

Web password recovery — a necessary evil?

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Abstract. Web password recovery, enabling a user who forgets their password to re-establish a shared secret with a website, is very widely implemented. However, use of such a fall-back system brings with it additional vulnerabilities to user authentication. This paper provides a framework within which such systems can be analysed systematically, and uses this to help gain a better understanding of how such systems are best implemented. To this end, a model for web password recovery is given, and existing techniques are documented and analysed within the context of this model. This leads naturally to a set of recommendations governing how such systems should be implemented to maximise security. A range of issues for further research are also highlighted.

Keywords: User authentication, passwords, password recovery, security questions, email/text-based password recovery

1 Introduction

Despite their widely-documented limitations, passwords remain very widely used for user authentication. However, although passwords are meant to be memorized, humans often forget or mislay them. In some contexts this is easily managed; for example, in an office environment, a user who forgets their password for access to a multi-user system can simply see a system administrator, who authenticates them and issues a new password. However, for web authentication, the main focus of this paper, it is clearly not so simple; we refer to the process of re-establishing a password in this case as *web password recovery*.

Most websites requiring users to create an account support password recovery, enabling legitimate users who forget their password to continue to use the website. This can be achieved in many ways, including use of a pre-registered email address or mobile phone number, and/or involving other pre-set fall-back means of authentication. However, many of these techniques introduce vulnerabilities which may enable an impostor to falsely change a password, either causing a denial of service or, in the worst case, enabling the impostor to authenticate as the user. In this paper, we analyze these issues by first introducing a general model for password recovery, and then examining various existing password recovery options within the context of this model. We also use the model to look at ways of improving the security and/or usability of password recovery.

The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we review prior art on password recovery, noting that much of the existing work on password recovery does not match the scope of this paper. This is followed in section 3 by a general model for web password recovery, intended to capture the commonly used approaches. Section 4 then reviews the various ways in which password recovery is performed in practice, within the context of the model. This then enables us in section 5 to provide a systematic assessment of the security strengths and weaknesses of existing approaches, along with potential usability issues. In section 6 we use the results of this assessment to provide a series of recommendations on the design of password recovery systems. Section 7 concludes the paper, including a discussion of possible directions for further research.

2 Prior Art

Many authors have looked at web password recovery, mostly focussing on particular classes of recovery system or the shortcomings of widely used approaches.

- Several authors have looked at ways to securely store backup copies of passwords on a client device; this is outside the scope of password recovery as we define it, since the web service itself is not involved. We briefly mention two papers of this type. Ellison et al. [5] describe how a locally stored copy of a password can be held in encrypted form, protected using answers to personal questions; the encryption key is derived from these questions in such a way that correct answers to k of n questions enables it to be reconstructed, allowing the user to forget some of the answers. Somewhat analogously, Frykholm and Juels [6] propose a provably secure technique for fault-tolerant password recovery; a secret password is stored protected by a collection of low entropy secrets, such that recovery is possible with only a subset of these secrets. This again enables the user to maintain secured backup copies of passwords, and hence, like the Ellison et al. scheme, it is outside the scope of this paper.
- Chmielewski et al. [4] focus on what they call client-server password recovery. They propose a series of protocols that allow a user to automatically recover a password from a server using partial knowledge of the password, and prove their security in a formal model. This can be regarded as a contribution to theoretical cryptography, rather than as a practical solution to the everyday problem of web password recovery.
- Mannan et al. [15] propose a scheme for password recovery rather different from many commonly used approaches. They propose that websites maintain copies of user passwords encrypted under a public key for which the user holds the private key on a personal mobile device (PMD). When the user invokes the recovery service, the website sends the encrypted copy to the user, who uses his/her her PMD to decrypt it.
- Kharudin et al. [13] describe a graphical user authentication method and propose its use for password recovery. However, the main focus is on the authentication technique rather than on the password recovery process.

All the prior art we have so far described, whilst relating to password recovery, falls outside our scope here, since the proposals are either independent of the web server or require major changes in how clients and servers interact. However, as we describe next, some authors have addressed the problem we consider here.

- A recent study by Stavova et al. [19] examines the usability of two password recovery techniques, namely backup codes and the use of trusted associates (social authentication). They examined a particular scheme where the backup value is stored as a QR code, to address the issue of backup codes being forgotten and/or written in clear text. They also considered a case where the account holder and a trusted associate can each retrieve a password share from a call centre, where the shares must be combined to obtain the password.
- Guri et al. [9] point out how details revealed during password recovery can be used to learn potentially sensitive personal user information.
- A number of authors have examined the security of challenge questions, a secondary means of user authentication widely used in real-world password recovery (see section 4.1). In 2008, Rabkin [17] examined leaks of answers to these questions via social media. In the following year, Just et al. [11] performed extensive surveys of user behaviour to analyse the relative security offered by various questions. In parallel work, also published in 2009, Schechter et al. [18] looked at the security properties of security questions as a secondary means of user authentication in the context of password recovery. In 2015, Bonneau et al. [2] conducted a study using a real-world data set to examine the security and memorability of security questions. A yet more recent study by Gelernter et al. [7] describes a possible man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack on password recovery by using the registration process for a malicious MitM website to gather the information needed (e.g. answers to personal questions) to conduct recovery for a different website.

3 A General Model

We now present a general model for a password recovery system. It provides a framework within which we can examine the security of various options for the recovery process. As discussed above, password recovery is a process which enables users to re-establish a password for a website account. Sometimes referred to as *password reset*¹, password recovery is typically performed when a user forgets the password for a website. There are a variety of ways in which password recovery can be performed, some more secure than others, and the general model is intended to capture all the means of password recovery in current use.

3.1 Constituent Processes

A password recovery process typically involves three sub-processes, namely:

¹ We avoid this terminology since it implies changing the existing password, and not all password recovery schemes involve such a change.

- **registration**, in which user-specific information to be used during password recovery is captured by the website,
- **password setup**, in which the user chooses and sends the website a new password for that site, and
- **recovery**, where the user interacts with the website with the goal of re-establishing a shared secret password.

Typically, the first of these will be performed just once, the second will be performed infrequently, and the third will be performed whenever necessary. These three sub-processes are next examined in greater detail.

3.2 Registration

In establishing an account with the website, a user typically sets up a user name and password, as well as other information for use in the recovery process. This information is used to ensure the security of the recovery process, i.e. to help prevent an unauthorized party from changing the password to cause a denial of service, or, even worse, obtaining a valid password for the account. Existing categories of information of this type are examined in section 4.1.

3.3 Password Setup

We assume the website uses a password to authenticate the user, and so both initially (probably as part of registration) and whenever the user wishes to change it, the user will need to supply the website with a password. Other information, e.g. a ‘password hint’, may be collected at the same time. Further examples of information that might be gathered in this stage are given in section 4.2.

3.4 Recovery

Password recovery is typically invoked by a user when he/she forgets the password for a website. Such a process typically has three stages, as follows.

1. **Recovery request.** This involves the user signalling to the website to request password recovery. The website will typically provide a means for this to occur, e.g. a special button.
2. **Request validation.** The website checks that the request is valid. A website may perform user authentication at this stage, obviously using a means other than the password, although by no means all websites do this. The website may also attempt to verify that the request originates from a human rather than a bot, e.g. using a CAPTCHA [1].
3. **Password re-establishment.** At the conclusion of this stage, if successful, the user is equipped with a valid password for the website. There are two main implementation approaches.

- The password recovery system can help the user remember (recover) his/her password; this will typically involve the system keeping a copy of every user password, and password recovery will involve reminding the user what it is (typically after he/she has been authenticated).
- The password recovery system can help the user set up a new password, often referred to as *password reset*. This may involve the system giving the user a temporary password, which the user must change at first use.

Regardless of the particular implementation approach, the recovery process will typically involve using a secure communications channel to the user, e.g. based on a previously registered email address or phone number. Examples of how each of these steps might be executed are provided in sections 4.3 and 4.4.

4 Model Components

We next examine how the model components can be instantiated. The various options introduced here are critically analyzed later in the paper.

4.1 Registration

Registration for the password recovery is typically implemented as part of a general registration process, in which the user establishes a new account (known as *registering* or *signing up*). As well as gathering information, it may also involve security-related steps, e.g. solving a CAPTCHA to prevent automated user account harvesting. It often involves collecting a wide range of information, including matters not relevant to password recovery (e.g. payment information); we focus only on information related to password recovery. Such information can be divided into two main categories:

- *personal information*, i.e. information about the individual that may be used for a range of purposes apart from password recovery;
- *recovery information*, i.e. information used only for password recovery.

A website will also typically require the user to choose a unique user name (or give an email address to function as a user name) as well as a password; these two pieces of information are obviously key to password recovery, although given their special status we do not include them in this classification. We next look at examples of widely used information types of both categories.

Personal information The following are examples of the types of personal information that may be gathered during registration and subsequently used for password recovery. In each case, examples of websites are given which use the type of information specified in a password recovery process.

- name (first name, last name), e.g. as gathered by Instagram²;

² <https://goo.gl/sG4wDv>, accessed: 09/04/2018

- gender, e.g. as collected by Facebook³;
- birth date (day, month, year), e.g. as gathered by Google Mail⁴;
- street address (street name, city, country), e.g. as used by Microsoft email⁵;
- email address, e.g. as collected by Amazon⁶;
- phone number (e.g. mobile number), e.g. as gathered by Twitter⁷.

Recovery information The types of information established purely for password recovery purposes vary widely, depending on the detailed operation of the recovery process. We can identify the following general categories.

- **Recovery authentication information**, i.e. information that can be used to authenticate the user. Examples include the following.
 - **Answers to security questions**: the website may give a list of security questions (also known as *personal knowledge* or *challenge* questions), for a user-selectable subset of which the user must provide answers. These questions cover topics which the user can easily remember since they relate to the user’s personal life, e.g. school name, mother’s maiden name, pet name, memorable street address, birthplace, favorite colour, etc. Examples of websites that request answers to security questions during registration include Apple and Google. In addition, some websites, e.g. Alipay.com, allow users to customize the question, i.e. the user provides both the question and the answer.
 - **One-time recovery (backup) codes**: a website may set up one or more one-time backup codes, which the user must securely retain for possible future use for account recovery. These backup codes are typically not used for password recovery as we define it here, but for closely related purposes. In particular, Facebook and Google both support the establishment of such codes to enable users to recover account access if a second authentication factor fails or is unavailable, e.g. if a one-time password sent via SMS or email cannot be accessed by the user. Of course, such backup codes could also be used for password recovery but, since we are not aware of any websites using them in this way, we do not discuss them further in this paper.
- **Recovery contact details**, i.e. special contact details, such as an email address or phone number, that are used for password recovery. Examples of such details include the following.
 - **Contact details for trusted associates (trustees)**: i.e. email addresses or phone numbers for one or more individuals trusted by the account holder, e.g. as used by Facebook. During password recovery, a verification code is sent to a trustee, who is trusted to relay it to the correct user.

³ <https://goo.gl/wCsLMk>, accessed: 09/04/2018

⁴ <https://goo.gl/b67119>, accessed: 09/04/2018

⁵ <https://goo.gl/9hbHNX>, accessed: 09/04/2018

⁶ <https://goo.gl/yrv1fA>, accessed: 09/04/2018

⁷ <https://goo.gl/uUYysF>, accessed: 09/04/2018

- **Recovery email address:** i.e. one or more email addresses to which a one-time password or a link to a special recovery page is sent by the website during the recovery process.
 - **Recovery phone number:** i.e. a phone number used to send a one-time password for recovery purposes.
- **Recovery preferences** can be gathered at this stage if a website offers more than one option for password recovery. The user preference can be established during registration, or, as is the case for Google, the user is simply offered various options if the password recovery process is invoked.

4.2 Password Setup

As part of the process of entering a password, the website may gather and store the following types of information.

- **Password hints:** when a password is entered, some websites also request a hint, intended to help the user remember the password. Alternatively, some websites, e.g. Google (see figure 1), record the time when the password was last changed, and subsequently use this information as a password hint when the user makes a password recovery request.
- **Old passwords:** some websites, e.g. Gmail, keep old (superseded) passwords, to enable their use for authentication during password recovery.




Fig. 1. Google password change hint

4.3 Recovery Request and Validation

We consider the request and validation steps together since, in practice, these steps are often combined. A website will typically provide a simple means for a user to invoke the password recovery process, e.g. by providing a link somewhere close to the password field in the login page. Once invoked the user will typically be asked to perform one or more of the following steps in order to prevent the acceptance of fraudulent requests:

- solve a CAPTCHA — some websites, e.g. PayPal, use a CAPTCHA during password recovery to filter out automated attacks;
- answer one or more of the pre-established security questions, e.g. as performed by Apple;
- select an option for password recovery (if the user registered multiple methods), e.g. as is the case for Amazon;
- enter the last password the user can recall, e.g. as requested by Google.

Following initial acceptance of the request, a user may be required to engage in further interactions to validate the request, e.g. as follows.

- An email is sent to the user’s registered address, and the user is asked to perform a task using information contained in the email, e.g. clicking on an embedded link or entering a code value.
- An SMS (text) message containing a secret code is sent to the user’s registered mobile number, and the user is requested to enter this code; alternatively the user may receive an automated call to his/her mobile phone and be asked to engage in a short dialogue.

4.4 Password Re-establishment

We next review some commonly used methods for re-establishing a password.

- **Email reset** involves a website sending a message containing secret information to the registered email address of the user requesting recovery. Subsequent use of this information implicitly authenticates the user, assuming that only the user can access emails sent to his/her email address. This approach is very widely used; Bonneau et al. [3] found that 92% of the 138 websites they tested use email-based password recovery. Various types of secret information are commonly sent, e.g. as follows.
 - **Verification codes/temporary passwords** are a temporary means of accessing the user account, purely for the purposes of establishing a new password, and are used, for example, by Amazon and Wikipedia — see Figure 2. Note that Wikipedia limits users to one temporary password per 24-hour period, and its temporary passwords expire after a week.
 - **Links** (URLs) are embedded in emails sent to a user-registered address. Clicking on such a link (which typically contains a secret string) redirects the user browser to a page enabling the user to set up a new password. Some websites, e.g. Twitter, limit the validity period of such links.
- **SMS reset** messages are sent to the user’s registered mobile number, and typically contain a secret verification code (analogously to email reset).
- **Use of an old password** is permitted by some websites, e.g. Google, as a means of authenticating a user for password recovery. Typically, it will form only part of the process of authenticating the user.
- **Use of a trustee** is supported by some websites (e.g. Facebook), where the trustee is used as a secure communications channel to the account holder for sending secret recovery information, such as a temporary (one-time) password.



Fig. 2. Wikipedia password recovery using a temporary password

4.5 After Password Re-establishment

After a user has reset his/her password, some websites immediately log out the user and require a fresh log-in with the new password; others allow the user to continue without logging-in again. In parallel with this, some websites notify the account holder via email that password recovery has occurred, with the goal of alerting users if the recovery was not authorised by the account holder.

5 Security and Usability Issues

We now consider potential security and usability issues for the recovery validation and password re-establishment techniques given in sections 4.3 and 4.4.

5.1 Security Questions

As observed in section 4.3, security questions are widely used to help ensure that a recovery request is valid. As discussed in section 2, apart from the fact that gathering such personal data potentially endangers user privacy, a range of serious security and usability issues have been identified. Bonneau et al. [2] identify the following problems.

- Answers to some questions are more readily guessed than others since they have a small answer space; such questions offer relatively little protection.
- Some users may provide false answers with the goals of limiting what is revealed about them and making it harder for impostors to guess their responses. However, users may forget their false answers, making the security questions useless in the recovery process.
- Although the questions are designed to cover topics which users will always know, some questions may nevertheless require the user to remember the answer they gave, e.g. which of many pet names they chose, or which colour they said was their favourite. Given such questions are likely to be used very

infrequently, and considerable time may elapse between setting them up and using them, a user’s recollection of the ‘correct’ answers is likely to fade.

- Cultural differences can have an impact on the memorability of some questions, e.g. Bonneau et al. [2] found that, for a typical set of questions, French users are most likely to recall their first phone number and are least likely to recall their father’s middle name.

Also, the answers to some questions could be obtained via social media, as discussed by Rabkin [17]. Even more seriously, the same questions are used by many sites, making possible the type of MitM attack described by Gelernter et al. [7] (see section 5.5), where a malicious site persuades a user to register with answers to security questions which are then used to impersonate the user to another site. The real issue here is that the authentication information (answers to security questions) is not site-specific; analogous problems arise when users employ the same password with many sites — this has caused many well-documented security problems, notably when passwords for one site are compromised and can then be used to try to impersonate users to other sites⁸.

The main lessons from this analysis would appear to be that: (a) security questions should be carefully chosen to maximise the level of security offered; (b) security questions only offer a limited level of security and should always be used in combination with other methods; and (c) ideally authentication information should somehow be made site-specific.

5.2 Trustee-based Recovery

As discussed by Gong and Wang [8], there are a number of security issues with relying on trusted ‘friends’ of a user to support password recovery.

- The account holder may forget who they chose as trustees, so that an individual may remain a nominated trustee even if they are no longer trusted. That is, the state of trust can change with time and a user could forget to remove a trustee from list.
- Use of trustees can be prone to ‘forest fire attacks’ [8], where compromise of a trustee account can compromise many other accounts.
- Users are sometimes obliged to nominate several trustees, e.g. Facebook mandates three. This may force the user to select less trusted associates.
- A malicious trustee could take over an account by triggering password recovery and (if necessary) communicating with other trustees (e.g. using social engineering) to obtain all the secret information necessary.

⁸ This analysis suggests a very simple attack on passwords, where a malicious entity sets up a site and persuades users to register and choose an ID and password; the site can then act on the assumption that some users will employ the same user name/password combinations elsewhere, and can try them out with other sites to see if they work. Such an attack could be very effective without even requiring any real-time MitM activity or compromise of existing password databases.

5.3 Email Reset

A major vulnerability of this approach is its assumption that emails cannot be intercepted. There are various ways this assumption could be invalidated.

- If emails are retrieved via an unencrypted link, e.g. if the user accesses email via a browser and the website does not use https, or if a mail client employs IMAP over a link not protected using SSL/TLS, then emails might be intercepted. This threat is particularly significant when using public access networks; a MitM attacker operating a ‘fake’ public wireless access network could intercept emails received via SMTP.
- If the reset email is forwarded to a third party, either accidentally or deliberately, then the contents could be compromised.
- Malware in the client device could be used to obtain the reset email. For example, Gelernter et al. [7] describe a malicious android application which, if installed, can covertly read received emails.

The use of email for distributing reset information also has other risks. For example, consider the case where the website for which password recovery is being performed is itself a provider of an email service (e.g. Google). In this case, sending a password reset message by email will not help, as the user will not be able to log in to retrieve it. In such a case it is common practice for the user to be asked to register an alternative email address to be used to distribute recovery information. During password recovery, in some cases the user will be shown a partially obfuscated version of this alternative email address, and the user will be asked to confirm that this is the correct address for use in password recovery. Figures 3 and 4 show this process as used by Gmail. This is a clear privacy breach, in that it may well be possible for a third party to learn the entire alternative address, e.g. by a web search or by automated harvesting of email addresses [9] (see, for example, Polakis et al. [16]).

Apart from the risk of spam, restricting access to email addresses is clearly desirable given that email addresses are often used as user identifiers. A further possible problem arising with the use of email relates to the non-permanent nature of email addresses. A user may register an email address which may later become re-assigned to someone else, e.g. because they change service providers or employers. In such a case, a password reset message may be received by a third party, who could use it to take control of the user account. Another issue could arise in a work environment in which employee emails are temporarily forwarded to another person, e.g. because the employee is sick or on leave; this could be especially hazardous if the forwarder is temporary or a contract worker.

5.4 Verification Codes and Reset Links

As discussed in section 4.4, there are two main ways email reset can be used for password recovery, namely by sending a verification code or a reset link. As discussed above, both give rise to a risk if the reset email is compromised. Apart from the direct compromise threat, both have other security and usability issues.




Fig. 3. Partial leakage of user contact number




Fig. 4. Partial leakage of alternative email address

- The following issues are associated with verification codes.
 - Lack of entropy: since verification codes are typically short numeric values, they are potentially vulnerable to brute force searching attacks. That is, if a website does not limit the number of attempts to enter the code, then a simple brute force attack becomes possible, as demonstrated by a successful attack on two Facebook sites [20].
 - As discussed in greater detail in section 5.5 in the context of codes sent via SMS, a user could be misled into revealing a verification code to a malicious site in a type of phishing attack.
- Reset links have a slightly different set of associated issues.
 - Some websites do not expire unused reset links, i.e. they remain valid indefinitely. For example, in an experiment we discovered that a link for rosegal.com remained valid for at least five months. Since it is hard to understand why a link needs to be valid for more than a few hours, this represents an unnecessary risk, since if such a link is ever disclosed it may enable the associated account to be hijacked.
 - Karlof et al. [12] describe a phishing attack on reset link-based password recovery. The attacker starts password recovery on a website for a target user, knowing this will cause the website to send an email containing a link to the target user. Simultaneously the attacker emails the user asking them to paste the link in an email they are about to receive into an attacker-controlled website; a similar attack works against verification codes in emails. This attack is similar to the Gelernter et al. [7] attack on SMS-based password recovery (see section 5.5).

5.5 SMS Reset

There are a variety of issues associated with the use of SMS reset messages, many of which are analogous to issues associated with email reset.

- Since codes sent to mobile phones are typically only six numeric digits⁹, i.e. there are only 10^6 possibilities, this means that it may be possible to successfully guess a code value. It is therefore imperative that websites limit the number of entry attempts a user is permitted.
- As noted in section 5.1, Gelernter et al. [7] describe an MitM attack on password recovery: the registration process for a malicious website is used to gather the answers to personal security questions in order to successfully complete request validation for a website with which the user already has an account. Of course, this MitM step does not complete the attack, as the attacked website will typically, after receiving the correct answers to security questions, send a verification code (e.g. via SMS) to the genuine user. To complete the attack, the malicious website (as part of its registration procedure) tells the user to expect a message containing a verification code which should be entered into the registration page. If the user enters the verification code received from the attacked website, the malicious website will now have what it needs to complete the process of capturing the user's account. The only defence against this attack is for the message containing the verification code to make it clear which website it is intended for (i.e. the attacked website rather than the malicious website).

This attack will work against verification codes sent via email or SMS, although it is much harder for the sending website to make clear how the code should be used in a 160-character SMS message than in an email. Indeed, Gelernter et al. [7] describe the results of a detailed survey of the use of SMS-based verification codes, with the goal of understanding both how clear the SMS messages are, and how likely users are to mistakenly enter a code intended for one website into a box on a different website. They go on to make a series of recommendations regarding how SMS messages should be designed to minimise the likelihood that a user can be deceived. They also recommend that the verification code should have a short validity period.

- In some countries, network coverage in rural areas is often poor or non-existent, meaning it may not be possible for a user to obtain a verification code sent via SMS. Similarly, if a user is traveling, he/she may not be able to receive the SMS. Also, occasionally SMS messages are delayed, which may cause the user to initiate many requests.
- Just as for email reset, the security of SMS reset relies on the assumption that an SMS message is a secure channel to the user. Again, as for email reset, this assumption can be invalidated in a range of ways, e.g. as follows.
 - Guri et al. [7] describe an attack based on an apparently harmless Android app which can monitor and redirect SMS messages to an attacker server. If such an app was installed, then a password recovery SMS might be compromised.
 - If the phone to which the SMS reset is sent is stolen then the contents of the SMS reset message could be compromised; even if the phone is password-locked, the message may still be compromised since many

⁹ Google and Dropbox both use 6-digit verification codes

phones display the contents of received SMS messages without requiring the phone to be unlocked.

- SMS reset messages could be intercepted at the network operator, e.g. by a malicious employee, or when sent over the air interface if the air interface link is not encrypted (as is the case in some countries). The reset message could also be intercepted by an unauthorised base station (an IMSI catcher or ‘Stingray’) [14] or by exploiting weaknesses in implementations of the SS7 protocol used by telecommunication companies to communicate with each other [21].
- If the user changes his/her phone number and forgets to notify the website, then the SMS reset message will be received by the new owner of that number.

5.6 Other Issues

We conclude this discussion of existing password recovery techniques by briefly reviewing certain other issues which have a bearing on the security and/or usability of the password recovery process.

- Use of an old password as the only means of user authentication for password recovery is clearly dangerous, since one reason a user might replace a password is because it has been, or is suspected of having been, compromised. It also seems relatively unlikely that a user will recollect an old password if they cannot remember their current password.
- Many web services use an email address as a user ID, e.g. Amazon, Facebook, Dropbox, Instagram, Twitter and LinkedIn. This has the major advantage of making it easy for the user to remember their account identifier, and it is also convenient for web service providers to deliver account-related functions via email as well as simplifying registration. However, as discussed by Jin et al. [10], there are significant risks associated with such an approach, not least that an attacker automatically knows one of the two parts of a user credential set, thereby facilitating attacks on the password recovery process.
- Password hints may reveal sensitive information, potentially endangering user security or privacy. For example, the Google password hint shown in figure 1 indicates when the user last changed his/her password – this reveals that Google was being used at that time. Whilst this may not seem so significant, for some sites this could be far more revealing.

6 Towards Secure Password Recovery

We next provide recommendations on best practice in implementing a password recovery system. These recommendations are based on the analysis given in the previous section. We consider the two most security-significant steps in password recovery, namely request validation and password re-establishment.

6.1 Recovery Request Validation

As discussed in section 4.3, two main security-related steps are commonly used during request validation, namely use of a CAPTCHA and security questions. The CAPTCHA prevents automated attacks on password recovery, and appears a reasonable step to include. Security questions are used to prevent malicious triggering of password recovery, which could otherwise be done on a large scale, e.g. using databases of email addresses (since user names are often the same as email addresses). However, the use and effectiveness of security questions is questionable for a variety of reasons. Firstly, as discussed in section 5.1, the answers can sometimes be readily guessed or obtained via social media, and, most seriously, the MitM attacks of Gelernter et al. [7] suggest that they offer relatively little protection. Secondly, there are significant privacy issues, since use of such questions involves gathering personal data, which could be misused. Thirdly, there are also usability issues, in that not all answers to questions can always be readily recalled. It is therefore highly questionable whether using security questions as a filtering mechanism is worth the trouble, since while it offers limited security it also has significant negative privacy and usability disadvantages.

6.2 Password Re-establishment

Depending on how password re-establishment works, there are a number of important recommendations which emerge from the analysis in section 5. We look separately at three main areas: email reset, SMS reset, and the use of trustees.

Email reset If email reset is used, then the website must try to minimise the chance that the email reaches an incorrect recipient. This means, for example, that the email address to which the message is to be sent should ideally have been used (or confirmed by the user) recently. This could be achieved by asking the user to enter the email address to which the reset email should be sent, and only if this matches with the address stored by the website should it be used.

If verification codes are sent via email, then the discussion in section 5.3 suggests that: (a) they should use as large an alphabet as possible (e.g. including letters, digits and punctuation), and be as long as possible, subject to usability constraints; and (b) they should expire after a short period of time.

Reset URLs sent in an email should: (a) have a short expiry period (just as for codes); (b) contain a random (secret) string which should be sufficiently long to make successful guessing attacks highly improbable; and (c) start with ‘https’, so that the connection to the server is secure.

SMS reset If SMS is used to deliver the means to re-establish a password, then very similar requirements to those for email reset apply. That is, regardless of what information is sent in the SMS, the website should try to ensure that the phone number is current, e.g. by requesting the user to re-enter the number, and only if it matches with the number stored by the website should it be used.

Apart from the requirements applying to verification codes and links previously mentioned, Gelernter et al. [7] give a list of recommendations aimed specifically at verification codes sent via SMS. In particular: (a) the SMS message should be designed so that the code is not displayed on the phone screen when locked, i.e. forcing the user to unlock the phone to obtain the code; and (b) the wording of the SMS should minimise the chance that the user can be deceived into submitting the code to the wrong website, including indicating the identity of the sending website, the purpose of the message, and a warning not to divulge the code to any other person or website.

Trustee-based password recovery Since significant risks arise from out of date trustee data, as part of the recovery request process the account holder should be asked to verify contact details for the trustee(s) to be used. For example, the user could be asked to re-enter trustee email addresses or phone numbers, with the website only using them if they match already stored values. Web sites could also periodically require users to revalidate trustee data. Clear instructions should be sent with the password recovery information sent to a trustee, to minimise the chance that a trustee is misled (e.g. via social engineering) into disclosing the recovery data to the wrong party.

7 Concluding Remarks

We have given a general model for the password recovery process, and we have also examined the range of ways in which this model is instantiated by today's websites. We then provided the first comprehensive review of known security and privacy weaknesses in existing approaches to password recovery; we also examined usability issues. This then allowed us to make a series of recommendations regarding how best a password recovery process should be designed.

There is clearly a need for further research in this important area, as well as new, more secure, ways of performing recovery. Almost all the techniques in common use are to some extent flawed, and many also pose privacy risks. One direction for future work would be to conduct large scale practical trials to try to understand better how users can interact with password recovery systems both securely and reliably. A further issue which has hardly been explored is that of account recovery, i.e. where a user forgets both his/her user name and password, or a second authentication factor fails. A range of techniques are in use for this purpose, e.g. backup codes (see 4.1), and the usability and security of these techniques clearly merits further investigation.

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