

**STRATEGIC WARNING TIME:
A DEFENCE PLANNING CONCEPT
FOR NEW ZEALAND**

This sub-thesis Roger Ball own work.

All sources used have been acknowledged.

June 1993


This sub-thesis is submitted for the degree of
Master of Arts (Strategic Studies) in the
Strategic and Defence Studies Centre,
Research School of Pacific Studies,
Australian National University.

Acknowledgments

The author is indebted to his supervisor, Dr Robert Woodman, for his support and invaluable advice. Thanks are also due to Matthew Jensen who provided access to his files and read the final draft.

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studied at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre under the auspices of a Freyberg Scholarship from the New Zealand Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force. That assistance is gratefully acknowledged. This paper is the personal view of the author and he takes full responsibility.



(RS Ball)

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

ADP Australian Defence Force

AUSA Australia, **Acknowledgements** States

ASDAPF Australian Strategic Analysis and Defence Policy

The author is indebted to his supervisor, Dr Stewart Woodman, for his support and invaluable advice. Thanks are also due to Matthew Jansen who provided comment and proof read the final draft. Dr Cathy Downes and Ken Ross made helpful contributions at various stages. The author studied at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre under the auspices of a Freyberg Scholarship from the New Zealand Ministry of Defence and the New Zealand Defence Force. That assistance is gratefully acknowledged. This paper is the personal view of the author, for which he takes full responsibility.

DNZ91 Defence of New Zealand 1991 - A Policy Paper

EWI Early Warning Indicators

FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangements

JIO Joint Intelligence Organisation

JMNA Joint Military Net Assessment

NZDF New Zealand Defence Force

RRF Ready Reaction Force

SEATO Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation

ACRONYMS

| | Page |
|--------|--|
| ADF | Australian Defence Force |
| ANZUS | Australia, New Zealand, United States |
| ASDAPO | <u>Australian Strategic Analysis and Defence Policy Objectives</u> |
| ASP90 | <u>Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s</u> |
| CFE | Conventional Forces in Europe |
| CSE | Central Studies Establishment |
| DIO | Defence Intelligence Organisation |
| DOA87 | <u>Defence of Australia 1987</u> |
| DONZ91 | <u>Defence of New Zealand 1991 - A Policy Paper</u> |
| EWI | Early Warning Indicators |
| FPDA | Five Power Defence Arrangements |
| JIO | Joint Intelligence Organisation |
| JMNA | Joint Military Net Assessment |
| NZDF | New Zealand Defence Force |
| RRF | Ready Reaction Force |
| SEATO | Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation |

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INTRODUCTION

paper on defence, Defence Zealand 1992 (DOWZ92), reflecting a long held view, states "there are no direct threats to our security". The difference in scale between New Zealand's defence capability and that of the United States is stark. But that only serves to emphasize the importance of the issue.

Gen Colin Powell:

"We no longer have the luxury of having a threat to plan for..."

Reporter:

"And will this make it more or less likely for US forces to go into battle?"

Powell:

"Haven't the foggiest. I don't know. That's the whole point. We don't know like we used to know."(1)

...it is of exceptional importance in considering how the...community might be more involved in measures for its own defence, and for other reasons too, that broad judgements of threat credibility and warning time...be accepted as part of the foundation on which national consensus on our defence posture should be built.(2)

Colin Powell is surely right: the United States doesn't know like it used to know. The end of East-West ideological confrontation has called into question the rationale for NATO, for US conventional strategy and the basis of nuclear deterrence. The present structure and role, and the future development of the United States' military capacity is being fundamentally questioned.

For New Zealand defence planners, the dilemma of 'not knowing' is not new. The New Zealand Government's white

paper on defence, Defence Zealand 1992 (DOWZ92), reflecting a long held view, states "there are no direct threats to our security". The difference in scale between New Zealand's defence capability and that of the United States is stark. But that only serves to emphasize the importance of the issue.

paper on defence, Defence of New Zealand 1991 (DONZ91), reflecting a long held view, states "there are no direct threats to our security". The difference in scale between New Zealand's defence capability and that of the United States could not be more stark. But that only serves to emphasise the point of the comparison: the dilemma of 'not knowing' raises for both countries, as it does for many others, important issues about the purpose and nature of military forces. Questions of where, when and against whom are among the most crucial determinants of military planning, and yet, what little reliable guidance could be drawn during the Cold War, has been removed. For all sorts of reasons, military as well as political and financial, those who work within the sphere of defence planning are now being asked to justify themselves afresh. They must, as Wrigley exhorts above, work to build consensus as a basis for defence posture. This paper is part of that effort.

There are many aspects of defence planning which could be taken up in this vein. The present study concentrates on one: the notion of strategic warning time and its possible application to New Zealand. But why warning time? After all, the British fared badly under a similar concept, known as the Ten Year Rule. That piece of policy guidance, established in 1919, stated that

It shall be assumed for framing revised Estimates that the British Empire will not be engaged in any great war during the next ten years, and that no Expeditionary Force is required for this purpose.(3)

The conceptualisation and application of the Ten Year Rule left Britain ill-prepared when war did come. That experience also seriously questioned the notion that states could gauge their present defence efforts against some idea

of what the future might hold; it suggested, as do all sudden events, that the best protection lies in having forces ready now, rather than in having forces on paper.

But this study is not about to propose the use of a Ten Year Rule for New Zealand. Indeed, as is discussed in later chapters, there are sound reasons why that concept is of dubious value for New Zealand. But there is a good case to be made for applying tools with which to plan our future requirements. Strategic warning time is such a tool.

Strategic warning time currently plays a pivotal role in the defence planning of some states, from which experience New Zealand can learn. Two settings in particular - Australia and the United States/NATO - are examined in Chapter One of this paper. The notion of warning time as it is (or was) applied is described and critiqued. The question asked of these case examples is typically 'Kiwi': how have others fared and can their experiences be usefully adapted for New Zealand conditions?

The concept of strategic warning time is little understood in New Zealand defence planning circles and even less applied. In response to this, Chapter Two looks at warning time in an abstract sense, explaining what it is and why it is important as a planning concept.

In Chapters Three and Four the question of 'what value is strategic warning time to New Zealand?' is examined. Chapter Three will provide an overview of New Zealand's past experience with notions of warning, including, in Annex A, an analysis of warning received for past deployments. Chapter Four then presents a framework of a warning time model. It will be seen that the value of

warning time to New Zealand is mixed and not uniform across all of the tasks performed by the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF). Nevertheless, there is a strong case to be made for the construction of a robust and sophisticated warning time model for New Zealand's unique strategic circumstances.

An important caveat to this work is that it does not seek to predict threats to New Zealand. Nor is this a study of force expansion and lead times. This paper focuses on the methodology of defence planning, sketching a framework for a model of warning time and suggesting avenues for further research. In this context, Sir Michael Quinlan has observed that

...the name of the game is choice, where uncertainty is pervasive and we cannot afford the full menu; and with choice, inevitably, go risk and opportunity cost - choice, that is, what not to provide, where to take a chance or accept dependence. In most of these assorted dimensions, of course, the planner is in the business of balance and blend, rather than black-and-white or absolute either-or.(4)

It is the interacting problems of extended time-scale and uncertainty which present the largest problems for the defence planner. The value of strategic warning time is that it can help to bring greater certainty over an extended time-frame; to make choices and to minimise risk.

In offering these arguments, this study presents itself from a parochial New Zealand perspective. But the focus and recommendations of this paper are fully intended to be New Zealand-centric. In writing this paper the author became acutely aware of the dearth of publicly available information on strategic and defence planning issues in New Zealand, which, aside from severely limiting the availability of source material, also provided some

motivation to contribute to a wider and better informed debate.

Footnotes

- 1 Guardian Weekly, 9 June 1991.
- 2 Alan Wrigley, The Defence Force and the Community (1990).
- 3 Quoted in W David McIntyre, New Zealand Prepares for War (1988), p 67.
- 4 Sir Michael Quinlan, "British Defence Planning in a Changing World", The World Today, August/September 1992, p 162.

United States is adjusting its notion of warning to a threat environment which, although better overall, is no far more confused:

Chapter One

THE APPLICATION OF WARNING TIME:

NATO/UNITED STATES AND AUSTRALIA

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter the evolution of strategic warning is placed in its broad historical context. Technological developments in particular have led to great advances in the ability of states to wage war at short notice and, as a corollary to this, have also meant that larger demands are now made on states to be forewarned of strategic developments.

The application of strategic warning is examined in more detail in two modern settings: firstly, the United States, with particular emphasis on conventional NATO commitments and recent changes in US strategic posture. It was on NATO's Central Front during the Cold War that the use of warning time was most highly developed, and NATO strategy relied heavily on the concept throughout East/West confrontation. Of particular relevance to New Zealand's circumstance is the changing nature of current US thinking. Since the removal of an overarching threat and without the geographical focus provided by Europe. The

United States is adjusting its notion of warning to a threat environment which, although better overall, is now far more confused.

The second example focuses on Australia, where the absence of a defined threat has been the most basic obstacle to the development of a strategy for the defence of the continent. In spite of this, such a strategy has been developed since the 1970s, and the notion of warning time has been central to it. Paul Dibb has commented that "The methodology that has been developed in this threat-free context could have applications to other medium-sized powers".(1) This, plus a large overlap between the strategic environment of Australia and New Zealand, makes the Australian setting of particular interest to New Zealand.

THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGIC WARNING

In Clausewitz's time, the slow pace of mobilisation and movement provided sufficient warning of an opponent's intention such that the possibility of surprise was a tactical rather than a strategic concern:

Basically, surprise is a tactical device, simply because in tactics, time and space are limited in scale. Therefore in strategy, surprise becomes more feasible the closer it occurs to the tactical realm, and more difficult the more it approaches the higher levels of policy...It is very rare therefore that one state surprises another, either by an attack or by preparations for war.(2)

A 'revolution in movement' during the nineteenth century however, made strategic surprise possible: in a purely military sense, the importance of strategic warning time

has evolved from a condensing of time and space since the ending of the Napoleonic Wars in 1815. By this we refer to the exploitation of dramatic technological advances in transport brought about by the development of railway networks in Europe and the New World and, later, the invention of the internal combustion engine. These events accelerated the pace of - and, more arguably, the potential for - war, allowing a state to mobilise, concentrate, attack and then sustain a force at greater speeds and on greater scales than ever before.(3)

Accentuating the rapid movement of large numbers of troops were concurrent advances in weaponry, communications, tactics and the administration of war. The introduction of airpower in the twentieth century added a further dimension to the equation, allowing the delivery of firepower in any direction, and at extremely short notice by forces already 'in being'. Taken together, these developments gave to a state an unprecedented ability to both surprise an enemy, and to inflict enormous losses.

The passing of an era in which strategic mobilisation was easily detectable gave way to a heightened requirement for defenders to possess accurate and timely intelligence of their neighbour's activities.(4) Indeed, it was during the Austro-Prussian War of 1866 that the timing of mobilisation first really mattered: rather than reacting to the onset of hostilities, it was the reciprocal fear of attack and considerations regarding the time needed to assemble operational forces which heavily influenced the beginning of war. Even more intensely analysed in this respect have been the events leading up to the July Crisis of 1914. The conventional wisdom has it that "...the war came about mainly because of railway timetables".(5) The fear of

being left behind in the race to prepare for war had encouraged the development of a system of interlocking mobilisation plans in Europe with the German Schlieffen Plan at its centre.(6)

In the nuclear age, the advent of the intercontinental ballistic missile (and precision guided munitions in general) epitomises the importance of strategic warning: any country can clandestinely mobilise its forces and gain tremendous advantage by attacking first. With the advent of the US nuclear doctrine of Mutually Assured Destruction, the application of strategic warning became absolutely crucial: early warning became key to guaranteeing the integrity of the deterrent (especially the vulnerable land-based leg of the triad) since only then could an effective counter-strike be ensured.

There is, of course, a fierce debate over whether new technologies have returned some or all of the advantage to the defence (with the advent of air defence systems, satellites and so forth). But, on balance, it remains the case that modern warfare has seen a dramatic increase in the ability of a state to wage war at short notice, with little warning, over great distances, and with greater firepower. As a consequence, the warning time available to the defender has decreased by a similar quantum. Ironically, because of the potentially crippling effects of a surprise attack with modern weaponry, warning time has decreased inversely to the need to receive it.

**THE UNITED STATES: WARNING TIME IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND THE
"NEW WORLD ORDER"**

To establish defence readiness in time it is of critical importance that the available warning-time be utilized purposefully.

1983 West German White Paper on Defence.

In 1967 NATO replaced its strategy of massive nuclear retaliation with a posture of 'Flexible Response' designed to avoid war with the Soviet Union through deterrence. An important element of the strategy was the principle of forward defence which aimed to defend the intra-German border, and to minimise damage and the loss of ground to an invading Warsaw Pact force.

Forward Defence was based on the premise that surprise and attack were two key features of Soviet strategy: since the publication in 1962 of Sokolovskii's seminal Soviet Military Strategy, NATO strategists had assumed that a Soviet nuclear or conventional attack on the Central Front would seek maximum advantage by minimising warning. The general consensus was that Warsaw Pact forces held a significant conventional advantage should Moscow suddenly decide to initiate war on the Central Front; by comparison, NATO forces were fewer in number, less ready, had greater distances to travel (both within Europe and across the Atlantic), and suffered from a potentially crippling lack of command unity at the political level. NATO planners assessed that success on the conventional battlefield was dependent upon their ability to hold out until reinforcements - particularly US troops - had arrived from the rear.

In the European theatre and for the purposes of Forward Defence, warning time became a central element of NATO planning. In conventional terms, it was commonly defined as "the time available between the evident understanding that the Warsaw Pact is preparing for an attack and the actual outbreak of hostilities." The definition reflects the fact that although warning time estimates did inform longer range planning, they were primarily concerned with (and regarded as) a basis for determining immediate operational needs.(7)

Based on these estimates, United States planning established its own schedule of readiness requirements, mobilisation plans and contingency arrangements to meet NATO commitments. Given that warning time was expected to be short, the US assigned personnel and materiel readiness its highest funding and strategic priority; pre-positioned materiel and airlift was emphasised as a means of minimising forward deployments. NATO planners were confident of some warning of an impending Warsaw Pact attack, but expected that indications might be ambiguous and acted on only after some delay. Consequently, during the 1980s, nearly six division-equivalents and 27 fighter squadrons were regularly stationed in Europe to guard against a Soviet surprise attack. In such an event, as many as ten more divisions and 42 more fighter squadrons would be moved on short notice from the US by means of pre-positioning and airlift.(8)

It was essential for the success of forward defence in Europe then, that early warning be gained to allow defensive preparations to begin in the face of an impending attack. Commanders relied heavily on intelligence and assessments of hostility indicators that would give clear

and early warning of attack. Assessments of warning in Europe were highly debatable, though the standard planning assumption appears to have been that the Pact would require about four days to mount an attack by its standing forces to achieve very limited goals, nine days following mobilisation to prepare an offensive with more ambitious territorial objectives, and two weeks for a campaign that threatened all of Western Europe.(9) For example, based on the (then existing) balance of forces, Kauffmann has calculated that, following two weeks of mobilisation, NATO had only a 15-20 percent chance of defending itself for 15 days against a Warsaw Pact attack.(10) Such estimates did not sit well with US plans to allow ten days to get reinforcements from the US to Europe (where they would likely spend up to another five days becoming operationally ready).(11)

Events in Europe over the last few years, however, have made the case for maintaining high levels of readiness across the board unnecessary: neither a bolt from the blue (nor even a bolt from the grey) is likely in the future.(12) The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the abandonment of Forward Defence in Europe have fundamentally changed the United States' strategic posture. The precise amount of additional warning time remains undetermined, though it has increased dramatically: the 1991 US Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA) commented that the probability of major conventional conflict in Europe "is low, and warning time has so greatly increased, that these conflicts are no longer the central point of focus or the principal driver of requirements for forces."(13)

The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the retreat of Soviet forward echelons means that any return by Russia to

a threatening posture will still face newly independent Eastern European states as buffers between it and Western Europe. The restrictive terms of the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty further complicates any offensive manoeuvre for both Russia and the Ukraine, while the economic and political disarray facing the former Soviet republics provides distractions to any adventurism. The United States estimates that even were the 'Soviet Union' (read Russia) to re-emerge as a threat, it would take them "several months to years" to return fully to pre-CFE force levels.(14)

Consequently, US Cold War plans for reinforcing the European theatre have given way to a slower and more traditional mobilisation and reinforcement strategy. The level of US forward presence for the defence of Europe is again under review, this time by the Clinton Administration, and may go as low as 40,000.(15) Moving to emphasise regional contingencies over the former Soviet threat, the US has shifted to a Base Force posture, which aims to be capable of fighting two regional wars simultaneously. Beyond this, the strategy of "reconstitution" requires the United States, despite current reductions, to be able to regenerate global war-fighting capabilities above those already in the Base Force in the event that a 'superpower' should once again threaten.(16)

Current US thinking has been reaffirmed by the Gulf War experience, which resulted in a recasting of force structure and mobilisation policy. The three Army National Guard combat brigades that were designated active duty brigades (to "round out" divisions) were never deployed (the 200,000 reserves called to active duty served mostly

in combat support roles). As US Secretary of Defense, Dick Cheney, stated:

It was unrealistic to expect part-time soldiers to maintain readiness rates as high as their active-duty counterparts...Instead of using guard combat brigades in future wars as integral parts of fast deploying divisions, they might better be organized into their own divisions that would be expected to train 90 to 120 days before being sent into battle.(17)

Cheney's assessment would not have been possible without the dramatically improved strategic circumstances pertaining in Europe. While things are far from settled on that continent, it is the absence of any imminent and large scale conventional threat which has made reliance on fewer active forces and slower-mobilising reserves possible.(18)

The Gulf War, the decline of the Soviet Union as a threat, and subsequent reductions in defence spending are causing a major reevaluation of US force planning. The loss of an identifiable threat creates difficulties as well as opportunities. The use of threat analysis as a basis for force structure planning is no longer tenable: "The real threat we now face is the unknown, the uncertain. The threat is instability and being prepared to handle a crisis or war that no one predicted or expected".(19)

The implication for the concept of warning time is that while resources may continue to be devoted to intelligence collection, and although warning time is said to be just as important as ever, traditional notions of the concept are giving way to new - but as yet unformed - concepts. The 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment states that:

In the past, operational planning assumptions and resource programming analyses have treated warning and political decisions as single events along the timeline of a major developing crisis. The realities of the emerging world order have resulted in a refinement to the process. Thus, in the future, for a given regional threat, operational concepts will be developed and alternative force level analyses will be conducted to account for four conditions of crisis onset: (1) slowbuilding crises; (2) fast-rising crises; (3) imminent conflict; and (4) conflict. This approach will illuminate the relationship between cost and risk as a function of assumptions about warning and political decision time. It will allow a far more precise array of options for decisionmakers in resource allocation and theatre campaign planning.(20)

This theme is developed further in the US' 1992 National Military Strategy:

Warning time, or available response time, is far more likely to be exploited by key decisionmakers if they have a menu of options from which to choose. These options need to be pre-planned and gauged to a wide range of crises. This fundamental change to our military strategy is reflected in an adaptive planning process, through which planners develop multiple options keyed to specific crises.(21)

These themes have been continued in subsequent defence and strategic documents issued by the US.(22) While the new Clinton Administration has yet to make its detailed views known on a number of defence issues, the methodology being developed in respect of warning time is unlikely to change. In essence, the United States is trying to come to grips with the fact that it no longer has an enemy against whom to plan. Traditional notions of warning time on the NATO Central Front relied heavily on a mechanistic assessment of likely Soviet actions and - in particular - speed of attack and mobilisation. This in turn, set the benchmark for US and NATO planning and, by extension, for force levels and readiness states. The use of threat based

planning against a singular and defined enemy has given way to an attempt to define strategy according to a range of regional contingencies. Without an identifiable threat, warning assessments must now be made against contingencies which are much less precise and which involve a greater selection of potential adversaries in a myriad of settings. Consequently, the length of time available for warning and response is expected to vary and force planners are now charged to have at hand a 'menu' of options for responding to those possibilities.

STRATEGIC WARNING TIME IN AUSTRALIAN THINKING

The treatment of warning in the Australian context has also undergone a significant evolution towards a no-threat based approach, but for rather different reasons and in quite different timescales to the US experience. In March 1951 Prime Minister Menzies stated in the Australian Parliament that:

The dangers of war have increased considerably. It is my belief that the state of the world is such that we cannot, and must not, give ourselves more than three years in which to get ready to defend ourselves. Indeed, three years is a liberal estimate.(23)

Statements similar to this - which focused on the requirements of mobilisation - were largely focused on Australia's alliance commitments in forward theatres. It was not until the late 1960s and early 1970s that the environment was right for the development of a concept for the defence of Australia. Externally, there were a number of imperatives: the failure of the war in Vietnam and, in 1973, the ending of Forward Defence following the enunciation of the Guam Doctrine. Over the same period, a

number of important organisational changes were occurring in the wake of Fairhall and Tange.(24)

Since the early seventies, and as defence thinking began to focus on Australia's specific needs (as opposed to those of its allies), the concept of strategic warning time has been central to the intellectual logic of Australian defence planning. The notion of varying levels of threat developing over increasing time scales was first discussed in the 1971 Strategic Basis of Australian Defence Policy and, since then, in all subsequent papers of that classified series.(25) The 1973 Strategic Basis offered a first definition of warning time as:

...the time from Government acceptance of a perceived threat to the time it is judged it will require an operational response.(26)

It was within the Central Studies Establishment (CSE) and the Joint Intelligence Organisation (JIO) that quantitative analysis of warning time was first initiated in Australia. Beginning in the early 1970s, studies on warning time were intended to relate warning assessments to the expansion needs of the core force.(27) The work has continued since then, with the completion of CSE reports in 1975 and 1986 (the latter was styled a "threat recognition and response model"), and a JIO (now the Defence Intelligence Organisation) report on warning time being completed in 1990.(28)

Alan Wrigley observes that there has been substantial continuity in warning assessments between the mid-seventies and mid-eighties.(29) Focusing on the 1976 white paper, and the 1981 and 1984 Parliamentary Joint Committee reports, Wrigley shows that all come to similar conclusions

regarding potential threats to Australia in kind, credibility and warning time.(30) Some differences over greater superpower tension in the mid-1980s are not material to the basic conclusion of all three papers that:

...there was much continuity in the determinants of Australia's strategic circumstances which, taken together, argued that major military threats against [Australia] were improbable and would, if they arose, be preceded by a series of developments.(31)

Indeed, Wrigley's thesis bears extension: there has been a notable consistency stretching from 1971 into the early nineties in the assessments of official Australian papers (both classified and public) and parliamentary reports on the likely warning for threats facing Australia. As Dibb has also noted, while the period of warning has varied from seven to ten years, the most important conclusion has continued to be that Australia would receive prolonged warning of major attack.(32)

The most recent defence white paper, Defence of Australia 1987 (DOA87), was a particularly important document in the development of a strategy for the defence of Australia. The white paper confirmed earlier assessments on two points: firstly, that low-level threats to Australia could emerge quickly from forces already extant in the region. Secondly, the capability to mount an invasive threat to Australia did not currently exist - except in the United States and the (then) Soviet Union - and it would take many years to develop such a capacity from amongst regional powers during which time Australia would be able to respond.(33)

In the absence of identifiable threats, planning was to be based on the 'enduring features' of the strategic

environment and the capabilities that could realistically be projected against Australia. Three levels of conflict were enumerated (low, escalated-low, and more substantial) and these replaced specific threats by creating 'generic' contingencies or threat classes. In this way, geography and regional capabilities provided the benchmark for force guidance and the test for capabilities, doctrine and readiness levels.

In a notable departure from the Dibb Review however, DOA87 discussed warning (but not warning time) in a far more general way. Indeed, DOA87 is generally imprecise about readiness requirements and lead times, and is reluctant to specify actual time frames for warning. This approach was continued in 1989 with the production of a classified strategic review, known as Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s (ASP90).(34) Wrigley argues this approach has allowed the Australian Defence Force (ADF) to interpret strategic guidance as implying that there will be little or no warning of low level conflict. Consequently, there has been an excessive emphasis on being able to deal with the full gamut of regional capabilities currently in existence.(35)

There may be some truth in Wrigley's observations, though he does not explore the reasoning behind the government's reluctance to be less predictive about strategic warning in public. Firstly, the 1975 and 1986 CSE studies on warning time had come in for much criticism: many felt that they attempted to be predictive where they should not, and that they had used data that was not of direct relevance to Australia.(36) While both studies had been misinterpreted (neither sought to be predictive), this fact illustrated a broader problem with warning time estimates which took a

"no-threat-for-so-many-years" approach. The mirth with which the Whitlam Government's "no threat for 15 years assessment" had been treated was enough of a caution against similar claims in public.(37) Finally, and related to this, was a desire not to offend the sensibilities of regional states by implying that Australia found them threatening.

As then Australian Defence Minister, Kim Beazley, explained:

...when it came to [DOA87], we in fact avoided the term 'warning time'. What we set out there was the relationship between warning and defence preparation - our simple theme being that warning is not something that starts on a given day, but is the process by which government adjusts defence planning to political and military developments.(38)

In this comment, Beazley reflects what is a unique application of warning designed for specifically Australian needs. Conventional notions of strategic warning - as they had been developed and applied by NATO strategists in Europe - were found at an early stage to be inappropriate to Australia's strategic requirements. Even as early as 1976, defence planners in Australia were de-emphasising the linear and scenario-specific nature of warning time being applied in the NATO setting. The 1976 Australian Strategic Analysis and Defence Policy Objectives (ASDAPO) and the subsequent Coalition Government's white paper reinterpreted the notion of warning time: it was to be used to enable defence and intelligence efforts to respond to changes in the strategic environment rather than as a response to a specific and identifiable threat.(39)

Based on a system of warning indicators that have been progressively refined, warning time is intended to be a flexible notion able to guide force development over the longer term. Quoting Beazley again:

It is not sensible to think of warning time as a finite period in which we will not be faced with military threat of any kind. Rather the concept provides a basis on which we can assess our own priorities for defence preparation and the time scales for our own defence effort.(40)

As ASP90 notes, that system of warning indicators focuses on capability as opposed to motive and intent, which are both held to be difficult to analyse and subject to change.(41) The nature of response is also an important feature. As Dibb relates, the defence force does not remain static until a threat has materialised. The concept of defence preparation time assumes that policy will be responsive to change, that intelligence efforts will be vigilant and timely, that an expansion base capable of timely response is maintained, and that lead times will remain within anticipated warning.(42)

Despite the reluctance of DOA87 to deal firmly with the subject of warning time, it seems clear that work on the subject has continued to proceed within the defence community. Beazley gave a particularly detailed outline of the concept to Parliament, outlining the key conclusions of work underway within JIO.(43) A major paper on strategic warning time was apparently begun within JIO in early 1988 and completed two years later.(44) The major conclusion of that report, commissioned during Dibb's leadership of the organisation, is that Australia faces no threat of major invasion (defined as a division group of around 20,000 personnel) to its north for at least seven years.

An area that remains unexplored however, is an assessment of warning for threats arising in the South Pacific. So long as Australian planning concentrated explicitly on the

defence of continental Australia, a wider application for warning time in the region was not warranted. Activities or threats beyond the continent would be tackled by forces intended primarily for the defence of Australia. However, both ASP90 and the 1991 Force Structure Review have identified a specific new role for the ADF which requires the defence force to "contribute to the national response to requests from South Pacific nations for security assistance, including incidents affecting the safety of Australian nationals". Unlike other tasks which would take the ADF beyond the continent, this role is said to require the purchase of dedicated capabilities, including a helicopter carrier.

The new role calls into question the purity of the defence of Australia concept. It is also not supported by assessments of warning time and defence preparation time. Presumably there is an onus on the ADF to ensure that, as with the other roles identified in ASP90, the defence force has the capabilities to do the job and that it can expand in a timely fashion should threat levels rise. While the concepts of warning and defence preparation underpin current levels of capability for the eight other roles of the ADF, there does not seem to be similar guidance for the South Pacific role.

CONCLUSION

The contrasting approaches adopted by the United States and Australia to the application of strategic warning time raise interesting questions about the use of the concept in New Zealand's circumstances. The absence or existence of threat can be seen to make a large difference to the type

of warning time model employed, and to subsequent guidance for force development.

The use of warning time on the NATO Central Front provides a useful example of how the concept is applied in an environment that is very specific about threat, operating environment and response. A reciprocal fear of surprise attack - to adopt Schelling's terminology - made strategic warning vital to NATO's defensive integrity. Threat/response cycles were largely operational in nature: they provided guidance for readiness levels and alert phases, and were relatively narrow in the range of variables which they considered.

The end of the Cold War has led to a reassessment by the United States of how it will use warning time in the 'new world order'. Recent US policy statements indicate the adoption of a more discrete conceptualisation of warning time keyed to different regions and to different types of conflict within regions. Efforts by the US to broaden its interpretation of warning away from a strongly threat-based model reflect a more complex and sophisticated approach which may have some application to New Zealand. As will be discussed further below, though on a much reduced scale, New Zealand also faces dilemmas in its defence planning as a result of a diffuse and ambiguous threat environment.

An important limitation of the US approach should be noted, however. The post-Cold War warning model remains very undeveloped and still appears to be 'operationally' focused on alert levels and short term response. The connection to, and implications for, the United States' regenerative capacity and reconstitution forces does not seem to have been well thought through. Any application to New Zealand's situation would have to address this shortcoming.

For Australia, the lack of a specific threat denied, as it has done for the United States in more recent years, the benchmark most often used by other countries against which to plan defence needs. Instead, geography and other enduring features have become the key to guidance. The adoption of 'credible contingencies' and 'levels of conflict' has provided a surrogate for specific threats and a more coherent basis for planning.

In contrast to the US experience, the Australian approach has seen warning and defence preparation time used in the force development process as a tool to inform alterations to force structure planning and readiness over the long run, rather than as a guide for operational response in the short term. The concept is seen in a far less 'mechanistic' way than it has been in Europe, reflecting the fact that, for Australia, the emergence of a threat (except at a low level) will not normally require an immediate operational response, but is more likely to have implications over the longer term. Furthermore, Australian treatment of the subject reflects greater concern over the very real problems of perception, including recognising when warning time has started, and establishing what exactly constitutes a threat to the national interest.

The Australian approach offers one method of defence planning which seeks to overcome the absence of threat. The overlap between Australia's and New Zealand's strategic outlook suggests that there may be some lessons here for New Zealand. As we shall discuss further below however, the largest obstacle to applying the Australian experience to New Zealand is that focusing force structure on a 'defence of New Zealand' strategy would not meet New Zealand's wider security interests.

Footnotes

- 1 Paul Dibb, The Conceptual Basis of Australia's Defence Planning and Force Structure Development (1992), Preface.
- 2 Michael Howard and Peter Paret (eds), Carl von Clausewitz, On War (1976), pp 198-99.
- 3 For further detail on these points see, for example, Michael Howard, War in European History (1976).
- 4 For an excellent discussion of these themes in the context of strategic surprise attack see Michael Handel, "Intelligence and the Problem of Strategic Surprise", Journal of Strategic Studies, 7 (3), September 1984, pp 229-281.
- 5 AJP Taylor, How Wars Begin (1979), p 120. For a vivid account of the intricacies and determinant nature of the various mobilisation plans see Barbara Tuchman, The Guns of August (1962), pp 74-75.
- 6 This traditional interpretation of the beginnings of WWI has been subject to heavy criticism from revisionist historians who discount the importance of mobilisation schedules and place greater emphasis on other causes. See for example the series of articles in International Security, 15 (3), Winter 1990/91, as well as the subsequent correspondence in the Summer 1991 edition.
- 7 Hans Goebel, "The Wrong Force for the Right Mission", National Security Series, No 4/81 (1981), p 46. For further discussion of warning time in the NATO context see, for example, Maj (P) Donald L Mercer, "Warning Time", Military Review, Vol LXII No 1 (January 1982), pp 14-18; and Carl-Friedrich Dwinger, "Warning Time and Forward Defence", National Security Series, No 2/84 (1984).

Because the focus of this study is warning time in the New Zealand context, comparisons with the United States and the NATO theatre will concentrate on conventional warfare. It should be noted however, that forward defence was closely linked to notions of flexible response and, ultimately, to nuclear deterrence. Strategic warning of nuclear threats - potentially measured in time scales as little as hours

- and minutes - was crucial to a posture of mutually assured destruction and relied heavily on technical means of detection. For an introduction to these issues see Desmond Ball and Jeffrey T Richelson (eds) Strategic Nuclear Targetting (1986).
- 8 Joseph A Pechman (ed), Setting National Priorities: The 1982 Budget (1981), p 169.
- 9 William W Kauffmann, "Non-nuclear Deterrence", in John D Steinbruner and Leo V Sigal (eds), Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question (1983), pp 58-61. In 1977 General Alexander Haig estimated that NATO would need 14 days warning time of an impending Pact invasion. In the same year, Senators Nunn and Bartlett argued before the US Congress that a "potentially devastating invasion of Europe" by the Soviet Union was possible "with as little as a few days warning". Other professional commentators believed that Soviet strategy aimed to achieve strategic surprise by giving NATO only 48 hours to react. (See Mercer (1982) op cit, p 17.)
- 10 Ibid, pp 84-90.
- 11 Indeed, there is a question over to what extent mobilisation plans were a function of capabilities and finances rather than of the Soviet threat, but that is another debate.
- 12 Dov S Zakheim, "The Defense Budget", in Joseph Kruzal (ed), 1990-91 American Defense Annual (1990), p 71.
- 13 Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Joint Military Net Assessment (1991), p 1/7. The assessment is consistent with NATO's new strategic concept agreed at the Rome Summit in November 1991. That paper states that the risk of attack on the Central European Front has been substantially reduced and "minimum Allied warning time has increased accordingly". However, the "range and variety of other potential risks...are less predictable than ever before". See "The Alliance's New Strategic Concept", NATO Review, No 6 Dec 1991, p 25.
- 14 Ibid, p 5/1.
- 15 "US commitment to NATO may reduce further", Reuters, (18 March 1993).

- 16 Cheney (1991) op cit, p 2/5. For a discussion of reconstitution and the Graduated Mobilisation Plan see John R Brinkerhoff, "Reconstitution: A Critical Pillar of the New National Security Strategy", Strategic Review, Fall 1992, pp 9-21.
- 17 Quoted in Gary Guertner, NATO Strategy in a New World Order (10 April 1991), fn 22.
- 18 Ibid, pp 19-20.
- 19 Colin L Powell, Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff, National Military Strategy of the United States (Jan 1992), pp 3-4.
- 20 Cheney (1991), op cit, p 2/8.
- 21 Powell (1992), op cit, p 12.
- 22 See for example, Dick Cheney, Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy, January 1993.
- 23 Cited in Desmond Ball, "The Australian Defence Force and Mobilisation", in Desmond Ball and JO Langtry (eds), Problems of Mobilisation in the Defence of Australia (1980), p 9.
- 24 On these issues see: Desmond Ball, "The Machinery for Making Australian National Security Policy in the 1980s", in ibid, p 140; Desmond Ball, "Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes", in Desmond Ball (ed), Strategy and Defence - Australian Essays (2nd ed) (1986); and Graeme Cheeseman and Desmond Ball, "Australian Defence Decision-Making: Actors and Processes", in Desmond Ball and Cathy Downes (eds), Security and Defence - Pacific and Global Perspectives (1990).
- 25 Paul Dibb, Review of Australia's Defence Capabilities (1986), pp 24-25; and Dibb, op cit, (1992), p 1.
- 26 Quoted in AT Ross, Threat Recognition and Response (Vol 1), CSE Note 53 (August 1986), p 1.
- 27 Ibid, p 4. See also Desmond Ball, "Analysis and Australian Defence Decision Making", SDSC Working Paper No 94, Canberra (1979), p 18.
- 28 The CSE report, cited in footnote 26 above, was a further iteration of the 1975 version. The JIO paper

- has not been released, although its main conclusions have been made public. See interview with Prof Paul Dibb, "Warning Time of a major assault put at seven years or more", Australian Defence Report, 2 (12), June 1992.
- 29 Wrigley (199), op cit, pp 45-46.
- 30 See Wrigley's discussion in ibid, Chapter Two, "Australia's Strategic Outlook and its Implications for Our Defence". Also see the 1976 white paper, Australian Defence; the Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, The Australian Defence Force: Its Structure and Capabilities (1984); and the Report of the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence, Threats to Australia's Security - Their Nature and Probability (1981) (Katter Report).
- 31 Wrigley (1990), op cit, p 45.
- 32 Dibb (1992), op cit, p 2.
- 33 Defence of Australia 1987, paras 3.38, 3.43.
- 34 Australia's Strategic Planning in the 1990s (ASP90) (27 November 1989), pp 23-25. (ASP90 was made public in 1992).
- 35 Wrigley (1990), op cit, pp 49-50. It is a well argued point that Wrigley makes when he contends that more specific guidance is required in terms of warning and preparation time in order to make best use of mobilisation requirements (ibid, p 47). Ironically Wrigley's own advice is not much more helpful for planning purposes when he argues that threats of significance would become evident over "a timescale that is greater than a few weeks or months" (ibid, p 47). The timescale to which Wrigley seems to be referring is identified later in the Review as a mere six months (ibid, pp 56,57).
- 36 Katter Report (1981), loc cit; and Alan Dupont, "Australia's Threat Perceptions: A Search for Security", Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 82 (1991), p 88.
- 37 Ibid, p 71.
- 38 Hon Kim C Beazley, Minister for Defence, Compendium of Speeches 1985-1989 (1989), p 162.

- 39 Dibb (1986), op cit, p 25.
- 40 Quoted in Dupont (1991), op cit, p 88.
- 41 ASP90, op cit, p 24.
- 42 Dibb (1992), op cit, pp 4,6.
- 43 Extracts of that statement are re-produced in ibid, Annex F.
- 44 Australian Defence Report (1992), loc cit.

sub-warning as a planning concept. Our interest is primarily to identify the key elements of warning and its value as a defence planning tool. A difficulty arises however, because the notion of warning time has been most developed and applied at the operational level. The preoccupation of the defence planners with this level of warning obscures the value and potential application of warning as a planning tool.

Chapter Two

CONCEPTUALISING STRATEGIC WARNING TIME

This chapter discusses the notion of strategic warning time in a more abstract sense, drawing on the case studies outlined above. After reviewing a number of technical definitions, differing approaches to warning time are looking at three questions: the purpose of warning, what is being warned of, and the issue of who is

INTRODUCTION

In broad terms, warning occurs at three levels. Political warning refers to the full range of variables affecting relations between states; analysis at this level is wide and long range. Strategic warning is normally also long range in its outlook and, although it includes consideration of political, economic and other variables, its focus is more military and security. Finally, operational warning refers to the activities of military forces, usually in the context of a specific threat environment, where conflict is happening or may happen. These levels should not be treated as mutually exclusive or as necessarily sequential in time: there are many possible scenarios where two or all three could occur at once.

But the level of analysis at which one approaches the subject has large implications for the application of warning. This paper refers always to strategic warning time to reflect the fact that the focus here is not just warning and response at the operational level of warfare,

but warning as a planning concept. Our interest is primarily to identify the key elements of warning and its value as a defence planning tool. A difficulty arises however, because the notion of warning time has been most developed and applied at the operational level. The preoccupation of the literature and of defence planners with this level of warning obscures the value and potential application of warning as a planning tool.

This chapter discusses the notion of strategic warning time in a more abstract sense, drawing on the case studies outlined above. After reviewing a number of technical definitions, differing approaches to warning time are examined by looking at three questions: the purpose of warning, what is being warned of, and the issue of who is being warned.

TERMS

Prior to dealing with these issues however, it is important to clarify a number of commonly used terms since they also have a time dimension and have a direct relationship to the warning process in defence planning. Lead time and preparation time are commonly used to indicate the process of preparing the armed forces for military operations. Lead time refers to the integration of personnel and equipment into the force structure such that they are capable of operational deployment. Ideally, lead time should be a function of warning time; that is, warning assessments should influence such things as procurement patterns, training and maintenance cycles, and so forth in response to a changing strategic environment.

Preparation time is the time taken to prepare personnel and equipment for a specific operational deployment. The ideal, again, is that preparation time should be driven by warning assessments and the time required for preparation should be within estimates of warning. Preparation time includes such things as training, mobilisation, planning, and transit of forces.

Readiness specifies the degree of notice - usually measured in months, days or hours - that forces would have to prepare for deployment. Readiness states are normally predetermined and aimed at achieving specific objectives (for example, to provide an operational battalion of infantry, drawn from the reserves, within three months) according to estimates of the warning and preparation time likely to be available. Obviously the intention is to have forces at readiness states which are less than the combined total of warning and preparation time.

In the previous chapter, a common NATO-style definition of warning time was quoted: that is, "the time available between the evident understanding that the Warsaw Pact is preparing for an attack and the actual outbreak of hostilities". Some Australian writers have adopted a similar approach by defining warning time as "the time taken from government acceptance of a perceived threat to the time it is judged an operational response will be required".(1) Definitions such as these are applicable at the operational level of warfare and planning. They also provide a useful guide for examining warning time in an historical context (as is done in Annex A to this paper). But for reasons which are outlined in greater detail below, they are of limited value when applied in a planning sense at the strategic level, or in circumstances where a threat is not well defined.

WARNING FOR WHAT PURPOSE?

The objective of warning time assessments is broad and its application can differ depending on the setting, the threat environment facing a defender, and also according to which organisation or even individual amongst the defender is being considered. The literature on 'surprise attack' tells us that the most important function of strategic warning is to give timely and accurate alert of surprise attack, since unexpected assault on an unprepared defender gives enormous advantages to an aggressor.(2) In this sense, warning time focuses heavily on the use of the concept to inform operational responses and alert levels. As noted in the previous chapter, this was the principal application of the concept on NATO's Central Front during the Cold War.

But while warning time is traditionally seen as an alert mechanism, another function is to act as a planning tool over a longer time frame. At this broader level, the objective of warning is to ensure the efficient and timely preparedness of one's overall defence capability in response to an evolving security environment. This approach better describes the Australian conceptualisation of warning time as it was outlined above. It allows the state to take advantage of a propitious security environment and also seeks to avoid being surprised by developments, such as the emergence of a threat, which may be detrimental to its security.

Without any notion of threat levels, a defence force could be expected to provide an average level of capability over

time as a guard against all conceivable threats on the spectrum. This would be both inefficient in times of peace, and irresponsible in times of instability. Warning can be an aid to narrowing the range of possible options facing defence planners:

This allows a greater capability to be brought to bear against the threat when its likelihood of materializing is high, than could be maintained against that threat on an ongoing basis during periods when it is but one of many low-probability possibilities.(3)

Thus, by discounting the unlikely and the incredible, a defence planner will know what doesn't have to be prepared for. Conversely, by identifying credible threats and their likely time frames, planners are able to concentrate resources in both time and space. In short, an effective strategic warning system acts as a narrowing mechanism, helping a defence force to be ready in some places some of the time, rather than in all places all of the time.

As noted in the Introduction to this paper, it is the problem of long time frames that makes planning for defence particularly difficult. The life cycle of major pieces of equipment runs into decades, while research and thinking on procurement begins many years earlier. Nor is it just a matter of equipment, but also of training personnel, integrating new technology and so on. As lead times are long, and because the future is unknown, there are very large choices to be made, and risks to be taken, in structuring defence forces.(4)

As Quinlan notes, the 'imperative of choice' manifests itself to defence planners in a number of ways, two of which are particularly relevant to the purpose of strategic

warning time. Firstly, there is what Quinlan calls the relative priority to be assigned between the near and the long term. By that he means the balance of forces between those 'in-being' and those 'in reserve'. Secondly, and related to this, is the issue of readiness states, not just for operational forces, but also for those forces intended for regeneration and reconstitution.(5)

Strategic warning is not the sole source of information for determining these features of the force structure, but it is the most important. Warning time will have less direct impact on other aspects of defence planning, but can help bring greater certainty to judgments about capability procurement priorities and doctrinal developments.

WARNING OF WHAT?

The monitoring of the strategic environment, particularly the identification of threats, is normally the substance of a warning time assessment. A common definition of threat has it that "Threat [is] judged in terms of both the capabilities and the intentions of a potential enemy, or combination of enemies".(6) Detailed models of threat assessment, which make up an important part of traditional warning time models, will seek to use Early Warning Indicators (EWI) to track and quantify the emergence (or dissipation) of threat over time. The objective is to ascertain when that threat has crossed a threshold requiring some form of warning or response. EWI are intended to provide unambiguous evidence of significant change in the environment; that is, to separate out meaningful data from irrelevant or conflicting background 'noise'.(7)

long-term nature of capability procurement, requires
Taken individually or as unbalanced groups, EWI would be of limited utility. The purpose of monitoring broad ranges of key variables is to provide patterns of signals by which to warn of future events. Before passing to the next phase of the threat/response cycle, indicators are separated from background noise, interpreted, integrated, weighted, and examined within the context of other EWI to see if a pattern emerges. If a pattern is identified it will be tracked until a certain threshold of 'danger' or 'threat' is crossed, at which point a warning is given in the next stage of the threat/response cycle.

cycle: diplomatic staff and intelligence operations will
There is a large body of literature on the formal study of intelligence cycles and issues relating to the collection, interpretation and use of warning information.(8) Many of the issues go beyond the present discussion, but an important overlap should be noted in the debate regarding use of operational warning cycles at the strategic level. Typically, operational intelligence cycles, when applied to the strategic setting, prove unsophisticated, are unable to cope with variation, and have a limited outlook in terms of time and range of observation. Their focus on the identification of 'threats' makes them of limited use to longer term force structure planning - a theme that is discussed in more detail below.

enough that government agencies or personnel be "warned";
Furthermore, in assessing threat, appreciations of motive and intent, as Australian strategic guidance has noted, are extremely difficult to make. Both are difficult to assess and can change quickly. For this reason defence planners typically tend to concern themselves with capability as a more reliable and constant indicator of long range strategic developments. And one which, because of the

long-term nature of capability procurement, requires longer-term responses from defence planners.

WARNING FOR WHOM AND AT WHAT LEVEL?

Closely related are questions of "From whose eyes are we viewing warning?", and "At what level is warning taking place?". There is a complex issue here about who is doing the perceiving, who is being warned, and at what level.

Many actors are involved in the warning and response cycle: diplomatic staff and intelligence agencies will collect information; analysts will distil and interpret it; their superiors will consider its significance; political leaders will be alerted if necessary; and defence planners will react - depending on the time available - by re-configuring force structures, procuring new equipment or deploying forces in response.

To consider the value of warning at its broadest level - as a planning tool and not merely as an operational alert mechanism - it must be the government which is the focus of examination. It is only at this level that the political, economic and military activities of the state can be coordinated. From the operational perspective, it is not enough that government agencies or personnel be "warned": history is replete with examples of surprise attack despite various actors amongst the defenders having had warning. A warning cannot be considered effective until it reaches a decision-maker capable of acting on it.

It does not follow, however, that the warning and response process should be dependent upon formal and constant

political involvement. Strategic warning should feed into a defence planning system, allowing force structure to change and alter to suit an evolving strategic environment. In this sense responses should avoid being held hostage to a decision about when 'warning has begun'. Such an approach is too categorical. It is also likely to be highly focused on a narrow definition of threat, rather than being responsive to strategic developments in general.

short, successful warning is more dependent upon psychology

A further issue relating to 'Who is being warned?' is the importance of perception and misperception. While we might view warning from the perspective of government, it should not be assumed that this equates to a view of the state as a unitary or rational actor. The state is neither: at each step in the warning and response cycle, individuals and organisations perceive and react in their own right. At each level there is opportunity for 'objective' information to be distorted, mishandled and ignored. Indeed, many have argued that it is these factors which are the major cause of warning failures. As Betts notes:

least to minimise them, and to ensure they are not missed

event ...there are no significant cases of bolts out of the blue in the twentieth century. All major sudden attacks occurred in situations of prolonged tension, during which the victim state's leaders recognized that war might be on the horizon.(9)

Betts' comment refers specifically to warning and response at the operational level, but we might apply it at the broader planning level as well. Invariably there is always information available for defence planners; indicators are there but they are too frequently ignored, interpreted incorrectly or mishandled. Timely and accurate warning is not just a matter of detection, but of assessment and application in the planning process. Problems of human psychology, ethnocentric slants, misperception, conflicting

interests, political competition, organisational biases, and poor internal management systems are all factors which prevent the effective use of warning. Even in cases where a threat is accurately assessed by officials, governments may be reluctant to act for a number of reasons. They may, for example, not believe the assessments produced by officials, or they may prefer to delay the expense and trouble of improving readiness states and capabilities. In short, successful warning is more dependent upon psychology and politics than on technology, organisation or information. Warning is vitally important, but the real issue, at the end of the day, is response.

A lesson therefore, for the development of warning time is that while warning indicators may exist 'objectively' in the strategic environment, there are barriers to our ability to perceive events accurately and react appropriately. One of the purposes of developing and formalising the notion of warning time is to strip away such blinkers from the warning and response cycle, or at least to minimise them, and to extend our ability to see events objectively.

CRITIQUE OF TRADITIONAL NOTIONS OF WARNING TIME

The traditional notion of warning time and its relationship to lead and preparation times can be thought of as a linear 'time line'. The time line is typical of the classic 'mobilisation' approach to strategic warning and illustrates how Early Warning Indicators are intended to generate warning assessments, followed by alerts and responses. Depending on the amount of time involved, the response may vary from re-configuring force structures over

a number of years, to mobilising reserves, to an immediate retaliatory strike. The linear approach outlined here provides a clear and parsimonious model of warning time - and there is certainly value in that. However, a number of difficulties should be noted.

Firstly, the model is threat-driven and depends upon the existence and accurate identification of a threat to provide guidance for defence planners - an approach which the 1991 Australian Wrigley Report dismissed as divisive and confusing, "inevitably speculative and almost entirely hypothetical".(10) The intention of threat-based planning (as with any planning) is to make the business of defence predictable and to allow the defence force to concentrate and prioritise. From threats planners are able to create detailed scenarios of when and how conflict may occur, who the participants might be, what their objectives might be, what capabilities and tactics they might use and, therefore, what is required of a defender to deter or defeat an opponent. The aim of such an approach is to maximise the effect of limited resources by introducing an element of specialisation, and to concentrate forces against a specific opponent in both time and space. The advantage is that specific guidance for the defence force and, if time allows, for the development of a force structure, can be gained.

One obvious disadvantage of a threat driven model is that, in the absence of threat, little guidance can be gained for the force structure: the warning system breaks down and planning is driven by other factors. A related problem occurs where threats are ambiguous. From a bureaucratic point of view, this can lead to a lack of consistency in force structure decisions, both over time and across the

organisation. At the military level, force development decisions will be based on strategic assessments which may turn out to be erroneous or simply lagging behind changes in the strategic environment. The consequences could be varied, including ignorance of political, technological and economic developments, through to failure to foresee an attack.

The tendency of warning time assessments to posit actual time frames accentuates these concerns: the 1975 warning time paper produced by the Australian Department of Defence's Central Studies Establishment is a case in point.(11) Although the study did not claim to be predictive about the future, it attracted criticism for focusing on threats of little relevance to Australia and for the way in which it applied quantitative historical analysis to Australia's unique circumstances.(12)

Another limitation of the threat driven model is that warning assessments have a tendency to adopt a 'worst-case' approach. The result is a lowering of the threshold for responding to emerging threats and this is expensive in terms of readiness levels and the spectrum of capabilities required to be maintained. It is also potentially destabilising in an environment where an overly-aggressive response would serve to fuel misperception and an arms race. A worst case approach can also result in a loss of credibility for the warning system if it is seen to 'cry wolf' too often.

Simple linear models of strategic warning also focus (and respond) on a bilateral basis to a single threat. The approach will not cope easily with multiple threats emanating from a number of sources, at various levels of

the conflict spectrum, and over differing time frames. This difficulty arises with many types of threat/response cycle through the over-concentration of Western defence planners on the use of the concept to inform military responses and alert levels at the operational level. Since the bombing of Pearl Harbour in 1942 and Roberta Wohlstetter's subsequent analysis, a large body of literature has been built around the problem of surprise attack and the place of warning in averting it. As we saw in the previous chapter, this emphasis has its foundations in the attention which Western scholars and strategists have given to the most demanding and immediate issues of the Cold War; namely, conventional war in Central Europe and problems surrounding the use of nuclear weapons. The Cold War provided a specific threat environment with relatively well defined parameters, placing a premium on a model of warning which was inherently operational rather than strategically or politically based.

CHARACTERISTICS OF A PREFERRED MODEL OF STRATEGIC WARNING

Noting these limitations on traditional notions of warning time, and prior to applying the concept of strategic warning to New Zealand's circumstances, we might summarise some general features of a preferred model for strategic warning which would avoid the difficulties outlined above. Firstly, the model should not be dependent on threats in order to function - though obviously it should be able to accommodate them if they emerge. In a low threat environment, where information and EWI are likely to be ambiguous and difficult to quantify, the model must still be able to provide an output that is applicable to force planning.

Connected to this is the necessity for the nature of the
The model also needs to be capable of accommodating an environment where tasks are multiple and diffuse. In other words, it should be multi-tracked and able to respond multilaterally - as opposed to single tracked and operating bilaterally. The model should also be able to deal flexibly with problems which may emerge unexpectedly at some advanced point; that is, it must be able to cope with strategic surprise.

In the elaboration of EWI, the model should focus on those which are capability oriented, rather than including intent and motive. While the latter factors will be important to an overall national response, from a defence planning perspective, it is change in capability that is the most reliable and consistent warning indicator.

In terms of response, the model should avoid being pre-determined in its outcome. By providing an extended time perspective, there should be greater flexibility to admit a range of responses from, say, diplomatic action to pre-emptive strike. By introducing greater flexibility the cycle should be reversible in the sense that early identification of a deteriorating environment could lead to responses which prevent further deterioration, or which actually improve the strategic environment.

An ideal warning model should aim to provide the defence force with warning within expected lead and preparation times. To achieve this, it is also necessary that the model and its output is accepted within the defence planning system as a guide to force expansion and readiness levels.

Connected to this is the necessity for the nature of the model and the assessments that it provides to be acceptable to not only those in the defence planning community, but also to a wider constituency within the public service bureaucracy and government and, to a lesser degree, within the media and academia. This issue goes well beyond the brief of the current discussion, but, as the quote from Alan Wrigley in the Introduction to this paper notes, it is fundamental to the practical application of warning assessments in defence planning terms.

In terms of force structure development, notions of warning time and associated concepts of preparation cannot provide all the necessary guidance. However, the model should bring greater certainty to the problem of long time-scales in defence planning terms. By that we mean warning times can provide guidance as to the balance between the force in being and reserves, and also to readiness levels. Warning notions would also provide information for the weighting of capability procurement priorities within the planning process.

10. Wrigley (1990), *op. cit.*, p 33.

11. AT Ross, *An Analysis of Warning Periods Associated with Major Conflicts 1939-73*, CSF Working Paper, Dept of Defence, Canberra (1975).

12. The Katter Report, for example, rejected the CSF study on the grounds that it "tended to relate to post-war states with long histories of friction rather than states with long histories of trans-oceanic attack". Katter Report (1981), *op. cit.*, p 39, para 2.25.

Footnotes

1 The definition is Graeme Cheeseman's, although IM Speedy's wording is very similar. See Cheeseman (p 30) and Speedy (p 68 fn 2) in Desmond Ball and JO Langtry (eds), Problems of Mobilisation in the Defence of Australia (1980).

2 For an introduction to the problems and issues surrounding strategic surprise see Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack: The Victim's Perspective (1988).

- 3 Ralph Strauch, Strategic Warning and General War: A Look at the Conceptual Issues, Rand Note (October 1979), p 36.
- 4 Quinlan (1992), op cit, p 161.
- 5 Ibid, pp 161-62.
- 6 Threats to Australia's Security - Their Nature and Probability (Katter Report), Joint Committee on Foreign Affairs and Defence (1982), p vi.
- 7 The term 'noise' was adopted from communication theory by Roberta Wohlstetter and refers to the background of inconsistent or irrelevant information. Roberta Wohlstetter, Pearl Harbour: Warning and Decision (1965), p 691.
- 8 See for example Strauch (1979), op cit; Richard K Betts, Surprise Attack (1982); Richard K Betts, "Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable", World Politics, 31 (1) October 1978, pp 61-89; and Handel (1984), loc cit. With particular application to the South Pacific, see Ken Ross, "Prospects for Crisis Prediction: A South Pacific Case Study", Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No 65 (1990).
- 9 Betts (1982), op cit, p 18.
- 10 Wrigley (1990), op cit, p 33.
- 11 AT Ross, An Analysis of Warning Periods Associated with Major Conflicts 1939-73, CSE Working Paper, Dpt of Defence, Canberra (1975).
- 12 The Katter Report, for example, rejected the CSE study on the grounds that it "tended to relate to contiguous states with long histories of friction rather than cases of trans-oceanic attack". Katter Report (1981), op cit, p 39, para 2.35.

have been - and continue to be - few countries in the world with the offensive naval and air capability necessary to indulge in such an expedition. An exercise of this nature would be enormously risky relative either to the spoils that New Zealand has to offer or to its strategic importance. Despite these reassuring factors, in New Zealand's strategic position, there have remained residual concerns that the sea lanes by distance may also prove a liability should sea lanes be cut, thus preventing trade and resupply.

CHAPTER THREE

STRATEGIC WARNING IN

NEW ZEALAND

Underlying New Zealand's approach to defence in 1945 were three primary assumptions: that she could only be seriously threatened physically by a major power; that against such a threat she could not be defended with the New Zealand resources available; and that her defence problem was, in any case, more than a matter of physical protection, so dependent was she on external trade. (1)

INTRODUCTION

Having looked at the application of strategic warning in two settings and discussed its nature in the abstract, this chapter turns to an examination of the New Zealand experience. The concept of warning time has historically had little impact on New Zealand defence planning in any formal sense and the reasons for this are discussed. The levels of warning available to New Zealand for past deployments will be reviewed and the basis of New Zealand strategic thinking will be outlined, including current approaches to warning time.

NOTIONS OF WARNING IN NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE POLICY THINKING

Since 1945 and even earlier, the New Zealand Government has assessed that any invasive threat of New Zealand would need to be mounted and sustained over vast distances. There

have been - and continue to be - few countries in the world with the offensive naval and air capability necessary to indulge in such an expedition. An exercise of this nature would be enormously risky relative either to the spoils that New Zealand has to offer or to its strategic importance. Despite these reassuring factors in New Zealand's strategic position, there have remained residual concerns that the security afforded by distance may also prove a liability should sea lanes be cut, thus preventing trade and resupply. As Ian MacGibbon has observed:

Underlying New Zealand's approach to defence in 1945 were three primary assumptions: that she could only be seriously threatened physically by a major power; that against such a threat she could not be defended with the New Zealand resources available; and that her defence problem was, in any case, more than a matter merely of physical protection, so dependent was she on external trade.(1)

As MacGibbon goes on to argue, the New Zealand response to this dilemma in 1945 and since, has been to opt for a posture of collective security as a means to ensure that other countries would be vitally interested should New Zealand's economic or physical security be jeopardised. Depending on the political leaning of the government of the day, this stance has been pursued through the United Nations or through membership of such security arrangements and treaties as ANZUS, SEATO and the FPDA. In the country's first post-war defence review, Holland's National government established a turn of phrase that was to epitomise this outlook:

We must rely for our security on the power of our allies...Acceptance of this simple fact has led successive Governments over the years to base their defence policy on joining with other like-minded nations in a common effort to find the most effective means of protection against aggression.(2)

And in 1961:

If our policy is one of collective security we must retain the confidence and support of the countries on whose assistance we rely...To do this we must join with them in defending what they regard as their vital interests as well as our own, and make the best contribution we can.(3)

There is not space here to fully discuss the evolution of New Zealand defence policy since 1945, or the changing nature of commitments and threat perceptions. The key point for present purposes is that since 1945 defence policy has rested on faith in collective security efforts, as expressed in Article 51 of the United Nations Charter. Defence strategy for New Zealand, therefore, has been collective in principle and forward in practice. Even the ruptures in domestic politics which occurred during the Vietnam War and, more notably, over the entry of nuclear warships, did not disturb this continuity.(4)

For New Zealand then, and in similar fashion to Australia, the concept of strategic warning has always been closely tied to mobilisation or preparation in response to the needs of allies (such as the 1949 commitment to provide a division in the Middle East within six months of the outbreak of conflict).(5) The notion of 'warning time' was not a consideration in the sense that it is being treated here. What mattered to defence planners in New Zealand was simply lead and preparation time - being given enough notice to assemble an expeditionary force in response to allied requests for assistance. As MacGibbon notes,

The emphasis was entirely upon 'global war' requirements, that is, the training of large bodies of men rather than the development of balanced, mobile, well equipped forces in New Zealand itself.(6)

Indeed, so long as New Zealand formed only an adjunct to larger allied formations, then warning assessments were largely academic: every threat to an ally became - conceivably - a threat against which New Zealand should plan. Since this was obviously absurd, Defence chiefs took the view that a 'well trained body of men' would suffice on most occasions, and that so long as larger allies could handle the crisis at the beginning, New Zealand would have time to mobilise. Without a direct threat to New Zealand, and lacking an independent capacity for collecting intelligence, New Zealand's ability or need to establish a clear connection between strategic guidance and capability procurement was not a priority.

Following the Korean War, the nature of defence, especially Army, structures began to change. The need for readily available forces, rather than slow-mobilising non-regulars became increasingly apparent in New Zealand's regional commitments. Since the 1970s, that trend has accelerated and there has been a gradual movement towards the establishment of forces able to act more autonomously of allied formations. In response to the 1969 Guam doctrine, the British decision to withdraw 'east of Suez', and the expansion of the Soviet Union into the region, there was ...a substantial shift in New Zealand's defence roles and force deployments in South-east Asia and the Pacific and, what is more important, of the concepts underlying the role of forces.(7)

The 1978 Defence Review reflected new regionally-focused priorities and made the "security around (New Zealand) a key objective". The review called for the development of capabilities able to respond to "low-key emergencies in our region", as well as the upholding of wider national

interests.(8) The 1978 paper also heralded the withdrawal of New Zealand troops from Singapore, though they did not finally depart until 1989.

The 1983 and 1987 reviews developed this regional theme and, aside from the issue of nuclear ship visits (which was taken up in the latter) the two papers exhibited almost identical priorities: both argued that the South Pacific was New Zealand's area of primary strategic concern, within which New Zealand should promote security and stability. Both reviews recommended that New Zealand should have the ability "to be able to mount an effective military response to any low level contingency within our area of direct strategic concern".(9)

The Labour Government's 1987 white paper further developed this line. That paper was seminal for a number of reasons: firstly, it established New Zealand's anti-nuclear policy in a defence policy document. It also placed far more emphasis on the relationship with Australia - some fourteen paragraphs were devoted to this topic compared to one in the previous defence review. Thirdly, the paper emphasised the importance of operations in the South Pacific, implying a force structure designed primarily for operations in that area and suited to low level operations. These aspects have been much remarked upon by commentators, but they have obscured another which is also worthy of note and of particular relevance to the present discussion.

Heavily influenced by the Australian Dobb review which had just been completed in that country, the 1987 New Zealand white paper embodied a conceptual development in thinking about the defence of New Zealand - as opposed to thinking

about how New Zealand could contribute to the defence of allies. The paper argued for greater operational and infrastructural self reliance, and concluded that:

For the first time we have adopted in formal policy terms the concept that the New Zealand armed forces will have the capability to operate independently, although more likely in concert with Australia, to counter low level contingencies in our region of direct strategic concern.(10)

The newly-elected National Government's 1991 defence white paper reflected a significant reorientation on a number of points: the too narrow geographical focus of the 1987 paper was replaced by the equally surreal view that New Zealand should maintain a force structure capable of responding - in partnership with others - to contingencies anywhere in the world up to mid-level conventional warfare. The anti-nuclear legislation, though still in place, was cited for having led to a decline in the professionalism of the Defence Force and for making full cooperation with traditional allies unattainable.

Despite the obvious (and important) differences surrounding the anti-nuclear stance and the geographical extent of New Zealand's defence interests, however, the two papers exhibited more than a modicum of continuity in their strategic assessments of threats to New Zealand. The 1991 white paper reaffirms the 1987 assessment that:

New Zealand is fortunate to have no visible or foreseeable threat of armed invasion. It is reasonable to assume that there would be considerable warning time for an event of such magnitude...(11)

In seeking to compensate for the perceived isolationism of the 1987 paper however, and also in response to the vanished Soviet threat to the Pacific, DONZ91 adopted a

more 'internationalist' approach, in which the South Pacific was de-emphasised. Despite this, a number of important themes remained: compared to defence reviews of the early sixties and before, the Pacific and Asia received most attention; the relationship with Australia continued to be singled out as fundamental to New Zealand's security; and the prescription for a limited military capacity for self reliance in the South Pacific was also repeated.

Defence policy papers of the last two decades reflect changes in New Zealand's external strategic circumstances as well as important developments in domestic politics. In geographic terms, the focus for combat scenarios has become more concentrated on Southeast Asia, Australia and the Southwest Pacific. Calls for greater 'self reliance' also found expression in terms of capabilities. The 1978 defence white paper called for the acquisition of a logistic support ship, an oil tanker was purchased, and an all-arms, self contained Ready Reaction Force (RRF) was created in 1984.

Greater attention has also been brought to bear on the conduct of operations in the South Pacific - the only theatre where New Zealand forces could conceivably operate alone. Increased maritime surveillance and the initiation of the Golden Fleece exercises in 1989 gave substance to this. The Golden Fleece exercises, which practised scenarios for providing assistance to South Pacific Island governments, also provided the first genuine avenue for the development of joint force operations by the NZDF. Furthermore, structural and legislative changes to defence's higher command under the 1990 Defence Act provided for the creation of joint force commanders under a Chief of Defence Force.

Change has, however, been slow and has occurred at the margins. Calls for a logistic support ship remain unrealised, while the concept of the RRF has provided very limited independent capacity to project power (especially without sealift), even for low level operations in the Southwest Pacific.(12) Accounts of the first Golden Fleece exercise reinforce the view that the ability to operate independently is heavily constrained not only in terms of capabilities, but also because joint force doctrines are underdeveloped.(13) The second Golden Fleece exercise, scheduled for 1993, has been deferred in order to release funds to pay for New Zealand's peacekeeping commitments in Somalia.(14)

Peter Jennings has concluded that the 1987 white paper's claim to have introduced greater self-reliance "is not borne out on a close examination of the Government's weapons acquisition projects".(15) And he describes changes in operational doctrine, which were meant to give greater emphasis to independent operations in the South Pacific, as "minor".(16)

The gap between rhetoric and reality is illustrated further in the area of defence planning where the concept of formally linking strategic developments to capability acquisition has not been well developed. As Jennings observed in 1987, "a policy of systematically linking force structure planning to wider strategic assessments is still lacking".(17) Five years later, Stewart Woodman also noted that

ten years or indeed longer, and should this situation change there would be "substantial warning time" in which to prepare counter-measures.(21)

New Zealand's (defence) planning...has been changeable and lacked a rigorous analytical underpinning...force structure planning has been largely ad hoc and done little more than shuffle the mix of capabilities originally acquired in the late 1960s. While the defence tasks set out in The Defence of New Zealand 1991 provide a useful tool for program budgeting purposes, they provide little practical guidance for defining force structure characteristics and priorities nor for determining the balance between major capability acquisitions and other areas of defence activity.(18)

Possibly that gap will be filled by the new 'Defence Planning System' which was inaugurated in 1992. That system seeks to "integrate strategic guidance, defence tasks and capabilities, planning and forecasting, and capital equipment procurement" in one "single chain of logic".(19) However, Rolfe also notes that this new planning system is little different from what has gone before and, if that is so, the problems identified above remain to be addressed.(20)

Thus, defence planning has also moved only slowly to reflect new realities in New Zealand's strategic position. Certainly it is only recently that notions of threat and warning, and the connection to planning have been noted in defence white papers. The first occasion was the 1987 white paper, which contained the fullest discussion available - in a public document at least - of threats to New Zealand and some rough indication of the time scales New Zealand would face in which to respond. The white paper felt that invasion was not a possibility "within the next ten years or indeed longer", and should this situation change there would be "substantial warning time" in which to prepare counter-measures.(21)

DONZ91 continued the warning time discussion and, for the first time, a definition was provided:

Warning time estimates the likely notice the New Zealand Government would have of evolving threats to our interests or security. Both warning and lead-times help determine the level of capability needed for tasks which our force-in-being must be able to carry out.(22)

This definition follows the conventional NATO approach to warning time: it is threat focused, linear in nature and dependent upon accurate and timely perception by the Government of threats. In Chapter Two, the limitations of that approach were discussed, while in the next chapter the focus is on why it is not well suited to New Zealand's particular circumstances. An alternative model is outlined.

NEW ZEALAND'S EXPERIENCE WITH WARNING

DONZ91 makes the interesting assertion that

In no case (since World War II) could the decision to deploy have been foreseen much more than a year beforehand. In most cases the notice was considerably shorter.(23)

It is difficult to speak with confidence about how New Zealand should deal with strategic warning in the future unless one has some idea of what the past has been like. In Annex A this statement from DONZ91 is tested and developed by examining the historical detail of cases where New Zealand military forces were either deployed operationally, or where their use was seriously contemplated, during the period 1898 to 1991. The results of this survey are compared to two Australian studies in an effort to test three propositions:

- That lower level conflicts have occurred with lesser warning time relative to medium and higher level conflicts.
- That warning time has been decreasing.
- That, since World War II, warning has averaged less than one year.

The key conclusions reached from this survey were that, firstly, the New Zealand experience has shown a strong correlation between the level (ie low, medium or high) of contingency and its warning time. Methodological differences between the study at Annex A and the two Australian studies prevented an adequate comparison between the three surveys.

Secondly, the study of past New Zealand deployments points towards a general decrease in warning time since World War Two. This conclusion is supported by one of the Australian studies examined, and in part by the other.

Finally, the contention that warning for New Zealand deployments has averaged less than 12 months since WWII is supported by the evidence at Annex A. Except for the Vietnam War, all other deployments gave warning times of less than twelve months; indeed, the average warning time for actual or possible deployments of New Zealand forces since WWII (including Vietnam) was only 5.8 months. Some implications of this data are suggested in Chapter Four.

- To provide defence advice
- To provide intelligence
- To maintain a force in reserve

THE STRATEGIC BASIS OF CURRENT NEW ZEALAND DEFENCE POLICY

Current New Zealand strategic guidance strongly reflects the historical pattern in favour of collective approaches towards security. DONZ91 takes the view that New Zealand faces no large direct threat, but instead must reconcile limited resources with the protection and promotion of wide interests. The white paper puts it this way:

New Zealand defence policy has to cover both an extensive home environment where the threat is low but the tasks demanding and an even more diffuse need to support our economic and other interests at great distances.(24)

There is nothing grandiose about the comment that New Zealand's interests are wide-spread - it simply acknowledges the key driving force of New Zealand defence policy. The absence of a large direct threat removes the bench-mark most commonly used by other states to structure their forces; that is, to better one's perceived enemy.

A number of other approaches are possible, such as the use of scenarios and net assessments, but the one adopted by DONZ91 is to key force structure to a series of eight defence tasks, derived from defence goals. These tasks, listed below, are used to provide order to activities and the purchase of equipment.

New Zealand Defence Tasks

- To protect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of New Zealand, and those countries for which it has constitutional responsibilities
- To provide defence advice
- To provide intelligence
- To maintain a force in reserve

in New Zealand's circumstances, imprecise and subject to change.

- To provide ancillary services, one of which is to make the conceptualisation of warning time in New Zealand's circumstances
- To contribute to regional security
- To participate in defence alliances

- To contribute to collective security

DONZ91 argues that the strategy which best encapsulates these tasks is that of 'Self Reliance in Partnership':

...to protect the sovereignty and advance the well-being of New Zealand by maintaining a level of armed forces sufficient to deal with small contingencies affecting New Zealand and its region, and capable of contributing to collective efforts where our wider interests are involved.(25)

Under current Government policy, the implications of such a strategy for the defence force are extremely broad. While the first priority for the defence force is the territorial integrity of New Zealand itself, very little military capability is structured for this purpose: other tasks command prior attention and determine capabilities. Add to that extremely limited resources, and these factors have resulted in an emphasis on general purpose capabilities able to work in a wide range of operating conditions, and capable of adapting to an equally varied range of tasks.

The rights and wrongs of such a strategy are not the direct concern of this paper. What does matter for present purposes is that the NZDF must structure for an extremely wide range of possible contingencies. The variables which other states use to guide force planning - such as the capabilities of an enemy, operating conditions etc - are,

in New Zealand's circumstances, imprecise and subject to change. This creates many difficulties, one of which is to make the conceptualisation of warning time in New Zealand's circumstances particularly difficult. On what threat, scenario or tasks should such a warning model be focused? And where or when?

This creates the most obvious difference between how the concept of warning is applied in Australia, or how it used to be applied in NATO. Australian strategic thinking, for example, sees warning as an understanding of the time it would take for a regional actor to mount a military threat against Australia. NATO focused (in a slightly different way) on the time available to respond to a threat from Warsaw Pact forces.

Those approaches have not been applied to New Zealand largely because there is an assumption that without a direct threat to New Zealand, they would not be useful. That assumption is tested in the following chapter.

CONCLUSION

There has been a clear policy desire, especially since the 1970s, to establish in New Zealand military forces able to act more independently, especially for low level tasks in the South Pacific. While acknowledging that that goal was narrowly conceived and was never meant to equate to self-sufficiency, achieving it has not been particularly successful in terms of capabilities, doctrine, planning, or consistency of political approach.

It remains the case that New Zealand's armed forces are

structured primarily for operating as part of larger allied formations, whether at sea, on land or in the air. The notion that New Zealand would only ever supply a 'large body of well trained men' for future conflicts has changed with the movement away from a non-regular army, but the principle remains: the NZDF is, by and large, an add-on, with very little ability to operate as an independent New Zealand force.

There are many reasons for that, but one which this study seeks to highlight is the lack of a robust planning model with which to systematically link New Zealand's strategic circumstances to capability needs and priorities. Notions of warning have made little impact on long range strategic thinking. The discussion of warning time which first occurred in 1987 reflected the higher profile which the concept had gained through publication of the Dibb Review in Australia. But it was defined rather differently and little thought has been given to how the application of the concept in Australia might differ from its use in New Zealand.

Footnotes

- 1 IC MacGibbon, "The Defence of New Zealand 1945-1957" in Sir Alister McIntosh et al, New Zealand in World Affairs Vol I (1977), p 145.
- 2 Review of Defence Policy (1957), p 3, para 4.
- 3 Review of Defence Policy (1961), p 4 (emphasis in original).
- 4 With regard to the dispute over entry of nuclear

- powered and armed warships, the Labour Government was of the view that its anti-nuclear policy would not prevent New Zealand remaining a full partner in a conventional ANZUS alliance. See Kevin Clements, Back From the Brink: the Creation of Nuclear Free New Zealand (1988), p 129. For a discussion of the continuities and disjunctures in reviews of New Zealand defence since WWII, see Dr JH Beaglehole, "The Evolution of New Zealand's Defence Policy and the White Paper of 1991", Address to the Ministry of Defence (August 1991).
- 5 In July 1949 the Chiefs of General Staff judged that, based on estimates of Soviet capabilities in the Caucasus, the division would have to be in the theatre of operations within three to four months, meaning that the unit would have to depart New Zealand within one to two months of mobilisation. This would certainly have been a difficult task when it is recalled that during WWII the first brigade-strength echelon of 2NZEF did not leave New Zealand until January 1940 - over 4 months after war had begun. The third and final contingent of the division reached the Middle East in September 1940. See MacGibbon in MacIntosh et al, op cit, pp 154-156.
- 6 Ibid, p 156.
- 7 RM Mullins, "New Zealand's Defence Policy", New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, 22 (7), July 1972, p 20.
- 8 1978 Defence Review, pp 18-19.
- 9 The quote is from the 1987 review, op cit, p 31. See also Defence Review 1983, pp 19-20.
- 10 Defence of New Zealand - Review of Defence Policy 1987, p 38.
- 11 Defence of New Zealand 1991 - A Policy Paper (DONZ91), p 37.
- 12 Peter Jennings, The Armed Forces of New Zealand and the ANZUS Split: Costs and Consequences (1988), p 64.
- 13 Peter Jennings, "Exercise Golden Fleece and the New Zealand Military: Lessons and Limitations", SDSC Working Paper No 187 (1989).
- 14 Matthew Grainger, "New Zealand to send team to Somalia", the Dominion (24 February 1993).

- 15 Jennings (1988), op cit, p 62.
- 16 Ibid, p 63.
- 17 Ibid, p 58.
- 18 Stewart Woodman, "Home Alone? Australia-New Zealand Defence Relations in a Changing World", Presentation to the Military Studies Centre's Conference on New Zealand's Defence and Strategic Policies in a Changing World (1992), p 12.
- 19 James Rolfe, Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships (1993), p 4.
- 20 Ibid, p 140.
- 21 Ibid, p 9, paras 2.2, 2.3. The white paper also concluded that "...the contingency of invasion is so remote that it need not form the basis of our defence strategy. Defence efforts must focus on more credible and feasible lower level threats, while maintaining a basis for expansion should serious threats emerge". (Ibid, p 11.) The assessment that "the threat of direct attack on New Zealand...is remote" was first recorded in the 1961 Defence Review (p 6, para 4) and has been echoed in all subsequent government reviews of defence policy. Until 1987 however, none had sought to estimate time scales or to differentiate the seriousness of differing levels of threat.
- 22 DONZ91, op cit, p 37.
- 23 Ibid p 29.
- 24 Ibid, p 16.
- 25 Ibid, p 54.

Chapter Four

A MODEL OF STRATEGIC WARNING TIME FOR NEW ZEALAND

INTRODUCTION

Historically this translated into armed forces maintained. It has been established that existing approaches to warning are not directly applicable to New Zealand's circumstances. Furthermore, New Zealand's historical experience is that warning is likely to be short. Two broad approaches are suggested to the issues raised by these conclusions: firstly, New Zealand could accept that warning will always be short and therefore the notion of warning time as a planning concept should be treated as of only marginal value. From this perspective, we should concentrate on having a ready reaction capability able to respond to events which arise with little or no warning.

The second broad approach, and that which is favoured by this paper, is to construct a warning time model for New Zealand that will provide defence planners with a flexible and forward looking tool as a necessary (though not sufficient) guide to important aspects of force planning in the NZDF.

IGNORE STRATEGIC WARNING TIME?

One possible application of the warning time notion for New Zealand would be to rely on others' alert mechanisms as the means to initiate defence preparation in New Zealand. This would certainly be consistent with the approach taken historically. New Zealand has not had to respond more quickly to deployments in the past due to the simple fact that it was never New Zealand under threat. So long as others - who were also likely to be larger and more capable - were more vitally involved, then New Zealand would always have time to prepare for conflict.

Historically this translated into armed forces maintained at low levels of readiness and with very little ability to mobilise quickly in response to unforeseen events. As we saw above, the most important requirement was that forces be structured in an 'expeditionary' fashion suitable for absorption into larger allied formations. That any New Zealand contribution would also likely be small in nature and of limited (or no) military significance, made rapid commitment unnecessary. New Zealand forces were, by and large, sent abroad for political purposes. It was the announcement of their commitment that had to be rapid, not their deployment.

Reversing such dependence on others' judgements could be both expensive and difficult. Broadly speaking, warning can be improved by acquiring greater intelligence collection and assessment capabilities, or by seeking better linkages to other states through intelligence sharing arrangements. The costs of acquiring a larger independent capacity would be high, involving an expansion

of signals and communications intelligence activities (perhaps with bases beyond the New Zealand mainland), more frequent surveillance over a wider area by aircraft and ships, and the greater use of satellite technology.

The cheaper alternative is to rely on other states for information regarding strategic developments. Indeed, this already is New Zealand's largest source of intelligence information, though it has been severely curtailed following the breakdown of the New Zealand-US leg of the ANZUS alliance. Relying on others has its disadvantages however: information may not be received in a timely fashion, may not be received at all, and is usually presented from the perspective of another country's strategic outlook.

A preferable approach would be to place the emphasis on response rather than enhanced warning. New Zealand could simply expect that warning will be negligible and acknowledge that the trade-off for this will be the heightened readiness of key capabilities. For tasks in the South Pacific and around New Zealand in particular (where New Zealand has a particular burden of responsibility) high readiness would become the accepted cost of not having a long term warning mechanism. This approach then, would marginalise the value of early warning as a defence planning concept and rely on other factors - principally the need for higher readiness - as determinants of force balance, readiness and procurement priority.

Part A: 'Partnership Tasks'

• Contributions to alliance

FRAMEWORK FOR A NEW ZEALAND STRATEGIC WARNING TIME MODEL

That approach is rejected here. It would abdicate to others the political and operational responsibility for providing warning for the use of the NZDF. It would do nothing to encourage the development in New Zealand of a more rigorous basis from which to draw guidance for the NZDF. It would place New Zealand in an especially reactive position towards its strategic environment, unable to respond to, and influence events, at an early stage. By placing the onus on higher readiness to counter lack of sufficient warning, it would also be a more costly path to take.

In a low threat security environment strategic warning time should be a planning tool able to inform force development over the longer term, not just operational reactions to one's strategic environment. In this section the framework for a model of warning time for New Zealand's unique strategic circumstances is investigated. The extremely broad scope of New Zealand's strategic outlook and the wide range of tasks and possible commitments that this gives rise to was noted above. In order to provide discipline, then, the framework is developed in two broad parts based on the two distinct elements which make up New Zealand's strategic outlook. For reasons which are explained further below, those two elements can be called the 'partnership' and 'self reliance' components of the defence strategy of 'Self Reliance in Partnership'. Within those two parts, the following categorisation can be made:

Part A: 'Partnership Tasks'

- Contributions to alliances

- **Contributions to regional security**
 - **Contributions to collective security**
- Part B: 'Self Reliance Tasks'**
- **New Zealand's immediate strategic area: New Zealand, Australia, and the Southwest Pacific**

Part A: Warning Time for 'Partnership' Tasks

What sort of tasks would these categories imply for the NZDF and how would warning be used to guide force structure? In general terms, the partnership side of the equation is distinguished from those under self reliance by the degree to which New Zealand would play a subordinate role, both in military and political terms, and usually at some distance from New Zealand. Such tasks are likely to be highly selective and designed to meet political objectives by making an appropriate operational contribution. The following are illustrative:

- **Contributions to Alliances**

This category would involve contributions under the ANZUS Treaty. Australia is discussed in greater detail below, while the New Zealand-US leg of the alliance is inoperative. If it were not so, contingencies could conceivably include a wide range of commitments from low to high level conflict in the Asia Pacific region.

From these three categories a number of general implications for warning and force planning can be

- **Contributions to Regional Security**

Illustrative of contingencies under this category are contributions to the protection of Singapore or Malaysia under the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), or the provision of naval or air forces for the protection of sea lanes. Under some more extreme circumstances, ground forces could be committed in support of allies or friends. The notion of 'region' could, most broadly, encompass the Asia Pacific generally, but for reasons of historical precedent, geographical proximity and because of residual defence links, the most likely location for involvement in the region would be Southeast Asia (Australia and the Southwest Pacific are covered in more detail below).

- **Contributions to Collective Security**

This category includes those 'partnership' contingencies which do not fall under the previous two sub-headings. For example, it takes in contributions to peace enforcement actions sanctioned by the United Nations or other coalition-type actions, such as the Desert Storm operation against Iraq. It covers also the increasingly important and demanding peacekeeping tasks, although these are not directly covered by this paper.

Implications for Warning and Force Planning

From these three categories a number of general implications for warning and force planning can be

highlighted. As noted above, the sheer range of possible contingencies covered and New Zealand's lack of an adequate and independent intelligence collection capacity makes elaborating on warning requirements difficult. Relying on others may still leave enough preparation time, but it may also lead to delays and a slower response from New Zealand, made worse by the long transitting times imposed by geography.

At odds with this is the fact that a high political value is placed on prompt response in times of crisis in order to show resolve or to act as a deterrent. Timeliness of response is therefore politically and militarily important and, furthermore, warning appears to be declining. This places a premium on readiness over regeneration: governments want options now, not later.

Acknowledging such contradictory factors, the preferred approach for these three categories may be to place the emphasis not on enhanced warning but on response. The construction of a more sophisticated warning time framework to aid rapid response would satisfy the need for timely reaction, but without calling for an over-elaborate warning mechanism. This suggests adapting the 'menu of options' framework that the United States has developed since 1991, which has seen a renewed emphasis on timely (normally short warning) response to a diffuse range of threats at great distance from its shores. This methodology has parallels for other states who also find themselves facing a low, but changeable, threat environment.

The 'menu of options' approach would see the identification of a range of generic contingencies drawn from the three categories listed above. Against each contingency could be

mapped a series of alternative response options at various readiness levels. The objective would not only be to shorten decision making and preparation time, but also to provide more flexibility by recognising that different situations could require a range of combat or combat support responses. A more ambitious design would also factor in political and economic responses. A key objective would be to satisfy not only operational demands, but also the political need for rapid response as a symbol of commitment to collective action.

The following hypothetical examples illustrate how this might work in practice:

Example A: Contributing towards a peace enforcement action with a coalition of partners. Response options could include:

- battalion of infantry
- company of engineers
- troop of armoured reconnaissance vehicles
- squadron of A4 Skyhawks
- squadron of transport aircraft
- frigate
- supply ship

Example B: Assisting in the protection of sea lanes may have the following response options to select from:

- frigate/s
- supply ship
- P3 Orions
- A4 Skyhawks

Against each option would be marked required lead and preparation times, updated regularly to allow for maintenance periods, deployments on exercise and so on. Such a menu would give decision makers a prepared series of options calibrated to actual crises. This process would have the advantage of linking specific capabilities to specific contingencies, providing an important indicator for readiness levels and force balance.

From the perspective of decision making, commanders and politicians would be able to respond more quickly from a pre-arranged format and would have more flexibility in the type and timing of response. In particular, decision makers would have more options regarding how soon they responded and at what level. They would have better information on the limitations of some options, as well as developed plans for what might be available should a commitment be upgraded in the future.

Part B: Warning for New Zealand's Immediate Strategic Area

Concentrating on a more sophisticated response mechanism has some advantages, but also runs the danger of unnecessary costs through excessive readiness. Long range trends, which could have fundamental implications for the nature and level of forces, may also be neglected. Focussing on response also reduces the model to a purely operational construct, ignoring the guidance it can provide to capability priorities, expansion requirements, procurement cycles and so on. In short, the approach recommended under Part A would not on its own provide the basis for long-term force structuring.

One methodology which overcomes some of these limitations has been well developed in the Australian context. As seen above, where a warning model has been created focussing on the geography of the area to be defended, its air and sea approaches, and the nature of regional military capabilities (extant and potential). Together with the concepts of credible contingencies and expansion base, the notions of warning and preparation time provide the basic determinants for Australian force planning and strategy.(1)

Assuming New Zealand's current strategic guidance, the Australian approach could not be transplanted directly to New Zealand: to structure for a direct threat to New Zealand would not guide the development of forces needed for wider (and more important) tasks. However, there are a number of reasons why the Australian methodology could work when applied to a wider geographical area which we might call New Zealand's 'immediate strategic area', encompassing the area in and around New Zealand, the Southwest Pacific and Australia, including its northern approaches:

- This area matters most for the immediate physical security of New Zealand and its dependencies, for its sea lanes, and for the security of its closest ally and South Pacific friends. A threat to or through any part of this area would be a threat to New Zealand.
- It is in this part of the world that New Zealand could expect to play a significant military role. For those tasks where New Zealand seeks to act alone, or with a large measure of independence, planning must be most comprehensive. Dependence upon others to provide warning would not be acceptable for political reasons (it would compromise New Zealand's sovereignty) or

operationally (there might be delays or even a complete absence of accurate information). There is a distinct requirement then to focus what limited independent surveillance and intelligence capabilities New Zealand has on its immediate strategic area.

- The area, although still huge by any standards, would provide far more specific guidance in terms of deployment times, operating conditions, capabilities of regional states, and so forth.

What would sort of contingencies or tasks would be used to guide planning? As indicated above, these are taken to be those tasks where New Zealand could expect to play a more prominent role and where it would have to rely to a very large degree on its own resources - from warning information, to response and sustainment. DONZ91 has defined the self reliance component of New Zealand's defence strategy as "an independent capability to deploy a national force to carry out low-level tasks in and around New Zealand waters and in the South Pacific."(2) In this paper Australia has also been included on the grounds that the strategic interests of New Zealand and Australia overlap widely, and that a threat to one would generally be recognised as constituting a threat to the other. It is worth observing however, that 'credible contingencies', as they are defined by Australian strategic guidance, include 'escalated low level' contingencies, which would be somewhat more demanding than the low level contingencies foreseen in DONZ91.(3) Illustrative of the actual tasks under self reliance are the following:

In and around New Zealand:

Counter-terrorism

EEZ patrol and enforcement

Australia:

Defence of Australia type 'credible contingencies' eg defending against covert mining, air attacks on northern settlements and lodgements of forces on Australian territory

Southwest Pacific:

Evacuation of nationals
Assistance to Island governments

Framework of the Warning Model for New Zealand's Immediate Strategic Area

In the space available here only a broad outline of a warning model is sketched, but it would have to contain the following features:

- Formal identification and categorisation of early warning indicators (EWI) for the area of strategic interest that would give a timely signal of a deterioration in the strategic environment.
- Assessments of the likely time frames available to the defence force before the emergence of threats to New Zealand or its interests.
- Identification of required lead times and preparation times to enable reaction to occur within warning.
- Establishment of a menu of options to enable timely and flexible response in an operational sense.

- Provision of a mechanism to allow response in terms of long range strategic planning. This would mean the integration of the concept within the defence planning system as a key driver of force development.

As an illustration of these features, take the following hypothetical example:

Example: Emergence of New External Presence in the South Pacific.

The following strategic EWI might be plotted to give early warning of this development:

- increased political contact with Pacific Island Countries (PICs), including establishment of diplomatic representation
- increased trade and aid contacts and the conclusion of agreements
- increased personal contact with PIC leadership elite
- increased frequency, duration and/or range of military deployments in the region
- use of PIC facilities by external power for re-supply, transit or forward basing of military forces
- signing of defence agreements or treaty
- provision by external power of military advisors and aid to PIC disciplined forces
- build-up of PIC disciplined forces with support of external power
- increasing influence over domestic politics of PIC by external power
- combination of the above with exclusion of PIC's traditional political, security and trading partners
- encouragement of terrorism and political extremism

forces in other PICs the reserve. In the extreme case that
- political support for opposition forces in other
PICs
- military support for anti-government rebels in a
PIC state

The above list is not exhaustive and covers only one hypothetical (and extreme) example. It does illustrate broadly however, the sort of EWI which would be seen to indicate a deteriorating strategic environment.

At each point there would be a need to assess the requirement for immediate operational responses. The earlier EWI may require only diplomatic reaction. Later EWI might require changes to the NZDF's deployment activities and the defence mutual assistance programme in the region, as well as forward planning on what direction the presence of a new (and possibly unwelcome) external actor will take in the region. In order to respond to the later EWI, lead and preparation times would be important considerations: if a larger submarine threat is envisaged for example, can present aircraft and crew numbers sustain more frequent patrolling? How long does a new aircraft take to acquire and integrate into the force structure? And what about its crew? These are the sorts of issues on which detailed knowledge is required in order for commanders to satisfy themselves that they have the capacity to respond to tasks within anticipated warning times.

The most important force structure guidance to be gained is an indication of any required change to readiness levels within the defence force and of the balance between the

force in being and the reserve. In the extreme case that New Zealand had to deploy its Ready Reaction Force to the South Pacific or to northern Australia, for example, the function of a warning model would be to give early notice of that possibility, leading to a reassessment of the battalion's readiness states, its sustainment capacity and the requirements for expansion of the Army should that be required.

If the model is sophisticated enough, it should capture also the generic characteristics described above: that is, it must be multi-tracked in the sense that it can accommodate a number of strategic developments at once. The process must also allow the in-put of non-military responses to meet a deteriorating situation and should be flexible enough to acknowledge an improvement, if there is one, in a situation that had initially been deteriorating. It must also have reaction options able to cope with surprise.

Finally, the model must be capable of reversal: planners must not automatically assume that identification of a deteriorating strategic environment will lead inexorably to conflict. The early identification of negative EWI should offer an opportunity to respond in a timely manner in order to improve the strategic environment, thus alleviating the need for larger military commitments later in time. The process should thus be premised on the possibility of 'reversal' and this should be one of the goals of the model.

Summary of a Complete Model

To recap: a model of warning time for New Zealand would be composed of two parts. Part A would focus on New Zealand's

wider interests and tasks. It would apply warning time where possible, but the emphasis would be on reaction - specifically, the construction of a pre-programmed 'menu of options' to shorten reaction time, to give greater flexibility, and to ensure that lead and preparation times have a clear connection to expected levels of warning in the selected areas where New Zealand considers that it can make a contribution.

Part B, focusing on New Zealand's immediate strategic area, would be more complex and would provide important information for determining large elements of force structure. Readiness levels, force balance and information for weighting capability procurement would be obtained through focussing on the geography of the area, regional capabilities, likely tasks and a detailed understanding of lead and preparation times. These elements, which contain a strong element of continuity, would provide the most reliable data for informing the acquisition of capabilities.

The interaction between the two halves of the model would require careful consideration, especially relating to the relative priority to assign between them. Other factors, primarily political, would determine that balance. A likely result could be that while Part B of the model would provide warning guidance for a large proportion of the force structure, some additional capability in selected areas would be needed to accommodate the demands made by partnership tasks under Part A of the model.

Some General Implications for Force Development

In the absence of a complete and functioning model, suggesting explicit guidelines for force development will

be avoided by this paper. However, some indications of the general effect that such a model would have on the NZDF are possible.

The most important impact on capability procurement priorities would be a greater emphasis on independent intelligence and surveillance capabilities. Emphasis would also be placed on links with allies and friends in order to widen sources since even an enhanced New Zealand capability would still have limited reach and capacity.

The effect on other capabilities, assuming the present strategic environment, would probably be an emphasis on meeting low level threats which might arise at short notice. With shorter warning times and a political imperative for timely response, readiness is seen to be important, even for small threats.

The corollary of this is that the expansion base would be de-emphasised in the absence of medium or high level threats. Two key dangers present themselves in this respect: firstly, even low level contingencies have the potential to be extremely demanding and may require expansion in order to be dealt with. Secondly, for even low level tasks, the defence force will still require a certain degree of sustainment. In trading off expansion for readiness - perhaps justifiable in a benign environment - care must be taken, especially with a small defence force, such as New Zealand's, to preserve the ability of the force to sustain itself for even low level tasks.

CAVEATS AND DANGERS

Some might argue that Part A of the model is superfluous since the contingencies likely to arise under these

headings can be satisfied with capabilities retained for tasks in New Zealand's immediate strategic area. That argument does not follow from the model of warning time outlined here.(4) The emphasis which the model places on New Zealand's area of immediate strategic concern is for the purposes of strategic assessment and defence force structuring; it says little about defence force activities. The preferred balance of activities between, on the one hand, the immediate strategic area and, on the other, the area beyond is not suggested by this model.

In any case, the model also takes in wider contingencies and commitments under the headings of regional, alliance and collective security. The inclusion of partnership tasks may well make additional demands on the force structure beyond that required for New Zealand's immediate strategic area.

In short, the model is for warning time alone; it is a planning mechanism and does not purport to be a basis for wider strategy. It does not, for example, advocate 'the defence of New Zealand's immediate strategic area' to be a defence strategy for New Zealand. That approach would not meet wider obligations and political interests as they are defined by present strategic guidance.

A second concern is more sustainable: considering the large impact that contingencies in the Australian north could have on the NZDF, especially the Army, it is questionable whether New Zealand would want to hold itself hostage to Australian strategic guidance. Should the current bi-partisan agreement in Australia over defence policy breakdown, or should it markedly change, New Zealand would have to reassess its own stance.

This paper has advocated the development of a more robust warning time model for New Zealand to contribute towards a more uniquely New Zealand strategic basis for force development. It would be ironic if the course of action recommended by this paper were to transfer operational and political dependency from one (former) ally to another.

One way of overcoming this difficulty may be for New Zealand to commit itself to only some very specific tasks in the defence of Australia's north - tasks which are not likely to change regardless of what party is in government and which would not result in the wholesale commitment of the NZDF to Australian objectives.(5) In any case, a number of tasks are already ruled out since, as noted above, Australian strategic guidance plans for contingencies up to 'escalated low levels' in its far north, and this is a step up from the guidance given in DONZ91 (which calls for the NZDF to be able to cope with self reliance tasks at low levels only).

COMPARISON TO PRESENT STRATEGIC GUIDANCE

As noted in the previous chapter, DONZ91 defined warning time as an estimate of the likely notice that the Government would have of evolving threats to New Zealand's interests or security. Such a definition is useful for applying to an examination of the historical record (as is done in Annex A), but as a basis for planning it leads to all of the difficulties associated with the British Ten Year Rule of the 1920s; that is, it is a static concept which is not intended to drive force structure in response to changes in the strategic environment.

The model advocated above would differ in an important respect: whereas current guidance focuses on the Government as the trigger mechanism for responding to warning, this model would respond to warning indicators at a much earlier stage. The difference is an important one as the objective of having a defence planning system keyed to changes in the strategic environment is to prevent threats arising, rather than to react once threats have emerged. The model would provide decision makers with more timely information and in a systematic fashion. That in itself would allow greater flexibility in response and more opportunity to influence events. A warning system that simply relies on acknowledgement, acceptance and response from government is too static. It will be far more easily surprised and will not likely leave sufficient time to take account of long lead times for larger capabilities, or for preparation in times of crisis.

The other main difference is one largely of emphasis. The model proposed in this paper would assume a far greater role in the defence planning system than the notion of warning time currently receives. But for it to do so, more detail would be required and it would need wide acceptance within defence and government thinking.

CONCLUSION: AGENDA FOR FURTHER WORK

In this paper we have focused on the rationale and methodology of a strategic warning time model for New Zealand. The example used above illustrates the further work that would be required in order for the model to function as an integral part of the defence planning

system. A detailed physical knowledge of the area of strategic interest would need to be combined with an equally complete picture of regional military capabilities. Analysts would need to settle on what they consider to be the contingencies or tasks most likely to be undertaken (what the Australians have called 'credible contingencies', but which New Zealand has preferred to call 'tasks') both within the area of immediate strategic interest and under the 'partnership' categories outlined above. The construction of EWI for contingencies and tasks would also be demanding.

A strategic assessment of time frames available for, say, contingencies in the north of Australia or the South Pacific would be particularly contentious. On this point, it would be best to avoid definitive assessments, such as a 'ten year rule'. It may be preferable to class future events according to an order of magnitude - say short term (within three years); medium term (3-8 years); and long term (beyond eight years), always remembering that such figures can never be predictions of threats, but estimates of the amount of warning available before a response might be required.

Other work includes a comprehensive assessment of necessary lead and preparation times and a comparison of them with likely warning, according to the tasks and contingencies identified. There is a large question, not covered by this paper, as to what extent and in what areas lead times have expanded or contracted, and the implications of this for warning and preparation. If lead and preparation times exceed of expected warning, some serious questions must be asked about preparedness.

In terms of response, putting together a menu of options for operational response would seem a sensible way to speed up reaction and give decision makers greater flexibility. (Such an approach would also have applicability in the peacekeeping field.)

Response over the longer term would occur through the defence planning system. The integration of the warning model into the system would be essential to its value. The output which it provides should be seen as an important (though not the only) driver of force structure changes, acting as a trigger mechanism for readiness levels and force expansion.

Footnotes

- 1 Dobb (1992), op cit, Chapter 1.
- 2 DONZ91, op cit, p 53.
- 3 For further discussion of this type of approach, see Stewart Woodman, "A Question of Priorities: Australian and New Zealand Security Planning in the 1990s", SDSC Working Paper No 260 (1992), pp 15-16.
- 4 A similar point is made in DONZ91, op cit, p 53: "A force structured for interoperability with Australia and our other allies will also be able to handle most South Pacific tasks. This is not true in reverse."
- 5 For a fuller discussion of this subject see Woodman (1992), op cit.

will frequently be taken at a very late stage in any crisis. Secondly, low level conflicts, which have been the most frequent type for New Zealand, have given much less warning relative to higher level conflicts. Finally, warning time has decreased markedly in recent years.

CONCLUSION

This paper has argued that strategic warning time is a valuable defence planning tool for guiding the structure of defence forces in New Zealand. The problem of having no threat - of 'not knowing', as Colin Powell described it - could be overcome by establishing a detailed and systematic strategic warning system to link developments in the strategic environment to force structure changes. From such a model, important information affecting readiness levels and the balance of forces could be gained. Data affecting priorities for capability procurement and developments in doctrine could also be systematically collated. This methodology would ensure that reaction is within expected warning, and would provide greater certainty to judgements about the strategic environment and the status of the Defence Force.

The evidence shows that the amount of warning time available to New Zealand has historically been short: an average of 9.7 months since 1898, while since 1945 that has reduced to 5.8 months. Since 1975, the average warning time has been just 4 days. We could not apply such data in a predictive manner, but it can be used to corroborate a number of trends which hitherto were supported, in the New Zealand setting at least, only by anecdotal evidence. Firstly, anticipating the operational use of military force is notoriously difficult and decisions to deploy forces

will frequently be taken at a very late stage in any crisis. Secondly, low level conflicts, which have been the most frequent type for New Zealand, have given much less warning relative to medium and higher level conflicts. Finally, warning time has decreased markedly in recent years.

This creates an important dilemma for defence planners: while warning is measured in months, the life-cycle of major force structure components, such as equipment and the specialised training of personnel, is measured in decades. There are many risks to be run and choices to be made in coping with this problem of extended time-frame versus uncertainty. A number of mechanisms could be applied in order to guide our choices and lessen the risks, of which the notion of strategic warning time is one.

Warning time was developed and extensively applied by NATO forces during the Cold War, largely as a mechanism with which to initiate operational alert against a specific enemy. It was conceived in a very straight forward fashion: threats triggered warning indicators which triggered responses. But the end of the Cold War removed an overarching threat to Western Europe, as well as the imperative for split-second reaction. The United States, amongst others, has had to re-think its approach to strategic warning in an environment where threats are more diffuse and of a lower order.

In Australia, the absence of defined threat has produced a very different conceptualisation of warning time. By focusing on the geography of the area to be defended and regional military capabilities, the notion of warning time is used to help determine readiness levels and force

expansion requirements. In this sense, warning time is an important guide to planning over the longer term. It would be an important step in the right direction. Such a model New Zealand's strategic circumstances present unique difficulties for the application of warning time. New Zealand faces no direct threat, and this removes a key guide for gauging the size, type and role of its military forces. Furthermore, the emphasis that has been placed historically on structuring forces to suit the needs of allies has retarded the development of a force able to conduct joint operations independently. It has also reduced the need for an independent planning system which links strategic developments to the procurement of equipment and the structure of forces.

In particular, New Zealand has given little thought to how the notion of strategic warning time might be applied. Clearly, in the absence of a direct threat, the use of the concept as it was developed by NATO is of limited relevance to New Zealand. However, there are lessons for New Zealand in the way that the United States has sought to redefine notions of warning and response in the post-Cold War era. New Zealand too should consider placing more emphasis on timely, flexible reaction through the preparation of a 'menu of options' to respond to short-warning crises.

The Australian approach would seem to have more relevance to New Zealand's circumstances since the strategic outlook of the two countries has many similarities. But it could not be applied directly since, for New Zealand, the defence of home territory is a secondary priority after the protection and advancement of wider interests.

New Zealand's unique strategic circumstances require a different approach to cope with the competing demands of

short warning and long lead times. The construction of a detailed and coherent strategic warning time model would be an important step in the right direction. Such a model would be composed of two parts. Part A would cover New Zealand's wider interests and tasks - or what we might call the 'partnership' side of New Zealand's defence strategy of 'Self Reliance in Partnership'. Because we could not expect to have detailed and timely intelligence on such a wide area, the emphasis here would be on reaction; having flexible and pre-planned options from which to choose at short notice in order to reduce reaction time and exercise more control over a situation.

Part B of the model would focus on New Zealand's immediate strategic area - the Southwest Pacific, Australia and New Zealand. By systematically examining those aspects of the region which contain a large element of continuity - such as geography and regional capabilities - and through a detailed understanding of lead and preparation times, a better appreciation of likely warning time for deployments could be gained. Furthermore, by more closely aligning readiness levels and force balance to developments in the strategic environment, lead and preparation times are more likely to be within expected warning.

This model would not necessarily form the basis for wider strategy and nor could it be used as a guide to actual deployments. Its purpose is to provide an element of a defence planning methodology applicable to New Zealand's unique circumstances. The objective of such an approach is not merely to avoid a surprise attack, but to ensure the efficient and timely preparedness of New Zealand's national defence capability in response to an evolving security environment.

compared to two Australian studies in an effort to test three propositions:

* That lower level conflicts were associated with less warning time relative to higher level conflicts.

Annex A

* That was **NEW ZEALAND'S PAST EXPERIENCE:**

* That, since World War II, warning has averaged less than one **ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF WARNING TIME**

It is not the aim here to estimate warning times for future

The armourers accomplishing the knights,
With busy hammers closing rivets up,
Give dreadful note of preparation.

Scope of the Analysis

Shakespeare, King Henry V, Act IV, Prologue.

In order to provide as wide a sample of case studies as

The detection of 'dreadful notes of preparation' is one of the primary aims for any system of warning. But in modern times those 'notes' are far more complex and changeable than they were in the time of Henry V. Indeed, looking at this problem from New Zealand's perspective, DONZ91 asserts that:

In no case (since World War II) could the decision to deploy have been foreseen much more than a year beforehand. In most cases the notice was considerably shorter.(1)

This statement is tested and developed in this annex by examining the historical detail of cases where New Zealand military forces were either deployed operationally, or where their use was seriously contemplated, during the period 1898 to 1991. The results of this survey are

compared to two Australian studies in an effort to test three propositions:

- That lower level conflicts have occurred with less warning time relative to medium and higher level conflicts.
- That warning time has been decreasing.
- That, since World War II, warning has averaged less than one year.

It is not the aim here to estimate warning times for future threats to New Zealand or its interests.

Scope of the Analysis

In order to provide as wide a sample of case studies as possible, the historical period covered is extended back to 1898 and widened to include situations where the use of force was seriously considered. The category of 'possible' deployments is considered in the analysis since this provides just as much information on the subject of warning time as actual deployments. That is, it does not actually matter for the purposes of the survey which follows whether or not deployment occurred, but that it almost did, and therefore a process of warning, response and preparation was initiated.

It should be noted however, that with only 22 case studies, the sample remains statistically small. This places some limits on the degree of confidence which we can have about conclusions reached from the data. One way of overcoming

this difficulty is to compare the results of the New Zealand survey to other studies, and this is done below.

An argument for including peacekeeping could be made. It would certainly widen the number of case studies examined and would account for an activity that, especially in recent years, has come to consume a large proportion of the New Zealand Defence Force's operating budget. However, detail on peacekeeping deployments is harder to come by: little information has been brought into the public arena and academic writing is negligible. Furthermore, peacekeeping is not a force determinant (ie the NZDF is not structured or funded primarily for this task). If one is seeking to draw conclusions about force structure from an analysis of warning times, then peacekeeping should be treated separately from 'conventional' deployments.

As an aside, though beyond the present study, an analysis of warning times for peacekeeping would be of value in light of the growing importance of peacekeeping and the likelihood of the NZDF's continued high level of involvement. It will become even more necessary as the line between 'conventional' deployments and United Nations sanctioned operations (such as peace enforcement) becomes more blurred.

Validity of Historical Research

Some may argue that the lessons derived from the earlier case studies (perhaps prior to World War II) are of little use to defence planners today. On balance it would seem sensible to treat the past with the caution that it deserves: as evidence of how things once happened under certain conditions, but not as a predictive mechanism for

the future. The real value of the data presented below is that it can be used to indicate trends and to corroborate more casual interpretations of past events.

Methodology (1898)

The cases used are outlined briefly at Appendix 1. A comprehensive discussion of the historical circumstances is not the objective, but rather determining the beginning and end points for warning time for the deployment concerned. For the purposes of this historical survey the definition of warning time used is that put forward by Cheeseman and Speedy: that is, warning time is "the time taken from government acceptance of a perceived threat to the time it is judged an operational response will be required".(2)

PRESENTATION OF NEW ZEALAND DATA

Warning Periods and Conflict Levels

The conflicts outlined in Appendix 1 can be ordered according to three broad levels to determine if there is a correlation between the 'size' of a conflict and its warning time. Conflicts can be assigned to 'levels' according to criteria such as types of weaponry and tactics employed, the objectives of the parties involved, degree of mobilisation, and the level of resources involved.(3)

*** High Level Conflicts (3)**

World War I (1914-18)

World War II (1939-45)

The following breakdown was applied:

- Low Level Conflicts: (14)
 - Fashoda (1898)
 - Fiji (1920)
 - Iraq (1920)
 - Niue (1921)
 - Ocean Island (1925)
 - Samoa (1928)
 - Samoa (1929-30)
 - Malaya (1948-60)
 - Thailand (1962)
 - Confrontation (1963-66)
 - Fiji (May 1987)
 - Fiji (September 1987)
 - Vanuatu (1988)
 - Bougainville (1990)
- Medium Level Conflicts: (6)
 - Boer War (1899-1902)
 - Chanak (1922)
 - Korean War (1950-53)
 - Vietnam War (1964-75)
 - Falklands War (1982)
 - Gulf War (1990-91)
- All Conflicts
- High Level Conflicts: (2)
 - World War I (1914-18)
 - World War II (1939-45)

Averages of Warning Time (WT) were as follows:

All Conflicts: WT Average = 9.71 months
 Low Level Conflict: WT Average = 55.64 days (1.85 months)
 Medium Level Conflict: WT Average = 7.48 months
 High Level Conflict: WT Average = 5 years, 11.5 months

The historical pattern shown here indicates that, for New Zealand, lower level conflicts have been both more frequent (64 percent of the sample) and have arisen with much less warning than medium level conflicts, averaging only 1.85 months. High level conflicts, of which there have been only two since 1898, have afforded prolonged periods of strategic warning.

Shorter Warning Times?

It is common to hear and read of the growing speed, readiness and integration of weapons systems and entire national military capabilities. Does this mean that strategic warning is actually decreasing? We might test this proposition for New Zealand by examining average warning times since, say, 1945 (the end of WWII) and 1975 (the end of the war in Vietnam). Below are figures broken down overall and then according to conflict level.

Geographical Distribution

- All Conflicts

It is also worth noting the geographical distribution of the Average 1898-91: 9.71 months
 Average 1945-91: 5.8 months
 Average 1975-91: 4 days (0.14 months)

- Low Level Conflicts

Average 1898-91: 55.64 days (1.85 months)

Average 1945-91: 93.7 days (3.12 months)

Average 1975-91: 5.25 days (0.18 months)

- Medium Level Conflicts

Average 1898-91: 7.48 months

Average 1945-91: 10.5 months

Average 1975-91: 0.2 days

- High Level Conflicts

Average 1898-91: 5 years, 11.5 months

Average 1945-91: na

Average 1975-91: na

When all conflicts are considered together, warning time does appear to be decreasing. But that is a rather crude assessment since the only high level conflicts (which both afforded long stretches of warning) occurred within the first time period. Once the data is broken down by conflict level the results are less clear-cut, but still seem to indicate reduced warning, especially since 1975.

Geographical Distribution

It is also worth noting the geographical distribution of the deployments surveyed: 16 of the 22 (or 73%) occurred, in part or whole, in the Asia Pacific region, including the two World Wars. Fifty percent of the deployments occurred, in part or whole, in the Southwest Pacific. Aside from the two World Wars, they were all low level conflicts, almost all of which afforded no warning time at all.

* -- For perception and warning time combined:

AUSTRALIAN STUDIES OF STRATEGIC WARNING

All Conflicts: Average = 14.3 months

The limits that can be placed on conclusions derived from such data (due to the small size of the sample) have been emphasised above. Furthermore, the contingencies to which New Zealand responded in the past may not necessarily be representative of situations which may be faced in the future.

All conflicts: Average = 5.5 months

One way of helping to overcome such limits is to consider comparative data from other countries. Such work is not widely available, at least in the public arena. However, two Australian studies do provide some basis for comparison.

We should note however, that Speedy included only one high level conflict (WWII) and three low level conflicts in his selection, which raises obvious questions about the

Speedy Study

A paper by Commander I M Speedy investigated warning and perception times for 15 conflicts between 1939 and 1973.(4) He concluded that the average time taken from the first indication of impending war to the firing of the first shot was 14.3 months. Since 1950, that average has decreased to 10.6 months. Furthermore, there was a 50 percent probability that conflict could occur in less than four months.

Speedy's figures are for perception and warning time combined. He does not elaborate on the distinction between the two notions, but reviewing his figures for warning time only, they show that warning since World War II has averaged 5.5 months and since 1950 it has been 4.0 months.

The phases of 'perceived threat' and 'specific threat'

Breaking Speedy's examples down by conflict level gave the following results:

- For perception and warning time combined:
 - All Conflicts: Average = 14.3 months
 - Low Level Conflict: Average = 14.17 months
 - Medium Level Conflict: Average = 10.94 months
 - High Level Conflict: Average = 51 months
- For warning time only:
 - All conflicts: Average = 5.5 months
 - Low Level Conflict: Average = 8.05 months
 - Medium Level Conflict: Average = 4.2 months
 - High Level Conflict: Average = 12 months

We should note however, that Speedy included only one high level conflict (WWII) and three low level conflicts in his selection, which raises obvious questions about the treatment of data according to conflict level. This point will be returned to below.

Central Studies Establishment Paper

A 1986 study by the Australian Department of Defence's Central Studies Establishment (CSE) examined 37 conflicts or crises between 1939 and 1973.(5) The study sought to establish a threat recognition model by analysing the process of perception and reaction to threats by governments. Three phases were identified as making up the period of 'warning' prior to conflict: notional threat, perceived threat, and specific threat.(6)

The phases of 'perceived threat' and 'specific threat' which, when combined, equate most closely with warning time

as it was defined above, averaged at 14.75 months between 1939 and 1973. Almost one quarter of the examples surveyed showed zero warning of specific threat (ie the identification of a specific hostile intent and the capability to carry it out). Thirty-five percent of the examples showed warning of five weeks or less in the specific threat phase.

As to whether this particular study shows a decline in available warning time, the message is a mixed one. Warning available in the perceived and specific threat phases actually increased after the Vietnam War: 13.6 months prior to 1975 compared to 19.1 months since then. However, when the notional threat phase is factored in, a significant decrease in warning is registered overall: an average of 52.1 months up to and including the Vietnam War, compared to an average of 23.3 months warning for conflict since then.

The CSE study also focused predominantly on medium level conflicts. Only one low level conflict was included (Confrontation) and one high level conflict (WWII), though each was examined from three different perspectives. A break-down by conflict level and by phase gives the following results:

| | Average WT (months) | | |
|--------------|---------------------|-------|-------|
| | N | P | S |
| Low Level | 192.00 | 10.67 | 15.00 |
| Medium Level | 96.16 | 34.45 | 17.68 |
| High Level | 348.33 | 82.98 | 37.00 |

Speedy's definition for warning time is the time taken for a warning to be received until the first action is taken to deal with the threat. The beginning point is when the threat is first perceived. The end point is when the threat is eliminated or neutralized. The time taken for a warning to be received is the time taken for the threat to be perceived plus the time taken for the threat to be eliminated or neutralized. The time taken for the threat to be perceived is the time taken for the threat to be perceived plus the time taken for the threat to be eliminated or neutralized.

| | Average WT (months) | | |
|---------------------|---------------------|--------|-------|
| | N+P+S | P+S | S |
| Low Level | 218.00 | 25.66 | 15.00 |
| Medium Level | 148.29 | 19.87 | 17.68 |
| High Level | 468.31 | 119.98 | 37.00 |

Key

N = notional threat
 P = perceived threat
 S = specific threat

Conclusion: Comparing the Data

Clearly there are differences in the results of each study. In explaining why that is, the first difference to note is in the treatment of definitions for warning: the CSE study uses three phases in an examination of not only warning as given by the Cheeseman and Speedy definition above, but also of the time taken for threat perceptions to crystallise. Obviously the time frame over which this occurs is much longer. The combined times for perceived and specific threats would seem to correlate most closely (but not exactly) to the definition of warning time adopted above.

Speedy's definition for warning time ("the first indication of war until the first shots are fired") is different again. The beginning point is ambiguous and he does not explain how it is established, or by whom. The definition used for collating the New Zealand data defines the end of warning as being the order to prepare an operational response. From then on, activity might be characterised by the term 'preparation time'. Speedy, however, sees the end point of warning as the firing of shots - thus warning includes preparation time in his model.

A further important difference was alluded to above: the conflicts surveyed by the Australian studies contain a disproportionately high number of medium level conflicts. (Obviously the number of high level conflicts could only be increased marginally by adding WWI). Analysis of warning time by conflict level cannot therefore be undertaken with any confidence with these studies.

A second effect of including a disproportionate number of medium level conflicts may have been to lengthen the average warning time overall since, as seen from the New Zealand data described above, low level conflicts are more likely to have shorter warning time.

Given these caveats on methodology and differences in raw data, can any general conclusions be drawn between the studies? As to the apparent correlation between the 'size' of a conflict and its warning time (which was supported by the New Zealand data), little can be added owing to the limited number of low level conflicts which both the Speedy and CSE study examined.

Do the Speedy and CSE studies support the contention that warning time is getting shorter? Speedy's work certainly

does. The CSE study paints a more complex picture: warning has increased for the perceived and specific threat phases, but once the longer run notional threat phase is included, warning time has markedly decreased over time.

Finally, the assertion made by DONZ91 (that deployments since World War Two could not have been foreseen much more than a year beforehand) would appear to be supported by the evidence presented in the section on New Zealand warning time. With the exception of the Vietnam War, which gave an extended period of warning of three and half years, all other deployments gave warning times of 12 months or less. Indeed, the average since 1945 (including Vietnam) has been only 5.8 months.

Footnotes

- 1 DONZ91, op cit, p 29.
- 2 Cheeseman in Ball and Langtry (1980), loc cit.
- 3 See, for example, the discussion of conflict levels in the Australian context in Ross Babbage, A Coast Too Long (1990), chapter two, and in Dibb (1992), op cit, chapter 5.
- 4 Lt Commander IM Speedy, "The Trident of the Neptune", Defence Force Journal, No 8, Jan/Feb 1978, pp 7-16.
- 5 AT Ross, Threat Recognition and Response (Vols I & II) (unclassified), Central Studies Establishment, Department of Defence, Canberra (1986).
- 6 Notional threat was defined as identification of general hostile intent and general capability. Perceived threat began with the identification of general capability and specific threat, or general

hostile intent and specific capability. Finally, specific threat was defined as identification of specific hostile intent and specific capability.

HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

Fashoda 1898

In September 1898 the British Government received a sudden request for assistance as a confrontation developed between Britain and France at Fashoda. Following resort to peaceful negotiations between the two protagonists, no aid was required.

Warning Time (WT): 0

Boer War 1899-1902

In mid-July 1899 it became apparent that Britain's colonies would be called upon to assist in the developing crisis between the Boers and British settlers. The NE premier, Seddon, received approval from Parliament to offer a contingent on 28 September.

WT: 2.5 months

World War I 1914-18

Rearmament and Defence Reorganisation in response to the growing German threat began in 1903 with Sir Joseph Ward's announcement that NZ was building a 'first class battle ship of the latest type'. In late July 1914 predetermined war plans were put into effect.

Appendix 1

HISTORICAL CASE STUDIES

WT: 5 years 3 months

1911 1920

Fashoda 1898

On 23 January 1920 the NZ Government was advised of serious

In September 1898 the NZ Government received a sudden request for assistance as a confrontation developed between Britain and France at Fashoda. Following resort to peaceful negotiations between the two protagonists, no aid was required.

Warning Time (WT): 0

1899 1902

Boer War 1899-1902

On 23 January 1920 the NZ Government was advised of serious

In mid-July 1899 it became apparent that Britain's colonies would be called upon to assist in the developing crisis between the Boers and British settlers. The NZ premier, Seddon, received approval from Parliament to offer a contingent on 28 September.

WT: 2.5 months

World War I 1914-18

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WT: 5 years 3 months

Fiji 1920

On 28 January 1920 the NZ Government was advised of serious unrest on Fiji, and two days later, a small expeditionary force was ordered to the islands to assist in the restoration of order.

WT: 2 days

Iraq 1920

On 19 September 1920 Britain requested NZ assistance in a crisis which had quickly developed in Iraq. The prime minister, Massey, offered to send a Battalion, though it was not finally required.

WT: 1 day

Niue 1921

In mid-May 1921 a vessel of the NZ Division of the Royal Navy, while on patrol in the Pacific, went to the assistance of the Niuean civil police and assisted in the apprehension of murder suspects.

WT: 0

Chanak 1922

An outbreak of conflict between Turkey and Greece presented a potential threat to British interests when, on 9 September 1922, the Turks regained Smyrna. On 16 September NZ received a request for assistance. Though no deployment occurred, planning was begun to deploy a 7000 man brigade-sized force.

WT: 7 days

Ocean Island 1925

Following a race riot on the island on 28 December 1925, the NZ Government received a request for assistance. HMS LABURNUM and 51 men sailed to assist in the restoration of order.

WT: 0

Samoa 1928

The rise of a Samoan nationalist movement led Maj Gen Richardson, the NZ Administrator on the island, to warn in early October 1928 of a "state of grave unrest". Following a deterioration in law and order on the island, Richardson requested military assistance from NZ. On 17 February, two ships and around 200 seamen and Royal Marines were despatched to assist.

WT: 4 months

Samoa 1929-30

Violence erupted unexpectedly again on 28 December 1929 when a celebration to welcome home a nationalist leader turned into riot in which 9 died and 18 were wounded. NZ once again hurriedly despatched a ship and Royal Marines.

WT: 0

World War II 1939-45

Specific preparations for what became known as World War II began in February 1933. A British Chiefs of Staff report, which recommended abandonment of the ten year rule and spoke of the 'writing on the wall', was considered and accepted by the NZ Government. New Zealand declared war on 5 September 1939.

WT: 6 years 8 months

Thailand 1962

Malaya 1948-60

In January 1952, with the...
Towards the end of 1954, Australia, New Zealand and British officials held discussions on the defence of the ANZAM area. By December 1954 commentators in New Zealand were predicting a contribution from New Zealand to the defence of Malaya. Concern with the deteriorating situation in Southeast Asia, amongst other things, led New Zealand to switch its wartime commitments from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. Following the Prime Minister's return from the Commonwealth Prime Minister's Conference in London, the new strategy was announced on 24 March 1955. The following day, the deployment of a Special Air Service Squadron to Malaya was announced. Two RNZAF units and frigates were also eventually sent.

...support operations in East...
Form WT: 5 months

WT: 12 months

Korea 1950-53

The invasion of South Korea by the North on 25 January 1950 came as a complete strategic surprise to the West. NZ announced the despatch of two frigates four days later and committed ground forces on 26 July.

of that year the US...
(NAC) WT: 0

the situation under...
consider options for...
its intention to...
WT: 3 years 6 months

Thailand 1962

In January 1962, with the advance of Pathet Lao troops on its border with Laos, the Thai Government requested NZ assistance. In May NZ deployed Bristols of No 31 Squadron and 1 SAS Troop.

WT: 4 months

Confrontation 1963-66

In January 1963, Indonesia announced a policy of 'confrontation' against the newly born Malaysian state. By January of the following year No 41 Squadron was carrying out support operations in East Malaysia as a prelude to the formal commitment of ground forces in September.

WT: 12 months

Vietnam 1964-75

Warning for NZ commenced in early 1960 as the situation in South Vietnam began to seriously deteriorate. In February of that year the US Military Assistance Command Vietnam (MACV) was formed. The NZ Government, which was keeping the situation under 'urgent and constant review', began to consider options for assistance. In June 1963 NZ announced its intention to make a military contribution.

WT: 3 years 6 months

Falklands 1982

On 31 March 1982 information was received of a large Argentinian fleet heading for the Falklands. Invasion followed on 2 April. NZ deployed a frigate on patrol duties in the Indian Ocean, freeing Royal Navy vessels for other tasks.

WT: 3 days

Fiji May 1987

A coup d'etat in Suva on 14 May 1987 afforded no warning to NZ. A RNZN frigate was, by chance, in Suva at the time. Other ships were also despatched and anti-terrorist units readied.

WT: 0

Fiji September 1987

A second coup by Rabuka on 25 September was similarly unexpected. HMNZS MONOWAI was ordered to depart for Fiji and sailed the next day.

WT: 0

Vanuatu 1988

Following a land rights march in Port Villa on 16 May 1988, rioting broke out and local security forces were stretched to the limit. Vanuatu requested NZ and Australian assistance and materials were flown in by air. RRF elements were also reportedly placed on alert. Unwin, Sydney (1990).

WT: 0

Bougainville 1989-90

Already tense, Bougainville erupted again in January 1990 as Bougainville Revolutionary Army Activity increased. The PNGDF's 'Operation Footloose' began on 11 January leading to an escalation in the conflict. After a number of foreigners were killed or injured in the fighting, the Australian and New Zealand governments advised their nationals to evacuate the island. The media reported that the Australian Operational Deployment Force was on standby to assist if required. It is highly likely that similar preparations were made by the New Zealand Ready Reaction Force based at Burnham.

WT: 3 weeks

Gulf War 1990

Saddam Hussien's invasion of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 was a successful strategic surprise. On 3 December the NZ Government announced that it would contribute two C130 aircraft and a medical team. Directorate of Departmental Publications, Department of Defence, Canberra (1989).

WT: 0

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