

Redistribution and Deliberation in Mandated Participatory Governance:  
The Case of Participatory Budgeting in Seoul, South Korea

by

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## ABSTRACT

This dissertation examines whether participatory budgeting (PB) processes, as a case of participatory governance and an innovative approach to local governance, promote inclusive and deliberative government decision-making and social justice outcomes. The first chapter introduces the case of the dissertation, PB in the city of Seoul, South Korea. It reviews the history of PB and the literature on PB in South Korea and discusses three issues that arise when implementing legally mandated PB. The second chapter explores whether inclusive PB processes redistribute financial resources even without the presence of explicit equity criteria, using the last four years of PB resource allocation data and employing multi-level statistical analysis. The findings show that having a more inclusive process to encourage citizen participation helps poorer districts to win more resources than wealthier ones. The third chapter is a follow-up exploratory study; the possible reasons behind the redistributive effects of PB are discussed using interview data with PB participants. The findings suggest that the PB process could have been redistributive because it provided an opportunity for the people living in the comparatively poorer neighborhoods to participate in the government decision-making process. Additionally, when scoring proposals, participants valued ‘needs’ and ‘urgency’ as the most important criteria. The last chapter examines the 32 PB meetings in order to find the combinations of conditions that lead to a deliberative participatory process, employing qualitative comparative analysis (QCA). This dissertation contributes to the field of public management, and particularly participatory governance by providing a review of the literature on PB in South Korea, presenting

empirical evidence on the redistributive effect of PB without explicit equity criteria, and finding the combinations of meeting conditions that could be used to promote deliberation in the context of PB.

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## Chapter 1

### INTRODUCTION

Opening government by increasing public participation has been a long-debated issue among scholars and practitioners. It has been argued that allowing more people to be involved in government decision-making processes could enhance democratic values of participation, public freedom, government trust, and responsibility and that it could increase the legitimacy of the decisions (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007; Fung, 2015; Fung & Wright, 2003; King & Stivers, 1998; Olivo, 1998). Public participation could also provide local knowledge to public managers in order to help them make decisions that are more grounded in residents' preferences. Ideally, the decisions that have been made through incorporating public input reflect the realistic needs of the residents better than the traditional decision-making process that relies solely on public officials. Although public participation is considered normatively desirable, there has been little empirical evidence on whether participation is also worth the effort in terms of enhancing the problem-solving capacity of governance systems.

Engaging the public through participatory processes is not an easy task for public managers. Participatory government decision-making processes in practice are often criticized on the grounds of inclusiveness and effectiveness. First, inclusiveness of the process is often questioned (i.e., whether the community members are well represented). Prior research has shown that the most active participants tend to be individuals who have higher levels of income and education and hence are already enjoying advantages (Hansen & Reinau, 2006; Schlozman, Page, Verba, & Fiorina, 2005; Thornley, 1977).

There are many groups that are often difficult to reach out without additional efforts because they may incur a higher opportunity cost when attending community meetings, and others might have lower levels of political efficacy. Second, even when a participatory process is well designed to balance representation of the constituents, whether the decisions reflect well the constituents' needs is a different matter. Public managers or elected leaders could merely consult with the constituents and still make decisions in favor of what the officials had already planned or what they desired in the first place.

Beyond the level of direct participation, it is critical to consider how the decisions are made in the government decision-making process. Scholars have suggested that voting and deliberation are complementary (Ferejohn, 2008) and some have emphasized that the communication process is more important than the voting procedure (Öberg, 2016). In fact, it is possible to design the process merely for a public vote without any exchanges or deliberation. However, the literature suggests that public deliberation could help people clarify, understand, and refine their own preferences and positions on issues (Elster, 1998), distribute information better (Gambetta, 1998), and redistribute power among people, therefore enabling decision-making to be based on empirical facts rather than money or power (Fung & Wright, 2003). Recognizing such benefits of deliberation, many different practices such as deliberative polls (Ackerman & Fishkin, 2005) and citizen initiative reviews (Knobloch, Gastil, Reedy, & Cramer Walsh, 2013) have been implemented.

Participatory budgeting (PB), which allows community members to participate in local budget decision-making processes, is a relatively recent example of direct democratic governance practice. PB has the potential for achieving the goal of deliberative governance due to its design because participants are expected a priori to gather and discuss the community's problems and envision solutions before casting a vote. Even though the deliberative process has been considered a core aspect of PB (Leighninger & Rinehart, 2016), there is still a lack of empirical evidence on the dynamics and the quality of such deliberation.

This dissertation pursues the following objectives: 1) explore the main issues and challenges in legally mandated participatory processes, 2) analyze resource distribution through participatory processes, 3) explore why redistribution occurs through participatory processes even in the absence of an equity principle, and 4) evaluate the quality of deliberation in participatory meetings and delineate the set of key institutional conditions of meetings that lead to a deliberative process.

In order to address these objectives, this dissertation consists of four individual studies, which are complemented by an introductory chapter and a concluding chapter. Each study answers one of the following research questions:

1. What are the issues that arise when implementing legally mandated participation?
2. Do participatory processes redistribute resources even without explicit equity principles?
3. According to participants, what makes a participatory process redistributive?

#### 4. What are the key determinants of a deliberative meeting?

This dissertation is a multi-methodological project employing both quantitative and qualitative research methods over four individual studies. Research methods include: 1) literature review of scholarly articles on PB and related literature, 2) multi-level regression/logistic regression analysis of resource allocations in PB, 3) interviews with PB participants (committee members) and content analysis of the interview records/notes, and 4) qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) using PB committee meeting records.

PB in Seoul, South Korea is the case employed in this dissertation. Seoul PB is an appropriate and meaningful case to study the research questions in this study for at least three reasons. First, South Korea is one of a few countries around the world which has mandated public participation in government budgeting process by national law. In addition to South Korea, the Dominican Republic and Peru mandated PB for all municipalities (Dias, 2014). In South Korea, participatory budgeting was mandated in 2011 by the revision of the national law on local finance. Second, PB was adopted in South Korea as a tool to increase public participation in the government decision-making process. In other words, there are no explicit equity criteria in the Seoul PB process, unlike the case of Porto Alegre, Brazil (de Sousa Santos, 1998; Fung, 2015; Marquetti, Schonerwald da Silva, & Campbell, 2012; Wampler, 2000). Third, full records of speeches in PB meetings are rarely found around the world. However, the city government of Seoul started to provide full meeting records—not summarized minutes—starting in 2016.

This dissertation studies PB as a case of participatory governance and provides theoretical and empirical contributions to the fields of public participation and deliberative democracy. Although public participation and deliberation in government decision-making processes have been widely studied in several different fields such as public administration and policy, political science, sociology, and communication studies, certain aspects of PB are still not well known to academics and to government officials. In particular, this dissertation examines how inclusive, participatory decision-making processes distribute public resources. This study adds empirical evidence to the theoretical argument that public participation produces decisions that well reflect residents' preferences. In addition, this research examines whether participatory budgeting allows those population groups that have been neglected in the traditional government decision-making to actually participate and whether the decisions favor the people most in need. Moreover, to the best of my knowledge, this research is the first empirical study to analyze the deliberative dimensions of PB using meeting records. This study also discusses how to manage institutional characteristics and factors in order to promote deliberation in decision-making processes. Based on the findings of the four research chapters, this research makes recommendations to balance direct and deliberative governance.

## Chapter 2

### MANDATED PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN SOUTH KOREA

Since it was first adopted in Porto Alegre, Brazil in 1989, participatory budgeting (PB) has spread to over 1,500 cities around the world. The way each jurisdiction implements PB varies with different social, political, and cultural contexts (G. Choi, 2004; Goldfrank, 2007). In a few countries such as the Dominican Republic, Peru, and South Korea, PB is mandated by law for all municipalities (Dias, 2014). In South Korea, PB was mandated by the revision of the national law on local finance in 2011.

Understanding how PB became mandated is important because it provides not only the historical and political context of the different cases but also the basis for exploring the effects of process design. In Peru, national decentralization reform in 2002 was a trigger to establish several participatory institutions. In this country, PB was mandated by the Participatory Budget Law in 2003 and its revision in 2009 (McNulty, 2012a). The reform was part of the efforts that aimed to clean up corruption in politics after the authoritarian Fujimori regime (McNulty, 2012a, 2014). It is important to note that the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MEF) was the main actor in this reform, which reflected the citizens' demands for change to address the lack of transparency in funding decision-making processes (McNulty, 2012a, 2014). In the Dominican Republic, PB became mandatory for all municipalities in the nation in 2007 with the adoption of two National Laws, which were later transformed in a constitutional amendment in 2010 (García, 2014). One noticeable aspect of this case is that the methodological guide that

was prepared for PB practice was transcribed into the law, in contrast, to the more common case of laws being made while not considering the participants (García, 2014).

Several scholars have studied some of the accomplishments and challenges of the mandated cases of PB. For instance, for the case of Peru, McNulty (2014) states that the success of PB was possible because it was mandated, but also because it remained flexible: her interviews with officials reveal that the laws on the books helped engage new actors in local decision-making processes. McNulty (2014) noted that although the Peruvian law requires government officials to hold meetings, it is not guaranteed that those meetings would be truly participatory. For this reason, PB advocates in Peru ask for stronger sanctions that would prevent officials from manipulating the PB process. Similarly, in the Dominican Republic, García (2014) reports that two laws and the Constitution have set forth the process, and points out that even though the process is mandated for all municipalities, its implementation still depends on the political will of the heads of local government. In addition, when the financial capability of the municipality is low and thus cannot respond to the needs of the citizens, participatory processes such as PB disappointed citizens when they saw that their participation had no results (García, 2014).

It is still not clear, however, whether the success and challenges suggested in the literature regarding the other cases of PB were mainly because PB was mandated or because of the nature of PB itself. In this regard, this paper provides a thorough review of how PB was mandated in South Korea and to identify challenges in South Korean PB in the context of legally mandated PB.

## **History of PB in South Korea**

PB in South Korea is rooted in decentralization reform and the expansion of civil society organizations. In 1995, South Korea changed the way of electing local government leaders from indirect to direct election, and any citizens over 18 years old became eligible to vote for the leaders of the district, city, town, and/or state. The total population of South Korea was about 45 million in 1995. Koreans started to realize not only that they have the right to vote, but also that there are many other ways they could participate in government decision-making processes. Each local government became autonomous and could focus more on local issues than in the past when the central government ruled the whole country. At the same time, many local civil society organizations (CSOs) emerged (Ahn, 2013).

The very first mode of public participation in the government budgeting process that the CSOs actively engaged was monitoring. This was not direct participation itself, but since 2000 the CSOs held many different budget-monitoring workshops nationwide. Those CSOs interested in civic participation in the government budgeting process formed the “budget monitoring network” and advocated for adopting PB. Based on these CSOs’ activities, in the June 2002 general election, the Democratic-Labor Party (a left-wing party) first adopted PB as one of their main campaign pledges. Before forming their pledges regarding PB, the South Korean Democratic-Labor party had communicated with the Brazilian Labor party (Lee, 2014). Although the party won only 0.1% of the seats, it was the first time in the country that the possibility of implementing PB was officially discussed.



The full-fledged efforts of adopting PB started when Moo-hyun ROH was elected President in December 2002 and named his cabinet “participatory government.” Two of his main presidential agenda items were government innovation and decentralization. On this basis, in “the roadmap for promoting decentralization in the *participatory government*,” adopting PB was suggested, by the government advisory committee, as a way of institutionalizing the increase of public participation in the policy process (The government innovation and decentralization committee, 2003). Moreover, in July 2003, the Ministry of Public Administration and Security (MOPAS) suggested local governments increase public participation in their budget formulation process by conducting online surveys and holding public hearings and meetings (Kwak, 2005).

Within this social context, the first PB case started in 2003 in the City of Gwangju, the sixth-largest city by population in the country (about 1.35 million in 2000). Bukgu, a district in the City of Gwangju, first started by installing a PB committee, then establishing its own PB ordinance in the next following year for the first time (Lee, 2014). Adopting PB was one of the pledges of the district head, who was from the same party as the President (Kim & Schachter, 2013). Although it was the very first case in South Korea that named the program “participatory budgeting,” the type of participation allowed in the first year was close to a public consultation rather than co-production or empowerment because the district head was in charge of constituting the PB committee and calling for meetings. The voluntary participative culture was not yet formed to make the PB active (Nah, 2005).

After then, following the strong will of President Moo-hyun ROH, the Local Finance Act was revised to encourage active involvement of residents in the local budget preparation process in 2005. At that time, the Local Finance Act opened the possibility of including residents in the budgeting process. Article 39 (Residents' Participation in Budget Compilation Process of Local Governments) states that “the heads of local governments may set and implement procedures for residents to participate in the process of compiling their budgets under the conditions prescribed by the Presidential Decree” (KLRI, n.d.a). Meanwhile, Article 46 (Procedures for Residents to Participate in the process of Compiling Budgets of Local Governments) of the Enforcement Decree of the Local Finance Act listed the ways that residents can participate in the budget preparation process as 1) public hearings or informal gatherings for discussion of major projects; 2) written or Internet question surveys on major projects; 3) the public offering of projects; 4) other means to appropriately solicit the opinions of residents, as prescribed by Municipal Ordinance (KLRI, n.d.a). Also, specific aspects of operation such as the scope of the budget, the procedures, and the means of PB should be prescribed by the Municipal Ordinance of each local government.

Following this revision of the law, 91 of 244 local governments (41.8%) in South Korea established PB ordinances during the five-year period 2005-2010 (Song, 2013). In October 2010, the MOPAS suggested three exemplary models as guidelines to facilitate local governments' PB adoption and implementation: (1) optional installation of a PB general committee, (2) required the installation of a PB general committee, and (3) required the installation of a PB general committee and thematic subcommittees.

During this time, the national congress had been preparing another revision of the Local Finance Act that made PB compulsory for all local government units in the country. After this revision in 2011, public involvement was mandated in two ways: 1) heads of local governments were required to establish procedures that allowed resident participation in local public budgeting processes, and 2) heads of local governments were required to enclose written statements that included residents' opinions of the budget proposal and submit them to the local council. Although all local governments were required to guarantee public participation in the budgeting process, they still had a certain degree of discretion in deciding how and to what extent they would involve people, from consulting to allowing them to make decisions.

After the second revision of the Local Finance Act, as of August 2014, 241 of 243 local governments (99.1%), including the city government of Seoul and its 25 district governments, established their own PB ordinances (Seoul PB, 2014). It took about 14 months for all 25 districts in Seoul to first adopt PB in any way by establishing ordinances, regardless of whether they had implemented PB in practice from the last day of December 2010 to February 2012. Even though there is no penalty for noncompliance, almost all local governments in South Korea had complied with the PB requirement. This could be attributed to many different reasons, but three possible explanations can be advanced. The first is that the central government incentivized local governments by including "whether the local government established its own PB ordinance" to the local finance analysis index, which is used as a basis of financial support for local governments (Park & Choi, 2009). The second is that an administrative culture of traditional authority

remains in South Korea that expects local governments to comply with requirements from higher government levels without any question (Jeong & Kim, 2012; Seong, 1999). The third is that changes in the governance system making heads of local governments directly elected by citizens have formed political motivations for heads of local governments to become more accountable to citizens by involving them more in decision-making processes (Ahn & Bretschneider, 2011).

### **Trends in Research**

In order to review the research topics related to PB dealt in the Korean literature, I archived 119 articles—from both peer-reviewed scholarly journals and non-scholarly periodicals such as magazines or reports. I used two keywords in the search: 1) “주민참여예산” /ju-min-cham-yeo ye-san/, which is the official term used in South Korea to call PB that can be directly translated as “resident participation budgeting” and “참여예산”/cham-yeo ye-san/, which is directly translated as “participation budgeting.” Two well-known Korean research article databases were used: 1) DBpia ([www.dbpia.co.kr](http://www.dbpia.co.kr)) and 2) Korean studies Information Service System ([www.kiss.kstudy.com](http://www.kiss.kstudy.com)).

Scholars in South Korea recognized PB starting in 2001. Figure 2.1 presents the trends in the type of research on PB in the peer-reviewed journals.

The trend goes along with the emergence and implementation of PB practices in South Korea. Until 2004, most of the scholars only focused on introducing other countries’ cases such as Brazil and Japan (Kwak, 2003; Nah, 2004) and the trend

continued until recently (Ahn, 2005; Ahn, 2007; Lee, 2007; Lee, 2008; Lee, 2011). The first case study article appeared in 2005 (Kwak, 2005) and case study still has been a popular type of research until now (Cho, 2015; Hong, 2013; Jeon, 2008; Jeong, 2014; Kang, 2011; Kim & Lee, 2009; Kim, 2008; Kim, 2015). Statistical studies started to appear in 2007 and have been a main type of research in addition to case study since 2010 (Choi, 2010; Jang & Yeom, 2014; Jung, Kim, & Kim, 2014; Kim & Lee, 2011; Kim & Hyun, 2016; Kwon, Lee, & Hwang, 2015; Lee & Hur, 2016; Lee & Lee, 2017; Park & Nam, 2012; Um & Yoon, 2013).




Figure 2.1 Trends in the Type of Research on PB in South Korea 2003-2017

After the emergence of PB in several municipalities, scholars started to conduct empirical analysis. Scholars have been mainly focused on categorizing the types of PB, evaluating the cases, and finding the factors affecting the processes and outcomes. Table 2.1 shows the different categories of distinguishing types of PB. Yoon and Lim (2016) point out that most of the Korean PBs (76%) falls into either the type of providing opinions or the type of operating general committees. In addition, Table 2.2 presents the variables appeared in the literature on Korean PB.

Table 2.1

*Types of PB in South Korea*

Source	Types of PB
Ahn (2007)	1) Government-led participation, 2) Collaboration between citizens and government (passive collaboration), 3) Collaboration between citizens and government (active collaboration), & 4) Citizens-led participation
Lee & Hwang (2013)	1) Operating general committees, 2) Operating regional committees, & 3) Collaboration between citizens and government
Yoon & Lim (2016)	1) Providing opinions (no committees) (41.1%), 2) Operating general committees (34.9%), 3) Operating regional committees (8.6%), 4) Collaboration between citizens and government (12.3%), & 5) Delegating authority (2.8%)

Table 2.2

*Variables appeared in the literature on Korea PB*

Categories	Variables
1. Elected officials and public managers	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Awareness and perceived needs of PB</li> <li>- Political attitudes and progressiveness</li> <li>- Enthusiasm, support</li> </ul>
2. Council members	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Awareness and perceived needs of PB</li> <li>- Political attitudes and progressiveness</li> <li>- Cooperation</li> </ul>
3. Structure of local administration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Transparency in budget formation</li> <li>- Providing good quality of budget information</li> <li>- The scope of eligible participants</li> <li>- Scope of budget formation process and areas allowing participation</li> <li>- The ways (means) of participation</li> </ul>
4. Residents	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Interest, attitudes, willingness to participate and desire to participate</li> <li>- Organizational power of residents</li> <li>- Leadership and leverage</li> <li>- Characteristics of resident organizations</li> <li>- Civic awareness and values</li> </ul>

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5. Environment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Autonomy and independence from the central government</li> <li>- Years of PB ordinance establishment</li> <li>- Development of media</li> <li>- Civil society organizations' capacities and support</li> <li>- Trust between local government and residents (social capital)</li> <li>- City size and population</li> <li>- Budget size and financial self-independence</li> </ul>
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6. Internal factors of PB	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Number of PB committees</li> <li>- The degree of sharing decision-making authority</li> <li>- Types of subcommittees</li> </ul>
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Source: Adapted from Choi (2011), translated, and modified.

### **Issues and Challenges in PB in South Korea**

Although involving the public in the budgeting process is legalized and mandated for all local government units in South Korea, there are many issues and challenges. In the next part of this paper, I present three issues that currently concern those who are interested in PB in South Korea.



## **Government-led Process**

One interesting characteristic of the PB process in South Korea is that the facilitation of the bottom-up process has been initiated through a top-down approach. This is because budget formation authority is given to the administration, and budget ratification is in charge of the council. It is “opening up” one part of the budgeting formulation process that has been considered the sole purview of the government. Therefore, deciding the scope of participation (inclusiveness) and implementing the winning projects are the responsibility of the local governments themselves.

First, it is the electoral leader’s will (e.g., Mayors) to decide whether to fully implement PB, which allows the public to make real decisions or to involve the public in a limited way, consulting through public meetings or surveys. As a result, although most local governments (99.1%) established their PB ordinances, there are only a few local governments that fully implement PB. Seoul city’s PB was adopted and implemented because of Mayor Won-Soon PARK’s strong will to enhance public participation as a new mode of governance for the city, embracing not only ordinary citizens but also city councils and civil society organizations (Park, 2015). When the adoption of a government process relies too much on one leader’s will, the continuity and stability of that process can be easily questioned when there is a change in leadership. In summer 2017, Seoul PB had its sixth cycle, and it is the last year of the current Mayor’s second term. In other words, it is still uncertain whether Seoul PB will continue its seventh cycle if people elect a different Mayor in next year’s national election. This is mainly due to the generic language of the Local Finance Law, which allows any type of participation. Since the

national law cannot regulate the specific type of participation, it can result in various types of implementation, including disguised compliance.

Second, PB processes are completely designed and managed by the government. When designing the process, it seems that some government officials have hesitated to fully “give up” their control of budget decision-making. In the city of Busan, for example, one-third of the PB committee was initially constituted of city officials (Junghee Kim, 2016). One of the reasons for this is that there were no public meetings or hearings at the stage of forming or establishing a PB ordinance (Kim, 2016). In addition, PB committee meetings are sometimes managed in a way that is more convenient for government officials than for the residents. PB committee meetings are usually held in government offices (e.g., city office, district office), and government officials are in charge of preparing the meetings. Since government officials have to be present all the time, they tend not to set meetings on holidays. In Seoul, PB committee meetings were held on weekday evenings, which made the participants rush tasks, leave early in the middle of the meetings, and difficult to even attend the meetings if they have families and children to take care.

### **Whom to Involve?**

In a literal translation, the PB in South Korea is called “Resident Participatory Budgeting System.” Taking this into account, it is important to clarify who are considered residents in the system, because the scope of eligible participants shapes the outcomes of PB (Chang, 2006). According to Smith (1997), there are three types of citizens: customer, owner, and value-centered citizens. Neither a customer purchasing

government services nor an owner exercising his or her limited rights, citizens can be recognized as a value-centered citizen through PB—collaborating with the government for the development of the community (Choi, 2011). According to the Local Autonomy Act, persons who “have domicile within the jurisdiction of a local government” shall be residents of such local governments (KLRI, n.d.b). However, the Seoul PB ordinance defines residents more broadly. It defines a “resident” as someone who 1) has an address in the city of Seoul, 2) works in an institution located in the city of Seoul, 3) is a representative or employee of a business that has its head office or branches in the city of Seoul, and/or 4) are currently enrolled in elementary/middle/high schools or universities in the city of Seoul. Moreover, there is an additional condition as to who is allowed to participate: the definition of a resident excludes public officials who work in the city government of Seoul or any other local government or government-funded organizations.

This broad scope of resident defined by the city of Seoul is understandable since anyone who lives and/or works in the city can be considered beneficiaries of the city’s administrative activities. However, other cities surrounding the city of Seoul may allow only those who live in the city to participate in their PB. This inconsistency may also cause some conflicts of interest. Seoul, where approximately 10 million people reside, has been the capital of the nation for a long time in Korean history. Due to the rapid growth of the area since the 1970s, all the nation’s social, economic, and cultural opportunities are mainly concentrated in this area. People started to move out to suburban areas and still commute to work in Seoul because of the skyrocketing housing and rent prices. In 2015, about 1.28 million people commuted from Gyeonggi-do (the province

surrounding the city of Seoul) to Seoul (Statistics Korea, 2015). Since many people work in one city but live in a different one, some might be involved in PB processes in two or more cities. It will not be problematic if all cities allow everyone who lives and/or works in the city. If there are certain cities not allowing those who work in the city participate in PB unlike other cities around them, the process may not be considered fair.

In addition, there are no specific clauses in the law to make sure the process includes those who have been traditionally neglected. One of the common criticisms regarding participatory processes in government is that often end up including the ‘usual suspects’ that is, residents with higher levels of education and income, who already have some degree of influence and power because those groups can be comparatively easier to engage. In other countries, PB sometimes became a tool for the government to maintain the status quo of the participation through the cooptation of actors (Wampler, 2008). However, if the government aims to increase inclusiveness in their decision-making processes, it should make an effort to increase the participation of people from traditionally neglected groups such as the youth, the disabled, and multicultural families. Seoul PB has tried different ways of including youth and multicultural families, but there is still a lack of available participation avenues for those groups. For example, they once included teenagers in the PB committee meetings and expected them to join the meetings in the late evenings. However, it was difficult for some young students not only to participate meaningfully but also to stay until the end of each meeting. Mothers of multicultural families participated as committee members, but they encountered some

language barriers because the meetings used very formal Korean, which sometimes might be not easy for them to understand, and no translations were provided.

### **Scope of the Mandate**

We also need to consider the scope of the mandate—what kinds of activities are exactly mandated throughout the local budgeting process. First of all, strictly speaking, some might disagree that “PB” is mandated in South Korea. This is a plausible argument given the various definitions of PB. A broad definition of PB describes it as “a mechanism (or process) through which the population decides on or contributes to decisions made on, the destination of all or part of the available public resources” (UN-Habitat, 2007, p. 20). Under this broad definition, PB could include any participation such as “lobbying, general town hall meetings, special public hearings or referendums on specific budget items” (Goldfrank, 2007, p. 92). Meanwhile, a narrow definition understands PB as “a process that is open to any citizen who wants to participate, combines direct and representative democracy, involves deliberation (not merely consultation), redistributes resources toward the poor, and is self-regulating” (Goldfrank, 2007, p. 92). In this regard, what is mandated by the South Korean national law could be considered as PB only under the broader definition, because it is still acceptable to simply consult with citizens without giving them any decision-making authority.

Second, although involving the public to some degree is mandatory, the rest of the PB process has not been mandated. On the one hand, implementing the winning projects is not required in the law, and the decisions are not legally binding (Kim, 2015). Indeed, legally speaking, there is no penalty for not implementing the winning projects. In other

words, the projects have no formal way of being realized if the council does not pass it, or if the local government leader does not implement at the end. There has been no such problem so far in the case of Seoul, but not implementing the projects due to budget limitation has been an issue in other countries (see García, 2014). If a project cannot be realized after all these participatory processes, it will negatively affect the participants' trust in the process and their motivation to participate in the future. On the other hand, the law does not regulate anything relative to the quality of participation. Seoul adopted a mobile vote to increase participation in the final stages of PB, but as a result, more people merely voted without deliberation, compared to the previous cycles. Before the mobile vote was installed, all voters had to come to the city hall, and there was some deliberation occurring between residents before the final vote.

### **Conclusion**

Although PB in South Korea has spread widely following the mandate in 2011, awareness of PB is still low among citizens. One reason could be that there are still many local government units not fully implementing PB in the narrow definition: residents making decisions after deliberation. By 2014, 99% of local government units had established their own PB ordinances. The implementation of PB, however, varies to a great extent, from consultation to decision-making due to the way the law regulates participation. Indeed, involving the public and reflecting their opinions in budgeting decision-making processes can be done through either holding public meetings or giving residents the power to deliberate and make decisions.

In this article, I summarized the history of PB and introduced three issues with regard to the mandate of PB in South Korea. First, could the current government-led process be more open? In order to make the process more participatory, the government needs to consider whether it could hand over the authority of managing the process to the PB general committee. The government could be involved in the process as one of the participating institutions, together with other civil society organizations. Second, the definition of participants needs to be clear. Although the current national law defines residents as persons who have a domicile in the area, PB sometimes more broadly defines residents to include those who work within the area. Currently, the involvement of traditionally neglected groups such as youth and minorities is not included in the mandate. Third, the mandate only requires each local government unit to include the public in the budgeting process. In other words, the decisions made through PB are not legally binding.

It has been about fifteen years since the first PB experiment in South Korea, and six years after the mandate. It is time to reflect on and consider the achievements and failures of the mandate. In 2017, South Korea elected another President, Moon Jae-In, who values citizen participation and claims a willingness to listen to citizens. Despite the language barrier, communicating with other countries that have mandated PB and sharing experiences would be an asset to all PB communities around the world.

## Chapter 3

### INCREASING SOCIAL EQUITY THROUGH PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE

Opening government and increasing public participation have been a long-standing debate among scholars and practitioners. It has been argued that involving more people in government decision-making processes could enhance democratic values of participation, public freedom, and responsibility, so as to increase the legitimacy of governmental decisions (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007; Fung, 2015; Fung & Wright, 2003; King & Stivers, 1998; Olivo, 1998). Public participation could also offer local knowledge that public officials might lack. The proposition is that decisions made through public participation processes could better reflect the actual needs of the populace compared to the traditional decision-making process, which relies solely on public officials (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). Although public participation is considered normatively desirable (Denhardt & Denhardt, 2007; Stivers, 1990), and suggested to help to achieve social justice (for instance, by increasing equity in resource allocation by distributing more resources toward the poor) there has been little empirical evidence as to whether citizen participation is worth the effort for enhancing social justice in governance systems.

This article examines whether participatory governance processes increase social equity in resources allocation. Participatory Budgeting (PB), which allows community members to participate in the local budget decision-making process is a relatively recent example of participatory governance practice. In particular, this study explores whether the inclusive structures of those participatory processes have any relationship to redistributive allocation outcomes, using the case of PB in Seoul, South Korea, where the



PB was introduced as a way of increasing public participation in government decision-making without an explicit consideration for redistribution of resources. In the context of this study, an “inclusive” process refers to the level of representation and participation of traditionally excluded groups and “social justice” refers to the redistribution of resource allocations from high-income to low-income districts.

The literature shows that when PB is designed with explicit equity criteria—as was the first case of PB in Porto Alegre, Brazil—redistribution was successfully achieved whereby resources are allocated to the economically and educationally disadvantaged (de Sousa Santos, 1998; Fung, 2015; Marquetti et al., 2012; Wampler, 2000). The equity criteria used in Porto Alegre, however, have seldomly been adopted by other cities. In fact, Archon Fung (2005) argues that social justice could still be reached even if not explicitly articulated as desired goals. In resource allocation, social justice outcome refers to redistribution, considering equity criteria. Social justice can become a byproduct when seeking legitimacy from the populace through the design of an inclusive, representative, and discursive (deliberative) process (Fung, 2015; Purdy, 2012). Moreover, when trying to enhance effective governance by improving the problem-solving capacity of the government through participation, some governments have designed a co-production process in which communities are involved in planning and design (Bovaird, 2007). In sum, in the pursuit of legitimacy and effective governance, participatory processes gather views from previously excluded groups and deliver public goods and services to those who are disadvantaged, therefore indirectly achieve social justice (Fung, 2015). In this regard, it is pertinent to empirically test if the redistributive effects of PB are present even

in the absence of explicit equity criteria, and explore the governance processes that are linked to social equity outcomes.

This study offers important contributions to the field of participatory governance because it offers empirical evidence for the link between civic participation and social justice outcomes. In other words, this study tests whether inclusive structures increase equity in resource allocation. In addition, to the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to examine PB distribution outcomes across multiple years by considering both project-level and district-level characteristics.

### **Participatory Governance, Participatory Budgeting, and Inclusiveness**

Participatory governance system benefits both the government and the public. By involving the public, the government can advance at least three democratic governance values—effectiveness, legitimacy, and social justice, depending on how the processes are designed (Fung, 2006, 2015). Increasing participation could help public agencies improve the capacity of problem-solving by drawing on more information and resources from citizens, advance legitimacy by improving the representativeness and responsiveness, and achieve social justice by making the previously excluded groups (e.g., low-income households) participate (Fung, 2006). In addition, from the citizen’s perspective, citizens could enhance their efficacy, competence, and trust in government (Cooper, Bryer, & Meek, 2006) by participating in government decision-making process and therefore become empowered as well (Buckwalter, 2014). Although often elusive, citizen empowerment could be realized when the participatory process is cooperative rather than

control-based (Buckwalter, 2014). In this regard, PB is considered as a pertinent example of participatory governance.

In particular, PB is a good case to explore the relationship between the process and its social justice outcome. A broad definition PB describes it as “a mechanism (or process) through which the population decides on, or contributes to decisions made on, the destination of all or part of the available public resources” (UN-Habitat, 2007, p. 20). Under this definition, PB could include any participation such as “lobbying, general town hall meetings, special public hearings or referendums on specific budget items” (Goldfrank, 2007, p. 92). Meanwhile, a narrower definition understands PB as “a decision-making process through which citizens deliberate and negotiate over the distribution of public resources” (Wampler, 2007, p. 21). When following the narrow definition, what distinguishes PB from other participation mechanisms such as citizen advisory boards, citizens’ juries or public meetings, is that citizens have the highest decision-making control and delegated authority by partnering with officials (Stewart, 2007).

Increasing public participation in government budgeting process can achieve and yield several different goals and outcomes. Participation in budgeting process allows “changing resource allocation, educating citizens, collecting input for decision-making, gaining support for proposals, reducing cynicism, enhancing trust, and creating a sense of community” (Edbon & Franklin, 2006, p. 438). One of the common criticisms about public participation in the budgeting process is that citizen inputs are used to merely back up the directions of public officials intended rather than making real changes in resource

allocation (Edbon & Franklin, 2006). In PB, however, resource allocation completely depends on how the process goes, because citizens replace traditionally authorized decision makers (e.g., public officials and technical experts) and make decisions by themselves (Fung, 2006). Furthermore, PB can be considered a collaborative governance process. Purdy (2012) defines a collaborative governance process as a process that “seek to share power in decision making with stakeholders in order to develop shared recommendations for effective, lasting solutions to public problems” (p. 409). The design of PB process allows the public to share the decision-making power with public officials.

In addition, even though economically disadvantaged citizens are less likely to participate in general local government participatory processes (e.g., town committee and board) (Arceneaux & Butler, 2015), PB has been successful in involving citizens from traditionally underrepresented groups such as women, low-income households, and those with lower education levels (Baiocchi, 2003; Fung, 2006; Marquetti et al., 2012; McNulty, 2012b). It is important to reiterate that the redistributive resource allocation through PB, however, was possible in Porto Alegre, Brazil because they intentionally developed a set of explicit criteria on equity following the central goal of the program, allocating the resources to low-income neighborhoods (Marquetti et al., 2012; Wampler, 2000). Whether social justice could be unintendedly achieved, as suggested by Fung (2015) when increasing inclusiveness in PB, is the focus in this article.

Social justice can be achieved, however, even when it is not explicitly intended (Fung, 2015). In the pursuit of legitimacy and effective governance, participatory processes gather views from previously excluded groups and deliver public goods and

services to those who are disadvantaged, therefore indirectly achieve social justice (Fung, 2015).

In this regard, inclusiveness is a critical factor when assessing a participatory process in terms of achieving social justice. In order to promote democratic values, the scope of participatory processes must be expanded for increasing inclusiveness (Box, 1998; King & Stivers, 1998). Although differently conceptualized and measured in several empirical studies, there are two dominant dimensions of inclusiveness in the literature related to participatory processes: representation and participation (Rossmann & Shanahan, 2012).

A participatory process needs to involve those people outside of the government significantly; whom to involve or how to represent the values of constituencies are the matters of representation (Rossmann & Shanahan, 2012). The design of the process needs to consider not only the number of participants involved in each meeting and in total, but also the representation of the people regarding gender, age, ethnicity, and geographic distribution (Roberts, 2010; Weeks, 2000). Bringing in different perspectives is important to represent the values of constituencies as much as possible and to allow the participants to have a better understanding of different issues and therefore enhance the process as well as the implementation of the decisions (Feldman & Khademian, 2007).

The other consideration is related to the level and quality of engagement and the structural opportunities for participation (Rossmann & Shanahan, 2012). Bryson et al. (2012) suggest that inclusiveness of composition of participants could be considered as one of the possible outcome evaluation criteria for practitioners when they aim to

promote democratic participation. Hong (2015) uses the definition of inclusiveness which refers to “the openness of the political system and the degree (p. 273).” While some scholars focus on the number of individuals involved (Ebdon, 2002), others consider the structural avenues for participation such as public meetings, panels of focus groups, community visioning, advisory boards, open house discussions, and survey (see Beckett and King, 2002, p. 477). In this regard, an inclusive process refers to the process which provides various structural avenues to achieve a high level of participation and representation, in this research.

A few prior studies have found some negative effects of inclusiveness on different participatory outcomes. Hong (2015), for instance, argued that greater inclusiveness may hinder active citizen engagement in the budgeting process by decreasing the sense of ownership of each individual over the resulting decisions, thereby lowering a participant’s engagement in the process. Moynihan (2003) claimed that including more people in the process increases costs and hinders reaching consensus and moving forward in making decisions, making the budgetary decision-making process less efficient. In addition, large but unrepresentative participation may fail to accurately reflect the needs of the citizens (Weeks, 2000).

Nevertheless, other scholars show that increasing inclusiveness has a great potential to improve representativeness and effectiveness in the participation processes (Bryson et al., 2012; Fung & Wright, 2003). Increasing participatory representativeness is possible through better outreach and optimizing accessibility of the process, therefore, have diverse inputs (Bryson et al., 2012). In other words, including those who are

traditionally neglected and disadvantaged (Bryson et al., 2012; Fung & Wright, 2003) would contribute to a better reflection of the community's needs. Therefore, an inclusive process may redistribute resources if those who are in need will receive more resources at the end.

Based on the discussion above, the proposed hypotheses are as follows:

H1: A district that provides more structural avenues for participation would receive more resources than their counterparts.

H2: Districts with lower average household incomes would receive more resources than their wealthier counterparts.

### **The Research Setting**

The city of Seoul, the capital of South Korea, adopted PB in December 2011. Currently, the national law, Local Finance Act, requires all local governments in the country to involve the public in their budgeting processes. They, however, still have a certain degree of discretion in deciding how and to what extent they would involve people, from consulting to decision making. Even though there is no penalty in the law for noncompliance, almost all local governments in South Korea complied with the PB requirement nonetheless because of the incentives provided by the central government.

The Seoul city PB can be considered as a compelling case in its PB structural design. This article examines PB processes at the district-level for three reasons. First, districts are the smallest autonomous government units in a city; they collect taxes and operate their own budgets. Second, they are very close to the community, which makes it

easy to reach out to residents. Third, among the 246 local government units of South Korea, Seoul city and its 25 districts have a unique hierarchical structure for PB. The city-level PB allocates the funds for the winning projects to the district governments in which the projects are located. In this setting, the districts compete with each other in the city-level PB which results in expanding district-level budgets. In other words, the more projects a district win in the city-level PB, the more funds it can add to the district coffers. In other words, even though it is mandated to do PB, the design of the PB process provides financial incentives for district governments to participate in the city-level PB. This becomes a great motivation for district governments to manage PB well to win more projects and funds.

The Seoul city government operates PB with a budget of 50 billion Korean won (KRW) (about 43 million USD) every year. Any resident in the city can submit project ideas and proposals directly to the city or their district. There are two tracks in the Seoul city PB. One track is directly open to the public, and the other track is designated for the regional committees. There is a ceiling amount for the districts, but no regional quota in the final vote. Each district cannot submit projects whose budgets exceed 30 billion KRW in total. The district-level committees review district-specific proposals and make the initial decision on the priority of the projects, and citizen delegates in the city-level thematic committees review all proposals and again filter those that do not qualify or are impossible to implement for legal or financial reasons. Citizen delegates and regular citizens vote on the projects brought to the general meeting in the final stage.<sup>1</sup> In the very final step, the city council approves the winning projects unless the council finds one



disqualified. Although the amount allocated to PB represents less than 1% of the Seoul city budget, a great deal of projects is approved and implemented within the funds of 50 billion KRW every year.

### Data and Methods

This study is based on original data collection and coding of data on individual PB project proposals.<sup>2</sup> The information on each proposal such as location, amount of funds requested and allocated, final status, themes, purpose, description, and the results of committee screening is from the Seoul PB website on a year-by-year basis for 2012-2015. The data include the proposals submitted by the districts for the final vote in the last stage of the PB process (see Table 3.1).<sup>3</sup>

*Table 3.1*

*Project Final Status by Year*

Year	Project final status		Total Submitted
	1 (won)	0 (lose)	
2012	119	106	225
2013	214	153	367
2014	346	181	527
2015	518	581	1,099
Total	1,197	1,021	2,218

The unit of analysis is a project, and the data consist of 2,218 projects submitted to the final stage of PB during the entire four years of Seoul PB from 2012 to 2015, representing fiscal years 2013-2016. Then the project-level data was merged with the district-level data on each district's financial needs and social and political environment.

And Table 3.2 contains detailed measurements and sources of variables used in this study.

Table 3.2

*Measurements and Sources of Variables*

<b>Level</b>	<b>Construct</b>	<b>Variable</b>	<b>Definition</b>	<b>Source</b>
<i>Dependent variables</i>				
Project	Project size	Amount of funds	The amount of funds received for the project.	Seoul PB
	Project final status	Project's final status	1: If the project is finally selected 0: not selected	website (2012-2015)
<i>Independent variables</i>				
District	District's financial needs	Average household income	Each district's average household monthly income.	Seoul Survey (2008)
		District government's fiscal status	Fiscal self-reliance ratio of each district government. The ratio was converted to a percentage and used in the decimal form.	Seoul city data center (2012-2015)
	Inclusiveness	Type of PB committees	Type a: PB ordinance does not require to install any committees. Type b: PB ordinance requires to install at least one kind of sub-committee in addition to a PB general committee. Type c: PB ordinance mandates that local government install both thematic committees and regional committees in addition to a PB general committee.	Ministry of the Interior (2012-2015)

		In the model, setting type A as a base, for example, if a district has established type B committees, the 1 <sup>st</sup> dummy was coded 1 and 0 otherwise. In the same way, if a district has installed type C committees, the 2 <sup>nd</sup> dummy was coded 1 and 0 otherwise.	
Political environment	District government's head's affiliated party	1: If the district head's political party affiliation matches the city mayor's party affiliation. 0: Does not match	The websites of the city of Seoul and its 25 districts
	Citizen pride	To what extent the respondent is proud of being a citizen of Seoul, from 0 (not feeling proud at all) to 100 (feeling very proud). Each district's average score for each year.	Seoul Survey (2011-2014)
Social environment	Civic activity participation rate	The percentage of respondents participated in activities through civic organizations in each district	
	Volunteering participation rate	The percentage of respondents participated in volunteering in each district	
	Trust in neighbors/strangers/public organizations (each)	To what extent the respondent trust neighbors/strangers/public organizations (five-level Likert scale from 1 (do not trust at all) to 5 (trust to a great extent)). Each district's average for each year.	
District size	Population	Population by the district in each year.	Statistics Korea (2012-2015)

Project	District demands	Project themes	(1) childcare and women's issues, (2) construction, transportation, and housing, (3) culture, (4) economics and industries, (5) environment and parks, and (6) health and welfare.	Seoul PB website (2012-2015)
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### **Dependent Variables**

There are two dependent variables one for each of the two models employed in the analysis: 1) project final status (coded binary) and 2) the amount of funds received for the project. These two indicators were used to compare the resources that the districts received.

### **Independent Variables**

**District's Financial Needs.** The district's financial needs are measured by (1) district average household monthly income and (2) fiscal self-reliance ratio of the district government. The average household monthly income data come from a Seoul survey taken in 2008. Seoul city conducts a basic demographic survey every year with a sample of 20,000 households. Based on the survey data, the city published the district's average household monthly income in 2008. Since this study's focus is on the "rank" of the districts regarding their poverty, this data was used with an assumption that the trend in the districts' poverty levels would not have dramatically changed throughout the years. However, district average household income is constant throughout the years in the model due to the data availability. To supplement the analysis, the fiscal self-reliance ratio of the districts was also considered.

The fiscal self-reliance ratio is used to determine a district's financial status because of 1) the way it is calculated that could serve as a proxy for household wealth in a district, 2) the district governments' roles in the PB process, and 3) data availability. First, fiscal self-reliance ratio of a local government is a proxy for the residents' level of income and wealth as it is calculated by  $\frac{\text{local tax} + \text{non-tax receipts}}{\text{local government budget}}$ . In other words, a fiscal self-reliance ratio shows the capacity of a local government to fully operate its planned budget relying solely on its own revenue sources. Since most local tax collections are based on the income of residents and the properties located within the area, having more wealthy people and corporations located in the area increases the probability of tax revenue collection, which in turn increases the fiscal self-reliance ratio. Second, the district governments play critical roles in the PB process. The district governments are empowered by the law to initiate, manage, and monitor the PB process. This means that the funds allocated to the winning projects are added to the district government's budget. Districts often suffer from a fiscal deficit, so the city PB process is a good opportunity for them to obtain more additional funds from the city. Finally, the fiscal self-reliance ratio of the 25 districts in Seoul is available for all four years of the study period from 2012 to 2015. Therefore, using the fiscal self-reliance ratio adds more variation to the data analysis compared to using only the district average household income.

**Inclusiveness.** Since an inclusive process refers to the process which provides various structural avenues for participation, the districts were categorized based on their PB structural avenues for participation, which are the type of committees. PB process

structures are categorized based on the type of PB committees that are required by the district’s PB ordinances (see Figure 3.1 and Table 3.2 for more detail).

It is posited that compared to type A, installments of types B and C committees relatively signify a more “inclusive” participatory process because a district can bring more people to the PB process by installing diverse committees rather than having no committee or just a general committee. The PB ordinance serves as a proxy to measure the committee installation status because district council has to revise the ordinance if the district wants to install different kinds of committees.




Figure 3.1. Type of PB committees

**Political environment.** The district government head's affiliated party is one of the control variables drawn from the PB literature. A political leader from a Left-wing party tends to be more open to public participation in the decision-making process (Um & Yoon, 2013). Since PB creates the governance arena for the different levels of institutions such as city government and sub-city level governments, it is critical to take the alignment of political parties of those leaders into consideration. This is because 1) a district head from the same party as the City Mayor might try to comply more actively with the city's policy programs, and 2) although not officially allowed, the City Mayor could try to make the process more favorable to the districts with government heads from the same party. In this regard, I considered whether the district head's political party affiliation matches the current mayor's party affiliation. Seoul city's mayor during the study period (2012-2015) actively argued for adopting PB and initiated the process, and his political party affiliation is center-left.

I also included citizen identity and pride. National identity and pride have often been considered as showing support for the political community (Norris, 1999). Having more people that are supportive of the political community in a district could increase the probability of having a higher rate of active citizen involvement and participation.

**Social Environment.** Social capital and social trust are also important factors that affect public participation (Jennings & Stoker, 2004; Putnam, 2001). Scholars have pointed out that well-developed civil society is one of the most important conditions to adopting PB and helping it take root in society (Avritzer, 2006; Kwak, 2007; UN-Habitat, 2007). Civil society works as one of the main factors in PB with local governments (UN-

Habitat, 2007). Sustainably high levels of participation in Porto Alegre, Brazil was possible because of an existing tradition of neighborhood associations (Avritzer, 2006; Wampler & Avritzer, 2004). Even in cities without strong civic society traditions, civic organizations can actively lead the PB process (Ahn & Choi, 2009; Um & Yoon, 2013). Residents are likely to be more engaged by participating in the civic activities initiated by local civic organizations. In this regard, I included the number of residents engaged in civic activities and volunteering to measure the citizenry's interest in PB (Um & Yoon, 2013).

Moreover, social trust as measured by trust in neighbors, in strangers, and in public organizations is an important issue in public administration. It is well known that PB helps restore trust in government (Ganuza & Baiocchi, 2012; Goldfrank, 2007), and it takes time to build trust even among the participants in the PB process (Pinnington, Lerner, & Schugurensky, 2009). It is still not known to what extent the preexisting social trust affects PB outcomes. When there are higher levels of trust between neighbors, strangers, and public organizations in a district, the PB process could be more easily facilitated than the others with lower levels of trust.

**Other Controls.** District size, district demand, and project size were also controlled, as those are also possible factors that affect funding allocation outcomes for PB. First, the population was included to control the size of each district. The number of proposals is very likely related to the size of the area because a greater number of people would possibly increase demand. Therefore, it is possible that the more populated district may submit more projects and thus have more projects selected in the end.



Second, district demand was also controlled in the analysis as some districts with higher demand might simply win more projects and more funds. District demands were measured by project themes, which indicate that what categories of the project are needed in each district as some area might be underdeveloped with respect to a certain theme. Under ideal conditions, those projects that are most desired or demanded should be selected through the deliberation process. Thus I use project themes to reflect the demand of the districts (Marquetti, 2009). In this regard, poor districts that lack basic facilities may propose more projects related to infrastructure than rich districts and therefore win more projects related to its demands. Furthermore, project themes are very likely to affect the decisions of people voting in the final stage of PB, as some might consider a certain theme is more necessary and critical than other themes. There are six categories, each project belongs to one category according to its theme: (1) childcare and women's issues, (2) construction, transportation, and housing, (3) culture, (4) economics and industries, (5) environment and parks, and (6) health and welfare.

Third, project size was included in the first model because this might also affect the funding allocation outcomes of PB.<sup>5</sup> Related to the project themes, some projects might cost more than others due to their nature. For example, the projects proposing to build infrastructure may require more funds due to the characteristics of the project itself. I measured project size by the amount of funds received for each project in US thousands of dollars.<sup>6</sup>

## **Model Specifications**

This study employs multilevel mixed effects models to capture both the project-level and district-level effects on the resource allocation. Specifically, the first model looks at how many projects each district has won in the city-level PB during the last four years (2012-2015). However, looking at the number of winning projects is necessary but not sufficient because the amount of funds varies for each project. Therefore, the actual amount of funds requested for a project serves as the dependent variable in the second model. In the second model, the amount of funds for the projects that did not pass the final stage are included as zeros. The raw data range from zero to 2,100 in thousands of USD, but this variable was included with a log transformation in the second model for us to 1) compare the approximate percentage change in the amount of funds received for a one-unit increase in the independent variables and 2) mitigate possible distribution biases. After taking a log transformation, the distribution of the residuals in the model is closer to normality than before (see Appendix B, C, and D).

Multi-level analysis is appropriate for this study for three reasons. First, decisions are made at the project level. In other words, each project proposal is evaluated and voted to be selected throughout the PB process, and each project has its targeted location (district). Therefore, project-level characteristics and whether each project was selected should not be neglected. District-level characteristics, however, also affect projects proposed for/in its districts in various ways. In this regard, it is assumed that projects are “nested” in their particular districts. Multi-level analysis is useful when each level can be potentially considered as a source of unexplained variability (Snijders & Bosker, 2012).

Finally, simply using the district as the unit of analysis is not sufficient to explain the dynamics of PB process on the results, because of an insufficient number of cases. There are 25 districts in Seoul, and it has been four years since the city first implemented PB. Therefore, there would be 100 observations in total (4 times repeated observations on 25 samples), which reduces the power and ultimately the generalizability of the statistical analysis.

According to the type of dependent variables of each model, I test the first model with multi-level logistic regression analysis and the second model is tested with multi-level normal regression analysis (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2008).

Model 1

$$Y = \beta_1 + \beta_2 Needs + \beta_3 Inclusiveness + \beta_4 Political + \beta_5 Social + \gamma Controls + \varepsilon$$

Model 2

$$Y = \beta_1 + \beta_2 Needs + \beta_3 Inclusiveness + \beta_4 Inclusiveness \times Demand + \beta_5 Political + \beta_6 Social + \gamma Controls + \varepsilon$$

The dependent variable,  $Y$  is 1) project status in Model 1 and 2) amount of funds requested for a project in Model 2. *Needs* refer to financial needs, which are measured by 1) district's average household income and 2) fiscal self-reliance ratio of the district government, and *Inclusiveness* are measured by the type of PB committees. *Political* and *Social* environments are included in the model in addition to other controls, which include project size (only in the Model 1), district size, and district demands (project themes).  $\varepsilon$  represents random error term or unobserved determinants of  $Y$ .

## **Empirical Results**

Model 1 explores the factors that explain the likelihood of a project getting selected in the final stage of PB (Table 3.3), whereas Model 2 explores the factors that explain the amount of funds received (logged) for a winning project in the final stage of PB (Table 3.4). Table 3.5 presents a comparison of the estimated amount of funds allocated to different types of PB committees for the lowest- and highest-income districts; this is an interpretation of the interaction variables of average household income and types of PB committees I included in the Model 2.

As shown in Table 3.3, according to the results of the logistic regression model (Model 1), the odds of being selected in the final stage for a project in a district with a higher level of average household income is approximately 77% lower than the odds of being selected for a project in a district with lower average household income. Another measure of districts' financial needs, the district office's fiscal self-reliance ratios, appears not to be statistically significant.

Model 2 results are presented in Table 3.4. In the simple linear regression model without any interaction variables included, on average and holding all else constant, there is approximately 0.9% decrease in the amount of funds received for each one percent increase in a district's average household income. In the model with the interaction between average household income and PB committee-type variables included, the extent increases to about 1.28%. In other words, on average and holding other variables constant, for each one percent increase in district's average household income, there is about 1.28% decrease in the amount per capita of achieved funds for a district.

Table 3.3

Multilevel Logistic Regression Results of Model 1

		Odds ratio	Std. Err.
<i>District's financial needs</i>	Average household income (log)	.230**	.006
	Fiscal self-reliance ratio	.998	.135
<i>Type of PB committees (Base: Type A)</i>	Type B	1.355*	.214
	Type C	1.179	.202
<i>Political environment</i>	Party affiliation matches between the district govt. heads and the city mayor	1.076	.191
	Pride as a Seoul citizen	1.060**	.022
<i>Participation</i>	Civic activities	1.246**	.137
	Volunteering	1.024**	.011
<i>Social trust</i>	Neighbors	.606	.292
	Strangers	.948	.397
<i>District size</i>	Public organizations	1.114	.419
	Population (log)	.944	.205
<i>Project themes (Base: childcare &amp; women's issues)</i>	Construction, transportation, & housing	1.397**	.234
	Culture	1.020	.188
	Economics & industries	1.435**	.261
	Environment & parks	1.226	.204
	Health and welfare	1.002	.183
<i>Project size</i>	Project fund (log)	.946	.036
<i>Year</i>	2013	1.130	.221
	2014	1.258	.322
	2015	.844	.409
<i>_cons</i>		.342	1.116
<i>District: Identity</i>	sd (_cons)	.035**	.027

Note. \* P < .10, \*\* P < .05, \*\*\* P < .001

Table 3.4

Multilevel Regression Results of Model 2

Dependent Variable: Amount of funds for a project		No interactions		Interactions (average hh income x PB committees)	
		Coef.	Robust Std. Err.	Coef.	Robust Std. Err.
District's financial needs	Average household (hh) income (log)	-.915*	.553	-1.280**	.457
	Fiscal self-reliance ratio	-.001	.007	-.002	.006
Type of PB committees	Type B	.218**	.102	-.938**	.411
	Type C	.169	.127	.476	1.303
Average household income x PB committees	Average hh income x Type B committees			1.150**	.393
	Average hh income x Type C committees			-.372	1.417
Political environment	Party affiliation matches between the district govt. heads and the city mayor	.088	.136	.179	.121
	Pride as a Seoul citizen	.026	.020	.028	.019
Participation	Civic activities	.116	.086	.136*	.082
	Volunteering	.010	.009	.006	.008
Social trust	Neighbors	-.204	.527	-.195	.507
	Strangers	-.004	.364	.075	.274
District size	Public organizations	-.066	.280	-.051	.350
	Population (log)	-.177	.181	-.173	.148
Project themes (Base: childcare & women's issues)	Construction, transportation, & housing	.278**	.101	.288**	.101
	Culture	-.034	.105	-.030	.105
	Economics & industries	.242**	.099	.248**	.099
	Environment & parks	.290***	.069	.303***	.070
	Health and welfare	-.049	.080	-.041	.080

Year	2013	-.013	.214	-.160	.209
	2014	-.300	.262	-.349	.249
	2015	-.606	.399	-.617	.392
_cons		5.423*	3.278	5.358*	2.974
District: Identity	sd (_cons)	.142**	.041	.111**	.047
	sd (Residual)	1.229	.025	1.229**	.025

Note. \* P < .10, \*\* P < .05, \*\*\* P < .001

Compared to the type A districts regarding PB committee requirements, the type B districts won more funds. The type B districts that are required to install PB general committee and at least one kind of subcommittees won about 22% more than the type A districts, which have no requirements regarding PB committee installation or that need to install only a PB general committee. Even if we compare the districts with the same level of average household income, the districts which have to install a PB general committee and one kind of sub-committees (type B) won about 1.15% more funds than the type A districts, on average and holding other variables constant.

I added an interaction term to the model to test whether the fund allocation results differed by average household income and by type of PB committees of a district. For the type B districts, a 1% increase in average household income would yield about 0.13% decrease in the amount of funds received. In addition, for the type A districts, a 1% increase in average household income would yield about 1.28% decrease in the amount of funds received.

Table 3.5 presents the amount of funds calculated based on the interactions of the type of committees and the lowest and highest levels of average household income.

When comparing the districts with the lowest and highest levels of average household income, type B districts consistently won more funds than type A districts. Furthermore, the lowest-income district won more funds than the highest-income district regardless of the type of PB committee. It is interesting to note that the differences in the amount of funds won between different type of PB committees are much greater among the highest-income districts (\$2,840) than that of the lowest-income districts (\$1,056). This implies that for the highest-income districts, being inclusive is more important than in lowest-income districts with respect to winning more funds.

*Table 3.5*

*Comparison of the Amount of Funds between Type of PB Committee and the Lowest- and Highest-Income Districts*

		Average household income		Differences in the income level
		The lowest-income district	The highest-income district	
Type of PB committee	Type A	2,778 (USD)	241	2,537
	Type B	3,834	3,081	753
Differences in the type of PB committees		1,056	2,840	

Note. Amount of funds for the winning projects in USD

The rate of participation in civic activities is positively related to the amount of funds received. On average and holding all else constant, for each one percent increase in



the district's average civic activities participation rate, there is about 13.6 percent increase in the amount of winning funds.

While pride as a Seoul citizen and volunteer rate appears statistically significant in Model 1, they are not significant in Model 2. In addition, political party affiliation matches between the head of district government and the city mayor and social trust variables (trust in neighbors, strangers, and public organizations) are not statistically significant either.

### **Discussions**

The results of this study offer several interesting issues. First, the results indicate that a poorer district has a higher probability of winning a project and is rewarded more funds compared to its wealthier counterparts. These results suggest that, even without explicit criteria on equity in the Seoul PB process, the funding allocations have redistributed resources to the poor.

Second, inclusiveness, which was measured by the types of PB committees required to be installed for each district, is another important factor that explains the probability of being selected in the final stage for a project and the amount of funds allocated to a district. Compared to the type A districts, which do not have to install any PB committees or have only one general PB committee, the type B districts that are required to install a general PB committee and one kind of sub-committee (either thematic or regional) have been awarded more projects and funds. It is interesting to note that type C districts were not statistically significant in either model analysis. Considering that type C districts are required to install both thematic and regional sub-committees in

addition to a general PB committee, I suggest that there is a peak-point at which the degree of inclusiveness positively affects the financial allocation results of PB.

Third, an interaction term to Model 2 was included to test whether the relationship between the amount of funds received for a project on the district's average household income differed by the district's type of PB committees. The model predicted that the lowest average household income district with type B PB committees (general PB committee and one sub-committee) won the most among the four possible cases (see Table 3.5). This suggests that a district's financial needs and type of PB committees are both important to consider together. It is interesting to note that the differences in the amounts of funds between different type of PB committees are much greater among the highest-income districts than that of the lowest-income districts. As installing either thematic or regional committee enables the district government to hear the residents' voices more directly and effectively, ultimately the government would better reflect the resident's demands and needs. The wealthiest districts might benefit more from having a more inclusive PB design because they could create a niche by listening to residents when there are comparatively sufficient resources available in the community.

Fourth, in the analysis political and social environment displayed some different effects on the odds of winning a project and the amount of funds received. While pride as a Seoul citizen, civic participation, and volunteer rate were positively related to the odds of winning a project, only civic participation was positively associated with the amount of funds received. It means that having more residents being proud of living in Seoul, participating in civic activities and volunteerism increases the chance of winning more

projects. And among those, higher civic participation rate leads to more funds for a district. It is important to note that, however, the information used in the study are district average measures, not average measures of the PB participants. As such, the measures suggest indirect rather than direct effects of civic participation and volunteer rate on the communities' other participation processes, which in this case is PB.

### **Conclusion**

This study's results show that in the case of Seoul PB, even without the presence of equity criteria, poor districts won more projects and funds compared to rich districts. This finding confirms the argument that social justice outcomes such as redistribution are possible even without the presence of explicit criteria on equity (Fung, 2015). The findings indicate that redistribution is possible because of the way the PB structure is designed (i.e., the inclusion of different configurations of subcommittees). The second model predicted that the lowest average household income district with type B PB committees (general PB committee and one sub-committee) won the most among the four possible cases. In addition, the inclusiveness of the PB process was partially associated with the amount of funds awarded to the winning projects: districts that have at least one sub-committee in addition to a general PB committee won more projects and funds compared to those that have no committee or only a general PB committee.

Two findings from this paper suggest interesting avenues for future research. First, the relationship of inclusiveness and PB funding allocation was not simply linear. In other words, type C districts that are required to install both thematic and regional sub-

committees in addition to a general PB committee showed no statistical difference from type A districts. This finding might imply that there is a certain threshold before which the extent of inclusiveness positively leads to more projects and funds. Installing and operating all different types of committees may increase transactional costs for the district government, and this, in turn, may generate inefficiencies. Hence, it is pertinent to interrogate this result to interrogate this result with additional measures of inclusiveness. Second, the difference in the amount of funds between the types of PB committee appeared greater within the district with the highest level of average income than that of the districts with the lowest level of average income. Simply put, the wealthiest districts benefit more than the poorest district from installing one more sub-committee in addition to a general committee (changing from type A committee to type B committee). It would be interesting to study how the various type of PB committee work differently in different social, economic, and environmental settings.

There are three limitations of this study. First, due to the data availability, the average household income from a panel survey in one year was used. Since there is no publicly available data on the exact average household income for each district, I considered the fiscal status of the district government office for financial needs of the district. Second, a set of district characteristic variables such as participation in civic activities and volunteering, social trust, and pride as a citizen are adopted from a panel survey. Although this study used each district's average information as a proxy that affects the overall atmosphere of the society within each district, a direct measure of the PB participants could enhance the accuracy of the analysis. Third, the type of PB

committee is measured based on the content of districts' PB ordinances, not the actual practice. Although taking the ordinances into the consideration is a good proxy because districts need to first establish the ordinance, to newly install any different kind of committee, there might be a case in which the committees are not implemented in practice.

Despite the limitations, the findings of this study make several contributions to the fields of participatory governance and civic engagement. First, civic participation in the decision-making process is often considered an essential mechanism for increasing accountability and social justice. This study offers empirical evidence to show that civic participation leads to the greater achievement of social justice. Second, this study employs multi-level mixed-effects analysis to account for both project-level and district-level determinants. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first study to look at the PB distribution outcomes by considering both project-level and district-level characteristics with the assumption of the nested structure of the relationship between projects and district. Third, I examined how the inclusiveness of the process itself influences the outcomes of PB. The findings suggest that having more inclusive processes to encourage citizen participation helps gain more resources than others with less inclusive processes. Furthermore, the findings in the case of Seoul PB show that redistributive effects appear differently in districts with different levels of average household income and district's type of PB committees. Operating an 'inclusive' participatory process is even more important for districts with a higher level of average household income. The differences

in the amount of funds won between different type of PB committees are much greater among the highest-income districts than that of the lowest-income districts.

### **Notes**

1. Two hundred and fifty delegates are equally drawn from those who applied, regarding age, gender, and districts.
2. Source: <http://yesan.seoul.go.kr> (in Korean).
3. On the one hand, it means that the residents have been actively participating over the years since it was first introduced. On the other hand, since there is a ceiling that each district can submit to the city-level PB, the city PB committee tends to prioritize small (less costly) projects rather than large (more costly) projects.
4. Project size, which is measured by the amount of funds is a control variable in the first model only. This variable is the dependent variable in the second model.
5. Converted in the ratio of one US Dollar (USD) = 1,200 Korean Won (KRW).

## Chapter 4

### UNEXPECTED CONSEQUENCES: EXPLORING HOW CITIZENS MAKE DECISIONS IN PARTICIPATORY MEETINGS

Along with the recognition of the value of public participation in the government decision-making process (Fung, 2006; Irvin & Stansbury, 2004; Yang & Pandey, 2011), both scholars and practitioners have explored the question of how to design participation processes to achieve expected outcomes to a great extent (Bryson, Quick, Slotterback, & Crosby, 2012; Nabatchi, 2012; Wright & Street, 2007). Since the design is one of the critical components of planning in terms of shaping the process and producing desirable outcomes, the very first stage in design guidelines for public participation is identifying purposes and assessing the context (Bryson et al., 2012).

Scholars have evaluated various cases of public participation practices in terms of its goal and design. For example, PB in Porto Alegre, Brazil was designed “pro-poor,” because the goal was to achieve a social justice outcome such as redistribution (Fung, 2015; Marquetti et al., 2012; Wampler, 2000). In this case, participants followed the designed process accordingly so that the PB initiative was able to achieve their desired outcomes. Not all cases, however, can achieve the outcomes as intended. The previous chapter provided empirical evidence that achieving social justice outcome—redistribution—is possible even without any explicit criteria on equity embedded in the process. Having unexpected consequences are not always negative, but would have been better for the managers if they could have predicted and managed the process

accordingly, and understanding how participants behave in the participatory meetings would be essential.

The literature on PB suggests that social justice outcomes may be achieved, even when not intended if the process has been designed and implemented in pursuit of legitimacy and effectiveness of governance (Fung, 2015). By involving ordinary citizens, it is expected that the decisions will better reflect the demands of the people since the procedures are determined by those most affected by the process (Fung & Wright, 2003). This means that it is pertinent to study how the participants make decisions in the PB processes. This study tries to reveal what happened *behind the scene* by analyzing the interviews conducted with active participants in PB.

This chapter is organized into three sections. The first section reviews the literature and introduces the research setting, the PB process of Seoul, South Korea. The second section presents the data and the methods, and then the third section reports the main research findings and discusses the implications. The last section summarizes the conclusions, provides the summary of the results, and discusses the limitations and contributions of the study.

### **Opening the Government: Redistribution of Power and Resources**

The long-standing hesitation of increasing public participation comes from the basis of representative democracy because involving the public could mean losing the decision-making control. Lawrence and Deagen (2001) suggest that public involvement may not be necessary in cases in which the manager is confident that they have sufficient



information to make a high-quality decision, and public acceptance is reasonably certain. In addition, the tendency of pursuing efficiency in the government decision-making has been left either to public managers or with certain groups of people with power. A large barrier to public participation can be found in its costs, particularly time and money. It has been argued that a well-trained, skilled public manager may make the same decision within a shorter period of time than the public would choose at the end of the process of involvement (Irvin & Stansbury, 2004). Even when the government tries to open up their decision-making process, due to the costs involved in reaching out to the broader public, the participatory process could simply end up with including those stakeholders who are deeply related to the issue or are politically, economically, or socially privileged, still keeping the process efficient and also merely satisfying the goal.

Considering the principle of public participation, allowing the public to participate in the government decision-making process means that the government gives back the delegated power to the ones who originally owned it. Arnstein (1969) contends that citizen participation is “a categorical term for citizen power,” (p. 216)—the means by which the traditionally underrepresented groups can also be involved. In this regard, reducing participation bias through either random selection or targeted demographic recruitment is critical (Nabatchi, 2012). In addition, it is important to share decision-making authority because if participants realize they have participated in the process which would not be implemented, they could easily lose faith in government (Smith & McDonough, 2001). The different levels of shared authority in various participatory processes are well described in the International Association for Public Participation

(IAP2) Spectrum of Public Participation, with five levels ranging from information to empowerment (see Figure 4.1).

Moreover, “shifting power to those who are socially and politically marginalized,” (Fung, 2015, p. 519) can contribute to advancing three values of democratic governance: legitimacy, effectiveness, and social justice (Corburn, 2003; Fung, 2015). Bryson et al. (Bryson et al., 2012), in their synthesized guidelines for designing public participation, suggest to recruit diverse stakeholders and enable diverse participation by 1) providing multiple ways to participate, 2) providing supplementary services such as language translation or child care, and 3) ensuring meeting locations and time accessible, if the public participation aims at advancing social justice (i.e., improving equity in distributing public services). This means that diverse participation would lead to advanced social justice as an outcome. This is possible when participatory processes gather views from previously excluded groups and deliver public goods and services to those who are disadvantaged (Corburn, 2003). They are more likely to gather local knowledge, which will recognize the current status of inequitable distribution (Corburn, 2003), and therefore contribute to the indirect achievement of social justice (Fung, 2015).

Furthermore, participatory processes need to have specific procedures and rules in order to yield the desired outcome. One of the stages required in designing public participation consists of the creation of rules and structures to guide the process. Indeed, rules about managing the process and making decisions connect participatory processes

and organizational structures (Bryson et al., 2012). For example, participatory processes




Figure 4.1. The modified spectrum of public participation with communication modes.

Adapted from Nabatchi (2012).

may consult citizens without any established initiatives, collaborate with citizens, or empower them by installing various types of committees such as regional or thematic committees, and incorporate the recommendations from the citizens into the decisions (Yoon & Lim, 2016). In other words, the organizational structures will reflect the purpose of the participatory processes and the level of shared authority. There is extensive literature on how people make decisions in different settings. There is still a dearth of empirical evidence, however, on how PB participants make decisions within a certain set of rules provided. This is the focus of this chapter.

### **The Research Setting**

The city government of Seoul has designed PB with several layers of participatory components in order to better reflect citizens' opinions. First, the 25 districts in the city were included as the regional committees in the city-level PB. It was expected that the district governments facilitate the regional committee meetings so that they refine the residents' needs and ideas, and submit the proposals to the city-level PB. Second, the city runs several thematic committees, and the city PB committee members review and score the proposals. In 2016, there were nine thematic committees: 1) Transportation & housing, 2) Urban safety, 3) Culture & tourism, 4) Welfare, 5) Women & health, 6) Job opportunities, 7) Youth, 8) Environment & parks, and 9) Teenagers. Third, any residents in the city (including the committee members) can vote on the proposals submitted to the final stage.

The 25 autonomous districts have a head directly elected by the residents, have their own revenue from local taxes such as property taxes and non-tax receipt, and operate their own budget. Almost all districts, however, are not 100% financially independent, so that have to rely on grants-in-aid from the government of higher-level (either Seoul city government or the national government) to fully operate their budget. Since Seoul PB includes the 25 districts as its regional committees in the city-level PB and districts are in charge of implementing the winning projects, PB became an additional revenue source for the districts.

The process can be briefed as follows. First, any resident in the city can submit project ideas and proposals directly to the city or their district. The city officials review the proposals first, but at this stage, city officials only serve to filter whether there are any legal or practical issues involved. In particular, the city officials leave a note on the projects which overlap with the city's planned policy programs in the near future. Second, in the PB thematic committees based on the project themes, the proposals are reviewed, scored, and filtered so that each proposal is decided whether it would be sent to the final stage of PB. In 2016, there were 38 PB thematic meetings—from 2 to 5 meetings per each thematic committee—held during the summer (June to August) in 2016. Ordinary citizens and committee members vote on the projects brought to the general meeting in the final stage. In the very final step, the city council approves the winning projects unless the council finds one disqualified.

The PB committee members, who review, score, and filter proposals, are also ordinary citizens who volunteer to participate actively. To become a committee member,

any resident who 1) has an address, 2) works, and/or 3) are enrolled in an elementary-, middle-, high-school, college, or university in the city of Seoul can first apply. The city government randomly draws 250 people out of those applied people with a consideration of balancing them in terms of gender, age, and location. As a result, the committees are comprised of about 10 members each from 25 districts in Seoul. The members can continue if they wish to, to serve as a committee member for two years in a row in maximum.

The PB committee members are required to review and score each proposal. The members choose, based on their interest, one out of nine PB thematic committees to participate. The city managers who are in charge of managing PB are supposed to distribute the proposals book to the committee members in advance of thematic meetings to allow them to review the proposals beforehand. The committee members use the evaluation form with eight evaluation criteria prepared by the city government to score each proposal: 1) needs, 2) urgency, 3) publicness, 4) effectiveness, 5) accomplishment, 6) subject fit, 7) gender equality, and 8) project cost appropriateness (see Table 4.1). The aggregated score from the committee members is considered in each thematic committee to decide whether to pass a project to the next level or not.

Table 4.1

Seoul PB Thematic Committee Proposal Evaluation Form

Project No. _____ Project title: _____						
Item	Indicator	Disagree ... Agree				
		1	2	3	4	5
Need	Is this project, with regard to the purpose and impact of PB, really necessary?					
Urgency	Is this project urgent and needs to be implemented immediately?					
Publicness	Do you think this project benefit a majority of the residents?					
Effectiveness	Is there a valid ground for this project's plan?					
Accomplishment	Can this project be done within the proposed time?					
Subject fit	Is this project appropriate with regard to the overall theme of PB?					
Gender Equality	Is this project helpful in improving gender equality?					
Project cost appropriateness	Is this project's cost appropriate in terms of its purpose?					
<b>TOTAL</b>						

## **Data and Methods**

### **Data**

This study uses the in-depth interviews with 28 PB committee members, who participated in Seoul PB in 2016, to answer the research question. Committee members are active and critical participants because they, as budget delegates, review and score proposals submitted to the PB and cast votes in the final stage of PB with other citizens.

Since there is no contact list available regarding the members' privacy protection, I went to the committee meetings and met the committee members. I explained the purpose of the study, asked whether they are interested in participating, and gained their contact information. Since the meetings were held in the late evening, the interviews had to be arranged at a different time and place. I contacted those who gave their contact information within 1-2 days and met them individually at their best convenient time and place. The interviews were conducted in July-August 2016 and each interview took about 30 minutes. Among the 36 committee members who gave me their contacts, 28 finally participated in the interviews.

Table 4.2 presents the characteristics of interviewees. The age of the 28 committee members ranged from 17 to 67 years old, and the modal age group was 40-49. A little more than half of the interviewees (53.6%) had a bachelor's degree. Most reported being first-time participating in the Seoul PB committee, but about 36% have continued to serve as committee members since the previous year. More females (57.1%) than males (42.9%) participated, and people from the Women & Health committee



participated in the interview the most, followed by the Job opportunities committee.

Among the participants, 17.9% were serving as chairs in their thematic committees.

*Table 4.2*

*Characteristics of PB Committee Members Interviewed*

Characteristic	% (N=28)	Characteristic	% (N=28)
<b>Age</b>		<b>Term</b>	
Under 20	10.7	First	64.3
20-29	17.9	Second	35.7
30-39	10.7	<b>Gender</b>	
40-49	32.1	Female	57.1
50-59	17.9	Male	42.9
60 or over	10.7	<b>Thematic committee</b>	
<b>Education</b>		Transportation & housing	7.1
Current high school students	14.3	Welfare	14.3
High school graduate	3.6	Women & health	25.0
2-year college graduate	7.1	Job opportunities	21.4
Current 4-year university students	10.7	Teenagers	14.3
Bachelor's degree	53.6	Environment & parks	17.9
Master's degree	14.3	<b>Committee chairs</b>	17.9

## Methods

The interviews were audio-recorded with participants' consent. All the interviews were conducted in Korean because it is the national and official language. After the interviews, the related parts of the audio-recorded interview were transcribed and translated into English for the purpose of analysis.

Interview transcripts and notes were analyzed following the process presented in the "*Qualitative interviewing: The art of hearing data*" by Rubin & Rubin (2005). First, interviewing and transcribing processes were already a part of the analysis because while conducting and listening to the interviews, I gained an idea of the most important concepts and themes.

The first stage of the analysis was finding the concepts, themes, and topical markers in the interviews (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). The most important part of the interview I focused on is the response to the question "What criteria did you personally use to decide which proposals to score high in the city thematic committees?" In addition, participants could also talk about how the decisions are made while answering the question "What do you think about the PB process in general? What are the positive and negative aspects?" I looked for the terms such as "scoring/reviewing/filtering proposals," "votes," and "criteria," and found the summary statements which include explanations of how the funding allocation decisions are made. The second stage consisted of understanding and clarifying what is meant by specific concepts and themes (Rubin & Rubin, 2005). In this stage, I synthesized different versions of explanations and then elaborated and integrated the concepts and themes.

In the next stage, I coded the data to examine the interviews. Coding categories include “criteria used for scoring proposals” and “descriptions of scoring and decision-making processes.” The types of criteria that are used for scoring proposals were discovered while exploring the interview data and will be presented in the findings section. After coding the interviews, I synthesized the concepts and themes to conclude from information in the interviews that process by which the committee members made decisions and what were the main dynamics that drove the outcomes redistributive.

## **Findings and Discussions**

### **Scoring Criteria**

**Not following the formal evaluation criteria.** Even though there was a formal evaluation form with eight criteria (Table 4.1), participants reported that they did not fully use the evaluation items but rather used their own criteria for several reasons.

First, some committee members described their concerns regarding the evaluation criteria:

I wasn't sure what the gender equality criterion was about... Maybe it is because I am a man, but it was kind of difficult for me to think from women's perspectives... I thought... Gender equality is really difficult (Participant #18).

I think overall, the evaluation criteria are good. But, to look at it more specifically, for example, gender equality, it is perceived as trying to give benefits to men and women half and half ... but this needs more training ... (...) it is not trying to make numerically 50:50 (Participant #3).

For example, when the proposal is about a dog park, you know, there is a criterion related to gender equality... a pet dog and gender equality have nothing to do with each other but if I try to fit that criteria to this proposal then this one would get 0 points. So sometimes it is different by themes and subjects but trying to fit this one to all didn't make sense to me (Participant #6).

I think they are all in need, they are all necessary (Participant #12).

Second, participants had different views on the items. For example, gender equality was often described as ambiguous one. One member of the environmental & parks committee expressed difficulty in considering gender equality, and another member of the women & health committee argued that gender equality needs to be more carefully educated to the committee members. The other participant in the women & health committee found that the gender equality item is sometimes not applicable to certain types of projects, depending on its themes or subjects. In addition, there was one participant who expressed her doubt on the usefulness of the 'needs' item because she felt all proposed projects are in need.

In this regard, committee members revealed that they scored the proposals regardless of the given criteria. In some cases, they marked "5" for all items and gave the full points (total 40) to the proposals they wanted to be selected, while checked "1" for all items to the proposals they did not want to be selected:

When a proposer from Gangnam-gu starts to come out to the floor to present, people were already marking on “1”s (Participant #22).

I might have given some pluses to our districts; if the total 50 was possible, I could have given 50 (Participant #12).

There is a table of criteria. But these are somewhat difficult and does not come to my mind right away. I have my own criteria. (Participant #6).

A committee member shared what he has seen in the meetings since Gangnam-gu is well known as one of the wealthiest districts in Seoul, committee members gave the lowest score to the proposal submitted by someone from the high-income neighborhoods regardless of the project’s quality or content. In addition, other participants responded that they would have given the highest score possible to a proposal or use her own criteria. This means that committee members have evaluated the proposals in their own ways, rather than following the items given in the evaluation form.

**Needs as the most important criterion.** In this regard, the participants were asked what criterion, either from the evaluation form or their own, they considered the most important. Most of the participants responded that they consider “needs” as the most important criterion (see Table 4.3):

I took a look at whether it is really in need (Participant #9).

If the residents proposed a brilliant idea, if it is really needed, I put those in a priority. (Participant #4).

Whether the project is really in need for the residents (Participant #3).

When residents find... when they have felt in their daily life, that something they really need... as you know, the proposers came and presented their proposals, if I can agree with them that it is really needed in our life ... (Participant #2).

*Table 4.3*

*The Most Common Criteria Committee Members Used in Proposal Evaluation*

Criterion	#	% (Total N=28)
Needs	13	46.4
Appropriateness (cost)	8	28.6
The idea is from a resident (not district office)	7	25.0
The idea is not overlapping with any city policy	6	21.4
Effectiveness	4	14.3
My district	4	14.3
Equity (redistribution)	4	14.3
Uniqueness	4	14.3

Related to the necessity, committee members also valued whether the idea/project is overlapping with any existing city policy programs. It won't be "necessary" to be selected in PB, if the problem is going to be solved through different mechanisms anyways. There were also some participants who looked at the necessity in the districts:

I wanted to, I was in... kind of... favor of those districts falling behind (Participant #25).

Since I know that districts differ in their “housekeeping,” I think... um, how can I say, it is better to allocate more funds to those districts with low self-reliance... (Participant #4).

Other than the criteria listed in Table 4.3, there were more criteria mentioned. Those include whether the project is fair, feasible, safe (10.7% each), makes sense, have a component that could engage residents, have benefits to a larger population (7.1% each), and not political (3.6%).

**Giving a priority to the districts in need.** Even though the city expected the committee members to review and evaluate the proposals based on its content and quality, committee members often considered the location of the project more than the proposal itself.

Since I know that districts differ in their “housekeeping,” I think... um, how can I say, it is better to allocate more funds to those districts with low self-reliance... (Participant #4).

Well, the demands and the needs differ in districts. There are some districts where the basic infrastructure lacks... but there are also other districts not interested in PB at all. Seocho-gu, Gangnam-gu, Songpa-gu... These districts not only have sufficient budget but also not interested in PB... So I wanted to, I was in... kind of... favor of those districts falling behind (Participant #25).

**Disadvantaged groups participated more actively.** Even though they were not directly asked to report the differences in participation between those traditionally neglected groups and others, participants shared what they have seen regarding the differences while answering to the question related to the process.

The degree of participation of those from high-income districts is low, and those from low-income districts participate actively... And we (low-income district) almost beg for projects and funds. Sir, you know our district... We are always in top 5 of any kind of bad indexes like serious crime rate, [...] and we always mention it in presentations so now they (other committee members) all know (Participant #22).

Even though women want to speak, you know what? Even if women want to speak, in a public meeting, for example, in a residential neighborhood hearing, even where it is allowed to debate, mothers or elderly such as over 50 years old, don't or can't speak in public. It hasn't been that long for women to have power, you know, even it is allowed to debate and speak out, ... they just speak in the back, like *I didn't like that one, I wanted to do this...* But what is funny is that... those who have money and power? They tend to dominate the floor. Because to speak out, you need some wealth or capacity. Those who are ordinary, or poor, or even the people who fall behind, they don't have any opportunity to speak. Those who are rich are more self-confident, they don't care about what others say because they have money... [...] Even though there are many things to be improved, I understand that there is always trial and error at the beginning... I



wish this PB can be more expanded and facilitated because I really liked that... to learn that I could witness the changes. I like that I could contribute to making this society better (Participant #16).

Participants have recognized the wealthiest districts' (e.g., Gangnam-gu, Seocho-gu, Songpa-gu) lack of interests in PB by seeing that the committee members from those districts are not attending the committee meetings. For example, participant 16 was concerned that in other participatory mechanisms, those who are ordinary, poor, or falling behind (e.g., women, the poor, and elderly) tend not to speak out even if they are expected and allowed to. Although she did not agree that PB was doing a really good job in making the processes differently such as including more voices from the disadvantaged groups, she recognized the positive changes she has had as a mother and as a woman after participating in PB.

One of the reasons why that the participation of those from low-income districts was active could be attributed to the support from the district offices.

We meet the proposers in the bus provided by the district office. [...]  
District officials call me to check whether I would be attending today's meeting. I always tell them not to worry because I will always go (Participant #22).

I felt that the city office does not really take care of committee members.  
It would be great if they could provide at least some beverages for us volunteering

hard in this process. Jungrang-gu district office provided coffee one day (Participant #13).

Since the district offices were desperate in winning more projects and funds, the districts in those low-income districts provided transportation for the committee members and idea proposers in their districts and something to eat or drink for all committee members. In addition, district officials even made a call on the day when the meetings held to make sure the committee members go to the meetings that they could score in favor of their district.

**Please vote for “our district.”** Many committee members revealed that they were more inclined to be favor of the proposals submitted from/for their own districts or reported that there are committee members who voted or scored high for their districts.

Umm... because I live in “OO district,” the proposals from our district catch my eyes (Participant #18).

When I see, oh this is our district’s! I kind of feel that I would like to give more (score) to our district’s (proposal), (...) I might have given some pluses to our districts because while I was passing by, I saw that oh this is really in need, I know it for sure... (Participant #12).

People are not mature in terms of civic awareness. They just try to get only their districts’ (Participant #16).

And there were some districts and committee members from the district teamed up together to get higher scores and more votes:

There are about 10 to 15 people from 1 district, but well, I have received text messages with proposal ID numbers, saying that this this this one are our district's... please take a look again at these ones, yes, from district offices, it is inevitable. Well, I try to be fair, but other committee members also receive those text messages or post-it notes. It might not be ethical, but there are too many proposals to review... so some people just give up reviewing them all and just mark high scores to those proposals (Participant #12).

This could be an unexpected good effect of some adverse effects, but those poor districts united, formed a team to vote for each other. Some might think this is a collusion (Participant #23).

I realized that there were some districts had some kind of agreement among them. I could see that after seeing the results from the first round. But there was nothing we could do about it (Participant #24).

Some committee members were not only voting for their own districts but also voting for other districts when they were asked. And those who formed a team and actively advocated and promoted their proposals are those from the low-income districts. Although some committee members think it is inevitable or even desirable, others found that the intervention of district office makes the process not fair.

While participating in PB, what I felt the most was that the competition among the districts is really intense. I think the evaluation should be done fairly, but as we say that *men are blind in their own causes*, when district officials contact, and I think all the committee members should have received a call from their district office, including me, in fact I think we should fairly evaluate the proposals on our own terms, but in particular, teenager committee members check as they were asked by the public officials. I've seen many cases like that (Participant #26).

The district leaders really care about winning more. If the district does not win many projects, the district heads push hard the budget team members in their organizations. It is easily observed. Making PB as a competition among districts is not desirable (Participant #4).

The participants recognized that this PB process is a competition among the citizens, which is a kind of power game among them. It is worthwhile to note that the participants from the districts in need became an active advocate for their districts.

**Different views on “redistribution.”** Among the committee members, there was no consensus on whether it would be more desirable to *redistribute* resources. Some members thought that it makes more sense to give more projects and funds to those low-income districts:

This might be considered selfish, but I think the city should assign increase the number of assigned committee members from those low-income districts, even 1 or 2 more people. We (our district) desperately need welfare and public health (Participant #22).

Gangnam-gu (one of the high-income districts in Seoul) talks about future. Something like... designing and planning small-space edible gardens... they call it a small city-gardens. But we ...? sidewalk... (our district/one of the low-income districts) We need to fix sidewalk pavements. Here, it is hard to see just a step ahead, but Gangnam-gu already sees what will happen 10 years later (Participant #22).

Others had a different view, emphasizing that equality should be considered:

When we tried to allocate resources, it was not *let's give all at once to this one district* but *let's just help all 25 districts as a whole to spend money effectively on welfare*. But when I saw the results, which districts won, it was different from what we first tried. (Participant #1).

It is a problem that the districts in which the civic organizations are already well organized and active, such as Eunpyeong-gu or Dongdaemun-gu, the resource allocation is unequally distributed towards them. Districts like Jung-gu, they won nothing. They think Gangdong-gu, Gangnam-gu, and Songpa-gu, these districts are really wealthy so they are always the last (Participant #16).

A participant who first strongly stated that he considered the district's overall necessity the most, and related himself very much towards equity and redistribution, later admitted that the criteria could not fit all project themes:

In fact, parks or environments are usually related to facilities and infrastructure. Streams and river... Parks... Well, the equity criterion could have been appropriate and fit well due to the project themes in my committee. It might be different in other thematic committees... When I saw the winning projects, sometimes age group mattered. Youth committee. I saw that the project from Seocho-gu (one of the wealthiest districts in Seoul) was selected, in fact, the problems and challenges for youth maybe the same anywhere. It might be more challenging there, due to the high rents or such circumstances. I thought, in that case, the city's evaluation criteria would make sense. Well, I think the criteria given by the city need to be differently applied depending on the project themes (Participant #25).

He shared the moment when he realized that the city's evaluation form might make sense in some cases, for example when the problem the project attempts to address is related to a certain age group rather than to a specific location. He suggested that the criteria given by the city need to be applied differently according to the project themes.

## Conclusion

This chapter explored what happened *behind the scene*, focusing on how participants actually made decisions. The findings provide us a better understanding of how unintended consequences—redistributive resource allocation—could have happened. First, even though the city has put efforts to balance the participants in terms of their gender, age, and the districts they live in, the actual participation of committee members from low-income districts was more active than those from the high-income districts. Some district offices in the low-income districts provided transportation (small buses) to the meeting venues or called the committee members in their districts to make sure they attend the meetings with the expectation that they will evaluate in favor of the proposals submitted in their districts. According to some committee members, the committee members of the high-income districts often did not attend the meetings.

Second, the committee members evaluated the proposals considering “needs” as the most important criterion. The findings indicate that participants used their own criteria in reviewing and scoring the proposals. Rather than following the eight criteria provided in the evaluation form one by one, the participants revealed that they reviewed and scored the proposals regarding one or two criteria they thought were the most important. The criteria the participants considered were sometimes among the 8 criteria provided (needs, urgency, publicness, effectiveness, accomplishment, subject fit, gender equality, and project cost appropriateness) or their own, such as whether the idea was initiated by a resident not a district office and whether the idea is overlapping with any existing city policies. Almost a half of the committee members participated in the

interview responded that they focused on whether the proposed project is really necessary or the district which the project would be located is in need. In addition, there were also committee members who explicitly expressed their considerations of equity and redistribution.

Third, the low-income districts even teamed up with each other to get higher scores and more votes. Interview participants revealed that there were some low-income districts which formed a team—or a collusion, depending on the perspectives—to vote and score higher for each other. Some might consider it as a game-winning strategy; others might have seen it unfair. Regardless of how the committee members view the team (the collusion) either positively (inevitable) or negatively (unfair), it seems that at least the teamwork achieved its goal since the PB processes distributed more projects and funds toward the poor neighborhoods. This finding suggests an opportunity for future research. It is not surprising that the competition among the districts became intense and the poor districts teamed up because PB can add more funds to the district budget as the implementations of the winning projects are in charge of district offices. But there are many different ways that districts could do “better” in the city-level PB. It would be interesting to see the strategies each individual or organization develop within this context.

In sum, PB allowed people from the low-income districts to have a voice in the budgeting decision-making process, and since they advocated for their neighborhoods actively, compared to those living in the high-income districts, the low-income districts could win more projects and funds than their wealthier counterparts. In addition, even



those committee members not from the low-income districts have considered ‘needs’ as the most important item in the evaluation, which in turn, resulted in evaluating in favor of the proposals submitted from the low-income neighborhoods.

There are at least three limitations of the study. First, this research could only capture those who participated in 2 years of the PB cycle (2015-2016), while the previous chapter concluded the redistributive effect of PB by studying the 4 years of data from 2012 to 2015. To address this limitation, I have a plan of replicating the analysis in the previous study by limiting the study period to 2015 and 2016 to match the data with this study. Second, the findings of the study will be more strengthened if the arguments made by the participants can be complemented with some factual data. For example, although the participants reported that the committee members from the high-income districts tend not to attend the meetings, checking and comparing the actual attendance rate of the committee members in terms of their affiliated districts would be beneficial for the purpose of increasing validity. Third, there are some possibilities of selection bias due to factors beyond my control. Even though the sample of interviewees is relatively well distributed in terms of age, gender, and districts, there were some districts that this study could not capture. Moreover, the participants who accepted to be interviewed might be more politically active than other committee members. It is also possible that they could have accepted to participate in the interview because they are in favor of the city’s participatory approaches such as PB. Since the sampling frame was not available to me due to the privacy protection of the committee members, I had to contact the committee

members by attending the meetings. This means that I could not reach out to the members who have never come to the committee meetings.

Despite these limitations, this study offers important contributions to the fields of public management and participatory governance. First, this study provided empirical evidence for the possible link between civic participation and social justice outcomes. In other words, this research explored how the participants made decisions in the participatory processes and how it resulted in allocating more resources to the poorer neighborhoods than the wealthier counterparts. Second, this research revealed a behind story of what happened among the participants that cannot be observed in other publicly available records. Even if there was some discrepancy between the factual data and what the participants have reported, or even before comparing the factual data with the interview contents, this study itself is still meaningful in terms of understanding how the participants have experienced and perceived the participatory processes. The narratives from the participants will be a good learning material for the practitioners who aims at increasing public participation in their decision-making process to understand how the ordinary citizens make decisions in those participatory processes with regard to making rules and designing the processes.

### **Notes**

1. In this study, I intentionally used the term “our district” in order to reflect the cultural nuance of Korean language. To translate into English accurately, it should be “my district,” but in Korean, the word “our” is used to express the group or the

members of the group. For example, it is “our family,” “our mother,” and “our country” if translate the meaning, not “my family,” “my mother,” and “my country.” It may sound weird to native English speakers, but the language itself considers the fact that there are other members of the group than “me.” The term “our” does not necessarily include the listener(s) in the conversation, which is the case in English, but in Korean, the term “our” includes other group members such as family members and other citizens.

2. The interview protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the Arizona State University (ID: STUDY00004630).

## Chapter 5

### FINDING THE KEY DETERMINANTS OF A DELIBERATIVE PARTICIPATORY PROCESS

Deliberation has been a significant topic for the scholars interested in participatory governance. This significance is because, along with who makes the decision, how the decision is made is critical. Direct participation in decision-making can occur in the absence of any deliberation. In addition, deliberation can be not related to any decision-making. For example, people can vote without any communication process of discussing issues and understanding each other's preferences, and the process of people discussing issues is not always connected to voting. In this regard, participation and deliberation—voting and deliberation—can be considered complementary (Ferejohn, 2008). Some scholars even emphasize that the communication process is more important than the voting procedure (Öberg, 2016), because of its educational impact beyond the communication (Gastil, 2004).

Participatory governance scholars recognize PB as a good exemplar practice which can achieve the goal of promoting deliberative democracy (Hagelskamp, Rinehart, Siliman, & Schleifer, 2016). PB provides a venue for residents not only to gather and discuss where to spend the government money but also to vote for the projects they would like to see implemented. This setting provides the reason why PB can be considered the best example of the combination of direct and deliberative democracy. Scholars have recognized that even though PB provides participants opportunities to deliberate (Ganuza & Francés, 2012), PB needs to be more deliberative than usually

practiced (Hartz-Karp, 2012).

Despite the significance of the topic, there exists a lack of empirical studies which examine the quality of deliberation in how PB is practiced. Not only in the PB setting, but also in a broader context, the most critical reason why there is a lack of empirical studies is due to the fact that there are not many data collected in a practical or suitable way to properly measure deliberation (Thompson, 2008). While many scholars have attempted to examine deliberation through participant surveys (Chambers, 1996; Janssen & Kies, 2005; Ryfe, 2005; Sulkin & Simon, 2001), we still know only a little about how to make a process “deliberative” in PB. The challenge of studying deliberation comes from the fact that deliberation depends mostly on its context, and therefore, more empirical studies which take into account contextual factors of PB are needed.

In this regard, this chapter assesses the quality of deliberation and the conditions of PB meetings. Using the meeting records available in the case of Seoul, South Korea, this study attempts to find the combinations of conditions connected to the deliberative meeting process. The data used in this study consists of meeting records of the 32 PB thematic committee meetings held in 2016 cycle. Fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) is used to analyze the cases and find the possible pathways that show a deliberative meeting. QCA is appropriate because it is a case-based analytical tool developed by adopting a set theory which enables the researcher to explore the conditions for the outcome and identify different causal pathways that lead to a specified outcome (Ragin, 2008). Based on the findings, I provide recommendations for public managers who wish to promote deliberation in their decision-making processes.

## **Literature Review**

Deliberation can be considered a double-edged sword because its effects could be positive and negative depending on how it is managed. Literature suggests that public deliberation could help people clarify, understand, and refine their own preferences and positions on issues (Elster, 1998; Gastil, 2000), distribute information better (Fishkin, 1995; Gambetta, 1998), and redistribute power among people, therefore make more legitimate decisions based on reasons rather than money or power (Cohen, 1989; Fung & Wright, 2003). Even after deliberation, on the other hand, cascades within groups could be polarized (Hamlett & Cobb, 2006) and their views may become more extreme (Schkade, Sunstein, & Hastie, 2010). Therefore, it is important to find how to facilitate deliberation in a participatory decision-making process. In this regard, there would be two approaches studying deliberation: 1) measuring the quality of deliberation and 2) finding determinants that are associated with the deliberative process.

### **Measuring the Quality of Deliberation**

Scholars have been developing several indices to evaluate deliberation quality. The sets of criteria used to code each speech (or comment in online settings) made by individuals vary but several of them can be grouped.

The most basic element of deliberation is communication. Monologue, speaking by oneself, does not offer any benefit to the overall process. In this regard, there should be some degree of reciprocity (Borge & Santamarina, 2015; Graham & Witschge, 2003; Hagemann, 2002; Schneider, 1997), exchange of opinions (Dahlberg, 2001; Wilhelm, 1999), interactivity (Rowe, 2015; Trénel, 2004), and therefore it determines the quality of

discussion (Westholm, 2003). In addition, when a discussion flows to a non-relevant topic, it is obvious that the efforts and time devoted by the participants will be wasted. In this regard, whether each speech is relevant to the topic with the index categories such as *topic* (Rowe, 2015), *topic relevance* (Trénel, 2004), and *relevance/quality* (Coleman, Hall, & Howell, 2002) is important in terms of making a communicative process deliberative.

Moreover, in order to sustain a process deliberative, it is important for the participants to *respect* (Trénel, 2004) each other. The very beginning of the respectful deliberation starts from listening (Wilhelm, 1999), and participants are expected to attempt to understand the argument from the other's perspective (Dahlberg, 2001). In many cases, however, it is difficult to measure how much one's speech or attitude is respectful or not so often this variable is excluded in empirical evaluations. To address this, Steenbergen et al. (2003) and Steiner et al. (2004) have suggested to look at 1) whether there are any negative statements about the groups that are to be helped through the policies/issues, and whether these comments are implicit or explicit; 2) whether counterarguments are ignored/included but degraded/ neutrally included/ or included and valued.

One of the key elements of deliberation is providing reasons to justify one's argument, claim, or opinion. When we see a *rational-critical debate* (Graham & Witschge, 2003), the *quality* (Schneider, 1997; Westholm, 2003) of deliberation is high. *Rationality* (Hagemann, 2002; Wilhelm, 1999) or *justification* (Borge & Santamarina, 2015; Rowe, 2015; Steenbergen et al., 2003; Steiner et al., 2004; Trénel, 2004) is usually

measured by its level – whether there is any justification meaning that the speaker does not present any reasons, there is a simple reasoning provided, or several sophisticated/qualified linkages provided to justify one’s argument. Muhlberger (2000) also considers *universality* of justification which means that the provided reasons must be acceptable to anyone.

The deliberative theory also emphasizes the direction of deliberation. The participants should consider and *reference to the common good* (Trénel, 2004). It starts with having a sense of *empathy* (Borge & Santamarina, 2015) and is related to setting the topic as *conflictual issues* (Muhlberger, 2000) which are considered as a social problem and *public affairs* (Hagemann, 2002). Whether the discussion flows in a way that considers the common good can be found in the *content of justification* (Steenbergen et al., 2003; Steiner et al., 2004). Rather than being in favor of the issue which would benefit a particular individual or group, appeals to the common good either in utilitarian terms or in terms of helping the disadvantaged in society (Steenbergen et al., 2003). Also, Muhlberger (2000) looks at whether there is any explicit discussion on the *relationship* between self and others. This element values discussion of commitments and responsibilities to the community.

According to Cohen (1989), “ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus (Cohen, 1989).” Although reaching a consensus is not an easy task in the real world, at least the participants are expected to at least attempt to find solutions which are acceptable to all (Steenbergen et al., 2003). In this regard, providing *alternatives* (Rowe, 2015) and making suggestions are crucial; in that way, people are



more likely to reach a consensus by discussing different alternatives and finding the best option for all. This element is often called *constructiveness* or *constructive politics* (Steenbergen et al., 2003; Steiner et al., 2004).

Although elements above are mostly about the settings, so that becomes the concern for whoever manages or organizes the process, some scholars consider certain attitudes of the participants as well. For example, participants are expected to show *sincerity* (Borge & Santamarina, 2015; Dahlberg, 2001; Muhlberger, 2000) which means to make a sincere effort to understand all related information fully and actively participate in the process. Everyone participated in the discussion should feel free to express his/her *opinions* (Rowe, 2015; Trénel, 2004). In particular, participants are expected to examine their own preferences and cultural values so that *reflexivity* (Borge & Santamarina, 2015; Dahlberg, 2001; Graham & Witschge, 2003) can be considered as a measurement. In addition, when the participants present their opinions, it is much valued when they share their *personal experience* (Trénel, 2004) as a *narrative* (Rowe, 2015) because personal experience is also a form of information which assists persuasion of others (Burkhalter, Gastil, & Kelshaw, 2002).

Most importantly, however, *Equality* in access to speech (Borge & Santamarina, 2015; Dahlberg, 2001; Muhlberger, 2000; Schneider, 1997; Trénel, 2004) is the minimum requirement for the desired setting for deliberation. In addition, the discussions should not be dominated by few participants. Merely guaranteeing equal opportunity, however, is not enough for a high quality of deliberation. Any participant should feel free to make any speech, so that *openness of discussion* (Hagemann, 2002) and *autonomy*

(Dahlberg, 2001) need to be considered as well. Although named as *participation*, Steenbergen et al. (2003) and Steiner et al. (2004) try to take whether one was disturbed/interrupted by other participants into account. Furthermore, *Inclusion*, the question of who the participants are is also an important element to consider (Dahlberg, 2001; Muhlberger, 2000) in order to guarantee to have diverse perspectives in the discussions. Moreover, Coleman, Hall, & Howell (2002) take *gender balance* into account as well because male often dominates traditional participatory processes.

In this regard, this study focuses on whether few participants dominate discussions in a meeting. This measure takes *Equality* in access to speech (Borge & Santamarina, 2015; Dahlberg, 2001; Muhlberger, 2000; Schneider, 1997; Trénel, 2004), the *openness of discussion* (Hagemann, 2002) and *autonomy* (Dahlberg, 2001) into account. When a meeting is not dominated by few, the meeting can be considered deliberative, as it implies equal access to speech, open discussion, and autonomy.

### **Key Determinants of a Deliberative Process**

Deliberative theorists have specified normative conditions that lead to a deliberative process. Scholars in the fields of political science, communications, sociology, and public policy have widely explored this issue. One thing to note is that the elements discussed above can be categorized into two groups. On the one hand, the setting of the meetings as a pre-condition for deliberation, which includes elements like access to speech, inclusion, diversity of participants and autonomy. On the other hand, the quality and characteristics of speech. For instance, how people discussed on what kinds of issues can be evaluated by looking at the content, tone, and length of speeches. It

is important to distinguish these two aspects because the setting of the meetings could affect the quality and characteristics of speech. Thus, several aspects of the quality of deliberation measurement index also include the process/meeting settings that lead to the deliberative process. Since there is a possibility that institutional design could manipulate the results (Tucker, 2008), it is important to study how to make a better design of the meetings.

First, the role of public managers is significant since they are in charge of initiating, designing, and guiding the deliberative participatory process. Under this category, however, the focus is more on the role the public managers they play in the deliberative process. Roberts (1997) suggests that amongst the four approaches to general management, the managers who take the generative approach and thus would design the participatory process to achieve effectiveness (and efficiency is of minimal interest), can facilitate deliberation. The desirable role of public managers is, therefore, “to provide the public with alternative visions of what is desirable and possible, to stimulate discussion about them, to provoke reexamination of premises and values, and thus to broaden the range of potential responses and deepen society's understanding of itself (Reich, 1990, p. 8).” The process needs to be designed in a way not just aimed to discover what people want but provide a setting where the participants can understand each other’s preferences (including their own), critically think, and revise what they believe (if they feel necessary) (Reich, 1990; Roberts, 1997). In sum, the public manager should not try to direct people to what the goal of the manager him/herself or the organization and/or to intervene much in the process.

Second, as briefly mentioned in the previous section, some elements in the quality of deliberation measures are, in fact, about the institutional settings of the meetings. Those are inclusion (Dahlberg, 2001; Muhlberger, 2000) and diversity of participants (Schneider, 1997). There could be a trade-off, however, between broad participation and meaningful exchange between participants since there is a limitation on the capacity that each meeting can hold in order to guarantee a meaningful opinion exchange and discussion among participants. In addition, the design of the process needs to consider not only the number of participants each meeting will hold, but also the representation of the people as much as possible - gender, age, ethnicity, and geographic distribution (Roberts, 2010). Furthermore, even if equality in access to speech (Borge & Santamarina, 2015; Dahlberg, 2001; Muhlberger, 2000; Schneider, 1997; Trénel, 2004) is considered, the actual discussion might be dominated by a few people in the meeting so that the role of facilitator becomes important in leading and moderating discussions.

Third, the role of facilitators and moderators is also an important factor that determines whether a participatory process is deliberative or not. Public managers, in some cases, might take a role of moderator/facilitator but in most studies and cases public managers and facilitators are distinguished. There are at least three areas which considered challenging and thus the role of facilitation is particularly important: 1) the handling of expertise, 2) the extent and discourse management, and 3) wrapping up the deliberation to a conclusion (Moore, 2012; Ryfe, 2006; Stromer-Galley, 2007). Facilitators in practice tend to place a high value on attaining technical expertise, which is related to the contents of the issues (Chilvers, 2008), and informing participants in the

deliberation is crucial in order to make them all on the same page in terms of understanding the issues.

What Moore (2012) called the processual expertise – promoting good deliberation, however, tend not to appear not as much as the importance of interaction the interviewed facilitators believe in the study of Chilvers (2008). Facilitators are expected to 1) summarize discussion, 2) ask participants who agree or disagree with a certain position and make statements on the results, 3) attempt to bring participants back to focused topic if necessary, 4) intervene when there is a conflict between participants, and 5) invite quiet participants to speak (Stromer-Galley, 2007).

Based on the discussion above, this study considers six meeting conditions: 1) pattern of participation, 2) participation of public managers, 3) the attitude of facilitator, 4) facilitator's gender, and 5) participation of female committee members.

### **The Research Setting**

There are five steps in the Seoul PB process. First, the residents can propose their ideas that could solve problems in their neighborhoods. Secondly, public managers in the city department review the proposals to check the feasibility of the projects. The city officials review the proposals first, but at this stage, city officials only serve to filter whether there are any legal or practical issues involved. The notes are attached to each proposal for the review in the next step. Thirdly, the idea proposals are reviewed, scored, and filtered by the PB thematic committees. Fourthly, ordinary citizens and the PB

committee members cast final votes. Lastly, the city council review and approve the winning projects unless they find one disqualified.

The PB committee members, who review, score, and filter proposals, are also ordinary citizens who volunteer to participate actively. To become a committee member, any resident who 1) has an address, 2) works, or 3) are enrolled in an elementary-, middle-, high-school, college, or university in the city of Seoul may apply. The city government randomly draws 250 people out of those applied people with a consideration of balancing them in terms of gender, age, and location. As a result, the committees are comprised of about 10 members each from 25 districts in Seoul. The members can continue if they wish to, to serve as a committee member for two years in a row in maximum.

The PB committee members are required to review and score each proposal. The members choose, based on their interest, one out of nine PB thematic committees to participate. Each committee elects two committee chairs (one male and one female), and the committee chairs take turns to play a role of facilitator in the meetings. City managers attend the meetings in order to assist the facilitators and provide information if necessary. On average, five to seven managers help the logistics such as setting the meeting venue, adding up the scores from the committee members. In each thematic committee, proposers come to the last meetings to present their project ideas in front of the committee members.

## **Data and Methods**

### **Data**

This study uses 32 stenography meeting records of PB thematic committees held in Seoul, South Korea from May to July 2016. The meeting records of thematic committees are provided by the city government of Seoul and available to the public through the Seoul PB website. In 2016, there were nine thematic committees: transportation and housing, urban safety, culture and tourism, welfare, women's issues and health, job opportunities, youth, teenagers, and environmental issues and parks. Each thematic committee gathered from three to five times in the 2016 PB cycle. In total, there were 33 meetings held from May to July 2016, and there are 32 meeting records available (see Table 5.1). The city government of Seoul started to provide these meeting records since 2016. In this study, the unit of analysis is a meeting.

In each meeting, the city hired stenographers and placed several audio recorders in front of the microphones which participants used during the discussions. Three to four weeks after the meetings, the city government uploaded cleaned meeting records to their website archives. The meeting records, which are stenography of each speech, provide anyone interested in PB a great opportunity to see what kind of issues the participants have discussed, who spoke more than others or not, and how – without having to be present at all meetings in person. The data used in this study, particularly the meeting records, are unique and important because most of the PB initiatives around the world only provides summarized meeting minutes due to many obstacles.

Table 5.1

Available Meeting Records in 2016

	Meetings					Total
	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	5th	
Transportation & housing	O	O	O	O	O	5
Urban safety	O	O	X	X	X	2
Culture & tourism	O	O	O	X	X	3
Welfare	O	O	N/A	O	O	4
Women's issues & health	O	O	O	O	O	5
Job opportunities	O	O	O	O	O	5
Youth	O	O	X	X	X	2
Teenagers	O	O	X	X	X	2
Environment & parks	O	O	O	O	X	4
<b>Total</b>						<b>32</b>

Note: O: meeting held & records available, X: no meeting held, N/A: not available,

Shaded cells: meetings that proposers attended to present their ideas.

## Methods

The analysis uses qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) in order to find the combinations of conditions which lead to the desired outcome—a deliberative meeting, in this case. QCA is a case-based analytical tool identifying different causal pathways that lead to a specified outcome (Ragin, 2008). QCA adopts a set theory which enables the researcher to explore the conditions for the outcome (Ragin, 2008). One of the QCA software programs, *fsQCA*, is used to analyze the data. Among the different types of QCA analyses, this study uses a fuzzy-set QCA (fsQCA) because the distribution of the outcome variable is continuous. The number of case is 32 is sufficient for a proper analysis of fsQCA (Ragin, 2008).



First, the relevant cases are identified and assessed based on the quality of deliberation as discussed below under the section *desired outcome*. In the next phase, the cases are assessed by looking at whether a set of conditions appear in each case. In the literature, there are several conditions which indicate what is necessary for producing good deliberation (see Chambers, 2004, 2005; Steiner, Bächtiger, Spörndli, & Steenbergen, 2004; Thompson, 2008). In this study, equality of resources (i.e., talents, status, and power) in membership and participation, institutional conditions (i.e., the roles of facilitators and city officials, diversity of participants), and patterns of participation (i.e., level of participation by participants, participant behaviors) are considered.

In the next phase, “truth table” is constructed, which is the last stage of QCA analysis process to find the combinations of conditions that lead to the deliberative meetings in this setting. Given the fact that the total number of cases in this study is 32, the frequency threshold is set to 1. Consistency threshold was set as 0.9.

Necessity analysis and sufficiency analysis results will be reported, and therefore the sets of conditions which produces a deliberative meeting will be presented. Two indicators, consistency and coverage, are used for “assessing two distinct aspects of set-theoretic connections” (Ragin, 2008, p. 44). Consistency shows “the degree to which the cases sharing a given combination of conditions agree in displaying the outcome in question” (Ragin, 2008, p. 44). In other words, by looking at consistency, we can see “the degree to which instances of the outcome agree in displaying the causal condition thought to be necessary” (Ragin, 2008, p. 44). Meanwhile, coverage assesses “the degree to which a cause or causal combination “accounts for” instances of an outcome” (Ragin,

2008, p. 44), so that we can examine “the degree to which instances of the condition are paired with instances of the outcome” (Ragin, 2008, p. 45).

### **Desired Outcome: Identifying a Deliberative Meeting**

The basic features of deliberation include ensuring participants have equal opportunities to join the discussion and participants engage fully in the discussion. The meeting is considered less deliberative if the fewer participants dominate the discussion (see Appendix F for the distributions of speeches by participants in each meeting). This study measures the deliberativeness by calculating the variability of the participants’ speeches in each meeting by using the relative standard deviation (RSD) or coefficient of variation (CV). First, the number of speeches each participant spoke along with the total number of speeches in each meeting are counted. Secondly, RSD—standard deviation divided by mean—is calculated for each meeting. After this stage, the numbers are converted in order to fit the requirements of the QCA method, setting the maximum value as 1. Since the higher relative standard deviation indicates that the data points are spread out over a wider range of values in relation to the mean, it is considered that the higher RSD represents the more distributed participation. A deliberative meeting will be coded as 1, and a non-deliberative meeting will be coded as 0, others in between based on its relative scores of the RSD.

### **Conditions**

**The pattern of participation.** In order to measure how many participants joined the discussions, the number of speakers is divided by the number of attended members

(PP). If full participation is achieved, then the meeting is coded as 1. This participation does not include idea proposers, public managers, and facilitators.

**Public managers.** The extent of public managers' dominance in each meeting is measured by looking at the number of speeches made by public managers divided by the total number of speeches in the meeting (PM).

**Participation of facilitators.** Similar to public manager's dominance, the extent of facilitators' dominance in each meeting is measured by taking the number of speeches made by facilitators divided by the total number of speeches in the meeting (PF).

**Authoritative facilitator.** In each meeting, the facilitator's speeches are examined, and the meeting is coded as 1 if the facilitator 1) did not allow the committee members to ask questions to the proposers, 2) cut off discussions, or 3) did not allow the participants to exchange opinions (AF).

**Facilitator's gender.** Gender of the facilitator is coded as binary, coded as 1 otherwise 0 if the facilitator of the meeting is a female. There were 15 meetings which had a female facilitator (FF).

**Participation of female committee members.** There are two indicators used to take the participation of female committee members into the consideration: 1) the number of female speakers divided by the number of speakers in the meeting (FP1), and 2) the number of speeches made by female speakers divided by the total number of speeches in the meeting (FP2).

## Findings and Discussions

### Quality of Deliberation and Conditions of the Meetings

The 32 meetings vary in terms of its quality of deliberation and seven conditions considered (see Table 5.2).

*Table 5.2*

*The Dataset for the Meetings and its Conditions*

id	RSD	DV	PP	PM	PF	AF	FF	FP1	FP2
ct1	1.232	0.612	0.875	0.256	0.225	0	0	0.5	0.275
ct2	0.973	0.484	0.75	0.233	0.137	0	1	0.467	0.28
ct3	1.589	0.789	0.563	0.031	0.377	0	0	0.444	0.096
ep1	1.323	0.657	0.714	0.254	0.238	1	1	0.267	0.06
ep2	1.273	0.632	0.895	0.141	0.251	1	0	0.412	0.261
ep3	1.338	0.665	0.2	0.086	0.554	1	1	0	0
ep4	1.014	0.504	0.067	0.114	0.591	0	0	1	0.011
jo1	1.335	0.663	0.36	0.126	0.273	0	0	0.444	0.211
jo2	1.163	0.578	0.273	0.304	0.391	1	1	0.333	0.058
jo3	1.046	0.519	0.5	0.268	0.244	1	1	0.2	0.15
jo4	1.748	0.868	0.389	0.077	0.533	1	1	0.143	0.016
jo5	1.037	0.515	0	0.009	0.697	1	0	0	0
t1	1.026	0.51	0.077	0.595	0.286	0	1	1	0.012
t2	1.157	0.575	0.308	0.017	0.258	0	0	0.75	0.27

th1	1.787	0.888	0.762	0.201	0.394	0	0	0.625	0.249
th2	1.438	0.714	1	0.183	0.337	0	0	0.467	0.291
th3	1.578	0.784	0.737	0.172	0.382	0	1	0.571	0.116
th4	1.835	0.912	0.579	0.01	0.394	0	1	0.364	0.038
th5	1.682	0.836	0.474	0.041	0.453	0	0	0.333	0.033
us1	1.008	0.5	0.409	0.188	0.251	1	1	0.444	0.419
us2	1.735	0.862	0.381	0.094	0.505	0	0	0.5	0.084
w1	1.403	0.697	0.667	0.192	0.359	1	0	0.5	0.24
w2	1.146	0.569	0.579	0.218	0.244	0	1	0.545	0.309
w4	2.013	1	0.867	0.003	0.42	0	1	0.385	0.029
w5	1.174	0.583	0.267	0.021	0.326	0	0	0.5	0.322
wh1	1.296	0.644	0.875	0.179	0.293	0	1	0.714	0.299
wh2	1.478	0.734	0.706	0.211	0.368	0	0	0.667	0.351
wh3	1.429	0.710	0.545	0.025	0.445	0	0	0.667	0.17
wh4	1.605	0.797	0.833	0.026	0.386	0	0	0.6	0.174
wh5	1.639	0.814	0.273	0.006	0.678	0	1	0.333	0.006
y1	1.399	0.695	0.882	0.126	0.309	0	1	0.333	0.145
y2	1.835	0.911	0.857	0.044	0.385	0	0	0.333	0.102

Note. ct: culture & tourism, ep: environment & parks, jo: job opportunities, t: teenagers, th: transportation & housing, us: urban safety, w: welfare, wh: women & health, y: youth, RSD: Relative standard deviation, DV: converted relative standard deviation (RSD 2.013 = 1), PP: participation, PM: participation of public managers, PF: participation of

facilitators, AF: 1 = authoritative facilitator, FF: 1 = female facilitator, FP1: participation of female participants (participants), and FP2: participation of female participants (speeches)

First, when comparing the relative deliberativeness of each meeting, there is a comparatively wide range of distribution. When comparing the converted value of the deliberativeness, the minimum value was 0.484. This was the only value to fall below 0.5. All the other 31 meetings ranged between 0.5 and 1. The mean of the values was .694, and the median was .68. These marginally elevated values indicate PB meetings were slightly “deliberative,” meaning that overall participation in each meeting was comparatively well distributed—not dominated by few participants.

Second, participation (PP), which is measured by the number of participants who spoke out relative to the number of attended members, appears to be widely ranged (mean: .55, std. dev.: .28). Interestingly, there were four meetings which none of the participants except facilitators or public managers speak at all. This happened in the later meetings where proposers came to present their ideas and when the facilitators did not allow the committee members to ask questions to the proposers. The variation came from this aspect, whether the facilitator in the meeting allowed questions and answers among proposers and committee members.

Third, public managers’ participation (PM) also varied in meetings. In each meeting, five to seven public managers attend the meeting to assist in logistics of the meeting and answer to questions if there are any. The percentage of the speeches made by

public managers in each meeting ranged from 3% to 59.5%. On average, public managers made about 14% of the speeches in meetings but dominated the discussion in the teenager committee (t1).

Fourth, facilitators tend neither to dominate the discussions nor authoritative. There were, however, about 28% of the meetings which the facilitator behaved authoritative (AF). The facilitators in job opportunity committee and environment and park committee tend not to allow discussions among committee members, cut off discussions, or discourage committee members from asking questions to idea proposers. Since the committees were required to elect two committee chairs (one male and one female) and the committee chairs take turns to take a role of facilitator, the gender of facilitators (FF) in the meetings was quite balanced—about 47% of the meetings had a female facilitator.

Fifth, female participants' participation (FP1 and FP2) also varied in meetings. It is worthwhile to note that, however, even though the number of speakers was quite balanced in terms of gender (FP1), the percentage of the speeches made by female participants tend to be lower than that of their male counterparts (FP2). There were no meetings which went over 50% of the percentage of speeches made by female participants.

### **QCA Analysis**

fsQCA allows the researchers to examine the multiple combinations of the conditions for the outcome (Ragin, 2008). In this case, the desired outcome is a deliberative meeting, and seven different conditions are assessed in terms of whether any

of the conditions lead to the presence of the desired outcome. Table 5.3 presents the truth table—remainders (which are the conditions logically possible but lacking empirical instances in this case) are omitted in the table. The key feature of the QCA method is a set-theoretic approach. This means that, when interpreting the results, we need to remember that 0 and 1 each represent presence and absence. For example, a deliberative meeting is considered 1, and therefore, 0 indicates a meeting is not deliberative at all.

**Necessity Analysis.** The results of the necessity analysis suggest that there are three necessary causes to a deliberative meeting (“~” represents “not”). The consistency threshold was set by 0.90 and coverage threshold was set by 0.80.

- 1) DV: ~FP2 (consistency: 0.99, coverage: 0.82)
- 2) DV: PP *or* ~FP1 *or* ~PF (consistency: 0.92, coverage: 0.84)
- 3) DV: PP *or* PM *or* PF *or* ~FP1(consistency: 0.90, coverage: 0.87)<sup>1</sup>

The first condition suggests that it is necessary to have weak membership in female participation in terms of the number of speeches. The second condition suggests that it is necessary to have either strong membership in overall participation, or weak membership in female participation in terms of the number of participants, or weak membership in facilitator’s participation. The third condition suggests that it is necessary to have either strong membership in overall participation, or public managers’ participation or facilitator’s participation, or weak membership in female participation in terms of the number of participants. Overall, the solution consistency was 0.89 and coverage was 0.90.



Table 5.3

Truth Table for the Meetings and its Conditions

	PP	PM	PF	AF	FF	FP1	FP2	obs	consist	cases
1	1	0	0	1	1	0	0	1	0.98	ep1
2	1	0	0	1	0	0	0	1	1	ep2
3	1	0	0	0	1	1	0	3	0.98	th3, w2, wh1
4	1	0	0	0	1	0	0	4	0.99	ct2, th4, w4, y1
5	1	0	0	0	0	1	0	4	1	th1, wh2, wh3, wh4
6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	3	1	ct3, th2, y2
7	0	1	0	0	1	1	0	1	0.94	t1
8	0	0	1	1	1	0	0	2	1	ep3, jo4
9	0	0	1	0	1	0	0	1	1	wh5
10	0	0	1	0	0	1	0	1	0.98	ep4
11	0	0	0	1	1	0	0	2	0.97	jo2, us1
12	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1	0.98	t2
13	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	2	1	jo1, th5

**Sufficiency Analysis.** Sufficiency analysis allows us to find the combinations of conditions as “solutions.” Among the three solutions, the parsimonious solutions can be understood as fundamentally explanatory conditions of the solution (Rubinson, 2016). The parsimonious solutions in this model indicate three paths to a deliberative meeting.

- 1) DV =  $\sim$ PM and  $\sim$ AF (consistency: 0.82, coverage: 0.74)
- 2) DV =  $\sim$ PM and  $\sim$ PF (consistency: 0.91, coverage: 0.80)
- 3) DV = FF and  $\sim$ PM (consistency: 0.82, coverage: 0.45)

The first condition suggests that the meetings are deliberative when the public managers are not dominating the discussion, and the facilitators are not authoritative. The second condition indicates that the meetings are deliberative when both the public

managers and facilitators are not dominating the discussion. Moreover, the third condition suggests that the meetings are deliberative when there is a female facilitator, and the public managers are not dominating the discussion. Overall, solution consistency is 0.82 and solution coverage is 0.98.

It is worthwhile to note that some conditions are appeared necessary but not sufficient for the desired outcome or vice versa. The findings indicate that different conditions affect the necessity and sufficiency of deliberative meeting differently. First, strong membership in participation and weak membership in female participation appeared as necessary conditions. This means that the meetings need to have most of the participants speak rather than having most of them remaining silent and the discussion should not be dominated by a certain gender. In contrast, the condition of public managers not dominating the discussion is always a part of sufficient conditions. In other words, this suggests that it is important for public managers to leave the participants to discuss in the meetings, rather than intervening.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter examined the quality of deliberation and the conditions of 32 PB thematic committee meetings in Seoul, South Korea. Employing fsQCA method, the study examined the combinations of conditions that lead to a deliberative participatory process. The findings suggest that there are three pathways to a deliberative meeting. The meetings can be deliberative 1) when public managers are not dominating the discussion and the facilitators are not being authoritative, 2) when both the public managers and

facilitators are not dominating the discussion, or 3) when there is a female facilitator and the public managers are not dominating the discussion.

There are at least three limitations in this study. First, the degree of deliberativeness is relatively measured. Among the 32 meetings, the meeting with the maximum RSD was considered as the full membership (1) of a deliberative meeting. It is important to note that the overall quality of deliberation in the PB meetings of this case might be higher or lower than other cases of PB. The focus of this study was comparing the meetings with a variety of different settings within the same PB process. It would be interesting to compare different PB processes or cases to find out whether the solutions—the combinations of conditions—can be still applicable. Second, this study tested the quality of deliberation based on the variability of the distribution of the speeches and the speakers. Although there are many ways of measuring deliberation as discussed in the literature review section, this study focused on whether the discussions are dominated by few participants due to the limitation of the data. Third, there are no data available on the individual attendance throughout the meetings. Due to this fact, those who remained silent could not be distinguished with those who did not attend the meetings when measuring the patterns of participation. This is the reason why the analysis measured the patterns of participation based on the number of speakers relative to the number of attendees, not taking the number of people who remained silent into account.

Despite these limitations, this study makes important contributions to the academic field and to those public managers who are interested in promoting deliberation in their decision-making process. First, when examining deliberation, this study

distinguished pre-conditions for deliberation and the quality and characteristics of speeches. In the literature, these elements were often mixed with the factors that affect the quality of deliberation, but they need to be distinguished because one can become a cause for the other. Second, this study developed a tool to measure a deliberative meeting, which is using a relative standard deviation to compare the extent of speech domination of each meeting. Since each meeting varies in the number of participants, the number of speeches made by each participant and the total number of speeches using RSD measures are useful for a valid comparison. Third, it is important to understand the necessary and sufficient conditions for a deliberative meeting. It is necessary to give all participants equal opportunity to speak out and balance the discussions in terms of gender. Necessary conditions, however, do not guarantee that a meeting will be deliberative. For this, good facilitation is required. Neither public managers nor facilitators should dominate the discussions.

## Chapter 6

### CONCLUSION

This dissertation research examines whether participatory budgeting (PB) processes, as a case of participatory governance and an innovative solution to local governance, promote inclusive and deliberative government decision-making and social justice outcomes. Each chapter answers one of the research questions below:

1. What are the issues that arise when implementing legally mandated PB?
2. Does PB redistribute resources even without explicit equity principles?
3. According to PB participants, what makes PB redistributive?
4. How deliberative are the PB processes? What are the key determinants of a deliberative meeting?

The first study introduced the case, PB in the city of Seoul, South Korea, by reviewing the history of PB and the literature on PB in South Korea. It was a timely review since it has been about fifteen years since the first PB experiment in South Korea, and six years after the mandate. The chapter discussed three issues that arise when implementing legally mandated PB in Seoul. First, the issues regarding the current government-led process were discussed. In order to make the process more participatory, the government needs to consider whether it could hand over the authority of managing the process to the PB general committee. The government could be involved in the process as one of the participating institutions, together with other civil society organizations. Second, I pointed out the matter of defining participants. Although the current national law defines residents as persons who have a domicile in the area, PB

sometimes more broadly defines residents to include those who work within the area. It is noteworthy that the consideration of traditionally neglected groups such as youth and minorities is not included in the current mandate. Third, the scope of the mandate was discussed. The current mandate only requires each local government unit to include the public in the budget formation process. In other words, the decisions made through PB are not legally binding.

The second study examined whether inclusive PB processes redistribute financial resources even without the presence of explicit equity criteria. This study employed multi-level mixed-effects analysis to account for both project-level and district-level determinants with the assumption of the nested structure of the relationship between projects and districts. Using the last four years (2012-2016) of resource allocation data in Seoul PB, the findings indicated that a poorer district has a higher probability of winning a project and is rewarded more funds compared to its wealthier counterparts. These results suggest that even without explicit criteria on equity in the PB process in Seoul, the funding allocations have redistributed resources to the poor. In addition, inclusiveness, which was measured by the types of PB committees required to be installed for each district, is another important factor that explains the probability of being selected in the final stage for a project and the amount of funds allocated to a district. It was interesting to note that the relationship of inclusiveness and PB funding allocation was not simply linear. Type C districts that are required to install both thematic and regional sub-committees in addition to a general PB committee showed no statistical difference from type A districts. This finding might imply that there is a certain threshold before which

the extent of inclusiveness positively leads to more projects and funds. Moreover, the difference in the amount of funds between the types of PB committee appeared greater within the district with the highest level of average income than that of the districts with the lowest level of average income. Simply put, the wealthiest districts benefit more than the poorest district from installing one more sub-committee in addition to a general committee (changing from type A committee to type B committee).

The third chapter explored the possible reasons behind the redistributive effects of PB, using interview data from 28 PB participants collected in 2016. The findings provide us a better understanding of how unintended consequences—redistributive resource allocation—could have happened. The PB process could have been redistributive because PB provided a good opportunity for those people living in the comparatively poor neighborhood to participate in the government decision-making process. Even though the city has put efforts to balance the participants in terms of their gender, age, and the districts they live in, the actual participation of committee members from low-income districts was more active than those from the high-income districts. Some district offices in the low-income districts provided transportation to the meeting venues or called the committee members in their districts to encourage them to attend the meetings. In addition, when scoring proposals, the participants considered ‘needs’ and ‘urgency’ as the most important criteria. Rather than following the criteria provided in the evaluation form, the participants revealed that they reviewed and scored the proposals regarding one or two criteria they thought were the most important. Furthermore, the low-income districts teamed up with each other to get higher scores and more votes. Interview

participants revealed that there were some low-income districts which formed a team—or a collusion, depending on the perspectives—to vote and score higher for each other. The teamwork worked since the poor neighborhoods received more projects and funds in the PB process. This chapter provided some possible reasons that PB was redistributive based on the participants' responses. Future studies could take these reasons into considerations when examining the redistributive effect of PB.

The last chapter examined the quality of deliberation and the conditions of 32 PB meetings in order to find the combinations of conditions that lead to a deliberative participatory process, employing a fuzzy-set QCA. When examining deliberation, this study distinguished pre-conditions for deliberation and the quality and characteristics of speeches. In the literature, these elements were often mixed with the factors that affect the quality of deliberation, but needs to be distinguished because one can become a cause for the other. In addition, this study developed a quantified measure of a deliberative meeting using a relative standard deviation to compare the extent of speech domination of each meeting. Since each meeting varies in its number of participants, the number of speeches made by each participant, the total number of speeches, using RSD measures are useful for a valid comparison. The results of the QCA analysis revealed necessary conditions and sufficient conditions that are connected to a deliberative meeting. It is considered necessary to give all participants equal opportunities to speak out and balance the discussions in terms of gender. Necessary conditions, however, does not guarantee that a meeting will be deliberative. The sufficiency analysis suggests that there are three pathways to a deliberative meeting. The meetings can be deliberative 1) when public



managers are not dominating the discussion and the facilitators are not being authoritative, 2) when both the public managers and facilitators are not dominating the discussion, or 3) when there is a female facilitator and the public managers are not dominating the discussion.

This dissertation contributes to the field of public management, and in particular, participatory governance by 1) providing a review of the literature on PB in South Korea, 2) presenting empirical evidence showing that the redistributive effect of PB is possible even without explicit equity criteria, and 3) analyzing the set of meeting conditions contributed to the quality of deliberation in the context of PB using the empirical data. PB has often been criticized that it became a tool for the government to maintain the status quo of the participation through cooptation of actors. It is important to note that, however, the findings of this dissertation suggest that PB provides an opportunity to those population groups that have been neglected in the traditional government decision-making to actually participate and thus help the government achieve social justice by redistributing resources. In addition, the findings suggest that depending on how the public managers and facilitators manage the process, the PB meetings can be deliberative, which may become a factor that derives redistribution by helping people to make decisions based on the reasons, not money or power. In sum, this dissertation adds empirical evidence to the theoretical argument that public participation produces decisions that well reflect residents' preferences and it is possible to balance direct and deliberative governance.

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
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APPENDIX A

THE PROCEDURE OF PARTICIPATORY BUDGETING IN SEOUL







Source: Seoul PB (2015b)

APPENDIX B


DISTRIBUTION OF THE AMOUNT OF FUNDS



APPENDIX C

DISTRIBUTION OF THE AMOUNT OF FUNDS, NOT INCLUDING THE

PROJECTS NOT SELECTED (LOGGED)



APPENDIX D

CHARACTERISTICS OF 25 DISTRICTS IN SEOUL


	# of Households	Area (km <sup>2</sup> )	Population	Expenditure Budget (USD thousands, 2008)	Expenditure Budget per Capita (USD, 2008)
Jung-gu	61,546	9.96	140,807	295.36	2097.62
Gangnam-gu	230,755	39.5	569,997	511.81	1498.47
Mapo-gu	166,722	23.84	393,576	228.24	1473.83
Dongdaemun-gu	157,650	14.2	375,683	300.02	1216.32
Dongjak-gu	169,293	16.35	416,268	259.63	914.68
Jungnang-gu	174,313	18.5	423,655	300.76	897.92
Geumcheon-gu	104,357	13	260,734	223.12	855.74
Youngdeungpo-gu	167,685	24.55	426,876	299.68	814.85
Gangdong-gu	187,490	24.59	492,728	265.22	798.60
Yangcheon-gu	181,135	17.4	500,533	376.80	752.80
Guro-gu	171,498	20.12	454,478	320.11	709.92
Gangseo-gu	223,708	41.43	573,794	291.20	704.35
Dobong-gu	138,036	20.7	364,454	247.27	702.03
Gangbuk-gu	142,150	23.6	346,493	316.93	678.47
Gwanak-gu	247,598	29.57	540,520	302.13	631.84
Seocho-gu	168,878	47	439,998	244.64	623.71
Songpa-gu	257,852	33.88	680,150	293.59	601.58
Yongsan-gu	110,706	21.87	255,294	382.55	579.91
Gwangjin-gu	158,534	17.06	384,269	231.17	558.96
Seodaemun-gu	135,104	17.61	324,733	394.98	556.00
Seongdong-gu	125,848	16.85	306,868	250.05	555.50
Jongno-gu	75,659	23.91	173,148	255.19	538.27
Nowon-gu	222,959	35.44	600,829	333.76	507.50
Eunpyeong-gu	200,502	29.7	505,902	319.65	490.77
Seongbuk-gu	197,992	24.57	490,639	240.79	431.65



Source: Seoul Statistics (2015) and the City Government of Seoul (2015)

APPENDIX E

DISTRIBUTIONS OF SPEECHES BY EACH MEETING







APPENDIX F  
IRB APPROVAL DOCUMENT



APPROVAL: EXPEDITED REVIEW

Daniel Schugurensky  
Public Affairs, School of  
-  
dschugur@asu.edu

Dear Daniel Schugurensky:

On 7/25/2016 the ASU IRB reviewed the following protocol:

Type of Review:	Initial Study
Title:	Understanding the dynamics behind the redistributive funding allocations of participatory budgeting (PB)
Investigator:	Daniel Schugurensky
IRB ID:	STUDY00004630
Category of review:	(6) Voice, video, digital, or image recordings, (7)(b) Social science methods, (7)(a) Behavioral research
Funding:	None
Grant Title:	None
Grant ID:	None
Documents Reviewed:	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• HRP-502c - survey CONSENT DOCUMENT -SHORT FORM.docx, Category: Consent Form;</li> <li>• Seoul_PB_Survey questions_final.docx, Category: Measures (Survey questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus group questions);</li> <li>• Parental-Consent.doc, Category: Consent Form;</li> <li>• Parental-Consent_Korean.docx, Category: Translations;</li> <li>• Seoul_PB_Interview questions_final.docx, Category: Measures (Survey questions/Interview questions /interview guides/focus group questions);</li> <li>• recruitment script.doc, Category: Recruitment Materials;</li> <li>• HRP-502c - interview CONSENT DOCUMENT -SHORT FORM.docx, Category: Consent Form;</li> <li>• Child-Assent-Forms_Korean.docx, Category: Translations;</li> <li>• Survey-Consent_Korean.docx, Category: Translations;</li> <li>• Translation certification form.pdf, Category: Translations;</li> <li>• HRP-503a-Seoul PB_protocol.docx, Category: IRB Protocol;</li> <li>• Seoul_PB_Interview questions_Korean.docx, Category: Translations;</li> <li>• recruitment script_Korean.docx, Category: Translations;</li> <li>• Seoul_PB_Survey questions_Korean.docx, Category: Translations;</li> <li>• Child-Assent-Forms.doc, Category: Consent Form;</li> <li>• Interview-Consent_Korean.docx, Category: Translations;</li> </ul>

The IRB approved the protocol from 7/25/2016 to 7/24/2017 inclusive. Three weeks before 7/24/2017 you are to submit a completed Continuing Review application and required attachments to request continuing approval or closure.

If continuing review approval is not granted before the expiration date of 7/24/2017 approval of this protocol expires on that date. When consent is appropriate, you must use final, watermarked versions available under the “Documents” tab in ERA-IRB.

In conducting this protocol you are required to follow the requirements listed in the INVESTIGATOR MANUAL (HRP-103).

Sincerely,

IRB Administrator

cc: Won No