

Referendums in the EU's constitution building process

Simon Hug · Tobias Schulz

Received: 7 September 2006 / Revised: 2 November 2006 /
Accepted: 1 March 2007 / Published online: 26 April 2007
© Springer Science + Business Media, LLC 2007

Abstract In ten member states of the European Union (EU) the new constitutional treaty was supposed to be ratified by referendum. A growing number of theoretical models predicts that such additional ratification hurdles result in an advantage for negotiators in the bargaining game. The impact such a referendum constraint can exert, however, depends on the timing of its announcement, the remaining ratification rules as well as the preference constellations. If parliament and voters are actually in favor of the new treaty, ratification constraints may cease to affect the bargaining outcome. After presenting the theoretical foundation of these arguments, we present empirical

This article emanates from the DOSEI (Domestic Structures and European Integration) project funded by the European Union in its Fifth Framework program and directed by Thomas König (Universität Speyer) and relies on an earlier version prepared for presentation at the DOSEI Final Conference (Brussels, Belgium; June 19–22, 2005) and the conference “The EU's constitution-building process: From high hopes to ratification failure and beyond” (Zürich June 30–July 1, 2006). Participants at this conference, and especially Helen Milner, and two anonymous reviewers provided much appreciated comments. Irena Brinar, Mark Chandler, Michelle Cini, Béla Jankya, Leszek Jesien, and Andris Runcis provided invaluable help in locating EU treaties in the languages of the new member countries. We gratefully acknowledge the able research assistance of Ladina Caluori, Barbara Gähwiler, Ursula Häfliger, Annika Raudonat, and the financial support of the Swiss *Bundesamt für Bildung und Wissenschaft* (Grant number BBW Nr 02.0313) and the *Grundlagenforschungsfonds* of the University of St. Gallen (Grant number G12161103).

S. Hug (✉) · T. Schulz
Institut für Politikwissenschaft, Universität Zürich,
Hirschengraben 56, 8001 Zürich, Switzerland
e-mail: simon.hug@access.unizh.ch

T. Schulz
e-mail: schulz@pwi.unizh.ch

S. Hug · T. Schulz
CIS and IPZ, Universität Zürich, Zürich, Switzerland

evidence much in line with the theoretical implications. More specifically, especially for the issues changed during the intergovernmental conference, those governments gained that had scheduled a referendum and voters had a stronger preference for the status quo.

Keywords Negotiations · Referendums · Two-level games

JEL Codes K33 · H77 · D72

1 Introduction

The negative outcomes of the referendums in France and the Netherlands, followed by the decided suspension of the referendums in Great Britain and the anticipated suspension in Denmark,¹ has at least temporarily halted the ratification of the “Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe.”² These events, combined with the unprecedented number of referendums scheduled on this treaty, illustrate the increasing importance of popular input in ratification processes of international treaties, at least in the European Union (EU). The negative outcomes of the referendums in France and the Netherlands also provide ample illustration of so-called “involuntary defections” (e.g., Schelling 1960; Iida 1996) in the ratification of international treaties.

While these topical events raise the question of what will happen to the EU-constitution, and how the two countries having experienced a negative referendum outcome will deal with their rejection, our focus will be on how expectations of such possible ratification accidents may have affected the negotiations on the EU constitution. Ratification accidents may obviously happen in different arenas, but given the considerable number of referendums having been scheduled on the EU-constitution, the focus of this article will be on the impact of popular consultations. Needless to say, assessing the impact of these referendums requires controlling for the possible impact of the other ratification hurdles.³

The argument that the hurdles raised by the domestic ratification procedures may affect the bargaining outcome is prominent in the literature on two-level games (e.g., Schelling 1960; Putnam 1988; Iida 1993; Schneider and Cederman 1994; Mo 1994; Milner and Rosendorff 1996). Empirical studies

¹The British government has suspended the discussion of the bill that would have led to a referendum (*Financial Times*, June 7, 2005, 1), while the Danish government is still hesitating (*Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, June 11, 2005, 3). At the time of writing 15 member countries have ratified the EU constitution (*Source*: http://europa.eu.int/constitution/ratification_en.htm (accessed June 24, 2006), while the member states have decided to keep on hold the treaty for another year (*Financial Times* June 16, 2006, 3).

²This is the official name of what we will refer to as EU-constitution in what follows.

³In previous work (Hug and Schulz 2005), we did not control for these other hurdles. In addition, in this article we also address more specifically the problem whether particular gains might be due more to “luck” than “power” (Barry 1980a,b).

(e.g., Evans et al. 1993; Milner 1997; König and Hug 2000; Hug and König 2002, 2006b; Mertah and Pahre 2005), however, are largely hampered by the considerable demands put on the amount and quality of information on various aspects of the negotiation and the ratification stages.⁴ Hence, it cannot surprise that few studies have found systematic and consistent evidence in support of implications from two-level games.

Drawing on a wealth of information coming from diverse sources, this article offers an assessment of how referendums scheduled for the ratification of the EU-constitution have affected the bargaining over this new treaty. We find evidence that countries having announced a referendum before the conclusion of the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) in Brussels in June 2004 made significant gains in the last phases of the negotiations, depending on the voters' preferences.

We proceed as follows. In the next section we start by discussing the theoretical background allowing us to derive hypotheses on the effect of ratification constraints on negotiation outcomes. Given that we derive these hypotheses from spatial models, their empirical tests also require a spatial representation of the various actors' positions. Thus, in section three we discuss the way in which we derive a common bargaining space in which the positions of the relevant ratifying actors may be mapped. This spatial representation, based on data collected in the DOSEI-project ("Domestic structures and European Integration"),⁵ allows us to derive information on negotiation gains, ratification constraints etc. In section four we discuss the institutions under which the ratifications in the various member countries occurred, as well as the timing of the decision to launch a referendum. The former is crucial information to assess whether the governments were constrained by the requirements of the parliamentary ratification process. The latter is necessary to determine the effect of referendums on the possible gains realized by negotiators. Based on this information we propose in section five empirical tests of our theoretically derived implications on the effects of referendums on negotiation gains. In section six we conclude.

2 Theoretical Models on the Effect of Ratification Processes and Referendums

At least since Schelling's (1960) influential work scholars try to understand how ratification constraints may affect the power of negotiators.⁶ Putnam's (1988) article provided a first attempt to formalize negotiations followed by domestic ratification processes to understand their possible effects. This article

⁴Hug and König (2002) discuss these requirements in detail, as does Pahre (2005) from another perspective.

⁵see <http://dosei.dhv-speyer.de>.

⁶What follows relies heavily on Hug (2004).

spawned a series of studies attempting to understand various aspects of these two-level games (e.g., Iida 1993; Schneider and Cederman 1994; Mo 1994; Milner and Rosendorff 1996; Tarar 2001, 2005; Dai 2002; Butler 2004). While many of these articles came to rather strong predictions concerning the effect of ratification constraints, the systematic evaluation of all possible preference profiles by Hammond and Prins (2006) alerted scholars to the contingency of many of these results.⁷

In addition, these formal models are limited in ways that make them difficult to apply to many recent international negotiations. On the one hand, almost all models focus on bilateral negotiations, which are hardly characteristic of most negotiations taking place in the EU context, for instance. On the other hand, most formal models systematically restrict their bargaining space to a one-dimensional line.⁸ While this one dimension may represent the contract curve derived from a multi-dimensional bargaining space in a bilateral negotiation, this shortcut is no longer available in multilateral negotiations.

Recent advances in theoretical models on multilateral bargaining allow, however, to derive implications for the effect of ratification constraints under empirically more realistic assumptions.⁹ Almost systematically, the “multiplicity of subgame perfect equilibria” (Muthoo 1999, 337) in these bargaining models with more than two players is either circumvented with a restriction of the bargaining protocol (e.g., Chae and Yang 1988, 1994; Baliga and Serrano 1995; Krishna and Serrano 1996) or the assumption of stationary strategies (e.g., Merlo and Wilson 1995; Winter 1996; Banks and Duggan 2000).

While the multiplicity of equilibria in multilateral bargaining situations is a first complication, an additional one becomes especially relevant for international negotiations whose outcomes require ratification, namely the nature of the bargaining good. While in bilateral negotiations, the contract curve may either reflect an underlying private good, like a dollar, or a public good, this simple equivalence does no longer hold in multilateral negotiations. Hence, the distribution of the bargaining gains domestically has to be assessed explicitly in the case of negotiations over a private good.¹⁰

⁷Hug and König (2002) illustrate these contingent effects in their study on the negotiations on the Amsterdam treaty.

⁸The only exception to this we are familiar with is Gilligan’s (2004) model, which focuses on multilateral negotiations in a multidimensional space. The model deals, however, not with the ratification constraints directly, but focuses on the issues of compliance at the domestic level. Hammond and Prins (2006) also consider a two-dimensional model, but are unable to derive general results, while Mansfield et al.’s (2000) model focuses on bilateral bargaining in a two-dimensional space, but, as Dai (2002) rightly criticizes, restricts the set of possible bargaining outcomes.

⁹Still at the end of the 1990s the author of a leading textbook on bargaining models argued that “... the literature on multilateral and coalitional bargaining that uses... game-theoretic methodology... is extremely small (albeit growing) and under-developed” (Muthoo 1999, 336).

¹⁰Tarar (2005) rightly argues that even in bilateral negotiations the nature of the bargaining good and how spoils will be distributed domestically are of central importance.

Based on Tarar's (2001) model for bilateral negotiations, Hug (2004) proposes an extension covering negotiations over a private good among three negotiators. While some of Tarar's (2001) results carry over to this multilateral bargaining situation, others do not. More precisely, in trilateral negotiations ratification constraints are profitable for all participant negotiators as long as the former are not mutually incompatible. In addition, however, it is the initiator of the negotiations who is likely to reap the largest gains.¹¹

Negotiations over a public good are more easily formalized in Banks and Duggan's (2000) general bargaining model.¹² Hug (2004) links Banks and Duggan's (2000) model for negotiations on public goods under a unanimous decision rule with possible ratification constraints. This attempt illustrates and underlines that under these modeling assumptions no general conclusions are possible, except that the initiator of the bargaining process may reap any remaining spoils. Whether particular ratification constraints will strengthen the bargaining positions of particular negotiators depends on the relative location of the reversion (or status quo) point and the positions of the various negotiators and domestic ratification agents.

Nevertheless, as general insight may serve the result that domestic constraints may strengthen the bargaining position of particular countries depending on the preference configuration. In addition, the advantage of the initiator of the bargaining process, first derived by Rubinstein (1982), seems also to be a rather robust result. The question arises, however, whether referendums as a last stage of a ratification process have specific additional effects. The important distinction here is between normal ratification procedures for international treaties and procedures that change over the course of a negotiation.¹³ If normal ratification procedures allow or require a referendum, for instance in France or Denmark,¹⁴ then this institutional element combined with the preferences of the voting population forms an additional ratification constraint.¹⁵ More complicated is the situation when constitutions allow for referendums on unspecified topics or if countries announce referendums without relying on specific constitutional foundations. In that case, the effect of these additional ratification hurdles is likely to be determined by the timing of launching a referendum. If a referendum is triggered before the end of the negotiations, we may presume that an additional ratification hurdle is erected. If the referendum is triggered after the end of the negotiations, like for instance the French referendum on the EU-constitution, we would expect few if any effects on the bargaining outcome.

¹¹These results are based on a model of negotiations over a private good, where the gains are shared with the whole population. In Tarar's (2001) conception this would correspond to a presidential system, where the president has the goal to get reelected.

¹²Gilligan (2004) also builds on this very general model.

¹³Milner (1997) discusses ratification constraints that vary over time.

¹⁴We discuss these institutional provisions in more detail below.

¹⁵Hug (1997) (see critique by Feld 1997), as well as Feld et al. (2002), Hug (2002), and Feld and Kirchgässner (2004) discuss formal models dealing specifically with referendums on international treaties, mostly in the context of European integration.

Thus our current theoretical knowledge would suggest the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1 *Countries with an electorate preferring the status quo and a referendum announced before the end of the IGC realize more negotiation gains, independent of the other domestic ratification constraints.*

Hypothesis 2 *Independent of the domestic ratification constraints, the initiator of the negotiations reaps more gains than the other negotiators.*

3 Deriving the Bargaining and Ratification Space

To test our hypotheses, we need information on the bargaining positions of three different sets of actors as well as relative positions for the three policy positions corresponding to the status quo, the draft constitution and the final IGC outcome. First, we obviously need information on the positions that the national governments hold on the issues raised by the constitution project. In addition, we also must be able to evaluate these positions relative to the final constitutional treaty, the draft constitution presented by the Laeken Convention as well as the status quo (i.e. the (Nice-)consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (TEC)). Second, relative to these positions we must be able to establish the positions of the respective electorates, since our main interest is in assessing the influence of the referendum constraint. Third, we also have to take into account the preference constellation in the national parliaments. This is only possible if we are able to gain information about the positions of national parties holding seats in the parliaments. The parliamentary ratification stage is a crucial control variable within our model that cannot be dismissed. Given that no single data-source covers all three sets of policy positions, we must link the political positions derived from three different sources.

We derive the positions of the governments from an expert survey carried out in the DOSEI-project,¹⁶ whereas for the positions of the median voters we rely on mass survey data, namely the Eurobarometer-data.¹⁷ In addition,

¹⁶This survey elicited from experts the government positions on the contentious issues in the bargaining process. The list of questions used in this article is listed in Table 12 in the appendix, while the contributions in König and Hug (2006) discuss the results by country.

¹⁷Our analysis is based on the EB 60.1 for the old member states and on the CCEB 2003.4 for the new member states. The Eurobarometer-data is aggregated on the national level, by determining the median response category for each national electorate. These median positions were unique for all countries, except Italy, where for one question the same number of respondents chose one of the two answer categories. We have employed both of these median values in the subsequent analyses, but we will report only the results of one of these analyses here. The result of the second analysis yields similar results.

we employ party manifestos for the 2004 European Parliament Election to determine the positions of the political parties in the national parliaments.¹⁸ As a control, we also estimate the parties' position on the EU-constitution by aggregating the responses of their voters to the question whether they are in favor of a constitution or not.¹⁹

Having the basic ingredients for our empirical tests, the next question relates to how we test our hypotheses. More precisely, we have to determine what the relevant bargaining and ratification spaces are. There are basically two main strategies how to proceed at this stage. First, we could assume that the dimensionality of the bargaining space corresponds to the set of main issues debated during the negotiations.²⁰ The drawbacks of this approach are that we have to assume that the various issues are dealt with independently of each other,²¹ and given the data restriction, we would need to make strong assumptions concerning the ratification space. The advantage, on the other hand, is that we can more easily control for the overall preference configuration. Second, we could assume that the relevant bargaining and ratification spaces are similar (if not identical), and thus carry out our analysis in one common space. The disadvantage of this approach is that it is much more difficult to control in our analysis for the general preference configuration. On the other hand, we explicitly allow for (and actually assume) issues to be dependent on each other.

The solution we choose attempts to combine both approaches. We first follow a twofold strategy to combine these datasets: In a first step we matched the information contained in the two surveys into a common space before in a second step, the party manifestos may be used to determine the party positions relative to the constitutional projects and the status quo. The combination of the two survey-datasets must rely on a dimensional analysis of the data,²² since we do not have exactly the same information for the governments' and voters' positions.

¹⁸The party manifestos of the old member states have been made available to us by Manfred G. Schmidt, to whom we wish to express our gratitude. The manifestos of the remaining countries have been collected in a joint effort of the scholars engaged in the DOSEI-project.

¹⁹Unfortunately, the resulting indicator has no variance whatsoever, suggesting that the Constitution would be ratified by the parliaments of all member countries according to the specified rules. Only if we consider the relevant criterion for Denmark the 5/6 majority, do we find one parliament where the expected outcome would be negative.

²⁰The presumption here would be that our expert survey has covered all the relevant issues.

²¹Obviously there are (imperfect) ways to address the dependence of these various issues.

²²In both datasets the variables are ordinal and therefore a factor analysis based on a linear relationship is inappropriate. We therefore employed a factor analysis for ordinal variables developed by Martin and Quinn (2004) which is discussed by Quinn (2004) in more detail. This factor analysis relies on Bayesian statistics and the mean of the posterior distribution can be interpreted as the maximum-likelihood estimate under the assumption of uninformative priors (Jackman 2004). Hix and Crombez (2005) propose different ways in which policy spaces might be derived for the data stemming from the expert survey, while our approach is discussed in more detail in Hug and Schulz (2005).




Fig. 1 Matched spaces of the DOSEI- and EB60.1/CCEB2003.4-data, full set of EB questions

The matching of the two two-dimensional policy spaces we obtain from the factor analysis²³ is straightforward if the three outcomes (the status quo, the draft constitution and the IGC result) are included in each dataset by assigning the survey answer categories for each issue of the dataset.²⁴ Because this results in three observations that the two datasets now have in common, we can use the positions of these three common points as anchors to map the positions of the voters into the policy space of the governments. The rotation and stretching of the space of the electorates are done by regressing the two coordinates of each anchor in the voters' space on each dimension of the anchors in the governments' space.²⁵ Figure 1 depicts the resulting bargaining space. As the information provided in the appendix shows, the first dimension is mostly related to policy issues in the areas of taxation, cohesion policies, but

²³Ideally, we would have determined the dimensionality of the bargaining space on the basis of an information criterion covering the whole analysis. Unfortunately, the factor analysis of ordinal variables we employ (Quinn 2004) fails to yield the relevant information to calculate, for instance, a *Bayes factor*. Instead of this we assessed the “fit” of various bargaining spaces with different dimensionalities by assessing how well the corresponding factor scores predicted the responses on the various issues. Especially for the expert survey data we found that the average value of the Akaike information criterion drops considerably from a one-dimensional space to a two-dimensional space. Increasing the dimensionality from two to three or four, however, fails to change this average value. The results of these additional analyses will be made available on our website.

²⁴In Table 13 in the appendix this coding is listed for the Eurobarometer-data.

²⁵The technical details on this simple procedure are discussed in more detail by Hug and Schulz (2005). The validity of this matching procedure is highly dependent on the similarity of the structure of the data in the two datasets. Clearly, the relative positions of the three policy outcomes across the data sources should be very similar as should the dimensions that have been established. Hug and Schulz (2005) compare the factor loadings of the two dimensional analyses in detail, so that we only list the relevant questions from the two sources in the appendix (Tables 12 and 13).

also institutional questions. The second dimension, on the other hand, relates mostly to the role of the European parliament.

Once we have a common space for voters and national governments, we need to determine the relative position of the parliamentary actors, namely the political parties.²⁶ In previous analyses (e.g., Hug and König 2002; König and Luetgert 2003; Schulz 2003), this information has been extracted from mass surveys, since there used to be questions on the party affiliation in earlier Eurobarometer-surveys. Unfortunately, party affiliation is no longer systematically available,²⁷ forcing us to rely on other sources. One easily available source for information on party positions are party manifestos. Since most parties in the European member states (including the new members) published manifestos related to the European Parliament (EP) Elections of 2004,²⁸ analyzing such texts should generate relatively valid estimates of a party's position toward the content of the constitutional treaty. Given that a hand-coding of these texts is resource intensive, we rely on a computer-assisted coding using the Wordscores methodology proposed by Laver et al. (2003).²⁹

The Wordscores methodology relies on a-priori reference scores that must be assigned to a-priori chosen reference texts against which the remaining texts (virgin texts) will be compared and scored. It is well suited for our purpose, i.e. to integrate the party positions into the two-dimensional bargaining space. To this end, we first have to choose the positions of the status quo, the IGC and the Draft Constitution on both dimensions as reference scores. What remains to be found are reference texts that define these three points extensively. We have chosen to rely on the original treaties but we used only those parts of these texts that correspond to the issues that appear in our expert survey.³⁰ The results of this scoring-strategy are listed in Table 14 in the appendix. All in all,

²⁶Here we assume that the political parties are very disciplined and thus can be considered as unitary actors.

²⁷The EB 60.1 does not include information on party affiliation while the CCEB 2003.4 does. The most recent Eurobarometer for the old member states (EB 61) does provide such information for the European Parliament election and so does the corresponding dataset for the new members (CCEB 2004.1). Important items, however, for example the questions on competence delegation for 25 policy fields, are missing in this questionnaire. Since this has, as we show in Hug and Schulz (2007), severe consequences for the dimensional analysis, we refrain from using the more recent Eurobarometer-dataset. We also assess on the basis of a question concerning a likely vote on the EU constitution to assess whether particular parties were in favor or not. Using this information to determine the likelihood of ratification in parliament suggested, however, that in all parliaments the required majorities would have been achieved.

²⁸We employ the party manifestos for the EP elections instead of those for national elections for several reasons. First, most manifestos for the EP elections, contrary to those for national elections, contained statements on the constitutional treaty or at least on the way in which the EU should develop. Second, using manifestos for national elections would have created a problem of timing, since the national elections occur at different times. This would have resulted in the texts referring to proposals made at very different points in time. Finally, contrary to König and Finke (2007) (in this issue), we also refrained from using data from expert surveys, since the link to positions on the constitutional treaty is tenuous at best.

²⁹Benoit et al. (2005) apply the same methodology in their analysis of contributions to the European convention.

³⁰This set of reference texts is available on request from the authors.

Table 1 Ratification of international treaties

	Parliamentary chambers	
	1	2+
Simple majority	MT, UK	BE, IT, NL, IE
Qualified majority	AT(2/3), CY(2/3), DK(5/6), EE(3/5), EL(3/5), FI(2/3), HU(2/3), LT(2/3), LU(2/3), LV(2/3), PT(2/3), SE(5/6), SI(2/3), SK(3/5)	CZ(3/5), DE(2/3), ES(3/5), FR(3/5), PL(2/3)
+ referendum	DK	FR, (IE)

Source: Hug and Schulz (2005), Hug and König (2006b) and http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const_Rat.htm

Legend: FR and IE appear twice, since there are alternative ratification processes, of which, in the case of Ireland, one only applies to treaties related to the EU (hence the parentheses)

the results are quite plausible: not only are most parties positioned relative to the three versions of the treaties as well as relative to the other parties in an expected manner,³¹ but in many cases the government parties are also located quite close to the national position identified by the expert survey, although this position did not enter the wordscore as a reference score. Of course, since the draft constitution, the IGC outcome and the status quo do not differ much on the second dimension (see Fig. 1), there is not much variation between the party positions on this dimension. The national positions, on the other hand, do vary on the second dimension quite considerably. The variance is much greater on the first dimension, however, and thus reduces the importance of the second dimension for the following analysis.

4 Institutional Ratification Provisions

With respect to the constitutional treaty the ratification constraints the 25 governments of the EU face in their countries vary to a large extent. These constraints are rather complex and have not been known with great certainty at every stage of the bargaining process for every country. While in some countries (for example Ireland) the rules had been clear and well known from the outset, other countries have not yet managed to decide definitely at the time of writing whether a referendum should be held on the topic (as it is the case in the Czech Republic). As far as the majority rule in parliament is concerned, most countries know a stronger and a weaker requirement for international treaties depending on whether the treaty affects the national constitution or not. While in some countries it obviously was not too difficult to decide that the national constitution was not affected by the constitutional treaty,

³¹There are some exceptions, of course, for example the “Uniti nell’ Ulivo” in Italy, the “ÖVP” in Austria or the communist party in France. Most of these cases can be explained, however, by the quality of the texts available.

Table 2 Ratification of treaty on EU constitution

	Parliamentary chambers	
	1	2+
Simple majority	EL, LV, MA, SE	BE, IT
Qualified majority	CY(2/3), FI(2/3), HU(2/3), LT(2/3), SK(3/5), SI(2/3),	AT(2/3), DE(2/3), FR(3/5)
+ referendum	DK, LU, PT, UK	CZ(3/5), ES(3/5), IE, NL, PL(2/3)

in other countries, this decision was explicitly made by parliament (Austria) or the constitutional court (Spain). Thus, Table 1 summarizes the ratification processes under the assumption that the ratification of an international treaty requires constitutional changes.

For the ratification of the EU-constitution the ratification constraints differ, however, considerably. Obviously it is difficult to assess precisely what the negotiators anticipated regarding the various ratification procedures to be used in the 25 domestic arenas. In Table 2 we report, however, the majority requirements in parliament as we think they might have been expected during the final IGC. We expect that at that time a discussion about the effect of the treaty on the national constitution should have been started. In some countries, however, namely Luxembourg, Greece, Sweden and Lithuania, no indication of such a public discussion could be found. Hence, we conclude that it was not expected that the more stringent ratification rule will apply in these countries. A special case is Spain, where the constitutional court had to decide on the applicability of the higher ratification provisions, which it did not before December 2004. Therefore, we will assume the higher parliamentary ratification hurdle for this country.

As far as the referendums are concerned, the situation is not less complicated. In many countries referendums on international treaties could be triggered by the elite under certain circumstances. Table 3 shows at what point in time referendums were called. As the table shows, all referendums, except one, namely the French one, were called between the end of the Laeken convention and the end of the IGC. Given our discussion above, we will only

Table 3 Timing of referendum announcement

Country	Time of announcement
Ireland	No announcement, since required
Spain	June 1, 2003 (Aznar) June 24, 2004 (Zapatero)
Luxembourg	June 27, 2003
Denmark	August 8, 2003
Netherlands	September 10, 2003
Portugal	October 7, 2003
Czech Republic	October 7, 2003
Poland	March 24, 2004
United Kingdom	April 20, 2004
Belgium	June 1, 2004, but then withdrawn
France	July 7, 2004

Table 4 Referendums on the EU constitution

Referendum or not	Countries
No referendum	Austria (AT), Belgium (BE), Cyprus (CY), Estonia (EE), Finland (FI), Germany (DE), Greece (EL), Hungary (HU), Italy (IT), Latvia (LV) Lithuania (LT), Malta (MT), Slovakia (SK), Slovenia (SI), Sweden (SE)
Referendum, not binding, but announced after IGC	
Referendum, not binding and announced before IGC	Luxembourg (LU), Netherlands (NL), United Kingdom (UK)
Referendum, binding but announced after IGC	France (FR),
Referendum, binding, required and/or announced before IGC	Czech Republic (CZ), Denmark (DK), Ireland (IE), Poland (PL), Portugal (PT), Spain (ES) ^a

^aIt was not before late December 2004 that the Spanish Constitutional Court ruled that the constitutional treaty did not affect the Spanish constitution and that as a consequence a binding referendum would not be necessary (compare http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/Treaties/Treaty_Const_Rat_spain.htm)

consider this set of countries as having possibly profited from the scheduling of a referendum during negotiations.³² Table 4 differentiates the countries that had announced referendums during and shortly after the bargaining process from those with no referendum. In addition Table 4 also indicates whether the outcome of the referendum is binding. Spain is a special case, because a binding referendum was probably expected before the Constitutional Court ruled that out.

5 Testing the Effects of Referendums

Testing our theoretically derived hypotheses requires apart precise information on the preferences of various actors as discussed above, also a measure of gains realized during the negotiations.³³ In their study on the Amsterdam negotiations Hug and König (2002) used the number of issues dropped from the final draft which would have made a country worse of as measure for the gains realized. König and Daimer (2005) on the other hand use as measure for the negotiation gains the number of issues settled according to a country's preferences.

³²Additional analyses reported in Hug (2007) (forthcoming) support this theoretically informed decision. If France is added to this set of countries most of the effects of this additional ratification hurdle are reduced.

³³It is quite obvious that we need to subscribe here to the assumption of interpersonal comparisons of utilities, since hypotheses derived from two-level games suggest differential effects on negotiation gains. While being aware of the problem of such comparisons, we alert the reader that all studies, whether quantitative or qualitative, engage either implicitly or explicitly in such comparisons.

Given our interest in the final stages of the negotiations and our explicit spatial representation we will rely on two different measures. First, we will look only at those issues covered by our expert survey for which the draft adopted at the June 2004 Brussels IGC differed from the Convention draft.³⁴ This limited set allows us to measure the negotiation gains that were realized between the end of the Laeken Convention and the final IGC meeting, i.e., the period during which all referendums were announced, with the exception of the French one as discussed above. In addition, given that the set of issues is quite limited we can also assess whether gains were realized in issue areas that were considered as vital for particular governments.³⁵ Second, we will also measure in our spatial representation discussed above (see Fig. 1) whether governments were able to move the negotiation outcome toward their preferred position, both over the full Constitution building process (distance to status quo compared to distance to IGC outcome) and the final negotiation phase (distance to draft compared to distance to IGC outcome).

In a first stage we analyze whether governments that had announced referendums before the end of the IGC negotiations fared any better than the remaining countries in the last stage of the negotiations. If we consider all issues that were changed in this last stage, we find that on average countries having announced a referendum gained 1.11 points,³⁶ while the average is only 0.94 for the other countries. If we consider the gains the negotiators realized only for issues that our experts considered as vital for the government under consideration, we find a different picture. Countries having announced referendums before June 2004 actually incurred a loss of -0.22 for their vital issues, while the remaining countries faced a loss of only -0.09 .

This simple analysis only partly confirms the hypothesized effect of referendums on the negotiations on the EU-constitution, however, the tests so far neglected the contingent effect of referendums. More precisely, theoretical models suggest that the effect should depend on the voters' preferences as stated in Hypothesis 1. Thus, in what follows we will provide a more precise test of this hypothesis by looking at the effect of voter preferences contingent on the presence of a scheduled referendum or not. The results are depicted in Figs. 2 and 3. In both figures we depict on the horizontal axis the difference between two distances, namely the one between the voters' ideal point and the status quo, and the distance between the voters' ideal point and the IGC outcome. Since we subtract the former from the latter, positive values indicate that voters are closer to the draft treaty than the status quo, while negative values indicate the reverse. Consequently, negative values suggest that voters

³⁴We thank George Tsebelis for suggesting this additional analysis.

³⁵At the end of the expert survey, the experts were asked to identify the issues which they considered to be of vital importance for their national governments. Hug and König (2006a) provide a comparative analysis of these vital issues.

³⁶One point corresponds to one answer category closer to a national position in the expert survey.




Fig. 2 Gains during the IGC: all issues. Regression for countries with referendums: gains = $0.20(0.58) - 21.12(8.96) * \text{voters' preferences}$ (standard errors in parentheses); regression for countries without referendums: gains = $-0.81(0.68) - 4.92(11.28) * \text{voters' preferences}$ (standard errors in parentheses)

in a particular country prefer the status quo to the proposed constitutional treaty. On the vertical axis we depict the gains in the measure discussed above.

Figure 2 reports the results when considering all issues having been changed in the draft treaty before the adoption at the IGC in June 2004. Each \times corresponds to a country that has called a referendum on the EU-constitution before the end of the IGC, while the $+$ s correspond to the remaining countries. The two lines summarize the relationship between the preferences of the voters and the gains realized in the last phase of the negotiation. For the countries having called a referendum, we find as expected a strong negative relationship. This suggests that countries with a skeptical electorate and a referendum announced before the end of the IGC fare better in the last stages of the negotiations and realized more gains than the other countries. If countries having triggered referendums before the end of the IGC have a rather supportive electorate for the EU-constitution, we find that they actually gained less than the remaining countries. The second line for the countries having refrained from calling a referendum suggests that the preferences of the voters did not affect systematically the gains realized in the last phase of the negotiations.

While Fig. 2 provides considerable support for Hypothesis 1, we might suspect that the gains realized by countries should be more strongly visible




Fig. 3 Gains during the two stages of negotiation: vital issues. Regression for countries with referendums: $gains = -0.55(0.31) - 7.68(4.79) * voters' preferences$ (standard errors in parentheses); regression for countries without referendums: $gains = -0.34(0.27) - 9.46(4.43) * voters' preferences$ (standard errors in parentheses)

in areas their respective governments considered important.³⁷ Thus, in Fig. 3 we report the results of the same analysis as in Fig. 2 but only count the gains a particular country realized on issues considered to be vital to its national government.³⁸ While we find again a negative relationship for referendum countries, the negative effect also appears for those countries that have not triggered a referendum. This suggests that when it comes to vital issues, having a skeptical electorate at home was sufficient to threaten at the negotiation table.

The same analysis is also possible for the other measure of the gains realized. We present the results of these parallel analyses in Figs. 4 and 5. In the first of these figures (Fig. 4) we use the overall gains realized over all issues by comparing the preferences over the current status quo and the IGC outcome. As in the previous figures we find a negative relationship for the set of member countries having announced a referendum before the end of the IGC. Thus, again, overall member countries with such referendum announcements fared better, provided their electorate were critical toward the EU-constitution. For the countries without referendum announcement we also find a negative relationship, but it is much weaker.

³⁷We thank Michael Marsh for the suggestion to control for the salience of issues.

³⁸These obviously differ from one member state to the next.




Fig. 4 Overall gains: SQ - IGC outcome. Regression for countries with referendums: gains = 0.04 (0.02) - 0.21 (0.24) * voters' preferences (standard errors in parentheses); regression for countries without referendums: gains = 0.06(0.01) - 0.04(0.14) * voters' preferences (standard errors in parentheses)

Since all referendums were announced between the end of the Laeken Convention and the end of the IGC, we would expect that the relationship would even be stronger for the indicator measuring gains in this last phase. Figure 5 shows, however, a different picture. Both for the countries having announced a referendum and those that refrained from doing so, we find a positive relationship between voter preferences and gains.

These results may be influenced, however, by the fact that referendums are not the only ratification constraint. Based on our information on the location of various actors in a bargaining space, we can also determine whether parliaments are likely to encounter problems in the ratification process. Table 5 summarizes this information unfortunately only for 23 out of the 25 countries. Given that our method to derive the policy positions of parties on the basis of their party manifestos and the treaties in their domestic language, we faced two problems. First, Malta apparently has not yet a completely translated set of currently used treaties. Hence, we were unable to determine the positions of the Maltese parties. Second, the party manifestos of Cyprus were not available electronically, forcing us to drop also this country from the analyses. In the analyses that follow, we will only retain from this table whether ratification was likely (1) or not (0). We use this variable together with the information already presented to test our hypotheses.




Fig. 5 Overall gains: Convention draft - IGC outcome. Regression for countries with referendums: $\text{gains} = 0.01(0.00) + 0.03(0.03) * \text{voters' preferences}$ (standard errors in parentheses); regression for countries without referendums: $\text{gains} = 0.01(0.00) + 0.02(0.04) * \text{voters' preferences}$ (standard errors in parentheses)

In Tables 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10 we report the results of simple regression analyses attempting to explain the various measures for the gains.³⁹ As independent variables we use the scheduling of a referendum before the end of the IGC, this variable interacted with an indicator whether parliamentary ratification was likely not to cause any problems, the voters' preferences interacted first with the referendum variable then also with the parliamentary ratification indicator, and finally the parliamentary ratification indicator and two dichotomous variables for the two countries having held the presidency during the final stages of the IGC, namely Ireland and Italy.

In Table 6 our dependent variable is the number of points by which the issues changed during the IGC were altered in the direction of a national positions. The first two models reflect the results presented graphically in Fig. 2. As discussed above, the simple fact of scheduling a referendum before the end of the IGC increased the gains during this last phase of the negotiations (model 1). The results of model 2 suggest again that these gains are largely

³⁹For all the regressions based on a sample of 23 or 25 observations we calculated also, based on a suggestion by one reviewer, bootstrapped standard errors. Systematically, the differences were at most 10% of the OLS-estimates, hence affecting in no case our substantive conclusions. For this reason, we refrain from reporting these results here.

Table 5 Preference configurations and ratification constraints in national parliaments

Country	Pos. seats ^a		Pos. seats		Scored ^b		Seats ^c		Rule ^d		Threshold		Difference	
	lower	upper	lower	upper	lower	upper	lower	upper	lower	upper	lower	upper	lower	upper
at	73	23	170	58	183	62	0.667	0.667	122.000	41.333	-49.000	-18.333		
be	97	45	149	71	150	71	0.500	0.500	75.000	35.500	22.000	9.500		
cz	120	32	200	73	200	81	0.600	0.600	120.000	48.600	0.000	-16.600		
de	554	56	603	63	603	69	0.667	0.667	402.000	46.000	152.000	10.000		
dk	98	0	175	0	179	0	0.500	0.500	89.500	8.500	8.500			
ee	62	0	101	0	101	0	0.500	0.500	50.500	11.500	11.500			
el	135	0	300	0	300	0	0.500	0.500	150.000	150.000	-15.000			
es	182	118	340	246	350	259	0.600	0.600	210.000	155.400	-28.000	-37.400		
fi	191	0	200	0	200	0	0.667	0.667	133.333	57.667	57.667			
fr	563	276	574	276	577	321	0.600	0.600	346.200	192.600	216.800	83.400		
hu	198	0	386	0	386	0	0.667	0.667	257.333	-59.333	-59.333			
ie	132	49	151	53	166	60	0.500	0.500	83.000	30.000	49.000	19.000		
it	495	246	600	299	613	320	0.500	0.500	306.500	160.000	188.500	86.000		
lt	95	0	121	0	137	0	0.500	0.500	68.500	26.500	26.500			
lu	26	0	59	0	59	0	0.500	0.500	29.500	-3.500	-3.500			

lv	61	0	100	0	100	0	100	0.500	50.000	11.000
nl	137	69	148	72	150	75	0.500	0.500	75.000	62.000
pl	330	81	403	83	460	100	0.667	0.667	306.667	23.333
pt	111	0	216	0	230	0	0.500	0.500	115.000	-4.000
se	117	0	349	0	349	0	0.500	0.500	174.500	-57.500
si	38	0	80	0	90	0	0.667	60.000	-22.000	-8.000
sk	82	0	128	0	150	0	0.600	90.000	-102.500	-61.000
uk	227	271	644	453	659	664	0.500	329.500	332.000	

^aThis and the next column give the sum of the seats of those parties for which we find a positive difference when we compare the euclidean distance between their ideal point and the status quo and their ideal point and the IGC outcome, respectively

^bThis and the next column give the sum of the seats of those parties for which we were able to score party manifestos

^cThis and the next column list the number of seats of the respective chamber of parliament

^dThis and the next column give the ratification rule in parliament as it applies to the constitutional treaty. In some countries the weaker majority requirement applies because the constitutional treaty does not affect the constitution

In Luxembourg, the European Parliament Election took place the same day as the election to the national parliament. For this reason no European Parliament Election manifesto is available for one of the governmental parties (the DP) and which is the reason why its score should be regarded as less valid. It actually is rather implausible that the position of a party belonging to the government coalition is that close to the status quo

The manifesto of the 'Partido Popular' is missing for Portugal. Since this party held 14 seats in 2003 and since it is actually not a Euro-sceptic party, we will assume that it was expected at that time that the Portuguese parliament would ratify the treaty

For Slovakia, the manifesto of a splinter party (the L'U (Peoples Union)) is missing that separated from the HZDS and has a rather nationalistic orientation. For that reason, we would assume that the rejection of the constitutional treaty was expected to be even more severe than this table would suggest

Table 6 Explaining gains in changed issues during IGC

Model variables	1b (s.e.)	2b (s.e.)	3b (s.e.)	4b (s.e.)	5b (s.e.)	6b (s.e.)	7b (s.e.)
Referendum	0.174 (0.894)	-0.608 (1.124)	-0.518 (1.112)	0.121 (1.391)	-0.405 (1.503)	-0.405 (1.546)	-0.425 (1.592)
Referendum × parl. pro EU-const.				-1.386 (1.775)	-0.204 (2.177)	-0.056 (2.282)	-0.184 (2.371)
Referendum × voters' preferences		-16.203 (17.773)	-13.463 (17.542)	-14.700 (17.807)	-27.921 (22.699)	-27.921 (23.355)	-28.770 (24.133)
Voters' preferences		-4.917 (9.832)	-6.552 (10.471)	-5.985 (10.611)	-5.985 (10.645)	-5.985 (10.953)	-5.136 (11.474)
Referendum × voters' preferences × parl. pro EU-const.					27.094 (28.699)	25.783 (29.785)	25.783 (30.657)
Parl. pro EU-const.			1.385 (0.858)	1.931 (1.115)	1.931 (1.119)	1.931 (1.151)	2.059 (1.228)
IE						-0.837 (2.488)	-0.837 (2.561)
IT							-0.946 (2.373)
Constant	0.938 (0.536)	0.809 (0.592)	0.150 (0.782)	-0.145 (0.876)	-0.145 (0.879)	-0.145 (0.905)	-0.124 (0.933)
rmse	2.145	2.132	2.030	2.053	2.059	2.119	2.181
n	25	25	23	23	23	23	23

dependent on having a skeptical electorate. In the absence thereof scheduling a referendum may be even counterproductive. This strong contingent effect of the voters' preferences remains even when we control for the fact whether the parliament was expected to ratify the EU-constitution according to the respective domestic requirements (model 3). This later dichotomous variable should, however, again modify the effects of the other two variables. This is accounted for in models 4 and 5. Interestingly enough these additional interaction effects change in part the overall picture. While the effect of the voters' preferences is still as expected negative, this effect is almost completely reduced in countries where the parliament was in favor of the EU-constitution.

Finally, hypothesis 2 would suggest that the two countries having held the EU-presidency during the final phases of the IGC would obtain additional gains. The results reported in the last column hardly support this implication. Both for Ireland which presided over the final negotiations and Italy having led the EU at the beginning of the IGC we find negative coefficients.

While the results discussed so far provided some support for the hypothesized effect of voter preferences and an announced referendum, we did not control so far for the effect of the overall preference configuration. To do so, we analyze exactly the same set of issues, namely those changed during the IGC, but estimate the effect of voter preferences and institutions for each of the issues separately and controlling for the number of countries which won due to the proposed change. Hence, instead of having 25 observations we have six times as many, namely the number of issues changed at the IGC times the number of member countries. Our dependent variable is the gain realized

during the IGC, while the independent variables remain the same with one exception. For each issue we calculated the number of member states winning from the changes adopted in the IGC. Given that the dependent variable only takes on four different values and because of the clear lack of independence between observations, we estimated our model as an ordered probit model and calculated clustered standard errors per member state.⁴⁰

The results reported in Table 7 first confirm the insights of the previous analyses. Model 2 clearly shows the less skeptical voters become, the lower are the gains in countries having scheduled a referendum before the end of the IGC. This statistically significant effect is reduced if we also allow for an effect of the voters' preferences in countries having not scheduled a referendum. But quite clearly, the substantive difference remains. In model 4 we introduce as control variable the number of countries having gained on the particular issue during the IGC. Not surprisingly, we find a strong and significant effect, but more interestingly, none of the other estimated coefficients is affected by the introduction of this new control variable. Adding the other variables also employed in Table 6 hardly changes the general conclusions.⁴¹ The only notable insight is the effect of voters' preferences is positive and statistically significant in countries where parliaments were expected to be in favor of the constitution and a referendum was scheduled. In the models in which this interaction appears (models 7–9 in Table 7), the interaction effect between referendums and voter preferences also becomes statistically significant and strongly negative. This suggests the conclusion that the effect of voter preferences was especially strong if parliament was expected to be against the EU constitution and a referendum was scheduled. Concerning our second hypothesis we find stronger results that go against our expectations, however. For Ireland we find even a significant negative effect, while the effect is also negative for Italy but not statistically significant.

On a more abstract level the results reported in Table 7 suggest that even though the preference configuration as measured by the number of winners is an important predictor for gains, it fails to affect the general thrust of our results. Hence, in the remaining analyses we refrain from controlling for this important independent variable, since it is most likely orthogonal to all our other independent variables (as in the analysis reported in Table 7).

Hence, we turn to another control that might prove important, namely the saliency of the issues considered. While Fig. 2 suggested much less support for our hypotheses when the dependent variable is the gains made in the vital issues, the results reported in Table 6 alter this picture a bit. The first model obviously replicates the negative result discussed above, but once we take

⁴⁰This obviously only controls for the lacking independence in the error structure and not in the possibly misspecified theoretical model (a point often forgotten by scholars employing clustered standard errors). Ideally, we would also allow for issue specific effects, but given that the number of winners only varies across issues, this is not possible.

⁴¹Again, given that we fail to have information on the position of the political parties in two countries, we have a smaller set of observations in models 5–9.

Table 7 Explaining gains per issue during IGC

Model variables	1b (s.e.)	2b (s.e.)	3b (s.e.)	4b (s.e.)	5b (s.e.)	6b (s.e.)	7b (s.e.)	8b (s.e.)	9b (s.e.)
Referendum	0.092 (0.206)	-0.183 (0.227)	-0.145 (0.217)	-0.149 (0.222)	-0.131 (0.197)	0.018 (0.274)	-0.122 (0.250)	-0.122 (0.250)	-0.128 (0.250)
Voters' preferences			-1.462 (2.474)	-1.494 (2.525)	-1.991 (2.733)	-1.871 (2.709)	-1.878 (2.719)	-1.880 (2.722)	-1.650 (2.795)
Referendum × voters' preferences		-6.425 (2.460)	-4.970 (3.458)	-5.022 (3.554)	-4.326 (3.349)	-4.614 (3.551)	-8.160 (3.876)	-8.168 (3.880)	-8.407 (3.953)
Winners				0.039 (0.011)	0.035 (0.012)	0.035 (0.012)	0.035 (0.012)	0.035 (0.012)	0.036 (0.012)
Parl. pro EU-const.					0.348 (0.219)	0.477 (0.338)	0.479 (0.340)	0.479 (0.340)	0.515 (0.369)
Referendum × parl. pro EU-const.						-0.324 (0.384)	-0.013 (0.353)	0.048 (0.349)	0.013 (0.375)
Referendum × voters' preferences × parl. pro EU-const.							7.196 (2.864)	6.648 (2.803)	6.655 (2.808)
IE								-0.352 (0.026)	-0.352 (0.026)
IT									-0.262 (0.283)
Cut 1	-1.048 (0.164)	-1.064 (0.167)	-1.027 (0.155)	-0.449 (0.277)	-0.371 (0.309)	-0.306 (0.321)	-0.310 (0.322)	-0.310 (0.322)	-0.315 (0.325)
Cut 2	-0.325 (0.163)	-0.329 (0.164)	-0.291 (0.147)	0.329 (0.278)	0.431 (0.299)	0.500 (0.310)	0.502 (0.312)	0.503 (0.312)	0.499 (0.314)
Cut 3	0.899 (0.148)	0.913 (0.150)	0.953 (0.139)	1.606 (0.288)	1.722 (0.317)	1.795 (0.341)	1.804 (0.345)	1.807 (0.345)	1.805 (0.346)
log likelihood	-192.783	-190.581	-190.319	-187.377	-170.097	-169.736	-169.054	-168.823	-168.674
<i>n</i>	150	150	150	150	150	138	138	138	138

Legend: To control for country heterogeneity the standard errors were clustered

Table 8 Explaining gains in changed vital issues during IGC

Model variables	1b (s.e.)	2b (s.e.)	3b (s.e.)	4b (s.e.)	5b (s.e.)	6b (s.e.)	7b (s.e.)
Referendum	-0.128 (0.404)	-0.212 (0.463)	-0.120 (0.488)	-0.027 (0.620)	-0.160 (0.682)	-0.160 (0.704)	-0.158 (0.729)
Referendum × parl. pro EU-const.				-0.203 (0.791)	0.548 (0.508)	0.113 (1.040)	0.128 (1.086)
Voters' preferences		-9.460 (4.055)	-10.481 (4.594)	-10.398 (4.730)	-10.398 (4.833)	-10.398 (4.991)	-10.504 (5.255)
Referendum × voters' preferences		1.780 (7.330)	3.175 (7.697)	2.994 (7.937)	-0.367 (10.305)	-0.367 (10.641)	-0.261 (11.054)
Referendum × voters' preferences × parl. pro EU-const.					6.887 (13.030)	6.755 (13.571)	6.755 (14.042)
Partl. pro EU-const.			0.468 (0.377)	0.548 (0.497)	0.098 (0.988)	0.548 (0.525)	0.532 (0.562)
IE						-0.084 (1.134)	-0.084 (1.173)
IT							0.118 (1.087)
Constant	-0.094 (0.243)	-0.341 (0.244)	-0.625 (0.343)	-0.668 (0.391)	-0.668 (0.399)	-0.668 (0.412)	-0.671 (0.427)
rmse	0.971	0.879	0.891	0.915	0.935	0.965	0.999
<i>n</i>	25	25	23	23	23	23	23

Table 9 Explaining overall gains (Draft-IGC)

Model variables	1b (s.e.)	2b (s.e.)	3b (s.e.)	4b (s.e.)	5b (s.e.)	6b (s.e.)	7b (s.e.)
Referendum	0.004 (0.003)	0.005 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	0.003 (0.006)	0.003 (0.004)
Referendum × parl. pro EU-const.				0.009 (0.006)	0.006 (0.008)	0.006 (0.008)	0.003 (0.007)
Referendum × voters' preferences		0.014 (0.059)	0.019 (0.063)	0.027 (0.062)	0.052 (0.080)	0.052 (0.083)	0.034 (0.066)
Voters' preferences		0.017 (0.033)	0.011 (0.038)	0.008 (0.037)	0.008 (0.038)	0.008 (0.039)	0.026 (0.032)
Referendum × voters' preferences × parl. pro EU-const.					-0.053 (0.102)	-0.052 (0.106)	-0.052 (0.084)
Parl. pro EU-const.			-0.001 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.003)
IE						0.000 (0.009)	0.000 (0.007)
IT							-0.020 (0.007)
Constant	0.007 (0.002)	0.007 (0.002)	0.006 (0.003)	0.008 (0.003)	0.008 (0.003)	0.008 (0.003)	0.008 (0.003)
rmse	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.007	0.008	0.006
<i>n</i>	25	23	23	23	23	23	23

Table 10 Explaining overall gains (Status quo-IGC)

Model variables	1b (s.e.)	2b (s.e.)	3b (s.e.)	4b (s.e.)	5b (s.e.)	6b (s.e.)	7b (s.e.)
Referendum	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.015 (0.017)	-0.017 (0.019)	0.008 (0.021)	0.001 (0.023)	0.001 (0.024)	0.001 (0.024)
Referendum × parl. pro EU-const.				-0.055 (0.027)	-0.038 (0.034)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.029 (0.035)
Voters' preferences		-0.042 (0.150)	-0.073 (0.176)	-0.050 (0.164)	-0.050 (0.165)	-0.050 (0.168)	-0.085 (0.170)
Referendum × voters' preferences		-0.171 (0.271)	-0.146 (0.296)	-0.195 (0.274)	-0.382 (0.314)	-0.382 (0.359)	-0.347 (0.358)
Referendum × voters' preferences × parl. pro EU-const.					0.383 (0.444)	0.350 (0.458)	0.350 (0.455)
Parl. pro EU-const.			-0.007 (0.014)	0.014 (0.017)	0.014 (0.017)	0.014 (0.018)	0.009 (0.018)
IE						-0.021 (0.038)	-0.021 (0.038)
IT							
Constant	0.060 (0.008)	0.059 (0.009)	0.064 (0.014)	0.051 (0.016)	0.052 (0.014)	0.052 (0.014)	0.051 (0.014)
rmse	0.032	0.032	0.034	0.032	0.032	0.033	0.032
<i>n</i>	25	25	23	23	23	23	23

into consideration the voters' preferences and the parliamentary ratification constraints, most of the estimated coefficients have the expected signs. We find again that having skeptical voters allowed countries with referendums to realize gains. When looking for an indication whether the presidency allows for additional gains, we find again hardly conclusive results. On vital issues Ireland on average lost out while Italy, surprisingly seemed to have gained a bit, but these effects are statistically not significant.

Turning now to the analyses using the information from the spatial analysis, the results become weaker. If we look at the overall gains realized during the IGC (Table 9), we fail to find the expected effect for voters' preferences, even when controlling for parliamentary ratification. Also the results for this later variable are hardly informative, as are those for the effect of the EU-presidency. While finding a positive coefficient for Ireland and a negative one for Italy, these are correspondingly very small, even though the later achieves statistical significance. These rather disappointing results are likely to find an explanation in Fig. 1, which suggests that in the spatial representation the draft constitution and the IGC outcome are almost indistinguishable. Given this, measures based on movements from the former to the latter are likely to be quite noisy measures of the success in the final negotiations.

Finally, we present in Table 10 the results for the overall gains over the whole negotiation phase comprising also the Laeken convention. Here the pattern of estimated coefficients is much more in line with our theoretical implications. Again, we find the anticipated effects of voter preferences in countries having scheduled referendums, some of which even almost achieve statistical significance. The effect is slightly strengthened in countries having supportive parliaments, but this effect is minute.

6 Conclusion

Compared to any previous treaty modifications in the EU, the "Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe" involved to a much larger extent actors beyond the iron-circle of governmental and supranational representatives. Already during the drafting phase societal interest were actively sought to be associated, as they were in many member countries in the preference formation stage (Hug and König 2006a). Hence, it can only partly surprise that many governments of member states decided to consult their citizens in the ratification stage. As discussed in this article almost all these referendums were either constitutionally required or announced before the IGC negotiations concluded in Brussels in June 2004. Most theoretical work on ratification processes would suggest that these referendums erected additional ratification hurdles and thus may have benefited member states during the negotiations.

In this article, we first discussed the theoretical underpinnings for this contention, which suggested that hypotheses may be formulated on the effect of such referendums, but that these are contingent effects. In addition, the implications of the theoretical models also set the bar at a very high level when it comes to the quality and wealth of information necessary to test these implications. Thanks to the painstaking data-gathering effort undertaken in

the DOSEI-project we were able in this article to present rather rich empirical evidence supporting many of the implications of the theoretical models.

More precisely, we find that referendums may have led to negotiation gains, provided, first of all, that the referendum is scheduled in a country with skeptical voters. In the absence of Euro-skeptic voters, calling a referendum hardly has the hoped for effect. This result appears strongest for the issues changed during the IGC. While similar patterns of gains and losses as a function of referendums and voter preferences also appear over the whole negotiation process, the effects are weaker. Second, the effect of referendums and voter preferences is also affected by whether the EU-constitution was likely to cross the bar of parliamentary ratification.

While these results give much credence to the theoretical models discussed above, two major issues are still unresolved. First of all, given that most of the referendums scheduled on the EU-constitution were not required, we need to understand why these were triggered. Was it the idea that a referendum could be used as a bargaining chip, or were there other considerations as Closa (2005) suggests.

Second, given that already two referendums have failed on the EU-constitution, namely in France and the Netherlands, the question arises whether these countries will have the possibility to reap additional gains in renegotiations. In previous "ratification accidents" the "renegotiations" resulted in rather negligible changes if at all, but the countries concerned were obviously not part of the founding members of the EU. Thus, even though the present article has offered evidence in support of the theoretical implications on referendums, there still are a series of questions that await answers in future research.

Appendix

Table 11 reports the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the regression analyses, while Table 12 list the topics covered in the questions used in the factor analysis reported in the main text including the factor loadings of

Table 11 Descriptive statistics

Var	Min	Mean	Max	S.D.	Number
Gains draft-IGC	-0.013	0.008	0.014	0.007	25
Gains status quo-draft	-0.017	0.049	0.112	0.037	25
Gains in changed issues	-2.000	1.000	4.000	2.102	25
Gains in changed vital issues	-1.500	-0.140	2.000	0.952	25
Referendum before end of IGC	0.000	0.360	1.000	0.490	25
Parliamentary support for EU-constitution	0.000	0.522	1.000	0.511	23
Voters' preferences for IGC outcome	-0.100	-0.032	0.064	0.054	25
IE	0.000	0.040	1.000	0.200	25
IT	0.000	0.040	1.000	0.200	25

Table 12 Issues of the DOSEI questionnaire and factor loadings

Question	λ_1 (s.e.)	λ_2 (s.e.)	λ_3 (s.e.)
1. CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS	2.098 (0.012)	0.040 (0.019)	-0.030 (0.019)
2. SUBSIDIARITY	-1.217 (0.007)	-0.026 (0.014)	-0.028 (0.014)
3. RELIGIOUS REFERENCE IN THE PREAMBLE OF THE CONSTITUTION:	0.303 (0.005)	0.016 (0.009)	0.005 (0.009)
4. RIGHT TO WITHDRAW FROM THE UNION	0.488 (0.006)	0.031 (0.017)	0.040 (0.016)
5.1 OBJECTIVES: Market economy	2.031 (0.011)	0.040 (0.018)	-0.016 (0.018)
5.2 OBJECTIVES: Employment	1.853 (0.009)	0.040 (0.013)	-0.005 (0.013)
5.3 OBJECTIVES: High level of competitiveness	1.598 (0.010)	0.028 (0.023)	0.039 (0.024)
6. PRESIDENCY EUROPEAN COUNCIL (TERM)	0.942 (0.007)	0.057 (0.017)	-0.015 (0.017)
7. ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT EUROPEAN COUNCIL	-0.661 (0.007)	-0.023 (0.018)	-0.046 (0.018)
8. QUALIFIED MAJORITY THRESHOLD	0.611 (0.007)	0.082 (0.020)	-0.017 (0.020)
9. COMPOSITION COMMISSION	-0.809 (0.009)	0.078 (0.030)	0.059 (0.030)
10. APPOINTMENT / ELECTION OF THE COMMISSION PRESIDENT	-1.041 (0.007)	-0.028 (0.013)	-0.048 (0.013)
11. APPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS	-0.157 (0.007)	0.074 (0.021)	0.011 (0.021)
12. EXTERNAL REPRESENTATION OF THE UNION	2.068 (0.011)	0.060 (0.018)	-0.032 (0.018)
13.A APPOINTMENT OF THE EU FOREIGN MINISTER	1.452 (0.009)	0.051 (0.025)	-0.017 (0.025)

13.B APPROVAL OF EU FOREIGN MINISTER BY EP	-0.499 (0.006)	-0.022 (0.016)	-0.036 (0.016)
14. JURISDICTION	1.408 (0.009)	0.039 (0.021)	-0.051 (0.021)
15.2 RIGHT OF INITIATIVE OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS: EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT.	-1.327 (0.008)	-0.043 (0.022)	-0.038 (0.022)
15.3 RIGHT OF INITIATIVE OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS: COUNCIL.	-1.398 (0.008)	0.000 (0.013)	0.029 (0.013)
15.5 RIGHT OF INITIATIVE OF LEGISLATIVE ACTS: CITIZENS.	-0.657 (0.007)	0.064 (0.020)	0.038 (0.021)
16. ENHANCED COOPERATION: SCOPE	2.018 (0.012)	0.124 (0.039)	0.042 (0.040)
17.1 DELEGATION OF COMPETENCIES: Agriculture	1.288 (0.007)	0.020 (0.015)	0.025 (0.015)
17.3 DELEGATION OF COMPETENCIES: Area of freedom, security and justice	0.529 (0.008)	0.081 (0.026)	0.004 (0.026)
17.4 DELEGATION OF COMPETENCIES: Foreign policy	-0.022 (0.008)	0.065 (0.029)	-0.007 (0.029)
17.6 DELEGATION OF COMPETENCIES: Tax harmonization	-0.763 (0.008)	0.049 (0.026)	-0.071 (0.026)
17.8 DELEGATION OF COMPETENCIES: Social policy	-0.757 (0.007)	0.062 (0.022)	-0.058 (0.022)
17.9 DELEGATION OF COMPETENCIES: Health	-0.406 (0.006)	0.031 (0.013)	-0.027 (0.013)
17.11 DELEGATION OF COMPETENCIES: Education	-1.061 (0.007)	0.024 (0.015)	-0.025 (0.015)
17.12 DELEGATION OF COMPETENCIES: Research, technological development and space	0.051 (0.007)	0.046 (0.021)	-0.020 (0.021)
18.A2 INVOLVEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT: Structural and Cohesion Policies	1.651 (0.008)	-0.013 (0.012)	-0.037 (0.012)

Table 12 Continued

Question	λ_1 (s.e.)	λ_2 (s.e.)	λ_3 (s.e.)
18.A3 INVOLVEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice	0.367 (0.006)	0.048 (0.019)	0.016 (0.019)
18.A5 INVOLVEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT: Tax harmonization	-0.774 (0.009)	0.112 (0.032)	-0.048 (0.032)
18.A6 INVOLVEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT: Monetary Policy (for the Euro-States)	0.770 (0.008)	0.067 (0.024)	-0.060 (0.024)
18.A7 INVOLVEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT: Economic Policy	0.662 (0.007)	0.056 (0.023)	-0.051 (0.023)
18.A8 INVOLVEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT: Employment Policy	1.617 (0.009)	0.049 (0.021)	-0.025 (0.021)
18.A9 INVOLVEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT: Social Policy	0.634 (0.007)	0.055 (0.022)	0.036 (0.022)
18.A10 INVOLVEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT: Social Security Rights	-0.389 (0.009)	0.100 (0.038)	-0.085 (0.038)
18.A11 INVOLVEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT: Common Foreign Policy	-0.540 (0.007)	0.096 (0.025)	-0.014 (0.025)
18.A12 INVOLVEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT: Defense Policy	-1.598 (0.011)	0.115 (0.032)	-0.028 (0.032)
18.B1 COUNCIL VOTING RULE: Agriculture	0.887 (0.007)	-0.010 (0.015)	-0.024 (0.015)
18.B2 COUNCIL VOTING RULE: Structural and Cohesion Policies	2.018 (0.010)	-0.026 (0.020)	-0.030 (0.020)
18.B3 COUNCIL VOTING RULE: Area of Freedom, Security and Justice	0.312 (0.006)	0.024 (0.015)	0.010 (0.015)
18.B4 COUNCIL VOTING RULE: Internal Market	1.540 (0.009)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.062 (0.018)
18.B5 COUNCIL VOTING RULE: Tax harmonization	-0.845 (0.010)	0.120 (0.038)	-0.099 (0.038)
18.B6 COUNCIL VOTING RULE: Monetary Policy (for the Euro-States)	0.213 (0.009)	-0.002 (0.037)	-0.125 (0.037)

18.B7 COUNCIL VOTING RULE: Economic Policy	0.262 (0.010)	-0.006 (0.038)	-0.131 (0.039)
18.B8 COUNCIL VOTING RULE: Employment Policy	0.638 (0.009)	0.021 (0.030)	-0.111 (0.031)
18.B9 COUNCIL VOTING RULE: Social Policy	0.699 (0.006)	0.018 (0.012)	-0.018 (0.012)
18.B10 COUNCIL VOTING RULE: Social Security Rights	-0.406 (0.009)	0.066 (0.034)	-0.126 (0.034)
18.B11 COUNCIL VOTING RULE: Common Foreign Policy	-1.728 (0.011)	0.023 (0.029)	-0.106 (0.029)
18.B12 COUNCIL VOTING RULE: Defense Policy	-1.755 (0.011)	0.021 (0.029)	-0.117 (0.029)
19. INVOLVEMENT OF THE PARLIAMENT IN THE ADOPTION OF THE BUDGET	0.374 (0.005)	0.019 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)
20. STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT	-0.329 (0.006)	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.020 (0.012)
21. STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT	0.301 (0.005)	0.020 (0.011)	-0.016 (0.011)
22. COMMON SECURITY AND DEFENSE POLICY	0.562 (0.011)	0.147 (0.047)	0.017 (0.047)
23. MANAGEMENT SYSTEM FOR EXTERNAL BORDERS (SCOPE OF UNION ACTION)	0.904 (0.006)	0.038 (0.014)	-0.002 (0.014)
24. MIGRATION AND ASYLUM POLICY: SCOPE OF UNION ACTION	0.883 (0.008)	0.084 (0.030)	0.036 (0.030)

^aMeasure of item difficulty³³ Quinn (2004)

^bLoadings on the first Dimension

^cLoadings on the second Dimension

Table 13 Set of Eurobarometer-questions used and corresponding coding of Status Quo, Draft and IGC-outcome

<i>STQ^c</i>	<i>DRF</i>	<i>IGC</i>	<i>CCEB^b</i>	<i>EB^b</i>	
1	2	2	q42.1	Q28A01	Decision making: defense
2	2	2	q42.2	Q28A02	Decision making: protection of the environment
2	2	2	q42.3	Q28A03	Decision making: currency
2	2	2	q42.4	Q28A04	Decision making: humanitarian aid
1	1	1	q42.5	Q28A05	Decision making: health and social welfare
1	1	1	q42.6	Q28A06	Decision making: basic rules for broadcasting and press
1	1	1	q42.7	Q28A07	Decision making: the fight against poverty, social exclusion
2	2	2	q42.8	Q28A08	Decision making: the fight against unemployment
2	2	2	q42.9	Q28A09	Decision making: agriculture and fishing policy
2	2	2	q42.10	Q28A10	Decision making: supporting regions which are experiencing economic difficulties
1	1	1	q42.11	Q28A11	Decision making: education
1	2	2	q42.12	Q28A12	Decision making: scientific and technological research
1	1	1	q42.13	Q28A13	Decision making: information about the European Union, its policies and institutions
1	2	2	q42.14	Q28A14	Decision making: foreign policy towards countries outside the European Union
1	1	1	q42.15	Q28A15	Decision making: cultural policy
2	2	2	q43.1	Q28B01	Decision making: immigration policy
2	2	2	q43.2	Q28B02	Decision making: rules for political asylum
1	2	2	q43.3	Q28B03	Decision making: the fight against organized crime
1	1	1	q43.4	Q28B04	Decision making: police
1	2	2	q43.5	Q28B05	Decision making: justice
2	2	2	q43.6	Q28B06	Decision making: accepting refugees
1	1	1	q43.7	Q28B07	Decision making: juvenile crime prevention
1	1	1	q43.8	Q28B08	Decision making: urban crime prevention
1	1	1	q43.9	Q28B09	Decision making: the fight against drugs
1	1	1	q43.10	Q28B10	Decision making: the fight against trade in, and exploitation of human beings
1	1	1	q43.11	Q28B11	Decision making: the fight against international terrorism
1	1	1	q43.12	Q28B12	Decision making: tackling the challenges of an aging population
2	1	1	q44.2	Q2902	For or against - one common foreign policy
2	1	1	q44.3	Q2903	For or against - common defense and security policy
1	2	2	q51.1	Q2908	After enlargement, there should continue to be at least one Commissioner from each member state
2	1	1	q45.2	Q3202	When an international crisis occurs, EU member states should agree a common position

2	1	1	q45.3	Q3203	The EU should have its own Foreign Minister, who can be the spokesperson for a common EU position
2	1	1	q45.10	Q3210	Agree or not – The EU should have a common immigration policy towards people from outside the EU
2	1	1	q45.11	Q3211	Agree or not – The EU should have a common asylum policy towards asylum seekers
1	3	3	q45b	Q33	In your opinion, should decisions concerning European defense policy be taken by national government, NATO or EU?
3	3	3	q52	Q50	The President of the European Commission should be [nomination/election]
2	1	1	q53	Q13	For or against of EU with a European government responsible to the EP?
1	2	2	q54	Q51	The presidency of the Council is taken by each country in turn, for a period of six months. Do you think that...?
1	3	2	q55	Q52	Opinion about the right of veto
2	1	1	q67	Q49	The EU should or should not have a Constitution?

^aThe descriptions of the questions are taken directly from the codebook. They have been shortened if necessary

^bThe questions listed here are a subset of those questions that are the same in the two Eurobarometer data-sets (CCEB 2004,3 and EB 60.1). We have selected those that seemed to be in close correspondence with the questions of the Dosei-questionnaire

^cThe first set of questions (delegation of policies) are coded according (Hix 2005). Here a “1” means “decision on the national level” and a “2” means “decision on the European level.” The coding for the remaining questions is explained in the text

Table 14 Wordscores of 2004 european parliament election party manifestos

Party	First dimension		Second dimension		Scored		Seats	
	Score	SE	Score	SE	Total	Unique	Lower	Upper
Status Quo	-0.081		0.046					
Draft Const.	0.030		0.050					
IGC Outcome	0.018		0.042					
AT FPOE	-0.048	0.041	0.050	0.017	201	93	18	7
AT GA	0.071	0.027	0.046	0.013	318	144	17	4
AT O EVP	-0.067	0.010	0.042	0.004	3,236	689	79	28
AT S POE	0.003	0.016	0.054	0.008	1,188	338	69	23
BE A GALEV	0.053	0.017	0.046	0.002	5,665	753	0	0
BE CDV	0.017	0.016	0.044	0.002	6,798	941	21	9
BE S PA	0.004	0.014	0.049	0.002	8,523	994	23	12
BE S PIRIT	0.024	0.028	0.044	0.004	2,404	558	.	.
BE V B	-0.119	0.011	0.044	0.001	7,632	1,343	18	8
BE V LD	-0.044	0.019	0.044	0.003	5,151	737	25	12
BE CDH	-0.055	0.029	0.049	0.001	2,108	1,400	8	4
BE E COLO	0.055	0.041	0.052	0.002	5,338	878	4	2
BE FN	-0.094	0.044	0.044	0.002	4,965	912	1	2
BE MR	0.030	0.104	0.042	0.004	901	339	24	10
BE PS	0.011	0.022	0.048	0.001	9,410	1,624	25	12
CZ C SSD	-0.011	0.062	0.054	0.003	1,058	415	70	11
CZ K DUCSL	-0.095	0.037	0.047	0.002	2,191	696	31	31
CZ K SCM	0.058	0.049	0.046	0.003	1,365	495	41	3
CZ O DS	-0.064	0.052	0.041	0.003	1,182	468	58	26
CZ S Z	-0.022	0.023	0.047	0.001	6,287	1,279	.	.
CZ US Irs	0.055	0.042	0.049	0.003	1,844	669	.	1
DE C DUCSU	0.024	0.039	0.044	0.005	4,323	737	248	25
DE FDP	-0.081	0.031	0.045	0.003	7,309	1,028	47	16

DE G	0.075	0.021	0.053	0.003	4,542	1,379	55	
DE PDS	-0.052	0.021	0.044	0.003	3,038	1,390	2	
DE SPD	-0.013	0.055	0.049	0.006	2,196	501	251	7
DK DF	0.022	0.042	0.045	0.003	2,133	511	22	
DK EL	0.058	0.059	0.053	0.004	1,154	326	4	
DK FMEU	-0.089	0.063	0.042	0.005	188	36		
DK JB	0.018	0.043	0.045	0.003	2,467	494		
DK KF	-0.091	0.042	0.045	0.003	2,250	450	16	
DK KRF	-0.007	0.063	0.049	0.004	1,012	313	4	
DK RV	-0.064	0.031	0.046	0.002	892	73	9	
DK SD	-0.043	0.039	0.053	0.002	2,869	606	52	
DK SF	0.094	0.027	0.049	0.002	4,755	782	12	
DK V	-0.022	0.036	0.042	0.002	3,022	625	56	
EE ER	-0.109	0.033	0.050	0.004	481	153	19	
EE ERL	-0.066	0.028	0.051	0.003	638	319	13	
EE ESDTP	0.024	0.017	0.046	0.002	1,039	361		
EE IML	-0.048	0.025	0.050	0.003	741	299	7	
EE KESK	0.056	0.026	0.048	0.003	535	277	28	
EE M	0.044	0.025	0.040	0.003	644	274	6	
EE RP	0.005	0.011	0.044	0.001	3,224	905	28	
EL DIKKI	0.011	0.022	0.051	0.001	3,759	516		
EL KKE	-0.105	0.021	0.041	0.001	3,524	497	12	
EL ND	0.033	0.025	0.051	0.001	2,858	498	165	
EL PASOK	0.011	0.030	0.050	0.001	2,124	388	117	
EL SYN	0.053	0.037	0.050	0.002	1,220	291	6	
ES CIU	-0.074	0.013	0.043	0.001	13,239	393	10	6
ES ERCPSC	-0.075	0.016	0.041	0.001	8,988	333	8	16
ES GPMBNG	-0.033	0.019	0.052	0.001	11,835	934	5	
ES IU	-0.004	0.014	0.049	0.001	6,467	1,471	5	2
ES PP	0.065	0.019	0.046	0.001	9,760	1,142	148	126
ES PSOE	0.056	0.025	0.050	0.001	5,727	905	164	96
FI KD	0.020	0.016	0.048	0.001	1,451	628	7	
FI KESK	0.013	0.015	0.049	0.001	1,664	611	55	

Table 14 Continued

Party	First dimension		Second dimension		Scored		Seats	
	Score	SE	Score	SE	Total	Unique	Lower	Upper
	FI KOK	0.015	0.018	0.047	0.001	1,177	480	40
FI PS	-0.019	0.051	0.053	0.003	155	102	3	.
FI SDP	0.020	0.020	0.047	0.001	956	414	53	.
FI SFP	-0.162	0.060	0.039	0.001	149	15	9	.
FI VAS	-0.003	0.029	0.048	0.002	374	193	19	.
FI VIHHR	0.017	0.012	0.046	0.001	2,570	838	14	.
FR CPNT	-0.051	0.015	0.046	0.001	7,814	728	.	.
FR FN	-0.129	0.017	0.045	0.002	6,197	967	.	.
FR OL	0.016	0.041	0.056	0.005	875	249	.	.
FR PC	0.093	0.021	0.052	0.003	2,308	403	21	.
FR PRG	0.022	0.034	0.049	0.004	1,300	378	7	.
FR PS	-0.004	0.016	0.045	0.002	5,676	861	140	82
FR RPMPF	-0.062	0.008	0.046	0.001	4,858	1,844	3	.
FR UDF	0.011	0.012	0.046	0.001	9,889	1,094	29	27
FR UMP	0.037	0.030	0.047	0.003	1,830	489	357	167
FR V	0.017	0.008	0.042	0.001	1,922	1,591	3	.
HU SZDSZ	-0.007	0.015	0.050	0.003	2,475	537	20	.
HU FIDESZ	-0.026	0.008	0.044	0.002	3,577	376	164	.
HU MDF	-0.079	0.027	0.051	0.006	83	2,071	24	.
HU MSZP	0.070	0.046	0.043	0.009	984	205	178	.
IE FF	0.045	0.050	0.046	0.002	586	186	80	29
IE FG	0.019	0.045	0.052	0.002	6,054	844	31	15
IE GP	-0.043	0.058	0.043	0.003	7,428	1,023	6	.
IE LP	0.054	0.059	0.047	0.003	4,290	772	21	5
IE PD	-0.060	0.049	0.052	0.002	3,818	693	8	4
IE SF	-0.097	0.021	0.043	0.001	6,775	883	5	.

IT AN	-0.091	0.028	0.047	0.002	2,196	1,252	97	47
IT FDV	0.048	0.028	0.046	0.002	1,757	469	7	11
IT FI	0.035	0.017	0.048	0.001	1,411	425	173	76
IT IDV	0.011	0.019	0.048	0.001	3,934	733	.	2
IT LN	-0.003	0.014	0.050	0.001	2,878	717	28	17
IT NPSI	-0.042	0.011	0.048	0.001	6,379	1,042	6	1
IT PDCI	0.072	0.044	0.035	0.005	741	1,143	10	2
IT PDS	-0.021	0.013	0.048	0.001	540	204	135	64
IT PRC	-0.068	0.019	0.043	0.001	6,732	949	11	3
IT SDI	0.055	0.022	0.051	0.002	3,004	603	9	6
IT UDC	0.045	0.040	0.050	0.003	2,246	548	34	31
IT UDEUR	-0.077	0.009	0.048	0.001	911	345	11	5
IT UNU	-0.111	0.046	0.048	0.003	5,562	1,481	79	34
LT DP	-0.114	0.053	0.040	0.003	609	212	.	.
LT LCC LLS	0.037	0.047	0.048	0.003	458	261	.	.
LT LD	-0.051	0.106	0.053	0.005	720	369	.	.
LT LKD	-0.059	0.046	0.044	0.003	194	94	16	.
LT LSDP	0.047	0.051	0.050	0.003	785	449	.	.
LT LVP	0.054	0.048	0.043	0.003	541	303	.	.
LT NS	0.033	0.043	0.047	0.003	560	294	22	.
LT TSLK	-0.030	0.019	0.049	0.001	859	433	10	.
LU ADR	-0.024	0.027	0.042	0.002	4,184	1,178	5	.
LU CSV	-0.086	0.013	0.050	0.001	4,962	891	23	.
LU DG	0.043	0.021	0.052	0.002	4,271	1,723	7	.
LU DL	-0.047	0.020	0.045	0.001	8,935	1,052	.	.
LU DP	-0.073	0.025	0.043	0.002	8,167	1,018	10	.
LU LSAP	0.061	0.051	0.045	0.003	1,547	430	14	.
LV JL	0.071	0.024	0.046	0.004	286	159	14	.
LV LC	0.019	0.023	0.046	0.004	297	165	.	.
LV LKDS	0.069	0.021	0.046	0.004	333	176	.	.
LV LPP	-0.015	0.023	0.041	0.004	302	168	10	.
LV LSDSP	-0.124	0.028	0.052	0.003	328	184	.	.
LV LSP	-0.017	0.025	0.049	0.004	302	172	5	.

Table 14 Continued

Party	First dimension		Second dimension		Scored		Seats	
	Score	SE	Score	SE	Total	Unique	Lower	Upper
	LV PCTVL	0.036	0.023	0.049	0.004	302	157	6
LV SDLP	0.009	0.031	0.045	0.005	188	128	.	.
LV SDS	0.007	0.022	0.045	0.003	355	210	.	.
LV TBLNKK	-0.076	0.027	0.047	0.003	327	172	7	.
LV TP	-0.086	0.032	0.054	0.004	240	142	20	.
LV TSP	0.017	0.023	0.040	0.004	339	201	14	.
LV ZZS	-0.084	0.033	0.050	0.004	211	144	12	.
NL CDA	0.013	0.018	0.049	0.001	6,349	792	44	23
NL CU SG	-0.044	0.012	0.049	0.001	6,798	1,166	3	2
NL D66	0.034	0.022	0.045	0.001	4,355	728	6	3
NL GL	-0.018	0.011	0.048	0.001	7,260	1,437	8	5
NL LPF	-0.145	0.045	0.037	0.002	1,390	361	8	1
NL PVDA	0.050	0.016	0.049	0.001	7,235	959	42	19
NL SP	0.005	0.015	0.048	0.001	646	1,078	9	4
NL VVD	0.019	0.050	0.049	0.003	958	321	28	15
PL LPR	-0.116	0.009	0.042	0.001	6,136	1,043	30	2
PL PIS	-0.079	0.044	0.046	0.006	401	210	43	.
PL PO	0.019	0.027	0.050	0.004	805	352	56	.
PL PSL	0.052	0.028	0.050	0.004	688	289	37	.
PL S	-0.009	0.061	0.041	0.007	170	106	.	.
PL SDPI	-0.038	0.059	0.046	0.009	154	93	.	.
PL SLD UP	0.030	0.034	0.053	0.006	452	252	190	75
PL UW	0.050	0.056	0.049	0.010	162	82	.	.
PT BE	0.010	0.029	0.047	0.003	2,260	479	3	.
PT PCDPPEV	-0.005	0.007	0.053	0.001	5,658	1,792	12	.
PT PS	0.050	0.017	0.045	0.002	6,943	1,016	96	.
PT PSD	-0.096	0.029	0.044	0.003	2,893	658	105	.
SE C	0.054	0.013	0.048	0.001	3,273	640	22	.

SE FP	0.013	0.011	0.044	0.001	4,875	795	48
SE KD	-0.075	0.024	0.044	0.001	1,274	362	33
SE M	-0.027	0.019	0.047	0.001	1,611	388	55
SE MG	0.061	0.049	0.056	0.004	177	104	17
SE S	-0.103	0.038	0.046	0.002	660	247	144
SE V	-0.008	0.020	0.045	0.001	1,571	433	30
SI DSS	-0.066	0.037	0.049	0.003	324	123	.
SI LDS	-0.066	0.037	0.049	0.003	324	123	34
SI NSD	-0.116	0.048	0.051	0.003	239	103	.
SI NSI	0.029	0.032	0.048	0.003	464	192	8
SI SDS	0.038	0.018	0.040	0.002	1,481	543	14
SI SLSSKD	0.021	0.016	0.044	0.001	2,169	609	9
SI SMS	0.021	0.016	0.044	0.001	2,169	609	4
SI ZLSD	0.048	0.017	0.051	0.002	1,822	484	11
SK ANO	0.054	0.138	0.047	0.005	79	59	12
SK HZDS	-0.073	0.040	0.054	0.002	529	129	25
SK KDH	-0.032	0.030	0.044	0.001	1,270	575	15
SK KSS	-0.068	0.100	0.040	0.004	154	102	10
SK OKS	-0.032	0.017	0.047	0.001	4,048	1,033	.
SK SDKU	0.086	0.032	0.044	0.001	1,208	463	21
SK SDL	-0.031	0.037	0.048	0.002	807	357	.
SK SMER	-0.066	0.026	0.047	0.001	1,555	521	25
SK SMK	0.063	0.099	0.051	0.004	146	99	20
UK C	0.032	0.018	0.046	0.004	8,176	964	166
UK DUP	-0.118	0.025	0.049	0.005	5,006	757	5
UK L	-0.059	0.024	0.042	0.006	4,989	680	412
UK LD	0.039	0.017	0.051	0.004	9,395	1,055	52
UK PC	0.010	0.033	0.044	0.007	2,467	521	4
UK SNP	0.013	0.022	0.052	0.006	5,921	765	5

The 'Score' is the *transformed* score calculated by the Wordscores program and consequently "SE" is the standard error of the transformed scores. "Unique" is the number of unique scored words and "Total" the total of the words contained in a text

the various questions on the first (λ_2) and second (λ_3) dimension. λ_1 can be compared to a measure of the “item difficulty” (Quinn 2004). In Table 13 we list the questions used in our most extensive analysis presented in the main text of this article. Table 14 reports the results of the wordscores analyses yielding the positions of political parties relative to the status quo, the draft constitution and the IGC outcome.

References

- Baliga, S., & Serrano, R. (1995). Multilateral bargaining with imperfect information. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 67(2), 578–589.
- Banks, J. S., & Duggan, J. (2000). A bargaining model of collective choice. *American Political Science Review*, 94(1 MAR), 73–88.
- Barry, B. (1980a). Is it better to be powerful or lucky? Part I. *Political Studies*, 28(2), 183–194.
- Barry, B. (1980b). Is it better to be powerful or lucky? Part II. *Political Studies*, 28(3), 338–352.
- Benoit, K., Laver, M., Arnold, C., Pennings, P., & Hosli, M. O. (2005). Measuring national delegate positions at the convention on the future of Europe using computerized wordscoring. *European Union Politics*, 6(3), 291–313.
- Butler, C. K. (2004). Modeling compromise at the international table. *Conflict Management and Peace Science*, 21(3), 159–177.
- Chae, S., & Yang, J.-A. (1988). The unique perfect equilibrium of an N-person bargaining game. *Economic Letters*, 28, 221–223.
- Chae, S., & Yang, J.-A. (1994). A N-person pure bargaining game. *Journal of Economic Theory*, 62, 86–102.
- Closa, M. C. (2005). Why convening referendums? Explaining decisions in EU constitutional politics. Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Granada.
- Dai, X. (2002). Political regimes and international trade: The democratic difference revisited. *American Political Science Review*, 96(1), 159–166.
- Evans, P. B., Jacobson, H. K., & Putnam, R. D. (Eds.). (1993). *Double-edged diplomacy: International bargaining and domestic politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Feld, L. P. (1997). Referenda (“Voice”) and tiebout competition (“Exit”) as means of integration? Comment to Simon Hug. *Aussenwirtschaft*, 52(1-2), 311–318.
- Feld, L. P., & Kirchgässner, G. (2004). The role of direct democracy in the European Union. In: C. B. Blankart, & D. C. Mueller (Eds.), *A constitution for the European union* (pp. 203–236). Cambridge: The MIT Press.
- Feld, L. P., Kirchgässner, G., & Weck-Hannemann, H. (2002). Enlargement and the European budget: Budgetary decision-making and fiscal constraints. In: B. Steunenberg (Ed.), *Widening the European Union: The politics of institutional change and reform* (pp. 144–162). London: Routledge.
- Gilligan, M. J. (2004). Is there a broader-deeper trade-off in international multilateral agreements? *International Organization*, 58, 459–484.
- Hammond, T. W., & Prins, B. C. (2006). Domestic Veto institutions, divided government, and the status quo: A spatial model of two-level games with complete information. In: R. Pahre (Ed.), *Democratic foreign policy making: Problems of divided government and international cooperation*. New York: Palgrave.
- Hix, S. (2005). *The political system of the European Union* 2nd edn. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
- Hix, S., & Crombez, C. (2005). Extracting ideal point estimates from actors’ preferences in the EU constitutional negotiations. *European Union Politics*, 6(3), 353–376.
- Hug, S. (1997). Integration through referendums? *Aussenwirtschaft*, 52(1-2), 287–310.
- Hug, S. (2002). *Voices of Europe. Citizens, referendums and European integration*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.

- Hug, S. (2004). Models of multilateral negotiations and ratification. Prepared for delivery at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2–5, 2004.
- Hug, S. (2007) (forthcoming). The strategic context of referendums on the EU constitution. In: C. H. de Vreese (Ed.), *The dynamics of referendum campaigns*. London: Palgrave.
- Hug, S., & König, T. (2002). In view of ratification. Governmental preferences, and domestic constraints at the Amsterdam intergovernmental conference. *International Organization*, 56(2), 447–476.
- Hug, S., & König, T. (2006a). Conclusion. In: T. König, & S. Hug (Eds.), *Policy-making processes and the European constitution: A comparative study of member states and accession countries* (pp. 260–278). London: Routledge.
- Hug, S., & König, T. (2007) (forthcoming). Referendums and ratification of the Amsterdam treaty. In: R. Pahre (Ed.), *Democratic foreign policy making: Problems of divided government and international cooperation* (pp. 133–150). New York: Palgrave.
- Hug, S., & Schulz, T. (2005). Using mass survey data to infer political positions. *European Union Politics*, 6(3), 339–352.
- Hug, S., & Schulz, T. (2007) (forthcoming). Referendums and ratification of the EU constitution. In: W. Marxer, Z. Pällinger, B. Kaufmann, & T. Schiller (Eds.), *Direct democracy in Europe - current position and research prospects for the 21st Century*. VS-Verlag.
- Iida, K. (1993). When and how do domestic constraints matter? Two-level games with uncertainty. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 37(3), 403–426.
- Iida, K. (1996). Involuntary defection in two-level games. *Public Choice*, 89(2), 283–303.
- Jackman, S. (2004). Bayesian analysis for political research. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 7, 483–505.
- König, T., & Luetgert, B. (2003). The treaty of nice. Institutional reform of the European Union by intergovernmental and domestic Veto players. Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR General Conference, Marburg 18–21 September 2003.
- König, T., & Finke, D. (2007) (in this issue). Reforming the equilibrium? Veto players and policy change in the European constitution-building process. *Review of International Organizations*, 2(2).
- König, T., & Hug, S. (2000). Ratifying Maastricht. Parliamentary votes on international treaties and theoretical solution concepts. *European Union Politics*, 1(1), 89–122.
- König, T. & Hug, S. (Eds.) (2006). *Policy-making processes and the European constitution: A comparative study of member states and accession countries*. London: Routledge.
- König, T., & Daimer, S. (2005). Absolute and relative gains in European constitution-building-and why? Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, 14–19 April, Granada.
- Krishna, V., & Serrano, R. (1996). Multilateral bargaining. *Review of Economic Studies*, 63(1), 61–80.
- Laver, M., Benoit, K., & Garry, J. (2003). Extracting policy positions from political texts using words as data. *American Political Science Review*, 97(2), 311–331.
- Mansfield, E. D., Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (2000). Free to trade: Democracies, autocracies, and international trade. *American Political Science Review*, 94(2 June), 305–321.
- Martin, A. D., & Quinn, K. M. (2004). MCMCpack 0.4-8. (available from <http://mcmcpack.wustl.edu>).
- Merlo, A., & Wilson, C. (1995). A stochastic model of sequential bargaining with complete information. *Econometrica*, 63(2 Mar.), 371–399.
- Mertah, A. and Pahre, R. (2005). Patently misleading: Partial implementation and bargaining leverage in Sino-American negotiations on intellectual property rights. *International Organization*, 59(3), 695–730.
- Milner, H. (1997). *Interests, institutions, and information. Domestic politics and international relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Milner, H. V., & Rosendorff, B. P. (1996). Trade negotiations, information and domestic politics: The role of domestic groups. *Economics & Politics*, 8(2), 145–189.
- Mo, J. (1994). The logic of two-level games with endogenous domestic coalitions. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 38(3), 402–422.
- Muthoo, A. (1999). *Bargaining theory with applications*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pahre, R. (2005). Formal theory and case-study methods in EU studies. *European Union Politics*, 6(1), 113–145.

- Putnam, R. D. (1988). Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. *International Organization*, 42(3), 427–460.
- Quinn, K. M. (2004). Bayesian factor analysis for mixed ordinal and continuous responses. *Political Analysis*, 12(4), 338–353.
- Rubinstein, A. (1982). Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. *Econometrica*, 50, 97–110.
- Schelling, T. C. (1960). *The strategy of conflict*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
- Schneider, G., & Cederman, L.-E. (1994). The change of tide in political cooperation: A limited information model of european integration. *International Organization*, 48(4): 633–662.
- Schulz, T. (2003). Explaining gains and losses in EU accession negotiations. Paper prepared for presentation at the ECPR General Conference, Marburg 18–21 September 2003.
- Tarar, A. (2001). International bargaining with two-sided domestic constraints. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 45(3), 320–340.
- Tarar, A. (2005). Constituencies and preferences in international bargaining. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 49(3), 383–407.
- Winter, E. (1996). Voting and vetoing. *American Political Science Review*, 90, 813–823.