

Penultimate draft.

To appear in: *The Philosopher and the Artist: Wittgenstein and Paolozzi*. Ed. by Diego Mantoan and Luigi Perissinotto. Palgrave MacMillan, 2018.

The philosopher as artist

Ludwig Wittgenstein seen through Eduardo Paolozzi

Wolfgang Huemer
Università degli Studi di Parma
wolfgang.huemer@unipr.it

Abstract: In this article I argue that the strong fascination that Wittgenstein has had for artists cannot be explained primarily by the content of his work, and in particular not by his sporadic observation on aesthetics, but rather by stylistic features of his work formal aspects of his writing. Edoardo Paolozzi's testimony shows that artists often had a feeling of acquaintance or familiarity with the philosopher, which I think is due to stylistic features of his work, such as the colloquial tone in which Wittgenstein shares his observation with the reader, but also the lack of long-winded arguments or explanations. In the concluding part I suggest that we can read Wittgenstein's artworks of a specific kind: as philosophical works of art.

"Some people need, perhaps, Greenberg, I need Wittgenstein" (Paolozzi 2000: 128)

Wittgenstein's fascination for artists

In the cultural history of the last century Ludwig Wittgenstein plays an exceptional role. His works not only had a substantial influence on philosophers, they also had a strong impact beyond the circles of academic philosophy; in particular, they have found a significant resonance in the artworld. Other philosophers of the twentieth century often appear as abstract, overly technical, or engaged in highly specialized discussions, which can discourage readers who do not have a professional training in philosophy. Wittgenstein's work, on the other hand, has fascinated and inspired artists, poets, and composers. Terry Eagleton has put it elegantly when he said that

Frege is a philosopher's philosopher, Sartre the media's idea of an intellectual, and Bertrand Russell every shopkeeper's image of the sage [...]. But Wittgenstein is the philosopher of poets and composers, playwrights and novelists, and snatches of his mighty *Tractatus* have even been set to music. (Eagleton 1994: 153f)

What is it that makes Wittgenstein so attractive to a broader audience? To some degree his popularity can definitely be explained by his unusual biography. He was descendant of one of the

richest families of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but renounced his heritage; he wrote a philosophical treatise that was to become most influential, but abandoned his academic career to become elementary school teacher. For a short while he worked as gardener in a monastery, then as architect to project a house for his sister. When he come back to work in philosophy, he substantially revised his old position and started off in a very different direction. He returned to Cambridge to teach philosophy, but toyed with the idea to emigrate to Russia and left for longer periods to stay in a lonesome cabin in Norway. In short, Wittgenstein did not pursue a linear academic career.

Many facts of his biography have become accessible to a broader audience shortly after Wittgenstein's death in 1951; first through obituaries – many of which did not omit to mention little anecdotes of Wittgenstein's life to illustrate his personality (cf. for example Russell 1951) – and later, in 1958, through Norman Malcolm's biography, which contains a reprint of G.H.v. Wright's "Biographical Sketch". It soon became common knowledge that Wittgenstein did not correspond to the widespread image of the armchair philosopher (or, even worse, of the philosopher who raises from his desk only punctually at 5 pm to have a short afternoon walk). His biography rather provides material for a film.

It would be reductive, however, to explain Wittgenstein's success beyond the sphere of academic philosophy only on the basis of his biography. The circumstances of his life might have attracted the attention, which then has led many to engage in studying his philosophical work, as it was the case for Eduardo Paolozzi, for example. The situation is somewhat paradoxical, however. Even though it was the *philosopher* Ludwig Wittgenstein who fascinated a broader audience, it is difficult, if not impossible, to mention a particular philosophical thesis or argument that could explain this fascination.¹ More than any specific philosophical point I think it was the way in which he shared his reflections with the reader, i.e., the literary form he had chosen to express his philosophical perspective, that had attracted a broader audience and invited them to engage in studying his philosophical works. Wittgenstein explicitly states in the prefaces to both books that he has published or prepared for publication during his lifetime, the *Tractatus Logico-*

¹ One might argue that Wittgenstein's strong interest in language was most compelling for many readers – and in particular for writers and poets, but also for artists (cf. Huemer 2013b). Eduardo Paolozzi, for example, explains his interest for Wittgenstein with the following words: "I think that for the first time I have a necessity to embrace some kind of language in relationship to the processes I'm involved with. And I find his [Wittgenstein's] is the most sympathetic language." (Paolozzi 2000: 128). Wittgenstein's interest in language, however, is ubiquitous in his work and can hardly be broken down to a single thesis or argument.

Philosophicus and the *Philosophical Investigations*, that he has struggled for a long time to find the most adequate literary form to express his thoughts. Even an untrained eye can see at first glance that the literary form of the works – very much like their author – did not fit the ordinary academic conventions of the time.

The first thing one can note when opening the *Tractatus* is that it consists of short sentences that are enumerated in a hierarchical system, which not only serves to make the relations between the sentences explicit, but also communicates a sense of logical order and precision.² The style is hermetic, the text consists of short, aphoristic statements that make apodictic assertions. Moreover, the author does not make a minimal attempt to explain or motivate his views, nor does he share his reasons for holding them with the reader, who looks in vain for an argument. In this way, the author does not leave any space for discussion or doubts. On the contrary, already in the preface he states that “the *truth* of the thoughts that are here communicated seems to me unassailable and definitive. I therefore believe myself to have found, on all essential points, the final solution of the problems” (*TLP*: preface). This is the tone of a self-confident person who does not have an urge to explain himself to others which, in turn, can be seen as an expression of the solipsistic position proposed in the book (cf. *TLP*: 5.62).

The *Philosophical Investigations*, on the other hand, present themselves in a very different style. The author often proposes his ideas to an anonymous interlocutor, who is never introduced or described and does not have a name. The author simply uses the second person singular (“you”) to address the interlocutor. This “quasi-dialogical” structure involves the reader and invites her to weigh the ideas expressed against her own views on the topic – or the position defended in the *Tractatus*. The form, thus, conveys Wittgenstein’s goal to encourage the reader to reflect autonomously on the topics discussed and to “stimulate someone to thoughts of his own.” (*PI*: preface). Moreover, Wittgenstein no longer speaks about the truth of the propositions expressed in the book. He rather presents “a number of sketches of landscapes which were made in the course of [...] long and involved journeyings. The same or almost the same points were always being approached afresh from different directions, and new sketches we made” (*PI*: preface). This leaves ample space for revisions, doubts, and discussions. Moreover, Wittgenstein presents his theses in a very hesitant manner; often they are challenged by the anonymous

² This, incidentally, was one of the aspects Paolozzi seems to have appreciated in Wittgenstein: “I liked the idea of linking art and philosophy. Because one of the ten reasons for making a series of prints around the writings of a philosopher was that I just felt that somehow everybody had a sense of precision in their work.” (Paolozzi 2000: 147)

interlocutor. The author who opened his *Tractatus* with the apodictic statement “The world is all that is the case” (*TLP*: 1) introduces the main thesis of his new theory of language with the following words: “For a *large* class of cases—though not for all—in which we use the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.” (*PI*: § 43)

The very fact that the literary form changes so drastically shows the discontinuity in Wittgenstein’s thought that has been emphasized so much among the early interpreters. The fact that the stylistic dimension continues to play a central role shows, on the other hand, that, notwithstanding the discontinuities, there are important continuities in Wittgenstein’s philosophical perspective. Most importantly, the focus on style distinguishes Wittgenstein’s work from that of almost all academic philosophers of the twentieth century for who the literary style of philosophical works plays at best a marginal role: typically, it is considered an ornament that could render the reading of a text more pleasant, but does not contribute to its meaning or significance. It should not come as a surprise that readers who do not focus exclusively on philosophy, but have broader cultural interests, are attracted by this aspect of Wittgenstein’s work.

Wittgenstein and aesthetics

If what I have said so far is correct, it is not primarily the content, not a particular thesis or argument, but rather the form of Wittgenstein’s philosophy that has caught the attention of artists, writers, and composers.³ In particular, it is hardly plausible that Wittgenstein’s contribution to aesthetics could have caught their attention. It is well known that Wittgenstein has not become famous for his work in aesthetics, nor has he ever made an attempt to formulate a systematic *theory* of art, the nature of artworks, or aesthetic experience.⁴ All we have is a short booklet that

³ I do not want to suggest that we can make a clear-cut distinction between these two elements; especially in the work of Wittgenstein, where the literary style contributes to the meaning of the text, this does not seem promising. I do want to emphasize that it was not primarily a specific philosophical thesis or argument, but rather Wittgenstein’s philosophical style that attracted a broader audience.

⁴ This does not mean that there cannot or have not been promising Wittgensteinian theories in aesthetics, however. For an interesting recent approach cf., for example, Sedivy (2014).

contains *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*⁵, but, as the editor Cyril Barrett explains in the foreword,

nothing contained herein was written by Wittgenstein himself. The notes published here are not Wittgenstein's own lecture notes but notes taken down by students, which he never saw nor checked. It is even doubtful if he would have approved of their publication, at least in their present form. (in: Wittgenstein 1966: vii)

There are, I think, good reasons to share Barrett's doubts: Wittgenstein was very hesitant to publish his work, he used to rewrite and refine his texts again and again, changing the exact wording or the order of his remarks numerous times. Moreover, Wittgenstein always raised suspicions against a theory of art, although the motives have changed over time: while he affirmed in his *Tractatus* that there can be no meaningful propositions in aesthetics (cf. *TLP*: 6.421), he often voices a suspicion against theories *tout court* in his mature philosophy (cf., for example, *PI*: § 109).

There are, however, two aspects in Wittgenstein's views on aesthetic that seem relevant. First, Wittgenstein does not conceive of aesthetics as a discipline detached from a general philosophical investigation. In the first lecture, he suggests (according to the notes taken by his students) that "[i]n order to get clear about aesthetic words you have to describe ways of living" (Wittgenstein 1966: 11). Moreover, some commentators have recently argued that for Wittgenstein the aesthetic dimension of life was fundamental (cf. Hagberg 2014). Charles Altieri, for example, has suggested that Wittgenstein's remarks on aesthetics "clarify a full range of powers we use to explain why expressive activity of all sorts can play important roles in human behavior" (Altieri 2015: 94). In the light of these interpretations we can state that for Wittgenstein aesthetics was not an abstract theory, nor an academic discipline detached from ordinary life, but rather a central element of our form of life that is of crucial importance when it comes to form or refine our repertoire to express who we are and to define who we want to become.

Second, Wittgenstein's perspective on aesthetics is not expressed by what he has *said* in his *Lectures on Aesthetics* or in other places; it is rather *shown* in the corpus of his writings.⁶ Our

⁵ The lectures were first published in 1966, the year after the completion of Paolozzi's series *As is when*.

⁶ Wittgenstein hints at this aspect in an early letter to Ludwig von Ficker: "the *Tractatus* actually consists of two parts: the one I have written and the other one, that contains all the things I have *not* written. And this second part is the important one. For in my book the ethical is confined from within, as it were; and I am convinced that *strictly* it can be confined *only* in this way" [My

judgments on art, music, and literature are a way to express our perspective behind the background of a shared environment, they allow us to communicate what is important to us and, thus, to make emerge a precise articulation of ourselves – and we find this aspect in many of Wittgenstein’s later writings that contain numerous observations in on art, music, and literature – or better: on artists, composers, and writers. Many of these sporadic remarks – which have been made accessible in *Culture and Value*, first published in 1977 – have the character of short side-remarks. Wittgenstein generally only *mentions* composers, writers, or artists, but does not discuss their work. In most cases he expresses short, succinct judgments, but does not bother to explain or justify them.

At one point Wittgenstein affirms that two words with which one is well familiar are distinguished “not merely by their sound or their appearance, but by an atmosphere as well”. He illustrates this point with “names of famous poets and composers” and suggests that “the names ‘Beethoven’ and ‘Mozart’ don’t merely sound different; no, they are also accompanied by a different *character*” (Wittgenstein 1980: § 243). It seems to me that this point suggests a particular reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks: he often uses the “character” of the names mentioned, the “atmosphere” they evoke, to draw a detailed map of a rich cultural landscape that allows him to locate himself as well as to display the perspective and the standpoint he adopts towards it. It seems to me, in other words, that the finely articulated web of cultural references in which Wittgenstein does not further elaborate his take on the poet or composer in question, also serves the purpose of letting an elaborate self-portrait emerge. Wittgenstein so provides a key for those readers who are able to recognize it.⁷

Wittgenstein’s scattered remarks on composers, writers, and artists, thus, can have a very particular effect on readers who are open to them: they invite to understand the text not primarily as presentation of an abstract philosophical argument formulated by an anonymous author, but rather as an encounter with a concrete and recognizable personality. A reading along these lines

translation: “Ich wollte nämlich schreiben, das Werk bestehe aus zwei Teilen: aus dem, der hier vorliegt, und aus alledem, was ich *nicht* geschrieben habe. Und gerade dieser zweite Teil ist der Wichtige. Es wird nämlich das Ethische durch mein Buch gleichsam von Innen her begrenzt; und ich bin überzeugt, dass es, *streng, nur* so zu begrenzen ist.” (Wittgenstein 1969a, 35). Since for Wittgenstein “Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same” (TLP: 6.421) his affirmation definitely also holds for aesthetics.

⁷ I provide a more detailed argument for this reading in (Huemer 2013a, 2013c).

can easily arouse a feeling of acquaintance or familiarity with the (implied) author.⁸ In Wittgenstein's mature philosophy this feeling can be enforced by the quasi-dialogical style of texts that allows the reader to witness an inner dialogue or to identify with the interlocutor. In both cases the feeling of familiarity and acquaintance is intensified. In Wittgenstein's early philosophy, notwithstanding the differences in style, we can observe a similar effect: the apodictic character of the propositions and the absence of arguments show that Wittgenstein does not want to explain himself to the rest of humanity, but rather writes for those who already share his views. In the first line of the preface to the *Tractatus* he states: "Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it—or at least similar thoughts" (*TLP*: preface). In this way he creates a sense of "we and the others": either one is already familiar with the thoughts expressed – and, thus, sympathetic to the perspective developed – or else one is excluded from the circle of those who can understand the work.

Paolozzi and Wittgenstein: As is when

So far, I have argued that Wittgenstein's fascination for a broader audience is related to stylistic elements of his works that make a concrete and recognizable personality emerge. I would now like to suggest that this aspect is particularly important in Eduardo Paolozzi's perspective on Wittgenstein. I will focus mainly on the series of screenprints *As is when* from 1964/65.

The series consists of 12 prints, all of which contain texts by or about Wittgenstein.⁹ In interviews Paolozzi has explained that his attention was drawn to Wittgenstein first by Maurice Cranston's obituary in the *World Review*, by an article from Erich Heller in *Encounter*, and by Malcolm's *Memoir* (cf. Paolozzi 2000: 147)¹⁰. The passages on Wittgenstein often recall anecdotes

⁸ It might, of course, also provoke the opposite reaction: the reader might just feel repelled by the (implied) author's personality and, in consequence, also by the work – which can explain why Wittgenstein's work has evoked very ambivalent reactions in the philosophical community.

⁹ Seven screens contain quotes from Wittgenstein's works (I, IV and XI from the *Tractatus*, III and X from the *Notebooks*, II from the *Blue and Brown Books*, and IX from the *Philosophical Investigations*). The screen II also contain quotes from a book review of Malcolm's *Memoir* by Newman that appeared in *Scientific American* and a quote from Russell's obituary in *Mind*, and the remaining five screens V, VI, VII, VIII, and XII contain quotes from Malcolm's *Memoir* (the quote of V stems from G.H.v. Wright's biographical sketch reprinted in this booklet and VII notes from a lecture by Wittgenstein recorded there. All quotes are reproduced in the appendix to this contribution.

¹⁰ Interestingly enough Paolozzi did not mention James R. Newman's book review of Malcolm's *Memoir* that appeared in *Scientific American* (Newman 1959). This omission surprises, since Paolozzi used the title and a passage from this text (where Newman paraphrases G.H.v. Wright's

of Wittgenstein's life that illustrate his philosophical mentality, but do not focus on those of Wittgenstein's personality traits that captivated Paolozzi: his restlessness and his being "a strange man, a tormented lonely man, who was a foreigner", who "inherited a lot of money which he renounced, and embraced the doctrine of poverty" (Paolozzi 2000: 127f). Paolozzi explains that his fascination with Wittgenstein was not focused on his biography, "the actual work is the key" (Paolozzi 2000: 128). Among quotes reproduced on the prints we find passages where Wittgenstein uses strong or unusual pictures or metaphors (VIII, X, XI, and, to some extent, the quote from *Blue and Brown Books* on II). Others refer to or express Wittgenstein's early picture theory of language (IV and the quote from Newman on II). On VII and IX he presents Wittgenstein's (later) philosophical method – which, incidentally, also seems programmatic for works of Paolozzi like the *Krazy Kat Arkive*.

In short, Paolozzi's interest in Wittgenstein focused on his philosophical work, but was triggered by his unusual biography, in which he recognized several analogies to his own. Moreover, in interviews he repeatedly states that "I wanted to identify myself with" Wittgenstein (Paolozzi 2000: 127 and 147) and conceived of the prints as a "kind of combined autobiography" (Paolozzi 2000: 147). This illustrates that Wittgenstein's writings aroused in Paolozzi a feeling of closeness and familiarity that I have discussed in the preceding section. For him, Wittgenstein was not a distant, abstract philosopher, but a concrete and tangible person, who was, in a sense, present in his studio: "My own Wittgenstein works were a kind of collaboration with Wittgenstein" (Paolozzi 2000: 150).

The philosopher as artist

Paolozzi, thus, has perceived Wittgenstein as a collaborator in his artistic production, which invites to conceive of Wittgenstein's works as works of art of a particular kind – and, in fact, they contain elements that we usually do not find in philosophical works, but in works of art. Let me mention just three of these elements that can be found in the *Tractatus*. First, for Wittgenstein the harmony between form and content was important. We have seen above that he had struggled hard to find his own, personal style that was adequate to express his philosophical perspective. In a letter to von Ficker he says of the *Tractatus* that the work was "strictly philosophical and

"Biographical Sketch") in print II. Given that Paolozzi liked to read the *Scientific American* (cf. Paolozzi 2000: 139), it is plausible that Newman's review has drawn his attention to Malcolm's book and thus played a crucial role in reviving his interest in Wittgenstein in the late fifties.

literary” (Wittgenstein 1969a, 33).¹¹ Second, Wittgenstein breaks the readers’ expectations, who typically engage with philosophical texts in order to gain new insights or to get acquainted with new arguments. Moreover, working through a philosophical book requires concentration and patience, but promises a cognitive gain that outweighs these efforts. Wittgenstein, on the other hand, states that the goal of his book was not to offer knowledge or arguments – he states that the reader either has already known what is said in the book or else she will not understand it – but to provide pleasure: “[i]ts purpose would be achieved if it gave pleasure to one person who read and understood it” (*TLP*: preface). Third, Wittgenstein states at the end of his work that the propositions contained in it are meaningless. Very much like in other artworks, thus, the material of which the work is created – the propositions – point beyond themselves and can so constitute a new dimension of meaning, which is not *said* or stated explicitly, but *shown* in the work.

There is, thus, a sense in which we could call Wittgenstein an artist. It would be wrong, however, to think of him as a poet; his works are not *literary works of art*. This misunderstanding could be invited by Wittgenstein’s famous passage that “really one should write philosophy only as one writes a poem”. It would entail, however – as Wittgenstein points out – that he was a failed artist, i.e., “someone who cannot quite do what he would like to be able to do” (Wittgenstein 1998: 28). I rather think that we should consider Wittgenstein’s to be works of art *sui generis*; *philosophical works of art*, as it were. They are designed to provide pleasure to those who “read and understood” them, which indicates that Wittgenstein has a very specific form of aesthetic pleasure in mind: the pleasure one feels when one realizes that the philosophical problems that have disturbed us are only the result of a misunderstanding of our language. The goal Wittgenstein pursued with his philosophical works of art was, thus, to make “propaganda for one style of thinking as opposed to another” (Wittgenstein 1966: 28).

Appendix: The quotes in Paolozzi’s series *As is When*

I Artificial Sun:

“The world is all that is the case” (Wittgenstein, *TLP*: 1) (Wittgenstein 1961b, 7)
Paolozzi adds: “TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN”

II Tortured Life:

“The tortured life of an influential modern philosopher: the late Ludwig Wittgenstein” – Title of (Newman 1959)

Column 1 and 2:

“Wright, one day in a trench on the eastern front while he was reading a magazine in which there was a picture of the possible sequence of events in an automobile accident. The picture, he said, served as a proposition whose parts corresponded to things in reality; and so he conceived the idea that a verbal proposition is in effect a picture, ‘by

¹¹ My translation: “das Werk ist streng philosophisch und literarisch”

virtue of a similar correspondence between *its* parts and the world.’ In other words, the *structure* of the proposition ‘depicts a possible combination of elements in reality, a possible state of affairs.’ The *Tractatus*,” (Newman 1959, 149f),

Column 3:

“the proposition: “There is no hippopotamus in this room at present”. When he refused to believe this, I looked under all the desks without finding one; but he remained unconvinced.” (Russell 1951: 297)

Column 4:

“Let us ask the question ‘Should we say that the arrows \rightarrow and \leftarrow point in the same or in different directions?’—At first sight you might be inclined to say ‘Of course, in different directions.’ But” (Wittgenstein 1969b, 140)

III Experience:

“9.11.16. Ist der Glaube eine Erfahrung? Ist der Gedanke eine Erfahrung? Alle Erfahrung ist Welt und braucht nicht das Subjekt. Der Willensakt ist keine Erfahrung.” (Wittgenstein 1961a, 89)

“9.11.16 Is belief a kind of experience? Is thought a kind of experience? All experience is world and does not need the subject. The act of will is not an experience.” (Wittgenstein 1961a, 89e) [The full stop after 9.11.16. is omitted in Paolozzi’s screenprint]

IV Reality:

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 2.063–2.141

“2.063 Die gesamte Wirklichkeit ist die Welt.

2.1 Wir machen uns Bilder der Tatsachen.

2.11 Das Bild stellt die Sachlage im logischen Raume, das Bestehen und Nichtbestehen von Sachverhalten, vor.

2.12 Das Bild ist ein Modell der Wirklichkeit.

2.13 Den Gegenständen entsprechen im Bilde die Elemente des Bildes.

2.131 Die Elemente des Bildes vertreten im Bild die Gegenstände.

2.14 Das Bild besteht darin, daß sich seine Elemente in bestimmter Art und Weise zu einander verhalten.

2.141 Das Bild ist eine Tatsache.”

“2.063 The sum-total of reality is the world.

2.1 We picture facts to ourselves.

2.11 A picture presents a situation in a logical space, the existence and non-existence of states of affairs.

2.12 A picture is a model of reality.

2.13 In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them.

2.131 In a picture the elements of the picture are representatives of objects.

2.14 What constitutes a picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way.

2.141 A picture is a fact.”

V Wittgenstein the soldier

“At the outbreak of the war, Wittgenstein entered the Austrian army as a volunteer, although he had been exempted from service because of a rupture. He served first on a vessel on the Vistula and later in an artillery workshop at Cracow. In 1915 he was ordered to Olmütz, in Moravia, to be trained as an officer. As previously mentioned, he fought on the East front. In 1918 he was transferred to the South front. Upon the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian army in November, he was taken prisoner by the Italians. It was not until August of the following year that he could return to Austria. During the major part of his captivity, he was in a prison camp near Monte Cassino in south Italy. When Wittgenstein was captured he had in his rucksack the manuscript of his *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung*,” (von Wright 1955: 533)

VI Wittgenstein in New York

“I went to New York to meet Wittgenstein at the ship. When I first saw him I was surprised at his apparent physical vigour. He was striding down the ramp with a pack on his back, a heavy suitcase in one hand, cane in the other. (Malcolm 1984: 68)

VII Parrot

“What I give is the morphology of the use of an expression. I show that it has kinds of uses of which you had not dreamed. In philosophy one feels *forced* to look at a concept in a certain way. What I do is to suggest, or even invent,

other ways of looking at it. I suggest possibilities of which you had not previously thought. You thought that there was one possibility, or only two at most. But I made you think of others. Furthermore, I made you see that it was absurd to expect the concept to conform to those narrow possibilities. Thus your mental cramp is relieved, and you are free to look around the field of use of the expression and to describe the different kinds of uses of it." [Quote from a lecture from Wittgenstein, reported by Malcolm] (Malcolm 1984: 43)

VIII Futurism at Lenabo

"It is worth noting that Wittgenstein once said that a serious and good philosophical work could be written that would consist entirely of *jokes* (without being facetious). Another time he said that a philosophical treatise might contain nothing but questions (without answers). In his own writings he made wide use of both. To give an example: 'Why can't a dog simulate pain? Is he too honest?' (Philosophical Investigations, § 250)" (Malcolm 1984: 27f)

IX Assembling Reminders for a particular Purpose

Philosophical Investigations §§ 126, 127

"126. Die Philosophie stellt alles bloß hin, und erklärt und folgert nichts.—Da alles offen daliegt, ist auch nichts zu erklären. Denn, was etwa verborgen ist, interessiert uns nicht. 'Philosophie' könnte man auch das nennen, was vor allen neuen Entdeckungen und Erfindungen möglich ist.

127. Die Arbeit des Philosophen ist ein Zusammentragen von Erinnerungen zu einem bestimmten Zweck."

"126. Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything.—Since everything lies open to view there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest to us. One might also give the name 'philosophy' to what is possible *before* all new discoveries and inventions.

127. The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose."

X The Spirit of the Snake

"Bedenke nur, daß der Geist der Schlange, des Löwen, *dein* Geist ist. Denn nur von dir her kennst du überhaupt den Geist. Es ist nun freilich die Frage, warum habe ich der Schlange gerade diesen Geist gegeben. Und die Antwort hierauf kann nur im psychophysischen Parallelismus liegen: Wenn ich so aussähe wie die Schlange und das täte, was sie tut, so wäre ich so und so. Das Gleiche beim Elefanten, bei der Fliege, bei der Wespe. Es fragt sich aber, ob nicht eben auch hier wieder (und gewiß so) mein Körper mit dem der Wespe und der Schlange auf einer Stufe steht, so daß ich weder von dem der Wespe auf meinen, noch von meinen auf den der Wespe geschlossen habe." (Wittgenstein 1961a, 85).

"Only remember that the spirit of the snake, of the lion, is *your* spirit. For it is only from yourself that you are acquainted with spirit at all. Now of course the question is why I have given a snake just this spirit. And the answer to this can only lie in the psycho-physical parallelism: If I were to look like the snake and to do what it does then I should be such-and-such. The same with the elephant, with the fly, with the wasp. But the question arises whether even here, my body is not on the same level with that of the wasp and of the snake (and surely it is so), so that I have neither inferred from that of the wasp to mine nor from mine to that of the wasp." (Wittgenstein 1961a, 85e)

XI He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder

"My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them—as steps—to climb beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it.) He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence." (TLP: 6.54, 7)

"Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, daß sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt, wenn er durch die — auf ihnen — über sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er muß die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.) Er muß diese Sätze überwinden, dann sieht er die Welt richtig. Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muß man schweigen."

XII Wittgenstein at the Cinema admires Betty Grable

"Wittgenstein was always exhausted by his lectures. He was also revolted by them. He felt disgusted with what he had said and with himself. Often he would rush off to a cinema immediately after the class ended. As the members of the class began to move their chairs out of the room he might look imploringly at a friend and say in a low tone, 'Could you go to a flick?' On the way to the cinema Wittgenstein would buy a bun or cold pork pie and munch it while he watched the film. He insisted on sitting in the first row of seats, so that the screen would occupy his entire field of vision, and his mind would be turned away from the thoughts of the lecture and his feeling revulsion. Once he

whispered to me ‘This is like a shower bath!’ His observation of the film was not relaxed or detached. He leaned tensely forward in his seat and rarely took his eyes off the screen. He hardly ever uttered comments on the episodes of the film and did not like his companion to do so. He wished to become totally absorbed in the film no matter how trivial or artificial it was, in order to free his mind temporarily from the philosophical thoughts that tortured and exhausted him. He liked American films and detested English ones. He was inclined to think that there *could not* be a decent English film. This was connected with a great distaste he had for English culture and mental habits in general. He was fond of the film stars Carmen Miranda and Betty Hutton. Before he came to visit me in America he demanded in jest that I should introduce him to Miss Hutton.” (Malcolm 1984: 26f)

Bibliography

- Altieri, Charles (2015), *Reckoning with the Imagination: Wittgenstein and the Aesthetics of Literary Experience*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
- Eagleton, Terry (1994), “My Wittgenstein”, *Common Knowledge* 3: 152–57.
- Hagberg, Garry (2014), “Wittgenstein’s Aesthetics”, in *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, edited by Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2014. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University. <https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2014/entries/wittgenstein-aesthetics/>.
- Huemer, Wolfgang (2013a), “«The Character of a Name»: Wittgenstein’s Remarks on Shakespeare”, in *Wittgenstein Reading*, edited by Sascha Bru, Wolfgang Huemer, and Daniel Steuer, 23–37, Berlin, Boston: de Gruyter. doi:10.1515/9783110294699.23.
- Huemer, Wolfgang (2013b), “Wittgenstein e la letteratura”, in *Wittgenstein, l’estetica e Le Arti*, edited by Elisa Caldarola, Davide Quattrocchi, and Gabriele Tomasi, 227–41, Roma: Carocci.
- Huemer, Wolfgang (2013c), “Wittgensteins Kulturelle Heimat: Über Philosophie Und Dichtung Im Kringel-Buch”, in *Kulturen Und Werte*, edited by Josef Rothhaupt and Wilhelm Vossenkuhl, 433–49, Berlin, Boston: DE GRUYTER. doi:10.1515/9783110277562.433.
- Malcolm, Norman (1984), *Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir*, 2nd ed. Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press.
- Newman, James R. (1959), “The Tortured Life of an Influential Modern Philosopher: The Late Ludwig Wittgenstein”, *Scientific American* 201 (2): 149–58.
- Paolozzi, Eduardo (2000), *Writings and Interviews*, edited by Robin Spencer. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Russell, Bertrand (1951), “Obituary: Ludwig Wittgenstein”, *Mind* LX (239): 297–98. doi:10.1093/mind/LX.239.297.
- Sedivy, Sonia (2014), “Art from a Wittgensteinian Perspective: Constitutive Norms in Context”, *The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 72 (1): 67–82. doi:10.1111/jaac.12043.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig. (1953), *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1961a), *Notebooks, 1914-1916*, edited by G.E.M Anscombe and G.H.v. Wright. Translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1961b), *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, translated by David Pears and Brian McGuinness. London: Routledge.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1966), *Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief*, edited by Cyril Barrett. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1969a), *Briefe an Ludwig von Ficker*, edited by G.H.von Wright. Salzburg: O. Müller.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1969b), *The Blue and Brown Book: Preliminary Studies for the “Philosophical Investigations”*, Second Edition, Malden, Mass.: Blackwell.

- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1980), *Remarks on the Philosophy of Psychology*, edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and G.H.v. Wright, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe. Oxford: Blackwell.
- Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1998), *Culture and Value: A Selection from the Posthumous Remains*, edited by G. H. von Wright and Heikki Nyman, translated by Peter Winch, rev. ed., Oxford, UK; Cambridge, Mass.: Blackwell.
- Wright, Georg Henrik von (1955), "Ludwig Wittgenstein, A Biographical Sketch", *The Philosophical Review* 64 (4): 527–45. doi:10.2307/2182631.