

Organised crime, corruption and the movement of people across borders in the new enlarged EU: A case study of Estonia, Finland and the UK.

Interim Project Report
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Introduction

The project reported here is a three country project, Estonia, Finland and the UK. It is funded by the European Commission AGIS Programme, The Directorate General Justice, Freedom and Security. It investigates the issues of corruption by organised crime in relation to border controls and immigration using as a case study the Finnish - Russian and the Estonian - Russian border, the methods of illegal facilitation of people across borders, the role of crime groups and networks as well as organised crime and the relationship between illegal facilitation and exploitation in the labour market.

A working hypothesis of the research is that the EU border with Russia is 'weak' and vulnerable to corruption at different levels: systemic, that is corruption is incorporated within the system of immigration and border crossing, institutional where the institution is tolerant of corrupt practice and individual where the person is prepared to undertake illegal actions because their employment provides them with an opportunity to exploit their position for gain. So, corruption is used to maintain the flow of people across the border illegitimately by utilising existing legitimate channels. Therefore the Finnish - Russian and the Russian - Estonian border will be targeted by organised crime to secure the movement of people illegally due, in part, to the accession of Estonia to the EU. The project investigates the flow of people illegally from Russia (3rd Country) into Finland (destination and transit country) and Estonia (transit country) and how facilitated people are moved onward. Particular attention is focused on the possible processes of corruption in relation to existing structures. Once a person has reached a transit country the research is structured to investigate the progress to a destination country¹. A further area of the research project is how illegal immigration results in new forms of organised crime, by those who have entered illegally, in a destination country (see for example Richards 2004).

There are four key research questions:

1. How is corruption used to secure the passage of people across borders?
2. Is there evidence that border controls are weak?
3. How are people moved from one EU member state to another?
4. What is the impact of illegal forms immigration on crime rates and organised crime and criminal groups/networks in destination countries?

The research project is structured to allow for the exchange of knowledge between key law enforcement personnel in each of the participating countries. In each country there is a *Local Network Group* comprising of law enforcement professionals with responsibility for immigration, border control, 'organised' crime and prosecutions. At two critical points in the research process, the interim and final report stage, the *Local Network Groups* are brought together to form a *Project Network Group*. The *Project Network Group* is involved in the review of the research data and contribute to the analysis of the data. This Interim Project Report is in part the product of the *Project Network Group* that met in Tallinn in January 2006².

There are five areas which have emerged from the research data in the first phase; first, corruption and document fraud, second, the illegal crossing of borders, third, the identification of key policy issues, fourth, the exploitation of people entering the EU illegally and finally the role of organised crime and criminal networks. Each of these areas will be discussed in detail in this report.

The illegal movement of people across borders is not a new phenomenon, there has always been a movement of people for a number of reasons. However, as the disparities between the developed and developing worlds widen so one impetus for migration is that of

¹ A source country is the country of origin of people migrating, a transit country is one that a facilitated person moves through, and a destination country is that country to which they wish to enter as their final destination.

² The project was launched in 2005 and is to close by the end of 2006. The main data are collected by interviewing some 30 relevant authority representatives in each country. Interim and final findings are presented for discussion and commentary to meetings of the Project Network Groups and the Local Network Groups at different stages of the project.

economics. However, for many the decision to migrate without the necessary entry requirements of the country of choice can be a hazardous and dangerous decision as the means of entry will by necessity be illegal. Within the European Union (EU) there is an expectation that there should be a free movement of people between member states. This is to assist in the economic development, free movement of labour and to ensure responsive markets are responsive. However, as recent research has indicated the development of markets and of responsive labour markets is not an even process and labour markets develop in relation to profitability and the regulation of wages (Peck *et al.* 2005). The principle of free movement creates a number of anxieties, and for some states such a principle has political implications, for member states. The concern is that once a person has managed to obtain entry to the EU they have freedom of movement across all EU member states virtually unhindered.

It was such an anxiety caused by this free movement of people that resulted in the UK and Ireland not signing the Schengen Agreement in 1994. For member states illegal immigration is a political issue and creates a number of political difficulties and a consequence in some EU member states is the impetus the issue provides for far right politics. One response to illegal immigration by the EU has been to strengthen border security through forms of co-operation and the introduction of FRONTEX³ is evidence of such a response. At the same time individual countries have introduced more restrictive policies in relation to immigration (Anti-Slavery International 2002).

The number of people being moved is difficult to calculate, however, the numbers are thought to be considerable (Woodbridge 2005). The opportunities that this presents to criminal networks, crime groups and organised crime is obvious. Individuals will pay to be moved from a source country to a destination country, or for component parts of each journey. The numbers of people, the practical difficulty in securing borders and the potential opportunities for exploitation of those who are illegally moved are considerable. The potential gains from facilitation and trafficking are ones that

attract all types of criminal enterprise. As Koser (2001) has argued there are three key debates, "...the efficacy of asylum policies, the trafficking of asylum seekers and their increasing vulnerability" and each of these debates is effected by criminal activity and criminal justice policy responses.

Defining the Problem and Securing Borders

The number of illegal immigrants in any of the participating countries is difficult to quantify. In Finland and Estonia there are some obvious measures, for example any black or minority ethnic populations would be highly visible in Finnish and Estonian society as these are not strongly multi-cultural societies. However, this did not rule out that there could be a number of people illegally in the country, for example Russians who have entered legally and over stayed would not be visible either physically or through language in Estonia; (in Finland, however, the Russian language would be a possible clue). In the UK with a culturally diverse society it is difficult to identify people in the country illegally by physical characteristics and lack of English as a language is also not an identifying factor. Consequently people who enter the UK illegally are able to conceal themselves in a range of communities that are established and living in the country legally.

The lack of any reliable means of estimating the number of people in a country illegally (Woodbridge 2005) means that other ways of measuring the impact of illegal immigration are used. Crime figures may be one useful indicator of the provisional size of a country's illegal immigrant population; for instance how many people are arrested for offences who are not in the country legally? Victimisation statistics would also be a useful measure, although people in a country illegally are not likely to report crimes due to their illegal status. Social indicators may also be useful in determining if there is a problem, for example the number of women who are not a national of the country employed in the sex industry, or persons employed in construction work and other sectors employing casualised labour.

³ FRONTEX is a European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union and was established to improve integrated management at the EU's external borders.

It is apparent that the issue of secure borders is one of definition and perception. For example, it can be defined as ‘*destination*’ country problem as it is there that people entering the EU illegally are intending to go to and therefore not the problem of the *transit* country. It might be that destination countries have a range of factors that make them ‘more desirable’ destinations than other countries; the presence of established expatriate communities could be considered a ‘pull’ factor (Aromaa 1995.)

Actually defining who is an illegal immigrant is also problematic. A number of problems can be identified in relation to the definition of ‘illegal immigrant’. First, the status of the immigrant may change over time, so a person may enter a country legally but over stay and therefore become illegal. The legal status also creates confusion in relation to those people who are trafficked. Many trafficked people have crossed a border legitimately. It is their exploitation which is illegal rather than their residence status.

The introduction of the Schengen Agreement did not exacerbate the problem of illegal immigration. Finland experienced an increase in the number of illegal immigrants shortly after joining Schengen; however, this was shortlived and thought to have been the result of those facilitating the movement of people across borders testing ‘new’ Schengen border arrangements. For many member states Schengen was viewed positively as it provided a unified and common system of monitoring border movements that relied on the sharing of information and the use of agreed procedures and protocols. This can be seen to provide a much greater ability to control border crossing points across the EU as it takes place within an agreed and unified structure.

Whilst the above were viewed as positives there was also recognition that there were some negative aspects. Schengen allows for the free movement of people, it also allows for the free movement of criminal networks and allows crime groups the opportunity to exploit the ability to move freely and establish links to extend and broaden their networks.

Borders are difficult to secure, there are many points of vulnerability and it is clear that in many respects border controls are reactive to the new forms of strategies used by those wishing to circumvent them. An example of this is the establishment of ‘Juxtaposed Controls⁴’ between the UK and France and the UK and Belgium in an attempt to prevent the illegal crossing of the borders prior to the border being crossed. The Finnish-Russian border represents a different approach. In Finland, a model referred to as Police-Customs-Border Guard-Cooperation (PCB-coop) was developed to meet the needs of improved authority cooperation within the country. This model was then extended to incorporate also the Russian counterparts who participate in regular cross-border meetings which amount annually to hundreds at local level, about 100 at regional level, and 2-4 at executive level.

There are three key issues in assessing border security; first the level of systematic corruption of border guards at the border crossing point. It was recognised by all respondents that there were occasions when a border guard may well be corrupt or susceptible to bribes but that the real test was whether there is any evidence of systematic corruption of border guard personnel where the corruption flows from the top of the organisation to the bottom. It is also recognised that some borders have particular points of vulnerability. These vulnerable points may be at particular times of the day, or particular times on particular days, or at the point of shift change. These points are not indicators of corruption but are pointers towards vulnerability of borders to exploitation of weaknesses by those wishing to facilitate the movement of people. In attempting to assess how secure a border is there are a number of potential measures; the number of refusals at a border crossing point, as the level of refusals is one indicator that border guards are engaged in their work and actively attempting to prevent illegal entry. There are also a number of potential ways of strengthening borders and one is the employment of extra border guards. However, such a strategy does not always result in a reduction of the number of people entering a country illegally. Another strategy is to increase the use of technological devices to prevent illegal entry, such as

⁴ Juxtaposed Controls is where UK immigration is located at the French and Belgian Channel ports, likewise the French Gendarme have border crossing controls at the major UK channel ports.

the heat seeking devices and detectors of movements in freight traffic, that are used at a number of ports. However all of this, additional personnel and technological devices require a financial commitment from states and has policy implications on how border agencies are structured, for example are certain activities contracted out to the private sector⁵?

There are other ways to protect and secure borders. Whilst increasing staff and technological know-how may lead to a reduction in the number of people entering a country illegally it does not address the roots of the problem. A more far reaching means of dealing with the problem of illegal immigration is to attempt to control the flow and direction of people moving illegally. This is probably easier said than done as the movement and migration of people is an issue that is linked to the movement of global capital, the restructuring of production and the needs of the wider European economy and the economic wellbeing of some member states.

It is not possible to quantify the size of illegal immigration with any degree of reliability as the nature of the problem is such that it is hidden and so the number of people illegally in any country is a matter of an informed guess. It may not be necessary to quantify the problem with exact numbers but other indicators such as levels of criminal involvement, activity in relation to prostitution may prove to be 'good indicators' of the extent of the problem in any one country. It is also acknowledged that not all cases of illegal immigration are the result of a person entering a country illegally. Many people enter a state legally but remain without permission after their right to residence has expired. This is a complicating factor in trying to assess the 'size of the problem'.

In order to understand the attraction of some states as destination countries it is important to analyse the historical traditions and the social composition of the destination country. So, a country with a long colonial history may well experience illegal immigration from former colonies. Other countries may have a record of receiving certain groups and communities and there

that country becomes a focal point because of the size of its 'expatriate' communities. Such communities provide places of shelter and also provide a common language and a basis of knowing how the *new* society actually functions. (Aromaa 1995.) Such expatriate communities also usually have links with communities in the country of origin and so it makes the arrangement of travel and entry easier. It also adds another dimension to the process of facilitation where the motivation may not be money alone but also a sense of loyalty to an area, region or town. For many states the issue of illegal immigration is a politically charged one and this has an influence on how policy in this area is structured and delivered.

Illegal immigration is a problematic for many states. For some, such as the UK, the problem is that the UK is a destination state and with that comes a range of subsidiary problems which include possible effects on crime and the structure of the sex industry. For other states, such as Finland, it was clear that the problem was not one of being a destination country but a series of issues in relation to people entering illegally and thus rendering some of the border areas vulnerable to corruption and other illegal practices. The global issues were also recognised by respondents where the links between economic performance, availability of labour and the costs, both human and economic, of illegal immigration, were understood.

The Role and Extent of Corruption

Corruption is of particular interest because the use of corrupt practices to secure the compliance of officials allows criminals an easy passage across borders and at the same time legitimates their illegal practices. For example, the corruption of a border guard could result in official residence stamps being placed in a passport, ignoring false documents or impostors. For those attempting to facilitate people illegally across borders corruption is one of the key methods used to achieve such ends as it lowers the risk at one of the most vulnerable parts of the journey.

⁵ In the case of Finland, the same result has been traditionally achieved by the strong Russian border controls on which the Finnish authorities have been able to rely. Whether this will be so also in the future remains to be seen.

The definition of corruption used in the research is:

“...many kinds of “irregular” influence, the objective of which is to allow the participants to make profits they are not entitled to, the method being the breaking of internal or external rules.”

For some of the respondents this definition would have been more accurate if profit was replaced by ‘*gain*’. The idea that the profit or gain was solely individual was also questioned by some respondents who argued that a person may make a gain for others through loyalty or family affiliation. The important point to note is that many respondents considered that the process of corruption might take place at a distance from the port of entry and that it was not a simple matter of the offer of a monetary reward, other forms of favourable treatment may also act as an inducement to behave in a corrupt fashion.

There is a need to identify the risk factors in relation to corruption. The level of remuneration of border guards is one such indicator, low salaries of border guards is a potential weakness and likely to be exploited by criminal groups. One strategic means of eliminating the potential risks and weaknesses is by identifying the weaknesses and taking action to remedy them where at all possible. It is apparent that there are social structural reasons that also contribute to corruption being more difficult; for example in Finland there are very low levels of corruption among public officials. The reason for such low levels of corruption might be that there is a tradition of high moral standards amongst Finnish civil servants and a high level of transparency of state institutions and the actions of public officials. In Finland there is a very high degree of loyalty to state institutions that requires commensurate levels of behaviour. So, it is important to analyse the social context within which corruption occurs if an accurate threat assessment can be undertaken.

This need to understand the social context and how it changes over time is evident in relation to Estonia. The movement of people across the Estonian border does not appear to be a significant issue in relation to

corruption; however, goods and money appear to be the weak points in relation to corruption. So, it is commodities that are more profitable than people currently within the Estonian context. However, it is also apparent that in certain situations people are commodities and therefore this may result in future vulnerability for Estonia. The strategy in relation to corruption for all states should be the elimination of risk; this requires the identification of weaknesses and vulnerable points, an understanding of the social and economic context and the need to define potential future threats.

The research undertaken by all three countries indicates that corruption is not systemic or endemic in any of the three countries. There were isolated cases and what was described as low level bribery. There are also no indications that the findings of this research are inaccurate as a number of officials from different agencies confirmed that corruption was not regularised or tolerated. The low levels of corruption may also indicate that there are other criminal strategies that are used to facilitate entry.

Moving People Across Borders


The movement of people across borders is not a new phenomenon. However the socio-political and economic context has changed greatly over the past two decades. The globalisation of markets, production and consumption has resulted in the movement of people to meet the new demands for labour in developed areas. Consequently there are numerous ways in which people are moved across borders. The desire for individual people to move from their country of residence where they have legal status to a country where they will be considered an illegal immigrant is one that is motivated by a number of factors; the desire to improve their economic position, to avoid torture and interrogation at the hands of political dictators, to join family in the destination country and to access what is seen to be a better and more stable life are just a few of the reasons. The journey from the country of origin to the destination country can be a dangerous and

arduous one and provides many opportunities for criminal groups, organised crime and criminal networks to exploit through a variety of entrepreneurial activities.

In order to understand the process of facilitation it is important to recognise that there are very many different ways in which a person can be moved across a border but we would define three models of facilitation. First is the *Organised Facilitation* model. A person can purchase in the country of origin a total package that they buy from the facilitator [s] a travel package with the necessary documentation that will move them from the point of origin to the destination country using false document to allow the individual to travel in relative comfort. The journey may be staged and during the waiting periods the person being moved will be put up in ‘safe houses’ and moved into the destination country on forged documents. This ‘tailor-made’ package is expensive and can also take a considerable amount of time, for example the journey from China to the UK could take anywhere up to nine or twelve months and such journeys rely on a good organisation in order to make the journey a successful one and is usually the domain of organised crime groups. Second is the *Component Facilitation* model. A person buys the journey in individual pieces; so the crossing of the border is purchased from a facilitator and once over the border it is then up to them to make the necessary contacts in order to continue their journey. This again relies on criminal networks rather than organised crime and the facilitation usually is in the form of concealment in a truck, van or car. The facilitated person arranges and buys each component part of the journey, usually completing one part of the journey before negotiating and paying for the next component part. This may involve them in contact with a number of criminal groups and networks as they make their journey. The type of journey that they make can vary from being facilitated in the back of a lorry or by a courier taking them across the border. The difference is that the facilitation is not organised from the point of departure to the point of arrival and is not undertaken

by the same organisation. The final model of facilitation is what can be termed *Opportunistic Facilitation*, this relies on the individual attempting to make their own way in many circumstances either because their resources will not cover the final part of the journey or they have not established the contacts to enable them to have an organised facilitation. It is this group of people who attempt to gain entry by jumping trucks at the ports or by concealing themselves on trains. For many this is a hazardous means of gaining entry. So, each of these facilitation models requires different types of organisation, from the highly organised to the disorganized, relying on criminal groups or networks and in some cases organised crime. The model by Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004) provides a definition of the different types of crime groupings:

Fig 1.



(Taken from Bruinsma and Bernasco 2004)

The first diagrammatic representation suggests a very closed network, in the typology used by Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004) this is most common in relation to the movement of drugs, a tight network protecting the commodity as it makes its journey from origin to destination. The second diagram suggests gaps between contact with the crime networks or groups and this is similar to our model of *Component Facilitation*. The third diagram shows very little contact with crime groups other than at the beginning and the end of the journey. This in our view corresponds to our *Opportunistic Facilitation* model where there has to be some initial contact to make the first part of the journey and there may be a connection to a crime group or network in the destination country.

In relation to each of the models certain types of criminal activity make the process of facilitation easier and less risky. Fraudulent documentation is one such criminal activity. Document fraud and forgers up until the expansion of the internet were usually group and area-specific. So, an illegal immigrant would obtain their fraudulent documents from a forger working in their country of origin. However, organised crime by exploiting the internet, has led to forgery and fraudulent documents becoming more widespread as they are able to exploit the market and business opportunity by supplying documents globally. Criminal groups have taken advantage of the global market place and are able to provide a service to anyone who is willing to pay. The internet has resulted in the purchasing of fraudulent documents to facilitate illegal immigration more accessible, more sophisticated, and more widespread.

Fraudulent documents are also used in relation to the accession states in the Baltic region. A person from Ukraine, for example, can enter Lithuania relatively easily due to pre-EU border crossing relationships. Once a person has crossed into Lithuania they can acquire a forged Lithuanian passport or they can act as an impostor on real documents and move freely across the EU. Therefore, there is a considerable market in forged

and fraudulent documents. So, the UK witnesses a significant increase in the number people attempting to enter the UK on forged documents, for example there has been a dramatic rise in the number of Ukrainian people entering the UK on false documents.

In relation to Finland there had been an increase in the use of false documents and the methods by which different countries issue identification documentation can also result in opportunities for forgery. For example in Russia both the Ministry of Interior and Foreign Affairs issue identity documents used for travel and so these documents can be easily counterfeited. There was some evidence within Estonia that forgery was taking place, however, identity theft was the main issue. Another noted feature of the Estonian situation was that some people had made false claims for citizenship and then obtained a passport once citizenship was granted. The citizenship was illegal and yet the passport was a legal document. In the UK there was evidence of high quality forgeries of varying nationalities produced using advanced technologies and linked to organised crime groups; such documents are difficult to detect, requiring highly skilled intelligence officers. The organisation of forgery appears to be highly sophisticated with large scale forgery factories and highly sophisticated distribution networks. For example in Lithuania there was the small-scale independent production of forged Euros. A law enforcement operation was conducted against the crime group and the operation dismantled, however, knowledge of how to counterfeit documents remained and production shifted towards a new market, the counterfeiting of passports.

There is evidence of sophisticated production and distribution networks with organised crime groups acting as the main entrepreneurs. However, the internet has allowed for the production of forged documents outside of the country of origin, so UK passports can be forged in Lithuania for example. However, whilst there have been successes by law enforcement agencies in detecting the production sites of false documents it is also apparent that forgeries are difficult to detect making the job of the border guards more difficult. There is also some evidence that documents are re-used and this indicates the organisation of facilitation by criminal groups or individuals in cases where the documentation is re-used.

Exploitation & Labour

The research project is also designed to explore the nature of exploitation, especially if there is involvement in criminal activities by those who have been facilitated, and what is the nature of this criminal activity. However, it is not possible to draw a clear distinction between those who are in a country legally and yet are exploited and those who are facilitated or trafficked. The problem with a policy that simply focuses on illegal migration is that it does not cover the proportion of exploited migrants who arrived legally and yet find themselves in highly exploitative work situations. So many people working in exploited forms of labour may not be in the country illegally, therefore they have rights which are legally protected, and however, such rights can be overlooked when the policy focus is simply one that is centred on immigration. The need to protect the integrity of state's immigration systems is an important and legitimate interest. However, much policy tends to prioritise combating illegal migration over protecting human rights of exploited workers and guaranteeing fundamental labour rights to all workers.

There is also a focus on coercion in relation to the exploitation of immigrant workers. The UN Trafficking protocol includes elements of coercion into the definition of trafficking, the use of coercion as a distinguishing element is problematic on several levels. First it creates a dichotomy between the 'genuine and non-genuine' victim of trafficking and/or exploitation. 'Genuine' victims are seen as deserving of assistance and those defined as 'non-genuine' do not receive assistance. There is an important question concerning how the genuine victim is defined. It appears in the UK that the deserving victim is young, female, over 18, subjected to forced sexual services, and willing to collaborate with the authorities (see for example Kelly 2004). But even within that group, the number of the 'deserving' victims can be seen as being limited, for example in the UK the *Poppy Project*, for victims of trafficking, has only been able to assist 25 women at any given time (see <http://www.womeninlondon.org.uk/notices/eaves0409.htm>). However, not all trafficked women are forced to work in the sex industry and some

are in domestic servitude as well as other forms of highly casualised and poorly remunerated labour, however, there is also a policy tension where one type of forced labour is seen to be more deserving than another.

Some Interim Conclusions

The first conclusion is that the overall response to illegal immigration is, in the member states studied, a law enforcement one, or one that relies on criminal justice strategies to prevent illegal immigration. Every state has strategies to combat illegal immigration; for some countries this is a greater problem than for others. The UK is a destination country and so it finds itself the subject of many attempts by people to enter illegally. It is also an issue of considerable political complexity and so there are a number of co-ordinated strategic interventions, for example a dedicated office within the Crown Prosecution Service to focus on immigration crime and the setting up by the Home Office of REFLEX. These are dedicated teams under the operational direction of Chief Constables within police areas. REFLEX teams may be partnership based bringing together criminal justice professionals from across different criminal justice areas, for example immigration and police. The teams may have an operational function or they may be a means of co-ordinating intelligence to inform joint Police and Immigration Service operations in that area.

The REFLEX approach in the UK has been thought to be relatively successful as it has made the terrain on which organised crime operates more hostile. REFLEX can also exploit the network of overseas liaison officers to share intelligence and co-ordinate operations. The establishment of EUROPOL is one of the ways in which countries share intelligence and undertake joint operations. There is some evidence that EUROPOL has been a successful agency in the countering of illegal immigration with shared operations and the apprehension of organised crime members involved in facilitation. The setting up of FRONTEX, similar to the Finnish model of "PCB-coop" indicates

a development in the EU strategy to protect borders by collaboration with external countries. However, the Finnish model, REFLEX, EUROPOL and FRONTEX are all criminal based strategies using law enforcement and criminal sanction as a means to combat illegal immigration.

The second conclusion is that there are many different forms of crime groups operating in the illegal immigration market. These can be characterised as *Organised Facilitation*, *Component Facilitation* and *Opportunistic Facilitation* and they conform broadly to the organisational structure as defined by Bruinsma and Bernasco (2004). It is important in addressing issues of illegal immigration to understand the arenas in which these different crime groups operate, as they do not appear to operate across all types of illegal immigration activity. Thirdly, there does not appear to be any form of systemic corruption in the states that form the basis of our research. There were examples of individual cases but none of systematic and organised corruption of public officials that would fall within our definition, that is corruption within the three countries. Possible corruption in Russia became indirectly visible at least in the Finnish data. Fourthly, there is a large and active market in the supply of forged documents. It is here that the organisational requirements of organised crime groups are evident. Fifthly, there is a need to understand the social, economic and political context of each country. For example, there has been a long tradition of immigration to the UK and so there are many expatriate communities. The UK has a long colonial history and this contributes to the focus of the UK as a destination country. Consequently, it is apparent that the movement of people is not random and that the choice of destination country is based on historical associations and connections made with family and friends⁶.

The world of illegal immigration is obscured by the clandestine nature of the activity. This makes undertaking research difficult as there is plenty of law enforcement personnel to interview but those involved in illegal immigration in relation to either the facilitator

or the facilitated are difficult to find. In relation to the person who crosses a border illegally they are a conundrum for many criminal justice agencies as they are both the offender and the victim at the same time. There is no clear demarcation between the offender and the victim and this makes for uneasy policy making and implementation and partly explains the official criminal justice responses to those who are moved illegally. It is hoped that the next phase of this research will shed some light on this murkier world.

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⁶ To a degree, this seemed to be the case also with the Estonian-Russian dimension, while Finland resembles this description only occasionally.

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