it has become a general 'atmospheric' condition transcending socio-economic and class categories. The ubiquity of vote buying exposes a wide range of voters –whether they are more or less educated, 'haves' or the 'have-nots,' or rural or urban dwellers– to the practice.

More unexpectedly, Model 1 of Table 3.2 also shows that among the socio-demographic variables included in the equation, three variables have a significant relationship with vote buying: gender (male), age, and religion (Muslim). When adding the control variable of civic engagement, as in Model 2 of Table 3.2, the coefficient of male loses statistical significance. In contrast, the magnitude of the age coefficient increases in specification when civic engagement is put into the model. Meanwhile, the coefficient of 'Muslim' remains significant at about the same level of strength –and in the same direction– when the element of civic engagement is included. This confirms the bivariate model suggesting that younger citizens[12] and Muslims reported statistically significant higher frequencies of vote buying offers (see Appendix C). However, when I entered a full set of controls (as in the final column of Table 3.2), the only socio-economic and demographic variable that remained statistically significant was that of being Muslim. This significance was at the 0.05 levels. Put differently, being a Muslim significantly predicts a greater probability that a respondent reported electoral handouts, even when a full set of controls was included.

The consistency of this relationship requires investigation. There are two possible explanations. First, there is ample evidence that Muslim candidates and recipients justified vote buying using religious reasoning. Many candidates, either from Islamic or non-Islamic parties, packaged their gifts in religious terms, for example by describing them as alms (*sedekah*). Accordingly, the Muslim recipients might not feel that the cash handouts they received were a form of morally questionable 'money politics,' but instead viewed them in terms of a "moral economy of gift-giving"

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[12]One potential explanation for this is that young adults are considered to be politically unsettled and thus have weaker political preferences and voting intentions. Opinion polls show, for example, that their intentions to show up at the polls are not as strong as those of the older voters. According to Indikator's exit poll in the 2014 legislative elections, the proportion of registered 26 to 40-year-olds who turned out to cast their ballot was lower than that of other age groups. These hesitant young voters may create a strong incentive for vote-seeking politicians to induce them with benefits. See Indikator's exit poll material release at http://indikator.co.id/uploads/20140411204045.Hasil_EP_Pileg_2014_Update.pdf.

(Aspinall et al., 2017: 4). Second, vote buying appears to be endemic among Muslims because traditional patron-client networks —through which candidates' benefits can be delivered— are more prominent in Muslim communities. In particular, many candidates used various deeply entrenched informal social institutions, such as Islamic boarding schools (*pesantren*), mosques or religious gatherings (*majelis taklim*).[13] Importantly, such loose informal networks do not always constitute themselves through official membership, and are thus outside of the civic engagement linkages that respondents reported when asked about their membership in social organisations.

While loose social interactions in Muslim society may have played a role in increasing their exposure to clientelistic practices, the overall effect of civic engagement on vote buying is not significant. The regression analysis, as shown in Model 2 of Table 3.2, confirms the bivariate statistics that the substantive effect of civic engagement –measured by membership in social organisations– is statistically insignificant.[14] As noted above, much of the literature on electoral clientelism suggests that networks of civic engagement explain the likelihood of being targeted with electoral incentives (Faughnan and Zechmeister, 2011; Callahan, 2005b; Brusco et al., 2004; Cruz, 2014). But my analysis suggests that civic engagement in Indonesia has little impact on the individual's propensity to be so targeted. Individuals' involvement in social organisations makes no difference in the probability of them being exposed to vote buying.

What about political attitudes? Three observations stand out in Model 3 of Table 3.3. First, across all components of political attitudes, party identification has a statistically significant and positive relationship with vote buying. The multivariate analysis shows that this partisanship is not spurious and remains significant and relatively stable regardless of civic engagement, political attitudes, demographic and socio-economic factors. The effect of party closeness is very large ($p < 0.001$). Extant literature suggests that party affiliation encourages citizens to become politically active. Dalton (2016: 8) found that in the U.S., people with higher party identification are more likely to persuade others, distribute propaganda hats, shirts, and posters, participate in campaign events, or donate to a party's candidate during campaigns. Electoral turnout, Dalton continues, was 26 percent higher among strong partisans than among independents. Verba and Nie (1972:

[13]The local executive election dataset –which will be explored in the next section– found a significant correlation between vote buying intensity and intensity of religiosity among Muslim respondents. In this correlation, the less religious Muslims were more likely to engage in vote buying practices, and vice versa.

[14]For further discussion on the bivariate results, see Appendix C.

219–220) claim that partisan identification mobilises political activity among lower-status citizens who might otherwise be inactive. The same holds true in other established democracies. Voters with strong party identification voted at a higher rate in the 2009 German Bundestag elections. In addition, they were several times more likely to get involved in campaign rallies and were about twice as likely to try to influence other voters (Dalton, 2016: 8). What stands out about party identification in Indonesia, by contrast, is its strong correlation with experience of vote buying. In crude terms, partisan voters in Indonesia tended to be 'money grubbing' and are significantly more likely to be recipients of material benefits.

Second, defying expectations, the model also shows that political interest is found to be statistically very significant ($p < 0.001$) in explaining the propensity of being offered vote buying. The original relationship between political interest and vote buying remains substantial and significant, even when controlled by all variables in the model. Thus, instead of reducing the individual's propensity to engage in clientelistic practices, political interest serves –in the Indonesian case– as a breeding ground for vote buying. The dominant view among political scientists is that a good citizen in a democratic polity is a citizen interested in and well-informed about politics, with strong and stable preferences (e.g. Converse, 1970; Van Deth, 1983; Van Deth, 1989). The regression analyses of the Indonesian data, however, shows that political interest is positively correlated with a distinctly non-democratic practice, i.e. vote buying.

There are two possible explanations for this rather counter-intuitive finding. First, it is plausible that in the Indonesian case, political interest is an indicator of political alienation. Arguably, those who are interested in politics actually desire to participate in a democratic manner, but that desire is undermined by their perception that the political process does not operate justly. This perception, then, makes them increasingly pragmatic at election time (this interpretation is supported by the analysis of the efficacy measure below). Another possible explanation for the link between political interest and vote buying has been suggested by Guardado and Wantchekon (2014: 7). They propose that exposure to electoral handouts is endogenous to voter political interest. Based on their theory, if voters are highly interested in politics, they are likely to get involved in more political activities than others. This, in turn, increases their likelihood of being offered a reward by political operatives they come into contact with.

Finally, consistent with prior expectations (and as indicated above), regression results reveal that political efficacy stands out as a strong predictor of vote buying. The variable

of efficacy presents a negative coefficient and is in the expected direction, implying that less efficacious individuals are more likely to receive offers of vote buying. The reverse is also true: those with higher efficacy are less likely to engage in such practice. Of course, this finding is neither new nor surprising, given that the existing literature on clientelism has long suggested such a relationship (e.g. Banegas, 1998; Kerkvliet, 1991; Schaffer and Schedler, 2007). By contrast, other political attitudes have little effect in determining vote buying in Indonesia, including support for democracy or political (i.e. electoral) participation, which I had earlier hypothesised would show correlations with vote buying experience. Indonesian respondents supporting democracy are not more or less likely to engage in vote buying than those who do not, and electoral participation is no reliable predictor of such engagement either.

3.4.1.2. The determinants of club goods: who gets targeted?

Table 3.3 presents regression results with regard to club goods provision as the dependent variable. It is based on respondents' reported observation of political parties, candidates or brokers offering people in the neighbourhood collective goods or assistance. I estimate the model using a binary logistic regression. Among eight commonly encountered covariates in the literature, Model 1 of Table 3.3 shows four variables that achieve statistical significance at the strictest level used in this study ($p < 0.05$), and even the statistical significance of the 'rural' and 'Javanese' coefficients reach up to the 0.01 and 0.001 level of significance respectively.

In general, modernisation theory is again not empirically persuasive. Levels of income and education —as main indicators of economic modernisation— have no significant associations with exposure to club goods. However, the rural coefficient — another measure of modernisation — has a significant relationship with club goods, and therefore needs discussion. As shown in Models 1 through 3 of Table 3.3, living in rural areas *always* predicted the provision of club goods, and this effect was *always* significant, regardless of socio-economic and demographic factors, civic engagement and political attitudes. The substantive effect of the coefficient reaches the 0.05 significance cut-off, implying that rural dwellers were heavily targeted. This pattern can partly be attributed to the sub-standard infrastructure and poor transportation in rural areas. These conditions open opportunities for candidates and brokers to supply funds or benefits to local communities. In addition, rural areas feature static and intimate social relationships that favour clientelism (Hicken, 2007a: 55–56). This notion corresponds with frequent statements from candidates and

their brokers that rural settings create an environment that is conducive to quid pro quo exchanges, as those who live in rural areas are considered to be more 'reciprocal' than urban dwellers. It is worth noting, however, although we did find an effect of rurality on the targeting of club goods, its impact on determining vote buying is statistically insignificant, as noted above.

Table 3.3 **Logistic regression analysis of the determinants of attracting club goods**

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Socio-demographics		And Civic Engagement		And Political Attitudes	
	B	S.E	b	S.E	b	S.E
SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHICS						
Gender	**.327***	.140	**.319***	.142	.315	.179
Rural	**.524****	.160	**.447****	.163	**.432***	.203
Age	-.005	.006	-.005	.006	-.008	.008
Education	.033	.034	.018	.035	.028	.044
Income	.031	.024	.029	.024	-.016	.031
Religion (Islam)	.144	.238	.189	.244	-.133	.308
Ethnic (Javanese)	**.516*****	.156	**.474****	.158	**.571****	.193
Region (Java)	**-.407***	.162	**-.457****	.167	-.250	.205
CIVIC ENGAGEMENT						
Civic engagement			**1.659****	.591	1.374	0.704
POLITICAL ATTITUDES						
Party identification					.164	.108
Efficacy					.057	.198
Political interest					**.195***	.076
Political information					.057	.151
Political participation					.110	.221
Political trust					.200	.191
Democratic support					-.355	.185
Constant	-1.384**	.434	-1.461***	.442	-1.946	1.162
Pseudo R2	.038		.045		.078	
Valid N	976		958		642	

Note: * p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001

b = Unstandardised Coefficients

The results also reveal that ethnic Javanese voters (i.e. citizens with their roots in the Javanese heartlands of Central and East Java) are more vulnerable to club goods provision than their non-Javanese counterparts. The 'Javanese' coefficient remains significant even when a full set of controls is included. The link between being Javanese and political clientelism raises questions for future research. Possible answers to such questions include electoral density and social norms of reciprocity. Most electoral constituencies on Java are densely populated, thus presenting candidates with large numbers of voters in geographically smaller constituencies. This creates a

strong incentive for politicians to cultivate a clientelist approach as voters are more easily targeted and identifiable in densely populated areas. However, this is not the only possible explanation for why Javanese voters were more likely to be targeted for club goods. It is also plausible that candidates consider Javanese voters to be more reciprocal so that their machines do not need to invest massively in strict monitoring and enforcement. Based on interviews I conducted with candidates, the dominant discourse among politicians is that Javanese voters, especially those who live in rural settings where public goods are still limited, are more likely to reward providers of material benefits than are other voters.[15] In the socio-political context of Indonesia, where the secrecy of the ballot is rarely violated and monitoring the effectiveness of individual gifts is therefore difficult, distributing small-scale club goods to voters with a high degree of reciprocity constitutes an electorally advantageous strategy.

In an apparent paradox, the results also show that there is a statistically significant correlation between living outside of Java and receiving offers of club goods. Recall, however, that being ethnic Javanese and living on Java are different categories. Significant percentages of Javanese live outside of Java, and many citizens living on Java are not ethnically Javanese (most notably, the Sundanese). Thus, the two findings are not necessarily contradictory. My data indicate that people who live outside Java were more likely to benefit from the provision of club goods, even when the civic engagement variable is introduced in the model. However, the magnitude of the effect dropped and failed to approach any conventional level of statistical significance when a full battery of controls was added. Despite all of this, the effect of "Outer Islands" on the probability of being targeted with club goods still warrants discussion, given its statistical significance at least based on Models 1 and 2 of Table 3.3. Club goods, which typically consist of small-scale infrastructure programs, are perhaps attractive for voters in the Outer Islands due to the existence of developmental gaps (e.g. Sutiyo and Maharjan, 2017). Although Indonesia has generally suffered from an infrastructure deficit, this deficit is worse in the Outer Islands, thereby rendering its electorate vulnerable to club goods. Separately, Model 1 of Table 3.5 shows that male voters are found to be significantly exposed to club goods. When I added a control for civic engagement, however, the magnitude of the male coefficient became statistically insignificant.

Likewise, binary logistic regression results initially revealed a significant relationship between civic engagement and club goods at the 99 percent level. At first glance, it is

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[15]For example, Marwan Jafar, Interview, Jakarta, 20 April 2014.

plausible to assume that people engaged in civic associations will be more likely to be targeted with club goods, given that such goods are partly targeted at associations (in contrast to mostly individual-level vote buying, where my study found no significant correlation with civic engagement). However, when I introduced a full battery of control variables, the coefficient reduced in magnitude and was no longer significant in the strictest sense ($p < 0.050$). To be sure, this variable, civic engagement, remains significant at the 0.051 level. Even though the magnitude of the association is gradually reduced, its effect is very close in magnitude to the 0.050 significance cut-off. This leads to the conclusion that there is at least a moderate correlation between being socially engaged in organisations and the likelihood of being targeted with club goods.

Having assessed the impact of socio-economic factors and civic engagement, we are now in a position to review the effect of political attitudes. In general, respondents' reports on have little to do with their political attitudes. The only political attitude variable that remains significant and relatively stable, even when I introduced the full battery of control variables, is political interest. Again, this contradicts major scholarly works (e.g. Converse, 1970; Van Deth, 1983; Van Deth, 1989) which suggest that political interest is an important prerequisite for participation in a democratic polity, and thus should be incompatible with non-democratic practices such as clientelism. As noted in regards to the same correlation with vote buying, it may be the case that the more interested an individual is in politics, the more alienated he or she is in political affairs[16]. This, in turn, could lead them to compensate for this alienation through pragmatic exchanges. Similarly, as in the case of vote buying, it is also possible that individuals with a high level of interest in politics are more likely to have dealings with politicians, and are thus more exposed to clientelistic practices.

Overall, there are few relationships between political attitude variables and the provision of club goods. This is perhaps not unexpected seeing the surveys test individual political attitudes, while club goods are distributed at the collective level. It is possible that persons who do not individually hold attitudes that make them suspectible to clientelistic exchanges live in communities in which club goods distribution occurs. Indeed, there is an original relationship based on bivariate statistics

[16]For more discussion about this phenomenon in the case of Indonesia, see "The Internet, Apathism and Political Alienation, Findings from a Nationwide Survey, 19-27 June 2013," Indikator, available at: http://indikator.co.id/uploads/20130723190925.23_Juli_2013_Rilis_INDIKATOR.pdf accessed 7 May 2017.

between party identification and club goods. However, the effect of party closeness disappears when controlled by other variables (Model 3 of Table 3.3). This means that the targeted distribution of such collective patronage is more inclusive, with little apparent regard to voters' ideological proximity to political parties. Regarding political information, the bivariate model suggests a positive and significant relationship with club goods provision (see Appendix C). However, its significance diminishes when controlled for other theoretically relevant factors used in this study. Likewise, the bivariate model reveals that efficacy has a significant impact on club goods. However, the association becomes spurious when a full set of control variables is included. Similarly, if we rely on the bivariate analysis, it seems legitimate to suspect that those who have a favourable opinion of democracy are less likely to engage in club goods. However, the regression results show that this conclusion is misleading. It is therefore safe to conclude that most individual characteristics with regard to political attitudes have little effect on determining club goods provision. Instead, being ethnic Javanese, residing in a rural area and engaged in civic organisations are the most significant predictors of who gets targeted with club goods provision in Indonesia's parliamentary elections.

3.4.2. Local executive elections

Having analysed the characteristics of those voters who were most likely to attract vote buying and club goods provision in the 2014 national legislative election, we can now proceed to assess the dynamics of vote buying during local government elections. As discussed in Chapter 1, I draw from extensive local surveys conducted in 34 provinces and 513 districts or municipalities across Indonesia from 2006 to 2015. Table 3.4 presents the summary statistics for all variables and covariates used in my dataset of local elections.

In my analysis of the survey data, the dependent variable was a pair of questions relating to vote buying. The first was a single two-point item: "As an effort to win the gubernatorial/regency/mayoral election, certain candidates or campaign workers typically give money or gifts for people to influence their vote. In your opinion, can the money/gift be considered as something acceptable or unacceptable?" As presented in Chapter 2, 39.4 percent of survey respondents thought vote buying was acceptable. Among those who responded affirmatively, I provided a follow-up question: "If acceptable, how would you respond to an offer?"

Table 3.4 **Descriptive dependent variables and covariates (local election data)**

VARIABLES	MEAN	Std. Deviation	Min	Max	N
Vote buying	1.88	1.14	1	4	574,686
Party ID (general)	1.27	0.71	1	4	277,634
NasDem partisan	1	0.1	1	4	277,258
PKB partisan	1.03	0.26	1	4	277,086
PKS partisan	1.02	0.2	1	4	277,191
PDI-P partisan	1.07	0.38	1	4	276,777
Golkar partisan	1.06	0.35	1	4	276,784
Gerindra partisan	1.01	0.15	1	4	277,226
Democratic Party partisan	1.02	0.21	1	4	277,120
PAN partisan	1.02	0.19	1	4	277,187
PPP partisan	1.02	0.2	1	4	277,132
Hanura partisan	1	0.09	1	4	277,280
Religion (Islam)	0.86	0.35	0	1	725,890
Gender (male)	0.5	0.5	0	1	725,757
Age	41.03	13.85	15	105	722,851
Rural	0.59	0.49	0	1	725,880
Ethnic (Javanese)	0.41	0.49	0	1	725,890
Income	5.07	3.42	1	12	627,271
Education	4.62	2.42	1	10	719,740

It is important to emphasise once more, then, that in contrast to the survey after the 2014 legislative elections, which measured vote buying and club goods *experience*, the local elections dataset measures vote buying *acceptability* and *hypothetical action*. Thus, while they are not entirely comparable, measures of those who accept vote buying and would act on it can be seen as proxies for those likely targeted by the practice. The results drawn from the local elections dataset confirm this broad compatibility with the legislative survey data: they show that the majority of vote buying accepting respondents (65.7 percent, or 26.2 percent of total respondents) would take the money but vote according to their conscience; 20.8 percent would accept the money and vote for the giver; and 7.1 percent would vote for candidates who distributed the largest amount of cash. Only 4.2 percent of those who thought vote buying is generally acceptable would not personally accept payment for their vote.

Therefore, I merged these two questions and recoded them to scale them from 1 to 4, where 1 represented the respondents who viewed vote buying as entirely unacceptable; 2 indicated those who thought it was acceptable practice but would refuse to accept such offers; 3 was for those who saw it is acceptable and would accept a payment, but would vote for candidates based on their conscience; while 4 indicated those who looked at vote buying as acceptable, would accept a gift and vote for the buyer (this category also includes those who would vote for the candidate who offered the most

cash). Those who answered "do not know" or "refused to answer" were not included in the analysis. The dependent variable I am trying to explain in this study can be seen in Table 3.5.

Table 3.5 **Vote buying index at the local elections, 2006-2015**

Scale	Frequency	Percent
(1) Vote buying is unacceptable	350,275	61
(2) Vote buying is acceptable, but would not accept a gift	9,584	1.7
(3) Vote buying is acceptable, would accept a gift, but vote conscience	150,837	26.2
(4) Vote buying is acceptable, would accept a gift and vote for the giver	63,989	11.1
Total	574,686	100

Source: LSI, Indikator, and SMRC historical dataset on sub-national executive elections

Table 3.6 presents regression results with respect to the vote buying index at local elections, using linear regression analysis.[17] Clearly, party identification in general has a predictive value in terms of who is more accepting of vote buying in local executive elections, both in the attitudinal and behavioural dimension (Model 1 of Table 3.6). A voter's closeness to a political party increases the degree to which vote buying is reported as being acceptable by respondents, and it boosts the likelihood of them then taking the payment and repaying the buyer with their votes. However, partisanship was not the only factor that counted. It acted together with socio-economic variables such as level of income and education as well as rural residence—all factors from which modernisation theorists draw— to affect the dependent variable. Unlike the pattern we found in the national legislative elections where socio-economic factors are generally insignificant,

[17]As noted in footnote 10, using a linear regression requires the classic assumption test, particularly a normality test. Based on a statistical test, it can be concluded that the residuals are not normally distributed (see Appendix F). Thus, I had to conduct a logistic regression because this non-linear model does not require many of the key assumptions of linear regression and general linear models. In this logistic model, the dependent variable is a dichotomous measure that takes a value of 1 if the respondents stated that "vote buying is acceptable, accept the gifts, but vote conscience" or "vote buying is acceptable, accept the gifts and vote for the giver," while 0 indicates those who reported "vote buying is unacceptable" or "it is acceptable, but do not accept the gifts." Given that the logistic regression produces substantive results that are virtually similar to the linear model as shown in Appendix G, I favoured the linear regression. The rationale is simple: the results from the linear regression as presented in Table 3.6 are generally readily more interpretable than those of the logistic model. This is largely because the linear regression assumes that "the probability p is a linear function of the regressors, while the logistic model assumes that the natural log of the odds $p/(1-p)$ is a linear function of the regressors" (Hippel, 2015).

these variables interact with voter partisanship to explain who is most likely to approve of (and engage in) vote buying during local elections.[18]

The original relationships between party identification and the acceptability of vote buying remain largely unchanged when comparing the bivariate statistics with multivariate analyses. Model 1 of Table 3.6 shows that the estimate is not only positive, but its substantive effect reaches statistical significance at the 99 percent level. One might question how voters' ideological proximity to political parties influences vote buying in the election for regional heads, given that voters in such elections choose individual candidates, not parties. However, most candidates running for the local elections are nominated by broad coalitions of political parties, giving the latter an important role in the campaign.[19] Building on this, the results of this study suggest that despite the increasing personalisation of local elections, voters' partisanship still matters in determining vote buying patterns in sub-national executive contests. Apparently, candidates favour targeting loyalists of their own nominating parties, prior to expanding their electoral base. As I will discuss in Chapter 4, the logic behind this strategy is risk aversion on the part of candidates. This risk aversion makes them target their own nominating parties' bases, in the expectation that this maximises their support and increases turnout.

If party identification in general creates a social atmosphere conducive to clientelist exchange, the question arises: which specific partisanship (i.e. closeness with which particular party) is most closely associated with high levels of acceptability of vote buying? To answer this question, I recoded party identification into new variables based

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[18]To further examine the determinants of vote buying in local elections, I also present regression results using another linear model, as presented in Appendix H. The dependent variable and covariates used in the regression analyses both in Table 3.6 and the Table of Appendix H are practically indistinguishable. There is only one exception: with regard to religion, the former divides it into two broad categories: Islam and otherwise, while the latter refers specifically to the level of religiosity among Muslim respondents, as will be explored in the following pages. The main point, however, is that the two regression equations give results that are virtually identical, including with regard to the effects of party identification and modernisation theory dimensions on vote buying patterns at local elections. Concretely, those who self-identify with political parties as well as socio-economically vulnerable individuals are significantly more likely to be accepting of vote buying. Again, to be accepted as a multiple regression model assumption, I also conducted a normality test. The residuals from the linear model, as appeared in Appendix I, are not normally distributed. However, given that the substantive effects of the logistic regression are generally indistinguishable from the results of the linear model as shown in Appendix J, I therefore have confidence that the conclusion still holds: party identification and modernisation dimensions both have significant impacts on predicting vote buying patterns at local elections.

[19]Based on the Law 8/2015, candidates are required to secure support from a particular party or coalition of several parties that hold at least 20 percent of the seats in the local parliament (DPRD), or won 25 percent of valid votes cast in the previous regional legislative elections. Another pathway is independent candidacy, with nominees having to collect a large number of signatures from citizens to run. Given the logistical challenges involved in this approach, however, most nominees still choose the party option.

on partisan identities in each political party, and divided the latter into four categories. For instance, the variable of Golkar partisanship is recoded into four categories: 1 = those who do not feel close with Golkar, including those who are indifferent or opposed to the party; 2 = those who feel a little close to Golkar; 4 = those who are quite close to it; and 4 = those who are very close to it. The same was done for the other partisan variables. Models 2 through 11 of Table 3.6 present a sense of this variation. Three relationship patterns stand out. First, partisanship to most political parties has a direct, positive and substantial effect on vote buying. In particular, partisanship to NasDem, PKB, PDI-P, Golkar, Democratic Party, and PPP are statistically significant predictors of the acceptability of vote buying, implying that those who feel closer to the aforementioned parties tend to view the practice as acceptable, and to then profess they would take the money being offered and vote for the giver. Second, the effect of partisanship to both Gerindra and Hanura is small and cannot be distinguished statistically from zero. Third, both PKS and PAN partisans present a negative but statistically significant association with acceptance of vote buying, meaning that they are less likely to accept it than others.

In trying to explain the latter phenomenon, one could claim that voter affiliation to PKS and PAN makes these party loyalists less accepting of vote buying because of their socio-economic backgrounds. It has often been pointed out that the two parties have more educated and better income supporters compared to other parties (Mujani, et al., 2011). But this claim has no empirical foundation, given that the coefficients of the partisanship to PKS and PAN remain significant even when controlled for socio-economic and demographic factors, including income.

Interestingly, whatever indicators of voter partisanship are added in the equation, whether partisanship in general or specific to any particular party, Models 1 through 11 of Table 3.6 indicate that socio-economic factors are also significant. As previously, these factors are measured by three variables: level of income and education as well as socio-geographical location (i.e. rural vs urban residency). The magnitudes of the associations remain significant at the same level of strength and in the same direction. The estimate of the rural dimension is positive, meaning that non-urban dwellers tend to be more vulnerable to vote buying. Other important variables associated with key assumptions of modernisation theory are also associated with vote buying. The coefficients of income and education display the expected negative sign, and their effects on such practices are substantial and significant. Clearly, this finding is inconsistent with the results from the post-legislative election in which factors associated with modernisation theory in general does not affect the individual experiences of patronage distribution.

Table 3.6 **Linear regression analysis of the determinants of vote buying acceptability at local-elections, 2006-2015**

	MODEL 1	**MODEL 2**	**MODEL 3**	**MODEL 4**	**MODEL 5**	**MODEL 6**	**MODEL 7**	**MODEL 8**	**MODEL 9**	**MODEL 10**	**MODEL 11**
CONSTANT	2.182***(.014)	2.106***(.026)	2.153***(.017)	2.301***(.018)	2.147***(.015)	2.199***(.015)	2.210***(.020)	2.150***(.018)	2.252***(.019)	2.160***(.018)	2.267***(.029)
Party identification	.041***(.003)										
NasDem Partisan		.119***(.022)									
PKB Partisan			.074***(.010)								
PKS Partisan				-.078***(.013)							
PDI-P Partisan					.072***(.006)						
Golkar Partisan						.025***(.007)					
Gerindra Partisan							.015 (.015)				
Democratic Partisan								.075***(.012)			
PAN Partisan									-.028**(.013)		
PPP Partisan										.063***(.012)	
Hanura Partisan											-.041 (.025)
Islam	.114***(.006)	.114***(.006)	.112***(.006)	.114***(.006)	.118***(.006)	.113***(.006)	.113***(.006)	.113***(.006)	.114***(.006)	.113***(.006)	.113***(.006)
Male	-.047***(.005)	-.043***(.005)	-.044***(.005)	-.043***(.005)	-.047***(.005)	-.043***(.005)	-.043***(.005)	-.044***(.005)	-.043***(.005)	-.043***(.005)	-.043***(.005)
Age	-.003***(.000)	-.002***(.000)	-.002***(.000)	-.002***(.000)	-.002***(.000)	-.002***(.000)	-.002***(.000)	-.002***(.000)	-.002***(.000)	-.002***(.000)	-.002***(.000)
Rural	.026***(.005)	.025***(.005)	.025***(.005)	.025***(.005)	.026***(.005)	.026***(.005)	.025***(.005)	.025***(.005)	.026***(.005)	.026***(.005)	.026***(.005)
Javanese	.262***(.005)	.263***(.005)	.260***(.005)	.262***(.005)	.261***(.005)	.264***(.005)	.263***(.005)	.263***(.005)	.263***(.005)	.262***(.005)	.262***(.005)
Income	-.025***(.001)	-.026***(.001)	-.026***(.001)	-.025***(.001)	-.025***(.001)	-.026***(.001)	-.026***(.001)	-.026***(.001)	-.026***(.001)	-.025***(.001)	-.026***(.001)
Education	-.065***(.001)	-.064***(.001)	-.064***(.001)	-.064***(.001)	-.064***(.001)	-.064***(.001)	-.064***(.001)	-.064***(.001)	-.064***(.001)	-.064***(.001)	-.064***(.001)
Weighted N	**225,036**	**225,144**	**225,064**	**225,095**	**224,759**	**224,728**	**225,119**	**225,049**	**225,089**	**225,043**	**225,166**
R2	**.051**	**.050**	**.050**	**.050**	**.050**	**.050**	**.050**	**.050**	**.050**	**.050**	**.050**

Regression coefficients (b) *** standard errors in parentheses

*Sig <0.1; **Sig <0.05; ***Sig <0.01

There are two possible explanations for this incosistency. First, there are methodological differences between the datasets. Most importantly, the legislative dataset is more about capturing concrete experiences of being targeted with vote buying, while the local executive dataset is about vote buying acceptability. Though it did include a hypothetical question about action, the local election dataset asked respondents more abstract questions about vote buying. Socio-economically vulnerable individuals may have no problem accepting cash or a gift from would-be regional heads, but it does not necessarily mean that they will be the prime target of patronage distribution. Targeting largely depends on the actions of candidates and brokers, and the criteria they use when selecting targets and identifying recipients who will be more reliable at delivering votes. The legislative dataset provides evidence that target selection is more about ideological proximity of recipients than their socio-economic backgrounds.

Second, the insignificance of socio-economic factors in legislative elections may be a result of the intensity of competition in these races. As discussed in Chapter 2, in terms of the number of candidates running for office, legislative elections are much more massive and competitive given the large number of candidates running for national, provincial, and district parliaments (Mujani et al., 2011: 98). Given this highly competitive legislative election setting, candidates may be more more likely to disregard the socio-economic backgrounds of voters when engaging in vote buying.

Other commonly investigated socio-demographic variables are also positively associated with the acceptability of vote buying at the local level. Regardless of all indicators of partisanship and socio-economic factors, the Models 1 through 11 of Table 3.6 demonstrate that the coefficients of age, being Javanese and being Muslim remain significant and relatively stable. Consistent with the results from the national legislative elections, the younger an individual is, the less resistant he or she is to clientelist politics. There are at least two plausible explanations: First, statistically speaking, the majority of voters are those aged under 40, making these "younger voters" an attractive target for vote-seeking candidates. Second, those aged below 40 are often more economically vulnerable, and as shown above, lower income is associated with higher acceptability of vote buying. It is important to point out again, however, that this latter association was not found in the legislative election dataset.

Congruent with the results from the national legislative election, being Javanese stands out as a strong predictor of the acceptability of vote buying during local government elections. As discussed above, this can possibly be explained through

the logic of reciprocal obligations within the Javanese social fabric. Note that vote buying in Indonesia largely happens in settings where vote buyers do not explicitly request a quid pro quo (Aspinall et al., 2017: 3). Thus, investing in Javanese voters, who are thought of as being appreciative of implicit forms of communication and as culturally inclined towards reciprocity, might be seen as particularly rewarding. A successful Javanese candidate running in one electoral district in Central Java put it,

> We, candidates, of course, need a vote. If there is an individual willing to vote for us, we have to show our generosity and mutual understandings. To me, Javanese voters are more likely to reciprocate with their votes because, in Javanese culture, repaying others' generous acts is often encouraged. (Interview, 19 April 2014).

The last relevant demographic variable is religion. The significance of being Muslim in predicting the acceptability of vote buying in local executive elections may once again point to the clientelist potential of informal Islamic networks, as discussed earlier. In the post-national legislative election survey, the regression results based on the available data did not allow us to further examine why Muslims are more prone to experiencing vote buying. Likewise, as indicated earlier,[20] Models 1 through 11 of Table 3.6 which draw from the local election dataset also restrict our ability to analyse the reasons behind the vulnerability of Muslims to vote buying. However, Models 1 through 11 of Appendix H provide substantial variations in effects among Muslim respondents. Using the level of religiosity instead of a binary religion categorisation, I found that the less religious Muslims are, the more accepting they are of vote buying during local elections. The level of religiosity is measured by the intensity of performing congregational prayers (*sholat berjemaah*) except Friday prayers, the intensity of attending Islamic study groups (*pengajian/majelis taklim*) or religious discussions, and of attending the *tahlilan* (a collective ritual to commemorate a deceased person), *yasinan* (a religious gathering in which Muslims recite the *Yasin* verses), and *selamatan* (religious celebration).[21] The regression results show that Muslims who never or rarely attended these rituals were statistically more likely to accept vote buying than those who were more active in exercising these rituals. Of course, attendance at such religious group events can often serve as an entry point to clientelistic networks, so this finding tends to contradict the assumption that it

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[20]See footnote no. 18 about the diferrence in terms of religion and level of religiosity measures used in the linear models between Table 3.6 and Appendix H.

[21]These three items are added to constitute a four-point scale of religiosity level, from never (1) to very frequently (4).

is the social network effects of Muslim religiosity that counts for vote buying and suggesting that some other factor must be at play.

Having established the regression results with respect to vote buying at the national legislative election and local executive contests, we now need to highlight the most salient issue found as being significant in both electoral settings. The finding is clear: party identification has a strong, consistent, direct, positive and highly significant effect on an individual's propensity to receive offers of vote buying or to be accepting of the practice. This effect remains significant, regardless of socio-economic factors, civic engagement and political attitudes. The results from the post-legislative election survey and local election data are similar and reinforce each other. In other words, a voter's partisanship consistently and significantly predicts the likelihood of being offered (or being accepting of) vote buying in any election in Indonesia. Other factors stand out as well –such as being Muslim– but in the largest Muslim nation on the globe, this is not a theoretically challenging finding.

On the other hand, the finding that party loyalists are the primary targets of vote buying obviously contrasts with the swing-voter model, which proposes that parties or candidates will not waste their vote buying efforts on already locked-in partisans (see Chapter 1). As I will argue in the following chapter, the underlying logic behind candidates' decision to target loyalists is that they are safe bets, or a good return on a limited investment. By contrast, from the candidates' perspective, targeting non-partisans is a risky enterprise. Hence, investing in party loyalists is a function of candidates' attempts to manage and mitigate electoral uncertainty. A widely held view among candidates and brokers is that because electoral competition has become increasingly competitive after the introduction of the open-list PR system, and in an environment where electoral participation is optional and the ballot is secret, it is important to target 'loyal' or 'base' voters, and of course party loyalist form a large subset within this group.

3.5. Conclusion

At the beginning of this chapter, I developed a number of hypotheses on who is most likely to be targeted by vote buying efforts. These hypotheses were drawn from the main streams of the vote buying literature. Let us now review systematically whether these hypotheses hold. It is clear that factors derived from modernisation theory have

little effect in determining an individuals' propensity to experience vote buying and club goods provision in the national legislative election. One of the most common measures of modernisation theory is education. Some assume that better educated voters are less likely to engage in vote buying, partly because they understand that the practice undermines democracy, and partly because they are economically better off. But in the case of Indonesia's legislative elections, there are no significant differences by educational level in the receipt of electoral incentives. Another surprising result is the insignificance of poverty. One of the strongest findings in prior research on clientelism is that poorer voters are more susceptible to vote buying and club goods because even small transfers or club goods are valuable to them. In Indonesia's national legislative election, however, vote buying and club goods have no significant relationship with poverty. The only dimension drawn from the modernisation approach where this study found some affirmative evidence is rural residence. As noted above, this hypothesis is partially verified in the case of Indonesia. Indeed, rural settings stand out as a significant predictor of club goods provision. However, vote buying in the country's most recent parliamentary election did not differ between rural and urban regions.

Additionally, this study explored whether civic engagement can explain the likelihood of being offered vote buying and club goods in the run-up to the 2014 legislative election. This hypothesis, however, is mostly denied in the case of Indonesia. Involvement in social organisations did not make a difference in terms of whether citizens received offers of vote buying or not. With respect to club goods, it initially appeared that political machines targeted organisationally active individuals, given that the bivariate model indicated an apparently positive relationship between civic engagement and this collective form of patronage. Regression results, however, showed that this relationship was spurious and misleading, suggesting that club goods provision has little to do with civic engagement.

With respect to specific hypotheses relating to political attitudes, I expected, drawing from the swing-voter model, that party identification levels would be negatively associated with the likelihood of experiencing vote buying. In other words, I hypothesised that the more non-partisan voters were, the more likely they would be to receive vote buying offers. In the case of Indonesia, however, the opposite turns out to be true: partisan voters are proportionally more likely to receive vote buying offers than non-partisans. It must be noted, on the other hand, that partisanship fails

to predict the delivery of club goods.

In terms of political efficacy, I expected to find that feelings of political alienation increase the likelihood of exposure to clientelist exchanges (Reef and Knoke, 1999: 414). Using Indonesia's most recent legislative election, I partly verified this hypothesis; however, club goods overall have no significant relationship with political efficacy. Another element of political attitude dimension is political interest. I expected to find that the more uninterested a citizen in politics, the more vulnerable they would be to vote buying and club goods. Against expectations, instead of interest in politics predicting less exposure to vote buying and club goods, it increased it. Interest in politics significantly predicts the probability that someone would report vote buying and club goods provision. Another important political attitude is political trust. People with lower political trust are believed to be more unlikely to trust democratic institutions, and they are therefore more likely to build transactional relationships with political parties or candidates (as indicated above, this is similar to arguments surrounding efficacy, but political trust is a more abstract concept). If this claim is true, I expected to find that citizens with less trust in political institutions to be more likely to engage in vote buying and club goods provision. In the Indonesian case, this hypothesis is not falsified since the bivariate and multivariate models found no evidence; there was simply no relationship to clientelism. Further, there is also no statistically significant relationship between vote buying and electoral participation, political information, and support for democracy.

Having summarised the effects of socio-economic factors, civic engagement and political attitudes on clientelism during national legislative elections, let us now review the determinants of the acceptability (rather than experience) of vote buying during local executive government elections. Despite modernisation measures having little impact on explaining vote buying in the national legislative elections, my large dataset of local executive elections from 2006 to 2015 shows that individual-level measures drawn from modernisation theory still matter in explaining such practices in local executive elections. As discussed above, less-educated, rural residents, and socio-economically vulnerable individuals are significantly more likely to be tolerant of vote buying in such elections. However, it is worth noting that these effects of the modernisation hypothesis coexist with party identification. Taken together, the two —independent of each other— seem to be the determinants of how acceptable vote buying is to citizens during elections for local leaders.

There are two explanations for why socio-economic factors do not matter in legislative elections, but do in local executive elections. First, as I have emphasised there was a significant measurement difference: the local executive election dataset does not allow us to determine whether voters actually experienced electoral bribes since it only asked about vote buying acceptability. Socio-economically individuals or rural voters may be tolerant of vote buying at local elections, but they does not necessarily mean they experience vote buying offers. The question of whether such voters are really being targeted or not depends on what candidates and their brokers do during their clientelistic operations and the criteria they use when identifying recipients. Second, the difference may result from the differing competitiveness between the two types of elections in Indonesia. Compared to regional government head races, legislative elections in Indonesia are much more competitive, which may encourage candidates to reward party loyalists regardless of their socio-economic backgrounds.

Given the consistently strong evidence for the importance of party identification in predicting the likelihood of a voter being targeted by vote buying (in both the national parliamentary election and local executive races), the remainder of this dissertation focuses on how exactly such party-based partisanship affects electoral patronage distribution. The finding that party affiliation significantly attracts benefits raises further puzzles. First, why do parties and candidates disproportionately target party loyalists with their favours? As indicated, this finding runs counter to prior research done by advocates of the swing-voter argument, who suggest that such persons are already captive voters and will support their party no matter what. Second, if partisans are indeed the preferred vote buying target, how feasible is it for candidates to win only by targeting such voters? How many partisan voters are there, and how does their number affect further efforts to theorise vote buying patterns in Indonesia? The next chapter addresses these questions.

CHAPTER 4

DO CANDIDATES TARGET LOYALISTS OR SWING VOTERS? BEYOND THE CORE- VERSUS SWING-VOTER DEBATE

In the previous chapter, I have identified the typical characteristics of voters who were most likely to experience vote buying and club goods provision. Among a number of findings, the most consistent and intriguing was that a high level of party identification, i.e. self-reported closeness to one of Indonesia's political parties, is a significant predictor. In this chapter, I turn in more detail to the interplay between party identification and vote buying. This linkage clearly relates to the core- versus swing-voter debate that has been the primary concern of much of the comparative literature on vote buying. At the centre of this debate is one key question: given the budgetary constraints candidates face, how and, especially, to whom do they distribute gifts to optimise their electoral prospects? As I will show in the following pages, most candidates and brokers repeatedly claim that they target partisan, loyalist voters. And as indicated in the previous chapter, voters with high levels of party identification are indeed –in *relative* terms– more likely to be targets of vote buying. But as the discussion below reveals, the number of party loyalists in Indonesia is small, leading to a situation in which the vast majority of vote buying —in *absolute* terms— happens among non-partisan voters. Hence, the main task of this chapter is to unpack this complex interrelationship between party identification, broker and candidate strategies, and the observed practice of vote buying on the ground.

Given the centrality of party identification in attracting benefits, this chapter begins with descriptive data about the level of mass partisanship, its distribution across political parties and the demographic profiles of party identifiers in Indonesia. Then I consider whether the substantial effect of partisanship on vote buying reflects a case of reverse causality: Did such voters become the target of vote buying because they had professed greater ideological proximity to the party? Or, did electoral handouts come first and then predict likelihood of being close to the party? The next question I discuss is variation across parties, and whether support for any particular political party is most closely identified with vote buying and club goods provision. Next, I examine the core- versus swing-voter models, highlighting evidence from a survey of politicians and brokers as well as qualitative data that seem to point to a tendency towards core voter strategies among election practitioners. The chapter then discusses

the apparent paradox that although in *relative* terms party loyalists are more likely to be targeted, and politicians and brokers confirm that such voters are their primary targets, in *absolute* terms most vote buying occurs among non-partisans. This finding leads to further puzzles in regards to whether failed targeting took place, or whether there are other factors that can explain this pattern. The chapter, therefore, ends by setting up the key questions for the following chapters to tackle.

4.1. Political party partisanship in Indonesia

At the outset, it is essential to show the aggregate level of self-reported party identification in Indonesia based on my post-election survey of voters in April 2014. While there is much divergence of opinion on the nature and measurement of party closeness (Blais et al., 2001; Greene, 2002), this study measures the degree of partisanship regarding a political party by using the three items introduced in Chapter 3. Through the first measure, respondents were asked whether they feel close to any political party. In my post-2014 legislative election survey, only 14.9 percent (herein we round up to 15 percent) nationally reported having such closeness –a low figure by international standards (featured in vertical stripes within Figure 4.1). As discussed in Chapter 2, there were around 187 million registered domestic voters in the 2014 legislative election. Hence, the 15 percent would mean an estimated 28 million voters nationwide felt close to a party.

Figure 4.1 **Proportion of voters feeling close to a political party? (%)**



Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

For the purpose of this study, I categorised as 'non-partisan' those respondents who either gave a straight negative response or could not answer this question. Consequently, the number of non-partisans is –at 85 percent– extremely high, constituting the vast majority of the electorate, or about 159 million voters. As will be further demonstrated in Chapter 5, this pattern was confirmed in a series of nationwide surveys during the run-up to 2014 elections.

Those who answered the opening question with "yes" were requested to name the specific party they feel close to. Figure 4.2 shows that mass partisanship in Indonesia varies widely across party distribution. Of those expressing partisanship, a quarter felt some degree of attachment to PDI-P. Following PDI-P was Golkar with 21.8 percent, and then Gerindra with 13.5 percent. Thus, among those identifying partisanship, more than 60 percent of respondents felt close to one of three largest parties. At the other extreme of the spectrum, we find parties with almost no partisans: PBB (0 percent) and PKPI (0.6 percent). To some extent, the distribution of party loyalty reflects the distribution of votes in the 2014 parliamentary elections. The big three of partisan identifiers, PDI-P, Golkar, and Gerindra, were placed in the top three spots and in the same order in the election results. However, it is important to note that the vote totals for all parties were several times larger than the number of voters who expressed allegiance to those parties.

Figure 4.2 **Distribution of partisanship across political parties (%)**



Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

In the third and final measure, those who reported being close to a political party were asked to rate the strength of this affiliation on a three-point scale: "How close do you

feel toward the party?" Those who said "very close" to the party were classified as *strong partisans*. Those who replied "quite or fairly close" to the relevant party were categorised as *moderate partisans*, while those who reported "a little close" to a party were classified as *weak partisans*. Among the 15 percent of the respondents who felt close to any party, moderate partisans were the largest subgroup (58 percent), with weak partisans (23.1 percent) and strong partisans (17.4 percent) constituting much smaller segments. Note that those who reported having varying levels of closeness to a party are distributed across political parties.

Earlier works on party identification suggest that demographic variables can shape partisanship (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1969). It is therefore essential to explore the demographic features of party identifiers in Indonesia. In this study, given the limited number of voters who identify themselves with the relevant parties, I divided the classification of party identifiers into two big categories: those who display some partisanship and those who do not. Based on the bivariate test with Pearson's Chi-Square, we see very few strong relationships between demographic variables and party identification —only 2 of the 10 coefficients reach the 0.05 level of statistical significance.

The first two rows of Table 4.1 shows that these two coefficients relate to gender and socio-geographic residency. Concretely, party identifiers are more likely to be men and to live in urban areas. Popular belief holds that men in Indonesia tend to be more politically active and assertive than women, given the still patriarchal social structures in many parts of the country (Robinson, 2009; Bessell, 2005). However, previous works argued that rural dwellers seem to be more partisan (e.g. Mujani, 2007: 210), contradicting the finding in this study. Part of the explanation for this difference could be the ongoing reclassification of rural citizens as urban. The 2010 census showed that the urban population grew from 26 percent in 1970s to 49.7 percent in the last 40 years, with this increase partly due to the reclassification of once rural village areas as urban in the last census (Firman, 2012).[1] Hence, the increasingly blurred boundaries between urban and rural (especially in suburbs of larger urban centres) might have contributed to this study's identification of urban voters as being more partisan, in contrast to previous findings that rural citizens have stronger party attachments.

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[1]For a general discussion of the dynamics of urbanisation, see Tommy Firman, "Urbanisation and Urban Development Patterns", *The Jakarta Post*, 12 May 2012.

Table 4.1 **Percentage of party identification by demography and chi-square analysis**

	Base	Some Party ID	No Party ID	Chi-square: value/df/significance
GENDER				
Male	50.3	18	82	
Female	49.7	12	88	8.923/1/.003
RURAL-URBAN				
Rural	50.4	13	87	
Urban	49.6	17	83	4.297/1/.038
AGE				
<= 21 years old	4.3	10	90	
22 - 40 years old	44.7	13	87	
41 - 55 years old	34.7	17	83	
> 55 years old	16.3	17	83	3.838/3/.279
PROFESSION				
Blue Collar	70.5	15	85	
White Collar	29.5	14	86	.161/1/.688
INCOME (CATEGORY 1)				
< 800 thousands	33.5	14	86	
800 thou - 1.59 million	34.8	13	87	
>= 1.6 million	31.8	18	82	3.247/2/.197
INCOME (CATEGORY 2)				
< 1 million	42.6	15	85	
1 - < 2 million	31.0	14	86	
=> 2 million	26.4	17	83	1.700/2/.427
EDUCATION				
<= Primary School	41.4	16	84	
Junior High School	21.1	13	87	
Senior High School	26.3	14	86	
University	11.1	19	81	2.990/3/.393
ETHNIC GROUP				
Javanese	41.0	16	84	
Others	59.0	14	86	.644/1/.422
RELIGION				
Islam	89.1	15	85	
Others	10.9	17	83	.601/1/.438
REGION				
Java Island	57.9	15	85	
Others	42.1	14	86	.413/1/.520

Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

The result for age requires elaboration. Literature on party identification in established democracies suggests a strong and positive relationship between age and partisanship through both socialisation (Jennings and Niemi, 1974; Shively, 1979) and life cycle processes (Converse, 1969; Dalton and Weldon, 2007). Both models lead to a conclusion that older voters tend to be more partisan, especially in older democracies. However, these models cannot be generally applied to younger democracies as Indonesia since their citizens have not experienced democratic polities for their entire life cycles (Samuels, 2006; Mujani and Liddle, 2012; Mujani and Prasetyo, 2012).[2] Although the third row of Table 4.1 shows that there is some support for this hypothesis, suggesting older voters have a slightly higher likelihood of being partisan than younger ones, the Chi-Square analysis clearly reveals that age is unrelated with partisanship.

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[2] In his influential article "Of Time and Partisan Stability" (1969), Philip Converse argued that party identification results largely from a combination of parental socialisation and life-cycle processes. In short, following these models, older democracies exhibit higher levels of partisanship because their voters inherit what Converse (1969) coined as a "partisan push" from their parents. In contrast, voters in relatively younger democracies are assumed to have a lower level of party attachment because they lack this partisan push.

The result for education also merits further exploration. The coefficient of education even fails to reach statistical significance in the mildest sense ($p < 0.1$). Even though some authors claimed that the best informed are the most partisan (Campbell et al., 1960; Converse, 1964; Miller and Shanks 1996), I found little evidence for this hypothesis in Indonesia. The connection between education and party identification is often established as part of the rational information-seeking approach which highlights that better-informed individuals tend to have a partisan identity. The rationale is that since education is important for obtaining political information and knowledge, it is therefore central to the acquisition of partisanship. However, this is not the case in Indonesia. The insignificance of education is consistent with Samuels' (2006) findings in Brazil. Coincidentally, the two countries face similar problems in which citizens have relatively limited degrees of education and both have adopted presidentialism and an extreme multiparty system.

In terms of monthly income correlates, the Chi-Square test found that the relationship between income (defined in this study by two categories as shown in Table 4.1) and party identification is not statistically significant. It is worth noting that in many cases, distinguishing the effect of income from closely related variables such as education and occupation is extremely difficult. Given the relationship between partisanship and income and education is weak, it is therefore unsurprising that profession (divided into two categories: blue or white collar employment) is not associated with partisanship either. Ethnic, religious affiliation and regional divisions also appear entirely unrelated to partisanship. Arguably, these findings also have implications for the debate on the link between social cleavages and the existing party system. In the case of India, for example, Chhibber (2001) argued that the type of party competition shapes the politicisation of social differences. Since the decline of Indian catch-all parties in the 1990s, social divisions have become more salient and electoral competition has been highly influenced by religious and caste-based issues. In Indonesia, by contrast, most parties in Indonesia have increasingly assumed a catch-all party posture (Mietzner, 2013; Mietzner and Muhtadi, forthcoming), and this tendency discourages them to politicise any of those social cleavages.

The low scores of mass partisanship as discussed above leave a number of unanswered questions: if there are so few voters with clear and declared loyalty towards a particular party, why were candidates very keen to target such voters? In the same vein, considering the large proportion of non-partisans with a greater potential to change their voting decisions if given benefits (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit

and Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005), as thoroughly discussed in Chapter 1, why did political machines profess that these voters were secondary to their vote buying strategies? And finally, given that in total numbers more non-partisans than partisans experienced vote buying attempts, does that mean that candidates and brokers misdirected their vote buying operations? But first, I will discuss whether or not voters' partisan closeness is entirely a result of their receiving electoral rewards.

4.2. Is party identification endogenous to benefits?

The finding that party affiliation is a significant predictor of vote buying raises an important question about the potential of reverse causality. It may be argued, as Diaz-Cayeros and his collaborators (2012: 159) have done, that the linkage between partisanship and vote buying is a case of "conditional partisan loyalty," i.e. that it is strongly influenced by distribution itself. They argue that the driving factor behind politicians' tendency to funnel benefits to their own supporters is the endogeneity of partisan loyalties to material inducements (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012). Stokes and her colleagues (2013: 54) have indicated the same potential endegenous-loyalty problem, aptly summarising the problem as follows: Rather than voters' political preferences attracting handouts, these electoral incentives may cause people to identify with and support the party that gives them.

We must discuss two important caveats when dealing with the probability of an endogeneity problem (Stokes et al., 2013: 54–55). Since this study relies on survey data, the problem of reverse causality might be the result of a measurement error. To minimise this potential bias, I developed survey instruments for measuring political party partisanship based on those proposed by the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES). These measurements are plausibly proven to attract answers that are not caused by a respondent's receiving particularistic rewards. Additionally, I put the question about respondents' feelings about parties at the beginning of the relevant questionnaire section to avoid the possibility of being contaminated by later questions on whether they have received a gift or social benefits from a party or candidate. By doing so, this question order is expected to be statistically independent of respondents' potential responses that could take the rewards they receive into account. Nonetheless, this methodological survey approach does not yet fully address the probability that respondents could conceptualise party loyalty as conditional on the rewards they received, rather than fixed (Diaz-Cayeroz, et al., 2012: 23).

To test for endogeneity bias, this study presents very simple statistics. Figure 4.3 suggests that party loyalty in Indonesia is not conditional on receiving offers of vote buying. If party loyalty was endogenous to distribution of rewards, we might expect that partisan party alignment would increase parallel to the gradual intensification of vote buying as an election approaches. The tracking polls I conducted in the lead up to the 2014 elections allow us to examine whether this occured. The square dotted line traces the percentage of respondents who feel close to political parties, and the long dashed line pinpoints the percentage of respondents who experienced offers of electoral rewards. In order to detect potential reciprocal effects of vote buying transactions on a recipient's 'closeness' to the party, we need to track the two lines over time. The square dotted line shows that the percentage of people who reported being targeted with benefits started at a low point in January 2014 but increased over the course of the campaign, from 4.3 percent in January to 8.1 percent in February, 10.7 percent in March, and 25 percent in the few days leading up to the election in April.

Figure 4.3 **Party identification and vote buying approaching the 2014 election (%)**



Source: The January, February-March, and late March 2014 data were taken from my pre-election surveys, while the April 2014 numbers were drawn from my post-election survey (see Appendix A)

If the endogenous loyalty thesis were correct, party identification levels should have risen in concert with the dramatic increase of vote buying incidents in the weeks leading to the poll. However, the red line clearly indicates that partisan loyalties around the 2014 elections were relatively stable, ranging from 12.9 percent to 14.9 percent. Put simply, party identification was virtually unaffected by short-term

electoral incentives, providing evidence that the effect of voters' partisanship on their individual probability of being targeted by vote buying is not endogenous, and that a voter's party loyalties in Indonesia are not a function of his or her clientelist interactions with the party or its candidates. This finding is in line with the claims of early proponents of the concept of party identification, who defined party identification as a sense of personal, psychological attachment (Campbell et al., 1960) and viewed party idenfication as more of an identity than an opinion (Larcinese et al., 2012: 3). Partisanship, therefore, is independent of short-term factors such as vote buying.

4.3. Variations in party identification by party and type of clientelist exchange

Having ruled out the possibility of reverse causation it is now important to examine whether partisanship towards any particular political parties is most closely identified with the two main types of clientelist exchange, namely vote buying and club goods provision. Recall that a similar exercise was undertaken in Chapter 3, based on the local elections data set. But the approach here, using data from my post-election survey in April 2014, allows for a broader comparison across legislative, local and presidential elections. As in the Chapter 3 exercise, I first recoded party identification into new variables, consisting of partisan identities in each party. In every party-specific partisanship, I transformed an existing variable into four categories reflecting varying degrees of partisanship. For instance, the partisanship to NasDem variable ("Nasdem partisan") was recoded into four categories: 0 refers to respondents who did not identify with NasDem, including those who were ideologically indifferent or opposed to the party; 1 represents weak partisans; 2 points to moderate partisans; and 3 indicates strong partisans of NasDem. The same approach was used for other partisan variables in each political party. Afterwards, to measure the strength of a linear correlation between the two variables, each partisan identity was correlated with vote buying and club goods provision.

Table 4.2 shows important variations among core constituents of all parties. If we refer to the vote buying in legislative elections, partisans of the three big parties PDI-P, Gerindra and Democrats (as well as PKS) are more likely than others to be targeted for vote buying. Similarly, Golkar partisan affiliation has a markedly strong relationship with the overall vote buying index. As discussed in Chapter 2, the vote buying index is a composite statistic of vote buying in legislative elections and vote buying in presidential and local executive elections. In general, these statistical

results correspond with findings from a related but differently worded question already analysed in Chapter 2: when asked which party or candidates offered goods or money, the most frequent answer was Golkar (32.2 percent). Following Golkar are PDI-P (26.5 percent), Gerindra (25 percent) and the Democratic Party (18.4 percent).

Table 4.2 **Correlations (Pearson's *r*) between party identification and clientelist exchanges**

	Vote buying in legislative elections	Vote buying in presidential and local executive elections	Vote buying index	Club goods
NasDem partisan	-.012	-.007	-.008	-.004
PKB partisan	.046	.023	.055	.003
PKS partisan	.073*	-.037	.036	.019
PDI-P partisan	.096**	.011	.080*	.072*
Golkar partisan	.058	.037	.062*	.028
Gerindra partisan	.062*	.023	.047	.103**
Democrats partisan	.077*	.055	.083**	.063*
PAN partisan	.059	-.011	.036	.011
PPP partisan	.034	.020	.041	-.001
Hanura partisan	.025	.106***	.073*	.064*
PBB partisan	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)
PKPI partisan	.(a)	-.012	.(a)	.(a)

a) cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant (no cases).
$***p < 0.001$, $**p < 0.01$, $*p < 0.05$

Alternatively, in order to examine partisanship with which party increases the likelihood of being offered benefits, I correlate the variables of party identification with clientelist exchanges in each political constituency. I conducted such correlation because there are predictable variations in the level of party identification across political constituencies and people who voted for certain political party weren't necessarily close to that party. The results, however, are generally similar to those produced by the first technique.

Table 4.3 reveals a clear positive correlation between party identification and clientelism in some political constituencies. Party-based identification among those who voted PDI-P, Golkar, and Democratic Party in the most recent legislative election correlates with greater likelihood of engagement in vote buying, defined in this study based on a combination of responses to a battery of questions that inquired about respondents' exposure to such

practices in the legislative elections as well as national and local executive elections (see Chapter 2). As can be seen in the third column of Table 4.3, the magnitudes of the relationship are strong since their substantive effects reach the 0.05 significance, or even more. Partisan closeness among Gerindra, Democrats and Hanura voters explains the probability that respondents would report having been offered club goods. Similar (but not entirely congruent) with the first model, when we restrict our analysis only to vote buying in legislative elections, partisan attachments among those who voted for PDI-P, Golkar, PKS, Hanura and PPP (thus half of all parties in the 2014-2019 parliament) are found to be significantly correlated with vote buying.

Table 4.3 **Correlations (Pearson's *r*) between party identification and clientelist exchanges in each group of political constituencies**

	Vote buying in legislative elections	Vote buying in presidential and local executive elections	Vote buying index	Club goods
Party identification in each group of political constituencies				
NasDem	.382*	.109	.345	-.092
PKB	.162	.118	.180	.170
PKS	.339*	-.043	.257	.093
PDI-P	.253***	.089	.222**	.117
Golkar	.157*	.096	.154*	.100
Gerindra	.146	.118	.172	.298**
Democratic Party	.220	.173	.248*	.261*
PAN	.117	-.033	.072	-.065
PPP	.394**	.193	.420**	.050
Hanura	.433**	.706***	.620***	.403*
PBB	-.350	-.252	-.351	-.301
PKPI	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)	.(a)

a) cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant (no cases).
***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$

Overall, despite persons expressing party loyalty attracting benefits, we must be especially attentive to variations. Such relatively consistent findings between the two statistical techniques reinforce the notion that partisanship towards some parties does not automatically make such partisans a vote buying target. Only where a positive, direct, and significant correlation with such handouts exists can we tie particular party-based partisanship to a higher likelihood of being targeted with clientelist techniques.

4.4. Testing the models of distributive politics

4.4.1. Evidence from surveys of local politicians and brokers

In the preceding sections, I discussed survey data on the interplay between party identification and clientelism, and addressed a number of methodological problems in analysing this interplay. This has put me in a position to now further review the debate about core and swing voters against the background of findings on the influence of voters' partisan predispositions.

So far, our examination about the conflicting strategies of core or swing voter targeting has only dealt with the demand side of vote buying, namely the voters. However, the supply side is equally important: how do candidates and brokers view the core vs swing voters dilemma? In order to take additional steps to explore whether candidates and brokers target core or swing voters in Indonesia, this section primarily draws from the survey of low-level politicians and brokers in four provinces (West Sumatra, Central Java, East Java and North Sulawesi) I conducted in September and October 2014 and which was described in chapter 1 and is explained in greater detail in Appendix B. This survey asked respondents numerous direct questions about their clientelistic practices. The total sample was 1,199 respondents consisting of 300 provincial and district legislators and 900 brokers who worked for them in the 2014 elections.

Stokes and her colleagues (2013: 31) argue that, faced with limited budgets, political parties and their candidates do not waste resources on targeting core voters with material inducements, assuming that they are likely to vote for them anyway. At the same time, however, rewarding voters who are ideologically distant from or opposed to the party or candidate is also considered wasteful (Stokes, 2005). Accordingly, candidates are assumed to reach out to swing voters in the middle between these two extremes: that is, uncommitted voters who will reciprocate with votes for any kind of gift. Reflecting these dynamics, political machines usually divide locales into three categories: party base, party opponent base, and locations of swing voters. It is important to note that the distinction between "party base" and "individual candidate base" is often blurred in the Indonesian context: I return to this point in Chapter 5. It is in this context that respondents in my survey addressed the question of whether they distributed largesse in party base, swing voter or opponent base areas.

The possible overlap of party with personal networks notwithstanding, the results of the survey show that politicians and brokers claimed to have distributed more

benefits in their party base areas than in other territories (Figure 4.4). This finding is, of course, inconsistent with the expectation inherent in the swing voter hypothesis, and instead seems to confirm the notion of core voter targeting proposed by Nichter (2008) and others (Cox and McCubbins, 1986; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012; Stokes et al., 2013). I did not find considerable heterogeneity by province. Compared to their operatives or brokers (referred to as 'success teams' in the figure), candidates exhibited even greater inclinations to funnel resources to locations where their parties performed well in the past. It is worth noting, however, that in the context of an open-list system —as I will further discuss in Chapter 5— contenders win seats not only by defeating candidates from other parties. More importantly, they have to beat co-partisans from their own party –and this makes the party base a particularly contested field. Consequently, party nominees 'individualise' the party base by distributing more resources to party supporters in an effort to get maximise their individual votes from them. The implication is clear: they need to outdo their internal rivals in terms of patronage distribution.

Figure 4.4 **Party base is the preferred target (%)**[3]



The survey question used is: "During the last 2014 legislative election, how did you distribute largesse in order to get votes?" Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014.

The same trend emerged from a measure that explored the priorities of resource allocation to different broker teams. The wording of the question was as follows: "There are two different success teams working in two different areas. One area is known as party base area, while the other is known as the swing competitive area

[3]"All sample" here represents a combination of local MPs and brokers. However, as indicated earlier, the proportion of brokers surveyed is much larger than the proportion of local politicians interviewed. See Appendix B.

for political parties. Between these two success teams, which one will get more money and logistical support from the party or candidate?” Figure 4.5 below reveals that the majority of local MPs and brokers preferred to allocate more resources to campaign teams working in party strongholds than in swing areas. Again, the figure is strongly suggestive that Indonesian candidates prioritise mobilising their own party supporters: what Nichter (2010) famously called “turnout buying,” and Schaffer and Schedler (2007: 25) briefly refer to as “participation buying.”

Figure 4.5 **Party base receives more resources (%)**



Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

In order to further consolidate the finding, I inserted an additional question on this matter in my broker survey: “If you distributed envelopes/staple goods package, which type of voters did you prioritise?” Three choices were provided: (1) Voters who regularly vote for the party I support; (2) Voters who regularly vote for another party; (3) Voters whose voting behaviour cannot be determined. Over 75 percent of brokers admitted to targeting voters they thought of as being regular party supporters. Only one-fifth favoured swing voters, while only 2 percent preferred the supporters of rivals. Asked in an open-ended question to specify the main reason for prioritising such partisan, loyalist voters, the most typical response was that these voters were relatively certain targets. However, I found a significant variation to this trend in West Sumatra (as previously noted, an area of relatively low vote buying), where non-partisan voters were disproportionately targeted for vote buying. This stood in contrast to Central Java, East Java and North Sulawesi, where brokers favoured those perceived as party loyalists over ideologically indifferent voters.

For even greater confidence in the results, I also used hypothetical scenarios developed from the work of Stokes and her colleagues (2013: 68-69).[4] In these hypothetical scenarios, both candidates and brokers were asked to evaluate the effect of voter types —defined by turnout propensities and voters' ideological proximity to the party or loyalty to the candidate— on how benefits would be distributed in each situation. For the various questions, the same prompt was used: "Imagine this situation. There is a candidate who together with his success teams offered 10 social assistance packages to mobilise voters. In reality, the candidate's broker had 40 neighbours in need of social assistance." Following this, four individual questions were asked.

The first choice was between **certain core vs certain swing voters**. The former was defined as those who would always vote for and prefer the party/candidate of the broker, while the latter referred to those who were certain to vote but were indifferent towards the party or candidate.[5] The second version differentiated between **potential core vs potential swing voters.** The former category represented those who do not always vote in every election, but if they do they always vote for the party or candidate of the broker, while the latter refers to those who would not always vote, but when doing so, their choices change easily and cannot be predicted.[6] The third choice was between **certain core vs potential swing voters**.[7] The last version posited a choice between **potential core vs certain swing voters**.[8]

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[4]Despite employing the work of Stokes and her colleagues (2013), this study used a slightly different wording. In my questionnaire, I intentionally referred to the loyalty of voters not only in terms of party loyalty, but also in terms of 'loyalty' to individual candidates. This slightly differs from Stokes and her collaborators who conceptualised loyalty exclusively in terms of voters' proximity to political parties.

[5]The question was: "The neighbours are altogether 40 people who are definite voters who always vote in every election. From these 40 people, some are loyal voters who would vote for the party or candidate of the broker, and some others are swing voters. Which group will the broker direct more assistance to?" In addition to the propensity of turnout, Stokes et al (2013) use the phrase "voters who prefer the party of the broker" as an explanation to loyal voters. However, I modified the phrase with: "voters who would vote for the party or *candidate* of the broker." Hence, the assumption that underlies my study is that brokers do not only function as an agent of parties but also as an agent of individual candidates.

[6]The prompt was: "The neighbours are altogether 40 people who are potential voters who would not always vote in every election. From these 40 people, if they participate in voting, some are loyal voters and would vote for the party or candidate of the broker, and some others are swing voters. Which group will the broker direct more assistance to?"

[7]The prompt was: "From these 40 people, some are certain voters who are loyal to the success team's direction, and some are potential voters whose votes are uncertain or swinging in terms of the party or candidate they are going to vote for. Which group will the broker direct more assistance to?"

[8]The prompt was: "From these 40 people, some are potential voters, but if they participate in voting, they would vote for a party/candidate as directed by the success team. Some others are definite voters whose voting behaviours in terms of which party or candidate they vote for, are swinging."

Given the multiple questions were similar, following Stokes and her collaborators (2013: 380), I used an important statistical technique namely randomisation or rotation to help overcome the bias that can result from the order in which items are displayed. Table 4.4 shows that all versions of the question produced a similar conclusion: politicians and their brokers overwhelmingly prefer core voters over swing voters, whether potential or certain. By pooling across the four versions, 75.9 percent of surveyed candidates and brokers preferred to direct social programs to co-partisans, while only 15.5 percent favoured undecided voters. There were no substantial variations across respondents, whether they were elected candidates or brokers. Although candidates showed a slightly higher intention to target loyalists compared to their brokers, the difference was not statistically significant. Hence, the conclusion still holds that political machines prefer to target material benefits to core constituencies, even when there was a little chance that those conceived as loyalists might not participate in the polls.

Table 4.4 **Core, loyal voters vs. swing voters (ordered rotation)**

Type of Voters	Percent (%)	Standard Error	95% CI (Percent -/+ SE*1.96)	
			Lower	Upper
Certain Core Vs. Certain Swing				
Core/Loyal	76.4	2.0	72.6	80.3
Swing/Uncommitted	15.8	1.6	12.6	18.9
Potential Core Vs. Potential Swing				
Core/Loyal	77.3	2.0	73.4	81.2
Swing/Uncommitted	12.4	1.5	9.5	15.3
Certain Core Vs. Potential Swing				
Core/Loyal	78.7	1.9	75.0	82.4
Swing/Uncommitted	11.2	1.3	8.6	13.8
Potential Core Vs. Certain Swing				
Core/Loyal	68.6	2.2	64.3	72.9
Swing/Uncommitted	19.8	1.8	16.3	23.3

Note: CI = Confidence Interval; SE = Standard Error;
Those who reported "do not know" or "no answer" are not included in the analysis.
Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014.

In short, the evidence emerging from the various surveys and experiments suggests that in Indonesia, brokers and candidates tend to direct patronage distribution flows during elections towards voters with strong party-based loyalties. As I will discuss

in the following section, the logic behind this inclination to prioritise loyalists over swing voters is largely to reduce risk. Core supporters are seen as less risky, more responsive, and predictable targets, which is, at first glance, consistent with the core voter argument.

4.4.2. Reasons behind the tendency to favour core voters

4.4.2.1. Double-layered risk aversion

Having stated the favoured tendency among political actors, I now turn to delve more deeply into explanations for why candidates and brokers preferred to channel benefits to party loyalists rather than to uncommitted voters. In order to explain the logic behind their proclaimed core voter strategies, I draw from the survey of local politicians and brokers and in-depth interviews with national politicians. After posing the hypothetical questions analysed above, I asked brokers and candidates for a spontaneous response to an open-ended question explaining their choice. As in Figure 4.6, the respondents who reported expressing a strong desire to target loyalists (recall that this was the majority of politicians and brokers) did so due largely to reduce risk as core supporters are seen as less risky, more responsive and predictable.

This finding was echoed by many candidates I interviewed during my 13 months of fieldwork in Indonesia. Many stated that they were mostly concerned about the threat of opportunistic defection by voters when engaging in vote buying. In order to minimise uncertainty over whether or not the recipient would repay the supplied benefits with votes, risk-averse candidates tend to target their assumed core supporters whose support can –according to the expectations of campaign organisers– be maximised by increasing turnout. In a similar vein, facing enormous pressures from their candidate to guarantee the votes, most brokers are reluctant to put their work at risk by distributing to voters who might lack any sort of electoral commitment to the candidate. In short, the strong preference to favour core supporters reflects the search for certainty among both candidates and intermediaries. Thus, this study confirms propositions by early core-voter theorists (Cox and McCubbins, 1986: 379) who argued that political actors are inherently risk-averse and are reluctant to shower benefits on swing voters because many such voters might defect.

Figure 4.6 **Why do success team members target loyalists (left panel) or uncommitted voters (right panel)? (%)**



Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

This analysis is supported by my targeted interviews with national-level politicians. One prominent national politician from the traditionalist Muslim party PKB (National Awakening Party) which was founded by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), Indonesia's largest traditionalist Muslim organisation, admitted that most of his campaign benefits were distributed to his party's bases. He explains:

> I asked my teams to deploy more resources to traditionalist *santri* (devout Muslim) bases because they are the most reliable voters with the highest electoral potential. Those affiliated to NU, the traditionalist *santri* are my party's real constituency. … For me, targeting NU followers that are closely connected historically as well as ideologically to PKB was more appealing and much more certain (Interview, 18 April 2014).

A successful candidate from the Islamist PPP (United Development Party), employed a portfolio of strategies that maximised his electoral support by investing in the loyalty of his own party and personal supporters. Asked why he predominantly distributed campaign benefits to loyal supporters, the candidate, who was running in South Kalimantan, where Banjarese were the largest ethnic group, cited a local philosophy: "*Jangankan haruan*[9]

[9]*Haruan* is a species of snakehead fish, an indigenous freshwater fish of Banjar and a common food item among the local populace.

ganal, haruan halus haja bisa meluncat" (never mind a big fish, even a small fish can escape you). In other words, his view was that loyal supporters are like small fish, whose support is hard enough to secure, while targeting 'big fish' (in this case, swing voters) is much more difficult, needing a lot of effort and resources (Interview, 21 July 2014). Similarly, a candidate from the modernist Islam party PAN explored how potential electoral return rises with an increase in risk. Though uncommitted voters make up a much higher proportion of the electorate, he argued, they are typically associated with high levels of uncertainty. "Pursuing swing voters is not only a difficult task, but it would also mean overlooking loyal supporters as a captive (*pangsa pasar*) vote," he explained (Interview, 22 April 2014).

In many electoral territories, there are local equivalents to the Banjarese phrase cited above, and candidates often mentioned them in interviews with me. These phrases generally suggest that individuals operating under conditions of uncertainty should avoid risk,[10] with many running along the lines of "take care of your own" and "secure your possessions!" (Holder, 1975, cited in Cox and McCubbins, 1986: 383). For instance, a candidate from Hanura focused on turning out his (potential) masses in his electoral district in Central Java so his campaign largesse was not wasted (Interview, 14 May 2014). A prominent national leader of PKB, on the other hand, admitted that targeting unknown people was like making a bargain with an uncertain payoff – and costly as well (Interview, 20 April 2014). In emphasising the unreliability of such voters, many candidates characterised undecided voters as '*tidak jelas*' (uncertain) or '*tidak bisa dipegang*' (unreliable, lit. 'cannot be held'). In contrast, they perceived loyal supporters to have what Diaz-Cayeroz and his colleagues (2016: 71) called "a high level of adherence" that makes them more responsive to quid pro quo exchanges. In summary, the important driver behind candidates' preference for capturing loyalists was an operational rationalisation of their personal tendency towards risk aversion.

4.4.2.2. The moral economy of vote buying

In addition to being rationalised as the most effective and low-risk strategy, some political operators justify and explain the targeting of party loyalists as an act of gift-giving – a moral duty, even. As shown in the left panel of Figure 4.6, when asked why

[10]To mention a few: There is a Javanese proverb "*ojo mburu uceng neng kelangan deleg"* (do not chase small fish while losing more valuable goods), or the Sundanese phrase: "*moro julang ngaleupaskeun peusing"* (being tempted by other goods may cause us to overlook our belongings).

they targeted loyal voters, many of the surveyed candidates and brokers defended it as a reward, a sign of attention or reciprocal action for their supporters. In such cases, as argued by Walker (2014), vote buying is not defined in terms of economic market transactions; rather, it is a function of complex social relations entangled in a traditional moral economy of exchanging votes for gifts (Aspinall et al., 2016: 4).

In the interpretation of cash handouts or small favours to voters as a ritual gift exchange rather than as an act of blatant vote buying, the recipients do not object to the payment because it is not seen as a bribe for their votes (Walker, 2014). Instead, they might consider it as part of a moral economy closely associated with elections, or perceive it as signaling "the positive personal qualities of the giver, such as generosity, politeness, responsiveness, and respect...[that] lead citizens to believe that the candidate is good or worthy" (Schaffer and Schedler, 2007: 26). Accordingly, embedding vote buying within social norms of reciprocity helps generate a feeling of obligation on the part of beneficiaries to reciprocate with support (Schaffer 2007a: 193; Aspinall et al., 2016).

Around Asia, there are many terms to describe this phenomenon. The Indonesian trait of *hutang budi* (norm of reciprocity) is somewhat akin to *utang na loob* in the Philippines (Alejo, et al., 1996: 84) or *guanxi* (关系) in China (Wang, 2013: 4–5). In Indonesia, it is said that once a person has granted us a favour, we should do everything to pay that favour back to him/her, sometimes even at the expense of ourselves. Vote buying fits into this culture of mutual favours, in which candidates are happy to provide small gifts, and voters are happy to give their vote. Many candidates typically describe gifts as *uang saku* ('pocket money'). The standard justification is that the 'gift' is given to compensate loyal supporters for the time they lose by going to polling stations (Aspinall, et al., 2016: 11). Edi Inrizal, an anthropologist from University of Andalas, argued that Indonesians tend to favour indirect references and transactions over blunt treatments of realities. Thus, monetary exchanges need to be packaged in language of morality and generosity. In this context, he mentioned a saying, '*kanai pacak'* (splash out a little money), which is often applied to gift-giving in elections. For ordinary people, political power is often equated with big resources and money, so those running for it should distribute small amounts of money to their voters as a cultural token of gratitude (Edi Inrizal, Interview 21 September 2014).

Such practices and the beliefs that legitimate them are not only limited to voting day, however. When visiting influential religious or other local leaders during the campaign, Hanif Dhakiri from PKB, for instance, did not come empty-handed, providing them

with religiously symbolic goods such as *peci* (associated with Muslim men's hats), sarongs, or even money (Interview, 26 August 2014). Many other candidates did the same thing. They often call these gifts as '*buah tangan*' (keepsake) or '*tanda mata*' (souvenir). Despite the cost that these items incur, there is a widely held view among politicians that allocating resources to loyal supporters is not as costly as giving to undecided voters. In an attempt to show that core voters are generally the cheapest target, a PAN candidate, running in one electoral district in East Java, explained that

> Unlike swing or transactional voters, investing in loyal voters does not cost a lot. For Javanese, providing money gifts to loyalists is regarded as *bisyarah* or a sign of love. ... It is not *peningset* … something that binds. At Javanese weddings, the groom gives expensive presents to bind the bride (*peningset*). Instead of binding voters with expensive gifts or big money, *bisyarah* is simple and a cultural tradition (Interview, 22 April 2014).

Another successful candidate from the Democratic Party, who was running in an electoral district in West Java, confirmed the notion that

> *Bisyarah* parallels with cultural values. It is not only a Javanese, but an Indonesian tradition. If you are seeking people's votes, you have to have good understandings. People who are going to vote for me would be unable to work on voting day. I compensate them for that. It is not expensive, just keepsakes to 'tie' them so they do not run to cashed-up rivals. If you give your loyal supporters just IDR 10,000 each, that would be enough. Even if a competitor swamped them with big money, let's say IDR 100,000, they would still deliver their votes to us (Interview, 25 April 2014).

It is noteworthy that candidates and brokers often feel a high level of anxiety if they do not comply with the social norm of gift-giving. It has virtually become conventional wisdom among practitioners in Indonesia that voters who initially support one particular candidate but do not receive gifts can end up voting for more cashed-up rivals. This is particularly so because although voters might be party loyalists, they still have to pick between several candidates from that party (see Chapter 1). As shown in the left panel of Figure 4.6 above, 11 percent of surveyed candidates and 14 percent of brokers showered their supporters with benefits to protect their bases from other (internal) competitors. Hajriyanto Thohari from the nationalist Golkar party was told by his success team members that they needed to make cash payments in order to secure their votes a few days before the election. Hajriyanto mentioned a term being used to describe this practice: *tembakan terakhir* or 'final shot.' He said: "I rejected their suggestion. They replied that they would not be responsible if I failed to get the seat. … I did not make it, despite the fact that I had been previously elected many times in this electoral district" (Interview, 21 April 2014).

Similarly, a prominent PKB politician admitted: "I distributed patronage or money to tie them to me. … just small sums of money. … These minor gifts… ensure that the voters I had been cultivating do not switch to opponents" (Interview, 20 April 2014). As I will argue in more detail in Chapter 5, higher uncertainty as a result of the open ballot system and intense intraparty competition drives candidates to — in a term they frequently used —'tie' (*mengikat*) their loyalists with cash, so they would not turn their backs on them. These findings are somewhat similar to those of Dunning and Stokes (2007) in Mexico, where many initial supporters of the Party of the Institutionalised Revolution (PRI) finally voted for rivals because they did not get any electoral incentives. In Indonesia, however, things are even more complicated because although voters might remain loyal to a party, they still can vote for a different candidate within that party. When parties must distribute benefits to sustain partisan loyalty, Dunning and Stokes called the relevant voters' attitude 'conditional loyalty.' Overall, despite the cultural norm of gift-giving in Indonesia motivating candidates to cultivate their core supporters, the dominant discourse among candidates is that a significant proportion of their so-called loyalists would change their votes if they did not receive assistance. Again, my findings from broker and candidate survey as well as qualitative interviews support the notion that partisan, loyalist voters are widely favoured as vote buying targets among political actors.

4.4.3. Evidence from nationwide surveys

In this section, I return to analysing voter-level data in order to obtain more detailed information on who receives offers of material benefits, and when. By adding temporal dimensions these data (see Table 4.5) is again highly supportive of the party-loyalist strategy, and explains in which period party loyalists receive the most offers of benefits. Non-party identifiers were consistently less likely to be offered gifts across four surveys in 2014 leading up to the election. Using the statistical analysis approach of relative risk or risk ratio (RR), the probability of self-proclaimed partisan voters experiencing vote buying was two or three times higher than that of non-identifiers. For example, in January 2014, 9.1 percent of the respondents with partisan closeness were being offered rewards, but only 3.5 percent of those with no partisanship were targeted—a proportional difference of (9.1 – 3.5)/3.5 or around 1.55 (or 155 percent). The same also held true in late February and early of March 2014, about one and a half months before the election, with a proportional difference of 1.96 or 196 percent.

Table 4.5 **Individual vote buying by some or no partisanship (%)**

		Reported Having Been the Target of Vote Buying			
		Yes	**No**	Don't Know	Total
January 2014	Some Partisanship	9.1	90.1	0.8	100
	No Partisanship	3.5	94.3	2.1	100
	Relative Risk	2.6			
	Proportional Difference	1.55	-0.04		
February-March 2014	Some Partisanship	19.2	75.9	4.9	100
	No Partisanship	6.5	90.2	3.3	100
	Relative Risk	3.0			
	Proportional Difference	1.96	-0.16		
Late March 2014	Some Partisanship	19.9	76.8	3.3	100
	No Partisanship	9.1	86	4.8	100
	Relative Risk	2.2			
	Proportional Difference	1.18	-0.11		
April 2014	Some Partisanship	43.1	55.8	1.1	100
	No Partisanship	21.8	75.2	3.0	100
	Relative Risk	2.0			
	Proportional Difference	0.97	-0.26		

Source: The January, February-March, and late March 2014 data were taken from my pre-election surveys, while the April 2014 numbers were drawn from my post-election survey (see Appendix A)

As the election approached, the pace of vote buying accelerated as both party loyalists and uncommitted voters were increasingly targeted. In April 2014, about 25 percent of respondents were exposed such transactions. However, when restricting my analysis only to those with or without partisanship, 43.1 percent of the party identifiers were offered rewards. By now 21.8 percent of the non-identifiers had been offered rewards too, a big jump from 3.5 percent in January, 6.5 percent in late February to early March and 9.1 percent in the end of March. Once again, consider that this segment of non-identifiers constitutes 85 percent of the total electorate. Indeed, it appears that the machines were still taking care of core constituencies, with proportional differences of 1.18 (118 percent) and 0.98 (98 percent) in late March 2014 and April 2014, respectively. Relative to previous results, however, the overall percentage of investment in core voters slightly decreased, while that in non-partisan voters markedly increased. The statistical risk ratio of partisans being targeted in January and February-March 2014 was two to three times more likely than that of non-identifiers, but this probability slightly decreased to only two times in the end of March and April 2014 (Table 4.5).

From the data above, it is evident that candidates simultaneously target party loyalists and non-partisan voters, and the proportion of the latter increases as election day nears (while partisans are still clearly preferred in relative terms). However, such interpretations contradict the results from my sample survey of low-level politicians and brokers, as well as my in-depth interviews with high-level politicians. These political operators repeatedly expressed a strong preference for targeting loyalists. They believed that investment in uncommitted voters might be wasted. If they showed such strong preference to capture core supporters in their strategic thinking, why did they end up distributing so much cash and goods to so many non-partisan voters? This question is particularly relevant given that, it will be recalled, that in total numbers, non-party identifiers heavily outnumbered party identifiers, meaning that more voters without partisan attachments received offers than those with such attachments. This is the puzzle I develop in the last sections of this chapter – a puzzle that the following chapters then try to resolve.

4.5. Mixed results

The puzzle described above is further illustrated in a last presentation of survey results comparing levels of vote buying in the 2014 and 2009 elections in relation to voters' partisanship. As shown in figures 4.7 and 4.8, the incidence of vote buying increased from 2009 to 2014, but the pattern in regards to partisanship remained the same: in relative terms, partisan voters were more likely to be targeted, but in total numbers, uncommitted voters who received benefits outnumbered the core voters who did so.

Figure 4.7 **Gift receipt by partisan effect: direct vote buying (%)**



Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

If we use a purely percentage-based analysis, the analysis of the survey data, and of the Indonesian case, presented so far provides strong support for the core voter model, according to which partisan orientation increases the likelihood of a persona receiving benefits during an election. This is true for both direct (Figure 4.7) and neighborhood measures (Figure 4.8), which consistently show that if a voter identified with a party, then he or she was more likely to receive offers of vote buying than someone who was not partisan.

Figure 4.8 **Gift receipt by partisan effect: neighbourhood vote buying (%)**



Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

If we rely on the *absolute* approach, by contrast, we come to a different conclusion –one that the swing voter school of vote buying would prefer. As shown in Figure 4.7, 'only' 22 percent of non-partisans received gifts during the 2014 campaign. However, these are 22 percent of the vast majority of voters (85 percent of the total electorate). By contrast, the 43 percent of loyal, partisan voters who received gifts sounds large, but they only make up a tiny percentage of the electorate. Put in a different way, 22 percent of 85 percent is much larger than 43 percent of 15 percent. Recall that there were approximately 187 million voters in the 2014 election. This means there were almost 35 million non-partisan voters who received offers of vote buying but only 12 million partisan voters who were exposed to such exchange. The numbers also bear out that vote buying increased faster among uncommitted voters than among party loyalists. It roughly tripled in the former category, while it only approximately doubled in the latter between 2009 and 2014 (based

on the direct measure). Clearly, the voter survey data lead to differing —and, depending on the approach, even conflicting— interpretations on how to locate Indonesia in terms of the swing- versus loyalist-voter debate on vote buying targets.

4.6. Conclusion

This chapter has discussed –from a number of methodological, empirical and statistical perspectives –the effect of partisanship on vote buying. After first establishing the level of party identification in Indonesia and analysing its extent among the supporters of the various parties, I developed a socio-demographic profile of such partisans. For the purpose of this study, the finding that party identification levels in Indonesia are low is crucial –only 15 percent of the electorate feel close to a political party. That those partisans are more likely to be males and from urban areas also helps us to understand who exactly political operators are targeting. In order to avoid vulnerability to endogeneity assumptions, I further demonstrated that partisanship –as measured by my surveys— is not endogenous to electoral bribes. From this firmer methodological platform, I was able to show that there are variations in the effects of partisanship across the party spectrum, and in terms of the type of clientelistic offer (vote buying or club goods) as well. Two different statistical analyses allowed us to assess that relative to other partisanships, those who are aligned with PDI-P, Golkar and the Democratic Party (and other smaller parties depending on the measure) have a higher probability of being targeted with benefits than partisans of other parties. Roughly, the larger the party, the higher the chance a loyalist to that party has of being hit by vote buying.

But given that partisans are low in number, and non-partisans constitute the vast bulk of the electorate, how do political operators themselves explain how they direct their limited resources during campaigns? My novel dataset from low-level politicians and brokers found that they indeed professed that they targeted loyalists. This pattern was confirmed by in-depth interviews with high-level politicians. The rationales behind this preferred strategy were associated with risk aversion and the moral economy of vote buying. Yet additional individual-level data showed that while in relative terms, partisans were more likely to be targeted, in absolute terms, more swing voters received rewards. In essence, then, neither the core-voter nor the swing-voter model is fully applicable in Indonesia. Political operators claim to target loyalists, and they indeed reach a significant

number of them with their vote buying efforts. But vote buying is so extensive and the number of partisans so small, that in reality much of the cash and gifts are absorbed by swing voters. Is this the result of failed targeting on the part of the operators? Or did candidates and brokers misunderstand who exactly was a loyalist and who was a swing voter, leading them to believe they targeted the former but ultimately hit the latter? Or were other mechanisms at work? The discussion above systematically set up this puzzle, which I address in the next chapter.

CHAPTER 5

HOW TARGETING GOES ASTRAY:
EXPLAINING THE GAP BETWEEN INTENTIONS AND OUTCOMES

This chapter addresses puzzles that were identified in the previous chapter. First, if partisan voters have a higher probability of being targeted for vote buying, while mass partisanship in Indonesia is comparatively weak, how feasible is it for candidates to win only by targeting partisans? Second, how can we explain the gap between politicians' insistence that they are predominantly targeting party loyalists and the reality that so much cash and goods end up in the hands of non-partisan voters? This second puzzle raises a further question about the criteria that politicians and brokers actually use when identifying the loyal voters they wish to target.

With respect to the first of these puzzles, I argue that given partisan voters are limited in number and fought over among multiple candidates from the same party, candidates first target the party constituencies they think will be likely to support them personally. However, to clinch victory, they need to seek support beyond their own traditional party bases, and they leverage personal connections in order to do so. This, in turn, has to do with the second puzzle: given they are so dependent on personal networks, candidates and brokers misrepresent personal connections as partisan leanings. They say they are targeting partisan voters, when in reality they are targeting voters who are connected to them, or to their brokers, by personal ties. By emphasising this point, I offer a contribution to the long-standing debate between advocates of core- versus swing-voter models of vote buying by integrating analysis of the core-voter strategy with an emphasis on personal networks. I argue that candidates and brokers' targeting strategies are misdirected; they plan to target partisan voters, but in fact they distribute most benefits to voters embedded in personal networks, who they presume to be loyal (but in fact are quite often only weakly connected to them). Put simply, candidates and brokers misidentify, or even exaggerate, the number of partisan voters because they typically blur the line between partisan and personal loyalties.

This interpretation, however, leaves a question unanswered: why should candidates get it so wrong? We know from comparative literature that brokers have an incentive

to exaggerate the number of partisan, loyalist voters,[1] even to deceive their candidates on this issue, so that they can engage in predation. But candidates do not have any such incentive. In addition to the mistargeting story, this chapter accordingly argues that many of the people that are connected through personal networks are in fact not even loyal to the candidate. This is largely because candidates are targeting people through other networks in which brokers may lack close personal ties to them, leading to agency loss. Finally, I argue that much of what I observe in Indonesia is like neither the core-voter nor the swing-voter model. This is largely because literature proposing these models was developed in settings that differ significantly from Indonesia. As a result, the dynamics of vote buying, or at least the targeting of vote buying, are distinctive in Indonesia.

5.1. Contextual factors

As discussed in Chapter 1, vote buying does not occur in isolation. It is therefore important to take into account its institutional context. Our first challenge is to assess whether Indonesia's context differs from those under which the swing versus loyalist debate arose. In shining a light on context, this chapter compares Indonesia to several Latin American countries on which the literature is based, in terms of five contextual factors: (1) organisation of vote buying; (2) electoral system; (3) party base; (4) level of partisanship; and (5) voting systems.

In terms of the structure of vote buying, much of the relevant literature is produced out of Latin America, which assumes party-based voting.[2] In such cases, we should not only

[1]In this study, the word 'partisan' is sometimes used interchangeably with 'loyalist'. However, I should stress that there is still a significant difference between the two. I define the first in party terms and the second in candidate terms. However, as I will argue later, given the nature of open-list PR which incentivises personal votes, candidates will "personalise" those who are loyal to their party in the sense that they will try to convert, or combine, their support for the party into personal support for them as an individual candidates, over their co-partisan rivals.

[2]Among others, Stokes (2005) provides evidence of this from Argentina. Enforcing vote buying bargains among swing or weakly opposed voters in Argentina, she argues, requires a well-organised party structure. Contra Stokes, Nichter (2008) argues that the Peronist party's leadership and its party brokers favoured their own supporters rather than swing voters with the objective of maximising turnout (see Chapter 1). Auyero (2001) and Levitsky (2003) also worked on Argentina, but focus on how party brokers function in everyday politics in the country. Similarly, in a later work, Stokes and her colleagues (2013) found evidence of the core-voter tendency in Argentina, Venezuela, and Mexico (as well as India), while emphasising the role of political parties as the main distributor of clientelist exchange. Similarly, Diaz-Cayeros and his colleagues (2002; 2016) found that political operatives in Mexico engage in more turnout buying (targeting passive loyalists to ensure they vote) rather than vote buying (favouring swing voters to sway their vote). The rationale is to avoid envy and jealousy among core constituents who might defect if not given benefits. Gans-Morse et al. (2014) generated valuable insights into the role of political context in Argentina and Brazil in shaping vote buying. In their model, given Brazil's strictly enforced compulsory voting and low machine support, party machines predominantly targeted swing voters rather than passive supporters. The point is that this literature on organisation of vote buying in Latin American countries focuses on political parties.

expect to see a high level of partisan voting, but the party machine will obviously be at the centre of political campaigns. Indonesia is virtually the opposite. This is important because both the swing and core voter models arose in settings where party machines have the capacity to monitor recipients' votes to ensure that bargains are kept. Political parties in Argentina are bottom-heavy organisations that embed themselves socially into communities, relying on an army of brokers linked to their local party structure (Stokes, 2007: 82-83; Kramon, 2013: 11). This organisation stems largely from the capacity of parties to control the distribution of state resources, enabling them to engage in deep interactions with voters (Auyero, 2001). The same holds true in other Latin American countries such as Mexico and Venezuela (Table 5.1). The assumption that typically underlies the literature on turnout buying (e.g. Nichter, 2008; Cox and McCubbins, 1986) is that parties are the only dominant actor in delivering benefits to their supporters. Even the norms of reciprocity model of Finan and Schechter (2012) requires the existence of party operatives who can develop iterative relationships with voters and therefore channel rewards to reciprocal individuals. As Kramon (2013) pointed out, if political parties do not possess such personalised relationships with voters, vote buying is unlikely to be effective in encouraging a sense of moral obligation on the part of voters.

Table 5.1 **The different contexts of Indonesia and Latin American countries**

Countries	Party Organisation	Electoral System	Two-Dominant Party System?	Voting Legally Compulsory?
Indonesia	Weak	Open List PR	No	No
Argentina	Strong	Closed List PR	Yes	Yes
Venezuela	Strong	Plurality + Closed List PR	Yes	No
Mexico	Strong	Plurality + Closed List PR	No[3]	Yes
Brazil	Weak	Open-List PR	No	Yes

Scholars of Indonesia have come to the conclusion that most parties in Indonesia are less organised as political machines and they generally lack the capacity and organisational structure to penetrate local communities (Tomsa and Ufen, 2012; Berenschot, 2015).

[3]At national level, Mexican electoral politics have been dominated by three political parties: the National Action Party (PAN), Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Each of them enjoys a strong tradition of having partisan voters: The traditional party, PRI have strong support among low income who live in rural areas, while the conservative, right-leaning PAN largely generates votes from people with higher education and income. The resurgent-left, PRD had strong support among disenfranchised voters where their income does not match the level of education of the population, especially among urban poor and lower middle class. For more discussion about this, see Manuel Suárez and Irina Alberro (2011), "Analyzing partisanship in Central Mexico: A geographical approach," *Electoral Studies*, 136-147.

Compared to many countries in South America, the mobilisational strength of Indonesian parties is generally weak and they are hardly involved in any kind of constituency service. In the conventional literature on vote buying, constituency service plays a significant role in increasing interactions between parties and voters (e.g. Auyero, 2001; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). This is largely because, Berenschot (2015) argues, the distribution of state resources in Indonesia is largely not under the control of political parties, but instead in the bureaucracy, which has maintained significant discretionary power since the authoritarian period. As Berenschot (2015: 560) put it with regard to Latin America, "the degree of party control over the distribution of state resources seems to constitute an important contrast with Indonesia". This helps explain why most Indonesian parties are largely invisible at the grassroots and therefore lack the requisite capacity and organisational structure to engage with voters.

Put in a nutshell, the literature on the swing and core-voter models arises in a context where party machines are both active in, and capable of, mobilising voters. Accordingly, the main organisational vehicle for vote buying in Latin America is parties. In Indonesia, by contrast, parties are largely inactive and inert, and it is individual candidates who run grass-root campaigns, including clientelist mobilisations.

Another difference with a lot of the Latin American cases on which the literature is based is the electoral system. In many countries in that region, MPs are elected through closed-list proportional representation and the remainder are elected by plurality rules (Table 5.1). Under the closed-list system, candidates rely primarily on party reputation and competition primarily occurs as disputes between parties (Mainwaring, 1991). It therefore makes sense to target partisan voters and geographically discrete base areas to mobilise turnout. In this context, as Gans-Morse and his colleagues (2014: 417) put it, because parties and candidates have different electoral bases, they "do not directly compete to provide clientelist rewards to the *same* citizens" (italics in original).

Indonesia, by contrast, provides a completely different picture. Indonesia has adopted open-list elections. How does this difference make the logic of vote buying different in the Indonesian case? One obvious difference is that candidates need to rely on personal networks rather than the party. The open-list PR incentivises a personal vote and makes parties less relevant, which in turn lead elections to be more candidate-centric. Vote-seeking politicians wage highly personal campaigns, with little reference to their party platforms or policy positions (Warburton, 2016). They also build personal campaign teams, independent of party structures. An overwhelming

majority of candidates across the political spectrum, across distinct strata of legislative assemblies, rely on informal non-party organisations of brokers—known as *tim sukses* (success teams)—to mobilise voters. Since party structures are contested among other individuals in the party list, candidates cannot rely exclusively on them. This is obviously different from the context which has given rise to the dominant literature on vote buying or turnout buying in Latin American settings where political parties are well-organised and socially embedded (e.g. Stokes, 2007; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2016). While the literature conventionally assumes that brokers are "agents of a political party" (Holland and Palmer-Rubin, 2015: 1187), brokers in Indonesia are the soldiers of individual candidates. In Indonesia, candidates require their brokers to perform multiple tasks, ranging from constituency mobilisation, organising campaign rallies, distributing campaign paraphernalia, and delivering cash to voters.

Moreover, rather than winning the majority or large plurality of the votes that parties or candidates pursue in various Latin American countries, in Indonesia's open-list multi-member districts, a small proportion of the electorate can decide candidates' electoral fate. As already discussed in Chapter 1, given this system allows voters to determine which among a party's candidates are elected, it only requires candidates – provided they, their party and their fellow party candidates have collectively won enough votes to gain one seat – to win just enough voters to beat their co-partisans. The marginal value of each voter collected through vote buying strategies can be high enough to clinch victory. Nurul Arifin of Golkar colourfully talked of "the 2014 elections [being] like the civil war in Syria. Brothers are battling each other. The sword used in the battle is money to kill their own brothers" (*Merdeka.com*, 28 April 2014). She pointed her finger on the open-list PR's effect of making candidates of the same party fight each other. For Nurul, the only way to beat co-partisans is by outspending one's internal party rival in terms of distributing cash to voters; she claimed not to participate in vote buying and attributed her defeat to that fact (*Merdeka.com*, 28 April 2014).

Having discussed the first two distinguishing features of Indonesia's political environment relative to several Latin American countries, we now turn to reviewing the degree of partisan closeness in the two regions. Much of the debate on vote buying strategies has arisen in contexts where levels of voter partisanship are higher than in Indonesia. Table 5.2 compares the level of partisanship in Indonesia with other countries (excluding Western countries) that have more or less adopted the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) questions on partisanship. The most recent measure of mass partisanship in Indonesia (August 2016) is 11.4 percent, far below the average level (49 percent).

Table 5.2 **Party closeness across the world**[4]

COUNTRY	%	N	COUNTRY	%	N	COUNTRY	%	N
ASIA			Ecuador 2013	32	1,200	Benin 2012	38	1,200
Indonesia 2014	15	1,210	Nicaragua 2013	47	1,000	Cote d'Ivoire 2013	54	1,200
Vietnam 2005	81	1,200	Mexico 2013	34	1,200	Botswana 2012	63	1,200
India 2005	47	5,178	Dominican Rep 2013	59	1,000	Burkina Faso 2012	63	1,200
Thailand 2006	28	1,546	Panama 2013	43	1,000	Burundi 2012	68	1,199
Philippines 2005	42	1,200	Uruguay 2013	58	1,200	Cameroon 2013	41	1,200
Bangladesh 2005	60	3,176	Chile 2013	25	1,200	Cape Verde 2011	60	1,208
Japan 2007	75	992	Paraguay 2013	71	1,200	Egypt 2013	22	1,200
South Korea 2006	61	1,060	Honduras 2013	59	1,000	Ghana 2012	59	2,400
Taiwan 2006	61	1,587	**AFRICA**			Guinea 2013	57	1,200
Mongolia 2006	90	1,211	Uganda 2012	73	2,400	Mozambique 2012	71	2,400
Pakistan 2005	31	2,654	Tanzania 2012	84	2,400	Namibia 2012	69	1,200
AMERICAS			Zimbabwe 2012	64	2,400	Niger 2013	80	1,200
Argentina 2013	26	1,200	Zambia 2012	49	1,200	Nigeria 2012	45	2,400
Bolivia 2013	23	1,200	Kenya 2011	58	2,399	Senegal 2013	60	1,200
Colombia 2013	26	1,200	Lesotho 2012	66	1,197	Sierra Leone 2012	73	1,190
Guatemala 2013	15	1,000	Liberia 2012	68	1,199	South Africa 2011	60	2,399
Brazil 2013	18	1,204	Madagascar 2013	30	1,200	Togo 2012	34	1,200
Peru 2013	16	1,500	Malawi 2012	60	2,407	Algeria 2013	42	1,206
Venezuela 2013	58	1,200	Mali 2012	41	1,200	Tunisia 2013	30	1,200
El Salvador 2013	39	1,200	Mauritius 2012	26	1,200			
Costa Rica 2013	28	1,000	Morocco 2013	20	1,200	**AVERAGE**	**49**	

Sources: Data from South and Central American countries are taken from the Latinobarometer 2013[5], while those from African countries are provided from the Afrobarometer Round 5 2011-2012[6]. Data from some Asian countries are taken from the Asian Barometer 2 (2005-2008).[7]

In my study, the question reads: "There are people who feel closer to a certain political party and some who are not. How about you, do you feel there are any political parties who you feel closer to?" The question used in the Americas is "Is there any political party you feel closer to than others?" whereas in Africa it is: "Do you feel close to any particular political party?" The question used by the Asian Barometer is: "Among the political parties listed here, which party if any do you feel closest to?"

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[4]One important note is that partisanship in Vietnam which reached up to 84 percent clearly means something different under one-party rule than party identification in (multiparty) democracies.

[5]See http://www.latinobarometro.org/latOnline.jsp Accessed 14 May 2016.

[6]See http://afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis/analyse-online Accessed 14 May 2016.

[7]See http://www.jdsurvey.net/jds/jdsurveyAnalisis.jsp?ES_COL=101&Idioma=I&Seccion Col=06&ESID=503 Accessed 18 May 2016.

With regards to the level of mass partisanship, Indonesia is different to Venezuela, Mexico, and Argentina and others, from which comparative literature on turnout buying has been produced, where levels of partisanship are relatively high. In such cases, the prospects of victory are much better for parties that simply target their partisan supporters with material inducements. This contrasts sharply with Indonesia where voters produce low scores on party identification.[8] The country's condition of low party identification is similar to Brazil, where the recipients of largesse are predominantly swing voters (Nichter, 2010; Gans-Morse et al., 2014).

Figure 5.1 reveals the total percentage of Indonesians who reported feeling close to any party from 1999 to 2015. The percentage between July 1999 and November 2004 exceeded 50 percent, reflecting the decline of the early enthusiasm that accompanied the transition to democracy and Indonesia's first post-Suharto elections in June 1999, but there was a further sharp decline in mass partisanship from December 2004 to December 2005, with the aggregate level of partisan allegiance decreasing significantly to less than 30 percent. Data from 2006 to 2010 exhibit increasingly weak party identification, with the level of party allegiance shrinking to an average of 22.2 percent. Since 2011, the degree of partisan affiliation of the electorate has fallen below 20 percent. This low level of partisanship is not superficial but is consistent.

One contextual factor that helps explain the level of partisan loyalty is the political party system. This is another difference between Latin American cases and Indonesia. Political scientists have long argued that party identication tends to be lower in multiparty systems (e.g. Thomassen and Rosema, 2009: 50). In two-dominant party systems, it tends to be higher. Countries like Argentina, Venezuela, and, to a lesser extent, Mexico, where much of the scholarly literature has identified turnout buying strategies, have two (or three) dominant party that have decades-old historical roots. Parties have strong 'base areas' in these countries. Take, for instance, working class areas in Argentina that have been voting for Peronists for years, or the long-time rural voter base of the Party of the Institutionalized Revolution (PRI) in Mexico.

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[8]For further discussion on the aggregate level of mass partisanship in Indonesia, see Chapter 4.

Figure 5.1 **Proportion of voters stating they felt close to a party, Indonesia, 1999-2015 (%)**



Sources: May-July 1999: University of Indonesia and Ohio State University; October 2002: Centre for the Study of Islam and Society (PPIM); A series of surveys from November 2003 to March 2013 and one survey in January 2015 belong to the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI); October 2013, December 2013, End March 2014, Early June 2014, October 2015 and December 2015: Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC); Early and End of January 2014, February-March 2014, Early March 2014, April 2014, May 2014, End June 2014: Indikator Politik Indonesia.

The Indonesia case, however, is completely different. There has been a highly fragmented political party system in the country during the periods of competitive democracy (1950s and post-1998). As a result, only a few political parties in Indonesia enjoy a strong tradition of having partisan voters. PDI-P is perhaps the strongest example because there are some areas, especially in Central Java and North Sumatra, where people have been voting for the party for years, and where they can go back further and trace a history of PNI dominance in the 1950s. As thoroughly discussed in Chapter 1, PDI-P has taken root among less pious Muslims, middle-lower income groups and religious minorities. Another party that deserves to be mentioned is PKB, which has profited from close ties with the large socio-religious organisation, NU. It has consistently maintained its electoral base, especially within traditionalist communities in East Java. In general, however, most political parties in Indonesia do not have large or long-standing partisan bases.

Finally, much of this literature occurs in settings where voting is compulsory such as in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. Intuitively, compulsory voting increases the likelihood of parties targeting swing-voters with payments, while the party loyalist strategy is more likely to develop in environments where voting in elections is optional. In places where voting is compulsory, parties logically will not fear non-participation by their own supporters because they may be subject to a penalty if they do not cast their votes. In such places, uncommitted swing voters who are willing to sells their votes are also more likely to participate. Empirical evidence, however, shows mixed results. Where compulsory voting laws are weakly enforced, as in Argentina, we can see evidence of turnout buying. In contrast, strict enforcement of compulsory voting encourages machines to target swing voters in Brazil (Gans-Morse et al., 2014; Nichter, 2010). In Indonesia, voting is not compulsory. Under such circumstances, lukewarm supporters might not show up at the polls, if not given a benefit, making payments to such voters more likely. This gives rise to what Schaffer and Schedler (2007: 17–18) described as "participation buying."

Targeting party loyalists may help reduce uncertainty on the part of candidates regarding the final electoral results, as suggested in the preceding chapter. If a party loyalist bothers to turn out, the paying candidates can be reasonably sure that the voter will support them.[9] However, it does not make this uncertainty completely disappear because the voter may of course choose a different candidate from the same

[9]The rationale is simple: partisan voters are more likely to vote out of habit than non-partisans. Much of the literature on voting behaviour suggests that habit plays a key role in determining voter loyalty (e.g. Lock and Harris, 1996; Van Riet, 2010). Partisan voters are staunchly loyal to their party even when they disagree with its political stances (Glover, 2010).

party. Even if the party loyalist strategy is plausible in the context of non-compulsory voting, the emphasis on the personal vote under the open-list systems adopted by Indonesia means that candidates from the same party have to compete against each other for the support of a limited pool of partisan voters.

Overall, much of the scholarly literature analyses vote buying in the context of well-organised parties. It was also developed in a context where political parties are more prominent in organising election campaigns. Equally, the existing literature arose to describe environments where parties have some very strong 'base areas'. Indonesia, however, is different from these conditions. Vote-seeking politicians in Indonesia operate in a setting where the structure of vote buying is largely not party-based and political parties play, overall, a marginal role in election campaigns at the grassroots. The personalised nature of voting allows candidate to win only by gaining the support of a small slice of the electorate and in conditions where partisan ties are comparatively weak.

5.2. Solving the puzzles

Having explained the contextual factors that affect the strategies candidates employ, we are now in a position to review the two puzzles stated at the outset of this chapter. In this section, I start to discuss the first puzzle about the feasibility for candidates to win by targeting only partisans, given their low absolute number and the strong intraparty competition among candidates for the support of such voters.

In an attempt to answer the first puzzle, I propose an explanation for how vote buying works in Indonesia that is distinctive from the swing and core voter models. I do so by drawing on the core voter model, which emphasises turnout buying targeting party loyalists, but combine this analysis with a strong emphasis on personal networks. I argue that in Indonesia candidates and brokers actually intend to target partisan voters, but in reality they mostly distribute patronage to people who are connected to them via personal networks. I call this combination of features a 'personal loyalist strategy.' Allowing a role for partisan voters, this strategies tries to personalise such voters by making them loyal no only to the party, but also to the individual candidate within the party, as will be elaborated below.

The personal loyalist strategy, which combines targeting personalised party constituents with reliance on personal networks, is best suited to the context of an open-list PR

system like Indonesia which provides incentives to politicians to rely on personal networks rather than the party, and in settings where the loyalties involved are largely personalised. The approach is built upon three distinct but interrelated strategies that candidates typically use. First of all, when they can, candidates start by targeting areas they think of as being 'party bases' on the basis of previous election returns. They believe these areas will likely yield greatest success in terms of personal votes. But, given there are only a few party strongholds and these are typically contested among co-partisans, every candidate, starting long before the election, seeks to personalise their campaign in order to maximise their individual votes. They do so by reaching down to voters within this party base as individuals, including via party operatives whom they treat as personal clients.

Second, having realised that their party loyalists are limited in number and vulnerable to competition from internal competitors, candidates seek to expand their electoral base by using whatever personal connections they can mobilise. They start by determining their 'base' not only on the basis of previous electoral patterns, but also based on their birth place, kinship, religious or ethnic ties, as I elaborate in more detail in the next section. In addition, candidates also choose areas where they have network connections or where they have in the past provided patronage and constituency service (Aspinall et. al. 2017: 13: Dewi et al., 2016: 171). This is typically not enough, though. If they rely solely on their personal networks, candidates would fail to gain the votes they need to win. Recall that candidates running for national-level and provincial-level parliaments have to win hundreds of thousands of votes, depending on the density of the population (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016).

Finally, in order to further enhance their electoral prospects, candidates seek to reach out to a greater number of voters through personal connections mediated by non-party brokers. These brokers expand beyond the party and the candidate's personal electoral base by providing additional support on the basis of their own clientelist and other personal networks. As Aspinall and his colleagues (2017: 5) nicely put it, "brokerage networks were a method for scaling up a candidate's personal patron-client networks to encompass a greater number of voters." Therefore, I argue that what matters here is not the broker per se, but the *size* of the broker army who run vote buying efforts on the basis of their heterenegous networks. How large and strong the brokerage network a candidate has can determine whether that candidate wins more votes than his or her internal rivals.

At first sight, this personal loyalist strategy looks promising. With limited resources in hand and dealing with large constituencies, candidates strategically target only those they think will be most likely to support them personally. However, as presented in Chapter 7, most of the recipients simply take the money, but vote according to their conscience. A senior journalist in Padang, West Sumatra, cited an analogy of hiring a person to climb coconut trees. He said giving money to voters is like when a coconut picker takes the salary, but declines to pick the coconuts (Sukri Umar, Interview 23 September 2014).[10] Notwithstanding candidates' strong intentions to reward only people they think of as loyal supporters, this strategy cannot fully prevent 'leakage' or 'slippage' to people who do not repay them with support.[11] This is largely because many of those candidates depict as 'loyalists' are likely to defect, as will be explained in more detail in the following pages. The distinction between 'party base' and 'personal vote base' is thus blurred, as Aspinall and his colleagues (2017: 13) explain:

> Overall, when candidates used terms suggesting core versus swing voters, they thus typically understood such terms in personal terms, rather than in terms of voters' identification with a party or program. They were talking about a clientele rather than a party core.

This brings us back to the seemingly paradoxical finding in my voter survey described in Chapter 4: while partisan voters are more likely to be targeted than non-partisans, in fact most vote buying happens among uncommitted voters. This outcome, I argue, is a result of weaknesses of the strategy above that combines a party loyalist approach with reliance on personal networks. But why is the conceptual confusion? Why do candidates keep insisting they are targeting loyal voters, while the facts show that much of their spending is wasted on uncommitted voters who receive benefits but do not always reciprocate with their votes? Three preliminary explanations are offered at this stage: (1) candidates and brokers tend to exaggerate the number of partisan voters; (2) they exhibit confusion about the concept of 'loyalty;' and (3) agency loss occurs, contributing to a large amount of targeting of uncommitted voters.

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[10]This strategy is not only unique in the Indonesian context. Cardinal Sin, Archbishop of Manila, for instance, is widely known for his advice by giving a famous analogy: "take the bait, but not the hook" (Schaffer, 2005; Hicken et al., 2017).

[11]It is striking that candidates keep thinking of such people as their "base", while they should know that a lot of them are only weakly connected to them. As I argue in chapter 7, candidates actually understand that the targeting of vote buying is misdirected, but because their goal is only to obtain a narrow winning margin they know that the strategy is still worthwhile.

5.2.1. Exaggerating the numbers of partisan, loyalist voters

The first probable explanation for the gap is clear: Many politicians across the political spectrum exaggerate the number of partisan voters in Indonesia. Many politicians find it hard to accept the reality that relatively few voters feel close to any political party in Indonesia today. As one of the leading public commentators on Indonesian political affairs, with regular national media exposure due in part to my position with the country's pre-eminent opinion survey organisations, LSI and Indikator, many political parties frequently invite me to discuss political trends and, especially, to explain survey data. When I present on the general decline in partisanship, party leaders often admit there is such a trend, but stubbornly reject the finding that as many as nine out of ten Indonesians express say they are not close to any political party. They typically claim that the level of partisan loyalty is not that low. Politicians not only express this denial in internal and closed discussions, but also in public forums. In the lead-up to the 2014 election, I appeared on a prime-time television political program with Romahurmuziy from the Islamist party, PPP. He expressed his strong disagreement with my survey findings suggesting low scores on voters' psychological bonds with political parties. Similarly, in a confidential interview, one elected candidate from the traditionalist Islam party PKB suspected that many pollsters have consistently underestimated how many people feel close to political parties, especially his own party, by arguing:

> It is difficult to believe that people who self-describe as being PKB loyalists are much fewer than those of the PKS. My party is closely associated with the largest Islamic organisation and it can be traced back in the history of NU dominance in Java during the 1955 elections. … So weird (Interview, 12 May 2014).

The tendency to exaggerate the number of partisan voters might help increase politicians' confidence in the context of competitive elections and ameliorate their anxiety about future election results, as discussed below. However, although many politicians exaggerate the number of partisan voters, overall they typically agree that more Indonesians match the non-partisan profile than are partisans. They understand that many voters do not have partisan attachments, but insist a significant proportion of the electorate still feel close to a party.

Another powerful example of exaggeration is provided by a unique set of polling data from low-level politicians and brokers. As previously explained, in September to October 2014, I surveyed 299 candidates and 900 brokers in four provinces (Appendix

B). Figure 5.2 shows that, overall, respondents tended to overestimate the number of partisan, loyalist voters. The prompt is: "We would like to inquire further about the characteristics of voters in your area. Out of ten people in your area,[12] approximately how many people who always vote in every election and would always vote for the party/candidate[13] you support?" Hence, voter loyalty here is defined in terms of turnout propensities and partisan closeness or loyalty to the candidate as previously discussed in Chapter 4). While responses to this question were quite scattered, the modal answer —either from the surveyed candidates (featured in horizontal stripes within Figure 5.2) or brokers (highlighted in vertical stripes)— was "7 out of 10." No candidates said "none", whereas about 74 percent of candidates estimated the frequency of loyal voters in their regions at six out of ten or higher. Similarly, the overwhelming majority of brokers (74 percent) claimed that of ten people in their neighbourhoods, six to all could be categorised as certain loyal voters. Only 23 percent of brokers estimated the frequency of perceived loyalists at one to five out of ten people in their neighbourhoods. This response is, of course, a huge exaggeration, though presumably some bravado was involved.

Figure 5.2 **Political actors' perceptions of the frequency of loyal voters (%)**



The question used is "In your region, out of ten typical voters how many people would who always vote in every election and would always vote for the party/candidate you support?"

Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014.

[12]In my questionnaire, I used undefined 'wilayah' (area) which did not specifically refer to electoral district or village or neighbourhood.

[13]Having used the wording "the party/candidate," the question problematically conflated partisanship with a sense of loyalty to the candidate. Unfortunately, this part of the survey was designed before I decided to focus on the issue of partisanship in my follow-up research.

Before we move on, it is worth pausing to consider one more source of information to check whether candidates and brokers really are exaggerating the number of partisan voters (so far I have only relied on self-reported levels of partisanship in surveys). One way to think about party loyalist voters is that they are those voters who faithfully return to their party at every election. Accordingly, I provide additional data by estimating the number of partisan voters based on those who supported a party in the 2009 legislative election and voted for the same party in 2014.[14] It must be noted, however, that the number of national parties competing in these elections did not remain the same (38 parties contested in 2009 compared with 12 parties in 2014). It means my estimate is only able to measure the loyalty of voters whose parties competed in both 2009 and 2014. This calculation cannot also exclude 2014 first-time voters who were, of course, ineligible to vote in 2009.

My strategy is simple: drawing from my post-election survey in 2014 (see Appendix A), I ran cross-tabulation between those who reported their party choices in 2009 and 2014 to get the detailed percentages of party loyalists and non-loyalists in each party. As shown in Table 5.3 (look especially at the numbers without brackets), the proportion of party loyalists, by this measure, varies considerably. Only 20.7 percent of voters who supported the Democratic Party in 2009 voted for the party again in 2014. This is largely because the party's popularity dropped significantly in 2014 following a series of party corruption scandals (Aspinall, Mietzner, and Tomsa, 2015). Parties that were relatively successful at maintaining their voters' loyalty were Hanura, PDI-P, Gerindra and Golkar. Note that the sampling frame of my voter-level data is not only limited to the total number of valid votes casted in the election, but all registered voters including those who did not turn out on voting day. Accordingly, to produce an estimate of the proportion of eligible voters who are loyal to a particular party, I also convert these percentages of party loyalists and non-loyalists in each party into percentages of the fixed voter list or *Daftar Pemilih Tetap,* DPT (look for the number in brackets). I prefer to divide by the DPT, rather than by the total number of valid votes, because these data are based on the post-election survey whose target population were not only those who cast their votes on election day but also those who did not turn out.

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[14]The question reads: "Did you vote in the 2009 elections?" If the respondent responded affirmatively, we asked "Which party did you vote for?" The interviewer showed the list of political parties competing in the 2009 election. In the survey, we also asked: "Did you vote in the 2014 elections?" If yes, we asked "Which party did you vote for in the 2014 elections?" The interviewer showed the list of political parties competing in the 2014 election to the respondents.

Table 5.3 **Estimated numbers of party loyalists in Indonesia measured by voters who voted for the same party in two consecutive elections, 2009 and 2014**

	2009 Election Results (Baseline)		Having voted for the party in 2009 did you vote for it again in 2014?*	
	As percentage of Total Number of Valid Votes (%)	As percentage of Fixed Voters List (%)	**Yes**	**No**/Do not Know/No Answer
PKB	4.9	3.0	48.5 [1.5]	51.5 [1.5]
PKS	7.9	4.8	49.1 [2.4]	50.9 [2.4]
PDI-P	14	8.5	59.6 [5.1]	40.4 [3.4]
Golkar	14.4	8.8	52.6 [4.6]	47.4 [4.2]
Gerindra	4.5	2.7	53.3 [1.4]	46.7 [1.3]
Democratic Party	20.8	12.7	20.7 [2.6]	79.3 [10]
PAN	6	3.7	42.5 [1.6]	57.5 [2.1]
PPP	5.3	3.2	44.4 [1.4]	55.6 [1.8]
Hanura	3.8	2.3	69.2 [1.6]	30.8 [0.7]
PBB	1.8	1.1	8.3 [0.1]	91.7 [1.0]
PKPI	0.9	0.5	0 [0]	100 [0.5]
Others	15.6	9.5	0 [0]	100 [9.5]
Total	**100**	**60.8**	**36.6 [22.2]**	**63.4 [38.5]**

*The first figure in each of the last two columns is an estimate based on the total number of valid votes; the second number is based on the DPT.

Source: The data on those who supported a party in the 2009 legislative election and voted for the same party in 2014 are collected from my post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014, while the data on the 2009 election results are taken from the Indonesia's Electoral Commission (Komisi Pemilihan Umum, KPU).

Though using this rather weak measure of party loyalty (voting for the same party in two consecutive elections), the conclusion still holds that the number of party loyalists in Indonesia is relatively low. Only 22.2 percent of the total electorate voted in 2014 for the same party they had supported in 2009. Of votes cast, 36.6 percent were cast by people voting for the party they had supported in 2009. There is not a huge difference between these figures, especially the first one, and the number of voters who reported themselves as being close to a party (15 percent) shortly after the 2014

election is not significant, implying that the estimated proportion of party loyalists in Indonesia lay somewhere between 15 percent and 22 percent at that time. If we could compile data about voter loyalty based on those who faithfully return to their party in every election (i.e. 1999, 2004, 2009 and 2014), I suspect the percentage of party loyalists would be significantly lower than 22.2 percent. In short, a range of between 15 percent and 22 percent of party loyalists provides strong evidence that politicians and brokers make exaggerated claims about the number of such voters.

5.2.2. The amorphous concept of loyalty

A second reasonable explanation for why so much cash ends up in the hands of voters who are not especially attached to any particular party, despite strong desires of politicians and brokers to target loyal voters, is the obscurity of the concepts of voter loyalty and base areas in the Indonesian context. Though they make bold claims about how many voters are loyal, in fact many politicians and brokers use amorphous criteria in defining loyal and non-loyal voters.

Using a hypothetical scenario which is developed from Stokes and her collaborators (2013), this study asked the surveyed candidates and brokers about the effect of voter types (defined by turnout propensities, partisan affiliation and loyalty to the candidate) on attracting benefits. The sum of their responses to this question is then classified based on their political parties. Table 5.4 shows that I found surprisingly little variation across political parties in the targeting strategies. Almost all candidates from different political parties, except PKPI, said they would prioritise “loyal voters.” In fact, more than 80 percent of respondents said this in most cases.

But one interesting point is that the figure for the PDI-P is quite low, despite that party actually having a strong party base. This corresponds with the narrative from PDI-P candidates that their support base is truly loyal and solid so they do not need to seduce them with payments to attend polling places. Ahmad Basarah, a successful PDI-P candidate, for instance, claimed that he did not distribute money within his own party base and only paid for snacks, drinks and cigarettes for the many informal meetings he held with his loyalists (Interview, 21 April 2014). This claim, however, contradicts what we found from voter surveys. As discussed in Chapter 4, those who felt close to PDI-P were significantly more likely than the average voter to be exposed to vote buying.

Table 5.4 **Variations across political parties in targeting strategies**

Party Affiliations	Which group will the success team direct more assistance to?	Percent (%)	Standard Error	95% Confidence Interval	
				Lower	Upper
NasDem	Loyal voters	93.86	3.68	81.35	98.17
	Swing voters	5.16	3.41	1.37	17.61
PKB	Loyal voters	86.96	4.51	75.33	93.57
	Swing voters	12.42	4.48	5.94	24.14
PKS	Loyal voters	82.76	9.65	56.00	94.77
	Swing voters	7.63	5.50	1.76	27.63
PDI-P	Loyal voters	63.69	5.56	52.25	73.76
	Swing voters	29.28	5.24	20.12	40.49
Golkar	Loyal voters	77.13	5.92	63.58	86.70
	Swing voters	20.97	5.74	11.86	34.36
Gerindra	Loyal voters	79.30	7.46	61.08	90.34
	Swing voters	19.16	7.42	8.47	37.77
Democratic Party	Loyal voters	87.94	5.33	73.11	95.14
	Swing voters	5.18	2.90	1.69	14.82
PAN	Loyal voters	69.38	9.71	48.03	84.75
	Swing voters	21.11	8.34	9.11	41.69
PPP	Loyal voters	82.36	13.50	42.97	96.66
	Swing voters	17.04	13.51	3.05	57.29
Hanura	Loyal voters	78.91	11.81	48.15	93.78
	Swing voters	16.04	9.75	4.41	44.18
PBB	Loyal voters	92.25	6.30	67.85	98.53
	Swing voters	7.75	6.30	1.47	32.15
PKPI	Loyal voters	49.24	34.98	5.86	93.80
	Swing voters	50.76	34.98	6.20	94.14

The question used is: “Imagine this situation. There is a candidate together with his/her campaign team who offered 10 social assistance packages to mobilise voters. In reality, the candidate’s success team member had 40 neighbours in need of social assistance. According to you, which group of voters will the campaign team direct more assistance to?”

Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014.

However, the general rule remains the same: candidates and brokers tended to say they focus on mobilising their own party bases. This is particularly the case when they were asked about their strategies in the 2014 election. When we divided locales into three categories: party base, opposition base, and swing districts, their first priority was consistently to exploit the ‘party base’ (Table 5.5).

Table 5.5 **In 2014, where did you distribute largess to get votes? (%)**

	In area which always support my party (party base)	In swing area where the voting behaviour cannot be determined	In area which always support other parties (party opponent base)	Do not know/No answer
NasDem	52.54	9.60	0.20	37.66
PKB	64.63	14.54	3.42	17.41
PKS	27.23	18.24	7.97	46.56
PDI-P	39.69	24.21	3.45	32.64
Golkar	65.86	20.80	3.07	10.26
Gerindra	69.72	6.79	9.48	14.01
Democratic Party	67.19	24.78	0.04	7.99
PAN	66.04	13.84	3.48	16.64
PPP	88.13	0.83		11.04
Hanura	78.71	4.50	3.87	12.92
PBB	86.76	2.91		10.32
PKPI	49.24	49.24		1.51
Don't know	10.69			89.31

Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

As shown in Table 5.5, candidates from PKS and NasDem and their political operatives tended to be more reluctant to report their targeting strategies in 2014. The same holds true in the case of PDI-P candidates, showing that 'only' 39.69 percent of the respondents from the party's candidates and their brokers reported targeting their own base while around a third of them were unwilling to respond to the question. However, the big picture is consistent: the so-called party base is the preferred target.[15] Most politicians and their on-the-ground brokers prioritised their party bases because they thought their potential vote was higher there.

This is quite a striking result, not least because Tables 5.4 and 5.5 highlight evidence of targeting partisan voters in parties that do not really have a tradition of having partisan loyalist voters. As noted earlier, Indonesia has very few political parties which have enjoyed consistent political support across several elections. It is especially striking that candidates from NasDem claimed to be targeting their own loyal supporters, while in fact the party had just been officially launched in 2011 and was running for the first time in 2014. Hanura and Gerinda were quite similar. They competed for the first time in 2009 and their shares of the vote were quite minimal at the time. Accordingly, these three parties must have had only very small numbers of truly 'loyal' partisan voters.

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[15]Interestingly, candidates and brokers from Central Java and North Sulawesi were more likely to target party loyalists than those from West Sumatra and East Java. This is perhaps related to the evidence that partisan voters are more likely to be found in Central Java and North Sulawesi (see Chapter 4).

Note that in the lead-up to the 2014 election, partisan voters constituted only 15 percent of the total electorate (see Chapter 4). Even if we use another criterion of voter loyalty based on those who voted for the same party in 2014 and 2009, as noted above, we have only around 22 percent of the total electorate. These small numbers of party loyalists, to be sure, are highly contested, with internal party rivals competing for their support in the context of an open-list PR system which intensifies intense intraparty contests.

Table 5.6 **Candidates' position on the party list and targeting strategies (%)**

Party list	In area which always support my party (party base)	In swing area where the voting behaviour cannot be determined	In area which always support other parties (party opponent base)
1	74.63	21.95	3.43
2	87.69	6.30	6.01
3 and 4	73.48	22.89	3.63
5, 6, and 7	67.65	25.29	7.06
> 7	73.47	26.49	0.03

Chi-Square Tests			
	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	27.444[a]	8	.001

Note: The "refuse to answer" and "do not know" options were excluded from the analysis.

Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

There is a widely held assumption that candidates who are placed high on party lists tend to rely on party members in their success teams because they are usually heads of party branches or close to key party leaders. Intuitively, these candidates will also tend to target party loyalists more than they target unattached voters. Table 5.5 above confirms this practitioner's rule of thumb. The bivariate test with Pearson's Chi-Square shows that the relationship between candidates' position on the party list and targeting strategies reaches the 0.05 level of statistical significance.

5.2.3. Agency loss

In addition to the two above factors, the problem of targeting gets worse as a result of agency loss. As discussed earlier, candidates and brokers tend to inflate the number of partisan voters because they actually conflate those who are loyal to the party and those who are

perceived to be personally loyal to the candidate. However this is not the only problem. Brokers clearly have an interest to overstate their capacity to sway people to support their party/candidate. Brokers frequently try to convince their candidates they have leverage in a particular subdistrict or village, within an ethnic organisation, or inside some other social network (Warburton, 2016: 343), but in fact their claims are often baseless. That is similar to the point made by Stokes et al (2013), who argue that brokers have an incentive in exaggerating their followers in order to extract rents. They argue that party leaders tend to favour targeting swing voters, but they are unable to control their party brokers who instead direct benefits to core supporters for rent extraction purposes. Such difficulity in controlling and monitoring brokers can be a source of substantial 'leakages' which can help explaining why many supposedly 'loyal' voters targeted by machines in fact do not reciprocate with their votes: in the context of an overall turnout-buying strategy brokers might (reversing the story suggested by Stokes et al., 2013) exaggerate the number of loyal voters to ensure a greater amount of money and goods flow through their hands

But why do candidates also exaggerate? It is reasonable to assume that candidates cannot be easily fooled by their brokers. As we shall see, there is plenty of evidence that candidates do know that a lot of people who are identified through personal networks, including those who are provided by their brokers, are only weakly connected to them. They also fear that such voters are not immune to approaches by brokers for rival candidates and they generally also worry that their brokers might trick them for rent extraction purposes. Even so, vote buying remains an attractive investment for most candidates. We shall see in Chapter 7 that part of the explanation is that they still believe that there are a sufficient proportion of the electorate whose voting decisions are largely influenced by handouts, and this is more than enough to constitute narrow winning margins. Given the ballot secrecy that is strongly enforced in Indonesia (Chapter 6), many candidates, especially those who won a seat, seemed to be lenient if their brokers did not deliver all the votes they promised as long as they were successful in securing enough personal votes to win. Most candidates are still convinced that among those being targeted by their brokers, a proportion of recipients will reciprocate with votes. One prominent national politician from PKB, for instance, was quite relaxed about his broker performance. Despite handing out a large sum of money in 450,000 envelopes containing cash, he yielded 'only' around 123,000 votes and still got elected. He explained:

> There is a consensus among candidates: If you only get a third of the total envelopes you distribute, that's a good result. First, set your target. If you want to receive 100,000 votes to get elected, you must distribute envelopes tripling that. That's the rule (Interview, 20 April 2014).

Needless to say, many losing candidates still get quite upset if their brokers fall far short of their targets. Regardless of the outcome, most candidates actually realise that in the context of open-list PR systems, they rely heavily on brokers to reach out voters in search of personal votes and so “stand out in a crowded field of co-partisans” (Shugart, 2001: 183). As discussed in Chapter 6, when candidates started to exhaust the supply of partisans or those who have close personal ties to them, they often rely on their brokers to determine which voters should be targeted. These people who are selected through personal networks are loosely connected to ideological proximity to the party and may lack personal relationships with the candidate. Accordingly, the potential for leakage —defined as those who receive payment yet do not reciprocate with votes—is great. However, in a context of competitive elections like Indonesia where minor changes in voter support can make a difference to the outcome (see Chapter 7) and multiple candidates engage in vote buying, anxious candidates have little option but to rely on brokers to win the election. They need these brokers to expand their voter base.

In addition, candidates typically acknowledge that it is almost impossible to fully eliminate broker predation and to enforce voter compliance. Candidates are generally aware that to make vote buying work they need skilled and reliable brokers to distribute rewards to the voters they believe most likely to support them in return. In general terms, to do so, candidates would require a double-layered control mechanism to monitor both brokers and voters. The first layer of the mechanism aims primarily to discipline brokers in order to make vote buying more efficient and reduce incentives for broker predation. The second layer is devoted to dealing with the problem of voter compliance. In order to help detect who has kept with the bargain and enforced the deal, politicians require what Stokes (2005: 322) called “tentacle like organisational structures” Yet, in practice, most candidates in Indonesia fail to build impressive monitoring structures. As explained in Chapter 6, candidates invest little effort in disciplining brokers. Equally, brokers have weak mechanisms to monitor their voters to ensure that they vote for the candidate. Accordingly, despite such a strong desire among candidates and brokers to appeal to constituents who they think will reciprocate, they mostly end up distributing resources to uncommitted voters. As the quotation from the PKB politician above suggests, they learn to live with considerable mis-targeting and wastage.

To sum up the discussion, political machines plausibly exaggerate the proportion of loyalist voters. This is partly because the concept of loyal voters in the Indonesian context is ambiguous and obscure. When candidates and brokers routinely talk about

targeting loyalist voters they not only refer to fixed party loyalties, but also judge loyalty in terms of personal networks.[16] This confusion leads to misdirection of targeting strategies. Instead of directing campaign resources toward constituents who are truly loyal, most brokers end up being distributed to unattached voters, who do not necessarily reciprocate with support. Moreover, agency loss also produces the unreliability of voters who are identified through personal networks. These factors in combination –exaggerated claims about the number of loyalists, confusion of personal connections with loyalty, and poor voter compliance with clientelist deals– contributes to the large amount of targeting of uncommitted voters.

5.3. Dimensions of personal networks

Having understood the reasons why targeting goes astray, the subsequent question is: what sort of person does get targeted for the payments? What criteria are used in targeting those whom the candidates and brokers claim to be 'loyalists'? In seeking an answer, one quickly gets bogged down in a classic anthropological conundrum: the responses candidates and brokers provide in survey interviews may not be honest answers, or at least not responses that satisfy the observer (Eder, 1991: 153). But we can seek a satisfactory explanation from qualitative research. From my field interviews, it was obvious that when candidates claimed to be targeting 'loyalists', they typically referred to more personalised rather than strictly party-based relationships.

As discussed in an earlier section of this chapter, context really matters in explaining this ambiguity. Given the nature of the non-party organisation of vote buying in Indonesia, as noted above, candidates and brokers appear to extend the definition of loyal voters to include persons who are 'close' to them by virtue of brokerage networks, kinship and patronage loyalties and other informal connections. In interviews, candidates and brokers always talked about targeting 'loyal voters' and 'base areas,' superficially sounding as though they were concerned with partisan loyalty and past voting patterns. However, when I pushed them and asked them what their 'basis' really was, it generally turned out

[16]The point that, in practice, partisan and personal networks might be overlapping can be evident when political parties often recruit their supporters through personal or familial relationships. When a PDI-P candidate recruits a broker, this broker is likely to be from similar ideological and organisational networks as the candidate. Similarly, a PKB candidate typically mobilises brokers from the 'traditionalist' Islamic community in which the party was rooted. Then, the brokers are expected to target voters on the basis of nearness to their own personal networks. In other words, despite the salience of candidates' personal networks, to some extent, these networks should be situated within ideological, social-cultural and religious milieus linked to their parties.

to be about clientelism.[17] For example, having a strong brokerage network in a particular village makes that area part of the 'base' of that candidate (Aspinall, et al., 2017: 13). This is why, despite candidates and brokers claiming to be targeting loyal voters and base areas, they are not truly pursuing a core-voter strategy as typically understood by scholars writing on other countries. Put differently, when candidates asked their brokers to exploit 'base areas', they typically understand this phrase in personal rather than partisan terms (Aspinall et al., 2017: 13–14).

This is the main argument in the personal loyalist strategic logic I outline above. Candidates tend to be confused, and they wrongly think of personal loyalists as party partisans. The confusion over the definition of loyal voters provides suggestive evidence of the plausibility of my argument. Given the significance of personal connections in explaining targeting strategies, it is essential to better understand the various dimensions of personal networks in the Indonesian context.

One important foundation of personal networks in Indonesian electoral politics is areas where a candidate has close personal or familial connections. This typically includes the location of a candidate's birth place, or where they grew up or lived, but can include other areas where they have family or marriage ties (e.g. a spouse's home village/sub-district) (see also, Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016; Aspinall et al., 2017). When deciding on where to focus their campaign strategies, candidates generally draw in not only their immediate family, but also to the greater family by using "bilateral kinship links from both parental lines and following the various branches of the family tree as far as they went" (Sumampouw, 2016: 326). The photo below was provided by a campaign team working for Lathifah Shohib, a PKB candidate (dressed in green) who lives in Malang, East Java (Figure 5.3). She is a distant cousin of the late Abdurrahman Wahid, popularly known as 'Gus Dur,' the former president of Indonesia and the grandson of the founder of NU, KH Hasyim Asy'ari. Lathifah was a simple teacher and unable to mobilise a large campaign because of her limited finances. To attract loyalty from PKB and NU cadres, she hired a number of buses to travel to Wahid's tomb in Jombang, and asked those who accompanied her from Malang to take the *baiat* or oath of allegiance to help win her campaign. Indeed, she finally got elected. Her campaign team organiser said to me, "Aside from the living, we also make use of the dead" (Interview, Anton Miharjo, 2 May 2014).

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[17]Aspinall and his colleagues (2017) also had similar experiences when inquiring about candidates' targeting strategies. As Aspinall et al. (2017: 12) put it, most candidates claimed "they prioritized voters they considered to be their basis... believing this would yield greater return on their efforts."

Figure 5.3 **The oath of dedication to help Lathifah win, at Abdurrahman Wahid's grave (**Jombang, East Java, 12 January 2014)

Photo by Anton Miharjo

In ethnically and religiously divided areas, a personal bases and networks can be also created on the basis of primordial affiliations. Ethnic associations in North Sumatra, for instance, played an important role in mobilising electoral support for candidates. Religious networks are equally important for many candidates. Candidates from the Batak ethnic group, for example, usually take advantage of *marga* (clan) networks to reach voters from the same clan (Interview, Firman Jaya Daeli, 21 July 2014). The same holds true in the case of many parts of eastern Indonesia where *fam,* derived from the Dutch *familienaam*, and equivalent to *marga*, is used to mobilise personal loyalty for candidates who share family connections (Sumampouw, 2016: 325). Further, in North Sulawesi, Christian candidates mostly targeted the Gereja Masehi Injili di Minahasa (GMIM, Christian Evangelical Church in Minahasa), the largest Protestant denomination in the province, and built personal associations with religious networks.

Personal networks can also refer to a group of voters having been previously targeted for patronage or constituency services. Viva Yoga Mauladi, a successful candidate from PAN, for instance, targeted what he called base areas where he had distributed patronage in the past (see also, Aspinall et al., 2017). As a part of the leadership of a parliamentary commission for agriculture, plantations, forestry and maritime affairs, fisheries and food affairs, he mostly funnelled his pork-barrel projects to villages or community groups in his electoral district where he had personal or

network connections. Such practices were not limited only to incumbent candidates who could access regular slush funds allocated to their constituents, but were also practiced by non-incumbent yet well-resourced candidates who were widely known for their generosity in particular villages. Accordingly, as suggested by Aspinall and his colleagues (2017: 13), most candidates viewed loyal supporters in terms of networks rather than partisan and geographic terms. Viva Yoga, for example, who regularly distributed small-scale infrastructure to local farmer associations, plantation workers, or fishermen groups that were closely related to his portfolio, claimed that the members of the groups were his core constituencies (Interview, 22 April 2014).

Overall, the relationships between politicians, brokers, and voters have increasingly been less ideological and more about personal connections and trust. This helps explain why party switching or political turncoatism is pervasive in Indonesia, especially at the constituency level. Some district candidates in a number of regions in South Sumatra move to other parties before an election, but still get elected (Hilmin, interview, 20 November 2014).[18] It is often the case that when they switch to a new party, they bring their brokerage networks with them. Most brokers simply follow their bosses because they are strongly motivated by personal ties with, and zeal regarding, the candidate rather than party links. If such a shift occurs, the brokers ask their voters to follow as well (Hilmin, interview, 20 November 2014). This could not occur were those brokers and their followers strongly tied to their parties. As previously discussed, the nature of vote buying in Indonesia is non-party based, so that brokers' commitment to the candidate and brokers' relationships with voters is not a matter of ideological conviction about the candidate's party. Rather, it involves a clientelist relationship and personalised networks between candidates and brokers, and between brokers and voters.

5.4. Maintaining 'loyalty'

The discussion thus far has argued that personal networks matter most in explaining targeting strategies. This does not mean that candidates ignore areas which have traditionally been viewed as their party bases. As noted above, the personalised nature of voting under the open-list system encourages candidates to personalise party strongholds when pursuing personal votes against co-partisans. But in order to win they

[18]For more discussion about party switching in the case of Indonesia, see Nathan Allen, "Diversity, Patronage and Parties: Parties and Party System Change in Indonesia," PhD dissertation at The University of British Columbia (2012).

also try to expand their electoral support by targeting areas where they potentially have personal bases mediated by their brokers. In this section we will explore the next stage, which is when candidates start building intimate social relations with their so-called loyal supporters, trying to lock in their relationship through the provision benefits.

Hence, in order to build and maintain voter loyalty, patronage plays a crucial role as political glue that links voters to candidates and secures their votes. In fact, given the significance of patronage in binding voter loyalty, it is sometimes difficult to disentangle patronage from other dimensions of personal networks when explaining electoral outcomes (Warburton, 2016: 351). Figure 5.4 reveals that the surveyed candidates and brokers believed that 51 percent of their supposedly loyal voters had received "a lot" or "quite a lot" of assistance, including money or gifts or construction of roads, houses of worship, insurance, and the like, from the candidate. Meanwhile, only 21 percent believed their "loyalists" had not received any inducements. This distribution of material benefits not only occurred during campaigns; most incumbent candidates pour rewards into their voter bases long before the election.[19] Most candidates I encountered used a variety of terms for this practice, such as '*menyantuni*' or '*melayani*' (serve or provide services).[20] A commonly shared view among candidates is that they distributed largesse to their constituents because these were the masses of whom they were sure, rather than being indifferent groups whose voting behaviour could not be determined (see Chapter 4).

Figure 5.4 **How many loyal voters have received assistance? (%)**



Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

[19]Such ongoing relationships that involve reiterated exchanges largely happen among serious candidates —especially incumbents who had been cultivating their constituents long before the election. Many candidates —especially first-timers, however, have no opportunity to build ongoing relationships with voters partly because of their limited access to state patronage.

[20]Also, see Eve Warburton on the case in Southeast Sulawesi (2016: 358–359).

By targeting voters whom they suspected to be leaning to them, candidates could minimise potential wastage of their resources. Although targeting such voters would not guarantee that such offers would always be reciprocated, at least candidates would feel more confident that their investments would be translated into more votes than if they distributed to those outside their personal networks of relationships. For instance, one campaign manager, affiliated with a Jakarta-based political consultancy firm, gave me an image of a truck filled with Muslim prayer clothing transported to a group of voters in one district in East Java, because they had committed to support a candidate he was working for (Interview, 2 May 2014). In sum, candidates and brokers preferentially target those who they think will be loyal and reward them with benefits.

But how sure were the candidates and brokers of the loyalty of these allegedly loyal voters? Figure 5.5 suggests that they actually believed the so-called 'loyal' voters also operated according to a 'transactional' logic and were concerned about concrete benefits and immediate rewards. The modal answer to the question about the percentage of 'loyal' voters who would change their vote if they stopped receiving campaign largesse was "quite a lot," while about 40 percent of the sample saying "a lot" or "not a lot." It is especially striking that —in the respondents' view— only 12 percent of respondents believed that all of their "loyal" voters would remain loyal and would be willing to turn out to vote for them, even if they did not receive any benefit.

Figure 5.5 **Loyalists who would change their vote if they stopped receiving assistance (%)**



Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

Again, contextual factors really matter in explaining this finding. In particular, Indonesia's highly competitive electoral settings drives candidates to ensure that voters they cultivate will not betray them and switch to cashed-up rivals. The majority of political actors surveyed thought that a significant fraction of their so-called loyal supporters would change their loyalties if not given benefits. As I will discuss in Chapter 7, the high degree of uncertainty induced by zero-sum competition inside party lists encourages candidates to be more responsive to voter demands (Hobolt and Klemmensen, 2008). My finding confirms ethnographic work by Aspinall and his colleagues (2017) who found deep anxiety among politicians regarding their chances of winning and widespread doubt about the allegiance of perceived loyalists who were not given payments. This is particularly the case when multiple candidates engage in vote buying and they need to make cash payments—borrowing the words of a Golkar's candidate—"to secure" (*mengamankan*) their voter base (Interview, 21 April 2014).

This finding might raise doubts about causation. Do candidate consider these people to be loyal voters merely because they have received benefits from them? Or, does their loyalty come first, but need to be 'locked in' by gifts? Although the answer may not be quite clear-cut, I would argue that, at first, candidates map out areas or groups of voters whom they think of as sympathetic, or of having the potential to support them, either on the basis of personal relationships, social networks, or past personal patronage. My field observations suggest that candidates then do not take the loyalty of such perceived supporters for granted, with the exception of those who have relational networks or a high degree of personal closeness to the candidates. Instead they use material benefits to lock in their 'loyalty'. The result is that it seems that a lot of what candidates and brokers mean by their 'loyal' voters is simply people or community groups they have provided with benefits. However, as suggested by Aristo Munandar, a Golkar candidate running for a provincial seat legislature in West Sumatra, these benefits do not always come from candidates' own purse, but they can be accessed from state resources. Aristo was proud to claim that, when he was the head of Agam district, he frequently made visits to his constituents, providing them benefits from state funds, often in the form of projects that allowed him to generate loyalty among recipients (Interview, 23 September 2014). Incumbent candidates often rely on public resources and direct them to their base areas as a means of building and maintaining voter loyalty. Then, it is almost as if there is an underlying cultural assumption: "I have helped you, so I can expect your help in return."

The next interesting question is this: if the loyalty of the core supporters depends so much on benefits being offered, what sort of language accompanies such transactions? In most cases, candidates draw upon the language of gift-giving, labelling their gifts in religious terminology such as alms (*sedekah*), or other forms of charitable donations in Islam when attempting to engage the support of their constituents (see also, Muhajir, 2016). At the point of exchange with all groups of the electorate, whether loyal or undecided voters, as observed closely by Aspinall and his collaborators (2017: 5) in Java, "candidates and brokers downplayed the significance of their cash gifts and emphasised their emotional bonds with recipients, in line with what we might expect from the anthropological literature."

However, I found a slight difference during my observations. When dealing especially with so-called uncommitted voters, whom political machines usually called the 'floating masses' (*massa mengambang*), candidates frequently used economic terms such as 'electoral investment,' 'electoral market price,' and so on. Needless to say, these conversations about the transactional character of floating masses take place behind the backs of the voters. To be fair, the negative characterisation is not exclusively directed at such voters, suggesting that supposedly loyal voters are occasionally associated with a transnational logic too, if not secured with a gift. But candidates and brokers appeared to be more lenient or benevolent if the payments were directed to the so-called loyalists rather than uncommitted voters.

This qualitative finding corresponds with the results from my broker survey. As shown in Figure 5.6, when asked what motivated candidates to engage in vote buying,[21] while responses were quite scattered, a significant proportion of the sample said "as a form of kickback to voters" (39 percent) and "as compensation in lieu of wages lost because the voter had to leave work to come to the polls" (38 percent). About 26 percent of the respondents viewed the offer as "a sign of gratitude or reciprocation from candidates." Interestingly, when I ran cross-tabulation tables, brokers who targeted undecided voters were more likely to consider the gifts as "a form of kickback to voters." In contrast, those brokers who were targeting loyal supporters were more likely to view the payment "in lieu of income lost because voters had to leave work," or "as a sign of gratitude from the candidate," or "as a sign that the candidate is socially minded." There are indications that intermediaries can tolerate such compensation for 'loyal' voters partly because they view such voters as being more reciprocal than undecided voters. Regardless of the fact that

[21]The question reads: "According to you, what is the motivation of the candidate who distributed the envelope/money/goods to the voters prior to the election?" [answer can be more than one].

some perceived loyalists can end up voting for rivals, they were seen to be more reliable in delivering support to the distributing candidate.

Figure 5.6 **Payments as a binding transaction or gift?**



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

Having presented the results of my study, one might question the meaning of the very concept of 'loyal voters' in the Indonesian context. If these voters are truly loyal, as claimed by candidates and brokers, why do they need to be given rewards at all? If they are genuine loyalists, they should turn out of their own accord and vote for their own party or candidate without being enticed with a benefit (Stokes et al., 2013: 111). This widely held assumption, however, is not supported by the facts in the Indonesian case. As alluded to earlier, detailed studies of grassroots electioneering for the 2014 elections by Aspinall and his colleagues (2017: 2), for example, capture candidates' "deep anxiety about the reliability of even supposedly loyal voters, suggesting that their votes were vulnerable if not secured with a payment." In short, the loyalty of the so-called loyal voters cannot be taken for granted since their allegiance to the candidate tends to be affected by short-term electoral incentives.

It is worth noting that my finding in Indonesia differs from those in the study of Diaz-Cayeros and his colleagues (2012) in the case of Mexico. They found that political parties favoured their partisan voters as an artefact of endogenous party loyalty. Diaz-Cayeros et al. (2012: 23) argue that "if swing voters are constantly targeted with benefits, core voters will no longer tolerate it, and will soon become open to mobilisation by other political parties, behaving much like swing voters in future elections." In their theoretical framework, party loyalty is conditional, or endogenous, rather than fixed. The Indonesian case is different. The driving factor behind candidates' insistence on giving cash to their

'loyal' supporters is suspicion of the allegiance of their perceived loyalists in the context of increasing electoral uncertainty induced by intense intraparty competition. In addition, as noted above, voter loyalty in Indonesia is not framed in terms of partisan convictions, as the literature (including Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012) conventionally assumes. Given that beneficiaries are in practice largely selected in terms of personal network relationships, we witnessed why the targeting of so much vote buying ends up in the hands of undecided voters who do not always reciprocate with votes.

5.5. Conclusion

So, how do politicians in Indonesia determine which voters to target? When it comes to the targeting strategies, the existing literature offers two conflicting schools. As we have seen, one school of thought holds that in terms of distributing cash payments, political machines favour their core supporters over ideologically indifferent voters (e.g. Nichter, 2008; Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012; Stokes, et al., 2013). Another school claims that parties will not squander their limited budgets on core supporters, but instead expend them on swing voters in an attempt to convince them to support the giver (e.g. Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005).

At first, my findings seem to show that candidates and intermediaries tend to target constituents who they think of as being truly loyal, strongly evocative of core-voter strategy. Moreover, the logic of various elements of Indonesia's institutional framework, such as optional voting, open-list PR, and ballot secrecy, provides strong incentives for political machines to favor party loyalists because such voters are thought of as being more reciprocal, and as a more predictable source of votes. Yet, theoretically, the model is built on the assumption that voters can be categorised 'loyalist' as long as they are proximate to a party in ideological or partisan terms (Stokes et al, 2013: 45). However, the number of partisan voters is limited in Indonesia and this small segment of voters is highly contested among co-partisans in the context of open-list PR which incentivises zero-sum, intraparty competition.

If candidates and broker really favour only their loyal party supporters, as sometimes seems suggested by how they describe their strategies, how could they expect to win given the limited number of such voters? In an attempt to address this puzzle, this chapter offers an alternative explanation to the literature by highlighting the importance of personal networks in explaining clientelist strategies in Indonesia. My argument works for a context where partisan ties are relatively weak, where the electoral system is candidate-

centric, where the organisation of vote buying is not party-based, and where personalised loyalties matter far more. Given the party's captives are both limited and contested among internal rivals, candidates skilfully use their personal networks as the major tool of voter mobilisation. These personal networks have multiple dimensions ranging from kinship, ethnic and religious ties, to patronage to brokerage networks. In short, the empirical evidence paints a picture largely consistent with the personal loyalist (i.e. people who were selected through personal networks) strategy I highlight.

The reliance on such networks, however, makes the personal loyalist strategy vulnerable to the problems of targeting and principal-agent breakdown that arise in the relations between candidates, brokers and voters. In particular, this chapter has identified a pattern in the allocation of vote buying where, despite politicians' and brokers' strongly expressed prefererence for targeting loyalists, they end up distributing to voters who are in fact not loyal to the candidates. I have discussed three major difficulties associated with the personal loyalist strategy: First, candidates and brokers misidentify the number of loyal voters, because they tend to mix up partisan and personal loyalties. Second, the loyalty concept in Indonesia is ambiguous and has multiple dimensions relying on a more personalised rather than strictly party-based relationships. Unsurprisingly, when it comes to determining who gets targeted for vote buying, candidates depend on personal networks rather than judging their targets in terms of partisan and ideological leanings. Third, agency loss also explains why the targeting of vote buying ends up with voters who do not reciprocate. Candidates obviously know that brokers have an interest in exaggerating their influence. They are also aware that voters whom brokers classify as loyal are often typically contested by brokers working for rival candidates, and often receive multiple payments. Even so, precisely because political actors are not really confident about the 'loyalty' of their so-called loyal voters, they typically fear many such voters will not vote for them unless they receive gifts.

In conclusion, the targeting strategy in Indonesia must be seen as a distinctive type that functions like neither the core-voter nor the swing-voter model. Much of the literature on core- and swing-voter models is framed by a context different from that in Indonesia. The existing literature relies on the underlying assumption that party machines are both engaged with voters and capable of mobilising them. This sort of analysis does not fit the Indonesian context, where elections have been largely driven by candidate-centred politics in which a lot of the connections with voters are not mediated by parties, but instead by informal brokerage networks. The differences in context make the dynamics of vote buying, at least the targeting, very distinctive.

CHAPTER 6

VOTE BROKERAGE, PERSONAL NETWORKS, AND AGENCY LOSS

In the previous chapter, I showed that the targeting strategy used by Indonesian legislative candidates that combines the party loyalist strategy and personal networks makes vote buying tremendously inefficient. Candidates and brokers plan to target party loyalists, but in reality most vote buying happens among uncommitted voters. In this chapter, I argue that such vote buying efforts not only suffer from inefficiency of delivery, but are also undermined by a substantial amount of 'leakage', given the intrinsic principal-agent problems that arise in the relations between candidates and brokers. I show that most candidates lack mechanisms to systematically monitor or discipline their brokers, making vote buying attempts vulnerable to broker predation. I also provide empirical evidence of rent-seeking behaviours by brokers, drawing on a unique survey of brokers.

But if vote brokerage is subject to rent-extraction, this does not mean that all brokers are equally untrustworthy and unreliable. The available body of research on electoral clientelism in Indonesia clearly demonstrates that vote brokerage —which relies on personal networks— remains critical to electoral success, given brokers' significance in expanding candidates' electoral base and distributing material inducements. Overall, I argue that despite the inherent weaknesses of vote buying using personal networks, these networks really matter in shaping how vote buying works, which brokers are recruited, and how targeting occurs. This chapter accordingly aims to explore brokerage networks —who the brokers are, and what drives them to join a candidate's success team. It also discusses the logistics of vote buying, such as how candidates recruit and monitor brokers, and how brokers determine what, when, and how much money to give. It seeks to answer these and related questions through an examination of my field research findings and data produced by my broker and candidate surveys, as well as voter surveys from Indonesia's most recent elections.

6.1. How many brokers are there in Indonesia?

My unique survey of a probability sample of vote brokers provides information about the estimated population of brokers in West Sumatra, East Java, Central Java and North Sulawesi. As I explain in Chapter 1, the selection of these four provinces was primarily guided by the fit of cases with the statistical findings of large-scale surveys in 66 out

of 77 electoral districts across Indonesia. I then selected these four provinces to reflect variations in levels of mass partisanship and vote buying across Indonesia.

Table 6.1 **Demographic profile of four provinces**

Province	Life Expectancy (years)	Literacy (percent)	Average years of school completed	Adjusted per-capita expenditure (in thousands of rupiah)	Human Development Index
Central Java	70.8	91.6	7.7	644.2	73.3
East Java	68.8	90	7.7	643.7	71.9
North Sulawesi	71.7	99.4	8.7	631.2	75.4
West Sumatra	69.2	97.7	8.8	635	73.9
INDONESIA	**68.9**	**92.3**	**8**	**630.3**	**71.7**

- Source: http://data.go.id/dataset/ipm-dan-komponennya-per-kabupaten
- Note: All data from 2012

Table 6.1 illustrates that relative to other provinces, Central Java is slightly wealthier and has slightly better life expectancy and human development scores than the average, but in terms of literacy rates and number of school years completed it is below the national average. In East Java, the patterns are broadly similar to Central Java, with the exception that in terms of life expectancy, East Java is marginally behind the national average. Although much of North Sulawesi and West Sumatra do relatively well in terms of life expectancy, literacy, number of school years completed and human development scores, both score badly on average monthly per-capita expenditure. In socio-cultural and political terms, Central Java is widely known as the secular PDI-P's primary stronghold with a mixed population of *abangan*, socio-economically lower-class nominal Muslims, as well as more pious *santri* Muslims with traditionalist Islamic backgrounds (Geertz, 1960). While East Java is a centre of NU-style traditional Islam, it is also has a large concentration of *abangan* in the southern part of the province. West Sumatra is the home of Islamic modernists, who adhere to orthodox Islam while accepting modern ideas, and it provides the strongest support outside Java to the biggest modernist organisation, Muhammadiyah. North Sulawesi is predominantly Protestant with a sizeable Catholic minority and is recognised as a stronghold of both PDI-P and Golkar. In terms of political alignments, by contrast, East Java and West Sumatra are categorised as 'swing' regions with no single party dominating.

As already explained in Chapter 1, my research began with a face-to-face survey of a probability sample of 300 elected candidates for provincial and regent/district DPRD electoral districts in four provinces. Then, for every randomly selected DPRD member, three of their brokers who helped them during the 2014 election were also randomly

selected, making about 900 brokers in total interviewed. The population of brokers in each region was, of course, unknown because brokerage teams are informal and unregistered. To determine the broker population, I made an estimate based on the average number of brokers mentioned by local MP respondents. Hence, the sample in four provinces in total reached 1,200 respondents consisting of 100 Provincial DPRD members, 300 brokers of Provincial DPRD candidates, 200 Regent/City DPRD candidates, and 600 brokers of Regent/City DPRD candidates. I personally administered these unique surveys of elected candidates and brokers from September to November 2014 (for more information about these surveys, see Appendix B). To my knowledge, mine is the largest and most detailed survey of candidates and brokers undertaken to date anywhere in clientelism research.[1]

Table 6.2 **The average number of brokers per candidate**

PROVINCE	DPRD I	DPRD II
West Sumatra	44.3	22.8
Central Java	416.5	126.5
East Java	339.3	195.3
North Sulawesi	426.7	97.7

Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

Table 6.2 presents the survey results, showing the average number of brokers by province. There is considerable variation. In each province, the average number of brokers for provincial legislature (DPRD I) candidates is greater than the average number for district legislature (DPRD II) candidates. This gap is largely because the electoral districts at the provincial level are larger, and their populations are greater, which in turn necessitates a larger number of brokers. It is important to note that in Java the boundaries of the national and provincial electoral districts coincide (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016: 15). Broker armies in Central Java and East Java were both large, and vote buying strategies were extensively pursued in both provinces. This finding contrasts with the normal expectation. Previous works argued that the greater the size of the electoral constituency, the lower the likelihood of clientelist strategies being pursued (Stokes, 2007; Hicken, 2007a). However, my survey findings pointing to large brokerage networks in Central and East Java correspond with general findings from my pre-election surveys in all electoral districts of these two provinces, which suggest that voters in these provinces were more likely to view vote buying as a normal practice (see Chapter 1).

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[1]For comparison, Stokes and her collaborators conducted a 2009 survey of about 800 councillors and non-elected brokers in four Argentine regions—the provinces of Cordoba, Misiones, and San Luis, and the Greater Buenos Aires (see Stokes et al., 2013; see also, Appendix B).

Consistent with prior expectations, the brokerage networks in West Sumatra were much simpler relative to other regions. Instead of utilising large networks of brokers for grassroot campaigning, most elected candidates in the province instead drew on traditional leadership structures, known locally as '*tungku tigo sajarangan*' (the three stoves at the hearth) that comprises three pillars: *adat* or clan elders (*ninik-mamak*), religious leaders (*alim-ulama*) and *cadiak pandai* (enlightened intellectuals). Where they could, candidates approached and recruited these people into their personal teams (Edi Inrizal, Interview, 21 September 2014). This qualitative evidence parallels my voter survey results in West Sumatra, indicating that the level of vote buying in the province was much lower than in other regions in Indonesia, presumably largely because candidates were instead relying partly on the informal influence exercised by these community leaders.

To estimate the broker population, the average number of brokers per legislator is multiplied by the total number of legislative seats in the province concerned. For example, Table 6.3 shows that the average number of brokers for each provincial legislator in West Sumatra was 44.3 people. I then multiplied these with the total seats so the estimated broker population in the province was 2,880. In four provinces, it is estimated that there were around 97,657 brokers working for successful provincial legislative candidates in the 2014 elections, and 576,922 brokers for successful candidates in district legislatures. Note that this is only a calculation that includes the successful candidates. Brokers who worked for candidates who did not get elected are not included. Hence, in fact, the total number of brokers must have been much higher.

Table 6.3 **Estimated broker population in four provinces**

Province	DPRD I		DPRD II		Total
	Legislators	Brokers	Legislators	Brokers	
West Sumatra	65	2,880	575	13,118	16,638
Central Java	100	41,647	1,570	198,622	241,940
East Java	100	33,927	1,675	327,098	362,801
North Sulawesi	45	19,203	390	38,084	57,721
Total	310	97,657	4,210	576,922	679,099

Source: My survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

For the sample to be representative, I then weighted the data using the following formula:

$$W_{ijk} = \frac{N_{ijk}}{N} \Big/$$

In which:

W_{ijk} = Weighting variable for provincial data i, DPRD level j, broker category k
N_{ijk} = Population amount for province i, DPRD level j, broker category k
N_{ijk} = Sample amount for province i, DPRD level j, broker category k
N = Total population
n = Total sample
i = West Sumatra, Central Java, East Java, North Sulawesi
j = DPRD I, DPRD II
k = Legislators, brokers

To determine statistical significance, a standard error value is needed. In this study, the standard error is calculated by assuming stratified random sampling: population grouped by province, office level (i.e. DPRD I and DPRD II), and respondent category (i.e. candidates and brokers), then the sample in each stratum is selected by simple random sampling. However, the standard error of these surveys could have been larger than estimated. This is largely because, in practice, the sampling is conducted with a more complex procedure. All these sampling and statistical procedures are described further in Appendix B. Based on the available data, it can be concluded that the total number of brokers working for successful provincial and district legislative candidates in four provinces in 2014 was quite large (674,579 people). In most recent legislative election, there were 62,994,652 registered voters in these provinces. Hence, a broker-to-voting-eligible-population ratio in the four provinces was around 1 broker to 93 voters. Of course, if we include those who worked in other provinces, including those who helped unsuccessful candidates, the estimate would have been much bigger.

6.2. Who are the brokers?

My survey of a probability sample of brokers offers insight into the characteristics of brokers. In terms of gender composition, Table 6.4 clearly shows that political brokerage is a male-dominated field. Most of the brokers interviewed in four provinces are male, with higher percentages in Central Java and East Java at 92.7 percent and 91.4 percent respectively. The majority of the surveyed brokers were aged between 41 years and 55 years. The average age of brokers was 44 years (the youngest broker was 17 and the oldest 76). Candidates presumably tended to recruit middle-aged men

because the middle-age period is associated with the greatest independence, esteem, prestige and social involvement; therefore, these brokers can demand respect from both the young and the elderly in the community (Martel, 1968: 56)—a necessary condition of successful brokerage activity. The majority of the interviewed brokers (77.6 percent) were Javanese due to the fact that one-half of the survey interviews were conducted in East Java and Central Java. Brokers were mostly Muslim (91 percent), with only 9 percent of the respondents being Christian.

How do the findings place brokers with respect to the general population? To provide an apple-to-apple comparison, I use voter survey data only from East Java, Central Java, West Sumatra and North Sulawesi. In order to increase the sample size, I utilise three nationally representative voter surveys that were held simultaneously just before the broker survey was conducted (September-October, 2014). In terms of socio-economic status (SES factors), my survey results reveal that, compared with voters in four provinces, brokers tended to be more educated and slightly wealthier. Table 6.4 also shows that most voters were employed in blue-collar jobs (82 percent) such as farmers, fishermen, small street-stall sellers and so on, compared with 63.8 percent of the sampled brokers whose jobs can be grouped as blue-collar employment. In terms of monthly earnings, surveyed brokers were not as a group poor by Indonesian standards, though they were also not wealthy. The modal respondent earned between IDR. 1 million and less than IDR. 2 million per month (38.4 percent), though 36.6 percent of brokers said their monthly income was more than IDR. 2 million per month. In contrast, almost half of the voters reported monthly earnings of below IDR. 1 million. Brokers were also more educated than the general population. The modal respondent in my brokers' survey was a senior high school graduate (45.8 percent), though 19.9 percent of brokers said they were college graduates. Almost half of the sampled voters had a maximum of primary education or no education at all.

When asked whether politics was the brokers' main source of income, almost all respondents (99 percent) said that politics was not their main profession. The largest main occupation mentioned was farmer/animal breeder/fisherman (26 percent), followed by private employee/self-employed and blue-collar worker/maid with 10 percent and 9 percent respectively. A significant number of brokers described themselves as entrepreneurs/businessmen (8 percent), street-stall sellers (7 percent) and teachers/lecturers (5 percent). Some brokers derived income from automotive services (4 percent) and wholesale trade (3 percent), were retirees (3 percent) or village bureaucrats (2 percent). The remaining brokers were professionals (lawyers/doctors/etc.), drivers, security personnel, freelancers, or civil servants (PNS).

Table 6.4 **Demographics of brokers compared with general population (%)**

	Elected Candidates	Brokers					General Voters					Sig.
		All	West Sumatra	Central Java	East Java	North Sulawesi	All	West Sumatra	Central Java	East Java	North Sulawesi	All
GENDER												
Male	84.9	91.4	86.2	92.7	91.5	87.1	50	50	50	50	50	0.000
Female	15.1	8.6	13.8	7.3	8.5	12.9	50	50	50	50	50	
AGE												
<=25 years old	1	2	7.1	2.4	0.9	5.9	12	10.1	12.7	11.4	13.3	0.000
26-40 years old	32.3	34.5	39.3	27.6	38.6	38.2	34.2	40.4	34.9	32.2	46.7	
41-55 years old	58.2	51.7	42.9	54.2	51.7	43.1	34.9	33.7	33.2	36.9	26.7	
> 55 years old	8.6	11.7	10.7	15.9	8.8	12.7	19	15.7	19.2	19.4	13.3	
EDUCATION												
<=Primary School	0	16.7	14.3	21.2	14.6	10.9	47.7	21.3	50	48.7	47.5	0.000
Junior High School	0.7	17.7	17.9	13.9	20.3	16.8	18.1	15.7	18.1	18.4	15	
Senior High School	20.3	45.8	53.6	46.7	43.4	54.5	25.3	43.8	22.9	25.1	32.5	
University	79	19.9	14.3	18.2	21.6	17.8	8.9	19.1	9	7.8	5	
INCOME												
< IDR 1 million	0.2	25	7.4	20.8	29.8	17.8	46.9	27.8	43	53.6	27.5	0.000
IDR 1 - <2 million	0	38.4	37	40.8	37.4	34.7	29.3	36.7	34.3	23.6	37.5	
IDR >=2 million	99.8	36.6	55.6	38.4	32.8	47.5	23.8	35.6	22.7	22.8	35	
OCCUPATION												
Blue Collar	20.9	63.8	70	69	60.4	62	82	66.7	81.7	83	100	0.000
White Collar	79.1	36.2	30	31	39.6	38	18	33.3	18.3	17	0	

Source: Voter survey data are taken from three nationally representative voter surveys: (1) by Indikator conducted 18-23 June, 2014; (2) by SMRC conducted 2-9 June, 2014; and (3) by SMRC administered 20-24 July 2014. The number of samples in the Indikator June survey, the SMRC June and SMRC July surveys analysed from four provinces (West Sumatra, East Java, Central Java and North Sulawesi) used in this study was 420, 780, and 400 respondents, respectively. Meanwhile, candidate and broker data are taken from my survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014.

Continued: Demographics of brokers compared with general population (%)

	Elected Candidates	Brokers					General Voters					Sig.
		All	West Sumatra	Central Java	East Java	North Sulawesi	All	West Sumatra	Central Java	East Java	North Sulawesi	All
ETHNIC GROUP												
Javanese	70	77.7	7.1	99.1	78.6	1	77.4	11.1	96.6	71.7	2.5	0.000
Sundanese	0	0.3	-	0.9	-	-	1.1	2.2	1.9	0.3	-	
Malay	0.1	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	1.1	-	0.1	-	
Madurese	6.3	11.4	-	-	21.4	-	11.3	-	0.1	23.2	-	
Bugis	0	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Betawi	0	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	-	-	
Batak	0.4	-	-	-	-	-	0.3	3.3	0.3	-	-	
Minang	12.2	2	82.1	-	-	-	4.6	82.2	-	-	-	
Cirebon	0	-	-	-	-	-	0.6	-	0.4	0.9	-	
Chinese	0.6	-	-	-	-	-	0.8	-	0.6	0.9	2.5	
Minahasa	5.1	3.8	-	-	-	45.5	0.9	-	-	-	37.5	
B. Mongondow	2.1	1.4	-	-	-	17.2	0.6	-	-	-	25	
Talaud	0	0.1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	
Sangihe	0.8	1.6	-	-	-	19.2	-	-	-	-	-	
Others	2.7	1.6	-	-	-	16.2	2.2	-	-	2.9	32.5	
RELIGION												
Islam	85.9	91	100	94.1	97.8	33.7	96.4	96.7	97.3	97.8	52.5	0.000
Protestant	9	7	-	1.9	1.9	61.4	1.7	1.1	1.3	0.9	25	
Catholic	4.9	2	-	4	0.3	4	1.4	2.2	1	0.5	22.5	
Hindu	0	-	-	-	-	-	0.4	-	0.3	0.5	-	
Buddha	0.2	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	-	0.1	-	
Confucius	0	-	-	-	-	-	0.1	-	0.1	0.1	-	

Source: Voter survey data are taken from three nationally representative voter surveys; (1) by Indikator conducted 18-23 June, 2014; (2) by SMRC conducted 2-9 June, 2014; and (3) by SMRC administered 20-24 July 2014. The number of samples in the Indikator June survey, the SMRC June and SMRC July surveys analysed from four provinces (West Sumatra, East Java, Central Java and North Sulawesi) used in this study was 420, 780, and 400 respondents, respectively. Meanwhile, candidate and broker data are taken from my survey of low-level politicians and brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014.

Clearly, most of the surveyed brokers were not full-time professional brokers; instead, brokerage was simply a temporary or part-time job at election time. This finding contrasts sharply with Zaragaza's description (2014) of everyday political mediation in Argentina, which indicates that brokers perform a wide range of roles to help their party, including performing constituency service and performing basic governmental tasks. In Indonesia, brokers are generally not multitasked in this way, but instead focus on helping their bosses to win an election. Their challenge is to combine this job with their everyday occupation.

In terms of social involvement, the mean of the brokers' responses to questions asking about their involvement in various forms of associational life was 17.94 with a standard deviation of 3.68. Overall, brokers were highly socially engaged people compared with the general population. For instance, 50 percent of the brokers described themselves as being active members of local religious community groups (*majelis taklim*), which was the largest civic association mentioned, compared with 23 percent of the voters reported being active members of such group.[2] Note that each respondent was allowed to provide multiple answers. The next most important association were rotating credit groups (*arisan*), with 34 percent of the brokers reported being active members, compared with 25 percent of respondents who said so in my voters' survey. Brokers were also more actively engaged than voters in some organisations such as NU, youth community councils, agricultural/fishermen groups or industrial unions and cooperatives.

To further compare the characteristics of brokers with the general population, I conduct a case-control study by combining data from my unique dataset of brokers and voter surveys (Table 6.5). In doing so, people with the outcome of interest (i.e. brokers) are compared and matched with a control group (i.e. general voters).[3] The assumption here is that our respondents in the voter opinion surveys were not brokers. The results suggest that, compared with voters based on data from my polling institute's voter surveys, brokers were older, much more likely to be male, had more education and enjoyed higher median household incomes than the typical Indonesian, and they tended to be more active in social organisations. In determining the number of selected matching variables, the region variable (North Sulawesi and otherwise) is set as a control, not a possible determinant of becoming a broker, given we have selected the variable from the beginning. We included the variable of region in the equation to control the variable of religion because North

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[2]This is based on my post-election survey of voters in 2014. For more discussion about the methodology of this survey, see Appendix A.

[3]For further discussion on case-control study, see Alan Agresti, *An Introduction to Categorical Data Analysis* (2007).

Sulawesi is feared to be biased for non-Muslims, while West Sumatra, East Java and Central Java are potentially biased for Islam.

Table 6.5 **Logistic regression of whether or not the respondent was a broker**

	Dependent Variable (0= General Voters; 1= Broker)	
	B	S.E.
Male	2.27**	0.13
Age	0.02**	0.00
Income	0.05**	0.02
Education	0.26**	0.02
Number of organisations	0.25**	0.04
Muslim	-0.05	0.25
Javanese	0.15	0.13
Region (North Sulawesi)	1.58**	0.30
Constant	-6.38	0.46
Valid N	2,394	
Log likelihood	2668.1	

Note: *$p < 0.05$; ** p <0 .01

Most surveyed brokers reported being political party members or sympathisers (63.5 percent),[4] while 34.6 percent were not affiliated with any political party –which is a high number if we remember that all of the candidates for whom they were working were party nominees. A total of 27.3 percent of those who were party members reported affiliation to the PDI-P, followed by the PKB and Golkar with 17 percent and 16.2 percent respectively. Smaller numbers of brokers described themselves as rank-and-file party members of the Democratic Party (11.1 percent), Gerindra (9 percent), PKS (5.6 percent) and PAN (5.4 percent). Very few mentioned party membership in PPP, Hanura, PBB and PKPI. However, it is important to treat these findings cautiously given the notorious tendency among brokers to report they are a part of their candidate's party, while in fact simply working for the individual candidate without having any deeper affiliation to the party.

This finding gives rise to the causation issue: Did the brokers become party members because they had been invited by candidates to join the success team? Broker recruitment in this sense would be equivalent with significant efforts made by candidates to expand their party. Or, did party membership come, with candidates turning to their parties when searching for brokers? Figure 6.1 helps answer this

[4]Unfortunately, the survey did not differentiate between members and sympathisers.

chicken and egg problem. When requested to provide the year they became a member of their party, only 9.3 percent mentioned "prior to 1990" suggesting that most brokers had started to work for their party or candidate after the fall of Suharto. The majority of those becoming party brokers had started to help their candidate's party during election years, indicating that elections provide an important mechanism either for non-party people to be recruited as brokers and then become rank-and-file members, or, put another way, for those who are already party members to become more active in their party.

Figure 6.1 **Year brokers first became a member/supporter of the party (%)**



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

Along these lines, we then asked all surveyed brokers to state the names of politicians whose opinions or political line they most often follow. About 71 percent were willing to mention the name of a party leader they followed. Some named local political bosses and some named national leaders. Among those who mentioned a name, we asked the average number of years they had followed that person. Of those brokers who stated the name of a political boss, 30 percent had followed that person for the last 5–10 years, 15 percent had followed for 10 –15 years and another 15 percent had been committed more than 15 years. It is plausible to assume that they had not only followed their patrons, but had also worked to help them win in previous elections. For candidates, a broker's length of following, especially those who had always been sticking to the same local boss, can reproduce pacts of mutual loyalty in which they can rely on brokers' work in generating votes and provide material compensation to brokers in return.

6.3. How do candidates recruit brokers?

Most candidates saw broker recruitment as critical to their strategies. As one candidate of the Islamist PPP, who ran for reelection in 2014, explained: “The last elections were all about a distribution strategy. Therefore, how we selected success team members was a key to success in securing victory” (Interview, 21 April 2014).

But what sorts of persons did candidates recruit? Generally, individuals recruited into campaign teams could be divided into two groups: party functionaries (either at the subdistrict or village/precinct level) and non-party members (Kadir Karding, interview, 18 April 2014). Candidates felt they must involve local party functionaries in a success team, not only for practical reasons, but also to avoid offending their fellow party members. Since party structures were contested by competing candidates on the party list, however, candidates could not rely exclusively on party cadres. Some candidates accused party functionaries of operating as “double agents” (*main dua kaki*) or “money grubbers” (*mata duitan*).[5]

In terms of non-party brokers, my broker survey provides a complete picture of how the process of recruitment works. Figure 6.2 reveals that brokerage structures take advantage of relational networks.[6] Asked about their relationship with the person who asked them to join the campaign team, 79 percent of brokers were recruited by those they categorised as family and friends. Respondents were allowed to give multiple responses, but this figure clearly indicates that candidates rarely recruited people they did not already know well as core team members, who in turn recruited close associates, and so on down the campaign team structure. The most frequent explanation candidates give for prioritising relational networks is that brokers with whom they are personally close are more loyal and less likely to shirk (Aspinall et al., 2015). Also, recruiting through personal networks helps to reduce the costs of maintaining a network of brokers because members will be willing to work hard on the campaign even without payment, or for lower payments than otherwise. In contrast, a modest portion of brokers were recruited by their party leaders. Interestingly, when it comes to broker recruitment, candidates were more likely to favour neighbours over organisational networks, confirming that brokers were genuinely recruited on the basis of personal connections.

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[5]My informants spoke on the condition of anonymity due to the sensitivity of this information.

[6]For more discussion about the relational networks, see Aspinall et al. (2015).

Figure 6.2 **Brokers' relationship with the person who invited them to join the team (%)**



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

Consistent with earlier works, the findings expressed in Figure 6.3 below reinforce the notion that most candidate-broker relationships in Indonesia are highly personalised. About 61 percent of brokers were asked to join by the candidate directly. This figure more than tripled the findings of a survey conducted in in Central Java III constituency by Aspinall and his collaborators (2015). Note, however, that the population of my survey was brokers who worked for candidates who were *elected* at provincial and regent/mayoral levels. It may be that candidates who constructed success teams on the basis of intimate relationships were more likely to win their seats.

Meanwhile, only 38 percent of respondents were asked to join the success team by other, more senior brokers. These respondents were asked to specify the position in the campaign team structure of those who had approached them to join. The modal answer to this question was "village coordinator" (34 percent), followed by "sub-district coordinator" (30 percent) and "base-level brokers" (22 percent). The remainder identified "regency/city coordinator" or "provincial coordinator." This parallels prior research that when candidates exhaust their supply of close friends and family members when forming a success team, they typically turn to campaign coordinators to recruit the rest. Unavoidably, among those recruited in this way, a considerable portion have connections that are more transactional than personal (Aspinall, 2014; Aspinall et al., 2015).

Figure 6.3 **Who invited the broker to become a success team member? (%)**



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

In short, the pattern of relationship between candidates and brokers reflects a centrality of personal networks and, by extension, relatively marginal role of political parties, in grassroot campaigns in legislative elections. Asked whether they knew anything in advance about the candidate they supported, 71 percent of brokers knew the candidate personally and were close to him/her. Around 19 percent knew the candidate personally but were not particularly close before becoming part of the campaign team. Only 4 percent had heard about the candidate but never met him/her; 5 percent had never heard of the candidate before. Again, recall that the sampled brokers were those working for *elected* candidates. Prior contacts between candidates and brokers partly mediate electoral success. Many candidates failed to be elected presumably because they used a much looser method of selecting brokers without ensuring whether or not they were truly committed to them.

Such prior contacts, however, do not necessarily imply long-term clientelist interactions. Some brokers might have personal affective ties to the candidate, without clientelist exchanges. Respondents were asked to name whether they had had prior assistance from a number of actors such as the candidate, success team village coordinators, sub-district coordinators, district coordinators and party leaders. Although 71 percent of brokers knew the candidate personally prior to becoming a member of his/her success teams, the left panel of Figure 6.4 shows that only 37 percent had previously received assistance from the candidate or team members. As a follow-up, these 37 percent of brokers were requested to specify the forms of assistance they had received. As shown in the right panel of Figure 6.4, the modal answer was "project access" (66 percent), such as constituent funds for the construction of roads, bridges and so on.

Figure 6.4 **Prior mutually beneficial exchanges involving brokers (%)**



The question in the left panel reads: "Before becoming a success team member, have you ever received assistance (e.g. in government paperwork, job assistance, project access, schools, health care treatment for you or family members), from the following parties?" If "Yes", the interviewer asked a follow-up question: "In what forms? (Can be more than one answer)." The responses to this question are then shown in the right panel.

Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

Clearly, distribution of such patronage helps create networks for the candidate (see Chapter 5). It gives incumbent candidates a comparative advantage in getting re-elected since they have had the opportunity to form patronage-based networks since at least the preceding election and have greater access to pork-barrel projects and other state resources while sitting in the legislature. Numerous brokers had also received educational help (15 percent), job offers (12 percent), health-related assistance (9 percent) and help in government paperwork (9 percent). The proportion of those who said they had received other forms of help, such as money, goods, or protection, was also numerically significant (19 percent). Meanwhile, 63 percent of brokers had not received help from the candidate. These respondents mostly were located at the ground level and did not work directly with the candidate. They interacted directly with voters instead. I call them "extended success teams"—people who are recruited by the senior brokers who usually enjoy direct access to the candidate. As will be explored in the following section, these extended success teams are a source of rent-seeking, because brokers at this level often have transactional rather than personal commitments to the candidate.

However, an important point is that the left panel of Figure 6.4 demonstrates that brokers seem to be more tightly bound to candidates than with other actors when it

comes to clientelist exchanges. Only a tiny fraction of brokers had had prior clientelist interactions with more senior brokers. Of those, only an insignificant number had benefited from party leaders, confirming that the relationship between candidates and brokers is more personal than partisan. The results show evidence of the weakness of clientelist ties between party structures and brokers. Likewise, very few respondents mentioned their prior exchanges with campaign coordinators at the district level (1 percent), sub-district level (1 percent) and village level (4 percent). All of this suggests that the nature of the relationship between ground-level brokers and coordinators at district or sub-district level is generally one-off, non-iterative, and short-term. The relationships between candidates and at least senior brokers, however, tend to be more personal and long-lasting.

6.4. What are brokers looking for in a candidate?

The dominant literature on clientelism suggests that an individual's motivation to join a broker network is primarily driven by partisan orientations (e.g. Auyero, 2000; Auyero, 2001; Zarazaga, 2014). The scholarly focus on the role of political parties and party brokers has left the function of individual candidates and their non-party brokerage networks relatively understudied. But in a context like Indonesia, where parties play a minor role in grassroot campaigning, and where under the open-list PR system co-partisans compete against each other, why should a broker end up working with one candidate rather than another? One answer is that brokers vary by types depending on the differing commitment and the degree of personal closeness to the candidate. Some are "pragmatists," in Szwarcberg's (2015: 2) term, or "opportunists" in Aspinall's (2014: 545) categorisation who seek immediate payoffs during the course of a campaign, and will thus gravitate toward whichever candidate offers the best material pay-offs. Others are "clientelist brokers," in Aspinall's term, who intend to have durable relations with the candidate in the hope of receiving future benefits (2014: 545).

My own findings suggest, first and foremost, that a candidate's personal reputation is important in attracting brokers to a success team. Figure 6.5 illustrates the main reason respondents gave for joining a success team—with the important caveat that the sampled brokers here all worked with successful candidates. Few depicted themselves as pragmatist brokers whose materialistic motivations are typically blamed for the failures of success teams to reach expected vote targets. Only an insignificant number were primarily motivated by ethnic and religious factors. The

primary motivations success team members gave were the "candidate's *ketokohan"* (personality or personal qualities) and the "candidate's programs." These responses point to the significance of personal reputation in generating electoral support independent of the party. This finding corresponds with the dominant discourse among candidates and brokers in interviews during my 13-month-fieldwork in Indonesia. They sometimes used the word '*figur*', which is more or less synonymous with '*ketokohan*', to illustrate that it was the candidate's individual qualities that really mattered under the open-list PR system.

Figure 6.5 **Reasons for joining a candidate's success team (%)**



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

Virtually all brokers admitted that a candidate's personal reputation helped increase his or her vote share. My very large dataset surveys of voters in 66 electoral districts across Indonesia also reveals that, when asked to name the personal qualities they think are most important in a candidate, the majority of respondents named "honest/ trustworthy" and "cares for the people." In Indonesian politics, caring for the people connotes having a track record of having delivered benefits or patronage to voters. Similarly, the term "program" as in Figure 6.5, has a specific meaning in the Indonesian context, as Aspinall et al. (2015: 12) explain:

> It refers not to a collection of policies or ideas the candidate supports—what we might elsewhere call a candidate's platform—but to what a candidate has done for the village/voters/constituency. In other words, "program" refers to how adept or generous the candidate has been in providing the area with pork, patronage, and club goods.

Candidates who are able to meet those desirable criteria come to be viewed as having higher prospects of victory. Other things being equal, brokers prefer "to work for a candidate who was likely to win rather than one who was personally wealthy but had poorer prospects of victory" (Aspinall et al., 2015: 12). This statement nicely parallels my interviews with brokers: When they decided to work for a candidate, it had little to do with whether the candidate was using a vote buying strategy, and much more to do with the candidate's reputation, since a strong reputation would maximise chances of victory. This is not to say, of course, that personal reputation is itself sufficient to obviate the need to distribute cash to voters; even many candidates with strong records of patronage delivery and personal popularity in their electoral districts felt that they still needed to use vote buying strategies in order to lock in the support of their voters.

6.5. Whom do brokers target and how?

What structures do politicians construct to engage in vote buying? The typical organisations of brokers, which are known locally as *tim sukses* (success teams), work within a pyramidal and territorial structure. At the apex of a typical success team for a DPR member is an inner circle of two or three people who help build and control the network. As observed by Aspinall (2014), the bulk of the structure consists of a territorially organised network, stretching down to the village and, often, hamlet or even polling booth level, where local brokers are recruited to directly influence voters (see also, Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016). Hence, the majority of success team members consist of base-level brokers –what I called the extended success team– whose local networks allow them to collect votes on the candidate's behalf. These base-level brokers play a critical role since they have to provide lists of voters willing to vote for the candidate, deliver the payments to them, and then monitor the recipients to ensure they show up on voting day.

In terms of targeting strategies, it is clear that when it comes to determining who gets targeted for vote buying, brokers predominantly rely on personal networks, or simply on personal closeness to brokerage networks. As shown in Figure 6.6, brokers usually target people among their family members, neighbours, friends, and relatives in the village. Although brokers have an incentive to expand electoral support beyond their personal networks, they tend to favour easy targets to increase the effectiveness of vote buying and reduce the cost. When asked to name multiple targets, a modest portion of brokers also mentioned those who were active in their professional and religious community groups.

When asked to specify where their vote targets lived, most of them said they resided in the same neighbourhood or village. There was little variation between provinces, indicating that the targeting strategy based on brokers' personal networks is likely common across Indonesia.

Figure 6.6 **Who did brokers ask to vote for the candidate they support? (%)**



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

A parallel discourse emerged from my qualitative findings, suggesting that the single most common strategy is that almost all brokers chose to prioritise voters *whom they know and who know them*. Recall that when brokers often talked about family, they did not only refer to their immediate kin but much wider ties, linked to them via kinship or common ancestors, marriage connections, emotional relationships and place of birth or residence (Alamsyah, 2016: 108). In my interviews with many brokers, I asked why they favoured such a personal strategy. The most frequent answer is that such persons were the most reliable voters. By directing benefits to their personal networks they believed their offers would not go to waste. In fact, as long as the personal connections between brokers and voters were strong, the payment was simply often just a courtesy. There is a shame effect if the targeted family members and close associates accept the offer but do not reciprocate with votes. One broker working for a candidate running in an electoral district in East Java said, "The point is not *how much* money did you give but *who* gave the money to voters. Voters in the villages do not care about politics," (Interview, 30 September 2014). Another broker, whose wife was running for a district parliament seat in South Tangerang, put it, "They even do not know which candidate I support" (Syafrani,

Interview, 5 December 2014). The broker was not only an influential leader in the district, but also one of the leading commentators on law and politics, appearing on prime-time television programs several times a week.

Figure 6.7 **Where do the people targeted by brokers live? (%)**



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

All of this suggests that it is not the message but the *messenger* that matters. As one broker put it, "The more brokers a candidate has, and the greater family and friendship networks a broker has, the bigger chance for a candidate to win" (Interview, 4 October 2014). My low-level politician survey found that the number of brokers working for the sampled candidates, who were successfully (re)elected in 2014, varied in size, including one extreme outlier—one candidate reported working with 3,000 brokers. But the mean number of brokers was 149.44 with a standard deviation of 299.1, suggesting that team sizes were quite large. Faizin, a successful candidate from the Islamist PPP who ran in 2014 for a district parliamentary seat in Batang, Central Java, explains:

> For the candidates, rather than assigning brokers to collect a significant number of votes…beyond their limits, it is better to have a bigger army of brokers but ask every one of them to chase fairly modest vote targets. If you burden your brokers with impractical tasks, they will certainly fall short of expectations (Interview, 23 January 2017).

In other words, if the target is set too high, it will be difficult for brokers to reach it due to the limits in the number of family-and-friend votes they can access. But since most candidates need to chase a large number of votes, brokers in fact often do exhaust the support of those with close personal connections to them. Inevitably, they must reach out those with whom they lack close personal ties, increasing the risk of wastage and slippage.

The longer the list a broker collected, the more likely it would include voters beyond his/her immediate circle, which then increases the prospect of a higher failure rate.

6.6. How do brokers determine what, when, and how much to give?

It is technically difficult to distribute benefits to a large numbers of voters when time is running short, as it inevitably does toward the end of a campaign period. Part of the solution is that candidates favoured distributing cash over staple foods because it is extremely difficult to procure and distribute food in a context where vote buying is illegal. The results from the brokers' survey show that they were three times more likely to report handing out cash (16 percent) than foodstuffs (5 percent), which is consistent with our voter survey results. Designed as a multiple choice question, the most common item offered to those who self-reported vote buying attempts (25.1 percent) was money (75.5 percent of 25.1 percent = 18.7 percent), foodstuffs (12.8 percent) such as rice, sugar or noodles, and household items such as kitchenware, crockery, or religious clothes like headscarves, prayer robes or mats (11.4 percent). Some respondents also mentioned other items such as clothing, cigarettes, health and death insurance, medicine, and so on.

This study did find substantial heterogeneity by province where the proportion of brokers reporting engagement in distributing cash was 22 percent in Central Java, 14 percent in East Java, 8 percent in North Sulawesi, and only 4 percent in West Sumatra (Figure 6.8). This closely mirrors the data from my voters' surveys suggesting that vote buying has become an endemic problem in Central and East Java, but is much less common in West Sumatra and North Sulawesi. We must also assume a significant social desirability bias leading to some under-reporting of engagement in vote buying in each province.

The literature on clientelism has long stated the effect of constituency size on the relative costs and effectiveness of vote buying. Scholars argue that a small constituency size may increase the likelihood of vote buying (Stokes, 2007: 86–87; Hicken, 2007: 56–57). However, my broker survey shows that constituency size does not seem to have much effect; in fact, 24 percent of provincial brokers reported they engaged in vote buying, while only 20 percent of district brokers said so, though this difference was not statistically significant. At least this suggests that vote buying efforts did not only take place in small electorates, but also happened in larger electorates.

Figure 6.8 **Variations in the distribution of cash by province (%)**



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

When it comes to the amounts of money distributed, there was significant variation, including inter-regional variations. For instance, candidates spent lesser sums per voter in Java than in the two outer island provinces. In many instances, it is more expensive to 'buy' urban dwellers than rural residents. To some extent, there are also inter-candidate variations. In some areas, wealthy candidates set the price of a vote much higher than the market price (*harga pasaran*) of a vote (Aspinall et al., 2017: 5).

Overall, however, when it comes to the amount of cash distributed to voters, the effect of constituency size really mattered. Figure 6.9 illustrates the pattern. Brokers working with provincial candidates usually distributed smaller sums of money (typically below IDR 25,000 per-voter) than district-level brokers. It shows those who gave out larger sums, from IDR 30,000 to 50,000 to be exact, were more likely to be district-candidate brokers than provincial brokers. Through interviews with candidates running for the DPR, I ascertained that they mostly gave out even smaller payments than did candidates for the provincial DPRD I seats. Albeit with significant variations in the amounts paid, they generally distributed smaller cash handouts that ranged between IDR 10,000 and 15,000 per voter. The reason is simple: candidates running for national-level seats had to collect many more votes than did candidates for the provincial-level parliaments.[7] Candidates contesting for national DPR seats had to win hundreds of thousands of votes to secure victory, while those running for provincial DPRDs usually had to secure tens of thousands of votes. Similarly, candidates for district-level legislature had to provide much larger payments because they had to secure only 2,000–10,000 votes.

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[7]However, this is not the case in Java where the boundaries of the national and provincial electoral districts coincide (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016: 15).

Figure 6.9 **How much money did brokers distribute to voters? (%)**



In sum, the total expenditure on vote buying of national and provincial candidates was still more costly than that of district candidates. A successful national candidate from the traditionalist Islamic party running from one constituency in Central Java admitted distributing 450,000 envelopes containing sums of between IDR 10,000 and 20,000 each (Interview, 20 April 2014). If the average price of the vote was IDR 15,000, the candidate spent 6.75 billion on vote buying. A re-elected candidate, from PAN, admitted that running in the 2014 elections was extremely expensive. He said, "I ran three times in the elections, but the 2014 campaign was the most 'brutal' one" (Interview, 22 April 2014). He was visibly emotional and appeared to tear up when recalling his brother's crying during his campaign because he felt guilt for his inability to help support him financially, instead assisting him only through his prayers.

Given there are overlapping constituencies in Indonesian legislative elections, politicians reduce the costs associated with the larger electorates by coordinating their efforts through cooperative deals, which are usually called 'tandem arrangements' with other candidates. My unique survey of candidates shows that provincial candidates were more likely to run in a tandem pair with a DPR candidate than with district candidates. About 55 percent of the sampled district candidates reported collaborating in a tandem with provincial candidates, while 73 percent of the surveyed provincial candidates ran in a tandem pair with district candidates. The data show that provincial candidates were more likely to have such cooperation than district candidates. Almost all of these tandem arrangements occurred within a single party. In terms of vote buying expenses, DPR candidates usually shared funding with lower-level candidates who were more responsible for providing personnel to conduct the transactions either on the behalf of lower-level themselves or the DPR candidate. In my interviews with

DPR candidates, they were concerned about the reliability of their local counterparts in handing out cash on their behalf. It was often the case that tandem arrangements benefitted only the local candidates, who used the extra money that came to them from the DPR candidate to increase the amounts distributed to each voter without acknowledging their higher-level counterpart.

Figure 6.10 provides insights into the timing of cash distribution. Using a disguised technique to reduce social desirability bias, I asked the respondent to observe how many brokers from the same village as him/her distributed cash to voters. As the top panel of Figure 6.10 shows, a plurality of provincial brokers said that payments were made in the final 24 hours leading up to the vote. In contrast, district brokers seem to have no specific time frame in mind for handing out cash (botttom panel), suggesting that vote buying can occur at any time even *before* the "quiet period" that begins three days before the vote when no campaigning is permitted. The modal answer is "the night before voting day," which is consistent with the conventional wisdom, but this option only had a razor-thin-lead. It is a widely held view among candidates and brokers that voters will often vote for the candidate who distributes payment closest to the vote, as the final payment is considered to have a greater impact in voters' memories (a point I return to in a moment). But why was this not the case for district candidates?

Figure 6.10 **When did provincial brokers (top panel) and district brokers (bottom panel) hand out cash to voters? (%)**



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

Because they occur in smaller constituencies, the intensity of vote buying is greater in the district-level DPRD contests, where candidates can secure a seat with only a few thousand votes. The smaller constituency size allows candidates and their political operatives to gain knowledge about their rivals' tactics. When they learn that rival teams have begun distributing cash, they are typically provoked to follow suit. As argued in Chapter 5, candidates often feel anxious that their supporters will desert them in favour of cashed up rivals, if their loyalty is not secured by way of a payment. In contrast, in the larger provincial constituencies it is more difficult to keep tabs on competitors.

Overall, however, the big picture remains unchanged: as the elections draw near, the probability of vote buying increases. Interestingly, as shown in both the top panel and top panel of Figure 6.10, post-electoral payoffs are not common in Indonesian elections. As noted above, the proximity of the election boosts vote buying incidence largely because of a popular belief among candidates that voters will often vote for the candidate who gave the payment the last, because that candidate will be fresh in the memory.[8] The prisoner's dilemma offers a potential answer for the breadth of this last-minute panic. Candidates might stand to gain more financially if all of them did not engage in vote buying. But the risk of being trumped for an individual who does not participate when others do so, means that such people might feel they have little choice. Applying the prisoner's dilemma to candidates' behaviours when the elections draw near, a candidate will be keen to pursue vote buying if other candidates are using the same strategy. They often

[8]This, however, contradicts with the widespread perception among brokers who believed that only few voters would vote for the candidate who distribute cash the last, as will be discussed later in this chapter.

see distributing gifts as their best chance of stopping other candidates from winning votes (Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014; Muhtadi, 2015). For example, a successful candidate from Indonesia's biggest Islamic party admitted to pouring money into the electorate on voting day up until 9am, having seen an opponent distributing cash just before the polling stations opened. He defended his actions:

> It is not only a 'dawn attack' [a universally recognised term that reflects the fact that payments are sometimes distributed just after the dawn prayer]. It is also a 'serangan duha' (*dhuha* attack) [referring to *Dhuha* or mid-morning prayer time, which is performed immediately after sunrise when the sun has risen to a certain height] (Interview, 20 April 2014).

As I will argue in Chapter 7, the prisoner's dilemma can be best explained in a context of high competitiveness where uncertainty is great regarding the electoral outcome. Under open ballot systems dominated by personal votes, the personal incentive to win is high, leading candidates to use all available means in their campaigns, including making payments to voters, especially if they see multiple candidates doing it. In the prisoner's dilemma, Takeuchi (2013: 78) points out, "each player's rational strategy to maximise his or her individual payoff ends up with a worse outcome than some other possible outcome that may be better for both players." In the face of closely contested races, the probability of each candidate engaging in vote buying increases, given that small changes in support can be expected to alter the outcome of the election.

6.7. How do brokers extract rents?

From the outset, I have stated that my explanation of vote buying patterns in Indonesia, which integrates attention to a party-loyalist strategy with emphasis on personal networks, points to a style of vote buying that is prone to rent-seeking behaviour. My study is consistent with the growing interest in the literature in the issues of broker predation and defection (e.g. Aspinall, 2014; Stokes et al., 2013). In my interviews and FGDs with candidates, they raised deep concerns about the unreliability of brokers, especially those who did not enjoy prior relationships with them. Confronted by the risk of embezzlement and defection by their brokers, candidates therefore constructed their personal campaigns on the basis of relational and personal networks in order to minimise brokers' misbehaviour. As noted above, however, due to the limited availability of brokers who have personal ties to the candidate, most end up building 'extended success teams' involving at least some persons with no *direct* personal

relationships with the candidate. Drawing from my unique dataset of brokers and candidates and close analysis of campaigns during the 2014 elections, I find at least five pieces of empirical evidence pointing toward agency loss[9]—which implies that brokers can extract rents from candidates— and broker unreliability.

First, this study found significant evidence of brokers' misbehaviour, especially defection, or at least the potential for it. Fully 28 percent of brokers in my survey admitted they were asked to support multiple candidates during the 2014 election. Provincial brokers were more likely to be approached by multiple candidates, especially from the same party. Among those being targeted by multiple candidates, 39 percent were approached by candidates coming from a different party. Interestingly, district brokers were more likely to be asked by multiple candidates from *different* parties. The survey also asked: "Were those candidates competing at the same legislative level (DPR RI, DPRD I, DPRD II) or a different level?" The modal answer is "different legislative level" (61 percent), which potentially suggests that even if they ended up working for more than one candidate they may not have been in direct competition for the same votes. However, 29 percent of brokers were asked by multiple candidates who competed at the same legislative level and in the same electoral district and were therefore in direct competition. The remaining 8 percent were at the same legislative level but in different electoral districts. Evidently, district brokers were more likely to be targeted for defection than provincial brokers. There were hundreds of thousands of candidates running for seats in district-level legislatures, simultaneously trying to draw on the same supply of brokers, creating incentives for opportunistic brokers to defect or to split their efforts between more than one candidate.

Second, as implied by the territorially pyramidal structure of success teams used by most candidates (Aspinall, 2014), it is possible that "some of the money they were distributing would go missing, as it had to be passed through several sets of hands… before it reached the voter" (Rohman, 2016: 243). While considering social desirability that might lead brokers to underestimate rent seeking, this study used an obtrusive measure: "Did you receive any envelopes/cash to distribute to voters from the candidate or campaign coordinator?" About 16 percent said yes. Of those, 12 percent reported diverting resources for their personal benefit. Only 5 percent of brokers reported receiving staple goods to be distributed to voters. Of those, 11 percent expropriated these in-kind goods. The actual cases may well exceed those

[9]Chapter 5 conceptually discusses agency problems in the relationships between candidates and brokers and the interactions between brokers and voters in which both problems bring costs to candidates.

figures, but these figures show at least that the widely-held assumption that many brokers engage in extracting rents is well-founded.[10]

Third, I did find a consistent pattern in the dataset showing that brokers have an interest in exaggerating the number of supposedly base voters and even in deceiving their candidates on this issue (see Chapter 5). The survey asked: "In your opinion, are you certain that your neighbours' swinging voting intention can be directed according to campaign team's persuasion if given assistance (envelope/money/gifts, construction of houses of worship, irrigation, roads, etc.)?" Nearly 70 percent of brokers claimed that they were "very" or "quite certain" they could influence their neighbours' voting decisions by giving them material inducements (Figure 6.11). However, this response might not simply be a measure of the susceptibility of voters to patronage, but also as a reflection of rent-seeking behaviour on the part of brokers. When brokers provide high estimates of the effectiveness of their gifts, the more cash they will have to distribute, and the more they can engage in predation. By promoting this expectation, brokers are sending a message to candidates to provide more benefits for them to distribute.

Figure 6.11 **Broker's confidence in their ability to influence neighbours if they provide them with benefits (%)**



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

The issue here is that though brokers express confidence in their ability to sway voters with gifts, research on voters themselves provides little evidence to support this view. Recall that in my post-election survey of voters, respondents were asked

[10]Indeed, we found quite a small number of brokers admitting rent-seeking behaviours. Note that the population of my survey was brokers who worked for successful candidates who, as discussed above, mostly had had clientelist interactions with them. While acknowledging social desirability bias, it may be that candidates who built success teams on the basis of personal and long-lasting relationships were more likely to win because their brokers were less likely to extract rents.

to assess whether vote buying was acceptable or unacceptable. Among those who thought it was acceptable (40 percent), a follow-up question was provided: "Will you accept those money or gifts?" The modal answer was that they would take the money but vote based upon their conscience (57.7 percent), while some answered they would "not accept". This evidence confirms the classic problem of vote buying being an uncertain business. Funneling benefits to uncommitted voters is a risky bet because they can behave opportunistically (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012: 77). Asked what they would do with voters who received payments but did not come to the voting booth, 73 percent of brokers said they would not do anything. Why, then, did brokers insist on directing benefits to such voters when they could not guarantee that the recipients would reciprocate on voting day? By urging their candidates to distribute money or gifts to uncommitted voters, brokers had greater opportunities to extract rents.

Fourth, another common example of shirking was that the candidates' claims that most brokers worked on the basis of systematic voter lists proved to be unfounded. Most candidates say that they instruct ground-level brokers to draw up lists of potential voters willing to support them, a process known locally by the English-language term, 'by name, by address.' Some candidates I encountered even showed me a stack of their brokers' voter lists. However, it turns out that success team members who compiled voters lists were not as numerous as candidates expected. Only 47 percent of provincial brokers admitted that they drew up voter lists and 52 percent of district brokers did so. If it is the case that most candidates had these lists, why did only about half the brokers reportedly produce them? Viva Yoga of PAN admitted that many candidates were tricked by their brokers, who provided them with fake voter lists. Accordingly, he always quality-controlled the lists by conducting spot-checking, hiring a polling firm for this task, and finding that some people whose names were on the lists were already dead (Interview, 22 April 2014). It is also plausible that some brokers worked for multiple candidates at the same time, giving them exactly the same voter lists (Triantini, 2016: 258).

Even among those who provided voter lists, not all of the names on the lists ended up voting for the candidate a broker supported. Some opportunistic brokers intentionally filled their lists with names of individuals whose voting behaviour could not be determined, simply as a way to generate profits. Recall that most candidates rely on these lists as a basis for delivering cash payments. According to Triantini (2016: 250) in the case of Blora, Central Java, base-level brokers locally called *sabet* "used rather slipshod methods in drawing up the lists, writing down people's names without knowing anything about their preferences, or without inquiring about which among

them had been contacted by other teams." My brokers' survey found similar evidence. About 22 percent of brokers reported putting some or most of the names on their list without first consulting the voters.

Therefore, candidates expect that there will be a gap between the number of the names on the list to whom they distribute payments and the final number of votes they receive. They typically use a term derived from English, "margin error," (*sic.*) for describing this discrepancy, blaming 'extended brokers,' whose primary motivations are largely the pursuit of material rewards rather than long-term personal relationships with them. In my interviews, when candidates talked about this "margin error" they typically referred to two sources of failure: (1) unreliability of voters who receive cash but who do not feel bound to repay with their votes; (2) failings of brokers, either due to rent-extraction by brokers or lack of capacity to identify and distribute benefits to voters who would reciprocate with votes. For their part, brokers typically point their finger at the transactional nature of voters who might vote for more 'generous' rivals.

Confronted by pervasive broker predation, some candidates claim to keep a tight rein on their success team members by doing multiple checks of the names on the lists. Realizing that the determinant of electoral success is the strength and reliability of brokerage networks, Saan Musthafa of the Democratic Party hired a Jakarta-based polling organisation to survey the effectiveness of his teams including by randomly sampling the people on the lists to check whether brokers had really talked to them (Interview, 25 April 2014). As I elaborate in more detail below, however, candidates in general had very few instruments to monitor their brokers. Having seen that they were mostly unable to build tight and strong monitoring of their teams, candidates were responding by trying to pick brokers on the basis of intimate and personal contacts. However, due to the limited number of those who were emotionally and personally close to candidates, it was hard to avoid recruiting at least some brokers who lacked such ties.

Lastly, aside from the above rent-seeking behaviour, another form of principal-agency problems between candidates and brokers arose because some brokers actually did not know their supposed clients well. My argument here is different from what Stokes and her colleagues' (2013) concluded—that brokers are necessary for clientelist exchange because they know their clients intimately. They argue (2013: 96) that "brokers are indeed involved in long-lived interactions with their neighbours and clients, interactions which —in the brokers' view— give them privileged information about the preferences and behaviours of individual voters." They offer detailed

evidence from their broker survey in Argentina suggesting that nearly 80 percent of brokers claimed they would know when their neighbours, with whom they have a lot of dealings, voted against the candidate they were 'supposed' to support. Although this measure is likely to be distorted by social desirability bias, it is a simple measure of brokers' confidence in their ability to observe their clients' political preferences and actions.

Using a similarly worded question, my survey found a somewhat different picture in Indonesia. Indeed, 57 percent of brokers claimed to be able to infer whether their neighbours voted against their candidate.[11] But the proportion of those who said they couldn't ascertain their clients' preferences was more than double the figure Stokes and her colleagues found in Argentina. As a follow-up, my broker survey asked those ground-level operatives who claimed to know when a neighbour voted against a candidate they supported how they did so. How could they work this out? The most frequent answer was derived from their day-to-day interactions with clients, enabling them to "draw inferences from attitudes or affect" (37 percent) such as being socially awkward, or through mannerisms or change of attitude, a look or gesture, or trying to avoid them. Others said they found out by "asking around through direct communications about how a neighbour discusses any particular party/candidate" (31 percent), whereas others said that they had been simply informed by their neighbour (5 percent), or based on information provided by other neighbours who stayed loyal (5 percent), or through closely monitoring their data collection or internal surveys (3 percent), or through his/her organisational and political backgrounds (3 percent), or through the display of campaign posters or propaganda tools for another party or candidate in the voter's home (3 percent).

But the key point is that in Indonesia there are widespread perceptions of ballot secrecy as evidenced in the relatively large number of brokers who recognise the difficulties they have in inferring their neighbours' vote choices. These findings are consistent with a widespread, almost 'doctrinal' belief that the country's elections must be 'direct, general, free and confidential' (*luber*) that runs deep among voters. In my post-election survey of voters, we asked respondents whether, despite the principle that elections are confidential, influential people could discover how they voted. Only 19.7 percent responded that this was "somewhat likely" or "very likely."

[11]The question reads: "If you had a good relationship with your neighbours, when they voted for the candidate/party you did not support, would you know about it?"

The majority of respondents confirm the conventional wisdom that the secrecy of the ballot is difficult to violate, and even powerful persons in the neighbourhood would not be able to find out how an individual voted.

In sum, brokers have both strong incentives and opportunities to shirk. The problems of predation and defection are especially severe in the case of extended success teams whose commitments to the candidate are more transactional and shoes members lack prior contacts with the candidate. As I will explore in more detail in the following pages, many candidates pour out cash handouts *en masse*, but they ironically invest little effort in monitoring and disciplining brokers.

6.8. Can brokers rely on their voters?

When they fall short of their targets, brokers typically blame voters' expectations of monetary rewards, accusing them of being merely driven by money and choosing to vote for rival candidates who paid more (see also, Alamsyah, 2016). Indeed, there is some anecdotal evidence that voters simply auction their votes off to the highest bidder. One excellent study by Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016) asserts that voters were increasingly ruled by a pragmatic and transactional logic and political actors tried to meet such expectations. The existence of such purely materialistic voters is empirically founded: a significant portion of the electorate received payments from multiple candidates in Indonesia's most recent elections (Figure 6.12). During the run-up to the legislative elections, I held monthly nationwide surveys asking the respondents, using exactly the same wording, whether they had been targeted for vote buying. A follow-up question asked those who responded affirmatively: "Which party or candidate or success team from which party offered you those goods/gifts?"

Given that respondents were allowed to give multiple answers, I then recoded the responses to this question to show vote buying by multiple parties. Recall that due to the nature of question and options provided, this exercise can only capture interparty duplication of vote buying efforts, not whether multiple candidates within the same party were providing payments, which was also quite possible due to the open-list PR system. Even so, I found a consistent pattern in which, as the election drew nearer, it became more likely that a voter had received payments from more than one party. Not only did multiple payments increase, but also—as previously discussed in Chapter 4—the percentage of those being targeted by vote buying rose dramatically. In January 2014, only 4.3 percent

of voters were exposed to vote buying. As the election period was approaching, however, those who reported being targeted with benefits experienced a six-fold increase with about 25 percent of voters reporting such exchanges. Apparently, candidates believed that a final push could make the difference between winning and losing (Tjahjo Kumolo, informal communication, 20 April 2014).

Figure 6.12 **How massive were multiple payments in Indonesia? (% of those saying they had been targeted for vote buying)**



Source: The January, February-March, and late March 2014 data were taken from my pre-election surveys, while the April 2014 numbers were drawn from my post-election survey (see Appendix A)

Many candidates claim that providing multiple payments to voters is the best way to tie voters so they did not turn to cashed-up rivals. As discussed in Chapter 4, candidates and brokers who do this are trying to 'secure' their vote from 'dawn attacks' carried out by other teams. The results from my broker survey confirmed that, when asked to observe other success teams, 28 percent of the respondents claimed a significant number of other teams delivered cash more than once. However, when asked whether they themselves engaged in the practice, they seemed to be reluctant to report. Only a tiny fraction of brokers (6 percent) admitted doing so. Hence, the average of responses to these two questions is 17 percent. As discussed in Chapter 4, many surveyed brokers used the verbs "to tie" (*mengikat)* or "to secure" (*mengamankan)* when describing the function of the second payments, which is consistent with my qualitative and in-depth interviews with high-level politicians. Brokers often told candidates to make follow-up cash payments in response to late manoeuvres by rivals. The sense of last-minute panic is evident where the majority of brokers heard that during the cash envelope distribution phase, other success teams were doing the same

thing in the same village, but with larger sums of money (Figure 6.13). It is therefore safe to argue that brokers cannot fully trust their voters, and even the so-called loyal voters need to be locked in with gifts.

Figure 6.13 **Other teams also distribute cash envelopes (%)**



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

I should stress that multiple payments were not merely a manifestation of materialistic voters, but they can also be a function of opportunist actions on the part of brokers. Rohman (2016: 240) found numerous *korlap* (field coordinators) working for multiple candidates, with the brokers providing candidates with the names of the same individuals on their lists, prompting a large number of voters in the village where he conducted his research to accept rewards from different candidates. Ahmad Muzani of Gerindra told me that in his electoral constituency in Lampung I, that there were numerous reports of locals receiving five to eight envelopes from several brokers. “What can I say? It is the time for them to harvest money (*panen uang*) during election season” (Interview, 13 April 2014). Tubagus Ace Hasan of Golkar reported another colourful story. In his constituency in Banten I, a night before the voting day, the consumption of catfish increased because locals usually hold dinner parties with catfish recipes while waiting for cash envelopes from brokers (Interview, 14 April 2014).

The results from my broker survey are partially consistent with this candidate narrative. Asked what would happen when one household receives cash envelopes from multiple

candidates, the responses from the sampled brokers were quite scattered. Twenty-two percent of sampled brokers believed that if offered money from more than one candidate, the household would split its votes between candidates; another 22 percent thought the household would vote for the candidate they liked the most either because of his/her program (recall the meaning of 'program' in the Indonesian context as noted above), or because the candidate has helped develop the village; 12 percent said that the household would accept all the envelopes but allow each family member to choose according to their personal choice; 9 percent believed that all family members would choose the candidate whose money/gift was given by the people closest to the family and known by them; only 8 percent responded that they would choose the candidate who gave the biggest amount of money/goods.

We also posed a hypothetical question to brokers in our survey, this time asking them to assess voting decisions of persons who received multiple payments from different candidates. The question asks: "If a voter receives envelope/money/goods from several success team members of different candidates, in your opinion which candidate has the better chance to be supported by the voter." Interestingly, as shown in Table 6.6, very few brokers believed that the voter would vote for the candidate who gave the envelope first or the last. The majority of brokers believed that the candidate's reputation for being most likeable would make the difference.

Table 6.6 **Supposing that a voter receives envelopes from success team members working for different candidates, what should be done?**

Response	**Percent**
Vote for the candidate/party who gave the most money	15
Vote for the candidate whose envelope was given by a person who the voters are most familiar with (e.g. family or close neighbours)	15
Vote for the candidate who they like the most (for example, because they prefer his/her program, feel close emotionally, or because the candidate had helped with the development of the village)	47
Vote for the candidate who gave the envelope first	2
Vote for the candidate who gave the envelope last	9
Others	1

Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

6.9. How stringent was candidates' monitoring of brokers and voters?

As alluded to earlier, candidates' capacity to monitor broker performance is weak. Surprisingly, my broker survey reveals only 10 percent of the sampled brokers admitted that their actions were often monitored by their superiors in the team or campaign coordinators; a large majority felt they were not monitored at all (Figure 6.14). Candidates are also vulnerable to rent-seeking behaviour by brokers because there are few punishment mechanisms for brokers who do not meet their target numbers of votes. Fifty-six percent of brokers admitted to failing to meet their targets. When asked a hypothetical question about the consequence if a broker fell far short of his or her target,[12] only 7 percent of respondents said the failing broker would receive any negative treatment from the campaign coordinator or candidate. Among those who responded affirmatively, a follow-up question was asked about the form of negative treatment: the answers were that the failing broker would be subjected to verbal abuse (30 percent), not invited to join success teams in the future (28 percent), cut out of future pork barrel projects (20 percent), or not receive the money or goods that had been promised (9 percent). All of this suggests that most candidates are unable to build stringent mechanisms to monitor or discipline their brokers.

Figure 6.14 **Monitoring and disciplining brokers (%)**



Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

[12]The question reads: "If there is a broker who did not meet the target (for example, he/she promised to generate 20 votes, but the candidate finally got only 2 votes at the polling station/village), did the broker receive certain negative treatments from the campaign coordinator or candidates concerned?"

Not only did candidates have few instruments to enforce discipline on their brokers, the brokers themselves had even fewer mechanisms for monitoring their voters to ensure that they kept their bargain to vote for the candidate. Asked what they could do when voters received gifts but voted for another candidate, the overwhelming majority of brokers said they could not do anything. Similarly, brokers could not do anything with voters who took the money but did not even attend the polling station (Table 6.7). Only a few brokers reported they would scold or threaten those who just took the money, but voted for other candidates.

Table 6.7 **What would you do when a recipient did not come to the voting booth?**

Response	Percent
Nothing, I could not do anything	73
Ending the voter's chance to ask for help to the candidates	8
Not give the vote money/goods again in the next election	7
Ask for the money/goods to be returned	3
Reprimand them	7
Threaten them	2

Source: My survey of brokers, September 30 – October 25, 2014

Why did brokers seem to be pessimistic about enforcing their deal with voters? The answer primarily lies in the fact, already touched upon above, that elections are free and that ballot secrecy is strongly enforced in Indonesia, incentivising voters to behave opportunistically. My voters' survey reports very minimal rates of intimidation or violence from political campaigns, suggesting that both brokers and voters who were unable to comply with the bargain would rarely be targets of violence. An overwhelming majority (84 percent) considered the 2014 election as "fair and free" based on the exit polls run by Indikator Politik, to which I am affiliated in which 1,928 respondents were interviewed face-to-face immediately after casting their votes.[13] There is widespread confidence that vote choices can be kept secret from politicians and their success teams. My post-election survey of voters asked respondents whether politicians could guess how they voted. 74.8 percent of the

[13]Available at http://indikator.co.id/uploads/20140411204045.Hasil_EP_Pileg_2014_Update.pdf accessed 5 October 2016.

sample responded this was "not at all likely" or "not very likely," while only 13.2 percent said it was "somewhat likely" or "very likely." Likewise, when asked to name who else might be aware of how they voted, though they were allowed to provide multiple responses, only 2.3 percent of the sample responded that party or a candidate brokers could find out how they voted (Figure 6.15).

Figure 6.15 **Who else do you think is aware of how you voted? (%)**



Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

The modal answer is husband or wife (58.8 percent) then followed by relatives (14 percent), suggesting that many voters do not discuss their electoral choices with outsiders or, sometimes, even within the family. One senior PKB politician colourfully recounted a story of his neighbour from his hometown in Central Java who, despite receiving a lot of benefits from him shamelessly requested additional compensation in return for his vote. Or as the politician ironically noted, "Still, which candidate he finally cast his vote for was a mystery to me" (Interview, 20 April 2014). With echoes of earlier work by Aspinall and his collaborators (2015), much of what I see in Indonesia provides little support for Stokes' (2005) theory of "perverse accountability". She argues that instead of politicians being accountable to voters, where vote buying transactions occur, voters are held accountable for their vote through direct and indirect coercion. This was not the case in Indonesia. Even those who take rewards do not lose their power to hold politicians accountable because political machines are unable to infer voters' behaviours; voters can still take money from a candidate and vote against him or her.

6.10. Conclusion

In this chapter, I have outlined that, unlike the comparative literature on vote buying which conventionally assumes that political parties play a central role in the distribution of material inducements, political parties in Indonesia have a relatively marginal role in electoral campaigns. Under Indonesia's open-list PR system, the influence of party organisation is limited and it is individual candidates who have more prominence in electioneering. Additionally, in settings like Indonesia where partisan ties are weak and where the personalised nature of voting requires co-partisans to compete against each other, candidates rely on more personalised rather than strictly party-based relationships. As a result, personal networks and non-party brokers play the critical role in grassroot campaigning.

At the outset of the chapter I demonstrated that personal networks not only structured vote buying, but also had significant impacts on (1) broker recruitment, (2) success team structures, and (3) targeting strategies. Personal networks shape how candidates recruit success team members and determine the structure of vote brokerage. More than two-thirds of sampled brokers knew the candidate personally prior to joining his/her success team. There are two logics underpinning this strategy. First is to minimise the problem of broker loyalty. Those who have personal connections with candidates are less likely to shirk. Second, from a purely strategic perspective, such brokers are more likely to campaign on the candidate's track record. The centrality of personal networks was also visible in targeting strategies. Brokers prioritised household members, close friends, and neighbours when collecting votes.

The chapter also explained how the dynamics of electoral competition entangle candidates in a prisoner's dilemma. As the election drew nearer, the magnitude of vote buying efforts increased significantly and uncommitted voters and those perceived to be 'loyalists' were more likely to receive offers from brokers. Simultaneously, the availability of reliable brokers is limited. Candidates and brokers started to exhaust the supply of voters who have personal connections to them and move further afield in the search for both brokers and voters. Accordingly, a substantial amount of leakage—which occurs when people receive payment yet do not reciprocate with votes—occurred. Given that many beneficiaries were selected on the basis of personal networks, which were loosely connected to ideological proximity to the party or candidate, the potential for such slippage was great. In a context where elections were extremely competitive and multiple candidates engaged in vote buying, anxious

candidates also poured money into their so-called base voters, anxious that they would otherwise desert them. Brokers repeatedly reported last-minute manoeuvres made by rivals to outbid them. As such, candidates' decisions to intensify vote buying efforts were often like last-minute panic buying. In engaging in this practice they had little option but to rely on the discretion of brokers to determine which voters should be targeted, when and with how much money.

This was a risky game for candidates. Given their lack of mechanisms to monitor their brokers and the reality that many of them used 'extended success teams', relying on at least some brokers with whom they lacked direct personal connections and who were more concerned with a material payoffs, their vote buying attempts were vulnerable to rent extraction by brokers. Fine-grained evidence from my unique broker survey combined with qualitative work demonstrates that rent-seeking behaviors among brokers were common in the most recent legislative election. Nonetheless, candidates were quite relaxed about their brokers failing to meet vote targets, at least if they were successful in securing enough personal votes to win. Having realised that such rent-seeking behaviours are unavoidable and there are so many difficulties in enforce the vote buying contracts, candidates are tolerant if their brokers fall short as long as they produce victory in the context of Indonesia's highly competitive electoral landscape. Finally, despite the personal networks helping to provide a mechanism to structure vote buying in Indonesia, they cannot escape from the problem of agency loss between candidates and brokers that is integral to electoral clientelism in many contexts.

There remains one major puzzle, however. If vote buying efforts are so vulnerable to broker predation, as shown in this chapter, and the targeting is so misdirected, as already discussed in Chapter 5, why do candidates invest so heavily in it? The next chapter will provide an answer.

CHAPTER 7

DOES VOTE BUYING AFFECT VOTING BEHAVIOUR? CHASING NARROW WINNING MARGINS

Making vote buying work is extraordinarily difficult, especially in the presence of ballot secrecy. Yet vote buying is extremely widespread in Indonesian electoral politics. Furthermore, vote buying efforts face serious problems in their targeting: as we have seen, political actors try to 'buy' the votes of those who look like their loyal supporters, yet in practice end up giving most payments to other voters. The problems get worse as a result of rent-seeking behaviors by brokers, which increase the inefficiency of vote buying. All this leads to an obvious puzzle: if such electoral handouts are so misdirected, and create strong incentives for brokers to extract rents, why do candidates invest so much money and goods in them? The answer must be found at least partly in the effect of vote buying on electoral behavior. How effective is vote buying in actually winning votes? Surely it must have some effect in order for candidates to pursue it?

Little research has been conducted in Indonesia to measure the influence of vote buying on voting behavior. In the beginning part of this chapter, I endeavor to quantify the impact of vote buying on voter turnout and the vote shares won by candidates. I find that handouts actually produce a sizeable turnout or higher vote share for the distributing candidate. However, using a variety of techniques, I also find payments influences decisively the votes of 'only' about 10 percent to 11 percent of people who receive them. In these seemingly low numbers lies the key to the attractiveness of a vote buying strategy. The proportion of recipients who admit their choice is influenced by material inducements is more than enough to constitute a small margin of victory for most candidates.

7.1. Effect on voter turnout

As its name implies, vote buying is often defined in the literature as a direct market transaction where voters provide their vote in return for money or gifts (Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014). Brusco and her collaborators (2004: 67), for instance, define vote buying "as the proffering to voters of cash or (more commonly) minor

consumption goods by political parties, in office or in opposition, in exchange for the recipient's vote." In a similar vein, Finan and Schechter (2012: 864) view vote buying as "[offered] goods to specific individuals before an election in exchange for their votes." Given that vote buyers often do not explicitly demand a vote in exchange for their payment, Aspinall and Sukmajati (2016: 20) slightly modify the definition as "the systematic distribution of cash payments and/or goods to voters in the few days leading up to the election with the implicit expectation that recipients will repay with their vote." Similarly, Kramon (2009: 4) defines vote buying as "the distribution of particularistic or private material benefits with the expectation of political support." All of these definitions assume that paying boosts voter turnout and/or the vote share of the paying candidate or party (Guardado and Wantchekon, 2014: 2).

In practice, however, vote buying is an uncertain business. How do vote buyers ensure that the vote that is being sold is actually provided, especially in the presence of ballot secrecy? As previously presented in Chapter 6, most electoral payoffs in Indonesia are provided before the elections. If this is the case, it is possible for the recipients to behave opportunistically: to take the money and run. But if a candidate was to promise to provide cash only after the election, voters would likely suspect that the candidate would break his/her promise and not deliver (Baldwin, 2016: 67). If vote buying instead takes place before the election, with voters accepting payment but still being allowed to vote based upon their conscience, as Kramon (2009: 2) has questioned, why might vote buying have an influence on voting behaviour?

The effectiveness of vote buying clearly relates to the party loyalist versus swing targeting debate in the literature. If we stick with the party-loyalist argument, which views vote buying as turnout buying in which parties or candidates target voters who are already inclined to support them, the payment looks more like the mobilisation of passive supporters to come to the voting booth, rather than 'buying' the vote of an indifferent voter. In contrast, the swing-voter hypothesis implies that the payment really does act to purchase the support of an uncommitted voter. In this case, monitoring whether recipients turn out at the polls is less of an issue for the distributing party than is monitoring vote choice (Nichter, 2008). In the turnout buying model, if a passive supporter bothers to turn out, the givers can be confident that the voter will choose them. This sharply contrasts with the model presented by

the swing-voter school,[1] under which even if the recipient shows up at the polls, the vote buyer will still have no guarantee whether that person votes for the buyer or some other candidate.

Regardless of such challenges, I argue that politicians still have incentives to pursue vote buying because the evidence suggests it seems to influence voting behaviour in Indonesia. Let us first discuss its impact on voter turnout. My survey of voters conducted immediately after the 2014 parliamentary election allows me to examine the effect of vote buying on turnout. While the measure of vote buying has been already discussed in Chapter 2, the wording for the question on turnout was: "When discussing the election with others, we found many people could not vote because they were far from home, sick, or did not have the time or other reasons. What about you? Did you vote during the last legislative election on April 9, 2014?" Given that social desirability bias might induce the respondents to overstate their voting histories, I weighted the reported turnout by using the official turnout rate according to Indonesia's General Election Commission (KPU). The commission reported that national turnout for the 2014 legislative election was about 75 percent.[2]

Table 7.1 **Cross-tabulation of a respondent's reported turnout and their likelihood of being offered vote buying**

		Did you vote during the 2014 election?		Total
		No	Yes	
Receiving offers of vote buying in the 2014 legislative elections	No	26.0	74.0	100
	Yes	19.0	81.0	100
Total		24.3	75.7	100

Pearson Chi-Square (Value/df/significance)	5.675/1/0.017

Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

To test how voter turnout is affected by electoral handouts, I ran a Cross-Tabulation followed by Chi-Square to determine whether or not a null hypothesis can be rejected. The "do not know" or "refuse to answer" options were not included in the analysis. My

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[1]Abstract Politics (2008), http://abstractpolitics.com/2008/05/vote-buying-or-turnout-buying/. This is a review of "Vote Buying or Turnout Buying? Machine Politics and the Secret Ballot" (2008) by Simeon Nichter, *American Political Science Review* 102 (February): 19–31.

[2]For further discussion, see http://www.kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/Partisipasi_Pemilih_pada_Pemilu_2014_Studi_Penjajakan.pdf

primary interest was to examine the hypothesis that respondents who were exposed to vote buying were more likely to participate in the 2014 legislative elections. The cross-tabs seem to support the notion that electoral handouts are quite effective at producing a higher turnout. About 81 percent of the respondents who received a pre-electoral benefit showed up at the polls, compared to 74 percent of those who did not receive offers of vote buying. Turning to the measures of strength and significance, the Pearson chi-squared value is 0.017, meaning that it is below the p-level of 0.05, thus making it significant. Although vote buying and voter turnout do have a statistically significant association, it is also reasonable to argue that vote buyers were targeting voters they believed or knew were more likely to vote. As argued in Chapter 2, this notion is in line with the evidence that candidates and brokers tend to target more heavily that group of voters for whom vote buying is an acceptable practice, which in turn increases their likelihood to vote if given rewards.

In order to explore which voters whose attendances in polling stations was most influenced by vote buying, I then grouped or split the data to compare results across different subsets, I ran a cross-tab of respondents' reported turnout and the likelihood of being offered vote buying with respect to the categories of some demographic variables. Given the limited sample size of each group, I divided them into two broad categories. Table 7.2 contains separate tables of results for each group. Without even turning to the Chi-Square results, in the data from the cross-tabs the gendered effects of vote buying on voter turnout are evident. The electoral participation of female voters was found to be significantly influenced by material rewards. Female voters exposed to a pre-electoral exchange were far more likely to turn out than those who did not receive the offer. Furthermore, the Chi-Square test reaches a significance level of 0.000, confirming that the effect of vote buying on turnout among female voters is truly significant.

With regard to the age category, although voters aged below 40 years experiencing such attempts were more likely to vote than their counterparts who did not receive the offer, the relationship was not statistically significant in the strictest sense ($p < 0.050$), but it is still significant at at the 90 percent level. In contrast, the difference in voting participation between those who received an offer and those who did not among voters aged 40 years old or above is clearly significant.

Table 7.2 **Reported turnout and vote buying experience across demographic groups**

		Reported Voter Turnout		Chi-Square (value/df/Sig)
	Self-Reported Vote Buying	No, I didn't Vote	Yes, I Voted	
Gender				
Male	**No**	26.76	73.24	0.044/1/0.835
	Yes	27.61	72.39	
Female	**No**	25.28	74.72	18.729/1/0.000
	Yes	6.84	93.16	
Age group				
< 40 years old	**No**	32.42	67.58	2.811/1/0.094
	Yes	25.00	75.00	
>= 40 years old	**No**	20.82	79.18	4.970/1/0.026
	Yes	12.21	87.79	
Rural-urban				
Rural	**No**	27.04	72.96	1.225/1/0.268
	Yes	22.45	77.55	
Urban	**No**	24.88	75.12	5.459/1/0.019
	Yes	15.15	84.85	
Education				
<= Primary School	**No**	15.36	84.64	0.347/1/0.556
	Yes	17.70	82.30	
>= Primary School	**No**	32.84	67.16	10.465/1/0.001
	Yes	19.76	80.24	
Montly Income				
Below 1 million rupiah	**No**	24.66	75.34	2.878/1/0.090
	Yes	17.09	82.91	
Above 1 million rupiah	**No**	27.26	72.74	3.074/1/0.080
	Yes	20.37	79.63	

Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

Contrary to the conventional wisdom suggesting rural voters are more likely to be prone to electoral inducements, my study found the opposite. Exposure toward vote buying among urban dwellers makes a difference. Those who received an offer had higher turnout compared to those who did not. The two do have a statistically significant relationship. However, as indicated earlier, it may be the case that brokers could be targeting voters they know will vote, and these voters were more likely to live in urban areas. This finding is especially striking, given much of the literature on clientelism suggesting that rural voters are more prone to clientelist practices due to the prevalence of traditional patron-client networks through which material benefits can be delivered (Hicken, 2007a: 56). Part of the explanation for this confusion will be the ongoing reclassification of rural dwellers as urban (see, Chapter 4). These blurred boundaries between urban and rural might have resulted in the identification of urban citizens as being more likely to turn out as a direct response to a gift of cash or goods.

In terms of education, the effect of vote buying on turnout is more obvious among those educated *above* primary school. The Chi-Square proves that vote buying has an effect among those who were educated to middle school or above. Finally, the level of income does not make a difference. Looking initially to the cross-tabulation displayed in Table 7.2, vote buying looks like is has an influence among both those who earned below and above IDR. 1 million per month. However, when I ran a Chi-Square to examine the significance of the relationship, we find no statistically significant difference in behaviour between individuals from both categories of income who received cash handouts and those who did not.

Overall, the findings provide initial suggestive evidence that vote buying may have a significant impact on turnout but we cannot be sure about the direction of causation: it may be that success teams target for payment voters who they identify as being more likely to turn out. Even if we accept that electoral handouts resulted in greater turnout, their effects are different among demographic groups. The finding that vote buying works at boosting electoral participation among women contradicts previous studies focusing in Africa suggesting males, especially those who support relatively weak parties, are most likely to be targeted and this, in turn, increases their turnout (e.g. Kramon, 2009). The finding that cash handouts among rural and lower education voters do not boost turnout is hugely significant, as but do some among urban voters runs counter to ealier studies, most out of Africa, that rural voters are more likely to comply with vote buying contracts, at least in the sense of showing up at the polls (Bratton, 2008: 11). Similarly, the finding that experience vote buying increases the likelihood of turning out to vote among those who were educated at the middle school level or above at a higher rate than among less educated voters (defined as those who only had a primary education, or had no formal education at all) is inconsistent with previous studies (e.g. Blaydes, 2006; Kramon, 2009). These findings point to a possible future research agenda.

7.2. Effect on vote choice

7.2.1 Estimates from direct individual and neighbourhood measures

Having reviewed the effect of vote buying on voter turnout, we are now in a position to test its influence on voting choice. I return to data from my large nationally representative survey conducted immediately after the 2014 legislative election. The

data allow me to quantify the effects of vote buying using a number of survey items of varying degrees of directness, including a list-experiment. The main objective of employing various methods is to minimise the potential effect of respondents' fear about answering questions about vote buying. In addition, I wanted this study to provide a sense of comparison between what different techniques tell us about the effects of vote buying on vote choice and examine whether direct individual questions about the influence of vote buying are subject to social desirability bias. To complete the picture, I also measure the extent to which vote buying is effective in the elections of regional leaders, utilising a large dataset of local surveys from 2006 to 2015.

Table 7.3 **Relative influence of vote buying in 2009 and 2014 (%)**

Measure	Baseline	Influence	Total Score
Direct individual vote buying in 2014	25	41.8	10.2
Direct neighbourhood vote in 2014	28.9	58.1	16.7
Direct individual vote buying in 2009	10.1	49.6	4,9
Direct neighbourhood vote buying in 2009	12.9	60.3	7.7

Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

Table 7.3 provides a sense of comparison between reported vote buying and its effects on vote choice[3] in the 2009 and 2014 legislative elections based on both the direct individual and neighbourhood questions. Recall that the question about the influence of vote buying was only asked to those who admitted being offered a reward. Of those subjects (25 percent) who reported being targeted in 2014, around 41.8 percent admitted that the handouts were effective at influencing their vote. Thus, out of Indonesia's total electorate, vote buying had an influence on 10.2 percent. However, when the respondents were asked to assess in their neighbourhood whether vote buying was effective, of those subjects (28.9 percent), 58.3 percent felt that vote buying influenced the decisions of their neighbours. The likely effect of vote buying on vote choice in response to the neighbourhood question was higher than in the direct individual measure, but not substantively so.

A similarly slight pattern in the perceived effectiveness of vote buying also occurred in 2009. Compared to a direct individual measure, those who admitted being offered

[3]If a respondent gave an affirmative reply when asked about vote buying offers, I asked a follow-up question: "Did the gifts have an influence on your vote?"

gifts saw their neighbourhood as being more vulnerable to be influenced by vote buying than they were themselves. Perhaps, some respondents—who admitted to receiving offers of vote buying—misrepresented themselves to show to interviewers that the gift had no effect on their votes. When it came to the question whether vote buying was effective in their neighbourhood, they were likely to be more open. Or perhaps such respondents simply thought that their neighbours were more likely to be influenced by gifts than they were themselves.

Table 7.4 **The effect of vote buying by some or no partisanship**

	Reported Effectiveness of Vote Buying			Total
	Vote buying had an effect	Vote buying had no influence	Do not know/ no answer	
Some Partisanship	37.2	60.3	2.6	100
No Partisanship	43.6	54.7	1.8	100

Pearson Chi-Square (Value/df/significance)	0.884/1/0.347

Source: My post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

What about partisanship? Looking first to the cross-tabulation presented in Table 7.4, a slightly larger proportion of non-partisans than partisans admitted that vote buying had on influence on their voting decisions. However, the Chi-Square test shows that the relationship between vote buying effect on vote choice and voter partisanship is insignificant. The Chi-Square value is 0.347, suggesting that there is absolutely no correlation between the effectiveness of vote buying on vote choice and partisanship. Though we have seen that partisanship clearly attracts vote buying (Chapter 3), it appears that the effect of such handouts on voting decisions has little to do with partisanship. It may be the case that the payment is largely seen by party loyalists as a sign of gratitude or reciprocation from candidates (see Chapter 5), while the effect of vote buying on uncommitted voters is not particularly large because of ballot secrecy and problem of compliance, such that most such voters do not feel obliged to reciprocate.

Overall, then, my study finds evidence that vote buying produces electoral support for the distributing party or candidate. However, its effect seemed to be ‘limited’, amounting to ‘only’ 10.2 percent of the total electorate.

7.2.2. Estimates from a list experiment

Can we be certain of this finding? We might have reasons to doubt the apparently insignificant effect of vote buying based on the direct individual measures. Given that vote trafficking is illegal and generally associated with a negative stigma (Gonzalez-Ocantos et al., 2012; Corstange, 2012), some respondents might be reluctant to admit the effectiveness of such handouts. In order to minimise the problem of social desirability, I therefore employed a list-experiment to estimate the proportion of individuals who voted for politicians simply because they received material benefits from them. Recall that the list-experiment is an increasingly influential mode of quantitative research to figure out causal relationships between independent and dependent variables. The electoral effect of clientelist mobilisation strategies cannot be ascertained conclusively by using direct survey questions. By using a list-experiment we can provide treatments that allow us to isolate the effect.

Accordingly, I implemented the technique with one control group and three treatment groups and I used the same inquiry for each group. The prompt in the second list experiment was as follows:

> People decide who to vote for based on a lot of different reasons. I will read you some of the reasons people have told us: please tell me if they influenced your decision to vote or your decision over who to vote for. I'm going to read you the whole list, and then I want you to tell me how many of the different things influenced your choice. Do not tell me which ones, just tell me how many. How many among those reasons could influence your decision on who to vote for?[4]

For the control group, interviewers presented the baseline list of non-sensitive reasons for voting included the following four items:

1. Reading newspaper coverage of the campaign regularly;
2. Reading the candidates' and political parties' campaign platforms thoroughly;
3. Along with friends/colleagues/neighbours/relatives and so on discussing the election campaign and the candidates; and
4. Talking directly to a candidate about his/her policies.

[4]Note that the wording used in this list-experiment is a bit ambiguous and suggests a hypothetical situation, not just the actual vote in 2014. It is therefore difficult to reach definitive conclusions. Further research is needed to determine the effect of particularistic strategies on voting behaviour.

The treatment group was presented with a fifth option, placed in the third response position. The three sensitive items, each of which was randomly assigned to a quarter of the sample, were as follows:

1. Receiving assistance with paperwork or numerous documents required for receiving government social funds (for instance, identity card, letter of notification as underprivileged family (SKTM), Raskin rice for the poor, scholarship and other social security or government services) (first treatment group).
2. A candidate provided assistance or donations for the community in a village/ ward/ neighbourhood such as building or renovating roads, bridges, houses of worship, football field, etc (second treatment group).
3. A candidate offered you money or a gift (third treatment group).

The main objective of this list-experiment was to detect the extent to which three particularistic approaches –relational clientelism, club goods and vote buying– have an effect on voting choice. I refer to the option provided by the first treatment group as 'relational clientelism' because benefits such as help in obtaining documents, required —for instance— to access government social funds require ongoing relationships beyonds campaigns (Nichter, 2010). In terms of timing, therefore, the benefits derived from such relational clientelism can occur at any time during the electoral cycle, which conceptually contrasts with vote buying, which is defined as a last-minute effort to shape electoral outcomes (Schaffer, 2007: 5–6). Relational clientelism arises from an enduring relationship between voter and politician, and reflects the presence of intimacy and deep ties between patrons and clients. In short, a vote might be paying back a candidate for past help. While the delivery of vote buying and club goods tend to be more election-centred, relational clientelism occurs over longer time scales. The second treatment option is clearly an example of club goods.

Before further discussion, I need to present the descriptive analysis of the control group. The mean number for the four factors that respondents in the control group said influenced their decision of who to vote for was 1.247. In other words, this is the average number given when the control group was asked to state how many of the four activities cited above influenced them. This number is our baseline. The average number of items indicated by the first treatment group where subjects had the added option of relational clientelism was 1.490. Meanwhile, the average number indicated by the second treatment group where list included club goods was 1.476. Finally, the

average number of items indicated by the third treatment group, which provided the additional option of vote buying, was only 1.385.

As noted above, there is some ambiguity whether the prompt used in this study was a hypothetical vote or actual vote in 2014. The results of the list-experiment, although not yet conclusive, shows the significance of relational clientelism and club goods for voting behaviour. Table 7.5 demonstrates that the difference between the first treatment group and control is 0.243, implying that 24.3 percent of respondents reporting their decision over who to vote had been influenced by such relational clientelism. The difference between the second treatment group and the control was 0.229, implying that 22.9 percent acknowledged that their vote choice had been influenced by the provision of club goods activities. Contrary to the rule-of-thumb among politicians and intermediaries, who often belittle club goods, it turns out this tactic is relatively effective in winning votes.

In contrast, according to the list-experiment estimate, the difference between the last treatment which, included vote buying, and the control group was only 0.138, indicating that vote buying influenced the vote choice of 13.8 percent of respondents.

Table 7.5 **Estimated % of reporting the influence of particularistic strategies**

	Estimated %	**SE**	**sig.**
Relational clientelism (Treatment I - Control)	24.3%	10.0%	.015
Club goods (Treatment II - Control)	22.9%	9.8%	.020
Vote buying (Treatment III - Control)	13.8%	9.9%	.162

Source: This list-experiment was embedded within the post-election survey, 22 – 26 April 2014

This estimate is not only markedly lower than the estimate for respondents whose choice is influenced by relational clientelism and club goods. The difference between the vote buying treatment and control also did not reach traditional levels of statistical significance. In contrast, the difference between the relational clientelism and club goods treatments and the control were both significant at a 95 percentage confidence level. Therefore, we can be reasonably certain that relational clientelism and club goods have stronger effects on electoral outcomes than vote buying.

As alluded to earlier, these findings challenge much of the emerging conventional wisdom about the perceived insignificance of club goods and relational clientelism in driving votes, relative to that of vote buying, in Indonesia. Much of the literature on club goods in Indonesia assumes that such collective patronage, typically consisting of small-scale infrastructure projects, or donations to certain associations, is a less reliable strategy in winning votes (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016: 23). This corresponds with the narrative among candidates that spending money on club goods is squandering it since they have no guarantees that neighbourhood or community associations who received the benefits will repay with their vote. Viva Yoga Mauladi, a candidate from PAN, shared the view, arguing that the provision of club goods was wasteful, in part because it was ineffective in swaying voters' choices. He said:

> Many incumbent candidates, long before the elections, had in fact distributed a lot of social assistance to voters, renovated mosques, paid for road repairs, and so on and so forth. But, ironically, they lost to candidates who launched 'dawn attacks' by simply distributing small payments to voters just before the election. Caring for the needs of community is of course important, but it would not be enough. They expect to receive concrete, immediate payments (Interview, 22 April 2014).

The results of the list-experiment provide strong evidence against these expectations. In fact, club goods have a significant effect on voting decisions. Perhaps club goods can be effective if distributed strategically. In particular, they can secure electoral support from local and influential community leaders a long time in advance of an election. A successful candidate from PKB, for instance, rewarded formal and informal social associations with club goods which he thought were most likely to support him in exchange. He claimed that he was successful not only in getting most of their leaders to endorse the gift, but in ensuring they joined his success teams (Interview, 27 April 2014). To map out social networks that potentially increase the likelihood of candidates' victory, Aspinall (2016) distinguishes two sorts of networks which candidates typically use for the provision of club goods: networks of affect and networks of benefit, suggesting that the latter is generally more effective in increasing votes.

Whatever the reason it is clear that club goods are ubiquitous. As presented in Chapter 2, my post-election survey found that 27.4 percent of respondents reported that their community had received club goods from parties or candidates. One explanation for how widely used club goods is that this form of patronage is viewed as legally and morally legitimate relative to vote buying. More importantly, in practice,

candidates "do not rely on club goods or individualised vote buying in isolation, but in combination" (Aspinall, 2016: 11). In Indonesia, vote buying tends to be combined with other forms of patronage politics, especially provision of club goods. Serious candidates typically view their club goods and pork-barrel spending as an entry door (*pintu masuk*) to establish links with voters, while vote buying is a way to secure (*mengamankan*) their votes (Golkar politician, Interview, 21 April 2014). There may be combined effects of club goods and vote buying on electoral outcomes, which is important for the future research agenda. While conducting the list-experiment, it might be the case that there is some overlap between club goods and vote buying, let alone relational clientelism, in determining vote choice.

Another surprising result, notwithstanding the ambiguity in the wording used in the survey experiment, is that the relational clientelism contributed significantly to the voters' decisions. Many candidates underestimate the effectiveness of relational clientelism in driving votes and typically assume that it is not possible to go out into the community without distributing money or goods. Defying expectations, it appears that there are a variety of persuasive approaches that candidates can use that do not always involve gift-giving, but which can be effective. As in many Latin American countries, weaknesses in government social programs' make them vulnerable to clientelism (Sugiyama and Hunter, 2013). When a politician, or a broker who helps a politician, facilitates a persons' enrolment in a government program, such as RASKIN (subsidised rice program), BLSM (unconditional cash transfers), and other social services, it appears that this can be quite effective in driving votes. Obviously, however, this topic requires more research.

Putting these important issues aside for now, there is one obvious and critical conclusion from the list-experiment regarding the effectiveness of vote buying. Overall, the estimate provided by the list-experiment is congruent with the direct individual and neighbourhood measures of the impact of vote buying on vote choice, which ranged from 10.2 to 16.7 percent of the total electorate. The effect of vote buying based on the list-experiment —although statistically insignificant— was 13.8 percent of the total sample, which is statistically indistinguishable from the results from the direct and neighbourhood survey items. Cumulatively, we have strong evidence that a little more than 10 percent of Indonesians' voters are willing to let cash payments or gifts sway their voting choices.

7.2.3. Estimates from local election dataset

Recall that the estimates of vote buying effects above refer to Indonesia's most recent legislative election. How about the effect of such exchange in different election settings? As discussed in Chapter 2, we know that vote buying is also extremely widespread during local election campaigns. But how effective are they in this kind of election?

My large dataset of local surveys in 34 provinces and 513 regencies/cities across Indonesia from 2006 to 2015 allows me to quantify the effect of vote buying in local elections. To achieve this goal, I had to synthesise a vote buying effect out of two separate variables. I ran a 'count' query to gain a sum for the responses to the first question inquiring whether distributing cash handouts was "acceptable". The 39.4 percent of respondents who thought vote buying was acceptable were asked a follow-up question: "How would you respond to an offer?" About 65.7 percent of respondents said they would take the payment but vote as they pleased; 20.8 percent would vote for candidates who gave them money; and 7.1 percent would accept and vote for candidates who gave the most. Only 4.2 percent would not accept payment for their vote, even though they thought giving cash was an acceptable practice.

In order to measure the effect of vote buying during local elections, I categorised the responses from the synthesis of the two questions into four groups: first, voters who viewed the payment as totally unacceptable, which was 61 percent of the electorate; second, those who thought vote buying was acceptable, but declined to accept the offer, which constituted a tiny proportion (1.7 percent); third, those who saw it as an acceptable practice, would accept the money but still vote for their preferred candidate, amounting to 26.2 percent of the overall respondents; and fourth, those who thought it was acceptable to give cash, would accept such a gift and vote for the giver. I defined this group as vote sellers- i.e. those whose voting decisions are mostly affected by rewards. My large dataset found that 63,989 respondents—equal to 11.1 percent—out of 574,686 cases included in this study can be grouped in this constituency of vote sellers.

In sum, estimated from a wide range of methods, my study found the effect of electoral handouts on voting choice lies somewhere between 10.2 and 11.1 percent. But I decided to exclude the estimate based on a list-experiment—which stood at 13.8 percent—largely because it was statistically insignificant. Similarly, I did not include the estimate from the neighbourhood question because it, in fact, does not allow us to measure whether vote buying actually influenced the choice of people in the respondent's community.

7.3. Chasing a margin of victory

At first glance, all of the estimates I have come up with for the effect of vote buying may appear small, since the data showed that only a relatively small proportion of recipients of payments reciprocate with votes. These results present a puzzle. If this is true that vote buying yields minor results, why do politicians do it? If the votes of only a small proportion of those to whom they deliver payments are swayed, why do they persist? Note that vote buying is not an easy task. The problems of broker predation and misdirected targeting already make vote buying tremendously inefficient, as discussed in earlier chapters. Yet on top of these problems, that it is also, overall, ineffective at influencing vote choices. Under such circumstances, why do candidates invest large amounts in gifts to voters?

The answer is the found in the high electoral uncertainty regarding candidates' personal prospects of victory. Although, in the aggregate, the effect of vote buying on electoral outcomes looks insignificant, a minor shift in votes can make a huge difference for a candidate. It can be the difference between winning and losing in a competitive election. Candidates have reason to invest in vote buying because they are usually chasing a narrow winning margin.

7.3.1. Open-list PR and electoral competitiveness

In order to substantiate this argument, I first establish the extent to which electoral competitiveness affects candidate behaviour. As discussed in Chapter 1, since the introduction of a fully open-list system in 2009, legislative elections have been extremely competitive. Note that in Indonesia's most recent elections, there were 6,608 candidates distributed across 12 national parties running for the 560 seats in the House of Representatives. Therefore, the average level of competitiveness was 11.8 candidates per seat. As discussed in Chapter 1, in order to determine the winning candidate according to the open-list system, each party that successfully secures a seat (or seats) must allocate it (or them) to whichever of its candidates obtained the most votes. If there is only one seat for the party, the winner takes all. The open-list system has thus produced a pattern of 'ground war' electioneering in which candidates from the same party engage in intense campaigning for personal votes (Aspinall et al., 2017: 12). PDI-P's Richard Sualang, for instance, recalled that during the 2014 campaigns one candidate from a different party approached him to release his voter lists (the lists which, as we have seen, many candidates use to determine to whom

they will deliver cash payments). If he was willing to hand over the lists, this external rival promised he would use them to ensure that he was not targeting Sualang's base voters, and to ensure that he was instead distributing resources to his own constituents in order to outspend his co-partisans (Interview, 26 April 2014).

As a result of this situation, legislative elections in Indonesia have become zero-sum games. One striking example is a close battle for a seat in the provincial legislature in the electoral district 5, Special Region of Yogyakarta. PDI-P was declared to be the winner and received two seats. Koeswanto won the first seat by a comfortable margin. However, there was great uncertainty about which candidate would secure the second seat because the results were so close. With 99 percent of the vote counted it was still unclear who would win. Eventually, the final count gave incumbent candidate Gimmy Rusdin victory by a single vote, meaning that the vote margin was essentially zero. He won the race dramatically with a total of 9,417 votes, while his internal rival, Listiani Warih Wulandari, secured 9,416 votes.[5]

Under open ballot systems, candidates have clear incentives to compete against internal party rivals, rather than focusing their competition against candidates from other parties. Whether based on past voting records or a strong belief that each party has its own constituency, they are usually able to predict how many seats each party will win in a given electoral district (Ibrahim, 2016), or at least there is relatively little uncertainty regarding the distribution of seats among parties. But they suffer from a high degree of uncertainty regarding which individual candidate will win. This is particularly the case when there is no candidate who is widely favoured to win in a particular district. Even the presence of a very popular candidate does not necessarily lower the level of uncertainty. In the electoral district Central Java V, it is almost impossible for PDI-P candidates to defeat the incumbent, Puan Maharani, the daughter of party matriarch Megawati Soekarnoputri. But although Puan regularly wins one seat, other candidates from the same party still have a chance of getting elected to the additional seats in the constituency.

The dominant narrative among candidates is that open-list PR systems offer a degree of hope of electoral success to all candidates as individuals, and that their electoral fate therefore depends heavily on their own efforts. Note that in order to gain a seat,

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[5]E-Parlemen DPRD DIY, "Daftar Caleg Terpilih DPRD DIY Periode 2014 – 2019," published 25 April 2014, viewed at http://www.dprd-diy.go.id/daftar-caleg-terpilih-dprd-diy-periode-2014-2019/ accessed 20 May 2014.

candidates first need to make sure their party reaches the national threshold for parliamentary representation (3.5 percent of the national vote) and reaches the quota required to gain at least one seat in their electoral district (this is the total number of valid votes cast in the electoral district divided by the total number of seats). The total vote for the party and its individual candidates is therefore important. Assuming a party gains one seat in a district, since that seats goes to the candidate on the party list who obtains the most personal votes, most elected candidates are helped either by voters who vote for the party only or for other candidates from the party. In short, the main challenge for candidates is to be ranked above their co-partisans. Hence, most candidates approach an election feeling they need to figure out how many personal votes they need to win, how close the race will be, who their main internal rivals are, their relative areas of strength, and so on.

The literature on electoral mobilisation shows that politicians act strategically. If they have little chance of getting elected, they do not invest large amounts of resources in personal campaigns. Likewise, if they have a reasonable chance of winning a seat, they will make more of an effort to compete (Milazzo and Karp, 2013). Selb and Lutz's important study (2015) found that the level of competitiveness is not only determined by actual election results, but also by candidates' self-perceived competitiveness. Candidates facing a narrow loss or narrow victory are likely to spend heavily in search of personal votes to outdo co-partisans, generating a cycle of competition which results in even more competitive elections.

This setting is clearly relevant to my inquiry into vote buying. The great uncertainty surrounding electoral outcomes in places like Indonesia creates incentives for candidates to pursue vote buying to maximise the chances of winning (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; van de Walle, 2007). The literature has long stated that vote buying tends to be higher in constituencies where elections are highly contested.[6] The rationale is simple: in an environment in which a relatively small percentage of the votes can change candidates' electoral fortune, their propensity to engage in vote buying increases. In this regard, vote buying is a means of reducing electoral uncertainty (Jensen and Justesen, 2014). Electoral uncertainty is in fact the defining feature of electoral competitiveness (Przeworski, 1986; Schedler, 2013). The more uncertain the outcome of an election, the more competitive it is (Blais and Lago, 2009: 95; Franklin, 2004: 56–57). It follows that under an electoral

[6]Indeed, there is an issue of reverse causation here, which I will address in the final part of this chapter, whether candidates are more inclined to buy votes in more competitive districts or whether more vote buying makes districts more competitive.

system which creates competition for personal votes, candidates' uncertainty regarding the probability of winning will make them consider vote buying as a way to chase even a narrow margin of victory.

In this study, electoral competitiveness is measured at the national level and is operationalised as margin of victory. Using official election statistics, this chapter presents two different measures of the margin of victory —one taken as a percentage of overall valid votes in the electoral district, one as a percentage of the valid votes per party in the district. Note that this may be problematic when comparing to the effectiveness of vote buying: a single vote buyer does not distribute payments either to all voters in the electoral district, or even to all who support his or her party, but to a significantly lower number. But, at least, the latter (i.e. a percentage of valid votes cast for a party in an electoral district) is a better measure for assessing the margins needed by individual candidates to win by distributing cash (remembering that no candidate will distribute cash to all the party's voters in an electoral district, let alone to all voters). Hence, my analytical focus is on victory margin as a percentage of the valid votes cast for each party in the district.

In this section, however, I start determining average margin of victory as a percentage of all valid votes cast in the constituency, simply to provide a broader picture of how competitive parliamentary elections in 2014 were in each constituency. However, given that under open ballot systems electoral competition takes the form of intraparty competition, and considering that under the system, the primary focus of candidates (the main vote buyers) is getting themselves a seat before their intraparty competitors, the level of competitiveness should be closely examined within political parties. Accordingly, after establishing the difference between the vote share of the lowest-placed winner and the highest-placed losing candidate from the same party in any electoral district, I will discuss the primary interest of this study: margin of victory as percentage of votes cast for a particular party in the constituency in the following section. Then, as I elaborate later in this chapter, in order to test the relationship between vote buying and such electoral competitiveness—measured as the margin of victory—I merge the actual election results with pre-electoral district surveys to gain ex-ante information on the ubiquity of vote buying at the constituency level.

Before proceeding, I present descriptive findings about the closeness of electoral results in each electoral district using victory margins of individual candidates over their party-list rivals as the primary measure of electoral competitiveness, with those victory margins calculated as a percentage of the total valid votes cast in the

consituency. Figure 7.1 showing the average margins of victory in each national parliamentary constituency is simple: the larger they are, the less competitive is the electoral district. Because the quota—determined by population size—varies considerably across electoral districts, the average margin of victory in each district is then divided by the total number of valid votes cast in that constituency to produce the percentages in figure 7.1. To make it simple, I categorise the results into four broad groups. The first group is ultra-close contests—those with a victory margin of less than a one half of one percent. In 2014, the smallest margins were seen in West Java XI and East Java III—its precise margin was actually 0.47 percent, rounded up to 0.5 percent as appeared in Figure 7.1. The second is very close races, those with victory margins of between a half of 1 percent and 2 percent.[7] The majority of constituencies (48 out of 77 electoral districts across Indonesia) belong to this group, confirming the hypothesis that the general pattern has been extremely competitive under open-list PR system. It is also worth noticing that in the above graph, most of those very close contests were located in the densely populated islands of Java and Sumatra with some of them decided by even less than 1 percent of the total polled votes.

Figure 7.1 **The average margin of victory in personal votes by electoral district (%)**



Source: assorted the Electoral Commission (KPU) documents relating to the results of the 2014 legislative elections

[7] I adapt the first two categories from Ray Christensen and Kyle Colvin, "Stealing Elections: A Comparison of Election Night Corruption in Japan, Canada, and the United States" (2007).

The third group is close contests –decided by an average margin of between 2.1 percent and 4 percent in 2014. As shown in Figure 7.1, 17 electoral districts are in this category. A last category is uncompetitive electoral districts which had an average winning margin of over 4 percent. Interestingly, only a handful of constituencies were decided by big margins. The least competitive constituency in 2014 was Gorontalo, where winning candidates had an average 11.8 percent margin of victory, followed by Bangka Belitung which had fairly high margin of 6.9 percent and Riau Islands and West Papua which equally had a margin of 6.6 percent. These uncompetitive races all occurred in electoral districts with low magnitude with only three seats available in each constituency. This finding parallels Carey and Shugart's (1995: 431) argument that where district magnitude is higher, incentives to cultivate personal votes increase. Under open ballot systems, the higher a district magnitude, the more co-partisan competitors enter the race, resulting in more competitive elections as a result of increasing intraparty competition. The reverse is also true.

Overall, 69 out of 77 constituencies were decided by slim margins of less than 4 percent, calculated as a proportion of all votes cast in the electoral district, suggesting that the level of competitiveness in the constituencies was extremely high. As noted above, such constituency level campaigns were systematically associated with intraparty competition in which candidates from the same party were busy fighting against their co-partisans. Such fierce competition between individual candidates for personal votes helps explain why candidates pursue vote buying, despite its seemingly small effects on vote choice. Recall that the effect of vote buying on voting decisions ranged between 10 percent and 11 percent of the electorate, as discussed above. Note that there were around 187 million voters in Indonesia's most recent legislative election. Even if we use such a pessimistic estimate, the range between 10.2 percent and 11.1 percent would mean an estimated 19 million to 20.7 million voters nationwide admitted that receiving money and gifts can be a crucial factor influencing their voting decisions. For a more optimistic estimate provided by the neighbourhood measure, vote buying can affect 16.7 percent of the total electorate.

Note that the estimates of vote buying effectiveness are calculated as a percentage of those who received money from a candidate, rather than the electorate. Given that 'only' 25 percent of respondents were exposed to vote buying (based on the direct measure), and 41.8 percent of the recipients were influenced, in total numbers, vote buying had an influence on 10.2 percent. The effect would likely have been higher if the candidates were able to distribute payments to more than a quarter of the electorate. Given that among

those being targeted, 41.8 percent admitted that the handouts were effective at influencing their vote, it can be inferred the more the number of envelopes candidates distribute, the more likely they are to generate higher vote share. Let's say that an electoral district has 1,000,000 valid votes, and an average margin of victory of 4 percent. 4 percent is 40,000 votes. If a candidate gave cash to 100,000 voters, he/she would generate 41,800 votes (41.8 percent of the 100,000 recipients), assuming he/she is the only candidate who engages in a vote buying operation. This amount would be more than enough to explain the victory.

It is more complicated in practice, though. As already discussed in Chapter 6, given that there are multiple candidates competing to purchase the votes, or even avidly bidding up the price of votes to defeat rivals (Aspinall et al., 2017), and the evidence that a significant number of the electorate received multiple payments, it would be difficult for candidates to assess how successful their vote buying efforts was in generating votes. Therefore, many wealthy, serious candidates often double their efforts at vote buying in the hope of reducing uncertainty with regard to the election outcomes and maximising their individual chances of success.

This helps to solve the above puzzle of why politicians insist on spending money on vote buying in legislative elections, despite the fact that it is a strategy that would seem to fail to yield full effects. Despite vote buying being vulnerable to broker predation and the recipients not always repaying with votes, politicians believe that minor changes in voter support—whether by buying votes or other electoral strategies—can make a difference to the outcome.[8] Overall, this is in line with previous works suggesting that vote buying is a key instrument for parties or candidates to create winning margins (e.g. Jensen and Justesen, 2014).

7.3.2. Intense intraparty competition

Having established the average margin of victory in each constituency, we are now in a position to provide the average victory margin in each *political party*. As noted above, due to Indonesia's open-list PR system, which incentivises intraparty competition, this measure is a better indicator for assessing the competitiveness that candidates care most about. To arrive at the figure, the average margin of victory

[8]For further discussion on the impact of competitive electoral settings where minor shifts in vote shares can change electoral results, see Milazzo and Karp, "Electoral Competitiveness and Candidate Behaviour in Proportional Representation Systems," paper prepared for presentation at the Annual Conference of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois. August 29-September 1 2013.

is calculated as the lowest winner's votes minus the losing runner-up's votes from the same party divided by the total number of valid votes polled for that party in the electoral district. Overall, the size of the winning candidate's victory within a political party varies significantly. For instance, the winning party in 2014, PDI-P, won 109 of the 560 seats in the national legislature, with the victory margins of these candidates over their nearest-placed PDI-P competitors ranging from 0.1 percent to 67.2 percent. At the high end, PDI-P's Jimmy Demianus Ijie of West Papua defeated his nearest co-partisan by the widest margin. At the low end, PDI-P's Wiryanti Sukamdani of Jakarta I seat scraped through with a small margin of 441 votes or equal to 0.1 percent, the lowest margin among all PDI-P winning candidates. A President Director and CEO of PT Sahid International Hotel, and a daughter of one of the richest men in Indonesia, Wiryanti not only defeated her nearest party rival Abadi Hutagalung, she also successfully unseated the incumbent candidate Adang Ruchiatna. As alluded to above, PDI-P candidates also fought in a close race to compete for the third seat in one of the party strongholds in Central Java V. The promising young professional Darmawan Prasodjo lost to Rahmad Handoyo by a margin of 485 votes or 0.1 percent. Among electoral districts won by PDI-P, 27 constituencies witnessed victory with a margin of less than 4 percent. Among others, East Nusa Tenggara I saw the closest fight as Honing Sanny, who polled 49,287 votes, beat an intellectual-turned-politician widely known as Megawati's surrogate Andreas Pareira, who received 49,089 votes; West Java VII was among the most closely contested constituencies where four PDI-P candidates had a close fight to compete an additional seat received by the party.

Similarly, politicians from Golkar, the second-placed party in the 2014 legislative election, were forced to compete in very tight races against co-partisan rivals in many electoral districts across Indonesia. Of the 91 seats the party won, 26 seats were close victories in which the winning candidates needed a margin of less than 4 percent to topple their internal competitor. In West Java XI, four candidates from Golkar initially had a chance of winning an additional seat. Ultimately, Ahmad Zacky Siradj took home the prize by the lowest margin of 0.2 percent. Likewise, in Central Java IV, Endang Maria Astuti, who occupied a low rank on the party list unexpectedly defeated—with a victory margin of 0.3 percent—high-profile names from her own party, including the sitting candidate Hajriyanto Thohari, former Deputy Chairman of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR), who ended in the third position. Golkar politicians from the outer islands also witnessed tight wins, including Indro Hananto who defeated his nearest party rival by a 0.3 percent victory margin in South

Kalimantan I, Syamsul Bachri who won with a 0.6 percent margin in South Sulawesi II, and M. Lutfi who retained his constituency in West Nusa Tenggara, defeating his nearest rival by a margin of 0.9 percent.

The third placed party in 2014, Gerindra, also experienced high-intensity campaigns among its candidates. Fourteen out of the 73 seats Prabowo's party won were decided by a margin of less than 4 percent, with some won with a margin of less than 1 percent. The striking example was Martin Hutabarat, who almost lost his seat in North Sumatra III to his party rival Sortaman Saragih. Only 27 votes separated the winning Martin from the losing candidate, meaning that the margin was basically zero. This was the lowest victory margin not only in that electoral district, but also among all Gerindra winning candidates. Likewise, Gerindra's Dairul suffered defeat at the hands of his internal party competitor, H. Anda in Banten I constituency with a small margin of 332 votes. In West Kalimantan, Katherine Oendoen defeated her party rivals by a slim margin of 0.3 percent, including Deputy Party Leader Arief Poyuono.

In a similar vein, a high degree of intraparty competition happened among the Democratic Party's candidates in 2014. A series of high-profile corruption scandals implicating its party executives (Aspinall, Mietzner, and Tomsa 2015) forced its candidates not to rely on party branding but instead on their individual efforts, intensifying intraparty competition. Almost half of the 61 seats the party won in 2014 were decided by a margin of less than 5 percent. Dramatically, among these lowest-margin wins, two seats saw victory with winner-loser differences of almost zero percent. Salim Mengga retained his constituency in West Sulawesi with a small margin of 25 votes after defeating the closest rival, Sulfia Suhardi. This was the lowest winning margin across national DPR constituencies in Indonesia and across the winning candidates in all political parties. Similarly, Ikhsan Modjo, an economist-turned-politician and party leader's ally, was surprisingly defeated by a notorious local politician Ayub Khan with a margin of 57 votes in East Java IV.

Smaller parties also deserve to be mentioned. In Papua, the internal political race within NasDem was heated as several high-profile candidates clashed with each other. Three candidates had a chance of winning but Sulaiman Hamzah ultimately won the seat, defeating former two-term governor of Papua, Barnabas Suebu, with a small margin of 1 percent. In general, at least a quarter of NasDem's victories in 2014 were closely contested within the party list. A high degree of uncertainty and intense intraparty competitions can produce what Christensen and Colvin (2007) termed

‘election night corruption’ in which one candidate ends up engineering sufficient votes to defeat the nearest rival by a slim margin. For instance, Hanura’s top-ranked politician Erik Wardhana was first announced to hold a narrow lead over his co-partisan rival Djoni Rolindrawan in West Java III. The initial vote tallies showed that the sitting candidate Erik would retain his constituency by a margin of 0.9 percent. Djoni refused to concede, however, and reported Erik to the Elections Supervisory Agency (Bawaslu) and The Election Organisation Ethics Council (DKPP) for allegedly manufacturing votes to win the election. Having proved such fraud, both bodies recommended the General Election Commission (KPU) revise the vote tallies and Djoni was then declared the winner (see DKPP’s Putusan No 30 Tahun 2014; *Media Indonesia*, 22 September 2015).

Zero-sum intraparty campaigns also appeared among candidates running with Islamic political parties. Among the victories with the smallest margins in PKS, for instance, three seats had a margin of less than 1 percent. Of the three, West Java V witnessed the closest fight as PKS’ Soemandjaja won by a margin of 0.5 percent against his nearest party rival; Central Java III’s Gamari and DKI Jakarta III’s Adang Daradjatun were two of the candidates with 0.7 percent and 0.8 percent victory margins, respectively. Though not so tight compared to other political parties, intense campaigning among PPP candidates occurred in some electoral districts. Among others, Anas Thahir and Zaini Rahman were neck and neck in East Java III, with the latter trailing by just a 0.4 percent margin. The level of competitiveness among PKB’s candidates seems to be higher than PPP. Around 11 of 43 seats received by this moderate Islamic party had a margin of between 0.1 percent and 3.4 percent compared to PPP who had less hotly contested battleground constituencies. Among others, PKB’s Siti Masrifah won Banten III constituency, defeating her party rivals, including a well-known actor Tommy Kurniawan. The same is also true for candidates running with the Islam modernist party PAN. Almost one quarter of its total 47 seats in 2014 were decided by a margin of less than 7 percent.

Overall, the average difference between the vote share of the lowest winner and the losing runner-up’s votes from the same party in a given electoral district was 31,801 votes. Table 7.6 shows that the absolute number of votes in the margin of victory in each political party varied slightly from 22,125 votes (Democratic Party) to 39,263 (PAN). In general, these absolute margins of victory in each party are relatively small if we divide by the total number of valid votes cast for all political parties in all electoral districts (77 constituencies). Column 3 of Table 7.6 shows the average number of valid votes polled in each district was 1,584,463.9 votes.

Table 7.6 **Average margins of victory by political party**

Political Parties	Average Margin of Victory in Each Political Party	Average Number of Valid Votes Per Electoral District	Percentage
NASDEM	35516.7	1584462.9	2.24
PKB	30180.2	1584462.9	1.90
PKS	28500.4	1584462.9	1.80
PDI-P	23080.2	1584462.9	1.46
GOLKAR	23387.1	1584462.9	1.48
GERINDRA	25530.5	1584462.9	1.61
DEMOCRATIC PARTY	22124.9	1584462.9	1.40
PAN	39263.1	1584462.9	2.48
PPP	35049.7	1584462.9	2.21
HANURA	23247.6	1584462.9	1.47

Source: assorted the Electoral Commission (KPU) documents relating to the results of the 2014 legislative elections

The results are largely self-explanatory: all political parties suffer from a high degree of competitive intraparty contests measured by a small margin of between 1.40 percent and 2.48 percent. The pattern of intraparty competition among Democrats' candidates was highest, perhaps due to the decreasing popularity of the party, which forced its candidates to rely on their personal reputations, as discussed earlier. Meanwhile, though still competitive by any standard, candidates running with PAN witnessed victory with the highest margin compared to other parties. Overall, however, candidate-level competition in seeking personal votes in Indonesia is comparatively high since it only needs a margin of 1.65 percent of votes cast for that party on average for a candidate to win the final seat won on their party list. This finding is compatible with previous works (e.g. Christensen and Colvin 2007), suggesting that the level of between-candidate competition in multi-seat districts is likely to be more competitive since the vote share of the lowest winner and the losing runner-up will be much closer to each other compared to elections in single seat districts.[9]

[9]Again, regarding the electoral effect of vote buying that stood at 10.2 percent of the electorate, what candidates care most about is how to win the election by a margin that fell within 10.2 percent of their own personal vote. Recall that it is not the total party vote that really counts, but the number of voters a candidate distributed money to.

7.3.3. Electoral competitiveness and vote buying

Having discussed the zero-sum nature of intraparty competition, we now turn to examine the relationship between variations in electoral competitiveness and vote buying. Accordingly, I need reliable data on the level of vote buying incidents at the electoral district level. Pre-election surveys conducted by my polling organisation Indikator before the national legislative electon in 2014 are a good source of data for that purpose. In these surveys, multistage random sampling was used to produce a sample that enables us to make inferences and generalisations about the target population. I use 13 surveys with a total number of respondents of 9,344, with the numbers per electoral district varying considerably from 410 to 2,387 respondents.

Table 7.7 illustrates vote buying incidence and the average margin of victory in 13 electoral districts.[10] The wording used to measure vote buying in these surveys was: "During the run up to the April 9th 2014 election, did you observe candidates or success team members offering you money, food, household items, and/or other goods (excluding propaganda hats, shirts, and posters)?" Unfortunately, the district surveys were conducted about two months prior to the elections, while vote buying typically takes place or accelerates during the last few days leading up to the polls. We can therefore assume that such practices are not fully captured by these surveys. But though the available data likely seriously underestimate levels of vote buying, they do allow comparison across a number of electoral districts and therefore help us examine whether a high degree of competition actually drives candidates to engage in vote buying. If this is true, it should be reflected not only in a few days before an election, but also some months before the voting day.

To test the impact of electoral closeness on vote buying, I take two steps of statistical examination. I first investigate the link between competitiveness and vote buying in each electoral district (Figure 7.2). Then, in the next analytical step, I examine the relationship between individual-candidates-level-competition and vote buying as a better measure for determining the level of competitiveness in settings like Indonesia where under open-list electoral system, every individual candidate fights for personal votes.

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[10]My polling institute Indikator, along with SMRC, together actually conducted electoral district surveys in 73 out of 77 constituencies. Unfortunately, the wording used was not the most explicit version possible to uncover vote buying behaviour. The question was only intended to measure how acceptable vote buying was according to respondents, which of course does not allow us to measure whether voters actually accepted electoral bribes or even received vote buying offers.

Table 7.7 **Vote buying and winning margins in 13 electoral districts (%)**

Electoral Districts	Vote Buying (y)	Winning Margin (x)
West Sumatra - II	3.80	2.72
West Java - VII	12.77	0.75
West Java - XI	7.73	0.44
Central Java - III	5.20	1.98
Central Java - V	6.17	0.90
Central Java - VI	3.66	1.77
Central Java - VIII	6.48	0.61
East Java - II	6.93	2.84
East Java - V	5.36	1.26
East Java - VIII	7.14	1.38
East Java - IX	8.46	1.79
East Java - XI	4.60	3.01
Southeast Sulawesi	7.98	2.45

In the first step, the competitiveness of elections in 13 constituencies is based on the average margin of victory across rather than within party lists – i.e. I calculate victory margins as a percentage of the total number of valid votes cast in the electoral district. Hence, it can be said that the first stage aims to examine whether the electoral closeness in each constituency is correlated with vote buying. The second step is to gauge the extent to which the level of intra- and interparty competition *within* districts shapes vote buying (Figure 7.3). Given each electoral district had multiple seats being contested, I include the average margin of all winning candidates across political parties.

The scatter plot below demonstrates how the level of competitiveness in each electoral district influences vote buying. Each dot is one district. The vertical axis is the percentage margin of victory, while the horizontal axis is the percentage of respondents in that district who said they experienced vote buying offers. As can be seen in Figure 7.2, the levels of both competitiveness and vote buying vary considerably. The dashed line, which indicates the overall trend, is the most salient part of the figure. It goes markedly down to the right, showing the relationship between competitiveness and vote buying is in the expected direction, suggesting that narrower victory margins are likely to increase the level of vote buying.[11] However, the Pearson correlation test shows that the magnitude of the association fails to reach statistical significance in the strictest sense.

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[11]It is important to note, however, although it is not significant, this finding gives rise to the causation issue: Is it that candidates are more likely to buy votes in competitive districts? Or, does vote buying generate closer races? It must be acknowledged that this study cannot be sure about the direction of causation.

Figure 7.2 **Correlations (Pearson's *r*) between competitiveness and vote buying in each constituency (%)**



	Vote Buying		
	N	Correlation	Sign.
Vote Margin	13	-0.430	0.143

Therefore, we need to go beyond just testing the relationship between competitiveness in each electoral district and vote buying. Recall that electoral district races are not contested in a vacuum. Electoral competitiveness in each district should be put in the context of candidate competition *within* parties and *between* parties, as can be seen in Figure 7.3. In this figure, each dot is one candidate gaining the final seat won by his/her political party. In 2014, of the races for which I have relevant survey data available there were 92 seats available in 13 electoral districts. At the top of centre point, is NasDem's Hasan Aminuddin of East Java II, who won by a large margin in a district whose respondents reported receiving attempts at vote buying at a roughly average rate. At top right is West Java VII, home of PPP's Wardatul Asriah, who won by a fairly high margin in the constituency, where respondents reported the highest rate of vote buying. At bottom left is PPP's Muhammad Iqbal of West Sumatra II, who won by a slim margin in a district where its residents were less likely to be exposed to vote buying.

Figure 7.3 **Correlations (Pearson's *r*) between competitiveness and vote buying within electoral districts (%)**



	Vote Buying		
	N	Correlation	Sign.
Vote Margin	92	-.218*	0.036

The dashed line in Figure 7.3 demonstrates the overall trend. The line falls to the right, again showing that the correlation is in the expected direction, implying that the relationship between competitiveness of elections—marked by smaller winning margins—and vote buying really exists. The Pearson correlation test returned a significance level of 0.036 proving that the two variables do have a statistically significant relationship. We can be reasonably sure that, as electoral contests grow more competitive, average levels of vote buying increase. It is worth noticing, though, notwithstanding a clear correlation between competitiveness and vote buying, there is a causal issue, as discussed earlier. This study is unable to assess whether more competitive electoral districts make candidates to buy votes or whether the opposite is true: more vote buying generate more competitive elections.

To sum up, regardless of such chicken and egg problem, the analysis confirms much of the existing literature that states electoral systems shape politicians' strategies and behaviour. When the election of candidates within party lists is dependent upon securing a personal vote, they will respond to such competition by building personal appeals rather than relying on party reputation (Chang 2005; Carey and Shugart, 1995). Under these circumstances, what matters most in the open-list campaigns is intraparty

competition rather than interparty competition. As I have argued, it is the competition between candidates within a party list that makes them engage in more intense personal campaigning (Selb and Lutz, 2015). Given that seats are taken by candidates who obtain the most votes from each list, intraparty competition under the open-list system increase candidates' electoral uncertainty. The dominant narrative among candidates is that they were all dubious about their chances of getting elected –not only rank-and-file candidates placed low on their party list, but also party leaders who were placed high.

The link to vote buying is therefore doubly clear: first, when candidates are forced to compete against co-partisans, they can no longer rely on their party label to take them into parliament and they have clear incentives to differentiate themselves in other ways (Aspinall and Sukmajati, 2016: 13); second, when elections become highly contested, and a relatively small proportion of the overall votes cast can make a difference, strategic investment in vote buying can be expected to alter the outcome of the election. Because the open ballot system only requires candidates to provide a small slice of the vote to beat their co-partisans, the value of each vote increases. Therefore, while vote buying gains a seemingly small percentage of the overall vote, this can be more than enough to help a candidate win in a narrow race. As a result, although vote buying is inherently uncertain because of the problem of voter compliance and broker predation, such a strategy can make a real difference to election outcomes in closely contested elections such as those in Indonesia. My finding clearly shows that vote buying is an integral part of highly competitive elections. Given the significance of vote buying in determining the final results, my finding slightly differs from previous work by Aspinall and his collaborators (2015), which suggests that cash handouts in Indonesia are more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout. I would argue that it seems to play a deceptively small, but in fact very consequential role in determining electoral outcomes.

7.4. Conclusion

This chapter has endeavored to show the effect of vote buying on voting behaviour in Indonesia. It began with the puzzle about misdirected targeting of vote buying and brokers' rent extraction that might undermine its impact on vote choice. If such a strategy is largely ineffective, why would candidates invest scarce resources in it? But, if vote buying is truly effective, how big or small is the effect and what does it mean and for whom? I have shown in this chapter that vote buying is indeed effective

in producing both greater turnout and greater vote share, but the effect is limited to a small minority of voters. In terms of the effect of vote buying on turnout, I have shown that exposure to clientelism has a positive effect on the likelihood of turning out to vote. Rates of electoral participation are significantly higher among those who received cash handouts than those among who did not (81 versus 74 percent).

Regarding the effect of vote buying on voting choice, utilising both traditional obtrusive and unobtrusive measures, I have demonstrated that the estimated effect of such practice lies somewhere between 10.2 and 13.8 percent. These figures, however, define a range of the effectiveness of vote buying, rather than an accurate point-estimate. If we restrict the effect only based on a direct survey item, we witnessed that offers of vote buying 'only' influenced 10.2 percent of voters nationwide during legislative elections and 11.1 percent during local executive contests. Note that the 10.2 percent effect of vote buying is estimated based on those who experienced vote buying compared by the total electorate. If we specifically focus on the effect of vote buying *among* those who received payments from candidates (25 percent based on a direct survey item), its impact on vote choice was up to 41.8 percent of the recipients. Hence, in fact, the percentage of the total number of those whose votes can be bought must have been higher if machines are capable of handing out money to voters to more than a quarter of the whole electorate. But, in total numbers, the electoral effect of vote buying in legislative elections was 'only' 10.2 percent of the whole electorate.

My results answers a critically important question: If it is true that vote buying has a relatively trivial effect –in the sense that it only affects the voter choice of about 10.2 percent of voters– why do politicians insist on pursuing such a strategy? I showed in Chapter 2 that vote buying has become an increasingly prominent electoral strategy. But judging the *effect* of such vote buying without contextualising it within the context of the electoral system where candidates compete and interact can be difficult. What we really want to know is not 'how significant is the effect of vote buying', but 'is it significant enough to achieve a desired outcome?'

Therefore, I have demonstrated at length in this chapter that the seemingly trivial effects of vote buying on voting choice in fact are quite large enough to frequently determine the outcome of electoral races in Indonesia. In an environment where elections are shaped by intraparty competition like Indonesia, candidates depend on personal votes to defeat co-partisans. Under such circumstances, electoral uncertainty regarding the electoral outcomes increases. To measure this, I use two different measures of victory

margins to assess how competitive parliamentary elections in 2014 were in each constituency and each political party. First, the average margin of victory by electoral district shows that 69 out of 77 constituencies in 2014 were decided by narrow margins of less than 4 percent. Second, given the nature of electoral competitiveness in Indonesia is characterised by intraparty competition, I also provide the average margins of victory by political party as a better measure of electoral competitiveness. The empirical evidence reviewed in this chapter reveals that the average margin of victory within political parties— by which winning candidates defeated their internal party rivals— was only 1.65 percent.

Here lies the key to why vote buying remains an attractive investment and has been widely practiced in Indonesia. While the effect of vote buying on voter turnout and vote choice may appear small, in Indonesia's highly competitive election settings, that 10.2 percent matters significantly. The marginal value of each voter collected through buying votes is high enough to constitute narrow winning margins, which helps explain why candidates pursue vote buying, despite its seemingly small effects on voting behaviour.

CHAPTER 8

CONCLUSION

As the third wave of democracy has swept the world since the 1970s (Huntington, 1991), scholarly attention has increasingly turned to assessing the quality of democracy (Kramon, 2013: 252). One of the important measures of the quality of democracy is free and competitive elections. A widely held view among scholars is that electoral clientelism has become a major impediment to such democratic elections. Indonesia is a perfect example. It has made important advances toward democratic consolidation with four consecutive national elections since 1999 and thousands of local elections since 2005. In reality, however, the development of democracy in Indonesia has been burdened by pervasive forms of patronage distribution, especially vote buying. As a former student activist who took to the streets along with thousands of protesters demanding democratic reforms in 1998 — which ended in the birth of a newly democratic regime— in making this study I have been in part motivated by normative concerns about the impact of vote buying on the accountability of democratic institutions and policy representation in my country.

More importantly, this study has also been driven by the strong impression I received when I was conducting 13 months' fieldwork in Indonesia. I increasingly felt that the dominant literature on vote buying and turnout buying, which were developed in other settings, was simply insufficient to explain the ubiquity of vote buying in Indonesia. Much of the scholarship on vote buying is based on the Latin American experience. As a consequence, theories of vote buying assume that *parties* determine how money is distributed. In Indonesia, by contrast, *individual candidates* do the vote buying. In Indonesia's open-list ballot system, intraparty competition is fierce, and candidates see party peers as their most proximate threat. Under these conditions, candidates are compelled to rely heavily on personal networks rather than party machines. Intense competition between a large number of candidates also means they only need a small share of the popular vote in order to win office. This differs from the situation in Latin America, where candidates and parties tend to pursue majorities or large constituencies. For all of these reasons, the established theories can offer only limited insight into the machinations of vote buying in Indonesia.

Under such different conditions, and in a context where candidates in Indonesia are largely insecure about their prospects of victory, I have argued in this dissertation

that candidates have clear incentives to use vote buying as a means of chasing a small margin of victory. In settings where elections are shaped by intraparty competition as a result of the open-list system, candidates busy themselves fighting on the ground against their internal party rivals in the hunt for personal votes. The desire to defeat their co-partisans makes them risk-averse when selecting targets for their material rewards. As a result, most politicians and brokers say that their preferred targets are partisan, loyalist voters, which is strongly evocative of the core-voter strategy that has been devised in the Latin American context.

Yet, as I explained in Chapter 4, my voter survey showed that while such partisan voters are more likely to be targeted than non-partisan voters, in reality the vast majority of vote buying —in absolute terms— happens among undecided voters. This is particularly the case because the aggregate level of mass partisanship in Indonesia is relatively small. Only 15 percent of Indonesians feel close to a party. This limited number of partisans is also highly contested among internal rivals. Accordingly, my findings show that although politicians tending to target constituents who they think are truly loyal, most brokers end up distributing to voters who receive benefits but do not reciprocate with votes. For various reasons, therefore, we cannot conclude that Indonesian electoral clientelism is based on the pursuit of party loyalist strategies.

In order to explain this combination of features, in Chapter 5 I offered an additional account to the scholarly literature on vote buying by combining the party loyalist model with a role for personal networks. I argued that in Indonesia candidates and brokers actually intend to target partisan voters, but in reality they mostly distribute patronage to people who are connected to personal networks. Though they think of these people as 'loyalists' in fact they might lack any sense of loyalty to the candidate. I call this mixture a 'personal loyalist' approach. Though it acknowledges that candidates largely depend on personal networks to identify voters to target with vote buying, this approach does not rule out the importance of party loyalists, seeing also a significant role for personalised partisan voters (i.e. those who posses a sense of loyalty to both the party and individual candidate within the party).

The personal loyalist approach is best explained in the context of open-list systems, as indicated earlier. Under such circumstances, the pressure to collect personal votes is intense. Candidates seek to personalise party constituents to defeat their internal party rivals. However, given only a tiny proportion of Indonesians are aligned with parties, such intraparty competition pushes candidates not to depend solely on party loyalists

to win elections. To be sure, despite their limited numbers, such voters are also fought over among multiple candidates from the same party, but their numbers are limited. Accordingly, having personalised their party constituents, politicians seek to expand their electoral base and extend their vote buying reach through personal connections mediated by non-party brokers. In the process, candidates frequently confuse personal loyalists as partisans, and misconstrue people with personal connections to their brokers as loyalists, too. At the same time, expanding electoral bases in this way can make vote buying susceptible to broker predation. Agency loss produces massive rent-seeking behaviours by brokers, making the problems of vote buying distribution severe (see Chapter 6). It is often the case that brokers exaggerate the number of loyalists, even deceive their candidates on this issue, so that they can engage in predation. As a result, many of the people who are identified through personal networks mediated by brokers are in fact not even loyal to the candidate. These two factors in combination –confusion of personal connections with loyalty, and agency loss– contribute to the large amount of targeting of uncommitted voters revealed by my study.

Interestingly, notwithstanding these factors, candidates still insist on spending a large amount of money on vote buying to pursue such spuriously loyalist voters. Recall that as many as a third of voters nationwide are exposed to the practice, making the aggregate level of vote buying in Indonesia the third-highest in the world, as indicated by voter surveys taken over the last decade. Yet these problems, plus other factors, clearly undermine the effect of vote buying on electoral behaviour. Offers of money 'only' influenced the vote choice of roughly 10 percent of the total electorate (see Chapter 7). Here lies the key to why vote buying remains so important: while this effect may appear small, in Indonesia's highly competitive electoral landscape, that 10 percent matters immensely. Across the country, the average margin of victory by which winning candidates defeated their co-partisans was only 1.65 percent (with the winning margin here defined as the percentage of votes cast for a party in a constituency which separated the lowest-placed winner from the highest-placed loser on a party list). The 10 percent swayed by cash are more than enough to make a difference to electoral outcomes, both in the aggregate and in the case of many individual races. Most politicians, therefore, feel vote buying can play a decisive role in determining the electoral outcome that counts: whether or not they win a seat in the legislature. As a result, many pursued this strategy with enthusiasm. By proposing that vote buying in Indonesia is a function of narrow victory margins, my study explains how and why vote buying is so prevalent in the country.

8.1. Theoretical implications

I have argued that the personal loyalist strategy helps to explain patterns of vote buying in Indonesia. What are the primary theoretical implications of this personal loyalist approach, and how do they contrast with predictions of existing theories? Table 8.1 provides a stylised summary of five major models of vote buying: my own personal loyalist model, plus the following four models: swing-voter, core-voter, informational model, and norms of reciprocity model.[1] The swing-voter logic predicts that uncommitted voters or weakly opposed voters would be the preferred target of campaign largesse in order to persuade them to vote for the benefactor party or candidate and change the game (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987; Dixit and Londregan, 1996; Stokes, 2005). This is based on the underlying assumption that a loyal voter is already captive. In contrast, the core-voter hypothesis argues that parties and candidates tend to target their own party supporters, because such voters are the most predictable source of votes. The rationales behind the 'core voter' model vary, ranging from risk aversion on the part of candidates (Cox and McCubbins, 1986), mobilising lukewarm supporters for turnout (Nichter, 2008), the endogeneity of partisan loyalties to electoral handouts (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012) to broker predation (Stokes et al., 2013). Unlike the swing- and core-voter models whose key parameter in distributing benefits largely depends on voters' partisan proximity to the machine or to its opponents, the norms of reciprocity model does not require voters to have strong ideological attachments. Instead, according to this model, clientelistic practices produce a sense of moral obligation or indebtedness on the part of beneficiaries to vote for the distributing candidate in exchange for the reward (Finan and Schechter, 2012). Finally, drawing from much of the African elections, Kramon (2013) developed the informational model of vote buying, arguing that vote buying is a mechanism for politicians to establish credibility with voters regarding the distribution of patronage and private goods in the future. It serves primarily to convey information to voters that candidates are credible and able to provide future rewards.[2]

Each line of Table 8.1 shows what theoretical preconditions or outcomes are to be expected by each of these models. The first group of "Contextual Factors" sets out the features of electoral competition under which the model is assumed to be applicable.

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[1]For comparison, see Kramon (2013: 65–69) who also made some comparisons between his own informational model and other three major approaches to the study of vote buying: the swing-voter, the core-voter, the norms of reciprocity models.

[2]In addition to Kramon (2013), the informational argument can also be found in the works of Lindberg (2003) and Nugent (2007).

The second, "Nature of Vote buying" summarises what form vote buying takes in each model. Finally, the table summarises effects of vote buying both in terms of vote choice and turnout.

Table 8.1 **Different models of vote buying: contrasting theoretical predictions**

	Variables	**Personal loyalist**	**Swing Voter**	**Core Voter**	**Informational Model**	**Norms of Reciprocity**
Contextual Factors	Party organisation	Weak	Strong	Strong	Weak	Unclear
	Compulsory voting	No	Yes	No	Unclear	Unclear
	Ballot secrecy	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
	Candidate-centred	High	High	Low	High	Unclear
	Party base	Weak	Strong	Strong	Weak	Strong
	Partisan preference	Low	Low	High	Low	Unclear
Nature of Vote Buying	Organisational structure	Individual candidates	Party	Party	Unclear	Party
	Objective	Victory margin	Vote choice	Turnout	Credibility	Vote choice
	Targeting	Mixed	Swing	Loyal	Diffuse	Reciprocating
	Cost	Expensive	Expensive	Cheap	Expensive	Unclear
	Broker type	Non-party	Party	Party	Unclear	Party
	Broker monitoring	Low	High	High	Low	Unclear
	Legality	Illegal	Illegal	Illegal	Grey area	Illegal
	Voter enforcement	Weak	Strong	Strong	Weak	Not at all
	Location	Private	Private	Private	Public	Private
	Strong men existence	No	Unclear	Yes	Unclear	No
	Personal networks	Yes	Unclear	Unclear	Unclear	Yes
Electoral Impacts	Vote choice	Minimal but sufficient effect	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
	Turnout	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

For simplicity's sake, let's focus here only the aspects ofQ my personal loyalist approach that have the most notable theoretical implications. The first distinctive feature of my model concerns the political context, specifically the role of political parties. I have demonstrated from the outset that the existing theories of vote buying have emerged in contexts different from that in Indonesia. Table 8.1 makes these differences visible in a number of fields, such as party organisation, electoral system, party base, partisanship and voting system. In particular, much of the extant literature on the swing- and core-voter models relies on the underlying assumption that party machines have the capacity to enforce vote buying agreements, and that they engage in ongoing constituency service (Stokes, 2005; Kramon, 2013). In contrast, the other three models (i.e. the norms of reciprocity and informational models as well as my personal loyalist model) do not require well-organised party organisations. In Kenya, as in many African countries where the informational theory was produced, the main

proponent of the approach Eric Kramon (2013) shows that socially embedded and well-organised parties do not exist. Similarly, the reciprocating model is built on the assumption that political parties are weak. Drawing from an excellent study conducted in Paraguay, the key theorists of the model Frederico Finan and Laura Schechter (2012) demonstrate that political parties in the country are weakly organised, not strongly ideologically oriented, and less embedded in society. Accordingly, Paraguayan politics tend to be extremely personalised (Rizova, 2007). My personal loyalist model arises in a similar setting. Vote buying in Indonesia, therefore, does not rely upon strong party organisations, but can also be mediated through a variety of informal networks. This study has provided evidence that institutional factors matter. The non-party organisation of vote buying in Indonesia is largely a product of the open-list system, which incentivises intraparty competition and prompts candidates to invest in build campaign teams that rely on personalised networks.

Still with regard to the role of parties, much of the literature on swing- and core-voter models broadly assumes that *only* one machine has the ability to engage in clientelist exchange (Nichter, 2010). This assumption may be justified in the context of contemporary Latin America, where mostly only one party can take advantage of the state resources and social networks required for clientelism (Stokes, 2009b: 12; Nichter, 2010: 97). This, however, does not really fit in Indonesia where there is cartelised party system, so that no party is locked out of state resources (Slater, 2004; Ambardi, 2009). Note that all parliamentarians independent of party affiliation have opportunities to access resources allocated for their constituencies (Farhan, 2016).[3] More importantly, the expectation of the personal loyalist strategy is that multiple candidates from the same party or other parties compete against one another even in the same neighbourhoods or households. This runs contrary to the existing literature on vote buying, which assumes that each machine tends to cultivate separate networks with distinct constituencies (Stokes, 2005: 324; Gans-Morse, et al., 2014: 17). In Indonesia, by contrast, as Aspinall and his collaborators (2017: 2) put it, "competing network machines often overlap within the same geographical locations and social milieus". Many areas, especially in Java, had become free-for-all battlegrounds in

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[3]Take for example Mulyadi of Democratic Party. As a leader in DPR Commission V, which is responsible for infrastructure and public works, he directed the rural infrastructure improvement program (Program Pembangunan Infrastruktur Perdesaan, PPIP) funds (about IDR 250 million per village) to his electoral district in West Sumatra II. In 2014, Mulyadi received the biggest share of votes in his district. Similarly, Roem Kono of Golkar secured another term in office because of his achievement in building an image as a caring person, thanks to state projects he directed toward his constituents in Gorontalo.

which multiple candidates fight for personal votes in every village, neighbourhood and laneway (Aspinall et al., 2017: 12). Multiple candidates from multiple parties also compete against each other to recruit brokers and determine their base areas. In sum, borrowing Stokes' (2005: 324) words, these "duelling machines" not only compete to purchase votes, but they also avidly bid up the price of votes to outbid rivals (see Chapter 6; also, Aspinall et al., 2017).

A second distinctive feature of the personal loyalist model concerns the purpose of the vote buying transaction. The swing-voter model assumes vote buying is an exchange of a reward for a vote choice: a voter receives money and in return votes for the giver. Conversely, according to the core-voter school, the payment is not to 'buy' a vote, but rather to mobilise supporters to turn out. In the norms of reciprocity model, the expectation is that such exchange serves either in a model of vote buying (persuading swing voters) *or* turnout buying (mobilising core voters). The informational theory views the transaction as a mechanism to convey a signal of candidate credibility with respect to future performance (Kramon, 2013). The personal loyalist strategy offers a slightly different story. In Indonesia's extremely competitive election settings, where only the winner takes home the prize of office, vote buying serves as a means of providing a small margin of victory. Minor shifts in support whether as a result of buying lukewarm supporters for turnout (core-voter model), or purchasing the support of uncommitted voters (swing-voter model) can make a difference in the electoral outcome. Most politicians in Indonesia realise that vote buying does not ensure victory in an election, but they do believe that it increases their chance of winning in a closely contested election. The dominant narrative among politicians is that if they do not engage in vote buying and others do, they will certainly lose. Hence, although vote buying does not always produce the vote that was hoped for, candidates still have incentives to pursue vote buying because in the context of fierce campaigns like Indonesia the value of each vote collected through such exchange can potentially make the difference between winning and losing.

A third point where my thesis about the personal loyalist strategy differs from other approaches regards targeting strategies. Given that the primary purpose of vote buying under the swing-voter model is more to sway voters' decisions than increase their turnout, the theory therefore predicts that politicians tend to target voters who are ideologically unattached or weakly opposed supporters. In contrast, the core-voter theory observes that politicians will try to target lukewarm supporters to persuade them to turn out on voting day. While the swing- and core-voter models employ an

ideological test to explain who is or is not targeted by clientelist parties, the reciprocity model predicts that political machines target voters who are intrinsically reciprocal. According to this line of reasoning, machines will not distribute their largesse randomly across the electorate, but will look at whether voters feel indebted to reward those who have helped them in the past (Greene and Lawson, 2012). By contrast, the informational model argues that the targeting of handouts will be relatively diffuse. Given that under such a model vote buying is a mechanism to signal credibility with respect to future rewards, cash distribution is therefore less targeted at specific types of voters (Kramon, 2013). In Kenya, where the literature on the informational model is based, distribution of cash and gifts can take place in public and one voter can receive multiple payments from multiple candidates, a strong indication that vote buying is distributed in a diffuse manner. An expectation of my own approach is that politicians and brokers express strong intentions to target constituents they think are truly loyal, but in reality they mostly target uncommitted voters who will not always reciprocate with support. This is largely because the concept of loyalty in Indonesia is ambiguous and has multiple dimensions ranging from kinship, ethnic and religious ties, receipt of patronage to connection via brokerage networks. When candidates and brokers claim to be targeting partisan, loyalist voters they do not only rely exclusively on partisan loyalties, but also judge the target in terms of personal networks. As a result, they misidentify non-partisans as partisans because they assume personal connections are partisan leanings. But the key is that they target persons who are connected by personal networks to their brokers, even if some of these persons to, in fact lack even a sense of personal loyalty to the candidate.

As with the informational model, my approach contrasts with the assumptions that underlie the two dominant theories of vote buying, which suggest that politicians distribute particularistic rewards in a highly targeted way to specific types of voters guided by the partisan preferences of the recipients to the machine or to its opponents (Diaz-Cayeros et al., 2012). Furthermore, both the swing- and core-voter models require ideological parties and ideological voters (Amick, 2016). In contrast, it is extremely difficult in Indonesia to target individuals based on their political preferences, not only because the population is becoming less attached to parties, with only one in ten people in the country who feel close to a political party (see Chapter 4), but also because parties are becoming less ideological and are weakly rooted in society (see Chapter 1). Tomsa (2010) claims that most Indonesian parties are now presidentialist in essence and no longer represent sharply defined ideological

constituencies. The current models of vote buying were developed in a setting where some parties possess very strong 'base areas'—e.g. working class areas in Argentina that have been voting for Peronists for decades, or the long-time rural voter base of the Party of the Institutionalised Revolution (PRI) in Mexico (see Chapter 5). A few parties in Indonesia, like PDI-P and PKB, have quite a strong tradition of having partisan voters; most do not. All of this distinguishes Indonesia from the Latin American cases on which the literature is based and therefore explains why the targeting of vote buying is distinctive in Indonesia.

Finally, existing theories also differ with regard to the impact of vote buying on voting behaviour. Most existing models predict that the exchange will influence vote choice; only the core-voter approach differs in this regard, instead focusing on mobilising the turnout of passive loyalists. Although the dominant theories of vote buying admit the effectiveneness of such a practice on vote choice, they have no consensus in the answer to why vote buying sways individual's vote decision (Kramon, 2013: 68). The expectation of the swing-voter model is that despite targeting those who are ideologically unattached, machines are able to detect who has kept with the vote buying bargain and enforce the deal (Stokes, 2005: 322). As noted above, in this view, parties have the capacity to monitor the recipients and ensure they reciprocate with votes because they are bottom-heavy and socially embedded in local communities (Stokes, 2005). In the reciprocity model, vote buying is effective because it is a moment of retrospective evaluations of candidates, when voters feel a moral obligation to vote only for those who have provided them with rewards (Greene and Lawson, 2012) and because of their hopes of maintaining close social relations and receiving future rewards (Finan and Schechter, 2012). Meanwhile, the informational model has little to do with restrospective evaluations (Kramon, 2013). Instead, the framework largely depends on prospective expectations of politicians, where voters expect to receive patronage goods in the future.

Overall, the dominant models assume that cash handouts will affect vote choice and motivate the recipients to turn out on voting day. Though my study does not directly address this debate, it does take up one issue which has been largely neglected by the scholars who have engaged in it. Thus scholars proposing these approaches have largely neglected the critical issue of the *magnitude* of the effect on vote choice and turnout: How big is the effect of cash gifts on both vote choice and turnout, and how should we interpret it? The conventional literature on vote buying generally fails to quantify the effect, assuming that vote buying will automatically result in higher

turnout or vote share. The expectation of the personal loyalist strategy is that the impact of vote buying exchanges may appear insignificant in numerical terms, but could still be influential in determining electoral outcomes. Recall that the meaning of the effect of vote buying, whether small, medium or large, varies by context. A 10 percent effect on voting decisions might be small in some contexts, but this number will be sufficiently high to clinch a victory by a vote buyer in many highly competitive election settings, as in Indonesia. This is similar to how advertisements work. They might be unable to make all viewers buy the product being advertised, but at least some people get interested, translating into increased sales. Likewise, vote buying may be 'ineffective' in yielding significant votes to the extent anticipated by the buyer, but the votes that are flipped may be more than enough to make him or her win.

8.2. Policy implications

Having discussed some theoretical dimensions of this study, we are now in position to review the policy implications. This dissertation clearly has implications for democratic accountability in general, and reform of electoral institutions in particular. In Chapter 1 we began the research by delving into an explanation of institutional arrangements in the post-Suharto era, seeing these as shaping the supply-side of vote buying. Changing electoral rules clearly shapes the propensity of candidates to engage in vote buying. Therefore, it is appropriate for this study also to offer 'supply-side' remedies to discourage parties or candidates from adopting vote buying strategies.

This study found that patronage distribution has been central to election campaigns in Indonesia. The results demonstrate that most candidates pursue vote buying because they see this strategy as affecting the outcomes of many competitive elections, where small changes in the voting calculus can alter the final results. An obvious conclusion is that the open-list system, in which a small number of personal votes are expensive yet critical for politicians, has been responsible for the growing prominence of cash handouts during political campaigns in Indonesia.

Although this list is not exhaustive, we can speculate that the open-list system has three far-reaching implications for Indonesia's political system as a whole. First, the open-list system obviously makes elections more candidate-centric because they create incentives for the cultivation of a personal vote. The results in Chapter 1 show that official statistics of parliamentary elections over the period of 2004–2014 exhibit a clear linear trend toward an increase in the share of personal votes cast, and a decline

of party votes. The finding from a series of voter surveys conducted by my polling institute, the Indikator in 56 electoral districts in February 2014 with a total of 43,510 respondents also shows that candidates have become more important. Likewise, a voter surveys conducted by LSI and La Trobe University in North Sulawesi and Maluku in October 2012 suggested that voters were more likely to vote based on specific candidate attributes than on the party affiliation of the candidates.[4] This corresponds with the results as presented in Chapter 6 that the candidate's qualities and personal reputation are far more important than the program of the party for which the candidate runs. The increasing role of candidates should be read in the context of the open-list PR system with its emphasis on intraparty competition (see Chapter 7). Under such circumstances, candidates are forced to compete against each other and differentiate themselves from their internal party rivals, including by vote buying. Accordingly, they need to run well-structured but expensive success teams and expend money on cash payments, club goods and other handouts.

Second, it follows that given that the open-list elections create incentives for candidates to pursue clientelist strategies, money has become the most important foundation of political success. Indeed, more money does not guarantee victory, but it does increase the chance of it (Aspinall et al., 2015). This was very evident during the 2014 campaign, which most candidates dubbed as the most 'brutal' election in Indonesian history. Zuhairi Misrawi, a DPR candidate from PDI-P with NU background jokingly put it, "there is a new Islamic jurisprudential maxim in politics: '*Al-fulus tuhyin nufus, ma fi fulus manfus'* (money will extend your life. If you don't have money you will die politically)" (Informal Communication, 2 July 2016). As Indonesia has moved away from party-centred to candidate-centred campaigns, candidates themselves have had to engage in costly mobilisation efforts, including running advertisements, commissioning surveys, building campaigns, mobilising constituencies and buying votes. The popular view is that given such massive costs, only better-resourced candidates can do well in elections. These expensive electoral processes, coupled with the fact that most parties are less ideological, means that parties are open to nominating candidates from outside the ranks of their own cadres. The Forum of Citizens Concerned about the Indonesian Legislature (FORMAPPI) revealed that in the 2014 election, only 33 percent of the candidates could be classified as party

[4]The candidate-centred campaigns have been particularly strong in Eastern Indonesia partly because the party systems in the region tend to be less patterned and less institutionalised than those in the western part of the country (Tomsa, 2014: 250).

cadres. Almost half of the total candidates (3,241 out of 6,607) running for national parliamentary seats had business backgrounds, with many joining the parties just a few months before the election (FORMAPPI, 2013).[5] The entry of such business people has come at the expense of candidates with backgrounds in political and social activism, who are considered to be unable to fund their own campaigns (Budiman Sudjatmiko, Interview, 29 April 2014). Such findings correspond with those of a study from PUSKAPOL UI (Centre of Political Studies, University of Indonesia) that documented two important aspects of the backgrounds of those elected in 2014. About 58.86 of MPs had backgrounds in business or the private sector, or they were entrepreneurs or professionals,[6] suggesting that money is an important for winning elections. PUSKAPOL also revealed that 77 out of 560 elected candidates came from wealthy political dynasties (*Republika*, 9 October 2014). Around seven out of them were among the top ten candidates receiving the biggest share of votes in 2014.

Third, by contributing to more candidate-centred elections, the open-list system has also jeopardised the relationship between voters and parties, making party cues less important and directing voters toward the short-term appeal of candidates. This electoral system has also contributed to the rapid decline of party loyalty (Chapter 5) and diminution of the image of parties in the public eye (Chapter 6). Survey data show that the number of Indonesians who feel close to a political party has declined significantly from 86 percent in 1999 to a mere 11 percent in August 2016. This number is comparatively low, making Indonesia a country with one of the lowest partisanship levels in the world (Mietzner and Muhtadi, forthcoming). Interestingly, the level of party identification started collapsing in 2004 (see Chapter 4), when the country introduced the semi-open proportional system and for the first time ballot papers featured candidate names as well as party logos, allowing voters to vote for a particular candidate rather than just for a party. This parallel development of declining party loyalty and the adoption of candidate-centred elections has made it difficult for parties to mobilise voters on the basis of programmatic campaigns and policy positions.

Accordingly, in order to reduce vote buying and move toward more programmatic politics, Indonesia needs to also move toward a more party-based system of electoral

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[5]FORMAPPI, "Anatomi Caleg Pemilu 2014" (The Anatomy of Candidates in the 2014 Legislative Elections), 3 October 2013.

[6]Republika, 'Ini Dia Profil Anggota Legislatif 2014-2019 (Here are Profiles of the 2014-2019 National Legislators)," 9 October 2014 http://www.republika.co.id/berita/koran/teraju/14/10/09/nd6caa-ini-dia-profil-anggota-legislatif-20142019.

competition. This can be made possible by revising the current electoral system and returning to closed-list proportional representation. Shifting the arena of competition from intraparty competition between individual candidates, to interparty contests, should reduce the need to generate personal votes through vote buying. More importantly, in closed-list multimember districts, voters choose among parties and the rank order of the candidates in the party list is determined by the party. Given that citizens are not allowed to express a preference for any particular candidate within each list, this type of electoral system tends to produce party-centric elections. In such a system, voters should increasingly turn their attention to party policies rather than personalities, enhancing party cohesion, reducing internal disputes, and centralising party leadership (Suwarso 2016). As Norris (2006: 105) argues, closed-list elections "encourage politicians to offer programmatic benefits, focused on the collective record and program of their party, and to strengthen cohesive and disciplined parliamentary parties." In an environment where voters have less choice to determine the fate of individual candidates, and where campaigns are more focused on party platforms than on personal reputations and connections, we can expect a reduction in the importance of money in determining electoral outcomes.

In a country such as Indonesia it is crucial to develop an electoral system that cultivates partisanship among voters. The existing literature on electoral systems largely focuses on the impact of the closed-list on strengthening parties' grip over candidates. Much of the literature suggests that this system has positively improved the development of party organisations (Suwarso, 2016: 165). However, little is known whether closed-list systems, in which parties tend to use electoral strategies that place more emphasis on ideology, also generate partisan attachment. An important avenue for further study would be to look at how ideologically based interparty competition affects voters' ideological proximity to party platforms. As noted above, when Indonesia adopted the closed-list system in 1999, almost nine in ten people felt close to a political party. The introduction of a partial open-list system in 2004, marked the beginning of a significant drop in levels of partisanship, with the situation becoming even worse after a fully open-list system was adopted in 2009. Intuitively, it makes sense to draw a link between party-centred elections and the strengthening of partisanship among voters. Further research is needed to investigate the extent to which electoral systems influence voter partisanship in Indonesia.

8.3. Concluding remarks

In the last part of this thesis, I highlight my contribution to the study of vote buying and how it might make a difference. Overall, this study makes four contributions to the comparative literature on vote buying. First, in terms of methodology, this study has used multiple methodologies by combining quantitative and qualitative approaches to determine the patterns of vote buying in Indonesia. Most previous works on clientelist exchanges are either purely ethnographic or they rely heavily on survey data (Kramon, 2013: 253). Focusing solely on one type of approach is susceptible to methodological problems. The general challenge of the former is to establish the extent of clientelism in a population and to determine causal inferences. The methodological problem of the latter is in understanding a phenomenon or the context in which the data are collected. Mixed methods of the sort I used in this study can offset these weaknesses and have allowed me to develop a broader perspective of vote buying in Indonesia. My surveys and qualitative research allow me to determine the scope of vote buying, trace its causal mechanisms, test novel hypotheses, provide interpretations in a meaningful way, and adjudicate between claims and debates in the existing literature. In particular, by relying on voter surveys my study has demonstrated that the level of vote buying in Indonesia is high by international standards, and such practice is effective in producing slightly —but electorally consequential— higher rates of turnout and vote share that are enough for most candidates to secure victory. No other methodological approach can so systematically establish the extent and the effectiveness of vote buying. In addition, supported by a list-experiment, my study has also showed that direct survey items about vote buying in Indonesia are not subject to response bias. Moreover, unlike much of the literature on vote buying which largely relies on voter surveys, my analysis is not based solely on the demand side of vote buying. By utilising broker and politician surveys, my study also puts emphasis on the supply side in order to understand vote buying from the perspective of the actors who orchestrate it.

Second, by embedding my quantitative findings in rich empirical findings drawn from my qualitative fieldwork, I have been able to demonstrate that investigating the political context in which vote buying operates is crucial to really understanding how the mechanism work in practice. Much scholarly theorising on vote buying is based on empirical observations drawn from several Latin American countries. In these countries, as already noted above, the organisation of vote buying is party-based, and political parties are not only socially embedded, but they are also well-

organised. The Indonesian case, however, is very different. This study has explained the prevalence of vote buying in the Indonesian setting where —partly as a result of the personalised electoral system and intense intraparty competition that occurs there— candidates rely on personal networks rather than their party, where partisan ties are weak, and where personalised loyalties matter far more. I have showed that the meaning of 'partisanship' in the framework of the Indonesian context —where a lot of connections between voters and candidates are not mediated by political parties but by informal brokerage networks— is far more nuanced than we might expect. One may relate the findings from Indonesia to neighbouring countries such as the Philippines and Thailand, where much of the literature suggests that political parties are generally weak and where vote buying practices are prevalent. Julio Teehankee, for instance, shows that after the Second World War and long period of dictatorship under Ferdinand Marcos, political parties in the Philippines "suffered from weak internal organisation, structure, and discipline, which resulted in weak party loyalties and constant party-swiching" (2012: 190). Schaffer (2007b: 3) also shows that in the Philippines, clientelist practices have also become a central feature of electoral politics. However, one major point of divergence is that constituency service in the Philippines plays a greater role in the interplay between parties and voters at the grassroots than in Indonesia (Berenschot, 2015: 560). Additionally, Filipino voters were more likely to be attached to parties with 42 percent feeling close to political parties in 2005, compared to Indonesian with only 15 percent of the electorate who did so (see Chapter 5). Similarly, despite sharing a lot of similarities with Indonesia with regard to the widespread occurence of vote buying (Hicken, 2002; Callahan, 2005a), weak party organisation and the use of personal campaign strategies (Hicken, 2002), political parties in Thailand are more likely to engage in constituency service than their counterparts from Indonesia. In her excellent ethnographic research in Thailand, Bjarnegard (2009: 123) shows that although they show little interest in promoting party policy, parties in the country actively arrange drainage, roads, electricity, and admission in school for their party supporters, suggesting that *parties* largely take care of the needs of community which typically happens beyond elections (Berenschot, 2015). In Indonesia, by contrast, *individual candidates* present themselves as caring for the interests of the community and offer 'concrete' benefits to their constituents, especially during election time. This greater role of individual candidates makes vote buying in Indonesia more personal (i.e. non-party-based) and might distinguish it from the existing literature, especially that which stems from Latin American cases.

Third, the fine-grained analysis of this study also contributes a more detailed understanding of how targeting of vote buying in Indonesia works, arguing that empirical evidence reviewed in this project fits differently to the pathway of the lively debate in the literature between proponents of the core- and swing-voter models. My research design, which primarily relies on tracking individual voter surveys, allows us to conclude that although there is a greater likelihood of party loyalists being targeted, the absolute majority of vote buying happens among non-partisans, given the relatively small number of party loyalists in Indonesia. In fact, my rich probability sample of low-level politicians and brokers, and in-depth interviews with national politicians, provide evidence strongly evocative of the core-voter argument. I have highlighted three pieces of empirical evidences explaining the gap between the politicians' intentions to focus on party loyalists and the fact that in total numbers, swing voters are more targeted than loyal supporters. First, candidates and brokers tend to exaggerate the number of partisan voters. Second, loyalty is an amorphous concept and has multiple dimensions in Indonesia. Third, agency loss results in both unreliable brokers and unreliable voters, confirming the classic problem of vote buying as an uncertain business. These are the points for departure for the personal loyalist approach I put forward. Despite candidates and brokers' claims that they were targeting loyal voters, it turned out that they were often providing benefits to basically uncommitted voters.

Lastly, my study has endeavoured to advance our understanding of the logic and motivations behind candidates' insistence on pursuing vote buying, regardless of the fact that the targeting of vote buying is so misdirected and there are principal-agent problems among politicians and brokers, and between brokers and their voters. I have shown throughout this study that despite such intrinsic problems of clientelist exchange, vote buying remains an attractive investment and has been widely practiced in Indonesia. This is largely because candidates believe that the voting decisions of a sufficient proportion of voters can be swayed by rewards. Even if the overall number of such voters is small, it is often more than enough to provide a vote buyer with a narrow winning margin. By emphasising the role of vote buying as a mechanism to provide a small margin of victory, and by understanding the electoral motives behind candidates' distribution of rewards, we can better understand how and why vote buying has become so rampant in Indonesia.

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APPENDIX A

INDONESIAN VOTER SURVEYS

As discussed in Chapter 1, the data used in this study is largely based on a national public opinion survey I conducted immediately after Indonesia's most recent legislative election in 2014. Given the centrality of this survey, I here explain its methodology, notably its sample size, sampling scheme, pre-survey preparation, data collecting, quality control, data entry and data analysis. Note that because I have been involved with the Indonesian Survey Institute (LSI) and Indonesian Political Indicator (Indikator), I here simply describe standard survey methods that have been used regularly by my polling institutes; the survey in question followed these standard methods. In addition, this study incorporates trend data from three pre-election surveys conducted by my polling institute, Indikator. However, since these pre-election surveys were done by the same survey institute and followed Indikator and LSI's standard sampling methodology and operating procedures, I will simply describe their sample sizes, timing of data collection, margins of errors, and numbers of original and substitute respondents.[1]

A.1. The April 2014 post-election national survey

My original survey took place from 22 to 26 April 2014, around two weeks after the 2014 legislative election. This timing provided citizens with a recent reference point for a variety of questions, including whether they had been targeted for clientelist exchanges during the campaign. The population of this survey was all Indonesian citizens who had the right to vote in elections: those who were 17 years old and above, or already married when the survey was conducted. The planned sample size was 1,220 voting-age adults, but one primary sampling unit (ten respondents) was considered to consist of defective interviews. Overall, the sample size was thus 1,210, selected with multistage random sampling, proportionally distributed over the 34

[1]In addition to the nationally representative public opinion surveys, this study is also enriched by a series of electoral district surveys and local election polls conducted by LSI, Indikator, and Saiful Mujani Research and Consulting (SMRC), especially when dealing with the issue of vote buying. These three non-partisan research institutes generally use the standard methodology of surveying Indonesians over the age of 17. Importantly, I have explained already the sampling methodology of those surveys, most notably in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2.

provinces. Based on this sample size, the estimated margin of error is ± 2.9 percent at 95 percent confidence level, assuming a simple random sampling design. The margin of error is at its highest when the true proportion being estimated is close to 50 percent. Nonetheless, somewhat higher error margins should be expected because of the use of multistage cluster sampling in this survey. It is worth noting that the design effect is not easily calculated using established statistical software.

With regard to the sampling scheme, the administrative system in Indonesia is divided into provinces (*provinsi*), districts/cities (*kabupaten/kota*), sub-districts (*kecamatan*), urban/rural villages (*kelurahan/desa*), neighbourhoods (*rukun warga*—RW) and subneighbourhoods (*rukun tetangga*—RT). Since this survey unit was designed to be nationally representative, the demographic composition of the sample—gender proportion, province, and rural-urban residence—should reflect the voting-age adults of the Indonesian population based on the 2010 Census (https://sp2010.bps.go.id/). As Indonesia is divided into 34 provinces, the sample was drawn proportionally in each province using random selection of the samples according to the following procedures.

The population was initially grouped based on the population of each province across Indonesia; in this way we can produce proportional samples in each of the provinces. The second stratification was conducted on the population proportion based on gender. According to the 2010 Census, the sex ratio for Indonesia is 101, which means that for every 100 females, there are 101 males (https://sp2010.bps.go.id/). In this study, the ratio was therefore rounded to 100, and therefore the gender proportion in the sample was equal: 50 percent male and 50 percent female. The third stratification is classification which is based on the area of domicile: urban and rural. Following the 2010 Census, the proportion was 49.79 percent urban and 50.21 percent rural (https://sp2010.bps.go.id/).

It must be noted, however, that the rural-urban proportion varies by province. Accordingly, the number of rural-urban respondents was selected in proportion to the size of population in each province based on the primary sampling unit, i.e. the *desa* (rural villages—the smallest administrative unit) or *kelurahan* (urban villages, wards). Systematic random sampling was done on the villages (urban or rural) selected in each province according to its proportion of population. From each of these primary sampling units ten respondents were chosen. Our research teams then went to the office of the selected rural or urban villages, and asked for the list of *Rukun Tetangga* (RT, the smallest neighbourhood units or hamlets). All RTs were listed, and then five RTs were selected at random. Our interviewers then met with the RT officials and asked them to provide the list of households (*Kepala*

Keluarga, KK) in the selected RTs. Having listed all of the households in each selected RT, two households were then selected at random. In each of the randomly selected families, all of the household members with the right to vote were listed—those who were 17 years and older or married—and one person, male or female, was selected to be a respondent. If the first household member chosen was a female respondent, then the next household member would be male, and vice versa. The interviews were conducted face-to-face.

Figure A.1 **Flow chart of respondent selection through multistage random sampling**



With 1,220 respondents initially planned, this survey selected 122 primary sampling units (PSU), in which each PSU consists of 10 respondents/interviewees. Hence, one enumerator was assigned to do the interviews in one PSU, so that the numbers of enumerators were 122 persons. In total, I deployed 157 people during the data collecting, including 30 area coordinators and their field assistants and five national supervisors. I assigned one field manager to monitor the survey full-time. As I have been working in the Indikator and LSI for several years, I used my institutes' resources, including a pool of experienced enumerators located in every province of Indonesia. Most of them were university students and part-time employees who have been working with my survey organisations for some time on a project basis. They come from various educational backgrounds, such as humanities, social sciences, engineering, and natural sciences. From this pool of enumerators, we selected the interviewers for this survey. Important criteria we usually use for selecting the

interviewers are competence, integrity, trustworthiness, independence, and ability to work in a team.

Simultaneously, I developed the questionnaire of this survey. For purposes of generalisation and international comparability, this survey used a number of questions that are partially derived from and comparable to similar questions that have been asked elsewhere. Nonetheless, I had also my own particular questions to adjust to the aspects of the Indonesian situation I was most interested in. Some measures of vote buying and club goods employed in this study were generated from the project "Money Politics in Southeast Asia." I would like to acknowledge my supervisor Edward Aspinall and other principal investigators of this project (i.e. Allen Hicken, Meredith Weiss, and Paul Hutchcroft), who in the spirit of advancing academic research on this topic, generously provided me with some additional funding for conducting this post-election survey, and more importantly, allowed me to employ their measures and share the results for the purposes of this study. The definitive language version of the questionnaire was Indonesian, and if necessary it was translated into local languages by my interviewers. Given that some questions were taken from a larger project of a four-country study of money politics as noted above, and were written in English, it took a few days to translate them. Pre- testing the questionnaire was undertaken on about 25 adults from different socio-economic backgrounds in order to (1) decide the length of the survey interview; (2) improve the question wording, if necessary; (3) correct and improve translation; (4) delete unnecessary questions or add new ones, as required; (5) test the order of questions and identify bases; (6) check accuracy and adequacy of the questionnaire instructions; (7) catch any items which were conceptually vague; and (8) determine whether the questions were clear.

Workshops for area coordinators and field interviewers were conducted in strategic locations based on the sample spots that were generated. The minimum workshop time for area coordinators and interviewers was two days prior to fieldwork. Workshop activity mainly consisted of one day of office training to learn the basics of the project. In some cases, there were practice interviews among participants, i.e., field interviewers interviewed field supervisors as respondents to understand each question and accustomise themselves to the flow of interviewing and the format of the questionnaire. Interviews were practised with a field supervisor until the interviewer was confident. In the training, my research teams were presented with several guidelines. In particular, they were asked not to provide options 'do not know' or

'refuse to answer' to the respondents. These options were only for the enumerator to fill in privately if the respondents truly could or would not respond with an answer. Importantly, during the workshop, enumerators were clearly instructed to conduct interviews in respondents' homes or other private and suitable places, rather than to recruit them in public venues such as village offices or ward buildings. It was stated that there should be no village officials or heads of RT sitting in or listening when the interview took place. Given the unit of analysis of this study is an individual, other persons including household members, were also not permitted to intervene when the interview was being conducted.

Having conducted the workshops, the data were then gathered through face-to-face interviews with randomly selected respondents. The area coordinators were responsible for obtaining necessary permission from local governments. Anchors reported to the field manager and observed interviewers, followed up and did surprise checks on the field interviewers. We also ensured that logistics for field research were received quickly and administered correctly. One primary sampling unit (10 respondents) in Lhokseumawe, Aceh, was judged invalid for analysis because it contained fake interviews. In addition, it is important to note the number of calls and substitutions. If the field surveyors found selected respondents who could not be contacted during the first attempt, they were asked to visit a second time. My research teams successfully interviewed 1,032 of the original respondents (85.3 percent of the total). One hundred and seventy eight respondents (14.7 percent) were unavailable to be contacted for various reasons, namely 'not accessible within the agreed upon field duration' (59.5 percent) (i.e. working out of the area or going to school outside the region); 'refused to be interviewed' (31.5 percent); 'being too old' (3.4 percent); 'very sick' (3.9 percent); and 'others' (1.7 percent). In these cases, we decided to substitute original respondents with others taken from another household beyond the covered intervals in the sample precinct.

More importantly, to make sure that the survey interview was actually carried out by the trained field researcher, we conducted layered spot-checks as quality control. The initial spot-checks were conducted randomly on 20 percent of the total sample by the persons-in-charge at the provincial level who returned to the selected respondents. The next level of spot-checks was done by national supervisors from the Jakarta office in the villages already checked by the area or provincial coordinators. In the quality control process, however, no significant error was found.

With regard to field editing, after each interview, the field researchers were asked to check their own work and check for consistency. All accomplished interview schedules were submitted to the assigned field anchor who, in turn, edited every interview. Once an incomplete or inconsistent answer was spotted in the questionnaire, the field interviewers were asked to revisit the respondent's house re-asking the question for verification. For purposes of the data processing, office editors checked for final consistency on all interviews before coding. A data entry computer program also verified the consistency of the encoded data before data tables and figures were generated. Having cleaned the questionnaires, 1,210 (99 percent) of the post-election survey were judged valid for analysis. As noted above, although 178 out of 1,210 respondents were substitutes, they possessed the same qualities (in terms of gender, age bracket, and socio-economic classes) as the original respondents. I was personally involved in all stages of the survey, from designing the survey, developing the survey instrument, training of field coordinators and interviewers, pre-tests, spot-checks, cleaning, coding, and data entry.

To prove that my national public opinion survey was representative, we need to compare the demographic composition of the sample with the Indonesian population based on the most recent census (Table A.1). In terms of gender composition and urban-rural domicile, the sample of the survey was almost identical to the Indonesian population (see the left panel of Table A.1). This is largely because the population was initially stratified based on gender and based on area of residence. Interestingly, although the categories of religion and ethnic groups were not determined from the outset, as shown in the right panel of Table A.1, the demographic samples based on these two important categories were similar to the Indonesian population, confirming that the survey is representative of the country as a whole.

Table A.1 **Demographic profiles of the sample compared to population (%)**

Categories	Sample	Population
Gender		
Male	50.3	50.1
Female	49.7	49.9
Rural-Urban		
Rural	50.4	50.2
Urban	49.6	49.8

Categories	Sample	Population
Religion		
Islam	89.1	87.3
Catholic/Protestant	8.4	9.8
Other	2.4	3.0
Ethnic Groups		
Javanese	41.0	40.2
Sundanese	14.9	15.5
Bataknese	3.2	3.6
Betawi	3.0	2.9
Minang	2.7	2.7
Bugis	3.3	2.7
Malay	2.1	2.3
Others	29.8	30.1

In addition, Table A.2 shows that survey sample demographics by province also reflect the Indonesian population. Since this survey unit is nationwide, the samples were drawn in proportion to the size of population of each province. This is largely because each province has a different density of population. The higher population a province has, the more samples were generated. For instance, 17.5 percent of the sample was taken from the most densely populated province, West Java, compared to West Papua, accounting for only 0.4 percent of the total sample.

Table A.2 **Sample demographics by province in comparison with the 2010 census (%)**

Province	Sample	Population
NAD (Aceh)	1.8	1.8
North Sumatera	5.2	5.2
West Sumatera	2.0	2.0
Riau	2.2	2.2
Jambi	1.3	1.3
South Sumatera	3.1	3.1
Bengkulu	0.7	0.7
Lampung	3.2	3.2
Bangka Belitung	0.5	0.5
Riau islands	0.7	0.7
DKI Jakarta	3.8	3.8
West Java	17.5	17.5
Central Java	14.6	14.6
DI Yogyakarta	1.5	1.5
East Java	16.4	16.4
Banten	4.2	4.2
Bali	1.6	1.6
West Nusa Tenggara	1.9	1.9
East Nusa Tenggara	1.7	1.7
West Kalimantan	1.9	1.9
Central Kalimantan	1.0	1.0
South Kalimantan	1.5	1.5
East Kalimantan	1.5	1.5
North Sulawesi	1.0	1.0
Central Sulawesi	1.0	1.0
South Sulawesi	3.4	3.4
Southeast Sulawesi	1.0	1.0
Gorontalo	0.4	0.4
West Sulawesi	0.5	0.5
Maluku	0.6	0.6
North Maluku	0.4	0.4
Papua	1.7	1.7
West Papua	0.4	0.4

A.2. Pre-election surveys in January, February-March, and late March 2014

In order to capture the level of intensification of vote buying efforts during the run-up to the 2014 election, I inserted a number of questions relating to this practice and other related issues into several Indikator national opinion surveys conducted in January, February–March and late March 2014. All of these surveys applied standard survey methodology and procedures similar to those used for the post-election survey described above. They also implemented similar layers of quality control, from intensive workshops of interviewers to spot-checking, supervision and data entry. Accordingly, this appendix simply describes the most important aspects of the survey methods, assuming that all steps involved in these projects were similar to what was already thoroughly explained in the preceding section.

First, face-to-face interviews were conducted January 18–30, 2014. Multistage random sampling was used to produce a probability sample of 2,039 voting-age adults drawn from all provinces in Indonesia and including an oversample from the Jakarta province. Based on this 2,039 person sample, the overall margin of error reaches ±2.4 percent at 95 percent confidence level. There were 1,678 original respondents (82.3 percent), while the substitute respondents were 261 people. Among those who could not be interviewed, 51 percent 'could not be contacted for various reasons' (i.e. working out of the area or at school outside the region), 14 percent 'were not willing to be interviewed,' 4 percent was 'too old,' 2 percent was 'sick' and so on. Quality control of the interview results was conducted randomly on 20 percent of the total sample by the supervisors who returned to the selected respondents. There were no significant errors found in this survey.

The second pre-election survey was conducted February 26–March 6, 2014. The sample size of 2,050 is representative of the country as a whole. Based on the sample size, the estimated margin of error is ±2.2 percent at 95 percent confidence level. Selected respondents were interviewed through face-to-face interviews by trained interviewers. Of the 2,050 cases in this survey, 1,705 (83.2 percent) were original respondents, 345 cases involved respondent substitution. The third pre-election survey was conducted March 19–24, 2014. The number of samples is 1,220 voting-age adults who were selected with multistage random sampling proportionally distributed over the 34 provinces. The margin of error is around ±2.9 percent at 95 percent significance level. Of the 1,220 cases in this survey, there were 1,046 (85.6 percent) original respondents and 174 substitute respondents. Again, the modal answer to the question why original respondents could not be interviewed was "inaccessible within the field duration" (57 percent and 51 percent in the February–March and the late March surveys, respectively). Notwithstanding there were around 15 to 16 percent of substitution, these substitute respondents generally had similar profiles to the original cases. In these surveys, quality control of the results was also carried out randomly on 20 percent of the total samples with strict supervision by the Indikator headquarter. No significant errors were found in either pre-election survey.

APPENDIX B

SURVEY OF BROKERS AND CANDIDATES

As well as relying on general population surveys, I also wanted to analyse the attitudes and experiences of both elected representatives and vote brokers with regard to vote buying and other forms of patronage politics. However, in conducting a survey which captured both groups, there were significant design challenges, especially in designing a sample frame to select brokers. Ideally, in order to capture the attitudes and behaviours of vote brokers, a survey should be conducted by doing a census of all such brokers in the country. However, this approach would not only need gigantic resources and a huge amount of money but also would take a long period of time. The solution to this problem is to use sampling: collecting data from several samples of the population. As Andrew Thornley (2014) nicely put it, “you do not need to eat a whole bowl of soup to sample the flavours; just one taste will suffice—assuming all of the ingredients have been mixed well.” Obviously, the ‘ingredients’ point to the sampling method that enables us to make inferences and generalisations about the targeted respondent population.

Since we want to make a sample the basic foundational ground for making a conclusion about the whole population of brokers, we need a suitable and practical sampling frame. This is one of the biggest methodological problems I encountered: there is no ready-made sampling frame of vote brokers in Indonesia. Recent scholarship on vote brokers in Indonesia has greatly contributed to providing valuable insights into the underexplored nature of political brokerage (e.g. Aspinall, 2014; Triantini, 2016; Hamdi, 2016), notably regarding its structure, networks, and varying modus operandi in distributing electoral handouts. However, little is known about the extent to which results from these convenience samples can be reliably projected to the whole population of vote brokers (Stokes et al., 2013: 261–262).

In order to address the problem of the absence of a sampling frame of brokers, and in an attempt to produce a sample that allows for a scientifically sound portrayal of the targeted population, this study generates a probability sample of brokers in a way inspired by Susan Stokes and her colleagues (2013), who collected information from randomly selected city councillors in Argentina. However, unlike Stokes and her colleagues, who considered the councillors as ‘elected brokers,’ my study does not refer to local parliament members—an entry point to provide the sampling frame—

as political brokers. In addition, my study slightly contrasts with Stokes and her collaborators in terms of selection of non-elected brokers, as will be described below.

Given that I funded the construction of this unique dataset of brokers out of my own pocket, I was only able to draw a representative sample in four provinces. In order to determine the locations for the probability sample of brokers, unlike Stokes, et al. (2013) who purposively selected four Argentine provinces from which to pick brokers, I was instead guided primarily by the fit of cases with the statistical evidence from a large dataset of electoral district surveys conducted by Indikator and SMRC during the run-up to the 2014 election. Using results from individual-level data, I measure the relationship between partisanship and vote buying as the determinant for case selection for both my MP and broker surveys (Figure 1.3 in Chapter 1). In short, our massive dataset of pre-election surveys in 73 out of 77 electoral districts across Indonesia results in the following four provinces from which to sample MPs and brokers: Central Java, East Java, North Sulawesi and West Sumatra. These areas not only reflect variations across the level of partisan closeness and vote buying, but also vary with respect to socio-economic and political profiles, the topography of power, and the level of competitiveness (see chapter 6 for more details).

The population of this survey is all DPRD (local parliament) members at both the provincial and district levels and their brokers, locally known as success team members, in four provinces (West Sumatra, Central Java, East Java, and North Sulawesi). Hence, it is worth noting that our data on candidates' behaviours and strategies in this study refers to newly elected local candidates (though of course some of them may have served previously in the DPRD). This is because when this unique, face-to-face survey was conducted September 30 – October 25, 2014 these low-level politicians had been just elected in the April legislative elections and had been officially inaugurated as local MPs in August 2014. The sample was determined with multistage random sampling method. The size of the sample in each province was set at 300 respondents, so the sample in four provinces in total was expected to reach 1,200 respondents (100 Provincial DPRD members, 300 campaign team members of Provincial DPRD members, 200 Regent/City DPRD members, and 600 success team members of Regent/City DPRD members). It is no exaggeration to say that our data is the largest research sample of political operatives in any region.[2]

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[2]For comparative perspective, Stokes and her colleagues' survey in 2009 'only' generated a probability sample of 800 elected city councillors and non-elected brokers in four provinces in Argentina (Stokes et al., 2013).

First of all, I demonstrate the population of Provincial and District DPRD members in the four provinces from which the sample was drawn and then discuss the procedure of sample selection in a systematic way. As shown in Table B.1, in the four provinces, in total there are 310 members in provincial legislatures (DPRD I) and 4,210 members in district legislatures (DPRD II). Given that the number of district DPRD members is much greater than that of provincial DPRD members, and given this study is intended to capture intense lower-level campaigns, I decided to draw a larger sample of district DPRD members and their brokers than their counterparts from provincial legislatures.

Table B.1 **Population of local MPs in four provinces**

	Provincial DPRD	District DPRD	Total
West Sumatera	65	575	640
Central Java	100	1,570	1,670
East Java	100	1,675	1,775
North Sulawesi	45	390	435
Total	310	4,210	4,520

Let's start with the sampling procedure for drawing representative samples of Provincial DPRD members and their brokers (Table B.2). First, the population in each province was grouped (stratified) according to its Provincial DPRD electoral districts. Second, in each Provincial DPRD electoral district, a sample of Provincial DPRD members was randomly selected based on proportion. Then, for every selected Provincial DPRD member, three of their brokers, who helped them during the last legislative election, were also randomly selected.[3] As noted above, the population number of brokers in each region was unknown. Accordingly, to determine the broker population, as already discussed in Chapter 6, and to draw a probability sample of brokers, I needed to collect the relevant data based on information mentioned by provincial MP respondents when the interviews were conducted.

[3]As I will describe in the following pages, I divided the brokers into two categories: core team and base-level brokers. Hence, for every surveyed local DPRD member, we then sampled one core team member and two base-level brokers.

Table B.2 **Population and sample sizes of provincial DPRD members and their brokers**

<table>
<tr><th rowspan="2">PROVINCE</th><th rowspan="2">Electoral district (Strata)</th><th colspan="2">POPULATION</th><th colspan="2">SAMPLE</th><th rowspan="2">Total Sample</th></tr>
<tr><th>DPRD members</th><th>Brokers</th><th>DPRD members</th><th>Brokers</th></tr>
<tr><td>West Sumatra</td><td>8</td><td>65</td><td rowspan="5">Sample is acquired and estimated based on information from newly elected DPRD members during field interview process</td><td>25</td><td>75</td><td>100</td></tr>
<tr><td>Central Java</td><td>10</td><td>100</td><td>25</td><td>75</td><td>100</td></tr>
<tr><td>East Java</td><td>11</td><td>100</td><td>25</td><td>75</td><td>100</td></tr>
<tr><td>North Sulawesi</td><td>6</td><td>45</td><td>25</td><td>75</td><td>100</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">Total</td><td>310</td><td>100</td><td>300</td><td>400</td></tr>
</table>

In order to give a broader sense of this random selection, I will elaborate this detailed, complex procedure as follows. When the interview with each Provincial DPRD member was approaching the end, we asked:

> How many brokers [*tim sukses*, *tim relawan*, *tim kampanye pemenangan*[4]] - from the top level or core team [*tim inti*] to lowest-level member who deal directly with voters [door-to-door] - worked for you during the 2014 legislative election?

My field researchers then recorded this number. Note that district DPRD members were also presented with this question. Among those who responded to this question, the mean number of brokers working for provincial and district DPRD members was 149.44 with a standard deviation of 299.1. As already shown in Chapter 6, the number of brokers working for the sampled successful candidates varies across the province and varies in size, including one extreme outlier—one candidate who reported working with 3,000 core and ground-level brokers. As previously detected by Stokes and her colleagues (2013: 267), low-level politicians are likely to inflate the number of brokers, but they may not be able to provide the names of their brokers. To address this problem, I first distinguish non-elected brokers into two categories: 'core team' (*tim inti*) and 'lowest-level brokers' or 'ground-level brokers,' whose main tasks were swaying voters in favour of the candidate they support. As Aspinall and his colleagues (2017: 10) explain, in Indonesia this type of broker was known by a variety

[4]I used these three words for brokers in the survey instrument. As discussed in Chapter 6, a frequently mentioned expression for informal networks of vote brokers is 'success teams' (*tim sukses*). However, in some cases, people used a variety of names to call brokers, such as a less pejorative term, '*tim relawan*' whose closest English equivalent is 'volunteer team;' another neutral term is '*tim kampanye pemenangan*' (winning campaign team). In the Indonesian context, the word 'broker' has in fact been Indonesianised, but this word is considered by many as a more pejorative term than the often-used, neutral term '*tim sukses*.'

of terms, such as *kader* (or cadre) or *sabet* or *gapit* (Javanese terms meaning 'whip'). What concerned Stokes and her colleagues about the overestimating tendency above corresponds with my questionnaire pretesting findings. The results from the pre-test on about five politicians and 10 senior brokers show that my politician respondents often found it difficult to name their base-level brokers. They were able to answer how many brokers worked for them, but when asked to provide a list of names of their grassroot brokers, they typically said that it was their core campaign team (*tim inti*) who had the list. Then, we asked *tim inti* "how many base-level brokers did you have who were charged with influencing voters." The objective is clear: (1) to evaluate or match the numbers of the broker army given by each local MP member in the previous question. We found that most surveyed low-level politicians accurately reported the number of brokers who worked for them in 2014. (2) Given most *tim inti* had a complete list that contained the names and addresses of grassroot brokers, it was then instrumental to assess the probable number of brokers who worked in direct contact with voters.

In order to draw a representative sample of the core team, the sampled Provincial DPRD members were read the following prompt at the end of the interview:

> We greatly appreciate your participation. The success of this study depends on your cooperation. We also need your help to choose some of your campaign team members for interviews. To ensure that we would interview a representative group of people, these people should be selected at random. Can you mention the names of the core campaign team who have helped you in the recent 2014 legislative election?

Interestingly, all the surveyed Provincial DPRD members were happily willing to accept the request and provided a bunch of names of their core teams, including their contact information. This is also the case for the sampled district MPs members, as will be explained below. My researchers were then instructed to enter the list of names of *tim inti* in alphabetical order to select one respondent from the category of the core campaign team with simple random sampling. As noted above, the same procedure was done to determine the respondent category of the base-level brokers. When the interview with the sampled core team member was approaching the end, our research teams read the following prompt:

> We greatly appreciate your participation. The success of this study depends on your cooperation. We also need your help choose the names of the campaign volunteer team [*tim relawan* or *tim sukses*] who worked at the very bottom level or in direct contact with the voters (door-to-door) for interviews. To ensure that we interviewed a representative group, these people should be selected at random.

Interestingly, most of the core team members handed over a printed list of their base level brokers. Similarly, my field researchers then entered a list of names of the grassroot brokers provided by the surveyed core team member to the random sheet alphabetically to determine two respondents from the category of the base-level brokers who worked in direct contact with the voters. The sample in this stratum was selected by simple random sampling.

Having discussed the random selection of the sample of Provincial DPRD members and their brokers, I am now in a position to describe the sampling procedure for determining district local MP members and their political operatives. It was carried out in a generally similar fashion, but with a slightly different procedure: First, the population in each province was grouped (stratified) based on four different zones. Each zone was a combination of provincial electoral districts. I present detailed information of these zones in every province in the last part of this appendix. I used specific criteria to establish such zones which vary depending on the geographical proximity, history and conditions of a particular region. Second, in each zone, a regency/city (*kabupaten/kota*) was picked randomly as a sample by proportion. In total, ten regencies/cities were selected as shown at the end of this appendix. Third, in each selected regency/city, five regency/city DPRD members were randomly selected as respondents (see Table B.3).

Tabel B.3 **Population and sample sizes of district DPRD members and their brokers**

PROVINCE	POPULATION			SAMPLE			Total Sample
	Regency/ City	DPRD members	Brokers	Regency/ City	DPRD members	Brokers	
West Sumatra	19	575	Sample acquired and estimated based on information from newly elected DPRD members during field interview process	10	50	150	200
Central Java	35	1570		10	50	150	200
East Java	38	1675		10	50	150	200
North Sulawesi	15	390		10	50	150	200
Total				40	200	600	800

Finally, for every surveyed district DPRD member, we sampled one core team member (*tim inti*) and two grassroot brokers, using simple random sampling with the same procedure as explained above. Figure B.1 sums up our discussion about the sampling procedure for generating a probability sample of local politicians and core teams and base-level brokers.

Figure B.1 **Flow chart of respondent selection**



The survey instrument was written and administered in Indonesian. Because my study was exclusively conducted in Indonesia, it is difficult to make global comparisons. Accordingly, for international comparability, I used a number of questions that have been used elsewhere, including a 2009 broker survey by Stokes and her collaborators (2013). I also incorporated their innovative survey experiment in my brokers' survey (see Chapter 4).[5] Needless to say, I also had my own particular questions related to the aspects of the Indonesian situation with which I was primarily concerned. My supervisor, Edward Aspinall, also helped me to develop the survey instrument, lending his questionnaire for his broker survey in the Central Java III electoral district. Overall, as outlined in Chapter 1, with respect to the local politicians' survey, my survey instrument sought to collect information on targeting strategies, broker recruitment, the structure of their personal campaign team, voter pragmatism, the level of competitiveness, and broker monitoring. Regarding the brokers' survey, I asked a battery of questions about the mechanisms of vote buying (who is targeted, when, how, and why they are targeted), prior personal contact with candidates, rent-seeking behaviours, and so forth (see Chapter 6). As indicated above, my survey instrument was piloted in late August 2014, three weeks prior to field implementation.

With the proposed 1,200 respondents from provincial and district DPRD members and their brokers, this survey required at least 100 experienced, skilful interviewers. One

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[5]One of the authors, Thad Dunning, posted the survey instrument in its entirety at http://thaddunning.com/data/brokers. Since the questionnaire was written in Spanish, I hired a trusted translator to translate it into Indonesian.

field interviewer was assigned to interview one selected Provincial DPRD member, two selected District DPRD members, three provincial brokers, and six district brokers. In addition, I was helped by four area coordinators and their assistants, along with five national supervisors. I personally monitored the survey full-time. However, since the nature of this survey was completely different compared to voter surveys, I was first looking for not only competent but also experienced field researchers who had the ability to approach politicians in a way that would ensure they were willing to be interviewed. I personally recruited them based on input and discussion with my provincial coordinators. Most of them were senior researchers, has been working with my survey firm for a long time, and having Master's degrees, mostly in political and social sciences.

More importantly, prior to going to the field, intensive training of field researchers was conducted in four capitals of the provinces. I went to Padang (West Sumatra), Surabaya (East Java), Manado (North Sulawesi), and Semarang (Central Java) to directly train them in how to conduct face-to-face interviews with middle-level elites. One to two days of intensive workshops were conducted in each of these capitals to teach the basics and the *raison d'etre* of the project and to understand the sampling procedure for determining a representative sample of local DPRD members and their brokers. The workshop was also intended to provide participants with appropriate communication skills to approach respondents and make them understand each question well before answering it.

To increase the response rate, I set a field period that would be lengthy enough for the field researchers to interview all the respondents assigned to them. Note that it is not always easy to convince party elites to accept an interview request on sensitive questions like vote buying and its targeting strategies. Despite this practice being less likely to be stigmatised than in the past (see Chapter 2), it is still illegal in Indonesia. In some cases, especially when selected respondents were difficult to reach, I personally made a call to them, asking them politely on behalf of my interviewers to accept the interview request. On some occasions, I also accompanied members of my research teams to interview the respondents. Simultaneously, we also carried out layered spot-checks as quality control. The initial spot-checks were conducted by area coordinators in each province on 20 percent of the respondents under their supervision. The next level of spot-checks was carried out by national supervisors with 50 percent of the respondents already checked by provincial supervisors. We also used the telephone for call-back and spot-checking: once we got the respondents'

contact information from the survey form, my national supervisors rang them and cross-checked the information gathered during the interview. No significant errors were found.

Interestingly, notwithstanding the complexities of the sampling procedure and the nature of the survey, we got relatively high response rates. One sampled District DPRD member in one regency in East Java could not be interviewed within the agreed-upon field duration. Among 1,199 respondents who participated in the survey, 1,071 (89.3 percent) of the respondents were from our original selection. Only 128 (10.7 percent) were substituted. Reasons for respondent replacement varied: 46 out of 128 respondents (35.9 percent) were unwilling to be interviewed; 44 respondents (34.4 percent) were out of town; 34 respondents (26.6 percent) could not be contacted at all, or had an unclear address; 1 respondent (0.8 percent) moved. We also decided to replace three respondents from West Sumatra because they claimed they did not have base-level brokers. Because these substitute respondents generally had similar profiles to the original selections and the respondent substitution followed the procedure, I decided to include them in the analysis. Having cleaned the questionnaire, 1,199 cases were judged valid for analysis. As indicated earlier, I was personally and directly involved in all steps of the project, from recruiting and training of the provincial coordinators and field researchers, pre-tests, spot-checks, cleaning, coding, and data input.

Figure B.2. **Zoning map of West Sumatra and its selection**

Zone 1: West Sumatra I, II, III electoral districts
Zone 2: West Sumatra IV and V electoral districts
Zone 3: West Sumatra VI electoral district
Zone 4: West Sumatra VII and VIII electoral districts

Zone	Selected Regent/City
1	KOTA PADANG
1	KOTA PARIAMAN
1	AGAM
2	PASAMAN
2	PASAMAN BARAT
3	DHARMASRAYA
3	KOTA PADANG PANJANG
4	SOLOK SELATAN
4	KOTA SOLOK
4	PESISIR SELATAN

Figure B.3. **Zoning map of Central Java and its selection**

Zone 1: Central Java I, IX, and X electoral districts
Zone 2: Central Java II and III electoral districts
Zone 3: Central Java IV and V electoral districts
Zone 4: Central Java VI, VII and VIII electoral districts

Zone	Selected Regent/City
1	KOTA SALATIGA
1	TEGAL
1	BATANG
2	DEMAK
2	BLORA
3	WONOGIRI
3	KLATEN
4	MAGELANG
4	KOTA MAGELANG
4	KEBUMEN

Figure B.4. **Zoning map of North Sulawesi and its selection**

Zone 1: North Sulawesi I and II electoral districts
Zone 2: North Sulawesi III electoral district
Zone 3: North Sulawesi IV electoral district
Zone 4: North Sulawesi V and VI electoral districts

Zone	Selected Regent/City
1	MINAHASA
1	MINAHASA SELATAN
2	MINAHASA UTARA
2	BOLAANG MONGONDOW UTARA
3	SIAU TAGULANDANG BIARO
3	MINAHASA TENGGARA
3	BOLAANG MONGONDOW SELATAN
4	KOTA MANADO
4	KOTA BITUNG
4	KOTA KOTAMOBAGU



Figure B.5. **Zoning map of East Java and its selection**

Zone	Selected Regent/City
1	KOTA SURABAYA
1	SITUBONDO
2	JEMBER
2	KOTA MALANG
2	KOTA BLITAR
3	PACITAN
3	NGAWI
3	MADIUN
4	TUBAN
4	BANGKALAN

Zone 1: East Java I, II, III electoral districts
Zone 2: East Java IV, V, VI electoral districts
Zone 3: East Java VII, VIII electoral districts
Zone 4: East Java IX, X, XI electoral districts

APPENDIX C. CORRELATION BETWEEN VARIABLES (PEARSON'S *r*)

	Vote Buying	Club Goods	Gender	Rural	Age	Education	Javanese	Religion	Civic engagement	Party ID	Efficacy	Political interest	Political Information	Participation	Trust	Support for Democracy
Vote Buying	1	0.331***	0.055	0.012	-0.09**	0.069*	0.035	0.079*	0.036	0.184***	0.003	0.201***	0.083*	0.018	-0.036	-0.04
Club Goods	0.331***	1	0.074*	0.114***	-0.025	0.023	0.078*	0.004	0.114***	0.138***	0.097**	0.143***	0.069*	0.029	0.016	-0.091**
Gender	0.055	0.074*	1	-0.003	0.125***	0.05	-0.022	-0.013	0.002	0.094**	0.04	0.168***	0.128***	-0.021	-0.061*	0.002
Rural	0.012	0.114***	-0.003	1	-0.038	-0.31***	-0.022	-0.128***	0.097***	-0.059*	0.09**	-0.063*	-0.219***	-0.046	0.139***	-0.034
Age	-0.09**	-0.025	0.125***	-0.038	1	-0.24***	0.082**	0.017	-0.035	0.036	-0.023	-0.061*	-0.124***	0.29***	0.135***	0.005
Education	0.069*	0.023	0.05	-0.31***	-0.24***	1	-0.1***	-0.074*	0.067*	0.04	0.084**	0.276***	0.444***	-0.045	-0.178***	-0.033
Javanese	0.035	0.078*	-0.022	-0.022	0.082**	-0.1***	1	0.254***	0.16***	0.014	-0.032	-0.175***	-0.131***	0.031	0.052	-0.005
Religion	0.079*	0.004	-0.013	-0.128***	0.017	-0.074*	0.254***	1	-0.009	-0.023	-0.027	-0.12***	-0.057	-0.023	-0.112***	-0.05
Civic engagement	0.036	0.114***	0.002	0.097***	-0.035	0.067*	0.16***	-0.009	1	0.133***	0.01	0.009	0.026	0.016	0.127***	0.081*
Party ID	0.184***	0.138***	0.094**	-0.059*	0.036	0.04	0.014	-0.023	0.133***	1	0.114***	0.261***	0.125***	0.084**	0.036	0.047
Efficacy	0.003	0.097**	0.04	0.09**	-0.023	0.084**	-0.032	-0.027	0.01	0.114***	1	0.135***	0.049	0.017	-0.005	-0.445***
Political interest	0.201***	0.143***	0.168***	-0.063*	-0.061*	0.276***	-0.175***	-0.12***	0.009	0.261***	0.135***	1	0.452***	-0.004	-0.036	-0.038
Political Information	0.083*	0.069*	0.128***	-0.219***	-0.124***	0.444***	-0.131***	-0.057	0.026	0.125***	0.049	0.452***	1	-0.075*	-0.165***	-0.003
Participation	0.018	0.029	-0.021	-0.046	0.29***	-0.045	0.031	-0.023	0.016	0.084**	0.017	-0.004	-0.075*	1	0.107***	0.012
Trust	-0.036	0.016	-0.061*	0.139***	0.135***	-0.178***	0.052	-0.112***	0.127***	0.036	-0.005	-0.036	-0.165***	0.107***	1	0.082*
Support for Democracy	-0.04	-0.091**	0.002	-0.034	0.005	-0.033	-0.005	-0.05	0.081*	0.047	-0.445***	-0.038	-0.003	0.012	0.082*	1

***p<0.001, **p<0.01, *p<0.05

APPENDIX D

NORMALITY TEST OF THE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE BUYING

Based on the results of the normality test below, the empirical distribution of the data (the histogram) in Model 1 is not bell-shaped. Similarly, the histograms in both Model 2 and Model 3 do not resemble the normal distribution, suggesting that the residuals were not normally distributed.







APPENDIX E

LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE BUYING

The dependent variable is a dichotomous measure that takes a value of 1 if the respondent received vote buying once/twice, several times, rarely, quite or very often.

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Socio-demographics		And Civic Engagement		And Political Attitudes	
	b	S.E	b	S.E	b	S.E
Socio-Demographics						
Gender	.266*	.129	.236	.130	.103	.170
Rural	.032	.146	.001	.149	.331	.194
Age	-.012*	.005	-.013*	.005	-.010	.007
Education	.069*	.031	.052	.032	.059	.042
Income	.020	.022	.023	.023	-.035	.030
Religion (Islam)	.555*	.225	.592**	.228	.88**	.288
Ethnic (Javanese)	.071	.144	.052	.146	.192	.188
Region (Java)	.044	.152	.004	.154	-.058	.197
Civic Engagement						
Civic engagement			.293	.568	-.689	.714
Political Attitudes						
Party identification					.392**	.123
Efficacy					-.424*	.193
Political interest					.290***	.077
Political information					.082	.144
Political participation					.097	.196
Political trust					.126	.177
Democratic support					-.205	.178
Constant	-.573	.406	-.476	.409	-1.115	1.103
Pseudo R2	.030		.027		.080	
Valid N	1014		995		671	

Note: * p <0.05; ** p <0.01; *** p <0.001

b = Unstandardised Coefficients

APPENDIX F

NORMALITY TEST OF THE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE BUYING ACCEPTABILITY IN LOCAL ELECTIONS (MUSLIMS VS NON-MUSLIMS)

The residuals from the linear model, as appeared in the empirical distribution of the data (the histograms) in all models below, are not normally distributed.








Histogram Residual Model 7
Mean = -9.07E-14
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 225,119
Frequency
Regression Standardized Residual


Histogram Residual Model 8
Mean = -9.01E-14
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 225,049
Frequency
Regression Standardized Residual


Histogram Residual Model 9
Mean = -9.16E-14
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 225,089
Frequency
Regression Standardized Residual


Histogram Residual Model 4
Mean = -9.19E-14
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 225,095
Frequency
Regression Standardized Residual


Histogram Residual Model 5
Mean = -9.06E-14
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 224,759
Frequency
Regression Standardized Residual


Histogram Residual Model 6
Mean = -9.07E-14
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 224,728
Frequency
Regression Standardized Residual


Histogram Residual Model 10
Mean = -9.25E-14
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 225,043
Frequency
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Regression Standardized Residual


Histogram Residual Model 11
Mean = -9.24E-14
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 225,166
Frequency
12,000
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Regression Standardized Residual

APPENDIX G

LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE BUYING ACCEPTABILITY IN LOCAL ELECTIONS, 2006-2015 (MUSLIMS VS. NON MUSLIMS)

B *** (SE)	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5	MODEL 6	MODEL 7	MODEL 8	MODEL 9	MODEL 10	MODEL 11
CONSTANT	.083**(.026)	-.020 (0.048)	.028 (.031)	.339***(.037)	.015 (.029)	.108***(.028)	.147***(0.038)	.016 (.034)	.227***(.036)	.058*(.034)	.226***(.057)
Party identification	.068***(.007)										
NasDem Partisan		.176***(.041)									
PKB Partisan			.131***(.019)								
PKS Partisan				-.185***(.027)							
PDI-P Partisan					.129***(.012)						
Golkar Partisan						.046***(.013)					
Gerindra Partisan							.009(.029)				
Democratic Partisan								.139***(.022)			
PAN Partisan									-.072***(.026)		
PPP Partisan										.095***(.023)	
Hanura Partisan											-.070(.050)
Islam	.198***(.012)	.196***(.012)	.194***(.012)	.198***(.012)	.203***(.013)	.196***(.012)	.195***(.012)	.195***(.012)	.197***(.012)	.195***(.012)	.196***(.012)
Male	-.051***(.009)	-.045***(.009)	-.046***(.009)	-.044***(.009)	-.051***(.009)	-.044***(.009)	-.044***(.009)	-.046***(.009)	-.044***(.009)	-.045***(.009)	-.044***(.009)
Age	-.007***(.000)	-.007***(.000)	-.007***(.000)	-.007***(.000)	-.007***(.000)	-.007***(.000)	-.007***(.000)	-.007***(.000)	-.007***(.000)	-.007***(.000)	-.007***(.000)
Rural	.018*(.010)	.015 (.010)	.015 (.010)	.016 (.010)	.017*(.010)	.017*(.010)	.016 (.010)	.015 (.010)	.016 (.010)	.017*(.010)	.016 (.010)
Javanese	.461***(.009)	.463***(.009)	.458***(.009)	.461***(.009)	.458***(.009)	.464***(.009)	.462***(.009)	.462***(.009)	.462***(.009)	.461***(.009)	.462***(.009)
Income	-.047***(.002)	-.047***(.002)	-.047***(.002)	-.047***(.002)	-.047***(.002)	-.047***(.002)	-.047***(.002)	-.047***(.002)	-.047***(.002)	-.047***(.002)	-.047***(.002)
Education	-.111***(.002)	-.110***(.002)	-.109***(.002)	-.109***(.002)	-.109***(.002)	-.109***(.002)	-.109***(.002)	-.110***(.002)	-.109***(.002)	-.109***(.002)	-.109***(.002)
Weigthed N	**225036**	**225144**	**225064**	**225095**	**224759**	**224728**	**225119**	**225049**	**225089**	**225043**	**225166**
Pseudo-R2	**.058**	**.058**	**.058**	**.058**	**.058**	**.058**	**.057**	**.058**	**.057**	**.058**	**.057**

Regression coefficients (b) *** standard errors in parentheses *Sig<0.1; **Sig<0.05; ***Sig<0.01

APPENDIX H

LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE BUYING ACCEPTABILITY IN LOCAL ELECTIONS, 2006-2015 (LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY AMONG MUSLIMS)

B *** (SE)	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5	MODEL 6	MODEL 7	MODEL 8	MODEL 9	MODEL 10	MODEL 11
CONSTANT	2.388***(.018)	2.239***(.036)	2.361***(.021)	2.496***(.024)	2.347***(.020)	2.396***(.020)	2.401***(.026)	2.342***(.023)	2.464***(.024)	2.349***(.023)	2.510***(.042)
Party identification	.036***(.004)										
NasDem Partisan		.180***(.032)									
PKB Partisan			.062***(.012)								
PKS Partisan				-.079***(.016)							
PDI-P Partisan					.068***(.009)						
Golkar Partisan						.021**(.009)					
Gerindra Partisan							.016 (.020)				
Democratic Partisan								.078***(.016)			
PAN Partisan									-.048***(.016)		
PPP Partisan										.068***(.015)	
Hanura Partisan											-.092**(.038)
Religiosity level	-.010***(.001)	-.009***(.001)	-.010***(.001)	-.009***(.001)	-.009***(0.001)	-.009***(.001)	-.009***(.001)	-.009***(.001)	-.009***(.001)	-.009***(.001)	-.009***(.001)
Male	-.490***(.006)	-.046***(.006)	-.047***(.006)	-.045***(.006)	-.050***(0.006)	-.045***(0.006)	-.046***(.006)	-.047***(.006)	-.046***(.006)	-.046***(.006)	-.046***(.006)
Age	-.001***(.000)	-.001***(.000)	-.001***(.000)	-.001***(.000)	-.001***(.000)	-.001***(.000)	-.001***(.000)	-.001***(.000)	-.001***(.000)	-.001***(.000)	-.001***(.000)
Rural	.031***(.007)	.031***(.007)	.031***(.007)	.031***(.007)	.032***(.007)	.032***(.007)	.031***(.007)	.031***(.007)	.032***(.007)	.032***(.007)	.032***(.007)
Javanese	.276***(.006)	.277***(.006)	.275***(.006)	.276***(.006)	.274***(.006)	.278***(.006)	.277***(.006)	.276***(.006)	.277***(.006)	.277***(.006)	.276***(.006)
Income	-.027***(.001)	-.027***(.001)	-.027***(.001)	-.027***(.001)	-.027***(.001)	-.027***(.001)	-.027***(.001)	-.027***(.001)	-.027***(.001)	-.027***(.001)	-.027***(.001)
Education	-.067***(.002)	-.067***(.002)	-.066***(.002)	-.066***(.002)	-.066***(.002)	-.066***(.002)	-.066***(.002)	-.067***(.002)	-.066***(.002)	-.066***(.002)	-.066***(.002)
Weigthed N	**140008**	**139804**	**139749**	**139762**	**139693**	**139545**	**139783**	**139747**	**139738**	**139742**	**139819**
Pseudo-R2	**.049**	**.049**	**.049**	**.049**	**.050**	**.049**	**.049**	**.049**	**.049**	**.049**	**.049**

Regression coefficients (b) *** standard errors in parentheses *Sig<0.1; **Sig<0.05; ***Sig<0.01

APPENDIX I

NORMALITY TEST OF THE LINEAR REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE BUYING ACCEPTABILITY IN LOCAL ELECTIONS, 2006-2015 (LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY AMONG MUSLIMS)

The residuals from the linear model, as appeared in the empirical distribution of the data (the histograms) in all models below, are not normally distributed.








Histogram Residual Model 4
Mean = -1.58E-13
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 140,210
Frequency
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Regression Standardized Residual


Histogram Residual Model 5
Mean = -1.57E-13
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 140,140
Frequency
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Regression Standardized Residual


Histogram Residual Model 6
Mean = -1.54E-13
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 139,992
Frequency
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Regression Standardized Residual


Histogram Residual Model 7
Mean = -1.59E-13
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 140,230
Frequency
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Regression Standardized Residual


Histogram Residual Model 8
Mean = -1.59E-13
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 140,194
Frequency
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Regression Standardized Residual


Histogram Residual Model 9
Mean = -1.58E-13
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 140,186
Frequency
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Regression Standardized Residual



Histogram Residual Model 10
Mean = -1.58E-13
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 140,189
Frequency
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Regression Standardized Residual



Histogram Residual Model 11
Mean = -1.56E-13
Std. Dev. = 1.000
N = 140,267
Frequency
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Regression Standardized Residual

APPENDIX J

LOGISTIC REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF THE DETERMINANTS OF VOTE BUYING ACCEPTABILITY IN LOCAL ELECTIONS, 2006-2015 (LEVEL OF RELIGIOSITY AMONG MUSLIMS)

B *** (SE)	MODEL 1	MODEL 2	MODEL 3	MODEL 4	MODEL 5	MODEL 6	MODEL 7	MODEL 8	MODEL 9	MODEL 10	MODEL 11
CONSTANT	.403***(.033)	.205**(0.064)	.335***(0.037)	.648***(.046)	.327***(.036)	.411***(.035)	.439***(.048)	.318***(.042)	.567***(.044)	.347***(.041)	.642***(.082)
Party identification	.057***(.008)										
NasDem Partisan		.246***(.056)									
PKB Partisan			.124***(.021)								
PKS Partisan				-.200***(.033)							
PDI-P Partisan					.117***(.016)						
Golkar Partisan						.038** (.016)					
Gerindra Partisan							.011 (.036)				
Democratic Partisan								.135*** (.028)			
PAN Partisan									-.121***(.031)		
PPP Partisan										.102***(.026)	
Hanura Partisan											-.193**(.075)
Religiosity level	-.018***(.003)	-.016***(.003)	-.017***(.003)	-.016***(.003)	-.016***(.003)	-.016***(.003)	-.016***(.003)	-.016***(.003)	-.016***(.003)	-.016***(.003)	-.016***(.003)
Male	-.044***(.011)	-.039***(.011)	-.041***(.011)	-.038***(.011)	-.046***(.011)	-.039***(.011)	-.039***(.011)	-.04***(.011)	-.039***(.011)	-.04***(.011)	-.039***(.011)
Age	-.005***(.000)	-.005***(.000)	-.005***(.000)	-.005***(.000)	-.005***(.000)	-.005***(.000)	-.005***(.000)	-.005***(.000)	-.005***(.000)	-.005***(.000)	-.005***(.000)
Rural	.013 (.012)	.013 (.012)	.014 (.012)	.0130 (.0120)	.014 (.012)	.014 (.012)	.013 (.012)	.012 (.012)	.014 (.012)	.015 (.012)	.014(.012)
Javanese	.470***(.011)	.472***(.011)	.467***(.011)	.469***(.011)	.466***(.011)	.473***(.011)	.471***(.011)	.471***(.011)	.471***(.011)	.471***(.011)	.471***(.011)
Income	-.048***(.002)	-.049***(.002)	-.049***(.002)	-.048***(.002)	-.049***(.002)	-.049***(.002)	-.049***(.002)	-.049***(.002)	-.049***(.002)	-.049***(.002)	-.049***(.002)
Education	-.106***(.003)	-.105***(.003)	-.104***(.003)	-.104***(.003)	-.104***(.003)	-.105***(.003)	-.104***(.003)	-.105***(.003)	-.104***(.003)	-.104***(.003)	-.104***(.003)
Weigthed N	**140008**	**139804**	**139749**	**139762**	**139693**	**139545**	**139783**	**139747**	**139738**	**139742**	**139819**
Pseudo-R2	**.055**	**.054**	**.054**	**.055**	**.055**	**.054**	**.054**	**.054**	**.054**	**.054**	**.054**

Regression coefficients (b) *** standard errors in parentheses *Sig<0.1; **Sig<0.05; ***Sig<0.01