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Service-sector Guilds and the Challenge of Liberalization: The organization of maritime- cargo handling in Barcelona, c.1760-1840

Brendan J. von Briesen

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**Service-sector Guilds and the Challenge of
Liberalization: The organization of maritime-cargo
handling in Barcelona, c.1760-1840**

Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Ph.D.)

Universitat de Barcelona

Departament d'Història i Arqueologia

Secció d'Història Contemporània i Món Actual

Programa de Societat i Cultura

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Barcelona, 2017

BARCELONA.



[Port and City of Barcelona.]

The Penny Magazine of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, “[Port and City of Barcelona]”, 16 April 1836, No. 259, pp 1. [Author’s collection; modified].

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Abbreviations (and English translations)

Arxiu General del Museu Marítim de Barcelona AGMMB

General Archive of the Maritime Museum of Barcelona

Arxiu Històric de la Ciudad de Barcelona AHCB

Historic Archive of the City of Barcelona

Arxiu Historic de Protocols de Barcelona AHPB

Historic Archives of Protocols [of the Notary College] of Barcelona

Arxiu Municipal Contemporani de Barcelona AMCB

Municipal Contemporary Archive of Barcelona

Archivo Naval de Cartagena ANC

Naval Archive of Cartagena

Biblioteca de Catalunya BC

Library of Catalonia

Biblioteca de la Universitat de Barcelona UB

Library of the University of Barcelona

Biblioteca de la Universidad Pompeu Fabra UPF

Library of the Pompeu Fabra University

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Preface

Acknowledgements

First and foremost, I extend my most sincere gratitude to my Dissertation Director, Dr. Jordi Ibarz Gelabert, without whom this dissertation would not have been possible. He granted me a considerable degree of academic freedom, yet was always available to spend the necessary time discussing my work and his own on the topic. I consider myself quite fortunate for the degree of confidence which he placed in me and in my ability to develop this dissertation – from the general points to the most specific interpretations of the facts at hand. What is more, he always maintained an objective view of the questions raised, and guided my investigation in such a way that it remained my own research, and allowed me to arrive at my own conclusions. It has truly been a pleasure.

I must also highlight the important opportunities for reflection offered by Dr. Juanjo Romero Marín. In addition to his expertise on this topic, he was always willing to share of his valuable time in critiquing my arguments and making considerable recommendations for improvements and sharing worthwhile articles and texts to inform my understanding.

This dissertation also benefitted specifically from the thoughtful scrutiny and kind-hearted encouragement of the scholars who comprise the “Trabajo, Instituciones y Género” consolidated academic work group based at the Universitat de Barcelona.¹ My incorporation into that group provided me with a cohort of professors and doctoral candidates highly versed in the general issues discussed in this dissertation. Likewise, the work group provided a sounding board for the ideas I explore, and their critiques of my work at numerous seminars and congresses made for a significantly improved product. I was privileged to have had access to a group of scholars who have dedicated their professional lives to the topics herein discussed. Their respect and critical open-mindedness reflect the great spirit of academic freedom of inquiry which defines the Department of History and Archaeology of the Universitat de Barcelona.

¹ The group enjoyed the financial support of the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation as research projects: “*La reconstrucción de la actividad económica de Cataluña contemporánea: trabajo, demografía y economías familiares*” (The reconstruction of economic activity in contemporary Catalonia: work, demography and household economies” HAR2011-26951; and from “*Crisis y Reconstrucción de los mercados de trabajo en Cataluña (1760-1960). Ocupaciones, culturas de trabajo y estrategias adaptativas.*” (Crisis and Reconstruction of the Labor Markets of Catalonia, 1760-1960: Occupations, Work Cultures and Adaptive Strategies) HAR2014-57187-P.

My sincere appreciation is also extended to Dr. Raffaella Sarti, Aggregate Professor of Early Modern History and of Gender History at the Università de Urbino “Carlo Bo” in Italy. She was gracious to host my three-month stay at that University, shared her time willingly, and offered valuable insights and contacts, for which I am most grateful.

I regularly received ideas, constructive criticism, and unfailing encouragement from Dr. Juan Antonio Rubio Mondéjar and Dr. Fernando Largo Jiménez, with whom I had the previous privilege of conducting a Masters of the Arts in Economic History. The writing of one’s dissertation is largely an exercise in self-imposed physical and intellectual isolation, delving ever deeper into a seeming quagmire of terms, concepts, and activities that are of almost no discernible importance to any but a handful of other scholars; as such, during these times, the sympathy and commiseration of other scholars in a similar situation is without equal.

I would also like to take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to the staff and, especially, the librarians and archivists, who executed their duties with great care, efficiency, courtesy, and professionalism. On many occasions, these laboring scholars made recommendations for consultations that produced documents that otherwise would have remained unknown to me. This dissertation would have remained, literally, theoretical without their dedicated, daily work, for which I extend to them my utmost appreciation.

On a more personal note, I must express my gratitude to my friends and family, who not only made this dissertation possible, but also encouraged me to stay the course and weather every storm, be it intellectual, psychological, or logistical.

Appreciations aside, I humbly dedicate this dissertation to the masses of toilers condemned to work away their lives without recognition, whose stories will never be known; and, to the popular historians who strive to dignify labor’s contributions to the great tasks of humanity and to rescue their memory from the “enormous condescension of posterity”.²

² Thompson, E. P. (1963) “Introduction”, *The making of the English working class* (1. Vintage ed). New York: Vintage Books, p. 12.

A note on language, terminology, and translations

I must note the fact that this dissertation is not written in the language of use in the area studied, or by the people treated herein. None of the primary sources encountered were written in English; nor are many of the secondary sources. I have chosen to write in the English language as it is arguably the *lingua franca* of the Academy, and there is almost nothing written in this language about the handling of maritime cargo in Barcelona during the period studied. I believe I am the first “outsider” to conduct an investigation on this topic – that should be kept in mind, as my own ignorance or bias could become relevant (something of which I have attempted to be conscious during my research). It is my sincere hope that, by writing in English, there will be greater interest in this history, as well as a wider possible readership of this investigation.

The main languages of the primary documentary sources during the period studied are the sister languages Catalan and Castilian (the language of the region of Castile, often referred to by the misnomer “Spanish”).³ While Catalan is the traditional and current language of the area studied, Castilian was imposed after the siege and fall of Barcelona in 1714 to French and Castilian troops intent on placing the Borbón family on the throne in a conflict widely known as the War of the Spanish Succession. This imposition is notable in legal documents. That said, the names of the trades sometimes remained in Catalan long after, at times being accompanied by a Catalan-to-Castilian translation and explanation. I use italics for terms in both Castilian and Catalan and will specify the original language where there may be doubt, for the sake of clarity and to promote further research.

While there were subsequent periods of revival of public and academic usage of Catalan, a similar process of language suppression accompanied the fall of Barcelona (and Catalonia) to the Nationalist forces led by General Franco in 1939. This suppression lasted to varying degrees throughout the period of the Franco regime (1939-1975); however, as a result of the political process commonly referred to as “the transition” (c. 1975-1980), the increased degree of autonomy and linguistic sovereignty has resulted in a corresponding expansion of the use of Catalan for academic work. This has meant that there is a considerable and growing body of

³ This linguistic issue has a territorial corollary: in this investigation, I use the commonly accepted term “Spain” to refer to the territory of the nation-state comprised of the various [autonomous] regions (of which Catalonia is one).

literature in Catalan, especially covering topics written for and by academics in Catalonia. Much of the secondary literature dealing with the specifics of this dissertation is in Catalan, without available translations in English or Castilian.

As for place names and other specifics, I have chosen to generally mix the, Castilian, local Catalan, and English terms for ease of reading without limiting their historic or present location or further research (each of these three aims connotes a preference for each language, respectively). Many of the places investigated are existent in Barcelona, and scholars may visit them physically or virtually to facilitate a broader understanding of the milieu herein described.

All of the translations contained herein are mine: I quote the original text in the footnotes for academic reasons and to maintain transparency. Obviously, language transmits connotations and denotations, a fact which is not lost on me. Therefore, I initially present the original terms in the body of the text with the English-language terms. From that point on, I generally use the English term for simplicity. While I prefer cognates where possible, at times this is not possible, and non-cognates are used. While it is encouraged that these choices may be scrutinized by other scholars, I hope that the terms used will contribute to further research (especially considering the importance of term-based digital searches to present scholars).

When quoting primary documents, I have not altered the original spelling, punctuation, or placement (or absence) of accent marks; nor have I placed “[*sic*]” to denote an error in the original, inasmuch as at the time these usages were not erroneous, *per se*. In those few cases where a discernible error was made in the original, I do draw attention to this.

Chapter 1.

Introduction

Regarding the “Guild or Union” of Maritime Porters in 1855:⁴

“The association in its essence subsists as it was founded in the years of 1500 or much before, and as much for its antiquity as for its originality deserves to be observed in all its aspects, as it is a monument that the sixteenth century has left us for the study of the grave questions that today are agitated around the organization of labor.”

⁴ Biblioteca de Catalunya [BC], *Junta de Comercio*, Leg. CXXII, folio 111r, “Informe del Administrador de Aduanas”, Barcelona, 14 March 1855. Original: “La asociacion en su esencia subsiste tal como se fundó por los años de 1500 ó mucho antes, y tanto por su antigüedad como por su originalidad merece ser observada bajo todos aspectos, pues es un monument que el siglo 16 nos ha dejado para el estudio de las graves cuestiones que en el dia se agitan sobre la organizacion del trabajo.”

1.1 General Overview

This doctoral dissertation analyzes the various maritime cargo-handling guilds that operated in the port city of Barcelona during the transition from the Spanish ancient regime to liberalism. The principal aim is to elucidate the most prominent areas of operation, characteristics, internal functions, and the (especially judicial) interactions of these organizations and show how they, as an economic sector, differentiated in important ways from other guilds.

The guilds studied represent the maritime cargo transportation sub-sector of the service sector. There are important ways in which this classification is relevant to guild studies. First off, the services sector was of considerable economic importance during the period studied (and is arguably more so now). Secondly, guilds in the service sector amount to a relatively understudied aspect of guild studies. The most salient features of guilds in the service sector show significant differences from the craft guilds in the tertiary sector. These differences were most evident in the various organizational models, internal structures and composition.

Liberalism was the main phenomenon that defined the superstructural milieu in which these guilds operated and developed in the time period studied. In this investigation liberalism is treated mainly as a political-economic process – economic liberalization became a major aspect of the liberal political program. I treat both the liberalization of Trans-Atlantic, imperial commerce and the subsequent liberalization of the guilds within their connected historic context, highlighting the participation of a number of key ideologues and increasingly powerful economic sectors in the reform process. The liberalization of both dealt with a number of similar themes: monopoly privileges; encouraging the growth of the national economy through institutional reforms; the common good; and individual freedoms. Finally, I look at the organizational responses of the various maritime-cargo handling guilds of Barcelona in the face of this question of their collective interests and existence.

To begin the investigation, I establish the justification of this dissertation as it pertains to the various, interconnected scholarly perspectives of labor history, social history, labor geography, and economic history. Each of these fields of study has touched upon the guilds. And while the object of study is the same, the questions raised and the methodological approaches are

sometimes quite different. I have used these fields to inform my research, and have found that a multidisciplinary combination of the various approaches allows for a more complete understanding of the matters at issue.

I look at the related issues in the context of the specific place and time investigated – Barcelona, from 1760 to 1840 – in the context of maritime cargo handling. In synthesis, the issues are related to the role of Barcelona as a Mediterranean trade hub, in which a complex universe of cargo-handling trades developed to serve the needs of merchants. I feel that a brief justification of the selection of both the place and time frame are important. I look briefly at the transition from the Spanish Ancien Régime to the process of economic liberalization in Barcelona. This process is important for understanding the precise topic studied; likewise, it represented an epochal paradigm shift throughout Europe and in Spain. Finally, while there are very important differences, there are noteworthy similarities with the ongoing process of globalized economic liberalization.

I also address the logical framework of this dissertation. I lay out the major questions raised in this investigation and some of the hypotheses which I intend to test. As a means of examining these issues, I lay out the methodological and methodical approach of this study – based mainly on the study of the legal and official documents created by the guilds and other institutions.

To place this investigation in its general context, I discuss the historical context of the time period studied. The period was marked by war, revolutions and political instability. The economic context was defined by a dual-pronged paradigm shift – from the ancient regime of artisan production to a liberal, bourgeois model based on vertical control and industrialization. It is important to understand that the experiences of Spain were similar to those of other European monarchies in this general period.

1.2 Structure of the Dissertation

Chapter two covers the historiography and state of the art of guild studies, followed by a review of the literature covering the specific guilds dealt with herein. The in-depth look spans over two hundred years of guild studies, and provides a better context to the reappraisal of the guilds. It is important to understand the guilds, especially (although not exclusively) from a European perspective, as this investigation is largely devoted to understanding the internal mechanisms of the guilds, as well as their interactions with other guilds, non-guild members, and government authorities. I then address the most prominent studies dedicated, specifically, to the maritime cargo-handling guilds of Barcelona and other ports. There are a number of trade-specific studies, which I treat as case studies. I then look at studies surrounding the liberalization of commerce and the trades.

In the third chapter, I describe in detail the areas most relevant to the activities discussed in the chapters of this investigation. I differentiate between place and space, and use these frameworks to describe the principal locations of the port, surrounding neighborhoods, and the interactions between the workers and other groups to appropriate and define these areas.

After establishing the geographic and socio-cultural milieu of the port, the fourth chapter presents an in-depth look at the histories and functional roles of the various maritime cargo-handling guilds in Barcelona. As I show, Barcelona had a highly specialized and well-organized service sector. To put these considerations in a more general context, I have included information about maritime cargo-handling systems in other, contemporary port cities.

The fifth chapter examines the modes of service provision and socialability, with the aim of analyzing the construction of human capital and work cultures. This covers the main models of service provision and some of the leveling mechanisms used in the maritime cargo handling guilds. Chapter six continues the look at the internal characteristics of the guilds. It covers membership dynamics, covering entrance qualification, internal qualification and stratification in some of the guilds. This looks at the functional dynamics of the monopoly of labor market control.

In chapter seven, I examine the question of Liberalization as a political and economic process. I chart the development of commercial liberalization – which in the case of Spain involved maritime commerce, especially with privilege-determined ports in Spain and the colonies in America. I look at the ideological and political processes in which economic liberalization was promoted and, eventually, instituted in an unsystematic progression. Liberalization is fundamental to this investigation, as it resulted in numerous attempts to limit guild privileges and abolish the guilds. In addition to an examination of the processes of liberalization, I also examine the efforts of the guilds to refuse, resist or adapt to these changes.

I present the conclusions of this investigation in chapter eight. As I will show, the service-sector guilds studied here differed significantly from the historic “norm” of craft guilds. In addition, the guilds of Barcelona utilized a great variety of models, operational characteristics, and adaptive strategies in dealing with other guilds, the state, and economic actors. In closing the conclusions, I propose additional lines of further investigation.

1.3 Justification

This investigation aims to contribute to a number of sub-fields of history: labor history and guild studies; port labor studies; and the economic history of liberalism.

Guild studies

Guild studies are in a process of re-evaluation and revision. Long-held interpretations and conceptions are being challenged by a new wave of investigations. These challenges take the form of new methodological and thematic focuses from different, related fields of history. Methodologically, instead of relying on theoretical constructs, recent authors have reevaluated teleological suppositions by returning to the archives. Generally, the aim has been to test old assumptions and highlight exceptions in an attempt to clarify any rules that may remain. In conjunction with the expansion of geographic and temporal focus, scholars have re-focused attention on what aspects of guilds are studied. It seems from the research that the exceptions may outweigh the rules, as it were.

The study of the guilds in labor history has long tended to be largely influenced by ideological considerations, markedly differentiated between case studies of the guilds and histories of the supposedly “new” labor movement in the mid- to late-nineteenth century in the context of early socialist-communist advances. The issue is addressed in the first breaths of the of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Marx & Engels, 1848, p. 14):⁵

The history of all hitherto existing society⁶ is the history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master⁷ and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

⁵ Page refers to the pdf available at <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf>

⁶ Original note: “That is, all written history” (Engels 1888).

⁷ Original note: “Guild-master, that is, a full member of a guild, a master within, not a head of a guild” (Engels 1888).

Marx and Engels continued to describe the death of the old system and the rise of a new class – the industrial proletariat. The re-instatement of guild privileges was at the heart of the fray in 1847-1848 revolutionary Germany, the context in which Marx and Engels wrote the *Manifesto of the Communist Party*. This statement should, therefore, be considered as an opinion or prediction, as opposed to a demonstrable fact. And even if one accepts the validity of the prognostication, it was not true in totality – some sectors did not evolve and even in industrial work there was no clean break from craftsman to proletarian. What is not in question is the tremendous impact of this assessment on the social sciences, particularly labor studies.

These tensions are evident in now-classic histories of the topic (Brentano, 1870; Webb & Webb, 1894) that hinged on the continuity or not, respectively, between the guilds and the trade unions. Writing in the context of the second industrial revolution, Harry Tipper (1922, p. 3) presents the traditional view of discontinuity between guild and union, stating out of hand that the trade union, “is quite different, and rose out of different industrial and social necessities”. While recognizing centuries of “industrial difficulties”, he attributes the considerable change in ownership in the means of production (from craft tools to steam-powered machines) to the change in the organizational structure of workers to the incorporation of steam power to manufacture.

However, this traditional view is being replaced with more nuanced interpretations, as scholarship reveals more about the impact of technology on these ancient organizational structures and provides examples of organizational continuity. In the appreciation of the venerable Eric Hobsbawm (1965, p. 109), the reappraisal of the traditional, non-continuity argument was already “fairly familiar” in the mid-1960s:

The links between such guilds (and analogous organizations) and the subsequent movements of skilled urban wage-workers are also fairly familiar. Broadly speaking, social differentiation within or between crafts produced organizations modeled on the pattern of the older guilds or fraternities, but expressing the specific interests of particular sections, notably the journeymen, and a good deal of the traditional pattern was subsequently taken over – the exact ways are still occasionally in dispute – into the early trade unions of skilled wage-workers in

the industrial period. Alternatively, some of the older journeymen organizations – the French *Compagnonnages* or the German *Gesellenvernbaende* – took over certain trade union functions in the early industrial period before giving way to the more up-to-date trade union pattern.

Even so, the impact of the orthodox Marxist view embodied in the Webbs' view – non-continuity – was such that it was still being specifically challenged almost a century later (Leeson, 1979). It must be recognized that the ideologically inspired view of the Webbs remains paradigmatically hegemonic outside the specialist realm of guild studies.

Guilds as a global phenomenon

In the introduction to a collection of papers dedicated to expanding the focus of guild studies, the editors note that guilds are a topic for global historians, social historians, and economic historians alike (Lucassen, De Moor, & van Zanden, 2008). The conflux of these areas of study largely defines the focus of labor history in a globalizing scenario. Labor history can be understood as a point of encounter between social history and economic history.

The rise of globalism has contributed to an interest in the interconnectedness of markets. Global history has encouraged the study of guilds and “guild-like organizations” throughout the world. While traditional history focused on guilds *per se*; recent investigations incorporate guild-like organizations that meet basic organizational and functional definitions: this makes possible an enriched understanding of labor organizations. The new understanding of the guilds is based on an expanded panorama of investigation, eschewing a Eurocentric focus and expanding the geographic and temporal appreciation beyond the European medieval and modern periods. While it is true that history is local, it is unquestionable that a comparative approach based on related, divergent, and independent experiences can also contribute to understanding of the topic.

While global historians have worked to broaden the geographical panorama, social historians (and particularly labor historians) have worked on the time-frames of study. The traditional view of guilds as purely medieval and early modern organizations – in which their study has been dominated by medievalists and early-modern historians – has faced significant challenges from late-modern and contemporary historians. These efforts have led to a re-examination of the

intricacies of guild functionality and their role within the larger context of the societies in which they operated. Temporal expansion has expanded our collective understanding of ancient guilds, as well as guilds in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. Questions regarding free and unfree labor, and the role of women and children in the guilds (and the economy overall) reveal a more lucid picture of the guilds and their socio-cultural milieu.

A fundamental issue is the role of guilds, and guild members, in society. This has grounded an interest in the socio-cultural activities of the guilds. The once-clear differentiation between religious brotherhoods (confraternities) and guilds is no longer transparent. Current understanding suggests that comprehension of the historic context is crucial to understanding the multiple roles and interchangeability of terminology of these associations. As guilds in a predominantly Catholic country, the guilds studied here help elucidate these issues.

As complex organizations with a significant role in the political and economic life of their communities, guilds are a valid level of analysis for social studies. The similarities with labor unions also allows for interesting investigations, applying methodologies generally used to understand more recent structures *vis-à-vis* their analogous ancient structures. The previously common practice of starting fresh with the unions, without looking at the guilds from which their traditions (and, in some instances, organizations) evolved has given way to an intellectual trend at expanding the temporal context to include the forerunners of the unions. A fine example of this approach is visible in studies of socialability, for example.

It is important to note that guilds remain a relevant organizational structure, especially in those trades or those economies (national or sub-national) in which capitalist penetration is not the dominant mode of ownership of the means of production. Economic Historians are concerned with elucidating the variables that contribute to economic systems and their development over time. Examples from societies with almost all types of economic systems have been studied, from traditional artisan societies – from ancient times to the twentieth century – to the promotion of guild-like organizations in the most *avant-garde* professions of the twenty-first. The question is no longer *whether or not* guilds and guild-like organizations existed, but *to what degree* they were able to defend and advance their interests within changing political and economic regimens.

The means for defending and advancing the interests of members (and of the collective, at least as perceived by masters) are as varied as the challenges they faced. The guilds imposed regulations covering input acquisition, labor market supply and demand, work processes, and market mechanisms. Internally, the guilds employed mutual aid strategies to benefit infirm, injured, and aged members. These benefits were extended to their immediate families through dowry incentives (cash and otherwise), benefits and opportunities for widows, and intangible inheritance in the form of preferential membership treatment for sons and sons-in-law.

Considerable attention has been directed at the internal control mechanisms and contradictions in the guilds, particularly relating to the sometimes conflictive relationships between journeymen and masters. As noted by Hobsbawm, these conflicts contributed to the rise of autonomous or independent organizations (legally recognized or not, permitted or repressed). This issue was a by-product of the capitalist formation within those trades, a process itself connected to the development of technologies that allowed those with sufficient capital to replace wage-earners. Thus, a rich debate in this field regards the effects of guilds (and their privileges) in the retarding of, and/or contribution to, capitalist economic development. These studies address skill and know-how transmission, intellectual property rights, technological developments, barriers to growth, barriers to the concentrated formation of capital, and the prevention of non-privileged individuals from operating in guild-dominated industries and economic activities. Often, these studies are invariably conducted with an eye to economic liberalization, especially those aspects dealing with the abolition of guild monopolies over production and market regulation.

In addition to contributing to existing debates, there is considerable opportunity to similarly expand the sector-based focus of research. Generally speaking, academic investigations have delved deeply into the craft guilds; however, relatively little is known about the workings of service-sector guilds. It is my hope that this investigation contributes to this by focusing on service-sector guilds in a relatively important shipping port during a period of political and economic change – the rise of liberalism.

Labor geography is a relatively new sub-field of economic geography and attempts to define places and spaces from the perspective of labor. I rely on a theoretical approach of the progenitor of this sub-field (Herod, 1995, 1997). As is common with investigations related to

labor history in general, and port labor in particular (Ibarz, 2016), the main focus of research has been on organizations and experiences in an industrial context. I make the case that the analytical framework is applicable to guild studies. In fact, considering the common importance of territorial delimitations, this analytical approach is especially well-suited to understanding the operations of guilds.

Ports and port labor history

In the period studied, the port of Barcelona was an important regional trade hub. It was involved in trade with other Spanish cities, northern European and Mediterranean markets, and operated as an indirect gateway to the Spanish American colonies (through its agents in Cádiz). By 1760, trade with the American colonies was brisk. As a port city in a region with poor terrestrial transportation networks, maritime commerce was always particularly important to the Barcelona economy.

These experiences contributed to the development of important economic instruments and institutions in Barcelona. The law-giving Consulate of the Sea (*Consulado de Mar*) was housed at the *Llotja* (or *Lonja* in Castilian; translated as the Exchange), a wholesale market alongside the port where maritime insurance and the long-distance-trade-facilitating letters of exchange (*letras de cambio*) were bought, traded, and fulfilled alongside bales of the main goods of the medieval market – wool, silks, bulk foodstuffs, and finished artisan products (Castañeda Peirón, 2008). As the reach of the unified Spanish Empire expanded through the conquest of the Americas, the globalizing networks of trade were a crucial aspect of colonial trade and domination. This trade was transatlantic, dependant on ocean-going vessels.

During the period studied, the labor landscape was largely tradition-based, and technological change was yet to revolutionize port activities. Even the first appearance of steamships would have relatively little impact on cargo-handling. The first cranes were introduced after 1840. In this context, labor market regulation was conducted by a variety of different guilds. I look at their socio-judicial definitions – a combination of socio-cultural and legal determinations. They advanced and defended their monopolistic privileges based on Ordinances.

The period studied covers the end of the Spanish ancient regime and the onset of liberalism and the transition from proto-industrialism to the first industrialization of important economic processes (principally textile), ending with the years of the abolition of the guilds in Spain.⁸ The economic system of the Spanish Ancien Régime was re-invigorated by a series of royal decrees emitted based on the values of Enlightenment (*la Ilustración*), not least of which was liberalizing and expanding colonial trade while contributing to the strengthening of *national* economic markets. Contemporary to these market-regulating, centralized measures, technological change in non-cargo sectors was an additional key feature of this period.

Decades of proto-industrial developments gave way to the on-set of the first industrial revolution (Cameron, 1985; Ferrer, 2012). This industrialization was based on coal-fueled steam power, and it would contribute to the position of Barcelona as a locus of the textile industry (Sánchez, 2011a). Economic and demographic growth were inseparable. The labor needs of this transformation were met by a mix of proletarianized artisans and an influx of migrants from a poorly performing and disaster-prone (semi-)feudal rural/agricultural sector.

Similarly, the growth of the textile sector was intrinsically entwined in the ideological fabric of liberalism – the dominant threads of which were to the benefit of the bourgeois textile industrialists: the need to guarantee market access for the products of proto-industrialism provided the impetus to the liberalization of colonial trade; the perceived need to maintain protectionist trade policies in spite of a more pure liberal approach was designed to favor production; and the inputs of industrialized textile production were among the first goods and trades liberalized.

Economic (commercial) liberalization was followed by growth in the popularity of political liberalization – part of the backdrop that came to the forefront as the contradictions in the economy became more significant and in need of resolution. The period studied was marked by revolution and counter-revolution, global wars, invasions, occupations, civil wars, popular

⁸ Conveniently, the timeframe of this study correlates with that of the English-centered experience of the First Industrial Revolution (1760-1830) which has been given and arguably accepted as the Industrial Revolution since Ashton, T. S. (1948) *The Industrial revolution 1760-1830*. See, for example: Mokyr, J. (2000). The Industrial Revolution and the Netherlands: Why did it not happen? *De Economist*, 148(4), 503–520. As it will be noted, the Spanish experience of the First Industrial Revolution started later, but is still covered in this study, although peripherally.

rebellions, and any number of intrigues. In the end, the fundamentals of political liberalism won out, and absolutist monarchies across Europe were replaced by republics and constitutional monarchies: Spain was no exception (although this process was neither smooth nor guaranteed at any time).

Lest there be any doubt, liberalization remains a recurring topic as it relates to labor studies.⁹

⁹ Labor unrest remains over the continued liberalization of the port sector. See, for example, *El País*, “Los estibadores españoles convocan huelga los días 20, 22 y 24 de febrero”, 8 February 2017. [available at http://economia.elpais.com/economia/2017/02/08/actualidad/1486555382_419906.html; last consulted 14 February 2017].

1.4 Objective, hypotheses, methodology and methods

The objective of this investigation is to elucidate the maritime cargo handling sub-sector as a means of better understanding the functioning of guilds, especially as they reacted to the progressive development of liberalism, which amounted to a considerable challenge to the guild system.

The main questions addressed deal with the organizational models of the guilds in question. How were they organized? How did these organizational structures change over time, especially in the context of increasing specialization, technological change, competition, and economic liberalization? What was the membership composition and how did these components interact? What were the characteristics of the privileges enjoyed by the guilds, and how did the guilds defend and advance these privileges? What situations created difficulties, and how did the guilds respond to these challenges? What was the relationship with different government actors and institutions? How did the guilds respond to changing circumstances and the opportunities that arose there from? What considerations influenced the strategies employed?

I hypothesize the following:

1. The monopolistic privilege system divided among the guilds for handling cargo was based on a combination of subjectively and objectively determined characteristics of the cargo and the best means of handling it.
2. These considerations contributed to differences in their service-provision models, which in turn affected the organizational models and organizational cultures of these guilds.
3. Their responses to liberalism were informed by their respective organizational cultures and changes to them. That is, in the face of liberalization, the guilds were dynamic organizations that attempted to maintain or abandon age-old customs, practices, values and privileges, while staying relevant in a changing socio-economic context.

The surrounding questions relate to the organizational strategies that may have been developed to cope with large-scale market changes. Generally speaking in Europe, the internal pressures created by diverging interests in craft guilds – between successful masters and less-successful ones and journeymen, and between journeymen and apprentices – were detrimental to guild

survivability. Centuries of prohibitions on journeymen organizations (called combinations, clubs, or associations in the English tradition) led to serious schisms in the guilds, and placed these journeymen outside the law in many cases. These schisms could evince themselves through organizational changes, responding to the democratic structures; or, they could have been manifested by increased illegitimate competition – if workers felt that their individual interests were better served by not affiliating with the existing guild structures. What was the degree of resilience of the guilds – how flexible were they, without leading to internal dissolution or destruction? In what ways did the guilds respond to these challenges?

Inasmuch as the guilds developed in the context of the Ancien Régime, how did they fare when the hegemonic paradigm shifted? I suspect that the guilds were not *inherently* against the political variety of liberalism – in fact, it is likely that the increased political participation of the guild masters may have been seen as beneficial. However, the economic liberalism – inasmuch as it affected the important privileges upon which guild operations were based – represented a system that was diametrically and fundamentally opposed to the operations and survival of the guilds. With increasing liberalization and de-regulation of markets, I suspect that the economic motivations contributing to internal divisions that may have reached breaking points in the internally competitive guilds (which is to say, those in which the masters competed against each other). After all, the principal aim of the guilds was protecting and promoting the interests of their members.

I hope to find the answers to these questions in the legal records produced by guild actions. The focus on legal documents is preponderant in guild studies. The corpus of legal documents – ordinances, price schedules, legal cases, official requests, *et cetera* – represents a significant source of records. While it is likely to be far more complete during stages when the guilds functioned with official sanction, it may be that the non-legal actions of the (former) guilds may also appear in the records. I have found these documents in a number of guild and government archives; because of the various – sometimes competing – jurisdictions, these include guild, municipal, regional, and military archives, as well as collections of documents produced and stored by local representatives of the central government.

The primary documents shape the analytical framework. The lack of systematic quantitative information from the period makes cliometric analysis difficult. Likewise, while individual-level personal data is available, it is sparse. Furthermore, the people considered here were not of the sort that kept diaries, journals, personal accounts; nor were they the subject of biography. Therefore, I have chosen an approach based on the institutional/organizational level of analysis. I am interested in the collective responses, not only as a more manageable level of interpretation, but also because it lends itself more easily to deducing the relevance of guild studies to more general labor studies. Interestingly, this desire to understand long-standing organizations and their importance to contemporary was reflected in the period studied – or shortly thereafter, as evinced in the 1855 quote from the Customs Administrator.¹⁰

This organizational-level analysis is not intended to de-humanize the participants. At a number of points in this investigation, I highlight opportunities for future study at an individual level. However, the records rarely mention any of the so-called “great men” of history. In this sense, it is a popular history, concerned with the trials, tribulations, and celebrations of working people, as expressed through their organizational combinations.

I support this primary-source research with a careful examination of the existing secondary literature. These cover the field of guild studies at the international and, especially, European levels, from the social and economic historical perspectives. While I do not intend to carry out an exhaustive comparative analysis, I will study other European port cities and the models of service-sector guilds developed there to identify common trends, similarities and differences to better avoid the historicist deficiency of over-localizing phenomena beyond comparison with other cases.

In a similar vein, as my desire is to differentiate the service-sector guilds studied here, it is important to keep in mind the universe of Barcelona’s guilds. To understand the strategies employed by the service guilds, it is beneficial to understand those of the craft guilds. This is especially true in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when journeymen guilds were operating in a number of key industries. Likewise, the importance of the textile sector

¹⁰ BC, *Junta de Comercio*, Leg. CXXII, folio 111, “Informe del Administrador de Aduanas”, Barcelona, 14 March 1855.

cannot be underestimated or overlooked. The textile industry was vital to the economy of Barcelona, and the wealth generated contributed to the creation of a reform-oriented, liberal political block comprised of increasingly powerful merchants and factory owners dedicated to significant import/export activities; textile production was also at the forefront of the organizational and technological changes of proto-industrialization and the first industrial revolution. In response, the reaction of textile-sector workers was also in the vanguard, and their nascent class warfare shook Barcelona during the period studied.

Considering the objective and hypotheses of this investigation, the analytical level is organizational, not individual.

1.5 Archives, Libraries, and Sources Consulted

This investigation has been conducted in Barcelona and Cartagena, Spain. The primary documents are available in archives in these cities, and in virtual archives. Secondary literature has been identified using online search engines and a review of pertinent journals available in the principal academic libraries in Barcelona.

Primary sources

I have consulted primary documents housed in a number of archives, principally located in Barcelona. In these archives, I have focused my attention primarily on normative documents, chiefly amongst these, the privilege-granting ordinances and the legal cases in which their customary privileges were defended.

The primary documents consulted – which form the backbone of this study – are located in a number of thematic and governmental archives. This reflects the changing jurisdictional hegemony under which the guilds operated, as well as their interactions with a variety of institutions related to or controlled by different levels of the changing governmental hierarchy.

The *Arxiu General del Museu Marítim de Barcelona* (AGMMB) [General Archive of the Maritime Museum of Barcelona] is based at the museum of the same name, on the Barcelona coast. The Museum is housed at the old *Drassanes*, or shipyard. The building was an extremely important fixture from at least the fourteenth century. The museum – a multi-jurisdictional, collaborative institution – records and promotes this historical legacy.

The archive houses a number of collections related to the activities and key personalities of Barcelona's maritime history. The collection consulted for this investigation is the *fons del Gremi de bastaixos, macips de ribera i carreters de mar de Barcelona*, the fund of documents produced by and related to the Guild of Maritime Porters (known variably as *bastaixos, macips*

de ribera, et cetera) and Maritime Horsecart Operators (*carreteros de mar*). This collection is rather special, as few guilds were desirous of or able to maintain their records.¹¹

The Maritime Porters Guild collection covers a wide range of time periods and topics. There are documents from the fourteenth through twentieth centuries; the majority of documents date from the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth centuries. The Guild of Maritime Porters transitioned directly into a trade union in 1873, and it was able to maintain a significant portion of its documentation.¹² Most of the documents consulted are in good condition, a testament to the care with which they were kept over the centuries (as well as the skill and dedication of the curators). It seems as though the guild's interest in protecting its documented heritage was a conscious effort (and rightly so, as legal cases sometimes hinged on the guild's ability to produce ancient documents). Other documents include membership registries and deeds of properties (from as early as the fourteenth century) from which the guilds perceived a steady revenue. It is reasonable to assume that the guild made decisions regarding which documents to keep: this *may* create a preponderance of those documents supportive of their views, operations, or legal victories which they considered most relevant, and should be considered with this in mind.

Notarized copies of centuries-old legal documents underscore the relative importance of the antiquity of the organizations and the historic justification of their privileges. The frequency with which guilds used an *argumentum ad antiquitatem* is significant: tradition, customs, and established ways were part and parcel of the guild system. This underscores the dramatic impact of the changes brought about by liberalization, which I examine here. These were not merely perfunctory alterations: liberalization clearly marks not merely a paradigm shift but, indeed, an epochal rupture.

The filing system and box distribution of the Guild of Maritime Porters collection was re-organized during the last phase of my research: it was previously divided into eleven thematic sections; now it is divided into nine, comprised of seventeen boxes. Researchers should keep this in mind, and use the file/document number (a four-digit code, which was not changed) found

¹¹ For example, the archival collection of the Guild of Mariners was lost to fire in the riots of 1835 [according to the periodical *La Mañana*, 13 November 1878].

¹² Other maritime cargo-handling guilds, which ceased operations (and which did not transition to trade unions) do not seem to have preserved their records, so the overall documentary record favors the maritime porters.

in parentheses in the references, as the box (*capsa*) and folder (*carpeta*) may be different in the new system.¹³

In addition to the General Archive, the Museum houses a library of maritime-related books, academic journals, and trade journals. It also publishes books and the indexed academic journal *Drassanes* on topics related to maritime history. The Museum is quite active in promoting events and colloquia related to maritime history. Likewise, it participates actively in the Mediterranean Maritime History Network.

The *Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Barcelona* (AHCB) [Historic Archives of the City of Barcelona], also known as the “*Ardiaca*” for the building in which they are housed, is part of the municipal archive system. It contains a considerable collection of documents from Barcelona’s guilds dealing with the period in which the municipal government was charged with overseeing these organizations. There are a number of folders of documents for the period studied, many having to do with the Board of Commerce and the processes of re-assessing the guild ordinances during the process of de-monopolizing the guild privileges and liberalizing their market behaviors. There are also numerous legal cases from the period studied. For the half-dozen guilds studied here, there are dozens of legal cases. This series is particularly rich in cases from the late eighteenth century and early nineteenth century, showing the strong activities and, arguably, the conflictive co-existence of the guilds. Cases between the maritime cargo-handling guilds and local merchants are also noteworthy in the context of increasing pressure at the municipal level for liberalization. It is worth noting that the Archive has been known and cited by academics as the *Arxiu Històric del Municipi de Barcelona* (AHMB): I only refer to it by the current name. Most of my research was limited to the *Fons de la Junta de Comercio* section devoted to the Board of Commerce and, particularly, its commission dealing with corporations, of which the guilds were the primary example. It is worth noting that the internal call system was re-organized a few years ago, so citations by previous authors are, at times, difficult to consult. The Corporation collection is indexed physically.

¹³ The .pdf guide for the collection is available at: http://www.mmb.cat/img/admin/elements_arxius/arxiu_261_1.pdf

The *Arxiu Municipal Contemporani de Barcelona* (AMCB) [Municipal Contemporary Archives of Barcelona] house municipal documents from around 1820 (an important period of Liberal Government, called the Liberal Triennial) onwards. The archives are divided into thematic areas. The great bulk of the documents are posterior to the period studied. However, some relevant documents were found in the *Hacienda* (Tax/Treasury) section, corresponding to the internal revenue branch of the municipal government. Like the Historic Archive noted above, it is managed by the City of Barcelona (the *Ajuntament*). Unfortunately, not all of the documents in the index were properly catalogued, leading to the impossibility of consulting them. However, their existence, in principal, is evinced in the index (which was conducted many years ago).

Belonging to the Notary College of Barcelona (itself a seven-hundred year old *colegio*, a type of liberal-professional guild), the *Arxiu Històric de Protocols de Barcelona* (AHPB) [Historic Archive of Protocols of Barcelona] houses one of Spain's largest and most expansive collection of notary records. Each notary was required to keep a copy of all notarized documents, bound in a yearly manual, which would eventually be deposited in the care of the College. Of particular interest to this study, the Archive also houses the Manuals of the Scribe of the Sea (*el Escribano del Mar*) – an official position charged with recording matters regarding the maritime guilds covered by the Matriculate of the Sea (*la Matrícula de Mar*).

Among these documents are the minutes from the formal meetings of three of the guilds covered here (known collectively as *Gremios Matriculados* in reference to the naval Matriculate system): fishermen; seamen/mariners; and loaders/unloaders; in addition, there are also minutes relating to the Carpenters of the Riviera and the Caulkers, who functioned in a unified *Gremio de Maestranza* (the Guild of Mastery), as these two guilds had certified master craftsmen. The minutes list the members present and the matters discussed at the regular and extraordinary meetings (always in the presence of the municipal sheriff). The Scribes' Manuals (organized by year) are also replete with a variety of maritime-related documents, like crew contracts, ownership registries, guild mastership certificates, passports, *et cetera*. These Manuals span the entire period study, and offer an invaluable resource for research.

The AHPB has published (for thirty years) an annual academic journal called "*Estudis Històrics i Documents dels Arxius de Protocols*" nourished by research conducted in its archives. A review

of the index of the journal shows a mix of case studies on specific notaries, illustrious people, and thematic studies related to the generally economic documents notarized. However, little has been written on the Scribe of the Sea collection consulted here.

The Ministry of Defense, through the Armada and its Organ of Naval History and Culture, operates the national naval archive network under the direction of the Archival Subsystem. The collection is geographically diffuse, with regional military bases housing documents relating to their historic roles. The Navy's General Archive "Alvaro Bazán" is located in the Province of Castile, at the village of Viso del Marqués.¹⁴ The Archive is now closed to public consultations due to budgetary considerations.

When contacted regarding this investigation, the General Archive directed the author to the *Archivo Naval de Cartagena* (ANC) [Naval Archive of Cartagena]. The Naval Archive of Cartagena is located at the 2nd Brigade Naval Base in the southern Spanish city of Cartagena, Murcia. The Cartagena collection is massive, with many kilometers of files. Most of the collection deals with personnel files from the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; the sections relating to the eighteenth and early nineteenth century are far more modest. The archive houses documents created and stored by the Cartagena Naval Commandant's Office (*la Comandancia de la Marina*). Cartagena was, during the period studied, a major center of Spanish maritime and naval activity. It was responsible for naval activities for the eastern coast of the Iberian peninsula, stretching from the Catalanian Pyrenees at the French border, down to an area just south of Cartagena (at which point the military naval area fell under the auspices of the southern office). For its part, the Northern coast covering Galicia and Asturias was based at El Ferrol. The provinces of the Basque Country enjoyed a series of traditional *fueros* which excluded it from military oversight.

There are legislative and bureaucratic documents relating to the guilds covered by the *Matrícula del Mar* (the Matriculate of the Sea). The importance of the Matriculate – largely a naval recruiting and supply system – was considerable, as it was an administrative mechanism that

¹⁴ The Navy's General Archive "Alvaro Bazán" closed to the public in 2016.

prevented the abolition of matriculated guilds (see Chapter 4 for more information about jurisdiction and the Matriculate).

During the great majority of the period studied here, there were three guilds relating to maritime cargo that were covered by this military organizational mechanism: the mariners (*mareantes*), the loaders/unloaders (*cargadores/descargadores*), and the fishermen (*pescadores*). There are two boxes dedicated to visits conducted by the Comandante de la Marina (the chief officer charged with the naval region of the Eastern Coast of Spain, which covered Catalonia. While the visits constituted military reviews, considerable documentation was created because of an on-going disagreement between the mariners and the loaders/unloaders.

Another box contains the price schedules (*aranceles*) for loading and unloading cargo in the port of Barcelona (and other ports in the military area under Cartagena) during the period covered and beyond (into the twentieth century). This collection is best understood in conjunction with the Guild Assembly meeting minutes recorded by the Scribe of the Sea and housed at the AHPB.

I consulted the *Arxiu de la Diputació de Barcelona* (ADB) [Archive of the Provincial Government of Barcelona]. The provincial government operated across all of the municipalities of the Province of Barcelona. Regarding the matters studied here, the provincial government created and archived documents related to the infrastructural works, particularly the port area.

The *Archivo del Arzobispado de Barcelona* (AAB) [Archives of the Archbishopric of Barcelona] were also consulted, to no avail. The archives house hundreds of documents pertaining to the religious activities of some of the confraternities, but those related to the guilds studied here are not present in the seemingly exhaustive index. This lack of information can only be viewed as detrimental to a detailed understanding of some of the aspects pertaining to the sociability within the guilds.¹⁵ While the religious aspects of guilds have been a staple of guild historiography, existing records relating to those activities in Barcelona are limited. However, other sources do note the participation of the guilds in religious events and celebrations; at the very least, we know that the guilds carried out some religious and cultural activities during the period studied.

¹⁵ I suspect the lack of documents may be related to the multiple attacks on religious facilities, which included the burning of church infrastructures in 1835, 1909, and 1936.

A number of important documents were discovered in the *Biblioteca de Catalunya* (BC) [Library of Catalonia]. These documents were primarily official, including a number of proclamations related to the process of drafting ordinances and price schedules for cargo-handling services. A lengthy and enlightening supplication by some of the merchants of the city to the municipal government in the late 1770s was discovered here. Likewise, documents from the 1850s dealing with the still-functioning Guild of Maritime Porters were also found.

The Library also contains a significant selection of documents produced by the general operations of the Royal Commerce Board of Barcelona (*la Junta Real de Comercio de Barcelona*), more commonly known simply as the *Junta de Comercio*, or the *Junta de Comerç*. The Commerce Board was charged, among other things, with overseeing the operations of the guilds. With this aim, the Board established a Guilds Commission (*Comisión de Gremios*) that undertook the labors of communicating and negotiating with the guilds, especially during the process of liberalization.

This *Junta de Comercio* collection includes hundreds of communications between the Commission and the guilds from the first decades of the nineteenth century. These letters evince the variety of guilds and relate the process of negotiating new ordinances in the years prior to the eventual abolition of the guilds. There are a dozen or so documents related to the existence and issues surrounding the journeymen guilds. The myriad number of guilds suggests that the guilds of Catalonia did not pass quietly into the dustbin of history.¹⁶

I underscore the important efforts of the Pompeu Fabra University in making available significant portions of their collections of primary documents in a digitalized format.

Possible biases in primary documents

The documentation of the guilds is based largely on official documents. As organizations, they were capable – and often required – to create documents; likewise, their activities were noted in official writings. The principal document consulted is the guild *ordenanza* (alternatively called a

¹⁶ It is especially noteworthy that there were guilds of journeymen (though not from the maritime cargo-handling guilds). The relevance of this fact is the argument that the guild system divided between journeymen combinations or associations and the masters' guilds. Likewise, the fact that the guilds studied here did not – it seems – fracture at this time is interesting, as will be discussed.

guild charter or ordinance), as it provided – especially when supported by official pronouncements – the normative framework for the main, work-related activities of the corporation. Additional documents include legal cases, meeting minutes, and formal contracts – all of which were notarized. I was also able to identify and consult internally created documents, like membership rolls, account books, and notes.

The bulk of the primary sources are normative in nature – they represent official, often legal communications. Some of the documents are personal communications by government officials and guild representatives: because of their official positions and the expectation of legal ramifications, these should be considered as such. The legal cases generally present the histories of the adjudicating guilds, as well as the highly subjective view of guild representatives.

Considering the nature of the documentary body, a certain source bias must be recognized: by focusing on lawsuits, an image may develop that the guilds were highly contentious organizations. There are scores of cases between the various guilds and individuals spanning the period studied. There are also references to seizures of products and modes of transportation that were found to be in violation of guild privileges. While it is impossible to say whether or not harmony generally reigned on the waterfront, what is quite clear is that some of the legal cases were brought for what might seem to be somewhat trivial matters. The guilds seem to have defended their privileges with vigor. On the other hand, some cases mention that repetitive violations had motivated judicial action – giving the idea that the courts were perhaps a mechanism of last resort. This gives the impression that the degree of vigilance in defending guild privilege was considerable, yet a system of informal resolution was likely maintained on the waterfront.

Considering this, and taking into account the claims of repeated violations raised by plaintiffs, I feel it is fair to say that the regulation and defense of work and practices by the affected workers and their organizations was significant, but rare. That said, it could be that the cases saved in the archives were considered significant by the guild as they established precedence, and therefore merited protection. However, this is unlikely, as the archive contains a significant variety of documents that seem to be of relatively little importance.

A combination of factors works to hide the daily activities of the guilds from the written record. Generally speaking, their quotidian affairs were rarely newsworthy. Literary references are noteworthy for their ability to convey the construed conceptualization of the author, although it may shed light on common socio-cultural views – at least those of the socio-economic cohort of the author.

The reliance on official documents creates an analytic framework of legality. This obscures the existence of organizations that were not formally recognized. For example, I have had difficulty in identifying documentation pertaining specifically to the common porters (*camàlichs*, or *mossos de corda* in Catalan), a group that appears to have operated (in one form or another) for centuries but which was forbidden from forming a guild. They are mentioned as defendants in a number of cases, but there is little formal documentation relating to their existence, otherwise. It must be said that this could support the accusation that they were not consolidated as organizations.

More generally, legality creates a perception of formality and simplicity, one in which the guilds are seen (or show themselves to be) largely compliant with the hegemonic political bodies. When they hold a contrarian position to that of authority, they tend to frame their communications with humble supplications, appeals to authority, and a generally submissive approach. This may mask a more accurate understanding of their relationships with these bodies.¹⁷

Use of images

The use of artistic images and maps, while not necessarily precise in their contents, is justified by the ability to demonstrate a contemporary understanding of the subject matter (inaccurate as that may be). As is well known in cartography, maps are often based on previous versions. As such, there may have been a series of drafts (elaborated by different people, even) before a final version is sent to print. Also, because the subject matter or agency responsible for commissioning the work was – as often as not – governmental or military, this impacts the focus

¹⁷ A fine example of this arises in the context of the popular, anti-clerical and anti-industrial actions of Barcelona in 1835.

of the pieces (Fournier-Antonini, 2012). There are some very fine maritime maps from the period, developed to show the depths of the port area.

It is quite clear that there are some significant differences among pieces from the same period – even in matters that would seem rather straight-forward, such as the location or appearance of a predominant gate in the walls surrounding the city.

Likewise, some images corresponding to a posterior period have been used, as they illustrate concepts or realities that are hypothesized to be little changed or little different from those of the time period studied here. In all cases, I note the year of creation (if known) and/or publication, for clarity and academic honesty.

Secondary Sources

The great majority of the secondary sources consulted in this investigation are available through Google Scholar, or at academic libraries in Barcelona. The University of Barcelona operates the multi-library *Centre de Recursos per a l'Aprenentatge i la Investigació* (CRAI) [Center of Resources for Learning and Investigation]. This was my principal source of books and served for consultation of academic journals that – for whatever reason – are not indexed or available digitally. Likewise, I was allowed consult the Library of the Pompeu Fabra University, of Barcelona. This library has a significant collection of books, and also has access to a large selection of journals. I also relied on local and international booksellers for some works that were unavailable at these libraries.

Significant primary source research was also conducted via Google. This research was conducted using key terms in English, Catalan, and Castilian. This system includes the JStor database, which was also consulted individually. Also worth noting is the online database of articles published in Catalan or by principally Catalanian-themed journals, the cooperative of *Revistes Catalanes amb Accés Obert* (RACO) [Catalan Journals with Open Access]. This is an invaluable resource for research covering Catalonia.

The articles consulted deal with a variety of topics and academic fields. Principally, they are in English, Castilian, and Catalan; these cover global and European, Spanish, and Catalanian areas

of focus, respectively. As for academic areas, the fields of social and economic history predominate, although there are some pieces from the fields of sociology, geography, political science, urban studies, art history, women's studies, and cultural history. This has contributed to a multi-discipline approach.

The secondary literature covers the economic and political systems (ancient regime and liberal), and the ways in which they developed in Spain, Catalonia and, especially, Barcelona during the period studied. I dedicate significant attention to the historiography of guild studies – from the period studied to the present – to properly elucidate this complex and often misunderstood socio-economic structure. The guilds functioned as veritable institutions unto themselves: their activities are relevant to students across the humanities.

In the case of the studies of the maritime-cargo handling guilds in Barcelona, a common pool of documents is generally used in research. That is, when the same documents are used, it is difficult to contrast these with other records or to contradict them. In this way, there may be a compounding of the possible primary document biases.

Possible biases of the secondary literature

Possible biases in the secondary literature may also include those derived from personal views or the constraints of the specific fields of investigation. There is a tendency in labor history for scholar-activism, by which investigators have personal-political interests that may affect the focus or interpretation of their work. Likewise, the political implications of the construction of a political polity can be widely accepted – even taken for granted – in the immediate academic community, but create an interpretive bias or lead to misunderstandings in the larger community. For example, it could lead to attempts – conscious or otherwise – to underscore differences (or, in the worst case, superiority) compared with other communities.

While I am not saying that this has been the case with any of the authors consulted – or, in any case, that it negatively impacted the research or their analysis of the documentary record – it is worthwhile to keep this possible bias in mind. Just as being part of a society can impart analytic frameworks that may go unquestioned, the condition of “outsider” could also impart prejudices,

misunderstandings, or biases into the research. That said, my own status as an “outsider” may be reflected in this investigation.¹⁸

¹⁸ I believe I have largely mitigated this possibility through personal communications with some of the specialists, and by my participation in numerous academic congresses, at which my views have been open to challenge by local experts.

1.6 Historical Context: political, demographic, and economic backdrop

This dissertation looks at the various maritime cargo-handling trades of Barcelona during the period of about 1760 to 1840. In general terms, this period was revolutionary – politically, economically, demographically, and socio-culturally. The time-period studied spans a period covering the reign of King Carlos III (coronated in 1759) through the end of the [First] Carlist War (1839) and the end of the Regency of María Cristina (in 1840). In socio-economic terms, we see the end of the Ancien Régime and the rise of liberalism in the context of the proto-industrialization and the first industrial revolution. This liberalization included the numerous attempts at reducing or eliminating guild privileges and eventually the general abolition of the guilds, a process which receives considerable attention in this investigation. Before looking at the guilds in general, and those of Barcelona, in particular, it is worthwhile to understand the general historical foundation. As is so often the case, it is difficult to separate political and economic causes, philosophies, or interests; what is more, militarism and violence were often part of the mix in the major historic events.

Liberalization was a process – albeit an uneven and unassured one. In the time period covered, and for the topic at hand, the economic liberalization discussed included the expansion of direct trade privileges with the Spanish colonies in the Americas. This was followed shortly by increasing calls from some leading political thinkers and business sectors to remove the restrictive, even monopolistic privileges that underpinned the guild domination of economic activities. This was first felt in the textile trades, which were declared “free” from guild domination, and other strategic sectors followed. The service-sector guilds were lumped in with the other trade guilds. However, as we will see, they were able to differentiate themselves and realign with other strategic sectors of the state in response.

Political and Military context: Civil and European wars and their impacts on Barcelona

The Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (an English group dedicated to popularly spreading general information about the world, including some of the most widely available maps of the early nineteenth century) noted in *The Penny Magazine* that, “Barcelona has

experienced on many occasions the calamitous effects of war”.¹⁹ These “calamitous effects” were both direct and indirect (as they affected maritime trade); few, if any, positive effects have been identified.

Barcelona’s eighteenth century was opened and closed by war. The first decades were marked by the siege and defeat of the City of Barcelona in 1714, during the War of Spanish Succession, and the political ramifications of this outcome. In 1714, after a devastating siege, the city of Barcelona fell to the combined French and Spanish troops of the Borbón family, which was able to impose Phillippe d’Anjou as King Felipe V of Spain. The consolidation of the Borbón claim was largely secured by this victory over Barcelona (Hernández, 2001; Alcoberro i Pericay, 2010). In punishment for siding with the Austrian Hapsburgs against the Borbón claimant, a generally repressive regime was implemented under the dictates of the *Nueva Planta* Decrees (1707-1716) during and shortly after the divisive War of the Spanish Succession (Hernández, 2001, pp. 119–141).

The governance measures were also a response to various, older, larger home-rule efforts at maintaining traditional regional autonomies throughout Spain. Basically – and in addition to other measures – these decrees brought the area of the former Crown of Aragon under the direct jurisdiction of the King in Castile. It can be seen as a nation-building effort that centralized authority and attempted to create a single *Spanish* identity in place of the traditionally dominant regional, autonomous identities.

The centralization was vast and deep – covering laws, organizations, and official language. The once-autonomous municipal government of Barcelona – long a blend of guild, noble and bourgeois privileges – passed to indirect rule by the King via the appointment of 24 *Regidors* (Council Members) dominated by loyal bourgeois and military personnel (Hernández, 2001, pp. 127–141). Military authorities also played an important role in directing government (in this study, the role of the Navy was at times paramount, and able to supersede local rule).

In matters of guild regulation, 1714 marks a division between the former municipal jurisdiction and the central authority of the crown government (Delgado Ribas, 1995). This was especially

¹⁹ *The Penny Magazine of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge*, 16 April 1836, No. 259, pp 1-2.

true for some of the guilds studied here, as part of the Borbón measures was the implementation of a quasi-militarization of the maritime guilds (mariners, fishermen and unloaders) through the Matriculate of the Sea run by the Navy.

During the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the ancient regimes of absolute monarchies across Europe faced serious challenges from liberalism, especially in the form of constitutional monarchy (a process that was neither steady, absolute, nor in any way guaranteed during these years). The American and French Revolutions expanded the concept of political participation, building on bourgeois democracy, which, in turn, was seized upon by an emboldened working class and farmers desirous of electoral inclusion. In the early nineteenth century (amidst the Luddite rebellions) England saw the Chartist movement, which sought to expand suffrage to include working class men. Monarchs came and went – replaced by other dynasties, brought under the guillotine, or forced into exile.

The second half of the eighteenth century saw numerous wars among the European powers, vying to dominate global trade. These periods of warfare would have important consequences on trade – generally marking the nadirs of maritime traffic. An eminent scholar of Catalonian economic development, Pierre Vilar noted the importance of the difficulties faced by maritime commerce during years of war, especially noting 1744-1748, 1780, 1799-1800 (1962, p. 626), bemoaning the destiny of countless families and commercial enterprises (and, by extension, maritime cargo handlers) that had met ruin at the cannonades of fate.

The end of the eighteenth century was distinctly marked by the French Revolution and the anti-royalist terror (which reached Spain as a much-feared idea, if not yet as a practice). Likewise, the beginning of the nineteenth century would be defined by the overflow of French ideas and soldiers in the form of the invasion and occupation of Spain by France, a conflict known locally as *la Guerra del Francès*, or the War of the French. Thousands of Francophiles – known pejoratively as “*afrancesados*” – were exiled to France after the war, eventually returning with progressively radical ideas two decades later (López Tabar, 1999, 2001).

Napoleon’s troops had swept through Europe, bringing with them revolutionary democratic ideas, and occupying Barcelona for a number of years (1808-1814). After a military incursion,

Napoleon placed his older brother Joseph Bonaparte on the Spanish throne as José I – an event that contributed to Spanish rage, leading to a massive war, within the enormous European conflagrations erupting wherever Napoleon marched his troops and met opposition from the monarchies and peoples of Europe. Spain (and in this case, Catalonia) would provide one of the many the battlefields for a colossal, Clausewitzian (1832) duel between two camps of the world’s greatest superpowers; there was a component of civil war as well – in which a liberal-oriented Constitution was created in 1812 – with personal-political allegiances split between the Spanish and French belligerents.

This Spanish War of Independence is masterfully detailed and explained by Adolfo Blanch (1968). Blanch’s history is primarily political, diplomatic, and military in tone and content, masterfully dealing with the complexities of a war with three major belligerents – the English, French and Spanish governments, as well as popular *guerrillas*. Rich with primary source research, this monumental work addresses, day by day, the difficulties and resistance of the Spanish and Catalan peoples. Napoleon’s pretensions can be understood as a sort of radical continuation of eighteenth-century Enlightenment assessments of the weakness of Spanish institutions. Blanch (1968, p. 93) notes an interesting quote by Bonaparte, in which he places his imperial pretensions in the Spanish context of political and economic institutions; Napoleon clearly states his proposal for deep-seated reforms:

“After a long agony, your nation was going to perish. I have seen your ills and I am going to remedy them (...) Your monarchy is old; my mission is aimed at renovating it; I will improve your institutions, and I will make you the beneficiaries of a reform without having to experience ruptures, disorder, or convulsions”.²⁰

Whatever one could say about his intentions, the result of his actions – desired or otherwise – was abysmal, at least in the short term. Whatever the motivation – defense of religion, the Spanish King, the state, the homeland, etc. – popular sentiment exceeded the logistical and

²⁰ Original: “Después de una larga agonía, vuestra nación iba a perecer. He visto vuestros males y voy a remediarlos. (...) Vuestra monarquía es vieja; mi misión se dirige a renovarla; mejoraré vuestras instituciones, y os hare gozar de los beneficios de una reforma sin que experimentéis quebranto, desórdenes ni convulsions”

military limitations faced and a guerrilla campaign was undertaken. The consideration was such that it has been said by no less a historian than Pierre Vilar that the moment affirmed – at least in hindsight – Spanish national unity (de Puig i Oliver, 1997, p. 51) . That said, the defense of the (ironically Borbón) Spanish monarchy was – in the view of de Puig i Oliver – more relevant at the time than a concept of nationhood.

The War was conveniently seized upon by liberal-leaning politicians to promote their political and economic agendas. While, as we shall see, liberalization was already an important ideology, it was given impetus by the Cortes de Cádiz (a gathering of deputies), in which political representatives drafted a constitution (that of 1812) for the monarchy and promoted the liberalization of the trades, along with a considerable body of related legislation: the *Cortes* passed a short-lived abolition of the guilds in 1813 (Cabrillo, 2012; Carrau, 2012; Burrieza, 2013).

As for the impact on Catalonia, de Puig i Oliver (1997) notes that the objective of Napoleon's imperial ambitions was conquest of Spain and Portugal – not Catalonia, per se (although the annexation of Catalonia by France was certainly attempted in the process). He does a fine job of summarizing the most salient features, as well as the impacts on Catalonian society. Noting the “confusion” of the period, he highlights (1997, p. 15) the great importance of the context: “the episode of Napoleon in Catalonia necessitates situating it in its fundamental historic context: the crisis of the old socio-economic system”.²¹ In this context, the Napoleonic revolutionary zeal was aimed at wholesale institutional changes, not just in the general subjugation of the population by the occupying army. And if this French military occupation of the city were not sufficient complication, maritime traffic – including that of the port of Barcelona – was once again harassed and hampered by the British Navy. While the dimensions of the conflict are impressive, it is worth noting the main considerations, to be able to place the activities (or lack thereof) of the maritime-cargo handling guilds in perspective: this period delineates a clear “before” and “after” dichotomy, the “during” portion is largely absent from the documentary record pertaining to the activities of the guilds studied here.

²¹ Original: “(...) l'episodi napoleònic a Catalunya cal situar-lo en el seu context històric fonamental: la crisi del vell sistema econòmic-social.

Not unrelated to the revolutionary zeal of Napoleonic conquest, most of the Spanish colonies in the Americas struck out for freedom, leaving Spain a tattered Empire. Shortly after the end of the Spanish War of Independence, the great majority of the Spanish colonies in America had their own (largely civil) wars of independence – in this case, from Spain. From 1810 – 1825, Spain suffered a series of devastating losses, as Republics replaced colonies across the southern half of the American Continent. Maritime commerce was impacted, and the effects were more systemic than the simple port closures during other conflicts. The independence of Latin American countries compounded the difficulties and hardship left in the wake of the Spanish War of Independence and complicated the dominant mercantilist economic system employed by Spain.

In 1820 Spain saw a socio-political revolution – markedly anti-clerical and bourgeois – that brought to power a Liberal government that, although it lasted only three years before being crushed, would be an important experience for the forward-looking Liberals (Constitutionalists) intent on leaving the Ancien Régime of the absolute monarchy and privileged classes in the past. This was especially true of the industrial bourgeoisie that influenced the economic and political thinking of the period. Ramon Arnabat Mata (2001) describes in great detail this Revolution and the Liberal Triennial from the Catalonian perspective, including the years of civil war from 1822 to 1823, by which the monarchist forces regained control. The Catalonian viewpoint is particularly important in the historiography of the period because of the city’s recovery from the French occupation and the advances of industrial bourgeois liberalism in Barcelona.

Arnabat Mata discusses in great detail the economic policies of the Liberal regime: protectionism for agricultural and manufactured products; metallic taxation; abolition of the *señorial* agricultural system; confiscation and privatization of church property; *et cetera*. Likewise, he clearly places these economic policies in political context: “The economic policies of Liberalism (...) were inserted in the confrontation between two dominant sectors of society: the old privileged classes and the new propertied classes”.²² The former derived their economic power from the direct exploitation of the peasants, the latter, from the capitalist exploitation of manufacturing workers and the indirect exploitation of the peasants.

²² Original: “La política econòmica del liberalisme (...) s’insereix en l’afrontament entre dos sectors domknants de la societat: les velles classes privilegiades I les noves classes propietàries.”

Finally, the end of the period studied was witness to the Carlist War – the product of a crisis of royal succession created by the death of King Fernando VII in 1833. Unlike the early-eighteenth century War of the Spanish Succession, the Carlist War was a local affair – between traditionalist forces intent on placing Carlos on the throne, and constitutionalist monarchists (of lesser and greater degrees of liberalism) desirous of defending the regency of Maria Cristina. Xavier Hernández notes, in regards to the bourgeois revolution that went into full-swing with the death of Fernando VII, that it was a “‘bourgeois revolution without revolution’ but through the way of reform” (2001, p. 151).²³ He also notes a nuanced understanding of the reforms undertaken, noting that they were conducted by an “endemically weak and little developed state” (2001, p. 155).²⁴ In the end, not only were the constitutionalist forces victorious, the more radical elements won out within the internal power struggle. They brought with them, in 1836, a return to the 1813 abolitionist approach to the guild question.

Demographic growth, the urban explosion, and the ramifications on health

The intensification and expansion of economic activities was matched with demographic growth. Besides general implications, these two factors – economic and demographic growth – are also important to keep in mind when considering the efforts of the maritime-cargo-handling guilds to control the labor market as they faced increased pressures on both supply and demand sides of their labor.

The population of Spain grew from eight million in 1700 to eleven million in 1800, of which an estimated 14.2 percent lived in cities with a population of at least 10,000 inhabitants by the latter date (García Sanz, 2008). Pedro Ruiz Torres (2007, p. 76) places this growth in Catalonia the context of demographic change in Spain, overall:

The population grew somewhat more quickly in the first half of the eighteenth century than in the second, and during all of the century the greatest dynamism

²³ Original: “‘Revolució burgesa sense revolució’ per la via de la reforma” (151)

²⁴ Original: “un estat endèmicament dèbil i poc estructurat” (155)

occurred, above all, in the Mediterranean strip, with the exception of the Balearic Islands. During the Seventeen Hundreds Catalonia doubled its population (...).²⁵

Ruiz Torres (2007, p. 77) goes on to note that the demographic increase in Catalonia was among the greatest in all of Spain, and it accounted for close to half of the total population growth of Spain during the first half of the eighteenth century.

The population of Barcelona increased dramatically – nearly doubling in less than half a century – from approximately 60,000 people in 1759, to an estimated 100,000 just forty years later, at the close of the century (Hernández, 2001, p. 134). According to Ruiz Torres (2007, p. 82), Barcelona passed 100,000 inhabitants in 1787, compared with the estimated 190,000 inhabitants in Madrid.

Sources at the time give similar figures. *The Penny Magazine* notes that:

“In 1715, after the siege of the previous year the population was reduced to some 37,000 souls. In the course of half a century, the continuance of peace being favourable to industry, wealth accumulated, and the population had increased, in 1769 to 54,000; eighteen years afterwards it had more than doubled, being 111,410. [...] In 1807, the population amounted to 130,000. [...] In 1820 the population was 140,000”.²⁶

The *Penny Magazine* continues in describing the demographic growth of Barcelona. Having lost “one-fifth of the inhabitants” to the Yellow Fever of 1821, “[w]e find that, in 1830, nine years after the yellow fever had ravaged the town, the population had increased to 160,000 inhabitants”.²⁷

These demographic pressures in the urban centers would have dangerous consequences when the market, and agricultural, and transportation systems (especially when impacted by natural

²⁵ Original: “La población creció de manera algo más rápida en la primera mitad del siglo XVIII que en la segunda, y durante toda la centuria el mayor dinamismo se dio, sobre todo, en la franja mediterránea con la excepción de las islas Baleares. Durante el Setecientos Cataluña duplicó su población (...).”

²⁶ *The Penny Magazine of the Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge*, 16 April 1836, No. 259, p 1.

²⁷ *Ibid.* The 1821 Yellow Fever is covered in detail, below.

phenomena) were unable to guarantee sufficient foodstuffs (particularly grains) at reasonable prices.

In Madrid and elsewhere, this led to serious riots in 1766. Ruiz Torres (2007, p. 343) dedicates a chapter to these riots, underscoring the inability of the antiquated agricultural system and the tumultuous market system for selling grains – which was divided between the old monopolistic system and a more liberal one, which was studied in 1761 and enacted in 1765; the liberalization of other foodstuffs was considered thereafter – to respond to the increased demand caused by demographic growth while maintaining accessible prices:

The traditional preoccupation of the government for supplying Madrid responded as much to the paternal attitude of the king towards his people, especially there where the court was held, as with the maintenance of public order, but had counterproductive effects and resulted more and more unsustainable.²⁸

The leadership of these riots, according to Ruiz Torres (2007, pp. 369–371), was not a bunch of “vagabonds” as claimed by the nobles, but from the artisan class. They rallied around the image of the King, while calling for the death of his reform-oriented ministers. The general response of the royal government was to move towards the end of monopolistic practices and towards the liberalization of commerce, especially where it concerned foodstuffs (Ruiz Torres, 2007, pp. 388–391). Barcelona – perhaps owing mainly to its port, as well as its rural-urban connectivity (designed for import/export connectivity) – was able to avoid riots that summer.

Special climactic situations could also wreck havoc beyond matters related to distribution. The harvests of 1821 and 1822 were affected by harsh droughts, simultaneously resulting in price hikes for grains and a severe reduction in the demand for agricultural labor (Arnabat Mata, 2001, pp. 199–202). By mid-September, the situation was becoming critical, as hundreds of “*jornaleros*” (workers – the exact nature/composition of which is unknown) gathered in

²⁸ Original: “La tradicional preocupación del gobierno por el abastecimiento de Madrid respondía tanto a la actitud paternal del rey hacia su pueblo, en especial allí donde se encontraba la corte, como al mantenimiento del orden public, pero tenía efectos contraproducentes y resultaba cada vez más insostenible.”

Barcelona's seat of political power, the Plaça de Sant Jaume, to the cries of, "We are famished! We want bread!" (Arnabat Mata, 2001, p. 194).²⁹

Besides straining the capacity for feeding the population, demographic growth most likely contributed to worsening the dimension of outbreaks of diseases. While the period was marked by a number of relatively small outbreaks, a few epidemics deserve particular attention.

In the midst of the Liberal Triennial (1820-1823), Barcelona was ravaged by an outbreak of yellow fever (*la febre groga* in Catalan) in August 1821 (Arnabat Mata, 2001, pp. 195–199). By the time the fever subsided in December 1821 and January 1822, between eight and ten thousand Barcelonans were killed by the black vomit (Arnabat Mata, 2001, p. 197).

The class dimensions of survival were evident, as the wealthy quickly fled the city, while the poor were left in a city plagued by the mosquito-borne illness, devastated by economic paralyzation and chaos, and at the mercy of municipal attempts to keep the population alive and working in a militarily enforced quarantine of the city.

The port of Barcelona was the epicenter of the outbreak, and it was suspected that the fever was brought from a ship from the colonies. With the outbreak of Yellow Fever, the Barceloneta maritime neighborhood was almost immediately isolated from the rest of the city, which itself was quarantined from the rest of Spain in September. The economic damage of the epidemic was considerable, and long-lasting: while the sanitary quarantine was lifted, the economic embargo of Catalan goods remained in areas of Spain for some time.

In addition to the Yellow Fever outbreak of 1821, cholera was present towards the end of the period studied. Leprosy and other (believed to be) contagious diseases were also a consideration throughout. Medical facilities in the walled city were focused in the Hospital [in what is now the Raval neighborhood], surrounded by other unseemly economic activities that posed a threat to

²⁹ Original: "¡Tenemos hambre! ¡Queremos pan!" Original note: (42) les cites són de M. Crespi "Diario [de memorias de Barcelona (años 1820-1823)]", f. 43-44, 53 I 57 (1821).

the general population.³⁰ The area was also a main textile district, served by the maritime-cargo handling guilds.

It is also worth noting that the very nature of many of the jobs described here were prejudicial to the health and well being of the workers. Shortly after the period focused upon specifically, Monlau wrote *Elementos de higiene pública o arte de conservar la salud de los pueblos* (1847) in which he identified labors that, by their very nature, were damaging to the human body. Listed, for example, was the porter, whose tasks were carried out through brute strength, carrying loads on their backs. This description holds true for the maritime porters and unloaders, who also used their own strength; likewise, the men using horses and mules also relied on significant human strength and energy in their labors.

These matters enter into the guild framework in the issue of semi-retirement. After a set age, masters were sometimes allowed to hire a worker to undertake their labors for them, paying them a wage. In the case of mule renters, for example, masters over the age of retirement could hire a helper, paying him a monthly wage. In other guilds, a pension was paid out during the remainder of a worker's lifetime. These were important mutual aid functions of the guilds – one that differentiated the guildsmen from the lumpen-classes of workers, who had to depend on their meager savings and charity from the Church and traditional forms of social assistance.

The paradigm shift in economic policy

As the Borbón regime was consolidated in the early- and mid-eighteenth century, rulers implemented a process of centralizing reforms aimed at further unifying and strengthening a common Spanish market based on regional integration and colonial commerce. These efforts contemplated significant *attempts* at modernization of the economic system – covering areas like agriculture, colonial trade, technological innovation, scientific pursuits, and strengthening the military. However – in the magisterial appraisal of Pedro Ruiz Torres (2007, p. 443) – the results of these efforts fell short of the effort and the analysis thereof should be without

³⁰ The Raval neighborhood would become a focus of increasing industrial squalor and coal-fired contamination in the decades following the period covered here.

simplifications: “The king and his reformist environment were not the agents of the initiation of the ‘modernization’ of Spain. The period was full of unresolved problems (...).”³¹

These reforms – and the socio-cultural milieu that contributed to them – are known generally as *la Ilustración* (the Enlightenment), a cultural formation replete with metaphors of the torches of reason, of science, of the arts, of economics, and sometimes emanating from the torch of the monarchy, owing to the perception of illustrious leadership, sometimes referred to as “enlightened despotism”. Ruiz Torres (2007, pp. 442–425) discusses the question of enlightened or illustrious “despotism” to show that “enlightened absolutism” is more appropriate, as the centuries old systems in place – in Europe and in Spain – prevented despotism. As for the question of “enlightenment”, he places enlightenment in the global context of Europe (2007, p. 444): “In the context of the eighteenth century, not from the concepts of our epoch, these kings seem ‘illustrious’ in comparison with their predecessors and contemporaries, due to the fact that they were more open to the currents that called for the cultivation of reason and educational improvement”.³²

The Spanish Enlightenment was marked by a re-evaluation of the role of the state in the market. Ruiz Torres (2007, p. 472) places this in historic context: “The first half of the eighteenth century gave rise in Europe to a ever-larger community of scholars of the economy.... Between 1747 and 1756 a true blossoming of works on economics with distinct theoretical focuses was produced”.³³ Local economic institutions were also changed by the Enlightenment reforms. The *Real Junta Particular de Comercio* (the Royal Particular Board of Commerce, known commonly as the *Junta de Comercio*, or Board of Commerce) was established in 1758, with ordinances extended to it in 1763. With the suppression of the ancient Consulate of the Sea (*el Consulado del Mar*) – a common maritime legal system –by the *Nueva Planta* Decrees, the *Llotja* building (located on the Palace Plaza by the port) was available, and served as the seat for

³¹ Original: “El rey y su entorno reformista no fueron los agents del inicio de la ‘modernización’ en España. El periodo estuvo lleno de problemas no resueltos (...).”

³² “En el contexto del siglo XVIII, no desde las concepciones de nuestra época, esos reyes resultaban ‘ilustrados’ en comparación con sus antecesores y coetáneos, debido a que estaban más abiertos a las corrientes que reivindicaban el cultivo de la razón y la mejora educativa.”

³³ Original: “La primera mitad del siglo XVIII dio origen en Europa a una comunidad cada vez mayor de estudiosos de la economía.... Entre 1747 y 1756 se produjo una verdadera eclosión de trabajos de economía con distintos enfoques teóricos.”

the Board of Commerce. Clearly bourgeois in nature, the Board undertook the establishment of arts and trade schools, a nautical school, and weighed in on matters of liberalization of commerce and the guilds.

The discourse relating to expansion of commercial privileges was echoed in calls by the burgeoning merchant class to reform or eradicate the centuries-old guild structure. In both matters, the role of the state was central to the question – should the existing structured economy be replaced by a differently structured economy in which the role of the state is altered, decreased or increased, or should a more *laissez faire* approach be taken? This debate was represented by a number of different views championed by political elites in the mid-eighteenth century (Díez Rodríguez, 2001).

The significance of English ideological positions, and the radical events of the French Revolution were noteworthy, given the importance of foreign works by these ideologues of the late Spanish Enlightenment. Having been half-heartedly and temporarily abolished in France during the Revolutionary period, a similar recipe was in store for the guilds of Spain (Vardi, 1988; Fitzsimmons, 1996).

As regards the abolition of the guilds and their professional monopolies, the debates of the Enlightenment did not reach this conclusion. Instead, guild abolition would resurface, particularly in the Constitutions of 1812, during the Revolution of 1820 and the subsequent *Trienio Liberal* (the Liberal Triennial, the three years of Liberal government) (Arnabat Mata, 2001), and again in the 1830s (in the midst of the Carlist War).

The debate was first centered on the textile trades, which were declared “free” from guild domination. Other strategic sectors followed suit. The service-sector guilds were lumped in with the other trade guilds. However, as we will see, they were able to differentiate themselves and realign with other strategic sectors of the state in response.

To better understand the economic dimensions of the period (especially as they relate to maritime cargo handling in Barcelona), it is worthwhile to discuss three important aspects: agriculture, the textile industry, and maritime commerce.

Agriculture and agricultural exports

The importance of agricultural production was considerable for the Spanish region. It is estimated that the rural economy (a combination of agriculture, livestock, fishing, timber, and rural enterprises and services) constituted some 85 percent of the economy during the eighteenth century (García Sanz, 2008). Critical assessments of this situation place the difficulties of the Spanish economy on the failures of the rural economy (Chastagnaret, 2008; García Sanz, 2008); however, other scholars point to a need to expand long-view approaches and consider the totality of the Spanish economy (not just regional studies of a focus on agricultural production) to place these difficulties in their economic context (Alvarez-Nogal & Prados De La Escosura, 2007). That said, there is general agreement on the fact that agricultural productivity grew (at least somewhat) during the period studied in this investigation. What is not roundly questioned is the continued, significant importance of agricultural production in relation to the maritime-cargo handling guilds, which handled exported goods as well as the imported goods needed to meet the needs of the growing population (Clavera i Monjonell, Carreras, Delgado, & Yáñez, 1992).

The Spanish enlightenment brought changes to agriculture that were both qualitative and quantitative (de Puig i Oliver, 1997; Ruiz Torres, 2007). Gérard Chastagnaret (2008, p. 281) summarized this within the European context in the following manner:

In a general panorama of the Spanish economy between the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries one would insist upon the primacy of agriculture, as much in Spain as in the rest of Europe and immobility would be the dominant tone. That said, the eighteenth century is a period of agricultural growth, with an increase in the surface area cultivated, supported by the State, and with some progresses in culture.³⁴

The economics of the enlightenment period was marked by a physiocratic understanding based on the natural contributions of agriculture, as well as an increased comprehension of the

³⁴ Original: “En un panorama general de la economía española entre los siglos XVIII y XIX se insistiría en la primacía de la agricultura, tanto en España como en el resto de Europa y el inmovilismo sería la tonalidad dominante. Desde luego el siglo XVIII es un periodo de crecimiento agrícola, con un aumento de las superficies cultivadas, apoyado por el Estado, y con unos progresos culturales.”

importance of mercantilist national specialization based on global trade. In this context, agriculture played a key role. In the case of Spain and Catalonia, the main products included wine (and distilled *aguardiente*), olive oil, and grains; wool was also important, especially as the industrialization of the English woolen industry progressed, followed by that of Catalonia. However, nature has limits: growth was predicated on the natural productivity of cultivated areas (García Sanz, 2008).

During the enlightenment, groups of landowners met to discuss new understandings (from throughout the European world) and experimental methodologies for increasing production (Ruiz Torres, 2007; García Sanz, 2008). In the realm of policy, the end of the ancient regime included the termination of some *señorial* (aristocratic) privileges, and promoted the concentration of land in the hands of large-scale landowners, who were able to take advantage of the sale of seized lands: one of the major changes in the countryside was the seizure of Church landholdings, which were immense. These measures can be seen through the optics of revenue-seeking by the state, which saw in agriculture not only the lynchpin of the national economy, but also a source of tax revenue – especially inasmuch as during the ancient regime, the Church customarily claimed ten percent of net production (twenty percent brute) of agriculture on lands within its dominion (García Sanz, 2008).

In this way – from the perspective of the increasingly wage-based rural workforce and from the landowning families that leisured through existence – a basically feudal (albeit increasingly wage-based) system was maintained, although without some of the systemic privileges of the previous centuries.³⁵

(Proto-) Industrialization: the export-driven textile industry

Textile production in Europe was qualitatively transforming from pre-industrial or proto-industrial to industrial, from a putting-out system to centralized factories (Mendels, 1972; J. De Vries, 1994; Jones, 1994). Before progressing in this vein, I must recognize the basic criticisms

³⁵ Arguably, this semi-feudal situation would remain long after, being cited as a fundamental issue as late as the Second Republic and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. See, for example, the assessment of peasant servitude and vengeful repressions by landowners in Preston, P. (2012). *The Spanish Holocaust: Inquisition and Extermination in Twentieth-Century Spain*. United Kingdom: HarperCollins Publishers.

of the concept of “proto-industrialism”, which revolve around the difficulty in distinguishing one phase from its forerunner (or from an etymological understanding that “proto” refers to first, thus separate from the second). While it may be true that pre-industrial is a more correct terminology, it is not as widely accepted in the literature.

For that matter, the very concept of “industry” had a very different meaning in the period considered – referring not to a factory system (powered by water or steam), or even the employment of machines at all, but to the general activities of skilled workers. This is echoed in the concept of the Industrious Revolution (J. De Vries, 1994). Likewise, focusing on a specific trade or economic area can also obscure economic relationships with other sectors. Therefore, while recognizing the validity of the debate (if not the criticisms) I will continue to use the terminology of proto-industrialization (Marfany, 2010; Žmolek, 2013).

While certainly not fully contemporary with the English experience, Spain and Catalonia were not too far behind, especially in the textile trade (Ferrer, 2012; Gonzalez Enciso, 1984; Sánchez, 2011a). Catalonia was a major center of textile production. Alexander Sánchez (2011b) provides a general estimation of the industry that is useful for understanding the dimensions of the industry, which is credited as the forerunner of industrialization and of the engenderer of the Barcelona bourgeoisie. Generally speaking, the textile trade was relatively well-developed prior to the incorporation of steam-powered mills (which began at the end of the period studied).

Increasing economic power would bring with it greater political power, contributing to the rise of the industrial bourgeoisie. Sánchez (2011b, p. 217) notes that the textile magnates, (re-) organized in the Commission of Factories of Yarns, Textiles and Fabric Stamping of Barcelona (*La Comisió de Fàbriques de Filats, Teixits i Estampats de Barcelona*) was comprised of leading members of this rising industrial bourgeoisie:

The Commission would be a key organization in the process of the formation of the Barcelona industrial bourgeoisie. Promoted and lead, above all from its re-launching at the end of the 1820s, by a new generation of factory owners – the industrialists of steam – arising during the Liberal Triennial, would contribute in a decisive manner to form the collective identity of cotton businessmen, and would

do so in times in which the word “revolution” in Catalonia did not only have economic connotations, but also political and social ones.³⁶

He goes on to place the interests of these elite actors and those of their private association in the context of the specific aims of Liberalism, especially as concerned socio-political matters that directly affected their private economic interests. They were able to effectuate their political-economic views through a close relationship with the Commerce Board (*Junta de Comercio*), an organization that would play a central role in liberalizing the trades. Despite the general association of economic Liberalism with the free market, the Commission promoted protectionism when it benefitted their industry (just as the textile factory owners had done in 1760 when faced with an earlier effort at liberalizing the protectionist tariff regime). Sánchez (2011b, p. 217) explains their position:

This agenda was comprised of a series of topics that had as a central axis the fierce defense of protectionism, which the leaders of the Commission would elevate to the category of economic system.³⁷

Sánchez (2011b, p. 218) notes another main issue facing these nascent industrial capitalists: the so-called “labor question” – in which case they promoted a free market ideology:

Even so, two more fronts would also attract their attention during the decade of the 1830s: the labor question and the liberal revolution. These two topics would be determinant in the political evolution of the Commission towards moderate positions, despite the fact that some of its most well-regarded members were [self-] declared progressives. For a good share of the cotton businessmen, the

³⁶ Original: “La Comissió va ser una organització clau en el procés de formació de la burgesia industrial barcelonina. Impulsada i dirigida, sobretot des del seu relançament al final dels anys vint, per una nova generació de fabricants – els industrials del vapor– sorgits durant el Trienni Liberal, va contribuir de manera decisiva a formar la identitat col·lectiva dels empresaris cotoners, i a fer-ho en uns temps en els quals la paraula “revolució” a Catalunya no sols tenia connotacions econòmiques, sinó també polítiques i socials.”

³⁷ Original: “Aquesta agenda la componien una sèrie de temes que tenien com a eix central la defensa aferrissada del prohibicionisme, que els dirigents de la Comissió van elevar a la categoria de sistema econòmic.”

unequivocal commitment to the constitutional regime was perfectly compatible with the most absolute intransigence before the revindications of the workers³⁸

Raveux (2005, p. 158) places nineteenth-century industrialization in this historic context, stressing the importance of textiles:

Throughout the nineteenth century, Barcelona did not limit its activities solely to working cotton; instead it formed part of much wider industrial fabric and territory. However, the city lived and breathed cotton, and it is from its capital that Catalonia begins its process of industrial modernization between 1833 and 1844.³⁹

While Raveux notes “industrial modernization” in Spain as beginning with the operations of the Bonaplata steam-powered factory, the proto-industrial phase of production and the concentrated centralization of productive process in factories predated the application of steam-power to textile production by almost a full century (Sánchez, 2011a, 2011b). As Sánchez notes (2011b, p. 198):

In this sense, we can say that, as well as from the social point of view, the manufacturing stage would contribute to the birth of the modern industry, in generating an important process of entrepreneurial accumulation, not only in the form of capitals and infrastructures, but also of knowledge, capacity and organizational structures.⁴⁰

³⁸ Original: “No obstant, dos fronts més van atraure també la seva atenció durant la dècada de 1830: la qüestió laboral i la revolució liberal. Aquests dos temes van ser determinants en l’evolució política de la Comissió cap a posicions moderades, malgrat que alguns dels seus membres més destacats eren progressistes declarats. Per a bona part dels empresaris cotoners, l’aposta inequívoca pel règim constitucional era perfectament compatible amb la més absoluta intransigència davant les reivindicacions dels treballadors.”

³⁹ Original: “A lo largo del siglo XIX, Barcelona no limita sus actividades sólo al trabajo del algodón sino que forma parte de un tejido y de un territorio industriales mucho más amplios. Sin embargo, es en torno al algodón que la ciudad respira y es a partir de su capital que Cataluña comienza su proceso de modernización industrial entre 1833 y 1844.”

⁴⁰ Original: “En aquest sentit, podem dir que, també des del punt de vista social, l’etapa manufacturera va contribuir al naixement de la indústria moderna, en generar un important procés d’acumulació empresarial, no únicament en forma de capitals i infraestructures, sinó també de coneixements, capacitats i estructures organitzatives.”

The textile industry, built upon strong proto-industrial foundations, was among the first industries mechanized by the incorporation of the self-acting loom. Coal-fueled steam power facilitated the mechanization of a process which, for decades prior had experienced increasing concentration of productive processes and capital. Mechanization resulted in increased production. Both the coal used to power the plants and the textiles stamped with colorful images passed through the port (in the case of the textiles, both entering and leaving the city).

The importance of the cotton textile industry in Catalonia is tied directly to the issues of cargo-handling. As the industry depended on the importation of primary materials, and as the products of these factories – or manufactories as they were commonly called at the time – were largely destined for exportation, the impact on the cargo trades was significant. Maritime commerce was particularly important because of the relative advantages of maritime trade *vis à vis* terrestrial transport, and because of the significance of the colonial commercial relationship.

The importance of this agricultural growth and the production benefits of protoindustrial and early industrial revolution on the maritime-cargo handling trades were significant, as the increase in output led to greater exportation, which in turn created a greater demand for transportation services. This trade was also directly tied to colonial trade, as these exported agricultural and manufactured goods were taken from Barcelona to markets in the Spanish colonies.

Catalonia within the Spanish economy of the Enlightenment: the role of maritime trade

Carmen Sarasúa (2001, p. 40) notes, when describing the port of Cádiz, that, in general, “Seaports were main centers of economic activity in pre-industrial Europe.” They connected distant areas and served as hubs for trade, both internal and external. They acted as focal points for economic activities in an expanding system of interconnected markets, providing access to distant markets for inputs and outputs, thus encouraging production. Port cities played a central role in the transition from protoindustrialization to industrialization within the context of the first economic globalization.

Josep María Delgado Ribas (1995, p. 107) noted the importance of maritime traffic in globalization. He also notes a general lack of academic attention to the importance of ports and the services they offer in this development:

The importance of maritime commerce and transportation in modern industrialization has been amply recognized by international historiography; even so, the role of ports is often forgotten, or at best the object of a partial treatment that limits its focus to the study of the transformation and improvement of port infrastructures. But a port is much more than that; it is, above all, a bounded physical space in which are developed some very complicated labor relations the transformation of which constitutes one of the keys for understanding the birth of “modern” port activity, prepared to respond to the requirements derived from the process of industrialization (...).⁴¹

In noting the “very complicated labor relations”, he refers to three groups that negotiated this dynamic – all of which play central roles in this investigation: the municipal government; users of port services; and the workers’ “corporations that controlled port work” (Delgado Ribas, 1995, p. 108).⁴² He goes on to detail the interests of each group. The municipal authorities were concerned with efficiency, as near-by ports were a constant source of competition. Delgado Ribas (1995, pp. 108–109) states that:

The importers and exporters of merchandise valued different aspects of the port installations: ease of access, protection assured in case of storm, but also against corsair attacks, a judiciary that would decide according to maritime law with greater agility than the ordinary [justice system] and a cheap and efficient labor

⁴¹ Original: “La importancia del comercio y del transporte marítimo en la industrialización moderna ha sido ampliamente reconocida por la historiografía internacional; sin embargo, el papel de los puertos es a menudo olvidado, o a lo sumo objeto de un tratamiento parcial que limita su enfoque al estudio de la transformación y mejora de las infraestructuras portuarias. Pero un puerto es mucho más que eso; es, sobre todo, un espacio físico acotado donde se desarrollan unas relaciones de trabajo muy complejas cuya transformación constituye una de las claves para entender el nacimiento de la actividad portuaria “moderna”, preparada para dar respuesta a los requerimientos que se derivaron del proceso de industrialización (...).” [I discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 3, devoted to the Port of Barcelona as a place and space.]

⁴² By “corporations”, one should understand this to mean guilds.

source, specialized in the execution of the tasks of loading, unloading and transportation of merchandise.⁴³

Meanwhile, the workers corporations (guilds) had their own set of interests. In this way, the port service guilds did not differ significantly from their craft-artisan brothers. Delgado Ribas (1995, p. 109) describes their interests and strategies as follows:

Finally, the corporate organizations in which the port workers tended to organize themselves acted in defense of the economic interests of their affiliates; defense in the face of exterior pressures, tending to modify their privileges or increase their labor productivity without economic counterpart, in the face of other similar corporations, that threatened with invading the area of their exclusive competencies, and “internal” defense of some guildsmen respecting others that for their greater efficiency threatened with expelling from the market the less efficient.⁴⁴

Barcelona had long been a major economic center in Spain, and the principal trade city of Catalonia. Barcelona was also the primary import and export center for the area, a market for a considerable variety of goods and products from around the world. All of these goods – the economic lifeblood of the region – passed through the hands of the men studied here, the maritime cargo handlers. The key to this role was the port.

Economically speaking, the 18th century saw an early integration of the Catalonian regional market, increasingly influenced by central planning by the Royal Government in Madrid. There were beach cities all along the Catalonian coast, capable of loading and unloading cargo – in fact, some of these surpassed Barcelona by some measurements, as they exported one of

⁴³ Original: Los importadores y exportadores de mercancías valoraban diversos aspectos de las instalaciones portuarias: facilidad de acceso, protección asegurada en caso de temporal, pero también frente a ataques corsarios, una justicia que decidiera según el derecho marítimo con mayor agilidad que la ordinaria y una mano de obra barata y eficiente, especializada en el desempeño de las faenas de carga, descarga y transporte de mercancías.

⁴⁴ Original: “Finalmente, las organizaciones corporativas en las cuales tendieron a encuadrarse los trabajadores del puerto actuaban en defensa de los intereses económicos de sus afiliados; defensa frente a las presiones del exterior, tendentes a modificar sus privilegios o aumentar su rendimiento en el trabajo sin contrapartida económica, frente a otras corporaciones afines, que amenazaban con invadir el ámbito de sus competencias exclusivas, y defensa ‘interna’ de unos agremiados respecta a otros que por su mayor eficiencia amenazaban con expulsar del mercado a los menos eficientes.”

Catalonia's chief products – distilled alcohol known as *aguardiente* (Clavera i Monjonell et al., 1992). However, total trade was dominated by Barcelona, the hub from which the spokes spread to parts distant (via land and coastal transportation). Terrestrial transportation – an important aspect of this – benefitted from the infrastructural developments of the previous century (Garcia i Espuche, 1997), but maritime shipping remained dominant. In addition to market integration, there was a tendency of expanding and deepening of economic activity (Yáñez, 2006).

Maritime trade in Barcelona grew during the eighteenth century, especially as Barcelona benefitted from the initial mid-eighteenth century extension of Royal trade privileges with the Americas; although in the assessment of Chastagnaret (2008) the further, general extension of these privileges in 1778 negatively affected Barcelona briefly, but contributed to overall growth.

Andreu Vidiella offers an interesting view of this growth in trade capacity by analyzing the financing of the naval industry in Barcelona during the period just prior to that studied here. Vidiella (1981) studied the manuals of two notaries – one of which was Vicenç Simón, the official Maritime Scribe (*Escribano de Marina* or *Escribano de Mar*). Basing this work largely on the work of some of the best-known authors of the topic (P. Vilar, Martínez Shaw, Molas i Ribalta), Vidiella shows that from 1745-1760, the growth of demand for trade with the colonies drove the exportation of Catalan-produced goods and, in consequence, created demand for more, larger ocean-going vessels. While the time-frame covered in that study predates that focused upon here, it is worth reviewing, as it informs our understanding of the maritime shipping industry.

While market integration in Spain was relevant, another, perhaps more important aspect of this creation of a more generalized national economy was a diffusion of trade with the economically strategic colonies in the Americas. In effect, a policy of increasing free trade with the colonies was enacted by gradually expanding the port cities privileged with this right. It must be noted, however, that the merchants of Barcelona had already found ways around the previous exceptions by operating through offices and agents in Cádiz (Martínez Shaw, 1980, 1981; Fontana i Làzaro, 1987; Hernàndez, 2001; Yáñez, 2006). These processes – indirect trade organized by Barcelona's merchants, and administrative liberalization in Madrid – merit a closer

look, keeping in mind the relationship between the *actual practices* of economic actors and the *apparent response* of central authorities to legitimize these practices.

The relationships between Barcelona's most enterprising merchants and agents in privileged ports were key, as César Yáñez (2006, p. 686) points out: "For its operations with America, for certain, it was indispensable to maintain good relationships with merchants from Cádiz and Lisbon, who stood as authorized co-signatories of the Catalans with the colonial authorities."⁴⁵ Sustained by these relationships, after the fall of Barcelona in 1714, the growing trend for the Catalans was to operate more directly through Cádiz, consolidating the system of indirect trade. As Yáñez explains, this system was again modified in the mid-eighteenth century due to a change in the model of transoceanic transportation because of English piracy – the new system substituted large fleets protected by the Armada with single, authorized vessels. "It was in this context that the Barcelona [commercial] houses began to organize expeditions totally organized in Catalonia, passing by Cádiz only to comply with the formality required by the laws of the Indies" (Yáñez, 2006, p. 687).⁴⁶

This gradual process of indirect trade was followed by the process of increasing liberalization of the privileges of colonial trade in 1765 (which benefitted Barcelona) and 1778, which generalized the right for ports to directly trade with the colonies. This was a legalizing recognition of established practice, as indirect trade conducted by Barcelonan businessmen in Cádiz was common (Martínez Shaw, 1981; Fontana i Làzaro, 1987; Hernàndez, 2001; Yáñez, 2006). The importance of trade with the colonies should not be underestimated. This increasing trade led to the creation of the *Real Compañía de Comercio de Barcelona* in 1756.

César Yáñez (2006) expertly elucidates the role of maritime commerce in the First Globalization, for which he takes a long view; the article covers 1750-1914, but the author recognizes the significantly greater importance of the nineteenth century. He uses the Catalan "cosmopolitan bourgeoisie" of Barcelona to demonstrate his arguments, in the process explaining in broad

⁴⁵ Original: "Para sus operaciones con América, eso sí, era indispensable contar con buenas relaciones con los comerciantes gaditanos y lisboetas, que hicieron de consignatarios autorizados de los catalanes en las autoridades coloniales."

⁴⁶ Original: "Fue en ese contexto que las casa barcelonesas comenzaron a organizar expediciones totalmente organizadas en Cataluña, dirigiéndose a Cádiz sólo para cumplir con la formalidad que exigían las leyes de Indias."

strokes the economic context of the economic activities of the port. He explains how the Catalans' penetration into the Spanish colonies in the Caribbean served as a base of operations for trade with areas beyond Spanish imperial control and jurisdiction – like Brazil, the English colonies in America, and Africa. Yáñez (2006, p. 682) notes the importance of two moments of significance to the history: 1776 when the British lost control of their American colonies; and 1824, in which:

[...] the Battle of Ayacucho consecrated the Spanish defeat in its American dominions. They were fifty years that totally transformed the political map of all of America with the unconfusable sign of decolonization, a last reflex of profound changes in the socio-economic formation of the ancient colonies that induced them to break the colonial pact and reclaim their own government.⁴⁷

He notes the paradoxical relationship between the dusk of the Spanish Empire and the new dawn of Catalan commerce: “The best moment of the Catalan transoceanic economy coincides, then, with the context of the colonial decline of Spain.”⁴⁸ He goes on to differentiate the post-colonial market from the previous model of Spanish colonial trade, which was based on the re-exportation of foreign (European) goods and the importation of precious metals from the colonies to benefit the court. He clarifies that (2006, p. 683):

[...] in the Catalan case of the 1800s, commerce obeyed the internal demands of the economy, they exported products of the country – principally products of the earth – while searching the ports of America for products that were in demand in the local economy, creating an opportunity in which the mercantile, financial and

⁴⁷ Original: “(...) la Batalla de Ayacucho consagra la derrota española en sus dominios americanos. Fueron cincuenta años que transformaron del todo el mapa político de toda América con el signo inconfundible de la descolonización, reflejo último de cambios profundos en la formación socioeconómica de las antiguas colonias que las indujo a romper el pacto colonial y a reclamar el propio gobierno.”

⁴⁸ Original: “El mejor momento de la economía ultramarina catalana coincide, entonces, con la coyuntura del declive colonial español.”

transport services, also their own, encountered in America appropriate markets for expansion.⁴⁹

For his part Ruiz Torres (2007, p. 338) cites the importance of the end of the Seven Years' War, in 1763, with a strategic re-assessment of the colonial trade system. Likewise, this followed the major tactical shift in commercial logistics forced by the end of the convey system due to the devastations caused by the English Navy in 1739 (Ruiz Torres, 2007, p. 499). Whatever the political-military motivation, the ideological and economic debate had been underway for some time. As Ruiz Torres (2007, pp. 338–339) notes, “For some time, there had arisen voices against the colonial Ancien Régime and in favor of the elimination of privileges that restricted trade to one port. For some critics, those privileges were authentically responsible for the ‘Spanish decadence’.”⁵⁰

The end of the eighteenth century was a time of considerable growth, owing to the intensification of agriculture and a growth in industrial – especially textile – productivity through mechanization. Yáñez (2006, pp. 683–684) explains this dynamic:

From a strictly economic perspective, if international commerce grew exponentially beginning at the end of the eighteenth century, this was due fundamentally to the increase in marketable surplus, which was only possible because of a spectacular increase in productivity, first as an effect of agrarian specialization and later as an effect of the mechanization of industrial labor.⁵¹

Delgado Ribas (Delgado Ribas, 1995) also notes the expansion of colonial trade with contributing to a favorable labor panorama for the cargo-handling guilds. However, expansion

⁴⁹ Original: “(...) en el caso catalán del ochocientos, el comercio obedece a las exigencias internas de la economía, se exportan productos del país —principalmente productos de la tierra—, a la vez que se busca en los puertos americanos productos que son demandados por la economía local, dando lugar a que los servicios mercantiles, financieros y de trasportes, también propios, encontraran en América unos mercados propicios para su expansión.”

⁵⁰ Original: “Desde hacía tiempo se habían alzado voces contra el antiguo régimen colonial y a favor de la eliminación de los privilegios que restringían los intercambios a un solo puerto. Para algunos críticos esos privilegios eran los auténticos responsables de la ‘decadencia española’.”

⁵¹ Original: “Desde una perspectiva estrictamente económica, si el comercio internacional creció exponencialmente a partir de finales del siglo XVIII, esto se debió fundamentalmente al aumento de los excedentes comercializables, lo que sólo fue posible por un espectacular incremento de la productividad, primero por efecto de la especialización agraria y más tarde por efecto de la mecanización del trabajo industrial.”

and growth did not occur in a lineal fashion. There were considerable – at times drastic – difficulties during the period. The venerable economic historian Pierre Vilar, in his four-volume opus on the experience of Catalonia within modern Spain (1962), presents a quantified assessment of maritime trade for a period covering the late-eighteenth century. This coincides with the generally favorable view of the period. However, as the eighteenth century drew to a close, a number of externally created factors conspired to devastate maritime commerce.

Chastagnaret (2008, p. 283) notes that, “The war against England declared in October 1796 provoked the sinking of traffic beginning in 1797”.⁵² This was followed by another war between France and England in May 1803, in which Spain entered on the side of France in January 1804. The French occupation of parts of Spain (including Barcelona) from 1808-1814 also negatively impacted commerce. Finally, the collapse of the colonial system brought by the independence of most of the Spanish colonies in America again necessitated a serious re-orientation of maritime trade (Chastagnaret, 2008).

The increase in productive capacity (owing to agricultural growth and a solid foundation of proto-industrialization combined with the technological and organizational changes of the first industrial revolution), combined with greater market access, and corresponded with a general increase in cargo passing through the port. This cargo was not equally distributed among the guilds, but it did bring benefits to the sector over all, for example: the highly valuable finished textiles were handled by maritime porters, while coal was handled by cart operators; increased population meant increased importation of grains handled by maritime teamsters, while transportation into the Catalonian hinterland created opportunities for terrestrial cargo handlers.

In shipping, the first steamships were being deployed in the early nineteenth century, although this was not a considerable factor in Barcelona until later. The transportation of maritime cargo remained largely unchanged from preceding centuries. The vessels deployed continued a centuries-long evolution in design, gradually increasing in capacity, but unchanged in the source of locomotion (Vilar, 1962; Andreu Vidiella, 1981; Martínez Shaw, 1981).

⁵² Original: “La Guerra contra Inglaterra declarada en octubre 1796 provoca el hundimiento del tráfico a partir de 1797.” [The term “*hundimiento*”, or sinking, can safely be understood both literally and figuratively.]

The process of handling the maritime cargo was similarly unchanged. Cranes were not yet in use – goods were moved by the brute strength of people and animals. While there were certainly important changes surfacing – especially in relation to the types and quantities of goods to be handled – the means of handling them was ancient. This work was more complicated than “simply” loading and unloading the goods. There was a series of processes, generally the responsibility of different guildsmen. There were a number of trades, each of them with specific roles within the world of cargo-handling – from the people who unloaded goods and brought them to the shore, to the various modes of transporting those goods on land. The framework for this work was provided by the institutional interactions between these various service-sector guilds.

In turn, the maritime cargo-handling guilds were yet to be affected directly by technological changes when the liberalization of the trades was promoted and eventually enshrined in law. However, these trades were grouped with all the others in the eyes of economic pundits, ideologues, and policy makers. The liberalization of the trades was to be applied to all of the guilds, regardless of the economic sector or the degree of industrialization under way, and without much concern (it can be inferred) to the way this liberalization would affect the actual operations of many of the trades.

Chapter 2.

Historiography and General Considerations of Guild Studies

2.1 Chapter Introduction

This Chapter is aimed at providing a more in-depth look at guilds from an understanding of the various, dominant historiographies and at providing a general comprehension of the guilds. I look at the guilds from a long-view historical perspective, tracing the various hypotheses regarding their organizational lineage. This is important when considering the arguments used by the guilds studied here, many of which were based on the longevity of their organizations. Likewise, it underscores the flexibility of these organizations and their survival over millennia.

I have identified three general historiographic approaches, each responsive to shifts in the dominant economic-historical analytical paradigms. These are the liberal, Marxist, and post-Marxist trends (the latter comprised of heterodox Marxist and non-Marxist frameworks). These frameworks mark the main historiography.

After this, I focus on the guilds in general terms. The attention is primarily on European secondary-sector guilds: some attention is paid to experiences outside of Europe. I discuss the guilds in sections dealing with their general history, varieties, main compositional and functional-operational characteristics, with an eye to the major issues of study (many of which are introduced in the historiographic section).

I briefly describe the notion of a “guild system” – the combination of common minimal components useful in identifying and evaluating guild-like structures; specifically: apprentice, journeyman, and master). The use of the term “guild system” allows for analytical incorporation of “guild-like structures” noted in *Return of the Guilds* (Lucassen et al., 2008). In this way, a global perspective can be appreciated; likewise, the interpretation of analogous structures in the post-legitimated phase is feasible – for those scholars that insist that a *requirement* of “guild” status is that normative designation granted by the authorities.

I then look at the historically prevalent types of guilds: social and parish guilds, merchant guilds, craft guilds and service guilds. These differentiations represent a thousand years of guild formations, showing the evolution of an institutional model. These considerations are important inasmuch as the guilds studied here were service-sector guilds, a designation that has received

scant attention in the academically hegemonic literature. Then, I examine the main characteristics of the guilds, especially the secondary-sector organizations.

After discussing the guilds in general, I look at dockworker studies, particularly those of the collection presented in *Dock Workers: International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970* (Davies et al., 2000a, 2000b). This discussion places this dissertation in its academic context from the perspective of maritime labor history.

To close the historiographic analysis, I discuss the academic work on the specific Barcelona maritime-cargo handling guilds studied here. The principal objective is to establish the main characteristics of guilds in general, to be able to underscore the comparative differences when studying guilds in the service sector.

2.2 A Brief Historiography of Guild Studies

Social history in general – and labor history in particular – are part and parcel of the political and economic debates surrounding political platforms and policies. This tension between perceived role of scholars and the desire for objectivity (or, at least, a recognized, limited subjectivity) is nothing new: Marx (1845) put it this way in the Second Thesis on Feuerbach:

The question whether objective truth can be attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man must prove the truth — i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from practice is a purely *scholastic* question.

After noting this issue of objectivity *versus* subjectivity, Marx famously proposed – in what may be considered the epitome of (revolutionary) academic subjectivity – in the eleventh thesis: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it.” Nor has this consideration of scholar activism fallen out of style nor been limited to revolutionary perspectives. This mutually impacting, dual-directional connection – for better or for worse – between academia and the construction of a socio-political reality has not gone unnoticed by Social Historians. (e.g. Craig, 1972; Bess, 1993; McDaniel, 1995).

This situation was noted in the Keynote Speech for the recent First Conference of the European Labor History Network (ELHN, related to the European Social Science History Conference). Geoff Eley (2015) outlined the historiography of labor history, and noted that the trends of social (and labor) history were closely tied to the development of Marxian praxis. As a result, the end of Soviet imperial (co-) hegemony resulted in an end of Soviet-oriented hegemony in the academy. Put another way, Fukuyama’s (1989) contrarian play on Marx’s Hegelian conceptualization of the so-called “End of History” was, for the sake of this historiography, the end of Social (Labor) History as it was largely understood at the time.⁵³ Put another way, the current paradigm can be seen as the synthesis created out of the liberal thesis of history and the

⁵³ While I do not necessarily agree with Fukuyama’s liberal, determinist approach (offered to counter a socialist, determinist approach), it is worth noting the bounded search term “end of history” produces over 3,000 results in Jstor [as of December 2016].

antithesis provided by Marxism – a combination that attempts to reconcile social, economic, political, cultural, environmental, and other considerations.

The historiographic shift from dialectic-material determinism to multi-discipline investigation has impacted guild studies. Recent scholars have been generally more inclined to view possibilities of continuity between the guilds and trade unions. This underscores the intellectual framework of this investigation, as it fits squarely in the current academic paradigm of attempting to understand a complex series of relationships from various perspectives.

A liberal view of the guilds: the organization of labor according to Adam Smith

It is evident from the works of economic theorists of the eighteenth century that the guild system of masters, journeymen, and apprentices (and their groupings) lasted through the period of proto-industrialization. Perhaps the most famous account from the era is that of Adam Smith. I have chosen to devote the space below to Smith not only because of the quality of his work and its impact on economic philosophy – or because of the reductionist treatment of it by neo-conservative pundits – but, specifically, because it was a highly regarded publication during the Spanish Enlightenment. Smith’s work has also relatively recently been the focus of considerable retreatment (Brown, 1997).

Despite being on the Catholic Church’s Inquisitional list of censored works (those not to be read by the faithful without a license granted by the king), copies of a French-language translation published in London in 1779 were read and shared by political-economic ideologues and functionaries at the end of the eighteenth century, with some of Smith’s ideas resurfacing in proposals for reform (Ruiz Torres, 2007, pp. 590–594). The view of Adam Smith’s work represents, in a general way, the perception of the historic view of the guilds during the liberal, enlightened, proto-industrial period.

Smith (1776) does not generally use the term “guild” in his *Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations*. In fact, he refers to guilds by that term only once (quoting a historian) – specifically to unchartered “adulterine guilds” in “ancient times” in Rome but uses the term “corporation” on numerous occasions (1776, p. 171). This is not to say that Smith pays scant attention to “the trades, the crafts, the mysteries” as organizations – he merely refers to them as

“incorporations” throughout the text (1776, p. 170). In Part Two of Chapter X of Book 1, he cites the royal historiographer and antiquarian Thomas Madox in tracing the development of the ancient universities of Rome to the previous use of incorporation by workers. Smith (1776, pp. 165–166) also posits that the academic university was a copy of the craft and trade organizations’ use of the term:

When those particular incorporations which are now peculiarly called universities were first established, the term of years which it was necessary to study, in order to obtain the degree of master of arts, appears evidently to have been copied from the term of apprenticeship in common trades, of which the incorporations were much more ancient.

Smith discusses aspects of the guild system, like apprenticeship, the conditions of journeymen, and the desirability (or not) of relative monopolies. He notes that the tradition and “policy of Europe considers the labor of all mechanics, artificers, and manufacturers, as skilled labor; and that of all country laborers as common labor” (1776, p. 141). He does not treat the guilds (or their decay) as a topic of much concern, per se, but he does discuss them and efforts by the state to prohibit or encourage associations. He discusses the enforcement of regulations regarding the number of apprentices to master, and other issues faced by workers. He also looks at masters and journeymen and their impact on the price of commodities, wages, wage inequality, and other market considerations. Smith describes his understanding the functioning of apprenticeship in other European countries. In France, five years apprenticeship is served, followed by five years as a *compagnon* (journeyman). Smith lauds Scotland for its shorter apprenticeships (three years being common) and for having a fee structure to lessen the time to be served.

Smith places the journeymen in the “large manufactories [that] so frequently ruin the morals of the [journeyman]” (1776, p. 117). He also discusses the combinations of journeymen and of masters: “We rarely hear, it has been said, of the combinations of masters, though frequently of those of workmen” (1776, p. 94). He goes on to describe the contradictions of class warfare and a concise explanation into the economic and physical violence and counter-violence employed then (as now) between masters (and the supportive state apparatus) versus journeymen.

Smith famously decried the negative effect of combinations on the free determination of prices: “People of the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices” (1776, p. 177). That said, he opines that the correct action of the state is to neither prohibit nor promote these associations: “But though the law cannot hinder people of the same trade from sometimes assembling together, it ought to do nothing to facilitate such assemblies; much less to render them necessary”.

He posits that the increasing mechanization of the trades will be detrimental to the craft system and those who operate in it – but will be to the benefit of the consumer. It should be noted that the English Parliament did attempt to prohibit such associations by enacting the Combination Acts just twenty-five years after Smith’s work was published.

This is the liberal maxim: individual freedom (including the freedom of association) and the non-interference of the state in economic activities. *The Wealth of Nations* was not unknown in Spain in the late eighteenth century (despite being a banned book by the Holy Inquisition). As I will show, the Liberalism espoused in Spain was more interventionist.

The view of Marx and that of orthodox Marxists

The second historiographic view is that of Marx and the orthodox Marxists who followed his interpretation of non-continuity from guilds to trade unions. This class-based (as opposed to craft-based) interpretation is based on the arguments of historical materialism, by which the developments in the modes of production intrinsically altered the organization of work and, by consequence, the organizations of workers.

In the Marxist view, the guilds were made irrelevant as an organizational model by the creation of a two-class society, itself – as Marx posited in reference to the bourgeoisie, but equally applicable to the proletariat – the “product of a long course of development, of a series of revolutions in the modes of production and of exchange” created by industrialization (Marx &

Engels, 1848, p. 15).⁵⁴ It is important to understand the importance of this view in the subsequent century. I am repeating the quote here, as it is important to keep the perspective in mind. The issue of guild non-continuity and the rise of a new, two-class society (or at least one *dominated* by a two-class dynamic) is the focus of Chapter 1 of the *Manifesto of the Communist Party* (Marx & Engels, 1848, p. 14):

The history of all hitherto existing society⁵⁵ is the history of class struggles.

Freeman and slave, patrician and plebeian, lord and serf, guild-master⁵⁶ and journeyman, in a word, oppressor and oppressed, stood in constant opposition to one another, carried on an uninterrupted, now hidden, now open fight, a fight that each time ended, either in a revolutionary reconstitution of society at large, or in the common ruin of the contending classes.

The early, Marxian historiography was aimed principally at underscoring the special characteristics of class-conscious trade unions – differentiating them from the guild system. In the process, the mechanism driving the rise of a two-class society was attributed to industrialization – and not an evolution of the developing contradictions formed within the master-servant relationship at the heart of the craft guild system (by which guild masters employed other masters and, more often, journeymen). As such, these labor histories were *industrial* labor histories.

The orthodox Marxist interpretation was challenged in the mid-to-late nineteenth century by scholars basing their work on archival sources (L. Toulmin Smith, 1870; J. Toulmin Smith & Toulmin Smith, 1870; Brentano, 1870). Brentano formed part of the “Younger Historical School”, influenced by the ideas Schmoller, which included: “[...] economic (especially fiscal) policy and administration; the class structure of society; medieval and later forms of industry, especially of craft guilds and merchant guilds” (Schumpeter, 1954, p. 777–782: 778).

⁵⁴ Page refers to the pdf of the 1969 reprint of the 1888 edition [available at: <https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Manifesto.pdf>; last accessed 20 January 2017].

⁵⁵ Original note: “That is, all written history” (Engels 1888).

⁵⁶ Original note: “Guild-master, that is, a full member of a guild, a master within, not a head of a guild” (Engels 1888).

However, by the end of the nineteenth century, the work of the Webbs (1894) – two of England’s most influential Marxist historians – came to largely dominate the historical appreciation of the guilds for a century by attempting to distance the guilds from the development of the trade unions. They clearly separated the unions from the previous centuries of guild organization and journeyman clubs based on the view that the journeymen organized only temporary associations.

They maintained that guild and trade union were inherently different, and that no evidence of direct continuity existed. They highlighted the *newness* of the industrial proletariat as a defined socio-economic construction. This Marxian thesis has been one of the main focuses of scholarly debate over the intervening century. It is a testament to their work that it was being countered a century later (e.g. Leeson, 1979).

In any case, at least one of the guilds treated here was of direct continuity from guild to union in the mid- to late-nineteenth century.

Approximations to a revision of guild studies

The historiographic review continues with a third approach, constructed by various heterodox, neo-Marxists and by non-Marxists in the mid-nineteenth century. The re-assessment of the orthodox Marxist interpretive model has so far culminated with what has been called the “return of the guilds”, which comprises a significant part of recent literature.

Early proponents of the continuity model include a variety of case studies and in-depth, national approaches dealing with the activities of workers in the early nineteenth century (Darvall, 1934; Hobsbawm, 1951; Thompson, 1963; Hobsbawm, 1965; Leeson, 1973, 1979; Dobson, 1980). The work of Darvall stands out as a detailed, archival examination of the Luddite rebellion that concludes that the organizational basis was far more complicated than merely mob violence.

Eric Hobsbawm (esp. 1951, 1965) and E.P. Thompson (1963) stand among the giants of social history from a (neo-)Marxist perspective. While basically Marxist in their belief in the factual construction of a class, they diverge from the historic materialist approach – by which changes in the ownership of the means of production determine class existence, composition, and relationships – by highlighting the socio-cultural (individual and collective) experiential

components of the historic construction of class consciousness. As heterodox Marxists, they highlighted culturally influenced considerations while still maintaining aspects of the overall global view of the history of the working class. In addition, they often focused on master-journeymen antagonisms within the guild system, and with conflicts between workers and the state.

The preeminent importance of *The Making of the English Working Class* (Thompson, 1963) is noteworthy as a bridge between orthodox Marxist interpretations and the post-structural reassessment of the role of collective identity in the shaping of class. Bryan Palmer, Canadian historian and author of *The making of EP Thompson: Marxism, humanism, and history* (1981) and *E.P. Thompson: Objections and Oppositions* (1994), reflected on the impact of Thompson's work in an interview on the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of Thompson's opus (Gordillo, 2014, p. 112):

British Marxist historians, like Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill or Rodney Hilton, among others, contributed with a Marxist appreciation of capitalist development and of some periods of history, but it was Thompson who really construed a way to see class, which included the experiences of the working class, the cultural development in the formation of a class or the way in which the working class formed its own strategies and structured its own struggles [...].⁵⁷

That is, the creation of the working class is a product of the identities that arise from the socio-economic relationships between collective actors – relationships framed by the control of the means of production. In this way, his work combines the most effective arguments of orthodox Marxism with developing critical approaches.

In continuing with the growing trend at reconsidering guilds and their role in the development of the construction of the working class, R.A. Leeson (1973, 1979) brought purposeful re-

⁵⁷ Original: “Los historiadores marxistas británicos, como Eric Hobsbawm, Christopher Hill o Rodney Hilton, entre otros, contribuyeron con una apreciación marxista del desarrollo capitalista y de algunos periodos de la historia, pero fue Thompson quien realmente construyó una vía para ver la clase, que incluía las experiencias de la clase obrera, el desarrollo cultural en la formación de una clase o las maneras en que la clase obrera formó sus propias estrategias y estructuró sus propias luchas [...].”

assessments of labor history from the perspective of continuity. His two works cited in this investigation deal with two often-passed-over aspects of the journeyman experience: the continuity of guild symbolism by journeyman trade unions; and the intricate world of journeymen combinations, especially the practice of travelling, or tramping, a system made possible through networks of journeymen halls, regional correspondence, financing systems, and identification cards. He unabashedly criticized the still-dominant paradigm of discontinuity, specifically that of the Webbs (1894).

Return of the Guilds

There is little question that the post-modernist criticisms of social history elucidated during the last half of the twentieth century have been important in establishing a new analytical paradigm that rejects the teleological assumptions of deterministic historiography. This reached a climax in the late 1980s and early 1990s, coinciding with the geopolitical changes in the post World War II dual-hegemonic system (capitalist and soviet-socialist). This renewed framework of revision has accompanied – and is likely a product of – the transformation from a bipolar ideological framework dominated by avowedly capitalist and state-socialist perspectives into a multi-polar view of post-structural criticism, within the framework of increasing globalization. Interestingly, where once scholars attempted to understand the development of socialism by studying the trade unions; now, others attempt to understand the development of capitalism by studying the guilds.

It must be noted that these scholars were not the first to analyze the relationship between craft and industrialist production. Even venerable economic historians had drawn conclusions based on the relationship between the two systems. Schumpeter (1954, p. 146) noted succinctly that, “[C]apitalism did not burst upon a world that was a blank: it grew by slow degrees from a pre-existing pattern dominated, in the respect under discussion, by the spirit, institutions, and practice of craft guilds.”

The impact of heterodox Marxists and authors concerned with the lines of continuity is evident in references to these works by some of the scholars involved in the current reappraisal of the guilds (e.g. S. R. Epstein, 1998; Farr, 2000; van der Linden, 2008). José Antolin Nieto Sánchez

and Juan Carlos Zofío Llorente (2015) noted both precursors and late-comers to the “Return of the Guilds” line in Spain, in the context of the dominant, critical view of the guilds as impediments to the development of capitalism. They note that current studies paradoxically attempts new methodologies but receives little attention at the international level.

The most recent contributions to guild studies include the “return of the guilds” school of thought (Lis & Soly, 1994; Farr, 2000; Richardson, 2001, 2004; Lucassen et al., 2008; S. R. Epstein & Prak, 2008a). This research focuses on the multiple contributions of events and trends in the guild period that contributed to the formation of organizational models and practices during the early industrial period. The ability of guilds to act as incubators of skills, technology, and capital accumulation have been noted. By the same measure, a better understanding of the conflicts between journeymen and guild masters have shed light on the subsequent development of labor unions.

What has arisen is a critical, globalist/world history respective of local experiences (rejecting both teleological and historicist approaches). This has necessitated a multi-discipline or inter-discipline approach by historians. In the area of labor studies – and particularly guild studies – this has resulted in a geographic and temporal expansion of the areas of academic interest.

The past decades have seen a resurgence of interest in the study of guilds and “guild-like organizations” a term defined functionally in the introduction to *Return of the Guilds* (Lucassen et al., 2008) [perhaps an unknowing tip-of-the-hat to Anderson’s work (2003) of the same name].

The notion of “guild-like organizations” is interesting, and is not without corollaries in the guild studies of Barcelona. Molas Ribalta described the service guilds among the “Guilds of Rudimentary Structure” or “pre-guilds” (1970, pp. 55–59). However, this (pejorative) descriptor is inaccurate, and reflects an analytical bias. Whatever classification of “rudimentary” could be made, the notion that these were “pre-guilds” suggests that they were on some path towards becoming “guilds” – despite their centuries of successful, largely unchanged existence. These organizations filled all of the labor, economic, socio-cultural, and judicial roles and qualifications of guilds when they existed. The fact that they did not contain apprentices or

journeymen, or that their labors were relatively low-skilled should not preclude their inclusion in guild studies (as such).

The area of study encapsulated in the “Return of the Guilds” is generally comprised of a number of leading scholars (Europeanists, in general). The most influential works revolve around Steven A. Epstein (1991); Maarten Prak (1991); Stephan R. Epstein (1998, 2004, 2008; S. R. Epstein & Prak, 2008a); James R. Farr (1997, 2000); Hugo Soly and Catherine Lis (Lis, Lucassen, & Soly, 1994; Lis & Soly, 1994, 2008; Soly, 2008); Ian Gadd and Patrick Wallis (2006; 2002); Tine de Moor (Lucassen et al., 2008); Jan Lucassen (Kessler & Lucassen, 2008; Lis et al., 1994; Lucassen et al., 2008); and others. In addition to these predominantly social historians, noteworthy economic historians include: Jan Luitan van Zanden (Lucassen et al., 2008) and Gary Richardson (2001, 2004).

A high-note of this effort was an academic conference organized by the International Institute of Social History (IISH) and the research group in social and economic history at the University of Utrecht, held in Utrecht in October 2006, “as a part of a series of conferences on global economic history, a continuation of the Global Economic History Network” coordinated by scholars at the London School of Economics (Lucassen et al., 2008, p. 5). The declared aim of the conference was to bring together Europeanists and non-Europeanists to compare guilds and guild-like organizations from around the world. Many of the papers were published in the IISH’s *Journal International Review of Social History* as Supplement 53, a collection published in book format by Cambridge Press.

These efforts have produced a revision of the dominant paradigm by interpreting the functional roles of guilds, their relationship to the development of trade unions, and to the general development of capitalism. This process has resulted in a re-assessment of the historiographic hegemony of the last century.

However, this line of investigation has met with some criticism. Sheilagh Ogilvie (2004a, 2004b, 2007, 2008, 2014) has been highly critical of the guild-rehabilitating *Return* cohort. Based primarily of research into the behaviors of German guilds, her work is noteworthy for two main of reasons: her gender-perspective; and her critical analysis of monopoly privileges and

their tendency to inhibit capital formation (the focus of her multi-article debate with S.R. Epstein). The criticism of the patriarchal behaviors of the guilds, in general, has remained largely unchallenged. The role of the guilds in capital accumulation and the development of subsequent organizations remain largely open to debate.

In the case of Barcelona, the participation of some guild masters (or their sons) was evident in the development of the factory-based textile industry. Likewise, some guild masters went on to form owners' associations for maritime-cargo handling once internal employment was allowed in the mid-nineteenth century.

The efforts to reinterpret guilds have contributed to a geographic and temporal-economic expansion of the areas of study. Lucassen, De Moor & van Zanden placed the collection of conference papers (released as the book *Return of the Guilds*) in historiographic perspective, specifically within, “the recent emergence of the sub-discipline of ‘global history’, and of its branches ‘global economic history’ and ‘global labor history’” (Lucassen et al., 2008, p. 5). It is worth noting that a salient criticism of this effort (Ogilvie, 2008) had less to do with the globalization of guild studies as with the relationship between guild (in)efficiency and capitalism.

Euro-centrism has historically dominated the study of guilds. Lucassen, De Moor, and Luiten Van Zanden (2008, p. 7) summarized – while, it must be noted, not agreeing with – the predominant understanding of the decay of the guilds:

Guilds were a European medieval phenomenon which stifled entrepreneurship and innovation by laying down specific rules for the production of goods and services, and had therefore become less important in English towns by the seventeenth century, and never became established in the Americas. On the European continent their importance dwindled towards the end of the *Ancien Régime*, when economic corporations were toppled along with the rest of the old order.

They go on to show that much of this predominant view of the guilds has been refuted or re-examined by economic historians. They establish some criteria to be met for the consideration of guild or guild-like institutions. This definition allows for comparisons across geo-cultural and/or temporal divides. The use of the term “guild-like structure” has allowed for expanding institutional comparisons among non-European countries, as well as greater understanding of the universality of guilds beyond Europe (Lucassen et al., 2008). They provide examples of investigations of non-European guilds or guild-like structures – most commonly in highly structured, imperial societies, like China, Japan, India, or the Islamic World.

In Barcelona, the common porters (*camàlichs*) operated a guild-like structure. The principal difference is that their worker organization was never recognized formally by the government.

In summary, the existence of guilds and guild-like structures in global history shows that guilds represent an almost universal form for the social organization of labor. Regarding the Islamic World (a construction that, with all its obfuscations of locality has been used by external and group-member scholars), there are studies that try to trace their origins to Byzantium (and hence, to Rome) or later, medieval roots (Lewis, 1937). Lewis (1937, p. 26) expounds on two visions of the origins of Muslim guilds, reaching the conclusion that:

The Islamic guilds would thus be a synthesis of a material framework of organization inherited or imitated from the Greco-Roman world, and a system of ideas coming essentially from Syro-Persian civilization, giving as result a movement at once Islamic, Hellenistic, interconfessional, philosophic and corporatist.

Important studies of the Islamic guilds include Inalcik (1969), Toledano (1981), Yildirim (2006), and Hamdani (2002). The recent scholarship has re-examined the Islamic guilds, providing a more nuanced interpretation and echoing the complexities of academic understanding of the European varieties.

The organizations in Russia did not meet the minimum criteria of guilds – at least according to Gerschenkron (1952) in his review of Lyashenko’s *History of the National Economy of Russia to*

the 1917 Revolution. However, Tugan-Baranovsky (1970) uses the terminology of guilds to describe the types of workers, adopted from the English terms. These terms are not translated, but are instead kept in Russian (albeit without the Cyrillic lettering).⁵⁸ Likewise, Kessler and Lucassen (2008) discuss the experience of the Russian brick-makers under the state-directed Masonry Chancellery as a guild-like structure in that it united skilled craftsmen differentiated between their hierarchical levels.

The colonial expansion of European power brought with it the transmission of the organizations depended upon to order and regulate economic activities. This was the case in English and Spanish colonies in America, as well as European colonies in Africa. The U.S. scholarship looks at the English foundations of U.S. legal precedence (Perlman, 1922; Morris, 1937, p. esp. 60-67; Wilentz, 1983)

In the case of the Spanish colonies, these studies include more traditional investigations into the guilds themselves (e.g. Gutiérrez, 2014) as well as attempts at drawing connections with industrial organizations (Albro, 1996; Hart & Norvell, 1998).

Relatively little English-language scholarship covers the functioning of guilds in Africa. However, there is information on pre-colonial guild-like structures (e.g. Crowley, 1970), the changes brought about through colonization (Lloyd, 1953) and the resulting technological change (Neaher, 1979). This generally holds true for scholarship of maritime cargo handlers, despite the identified need, in hopes of contributing to a global history of labor (Davies et al., 2000a; Ibarz, 2016).

The importance of these criticisms has led social scientists towards a more holistic, global approach in which the interconnectedness of history and historical phenomena are kept in mind – even if totality is, in practice, not achievable. The methodological result of this is an increased attention to multi-discipline study and cross-field collaboration.

⁵⁸ The Russian word for skilled worker or foreman is “*master*” or “*masterovoi*” where “*podmaster’e*” is used to refer to a journeyman or foreman’s assistant.

2.3 The guilds: a millennial, global history

Having addressed the historiographic framework, it is important to outline the European and global history of guilds in general. This has mostly been formulated based on the experiences of trade-based craft guilds. By noting their main characteristics, the differences and similarities between these and the guilds in the service sector become more apparent.

The etymological foundation of “guild” or “gild” is derived from *geld*, or gold – referring to the entry payment required to join. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (Bradley, Craigie, Murray, & Talbut Onions, 1970, pp. 493–494), the term gild, or guild, is derived from the ancient Teutonic root “geld”, meaning “to pay, contribute” or “to sacrifice, worship”. Black (1984) traces the term to at least 450 CE, and uses the older spelling, “gild” to denote the older structure from modern variants. The modern spelling “guild” has been used since the 1600s, whereas the earlier version, “gild”, remained in use primarily through the early eighteenth century at least, (for example, by Thomas Madox, upon whose work Adam Smith bases his summarized history) and generally disappearing from the literature in the late twentieth century.

Even in the cloudy beginnings of the emergence of the written records of the guilds, the terms they used to describe themselves were varied: “‘craft’, ‘fraternity’, ‘mistry’, ‘brotherhood’, or occasionally ‘company’” (Leeson, 1979, p. 26). Other terms in Latin are recorded: *universitas*, *collegia*, *societas*, or *scholae* (A. Smith, 1776; Renard & Terry, 1918; Black, 1984; Gabba, 1984). Some differentiation is made among these terms in Latin, but this has apparently been obscured or dissipated over time (A. Smith, 1776). In Rome, there were *collegia* of religious, educational, and professional varieties, with similarly obscured ancient pasts (Gabba, 1984). The same apparently holds true for Babylon (Lambert, 1996). Linguistic continuity may impact the perception of organizational continuity.

This occurs in Castilian. The noun *gremio* or adjective *gremial* are still used in Spanish to describe a professional body (formal or otherwise), whether or not it is predominantly structured along the lines of a trade union, industrial union, or guild (e.g. Mellado Ruiz, Barría Oyarzún, Besoain Flores, & Enríquez Carrera, 2006). Likewise, in Barcelona, the term *colegio* refers to organizations of liberal professions (notaries, surgeons, architects, and others) while *gremio* was

used for non-liberal, manual trades (García Sánchez, 1998, pp. 523–524). There are still professional and mercantile associations called *colegios* and *gremios* in the city.

Pedro Ruiz Torres (2007, pp. 121–122) notes that the *colegio-gremio* stratification applied to merchants as well as technically qualified trades. Likewise, the social perception of the trades was determined by technical qualification, of which those trades based on manual labor were considered the lowest. The importance of this hierarchical model justifies citing this rather lengthy quote:

[...O]ther professions which today we give the name of “liberal”, for example that of surgeon or notary, were seen then in a very distinct way, than mechanical or manual professions that required empirical or artisan formation, and were not studied in the universities. The great merchants, dedicated to the wholesale of all types of products, did not want to be confused with the small merchants comprised of guilds of merchants of determined products, vendors in stores or bodegas specialized in a single product. The “honorable trades”, in function of the demand for greater learning and technical mastery, like those that received the qualification of artistic (painters, sculptors and in general the fine arts, but also goldsmiths and upholsterers), as well as the work of notaries and scribes, surgeons, apothecaries, and wholesale commercial agents or monetary agents [*corredores de lonja* or *de cambios*], had established their own social barrier with the rest of the trades that received the pejorative qualification of purely “mechanical”. These latter ones occupied an inferior place on the “cascade of disparagement” by which the Ancien Régime was ruled.⁵⁹

⁵⁹ Original: “(...) [O]tras profesiones a las que hoy en día damos el nombre de ‘liberales’, por ejemplo la de cirujano o la de notario, eran vistas entonces de un modo muy distinto, como profesiones mecánicas o manuales por requerir una formación empírica y artesanal y no estudiarse en las universidades. Los grandes comerciantes, dedicados a la venta al por mayor de toda clase de productos, no querían confundirse con el pequeño comercio integrado por gremios de comerciantes de productos determinados, mercaderes de tienda o botica especializados en un solo producto. Los ‘oficios honorables’ en función de la exigencia de un mayor aprendizaje y dominio de la técnica, como los que recibían el calificativo de de artísticas (la pintura, la escultura y en general las bellas artes, pero también la orfebrería y la tapicería), así como el trabajo de los notarios o escribanos, los cirujanos, los boticarios o los corredores de lonja o de cambio, habían establecido su propia barrera social con los restantes oficios que recibían el calificativo peyorativo de puramente ‘mecánicos’. Estos últimos ocupaban el lugar inferior de la “cascada de menosprecio” por la que se regía el antiguo regimen.”

Most importantly for the present study – the role of manual laborers was the least respected of all the economic actors, despite their fundamental importance to the overall functionality and success of the economy. Ruiz Torres continues:

Among all of the trades, the most disparaged, following a similar mentality, were those of the manual type, thus the disparagement of which they were the object. Even so, precisely thanks to “mechanical” work the elevated living level of the groups with greater privileges and [that were] themselves incapable of creating wealth was maintained.⁶⁰

This differentiation was especially important during the liberalizing attempts at abolishing the guilds, as the liberal *colegios* were not abolished, and many of them survive to this day. The functional, normative, and organizational differences between liberal *colegios* and non-liberal *gremios* are few, if any. The survival of the *colegios* is an important source for the study of guild flexibility and organizational continuities (e.g. Gunzberg Moll, 1995; Castañeda Peirón, 2008).

This separated definition hinges on a number of important ideas. First of all, it is a socio-economic system – it is not simply an economic organization; instead, it is a complex socio-economic relationship with significant cultural and political considerations. The sphere of influence of the guilds was never purely economic. Arguably, that was the most important relationship, one which forms the foundation of labor relations between master and servant to this day. Within the guild relationship there were unpaid servants (apprentices) and remunerated servants (journeymen) – this is in addition to a myriad of other classes of workers – slaves, indentured servants, and non-guild workers. The term “servant” has developed a different colloquial definition than the original, which is preserved in the English and American legal systems (i.e., an employee). This is also true of “freedom”, which originally denoted the status of socio-economic and political liberty acquired through guild or journeyman club membership (Rosenband, 1999).

⁶⁰ Original: “Entre todos los oficios aquellos que más envilecían, según una mentalidad semejante, eran los de tipo manual, de ahí el menosprecio de que eran objeto. Sin embargo, precisamente gracias al trabajo ‘mecánico’ se mantenía el elevado nivel de vida de los grupos con mayores privilegios e incapaces por sí mismos de crear riqueza.”

A long-view history of guilds

Guild-related documents are replete with references to the ancient origins of the guilds. The basis of their ordinances (often called guild charters) was consistently purported to be traditional customs. This question has resulted in a variety of hypothesis about the origins of the guilds. This is complicated by significant vacancies in the historic record. In Western Europe, the post-classical “Dark Ages” remain such largely because the documentation that would shed light on that complex era is absent. This is not so in the Eastern Roman Empire, where the system remained as established in the Justinian and Theodosian codes (Lewis, 1937; Gabba, 1984; S. A. Epstein, 1991).

This ignorance has not prevented the development of a plethora of (sometimes colorful) hypotheses to explain the origins of the guilds. What follows is a summary of these hypotheses. It is worth keeping in mind the above-described historiographic changes, *vis-à-vis* the development of the hegemonic ideological or academic paradigm. This is especially valuable when considering the present work, which is undertaken in the academic context of a globalization of guild studies, in which the experiences of guilds beyond the European core are valued and brought into context.

Over the years, a generalized historiography has developed, with its self-contained divergences of hypotheses at crucial historical moments. The organization of workers universally predates the formalization of their structures by governing bodies. Some scholars look to the most ancient sources available, applying the language and concepts of the guild into their interpretations. Documents from Babylon discuss groups of professionals adopting a common surname as guilds (Lambert, 1996); guilds were also functioning in Assyria and in Jewish Babylon (Mendelsohn, 1940; Wischnitzer, 1950; Ross, 1974).

The origins of the European guilds are generally discussed in the framework of European historical development. The Roman *collegia* are believed to have been copies or descendents of the earlier Greek organizations (Black, 1984; Gabba, 1984). S. A. Epstein (1991) gives a fine outline of the early history of the guilds, looking at the Roman and Byzantine *collegia* (in his view, modeled on Greek predecessors) and the early Christian guilds of Europe. Distinctions are

drawn with the ancient varieties, especially the Roman *collegia* and their Byzantine descendants – although the debate over continuity through the middle ages is not resolved (Renard & Terry, 1918; Black, 1984).

Some scholars posit a northern, Teutonic foundation (coinciding with the terminology of guild) while others look for survivor and descendent guilds in the scattered remains of the Roman Empire, particularly in southern France or Italy – or through Byzantium (Renard & Terry, 1918). Other authors see the organization of skilled workers as a universal, *spontaneous* phenomena (Kramer, 1905). In the case of England, Epstein (1991) shows that in 688-694 King Ine of Wessex codified laws that referred to guild associates; whereas the first evidence of a general sanction of English craft guilds is dated to Henry II (1154-1189). Anarcho-syndicalist militant and historian, Diego Abad de Santillán refers to armies of guildsmen who fought against the Amiridas in Moorish Córdoba in the tenth century, but also states that the *gremios* were of spontaneous creation across Spain, starting as *cofradías* and transforming quickly into technical associations “... first in León and Castile, then in Aragón and Catalonia; and not rarely did the technical corporation evolve circumstantially to the condition of organization of resistance and struggle” (1967, p. 14).⁶¹

The guilds are generally considered as complex social-professional corporations. In historic terms, distinctions can be drawn between social, or parish, guilds (in which matters of trade and manufacture were irrelevant) and the labor or professional associations (craft guilds and merchant guilds) in which the trade was fundamental. The social guilds are known by a variety of terms, and may or may not have had religious sanction or function. Professional guilds are generally divided into either craft guilds or merchant guilds. The complexity gives rise to considerable confusion, especially considering the changing meaning of the terms employed. Some authors refer to social, or parish guilds of professionally related or unrelated members, joined for mutual aid or religious functions (Brentano, 1870; Thijs, 2006).

It is interesting to keep in mind that there was – at least in some areas – a historical progression among these guilds. The parish or social guilds appear to have predated the trade-oriented

⁶¹ Original: “[...] primero en León y Castilla, luego en Aragón y Cataluña; y no raramente la corporación técnica evolucionó circunstancialmente a la condición de organización de resistencia y de lucha”.

organizations. Likewise, the development of trade associations progressed from general, village-wide collections (merchant guilds) in which many trades were organized, to a system of single-trade craft guilds. Kramer (1927) posits that merchant guilds gave rise to craft guilds as the number of similar producers reached a critical mass in a given area, at which time trades broke away to form their own corporations. Some early merchant guilds were of general membership, not necessarily divided by product (Brentano, 1870). This is certainly likely in small towns and villages; even as late as early nineteenth-century Catalonia there were general, multi-trade merchant guilds in some towns and small cities.⁶² In some cases, these merchant guilds were also called social, parish, or village guilds (see below). The general organization of crafts in guilds predates the formal foundation of the craft-specific companies. Since the existence of guilds seems to predate the existing record, it is likely impossible to definitively establish which type of professional guild appeared first.

While this investigation focuses on professional guilds, it should be kept in mind that there is significant danger in oversimplifying the complexity of the variety of guilds – especially considering the economic implications of non-professionally organized bodies.

In the case of Barcelona, the apparently clear-cut difference between mutual-aid based confraternities (often based around a patron saint) and guilds is obfuscated by cross-membership and organizational relationships by which the confraternities were under the control of the guild.

Social, parish, and village guilds

Social, parish, or village guilds generally receive less attention in economic studies than the professional bodies, despite being older (most likely) and representing the majority of responses recorded in 1389 (L. Toulmin Smith, 1870; Chisholm, 1910). When considering these, it is good to keep in mind that the parish could act as a geographic jurisdictional determination. According to Leeson, “The most numerous were those once termed ‘social’, but are now perhaps more accurately ‘parish’ guilds, groups of people of the ‘poorer’ or ‘middling sort’. (No mayors or

⁶² BC, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio*, Legajo XXXVIII (Caja 54), Nos. 1-3 [1825-1827]. The collection contains a number of communications and the resolution of disputes from multi-trade guilds from nearby towns reporting to the authorities in Barcelona.

bailiffs admitted, said one.)” (Leeson 1979: 25). Other guilds only admitted people of honor and good reputation.

Social guilds developed for fraternization and mutual aid – like insurance in case of fire, sickness, disability, old-age, or death (Bos, 2006; Thijs, 2006). Parish guilds (which likely represent the cooptation by the church of ancient structures) provided for church supplies, wages, and the coordination of pilgrimages. These societies were not just limited to social functions or the provision of church services or supplies, but many also carried out any number of infrastructural activities that would come to be considered municipal functions – like the construction or maintenance of schools, roads, and bridges (Brentano, 1870).

Authors touch upon the role of the church in overseeing the spiritual and religious aspect of guild life, and posit the possibility that guilds were under ecclesiastic supervision prior to municipal and royal legitimization (e.g. Renard & Terry, 1918; Abad De Santillán, 1967). The role of the Church is crucial to a proper understanding of the institution; although the merging of two complicated institutions is all but clear (Chisholm, 1910).

Parish guilds may represent the legitimization of pre-existing social guilds by church authorities, or they may have been an ecclesiastic accommodation to the existing practice of forming associated bodies for mutual aid. They could also refer to a territorial accommodation, as the parish was a recognized territorial extension. The stoic church attempted to stamp out the heavy drinking and carousing of the old guilds (Chisholm, 1910). The term confraternity (or *cofradía* in Spanish) may have been a dependent off-shoot of a professional guild (González Arce, ND). In this study, we will look at some guilds that organized mutual aid associations. Renard and Terry (1918) posit the inverse, that the craft guilds were a development of the religious brotherhoods. What is undeniable is that, by the time they entered the historic record, the professional guilds had adopted patron saints and religious affiliations; while in other cases, parishes developed communal, non-professional guilds to support local religious functions.

The differentiation between guilds and confraternities is complicated by the passage of the centuries. What is clear is that, in the period studied here, the guilds operated confraternities as internally controlled structures. These confraternities were responsible for the functions of

mutual aid (caring for sick and injured workers, covering burial expenses and masses, helping widows) and also participated in religiously affiliated cultural activities (especially special masses and festivities surrounding patron saint days).

Trade guilds: merchant and craft guilds

While parish and social guilds were constructed upon the perceived interests of the general freedom-enjoying community, professional guilds (craft or merchant) were based on the collective interests of those who worked and traded in the products of those professions. It is believed that these guilds arose in England after the Norman Conquest, but there is no precise dating on the Continent (Chisholm, 1910).

“The guild was first and foremost a fighting organization for the defense of the trade interests of those who belonged to it” (Renard & Terry, 1918, p. 32). The multiplicity of interests at work creates a somewhat complicated relationship, as competition in and among the guilds and their members was unavoidable (and gave rise to more successful and less successful members – economic success that could be parleyed into political power). The professional guilds functioned as an institution inasmuch as they established the ground rules for complex interactions – particularly the production and sale of goods and the corresponding labor relations.

Merchant guilds⁶³ ranged in exclusivity from trade monopolies of certain sectors, to something more akin to village collectives, parallel bodies at the village level. The very term “merchant” in the Middle Ages was synonymous with townsman, stemming from the term *mercator* (meaning negotiator) (Zimmern 1889). This would go far to explain the general membership of some of the merchant guilds – they were town-wide associations of burghers. In some areas, the merchant guilds operated as a sort of municipal assembly, integral to the passage of municipal regulations and rulings (J. Toulmin Smith & Toulmin Smith, 1870; Kramer, 1905). Whether or not the merchant guilds were communal or more elitist depended on the type of guild and the time and place in which it operated. Toulmin Smith discusses the relationship between the corporation and the community, or *comunitas* in the context of the medieval society.

⁶³ Or guild merchant, as some authors were fond of saying – a practice derived from the French phrase and to be eschewed for sake of clarity and respect for English grammar.

Kramer (1927) does not account for this, but instead focuses on what is now most commonly regarded as a merchant guild as traders. For some authors, the composition of amalgamated guilds complicates the differentiation between craft and merchant guilds. Kramer (1927) considers the merchant guilds predecessors to the craft guilds. In her work on the rise of guilds, she posits that the merchant guilds were initially comprised of any craftsman or trader in a community, to regulate sales. As the number of artisans within a particular field increased, this created the impetus to create an independent craft guild. Because of the limited existing primary sources, and because of the variety of guilds with different purposes and structures, this conclusion was, and remains debatable.

That said, the term “merchant guild” is generally used to describe the guilds of traders, or merchants. While there is not necessarily an organizational differentiation between the makers of goods and the sellers of those goods, these companies of traders did arise under the wider name of guilds. In London, the merchant guilds of various products even organized their own portage systems (Stern, 1960). For the sake of curiosity, examples of criminal organizations functioning as guilds also exist, as in the case of the Victual Brothers employed to do battle against the great merchant guild of the Hanseatic League (Bjork, 1943).

There are examples of single-trade guilds co-existing with multi-trade guilds in relatively simple markets. Considering the long-term evolution of increasing specialization in trades, and considering the examples from less-populous, less specialized markets, it is safe to hypothesize that the transition from merchant guilds to specific craft guilds is a product of increasing market segmentation. The guilds increasingly reflected the growing population of specialized trades, passing from general merchant guilds to specific craft guilds. That is, when a sufficiently large group of masters in a certain trade were able and desirous, they could seek to form a legitimized independent body by obtaining an ordinance from responsible authorities. The definition of “sufficiently large” was the product of local conditions and considerations.

In the case of the craft guilds, it is worthwhile to keep in mind that the organization was not differentiated from the profession or activity: a craft and to craft; a trade, or to trade a good (Leeson, 1979). It is sometimes beneficial to differentiate the craft guilds by the type of goods in

which they dealt. Craft guilds can be separated between victual sellers or vendors of durable, manufactured goods (Thrupp, 1943; Richardson, 2001).

Gervase Rosser (1997) presents a highly nuanced study of the different processes of craft labor negotiation in the context of Medieval European Towns. To contrast the study with “traditional” guild studies, Rosser likewise notes the plurality of work experiences, for both men and women. These experiences contrast with the centuries-old systems used by the service-sector guilds studied here, as I elucidate. That is, the differences in work negotiation were certainly not recent developments, underscoring the need to extend historic investigation to better understand service-sector guilds in the long view. While temporally prior to the period studied here, many of the issues and organized responses certainly have important corollaries for this investigation.

A consideration of guilds in the service sector

Adam Smith (1776) differentiated between “productive” and “unproductive” labor. The latter has come to be known as the service, or tertiary sector. Jordan (2006) discusses this historiographic trajectory from Smith onwards, and highlights the methodological and epistemological difficulties that arise from this dichotomy. Guilds have been differentiated by productive or commercial activities or the types of goods traded – perishable goods and services on one hand, or non-perishable goods, on the other (Richardson, 2001). However, there are very few studies devoted to guilds in what is now known as the service sector of the economy – which can be understood as those economic actors who do not create or commercialize any good; instead they provide ancillary activities. While guilds in the service sector received a brief mention by Maarten Prak (1991) and by S.R. Epstein (1998), in neither work was this type guilds the principal object of study.

Recent scholarship has highlighted guild-like experiences in the transport sector (Bellucci, Corrêa, Deutsch, & Joshi, 2014). In the introduction, the editors note that transport labor was, in fact, productive, inasmuch as it added value to the process “in ‘the sphere of circulation’” (Bellucci et al., 2014, p. 2). The studies presented in that collection are from terrestrial and maritime organizations in the non-European world.

Service-sector guilds were a form of craft guild, as they were defined by the craft, or trade in which the members were active. On the other hand, it is useful to keep in mind the significant differences between secondary and tertiary sector organizations. As I will show, the guilds studied here diverge from the standard, homogenized conceptualization of guilds in a number of meaningful ways. Briefly put, they are guilds in the service sector and merit a differentiated study on this basis.

2.4 The guild system: operational characteristics

In this section, I address the guilds – especially the secondary sector craft guilds – as they *generally* existed in Europe. Although the specific maritime-cargo-handling guilds varied from this paradigm, it is important to understand the normal operations of craft guilds. That is, it is worthwhile to consider some of their most salient aspects.

Official sanction: legitimization and judicial existence

The guilds functioned as semi-official institutions, responsible for ordering external and internal relationships. As a corporation, or body of individuals, the guild was a representational body of those workers of which it was comprised: they could provide a mechanism for social and political organization. Perhaps most importantly, the guilds maintained internal, labor-related order through the tri-partite structure. They also regulated (to various degrees) the productive and labor markets in which they operated. The diversity of membership and diverging interests created a dynamic, complicated organization, especially at those moments when the interests of the members of this hierarchical structure are not homogenous or addressed to the satisfaction of others (Dobson, 1980; Leeson, 1979; Lis & Soly, 1994).

An important characteristic of the guilds is the fact that they *generally* enjoyed official sanction: they functioned as semi-official, legally recognized institutions, through rights and privileges enshrined in ordinances. Official sanction and the freedom to produce and trade goods (and services) without being taxed was granted (when it was) in exchange for any number of services to be rendered to the state – from a lump-sum payment, loans, or the raising and funding of legions of yeoman (journeymen) for a ruler’s army, and seamen for the navy. As a type of institution, the guild was not independent of municipal, religious or nation-state institutions, but instead interacted with them autonomously (sometimes in unison, at other times in a contrary manner).⁶⁴ An important consideration for this investigation is the ability of the guilds to appeal to different state actors and institutions, taking advantage of jurisdictional conflicts to best meet their needs.

⁶⁴ Judicially speaking, they were corporations, and enjoyed judicial personhood.

Formal guilds, by a strict definition, required church, municipal, or state sanction, and could not exist without it. This legalistic framework limits the analysis of pre- and post-sanction existence and overshadows the complexity of relations in consideration. These accounts are limited since different guilds employed varying degrees of secrecy in some areas, and at different times (Kramer, 1927).

While craft guilds appear to have been accepted social institutions for some time, they generally enter the written record in the tenth or eleventh centuries, and considerable records from the twelfth and thirteenth centuries remain (Kramer, 1905; Renard & Terry, 1918; S. A. Epstein, 1991). In England, the guild structure was legitimized in the twelfth century and again in 1363, at which time all crafts persons and merchants were to choose one profession or merchandise in which they would be limited (Kramer, 1905, 1927; S. A. Epstein, 1991).

In his treatment of the maritime cargo-handling guilds of Barcelona, Delgado Ribas (1995) does a fine job of succinctly relating centuries of official sanction, placing this sanction within different economic contexts. It should be noted that the author's aim in analyzing the maritime cargo-handling guilds is to determine efficiency and productivity from a qualitative perspective, specifically as to (1995, p. 108):

“[...T]he development of organizational techniques that reduced labor and transaction costs. It is in this sense that a study of how port work was organized and how it was capable of adapting itself to the changing needs of each moment gains importance”.⁶⁵

Delgado Ribas underscores the importance of proper organization to municipal and, later, central authorities. He recognizes that the governmental bodies – in addition to maintaining their own interests – had the almost inherent interest in promoting the common good by negotiating between the guilds and merchants, while keeping the interests of the general consuming population in mind. The concept of common, or “public good” appears in the documentary

⁶⁵ Original: “[...E]l desarrollo de técnicas organizativas que redujeron los costes laborales y de transacción. Es en este sentido como cobra importancia el estudio de cómo se organiza el trabajo portuario y cómo es capaz de adaptarse a las necesidades cambiantes de cada momento.”

record by all sides at the end of the eighteenth century, when the reform or abolition of guild monopolies was being debated.

Interactions with local, regional, and eventually national authorities varied significantly over time and space. It is generally accepted that guilds were influential in local politics, especially those guilds that represented the most important trades. That some guilds (parish, social, or merchant guilds) may have formed what amounted to town assemblies in fourteenth-century England is also apparent (Brentano, 1870). The “freedom of the guild” acquired gave one the privilege of being a burgher of one’s town, fully able to participate in the political system. This freedom could also be purchased (Swanson, 1988).

Considering the multiplicity of interests among social and economic actors and institutions, and considering the great variety of geographic and temporal contexts, it is important to allow for a degree of flexibility in this analysis. Tine De Moor (2008) posited that the emergence of guilds was, unto itself, a “silent revolution” that responded to collective needs for interest-based organizations.

A chief consideration of government sanction was jurisdictional: what geographic area was covered by the ordinances? Guilds were largely, but not uniquely, an urban expression (Ogilvie, 2004b). Likewise, Renard and Terry (1918, p. 5) had noted that their legitimacy was often related to the importance of the town in which they operated:

The more commercial, the more industrial the town, the more numerous and full of life were the guilds; it was at Bruges or at Ghent, at Florence or at Milan, at Strasburg or at Barcelona, that they attained the height of their greatness; at all points, that is, where trade was already cosmopolitan, and where the woolen industry, which was in those days the most advanced, had the fullest measure of freedom and activity.

While most accounts limit the jurisdiction of the guilds to the municipality in which they were incorporated, some authors researched the establishment of rural guilds in those areas where

there were sufficient workers to justify the creation of a corporation (e.g. Deyá Bauzá, 1989; Ogilvie, 2004b).

The question of location is related to part of the debate over proto-industrialization, in which role of guilds (or lack thereof) is a point of contention (Gonzalez Enciso, 1984). The split and competition between rural and urban areas is central to guild issues. This topic is treated in general by some authors, but forms a central theme in certain works (Kriedte, Medick, & Schlumbohm, 1977; Ogilvie, 2004b; Ehmer, 2008; S. R. Epstein, 2008; S. R. Epstein & Prak, 2008a; Ogilvie, 2014). While the majority of guilds were centered in towns and cities, the existence of guilds in rural areas speaks to the flexibility of the guild as an organizational structure.

Tri-partite structure: apprentices, journeymen, and masters

According to the normative definition, guild membership was strictly restricted to journeymen and masters: apprentices were not guild members until having finished apprenticeship and having bought their freedom by paying the entry fee to the guild (and passing a trade exam, if necessary). By contrast, use of the term “guild system” allows the researcher to include the apprentices into the operational structure of the guild.

The guild system is a socio-economic complex in which the principal mode of organizing skilled labor is the guild. The guild system generally was based on a three-tiered hierarchical structure comprised of apprentices, journeymen, and masters. This structure created a mechanism for organizing the development of social, productive, and economic skills necessary to fulfill one’s labor obligations. Apprenticeship provided the means of inculcating the necessary skills; whereas journeymanship provided the framework for putting those skills to use (hired out to a master). Finally, in most trades, mastership was attainable only upon entry exam, payment, and completion of a master piece – a work of considerable quality dependent on mastery of the necessary productive skills and, to a perhaps lesser degree, the economic skills required to accumulate the wealth necessary to undertake the masterpiece (a process costly in both time and materials). This system of examinations was dominant in Europe and has been studied in Spain extensively (Nieto Sánchez 2013).

Most craft guilds operated under the following system of component parts: apprentice, journeyman, and master. The overwhelming majority of guild studies cover these types of guilds, and considerable recent research has been directed at the internal mechanisms and contradictions, especially in relation to the difficulties faced by the guilds during technological change, economic expansion, and shifting political hegemonies.

Perhaps the most salient common feature of the guilds is the three-tiered hierarchical structure. Renard and Terry (1918, pp. 6–7) describe this, in the French context::

There is the classic division into three degrees or grades.... [f]irst an apprentice for one or more years, then a journeyman (*garçon, valet, compagnon, servituer*), working under the orders of others for an indeterminate period, and finally, a master, established on his own account and vested with full rights.

The role and characteristics of each of these three categories differed among the trades, time, or location of the guild in consideration. Gadd and Wallis (2006) edited a work that presents a long-range (900-1900), pan-European look at intra-guild relations (particularly those between journeymen and masters) and represents a fine example of this historiography of internal dynamics. Likewise, the institutional structure (in itself a cultural institution) affected, and was affected by decrees, common law rulings, and legislation. A fine specific example of this (and the interplay between national and local government) is the British Statute of Artificers (Woodward, 1980).

It is important to understand these factors to be able to appreciate the qualities of the maritime-cargo-handling guilds, which were *not* tri-partite. The maritime-cargo-handling guilds were comprised of masters. Even this quality of master was unlike the general usage, as it was not dependent on the creation of a masterpiece or the passage of a mastership exam. That said, it is well documented that some of the maritime guilds – the Mariners, the Carpenters of the Riviera and the Caulkers – *did* have apprentices, journeymen and masters. For this reason, they were known as *gremios de maestranza* (guilds of mastership). The fact that the maritime-cargo handling guilds were comprised solely of masters was very, very important in their functional operations.

The lowest level of guild participation was that of the apprentice. It is very important to keep in mind that apprentices were not guild members. Upon completion of the apprenticeship, one became a journeyman. Guild membership was reserved for masters, but journeymen were often registered by the guild. Generally speaking, the positions of authority within the guild were reserved for masters. This important differentiation created an internal power structure that led to significant issues, as the relationship of employer (master) and servant (journeyman) consisted of divergent interests, which would surface in labor struggles within the guild. At these times, the masters could count on municipal or royal authorities to keep the journeymen in check (by outlawing combinations of journeymen).

Generally a boy or very young man, the apprentice was not a member of the guild, but labored under its rules. Contractual terms of apprenticeship varied by location, period, and trade. However, the term of seven years came to be considered customary, and was eventually enshrined in law in some places. For example, it was codified in England by Elizabeth II's "Statute on Apprentices", what came to be known as "Queen Betty's Law". Adam Smith (1776) notes national and trade-determined variations that ranged between four and ten years. The longer (and more expensive) apprenticeship terms were used by the guilds of more highly skilled trades, which supports S. R. Epstein's approach to a cost-productivity analysis of apprenticeship (1998).

Apprenticeship could have been charged to the apprentice (or his or her parents) or remunerated by the master, in kind or in coin. Most commonly, there were payments made by both parties – an apprenticeship fee paid for the apprenticeship, and payments in kind (room and board) provided by the master. Apprenticeships in the more prosperous trades were coveted, and the fee paid by parents for the apprenticeship could be considerable. Apprenticeships were different in different countries, and in different guilds.

S. R. Epstein (1998) looked at the mutually beneficial character of the institution of apprenticeship, arguing that apprentices exchanged low-cost labor for training, to the benefit of both master and apprentice. He also argues that this, more than the amount of time actually necessary to properly master the art, determined the relatively long length of the apprenticeship. In this fashion, the initial expenses of the master were recouped by the later years through the

more skilled labor of the apprentice (Epstein 1998). Considering the high productivity/low cost of apprentices, these could displace journeymen in the workshops. Therefore, the number of apprentices per master or per journeyman was a point of contention and remains one today in some trades.

Bernard Elbaum (1989) discusses apprenticeship in Germany, Britain and the United States. He finds continuity and discontinuity from the guild system beyond their official abolishment. Apprenticeship was no longer mandatory in England after 1814 (Kramer, 1927). However, the institution remained – one of the significant legacies of the guild system (Elbaum, 1989).

While skill transmission was principally achieved through apprenticeship, the functional role of journeymen was of paid (skilled) laborer. While the term “journeyman” would appear to refer to one who journeys, or travels, for his wages, the term “journeymen” actually refers to a person who works by the day (earning a wage) and is derived from the French term for a day and its activities, *journée* (Ashley, 1915; Leeson, 1979). It is seemingly similarly related to the Spanish term *jornada* still used today to refer to a work day. It should be noted, for sake of clarity, that the term *jornalero* does not denote membership in a professional association, but refers to a day laborer of the more common, generally unskilled sort – the term “*oficial*” being the norm for a journeyman (Terán Bonilla, 1997).

As noted above, after completing an apprenticeship, a worker could purchase the freedom of a guild by paying an entry fee, and begin to work for a wage – in the service of a master. The very concept of freedom is related to membership in a guild. The guild was the body responsible for extending the condition of freedom – a freedom purchased with guild membership. Whereas apprentices were indentured for a period of years (the exact number depending on the trade, era, and location of the apprenticeship), journeymen were hired on shorter terms (up to a year, generally), enter into contract, be paid in coin as opposed to in kind, and were considered freemen. This included the freedoms to participate in civic functions, work for pay, travel in pursuit of employment, and even the freedom to marry (which was in some times and places prohibited for apprentices).

Journeymen operated as wage-laborers in the guilds. Journeymen were generally prohibited from opening their own shop until they had attained mastership. Some very interesting literature has contributed much to a more nuanced understanding of the journeymen-master relationships in parts of Europe (Thompson, 1963, 1978; Leeson, 1979; Dobson, 1980; Lis et al., 1994; Wadauer, 2006).⁶⁶ This internal situation was contextualized by Sewell (1988, p. 607):

Moreover, varying forms of capitalist penetration – increasing division of labor, substitution of unskilled for skilled workers in certain phases of the production process, the development of urban putting-out networks or sweatshops, exploitative forms of subcontracting, and so on – have by now been documented for a wide variety of trades. This widespread advance of capitalist penetration into the artisan trades in the nineteenth century seems to parallel the widespread advance of artisan radicalism.

A major argument in *Social and Economic History* is the so-called “death of the guilds”. This death coincided with the rise of combinations of journeymen. These organizations were formed in response to the perceived interests of the journeymen themselves (with or without official sanction). This was a conscious process: as Perlman noted (1922, p. 5), the New York printers society stated the view in 1817 “that, ‘the interests of the journeymen are *separate* and in some respects *opposite* to those of the employers’” [emphasis unclear].

This organizational process is well-documented in a number of European areas (Hobsbawm, 1951; R. A. Leeson, 1979; Dobson, 1980; Lis & Soly, 1994). In Catalonia, the standard historiography shows sparse evidence of journeymen organizations, and depends more on the rise of mutual aid societies (Barnosell, 1999). However, and most interestingly, the rise of journeymen guilds in the late eighteenth century is noteworthy for their use of a localized, trade-based model developed by masters.

While most guilds and other societies are considered to have been locally constructed and locally comprised institutions, travel by members was not uncommon, especially in the eighteenth and

⁶⁶ It appears as though such work remains to be done in Spain, where Journeymen Guilds operated in a number of trades in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. BC, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio*, Legajo XXXVIII (Caja 54), Nos. 1-3 [1825-1827].

nineteenth centuries (Leeson, 1979). Following the Scholarship of Hobsbawm (1951), Leeson looks at the tramping system and its role in the formation of trade unionism in Britain and, to a lesser degree, Ireland. Traveling journeymen, known as “tramps”, traveled the countryside from town to town checking for available work at club houses along specific routes, sometimes thousands of miles long, in circuits.

The tramp system functioned as an unemployment system. The system also enabled the journeymen to drain an area of excess laborers in an organized fashion during times of strife to prevent scabbing; it also allowed members to avoid persecution for crimes, which required being served a warrant in person (Leeson, 1979).

The nucleus of the tramp system was the trade-based “house of call” generally an inn or pub: there were hundreds of trade taverns dotting the countryside – some of which remain to this day, though without their original function (Leeson, 1979). Drinking was a large part of the journeyman’s off-the-clock activities: an estimated one-third of the rules of these societies covered the proper order of drinking, as did one-third of the treasury (Leeson, 1979). Upon arrival at a hiring hall, the journeyman would present his traveling papers – called a “blank” – for verification of good standing. He would then receive food, lodging, drinks, and a determined amount of pocket money depending on the trade and locality. At times, the journeymen already at work in the receiving town would leave work upon the arrival of the tramp to accompany him to the pub for rounds of drinks (which were governed by rules). The following morning the tramp would be taken by a fellow brother in search of work (for which he was given a probationary period). If there was work to be had, he would stay (temporarily or permanently). If there was none, he would be on his way to the next town.

This practice spanned the pre-union to union eras and is an important aspect of the rise of the journeymen organizations that would become trade unions. Leeson argues that the travelling journeymen had a considerable impact on the formation of the trade union movement. He uses the complex, highly organized institution of traveling workers as a means of elucidating the experience of journeymen, and of showing their continuity into trade unions. More directly, he shows how the trade unions arose as regional and national-level networks of journeymen and

small master craft workers. “In one sense the unions did not make the system [of tramping], it made them, the unions, and shaped them in their earliest years” (Leeson, 1979, p. 18).

Sigrid Wadauer (2006) details the practice in Central Europe. Perlman (1922), in describing the excision of the journeymen workers from master-dominated organizations, notes the existence of tramping in the United States in the first years of the nineteenth century.

Apparently, the practice of traveling in associations has not been uncovered in Spain. However, the journeymen in some industries did operate confraternities and guilds during the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries.

The master, or liveryman, had either bought his status or had been a journeyman who had completed his masterpiece. The master was just that – a master in his or her own right. It was the highest level of the guild structure. He could establish his own shop, take an apprentice, and hire journeymen (within the guidelines of the guild in which he operated). Richardson (2001) explains the limitations and privileges of burgesses in trade and tax exemptions.

Historians have differentiated between small and large masters depending on the size of their economic operations (e.g. Herrigel, 1993). Large masters would, in some cases, go on to become the great mercantile traders of their area. The term burgess, or *bourgeois* or *burgués* is derived from the terms burgh and burgher, meaning town or townsman, respectively. The freedom purchased by guildsmen to operate a trade was the freedom of the burgh. Pedro Ruiz Torres (2007, p. 119) notes this progression from geographic to socio-economic status:

The word “bourgeoisie” had since long before had a meaning referring to the place of residence and the rights of the inhabitants of the city, but at the beginnings of the Modern Age there already was in Europe a [type of] person that, without enjoying the privileged position of noble, was differentiated from all

those that exercised a “vile and mechanical” trade. The citizens or inhabitants of the cities formed a hierarchically divided and ordered group.⁶⁷

While guild masters were permitted to open their own shops, they were not necessarily in the position to do so. This placed some small masters in league with journeymen as wage laborers. The ability of some guild masters to dominate trade and the rise of prominent families in the guilds led to contradictions in the guild structure. In some cases, wealthy masters ceased operative activities, by which it is meant that they did not practice the craft to which they belonged. Instead they hired small masters, journeymen and apprentices to create goods which they sold. These traders (and the companies they came to dominate) arguably would accumulate the capital necessary for expansion of trade, the extension of the factory system, and increased mechanization. The inclusion or not of masters in worker associations was the product of the structural development of particular industries and trades during increasing industrialization. An example of this is the case of German masters, who – when they functioned as a worker and not employer or merchant – associated themselves with journeymen (Herrigel 1993).

Women and the Guilds

A review of the historiography of guilds requires at least a mention of the participation of women. It can be safely stated that the participation of women in guilds was not common in the period studied; it was, in fact, an object of considerable contention and even prohibition over time. Leeson (1979) shows that men and women congregated in guilds, and worked together in their professions in the fourteenth century, a practice which gave way to male domination over the next two centuries amidst general guild constriction. It is difficult to determine any degree of wage equality during that period (which is not to say there was *not* an equal relationship).

Clare Crowston (2006, p. 19), in her review of literature dealing with the relationship between women and the guilds in western Europe, established the now-contested hegemonic historiography of these “archetypal patriarchal institutions”:

⁶⁷ Original: “La palabra ‘burguesía’ había tenido desde mucho antes un significado referido al lugar de residencia y los derechos de los habitantes de la ciudad, pero a principios de la Edad Moderna ya daba cuenta en Europa de la persona que, sin gozar de la condición privilegiada de noble, se diferenciaba de todos aquellos que ejercían un oficio ‘vil y mecánico’. Los ciudadanos o habitantes de las ciudades formaban un conjunto dividido y ordenado jerárquicamente.”

In cities and towns where they existed, the vast majority of guilds restricted their membership to men. Corporate statutes not only prohibited women from becoming mistresses, they also prevented them from entering apprenticeship or even taking employment with masters. Widows could inherit privileges from their husbands, but always with significant limitations. These restrictions derived from an idealized vision of the preindustrial family economy in which the master was a male family head, who simultaneously directed the labor of his wives, children, journeymen, and apprentices. [...T]he overwhelmingly male composition of the guild system, and its patriarchal vision of the social order, were common threads across western Europe.

She then details the reappraisal of the role of women during the artisan period, noting the rise in revisionist history by women as it related to feminist advances in society in general (specifically in the second decade of the twentieth century and in the 1980s).

The wives and children of master artisans and businessmen played an important role in the trade under the supervision of the spouse or father (Romero Marín, 2001; Romero Marín, 2007b). These roles were direct (participating in the productive processes) and indirect (especially in logistical operations, like bookkeeping.) Romero Marín (2007b) shows how these roles were largely shaped by the economic activities in which the family unit participated, especially in the changing context of proto-industrialization and industrialization. The pluri-occupation (or pluri-employment) practice of the maritime porters (Delgado Ribas, 1995; Romero Marín, n.d.) may suggest economic difficulties on the part of their families; this situation *could* have resulted in a greater need for market participation by the women in those households.

While the guild has been identified as a patriarchal institution – it is difficult to ascertain if the guilds were inherently patriarchal or if changes in the socio-cultural mentality of the membership changed over time and the institution merely reflected these developments (Ogilvie, 2004b; Crowston, 2006). It has also been documented that the exclusion of women accompanied other exclusions and limitations as the labor market supply constricted and guild privileges were more jealously guarded in the fifteenth century and later (Leeson, 1979; Crowston, 2006).

Crowston presents a highly nuanced interpretation of these and other considerations. She notes that, while gender was important for both men and women in guilds, the more relevant consideration was membership, as male-dominated (or exclusively male) guilds excluded women *and* the great majority of men; while female guilds (while rare) also excluded the great majority of women, as well. Crowston (2006, p. 44) puts feminist guild historiography within the larger context of socio-economic history:

In taking note of women's access to guild membership, one must avoid triumphalism. (...) The vast majority of men and women were not able to join guilds; it is their responses to that situation and the complex bonds they nonetheless forged with the corporate system that are beginning to emerge more clearly.

While the guilds, in general, were able to increasingly limit the participation of women in the early modern period, it is plausible that a similar process was undertaken in the service guilds. Ogilvie (2004a) noted the role of women in the service sector.

The role of women in the economy was debated during the time studied. Campomanes, in his *Discurso sobre el fomento de la Industria popular* (1774) and the *Discurso sobre la educación popular de los artesanos y su fomento* (1775) looked at increasing the labor market participation of women (albeit in gender-determined areas of the economy) as a means of increasing the economic vitality of Spain in the late eighteenth century (Peñalver Guirao & Riaza Díaz, 2010).

However, there are very few mentions of women in the documentary record relating to the service-sector guilds in Barcelona. There are no mentions of women attending the guild assemblies (the main source of membership figures). These jobs and the guilds that monopolized them were, for centuries, primarily – even overwhelmingly – male trades and organizations.

In the case of Barcelona, the participation of women seemingly followed the limitations of widows inheriting the privileges granted to their deceased husband by virtue of his position as guild master. Vicente (2008, pp. 50–51) discusses the customary practices during the period:

Granting that the wives and daughters of master artisans and merchants played an important role in the trade under the supervision of the husband or father, guild ordinances generally permitted a widow to work as a master, if she did not remarry, until a son passed the exam of mastery or a son-in-law could take over the store or workshop. These restrictions did not affect the widows of businessmen or women in trades that were not regulated by a guild, such as the production of calicos or “painted silks”.⁶⁸

She continues to discuss the case of a widow (likely of a textile merchant) who had to fight against the horsecart operators guild to extend her inherited privilege to use of her own horsecart in tasks related to the functioning of her business to her sons-in-law, who were not guildsmen (Vicente, 2008). It is noteworthy that the guild did not object to *her* use of her horsecart, which were grunted by guild ordinances that allowed private individuals and merchants to transport their own goods in their own cart, but that of her loaning out her horsecart to her sons-in-law. Vicente notes that the practice of merchants loaning carts was commonplace. The case was finally settled through the interdiction of the King, no less.

The Guild of Maritime Horsecart Operators also had widows of masters working. Due to the sad state of affairs of the guild after a more liberal ordinance was extended in 1832, the guild Directors of the Guild of Maritime Horsecart Operators noted that their guild, which “as it has no apprentices or journeymen” was in a disrepair, and that there were “some widows who can but suffer under the heavy load every day”.⁶⁹ This certainly suggests that at the time, these women were actually handling the cargo. The comments were made in reference to a proposed

⁶⁸ Original: “Encara que les esposes i filles de mestres artesans i comerciants jugaven un paper important en l’ofici sota la supervisió del marit o pare, les ordenances gremials generalment permetien a una vídua treballar com a mestre si no es tornava a casar, fins que un fill aprovés l’examen de mestratge o un gendre pogués encarregar-se de la botiga i el taller. Aquestes restriccions no afectaven les vídues de comerciants o les dones en oficis que no estaven regulats per un gremi com era la producció d’indianes i ‘pintats de seda’.”

⁶⁹ Arxiu Històric de la Ciudad de Barcelona, *Colección de la Junta de Comercio, Fondo Corporativo* [AHCB], [Carreteros de Mar], “[Carreteros de Mar _Esmo Señor_ tragineros mar]”, 1 July 1835 – 11 July 1835, Caja 42, carpeta 10. No approved, official ordinances or declarations based on or mentioning this 1834 draft have been located. This reference to working widows is one of the very few mentions of women in the archives. Unfortunately, this lack of information prevents a worthwhile analysis of the role of women in the sub-sector. However, Marta Vicente offers a rich look at a specific case of the working widow of a merchant and her struggle against the horsecart operators’ guild so that she could rent out her horsecart instead of work directly (taking her case all the way to the royal authorities). See Marta Vicente, “Comerciar en femení: La identitat de les empresàries a la Barcelona del segle XVIII”, *Recerques: història, economia, cultura*, (56), 2008, 47–59

ordinance of 1834, by which guild masters (and in this case, their widows) could hire workers to help with cargo handling.

Free and Unfree Labor

The free labor generally considered in this study was by no means the only form of labor. The guild system also adapted to or incorporated the labor of slaves and indentured servants in and outside of the guild structure. Teaching of the arts to slaves was not necessarily prohibited, as masters owned and used slaves, arguably, in place of paid journeymen (S.A. Epstein 1991); slaves owned could also be rented out, permitting the masters to exploit their labor indirectly as a source of revenue. Likewise, labor in Russia was affected by the use of farmed-out serfs where unskilled or semi-skilled labor was required (Tugan-Baranovsky, 1970).

The guilds of the Mediterranean trading centers –including Barcelona, Venice, and Genoa – had adapted to the institution of slavery in one way or another (S.A. Epstein 1991). The role of male and female slavery in the Mediterranean, in general, and in Barcelona, in particular, during the late middle ages is elucidated by Sallicrú i Lluç (2009). He notes, based on documents housed in the Archivo de la Corona de Aragón, the use of male and female slaves by guildsmen, either directly or, far more commonly, by hiring them out and thereby exploiting their labor. Sallicrú i Lluç notes that the boatmen used slaves (2009, p. 338). Delgado Ribas (1995, pp. 114–115) also documents the limitation to two slaves per boatman in the 1340 Ordinances and the use of slaves by boatmen in the early fifteenth century – as well as the growth and eventual prohibition of this practice. He shows how the debate over the use of slaves led to the division of the guild into “old” and “new” boatmen, with the former favoring and continuing the practice, while the latter were all freemen.

The maritime porters’ history is also dotted with references to slavery. Citing Capmany, Delgado Ribas (1995, p. 116) states that the arduous nature of the work was what “perhaps ... explains that during the Middle Ages the *Confraria de Santa Caterina de macips de ribera, faquines i bastaixos de capçana* was integrated fundamentally by slaves, Moors, Turks, and

Tartars”.⁷⁰ He goes on to discuss the debates of the early fifteenth century – when the boatmen faced the same issues over slavery – and the economic context that encouraged the use of slaves. In 1433 Barcelona passed an ordinance aimed at determining the origin of slaves to be sold, to better guarantee the “legitimacy” of their enslavement and to avoid legal cases based on claims of freedom-by-birth (Armenteros Martínez, 2008). This explains the importance of differentiating slaves originating from “Good Wars” – specifically “captured Muslims, Turks, Tartars, and other unfaithful [non-Catholics]”.⁷¹ However, during the period studied here, there are no indications suggesting the use of slaves or other forms of unfree labor by the guilds studied. Nor, for that matter, is there reference for the mechanisms for transporting human cargo.

Above issues regarding the roles of women and slaves should be kept in mind in those cases in which a scholar romantically trumpets the guilds as democratic institutions or as the forerunners thereof –they generally were democratic – *for their members* (e.g. Black, 1984). The above characteristics underscore a certain tension between the interests of the guild members and the “common good” or “public good” of society. The idea of the “common good” was relevant, especially as the guilds defended themselves against the abolitionist efforts of the liberal merchants, who exercised increasing power in government during the period studied. At times, the way the “common good” was construed as central to guild-related conflicts: sometimes this conflict was posited as being between guilds and the “common good”, as was done by liberalizers; for their part, the guilds also used arguments based on their contribution to the “common good”, as well as the dignity of their members. At all times, the debate was tri-partite, in which the guilds, other actors, and government authorities maneuvered to secure their own interests (with the government accepting, representing, and advancing a changing conceptualization of the “public good”). This change is evident in the documentary record examined in this investigation. Arguably, the re-definition of the common good was fundamental to the advance of liberalism.

⁷⁰ Original: “Quizá esto explique que durante la Edad Media la *Confraria de Santa Caterina de macips de ribera, faquins in bastaixos de capçana* estuviera integrada fundamentalmente por esclavos, moros, turcos y tártaros.” Original note (18): Capmany, A. de: *Memorias Históricas [sobre la Marina, el Comercio y Artes de la Antigua ciudad de Barcelona]*, Madrid, Imp. de Antonio de Sancha 1779], part. 2, lib. 2, pp. 217-219.

⁷¹ Original: (...) “cautivos musulmanes, turcos, tártaros y demás infieles”. Original note (19): Carrère, C. *Barcelona [centre économique a l'époque des difficultés 1380-1462]*. Paris-La Haya, Mouton, 1967, Vol.] I, pp. 90-91.

2.5 Functional roles of guilds

Guilds are varied, complex institutions, responsible for a number of functions that differed between the types of guild, respective trades, geographic area, and time-frame. Each organization developed its own rules and structure to meet the specific necessities of its membership at that time: no single, universal definition can therefore be developed.

Some authors view the guilds' functions within the larger social framework. For example, Renard and Terry (1918, p. 32) viewed that, "The guilds appear to have had three essential aims: an *economic* aim, a *social* and *moral* aim, and a *political* aim" [emphasis original]. Arguably, a case can be made for their cultural function – in the framework of socialability – as well, especially considering the voluminous rules for cultural interactions, with halls, taverns, feasts, drinking, and parading (Leeson, 1979). Ogilvie (2004b, 2014) critically addresses these issues within a general overview of the pertinent historiography.

Perhaps the oldest functional role of the guild was of providing any number of services for members. When someone joined the guild, they were required to make a (sometimes significant) payment for entry. At other times, when a guild member died without an heir (or in conditions of particular wealth) he or she would bequeath a property, the rents from which would go to support the guild. Fines applied to both members and interlopers could also contribute to common funds, which could cover mutual aid expenses.

As I discussed in the section dedicated to social, parish, and village guilds, these benefits were related to the main lifecycle events: dowry, illness, severe injury, pension, burial, and support for widows and orphans. These benefits – in addition to the right to participate in a more lucrative economic activity – were probably among the most important considerations when joining a guild. When the guilds were abolished, they often re-surfaced as innocent-seeming mutual aid societies, which could or could not participate in labor-related issues; these societies may have

acted as bridging organizations between the master-dominated guilds and the journeymen-dominated trade unions (Barnosell, 1999).⁷²

Self-regulation

One characteristic often attributed to professional guilds is self-regulation –generally though not always – within a context of civil and/or religious governance and sanction. This regulation was professional and social. Within the craft guilds, this issue applied professional work standards, best practices, and conditions of production and sale of goods, while for mercantile guilds it covered the purchase of materials and the sale of finished products.

As socio-economic and socio-cultural institutions, the craft-based guilds appeared in the written record with a highly developed level of organization, based on a democracy among members. According to Leeson’s estimate, in 1388 – in the wake of the so-called peasant uprisings of 1380-1381 – when the English Crown demanded the guilds to make their rules, functions, and property known, there were probably thousands of such groups in existence. For example, he describes the high degree of organization by attributing rules even to bell-ringers (Leeson 1979). That is to say, one can envision a degree of democratic organization among people of various socio-economic dimensions, not just highly skilled workers (as the guilds are considered generally).

In service-sector guilds it covered behavior more generally, by which they were required to obey the dictates of guild leaders. Contentions in life and work were treated in what could be considered guild courts, while other, more serious matters would be prosecuted by church or state authorities (at either parish/municipal or superior levels) (Krause, 1999). This created a parallel government, of sorts; and, highlighted the conflicts between the different bodies.

This capacity for self-regulation – in a larger sense, self-government – was one of the principal functions of the guilds. To a large degree, it was responsible for maintaining the socio-economic

⁷² An interesting example of this, from one of the guilds studied here, is that of the Mutual Aid Society of Master Maritime Horsecart Operators, through which masters would make regular payments to a common fund for supporting the aid of employees. Universitat Pompeu Fabra: *Memorial Digital de Catalunya*. Asociación de Patronos y Obreros Carreteros de Barcelona. (1903). *Estatutos de la Asociación de Patronos y Obreros Carreteros de Barcelona*. Barcelona: s.n. [Retrieved from <http://mdc.cbuc.cat/cdm/ref/collection/comercUPF/id/19943>; accessed 5 April 2015].

order that marked the ancient régime. By caring out these important regulatory functions, they lessened the responsibility of state actors to be directly involved in the market. However, this also provided opportunities for corruptive practices.

It is interesting to note that some authors have posited the development of democratic traditions in the internal and external operations of the guilds. Black (1984) traces the role of guilds in municipal governance, as does Putnam (Putnam, Leonardi, & Nanetti, 1993) in a case study of Italy. Other authors have noted the from-below, even revolutionary trajectory of guilds as a means of ordering and re-ordering society (De Moor, 2008). In a somber retrospective Krause (1999) looks at the end of the guild system and the possible ramifications on democratic practices. Generally speaking, these authors view in guilds an organizational vehicle by which previously marginalized communities could promote their collective interests; arguably, the revolutionary character of these structures changed in relation to the shift in the position of the bourgeois masters relative to the increasingly proletarian journeymen and small masters. That is, in Marxist terms, the predominance of the working class as the revolutionary vanguard replaced the bourgeoisie (previously revolutionary vis-a-vis the nobles).

Labor market regulation

The ability of the guilds to control and regulate membership was key to regulating the overall participation of their sector in the economy. Having more members, arguably, resulted in fewer opportunities for existing members, and would strain the collectively pooled resources from which the guild would carry out its mutual aid functions. Preferences for family members of existing guild members, the exclusion of strangers or foreigners, the ability of wealthy individuals to bypass formation and enter directly as masters (to participate in the employment of labor and sale of finished products) were all related to membership.

The guild was not – and is not – a monolithic institution: there are considerable differences between trades, localities, nations, and time periods. The degree to which a guild could compel their regulations varies by guild, location, and time period. In some cases, guilds were open voluntary organizations. In other cases, they prohibited membership by any number of means. On more than one occasion, a denial of membership could result in legal proceedings, in which

the complainant would request the authorities force the guilds to admit him or her. In others still, they were of obligatory membership, meaning that new, foreign, or alien practitioners were required to join the guild or leave town (on pain of fines or violence, as the case may be). These differentiations applied to merchant guilds as well as craft guilds. Ogilvie (2004b) shows that the punishment for a violation was sometimes far from prohibitive, and that guild penalties functioned more as a series of fines as opposed to functional limitations. Richardson (2001) also highlights the limits of these prohibitions. However, the maritime-cargo-handling guilds practiced prohibitive, obligatory membership, by which they could stringently control entries through objective and subjective requirements.

Market regulation

One of the main regulatory responsibilities of the guilds was market regulation. That is, in addition to controlling the labor market, by controlling the standards of purchasing primary resources, production processes, and the sale of goods, the guilds were able to control (or dominate) productive markets. Combined with their territorial characteristic, they generally functioned to promote the strength of local markets. Regardless, their principle aim remained the defense and promotion of the interests of their members. When the interests of some members overshadowed those of others (or of the collective), challenges arose. The guild existed to resolve these difficulties in a mutually agreeable fashion, when possible. If they were unable, judicial authorities could be involved. Failing internal and external legalistic conflict resolution, larger difficulties could arise.

Guilds were able to exercise diverse degrees of regulation in all levels of production. The acquisition of inputs, their transformation into goods, and the sale and trade in those goods were all of interest to the guilds. However, considerable difficulty is caused by an inaccurate understanding of the degree of regulatory power held by the guilds (e.g. Renard & Terry, 1918). Guilds undertook “the regulation of *production* and *sale*” [emphasis original] (Renard & Terry, 1918, p. 32). Craft guilds did not establish precise production indications, but instead sought to guarantee the quality of finished goods. They allowed craftsmen to operate by their own means as long as they were able to meet established minimum standards – a guarantee manifested in a trade mark or hall mark. The process for preventing shoddy goods from reaching market under

the aegis of the guild was called seeking, and guilds would name seekers to visit the various shops to verify the quality of goods (Leeson 1979).

The maritime-cargo-handling guilds similarly regulated the services provided by their members, the quality of which was guaranteed by the guild as a body. For example, an member's compliance with the maritime porters' guild's dictates was compelled by a number of mechanisms at the disposal of the gang leader or guild director, including exclusion from work or even house arrest (Romero Marín, 2007a). Guild members were sworn to respect and comply with the commands of the gang leader.

When the means of control were prohibitive of external competition, they resulted in functional monopolies. That is, monopolies represent the effect produced by sufficiently powerful or efficient market self-regulation. That said, the concept and practice of monopoly was not then the same as is generally understood today. Gary Richardson (2001) provides an in-depth review and analysis of the scholarly understanding and academic use of the term "monopoly" as its meaning shifted over centuries, especially in the context of medieval guilds in England. He notes in the field a certain "confusion caused by the evolution of economic terms" (2001, p. 224). He cites a half-dozen economic historians to establish the near-universal attribution of the characteristic of a monopoly in guild studies. He goes on to place the term "monopoly" in its historic context, showing that the experience of the guilds was rarely, if ever a total monopoly. Richardson argues that the guilds did not exercise a monopoly in the modern sense of the term, but rather commanded limited powers of preference in generally free markets. To further elucidate this notion, he groups the trades by occupation, differentiating between those that dealt in victuals (food stuffs and perishable goods) and services, and those that dealt in manufactured, non-perishable goods.

Based on Richardson's analytical framework, some of the guild privileges did attain the degree of functional monopoly; in either case, the *perception* of these privileges as "monopolistic" is clearly evident in the critical documents from the period.⁷³

⁷³ I treat this discussion in detail in an appendix.

Protecting the “mystery”: guilds as secret societies

Although it may seem contradictory – especially when considering the importance of official sanction (whether or not it was granted, sanction defined the legal status of an organization) – the guilds functioned as semi-secret societies, while the journeymen combinations functioned more often as fully secret societies (Darvall, 1934; Leeson, 1979; Lis & Soly, 1994). The state and society in general were fully aware of the existence and general functioning of the former; however, the latter often had to remain clandestine because of prohibitions and criminalization. By the early 1800s, the journeymen had developed sufficiently hearty and well-organized associations that they faced significant military and state-intelligence repression and suppression, but by they eventually could mock the judicial system’s attempts to prevent their combinations (Darvall, 1934; Thompson, 1963; Leeson, 1979) .

The trade-related knowledge protected by the guilds – known as the “mystery” (perhaps pronounced as “mastery”) – consisted of any number of trade secrets, the protection of which were arguably vital to the economic well-being of the members and to the collective existence of the craft guild. This was safeguarded by the regulated nature of the skills transfer between masters and apprentices, and between journeymen on the work-site (especially when traveling) (Leeson, 1979).

In a wide-ranging pamphlet on secret societies prepared for a radical labor history conference, Bob James (1999) discusses the various secretive functions of guilds:

The guilds were successfully integrating functions which we see today as inevitably separate. The guild was simultaneously a religious society, an industrial (i.e., a working conditions enhancer, i.e., trade union) society, a convivial society and a secret society. Because of its success in combining these four functions, it held a central place in its community, and was able to develop its fifth function, which is the best descriptor of the whole, that of a benefit society.

He goes on to place these functions within the context of secrecy – for the protection of trade secrets and for the protection of the guild itself:

But the history of manual labor and the history of the dignity, even the sacredness of physical work, is necessarily the history of secret societies. A second, more benign, “insiders” view of the need for “sacred knowledge” is that it is information kept hidden until the society member is considered ready. Implicitly hierarchical, the test of readiness is also a test of the commitment of members to the values of the society and of their perseverance in the face of challenges to the society itself.”

This secretive function was also met by journeymen combinations; more importantly, because of general and specific prohibitions, the need for secrecy was even greater. Arguably, the secrecy employed by journeymen was more importantly protecting the existence of their organization, and not the secrets of their labors (which arguably were well known by the masters). Interestingly, just as journeymen were able to exist without legal sanction, they were also able to extend their territorial extension beyond a single village or city. Leeson (1979) argues very effectively that the networks they formed along their traveling routes and the social networks created thereby formed the foundation of the unions of the trades aimed at increasing wages and limiting working hours in increasingly larger areas. The key to this ability was the secretive nature of their organizations.

Socialability: a place to be, a place to belong

Socialability – a matter of some interest in the fields of in labor history and labor sociology – refers to those activities of interaction not directly tied to the work experiences of a group (Castillo & Duch i Plana, 2015). The chief proponent of the study of socialability is Maurice Agulhon, who noted its role in the formation of the class consciousness of the French proletariat (1984). The guilds provided a mechanism for social and cultural expression, collective identity, group activities, personal interactions, and participation (as a group) in the larger society. On the other hand, socialability could also be arguably detrimental, as a culture of serious drinking would suggest. While difficult to quantify, the qualities of friendship, solidarity, trust, group cohesion, class consciousness, etc. had incalculable value to the members and, arguably, to the general society.

2.6 Challenges faced by the guilds: considerations for guild scholars

Over time, especially over the last two hundred years, the guilds have faced a series of interrelated challenges. It must be noted that they were, in fact, very much related. The political, economic, and productive changes depended on one another to progress in unison; likewise, the effects of these changes augmented the effects of the others.

For centuries, the guilds were generally able to adjust to and incorporate – and even promote and protect – technological change. However, proto-industrialism provided the guild system with a serious challenge, as it incorporated significant changes in the labor relations and control of the means of production, culminating in industrialization.

These changes contributed to internal divisions within the tri-partite guild structures. There are two major, inter-related issues: the increased concentration of capital in the hands of some masters; and, the autonomous organization of journeymen. While these differences existed in pre-industrial times (and in non-industrialized trades) they were augmented by the concentration of capital and its use to employ technology to replace or drastically increase the productivity of journeymen-workers (in turn employed by the master-owners of the manufactories).

Two important considerations are important: the division of labor within the guilds; and, the special, strategic position of maritime-cargo handling in relation to state actors, who would protect some of these guilds from abolition. Regarding the former, significant differences arose among the guilds between those that functioned collectively and those in which the services were provided by individuals (who increasingly competed with their guild brothers); regarding the latter, some of the guilds were more interested in and perhaps better prepared to take advantage of the changing jurisdictions to protect their official status and privileges.

Guild Flexibility: Technological Change and Specialization

Technological development was not necessarily contrary to the well-being of the guild structure. In fact, guilds were responsible for considerable technological development as well as the diffusion of techniques and technologies (S. R. Epstein, 1998). The guilds were not passive in this process, but actually laid the foundations of intellectual property rights: for example,

minstrels had propriety rights for their stories, and others could face punishment for plagiarism (Leeson, 1979). Likewise, the guilds promoted technological developments: “Rewards were also paid to inventors of new machines and new methods, on condition that they were sold or taught only to members” (Darvall, 1934, p. 141). However, these practices and technologies were treated more commonly – rewarded and shared by the guilds.

In the guild system, the idea of collectivity and common usage was more valued than individual advancement. The guild system recognized that existing know-how, best practices, technology, and productive processes – taught to new members through apprenticeship – were the result of generations of advances promoted and protected by the guilds. This system was challenged by a liberal ideology that attempted to privatize these common intangible goods and allow their use for the general population – or, at least, those wealthy enough to employ them.

As the name suggests, proto-industrialization is understood as the forerunner of industrialization, a high degree of technological change that compounded the issues brought about in the previous phase. Proto-industrialization is used to describe a complex collection of changes: including technology; the organization and control of work and work processes; and the growing importance of vertical employment relationships (all of which occurred prior to the introduction of steam-power to productive processes). The most important consideration of these changes is that they increasingly occurred outside the jurisdiction of the guilds.

Mendels argued in favor of the concept of proto-industrialization as the “first phase of the industrialization process” (Mendels, 1972, p. 241). He posits that the increasing application of labor to industry (as opposed to agriculture) was an important process that laid the foundations for machine industry, which concentrated “where there had been handicraft industry before” (Mendels, 1972, p. 246). Specifically, these were areas where rural families participated in the putting-out system, generally outside the purview of the guilds. While not mentioning guilds, *per se*, Mendels states that the “old crafts sometimes adopted themselves to the new industry: they shifted to areas and specialties which had not yet been mechanized....” He notes “the protracted persistence of the old techniques and organization in the face of the intrusion of the new ones” (Mendels, 1972, pp. 246–247). Jan De Vries looked at this period from the perspective of increased rural household production and demand, and referred to it as the

“industrious revolution” (1994, p. 249). The argument has been eloquently made that Catalonia experienced a process of proto-industrialism in the eighteenth century, especially in the textile industry (Sánchez, 2011a; Ferrer, 2012).

New technology does not necessarily displace workers, but can create demand for workers in new fields, or further demanded specialized labor that would merit a significant differentiation and the creation of a new guild. However, this understanding is based on a long-term appreciation of technological change – in the short term, displacement was sufficient to spark the ire of workers (referred, generally as Luddism, described below).

The trades adapted as machines – initially rudimentary, eventually quite complex – were increasingly used (and those who labored upon them were regarded as mechanics). Among the numerous terms used to describe a skilled worker in the nineteenth century – artisan, craftsman, tradesman, or mechanic – this last term assumed a “more proletarian meaning” (Rock, 1979, p. 15). In some fields, the technology implemented was sufficient to undermine the workers’ monopoly on required skill (in which case the guilds faded away). In other industries, the guildsmen adapted and maintained the lengthy apprenticeships while incorporating the innovative technologies and techniques (Rock, 1979; Haydu, 1988). The issue at hand, then, is not the development or integration of technology into productive process; instead, the issue is the ownership of that technology.

While these processes of concentration of capital and the incorporation of new technologies did not directly affect the maritime-cargo handling guilds as a sector, they did create the socio-economic background in which these guilds operated.⁷⁴ There are a number of reasons for this. Unlike the textile practices, it was impossible to put-out the maritime-cargo handling services to other locations. Likewise, the late introduction of mechanical implements and industrial processes meant that technological change and the issues it created arrived in the ports far later than in other economic activities.

⁷⁴ Some of the guilds did experience an internal stratification based on inter-master employment and the possible employment of non-masters, which will be examined.

Repression of guilds, clubs, and journeymen's associations throughout history

Guilds, as institutions, acted within, under and upon political structures. They functioned as quasi-governments – acting as a first line of legal enforcement upon their members and violators of their privileges. Their authority was derived from their ordinances, which were extended by governments. Likewise, the guilds were subject to political changes. When organizations represented a threat to the established order – an order which they may have previously helped define and defend – governments could act to limit their authority or repress their activities.

That said, their members acted, first and foremost, in coordination to further their collective interests. Some of their members rose to economic and political prominence (sometimes, it can be supposed, at the expense of other guild members, other guilds, or general society). At other times, some of the guilds (and their membership) were regarded as revolutionary bodies and thus came under suspicion and even persecution and prosecution at the hands of state and religious authorities. This contributed to the prohibitions against certain coordinated actions that have plagued organized workers for as long as states have existed.

In his overview of guild history, Black (1984) establishes that the ancient Roman *collegia* were at times considered a threat to the established order. They were outlawed (individually or collectively) for conspiracy, or *coniuratio*, by the *optimatus* Marcus Tullius Cicero and again by the *popularis* Gaius Julius Caesar (which shows the variety of politicians willing to suppress them). This struggle between organized workers and civic or ecclesiastic authorities would be a lasting feature, and official sanction gave rise to the possibility of both licit and illicit associations.

The European guilds appear in the Carolingian Capitularies of 779 and 789, while “a capitulary of 884 prohibits villains [village inhabitants] from forming associations ‘vulgarly called guilds’” (Chisholm, 1910, p. 14). Lest it be thought that small matters are here considered, a brief overview of some of the greatest rebellions in medieval Europe yields signs of guild and journeymen participation. Leeson notes a prohibition against coordinated action by workers dating from 1306 in England, while Morris (1937, p. 56) cites the Statute of Laborers of 1349 and the Statute of Artificers of 1549 as key anti-combination laws.

S. A. Epstein (1991) highlights the role of craft workers and masters in revolts in the fourteenth century, especially in Paris in 1358, the Ciompi Revolt in Florence in 1378, and the Peasant Revolt in England in 1381. Leeson (1979) documents that seven years after the 1381 revolt, the English Parliament created the Settlement Acts to reduce the mobility of laborers to the place where they were born. Around the same time, Parliament also demanded lists of members, functions, and property from all guilds and brotherhoods, while prohibiting among them covens – sworn secret associations.

Some of these lists were discovered by Joshua Toulmin Smith (1870), and formed the basis of his – co-written, perhaps, posthumously by his daughter, Lucy Toulmin Smith – and Luis Brentano’s separate analyses of the Merchant Guilds of late-fourteenth century England (Brentano, 1870; L. Toulmin Smith, 1870). It should be noted that the merchant guilds at that time were not comprised of merchants, per se, but were single organizations of a variety of craftsmen and vendors in each locality. It is postulated that these guilds then divided into associations of trades, a process highlighted by Kramer (1905, 1927) in her wonderful examination of the guilds’ relationships with the state, and an organizational-genealogical study of English Guilds, respectively.

It is important to keep in mind that combinations of workers represented (or were considered to represent) a threat to the order of society. This is best exemplified in the framework knitters, now known as Luddites. The networks of united journeymen were considered a viable threat to the English government, and were treated as such by the crown government, which employed a large network of spies, informants, and provocateurs (Darvall, 1934; Leeson, 1979). This litany of social conflicts further suggests that the guilds and journeymen associations did not act in monolithic fashion, and the interests of the guild masters did not necessarily coincide with those of the journeymen and apprentices.

While the above is interesting in its own right, for this investigation it is of note in that it demonstrates a trend in organizational evolution – the independent organization of journeymen outside the control of the masters – in which the guilds studied here were not involved during the period studied. Of course, there were dozens of active guilds at this time, most of them in trades comprised of masters, journeymen, and apprentices: the great majority of them did not

experience this internal division at this time. Even so, the appearance – and legal acceptance – of journeymen guilds is relevant to the overall framework of the period. The majority of the maritime-cargo handling guilds was comprised solely of masters, and had neither apprentice nor journeymen. They did not face the issues noted above.

Liberalization and abolition

The majority of this investigation is dedicated to the specific trades as a sector, and their organization in the context of increasing liberalization. Liberalism can be understood as a complex philosophy with political, economic and social components. It saw significant gains in Europe during this period; Spain, too, experienced this process, although certainly in a more limited and disjointed manner than did other countries. In Spain, the advances of Liberal ideology were checked and often retrograded by monarchy (absolutist and constitutionalist). The period studied is noteworthy for these struggles, and the impact of these ideological convulsions was evident throughout society. The men that made up the guilds studied here were directly impacted by these paradigm shifts.

While political liberalization provides the structural background, the focus of this work is related to the liberalization of commercial trade (especially exchanges with colonial ports in the Americas) and, more importantly, the liberalization of the trades (which is to say, the delegitimization of the guilds). While these three trends (political, mercantile, and labor market liberalization) are intertwined, for the sake of this study, I focus on the liberalization of the labor market – what amounted to the end of guild-based, guild-controlled market regulation. This traditional regulation was enshrined in monopolistic ordinances, as I will show. As these ordinances were rescinded, the ability of the guilds (which is to say, the workers of each occupation) to collectively (self-)regulate labor market conditions deteriorated.

The debate surrounding a possible relationship between guilds and the development of capitalism is of considerable importance, and marks an important debate within renewed interest in the guilds. While this debate is personified by Stephan R. Epstein (1998, 2008) and Sheilagh Ogilvie (2004a, 2007, 2008). S.R. Epstein argued that the skill-transmission efficiency of

apprenticeship within the guilds was fundamental to capitalist development. This was supported by the economic historian Joel Mokyr (2008).

Within this discourse, a number of issues are also worthy of note, including: the relative degree of specialization within the “guild system”; the relationship between journeymen and masters; the relationship to government bodies; and the relationship between cargo-handlers and the merchants who employed them. These three socio-economic relationships are inseparable in this study, as they defined the major thematic considerations in regards to the liberalization of the trades.

2.7 Cargo-handling in global perspective and in Barcelona

The main literature on cargo-handling often refers to docks, dockers, and dockworkers (e.g. Davies et al., 2000a). It must be recognized that the term “dock” refers to a specific infrastructural feature in which boats enter (an area also called a “slip) and where they are tied to a pier or wharf, giving greater direct access to the ships and their cargo. These features were not present in the port of Barcelona during the period studied. A better term – one used at the time – is “marina”; or, as I generally use, “port” (or “*puerto*”, which was also used very often at the time). However, in the field of maritime labor history (focused predominantly on industrialized ports) the terminology of “docks” and “dockers” is often employed. For sake of clarity, I generally refer to maritime-cargo handlers, not dockworkers.

The sub-field of maritime-cargo handling operates as a bridge between academic areas. In the field of the history of maritime matters, it is dedicated to labor; in discussions about guilds and labor organizations, it falls as a maritime outlier. This is especially true of studies of maritime cargo-handling guilds, which generally constitute a small minority within these often-sparse fields (Ibarz, 2016).

Cargo-handling is a vital economic activity, a concentration point in the distribution chain that makes the activities and actions of waterfront workers of vital importance to those concerned with economics and policy at the municipal and national levels. This reality is underscored by the importance placed on labor conflict in ports – a significant share of port labor studies, as it is in terrestrial labor studies (Ibarz, 2016) – as it is capable of basically shutting down the flow of goods, creating significant economic hardship in a very short time. This power does not go unacknowledged by dockworkers and their organizations when they formally or informally participate in campaigns, solidarity strikes, and labor boycotts (Oberst, 1988; Castree, 2000; Cleaver, 2000; Nelson, 2000; Murphey, 2006; Larmer, 2008; Garcia, 2013; Cole, 2015). While these deal with the industrial period of port labor, the importance of ports in national and global economies weighs more than any necessary propensity to strike, save during specific periods in technological development or labor-market conflict (Hamark, 2013)

The bulk of academic attention in the field of maritime labor history has been paid to more recent developments, particularly the mechanization, containerization, and automation of the field (Ibarz, 2016). A good example of this is *Dock Workers: International Explorations in Comparative Labor History 1790-1970* (Davies et al., 2000a). The product of international colloquia, the two volumes represent fairly the state of the art at the time of publishing (Ibarz, 2016). Of the case studies, three deal significantly with port workers during the guild period (c. 1790), and these are long-view histories beginning with the guild era (or the remnants of a guild-like structure) and stretching into the plainly casual phase/trade-union era of the early twentieth century (Barzman, 2000; Lee, 2000; Mankelow, 2000). Of the thematic studies that comprise the second volume, the most relevant deals with the formation and reproduction of the dock workers as an occupational group: he describes the phases as “artisanal”, “casual”, and “decasualization” (C. J. Davis, 2000).

The great majority – sixteen of twenty-two – of the case (which is to say, not thematic) studies begin with the post-guild (post-1850) period. This concentration on recent history is not limited to this specific area of interest. This may be due to source availability and the greater completeness of archives. But it is likely influenced by the belief that the differences of past centuries outweigh the similarities, particularly in the field of labor organization and relations. The perception of the guilds as outdated, medieval organizations is not uncommon, especially in fields that do not focus much attention on them.

It is also worth noting the preponderance of articles devoted to the capitalist, geographic core, with articles about periphery ports largely limited to colonial ports – that is, ports in which the predominant models, values, legal systems, *et cetera* were determined or influenced by the hegemonic imperial powers. By way of introduction, two of the editors explained the effort to globalize the studies of port workers; however, they also recognized the eventual difficulty of meeting this goal. After explaining the dangers posed by a theoretical “normal” experience – influenced by a similarly developed “normal” conceptualization of economic and organizational development, two of the editors (Davies & Weinbauer, 2000, pp. 4–5) note that:

[T]he first step in the process of exploring the comparative history of dockers was to invite contributions from as wide a range of historians across the world as

possible. To an extent we were successful in this aim, as the variety of locations dealt with in these essays shows, but we are also aware of significant gaps in the coverage achieved – South America, southern Africa and large swathes of Asia are notable by their absence, for instance.

By the same measure, the ports of northern Europe predominated. There is currently an effort to expand the temporal and geographic areas of investigation in the sub-field of port labor history. This effort is being conducted within the framework of the European Labor History Network, a working sub-group organized within the biannual European Social Science and History Conference promoted by the IISH. This effort aims to build upon the works collected in Davies, et al. (2000a, 2000b) by focusing on cargo-handling histories from the global economic periphery (Ibarz, 2016). In his assessment of academic production (especially that produced after the publication of *Dock Workers*), Ibarz (2016) notes that studies continue to focus on larger ports. Another persistent issue that Ibarz (2016) has identified in his systematic review of the last twenty years of publications in the sub-field of maritime labor studies is a paucity of attention to guilds.

The maritime-cargo handling guilds of Barcelona: an introduction to the literature

There is as of yet no major work dedicated to operations of the totality of the various maritime cargo-handling trades in Barcelona during the period. There are studies of specific trades, but no singular work attempting to present the various maritime-cargo-handling trades – as a sector – in one source. However, there are a number of works dedicated to individual trades, guilds, or groups thereof.

The Barcelona urbanist Albert Garcia i Espuche produced an intriguing study of the *Gents de Mar* (People of the Sea) within the framework of urbanism (2007). He looks at the conflux of space and labor in increasingly minute detail: from provincial, city, neighborhood to household levels. He describes these groups as follows:

Simplifying, we can distinguish, on one hand, the merchants and, on the other, the “trades of the sea”, among which we can talk about the trades “of the water” (mariners, fishermen, long-liners...) and of “the earth” (construction and repairs:

masters of the axe/maritime carpenters, caulkers, carpenters, saw-men, cord-makers...; transportation: boatmen/bargemen, unloaders, maritime porters, maritime teamsters, beach fishermen, and thrown-net fishermen...).⁷⁵

Unfortunately, his work operates at the individual level, and does not examine the guilds, *per se*. That said, it squarely places these guild workers in their living and working environments over centuries, from the fourteenth century to the first two decades of the eighteenth century, including the radically transformative year of 1714, when the city of Barcelona fell to Borbón troops and new portion of the city – centered on the maritime district – was rebuilt from the ruins of warfare.

Francesco de P. Coldeforns Lladó (1951) conducted an exhaustive investigation of the notary records of the Scribe of the Sea (*Escribano de Mar*), a collection of Manuals created by these official notaries of all matters maritime in the eighteenth and nineteenth century.⁷⁶ The Manuals contain thousands of transoceanic contracts for sailors, permission from wives for their sailor-husbands to travel, contracts bestowing the condition of *patrón*; apprenticeship contracts, certificates of mastery (*maestranza*), and other documents. The apprenticeship and mastery documents were produced in relation to two of the maritime guilds – the Guild of Carpenters of the Riviera and Caulkers (*Carpinteros de la Ribera* and *Calafates*), – known as *Gremios de Maestranza*. Along with the guilds of Fishermen and of Unloaders/Loaders, these were collectively known as the Guilds of the Sea (*Gremios de Mar*), or of the Matriculate (*Gremios Matriculados*).

The Matriculate (*la Matrícula*) was a government mechanism designed to manage and control maritime matters in favor of military considerations, but also dealing with the organization of maritime cargo handling (Delgado Ribas, 1995; López Miguel & Mirabet Cucala, 1995; Ibarz & Romero Marín, 2009). As part of this system, the Navy oversaw the operations of these guilds

⁷⁵ Original: “Simplificant, podem distingir, d’una banda, els mercaders i, d’una altra, els “oficis del mar”, entre els quals parlarem dels oficis “de mar en dins” (mariners, pescadors, palangrers...) i dels “de terra” (construcció i reparació: mestres d’aixa, calafats, fusters, serradors, corders...; transport: barquers, descarregadors, bastaixos de ribera, traguers de mar; pesca de platja: xaveguers...)”

⁷⁶ I discuss his sources in detail here, as these were influential in this investigation.

and defended them against encroachments by other governmental authorities.⁷⁷ This process resulted in a gradual evolution from traditional, artisan-structured guilds to organizations more closely tied to, and influenced by the state, especially the military. Likewise, the centralization of traditional functions contributed to the extinction of guilds that failed to maintain their monopolies or adapt to the new militarily directed paradigm, like the Carpenters of the Riviera (Colldeforns Lladó, 1951, pp. 23–26).

According to the author (1951, pp. 11–12), his book was the result of a fortuitous process of discovery undertaken around 1938, “[...] fruit of this search is the present work, whose only merit consists of taking advantage of the materials unearthed, rescuing them from oblivion”.⁷⁸ He classifies the sources into four categories: Manual of Embargos (*Manual de Embargos*) from 1749-1781; Maritime Registries (*Registros de Marina*) from 1751-1779; Manual of Maritime Guild Council Meetings (*Manual de los Consejos de los Gremios de Marina*) covering 1756-1772; and Maritime Manuals (*Manuales de Marina*), covering 1751-1876. He briefly discusses the condition and contents of each of the notary Manuals, which are organized chronologically, from 1751 through 1876, as well as the notary charged with the task of acting as official notary for maritime matters.⁷⁹

As this investigation only covers the maritime cargo-handling guilds, I pay relatively little attention to these Guilds of Mastership. That said, it is noteworthy that some of the maritime guilds were organized as tri-partite institutions, whereas the cargo-handling societies were not – so a comparison is worthwhile. In the case of the carpenters of the riviera and caulkers, apprenticeship was to last four years; journeymanhood, two, in which he had to work under a different master. After this, based on the determination of worthiness by guild

⁷⁷ The military had its own system of mutual aid, a *montepío*, which offered a variety of forms of assistance for members (Herráiz de Miota, 2005). In this way, some public servants also gained access to social security systems long enjoyed by guildsmen. While not directly tied to this investigation, it is interesting to note horizontal aspects of a generally vertical arrangement between the state and the guilds – especially including the guilds covered by military authority. Especially noteworthy, is the fact that the military *montepíos* were first instituted in 1761, shortly after the militarization of maritime guilds through the Matriculate of the Sea.

⁷⁸ Original: “...fruto de esta búsqueda es el presente trabajo, cuyo único mérito consiste en aprovechar los materiales hallados, sacándolos del olvido.”

⁷⁹ There are a few years missing, without extenuating circumstances beyond the likelihood that they were lost or destroyed when a previous storage facility was inundated by water. That said, it is worth noting that there are no records during the French occupation of Barcelona: “The Manuals corresponding to the years 1805 to 1815 do not figure in the Archive” (Colldeforns Lladó, 1951, p. 16). Original: “Los Manuales correspondientes a los años 1805 al 1815 no figuran en el Archivo.”

determination/exam, the journeyman could purchase his mastership, which would grant the right to work on his own, hire a journeyman and take on an apprentice (Colldeforns Lladó, 1951, pp. 33–42). In this process, the long-standing customary hereditary status of prospective apprenticeships was a consideration, as sons could apprentice with their fathers without inscription – a situation that led to problems, as they could sometimes skip the journeyman phase and resulting fees.

Maríano Vallvé Barriendos, (1988) investigated inter-guild conflicts in the Barcelona naval construction field, based almost entirely on the work Colldeforns Lladó (1951) and the notary archives of the Scribe of the Sea. Incorporation in the Matriculate was of fundamental importance, especially regarding legal defense of guild privileges. Barriendos Vallvé (1988, p. 104) quotes Joaquín Llovet i Verdura (1980):

“To the mentioned effect, the Court of the Marina of the province shall be understood in the first instance in all causes civil and criminal dealing with the matriculated [workers/personnel] (...) and inhibiting other judges”.⁸⁰

With this in mind, the author proceeds to study a number of conflicts divided into three sections: conflicts between the guild and other guilds; relations between carpenters of the riviera and standard carpenters; and between the guild and private individuals. The author presents a few examples of each of these, underscoring the relative scarcity of these fights. This was a common, essential practice of guilds. Barriendos Vallvé (1988, p. 109) notes:

Throughout this study, an element can be detected [that was] common to all the guilds of the Ancient Régime in general: the aggressiveness with which they defended their labor framework from exterior threats. In the concrete case of the Matriculate guild studied, this aggressiveness was projected with special

⁸⁰ Original: “A l’esmentat efecte, el Jutgat de Marina de la provincial havia d’entendre en primera instància de totes les causes civils i criminals tocant als matriculats, (...) amb inhibició d’atres jutges.” Source cited in footnote 7 of the article by author: Llovet i Verdura, J. (1980). *La matrícula de mar i la província de Marina de Mataró al segle XVIII*. Barcelona: Rafael Dalmau. (p.9). Note that the publication date is 1980, not 1951 as given by the autor. This was most likely a typo as the previous bibliographic entry is for Colldeforns Lladó (1951).

insistence towards other guilds and towards people both within the Guild and outside it.⁸¹

Barriendos Vallvé closes with a few sentences about the eventual end of the guild. Curiously – considering the author’s access to Colldeforns Lladó and the primary source materials of the Scribe of the Sea – Barriendos Vallvé does not describe the apparent end of the guild with the last guild council meeting in 1824 as per Colldeforns Lladó (1951, p. 24). Unfortunately, and continuing the lack of explanation in Colldeforns Lladó, he does not elucidate the demise of the Carpenters’ Guild. Instead, he addresses it in general terms, not devoid of ideological influence:

But the Guild of Carpenters of the Riviera and Calafates, and with it all the guilds of the Matriculate, could not resist the passing of time despite their privileged situation within the guild institutions. With the nineteenth century would arrive the inevitable end of the Ancient Régime in Spain and of the institutions that gave it life [quoting Colldeforns Lladó (1951, p. 42)]: “The effort made by the ancient and old *Mestres d’Aixa* (...) to continue the glorious tradition of the Guild, remained frustrated by the revolutionary ambiance that the nineteenth century infiltrated in all of the estates (...). The disappearance of the Guild was not the fault of its individuals”.⁸²

He closes with a line from Pere Molas Ribalta (1970, p. 199): “capitalism acted like a dissolvent in the guild world”.⁸³

While simultaneously nostalgic and revolutionary, this conclusion is not entirely accurate. As I will show, this early end to the Maritime Carpenters in 1824 occurred when other maritime

⁸¹ Original: “A lo largo de este estudio se ha podido detectar un elemento común a todos los gremios del Antiguo Régimen en general: la agresividad con que defendían su marco laboral de las amenazas exteriores. En el caso concreto del gremio de Matrícula estudiado, esta agresividad se proyectó con especial insistencia hacia otros gremios y hacia personas tanto del Gremio como ajenas al mismo.”

⁸² Original: “Pero el Gremio de Carpinteros de Ribera y Calafates, y con él todos los gremios de Matrícula, no podían resistir el paso del tiempo pese a su privilegiada situación dentro de las instituciones gremiales. Con el siglo XIX llegaría el inevitable fin del Antiguo Régimen en España y de las instituciones que le dieron vida: ‘El esfuerzo que hicieron los antiguos y viejos *Mestres d’Aixa* (...) para contibuar la tradición gloriosa del Gremio, quedó malogrado por el ambiente revolucionario de el siglo XIX infiltró en todos los estamentos (...). La desaparición del Gremio no fue culpa de sus individuos’.”

⁸³ Original: “capitalism actuó como un disolvente del mundo gremial”.

guilds – organized in the Matriculate and otherwise – remained healthy, being reestablished in 1824. That is to say, the demise cannot be attributed only to institutional changes, but in a combination based on understanding the strategies adopted by the guilds (and their willingness to execute them), within the context of capital accumulation and eventual industrialization. Or, perhaps more accurately in the case of the Guild of Carpenters of the Riviera, it *was* the fault of its individuals: most of Barcelona’s guilds continued to function after 1824.

Coldeforns Lladó treats the three cargo-handling guilds in the same fashion as the Guilds of Mastership. He differentiates the guilds of sailors/mariners (*mareantes*), fishermen (*pescadores*), and loaders/unloaders (*cargadores/descargadores*) and relates their general organizational histories. All three of these guilds were responsible for loading and unloading merchandise to and from boats anchored in the bay: as such, market competition was fierce, and they relied on external authorities to resolve these conflicts of privilege. This situation was compounded by the different jurisdictions, as the traditional municipal authorities were often out of sync with the central, naval authorities.

For all of the guilds, Coldeforns Lladó describes the antiquity and history of the guilds and of their *cofradías* (confraternities, or brotherhoods), religious societies that participated in a number of non-work related activities of socialability and mutual aid, yet functioned under the direction of the guild. This also occurred in the land-based maritime-cargo handling guilds. This contradicts a belief that the confraternities were (merely) a precursor to craft guilds.

He describes the activities of the guilds’ efforts to defend their trade privileges. Likewise, he notes the religious and “patriotic” (military) activities of the guilds. He also presents transcriptions of inventories of work-related and religious goods owned by the guilds and brotherhoods at different periods, based on documents created by taxation efforts. These inventories are a valuable source of information for understanding the dual labor-religious functions, as well as give an indication of the economic health of these bodies. Coldeforns Lladó closes with a sizeable appendix of normative and financial documents relating to the various matriculated guilds, including the relation of the sale of their goods upon dissolution.

Another interesting aspect of his research revolves around the foundation (c.1789), functioning, and demise of a nautical construction school under the direction of the guild. This transformation of the institution of apprenticeship would backfire against the guilds, leading to its demise. Attendance was not obligatory, nor was apprenticeship replaced through attendance: studies were more theoretical than practical. However, around 1796 attendance became mandatory for journeymen who wished to achieve mastership.

Colldeforns notes the efforts of the liberal-oriented *Junta de Comercio*, which established the Nautical School (*Escuela Náutica*) in 1769 established the Nautical Architectural School (*Escuela de Arquitectura Náutica*) in 1829-1830 – a few short years after the disappearance of the Guild of Carpenters of the Riviera.

Of particular note for this study are the three acts reestablishing the various guilds in 1824, after the end of the Liberal Triennial. This was an important moment in the development of the guilds – one of the main liberal challenges, one which would be followed up in the early- and mid-1830s.⁸⁴

Colldeforns Lladó (1951) covered the Unloaders Guild, especially during the last half of the eighteenth century and the first third of the nineteenth. Armed with the guild assembly minutes, he clearly shows that, while both guilds shared a similar Patron Saint (San Pedro Pescador, “the fisherman”) the guilds of fishermen and unloaders operated as separate organizations.

Margarida Tintó (1992) wrote a piece on the Boatmen’s Guild (*Barquers*) in the fifteenth century. The boatmen were most likely part of the Guild of Unloaders. Because of the temporal consideration, the piece is not referred to widely in this investigation. However, it is a good example of a recent look at the medieval operations of a little-studied guild.

Josep María Delgado Ribas (1995) contributed to a collection of writings relating to maritime trade and the corresponding legal framework (Martínez Shaw, 1995). He treats the *barquers* as components of the Guild of (Un)Loaders (*descargadores*). He studies them in two long periods,

⁸⁴ The Matriculated guilds survived the abolition of 1836, only to succumb to the liberalism of the 1860s-70s, when the matriculate – and the remaining guilds privileged with protection under this structure – was finally abolished (Ibarz & Romero Marin, 2009).

before and after 1714. He shows that in this year (with the fall of Barcelona) the institutional context changed from municipal to central/military. The loaders/unloaders were one of the guilds organized under the Matriculate of the Sea system, overseen by naval military authorities. Within the Matriculate, they faced pressures from the mariners/sailors, who were given unloading privileges in Barcelona. This challenge resulted in a long process of negotiation and adjustment. Delgado Ribas (1995) also studied the land-based maritime-cargo handling guilds. He traces their histories, and looks closely at the relationship between the guilds and municipal authorities. His perspective tends towards the economic importance of the guilds.

Juanjo Romero Marín has written a number of pieces about the artisan response to liberalization, (2001, 2005, 2006, 2007a, 2007b, 2014, n.d.). Central to his investigations are the questions surrounding resistance and flexibility of the guilds in the face of the challenges posed by liberalization.

Among Romero's works are sections dedicated to the Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators (which operated in a single guild until the end of the eighteenth century). He looks at internal organizational issues and conflicts and the strategies for overcoming these difficulties, as well as maintaining group unity in the face of external pressures from other guilds, merchants, and local authorities. By looking at the internal dynamics of guild composition, especially the family relationships, the work-based solidarity and the construction of occupational culture, he has shed light on how the Guild of Maritime Porters was able to successfully survive liberal abolition (as an organization).

This investigation has uncovered very little literature dealing with the Mule Rentors (*Alquiladores de Mulas*) or with the Maritime Teamsters (*Tragineros de Mar*). Both of these guilds used beasts of burden to transport cargo (as did the maritime horsecart operators), and their proper distinction is not always made (e.g. Sarrión, 2012). In an article dedicated to the experiences of a few Barcelona businesswomen, Vicente (2008) deals with the interactions of the widow of a Maritime Teamster with the guild masters during the period studied. Muset i Pons (1995a, 1995b) studied the circumstances of the Guild of Mule Rentors in a regional-transportation context, in the period immediately prior to that studied here. The author shows the economic difficulties of the guild in the mid-eighteenth century, owing to the significant amount

of money owed to it by the military. In this study, they are mainly referenced in official documents and in court cases involving other guilds.

The research of secondary sources has uncovered no studies dedicated to the common porters (*camàlics*) who operated in an informal association hauling personal belongings throughout the city. They appear often in the documentary record, as they were accused many, many times of intromission into the privileged activities of the Guild of Maritime Porters.

Nor has anything been found dealing specifically with the laborers of the plains (*labradores del llano*) who did, in fact maintain a guild to organize their relatively lowly work of removing debris from the city (and other operations).

2.8 Conclusions

Recent studies of the guilds have benefitted significantly from efforts to go beyond ideologically and socio-culturally influenced perspectives that attempted to relegate these ancient structures to the dustbin of history. The guilds were far more than stagnant, medieval European organizations that were legislated out of existence. As such, their existence across the longer periods of time, and across the globe – in one form or another – is becoming better understood as research leads to an expansion of the relevant historiography.

Their contributions to economic development contradict the notion that they were rigid, eventually antiquated structures. To the contrary, the guilds demonstrated a significant capacity to challenge changes, adapt to new circumstances, and develop their organizational models and functions in efforts to continuously better defend the perceived interests of their members. For most of their history, it is evident that the guilds consistently sought a balance between market conditions, competition among guild-members and the often-diverse interests of their members (collectively as tier-components or as individuals). That said, we have seen how the internal contradictions of the tri-partite structure created significant strains, stresses, and in some cases ruptures.

As formal institutions, great importance was placed on official sanction, as well as the means of securing and benefitting from it (the ordinances, and privileges, respectively). Likewise, the jurisdictional consideration of the ordinances determined the recipient guild's geographic areas of operation, a fundamental aspect of market control. The guilds (in secondary and tertiary sectors) were largely self-regulating bodies. This self-regulation was not only limited to the guild as an entity, but extended to the economy, inasmuch as the guilds were legally and functionally capable of influencing, controlling, and monopolizing the market. In this way, they operated as (quasi-)official, sanctioned institutions, empowered by the authorities to act on behalf of the state. That said, the state was still generally recognized as an arbiter of last resort (although the non-monolithic characteristic of the state would be seized upon and manipulated by some guilds in their moments of difficulty).

The age-old argument that the guilds were an impediment to the development of capitalism is being re-evaluated with an eye to their contributions to long-term economic development. This has been tempered by academic understand of guild operations and the workings of capitalism (a development that is, most certainly, neither complete nor completed). The guilds were important to the formation of an increasingly skilled, self-regulated workforce through the institutionalization of apprenticeship and contract-based wage labor. They promoted and protected intellectual property rights (although in a more collective fashion).

The protection of trade secrets and productive processes was of utmost importance to craft guilds: it certainly represented a central function upon which rested the practical execution of their market controls. However, the service-sector guilds treated here had few, if any trade secrets. This underscores an interesting aspect of service-sector guilds, which had no secrets of which to speak, and were forced to develop alternative methods for protecting their trades from intrusive competition by outsiders. By the same token, while some secondary sector trades were industrializing – susceptible to changes in capital concentration and the introduction of new technologies – the maritime cargo-handling trades would not face these issues for many decades.

These considerations are important when considering another of the main functions of the guilds – the institutionalization and transmission of collective skills knowledge. In those guilds in which some masters (through the employment of journeymen and apprentices) were able to outpace their peers in productivity and wealth, serious internal schisms developed. While this dynamic began to surface during the liberalizing process and likely occurred to a greater degree in some of the maritime cargo-handling guilds after the period studied, during the timeframe analyzed here, this was generally prohibited by guild regulations.

This is relevant for understanding the different functioning of the service-sector guilds involved in Barcelona's maritime cargo handling. The predominant evidence points to the fact that these were predominantly guilds of working masters, lacking in functional apprenticeships and devoid of contracting arrangements between masters and journeymen (however, sub-contracting between masters did arise).

There were significant socio-cultural contributions to the determination of these models – even when the work processes were collective, the organizational models were not necessarily so. This becomes evident when one compares the cargo-handlers in different cities.

The guilds were capable of considerable degrees of flexibility in regards to technological, political, and economic change. While the guild debate may seem academic, the implications for the development of organizational strategies, government policies and economic plans in regions or sectors of the economy that have not been (or may never be) “industrialized” is worth consideration.⁸⁵

⁸⁵ For organizational policy implications, consider, for example: Stiglitz, J., & Ellerman, D. (2000). “New bridges across the chasm: Macro-and micro-strategies for Russia and other transitional economies”. *Zagreb International Review of Economics and Business*, 3(1), 41–72; Fernandes, A. M., & Mattoo, A. (2009). “Professional services and development: A study of Mozambique”. *World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series*.

Chapter 3.

The Port of Barcelona:

An examination of place and space in port typologies

“To study dockworkers is also to study cities, and their evolution is not a simple matter to chart.”⁸⁶

“The commercial structure of Barcelona comes down to us as determined, basically, by the existence of the port.”⁸⁷

⁸⁶ Cooper, F. (2000). “Dockworkers and labour history”, In S. Davies, C. J. Davis, D. de Vries, L. H. van Voss, L. Hesselink, & K. Weinbauer (Eds.), *Dock Workers: International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970* (Vol. 2, pp. 523–541). Ashgate Pub. Limited. p. 539.

⁸⁷ Sans, M. (1971). “Evolución de los espacios públicos de Barcelona”, *Cuadernos de Arquitectura Y Urbanismo*, (83), pp. 43–50: 44.

3.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter sets the scene for the activities described hereafter. The geo-physical characteristics of the port were influential in the cargo-handling operations, and also impacted the definition of the trades and physically established the limitations of guild operations. However, this location-operation relationship was not deterministic – the processes by which the trades developed and modified their operations reflected social, cultural, economic and political factors. That said, it is important to be familiar with the setting to understand the social and operational interactions that occurred therein.

To accomplish this, I look at the economic geography of ports. Economic geographies have largely been macro-geographies, focused on regional or national interpretations, at times attaining a world-system scope, and generally not micro-geographies concerned with a few neighborhoods or a particular feature of a cityscape. There is room for studies aimed at the microeconomic level.

With that objective, the research looks at the Port of Barcelona during the period of 1760-1840 through the optics of location. Specifically, it looks at – specifically differentiated, though interrelated – conceptualizations of place and space to better understand the areas and human interactions relevant to the tasks of loading, unloading, and transporting maritime cargo. While discussing both concepts, it is useful to differentiate space from place: the former is based on abstract, socio-cultural perceptions with connoted importance; whereas place denotes the actual, physical features which could be specified. This underscores the importance of socio-spatial construction to the social history and geography of labor. To apply these concepts, I then look at the natural and constructed features of the port area, both geographic and hydrographic, as well as some of the principal buildings and urban areas which were vital to maritime commerce and cargo-handling.

The socio-economic activities of commerce and cargo-handling undertaken in the port area were generally focused in clearly established places: the beach; certain buildings; plazas; portals; and other identifiable physical areas. In addition, the port constituted a socio-culturally constructed reality: it was a space in which the subjects of this investigation – maritime cargo handlers –

lived most of their waking hours. The ebb and flow of their lives was largely dictated by the socio-spatial interpretation of the port area.

Physical factors helped determine the places and spaces of the port; likewise, the dimensions (and therefore the social definition) of the port were not entirely static, but were modified (intentionally and unintentionally) by natural phenomena and collective action – especially by the physical changes to the geography and hydrography of the coast, and to the constructed infrastructure. In the same way, the definition of the port area was also a product of socio-cultural and political-economic factors, subject to expansion, contraction and re-conceptualization. However, while modification was *possible*, changes did not necessarily alter the over-arching socio-economic definition: geographic extensions that incorporated new areas into the port system could be matched by a socio-economic extension of conceptual continuity.

Broadly speaking, the port comprised the area of the City of Barcelona in and around the natural beach and artificial harbor. For the sake of clarity, by “port” or “marina”, I mean both the maritime and terrestrial areas surrounding the beach. The port area stretched from the ancient *Drassanes* shipyards at the base of Montjuïc mountain (southwest of the city), along the coastal Sea Wall (*la Muralla de Mar*), to the Barceloneta peninsula.⁸⁸

To better understand the characteristics of the port of Barcelona, a comparison with European cities demonstrate three main hydro-geographic typologies of ports: fluvial (river) ports; natural, rock harbors; and sandy, coastal ports. These will be studied by way of comparison throughout parts of this investigation. The type of ports could have very significant operational consequences in the way ships would enter and be loaded or unloaded. As such, they could also impact the organizational functions of the guilds.

In London, geographic extension led to numerous difficulties for the guilds, as merchants attempted (successfully) to operate beyond the jurisdiction of the City of London, thus bypassing guild jurisdiction (Stern, 1960, pp. 123–125). A similar conflict arose in Marseille when an area beyond the bay and beyond the customary scope of the guilds was granted for the private

⁸⁸ The *Muralla de Mar* was a large military sea wall built along the coast, not a seawall in the hard-engineering sense of the term. The *Muralla de Mar* was a section of the city’s defensive fortifications.

operations of a joint-stock company called the *Compagnie de Docks et Entrepôts de Marseille* (albeit, in the mid-1850s, when hydraulic cranes could be introduced) (Sewell, Jr., 1988). In both cases, we see a combination of conflicts between the guilds and the merchants and the nascent bourgeoisie, which was able to effectuate their economic designs with the acquiescence or support of local political authorities. In Barcelona, the geographic characteristics of the port likely contributed to the defense of the socio-economic definition, as there was no feasibility of extending the port area beyond the realm customarily controlled by the guilds.

The above considerations are not intended to form the basis of a causal relationship – these are factors that could influence the panorama, but not determine them outright. Most of the developments were the product of socio-cultural, socio-economic, political and judicial elements. It is interesting to note how – at least in some cities – the advance of economic and political liberalism and technological change were very important to the definition and expansion of port areas, and the introduction of new port designs and cargo-handling technologies,.

3.2 Theoretical considerations: a place for space in labor studies

Before progressing to the sections devoted to describing the most salient natural and constructed features of the ports considered in this chapter (especially that of Barcelona), it is worthwhile to consider the theoretical justifications for the inclusion of this chapter in this dissertation. This requires the incorporation of elements of geography, especially those of human and labor geography. These form the basis of the ideas of place and space, which were important to the daily and strategic activities of the guilds studied here.

The SAGE Handbook of Geographical Knowledge (Agnew & Livingstone, 2011) devotes a chapter to establishing a thorough differentiation between the concepts of place and space. Tracing the ideas back to the Greek philosophers, the chapter author discusses the evolution of the uses of the terms, particularly through the seventeenth and nineteenth centuries (when academic debate over their respective meanings gained importance, according to the author). In the words of the chapter author (Agnew, 2011, p. 2):⁸⁹

The various meanings of the terms [space and place] can be used to trace the intellectual trends of the field, particularly disputes between that abstract spatial analysis which tends to view places as nodes in space simply reflective of the spatial imprint of universal physical, social or economic processes and that concrete environmental analysis which conceives of places as milieu that exercise a mediating role on physical, social and economic processes and thus affect how such processes operate.

Agnew is quite conscious of the historic difficulty in defining place and space: “Indeed, the vicissitudes of argument in geography over such definitional issues as regions, spatial analysis, and human-environment relations involve competing conceptions of space and place [...]” (2011, p. 3)

Place should not be considered merely as a compositional part of physical space (the Newtonian definition of space). The compositional, physical relationship between place and space is, of

⁸⁹ For Agnew (2011) the page numbers refer to the pdf version of the chapter [*available online at* www.geog.ucla.edu/sites/default/files/users/jagnew/416.pdf; last accessed 4 March 2017].

itself, the product of a subjective location-based perspective (that is, it is a question of scale). The ability to differentiate a particular place within the totality of space is based on the interpreter's relationship to both. For the purposes of this investigation, a scale-based definition of place and space obfuscates the important interplay between the objective and subjective interpretation. With that in mind, I use dichotomized definitions of place and space, without eschewing the important – at times necessary – relationship between the two.

Agnew noted the difficulties that can arise in the lack of clear distinction between place and space (especially in fields not based on geography) (2011, pp. 4–5):

First, sometimes the two terms, space and place, are not clearly distinguished from one another analytically or their meaning is reversed (as in de Certeau 1984). Second, empirical stories based loosely on the effects of places (in the plural) on, say politics, intellectual history, or economic growth, need not always involve sophisticated theorizing about place (in the singular).

The roles of place and space have been studied with different perspectives depending on the scholars and the investigative objectives, perceived research needs, or areas of specialization. Agnew goes on to express succinct definitions that are “largely uncontroversial” and which are appropriate for this study (2011, p. 6):

Sometimes this distinction is pushed further to separate the physical place from the phenomenal space in which the place is located. Thus place becomes a particular or lived space. Location then refers to the fact that places must be located somewhere.

Andrew Merrifield (1993) attempted to reconcile different approaches to the subjective and objective understandings of location by critically reviewing the philosophical history of geography from a Marxian appreciation of dialectics. A number of relevant considerations are addressed in this piece, especially the need to connect the objective and subjective as part of a totality. He is critical of a differentiation between the objective and subjective, underscoring the advantages of a dialectical approach. That is, “Social space must be posited as a material

process” (Merrifield, 1993, p. 521). More specifically, “[S]patial contradictions – that is, political conflicts between socio-economic interests and forces – express themselves in place” (1993, p. 522).

To address the different, albeit interconnected, aspects of the perception of locations, Merrifield points to Lefebvre’s conceptual triad of representations of space, representational space, and spatial practices. This relies on a separation between lived and abstract experiences. By building on this, Merrifield posits space as a conceptual framework in which place-based experiences are lived and interpreted (1993, p. 525):

[E]veryday life becomes a practical and sensual activity acted out in place. The battle becomes the moment of struggle between conceiving space through representation and living place through actual sensual experience and representational meaning. Place is synonymous with what is lived in the sense that daily life practices are embedded in particular places. Social practice is place-bound [...].

Simplified definitions of place and space for a socio-spatial understanding – which nonetheless encapsulate the differences between the seemingly conflictive understandings – differentiate more clearly between the two. With this in mind, for the purposes of this investigation “place”, refers to a physical location – unique, measureable, and subject to objective determination; whereas, “space” refers to an abstract construct, the object of subjective interpretations. Place can exist independently of the occupational usage thereof; while space is dependent upon an understanding of the symbolic and conceptual attributes and the socially constructed interpretation of a given place manifested by the participants of activities undertaken therein. A subjective interpretation is impossible without the physical basis of place (regardless of what occupies that place at any given time, spaces can be re-imagined).

Studies concerned with location – especially the establishment or not (or success thereof) of a given economic activity in a particular place – have flourished in economics and economic history, resulting in the field of economic geography and its descendents. This field addresses

issues of macroeconomic considerations (the importance of distance-based factors – specifically, proximity to inputs like materials, energy, and workforce *vis à vis* markets (Krugman, 1998).

Economic geography often reflects the interests of policy makers and elites concerned with the development of economic sectors or the interactions between large-scale economic actors, and not on the interaction between workers and space. For that focus, a different scale of geography has been developed, at the crossroads of labor studies and geography.

In a highly provocative and well-documented article, economic geographer Andrew Herod (1997) coined the term “labor geography” to describe geography carried out with a view of the subjective experiences of workers. This is in conceptual opposition to the general views espoused by both neoclassical and Marxist schools of thought – what he refers to as “the geography of capitalism” – in which labor is treated as yet another productive factor, objectifying and disempowering workers in the constructive process of spatial development. Quite to the contrary, labor geography focuses on the workplace as an important construct, comprised of the physical, social, and cultural components of location. The idea of labor geography is basically that the human aspect of geography is not considered from the perspective of the capitalists or state actors, but from that of the laborers. Simply put, the environment in which one labors effects and is affected by the workers.

This worker-centric perspective is valuable in understanding both the location-based aspects of the port, as well as the spatial conceptualization of the area. Many of the labor-defensive struggles revolved around the concepts of location dominance or exclusivity – by which a particular group of workers was privileged with a quasi-proprietary vocational relationship to a given place. These privileges were based on long-standing traditions and were officially sanctioned in ordinances. Generally speaking, anyone handling cargo in the port area had to belong to one of the official, state-sanctioned guilds (or be an employee of the owner of the cargo or vessel – a fact that gained importance with the advance of economic liberalism during the period studied).

Some places were even more stringently regulated: for example, cargo-hauling work performed in the Customs House and King’s Scale was the sole purvey of the maritime porters and the use

of this place was guarded by the guild. Likewise, the only people allowed to unload cargo from vessels anchored in the harbor had to meet certain requirements, including membership in a particular guild (if they were not the employees of the owner of the boat).

Port labor studies often take into account the features of port areas. In general, at least a brief mention is made in port studies to the infrastructure – and the technological developments that drove its development; usually, this is tied to the shift from artisan to causal occupational models. In Davies, et al. (2000b), there are two chapters devoted to spatial relationships in port labor history contained in the second volume (which is dedicated to thematic studies based on the case studies found in the first volume). These chapters (Cooper, 2000; Dossal Panjwani, 2000) look at the dynamic relationship between locations and labor in the context of port work: in the former, in two sections, one macro-spatial, the other micro-spatial; in the latter, as the principal focus of the chapter.

In an interesting expansion of the role of place, Jordi Ibarz (2015) widens the analytical view to include non-port areas that were important in port-labor conflicts – which places were used to plan and carry out labor-related conflicts (some of which were violent) in Barcelona (1931-1936). He combines geo-referencing, local knowledge, and a variety of media to determine and elucidate the relationship between places and organized conflicts.

By comparison, from the documentary record available, it seems as though the port-related conflicts during the period studied here were generally related to the port-specific areas described in this chapter, except in some cases in which the maritime cargo handlers were conducting merchandise to and from various parts in the city.

Case studies of dock workers in London (Stern, 1960), Marseille (Sewell, Jr., 1988; Pigenet, 2001), and north-western Italy (Addobbati, 2011) also treat the confluence of location and labor. These treatments cover the natural and changed physical characteristics and the socio-judicial definition of “the port” or “the docks”. Without entering into theoretical discussion of the conceptual frameworks, these studies reflect both objective (physical) definitions and subjective (socio-cultural and political-judicial) definitions of the working environment.

Whereas workplace is the concrete physical location at which a given labor is undertaken, workspace is the socially constructed, subjectively perceived area in which a given labor activity is carried out – the conceptually unified nexus of social, cultural, political, economic, and environmental factors. Workspace is based on the understanding of space as an abstract social construct, related to and often (but not necessarily) dependent on place in which labor occurs. Workspaces can be understood as the areas of general or specific labor activities, imbued with social and cultural meaning – a meaning that may or may not change, based on any number of subjective perspectives, alterable over time.

In Barcelona, it is quite clear that the port constituted a physically identifiable determined geographic area (which could have been officially demarcated, if so desired); similarly, it constituted a socio-cultural space. Likewise, on a much smaller scale, the Customs House (for example) was a place – it was a unique building and could be determined physically (via its address or a physical description); as a space, its relative importance or meaning was dependent on the shared, subjective understanding of its functions – it was not just any building, but was a particular building in which certain activities were conducted. This is true for all of the areas discussed – they are simultaneously, dualistically, places and spaces. While the port developed as a place through natural or designed alterations of geophysical and hydrographic features (discussed in section three); the area developed as a space through the socio-economic changes of the area – particularly the use of the various constructed places that dotted the area.

3.3 The geography and hydrography of three port typologies

The two most important characteristics of any port is depth and outlay. Depth determined the ability of vessels to reach the point of unloading cargo (either cargo be unloaded directly, or lighters were required). Additionally (and often in a related fashion), the physical enclosure (or lack thereof) was a key differentiator. These factors would become especially important over time, as the dimensions of ships were increased. For example, river access to Seville became less feasible over time due to changes in depth and increases in ship size (Sarasúa García, 2001).

Three port typologies are identified in this investigation: fluvial/estuary; harbor; and beach. There are some interactions between these typologies, as a beach port could become a (artificial) harbor with sufficient infrastructure (jetties, breakwaters, and other constructed features). By the same measure, an estuary port could, itself, be either a harbor or beach based on the surrounding geo-hydrographic features.

Significantly, ports can also be defined by the material composition: sandy and/or rocky. In the case of the former, the formation harbor bars could be detrimental to the proper functioning of the port; whereas, rocky ports could allow for more consistent, deeper mooring. The construction and maintenance cost for these two types of harbors could vary considerably over time. As regards the territorial extension of harbor ports, this was more difficult and costly than that of fluvial ports.

First and foremost, the port of Barcelona was initially a beach port until the mid-fifteenth century, when a close island was connected to the mainland to create a very meager artificial harbor. It was not a fluvial port, in which merchants can travel up river to a secluded area – protected from storms or rough water – for embarking and disembarking goods. Likewise, there was not a significant natural bay: instead, there was only a beach (and not even a cove, at that). The area available for mooring ships in the harbor area was limited. Cargo was hauled to the sandy coast from these anchored ships.

In examining the geography and hydrography of the port of Barcelona, I have found it useful to consider the ports of London, Marseille, Livorno, Genoa, Cádiz, and Valencia by way of comparison. With this aim, I have included maps that show the basic conditions of these ports

during the time period considered. In addition, they may be useful for reference when considering the organizational models employed by the maritime-cargo handling groups in these other port cities. As discussed significantly by Fournier-Antonini in a treatment of Marseille and Barcelona (2012), many of these works were solicited and made with specific uses in mind: as a strategic (or communally vital) infrastructure, the ports were the focus of many maps.

London, England

To better understand the characteristics of a non-fluvial, artificial harbor port such as Barcelona, it is worthwhile to look at those of a fluvial port. The geography of the Port of London is a prime example of a fluvial system, connected with a well-developed internal transportation system based on roadways and canals. The River Thames offered a large, continuous area of operations: anchoring was not limited to a reduced, confined area.



London. Phillips, Richard (c. 1804) "A Plan of London with its Modern Improvements", Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme & Brown: London (published 1814).

The principal port activities were focused on the City of London, and these were covered by its jurisdiction. However, over time, different economic actors (including the East India Company) would prove resourceful and successful in extending the functional definition of the port beyond traditional area; in addition, they were able to extend the socio-judicial definition of the port

(Stern, 1960). By comparison, there was little that could be done to expand the mooring areas in Barcelona, save expensive public works projects aimed at extending the jetty system (something which would occur in the later nineteenth century, after the period studied here). London (c. 1805) not only clearly shows the characteristics of a fluvial port, which could theoretically be extended as far as required by the shipping needs of the city; it also shows the city during a crucial moment in the growth and industrial-capitalist development of this city and its docks, a leader in global trade.

Marseille, France

The port of Marseille is an excellent example of a natural, rocky harbor (identified as the “Port” in the map). Protected from the elements, but limited in extension, the port offered characteristics similar to those of Barcelona, differing on the matter of sand and the creation harbor bars.

Sewell’s description of Marseille can be used as comparison for the port of Barcelona. Sewell noted that Marseille was, “the only part of the coastline [...] with natural shelter against storms, good access to the shore, and sufficient depth of water, all of which are required for a good port” (1988, p. 623). Marseille arguably enjoyed more significant qualities as a bay, as it was roundly surrounded on three sides – the corresponding feature in Barcelona was far less effective at protecting against rough waters. The last characteristic – sufficient depth of water – was somewhat problematic in the case of Barcelona, where the sandy coast often degraded the depth of the port.




Marseille. Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge (c. 1840), “Marseille: Ancient Massilia”, Charles Knight & Co.: England.

The Principal areas of note include the numerous loading and unloading quays (“*quai*”) lining the harbor and the *Lazarete* (quarantine area) visible at the top of the map. There was another quarantine facility located on an island beyond the area covered by this map (Böer, 2015)

Livorno, Italy

Livorno was a principal port for that area during the period considered – perhaps despite its relatively small size (Addobbati, 2011). The conditions allowed for the construction of a built-up, inner-harbor shipyard (“*Darsena*”, “7”, and “*Contro Darsena*”, “8”). (In Barcelona, the

Drassanes did not enjoy the benefits of a wet-dock.) That said, Livorno was also an open port, in which the harbor area had to be constructed.



Livorno. Gandini, Cremona (c.1830-1836) "Pianta della Città e Porto de Livorno".

Natural features include an outcrop and the adjacent “*moleto*”, a rock breakwater protecting the inner-harbor wet-dock, but making harbor navigation more challenging. The main work-related edifices are the Customs House of the Sea (“*Dogana di Mare*”, identified as “5”) and the *Lazzaretto* (“12”), where quarantine was imposed on goods entering the city by sea: it was housed behind military installations (“10”, “11”, “13”).

Genoa, Italy

Genoa was a natural harbor port, and it started with arguably superior original characteristics to those of a beach port, like Barcelona, which required artificial development. The geographic conditions created a better-protected harbor area (identified as “Porto”) – even before the construction of opposing jetties. The infrastructural port features were more extensive. Basically, the port area was protected by two breakwater jetties: the old (“*molo vecchio*”) and the new (“*molo nuovo*”).⁹⁰



Genoa. Giovanni Lorenzo Guidotti (and Giacomo Brusco) (1766), “Mappa di Genova nel 1766”, in Giacomo Brusco, (1773) *Description des beautés de Génes et de ses environs*. [also available at: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fb/Mappa_Genova_1766_-_clean.jpg; last accessed 5 March 2017].

⁹⁰ Similarly, in Barcelona, these areas were known as “*molls*”.

The old “*molo*” was the main constructed jetty (with a lighthouse), while the new “*molo*” was a secondary jetty (as they had cargo-related functions, they are also referred to in English as quays or wharfs). Together, they created a clearly delineated mouth to the port area. In addition, the inner harbor had a wet-dock shipyard (“*Darsina*”) and a set of piers with slips (American English) or berths (English) for direct docking (identified in the map as distinct “*pontes*”) – something importantly lacking in Barcelona. This facilitated the loading and unloading of cargo without the need to use lighters or barges. The notable commercial spaces include the granary (“*Ufficio del Grano*”) and the Customs House (“*Dogana*”, not identified on the map).


Cádiz, Andalucía, Spain

There are two port areas of interest in Cádiz. The first is found in the City of Cádiz, established around a small bay on a peninsula. The second is the Royal Port (*Puerto Real*) found in the northern edge of the eastern bay, further protected by a number of sizeable islands.

Both areas were natural harbors, not sand-beaches. In fact, Cádiz had benefitted from the inadequacy of the other port competing as the colonial trade hub. Sanlúcar de Barrameda was deemed inoperative because sand deposits restricted access to Seville; as such, Cádiz was bestowed with the royal privilege of serving as the colonial hub in 1717 (Sarasúa García, 2001). The importance of Cádiz was based on its proximal river access to Seville, and the fact that the harbor areas were natural, rocky, and protected from the elements.

Not all cargo was destined for Seville: much of the cargo was actually redeployed to port cities throughout Spain during the period studied (Trujillo Bolio, 2005). This meant that Cádiz handled both local and colonial trade (Malamud Rikles, 1983; Trujillo Bolio, 2005). This role was created by the privileged status of Cádiz in the colonial trade system, which was liberalized to permit direct trade in the second half of the eighteenth century (Delgado Ribas, 1986; Martínez Vara, 1994; Martínez Shaw, 2002; Martínez Shaw & Oliva Melgar, 2005). Prior to liberalization, merchants from throughout the kingdom maintained direct and indirect connections with Cádiz, often operating their own offices out of the city (Oliva Melgar, 1988, 1996, Yáñez, 1996, 2006). As such, the port services of Cádiz had developed to meet local and imperial needs. As such, it had to be able to handle a great quantity and variety of goods for

import and export. The city also housed the bureaucratic infrastructure for controlling and taxing colonial trade.




Cádiz. Robert Laurie and James Whittle; John Rocque (1794), “A Plan of the City of Cadiz and the environs with the Harbour, Bay and Soundings at Low Water also a Particular Plan of the Town and Fortifications from the Collection of Capt. Clark and Improved by the late John Rocque, Topographer to his Majesty”.

[Available at <http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?id=0000033410> ; last accessed 15 March 2017.]

Valencia, Spain

The Mediterranean city of Valencia was served by the nearby beach, el Grau. As such, Valencia was very similar to Barcelona in its geographic and hydrographic features: it was an open, shallow, sandy beach without natural protection from the elements, which included strong currents. This required a labor system that included men that could employ beasts of burden or human strength to haul small vessels ashore with rope, or use lighters to haul cargo ashore. It is also keeping in mind that the el Grau beach was just outside of Valencia, and transportation between the beach and the city was also necessary.




Valencia. Tomás López Enguidanos (1795), “Puerto de Valencia y vista del Grau”, [available at <http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?id=0000022498>; last accessed 15 March 2017]

The infrastructure of Valencia was also similar to that of Barcelona. It was not until the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth centuries that the port area was developed from a simple beach into an artificial harbor through the construction of a jetty and counter-jetty


(Muñoz Navarro, 2008). The existence of port-side warehouses in the constructed elements and a Customs House similarly marked the work life of the maritime cargo handlers.

Barcelona

I have chosen to include two contemporary maps of Barcelona, focusing on the port and environs, with the aim of aiding visualization of the areas discussed. The two maps that follow represent cartography near the beginning of the period studied (c.1760) and at the midpoint (c. 1800). The second map is shown with increasing detail, to place the port area in perspective and to clarify the most important areas of study.



Barcelona. Croisey, J. N. Bellin (1764) “Plan de Barcelone”. Source: Soley, R., & Gasset i Argemí, J. (1998). *Atles de Barcelona 1572-1900: (Vols. 1–2)*. Barcelona: Editorial Mediterrania, S.L. [available at <http://www.atlesdebarcelona.cat/gravats/371/> ; last accessed 4 March 2017].



Barcelona. J. Moulinier and P. Lartigue “Plan of the City and Port of Barcelona” in Alexandre de Laborde, *Voyage pittoresque et historique de l’Espagne*, (Paris, 1806). Source: Soley, R., & Gasset i Argemí, J. (1998), plate 376 [available at <http://www.atlesdebarcelona.cat/gravats/376/>; last accessed 4 March 2017].

The port of Barcelona was not a deep or rocky port; instead, it was a relatively shallow coastal area, constantly fluctuating in depth with the flows of sand over the seasons and years. These sands – and their interference with the entry of ships into the harbor area – were perhaps the most important feature of the existence, functioning, and economic development of the port during the years investigated. This sandy bottom was affected by the infrastructural changes in the artificial harbor through the construction and extension of the breakwater jetty, (*moll* in Catalan, or *muelle* in Castilian).

The most salient constructed feature of the port area was the Barceloneta peninsula, which was built by in-filling the area between the eastern edge of what would become the artificial harbor and the small outlying island (named “Maians”) – located a few dozen meters from the coast in the early fifteenth century (Alemany i Llovera, 2002, pp. 35–75). As this area was filled in with rocks and dirt, a single peninsula was formed, eventually elongated over the centuries. The construction of the Barceloneta peninsula – and the breakwater which jutted out from it – affected the currents entering the harbor, and created a situation in which a sand bar – technically a harbor bar, due to its location – formed from sands flowing out of the Besòs River, east of the city and the Tordera River further up the coast. This harbor bar was a significant barrier during the eighteenth century and – despite numerous public works projects aimed at removing the bar or mitigating its effects – remained a constant consideration for shipping (Alemany i Llovera, 2002, pp. 79–99).


The depth of the harbor was seriously impacted by the flows of sands, and the depth varied greatly during the period studied, depending on the area considered: at times the sandy harbor bar breached the surface of the waters, significantly affecting the entry of vessels to the harbor area. Generally speaking, however, during the period studied the depth did allow for the passage of large, ocean-going vessels into the meager harbor area where they anchored, and were then loaded or unloaded through the use of lighters (*barcazas* or *lanchonas*). The goods were unloaded from these lighters on any of the “*molls*”, or areas of the beach (at times designated by the chief goods unloaded there).

The perennial lack of natural protection and the periodic incursions of sand were the main justifications for amplifying the harbor area (which, ironically, led to more sand in the harbor

mouth). On a number of occasions, technical, climactic, and financial difficulties combined to ruin projects and efforts at creating a suitable artificial harbor (Alemany i Llovera, 2002, pp. 92–98).


During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries – at the behest of local merchants, many of whom were ascendant in local governance – the government of Barcelona undertook a number of maintenance and improvement projects. While these activities did not provide a permanent solution to the problems of exposure to violent storms and the perennial inflow of sands, the merchants of Barcelona made due with the existent port system, conscious of its deficiencies and the dangers posed in its navigation. The harbor bar accumulated to the point that it basically closed the harbor during the mid-1740s, severely limiting the entry of sea-going vessels into the port area: this meant anchoring beyond the harbor, in open sea. Supposedly, the amount of sand in the harbor was so considerable that it was supposedly possible to walk across the mid-harbor sand bar at low tide (Alemany i Llovera, 2002, p. 96). The sketches below show the closure of the mouth of the port due to the formation of a harbor bar.⁹¹

⁹¹ Sketches are available at the website of the Spanish Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sport at: http://www.mcu.es/ccbae/es/consulta/resultados_navegacion.cmd?busq_autoridadesbib=BAA20060991186 [last accessed 20 July 2015].



Barcelona. Sketches of the Port detailing the situation on 26 May 1743 (above) and in late October of the same year (below), when the sands again prevented access.

Note the jetty along the bottom of the images, complete with the constructed area.



In response to the enclosure of the harbor by sands in 1743, and in enjoyment of sufficient municipal funds, the city initiated in 1751 an important prolongation of the Barceloneta peninsula (completed in 1772), including a breakwater jetty.

However, these efforts again met with dire consequences: in 1773, one year after completing the extension of the Barceloneta breakwater, a sand bar impeded maritime traffic in the first months of the year. It was then cleaned out, only to return, leaving the bay in a deplorable state by October, when the harbor was sealed off by a sandy harbor bar stretching from the beach to the Barceloneta breakwater (Trías Fargas, 1968, p. 46).

Harbor navigation was again complicated in the second decade of the nineteenth century (after the occupation of the city by Napoleonic troops). At the turn of the nineteenth century, the port was once again almost non-navigable. It was reported that in 1802, the depth in some places was only eleven feet (between three and four meters). The submerged sandy harbor bar stretched across the mouth of the harbor, between the Royal Shipyards (*Drassanes* in Catalan, *Atarazanas* in Castilian) and the end of the Barceloneta peninsula. While information about the port during the war with France and the occupation of the city is scarce, in 1814, sands in the harbor had again complicated navigation (Alemany i Llovera, 2002, p. 96). In 1816 the sand had breached the surface. Such was the state of affairs that ships anchored beyond the harbor, from where cargo was hauled to the beach, which is to say, in the same manner as previously, just from a point beyond the opening of the harbor. Some boats were kept within the harbor for a few months, unable to navigate the shallows created by the harbor bar (Trías Fargas, 1968, p. 50).

The city again commissioned an extension of the jetty in 1816.⁹² The jetty extended the area of operations of the guilds, which were able to maintain their traditional privileges over these new places.

In 1820, a company was hired to dredge the area, but work stopped the next year due to insufficient funds. Between 1827 and 1829, a series of storms sank fifty ships in the harbor and the issue of sands once again surfaced, threatening to completely close the harbor. Such was the

⁹² According to the Port Authority of Barcelona [<http://www.portdebarcelona.cat/es/web/port-del-ciudada/32>; last accessed 21 July 2015].

situation that a steam-powered dredge was employed, beginning in 1829 and “after the traditional financial difficulties that paralyzed the work for a few years” the initial task was considered complete in 1845. The aim had been to remove fifty million cubic feet (approximately 1.4 million cubic meters) of sand from the harbor, principally to open a ten-foot (three-to-four meter) opening in the harbor bar (Trías Fargas, 1968, p. 51). Even so, dredging began again shortly thereafter, and continued well into the late nineteenth century.⁹³

The evident inability of municipal and royal authorities to maintain the port has been debated as a cause for the relatively slow economic growth of the city. The royal privilege over colonial trade held by Cádiz and Seville – constituted through a number of decrees emitted in first decades of the sixteenth century – compounded the economic challenges faced by Barcelona. However, it has been argued that, even without the royal trade privilege, the poor condition of the port of Barcelona was so deplorable that the city would not have been in an advantageous position to participate significantly in transatlantic colonial trade (Trías Fargas, 1968; Oliva Melgar, 1996). No matter the reasons for its exclusion from the *direct* colonial trade system prior to 1765, the Port of Barcelona did benefit from the liberalization of grains in 1765, of cotton importation in 1772 and of general trade in 1775 (Trías Fargas, 1968, p. 47; Delgado Ribas & Fontana, 1986). However, the 1765 measure that brought Barcelona into the privilege system and the resulting, expanded demands of trade required further maintenance and expansion of port facilities (Fuster, 2007).

As noted by economic historian Alfonso Herranz Loncán, in his study of Spanish infrastructure (2005, p. 185), the situation of the port remained less-than-optimal for decades after the time period studied here:

In reality, at the middle of the nineteenth century, the ports of the Spanish coast were noteworthy for their low quality, and it would not be until two or three

⁹³ Interestingly, a permanent solution has yet to be developed. The port is still dredged from time to time.

decades later that the process of building the modern works of berthing and shelter were initiated.⁹⁴

This general assessment is held for the port of Barcelona, which was not “modernized” until after the period studied here (Trías Fargas, 1968; Alemany i Llovera, 2002). This assessment refers both to the hydrographic quality and the operational infrastructure of cargo handling, which were not introduced until the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Alemany in Llovera (2002, pp. 110–113) counterpoises this to the 1799 introduction of specially equipped cargo docks in London (the inspiration for Barcelona and other industrializing ports around the world).

In summation, the situation of the port can be understood as one of continuing difficulties caused by sand and the lack of a natural harbor. There were the unexpected or unavoidable outcomes of the improvement projects carried out in the port – harbor bars necessitating longer jetties, which, in turn, expanded the dimensions of the resulting harbor bars. The growth and changes required by the city’s economic activities also impacted the use and perceived requirements of the port. There were conflicts – or at least significantly different views – between the city and the central government over the form of development. Likewise, there was a political and economic component related to the different economic interests that would benefit from improvements, as well as those sectors that would be taxed to expand the port. Most importantly, the period studied here covers an artisan port, with artisan labor and their respective organizations.

⁹⁴ Original: “En realidad, a mediados del siglo XIX los puertos del litoral español destacaban por su escasa calidad, y no sería hasta dos o tres décadas más tarde cuando se iniciara el proceso de construcción de las modernas obras de atraque y abrigo.” Original note (5): Guimerá Ravina, “El sistema portuario español (siglos XVI-XX): perspectivas de investigación”, in Guimerá Ravina, A. y Romero Muñoz, D. (eds.), (1996), *Puertos y sistemas portuarios (siglos XVI-XX): Actas del Coloquio Internacional “El sistema portuario español”*, Madrid, 19-21 octubre, 1995, Ministerio de Fomento, Madrid, pp. 125-141. (p.129); Alvargonzález Rodríguez, R. (1996), “Los puertos españoles desde una perspectiva geográfica. Modelos portuarios de los siglos XIX y XX”, in Guimerá Ravina, A. y Romero Muñoz, D. (eds.), *Op. Cit.* pp. 167-184; Romero Muñoz, D. and Sáenz Sanz, A. (1996), “La construcción de los puertos: siglos XVI-XIX”, in Guimerá Ravina, A. y Romero Muñoz, D. (eds.), (1996), *Op.Cit.* pp. 185-212. (p. 197).

3.4 The principal places and spaces of the Barcelona port area

The port of Barcelona constituted a clearly identifiable area of the city throughout the timeframe considered (by and large, it did not change substantially). The general geographic features described in the above section formed the literal foundations and delimitating factors of the secondary level of location – that of the edifications and open spaces that played a functional role in the work conducted in the area. These places were built with specific purposes, and they increased the socio-economic dimensions of the port. In the documentary record, the port area is also referred to as the beach and as the Marina.

Maritime cargo-related economic activities occurred mostly in the *Ribera* and *Barceloneta* neighborhoods. While these areas changed over time, these changes were not significant to the general concentration of activities during the period studied. The major constructed features – maritime, military, and socio-economic – predated and outlasted the temporal limits of this investigation.

The massive Sea Wall (*Muralla de Mar*) was part of the medieval walls that encircled the city until their demolition in the mid-nineteenth century, and was among the most important features of the coastal beach. The walls in general were principally defensive fortifications protecting the city from assaults (terrestrial and seaborne) for centuries; however, the walls also contained the city and its inhabitants, marking the boundaries of the city, and – in the case of the Sea Wall – of the Riviera (*Ribera*) neighborhood. Of notable importance (for this investigation, at least), there was a large gate in the wall, known as the Sea Gate (*Portal de Mar*), through which all goods passed. This was the main sea-side entrance to the city. Beyond this gate lay the beach and the *Barceloneta* neighborhood, an extramural community beyond most of the protections and restrictions of the city (Nicolau i Marti & Cubeles i Bonet, 2004).



Barcelona. “Ansicht von Barcelona” [“A view of Barcelona”] by G. L. Tittel, (c.1820). Source: Soley, R., & Gasset i Argemí, J. (1998). *Atlas de Barcelona 1572-1900*: (Vols. 1–2). Barcelona: Editorial Mediterrania, S.L., p.541.

The *Ribera* neighborhood spanned the lower, sea-side areas of the old city, abutting the massive defensive Sea Wall, and extending a few streets into the city proper. As the name suggests, this neighborhood was comprised of coastal properties – with a mix of open spaces, residences, and civic, religious, and private buildings. Roughly speaking, from this area the port area then jutted

out into the sea along a peninsula that constitutes what is now the Barceloneta neighborhood. The port area increased as the peninsula was formed and extended through development projects – primarily filling the sea with sand and rocks to extend and widen the peninsula. The building in the Sea Wall, called the Sea Gate (*Portal del Mar*) was used for controlling entry of goods and people into the city from the sea was also refurbished in the late 1830s, contributing to the architectural homogenization of the area in the 1840s (García Sánchez, 2016).

The area where these two areas converged – the ancient coast along the base of the city and the growing Barceloneta Peninsula – created the principal locus of port activity.

Commercial areas of note

Commercial activities were focused on the Palace Plaza (the *Pla del Palau*), the most important intersection of constructed spaces considered in this chapter.⁹⁵ The plaza was encircled by a number of buildings that housed the fundamental agencies and professional bodies involved in maritime trade and cargo-handling. These buildings and the public spaces of the environs (including the harbor) constitute the main workspaces of the port cargo handlers. The cargo handling guilds met here at the start of the work day.⁹⁶

Laura García Sánchez (2016) noted the importance of urban design on the city, and attributed much of this to the civil and military engineers of the end of the eighteenth century. This point is of considerable importance when looking at the port infrastructures, which were under the direction of public sector actors, not the private sector.

García Sánchez shows how the Palace Plaza evolved from a commercial center to a space of political hegemony, used by the monarchs from Madrid when Carlos IV and his family (and the court) visited the city in 1802. The Palace, the Customs House, and the Exchange (*Lonja*) were used to house the visitors, and the Santa María de Mar church was refurbished. After the royal


⁹⁵ The Plaza was named for a palace (of the *Lloctinent*, or Viceroy; or of the Captain General), demolished after a fire in 1875.

⁹⁶ Arxiu General del Museu Marítim de Barcelona, *fons del Gremi de bastaixos, macips de ribera i carreters de mar de Barcelona* [AGMMB], “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

family left for Madrid, the buildings of note were converted to serve other needs, but the air of political (royal) power remained.

With the advent of the Liberal Government in 1820, important places of the city were reconceived to fit these new roles (symbolic and functional) of a more democratic government. While these plans were generally not carried out in the three years of Liberal government, some aspects were incorporated into later designs – albeit without the liberal trimmings. García Sánchez (2016, pp. 9–10) notes that, the Palace Plaza, “conceived as a *plaza de armas* [a martial parade square] although the people of Barcelona converted it into the most lively social and political center of the city through almost the entirety of the nineteenth century”.⁹⁷

The below image shows a lithograph published in 1806, just a few years after the Royal visit. One can see the Palace on the left, followed by the Customs House and the Sea Gate; on the Right, in the foreground, sits the *Lonja* (the Exchange).



Barcelona. Réville, Lorieux, and Moulinier (c. 1806) “View of the Exchange [R.], of the Cap[tain] General’s Palace [L.], of the Custom house [2nd from L.], and Port of Barcelona” in A. Laborde’s *Voyage pittoresque et historique de l’Espagne*, plate 358, [available at: <http://www.atlesdebarcelona.cat/gravats/comments/358-a-de-laborde/?lang=es> ; 5 March 2017]

⁹⁷ Original: “... concebido casi como una plaza de armas aunque el pueblo barcelonés la convirtió en el centro social y político más vivo de la ciudad a lo largo prácticamente de todo el siglo XIX.”

Mercé Sans (1971, p. 44) noted the importance of maritime commerce and, by extension, the maritime commercial area of the city for the period studied:

The commercial structure of Barcelona comes down to us as determined, basically, by the existence of the port. In consequence, from the XVIII century, the important civil buildings were constructed in the Palace Plaza by the Sea Wall (Exchange, Customs, Viceroy Palace, *et cetera*); at the same time, the grain and textile warehouses – the two most important elements of commerce in the city during the period – were moved towards the sea, close to the port.⁹⁸

A number of important buildings surrounded the Palace Plaza. These buildings together formed the primary locus of the socio-economic activities related to cargo-handling. Some of these buildings were crucial to the development of these activities, while others provided little more than cursory or superficial importance. While there were important buildings and social spaces in other parts of the city, those of this waterfront area constituted the principal area of operations for commerce.

The Customs House figures prominently in this study, demarcating the principal nexus of cargo activity. A simple map of the early eighteenth century (1714) shows the Customs House (*Aduanas*) between the Exchange (*Llotja* in Catalan and *Lonja* in Castilian) and the Palace (Tarragó Cid, 1973). The Customs House of the early nineteenth century was built between 1790 and 1792.⁹⁹ The Customs House functioned as an administrative centre for tax-collection, as well as providing for limited, short-term storage facilities. The King's Scale (*Pes del Rei* or *Peso del Rey* in Catalan and Castilian, respectively) was housed next door, as well. The

⁹⁸ Orig: “*La estructura comercial de Barcelona nos viene determinada básicamente por la existencia del puerto. En consecuencia los edificios civiles importantes a partir del siglo XVIII se levantan en la plaza Palacio junto a la Puerta del Mar (Lonja, Aduana, Palacio Virreyes, etc.) al tiempo que se trasladan hacia el mar, cerca del puerto, los almacenes de grano y de tejidos, los dos elementos más importantes del comercio de la ciudad en la época.*”

⁹⁹ The building still stands at *Avenguda Marquès de l'Argentera, no. 2*. The principal façade now reads “*Delegación de Gobierno*” and it currently houses a *Delegación de Gobierno* dependency, the Offices for Citizens of the European Union.

maritime porters were allowed to use part of the building for storage (even when a new building was proposed in 1808), although they were required to pay rent.¹⁰⁰

All goods entering and leaving the city via the port that were susceptible to taxation were required to pass through the Customs House area for weighing, inspection and re-distribution. As the goods were often high-value products, there was an inherent interest in assuring their protection from damage, theft or manipulation. This concern was shared (albeit with different motivations) by government officials, merchants, customers, and cargo handlers (as the responsible parties could be charged for damaged goods). The maritime porters enjoyed a royal privilege that gave them a privilege over the handling of goods in this building.¹⁰¹ This monopoly was based on the trust placed in the members of this guild, and of the ability of the guild to regulate the good and honorable behavior of its adherents. Most importantly, the guild kept two teams of eight in each of these administrative buildings. Their work was provided free of charge to the city and merchants, as the rotated workers were paid from the guild's common funds.¹⁰² Likewise, there was a economic value for the government and merchants in monopolizing the labor to reduce confusion and increase the practical efficiency of the activities therein – and to attribute collective blame if the need were to arise.

It is worth noting the locations of other installations important to trade in the area. Principally among these is the Exchange House, where the eminently important *Consolat*, or *Consulado, de Mar* was housed. The Consulate of the Sea was a medieval organization responsible for codifying maritime law for Catalan merchants and sailors, eventually gaining recognition throughout the Mediterranean region (R. S. Smith, 1961).¹⁰³ In addition to the Consulate

¹⁰⁰ AGMMB, “[Sol·licitud del Gremi per poder disposar d'un magatzem on guardar les eines de treball mitjançant el pagament d'un cens]”, 1804-1808, Capsa 17, carpeta 2 (2349); and AGMMB [Rebut del pagament anual pel lloguer del local del Gremi, ubicat en la Casa del Pes del Rei de Barcelona del Gremi de Bastaixos] 1831/06/21 - 1870/06, Capsa 17, carpeta 1 (2348); AGMMB, “Establecimiento otorgado a favor de los Faquines de Capsana 1808/04/12 – n.d., Capsa 17, carpeta 3 (2350).

¹⁰¹ AGMMB, “[Memorial de l'aprovació de noves ordenances i de canvi d'institució rectora]”, [1815], Capsa 7, carpeta 2 (2251).

¹⁰² AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291).

¹⁰³ For a recompilation of these ancient laws, see de Capmany, A. (1791). *Codigo de las costumbres maritimas de Barcelona, hasta aqui vulgarmente llamado Libro del Consulado. Nuevamente traducido al castellano con el texto...* Madrid: Imp. de Don Antonio de Sancha. [Available at: <https://books.google.it/books?id=QZPxKf2KTeYC>; last accessed 5 March 2017].

Tribunal – the judicial body charged with settling trade disputes among merchants – the *Llotja* housed the wholesale trading market for Barcelona.

During the period covered in this investigation, the Exchange also served as the home of the Royal Board of Commerce (*la Reial Junta Particular de Comerç* in Catalan, or *la Real Junta Particular de Comercio* in Castilian).¹⁰⁴ Founded in 1758, the Commerce Board was comprised of some of the principal merchants and manufacturers of Barcelona, agglomerated in a royally chartered corporation capable of defending and promoting trade interests (Ruíz y Pablo & Fradera, 1919). Having suffered during the siege of 1714 – and used thereafter as a barracks until 1771 – the Exchange Building enjoyed important reconstructive projects between 1772 and 1802 (Riera y Soler 1909: 26; Bernaus i Vidal and Caballé i Crivillés 2003). García Sánchez (2016) describes the building from an architectural and functional perspective.

According to some documentation, the Supreme Revenue/Tax Council (*Supremo Consejo de Hacienda*) held meetings here – at least those of the Council’s General Board of Commerce and Coin (*Junta General de Comercio y Moneda*).¹⁰⁵ The Supreme Council was largely responsible for overseeing the operations of the guilds on behalf of the crown government. There were jurisdictional disputes, by which the guilds tried to seek a more favorable judgment from one body or another for the enforcement of their privileges.

While not specified precisely in the documentation heretofore consulted, warehouses were located in the vicinity of the Customs House.¹⁰⁶ These warehouses would have functioned as short-term storage facilities for goods, prior to re-distribution aboard other ships or over land throughout the city and beyond. García Sánchez (2016) notes the presence of some warehouses within the Sea Wall, and mentions the dismantling of these sections during the reconstruction of the Palace Plaza area.

¹⁰⁴ A *Consolat de Mar* exists today – similarly charged with arbitrating disputes arising from maritime commercial interactions – as a part of the *Cámara de Comerç de Barcelona*.

¹⁰⁵ BN, sección de la Junta de Comercio, Leg. XXIX, 751 (28 April 1819).

¹⁰⁶ The commercial warehouses that now house the Catalanian History Museum were constructed in 1877.

Non-commercial spaces of note

While not involved directly in trade activities, the local basilica (sometimes popularly mistakenly referred to as a cathedral) was of great importance to the cargo handlers.¹⁰⁷ The thirteenth-century Basilica of Santa María del Mar (of the parish of the same name) is located in the heart of the *Ribera* neighborhood, then a few blocks from the beach. It was perhaps the most emblematic structure of the area, towering over the neighborhood and looming large in both place and space. It is a massive monument to both the religiosity and work ethic of the cargo handlers, as the maritime porters famously carried the tens of thousands of stones required down from the royal quarries at Montjüic. This labor (organized by the guild) has become part of the local lore, and is celebrated in the stone carvings and bronze pieces that adorn the Basilica interior and exterior (especially the altar area and the pillars lining the principal doorway): a number of images of different sorts of cargo handlers can be found here.¹⁰⁸



Above Left: Image of a *manuela* of *bastaixos* carved into the exterior stone pillars flanking the main doors of the Santa María del Mar Basilica, Barcelona.

Above Right: Image of a *bastaixo* in bronze, located on the exterior of the main door of Santa María del Mar Basilica, Barcelona.

Source: Modified images from author's collection (photos by Chris von Briesen, 2013).

¹⁰⁷ Not involved, it should be said, as a location; as an institution, the Catholic Church may or may not have been involved in the business of trade, though that is beyond the scope of this investigation.

¹⁰⁸ While art interpretation is beyond the scope of this chapter, it is interesting to note that some of the depictions of men hauling stones for the cathedral show men working in *manuellas* (as proper *bastaixos*) while others show men using ropes (as was common for *camalichs*) – an important differentiation, examined in Chapter 3. Joan Alemany (2002:119) refers – *perhaps* in error – to the guild of *faquines/macips de la ribera* as a guild of “*mozos de cuerda de la ribera*”.

The Basilica of Santa María del Mar also had a locational role of cultural socialability, as it was the benefactor of considerable donations by the Guild of Maritime Porters (*bastaixos*), which had a chapel within and which provided money for candles, masses, and religious objects.¹⁰⁹ This practice was not restricted to the maritime porters, but was widespread among the guilds: Coldeforns Lladó (1951) presents transcriptions (based on notary records) of the detailed inventories of the veritable plethora of religious indumenta owned by some of the maritime cargo handling guilds. Likewise, the maritime porters carried out organizational-logistical functions (council meetings) and activities of work-related socialability here and in the plaza in front of the Basilica. [The daily appearance for work, however, occurred in the Palace Plaza.¹¹⁰]

For their part, the fishermen and sailors focused their religious energies at the *Església de Sant Miquel del Port* (that is, the Church of Saint Michael of the Port) in the heart of the Barceloneta maritime neighborhood. Built in the mid-eighteenth century along with the rest of the Barceloneta neighborhood, the church was central to the religious functions of the maritime community.

The Citadel (*La Ciutadella* in Catalan) was a massive edification of the political and military authority of the central, royal government based in Madrid. Much of the Ribera neighborhood was demolished at the orders of the crown, during and following the fateful siege of the city and its military capitulation in 1714 (Fuster, 2007). Over one thousand buildings were leveled for the construction of the imposing fortress – one of the largest in Europe at the time (Torras i Ribé & Sobrequés i Callicó, 2005). This area comprised almost twenty percent of the city (Palau i Orta, 2002). This citadel lorded over the denizens of the city, subjugating them, in every sense, to the will of the royal government in Madrid. While the Citadel does not figure in the archived

¹⁰⁹ AGMMB, “[Dotació i constitució d’ una capella del Gremi de Macips de Ribera a l’ Església de Santa María del Mar de Barcelona]”, 1366, Capsa 3, carpeta 3 (2751); AGMMB, “Llibre ahont se assentan las missas de celebrar per las animas dels confreres i altres eixides”, 1711 – 1828, Capsa 13, carpeta 2 (2327); AGMMB, “Llibre dela Confraria dels Bastaixos per la cera. 1781”, 1781 – 1908, Capsa 13, [carpeta 3] (2328); AGMMB, “Relación de lo que existe dentro de nuestro almacén y archivo depositado bajo la custodia del andador de cuyo depósito aún entrega todas las juntas al tomar posesión, también se hará cargo de todo lo que exista de Santa María”, [n.d.], Capsa 17, carpeta 5 (2352).

¹¹⁰ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

guild documents of the time (at least not those consulted for this study), it is worth noting its presence, which must have been inescapable when contemplating the cityscape of the time.¹¹¹

The matter of a *Lazareto* quarantine is also interesting. In 1787, the royal authorities advanced a centralized system of quarantine (based on foreign experiences). The principal quarantine for goods entering Barcelona was near Mahón, on the distant island of Menorca. It appears that the city had its own quarantine as well until 1771, and again in the early nineteenth century (Rodríguez Ocaña, 1988). While the exact location of the quarantine has not been determined, there are a few references to a *Lazareto* in Barcelona. One reference appears in a legal case between the Guild of Maritime Porters and the Guild of Maritime Horsecart Operators in 1804 (shortly after the previously united guild had split into two).¹¹² It was found that the maritime porters would enjoy the privilege of transporting cotton (a very important cargo for the textile-manufacturing city) to and from the quarantine. The case notes that the guild placed six men in the quarantine – at risk of infection – to protect the cotton as it aired out (in hopes that any contagion would be eliminated in the process). The *Lazareto* is also noted as a destination in the 1832 Ordinances.

¹¹¹ Certainly, the presence of thousands upon thousands of soldiers a few hundred meters away would have been present in the minds of any laboring people considering uncivil actions (like those of 1835).

¹¹² AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos al Reial Acord sobre la privativa de transport de cotó al Lazaret]”, 1804/12/16 – n.d., Capsa 7, carpeta 23 (2273).

3.5 The Port of Barcelona as a workspace

It is difficult to disaggregate the physical and socio-economic factors from the formation of a mode of labor: there are certainly mutually influencing considerations – geography and physical features influenced the organization of work processes. The social groups involved in these processes influenced the built-up features – and, where feasible, the geographic and hydrographic ones. The port, its technological facilities, and its capacity remained artisan or pre-industrial during the period studied. The interactions between the cargo laborers and their environment remained traditional, and reflected the common characteristics of the artisan phase (C. J. Davis, 2000), or monopolistic configuration (van Voss & van der Linden, 2000) of cargo handling.

Taking into consideration the geographic and build-up features, it is important to describe the general areas for the normal flow of goods as they entered the city (the inverted process being basically the same for exported goods). This shows the relationship between places and labor, and explains the importance of some of the places in a functional context. Likewise, as some of these locations are mentioned frequently in the archival sources, it is important to understand their roles in the overall workings of the port. By the same measure, the interaction between laborers and locations allows us to examine the social construction of workspaces.

As noted above, Barcelona existed by virtue of its harbor. Located along the mostly rocky Catalan coast, the shallow, sandy beaches of Barcelona permitted the city to function as a relatively important maritime shipping centre for about two millennia, connecting the Mediterranean world with the Iberian Peninsula. In this sense, the Port of Barcelona is relevant not only to the city, but to the economic functioning of the hinterland beyond the city. It was a nexus for importing and exporting goods throughout the Mediterranean region; and, as global exploration increased, so did the role of Barcelona. This importance as a regional, and then global hub has grown over time, and much of this occurred during the period covered by this investigation.

The creation of workspaces

The environment in which one works is important to the conceptualization and structure of the work and of the workers; it forms part of the consciousness developed within the space. The physical environs limit the area of activity, but also delineate the social realm of existence, creating a considerable intermingling of social and labor identity. The workspace is not merely a location – a backdrop to activities – instead, it assumes something of an almost subjective role in the goings on, impacting the participants even as they exert their will and capacity over the area and its features.

The construction of the space – physical and social, through edification and consensual concepts of public and private space – contributes to the overall understanding of the activities performed there. Likewise, many of the buildings that helped define the areas were built and maintained as locations for specific activities, contributing to the definition of the area within socio-economic terms. Together these contributed to the varied perceptions and conceptualizations of the lived experiences.

Were it not for a subjective interpretation of the space, the port would have remained a geographical construct, little more – just another sandy inlet of sorts along the rocky Catalan coast. By undertaking activities therein and thereabouts, however, a dimension of social reality was constructed in, and of, the space (objectively and subjectively, respectively). In the case of the Port of Barcelona, it gained meaning to the inhabitants of the city and, particularly, to the men who labored there: a significance that spanned the cityscape and the seascape.¹¹³

Overall, the port itself was dedicated principally to mercantile commerce. The port as a socio-economic construct was a kaleidoscope of workers known as *Gents de Mar* in Catalan (literally, “people of the sea”) – people who made their living at sea. García Espuche (2007) describes the sea-based professions and their relationship to the port city. He mentions some of the land-based maritime professions (including those discussed here), but does not address them in great detail in that article. Of interest in this mention is the division between construction and transportation subsectors, as the workers described comprised the transportation professions.

¹¹³ I say “men” as I am yet to have discovered any documentation of women working in cargo-handling during the period studied; that said, women certainly may have participated in those or other, ancillary labors.

Generally speaking, the port area (that is, the harbor and the surrounding strip of coast) was populated most significantly by a variety of sea-faring people and land-based workers: fishermen, shipwrights, caulkers and carpenters, sailors, boatmen, cargo handlers, and the mercantile middlemen employed in facilitating the practical and bureaucratic necessities of shipping. In addition to commerce and cargo handling, fishing occurred from the beach (with nets and lines) and out at sea, and for that activity the port area was little more than a humble harbor – for mooring or hauling small fishing boats on-shore, where maintenance or repairs could be undertaken.

The port area was a point where sea folk and city folk intermingled to greater or lesser extent, each with their own conceptualizations and expectations of social interactions. And while some well-heeled citizens were known to stroll along the top of the Sea Wall, observing the sea in moments of respite, the beach-side of the Sea Wall was a bustling area of industry – populated by workers and beasts of burden and the required implements and vehicles (Sans 1971). The physical coast (the strip of beach between the Sea Wall and the sea) was almost exclusively a space for maritime mercantile activities.

First, either the sailors of the merchant vessels or specialized unloaders disembarked goods from the large ships onto lighters (piloted by boatmen); whereas the land-based cargo-handling professions included maritime porters working in teams, maritime horsecart operators, mule renters, and maritime teamsters (and common porters, whose actions were intrusive). All but the last of these professions was organized in a guild. Each trade delineated their own definition and differentiation based on goods, mode of operations, and the geographic areas in which they were permitted to ply their trades. These people were defined by their employment and by their shared workspace; and, likewise, by a complex cultural interpretation of their social roles.

In cultural terms, the port and the surrounding area was one of significantly different conceptualizations. On one hand, during working hours or at night, it was no place for “civilized” people: like an extramural community, it was a place for the lowly, the criminal, the strange, and the outcasts – in other words, the dross of society. Some of the earliest archival records referring to maritime porters (from the early fourteenth-century Catalan *Llibre del Consolat de Mar*, or the *Book of the Consulate of the Sea*) were prohibitions of the carrying of

pointed blades – a measure simultaneously applied to slaves (Vives i Miret, 1933, pp. 13–14).¹¹⁴ It is, therefore, worthwhile and interesting to note the frequency of appeals to honor, decency, and trustworthiness by the organizations representing these workers. As evinced in the archival record, these declarations formed a central part of the self-inculcated and consciously promoted identity of the workers.

On the other hand, the port and, particularly, the walkway (*andén*) along the jetty were used by well-to-do Barcelonans for casual strolls. As an 1840 *Traveler's Manual to Barcelona (Manual del Viajero en Barcelona)* noted in a section devoted to recreational activities in Barcelona – which includes, it must be noted, a visit to the cemetery! – the walkways (*andén*) along the port were appropriated by Barcelonans for moments of leisure (Patxot, 1840, p. 185):

On Sunday afternoons in the winter, it is common that the walkway of the Port become a well-populated walk, and in the future it will be much more so upon completion of the Sea Gate that is being built.¹¹⁵

Likewise, the Sea Wall, with its walkway along the top, was a place of diversion (Patxot, 1840, p. 184):

For its busyness, singularly in the winter, it rates along [that of] the Rambla. The view that can be enjoyed from it is most delicious, as much for those who are accustomed to seeing the sea, as for those who for the first time are presented with this brilliant perspective, and, at the same time, the movement of a busy Port.¹¹⁶

While it is difficult to extrapolate precisely from a single source, it is interesting to consider that this recreational usage may have been seasonal (as the author highlights its popularity in the winter), or particularly on Sundays.

¹¹⁴ Recent copies of the ancient *Llibre del Consulat del Mar* are available for reference at the AHPB and elsewhere.

¹¹⁵ Original: “En los domingos de invierno por las tardes acostumbra convertirse el anden del Puerto en un paseo muy concurrido, y en adelante lo sera mucho mas así que estén concluidas las puertas del Mar que se están construyendo.”

¹¹⁶ Original: “Por lo concurrida, singularmente en invierno, corre parejas con la Rambla. La vista que desde ella se goza es deliciosísima, así para los que están acostumbrados á ver el mar, como para aquellos á quienes por primera vez se les presenta esta brillante perspective, y á la vez el movimiento de un Puerto concurrido.”

The picture that develops of the port is that of a space constantly renegotiated by numerous economic activities, with laboring men and their respective draft animals comingling with the occasional commercial functionary, among a plethora of boats, stacks of cargo sectioned by variety. That is to say, the interaction between people, animals, objects, and spaces created a complex non-urban/urban milieu, both inside and outside the barrier formed by the Sea Wall. Likewise, there was a multi-functional use of the space in terms of socio-cultural activities, with usage apparently varying based on the needs of commerce, but nonetheless taken advantage of by the general population in those opportunities when the space was not dominated by work.

Thus, when considering the social construction of the workspaces, it is important to keep in mind that maritime cargo handlers were not the only people occupying these spaces.

An extramural space: beyond the realm of civilization

Originally called the “Neighborhood of the Beach” or the “Maritime Neighborhood”, what soon became the Barceloneta (or, “Little Barcelona”) neighborhood was built atop a partially constructed beach which, for years, had been used to store small fishing boats in improvised shacks. The sandy beach was created by the build-up of sands which accumulated there after the integration of the small Maïans Island into the harbor area. The area had been destined for those families whose homes were destroyed by the construction of the *Ciutadella* fortress after the siege of 1714. It is worth noting that the wealthier victims of that clearance had moved elsewhere in the city; it would take decades for the poorer families to occupy the area, due to the requirement that they present themselves to the police for registration (Permanyer in Clos et al., 2003). As Permanyer (2003, pp. 18–19) noted, what developed in its stead was a maze of fishermen’s shacks:

The Marques de la Mina [who designed the neighborhood] wrote: ‘It was a smudge on such a famous city, capital of the Principality, [an] incomprehensible labyrinth of shacks of various types and forms, all of combustible materials’.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Original: “El marqués de la Mina escribió: “Era borrón de una ciudad tan famosa y capital del Principado el laberinto incomprendible de chozas de diferentes especies y figuras, todas de materias combustibles”.

However, once construction was planned and begun in 1753, the pace was startling, with scores of two-storey houses being built in a few years (Fuster, 2007). The area retained this character even with the construction of orderly streets and apartment buildings throughout the eighteenth century, as many of the residents were fishermen. For years – in addition to the fishermen and coal mongers who plied their trade and stored their boats and coal in shacks along the beach – the area would harbor unseemly characters, adding to the general disdain for the denizens of the waterfront: “all types of beggars, deserters, [persons] expelled by the military, emancipated youths who escaped from parental tutelage, the unemployed and vagrants” (Permanyer in Clos et al., 2003, p. 18).¹¹⁸

The Barceloneta neighborhood was an extramural community: it was under the jurisdiction of the military. The panorama created a socio-cultural and economic milieu of semi-lawlessness: the Sea Gate in the Sea Wall which separated the city of Barcelona from the Barceloneta was a place of taxation, searches, and curfew lock-outs. It is worth noting that guild regulations were enforced in the harbor and on the beach, beyond the city walls. This is a bit unusual as it goes against the common limitation of guild privileges to within the jurisdictional limits of a city. In the case of maritime cargo workers of Barcelona, the port was their world, bridging the relative civilization of the walled city with the strange, the foreign, and the alien of the outside world.


The internal, Barcelona-facing Barceloneta beach (as opposed to the exterior, seaside beach) was used by the guilds to store their boats – a situation that gave rise to conflicts and fights. This chaos was made orderly in the late 1790s at the behest of the naval authorities, which sought to address inter-guild conflicts at the source. The authorities specified precisely which sections of the beach were to be used by which guilds.¹¹⁹

It is noteworthy that many of the maritime cargo handlers did not necessarily live in the Barceloneta neighborhood. The documentary record shows that a considerable share of the maritime porters resided in Gràcia, a village located a few kilometers north of the city.

¹¹⁸ Original: “...[P]or todo tipo de mendicants, desertores, expulsados del ejército, jóvenes emancipados que escaparon de la tutela paterna, desocupados y vagabundos.”

¹¹⁹ ANC, “Zalvide”, box 1637.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to disaggregate those living in Barceloneta from those of Barcelona proper based on the guild documents.¹²⁰



Towards the horizon and beyond: the sea as a vast unknown

Beyond this area – beyond the city, beyond the harbor – lay the Mediterranean world and, by extension, interaction with the unknown. While a detailed review of the conceptualization of this world is certainly exceeds the scope of this chapter, it is at least worth noting.

During much of the period studied, this was a treacherous area, defined not by smooth sailing, but by considerable difficulties – not only in navigating the often rough waters, but in navigating the political sea of characters: most notoriously, capture by enemy nations and enslavement capture by Turkish and North African (“Barbary”) pirates and Ottoman corsairs, which plagued the sea during the late-eighteenth century.¹²¹ Guild regulations also made allowances for the payment of ransom, the guarantee of indemnities for the families of enslaved sailors, and other piracy-related issues – just as they helped defray the difficulties posed by the loss of life or limb, from accident or shipwreck. While the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries marked the high-

¹²⁰ Gràcia is now basically a neighborhood, united to Barcelona by the construction of the Eixample beginning in the 1850s.

¹²¹ The Guild of Mariners maintained a common fund from which rescue payments for “captives” could be made. The Manuals of the Scribe of the Sea housed in the AHPB contain references to this practice through the late eighteenth century; see for example AHPB, Escribano de Mar, Simón Vicenç, “[No Title, Mareantes]” 13 March 1765, Manual 42 (17651772). Interestingly, liberation was to be paid for in an egalitarian, in a first-in, first-out turn manner.

water mark of Barbary Piracy, progressive peace between Spain and north African kingdoms at the end of the eighteenth seems to have lessened the frequency (Fé Cantó, 2015). The phenomenon was not brought under a more full control until squashed by the combined imperial states of Europe at the post-Napoleonic Congress of Vienna in 1814-1815.

Similarly, the world beyond the harbor was one of opportunity and risk: it was the realm of sailors and merchant captains. Most of the cargo-handlers were land-based, and unloaders and boatmen rarely ventured beyond the mouth of the harbor in their small boats. Fishermen (sometimes involved in unloading boats) would surely have not ventured far into the open sea. Generally speaking, however, seafaring workers were people with whom the cargo handlers interacted and mingled in the port, and thus contributed to the *mélange* of otherworldliness of the cargo handlers' world (if only by proximity and association).

3.6 Chapter Conclusions

Place and space both played an important role in demarcating the social and economic activities examined. The process of demarcation was socio-judicial and socio-cultural: socio-cultural considerations combined with legal decrees in a mutually reaffirming process of definition.

Having looked at a number of European ports, it is clear that three typologies exist: natural harbors, beaches, and fluvial ports. These geographic and hydrographic foundations would affect the development of physical infrastructures and would also largely impact the development of maritime cargo handling. The tasks required to transport cargo were largely dependent upon – at least in the most fundamental way – the port types. Based on the necessary activities, the avenue was open to a multi-factor determination of the trades and guilds that arose to execute and monopolize them.

Barcelona was a sandy beach port, which was built into an artificial harbor prior to the period studied here. Between 1760 and 1840, there were considerable difficulties caused by the closing of the harbor mouth by sand. The major geo-hydrographic infrastructure varied little, save the extension of the existing jetty. Likewise, the port remained artisan in the sense that it had no docks or mechanized means of handling cargo. These modifications would only occur after the period studied. This overview of the layout of the port area of the city, its neighborhoods, key constructed features, and of the general flow of goods and people through these spaces, will be useful for understanding the development of the multi-guild universe of maritime cargo handling.

Location-based considerations affected the organization of labor, and of the strategies employed by labor organizations. Some of these limitations or opportunities were based on natural or constructed places, at other times, they were the product of subjective notions that were enforced by the activities of participants in the processes that developed therein.

These locations were designated by tradition and formalized in decrees and regulations – creating an institutionalization of space, as it were. Based on this, some members of society were able to enact a degree of ownership or protagonism in certain spaces at certain times. Where it related to work, this ownership could come to constitute, a privilege – legitimized, or

not, by government authorities. These privileged uses of space were often defended with great effort.

The marina constituted a recognizable part of the city – as a physical location and as a conceptual space. Comprehension of this area was the product of objective and subjective considerations: it was a blend of natural, constructed, and socio-cultural understandings. The spatial recognition of the port area was based on traditional understandings; so too were the cultural confines that encapsulated the work-life of the cargo handlers. The eventual formalization of these traditional ideas mirrors the formalization of these spaces, previously defined traditionally. In many cases, these definitions are inextricable, as the processes and activities of the labor of specific groups of cargo handlers were delineated by the physical confines of these areas – the beach (and even specific parts thereof), the Customs House, the Sea Wall, and areas beyond.

As noted briefly, the Customs House was the scene of innumerable conflicts, as the trades fought over the right to control the relevant economic activities therein. Meanwhile, on the streets outside, tradesmen vied with each other for work and rights-of-way, both within and without their respective guilds. At times, the chaos of hundreds of mutually competitive workers organized to defend their collective issues would lend cause to significant legal battles and a fair number of disorders.

Chapter 4.

Differentiation and organization of maritime-cargo handling guilds:

Goods, privileges, and leadership roles

4.1 Chapter Introduction

Having discussed the general historic context, and described the operational functions and organizational structure of European secondary-sector guilds, and having delineated the places and spaces of the port (and their physical and socio-cultural construction), I will now look in greater detail at the trades and guilds that functioned in Barcelona.¹²² The aim of this chapter is to elucidate the history and operational functions of the maritime-cargo handling guilds in Barcelona (with an eye to other European ports), focusing on the period of 1760-1840. I detail some of the most important functional characteristics and look at formal and practical leadership positions.

In the most general terms, service-sector guilds functioned in a similar fashion to guilds elsewhere in Europe: they organized, regulated, and represented membership in the profession; provided a minimum standard of quality assurance; exerted labor market controls; organized ancillary services and benefits for members and their families; and participated in the political and socio-cultural activities of the city. These ancient trades provided services to the government, merchants, and inhabitants of large and small port cities throughout Europe to fulfill functional necessities and guarantee (as best as possible) a dependable service, while at the same time protecting the needs of their members (Davies et al., 2000a).

The port of Barcelona was for centuries a pre-industrial trade hub and intermodal junction for local, regional, Mediterranean, and colonial traffic. With millennial roots in the Mediterranean trade, its influence grew with the imperial extension of Catalonia and, later, Spain, trading with parts of Europe, Africa, and the colonies in the Americas. During the period studied, the port of Barcelona was a multi-product shipping hub central to regional import and export activities, despite serious lingering difficulties – natural, infrastructural, and political-economic.

During the period studied here, the Catalonian capital continued to serve as an important port city for maritime commerce, connecting parts of the hinterland to the Mediterranean and the wider world, with considerable import-export activities (Clavera i Monjonell et al., 1992;

¹²² I have included a set of charts outlining these guilds and their principal characteristics as appendices.

Alemany i Llovera, 2002; Herranz Loncán, 2005; Yáñez, 2006). Its beaches, warehouses, and stores were filled with the raw materials and products of complex trade relationships.

It was one of a handful of points for exporting goods from throughout Catalonia, especially distilled *aguardiente* alcohol and stamped textiles (calicos, known locally as *indianas*), which formed the foundation of Catalan proto-industrialization.¹²³ In addition to these two major export goods (and it should be noted that the textiles required imported cotton), Barcelona trafficked in of a great variety of materials: besides export goods, the variety of imported goods was considerable, and differed with each arrival: lumber; metal bars; foodstuffs including fish, sugar, cocoa, coffee, and grains; raw cotton and silk for textile transformation; and miscellaneous goods together constituted the majority at the turn of the nineteenth century. Re-exportation was an important activity as well.¹²⁴

While there was no *general* distinction between which guild handled imported or exported goods; there were *specific* distinctions in the cases of some goods. The variety of cargo types is important, as it was the foundation of the goods-based privileges of the highly regulated, multi-guild system.

Because of the importance of maritime commerce to the economy, local and royal authorities were interested in guaranteeing the proper (albeit minimal) functioning of the port and the orderly supply of maritime-cargo handlers. That is, these service-sector guilds interacted with municipal and royal authorities in much the same way as craft guilds; however, the strategic value of port services to the overall functioning of the city (and the nation-state) created a situation in which authorities were encouraged to pay very close attention to balancing the needs of merchants and those of the port workers upon whom certain privileges were conferred

¹²³ For the economic role of calico stamped textiles, see Sánchez, Àlex, “Barcelona i la indústria de les indians: Una presentació”, *Barcelona Quaderns D’història*, 2011, 9–29. It must be recognized that Barcelona was not the main Catalan port for exporting *aguardiente*, but it was, nonetheless, an important one; see Clavera i Monjonell, Joan, Albert Carreras, Josep M. Delgado, and César Yáñez, *Economía E Historia Del Puerto de Barcelona: Tres Estudios*, Biblioteca Civitas Economía y Empresa (Madrid: Port Autònom de Barcelona; Barcelona: Editorial Civitas, 1992). Unfortunately a minor error in the quantitative appreciation of the exports precludes using that data in this investigation. For a study of Catalan proto-industrialization, see Ferrer, Llorenç, “The Diverse Growth of 18th-Century Catalonia: Proto-Industrialisation?”, *Catalan Historical Review*, 2012, 67–84.

¹²⁴ Pierre Vilar, *Catalunya dins l’Espanya moderna: la formació del capital comercial* (trans. by Eulàlia Duran i Grau), 4 vols (Barcelona: Edicions 62, 1986 [1962]), IV, p. 152.

(Delgado Ribas, 1995). As the trend towards centralizing (nation-building) progressed in the wake of the War of the Spanish Succession, the importance of the port to perceived royal-national interests predominated over those of the municipality; there was a corresponding involvement of central-government bodies, generally superseding the authority of municipal agents.¹²⁵

With the great variety of goods (and the various means of handling them), and because of the highly regulated, economically and militarily strategic nature of port activities, a complex labor environment comprised of numerous cargo trades developed to meet the needs of commerce and the state. In general terms, this panorama developed from the early fourteenth century onwards in Barcelona (Delgado Ribas, 1995; Arce, 2008).

The Barcelona maritime-cargo handling guilds covered all aspects of service-provision: from the unloading of merchandise from sea-going vessels, the handling of these goods to and in the Customs House and King's Scale; the movement of goods to different points in the city; and, finally, the transportation of goods to points beyond Barcelona.

In the case of some guilds, the majority of their services related to transporting cargo to different neighborhoods in the city or to near and distant villages and cities (which is to say, not precisely a maritime activity). Even so, I consider them as working in the sub-sector of maritime-cargo handling as the basis of their work was mainly transporting sea-born cargo. Certainly, the argument could be made that, at a certain point on land, the cargo ceased being *maritime* cargo

¹²⁵¹²⁵ While the appreciation of Spain at this time as a nation-state in construction may be controversial, the fundamental assessment of nationhood – which is to say a polity based on a dominant group able to exert hegemony on others within a contained border, especially in the wake of the War of the Spanish Succession – is, I believe, fair, and useful for understanding the importance of the Port of Barcelona to the imperial trade system. Interestingly, the concept of “nation” from the Latin origin *natio* – or, a litter [of pups] certainly much to the liking of the wolf-borne Romans – was already long in use, at least in France, where it appeared in a dictionary of the French Academy in the 1694: the term was defined as: “All the inhabitants of the same State, of the same country, that live under the same laws, and use the same language”. A little over a century later, this definition held in Spain: the Spanish Royal Academy (1817). *Diccionario de la lengua castellana por la Real Academia Española* (5th ed.). Madrid, España: Imprenta Real defines “nation” as “the collection of the inhabitants of some province, country or kingdom” (p. 592); whereas it defines “state” as “the political body of a nation” (p 392). For more on this topic as applied to Spain, see Humlebæk, Carsten, *Spain: Inventing the Nation* (London [etc.]: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015) [quoted, p.2]. The usage of the modern definition, according to Humlebæk, should be conditioned on the extent of a single set of laws; however, I disagree by the importance of the process as opposed to the product, as well as the current existence of multi-polity states and regardless of the form of government.

and became simply cargo (*terrestrial* cargo, as it were). While I am conscious of this, I believe that the consideration of these guilds within a study of the maritime sub-sector of transportation is useful. At some moment, all of these guilds interacted (in competition and cooperation), based on their handling of maritime cargo.

There were different guild configurations of these trades over time. Generally – although not always – each trade was organized in a single guild; likewise, there was only one guild for each of the trades. In turn, the guilds were sometimes organized in larger, multi-guild structures, with ordinances that covered the operations of all three. What is more – participation in only one guild was not exclusive: for example, there was significant membership overlap between the guilds of fishermen and unloaders. There is no clarification of how this was undertaken, or what direct repercussions this had on the ability of an individual to work on any given day (whether or not one could choose to act as a guild-member of one guild on one day, and of another the next day, for example).

In order to better understand this labor panorama, I examine at the socio-cultural and operational differentiation of the various maritime cargo-handling trades and some of their most important organizational leadership features. I look at the considerations by which these different trades were delineated, depending on such cultural factors as tradition, custom, and historic precedence; I also show that the type of goods handled, the means for transporting these goods on water and on land, and the implications of these factors on the development of the modes of service provision affected the organizational models used by the guilds responsible for these services.

I occasionally use the term “port work” when referring to the tasks of maritime-cargo handling. It must be recognized that this term could – but *should not* – convey a connotation that the port was more advanced in terms of infrastructure than it actually was in Barcelona at the time studied. Technically speaking, Barcelona did not have docks; Barcelona’s port facilities, as they were, were rudimentary – basically a beach with a single jetty – neither of which were such that a merchant vessel could be reached from the shore without the aid of a small boat: there was no ability to moor a ship. It was not until *after* the period studied that, to use W.R. Lee’s (2000, p. 342) phrase, “proper dock facilities” (which he used in reference to Bremen, Germany) were

constructed and supplied with mechanical technology.¹²⁶ The port area was a very simple harbor area centered on a beach. The terminology employed at the time was principally “*la playa*” (the beach), while the terms “*el puerto*” (the port) and “*la marina*” (the marina) surface occasionally – especially over time, with the latter two terms becoming more visible in later years, though not to the detriment of the traditional reference to the beach.

In much the same way, I sometimes use the term “port workers” to refer to maritime-cargo handlers, even though the functional characteristics of what would now be considered a port were still far on the temporal horizon – this is a common usage in the academic literature (e.g. Davies et al., 2000a, 2000b), and allows for the identification of certain trades and the evolution of their basic labors over time. It is not meant to be an exclusive term – the variety of workers present in the port area included any number of other workers in jobs relating to and supporting maritime commerce – common laborers, maritime carpenters and caulkers, fishermen, sail makers, tavern owners, import/export merchants and agents, etc.

John Barzman similarly makes this distinction when studying a latter period when he says, “Dock labour is not an obvious entity. [...] However, this category was preceded and then coexisted with another, that of ‘port workers’, which included workers in navigation inside the port, ship repair, packaging, harbor construction and maintenance” (2000, p. 60). That said, in this study, the term is used to refer solely to maritime-cargo handlers.

¹²⁶ Hand and steam-powered cranes were installed in Barcelona in 1865. *Revista de Obras Públicas* [1865], p. 258. This mention coincides with the inexact reference in Alemany i Llovera, J. (2002). *El Puerto de Barcelona. Un pasado, un futuro*. (2 [amplified]). Barcelona: Lunewerg.

4.2 Maritime-cargo handling guilds and the flow of goods in Barcelona

As far back as the records go regarding mercantile trade in the port, it seems that there have been identifiable groups of men dedicated to different aspects of the handling the ebb and flow of cargo. The judicial precepts of *The Book of the Consulate of the Sea (Llibre del Consulat de Mar)* date to the early thirteenth century (at least); it was compiled more formally in the mid-fifteenth century (Serrano Daura, 2003). *The Book* is full of references to the intricacies of maritime trade, including references to the movement of goods and the responsibility of those handling the cargo. A comparison with eighteenth-century practices shows that trade had changed little over the centuries (at least from the perspective of cargo handling).

As discussed, the port area consisted of distinct places and work-spaces. The division of the general areas in which the different guilds operated was a socio-culturally defined and legally codified matter: the harbor; the beach; the Customs House and King's Scale; and, throughout the city and beyond.¹²⁷ Each of these areas represented an understood space: where the harbor ended and the beach began was determined by a combination of factors: tides; cultural norms; and judicial precedence that created a general recognition of where cargo was to be unloaded and thereafter handled by a land-based guild. The Sea Wall was the beginning of the city proper, and was important because some taxes could be applied there; it was also customary to close the gate at dark, thus limiting the work-day schedule. The Customs House was arguably the most important divider of these areas, as it was the loci of significant privileged activities. Finally, the city walls generally determined the final frontier of guild prerogatives. While a distinction can be drawn between the city and the hinterland beyond the walls, for the purposes of this study, the distinction is less relevant: the determination of the privileged guild did not vary significantly.

The division of cargo-handling labor was a combination of areas and goods. This meant that there were often different guilds working in the same way, and the determination of which guild would handle which goods was based on the cargo in question. Although there were generally different guilds providing specific services, there was a privilege-competition continuum. The degree was limited by different factors, including: the area; the type of goods; the means of transporting them; and, the subjective determination of the owners of the goods. I generally focus

¹²⁷ A map of Barcelona (c. 1806) is included in the Annex.

on the development of the ordinances as they existed at the beginning of the period studied, paying greater attention to the later ordinances further below, as a way of explaining the aims and processes of liberalization.

As a way of exploring the various guilds and how they were differentiated, I have chosen to approach the question in a location-based ordering, following the flow of goods imported into the city (exportation being largely an inverse process).

From the boats to the beach: three unloader guilds

Ships arriving in Barcelona would anchor in the harbor, as there was nowhere to dock. While anchored, the cargo would be unloaded onto smaller boats; in the case of some types of cargo, goods were floated to the beach. In the English-language, the terms “harbor barge” and, more precisely, “lighter”, are used to identify these low-keeled, row-boats (known locally as “*lanchonas*” or “*barcazas*”); likewise, the terms “lighterman” and “bargeman” are used to refer to the workers who used and worked on these boats. In either case (hailed or floated), the boats were piloted to the beach by specialists in cargo-handling, which I call “loaders” and “unloaders” (from “*descargador*” in Castilian and “*descarregador*” in Catalan). These men would unload the cargo on the beach. It is important to note that the tasks of loading (stowage) and unloading were undertaken by the same group of workers: these two tasks were not a point of differentiated specialization in Barcelona.

When a merchant vessel arrived in Barcelona, the person in charge of the merchandise – be that person the owner of the ship, the captain, a commercial agent, or the owner of the goods (being a combination of seller and buyer) – would either employ the sailors already aboard the ship (if previously established by contract), or would employ one of the three guilds (mariners, unloaders, or fishermen) privileged with transporting cargo to the beach by lighter. There was no cargo-determined differentiation, nor was there apparently a subjective choice by the merchant as to which guild (or team thereof) would handle the goods.

The subjective determination of the merchant was between using and not using the sailors already employed aboard the ship for cargo handling: this was determined either in the written contract for the voyage or, *perhaps*, upon arrival in the port. In the case of using these sailors,

the merchant would still have to pay a fee to the harbor-based guilds, that is, he had to pay for the “Right of Anchorage”.¹²⁸ The amount was determined by whether or not the merchant used his own lighters, or those of the guild. In the case of the former, the anchorage fee was one-quarter of the full amount for handling cargo; in the case of the latter, it was one-half of the full amount. Similarly, goods moved from one vessel to another (not entering the city in any way) were also included in the schedules, as were special considerations for handling from ships anchored beyond the harbor (which was twice the normal amount).

It is interesting to note the centuries-old *traditional*, customary practice – at least for Catalans – codified in the *Book of the Consulate of the Sea* was that voyage-contracted sailors would carry out this labor in ports in which there were no specialized loaders/unloaders. Antoni de Capmany records Chapter 73 as stating:

The sailors have the obligation of receiving the merchandise at the hatches; but not to stow them if the captain has not promised this to the merchants. [...] Yet if the captain is in uninhabited land, in which there are no *faquines*, nor whomever would do it for money; the sailors must load and unload [the cargo], and they will be paid whatever the *contramaestre* esteems would have been given to those that would have loaded or unloaded [the cargo]. This chapter was made so that the captain not lose his voyage, nor the merchants. If there are men who load and unload [cargo] for money; this shall not be done by the sailors.¹²⁹

¹²⁸ Biblioteca de Catalunya [BC], Anon. “Arancel de precios de carga, descarga y trasbordo ó transbordo...” [18 agosto 1807] Reprinted by Garriga y Aguasvivas: Barcelona, 1819, 33-8:C 49/8. [available at <http://books.google.es/books?id=0wn2hSt5yPsC>; last accessed 17 March 2017].

¹²⁹ de Capmany, A.. *Codigo de las costumbres maritimas de Barcelona, hasta aqui vulgarmente llamado Libro del Consulado. Nuevamente traducido al castellano con el texto....* Imp. de Don Antonio de Sancha, 1791), p. 137. (Retrieved from <https://books.google.it/books?id=QZPxKf2KTeYC>; last accessed 1 September 2016); Original: “Los marineros tienen la obligación de recibir las mercaderías á la escotilla; más no á estibarlas si el patron no lo ha prometido á los mercaderes. [...] Más si el patron está en tierra despoblada, en donde no hallen faquines, ni quien lo haga por dinero ; los marineros deberán cargar y descargar, á quienes se pagará por lo que el contramaestre estime que tocara á los que hubiensen cargado ó descargado. Este capítulo se hizo para que el patron no perdiese con esto su viage, ni tampoco los mercaderes. Más si hay hombres que carguen y descarguen por dinero; no deben hacerlo los marineros.”

The ancient traditions also placed responsibility for damage or loss squarely on the various responsible parties, depending on the trajectory of the goods: on the deck, the captain is responsible; on the lighters, the lightermen are responsible – under pain of arrest.¹³⁰

In the case of hiring one of the specialized trades, these guilds would assign teams for executing the required tasks. Generally, they would unload merchandise from the merchant vessel onto a harbor lighter; some cargo was floated to the beach. The lighters were either rowed to the shore or were pulled by rope to the beach by horses.

An example of this practice is documented in a contract between the Mariners' Guild and two maritime horsecart operators. This written contract established the conditions, rates of pay for hauling the lighters.¹³¹ The contract for the "Provision of the service of hauling to land the Lighters of the Guild" ("*Arrendamiento del servicio de arrastre a tierra de las Barcazas del Gremio*") was dated 9 February 1791, at a time when these horsecart operators were still unified with the maritime porters (Colldeforns Lladó, 1951, pp. 207–209). The period contracted was one year. The terms were quite detailed, including sections covering: payment; work during inclement weather or on holidays; sanctions for violating the terms; *et cetera*. In addition, the contract was valid so long as the horsecart operators behaved "well" and the "*Prohom**[*bres* of the Mariners' Guild] could not remove them nor could [the Horsecart Operators] sever the contract under a penalty of one thousand *libras*...(1951, p. 208).¹³² To put this economic sanction into perspective, it represented the full-price entrance fee (that is, for an applicant not related to an existing member) of two-hundred maritime horsecart operators – an *incredible* sum! It appears that this contract was only for imported cargo, as no mention of hauling in the other direction is mentioned.

¹³⁰ While references to loading and unloading are omnipresent in this tome, the dozens of headings in Titles IV, V, and VI are of note for their highly detailed treatment of the topic, especially in specifying the minimum standards, responsibilities, and means of restitution in case of damages or loss. These sections cover the proper handling of a great variety of packaged goods – with ceramic vessels for wine and oil, and bales of cloth (the most important merchant goods) receiving the most exacting treatment. It is worth noting that wine-goods and textiles remained preeminent in the period studied here.

¹³¹ I have been unable to determine whether the maritime horsecart operators entered into the contract privately or on behalf of their guild.

¹³² Original: "no podrán los *Prohom**[*bres* del Gremio de Mareantes] removerlos ni aquellos [los Carreteros] separarse bajo pena de mil libras(...)."

It is clear that – if previously contracted sailors were not employed in cargo-handling – there was a privilege covering the loading and unloading goods from the merchant ships and transporting them to the port's beach. This privilege was shared by different trades/guilds, known by different names over time. During the period studied, there were three guilds involved in this trade: (lightermen and) unloaders, fishermen, and mariners. The inclusion of mariners in this scheme was introduced by the municipal government in 1644 and was underscored by the Naval (*Marina*) military authorities in the mid-eighteenth century to benefit sailors unfit for onboard service (for reasons of age or disability). The relationship between these guilds was complicated: at times they competed openly, at times they divided the work between the guilds (though perhaps not enthusiastically).

Delgado Ribas (1995) traces the conflictive relationship between the mariners and the other two guilds. The Guild of Mariners had won a unique privilege in 1757, paying one-fourth of their income to the other guilds. The mariners noted in 1760 that the fishermen and unloaders should have to matriculate, successfully seeking the exclusion of the latter from cargo-handling by the naval authorities. However, the fishermen and unloaders continued to unload cargo, much to the chagrin of the mariners. This led to attempts to organize these activities – efforts that lasted through the late 1770s, culminating in a 1779 decision to share the opportunities among the three groups based on the number of members. This membership-based determination was intrinsically connected by the dual-membership practice of the fishermen and unloaders. Whatever the differences between these three guilds, their constitution of a navy-supported and protected, tri-partite Guild of Matriculated guilds (with *considerable* internal autonomy) improved their position before the municipal authorities.

After the fall of Barcelona to Borbón authorities, the municipality lost jurisdiction over port activities. Thereafter, all three were under the regimen of the Navy, which became directly involved in resolving some of the most divisive conflicts between the guilds. This militarization of the ports brought important changes to the operations, including shared ordinances and the institutionalization of the *Matrícula del Mar* (a system of registry) (Delgado Ribas, 1995, pp. 111–112).

The Matriculate system was important to the state as it was the means for recruiting (impressing) military personnel for service at sea. The area covered was basically a few miles from the coast. The special considerations of maritime combat were such that it was advantageous to have personnel who were already accustomed to the environment. Lists of matriculated personnel were kept, and they were required to inform naval authorities of their whereabouts and when they planned to go to sea. These lists were comprised of workers organized in the different maritime guilds. The ability of the guilds to organize and supply these personnel from within their ranks was an important factor for the Spanish Navy: arguably, it was the main extra-labor service provided by these guilds. In exchange, these guilds came under the jurisdiction of protective naval authorities. Generally speaking, naval authorities took over from municipal authorities the government of these guilds – adjudicating disputes and legal fights, approving ordinances, and otherwise overseeing their operations. In fact, a *Gremio de Matriculados* was formed to govern these three guilds in a contentious process during the late 1760s and early 1770s.¹³³

The labor panorama on the beach was further complicated in the documentary record by the fact that the unloaders and fishermen both operated under the aegis of the same patron saint, *Sant Pere Pescador* (St. Peter the Fisherman).¹³⁴ Most importantly, there was a significant cross-over of membership for these two guilds: many, but not all, fishermen also worked as unloaders, and vice versa. This is evident in the membership present at general assemblies of the guilds and, more concretely, this fact led to complaints by the Guild of Mariners (Delgado Ribas, 1995).¹³⁵ The membership figures lie at the core of the determination of opportunities, so having two guilds (with basically the same members) allowed those individuals to, basically, work twice.¹³⁶

The first guild(s) to be described in this section cover the trades of lightermen (“*barquers*” in Catalan, “*lancheros*” in Castilian) and unloaders (“*descarregadors*” in Catalan, “*descargadores*” in Castilian). Delgado Ribas notes, correctly, that, “The development of the guilds linked to the

¹³³ Archivo Naval de Cartagena [ANC], “Zalvide”, boxes (*cajas*) 1637 and 1638.

¹³⁴ St Peter, the “Apostle of Apostles”, was a fisherman, whom Jesus supposedly told to become a “fisher of men”. For the allegory, see *The Bible*, Matthew 4:18-19 and Mark 1: 16-17.

¹³⁵ ANC, “Zalvide”, box 1637.

¹³⁶ I address the dual membership and interlocking directorates in chapter section 4.3, below.

provision of port services in not very well known, above all in their first stage” (1995, p. 111).¹³⁷ By “first stage” it is understood to mean their medieval existence, prior to the sixteenth or seventeenth century. González Arce treated the confraternity of *barquers* (under the invocation of San Pedro) from the fourteenth century, noting their origins and responsibilities (2008, pp. 287–288).

References to the lightermen and unloaders are scattered in the documentary record, generally referring to earlier times.¹³⁸ These two trades rarely occur in the documents. It could be that the two trades operated in a single guild; Julián Amich Bert (1956, p. 147) mentions mid-fifteenth century disputes involving the corporation of lightermen and unloaders. Or, it is possible that there were two separate guilds, as both were distinguished at a large ceremony in the first years of the seventeenth century (Rebullosa, 1601). Delgado Ribas (1995) gives a detailed history of the trades, but he generally refers to them interchangeably, as *barquers* and *descarregadors*.

Likewise, the unloaders received mention in articles by Albert Garcia i Espuche dedicated to the proto-industrial economic development of Catalonia and the labor-space of the port, respectively (1997; 2007). The changing terminology makes for complicated study – at times the men involved in handling maritime cargo were referred to as boatmen and unloaders; at others, as mariners; what is more, the fishermen also participated in the activities of loading and unloading, maintaining a separate guild.

García Sánchez (1998, p. 526) noted that when the guilds of Barcelona welcomed the visit of King Carlos IV in 1802, there was no representative from the guild of “Mariners, Unloaders and Lightermen, and Fishermen” – at the time these three (or four) trades were under the single Guild

¹³⁷ Original: “El desarrollo de los gremios ligados a la prestación de servicios portuarios no es muy bien conocida, sobre todo en su primera etapa.”

¹³⁸ The lightermen (“*Barquers*”) were the focus of a study by Margarida Tintó (1992); however, her work was focused on the profession during the fifteenth century. Delgado Ribas (1995, pp. 114–116) notes the division of the guild in the early fifteenth century, caused by differences over the use of slaves – the Old Boatmen (*Barquers Vells*) and New Boatmen (*Barquers Nous*). They operated a shared monopoly until 1644, when the Mariners were authorized by the municipal government to participate in the loading and unloading of maritime cargo (Delgado Ribas, 1995, p. 115). The process of abandonment of the differentiated term of lightermen from unloader is unknown. During the period studied, they were known simply as “Loaders and unloaders” (*cargadores y descargadores*). These were the same men involved in both activities.

of the Matriculate organized by the Navy.¹³⁹ This may have been a hold-over expression, anachronistic even at the time. The meetings of these guilds during the period clearly show that the guilds were autonomous even when under a unified structure.

In the official minutes of the meetings of the Loaders' and Unloaders' Guild, the organization is unfailingly referred to as the *Gremio de Cargadores y Descargadores*. During the period studied here, there is a specific Guild of Unloaders, responsible for unloading and rowing, and no further descriptive information is available. Lest there be any confusion, the use of two terms, "loader" and "unloader" refers to the exact same group – there was no operational or organizational differentiation – they did not constitute differentiated trades, just different tasks of the same workers.¹⁴⁰ What is more, the specific *trade* of lighterman is not specified in the documents related to the Unloaders' Guild. That is, the particular job position may or may not have continued. That said, the *function* or role certainly remained. It could be that the position of lighterman/bargeman continued to exist within the structure of the Unloaders' Guild, which operated collectively; or, perhaps, the trade – specified and identifiable among the work collective – disappeared, replaced by a more informal system for determining which individual would pilot the boat from the merchant ship towards the beach.

During the period studied here, there are only mentions of the Guild of Unloaders of Saint Peter the Fisherman (*Gremi de Descarregadors de Sant Pere Pescador*, in Catalan, or *Gremio de Descargadores de San Pedro* in Castilian): there is no mention of any Guild of Lightermen (*Gremi de Barquers*, in Catalan). This is highly indicative, considering that the guild would have *almost definitely* been under the oversight of the Navy (as were all the guilds related to military and commercial maritime activities – save those dedicated to land-based maritime-cargo handling).

Nor is there any mention of lightermen in the judicial files consulted, despite the many opportunities for competition, conflict, and intrusions. It seems possible that these two trades

¹³⁹ Original: "(...) el [gremio] de Marineros, Descargadores y Barqueros, y Pescadores". The singular "el" was used, not the plural "los", in reference to the guilds.

¹⁴⁰ AHPB, *Sección del Escribano del Mar*, Manuales. Generally, these minutes are indexed under "G", Gremio de Descargadores, as are those of the Carpenters of the Riviera and Caulkers (*Gremio de Maestranza*, or "Guild of Mastery), Mariners (*Mareantes*), and Fishermen (*Pescadores*).

originally operated in two separate guilds, combining into a single guild before the period covered by this investigation commenced. By the period studied, it seems that the two trades had already fused into one (with the specialization of lighterman having been subsumed under that of unloader). Based on these considerations, I account only for the existence of the Unloaders' Guild. Whatever the case, the guild operated in a horizontal manner, sharing work among the members, who worked in teams.

The fishermen were organized in the Guild of Fishermen of San Pedro Pescador (*Gremi de Pescadors de Sant Pere Pescador*). Their guild was ancient, likely predating the written record by a significant measure. The principal operation of the fishermen was just that – fishing. That said, they *did* participate in cargo handling. In January 1770 two hundred fifty-seven fishermen met, giving us an indication of the size of the guild at that time; by comparison, ninety-nine were present at a General Assembly in 1816, shortly after the guild had been abolished from 1813-1815.¹⁴¹ Whereas in 1824 (after the abolition of the Liberal Triennial) there were 199 members present in General Assembly.¹⁴² Unfortunately, while attendance was mandatory, these rolls are insufficient to concretely determine actual membership at any given time (although they do offer a good indication, at least of minimum membership).

The membership was comprised of owners of vessels and other fishermen. Among their most important collective property were the “*Casas Barracas*” (huts/shelters on the Barceloneta beach for keeping equipment) and harbor lighters, used for unloading cargo.

It is very difficult to ascertain their role in maritime cargo handling, especially because of the guild's relationship with that of the Unloaders' Guild. They are certainly mentioned in the documents alongside the Unloaders' Guild and the Mariners' Guild. However, the shared membership (and even use of a shared treasurer) between the Unloaders' and Fishermen's Guilds complicates the issue.

The Guild of Mariners of Saint Telm and Santa Clara (*Gremi de Mariners de Sant Telm y Santa Clara*) – was also an ancient guild. Over the centuries, their privileges for handling cargo was

¹⁴¹ AHPB, *Escribano de Mar*, Josep Raurés, No. 108 (1816), fo. 162

¹⁴² AHPB, *Escribano de Mar*, Josep Falp i Bach, No. 44 (1824-1825), 20 February 1824, fos. 36-38

confirmed by municipal and central authorities (Delgado Ribas, 1995). Like the other maritime guilds, they were under the control and protection of the central government under the auspices of the Navy, through the *Matrícula del Mar*.

During the period studied, their roles did not change: they provided experienced, qualified workers for merchant vessels and military ships; they also participated in the water-based handling of maritime cargo. This participation took two forms: as contracted mariners on merchant vessels, responsible for loading and unloading the ships on which they formed part of the crew; and as harbor-based cargo handlers. This differentiation of their realm of participation was based on their suitability for mercantile sea travel: healthy sailors would work on merchant vessels; older and injured sailors were allowed to work as harbor-based cargo handlers. In January 1770, one-hundred twenty-nine sailors met in General Assembly, at which presence was mandatory. In 1820, the membership was 103 present.¹⁴³ However, the total number of members is very difficult to ascertain, considering that much of their work took them far from the city for long periods of time.

The Historic Archive of the City of Barcelona contains a registry of goods unloaded by the Mariners' Guild during three months in 1800, in which the trades of boatman and unloaders are specified.¹⁴⁴ Likewise, the mariners are mentioned in a price schedule from 1807, updating the authorized prices for loading and unloading goods from merchant vessels. It regulated the fees charged by mariners and fishermen for handling cargo, and conformed to the, "Royal privileges and immemorial customs, and to that prescribed by the King in his Royal Ordinances".¹⁴⁵ The emission of these new prices was a response to the inability of the Royal Board of Government of the Principality of Catalonia to maintain the previously established prices in the face of the new schedule proposed by the directors of the Guilds of Mariners and Fishermen. This price schedule followed decades of conflict between the mariners, fishermen and unloaders guilds.

¹⁴³ AHPB, *Escribano de Mar*, Josep Falp i Bach, No. 43 (1820-1823), fos. 1-5.

¹⁴⁴ AHCB, [Gremi de Sant Telm/Mariners], "Llibre de entradas del Gremio de St. Telm y Sta Clara, comensat lo día 18 de Gene de lany 1800" [1800], caja 34, carpeta 1..

¹⁴⁵ BC, Anon. "Arancel de precios de carga, descarga y trasbalso ó transbordo...." [18 agosto 1807] Reprinted by Garriga y Aguasvivas: Barcelona, 1819, 33-8:C 49/8. [available at <http://books.google.es/books?id=0wn2hSt5yPsC>; last accessed 17 March 2017]. Original: "[... C]onforme á los Reales privilegios é inmemorial costumbre, y á lo prescripto por el Rey en sus Reales Ordenanzas."

The mariner are noteworthy for a particular specialization, that of *notxer*. The *notxer* was a load master and overseer, chosen and hired by the captain or owner of the merchant vessel. He was charged with supervising the activities of the crew and with enforcing orders and rules aboard the ship (Garcia Domingo, 2015). Most importantly, the *notxer* was responsible for the proper stowage of the cargo onboard the vessel (Delgado Ribas, 1995, pp. 118–120).¹⁴⁶

Three guilds between the beach and the Customs House

Once the cargo was unloaded on the beach, three trades divided the goods based on the type and origin of the goods. These trades were organized in two, and then three guilds (maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators, on one hand, and maritime teamsters, on the other). The maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators operated as a united, two-trade guild until 1796, when the maritime horsecart operators formed their own guild. The government eventually placed the Guild of Maritime Porters, the Guild of Maritime Horsecart Operators, and the Guild of Maritime Teamsters under the jurisdiction of a single ordinance, promulgated on 11 July 1832.¹⁴⁷ This ordinance had profound impacts on these three guilds, in line with the increasing liberalization of all the trades.

The main work divisions among the three guilds were based on the goods to be transported. The specification of goods was limited – only the exact goods mentioned were covered by the privilege system. New goods were not considered privileged. Those goods not specified as privileged to one of the guilds in their ordinances could be transported by either of the guilds (maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators), at the discretion of the owner of the goods. Likewise, the owners of the goods could transport their own property in their own carts – a point of contention over the decades studied here.

A main economic argument for the privileges of handling was based on the ability of the different guilds to provide the necessary care when transporting goods. The ability of the maritime porters to prevent breakage or ruin was important, especially when compared to the

¹⁴⁶ I discuss the position of *notxer* in the section dedicated to leadership positions in the guilds, below.

¹⁴⁷ AGMMB, “Copia de las ordenanzas de los Gremios de Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros y Tragineros de Mar de la ciudad de Barcelona publicada por el Supremo Consejo de Hacienda en 11 de julio de 1832”, 11 July 1832 - , Capsa 2, carpeta 1 (2209).

maritime horsecart operators and maritime teamsters. However, as trade increased in volume, it is likely that the merchants became increasingly concerned with the per-unit costs, and the greater quantity of goods also meant that limited (acceptable) losses could be taken into consideration by the owners of those goods. Thus the maritime porters were constantly justifying and defending their existence. When all else failed, they were successful in underscoring the important services they offered (at no cost to clients or the state) by providing sixteen men in the Customs House and King's Scale (eight in each).¹⁴⁸

The most careful means of transporting goods was by suspending goods by rope from poles, held by pairs or groups of men. This was the sole means of transportation utilized by the maritime porters. The names used in Castilian and Catalan for maritime porters are various, and differed over time. The earliest documented term, “*macips de ribera*”, refers to their status as former slaves of the Riviera. Other terms are more technologically specific: *faquines de capçana* describes porters employing a cushion on the head (*capçana*) or shoulder to off-set the weight of goods; similarly, “*faquines de las Aduanas*” refers to their presence in the Customs House. *Bastaixo de capçana* combines *bastaixo* (one who lowers) and *capçana*. Finally, the name *palanquín* (used elsewhere, in Spain) is derived from the pole used by pairs of workers – the pole was placed on the *capçana* cushion and goods were thereby suspended between the teams of between two and eight men. This bar-and-cushion (*barra i coxín*) combination was the most important feature of this trade. A Castilian-language document from 1765 states, “[The] Catalan word ‘Bastayxan’ means for a man to carry weight or cargo himself, be it on the neck or shoulders with a cushion and bar, or without these instruments...”¹⁴⁹ Generally, historians use the terms *faquines (de capçana)* and *bastaixos* when referring to these tradesmen. I use the term “maritime porters” as opposed to “longshoremen” due to the current connotations of the latter.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291).

¹⁴⁹ AGMMB, “El Gremio de Faquines, Macips de Ribera de la presente ciudad contra los prohombres y Gremio de Arrieros de Mar de la misma”, 1770-1776, Capsa 6, carpeta 1 (2313). Original: “[la] palabra catalana Bastayxan es significante de llevar peso ó carga el hombre sobre sí, ya sea con el Cuello, ó Espadas con cogin, y barra, ó sin estos Instrumentos....”

¹⁵⁰ The term “longshoremen” could have been used here to highlight the fact that they worked mainly *along the shore* – the etymological basis of the term. However, the modern connotation of a longshoreman as a mechanized dockworker is such that I feel this would obfuscate the nature of this work during the artisan phase.

The maritime porters were permitted to work during the day or at night if there was a need; work on the beach was supposed to be completed by nightfall, lest the maritime porters be required to station a guild member to watch over the goods.

The *bastaixos* did not work on the water, as this was the privilege of the maritime, unloader guilds. There are no regulations of this labor in the ordinances related to the maritime porters. The Ordinances emitted 17 September 1770, which judicially regulated the actions of the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators during the first part of the period studied, makes no mention of the vital activity of unloading the ships anchored in the bay.¹⁵¹ Instead, it is very specifically limited to the respective responsibilities and approved prices to be charged for transporting different goods from the beach to the Customs House and, thereafter, to different parts of the city.

This differentiation is important, as it means that the maritime porters were even less skilled than previously thought. There was no need for knowledge of complicated maritime knots or of the proper placement of goods on a boat for oceanic voyage. Their technical skill-set was limited to the proper handling of the cargo, often by work-gangs working in unison. They certainly had no monopoly on the skill-sets required to carry out their labors.

Given the relative simplicity of their work, it is worthwhile to note the ability of this guild to maintain its monopoly over this vital work over centuries. According to a statistical tour guide of the city from 1836, the Maritime Porters' Guild was recognized before 1323 (Unknown, 1836, p. 247):

This guild existed already in the year 1323, from which time they have had various ordinances approved by Alonso V of Aragon on 3 November 1418; by Fernando the Catholic, on 27 of June of 1519 [*sic*: 1513]; by the municipal

¹⁵¹ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

authority of Barcelona in the years 1432, [14]33 and 1666; and by the Royal Audience on 17 September 1770.¹⁵²

The documentary record notes the work of the *bastaixos* (maritime porters) in the early fourteenth century. Historians have settled on 1314 as the first distinguishable documentary mention of the maritime porters.¹⁵³ At the time, a municipal ordinance was dictated prohibiting them from carrying a *coltell* or *ganivet* (two varieties of pointed, wide-bladed knives). Six years later, this was amended to allow the practice by porters who were citizens of the city; two years after this, the 1320 ordinance was again amended to restrict the practice to citizens who had a house in the city. In 1328, it was established that a porter, or other person who was not a slave could not carry a *coltell* or weapon unless it was a knife without a point [which is not to say that slaves *could* carry a weapon]. This was repeated in 1334. According to Vives i Miret, this sort of ordinance resurfaced until the first quarter of the fifteenth century.

In another document, the guild cites the 1327 efforts of the Church in requesting the aid of their Guild for the hauling of stones from Montjuïc to the worksite for the construction of the Church of Santa María del Mar (begun in 1323).¹⁵⁴ This is certainly the basis of the assertion of the tour guide, which in turn, was likely based on the scholarship of Antoni de Capmany.¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Unknown. (1836). *Guía estadística de Barcelona y manual de forasteros para el año 1836*. Verdaguer. Retrieved [available at: <https://books.google.it/books?id=5fT02ChOMQsC> ; last accessed 12 March 2017]. Original: “Existia ya este gremio en el año 1323, desde cuya época han tenido varias ordenanzas aprobadas por D. Alonso V de Aragon en 3 de noviembre de 1418; por D. Fernando el Católico, en 27 de junio de 1519; por la autoridad municipal de Barcelona en los años de 1432, 33 y 1666; y por la Real Audiencia en 17 de septiembre de 1770.”

¹⁵³ Vives i Miret, J. *Historial del Gremi de Bastaixos de Capçana i Macips de Ribera de la Duana de Barcelona: segle XIII-XX*, (1933), p. 13.

¹⁵⁴ AGMMB, “[Memorial de l’aprovació de noves ordenances i de canvi d’institució rectora]”, [1815], Capsa 7, carpeta 2 (2251). There is more on this in Chapter 3 in the section pertaining to the Basilica of Santa María del Mar.

¹⁵⁵ de Capmany, A. (1792). *Memorias historicas sobre la marina comercio y artes de la antigua ciudad de Barcelona*, 4 vols (Madrid, España: Antonio de Sancha), IV, 358-359 [CCXLI]. In 1418, Alfóns V approved ordinances for a “New Confraternity of the Guild of *Palanquines* which are called *Bastaixos* or other Christians of the *Centura*”. The confraternity admitted men and women – as long as neither lived in sin or had concubines. Interestingly, along with the ability to collect and distribute funds for mutual aid functions (in case of injury, illness, or burial funds), membership in the confraternity also established that, in the unfortunate case that a member were to be executed, this would be carried out by a Royal Officer of Barcelona, and not another type of Officer.

Vives i Miret, J. (1933). *Historial del Gremi de Bastaixos de Capçana i Macips de Ribera de la Duana de Barcelona: segle XIII-XX*, pp. 13-16 notes that during the fifteenth century, slaves from infidel [Muslim] nations were prohibited from working as porters, unless ordered to do so by his master: only Christians from nations of proven faith could work as porters. In 1433, the monopoly of members of the Confraternity of *Santa Caterina* over the trade of portage was established in law. And, in 1439, a Charity (*Almoina*) of Sant Macià i de Santa Tecla was

Certainly, the guild most often referenced the ordinances of 1513, pronounced by King Ferran [Ferdinand] II of Aragon. They are cited frequently in later justifications for renewed ordinances and judicial arguments based on the antiquity of the guild and its privileges. [It is perhaps that this was out of ignorance of earlier emissions (although though the *Gremio de Bastaixos* was most likely in possession of the documents that make up the AGMMB collection), but is more likely owed to the political importance of recognition by the King of Aragon (who, along with his wife, Isabel I “*la Católica*”, Queen of Castile were the great unifiers of Spain, among other things): the guild preferred political symbolism over arguments based entirely on greater antiquity.] The guild’s ordinances were re-confirmed from time to time over the following centuries. There are records of their ordinances from 1666 and 1702, which were included in notary-penned, accuracy-sworn copy in 1761 for a legal struggle with a merchant.¹⁵⁶ Interestingly, the 1666 Ordinances note the presence of two classes of *bastaixo* – the porter and the horsecart operator – united in a single guild. There was a clear distinction of trades within the guild, but the name of the guild was still based on the trade of porter. Even in the late seventeenth century, the entry fees were different between the two classes. Five decades later, the two classes of confraternity brothers reached a signed agreement clarifying the goods handled by each.¹⁵⁷

The 1770 Ordinances were justified by a need to clarify the cargo-handling system for Barcelona.¹⁵⁸ In the two decades prior, a number of inter-guild contracts had been established. More importantly, there had been considerable inter-guild completion, violations or

founded, under the auspices of the confraternity. Membership in the Confraternity was based on the payment of five *sous* (*sueldos*) for those who were “natural [native] of the lands” and ten for others.

¹⁵⁶ AGMMB, “Ordinacions del anyo 1666 del Gremio de Bastaxos de Capsana, Macips de Ribera con un memorial despatxado del Excelentísimo Señor Conde de Riela, capitán general”, 1761/01/28-1769/08/22, caps 2, carpeta 4 (2212).

¹⁵⁷ AGMMB, “Concordia feta y firmada entre los proms y confreres dels Bastaixos, Macips de Ribera de la present ciutat de Barcelona, de una, y los confreres carreterers de dita Confraria, de altra, feta als 16 de Juny de 1723”, 1723/05/26 - 1723/07/17, Capsa 8, carpeta 4 (2293).

¹⁵⁸ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

misrepresentations of exclusionary, monopolistic privileges, intromission by non-guildsmen, and other issues.¹⁵⁹

The 1770 Ordinances form the foundation of the legal framework for this trade (and that of the maritime horsecart operators until 1796) during the period studied. The ordinances justified the reasoning for emitting ordinances (eliminate intrusions), clarify the roles of the maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators, and establish prices for transportation services. Prices were established based on the type of goods, the weight (and number of men needed to handle them) and the distance to be traveled.

Article 2 of the Ordinances of 1770 clarifies the logic for dividing the goods between the maritime porters and their guild brothers, the maritime horsecart operators:

Although the distinction of *Faquines de Capsana*, and *Carreteros de mar*, proceeds from the variety, and difference of the goods, and it is directed at the fact that these not be abused or deteriorated in their transportation; and although this loss, as it only effects the owners of the goods, was prevented by leaving to the them the decision of how these were to be conducted, because without doubt some would take greater care than would another, that these not be abused or deteriorated; even so, because perhaps the owners to save the greater cost of transportation, could abuse this freedom to the harm, and ruin of the *Faquines de Capsana*, whose conservation deserves the greatest attention of the Government, for the antiquity of their institution, and fidelity with which until now they have served the Public. For these reasons, the goods transportable by the *Faquines de Capsana*, and by the *Carreteros de mar*, shall be divided, with an eye that one, and the other, can subsist, and to avoid the confusion, and multitude of [legal] recourses that have been experienced until now.¹⁶⁰

¹⁵⁹ AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291). This lengthy document goes into considerable detail of the lead-up to the 1770 Ordinances.

¹⁶⁰ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202), p. 6-7. Original: “Aunque la distincion de Faquines de Capsana, y Carreteros de mar, procede de la variedad, y diferencia de los generos, y se dirige á que no se malgasten, ò deterioren en el transporte; y aunqe esta pérdida,

The next, third Article of the ordinances divides the goods by trade. Goods of a relatively high value (especially imported versions), and those that could be damaged or ruined through mishandling were handled by the maritime porters: spices, crystal, glass, mirrors, wine barrels, paper, fine cloths, and, interestingly, steel bars (but not less-valuable iron bars, which could be handled by cart operators). The idea of value as a socio-economic construct is highlighted in this differentiation.

In addition to these goods of value, the maritime porters would also transport quantities of metallic money for the residents of the city.¹⁶¹ Their trustworthiness was so great – it was said centuries after the fact – that, upon delivery, the money was not even counted.¹⁶² Likewise, the maritime porters also transported sick people.¹⁶³ These last two activities are among the most trust-based activities in a society.¹⁶⁴

Maritime porters were responsible for cargo-handling services in the Customs House and King's Scale, where goods were officially weighed to determine the taxes and tariffs. Due to their perceived high honor, they were also trusted with the custody of these goods, which was done by an eight-man work-gang at these locations. No fees were charged to the merchants for these necessary services. The wages of these workers – who were assigned on a rotating basis – were paid out of the collectivized revenue of the guild. This was also important for determining the prices for hauling these goods. The work of these two gangs included unloading the goods, moving them through the Customs House and to and from the King's Scale and then reloading

como solo toca à los dueños de los generos, quedaba evitada con dexar al arbitrio de estos el modo de la conduccion, porque sin duda cuidarian mas que otro alguno, de que no se malgastassen, ò deteriorasen; sin embargo, porque tal vez los dueños para ahorrarse el mayor coste del transporte, podrian abuser de esta libertad en daño, y ruina de los Faquines de Capsana, cuya conservacion merece la mayor atencion del Gobierno, por la antigüedad de su instituto, y fidelidad con que hasta aqui han servido al Público. Por estas razones, se dividirán los generos transportable por los Faquines de Capsana, y por los Carreteros de mar, con la mira de que unos, y otros puedan subsistir, y se evite la confusion, y multitude de recursos que hasta aqui se ha experimentado.”

¹⁶¹ AGMMB, “Memorial y Decreto a favor del Gremio de Bastaixos de Capsana y Macips de Ribera contra Antonio Prats”, 1782/10/07 - 1782/10/21, Capsa 4, carpeta 18 (2249).

¹⁶² AGMMB, “El Gremio de Faquines de la Aduana de Barcelona”, [n.d. – c. 1913], Capsa 1, carpeta 10 (2358).

¹⁶³ AGMMB, “[Certificació expendida pel Reial Acord d’ una reial providència atorgada el 2 de desembre de 1780 a Madrid]”, 03.05.1781, Capsa 1, carpeta 3 (2203).

¹⁶⁴ This was similar to the role of the Swiss porters in Livorno (Addobbati, 2011). By the same measure, it contrasts sharply with the theft-prone system in place in London (Mankelov, 2000, p. 368); arguably, the common practice of pilferage as a form of payment in London was a sort of acceptance of some forms of theft (D’Sena, 1989). In Barcelona, there is no mention of any pilferage system – the guild was collectively responsible for loss or theft.

the goods for removal from the facilities. They also maintained a sort of storage space at the House of the King's Scale.¹⁶⁵

The Guild of Maritime Porters was quite jealous of protecting its professional dominion over the Customs House, and of that of moving goods along the traverse from the beach to the Customs House and vice versa. Their defense of this privileged work area – and their commitment to offering services *pro bono* – contributed to their organizational survival in the face of liberalization.

Another maritime-cargo-handling trade that worked mainly in the beach is that of maritime horsecart operator (*Carreteros de Mar*). The job consisted, principally, in transporting maritime cargo in a horsecart, drawn by a single horse. During the time covered in this study, this profession was organized in a guild (jointly with the maritime porters and then, by themselves). They were originally only permitted to haul casks of wine, but not the more expensive – but similarly packaged – *aguardiente*, vinegar, or olive oil.¹⁶⁶

Internal competition was a concern for centuries among the horsecart operators: as far back as 1666, in which the ordinances (technically of the guild of porters, of which the horsecart operators were a separate class) limited each member to own only a single horsecart, and not lend or rent it to another. A manuscript copy of the Ordinances of 1666 was presented in the decade prior to the promulgation of the 1770 Ordinances.¹⁶⁷ In the interceding years, a 1748 amendment to the ordinances prohibited a horsecart operator from employing a *mosso* (helper) to handle goods, as they were prone to damage the goods.¹⁶⁸ The guild (which was comprised of

¹⁶⁵ AGMMB, “[Memorial de l’aprovació de noves ordenances i de canvi d’institució rectora]”, [1815], Capsa 7, carpeta 2 (2251); AGMMB, “[Sol·licitud del Gremi per poder disposar d’un magatzem on guardar les eines de treball mitjançant el pagament d’un cens]”, 1804-1808, Capsa 17, carpeta 2 (2349); AGMMB “[Rebut del pagament anual pel lloguer del local del Gremi, ubicat en la Casa del Pes del Rei de Barcelona del Gremi de Bastaixos]”, 1831/06/21 - 1870/06, Capsa 17, carpeta 1 (2348); and AGMMB, “Establecimiento otorgado a favor de los Faquines de Capsana”, 1808/04/12 – n.d., Capsa 17, carpeta 3 (2350).

¹⁶⁶ AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291); and AGMMB, “Ordinacions del anyo 1666 del Gremio de Bastaxos de Capsana, Macips de Ribera con un memorial despatxado del Excelentísimo Señor Conde de Riela, capitán general”, 1761/01/28-1769/08/22, caps 2, carpeta 4 (2212).

¹⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁶⁸ AGMMB, “Ordenansas firmadas por el rey Don Fernando VI, que Dios guarda en el anyo 1754, a favor del Gremio de Faquines, Masips de Ribera de esta ciudad. Decret reial dat per sa Magestat l’any de 1804, per las fillas expositats del Sant Hospital”, (1748/05/25 – 1817/07/02), Capsa 2, carpeta 2 (2211), fo. 2r-6v.

maritime porters and horsecart operators) had requested this change, since the guild was held responsible as a collective body for damages caused by any of the members. There is no indication of the votes, or whether a majority of horsecart operators favored the limitation. In either case, it can safely be assumed that the maritime porters would have overwhelmingly supported the restriction, as they stood to gain nothing in the employment system, and only lost funds, due to the mishandling of merchandise.

During the period studied here, they enjoyed a privilege in handling certain goods – those of relatively lesser per-unit value – in boxes, crates, barrels, sacks, or loose; these included: grains, cocoa, rice, nuts, unfinished leather skins, wine and oil in barrels, pasta, household furniture, rags, coal, weapons, iron bars (not steel) and clothing.¹⁶⁹

According to the ordinances – which were shared with the maritime porters – the owners of said goods could, if he or she so chose, have these goods handled by the maritime porters, thereby incurring a greater cost but assuring greater care be given. Their privileges over certain goods could always be superseded by the economic termination of the owner of those goods (the same was not true for the privileges of the maritime porters):

Although all of these goods may be, as they are, privileged to the Maritime Horsecart Operators, they cannot impede that the Owners have them handled by the Maritime Porters, if and when they consider it convenient, for the greater security, and wellbeing of those same goods.¹⁷⁰

What is more, the owners could transport them themselves if – and only if – the owner of the goods also owned the cart in which the items were transported.¹⁷¹

In April 1796, the Directors of the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators sought and received an order by the government that the horsecart operators strictly obey the

¹⁶⁹ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

¹⁷⁰ *Ibid.* Original: “Aunque todos estos generos sean, como son, privativos de los Carreteros de mar, no se podrá impedir à sus Dueños el que los hagan conducir por los Faquines de Capsana, siempre, y quando lo tuvieren por conveniente, para mayor seguridad, y comodidad de los mismos generos.”

¹⁷¹ *Ibid.*

ordinances and prices established in the 1770 Ordinances. Such was the situation that the members of the guild were called to a general meeting to inform them of this order. At the meeting, the First Director, the *Jurado* (most likely the Second Director), the manager (*síndico*), and the treasurer were present, along with forty-five other members.¹⁷² It seems as though this order was not effective, as the horsecart operators elected their own directors, and presented their own Ordinances for approval in June 1797.¹⁷³ In November 1796, the maritime horsecart operators were officially granted a separation from the guild they once shared with the maritime porters.¹⁷⁴

This separation ended decades of conviviality which had reigned since the two classes of trades within the same confraternity had agreed upon a division of goods in the early 1720s.¹⁷⁵ This measure was challenged through 1816 by the Guild of Maritime Porters, to no avail.¹⁷⁶ At that time, Masters with at least four years of experience could choose the guild to which they wanted to affiliate. It appears as though the maritime porters kept the documents from their period of unity. For example, in 1796, the horsecart operators disappear from the guild's membership rolls, which stayed in the power of the maritime porters.

The years immediately after the separation were defined by acrimonious relations between the former brothers. On 25 January 1802 a suit was adjudicated in favor of the plaintiff maritime porters over violations of their privileges to handle certain goods, based on the 1770 ordinances: cart operators in violation were to pay 50 *libras* in fines for future violations.¹⁷⁷ On 17 July 1807 the maritime porters petitioned the Mayor that the fine of 50 *libras* per violation was insufficient,

¹⁷² AGMMB, “[Certificació notarial de l'expedient instruït per Reial Acord sobre el nomenament de prohoms i l'observància de les ordenances]”, 1796/05/13 – n.d., Capsa 4, carpeta 7 (2238).

¹⁷³ BC, *Seccion de la Junta de Comercio*, XXXVI. Carpeta 8, folios 15-45, “[No title]”, Barcelona, 7 Julio 1801.

¹⁷⁴ BC, *Seccion de la Junta de Comercio*, XXXVI, Carpeta 8, folios 11-14, “[Real Audiencia]”, Barcelona, 10 May 1816; and *Ibid.*, XXXVI, Carpeta 8, folio 8 [or, 90], “Nuevas Ordenanzas para el regimen y buen gobierno del Gremio de Faquines de Capsana ó Macips de Ribera de la Ciudad de Barcelona”, Barcelona, 18 May 1816.

¹⁷⁵ AGMMB, “Concordia feta y firmada entre los proms y confreres dels Bastaixos, Macips de Ribera de la present ciutat de Barcelona, de una, y los confreres carreters de dita Confraria, de altra, feta als 16 de Juny de 1723”, 1723/05/26 - 1723/07/17, Capsa 8, carpeta 4 (2293).

¹⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, folios 11-14, “[Real Audiencia]”, Barcelona, 10 May 1816. The interceding years were complicated by the occupation of Barcelona by French troops between 1808 and 1814.

¹⁷⁷ AGMMB, “[Certificació notarial de la causa entre el Gremi de Bastaixos, d' una part, i el Gremi de Carreters de Mar, de l' altra, tancada el 29 gener de 1802]”, 24.01.1802, Capsa 4, carpeta 17 (2248). 50 *libras* was a very considerable sum of money.

and that cart operators be imprisoned for driving their carts “with violence” to the Customs House and Royal Scale, and that the use of horse-drawn carts be prohibited at the port gates.¹⁷⁸

As a point of comparison, the Marseille *portefaix* also operated in a labor environment with “carters” and “loaders”. While these roles are not clearly described, Sewell (1988, p. 617) makes clear that the maritime porters were a superior class of cargo-handlers, noting “[...] the division of labor between the privileged dockworkers and the distinctly unprivileged loaders and carters”. What is more, Sewell (1988, p. 617, note 37) shows that they hailed from different socio-economic backgrounds:

The dockworkers and the carters and loaders were from distinct social categories. This difference can be seen clearly in their recruitment patterns. Only 37 percent of the carters and loaders who married in Marseille in 1846 and 1851 had been born in Marseille, as against 89 percent of the dockworkers. Forty-one percent of the carters and loaders were sons of agriculturalists and 29 percent sons of unskilled workers.

In the case of Barcelona, the clearest socio-economic differentiation is that the maritime horsecart operators paid almost twice as much to enter the guild as did the maritime porters. While a certain social differentiation could have possibly existed, the economic consideration of becoming a maritime horsecart operator was not insignificant. There are no other indications of a hierarchy in the identities of these workers.

While horsecart operators were permitted to use a single horse for hauling a cart, the employment of a team of horses was reserved for maritime teamsters (called *traginers de mar* in Catalan). Their guild was known as the “Handlers of the Plaza del Oli” from at least the beginning of the fifteenth century.¹⁷⁹ They used a large cart (called a *carretón*) pulled by a team

¹⁷⁸ AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos a l’ Alcalde Major de Barcelona sobre la vulneració d’ordenances]”, 18.07.1807, Capsa 7, carpeta 22 (2271).

¹⁷⁹ AGMMB, “Temor [sic: Tenor] del privilegi dels Traginers de la Plasa del Oli. Privilegi del dia 11 de agost del any 1481, altre del any 1421 y altre del any 1439”, [sin fecha], Capsa 7, carpeta 38 (2287). They also claimed privileges from 1447 in AGMMB, “El Gremio de Faquines, Macips de Ribera de la presente ciudad contra los prohombres y Gremio de Arrieros de Mar de la misma”, 1770-1776, Capsa 6, carpeta 1 (2313).

of horses to haul greater quantities of goods – loose or packaged (in barrels, sacks, crates, *et cetera*).¹⁸⁰

The maritime teamsters competed with the maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators (especially with the latter) in the area of the port. The recurrent need to clarify roles and privileges was the basis of legal cases that justified the emission of new ordinances for the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators in 1770; however, the intromission continued for some time.¹⁸¹ After a legal case between the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators and the Guild of Maritime Teamsters, the latter were prohibited from using the smaller carts customarily used only by the maritime horsecart operators.¹⁸² In the face of liberalizing measures by the Royal Audience of Barcelona, the privileges of the maritime porters were confirmed (to the exclusion of the Maritime Teamsters) by the Royal Council – on the basis of long-standing royally granted prerogatives – in 1781.¹⁸³

Outside the port area, they also hauled guilds from the Customs House to parts throughout the city. Additionally, they could be hired to transport goods beyond the city and beyond (competing, as they did, with the Mule Rentors).¹⁸⁴

The 1770 Ordinances were delegitimized by the liberal government in 1813 until the return of absolutist government in 1814. Shortly thereafter, the royal authorities demanded that all the guilds resubmit their ordinances with reforms intended to eliminate monopolistic privileges. The maritime porters resisted submitting new ordinances that were called for in 1819. The resistance to the new ordinances was because the maritime porters understood it to be in an attempt by the government to identify and remove monopolistic privileges and practices – the bedrock of the

¹⁸⁰ There is a museum dedicated to the *Traginers* in the city of Igualada, (<http://www.museudeltraginer.com>).

¹⁸¹ AGMMB, “Sentencia echa a 20 de mayo 1768 a favor del Gremio de Faquines, Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar contra los Tragineros de Mar”, 20.05.1768 -12.04.1769, Capsa 5, carpeta 5 (2309); AGMMB, “Autos judiciales i atorgació de poders relatius al transport de mercaderies de la platja fins a la ciutat de Barcelona”, 04.04.1778 - 13.02.1779, Capsa 5, carpeta 1 (2306); and AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291). This last source justifies the otorgation of new ordinances in 1770 with a lengthy review of agreements and disagreements and the need for a solution to these.

¹⁸² AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos al Reial Acord]”, 14 Feb 1780, Capsa 7, carpeta 19 (2268).

¹⁸³ AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291).

¹⁸⁴ AHCB, [Traginers de Mar], “Llibre de las Sentencias ... la Real Audiencia a favor del Gremi de Traginers de Mar contra el Gremio de Llogaters de Mulas de la presente Ciutat, ... la ultima ... propietat confiscada als 20 ... de 1775”, 1776-1777, Vol. 1, Caja 3.

success of the Guild of Maritime Porters (Romero Marín, 2007a). In 1820, the maritime porters protested that their proposed ordinances had not been accepted and that they were forced to labor under ordinances that were not to their liking.¹⁸⁵ At the time, they were also fighting against the use of their privileged bar-and-cushion tools by non-guildsmen [which is to say, by the common porters].¹⁸⁶

The participation of the Maritime Teamsters' Guild in hauling goods from the Beach was confirmed by resolution of the Supreme Board of Revenue and Coin (the *Junta Suprema de Hacienda y la Moneda*) on 2 July 1819: it must be noted that this resolution generally liberalized the handling of maritime commerce for all goods not specifically privileged to the three Guilds of Maritime Porters, Maritime Horsecart Operators, and Maritime Teamsters.

The final ordinances studied here for the maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators were from 1832 (ordinances they shared with the Guild of Maritime Horsecart Operators and the Guild of Maritime Teamsters).¹⁸⁷ These were extended by the municipal authorities. The maritime porters immediately requested that these ordinances be brought in line with their privileges established by royal authorities in 1770.¹⁸⁸

The three-guild ordinance of 1832 covered the Guilds of Maritime Porters, Maritime Horsecart Operators, and the Maritime Teamsters. This ordinance shows the different views of these guilds in the face of the increasing liberalization of the trades.¹⁸⁹ The 1832 Ordinances highlights the decision of the Guild of Maritime Porters to defend the practice working by “turn” and of sharing work in an organized fashion (to maintain balance among the economic interests of all the members). This is juxtaposed by the decision of the maritime horsecart operators to compete more openly within their guild.

¹⁸⁵ AGMMB, “[Proposició de noves ordenances gremials]”, 1820, Capsa 7, carpeta 36 (2285).

¹⁸⁶ AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos a l'Ajuntament de Barcelona relativa a la vulneració de les ordenances sobre el transport de mercaderies]”, 1820/05/18 - 1820/05/31, Capsa 7, carpeta 34 (2283).

¹⁸⁷ AGMMB, “Copia de las ordenanzas de los Gremios de Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros y Tragineros de Mar de la ciudad de Barcelona publicada por el Supremo Consejo de Hacienda en 11 de julio de 1832”, 11 July 1832 - , Capsa 2, carpeta 1 (2209).

¹⁸⁸ AGMMB, “Instrucción que presenta el Gremio de Faquines de Capsana y Macipes de Ribera de la ciudad de Barcelona para poder conseguir a su favor de su Real Majestad una modificación en las nuevas ordenanzas de 11 de julio del corriente año”, n.d. [1832], capsa 7, carpeta 18 (2267).

¹⁸⁹ These matters are addressed in detail in Chapter 7.

Due to political liberalization, and despite the existence and validity of this three-profession ordinance, the horsecart operators submitted a new draft of guild regulations in April of 1834, in compliance with a Municipal order dated 28 February 1834, which was, itself, in compliance with a Royal Decree from January of the same year. There is no evidence of the acceptance of this proposal.¹⁹⁰

There were calls by the municipal government to draft new ordinances in 1840 after the government recognized the porters' argument that the 1836 abolition was actually a call for new ordinances; however, no such ordinances have been located [perhaps owing to the fact that they were never submitted].¹⁹¹

From the Customs House to the city and beyond

After having cleared customs and/or having been weighed, merchandise was re-distributed among a number of guilds. Just as occurred between the beach and the Customs House, the privileged guild was decided by a combination of the area in which the goods would be delivered, the objective needs of the cargo and the subjective determination of the owner of the goods. Whereas the beach was predominantly privileged to the maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators (but also, at times, to the maritime teamsters); goods leaving the Customs House could also be handled by members of any of these aforementioned guilds, as well as by members of the Mule Handlers' Guild. This last group was generally employed for goods that were to be transported to other towns and cities.

The mule rentors are referred to as "*alquiladores de mulas*" in Castilian, or "*llogaters de mules*" in Catalan. They are also referred to as "*arrieros de mulas*" (mule handlers) or "*alquiladores de bestias*" (beast rentors) (E, 1789, pp. 27–28, 1831, pp. 22–23). The Mule Rentors' Guild is named in conjunction with that of the maritime teamsters (*traginers de mar*) – even at times without clarification or with a seemingly erroneous lack of specificity. The differentiation also existed during earlier historic periods (Garcia i Espuche, 1997).

¹⁹⁰ AHCB, [Carreteros de Mar], "[Ordenanzas que ha formado el Gremio de Carreteros de Mar....]", 18 April 1834. Caja 42, carpeta 10.

¹⁹¹ AGMMB, "[Instàcia del Gremi de Bastaixos]", 08 January 1840, caps 7, carpeta 17 (2266); and AGMMB, "[Sol·licitud per al nomenament de prohoms del Gremi]", (29 January 1840 – 21 February 1840), Capsa 7, carpeta 9 (2258), folio 1r. [I treat this in greater detail in Chapter 7.]

The two trades continued to be distinct, and each maintained its own guild during the period studied: unassailable proof of this differentiation is a 1775 legal conflict between the two guilds.¹⁹² In that case, the mule rentors alleged that their guild had a monopoly over hauling all carts and litters (pulled by beast or man) throughout the city and beyond. Their allegation was not supported by the courts, which found in favor of the maritime teamsters. In addition, there is a Barcelona Board of Commerce document from 1808 naming representatives of three guilds: maritime teamsters, mule rentors, and maritime horsecart operators (among others).¹⁹³

The Mule Rentors' Guild is treated in considerable detail within the context of regional terrestrial transportation by Muset i Pons (1995a) – but not in relation to maritime cargo handling, specifically. Muset i Pons details the (economic) difficulties faced by the guild, and their ordinance-based attempts to overcome these challenges. The Guild of Mule Rentors obtained an ordinance in 1676 (referenced in later documents), and another in October 1760 (which is used in this study).¹⁹⁴ Their privileges were expanded in the 1760 ordinances (Muset i Pons, 1995a). It is evident that this expansion of powers was in response to the need to clarify the competencies of the guild, which was at that time in a dire situation economically. These troubles, much referred to in the supplications of the guild, are evident in the records, which show a considerable number of members lived as the employees of others (*mancebos*).

While they were prohibited from operating between the beach and the Customs House, mule rentors were available to haul goods to and from the Customs House from other parts of the city and beyond. Goods would be placed on the backs of the animal, or would be placed in medium-sized carts hauled by the mules (which is to say, larger than those of the maritime horsecart operators, yet smaller than the large carts employed by the maritime teamsters). The varied forms of transportation employed with the mule teams included carts, cars, carriages and litters. The 1760 ordinances also permitted the guildsmen to rent out horses, some of which were of

¹⁹² AHCB, [Traginers de Mar], “Llibre de las Sentencias ... la Real Audiencia a favor del Gremi de Traginers de Mar contra el Gremio de Llogaters de Mulas de la presente Ciutat, ... la ultima ... propietat confiscada als 20 ... de 1775”, 1776-1777, Vol. 1., Caja 3, folio 102r.

¹⁹³ AHCB, [Traginers de Mar], Vol. 1. “Cartillas despachadas por la Real Junta de Comercio para cabezas de corporaciones gremiales durante 1808”, [1808], Vol. 1, Caja 3, folios 165r-191v.

¹⁹⁴ AHCB, [Llogaters de Mules], “[No title]”, 1667, Caja 3, carpeta 100; and AHCB, [Llogaters de Mules], “[No title]”, [1760], Caja 3, carpeta 108, folios 96r-108r.

very high quality, destined to serve a growing population of wealthy people, particularly in Barcelona temporarily from other cities and countries.

In exchange for the right to transport goods across the realm, they provided numerous services to the royal and municipal governments. Some of these were of vital importance, especially in military matters. The Guild of Mule Rentors worked for military authorities, hauling goods and *matériel*, especially in times of conflict. This consideration was such that the privileges of other guilds could be superseded when the client was the military. For example, when the Guild of Maritime Porters seized and sequestered a few boxes of sugar – and, more importantly, the gear used to transport them – from two mule rentors in 1768, the seizure was reversed by the courts in light of the fact that the client of the privilege-infringing mule rentors (a fact which was sustained in the case) was the military.¹⁹⁵ There was a downside to this arrangement of working for the state: the guild was in poor shape, in large part because it was owed a considerable amount of money from the royal government, having hauled lumber for the naval construction industry.¹⁹⁶

These 1760 ordinances were still being cited as late as 1825, meaning that they had not been modified in sixty-five years. While this is not an unusually long period of validity for ordinances when considered in the long-term perspective, it is noteworthy when contrasted by the fact that most of the other maritime cargo-handling guilds had a number of different ordinances approved in that same period, which was tumultuous and marked by economic difficulties and short-lasting attempts at reducing monopolistic privileges and at abolishing the guilds.¹⁹⁷ Sometimes, these changes were solicited by the guilds, at others they were the result of demands from different political authorities (especially immediately after the special periods of 1813-1814 and 1820-1823, during which times the guilds were formally abolished).

¹⁹⁵ AGMMB, “Penyoramento que hicieron los prohombres del Gremio de Faquines, Masips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar a Pablo España y Fransisco Mas, alquiladores de mulas, a 2 setiembre 1768”, 02.09.1768 - 12.09.1768, Capsa 5, carpeta 5 (2310)

¹⁹⁶ Alquiladores de Mulas, Gremio de (1755) “*Respuesta por el gremio de alquiladores de mulas de la presente ciudad las dudas dadas / por el señor Don Pedro de Avila, Ministro de la Real Audiencia y Auditor de Marina, en el pleyto que sigue dicho gremio con Don Pablo Robledo, Director del Real Asiento de Arboladura*”; *escrivano Vicente Simon notario: Al-legacions juridiques (Il-lustre Col-legi d’Advocats de Barcelona)*. Barcelona: Josepf Altes.

¹⁹⁷ BC, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio*, Legajo XXXVIII (Caja 54), No. 1, folio 108 (1825).

Workers on the periphery of maritime-cargo handling

There were two trades that also operated in the universe of maritime-cargo handling guilds, but neither enjoyed any privilege over the handling of maritime cargo or merchandise. Both trades appear in the documentary source in relation to the guilds privileged with handling maritime cargo.

The common laborers, known as *Labradores del Llano* (literally, “laborers of the plains”, generally associated with rural labor) were among the least specialized and least skilled workers, filling the role of common laborer in the city, hauling items of very low value – like rubble from construction sites. Even so, they managed to maintain a guild. They were also responsible for transporting quicklime. Lime (“*cal*”) was used in masonry, some cleaning activities, and in processing human and animal waste – it is not clear which of these (or another) was the intended use of this material.¹⁹⁸

Most often, they are mentioned in the archives in relation to the work of the mule renters or the maritime porters, who were jealous of the intromission of the common laborers. The laborers won a legal dispute against the Mule Rentors’ Guild in 1766, defending their right to transport relatively low-valued goods that were not specifically privileged to any profession. The *Labradores del Llano* (but not specifically as a guild in that document) appear in the opening of the 1770 Ordinances of the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators, in which part of the justification for the Ordinances was to protect them from over-reaching application of privileges by the Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators.

The Guild of Common Laborers appears in a Board of Commerce document from 1826, in which they named their *prohombres* with whom the Board of Commerce was to work in the drafting of new ordinances.¹⁹⁹ The Board of Commerce was attempting to communicate with all of the guilds: those of maritime porters; maritime horsecart operators; and mule renters are included in

¹⁹⁸ It is difficult to ascertain to what degree this may have been supported by a specific privilege. This mention of hauling quicklime, for example, is mentioned in the introduction of the 1770 Ordinances of the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators.

¹⁹⁹ BC, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio*, Legajo XXXVIII (Caja 54), No. 2, folio 195 (1826).

this list; however, the maritime teamsters are notable for their absence (especially since the same collection does have communications to and from that guild).²⁰⁰

Interestingly, it is evident that the *Gremio de Labradores del Llano* also functioned as a sort of peace-keeping force in the Villa de Gràcia, for which they requested some type of insignia: their request was approved.²⁰¹ Unfortunately, there are no other references to this activity or their remuneration, relative authority, or responsibilities.

The last group to be differentiated is that of the common porters (variously called *mossos de corda* or *de cordel*, *mozos de esquina*, *faquines*, *camàlics* [with or without the “h”], or *guanyadiners*). The term “*faquin*” is still used in Arabic, and *camàlic* has been traced to the Arabic word *aljamal* or *hamal* (meaning “camel”): these usages were noted in other ports in Spain and Italy (Sarasúa García, 2001; Addobbati, 2011).²⁰²

Mozo de esquina means a “helper on the corner”; that said, the terms *faquín de corda* or *mosso de corda*, denotes the trade more accurately, as both terms mean, basically, a “helper with a rope” (Vives i Miret, 1933). This is because the porters used a rope, or cord (“*corda*”), to strap goods to their back for transport. Carrera i Pujal (1951) estimated that there were some three hundred common porters in the different plazas of the city at the end of the eighteenth century. At an important 1778 meeting there were ninety-nine members present. By their own

²⁰⁰ BC, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio*, Legajo XXXVIII (Caja 54), No. 1, folio 123 (1825); No. 2, folios 101 and 143 (1826); and No. 3, folios 46 and 47 (1827).

²⁰¹ BC, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio, Comisión de Gremios*, “[Labradores del Llano]”, 25 April 1827, Caixa 54, Legajo 38, Carpeta 3, folio 61.

²⁰² The etymological origin of *camallo* (pl. *camalli*) in Italian, and *camàlic(h)* in Catalan is similarly noted in Italian as in Catalan, traced to the Arabic term “*al-jamal*” (used in Cádiz; pronounced “hamal”), itself likely from the Latin *camelus*, from Greek *kamēlos*, of Semitic origin, meaning camel. The term “jamal” is still used to refer to a common porter in Farsi and Arabic. In Italian, the hypothesis is supported by the customary practice of referring to groups of *camalli* as a “*carovane*”, also from the Farsi (Persian) term *kārwān*, meaning a train of camels, as in a trade caravan. The hypothesis is that Europeans incorporated these terms during the Crusades. For more on the controversial aspect of this etymological debate in Italian, see Addobbati, A. (2011). “Livorno: fronte del porto. Monelli, Carovane e Bergamaschi della Dogana (1602-1847)”, in G. Petralia (Ed.), *I Sistemi Portuali della Toscana Mediterranea* (pp. 245–314). Pisa: Pacini Editore Spa., p. 262. Original note (76): *Ibid.* [Archivio di Stato di Livorno, Dogana, 1, n. 36]. And in Catalan, see: Vives i Miret, J. (1933). *Historial del Gremi de Bastaixos de Capçana i Macips de Ribera de la Duana de Barcelona: segle XIII-XX*.

accounting, their organization claimed a membership of roughly fifty in 1804.²⁰³ It could well be that these figures of the group did not include the totality of common porters in the city.

While not organized in a guild, the common porters' brotherhood functioned as a workers' organization for centuries. They were hired freely in plazas throughout the city – not keeping any sort of turn or order. They enjoyed no privileges (as they had no ordinances). As a trade, they maintained a confraternity or brotherhood (variably organized at different times as the *Cofradía de Santa Eulalia* or as the *Cofradía de Nuestra Señora de la Victoria de la Plaza Nova*) but it was never recognized as a legitimate guild.²⁰⁴

An important attempt in mid-1778 showed the efforts of the men of the confraternity to formalize their association (*la Cofradía de Santa Eulalia*) into a guild. They met in solemn reunion, in the presence of a Sherriff of the *Real Audiencia* (a court bailiff of sorts) to approve a draft set of ordinances. While these were never approved by the municipal authorities, they describe the work and basic organizational mechanisms of the group.

In the most general terms, they proposed to form a guild with very similar characteristics of the other maritime-cargo handling guild. They begin – as was customary – by noting the centuries-long history of their organization. The aim of the organization was to carve out a market share for the self-regulation of the labor market through membership controls. All members would be masters, based on a simple examination based on carrying a heavy load from one plaza to another, and carrying it up some stairs.

The common porters attempted to compete openly with the maritime porters, handling the same types of cargo, in the same areas, with the same means (a rope and a pole). The only difference was that the common porters would work individually or in teams of two – no more. The common porters would not operate in the pair-based gangs of *manuellas* that defined the cooperative service provision of the maritime porters. It should be noted that the maritime

²⁰³ AGMMB, “Copies de voler per ordenansas los camàlics en l’any 1778, y de 1784 y 1805”, 1778-1804, Capsa 8, carpeta 1 (2290).

²⁰⁴ Santa Eulalia is a Saint of Barcelona; whereas *Plaza Nova* is one of the principal plazas of the city (notably enlarged by aerial bombardment during the Spanish Civil War), located in front of the Cathedral.

porters generally used pair-based gangs when required by the cargo (often only a pair was sufficient) – this further underscores the competitive proposal of the common porters.

The common porters attempted to skirt the very precise privilege of the maritime porters to use a cushion to offset the weight of the pole – they would not use a cushion, but would use a rag, cloak, or other piece of cloth. Perhaps most interestingly, they note that this privilege was confirmed as pertaining to the Maritime Porters in 1629, 1631, and 1632 in legal struggles between the two parties, at the time in the form of the *Cofradía de Bastaixos y Macips de Ribera* and, interestingly, the *Cofradía de Bastaixos del Peso del Rey, o Guanyadiners* (which is to say, the common porters under the name of the “Confraternity of Porters of the King’s Scale, or “coin-earners”). These seventeenth-century struggles motivated the confirmation of the privileges of the maritime porters in 1666. Whether or not the common porters were operating in the King’s Scale in the mid-seventeenth century, the King’s Scale was solidly controlled by the Guild of Maritime Porters by the late-seventeenth century.²⁰⁵

The similarity of their labors placed them in constant competition with the maritime porters, with whom the legal struggles lasted centuries.²⁰⁶ There were periodic agreements and informal understandings with the maritime porters which allowed the common porters to freely transport private, non-commercial goods from one place to another within the city – so long as these were not protected by guild privileges.²⁰⁷

The relationship between the common porters and other guilds is slightly difficult to ascertain from the documentary record. Most commonly, the relationship was of illegitimate competition by the part of the common porters towards the maritime porters. It could fairly be described as acrimonious, with the maritime porters showering the common porters with disdain and derision. However, based on a legal document from the early 1830s, there existed the possibility that

²⁰⁵ AGMMB, “[Memorial de l’aprovació de noves ordenances i de canvi d’institució rectora]”, [1815], Capsa 7, carpeta 2 (2251).

²⁰⁶ These struggles are detailed in AGMMB, “Transunto auténtico de un decreto y memorial presentado por los prohombres del Gremio de Faquines, Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar de la presente ciudad a su Excelentísimo y Real Acuerdo contra los individuos vagos llamados camalics sobre cierta privativa autorizado dicho traslado por Ramon Costado, notario público. 14 Diciembre de 1778”, 26.11.1768 [*sic.*: 1778], Capsa 5, carpeta 6 (2311).

²⁰⁷ AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291).

common porters could “help” the maritime porters, but the privileges enjoyed by the maritime porters remained their prerogatives, and could not be shared with the common porters.²⁰⁸ This question is important as, generally speaking, the relationship was highly competitive and based on exclusionary monopolistic privileges. There are no other references to the ability of the maritime porters to out-source their activities to the common porters during the period studied. I maintain the hypothesis that the maritime porters did not employ the common porters, which was the case in some of the other European ports detailed above.

The response of the Guild of Maritime Porters to this threat was the presentation of centuries of confirmed privileges, which accompanied their rejection at this attempt of formalized professional intrusion. The government authorities finally denied the common porters their guild in 1784.²⁰⁹ A subsequent attempt at forming a guild was again rejected in 1804. During the period studied, the common porters would never enjoy the privileges afforded by guild ordinances. The common porters were neither allowed to form their own guild, nor were they in any other way incorporated into the multi-guild universe of maritime-cargo handling in Barcelona.²¹⁰ It seems most likely that the common porters generally limited themselves to avoiding handling privileged goods or entering the beach area. That said, there are numerous instances of common porters being caught transporting privileged goods, or working in restricted areas; unfortunately, it is impossible to gauge the frequency or representativeness of this practice, nor determine any trends that could have influenced the practice.

²⁰⁸ AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos a la Reial Junta de Comerç]”, 1833.05.25, Capsa 7, carpeta 21 (2270).

²⁰⁹ AGMMB, “Copies de voler per ordenansas los camàlics en l’any 1778, y de 1784 y 1805”, 1778-1804, Capsa 8, carpeta 1 (2290); and AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291).

²¹⁰ It is interesting to note that the trade of common portage remained until at least the 1930s, when photographs of *camàlics* with their distinctive ropes and signs advertising their services were taken in key points in Barcelona, such as along Via Laietana. It is supposed that the trade disappeared with the increasing availability of truck-based services. See Carrera i Pujal, J., *La Barcelona del segle XVIII*. (Vol. 2). (Barcelona: Bosch, 1951).

4.3 Leadership and functional positions: selection and activities

Having looked in general terms at the different guilds, it is worthwhile to look in further detail at the internal mechanisms of some of the maritime-cargo handling guilds (those for which there is sufficient information). By and large, the service-sector guilds used the same selection processes and positions as were in use by their craft-guild brothers. However, the specific activities of these leaders and the specialized, work-based, positions required by some of the modes of service-provision differed significantly from secondary sector corporations.

Guild Democracy: elections, councils, assemblies and government involvement

It has been well-documented that guilds provided the backbone of European democratic traditions and operations, albeit in a complex relationship with nobles and monarchies (Friedrichs, 1975; Black, 1984; Swanson, 1988; Putnam et al., 1993; Glassman, 1995). This relationship varied in manner, but operated as an organizational mechanism for collective representation, voting or civic obligations.

While certainly far from perfect democracies, the guilds operated internally through elective systems. The guilds generally operated through a system of limited democracy, with groups of varying size meeting regularly (yearly or twice-yearly) as a council (*consejo*) or board (*junta*) [two different terms used for the same body]. This Board could meet more often, if required. Occasionally, the general membership was called to attend a general assembly, at which matters of more considerable importance were discussed and decided upon.

The guilds were led by directors (traditionally called *prohombres*, a title that was replaced by the more modern term “*director*” in some guilds around 1800, with no functional difference). These directors were responsible for the guild before the government. A system of internal controls was developed so that the leaders could be held accountable to the board or, in some rare cases, to the general assembly of guild membership. The selection of directors was a quasi-democratic process. The selection of other positions and their activities is difficult to ascertain – and has been based on occasional mentions in various document types.

The best records for cargo-handling guild meetings are found in the Scribe of the Sea collection. The Scribe was required to be present at guild gatherings, and this notary kept note of the members in attendance (and often their role in the guild) and the matters discussed. These records span the decades covered in this investigation, and reveal important information about the leadership structures and some of the most pressing issues during the period. There are a few years without meetings, for which no ready explanation exists (considering the obligation that the Scribe be present, and the importance of holding at least one meeting per year to elect the leaders for the following year).

Generally speaking, there were usually between twenty and thirty or more members in attendance at these meetings (depending on the guild). When very important matters were to be discussed – or when the entire body was to be made to understand something – a general meeting was called, in which all the members were to be present or sufficiently justify their absence. The attendance at a general assembly of guild members could number above two or three hundred, giving a more accurate indication of the total number of guild members. Unfortunately, the periodic nature and variance in attendance of these gatherings means that yearly figures of total membership are generally unavailable.

Two of the guilds had structured councils, with a set number of 24 council members. On 21 December in 1760 and on 1 March 1761, the Guild of Fishermen saw its directors meet with members of the council: these were “members of the twenty-four” (“*veynteq.na*”, and “*veinte y cuatr.na*”, respectively).²¹¹

All three guilds met individually on 6 December 1761. In the case of the Guild of Mariners, three of the four directors and twenty-three other guildsmen were present, and the document notes that they are “all individuals of the twenty-four”. The Fishermen similarly met in council.²¹²

²¹¹ AHPB, *Sección del Escribano de Mar*, Vicenç Simón, Manual 38, “[Pescadores]”, 21 December 1760; and *Ibid.* “[Gremio de Pescadores]”, 1 March 1761.

²¹² *Ibid.* “[Pescadores]”, 6 December 1761.

On 21 December 1760, some 225 unloaders met in assembly to elect Directors for the following year.²¹³ On 1 March 1761, sixty-five individuals met to propose candidates to represent the guild in a dispute with the mariners over the ability of the Unloaders' Guild to admit into their guild fishermen and any other individual so long as he was matriculated.²¹⁴ On 6 December 1761, four directors and seventy-nine guildsmen of the Guild of Unloaders met.²¹⁵ In January of 1762, 36 members were named in a council (*Consejo*).

The issue of dual membership in the Guild of Fishermen and the Guild of Loaders and Unloaders was not insignificant. For example, in 1760, of the twenty Fishermen listed in the council meeting, twelve of their names also appeared in the membership of the Guild of Unloaders (with one possible and one unknown as he was recorded as absent in the list of Unloaders). Of particular note, one Gaspar Alien of the Fishermen was either a Director of the Unloaders or the son of the Director (there are two – father and son – are listed in the membership of the Guild of Unloaders). Simón Alien and Gaspar Alien (which one remains unknown) was nominated for Director of the Guild of Unloaders for the following year. The same was done for Gabriel Ballester. What is more, Onofre Martí (who was not in the roll of Unloaders), a Director of the Guild of Fishermen, was nominated to be First Director of the Guild of Unloaders for the following year. That is, not only was there considerable membership by council members of the Guild of Unloaders, it seems that there were interlocking directorates.

While the Guild of Mariners sought to end this practice through the courts in 1761, the issue remained.²¹⁶ On 24 May 1767 both guilds had individual meetings. Of the twenty-five fishermen present, twelve of them (including two Directors) were also listed in the rolls of the Guild of Unloaders.²¹⁷

It is interesting that the Guild of Unloaders assemblies and council meetings varied significantly. This system of a formal council of twenty-four members was already in use by the Fishermen

²¹³ *Ibid.* “[Gremio de Cargadores y Descargadores]”, 21 December 1760. Note that the Unloaders and Fishermen sometimes held their meetings on the same days.

²¹⁴ *Ibid.* “[Descargadores]”, 1 March 1761.

²¹⁵ *Ibid.* “[Descargadores]”, 6 December 1761.

²¹⁶ *Ibid.* “[Descargadores]”, 1 March 1761 and “[Pescadores]”, 1 March 1761.

²¹⁷ AHPB, Vicenç Simón, *Manual 42 (1765-1772)*, “[Pescadores]”, 24 May 1767; and *Ibid.* “[Descargadores]”, 24 May 1767.

and the Sailors, but not by the Unloaders.²¹⁸ This suggests that the customs of each guild were the important consideration, not the requirements of the government for a standardized structure. This is especially noteworthy considering the leadership of council members of the Guild of Fishermen in the Guild of Loaders and Unloaders.

In 1770, the Intendant General of the Principality of Catalonia and its Marine (Naval) service called for general meetings of the guilds registered under the maritime Matriculation system. These general meetings were to bring together the entire membership of these guilds, individually. These meetings had the objective of selecting twenty-four representatives from each who would be granted the “power and faculties of the guild itself” to form a body “to celebrate meetings and councils” that would act in the name of the general membership, including the naming or proposing of directors, and govern the guild “as though all or the majority of the guild members” were doing so. The standing directors of each guild were to propose forty-eight individuals “of the circumstances of most able, idoneous, and desirous of Peace”; of these forty-eight, the twenty-four receiving the most votes from the general body would thereby constitute the representatives of the guild.²¹⁹ This was the extent of the democratic system – in a word, it was representative.

Curiously, after this new system was established, there is no record of any of these guilds meeting for three years, through the end of 1772. On 14 March 1773, when the Unloaders met, the council was comprised of the twenty-four people named in 1770 – at least in principle.²²⁰ In fact, only fifteen were present (two of these being directors, having been selected from the group of twenty-four representatives).²²¹ By 1775, the guild was using the council of twenty-four.²²² It is worth noting that there is no mention in 1770 of the selection of the two directors, nor was this

²¹⁸ AHPB, Sección del Escribano de Mar, Vicenç Simón, *Manual 38*, “[Gremio de Cargadores y Descargadores]”, 21 December 1760; and *Ibid.* “[Pescadores]”, 21 December 1760.

²¹⁹ AHPB, Sección del Escribano de Mar, Vicenç Simón, *Manual de los Consejos Celebrados por los Gremios Matriculados (1765-1772)* No. 42, 7 and 14 January 1770. The quotes are from the meeting of Unloaders, celebrated on 14 January, but the language is similar in all the meetings. The fishermen met on 7 January 1770 and the Mariners met on 14 January 1770.

²²⁰ Showing that, once again, that it seems that the organizational culture was more important to the functioning of the guild than the instruction of the government authorities.

²²¹ AHPB, Vicenç Simón, *Manual No. 43 (1773-1775)*, “[Descargadores]”, 14 March 1773, pp. 79-80.

²²² AHPB, Vicenç Simón, *Manual No. 43 (1773-1775)*, “[Descargadores]”, 27 August 1775, pp. 261-262.

selection seemingly made in 1773 – suggesting that the group had met at least once, despite there being no record of this in the Manuals of the Scribe of the Sea (*Escribano de Mar*).

In 1776, the Guild of Fishermen and the Guild of Unloaders met together to determine whether or not they would employ the same *clavario* (Luis Ribalta) in both guilds. By unanimous decision, they determined to elect new treasurers to avoid that one treasurer serve both unions. This was discussed in the context of the proposal to unify the matriculated guilds.²²³

These men were tasked with choosing four people from among the twenty-four representatives for each of the two positions of director. Of these two groups of four, the three who received the most votes in each set would be proposed to the authorities, who would then select one from each group of three. Two weeks later, twenty-one of the twenty-four gathered. The directors selected by the authorities from the two groups of three were made known to the assembled body. They were duly sworn in (promising to “behave well and loyally” and to observe the guild ordinances and the royal maritime ordinances) and, as a sign of their position, they sat down in the chairs reserved for the directors, as was customary.²²⁴ At this meeting, it was noted that there had not been a treasurer “for a few years,” a group of three were proposed to fulfill the position (all of them from among the twenty-four representatives). There is no indication of how the guild finances were kept in order without a treasurer. From the body of evidence, it certainly seems that the treasurer was a very important role, and it is difficult to imagine the operations of the organization with this vacancy.

However, we know that council and general assembly meetings were not the only opportunity for guild members to raise concerns and discuss solutions – whether or not the directors or other officers were in favor of these. In fact, the minutes of meetings reveal that very few matters of importance were covered at the regular meetings. More often than not, it was more of a perfunctory gathering. Accounts were given of yearly expenses, brief updates on legal conflicts were reported and – more than anything else – the election of new directors was made once a year (generally in December) and sworn in a month later (in January). From time to time,

²²³ AHPB, Vicenç Simón, *Manual No. 34*, 14 July 1776, pp. 213-214.

²²⁴ AHPB, Vicenç Simón, *Manual No. 43 (1773-1775)*, “[Descargadores]”, 28 March 1773, pp. 86-87.

Council meetings were more frequent, depending on the guild and the period. It would seem, however, as though many issues were resolved outside of these formal structures.

Leadership: formal, functional, work-related, and external

Formal leadership of the guild rested with the directors (*prohombres*) – they went by different names at different times: during the period studied here; they were most often called *prohombres*.²²⁵ The *prohombres* were important to the functioning of the guild, both internally and externally. They were also the principal representatives of the guild. They were paid weekly for their efforts – and, in a few seemingly rare cases, they could also have a portion of their pay withheld.²²⁶ Each guild had two, three, or four *prohombres*, generally serving a one-year term (usually from January to the following January). There is no evident explanation for the number of *prohombres* per guild, which likely varied depending on the dictates of the authorities and by the traditions of the guild in question.

During certain periods, more than one trade was organized in a single guild. It is interesting to note that, in cases of a fusion of two or more guilds, the number of directors reflected this, with each trade being represented by a parity – not proportionate – number of directors. These united guilds sometimes retained the autonomous functions of each trade. At times, this was the case of the fishermen and unloaders, and of maritime porters and horsecart operators: in both guilds, there were four *prohombres*, two from each trade. In this way, each trade maintained its autonomy within the new structure. Fractures within fused guilds could deepen, eventually leading to separation, as occurred with the maritime porters and horsecart operators in 1796. In that case, the resultant guilds reflected this with fewer directors each.

In the case of the guilds studied here, during this time the operations of the election process were based on a *terna*, or set of candidates. That is, the election of guild officers was not direct, but was selective, with the final determination made by the royal-military authorities (or their local

²²⁵ It is interesting to note that the common porters, when proposing ordinances in 1778 referred to their leaders as “*Hermanos Mayores*” (“Older Brothers”), not as Directors or *Prohombres*; see AGMMB, “Copies de voler per ordenansas los camàlics en l’any 1778, y de 1784 y 1805”, 1778-1804, Capsa 8, carpeta 1 (2290).

²²⁶ AGMMB, “[Embargament d’un terç de la paga setmanal a Josep Abad, prohóm primer del Gremi de Bastaixos]”, 1817/08/23-1818/10/19; 1817/08/23-1817/11/15; 1818/10/19, Capsa 4, carpeta 15 (2246); and AGMMB, “[Embargament d’un terç de la paga setmanal a Esteve Bonafon, prohóm primer del Gremi de Bastaixos]”, 1819/02/19-1819/02/23, Capsa 4, carpeta 16 (2247).

representatives). Generally speaking, four men for each position were proposed by the First Director; likewise, the proposed candidates came from the leadership of the council. These candidates were voted upon by the gathered council members, reducing the list of candidates to three proposed for each of the three or four directorship positions. These names were then presented to the authorities, who would select the *prohombres* for the year. The directors served for one year, and were evidently not eligible for re-election. This selection mechanism reduced the degree of democracy, as well as the opportunity for dominance or corruption by certain individuals over a significant amount of time. In turn, it allowed the authorities to keep the guilds in check, preventing the election of any radical elements that could arise.

The *prohombres* oversaw some operations – or, more accurately, some areas of operations; but there were a number of specific tasks that were carried out by others. In addition to the elected-selected *prohombres*, a number of other officers (*síndico*, treasurer, scribe, and seeker) were employed by the guild to carry out specific roles. In some cases, they were drawn from within the membership (particularly from those in the council, although I am unable to confirm that this was a rule). While the *prohombres* were the formal leaders of the guilds, their terms were set to one year. The positions described in this sub-section provided for operational continuity.

On one hand, the employment of different actors reduced the concentration of power – and opportunities for graft – by the *prohombres*; on the other hand, this was also an organizational response to the reality that there were too many needs/areas for oversight in the daily workings of the guild, and of the work-based tasks of the trade. The men that filled these positions were compensated for the additional work related to their charges. While the positions were formal in the sense that they could act on behalf of the guild, in terms of leadership, their power was informal – the formal leaders of the guild were the *prohombres*.

The need to oversee work was at the foundation of the market self-regulation carried out by the guilds (on behalf of the municipality), and varied by consideration of the individual or cooperative modalities of service provision and internal competition. In craft guilds, there was no need for *constant* oversight; occasionally checking in on each workshop, or at least those of which there had been some conflict, was sufficient. Arguably, the same could be said of service guilds that used sub-contracting systems (in other ports, as this was not done in Barcelona) by

which the original contracted guild member was responsible for overseeing the operations of the people he employed. Some of the guilds studied especially in this section were directly orchestrated, cooperative operations; therefore, the guild needed to oversee all the work-related activities of the members. They were also responsible for maintaining the order established in the turn systems designed to spread more evenly the opportunity to work on a given day or on a given vessel to be loaded or unloaded.

Perhaps the most important of these positions was that of the manager (*síndico*). This was a long-term, remunerated, managerial position. Since the *prohombres* served only a one-year term, the guilds apparently created the role of *síndico* to give continuity to external relationships. There is no mention as to how this important position was filled, or under what conditions the office-holder could be removed or replaced. That is, it represented a less-democratic solution aimed at increasing internal functionality.

The *síndico* was generally charged with pursuing legal remedy for suspected violations of the guild's privileges. When the guild had to hire a lawyer, the manager would liaise with the lawyers and the guild directors, coordinate the presentation of evidence and testimony, while the directors would generally act as the official spokesmen for the guild. Perhaps most importantly, the figure of *síndico* becomes visible in the judicial process: specifically when his signature is placed "for the Prohombres who do not know how to write".²²⁷

The position of *síndico* was not superficial – his importance was such that maritime porters threatened rebellion to remove from office their *síndico* in November 1835, a situation decried by the *prohombres*.²²⁸ Unfortunately, we have no details about this – or the causes that encouraged such a threat – merely a note from the Directors to the local body that governed commerce-related disputes. They stated that the guild members were beyond their control, warning of the likelihood of "a sort of riot" the next day, "with the only objective of arbitrarily removing from his position the *síndico* of the Guild". In the judgment of the *Prohombres* this

²²⁷ Original: "Por los Prohombres que saben de Escribir de su Volundad Firmo Jose Ginot Sindico de Ditcho Gremio". This is an example (signed 12 Julio 1832) of the written evidence presented by the Guild of Maritime Porters in the legal cases contained in the AHCB, [Faquines de Capsana], "[No title]", Caja 27, Carpeta 3.

²²⁸ In the context of the first Carlist War, the city of Barcelona was wrecked with anti-clerical and anti-industrial violence during late July and Early August of that year. The first steam-powered textile mill, the Bonaplata, was attacked and torched; the next morning, the Customs House was sacked, and tax-collection booths were destroyed.

situation was unavoidable as “that corporation finds itself in such disorder that it is not possible for its representatives to control [the membership, or, the threat of riot]”.²²⁹

Juanjo Romero Marín (2007a, p. 112) interpreted this as a continuation of a pattern of confrontational maneuvers by the guild – which was facing abolition at the hands of the very same Commerce Board – that is, it was a thinly veiled threat by these representatives. While it is difficult to determine the motivations of the guild representatives, I suspect that it may well have been a combination of the representatives raising the alarm and distancing themselves from what could occur – they were, after all, the representatives of the body, and most likely would have been held responsible. In either case, it was apparently worth rioting to remove a *síndico*.

Another key position in the guild was that of treasurer (*clavario* literally, the “key-man”), who was elected.²³⁰ The treasurer was chiefly responsible for collecting dues and entrance exam fees, and for keeping track of the guild’s money and reporting on the state of accounts.²³¹ The treasurer, it seems, was not limited to a one-year term, as election of this officer was not a yearly event. For example, Pedro Pablo Ayman was the *clavario* of the Guild of Fishermen in 1760.²³² The next time a treasurer was specified in the meeting notes, in 1767, he remained as such.²³³

In addition to keeping and reporting the financial records of the guild, the corporation’s lockbox could be kept at his house.²³⁴ This was a remunerated position, and the treasurer was not limited to a one-year term. The presence of the treasurer was generally noted at meetings, and at times (usually mid-summer) he would present the expenses for the previous year. These accounts seem to have been scrutinized by the directors of the guilds, who could refuse to make or reimburse payments they considered unnecessary.

²²⁹ AHC B, [Faquines de Capsana], “[No Title]”, 18 November 1835, Caja 42, carpeta 18. Original: “una especie de asonada [...] con el solo objeto de separar arbitrariamente de su destino al Síndico del Gremio [...] aquella corporación se halla en un desorden tal que no es posible a dichos sus representantes de contener”.

²³⁰ AHP B, Vicenç Simón, *Manual 33* (1773-1775), “[Gremio de Cargadores]”, 5 February 1775, fos 554-556.

²³¹ AGMM B, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

²³² AHP B, Vicenç Simón, *Manual de los Consejos Celebrados por los Gremios Matriculados, 41* (1756-1764), “[Pescadores]”, 21 December 1760.

²³³ AHP B, Vicenç Simón, *Manual 42* (1765-1772), “[Pescadores]”, 24 May 1767.

²³⁴ *Ibid.*, “[Mareantes]”, 11 March 1764.

The degree or effectiveness of scrutiny, however, remains open to debate. Colldeforns Lladó (1951, p. 64) relates a communication by the *Comisario de Marina* (the Commissar for naval forces) in 1777, in which the officer described the process he witnessed of approving the Unloaders' Guild's preceding year's books, and his recommendations for improving the process:

[I] instructed the Board [of the Guild] that thereafter they shall keep the books in a more formal manner noting all of the Guild's income and saving some of the superfluous expenses, as to do so otherwise would not permit their approval, allowing that all of the 24 voting members of the Board shall have, successively, an intervention regarding the expenses moving 4 by 4 every two months.²³⁵

The guilds had their own scribes. It should be noted that the guild scribe was different from the government-appointed Scribe of the Sea [described below]. It is difficult to ascertain whether this was a normal guild member or a non-member (a notary or otherwise) given quasi-membership status.

One example that has surfaced in the records is from the Guild of Loaders and Unloaders. On 17 January 1762, three of the four directors of the guild sat in council with thirty-two other guildsmen to propose and vote on candidates for directors. At this meeting, Carlos Martí, who figures among the guildsmen, is identified as the [legal] representative and “Es.no” of the Guild (which, I infer, means *Escribano*, or Scribe): he had requested – because of the considerable amount of work and the relatively low remuneration – to be paid a “portion more”. After consideration of this request, it was agreed, by vote, that he be paid, “Three Parts”. That is to say, it is most likely that he was previously receiving two parts (one as a member, another for working as the guild's scribe).

This evinces a share-based system by which the guildsmen divided the income of the group (a common practice among fishermen). This is one of the few references to internal pay system, so it is difficult to corroborate or extrapolate further. That said, if every guildsmen were to be paid

²³⁵ Original: “previno a la Junta [del Gremio] que en lo sucesivo se havian de llevar las cuentas con más formalidades anotando todas las entradas del Gremio y ahorrando algunos gastos superfluous, pues que de otra manera no permitiría su aprobación, disponiendo que todos los 24 vocales de la Junta hubiesen de tener sucesivamente intervención en los gastos mudándose de 4 en 4 cada dos meses.”

one part each, then it is likely that having special duties – director, treasurer, manager-representative (*síndico*), seeker – entitled one to an additional share in this guild – and, with the favorable consideration of his request for more pay, he was to be given three parts (in total).²³⁶

Another position – one that had various occasional or daily responsibilities – was that of seeker (*andador* or *veedor* in Castilian).²³⁷ The terms were used interchangeably. Perhaps the Castilian name – *andador*, or, “one who walks around” – better reflects the principal activity. In craft guilds, the seeker was a very important position, responsible for overseeing guild-member compliance with the variety of guild regulations. The seeker was generally charged with visiting workshops – those of guild members or others suspected of intrusion – to guarantee that work was being conducted accordingly, and that products were of a suitable quality.²³⁸ In the case of the Maritime Porter, the *andador* was charged with overseeing some of the guild property and documents.²³⁹

Some of these activities were fundamental to the operations of the guild and to fulfilling their aim of keeping a level playing field based on commonly agreed upon standards and market regulations. This included: not hoarding materials at the expense of guild brothers; working to rule and upholding the tasks necessary to ensure high-quality production; not using prohibited materials or processes or otherwise adulterating inputs; not having too many apprentices or journeymen under his direction; not employing non-guildsmen; not selling goods or working on holidays or otherwise prohibited days; not selling goods below guild-established prices; *et cetera*. In journeymen guilds (a phenomenon seen in Barcelona in the late-eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries), the seeker could also visit workshops with the aim of verifying through card-checking the employment of only registered journeymen.²⁴⁰

²³⁶ AHPB, Vicenç Simón, *Manual de los Consejos Celebrados por los Gremios Matriculados (1756-1764)*, No. 41: 16 January 1762.

²³⁷ Technically speaking, the verb “*buscar*” means, more accurately, “to search (for)”.

²³⁸ See, for example, the case of a journeyman tailor whose shop was closed by the seeker of the master tailors’ guild. BC, Sección de la Junta de Comercio, Legajo XXXVIII (Caja 54), No. 3, 28 (1827).

²³⁹ AGMMB, “Relación de lo que existe dentro de nuestro almacén y archivo depositado bajo la custodia del andador de cuyo depósito aún entrega todas las juntas al tomar posesión, también se hará cargo de todo lo que exista de Santa María”, n.d., Capsa 17, carpeta 5 (2352).

²⁴⁰ BC, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio*, Legajo XXXVIII (Caja 54), No. 2, 91 (1826). It is not known whether this card was recognized in other areas, or if it served as a traveling card, as detailed in the English case by R.A. Leeson (1979).

In the maritime cargo-handling guilds, the role of seeker is less clear. There were no workshops to visit. There were no employment relationships between masters and journeymen. Some of the examples refer to acting on the behalf of the guild directors – checking on the health or recovery of supposedly sick or injured workers (who were enjoying benefits while not working); keeping a watchful eye on guildsmen under house arrest, *et cetera*. While the role of seeker was important in productive guilds they do not seem to have played a very significant role in the daily activities of the service-sector guilds studied here (based on the scarce mention thereof in the documentary record). On the other hand, the quotidian nature of their work could have generally obscured their activities, except in extraordinary circumstances. In any case, the seeker acted as the eyes of the guild leadership in guaranteeing compliance with their dictates.

The specific needs of the guild could also create positions that were uncommon in other guilds. For example, while there is very little information available regarding the position, it is noteworthy that the Guild of Mariners had a guild-selected position of “warehouse guard”, at least in 1820.²⁴¹ Nothing else is known of this role (although the job title goes a long way in explaining the function). An inventory of guild property (created in 1824 during the re-founding of the Matriculate guilds) lists the contents of the warehouse and a beach shack (*barraca*), including twelve small boats (most of them lighters) and a variety of work-related implements. The inventory also notes religious indumenta kept in the San Miguel of the Sea Church in the Barceloneta.²⁴²

Some of the maritime cargo-handling guilds had special positions – although they were generally informal in nature. Control of the work process was conducted by group- or gang-leaders (in the case of collective processes) and by directors. At least one of the maritime porters *prohombres* was required to be present were goods were unloaded at the beach; likewise, the Guild of Unloaders stationed two *prohombres* on the beach to oversee their operations. There, they would come to terms with the owners of goods and regulate the proper functioning of the work-gangs. In moments of conflict, they would also defend the interests of the guild directly, pursuing suspected violators of guild privileges. The *prohombres* made sure that the hiring by turn was

²⁴¹ The original term is “Guarda Almacen”. AHPB, *Escribano de Mar*, Josep Falp i Bach, No. 43 (1820-1823), fos. 1-5.

²⁴² AHPB, *Escribano de Mar*, Josep Falp i Bach, No. 44 (1824-1825), fos. 33-35.

conducted appropriately, so that work was distributed among members as equally as possible. After this, the operations of the teams were under the direct direction of the gang leaders.

For the guilds that operated cooperatively (particularly, those of maritime porters and unloaders), the teams – usually of eight men – were under the direction of elder, more experienced guildsmen. In the case of the maritime porters, this gang leader was called the “*cap de colla*” (literally, the “head of the gang” in Catalan). He would coordinate the most exacting details of the movements and functions of the gang. This role was especially important because the work – teams of up to eight men hauling heavy, sometimes awkward goods suspended from poles – depended on the very careful coordination of almost every action. This was made particularly difficult because of the considerable size and dimensions – as well as the fragility – of some goods, not to mention that, at times, the gang had to carry these goods clear across the city. Breakage or otherwise ruining of the goods would have to be paid by the guild, so great care was taken. Romero Marín (2007a) notes the importance of these collective activities in contributing to a high *esprit de corps* in the Guild of Maritime Porters, an important factor in building internal solidarity.

Although it is more difficult to ascertain with a high degree of certainty, it seems as though a similar system of gang-leader was used by the unloaders. At least historically, there was a differentiation made between boatman or lighterman, and that of unloader; perhaps the boatman acted as a gang-leader at one time; perhaps he was only charged with piloting the lighter to the shore. We do know that work remained cooperative into the mid-nineteenth century by the unloaders, as payments were first made to the guild, and then distributed to the guild-member teams.

At sea, the mariners were under the very strict direction and control of a loadmaster (*notxer*), a master mariner who enjoyed the confidence of the captain of the vessel. The *notxer* was granted significant leeway in handling the operations of the mariners, and was able to apply corporal punishment and, in case of desertion or disobedience, withhold payment (Garcia Domingo, 2015). Mariners employed – either by original contract or those hired on the beach in Barcelona – with the tasks of loading and unloading the ships, would have been overseen by a *notxer*. The *notxer* was responsible for the proper stowage of cargo onboard the vessel – a very important

responsibility indeed, considering the calamitous possibilities of improperly organized or lashed goods shifting during travel. In the case of mariners who were hired not to go to sea, but to only load and unload vessels in Barcelona – that is, not those comprising the crew of a vessel, but instead sailors, perhaps especially the elderly or injured sailors who were granted this work as a form of social benefit – there is little evidence that documents their specific labor behaviors. Where they do occur in official documents, it is generally in conjunction with the Guild of Loaders and the Guild of Fishermen, with which they shared the privilege of unloading vessels in the harbor.

There is no information regarding additional pay (if any) for the work-related functions of the gang leaders. In the case of the *notxer*, this was most likely negotiated directly between the captain or owner of the vessel and the chosen mariner. Curiously, if this occurred, it would seem that it was an informal, verbal agreement, as there are no records of a *notxer* contract in the bountiful notary records of the Scribe of the Sea, who normally recorded crew contracts.

The Scribe of the Sea (*Escribano de Mar*) was a single, appointed notary (sometimes assisted by another, in case of old age or illness). While the guilds may have employed their own notaries and scribes for particular necessities, the Scribe of the Sea was the official of record for the Matriculated guilds; the terrestrial guilds employed their own notary to make their meetings official. In the case of the Scribe of the Sea, he was responsible for noting, transcribing, and notarizing a series of documents related to maritime commerce. Of importance here, the Scribe of the Sea was present at guild meetings of the Matriculate guilds, and kept the official minutes. The presence of a notary meant that the meeting had a public quality – the guild was not a secret society.

In addition to the Scribe of the Sea, another official was always present at guild meetings: a Sheriff (*Alguacil*). In the case of the terrestrial (non-Matriculated) guilds, this was a municipal Sheriff; in the case of the maritime (Matriculated) guilds, this was a special Maritime Sheriff. In either case, he was an important embodiment of authority. The attendance of a Sheriff was an ancient custom – one not limited to Catalonia.

The presence of the Sheriff had a number of implications. First, he acted as a witness, should any question be raised as to the discussions or actions of the guild. This is particularly important when considering the possibility that a guild could otherwise operate in a secretive capacity – conspiring against the public order or deciding measures of extra-legal or illegal actions. The Sheriff would have also acted as a sort of guarantor for civility and order, as he would have been fully able to apprehend individuals (members or otherwise) bent on disrupting the meetings. He was paid a *per diem* or *honorarium* for his time (the amount is not given).

Lest there be any doubt about the importance of the presence of the above-noted officers, one group of workers (*camàlics*, or Common Porters) were not recognized as a formal guild, in part because their meetings were not overseen by a Sheriff or recorded by a notary. It must also be noted that they had not formally elected *prohombres*, despite over a century of operation of an informal, never-legitimized confraternity.²⁴³

²⁴³ AGMMB, “Transunto auténtico de un decreto y memorial presentado por los prohombres del Gremio de Faquines, Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar de la presente ciudad a su Excelentísimo y Real Acuerdo contra los individuos vagos llamados camalics sobre cierta privativa autorizado dicho traslado por Ramon Costado, notario público. 14 Diciembre de 1778”, 26.11.1768, Capsa 5, carpeta 6 (2311); AGMMB, “[Certificació expendida pel Reial Acord d’ una reial providència atorgada el 2 de desembre de 1780 a Madrid]”, 03.05.1781, Capsa 1, carpeta 3 (2203); and AGMMB, “Ordenació emesa pel Consell de Barcelona sobre les competències dels guanyadiners, els faquins de corda o camàlics i els bastaixos de capsana”, 20.11.1540, Capsa 1, carpeta 1 (2201).

4.4 Maritime cargo-handling guilds: examples from European port-labor studies

Maritime-cargo handling has constituted a vital aspect of European commerce for millennia, variably responsible for loading, unloading, transporting and, at times, protecting the lifeblood of commerce. While the work has generally been considered as low on the social ladder, there is no question of its importance – without laborers in the port, the flow of goods would be impossible. Different guilds operated in these ports to better guarantee the proper handling of these goods. The ways in which maritime-cargo handling guilds in Europe organized themselves, and the ways they carried out these similar tasks varied from port to port. The division of labor among the trades refers to how responsibility for the specific tasks of cargo-handling was socio-economically determined; whereas the organizational model refers to the internal mechanisms employed by the guilds to fulfill these responsibilities. While the products handled in each port were very similar, the organizational universe that developed was different in each place.

The strategic position of maritime-cargo handling, and that of the related maritime and naval-military functions, meant that these guilds received special consideration by government authorities. The strategies employed by different municipalities and central governments have varied significantly from one place to another. Because of this, a *purely* economic appreciation of their activities would not fully elucidate their functions.

While a primarily economic approach – focused on market efficiency – (e.g. Delgado Ribas, 1995) is beneficial for examining that aspect of port work, I believe that the importance of other considerations – location-based, socio-cultural, socio-economic, and politico-military – are similarly useful. While it is true that the primary role of these laborers was eminently economic, a wider appreciation of the multiplicity of factors better clarifies their other roles. Likewise, they shed light on the responses of these organizations to the challenges –internal, external, and existential – of liberalization.

Therefore, as a way of elucidating the particularities of the functioning of the guilds in Barcelona, I look first at other ports (those having been described in the previous chapter, as well as the port of Cádiz). The different approaches employed in other ports helps clarify and contrast the strategies employed in Barcelona. In this way, I hope to contribute to the notion,

exemplified in Davies & Weinbauer (2000), that there is no *normal* port or dock-worker paradigm. This also contradicts a deterministic approach for understanding the relationship between the type and means of handling cargo and the organizational model employed by the guilds – there were important socio-culturally determined values, traditions, and interests that influenced these organizational structures. These factors contributed to the judicial definition of the guilds, encapsulated in guild ordinances, and their various relationships with different government bodies (both of which are fundamental to understanding the liberalization of the trades).

In terms of labor-organization development, the port labor organizations of the period were solidly within the framework of the “artisanal phase” (C. J. Davis, 2000, pp. 543–545). Davis notes that, “The artisanal phase was a period where dockers enjoyed extensive job control. Creating guilds to maintain their power of job allocation and control, dockers strictly regulated access to dock jobs/crafts” (2000, p. 543). He notes the similarities of guild-like structures across the globe. He also underscores some important differences among the European ports studied in *Dock Workers: International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970* (Davies et al., 2000b) – of which he was an editor and in which the book section referred to here is included. Some of these differences include: cargo-based, location-based, or dock ownership in guild determinations; ethnic segmentation (which he noted was “not so apparent”); specialized, often higher-skilled, workers (for stowage); differentiation between “stevedores (loaders) and dockers (unloaders)”; *et cetera* (2000, p. 544). I address all of these considerations in this chapter.

This is very similar to the “monopolistic configuration” as posited by Lex Heerma van Voss and Marcel van der Linden (2000). The characteristics of this configuration are based on the local guild, which was responsible for entering into an understanding with the owners of the goods, organizing the work process, and coordinating worker activism and relationships with the influential political actors. The maritime cargo handling workers, who were organized in gangs of porters, handled general cargo (which is to say, all forms of cargo packaged in various, non-standardized manners) from sail-powered vessels, using little more than their own strength in a

low-intensity work rhythm.²⁴⁴ Because of guild privileges, workers generally enjoyed relatively high wages by keeping the supply of laborers artificially low (van Voss & van der Linden, 2000, pp. 763–767, 779).

Unfortunately, it is difficult to confirm or challenge this last point: there are no records of income; on the other hand, there are numerous declarations of the pluri-occupancy and the impoverishment of the guild members and their families. That said, if the supposedly high wages referred to by these scholars is relative to other manual laborers, there are certainly complaints by merchant-clients alleging that the employment of non-guildsmen would be significantly less expensive.

Before looking in detail at the cargo-handling paradigm of Barcelona, I will present an overview of cases in other European ports, in continuation of the comparisons made in the previous chapter. I make these comparisons in light of the above-discussed specific ideas presented by Davis (2000) and by van Voss & van der Linden (2000). More generally, these considerations are discussed throughout volume one of *Dock Workers: international explorations in comparative labour history, 1790-1970* (Davies et al., 2000a) and are approached thematically in volume two (Davies et al., 2000b).

Together, the cases discussed below offer noteworthy points of comparison and bring to light significant organizational differences. Overall, these ports represent different levels of economic importance (though with generally similar technological implements); they also demonstrate the variety of work cultures and guild organizational strategies. It must be noted that these cases do not comprehend sector-level appreciations of maritime-cargo handling – at least not with the wider perspective by which I examine the guilds. They generally treat a few of the trades and guilds in each port: those of the maritime porters and common porters being the most often treated, though cartmen were also present in some of the studies.

A recent quantitative assessment of port-labor history published in the last twenty-five years has shown that the artisan period has been the focus of less than 6% of the research. Likewise, very

²⁴⁴ Of course, some of the guilds here also utilized very basic technologies and animal traction. The concept of a “low-intensity work rhythm” is difficult to ascertain; in either case it is relative to the rhythms of the casual phase, when larger, steam-powered vessels demanded faster work rhythms to reduce the time spent in port.

few comparative studies have been conducted – and international comparisons are even less common still (Ibarz, 2016). In addition, the value of a sub-sector-level analysis is useful for approximating a better understanding of the overall picture, as well as explaining the logic behind the activities of specific trades and guilds (reasons that may remain obscured in only one trade is treated at a time).

With this in mind, I consider a number of comparison cases of other guild-phase, port-labor studies in Europe and especially in the Mediterranean region. These experiences offer comparisons in port geographies and the relationship with the work flow, division of labor within and among the guilds, and the organizational models that developed.

London, England: an out-sourcing model in a premier, estuary port

In his study of the London dockers, Roy Mankelaw (2000) bases his presentation on the artisan period largely on the work of W.M. Stern. Stern (1960) describes a complex, multi-guild paradigm in which the guildsmen were – depending on the guild – either contractors of labor, or direct laborers who participated in the actual handling of goods. He traces some of the porters – the Tacklehouse Porters, the tacklehouse being a sort of guild warehouse²⁴⁵ – to specific goods-specific merchant companies (guilds) in the early sixteenth century: at that time only the Companies of Grocers, Salters, Vintners and Fishmongers had Tacklehouse Porters. These were later followed half-a-century later by other Companies that were able to successfully petition the City authorities for portage privileges: the Drapers, Skinners, Haberdashers, and Cloth-workers (all textile-related); in their turn followed by the Ironmongers, Goldsmiths, Master Tailors, and others (Stern, 1960, pp. 38–39). The Tacklehouse Porters were responsible for handling the products of their guilds, and, hence, managed the specific tasks required by those guilds that maintained shipping and warehousing operations as part of their commercial activities. That is, these elite porters (who sub-contracted the labor) arose to meet the needs of the principal livery companies, formalizing – through incorporation – previously existent arrangements. These master porters enjoyed highly privileged and rewarding arrangements with these guilds.

²⁴⁵ The term “tackle” refers to the tools, gear, and implements used to load, unload and transport goods.

The Tacklehouse Porters would hire and manage the common Street, or Ticket, porters – laborers who would load, unload, and transport guild-specific inputs and products. These masters exercised a great deal of authority, and insisted on subservience from hired hands. The Street/Ticket Porters had originally been foreigners, not freemen (Stern, 1960, pp. 39–40).

Besides the exclusive Tacklehouse Porters, the labor panorama included a number of other types of porters, with different privileges based on four considerations, which were not mutually exclusive (Stern, 1960, p. 16):

Allocation of work among different Porters' organizations could be effected according to one of four criteria: type of merchant requiring services; type of goods handled; locality where services were required; places of origin or destination of guilds involved. Singly, any of these might have served, though the second and third were far more satisfactory than the first and fourth.

The guilds affected by the above considerations were all porters – they were not cartmen, nor did they apparently use beasts of burden. That is, the universe of porters was quite complex – to a greater degree than in Barcelona. The practice of dividing the privileges over different goods was important in some of the ports studied in this section; likewise, it was important in the case of Barcelona: excepting the first consideration, the above factors were present in the determination of privileges.

Likewise, Davis – basing his analysis in Mankelov's chapter – notes that, “The *porterage brotherhoods* dominated the dock trades. The *brotherhoods* divided the work based upon the functions of loading and unloading, the ‘movement of cargoes on land’, the ‘destination of cargoes’, and the type of cargo” (2000, p. 544). Location-based considerations were also important in London: “The *brotherhoods* [guilds] were supported by government degree [sic: decree] that ‘established twenty legal quays’ along the Thames River” (C. J. Davis, 2000, p. 544).

Stern also explains the roles of the guilds providing handling services at the scales where bulk goods were weighed, especially grains. The picture that develops is of a highly lucrative, long-

term monopoly for a municipally limited number of masters. This privilege was transferrable and could be considered a life-long investment. While the need for full-time porters in the municipal scales was the same in Barcelona, the organizational strategy was radically different: in Barcelona, this niche was covered by the Guild of Maritime Porters in a rotating turn-based, horizontally egalitarian fashion.

As was the case in Barcelona, the port area of London was also populated by lightermen and bargemen. In London, these workers generally operated strictly on the waterways, but there were examples of trade intrusion by these boatmen and the resultant legal defenses by the Ticket Porters (Stern, 1960, p. 69). The experience in Barcelona echoes this reality of general operations marked by occasional cases of competition or intrusion.

According to Mankelaw, the liberalization of certain aspects of port labor led to serious difficulties for the portage companies; part of this was reflected by the privatization of docks; the other, by competition with the Lightermen. The passage of the West India Docks' Act in 1799 was designed to allow that company to create its own docks. This Act also included a 'Free Water Clause' aimed at protecting the lightermen. In 1803, the Warehousing Act allowed for the construction of docks beyond the jurisdiction of the portage companies. The situation of the companies was further complicated by the application of the Combination Acts of 1799 and 1800, which generally attempted to prevent the formation of workers' unions (Leeson, 1979; Mankelaw, 2000, p. 369). In addition, the merchants were able to reduce the traditional monopolies of the portage brotherhoods. Mankelaw notes (2000, p. 368):

“Thus, by 1828, of the trade passing through the port of London, no more than one-quarter was handled at the docks; the result for the dock-labourers was disastrous. The combination of competition and loss of revenue brought bankruptcies and mergers to the dock companies, and a return to casualism and low pay for the dockers.”

Thus we see in London a very different organizational system of the maritime cargo handling guilds than that of Barcelona. The guilds arose out of the specific needs and capacities of the main craft-merchant guilds; they represented a development in the internal specialization of

economic operations, covering the cargo-management of certain trades (and, more specifically, of designated guilds). Their relationships were tied to the products monopolized by these organizations. Stern notes that the creation of a portage company to serve a guild was a process that required local governmental approval. The masters of these trade-determined guilds operated as economic intermediaries at the top of a labor hierarchy that included a number of trades, able to sub-contract and profit from the physical labor of others. Even with these structural differences, the effects of liberalization – put forth by merchants, local and national authorities alike – was, in large measure, very similar to what would eventually occur in Barcelona.

Marseille, France: Sub-contracting and outsourcing in a service guild

The Mediterranean port of Marseille was of similar commercial importance to that of Barcelona. It is especially interesting to consider here, as it formed part of the Mediterranean world, although from a different polity. The portage guild of Marseille represents something of a mid-point between the highly stratified organization of London and the more horizontal, egalitarian model employed in Barcelona. The labor organizational model demonstrates considerable similarities to that employed in Barcelona: however, the important practices of sub-contracting and out-sourcing were absent in Barcelona. Likewise, the development of a capitalistic model of port management – evident in Marseille – did not occur in Barcelona during the period studied.

Sewell's study of the Marseille dockworkers is carried out through a modified, microeconomic application of Leon Trotsky's macroeconomic theory of "uneven and combined development". With a recognition of the work of Raphael Samuel (1977), he notes that Trotsky originally developed the theory to explain the varied forms of national economic development in global history. He applies it to "micro-relations between different economic sectors within a national society, or even between different processes within the same industry" (1988, pp. 605–606). Basically, as Sewell notes, "It is notorious that capitalist development proceeds not by uniform incremental growth and innovation in all economic sectors or industries simultaneously but by industry-specific spurts (...)." (1988, p. 606). For the dockworkers of Marseille, this period

occurred between 1815 to the 1850s, when “a capitalist reorganization of dock work destroyed the dockworkers’ niche, reducing them to little more than unskilled laborers” (1988, p. 607).

His perspective is motivated by a desire to contribute to a paradigm shift from a reductionist, determinist approach to the creation of working-class consciousness, which he refers to as, “a monolithic model of capitalist development” through the incorporation of a more nuanced, multi-faceted analysis of the material and historical factors that contributed to the development of political action by a specific group of workers (1988, p. 604). In the process, he touches on some socio-cultural factors.

Membership in Marseille was significant: it is estimated that the guild had between 650 and 750 members at the end of the eighteenth century (Böer, 2015).²⁴⁶ While the global functions of the *portefaix* were under the direction of a Petit Council of sixty members, the daily operations were managed by twelve directors, divided between six “visitors of the sick”, who were charged with overseeing the mutual aid aspects, and six priors (locally called *prieurs*), who oversaw work-related aspects (Sewell, Jr., 1988, pp. 610–611). The specific tasks of cargo-handling were carried out by teams of maritime porters under the direction of a work-gang leader, a master (as in a master in the guild). However, based on the descriptions provided by Sewell (1988, p. 619), the work-gang leader was not only an operative administrator, but was also responsible for negotiation the hiring process and sub-contracted teams of ten to twenty of his guild brothers:

The master was named not by the dockworkers’ society but by the merchant whose goods were being handled. A master was the merchant’s representative on the docks. He recruited, organized, supervised, and paid his team of workers, and often handled such formalities as customs clearance as well. According to tradition, each dockworker, master included, was to get an equal share of pay for the work accomplished. A master, however, could work for more than one merchant and could have more than one team working at a given time; he also probably benefitted from various bonuses and gratuities from the merchant.

²⁴⁶ Original note (5) [paraphrased here]: There were 750 according to Victor Nguyen, (1962) “Les portefaix marseillais”, *Provence historique*, Tome 12, fac. 50, p. 363-397. However, Gaston Rambert estimates 300 members in 1728 and around 650 in 1789. See Gaston Rambert (dir.), *Histoire du commerce de Marseille*, Tome 4, Paris: Librairie Plon, 1954.

The practice of sub-contracting created the conditions for the “uneven and combined development” as some guilds in general, and some members, in particular, were able to accumulate capital at the expense of others. The economic development of the merchants for whom the selected masters most frequently worked would have also contributed to a corresponding development of these masters. While goods-related changes in the cargo panorama were possible in Barcelona, the leveling effect of the mode of service provision (at least in the collectively operating guilds) prevented “uneven” development between individual members.

This is a very important consideration for comparisons: in London, there were masters who outsourced the physical labor to other groups of porters; in Barcelona, this work was shared among guild members in an egalitarian fashion. In Marseille, the model was more mixed: it made internal competition possible, as gang leaders competed for jobs: some twenty became quite successful in the 1840s (Sewell, Jr., 1988, p. 619).

It is difficult to assess the impact of this merchant-master relationship. Normatively, all dockworkers were guildsmen, plain and simple: “(...) the masters and simple workmen were equal in the eyes of the dockworkers’ society: no privileges [were] attached to the position, and dues, fees, obligations, and benefits of membership were the same for all” (Sewell, Jr., 1988). He goes on to posit that, “For whatever reasons – and the sources unfortunately are virtually silent on relations between masters and workers – teams of dockworkers seem generally to have worked together in harmony.”²⁴⁷

There is reason to question this supposed “harmony”. The priors were responsible for mediating and preventing competition and for providing for more equitable access to work for members who did not form part of a permanent team, through an institution known as the *Muse* (Sewell, Jr., 1988, p. 611). In 1824 some members registered at the *Muse* complained to the priors that “some of the masters were bypassing the *Muse* and taking on new men of their own choice” (Sewell, Jr., 1988, pp. 616–617). In this way, internal guild solidarity was susceptible to being replaced by gang loyalty. Böer (2015, p. 5) also discusses this, noting that, “Rivalries in labor

²⁴⁷ This silence regarding the internal mechanisms is also, unfortunately, the case of Barcelona, as well.

could also oppose maritime porters against one another. Despite the insertion of a turn in the working groups – the “*muse*” system which was instituted in the middle of the eighteenth century in order to guarantee a minimum time of labor to the porters members of the guild – some tried to keep the work for themselves.”²⁴⁸

In addition, as the author notes, this master held no special qualifications, and as no mention is made of journeymen (or, much less so, of apprentices) it is safe to say that the guild was likely comprised solely of masters. Unlike the craft guilds, with their strict tri-partite hierarchical organization, this service-sector guild was single-tier – just like most of those of the maritime-cargo handling guilds of Barcelona.

In addition to sub-contracting within the guild, out-sourcing (hiring someone outside of the guild) was also an option: in times of high labor demand – a demand that exceeded labor supply – the guild could hire common porters. Claire Böer (2015) notes the hiring of the normally competing common porters (called “*robeirols*” in Provence, or “*crocheteurs*”, for the hooks they carried, elsewhere) during times of high demand.

Cornu (1974, 1999) discusses this matter in the deconstruction of the “myth” of the egalitarianism of the *portefaix*, replacing it with a critical assessment of their collective exclusionary practices. Specifically, he shows that *robeirols* were basically porters who worked without membership in the company. Seen another way, their exclusion was correlated by their exclusion from the port area, relegated as they were to other parts of the city (as was the case of the common porters in Barcelona who were prohibited from working along the beach).

He goes further by contrasting the socio-cultural construction of the collective image of these groups as diametrically opposed with consideration to place of birth, wealth, morality, political-military activities, place of residence/living; likewise, he notes favorable connotation of “*portefaix*” and the pejorative connotation of the terms “*crocheteur*” and “*robeirol*”. Simply put, the *portefaix* represented wealthy, orderly, moral, conservative city-born master-workers

²⁴⁸ See Roger Cornu (1974) “Les portefaix et la transformation du port de Marseille” *Annales du Midi*, Tome 86, No. 117, p. 181-201. Original note (19): “This ‘work turning system’ or ‘système de la *muse*’ was instituted during the middle of the eighteenth century, in order to divide the work between the members of the Guild.”

organized in a company; whereas the *robeirols* were poor, immoral, revolutionary outsiders (at the very least from outside of Marseille) without an organization.

In this way, a stratification of labor allowed solidarity among members of the *guild*, a solidarity that was not extended to all of the members of the *trade*. He notes that the foreign/outsider status – either alien (from a different national polity) or stranger (from another city or location within the ethnicity or national polity) – of the *robeirols* must be considered, as this ethnic-regional consideration adds a different dynamic to the arrangement, transcending labor stratification and introducing into the discourse terms of origin.²⁴⁹ This should be considered *vis à vis* the practices in the Italian ports, where origin-determined stratification was open and official, and that of Barcelona, where it was applied only indirectly – in as much as residency, family ties, and sponsorship connote origin. In Barcelona during the period studied, there are no qualifications based on individual or family origin.

This practice of out-sourcing does not seem to have occurred in Barcelona, where guild strength in the face of merchant demands was such that they did not out-source work to non-guild members – particularly the common porters (“*camàlichs*, or “*mossos de corda*”). In Barcelona, the relationship was purely competitive in the period studied, as the numerous legal actions attest. Nor was there apparently a consideration of origin: the common porters also seem (from their names) to have been Catalan. There is no mention of their supposed or actual condition of being foreign. In the case of Cádiz, addressed below, the corollary *aljamals* were strangers (from mountain villages in the North of Spain) but they were included in the organizational framework (Sarasúa García, 2001).

It is also important to consider the fact that in Marseille, there was an additional level of specialization in the loading of cargo on the merchant ships. Arguably, the most technically demanding skill of these service workers was the proper stowage of goods aboard the boat. This required an understanding of the ship, the cargo, and an ability to think in a multi-dimensional manner, taking into consideration the dimensions, weight, and propensity of some cargo to shift

²⁴⁹ For more on the usage of these terms for others, see William Rothwell, “‘Strange’, ‘Foreign’, and ‘Alien’: The Semantic History of the Three Quasi-Synonyms in a Trilingual Medieval England”, *The Modern Language Review*, 105 (2010), 1–19.

during travel. This was particularly important because if the goods were not stowed properly, the outcome could be disastrous for the ship and crew. In Marseille, this was the responsibility of a specially qualified individual, a loadmaster, “doing his work under the supervision of the captain and his officers” (Böer, 2015, p. 3). However, in Barcelona, this task was the responsibility of a master mariner (the *notxer*) selected by the captain or merchant, not a maritime porter or (un)loader.²⁵⁰

It is worth noting that Marseille, like London, had a central grain-house. Whereas in London, an individual sub-contracting system was used to organize the related handling tasks, in Marseille, a special group of workers were based there (Böer, 2015, p. 3). In Barcelona, the handling of grains was similarly important; however, there was neither a specific, central location of note, nor guildsmen responsible for working there – much less an organizational differentiation or stratification.

Marseille also had an interesting government facility that does not seem to have an identifiable analogue in Barcelona: that of an isolated quarantine. As clearly explained by Böer (2015) merchant ships were required to dock and be unloaded at a *lazaret* (named for St. Lazarus, famously struck by leprosy and patron saint of the ill).²⁵¹ In Marseille, there were two of these: a constructed facility along the coast from the northern mouth of the harbor; and, another on the outlying Frioul Islands of Pomègue and Jarre (Böer, 2015).²⁵² Not only would a groups of dockers or sailors be required to unload the ships (the sailors not receiving any additional pay for this arduous work), but the two groups of men had to live together in quarantined isolation from the general population. This created a special space for socialability between these economically competitive groups (Böer, 2015).

²⁵⁰ I discuss the position of *notxer* in the section below dedicated to trade-specific leadership positions.

²⁵¹ The *Lazaret* (French) or *Lazaretto* (Italian) was a common feature in Mediterranean ports, as the municipalities attempted to reduce the risks to the city of sea-borne plagues and illnesses. The practice of quarantine in Marseille was established in the early seventeenth century and was reinforced after the devastating plague of 1720-1722 (Böer, 2015, p. 6). In Barcelona – no stranger to plague or contagious diseases – there is no mention of a specific workforce. The prices for hauling of cargo to the quarantine appear relatively late in the records, in 1832 (and not prior).

²⁵² The Marseille quarantine is identifiable as “Lazaret” on the map provided in Chapter 3.

As in the case of Barcelona, political action was largely concerned with the fact that the Marseille guild of *portefaix* faced a political atmosphere of abolition and restructuring (Sewell, Jr., 1988, p. 604):

Between the Restoration and the Second Empire, when labor organizations were regarded as illegal “coalitions” under the penal code, Marseille’s dockworkers were nevertheless openly organized in a mutual aid society that was actually a continuation of their Old Regime corporation. By means of this society, they tightly restricted entry into the trade, minutely controlled all work done on the docks, and maintained wages superior not only to other unskilled workers but to those of virtually all skilled workers as well. In a working-class world populated by repressed, fragmented, and struggling labor organizations, Marseille’s dockworker corporation was supremely unified and self-confident, and was tolerated, sometimes even encouraged, for some four decades by merchants and political authorities.

Sewell shows how – through a combination of economic and socio-political guarantees – the dockworkers were able to maintain/reconstitute their guild as a very active mutual aid society, unlike other working class groups. A similar process occurred in Barcelona, especially for those guilds that were, or became, associated with the Naval authority’s Matriculate of the Sea.

Three ports of north-western Italy: flexible, mixed hiring in nationality-based guilds

The ports of Livorno, Genoa, and Florence were on the Mediterranean side of Italy, not the Adriatic coast. They existed in a trade universe shared by Marseille and Barcelona. These Italian ports show similarities with the Barcelona port system: especially the ports of Genoa and Livorno, which were open to the sea, not fluvial, like Florence. Likewise, the labor force (though comprised of a different, divided, set of components) was organized at the corporate level – there were a number of different trades with their respective guilds. Andrea Addobbati (2011) treats all three ports in a comparative fashion; whereas Luisa Piccinno (2002a, 2002b) focuses on Genoa.

The relationship with local authorities was similar to Barcelona, with the guilds responsible for managing and protecting the work undertaken in the respective Customs Houses. An interesting difference is the importance of annual cash payments by the corporations to the government in exchange for their privileges. There is no record of anything like this in Barcelona.

The terms used to refer to the trades in Italy (at least in Livorno and Genoa) are cognates of the terms used in Barcelona: the term and functional definition of *faquines* is *facchini* in Italian; *bastazi* is the Italian version of the Catalan *bastaixo*; and the Italians also referred to some porters as *camalli* (a cognate of the Catalan term *camàlic*). The specific role of the *facchini* in providing services in the Customs House (“*Dogana*” in Italian) is a corollary to that provided by the Barcelona *faquines* in the *Aduanas*.

The Italian *facchini* was not a single group of maritime cargo handlers: there were *facchini* “*di manovella*” (who used a bar, like the maritime porters of Barcelona) and *facchini* “*saccaioli*” (who used a sack, echoing the tool-determined differentiation of the *robeirols* in Marseille). This is very similar to the difference between the maritime porters (*faquines*, or *bastaixos*) and the common porters (*mossos de corda*) of Barcelona. These similarities underscore the different specializations, identifications, socio-economic levels, and organizational models – in the case of Livorno, the common porters were organized, in Barcelona they were loosely, unofficially organized.

The question of the workers’ origin was important in the Italian ports. In Genoa, these more or less locally stable strangers comprised *facchini* companies separate from those of the Genovese for centuries (Piccinno, 2002a). Piccinno notes that these workers were from the mountainous Province of Bergamo in the Lombardy region of northern Italy. In addition, there were companies of predominantly or solely foreigners in the independently organized and officially recognized – with their own statutes and rules – *Caravanas* of *camalli*. Their organizational determination – once unified in a single guild until the fifteenth century – was based on products (salami and salted fish on one hand, oil on the other) and on location (the Port area).

Piccinno (2002a, p. 5) cites an account from 1588 in which these labors from Bergamo were placed in their context: “[...] sent from the valley to the benefit of the whole world, which uses

them, like Asses, or as pack mules [...]”.²⁵³ These men from Bergamo were stratified – by privileged product – below the Swiss porters in Genoa. Even so, their privilege over hand-carried goods allowed them to dominate some important economic activities or sub-sectors.

The system employed in Livorno was based on importing workers from first two, then three different locations: initially with two Italian-dialect speaking groups of foreigners; followed by the introduction of Swiss aliens. The use of different dialect-speaking “foreigners” and other-language-speaking “aliens” contributed to the socio-cultural isolation of these workers within the larger community.²⁵⁴ This was compounded by the physical isolation of the port workers, who lived in the Customs House: in Barcelona, the workers only labored in the Custom’s House; they did not *live* there.

The application of an organizational strategy based on *divide et impera* by the origin of workers was a significant feature, one which was not evident in the other case studies – save, perhaps, that of Marseille, where the question of origin appears to have been an important consideration in granting, or not, guild membership (Cornu, 1974). The municipal government of Livorno’s idea of having workers from multiple communities in a single corporation was intended to create internal competition and prevent theft; the initial fifty-fifty representation of guildsmen was eventually complicated by the substitution of a large part of one of the groups by Swiss workers. Piccinno (2002a) notes that, in the case of Livorno the monopolistic privileges of the porters from Bergamo were subservient in the labor hierarchy, especially in regards to the Swiss Customs House porters.

The power of the guilds was such that it could impact the most intimate aspects of a worker’s life: the right or ability to marry and have a family. Interestingly, among the three Italian cases

²⁵³ Original: “[...] mandati fuor della vallata a beneficio di tutto il mondo, che si serve di loro, come di Asini, o di muli da somma, nelle facende che occorrono alla giornata.” Original note (11): T. Garzoni, *La piazza universale di tutte le professioni del mondo*, Venezia, 1588, p.811.

²⁵⁴ The terms for foreigner and alien – “*forrasteros*” and “*extranjeros*”, respectively – are used in Spanish guild studies – although they do not appear in the documents consulted. These terms were commonly employed in England with these characteristics, which are different than the modern-day denotations. Foreigners were still countrymen; aliens were not: see Selwood, Jacob, *Diversity and Difference in Early Modern London* (Surrey (etc.): Ashgate Pub Limited, 2010), p. 3. The usage of “stranger” has not achieved consensus, although it is solidly in the camp of the “other” – someone not from the city in question; perhaps it was inclusive of foreigners and aliens. For a treatment of the early medieval etymology, see Rothwell, William, *op. cit.*.

there were differences regarding the question of male workers' relationships with women. In Livorno, they were required to return to their villages to marry women from their area, and the women would return home to give birth, so that their sons would enjoy the opportunity to inherit the privilege of working in the Livorno port (as the positions were only open to villagers, not city-born sons).

The scenario was similar in Florence: a port worker attempted to gain the status of citizen of the city by marrying a Florentine woman: however, the opposite result was achieved – he and the proposed bride were forced to return to his village for the marriage. A man working in Genoa risked his employment if he married a Genovese woman (Addobbati, 2011, pp. 250–253). By comparison, in Barcelona, the maritime porters were allowed to marry (although it was not a requirement). In the Italian cases, maritime-cargo handlers were to remain foreigners and aliens – excluded from achieving the status of denizen of the city where he worked. Through the management of marriage, the guilds were able to set the parameters of work life-cycle longevity.

In London, individually conducted sub-contracting was common between guild masters and common (street/ticket) porters. In Livorno, to deal with the fluctuations of demand, the guild as a body could hire common porters – the *camalli* (as was done in Marseille with the *robeirols*). Generally speaking, though, work was carried out by the guildsmen. By comparison, in Barcelona, this activity of hiring and work-process coordination was conducted by the guild's directors (*prohombres*) on behalf of the collectively operated guild: there were no sub-contracting or out-sourcing systems, and income was shared. This is a key characteristic for understanding the solidity of the organization during the process of liberalization. There was no separation of journeymen from masters (as all were masters). There was no internal division between those who hired and those who labored, a process of disintegration that was fundamental in most other guilds – especially the three-tiered craft guilds (e.g. Leeson, 1979; Dobson, 1980).

Despite a very similar, complex universe of maritime cargo-handling trades and guilds; there were some significant differences of the Italian experiences in relation to those of the corollary groups in Barcelona. The most important of these was arguably the composition, division, and

isolation of work-groups by origin. The differentiation by product or area within a trade (and the corresponding guilds) was also relevant.

Cádiz, Spain: Complex stratification of a migrant work-force in the gateway to the colonies

Carmen Sarasúa (2001) has written a piece covering migration from a Burgos valley for employment. Her piece was included in a book on women and migration, and her perspective keeps that in view, even when dealing with the male cargo handlers, as their economic and social activities had serious repercussions on the women in their families (who were generally left at home or working elsewhere when the men migrated). Her piece covers the migratory experiences of both men and women from a particular valley in northern Spain. While the women traditionally travelled to work as wet nurses, the men migrated to Cádiz to work as maritime-cargo handlers. While the majority of the article is devoted to the family responsibilities incurred by this system, she offers a succinct look at the cargo-handling panorama of Cádiz at the end of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth century. Sarasúa (2001, pp. 40–41) places Cádiz in historic perspective as one of the most important ports in Spain:

From the time of Colón's [Christopher Columbus'] second expedition, the seaport of Cádiz was the point of departure and arrival for the expeditions between Spain and the New World. The monopoly of transoceanic trade between Spain and its colonies was granted by the Crown to Seville and its two nearby seaports of Sanlúcar de Barrameda and Cádiz, and a long fight for the privilege began [...]. In 1717 the long dispute was finally resolved in favour of Cádiz, and a period of expansion and sustained demographic growth started [...].

Cádiz was a highly dynamic city, filled with the treasures of global trade and imperialism – metallic, as well as resources and finished products. Some of Barcelona's leading merchants maintained commercial agents in the city – a practice that was made far less necessary with the multi-step liberalization of colonial trade in the mid-eighteenth (Martínez Shaw, 1981; Delgado Ribas, 1986; Delgado Ribas & Fontana, 1986; Fontana i Làzaro, 1987; Oliva Melgar, 1988, 1993, 1996; Hernández, 2001; Martínez Shaw & Oliva Melgar, 2005).

Cargo-handling work in Cádiz was shared among four trades: of the organized workers, three trades were organized – two together and one separately – in individual companies within a larger company; the other was organized in its own guild. The general company, comprised of the trade-based organizations, was the *Compañía del Palanquinado*. The Castilian term “*palanquinado*” was derived from the bar (*palanca*) used to suspend goods between two or more workers.²⁵⁵

This company was divided into two associations: the *Compañía de Carros y Trabajadores de la Real Aduana* (Cart operators and Workers of the Customs House) with two trades in one association, and the single-trade *Compañía de Aljamales*. The first group was tasked with operations in the Royal Customs House (*Real Aduana*) of Cádiz, and was internally organized into four teams of four workers each; the second group, of *Aljamales*, refers to workers who operated throughout the port area.

This division is very similar to that of Barcelona, in which the same trades were active and organized in a unified guild of maritime porters and horsecart operators centered on the Customs House; however, the official recognition of the *aljamales* – which were functionally homologous to the Catalan *camàlics* – is significant. Likewise, whereas in Cádiz the Customs House workers were restricted to that place; in Barcelona, the maritime porters and horsecart operators enjoyed a larger area of privileged operations. The most interesting feature of this arrangement is the inclusion of the *aljamales* in the guild universe: in Barcelona, the common porters were roundly excluded from forming or joining a guild.

Sarasúa (2001, p. 44) notes that, “The company functioned rather like the guilds: it was highly protective of the members, and had a well-structured internal organization”. As was the case of Barcelona, unfortunately:

²⁵⁵ Curiously, “*palanquín*” is also a slang term for “thief” in *caló*, a “Spanish Gypsy dialect”. See Buzek, I. (2007). “El oficio de ladrón: los nombres de especialidades del latrocinio en los diccionarios del caló”, *Hesperia: Anuario de Filología Hispánica*, (10), 99–112. Buzek notes, “(...) that the vast majority of [the terms for thief] are terms of Spanish origin proceeding from argot of Renaissance organized criminal groups, and therefore, they have nothing to do with the old Romani language” (2007, p. 99). In India, the English-language use of the “palanquin” refers to a covered litter carried on two long poles borne by men, used for transporting an individual able to pay for this relatively luxurious mode of travel.

“[...] very little is known about wages. They were paid by the Company, since in cases of debts to families or private people the debtors would directly address their complaints to the company, which in turn would deduct from the worker’s pay the amount of the debt”.

In addition to these two Companies, a third, unorganized group of porters, known as day-workers (*jornaleros*) also participated in the maritime-cargo-handling trades, in a highly stratified system of work-life-cycle based, conditioned upward mobility. Sarasúa (2001, pp. 42–43) described the internal-external dynamic between these groups:

The basic structure of the two companies was similar, with a small group of “proprietors” of the jobs and *jornaleros* or day laborers who worked for long years waiting their turn to become [sic.] proprietors [... and] an intermediate position between the *jornaleros* and the proprietors, called *terceristas* [meaning, literally, third-group members].

Cargo handlers in Cádiz were part of an incremental, vertical process; a person could – or, more likely, *did* – work in the various groups over the work life-cycle. Sarasúa (2001, p. 41) notes an example of this:

The career of those already at the top of the ladder is described by Josef Gutiérrez in a document presented in 1792 on behalf of his son. He had worked “as a *Jornalero* six years and as [an] *Aljamal* five and a half , and thirteen that I work in the said Real Aduana”, that is a total of twenty-five and a half years working for the company.

Access to the initial status of *jornalero* was gained by randomized selection by drawing names. However, advancement to *tercerista* was largely dependent on family membership and social contacts, as Sarasúa establishes (2001, p. 44):

Having a relative, especially [a] father, as a member of the company was an important comparative advantage in relation to other candidates. Workers’ sons

seem to have had a preferential right to be hired. The father himself could apply on behalf of the son.²⁵⁶

This combination of hereditary custom and application of social capital was especially true for attainment of the official status of proprietor (as it was for membership in the Barcelona maritime cargo-handling guilds). Sarasúa (2001, p. 44) highlights this fact in another case:

Domingo de Montes, for his part, complained in 1799 of working as a *jornalero* for eleven years, “having not been able to succeed in that time in being included in the poll by the company for not having a sponsor”.

This overall panorama of port labor is similar in some ways to the experiences in Barcelona: the importance of family connections and the need for sponsorship were fundamental in both ports. However, the usage of foreign or alien workers did not occur in Barcelona [during this period] – all were denizens of the city (or its environs). Likewise, the organizational model exhibits significant differences. The inclusion of the common porters in the Company shared by the maritime porters and cart operators in Cádiz is noteworthy (and echoes the early experiences of the homologous, two-trade guild in Barcelona from the mid-seventeenth to late eighteenth centuries).

The multiple tiers comprising the internal organization (*jornaleros*, *terceristas*, and masters) and the practice of out-sourcing labor to non-guild members were dissimilar, and highly relevant. These differences underscore the organizational flexibility of the guild as an institution, even when governed under the same (central, royal) polity; that said, the importance of municipal authority and traditions created opportunities for the development of different organizational models.

²⁵⁶ While the article does not include any examples thereof, it is likely that sons-in-law would have enjoyed this privilege. However, it would be a mistake to make this assumption: this could reflect an important difference with other trades and with the practice in Barcelona, especially considering the importance of the place of birth and residence in guild membership in Cádiz.

Valencia, Spain: A less-complex labor panorama in an artificial harbor

Valencia is an interesting comparison port for Barcelona, as they share similar geographic, hydrographic, and infrastructural features, as well as socio-cultural and economic trajectories. As Valencia was an artificial harbor built around a sandy beach, the general outlay is the same as Barcelona; the main differences are that Barcelona enjoyed the existence of the Barceloneta peninsula from which a single, large jetty extended; whereas Valencia had a circular jetty and counter-jetty design.

The labor panorama was similar to Barcelona as well, but was constrained by the smaller socio-economic dimensions of Valencia. Because of the beach-based artificial harbor with limited infrastructure, the tasks required for maritime cargo handling were basically the same; cargo handling activities were divided between water- and land-based activities. While in Barcelona, these activities had been divided among a half-dozen guilds for centuries, in Valencia, there just two groups dedicated to both spheres of operations. Mariners hauled goods from the boats all the way to where carts were available, whereupon cargo was handled by the “guild or confraternity of companions” (“*gremi o cofradia de companys*”) (Muñoz Navarro, 2008, pp. 734–735). The further clarification of these activities occurred in the first half of the eighteenth century, when labors were divided between the Confraternity of San Telmo for water-based activities, and the Confraternity of San Cristóbal del Grau, who were responsible for hauling cargo from the beach to carts nearby.

In Valencia, smaller ships were dragged ashore, while larger ones remained anchored in the port area and unloaded of cargo onto lighters. These two modalities were both conducted by the single confraternity of San Telmo: the “trade of loader or better said of hauler, which is how the confraternity also defined itself” (Muñoz Navarro, 2008, p. 732).²⁵⁷ These haulers would unload the ships and move the cargo to the carts located on the beach. While the use of ropes pulled by humans (and beasts) to haul small ships ashore was apparently far less common in Barcelona, the usage of lighters was the exact same. The methodological determination in Valencia was based on the dimensions of the vessel, as only shallow keeled ships could be feasibly beached. By

²⁵⁷ Original: “El oficio de cargador o major dicho de tirador, que es como se definía también la cofradía *dita dels tiradors de les mercaderies* [...]” [Italics in original show use of Catalan in a Castillian-language document.]

1793, the guild had 12 lighters for hauling cargo (and rescuing shipwrecked sailors). Just as there was corporate ownership of the means of service provision, the fees charged were distributed between social-religious functions and as income for the workers in some sort of cooperative manner.

Once goods were deposited on the beach, they were handled by another group, the Confraternity of San Cristóbal del Grau. Muñoz underscores the social dimension of familial relationships in Valencia, and the desire of this family-dominated guild to limit the number of members in a draft set of ordinances in 1766 (as there were no ordinances governing the confraternity). The Confraternity sought to monopolize their activities and reduce the membership from about 150 to fifty. The municipal authorities denied this attempt, as it was seen a detriment to the poor, unemployed men who gathered on the beach to hire themselves out. While there is mention of some sort of order, the way labor availability was organized remains unknown. However, it seems highly unlikely that a mandatory turn system was employed (as was the case of the maritime porters in Barcelona).

Interestingly, the municipal authorities used a very liberal logic when handing down their ruling. Muñoz (2008, p. 735) notes:

Within the logic of fomenting commercial activity and of some principles nearing liberalism [the authorities stated] that “the chapters conspire against the natural liberty that has been enjoyed by these poor men and those of commerce, and [serve to] enrich themselves at the expense of these, as chapter 5 excludes even the matriculated men”, referring to the matriculate of the sea created in the first half of the century.²⁵⁸

While the situation is similar to that of the intrusive common porters in Barcelona, the response of local authorities was the opposite. Monopolies were not given, nor was the number of members limited. Thus while membership in the confraternity may have been obligatory for

²⁵⁸ Original: “Dentro de la lógica de foment de la actividad commercial y de unos planteamientos carcanos al liberalism se esgrimía que ‘los capítulos conspiran contra la libertad natural que han gozado aquellos pobres y los del comercio, y a enriquecerse con detriment de éstos, a cuyo fin en el capítulo 5 exluien asta los matriculados’, referríendose a la matrícula de mar creada en la primera mitad de la centuria.”

work, it was an inclusive, rather than an exclusive monopoly of the labor market. Their fees were one-half those of the unloader/haulers who operated on the water.

From the beach, human and animal traction were employed to transport goods into the city proper, where their first destination was the Customs House. A variety of carts were used for these labors, but it seems that there was not a device-specific determination of trades or guilds for each.

These confraternities would join together in the early nineteenth century as the Guild of Mariners (*Gremio de Mareantes*) under the Matriculate of the Sea [although according to Muñoz the foundation date of the guild remains unknown]; in 1843, the Guild reached a monopolistic agreement with the Board of Commerce (*Junta de Comercio*) of Valencia based on officially sanctioned tariffs (2008, p. 738). This agreement resolved the causes of a labor strike in 1842. The “tensions remained until 1864” when the guild was “suppressed” (under the ending of the Matriculate) in 1864 (2008, p. 738). The tariff system (if not the pricing) was very similar to that employed in Barcelona. It incorporated considerations like the type and dimensions of the cargo, its value, and the difficulty in hauling it. In both cities, the guilds were responsible for loss or damages suffered.

4.5 Chapter Conclusions

By studying the different maritime-cargo guilds in detail, it is possible to note significant similarities between these tertiary-sector guilds and secondary-sector guilds. Their structures were analogous to the productive craft guilds, based on general assemblies, guild councils, and specific leadership roles. They likewise existed for centuries, playing an important role in the social and cultural life of the community. Their interactions with state actors was exactly the same, providing certain services (in exchange for the granting and confirmation of ordinances) while maintaining an important degree of autonomous and even conflictive relationships. Based on a normative assessment, there is no reason to reduce the service-sector guilds to proto-guilds or quasi-guilds.

Even a modest appraisal of a handful of European ports is sufficient to confirm the idea – noted by Davis and Weinbauer – that there is no “normal” port work experience.²⁵⁹ The variety of organizational and labor configurations attests to the necessity of understanding local traditions and practices. By the same measure, economic development was a highly localized affair as well. It seems quite evident that the maritime guilds followed similar trends of increasing specificity based on the economic development of their markets (as was common with secondary-sector guilds throughout Europe).

The comparison between European ports suggests that the reasons for the composition of the guild universe were not specifically dependent on the cargo in question, but on traditions that developed over time. In some ports, the maritime porters were responsible for unloading vessels, in others, there were specific lightermen. Some port studies specifically note the presence of cartmen and common porters. The existence of maritime porters was universal – and division of this trade into different guilds was not uncommon. The considerations included the specific goods in question, where they were unloaded or handled, whether or not they were imported or not, what their destination was, or what productive trade was involved. That is, it is impossible

²⁵⁹ Davies, Sam and Weinbauer, Klaus, “Towards a Comparative International History of Dockers” in Sam Davies, Collin J. Davis, David de Vries, Lex Heerma van Voss, Lidewij Hesselink, and Klaus Weinbauer, (eds), *Dock Workers: International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970*, 2 vols (Surrey, 2000), I, pp. 3-11: 4.

at this stage to create a predictive system or reach conclusions on the reasoning for the maritime-cargo subsector throughout Europe.

The existence of employment relationships within some of the portage guilds was an important consideration. The fact that in some ports these relationships could be either formal (as in the case of London) or informal (in the case of Marseille), in Barcelona, these relationships did not develop in the maritime porters. The reasoning for this is impossible to state positively; however, it would seem as though cultural considerations beyond those created in the work sphere or guild life were responsible.

Unfortunately, the port-studies encountered in this investigation focused mainly on maritime porters – references to other trades were perfunctory at best. This underscores the academic need for more sector-based investigations in other European ports.

While the question of national origin does not seem to have been a consideration in Barcelona, the other ports studied demonstrated very different models. In some ports, imported workers were used to create competitive scenarios. In Genoa and Florence, workers were from another community – a specific one at that – and the ongoing relationship with their place of birth was important. In Cádiz, the workers were from another part of Spain (a mountainous region, as in Livorno) – but I do not have enough information to determine whether they were solely from that area, or if they merely contributed to a larger pool of workers. In London, the use of foreigners (that is, men or women who were not free of the city) was a point of prohibition and conflict. In Barcelona, workers had to be residents of the area – there is no indication of foreign or alien workers.

The labor panorama in the port area of Barcelona was complex, with three guilds dividing the privilege of unloading the vessels in the harbor, three guilds privileged with moving goods from the beach to the Customs House, and another guild that was responsible for moving goods from Barcelona to other points beyond the city. Additionally, there were common porters and common laborers who, without any privileges over maritime-cargo handling still competed with the responsible guilds from time to time.

Most of these maritime-cargo handling guilds were capable of creating and defending monopolistic privileges (similarly based on considerations like types, origin, and means of handling said cargo, and of designated areas of operations). The fact that these guilds operated in the same sector (transportation), and the same sub-sector (maritime-cargo handling) in well-defined areas is very important. These guilds, as a group, enjoyed a set of monopolistic privileges that basically covered the entirety of their sub-sector: there were generally few opportunities for direct competition, as the goods created by each guild were clearly delineated. That said, the guilds did face some forms of competition over time precisely because there were numerous guilds providing the same service (cargo-handling). However, this did not preclude the guilds in Barcelona from forming complex, multi-guild structures to maintain the specific privileges, nor from jealously defending their privileges and the interests of the membership to their trades.

While they constituted a sub-sector of the economy, which was experience important growths, despite external difficulties, the guilds acted as independent organizations. Some of these guilds are ripe for further study: there is relatively scarce literature dealing with many of them specifically. While the documentary record contains significant deficiencies and gaps, there is certainly material for future investigations. The academic value of such study relates to its ability to highlight the experiences of service-sector guilds. Likewise, when treated as a sub-sector, these organizations exhibit complex relationships – generally at odds, but capable of working together when their sector-based interests were threatened by external actors. Perhaps more instructively, the guilds used a variety of strategies for promoting and defending their collective and individual interests.

The formal and functional roles of leadership were important in the coordination of guild activities and work practices. A closer examination of the maritime-cargo handling guilds permits the scholar to clarify important considerations in the semi-democratic operations and organizational functions of these service-sector organizations. Formal power was temporary – generally speaking, the executive officers were limited to one-year terms. Likewise, this power was tempered by the ability of the authorities to select from proposed candidates (the “*terna*”). However, a preponderance of the men selected to form the pool of candidates from which the

state selected the *prohombres* were members of the councils, not from the general membership, *per se*. As these council members were selected by the *prohombres*, it seems that they, informally at least, comprised a power elite within the guild. Informal power was checked by formal office holders and, in extreme cases, by the membership. Through these mechanisms, the guilds were generally able to balance the individual interests of their members with the collective interests of the guild as a body. In addition, they were able to fulfill some of their self-regulatory and market-protective functions through the employment of a number of specific positions.

The rising and falling tides of trade directly affected the work and, by extension, the economic importance of some guilds. This would also have affected the quality of life of the different sorts of cargo handlers (individually and as socio-economically organized corporations). This consideration is not based solely on growth: the incorporation of different products affected the highly regulated world of guild privileges, which determined the types of cargo handled by the various professions.

Nonetheless, the basic service-provision system prevailed long after the period studied here – well into the late nineteenth century, when industrial docks (based on those of Hull, England) were already functioning in Barcelona:

This would be very convenient for the exclusive supplying of the great arteries, but very little so for local commerce, for which the merchandise that had to be deposited in storage (and which in Barcelona represents the principal part of traffic), had to be transported *on the back*, by means of maritime porters, such a primitive and anti-economic system.²⁶⁰

Whatever these criticisms of the mode of transportation as “primitive and anti-economic”, the system remained. The main reason for the continued existence of the trade (and guild) was the ability of the guild to fiercely defend its privileges. The guild based its defense on a variety of

²⁶⁰ Valdés y Humarán, D. J. (1888), “Junta del Puerto de Barcelona: Memoria descriptiva de algunos puertos notables de Inglaterra y su estudio critico comparativo con el de Barcelona”, *Revista de Obras Publicas*, 295–300, p. 297. Original: “Esto será muy conveniente para el exclusivo abastecimiento de las grandes arterias, pero bien poco para el comercio local, por cuanto las mercancías que han de ser depositadas en los abrigos (y que en Barcelona representan la parte principal del tráfico), tienen que ser conducidas *á lomo*, por medio de faquines, sistema tan primitivo como antieconómico” [emphasis in original].

factors, including traditional justifications, as well as considerations for the interests of the merchants and residents of the city. Tradition and longevity were important during the Ancient Régime; whereas, arguments based on economic logic are more common – though not exclusively so – thereafter.

Chapter 5.

Modes of Service Provision and Socialability:

The construction of human capital and work cultures

5.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter examines the construction of human capital and different work cultures based on the combination of modes of service provision and activities of socialability. I address questions related to the construction of individual and social human capital and work cultures through the combination of work and non-work activities. I do this by looking first at different aspects of the types of cargo and the necessary work processes of service provision, which revolved around two main modes: the cooperative or individualistic labor-employment model; and the use (or not) of some sort of a turn system by the guilds for establishing an order among the guildsmen. I then proceed with an analysis of some of the activities of socialability of these guilds. Socialability covers the non-work related socio-cultural activities and interactions. Together, the modes of service provision and of socialability created opportunities and mechanisms for the transmission of individual and social capital, which together round out the major aspects of the resultant occupational and organizational cultures.

These diverse topics are unified through the conceptual frameworks of work culture, socialability, and individual and collective social capital, which I treat as inter-related concepts. This inter-relationship is based on the concept of the construction of human capital, through work-related activities and through socialability; reciprocally, these cultural values strengthened and contributed to, and were influenced by the work-process modalities, especially when considering the collective or individual service-provision models of the various guilds and the maintenance of a turn system.

The objective, here, is to better understand the social interactions – at work (hiring, work, and remuneration) and outside of work (socialability) – of the maritime-cargo handling workers, and the formation and maintenance of consolidated groups capable of creating and transmitting individual and social capital. Human capital is considered as including both technical, “hard” skills and “soft”, or personal and interpersonal ones (Moss & Tilly, 1996; B. D. Davis & Muir, 2004; Laker & Powell, 2011). These processes occurred during the work process and beyond.

There is a reciprocal relationship between work culture and human capital: on one hand, work cultures can be considered a type of human capital, as well as being a product of it; the same for

human capital, which is developed and inculcated through the processes that consolidate occupational and organizational cultures. Inasmuch as each trade had an occupational culture based on work-related activities, each guild had an organizational culture, which combined the occupational culture with the intangible products of organizational life and socialability.

Enriqueta Camps (1990, p. 306) notes this interplay between individual and group culture in the formation of individual and collective human capital:

The formation [development of capacities] during work appears that, in its essential characteristics obeys a process of socialization. An important part of the productivity of the workers can be attributed to the way in which he or she relates to colleagues and with the social groups of which they are a part. Thus, the process of adjustment to a new job is a process in which the individual adapts to the work group and learns its norms and customs.²⁶¹

While there is insufficient information to compare all of the trades and guilds in the same manner, there is certainly enough documentation of different aspects of some of the guilds to underscore some of the historic changes, organizational adaptations, and responses of these bodies to different situations. In their totality, there is evidence of important similarities and differences compared to cargo-handling guild configurations in other ports, and with the craft guilds of Barcelona.

²⁶¹ Original: “La formación en el trabajo parece que, en sus características esenciales, obedece a un proceso de socialización. Una parte importante de la productividad del trabajador se puede atribuir a la forma como se relaciona con sus colegas y con los grupos sociales que éstos forman. Así, pues, el proceso de ajuste a un nuevo trabajo es un proceso en que el individuo se adapta al grupo de trabajo y aprende sus normas y costumbres.”

5.2 Work processes: hiring, contracting, working, and remuneration

There was a distinct relationship between the type of cargo and the means and mode of handling it; and, between handling and the guild responsible; likewise, there was an interesting relationship between the mode of handling and the organizational model of each guild. More than anything else, this was related to the individual or cooperative nature of the work processes. What is more, just as with the cargo-related considerations, socio-culturally determined values (norms, customs, and traditions) influenced the guild models. The means for transporting each variety of goods through the port and city by certain guilds largely determined the mode of handling goods; this, in turn contributed to the definition of the mechanisms for hiring and contracting, carrying out these labors, and remunerating the guilds and individuals responsible.

In addition, the economic considerations of the client-merchants were relevant – increasingly, with liberalization. That is to say, it is important to approach an understanding of the degree to which the objective needs of cargo-handling or the subjective considerations of the “best way” of doing something were dominant, and in what temporal periods one or another predominated.

The process of liberalization of the maritime-cargo handling guilds – in effect, granting more authority to the merchants to make subjective determinations – was based on reducing and eliminating certain guild privileges. The objective was to benefit the merchants (and, indirectly, the end consumers of those goods). This was attempted by placing pressure on the government authorities to reduce monopolistic practices, or generally liberalize cargo handling.

It is worth noting that the context of liberalizing the trades marked the period and also impacted the modalities of service provision discussed here, as liberalization was implicitly based on an anti-corporate, individualistic philosophy that – in the realm of maritime cargo – sought to increase trade by empowering capitalist merchants by creating conditions of competition among and within the various groups of workers. This was balanced by the interests of the various governmental actors, with which different guilds were able to associate with the aim of protecting their privileges and the very existence of their corporations.

In every case, the work processes involved hiring (selection from among the guilds and individual members), contracting (formalization of the terms of employment), and remuneration

(fulfillment of payment as determined by the terms of employment). Two major modes of service provision were in play – whether a guild operated in an individual or cooperative manner; and what, if any, sort of turn system was employed to organize opportunities for work at a given moment.

The collective, social modality of cooperation – used by some of the guilds studied here – varied significantly from the individualistic modality employed in most craft guilds. As I have shown, the tri-partite structure of craft guilds was generally aimed at transmitting technical skills and norms of production that would allow an individual to satisfactorily complete the entire production process of a given good. While there were certainly examples of out-sourcing and sub-contracting in craft guilds (Rosser, 1997; S. R. Epstein & Prak, 2008a; Lucassen et al., 2008) this still resulted in certain tasks executed in an *individual* manner. While to a degree this represented *collective* processes (albeit, comprised of a series of individual processes), in this chapter, I look at tasks that were executed *cooperatively* – by which I mean a number of individuals worked together at the same time on a particular given task (one that could, arguably, only be completed by a group).

The second main modality – besides individual or cooperative – is that of the “turn”, by which some sort of order was applied by the guilds to economic activities that, otherwise, would have resulted in a competitive scenario, pitting one guildsman against another. This, likewise, varies significantly from the artisan craft guild norm, in which competition within the market was limited only by one’s membership in the guild – and sometimes not even then (Richardson, 2001). In the service guilds, the turn system was employed to level opportunities for work among members. This ran contrary to the interests of the merchants, who much preferred a competitive system by which they could negotiate prices and select a preferred cargo handler for a given task. In those cases where the guild maintained a turn – of one sort or another, as I shall discuss – the guild directors were responsible for maintaining the order and for sanctioning violators. Violations included skipping one’s turn or not showing up for work. The possible sanctions included fines and, in some cases – likely for repeat offenders – house arrest (Romero Marín, 2007a).

Types of cargo and the means and modes of handling

The most salient feature of the trades was the different means of handling cargo – what instruments they used, and how were these powered (in this case, human or animal traction). The means of service provision were the very definition of these guilds – evident in their names and technological privileges and limitations. The relationship between the types of cargo, how it was packaged, and the means of transporting it was, therefore, quite important in Barcelona. The means of handling cargo was also related to the overall mode of service provision – how the different types of cargo were handled. These considerations were a mix of objective (need-determined) factors as well as the subjective determination of the merchants, who continuously sought to lower the costs of cargo-handling.

The packaging of goods determined the means and manner of handling them. Inasmuch as barrels, sacks, crates, and loose pieces required different means of conduction, this fact contributed to the determination of which tradesmen were most appropriate. The packaging and transportation of goods and merchandise was a central issue of cargo-handling work until the universality of pallets and, later, containers in the twentieth century. In the labor configuration language of van Voss and van der Linden (2000), general cargo moved by hand was dominant during the pre-docker and monopolistic (artisan guild) phases, and a remnant during the casual configuration. This was no different for the case of Barcelona: in the artisan phase studied here, these requirements consequentially played a significant role in determining which of the many guilds would handle the goods.

The period studied was one of considerable goods-based changes for port labor. Trans-Atlantic commerce was of great importance to the merchants and cargo-laborers of Barcelona (Vilar, 1962; Delgado Ribas, 1986; Fontana i Làzaro, 1987; Martínez Vara, 1994). Liberalization of trade with the colonies in the mid-to-later part of the eighteenth century was followed by wars, naval blockades, and the occupation of the city during the Napoleonic Wars. Perhaps most importantly, post-Napoleonic independence of most of the Spanish colonies in the Americas (and concurrent liberalization of the trades by the *Cortes de Cádiz* in 1813) brought political and economic changes to the labor landscape in the port. The incorporation of different types of products would also impact the relative roles of the privileged trades.

It is important to keep these considerations in mind, as the goods handled by different professions varied significantly from ship to ship – it was often general cargo, not necessarily packaged uniformly.²⁶² While some particular goods became increasingly unified in their share of a vessel’s cargo and in packaging, the ships would often bring in a large variety of goods from around the world.²⁶³ The fact that cargo handling was determined largely by the type of cargo, and the fact that ships often brought all sorts of cargo, meant that different guilds often participated in the handling of goods from a single ship.

While the products traded varied daily and over time, it must be acknowledged that some goods played a greater role in the economic affairs of the city. The port had always traded in a huge variety of quotidian goods; however, the importance of the wine and *aguardiente* trade and of inputs and outputs from the growing textile industry were paramount to the economic development of the city and surrounding area during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Clavera i Monjonell et al., 1992). Towards the end of the period studied, coal became an increasingly important good, required for fuelling the nascent mechanization of the textile industry.²⁶⁴ While not within the scope of this investigation – as the human cargo was not trafficked through the port but on other legs of the transatlantic trade, from Africa to the Americas – the slave trade must also be recognized for its importance to Catalan shipping history and capitaist development, especially during the period studied, when the trade flourished legally until 1820 (Maluquer de Motes, 1976).

Pierre Vilar (1962, pp. 87–154) offers a fine series of compilations of goods passing through the port during the period from 1760 to just before the French Occupation in 1808. He assesses qualitatively and quantitatively a break-down of trade, providing some per-ship information on cargo.²⁶⁵ He shows that while many voyages were dedicated to bringing just a few products, others brought a variety of types of goods. This work also includes an “Appendix D” in which

²⁶² “Uniformly” in the sense that different types of cargo were packaged in a uniform manner. There was opportunity for uniformity in specific goods (like sacks of grain, for example), at least when they arrived from the same port.

²⁶³ AHCB, [Gremi de Sant Telm/Mariners], “Llibre de entradas del Gremio de St. Telm y Sta Clara, comensat lo día 18 de Gene de lany 1800”.

²⁶⁴ The quantitatively important growth of coal for powering steam-driven textile factories occurred largely after the period studied.

²⁶⁵ P. Vilar notes the limited nature of the sources used for this analysis; he based his calculations on daily announcements of merchant-ship arrivals in the port published at the time.

the author provides an assessments of traffic and cargo for the years 1787, 1792, and 1795 (1962, pp. 547–619). Vilar’s interest in this section is generally that of showing total imports and exports per year; and, of showing the quantities and value of the goods. While this is certainly interesting, it does not amount to a series during which significant trends can be noted with any degree of certainty. It does, however, demonstrate the great variety of goods entering and leaving the port.

The functional differentiation of cargo handling was based on a combination of the type of cargo to be handled and the techno-socially determined means of transporting those goods. That is, there was an inescapable relationship between the type of good, the normal means of packaging it, and the means of best handling these goods – as well as between the means of handling them and the determination of the trades responsible for these activities. The ease or appropriateness of a particular means of transporting the goods was related directly to the mode of that transportation. Some goods were more suited to be handled in a cart, and not suspended from a pole. Similarly, large quantities of goods were more economically transported by means of a larger cart drawn by mules or by a team of horses handled by maritime teamsters.

That said, it should be recognized that “best” is a not only a technical consideration; there are subjective, socially and economically determined valuations. These were the object of conflicts between economic actors (the owners of the goods) interested in lowering their costs and the guilds interested in sustaining their monopolies. This conflict was mediated by the governing authorities, which were likewise responsible for balancing the common good of the consumer population.

The combination of socio-economic and cultural factors is best understood by the fact that, in general terms, the same type of good (say, bars of metal or barrels of fish) could be privileged to different guilds, depending on the valuation of those goods. Expensive variants of some types of goods (which correlated with the geographic origin of importation) were to be handled by maritime porters and not horsecart operators – even when less expensive versions of the goods

could be handled by horsecart operators.²⁶⁶ The differentiation was determined by an economic valuation of the goods in question (and reflected the social subjectivity of value).

The subjectivity of this determination is highlighted by an important consideration: significant differentiation is made for the transport of goods on land; however, on the water, no such differentiation existed. Instead, the different guilds operating in the harbor were singly responsible for loading and unloading *all* types goods onto and from the boats, including: barrels of vinegar or wine, sardines from England or barrels of tuna from Sardinia, garbanzos, stamped cloth, millstones, carriages, horses and mules, *et cetera*.²⁶⁷ From a practical perspective, this difference was quite important to the owners of the goods who would, at least generally speaking, prefer that greater care be taken in their transportation. Therefore, when considering that no difference is made to goods handled on the water, and that a differentiation is made for goods of a particular value (on land), it is safe to say that at least some of the goods-based differentiation was socio-cultural, becoming enshrined in the legal ordinances.

The Merchant and the Captain

Before detailing the different work processes, it is worth discussing, even briefly, the figures of the merchant and the captain (as these represent the second half of the hiring and contractual relationship).

In her article about the financing of the naval industry in Barcelona (1745-1760), Magdalena Andreu Vidiella (1981, p. 272) notes that the terminology used to refer to the merchants was varied, and did not, it seems, reflect a differentiation or hierarchy: “In the eighteenth century the term ‘*comerciante*’ [a person involved in commerce] had an ambiguous meaning but what is certain is that in Catalonia ‘*negociante*’ (businessperson), ‘*mercader*’ (merchant/trader) and ‘*botiguer*’ (store-owner or shop-keeper) were terms referring to the same commercial activity

²⁶⁶ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

²⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

and did not indicate any type of social hierarchy.”²⁶⁸ She notes that the Catalan terms were used interchangeably to refer to the same person in the documents she consulted.

She goes on to classify merchants in three categories: large merchants from or residing in Barcelona registered with the Commerce Board of Barcelona or a similar body (or those simply known for their commercial activity); merchants not living in or from Barcelona; and merchants not registered with the Commerce Board and “whose names do not appear in the world of large commerce” (Andreu Vidiella, 1981, p. 272). Finally, she describes the process by which formal recognition of business partners and agents was undertaken, through the signing of an agreement to that effect before a notary and, after 1751, before the Scribe of the Sea, a specific notary charged with officiating and recording maritime activities on behalf of the state (1981, pp. 268–269).

For this investigation, these differentiations are less relevant, as, one way or another, there was a person who owned or acted as an agent on behalf of the owner of the ship or, as the case may be, of the merchandise. I interchangeably use the terms “merchant” and “owners” or “agents” to refer to the economic actors responsible for the goods in question, with little practical difference for the considerations of this labor-focused investigation.

With the above in mind, it must be noted that the owner of the goods in question could actually perform cargo-handling activities of his own goods. This went from using his own lighters and workers to unload his goods from a vessel in the harbor, to using his own means of transportation to move goods in and around the city. However, he could not employ non-guildsmen to do this work – he had to actually, physically move his goods by himself.²⁶⁹ This was an important point of intensifying conflict with the expansion of commercial activities in the city and the establishment of ever-larger manufactories capable of processing greater quantities of inputs,

²⁶⁸ She cites Molas i Ribalta, P. *Comerç i estructura social a Catalunya i València als segles XVII i XVIII*, Barcelona, 1977, pp. 6-19. Original [note (8)]: “En el siglo XVIII el término ‘comerciante’ tenía un significado ambiguo pero lo cierto es que en Cataluña ‘negociante’, ‘mercader’ y ‘botiguer’ eran terminos referidos a la misma actividad comercial y no indicaban ningún tipo de jerarquía social.”

²⁶⁹ AGMMB, “Ordinacions del anyo 1666 del Gremio de Bastaxos de Capsana, Macips de Ribera con un memorial despatxado del Excelentísimo Señor Conde de Riela, capitán general”, 1761/01/28-1769/08/22, caps 2, carpeta 4 (2212); and AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

many of which were imported. However (as discussed below), the 1832 Ordinances changed this dynamic – the owner of goods could hire non-guildsmen to help operate any means of transportation which he owned.²⁷⁰ This was a serious challenge to the monopoly system of guild labor, as it opened the way for the vertical integration of industry into transportation.

It is also important to briefly note the role of the captain in maritime-cargo handling. Generally speaking, the captain acted as the agent for the merchant, overseeing the work of the sailors and the handling of cargo. Antoni de Capmany (1791) wrote a highly detailed treatise on, and translation of the ancient practices of maritime commerce as noted in the *Book of the Consulate of the Sea* and the surrounding traditions. The considerations of responsibility in the eventuality of wet, damaged, or otherwise ruined cargo are the focus of numerous sections. Generally speaking, the captain was ultimately responsible for the cargo, even when it was in the hands of others (especially the lightermen) – inasmuch as the captain was responsible for securing restitution. Therefore, he (as it was generally a man) would be personally interested in guaranteeing the proper selection of cargo handlers and overseeing the necessary operations.

Enrique García Domingo (2014, p. 17) discusses the shared work culture – based on a common work experiences, environment, and values – of the sailors and captains:

They were characterized by their own work culture compared to that of the “terrestrials”, a class conscience that could even overcome national or linguistic barriers. The captain and the *paje* [literally, a page, though in maritime senses, a deck-hand], independent of their formation, economic power, or social consideration, felt that they formed part of a single group, they spoke the same language[,] and had their own system of values, differentiated from those of everyone else.²⁷¹

²⁷⁰ AGMMB, “Copia de las ordenanzas de los Gremios de Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros y Tragineros de Mar de la ciudad de Barcelona publicada por el Supremo Consejo de Hacienda en 11 de julio de 1832, Capsa 2, carpeta 1 (2209).

²⁷¹ [Page refers to p. 17 of Thesis, not pdf]; Original: “Los caracterizaba una cultura de trabajo propia frente a los ‘terrestres’, una conciencia de clase que podía superar incluso barreras nacionales o lingüísticas. El capitán y el paje, independiente de su formación, poder economic o consideración social, sentían que formaban parte de un

Even with these similarities, there were two distinct “classes” of seamen (in the Hobsbawmian, management-operational sense, as García Domingo notes): those who directed (captains), and those who labored (sailors). The captains were ultimately responsible for every aspect of maritime transport at sea.

Besides the captain, the figure of *patrón* also surfaces in the records, especially in the contracts by which one was recognized as a *patrón*.²⁷² A precise, differentiating definition of the *patrón vis-à-vis* the *capitán* is difficult to extrapolate – especially considering the likelihood that the meaning changed over time, or in relation to the type of vessel in question. There is relatively little secondary literature dedicated to this, and the mentions in the documentary record are insufficient to reach a conclusive position. For the purposes of this investigation, little attention is paid to the difference between the captain, *patrón*, merchant, or other employers of cargo-handling labor.²⁷³

Hiring and contracting of labor

Hiring was a two-part determination of which guild, and then which individual or work gang would be employed for a given task. The guild-selection was generally not done at the freedom of the client (until liberalization reduced the monopolistic privileges of some of the guilds): the specific types of goods and the location of the activity were determined in each guild’s ordinances.

The selection and hiring of these guilds – based on ancient practices – was established in their respective ordinances and was dependent on a number of factors. Primarily, the type of cargo and its customary packaging was fundamental, as each kind of package required a different means of transportation. That said, similarly packaged goods could sometimes be handled differently, based on socio-economically influenced considerations. In addition, the owners of the goods could use their own means of transporting their property if they were able and desirous to do so; likewise, and arguably more importantly, the owners of the merchandise (or their

mismo grupo, hablaban el mismo idioma y tenían un sistema de valores propio, diferenciado del resto de las personas.”

²⁷² These contracts are recorded in the Manuals of the *Escribano de Mar* housed in the AHPB.

²⁷³ Little information covering specific aspects of the labor relations or interactions between captains and sailors involved in loading or unloading vessels has been discovered in this investigation.

agents) enjoyed increasing opportunities of free choice over time (these last two considerations were increasingly important within the advance of liberalization).²⁷⁴ The selection of which specific individual(s) would actually handle the cargo was based on whether or not the guild in question employed a turn system [which I discuss in detail below].

Contracting encapsulates the formalization of the hiring process, either in writing or by oral agreement. It would seem as though contracts were short-term, based on a specific load or ship (in the case that the vessel carried uniform cargo). Contracts were apparently oral in nature, covering a set of loads on a given day. It is noteworthy that, if contracts were oral, this demonstrates a considerable reliance on honor, truthfulness and mutual confidence. These values were framed within the context of honorable behaviors by the individuals and groups involved.

The monopolies established in the privileges created opportunities for corrupt practices, but the guild system also created the means of overseeing the complete and effective execution of service provision. This is because relevant authorities could objectively verify the types of goods, quantities, and locations – with these, the guild and merchant responsible could be determined, as well as the customary completion of labors, all at officially established prices. While there are no records of informal arrangements (owing to the very nature of their informality); there are also no legal cases referring to failures to comply with contracts (oral or otherwise). It certainly seems that, whether or not both parties were in agreement with the terms of an arrangement, they tended to honor them, nonetheless.

Contracts (even oral ones) were organized either in a collective, centralized manner under the responsibility of a guild director, or on an individual, per-member basis. In the case of collective contracts, the terms of payment were *generally* not negotiable (technically speaking) – prices were determined by the type of goods, the quantity, and the destination. In the case of an individual contract, the prices could not fall below the established rates (an important means of preventing detrimental competition). That said, in practice, there were certainly processes of price negotiation.

²⁷⁴ I discuss the increasing tendency of the subjective determination by the owners – and the responses of the guilds – in Chapter 7, dealing with liberalization.

As for the relevance of official prices schedules – which, in theory, were designed to establish the officially authorized prices – it must be noted that the guilds were able to negotiate (perhaps “coerce” might be a better term) higher prices from merchants. There is no record of how this was accomplished; however, the emission of new prices was at times predicated on the need to update these schedules to better reflect the existent economic reality. That is, in practice, the official prices responded to actual prices; not the inverse.

There is evidence of longer-term contracts between guilds. In these arrangements, the guilds established the means for cooperative relationships based on service-provision by one guild to another. In the mid-eighteenth century, the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators reached agreements with some of the guilds to provide them with services under agreed upon conditions. Basically, the guild would be hired at lower rates to undertake actions that, otherwise, could be done by the merchants themselves. Among these were the druggists and re-sellers; the maritime porters protected these arrangements with legal actions, if necessary.²⁷⁵ Part of the justification for the emission of the 1770 Ordinances was the revocation of long-standing inter-guild contracts.²⁷⁶

There was also a yearly contract by which the Guild of Unloaders hired members of the Guild of Maritime Horsecart Operators to haul lighters to the beach. That said, I do not consider these to be examples of sub-contracting or out-sourcing, as the activities covered were generally not the principal activities of the guilds – instead they were auxiliary services; in this case, the Horsecart Operators were assisting the lightermen with a specific aspect of the labor of the latter, they were arguably not actually carrying out that labor (Colldeforns Lladó, 1951, pp. 207–209). Counterpose this with the cases of sub-contracting and out-sourcing of London and Marseille,

²⁷⁵ AGMMB, “Resumen del pleyto del Gremio de Faquines de Capsana contra Jayme Puigoriol en la sala segunda de la Real Audiencia”, 1830/02/01 - 1831/10/28, Capsa 4, carpeta 10 (2241); AGMMB “Capítulos que deben declarar los testigos sobre los extremos siguientes [...]”, 1830 – 1831, Capsa 4, carpeta 14 (2245); AGMMB, “Memorial despachado por la Real Audiencia favor del Gremio de Faquines, Masips de Rivera y Carreteros de Mar contra Antonio Gispert, comerciant, en el año de 1770”, 1770 – 1776, Capsa 5, carpeta 3 (2308); AGMMB, “Concordia feta y firmada per y entre los proms y confreres de Tendes y Revenadors de la present ciutat, de una, y los proms y confreres de Bastaixos, Macips de Ribera, de part altre”, 1751/06/10 – n.d., Capsa 8, carpeta 6 (2295); and AGMMB, “Concordia, feta entre lo Collegi de Droguers y Confiters de la present ciutat de Barcelona, de una part, y la Confraria de Bastaixos de Capsana, Masips de Ribera de la mateixa ciutat, de part altra”, 1748/10/11 – n.d., Capsa 8, carpeta 7 (2296).

²⁷⁶ AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291).

and it is evident that these arrangements in Barcelona did not meet the requirements of a hierarchical labor relationship.

Hiring by area of privileged operations

Generally speaking, when a merchant vessel arrived in Barcelona, the person in charge of the merchandise (be that the owner of the ship, the captain, a commercial agent, or the owner of the goods) would either use the sailors already employed and aboard the ship (if previously established by a crew-member contract), or would employ one of the three guilds privileged with transporting cargo to the beach (Guilds of Mariners, of Unloaders, or of Fishermen); which of these three guilds would handle a given load or vessel was based on a government-imposed sharing system established in the late 1790s.²⁷⁷

The subjective determination of the merchant was between using, or not, the sailors already employed for the voyage (determined either in the hiring contract for the voyage or, perhaps, upon arrival in the port). In the case that he used his own sailors, the merchant would still have to pay a fee to the harbor-based guilds for the ability to unload in Barcelona.²⁷⁸ The amount was determined by whether or not the merchant used his own lighters, or those of the guild: in the case of the former, the fee was one-quarter of the full amount for handling cargo; in the case of the latter, it was one-half of the full, normal rate. Similarly, goods moved from one vessel to another (not entering the city in any way) were also included in the schedules, as were special considerations for handling from ships anchored beyond the harbor (which was twice the normal amount).

Based on the located documents, there is no way to determine the frequency of the decision to employ or not employ sailors from the voyage. However, for voyages leaving Barcelona during the period studied, the apparent majority – from a casual review of the sailor contracts – included the responsibility for loading and unloading cargo.²⁷⁹ As ships arrived in Barcelona from all

²⁷⁷ ANC, “Zalvide”, caja 1637.

²⁷⁸ BC, Anon. “Arancel de precios de carga, descarga y trasbalso ó transbordo...” [18 agosto 1807] Reprinted by Garriga y Aguasvivas: Barcelona, 1819, 33-8:C 49/8. [available at <http://books.google.es/books?id=0wn2hSt5yPsC>; last accessed 17 March 2017].

²⁷⁹ These contracts, in their hundreds, were recorded by the Scribe of the Sea naval notary, and are available for consultation in the Manuals in the *Escribano de Mar* collection of the AHPB. For a historic treatment of this

over the world (but especially Spanish and European ports), the customs of other areas are beyond the scope of this investigation (e.g. Böer, 2015). However, the inclusion of a quarter-rate or half-rate for anchorage indicates that the practice of using previously contracted mariners for cargo-handling was in effect in Barcelona during the period studied.

The unloading work was collaborative, as such tasks of raising or lowering goods from a large merchant vessel to the low-borne lighters were largely impossible to execute individually. The amounts of cargo per lighter – while difficult to ascertain with any precision – were such that a group effort was far more efficient. For this reason, teams, consisting of about eight to ten men were employed. There was no system for sub-contracting within the guild, or of out-sourcing these labors to others. Generally speaking, the work modality was entirely horizontal, carried out cooperatively among masters.

The *notxer* – in addition to responsibilities when at sea – was in charge of overseeing the proper stowage of goods aboard the ship. This represented an especially skilled individual; however, unlike the norm of the guild system, this hard-skill qualification was not determined by the guild, but was a subjective determination made by the captain. This person was a sailor of some experience who enjoyed the trust of the captain/merchant (Garcia Domingo, 2015). His contract and payment were individual, as were his particular responsibilities.

The three maritime guilds handled all goods, regardless of any distinction or division among the guilds. Just as there was no cargo-determined differentiation, nor was there apparently a subjective choice by the merchant as to which guild (or team thereof) would handle the goods from the vessels (at least not one based on costs, since all three charged the same amount). It seems as though it was a first-come, first-hired or turn-based system (although this question is pending definitive conclusion, especially considering the possibility of changes in this system over time). Unfortunately, there is scant information regarding how this functioned in a practical sense.

collection, see Colldeforns Lladó, Francesc de P. (1951), *Historial de los Gremios de Mar de Barcelona, 1750-1865*, Barcelona: Gráficas Marina.

There were certainly conflicts throughout the period studied, such that the highest officer of the Navy responsible for the north-eastern region intervened to impose some sort of order – a process that dragged through the 1770s and included placing the three harbor guilds under a single ordinance in a general Guild of Matriculated guilds (the *Gremio de Matriculados*). The guilds resisted this effort and retained their autonomy. The inability of this effort to resolve the long-standing conflicts, the naval authority eventually divided the beach areas of operations among the three harbor-based guilds in the late 1790s. It was noted that the beach areas was the focal point of conflicts between these guilds (storage of lighters and hiring were conducted at the beach).²⁸⁰

The three guilds responsible for unloading would disembark merchandise from the merchant vessel onto a harbor lighter; other cargo could be floated to the beach. The lighters were either rowed to the shore or hauled by horses. Documentation of this latter practice is evident in a contract between the Mariners' Guild and two maritime horsecart operators. This written contract established the conditions and rates of pay for hauling the lighters.²⁸¹ The contract for the “Provision of the service of hauling to land the Lighters of the Guild” (“*Arrendamiento del servicio de arrastre a tierra de las Barcazas del Gremio*”) was dated 9 February 1791, when these horsecart operators were still in a shared guild with the maritime porters (Colldeforns Lladó, 1951, pp. 207–209). The period contracted was one year. The terms were quite detailed, including sections covering: payment; work during inclement weather or on holidays; and sanctions for violating the terms. In addition, the contract was valid so long as the horsecart operators behaved “well” and the “*Prohom**[bres of the Mariners' Guild] could not remove them nor could [the maritime horsecart operators] sever the contract, under a penalty of one thousand *libras*” (Colldeforns Lladó, 1951, p. 208).²⁸²

The normal (load-rate) contracts for unloading goods from the merchant vessel to the beach would have most likely been established orally, perhaps supported by annotations detailing the

²⁸⁰ ANC, “Zalvide”, caja 1637.

²⁸¹ I have been unable to determine whether the maritime horsecart operators entered into the contract privately or on behalf of their guild.

²⁸² Original: “[N]o podrán los Prohom*[bres del Gremio de Mareantes] removerlos ni aquellos separarse bajo pena de mil libras [...]” To put this economic sanction into perspective, it represented the full-price entrance fee (that is, for an applicant not related to an existing member) of twenty maritime horsecart operators – an *incredible* sum!

type of cargo, the number of loads and distances traveled within the city. Whatever the case may have been, there is no written record of these transactions between parties.

In general terms, the three guilds operating in the harbor were bound to distribute work among their respective members; however, there is scant information regarding how this functioned in a practical sense. The negotiations were conducted by a guild director on behalf of the guild, not the individual teams, or gangs of lightermen-unloaders (regardless of their particular guild affiliation). That is, while there may have been a degree of *inter*-guild competition (mitigated by agreements enforced by naval authorities), the *intra*-guild competition was inexistent. The guild directors (*prohombres*) would also oversee the coordination of the different work-gangs (and of the turn system) and guarantee that the work was conducted according to the terms negotiated and the standards of the guild.

There does not seem to have been any negotiable flexibility in prices, which were determined by official price schedules. Nor are there any judicial records of legal processes for unfair competition among the different guilds. However, there were certainly conflicts throughout the period studied, such that the highest officer of the Navy responsible for the north-eastern region intervened to re-establish some sort of order – a process that included placing the three harbor guilds under a single ordinance in a [General] Guild of Matriculated guilds (the *Gremio de Matriculados*).²⁸³ However, it should be kept in mind that the occasional rectification of the price schedule was due in part to the reality that higher prices than those authorized were the common practice. That is, the *normative* prices did not, in fact, necessarily accurately represent the *actual* prices, which were higher.

It should be noted that during the Liberal Triennial (1820-1823), the Matriculate system was abolished, along with the related guilds; it was re-established after the victory of Royalist forces, in 1824. During that relatively short period, legally speaking, the guilds lost their shared, monopolistic privileges (Colldeforns Lladó, 1951). Of course, in hindsight we can appreciate this period as short; however, it is difficult to surmise whether or not at the time there was reason

²⁸³ANC, “Zalvide”, cajas 1637 and 1638.

to suspect that it would be different than the 1813-1815 period of abolition. Perhaps it represented the progressive advance of liberalism over Ancient Régime monarchism.

It could be that the guildsmen perceived the abolition as final at the time. It is unknown whether this period of delegitimation was enforced, or if it was perfunctory, nor how these tasks were conducted during this period. It is – in my view – most likely that, the collective ownership of the lighters by the guilds, the specific skill-sets for loading (and stowing) and unloading goods, the willingness to undertake this somewhat precarious and physically straining labor on the water, and the centuries of customs and generations of social capital would have protected the functional monopoly of the guilds. There are no records of selling or (re-)acquiring these lighters that would correspond to a practical liquidation of the guild. There are no legal cases from the period during or shortly thereafter that would counter this hypothesis.

The three harbor-based guilds could only move the goods either between ships or from a ship to the beach – at that point the person responsible for the goods (by which it is to be understood, the captain, the owner of the goods, or his or her commercial agent) would have to enter into a new agreement with a land-based guild. The mariners, unloaders, or fishermen were not permitted to haul goods beyond the beach (or to the beach in the case of exported goods). That is to say, while all goods still on the water (from the ships to the beach) were handled by any of three unloading guilds without distinction, on land there was a series of considerations for determining which guild would handle a given class of goods. These considerations were encapsulated in the guild ordinances.

With the cargo successfully unloaded from harbor lighters onto the beach, the party responsible for the goods would have to hire from among the three terrestrial trades organized in guilds privileged with operating in this area. The hiring of the land-based guilds was a function of the type of cargo (as noted in the descriptions of the different guilds).

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the type of cargo remained fundamental for determining which of the three privileged guilds at the beach would haul what goods in the marina area into the city. As noted, two of these trades (maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators) were unified in a single guild until 1796, when they split; there were also maritime

teamsters for hauling large amounts of goods not privileged to the other trades. No one else could be employed to handle goods in this area.

In the most general terms, there existed an objectively-based relationship between the type of cargo and the means of handling it on land; and, between the way of handling and the guild responsible. However, in other cases, the privileged guild was determined by the relative value of some goods compared to their homologous, cheaper varieties: iron bars by one guild, steel bars by another; imported fish by one guild, locally caught fish by another (in this latter case, there could also have been a packaging factor that contributed to the guild-determination, but it is unclear).

The defense of these cargo-type privileges was a major part of the guild's responsibility, and there are legal battles that resulted from violations of existing ordinances as well as struggles to determine which guild (if any) would be privileged to handle new varieties of goods (especially since the ordinances were positivist privileges based on highly specified goods in existence at the time of drafting and approving the ordinances). In 1832, this monopolistic division was liberalized to allow the owners of merchandise to employ anyone to haul goods, by any means of transportation. Combined with the increasing success of the merchants, this would have created a potentially disastrous scenario for the different guilds, as it represented a loss of traditional business opportunities.

The last location in the marina area was the Customs House and King's Scale, both of which were under the dominion of the central, royal authorities represented by the navy, not local government or a merchants' association. Cargo did not necessarily pass through either or both of these locations: goods that did not require the application of a tariff or weighing could be transported to warehouses along the beach area or enter the city directly; likewise, goods that required weighing but not a tariff could be transported directly to the King's Scales; finally, goods that required a tariff but not weighing, which would pass only through the Customs House.

In any case, all work in both locations was carried out *exclusively* by the maritime porters. They defended this privilege on every occasion and by every means necessary: supplications to

various authorities; jailing and sequestering the possessions of violators; and bringing legal cases. And these are only the documented forms; it is likely that the daily activities remained largely undocumented.

There was no direct charge for this work in the Customs House and King's Scale, a fact that the Guild used to justify its monopolistic privileges (and their transport costs) in other areas. To carry out these labors, the Guild assigned eight men to the Customs House and King's Scale: the individuals were assigned on a rotating basis. The wages of these men was covered by the guild's common fund (although it is not known whether this was by a set wage, a sort of share system, or some other metric). The 1832 Ordinances include numerous specifications of the execution of these duties in the price schedule for the maritime porters.²⁸⁴

The matter of the honor of the guildsmen and of the Guild of Maritime Porters (and their ability to guarantee honorable work behaviors) was fundamental to this consideration because a considerable amount of wealth – in cash and in kind – was kept in the Customs House. These guild-subsidized services were supplied to governmental authorities, merchants, and the wider public. While in the short term, this *pro bono* service was an economic burden, the fact that the maritime porters could rightly claim centuries of providing these services at no cost was evidently an important consideration during the period of abolition and thereafter.²⁸⁵

From the Customs House, goods could be handled by any of the initial three land-based guilds, or they could be transported by mule rentors. There were legal disputes over whether or not good-specific privileges held by the maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators applied after leaving the Customs House or King's Scale, or if they were only applicable from the beach to these administrative buildings.²⁸⁶ Before 1832, the goods-based privileges of each guild held

²⁸⁴ AGMMB, “Copia de las ordenanzas de los Gremios de Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros y Tragineros de Mar de la ciudad de Barcelona publicada por el Supremo Consejo de Hacienda en 11 de julio de 1832, Capsa 2, carpeta 1 (2209).

²⁸⁵ The trade union formed in 1873 out of this guild was thereafter technically called the “Union of *Faquines* of the Customs House”; see Gremio de Bastaixos de Capsana y Macips de Ribera, *Estatutos del Gremio ó Confradía de Bastaixos de Capsana y Massips de Ribera : fundado en Tarragona en el año 1513 y viniendo poco después a esta ciudad : reformado en el año 1873 bajo el nombre de Unión de Faquines de la Aduana de Barcelona y reconstituido el 1903*, (Barcelona: Imp. E Badia, 1910), Biblioteca de Catalunya, Document ID 4-V-36/26.

²⁸⁶ AGMMB, “[Notificació al Gremi de Bastaixos de part del Batlle General del Reial Patrimoni]”, 1825/09/30, Capsa 7, carpeta 25 (2274).

throughout the city: interlopers were also prohibited from transporting goods leaving the Customs House.²⁸⁷ The 1832 Ordinances attempted to clarify this by noting that the subjective determination of the owner to select among the guilds was paramount; however non-guildsmen could still not participate with their own means of transportation.

The Guild of Mule Rentors did not generally enjoy monopolistic privileges over any particular sort of goods – their participation was based on the practicality of the mode of transportation and on the absence of a privilege held by another guild (especially those of maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators). The final destination of goods was relevant: goods re-exported by land – no matter what type of goods, generally speaking – could be handled by mule rentors or maritime teamsters (apparently at the determination of the owner of said goods, who could chose the mode of transport).

Those goods that were to be re-exported by sea would be transported to storage facilities by the maritime porters, maritime horsecart operators, or maritime teamsters – as they had been brought from the beach to the Customs House. Which guild was hired was based on goods-specific privileges. Thereafter – and for those goods simply exported, from storage facilities these same guilds would take them to the beach as per guild-specific privileges. From the beach, harbor-based guilds would transport them by lighter back onto the sea-going vessels. There was no general guild differentiation between imported or exported goods (although certain products were differentiated based on origin). This contrasts significantly with other ports, like London, where the precedence of goods was an important consideration (Stern, 1960).

The relationship between the means and modes of service provision

While the means of service provision describes the technologies and processes used for handling cargo, the mode of service provision refers to the organizational manner of carrying out the specific tasks of cargo handling. These were both somewhat determined by the objective requirements of the goods handled, and also by the traditional practices of the guilds (which were not mutually exclusive). By and large, the guilds were defined by the means of handling goods: fishermen, unloaders, and mariners used ropes to lower goods to lighters, which were rowed to

²⁸⁷ AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos]”, 1820/09/26 - 1820/09/27, Capsa 7, carpeta 12 (2261).

the beach; maritime porters generally used a pole to suspend goods between pairs of porters; and the maritime horsecart operators, mule rentors, and maritime teamsters used increasingly larger carts, hauled by either a single horse, mules, or a team of horses, respectively. The common porters (or, literally, “helpers with a rope”) – who did not enjoy any privilege over handling maritime cargo – used a rope to lash goods to their backs for portage.

The manner of transporting goods had considerable importance when organizing the necessary workers. The fragility, form of packing, and the dimensions of an object determined the best means of transporting the goods. This differentiation largely explains the mode of transporting the goods – either individual or collective/cooperative. While individualism requires little clarification, for the purposes of this investigation, collective work is meant to describe activities conducted by more than one person in a hierarchical fashion based on a relationship of employment, sub-contracting, or out-sourcing; whereas, “cooperative” is used to mean work that was conducted by more than one person in a horizontal, egalitarian functional relationship.

Work on the water was cooperative: raising or lowering goods from a large merchant vessel to lighters (which were low to the water) was largely impossible to execute individually. The amounts of cargo per lighter – while difficult to ascertain with any precision – were such that a group effort was far more efficient. For this reason, teams consisting of up to eight to ten men were employed. These guildsmen did not compete amongst themselves – some sort of turn was employed within each guild. There was no hierarchical system for sub-contracting within these guilds, or of out-sourcing these labors to non-guildsmen. Generally speaking, the work modality was entirely horizontal, carried out cooperatively among masters.

In Barcelona, the work of the maritime porters was organized collaboratively around pairs of workers (each pair was called a *manuella*). These pairs could work in work gangs (of up to eight men in four pairs): this formed the basic unit for hauling heavy cargo. This covered the proper handling of the goods and intangible considerations, like the group dynamics and the creation of a strong collaborative spirit among the workers. This, in turn, created a guild identity that was central to the work life of the members (Romero Marín, 2007a). Not all work was conducted by groups – smaller loads could be handled by a single pair of maritime porters. However, subcontracting was not practiced – contracting was conducted by a turn-based system controlled

by the guild (which I describe below). These factors meant that the maritime porters' guild did not experience a process of internal competition – there were no noted attempts within the guild to create a different system to the benefit of more successful members at the expense of others. Their struggles were against outsiders – mainly, individuals and guilds who competed illicitly and the merchants who hired them.

It is important to put this in perspective relative to the practice of centralized control, as used in Marseille (Sewell, Jr., 1988; Böer, 2015) and London (Stern, 1960; Mankelov, 2000), for example. These both offer comparisons for the systems of hiring. In Marseille, the work-gang leaders would take a larger share of the collective work (in which he may have participated) whereas in London the guildsmen were truly the masters of other men, enjoying considerable control by fully employing gangs in a sub-contracting system. That is, while this work was collective, it does not meet the criteria of collaborative work, as different, hierarchical employment relationships generally existed.

None of the other guilds or informal organizations of land-based cargo handlers operated collaboratively. The maritime horsecart operators worked individually – even when they were organized in a common guild with the collaboration-based maritime porters. The common laborers seem to have generally worked individually (or, perhaps collectively); the same was true for the common porters. The maritime teamsters also worked individually (perhaps with a helper, who was privately employed). The mule renters may have entered into collective contracts (as large amounts of goods to be transported to distant areas would require masters with many mules); however, the guild records show a considerable number of members (over half at one point) who were sub-contracted by other masters. This approximates a collective (not cooperative) work process, inasmuch as more than one person was involved in the actual tasks of service provision. However, the guild was modeled on individual, internally competitive work, individual contracting, and sub-contracting. This contributed to very different occupational and organizational cultures than those of the cooperative trades and guilds.

These considerations highlight the special character of the horizontal, collaborative strategy of the cooperative-mode guilds – a factor that certainly contributed to an occupational culture with a strong sense of group identity and *esprit de corps*, which, in turn, created a more unified guild

(part of the organizational culture) (Romero Marín, 2007a). This unity was, in part, the basis of the collective desire to resist abolition; whereas, in more individualistic, fractured guilds, one notes fewer or less passionate efforts at protecting the monopolistic organization of their respective trades.

By turn or by selection

After determining which guild had a privilege over a particular activity, the next task was to hire the men responsible for actually handling the cargo. In cases of cooperative work, the guild director (*prohombres*) would oversee the coordination of the different work-gangs (and of the turn system overall) and guarantee that the work was conducted according to the standards of the guild. In the case of a merchant not using previously contracted sailors, this client would hire one of the harbor based guilds, and these guilds, for their part, would assign teams for executing the required tasks. This was similarly true of the maritime porters, who worked in gangs. In the case of the individualistic maritime horsecart operators and maritime teamsters – when they used a turn system – the hiring of a given individual was not based on the determination of the client, either. Only when there was no turn system was the merchant free to select from among the guildsmen those which best suited his interests.

The turn was a mechanism by which the daily work was organized, with the aim of making the distribution of available work more orderly, fair, or even egalitarian; otherwise, the lack of a means for establishing some sort of order would have resulted in a competitive scenario, pitting one guildsman (or group thereof) against another, even within the same guild.

There were two sorts of “turn” systems employed by the three beach-based guilds: one was a long-term, revolving turn by list; the other was a first-come, first-hired daily turn established each morning by order of appearance. The maritime porters practiced the former; the maritime horsecart operators (at least as a separate guild) and the maritime teamsters practiced the latter until both abandoned their turn systems in 1832. Unfortunately, there is no record to explicitly explain the turn system employed by the harbor-based guilds. The mule renters apparently did not use a turn system at all.

In the 1770 Ordinances governing the maritime horsecart operators, references a turn system in Chapter 12, which states:

[...] and to prevent confusion, and emulations, that could occur between the members of the Guild if the election among *Faquines* were free, it is found to be convenient, that the practice of the turn be continued, as among the *Faquines de Capsana*, as among the *Carreteros de Mar*.²⁸⁸

These 1770 Ordinances were the product of a series of legal struggles, and it should be noted that the practice of the turn – and its inclusion in the Ordinances – was a victory for the maritime porters and horsecart operators against other guilds and individuals involved in the lawsuits. The guildsmen had been generally accused in those cases of:

[...] the abuse of the privileges which they had had declared in their favor, as with the establishment of a Turn, which the Guild of Maritime porters and Horsecart Operators had ordered, depriving Particulars of hiring for the transport of Goods, the Individual of the Guild who be to his greatest satisfaction, and delaying transportation whenever the Individual whose Turn it was were not readily available [...].²⁸⁹

Thus, we see the clear preference of merchants for a selection process. It must be noted that this preference could have referred to free selection between the members of the two trades, which would have also run contrary to the goods-specific privileges of these two trades (even, as they were, organized at that time in a single guild).

²⁸⁸ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202). Original: “[...Y] para precaver la confusión, y emulacones, que podría haber entre los del Gremio, si fuera libre la elección de Faquin, se halla por conveniente, se contiue la practica del turno, asi entre los Faquines de Capsana, como entre los Carreteros de Mar.” (p. 9).

²⁸⁹ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202), p. 5. Original: “[...E]l abuso de la privativa que tenian declarada à su favor, ya con el establecimiento de un Turno, que habia ordenado el Gremio de Faquines, y Carreteros de Mar, privando à los Particulares de valerse para el transporte de Generos, del Individuo del Gremio que fuese de su mayor satisfaccion, y dilatandose la conduccion siempre que no se hallase pronto el Individuo à quien tocaba el Turno [...].”

The situation in which a horsecart operator had to physically work with his own cart would be an issue about which the merchants would complain in 1778,²⁹⁰ and would eventually – after the period studied here – lead to a reconfiguration of the guild as an association of masters employing others to handle the horsecarts. These underscore the internal and external pressures against the maintenance of ancient practices.

In 1801 and 1827, the general membership of the Guild of Maritime Teamsters overturned the decision of the (presumably better-off) leadership of the guild to end the practice of a “turn” for determining work rotation. The members noted their concern that by ending the “turn”, some masters would enjoy undue advantage, especially those who had warehouses in which they could store coal, whereas other members did not enjoy this economic advantage.²⁹¹ This suggests an existing situation of socio-economic division within the guild. The “turn” practiced by maritime horsecart operators was discontinued, beginning a system of free choice by the owners of goods and merchandise. This change had been approved by the representatives of the Guild of Maritime Horsecart Operators, reflecting a developing dynamic of internal competition within the guild.

The matter of the turn was important during the re-assessment of the ordinances of the various guilds – a process that lasted from 1818 to 1832, when a single ordinance for three of the maritime cargo-handling guilds was institutionalized.

In the mid-to-late 1820s, the Commission of Guilds (under the Board of Commerce) was charged with soliciting proposals from the guilds for new ordinances. The aim was to eliminate monopolistic privileges and practices. The Maritime Teamsters were divided over the desire to defend their Guild’s use of the “turn” for determining the order by which men would be hired by merchants. The practice – which was ancient, and practiced by some of the other maritime-cargo

²⁹⁰ BC, *Colección de papeles políticos y curiosos*, “Els Comerciants de Barcelona fan una sol·licitud en què demanen l’abolició de restriccions en el transport de gèneres i mercaderies fins aleshores restringides als ‘Faquines de Capçana’ en pro de mesures comercials més lliberals [Manuscrit]” 1778, Ms.3668/24 (f. 239-249).

²⁹¹ BC, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio*, Legajo XXXVIII (Caja 54), No. 3, 46 (1827). The hauling of coal was liberalized the following year, and its hoarding was prohibited. De Villemur, L. (1828). *Edicte de Louis de Villemur: sobre: venta de varios artículos comestibles y otros régimen y arreglo de pesas y medidas y todo lo demás concerniente al cargo de los Señores Almotacenes*. Imp. Piferrer.

handling guilds – was designed to more equally distribute the possibility of working on any given day.

According to two different documents created on 4 April 1827, it is clear that the *Prohombres* (Guild Directors) attempted to end the practice in late 1826 or early 1827. However, a general assembly of the entire guild membership (held on 19 February of that year) reversed this effort. At the 19 February meeting, the membership decided to defend the practice of the “turn”. The basis for this decision was that the turn was established in their royally conferred ordinances and that the challenge had already been attempted in the tribunals (10 February 1801).

Likewise, the maintenance of the equalizing practice of assigning workers by turn was based on the fact that some members did not have a coal warehouse (“*almacen de carbon*”).²⁹² This last point is very important, as it shows the internal divisions in the guild based on capital accumulation. It also highlights the growing importance of coal to the city. Likewise, it is interesting to note that the trade in coal would be liberalized the next year, in 1828, when all privileges over handling coal were eliminated, and the hoarding of coal was prohibited.²⁹³

This suggests that the *prohombres* were not originally acting on behalf of the general membership. Instead, it seems that they (and, undoubtedly, some others of similar status in the guild) desired to end the practice of the turn, to their own benefit. Another way of analyzing this is that the *prohombres* wanted to position themselves favorably in the eyes of the Board of Commerce’s Guild Commission: they could basically say that they had tried, but were unable to convince the membership to end the turn. I believe that the first of these two possibilities is most likely, especially given the consideration of ownership of coal-storage facilities and the means by which they initially attempted to remove the “turn” – by passing the measure in a meeting in which the bulk of the membership was not present (but in which, most likely, the meeting was populated by other guildsmen in a similar, relatively wealthy position – the Guild Board).²⁹⁴ This underscores the pernicious influence of capital accumulation (and the importance of internal

²⁹² BC, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio*, Legajo XXXVIII (Caja 54), No. 3, 46 (1827).

²⁹³ De Villemur, L. (1828). *Edicte de Louis de Villemur: sobre: venta de varios artículos comestibles y otros régimen y arreglo de pesas y medidas y todo lo demás concerniente al cargo de los Señores Almotacenes*. Imp. Piferer.

²⁹⁴ BC, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio*, Legajo XXXVIII (Caja 54), No. 2, 46 and 47 (1827).

mechanisms for checking leadership and preventing self-interested actions to the detriment of the entire guild membership). In hindsight, it can be said that, overall, the democratic mechanisms of the guild were systemically self-correcting: in the end, the interests of the majority of members held.

The 1832 Ordinance effectively reduced the monopoly quality of the privileges to the very limited realm of the Customs House and King's Scale. To one degree or another, elements of competition were introduced into different privileged areas or activities. This contributed to competition between the guilds and among guild members within two of the guilds which abandoned the turn system (maritime horsecart operators and maritime teamsters). Overall, the definite beneficiaries of these changes were the merchants – the very same people whose increasing political and economic power promoted these changes. It must be noted that the Matriculated Guilds (mariners, unloaders, and fishermen) were not covered by these liberalizing measures – their protection by naval authorities kept them beyond the reach of the increasingly liberal municipal authorities and the influence of locally powerful capitalist-merchants.

The 1832 Ordinances ended the practice of the “turn” by the maritime horsecart operators and the maritime teamsters, but not by the maritime porters. This was couched in terms of the freedom of the owners of the goods:

10th. Tenth: In the maritime horsecart operators and teamsters the turn will not be kept, and the owners of the goods may choose the one that best suits him, or that can be found in any part of the city. In the maritime porters the turn will be kept as until now as determined by its *Caporal* [head, in this case a *prohombre*].²⁹⁵

The guild defended the practice that only guild members be hired for this trade (Vicente, 2008), however, this free-selection system contributed to internal competitions that, while by no means total or complete, were significantly different than the experience of the maritime porters.

²⁹⁵ AGMMB, “Copia de las ordenanzas de los Gremios de Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros y Tragineros de Mar de la ciudad de Barcelona publicada por el Supremo Consejo de Hacienda en 11 de julio de 1832, Capsa 2, carpeta 1 (2209). Original: “10º. Décimo: En los carreteros y tragineros de mar no se guardará turno, y podrán los dueños de los efectos echar mano del que mejor le parezca, ó del que pueda ser habido en cualquier punto de la ciudad. En los faquines seguirá el turno como hasta ahora según dispusiera su Caporal.”

Perhaps this situation contributed to the decision of the guild to return to a turn system just two years later.

In 1834, in submitting new ordinances, the maritime horsecart operators attempted to re-instate the “turn” and to restrict the hiring of others.²⁹⁶ The strategy decided upon by the Maritime Horsecart Operators was a daily turn by order of appearance (first in, first out). This Ordinance was proposed in compliance with an order by the municipal government on 28 February 1834 that guilds submit proposals for ordinances, as per the Royal Order of 10 January 1834.

According to the 1834 Ordinances, Chapter VI (which covered the operations of cargo-handling) notes that all maritime horsecart operators who intended to work that day were to be present at the location from which they would work (the beach or otherwise) at either six or seven in the morning (depending on the season: the former in summer; the latter in winter). As they arrived, they would line up their carts by chronological order of appearance. In this way, they established a turn for the day, which would be followed; no offer of employment could be refused except in cases of horsecart operators changing places, as long as this were not to the detriment of the other operators. This daily turn would be repeated after the last member in line had worked. Anyone who operated out of turn would be fined three *libras* per cartload. The next day, a new order would be formed.²⁹⁷

It is also worth noting that Chapter V, Article ii of the 1834 Ordinances prohibited the practice of a master having more than one cart (and, by extension, of hiring a laborer to act as a master). Likewise, Chapter V, Article iii states that “no individual shall use the horsecart and horse of another, nor lend his name...” and that he who did so would be fined.²⁹⁸ The only exception to this was the case of widows of guild masters and masters who were considered “*impedidos*” (or, “impeded”, or “unable” – who were unable to work, likely by reason of age, and perhaps by reason of long-term injury or illness); in these cases, the hired laborer was to live in the house of the widow/“*impedido*” and eat at his or her table – a silhouette of the practices of apprenticeship

²⁹⁶ AHCB, [Carreteros de Mar], “[Ordenanzas que ha formado el Gremio de Carreteros de Mar....]”, 18 April 1834. Caja 42, carpeta 10.

²⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, folios 190-197.

²⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, folio 193.

practiced by craft guilds. There is no proof that the 1834 Ordinances were ever officially approved.

By comparison, the maritime porters unceasingly defended the “turn” by which they organized the work-gangs on a rotating basis, going so far as to apply penalties for members who failed to show for a turn (Romero Marín, 2007a). Even in 1832, when the maritime horsecart operators and maritime teamsters abandoned the “turn”, the maritime porters protected it.²⁹⁹ This shows the continued high degree of solidarity within the Guild of Maritime Porters, which remained committed to the most egalitarian mechanisms for distributing work. This organizational solidarity was likely a product of the daily solidarities that arose from the collective nature of their work – a system that effectively limited the ability of some masters to centralize and control the hiring of certain work gangs. Likewise, since the *prohombres* were tasked with assigning workers, it is important that this process was not subjective: it was strictly, objectively regulated and verifiable by the turn system, so no *prohombre* could influence the selection process.

The different strategies employed by the guilds to auto-regulate the labor market at the functional level reflect diverse socio-economic values: the use or non-use of a turn (or type thereof) represents the most important reflection of these values. This differs significantly from the artisan, craft-guild norm, in which competition within the market was limited only by one’s membership in the guild – and sometimes not even then (Richardson, 2001). This ran contrary to the interests of the merchants, who much preferred a competitive system by which they could negotiate prices and select a preferred cargo handler for a given task. These considerations also contributed significantly to the organizational cultures of these guilds.

In those cases where a guild maintained a turn, the guild directors were responsible for maintaining the order and for sanctioning violators. Violations included skipping one’s place in the order (in the case of a daily turn) or not showing up for work (in the case of a long-term turn). The possible sanctions included fines and, in some cases – likely for repeat offenders – house arrest (Romero Marín, 2007a). There is no technical reason for the differentiation – the

²⁹⁹ AGMMB, “Copia de las ordenanzas de los Gremios de Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros y Tragineros de Mar de la ciudad de Barcelona publicada por el Supremo Consejo de Hacienda en 11 de julio de 1832, Capsa 2, carpeta 1 (2209).

horsecart operators and teamsters *could* have chosen to operate a long-term, revolving turn based on discipline.

Remuneration

Remuneration consists of the amount and form of payment for the successful completion of certain tasks, and of determining the distribution of that payment (individual or shared). Upon completion of a cargo-handling activity, the merchant would have had to pay the guild or individual who had undertaken the work. In all of the cases studied here, the guilds charged on a per-task basis. The different ordinances are very clear about this: they include price schedules for handling different goods, of different weights, to different locations. Normatively, there does not seem to have been any legally-recognized flexibility in the negotiation of prices, which were determined by official price schedules. Normative rules aside, it should be kept in mind that the occasional rectification of the price schedules were updated from time to time, due, in part, to the reality that charging higher prices than those authorized was a common practice. That is, the *normative* prices did not, in fact, necessarily accurately represent the *actual* prices, which were higher (raised over time). There is no indication of how these negotiations unfolded, or of the internal communications of the guildsmen in determining what should be the terms of negotiation or imposition of new (unsanctioned) rates. In any case, it is clear that prices (over time) were a bit more flexible, and not merely or only the product of periodic negotiations managed closely by government authorities concerned with balancing monopolistic privileges, the interests of the increasingly influential merchants, and with economic growth.³⁰⁰

While the maritime cargo handlers *may* have earned relatively high wages for manual laborers (at least according to the self-interested complaints of the merchants!), they were still solidly among the toiling masses. There is absolutely no indication of the maritime porters or other

³⁰⁰ For example, see the guild Ordinances cited in this work. For examples of price schedules, see: Buenaventura Gassó, A., “De orden del señor intendente presidente, insiguiendo acuerdo de la Real Junta de Comercio de este Principado se hace notorio al de esta Plaza, que por el Excelentísimo Señor Capitán general se ha comunicado la Tarifa, que ha aprobado, para los acarreo por los Carreteros de Mar, que es del tenor siguiente. Tarifa de los precios que podrán pagarse á los carreteros de mar por el transporte ó carreteo, segun se ha calculado, despues de haber tomado el parecer de diferentes Peritos” (1798); BC, Anon. “Arancel de precios de carga, descarga y trasbordo ó transbordo...” [18 agosto 1807] Reprinted by Garriga y Aguasvivas: Barcelona, 1819, 33-8:C 49/8. [available at <http://books.google.es/books?id=0wn2hSt5yPsC>; last accessed 17 March 2017]; and BC, *Colección de Reserva*, Comandante del Tercio Naval de Barcelona (1841), *Arancel ó tarifa de los precios que para el trabajo de carga y descargo deben regir en este puerto* (Barcelona: Imp.de Brusi).

cargo handlers living in any sort of relative extravagance. Quite to the contrary, the supplications of a number of the guilds often contained references to the economic hardship of their families.

As relates to actual income, this is far more difficult to determine. There is no documentation from this period located that explains *how* income was shared within a particular guild – what shares were deposited in a common fund or how much was shared more immediately among the men who worked that day or week, for example.

There were a number of tasks that were carried out on behalf of the guild, with more or less available information (service in the military, working in the Customs House and King’s Scale, rescuing the victims of maritime accidents, hauling cargo and materials for the government, etc.). For these efforts, payment was beyond the scope of the ordinances and price schedules, and appears to have been conducted through specific contracts or *gratis* in exchange for guild privileges.³⁰¹ It should be noted that remuneration was in cash, paid in national coin.

There is no indication of pilfering (customarily “legitimate” or otherwise) or payment in kind, as was practiced, for example in London (D’Sena, 1989). The absence of pilfering or in-kind payments is perhaps noteworthy, considering the relative commonality of this practice on the waterfronts of Europe at the time (Davies et al., 2000a).

Likewise, the common practice of pluri-employment, and the provision of collectively managed funds for sick, injured, or elderly masters, or their widows also points to a life of economic insecurity and even lifecycle precariousness. The principal complicating factors were: one, that commerce was somewhat irregular (especially considering the privilege basis of cargo and the inability to estimate when what sort of cargo may arrive); and, two, guild membership was controlled with an eye to balancing between a desire to not over-dilute opportunity while still being able to satisfy moments of maximum, not minimum, demand.

³⁰¹ See, for example AGMMB, “Penyoramento que hisieron los prohombres del Gremio de Faquines, Masips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar a Pablo España y Fransisco Mas, alquiladores de mulas, a 2 setiembre 1768”, 02.09.1768 - 12.09.1768, Capsa 5, carpeta 5 (2310); or, AMCB, *Sección de Hacienda*, “Pago de 492 r- v- á los Prohombres del Gremio de Carreteros...”, Serie 182-2, No. 198/1838.

Compared to the system in place in London – where some of the master porters lived as petty bourgeois employing and exploiting the labor of others – or in Marseille, where gang leaders became sub-contracting representatives of the merchants and employers of multiple teams of their brothers unloading different vessels, in Barcelona, the image of the dock workers is that of a hard-working laborer – an image supported by the documentary record.

5.3 Socialability

By sociability, it is understood to be the concept as used by Agulhon in his seminal work on socialability (Agulhon, 1984), as discussed by Jean-Luis Guereña (2003, 2008). Agulhon described socialability is “the history of the everyday life” (Agulhon & Verger, 1992, p. 141). He attempted to extend the study of labor beyond the work site, based on a typology of socialability, which I follow here. Arguably, socialability was not a new concept even then; it was a relatively new term for old areas of interest, given a more solid methodology and applied to labor (as a group) in an attempt to better understand the construction of class consciousness. By applying this methodology for examining socialability to the service-sector guilds, I address the some aspects of social and individual human capital, specifically skill development, transmission, and reproduction.

With an eye to counterposing proletariat experiences to those of their bourgeois contemporaries, Agulhon developed this concept to study aspects of the creation of class consciousness that were not directly tied to the modes of production or the ownership of the means thereof (these being the materialist foundations). Agulhon’s is a more precise application of a cultural appreciation that is not uncommon in labor history – one which is perhaps best represented by E. P. Thompson (1963).

Generally speaking, this socio-cultural approach is a divergent continuation of a Marxian paradigm that seeks to understand the construction of class consciousness, and, by extension, class. It must be noted that the degree of this departure from orthodox Marxism is significant, as it attempts to apply superstructural considerations to processes arguably founded in infrastructural – or, base – relationships. That is, it represents a friendly critique of the work of *Herr* Marx: it seeks to better address the processes by which *class consciousness* – not *class* – is created and replicated in society. With an eye to this, I will discuss the idea of a given “work culture”, as it similarly informs these ideas.

Returning to Agulhon, I apply his methodology – developed for the nascent French proletariat – to specific guilds in the service sector (coincidentally, the time period in consideration is the

same as that studied by Agulhon). Agulhon developed a basic typology consisted of the places of formal and informal socialability, and by the degree of formalism of the associations.

Throughout his work, Agulhon traces a comparative line between the bourgeois and proletariat versions of socialability and the relationship between the two models. After establishing this general dichotomy, he discusses the dynamic of socialability – which is to say, how and with what aim the processes of socialability functioned in the construction of the French working class. He ends his study with a series of modest conclusions, recognizing the analytical limitations while highlighting the value of the perspective in shedding light on a number of social, cultural, and political phenomena. These include – in the realm of labor history – the construction of class consciousness, the practical development of organizational models, and the construction of socio-political agglutinations.

It must be recognized that portion of the investigation represents an approximation, due to the relative scarcity of documents. As such, the conclusions reached are few; and where conclusions (even initial ones) are drawn on conjecture, this is noted. That said, even this initial attempt at looking at socialability in the maritime transport sub-sector is worthwhile, as it helps shed light on the interpersonal and group dynamics of these guilds. A more robust understanding of the practices of socialability in the maritime cargo handling guilds would round out or clarify these hypotheses.

Location of activities of socialability

The case of the cargo handlers offers an opportunity to test the idea of socialability in the tertiary sector (transportation) and particularly in the maritime-cargo subsector. The relevance of this identification is that the groups in this sub-sector had few requirements of technical-professional qualification; this meant that the non-technical aspects like honor, sympathy, and solidarity had a more important role in group formation. As such, the activities of socialability could have been more important for promoting and assuring coherence and proper functioning of the work group.

The guilds dedicated to loading, unloading, and transporting maritime cargo, each operated in relatively large areas (compared to workshops or even most factories). What is more, their areas of operation included work-related and non-work-related areas. This differentiation and its

application in this look at socialability are justified by the possibility of analyzing the interactions in these places and spaces. This is especially true since activities of socialability occurred in both, while the norms and expectations of proper behavior were different depending on the use of the areas in question. Arguably, socialability – in a larger sense – could occur anywhere, the locations detailed here were particularly relevant in the lives of the cargo handlers (for their importance in cargo handling and also in wider socio-cultural activities).

The Church

The religious function is evinced by the formal relationship between the Catholic Church as an institution and the guilds. During centuries, the guilds functioned as – or in concert with – religious brotherhoods (*cofradías*). All of the guilds were named after and dedicated to Saints or other religious figures who were mythically or historically allegorical for their trades. The guilds had an organizational presence – filled with indumenta – during important religious socio-cultural activities, like the Corpus Christi parades and others. This presence would have contributed to their identification as a trade and as a guild among other guilds and before the government, leading figures, and the general public.

At times, the terminology of guild and confraternity were differentiated; at other times the terms were used interchangeably, without any consideration or differentiation. This varies with the general historiography, which attempts to differentiate between the two sorts of organization. During the period studied, there was rarely any specific differentiation; instead, the terms were applied equally to the same body. On the other hand, there is reason to believe that the guilds maintained confraternities for specific functions – especially those related to the provision of social services to members. However, there is no way to specify the membership of one or another.

For example, the maritime porters, in General Assembly, agreed to form a “Brotherhood of Santa Tecla and the Holy Trinity” in the first half of the eighteenth century to attend to the needs of deceased members and their widows.³⁰² Through this vehicle, the guild paid for the Masses in

³⁰² AGMMB, “Llibre de privilegis de la Confraria de Bastaixos de Capsana, Masips de Ribera, concedits per la S. C. R. m. del Rey Don Fernando en lo any 1513. I per lo S. C. R. m. del Rey Don Felip V, any 1732”, 04.10.1730 - 10.03.1745, Capsa 3, carpeta 13 (2226).

which prayers were offered for the souls of departed brothers and their wives. They also rented bequeathed properties to generate income.³⁰³ They also purchased prayer candles for the alcove chapels and altars paid for and maintained by the guild – particularly in the Basilica of Santa Maria de Mar and the Church of Sant Miguel in the Barceloneta neighborhood.³⁰⁴ These religious activities represented a significant example of continuity – some of these practices dated to at least the fourteenth century.³⁰⁵ The ability to pay for and maintain a chapel was an element of social status.³⁰⁶ A part of the common funds of the guild (the product of collaborative work) were dedicated to cover these costs.³⁰⁷ At least in the seventeenth century, these special Masses could be withheld if a brother was indebted to the guild (and if his family did not fulfill these debts).³⁰⁸

Attending Mass was both a spiritual and a socio-cultural activity – it was a gathering of a meaningful part of the community. Additionally, there were opportunities for socialability before and after religious services. In addition to the spiritual function, the church – as a building and in the plazas in front – also operated as a meeting place for guild activities, especially their meetings.³⁰⁹

This was certainly not unique to the cargo handling guilds. Colldeforns Lladó presents an accounting of the religious activities of the guilds of Carpenters (and Caulkers) and the Mariners (1951, pp. 111–130). Likewise, it is interesting to note the great variety of religious indumenta in the inventories of guild property elaborated by Colldeforns Lladó (1951, pp. 141–172).

³⁰³ AGMMB, “Llibre ahont se assentan las missas de celebrar per las animas dels confreres i altres eixides”, 1711 – 1828, Capsa 13, carpeta 2 (2327).

³⁰⁴ AGMMB, “Llibre dela Confraria dels Bastaixos per la cera. 1781”, 1781 – 1908, Capsa 13, [carpeta 3] (2328).

³⁰⁵ AGMMB, “[Dotació i constitució d' una capella del Gremi de Macips de Ribera a l' Església de Santa Maria del Mar de Barcelona]”, 1366, Capsa 3, carpeta 3 (2751).

³⁰⁶ It is interesting to note the composition of the high-status guilds in the Cathedral versus the relatively lower-status guilds in other temples. This leant to the practice of referring to the Santa Maria Basilica as the “Cathedral of the Poor”.

³⁰⁷ AGMMB, “Relación de lo que existe dentro de nuestro almacén y archivo depositado bajo la custodia del andador de cuyo depósito aún entrega todas las juntas al tomar posesión, también se hará cargo de todo lo que exista de Santa María”, [n.d.], Capsa 17, carpeta 5 (2352); and AGMMB, “Difernts papers y apogas de la Confraria de Bataxos de Capsana, Macips de Rivera y CarreTERS de Mar del dret y señoria que tenen en lo Portal Major de Santa Maria del Mar de la present ciutat de las festas se feran en lo any 1782”, 1769 – 1782, Capsa 13, carpeta 4 (2329).

³⁰⁸ AGMMB, “[Acord pres per la Confraria dels Macips de Ribera de Barcelona]”, 1620/11/19 – [n.d.], Capsa 3, carpeta 26 (2797).

³⁰⁹ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202)

The taverns of the Port: the “Pudas”

While the church has been treated as an area *par excellence* for guild socialability, there is the possibility of socialability in another, less formal, socio-cultural location. In Barcelona, there were maritime taverns called “*pudas*” scattered throughout the port area. Unfortunately, the historiography about these places is extremely scarce (at best), reduced to literary references. It can be surmised that the *pudas* were viewed as low-quality, and were located only in the marina. It can be postulated that they were frequented by the various maritime workers, although there is no concrete evidence. However, given the considerable historiography about the tavern/drinking culture of workers (Leeson, 1979; Agulhon, 1984; D. De Vries, 2000; Solà i Gussinyer, 2003) and of cargo handlers in Cádiz (Sarasúa García, 2001), and its specific role in the formation of class-consciousness (especially in the journeymen), it is interesting to note the possibility of a drinking culture among cargo handlers in Barcelona. Conjecturally, the *pudas* and their clients were pejoratively viewed as rough, low-class fellows, as were the port workers. It would be unwise not to consider the socio-cultural perception of these workers and the specific locations of *pudas* within the larger port areas and the city in general.

If we accept as possible or even probable the presence of the maritime-cargo handling workers in the *pudas*, we encounter an interesting paradox created by the simultaneous existence of morality and immorality in the same group of people: on one hand, the church-goer – symbol of morality and upright living; on the other, the lowly, seedy tavern dweller. A Father Sendil (1820), presented a clear, scathing denunciation of the impious life of those who frequented the cafes and taverns of the city. Interestingly, it would seem that at least some of them also paid his holy wages from time to time.

The work space as an area of socialability

Agulhon (1984) differentiated socialability from the work experiences of laborers. In a way, this may have served to differentiate socialability as a construct, and to legitimize its study. Despite this academic separation, it seems that, in reality, the work space was also a place for socialability. That is to say, it was possible to undertake non-work-related activities in these places and spaces generally identified with work processes. This could have occurred during the work day, or not. That is, conviviality was not limited temporally to the work day: there were

daily gatherings of workers in preparation for work, and they may have left work together to walk home or, perhaps, to frequent a tavern. These would have provided opportunities for activities of informal socialability. I tend to believe that the free moments during the work day would have provided the most frequent opportunities for social interactions among workers – of the same guild and amongst the different guilds.

The short chats and conversations about daily life, sincere inquiries as to the health and well-being of guildsmen and their families, jokes, pranks, and cigarettes shared during a short break are not generally the material for historical investigation; however, they certainly would have formed a valuable contribution to the creation of sympathy, solidarity and common identity.

In as much as there was a clear appropriation of some spaces, the occupation of these would have served to foster guild identity; whereas the common usage of the port area would have contributed to a shared sub-sector identity – especially in relation to the general population (consciously or not). The port was, generally speaking, an extramural space, and, to a degree, represented a space beyond the confines of civilized living. At the risk of overemphasizing the importance of the commonality of the use of the port area, this identification probably contributed to the relative unity of the guilds – internally and amongst the guilds – in their negotiations with merchants and government actors, particularly during the process of liberalization.

Degrees of formality

Generally speaking, the guilds were, in themselves, formal organizations, under the watchful eye of government authorities; less is known about the brotherhoods, as it does not seem that they enjoyed their own recognition beyond that conferred to the trade association under which they were organized. The less-formal groupings of workers (like the Common Porters) not only operated informally in their work processes, but also did not tend to create a written record (the product of formality). That is, less is understood about them in a normative context. This differentiation is important when considering socialability, because membership in a guild may have lent a greater degree of formality to events and activities that otherwise have remained informal. Although I have no evidence in the case of maritime workers, the historiography of

drinking culture in journeymen associations in England (Leeson, 1979) offers a fascinating example of formalization of a normally informal practice (drinking).³¹⁰ The same could be said of a guild feast, by which tradition, norms, values, and shared practices engendered a process of formalizing a normally quotidian affair (eating).

The places and spaces outlined above offer examples of formality and informality. Church-based functions were the pinnacle expression of formality, especially in the spiritual and religious activities; likewise, the location of official meetings in these places added a legitimizing, honor-binding formality to guild gatherings. On the other extreme, the maritime taverns were among the least formal places in the city, perhaps even beyond the pale of normal behavior.

³¹⁰ Leeson estimates that roughly one-third of the association rules, and one-third of the journeymen groups' treasure was destined for *proper* drinking. He also attributes to the tavern the nucleus of craft-based, working-class organization in early-nineteenth century England.

5.4 Individual and social human capital

There is a complex, reciprocal relationship between human capital and work cultures. Aspects of social capital helped create work cultures, which, in turn, helped provide the vehicle for transmitting that capital among the members of a trade or guild. That is, they were at the same time inputs and products of the processes of the other. Likewise, significant changes to one could produce changes in the other.

While socialability is defined clearly – although in broad terms – by its intellectual progenitor, the concept of human capital suffers from a lack of a universally accepted and utilized definition. Because of this, diverse authors have identified lines or tendencies of usage. Robison, Schmid y Siles (2002) underscore the fact that social capital has different, even contradictory definitions, as well being a paradigm that is capable of spanning various disciplines of the social sciences. Ostrom y Ahn (2003) present a state of the art and discuss the various definitions and uses of these terms. They speak of minimalist and expansionist versions of social capital. Nezhad, Zadeh y Godzari (2007) present a sweeping review of the literature, summarizing the different versions in sociology and political science.

In a seminal work that serves as a theoretical beacon, Becker (1962) focused on the formal formation of human capital. These processes have been examined in the context of guild organizations, especially as they relate to democracy: of particular interest to this study, Rosenband (1999) applied the concept to the first phases of industrialization. Donald Street (1988) attributes to Jovellanos – a politician and theorist of the Spanish Enlightenment and participant in the debates over the reforms of the guilds – an early approximation of human capital.

The analytical line tracing the relationship between guilds and democracy (an important form of social capital) is similarly well documented (e.g. Black, 1984; Putnam et al., 1993; Krause, 1999). Besides the social value of democratic practices, these practices and the culture they contributed to within the guilds can be understood as social capital as it was practical for reducing long-term operational costs by providing for continuous, generally uncontested leadership and offered a vehicle for reducing internal friction.

Referring to the influential work of Putnam, et al. (1993) about the relationship between medieval associations and democracy in modern Italy, Rosenband (1999, p. 435) notes: “[...] Putnam contends that the craft communities were incubators of social capital”. The relationship between guild functioning and German municipal democracy from the fifteenth to late eighteenth centuries is well-documented by C.R. Friedrichs (1975). Barcelona had a similar system of incorporating guilds into municipal governance – at least until the end of autonomy after the fall of Barcelona in 1714. A visible legacy of this is the carving of a guild-specific identity symbol on the chairs of the ruling council in the chamber of the *Consell de Cent* in the Barcelona City Hall.

I consider the concept of social human capital as it is widely – though not unanimously – understood (Bourdieu, 1986; Lin, 1999; Portes, 1998; Smart, 1993), and its application to the world of workers (Rosenband, 1999). It should be kept in mind that the adjective “social” can refer to either (or both) the source of, and/or the collective ownership of something. For this reason, I use the terms “individual human capital” and “social human capital” to reaffirm the two types of ownership of physical and non-physical capital – both of which were largely the products of social relationships. With this in mind, I treat *social* human capital as a set of *collectively* held, intangible products created through social processes – which is to say, work-related relationships and those occurring outside of work (socialability). Similarly, I treat *individual* human capital as a set of *individually* possessed, intangible products created through individual and social processes (work-related and otherwise).

And while the *social* and *individual* aspects are not widely debated, there are very significant differences regarding the conceptual application of the term “capital”. Portes (1998, p. 2) warns that the term runs a certain risk: “As in the case with those earlier [sociological] concepts, the point is approaching at which social capital is applied to so many events and in so many different contexts as to lose any distinct meaning.” Following the trajectory established by Bourdieu (1986), Portes notes that the term is efficient for describing the positive aspects of socialability, an aspect that allows for a confluence of economic and sociological lines. Smart (1993) gives us a rich presentation from the perspective of cultural anthropology informed by a socio-economic analysis about the conceptualization presented by Bourdieu.

It can be argued that human capital is a form of capital, as was done by Bourdieu (1986). I tend to share the vision of Robison, Schmid, and Silas (2002, p. 1) who stated unequivocally that, “The capital metaphor should be taken seriously.” That is to say, it is a type of capital, basically representing one or many non-monetary outputs produced through social relations that, having not been expended, are stored for future use as an input, given the opportunity. Likewise, if applied “correctly” the value is increased in the process.

Human capital in practice: types of skills and their transmission

In the standard historiography (based on the experiences of craft guilds throughout Europe), the fulfillment of apprenticeship was necessary for attaining the status of journeyman. In turn, working as a journeyman and, eventually, producing a master piece to demonstrate the journeyman’s mastery of the guilds mystery (or collective know-how and skills) was the normal means for attaining the status of master. While there were other ways of attaining the status of master – principally by purchasing it – the life-cycle progression from apprentice to journeyman to master constituted the norm for craft guilds. In the guilds studied here, there was no cyclical progression: everyone concerned was a master.

This investigation supports a line of argument maintained by Epstein and other defenders of the “return of the guilds” (S. R. Epstein, 1998, 2008; S. R. Epstein & Prak, 2008a; Lucassen et al., 2008). Epstein postulated the importance of the capacity of the craft guilds to behave as institutions capable of efficiently transmitting the skills and work-related know-how that can be defined as types of human capital. In as much as this human capital was a shared product and intangible asset of a particular guild, it represented social human capital; likewise, when treated as an individual product or intangible asset of a particular worker, it was individual human capital.

As regards the specific capacities and know-how of work processes, there is an important dichotomy between “hard” and “soft” skills; which is to say, technical and non-technical abilities, respectively (Laker & Powell, 2011). The guilds were capable of transmitting the collection of lessons learned and best practices, and of inculcating the shared values of the member through a series of formal and informal processes, customs, norms, rules, rewards, and

sanctions (S. R. Epstein & Prak, 2008a; e.g. Rosenband, 1999). Particularly for Epstein, apprenticeship represented the vehicle *par excellence* for effectuating this transmission in the craft guilds. It must be kept in mind that these guilds transmitted and reproduced skills in the absence of apprenticeship (through a combination of work and non-work activities).

Labor skill is comprised of a number of types of capabilities: technical; economic; social; legal; and others. Generally speaking, skills can be divided into three types: the technical skills required for manufacture; the economic skills needed for the purchase of raw materials and the sale of manufactured goods; and, finally, the socio-cultural skills that facilitated sociability and reduced transaction costs and informational asymmetries. The former are known as “hard” or technical skills; whereas the latter two are regarded as “soft” or non-technical skills.

The transmission of skills (both hard and soft) can be divided into “tacit” and “direct” mechanisms; or, more reasonably, it included a combination of the two. Direct transmission is understood to mean learning by being taught; while tacit skill transmission occurred through experiential learning. Skills were transmitted in various fashions, formerly and otherwise. In many cases, guilds provided an institutional framework for the transmission of the various types of skills.

In craft guilds, skill mastery and demonstration was a part of guild-membership qualification, which included those skills, abilities, capacities and authorizations that permitted a person to execute a given activity, job, or trade in a specific geographic area. Skills represent the demonstrative ability to properly and, hopefully, efficiently carry out the functions of a trade. In some trades, the mere ability to successfully carry out the required activities was not enough to legally do so – there was a requirement of *proving* that ability and, or, attaining membership in a certain organization. Guilds provided a structure for both sorts of qualification, skill-based and jurisprudential. The differentiation between skill-based and legal qualification permits us to contemplate the success of low- or unskilled jobs that nonetheless met and maintained stringent legal requirements.

Central to the so-called “rehabilitation” of the guilds (Lucassen et al., 2008) is the role of guilds in providing a system for transmitting, reproducing and developing necessary skills and the

techniques for employing technology (S. R. Epstein, 1998; S. R. Epstein & Prak, 2008b): the guilds created the institutional framework for the learning and development of these skills, especially through apprenticeship. The economic efficiency of the apprenticeship system – at least from the perspective of the instructing master – was established by Epstein (1998), who shows that, in addition to apprenticeship fees, there is a general, organic division of the apprenticeship years between an initial period of low-value work and a later period of higher value work, nearing that of a journeyman. The cost to a master was not only in lost productivity when instructing – apprentices often (sometimes obligatorily) lived at the master’s house: all of his expenses were covered by the master in exchange for labor and obedience. While the Elizabethan determination of seven years for apprenticeship has influenced historiography, Adam Smith (1776) noted the different years of apprenticeship in various trades and nation-states. The Economic Historian, Joel Mokyr (2008), attributes the relative success of British industrialization to the institution of apprenticeship and its ability to transmit skills and know-how.³¹¹

Journeymanship also offered an opportunity for tacit, on-the-job skill development. By working for different masters – sometimes in distant places – the worker was able to learn other ways of executing a given job or function. In this regard, the German experience (*Wanderjahre*, literally, “the wandering years”) is noteworthy, both for the strict wandering system and the longevity of the practices, which are deep in traditional cultural expressions (Werner, 1981). Craftsmen were expected to complete three years of apprenticeship and at least three years and one day of traveling journeymanship away from his or her native town.³¹² Leeson (1979) treats these issues eloquently, especially the training value of journeymanship for the tacit transmission of skills and the transference of best practices among a relatively large geographic area.

With the above in mind, the successful completion of an apprenticeship was not the only way of gaining entry into a guild. The ability to simply purchase mastership represented a threat to the

³¹¹ Somewhat surprisingly, he does not cite any of S.R. Epstein’s well-regarded work on the topic.

³¹² The sleeve buttons on a journeyman’s jacket symbolize the three and three arrangement; the six jacket front-buttons for the days of the week, and the eight vest buttons for the hours per day to be worked – regardless of the wardrobe-color-coded industry to which the worker belongs. [It should be noted that these work-lengths were the product of important struggles by journeymen against masters, a history detailed by Leeson (1979) in the case of England]. From author’s conversations with wandering German journeymen who choose to undertake the traditional practice (Barcelona, 2016).

ancient order of things: it allowed relatively wealthy, technically unqualified men (or women) to enter into a position of employing skilled workers and functioning as merchants of goods, and not as the creators thereof. In the situation of a purchased mastership, there was relatively little need for that master to learn the know-how and develop the practical skills normally gained during apprenticeship – he was able to substitute skilled workers for his ignorance (as long as he was able to judge a proper finished product).

Craft guilds participated in the secondary sector of the economy; they were dedicated to the manufacture and sale of goods. Their skills covered the technical, entrepreneurial, and socio-cultural aspects of their work. In some trades the skills required were complex, and required years to learn through apprenticeship, and to eventually master during journeymanhood. However, there is little reason to conclude that this was the case for cargo-handling trades. The guilds studied here were part of the tertiary, service sector. The maritime cargo-handling trades were, generally speaking, relatively low- or even unskilled trades. The importance of this is that these guilds did not operate as significant, direct, hard-skill-transmitting institutions (as was conducted through apprenticeship, for direct transmission, and through journeymanhood for tacit transmission in craft guilds). The guilds had neither apprentices nor journeymen – everyone was a master. Even so, they were capable of transmitting – especially tacitly – the hard and soft skills that suited their particular guild and the accepted means of carrying out service-provision activities. The service guilds maintained a variety of socio-cultural systems that enabled them to maintain their organizational models for centuries.

The main high-skill activity of the maritime-cargo handling trades was the knowledge set used for placing and securing large amounts of cargo on an ocean-going vessel. Cargo becoming loose during the travels could jeopardize the lives of the sailors. To prevent this from occurring, proper knots, the correct placement of cargo, and familiarity with the behaviors of the vessel in question were highly important. Cargo that had been located incorrectly could even jeopardize the whole ship, as weight distribution could imperil the structural functioning of the craft or make it more prone to capsizing in rough waters. The same is true – albeit with less hazard – for the loading and unloading of the launches used to haul cargo from merchant vessels to the beach. Considering that human lives and vast amounts of wealth were at stake, these are skills that

could not – or at least should not – be developed through trial-and-error, but would require experience, skill sharing, oversight, and immediate correction.

In the case of the mariners, the role of *notxer* was important for coordinating work processes and for enforcing the orders of the captain. This person had no special qualifications – he was named by the owner of the ship or the captain, who was ultimately responsible for the goods in transit. There was no system for transmitting or reproducing the social skills (honor, trust, dependence), nor the technical skills, besides shared experience.

Even in roles or trades not responsible for organizing the stowage of goods onboard, a considerable amount of know-how is necessary for loading and unloading the boats (the main task of teams from the Unloaders' Guild) and for piloting the lighters to the beach. The objective difficulty of moving heavy, differently packaged goods from two vessels (on water) was compounded by the need to coordinate this work among a team (or even among numerous teams, if the men aboard the merchant vessels worked as an autonomous work-gang). What is more, the fact that the sailors could be from a different national polity, and thus speak a different language, adds a particularly interesting consideration to the scenario.

Another group of activities – arguably related to technique – were based on the successful application of a combination of human and animal force. For these activities, a human was required to physically load and unload goods appropriately and efficiently. Then, beasts of burden were used for transporting the goods to their destination, near or far. Because of this, multiple skill-sets are relevant – those related to cargo-handling, and those related to beast handling. Obviously, the maintenance and healthy upkeep of both vehicle and animal were very important, and reflect different knowledge sets, including an understanding of: animal welfare and behavior (for purchasing and care); proper use of tack and tackle; proper placement of cargo and load balance; and control and handling of animals in chaotic urban settings. That said, in their socio-historic context, to what degree this skill represented a market-scarce quality is debatable: in relative terms, the ability to handle beasts of burden was not uncommon in the time-period studied.

Arguably, the most important soft skill for the cooperative guilds was teamwork. The nature of the work created an internal delegation of responsibilities, especially in the case of those trades that operated in gangs: the maritime porters and the unloaders (be they members of the Unloaders', Fishermen's, or Mariner's Guilds) worked in teams. For example, the maritime porters selected a squad leader (a "*cap de colla*") who was responsible for directing the work of the team, which was comprised of up to eight men, working in pairs. While there is nothing in the historic record to support the hypothesis, it is logical to view this structure as a means of transmitting skills within the teams. However, this is arguably a far cry from the craft guilds, which maintained years of direct and tacit skill transmission achieved through the formal apprenticeship system, and augmented and diversified skill-sets by tacit learning during the less-formal journeymanship.

Finally, guild life (as opposed to work-life) required an additional set of soft skills. These were the non-physical, and more importantly, *non-technical* aspects of organization. Some of the organizational aspects of these guilds were quite common among the guilds operating in Barcelona and elsewhere at the time: annual and extraordinary meetings, internal debate and the ability to resolve disputes, social and religious functions, the provision of social welfare benefits, burials, sick pay, pensions, *et cetera* were commonplace. These skills were not uncommon within the socio-cultural context. Lest there be any doubt, I do not mean to down-play the complexity or importance of these soft skills, I merely desire to place them in their socio-cultural context.

These skills were used at every level of organization – internally and externally: the ability to organize the guilds and coordinate the daily work was important. This was especially true for cooperative guilds, which relied on a higher degree of cohesion (a unity that was built upon the horizontal organizational model, which prevented divisive competition). It was also true in competitive guilds, which had to guarantee cohesion amongst competing members. In the collaborative guilds, a significantly higher degree of group unity was required. Whereas craft guilds developed competitive internal dynamics, in which the guild functioned to establish parameters for culturally appropriate competition, hiring, outsourcing, *et cetera*, in the case of the cargo handlers, the guilds functioned to inculcate greater group cohesion for direct

cooperation. The requirements and benefits of labor were shared by all the guild members (or at least the ones who had shown up for work on a given day, or who had been involved in work during the day). The maritime porters provided free of charge teams of laborers in the Customs House and King's Scales, whose wages were covered by the guild. Likewise, teams shared the responsibility for daily activities. While these systems may seem simple, they can require considerable soft skills, reliant on the cultural paradigm in operation.

While internal mechanisms were important to the proper functioning of the guilds, the ability to maneuver in the complicated labor milieu of sector-wide competition and negotiations was central to the socio-economic environment in which the guilds operated. Cargo-handling existed within a complex universe of economic and political organizations and institutions. Above and beyond this, the guilds depended on their collective ability to navigate the often complex world of political machinations. The guilds showed themselves quite apt at this, by using the courts to defend and advance their interests, and by securing favors, contracts, and privileges from sometimes antagonistic governmental bodies. The guilds recognized and exploited the fact that the governmental framework was not monolithic; instead, it was multi-polar and at times variably competitive. The guilds were generally successful in playing the different bodies against each other. The best example of this was the ability of the maritime porters, fishermen, and mariners to avail to the good offices of the Maritime Commandant to preserve their organizations and traditional privileges while other guilds were being delegitimized, abolished, and dismantled.

Arguably, family relationships were an important means of transmitting these capacities, as well as a semi-objective means of determining the quality of an applicant based on years of experience with his relative (generally the father or father-in-law of the applicant). That is, it is safe to say that a certain degree of confidence could be placed in the ability of a parent to inculcate many of these values and skills in their offspring.

Work experiences and practices of socialability operated to maintain hard and soft skills, and offered opportunities for additional tacit and direct transmission. More importantly, daily life allowed the guild to auto-regulate members through fines and penalties. All of these considerations helped constitute the culture of work for the maritime-cargo handling guilds.

5.5 The construction of work cultures and occupational images

When discussing work cultures, there are two main varieties: occupational and organizational. Each trade had its own occupational culture: a collection of traditions, customs, norms, expectations, and values that informed – to one degree or another – the individual and collective decisions of the organization. This culture was influenced by the socio-economic and socio-cultural characteristics of the workers (*vis-à-vis* society at large).

Occupational culture is certainly not a new theoretical framework, dating to – at least – the 1950s (Weinberg & Arond, 1952). It remains in vogue, covering a diversity of occupations.³¹³ Interestingly, there is a combination of internal and external factors that are taken into account in elaborating an appreciation of a specific occupational culture. In the area of port labor, there was a critical assessment of the difficulties and issues faced in international and intergenerational studies of port labor as a sub-culture as early as the 1960s (Miller, 1969). Perhaps the most relevant work based on a collection of contemporary case studies formulated with established topics of investigation was undertaken in the late-1990s (Davies et al., 2000a). Certain aspects of this image can be quite specific, as is the case of the role of internal and international solidarity in dock-worker culture and the possible over-representation of this image.³¹⁴ The critical assessments are relevant for local and multi-location-based studies, as they underscore the multiplicity of external and internal factors, and how these can be overlooked by micro-histories when not balanced with larger-focused works.

Similarly, organizational culture remains a topic of interest across disciplines, especially in business management, business psychology, and sociology. From a cultural appreciation of external factors to economic performance, the concept developed to approximate an analytical framework for internal organizational management (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983; Ouchi & Wilkins, 1985; Schein, 1990, 2006).

³¹³ There seems to be a preponderance of more recent literature dedicated to academic and law-enforcement occupations, reflecting the application of the framework for both (perhaps self-interested) specific and general, social interests.

³¹⁴ While a sizable literature exists on this practice during post-artisan phases, even this appreciation may be exaggerated, and remains a current debate. For an example of a solidarity-focused piece, see Cole, P. (2015). Dockers & Transnational Solidarity: case studies from Durban and San Francisco” Paper presented at *Maritime Labour History*. Turin, Italy; for a counter-argument of disproportionate striking, see Hamark, J. (2013). Strikingly indifferent: the myth of militancy on the docks prior to World War II. *Labor History*, 54(3), 271–285.

For the purposes of concern here, occupational cultures are meant to be trade-specific; organizational cultures are guild-specific. While it is certainly likely that a general cultural profiles may have existed – for example, as Spaniards or Catalans; residents of the city; Catholics; manual laborers; service-providers; maritime workers; or, even port workers – the aim here is to differentiate between these trades and organizations.

By the same measure, the relationship between cultural dynamics and the construction of an “image” – of self, group, or “others – was close. The construction of a dockworker image remains a topic of interest – albeit, generally not in the artisan phase (D. De Vries, 2000; Ibarz, n.d.).

Work Cultures: Organizational and Occupational

As the guilds incorporated the entirety of the members of a given trade, the occupational cultures and the organizational cultures were intertwined. Even so, for analytical clarity, it is worth noting that the occupational culture refers to the construction of common expressions forged in the act of carrying out service-provision; organizational culture refers to the collective life of the guilds. The construction of different work cultures (occupational and organizational) was largely influenced by the specifics of the work process. Some of the trades depended on high degrees of solidarity during the work process; others were more competitive (especially in the context of liberalization).

The nature of the work also created situations in which seriously dangerous or even life-threatening situations were not uncommon: moving heavy, bulky items up and down flights of stairs; hauling cargo in the bay; fishing and ocean-going (the primary functions of two of the guilds that in addition participated in cargo-handling); traveling in mule caravans through the bandit-ridden countryside; *et cetera*. Ocean-going was particularly dangerous – not least of which was the possibility of capture and slavery, for which a common fund was maintained to pay the ransom for enslaved maritime guild brothers. These dangerous activities and environments would have contributed to the strength of the social bonds among guildsmen.

In a similar vein, the mutual aid functions of the guilds provided for pension, burial expenses (to guarantee the *proper* rest of a guildsman’s soul), and money for his widow in the case of passing

– the last two trust-based situations of great importance, considering the inability of the guildsman to enforce the agreement and the value of the great emotional and financial matters in question.

In the case of some of the service-sector guilds (those described as using a cooperative mode of service provision), their group autonomy combined with a high degree of internal interdependence, and contrasts significantly with the standard model of work-life organization in craft guilds (which was based on individualism and various forms of regulated internal competition). As guilds in the same sub-sector, the organizations studied here shared certain characteristics – both professional and socio-cultural, which combined to contribute to a shared work culture. However, significant differences are noteworthy, especially as they relate to modes of service provision and group cohesion.

Juanjo Romero (2007a, p. 105) discusses the concept of work culture, as it regards the maritime porters (*faquines*, also called *macips*) of Barcelona in the period studied here:

The fact that the *faquines* were not qualified workers, in the sense that they [did not] enjoy and make use of complicated technical skills, difficult to transmit and distant from other workers, did not mean that they did not participate in a work culture of their own, similar to other artisans of the city with qualifications. Quite to the contrary, the “*macips*”, perhaps for the low technical skill required to undertake their labors, demonstrated their own solid, structured, and complex work culture.³¹⁵

Romero (2007a, p. 105) goes on to reference the definition of work culture developed by Pablo Palenzuela:

(...) the work culture is: [a] “combination of theoretic-practical knowledge, behaviors, perceptions, attitudes and values that individuals acquire and build

³¹⁵ Original: “El que los faquines no fuesen trabajadores cualificados, en el sentido de que disfrutaban y hacían uso de unas destrezas técnicas complejas, difíciles de transmitir y alejadas a otros trabajadores, no significó que no participasen de una cultura del trabajo propio, similar a la de otros artesanos de la ciudad dotados de cualificación. Muy al contrario, los ‘macips’, tal vez por la baja capacitación técnica requerida para desarrollar sus labores, mostraron una cultura del trabajo propia, sólida, estructurada y compleja.”

based on their insertion in the processes of work and/or the internalization of the ideology of work, all of which modulate their social interaction beyond the concrete labor practice and orients their specific cosmovision [world-view] as a member of a determined collective”.³¹⁶

Part of this work culture is externalized (consciously or not) through the construction of a group image. David De Vries (2000) looks at the construction of the image of dock labor, a process he focuses on when examining the casual phase (after the artisan phase): I believe that – while less detailed because of the document record – the construction of “image” is possible and useful in a study of port workers and occupational culture in the artisan phase. That is, the methodological components are analogously applicable to the artisan-phase workers studied here. While *image* can refer to the way a group or individual is perceived by others, here, I treat it as the construction of the image of the *collective* self.

The construction of a work culture was conditioned by the workers’ environments, organizational structures, modes of work and – of interest to this section – their relationships and activities of socialability. As De Vries (2000, p. 681) noted, this occurred at work and beyond:

Cultural construction happened at many sites – at the work place, within organizational groupings such as gangs and unions; in places of social recreation such as bars and pubs; in street confrontations with authorities, and most importantly in the neighborhood and at the docker’s home.

Thus we see that both work-based interactions and those of socialability combined to contribute to the construction of a shared work culture and image of workers. The importance of *work-gang* identity was considerable in some ports – an importance that may have become more important than that of *guild* identity. However, the more horizontal, turn-based, temporary and interchangeable composition of work-gangs in Barcelona seems to have been quite malleable and

³¹⁶ Original: “[...L]a cultura del trabajo es: [un] ‘Conjunto de conocimientos teórico-prácticos, comportamientos, percepciones, actitudes y valores que los individuos adquieren y constriyen a partir de su inserción en los procesos de trabajo y/o la interiorización de la ideología sobre el trabajo, todo lo cual modula su interacción social más allá de su práctica laboral concreta y orienta su especificacoscovisión como miembro de un colectivo determinado’.” Original note (1) Palenzuela, P. “Las culturas del trabajo: una aproximación antropológico” *Sociología del Trabajo*, 24. 1995, p.13.

did not produce an overriding gang identity. This contrasts sharply with the more-permanent configurations controlled by a master/gang-leader selecting by preference work-gang members that arose in ports in which the guilds were structured more vertically, like London (Stern, 1960) and Marseille (Sewell, Jr., 1988). There was no process of sub-contracting or out-sourcing in Barcelona, so the membership-work relationship was solid in the gangs and in the guilds. The turn system would likely have made the membership of work-gangs a daily affair, not a long-term grouping.

Work identities: occupational and organizational

Guild identity is more difficult to surmise in the artisan period, as many of the examples of work culture are absent from the documentary record. However, there are characteristics of guild membership and activities that shed light on guild identity: family composition; religious functions; the membership typification by religious, ethnic, and national composition; and neighborhood-based proximities. Likewise, some of the values of guild identity – especially honor, trustworthiness, mutual aid – are certainly conducive of a strong collective identity.

The most salient feature of guild membership was common labor activities. After this, the immediate familial relationships represented one of the strongest forms of social networking. Considering the increasing preponderance of groupings of fathers and sons/in-laws in the guilds – as membership was a form of intangible inheritance – the family structure would have been very important in contributing to identity and work culture. Likewise, the family generally comprises a set of “strong ties” in the sense advanced by Social Network Theory (Granovetter, 1973, 1983).

Montserrat Carbonell Estellar (2015) treats these relationships in the context of mutual aid and benefits for the elderly in eighteenth-century Barcelona (both of which were important secondary functions of the guild). In a wider sense, patriarchal preference for elder guildsmen – although within strict rules and long-established customs of overall membership equality – in both the work process and the mutual aid functions of the guild reflect the guild culture in the context of worker life-span.

As noted, one of the main *documented* forms of socialability was religious, which would have had implications on the development of the organizational culture of the guilds. The preponderance of documents (a byproduct of the official nature of the activities) creates a possible source bias that places relatively too much significance on religion and religious activities in hindsight. Likewise, the social implications of *not* participating in religious functions are similarly difficult to judge. The interrelated and sometimes conflicting issues of religion, belief, (false) religiosity, and anti-clericalism have been quite contentious in Barcelona (especially during and since the mid-1830s). What is beyond doubt is that religiosity was used as a justification in support of the guild.³¹⁷

That said, based on the religious homogeneity of the group – Catholic – and the significant amount of guild wealth dedicated to religious objects, obligations, and functions, religious identity was most likely quite important. In consideration of some of the consequences of this, Gary Richardson and Michael McBride (2006) cliometrically analyze the relationship between religious belief and the effects thereof on institutions (guilds), and, thereafter, on economic productivity. As Barcelona was overwhelmingly Catholic, there is no opportunity to compare the relationship between participation in different religions and guild life.

Ethnic and national differences were largely irrelevant in the case of the Barcelona guilds – residence in the city was a prerequisite for membership. This was compounded by dependence on testimony from existing members and preferential treatment for sons and sons-in-law of existing members. In the early nineteenth century, family ties became a *de facto* requirement for membership. From a review of names of those present at guild meetings, there is no apparent presence of foreigners or aliens. “Foreigners” is understood here to mean people from other parts of Spain; whereas “aliens” refers to people from another country or nation-state (Rothwell, 2010). This represents a significantly – almost opposite – situation from that of the national determination of the role of foreign workers in the Italian ports described in Addobbati (2011) or of Cádiz, described by Sarasúa García (2001).

³¹⁷ AGMMB, “[Memorial de l’aprovació de noves ordenances i de canvi d’institució rectora]”, [1815], Capsa 7, carpeta 2 (2251).

The willingness to participate in collective violence is a fair indication of the strength collective identity. While David De Vries (2000) notes street conflicts with authorities, this does not seem to have occurred in the period studied here – for the great majority of time, the guildsmen (especially the maritime porters) acted as police of sorts, protecting the goods in the Customs House. This was echoed in Livorno, where the cargo-handlers lived and slept in the customs house (Addobbati, 2011). While the mentions are very rare, there are examples of situations that could have involved the threat or application of violence. Some of these include the sequestering of goods and carts from merchants – situations that are very difficult to gauge in seriousness. Likewise, there were conflicts between maritime porters and the maritime horsecart operators; and the accusation that the maritime horsecart operators drove their carts “with violence” it is most likely that this term was hyperbole (especially as now mention of injuries were made). Finally, and most significantly, in may have been involved in sacking the Customs House on 6 August 1835 and certainly had threatened to riot (as per the testimony of the guild directors to the authorities) in November of that year.³¹⁸

David De Vries (2000, p. 681) also incorporates the characteristic of time in port labor: “Above all it was marked by time and rhythm, punctuated by periodic economic fluctuations (...)”. While this statement was made in consideration of workers in the casual period of labor, the assertion holds true in the artisan phase. This collective sense of time would have been an important aspect of the occupational and organizational cultures. Time-discipline was important for daily activities, as was the organizational capacity to survive in a context of uncertain or irregular employment.

The typical work day for artisan-phase dockworkers in Europe (north and south) was dawn-to-dusk; in Barcelona the work-day started at 0600H in the summer, 0700H in the winter months; work was to be completed, preferably by sunset, or the guild would have to post a guild member to watch over the goods on the beach. That is, the schedule was clearly within the framework of the natural constraints common of the artisan life in the ancient regime (Agua de la Rosa and Nieto Sánchez, 2015)

³¹⁸ I cover both of these situations in Chapter 7.

While much has been written on work rhythm, it is difficult to contribute to this discussion based on the existing records. While certainly there are contradictory logics for and against working quickly, the documents are silent. An approximation to a hypothesis should have to take into account the fact that a merchant could traditionally hire anyone of his choosing if there was a danger of his goods still being on the beach at nightfall. By extension, the guild of maritime porters would have to assign workers to stay the night on the beach if goods that were under their responsibility were still waiting to be taken into the city. Similarly, the need for goods to pass through the Sea Gate (*Portal de Mar*) in the city wall also set a time frame for daily labor, as the gates were shut at night.


Certainly in some moments a faster work tempo would have been beneficial to the guildsmen (expanding opportunities for jobs in some competitive scenarios); however, it is just as likely that the majority of work was done at a pace that was not rushed, as the privilege system effectively eliminated the competition among guilds; and internal systems largely did the same against intra-guild competition. However, the fact that the guilds could be held liable for broken or otherwise damaged goods, would also contribute to a work culture of careful handling across the guilds (and especially so in the Guild of Maritime Porters, which was responsible for handling fragile and high-valued goods).³¹⁹

The consideration of work-flow during the year was also relevant. While the artisan/monopolistic phase discouraged excess labor supply, there was nothing the guild – or anyone, for that matter – could do to bring in more ships or calm the waves of winter storms. Some authors (Delgado Ribas, 1995; Romero Marín, n.d.) have posited a characteristic of significant seasonality to the availability to work (especially as it relates to the strategy of pluri-employment during the year). The artisan cargo-handling phase coincided with artisan shipping; sail powered vessels were more dependent on weather conditions than coal-powered vessels would be. Additionally – and perhaps more importantly – there is the possibility that the

³¹⁹ There is certainly no evidence of any sort of quick paces with cargo in the documents related to the maritime porters, unlike the jogging and running of Brazilian slaves working in portage work-gangs, the “trabalhadores de tropas” noted by Velasco e Cruz, Maria Cecilia, “Puzzling Out Slave Origins in Rio de Janeiro Port Unionism: The 1906 Strike and the Sociedade de Resistência dos Trabalhadores em Trapiche e Café”, *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 86 (2), 2006, 205–245.

construction of sail-powered vessels was such that they were more susceptible to inoperability or even shipwreck in the case of harsh weather.

While the documentation encountered makes an approach to this matter difficult to ascertain, there is certainly intriguing evidence for which to justify a reexamination of the hypothesis of significant seasonality. Pierre Vilar (1962) listed the arrivals of vessels in Barcelona during a number of years in the late eighteenth century, based on mercantile records. While the series he constructed was not sufficiently complete or disaggregated for a few of the years examined (nor sufficiently robust to trace trends or developments over time) there is data for three years, which serves the purpose here. That said, there is nothing in the partially disaggregated years to obviously undermine the overall picture that emerges. The following chart shows the total monthly number of ships arriving in Barcelona from French ports during three years. It is worthwhile to keep in mind that this represents the total (not monthly average) of different-sized French vessels; likewise, French traffic was a share of commerce, not the totality. Additionally, these figures represent arrivals, and do not include the subsequent departures.



Source: Author's work, based on Vilar, P., Catalunya dins l'Espanya moderna: la formacio del capital comercial [Orig.: La Catalogne dans l'Espagne moderne. Recherches su les fondements économiques des structures nationales; E. Duran i Grau, Trans.], IV, Barcelona: Ed. 62, 1962; 1987, Vol. 4, pp. 109-120.

While there are two note-worthy peaks (at the end of Spring and at the end of Fall), the data indicates that trade was more or less regular during the majority of the year (with an average of one French vessel every three-to-four days during most months). It is reasonable to posit that the lull in December traffic may have been related to religious festivities (more so than weather); especially as it appears that this trade was recuperated in January. Given the limitations of the data set, there is nonetheless an indication that the hypothesis of seasonality deserves a more robust quantitative assessment.

Similar evidence – while insufficient for developing a meaningful series – for irregular (but not overly seasonal) traffic (for the period of 1766-1773) is evident in Barcelona-Cádiz traffic (Oliva Melgar, 1988, pp. 464–468). In any case, while monthly seasonality may have not been an overwhelming consideration, it remains that trade was sporadic, difficult to predict, and influenced by factors far beyond the control of cargo-handlers. These factors would have encouraged pluri-employment.

5.6 Chapter Conclusions

This chapter has included a number of varied, inter-related considerations related to the practical functioning of the guilds. I have unified these ideas through the modest application of the theories of socialability, individual and social human capital, and work culture. Combined, these theories permit the scholar to look closer at the internal mechanisms – socio-cultural and work-related, respectively – by which the guilds were able to foment and protect their internal capacities.

The effects of economic changes resulting in the accumulation of capital are a topic for guild historians in general; there is very little known about these processes in service-sector guilds. The differences in the treatment of this revolve around the fact that some guilds internally operated collectively or cooperatively while others operated individually. This is in sharp contrast to the craft guilds, which were generally all modeled around degrees of internal competition – between masters, and between the components of the tri-partite structures. Specifically, the evolving class identities of bourgeois masters and increasingly proletarian journeymen (and unsuccessful masters) remain a bountiful area of investigation. These processes help elucidate the formation of class consciousness and class-based actions. That is, these conflicts within the guilds during the artisan phase likely established the bases of the quantitatively greater class conflicts of the industrial era (a favorite topic for labor historians and sociologists).

There were two major considerations for describing the mode of service provision: the individual or cooperative manner of working; and the use of a turn system for distributing opportunities. The first factor depended largely on the material considerations of the cargo; whereas the second was decided within each guild and reflected the values and expectations of members. Changes in the ordinances through liberalization effected only the use of a turn system. These modifications were both products of, and contributions to, the changing socio-economic conditions within each guild (internal considerations), and reflected the overall context of economic and political developments on the part of the proto-industrial bourgeoisie (external considerations).

The guilds that operated cooperatively shared income; whereas, the individualistic guilds did not. This created a dichotomy between work, pay, and internal identity that in many ways most clearly differentiates these organizational cultures. Likewise, the possibility of cooperative work, contracting, and remuneration clearly distinguishes some of these service guilds from the craft-guild norms of individualism, with or without sub-contracting, or out-sourcing. This is one of the most significant divergences from what could be considered a guild “norm” (regardless of the economic sector).

It is highly noteworthy that the normative prices for cargo handling were not necessarily the actual prices. The fact that these prices were updated because the real prices had been changed by the negotiating parties places the economic intervention of the state into perspective. What is likewise important is that in this process the cargo handlers and not the merchants were able to gain the advantageous position. The guilds were not fighting to defend the normative prices; they were actually pushing up prices in their daily interactions with the commercial agents and merchants.

The degree of monopoly of the related privileges and the use of a turn system both changed over time. The most important consideration of the gradual advance of liberalism as it relates to the maritime-cargo handling guilds (besides the abolition of 1836) was the 1832 declaration of Ordinances (for the maritime porters, maritime horsecart operators, and maritime teamsters). This three-guild Ordinance was rectified by the Board of Commerce, based on the dictates of the Royal Supreme Tribunal of 2 July 1819 in which the central government clarified the liberty of the owners of the goods to select any person – guildsman or otherwise – and use any means of transportation to haul his or her own goods.³²⁰ The passage of over a decade from the legal basis and the approval of new Ordinances in 1832 is testament to the political difficulties of the period and to the resistance of the guilds – especially that of the maritime porters – which took the form

³²⁰ AGMMB, “Copia de las ordenanzas de los Gremios de Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros y Tragineros de Mar de la ciudad de Barcelona publicada por el Supremo Consejo de Hacienda en 11 de julio de 1832”, 1832, Capsa 2, carpeta 1 (2209).

of delaying tactics, appeals to different forms of authority, and legal struggles in defense of their ancient privileges.³²¹

The main difference among the different service guilds was related to the organizational model employed to control and execute labor activities: cooperative or individual. The employment model for hiring – by which manner an individual was selected for work – was either by turn or by the choice of the merchant (who in that case acted as the employer). The turn served to level among all the members the opportunity to work on any given day. There were two forms of turn: one (used by the maritime porters) in which a list was kept, and turns were rotated as work was available; the other, in which the turn was formed anew each morning, based on a first-come, first-assigned mechanism. In the case of the latter, provisions were made so that a worker arriving later could not skip or purchase a better position in the daily turn *to the detriment of* the other guild members. When all of the available workers had had a turn, the turn was repeated. It is clear that the first format (of a permanent, on-going turn) was more egalitarian; however, it required more discipline on the part of guild members to be present (at six or seven in the morning, depending on the season); in the latter model, the individual interest to work on a given day served as the only motivating factor.

The internal division caused by the allowance of opportunities for private interests within the individualistic guilds would become increasingly important over the period studied here: more successful members would have seen the guilds not as guarantors of a minimum standard of living, but as impediments to their individual success based on a more capitalistic model of investment and labor-exploiting means of service provision. We see this process come to fruition after the period studied here in the case of the maritime horsecart operators, who formed an owners' association with a mutual aid component for collectively providing insurance benefits to their employees.³²²

³²¹ I address this process in greater detail in Chapter 7.

³²² ACMB, *Sección de Hacienda*, “Expediente Promovido Por La Asociación ‘Hermandad de Patronos’ del Gremio de Carreteros de Esta Ciudad Para Que Se Les Esima Del Pago Del Aribitrio Impuesto a Los Carros Y Camiones En Concepto de Parada Ó Puesto Fijo Dentro de La Ciudad”, 1894. For the statutes of this brotherhood, see Asociación de Patronos y Obreros Carreteros de Barcelona, *Estatutos de la Asociación de Patronos y Obreros Carreteros de Barcelona*, Barcelona: s.n., 1903. Available at Universitat Pompeu Fabra: Memorial Digital de Catalunya [available at: <http://mdc.cbuc.cat/cdm/ref/collection/comercUPF/id/19943>; last consulted 11/11/2015].

As for actual remuneration, the available information covers the payments made to the guilds, but not those made to the individuals. Each guild operated through customary practices to determine or assign the benefits of work. Where the work was conducted collaboratively, payment to individual members was determined by traditional practices (the specifics of which are largely absent from the written record). Where this work was individual, it was a matter of the client paying the responsible guild member for the work agreed upon and completed.

In describing the socialability, I have found that Agulhon's framework – originally developed to highlight socio-cultural practices of the nascent industrial proletariat in France – is beneficial, and works well for understanding the wider aspects of guild life. That said, it must be concluded that the documentary sources remain sparse for Barcelona: I have relied on informed speculation in cases in which further documentation may better elucidate the reality. It could also be that such documentation is non-existent: these guilds and their members lived lives of anonymity in a society in which wealth, political connections, and family relations were the principal determinants of fame and recognition in the written records. Literary references are rare, and often disparaging, reflecting the socio-economic class bias of the authors and the social perception of these laborers.

As in the work of Agulhon, documented practices of sociability often revolved around religiosity. Having discussed the possible source bias of these records, it remains likely that religious activities were, in fact, quite important to the guilds. Significant guild treasure was devoted to devotional goods and practices over the centuries. It is also very likely that the common characteristic of Catholicism was a unifying factor in the guilds. The churches also played an important role in the organization of work-life, principally as meeting places.

An important consideration for the construction of socialability was the general homogeneity of the cargo handlers as denizens of Barcelona. These workers were most often local residents, not imported workers from other places. That is, the shared very similar socio-cultural foundations, upon which their specific work and organizational cultures were erected.

Whereas craft guilds were concerned with the manufacture and sale of goods and their skills reflected this; the service guilds produced nothing and required a rather different sort of skills.

The relatively complicated skills necessary to prepare, process, and manipulate raw materials and market the resulting goods were non-existent. Generally speaking, in the maritime-cargo handling guilds physical fortitude, the ability to handle beasts of burden, and organizational management were the principal considerations. Likewise, there were few or no secrets or specialized techniques to master, save knot-tying and determining the best distribution of heavy objects in the vessels (limited, as they were, to very specific, subjectively determined individuals).

The social, economic, and political abilities of guilds – expressed collectively – were by far the most important skill-sets. The functioning and, indeed, the very existence of the guilds depended on these abilities. What is more, these skill sets represent the collective ability of the guilds, as they included comprehensive conviviality and the ability to effectuate change via representation and collective action in the face of often hostile economic and political actors. In short, solidarity – even among otherwise competing individuals was fundamental; it was the product of a work culture that impregnated the social fabric of organized labor.

In craft guilds, the institution of apprenticeship was the primary means for passing the collective and individual human capital of the guilds and masters, respectively. The most salient form of human capital in the craft guilds was individual – it was the knowledge and know-how that a master passed to an apprentice, followed by the individual capital developed by journeymen as they worked in different workshops and workplaces. The collective, social human capital of guild culture and practices were important, but they generally did not directly impact the work-life of these laborers. The individual nature of their work – at least before proto-industrialization increased specialization and procedural alienation of the workforce – was a defining characteristic of craft-guild labor. However, the guilds studied here did not have apprenticeship or journeymanship. Their work was often not individual, but was collaborative. This placed greater importance on the social human capital of the collective, and on the group-level creation and transmission of human capital.

The most interesting aspect of skill transmission within the guilds studied here is the fact that it occurred without apprenticeship or journeymanship status. There is no evidence of apprenticeship or journeymanship in the cargo-handling guilds. They were organizations of

masters. What is more, there is no evidence or even the possibility of the creation of a masterpiece, one of the hallmarks – if you will – of the craft guilds. There was an entrance process, based on a demonstration of physical capacity.

In as much as it refers to technical and technological matters – the trades considered here were generally unskilled or low-skilled. This remains a controversial point, as some authors rightly underscore the high degree of technical aptitude required for properly stowing goods on the merchant vessels and for correctly handling them on the harbor lighters and on land. This is not to say that there was no matter of skill to be appreciated – which I noted in a section dedicated to skill and capacity development – it means that these skills were not highly technical and did not require years of learning, practice, and application. The fact that this know-how was not generalized in the guilds is important. Even for the specific positions – *cap de colla* and *notxer* – that required a higher degree of knowledge, know-how, or skill these abilities were not the product of any sort of institutional development system – the determination of skill-qualification was made subjectively (by the work-gang in the case of the former, and by the merchant or captain in the case of the latter).

Despite their relatively low levels of skills, the service-sector guilds developed complex organizations, capable of functioning as united bodies through semi-democratic systems, balanced by a number of internal mechanisms. In addition, these guilds were able to employ men in specific positions to oversee and direct the organizational and labor functions of the guilds. What is more, the guilds were able to defend their privileges in the political realm, aptly maneuvering between sometimes-antagonistic political institutions. All of these actions were carried out in a semi-democratic system, dependent on social capital (and likely strengthened through socialability).

The socio-cultural factors – especially the construction and advancement of a socially valuable collective identity – were fundamental for transmitting values, expectations, and skills, as well as for solidifying and protecting collective interests. The customary practices of coordinated activities and smooth organizational functioning – enshrined in the ordinances – were paramount to the viability and success of the guilds. Whereas craft guilds (and some of the more individualistic service guilds) were organized around establishing the rules for internal

competition, the more collaborative service guilds (that is, the Unloaders, Mariners, Fishermen, and Maritime porters) were designed to promote or guarantee a greater degree of egalitarianism in the assignment of work and, directly or indirectly, of income. Even the guilds of more individualistic trades attempted to maintain egalitarian opportunities through a turn system. As such, knowledge, values, and traditional practices related to collectivity, democracy, and group action represented the greatest collective skill-sets of these bodies.

The most important conclusion in this regard is the flexibility of the service-sector guilds as organizations to promote and defend their collective and individual traditional prerogatives through internal structures and external relationships. Where feasible, the guilds employed roles that were common to guilds in general (like director, *síndico*, treasurer, scribe and seeker); where necessary, they also developed job-specific roles (*notxer* and gang-leader). Interestingly, there were systems of checks and balances at all levels to enforce the values of egalitarianism while recognizing the need to compensate those who assumed additional or specific responsibilities on behalf of the guilds.

Chapter 6.

Membership Dynamics:

Entrance Qualification, Internal Composition, and Stratification

6.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter examines different forms of trade and guild qualification, and the ability of the guilds to use subjective qualification to influence their monopolistic auto-regulation of the labor market. Combined with the organizational cultures, this ability helped determine the internal composition of some of these corporations.

In craft guilds a certain level of technical skill – demonstrated through the successful completion of an apprenticeship and/or an entrance exam – constituted a form of technical qualification for membership. In the guilds studied here, there were neither formal apprentices nor journeymen – only masters.

The only hinting at anything besides a masters-only composition is a line in the 1770 Ordinances for the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators:

22. From the day of his admission, until four years have been completed in the exercise of Maritime Porter, he cannot use a horsecart nor title himself Master; and the same for the Maritime Horsecart Operator, he cannot pass to Maritime Porter until having passed four years as a Horsecart Operator.³²³

However, considering the ambiguity of the language and the lack of any reference to apprenticeship or journeymanhood in the Ordinances (a common practice in craft guilds) or anywhere else in the archival records, I interpret this to be a prohibition against changing trades until four years had passed. That is, I interpret this to mean “title himself Master” of the other trade – not as a master in general terms. The four-year period was important for the operation of the two-trade guild, considering the relative autonomy and different functioning of the two trades. The entrance fees were different, so a porter who immediately became a horsecart operator would have paid roughly one-quarter of the normal horsecart operator entrance fee. It is

³²³ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202). Original: “22 Desde el dia de su admision, hasta que se cumplan quatro años de exercicio de Faquin de Capsana, no podrá poner Carreta, ni intitularse Maestro; y lo mismo el Carretero de Mar, no podrá pasar à Faquin de Capsana hasta quatro años de exercicio de Carretero.”

clear that the two trades were not a hierarchical division within the guild, since the prohibition was reciprocal.

Technical qualification was generally low: there were no formal means of inculcating technical skill as a pre-requisite for guild membership: it was developed during the labor processes. That is, technical skills were paramount in craft guilds. However, as noted previously, these service-sector guilds tended to be relatively low-skilled (or even unskilled); therefore, they had to rely on other mechanisms to control the labor supply.

This chapter is intended to show the flexibility of these organizations in protecting their monopolies of labor-market regulation, especially in the absence of significant technical-skill qualification. To do this, I will examine the types of qualifications used to determine the ability of an applicant to join a guild, and how types of qualification – especially non-technical ones – were used to manage the internal composition of the guilds (and, by extension, the trades, when the former had labor-market monopolies). Finally, I will look at some of the guilds for which there are personnel records to show how a guild's composition could become stratified due – in part – to the employment of an individualistic mode of service production.

It must be noted that this affirmation is made with an eye to the difference between normative and practical application of these membership criteria, especially as concerns the various ways one could become a guildsman without passing through the training processes of apprenticeship and journeymanship. It has been noted that the gulf between the two could be quite considerable (Ogilvie, 2014). However, the documentary record suggests that – over all – this was not the case in the guilds studied here, which had neither apprenticeship nor journeymanship. By the same measure, other factors were important for determining the internal composition of some of the guilds: principal among these was the existence or suppression of employment relations among members of the same guild.

6.2 Trade and Guild Membership Qualifications

In general, guild studies focus on secondary sector guilds; the service sector guilds show some differences in a number of operational and even organizational areas, but their *raison d'être* remains the same – to protect and advance the interests of members, especially by auto-regulating basic market conditions and the labor supply (Ogilvie, 2014). Qualifications constitute the various requirements that must be met by an applicant to participate in a trade or in a guild. While the specific requirements that comprised *trade* qualification can generally be reduced to a few hard skills and the ownership of basic work implements; the qualifications for *guild* membership were more extensive, often relying on these trade capacities as well as the intangible assets or non-trade related aspects of the applicants (like family relationships, perceived honor, or place of residence).

The types of qualification studied here can be divided into five categories: technical and technological; physical and operational; economic; socio-cultural; and judicial. Technical qualification refers to the ability to manipulate the technological implementations of work; physical and operational refers to the ability to execute a given task. The economic factor takes into account the variety of monetary or property requirements, including the ownership of the means of production or service-provision and the ability to make necessary payments to the guild. Socio-cultural qualification considers the social and cultural requirements for employment, such as domicile or residency, religious affiliation, gender, married status, and guild membership and position, *et cetera*. The judicial or legal qualification refers to the official norms that were to be met to carry out a trade – in most cases herein examined it relied on guild membership, which was officially determined, and auto-regulated by the guilds. These considerations varied greatly over time, and at every moment represented – to some degree – the general values of the society in question. By the same measure, they more specifically reflected the different occupational and organizational cultures.

It is important to differentiate between skills and qualification. As noted, qualifications were entry requirements – some of which were related to skills. Skills can be understood as the ability – the technical capacity – for a specific work-related activity. Skills could be “hard” in that they were technical, or “soft”, by which they were primarily interpersonal and intrapersonal in their

basis (Powell, 2002; Laker & Powell, 2011).³²⁴ Arguably, there is an interaction between the use of soft skills in the effective deployment and development of hard skills – especially where labor activities were largely social. Whereas qualifications were generally not flexible (either they were met or not), the degree of one’s development of hard and soft skills could vary qualitatively, especially over time through experiential learning.

It is important to understand that some qualifications were to be met to practice a *trade*; whereas others were required to join a *guild*. Inasmuch as these guilds tended to enjoy a strict, *exclusive* monopoly over the labor market, guild membership was a requirement for exercising the economic activity of these trades. By *exclusive*, it is understood that the guilds could refuse entry to an individual. In some trades, an *inclusive* monopoly meant that membership was required, but exclusion was rare: the guild had far less leeway in determining entry, which was more of a right of the properly qualified applicant.

Qualification was – above all – a mechanism for the guilds to establish and enforce control. This control included: minimum standards of production or service provision (of interest to government authorities and the general public); general employment protections for the inhabitants of a polity (through the judicial prohibition of foreigners or aliens); and – more importantly for this investigation – the control in question was the monopolistic control of the labor market by the guilds.

In the service guilds studied here, the socio-cultural qualifications and the determination of the fulfillment thereof by the guild in question meant that these could effectively exclude an applicant without much recourse to reconsideration. By extension, the monopolistic quality of labor-market auto-regulation was significant, and interlopers were apparently effectively prevented from interfering in guild-privileged activities. There are a few examples of legal recourse for entry – based on very special conditions, like military veteran status, but, generally

³²⁴ Powell (2002) bases his historic analysis of workforce development on the experiences of medieval guilds (if even in a cursory manner).

speaking, the guilds could use the socio-cultural qualification as an unassailable disqualifier to refuse the entry of an applicant.³²⁵

While trade qualification could be limited to physical ability and access to the means of production or service provision, guild membership required more: the fulfillment of all five types of qualification were generally required for entry into a guild. The guilds were guarantors of qualification; they determined, ensured, and certified the various expressions of labor qualification. They specifically guaranteed that members met all the forms of qualification. They helped determine and enforce qualification, acting within an institutional framework to determine and negotiate the specific requirements for membership. In defining these qualifications, they were not passive recipients of social or political machinations; instead, they actively participated in the processes of establishing and ensuring qualification.

Types of qualification

Technological and technical qualification was based on the ability to manipulate resources in the execution of one's labors. This included knowledge and skill development, wherein knowledge is the ability to discern *what* is to be done, and skill (or know-how) is the ability to carry out the required activities for the successful completion of an identified task – the *how*, as it were.

The technologies employed by the cargo-handling guilds included rudimentary tools (rope, hooks, sacks, and poles) and vehicles (carts of various sorts, sizes, and beast-team complexities; simple carriages; and harbor skiffs). The corresponding techniques were related most principally to knots and spatial conceptualization, with a special consideration of load-size and proper placement of heavy or bulky items. Certainly, the harbor-based guildsmen were also required (in a *de facto* manner) to know one's way around the significantly more complex ocean-going vessels, even if their interactions were limited to unloading or placing cargo in loadmaster-determined placements.

In the guild system (generally speaking) these abilities were transmitted and remained encapsulated in the institutions of formal apprenticeship and mastery, which often hinged on the

³²⁵ AGMMB, "Memorial y Decreto a favor del Gremio de Bastaixos de Capsana y Macips de Ribera contra Antonio Prats", 1782/10/07 - 1782/10/21, Capsa 4, carpeta 18 (2249).

creation of a masterpiece capable of demonstrating a considerable degree of technical capacity. Interestingly, it has been shown that the training systems seem to have been capable of protecting traditional values and delivery systems while incorporating new techniques and technologies (S. R. Epstein & Prak, 2008a). Whether or not this common perception was actually reflected in practice has been challenged, and the specific location and time period in question are important factors for understanding the validity of this generalization on technical qualification (Ogilvie, 2014). In either case, the argument is largely irrelevant, as the trade-guilds studied here were comprised principally or solely of masters; additionally, there is no indication of the incorporation or rejection of any new technologies in these trades (as opposed to what was occurring in the textile trade, which saw violent anti-machine riots in Barcelona in 1835).

The know-how of operations was also a consideration. Arguably, in the guilds that carried out additional, non-cargo related labors (fishermen and mariners) these pertained more prominently to those activities. The cargo-related know-how of these guilds was related to handling goods on the water. While this may have been of noteworthy importance or skill, there was apparently no formal qualification of previous know-how for the specific harbor-based cargo activities. Instead, it seems to have been a skill-set developed primarily through work activities. Similarly, the ability to swim was probably important, especially in the case of mariners, fishermen, and unloaders.

Physical qualification was the physical ability to carry out the work activities. These were most important for activities based on human physical strength required for carrying out a trade activity. The ability to meet this qualification may have not been prohibitive for young, healthy workers, it is reasonable to consider factors such as injury, serious illness, or – more importantly over the life-cycle – old age as permanent aspects of physical qualification.

The guildsmen would physically transport cargo, at times with purely human or animal force; at other times simple technologies or vehicles were utilized. Beyond the ability to determine the best way to move a specific sort of packaging (which should not be underestimated), there is relatively little task-specific knowledge required for hauling a heavy load. That said, the examination for entry into the maritime porters' guild required an applicant to carry a heavy load around Barcelona to demonstrate his physical ability. Lest this be taken lightly, a review of the

1770 Ordinances of the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators makes it quite clear that the weights carried and distances throughout the city could both be *quite* considerable.³²⁶ That is to say, the low degree of technical skill should not be inferred to mean that a task was easy.

A robust physical constitution – difficult to gauge quantitatively and likely subject to drastic qualitative change over time – was an inherent qualification. When a guildsman became ill, injured, or too old to be considered “fit” for work, he would either perform in a less strenuous capacity or, if he had met certain requirements, could cease working and collect disability, illness, or pension payments. These mutual aid functions of the guilds arose in response to the transient nature of physical qualification.

Physical qualification may have been sufficient for executing the actual labors of a trade; guild membership required (indirectly or directly) meeting economic criteria. In direct terms, these were the ability to pay an entry fee and establish ownership of the means of service provision. Indirectly, there were economic aspects of other qualifications – like living in the city, being married, or being free of a criminal record (which arguably contained economic factors).

Guilds required the payment of an entry fee. The fee varied among the guilds, and suggests a sort of socio-economic valuation of each in relation to the others. It seems that these membership fees represented an important part of guild funds; they were augmented by fines applied to guildsmen found in violation of some aspect of the ordinances and by those applied to non-guildsmen found in violation of the guild’s privileges. Similarly, members of some guilds were expected to make an annual contribution of two *libras* for general upkeep and guild activities.³²⁷

Curiously, there is no indication of any sort of general, mandatory contribution by the membership being levied by the guild in times of economic hardship or special circumstances, or to improve or advance the economic well-being of the guild. This is not to say it never occurred, but there are no such mentions. Bequeathment and donations also offered another opportunity

³²⁶ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

³²⁷ *Ibid.*

for increasing organizational revenue: there are records from previous centuries but none during the period examined here.³²⁸

While I have not discovered significant records relating to expenditures for (presumably) common guild activities of socialability (feasts, drinking sessions, participation in parades, etc.) these were most likely covered – if they occurred – in part through the general fund comprising entrance fees, the left-over of payments for collective work (at least in those guilds that operated collectively), annual upkeep contributions, and fines. The occasional special cost related to a function is evident in the records.³²⁹ The sometimes lengthy – and likely expensive – legal struggles would have also been covered by the common fund. It could be argued that for a wealthy guild, the entrance fee could be something of a symbolic formality or a means of excluding socio-economically undesirable elements; however, for the guilds studied here, it seems that the entrance payment was especially important to guild functions.

This money was also used to support the mutual-aid functions of the association – especially payments to sick, injured, elderly workers or their widows (burial funds or a sort of annual pension). These functions are visible in the guilds that made annual payments to “unfit” or charity cases.³³⁰ Arguably, besides the simple right to work, these benefits probably constituted one of the most important reasons for joining a guild. This function was so important that, when the journeymen or masters formed their own organizations, they continued this practice (Leeson, 1979).³³¹ One example of this continuity from the maritime-cargo handling guilds of Barcelona

³²⁸ AGMMB, “[Venda atorgada per fra Jeroni Polí i altres frares del Convent de Framenors de Barcelona a favor de Joan Malla, donzell domiciliat a Barcelona]”, n.d. - 1548/12, Capsa 3, carpeta 15 (2772); and AGMMB, “[Confirmació atorgada per Lluís Llull i de Boixadors, donzell domiciliat a Barcelona, a favor de Joan Costera i Jaume Clot, macips de ribera, prohoms de la Confraria dels Macips de Ribera de Barcelona i marmessors del testament de Joana, vídua]”, 1613 – n.d. Capsa 3, carpeta 17 (2776).

³²⁹ AGMMB, “Difernts papers y apogas de la Confraria de Bataxos de Capsana, Macips de Rivera y CarreTERS de Mar del dret y señoria que tenen en lo Portal Major de Santa Maria del Mar de la present ciutat de las festas se feran en lo any 1782”, 1769 – 1782, Capsa 13, carpeta 4 (2329).

³³⁰ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202); this guild maintained four such workers or their widows per year (although there is no detail of timeframes, revolving beneficiaries, or other considerations); in 1775, the Guild reported that 8 members were considered charity cases; AGMMB, “[Matrícula]”, 1692/10/29-1902/12/13, Caja 16, carpeta 3 (2339). The practice was also apparently undertaken by the Guild of Mule Rentors; see AHCB, [Llogaters de Mules], “[No title]”, [1760], Caja 3, carpeta 108, pp 96r-108r. [Detailed below.]

³³¹ The statutes for one such organization – the maritime horsecart operators owners’ mutual aid society for covering employees – are available at: Universitat Pompeu Fabra: *Memorial Digital de Catalunya*. Asociación de Patronos y

is that of the maritime horsecart operators, whose masters formed an owners' brotherhood after the abolition of the guilds and provided aid benefits to their employees in a collective fashion.³³² The literature on mutual aid societies and the development of the industrial labor organizations trace the practice to the guilds (Barnosell, 1999; Sordo Cedeño, 1983).

The economic considerations also extended to the costs of ownership of the means of service provision. The private ownership of the means of service provision represents an economic qualification, in addition to an operational necessity; however, the predominant characteristic of this requirement considered here is as it regards membership. These equipment costs varied significantly among the guilds, and included individual and collective property. A noteworthy consideration is the general collective ownership of the means of cargo-handling-service provision in the cooperatively operated guilds (maritime porters, mariners, unloaders, fishermen): this included the variety of basic handling equipment in the case of the maritime porters; likewise for the other three, and additionally including the maritime handling gear and small boats and lighters used in the harbor. In juxtaposition, the individualistic guilds were based primarily on the private ownership of the means of service provision, and this ownership would have represented an additional cost beyond the entry fee.

In those guilds that performed another trade in addition to cargo handling (such as fishing or sailing), there was private ownership of the means of production for those activities. The *Manuals* of the various Scribes of the Sea are replete with contracts recording the ownership of these matriculated vessels.

The economic requirement for entry has been criticized for its exclusion of the poor (Ogilvie, 2014). A noteworthy counter-argument to this is the post-1804 opportunity for young men in Barcelona to gain entry in a guild without paying a fee if he marries an unwed mother from the

Obreros Carreteros de Barcelona. (1903). For the statutes of this brotherhood, see Asociación de Patronos y Obreros Carreteros de Barcelona, *Estatutos de la Asociación de Patronos y Obreros Carreteros de Barcelona*, Barcelona: s.n., 1903. Available at Universitat Pompeu Fabra: Memorial Digital de Catalunya [available at: <http://mdc.cbuc.cat/cdm/ref/collection/comercUPF/id/19943>; last consulted 11/11/2015].

³³² AMCB, *Sección de Hacienda*, "Expediente: promovido por la asociacion 'La Hermandad de Patronos' del Gremio de Carreteros de esta ciudad para que se les esima del pago de abitrio impuesto.", Serie 182-2, No 7643 (c.1894).

House of Charity.³³³ While this criticism is certainly self-evident as it regards the entry fee, the criticism weaker as it applies to the equipment required to carry out a trade. There is an iron-clad economic logic to this: barring some sort of credit system, the inability of an applicant to provide and maintain the means of service provision was a *de facto* exclusion of economic participation.

Generally speaking, the son or son-in-law of a guild member could enter the guild by paying a reduced rate of entry.

The mid-eighteenth century struggles of existing masters of the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators over the application of this discount to sons born prior to the mastership of the father demonstrates the importance of the privilege to the beneficiary masters and their sons and sons-in-law.³³⁴ That is, the savings were such that a struggle was considered justified by the beneficiary masters and the rest of the guild (which did not want the privileged extended to the pre-mastership children). In the case of the maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators, this was a little more than half of the full rate. This was recorded in guild entrance records, which provide an interesting resource for analysis.³³⁵

Guild ordinances are replete with social qualifications required of guild membership. In medieval times, these were broad in their application, as various religious or ethnic groups were formally excluded *en masse* (Delgado Ribas, 1995). This is very similar to other parts of Europe at that time (Ogilvie, 2014). In the period studied, these did not have the same general exclusionary characteristics of formal, normative prohibitions of foreigners, religious or ethnic minorities, or others (which is not to say there was no practical exclusion).

Lacking demographic figures, it is difficult to ascertain the relevance of this practice in the guilds during the period studied here. However, it is quite clear that there were no women in these guilds save the occasional widows, who never appear in the membership roles but do surface in a

³³³ AGMMB, “Ordenansas firmadas por el rey Don Fernando VI, que Dios guarda en el anyo. 1754, a favor del Gremio de Faquines, Masips de Ribera de esta ciudad. Decret reial dat per sa magestat l'any de 1804, per las fillas expositas del Sant Hospital”, 1748/05/25 - 1817/07/02, Capsa 2, carpeta 3 (2211), folios 23r.-25r.

³³⁴ *Ibid.*, folios. 8r-14r.

³³⁵ These cases are examined in greater detail below.

few legal cases (Vicente, 2008). Likewise, an examination of surnames establishes that the guildsmen were exclusively of Catalan or Spanish origin (the issue of religious- or ethnic-minority participation is obfuscated by centuries of survival tactics, mainly the adoption of a surname largely indistinguishable from those of the predominant group; or, the abandonment of ancestral religions).

While a craft guildsman could be gauged by the quality of the goods produced and the prices at which these were offered, the service guilds could not demonstrate the quality of their work before being contracted to carry it out – their reputation was their attraction. This reality was magnified by the fact that technical qualification was low or inexistent: if not for the guild structure, these workers would find themselves in fierce competition with any number of laborers.

In service guilds, a different sort of reputation was necessary. Guild members were to be of honorable character. This is not to say that the consideration of honor among guildsmen was unique to the maritime porters – it was a common consideration throughout Spain and Europe (Morales Moya, 1987; Cabrillo, 1994; Farr, 2000).

The documentation makes regular mention of the good nature, trustworthiness, and provision of services to the city of these guilds (and, by extension, their members) – often as a justification for protecting their privileges.³³⁶ Romero Marín (2007a) highlights this consideration in the case of the maritime porters, and notes its importance for the construction of guild practices and culture. While honor was not monopolized by the cargo-handling guilds, it was of disproportionate importance to these guilds.

Likewise, the guild had to maintain honor as a collective good (an intangible, social asset) through auto-regulation: individual reputation was a component of, but not an alternative to group honor. It is important to understand that quality control was in the interest of these guilds

³³⁶ E.g.: AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202); and AGMMB, “Ordenansas firmadas por el rey Don Fernando VI, que Dios guarda en el anyo. 1754, a fabor del Gremio de Faquines, Masips de Ribera de esta ciudad. Decret reial dat per sa magestat l'any de 1804, per las fillas expositas del Sant Hospital”, 25 May 1748 – 02 July 1817, Capsa 2, carpeta 3 (2211).

– as demonstrated by the collective (not individual) economic responsibility of the guilds for covering the costs of lost or damaged goods. Interestingly, the 1832 Ordinances note that the character of guild members should be sufficient for handling the sorts of goods handled by the guild in question – which is to say; a socio-cultural gradation was applied based on the value or perceived worth of the goods to be transported.³³⁷

Honor was established through objective and subjective means. Objectively, the applicant must not be a known criminal. Subjectively, the guilds verified the *bona fides* of prospective members through the requirement that two existing guildsmen swear an oath that the prospective member was upstanding and honorable, and not a person of ill repute. In addition, the requirement that a member maintain a residence in the City was also important for establishing and maintaining the general ability to verify one’s good behavior. In this case, extramural residences were permitted, demonstrated by the large number of residences in Gràcia and other near-by villages, and in the Barceloneta neighborhood. In these ways, the guilds operated as semi-official organizations, providing a sort of criminal background check and the means of physically localizing laborers (activities that are conducted by state actors today).³³⁸

Similarly, good behavior was dictated. For example, maritime horsecart operators were to drive on the right side and always walk the horse, never riding the cart, whether it was full or empty. Each violation could result in the fine of three *libras*.³³⁹ This was to avoid disorder and dangerous situations. Curiously, after the guild had split in 1796, the maritime porters accused the maritime horsecart operators of “driving with violence”.³⁴⁰

Arguably, the most important socio-cultural qualification was the existence of strong bonds with an existing member. At the very least, this was expressed by the sponsorship by two existing members of an applicant. More importantly – and vitally so after 1815 and again after 1824 –

³³⁷ AGMMB, “Copia de las ordenanzas de los Gremios de Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros y Tragineros de Mar de la ciudad de Barcelona publicada por el Supremo Consejo de Hacienda en 11 de julio de 1832”, 1832, Capsa 2, carpeta 1 (2209).

³³⁸ As I show below, they also operated as tax-collection agents, verifying the labor status and collecting the amount owed by members.

³³⁹ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

³⁴⁰ AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos a l’ Alcalde Major de Barcelona sobre la vulneració d’ ordenances]”, 18.07.1807, Capsa 7, carpeta 22 (2271).

family relationships were the *paramount* determinant for an applicant to gain entry into the Guild of Maritime Porters. The specified type of relationship was between men and their sons or sons-in-law. The acceptance of common applicants generally responded to the labor needs of the guild; family-based entry was generally guaranteed for these applicants (even in times of possible labor surplus). However, this seems to have changed in the early 1820s, when family ties were a *de facto* requirement for membership.³⁴¹ The issue of familial relationships is of particular interest to the strategy of market auto-regulation employed by the maritime porters in the early nineteenth century and thereafter.

The legal, political, or judicial qualification was based upon the requirements set forth by governing bodies, by which a process of legitimization was effectuated. While guilds were legitimate and enjoyed official recognition, protection and privilege, the judicial qualification was part of the chartering of a guild. However, in some cases – specifically that of the common porters discussed here – or at certain times, the requirement of legal qualification was not relevant to labor.

Most importantly, the guilds studied here were historically legitimized (and re-legitimized) by royal decree – a fact noted regularly in the introduction to legal disputes and ordinances, which often traced the documentary lineage of the guilds. This created a powerful advantage when a conflict with local authorities would arise – the guilds could couch their arguably self-interested defense in terms of respect for the will of the monarchy. A fine example of this – and one directly related to membership and the auto-regulation of the labor market – was a dispute in 1784, by which the guild largely based its justification for not allowing the entry of a number of applicants based on the limits established in their royally-extended ordinances – even in the face of the “threats and violence” of the Mayor of Barcelona.³⁴²

³⁴¹ I show this quantitatively below.

³⁴² AGMMB, “Ordenansas firmadas por el rey Don Fernando VI, que Dios guarda en el anyo 1754, a favor del Gremio de Faquines, Masips de Ribera de esta ciudad. Decret reial dat per sa Magestat l’any de 1804, per las fillas expositats del Sant Hospital”, (1748/05/25 – 1817/07/02), Capsa 2, carpeta 2 (2211), folios 18r-19r: 19r.

Guild-membership qualifications in practice

While it can be argued that only the technical-technological, physical-operational and the aspects of economic qualifications dealing with the ownership of the means of production or service provision were necessary to participate in a given trade; the requirements for entering into a guild included all five categories. These factors combined internal and external sources of qualification (by the guilds and government). They similarly involved a mix of both subjective and objective determinations of qualification for guild membership.

These criteria highlighted the need and means for determining the suitability of an applicant in structures that did not maintain the skill-qualification training system of apprenticeship, nor the ability to further develop one's capacity through employment as a journeyman, especially when the journeyman's employment offered the opportunity or obligation to work with different masters or in different cities, where alternative methods, technologies, or techniques could be learned on the job – which is to say, where different organizational and occupational cultures existed (Leeson, 1979; Camps Cura, 1990; S. R. Epstein, 1998; De Munck, Kaplan, & Soly, 2007).

In these service-sector guilds, socio-cultural qualifications were far more important for labor-market auto-regulation than physical and technological ones, which were generally very basic and not reliant on any considerable degree of technical skill (especially when compared to the craft guilds in which years of training were paramount) (S. R. Epstein, 1998). An applicant to the Guild of Maritime Porters and Horsecart Operators was paired with a director-selected Companion of the Applicant (*Compañero al Pretendiente*) to haul loads from plaza to plaza as a pair and as a member of a four-man team. His strength and robustness was noted, and then communicated to the guild council, which would vote on approving the entrance. This was the entrance exam. There is no mention of any apprenticeship period or guild experience.³⁴³

While the physical requirements were based on the ability to carry a heavy load a given distance; the socio-cultural qualifications included subjective assessments of honor, reputable character, ability to work collectively, discipline, and occupational and organizational conviviality. These

³⁴³ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

characteristics were developed through the social nature of work and non-work activities. The increasing importance of familial qualification is noteworthy: guild membership can be regarded as an intangible inheritance.

The political and legal qualifications became increasingly important over time. Ordinances were used for centuries to protect the relative autonomy of the guilds in controlling the labor market – these charters represented the maximum judicial qualification. As the political-economic validity of the monopolistic practices contained therein were challenged and eroded by Liberalism, political connections became more important. In the case of the maritime-cargo handling guilds, the most important political factor was the ability of some of the guilds to navigate the complicated panorama of multiple jurisdictions and contradictory interests as expressed by local and central authorities (Delgado Ribas, 1995).

As local political actors became increasingly concerned with responding favorably to the growing demands of the nascent industrial bourgeoisie, central authorities maintained the superiority of national-military interests. The judicial qualification of official recognition (by one body or another) was fundamental to guild functioning and survival. By aligning with the politically dominant Naval authorities (through participation in the Matriculate of the Sea system), some of the guilds were able to protect their guilds and the monopolistic privileges upon which they depended.³⁴⁴ It is noteworthy that after the 1836 abolitionist measures (when the local authorities were refusing to hear complaints by guilds, the military was in a unique position to hear the complaints of guilds over violation by matriculated guilds or others.³⁴⁵

It is worth noting that the guilds, in general, were called upon to support the military.³⁴⁶ This support could be financial.³⁴⁷ It could also require the guilds to provide men for military service

³⁴⁴ AGMMB, “Memorial Decretado por el Señor Intendente a 22 de Marzo 1769, a favor del Gremio de Faquines, Masips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar contra los matriculados”, 1769/03/02 - 1769/07/10, Capsa 5, carpeta 2 (2307).

³⁴⁵ AGMMB, “[Sol·licitud sobre l'observància de normatives i l'intrusisme professional]”, 1837/06/26 – n.d., Capsa 7, carpeta 7 (2256); and AGMMB, “[Sol·licitud a la Comandància de Marina sobre el compliment de la normativa de transport de mercaderies al port]”, 1839/01/09 – n.d., Capsa 7, carpeta 6 (2255).

³⁴⁶ AGMMB, “[Contribució militar]”, 1819/07/28 - 1819/09/17, Capsa 16, carpeta 7 (2343).

³⁴⁷ AGMMB, “[Ordenaça de 27 d'octubre de 1760 sobre contribució militar]”, 1760/12/15 – n.d., Capsa 16, carpeta 8 (2344); AGMMB, “[Contribució militar]”, 1762/11/03 - 1832/10/31, Capsa 16, carpeta 6 (2342); and AGMMB, “[Contribució militar]”, 1816/03/30 – n.d., Capsa 16, carpeta 5 (2341).

– especially in times of pending conflict: in 1803, the maritime porters requested that one man be sent, instead of two.³⁴⁸

The success of the guilds studied here required a developed sense of political and judicial analysis – the ability to determine when and how to press their interests with different political actors; and, when to defend their interests through direct action or a possibly lengthy, expensive legal process. At stake in these circumstances were ancient privileges and monopolistic practices that were vital to the economic survival of guild members, and, arguably, the very survival of the guild. This required a good deal of flexibility and resilience: knowing when to base arguments on tradition, and when to base them on socio-political considerations or economic rationalism; knowing when to stand firm and knowing when negotiation is a better option. These abilities did not develop as a response to liberalization; they were crucial during centuries, as the different trades negotiated mutually beneficial arrangements, often formalized in agreements. When these negotiations failed or were not respected, direct actions and legal cases were used to correct or modify practices. Arguably, the decision to advantageously violate these agreements was another consideration.

The panorama of qualifications and capacities marked the organizational and occupational cultures of the guilds. The variety of criteria for membership in a given guild was a combination of traditional and normative expectations. The ability of the guilds to modify their ordinances given the need and desire of the leaders or membership, and the subjective nature of the determination of socio-cultural qualification provided the guilds the opportunity to regulate their membership.

³⁴⁸ AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos relativa a la prestació d'un home pel servei militar en lloc dels 2 homes que els demanen]”, 1803/09/17 – n.d., Capsa 7, carpeta 13 (2262); and AGMMB, “[Contribució militar]”, 1819/07/28 - 1819/09/17, Capsa 16, carpeta 7 (2343).

6.3 Membership composition of three trades/guilds

Membership figures give an indication of the overall economic activity of each guild; what little information is available about the socio-economic composition of that membership gives an idea of the economic well-being of the guildsmen (if not in relation to the general society, at least relative to their brothers in the guild). Likewise, it may highlight some effects of the mode of service provision and the internal employment relationships within the individualistic guilds.

Determining membership was a particular and important activity of the guilds. While more members could result in a stronger guild – as the mutual aid commitments of the guild would be shared by a larger group – this larger group could also overburden the existing stresses associated with a large supply of labor and mutual aid commitments. During some periods, the guilds actively attempted to limit membership, especially membership by people who had no connection to existing guild members. At other periods, it seems that the demand for labor superseded this consideration, and the guilds brought in new members despite the lack of family connections. This shows the flexibility of the guilds in their ability to sacrifice cultural considerations for economic ones when necessary: these were not organizations hampered by cultural considerations; quite the contrary, we see that these considerations informed the strategies for coping with economic needs.

There are cases in which the guilds denied membership to applicants, who thereafter sought official orders that the guild include them. In some cases, the legal system sided with the guild, in others, it sided with the individual, even in unusual circumstances (the courts generally held that members and the guilds must abide by the ordinances).³⁴⁹ This was even true even in the case of the son of an existing member. In that case, the judicial authorities sided with the father of the applicant, based on the ordinances; this confirmed hereditary membership as a right.³⁵⁰ However, it seems as though the power of the guilds to limit and determine memberships was considerable in practice.

One of the main economic functions of the guilds was their ability to auto-regulate the labor force and aspects of production or service-provision (S. A. Epstein, 1991; S. R. Epstein, 2004,

³⁴⁹ AGMMB, “Memorial y decreto a favor del Gremio de Bastaixos de Capsana y Macips de Rimbera contra Antonio Prats”, 1793, Capsa 4, carpeta 18 (2249).

³⁵⁰ AGMMB, “[Certificació d; un expedient judicial tramitat al Jutjat Ordinari de Barcelona]”, 1793, Caja 4, carpeta 5 (2236).

2008; S. R. Epstein & Prak, 2008a; Lucassen et al., 2008; Ogilvie, 2014). This role was all-encompassing: they established qualifications for entry; they directly and tacitly transmitted necessary skills and know-how; they controlled work processes and quality (S. R. Epstein, 1998, 2004); and they defended their monopolies against intrusion and their members from abject poverty (where feasible).³⁵¹

While, in theory, the guilds were open to anyone who met the requirements (especially during the advance of liberalization of the trades in the first decades of the nineteenth century), there are two important considerations in the case of the maritime porters: that the applicant received the support on an existing member who could vouch for the applicant's honor and trustworthiness; and, that the son or son-in-law (hereafter simply referred to as "sons") of a master was always allowed to enter and were charged a lesser fee to do so (generally about one-third the full rate). It was determined in a series of guild assemblies and judicial supplications in the second quarter of the eighteenth century that this privilege for sons (and those conferred to the husbands of the daughters of guildsmen, by which he could join under preferential terms as a "son") applied only to those children born *after* the father was made a guildsman.³⁵² Unfortunately, no instances of "naturally born" (bastard) sons are noted in the documents: there is, at present, no easy way to gauge the issue or frequency of any related practice of including or excluding illegitimate children. There is an interesting arrangement between the municipal authorities and the guilds of Barcelona to promote the marriage of young guildsmen to the women in the House of Charity charged with providing for unwed mothers. Applicants to a guild in Barcelona would not have to pay the entrance fee if they married one of the unwed mothers.³⁵³ Given that the children of these previously unwed mothers had been born before the mother's marriage to a prospective guildsman, the entry privilege would not apply to them.

In the case of the maritime-cargo handlers, trustworthiness was especially relevant. There are two particular reasons: because the guild was responsible for assuring the integrity of high-value

³⁵¹ For more on qualifications and skills in guilds in general, see Stephan R. Epstein, "Craft Guilds, Apprenticeship, and Technological Change in Preindustrial Europe, *Journal of Economic History*, 58 (1998), 684–713.

³⁵² AGMMB, "Ordenansas firmadas por el rey Don Fernando VI, que Dios guarda en el anyo 1754, a favor del Gremio de Faquines, Masips de Ribera de esta ciudad. Decret reial dat per sa Magestat l'any de 1804, per las fillas expositats del Sant Hospital", (1748/05/25 – 1817/07/02), Capsa 2, carpeta 2 (2211), folios. 8r-14r.

³⁵³ *Ibid.* folios 23r.-25r.

goods and goods stored in the Customs House (*Aduanas*); and, because trust was a subjective means of excluding undesirable applicants.

In the case of the maritime porters, only a few new members were generally admitted per year (except when there was a need to increase the work force for whatever reason) in addition to an unlimited number of sons of existing members. While the natural reproduction of existing masters seems to have been relatively stable (between two and five sons entered per year), in some years a relatively large number of non-sons were also made masters as a way of increasing or replacing the work-force capacity of the guild. Normatively, the Guild of Maritime Porters was to permit the entrance of two men (non-sons) per year. They used this (and the existence of a waiting list of applicants) to defend their refusal to allow the entrance of an applicant in 1754, and made references to it thereafter.³⁵⁴ What is most interesting is that this did not necessarily coincide with their practices, which were more flexible.

The Guild of Maritime Porters' archival collection contains a small book (which I call a registry, or membership rolls) that records almost three hundred years of entries, noting new master maritime porter and horsecart operators by name, their familial relation to other guild members, and the corresponding amount paid for examination to become a master.³⁵⁵ The rolls list the date and the examiners in almost every case and often record in writing whether a new master was a maritime porter or a horsecart operator: while this differentiation is not always evident, the corresponding entry fee is always listed, and this allows for a determination of the trade and family connections.³⁵⁶ When a new master entered the guild, the price of his entrance examination was contingent on his relationship to an existing master: for the maritime porters during the period studied, this was either 7-8 *lluires* for related applicants, or 27-28 *lluires* for unrelated applicants; for the maritime horsecart operators, the price of admission was 11-12

³⁵⁴ AGMMB, "Ordenansas firmadas por el rey Don Fernando VI, que Dios guarda en el anyo. 1754, a favor del Gremio de Faquines, Masips de Ribera de esta ciudad. Decret reial dat per sa magestat l'any de 1804, per las fillas expositas del Sant Hospital", 1748/05/25 - 1817/07/02, Capsa 2, carpeta 3, (2211).

³⁵⁵ AGMMB, "Matricula", 1692/10/29-1902/12/13, Capsa 9, carpeta 5 (2304). I stopped tabulating in 1850: the registry records entrants until 1902. Unfortunately, the document – kept in the possession of the Guild of Maritime Porters – does not record the 1800-1850 for the Guild of Maritime Horsecart Operators; nor have I located any information that would facilitate a comparison of the two trades.

³⁵⁶ A review of the rolls shows that while new masters were often enrolled in January and February, summer and early winter admissions were important, and seem to have increased over the years. The reason for this is unknown.

lluïres for sons, or 50 *lluïres* for non-sons.³⁵⁷ These fees did not change meaningfully during the period studied here. There are no records of a woman joining the guild.

The mastership rolls note as maritime porters those with the right to work at the King's Scale, mentioning it specifically; at other times, the right is to work, "in the plaza with all the other maritime porters". Only during one year are both descriptions given simultaneously. The reference to working in the plaza is based on the *Plaza del Palau* as the gathering place for daily work. It seems as though the description in the master roll/registry was a figurative device – more useful in differentiating the maritime porter applicant from a horsecart operator, and not a determination within the trade of maritime porters.


There are references in other documents to the requirement of the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators to provide two teams of eight men each in the Customs House and the King's Scales. As established, these sixteen men provided their services to the merchants and people of Barcelona (and the governing authorities responsible for those places) free of charge: they were paid by the guild from the common fund.³⁵⁸ The mention was made in relation to the need to defend the privileges of the guild: only through the monopoly created by these privileges and the collectivization of income was the guild able to off-set the costs of employing sixteen men without additional charges at the point of service.

A number of considerations could have influenced the determination of which members were to serve in one of these two locations. Was the work harder or easier than other tasks? Was it related to a lack of seniority – especially if it meant near-constant heavy labor? Was the average pay better or worse? Perhaps it was sought-after, as the work would have been a set wage for the shift or day, and not dependent on the traffic of merchandise. Or, perhaps it was a strategic decision, as these workers were influential at the moment of determining which workers or

³⁵⁷ Vives i Miret, in *Historial del Gremi de Bastaixos de Capçana*, notes that the 7 *lluïres* price for sons and in-laws of masters, and that of 27 for non-sons was contrasted with another fee – which does not appear in the records: "[...] and for strangers, that paid double that." (p. 26). There are no entries of this payment during the period examined. He goes on to say that, "Later it was raised for 'naturals' of the Kingdom" to pay 50 *lluïres* and 100 for the 'strangers'. The sons and sons-in-law were not required to pay any more [than previously]." Unfortunately, there is no timeframe considered in this statement, and there are no records of these payments in the membership papers. I am quite confident that the payments described in the body of this text correctly reflect the prices for sons and non-sons of the maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators.

³⁵⁸ AGMMB, "Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781", 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291).

which guild was tasked with transporting the goods upon leaving these two locations (an ability jealously guarded and of economic significance). It could have also been based on perceived honor or trust, as the guild would be collectively responsible for any misbehaviors or transgressions that could jeopardize the goods. However, assignment was done through a rotating list, once again demonstrating that egalitarian values superseded other considerations.³⁵⁹




Source: Authors' work, based on AGMMB "Matricula", 1692/10/29-1902/12/13, Caja 9, carpeta 5 (2304).

The above chart shows that family relationships were a consideration for the maritime horsecart operators – but not an exclusive one. There are many years when a large number of non-sons were enrolled. Since sons were granted access without discrimination, the relative lack of sons in the 1780s and the growing number of sons per year in the 1790s could reflect more sons simply reaching admission age in the period, or that more sons were choosing to become maritime horsecart operators.

The roll stops recording entries in 1796, when the horsecart operators had separated from the maritime porters, at which time their presence in the registry ceases. Unfortunately, this means

³⁵⁹ *Ibid.*

that it is not possible to determine if the maritime horsecart operators followed a similar trajectory to that of the maritime porters in the early nineteenth century.




Source: Author’s work, based on AGMMB, “Matrícula”, 1692/10/29-1902/12/13, Caja 9, carpeta 5 (2304).

In the above chart, we can observe a general tendency to include two to five “sons” each year. This was supplemented by non-sons to meet the expected needs of the guild to repopulate the guild to maintain functional capacity. It is evident that in the 1760s, this consisted of one or two non-sons per year. There was a noteworthy spike in 1769, a time when the guild was in conflict with the maritime teamsters and common porters (*mossos de corda*, or *camàlichs*). There may have been other factors that contributed to the relatively large number of new admissions (especially considering that there is no corollary spike in maritime horsecart operators at the same time). From the 1770s onwards, the higher overall number of applicants corresponded to sons and non-sons alike, although there was a definite preference for sons, shown by the annual elasticity of these members.

There were no new admissions from 1796 to 1804. This was a tumultuous period, as the country had gone to war with England and commercial traffic suffered at the hands of the blockade of

Spanish maritime trade; likewise, the struggle with the horsecart operators may have hampered new entries.



Source: Author’s work, based on AGMMB, “Matrícula”, 1692/10/29-1902/12/13, Caja 9, carpeta 5 (2304).

In the above chart, one notes that there were *three* groups of new masters in the Guild of Maritime Porters after the periods of abolition: sons/in-laws; not sons; and “returning” masters.³⁶⁰ The “returning” masters were charged a fee to re-join the guild, having “left” during the abolition of 1813 and that of 1820: one rejoined in 1819; and eight returned during the three years after 1824. Although there is proof in the membership rolls of maritime porters’ guild’s operation in 1810 (when one new applicant is named as a member), normalcy does not return to the now stand-alone Guild of Maritime Porters until August 1814 (after the end of the War of Independence against Spain’s former ally, France). In 1814, twelve sons and thirteen non-sons were made masters, recovering the work-force replacement that did not occur during the occupation of Barcelona and the *Cortes de Cádiz*-imposed abolition. The maritime porters

³⁶⁰ Please note that the y-axis is different in this chart. The dash line at y-axis “20” is intended to give perspective *vis à vis* the previous two charts.

drafted new ordinances in 1816, as a way of confirming their guild in the wake of the War and the abolition of the guilds by the *Cortes de Cádiz* in 1813, which was reversed in 1815.³⁶¹

The 1820-1823 Liberal Triennial (*el Trienio Liberal*) – during which no new members were added – is clearly evident. Just as in the post-1814 period, after the Liberal Triennial, there was a return to the guild by a few masters, who were charged a readmission fee greater than that paid by a son or son-in-law, but significantly less than that paid by a non-family applicant.³⁶² It is not clear if this was a punitive measure against those who recognized Liberal Triennial abolition or an attempt to replenish the coffers. After the Liberal Triennial: in addition to revolution, war, and failed crops, the 1821-1822 period was also marked by a devastating endemic of yellow fever, focused on the waterfront (although there is no information about deaths of guild members). Alone or together, these crises could have led to a need to repopulate the guild. Unfortunately, the documentary record does not explain the need for new members. Therefore, it is impossible to quantify the importance of the Liberal Triennial abolition in isolation from other factors.

Based on the relatively low number of “returnees” in relation to the total work force, it does not seem that the guild ceased to exist during the Liberal Triennial; but it does not appear that it enrolled new members, either. By the same measure, while it could be that there was a need to re-constitute the work force because of war- and fever-related deaths, the fact that the guild only incorporated sons suggests that these combined disasters were not the predominant consideration.

It could be that the sharp rise in membership responded to a specific need caused by the absence of previous members, or it could represent a sort of “catching-up” period, in which the low number of admissions in previous periods was met by new recruits who could not join during the previous years. However, we have no qualitative description of the decision to quickly admit a

³⁶¹ BC, *sección de la Junta de Comercio*, Leg XXXVI, “Nuevas Ordenanzas para el regimen y buen gobierno del Gremio de Faquines de Capsana ó Macips de Ribera de la Ciudad de Barcelona”, Barcelona, 18 May 1816, folio 8 [or, 90].

³⁶² In the case of the Guilds of Mariners, Unloaders, and Fishermen clearly documents a formal re-establishment of the guilds in 1824. It seems that a similar process was in play in the case of the maritime porters’ guild, although there is no mention of new ordinances for the Guild of Maritime Porters promulgated in 1824. See Colldeforns Lladó, Francesc de P., (1951) *Historial de los Gremios de Mar de Barcelona, 1750-1865*, Barcelona: Gráficas Marina.

relatively large number of masters. It is most likely that the fifty-six new members admitted in 1826 and 1827 were accepted to even-out the ranks that would have normally been filled during the Liberal Triennial, assuming an average of about ten new admissions per year. That said, it could also reflect an increased demand of cargo-handling services. In either case, this was done *entirely* with the sons of existing masters, which is noteworthy.

The year of 1838 was another time of uncertainty for the guild, as the 1836 abolition was taking effect. However, regardless of the judicial status of the guilds, it is clear that the application of the abolition was not immediate. The maritime porters continued to enroll new members – all of them continued to be sons of existing masters. This is an important reflection of the difference between a *de jure* and *de facto* abolition. Even without official recognition of their ancient privileges, the guild basically refused to cease operations – even when the local authorities refused to recognize the election of new guild directors (*prohombres*) in late 1840.³⁶³ A few months later, the Guild of Maritime Porters avoided this fate by successfully convincing the municipal authorities that the 1836 measure was not, in fact, abolition: it was a requirement to submit new ordinances.³⁶⁴

As can be seen, there was an increasing tendency to increase the endogamy of the corporation: after the French occupation of Barcelona (1808-1814) there were almost no non-family members admitted as maritime porters. The last non-son entered the guild in 1817 after the first abolition. After the Liberal Triennial (1820-1823), the relationship continued to be one of absolute importance – *only* sons and sons-in-law of existing members were permitted to join the guild. This finalized the transition to a family-based occupation that would mark the corporation through the early twentieth century.³⁶⁵

This shows the market-regulating effectiveness of subjectively applying the normative rule that new members were required to receive the support of an existing guild member. The cohesion of the existing masters in their decision to literally close ranks is remarkable, especially when

³⁶³ AGMMB, “[Sol·licitud per al nomenament de prohoms del Gremi]”, (1840/01/29), Capsa 7, carpeta 9 (2258); and AGMMB, “[Instància del Gremi de Bastaixos]”, 08.01.1840, capsa 7, carpeta 17 (2266). It should be noted that the registry continues basically unabated until the first decade of the twentieth century.

³⁶⁴ I detail this process in Chapter 7.

³⁶⁵ AGMMB, “El Gremio de Faquines de la Aduana de Barcelona”, [c. 1913], Capsa 1, carpeta 10 (2358).

compared to the internal divisions of other (individualistic) cargo-handling guilds at this time. From a period of crises, the maritime porters were able to stringently control access to the labor market for almost a century after the abolition of the monopolistic privileges of these trade corporations.

Maritime Porters and Horsecart Operators: Total members according to tax declarations


While the above charts document *new* members recorded in the guild registry, there is also information on *total* masters per year. This information was compiled by the guild to show which members were, the year previous, considered members for tax-paying purposes (registered in a *cadastre*, an internal census carried out by the guild). However, before proceeding to the analysis of these figures, it is worth keeping in mind that – from time to time – the guild held general membership meetings, in which the names of all attending masters were given. In 1754, there were sixty-five members listed in the general assembly.³⁶⁶ Considering that just six years later, only 35 masters were reported (37 counting new enrollments that year), it is likely that the tax-payment records under-recorded the membership.

The following chart shows the number of masters per year from 1760-1773.³⁶⁷ The lists – which in all but one provide name and tax contribution only – were used for assessing taxes. Although the lists were created the year following, I have used that information to determine the number of master maritime porters operating in the year shown in the chart. “New masters” (as so identified by name in the tax reports) have been included in “working masters”; I have also disaggregated them under the rubric “new masters” for the purpose of quick comparison. It is likewise interesting to note the apparent discrepancy between the master rolls and the tax-declaration of “new masters”, which was not insignificant.

³⁶⁶ AGMMB, “Ordenansas firmadas por el rey Don Fernando VI, que Dios guarda en el año 1754, a favor del Gremio de Faquines, Masips de Ribera de esta ciudad. Decret reial dat per sa Magestat l’any de 1804, per las fillas expositats del Sant Hospital”, (1748/05/25 – 1817/07/02), Capsa 2, carpeta 2 (2211), fo. 2r-6v.

³⁶⁷ Unfortunately, there is insufficient data to prolong this series.

Chart 6. Total Maritime Porters and Horsecart Operators from the Cadastre




Source: Author’s work, based on AGMMB, “Cadastre Personal” (1761-1775), Capsa 16, carpeta 3 (2339).

The year 1773 exhibits a dramatic increase in the total number of masters, with twenty-nine of the fifty-five masters having been admitted during that year. While the government-supplied instructions for the years 1772, 1773, and 1774 (all to assess the preceding years) are present in the archives, the filled-out documents for these years are not available. Unfortunately, there is not enough information to produce a high-quality series. Even so, this admittedly short period is nonetheless interesting.

The assessment for 1775 (showing the masters existent in 1774) divided the seventy-eight masters into five distinct groups. The first represents normal, healthy workers (of which there were forty, or 51% of the total); the second group included twenty (26%) injured and sick workers (“*Individuos estropeados y enfermos*”) who worked, although the guild claimed that they did so in a decreased capacity. The third group was comprised of eight (10%) “Individuals that cannot work and the Guild gives them charity” (I have included these in the total of masters *and* disaggregated them for visual reference in the above chart, left them disaggregated in the chart below).

Chart 7. Maritime Porters and Horsecart Operators (c.1775)



Source: Author's work, based on AGMMB, "Cadastre Personal" (1761-1775), Capsa 16, carpeta 3 (2339).

The figures about unhealthy (sick or injured) and charity cases are interesting: on one hand, the health-related figure either highlights the fact that the two trades were particularly injury-prone [or at the very least, that the guild *believed* that the perception of the trade as such that the tax-collecting authorities would consider it thus and not investigate the claim further]. It could also support the idea that the men were quite ill, which, in turn, could be related to poor diet or poor living conditions. The other point, related to charity cases, could refer to maritime porters or horsecart operators who were permanently injured or too old to work, those that for whatever reason were unusually poor, or a mix of these considerations. The point of comparison is the information available about the masters of the Guild of Mule Rentors from 1760 [below], in which only six percent of the workers were considered "unfit" for work; I suppose, again, for one reason (poor health or injury) or another (old age). Unfortunately, these hypotheses are impossible to compare further, much less test.

The fourth group lists eight masters (10%) who paid taxes through a different guild of which they were also members: two *Hortaderos de la Puerta Nueva*; one Mule Rentor; one Tavern Owner; one Silk Sail Maker; one *Hortalero de San Antonio*; and one member of the Village Guild of San Gervasio. Finally, the list notes that two masters (3%) were absent, as they were “in the service of the King”.³⁶⁸


This piece of information – dealing with membership in multiple guilds – is of considerable interest, because the general conception of the guilds is that they attempted to prevent members from belonging to more than one guild. What is more one member was also a Mule Rentor – a guild that competed with the maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators. These were not ceremonial or social-climbing guilds in which membership was desired to place one among a higher social class through activities of socialability: these were solidly working class organizations. This strategy underscores the importance of pluri-occupation by these guildsmen. It is quite possible that in the other guilds, there were also masters who worked in other trades besides the one or two maritime porters that would have been listed there. Likewise, the total dimension of this practice is impossible to gauge without comparing the reported payments in the other guilds. That is, only those masters who declared that they had paid taxes through another guild – it could very well be that other maritime porters were also masters in other guilds, but – since they paid taxes through the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators – this information is not recorded in the tax records consulted.

By comparison, in 1828, some one-hundred fifty members were listed (having doubled in roughly fifty-five years). This shows a continued effort in increasing the size of the guild membership – in line with increasing economic vitality of the port in general. The guild recorded in its registry a significant number of new masters – sixty-seven – in the years immediately prior to and including 1828 (thirty-nine in 1826; seventeen in 1827; and eleven in 1828, prior to the 31 Oct 1828 date when the Masters were recorded for tax purposes).

The age of the new masters in the registry – where the information was provided (very rarely) – ranges from nineteen to mid-twenties (keeping in mind that a man had to be married if he hoped to join). There are no records of women becoming masters. The 1828 information includes

³⁶⁸ AGMMB, “[Matrícula]”, 1692/10/29-1902/12/13, Caja 16, carpeta 3 (2339).

ages: the mean average of a master maritime porter in that year was about thirty-six and one-half years of age. I have compiled a table to show this information, below.³⁶⁹



Source: Author’s work, based on AGMMB, “Nombres y apellidos de los individuos del Gremio de Faquines de Capsana y Masipes de Ribera de la presente ciudad que van comprendidos en la lista según lo mandado por el señor Capitán General Gobernador de esta plaza de Barcelona”, Capsa 16, carpeta 1 (2337).

What is particularly noteworthy of the above chart is the relative scarcity of young men – especially considering the fact that sixty-seven new members were added in 1826-1828. Contrary to the logic of employing young, robust men, it seems that the newly accepted masters were in their late 20s and early 30s. Since the age window was relatively large for new entries, there is no way to infer how the preponderance of certain-aged men could reflect internal or external pressures of change or crises.³⁷⁰

³⁶⁹ It is interesting that the instructions given by the government required the guild to note the address of the guild member, among other things.

³⁷⁰ Whatever counter-logic or extenuating circumstances may have contributed to this remain beyond the scope of this investigation. It does not seem as though military service or civilian deaths during the Napoleonic Wars would coincide. That said, the deaths of the 1820 Yellow Plague and the military events of the 1820 Revolution and the 1820-1823 period of civil war could have impacted the pool of possible workers. However, the relatively large number of men in their late 20s and early 30s suggests that these considerations (which transpired when these men were in their early 20s, which is to say, of prime military age) were not relevant.

Membership composition of the Guild of Mule Rentors: A snapshot from 1760


The Guild of Mule Rentors operated individually. There does not seem to be any use of a turn system – any guild member could enter into contract on an individual basis with a merchant. The guild could also enter into collective arrangements, as was done with the military. There is no indication of the mechanisms employed for distributing this work or the remuneration for completion.

By way of an indication of the membership, tax-reporting information elaborated in 1760 (for taxes to be paid in 1761) shows that there were seventy-nine members.³⁷¹ The guild-reported information divides the Masters into different groups based on socio-economic considerations. There were nine masters (12%) that owned a house and “*botiga*” (a wholesale store or small warehouse). There were forty-six (58%) “Masters who do not have land and work as *mancebos* [under the employment of another person]”.³⁷² Following this significant group, there were five (6%) Masters who do not have a store (“*tienda*”) and are “unsuited to work”. There were eight (10%) masters who were “solemnly poor”. Thus, it is likely that the guild was reporting that over 15% were poor, to one degree or another.

Six (8%) Masters were also members of other guilds (or lived outside of Barcelona), and were thus exempt from double-paying tax; this is not to say that none of the other Masters were members of another guild: it means that they were not paying taxes through a different guild. Finally, four (5%) had “passed”; and one (1%+) had “died” – suggesting that the other four had retired during the year.

³⁷¹ AHCB, [Llogaters de Mules], “[No title]”, [1760], Caja 3, carpeta 108, pp 96r-108r.

³⁷² Original: “Maestros que no tienen tienda, y trabajan como á Manzevos”



Source: Author's work, based on AHCB, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio, Fondo Corporativo*, ["Llogaters de Mules"], "[sin título]", [1760], Caja 3, carpeta 108, pp 96r-108r.

It is similarly interesting to note that the tax-declaration information includes the street or plaza of residence of the Masters with houses, the *mancebos*, and those masters that paid taxes through a different guild; this last category included three masters who lived in another community (San Andres de Palomar); or, lacking the address, it notes the other guild. It does not include residence information for the other groups of Masters (the poor, the unfit, those who had "passed" and the deceased). There was a noteworthy concentration of members (at least those with listed residences) in Plaza Nova and Plaza Basea, which a travelers' guide places "near that of the Arrieros" (E, 1831, p. 43).

Lest there be any doubt, references to *mancebos* (a journeyman) are not a classification within the guild – they are all recognized and referred to as Masters "who work as *mancebos*" this is the foundation of the internal division between successful masters and the less fortunate ones, who were required by necessity to seek employment by their guild brothers. It appears that as few as

nine masters were in a position to employ as many as seventy of their guild brothers (if one includes the five that had passed or died, and the ones who also belonged to another guild). In any case, this panorama clearly shows a significant dichotomy between employers and employees (or contractors and sub-contractors if the “mancebos” had *tiendas* from which they could work) within a service-sector guild.

Pluri-occupationalism: the contradiction between employment and guild membership

There was no prohibition against membership in multiple guilds in Barcelona during the period investigated. In fact, there is evidence of multiple membership and pluri-occupancy by service guild members.³⁷³ An accounting of the taxes owned by members of the Guild of Mule Rentors in 1760 notes that one member had paid his taxes as a member of the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators and was therefore exempt from paying through the Guild of Mule Rentors.³⁷⁴

This issue was also central to the matter of dual-guild membership by unloaders and fishermen, a question decried by the mariners, who claimed that this as an unfair way of adding members to the Unloaders’ Guild, which competed directly with the mariners over unloading in the port. Interestingly, the membership of one did not represent the entirety of that of the other – it was a question of significant dual membership (at least during the last decades of the eighteenth century).³⁷⁵ What is meant by this is that the fishermen did not disaggregate unloading activities and organize them under another guild. The inventories of both guilds show that they maintained cargo-handling gear, including collectively owned lighters. Both guilds were centuries old, too. It merely seems as though both guilds were willing and able to enroll members in both. Perhaps this allowed the member to secure more frequent work, or otherwise gain privileges.

Pluri-occupationalism was an important aspect of the life of maritime-cargo handlers. Delgado Ribas (1995, p. 128) cites a document that notes that in the early eighteenth century, the

³⁷³ I do not intend to convey any belief that this was *special* to the service-sector guilds: it is beyond the scope of this investigation to identify example of these two phenomena in other guilds. It may very well have been a common practice across the various guilds of Barcelona. There apparently was no general prohibition.

³⁷⁴ AHCB, [Llogaters de Mules], “[No title]”, [1760], Caja 3, carpeta 108, pp 96r-108r.

³⁷⁵ Membership at occasional General Assemblies is available from the 1760s. These can be consulted in the *Manuals* organized by year in the collection of the “Escribano de Mar” (Scribe of the Sea), located in the AHPB at the Notary College of Barcelona.

maritime porters worked “outside the plaza, employing themselves in cleaning wells, slaughtering pigs and doing other things and jobs”.³⁷⁶ It is interesting to note that “outside the plaza” could mean outside the confines of the port-side Palace Plaza (*Plaza del Palacio* or *Pla del Palau*) or, more likely – given the activities in question – outside the city proper. Romero notes the prevalence of maritime porters who also worked in the early nineteenth century as brick-makers in the neighboring village of Gràcia (where many of them resided, it should be noted). Or, seen another way, *perhaps* maritime cargo-handling may have not been the principal economic activity, but was instead seen as a way of increasing the family income during a few months of the year through extra labor (though I do not believe this to be true).

³⁷⁶ Original: “[...F]uera de la plaza, empleándose en limpiar pozos, matar cerdos y hacer otras cosas y trabajos”. Original note: “AMM, Bastaixos, no. 14”.

6.4 Chapter Conclusions

Establishing and enforcing trade and guild entrance requirements through a variety of qualifications was a vital component of guild existence – it was their institutional role in the economy. That is, qualification acted as means for institutions to base their interest-oriented decisions in an argued defense of rules and expectations. The motivations for formally qualifying labor were of interest to the guilds in question, the government, and society at large. Qualification was comprised of criteria agreed by guilds and government authorities. At times, the guilds would be held to these standards by the government; at others, the degree of autonomy was considerable. The guilds were able to use the ordinances (which detailed the qualifications) to justify their monopolistic control over the labor market.

Some of the qualifications for entry in a trade were based on the demonstration of skill or capability (especially in those trades controlled by guilds) but this was used as a type of qualification. The variety of qualifications is far more complex for entry in a guild (comprising of those required for trade, and more).

In craft guilds apprenticeship, journeymanship, and mastership (with their respective exams or other manifestations) were the norm, augmented by spot-checks by seekers to maintain sustained quality. The guilds studied here did not have a tri-partite structure for a division of labor – they were all masters. While it could be that the four-year period that transpired before a maritime porter or maritime horsecart operator could call himself a master (as established in the Ordinances of 1770) was a corollary to journeymanship, there is no reference to a functional differentiation, varied tasks, two-tier examinations or anything of the sort. There were no formally noted apprentices or journeymen in the trades' guilds: there was no structural differentiation of qualification.

In craft guilds, the control of the labor market was facilitated by the location of trade activities in specific locations (like workshops or stores). In the maritime cargo handling sub-sector, work was not based in competitively operated private workshops: it was made available at a number of socio-culturally determined areas throughout the city, where the offer of labor was general and in need of structuring (hence the decision to use a sort of turn by most of the guilds). Because of

this, and because of the perceived and highly valued egalitarianism of membership, different social mechanisms were developed to distribute work and income – at least in the collaborative guilds.

Most importantly, given that the degree of technical qualification was quite low, the service-sector guilds depended on other means of controlling the labor market. The ability of the maritime porters to use a subjective determination of a socio-cultural qualification allowed them to effectively prevent any non-son from joining the guild for decades – precisely at a time that the guild system and its monopolistic privileges for controlling the labor market were under fierce attack by local, and then central authorities.

In the case of the Guild of Maritime Porters, this culminated in restricting entry only to the sons and sons-in-law of existing masters. The new-member tables based on the registry allow one to perceive the importance of the family relationship of the new master. When a new master entered the guild, his price of the entrance examination was contingent on this: either approximately 8 *lluïres* for related applicants, or 28 *lluïres* for unrelated applicants. While in the eighteenth century, there was a *preference* for admitting the sons (by birth or as in-laws) of other maritime porters, this was not the *sole* consideration. After the Napoleonic occupation of Barcelona (1808-1814) there were *almost no* non-family members admitted as maritime porters. After the Liberal Triennial (1820-1823), the relationship was of absolute importance – *only* sons and sons-in-law of existing members were permitted to join the guild. We do not have similar information for the stand-alone Guild of Maritime Horsecart Operators.

The documentary record allows us a glimpse at the internal composition of the guild and its strategies for controlling membership. Generally speaking, they were flexible in responding to economic and political changes. They did not maintain a two-entries-per-year practice; to the contrary, they were dynamic in maintaining what they estimated was the necessary labor pool. The fact that in some of the guilds, work and pay were shared means that membership numbers were of direct consequence to all members.

More specifically, the formation of socio-economic differences within the individualistic guilds – is evident. While I cannot trace a beginning to this process of internal stratification among

master mule renters during the period studied, I have documented it during the period investigated, nonetheless. What is more, the changes brought on by liberalization – the end of the turn system in some guilds, the weakening of limitations regarding the ownership of multiple means of service provision, and the allowance of intra-guild employment relationships – would eventually further divide these guilds along economic lines of internal stratification.

The flexibility of the Barcelona guild system overall is also evident as relates to pluri-occupancy and membership and participation in multiple guilds. The case of the maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators is appropriate, as these two mutually competitive trades were organized in a single guild until 1796. Where there were concerns of intra-guild competition, the guilds placed restrictions on how one could transfer from one trade to another. The principal concern seems to have been reducing the opportunities for intra-guild inter-trade competition caused by shifting membership: limiting trade-changing was a way of preventing an applicant from paying the lower entry fee of one trade in a guild and then working in another trade (always in the same guild) . However, it seems quite clear that masters could freely belong to multiple guilds – there were no personnel-level limits on inter-guild competition. The best example of this was the maritime porter or maritime horsecart operator who was also a master mule rentor.

Chapter 7.

Liberalization:

Reforms, abolitions, and the responses of the guilds

In 1832, the Commerce Board of Barcelona, in proposing a single ordinance for the Guilds of Maritime porters, Maritime Horsecart Operators, and Maritime Teamsters, sought:³⁷⁷

“[...] A] definitive resolution [...] to avoid the detriments which commerce is suffering because of the restrictions of the ordinances, which can end all of the reclamations and complaints as have been made by the three guilds in maintenance of their ordinances....”

³⁷⁷ AHCB, [Carreteros de Mar], “[No title]”, 14 January 1832, Caja 39. Original: “[...U]na resolución definitiva [...] para evitar los perjuicios que está sufriendo el comercio por las trabas de aquellas ordenanzas, pueda ponerse fin a tantas reclamaciones y quejas como se han producido una por los tres gremios en sostenimiento de sus ordenanzas [...]”.

7.1 Chapter Introduction

This chapter deals with the progressive advance of liberalism and the various attempts at reforming or terminating the guild system. This process began during the reformist initiatives during the end of the Ancient Regime in the late-eighteenth century, and became more pronounced under the liberal regimes (republican and constitutional-monarchist) of the early-nineteenth century. Each of these legislative measures and royal orders are treated in detail, within the context of political and economic developments.

The institutional behaviors of the guilds in their continuous attempts to define, defend, and extend their privileges in the face of the looming abolition of their ancient organizations serve as a counterpoint to these economic policies. The legal actions can be divided into three categories: the first was by direct action, in which the guilds used their competencies to act directly upon other actors; the second, was by recurrence to the judicial mechanisms of the courts to address complaints and settle disputes; reforms of their ordinances and privileges constitutes the third category. The body of evidence for the former is limited, but instructive; that of the second is quite vast, with perhaps a hundred legal cases identified in the various archives consulted. The documentary record of the third category is comprised of proposals for ordinances and officially recognized ordinances.

The first type of actions consisted of stopping suspected violators of guild privileges over the handling of certain goods, or of operating in privileged areas. Once stopped, goods and the means of transporting them could be sequestered, and a fine could also be applied to violators (and/or the person who hired the violator, in the case of an employment relationship). In some cases, it was possible that a violator could be jailed.³⁷⁸ A detailed account of this exists for the Guild of Maritime Porters for a period of roughly twenty-five years in the beginning of the nineteenth century.³⁷⁹

³⁷⁸ AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos a l'Alcalde Major de Barcelona sobre la vulneració d'ordenances]”, 1801/07/18 – n.d., Capsa 7, carpeta 22 (2271).

³⁷⁹ AGMMB, “Llibreta dels panyoraments. Comensa lo any de 1802”, 1802/01/29 - 1826/06/27, Capsa 4, carpeta 4 (2235). [I detail these below.]

The second type, judicial actions, was largely based on the ordinances of the guilds in question, and the judicial personhood which these bestowed on the corporations. In turn, these charters were sometimes modified to accommodate the results of some of these cases; likewise, socio-cultural perceptions were also relevant to the cases at hand. This contributed to a multi-factor development of the judicial framework under which the guilds operated.

The measures undertaken by the guilds were important to the development of the policies enacted to regulate their behaviors, inasmuch as the seemingly constant struggles between and involving the guilds was the subject of numerous attempts at reaching longer-term resolutions. It seems that the guilds viewed the defense (in the streets and in the courts) of their privileges and organizations as normal, permanent, even daily affairs. It is quite clear that they understood the maintenance of their privileges as central and necessary to their organizational existence and *modus operandi*.

These efforts explain some of the most important issues faced by the guilds, and likewise show the tangible shift in policy brought about by the advance of liberalism. This paradigm shift occurred over decades, with liberal advances and retreats (especially in the context of war, revolution, bloody counter-revolution, and the increasing political influence of industrialists and merchants). The liberalizations were not the product of a monolithic system: different actors adopted different positions based on their interests over time, at times underscoring a dichotomy between the local and national/royal bodies.

The battle was waged around the guild ordinances and their legitimacy in the eyes of the government. The most accurate descriptor of the monopoly-establishing mechanism in the ordinances is “privilege”, which is the cognate of the Castilian term “*privilegio*” used in the ordinances. An ordinance conferred to a guild a degree of authority in some matters – a power executed through various mechanisms, including the application of fines or the sequestering of goods and persons deemed in violation of the privileges – be they members of that guild, private “individuals” without membership, or members of a different guild. These privileges – and the degree of monopoly which these accomplished – were the primary concern of all parties (guildsmen, merchants, and government authorities). Because of these monopolies, each guild had to assure that there were sufficient members to carry out the work required by commerce;

however, the guilds also sought to limit the number of members, so as to not dilute opportunity and income.

The second term used to describe the market-controlling capacity of the guilds – their privileges were often referred to as “*privativas*” (privations; better understood as an exclusion) that prohibited the intromission of other individuals or organizations. This underscores the monopolistic characteristic – the privileges were not preferential, they were exclusive.³⁸⁰ What is more, the interpretation of these *privativas* was precise and literal – goods not specified were not protected by guild privileges, and were the source of disputes.³⁸¹

The guilds were responsible for defending their privileges on a daily basis: non-guild members or the member of a different guild could not undertake labor activities that were privileged to another guild – this was intromission. It was a violation of guild regulations and represented a type of disloyal competition among the guilds; in turn, these transgressions met with the sequestering of goods, significant fines, and the threat of imprisonment of the responsible parties.³⁸²

The defense of these privileges was part of a socio-judicial process to define their trades and privileges and to justify the existence of their guilds. I use the term “socio-judicial” to underscore the fact that the processes considered were not merely legal disputes: socio-economic and cultural aspects also conditioned the judicial actions. The courts were not pro-active in the sense that they brought parties together to resolve an issue: cases were the result of the formal actions of one party against another. This, in turn, was a result of subjective, socio-cultural determinations by those parties. References to purportedly ancient cultural constructions like tradition, honor, and custom were central to the arguments. These were used to underpin the letter of the law as enshrined in the ordinances, and placed these ordinances in the historic context that defined the guilds.

³⁸⁰ I have included a detailed consideration of the monopolistic quality of the privileges in the guild ordinances through an application of an analytical framework developed by Richardson (2001, 2004). [This assessment is presented as an appendix: “Monopoly Privileges in the cargo-handling guilds of Barcelona”.]

³⁸¹ AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291).

³⁸² AGMMB, “Llibreta dels panyoraments. Comensa lo any de 1802”, 1802/01/29 - 1826/06/27, Capsa 4, carpeta 4 (2235). [This is detailed below.]

There were economic considerations as well. Legal process could be quite costly to the guilds. The resources devoted to protecting privileges were therefore measured out with a two-fold aim: defend ancient privileges from any form of deterioration; enforce the *privativas*; and punish transgressors (with the aim of discouraging others from encroaching on their economic terrain). In most cases, the justification was based on an interpretation of existing privileges; occasionally, the aim was to actually extend the areas of privilege.

In the case of the guilds considered in this investigation, the totality of these legal disputes span centuries – with each case often taking months or years into consideration or to resolve; as such, they represent a continuous process of defining the trades and their economic and social interactions. As a body, these cases give an impression of the operations of the guilds and the legal environment in which they functioned – one based largely on abstract notions like traditions, customary expectations, and honorable interactions, as much as on the detailed responsibilities and privileges specified in the ordinances.

It is impossible to determine what, if any, disagreements occurred but which did not result in a legal case. It could be that some or even most cases were handled without recourse to judicial institutions – however, this seems unlikely given the relatively petty nature of some of the cases. There was a multiplicity of considerations for bringing or not a legal case. In all the cases, the long term economic interests of the plaintiff were fundamental to the decision to bring a suit against another party (even if the immediate costs may have outweighed the short-term gains).³⁸³

It is interesting to note that the parties often couched their arguments and justifications in terms of the common (or public) good in such a way that it benefitted them. The definition of the common good would remain central on both sides (guilds and merchants) during the advance of liberalism. Inasmuch as the government authorities were co-opted (or intellectually captured) by increasingly influential merchants and liberal arguments (Sánchez, 2011b), the common good was re-positioned in terms that were beneficial to the nascent industrial bourgeoisie.

³⁸³ I briefly discussed the source-bias risks of normative, legal documents in Chapter 1.

Institutions: formal and informal; legitimized and de-legitimized

Before progressing into a detailed history of the different aspects of liberalism, it is important to establish a framework regarding the largely institutional nature of the activities examined. Douglass North (North, 1991, p. 112) defined institutions as:

“[T]he humanly devised constraints that structure political, economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).”

Informal constraints represent a perception of proper or acceptable behaviors by an individual or group within the socio-cultural framework. Formal constraints, such as rules and laws, represent the product of formal institutions based on the societal norms (which is to say, informal institutions). Formal constraints are accepted, modified, defined, and enforced by authorities. It should not be assumed that the rules are more important than the norms and customs, especially since the rules are based on the willingness and ability of the authorities to force others to comply with them; whereas the socio-cultural norms are general at the social level and can survive changes in the regulatory framework.

Government authorities are empowered with legitimizing or de-legitimizing formal institutions. The source bias of legalistic documents and the difficulty is assessing informal institutions and actions combine to complicate an evaluation of the respective importance of formal and informal institutions.

This legitimacy, in the case of the guilds, was granted upon the approval of the guild's ordinances. This represents the main difference (at the institutional level) between a trade and a guild; the former was based on the socio-cultural construction of labor, whereas the latter was a formalized institution (based on one or many trades). In many cases, this formalization resulted in the codification of informal institutions (norms, traditions, and expectations). This formalization included the incorporation of workers in a trade organization that was capable of establishing and maintaining norms and rules for behavior (during and outside work activities).

The guilds, and their interactions, existed at the conflux of formal and informality as regards institutions and enforcement.

Likewise, the defense of guild privileges involved institutions, both formal and informal. The ability to bring a legal case or submit a supplication was first and foremost determined by the legal personhood of the party in question. The guilds were granted judicial personhood through their ordinances: that is to say, they were recognized by the courts based on their formal recognition by other government bodies. This underscores the role of state actors in legitimizing non-state actors; consequently, the state could also de-legitimize non-state actors (a process that underpinned the abolition of the guilds, wherein their ordinances were unilaterally cancelled). Similarly, the differentiation between *de jure* and *de facto* abolition becomes relevant, whereby bodies could theoretically continue to exist without state sanction. This is important for understanding the behaviors of these groups, especially in those instances when they no longer enjoyed official recognition.

7.2 Liberalism and the Liberalization: The historic context

The inter-connected development of economic and political liberalism was not limited to Spain (Losurdo, 2007). It was largely a pan-European experience (encompassing their colonies as well). In this section, the general ideological foundation is covered in greater detail, as a way of putting into perspective the Spanish, and Barcelona experiences, which are studied in greater detail, especially as they relate directly to the maritime-cargo handling guilds.

Liberalism was theoretically based on the freedom of the individual, and a greater degree of equality in judicial and political matters; however a more thorough investigation reveals serious contradictions. [In a searing criticism,] Losurdo (2007) dissects the hypocritical arguments of key liberal ideologues of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, especially in regards to their relationships with the institutions of slavery and what some would call “wage slavery”. He shows how the so-called “God-given” freedoms and liberties were actually only meant to be [and effectively were] enjoyed by certain select people, based on race, economic status, or activity.

The main proponents of Liberalism were the merchants and the growing industrial bourgeois (often one and the same, as the industrialists were producing goods for export and internalized this process). Their complaints, pronouncements, and demands for change were couched in terms of liberty, free choice, and the common good. However, when it came to their economic interests, they were more than willing to eschew these fine words in favor of protectionist trade measures or in favor of ending the freedoms of others to organize self-regulating bodies. Sánchez (2011b) documents this clearly in the case of the textile industrialists of Barcelona, whose growing economic power allowed them to successfully organize at the political level to defend and advance their economic interests.

It is noteworthy that economic liberalism initially gained a following in Spain within the halls of royal power. The policies of the Spanish Enlightenment clearly show the impact of [limited] liberal thought – best represented in the attention paid to Adam Smith’s (1776) economic thought (Ruiz Torres, 2007; Lambie & Aymes, 2008). However, instead of being monolithically free-market in its orientation, the efforts were piecemeal. It is interesting to note the appearance of advocates of direct state regulation as a replacement of indirect regulation through the guilds

(Díez Rodríguez, 2001). The dominant idea was to reform the guild ordinances to limit the monopolistic effects of the privileges, while maintaining the main features of the guild system.

In Spain, liberal ideas took root in the economic difficulties and social disintegration of the Ancient Régime (Ruiz Torres, 2007, pp. 527–623). It is worthwhile to keep in mind the fact that liberalism represented a fundamental alteration of the social order. In the Spanish Ancient Régime, the centuries-old customs, traditions, norms, and expectations of the institutional framework were based on a strict social order, comprised of *estamentos* (hierarchical socio-economic groups). These relationships were solidified in privileges or recognitions of local or regional autonomous powers (*fueros*). The supreme authority of this hierarchy was theological. The placement of the guilds in the social order was clearly defined in these terms (Ruiz Torres, 2007, pp. 72–73):

With this theological perspective, the freedom of man was subservient to the obligation and obedience of the divine precept, as well as in the political government, and the very social order formed part of a universal order [...]. The noble *estamento*, the Church, the universities, the urban patricians, the royal official bodies, the merchant, artisan and trade corporations and guilds and other groupings belonging to the Ancient Régime formed a hierarchical order. [This hierarchy had as a broad base] the great mass of the population that carried out trades looked down upon by the defenders of the traditional order. Agrarian or industrial work and commercial activities were considered “mechanical” activities that made vile the person and his [or her] family.³⁸⁴

It is relevant that liberalization was not only a political and economic phenomenon: it also questioned the theological basis of society as a political order. This gives an indication of the profundity of the crises, which went to the very institutional core of the social order. At the very

³⁸⁴ Original: “Con esa perspectiva teológica, la libertad del hombre estaba sometida a la obligación y obediencia del precepto divino, también en el gobierno político, y el mismo orden de la sociedad formaba parte de un orden universal [...]. El estamento nobiliario, la Iglesia, las universidades, el patriaciado urbano, los cuerpos de oficiales reales, las corporaciones y los gremios mercantiles y de artes y oficios y demás agrupaciones propias del antiguo régimen formaban un orden jerarquizado. [Esta jerarquía tenía como base amplia] la gran masa de la población que desempeñaba oficios menospreciados por los defensores del orden tradicional. El trabajo agrario o industrial y la actividad mercantil eran considerados una actividad ‘mecánica’ que envilecía a la persona y a su familia.”

foundation, the end of the Ancient Regime was a holistic restructuring of society. The attempts at reforming the old order were necessitated by external economic considerations, as well as a shifting of the economic power of the component groups of the dominant social order.

The first fiscal assault (in 1798) on Church properties and income was brought about by the need to increase state revenue (on the heels of a devastating war with England, and an overall panorama of economic difficulties) (Ruiz Torres, 2007, pp. 584–603). This was followed by a series of tax-imposing measures at the turn of the century (Ruiz Torres, 2007, pp. 604–623). In Spain – and in Barcelona – the wholesale discontent with the authority of the Church reached its apex with the burning of various religious properties in the context of the First Carlist War. The period of 1834-1835 was notable for the torching of a number of religious facilities (and the murder of clergy) in important cities (Fontana i Làzaro, 2003, pp. 147–183).³⁸⁵ In Barcelona, the conflagration occurred in the summer of 1835 with assaults on religious institutions.

The economically liberal policies of the reformist ancient regime brought the end of the colonial trade monopoly and the late-eighteenth-century revocation of specific guild privileges in order to permit or favor proto-industrial development and expansion. It must be kept in mind that the principal beneficiaries of both of these two liberalizations were the textile-industrialists and merchants. Because of the participation of industrialists in export activities, this can be understood as an integrated group.

The initial approaches by royal policy makers largely failed to achieve the necessary aims of the reforms (García Sanz, 2008). This created an impetus for increasingly radical economic and political prescriptions (Ruiz Torres, 2007; Lambie & Aymes, 2008) In this process, liberalism developed into an attempt of the bourgeoisie at gaining economic and political primacy, at the expense of the political power of the nobility and of the workers, who were represented (to a degree) by the guilds. Far from an egalitarian leveling of opportunities, liberalism is better understood in the process of the economic and political development of the bourgeoisie, especially *vis-à-vis* the monarchies from whom they attempted to seize political and economic primacy, and *vis-à-vis* the workers whom they attempted to keep from enjoying those very same

³⁸⁵ This anti-religious characteristic would become evident in the attacks on religious institutions, covered below.

political and economic liberties. The discontent of the working populations of Spain was largely limited to outbursts of rage during the decades-long demise of the ancient order (Ruiz Torres, 2007; García Varela, 2008).

Liberalization of the colonial trade port cities

Perhaps the most important early manifestation of liberal economic thought was the end of the monopoly privilege held by the port of Cádiz in handling trade with the Spanish colonies in the Americas. The end of the trade monopoly was done in phases during the second half of the eighteenth century. Over a few decades, port cities (in Spain and its colonies in America) that previously did not enjoy a privilege to participate in trans-Atlantic trade were granted trade status.

For Barcelona, this was accomplished through the Royal Decree and Instruction of Free Trade of Barlovento, of 16 October 1765. This was the first measure to expand trade participation. The Barlovento Decree removed the monopoly position of Cádiz by extending the privilege to nine cities, including Barcelona, with ports in the Caribbean. This was followed, in 1774 by a liberalization of trade between American colonial ports. The third step was the 12 October 1778 decree, which further expanded the number of trade-enabled ports in Spain (Martínez Shaw, 1980; Fontana i Lázaro, 1987; Oliva Melgar, 1988, 1996; Martínez Shaw, 2002; Martínez Shaw & Oliva Melgar, 2005).

The 1765 liberalization has been overshadowed in the historiography by the 12 October 1778 declaration of free trade. Oliva Melgar (1988, p. 454) goes so far as to say that, “The free trade [decree] of Barlovento has been victim of the greater transcendence given to the *Reglamento* of 12 October 1778 and everything related to that first step taken by the decision of 1756 [sic: 1765] has remained habitually relegated to a more discreet level”.³⁸⁶ The trade liberalization

³⁸⁶ Original: “El comercio libre de Barlovento ha sido víctima de la mayor trascendencia concedida al Reglamento de 12 de octubre de 1778 y todo lo relativo a aquel primer paso dado con la decisión de octubre de 1756 [sic.:1765] ha quedado habitualmente relegado a un plano más discreto.”

process culminated with the more general end of the privilege system in 1778 (Fontana i Làzaro, 1987; Martínez Vara, 1994; Ruiz Torres, 2007, pp. 498–526).³⁸⁷

An important institution that was established during this process was the *Real Compañía de Comercio de Barcelona a Indias* [the Royal Merchant/Commerce Company of Barcelona to the Indies] (Ruíz y Pablo & Fradera, 1919; Oliva Melgar, 1987).

In any case, a solid revisionist historiography not based solely on the normative sentences has clearly established that Catalan merchants were not excluded, *de facto*, from colonial trade – they simply used interlocutors or established mercantile houses in Cádiz during the monopoly period (Delgado Ribas, 1986; Oliva Melgar, 1987, 1988, 1993; Martínez Vara, 1994; Oliva Melgar, 1996; Yáñez, 1996; Martínez Shaw & Oliva Melgar, 2005). That is to say, the merchants of Barcelona had participated in colonial trade prior to the inclusion of the city in the privilege system.

Similar to maritime commerce liberalization, the creation of a more-free market through the elimination of protectionist measures was part of the general liberal economic regimen. An interesting dynamic of trade protectionism, tariff regimens, and liberalization is the process of national market unification encapsulated by these measures – in this case, the relationship between Catalonian textile and agricultural producers with the Spanish state (Arnabat Mata, 2001, pp. 173–182; Sánchez, 2011b). It is worthwhile to keep this in mind when considering the various products that passed through the Port of Barcelona, especially as trends in production and the governmental responses were largely beyond the ability of guild workers to modify or alter. That is to say, the decisions taken in Madrid were not made with Barcelona, much less the maritime cargo handlers, in mind. The vision of the Borbón crown was national – *Spanish* – unity.

³⁸⁷ The relationship between the 1765 and 1778 decrees is evident in the transition to the general liberalization of trade, even leading up to the 12 October Decree. See for example a Royal Decree from February 1778, available at Universidad de Sevilla's Fondo Antiguo portal [<http://fondosdigitales.us.es/fondos/libros/3858/2/real-decreto-dos-de-febrero-de-1778-en-que-sm-amplia-la-concesion-del-comercio-libre-contenida-en-decreto-de-16de-octubre-de-1765-instruccion-y-resoluciones-posteriores-que-solo-comprehendieron-las-islas-de-barlovento-y-provincias-de-campeche-santa-marta-y-rio-del-hacha-incluyendo-aora-la-de-buenos-ayres-real-cedula-de-diez-y-seis-del-citadomes-de-febrero-y-ano-de-1778-que-incluye-arancel-d-elos-derechos-que-sm-senala-los-escribanos-de-registros-de-lospuertos-de-indias-paralas-embarcaciones-del-referido-comercio-libre/>; last accessed 11 December 2016].

It is important to place the liberalization of commercial monopolies in the context of the imperial logic. Ruiz Torres (2007, pp. 498–526) notes that ending the commercial monopoly over the national origin of textiles sold in the colonies was necessary to avoid a situation that could lead to the destruction of the empire. The liberalization was not just of Spanish ports, but also of Spanish colonial ports – expanding the number of trade nodes in the transatlantic system. The questionable results of the first efforts led to an expansion of the policy, steadily increasing the number of trade ports on the Peninsula and throughout Spanish America. Likewise, the growing hegemony of a free-trade ideology within the circle of Ministers (and, one can safely infer, of the monarchy) permitted the steady, sustained implementation of these and other measures.

The independence of the Spanish colonies in America in the post-Napoleonic period destroyed the colonial trade system, as the crown government basically lost the ability to meaningfully regulate trade (Andrews, 1985; Fontana i Làzaro, 2007, pp. 106–119; Morelli, 2008; Chastagnaret, 2008).

7.3 The abolitions of the guilds and their ordinances

Liberalization of the trades (generally starting with textiles) was not a uniquely Spanish phenomenon, but was effectuated throughout much of Europe to coincide with the expansion of technologies and the organization of labor intended to increase production (Mendels, 1972; Gonzalez Enciso, 1984; Lis et al., 1994; J. De Vries, 1994; S. R. Epstein, 2004; Soly, 2008; Marfany, 2010; Ferrer, 2012).

The proto-industrial “freeing” of trades clearly marked the terms of the future debate over the abolition of guilds (Mendels, 1972; J. De Vries, 1994). The steam-powered machine-based industrialization that grew out of these processes resulted (at least in the short term) in the challenging of guild privileges and in the perception – on the part of the journeymen workers – in the elimination of work, as the machines offered significant increases in productivity. In some cases, this led to significant campaigns of frame-breaking and violence, known as “Luddism” (Darvall, 1934; Hobsbawm, 1965; Sale, 1996; Binfield, 2015).³⁸⁸

Arguably, there was a combined political and economic retarding of this process in Spain when compared to countries that experienced economic development earlier (Mendels, 1972; Gonzalez Enciso, 1984; J. De Vries, 1994; Mokyr, 2008; Marfany, 2010; Ferrer, 2012). Regardless of the relative chronology, the arguments against the guilds and in favor of their abolition were generally ubiquitous across the continent. The guilds had come to be seen as out-dated corporations that restricted commerce to favor their personal and collective interests, but at the expense of the general population. This assessment was initially applied to the secondary sector of the economy, and was extended to cover the tertiary sector.

Arguably, the lack of a differentiation between productive and service guilds during abolition was a serious issue, and one that did not pass unperceived by these guilds. In the midst of the liberalization of the guilds, they were fully conscious of the service nature of their labors. They

³⁸⁸ Luddism is at times called “Ludismo” in Castilian (although this term more precisely refers, ironically, to ludic activities). Significant Luddite activities occurred in the early 1830s throughout Spain and in 1835 in Barcelona, detailed below.

used this as the basis of an argument, in 1815, by which they attempted to defend their guilds from abolition at the hands of the Board of Commerce:³⁸⁹

[Regarding the] *Real Cédula* of 24 June 1770 [a type of royal decree], the trades under consideration of the Board of Commerce and Coin and of which they have emanated posterior measures about the same appear not to be applicable to the object of the trade of Maritime porters, owing to [the fact] that the cause that drives that resolution and the others that have followed it, have no other, save the fomenting of commerce and the advancement of trades, factories or manufactories and as it is for some time well known, that the guild of Maritime porters make no manufactory, nor produce any artifact, in natural consequence of this, that a corporation, that is not dedicated to any manufacturing industry, and that has no other elements save the employment of physical labor, honor and the legality of each individual is not susceptible to advancement in the productions of the art, as there are none and there can be none.

While this logic preserved their organization's privileges for the time being, *in the end* this argument was not successful, as the 1836 abolition would come to de-legitimize most guilds, regardless of whether they were dedicated to activities in the primary, secondary, or tertiary sectors. It is nonetheless interesting to note their awareness of a sector-based differentiation that *could*, or – in their view, at least – *should* be made instead of wholesale abolition.

The motivation for liberalizing the productive guilds was largely technological (with labor-concentration and production-process ramifications). While production in some areas (like textiles) went through protoindustrialization centralized in manufactories and then steam-

³⁸⁹ AGMMB, “[Memorial de l’ aprovació de noves ordenances id canvi d’ institució rectora]”, [1815], Capsa 7, carpeta 2 (2251). p 22-23. Original: “(...) Real Cedula de 24 de Junio del 1770, los negocios tocantes al conocim(ien)to de la Junta de Comercio y Monedas y de la que han emanado las posteriores disposiciones sobre el particular parece no son aplicables al objeto del oficio de Faquines de Capsana, atendido que la causa impulsiva de aquella resolucion y demas que la han subseguido, no ha sido otra, que el fomento del comercio, y el adelantamiento de los oficios, fabriles, o manufacturas y como que es desde luego bien visto, que ninguna manufacturacion, ningun artefacto produce el gremio de Faquines de Capsana, en natural consecuencia de esto, que una corporacion, que no se dedica a ninguna industria fabril y que no tiene otros elementos, que el empleo de la fuerza fisica, y la honradez, y legalidad de cada individuo no es susceptible de adelantamientos en producciones del arte, pues que ninguna tiene ni puede tener.”

powered factories, the service sector involved jobs and tasks that would not be mechanized for some time. There was no technical imperative to abolish the maritime-cargo handling guilds.

To further elaborate on the importance of sector, it is worthwhile to keep in mind that while the manual-labor guilds (*gremios*) were abolished, the liberal professions organized in *colegios* were never abolished, despite their clear monopolistic structures, which were arguably no different than those of the lower-status guilds (Ruiz Torres, 2007, pp. 121–122):

(...) [O]ther professions which today we give the name of “liberal” [professions], for example that of surgeon or notary, were seen then in a very distinct way, than mechanical or manual professions that required empirical or artisan formation, and were not studied in the universities. (...) These latter ones occupied an inferior place on the “cascade of disparagement” by which the Ancient Régime was ruled.³⁹⁰

This underscores the political and economic motivations of liberalization, which was not applied evenly to all corporations. In the end, whereas the professional colleges were excluded from the abolitionist measures, most guilds succumbed.

Liberalizations during the Ancient Regime

Authors have noted late-seventeenth century attempts at abolishing the guilds, specifically during the Cortes of Calatayud (Aragon) held in 1684-1687 (Molas Ribalta, 1970, p. 41; Perdices Blas & Sánchez Molledo, 2007, pp. LX–LXI). However, there is no clear lineage linking this early effort with the late-eighteenth-century abolitionist initiatives beyond an ideological tendency towards fomenting trade by limiting guild powers (or their very existence).³⁹¹

One of the main reasons guild privileges were under scrutiny was the desire to foster proto-industrial expansion and growth, which necessitated the elimination of labor-market controls

³⁹⁰ Original: “(...) [O]tras profesiones a las que hoy en día damos el nombre de ‘liberales’, por ejemplo la de cirujano o la de notario, eran vistas entonces de un modo muy distinto, como profesiones mecánicas o manuales por requerir una formación empírica y artesanal y no estudiarse en las universidades. (...) Estos últimos ocupaban el lugar inferior de la ‘cascada de menosprecio’ por la que se regía el antiguo regimen.”

³⁹¹ Which is not to question the importance of an ideological tradition: I merely postulate that the interceding century diminishes the likelihood of a continuity of policies.

held by the guilds. In Spain, proto-industrialization occurred first in the textile trades (wool, then cotton) (Mendels, 1972; Gonzalez Enciso, 1984; Ferrer, 2012). It evolved from putting-out (also called the domestic system) in rural areas to the concentration of the work-force in a single facility, known as a manufactory.

Production was initially liberalized during the proto-industrial development of a number of textile industries, making the textile industries “free”. In this sense, “free” means unbound by guild-membership requirements or regulations. The affected trades were no longer under the monopolistic privileges of any guild. This strategy had previously been employed in socio-economically strategic trades, like bread-making (differentiated from baking, which covered a variety of baked goods). Likewise, trade in certain goods was also liberalized for strategic, internal-security reasons: take, for example, the end of restrictions on the trade of grains in 1765 (Thomson, 2005).

There were some specific trades-liberalizing measures in Spain in the 1760s. These were the product of the General Board of commerce, Coin, Mines and Foreign Dependencies (*Junta General de Comercio, Moneda, Minas y Dependencias de Extranjeros*), under the Ministry of Revenue (*Hacienda*). The General Board was charged with reviewing guild ordinances with the aim of fomenting industry and manufacture.³⁹² This effort was directly connected to the revenue-generating activities of the state, which applied taxes to economic activities. The importance of this consideration to the state should not be underestimated, especially considering economic volatility and large-scale wars.

The general liberalization of industries in 1770 was an important measure in Spain; even so, certain textile industries and their specific trades were redundantly liberalized in the following years – (Díez Rodríguez, 1992; Thomson, 2005). That is to say, the first, general “freeing” of industry was again applied to certain trades in which the ability to concentrate labor and utilize basic mechanization for work processes had been restricted by guild ordinances. The ordinances had established and regulated the maximum number of employees that could be used by a master, which effectively prohibited workforce concentration. In the case of production and the

³⁹² Señan y Velazquez, J., & Xaramillo, G. A. (1817). *Guía o estado general de la Real Hacienda de España....* The *Junta* was a reconfiguration of the 1730 unification of the Board of Commerce (1679, etc.) and that of Coin.

guilds, the tendency towards liberalization and abolition was claimed to be based on the need for supporting economic productivity under the guise of individual freedom (of the worker, the merchant/consumer, and society in general). However, in practice, the auto-regulation provided by the guild system was replaced by direct regulation (to one degree or another) by the government.

In an article dedicated to the political philosophy of Antonio de Capmany (a late-eighteenth century author, statesman, and defender of the guild system), Fernando Díez (2001, pp. 198–204) establishes that there were three positions more or less against the existing guild system, each identified with a well-connected intellectual or politician during the 1770s. “Campomanes is [representative of] the deep reform of the guild system, while Jovellanos and Foronda represent the abolitionist option” (2001, p. 200).³⁹³ Díez (2001, p. 199) notes that, “The critique of the guild system begins in Spain with two discourses by Pedro Rodríguez Campomanes (*Fomento de la Industria popular*, 1774, and *Educacion popular de los artesanos*, 1775-1777)”.³⁹⁴ He goes on to elaborate (2001, p. 201):

Campomanes seeks to drastically reduce the relative autonomy of the guilds. It is about a systematic correction of the particular and localist *esprit de corps*, to introduce the centralizing and unifying principle of a state ‘industrial’ policy”.³⁹⁵

According to Díez, Gaspar Jovellanos shared this centralizing tendency, but favored replacing the guild system with state regulation through industrial legislation. Foronda promoted abolition in favor of a free market (2001, pp. 200–201). Pedro Ruiz Torres also treats these ideologues, their formation, careers, and principal works (2007, pp. 425–526).

Taken together, these proponents reflect the variety of opinions regarding the debate over reforming or replacing the guild system. Their arguments exemplify the changing views

³⁹³ Original: “Campomanes es la reforma en profundidad del sistema gremial, mientras que Jovellanos y Foronda representan la opcion abolicionista.”

³⁹⁴ Original: “La crítica del gremialismo comienza en España con dos discursos de Pedro Rodríguez Campomanes (*Fomento de la Industria popular*, 1774, and *Educacion popular de los artesanos*, 1775-1777).”

³⁹⁵ Original: “Campomanes busca reducir drásticamente la relativa autonomía de los gremios. Se trata de una corrección sistemática del espíritu de cuerpo, particular y localista, para introducir el principio centralizador y unificador de una política ‘industrial’ estatal.”

regarding the relationship between the guilds and the state, and provide the intellectual background of the political milieu in which the eventual process of liberalization of the trades would occur in the subsequent decades, culminating in the de-legitimization of the guilds in 1836.

The arguments for re-designing the corporate framework were based on the numerous legal conflicts. While there are many such cases, a series of legal cases and the application of considerable fines exemplify this situation, and mark the period examined here.

The Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators brought a legal case against the Guild of Maritime Teamsters before the local judicial body, the Royal Audience (*Audiencia Real*), which was decided on 20 May 1768.³⁹⁶ This corresponded to an interesting section in the guild membership registry relating to a series of significant fines (50 *lluires*) applied to members of the Guild of Maritime Teamsters in early 1769.³⁹⁷ On 21 February, nine teamsters were fined. Two days later, another six were fined; the next day, one more. The following week, another was fined, and two weeks later, two more. The last was fined on 11 April, for a total of twenty individuals fined, adding up to 1,000 *lluires* – a significant amount of money. The fine of 50 *lluires* assessed by the maritime porters' guild was equal to the entrance fee of someone who was not the son or son-in-law of a master maritime horsecart operator (the highest examination fee of the guild). The maritime porters sought permission to raise the fee to 100 *lluires* to dissuade maritime teamsters from further violating their privileges.³⁹⁸ This was part of the justification for pronouncing new ordinances in 1770.³⁹⁹

This situation resurfaced a decade later when the Guild of Maritime Teamsters attempted to modify their ordinances to create a system of open competition between the beach-based

³⁹⁶ AGMMB, “Sentencia echa a 20 de mayo 1768 a favor del Gremio de Faquines, Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar contra los Tragineros de Mar”, 20.05.1768 -12.04.1769, Capsa 5, carpeta 5 (2309).

³⁹⁷ AGMMB, “Matrícula”, 1692/10/29-1902/12/13, Caja 9, carpeta 5 (2304).

³⁹⁸ By way of comparison, 1,500 *lluires* (also called *libras*, meaning pounds) was enough to purchase a house in 1780; 50 *lluires* was the cost of renting a house for one year less than two decades later. See AGMMB, “Acte de confesió feta per Joseph Bonastre, sombrerer, als proms de la Confraria de Bastaixos de Capsana”, 1696-1794, Capsa 17, carpeta 4 (2351).

³⁹⁹ AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291); and AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

guilds.⁴⁰⁰ The relatively lower-cost, bulk hauling capacity of the teamsters would have seriously imperiled the maritime porters and horsecart operators were the merchants able to choose freely among the three guilds.

At the same time that Campomanes was calling for reforms of the guild system, the merchants of Barcelona attempted to influence the local government in favor of abolition of the monopolistic privileges of the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators. In February 1778, some merchants of Barcelona complained about the monopolistic privileges of the Guild of Maritime Porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators.⁴⁰¹

The liberalization they sought contemplated the elimination or reduction of privileges which constrained the ability of merchants to select the service provider who best suited them economically. Citing some one-hundred fifty years of conflict within the Guild of Maritime Porters and Horsecart Operators, the merchants justified their arguments in the language of the liberty of commerce, alleging that:

“[S]uch communes, or colleges [guilds] ... are detrimental to the public good, for the idea of monopolies which they contain; it seems that they can only justify the immeasurable ambition of the individuals of the Guild of Maritime porters and Maritime Horsecart Operators.”⁴⁰²

The merchants noted the historic encroachment of the guilds, which sought to extend their privileges over time:

⁴⁰⁰ AGMMB, “Autos judiciales i atorgació de poders relatius al transport de mercaderies de la platja fins a la ciutat de Barcelona”, 04.04.1778 -13.02.1779, Capsa 5, carpeta 1 (2306); AGMMB, “Los prohombres del Gremio de Faquines, Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar de la presente ciudad a su excelencia, suplican [...]”, 1779/10/28 - 1780/01/18, Capsa 4, carpeta 11 (2242); and, AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291).

⁴⁰¹ BC, *Colección de papeles políticos y curiosos*, Anon. “Els Comerciants de Barcelona fan una sol·licitud en què demanen l’abolició de restriccions en el transport de gèneres i mercaderies fins aleshores restringides als ‘Faquines de Capçana’ en pro de mesures comercials més lliberals [Manuscrit]” 1778, Ms.3668/24 (fos. 239-249). [The document is a draft.]

⁴⁰² *Ibid.*, folio 239r. Original: “[s]emejantes comunes, o colegios ... son perjudiciales al bien público, por el concepto de en sí trahen de monopolios; parece que solo pueden justificarla la desmesurada ambición de los Individuos del Gremio de Faquines de Capsana, i Carreteros de Mar.”

“Never content with those [privileges] which they have procured in different epochs and always without viewing any other object than that of augmenting them; they have solicited many numerous times the ordinances of their Guild, stretching more and more the liberty of conducting the Merchandise, and other effects belonging to the Neighbors of this City.”⁴⁰³

The signatory merchants close by requesting the abolition of the goods-specific, exclusive privileges so that they could be shared equally between maritime porters and horsecart operators:

[We S]upplicate Your Excellencies with the most obsequious respect that [illegible] Your Excellencies attend to this respectful instance, [that] you find it well to abolish the privative faculties of the transportation of goods and merchandise, that are given to the *Faquines de Capsana*, making them promiscuous between them and the *Carretero* brothers of a single Guild, and promoting by this means, or by those that Your Excellencies consider opportune and convenient the Liberty and greater utility of Commerce, and that of all the Neighbors of this Capital.⁴⁰⁴

There is no indication that the local authorities acted upon this request in any way. While the merchants were specifically concerned with just one guild, the request represents a cogent criticism which was the basis of the ideology of abolition. While this radical alteration of the beach-based guild system did not occur at that time, the situation was far from settled. The 1796 departure of the maritime horsecart operators from their guild with the maritime porters opened up new opportunities for struggles over goods (even though the framework of determined goods for the two guilds was not altered). What is more, the common porters continued to pose a near-

⁴⁰³*Ibid.*, folio 239v. Original.: “Nunca contentos con las que se han procurado en diferentes epocas i siempre sin mirar a otro oieto que al de aumentarlas; han solicitado varias muchas veses las ordinaciones de su Gremio, estrechando más i más libertad de la conduccion de Mercaderias, i otros efectos a propios de los Vecinos de esta Ciudad.”

⁴⁰⁴*Ibid.*, folio 247r.-247v. Draft original: “Sup.can á V.E. con el mas obsequoso respeto, que [illegible] V.E. atender á esta respetuosa instancia, se sirva tener á bien ~~extinguir~~ abolir las facultades prvativas del transporte de Generos, y Mercaderías, que estan otorgados á los Faquines de Capsana, haciendolas promiscuas entre ellos, y los Carreteros Cofadres de un mismo Gremio, y promoviendo por este medio, ó por los que V.E. considerase mas oportunas, y convenientes la libertad ~~del Com~~ y de mayor utilidad del Comercio, y de todos los Vecinos de esta Capital.”

constant threat to the privileges of the maritime porters in the beginning of the nineteenth century.

It is worth noting that a few months after the supplication was made, the common porters attempted to form a guild which would basically share with the maritime porters the privilege of handling maritime cargo goods. This would have certainly benefitted the merchants by offering cheaper means of transport, but the attempt was denied.⁴⁰⁵ There were also serious legal cases surrounding intromission into the privileged world of maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators by maritime teamsters and common porters, specifically regarding the handling of privileged maritime cargo in and around the beach and Customs House (although this was nothing new and would resurface over the following decades).⁴⁰⁶

In 1798, a decree by the [Super-]Intendent General of the Army and Principality of Catalonia (and President of the Consulate and Royal Commerce Board) re-stated recent liberalizing reform efforts carried out by the central government over the various trade guilds.⁴⁰⁷ The decree was pronounced in response to the complaints by guildsmen of various crafts over the prohibitions and obstacles contained in the ordinances of the different guilds to which they belonged, and which “are considered contrary to the progress of their industry”.⁴⁰⁸

The guild-membership requirement for participating in a trade was not revoked; the reform did, however, eliminate the ability of the guilds to refuse the entry of any person who had successfully passed the guild entry exam. That is, it eliminated the ability of the guilds to prevent entry based on the completion of apprenticeship, officialdom, domicile, or any other requirement found in their ordinances. The measure additionally curtailed the practice of paying any amount besides the costs directly associated with their entry exam for entry into the guild.

⁴⁰⁵ AGMMB, “Copies de voler per ordenansas los camàlics en l’any 1778, y de 1784 y 1805”, 1778-1804, Capsa 8, carpeta 1 (2290).


⁴⁰⁶ For the maritime teamsters, see: AGMMB, “Autos judiciales i atorgació de poders relatius al transport de mercaderies de la platja fins a la ciutat de Barcelona”, 04.04.1778 -13.02.1779, Capsa 5, carpeta 1 (2306); and for the common porters, see: AGMMB, “Transunto auténtico de un decreto y memorial presentado por los prohombres del Gremio de Faquines, Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar de la presente ciudad a su Excelentísimo y Real Acuerdo contra los individuos vagos llamados camalics sobre cierta privativa autorizado dicho traslado por Ramon Costado, notario público. 14 Diciembre de 1778”, 26.11.1768 [sic.: 1778], Capsa 5, carpeta 6 (2311).

⁴⁰⁷ AHCB, [Faquines de Capsana], “[D. Blas de Aranza y doyle, Caballero del Orden de Santiago del Consejo de S.M.]”, 16 March 1798, Vol. 1, folio 177.

⁴⁰⁸ *Ibid.*, folio 178. Original: “(...) se consideran opuestas á los progresos de su industria...”.

Not only were labor restrictions liberalized, technical processes were also unfettered. The centuries-old practices of communalizing technological developments (through the state or, at a more concentrated level, within the guilds) was replaced by a private system of intellectual property (Sáiz González, 1999, pp. 37–57, 75–96; S. R. Epstein, 2004). However, in the trades studied here, there was no technological change of note.

Lest it be thought that the reforms and abolitions were totally unfounded (even in the realm of maritime cargo handling) or were only applied to industry, it is useful to take a glimpse at the daily struggles to maintain the privilege system. The below chart shows the number of instances per year of seizures of goods by the Guild of Maritime Porters (many of which were from common porters transporting privileged goods) for part of the period studied.⁴⁰⁹



Source: Author’s work, based on AGMMB, “Llibreta dels panyoraments. Comensa lo any de 1802”, 1802/01/29 - 1826/06/27, Capsa 4, carpeta 4 (2235).

The occupation of Barcelona by Napoleonic troops (1808-1814) and the Liberal Triennium (*Trienio Liberal*) of 1820-1823 [both detailed below] are clearly distinguishable by the absence of events. The number fines imposed were significant during the most acrimonious period between the maritime porters and the maritime horsecart operators at the beginning of the

⁴⁰⁹ Unfortunately, there is no similar record of late-eighteenth century violations of guild privileges.

nineteenth century, as the maritime porters sought to defend their traditional privileges over certain goods. By the same measure, the sequestering of goods handled by merchants employing helpers or common porters (*mossos de corda*, or *camàlichs*) is also evident in the booklet, and seems to represent the majority of cases. This shows the willingness of merchants to violate privileges by hiring a non-guild member to transport their goods. The goods detailed in the seizures also show the difficulty created by the introduction of new types of goods that were not precisely covered by the highly specific privilege system. It is clear from other sources that during the guild-abolishing Liberal Triennial the common porters were allowed to haul goods from the beach.⁴¹⁰

The above points amount to a highly significant consideration – external pressures combined with the internal disintegration of the guild system. It was not only merchants and policy makers that were concerned with guild power: some guild members also felt that their opportunities were limited or restricted [at least in the short term] by guild policies or power-hoarding by (certain) masters. The guild system had evolved to level opportunities, which could detrimentally affect members of the three component groups in different ways: apprentices, journeymen, and masters were all subject to the traditions and regulations, and conflicts arose between the groups and among masters. Additionally, the guild system was challenged by workers who were unable to form their own guilds. Thus, in the first decades of the nineteenth century, the guilds faced challenges from increasingly powerful economic actors involved in the political process, as well as pressures from other workers.

The late-eighteenth-century, Spanish Enlightenment-era measures acted as precursors for the four major, all-guild abolitions of the early nineteenth century. These acts were passed by liberal regimens in 1813, 1820, 1834, and 1836. Throughout this period, in response to the abolitions, there were a number of Royal Orders aimed at reinstating and reforming the guilds – a political alternative to all-out abolition.

⁴¹⁰ Detailed below.

The 1813 revocation of guild ordinances

The general failure of Enlightenment economic reforms contributed to the expansion and deepening of liberal ideas as a more radical economic-political platform (Lambie & Aymes, 2008). The political vacuum caused by the French occupation of parts of Spain by Napoleon's forces created an opportunity to carry out a liberal program at the national level. This was effectuated in 1813, at the hands of the *Cortes* legislature (which was also concerned with ending the French occupation). The Decree CCLXII of 8 June 1813 pronounced by the *Cortes* legislature was titled “*Sobre el libre establecimiento de fábricas y ejercicio de qualquier industria útil*” [Regarding the free establishment of factories and the exercise of any useful industry]. It read, in full:

The general and extraordinary *Córtés*, with the just objective of removing the obstacles that have until now made difficult the progress of industry, decree:

I. All Spaniards and all [currently] residing foreigners, or those who [will] reside in the towns of the Monarchy, shall freely establish factories or artifacts of whatever sort they please, without need of permission or license whatsoever, given that they subject themselves to the policing rules established for the health of the same towns.

II. They may likewise freely exercise any useful industry or trade, without the need of exam, title, or incorporation in the respective guilds, whose ordinances are revoked in this part.

The Regency of the kingdom will be informed and will fulfill it, being printed, made public, and circulated. – Given in Cádiz on 8 June 1813.— *Florencio Castillo*, President.— *José Domingo Rus*, Deputy Secretary.— *Manuel Goyanes*, Deputy Secretary.— To the Regency of the kingdom.— *Reg. lib. 2. Fol. 187.*⁴¹¹

⁴¹¹ [At the time, *Cortes* was written as “*Córtés*”.] *Córtés de Cádiz* (1813). Colección de los decretos y órdenes que han expedido las Cortes Generales y Extraordinarias desde 24 de febrero de 1813 hasta 14 de setiembre del mismo año, en que terminaron sus sesiones; comprende además el decreto expedido por las Cortes Extraordinarias en 20 del dicho mes. (Vol. 4). [Retrieved from <http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/obra-visor/coleccion-de-los-decretos-y->

The 1813 measure did not specifically *outlaw* the guilds: it revoked their ordinances or at least those parts dealing with obligatory examination and membership (the wording is not entirely clear). This was applied to the *Matriculado* guilds under the military, as well as those that operated entirely in the civilian sphere.

The laws of the *Córtes de Cádiz* were generally revoked by the return of the absolute monarchy to power upon the expulsion of the French the following year, in 1814. Due to the political upheaval caused by the occupation of the city, the guild records are largely absent of documents regarding the entire 1808-1814 period, so it is difficult to gauge the immediate effect of the 1813 measure.

The re-legitimization of the guilds in 1814 was accompanied by renewed efforts at regulating the monopolistic privileges of the guilds.⁴¹² That is, the more revolutionary approach was replaced by a reformist approach. The rationale for this was largely the need to reduce restrictive elements of the economic order while maintaining the regulatory framework established and realized by the guilds. That is, the royal authorities apparently desired to maintain the advantages of the guild system while reforming their ordinances to help boost production. However, liberal elements in local government attempted to effectuate the spirit of the measure in the post-Napoleonic period by referencing re-legitimized royal orders dating from the late eighteenth century.

The economic justification was especially important in the face of the disintegration of the Spanish Empire and other economic ills. The European context was increasingly competitive, as northern countries had significantly reformed or abolished guilds and allowed or promoted the concentration of labor in manufactories and mechanization (Farr, 1997, 2000; Ian Anders Gadd & Wallis, 2002; Ian A. Gadd & Wallis, 2006; Wadauer, 2006; Pfister, 2008). This created a perfect-storm scenario for industrial ills in Spain and further motivated the liberalization of manufactory trades.

ordenes-que-han-expedido-las-cortes-generales-y-extraordinarias-desde-24-de-febrero-de-1813-hasta-14-de-setiembre-del-mismo-ano-en-que-terminaron-sus-sesiones-comprende-ademas-el-decreto-expedido-por-las-cortes-extraordinarias-/html/0027cd54-82b2-11df-acc7-002185ce6064_105.html; last accessed 11 December 2016], p. 86.

⁴¹² The 4 May 1814 Decree of Valencia by King Fernando VII can be consulted online [for example, at: <http://www.historiasiglo20.org/HE/texto-decretovalenciafernandoVII.htm>; last accessed 16 December 2016].

In response to the political opportunity brought about by the return of the King to power, the Guild of Maritime Porters submitted a proposal to the royal authorities a proposal for new ordinances that included their traditional privileges.⁴¹³ They note that some individuals, “[...] under the apparent name of the public good, they propose to Your Excellency the destruction, or annihilation of the Guild of Maritime Porters [...]”⁴¹⁴

Additionally, the Maritime Porters requested that the responsible jurisdiction for their supervision be changed from the Royal Board of Commerce to that of the *Real Patrimonio y Bayle General de Cataluña* [the Royal Patrimony and of the *Batlle* General of Catalonia, an administrative post responsible for royal properties and public services, among other things] or the *Real Audiencia*. While not explicit, this represents an important conceptualization of their guild as existing in the realm of public service, and the desire to protect themselves from the liberalizing intentions and actions of the Board of Commerce, which are made clear in a subsequent passage.

The Board of Commerce was in the process of making “free” craft guilds in industries experiencing a technological revolution. The Guild of Maritime Porters differentiated their service-providing guild from those that produce objects in the same document:

[Regarding the] *Real Cédula* of 24 June 1770 [a type of royal order], the trades under consideration of the Board of Commerce and Coin and of which they have emanated posterior measures about the same appear not to be applicable to the objective of the trade of Maritime porters, owing to [the fact] that the cause that drives that resolution and the others that have followed it, have no other, save the fomenting of commerce and the advancement of trades, factories or manufactories and as it is for some time well known, that the guild of Maritime Porters make no manufactory, nor produces any artifact, in natural consequence of this, that a corporation, that is not dedicated to any manufacturing industry, and that has no other elements save the employment of physical labor, honor and the legality of

⁴¹³ AGMMB, “[Memorial de l’ aprovaci’de noves ordenances i de canvi d’institució rectora]”, [1815], Capsa 7, carpeta 2 (2251).

⁴¹⁴ *Ibid.*, Folio 9r. Original: “[...] bajo el aparente dictado de bein publico, se os proponga tal vez en destruccion, y aniquilam.to del Gremio de Faquines de Capsana [...]”.

each individual is not susceptible to advancement in the productions of the art, as there are none and there can be none.⁴¹⁵

It is highly interesting that the Maritime porters used the argument that, as they were a service-providing guild and created no product, the measures seeking the liberalization of the trades should not be applied to them (even while accepting incorporating the internal logic of the measures in question). While falling far short of a class-based, or pan-guild defense, this shows both judicial acumen and political flexibility in differentiating their service-provision activities from those of the resource-transforming, productive guilds.

In 1819 all guilds were required by Royal Decree to submit new ordinances.⁴¹⁶ The requirement states clearly that the aim of government was to remove the monopolistic quality of the privileges contained in the ordinances. This process was cut short by the 1820 Revolution, but was reinitiated thereafter.

The Liberal abolition of 1820-1823 and the reactionary decade

The tumultuous 1820s were largely an intensification of the plots, rebellions, and political fights of the preceding two decades (Fontana i Làzaro, 2007, pp. 1–78). The country lay in economic ruin after the Napoleonic occupation (having suffered at the hands of invading French and supposedly friendly English soldiers alike). The situation was worsened by accompanying diseases and the destruction of a significant part of the agricultural productive capacity by acts of war and pillage, and by drought. Additionally, the independence of the Spanish colonies in the Americas further reduced the revenue-generating capacity of the state. In short, it was chaos.

⁴¹⁵ *Ibid.*, folios 11v.-12r. Original: “(...) Real Cedula de 24 de Junio del 1770, los negocios tocantes al conocim(ien)to de la Junta de Comercio y Monedas y de la que han emanado las posteriores disposiciones sobre el particular parece no son aplicables al objeto del oficio de Faquines de Capsana, atendido que la causa impulsiva de aquella resolucion y demas que la han subseguido, no ha sido otra, que el fomento del comercio, y el adelantamiento de los oficios, fabriles, o manufacturas y como que es desde luego bien visto, que ninguna manufacturacion, ningun artefacto produce el gremio de Faquines de Capsana, en natural consecuencia de esto, que una corporacion, que no se dedica a ninguna industria fabril y que no tiene otros elementos, que el empleo de la fuerza fisica, y la honradez, y legalidad de cada individuo no es susceptible de adelantamientos en producciones del arte, pues que ninguna tiene ni puede tener.

⁴¹⁶ This measure, dated 2 July 1819, is referenced in AGMMB, “Copia de las ordenanzas de los Gremios de Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros y Tragineros de Mar de la ciudad de Barcelona publicada por el Supremo Consejo de Hacienda en 11 de julio de 1832, Capsa 2, carpeta 1 (2209). The Supremo Consejo de Hacienda is translated as, the Supreme Council of Internal Revenue.

The Liberal Revolution (and the three-year period of liberal government which it ushered in to power) began in January 1820 with a military mutiny in Cádiz (the initial complaints resting on the poor rations caused by logistical failures in preparation for sending royal troops to the Americas to reclaim the rebellious, republican former Spanish colonies) (Fontana i Làzaro, 2007, pp. 79–114). The military disorder was seized upon by constitutionalist military and political plotters, who carried out a revolution. On 9 March, Fernando VII recognized the 1812 constitution and liberal ministers took power. Quickly thereafter, the king was placed under house arrest by liberal revolutionaries, and civil war (first by *guerrillas*, then by regular troops) raged for the next three years. During these three years (interchangeably referred to as the “Constitutional Triennium” or the “Liberal Triennium”), the central government was run by a series of more radical, then less revolutionary constitutionalists.

The absolutist monarchies of Europe did not stand idly by as the revolutionary constitutionalist message and example of Spain spread out through the periphery of the continent (each echo of which would be silenced in turn). Instead the five principal monarchs of Europe (reunited at the Congress of Verona in October 1822) delegated to France the responsibility for restoring Fernando VII to the throne with absolute royal sovereignty, which it did in late 1823 [it should be noted that this was at the request of Fernando, who was unable to re-take the throne with his own forces] (Fontana i Làzaro, 2007, pp. 103–106; Fontana i Làzaro, 2015). While it must be recognized that this relation regarding the Congress of Verona is the subject of recent criticism (de la Torre del Río, 2011), the end result was the same; for the purposes of this investigation, the controversy is more or less irrelevant.

In addition to all-out civil war, the 1820-1824 period was also marked by failed crops and an outbreak of Yellow Fever, centered on the port. The city of Barcelona was quarantined from the rest of Spain, and unknown tens of thousands of the residents perished (Hernández, 2001; Fontana i Làzaro, 2003).

The Liberal regime that came to power through the Revolution of 1820 was decidedly and avowedly liberal in both political and economic terms (Arnabat Mata, 2001; Fontana i Làzaro, 2003; Fontana i Làzaro, 2007). It is noteworthy that the political, judicial, and socio-economic foundations of this government were the measures put forth by the *Cortes* of Cádiz which had

met during the Napoleonic occupation (Burrieza, 2013). That is, the Liberal government re-established and developed upon the economic measures of 1812 (Fontana i Làzaro, 2007, pp. 97–106; Cabrillo, 2012).

Specifically as regards the guilds, on 22 May 1820, a *Circular* [Official Notice] was circulated instructing local authorities to carry out the Royal Order of 16 May, which was a complete and verbatim restatement of the Decree of 8 May 1813, without any changes.⁴¹⁷

What did this mean for the guilds? Once again, the Matriculate and civil-sphere guilds were formally stripped of their ordinances (Colldeforns Lladó, 1951). Officially, they no longer existed as judicial persons, nor enjoyed any privileges. However, it does not seem that they were in any way persecuted or repressed. As was the case during the Napoleonic occupation, the backdrop of military conflict and political upheaval contributed to a general scarcity of documents from this time. However, it is clear that at least some of them continued to function, even without privileges.

However, the abolition had taken affect: the common porters – long prohibited from handling maritime cargo – had taken advantage of the end of the privilege system – even going so far as to use the pole-and-cushion means of transport long-privileged to the maritime porters.⁴¹⁸ In September 1820, the Directors of the Guild of Maritime Porters accused their rivals, the common porters of entering the Royal Customs House, where goods were stored and protected by the maritime porters.⁴¹⁹ In this supplication, it was noted that the long-standing privilege of the Guild of Maritime Porters to transport goods to and from the Royal Customs House had been revoked, creating a situation in which the common porters were entering the Customs House (and causing great damage to goods, according to the maritime porters). The Guild of Maritime Porters argued that the common porters should not be permitted to enter the Customs House.

⁴¹⁷ The 22 May notice reestablishing the 1813 abolitionary measure is available online for consultation [<http://digital.utsa.edu/cdm/fullbrowser/collection/p15125coll6/id/1219/rv/compoundobject/cpd/1221>; last accessed 17 December 2016.]

⁴¹⁸ AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos a l’Ajuntament de Barcelona relativa a la vulneració de les ordenances sobre el transport de mercaderies]”, 1820/05/18 - 1820/05/31, Capsa 7, carpeta 34 (2283); and, AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos al Reial Acord relativa a la contravenció d’un decret]”, 1820/06/23, Capsa 7, carpeta 33 (2282).

⁴¹⁹ AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos]”, 1820/09/26 - 1820/09/27, Capsa 7, carpeta 12 (2261)

There is no follow-up or response to this supplication in the records – it seems as though the period was one of open competition.

And, just as in 1814, the return to power of the absolutist monarchy of Fernando VII again brought the re-instatement in 1824 of the guilds, their ordinances, and their respective privileges. Customary economic activities are hard to change, especially when not replaced by an alternative, functioning system. It could be that, in the absence of access to legitimate, judicial resolutions, the guildsmen took upon themselves directly the day-to-day defense of their ancient privileges. Upon re-establishment of the guilds, life basically either continued as it had been (largely unaffected by the abolition) or quickly returned to the *status quo ante bellum*.

And, just as in the first re-legitimization of the guilds in 1814, the 1824 effort was accompanied by an effort by Fernando to curtail the most monopolistic qualities of the guild ordinances. As such, the guilds were compelled to comply with the 1819 order to draft new ordinances, a process that lasted for the better part of the next decade (Romero Marín, 2007a). In the case of the maritime cargo-handlers, the adaptive strategies were quite varied, apparently owing to the internal dynamics of each guild. In summary, the new ordinance generally liberalized the selection of which trade would handle goods at the determination of the owners of said goods.⁴²⁰ For their parts, the Maritime Horsecart Operators and Maritime Teamsters would operate without a turn system, while the Maritime Porters continued their obligatory turn. Just eighteen months later, the Maritime Horsecart Operators proposed new ordinances that would have re-established the turn system, but there is no indication that this proposal was ever accepted.⁴²¹

The guilds under the Matriculate of the Sea system were apparently not affected by the decision to remove monopolistic privileges.

⁴²⁰ AGMMB, “Copia de las ordenanzas de los Gremios de Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros y Tragineros de Mar de la ciudad de Barcelona publicada por el Supremo Consejo de Hacienda en 11 de julio de 1832, Capsa 2, carpeta 1 (2209).

⁴²¹ AHCB, [Carreteros de Mar], “[Ordenanzas que ha formado el Gremio de Carreteros de Mar....]” . 18 April 1834. Caja 42, carpeta 10.

The 1834 Reform

Even after the end of the Liberal Triennium, Spain remained a festering wound in the political body of Europe. As noted by Josep Fontana (2007, p. 115):

The powers of the Holy Alliance that in 1823 “liberated” Fernando VII from the constitutional regimen attempted to reestablish internal peace and achieve that the monarch adopt a moderate policy and put his administration in order, with the aim that Spain reach political stability and cease to be a *foco* of permanent agitation.⁴²²

However, the “internal peace” was tenuously maintained through repression of liberal elements – such that the post-1824 period is known as “Ominous Decade” (Fontana i Làzaro, 2007, pp. 115–137).

The political madness and economic difficulties of the first quarter of the nineteenth century continued largely unabated into the 1830s (albeit on a decidedly smaller scale), a decade that began with the downfall of the Bourbon regime in France and failed uprisings by liberal officers in Spain (Fontana i Làzaro, 2007, pp. 135–137). With the death of Fernando VII on 29 September 1833, the political situation in Spain was once again thrown into utter chaos, as he left no male heir and disagreements persisted over the legitimacy of female inheritance of the crown. As a result, the country was torn between absolutist and constitutionalist forces. This time, though, both lines were represented by royals: Carlos (brother of the deceased King) for the former; and Queen Regent María Cristina for the latter. In general terms, the Carlists were stark traditionalists convinced of the moral and judicial supremacy of the Church (exemplified by the maintenance of the Inquisition) and the necessity of an absolutist monarch capable of crushing opposition. The *Cristinos* (as the supporters of Maria Cristina were known) included moderate and relatively extremist liberal elements convinced of the viability of a constitutional monarchy with liberal participation.

⁴²² Original: “Las potencias de la Santa Alianza que en 1823 ‘libraron’ a Fernando VII del régimen constitucional pretendían restablecer la paz interior y conseguir que el monarca adoptase una política moderada y pusiera orden en la administración, con el fin de que España alcanzase estabilidad política y dejase de ser un foco de agitación permanente.”

Enter, the [First] Carlist War (Fontana i Làzaro, 2007, pp. 147–175). The mid-1830s were defined by a multi-dimensional civil war which began with plots and developed into all-out civil war. The repression of plots by both Carlist sympathizers and more extreme liberal plotters and sympathizers underscores the severity of the political crisis.⁴²³ The conflict that ravaged the country was exacerbated by yet another outbreak of cholera, and a general panorama of economic woe (Fontana i Làzaro, 2007, pp. 147–183). The general labor situation was on the precipice of great change because of the arrival in Spain of steam-powered systems for mechanizing textile production.

In military terms, the Carlist War involved between 260,000 and 280,000 thousand troops, in addition to militia members (Fontana i Làzaro, 2007, pp. 149–150). The rural-urban dichotomy of the conflict underscored the socio-cultural and economic differences of the population. The conflict was marked by what (at the time at least) were considered unparalleled acts of brutality and savagery. Not least of which was the anti-clerical violence, which raged through a number of important Spanish and Catalan cities, beginning in July 1834 (about a week before the opening of the legislative *Cortes* of 1834), and resurfacing in Barcelona in July 1835 (Fontana i Làzaro, 2007, pp. 150–154).⁴²⁴

The 1834 reform was passed on 20 January – just a few days after Queen Regent María Cristina named the reformist liberal politician (and former political prisoner and exile in France), Francisco Martínez de la Rosa to the position of *Presidente del Consejo de Ministros* (President of the Council of Ministers); however he maintained Javier de Burgos as the *Ministro de Fomento* (Minister of Economic Development).

The justification of the 1834 reform (found in the preamble) is specifically aimed at the need to renovate economic development and growth:⁴²⁵

⁴²³ Take, for example, the execution of Mariana Pineda, whose “martyrdom” in 1831 was sufficiently exemplary to again gain relevance in the early twentieth century through the eponymous play by Federico García Lorca.

⁴²⁴ The 1835 violence is addressed in the following subsection, devoted to the 1836 measure.

⁴²⁵ The 1834 act was published in the official bulletin *Gaceta de Madrid*, No. 10, 21 de Enero de 1834 [available on line at: <http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE//1834/010/A00037-00037.pdf>; last accessed on 21 December 2016].

“Desiring to remove those obstacles that have opposed until now the fomentation and prosperity of the different industries; convinced that the rules contained in the statutes and ordinances that direct the guild associations, formed to protect them have served perhaps to accelerate their decadence; and persuaded of the utility that can be given to the State by these corporations, considered as gatherings of men animated by a common interest to stimulate the progresses of the respective industries, and help each other reciprocally in their needs, I have found [...] that all the ordinances, statutes or regulations peculiar to each branch of factory industry that rule today or will be formed hereafter, shall be corrected to deserve Royal approval on the following bases:”

However, it does not seem that the measure would have accomplished these lofty (and arguably much-needed) goals. No section of the act (or the combination thereof) abolished the guilds or eliminated their privileges or ordinances. The nine points of the act considered a number of reforms. However, they maintain the apprenticeship and journeymen components and the obligatory nature of guild membership for practicing a trade.

The first section notes that the “guild associations, no matter their denomination or objective, will not enjoy privileged *fueros* and depend exclusively on the municipal authority of each town”.⁴²⁶ The second establishes that the reform does not impact mercantile obligations of the parties, which will continue to be covered by the competent authorities. The third point attempts to counter the ability of the guilds to control the workforce: “There shall not be formed guild associations destined to monopolize work in favor of a determined number of individuals.” However, the practical ability of the guilds to limit new entries appears to have remained.⁴²⁷

The fourth point mandates that guilds dedicated to commercializing food goods – “rolls, drinks, fruits, vegetables or any other food or drink article” – cannot limit the number of

⁴²⁶ The *fueros* was a centuries-old mechanism of privileges conceded by the crown

⁴²⁷ As demonstrated through the study of the membership registry of the Guild of Maritime Porters in the previous chapter.

individuals. However, bread-bakers were specifically exempted from this freeing of the trade, considering the capital required to bake. Curiously, the making of bread had already been declared a “free” trade (at least in some localities); likewise, it seems contradictory that the declared logic – “that in no case whatsoever shall there be a scarcity of bread” – would have been better served by eliminating the membership requirement in bread-making guilds.

The fifth point is the first to refer to fabrication, and covers all interior trade in general: “No guild ordinance will be approved if it contains dispositions contraries to the freedom of fabrication, to the interior circulation [which is to say, not exportation] of the goods and fruits of the realm, or the indefinite concurrence of labor and of capital.”

The sixth point covers apprenticeship and examinations – a long-standing point of contention and one that directly influenced the expansion of the work force. Instead of eliminating the requirement of apprenticeship, the measure maintained the prerogative of the guilds to determine the conditions of apprenticeship. The measure specified that those who had done their apprenticeships outside of the Kingdom or in their homes would enjoy the right to take the examination to become a journeyman or master, and to practice the trade when following the rules established in the ordinances.

The seventh point grants the freedom of mobility – a guild member could transfer his operations anywhere in the Kingdom – granting that he joined the respective guild in his new place of residence. Likewise, any individual could practice any number of trades, granting that he inscribe in the respective guilds.

The ninth (and final) point states that, “All valid guild ordinance and those that may be made in the future, shall be made to conform to the above rules, and none shall be carried out without Royal approval.” This maintains the requirement that guild ordinances will be approved by the crown government (not local authorities) – even though the municipal authorities would govern the corporations.

The 1834 measure passed by the *Cortes* did not differ in any meaningful way from the reforms promoted by Fernando VII, before and after the Liberal Triennium, in that they attempted to eliminate the monopolistic privileges. The main difference is that the 1834 attempt devolved jurisdictional authority to the municipal governments (even while maintaining the royal prerogative in approving the ordinances).

The violence of 1835 and the “abolition” of 1836

The general economic and political panorama of the early 1830s remained largely unchanged in 1835, largely unaltered by the moderate reformist efforts of the liberal-influenced Queen Regent and the 1834 *Cortes*. The Carlist war had been raging since 1833, affecting mainly the rural population. However, related outbreaks of violence brought the complicated, multi-factor issues to the fore in urban areas in 1834 and 1835 (Fontana i Làzaro, 2003; Fontana i Làzaro, 2007; Romero Marín, 2007a; Cabrillo, 2012; Burrieza, 2013).

The 1834-1835 wave followed a similar experience of anticlerical violence during the Liberal Triennial, 1822-1823 (Ledesma, 1999). All of the 1830s violence occurred within the context of the Carlist War, in which the political participation of the clergy and the growing power of the liberal bourgeoisie were in play. The conflict was not simply traditionalists versus liberals – the emboldened journeymen and other elements of the nascent working class were able to express themselves in opposition to both these groups, as shown by the complex events of the Barcelona *Bullangues*.

The 1835 violence in Barcelona (known in Catalan as the *Bullangues*) was multi-faceted and included a number of significant events: the 6 August lynching of Military Governor Bassa, the representative of order; the subsequent assaults on the Bonaplata factory and the Customs House; the burning of port-area tax-collection huts (known as “*burots*” in Catalan); and the significantly later declaration of a state of siege and the threat of riot by maritime porters in November – all give us an indication of the political and social *milieu* of highly politicized labor relations in Barcelona in the months leading up to the abolition of the guilds in 1836.

On the hot summer night of 25 July, upon learning of the death a few days previous of workers in the Catalonian city of Reus, a section of the population of Barcelona revolted. Francisco Raüll

Julià⁴²⁸ (1835) – a Catalan Liberal newspaperman, in a highly politicized booklet in 1835, in which he reflected on the causes and effects of the commotions of 25 and 26 July of the same year – noted the ire directed at the clergy because of their involvement in the political-military organizations. In reference to events in Reus, he noted (1835, p. 32) these events were “[...] news that aggravated the fact that some clergy were those who captained the hordes of Vandals that desolated Catalonia, inflamed the spirits to a degree that is not possible to ponder”.⁴²⁹ Because of their perception of the role of elements of the Catholic Church hierarchy in supporting the Carlist cause, and likely also based upon long-standing displeasure with the reactionary aspects of the powerful clergy, the rage of the rebellious crowds in Barcelona was first directed at the physical infrastructures of the Church.

Initially, the Liberal press supported the anti-clerical rage, as it was focused on reactionary elements of society, groups and individuals that were insufficiently repressive or supportive (actively and/or passively) of anti-liberal forces (Fontana i Làzaro, 2003). However, when the ire of the masses was turned against industry, this basically favorable position changed radically. Liberalism in Barcelona was characteristically industrial. While the infrastructure of industrial production was nascent, it seems as though the coming industrial future was beyond the doubt of Barcelona’s liberal industrial bourgeoisie.

It could be that there were different elements that became active at different moments during the crisis of 1835. It could be that the anti-clerical violence was undertaken by one group, while the anti-industrial rage was the work of others. Or, it could have been the same amorphous group – radical elements of the Barcelona population, united by desperate poverty, labor preoccupation, hunger, and general downtroddenness.

I have been unable to unearth evidence of the actions of specific workers or organizations in the events of the summer of 1835. Likewise, there is no documentation of the participation of maritime cargo-handling workers in the events of 6 August 1835, when the Royal Customs

⁴²⁸ His paternal last name is spelled variously, at times Raüll, Raull, or Raül.

⁴²⁹ Original: “[...] noticia que agravaba el hecho de que algunos eclesiásticos son los que están capitaneando las hordas de Vándalos que desolan Cataluña, inflame los ánimos a un grado que no es posible ponderar”.

House was sacked. This attack on a principal symbol of central (royal) rule occurred just a few hours after the assault on and burning of the Bonaplata factory.

While not confirming that cargo workers were involved in the Customs House attack, it is interesting to note the condition of the maritime porters' guild just three months later (and only ten days after the declaration of a state of siege), the *Prohombres* of the guild went to the Commerce Board to inform them that there existed a possibility of “a sort of riot” the next day, “with the only objective of arbitrarily removing from his position the *Síndico* of the Guild”.⁴³⁰ In the judgment of the *Prohombres* this situation was unavoidable as “that corporation finds itself in such disorder that it is not possible for its representatives to control” the threat of riot.⁴³¹ Juanjo Romero Marín (2007a, p. 112) interpreted this as a continuation of a pattern of confrontational maneuvers by the guild – which was facing abolition at the hands of the very same Commerce Board – that is, it was a thinly veiled threat by these representatives.

While it is difficult to determine the motivations of the guild representatives, I suspect that it may well have been a combination of the representatives raising the alarm and distancing themselves from what could occur – they were, after all, the representatives of the body, and most likely would have been held responsible. In addition, it could have also been a way of seeking support from the authorities in order to prevent any public disorder and, in the process, defend the *status quo* in the guild.

One year later (in December 1836), the guilds were again abolished through the reestablishment of the 1813 decree. The 1836 Decree reads, in full:

Doña Isabel II by the grace of God and by the Constitution of the Spanish monarchy, Queen of the Spains, and in her Royal name the Queen Regent and Governor, to all those that are present and shall understand, be known: that the general *Córtes* have decreed the following:

⁴³⁰ AHCB, [Faquines de Capsana], “[No title]”, 18.11.1835 Caja 42, carpeta 18. Original: “una especie de asonada” ... “con el solo objeto de separar arbitrariamente de su destino al Síndico del Gremio”. The *Síndico* was a long-term, paid position in the guild, responsible for external relations, following legal cases, et cetera.

⁴³¹ *Ibid.*, “aquella corporación se halla en un desorden tal que no es posible a dichos sus representantes de contener”.

The *Córtes*, using the faculty conceded to them in the Constitution, have decreed:

The reestablishment of the decree of the general and extraordinary *Córtes* dated 8 June 1813, by which was ordered the freedom in the establishment of factories and the exercise of any useful industry, in the manner that in it was established.

Palace of the *Córtes* 2 December of 1836.= Antonio Gonzalez, President.= Pascual Fernandez Baeza, Deputy Secretary.= Julian de Huelvas, Deputy Secretary.

As such we order all the tribunals, justices, chiefs, governors and other authorities, civil as well as military and ecclesiastic, of any class and dignity, that keep and make kept, comply and execute the present decree in all its parts. They will be informed for its fulfillment, and will have it printed, published and circulated.= It is signed by Royal hand.= Palace 6 of December of 1836.= A.D. Joaquin María Lopez.⁴³²

With this short measure, the 1813 decree was once again the law of the land (however, this time it was not applied to the Matriculate Guilds). One sentence was sufficient to abolish the centuries-old guild system.

A few months later, eight commissioners representing fifty-two Colleges and Guilds of Barcelona took the opportunity to make public their support of the Constitutionals and the Queen Regent on 5 May 1837 in two – printed, not handwritten – documents (one directed to the legislature, the other, to the Queen Regent):⁴³³

⁴³² Gaceta de Madrid, No. 735, 10 December 1836, “[Real decreto mandando guardar, cumplir y ejecutar el de las *Córtes* que restablece otro de las generales y extraordinarias, fecha 8 de Junio de 1813, por el que ordenaron la libertad en el establecimiento de fábricas y ejercicio de cualquiera industria útil.]” [Retrieved from <http://www.boe.es/datos/pdfs/BOE//1836/735/A00001-00001.pdf>; accessed on 27 December 2016].

⁴³³ I find it interesting that these documents were not handwritten, but were printed, which suggests a wider distribution than only the stated recipients. AGMMB, “[Memorial de la Comissió de Col·legis i Gremis de Barcelona dirigit a les Corts espanyoles i a la reina d'Espanya]”; and “[A las *Córtes*]”, 1 May 1837, Capsa 3, carpeta 15 (2228).

The Colleges and Guilds of Barcelona abound in the same feelings, and if they have not elevated these before the Senate, it was, because to meet they had to overcome intrinsic inconveniences, and because even had these not occurred, it is not easy to congregate in a short time so many corporations. These are comprised of an immense number of families whose only surrounding is peace and tranquility, because they are the ones who form the artistic and industrial masses of the greatest capital of the monarchy; and because of this they make known equally, that no one surpasses them in love of the progress of liberty (not license), without which the arts and industry would lie in ruin.⁴³⁴

Unfortunately, there is no detail of which of the many guilds and colleges of Barcelona signed this statement.⁴³⁵ Likewise, there were seventy guilds and colleges recorded in a similar book in 1840.⁴³⁶

Interestingly, there is no mention whatsoever of the abolitionist measure of 1836, passed just a few months prior. Instead, the guilds seem to be making a sincere statement of support to the *Córtes* and Queen Regent in their combined struggle against the Carlist forces.

An ideological assessment of the guild question would suggest that the guilds would have supported the Carlists, as defenders of the old order (especially in light of the abolitionary measure emitted just a few months prior). After mid-1836, increasingly radical liberal elements held key positions in the constitutional monarchy of the Queen Regent (Fontana i Làzaro, 2007, pp. 147–183). Evidently, the guild representatives made the calculated decision to support the constitutionalist forces, reminding them of the ability and desire of the guilds to continue their

⁴³⁴ *Ibid.* Original: “Los Colegios y Gremios de Barcelona abundan en los mismos sentimientos ; y si no los han elevado antes al Senado, fué, porque para reunirse tuvieron que allanar inconvenientes estrínicos, y porque aun cuando no hubiesen estos mediado, no es fácil congregar en breve tiempo tantas corporaciones. Estas componen un inmenso número de familias cuyo ambiente único es la paz y tranquilidad, porque son las que forman las masas artísticas é industriales de la mejor capital de la monarquía ; y por ello se deja conocer igualmente , que nadie las aventaja en amor al progreso de la libertad (no licencia), sin la cual las artes é industria yacieran en el abatimiento.”

⁴³⁵ Unknown. (1836). *Guía estadística de Barcelona y manual de forasteros para el año 1836*. (Barcelona: Verdager), pp 242-251 [Retrieved from <https://books.google.it/books?id=5fT02ChOMQsC>; accessed on 26 December 2016]. Around the same time, there were some seventy-two guilds (at least according to a guide for travelers); Patxot, F. (1840). *Manual del viajero en Barcelona*. Barcelona: Francisco Oliva. Retrieved from <https://books.google.it/books?id=wRBFWLcqsLYC>.

⁴³⁶ Patxot, F. (1840). *Manual del viajero en Barcelona*. (Barcelona: Francisco Oliva), pp 181-183 [Retrieved from <https://books.google.it/books?id=wRBFWLcqsLYC>; accessed 26 December 2016].

ancient obligation to loyally raise troops for the service of the crown when necessary. Unfortunately, there is no record [located] regarding the response or lack of a response from the *Córtes* or crown government.

In the years that immediately followed the 1836 measure, the maritime cargo handling guilds continued to function. Their existence is evident in the court records, where a number of cases were brought to maintain ancient privileges from intromission by alleged violators (including other guilds).

In February 1837 a legal case was brought against a one Antoni Ametller over the issue of the defendant transporting boxes of sugar, a violation of the privilege of the plaintiffs, the Guild of Maritime Porters. On 18 December 1837, the defendant was found to be in violation, and was ordered to pay legal costs and 6 *lluires*.⁴³⁷

About six months after the abolition, on 26 June 1837, the maritime porters registered a complaint against the common porters before the Board of Commerce. The Board did not accept the filing, citing jurisdiction.⁴³⁸

On 9 January 1839, the Guild of Maritime Porters filed a complaint and request to the Commandant of the Navy against the alleged intrusion by the mariners in the unloading of goods.⁴³⁹ The mariners were a Matriculated guild and as such remained excluded from the abolition, and were under the jurisdiction of the Commandant of the Navy. No record has been found of an official response.

On 8 January 1840, the Guild of Maritime Porters requested authorization from the municipal authorities to elect new Directors. The Directors of the guild note that two years had passed since they were allowed to elect new Directors. Two weeks later, on 24 January 1840, the

⁴³⁷ AGMMB, “[Sentència del Tribunal de Comerç de Barcelona del plet entre el prohomi i comissionat del Gremi de Bastaixos i Antoni Ametller, demandat]”, 02.02.1837 – 18.12.1837, Capsa 4, carpeta 13 (2244).

⁴³⁸ AGMMB, “[Sol·licitud sobre l'observància de normatives i l'intrusisme professional]”, 26.06.1837–n.d., Capsa 7, carpeta 7 (2256).

⁴³⁹ AGMMB, “[Sol·licitud a la Comandància de Marina sobre el compliment de la normativa de transport de mercaderies al port]”, 9 January 1839, Capsa 7, carpeta 6 (2255).

municipal authorities denied this request, noting (in the margins of the original request, as was common):

[In] respect [of the fact] that the guilds are abolished by decree of the *Cortes*, the *Ayuntamiento* [municipal authorities] cannot accede to the naming of other Directors, unless the ordinances of the soliciting party have been approved by H.M. [Her Majesty].⁴⁴⁰

Just a few days later, on 29 January 1840, the Maritime Porters again requested that the municipal authorities authorize the Guild to elect Directors for the Guild for the year of 1841. They noted their “surprise” at the previous refusal of the municipality to authorize new elections, and reveal that the abolition had not been effectuated:

In effect, Your Excellency based [your argument] on the abolition of the Guilds by decree of the *Cortes*, being such that *de facto* there remain in this numerous Capital all of the scientific Colleges, those of the liberal Arts., and all the Guilds, such that the *Junta de Comercio* for the subsidy of this branch [of commerce], and Your Excellency yourself for the distribution in the branch of industry, and that of Commerce count on these Corporations, as it is to them that the distribution is made of the contributions, and afterwards each of them shares the amount designated to them among the individuals that comprise them, classifying them proportionally based on their respective members and possibilities.⁴⁴¹

⁴⁴⁰ AGMMB, “[Instàcia del Gremi de Bastaixos]”, 8.01.1840–24.01.1840, Capsa 7, carpeta 17 (2266), folio. 1r. Original: “Respecto de estar abolidos los gremios por decreto de Cortes, no puede accede el Ayuntamiento al nombramiento de otros Prohombres, á no ser que las ordenanzas de los recurrentes hayan sido aprobados por S.M. [Su Majestad]. Así lo acordó el Escimo Ayunto, conste”.

⁴⁴¹ AGMMB, “[Sol-licitud per al nomenament de prohoms del Gremi]”, (29 January 1840 – 21 February 1840), Capsa 7, carpeta 9 (2258), fo. 1r-1v. Original: “En efecto, V.E. se funda para ello en que estarian abolidos los Gremios por decreto de Cortes, siendo asi que de hecho subsisten en esta numerosa Capital todos los Colegios cientificos, los de Artes liberales, y todos los Gremios, en tanto que la Junta de Comercio para el subsidio de este ramo, y V.E. mismo para el reparto en el ramo de industria, y del Comercio cuentan con estas Corporaciones, pues que á ellas se hacen los repartos de las contribuciones, y despues cada una de ellas va repartiendo el cupo que se la ha sido señalado entre los individuos que la componen, clasificandolos proporcionalm[ent]e segun sus respectivos haberes, y posibilidades.”

The Directors go on to note that they had received no order communicating the abolition (nor had any of the other guilds or colleges, to their knowledge), and all continued to function and be represented by their respective officers.

The most interesting aspect of this supplication was judicial in nature:

[...A]dditionally, if one analyzes the decree of Your Excellency, it appears that the abolition would not be absolute, and if so only in respect to those Guild Corporations that did not have the approval of their ordinances by Her Majesty, such that, having them approved, far from being abolished the Corporation, they should be regarded as existent, according to the very spirit of the decree.⁴⁴²

The guild Directors note that the guild had existed and operated from 1323. The Guild also noted that the existing ordinances (from 1832) were passed despite the “express will” of the guild; nonetheless, they were rectified by the Board of Commerce of Barcelona, and approved by sovereign authorities (and accepted by the Guild). What was in play was the “political existence” of the corporation. The exponents considered that it would be “Anti-political [...] to take as abolished in this industrious Capital a Corporation so numerous, as well as so useful and necessary to Commerce [...]”.⁴⁴³

Specifically, commerce had necessity of a body of organized, committed, and trustworthy workers, as:

“[...]t would be a delirium, it would be a waking dream, and promote not a just and legal liberty, [but] instead a continuous disorder, a debauchery and license, so that men without responsibility and of bad morals, under the pretext of dedicating themselves to transportation, throw themselves on the property of others, and the same *Junta de Comercio* in the year of 1832 penetrated very well as to the

⁴⁴² *Ibid.*, folio 1v. Original: “[...] además de que, si bien se analiza el decreto de V.E., parece que la abolicion no seria absoluta, y si solo con respecto à aquellas Corporaciones Gremiales que no tuviesen aprobadas sus ordenanzas por S.M., de modo que, teniendolas ya aprobadas, lejos de quedar abolida la Corporacion, debe tenerse por ecistente, segun el mismo espiritu del decreto.”

⁴⁴³ *Ibid.*, folio 1v. Original: “Antipolítico consideran los esponentes que seria el tenerse por abolida en esta industriosa Capital una Corporacion tan numerosa, al paso que util y necesaria al Comercio [...].”

convenience of avoiding for the people it represents sizeable hurdles, when they proposed to His Majesty [Fernando VII] the ordinances that Your Excellency sees attached [to the letter of supplication], and obtained the approval of the same by the Sovereign.⁴⁴⁴

This time, in response, the authorities stated that the existing [and attached] ordinances (of 1832) had “no value”. The authorities required the submission of new ordinances for approval by the royal government. On 21 February 1840, the municipal authorities noted this [in the margin of the written request]:

Having no value the ordinances presented by the supplicants, being only licit the reform of these to the tone prescribed in the standing laws and Royal orders, they are given the period of three months to present them reformed, during which time the current Directors are allowed to continue to exercise their functions as such, or to call the Corporation to a meeting and name two to carry out the matters for which they are charged; not withstanding that it be understood that this condescendence serve as a pretext for those named to continue to function as Directors, because it will only be tolerated to give them time to reform their ordinances and present them to the municipal authorities.⁴⁴⁵

This constitutes a very significant decision on the part of the municipal authorities. Just one month prior, these very same officials had considered the guilds “abolished”; now they understood the 1836 measure to be one that required new ordinances (as argued by the Guild of Maritime Porters).

⁴⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, folios 2r-2v. Original: “[...] seria un delirio, seria sonar despierto, y promover, no una libertad justa y legal, sinó un continuo desorden, un desengreño y licencia, paraque hobres sin responsabilidad y de mala moral, so pretest dedicarse al transporte, se lanzasen sobre la propiedad ajena, y la misma Junta de Comercio ya en el año de mil ocho cientos treinta y dos se penetró muy bien de cuanto la convenia evitar à sus representados tamaños escollos, cuando propúso à S.M. las ordenanzas que V.E. vé acompañadas, y obtúvo la aprobacion de las mismas por el Soberano.”

⁴⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, folios 1r.-1v. Original: “No siendo de ningun valor las ordenanzas presentadas por los recurrentes, siendoles tan solo licito reformarlas à tenor de lo que proscriben las leyes y Reales ordenes vigentes, se les señala el término de tres meses para presentarlas reformadas, durante cuyo tiempo se faculta à los actuales prohombres para continuar ejerciendo las funciones de tales, o para reunir la Corporacion y nombrar dos que practiquen las gestiones de que se hallan encargados; sin que esta condescendencia pueda servir de pretexto para continuar despues los nombrados ejerciendo las veces de Prohombres, porque solo se tolera para darles tiempo para reformar sus ordenanzas y presentarlas al Cuerpo municipal.”

Thereafter, there is no indication of the result of the request. However, one way or another, the corporation elected new officers for 1840 and continued to function. Eight months later (in September 1840) there were two new Directors bringing a formal complaint to the Marine [Naval] Commandant on behalf of the Guild of Maritime Porters against the Mariners, whom were accused of professional intrusion for handling goods on land – a violation of the 1832 ordinances.⁴⁴⁶ Interestingly, the Maritime Porters note that the mariners were using the bar-and-cushion combination that is the long-standing traditional (and privileged) mode of transport of the members of the Guild of Maritime Porters. That is to say – these alleged violations were not merely accidental occurrences of carrying goods too far beyond the beach into the city – these were cases of usurping the privileged means and areas of operation jealously guarded by the maritime porters during five centuries. If this were not enough, the maritime porters accused the mariners of disturbing the public order and tranquility, and of using threats of violence against the maritime porters.

The supplication notes that in 1837 the Board of Commerce and the Marine Commandant's office agreed that the maritime porters would have a privilege over the handling of all the "fruits" from the colonies, except cotton, which could be handled by either the mariners or maritime porters at the discretion of the owners of the cargo. The removal of the privilege for handling cotton was significant as cotton was one of the principal resources for the burgeoning textile industry that was so important in Barcelona (Sánchez, 2011a, 2011b, 2015).

The Maritime Porters go on to note that the intrusion of the mariners was "very prejudicial to the supplicants, and contrary to dispositions that govern the matters, it seems that it should have contained the Matriculated and Mariners, and more so under the pretext of the Royal order of 23 March 1838 excluding all terrestrial transportation and handling [...]".⁴⁴⁷

More interestingly still, the document notes that the municipal authorities decreed on 2 January 1840 that the Guild of Maritime Porters:

⁴⁴⁶ AGMMB, "[Sol·licitud del Gremi de Bastaixos a les autoritats de Barcelona relativa a la pràctica d'intrusisme professional per part dels mariners o matriculats]", 21.09.1840, Capsa 7, carpeta 5 (2254).

⁴⁴⁷ *Ibid.* folio 1v. Original: [...] muy prejudicial à los recurrentes, y contraria a las disposiciones que rigen en la meteria, parecia deberia haber contenido à los Matricultados y Mareantes, mas so pretext de la Real orden de veinte y tres de Marzo de mil ocho cientos treinta y ocho del todo ajena del transporte y conduccion terrestre [...]."

[...C]ould continue as before[,] transporting goods from the boardwalk of the port to the top of the dock, warehouses, and other points, whenever the owners of the goods call them to this objective.⁴⁴⁸

The supplication closes by requesting that the Marine Commandant take all convenient measures,

[...W]ith the aim that the Mariners and Matriculated [individuals] abstain from restricting the liberty of Commerce to choose whom best suits him, and of depriving the *Faquines*, as they have done to this day [...].⁴⁴⁹

Despite the measures of the proceeding years, the Maritime Porters and Matriculated cargo handlers continued to operate more or less as they had for centuries. Their organizational structures and strategies were intact. Their privileges largely remained in effect, albeit with the relative “freeing” of cotton. Their legal struggles and defense of these privileges also remained.

Post-abolition port-labor organizations and the abolition of the Matriculate of the Sea

We know that the Guild of Maritime Porters continued to enroll a few sons every year throughout the nineteenth century and into the early twentieth century. The formal re-positioning with local authorities and resistance of the maritime porters allowed them to continue their cooperative practices. Their persistence allowed them to persevere through the end of the nineteenth century, forming a cooperative trade union in 1873 based on centuries of traditional practices.

The First Article of the First Chapter (“Objective and organization of the Guild”) of the union’s 1903 statutes lays out the history and purpose of the organization as had been done for centuries:

From time immemorial the Confraternity or Guild of *Bastaixos* had been founded, and would continue as such, to help each other mutually, as guildsmen, in the labors and tasks

⁴⁴⁸ *Ibid.* folio 2r. Original: “[e]l Gremio podria continuar como antes conduciendo los generos desde el andén del puerto, hasta lo alto del muelle, almacenes y demas puntos, siempre que los dueños de los generos les llamasen à este objetivo.”

⁴⁴⁹ *Ibid.* folio 2v. Original: “[...] à fin de que se abstengan los Mareantes y Matriculados de coartar la libertad del Comercio de valerse de quien mejor le acomode, y de privar à los Faquines, como han hecho hasta el día [...]”.

of porters, to load, unload, transport and drive merchandise everywhere and especially to the docks of the port and to the Customs House, thus meeting the conditions of a *work[ers']cooperative* [emphasis in original].⁴⁵⁰

The direct continuity is evident in the registry of new masters. Likewise, the corporation continued keeping track of members, noting which of them would lose rights as such for failing to work; this was done up until early June 1936 [six weeks later the Spanish Civil War (1836-1939) erupted].⁴⁵¹

As the guilds passed out of favor, other organizational terminology was used, especially that of “brotherhood” or confraternity. While in the productive guilds, this accompanied a process of internal disintegration, by which the journeymen increasingly distanced themselves (and placed themselves in organized opposition to the traditional authority and economic domination of the masters) (Thompson, 1963; Leeson, 1979), in the case of the service guilds studied here, the general absence of journeymen perhaps made for a smoother transition.

That said, with the end of the guild system, some masters began to formally employ workers. While the mule renters had already established this practice decades prior, in other corporations intra-guild employment was only possible with the end of labor-restricting guild ordinances. This was the case of the Maritime Horsecart Operators. At some time in the first decades after the 1836 abolition, the Maritime Horsecart Operators established a brotherhood comprised of masters to provide mutual aid to their employees.⁴⁵² No documents have surfaced to give any

⁴⁵⁰ BC, Gremio de Bastaixos de Capsana y Macips de Ribera, *Estatutos del Gremio ó Confradía de Bastaixos de Capsana y Massips de Ribera: fundado en Tarragona en el año 1513 y viniendo poco después a esta ciudad: reformado en el año 1873 bajo el nombre de Unión de Faquines de la Aduana de Barcelona y reconstituido el 1903*. Barcelona: Imp. E Badia: 1910. 729.295 / 4-V-36/26; Original: “De temps inmemorial la Confraria ó Gremi dels Bastaixos va fundarse, y seguirá aixis mateis, pera aujudarse mutuament, els agremiats, en els treballs ó feynas de camalic, pera carregar, descarregar, transportar y aconduir mercaderías á reu y especialment als molls del port y á la Aduana, reunint doncs las condicions d’ una cooperativa de treball [emphasis in original].” Unfortunately, a copy of the 1873 statutes has not been located; it is not known what – if any – changes were made between the 1873 version and that of 1903 (published 1910).

⁴⁵¹ AGMMB, “Llista de Bastaixos, que per no complir amb l'article 19 del nostre reglament, perden els drets com a tal”, 1906 – 1 June 1936, Capsa 7, carpeta 37 (2286).

⁴⁵² AMCB, *Sección de Hacienda*, “Expediente: promovido por la asociacion ‘La Hermandad de Patronos’ del Gremio de Carreteros de esta ciudad para que se les esima del pago de abitrio impuesto.”, Serie 182-2, No 7643 (c.1894); and Universitat Pompeu Fabra: *Memorial Digital de Catalunya*. Asociación de Patronos y Obreros Carreteros de Barcelona. (1903). *Estatutos de la Asociación de Patronos y Obreros Carreteros de Barcelona*.

solid indication of the organizational life of the Maritime Teamsters or Mule Rentors after 1836.⁴⁵³

It is worthwhile to note that those guilds organized under the *Matrícula de Mar* system (which is to say, those of Fishermen, Unloaders, and Mariners, among others) were excluded from the 1836 abolition. The Matriculate system governed the trade activities of maritime guilds and served as a recruitment registry for the Navy. The system was developed during the Spanish Ancient Regime but survived well into the liberal era because of its military importance (Ibarz & Romero Marín, 2009).

Barcelona: s.n. [available at <http://mdc.cbuc.cat/cdm/ref/collection/comercUPF/id/19943> ; last accessed 15 March 2017].

⁴⁵³ Considering the individualistic service-provision models of these two guilds, it seems likely that masters from both corporations began to hire permanent “helpers” – many of which were likely former guild brothers – and continued their trades in a competitive manner.

7.4 Chapter Conclusions

The ideology of liberalization was initially applied by reformist elements in the royal government during the Spanish Enlightenment. It was initially evident in the gradual end of the colonial-trade port monopoly held by Cádiz in the mid-to-late eighteenth century. During the same period, certain strategic products were made “free”. This logic was then applied to ending the monopolies of the guilds. We see, therefore, the implementation of an ideological framework – that of economic liberalism – applied from a macro-economic perspective to a micro-economic one. What started out of imperial and state-security necessities would be expanded to meet ever-more microcosmic considerations. Seen in another way, attention shifted from liberalizing colonial commerce and products, to liberalizing productive processes by reducing privileges, and finally to liberalizing producers, by eliminating membership monopolies.

Liberalization of the trades was a process that spanned over fifty years. This period arguably began during proto-industrialization, and was effectuated throughout the first industrialization. With the economic background of technological development and the increasing importance of capital, the development and full implementation of liberalization (as it regards the guilds) was most closely tied to political changes.

The privileges and rules of the guilds generally prevented the concentration of capital and the hiring of unlimited workers, especially in the new textile factories. This would lead to the passage of measures aimed at removing the obstacles to industrialization. Even so, the measures of 1813, 1820, 1834, and 1836 were applied evenly to reforming or abolishing the privileges of all guilds – not just those in protoindustrial or other productive sectors.

While the service guilds were fundamentally different from the productive sector, the privileges of all the guilds would be challenged. To underscore the class dynamic, it must be kept in mind that the so-called liberal professions (doctors, notaries, lawyers, and others) would not lose their monopolistic privileges: instead, they aligned themselves with the industrialists to secure their positions in society and their privileged monopolies.

Most interestingly, the reform of guild ordinances was demanded by the crown, but was to be carried out by the guilds themselves (under the supervision of municipal authorities). The central government did not go over the thousands of existing guild ordinances and directly make the desired changes. Instead, it required this action by the guilds, some of which used the opportunity to avoid, delay, and undermine the spirit and letter of the law whenever possible. These maneuvers aside, there does not seem any indication of outright decision on the part of the guilds to ignore the measures.

These legislative strategies did not change during the first third of the nineteenth century. A clear pattern emerges of reform and revolution (in the economic sense). Royal authorities were generally satisfied with reforming the more monopolistic guild privileges, while the liberal-dominated governments sought the wholesale elimination of privileges and the abolition of the guilds.

The internal characteristics of the guilds seem to have been highly relevant in their approaches to liberalization. In those guilds that had an individualist model, there were internal tensions that undermined guild cohesion and unity. In the cooperative guilds, this lack of internal dispute contributed to the ability of those guilds to resist the most egregious eliminations of privileges.

While it is somewhat beyond the scope of this investigation – largely due to the scarcity of documentary evidence at this stage, I feel strongly that the possible relationship between public unrest and abolition is certainly worth further investigation.⁴⁵⁴ After the attack on the Bonaplata factory, workers who complained about working conditions were criminalized.

⁴⁵⁴ There is a small but significant corpus covering the use of guild abolition – an ostensibly economic policy – for internal security in the wake of large-scale public disturbances. For a late-fourteenth century example, see Jones, D. (2010). *Summer of blood: the peasants' revolt of 1381*, HarperCollins UK; and Toulmin Smith, J., & Toulmin Smith, L. (Eds.). (1870). *English guilds. The original ordinances of more than one hundred early English guilds: together with ye olde usages of ye Cite of Wynchestre; the ordinances of Worcester; the office of the Mayor of Bristol; and, the costumary of the Manor of Tettenhall-Regis. From original MSS. of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries*. London (London): Trübner (Oxford UP). The history of the English Combination Acts – while directed at journeymen associations, and not the guilds themselves – similarly inform the research; see Darvall, F. O. (1934). *Popular disturbances and public order in Regency England: being an account of the Luddite and other disorders in England during the years 1811-1817 and of the attitude and activity of the authorities*, London (New York): Augustus M. Kelly [reprint: Oxford University Press]; Thompson, E. P. (1963) *The making of the English working class*, (New York: Vintage Books: 1966); and Leeson, R. A. (1979). *Travelling Brothers: The Six Centuries' Road from Craft Fellowship to Trade Unionism*. G. Allen & Unwin.

Chapter 8.

Conclusions:

**Contributions of a study of service guilds to port-labor and guild
histories**

8.1 Chapter Introduction

This dissertation opened with a quote from the Administrator of the Customs House, and I return to here. He said, regarding the “Guild or Union” of maritime porters in 1855:

The association in its essence subsists as it was founded in the years of 1500 or much before, and as much for its antiquity as for its originality deserves to be observed in all its aspects, as it is a monument that the sixteenth century has left us for the study of the grave questions that today are agitated around the organization of labor.⁴⁵⁵

Instead of a clear-cut distinction between the guild era, abolition, and the trade-union era, there was a gradual development of working class organizations on the part of journeymen and some disaffected masters. Likewise, the individualistic guilds appear to have incubated a capitalistic appreciation of economic freedom – one not based on the guild tradition of maintaining a floor for poor producers, but of removing the ceiling for wealthier ones. These two processes were intertwined. This analysis is enriched by the experiences of horizontal guilds, as was the case of the maritime porters, whose association was referred to as a “Guild or Union” by the Customs Administrator and would later describe itself as a “work[ers] cooperative” in its union statutes two decades thereafter.

There was certainly agitation: the mid-to-late nineteenth century was (at times literally) aflame with labor conflict, often couched in the newness of combative mutual aid societies and trade unionism. The Administrator evidently saw in the “Guild or Union” of Maritime porters an ancient model – still technically functioning as a guild, it would formally become a Union in 1873 – with lessons to teach about labor harmony through self-regulation. Arguably, the guilds still have much to teach us.

For centuries, Barcelona was a maritime commercial hub in the Mediterranean. Atlantic, and global economy: for as many centuries, maritime-cargo handlers unloaded, carried, carted, and distributed the very life-blood of the Barcelona economy – often, literally, on their backs.

⁴⁵⁵ BC, *Junta de Comercio*, Leg. CXXII, folio 111r, “Informe del Adminstrador de Aduanas”, Barcelona, 14 March 1855.

Commercially, it was a focal point for a variety of importations and exportations, especially agricultural exports (along with other important Catalanian ports) and the center of the export-oriented proto- and first industrialization of the textile industry. Much of its trade was dedicated to serving the needs and transforming the products of the Spanish colonies in the Americas (through offices in the privileged port of Cádiz and later directly); the loss of most of these colonies during the first decades of the nineteenth century sharply and directly affected commerce and, indirectly, the maritime-cargo handlers who relied on the bulk of this trade.

Paradoxically, the mid- to late-nineteenth century liberalization of colonial trade – which brought the formal inclusion of the port of Barcelona in the trans-Atlantic system – would initially benefit the Barcelona maritime-cargo handling guilds by increasing trade; however, the direct continuity of the liberal approach to economics, when applied to labor in the early-nineteenth century, would eventually hamper and, in some cases, destroy these corporations.

Methodology, methods, and sources

This investigation had as its objective an investigation into the maritime cargo handling subsector of the transportation service sector during the advance of liberalism as a set of economic policies. It began with a number of questions about the composition and functioning of these guilds, with an eye to how these may have changed during the period studied. How did liberalism develop in Spain? What were the main concerns of pro-liberal elements, and how did they address them? How did the guilds respond to this changing economic paradigm? How were these changes evinced in the daily functions? How did the guilds' ordinances develop to reflect or impose these different circumstances?

To answer these questions, I identified all the trades involved in these tasks, and placed them within their historic, geographic, and socio-economic contexts. I have treated a number of trades and their respective organizations – formalized in guilds or otherwise – including: boatmen/lightermen and unloaders (*lancheros* and *descargadores* respectively); sailors/mariners (*mareantes*); fishermen (*pescadores*); maritime porters (*bastaixos/faquines de capçana*); maritime horsecart operators (*carreteros de mar*); maritime teamsters (*tragineros de mar*); mule handlers (*alquiladores de mulas*); common non-maritime porters (*camàlichs/mossos de cuerda*);

and, common laborers (*labradores del llano*). Besides the three harbor-based guilds, all the other guilds were distinguishable by the means used for transporting goods. Together, these groups constituted the entire maritime-cargo handling subsector in Barcelona.

The secondary sources presented a number of challenges. The most relevant of these is a relative scarcity of literature covering the individual cargo-handling guilds in Barcelona, and even fewer that treat these in some groups. Likewise, even at the European level, there is relatively little written about cargo-handlers during the guild phase written in English. Ibarz Gelabert notes this shortage, and highlights the absence of a significant number of port-labor scholars capable of “bridging” the language barriers to bring local cases into English or Romance languages. That said, the main secondary sources covered the general historic, economic, and political-military context, as well as research into guilds in general and port labor history in particular.

The time period (1760-1840) was significant, as these eighty years were fraught with calamities and tidal shifts in commerce, politics, population die-back and growth, and any number of other factors. In a word, the period was revolutionary. Throughout this period, Barcelona was also directly affected by foreign and civil wars (between absolutist and liberal-constitutional monarchists), military occupation, revolution, diseases, population growth, and long-standing tensions with the central government.

I have relied on the works of a handful of – albeit exceptionally well-respected – historians for background and global context of the period investigated. By and large, very little information about the larger, surrounding events appears in the documentary record uncovered in this study.

By the same logic, I have focused on the economic aspects – and less on the political aspects – of liberalism. It became quite clear during the investigation that the liberalization of the trades developed as a process, one which culminated in the 1836 attempt to abolish the guilds. By choosing to not explore deeply beyond 1840, I did not attempt to fully determine the consequences of liberalization – a fact that became more irksome as the investigation progressed.

8.2 Labor Geography: an appreciation of place and space

The proper understanding of a labor organization requires a location-based and spatial consideration of the areas in which it operates. Some of the conclusions highlighted in this investigation underscore the importance of geo-spatial, socio-cultural, and political-economic considerations. While location-based analysis in socio-economic studies (including labor) is well respected; however, there is a considerable need to expand the literature analyzing place and space in labor studies, additionally there is no consensus of the meanings.

The physical state of the ports in question contributed to the objective and subjective determination of spatial relationships. This, in turn, influenced the organizational strategies developed by the responsible guilds. These were all affected by economic and political phenomena – beyond the control of the guilds. Even this lack of control did not mean that the guilds were passive in these processes: to the contrary, the variety of their responses to the changing panorama underscores their desire to retain a degree of participation – if not protagonism – in the practical decision making (even if the political determinations remained outside of their area of influence).

The theater in which port labor was – and continues to be – executed is very strictly defined by considerations of location, based on hydrographic and geographic factors. I viewed this from the dual-perspective of place (which I define as based on objective considerations) and space (defined subjectively). I have found the differentiation of objective place and subjective space to be useful in understanding different aspects of spatial analysis, which allow for an approximation to the subjective valuations of the actors. This was especially important in understanding the behaviors of the guilds in question, which were often based on the delineation of urban areas.

While these considerations are not intended to represent concrete correlations or, much less, causal relationship, the complexity of the issues demands a multi-factor interpretation. At the very least, these are not coincidences. This underscores the need for a multi-dimensional approach to investigating historical events and trends.

A port should first be considered as an objectively defined geo-hydrographic and built-up construct, and then as a confluence of socio-cultural and socio-economic activities. That is, ports

represent both an objective work place and subjective work space. Combined, these areas and the way they were conceived and appropriated set the scene for activities of labor activities, socialability, and struggle, and influenced the organizational models of the guilds.

The type of port is very important when considering work processes, organizational models, and the strategies developed to retain relevance in changing conditions. For example, in fluvial ports – where there was considerable room for extending the definition of the port, the existing limited-location privileges of the guilds could be nullified by constructing port facilities outside of these privileged areas (as was the case in London). On the other hand, where geo-hydrographic conditions made the expansion of the port prohibitively expensive (in the case of beach-based ports), the guilds were able to exercise more complete control of maritime-cargo-handling activities.

While the natural outlay of an area was a fundamental consideration, the development of port construction techniques, and the inclusion of available technologies was important. Once the technical and economic capacities of local, national, and private actors (especially through joint-capital enterprises, and private-public partnerships) were sufficient, the panorama changed to one in which the expansion of port facilities could undermine guild privileges, as was the case of pre-industrial London and industrializing Marseille. In Barcelona, significant port expansion projects were undertaken over centuries, starting with the medieval construction of the Barceloneta peninsula by joining a small island to the mainland. This created an extra-mural area that remained in the jurisdiction of the city, and the guilds studied here. This construction, in turn, brought unforeseen consequences in the form of accumulated quantities of harbor-bar-forming sand deposits – which are still occasionally remedied even today. This necessitated the first use of a steam-powered apparatus in Spain in the 1820s to dredge the sand from the harbor.

The port area of Barcelona also saw use-specific modifications over time, always with the aim of increasing the protective features of the harbor and of increasing the area of operations for greater maritime trade. The goal has always been to create a viable harbor where none existed. Considerable modifications to the port were made in the decades following the period studied here.

This study has approached the topic from the perspective of one city, to look at how these guilds functioned in a changing political and economic context in hopes of elucidating the operations of guilds in the service sector and underscoring the need for further investigation of these diverse organizations. A basic comparison has been done with a few other European port cities, to keep the case of Barcelona in perspective. Within the cargo-handling sub-sector, there are considerable differences between the guild panorama in European port cities (which is to say, what sorts of guilds were formed, and with what economic roles), and between the specific guilds in each city. It seems that the complexity of the economic panorama of the services resulted in a wider variety of guilds; this echoes the long tradition of craft guilds, which grew, split, and rejoined depending on the economic welfare and technological development of their trades.

These comparisons shed light on the relationship between objective and subjective port and cargo considerations, and underscore the flexibility of service-sector guilds as institutions, capable of developing of varied approaches to the organization of labor based on the objective needs of the cargo and port designs, mechanisms of control and leadership, internal composition, and strategic relationships with political and economic actors.

For example, compare Barcelona with its many guilds, to Valencia with one or two guilds responsible for all of the cargo-handling activities. The most diverse port studied here was London, with a plethora of different guilds and brotherhoods with monopolies over very specific goods, wharfs, or jobs.

Port labor was intimately connected to the conditions of the port-city systems. The different sorts of ports and their respective infrastructures must be kept in mind: it is impossible to disassociate the port-labor organizations from the conditions established by their ports. The cases of London and Marseille underscore the possible organizational effects of port expansion beyond the traditional jurisdictions of the ancient associations (just as rural manufactory contributed to the undermining of textile-guild monopolies, for example).

The usage of these areas was, and remains, a disputed consideration, as the various actors of a city – and the general population, or parts of it – have always vied to establish a degree of

“ownership”, or at least recognized usage, of those spaces. This was evident in the occupation of the boardwalk (*andén*), which was used by the maritime cargo handlers for work and by the general residents of the city for leisure (especially on the weekends). This was also the case of the central commercial nexus, the Palace Plaza (*Pla del Palau*, or *Plaza del Palacio*) in which an economic area was converted into a socio-cultural space for the King in the early nineteenth century. The Plaza retained its commercial importance, with the construction of a new Customs House there in the last years of the eighteenth century. That is to say, the socio-cultural construction or reconfiguration of places and spaces is a process, one not devoid of economic, political, or military considerations and values. The changing or shared use of port areas remains a topic of interest to municipal and national authorities.

It is evident that any study of port labor would do well to consider the objective and subjective determination, defense, and modification of the areas in which work was done. While the main focus tends to be on the roles of workers within these places and spaces, this can be expanded to consider the connective relationship between port areas and their cities, even to the point of incorporate the social and living areas of port workers. Likewise, since the goods that entered and exited the port were often destined for points far beyond the city, regional analyses or those based on inter-port connectivity (of goods and peoples) represent rich opportunities for expanding the scope of understanding.

8.3 Service Guilds in the maritime cargo handling sub-sector

Developments in the service sector – which includes the sub-sector of (maritime) transportation and cargo handling – were important in the economic development of Europe during this period. There is a need for greater investigation into the roles and functions of guilds in the service sector of the economy, as a way of highlighting the variety of guild structures and organizational models.

A monolithic treatment of the guilds undervalues the great diversity of organizational and functional models. The guild system functioned in the secondary and tertiary sectors. It was flexible and allowed for a considerable degree of diversity in the development of operational models (which in turn manifested in occupational cultures). Many of these combined ancient values while permitting the individual guilds to adapt various strategies (based on their organizational cultures) in the face of changing legal frameworks. Each corporation developed and preserved different organizational models, practices, values, and traditions. When faced with crises (temporary or existential) they developed different mechanisms of resistance, resilience, and response.

Generally speaking, guilds in the service sector of the economy have received passing mention by scholars of guild studies, especially by those associated with a “return” or “rehabilitation” of the guilds – and by extension, of the study thereof. By the same token, guilds in the service sector merit a “rehabilitation” that underscores the value of their study to labor history. While some scholars have reduced them to “guilds of rudimentary structure” or “*pre-guilds*” (Molas Ribalta, 1970, p. 55) because of their horizontal structures, these corporations behaved as guilds in every sense: politically; economically; and socio-culturally. They were clearly viewed as guilds during their existence, and deserve to be treated as such now.

The service guilds were markedly different from the productive craft guilds in some important ways. These guilds were horizontal, in that they were comprised of masters, and some of them were more egalitarian than others (most notably, through different sorts of turn systems). These are significant differences from the productive craft guilds, and allow for a re-assessment of the

major hypotheses and debates surrounding the study of European guilds during the end of the Ancient Regimes, since these debates have largely been focused on productive craft guilds.

One dominant line of argument in analyzing the decline of the guild system is the rise of journeymen consciousness and organizations, which complicates a simplistic reading based solely on normative measures. It is interesting to note that the historiography places the burgeoning workers' power in the textile workers' mutual aid societies in the mid-nineteenth century, which formed to circumvent the prohibitions on other forms of association after the abolition of the guilds. These mutual aid societies functioned like trade unions, as they united the journeymen of specific trades in defensive organizations capable of providing benefits to, and coordinating collective actions in defense of their members.

Likewise, in Barcelona, significant evidence of journeymen guilds dedicated to defending employment interests has been discovered in a variety of trades as early as the mid-eighteenth century. As these service-sector guilds did not have journeymen, they offer a valuable opportunity to highlight other organizational responses to changing economic realities manifested in, and compounded by economic liberalism.

In the service guilds studied here, the internal composition was based largely on the service-provision model and the conscious decision to maintain or abandon leveling systems. In those guilds that had employment or sub-contracting systems, or which abandoned a turn-based system of opportunity in favor of the free selection by merchants, employment relationships developed, mirroring the relationship between masters and journeymen in productive guilds.

One of the most important debates in guild studies in recent years (the so-called "Epstein-Ogilvie debate") has revolved around the role of guilds in the development of capitalism: did the guilds contribute to or retard the development of capitalism? Some authors have underscored the importance of skills transmission, intellectual property, hiring and sub-contracting systems and other mechanisms developed and refined by the guilds and which would provide the structural foundation of the capitalist mode of production during industrialization. These arguments are best understood in the context of proto-industrialism and the so-called "industrious revolution". These arguments have met with some detractors, who focus on the market-constricting and

exclusionary practices of the guilds, especially as regards limiting economic opportunities for women.

While the guild system *tended* to discourage or prevent the supremacy of some masters over others, the reality could be quite different. The guilds – especially craft guilds – allowed for a degree of capital accumulation, but also used mechanisms to temper these tendencies so that no master could become especially wealthy at the expense of his guild brothers (journeymen or other masters). These mechanisms included: limiting the number of apprentices or journeymen who could be employed by each master; controls over the hoarding of resources; limits on the number of shops that could be owned; minimum quality assurances; prohibition of the employment of non-guild members; shared market access. All of these were the object of complaints before the Board of Commerce.

Whereas many of the standard leveling measures were applicable only to the craft guilds, service guilds also attempted to level opportunities and prevent undue competition (to varying levels of success, it must be noted). One of these mechanisms was the “turn”, used to order which guild member would have the opportunity to hire himself out for a task. We have seen how the defense or abandonment of this system was highly influenced by changing work cultures and the development of economic-interest-driven stratification.

The internal contradiction between masters and journeymen – a point of considerable conflict in craft guilds – was largely absent in the service guilds; however, the reduction of some masters to the status of employees was important: large shares of masters of some of the guilds in the employment of their guild-brother masters. It should not come as any surprise that the leadership of some guilds responded to their personal interests, as opposed to those of the collective membership, only to be kept in check by democratic or extra-legal means.

Internal inequalities could take the form of permanent – possibly undemocratically selected – positions in the guild. It should be noted that the maritime cargo handling guilds employed members to fulfill organizational roles (as was common to all of the guilds, regardless of the sector). These could include directors, a manager, treasurer, seeker, and a scribe (who may have not been an operational member). After the violent summer of 1835, the general membership of

the maritime porters threatened “a sort of riot” in their extra-legal attempt to remove their permanent guild manager (*síndico*): this led the Guild Directors (*Prohombres*) to decry the situation before the authorities – as either a veiled threat in the form of a warning (Romero Marín, 2007a) or an act to distance themselves from responsibility.

The primary documents show a tendency in some guilds of capital accumulation and sub-contracting within the guild: the tax filings of the mule handlers show that in 1760, almost sixty percent of masters were employed as “*mancebos*”(a term generally reserved for journeymen) by their guild brothers – in a guild that did not have journeymen, it should be noted. A similar process *likely* occurred with the Maritime Horsecart Operators and Maritime Teamsters. Other studies have shown the participation of guilds in capital-intensive operations, like Barcelona’s naval construction industry.

In response to this, it appears that a false dichotomy lies at the basis of this debate: while the guilds often enjoyed and fiercely defended exclusionary and monopolistic practices, this (along with skill and know-how transmission, labor relations, quality control, and property rights) was beneficial for the accumulation of capital, which would be necessary for industrialization. While some guild restrictions contrary to the establishment of large-scale manufactories were abolished to make way for technology-driven industrialization, it is evident by the participation of guild masters and their sons in these processes that the guild system had laid the foundation for the eventual concentration of capital, knowledge accumulation, property rights, and commercial networks that made industrialism feasible. Studies of the composition of early (textile) industrialist elements in Barcelona demonstrate the presence of guild masters as early capitalists.

Technological developments, especially relating to the localization of technology in the work place could also contribute to an existential crisis of the guilds in general. However, in these guilds, specialization of labor (and its physical concentration in a factory setting) was less feasible, practical, or necessary than in the craft trades (those undergoing proto-industrialization). By focusing on trades that did not undergo a significant technological change or concentration of labor during the period, this study has isolated the impact of the liberalization of the trades.

Guilds in Port Labor Studies

In the field of the history of maritime affairs, labor is an underrepresented area of interest. Even in cases of port history, the main areas of interest tend to be based on infrastructural and technological changes. What is more, studies of port labor history (specific as these tend to be) most often look at the triumvirate of the organization of work, conflicts (strikes), and trade unions; there is generally little attention paid to the guild period, especially when compared to infrastructure, organizational activities, and technological change during the industrial period.

This leaves guild-era, port labor history as a niche within an arguably small field. It is difficult to justify this, considering the great importance of maritime trade (and by extension, the work of loading, unloading, handling, and transporting it): maritime cargo was, and remains, a vital nexus of international trade. It must be noted, that this pressure-point of global capitalism contributes an ideological motivation to some studies, especially those which focus on international dockers solidarity. In a similar vein, the conceptualization of dockers as a vanguard of the proletariat and masters of solidarity has contributed to a preponderance of studies on dock-labor conflicts, strikes, and violence. The relatively late industrialization of many ports (and of the organization of port labor) also creates opportunities for in-depth investigations into the artisan phase. Traditional practices and organizational models were in use well into the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries in some places.

I agree with the conclusion presented by Davies and Weinbauer (2000) that there is no “normal” port labor experience. Each experience is different, informed by local context; however, this should not be reduced to such a degree that each case can *only* be understood as applicable to its specific location – a consideration defended by Davies and Weinbauer. With this in mind, I have shown important similarities and differences with other port labor organizations in Europe, underscoring the local qualities of each, while paying attention to the global trends that influenced them.

That said, it should be noted that some of the ports studied here were in large and highly important economic centers. As such, the demand for port services was such that labor organization was justified or necessary, and multi-organizational labor panoramas developed.

While this served well for a comparison of organizational structures, it could also obscure the experiences in smaller ports. It could very well be that most ports had no organized labor – or perhaps a multi-functional association of unloaders and porters, responsible for all of the cargo-handling activities (as was seen in Valencia, for example). Additionally, the mention in the contracts of mariners of ports without unloaders underscores the fact that there were areas without anyone responsible for these important activities.

The most salient feature of the maritime cargo handling sub-sector is its variety, based on the types of location- and cargo-determined specializations. These differences affected how they organized labor and operated; how they configured and defended their labor-market participation and auto-regulation; and, how they responded to liberalism and economic change. These varieties are compounded at the European level when compared to the very different models and strategies employed in the other port cities – even those within the same or similar polities or maritime trade networks.

The maritime cargo-handling sub-sector was not monolithic in Barcelona – different guilds had different service-provision models, based on the objective and subjective considerations. Where work was carried out collectively and income shared in a generally egalitarian manner, these internal divisions were less likely to occur – there was no internal competition, and interests were collective. Specifically, the use of a “turn” to organize the order of hiring was fundamental: the turn served to level opportunities among members and prevented what was considered to be too high a degree of competition. This highlights the important differences between the guilds that used collaborative service-provision models and those that operated individualistically. In the case of the latter, the deepening internal tensions between better-off and more humble masters became quite stark, and the better-off masters took advantage of the political opportunity to increase their freedom of operation.

Every guild had qualifications for entry, and this was no different for service-sector guilds. Whereas craft guilds depended heavily (although not entirely) on apprenticeship to transmit and guarantee the transmission of skills and know-how as a pre-requisite for membership, the service-sector guilds studied here do not appear to have used apprenticeship. In the guilds studied here, the entrance qualifications were far less concerned with technical skills as much as

socio-cultural qualities. The ability to carry out a specific task was based on the ability to carry heavy loads throughout the city, or to handle the beasts of burden used by some of the guilds. Chief among the socio-cultural considerations was the honor and up-standing quality of the applicant, which was attested to by a number of the existing members.

Just as they had no apprenticeship, these guilds also had no journeymanship. In craft guilds, the years of journeymanship allowed a future master to hone the technical and other skills required to create a masterpiece – by which his full acceptance in the guild would be measured – and, more widely, the social and economic abilities to operate a workshop. The issue remains, then, of how the service guilds were able to transmit the skills necessary for the success of the guild masters and, by extension, of the guild. It appears that a considerable degree of this transmission occurred both on the job and during activities of socialability.

While labor activities offered the opportunity for hard-skill transmission; socialability – occurring during work hours, at religious activities, and, perhaps, in maritime taverns (*pudas*) – offered an informal mechanism for soft-skill transmission and other forms of inculcating and fomenting social and individual human capital. This shows the possibility for an analysis based on socialability applied to on-the-job opportunities and of alternative mechanisms for skill transmission, especially that of soft skills.

The guilds studied here were comprised of only masters – I encountered no mention of apprentices or journeymen in the documents consulted, and there were some statements confirming the masters-only structures. Even so, they developed mechanisms for establishing membership qualifications based largely on socio-cultural qualifications (especially in the absence of considerable technical qualifications, or apprenticeship); they were also capable of transmitting non-technical skills that were vital to their work activities and organizational functions (again, without the institutional mechanism of apprenticeship for direct transmission or journeymanship for tacit skill transmission).

Those guilds whose labor activities necessitated work-gangs developed egalitarian, horizontal, and cooperative operational and organizational models. These were very different from those of craft guilds and from other service guilds; they were even different than collectively operating

guilds in other cities. That is to say, the use of work-gangs did not determine horizontality in practice in other ports, particularly Marseille and London, where *de jure* and *de facto* hierarchies existed, complete with sub-contracting within the guild and out-sourcing of non-guild members.

The guilds also developed internal mechanisms for organizing work that depended on a few more-skilled workers to coordinate the specific tasks of the work-gangs. However, the men responsible for these leadership positions were either selected by the captain of the vessel to be unloaded (in the case of the loadmaster mariner responsible for determining the placement and security of cargo onboard a vessel) or by the guilds in an informal manner (in the case of the unloaders and maritime porters, the latter selected a work-gang leader to direct the pairs of *manuellas*). Work-gang leaders only operated in those guilds that worked in a collaborative fashion. Likewise, the guilds developed systems of persuasion and punishment for violations or refusing to respect the work-gang leader.

While sub-contracting and out-sourcing occurred in Marseille and London, there is no record of this in Barcelona. In Barcelona, egalitarianism was not merely paid lip service; it was the dominant ethos and the practical foundation of work-life for some of the guilds – even those organized around individual provision of services maintained mechanisms to prevent internal stratification (to varying degrees of success). In Cádiz, a clear and apparently strict hierarchy was in operation; however, it seems that this hierarchy also revolved around accepted practices that were part of a system of socio-economic life-cycle expectations: it does not seem that it was *designed* to be a permanent stratification (although it certainly may have had this effect). The fact that there was no large-scale attempt to privatize port activities (as occurred in Marseille at the end of the period studied here) left the field open to a variety of smaller-scale solutions, in which guilds, owners' associations, and free labor vied for dominance of different activities.

These demonstrate the flexibility of the guilds to develop organizational solutions to protect and retain their privileged positions. While the strategies were informed by long-standing, even ancient practices, some guilds were able to adapt to changing economic and political situations. Their objective remained the defense and promotion of the interests of their members. However, as in craft guilds, the changing economic considerations could create internal pressures that could produce divisions and, given the right circumstances, organizational ruptures.

8.4 Liberalization and guild responses

During the second half of the eighteenth century, royal advisors and political contributors – comprised of practical ideologues versed in economics, appreciative of science, and capable of developing holistic views of society – proposed and attempted a variety of reforms of the socio-economic system, during the latter part of the Enlightenment, without aggressively or *radically* modifying the structures of society. The Enlightenment policy makers were firmly planted in the Ancient Régime, while looking towards modernizing institutions to rescue a failing economic system. As such, the reforms attempted during the Enlightenment were aimed at making ancient institutions more efficient and capable of contributing in a changing economic paradigm.

In a wider sense, these changes were accompanied by socio-cultural developments, in which there occurred a repositioning of the core values and social relationships that marked and were marked by various social hierarchies. Political and economic factors greatly impacted guild experiences: in the period studied here, the advances of economic and political liberalism were fundamental to the challenges faced by the guilds. It is not possible to disaggregate these factors – the economic changes raised different political actors to positions of power; political policies created spaces for economic actors to rise to prominence.

The reformist policies covered many aspects of the economy including those relating to colonial trade and the guilds. While this Enlightenment at first called for varying degrees of reform, the failures of these attempts to address the underlying difficulties faced by society resulted in increasingly radical, even revolutionary political expressions, which were based on class interests (in this case, those of the bourgeoisie were dominant).

In the matter of the guild question, the proposals revolved around three lines: limit the monopolistic privileges; abolish the the guilds to create a free market system; and supplanting the guilds with direct state regulation. The first two strategies were attempted, alternating between absolutist and more liberal governments, respectfully. It is evident that there was a generational shift towards liberal economic thought during the last quarter of the eighteenth century; the failure – or limited success – of Enlightenment attempts at reforming the economic structures opened the way for a more radical approach: economic liberalism.

The correlation of economic and political interests – between merchants, government bodies, and the guilds – did not favor the guilds (some of which were straining under the affects of internal economic contradictions between wealthier and impoverished/employed masters). The resistance of the guilds to the reformist efforts created a context in which the economic actors calling for abolition were able to seize upon the failure of these measures to promote an agenda that included the official elimination of practical monopolies, and, eventually of the guilds.

One of the areas in which conflicting interests surfaced was in the definition of the common, or public, good. During the ancient regime, the interests of the guilds formed part of the calculation, while during liberalism, the interests of the merchants and industrialists became tantamount to public interests.

For its part, the military still harbored a view of the public good that included defending the privileges of the matriculated guilds to maintain the military responsiveness of the country. It is clear that military authority was plainly superior to civil authority in the hierarchy of jurisdiction and privileges. This was not only expressed in their dominance of municipal governing functions after the fall of Barcelona in 1714. It was evinced by matters as seemingly simple as the movement of a few boxes of sugar by mule rentors (thus violating a royal privilege guaranteed to the Guild of Maritime Porters) as by their ability to basically ignore the abolition of the guilds under their protection. The salvation of some of the maritime-cargo handling guilds (those of mariners, unloaders, and fishermen) was their participation in the Matriculate of the Sea organized by the Navy. Those guilds that were under the control of the naval authorities also enjoyed its protection: the 1836 abolition did not apply to them. This factor helped determine which trades would maintain their guild structures during later decades.

Another important consideration is the very different experiences of the different classes of corporations in the context of liberalism. While the guilds – bastions of manual labor – were abolished, the professional colleges (*colegios*) were not destroyed by liberal abolition. Quite to the contrary, many of these colleges retained considerable monopolistic privileges, authorities, and professional competencies – resistant to domination by local or central authorities to this very day. In the case of the professional colleges – which, arguably, did not represent the same type of class-based threat to the established order – negotiated conviviality and integration into

the liberal political-economic system seems to have been the dominant strategy employed by these corporations and different political and economic actors.

On the other end of the spectrum, the possibility of guilds in the primary sector raises the possibility of other types of guild structures and approaches to liberalization. Further study of guilds in the primary sector – where they can be found – would also enrich our understanding of economic development and organizational strategies in the guild system.

In any case, the economic interests of the increasingly powerful liberal bourgeoisie were such that the monopolistic privileges of the maritime-cargo handling guilds were challenged from at least the last quarter of the eighteenth century. Despite the functional and technological differences, most of the cargo-handling guilds (save those in the Matriculate system) were more or less affected by the privilege-reducing measures.

The guilds were increasingly marginalized from the political discourse by the liberal attempts, but they surfaced to defend and promote their interests (sometimes with considerable flexibility, resilience, and adaptability). With the development of liberalism – as a socio-cultural, economic, and political totality – their ancient systems were directly challenged. To what degree were guilds, as institutions, frozen in time – irrevocably medieval and incapable of developing survival strategies in the changing circumstances? The legal records are replete with *argumenta ad antiquitatem* and justifications based on tradition and custom.

It is interesting to note that the guilds were not inherently or monolithically linked to a political ideology – as seems to have been more often the case with the nascent industrial bourgeoisie enamored with liberalism. Likewise, it is likely that the contradiction between wealthy and poor masters (and journeymen in the case of the tertiary sector guilds) were deepening. While it is impossible to be sure, it seems that the same workers who attacked and burned the convents – much to the satisfaction of Liberals – in the first days of the riots of the Summer of 1835 (as the Church was a supporter of the absolutist Carlist forces) were the ones who then turned their rage on the tax-collection booths along the waterfront and against the most important symbol of industrial liberalism: the steam-powered Bonaplata textile factory. The relationship between these activities and the 1836 abolition of the guilds remains inconclusive. To counterpose this, it

is interesting to note that a number of guilds (or at least their representative masters) from different trades pronounced their support, in 1837, of the constitutionalist monarchists (the very liberals who had abolished the guilds a few months prior).

The process of liberalization was neither determined nor assured at the time: instead, it was defined by decades of advances and set-backs. The principal economy-wide abolition was the 1813 measure, which would form the basis of similar measures in 1820, and would be re-instated in 1836. Thus, the first abolitionist measures were short-lived, lasting only as long as the liberal governments were able to hold on to power. The return of absolutist forces always brought a repeal of the liberal measures and a return to a reformist approach. The integration of more radical liberal economic thought within the halls of the constitutionalist monarchy around 1836 solidified the political consolidation of what was once a revolutionary economic approach (without meaningful political reforms). That is to say, the flexibility of the constitutional monarchy at stemming off political upheaval through economic policy changes is also noteworthy.

The 1836 would take a few years to be generally applied (unlike the immediate application by previous radical liberal regimes). The different guilds' approaches to the challenges of Liberalism were varied: some disintegrated from within, as internal hierarchies re-defined, at least in practice, the traditional leveling aspects of the guild system (like the turn system or prohibitions against internal employment).

The internal divisions in the guilds (such as the accumulation of capital and the ability of some masters to employ others) were related to the various measures undertaken by the members of these organizations. These contradictions were visible in many guilds (in the tertiary sector as well as in some of the service-sector guilds studied here) throughout the end of the eighteenth century and the first quarter of the nineteenth century. It was manifested in the 1832 ordinance for three separate guilds (maritime porters, maritime horsecart operators, and maritime teamsters). This new, unified ordinance incorporated many of the market-liberalizing demands of the merchants.

It is interesting to note the 1834 draft ordinances of the Maritime Horsecart Operators in which they attempted to walk back the organizational changes related to the use of a turn that were accepted (or imposed) in 1832. We also see this in the Maritime Teamsters, who faced similar issues over the use of a turn and capitalization by wealthier masters in the decades proceeding the 1832 ordinances. Both of these guilds show that there were considerable differences developing between the guild leaders (and wealthier masters) and the general membership. Finally, the mule renters – who used no turn – clearly demonstrated an internal employment system of poor masters by wealthy masters as early as the last quarter of the eighteenth century.

We have evidence of at least one guild that reacted to abolition by eventually forming a Brotherhood of Owners of the Guild of Maritime Horsecart Operators, complete with a mutual aid association for providing basic services to the employees of the brotherhood's members. For their part, the common porters – although without a formal guild – continued their individual service-provision model, using a small badge to identify members and effectuate even a modest form of labor-market regulation and accountability.

While some guilds disintegrated or complied with the measures, others resisted with greater and lesser degrees of success. Some of the more cooperative guilds were able to counter the liberalization through flexibility, egalitarian or leveling mechanisms, solidarity, and political maneuvering. The maritime porters refused to abandon their egalitarian organizational structure and cooperative service-provision model. The three Matriculated guilds (mariners, unloaders, and fishermen) responsible for unloading ships in the harbor also maintained their cooperative mode of service provision and the horizontal organizational structure.

With the aim of protecting their ancient organization and monopolistic privileges, the maritime porters were able to convince municipal authorities that the 1836 decree was not an abolition, but a call for new ordinances. The municipal government of Barcelona initially denied permission (in late 1840) to the maritime porters to elect guild directors, while also entertaining arguments by and entering into contracts with other guilds. By early 1841, the maritime porters had repositioned the 1836 abolition as a reformist measure (a logic accepted by municipal authorities), elected new directors, and were judicially defending their historic privileges.

While there is no evidence of the new maritime porter ordinances (if any were ever presented), there is proof of the continuous operation of the guild into the early twentieth century. The Guild of Maritime Porters was able to protect their ancient privileges and *modus operandi*, carrying forward a centuries-old tradition of egalitarian, cooperative, horizontal organization in the form of a trade union in 1873: in the process, they left a monument and source of reflection regarding the nascent industrial labor organizations (trade unions).

All of this is to suggest that, at the time the 1836 abolition was put forth, there was little reason for the guilds to conclude that this change in policy would be effectuated or lasting. Given that the general historiography places the abolition of the Spanish guilds in 1836, this issue requires considerable reassessment of the behaviors of guilds across the spectrum and in other municipalities.

The role of values, customs, and traditions in changing circumstances

The socio-cultural considerations are demonstrated by the importance of tradition and custom in all aspects of guild life and service-provision. Perhaps more than any other factor, tradition was paramount to the general and specific operations of the guilds. The “best” ways of doing things was often a combination of the objective needs of the cargo to be handled and as of cultural expectations. This, in turn, impacted the service-provision model of the guilds: was cargo to be handled collaboratively by gangs or individuals. Even so, while strict delineation of responsibilities and privileges over handling certain types of cargo was enforced on the land, there was no such distinction in the tasks of loading and unloading the ships in the harbor: specialization occurred among the land-based guilds only.

The guilds were always fond of noting their ancient lineage. These men were able to maintain centuries of values and traditions that protected their dignity, labor, and cherished organizations, contributing to cultures of work that were part and parcel of their labor activities and would be – at least in some cases (like that of the maritime porters) – fundamental for their ability to successfully resist external pressures (Romero Marín, 2007a). That is not to say that the historic justification was not appropriate: however, in the light of challenges to the old order brought

about by the Enlightenment and acted upon by Liberalism, the *sole* dependence on tradition ceased to be an effective strategy – other factors were needed.

The subjective interpretation and valuation of customary practices can be a source of incredible strength; by the same token, the over-reliance on tradition can reduce the ability of an organization to develop new strategies when these are demanded by external or internal changes. That is to say, these institutions can – by failure to modify their practices – become anachronistic. This is not a superficial matter – the inability to adapt to changing circumstances could be disastrous for a corporation and its members. That said, the objective needs of the cargo and the means for transporting it allowed the cooperative guilds to continue to function during abolition and thereafter. In some cases the *modus operandi* contributed to a work culture based on collective execution of tasks and the creation of a high degree of *esprit de corps*.

A good part of the academic work of the past decades has been directed at including different perspectives and paradigms into the discipline of history, and this is no exception for the field of labor history, or its own sub-fields of port or guild studies. While Marxian-influenced works – which tended, even at an early time, to view trade unions as inherently different and separate from the guilds – has elevated the interest in economic factors; a subsequent abandonment of this paradigm should not overlook economic considerations. While this dissertation has covered these questions from a social perspective, the economic changes – in market factors and ideological responses – were the main consideration for understanding the changing circumstances of the various institutions studied here.

Institutions – whether these were guilds, local or national governments, or merchant-trade associations – could exercise considerable degrees of flexibility when amalgamating diverse interests. Rarely is the product of this alchemy a coherent, holistic ideology. Liberalism was a complex phenomena – the social, cultural, economic, and political factors were often intertwined, yet rarely monolithically: while merchants called for more freedom (through liberalization), they meant more economic freedom for them, at the detriment of others. They desired competition of service providers, while at the same time working to avoid competition with foreign producers of the same goods. In doing so, they relied on their growing economic – and, consequentially, political – power.

The guilds – as a collection of institutions – also demonstrated variety and flexibility in their organizational models and collective responses to the advances of the liberalization of the trades. For their part, the rift between monarchic programs (absolutist or constitutionalist) opened the way for liberals to intellectually capture the constitutionalist crown in the 1830s (at first by moderates, then by radicals). Likely, the flexibility of the constitutionalist monarchy lay in need of the economic support of the increasingly powerful merchants and industrialists, but also conscious of the real need to seriously, profoundly reform some ancient economic structures and abandon others. Most of all, undermining the old power structure was likely meant to destroy their socio-political and military adversaries, the absolutist forces supported by the most reactionary elements and sectors of society.

Liberalism remains a relevant, controversial set of economic principals – ones that are still applied based on the entrenched interests of economic actors capable of influencing nation-state actors. The globalization of trade has brought the globalization of liberalism – but these economic prescriptions may still require political actors (accountable or not to their respective electorates or constituencies). The examples of flexibility, resistance, and resilience shown by the guilds have much to teach modern-day labor organizations that face labor-market liberalization.

The generally democratic expectations, traditions, and practices of the guilds meant that the membership was sometimes able to keep the leadership accountable through a series of checks and balances. This was shown by the disagreements over the use of a turn in the guild of Maritime Teamsters in 1801 and 1827, and over the struggle over the end of the turn or the hiring of employees in the Guild of Maritime Horsecart Operators. If this failed, direct action (or the threat thereof) was also an option, as was shown by the maritime porters who threatened “a sort of riot” if their demand for the removal of the guild’s *síndico* was not heeded by the leadership.

The importance of culture should temper the desire of outside actors to introduce or impose solutions to the problems of others. Culture cannot be simply implemented – it develops through daily interactions over years, decades, and centuries. And even when traits are inculcated and integrated, this always occurs within the context of existing conditions, constraints, and

constructs. The fact that some international policy advisors have promoted guilds as organizational models underscores the need for further investigation within local contexts (e.g. Stiglitz & Ellerman, 2000). That said, the approximations of global guild history may contribute to a more nuanced understanding of labor traditions in areas or trades that are just now advancing through industrialization.

Annexures and Appendices

Annex 1. Map of Barcelona (c. 1806)⁴⁵⁶



⁴⁵⁶ J. Moulinier and P. Lartigue “Plan of the City and Port of Barcelona” in Alexandre de Laborde, *Voyage pittoresque et historique de l’Espagne*, (Paris, 1806). Source: Soley, R., & Gasset i Argemí, J. (1998), plate 376 [available at <http://www.atlesdebarcelona.cat/gravats/376/> ; last accessed 4 March 2017]

Appendix 1. Maritime-cargo handling trades in English, Castilian, and Catalan

English Term(s)	Castilian Term(s)	Catalan Term(s)
Boatman (-men)	Lanchero(s)	Barquer(s)
Unloader(s)	Descargador(es)	Descarregador(s)
Mariner(s), Sailor(s)	Mareante(s)	Mariner(s)
Fisherman /-men	Pescador(es)	Pescador(s)
Maritime porter(s)	Palanquín(es)	Bastaixo(s), Faquín(es) de Capçana, (or, Capsana), Faquin(es) de Ribera, Macip(s) de Ribera
Maritime Horsecart Operator(s)	Carretero(s) de Mar	Carreter(s) de Mar
Maritime Teamster(s)	Traginer(s) de Mar, Arriero(s) de Mar	Traginer(s) de Mar
Mule Rentor(s), Mule Handler(s)	Alquilador(es) de Mulas, Alquilador(es) de Bestias, Arriero(s) de Mulas	Llogater(s) de Mules
Common Laborer(s)	Labrador(es) (del Llano)	
Common Porter(s)	Mozo(s) de Cuerda, Aljamal(s), Mozo(s) de Esquina, Ganapan(es)	Mosso(s) de Corda, Camàlic(h)(s), Guanyadiner(s)

Appendix 2. Maritime-cargo handling trades and their principal characteristics

Area	Trade	Guild?	Means of Transporting	Responsibilities / privileges	Individual / Cooperative Work
Harbor	Unloaders, Fishermen, Mariners	Yes – three guilds (sometimes united)	Lighters or harbor barges	All goods, regardless of any consideration	Cooperative
Beach, Customs House, and City	Maritime porters	Yes	Goods suspended from poles suspended from the head or shoulders	Fragile, imported, or high-value goods (packaged or loose)	Cooperative
Beach and City	Maritime Horsecart Operators	Yes	Small horsecarts pulled by a single horse	Goods of inferior quality, price (packaged or loose)	Individual
City and Beyond	Maritime Teamsters	Yes	Large carts (wagons), pulled by a team of horses.	Large quantities of packaged and loose goods	Individual
City and Beyond	Mule Rentors / Mule Handlers	Yes	On the backs of mules, or using small carts pulled by mules, litters, etc.	All types of packaged goods	Individual
City	Common Laborers	Yes	Hand-cart	Refuse, rubble, waste, etc.	[Indiv.]
City	Common Porters	No	On their back, using rope	Private goods that were not cargo	[Indiv. And teams of two]

Appendix 3. Monopoly privileges of the cargo-handling guilds of Barcelona

The question of whether or not the privileges represented monopolies was central to the liberal arguments in favor of abolishing the guilds. With that in mind, it is worthwhile to analyze the ordinances and judicial struggles to test the hypothesis that the privileges were designed to be, and functioned as, monopolies.

In some cases, these ordinances gave a degree of monopoly over some activities to a determined guild; however, the degree of operative functionality of a monopoly was a matter of debate, to be settled before judicial bodies. Gary Richardson (2001) elucidates the concept of monopoly in historic context, by tracing the major conceptual authors and their works and the varied application of these in the historiographic and economic literature over the last three centuries.

In a later article (Richardson, 2004), he shows that monopoly was rarely an exercise in totality (at least by medieval English guilds) but was instead functionally limited by various market factors. He uses six questions to test the applicability of the descriptor “monopoly” to the privileges obtained by guilds in medieval England. I use this method to elucidate the degree of monopoly (if any) contained in the privileges defended by the guilds. That is to say, the intent here is not to question the validity of his findings; it is to apply his methodology to a specific case.

Before progressing to the six questions developed by Richardson (2004) to test the degree of monopoly control, it is worthwhile to underscore the differences between guilds. Guilds have been differentiated by productive or commercial activities or the types of goods traded – perishable goods and services on one hand, or non-perishable goods, on the other (Richardson, 2001). This investigation is focused on service-sector guilds.

Richardson was not ignorant of this differentiated character by economic sector. “Guilds that sold victuals and services, which could not be traded over long distances, often used their powers to advance their own interests at their neighbors’ expense.” After describing productive guilds, he goes on to note (2004, p. 234) that:

The second type of craft guild, providers of services such as innkeepers, teamsters, and minstrels, operated under different conditions. Services could not be sold over long distances to anonymous consumers in international markets. Markets for services were local.

The service sector can be understood as those economic actors who do not create or commercialize any good, instead they provided ancillary activities. That said, these organizations still operated under the terminology and functional structure of guilds, meeting the definition of such as established by contemporaries and by later scholars (e.g. Pfister, 2008, pp. 32–33). They represent a different sort of economic guild, having similar aims but different characteristics.

As noted above, the method used in this section was developed by Richardson (2004) in an article examining the monopolistic privileges of late-fourteenth century charters (ordinances) from throughout England. The charters had been brought to light and published by a sort of nineteenth century historians Richardson calls “collectors” (Richardson, 2001, p. 225). For example, Joshua Toulmin Smith (1870) discovered (in a sack!) a trove of original documents at the end of the nineteenth century that provide a rich source for studies of medieval English guilds. Richardson combines this source with a general understanding of English Common Law as it stood at the time. After a brief but precise synopsis of the state of the questions related to labor specialization and the relationship between guild regulations and economic development, Richardson establishes that the privileges accorded to English medieval guilds “did not provide a monopoly in the Marshallian sense” (2004, p. 8).

By Marshallian, Richardson refers to late-nineteenth century economist Alfred Marshall, who defines a monopoly as a situation in which, “a single person or association of persons has the power of fixing either the amount of a commodity that is offered for sale or the price at which it is offered” (Marshall, 1890).⁴⁵⁷ In the case at hand, the “commodity” is substituted by the service of cargo-handling. It must be noted that the pricing of these services was the product of a negotiation between different actors (representing supply and demand) and mediated by the state

⁴⁵⁷ Marshall, A. (1890). *Principles of Economics* (Vol. V (Ch. 14 “The Theory of Monopolies”). [Retrieved from <https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/economics/marshall/bk5ch14.htm>; last accessed 17 January 2017].

(in representation of the public interest, as it was conceived of at the time). Thus, it can be understood that the various guilds of maritime-cargo handlers operated sorts of semi-public monopolies. That is, the supply of services was monopolized, but the opportunity for monopoly profits was reduced or eliminated by price regulation. That said, the fact that the guilds at times effectively charged rates other than those established in the price schedules must be noted.

While he is careful to note that his conclusions apply to English medieval guilds, and not modern English variants, the article does provide interesting points for consideration in testing whether or not privileges amounted to a monopoly. As readers should agree, the questions, inasmuch, are not limited temporally or geographically.

Specifically, these questions are (Richardson, 2004, pp. 12–13):

- (a) Did guilds possess rights to be sole sellers in certain markets?
- (b) Did the law allow sellers to manipulate quantities and prices?
- (c) Did the law allow guilds to erect barriers to trade?
- (d) Did the law allow guilds to erect barriers to entry?
- (e) Could guilds use their regulatory powers to restrict competition?
- (f) Was the enforcement of laws lax?
- (g) Could guilds monopolize markets by corrupting the legal system?

How can these questions – which place guild privileges in the context of the market and the responsible legal framework – be adapted to elucidate the degree of monopoly control exercised by the guilds studied here? The English guilds studied by Richardson were craft guilds, involved in manufacturing and selling goods. These goods were sold from the home-workshop, at local fairs, and sold at distant markets via intermediaries – a point which is important in Richardson’s analysis. However, under investigation here are guilds that were not involved in making or selling goods: they were involved in selling the provision of services in a contained, local market. Therefore, the questions – which I here consider in the context of the service guilds – should be applicable for determining the monopolistic character of the privileges enjoyed by the guilds.

Therefore, I replace “sellers” with “service providers” in (a) and (b), leaving the other questions as they stand. I will proceed to discuss each point, using the modified questions, in hope of determining the existence of monopoly authority.

(a) Did guilds possess rights to be sole service providers in certain markets?

This answer is affirmative in the case of some guilds, only suffering abrogation during periods of liberalization. Unless he or she was the owner of the goods in question, no private individual (by which it is meant, anyone not belonging to the guild responsible for the specific type of cargo) was permitted to handle maritime cargo in the privileged areas. Within the realm of guild operations, certain guilds had privileges of handling specific goods that could not be handled by others. This established labor monopolies over service provision for maritime cargo-handling, divided by types of goods and specific port areas.

To better understand this, I believe focus should be on the definition of the market. There were four geographic areas that constituted separate markets for maritime cargo-handling: in the bay to the beach; from the beach to the Customs House; within the Customs House; and from the Customs House to points beyond. In the first area, the market was dominated by three guilds (unloaders, mariners, and fishermen). However, the owners of goods could choose to employ their own personnel and equipment to handle the goods, paying the privileged guilds a reduced rate; thus, we see a partial monopoly in action.⁴⁵⁸ From the beach to the Customs House, responsibility for handling goods by maritime porters and maritime horsecart operators was determined by the specific types of goods to be transported.⁴⁵⁹ The determination was based on functional and cultural criteria.

The only persons permitted to handle goods within the Customs House were maritime porters. However, it must be noted that this service was provided by a team of maritime porters, *gratis*.

⁴⁵⁸ Moreno, A. (1784). *D. Agustin Moreno, auditor de marina de esta provincia, ministro interino de ella ...*, *Como por repetidas veces se hayan quejado los prohombres de los gremios de mareantes y de cargadores y descargadores de esta matricula, señaladamente con representacion de diez y ocho de febrero ultimo, exponiendo que conforme a reales cédulas y edictos para su observancia expedidos tienen concedida la privativa en la carga y descarga de todos los generos, granos, efectos y mercaderias ...* Barcelona: Bernardo Pla.; Anon. (1819). *Arancel de precios de carga, descarga y trasbalso que en el percibo de los derechos deben arreglarse los gremios de mareantes...para el embarco y desembarco de los géneros, víveres y demás mercaderías que se transportan este puerto de Barcelona*. Imp.Garriga y Aguasvivas; and Ministerio de la Marina (1841). *Arancel o tarifa de los precios que para el trabajo de carga y descargo deben regir en este puerto*. Madrid, España: Imp. de Brusi.

⁴⁵⁹ AGMMB, “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

Despite the rational, cost-based *prima facie* argument against maintaining this monopoly, the maritime porters defended this privilege throughout the years. This service was cited as an example of their honor and trustworthiness, and represented a general service provided for the common good of the merchants, government, and citizens of Barcelona.⁴⁶⁰ It is likely that – by controlling which goods left the Customs House, when – they were able to influence the decision-making determining which guild handled goods leaving the Customs House and also better guarantee that their guild was not slighted by another. This is especially relevant as the maritime porters shared work and income, whereas others did not. And, since the owner of goods could choose to have privileged goods handled by a less expensive guild (specifically, the maritime horsecart operators) if maritime porters were not present when the goods were available, the maritime porters' ability to delay delivery of these goods until a team was ready would have secured their collective income.

(b) Did the law allow service providers to manipulate quantities and prices?

This question is a bit more difficult to respond to conclusively. Firstly, the manipulation of quantities could be understood as the quantity of service providers necessary or available. By necessary, I mean, since some fees were dependant on the number of individuals required, by determining a larger group was necessary, a larger fee could be charged. However, the ordinances determine the prices to be charged, the number of workers based on weight, mediating some subjective aspects of this consideration.

The idea of a limited number of available workers is also a relevant consideration. A strong monopolistic privilege would allow, say, for a guild to maintain a limited number of members, no matter the amount of goods to be handled. In this scheme, the total fees to be collected (based on the quantity of goods to be handled) would be shared by a smaller group of workers, regardless of how long they took to transport the goods. In the face of this possibility, the ordinances provided that a merchant could employ people of other guilds or even private individuals to handle goods at dusk, so that goods would not be left (more or less abandoned) on the beach after dark. In this way, there was a daily time limit.

⁴⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

As to the issue of manipulating prices, at face value, there is little room for price manipulation. Informational asymmetries were reduced or eliminated through general posting of the applicable fees. The ordinances and intervening price schedules established prices by type of goods, weight, distance, and by the number of people required. At times, the guilds requested updates of the prices through the proper channel – by drafting new prices and sending this along to the responsible government body. Less than a month after the promulgation of the 1832 Ordinances, the maritime porters proposed a new fee schedule with price increases.⁴⁶¹ Within less than two years, the guilds were submitting new ordinances for internal functioning.⁴⁶² In the case of the maritime porters, their privileges were underscored in 1835.⁴⁶³

However, the guilds did not necessarily honor these arranged prices. In 1796, the City Council pressured the Maritime porter and Horsecart Operators Guild to respect the price schedule established in the 1770 ordinances,⁴⁶⁴ but emitted new prices (only for the horsecart operators) in 1798.⁴⁶⁵ In 1807, the authorities were forced to update the price schedule for loading and unloading goods from merchant vessels. It regulated the fees charged by mariners and fishermen for handling cargo, and conformed to the “Royal privileges and immortal customs, and to that prescribed by the King in his Royal Ordinances”.⁴⁶⁶ It is made clear in the document that the emission of these new prices was a response to the inability of the Royal Board of Government of the Principality of Catalonia to maintain the previously established prices in the face of the new schedule proposed by the directors of the guilds of mariners and of fishermen.

(c) Did the law allow guilds to erect barriers to trade?

The guilds could not choose to handle or not handle goods or the goods of this or that merchant; the relationship was based on an understanding of obligation. The guilds were not free to determine the conditions under which they would operate – these determinations were

⁴⁶¹ AHCB, [Faquines de Capsana], “[No title]”, aja 27, folio 3, leg. s/n [9 August 1832 – 20 October 1832]

⁴⁶² AHCB, *Colección de la Junta de Comercio, Fondo Corporativo*, Caja 40, folio 10, leg. s/n [18 April 1834]; and AHCB, *Colección de la Junta de Comercio, Fondo Corporativo*, Caja 42, folio 18, leg. s/n [April 1834].

⁴⁶³ AHCB, *Colección de la Junta de Comercio, Fondo Corporativo*, Caja 42, folio 18, leg. s/n [14 April 1835].

⁴⁶⁴ AGMMB, “[Certificació notarial de l’ expedient instruït per Reial Acord sobre el nomenament de prohoms i ‘ observància de les ordenances]”, 13.05.1796, Capsa 4, carpeta 7 (2238).

⁴⁶⁵ Buenaventura Gassó, A. (1798) “De orden del señor intendente presidente, insiguiendo acuerdo de la Real Junta de Comercio de este Principado ... Tarifa de los precios que podrán pagarse á los carreteros de mar por el transporte ó carreteo[...].”, Biblioteca de U. Pompeu Fabra, *Fons regnats Ferran VI, Carles III i IV (1750-1807)*.

⁴⁶⁶ Anon., “Arancel de precios de carga, descarga y trasbalso ó transbordo...” [18 agosto 1807], Reimpreso por Garriga y Aguasvivas: Barcelona (1819), [Available at BC, 33-8:C 49/8]. Original: [...C]onforme á los Reales privilegios é inmemorial costumbre, y á lo prescripto por el Rey en sus Reales Ordenanzas.”

encapsulated in the ordinance structure, which granted them privileges in exchange for their willingness to provide their services when so needed.

(d) Did the law allow guilds to erect barriers to entry?

Ordinances established the barriers to entry, if any, in each guild. It is concluded that the service guilds discussed were comprised solely of masters – as there is no indication of apprenticeship or officialdom in any of the documents. Likewise, there was no examination for new masters. Instead, the testimony of two standing members was sufficient, granting that initiation fees were paid in good order. While this may seem a slight barrier, it could also prove an effective one, considering the subjectivity and reliance on social networking. Some other requirements existed, including the residency of the worker in Barcelona, or the absence of a criminal record. In some cases, the number of initiates was limited in the ordinances. For example, in the case of the maritime porters, this was limited to two new masters per year, plus the sons of existing masters.⁴⁶⁷ Likewise, marriage was another means of gaining entry. The degree of maximization of endogamy has been noted (Romero Marín, 2007a). This exclusionary ability was also established in the ordinances for the maritime horsecart operators.⁴⁶⁸ It seems this would offer for little flexibility, especially considering the alteration of a status quo through increased market conditions.

The government eventually placed the three principal land-based, maritime cargo guilds – the maritime porters, horsecart operators and the maritime teamsters – under the jurisdiction of a single ordinance, promulgated on 11 July 1832 (in accords with a dictate by the *Consejo Supremo de Hacienda* from 2 July 1819).⁴⁶⁹ While this would not have constituted a sector-based guild as defined by Pfister (2008, p. 33), it was a sector-based ordinance. The twelfth section states: “There shall be admitted in each guild those apt and honorable subjects who are considered sufficient for the transport of their respective class.”⁴⁷⁰ This means, in effect, that each guild can determine the number of initiates and rely on social networks. This amounts to an

⁴⁶⁷ *Op. cit.* “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia ...”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

⁴⁶⁸ AHCB, *Colección de la Junta de Comercio, Fondo Corporativo*, Caja 40, folio 10, leg. s/n [18 April 1834].

⁴⁶⁹ AGMMB, “Copia de las ordenanzas de los Gremios de Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros y Tragineros de Mar de la ciudad de Barcelona publicada por el Supremo Consejo de Hacienda en 11 de julio de 1832, Capsa 2, carpeta 1 (2209). The Supremo Consejo de Hacienda is translated as, the Supreme Council of Internal Revenue.

⁴⁷⁰ AHCB, [Faquines de Capsana], “[D. Pedro Alcantara Diaz de Labandero Cevallos...]”, Caja 27, Carpeta 3, folio s/n. Orig: “Se admitirán en cada gremio los sujetos aptos y de honradez que se consideren suficientes para el transporte de su respectiva clase.”

exclusive organizational strategy; whereas, Richardson found that in the case of the medieval English guilds, “The charters established inclusive rather than exclusive organizations. They required everyone to join the organization. They did not prohibit anyone from entering the craft” (2004, p. 15). Since work was limited and beyond any growth or diversification strategies, there is a positive economic motivation for limiting the number of new initiates. This limitation was similar in cases when the guild in questions operated by turn (each guildsman having an orderly opportunity to work) – in which they would share the income generated; as in those cases in which they competed directly with one another, and would therefore be desirous of limiting competition. This is because the total amount of work was beyond their control, and could not be increased (as production of manufactured goods could). The counterbalance to this was the desire to maintain enough guildsmen present and available so as to not lose business to another guild (as the merchant could choose to employ less expensive horsecart operators in the absence of maritime porters.)

(e) Could guilds use their regulatory powers to restrict competition?

This question addresses the issue of the participation of non-guild members in the economic activities covered by the privileges. Generally speaking, the maritime cargo-handling guilds restricted competition from non-guild members. The competition amongst the various guilds was dictated by the terms established in the ordinances. This competition increased with liberalization, but only in some market areas. The ordinances allowed the guilds to restrict non-guild members from entering into the business of maritime cargo service handling provision.

The greatest loophole available in the ordinances was the ability of the owners of goods to transport these themselves, by using their own means of transportation (equipment and laborers). This allowed some merchants to bypass the hiring of maritime porters and horsecart operators.⁴⁷¹ Likewise, while goods were still in the bay – being loaded or unloaded from the ships – merchants employing their own laborers and harbor boats had certain freedom, although they would still be required to pay the respective guild at half the normal rate.⁴⁷²

⁴⁷¹ *Op. cit.* Buenaventura Gassó, A. (1798). And Izquierdo, D. (1800). [No title], “[Privativo de Carreteros de 1800]”, [Available: <http://mdc.cbuc.cat/cdm/compoundobject/collection/regnatsUPF/id/16443/show/16441/rec/68>; last accessed 15 January 2017].

⁴⁷² *Op. cit.* Anon. (1819). *Arancel de precios*; Moreno, A. (1784);and, *Op. cit.* Ministerio de la Marina (1841).

An interesting example of this is highlighted by Marta V. Vicente (2008), in her study of the participation of women in commerce in Barcelona during the time studied here. She recounts the case of one Paula Llorens, a widow, and her 1799 supplication to the King, after her attempt to pass her late husband's maritime horsecart and horse to her sons was blocked by the horsecart operator's guild and the local authorities of Barcelona (2008, pp. 49–51). Although, as a widow, she was allowed the use of the cart belonging to her inherited business, the guild argued against her being able to pass this right on to her sons-in-law.

“Paula insisted that, against the demands of the Maritime Horsecart Operators Guild, she could leave [loan] the cart to her family, free of charge, in the same way that merchants and businessmen loaned their carts amongst themselves. To permit the guild to prohibit the businessmen this practice, she warned, would reduce economic activity and the benefits that were provided by commerce and [which] benefitted the ‘public good’” (Vicente, 2008, p. 50).⁴⁷³

(f) Was the enforcement of laws lax?

Another consideration deals with what Farr calls “the apparatus of enforcement available to guilds – workshop inspections, fines, and access to courts being the most significant – [which] was sanctioned by authorities” (Farr, 1997, p. 49). That is to say, various actors were involved in enforcement of the laws. The first line of enforcement was carried out by the guilds, which jealously defended their privileges; the second, by the government, if it so saw fit. Enforcement was, in many cases, applied directly by the guilds, which would sequester goods and the means of transporting them when they suspected a violation of their privileges.

Likewise, by taking advantage of the judicial personhood provided by the incorporation enshrined in the ordinances, enforcement could also be applied indirectly, by accessing the judicial system via lawsuits and calls for imprisonment in some dire cases. There are scores of cases of lawsuits between the various cargo-handling guilds and against other guilds and

⁴⁷³ Original: “Paula insistia que, en contra de les demandes del gremi de carreters de mar, ella podia deixar el carro a la seva família, lliure de càrrecs, de la mateixa manera que mercaders i negociants es prestaven els seus carros el seus carros els uns als altres. Permetre al gremi que prohibís als comerciants aquesta pràctica, advertia, reduiria l’activitat econòmica i els beneficis que sostenien el comerç i beneficiaven al ‘bé públic’.”

individuals.⁴⁷⁴ (That said, and as I established in the section dedicated to sources, it is impossible at this point to determine the frequency of these lawsuits in relation to the overall number of suspected violations of the privileges; we may never know many such occurrences were ignored or negotiated informally.) When not satisfied, the guilds had recourse to the courts to increase fines or even to request incarceration. This was done by the maritime porters against the horsecart operators after their previously unified guild split into two around 1798.⁴⁷⁵

(g) Could guilds monopolize markets by corrupting the legal system?

Based on a reading of the available documents, there is little evidence of any sort of “corruption” of the legal system. Quite to the contrary, the court documents show a stringent application of the law by the guilds. In the case of the maritime cargo-handling guilds of Barcelona, there was apparently no need to “corrupt” the system.

This determination is informed by the relatively democratic structure of the local government at the time, which amounted to a sort of municipal republican government under the authority of a monarchy. This system depended on complex interactions between different parties, particularly the guilds, businessmen, and the authorities. As shown (Vicente, 2008) the different levels of government must also be considered, as must be the difference between the elected officials and the decisions of the judicial system. By and large, the local government acted as a semi-interested mediating force between the guilds and proponents of liberalization, generally siding with the guilds until political changes resulted in a shift in policies in favor of liberalization.

⁴⁷⁴ Located in noted collections of the AGMMB and the AHCB, *Colección de la Junta de Comercio, Fondo Corporativo*.

⁴⁷⁵ AGMMB, “[Certificació notarial de la causa entre el Gremi de Bastaixos, d’ una part, i el Gremi de Carreters de Mar, de l’ altra, tancada el 29 gener de 1802]”, 24.01.1802, Capsa 4, carpeta 17 (2248); and AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos a l’ Alcalde Major de Barcelona sobre la vulneració d’ ordenances]”, 18.07.1807, Capsa 7, carpeta 22 (2271).

Resumen de Tesis Doctoral

Objetivo, hipótesis, metodología y fuentes

Esta investigación tiene como objetivo elucidar el sub-sector del manejo de la carga marítima en Barcelona (1760-1840) para mejor entender la función de los gremios de servicios. En especial analiza como reaccionaron estos gremios al desarrollo progresivo del liberalismo, que representó un reto considerable al sistema gremial. De esta manera, la tesis contribuye a la historiografía de los estudios de gremios europeos y de la historia de trabajo en el ámbito marítimo. Es notable que el objeto de estudio se encuentre como un *outlier* (o, caso atípico) en varios campos, ya que en los estudios de gremios hay poca atención puesta en el sector de servicios, y en los estudios de trabajo marítimo hay muy pocas investigaciones sobre la época artesanal.⁴⁷⁶ A nivel de historia local, existen unas pocas publicaciones sobre los gremios tratados aquí, pero en su mayoría enfocan a un solo gremio, de manera individual, desconectado del resto de componentes del universo del trabajo portuario.

Las principales preguntas giran alrededor de los modelos organizativos de los gremios de la carga marítima. ¿Cómo se organizaron? ¿Cómo cambiaron estas estructuras con el paso del tiempo, especialmente en el contexto de mayor especialización, con el cambio tecnológico, la competencia y la liberalización económica? ¿Cuáles fueron las características de los privilegios de los gremios, y cómo defendieron y avanzaron los mismos? ¿Cuál era la composición de los individuos agremiados y cómo interactuaban? ¿Que situaciones crearon dificultades, y cómo respondieron a estos retos? ¿Cuáles fueron las relaciones con los distintos actores gubernamentales e instituciones? ¿Cómo respondieron a circunstancias cambiantes y las oportunidades que éstas conllevaron? ¿Qué consideraciones influyeron en sus estrategias?

⁴⁷⁶ S. BELUCCI, L. R. CORRÊA, J.-G. DEUTSCH, & C. JOSHI [eds] (2014). "Introduction", in *Labour in Transport: Histories from the Global South (Africa, Asia, and Latin America), c. 1750-1950*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. And, J. IBARZ (2016). "Recent trends in dock workers history", paper presented at *XI European Social Science History Conference*, Valencia, Spain.

En tanto a las hipótesis concretas de esta investigación, son tres:

1. El sistema de privilegios monopolísticos (divididos entre los gremios) para el manejo de carga se basó en una combinación de características subjetivas y objetivas de la carga y la mejor manera de manejarla (de manera cooperativa o individual).
2. Estas consideraciones contribuyeron a crear diferencias en sus modelos de provisión de servicios, dando lugar así a diferentes culturas de trabajo (en combinación con otras consideraciones socio-culturales) e influyendo los modelos organizativos y las culturas organizativas de los gremios.
3. Sus respuestas durante el liberalismo fueron informadas por sus respectivas culturas (de trabajo y de organización) y por los cambios en las mismas. Es decir, frente la liberalización, los gremios eran organizaciones dinámicas que intentaron mantener o abandonar sus antiguas costumbres, prácticas, valores y privilegios mientras que buscaban seguir siendo relevantes en un contexto socio-económico cambiante.

Para probar estas hipótesis, he recurrido a una variedad de fuentes primarias y secundarias. La gran mayoría de fuentes primarias consistían en documentación normativa (particularmente las ordenanzas, tarifas y pleitos jurídicos), notas oficiales de sus reuniones, correspondencia y documentación producida por los gremios. La literatura secundaria utilizada es la de la historiografía de los gremios a nivel europeo y el estado de la cuestión de la misma, estudios de diferentes puertos y sus estructuras laborales, la historia de trabajo portuario y la liberalización en España. De esta manera, he logrado situar las experiencias locales en relación a experiencias en otros puertos, además de situar la investigación en la historiografía más relevante y reciente.

Estructura de la tesis

Partiendo de una introducción, donde establezco el objetivo, hipótesis, metodología, métodos y fuentes de la investigación, entro en un análisis global de la coyuntura en la cual se desarrolló la liberalización. De allí hago un resumen de la historiografía de los temas de mayor interés, especialmente sobre el estado de la cuestión de los estudios de los gremios europeos.

Básicamente, distingo tres grandes tendencias historiográficas: la del marxismo ortodoxo en la cual se postula un desconecte entre gremio y sindicato; la de la continuidad de gremios a sindicatos y de gremios a empresas (contemporánea al marxismo original); y la actual tendencia revisionista (con algunas raíces en el marxismo heterodoxo-culturalista que en algún sentido intenta agregarse al materialismo histórico) que estudia las relaciones y conflictos laborales, el desarrollo tecnológico y la protección de propiedad intelectual colectiva, la transmisión de capacidades y otros aspectos relacionados al papel de los gremios en establecer la base del capitalismo (en su conjunto llamado a veces, *“the return of the guilds”*). Este apartado cubre también información general sobre los gremios de diferentes sectores económicos para dar una perspectiva para lectores no familiarizados con la época artesanal.

El tercer capítulo se enfoca en varios puertos europeos (Londres, Marsella, Génova, Livorno, Florencia, Cádiz y Valencia), desde las perspectivas de sus características hidro-geográficas y el panorama laboral respectivo. Estos puertos y sus sistemas laborales (ambos muy variados entre sí) sirven de referencia a lo largo de la tesis. Adicionalmente, en este capítulo hago un estudio sobre el puerto de Barcelona desde la perspectiva histórica, enfocando en sus características naturales, portuarias e infraestructurales. Finalmente, analizo los diferentes lugares (definidos objetivamente) y espacios (definidos subjetivamente) de trabajo y los procesos de establecimiento de usos y pertenencias laborales y socio-culturales sobre los mismos en Barcelona y en los puertos de referencia.

Los siguientes tres capítulos (4-6) entran progresivamente en mayor detalle sobre aspectos generales y específicos de los oficios y gremios de la carga marítima de Barcelona en diferentes aspectos: sus privilegios y las acciones para defender los mismos; sus modos de trabajar, la construcción de sus modelos y culturas organizativas; las posiciones de liderazgo formal y laboral; actividades de sociabilidad; la creación y transmisión directa e indirecta de capacidades (*“duras”*, o técnicas, y *“blandas”*, o socio-organizativas); la determinación y aplicación de cualificaciones formales e informales; y las contradicciones socio-económicas dentro de algunos de ellos. En todo momento, intento establecer la relación existente entre estos diferentes aspectos.

Los oficios y gremios tratados son: mareantes; descargadores; pescadores; faquines de capsana (bastaixos); carreteros de mar; tragineros de mar; alquiladores de mulas; y – por su intromisión – los labradores del llano y los *mossos de corda*, o *camàlichs* (estos últimos sin gremio a pesar de sus muchos intentos, siempre protestados por los bastaixos). La inclusión de los *camàlichs* en el estudio permite subrayar la importancia del reconocimiento formal y oficial por parte de la autoridad gubernamental.

Parto de una definición socio-jurídica de los oficios y gremios, basada en un análisis de la interrelación de lo jurídico con lo social. Esta definición de los gremios está expresada en las ordenanzas gremiales, en pleitos jurídicos (basados en las mismas) y en los cambios de privilegios y responsabilidades. Por su parte, la construcción de modos de trabajo fue una combinación de factores tradicionales y las necesidades objetivas de la carga misma. En términos generales he identificado dos modos de trabajo: la individual (cuando una sola persona era capaz de manejar y conducir la carga) y la cooperativo (cuando el manejo correcto requería un grupo). Este último modo de trabajo (el cooperativo) llevó en el caso de Barcelona (pero no en otros puertos) a la construcción de culturas de trabajo y modelos organizativos igualitarios, en los cuales se controlaban estrictamente las oportunidades de trabajar y repartieron de manera bastante igualitaria los ingresos del trabajo del colectivo. El modo individualista llegó a producir en algunos gremios (o por lo menos por parte de sus líderes) el abandono durante el proceso de liberalización de sistemas de turno (el cual fue en su momento menos estricto que los turnos usados por los gremios cooperativos) y la aparición de relaciones (proto-)capitalistas de empleo (entre maestros del mismo gremio, y debates sobre la contratación de ayudantes no-agremiados por maestros).

Aunque todavía no se puede llegar a confirmar con certeza una relación de causalidad entre estos modelos organizativos y el grado de resistencia frente las medidas reformistas o abolicionistas (dado el factor de la participación de tres de los cuatro gremios cooperativos en una estructura militarizada – la Matrícula de Mar – que los protegía de las medidas reformistas), la correlación es notable. Fueron los gremios igualitarios que lograron mejor mejor o incluso sobrevivir a la abolición (pasando en por lo menos un caso – el de los bastaixos – a constituir directamente una

unión de trabajo). En cambio, los maestros de gremios individualistas llegaron a formar asociaciones de patronos en sus respectivas áreas económicas.

Es notable que estos cambios se dieran en un período en el cual no hubo ninguna transformación tecnológica dentro del subsector. De todas formas, el panorama tecnológico cambiante (es decir, la primera industrialización) llegó a amenazar estos gremios. Es interesante señalar que los *bastaixos* (faquines de capsana), por su parte, se diferenciaron de los oficios susceptibles a la industrialización para defender su existencia y privilegios:

“[...en la] Real Cedula de 24 de Junio del 1770, los negocios tocantes al conocim(ien)to de la Junta de Comercio y Monedas y de la que han emanado las posteriores disposiciones sobre el particular parece no son aplicables al objeto del oficio de Faquines de Capsana, atendido que la causa impulsiva de aquella resolucion y demas que la han subseguido, no ha sido otra, que el fomento del comercio, y el adelantamiento de los oficios, fabriles, o manufacturas y como que es desde luego bien visto, que ninguna manufacturacion, ningun artefacto produce el gremio de Faquines de Capsana, en natural consecuencia de esto, que una corporacion, que no se dedica a ninguna industria fabril y que no tiene otros elementos, que el empleo de la fuerza fisica, y la honradez, y legalidad de cada individuo no es susceptible de adelantamientos en producciones del arte, pues que ninguna tiene ni puede tener”.⁴⁷⁷

Es decir, que esta investigación se trata de oficios aislados (en el momento estudiado) de los impactos de la transformación tecnológica pero dentro de un marco económico cambiante, gracias a la industrialización de la producción de textiles. Esto es muy relevante, ya que los estudios relacionados con los gremios, cambio tecnológico y desarrollo del capitalismo industrial normalmente se enfocan en los oficios directamente afectados. Sin la existencia de este factor de cambio tecnológico, se puede ajustar el análisis a base de otras consideraciones, especialmente analizando los cambios al interior de los gremios.

⁴⁷⁷ Arxiu General del Museu Marítim de Barcelona, *Fons del Gremi de bastaixos, macips de ribera i carreters de mar de Barcelona* [AGMMB], “[Memorial de l’ aprovaci’ de noves ordenances id canvi d’ institució rectora]”, [1815], Capsa 7, carpeta 2 (2251). p 22-23

Cierro la investigación con un análisis del liberalismo durante la ilustración española y durante los subsecuentes gobiernos liberales, absolutistas y constitucionalistas (con sus respectivas perspectivas sobre la “cuestión gremial”). De esta manera, logro analizar el liberalismo como filosofía aplicada y como se desarrolló (tanto en sus avances como retrasos). Presto particular atención a los intentos principales de abolir y/o reformar profundamente los gremios (1813, 1820, 1834 y 1836).

Las conclusiones más destacadas de la investigación giran alrededor de los temas de interés para los debates más relevantes en los estudios de los gremios europeos, la historia del trabajo marítimo en la época artesanal, y para la historia local.

El mercado laboral de la carga marítima: la selección y privilegios monopolísticos

Los hombres (y parece que solamente hombres laboraban de manera directa)⁴⁷⁸ del subsector de la carga marítima eran responsables de cargar y descargar los bienes que llegaban a o salían de Barcelona en barcos, y de transportarla a diferentes sitios dentro y fuera de la ciudad. Barcelona era un nexo central (“hub”) de intercambio para el tráfico local, mediterráneo y colonial: la exportación, importación y re-exportación fueron, además, actividades importantes para la ciudad. Los bienes que pasaron por el puerto de Barcelona incluían productos agropecuarios a granel y procesados (especialmente vino y aguardiente), mercancías generales, y textiles estampados (conocidas localmente como “indianas”, el producto por excelencia de la proto-industrialización e industrialización en Cataluña).⁴⁷⁹ De la misma manera, había una diversidad considerable de bienes importados, los cuales variaban con cada llegada: madera; carbón, barras metálicas; bienes comestibles como pescado, azúcar, cacao, café y granos básicos; algodón y

⁴⁷⁸ Para un caso muy interesante que en cierta medida ejemplifica la participación de mujeres (viudas de maestros), véase: Marta VICENTE (2008). “Comerciar en femení”: La identitat de les empresàries a la Barcelona del segle XVIII. *Recerques: història, economia, cultura*, (56), 47–59. Relata el caso de una viuda de un carretero y ilumina el debate sobre la prestación de medios de servicio (en este caso la carreta) que llegó a incluir hasta la realeza.

⁴⁷⁹ Àlex SÁNCHEZ, “L’altre pa de la indústria. La procedència del cotó descarregat al port de Barcelona, 1790-1840”, en *Barcelona i el mar. Activitat portuària i façana litoral, segles XVIII-XXI*, en Ramon GRAU I FERNÁNDEZ (ed.), *Seminari d’Historia de Barcelona: Barcelona Quaderns d’Historia*, BQH 22, Barcelona, Ajuntament de Barcelona, 2015, pp. 87-110.


seda para transformar. La mercancía general representaba la mayoría de carga al inicio del siglo XIX.⁴⁸⁰

Con el paso de los siglos, se conformó un mercado laboral complejo y altamente regulado para manejar esta variedad de bienes, los cuales arribaron empacados y presentados de diversas formas. Dicha regulación se basaba en privilegios tradicionales y confirmados como monopolísticos en las ordenanzas de los determinados gremios. Los privilegios cubrían el manejo ciertos bienes (es decir, los modos de trabajo) además de sus privilegios (a veces compartidos) sobre el trabajo en áreas específicos de la ciudad. A lo largo de los siglos, las ordenanzas gremiales fueron extendidas y confirmadas por diferentes administraciones reales y locales. Dentro de este sistema de auto-regulación (regulado, a su vez por el gobierno), los diferentes gremios de carga marítima mantuvieron sus monopolios específicos sobre cierta clase de bienes y en ciertos trayectos dentro de la ciudad.

Los barcos que llegaban a Barcelona se anclaban en el arenoso puerto. No había ninguna protección natural y el único elemento portuario construido era el espigón de la Barceloneta; No existía ningún muelle donde se podría atracar directamente, por la falta de profundidad.⁴⁸¹ Esto explica la dificultad de efectuar mejoras en el sistema de descarga, debida a las condiciones naturales del tipo de puerto (en este caso, de playa modificada) y la resultante implicación económica de dichas mejoras.

⁴⁸⁰ La información general sobre importaciones y exportaciones se deriva de Pierre VILAR, *Catalunya dins l'Espanya moderna: la formació del capital comercial* (trans. by Eulàlia Duran i Grau), 4 vols, Barcelona, Ed. 62, 1962, IV, p. 152. Para un registro detallado de bienes descargados por el Gremio de Mareantes entre enero y marzo del 1800, véase Arxiu Històric de la Ciutat de Barcelona [AHCB], fons de la Junta de Comerç, secció corporacions, Mareantes (Gremio de San Telm i Santa Clara), “Llibre de entradas del Gremi de St Telm y Sta Clara, comensat lo día 18 de Gene de lañy 1800”, Caja 34, carpeta 1.

⁴⁸¹ Para poder percibir estos espacios el autor recomienda (y incluye como Anexo 1) J. MOULINIER and P. LARTIGUE “Plano de la Ciudad y del Puerto de Barcelona” en A. LABORDE *Voyage pittoresque et historique de l'Espagne* (c. 1806) Paris, P. Didot l'aîné, 1811 [disponible en <https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:BNE.Barcelona.planos.1806.jpg>; revisada 29 abril 2016]. Para un historia general del puerto y sus instalaciones, véase Joan ALEMANY I LLOVERA, *El port de Barcelona* (Barcelona, 2002). Para una historia económica del puerto, véase Joan CLAVERA I MONJONELL, Albert CARRERAS, Josep M. DELGADO, y César YÁÑEZ, *Economía e Historia del Puerto de Barcelona: Tres estudios*, Madrid, Port Autònom de Barcelona; Editorial Civitas, 1992. Para una colección más reciente sobre diversos aspectos del puerto y su relación con la ciudad, véase a Ramon GRAU I FERNÁNDEZ, (ed.) (2015). *Barcelona i el mar. Activitat portuària i façana litoral, segles XVIII-XXI*. Barcelona: Ajuntament de Barcelona.



Barcelona. J. Moulinier and P. Lartigue “Plan of the City and Port of Barcelona” in Alexandre de Laborde, *Voyage pittoresque et historique de l’Espagne*, (Paris, 1806). Source: Soley, R., & Gasset i Argemí, J. (1998), plate 376 [disponible en: <http://www.atlesdebarcelona.cat/gravats/376/> ; last accessed 4 March 2017].

Sobre el agua, la carga era manejada por tres gremios: mareantes; pescadores; y descargadores. Estas tres corporaciones fueron organizadas bajo el sistema de la Matrícula de Mar (una especie de registro para el reclutamiento de la Marina y para la organización de las actividades de carga y descarga) y se repartieron las oportunidades de cargar o descargar los barcos.⁴⁸² Los mismos precios fueron establecidos formalmente para los tres. Es notable que, a veces, estas tarifas fueron actualizadas para representar adecuadamente los verdaderos precios cobrados, lo cual evidencia cierto poder de los gremios, a veces por encima del poder gubernamental.⁴⁸³ La carga también se podía transbordar directamente a otros barcos para la re-exportación. Las mercancías destinadas a la ciudad y sus *hinterlands* (a pesar de estar relativamente mal comunicados) eran

⁴⁸² Archivo Naval de Cartagena [ANC], Zalvide, [en especial:] “[Mui Iltre Señor: Los prohombres del Gremio de Mareantes....]”, 20 October 1773, Caja 1637, Libro Primero, fos 4-24. Para más información sobre el sistema de la Matrícula del Mar de carácter normativo, véase Olga LÓPEZ MIGUEL y Magda MIRABET CUCALA, “La institucionalización de la Matrícula de Mar: Textos normativos y consecuencias para la Gente de Mar y Maestranza” en Carlos MARTÍNEZ SHAW (ed.), *El derecho y el mar en la España moderna* (Granada, Servicio de Publ. de la Univ. de Granada, 1995), pp. 217–239. Para más información sobre el fin del sistema (y su impacto en el manejo de carga) véase Jordi IBARZ GELABERT y Juanjo ROMERO MARÍN, “L’abolició de la Matrícula de Mar i les tasques de càrrega i descàrrega al Port de Barcelona, 1868-1874” *Barcelona Quaderns d’Història*, (2009), pp. 255-270.

⁴⁸³ Agustín MORENO, *D. Agustín Moreno, Auditor de Marina de Esta Provincia, Ministro Interino de Ella* [...] (Barcelona, 1784) [disponible en: <http://books.google.es/books?id=1hd0MwEACAAJ>; revisado el 19 abril 2016]; Anon., *Arancel de precios de carga, descarga y trasbordo que en el percibo de los derechos deben arreglarse los gremios de mareantes* [...] (Barcelona: 1819) [disponible en: <http://books.google.es/books?id=0wn2hSt5yPsC>; revisado el 19 abril 2016]; y, BC, *Colección de Reserva*, Comandante del Tercio Naval de Barcelona, *Arancel ó tarifa de los precios que para el trabajo de carga y descarga deben regir en este puerto* (Barcelona, 1841).

llevadas en lanchonas o flotando hacia la playa. Allí, fuera de la muralla de mar que protegía la ciudad, eran descargadas..

En la playa, el gremio responsable de hacerse cargo de estas mercancías se seleccionaba en función de la clase de carga. Esto se determinaba teniendo en cuenta varias consideraciones. Estas incluían: el valor relativo; el origen y destino dentro de la ciudad; la forma de ser empacado; y la mejor manera de transportar los bienes. Desde la playa, la carga era llevada hacia las Reales Aduanas (pasando por el Portal de Mar de la muralla) por uno de tres gremios privilegiados: bastaixos; carreteros de mar; y tragineros de mar. Dentro de las Aduanas y el Peso del Rey (que colindaba con las Aduanas) solamente se permitía la entrada de bastaixos – un privilegio ferozmente defendido. Desde las Aduanas, a estos tres gremios responsables, se añadía la participación de los alquiladores de mulas, quienes transportaban bienes a puntos fuera de la ciudad. Se permitía (de manera limitada) que el dueño de las mercancías transportara en ciertos trayectos su propia carga, por sus propios medios, y bajo su propia fuerza sin ayudantes. Esta libertad se fue expandiendo con la liberalización del mercado laboral.⁴⁸⁴ La expansión de sectores en etapas avanzadas de los procesos de proto-industrialización y el consecuente incremento de materia prima y bienes para exportar hizo aumentar el deseo de los empresarios de poder controlar el transporte o, por lo menos, bajar los costes del mismo.

La defensa de los privilegios

Las experiencias de los tres gremios de descarga en el ámbito del interior del puerto (es decir, desde los barcos hasta la playa) – específicamente, los gremios de mareantes, descargadores y pescadores – nos da una indicación sobre sus estrategias de operar una actividad no puramente monopolística. Los tres gremios (todos del sistema de la Matrícula de Mar, bajo la Marina militar) compartieron incómodamente el privilegio de descargar los barcos de todos los bienes sin diferenciar entre los gremios por la clase de carga.

Los mareantes acusaron a los otros de pertenecer en dos gremios a la vez, captando así oportunidades desiguales en el sistema establecido de turnar entre los gremios la descarga de

⁴⁸⁴ Josep María DELGADO RIBAS, “La organización de los servicios portuarios en un puerto pre-industrial: Barcelona 1300-1820”, en MARTÍNEZ SHAW (ed.), *El derecho y el mar en la España moderna*, pp. 107–146.

cada barco que llegara al puerto. Frente esta situación, se desarrolló una larga lucha entre los mareantes por una parte y los gremios de descargadores y pescadores de la otra durante las últimas décadas del siglo XVIII. Es evidente que hubo una doble participación por parte de estos últimos, además de una participación elevada de estos doblemente agremiados en la dirección de los gremios (o por lo menos de padres e hijos con el mismo apellido, algo difícil de diferenciar en documentos donde solamente aparece uno de los dos apellidos). En algunos momentos, los descargadores y pescadores compartieron hasta el mismo tesorero [*clavario*] o médico. El conflicto llegó a producir importantes desavenencias en la playa (el sitio de contratación) de modo que el Comandante de la Marina se vio obligado a viajar desde Cartagena hasta Barcelona para intentar a resolver el conflicto.

La estrategia del Comandante incluía la división de la playa en tres áreas (una para cada gremio). Mandó a que se formase entre los tres gremios una estructura supra-gremial, el Gremio [General] de [Gremios] Matriculados. Esto no era un gremio nuevo, sino una estructura que posibilitaba la reunión de representantes de cada gremio para discutir e intentar a resolver sus diferencias sin recurrir a la violencia o a pleitos jurídicos. A pesar de que se mandó a formar éste supra-gremio en 1770, no existe ningún registro de reuniones de los diferentes gremios, ni mucho menos una reunión entre los mismos durante casi tres años. Esta falta de actas de reunión es notable por dos hechos: primero, porque como gremios matriculados, sus reuniones requerían la presencia del Escribano de Mar (un notario especial para asuntos marítimos); y segundo, porque es evidente que – de una u otra manera – se reunieron (muy probablemente cada gremio por su parte) para nombrar/elegir nuevos directores. Curiosamente, no parece que se mandara limitar la participación de una persona en un solo gremio. Es decir, los doblemente agremiados siguieron aprovechando las elevadas oportunidades de trabajar gracias a su participación en dos gremios.

Los gremios tenían que defender diariamente sus privilegios: los no-agremiados, o miembros de otros gremios no podrían llevar a cabo actividades laborales reservadas a otros gremios (esto se llamaba “intromisión”). Esta era una violación muy seria de las regulaciones gremiales y representaba una especie de competencia desleal entre los gremios. A su vez, estas transgresiones significaron la aplicación de importantes multas, el secuestro de bienes, y el posible encarcelamiento de los culpables de dicha intromisión.

Las tensiones dentro del mercado y los respectivos monopolios de los gremios se traducían en pleitos jurídicos y la aplicación de multas por parte de los gremios contra los que habían violado sus privilegios. Por ejemplo, el entonces único Gremio de Bastaixos y Carreteros de Mar presentó una demanda contra el Gremio de Tragineros de Mar en la Audiencia Real, con resolución el día 20 de mayo de 1768.⁴⁸⁵ Esto se tradujo en una serie de multas significativas (de 50 *lliures* cada una) aplicadas a los agremiados del Gremio de Tragineros de Mar a inicios de 1769.⁴⁸⁶ Para poner estas cantidades en perspectiva, 50 *lliures* era la cantidad pagada para que un carretero sin familia en el gremio entrara en el mismo. A su vez, los bastaixos pidieron subir la multa a 100 *lliures* por violación de la norma. De ésta manera buscaban prevenir aún más la intromisión de tragineros de mar en sus faenas privilegiadas.⁴⁸⁷ El día 21 de febrero fueron multados nueve tragineros. A estos, dos días después les siguieron seis multados más, y el día siguiente, otro. La siguiente semana fue multado otro; y dos semanas después, dos más. La última multa (en esta serie) se aplicó el día 11 de abril. En total fueron veinte los individuos multados por una cantidad de 1000 *lliures* en total. Estas acciones (tanto jurídicas como directas), junto con la intromisión de los *camàlichs*, tuvieron mucho que ver con la aprobación de las nuevas ordenanzas del Gremio de Faquines de Capsana y Carreteros de Mar en 1770.⁴⁸⁸

Una situación parecida surgió una década más tarde, cuando el Gremio de Tragineros de Mar intentó modificar sus ordenanzas para crear un sistema de competencia abierta entre todos los gremios privilegiados a trabajar desde la playa.⁴⁸⁹ La capacidad superior y a mejor precio de los tragineros hubiera perjudicado seriamente a los bastaixos y carreteros si los comerciantes tubieran plena libertad para escoger entre las tres clases de transportistas. Como veremos, esta situación se llegó a repetir en 1832.

⁴⁸⁵ AGMMB, “Sentencia echa a 20 de mayo 1768 a favor del Gremio de Faquines, Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar contra los Tragineros de Mar”, 20.05.1768 -12.04.1769, Capsa 5, carpeta 5 (2309).


⁴⁸⁶ AGMMB, “Matrícula”, 1692/10/29-1902/12/13, Caja 9, carpeta 5 (2304).

⁴⁸⁷ A modo de comparación, 1500 *lliures* era suficiente para comprar una casa en 1780; 50 *lliures* era el precio para alquilar una casa durante un año, menos de dos décadas después: AGMMB, “Acte de confessió feta per Joseph Bonastre, sombrerer, als proms de la Confraria de Bastaixos de Capsana”, 1696-1794, Capsa 17, carpeta 4 (2351).

⁴⁸⁸ AGMMB, *fons del Gremi de bastaixos, macips de ribera i carreters de mar de Barcelona* [AGMMB], “Ordenanzas concedidas por la Real Audiencia del Principado de Cataluña a 17 setiembre de 1770 al Gremio de Faquines de Capsana o Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar [...]”, 1770, Capsa 1, carpeta 2 (2202).

⁴⁸⁹ AGMMB, “Autos judiciales i atorgació de poders relatius al transport de mercaderies de la platja fins a la ciutat de Barcelona”, 04.04.1778 -13.02.1779, Capsa 5, carpeta 1 (2306); AGMMB, “Los prohombres del Gremio de Faquines, Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar de la presente ciudad a su excelencia, suplican [...]”, 1779/10/28 - 1780/01/18, Capsa 4, carpeta 11 (2242); y, AGMMB, “Libro que trata de varios privilegios otorgados por el Rey Carlos III, 1781”, 1781, Capsa 8, carpeta 2 (2291).

El embargo de bienes privilegiados conducidos por otros fue una estrategia de acción directa para proteger su monopolio. Los bastaixos podrían parar a los acusados *in flagranti* (y reportar los casos a un alguacil). Estos embargos se apuntaban en una libreta: existe una libreta, cubriendo los años de 1802-1826.⁴⁹⁰ En la libreta se percibe una variedad de acusados, entre los cuales destacan personas de otros gremios y comerciantes empleando individuos o mozos (*mossos de corda*, también llamados *camàlichs*), los cuales representan cierta pluralidad de los casos. En algunos casos, se repite en varias ocasiones los mismos comerciantes: esto demuestra la voluntad de algunos comerciantes de vulnerar los privilegios a través de la contratación de no-agremiados para transportar sus bienes. El cuadro siguiente demuestra el número de eventos por año de embargos [*panyoraments*] de bienes por parte del Gremio de Bastaixos durante el período estudiado aquí.



Fuente: Trabajo del autor, basado en AGMMB, “Llibreta dels panyoraments. Comensa lo any de 1802”, 1802/01/29 - 1826/06/27, Capsa 4, carpeta 4 (2235).

La ocupación de Barcelona por parte de las tropas napoleónicas (1808-1814) y el Trienio Liberal (1820-1823) se destacan claramente por la ausencia de eventos. La cantidad de eventos fue más significativa durante el período más acrimonia entre los bastaixos y carreteros de mar, al inicio del siglo XIX. En ese período los bastaixos intentaban defender sus privilegios tradicionales sobre ciertos bienes. También deja en evidencia las dificultades creadas por la aparición de nuevos productos que no habían sido especificados en el sistema de privilegios. Los bastaixos

⁴⁹⁰ AGMMB, “Llibreta dels panyoraments. Comensa lo any de 1802”, 1802/01/29 - 1826/06/27, Capsa 4, carpeta 4 (2235)

buscaban incluir estos nuevos bienes en sus privilegios, mientras que los comerciantes y los transportistas no-agremiados argumentaron que los bienes no estaban privilegiados y, por ende, quedaron fuera del sistema monopolístico de privativas.


Culturas de trabajo y culturas organizativas

Todos los gremios de carga y descarga marítima eran horizontales, ya que no había aprendices ni oficiales – solo maestros.⁴⁹¹ Algunos de estos gremios (marineros, pescadores, descargadores y, sobre la tierra, los *bastaixos*) trabajaban de manera cooperativa en cuadrillas y funcionaban de una manera igualitaria – usando un turno para nivelar las oportunidades para trabajar y repartiendo de manera colectiva los ingresos entre los agremiados que habían trabajado durante cierto periodo. Además, estos ingresos colectivos cubrían los honorarios de los funcionarios del gremio (quienes cobraban dos o tres porciones en vez de una); de esta caja colectiva también pagaban las actividades de sociabilidad y apoyo mutuo, con lo cual ayudaron (aunque fuera mínimamente) a los enfermos, estropeados y agremiados jubilados (o sus viudas) con un humilde pago. El funcionamiento igualitario de los *bastaixos* de Barcelona contrasta con las experiencias de sus homólogos en otros puertos.⁴⁹²

⁴⁹¹ Esto habrá contribuido a la conclusión de que estos gremios de servicio eran “Gremios de estructura rudimentaria” o “unos gremios rudimentarias, unos *pre-gremios* que no reunían todos los requisitos de una asociación de esta clase”, hecha por Pedro [Pere] MOLAS RIBALTA, *Los Gremios Barceloneses Del Siglo XVIII: La Estructura Corporativa Ante El Comienzo de La Revolución Industrial*, Madrid, Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros, 1970, p. 55. La descripción “rudimentaria” – que significa sub-desarrollada – es un poco dudosa dadas las trayectorias organizativas, su capacidad de controlar el mercado laboral y ejercer otras actividades gremiales. En vez de “rudimentarias” es mejor referirse a ellos como “horizontales” ya que la principal diferencia es su estructura y no el grado de desarrollo organizativa asumiendo una supuesta etapa final parecida a la de los gremios verticales/productivos del sector secundario.

⁴⁹² Sobre el rechazo de una experiencia “normal” (o típica) en el trabajo portuario, véase Sam DAVIES and Klaus WEINHAEUER, “Towards a Comparative International History of Dockers” en Sam DAVIES, Collin J. DAVIS, David DE VRIES, Lex HEERMA VAN VOSS, Lidewij HESSELINK, and Klaus WEINHAEUER, (eds), *Dock Workers: International Explorations in Comparative Labour History, 1790-1970*, 2 vols, Surrey, England, Ashgate Pub. Ltd, 2000, I, pp. 3-11, 4. Para una estructura gremial de trabajadores de carga en España, véase Carmen SARASÚA GARCÍA, “Leaving home to help the family? Male and female temporary migrants in eighteenth-and nineteenth-century Spain”, en Pamela SHARPE (ed.) *Women, Gender and Labour Migration: Historical and Cultural Perspectives*, London [etc.], Routledge, 2001, pp. 29-59. Para un sistema altamente estratificado con varios gremios, véase Walter M. STERN, *The Porters of London*, London, Longmans, 1960, pp. 38-81; y Roy MANKELOW, “The Port of London, 1790-1970” en DAVIES [etc.], *Dock Workers: International Explorations*, I, pp. 365-385. Para una diferenciación entre igualitarismo *de jure* y *de facto*, véase William H. SEWELL, Jr., “Uneven Development, the Autonomy of Politics, and the Dockworkers of Nineteenth-Century Marseille”, *The American Historical Review*, 93 (1988), pp. 604-637, 619-620. Sewell hace mención de que los descargadores agremiados en Marsella eran aparentemente igualitarios, pero no lo eran en la práctica: mientras que la sub-

El siguiente cuadro demuestra la situación socio-económica de los maestros (a partir de sus propias declaraciones para la contribución de impuestos en 1775).⁴⁹³



Fuente: Trabajo del autor, basado en AGMMB, “[Cadastré Personal]”, 1761-1775, Caja 16, carpeta 3 (2339).


Los demás gremios (carreteros de mar, tragineros de mar y alquiladores de mulas) funcionaron todos de manera individual, con diferentes grados de competencia intra-gremial. Los primeros dos tradicionalmente usaron un sistema de turno en el cual el primero en llegar era el primero en salir a trabajar (a base de las llegadas de cada mañana, ya que estacionaban sus carretas y carretones en orden, respectivamente) y prohibieron la sub-contratación o contratación de no

contratación en el gremio está bien documentada, la contratación de no-agremiados es menos conocida y Sewell lo aborda como una hipótesis en el caso de los mozos de Marsella (llamados *crocheteurs*, o *robeirols* en Provençe). En Barcelona, un grupo análogo (los *camalichs*, o *mossos de corda*) fueron, aparentemente, excluidos siempre de los trabajos de carga y descarga marítima. Representaban una competencia desleal y cuando intentaron formar su propio gremio, los *bastaixos* intentaron exitosamente prohibir esta colectivización de “individuos vagos”; véase AGMMB, “Transunto auténtico de un decreto y memorial presentado por los prohombres del Gremio de Faquines, Macips de Ribera y Carreteros de Mar de la presente ciudad a su Excelentísimo y Real Acuerdo contra los individuos vagos llamados *camalichs* sobre cierta privativa autorizado dicho traslado por Ramon Costado, notario público. 14 Diciembre de 1778”, 26 November 1768 [*sic.*: 14 December 1778], Capsa 5, carpeta 6 (2311). Décadas más tarde, el asunto volvía a plantearse de nuevo; véase AGMMB, “[Súplica del Gremi de Bastaixos a la Reial Junta de Comerç]”, 25 May 1833, Capsa 7, carpeta 21 (2270).

⁴⁹³ AGMMB, “[Cadastré Personal]”, 1761-1775, Caja 16, carpeta 3 (2339).

agremiados; de esta manera intentaron limitar o minimizar la competencia directa y la estratificación de los agremiados.

Por su parte, los alquiladores de mulas no utilizaron ningún sistema de turno y permitieron la subcontratación de agremiados de tal manera que aproximadamente 58% de los maestros trabajaban “como mancevos” (“mancebos”), es decir, como si fuesen oficiales, ocupados por maestros más ricos: dependiendo de los cálculos, entre 12% y 20% de los agremiados estaban en la posición de emplear entre 58% y 74% de los agremiados (el factor variable es la posibilidad o imposibilidad de los maestros quienes se declararon no aptos para trabajar o “pobres de solemnne” de trabajar en alguna capacidad.⁴⁹⁴ La composición socio-económica del Gremio de Alquiladores de Mulas se puede ver en el siguiente cuadro.



Fuente: Trabajo del autor, basado en AHCB, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio, Fondo Corporativo*, Llogaters de Mules, “[Sin título]”, [1760], Caja 3, carpeta 108, pp 96r-108r.

⁴⁹⁴ AHCB, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio, Fondo Corporativo*, Llogaters de Mules, “[No title]”, [1760], Caja 3, carpeta 108, fos 96r-108r.

Hemos visto, en estos ejemplos dos culturas de trabajo diferentes basadas en la forma de provisión de servicios: cooperativa o individual. Estas diferencias se acentuaron durante el proceso de reformas liberales de los privilegios y ordenanzas (especialmente en las décadas inmediatamente posteriores al período estudiado aquí, cuando se formaron organizaciones de patrones).

Auto-regulación de la fuerza laboral: el papel de las redes sociales y familiares

Las funciones económicas de los gremios (en general) se basaron en su capacidad de auto-regular la fuerza laboral y aspectos de producción o la provisión de servicios. Debido a su carácter monopolístico, cada gremio tenía que auto-regular el mercado laboral para garantizar que había suficientes agremiados para llevar a cabo el trabajo requerido por el comercio (lo cual cambiaba con las estaciones durante la época pre-industrial). A la vez, los gremios también buscaban limitar el número de agremiados para no diluir demasiado las oportunidades de trabajo y los ingresos.

Su papel englobaba todo: establecieron las cualificaciones para entrar en un oficio; transmitieron de manera directa e indirecta las capacidades y conocimientos; controlaban los procesos de producción/servicio y un mínimo de calidad; defendieron sus monopolios contra la intrusión; e intentaron (en la medida de lo posible) prevenir que los agremiados cayesen en la pobreza extrema.⁴⁹⁵ En teoría, los gremios eran abiertos a cualquier persona que tuviera los requisitos para ser admitida (especialmente durante la liberalización a inicios del siglo XIX). Pero había dos consideraciones muy importantes en el caso de los *bastaixos*: que el solicitante gozara del apoyo de un agremiado quien podría dar fe de su buena conducta, honor y fiabilidad; y, que el hijo o yerno (en adelante referidos simplemente como “hijos”) de un maestro siempre podía entrar en el gremio, pagando un cuota de entrada inferior a la hora de agremiarse (normalmente, la tercera parte del cobro normal).

⁴⁹⁵ Véase, por ejemplo a Jan LUCASSEN, Tine DE MOOR, y J VAN ZANDEN (eds), *The Return of the Guilds*, International Review of Social History Supplements, 16 Cambridge [etc], Cambridge University Press, 2008; o Stephan R. EPSTEIN y Maarten Roy PRAK (eds), *Guilds, Innovation, and the European Economy, 1400-1800*, Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008.

En el caso de los diferentes gremios estudiados aquí (y especialmente los cooperativos), la fiabilidad era especialmente relevante.⁴⁹⁶ Existían dos razones para esto: primero, porque el gremio era responsable de asegurar la integridad de los bienes (en el caso de los faquines de Capsana de los bienes guardados en las Aduanas) y en el caso de pérdida o daño se encargaba de cubrir los gastos para recompensar a los dueños de los mismos; y, segundo, porque la confianza era una manera subjetiva para excluir del gremio solicitantes no deseados.⁴⁹⁷ La capacidad de determinar la entrada en el gremio era (además de una protección económica colectiva) una manera por la cual el gremio pudo regular el mercado de trabajo a través del establecimiento de cualificaciones socio-culturales dada la ausencia de la cualificación tecnológica.

He estudiado de manera detallada el caso de los carreteros de mar y, aún más el de los bastaixos (faquines de capsana) respecto la entrada de “hijos” (por lo cual se entiende hijos legítimos y yernos). Solo se permitían entrar cada año a algunos nuevos agremiados no-hijos (exceptuando años en los cuales había una necesidad de aumentar la fuerza de trabajo por cualquier razón), además de un número aparentemente ilimitado de hijos y yernos de agremiados. Mientras que la reproducción natural de los maestros parece haber sido bastante estable (entre dos y cinco hijos entraron al gremio por año), en algunos años un número relativamente alto de no-hijos fueron aceptados como maestros para aumentar o reemplazar la fuerza de trabajo del gremio.

Los fondos conservados del Gremio de Bastaixos contienen una libreta (un registro) en el que se anotaron más de doscientos años de entradas: se anotó el nombre del nuevo maestro bastaix o carretero, su relación familiar con algún agremiado y la correspondiente cantidad pagada para ser examinado para ingresar al gremio.⁴⁹⁸ El registro contiene la fecha y los examinadores en casi todos los casos, y muchas veces se especifica por escrito si el nuevo maestro iba a ser bastaix o

⁴⁹⁶ Para una consideración de honor en la economía española del antiguo régimen, véase a Antonio MORALES MOYA, “Actividades económicas y honor estamental en el siglo XVIII”, *Hispania*, 47 (1987), 951-976; sobre la determinación jurídica del honor de un determinado oficio en España, véase a Francisco CABRILLO, “Industrialización y derecho de daños en la España del siglo XIX”, *Revista de Historia Económica/Journal of Iberian and Latin American Economic History (Second Series)*, 12 (1994), 591-609. Igualmente, el honor constituía un asunto en los gremios europeos en general; véase a James FARR, *Artisans in Europe, 1300-1914*, p 6.

⁴⁹⁷ Para un análisis sobre la cuestión de honor en el Gremio de Bastaixos, véase a Juanjo ROMERO MARÍN, “Los Faquines de Capçana y su supervivencia en la era liberal”, *Drassana: Revista Del Museu Marítim*, (2007), pp. 104-114; 108-110.

⁴⁹⁸ AGMMB, “Matrícula”, 1692/10/29-1902/12/13, Capsa 9, carpeta 5 (2304). Dejé de calcular en 1850: el registro tiene entradas hasta 1902. Lastimosamente, el documento, en posesión del Gremio de Bastaixos no contiene información sobre los carreteros de mar después de 1800. Tampoco he localizado otra información en la cual basar una comparación entre dichos oficios/gremios.


carretero. Mientras que esta circunstancia no fue siempre anotada, sí que el registro siempre contiene el pago del examen y a partir de la respectiva cantidad se puede determinar la existencia de una relación familiar con algún agremiado.⁴⁹⁹ Cuando un solicitante entraba al Gremio de Bastaixos y Carreteros, el precio del examen se determinaba a partir del oficio y la relación con algún agremiado: durante el período estudiado, para los bastaixos, esto era de 7-8 *lliures* para un familiar y de 28 *lliures* para alguien que no era el hijo o yerno de un agremiado; para los carreteros de mar era de 11-12 *lliures* para un hijo o yerno y de 50 *lliures* para un no-familiar.

Las siguientes páginas contienen tres cuadros basados en el registro de nuevos agremiados durante noventa años (1760-1850).⁵⁰⁰ He tomado la información existente y he diferenciado entre los dos oficios de bastaix y carretero de mar; estos dos oficios estuvieron unidos en un solo gremio hasta 1796, cuando los carreteros salieron para formar su propio gremio (y cuando sus entradas dejan de aparecer en esta libreta). En la primera gráfica (Cuadro 4) se puede ver los nuevos carreteros de mar agremiados (hijos y no-hijos) entre 1760 y 1800. En la segunda (Cuadro 5), se presenta la misma información para los bastaixos. Estos cuadros establecen las pautas del comportamiento de los dos oficios durante cuarenta años. En la tercera (Cuadro 6) se muestran los nuevos ingresos en el Gremio de Bastaixos entre 1800 y 1850 (los carreteros ya habían separado del gremio). En su conjunto, ponen en evidencia el papel de las relaciones familiares y la creciente importancia de esta estrategia aplicada en momentos de crisis estructural (por el avance del liberalismo).

⁴⁹⁹ La revisión del registro demuestra que mientras los nuevos maestros muchas veces entraron al gremio en enero o febrero, la admisión de maestros en el verano y otoño parece haber aumentado con los años. Aunque no se sabe la razón por esto, podría significar una cierta divergencia del modelo tradicional hacia un modelo más atento a las necesidades del mercado laboral.


⁵⁰⁰ Todos ellos elaborados por el autor a base de AGMMB “Matrícula”, 1692/10/29-1902/12/13, Caja 9, carpeta 5 (2304).

4. Carreteros de Mar: Nuevos maestros por año: 1760-1800



El cuadro mostrado más arriba demuestra que las relaciones familiares eran una importante, pero no decisiva circunstancia para los carreteros de mar en éste período. Hay claros momentos cuando un número elevado de no-hijos fueron admitidos para hacer crecer las filas de la fuerza de trabajo. Esto es especialmente interesante cuando uno considera la modalidad de competencia interna en la provisión de servicios. De la misma manera, la decisión de aceptar nuevos maestros no se basaba en la existencia de oficiales quienes se habían cualificado para la maestranza (ya que no había la figura de oficial). Es imposible determinar con exactitud el motivo de esta inclusión de no-hijos.

5. Nuevos maestros bastaixos por año: (1760-1800)



En el Cuadro 5, se observa la tendencia general de incluir entre dos y cinco “hijos” cada año, comparado con los 1-2 no-hijos. Parece que esto refleja la inclusión de todos los hijos que solicitaban el ingreso en un año, subrayando la consideración de que la entrada en el gremio era una herencia, es decir, un derecho. Este número se suplementaba con no-hijos para llegar a lo requerido por el gremio – para repoblar el gremio con el fin de mantener la fuerza laboral mínima para cumplir con sus responsabilidades para la provisión de servicios. Hubo una alza en 1769, cuando los bastaixos mantuvieron un conflicto importante con el Gremio de Tragineros de Mar y los *mossos de corda* (*camàlichs*). Aún así, desconocemos la totalidad de factores que pueden haber contribuido a este número relativamente alto de nuevos ingresos.

Como se puede ver en los dos cuadros mostrados más arriba, en el registro se dejan de anotar nuevas entradas en 1796, y solo recomienza en 1804. Fue un período tumultuoso, ya que el país estaba en guerra con Inglaterra, la cual conllevaba una crisis en el tráfico comercial marítimo a causa del bloqueo del comercio español. Internamente, después de años de luchas y conflictos, los carreteros se separaron del gremio en 1796 para formar su propio gremio. Parece que ninguno de los gremios aceptó nuevos ingresos durante este momento de conflicto.

A continuación, el Cuadro 6 presenta el período siguiente incluyendo las prácticas desarrolladas durante la primera mitad del siglo XIX hasta 1850.⁵⁰¹



⁵⁰¹ Nota bene: el eje de “Y” es diferente en este cuadro; he incluido la línea quebrada en 20 del eje “Y” para ponerlo en perspectiva con respecto a los dos cuadros anteriores (Cuadros 4 y 5).

En el Cuadro 6, se puede notar que se dieron tres períodos con ingreso de nuevos maestros en el Gremio de Bastaixos después de los momentos de abolición de los gremios: hijos/yernos; no-hijos; y regresos. Los “regresos” – eran maestros que volvían a alistarse en el gremio – y se refieren al cobro fijado para entrar de nuevo al gremio aquellos que, habiendo abandonado el gremio durante la abolición de 1813 y de 1820 volvían más adelante: uno volvió en 1819; y ocho volvieron en los tres años después de 1824.

Aunque hay indicaciones en el registro de las operaciones del gremio en 1810 (cuando entró un maestro), la normalidad no volvió al gremio hasta agosto de 1814 (después del fin de la Guerra de Independencia contra Francia, ex-aliado de España). En 1814, doce hijos y trece no-hijos entraron como maestros, produciéndose de esta manera el reemplazo de la mano de obra que no había ocurrido durante la ocupación de Barcelona y la abolición impuesta por las Cortes de Cádiz. Los Bastaixos redactaron nuevas ordenanzas en 1816 para confirmar de nuevo su gremio después de la Guerra y la abolición de los gremios decretada por las Cortes de Cádiz en 1813 (restituidos en 1815).⁵⁰² El último no-hijo entró al gremio en 1817; después de esto, la política de admitir solamente familiares continuó hasta más allá del periodo estudiado.

El Trienio Liberal (1820-1823) – durante el cual no se aceptaron nuevos maestros – queda claramente evidente en el registro. Después, volvieron al gremio unos maestros, quienes pagaron una cuota de ingreso mayor a la pagada aquel año por un hijo/yerno, pero notablemente menor de lo que pagaba un no-hijo.⁵⁰³ No queda claro si esto tenía un carácter punitivo contra aquellos quienes habían reconocido la abolición Liberal, o era tan solo una manera de recaudar fondos para las mermadas cuentas del gremio. En base al número relativamente bajo de “regresos” en relación a la totalidad, no parece que el gremio dejara de existir durante el Trienio Liberal – pero tampoco parece que aceptaran nuevos ingresos.

⁵⁰² BC, sección de la Junta de Comercio, Leg XXXVI, fol 8 [or 90], “Nuevas Ordenanzas para el regimen y buen gobierno del Gremio de Faquines de Capsana ó Macips de Ribera de la Ciudad de Barcelona”, Barcelona, 18 mayo 1816.

⁵⁰³ En el caso de los Gremios de Mareantes, Descargadores y Pescadores se demuestra de manera clara el re-establecimiento formal de los gremios en 1824. Véase Francesc de P. COLLDEFORNES LLADÓ, *Historial de los Gremios de Mar de Barcelona, 1750-1865*, Barcelona: Gráficas Marina, 1951. Parece que un proceso similar se llevó a cabo en el caso del Gremio de Bastaixos aunque no se hace mención de nuevas ordenanzas. Sin embargo, hubo declaraciones relacionadas con sus privilegios; véase, por ejemplo, AGMMB, “[Notificació al Gremi de Bastaixos de part del Batlle General del Reial Patrimoni]”, 30.09.1825, caps 7, carpeta 25 (2274).

Después del Trienio Liberal: además de revolución, guerra, y malas cosechas, el período de 1821-1822 fue marcado por una brote devastador de fiebre amarilla, especialmente virulenta en el puerto (aunque no hay información sobre la muerte de agremiados). Por si solas – y aún más en conjunto – éstas crisis pueden haber creado la necesidad de repoblar el gremio. Desafortunadamente, la documentación no especifica las causas de la necesidad de aumentar el ingreso de nuevos maestros. Debido a esto, es imposible cuantificar la importancia de la abolición del Trienio Liberal con independencia de estos factores diversos. Podría ser que el aumento brusco de maestros respondiera a una necesidad específica causada por la ausencia de maestros que ya no estaban en el gremio (por cualquier razón) o porque simplemente representaba un período de recuperación de la mano de obra, en el cual al bajo número de nuevos ingresos realizados previamente se respondió con un aumento en el número de nuevos maestros.

No tenemos ninguna descripción cualitativa en otros documentos sobre la decisión de aumentar de manera acelerada la cantidad de nuevos maestros. Lo más probable es que los cincuenta y seis nuevos maestros en 1826 y 1827 fueran ingresados con el fin de recuperar la mano de obra que no se pudo complementar normalmente durante el Trienio, asumiendo un promedio de diez a quince nuevos ingresos por año, más o menos. Por otro lado, podría reflejar un aumento en la demanda de mano de obra. De todos modos, los ingresos fueron – en su totalidad – hijos y yernos de maestros, por lo cual lo más lógico es pensar que no pudieron ejercer el derecho de entrar durante el Trienio (tal vez estaban trabajando informalmente). Después del Trienio Liberal, la relación de parentesco fue de importancia absoluta – *solamente* se permitió la entrada de hijos y yernos.

Es destacable que las reformas de 1834 y la supuesta abolición de los gremios españoles en 1836 no provocaron cambios importantes en las entradas. En cierta medida, el año de 1838 representa otro momento de incertidumbre para el gremio, ya que, como se explica más abajo, la abolición de 1836 se estaba implementando en Barcelona. No obstante, no parece que el impacto fuera grave ni duradero. Algo interesante para la historiografía de los gremios en España, es la continuidad de las entradas mucho más allá de 1836 (de hecho, hasta 1902).

Una aproximación del cálculo a partir de los apellidos ha demostrado un grado considerable de parentesco en el Gremio de Bastaixos.⁵⁰⁴ La participación de padres e hijos en las asambleas y reuniones solamente se percibe si comparten el mismo nombre y apellido (cuando se anota “padre” e “hijo”, o “mayor” o “menor” después del apellido, respectivamente). Además la variedad de apellidos posiblemente no era suficientemente grande en la población analizada para utilizar este dato como un medio de deducción con algún grado de seguridad la relación de parentesco (especialmente considerando las probablemente largas trayectorias de familias, produciendo de esta manera “árboles genealógicos” con muchos “ramas”). Es importante tener en cuenta el hecho de que los yernos fueran considerados hijos en la época: pero es imposible identificar la relación sin hacer una investigación de los registros matrimoniales (en los cuales normalmente se anota el oficio de los padres). Es más, la posibilidad (o, más bien, probabilidad) de que hermanos y tíos también pueden haber sido maestros, complica considerable este análisis.⁵⁰⁵ Es decir, la construcción socio-cultural de la “familia” puede ofuscar el verdadero grado de parentesco. Por esta razón el cálculo hecho a base de la Matrícula de nuevos maestros puede ser más exacto a la hora de intentar reconstruir las estructuras familiares manifestadas en estos gremios.

El registro de bastaixos demuestra que, durante los períodos de crisis, el gremio no añadía (oficialmente) nuevos maestros. Estos períodos eran seguidos por años de intenso crecimiento de la fuerza laboral del gremio. Mientras que a finales del siglo XVIII había una preferencia por el ingreso de parientes, no era esta la única consideración. Antes de la Guerra de Independencia (y de la abolición de 1813), esta reconstitución se hizo a partir de la inclusión de hijos y no-hijos. Parece razonable concluir (a partir del diferente número de ingresos por año) que todos los hijos y yernos que querían, podían ingresar en el gremio. Adicionalmente, si los objetivos respecto la dimensión de la fuerza de trabajo no se cumplían, quedaba abierta la posibilidad de incorporar a los no-hijos. Pero después de la Guerra y, especialmente, después del Trienio Liberal, la política no-formal de solo dejar entrar a los hijos y yernos llegó a ser hegemónica: a partir de 1820,

⁵⁰⁴ ROMERO MARÍN, “Los Faquines de Capçana y su supervivencia en la era liberal”, pp. 107-108.

⁵⁰⁵ Los reglamentos especifican que un hijo o yerno podría recibir una consideración especial. Aparentemente, y a pesar de los comentarios de los agremiados de que solo admitían dos por año, parece ser que en realidad no existía tal limitación. Tampoco había límite sobre el número de hijos o yernos de cada maestro con que habían nacido cuando dicho agremiado ya era maestro, y no antes.

ninguno que no fuese hijo o yerno fue aceptado. A partir de este momento el Gremio de Bastaixos de Barcelona se convirtió en una organización estrictamente hereditaria.

Reformas durante la Ilustración y abolición durante los regímenes liberales

La Ilustración española contemplaba una variedad de reformas importantes a las instituciones socio-políticas de España, incluyendo: el fin del monopolio de Cádiz sobre el comercio colonial; la creación de grupos locales de mejora económica; y las reformas de los privilegios gremiales monopolísticos.⁵⁰⁶ Mientras que se dieron algunos cambios en las políticas económicas de los reyes borbónicos, la estrategia aplicada a la cuestión gremial se basó, efectivamente, en mantener la existencia de estas instituciones del Antiguo Régimen pero a la vez en reformar algunos de sus privilegios más monopolísticos.

Sin embargo, algunos elementos moderadamente liberales de la sociedad (y del gobierno real) aumentaban su fuerza política a finales del siglo XVIII. En lo referente al trabajo portuario, algunos comerciantes de Barcelona hicieron una petición solicitando la abolición del Gremio de Bastaixos y Carreteros de Mar en 1778 (en plena Ilustración):

“[S]emejantes comunes, o colegios [...] son perjudiciales al bien público, por el concepto de en sí trahen de monopolios; parece que solo pueden justificarla la desmesurada ambición de los Individuos del Gremio de Faquines de Capsana, i Carreteros de Mar.”⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰⁶ Pedro RUIZ TORRES, *Historia de España: Reformismo e Ilustración*, series by Josep FONTANA I LÀZARO and Ramón VILLARES (eds), *Historia de España*, 12 vols, Barcelona [etc.], Crítica [etc.], 2008, V, p. 425-623. Esta obra presenta una excelente historia general del periodo, además de una crítica elocuente de la aplicabilidad del concepto de “Despotismo Ilustrado” (pp. 425-526). Para una colección sobre el estancamiento económico y los esfuerzos de reforma, véase a Monique LAMBIE and Jean René AYMES (eds), *Ilustración y liberalismo, 1788-1814* Madrid, Sociedad Estatal de Conmemoraciones Culturales : Patrimonio Nacional, 2008. Para una consideración de las tres principales perspectivas sobre las reformas al sistema gremial (abolición/libre mercado, legislación en vez de ordenanzas, y reforma de las ordenanzas), véase a Fernando DÍEZ, “El gremialismo de Antonio de Capmany (1742-1813): La idea del trabajo de un conservador ingenuo”, *Historia y Política* (2001), pp. 171-206.

⁵⁰⁷ Biblioteca de Catalunya [BC], *Colección de papeles políticos y curiosos*, Anon. “Els Comerciants de Barcelona fan una sol·licitud en què demanen l'abolició de restriccions en el transport de gèneres i mercaderies fins aleshores restringides als ‘Faquines de Capçana’ en pro de mesures comercials més lliberals [Manuscrit]” 1778, Ms.3668/24 (fos 239-247r., 247r. and 239). El gremio, compuesto de dos oficios, se partió en dos gremios distintos en 1796, aunque los motivos exactos quedan desconocidos.

Aunque su petición no tuvo éxito, este comentario establece de manera clara un esfuerzo por alterar radicalmente el mercado laboral de la carga marítima a través de la expansión de las libertades de los comerciantes y de la eliminación de los monopolios que especificaban que gremios manejaban determinadas mercancías. Es notable el uso del concepto de bien público, o común durante los procesos. En términos generales y con el paso del tiempo, una tendencia radical a favor de la abolición llegó a definir la política de los liberales en tanto al trabajo, siendo esto muy ligado a su interés económico en avanzar las libertades de la industria, pero muchas veces a través del lenguaje del bien público.⁵⁰⁸

La invasión y ocupación de importantes partes de España (incluyendo Barcelona) por parte de las tropas napoleónicas creó una oportunidad para que los liberales reunidos en las Cortes de Cádiz abolieran los gremios en toda España, lo que hicieron con legislación de 8 de junio de 1813.⁵⁰⁹ Mientras que esta medida no duró mucho tiempo (siendo dejada sin fuerza por el regreso del absolutista Rey Fernando VII), llegó a ser aplicada durante el más revolucionario Trienio Liberal (1820-1823). Además, los conflictos políticos militarizados crearon un fondo de dificultad económica ya que el comercio se vio afectado por las guerras y revoluciones. Y si esto no fuera suficiente, la fiebre amarilla llegó a la ciudad (por el puerto, evidentemente) en agosto del 1821. El vómito negro había matado entre ocho y diez mil barcelonenses (aproximadamente 8-10% de la población total de la ciudad) antes de que volviera la normalidad en enero 1822. La fiebre también conllevó el aislamiento del resto de España (a través de un bloqueo militar) de los habitantes y mercancías de la ciudad. La situación empeoró aún más con las malas cosechas de 1821 y 1822.⁵¹⁰

A partir de 1819 (pero interrumpido por el Trienio Liberal), y a lo largo de los años 20 del siglo XIX, los gremios fueron obligados por ley a presentar nuevas ordenanzas limitando el carácter

⁵⁰⁸ Àlex SÁNCHEZ, “Els fabricants d’indianes: Orígens de la burgesia industrial barcelonina”, *Barcelona Quaderns d’Història*, (2011), 197-219.

⁵⁰⁹ Para un buen resumen de la legislatura en lo tocante a los gremios durante el período investigado, véase a Josep M. SABATÉ I BOSCH, *El Gremi de marejants: societat marítima i protectora: una aproximació històrica*, Tarragona, [Ajuntament], Gremi de Marejants, 1992, p. 18. Para un tratamiento detallado, véase a José Antonio YVORRA LIMORTE, “Las Cortes de Cádiz: Su proyección social”, *Corts: Anuario de Derecho Parlamentario* (2012), pp. 209-223; y Javier Guillem CARRAU, “Breves apuntes sobre el liberalismo económico y las nuevas reglas para actuar en los mercados de La Constitución de Cádiz”, *Corts: Anuario de Derecho Parlamentario* (2012), pp. 59-69.

⁵¹⁰ Ramon ARNABAT MATA, *La revolució de 1820 i el trienni liberal a Catalunya*, Vic, Eumo Editorial, 2001, pp. 194-202.

monopolístico de sus privilegios. Así que – y a pesar de años de resistencia por parte de los faquines de capsana, fue acordada y aprobada una Ordenanza en 1832, que cubría las operaciones de los tres principales gremios terrestres (Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros de Mar y Traginers de Mar). En esta ordenanza se nota el avance de la “libertad” del dueño de las mercancías de escoger entre los tres gremios, bajo ciertas normas. En la misma ordenanza, los carreteros y traginers abandonaron el sistema de turnos por día (los faquines mantuvieron su turno estricto).⁵¹¹ Un año y medio después, los carreteros intentaron (sin evidente éxito) presentar nuevas ordenanzas restableciendo el antiguo paradigma y el uso del turno.⁵¹² Es notable que, dentro de algunos gremios, los líderes intentaron terminar con el turno en varios momentos en el primer cuarto del siglo, pero sus esfuerzos fueron rechazados por la mayoría de los agremiados (señalando desigualdades socio-económicas, ya que se hace mención del hecho que algunos maestros que eran dueños de almacenes de carbón se hubieran beneficiado de manera significativa con el fin del turno).⁵¹³

Después de un período de fuerte represión absolutista contra los constitucionalistas, la muerte del rey Fernando VII llegó a producir una crisis de estado, ya que se quedó sin hijo varón para asumir el trono. Empezó así la (Primera) Guerra Carlista. En este contexto (de cruel guerra civil entre carlistas absolutistas y constitucionalistas) la regencia de María Cristina (con la marcada participación decisiva de ministros liberales reformistas y luego más radicales) llevó a cabo primero una reforma del sistema gremial en 1834 (que trató de reducir el carácter monopolístico de los privilegios gremiales, siguiendo el espíritu del reformismo ilustrado) y luego un intento de abolirlos por completo en 1836 (fecha que marca, en la historiografía tradicional, el fin del sistema gremial en España).

Es notable que el conflicto – especialmente, pero no únicamente, en Barcelona – se mezcló con revueltas anti-clericales y anti-tecnológicas. En el verano de 1835 en Barcelona, se desarrolló

⁵¹¹ AGMMB, “Copia de las ordenanzas de los Gremios de Faquines de Capsana, Carreteros y Tragineros de Mar de la ciudad de Barcelona publicada por el Supremo Consejo de Hacienda en 11 de julio de 1832, Capsa 2, carpeta 1 (2209).

⁵¹² AHCB, [Carreteros de Mar], “[Ordenanzas que ha formado el Gremio de Carreteros de Mar....]”, 18 April 1834. Caja 42, carpeta 10.

⁵¹³ BC, *Sección de la Junta de Comercio*, Legajo XXXVIII (Caja 54), No. 3, 46 (1827). El comercio del carbón fue liberalizado y su acaparamiento fue ilegalizado el siguiente año; véase De Villemur, L. (1828). *Edicte de Louis de Villemur: sobre: venta de varios artículos comestibles y otros régimen y arreglo de pesas y medidas y todo lo demás concerniente al cargo de los Señores Almotacenes*. Imp. Piferrer.

una serie de revueltas poco esclarecidas en la historiografía (las *Bullangues*, o la *Crema dels Convents*). Mientras que el asalto a la fábrica de vapor “Bonaplata” es famosa, menos estudiado son los asaltos en el área y contra las instalaciones del puerto (quema de *burots* donde se cobraban los impuestos por la entrada de bienes a la ciudad todavía amurallada); un asalto fracasado a las Reales Aduanas la mañana después de la quema del vapor “Bonaplata”; ataques contra los bienes del gremio de pescadores; la quema de los papeles del Gremio de Mareantes; etc. Es destacable que uno de los pocos revoltosos ejecutados con motivo de esas revueltas fue un marinero.⁵¹⁴ De allí surge la posible – pero poco investigada – relación entre los eventos de 1835 y la abolición de los gremios en 1836.

Mientras que se ha quedado en la incógnita esta posible relación, he podido analizar la correspondencia mantenida entre el Gremio de Bastaixos y el Ayuntamiento de Barcelona entre 1839-1840. En ella, los bastaixos solicitaron poder llevar a cabo elecciones para escoger nuevos Directores. La respuesta inicial del Ayuntamiento fue negativa alegando este que los gremios habían sido abolidos.⁵¹⁵ A pesar del rechazo inicial por parte del Ayuntamiento de Barcelona de reconocer el gremio, los bastaixos persistieron en defender su antiguo sistema de privilegios. Es destacable que, después de que las autoridades municipales se negaran a reconocer la validez de la elección de nuevos directores del Gremio de Bastaixos (citando el hecho que los gremios habían sido abolidos), los bastaixos lograron convencer con mucha astucia al Ayuntamiento en 1840 de que la “abolición” de 1836 fue, realmente, una solicitud para presentar nuevas ordenanzas (contrariamente a lo generalmente aceptado tanto en su momento como en la historiografía).

Sin importar el nombre de su organización, los bastaixos siguieron funcionando como un gremio hasta inicios del siglo veinte, controlando de manera estricta el mercado laboral a través de la determinación subjetiva de nuevos maestros basada en consideraciones socio-culturales y,

⁵¹⁴ J. M. OLLÉ ROMEU (1993, 1994). *Les bullangues de Barcelona durant la primera guerra carlina (1835-1837)* 2 Vol., Tarragona: El Mèdol; F. RAÚLL JULIÀ (1835). *Historia de la conmovición de Barcelona, en la noche del 25 al 26 de julio de 1835, causas que la produjeron, y sus efectos hasta el día de esta publicación*. Barcelona: Imp. Ignacio Estivill [<https://books.google.it/books?id=tzhpa1bntVgC>; revisado por última vez el 21 mayo 2017]; y M. SANTIRSO RODRÍGUEZ (1999). De repente, el verano de 1835. *Historia Social*, (34), 3–26.

⁵¹⁵ AGMMB, “[Instàcia del Gremi de Bastaixos]”, 08 January 1840, caps 7, carpeta 17 (2266); and AGMMB, “[Sol·licitud per al nomenament de prohoms del Gremi]”, (29 January 1840 – 21 February 1840), Caps 7, carpeta 9 (2258).

específicamente, en las relaciones familiares. Aunque no he podido localizar la propuesta de ordenanza solicitada por el Ayuntamiento en 1840, es evidente (como se constata con la libreta de entradas, que va hasta los primeros años del siglo veinte) que el Gremio continuó funcionando.

A partir de este momento, además, usaron a veces el término “corporación” para describir su organización.⁵¹⁶ No hubo, aparente, mayor cambio estructural en el gremio. En 1855, el Administrador de Aduanas de Barcelona se refirió (en tono respetuoso) a la organización como un “Gremio o Unión” digno de ser estudiado:

La asociación en su esencia subsiste tal como se fundó por los años de 1500 ó mucho antes, y tanto por su antigüedad como por su originalidad merece ser observada bajo todos aspectos, pues es un monumento que el siglo 16 nos ha dejado para el estudio de las graves cuestiones que en el día se agitan sobre la organización del trabajo.⁵¹⁷

Dos décadas más tarde, los faquines lograron una re-formación de su gremio en una Unión (en este caso un sindicato cooperativo), en 1873 gracias a su defensa de su antiguo privilegio de trabajar honradamente en las Aduanas. En los estatutos de dicha Unión se nota la continuidad de su estructura horizontal y valores y prácticas igualitarias.⁵¹⁸ Por su parte, los maestros del Gremio de Carreteros pasaron a formar una organización, “la ‘Hermandad de Patronos’ del Gremio de Carreteros” en la cual optaron por emplear “obreros”.⁵¹⁹

⁵¹⁶ Para el rechazo por parte de las autoridades municipales a la propuesta de nuevos directores del Gremio de Bastaixos (en el cual indican que los gremios habían sido abolidos), véase AGMMB, “[Instàcia del Gremi de Bastaixos]”, 08.01.1840, caps 7, carpeta 17 (2266). Para una comparación terminológica de "gremio" o "corporación", ver AGMMB, “[Solicitud a la Comandancia de Marina sobre l’ compliment de la normativa de transport de mercaderies al port]”, 09.01.1839, Caps 7, carpeta 6 (2255) y AGMMB, “[Solicitud del Gremi de Bastaixos a les autoritatss de Barcelona relativa a la pràctica de intursisme professional per part dels mariners o matriculats sobre l’ observancia de normatives i l’intrusisme profesional]”, 21.09.1840, Caps 7, carpeta 5 (2254).

⁵¹⁷ Biblioteca de Catalunya [BC], *Junta de Comercio*, Leg. CXXII, folio 111r, “Informe del Administrador de Aduanas”, Barcelona, 14 March 1855

⁵¹⁸ *Estatutos del Gremio ó Confradía de Bastaixos de Capsana y Massips de Ribera : fundado en Tarragona en el año 1513 y viniendo poco después a esta ciudad : reformado en el año 1873 bajo el nombre de Unión de Faquines de la Aduana de Barcelona y reconstituido el 1903*, (Barcelona: Imp. E Badia, 1910), Biblioteca de Catalunya, Document ID 4-V-36/26.

⁵¹⁹ ACMB, *Sección de Hacienda*, “Expediente Promovido Por La Asociación ‘Hermandad de Patronos’ del Gremio de Carreteros de Esta Ciudad Para Que Se Les Esima Del Pago Del Arbitrio Impuesto a Los Carros Y Camiones En

Conclusiones

Los gremios de servicios presentan diferencias importantes frente a los gremios de producción, objeto de la mayoría de estudios científicos. El sistema gremial (en general) fue muy flexible y se aplicó a diversos grupos laborales en sectores económicos con características muy distintas. Además, el modelo tri-partito (con maestros, oficiales y aprendices) – tradicionalmente utilizado como el punto de partida historiográfico para considerar como “gremio” una corporación – no es motivo de exclusión y más bien refleja un error analítico post-facto de los historiadores que buscan simplificar una realidad compleja. No queda ninguna duda de que las corporaciones estudiadas aquí eran, y fueron consideradas y por ese motivo denominadas durante siglos, *gremios*. Es destacable que las cuestiones más relevantes para la historiografía actual sobre la relación entre el sistema gremial y el avance del capitalismo se pueden discutir perfectamente en el caso de los diferentes gremios de carga marítima. Incluso, en algunos debates, por ejemplo el relacionado a la transmisión de capacidades laborales y organizativas, estos gremios enriquecen de manera notable el discurso, por sus estructuras horizontales (sin aprendizaje) y la ausencia general de capacidades laborales secretas o complicadas.

El análisis llevado a cabo a nivel de sub-sector es importante, ya que permite comparar la variedad de modos de trabajo, modelos de provisión de servicios, relaciones de desigualdad *de facto* dentro de algunos gremios, papeles de liderazgo organizativo y laboral (estos últimos necesarios para organizar el trabajo en equipo); relaciones con entes gubernamentales, competencia inter-gremial, la transmisión directa e indirecta de capacidades “duras” y “blandas” (especialmente en ausencia de aprendices u oficiales, receptores de dicha transmisión), sistemas para determinar la cualificación formal e informal, estrategias para controlar sus respectivos mercados laborales y trabajos especializados, etc.

Las culturas de trabajo fueron, en gran medida, un producto del modo de la provisión de servicios: algunas mercancías fueron mejor manejados por hombres, sin usar carretas; otras cargas se podían transportar en carretas o carretones sin riesgo de arruinarlas. Estas

Concepto de Parada Ó Puesto Fijo Dentro de La Ciudad”, 1894. Para los estatutos desta hermandad, ver Asociación de Patronos y Obreros Carreteros de Barcelona, *Estatutos de la Asociación de Patronos y Obreros Carreteros de Barcelona*, Barcelona: s.n., 1903. Disponible en línea en la Universitat Pompeu Fabra: Memorial Digital de Catalunya [<http://mdc.cbuc.cat/cdm/ref/collection/comercUPF/id/19943>; last consulted 11/11/2015].

consideraciones es establecieron como privilegios monopolísticos en las ordenanzas de cada gremio. Los requerimientos físicos y materiales de sus labores, en el caso de los gremios colectivistas, contribuyeron a que éstos formaran organizaciones relativamente sólidas, basadas en la solidaridad interna, la cooperación, y valores igualitarios. Esto se contrasta de manera significativa con la cultura de los gremios individualistas e internamente competitivos, además también contrasta con las experiencias en otros puertos donde el trabajo colectivo no llegó a concretarse en modelos organizativos realmente igualitarios.

A pesar de ser horizontales – es decir, organizaciones de maestros, supuestamente iguales – en los gremios internamente competitivos, la concentración de capital y las relaciones de empleo, actuó en paralelo con la ausencia o el abandono de sistemas de turnos para nivelar, en alguna medida, las oportunidades de trabajo y así evitar que se produjeran fracturas internas. Seguramente, donde se establecieron medidas nivelatorias estas contribuyeron al fracaso de los intentos liberales de abolir sus antiguas organizaciones.

En el momento en que los gremios fueron obligados por las leyes de carácter liberal a abrir sus filas a cualquier miembro de la sociedad que tuviera la suficiente cualificación, la habilidad de los gremios para determinar las cualificaciones de los solicitantes de manera subjetiva a base de la percepción de honor y la *buena fe* de los mismos – jurada por un maestro – significaba que el gremio podía controlar efectivamente la composición de la fuerza de trabajo. Este hecho subraya la importancia de las redes sociales en el proceso de entrada en un gremio. Las redes familiares representaron una forma sumamente importante de red social, una que aumentó su importancia en momentos de crisis hasta convertirse en una nueva norma. Los hombres del Gremio de Bastaixos utilizaron su poder para determinar de manera subjetiva la cualificación de un aspirante para proteger los intereses familiares de los maestros: la maestría representaba una herencia invisible para los hijos, y una clase de dote para las hijas de los maestros. En un sistema de provisión colectiva de servicios estos hechos contribuyeron – sin duda – al establecimiento de enlaces más fuertes entre los agremiados. De la misma manera, en un modelo competitivo, estos enlaces pudieron haber sido fuertes, pero el resultado hubieran sido operaciones a base de la familia, con menos cohesión intra-gremial [llegando, naturalmente, pero

no estudiado aquí, a la formación de empresas familiares más parecidas a las estructuras tradicionalmente usadas por gremios productivos y luego capitalistas].⁵²⁰

⁵²⁰ El uso de estrategias familiares por parte de grupos artesanos/de oficio (en el sector secundario de la economía) durante la liberalización del mercado laboral de Barcelona durante el siglo XIX fue analizado en Juanjo ROMERO MARÍN, “Familial strategies of artisans during the modernization process: Barcelona, 1814–1860”, *The History of the Family*, 6 (2001), pp. 203-224. La participación de hijos de maestros gremiales en la (proto-)industrialización de la industria textil en Barcelona fue destacada por Alex SÁNCHEZ, “Els fabricants d’indianes: Orígens de la burgesia industrial barcelonina”. Para una discusión de los debates alrededor de la cuestión de empresas familiares (“*family firms*”) en el análisis de redes sociales (“*Social Network Analysis*”) para investigaciones empresariales, y sobre la importancia de estas estructuras en el desarrollo empresarial (aunque sea en un período posterior) véase a Juan Antonio RUBIO MONDÉJAR, “Andalucía durante la segunda revolución tecnológica: ciclos de inversión, sociedades mercantiles y grupos empresariales” (Ph.D., Universidad de Granada, 2014) [disponible en: <http://digibug.ugr.es/handle/10481/34189#.V0LbjL50Maw>; revisado el 23 de mayo 2016], pp. 116-118; 274-308 [se refiere a las páginas de la tesis y no del pdf].

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“What a most useful work, likewise how delicious is a bibliographic catalogue edited in this manner! Conceived thus the *Bibliography*, is at the same time the *body*, the *external* history of the intellectual movement, and an excellent and indispensable preparation for the study of the *internal* history. The registries of works done without these conditions would be useful in the sense that they are the catalogues of editors and booksellers, but they would not be the work of a writer, but of a common porter; we should not call their authors *bibliographers*, but instead *cartmen* and *faquines of the Republic of Letters*.”⁵²¹

⁵²¹ Menéndez y Pelayo, M., “De re bibliographica”, *Revista Europea* (Madrid), 3, Tome VIII (125), (1876, July 16), 65-73. Original: “¡Qué obra más útil, a la par que deliciosa es un catálogo bibliográfico redactado de esta manera! Así concebida la *Bibliografía*, es al mismo tiempo el *cuerpo*, la historia *externa* del movimiento intelectual, y una preparación excelente e indispensable para el estudio de la historia *interna*. Los registros de obras hechos sin estas condiciones serán útiles en el sentido en que lo son los catálogos de editores y libreros, pero no serán trabajo de literato, sino de mozo de cordel; no llamemos a sus autores *bibliógrafos*, sino *acarreadores* y *faquines de la república de las letras*.” [Emphais in original.]

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