

Lightweight Classification of IoT Malware Based on Image Recognition

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Abstract—The Internet of Things (IoT) is an extension of the traditional Internet, which allows a very large number of smart devices, such as home appliances, network cameras, sensors and controllers to connect to one another to share information and improve user experiences. IoT devices are micro-computers for domain-specific computations rather than traditional function-specific embedded devices. This opens the possibility of seeing many kinds of existing attacks, traditionally targeted at the Internet, also directed at IoT devices. As shown by recent events, such as the Mirai and Brickerbot botnets, DDoS attacks have become very common in IoT environments as these lack basic security monitoring and protection mechanisms. In this paper, we propose a novel light-weight approach for detecting DDoS malware in IoT environments. We extract the malware images (i.e., a one-channel gray-scale image converted from a malware binary) and utilize a light-weight convolutional neural network for classifying their families. The experimental results show that the proposed system can achieve 94.0% accuracy for the classification of goodware and DDoS malware, and 81.8% accuracy for the classification of goodware and two main malware families.

Index Terms—IoT cyber-security, Malware image classification, Convolutional Neural Network

I. INTRODUCTION

Nowadays the notion of the “Internet” has extended from the connection between personal computers to networks to a much larger range of devices. Traditional micro devices, such as many kinds of sensors and controllers, are typically only able to perform domain-specific tasks based on pre-defined rules. By substituting these function-specific devices with CPU-controlled ones and connection-enabled micro-computers, these “things” become smarter due to the stronger computational capability and the information sharing through the interconnection among them via the Internet. Therefore, these things can deal with much more complicated tasks than before and by enabling Cloud services users can easily receive data reported by the things and control them.

Despite these advantages, becoming smarter means also becoming more vulnerable, with more chances for potential adversaries to threaten these things. Yet general IoT systems

are still far from being properly secured due to the difficulty of creating unified standards for the various types of IoT hardware and software platforms. In addition, even if smarter compared with current personal computers, IoT devices still lack of sufficient computational resources to be able to use existing PC security solutions. However, Cloud services provide a way for developing security protection for IoT devices, e.g., for malware detection [18], [19].

In this paper, we consider a solution to protect the local IoT devices from being abused for DDoS attacks based on botnets of IoT devices, which is currently a common attack method against IoT networks. To accomplish this, we first classify the IoT DDoS malware samples recently collected in the wild on two major families, namely Mirai and Linux.Gafgyt. We then propose a lightweight solution for detecting and classifying IoT DDoS malware and benign application locally on the IoT devices by converting the program binaries to gray-scale images, and by feeding these images to a small size convolutional neural network for detecting malware. In this way, resource-constrained IoT devices can afford the computation needed for running the proposed detection system locally. Experimental results show that the proposed system can achieve 94.0% accuracy for classifying goodware and DDoS malware, and 81.8% accuracy for the classification of goodware and two main malware families.

The main contributions of this research are the following ones:

- this is the first classification system tested on real IoT malware samples - previous works have used regular or mobile malware samples instead, due to the difficulty in obtaining IoT malware samples [2], [11], [13]. Specifically, there is currently no publicly available IoT malware dataset and the first IoT honeypot for collecting samples of IoT threats was released relatively recently [1];
- the proposed IoT malware classification system can be deployed on real IoT devices. We show in detail the feasibility of using lightweight image classifier for recognizing IoT malware through malware images. Malware image

classification has been proposed for classifying regular malware [4]; however, IoT malware is functionally different. For example, many IoT malware may try to kill other malware to guarantee enough computational resource for themselves;

- according to the experimental results, we prove that the proposed system can reliably classify goodware and IoT DDoS malware;
- to the best of our knowledge, there is currently no reference to describe the time complexity of convolutional neural networks (CNNs). However, the proposed CNN-based approach is empirically considered to be lightweight since it does not need to maintain any training data for classification, which is unlike several other types of common classifiers for malware classification such as Support Vector Machine and K nearest neighbours. The computation of CNN for classification is rather simple which only involves summation and activation. In addition, the proposed system is based on a two layer shallow network which is much more efficient than common deep learning models.

The paper is structured as follows. In Sect. II we discuss related work. Sect. III explains procedures for extracting IoT DDoS malware images and implementing a small size convolutional neural network for classification. In Sect. IV the detection results in two different scenarios are listed and in Sect. 5 the limitation of the proposed method is discussed. In Sect. VI the achievement of this research is summarized and future work is discussed.

II. RELATED WORKS

Even if IoT security is an important topic, few defensive solutions exist in the literature [12]. Only recently, the first honeypot specifically for collecting IoT malware has been established by Pa et al. [1]. Their honeypot systems simulated 8 different CPU architectures and are built for observing attacks coming through the Telnet protocol. Initially they collected 43 distinct malware samples which are mostly DDoS attack malware. Their results show that the DDoS attack is the most common security threat in current IoT network environments. These authors kindly shared their observed data set with us which we have used in this research for evaluating our proposal.

To the best of our knowledge, while most other works focus on Android malware detection [24], [25], the “Cloudeye” [2] is in practice the only current work specific for IoT malware detection. The system is a signature matching-based malware detection solution. IoT clients are only responsible for preliminary scanning the software locally, and then sending hashed abstracts of suspicious files to Cloud servers for deep analysis, therefore guaranteeing data privacy and low-cost communications. However, in IoT environments the inherent weakness of signature matching-based detection still exists: for example, the proposed system is not able to deal with new variants of existing samples.

Apart from signature matching, machine learning-based malware detection has been proved as effective in various scenarios [3], [14]–[16], [22], [23]. In IoT environments, machine learning methods are expected to be suitable too because of the availability of Cloud services. In fact, in a possible scenario, the training can be performed on Cloud server, while resource-constrained IoT devices can receive the trained classifiers from the servers and run the algorithm locally. In fact, several machine learning classifiers are heavy at training but efficient during test phase.

Classifying malware images has been proved as an effective way for recognizing common PC malware [9], [26]. It is essentially a method for comparing two malware binaries. Nataraj et al. first utilize malware images for classifying regular Internet malware with k-nearest neighbors [4]. However, the system requires pre-processing of filtering to extract the image texture as features for classification, which might not fit the resource-constrained IoT environments. Similarly, the artificial neural network (ANN) malware classification proposed by Makandar [28] might also be hard for IoT devices to handle since the heavy computational cost of multiple fully connected layers in ANN for classification. Yue utilized convolutional neural network for malware family classification [5]. In this research, we use malware images for IoT malware classification and show it is a feasible approach.

III. METHODOLOGY

In this Section, we describe the methodology of feeding malware images as features to a small two-layer convolutional neural network for detection.

A. Lightweight IoT DDoS Malware Filter

For the scenario of detecting IoT DDoS malware detection locally, as previously pointed out, the main difficulty of deploying malware filters lies in the fact that the computational resources available on IoT devices is limited. A direct solution under such a condition is relying on the security protection services provided by powerful remote servers such as IoT Cloud servers. These servers are usually well guarded such that a central node failure (e.g., taken down by attacks) rarely occurs. Another advantage is that the threat databases maintained on these servers are much more comprehensive and can be updated more rapidly than on IoT devices. For these reasons, in our proposed system, firstly a lightweight malware classification system can be responsible for recognizing suspicious programs and behaviors locally. Note that at this stage, the main goal is to provide a score whether a file might be suspicious or not, i.e. it needs further analysis. In such a case, the system delivers the files or the corresponding abstracts to a remote Cloud server for deeper analysis. The Cloud side can update and distribute new trained detectors to the clients periodically. In the following, we discuss the local malware filter on the client side. We assume that a set of Cloud servers are able to analyze malware samples and retrain the classifiers using standard machine learning algorithms. The proposal system structure is shown in Fig.1.




Fig. 1. The light-weight malware detection scheme proposed.

B. IoT DDoS Malware Families

According to the recent observation and preliminary analysis [1], the IoT DDoS malware are functionally similar to existing DDoS malware on PC platforms. However, IoT DDoS malware also contain some new features that are rarely observed before. For example, some samples try to kill other samples of competitive families to get more system resources for themselves, due to the limited computational capability of IoT devices. In addition, IoT malware often targets a specific class of devices, such as Internet cameras, DVR and so on. Finally, IoT malware can be also compatible with different processor architectures, ensuring the maximum possible successful infections.

C. Malware Image Classification

An interesting and novel way of conducting malware classification is to analyze malware images. In particular, a malware binary can be reformatted as an 8-bit sequence and then be converted to a gray-scale image which has one channel and pixel values from 0 to 255 [4]. The resulting image can then be fed into machine learning image classifiers for classification. Many machine learning classifiers are essentially much more efficient than signature-matching systems, which is the most common used malware detection method. In a matching signatures system, the signature database is typically large in size as it has to contain information for each malware sample and all of its possible variants. In the case of machine learning, little information has to be kept for classification. For example, k-means clustering needs only the information of centroids and radii for classification once trained. Support vector machine merely keeps a small set of training data (i.e., the support vectors) in the test phase. In addition, machine learning methods overcome signature matching on detecting zero-day attacks. Even if machine learning based methods can have higher false-positives, however, in our case of building preliminary malware filter, the false-positives can be less expensive than false-negatives since the latter will make the IoT device exposure to maliciousness directly. Converting malware binaries to the corresponding images only requires to obtaining the input vectors of the convolutional neural network, i.e., 8-bit vectors. Such convention is straight-forwards that requires only re-organize the binaries but no further pre-processing (i.e., the real image is even not necessary but only the corresponding vector that represents the image is needed as input).

D. Neural Network for Malware Detection

Convolutional neural networks have been proved to have better performance for image recognition than many other kinds of classifiers. A convolutional neural network has two important characteristics that make it fit the scenario of preliminary filtering malware on local IoT devices:

- **automatic feature extraction:** many previous works have focused on extracting effective features for malware detection. However, most of them are only effective under specific scenarios, and this might lead to poor scalability. Neural network can automatically extract higher level features from the input raw features. That is, the network can learn deep non-linear features that can be hardly discovered and understood by human-beings. These are sometimes actually counter-intuitive, but indeed effective.
- **test phase efficiency:** the training progress of a convolutional neural network requires heavy computation and, for instance, high-end graphic cards are necessary for accelerating training large networks. However, once trained, the network itself is rather lightweight and can be run with tiny computational resources, since only the trained parameters and information of network structure are kept [29], [30]. In contrast, another supervised lightweight classifier, the one-class support vector machine (OCSVM), though simpler than normal two-class SVM, still needs to keep a certain amount of training data when running the classification, while a convolutional neural network does not need to keep any. In practice, the training can be handled by the Cloud servers and only the trained network is sent to IoT nodes. On the local IoT side, the convolutional neural network can be run for detecting malware images.

IV. EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS

A. Preparing the Dataset

In this Section we evaluate the efficacy and efficiency of the proposed method on an IoT malware dataset collected by IoT POT [1], the first honeypot for collecting IoT threat samples. The malware samples are labelled using VirusTotal [8] with the majority rule. The dataset originally contains 500 malware samples, where most of them are classified into four big families: Linux.Gafgyt.1, Linux.Gafgyt (other variants of Linux.Gafgyt family except Linux.Gafgyt.1), Mirai [10] and Trojan.Linux.Fgt. The rest of the samples belong to relatively rare families such as Tsunami, Hajime, LightAidra. Then we re-organize the samples into two big categories: Mirai family, which contains Mirai and Trojan.Linux.Fgt, and Linux.Gafgyt family which contains Linux.Gafgyt.1 and other variants. In particular, Mirai has been shown to have similar features to Trojan.Linux.Fgt [17].

On the other side, the benign binary samples are collected from Ubuntu 16.04.3 system files. The number of samples are balanced for each family by randomly removing the samples that belong to classes that are too big. After the preprocessing phase, we analyzed 365 samples where each class has the same




Fig. 2. Images of Goodware




Fig. 3. Malware Image Examples of the Linux.Gafgyt Family. Note that these are the raw malware images (the same below) whose size will be unified for putting in CNN.

number of samples. Among them, we utilize 45 samples (each class has 15 samples) for testing, and the rest for training. According to the discussion above, the system proposed is only responsible for preliminary detection. That is, the goal is to identify whether a sample is benign or belongs to one of the big malware families: Mirai and Linux.Gafgyt, but there is no need to understand exactly which kind of variant it is.

B. Obtaining the Malware Images

Once the raw data-set is ready, we convert each sample to the corresponding malware gray-scale image by following the same procedures implemented in [4]. In particular, a malware binary can be reformatted to a sequence whose elements are 8-bit strings. Then each string can be converted to a decimal number which can be seen as the value of a one-channel pixel, which is in the range between 0 and 255. Therefore the entire sequence represents a gray-scale image. We rescale the images to the size of 64x64 such that they can be used as input to a convolutional neural network. Some examples of malware and benign-ware images are shown by Fig. 2, 3 and 4. By comparison, the structural difference between malware and goodware images can be identified. For example, it can be seen that malware images always are more dense. In particular, the majority of the Mirai malware images have a dense central code payload. On the other hand, the image of goodwares tend to have larger header parts than malwares.





Fig. 4. Malware Image examples of the Mirai Family



convolution layer(kernel=3, stride=1, depth=32)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
convolution layer(kernel=3, stride = 1, depth=72)
max pooling layer(kernel=2, stride=2)
fully connected layer(size=256)
softmax classifier

TABLE I
STRUCTURE OF THE IMPLEMENTED CNN.

C. Convolutional Neural Network Configuration

To be lightweight, we have implemented a small, two layer shallow convolutional neural network, compared with common image recognition models, such as ImageNet [20] and VGG [7]. The network structure is shown in Table. I. The network is trained with 5000 iterations with a training batch size of 32 and learning rate 0.0001.

D. Results

The classification results are shown in Tables III and II for the cases of two (benign and malicious) and three-class (benign and two malware families: Mirai and gafgyt) classification. We have performed a 5-fold hold-out validation, namely the experiments were conducted five times which each time with a completely different training/test data combination (i.e., there are no shared test samples between any two of five test data sets).

According to the results of two-class classification, we find the proposed system can predict the existence of maliciousness with about 94.0% accuracy on the average. The accuracy of three-class classification is relatively lower. Specifically, there are 6.67% malicious samples are misclassified as benign which

True \ Predict	Benign	Gafgyt	Mirai
	Benign	94.67%	2.67%
Gafgyt	6.67%	72.00%	21.33%
Mirai	0%	21.33%	78.67%

TABLE II
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR 3-CLASS CLASSIFICATION

True \ Predict	Benign	Malicious
	Benign	94.67%
Malicious	6.67%	93.33%

TABLE III
CONFUSION MATRIX FOR 2-CLASS CLASSIFICATION

all belong to Gafgyt family while there is no misclassification of Mirai family to benign. This indicates the Gafgyt has more similar binaries to benign goodware. On the other side, the probability of misclassifying a Mirai sample to Gafgyt class is the same as probability of misclassifying the latter to the former. Generally, the difference between benign and malicious samples is more recognizable than the difference between two malware families. Comparing with misclassification between benign and malicious samples (i.e., two-class classification), the system is more likely to misclassify the samples of two malware families in the case of three-class classification. This indicates the similarity between these two families. Specifically, samples of two families might be obfuscated in similar ways, or/and share a part of the malicious functions. In fact, the basic botnet functions of different DDoS malware are similar, and mainly include receiving instructions from the control server and spreading the infection. Similar to the local malware filter proposed in this paper, the IoT malware itself also has to be lightweight such that their functions have to be relatively direct and simple since there is little space to add more complex functions according to the limited computational resources.

Our accuracy results compete with similar previous works [3], [5]. In specific, Yue [5] also utilized convolutional neural networks and malware images for classifying several PC malware families. However the results are carried out by using much bigger and complex network structures (i.e. Very deep networks (VGG) which contain more than 10 layers while ours only has two layers). Similarly, a very complex preprocess procedure is needed in [5] which involves initial feature selection and random projection while our proposal directly uses raw features for classification. According to the accuracy results, the proposed system can be utilized as a regular malware detector, or a first-layer malware classifier. That is, it can conduct a precise classification to identify benign and maliciousness but may misclassify the exact identity of a specific malware sample, which needs the aid of Cloud to conduct precise classification. A comparison of corresponding experimental accuracy and settings is shown by Table.4.

V. LIMITATION

Despite the advantages of being fast and lightweight, the proposed detection method is vulnerable to complex code obfuscation that entirely changes the structure of a binary – this issue is common in image-based detectors [31]–[33]. The problem can be partially mitigated by using more complex static features, such as OpCode sequences and API calls [34], even though obfuscation on these features is also possible.

However, the usage of obfuscation techniques on IoT malware is not widespread nowadays, therefore it is difficult to evaluate whether in the near future IoT malware will be obfuscated using similar techniques used in traditional malware, also considering how the limited computational resources of IoT devices influences the implementation of obfuscation methods.

VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

In this paper we have proposed a lightweight malware image classification scheme for detecting IoT DDoS malware on local IoT devices, and shown its effectiveness. The malware detector is based on convolutional neural networks and can be tuned to be more efficient by using various techniques of reducing network size. For example, removing the neurons and links that are not critical in the network can reduce the number of parameters needed for classification [21]. Such further improvements can make the proposed system implementable on IoT devices with even less computation resources. In addition, new malware image extraction methods can be proposed to obtain more representative features of malware for classification.

VII. ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This research was partially supported by Collaboration Hubs for International Program (CHIRP) of SICORP, Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST), and Project of security in the IoT space funding by Department of Science and Technology (DST), India.

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Metrics \ Systems	Our method	ANN with random projection [5]	Weighted loss [3]
Accuracy	94.0%	99.5%	96.9%
Classifier	CNN	ANN	CNN(VGG-s)
Num of Layers	2	2	5
Num of nodes	104	1536	1888
Fully connect layer	256	2048	4096X2
Preprocess	Or-organizing binary	N-gram binary, Random projection	Or-organizing binary
Input dimension	64X64 scalar matrix	179 thousand binaries	Unknown

TABLE IV

COMPARING PROPOSED SYSTEM WITH TWO PREVIOUS RELATED WORKS. IN PARTICULAR, THE NUMBER OF HIDDEN LAYERS, NUMBER OF NEURONS AND THE NUMBER OF NODES IN FULLY CONNECT LAYERS ARE SHOWN BY “NUM OF LAYERS”, “NUM OF NODES”, “FULLY CONNECT LAYER” RESPECTIVELY. IT CAN BE SEEN THAT THE PROPOSED SYSTEM IS MORE LIGHTWEIGHT THAN REFERENCES DUE TO THE SMALLER SIZE OF NETWORK MODEL AND LOWER DIMENSIONS OF INPUT, AS WELL AS SIMPLER PREPROCESSING.

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