


**THE LOGIC AND LANGUAGE OF THE
INCARNATION : TOWARDS A CHRISTOLOGY OF
IDENTIFICATION**

Peter McEnhill

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
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THE LOGIC AND LANGUAGE OF THE INCARNATION

Towards a Christology of Identification

by

P. McEnhill

Submitted
to the University of St. Andrews
in application for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy.



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Professor D.W.D.Shaw

(b) I was admitted as a research student under Ordinance 350 (General No.12) on 10th October 1988 and as a candidate for the degree of Ph.D. under Resolution of the University Court, 1967, No.1 (as amended) on 9th October 1989

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TO LINDA

The writing of acknowledgements can be a specious but nevertheless necessary practice as the completion of a thesis is rarely, if ever, the work of the author alone. As a result debts are accumulated exponentially as the work progresses and the acknowledgment of some of these is but small recompense for the many favours and kindnesses that have come my way during the course of this research.

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THE LOGIC AND LANGUAGE OF THE INCARNATION

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Abstract of Thesis

This thesis provides an examination of the contemporary discussion of incarnational language as it receives classical expression in the formulations of the Council of Chalcedon in 451 A.D. with a view to developing an incarnational account based on God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth. With this in view consideration is given to a number of contemporary defences of the logic of Chalcedon viewed as a literal statement of identity. It is argued that such defences fail in that they carry over the tensions inherent in Chalcedon unresolved into their own positions. From this conclusion consideration is given to the criticism that incarnational language is not literal but metaphorical. This is agreed, but an argument is offered to show that metaphors can refer and bear cognitive information and as such are capable of conceptual articulation. It is further argued that there is an important class of metaphors which are 'theory-constitutive' such that the theoretical claims which they embody cannot be expressed apart from the metaphor. An attempt is made to show that the metaphor of incarnation is one such 'theory-constitutive' metaphor.

The results of this general discussion of incarnational

language are then applied to the christological theories of Theodore of Mopsuestia and Donald Baillie. It is argued that they are legitimate and proper attempts to articulate the claims embodied in the metaphor of incarnation. An attempt is made to show that they offer a genuine middle way between Chalcedon and purely inspirational accounts of the incarnation. However, it is conceded that the traditional question raised against these theories, as to whether or not they can successfully maintain a unity of person, is a legitimate one, given their failure to indicate adequately how the union operated.

The concept of God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth is introduced as one which shares a certain 'family resemblance' to Baillie's and Theodore's approach. It is argued that the concept of identification provides the type of conceptual underpinning that both Baillie's and Theodore's approach require. The fourth and fifth chapters of this thesis are devoted to presenting an account of the incarnation from the perspective of identification with particular emphasis being given to demonstrating that the concept of identification can account for the unity of God and man in Christ whilst respecting the integrity and individuality of the human person.

CHAPTER ONE

TWO INTO ONE WON'T GO!

Contemporary Questions on the Doctrine of the

Incarnation

1.(i) Contemporary Questions on the Incarnation

Recent treatments of the incarnation have concentrated on a number of separate though interrelated problems which the traditional formulations of the doctrine are believed to raise. There are a number of ways in which one can characterise these problems but for convenience sake they can be grouped adequately under four broad headings. Firstly, there is the question as to whether or not the New Testament evidence supports or demands the later credal interpretations of the person and nature of Christ. Secondly, there is the related but distinct question of the historical conditioning of the doctrine of the incarnation, particularly as it was influenced by Greek Metaphysics. Thirdly, there is the problem of the uniqueness and finality of the Christian claims concerning Christ. This difficulty has at least two foci: initially the problem of the finality of Christ finds expression when one considers the Christian faith in relation to the other great world religions. However, there is often a second sense attached to the notion of the uniqueness of Christ which is that it is just incongruous for those of us who live with a developmental and evolutionary world view to attach absolute significance to a particular man at a particular moment in world history. Finally, there is

the charge which will be the particular concern of this chapter, namely, that the doctrine of the incarnation is incoherent and meaningless in that it maintains a logical contradiction.(1)

This final issue is exceedingly important and as such has come to the forefront of contemporary theological and philosophical discussion. The reasons for this are not hard to find as a doctrine which is logically incoherent cannot justifiably be maintained by any person who wishes to explicate her faith according to the accepted canons of rationality. Therefore, if the Chalcedonian understanding of the person of Christ can be shown to be incoherent it matters little whether or not the doctrine can find support in the New Testament, or that it can be shown to be a culturally conditioned concept, if it is incoherent at the conceptual level then it has to be reformulated or abandoned.

The issue of logical incoherence indeed all of the issues we have outlined came to the forefront of popular debate in the celebrated volume of essays entitled THE MYTH OF GOD INCARNATE .(2) Although causing something of a furore at the time much of what was contained in these essays had been anticipated in earlier works. Indeed it could be argued that the debate advanced very little

beyond the criticisms offered by Harnack and Troeltsch at the beginning of this century and by Strauss in the middle of the previous century.(3) Yet, for the purposes of this thesis, the volume is of interest in that it brings together and crystallises in a concise form many of the problems which are felt to pertain to the traditional doctrine of the incarnation. With that in mind I intend to use the essays presented there as a suitable springing off point for entering into the incarnational debate.

Broadly speaking the contributors to the volume felt that the traditional Chalcedonian model of the incarnation was no longer tenable. Their reasons for believing this can be regarded as falling under the four headings outlined earlier. The four headings are useful as interpretative categories but it should be noted that they are not always kept separate by critics of the traditional doctrine of the incarnation, many of whom, like Don Cupitt, seem to be arguing on all or most of these points at one and the same time.

For the purposes of this thesis I intend to leave aside, for the most part, the question of the New Testament evidence. My reasons for so doing are two-fold. Firstly, there is the necessary limitation of space.

Any thesis has to give priority to its own particular concerns. In this case the focus of attention is upon the doctrine of the incarnation as it finds its fullest expression in the formulations of the Council of Chalcedon in 451 A.D. As such the question as to whether or not the New Testament supports the full-blown doctrine is of related but subsidiary interest. Secondly, there is the widespread disagreement among New Testament scholars about what can conscientiously be said about the incarnational texts of the New Testament. It would require a thesis devoted to this topic alone to clarify this situation. Finally, I would wish to argue that whatever view is taken on the question of whether or not the New Testament envisages an ontological identity between God the Son and Jesus of Nazareth, it seems to be clear that the New Testament envisages at least a functional identity between God the Son and Jesus of Nazareth.(4) That is, despite the evident diversity of Christological models that are contained in the New Testament, the New Testament writers are fundamentally in agreement in holding that Christ represents God to man and man to God. In other words the message that God was decisively and uniquely present in Christ is the underlying conviction of the entire New Testament.

This point is worth making, for many of the problems (although not the logical problems) that are felt to pertain to the traditional doctrine of the incarnation apply just as much to any functional identification of Jesus of Nazareth with God the Son which is construed in New Testament terms. For example, the problems of the uniqueness of Christ in his relationship to God and his specific and absolute importance for human salvation are raised as much under the functional model of Christ as they are under the Chalcedonian model. Frances Young in her contribution to the 'Myth' debate recognises as much when she writes:

"On the whole the New Testament is totally Christocentric. Maybe the content and form of the confessions are not all that distinctive, yet their combined application as interpretative categories for the person of Jesus of Nazareth is unparalleled; and the force of this is to make Jesus the one intermediary through whom God is revealed and can be approached with confidence."(5)

The debate as to whether or not the New Testament ascribes an ontological relationship between Jesus of Nazareth and God the Son is, as I have said, a long and technical one. Precise agreement is hard to find as to how the nuances of expression in the New Testament are to be interpreted. For example Don Cupitt's assessment of the New Testament evidence is that "... the New Testament nowhere says that the Son of God is God of

God. In pre-Nicene days the phrase 'Son of God' could be used to emphasise the difference of status between Jesus and God..."(6) Graham Stanton in direct response to Cupitt argues that although the early Christians were slow and cautious to refer to Jesus as God (an understandable diffidence given their monotheistic background) yet it is at least equally impressive that given this background they did in fact on occasion edge towards such language.(7)

It would be fair to say that the debate upon what the New Testament can be reasonably held to say about Jesus of Nazareth and his relationship to God the Son is not settled in either the "Myth of God" debate or in the subsequent volume Incarnation and Myth: The Debate Continued.(8) Nor indeed could one reasonably expect non-technical and popular volumes such as these to settle the issue. It would be helpful if the specialist literature could be looked to for a final and conclusive answer, but unfortunately none seems to be forthcoming despite the valiant attempts of a number of scholars.(9)

Generally speaking, although one recognises the necessary distortions of generalisations, the view of the majority of New Testament scholars would tend

towards a functionalist presentation of the person of Christ in the New Testament. That is, despite the Prologue to the Fourth Gospel, the intimations of pre-existence in the Pauline writings and in the Letter to the Hebrews, and the use of titles such as Son of God and Lord, no clear ontological relationship which can be held to imply that Jesus is 'very God of very God' in the sense intended by the later creeds exists in the New Testament documents. Christ's relationship with God is best described as one of the embodiment of the Spirit and the power of God. A Sonship which is constituted and revealed by his perfect obedience to the Father.(10)

The difficulty in establishing what the New Testament can be held to say concerning the relationship between Jesus of Nazareth and God the Son is exacerbated by recent trends in hermeneutical theory. For example, David Brown, in his work The Divine Trinity, agrees with Frances Young's assessment that the New Testament evidence largely points to a functional understanding of the person of Christ.(11) Yet he wishes to argue that although this may have been the intention of the New Testament authors there may yet be implications within the texts they created which have ontological import. Brown wants to maintain that certain motifs that the New Testament writers used concerning Christ have

implied within them the substance of later ontological reflection. Notions such as pre-existence and the hypostasis of wisdom, the Logos prologue, the assertions that Christ was in the form of God, that the fulness of God dwelt within him, etc., carry with them ontological ramifications whether or not the New Testament writers intended this.

Brown argues that it is necessary to distinguish between the historical origin and the theological truth of certain ideas.(12) According to Brown, we need not make the disciples' intentions our own. It is possible to recognise that their monotheistic assumptions prevented them from completing the equation that Christ was God the Son but to nevertheless see that this is the logical outcome of the pre-eminence that they accorded Christ in the scheme of salvation and of the fact that they addressed worship to him.

Although this may seem in one sense to be forcing a reading upon the New Testament beyond the intent of its authors, there is something to be said for Brown's approach. It is clear that the New Testament pattern, as far as it can be detected, seems to begin with an assertion of Jesus as one who is closely associated with the eschatological reign of God. In this close

association he is himself the embodiment of God's purpose and message. However, this early witness to Jesus demanded the type of conceptual clarification that the later New Testament writings and the early fathers engaged in. A 'functional' christology demands to be interpreted along the lines of showing what would have to be the case for it to be true that Jesus was in his teaching and ministry the embodiment of God's message and purpose. As we know the Church eventually decided that Jesus would have to be 'very God of very God' in order to inaugurate the Kingdom of God, in order to be the manifestation and harbinger of God's saving grace. It is not for us to say that this type of conceptual development is a betrayal of an earlier and more primitive message although we may say that the particular conceptual development that arose is not the only, and not necessarily the best, possible interpretation.

The purpose of mentioning Brown's treatment of the New Testament data was not to enter into the debate concerning whether or not the meaning of a text is independent of the author's intention, rather it was merely to show how difficult it can be to assess the New Testament data and its precise implications for articulating Jesus of Nazareth's relationship to God

the Son. Having established the case that no clear opinion exists among New Testament scholars on those texts which seem to imply an ontological linking of Jesus to God the Son, I merely wish to note the point and pass on.

1.(ii) The issues of identity and coherence.

Of all the difficulties raised against the traditional doctrine of Chalcedon it is the accusation of logical incoherence that is potentially the most damaging. An incoherent account of the person of Christ cannot justifiably be sustained by even the most credulous believer once the incoherence has been demonstrated. But to raise the issue of the demonstration of incoherence is perhaps to arrive immediately at the heart of the issue. For many scholars have asserted forcefully and volubly that the traditional doctrine is incoherent but few have offered a developed argument that conclusively demonstrates that fact.

Within the 'Myth of God' symposium it is Don Cupitt and John Hick who most emphatically argue that the Chalcedonian definition of 'two natures in one person' is a logical contradiction, but this assumption seems to be hovering around in the background in a number of the

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essays. Cupitt and Hick both developed the claim of logical contradiction in earlier works and they add nothing substantially new in their work for the 'Myth' collection. (13) Cupitt articulates the point most clearly when he argues that "the eternal God and a historical man are two beings of quite different ontological status. It is simply unintelligible to declare them identical." (14) Hick in similar fashion maintains that the assertion that Jesus is God is as devoid of meaning as a statement of the form that a 'circle is a square'. (15)

Both theologians have been roundly criticised for the imprecision of their terminology in that the Church has never declared that Jesus is identical with God simpliciter. (16) The traditional doctrine is that Jesus is identical with God the Son, the second person of the Trinity. However, since God the Son is held to be very God of very God, equal in power, status, substance and significant attributes to God the Father then the thrust of Cupitt and Hick's suggestion retains its original force.

Although Cupitt and Hick never precisely spell out those aspects of divinity and humanity which they take to be logically incompatible it is not difficult to put flesh

on the bare bones of their argument. By definition the God of classical theism is pure Being or Spirit, necessarily existent, incorporeal, infinite, omnipotent, omniscient, standardly held to be immutable and impassible. Human beings are contingent, finite, corporeal, limited in power and knowledge and certainly open to change and emotion. Given this rudimentary outline of what it means to be divine and human it is not difficult to see what generates the charge of logical incoherence. How can any one person simultaneously exemplify the attributes of necessity and contingency, infinity and finitude, incorporeality and corporeality, eternity yet having a beginning in time? The answer given by Cupitt and Hick is that no being can exemplify all of these properties at one and the same time for they are logical complements.

It is clear that the underlying philosophical theory behind these criticisms is the theory governing strict numerical identity. This theory sometimes known as Leibniz' Law argues that for 'a' to be identical with 'b' then any property which 'a' has must also be exemplified by 'b'. This principle is known as the 'indiscernibility of identicals'. It would be fair, I think, to say that this was the standard position on the question of identity among philosophers although there

are a number of notable philosophers who opt for a thesis of relative identity. This thesis argues that the statement 'a' is identical to 'b' is an incomplete expression and must be expanded into the form 'a' is the same 'F' as 'b' where 'F' is some sortal concept term before it becomes intelligible. According to this theory 'a' and 'b' are identical only with respect to 'F' and may therefore differ at some other point.(17)

The thesis of relative identity has been put to great use in recent philosophical discussions of the Trinity. It is argued that this thesis saves the Trinitarian doctrine from falling into logical incoherence by saying that God the Son and God the Father can be the same God but not the same person.(18) Despite the obvious attractions of this theory for Trinitarian thought it is of limited value when applied to the problem of the logical coherence of the incarnation. The classical theory of the incarnation states that God the Son and Jesus of Nazareth are identical in that they are the same person. However, it is precisely this issue, the issue of whether or not one person can simultaneously co-exemplify divine and human attributes that is at question here. Therefore, on any theory of identity the problem will remain that of showing how any one person can, at one and the same time, exemplify mutually

contradictory attributes. Consequently the theory of identity that will be presupposed in the ensuing discussion will be that for 'a' to be identical with 'b' any property which belongs to 'a' must also be exemplified by 'b'. As such in order for it to be the case that Jesus of Nazareth is identical with God the Son then according to the principle of indiscernibility any property or attribute which essentially belongs to God the Son must belong to Jesus of Nazareth and vice versa.

It is clear from the earlier discussion of both Hick and Cupitt that this theory of strict numerical identity has already been presupposed in the theological discussion. As they and other contemporary theologians have attempted to flesh out the logical difficulties of the incarnation it is precisely the notion of the impossibility of one person co-exemplifying contradictory attributes which has been brought out. For example, Maurice Wiles has argued that 'being created is part of the meaning of man' and that 'not being created is part of the meaning of God'(19)

Here there is a direct assertion of a logical contradiction in the doctrine of the incarnation. Obviously one and the same person cannot be both

'created' and 'not created'. (Even the thesis of relative identity would have difficulties at this point). The question at issue therefore becomes, is being created part of the meaning of man? Being uncreated seems to be part of the meaning of God, for God's properties are usually held to belong to him essentially or necessarily, but is that the case for human nature?

1.(iii) The Integrity of the Humanity of Christ

As theologians and philosophers have discussed the coherence of the incarnation it has emerged that there are two separate questions which have to be answered successfully if the doctrine is to be shown to be coherent. The first question concerns the possibility of human nature incarnating the Word of God without thereby losing its status as a truly human nature. The second problem is to show that it is possible for the divine Word to become incarnate without threatening the integrity of its divine nature. In this section the focus of concern will be upon the possibility of a human nature manifesting the fulness of the divine nature without losing its integrity in the process.

In earlier references to those theologians who had maintained that the doctrine of the incarnation was

incoherent it was pointed out that they had asserted rather than demonstrated that this was indeed the case. The lack of a developed argument demonstrating this point was put right by A.D. Smith in an article entitled "God's Death".(20) Smith is aware of the type of manoeuvres that have been traditionally used to defend the doctrine and he develops a subtle argument which is designed to negate such tactics. As such, his probing of the questions constitutes one of the most sophisticated attempts to show the incoherence of the two-nature view of Christ.

Smith focuses upon the concept of human death as a means of demonstrating that there are properties which God the Son would have which a human being cannot possess and remain a human being. Smith asks whether we can properly speak of God's death on the Cross. It makes sense to say that Jesus of Nazareth died on the Cross, but in what sense can God be said to die? The classical response to this question would be to say that God the Son did not die as such but that he experienced the death of the human nature which he had assumed.

Smith attempts to forestall this response and to hoist the traditional doctrine by its own petard. According to Smith there are certain possibilities which apply to

human beings after death. There is the possibility of annihilation, which is what most people fear, and there is the possibility of mere bodily death ('somatic termination' in Smith's words). Mere bodily death allows for the continued existence of consciousness, soul or spirit. This continued existence is said by Smith to be conditional in that it is a free and gracious gift of God to sustain human beings in existence after death. Conditional immortality is contrasted with absolute or necessary immortality which Smith argues is not a position which could win the support of the theological tradition of Christianity.(21)

Smith then applies these notions to Christ's death. It seems obvious that we cannot speak of the possibility of annihilation in relation to Christ, for he is identical with God the Son. If he faced annihilation then there would be a time when the Son was not, at least for the period of the few days after Good Friday. It seems part of the definition of God that he cannot cease to exist and on this understanding alone annihilation is not a possibility for Jesus of Nazareth.

Consideration must therefore be given to the idea of survival after bodily termination. On Smith's understanding, this survival, if it is human, must be

conditional, a survival which is a result of a free and gracious act of God. Yet this would mean that, if God the Son is truly human then the eternity of the Son is not absolute, or necessary, but conditional. It is conditional in that there was a time when the Son's existence was maintained by a special act of grace of, presumably the Father, or the Father and the Spirit jointly.(22)

Smith proceeds to argue that this cannot be the case as if Christ is God the Son then he is necessarily eternal and this precludes any notion of his taking upon himself conditional immortality. As a result the only possible type of 'death' that God the Son can experience is bodily termination, but as that does not include the possibility of annihilation it cannot be a genuinely human death. For it is part of the meaning of human death that in it human beings face the possibility of annihilation.

Smith suggests that a similar type of argument can be put forward for the notion of coming into existence. It is part of the meaning of man that he is contingent, that he comes into existence. This is obviously a property which the 'eternal' Son of God cannot assume

and therefore he cannot have become man in the sense that other contingent human beings are men.(23)

The importance of these categories of 'ceasing to exist' and 'coming into existence' is that they resist the traditional separation of properties into those which are held to be appropriate to each nature. As Smith points out, they are notions which apply to the whole being of an object. A division and attribution to the two-natures would, according to Smith, "locate an ontological gulf within the person of Christ" and would have the effect of dividing the substance of Christ as unacceptably as any Nestorian, it would make any talk of the unity of Christ a collection of empty words.(24) The force of Smith's point must be taken on board here. He is arguing that,

"One and the same entity cannot cease to exist at two different times or at any one time have two incompatible ontological statuses; no more can one single entity both cease to exist and never cease to exist, or have both conditional immortality at a certain point in history and yet also possess necessary existence eternally. To refer such fundamental ontological differences to the two natures in Christ is blatantly to hypostasise Christ's natures, to treat them as entities or substances in their own right, and thus to fracture the supposed unity of the one individual comprising both natures."(25)

Smith's argument is powerful and persuasive and it blocks a variety of moves sometimes put forward to

defend the traditional doctrine. It blocks the appeal to the two-natures as a means of solving the dilemma by arguing that ceasing to exist is the type of property that has to apply to Jesus of Nazareth in his concrete entirety. It also interestingly blocks any Kenotic moves as an attempt to solve the problem. It may or may not be plausible to argue that an omnipotent and omniscient being can temporarily lay aside these attributes to be fully human, but it surely makes no sense to say that an eternal being can lay aside its eternal nature and cease to exist for a time or for that matter can come into existence at a particular time?

Given Smith's lucid development of the logical difficulties which he feels pertain to the doctrine of the incarnation it is not difficult to sympathise with the thrust of the argument. It must be conceded that at least a prima facie case of logical incoherence has been established. It is disheartening therefore to see the haphazard treatment that the question of incoherence receives from some defenders of the doctrine. Brian Hebblethwaite contents himself with the counter-argument that the notions of divinity and humanity are not terms which are sufficiently precise to establish the logical impossibility of their being co-exemplified simultaneously in one person.(26)

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Whilst there may be some truth in this, it is nevertheless an appeal to vagueness. It can be agreed that the being of God is ultimately mysterious, pure being beyond our comprehension, and Hebblethwaite is right to say that we do not have a sufficient understanding to say that the divine cannot become incarnate in the human. Yet, God has been traditionally defined according to the categories of omnipotence, omniscience, infinity etc. These categories may not capture God in his essential being but they do seem to say enough about God to at least establish an initial plausibility to the claim that a being so defined cannot take on the limitations inherent in being human.

Powerful as Smith's challenge is it depends very heavily upon certain concepts constituting part of the meaning of being human. Is it really part of the meaning of being human that we have conditional immortality? Or that we have a certain beginning in time? It is true that all human beings have possessed these attributes, but are they essential to what it is to be a human person?

This question is explicitly and forcefully pursued by T.V. Morris in his work The Logic of God Incarnate .(27) In this work, which is the most thorough treatment yet

of the logical problems of the doctrine of the incarnation, Morris attempts to show that the two-nature model of the person of Christ as formulated at the Council of Chalcedon can withstand the charge of logical incoherence. He is not attempting to show that the doctrine is true or probable, merely that it is not logically impossible. Minimal as this task may appear it is nevertheless an important one when a number of scholars are stating that the doctrine is incoherent.(28)

Morris allows that the statement Jesus of Nazareth is God the Son is a literal numerical identity claim which must satisfy the principle which governs all identity claims, namely, the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals. In order for it to be true that Jesus of Nazareth is identical with God the Son every property which is necessary and essential to being God the Son must apply to Jesus of Nazareth and every property essential to being Jesus of Nazareth must apply to God the Son.

In order to show the logical propriety of the doctrine Morris begins by making a number of distinctions. Firstly, he draws a distinction between a creature's 'individual nature' and its 'kind nature'. An

'individual nature' is that set of properties which constitutes who and what the individual is. 'Kind natures' are a larger category denoting a commonality of properties held by members of a certain species or group. A 'kind nature' would therefore specify the particular group of properties individually necessary and jointly sufficient for membership of that kind.(29)

Morris argues that although no one person can have more than one 'individual nature', it is not the case that an individual cannot have more than one 'kind nature'. For example, I have my own 'individual nature' and no other nature, but I have a number of 'kind natures'. I have the 'kind natures' of being human, male, mammal etc.(30)

At this point Morris begins to foresee certain difficulties with the concept of 'kind natures'. For, according to standard accounts, 'kind natures' are essential to their members, that is, I exemplify my 'kind nature' of humanity essentially. I literally could not exist as "I" without exemplifying the 'kind-nature' of humanity. The reason for this is that if "I" existed without exemplifying humanity I would quite literally not be myself but some other species or being. Such a view seems on the surface level to be intuitively valid and unobjectionable. However, it does cause problems

when applied to the doctrine of the incarnation. For it would mean that God the Son did not assume humanity at a particular point in time but must always have displayed humanity essentially, if he were ever to display it at all, for 'kind natures' are not held contingently but essentially by their members.

In order to derail this objection Morris has to argue that anyone who wishes to maintain the traditional doctrine of the incarnation will have to reject the theory that 'kind natures' are held essentially by every one of their members.(31) Since Christian orthodoxy has always maintained that God the Son took on humanity at a particular point in time and prior to that did not display humanity then the notion that 'kind natures' must be displayed essentially by their members has to be abandoned as not to do so would leave the doctrine open to the charge of logical incoherence.

Morris' position becomes even more complex (and difficult to defend) when he allows that any typical member of a natural kind will belong to that kind essentially. That is, a tiger cannot exist without exemplifying its 'tigerishness', and 'I' cannot exist without exemplifying humanity essentially. However, Morris argues that no orthodox Christian will argue that

Jesus was a typical member of the natural kind of humanity.(32) The point that is being made is that an individual with only one 'kind nature' must exemplify that nature essentially. However, if an individual has more than one 'kind nature' he must necessarily exemplify one of them but the other 'kind nature' can be exemplified contingently. On this theory God the Son exemplifies his 'kind nature' of divinity essentially but displays the 'kind nature' of humanity contingently thus satisfying the traditional belief that God became incarnate at a particular point in time and also satisfying the philosophical requirement of displaying at least one 'kind nature' essentially.

One cannot help but feel that the whole thrust of Morris' strategy here separates Christ's humanity from every other instance of humanity to such an extent that it is no longer recognisable as humanity. At any rate it is clear that the "essential" person under consideration is God the Son. In so far as he is defending the traditional interpretation of Chalcedon this is to Morris' credit in that he recognises that this is in effect what the tradition has taught. However, he seems oblivious to the fact that it is precisely this tendency within the tradition, from Alexandria onward, which has threatened the true humanity of Jesus.

Furthermore one cannot help but feel that a more satisfactory way of dealing with the problem of 'kind - natures' being exemplified essentially by their members would be to resort to the Barthian claim that God willed to become incarnate before the creation of the world. Thus, in a sense, the whole history of the world is nothing other than the working out of God's primal decision to become one with us. By recourse to this notion of a primal decision, and with reference to the concept of God's timeless existence, one could perhaps have argued that God the Son displayed humanity essentially although the incarnation took place at a particular point in time. Certainly it could be argued that in the realm of possible worlds and transworld identities so beloved of philosophers of Morris' ilk there is no possible world in which God is not the God who has become incarnate. For incarnation has become a fact in the life of God himself who therefore exists in every possible world as the God who was incarnate in the life of Jesus of Nazareth.

The distinction between essential and non-essential 'kind natures' and between typical and non-typical human beings leads to another set of distinctions that Morris wishes to make. He wishes to distinguish between being 'merely human' and being 'fully human' and between

having 'essential' human properties and having 'common' or universal human properties.(33) More will be said about these distinctions later but attention is drawn to Morris' questionable tactic of utilising dogmatic considerations to rule out philosophical positions which conflict with the position he wishes to defend.

One must question the use of a dogmatic bar in a work of this nature. It is of course familiar from the writings of Barth that we do not impose an abstract conception of divinity or humanity upon the figure of Christ. Rather the method is to find out what we can know about God and man from what we know of Christ.(34) Whilst this is perhaps acceptable within the field of dogmatic theology it is not so acceptable in a work which seeks to show the logical coherence, by strictly rational arguments, of the doctrine of the incarnation. The reason why it is so objectionable is that Morris is arguing that adherence to the very doctrine which is being questioned will rule out a philosophical position which seems otherwise unobjectionable (a position which he himself believes applies to every other member of the human race apart from Jesus of Nazareth). The result is that a philosophical position is ruled out because it makes the notion of incarnation impossible when the very question at issue is the possibility of the incarnation.

Noting Morris' appeal to dogmatic considerations and the distinctions he has introduced it is time to consider the metaphysical divergences between God and man which A.D. Smith raised, i.e. how can one person be eternal and yet have a beginning in time? In order to accommodate these differences Morris utilises the distinctions between 'essential' human properties and 'common' human properties and being 'fully human' and 'merely human'. This distinction involves the separation of 'common' human properties from 'essential' human properties. Such a distinction seems unobjectionable until it is realised that Morris intends to include within the group of 'common' but not 'essential' human properties such properties as 'having a beginning in time' and 'the possibility of passing out of existence'.(35)

Having previously drawn the distinction between being 'merely human' and 'fully human', Morris argues that Christianity has never maintained that Jesus was 'merely human' but that he was 'fully human'. A 'mere' human being (everyone else who has ever existed apart from Jesus of Nazareth) will have had a beginning in time, will pass out of existence and will exemplify all the other limitations which are part of 'mere' humanity. However, these properties although universal

accompaniments of human nature are not essential to human nature. A being is 'merely human' if it has all the properties necessary and sufficient for satisfying the description of humanity. A 'mere' human being will exemplify those properties alongside some limitation properties. A 'fully human' being, however, is someone who exemplifies all the properties necessary for humanity but which also at one and the same time exemplifies an ontologically higher kind such as divinity.(36)

It is obvious at this point that Morris is trading very heavily upon the vagueness of the term 'humanity'. He never at any time offers an anthropology which would set out the properties which he considers essential for constituting humanity. He argues, after the manner of Barth, that there is nothing which could force the Christian to count as essential any common human properties which would rule out a literal divine incarnation.(37) In this sense anthropology is not divorced from incarnation and the Christian accords, within certain bounds, an epistemic priority to the notion of incarnation. Whilst there is something in the fact that a Christian need not count as essential to being human any common property which precludes a literal incarnation of God, great care must nevertheless

be taken, and good grounds must be given, for showing that we are not thereby distorting the whole concept of what it means to be human to save a particular interpretation of Christian doctrine.

It is clear that the concept of human nature has not been defined exactly enough to rule out the manoeuvre that Morris wishes to make. Yet, it does lead to a strange view of humanity. For the manner of the origination of an individual human being can no longer count as an essential component of what it means to be human. Again this contradicts a recent and influential philosophical account which maintains that although origins of individuals can only be known a posteriori, they are nevertheless necessary truths. That is to say, I could not have sprung from any other source than from my natural parents. This can only be known after the fact, but once it is known, it constitutes a necessary truth about me.(38)

Morris' rebuttal of this charge is a little unconvincing. Part of the reason is that he again introduces into the logical debate a dogmatic bar. This time the principle invoked is that of creatio ex nihilo. Morris maintains that any theist who wishes to maintain such a position cannot agree that having a certain

sort of origin is necessary for 'natural kind' membership. The reason for this is if we hold that Adam was created out of nothing along with an entire universe, then Adam could not count as a member of the 'natural kind' humanity, since he did not have the same type of origin as every other member of the human race. If Adam did not count as human, then we, his descendants, do not count as human either.(39)

Morris supports this argument by considering the idea of scientists concocting from basic chemicals a being with the constitution, organs, appearance and mannerisms of a human being. This being acts in every way as a human being would act and enters into the social relationships that human beings would enter into. Would such a being count as human? Morris thinks he would, but allows that variations of opinion could occur on this point.(40)

It is important to point out here that Morris is placing a great deal of importance on a point which he himself allows is debatable.(41) It is by no means certain that such a being would count as human. Society could be forced to create a new category for describing such beings, perhaps 'humanoid 2' or some such similar terminology. Should such a situation ever occur it is more than conceivable that a distinction would be drawn

between such creatures, no matter how human they may appear, and those who descended from human parents in the normal biological way. The reason for such a distinction may be that such creatures would not share in the same genetic pool in which we all share. This does not constitute a knockdown argument but it is no more speculative than Morris' proposal.

With particular reference to christology and Christ's human nature John Knox has written these words,

"A true human being could not be freshly created. Such a creation might look like a man and even speak like a man. He might be given flesh like a man's and a man's faculties, but he would not be a man. He would not be a man because he would not belong to the organic human process, to the actually existing concrete entity in nature and history, which is, and alone is, man." (42)

In a similar vein John Robinson argues that,

"...But this is to ignore completely what for us is a sine qua non of personal existence, namely, the nexus of biological, historical and social relationships with our fellow-men and with the universe as a whole. If that is not there, then Jesus may have entered completely into the place where we were-but only as a visitor. He was like one of us, but he was not one of us." (43)

The argument concerning whether or not the genetic or biological origins of a being constitute a strong reason for according, or not according, an individual

the status of being human is not as trivial as it may first appear. There is a genuine philosophical difficulty in agreeing upon the precise range of properties which would be individually necessary and jointly sufficient for membership of the natural kind 'humanity'. It should always be realised, however, that this difficulty is an abstract difficulty. For there is certainly no practical difficulty involved in the recognition of other human beings. We do not even have to look for certain defining characteristics, we recognise one another immediately.

It is important to note that this 'common sense' recognition, far from being trivial and unphilosophical, has important moral implications. For the fact is that this recognition happens even when the person we are recognising as human is physically or mentally handicapped to such a degree that they no longer look or act like other human beings. Despite the grave differences in, say, the number of limbs, or the absence of various parts of the body, or the fact that they may provide us with no evidence that they possess the rational capacities that we normally take as typifying humanity, despite all these differences we recognise such people as fully human and accord them all the legal and moral rights which apply to human beings. The

underlying reason behind this immediate and unproblematic 'moral' recognition that such severely handicapped people are fully human is surely the knowledge that they have the same biological descent as ourselves, they share in the same genetic pool from which we and our forebears descended.

Returning to Morris, a more serious deficiency in his argument is his appeal to the notion of creatio ex nihilo. Again it seems strange in a strictly logical work to see a direct appeal to a dogmatic concept as a means of overruling an otherwise straightforward philosophical position. The doctrine of creatio ex nihilo does not of course rule out the concept of humanity (Adam) developing through an evolutionary process from the basic building blocks of matter. In this sense Morris is wrong to say that the theist who wishes to maintain a doctrine of creation out of nothing has to rule out the idea that types of origin are essential to being a member of a natural kind. Furthermore, the doctrine of incarnation can hardly seek support from another doctrine which is itself under immense pressure from scientific, logical and indeed theological qualifications which cast doubt on its appropriateness and truth.

Flexible as the concept of humanity may be it does seem that this type of manipulation is stretching it to breaking point in order to accommodate the notion of a divine incarnation. How far can human nature be stretched before one is no longer talking of human nature but some other type of being?

John Hick, in a direct response to Morris, raises this point specifically. Hick points out that Morris assumes that because an ontologically higher being manifests many of the properties of a lower ontological being, it is therefore possible for a lower order being such as humanity to manifest higher ontological categories such as divinity. To illustrate his point Hick cites the example of a rock and a crocodile. Both share the properties of being physical objects, but the crocodile has properties which the rock lacks, namely that it is animate. Similarly, the crocodile and a human person share many common properties, but the human person possesses higher order thought processes which the crocodile lacks and so on.(44) All of this is straightforward and unobjectionable but Hick wants to say that the reverse strategy is not permissible. That is, a lower order being cannot manifest the properties of a higher ontological kind "without invariably breaking the mould of the lower kind."(45)

The idea behind this objection is that just as it is impossible to conceive of a human being becoming incarnate in a crocodile because a crocodile's bodily structure, and particularly its central nervous system, is incompatible with the manifestation of human intelligence, it is similarly inconceivable to imagine a divine incarnation in a human life. Hick asks, "how a human brain would process the omniscient knowledge of the second person of the Trinity? How could a finite human frame exercise omnipotent power?"(46) The conclusion drawn is that as it is not possible to imagine a crocodile incarnating a human life without thereby becoming something altogether different from what we usually mean by the term crocodile, it is similarly inconceivable that a human being could be divine and yet still remain an authentic human being?

Morris' strategy of distinguishing between 'full humanity' and 'mere humanity' is designed to overcome some of these difficulties. However, the cost of doing so is enormous, for Jesus of Nazareth becomes in fact the only fully human being that ever existed and the rest of the human race are mere human beings. As a result the insistence upon his full humanity, upon his absolute oneness with us in our human condition, becomes a mere shadow of what was originally meant by that term.

Two Into One Won't Go!

For Jesus' humanity, on this representation, is as different from actual humanity as it is possible to be. It is pertinent to ask at this point if Morris is being faithful to his intention of defending Chalcedon which insisted that Jesus of Nazareth was in his humanity, "...like us in every respect apart from sin."

In concluding this part of the discussion it has to be asked whether or not Morris has successfully demonstrated the logical possibility of human nature incarnating the divine nature and remaining truly human. Intuitions will vary on this point. However, what is not questioned is that the defence Morris offers makes Jesus' humanity different from every other instance of humanity, and one has to ask if this is a direction in which incarnational theology wishes to move. Similarly, one has to ask, in the light of Morris' invocation at certain strategic points of a dogmatic bar against certain awkward positions, whether or not his work is strictly a logical demonstration of the possibility of the incarnation. If, given strong enough motivation, the theist can invoke a dogmatic presupposition to defend the doctrine of the incarnation, why should he bother to demonstrate its rationality at all? Why not just invoke the dogmatic presupposition from beginning to end and say that the doctrine of the incarnation is true

irrespective of the logical difficulties which are being raised against it?

Whilst genuine doubts may be expressed as to whether or not a human life can manifest the entirety of the divine life without violating its own integrity, this is not the end of the problem. For it may be true, as Morris has argued, that many if not all human properties are contingent, and that Jesus of Nazareth may or may not have exemplified them without diminishing his human status. In the case of the divine nature, however, it is generally acknowledged that a being such as God the Son does not exemplify his divine properties contingently but essentially. As Morris himself asks, does this not leave us with a Jesus who was omniscient, omnipotent, necessarily existent and all the rest, as well as being an itinerant Jewish preacher? "And is this not outlandish to the greatest possible degree?"(47)

The far more difficult task facing Morris is how one reconciles the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, incorporeality etc, with the limitations inherent in human nature. Divine properties, as essential properties, are not susceptible to the type of manipulation to which Morris subjected the human nature of Christ. The following section therefore shall be

devoted to an examination of the problem as to how the divine nature might become incarnate in a human life and remain divine.

1.(iv) The Integrity of the Divine Nature in Christ - Kenosis and Two-Minds

In the patristic theories of the incarnation the integrity of the divine nature was maintained by carefully distinguishing between what was appropriate to the Word as Word and what was appropriate to the Word by virtue of the the human nature which he had assumed. Contemporary defenders of incarnational theory have utilised a somewhat similar strategy involving a two-consciousness theory of Christ's person. As such an examination and critique of three exponents of a two-minds theory of the person of Christ will be the main focus of this part of the chapter. However, before coming to that some brief consideration must be given to an alternative strategy for preserving the integrity of the divine nature in Christ : the Kenotic strategy.

1.(iv) a. Kenosis

The concept of Kenosis will be dealt with only briefly here as the main focus will be directed toward the

traditional understanding of the two-nature doctrine of Chalcedon. However, as an alternative, and perennially popular alternative, to Chalcedon the concept of kenosis, or the self-emptying of the Logos in the act of incarnation must be dealt with.

The concept of Kenosis derives from the passage in Paul's letter to the Philippians, where he says,

"For the divine nature was his from the first; yet he did not think to snatch at equality with God, but made himself nothing, assuming the nature of a slave. Bearing the human likeness, revealed in human shape, he humbled himself, and in obedience accepted even death-death on a cross." Philippians 2:6-9

Here we have a reference to the humiliation and condescension of the divine Son in the act of incarnation, the divesting of heavenly glory in order to become one with us. This idea of a divine emptying, a self-limitation in order to become human is the central idea of Kenosis. The theory attained a peak of popularity in Germany in the nineteenth century through the writings of Gottfried Thomasius (1802-73). Although it received a thorough refutation at that time, it was picked up after its demise in Germany by a number of British theologians at the turn of the century, notably P.T. Forsyth, H.R. Mackintosh and Charles Gore.(48) So

strong was the theory's influence in Scotland that Kenoticism came to be seen as the besetting sin of Scottish Christology. Today, there has been a revival of interest in Kenotic theories, particularly in philosophical circles, and it is proper therefore to consider its claims to provide a viable model for the incarnation.(49)

In all its forms Kenoticism argues that the second person of the Trinity divested himself of certain divine attributes in order to become human. The question at issue therefore has been to ascertain which divine attributes are incompatible with humanity, and furthermore, which attributes can the second person of the Trinity abandon and remain divine? The theory therefore presupposes a distinction between essential and relative divine attributes.

The attributes which are normally considered to be incompatible with humanity are attributes such as omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence etc. The question therefore removes to a consideration as to whether these are essential or relative divine attributes. Obviously, Kenoticism abandons as a matter of course the traditional attribute of immutability (or at least

defines immutability in terms of God's constant faithfulness to his purpose and character).

The contemporary philosophical discussion tends to focus upon the question of omniscience as it does, on the surface level at least, seem to be an essential attribute, or one which is 'modally internal' to God.(50) This critique will follow the contemporary habit and focus upon the issue of omniscience. It has to be asked of those who posit the giving up of an omniscient state by God the Son that they provide a meaningful model or analogy which would help us to understand how an omniscient being could divest itself of what it in fact knew. The problem becomes more sharply focused when one considers that God's knowledge is intuitive and immediate and is not dependent upon experience.

Morris (who rejects Kenoticism) offers a possible analogy of a spy who is given a limited-amnesia-producing pill to prevent him from revealing secrets under torture.(51) This is offered as a plausible analogy of how a Kenosis of God the Son's knowledge might take place during the period of incarnation. Yet, surely the model applies only to creatures like ourselves who have a central storage system in the brain

which can be affected by drugs or injury. It is known that the long or short term memory capacities of a person can be affected by tampering with certain areas of the brain. However, apart from this type of interference a person cannot 'will' himself not to know that $2 + 2 = 4$, nor can he 'will' himself not to know past facts about his life.

At this point I would not consider cases of Freudian repression as a 'willing' not to know certain past facts. Whether this repression constitutes a real not knowing rather than an attempt by the sub-conscious not to accept or to ignore certain events is a moot point. The fact that such repression often reveals itself in neurotic behaviour casts some doubt on whether or not the events remain totally unknown. In any case the notion of sub-conscious repression is not a particularly apt model for the incarnation, as it is questionable whether the Divine mind could be said to have a sub-conscious element which could operate in this way.

It is true that one can forget things, but presumably this is due to the fact that either (i) the brain has a massive but limited capacity and occasionally divests itself of certain memories, or (ii) that for some reason

the person concerned cannot activate the correct neural process or path which will release the desired information. Again this is a physical storage model which cannot be held to apply to a divine being who knows what he knows essentially. How can such a being divest itself of such knowledge?

One might perhaps envisage a model where God the Father and the Spirit exercise, during the period of the incarnation, some sort of limitation upon the omniscience of the Son. However, this would seem to introduce an unwanted hierarchy into the Trinity and would probably violate the adage opera Trinitatis ad extra sunt indivisa. A further question arises, if there is a genuine divesting of knowledge, presumably Jesus does not know that he is God the Son and therefore omniscient. For it would seem to be a strange divestment of omniscience for Jesus of Nazareth to be finite in knowledge yet to include within his beliefs about himself the knowledge that he was once omniscient. Certainly the synoptic gospels do not portray Jesus as someone who was aware of his own pre-existent omniscient state.

If this was the case then one is forced to deal with the question how, at a date following the resurrection,

did Jesus regain his omniscient range of knowledge. If there had been a true kenosis with respect to knowledge then Jesus would not have been aware of a prior state when as God the Son he possessed omniscience. If he was not aware of such a prior state how could he will himself to regain it? Perhaps the answer is that the Father or the Spirit revealed it to him, but this again seems to place the Son in a subordinate position to the Father, in that, his knowledge that he is omniscient and therefore God the Son is not something he knows intuitively and essentially, but knows derivatively from the Father.

The question has been raised as to God the Son's ability to meaningfully divest himself of his omniscience. There are similar arguments that could be made for almost all of God's attributes. It would be fair to say that the main criticisms which have been directed against kenoticism since the time of Thomasius revolve around two questions. First, can one separate the divine attributes into essential and relative attributes, as the theory presupposes, without losing the divine element in the incarnation? Second, does the kenotic theory demand an unwanted separation of the divine persons so that we are constrained towards a social, and perhaps a tritheistic, understanding of the

Trinity?

To the first of these concerns Donald Baillie suggests that,

"For though the Son of God keeps his personal identity in becoming the subject of the human attributes which He assumes. He has divested Himself of the distinctively divine attributes; which would imply, if language means anything, that in becoming human He ceased to be divine."(52)

To the second Wolfhart Pannenberg points out that,

"An incarnation thus understood as incapacitation of the Son necessarily draws the doctrine of the Trinity into difficulties as well. Is not the Son, who had given up his relative divine attributes in the flesh, excluded from the Trinity for this period, since during his humiliation he was apparently not equally God with the Father and the Spirit?"(53)

In conclusion to this brief examination of kenotic theories it seems that there are good grounds for maintaining that the attributes of God are such that they will be exemplified essentially by him and that consequentially God cannot divest himself of such attributes and remain God. That question has by no means been settled finally in this discussion, but it would seem that at least the logical possibility of a genuine kenosis has been brought into question. As such I would

like to merely note the continuing possibility of a redefined kenotic strategy emerging and to move on to consider the 'two-minds' theory of the person of Christ.

1.(iv).b. Two-minds or The Black Hole of Chalcedon!

One of the most popular ways of defending the coherence of the doctrine of the incarnation in recent years has been to offer a 'two-minds', or 'two-consciousness' theory of the person of Christ. This type of approach has been advocated by such diverse writers as Brian Hebblethwaite and Karl Rahner and earlier this century by Sanday. (54) In this paper, however, consideration shall be given to three contemporary writers who have offered the most articulate and philosophically rigorous theories which have been presented so far. I refer to the works of T.V. Morris, Richard Swinburne and David Brown and I intend to deal with them in that order.

Each of these authors makes a distinctive contribution to the subject, yet the first two, at least, leave the essential difficulties of Chalcedon unresolved. Indeed they merely translate the traditional dilemmas associated with Chalcedon into a new terminology. These dilemmas which concern the difficulty in describing the true and unique subject of the person of Christ form the

'black hole' of this part of the chapter. David Brown offers a more nuanced theory which does perhaps make a genuine advance on the other two positions. However, it is part of the ongoing contention of this paper that the advance which Brown suggests is actually much more congenial to the explication of another theory of the incarnation, Baillie's famous 'paradox of grace', which Brown himself rejects, than it is to Chalcedon. The justification for this assertion is given in chapter three of this thesis.

Although there are differences in detail between the three theories which are developed, they are all similar in that they attempt to preserve the integrity of the divine nature in the incarnation by attributing the distinctively divine properties of Christ to his divine range of consciousness and the distinctively human properties to his human range of consciousness. As such they may be regarded as following the classical pattern of distinguishing between what is appropriate to the Word as Word and what is appropriate to the Word by virtue of the human nature which he assumed.

To begin with Thomas Morris who has offered by far the most complete version of the 'two-minds' theory and as such provides the clearest example of what such a theory

might entail. Firstly, the claim is made that a person is not identical with a particular range of consciousness, experience or beliefs which he might happen to have.(55) This means that we can allow in the one person, Jesus of Nazareth, two distinct ranges of consciousness, one divine and one human. The divine mind which is omniscient contains everything that is contained in the human mind but is not itself contained by the human mind. The human mind or consciousness came into existence at the birth of Jesus and grew and developed as the boy Jesus grew. It drew its information and knowledge of the external world, including cultural and social beliefs in the same way as any other human mind. As Morris asserts "the earthly range of consciousness, and self-consciousness, was thoroughly human, Jewish and first century Palestinian in nature."(56)

The relationship between the divine and human minds is described as asymmetric. That is the divine mind had immediate access to the contents of the human mind but the human mind had only that access to the divine mind which was allowed by the divine mind and which was possible for it to have given its finite cognitive abilities. This arrangement accounts for the gospel pictures of Jesus which portray a man who underwent real

moral and spiritual growth, who confessed to ignorance and who truly felt forsaken by God on the cross. All these experiences are true experiences of Jesus in his human range of consciousness. The divine range of consciousness knows about these experiences of course but it does not itself experience them directly.

How Morris pictures this can be best understood by his answer to the question 'could Jesus be tempted to sin?' The problem here is that God is necessarily good and cannot be tempted to sin, whereas the New Testament portrays Jesus as undergoing real experiences of temptation to which he did not succumb. According to Morris, Jesus could be tempted to sin just in case it was epistemically possible for him to sin.(57) That is, if in his earthly range of consciousness he did not rule out the possibility of his sinning. In order for this to be the case the earthly range of consciousness would have to lack at least one piece of information available to the divine range of consciousness, namely, that he was necessarily good and as such that it was impossible for him to sin.(58)

The outcome is that Jesus in his earthly range of consciousness believed that it was possible for him to sin but in fact did not.(This is obviously a claim of

faith rather than an empirically provable fact). In order to be tempted all that is required is for Jesus to believe that he could possibly sin. In fact he could not have sinned for the divine mind would have **prevented** such an occurrence. But we have to believe (again by faith) that the divine mind did not prevent it in any way and that Jesus' choice to resist temptation was a truly free choice of his human range of consciousness.(59) The role of the divine mind in Morris' theory at this point gives clear indication as to who he believes to be the true subject of Jesus' actions.

At this point a number of alarm bells will be ringing in the minds of those with only the faintest acquaintance with early Christian heresy. These suspicions can only be further heightened by the way in which Morris attempts to defend himself from the charge of Nestorianism as he is forced to consider the question; "if, in the case of God incarnate, we have a human and a divine mind, how do we avoid the Nestorian conclusion that we have two persons?"(60)

Morris repeats the point that a range of consciousness or mind is not to be equated with a person. A person may have more than one range of consciousness. Justification

for this assertion is found in notions of split-personality and Freudian theories of the divided conscious and subconscious mind in every human person. Morris also utilises a theory developed by Aquinas to support his position. This theory makes use of the concept of a suppositum which is a whole of a particular kind, an individual bearer of properties. An individual person would normally constitute a suppositum. However, although it is conceded that in all normal circumstances the conjunction of a rational soul and a body would normally constitute a suppositum or individual person, in the case of the incarnate Word they do not. The human soul and body of Christ do not constitute a suppositum apart from their union with the divine person of God the Son in the incarnation.(61)

Morris applies this directly to the 'two minds' hypothesis. Normally, minds and persons would be individuated in a one to one correlation. Indeed outside the act of the incarnation it may be impossible for a mere human being to exhibit more than one range of consciousness at a time. But in the case of Jesus a human body and a soul do not suffice to individuate a person. Only with the divine mind of God the Son do they individuate a person who is both human and divine.(62)

With this we have almost reached the end of Morris' defence of the Chalcedonian definition of the person of Christ via a 'two-minds' hypothesis. There is, however, one problem still outstanding. What is it exactly that makes the two minds arrangement unique in the case of Jesus of Nazareth? Presumably, the divine mind, which is omniscient, has unlimited access to every human mind. Is it the case then, according to the 'two-minds' theory', that God is incarnate in each and every one of us?

Morris is aware of this difficulty and answers thus:

"..In Jesus' case, the earthly mind is contained in the Divine mind in a distinctive way. Jesus was a being who was fully human, but he was not a created human being. He was not a being endowed with a set of personal cognitive and causal powers distinct from the cognitive and causal powers of God the Son. For Jesus was the same person as God the Son. Thus, the personal cognitive and causal powers operative in the case of Jesus' earthly mind were just none other than the cognitive and causal powers of God the Son. The results of their operation through the human body, under the constraints proper to the conditions of a fully human existence, were just such so as to give rise to a human mind, an earthly noetic structure distinct from the properly divine noetic structure involved with the unconstrained exercise of divine powers."(63)

Morris is attempting to indicate here the way in which the human mind of Jesus is 'metaphysically owned' by the divine mind in a way which is unique and distinctive. For only if there is a distinct and unique ownership of

the mind of Jesus by God the Word can he claim a true identity of person between them. That is why the notion of epistemic access is not sufficient to count as a unique incarnation in Christ. For clearly the divine mind has such epistemic access to every human mind.

The desire to establish identity has led Morris into rocky and treacherous waters. There is at least an initial charge of an incipient docetism hovering in the background when he argues that the 'cognitive and causal powers of the earthly mind of Jesus of Nazareth were none other than the cognitive and casual powers of God the Son.' There is perhaps too the faint aroma of Apollinarianism in the attempt to show that the mind of God the Son is the mind of Jesus of Nazareth, albeit operating under the restrictions of a fully human existence. And what of these restrictions? How do the cognitive and causal powers of God the Son being restricted by the constraints of human existence, thereby giving rise to a fully human mind, differ from a kenotic restriction or giving up of certain properties? It seems that in Morris' mind they must differ as he has rejected kenoticism as logically impossible, given his Anselmian conception of God as maximal being, yet it is hard to see what the difference is.

The problem of identity and uniqueness of ownership is one that Morris has yet to solve. In his most recent article on the subject "The Metaphysics of God Incarnate" he admits, "that I am no more sure about how to spell out what constitutes metaphysical ownership in the case of the Incarnation than I am to spell out exactly what it is for a range of mentality to be a part of my mind, or to belong to me."(64) Again we are led to the argument that the complete human mental system of Jesus was not intended alone to define a person. Rather,

"It was created to belong to a person with a divine mind as well, as the ultimately hierarchically maximal mental system. At any point during the metaphysical event of the Incarnation, it is thus possible that the human capacities of Christ, or the entirety of what we are calling his human mental system be subsumed and overridden by the divine mind without it being the case that any person's freedom is thereby abrogated. And this is a crucial difference between Jesus and any other human being, indeed, between Jesus and any free-willed creature of God."(65)

To show how far Morris pursues this approach one further example is offered. Morris considers the question of whether or not Christ could be said to have had erroneous beliefs. The answer, we are told, must be given in terms of the 'two-minds' hypothesis and we are directed to the earthly range of consciousness in which we may say that Jesus possessed certain erroneous

beliefs concerning, for example, the cosmos. Morris proceeds to argue in the following fashion:

"However, if the question is pressed, if we must be able to say, in principle, what the one person Jesus of Nazareth believed about this or that issue, we must recognise the priority of the divine and represent God the Son's ultimate 'doxastic' state as being captured in his divine omniscience.. ...This feature of hierarchical organisation does not leave us in puzzlement concerning the final story about the person."(66)

The 'two-minds' view as presented by Morris does seem, despite his best intentions, to posit, in Smith's words, an ontological gulf in the person of Christ as great as any Nestorian. Consider this example. The divine mind is omniscient and consequently aware of its necessary goodness. The human mind is limited and not aware of its own necessary goodness. On this view we may say that there are properties which the one person Jesus of Nazareth has, which the person Jesus of Nazareth lacks. That is being aware of his own necessary goodness

The only solution to this dilemma is to argue, as Morris does, that the 'higher' range of consciousness has a greater claim to constitute that set of properties which instantiate the person. Alternatively, we could imagine a Thomistic infusion of knowledge whereby the human mind of Jesus is aware of its necessary goodness. But this does not solve the problem, for the divine mind is still essentially aware of its necessary goodness whilst the

human mind is only derivatively aware. To argue that Jesus in his divine range of consciousness is essentially aware of his necessary goodness whilst in his human range of consciousness he is only contingently aware of it, is only to posit the ontological gulf in a different guise. For how can one person know something essentially and contingently at the same time.

This follows from the insistence that there is one person Jesus of Nazareth/God the Son. Under the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals any property which applies to Jesus of Nazareth must apply to God the Son and vice versa. On the above argument then it can be said that God the Son/Jesus of Nazareth is both omniscient and limited in knowledge. This can be said because he has two ranges of consciousness, one divine, one human. But of course one person cannot be omniscient and limited in knowledge at the same time. If one is omniscient then one is aware of all the knowledge that one's limited range of consciousness lacks. Suppose that set 'A' is the set of all that can be known and all that it is possible to know and that set 'B' is all that Jesus of Nazareth knew. An omniscient being would possess set 'A', but of course set 'B' would already be included in set 'A' and would add nothing to set 'A'. Therefore to say God the Son had a limited range of

consciousness through his human incarnation is to add nothing to what he in fact already knew.

It is this point that reveals that all the talk of a separate and limited human range of consciousness is a fiction. In Morris' scheme the subject of all experience is God the Son who embraces any human range of consciousness in his omniscience. There really cannot be one person who is both omniscient and yet limited in knowledge, there can only be one person who is omniscient, or two persons, one omniscient and one limited. In other words to speak of an omniscient person having a limited range of consciousness is self-referentially incoherent.(67)

There are two possible ways out of this dilemma. One which Morris seems to embrace but ultimately holds back on, is to argue that the human mind of Jesus is the mind of God the Son. Morris seems to want to say this when he argues that the 'cognitive and causal powers of God the Son gave rise to the cognitive and causal powers of Jesus of Nazareth' but, given his argument that the mind of Jesus was a product of its time and thoroughly Palestinian in nature and capable of holding false beliefs, it is hard to know exactly what he means by this.

The danger facing Morris is that any firming up of the argument that the mind of God the Son produces the mind of Jesus of Nazareth would seem to threaten the fully human status of that mind. Part of the problem is that Morris understands the mind solely in terms of a noetic structure or a system of beliefs. Yet a living consciousness, a person, is much more than a system of beliefs, it is also a centre of volition and will. If it is argued that the rational and cognitive powers of Jesus of Nazareth are in fact the rational and cognitive powers of God the Son, does this mean that the will of Jesus is also the will of God the Son? Morris' clearly believes that Jesus had a human will for he asserts that Jesus always chose aright. But his insistence that if Jesus had not chosen aright he would in fact have been prevented from deviating from the divine will by the intervention of God the Son clearly threatens the reality of that will. Or it leaves us with a theory which, as John Hick mischievously suggests, is not not a Chalcedonian theory of the incarnation, but is rather a theory which argues that,

"...Jesus is God incarnate, not in the sense that the personal will that was encountered by all who met Jesus was the will of God the Son operating on earth but in the sense that God singled Jesus out for special treatment—namely by not allowing him to go wrong."(68)

It has been necessary to dwell at some length on Morris' attempt to defend Chalcedon as he elaborates in rigorous detail a defence which is now being utilised by many philosophers in relation to the doctrine of the incarnation. It is undoubtedly a bold, innovative and extremely technical defence of the Chalcedonian formulation of the person of Christ. As such it deserves to be treated with considerable respect. Its failure, perhaps, is that it is too good a translation of the two-natures doctrine of Chalcedon into the 'two minds' theory of Morris. In other words the problems, ambiguities and tensions surrounding the subject of the incarnation which haunt Chalcedon are carried over unresolved into Morris' scheme.

This is evident from the profound ambiguity at the centre of Morris's presentation which mirrors that of Chalcedon itself. Viewed from one perspective Morris is a defender of the Alexandrian interpretation of Chalcedon and comes very close to a modern presentation of the classical theory of anhypostasia or at best enhypostasia. That an Alexandrian christology is his preferred option is clear from his citations of Athanasius and Cyril and from his constant opposing of this interpretation with what he understands a Nestorian position to be.

Morris' 'two-minds' theory suffers too from the classical fault of the Alexandrian scheme in that although he accords a technical and formal place for the full humanity of Christ in his theory, he allows it to play no real useful or valid role in his system. This is clear when he argues that the divine mind would prevent Jesus from freely choosing evil. This implies that the choices of Jesus' human consciousness are relevant only when they mimic the choices of God the Son. If that is the case what was the point of Jesus possessing a truly human consciousness?

In the three assertions:(i)that the cognitive and causal powers of Jesus of Nazareth were none other than the cognitive and causal powers of God the Son,(ii) that the ultimate belief state which really matters in the incarnation is the belief state of God the Son,(iii) that God could override the choices of Jesus without violating his personal freedom, there is a complete contemporary presentation of the Alexandrian concept of the Logos as the subject and centre of the actions of Jesus of Nazareth. On this reading, the charge of an incipient docetism, a prevailing problem for the Alexandrian tradition, certainly remains a problem for their modern interpreter. Finally, Morris in his admission that he has no clear idea what constituted

'metaphysical ownership' in the case of the incarnation seems to be blissfully ignorant of the fact that the issue of what constitutes 'metaphysical ownership' is precisely the major difficulty that has haunted theology in its interpretation of Chalcedon. Thus Morris can hardly be said to have shown the logical possibility of Chalcedon nor advanced significantly the interpretation of it, thereby justifying my claim that he has carried over into his scheme the central difficulties and ambiguities of Chalcedon.

Notwithstanding all that has been said there is an ambiguity at the heart of Morris' presentation which has led to the charge of Nestorianism being made against him.(69) This seems an unlikely charge given his Alexandrian preferences and the foregoing criticisms of his position. The ambiguity stems from two separate sources. Firstly, Morris is a modern person and cannot ultimately separate what it means to be a person from the modern conception of a psychological subject of experience and will. As such he is anxious, however, unsuccessfully, to argue for a real and complete individual man at the heart of the incarnation. Secondly, his strategy for protecting the perfections of the divine nature within the incarnate person by sharply separating what is appropriate to the 'two-

minds' is a thoroughly Antiochene and Nestorian strategy.

Morris' strategy for defending the logical propriety of Chalcedon is one which Nestorius would heartily have approved of. The idea that God the Son was impassible, perfectly good, omnipotent etc., in his divine range of consciousness (for Nestorius, read 'nature') and passible, finite, subject to temptation in his earthly range of consciousness (human nature) is Nestorian through and through. The Alexandrian attribution of properties appropriate to the Word as Word and those appropriate to the flesh as flesh differs from this by refusing to acknowledge a separate and complete hypostasis of the human nature of Christ. The Antiochenes demanded a complete and full hypostasis of the human nature precisely because they felt that the Alexandrian rejection of a human hypostasis threatened the impassibility of the Word. (There was also a strong soteriological motive too).

Just as Nestorius' separation of the divine and human natures threatened the unity of the person of Christ so also does Morris' separation of the divine and human ranges of consciousness. Morris' appeal to a special and particular use of the term person in relation to Christ

cannot save him here. For he would have to show how his special and particular use of the term person differs qualitatively from Nestorius' term prosopon. The normal accusation levelled against the prosopic union is that it fails to demonstrate the ontological basis of the union of God and man in Christ sufficiently. Morris, however, must either strengthen the Alexandrian nature of his theory, in which case the true reality of the man Jesus evaporates, or he stresses the true humanity of Christ. In which case his admission of ignorance as to what constitutes the 'metaphysical ownership' of Jesus by God the Son begins to look very Nestorian.

The Antiochene tradition on the whole has received an unfavourable press on the question of its inability to maintain a true unity of person in the figure of Christ. Yet the truth of the matter is that it fares no worse than the orthodox tradition. Either the orthodox tradition must favour an anhypostatic theory whereby God the Son is the person and the full and true humanity of Christ is thereby threatened, although maintained in a theoretical sense. Or it must embrace the position of Aquinas, and favoured by Morris, and argue that there is a special and unique sense of the term person which applies to the incarnate Christ and no-one else. This is

a possible and viable position but it appears arbitrary on the face of it to assert that the Antiochene prosopic unity is necessarily less successful in maintaining, what was its clear intention, a unity of person. This is a point which is simply referred to at this point but which shall be given deeper consideration in chapter three.

If it seems strange that a particular theory can be accused of being both Antiochene and Alexandrian then it is worthwhile remembering that Morris is attempting to defend Chalcedon and that Chalcedon has long been viewed as a compromise between those two schools. On the one hand Morris clearly wishes to favour an Alexandrian interpretation, but fails to spell it out precisely and exactly because to do so would threaten Jesus's humanity. On the other hand Morris' recourse to a 'two-minds' strategy brings him very close to the Antiochene position.

Perhaps the main reason that Morris comes so perilously close to the position of Nestorius is that by using the category of consciousness to explicate christology he imports contemporary psychological notions of the person and personality into the metaphysical structures of classical doctrine. This importation of modern

categories of the person may mean that Morris is ultimately unable to reflect faithfully and accurately either school of thought. Thus Morris hesitates perpetually unable to fall decisively on either side of the Alexandrian/Antiochene divide which might not be a bad description of Chalcedon either.

The second 'two-minds' theory which will be considered is that offered by Richard Swinburne in an article entitled "Could God become Man?"(70) Swinburne utilises a 'two-minds theory' which is in all essential respects similar to that of Morris and it is not therefore necessary to go to great lengths in outlining it. He differs in one vital and crucial respect from Morris in that he clearly offers a criterion of identity between God and Jesus of Nazareth. God and Jesus of Nazareth are the same person because they possess the same soul.(71) Swinburne has elsewhere argued that the principle of human identity is the soul and he utilises that theory to offer a defence of Chalcedon. Swinburne, like Morris, maintains a 'modally exalted' view of the divine nature and uses the 'two-minds' view of the person of Christ to defend it.

To be human, according to Swinburne, is to have a human body animated by a human soul. For God to become man on

this theory he would have to unite his soul to a human body. This would be a genuine human being albeit with a unique mental system. Yet it would be human because it was a human body animated by a soul "...for nothing can become a man (while remaining what it is) unless it has its principle of identity, the soul which is subsequently the human soul."(72)

If the principle of identity in a human person is the possession of a soul, the problem that Swinburne must deal with is how the 'soul' of God becomes the soul of the man Jesus. Swinburne (obviously possessing a deeper acquaintance with the production of souls than the present writer) argues that;

" The mechanism which gives rise to souls cannot dictate which soul will arise, for in general souls do not exist before birth and so there can be no law dictating that a particular bodily process will give rise to this soul as opposed to that one. All the mechanism can do is to ensure that it gives rise to a soul, which will then have a certain mental life. That soul, God could ensure, without violating that mechanism, was his own soul."(73)

And again,

"So if we don't draw the limit of the human too strictly, certainly God can become man. He would do this by acquiring a human body (joining his soul to an unowned human body), acting beliefs, sensations and desires through it.(74)

It is clear that for Swinburne to be a human being you must have a human body which is animated by a soul, but that this soul need not be a created soul. Swinburne argues that the soul is the subject of experience and initiator of action, and is the essential part of any human being or person, whose possession makes any future individual that individual. Souls, however, are not eternal, they do not come into existence before birth.(75) On this reading then, Jesus of Nazareth differs from every other human being in that the soul which he possesses, his principle of identity, is not a normal 'human' soul but the soul of God.

Having established a criterion for identity between God the Son and Jesus of Nazareth, Swinburne goes on to consider the difficulty of one person possessing contradictory attributes. It is to this end that he utilises the 'two-mind' theory in a manner similar to Morris and the criticisms levelled against that theory apply to Swinburne's treatment too.

It is hard not to poke a little fun at Swinburne as he so confidently describes the normal mechanisms for the production of souls with the certainty of a man who has seen them rolling off a production line. But one should applaud the attempt to provide a clear and unequivocal

criterion of identity between God and Jesus of Nazareth.

There are, however, certain problems which confront his account. The first, and by no means the easiest to refute, is that Swinburne's theory looks remarkably like a modern day version of Apollinarianism. Apollinarius taught that the Logos was the controlling and rational principle in the person of Christ. He was condemned by the Cappadocian adage "What has not been assumed has not been redeemed" In other words there was a clear recognition that a full and undiminished humanity, including the possession of a rational soul, was required in the person of Christ. Swinburne acknowledges that Chalcedon declared Christ to have a 'reasonable soul', however, he understands this to mean a human way of thinking and acting. Swinburne's acknowledgment of a human range of consciousness may be some defence against the charge of Apollinarianism, but his continual use of terminology such as 'the soul of God acquired a human body through which he acts' leaves some doubt as to the reality of the humanity of Christ.

Swinburne is aware of the difficulty, for he quotes the Cappadocian adage in his article, but he does not provide a satisfactory solution to the problem. It is surely not sufficient to say that a human person is

someone with a human body animated by a human soul and then to say that God could have become man by animating a human body with the soul of God. For it would still be true that there is an infinite qualitative difference between human souls and the divine soul. Swinburne acknowledges this when he says that normally souls do not exist before birth. In other words they are contingent, created and therefore finite. The soul of God is presumably not finite, contingent and created.

The question suggests itself if it is possible to treat the human body as what might best be described as some form of 'person shell'? Swinburne's original statement was that to be human was to have a body animated by a 'human' soul. However, he went on to say that Jesus Christ was human because he had a human body animated by the soul of God. This leads to the conclusion that the body is a 'person shell' which can be indiscriminately animated by a normal human soul, or the soul of God, or perhaps any old form of soul, yet for it to still form an authentic human being. This may be being unfair to Swinburne but he should clarify the distinction between the soul of God and human souls and explain why they are interchangeable in this way.

Is it the case that a divine soul can take the place of

a human soul merely because both are incorporeal? Is it correct to say that God possesses a soul in this sense? Again Swinburne's imprecision makes interpretation difficult. For he refers throughout the article to the soul of God. On a superficial reading this would mean that his theory was asserting that God simpliciter was incarnate in Christ. However, as Swinburne is defending Chalcedon, which clearly states that God the Son was incarnate in Christ, then perhaps the phrase soul of God should be expanded to read the soul of God the Son. Although there is a reputable tradition which regards the incarnation as a work of the whole Trinity the idea that the 'soul' of God simpliciter became incarnate in Christ would accord most easily with a modalist theory of God rather than a Trinitarian one.

But to expand the phrase to the 'soul of God the Son' would bring its own difficulties for it would then seem that Swinburne's theory calls for three divine souls corresponding to Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Yet given that Swinburne believes that the soul is the principle of identity and individuation, does this not necessarily lead to tritheism, three individual Gods corresponding to three divine souls? Given this type of difficulty more work will have to be done to show that it establishes a plausible model for the incarnation. More

work will have to be done to show how this is a genuine human existence rather than the eternal soul of God the Son masquerading as a human being through the medium of a body.

Swinburne goes some way to attempting to meet this charge by using the 'two-minds' hypothesis. It is clear that he intends to attribute a real human will and consciousness to Christ. Ultimately, however, he faces the same difficulties as Morris did if pressed as to the true subject of the actions of Christ. Either he must make reference to the divine soul, which on his view is the ultimate subject of experience and the initiator of action, thereby making the humanity illusory. Or he must so stress the separateness of the human and divine ranges of consciousness that he loses the unity of the person. Swinburne's use of the soul as the principle of identity will always mean that his theory is pulled towards the Alexandrian pole of the dichotomy and, as such, threaten the true humanity of Christ. Indeed, Swinburne has, as I have tried to indicate, come as close to an Apollinarian presentation of the person of Christ as it is possible for a twentieth century person to come. As such a real question mark must be placed against his attempt to demonstrate the logical coherence of Chalcedon.

Further work will also have to be done by Swinburne to fully establish his dualistic theory that the soul is the principle of individuation and identity. Although he has argued forcefully for this it is by no means a widely accepted position among philosophers or theologians. Therefore, its acceptance as an account of the philosophical verity of the incarnation is likely to be extremely limited.

The third and most theologically sophisticated presentation of the 'two-minds' theory of the person of Christ is that offered by David Brown in The Divine Trinity. He asks,

"What would take us in the direction of speaking of one person...it has already been noted that a common external presentation is insufficient....Clearly what is required to justify passing beyond such metaphor is a reference to internal psychology, that indicates some kind of ontological bond between the two centres of consciousness.(76)

Brown develops what he terms a 'flow' account of the 'two-minds' model. By this he means that there is a continuous flow or interchange of experiences and information between the two centres of consciousness. "The human nature experiences to the maximum extent compatible with it remaining a human nature, all the internal life of God the Son in his trinitarian relations".(77) Of course the human consciousness would

not know that it was participating in the divine relationship as there would be no comparable experiences which it could compare with this one, it would be unable to distinguish what it was experiencing from any other case of prophetic inspiration or mystical union with God.

However, before it is possible to properly speak of one person it has to be asserted that the flow of information goes the other way too, from human to divine. Brown criticises Aquinas' idea of a constant infusing of information in the incarnation as it only goes one way. He argues that if the flow only goes one way the simplest explanation would be to speak of a divine assumption or inspiring of a human personality. (78) Of course there are limits as to what information the divine nature could receive from the human nature without transforming it. For example, the divine range of consciousness could not receive any erroneous beliefs about the world. Similarly, the divine perspective on suffering would be such as to transform the human experience entirely.

Like Morris and Swinburne, Brown is aware that the divine range of consciousness has this total perspective and access to every human mind in any case, he is

therefore left with the problem of showing how this arrangement in the case of Jesus of Nazareth is unique and distinctive to Jesus alone. Brown considers the possibility that in this case the 'flow' of information and knowledge is freely communicated and never against or despite the human nature.(79) But this soon proves to be inadequate as an explanation, for the reason that it is hard to see how the omniscient access to our minds could ever be said to be against our wills. Furthermore, it is necessary to speak of a unity of experience as well as a sharing of information before identity of person can be established.

In a passage that will be returned to at a later stage Brown argues that, **"in this case and in this case alone, God allows himself to be directly affected by human experience in some sense beyond that of merely knowing that certain things are happening."**(80) Brown concedes that the difficulty has always lain in specifying precisely what this further sense is, however vital it may be.

In order to specify what he means Brown has to make certain adjustments and modifications to the two nature model of Chalcedon. For in order to claim that there is a single person present in the union the notion of

divine impassibility has to be modified. This follows from the fact that to speak legitimately of one person means that the divine consciousness must truly experience the experiences of the human nature of Christ. Brown does not completely reject impassibility but argues that the concept of incarnation reinterprets impassibility to mean the divine consciousness having such an omniscient perspective on pain and suffering so that those experiences although felt are transformed in some way. In the same way the omniscient mind would experience the death of Jesus as the personal loss of bodily experiences and the cessation of the flow of information.

This modification of the term impassibility allows the divine consciousness to be the subject of the human experiences of Jesus of Nazareth. Such openness to the human experience of Jesus has to be stronger than mere sympathy if we are to justify talk of one person. According to Brown talk of one person is justified because of the unique way in which the divine nature is affected by this particular human life.(B1)

Pursuing this line of thought leads Brown to turn the usual 'two- minds' model on its head. It has been shown, in the models already considered, that the divine mind

is the primary subject of the person, making it difficult to know if anything other than a formal recognition of humanity is being made. Brown doubts whether his line of argument makes it possible to continue to maintain the priority of the divine consciousness in the incarnate life of Christ. He argues that in his model the human consciousness has ceased to be a mere cipher but has a real role to play. For it is the thoughts, experiences, words and deeds of the human mind which receive expression in the life of the incarnate one rather than the divine mind.(82)

Brown does not wish to deny the divine commitment or involvement in the life of the one incarnate person; it is just that the usual position is reversed in that the divine nature receives things at 'second hand' from the human nature.(83) Brown argues that this does nothing to undermine the tenability of the model since he argues that it need not always be the highest range of consciousness that most reaches expression if the entity spoken of is to be spoken of as one person.(84) By way of reinforcing this point Brown refers to Luther's method in Christology which stresses the human nature of Christ as the primary subject in the incarnation.

It is clear from what has been said that Brown's thesis

is substantially different from those offered by Morris and Swinburne in the real role that it offers the human life of Jesus despite sharing a 'two-minds model'. It should be said at once that there is much that should be valued in Brown's theory, particularly his stress on the human life of Jesus as the focus of expression of the divine purpose and love. The priority of the human life of Jesus in Brown's theory separates his contribution from that of Morris and Swinburne and absolves him of any taint of docetism that haunts the other 'two-minds' models.

Yet one wants to ask in what sense this is a faithful representation of Chalcedon. If it is Chalcedonian, then it has to be admitted that it is Chalcedon viewed from a very Antiochene perspective. No Alexandrian theologian could have attributed such an importance to the human individual in the act of incarnation that it was the words, deeds and thoughts of the human mind that principally came to expression in the incarnate life. (One doubts even if an Antiochene thinker would have said this either.)

For what is the ontological connection in Brown's theory? What constitutes and justifies talk of one person? It is a divine 'allowing', a divine allowing

which enables the divine mind to experience the thoughts, activities and deeds of Jesus Christ in a unique and distinctive way.

But, given Brown's insistence that Jesus could not distinguish his human experience of the divine mind from any other experience, and given that Jesus's human consciousness was unaware that it was participating in the divine life, and given that it was the thoughts and deeds of the human consciousness which principally came to expression in the incarnate life (albeit prompted and influenced by the divine consciousness) is all this not nearer to the language of inspiration rather than incarnation? It has to be conceded that Brown's theory, at least as interpreted here, is much nearer to the Antiochene approach of an indwelling by 'good pleasure' rather than an incarnation, an embodiment of the Divine Word. In the third chapter of this thesis an attempt will be made to show that these alternatives are not stark absolutes and that a middle way is possible through them and that Brown's theory may be of some value in suggesting the direction that middle way should take.

It should be stressed that Brown rejects the 'Antiochene' model of christology (although he values

its stress upon the complete humanity of Jesus) and distinguishes it quite clearly from the Chalcedonian model.(85) Therefore the argument that Brown's thesis is best viewed as a continuation of this type of approach is controversial. Yet it is possible to argue that the position he develops, indeed the very choice of a 'two-minds' model which necessarily brings overtones of duality, forces Brown towards the 'Antiochene' position.

In summing up this consideration of the logical defence of the two nature model of Chalcedon via a 'two-minds' strategy we may say that there is still an unresolved ambiguity at the heart of each system as to the true subject in the incarnate life of Christ. This inherent ambiguity is not an unimportant point of only passing interest. It does point to the extent to which almost any modern understanding of the incarnation must necessarily be removed from the concerns of the early Greek fathers, both Alexandrian and Antiochene.

Perhaps of all the models considered here only that offered by Richard Swinburne offers a close approximation to the thought of the early fathers. The reason for Swinburne's proximity, and Morris and Brown's distance, is that only Swinburne offers a decidedly

dualistic understanding of the person of Christ. As such, like the early fathers, he is prepared to give a clear criterion of identity between God the Son and Jesus of Nazareth, namely, that the soul of God the Son is embodied in the human frame of Jesus of Nazareth and is the ultimate controlling principle of thought and action.

Morris' 'two-minds' theory is intended to arrive at the same position but as has been shown he is ultimately unclear as to what constitutes 'metaphysical ownership' of the mind of Jesus of Nazareth by the mind of God the Son. Morris' theory hesitates perpetually on either side of the dilemma finally unable to decide in which way to move forward. The result, as Hick has pointed out, is that his theory does not so much give an account of the incarnation of God the Son, but instead offers the picture of a mind controlling the mind of Jesus which prevents him from ever contravening the will of God the Son. The result is that the purpose and plan of the mind of God the Son come to expression in the life of Jesus and that the experiences of Jesus are 'owned' by God the Son. But is this the traditional idea of incarnation? Framed in this way, a reasonable reading of the 'two-minds' theory, would conclude that it reads much more like an 'inspirational' christology than a

'metaphysical' christology. This same 'inspirational' tendency is found, and indeed is much stronger, in Brown's theory despite his strenuous attempts to avoid it.

The reason for this is not hard to find for it would seem that any attempt to defend Chalcedon by recourse to 'two-minds' necessarily imports into Chalcedon traces of the modern psychological categories of the person (intention, relationality, self-consciousness etc.) that were not immediately at the heart of the classical notion of person. The result is to move the theory away from strict ontological categories into contemporary psychological categories with all that that entails. The move from ontology to psychology mirrors the movement of thought which replaces an 'embodied Word' with a 'controlling consciousness in an asymmetric accessing relationship with a human consciousness'. Thus the movement from incarnation to inspiration becomes inevitable. For what is an 'asymmetric accessing relationship' if not a neologism for what theologians traditionally meant by inspiration, although with all the warmth of a term which draws upon the realm of human experience missing when replaced by terminology drawn from the language of information technology?

There is much more that could be said about all these theories and doubtless the authors could and would respond to the criticisms offered here. Yet there is substance in the assertion that rather than solving and defending the difficulties of Chalcedon they merely translate them into contemporary terminology. Any appearance of a solution is gained by the inevitable move away from strictly incarnational language towards language which may be characterised as strongly inspirational language.

The central problems lying at the heart of Chalcedon remain unsolved. Is there a unified person? Is a full humanity retained in anything other than a formal sense? The extended and accentuated sense given to the term person in Morris' theory tends to lead to the conclusion that it is not. For either the term means something like what we mean when we use the term of another person or it does not. If in the incarnation we use the term in a way which applies only to Jesus of Nazareth then the whole purpose of insisting upon a oneness of person begins to lose its point.

This ambiguity surrounding the term person constitutes the 'black hole' at the centre of Chalcedon into which the 'two-minds' theorists seem to have stumbled. There

is a real question as to whether or not a non-dualistic understanding of the person of Christ can reflect Chalcedon accurately. The attempt therefore, to demonstrate the possibility of a strictly literal and logical identity between God the Son and Jesus of Nazareth in Chalcedonian terms must be considered to have failed. This is not to say that it cannot be done but merely that the difficulties which have been outlined in this treatment of the problem must be attended to by those who feel that they wish to move forward in this direction.

This thesis, however, will move forward in a different direction by exploring the concept of what might be involved in the concept of the divine 'allowing' of itself to experience the human life of Jesus of Nazareth uniquely and directly. The primary category which suggests itself to explicate this 'allowing' is the category of God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth. Whether this type of approach has parallels with other theories and whether or not it can justify the term incarnation will be the concern of the following chapters. But only after some consideration has been given to the claim that incarnational language is not literal and fact asserting but is primarily metaphorical and value affirming. It is to a

Two Into One Won't Go!

consideration of this claim that the next chapter is devoted.

CHAPTER TWO

METAPHOR : THE POETIC OF FAITH

The Conflict of Appropriateness and Dissonance

2.(i) Introduction

The first chapter may be thought of as having a decidedly negative purpose. Its purpose was to examine some contemporary defences of Chalcedonian christology that understood incarnational statements as literal statements of identity. The conclusion to that discussion was that none of the defences advanced significantly upon Chalcedon itself and that most if not all of the difficulties traditionally associated with Chalcedon resurfaced in the treatments offered by its contemporary advocates.

This is not a new or particularly startling conclusion as many critics of Chalcedonian christology have arrived at precisely the same position. However, the value of the discussion lay in showing precisely why the contemporary representations of Chalcedon failed, and more particularly why the two-minds positions of Morris and Brown had an inevitable tendency to drift towards what they characterised as an inspirational or psychological christology despite their best intentions. There are many possible reasons for their failure to successfully defend a Chalcedonian christology, ranging from the possibility that the contemporary defences of Chalcedonian christology are not themselves particularly

faithful to the historic credal formulations, to the possibility that Chalcedon cannot be coherently defended as it contains at its heart a massive contradiction which has only been accentuated in modern times due to the development of the dynamic relational and psychological understanding of the human person.

Certainly one cannot rule out as unreasonable, or unduly critical, the opinions of those who have argued that there is no way forward for christology through following the Chalcedonian pattern. One such critic has argued that a possible way forward from this negative position is to treat incarnational language not as literal and fact asserting but instead as metaphorical and to some extent value asserting. The critic in question is John Hick who writes;

" They have not asked what kind of language use one is engaging in when one says that Jesus was God the Son Incarnate. Is it a factual statement (a combined statement, presumably about empirical and metaphysical facts, or does it express a commitment, or make value judgements, and is its meaning literal or metaphorical or symbolic, or mythological, or poetic...? (1)

Later, in the same article, after asserting that both the councils of Nicaea and Chalcedon intended their statements to be literal statements of identity, Hick makes his now famous comparison that to say Jesus of Nazareth was also God is equivalent to saying that a

circle is a square. Hick concludes therefore that the real point and value of incarnational language is not to indicate facts but to express a valuation and to evoke a certain attitude.(2)

Hick's view is, of course, exceedingly common and is rooted in the widely held distinction between literal and figurative language. In this view literal language refers directly and unproblematically to states of affairs in the real world whilst figurative language, especially metaphorical language, is in some sense parasitic upon this literal predication. Metaphorical language is on this account a deviant usage used solely for ornamental effect and conveying no new information.

Such a distinction is not exclusively the domain of critics of traditional incarnational language. Precisely the same fact/value distinction as that made by Hick (although drawing extremely different conclusions) is made by that staunch defender of theological and scientific realism T.F. Torrance, who puts it the following way,

"Thus in spite of the hymnic character of the Creed [Nicene] its language cannot be treated as if it were merely symbolic....employing aesthetic, non-conceptual forms of thought that are related to God in a detached, oblique way, but that derive their meaning and justification mainly through co-ordination with the religious imagination and self-understanding of the Church. Rather is the language to be regarded as

essentially significative, employing conceptual forms that are intended to refer us to God in a direct and cognitive way....If they are merely symbolic, then the spatial element in them can be interpreted quite easily, in a merely metaphorical or tropical sense, yet at the expense of any conceptual correlation with the inherent intelligibility of God."(3)

It is clear that for both Torrance and Hick, although taking very different views on the value and continuing relevance of the credal statements of the Church, the assertion that christological language is metaphorical or figurative is equivalent to saying that it is therefore non-referential and non-cognitive and as such is incapable of providing conceptual and ontological clarification about the nature of God in Christ.

The purpose of this chapter is to explore this widely held view in the light of the ongoing and current discussion of the nature and value of metaphorical predication. For within that discussion we find that it is precisely this literal/figurative, fact/value distinction which is being questioned. The burning question is whether or not metaphorical statements have cognitive, referential and ontological significance. The focus of this chapter is to consider the assertion that incarnational language is primarily metaphorical but not thereby to concede that it does not intend to refer or factually assert what is indeed the case.

Nicholas Lash has anticipated something of the flavour of the approach that will be taken here when he argued, in his rejoinder to Hick, that although the Fathers might not have had a theoretical and precisely articulated theory of the distinction between metaphorical and literal language that did not preclude them from using language in a sophisticated fashion. Indeed, the Fathers showed every sign that they were aware that they were stretching language to adequately refer to the mysteries of which they wished to speak. Furthermore, Lash doubts if contemporary linguistic studies allow such a sharp distinction between the literal and metaphorical as that posited by Hick.(4)

In this sense an attempt will be made to rebut the position advocated by Hick that there is an easy escape route out of our christological dilemma by treating incarnational language as metaphorical and therefore non-significative. If recent treatments of metaphor are even close to being right then it would seem that metaphors abound in all areas of human intellectual activity and that they do refer and provide cognitive information. Indeed certain treatments of metaphor argue that it is precisely at the limits of our understanding when we are struggling to articulate what it is that we only dimly

perceive that metaphors have their most useful application.

In order to justify this assertion I will have to examine the current debate on the nature of metaphorical predication. This is a field which has generated an enormous amount of literature and therefore some selection will be necessary but I hope to provide a reasonably accurate account of at least the main contours of that debate before suggesting its applicability to incarnational language. In order to provide an early indication of what I seek to establish let me reaffirm my intention to show that metaphors are necessary and irreplaceable cognitive instruments which provide epistemic access to the world. Furthermore given the nature of the referent of theological language metaphors have a necessary and central place within theological discourse. I am not, however, committing myself to the thesis that metaphors are completely irreducible, that is to say that the cognitive information which they provide cannot, in principle, be literally paraphrased at least in part.

2.(ii) The Role of Metaphor

The principle dialogue partner in this discussion of the nature of metaphor will be Paul Ricoeur who has written extensively on metaphor and whose work THE RULE OF METAPHOR provides the most exhaustive account of the subject yet attempted.(5) Although Ricoeur will provide the principle focus of discussion, as he himself engages in a wide ranging debate with virtually every other prominent writer on the subject, we shall find ourselves engaging in dialogue and discussion with the views of Max Black, I.A. Richards, Donald Davidson and many others.

Although the recent history of metaphor, influenced by the views of Hobbes, Locke and Johnson, has tended to stress its ornamental and parasitic function, and to see it as a usage of language that should be discarded when one is seeking clarity and reference, this has not been the sole estimation of its function and value. Alongside such views of the lowly estate of metaphor there have been philosophers who have attributed to it a fundamental role in the ability of humans to conceive of and classify the world which they inhabit. This view can be traced to

Vico who writes;

"From all this it follows that all tropes... which have hitherto been considered ingenious inventions of writers, were necessary modes of expression of all the first poetic nations, and had originally their full native propriety. But these expressions of the first nations later

became figurative when, with the further developments of the human mind, words were invented which signified abstract forms or genera....And here begins the overthrow of two common errors of the grammarians: that prose speech is proper speech and poetic speech improper; and that prose speech came first, and afterwards speech in verse."(6)

For Vico man is possessed of an instinctive poetic wisdom, a sapienza poetica, which gradually evolved through metaphors, symbols and myths towards modern and abstract thought. Vico developed the concept that we live in a world of words, made for us by our language and wherein our minds are formed by language and not language by the minds which speak it. This conception of the priority of metaphor over literal language can be found in the writings of Vico's contemporary Herder and more recently in the works of Nietzsche. Nietzsche writes;

"What then is truth? A mobile army of metaphors...which after long usage seem to a people fixed, canonical and binding. Truths are illusions of which one has forgotten that this is what they are- metaphors that have become worn out and without sensuous force; coins that have lost their face and are considered, no longer as coins, but as mere metal."(7)

Writing today Gadamer has once again asserted the priority of metaphor but gives a different reason for, and assigns a different value to, the transition from the metaphorical to the literal than did Nietzsche. Gadamer maintains the primacy; metaphor precedes and is

itself the presupposition of 'classificatory logic' and science. For Nietzsche, literal language and the concept of truth was a forgetfulness of the fundamentally metaphorical nature of language due to accustomed usage. Thus for Nietzsche such a forgetfulness which forgot the arbitrary nature of the demarcations introduced by metaphor led to the debasement of the concept of truth itself. In contrast, for Gadamer, the transition from metaphorical to literal is not brought about by forgetting the metaphorical nature of language but is brought about by a transition in the history of mind: the determination to classify and define, to regulate words and to categorise. Only at this point did it become possible to recognise that certain utterances were figurative and others literal.(8)

In order to assess how two such different estimations of the value and place of metaphor came about it will be necessary to give a brief review of the classical account of metaphor as it is found in the writings of Aristotle. For it would be true to say that both views of metaphor, that it is an ornamental and deviant usage and that it is a necessary and important part of linguistic practice, can find support in Aristotle's treatment of the problem.

At the outset I should mention that my treatment of metaphor is following Aristotle and many contemporary accounts of metaphor by including within the compass of 'metaphor' other tropes which later grammarians separated out, namely, synecdoche, metonymy, catachresis etc. Aristotle had little to say about these individual tropes treating them more as different functionings of a more basic metaphorical transfer.

Aristotle distinguished three categories of language, logic, rhetoric and poetic. For Aristotle metaphor was something that primarily happened at the level of word meaning rather than sentence meaning. It is something that happens to the noun, a process which consists in the giving of a name to a thing that belongs to something else. This displacement or transference, an epiphora, is the characteristic feature of metaphor. The movement of transference can take place between genus and species, species to genus, from one species to another or on grounds of analogy.(9)

Aristotle hinted that metaphor could give a name to that which has no name. He anticipates here the catachretic role of metaphor, the filling of a semantic void by the use of a familiar word in a new way. For example, in the metaphorical phrase 'sowing around a God created flame'

the action of the sun is to light what sowing is to grain. However, properly speaking, there is no name here for the original item. We have filled a semantic lacuna by metaphorical predication. Yet it would have to be conceded that for Aristotle metaphor, properly considered, is really a decorative addition to language. Its use in relation to rhetoric is to add charm and distinction to an argument. Its function is to affect the hearer by the aptness and power of its unusual attribution and to therefore cause the hearer to be sympathetically disposed towards the argument being proffered. Clarity of understanding by contrast was thought to reside in ordinary or literal language.(10)

Paul Ricoeur argues that Aristotle's treatment had the following implications for the development of metaphor. Firstly, it located meaning at the level of the noun or word meaning. Secondly, the idea of transfer of one word to another realm led to the notion that the borrowed word was somehow a deviant usage and was to be contrasted with the proper literal meaning of the word. This reinforced the conception that language and the objective world to which it refers were quite separate entities and that the manner in which something is said does not significantly alter what is said.

In Aristotle's treatment metaphor occurs in a game whose rules are already given, a game already constituted. Metaphor is therefore a violation of the order of this game. Metaphor's role according to Aristotle is to instruct rapidly. It adds charm to our arguments and affects the hearer by predisposing him to listen to what we have to say. However, despite the preference given to the clarity achieved by literal language, Aristotle acknowledged that the ability to form apt metaphors is a work of genius. It is the perception of similarities within the dissimilar.

Ricoeur links his discussion of metaphor with Aristotle's by utilising what Aristotle had to say concerning the mimetic function of metaphor. As mimesis metaphor mimics and redescribes reality. It represents the referent in terms of another subject. Metaphor's figurative nature has the power to set things before the eye, to depict the abstract in concrete terms. Ultimately, it has the capacity to signify active reality. This Aristotelian category of mimesis is central to Ricoeur's theory of the cognitive and referential value of metaphor.

In the final analysis mimesis reminds us that no discourse ever suspends reality entirely. All mimesis, especially creative mimesis, takes place within the

horizons of our being in the world. And the truth of poetic expression is to make contact with our being in the world. According to Ricoeur, mimesis does not only embody the referential function of poetic discourse, it connects this referential function to the revelation of the 'Real as act'. He argues that, " To present men as acting and all things as in act-such could well be the ontological function of metaphorical discourse....Lively expression is that which expresses existence as alive."(11)

Ricoeur finally rejects the Aristotelian word-centred/deviant usage account of metaphor. He does so because he favours a theory of meaning that is semantic rather than syntactic. That is, for Ricoeur, meaning is properly attributed to sentences and not words. The sentence is the individual unit of discourse, words find their meaning only in the context of the sentence. He traces this contextual theory of the meaning of words back to I.A.Richards who spoke of the interanimation of words in any given sentence. The process by which we understand the meaning of a sentence is not one of adding up the different word meanings to achieve a total meaning. Rather each word receives its meaning from its use and context in the sentence.(12)

In this account all words are polysemic. That is, they have a wide range of possible meanings and uses and it is only the context within which the word is used which suggests one meaning rather than another. As such the distinction between literal and metaphorical words, between proper and deviant usage, vanishes. For all words gain meaning from their context. Metaphor, therefore, cannot be regarded as a deviant secondary usage, it is as valid and meaningful as the literal.

As well as following Richards in the contextual theory of meaning where words receive their meaning through a process of interanimation, Ricoeur follows Richards in ascribing a basic duality in the structure of the metaphorical process. Richards' terminology for this duality was 'tenor' and 'vehicle'.⁽¹³⁾ The 'vehicle' is usually the word which we recognise as being used metaphorically. The 'tenor' can be more difficult to pin down. Strictly speaking it need not appear in the metaphorical statement at all. It is the underlying subject matter of the metaphor rather than the non-metaphorical element of the statement.

This basic duality has been recognised by all major writers on the theme of metaphor. Max Black, who introduced the study of models and metaphors to the

philosophy of science and who was himself heavily influenced by Richards, coined the terms 'focus' and 'frame' to represent Richards 'tenor' and 'vehicle'. By 'focus' he meant the word that is being used metaphorically and by 'frame' he meant the literal words which surrounded it in the statement.(14)

Some contemporary commentators on metaphor have accused Black of misunderstanding what Richards meant by 'tenor' and 'vehicle'.(15) Related to this criticism is the objection to Black's assertion that each metaphor has two subjects, a 'principal' and 'subsidiary' subject.(16) In this account of the metaphorical statement the 'principal' subject is acted upon by the 'subsidiary' subject and certain features of the 'subsidiary' subject sort and affect our viewing of the 'principal' subject. Thus in the metaphor 'Man is a Wolf', the 'principal' subject man is viewed in terms of certain properties which are normally associated with being a wolf. Whilst agreeing that many metaphors do not have two explicit subjects, a 'writhing script' being a suitable example, and acknowledging that Black may have been careless in his terminology, I nevertheless feel that the basic idea that there are at least two poles in every metaphor and that one is in some way disrupted by the other seems to be indisputable.

Ricoeur's theory utilises this idea of metaphor disrupting a whole semantic network by an unusual attribution. As such metaphor is a deliberate category mistake which always involves at least two ideas and is the deliberate taking of one thing for another. This deliberate rule-violation is a discursive phenomenon and in order to affect one word the metaphor has to disturb a whole network of associations by means of a strange and new predication.(17) Following Black, he argues that metaphor bears information due to its ability to re-describe reality. Metaphor accomplishes this re-description on the basis of its ability to de-construct our literal world. The inability of metaphor to be understood literally is the key to a new understanding which is brought about by the strange use of the metaphor.

Metaphor has the power to do this due to its ability suddenly to combine elements that have not been put together before. Metaphor has an unparalleled power to set a scene before our eyes. It is more concentrated and powerful than simile. On the one hand it shocks us as we perceive the absurdity and destruction of the literal meaning of the statement; on the other hand it has a certain 'hidden' quality that instructs us rapidly. In the midst of the shattered literal interpretation we

suddenly perceive the aptness of the metaphor and our understanding of the subject which is metaphorically described and re-described is enhanced.(18)

Ricoeur's theory that metaphor has the power to redescribe reality due to its ability to force the hearer of the metaphor into considering the subject in the light of new and previously undreamed of networks of associations would in itself be unproblematic to most scholars. It is his insistence that metaphor is in some sense irreducible, that it has a reference distinct and different from the literal reference and that it bears cognitive information which cannot be paraphrased literally that is questioned. Ricoeur's justification for these claims lies in his account of the referential nature of metaphor which is a specific instance of the referential nature of a narrative text.

2.(iii) Metaphor, Text and Reference

As previously noted Ricoeur rejected the word centred theory of meaning, which he attributed to Aristotle, as this led to a substitutionary or at best comparison view of metaphor whereby one could replace the metaphorical word by another proper and more literal word. Following Richards (but also Frege and the later Wittgenstein)

Ricoeur emphasised the contextual nature of word meaning. Words find their meaning in the context of the basic unit of discourse which is the sentence. This is important to Ricoeur's theory of metaphor as it is only at the level of the sentence that language has the ability to pass outside itself and to refer to the world. At the sentence or semantic level language exhibits its ability to transcend itself and to relate to the world.(19)

Ricoeur argues that the word belongs to the structure of this lower and higher level. It is made up of signs(letters) but it is also itself a unity of higher meaning as it combines with other words to form a sentence. The sentence is not reducible to the sum of its parts. In context it says more than the individual words analysed separately can say. This higher unit of meaning (the sentence) provides the key to Ricoeur's account of sense and reference. In the sentence language displays its intentional character. The sentence aims beyond itself and refers and points to something else.

If the objection should be raised that there is a constancy of meaning to our words and this is what makes intelligible discourse possible, Ricoeur would argue that constancy of meaning is never anything but constancy of contexts. The stability and constancy of our discourse

is not self-evident but is something which itself requires to be explained. Words can and do signify more than one thing and it is only the work of good authors which encourages the ascription of fixed values of usage to them, but this should not lead us into assuming that words have, or possess, fixed meanings.(20)

From this perspective the sharp separation between poetic and technical(literal) language is overcome. They constitute two poles of a single scale. One end is occupied by univocal meanings anchored in definitions whilst at the other end no movement stabilises outside the movement among meanings. The aim of Ricoeur's discussion here is to abolish the sharp distinction between literal and metaphorical language. Metaphor and poetic language is as valid as technical and literal language for all share in the polysemy of word meaning and it is only common usage that fixes certain word meanings at the expense of others. Similarly, all language at the semantic level refers. It is not only literal language that refers but all language shares in the self-transcending nature of language to point beyond itself. In order to understand this more fully some consideration will have to be given to Ricoeur's treatment of the referential possibilities of metaphor in relation to the larger context of the literary work.

In order to make this transition Ricoeur utilises the Fregean distinction between sense and reference. Frege argued that sense (Sinn) is what the proposition states whilst reference (Bedeutung) is that about which the sense is stated. Hence the famous example, 'Morning Star' and 'Evening Star', both these terms have the same referent but very different senses.(21) For Frege this distinction applied only to proper names and not propositions but Ricoeur wants to expand Frege's distinction to the level of propositions. He argues that the reference is communicated from the proper name to the entire proposition. The proper name identifies and refers to something whilst the predicate says something about that which is identified.(22)

Ricoeur then extrapolates this distinction between sense and reference from the realm of the sentence to the realm of the text. Here the question of reference becomes a question of hermeneutics rather than semantics. The text is more extensive than the sentence. It is a complex entity of discourse which is not reducible to the more basic units of the sentence. As such in the case of a text the distinction between sense and reference which was found to be operating at the level of the sentence becomes a distinction between the structure of a textual work and the world of the textual work.(23) When Ricoeur

uses the term 'world of the work' he seems to mean a structured domain of meaning presented by a text, a possible mode of being in the world, rather than an objective external reality.

Hermeneutics is vital to this scheme as it provides the key that enables the reader to regulate the transition from the structure of the work to the world of the work. In order to interpret a work "we must display the world to which it refers by virtue of its arrangement, genre and style."(24) In this move Ricoeur rejects the Schleiermachean and Romantic hermeneutical method of searching after a world beyond the work and instead seeks to address the world which is displayed in front of the work. This addressing of the world in front of the work involves passing from the structure of of the work (its sense) to the world of the work(its reference).

Of course Frege and many philosophers since have denied that poetic works and fictive works have a reference. They may be said to have a sense but not a reference. Frege allowed reference only to scientific statements and not to poetic statements, for him the proper name 'Ulysses' has no reference. Ricoeur wishes to challenge this distinction head on. His reason for doing so is that he wishes to draw a parallel between the indirect

reference of the aesthetic work and that of metaphor. In the case of the literary work it is not that the work has no reference but that the reference is indirect and ambiguous. He argues that "the literary work through the structure proper to it displays a world only under the condition that the reference of descriptive discourse is suspended."(25)

However, reference is only suspended at the first level of discourse in order to refer at a second level of discourse. This notion of split-reference is fundamental to Ricoeur's theory of hermeneutics and metaphor. The process of interpreting a metaphor is parallel to the process of interpreting a text. The text creates a virtual or fictive world which is itself a redescription of reality and which refers indirectly back to the familiar world. This ability of the poetic or artistic work to redescribe reality and to offer a fresh way of viewing the familiar world is at the heart of the concept of poetic truth. For Ricoeur, to raise the question of the referential quality of poetic language is to try to show how symbolic systems reorganise the world in terms of works and works in terms of the world.(26) Therefore one aspect of the nature of the literary work is its ability to provide an insight into the world outside the text.

In the same way that the reference of a text is altered through ambiguity so too is the reference of a metaphor. The literal meaning of the metaphor is shattered by our inability to interpret the words as they stand and we search for a metaphorical meaning. In the same way the literal reference of the statement is suspended but only to make way for a metaphorical reference. He writes,

"..it was and it was not contains in nuce all that can be said about metaphorical reference. Poetic language is no less about reality than any other use of language... but refers to it by means of a complex strategy which implies as an essential component- a suspension and seemingly, an abolition of the ordinary reference attached to descriptive language. This suspension is only the negative condition of a second order reference, of an indirect reference built on the ruins of the direct reference. This secondary reference is so called only because of the primacy of the reference of ordinary language. For in another respect it constitutes the primordial reference to the extent that it suggests, reveals, unconceals the deep structures of reality to which we are related as mortals who are born into this world and who dwell in it for a while.(27)

Ricoeur makes explicit the link between this exalted view of the power of metaphor and the philosophy of Heidegger when he says that the emergence of the more radical way of looking at things that comes through metaphor is the unconcealing of that layer of reality which phenomenology calls pre-objective and which constitutes the horizon of all our modes of dwelling in the world. It is important to realise at this point that when Ricoeur therefore speaks of metaphorical truth he is

not primarily speaking of the truth of certain propositions generated by metaphor but rather a disclosure of a newly made possible way of being in the world itself as we apprehend the world in a new way through the redescription offered by the metaphor or text.

Realising this it becomes easier to understand why Ricoeur finds a place for feeling and imagination in his account of metaphor. Feeling should not be understood as mere emotion (it seems to be akin to Schleiermacher's conception of feeling). Feelings, according to Ricoeur, have intentionality and the new congruence produced by metaphor is felt as well as seen. Feelings are a way of orienting ourselves in the world and they connect us to other beings and Being itself. With this notion Ricoeur addresses himself to the affectus element of metaphor that was a feature of the rhetorical tradition. The role of feeling it is to make our own what has been put at a distance by thought in its objectifying phase. Feelings as such abolish the distance between the knower and what is known. Feeling, is not, therefore, to be regarded as contrary to thought, rather it is thought made ours(28).

Similarly, imagination's role is to contribute to the epoche or suspension which is proper to the split-

reference of metaphor. Imagination helps to schematise the assimilation between terms by its insight into similarities, it also helps to picture the sense of the metaphor due to its grasp of the images which are aroused, yet it does more than just this: it contributes to the projection of the new possibilities of redescribing the world which are opened up by the metaphor.(29)

Ricoeur's somewhat holistic and complex account of metaphor has gone some way to addressing many of the reservations and caveats usually raised against the notions of metaphorical reference and truth. Metaphor accomplishes its redescription of reality on the basis of a blockage in the literal interpretation of the statement. In this blockage the primary reference founders but this is merely the negative condition of another referential possibility. Metaphor is a transference whereby an entire semantic realm is transposed into an unusual setting. It is not the mere moving around of an isolated predicate.

Indeed in the adopted semantic region the metaphor acts in a manner analogous to a model,(Ricoeur argues that metaphor is to poetic expression what model is to scientific expression), as such it reorganises our

viewpoint of the subject in relation to the transposed network. This modelling function of metaphor is related to its mimetic function for we see the subject in terms of the metaphorical predication.

Metaphorical predication is seen against a larger conception of poetic discourse, which faces reality by inventing heuristic fictions (Mythos) which construct a fictive world, and thereby redescribes reality. Metaphorical predication is as valid as literal predication. Poetic language is as referential as literal language though by a more circuitous route. Poetic language and metaphorical predication have ontological implications. Yet within the verb 'to be' in any metaphor we must always detect an 'is not' which is implied in the impossibility of the literal interpretation of the metaphor. Ricoeur writes, "there is no other way to do justice to the notion of metaphorical truth than to include the critical incision of the (literal) 'is not' within the ontological vehemence of the (metaphorical) 'is'." (30)

Ricoeur's monumental theory of metaphor may be thought of as providing a way of addressing the 'something more' nature of human existence in the world. Human existence is not only actuality but possibility, not only what is

but what could be. Metaphor's role, indeed the role of all poetic description, is to make available for us a new way of being in the world. The ontological function of metaphorical discourse is to reveal what is real not simply as given and actual but as potential and becoming. Parallel, therefore to the polysemy of language is a polysemy of being and as such the "reference of metaphorical utterance brings being as actuality into play."(31)

2.(iv) Metaphor and Conceptual Clarification

At this point it is possible to see the possibilities that Ricoeur's theory of metaphor offers to a consideration of incarnational language. If much of the language that describes Jesus Christ is undoubtedly metaphorical then this does not mean that it is simply a picturesque way of describing a unique man whom we have come to admire. Rather the text of the New Testament and its central metaphors for Christ such as 'son'(Jhn 17:1), 'son of God' (Mk 1:1), 'Lord' (Lk 11:1) , 'Word'(Jhn 1:14), 'Messiah' (Mth 16:17) pick out and refer to Jesus Christ and God's activity and presence in him. This world and our existence in it are given a new description. For to say that 'the Word became flesh and dwelt among us' is to redescribe our world and to present to us a new way

of looking at the world as a world in which God is uniquely involved in the life and activity of Jesus Christ. For the Christian community the world is a world of God's presence and not God's absence. From the texts of the New Testament gospels a new possibility of self-understanding is opened up to the Christian community that they are the objects of God's Fatherly love and that he has brought about their salvation in Christ. The possibility is laid before them of a new way of being in the world through following the way of the incarnate one and living and being in a world which is of ultimate value and significance because it is an incarnational world. To say all this is to say more than is present to the world of actuality. It is to give expression to what is more than actual and to give voice to the possibility that God is with us in Christ. To say this something more, to bring a new field of reference to speech, to reveal the pre-objective reality that our horizon of being takes place within an incarnational world requires the metaphor 'The Word became flesh and dwelt among us full of grace and truth'.(Jhn 1:14)

Before considering these possibilities, however, some residual problems remain. For it has to be admitted that there is an inherent ambiguity in Ricoeur's treatment of metaphorical reference. Ricoeur would not seem to be

suggesting that metaphors correspond to the way the world actually is- for that would be metaphysics- but rather they correspond to what the world potentially could be for us. This raises the question of verification. How do we distinguish between the genuine and false possibilities that are opened up for us by metaphor? Or is it the case that metaphor's chief function is solely to alter the way we look at the world?(32)

If this latter option was the position that Ricoeur was advocating then his position would seem to reduce to that of those writers, like Hick, who argue that metaphorical language primarily expresses an emotive response, or reflects a subjective attitude, towards the referent. But this cannot be the case for much of Ricoeur's polemic is designed specifically to counter this approach, despite the role he finds for feeling in metaphorical reference.

Yet much of what Ricoeur has had to say in his account of metaphorical predication offers a view of language which resembles a surrealist impression of a lunar landscape. New interpretations and discoveries are there around every corner. One can leap off into the stellar void or fall into a gaping abyss that opens up before one's feet. All is chaotic and unstructured.(33) Everything is

possible and possibly expressed in language, but yet one cannot gain hold of any one aspect in order to understand more fully, for ultimately the full meaning of the metaphor eludes our attempts at articulation.

Ricoeur is fully aware of metaphor's need for an interpretative structure and devotes a significant part of the concluding chapter of his work to providing such a structure. He begins by rejecting any notion of an ontological naivete which may be said to apply to his account of metaphorical reference. By this he means to reject the notion that the metaphorical utterance contains ready made an immediate ontology that philosophy only has to spell out.(34) He also wishes to avoid the Wittgensteinian notion that language games are radically heterogeneous. According to Ricoeur the metaphorical utterance contains within itself a demand for elucidation.

This demand for elucidation can only be met by utilising a different means of discourse than metaphorical discourse. The type of discourse which Ricoeur has in mind is a speculative or interpretative discourse. Speculative discourse finds both its possibility and demand within the dynamism of the metaphorical statement. The semantic richness of the metaphorical predication

initiates a desire for conceptual clarification. The need for this clarification is due to the fact that the gain in meaning that is established by the metaphorical predication is not yet at that point a conceptual gain. It is not yet a conceptual gain as the semantic gain is not yet separable from the tensive interaction between the literal and metaphorical readings of the statement.(35)

The metaphorical statement only provides a semantic sketch without a complete conceptual determination. It goes beyond the familiar referential field by means of a new and unusual attribution and as such it brings a new referential field towards language. As such the metaphor hints at an ontological reality, but at this stage it is only a hint without rigorous conceptual clarification. A meaning is hinted at but not yet determined. An experience, a way of being in the world is suggested but not yet totally expressed.

It is due to the sketchy nature of metaphorical predication that there arises a need for a speculative discourse. Speculative discourse is to be thought of as a type of meta-language. It establishes the primary notions from which we will draw our concepts. Ricoeur's account of speculative discourse is that it provides the

genera of philosophy, it is the overarching framework within which everything is interpreted. Examples of such meta-languages, such frameworks, can be found in the role of the categories of Being in Aristotelian and Thomist philosophies, Understanding in Kantian philosophy and the axioms of logic in analytic philosophy.(36)

Metaphorical discourse is driven by its own tensive nature towards conceptual clarification. For it is only the conceptual clarification of meaning, which is the product of speculative discourse, that enables metaphorical discourse to free itself from the play of double meaning which is a feature of its own dynamism. Yet great care must be taken not to imply that speculative discourse destroys or supersedes metaphorical discourse. The universe of discourse must instead be viewed as set in motion between this interplay between the domains of metaphorical and conceptual language.

Interpretation takes place at this point of intersection between the two spheres of discourse. As it is the work of conceptual language it cannot help but to strive after univocity and rationalisation of the terms of involved in the metaphorical predication. However, it is only an improper reductive interpretation that rationalises the metaphorical and symbolic base of discourse. A proper

hermeneutical interpretation would seek to strive after the clarity of the concept whilst preserving the dynamism of the metaphorical meaning that the concept attempts to pin down. Metaphor and the whole arena of creative imagination's role in relation to conceptual language is to provoke it into a "thinking more".

"This struggle to think more, guided by the vivifying principle is the soul of interpretation.. Creative imagination is nothing other than this demand put to conceptual thought."(37)

Speculative discourse bases its work upon the dynamism of metaphor. As such it can never be that metaphorical discourse becomes superfluous to a later and more superior conceptual discourse. Interpretation and conceptual clarification can only take place as an examination of the experience of belonging that is revealed by poetic discourse. As such a proper hermeneutics will return us to 'that experience of belonging as a whole which is revealed by the tensive nature of metaphorical discourse whilst preserving the distanciation which creates the space and possibility of speculative discourse.'(38)

This need for conceptual clarification is important if metaphor is to have a vital role in incarnational discourse. For theology is nothing if it is not the result of the conceptual demand put to our thinking by

the chaotic and shocking metaphors of the New Testament that God was in Christ reconciling the world to himself. The entire history of christological and Trinitarian discourse is the product of christological metaphors and the need to understand and to articulate their 'shocking' attribution. The stereoscopic tension of the true metaphor is found in the claim that Jesus 'is and is not' God. Trinitarian terms such as 'the Son is homoousios with the Father' and 'One God yet three persons' are the conceptual outworkings of the way in which it is true to say that Jesus Christ 'is and is not' God in the sense that there is more to be said about God than the fact that Jesus Christ is God.

Contrary to what many critics have suggested such conceptual clarification is not an illegitimate debasing of the primary language of faith. This study of metaphor suggests that metaphorical language demands that it be interpreted if its novel attribution is to become a genuine cognitive gain. As such the early development of doctrine was not an improper 'hellenisation of dogma'. The Church had to explore the implications of christological metaphors and to develop these in terms of the philosophical and conceptual categories of the day. However, the attempt to canonise one particular interpretation and to refuse to allow it to be constantly

challenged by the New Testament metaphors as to the adequacy of its interpretation was to cut the hermeneutical circle from returning to the experience of being in the world suggested by the metaphors. This meant that the doctrinal figure of the incarnate Christ lost contact with the lively christological metaphors which were its precondition and presupposition.

2.(v) Metaphor : Caveats and Considerations

Having examined what is easily the most massive and influential study of metaphor amongst contemporary philosophers, and lest we be carried away by its powerful rhetoric, it is perhaps time to consider a few demurrals from the type of theory advocated by Ricoeur. The most prominent philosophical criticism is that offered by Donald Davidson in his article "What Metaphors Mean". Davidson's position on metaphor is a subtle one and it is easy on a first reading to misunderstand him. His thesis is that metaphors mean what their words in their most literal interpretation mean.(39) Since many metaphors, by common acknowledgement, mean nothing literally this would seem to be equivalent to saying that metaphors are meaningless. However it is clear that many metaphors are meaningful. For example, to speak of a 'gnawing pain' is metaphorical, for pains do not gnaw our bodies. Yet at

the same time it would be a foolish man who said that there was no meaning to the term 'gnawing pain'.

Davidson is not a foolish man and, like Ricoeur, he sets his views on metaphor within a larger theory of meaning. Davidson agrees with advocates of metaphor that a metaphor cannot be paraphrased, not because it says something too novel or too rich to be paraphrased but because there is nothing there to paraphrase. Davidson's views on metaphor belong to his wider views of speech act theory. His account of metaphor depends upon the distinction between what metaphors mean and what they are used to do. For Davidson metaphors belong exclusively to the domain of use.

Yet this is not to deny that metaphors are useful. Davidson concedes that metaphors are useful devices in literature, science and law.(40) Yet, he argues, that metaphors have no distinctive meaning and bear no cognitive information that can not be gleaned apart from the metaphor. Metaphors according to Davidson are useful in that they 'nudge' us into noting certain things. However, he argues that although it is possible to decide whether or not the visions, thoughts, feelings and emotions which a particular metaphor inspires are true or

false, it nevertheless makes no sense to speak of a special metaphorical truth inhering in the sentence.(41)

Davidson has a further argument directed against the idea that metaphor carries a unique and irreplaceable cognitive content which is summed up in the following phrase, "...if metaphor has a special cognitive content why should it be so difficult to spell it out...Why can't we, if we are clever enough, come as close as we please?"(42) The general response to this type of criticism by those writers who argue that metaphors do have a genuinely cognitive role is to argue that the implications that the metaphor evokes are more varied than any literal paraphrase.(43) Janet Soskice, for instance, has argued that to call a camel 'the ship of the desert' evokes potentially limitless suggestions. The word 'camel' in and of itself would not convey all the possible implications and to replace the metaphor with 'proper words' would not do justice to the metaphor, for the implication complex which it invokes cannot be carried by a single atomistic predicate.(44)

Interesting as that suggestion is, it lacks telling force against Davidson's suggestion. For Davidson's point argues that it is in principle possible to spell out literally all that a metaphor invokes. He may allow that

this would be a difficult and somewhat tedious process but, in principle, it should be possible. David Cooper in his book Metaphor makes a similar point to Davidson when he argues thus, "if the cognitive content or truth of a metaphor involves grasping something that transcends the literal truths prompted by the metaphor-namely, the weights and balances to be given to these truths according to their richness and importance- why can't the literal truths(the paraphrase) to which we are led by the metaphor not include second order truths about the rest of them, why can't we spell out the implication complex of the metaphor and the relative degrees of importance as part of the paraphrase?"(45)

Davidson and Cooper both seem to allow a certain scope to our use of metaphor but to deny the larger claims made for it such that it has a special cognitive content that literal language does not possess and that it is in some way irreducible and unparaphraseable. Although Davidson's critique is a powerful one I think that ultimately Ricoeur's theory of metaphor eludes it. For if we take at face value Davidson's admission that metaphor can 'nudge' us into noticing things for the first time or to make new connections then this sounds something like Ricoeur's claim that metaphor has the ability to make new connections, to reveal things in a new way, although

Davdison's terminology is somewhat less inflated than Ricoeur's.

Similarly the demand that if metaphors have a genuine cognitive content then it should in principle be possible to state this in some non-metaphorical way is met by Ricoeur's admission of the need for speculative discourse in order to conceptually articulate the possibilities suggested by the metaphor. Ricoeur's concern at this point is to argue that the later paraphrase is not superior to the metaphor which is its necessary base and condition and that the conceptual articulation is constantly challenged as to its applicability and aptness by the plethora of possible interpretations of any sufficiently lively metaphor.

The question of whether or not metaphors are, at least in part, irreducible is not related to the possibility of their conceptual clarification. If this were the case then there would be no sense to Ricoeur's complex discussion of the need for speculative discourse. Indeed certain metaphors do seem to be completely reducible as is evidenced by 'dead' metaphors such as the 'arm of the chair' or the 'foot of the mountain' which are so reduced to a single possibility of meaning and interpretation that they are no longer recognised as metaphors. However,

Ricoeur does argue that metaphors are irreplaceable in that they perform a function for us in revealing things as they are which is indispensable to the projection of human possibility in the world. The irreplaceable aspect of metaphor then is found in this disclosing, revealing, nudging us into seeing things in a new way for the first time. As such literal interpretation or conceptual clarification can never truly replace or exhaust any sufficiently lively metaphor, for the metaphor will always challenge the interpretation as to the adequacy of articulation of the possibility which the metaphor has revealed.

Ricoeur would no doubt also refer us back to his argument that maintains that poetic language is as valid as literal language and that the demand therefore, for a literal paraphrase, is unnecessary. Alternatively, he may suggest that literal language does not have the deconstructive power of metaphor which is a necessary pre-requisite of beginning to look at the world in a new way. This looking at the world in a new way is the contribution of 'poetic language' rather than technical or literal language. It is an accomplishment of texts, metaphors and models and it is a revealing and a disclosure which takes place in the particular human medium for such disclosures which is language. These

disclosures are necessary for the expansion of our 'being' in the world as we actualise the 'more' that is possible for us as human beings in the world. This expansion of 'being', this actualisation of human possibility, could not be accomplished without the creative moment of language typified in metaphorical predication.

It is interesting that David Cooper, who argues against much of what Ricoeur would have to say concerning metaphor, suggests a very similar understanding of metaphorical truth by utilising the Heideggerean conception of disclosure. In this discussion truth is not primarily related to the truths of propositions, but is rather a revealing of what things really are to us as objects present themselves to us through our interests and concerns. A clock, for instance, would not present itself to a group of primitive tribesmen as a clock. It can only be a clock to those people whose interests and concerns are such that the clock has disclosed itself to them as a clock. Cooper argues that metaphors may help us by participating in such a disclosure.(46)

In Davidson's scheme there is no such thing as metaphorical truth. We may decide that the propositions which the metaphor gives rise true are true or false but

there is no such thing as a true metaphor. For Ricoeur and Cooper the question of truth is not primarily related to secondary propositions but to the way of being in the world which the metaphor reveals to us. The metaphor may be said to be true in that it discloses a possible mode of existence to us, it expands our being and offers to us a new understanding of reality. The question as to whether this 'existential' account of truth is to be preferred to Davidson's more 'propositional' understanding cannot be settled here. It is sufficient to understand that two very different conceptions of truth are involved.

To summarise the discussion so far: I hope that it has been shown that metaphors are not decorative additions to language whose primary purpose is to evoke a response or to express a certain attitude. Metaphors can and do refer and they do possess a genuine cognitive content. However, it is both possible and necessary to specify, in some non-metaphorical way, the ontological suggestions of metaphor before they can become a conceptual gain. However, those authors who argue that incarnational language is metaphorical may respond that although it may be the case that certain metaphors refer and have cognitive content that need not mean that all metaphors do so. Furthermore, they may ask, if all metaphors are

permissible and, if not, how does one distinguish a good metaphor from a bad one?

It is certainly true that some of the difficulties surrounding an adequate theory of metaphorical predication have arisen from precisely this fact that certain scholars have been proposing theories of metaphor without recognising that not all metaphors are used in the same way or for precisely the same purpose. There are trivial metaphors and there are vital metaphors, there are metaphors which are poetic conceits and there are metaphors which are being used to articulate some only dimly understood possibility at the limits of our understanding. Obviously if incarnational language is metaphorical then it will have to be of the second variety if it is to have any genuine cognitive content. In order to assess that possibility it will be necessary to consider the claim that metaphors can in important respects resemble models.

2.(vi) Theory Constitutive Metaphors

The theory that metaphors in some way resemble models is neither new nor startling. In the examination of Paul Ricoeur's theory of metaphor it was found that he felt that metaphors are to poetic expression what models are

to scientific expression. Ricoeur is following here a suggestion first made by Max Black which in turn heavily influenced Ian Ramsey's treatment of religious language.(47)Black's account of metaphorical predication is fairly straightforward and similar to that outlined by Ricoeur.

According to Black metaphors work by projecting upon the primary subject a set of associated implications that belong to the secondary subject. The maker of the metaphorical statement selects,sorts,emphasises, organises and suppresses features of the primary subject by applying to it features of the secondary subjects implicative complexes.(48) The terms that Black used for this sorting process were themselves metaphorical, the metaphorical word acting as a filter or a screen upon the primary subject.

Metaphors for Black act in a similar manner to models,'Every metaphor is the tip of a submerged model'.(49) Every suitable metaphor then, in a manner similar to a model, suggests an analogy or a structural correspondence between the subject under description and the metaphor which acts upon it. In changing the description the metaphor alters our understanding and relationship towards the subject which has been newly

described. Following contemporary philosophy, Black argues that the world is essentially a world under a certain description. Metaphor's cognitive ability derives from its power to change that description. Metaphor has the power to make connections that once they are perceived are then truly present for everybody. Metaphors enable us to see aspects of reality which previously were hidden to us by revealing a new description of the world in which we live.(50)

Metaphors consist of the "..interactions between two subjects, grounded in analogies of structure(partly created, partly discovered)...The imputed isomorphisms can be rendered explicit and are the proper subjects for the determination of appropriateness, faithfulness, partiality... and the like. Metaphors that survive such critical examination can properly be held to convey, in indispensable fashion, insights into the systems to which they refer."(51))

Black's account of metaphors and models was to prove influential in the study of religious language.(52) However, at this point I would like to briefly outline a recent contribution to the subject which builds on the work of Black and which is proving to be extremely influential on contemporary theologians.(53) The article

to which I refer is Richard Boyd's "Metaphor and Theory Change: What is "Metaphor" a Metaphor for?" (54) It is to Boyd that I owe the term 'theory constitutive metaphors'.

Boyd argues that there is an important class of metaphors which play an indispensable role in the development and articulation of theories in mature sciences. Part of the function of these metaphors is to introduce terminology where none previously existed thereby mapping a vaguely understood referent and picking it out so that it can be subsequently identified and meaningfully talked about.(55)

It is important to realise that the success of such metaphors is not dependent on our being able to specify precisely and exactly what the relevant similarities and analogies between metaphor and referent are. Indeed it is this ambiguous 'open ended' quality which makes them useful flexible tools in developing research programmes.(56) Nevertheless a successful research programme will succeed in explicating, at least in part, certain of the relevant similarities and analogies suggested by the metaphor.(57)

Central to Boyd's theory is a non-definitional account of reference which builds on the work of Putnam and Kripke.

Briefly put these theories argue for a 'causal theory of reference' which separates the ability to successfully refer from the ability to provide a complete and unrevisable and exhaustive description of the referent. Indeed one can successfully refer even when when the identifying descriptions that are associated with a name or natural kind prove to be false. For example, a speaker who knows that Columbus discovered both America and that the world was round truly refers to Columbus when he uses the term even though Columbus did neither of these things. Reference is successful because it does not depend upon exact knowledge of the referent but rather depends upon the speaker being a member of a relevant linguistic community which has passed that description of Columbus from link to link.(58) Reference on this theory is a linguistically mediated 'epistemic access' to the world as communities pass on terms which have received an original 'dubbing' ceremony. In this sense I can successfully refer to a beech tree even though I am not capable of offering a definite description of the natural kind beech trees which would distinguish them from elm trees. I can successfully refer because I exist in a community where experts have 'dubbed' certain types of tree 'beech' trees and I have learned the appropriate situations in which to identify and refer to them.

Boyd argues that theory-constitutive metaphors serve exceptionally well as 'non-definitional' modes of reference fixing which are especially well suited to the introduction of terms referring to kinds whose real essences consist of complex relational properties, rather than features of internal constitution.'(59) This theory is 'realist' (though not naively so) in that one of metaphor's task is to accomplish the task of the 'accommodation of language to the causal structure of the world.'(60) By this Boyd means that metaphors introduce terminology and modify current terminology so that 'our linguistic categories cut the world at its joints.'(61)

As an example of one such theory-constitutive metaphor Boyd offers the current psychological model of understanding the brain as a computer and thought as a form of information processing. This metaphor is theory-constitutive in that generally speaking psychologists do not know how to offer literal paraphrases which express the same theoretical claims.(62) This metaphor then is an irreplaceable part of this scientific theory for it constitutes the theory that it expresses. It gives rise to terminology such as 'neural programming', 'thought is an algorithmic computation, memory is encoded or indexed by labelling etc.(63) Boyd's argument is that the centrality and prevalence of computer metaphors in

theoretical psychology, and the exploration of analogies and similarities between minds and computers, play an indispensable and irreplaceable role in the vocabulary of contemporary psychology as the same cognitive claims could not be made apart from them.(64)

Boyd's account of metaphor is substantially in accordance with that offered by Ricoeur. Both agree that metaphors are not only allowable but indeed in certain cases are vital and necessary in the development and acquisition of new information about the world. Both agree that the vague or open-ended quality of metaphors, far from being a problem, is instead part of their contribution to the gain in information which is achieved through their use. For it is the the potentially limitless interpretations offered by a metaphor when it transposes a known semantic field or relational structure onto a new referent, which generates new terminologies and insights, that enables a competent community of receivers of the metaphor to both fix the referent and gain access to it through the terminology provided. Similarly, both agree that there is a conceptual development required and demanded by the vital suggestiveness of metaphorical predication before a genuine cognitive gain is established.

The relevance to this theory of metaphor to incarnational language is at once obvious and indeed in some cases necessary. For if we follow Eberhard Juengel in arguing that all talk of God is necessarily metaphorical because there is an absolute difference between God and the world, and talk of God therefore involves the transference of words drawn from the world and human experience to God, then one must develop a complete account of metaphorical predication.(65)

Furthermore it is clear that many of the terms used for Christ in the New Testament are metaphorical. The term 'son of God' (Mk 1: 1) for example, has a history of use in the O.T. where it is quite clearly used to pick out and refer to someone or something who was specially favoured and who had a particular role to play in the purposes of God. Therefore angels are 'sons of God' (Deut 32:8), Israel is the 'son of God' (Ex 4:22) and the King of Israel is the 'son of God' (2 Sam 7:14).

Jesus Christ is described as the 'image of the invisible God' (Col 1:15), a metaphor which is literally impossible but which nevertheless evokes a powerful constellation of possibilities as to precisely which way Jesus could be the image of the invisible God. Similarly, Jesus is portrayed as the 'Son of Man', 'the second Adam', 'the

Wisdom of God that created the world', 'the Word of God become flesh'. Merely to list these images shows the way in which the earliest Christian communities searched around for ever more powerful metaphors to adequately describe the reality of Christ.

Within this kaleidoscope of images certain metaphors achieved a certain dominance so that they became root-metaphors or models. That is they suppressed, organised and controlled the suggestions of other less primary models. Obviously the category of 'sonship' and the whole Father - Son relationship which portrayed Jesus as the 'son of God' came to dominate and control the suggestions offered by other less successful metaphors. For example, the image of Jesus as the 'Son of man' so prominent in the synoptic gospels is excluded in the fourth gospel by the powerful combination of the metaphors of Jesus as the Word become flesh and Jesus as the unique 'Son' of the 'Father'. In the same gospel the root-metaphor of Jesus as the incarnation of the pre-existent Logos seems to have suppressed the idea of Jesus' adoption by the Spirit of God at his baptism which many feel was the earliest form of christology.

Sally McFague has suggested that the root-metaphor of the parables is the 'Kingdom of God' which suggests a way of

being in the world as the free gift of God.(66) This dominant model is a personal and relational one and our metaphors and models and the conceptual clarification of them should therefore stress the personal and relational nature of God. As such McFague accepts the powerful metaphors of Fatherhood and Sonship because they richly express relational insights concerning the nature of God, although she rejects the absolutisation of these metaphors which has taken place within theology.

David Tracy has also argued that the 'Kingdom of God' is a root-metaphor of the New Testament. However, he argues for the necessity of the type of conceptual explication which I have outlined for this type of root- metaphor. For Tracy the metaphor 'God is Love' as it is found in the Johannine letters is part of the process of conceptual clarification of the root-metaphor the 'Kingdom of God'.(67)

Whilst agreeing with much of what McFague and Tracy have to say and having no strong objection to the idea that the 'Kingdom of God' or 'God is Love' are root-metaphors of the New Testament, I would, however, suggest that a more basic root- metaphor is God's presence and activity in Jesus Christ. McFague has argued that a metaphorical theology cannot identify any single individual including

Jesus of Nazareth with God.(68) In one sense this is acceptable and one could say that Christian theology has never simply identified Jesus of Nazareth with God, the whole doctrine of the Trinity bears witness to that.

Yet the question has to be asked if McFague has taken the parables and texts of the New Testament seriously enough. The 'Kingdom of God' is surely a basic notion but is it separable from the person of Jesus of Nazareth in the way that McFague supposes. That Jesus preached the 'kingdom of God' and the Church preached Jesus is a truism which has become a cliché. Yet from the beginning Jesus was intensely associated by the earliest proclamation with the rule and activity of God. The very early use of the ascription "Lord" testifies to that. And this association was not accidental, for even the most 'non-metaphysical' of contemporary biblical scholars argues that Jesus strongly associated his person and activity with the inauguration of the Kingdom.(69)

This is true too in the case of Tracy's root-metaphor "God is Love". For if we read the first letter of John from which it is drawn we find that it says " For God is Love; and his love was disclosed to us in this, that He sent his only Son into the world to bring us life."(1 Jhn 4:7) Throughout the New Testament we find that

metaphor is heaped upon metaphor, image upon image, all reinforcing the central idea that God was in Christ. "But in this final age he had spoken to us in the Son whom he has made heir to the whole universe, and through whom he created all orders of existence: the Son who is the effulgence of God's splendour and the stamp of God's very being ."(Heb 1:2-3) " He is the image of the invisible God.."(Col 1:15)

The most basic idea throughout the New Testament is that God was uniquely present and active in the life death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. As Juengel puts it the root-metaphor of the New Testament, of the whole story of salvation, is the identification of the risen one with the crucified man Jesus of Nazareth.(70) This metaphor has to be interpreted through other christological metaphors such as 'Son of God' which refers us to the origin of God's activity in Christ and Kyrios which refers us to the present and future activity of God's presence in Christ.(71)

Kenneth Surin in a paper devoted to the 'grammar' of the incarnation makes a similar point.(72) Surin argues that 'incarnational propositions' are propositions whose truth must be presupposed in order that truth may be assigned to other more abstract theological propositions. The

example he gives, is the proposition, 'In Christ God reconciled all things to himself'. This presupposes the 'incarnational proposition' 'Jesus Christ is of the same substance as the Father.(73) Surin argues that 'incarnational propositions' are 'pragmatic' propositions which must be true in order that christological discourse can be appropriately transacted.(74)

Surin makes the point that the 'incarnational' theologian is compelled to endorse a number of axioms. These are soteriological axioms which include the claims: (i) that God redeems all things by breaking into history; (ii) that our salvation can only be accomplished if God allows our sin to 'interrupt' his own life through Jesus of Nazareth; and (iii) that this 'interruption' is possible only if the very being of God engages and identifies with the human condition in and through Jesus of Nazareth.(75)

The justification for these axioms is drawn from Scripture and its central and controlling metaphor of 'incarnation'. The Church is the community which consents to be interrogated by the Scriptures and to learn what it means to live the way of Jesus in the world. Surin argues that "Incarnational propositions are thus the indispensable underpinning of the ecclesial community's 'pedagogy of discipleship', a 'pedagogy' which is

inaugurated when the believer enters the Church's Gospel-shaped narrative space."(76)

Here we have the type of hermeneutical circle described by Ricoeur in operation. The Scriptures, the narrative text of the New Testament open up a 'Gospel shaped narrative space' for the believer and invite him to enter it. Yet in order to inhabit this space the believer must pragmatically presuppose a number of incarnational claims about Jesus Christ because the text demands that we speak of him in this way. Yet we only make sense of Scripture by speaking of Jesus in this 'incarnational' way.(77) As such theological talk about Christ is appropriate when 'incarnational' propositions are pragmatically presupposed and the justification for the use of such propositions is the root 'incarnational' metaphor of Scripture.

Surin's treatment anticipates much of what I want to say about the root-metaphor of incarnation. For although it may be disputed that there is a clear incarnational claim in the New Testament - indeed perhaps only in the phrase 'The Word became flesh and dwelt among us'(Jhn1:14) do we have an unequivocal statement of incarnation (78)- yet there is no doubt that once stated the metaphor of

incarnation shaped and structured the interpretation of all other christological metaphors.

As such I want to suggest that the metaphor of the incarnation became for the christian community a 'theory-constitutive' metaphor. That is, it was used to fix a reference and to enable the community to articulate what they wanted to say about God's presence and activity in Jesus of Nazareth. Like all genuine theory-constitutive metaphors it provides a way of speaking about a phenomenon which is only dimly understood. Yet in providing a way of speaking it provides a terminology for the community, and modifies existing terminology, so that the community can meaningfully articulate what they believe.

In common with many theory - constitutive metaphors the theory cannot be expressed apart from the metaphor for it constitutes the essential claims of the theory. Therefore the christian community cannot express what it believes about God and God's presence in Jesus Christ apart from the metaphor of incarnation. To abandon the metaphor of incarnation would necessarily involve the community in saying something else, in developing another theory, about God and Jesus Christ. To illustrate this point let us consider the theory that the metaphor generates as a

scientific research programme. According to one influential account of such research programmes they are made up of a number of hard-core hypotheses and a set of auxiliary hypotheses. (79) The hard-core hypotheses define the shape and nature of the programme. They define its identity and suggest the way in which the programme is to be pursued. The auxiliary hypotheses perform the task of accommodating the programme to the world. That is, they are the presuppositions and implications generated by the hard-core of the programme. They are theories which state what must be the case if the hard-core hypotheses are true.

In this scheme the auxiliary hypotheses defend the hard-core of the programme by allowing themselves to be modified or discarded in the face of any contrary evidence to the programme. The programme remains intact for as long as one is only modifying or reshaping the auxiliary hypotheses. As soon as one has altered the hard-core hypotheses the programme has failed and in effect a new programme has been initiated.

The incarnation understood as the theory-constitutive metaphor of the christian community occupying a 'Gospel shaped narrative space' is the hard-core hypothesis of the christian programme. It provides the identity and the

direction and the goal of the programme and cannot be abandoned or changed without in effect ending the programme. However, like all rich metaphors it demands articulation and conceptual clarification so that 'it cuts the world at its joints', to use Boyd's phrase. This articulation and conceptual clarification may be thought as corresponding to the auxiliary hypotheses of the programme. That is to say that one can always modify and change the articulation or conceptual clarification of the metaphor without ending the programme but one cannot change the metaphor.

The generation and modification of terms by the early christian community suggests that the concept of incarnation did fulfil the function of a theory-constitutive metaphor. As the theory-constitutive metaphor of the mind as a computer generated terms such as 'neural programming', 'memory labelling', 'the encoding of thoughts' etc., so the metaphor of incarnation suggested and adapted terminology to express its own insights. The metaphor demanded explication and suggested important similarities and analogies which would be helpful in understanding the metaphor. Therefore the concept of Jesus as the 'son of God' which need not have carried any metaphysical overtones was developed and expanded until Jesus' unique relation to the Father was

captured in the title 'God the Son'. The Sonship motif generated its own cluster of related metaphors such as 'only begotten' and 'Eternally generated'. Indeed the whole doctrine of the Trinity is the result of the attempt to develop a terminology which accommodated the language of the christian community to the 'causal structures of the world', or in this case to their experience of the divine reality.

Similarly, the terms ousia and hypostasis were modified and adapted so that they could carry the conceptual implications of the metaphor of incarnation. This was not an easy task and shows that the 'accommodation of our language to the causal structures of the world' is fraught with difficulty and misunderstanding. To say that the Son was homoousios with the Father was to transfer a word which applied to everyday substantial and material things to God who was not himself material or substantial. Lonergan has argued that the original use of homoousios was undoubtedly metaphorical.(80) Certainly the shock and misunderstanding generated by this novel attribution would seem to bear him out.

The important point to realise is that this conceptual clarification is not an illegitimate reduction of the liveliness of the incarnational metaphor. The metaphor

demands this type of clarification but is not exhausted by it. As such there is no point at which one can say that one particular interpretation has exhausted the meaning of the metaphor. This is obviously true as the categories which we use to interpret any given metaphor will themselves change as our primary philosophical categories from which they are drawn develop and expand.

Therefore the problem with the classical theory of Chalcedon and its presentation of the incarnation of God in Christ is not that it is a conceptual determination of the language of faith but that it has assumed the place of the sole determination of that language. Consideration has already been given in the first chapter as to doubts concerning its continuing adequacy and its possible re-pristination today. But this is what might have been expected, for the categories of conceptual articulation today have a different shape from those of the Fathers. Substance has given way to action, ontology to psychology and a static view of the person to a relational and social view of the person.

In addition to this it was understood that one of the features of a theory-constitutive metaphor was that often it was extremely difficult to specify precisely and exactly what the relevant similarities and analogies

suggested by the metaphor were. This difficulty is due to the conceptual open-endedness of metaphorical predication. It is the work of articulation to explore what these might be and to measure them against the original metaphor and the way in which they open up a way of being in the world, the way in which they advance the programme suggested by the metaphor. As such the work of conceptual clarification can never come to an end for continually the suggestiveness of any sufficiently lively metaphor will constantly challenge the conceptual articulation of its insight into a thinking more.

In summing up what has been achieved in this lengthy discussion of metaphor I hope to have demonstrated a number of things.

(1) To have offered a general theory of metaphorical predication which demonstrates that metaphors do refer and provide genuine cognitive information.

(2) To thereby reject the theory that 'Incarnational' metaphors are merely statements of subjective feeling or belief towards Jesus Christ and to suggest that they do genuinely refer and bear cognitive information about God's presence in Christ.

(3) To have shown that the conceptual articulation of metaphors is both necessary and legitimate as it is the attempt to clarify the cognitive claims of sufficiently lively metaphors

(4) To have shown that there is important class of metaphors which are theory-constitutive in that the theory they help to espouse cannot be said apart from the root-metaphor

(5) To have argued that the metaphor of the incarnation is one such theory -constitutive metaphor that unites, integrates and suggests the lines of development for other less central metaphors of the New Testament. And that the same claims cannot be made apart from the metaphor of incarnation for the metaphor constitutes the theory it suggests.

(6) To have suggested that the conceptual articulation of this root-metaphor is the work of the christian community which has as its basis and presupposition the metaphor of incarnation.

(7) To have shown that the conceptual open-endedness of the metaphor and the difficulty in specifying precisely the exact similarities and analogies involved in the

theory-constitutive metaphor of the incarnation means that the work of conceptual clarification must continue for as long as there is a community shaped and defined by the programme that the theory suggests.

CHAPTER THREE

'GOOD PLEASURE', 'GRACE' AND THE PERSON OF GOD INCARNATE

3.(i) Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to move from the more general discussion of the logic and language of the incarnation offered in the opening two chapters, to a more specific consideration of an alternative approach to the incarnation. This seeking out of an alternative christological matrice of interpretation is required by the fact that the discussion of the opening chapter concluded that the contemporary defences of Chalcedon had implicitly moved from 'ontological' to 'psychological' categories, from 'incarnational' to 'inspirational' christologies. This move was necessitated by the contemporary understanding of the person as a relational subject of consciousness, will and activity.

Similarly, the discussion of incarnational language as metaphorical suggested that the primary metaphor of 'incarnation', like all sufficiently lively metaphors, contained within its own inherent dynamism the demand for conceptual explication. Yet the analysis of the classical explication of the metaphor of incarnation, as found in the credal statements of the Council of Chalcedon, suggested that that conceptual articulation was no longer adequate today. Successful as the philosophical categories may have been for their own time (and there is some doubt

about that) there is no doubt that the static figure of Christ offered therein no longer speaks to the community of faith as a credible, nor a satisfying, account of God's presence in Christ. The conceptual explication of the early Greek Fathers is increasingly being challenged by the metaphors of the New Testament into a 'thinking more', to provide a new articulation of the divine reality of the person of Christ, so that we are returned to the experience of being a disciple in the 'incarnational' world that is opened up to us by the root-metaphors of Scripture.

The focus of this chapter will therefore be devoted to an analysis of two theories of the incarnation which have attempted to take the full and individual personhood of Jesus of Nazareth seriously and which have also attempted to offer an account of God's presence in Christ in language which is not drawn from the categories of Chalcedon. As such they present themselves to us as responses to the metaphor of 'incarnation' which offer an alternative matrice of interpretation to that of Chalcedon.

The primary account that I have in mind is that offered by Donald Baillie in GOD WAS IN CHRIST. (1) The second account that will be considered is much more ancient and

is that offered by Theodore of Mopsuestia.(2) The reason for linking the two is that the categories which they developed to articulate the metaphor of incarnation 'grace' and 'good-pleasure' are very similar. The similarity is confirmed when a contemporary writer accuses both of the same christological fault, namely, that, they fail to maintain a unity of person in the incarnate figure of Christ.(3)

The reason for focusing upon Baillie's theory is that the ongoing concern of this thesis is to develop, out of his account of the incarnation, a theory of God's presence in Christ which shares the same basic structure of Baillie's theory, so that one might speak of them sharing a family resemblance, yet which legitimates talk of one 'incarnate' person. The development of that theory is the work of the following two chapters. The linking of Theodore's theory with Baillie is to explore any insights that Theodore's somewhat similar account might offer to an analysis of Baillie's position.

The idea that a clarification of Baillie's relationship to the Antiochene school, of which Theodore is the greatest representative, might be helpful, is suggested by a profound ambiguity which surrounds some contemporary treatments of Baillie's position. In a recent work

devoted to christology a number of differing estimations as to the character and value of Baillie's work were offered.(4) John Hick, for example, suggests that in the type of Christology offered by Baillie there is the basis for a theocentric development which is compatible with religious pluralism.(5) That is, although Baillie believed Jesus to be unique this is not logically necessary to his position and that the possibility is open for other founders of faiths to have the same degree of infilling of grace as Jesus had.(6) Hick concludes that Baillie had discarded the traditional language of Chalcedon in order to make the idea of the incarnation more intelligible to modern men.(7)

In the same volume S.T.Davis, a conservative analytic philosopher, defends the traditional Chalcedonian presentation of the person of Christ. To do this Davis distinguishes between what he terms 'minimal' christologies and 'full' christologies. He rejects all 'minimal' christologies as insufficient and he clearly regards Hick's christology as minimalist. Interestingly though, Davis draws a distinction between those who try to reinterpret Chalcedon, whilst remaining essentially faithful to it, and those who simply reject it. Baillie, he argues, belongs to the group of faithful interpreters rather than rejectors.(8)

In another recent work by David Brown, Baillie is taken to task for offering an essentially non-interventionist account of the incarnation and for representing the Nestorian/Antiochene position in modern guise.(9) From this it is clear that Baillie's account of the incarnation is still important as is evidenced by its continuing appearance, even if only to disagree with it, in all these contemporary works.

Consequently it might prove worthwhile to explore the ambiguity surrounding Baillie's position and to ask in what sense Hick is right to cast Baillie's theory as 'inspirational'. The thesis of this chapter is that Hick is wrong in this assessment and that there is no possibility of arriving at a theocentric position which is separable from the God who Christ revealed and who is incarnate in Christ from Baillie's position.(This is what might be expected if the incarnation functions as a theory-constitutive metaphor so that the same claims cannot be made apart from the metaphor of incarnation).

Furthermore, it will be suggested that Davis may be right to say that Baillie belongs to the faithful interpreters of Chalcedon. Although the justification for this may mean that an expansion of what Chalcedon allows is called for. Support for that idea will be drawn from a

critique of David Brown's rejection of Baillie's position. It will be argued that Brown may be right to state that Baillie's position ultimately has profound difficulty in maintaining a unity of person in Christ, but that he is wrong to reject it. It will be suggested that Brown's theory of two-minds, as discussed in the first chapter, is in itself totally compatible with Baillie's famous 'paradox of grace' christology. It follows then, that if, as Brown contends, his theory is faithful to the two-nature model of Chalcedon then Baillie's theory is similarly faithful. In order to demonstrate this it will be necessary to take a detour through what is normally termed Baillie's 'Antiochene' heritage via Theodore's theory of the incarnation.

3.(ii) Eudokia - A Neglected Option

The greatest exponent of Antiochene incarnational theory is undoubtedly Theodore of Mopsuestia. He more than Nestorius, who followed him closely, gave shape to the distinctive features of Antiochene Christology. Although his views were anathematised many years after his death at the Council of Constantinople in 553 A.D., this was a reaction to the Nestorian controversy and was an attempt to clear the Fathers of Chalcedon from the charge that

they tolerated views which were Nestorian in tendency. Despite this, it remains true that during the period of his lifetime Theodore's views formed part of the acceptable range of Christological theory.

It is not part of the intention here to discuss how proper it is to characterise Theodore as a Nestorian (nor if it is even proper to characterise Nestorius as a Nestorian).⁽¹⁰⁾ Suffice to say that there is nothing in the teaching of Nestorius that is not anticipated in the writings of Theodore, although Theodore perhaps expressed himself more carefully and less polemically than his unfortunate pupil. Instead concentration will be given to an analysis of the main features of Theodore's conception of the incarnation.

Theodore, as is well known, thought that the manner in which God was present in Jesus of Nazareth was by Eudokia or 'good pleasure'. His rejection of the language of substance (ousia) for the mode of God's presence in Christ may seem radical but it must be remembered that the language of 'substance' was not used as a category for describing God's presence in Christ by any significant figure in Alexandria or Antioch at this time. It was widely accepted that the terms which were to be used to describe the union were physis and hypostasis,

or nature and person. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that the eventual rejection of Theodore's position was due to the fact that he rejected the category of substance as a way of explicating God's presence in Christ.

The grounds for rejecting Theodore's position arose out of the Nestorian controversy and the suspicion that the Antiochene tendency to speak of a homo assumptus, sharply differentiating which properties could properly be applied to the divine and human natures in Christ, led to the intolerable and already rejected 'two Sons' doctrine of Paul of Samosata.

It is clear that Theodore never intended to return to the teaching of Paul of Samosata for he explicitly rejected that teaching. Yet he would not be the first theologian to reject a particular view only to find himself restating a similar doctrine in different words. In order to establish whether or not Theodore taught a 'two Sons' doctrine some consideration must be given to the key concepts in his thought. A number of questions immediately suggest themselves as requiring to be put to Theodore's scheme. What exactly did he mean by God's indwelling of Jesus by good pleasure? How might this differ from an adoptionist or inspirational account of

the person of Christ? What did he mean when he speaks of the divine and human natures in Christ? Are there two centres of will and activity? What does it mean to say that the two natures united to form one prosopon? Is this the hypostatic union under another name?

Theodore rejected the idea that God was present in Christ substantially or by activity. His reason for rejecting such concepts is that they belong to God's essence. For Theodore it is axiomatic that God is present everywhere at all times and is not spatially circumscribed. These are properties that belong to the substance or essence of God. Therefore to say that God was present in Christ substantially would be to argue that God's essence was to be found only in those whom he was said to indwell to the exclusion of all else, or it would mean that God is present substantially in everything, even in animals and inanimate matter.(11) Yet, Theodore argues, scripture clearly teaches that God chooses to indwell certain people and not others, he promises to be near to some and not to others. If indwelling is thought to be a feature of God's essence then we cannot make sense of the scriptures or demonstrate how God can be present in some things and not in everything.(12)

Theodore develops a similar argument for rejecting God's active operation as the manner by which he indwells Christ. Clearly God's activity is universal in scope. If his indwelling of Christ is said to be a matter of activity then one has to say that God's indwelling is universal or that God was limiting his operation only to those whom he was said to indwell.(13) Since God foreknows everything and governs everything and is actively working in everything, his manner of indwelling certain people in particular cannot be accomplished by this universal operative activity.

It is clear at this point that Theodore is trying to distinguish God's indwelling of those prophets and saints, with whom He is particularly said to be associated, from his general presence and operation in the world. It is possible to appreciate the attempt even if today the tendency would be to try to trace a connecting line between the manner by which God is present and active in all things and the way he is present in particular individuals. Theodore is basing his understanding of this differentiation of indwelling upon a particular understanding of certain scriptural passages where God is said to indwell certain individuals in a way in which he does not indwell others. Since this differentiation is clearly presented in scripture

Theodore argues that the indwelling cannot be accomplished by substance or activity, for God is present everywhere and at all times in these categories.

Having rejected these two categories Theodore asks what is left to explain the manner of God's indwelling? He asks,

"What explanation shall we use which, when we maintain it, will in these matters be manifestly appropriate? It seems evident, we shall say, that the indwelling should fittingly be described as taking place by good pleasure. And good pleasure means the best and noblest will of God.. (14)

The category which Theodore settles upon is that of 'good pleasure or 'Eudokia'. This is to be thought of as the active, loving disposition of God towards those with whom he is pleased to dwell. This is the manner by which God drew near to the prophets and the saints of scripture, and it is through the same loving disposition that God can be said to indwell Jesus of Nazareth.

It is obvious at once why this way of speaking of God's presence in Christ ran into difficulties after the sensitivities of the Church were heightened by the Nestorian controversy. Yet it would be a mistake to think that Theodore taught that God's presence in Jesus of Nazareth was no different from the way he was present to other men. Had Theodore taught that he would have found

no place in the Church of his time. Theodore explicitly teaches that God is present to everyone by virtue of his essence and his ruling activity, but that he draws especially near to certain men and woman by the indwelling of his 'good pleasure'. Yet this indwelling by 'good pleasure' is not all of a kind, for even the mode of the indwelling will vary according to the degree of God's good pleasure.(15)

Having introduced the notion of degrees of 'good pleasure' Theodore explicitly counters the idea that God was present in Christ in precisely the same way that he was present in the apostles. Theodore rejects this idea saying,

"But we do not say that God's indwelling took place in Christ in this way, for we could never be so insane as that. On the contrary, the indwelling took place in him as in a son ; it was in this sense that he took pleasure in him and indwelt him.

But what does it mean to say "as in a son"? It means that having indwelt him, he united the one assumed as a whole to himself and equipped him to share with himself in all the honour in which he, being Son by nature, participates, so as to be counted one person in virtue of the union with him and so to share with him all his dominion, and in this way to accomplish everything in him, so that even the examination and judgement of the world shall be fulfilled through him and his advent. Of course, in all this the difference in natural characteristics is kept in mind.(16)

This quotation provides everything that is attractive and everything that is worrying about Theodore's position at one and the same time. On the positive side Theodore is clearly trying to maintain a unique presence in Christ, he wishes also to speak of one person and to preserve the sense that the Word united himself with 'one assumed as a whole to himself'. There is clearly no room in Theodore's thought for anything remotely approaching a doctrine of anhypostasia. The Word assumed a complete human being and had to if our salvation was to be sure of covering our complete humanity. This much had been learned in the controversy with Apollinarius and it forms a benchmark for Theodore's theology.

Yet what exactly does this 'indwelling as a Son' consist in? Theodore seems to draw a clear distinction between God the Son who is indwelling Jesus of Nazareth, who is a Son by nature, and the one assumed, who shares in this sonship by virtue of the union that God has established through the act of indwelling. On a surface reading this would clearly seem to imply an adoptionist Christology. Yet one is bound to ask what Theodore means when he says that we are to 'count' the indwelling Son and the man assumed as one person by virtue of the union. What type of 'person' does Theodore have in mind at this point?

Further light may be thrown on these issues by a wider examination of Theodore's writings on the incarnation. On a surface reading Theodore's text seems to raise questions that would convict him fairly readily of adhering to the Nestorian heresy. Yet elsewhere much of Theodore's terminology clearly prefigures later Chalcedonian dogma. For example,

"Thus there results neither any confusion of the natures nor any untenable division of the Person; for our account of the natures must remain unconfused and the Person recognised as indivisible." (17) And again,

"We display a distinction of natures but a unity of Person." (18)

Undoubtedly too much can be read into this verbal similarity but it is nevertheless striking that Theodore's language can so closely resemble the great creed of christological orthodoxy. (19) This demonstrates, perhaps, the contention of a number of scholars that many in the Eastern Churches felt that Chalcedon had rejected to some extent the views of Cyril of Alexandria. However, though the issue of Theodore's prefiguring of later formulations is debatable; what is not debatable is the fact that he clearly sought to maintain the unity of Christ's person with God the Word, and that there was a unique union between God and man in Jesus Christ which was not equalled on any other occasion.

This union or Henosis was effected or constituted by God's indwelling of Jesus of Nazareth by 'good pleasure'. The unity of the person is recognised by the fact that the Word accomplishes everything through the person Jesus of Nazareth.(20) Theodore argued that this union was to be a lasting and real union. He writes,

"... For this reason in asserting that the Son of God will come as judge from heaven, we understand at one and the same time the advent both of the man and of God the Word, not because God the Word is degraded to be similar to him by nature, but because by good pleasure there will be a unity with him wherever he is, since through him the Logos accomplishes everything.(21)

Theodore's terminology at this point may be slightly unfortunate yet within the limitations of his terminology there is a clear intent to maintain a true and lasting union between God the Word and Jesus of Nazareth. It is Theodore's respect for the integrity of both natures and their mutual inviolability that leads him to distinguish the 'man' from 'God the Word'.

Theodore's fear of compromising the integrity of the individual natures in the incarnate figure of Christ led him to reject a view which was similar in many ways to his own. This was the incarnational theory of Gregory of Nyssa. Gregory, like Theodore, seemed to reject a substantial union between God and man in favour of a 'God receiving man' christology.(22) Gregory argued too,

that the God-man was hen prosopon, or one person, but he seemed to prefer the terminology of 'mixture' rather than union to describe the way in which God was present in Christ. For Gregory God's presence in Christ is ultimately an impenetrable mystery. Yet if we are to understand it we must understand it in terms of the divine power filling Christ, a power of love which is most fully demonstrated in self-giving.(23) Gregory emphasises the fact that the presence of God in Christ in the incarnation is similar and parallel to, although of a different order from, His continual immanent presence in creation. The union of God and man in Christ, therefore, is related to the indwelling of Christ in everything.(24)

The similarities between Gregory's and Theodore's position are too obvious to need spelling out. It is Theodore's rejection of the notion of 'mixture' which is most important here. Theodore rejected the concept of mixture in favour of union because he stressed the completeness and the distinction of the two natures in one person. For Theodore the notion of mixture threatens the integrity of the two natures, particularly the divine nature. Theodore prefers the concept of union over mixture as it allows for there to be two complete natures side by side in the one person of the incarnate Christ. He writes,

"When we distinguish the natures we speak of

the nature of God the Word as complete and of his person as complete (for there is no hypostasis without its person) Moreover, the nature of the man is complete and likewise his person. but when we consider the union, then we speak of one person.(25)

Theodore reinforces this terminology in the very next fragment,

"...the essence of God the Word is his own and the essence of man is his own, for the natures are distinct but the person effected by the union is one. In this way, when we try to distinguish the natures, we say that the person of the man is complete and that of the Godhead is complete. But when we consider the union, then we proclaim that both natures are one person, since the humanity receives from the divinity honour surpassing that which belongs to a creature, and the divinity brings to perfection in the man everything that is fitting."(26)

Once again it is important to note the strong emphasis upon the reality of the union between God and man and the insistence that we properly speak of one person. Yet one can immediately see the points which raised alarm in the minds of his critics. If in the figure of Christ there are two complete entities, the person of God the Word being complete, and the person of the man being complete, how can Theodore maintain that there is one rather than two persons? How does he avoid the 'two sons' charge?

Theodore was alive to this issue and attempted to avoid the 'two sons' charge by arguing that properly speaking only God the Son is a Son by nature and that the 'man assumed' is bestowed the title and honour by virtue of

the union which God the Son has with him. There are not 'two sons' as the union means that God the Son accomplishes everything through the man assumed. Once the union has been effected no separation other than a theoretical distinguishing of the natures is to be allowed.

Ingenious as this answer is it cannot suffice for the duality of persons in the incarnate figure of Christ. Theodore acknowledges two complete entities, two wills, two psychological subjects of attribution, for it is important to Theodore's scheme of things that Christ grew in moral stature through the exercise of his own will along with the co-operating power of the Word of God.(27) It is difficult, therefore, to maintain that Theodore can meaningfully speak of one person despite his best intentions.

A monograph devoted to Theodore's christology comes to precisely this conclusion.(28) In this work Frances Sullivan devotes himself to an analysis of what the concept of one prosopon meant to Theodore. Interestingly, Sullivan suggests that the term had no single or univocal meaning for Theodore. For an examination of Theodore's writings reveals that the word had a very elastic sense. Theodore speaks of a person as

a prosopon, the apostles as a group are a prosopon and even in one spectacular case it is suggested that the whole human race forms a prosopon.(29)

Sullivan is manifestly unsympathetic to Theodore's christology, declaring him to be the true father of Nestorianism. He concludes that Theodore teaches that the man assumed is an ultimate subject of attribution in his own right and that the unity of prosopon is nothing other than a unity achieved through a moral and dynamic relationship, a sharing of activity and prerogatives between the Word and the man assumed.(30)

The source of Theodore's confusion according to Sullivan can be traced to his failure to distinguish between that which can be predicated of the Word by virtue of his divine nature and that which can be predicated of the Word by virtue of the human nature which he assumed. Similarly, Sullivan argues that Theodore makes no distinction between human nature and the individual man, leading to the mistake of believing that we have to speak of a complete individual which the Word assumed to himself. Sullivan concludes that for Theodore the man in the incarnation is a human suppositum, a personal subject distinct from the Word.(31)

It will be clear at this point that Sullivan is judging Theodore by the anhypostatic doctrine of Cyril of Alexandria. Consequently, although Sullivan admits that Theodore's use of the term prosopon was fairly elastic, he has no difficulty in stating that whatever the prosoptic union was, it was not a union in one hypostasis. (32)

Despite the fact that Sullivan is manifestly unsympathetic to Theodore's thought, enough of Theodore's theory has been given to show that his conclusions are not unjustified. There is no doubt that it is extremely difficult to show that Theodore intended to teach anything that corresponded to the hypostatic union that has come to be the accepted interpretation of Chalcedon, particularly if that is interpreted through the concept of anhypostasia. However, the reason why Theodore could not teach anything that remotely corresponded to that notion is perhaps what makes him so attractive to contemporary theology. For whether it is regarded as a gain or not, there is no doubt that a Jesus who is said to have an impersonal humanity is not a viable option today. Theodore's explicit acknowledgment of Christ's concrete human individuality is an idea whose time has surely come.

But to move in that direction is to confront exactly the same problem as Theodore faced: how to speak meaningfully of one person in Christ when it is necessary to say that God and wholly God, and man and wholly man are involved in the act of the incarnation. Theodore's theory of prosopic union is generally judged to be a failure. Whilst this may be true, that it fails to say enough concerning the union of God and man in Christ to throw off the haunting shadow of dualism, it is equally true that the theory of the hypostatic union has, at least, equally grave difficulties attached to it, particularly with regard to the full humanity of Christ.

Before moving on from this consideration of Theodore's account of the incarnation it is perhaps worthwhile to consider briefly a sympathetic treatment of Theodore's position which offers an deeper analysis of the nature of the prosopic union.

The analysis to which I refer is that offered by Richard Norris in his book Manhood and Christ .(33) Norris asserts, as this paper has asserted, that Theodore's insistence upon a fully human and complete individual who is indwelt by the Word can be traced to his strong soteriological concerns. It is central to Theodore's understanding of the work of redemption that it involves

a double agency, a deed of both God and man, the product of a divine self-giving and human obedience.(34)

This means that Norris agrees with the position developed here that Theodore teaches that the man and the Word are not just two logical subjects but psychological subjects as well. Two centres of will and activity.(35) Norris interprets this far more sympathetically than Sullivan when he maintains that 'the two terms of the Incarnational relationship represent action and response....The point of Theodore's usage is to show that the Man and the Word are two intimately related agents bent upon an identical project.'(36)

The doctrine of inhabitation by 'good pleasure' is the basis of the union between the Word and the man assumed. This 'good pleasure' is the intentional presence of God, it is grace.(37) Norris argues forcefully, however, that the idea of co-operation is not a **constitutive** part of this union. At this point he is tackling head on those critics who argue that Theodore taught a mere 'moral union' between God and man. The union is effected by God's gracious indwelling of Jesus of Nazareth. The co-operation between man and God which is evidenced in the life of Christ is a **result** of that union through indwelling and is not that which constitutes it.(38)

The union which God the Word brings about is not due to any mutual or reciprocal action of God and Man, it is the result of the prior action of the divine Word who unites the man assumed to himself. This activity and prevenient choice of the divine Word is logically prior to the prosopic union which it effects, and to the co-operation between God and Man. It is this feature of the divine indwelling which distinguishes the indwelling of Christ from all other instances of indwelling.(39)

The priority of God the Word's activity in the union can be seen in Theodore's insistence that the assumed man was indwelt by God from his formation in the womb.(40) In this sense the man is passive in respect of the union and the Word is active. The union is not a result of human nature and is not a gradual achievement of human effort. The scriptures can speak of the assumed man growing in wisdom and knowledge, but this does not mean that the union is being progressively realised, but that the fact of the union is necessarily manifested in different ways and to different degrees as the assumed man grows from childhood to manhood.(41)

In summing up Theodore's position Norris reiterates the vitally important features of Theodore's account of the incarnation. Firstly, it cannot be said often enough that

the idea that the union is a result of a co-operation between God and man is not Theodore's way of defining the manner of the union. Co-operation is a reality in the incarnate life, but as a result rather than a cause of the union.

Secondly, the union is a work of divine prevenience and condescension which is prior to, and the basis of, all that is accomplished in the man. The essential point here is Theodore's insistence that there is a single source of all that Christ is and does (though) not a single subject.(42) Ultimately, the source of all that Christ does is the indwelling Word.(43)

Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, Norris argues that even the prosopic union is not a **kind** of union but is the outward expression of an underlying unity which might be any one of several different kinds.(44) Although this may seem to be surprising conclusion it is true that Theodore offers no explanation of the union between God and man in Christ other than his assertion that it is an indwelling. Therefore the prosopic union is not itself the basis of the union but is the expression of it. Certainly, Norris is right to say that when Theodore speaks of Christ as one prosopon he means that the Lord

presents himself to the world and the believer as a single object of knowledge and faith.(45)

Finally, with regard to how one might interpret the one prosopon Norris is clear that it is what he terms a persona communis and that it is not the hypostatic unity of Chalcedon. Yet neither is it a merely 'moral' union.(46) Norris concludes that Theodore's doctrine does presuppose a basic dualism but that Theodore refuses to assimilate the unique case of God's indwelling of Christ to an ordinary instance of divine co-operation with a man of good will.(47) Instead, Theodore sought to overcome the limitations placed upon him by his dualism by insisting upon the priority of the union. In a passage which could equally be a commentary on Baillie's position Norris writes,

"The doctrine of prosopic unity as Theodore propounds it has two equally important constituents, which when taken together define what is, for him, the essential nature of the paradox of the incarnation. On the one hand, it seeks to preserve the reality of Christ's human nature as a concrete centre of human activity; on the other hand, it involves a systematic denial that the human will in and through which salvation is wrought is ultimately the agency by which salvation is wrought.(48)

Much has been made of Theodore's failure to overcome the dichotomy involved in maintaining two subjects of attribution in the person of Christ. It is felt that his

concept of a prosopic unity, although interesting, cannot bear the weight of technical analysis. Sometimes it is argued that he lacked a sufficiently complex definition of the person and although he cannot be faulted for this he must nevertheless be judged to have failed.(49)

It is possible that there is some truth in this argument that Theodore can, in the end, only provide an external unity between God the Word and the man assumed despite his best intentions. Yet as was argued earlier there remains the sneaking suspicion that his attempts to speak of 'one person' are no more forced or stretched than the traditional or orthodox notion of the hypostatic union, which has had an altogether more favourable press despite the widespread recognition of its shortcomings.

In the discussion of the contemporary 'two-minds' theories in chapter one Morris was criticised for utilising an extended and unique sense of the term person in relation to Jesus Christ. Morris, of course, did not invent this approach but found it in the writings of Aquinas who argued that although in all other occasions a mind, body and soul would suffice to constitute a suppositum, in the case of Christ they did not and that a suppositum or hypostasis was only constituted in union with God the Son. It is surely pertinent to ask in

what sense is Theodore's conception of a prosopic unity any more forced, external, ambiguous or stretched than the very extenuated concepts offered above? How does it compare with the classical theory of anhypostasia, wherein the Word is the ultimate subject of the human experience and activity of Christ, but in such a mysterious way that he manages not to undergo change or be affected by them? It is hard not to get the impression that the human nature, according to this model, has just been glued on in a purely external fashion. Certainly, if Theodore is accused of failing to achieve a real unity of person then it can also be asked if the notion of anhypostasia achieves a real humanity in anything other than a technical and formal sense.

This is a real problem that faces Morris, Brown and all contemporary defenders of Chalcedon. For despite their avowed intentions to reformulate faithfully the credal statements they cannot help but be modern people. Therefore, questions of psychology, such as what does the one person Jesus Christ ultimately believe about himself, inevitably arise. Even the attempt to answer the problem by recourse to a 'two-minds' view of Christ reveals their utterly different starting point from the formulators of Chalcedon. The result is that their attempts to argue for a special, unique category of person, which applies only

to the incarnate Christ, lack ultimate conviction. What type of person is this? Is it still reasonable to hold that this human nature which Jesus of Nazareth is said to exemplify is anything like our human nature? And if it is possible what is there to prevent a follower of Theodore from arguing that his concept of one prosopon after the union is at least as meaningful as Morris' resurrection of a special and distinct person or suppositum which applies only in the case of Christ?

The point that is being laboured here is that the concept of one person after the union is a concept which is very difficult to substantiate given the contemporary understanding of the person. Theodore, Nestorius, and the whole Antiochene tradition, have been obvious targets for criticism on this point but it is possible to maintain that no-one else has satisfactorily resolved this issue either.

The nub of this discussion is that the terms hypostasis and prosopon are used in a very special and extended sense in Christological discourse. Outside the bland and unthinking characterisations of the prosopic unity as somehow only moral and external, and the equally bland and unconvincing characterisation of the hypostatic union as real and internal, there is no satisfactory

analysis of the two notions which finally explains why one is preferable to the other.

Indeed to pick up on the discussion of metaphor in the previous chapter, it is possible to see in both terms the type of tension inherent in words which are being applied in new ways as the result of a lively metaphor which is demanding conceptual articulation. The notion of person was extended and modified by the theory-constitutive metaphor of the incarnation. The early Fathers had to develop new terminology and to modify existing terminology in order to 'accommodate their language to the causal structures of the world.' The fact that history sanctioned hypostasis as the more adequate term should not blind us to the fact that Theodore was equally trying to express the same incarnational reality through the term prosopon. Neither should we forget that the conceptual articulation of root-metaphors changes as the philosophical categories of interpretation change. Therefore, it is possible that Theodore's conception of a prosopic union better reflects the incarnational reality given the contemporary understanding of the person.

This extended discussion of Theodore's position is valuable in itself as an alternative articulation of the metaphor of incarnation to the majority position of

Chalcedon. It certainly has a fierce imaginative power and is not uncongenial to the life of faith, to the way of being in the world, which is opened up by the incarnational metaphors of the New Testament. As such the neglected option of Eudokia must be considered as a live christological option today.

The discussion also serves as a basis for, and introduction to, the christology offered by Donald Baillie. That Baillie's position shares a certain family resemblance to Theodore's is undoubted, although the connection between Baillie's and Theodore's theories is somewhat circuitous. However, Baillie's theory may be thought of as containing and improving upon the valid insights of Theodore. Furthermore, the examination of Theodore's theory of the incarnation will prove useful in that the single greatest problem facing Theodore's theory, namely, the unity of the person of Christ also haunts Baillie's account of the incarnation.

3.(iii) Baillie and the Analogy of Grace

Like Theodore, Baillie draws on an analogy from religious experience in order to elucidate what he feels to be the central truth of God's incarnation in Christ.(50) The analogy that Baillie wishes to make is drawn from the experience of grace in the individual's life. This is the famous 'paradox of Grace'. According to Baillie the believer in his own life acknowledges a 'divine prevenience' in relation to his own acts. That is to say whenever he performs a good act the believer acknowledges that somehow in a paradoxical way the good that he has done is wrought not by himself but by God.(51

Baillie is anxious to point out that this sense of divine prevenience does not abrogate human personality nor forestall personal responsibility for the individual's actions. The wrong that the believer does is still of his own choosing. Yet in this paradoxical experience of grace it is possible, argues Baillie, to find a way of approaching the mystery of the incarnation itself. Baillie wants to suggest that this 'I , yet not I, but the grace of God in me,' this central paradox of the christian life, this experience of grace, even in its admittedly fragmentary form is a reflection of that

perfect union between God and man which occurred in the incarnate life. (52)

The 'paradox of grace' was for Baillie, then, a "faint analogue" of the union between God and man in Christ. "It was not I but God," is a phrase which is true of human religious experience and which is true of Christ's human life. Jesus' life, which was a truly individual human life, with all its human choices and actions was at one and the same time, in a 'deeper and prior' sense the very life of God incarnate.(53) One advantage of Baillie's theory is that it is in accord with the historical picture of Jesus. Baillie was profoundly influenced by the portrayal of Christ in the Fourth gospel where Jesus is constantly found to be subordinating himself and his mission to the Father.(Jhn 5:30)(Baillie is aware that there are serious question marks as to the historical authenticity of the Fourth Gospel) Yet the suggestive power of a gospel which combines the highest christology with the deepest confessions of human dependence on the Father has exerted a powerful attraction on Baillie. He argues that here we find in Jesus not so much self-consciousness as God-consciousness.(54)

With the 'paradox of grace' concept Baillie is attempting to argue that the actions and choices of Jesus were

purely human and, in a favourite phrase of his, "..in a sense everything depended upon them."(55) "Yet as soon as we have said that we must also say something else, we must say that in the last analysis such human choice is never prevenient or even co-operative but is wholly dependent upon divine prevenience."(56)

The result of this paradox, according to Baillie, is that, "We must say that in the perfect life of Him who was always doing the things that are pleasing to God this divine prevenience was nothing short of Incarnation."(57) It is difficult not to be reminded strongly at this point of Norris' conclusion to his study of Theodore's Christology, "..Theodore, however haltingly, tries to resolve within the limits set by the Church's traditional confession of Christ: the problem of how the obedience of Man to God can be at once a genuinely human obedience and the decisive act of divine grace."(58)

Baillie's attempted reconstruction of Christology along the lines of grace raised, and still raises, many problems, many of which Baillie himself anticipated. Most obviously there was the charge that his position was a return to a form of the ancient christological heresy of adoptionism. This charged Baillie with merely arguing that God united himself with a man who lived a perfect

life. As such could God really be said to have become incarnate in the traditional sense? And wasn't there a dangerously 'Pelagian' element to Baillie's views?(The form of this criticism if nothing else reveals Baillie's similarity with Theodore).

Another criticism was levelled against the notion of paradox. Was this not a retreat into mystification to cover up nonsense and poor argument? Others suggested that Baillie bypassed rather than solved the categories and difficulties of Chalcedon.(59) In addition to these difficulties there was the question as to whether or not Baillie taught that Christ was different only in degree and not in kind in terms of the divine presence within him. Finally, there seemed to be in Baillie's comments on the Trinity and the concept of Christ's pre-existence some unwelcome developments which arose from Baillie's method of approach.

Perhaps the most sophisticated charge of adoptionism against Baillie's Christology was that offered by John Hick in an article reviewing Baillie's work.(60) Hick acknowledged that Baillie had attempted to defend himself from the straightforward charge of adoptionism by stressing that God's action was always prevenient and prior to the human choices of Jesus. However, Hick argued

that Baillie must stress either God's prevenience or Jesus' choice. On the one hand Baillie seems to be arguing that God predestined Christ's choices, yet also, that these choices, from a human point of view, remained free. On the other hand Baillie seems to wish to argue that Jesus' choices were genuinely his own and important as choices of the one who was always doing the will of God. Hick argues that if Baillie stresses God's prevenient activity, then he shows how the incarnation may have been possible, but only at the expense of making it unnecessary. For if God could have so influenced men's decisions so that they were always right and good decisions, yet remaining all the time free decisions, then the fall and sin and consequently the incarnation become inexplicable.(61)

Alternatively if Baillie wishes to stress the human choices of Jesus then he is guilty of a form of adoptionism. According to Hick even a form of what he terms 'continuous adoptionism' is still adoptionism.(62) Hick's dilemma is a real one for Baillie's christology and for the Antiochene Christological scheme in general. Both positions stress the prior action of God and the genuine choices of the human Jesus. If Hick cannot be answered adequately then a blow is struck not only against Baillie but against the Antiochene scheme in

general.

Unfortunately Donald Baillie was not alive when Hick reviewed his work and therefore it is not possible to know how he would have responded. However, we have the next best thing in that his brother John Baillie did respond directly to Hick. With respect to the predestination/adoptionist dilemma John Baillie argues that his brother would clearly have embraced the predestinarian element.(63) He further argues that Hick downplays the paradoxical and mysterious nature of the relation between God's grace and man's free-will, asserting that the relation between the two is not one that can be overly simplified in the way that Hick attempts to do.(64)

An obvious response here would be to argue that John Baillie is retreating into the notion of paradox to protect his brother's Christology from suffering a devastating blow. But this would be a harsh judgement, for the notion of the paradoxical and ultimately mysterious nature of the incarnation is central to Donald's thought. The concept of paradox had long been central to Baillie's thought as is evidenced by its frequent appearance in his unpublished writings and lectures. He tries to show throughout God was in Christ

that the Christian faith is ultimately paradoxical at every point.(65) The reason for this is that whenever the living God is the ultimate explanation of anything it is always as a deeper or higher dimension of explanation of something which, on the empirical level, can (and ought to be) explained otherwise.(66)

Paradoxes, according to Donald Baillie, can and must be admitted when they arise from experience.(67) As such paradoxes cannot be eliminated from the Christian faith, from the conception of the incarnation, without losing the incarnation itself.(68) Paradoxes according to Baillie find their resolution in experience. That is to say, a mystery might not be able to be formulated in words without contradiction but it can be actualised and lived in religious experience."There should always be a sense of tension between the two opposite sides of our paradoxes, driving us back to their source in our actual religious experience of faith."(69) Only paradoxes which can be shown to spring directly from faith are justifiable for theology.(One is strongly reminded at this point of Ricoeur's treatment of the tensive nature of live metaphors which spring from, and speak to, an experience which strives after conceptual clarification. But a live metaphor is one which always returns to experience so as to achieve a new description

of reality, a new way of being in the world.)

The relation of all this to the paradox of the incarnation is that on the one level one speaks of the life of Jesus in purely human terms. He was a man, an individual human being. Baillie is quite clear on this, yet when one has finished saying all that could be said from a human point of view there is still something left unsaid, that is, in the life of this man we are confronted by the very life of God incarnate.

"... is it not the same type of paradox taken at the absolute degree that covers the whole ground of the life of Christ..of which we say that it was the life of a man and yet also, in a deeper and prior sense, the very life of God Incarnate."(70)

Enough has been said to demonstrate that the notion of paradox was not an ad hoc argument invented solely for the purposes of overcoming a weak point in his theory. It is possible, however, that his defence of the notion of the paradoxical nature of God's presence in Christ has left him open to another charge proffered by Hick, namely, that God's presence in Christ differs from his presence in us only by degree and not in kind.(71)

Again we are left to rely upon John Baillie to provide some answer as to how his brother might have responded to this charge. John Baillie questions the degree/ kind

distinction arguing that a difference of degree taken at the absolute level is already a difference a kind.(72) As a source for this particular view John Baillie refers to H.R. Mackintosh the great Scottish theologian who was a teacher of, and extremely influential upon, both Baillie brothers. Mackintosh writes,

" Fidelity to moral fact, then, obliges us to emphasise, as a fundamental principle, the truth that Divine immanence is essentially a matter of degree ,....
...One true mode of describing Christ, accordingly, is to speak of His person as representing the absolute immanence of God. For the Divine indwelling must vary in quality and intensity with the receptiveness of man; hence as it deepens it must from time to time involve new departures, turning points, crises of an epoch making character. Of these the life of Christ is the last and highest. He opens a new order; we may certainly put it so if we add that in this new order He is unique."(73)

The degree/ kind distinction charge is one that is often levelled against Antiochene-type christologies.(74) As this criticism is so pervasive in relation to the type of christology offered by Baillie it will be necessary to deal with it briefly at this point. The argument seems to run that if one pictures God's presence in Christ after the manner of his presence in the prophets, apostles and all believers, as assuredly the categories of 'good pleasure', and 'grace' do, then one cannot maintain a unique difference between Christ and the rest of humanity. Christ becomes not God among men but only

the man who is supremely filled, inspired, motivated by God.

Much of the language that Baillie and others have used lends itself to this type of criticism. The stress upon the complete and individual humanity of Jesus, and his oneness with us, tends in some eyes to detract from his absolute uniqueness as it has been traditionally conceived. Yet there is perhaps an indication in the writings of Baillie as to how he sought to deal with this problem. Baillie, you will recall, set himself the problem of solving in what way the life of Jesus was, "... not in some 'psychological' way but on a deeper level, in a more ultimate analysis, in a transcendent dimension, the very life of God himself?"(75)

Baillie with this reference to a 'more ultimate analysis' is explicitly invoking the notion of a higher level of description that is applicable to the human life of Jesus. One can describe his actions and choices from a purely human point of view for they are truly human actions and as such stand in relation to the historical and cultural circumstances which condition and affect all human actions. Yet when all this has been said there is still something more to be said, 'something of a higher, more transcendent dimension, something divine.'(76)

Does this appeal to a higher level of description satisfy the criticism that, according to Baillie's scheme, Jesus is only different in degree and not in kind from us? I would suggest that it does and that properly understood the notion of differing levels of description does allow us to consider differences of degree as in effect differences in kind.

Consider the example of a computer operating a programme. On one level what is happening can be explained in terms of electrical circuits and switches which are activated by an electric current so that they are in an off or on state. Yet on another level of description the computer is solving a puzzle and providing an answer, or playing a game. The solving of the puzzle or the playing of a game is not separable from the activity of the current switching switches on and off, but neither is it reducible to it. Similarly, at the game playing or puzzle solving level notions such as winning or losing, problems and answers, become appropriate which are meaningless at the level of circuitry, but which cannot be performed without the circuitry. (77) It is important to realise that it is not that one level of description is wrong and another right. It depends very much upon what you wish to know and what questions you wish to ask as to which level of description is most appropriate.

Each level of description is a different but nevertheless complementary description of a single system

Once we are alerted to the distinction between levels of description we find that we are used to drawing degree /kind distinctions all of the time. For example, on one level both the chair I am sitting on and the person sitting on it can be described in terms of the atoms which compose us. If the chair is wooden or plastic we may even both be seen to be predominantly conglomerations of carbon atoms. At one level such a description would be entirely accurate, yet no one would wish to deny that according to another level of description I am a being of a different kind from the chair. Such a secondary description would involve reference to higher concepts such as animate and living matter as opposed to inanimate and dead matter. Categories such as intention, volition, desire, memory, love could be appropriately predicated of the conglomeration of atoms which constitute me, whilst they would be inappropriate when applied to the chair. Yet in a fundamental sense there is nothing in my atomic make-up which cannot be found in the natural world of inanimate objects. I am just a particularly complex organism in which the atoms and molecules are structured in sufficiently complex a way to produce life. There is no difference in kind, at the most basic level of

description, between myself and the inanimate world which I inhabit, yet it cannot be denied that we continually, and correctly, say that there is a such a distinction. The difference in degrees of complexity and organisation of atoms becomes a difference in kind when a certain threshold is reached and life is produced.

Another example of the differing levels of description approach is the famous mind/ brain identity problem. On the one hand the workings of the brain can be explained in terms of neural processes, electro-chemical impulses firing neurons. Yet on another level the mind is characterised by thoughts, emotions, memories etc. It makes little sense to say that the neurons are aware of the contents of our memories although they seem to be essentially connected to their workings. Similarly, our thoughts, memories, emotions are not aware of the firing of the neurons. The two are undoubtedly interconnected, but it would make little sense if someone was asked what they were thinking, for them to describe the path of the neurons as they fired in their brain. The mental life of concepts, emotions, memories, pains and desires requires reference to a wholly different order of discourse from the neural workings of the brain before it can be adequately explained.

These are analogies and all analogies break down at some point if pressed, but the point I think is clear. We are quite used to making kind distinctions from differences in degree that are sufficiently complex to warrant them. Therefore the mind is not simply the process of neurons firing, a computer programme is not simply switches and circuitry. More has to be said and it has to involve two different levels of description if a complete and adequate account of these phenomena is to be given.

Mackintosh, it seems, was right, a difference in degree can become a difference in kind. God's presence in Christ can be conceived of after the manner of his presence in us, but the difference in degree can mean that there is an absolute difference between that presence and ours. Christ's actions can on the one level be perfectly described as human actions and choices, yet on another level they can only be explained by reference to the activity of God himself in the 'incarnate' one. Of course, these analogies, which are drawn from the world around us, do not prove there was a difference in kind between Jesus and ourselves, it merely attempts to show that such a distinction is not one which we are unused to making.

It seems that Baillie may have been intending this type of distinction when he argued that in one sense the life of Jesus was a purely human life of response and faith and love to God. Yet on another level something more needed to be said and that was that this life was the very life of God incarnate. Jesus' life was a perfect life because of God's activity in him and through him and yet it was a totally free human response to God. How this could be accomplished in a truly human life is ultimately a mystery, a paradox, but it is a paradox which finds its analogue in our own lives and as such we are able to grasp, however feebly, something of its import and relevance.

Enough has been said to show the close similarities between Baillie's 'paradox of grace' theory and Theodore's 'indwelling through good pleasure' theory. Indeed, they are virtual equivalents, for although Theodore did not use the term 'grace' to describe God's presence in Christ it is clear that for Baillie grace is never anything other than a loving personal relationship in which God gives of himself freely to the believer. Furthermore, both clearly wish to maintain that Jesus was a truly human individual in the act of incarnation. As such both Baillie and Theodore have to wrestle with the problem of how a human response to the divine

initiative can be genuinely free at every moment, yet, at one and the same time, be the perfect realisation of the will and love of God.

Both wish to argue that this realisation of the divine will and purpose mirrors, yet transcends at every point, the types of prophetic inspiration which we read of in the pages of our bibles and which we occasionally acknowledge among our contemporaries. That is to say it is a model of God's presence in Christ which accords with his presence in men and women throughout the ages and is understood today, although it transcends it in scope at every point.

To the criticism that such a perfect response to God at every moment is logically impossible and unrealistic for any truly human being, we would have to say that such a criticism neglects the emphasis that is being made upon the priority of God's action. Furthermore, one could paraphrase a famous argument in the philosophy of religion, 'if there is no logical impossibility in man freely incarnating the purpose, will and love of God on one or several occasions there cannot be a logical impossibility in his incarnating the purpose, will and love of God on every occasion.(78)

But it would have to be conceded that although Baillie and Theodore clearly intend to maintain a unity of person in Christ they do not explain how this is possible according to their scheme of things. If anything, Theodore makes a clearer attempt to at least acknowledge this problem than Baillie, who does not address it in any way. As such they fall foul of a criticism that John McIntyre raised against the somewhat similar christology of Norman Pittenger,

"....one wonders if he really faces the difficulties of Nestorianism,... for while the latter might be able to say that it was dealing with a metaphysical structure and was not obliged to show "how it worked" Nestorianism based on the psychological inadequacies of its rival theories cannot afford to ignore such difficulties."(79)

Baillie, it would seem, would also be condemned to showing how his theory 'worked'. Baillie's only response to this type of criticism is to stress over and over again the 'paradoxical' nature of the incarnation, its ultimately mysterious nature. However, remorselessly as ever, McIntyre has also argued that closer attention should have been paid by Baillie to the notion of paradox showing, "...if you like, how it works."(80)

Powerful as McIntyre's critique is on this point there is perhaps support for Baillie's position from a somewhat surprising corner, namely, contemporary analytic

philosophy. Within contemporary philosophical discussion of the philosophy of mind and with particular regard as to how one might explain the mystery of mental states within a physical and materialist perspective, Donald Davidson has developed the theory of 'anomalous monism'.(81)

'Anomalous monism' is a monistic theory because it maintains that psychological events are ultimately physical events. It is 'anomalous' because it maintains that when events are described in psychological terms they are not describable by strict physical laws. To say that psychological events are ultimately physical is to say that 'events such as perceivings, rememberings the acquisition of knowledge and intentional actions are directly or indirectly caused by physical laws'.(82) However, it is an important part of this theory that there are no psycho-physical laws which can cover the psychological beliefs, intentions, desires etc. which play a part in our acting and decisions. Therefore, although the theory believes that all psychological states are caused by physical events it does not believe that these events can be subsumed under general law-like physical statements. Ultimately, then 'anomalous monism' confesses a certain degree of ignorance about mental and emotional states which suggests a mystery at the heart of

human personhood, of human acting and being in the world. Or as Adrian Thatcher puts it, "I think anomalous monism turns out not to be an explanation of human action, but a stylish confession of the absence of one. It recognises human transcendence and the inevitable anomalies transcendence brings."(83)

The relevance of this theory to Baillie's position is that the criticism that Baillie has failed to show how his theory 'worked' is less devastating if we have to confess a certain mystery, a certain paradox or anomaly, in our own attempts to explain the relationship between physical laws and the mental states of the human person. If contemporary philosophers have to confess a certain 'cognitive' humility when faced with the mystery of the human person, might we not expect the same order of mystery to lie at the heart of the one incarnate person of Christ.

Of course a defender of strict Chalcedonian orthodoxy could equally well claim the support of the theory of "anomalous monism" in order to defend the account of Christ's person contained there from the type of criticism levelled in the first chapter of this thesis. There is some truth to this and in order to clarify the point it will be necessary to remind ourselves of one of

the original points of this chapter, namely, to show that Stephen Davis was right to classify Baillie as one of the faithful reinterpreters of Chalcedon, although that such an estimation calls for an expansion of what the dogma of Chalcedon has been traditionally thought to allow. To demonstrate this will require a brief examination of the claim that Baillie's christology belongs to the Antiochene school.

3.(iv) The interpretation of Baillie's Christology Today

Since the publication of God Was In Christ friend and foe alike have characterised the book as "Antiochene". Norman Pittenger in The Word Incarnate links Baillie with Theodore of Mopsuestia and the Antiochene tradition. In the same manner John Robinson in The Human Face of God and Anthony Hanson in Grace and Truth follow Pittenger and place Baillie firmly in the Antiochene camp. (84) Pittenger, Robinson and Hanson are all admirers of Baillie's work and they place themselves and their work in that same Antiochene tradition (a tradition which sometimes includes Schleiermacher as well). David Brown, as was indicated earlier, also places Baillie in the Antiochene camp, although in his view that is a significant fault rather than a sign of strength.(85)

Faced with this chorus of agreement it is strange to find that Baillie himself never appeals to either Theodore or Nestorius nor to any other Antiochene figure to support his position. Theodore does not appear at all in God Was In Christ and Nestorius only appears in relation to the discussion of anhypostasia. (86) Baillie makes no reference to any similarity between his own position and that of Nestorius, he merely makes the point that to say that Jesus was truly and fully human and also the incarnation of the divine Word does not commit us to the Nestorian heresy of dividing Christ into two persons.

It is not that Baillie is averse to seeking historical antecedents for his position for he does quite clearly delineate his theological 'forebears', but the historical figure he goes back to time and again is not an Antiochene, nor even a Greek father, but that father of Latin theology, Augustine.

Baillie cites Augustine as saying "The Saviour the Man Christ Jesus is Himself the brightest illustration of predestination and grace." Every man, from the commencement of his faith, becomes a Christian by the same grace by which that Man from His formation became Christ." (87)

What then are the reasons for regarding Baillie as a disciple of the school of Antioch? Have Pittenger, Robinson and Hanson got it wrong? Enough has already been said about the respective theories of Baillie and Theodore to establish at least the initial plausibility of their claim. Baillie would seem to conform to the Antiochene pattern, at least in spirit, even if he did not draw on Theodore directly.

As has already been argued, the relationship between Baillie's concept of grace and Theodore's concept of 'Eudokia' is that they are virtual equivalents. Grace, for Baillie, is never anything other than a loving personal relationship in which God gives of himself freely to the believer and it is clear that this is exactly what Theodore means by "indwelling by good pleasure". Both accounts argue for the priority and the reality of the union achieved by God's indwelling of Christ. Both accounts maintain the importance of the free choices of Jesus within the union, but argue that such choices do not constitute the union but are a realisation of it. As such the choices and actions of the man Jesus can never be considered apart from the prevenient activity of God. Both accounts argue strongly for the reality and concreteness of the human individual in the incarnation and also draw a parallel between the mode of

God's presence in Christ with his presence in us, although it is nevertheless a unique mode of presence in Christ.

It is tantalising, but ultimately speculative, to dwell on the reasons for Baillie's failure to draw direct allusions between his theory and that of Theodore. It becomes all the more tantalising when we find that in his unpublished lecture notes he attributes to Theodore the following idea, " Theodore emphasised the real human will of Christ, and thought of him as the man in whom God supremely and uniquely dwelt, by a kind of moral union of wills. With the strong ethical interest of the Antiochene school Theodore conceived of the union of divine and human in Christ as rather an ethical than a metaphysical union. God dwelt in Jesus not substantially but by grace or favour."(88) Baillie goes on to credit Theodore with the notion that each good action can be viewed from two perspectives; one as an expression of God's power and the other as an expression of man's will.(89) That is he credits Theodore with the central idea in the celebrated 'paradox of grace'. However, we do not find at this point in the text, the cry of 'Eureka'.The point is merely noted, very briefly, before passing on. Baillie makes no reference to the similarity with his own position

It is possible that Baillie did not make explicit the link with 'Antioch', and by implication, Nestorius, because he was aware that his own position was vulnerable to the same charge and consequently he did not wish to invite it upon himself by drawing direct parallels with a condemned school of thought. This may be true but can only remain at the level of speculation.

It may just be that although Baillie was aware of the similarity he made nothing of it because he was consciously drawing his inspiration from another source, namely, St Paul via Augustine. This is perhaps the most plausible explanation and means that if Baillie is to be characterised as one of the "Antiochenes" then this has to mean his work is in the Spirit of the 'Antiochene Fathers' rather than forming a direct and conscious representation of their thought.

The notion that someone like Baillie could begin by following hints in Augustine and end by developing a christology very similar to that of Theodore of Mopsuestia is reinforced by the discussion, suggested by Harnack, at the beginning of this century as to whether or not Augustine preferred a dynamic 'grace' centred model for the christological union to that of the more 'substantial' language of Cyril and Chalcedon. Harnack

argued that Augustine started from the human-nature or soul of Jesus which received the Word into its Spirit. "This receptiveness of Jesus was, as in all other cases, caused by the election of grace; it was a gift of God, an incomprehensible act of divine grace; nay, it was the same divine grace that forgives us our sins which led the man Jesus to form one person with the Word and made him sinless." (90)

This idea is explored in an article by John McGuckin entitled "Did Augustine's Christology depend on Theodore of Mopsuestia". (91) McGuckin agrees with Harnack's suggestion that Augustine's christology could not be understood along the lines of an unrepeatable localisation of the Word in him, but should instead be thought of as a singular receptivity of Christ to the presence of God. (92) Such an estimation of the Father of Latin theology was of course vigorously opposed by Catholic theologians. However, the charge that Augustine was more in line with Antiochene Christology than Alexandrian Christology has never gone away.

The category of grace came to the forefront of Augustine's thought in letter 187 written in 417 AD. Here Augustine elaborates a doctrine of the degrees of the presence of God in a manner similar to that of

Theodore. Augustine maintains that God is present to all things everywhere but dwells only in beings which have understanding and volition. And these he indwells only to the extent that they are with him, oriented towards him in love and attention. Augustine goes on to suggest that God only indwells those who are influenced by his grace. He develops this thought in relation to the person of Christ in a passage where he is commenting on Colossians 2;9 where it says 'in Christ the fulness of the Godhead dwells bodily.' Augustine argues that this cannot be taken to mean a material presence but rather that Christ is the head and sum of what is represented in the saints, who are his body. Therefore, although the christological union is unique, it is effected by grace just as much as the indwelling of God in other men—only more so, for here there is a 'singular grace' of assuming him into a unity of person with the Word.(93)

So great is the similarity of thought between Augustine and Theodore at this point that some have argued that not only is there a similarity between Augustine and the Antiochene Father but that Augustine is directly dependent on the work of Theodore. McGuckin, however, gives good reasons for rejecting this thesis, arguing that it is very unlikely that Augustine was sufficiently fluent in Greek in 416 AD to be able to read the

translations of Theodore's writings. McGuckin also suggests that the similarity of theme can be explained without reference to Antioch at all, for the doctrine of the degrees of presence of God is also a concern of Plotinus and Porphyry who we know influenced Augustine deeply.(94)

Yet it is also the case that Augustine was heir to a long standing Latin tradition which elaborated the union of God and man in Christ in the technical formula of one person in two substances inherited from Tertullian.(95) Yet Augustine did not appear to view the union of grace and the more 'substantial' or ontologically based union of the Latin tradition as conflicting. Four years after writing letter 187 he wrote a synopsis of christology which returns to the traditional terms of substance so prevalent in Latin theology. McGuckin suggests that Augustine did not appear to hold the two views as incompatible. Augustine seems only to qualify the one person in two substances formula when there was a danger of implying that God's presence in Christ was a material entity.(96)

McGuckin concludes that the fact that the two models of 'grace' and 'substance' may not be conflicting is a position which was missed at Ephesus in 431 and 449 AD.

He concludes that the Antiochenism of Augustine is not a Syrian influence at all but a long standing aspect of traditional Latin Christology coming back to the East through Leo's Tome which owed much to Augustine and which decisively shaped the interpretation of Chalcedon.(97)

Therefore it is plausible to assume that Baillie could have arrived at very Antiochene conclusions via Augustine without consciously drawing on Theodore or Nestorius. Furthermore, it would seem that Baillie, following Augustine, is someone who is offering an alternative but complementary account of the person of Christ using the language of grace. This language is an advance on the traditional formulation but it is not a sheer rejection of it. It is an explanation of the phenomenon of the incarnation at a different level from that of Chalcedon and is perhaps, in the light of today's presuppositions, a more helpful form of explanation than the language of Chalcedon, but it is not fundamentally incompatible with, or contradictory to, the intention of Chalcedon.

3.(v) Conclusions

To return to the stated intent at the beginning of this chapter to show that Hick was wrong to classify Baillie's christology as 'inspirational'. Augustine foresaw the

same dilemma and attempted to forestall the charge of offering a merely 'inspirational' christology' by arguing that "it has never been, nor is it, nor will it ever be, possible to say of any of the saints; And the Word was made flesh. None of the saints by any excellence of grace of any kind ever received the name of Only Begotten."(98) Baillie, (and indeed Theodore) would make exactly the same response and Hick is therefore wrong to continually read Baillie's christology as an example of an 'inspirational' christology. To do so, Hick has to continually play down the element of divine initiative and prevenience which so dominated Baillie's thought. Baillie, as indicated earlier, argues as forcefully as he can that, although in a sense everything depended upon Jesus' human choices, at a deeper and prior more fundamental level everything depended upon the prevenient grace of God. This was also true of Theodore's position as outlined earlier.

As such Hick cannot merely choose to disregard Baillie's efforts to save himself from the charge of adoptionism by saying that his position does not logically require a unique Christ. Baillie would not concede this point, his position does logically require a unique Christ- for he repeatedly argues that Christ taught of a God who reaches out to man before we reach out to him, a God who was

preveniently seeking us in grace, if God is not in Christ then Christ was wrong about the God whom he served. Consequently the Christian church cannot make the same claims about the nature of God apart from the theory-constitutive metaphor of incarnation, for this would mean that God was not seeking us out. Hick, can of course develop an inspirational christology if he so wishes, but he does violence to Baillie's position by suggesting that it can serve as a basis for a merely 'inspirational' christology.

As for the second stated intention enough has now been said 'vis a vis' Baillie and Augustine to justify the claim that Davis was right to place Baillie among the faithful interpreters of Chalcedon, although to do is to expand the terms of Chalcedon to include christologies of 'grace' and 'good-pleasure'. But this may not be too great an expansion after all. For a plausible interpretation of Chalcedon is that it was a step back towards the 'Antiochene' position from the excessive Alexandrianism of Ephesus. If this is true then it may be possible to find in the christologies of 'grace and 'good pleasure' an account of God's presence in Christ which satisfies both the demands of faith and the contemporary stress upon the reality of the human person at the heart of that faith. As such it offers a genuine middle

way between Chalcedonian christologies and mere 'inspirational' christologies.

To turn finally and briefly to the objections of David Brown. Brown rejected Baillie's position as a return to the Antiochene/Nestorian model in modern guise. (Suitably qualified by the above discussion this is an acceptable proposition). Brown also accuses Baillie of failing to maintain a unity of person in Christ and for holding essentially a non-interventionist christology.(99)

As to the first of these charges it has been shown that Baillie is not simply an Antiochene and that any characterisation of him as such will have to place Augustine there too. On the question of Baillie holding a non-interventionist position Brown is simply mistaken. Brown confuses a non-interventionist model with having a different model of intervention. It is quite clear that for Baillie the model for understanding God's intervention in the world is that of grace. God is present, he intervenes and acts in human life through grace. Baillie's model is not an intrusive model of intervention, it is not incompatible with human experience as we know it, but it is not a non-interventionist model.

Finally consideration must be given to Brown's charge that Baillie cannot maintain a unity of person between God the Son and Jesus of Nazareth. In order to respond to this it will be necessary to consider briefly Brown's own attempt to overcome this problem. Considerable space was devoted to this in chapter one so a brief resume is in order here. Brown defends the two-nature definition of Chalcedon by means of a 'two-mind' hypothesis. That is, in the one person Jesus of Nazareth, we have two ranges of consciousness, one human and one divine. There is a flow of information between the two centres of consciousness limited only by what it is possible and proper for each to possess. We are to imagine a constant infusing of knowledge on the part of the Divine mind to the human mind and the constant receiving of human experiences on the part of the Divine mind from the human mind. The human mind does know that it is participating in the Divine mind, participating indeed, in the Trinitarian relations of the Divine life. The reason that it does not know this is that it has no basis for distinguishing between what it participates in and any other case of prophetic inspiration or mystical vision.(100)

Brown is aware that on any standard definition of omniscience, an omniscient divine mind would have access

to the individual mind of Jesus anyway. Therefore, we need a stronger reference to an ontological bond between the two minds to justify talk of one person. In other words more than a flow of information is required, there is need also for a sharing of experiences. Brown argues that such a sharing of information and experience would mean "that in this case and in this case alone, God allows himself to be directly affected by human experience in some sense beyond that of merely knowing that certain things are happening".(101)

Brown goes on to say that the difficulty lies in specifying precisely what this further sense is, but it remains vital if talk of one person is to be justified. At this point Brown turns the normal 'two-minds theory' on its head. Normally, the divine range of consciousness takes priority; it is the initiator of action and the true subject of human experience as in the classical theory of anhypostasia. However, on Brown's model it is the thoughts, experiences, words and deeds of the human mind which receive expression in the life of the incarnate one rather than the divine mind.(102) This does not deny the commitment of the divine mind to what is happening in the single person; it is just that the usual position is reversed in that the divine mind

receives things as it were at second hand from the human mind.

One is tempted to respond here that if this is Chalcedon that is being defended, it is Chalcedon turned on its head. It is surely Chalcedon from a very Antiochene perspective, with the stress on the priority of the human mind going further perhaps than even the boldest Antiochene would ever have dreamed of going. However, the essential point being made is that there is nothing here that is incompatible with Baillie's position. Baillie would not have expressed himself in this manner, he was quite sure that we should not explicate the incarnation by reference to an abnormal psychology in the person of Christ.(103) But there is nothing here that violates the logic of the 'paradox of grace', and consequently one fails to understand why Brown so vehemently rejects Baillie's position.

Indeed, Brown may have unwittingly done Baillie's theory a service by suggesting the type of theory which is required to undergird and support Baillie's type of approach. For the point which Brown draws our attention to, is the question, what allows us to justifiably talk of one person in Christ? As indicated earlier in the discussion Baillie never addresses this question

satisfactorily, resorting instead to the notion of paradox. Brown's position develops a theory which speaks of the Divine mind 'allowing' itself to be uniquely affected by the human experience of Jesus of Nazareth, of a divine commitment to the human actions and words of Jesus. Baillie's position, the paradox of grace, calls for just this type of explication.

Baillie would surely have rejected Brown's advocating of an abnormal psychology in the figure of Christ and this would seem to imply that he would reject the 'two-minds' approach. However, as Brown has outlined it the 'two-minds' approach stresses the reality of Jesus' human religious experience. Jesus could not distinguish his relationship with the Father from any other human relationship with God (except of course in the normal manner of being aware of his exceptional devotion to God). Baillie would have to concede at least this much to the 'two-minds' approach, unless he wanted to say that God was unaware of Jesus' response or not involved in his actions and Baillie clearly wanted to say that he was. In this sense every incarnational theory is a 'two-minds' theory. For every theory which acknowledges the reality of Jesus' intellectual and cognitive processes must also acknowledge an awareness on the part of God of that human mind and of his involvement in the choices and actions of

that human mind if talk of an incarnation is to be justified. However, as suggested in chapter one there is another category of interpretation which undergirds Brown's divine 'allowing' and Baillie's 'paradox of grace' and that is the concept of God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth.

With this notion of identification we return to a perceptive comment of John McIntyre who had much to say about the notion of identification in On The Love of God .(104) At the end of his review of the critical discussion of God was in Christ McIntyre argued that Baillie's position had to be developed in a number of ways. One of these would involve a development and discussion "of the state of play in the logic and metaphysics of substance, and also what has come to be known as the philosophy of mind..the borderline between philosophy and psychology.(105) His own concept of identification is perhaps the best way forward in these areas and is potentially the most fruitful way of explicating Baillie's Christology today.

CHAPTER FOUR

IDENTIFICATION AND INCARNATION

The Basis of Unity

4.(i) Introduction

In the previous three chapters the implications for incarnational language when viewed initially as literal statements of identity and then subsequently as metaphorical statements have been discussed. It was argued that the literal interpretation of incarnational language, particularly in the classical formulation of Chalcedon, led to insuperable difficulties surrounding the question of the real human personhood of Jesus of Nazareth. This difficulty has always been felt and the ensuing tension resulted in many of the 'heretical' presentations of the person of Christ in the patristic period. The difficulty, however, has been exacerbated for contemporary believers with the development of the modern psychological understanding of the person as a centre of consciousness, will and agency. Such a theory of the person does not allow for the traditional solutions to this difficulty such as anhypostasia or enhypostasia.

As a consequence of the modern understanding of the person virtually every contemporary christology begins with the realisation that no matter what else may be said about Jesus of Nazareth the fact that he was a real, historical, individual person is the basic starting point for all discussion. However the manner of the divine presence in Jesus of Nazareth is portrayed it is generally agreed that

it must not violate the reality of his historic individual humanity. This presupposition is accepted as basic and given in the presentation of the incarnation to be outlined in this chapter

In the discussion of incarnational language as metaphorical it was shown that the ontological implications of the christological claims of the New Testament cannot be avoided by simply asserting that such language is merely figurative and metaphorical. Following Ricoeur's treatment of metaphor it was agreed that an ontological and conceptual demand is put to our thinking by the suggestive 'is' of metaphorical predication. If the claim is made that Jesus Christ is metaphorically the Son of God then we have to examine what this means. In what way is Jesus Christ the Son of God? How are we to construe the variety of implications that that metaphor throws up?

As such the history of christological discourse can be viewed as the conceptual response to the chaotic suggestiveness of the New Testament claim that God was in Christ, the Word became flesh. Rather than seeking refuge, as some authors have done, by stating that incarnational language is 'merely' metaphorical it was argued that such a realisation is only a beginning point to understanding what is involved in such language and that the

implications of the metaphor need to be elaborated. If the the claim is made that God became man then our understanding of the world is shattered by this incarnational claim. A new possibility of understanding is opened up to us that this is a world in which God is present to us as human beings by being completely and totally involved and immersed in the human situation.

Similarly, the understanding of what it is to be a person, a human being, is at once shattered and expanded. Any understanding of the person which precludes the possibility of God incarnating himself in a human life is destroyed by the metaphorical yoking of two literally understood impossibilities in one sentence, God became man. With the shattering of the literal understanding of both these concepts a new possibility of interpretation is put to thought to rethink the categories of divinity and humanity in terms of this metaphorical predication.

Chalcedon, indeed the whole Christological discourse of the early Church represents the attempt to conceptually clarify the New Testament claim that God was in Christ. Yet this clarification of the metaphor of incarnation is capable of a number of interpretations and is not reducible completely to any single one. The problem with the Chalcedonian interpretation is that it precluded other

valid interpretations of the metaphor by usurping the place of power as the single literal and true account of the incarnation. This meant that the suggestive power and interpretative possibilities opened up by the metaphor of incarnation were illegitimately reduced to a single option.

Realising that there are many possible conceptual interpretations of the incarnational metaphors of the New Testament consideration was given to the christologies of Donald Baillie and Theodore of Mopsuestia. Both these christologies were considered to be valid interpretations of the New Testament picture of Christ. Both possessed the singular virtue of taking seriously the true historical humanity of Jesus of Nazareth and as such are marked as genuine possibilities for the development of a modern christology. However, it was also argued that in their interpretation of the person of Christ they had failed to pay sufficient attention to the question of the unity of that person. Both Baillie and Theodore clearly wished to maintain a unity of person in Christ but they failed to give a clear indication how that might be achieved in practice. The present chapter then is best viewed as an attempt to continue in the school of Baillie and Theodore with a christology which shares a 'family resemblance' to that of the 'paradox of grace' and indwelling by 'good

pleasure' christologies. It certainly takes place within what could be termed a 'call and response' situation, but which nevertheless attempts to provide a conceptual interpretation which justifies talk of one person in the incarnate figure of Christ by utilising the concept of God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth.

The concept of identification has already implicitly arisen at a number points throughout the discussion but a systematic treating of it has been postponed until this point. In the critique of the 'two-minds' theories in the first chapter we discovered, in the most promising version of that theory, in the position offered by David Brown, reference to a 'divine allowing' whereby the human experiences of Jesus of Nazareth were uniquely experienced by the divine mind of the Son of God. It was argued that only such a unique experiencing of the human life of Jesus by the divine mind legitimised talk of a unity of person in the incarnate figure of Christ. It was suggested that any talk of such a 'divine allowing' more closely approximated the language of identification than the language of Chalcedon which Brown's theory sought to represent.

It will be remembered that the discussion of metaphor acknowledged the need for certain bridging concepts

between the chaotic suggestiveness of live metaphors and the abstract precision of conceptual clarity. It will be argued here that the concept of identification is ideally suited to perform this bridging function as it oscillates between the richness and variety of metaphorical language and need not necessarily suggest that it is the one 'true' definitive interpretation of incarnational metaphors.

The discussion of metaphorical predication also suggested that there were certain 'root' or dominating metaphors which controlled the network or association of ideas thrown up by other more subsidiary metaphors. These dominant metaphors control the association of ideas suggested by other metaphors by filtering out meanings which are not compatible within the fields of reference which the dominant metaphors have established. Therefore such metaphors as 'Son of God', Logos, 'Messiah' control the ideas suggested by other metaphors such as 'suffering servant', 'Son of David', 'Son of Man' etc. In the discussion of metaphor consideration was given to the claim that one root metaphor from the New Testament is the statement 'God Is Love'. However, it was briefly argued that the statement 'God is Love' requires to be interpreted within the context of the New Testament placing of that statement within the larger scope of God's activity in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus

Christ. It was claimed that this larger metaphor of God's incarnation in Christ was a theory-constitutive metaphor which meant that the same claims could not be made apart from that metaphor. So that for the christian community the statement 'God is Love' is justified and given content and meaning within the framework of the metaphor of incarnation.

4.(ii) The Theological Articulation of Identification

Happily for this thesis a recent work of profound theological insight and power has analysed the statement 'God is Love' through the root New Testament metaphor of God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth in a provocative and compelling way. Eberhard Juengel's monumental work GOD AS THE MYSTERY OF THE WORLD devotes a considerable portion of its length to a recurring treatment of these topics.(1) In this work Juengel discusses how we might speak responsibly about God in the modern age. Central to his argument is the claim that the the New Testament context demands that the statement 'God is Love' be understood in the light of God's identification with the dead man Jesus of Nazareth.(2)

Identification for Juengel is a relation of love; it is a going forth on behalf of God to establish a unity with

that which is other than himself. God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth is an event which **establishes** and expresses a 'still greater similarity between God and man taking place within a great dissimilarity'.(3) For Juengel the identification of God with the man Jesus expresses a nearness between God and man which surpasses 'mere' identity. Juengel argues that the establishing of an identity between God and man which abolished every difference between them would be the end of the original distance without the establishment of nearness between the two entities.(4)

What Juengel appears to be saying here is that a relationship of identification between God and man establishes a closeness or unity which respects and retains the distinction and integrity of the two natures involved without compromising the reality of the union which is achieved. Though Juengel's language is typically convoluted at this point it would seem that he is trying to laboriously rework the classical language of one person(nearness, similarity) in two natures (distance, difference) without the natures being confused or separated.

Of importance to the earlier discussion of metaphor is the fact that Juengel places this discussion within a wider

discussion of theological language as analogical, metaphorical and parabolic. Here Juengel argues that in evangelical speech the ontological difference between God and man, 'the establishment of a still greater similarity within a great dissimilarity,' is mirrored in the tensive 'is and is not' quality of all human speech about God. It is only by recognising this tensive quality in evangelical speech about God, whether it be analogical, parabolic or metaphorical, that one can risk the Easter confession that Jesus Christ is true God and true man. 'Only in this sense, recognising that ontologically and hermeneutically one is asserting a still greater similarity in the midst of such great dissimilarity, can one say that the man Jesus is the parable of God.'(5)

Juengel's understanding of metaphorical and parabolic language will not be pursued at this point as it is largely in accord with the position outlined in the previous chapter on metaphor. Suffice it to say that in metaphorical and parabolic language a new dimension of reality comes to expression through the revelation of possibilities revealed in the novel predication suggested by metaphorical language. The hearer of the metaphor is drawn into the reality described by the metaphor through its character as addressing speech which involves and includes the hearer in the new possibilities, the new

reality which is being described. For example, Juengel argues that in the parables of Jesus God comes closer to his human hearers than they are to themselves and consequently if Jesus is the parable of God then God has come closer in him to humanity than humanity is able to come close to itself.(6)

Juengel develops this theme to argue that if we understand the Cross as God's identification with the dead Jesus then this is a moment in which the divine life is revealed and defined as a life that exists for others. Being for others God is identical with himself in his triune nature. This determination of the divine life as being for others is the essential meaning of love. Therefore theological speech about the death of God is revealed through the event of God's identification with Jesus as the most original self-determination of God for love.(7)

This is not of course to suggest that God did not become 'love' until the death of Jesus, rather it means that the death of Jesus discloses the depths of the divine life. The eschatological event of the identification of God with the man the Jesus is the innermost mystery of the divine being.(8) Here, Juengel is arguing that God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth is the revelation of the eternal being of God."God is from all eternity in and

of himself in such a way that he is for man."(9) As such the eschatological event of God's identification with Jesus is an event which moves the eternal being of God to self-determination. This being for others in identification with Jesus requires self-differentiation within the being of God and is therefore the beginning of the Christian understanding of the triune nature of God.

Juengel's discussion of God's identification with the dead man Jesus is set within a discussion of how one might meaningfully speak of God today with particular attention being paid to the statements on the death of God. As such he is addressing the difficult problem of God's unity with perishability and placing it within the larger framework of narrative theory. As stressed at the beginning of this discussion Juengel argues that the narrative context of the New Testament insists that the statement 'God is love' be understood in relation to the cross of Jesus Christ and God's self-identification with that cross. Within the narrative framework of the New Testament this means that the believer is entangled in the stories of Yahweh's dealings with Israel and in the stories of God's dealings with his newly called people. For this is the story of God's humanity which is revealed and fulfilled in the identification of God with the man Jesus. This identification expresses itself in that the man Jesus

merits being called the Son of God. For in this identification with the man Jesus, which is presented in the narrative as God's sending his only Son into the world, God demonstrates that he is love itself.(10)

However, as intimated earlier, such an identification of God with the man Jesus requires the self-differentiation of God. For the essence of God is love, but this is not the self love of an isolated 'I'. Rather it must be understood through the event of God's identification with Jesus which reveals the eternal being of God as differentiated being. In this differentiation within himself God is 'lover and beloved or in New Testament terms he is Father and Son'.(11) Developing this line of thought Juengel argues that the perfected identification of God with the crucified man Jesus is the mutual work of Father, Son and Holy Spirit.

The love relationship that exists in the eternal being of God is not to be thought of as a simple expansion of the usual 'I-Thou' relationship of love. Rather we have to see that God is not only the loving one and the beloved one but as the Holy Spirit goes out beyond himself and thus determines the loving 'I' to the beloved 'Thou'. God's love is therefore eternally going forth to include the other, to include man. God is always giving himself to the

other and the New Testament idea for this is that of the Son of God who has been given to the world. If God were only the one who loved himself eternally then the differentiation of God would not be necessary and God would not be love at all in his absolute identity.(12)

Yet to understand God in unity with death and perishability, to understand God's identification with the crucified Jesus of Nazareth, we have to understand that God is love precisely in that he loves his Son in his identity with man. Juengel argues that God loves the world in which sin and death dominate. God's love radiates into lovelessness. And more than that God's love involves itself completely with that lovelessness by identifying himself with it in Jesus Christ.

So far Juengel has provided a powerful analysis of what it means to speak meaningfully of God in the light of God's identification with the crucified Jesus of Nazareth. It has been necessary to dwell at some length on Juengel's contribution as he shows both the necessity of some conceptual clarification of the New Testament metaphors for God's presence in Christ and the usefulness of the concept of identification as a means of providing that clarification.

Juengel, however, does not dwell upon the details of what might be involved in the process of God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth. He tends merely to assert it as a fact or implication of the cross of Christ. Yet his insight that the concept of identification has ontological implications for the very being of God itself and the realisation that identification is the deepest meaning of the love of God are insights that will be carried forward in the discussion of this topic.

Insightful as Juengel's analysis of the love of God from the standpoint of identification is, it is nonetheless predated by the work of John McIntyre in ON THE LOVE OF GOD.⁽¹³⁾ McIntyre's analysis not only predates Juengel's but is itself a model of clarity and brevity where Juengel's is dense and ponderous. McIntyre's analysis of identification takes place as the penultimate point in a discussion of seven determinations of the love of God. Like Juengel, McIntyre suggests that the concept of identification is the deepest determination of the love of God and is itself the concept in which all the other determinations such as concern, commitment, communication, community, involvement and response and responsibility find their deepest meaning.⁽¹⁴⁾

McIntyre begins his analysis with the baptism of Jesus and asks 'for what reason does the sinless one go forth to receive a baptism of repentance'? This baptism makes no sense unless it is viewed from the perspective of a righteous God's identification with sinners. In the baptism of Jesus we see righteousness going forth beyond itself to identify itself with its very opposite.(15) Thus the true meaning of Jesus's baptism only becomes clear when viewed from the perspective of identification. The difficulty in understanding why this baptism of repentance and remission of sins is undergone by the sinless one is overcome by understanding that in this process of identification love vindicates the unloving and justifies the ungodly. McIntyre writes, "They pass over, from being on one side, even on the one transcendent and totally other side, to identify themselves with that which is their negation."(16) Here McIntyre anticipates Juengel's theme of the love of God radiating out into a loveless world.

McIntyre is quite clear that identification is not to be read as mere sympathy. It is to be understood as a movement by God which involves the real taking on of the human condition even to the extent that Jesus took upon himself the sinful human condition and did not just suffer the consequences of sin. Love can go no further than this type of identification which is complete and total. Such

an identification must be protected against any dilution, any appearance of a feigned experience on the part of God. Identification was something that took place, something through which Jesus actually lived and experienced and above all something that happened to him in his death.(17) In an important passage McIntyre argues that we must acknowledge that in this act of identification the divine person entered into the depths of human life including its shame and sin and **experienced** those to a degree of sensitivity beyond our understanding.(18)

To show the true depths of this identification McIntyre outlines how all the other determinations of the love of God come to fruition in it. Of particular importance to our theme is his treatment of love as concern. Through identification love as concern is amplified and we find that mere concern for another is transcended until;

"it has crossed over and literally made itself one with the subject of concern....
...concern is a bi-polar conception involving a subject of supreme value and a person to whom he is of ultimate concern. When concern reaches its fulfilment in identification then the bi-polar field becomes unicentral. **The Word has been made flesh and God has made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin. The two poles of supreme value and of ultimate concern have coalesced in One who is God-man.**"(19)

At this point McIntyre's analysis of identification which has primarily concentrated upon God's identification with

humanity through Jesus shows its appropriateness and indeed almost its necessity as a model for the act of incarnation itself. Indeed McIntyre argues that, "... - the fact of identification is central to the Incarnation itself-in taking our humanity Jesus Christ made Himself one with us."(20)

In a manner which again anticipates Juengel's later treatment McIntyre suggests that the concept of identification has implications for our understanding of the Trinitarian nature of God. We are, he says, accustomed in the doctrine of the Trinity to read of the notion of perichoresis, the interpenetration of the persons of the Godhead into one another, so that while they are held to be distinguishable from one another, they nevertheless dwell within one another and share each other's nature. McIntyre suggests that, "... it is not too far- fetched to suggest that a transcript of that situation has occurred ... to produce the identification in which love in community results in the penetration of the love of God into sinful human nature and in the outpouring of that love in the death of Christ on Calvary. Because in that Person community passed beyond itself to become identification."(21)

It is clear that McIntyre has provided, in concentrated form, a powerful model for understanding the incarnation. It is true that McIntyre's primary purpose is to understand God's identification with sinful humanity through his presence in Jesus of Nazareth rather than dwelling upon the notion of identification as the manner by which God was present in Jesus of Nazareth but one is clearly implied in the other and the transition from one to the other is justified.

It is worth noting that McIntyre clearly draws ontological implications for the very being of God from the category of God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth in a manner which again anticipated Juengel's later treatment of the topic. Similarly, Juengel and McIntyre are in perfect agreement in saying that the Cross is the definitive revelation of what it means to speak of the love of God and that it finds its deepest explication through the notion of God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth. Although McIntyre focuses his attention primarily upon God's identification with humanity through his action in Christ, and Juengel's analysis is an exposition of the meaning of the death of God viewed from the fact of his identification with the dead man Jesus, both accounts presuppose a prior identification between God the Son and Jesus of Nazareth

which is the basis and presupposition of speaking about God's identification with sinful humanity.

Neither McIntyre nor Juengel specifically utilise the concept of identification to spell out the precise nature of the union between God and man in Christ, but enough has already been said to show the value of their treatments for this purpose. Certainly they are suggestive of further development and some indication will be given in the following account of identification and the incarnation as to the direction that that development might take.

4.(iii) Identification and Incarnation

Enough has already been said to clearly establish that the concept of identification is not to be confused with mere sympathy, being a much stronger concept. Indeed both writers argued that God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth is the deepest meaning of God's love for man and as such has ontological implications for the very being of God and, by extension, for the very being of man. In this sense God can go no further than a complete and entire identification with Jesus of Nazareth which is a real taking to himself the full reality of a human life.

Those sensitive to theological difficulties will immediately be asking if the concept of identification does not necessarily involve some form of adoptionism. This difficulty can only be exacerbated by the statement made at the opening of this chapter that whatever else may be said about Jesus of Nazareth the fact that he was a real, historical individual person is not to be questioned. It is clear that both McIntyre and Juengel acknowledge the true individuality of Christ in their approaches also. However, the acknowledgement of Jesus' real and particular humanity need not necessitate an adoptionist christology. For the concept of God's identification with Jesus does not imply that it is the result of a response by God to the worthiness of Jesus. Juengel's discussion brought out clearly that the event of God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth reveals something of the eternal being of God in that God is constantly going forth from himself in love. God's being is such that he is from all eternity for man and this is revealed in his being from all eternity for this man Jesus of Nazareth. Such an analysis of God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth requires a self-differentiation within the eternal life of God. In that discussion Juengel reveals the ontological implications of identification and rescues it from the charge of mere empathy and subjectivity.

The force of Juengel's and McIntyre's discussion was to show that identification is not an afterthought on the part of God. It is not as it were a response by God to the sinful nature of the human condition. Instead, as Barth might have put it, God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth reveals that the very being of God is determined as being for man. Identification, properly understood, is part of the essential meaning of love and if God is love then it is part of the essential meaning of God that he goes forth to identify with that which is not himself.

In this sense God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth cannot be separated from the eternal being of God as love. The identification which reaches its culmination in Jesus of Nazareth is part of a continuous going forth on the part of God to identify with that which is other than himself. In this way identification is related to creation, to the election of Israel and her story and it continues today in God's presence in the world through his Spirit and the Church. If identification in love is part of the very life of God then the incarnation ceases to be a divine irruption in a history which is separate from God but is instead the fulfilment and deepest meaning of that history which is nothing other than the history of God's going forth in love. In this adoptionism is precluded, for

there is no sense in which God has responded to a good and holy man in a way which was separate from his previous activity and purpose. Rather the concept of identification, in agreement with the traditional incarnational theories, argues that God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth is nothing other than the fulfilment of God's activity in creation, the calling into being of a human life which is the human life of God himself.

To phrase it thus is perhaps immediately to run the risk of that perennial alternative to adoptionism, docetism, although such a conclusion would be a misunderstanding of the intention of this thesis. What does it mean to say that God called into being a human life which was the human life of God himself? In a subsequent chapter an attempt will be made to show what is involved for the concept of an incarnation based on identification given a contemporary understanding of the person, but here it is enough to assert that this was a truly human life. It was complete and concrete and particular. Jesus of Nazareth was a human individual as Tom, Dick and Harry are human individuals. In saying this of course one averts the charge of docetism only to run into that other great difficulty facing all christological theories, namely, inserting an unwanted duality into the person of Christ,

and consequently failing to remain faithful to the classical insistence that there was only one person in the incarnate figure of Christ.

Yet in the analysis of the concept of identification we touched upon issues that possibly can throw light on the vexed problem of the unity of the person of Christ. John McIntyre, for example, demonstrated the possibilities inherent in the concept of identification by saying that in the process of identification love as concern moved from being a bi-polar concept to one that was uni-central.(22) That is to say that in God's identification in love with Jesus of Nazareth, God no longer stands on the other side of humanity but has crossed over and literally made himself one with the subject of his loving concern. Concern, as McIntyre intimated, involves a subject of supreme value and a person to whom he is of ultimate concern. Yet, "...when concern reaches its completion and fulfilment in identification then the two poles of supreme value and of ultimate concern collapse into one. In this sense the Word has been made flesh."(23)

McIntyre is suggesting here (and I wish to pursue the suggestion further than he does) that there is something in the nature of divine love expressed through the concept

of identification that makes it possible to transcend the limitations of individual personhood so that God, so to speak, can literally pass over and become one with that which is other than himself.(24) Great care must be taken at this point to avoid the suggestion that God becomes something other than God in such an act of identification. This is, of course, the great charge made against kenotic theories of the incarnation that God necessarily becomes something less than God by divesting himself of his divine attributes in order to become incarnate. But an incarnational theory based on God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth will not presuppose an alteration to the divine nature in terms of a diminution. Rather it will assert that the divine nature adds to its specifically divine mode of existence a human mode of existence through an identification in love with the historical, individual and particular life of Jesus of Nazareth.

This suggests that the basis of the unity of God and man in Jesus Christ is an identification on the part of God the Son with Jesus of Nazareth. This identification is prior to, and is the presupposition of, any response made by Jesus of Nazareth. In this sense an incarnational theory based on God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth is faithful to Baillie's insistence that we

cannot forget the prevenient activity of God in the incarnate life of Christ.

It has to be admitted that many will perceive this to be an unreservedly dualistic picture of the person of Christ. Fortunately help is at hand from a number of sources. Firstly, it has already been asserted that there are definite hints in McIntyre's and Juengel's analyses to suggest that a divine identification in love can transcend the boundaries of individual personhood and become one with that which is other than itself. Certainly any genuinely incarnational theory will have to assume, and if possible show, that it is possible for a human life to manifest the divine nature in such a way that its integrity is not violated or the whole christological enterprise would necessarily come to an end.(25)

The category of God's complete identification with Jesus of Nazareth is required in order to lift us out of a christology of 'address and response.'(26) Such a Christology might be valid and enjoy some considerable biblical support but it would not amount to an incarnation of the divine life. A christology based merely on an addressing God and a responding man would not be able to differentiate itself from any other situation, such as the call given to the great Old Testament prophets, to justify

the belief that it was an incarnation of God. This is the dilemma from which Baillie's position ultimately could not escape despite his best intentions. His unwillingness or inability to clarify the 'paradox of grace' left him unable to differentiate his account of God's presence in Christ from God's presence in us.

This is not to denigrate the value of viewing christology from an address and response perspective. Indeed much that a christology of identification has to offer will presuppose just this type of situation. But it must be asserted that the response of Jesus of Nazareth to the address of God is the **result** of a prior identification by God and is not the basis of it.

The idea that in the act of divine identification a unity of person between God and man in Christ can be achieved can find some conceptual support in the patristic notion of perichoresis. McIntyre has already shown the possibilities pertaining to this term drawn from its Trinitarian use where it describes the mutual indwelling or interpenetration of the three persons of the Trinity so that we can meaningfully speak of three persons yet one God. Before pursuing this further it is worth pointing out that the term perichoresis had a prior and original Christological use to explain the nature of the union

between God and man in Christ before it was reserved for Trinitarian reflection.(27)

Perichoresis presents to us the very type of movement that I have been suggesting takes place in God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth. It can be seen as a going forth in love which involves itself completely and entirely in giving itself to that which is other than itself which nevertheless maintains the integrity of the individual natures involved whilst achieving a true unity of person. God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth then follows the pattern of the Trinitarian relations within the Godhead which are reciprocal relations of selfless love and self-giving. These relations do not posit an isolated understanding of the person, but instead a relational understanding which nevertheless does not lead to an absorption and loss of the self in relation but instead is the maintenance of the validity of the person within relationships of mutual self-gift.

Hegel summed up the relational understanding of the person beautifully in his account of the Trinity;

"..when we are dealing with personhood, the character of the person, the subject, is surrendered. Ethical life, love, just mean the giving up of particularity, of particular personhood, and its extension to universality-- so, too, with friendship. Inasmuch as I act rightly towards another person, I regard him as identical with myself. In friendship and love I give up my abstract personhood and

thereby win it back as concrete. The truth of personhood is found precisely in winning it back through this absorption, this being absorbed into the other."(28)

Elsewhere in his writings on christology John McIntyre has cited his appreciation of Ephraim of Antioch's concept of a fusion of the divine and human hypostaseis in the person of Christ. Although this would at first sight seem to be verging very close to the often rejected idea of a hybrid God- man, a tertium quid according to the Fathers, McIntyre attempts to forestall this criticism by suggesting that although the natures are not to be confused the hypostaseis may be.(29) The great advantage of this position is that the real, complete and individual humanity of Jesus of Nazareth is maintained in the union. McIntyre could have perhaps usefully related his two separate discussions of identification and Ephraim here, although he would probably feel that to do so would be to confuse logical and psychological categories.

Yet the model of a composite hypostasis can only be helped by explication in terms of a fusion achieved through the self-identification of God the Son with Jesus of Nazareth. For only by asserting that the basis for this fused hypostasis is found in such an act of identification can we hope to avoid the misunderstandings that the concept of a composite hypostasis all too readily

lends itself. Such an identification is total and complete as it mirrors the divine going forth in love which is the Trinitarian nature of God. The humanity of Christ is safeguarded by acknowledging that a composite hypostasis achieved through identification includes the wholeness of the humanity of Christ.

Again it must be reiterated that this understanding of identification must be read as transcending mere empathy and concern. It is to be understood that the human experiences and decisions of Jesus of Nazareth are really and truly experienced by God the Son as **his** experiences. This is to develop the idea, used earlier by David Brown in the discussion of the 'two-mind' theories of the person of Christ, that the Son '**allows**' himself to be affected in a unique and total way by the human life and thoughts of Jesus of Nazareth. Indeed the full value of Brown's 'two-minds' theory can only be realised when it is removed from the situation of defending a Chalcedonian interpretation of Christ to a situation where it is defending the type of approach that Brown rejected as Nestorian(including Baillie's). This experiencing of the life of Jesus must be an experiencing that is unique to this relationship. That is, the Son must experience the life of Jesus of Nazareth in a way that is distinct from his omniscient

awareness of the experiences, thoughts and actions of other individuals.

That is to say that the unity of the person of Christ cannot therefore be found only in the knowledge that the Son has of Jesus of Nazareth but must found in a taking on, 'an assuming', of the experiences of Jesus of Nazareth from the inside as it were. This taking on of the experiences of Jesus of Nazareth is best expressed through the concept of identification. Such a concept is of course itself metaphorical in that we are attempting to articulate a work of God which lies at the heart of the mystery of the gracious initiative of God and the perfect freedom of a human response. Nevertheless its usefulness lies in its ability to enable us to arrive at some understanding of the processes involved although its application is understandably limited.

For it is in the nature of one human being's identification with another that it is always incomplete and fragmentary. This arises from the limited nature of the knowledge that we have of other persons and our inability to 'feel' or imagine their experiences no matter how much we may be concerned for them. Identification at the human level is also limited due to the understandable desire not to lose one own's identity in the act of

identifying with another. However, in the case of a divine and omniscient and omnipotent being whose very nature is to go forth in love these limitations do not apply. In a way transcending our understanding God the Son, through his omniscient range of knowledge, can actually identify with and experience the human life of Jesus of Nazareth in a way that we as human beings cannot do with one another. This participating in the human life of Jesus of Nazareth has to be understood as transcending normal examples of interpersonal intimacy and also transcending the internal relationship that God has with everyone as part of his providential indwelling of the whole of creation.(30)

Perhaps the closest analogy that can be offered is that of a parent's love for its child or of one person's love for their partner. There is a sense in which in these relationships of love we can share another's joys, hurts and triumphs as though they were our very own. No parent who has watched their child undergo a deeply disappointing experience will deny the fact that the child's sorrow is, in a deep and real sense, experienced by the parent. Nor will they deny that it is possible to enter into and celebrate a child's joys and triumphs in such a way that the child's joys and triumphs are intrinsically more meaningful and important to them than their very own. Nevertheless, even here, it is not a true experiencing of

the child's pain or joy, but is rather a limited identification whereby the child's pain is mirrored in us as we identify with them and put ourselves in their place and imagine what they must be feeling. For in the final analysis we are unable to truly experience another's pain or know their inner thoughts. Although our powers of identification, the ability to place ourselves in another's shoes through the exercise of imagination, are considerable, the analogy finally breaks down.

It is precisely at the limits of human identification that we see the possibility of divine identification. For here there is no limitation in knowledge, here the divine Son knows us better than we know ourselves. Here there is no inability to experience another's sorrows and hurts as one's own. This entails a rejection (common in much contemporary theology) of an absolute divine impassibility. Yet as has been so famously argued the Cross of Jesus Christ demands that the divine apatheia be abandoned.(31) For the Cross of Christ tells us that God is supremely able to take upon himself the sins, hurts and sorrows of our troubled world. Similarly, there is no need to presuppose a corollary of the human fear that in a relationship of complete identification we will lose our essential self. For the meaning of the Trinity, as Hegel so rightly pointed out, is that it is precisely in

relation, in absorption, in identification with the other that true personhood is achieved.

In order to sum up this part of the discussion an attempt has been made to show that the concept of identification is a legitimate conceptual tool which can bring insights into the doctrine of the incarnation. That it is not an alien import into such discussion has been shown by the demonstration of its theological pedigree in the works of McIntyre and Juengel, where it is specifically related to the love of God as it is revealed in the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth. The insights of these authors have been developed to show that the concept of identification can provide the basis for the ontological unity between God and man in Jesus Christ in a way that safeguards the 'one person' stipulation of christological theory. This unity is found in the assertion that it is through an act of divine identification that the life, thoughts and activity of Jesus of Nazareth are uniquely experienced and 'owned' by God the Son as his own experiences. The position thus outlined shares a 'family resemblance' to that of the 'paradox of grace' christology of Donald Baillie. It is the contention of this thesis that it provides the type of conceptual clarification that Baillie's position is felt to require, particularly with respect to the question of the unity of Christ. Yet

mention of Baillie's Christology immediately reminds us of his insistence that 'in a sense everything depends upon the human choices of Jesus'. It is to the application of the concept of identification to this human dimension of the doctrine of the incarnation that we now turn.

CHAPTER FIVE

IDENTIFICATION AND INCARNATION

The Human Dimension

5.(i) Introduction

Despite the claim that the concept of identification is able to establish a unity between God and man the question could still be raised 'in what sense is this an 'incarnation'? According to the account so far developed God the Son has identified himself with an individual human life but as yet nothing has been said about the nature of that life to show that it is an incarnation of the will and purpose of God. An act of identification by God with Jesus of Nazareth need mean nothing more than God's involvement in a human life with all its flaws, mistakes and false beliefs. As such it could not be said to reveal anything about the nature of God as love far less could it be said to be the manifestation of the grace and truth and purpose of God within the framework of human existence.

It is not being denied that there have been those who have argued that the human life that Jesus lived revealed nothing special about the divine nature. For it has indeed been asserted that there was nothing remarkable about him as a man so that one might speak of a divine incognito in the life of Jesus.(1) But this position does not seem to satisfy the demands of faith or account for the powerful impact of Jesus amongst his early followers. The position

being developed here would wish to argue that it is necessary to expand this account of the incarnation in terms of identification so that it becomes possible to say that the human life lived by Jesus was the human expression of the very life of God himself.

Yet it has to be realised that any account of the life lived by Jesus must take very seriously the assertion already made that Jesus was an historical, concrete, individual person with all that that entails. As such he was a subject of action and intention and will and the life that came to expression through him must have come to expression through the agency of his will with him as its subject. Concepts which would replace a real human subject in the person of Christ with a divine subject must be rejected as failing to provide an adequate account of the full humanity of Christ.

As this commits a theory of incarnation based on identification unreservedly to a contemporary account of human personhood some indication will have to be given as to what this means in order to demonstrate that the concept of the person that is being proposed allows both for the type of identification, perichoresis, fusion etc. suggested, and for the manifestation of the will and purpose of God in such a way that the freedom and

integrity of the person is not violated.

5.(ii) The Contemporary Understanding of the Person

The beginning point of this analysis of the person is taken from an unpublished paper by D.W.D.Shaw entitled "Identification and Incarnation." Shaw argues that the contemporary understanding of person is not that of an isolated and self-contained static essence but is instead one which views persons as coming to be in relation to other persons. In other words the relations which a person enters into are not external to that person but are instead relations which constitute that person as who and what they are.(2) Such an understanding of the person immediately invites the question, 'if I am nothing more than a series of relationships, if I am constantly on the move, what constitutes the real me?' What and who is the basis for the enduring sense of self, for the 'I' existing through time, that seems to be so self-evident upon a moment's introspection and about whom I am ultimately concerned and convinced. For I can certainly acknowledge the value of the relational account of the person whilst still querying whether or not it provides an adequate explanation for the enduring person through time that I know myself to be.

Shaw is sensitive to this point and he picks up a throwaway line by Paul Tournier to the effect that only 'God knows' the true person.(3) Shaw argues that there is something in this remark and further argues that God does know the individual in ways that he does not even know himself. And this knowledge of the individual provides the unity of the individual as a person which he needs amid the myriad of fluctuating relationships that he shall enter into. In this sense God's love for the individual bestows an identity upon him.

Shaw in a relatively short paper does not attempt to expand upon this insight to develop a full-blown relational account of the person. However, he is signalling a possible approach to the person of Christ which utilises a contemporary insight into the nature of human personhood. That is to be a person is possible and is only possible within relationships with other human beings and, from a Christian perspective, ultimately with God.

The classical, and until relatively recently, received approach to personhood, by contrast, asserted the absolute static and individual nature of the person. To be a person was to be a whole of a particular kind, an essence complete and entire to oneself. Originally deriving from

the term persona which meant a party to a contract having rights and obligations and also referring to the role of an actor in a play its original sense stressed the public role or appearance of an individual. This would be true of the cognate Greek term prosopon of which persona is an approximation.

The stress on individuality and unrelatedness which had already attached itself to the concept of person was accentuated by the famous definition offered by Boethius that a person was a naturae rationabilis individua substantia, an individual substance of a rational nature.(4) This definition dominated the Western understanding of person since its formulation and reaches its natural and most complete expression in the isolated and self-positing rational ego of Descartes.(5)

In contrast to this a relational theory of the person stresses the fact that persons can only be persons within relationships with other persons. This approach finds inspiration in the dialogical personalism of Martin Buber but its roots are much older than that as was evidenced in the previous treatment of Hegel's understanding of the persons of the Trinity.(6)

This relational theory of the person was further developed

in our century by John MacMurray in his Gifford lecture series where he argued that;

"As persons we are only what we are in relation to other persons....the Self exists only in dynamic relation with the Other...The self is constituted by its relation to the Other,... it has its being in relationship."(7)

Prior to MacMurray's Gifford lectures, John Robinson anticipated much of what MacMurray would later say in his unpublished doctoral dissertation "Thou Who Art"[1946].(8) Robinson draws much of his inspiration from the dialogical personalism of Martin Buber's 'I' and 'Thou' philosophy, but he traces the beginnings of this understanding of the person further back still to the writings of Feuerbach, Kierkegaard and to the Trinitarian/Unitarian disputes of the eighteenth century. It is within the context of these disputes that Robinson finds the beginnings of the relational understanding of personality. He cites E.G. Geijer (1783-1847) as one who insisted upon the impossibility of existence in isolation from other persons. Geijer argued that even the Divine personality is unthinkable in isolation. 'God can only be conceived as a person if He has from all eternity made his counterpart as free as Himself'.(9)

Robinson rejects the classical theory of the person

because it pays no attention to the factor which he argues is a minimum requirement for any definition of personhood or personality, namely the responsibility to exist in loving relationship with other persons. Robinson argues that a person properly understood is someone who ought to live in a relationship of love. This responsibility to live in a relationship of love is not accidental to personhood, but constitutive of it, irrespective of whether or not the person realises the obligation laid upon him.(10)

Robinson is aware of the difficulty of retaining the importance of the individual in the relational theory of the person, but he argues that is it only because a person is an object of love that he can be fully an individual. Robinson argues that the individual is loved for what he is because of the uniqueness of his own particular nature. Indeed it is love which bestows significance and value to that element in man which makes it impossible to exchange or replace him with anyone else. Here Robinson is echoing the point made by Shaw that the love of God bestows an identity upon the individual person. Robinson makes the point explicitly, "Love not only appreciates individuality it bestows it".(11)

The particular value of Robinson's discussion of the

nature of personality to the topic of this thesis is that it is his explicit intention to relate his analysis of the person to the doctrines of the Trinity and Incarnation. Drawing heavily upon Buber, Robinson argues that there is no 'I' taken in itself; there is only the 'I' in relationship. One can exist in 'I - It' relationships which are impersonal and in which the world and other persons are related to purely as objects. The alternative relationship is the 'I - Thou' relationship which is a personal and loving relationship with others. Like Buber he acknowledges that the moment of the 'I -Thou' encounter is always in the creative now and that it cannot be adequately expressed except in negative terms, for as soon as it is expressed it has passed into the past and belongs to the world of 'I -It' relationships.(12)

Robinson pictures persons as caught inextricably in a world of relations which constitute them as the persons they are. These relations will be 'I - It' or 'I -Thou' and it is always possible to move or fall from an 'I-Thou' relationship to an 'I -It' relationship, indeed, it is done all the time. Yet in the midst of all these finite 'thou' experiences we encounter the claim of the absolute 'Thou' from whom no escape is possible.(13)

Again drawing heavily upon Buber, Robinson asserts that

every contact of an 'I' with a finite 'thou' points beyond itself to encounter with an infinite 'Thou'. Robinson argues that this realisation leads us to the conclusion that as man cannot be defined in terms of himself but only in relation to God and the awareness of his responsibility in face of God's absolute claim, then man's essential being, his personhood, lies in his responsibility to God.(14)

Robinson returns to argue that the 'I - Thou' relation does not negate the concept of individuality but demands and creates it. He returns to the theme that love creates individuality and argues that we are what we hear from God. That is to say we are the particular person we are because we hear a particular word from God. Our individuality rests not in ourselves but in the particular Divine word which has called us into being and which addresses us and to which our whole life is the response we have to make.(15)

It is this "Thou" relationship which we have with God, mediated through the relations which we have with our finite environment, that constitutes us as the persons we are. This is the very basis of our individuality which determines the particular relations which we have.

Individuality, then, lies not in our own substance but in the Divine word to which our lives are the answer.(16)

Robinson sums up his own position succinctly in the following words;

"To every individuating creative word or logos which proceeds out of the mouth of God there corresponds an individual who exists as its analogos -he who is called to return that word by simply being truly what he is- the essence of man is existence as an analogue and his nature can only be defined by reference to God...
.... Man is not a finished product. He is possibility which is to be fully realised only by his own response. He has to make the answer to God which he is. That answer will differ for each man according to the Word which calls it forth. Individuality is constituted by the fact of a difference of Divine address".(17)

Enough has been said to anticipate the way in which Robinson will apply this to the person of Christ but before doing that some consideration will be given to the deep similarities between Robinson's approach and that of a recent approach to the concept of the person, namely, A.I.McFadyen's THE CALL TO PERSONHOOD .(18) McFadyen too draws heavily upon the personalist philosophy of Martin Buber and he attempts to construct a dialogical theory of the person around the themes of call and response. Following the same pattern as Robinson human beings are understood as being constituted by the call of God to be his dialogue partner, a personal relationship with God which respects the individual's freedom and independence.

This call of God McFadyen represents as the vertical image of human nature. To be a human being is not to be a static unrelated substance but is instead a response to an external address. Because this address respects human freedom and allows the human dialogue partner to make what response they will it is conceived in terms of grace.(19)

This human openness towards God marks 'the exocentric nature of the ontological structure of human beings' which is to be conceived as a 'being in gratitude.'(20) Parallel to this vertical address by God there is the horizontal image or address which is the mediation of the response to God's address in a distorted or undistorted fashion in the social world of the individual.(21) McFadyen sums up his basic position by saying that

"Persons...are structures of response sedimented from past relations in which they have been addressed, have been responded to and have communicated themselves in particular forms...
.... The process through which one's own identity is received is simultaneously one in which it is uniquely borne for others. For one's identity as an I is inextricably linked to the reality of the I of other people: an I only for an I."(22)

McFadyen develops this account to argue that personal identity is socially formed through the sedimentation of significant relationships which are determinative for that person's identity. The individual is placed in a public sphere where communication takes place and an identity is

bestowed upon the individual through the ways in which he is communicated with, regarded, and placed by others. The personal appropriation of this socially bestowed identity may be conceived as the formation of the self. The self in this theory is not an inner essential core but a theory which one has about oneself that enables oneself to centre one's experience and to organise one life as a subject of communication. (23)

Wolfhart Pannenberg in his ANTHROPOLOGY IN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE argues for a very similar theory to that of Robinson and McFadyen except that his account is specifically directed towards overcoming the tension between the absolute unrelated concept of the person and the relational account offered by Buber's dialogical personalism.(24) Again the basic characteristic of human being is found in its openness to the world. This exocentric feature of human beings means that they are always present to what is other than themselves in a way that is distinct from animals. For human beings are aware of what is other as an object to them, yet they also are aware of the object and themselves in distinction from other objects. Pannenberg argues that this capacity for objectivity is a feature of human self-transcendence.(25)

Pannenberg argues that this perception and awareness of the world of objects, as over and above oneself as an object, provides the platform for a return from experience of the object to an appreciation of oneself as a self or ego. The point of this phenomenological beginning is to ground what has in fact already been assumed in the treatment of Robinson, that it is in and through experience of the world that human beings reach experience of themselves.(26)

Developing this line of thought Pannenberg argues that the basic form of human behaviour as being present to the other as other leads back to the otherness of the behaving entity itself as it knows and appreciates that it is not the other. In this way self-consciousness can be seen to be socially mediated.(27) From this realisation Pannenberg begins a lengthy treatment of the history and development of the theory that the self is fundamentally socially mediated. The precise details of the theory need not concern us here except to say that Pannenberg is concerned with the goal of unifying the tension between the exocentric understanding of human nature and the centrality of human beings, which is the structured condition necessary for self-consciousness. In other words although acknowledgment is given to the relational

formation of the person there is still an 'I' or 'ego' who is the subject of these relationships.

Pannenberg makes a prolonged journey through a number of options before finally distinguishing between the self and the 'ego'. This distinction draws a line between the spontaneous 'ego' or, the 'I' of the present, and the 'self' which is the ego that is given to itself as an object of reflection upon itself.(28) This distinction is located in the fact that 'I' can reflect upon 'itself' and in this way can treat 'itself' as an object to 'itself'.

This process of self-reflection is a product of social interaction with other individuals. In this fashion the individual experiences himself not directly but indirectly from the viewpoint of other persons. The creation of the self, the enduring 'I', is based upon the capacity of human beings to identify and internalise the role that is bestowed in social interaction and thus memory is the presupposition of the enduring 'I' in the myriad of social relations which the individual enters into.

The concept of identification is of vital importance here for it describes the process by which the judgments, values and estimations of other persons become

internalised and no longer stand over against the individual as alien or co-ercive. Pannenberg takes the notion from Freud who used the concept to explain how the child identifies with the parental expectation regarding it. This process of identification is vital for the formation of personal identity for it provides a principle of selection from the constellation of relationships in which the individual is located and also provides an explanation as to why not any and every person can equally determine the self by passing judgement on it.(29)

Pannenberg goes on to develop the concept of self-identification by arguing that the 'ego' or 'self' only achieves endurance through this process of self-identification (This account parallels McFadyen's concept of the sedimentation of relationships and Robinson's portrayal of the mediation of the self through relationships). This process of self-identification is a mark of human openness to the world and requires the phenomenon of basic trust. Pannenberg views the human project as being the reconciliation of the 'ego' with the self. This search for wholeness, which transcends the limitations of life at any given moment, is summed up in the word Person. 'Person signifies the human being in its wholeness, which transcends the fragmentariness of reality at hand.'(30)

For Pannenberg this viewpoint surmounts the opposition between the "absolute"(unrelated) concept of person and the relational concept which looks to the conditioning of the 'ego' by the 'Thou'. For he has argued that the self is mediated socially while the ego knows itself to be identical with the 'for-itselfness of its self-consciousness'.(31) In the concept of the person the whole of the individual's life appears in the present. For at every moment the life of the individual is partly past and partly still future, yet in that moment it is implicitly present as a whole. Pannenberg concludes his discussion by focussing upon the openness of persons to their divine destiny beyond the limits of any finite fulfilment. This openness to the divine destiny is the basis of the inviolability and dignity of the person. (32)

5.(iii) The Person of Christ

The point and purpose of this extended treatment of the relational theory of the person is to establish its suitability and validity for a theory of the person of Christ. For if the incarnation is to involve a truly human person then it is this understanding of the person that it is meant. In other words the human life that Jesus lived, the person that he was, came to expression within a world of social relations which in large measure

constituted the possibilities and form of his existence. That is to say if the incarnation is understood to be the result of a specific address of God to Jesus of Nazareth then that address is mediated as a possibility for Jesus through the language, images, concepts and thought forms presented to him in his social world. Put more bluntly God's gracious call to Jesus was mediated to him through his encounter with other people. And the perfect human response of an obedient life which Jesus made to the specific call of God was presented as a possibility to, and for Jesus, within the nexus of personal and socio-cultural relationships.

To be a person according to the relational theory is to inhabit a 'public space' which is made available for it in community and disclosed to it in language. A person is an agent, a self-aware centre of consciousness. But self-awareness includes the idea of being open to different significances, of making evaluations, of coming to be a person by actualising possibilities which are opened up for it in dialogue with a community. In the words of Charles Taylor: "I become a person and remain one only as an interlocutor."(33)

From this discussion of the nature of human persons it is clear that an individual person cannot exist or be

created in a vacuum. If it is true to say that the person is born and comes to be in relation, then for God to become man he has to enter this world of relations. This means that the theory of an anhypostatic Christ with an unrelated Word operating as the subject of his actions must finally be rejected. For an 'impersonal' Christ divorced from the real world of human relations is not a possibility for a valid christology given a relational theory of the person. For God to call into being a human life which is the very human life of God it has to be possible for such a life to emerge within human historical and social life. That is concepts and ideas such as the call of God, obedience to God, prophetic vocation, service, response, have to exist and form part of the 'public space' of the individual person so that the individual, in the concrete form of his existence, can identify and internalise these concepts and make them his own.

In this way an incarnation of the will and purpose of God, issuing forth in a life of perfect obedience, presupposes a pre-history of God's dealings, of God's address and human response in which a gradual realisation of a life lived wholly in response to God becomes a possibility. As such any account of the incarnation of the love of God in the life of Jesus cannot be separated from the larger

story of creation, from the election and call of Israel, from the prophetic role of the prophets, which was the cultural world, the 'public space' which Jesus inhabited and as such was the necessary presupposition of the sedimentation and mediation of the address and call of God made by him.

It seems then that parallel to God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth there is a reciprocal identification made by Jesus to the call and address of God. This identification takes the form of a total and obedient response in the life of Jesus to the claim of the absolute "Thou". It is possible to develop here the idea, found earlier in Pannenberg's discussion of Freudian theory, that the creation of the enduring self is made possible through the identification with socially mediated and externalised models which are internalised through the process of identification and as such no longer stand over against the self but become part of one's own self identity. This picture has the virtue of according with the basic N.T. picture of Jesus as one overwhelmingly conscious of, and responsive to, the claims of his Father. A person who found that the essence of freedom and selfhood lay in obedience to the will of the Father who sent him.

The notion of a reciprocal identification on the part of Jesus to the address of God returns us to Baillie's insistence that in a sense everything depended upon the human choices of Jesus. A theory of reciprocal identification also has the virtue of allowing for growth and development in the expression of the will and purpose of God in the life of Jesus.(34) A developing expression of the incarnation is required by what is known of human development and the growth of religious sensibilities in the human person. But it is important to realise that it is only possible to speak of a development in the outworkings of the call of God in the life of Jesus because it is not being suggested that the unity between God's will and Jesus' response is the ontological basis for the unity of the person.(35) There is no question of a growth towards an ever-increasing unity of person so that the climax of Jesus' life is the event of incarnation. Instead the basis of the unity of the person is established in God's prior identification with Jesus of Nazareth, so that the experiences and activity of Jesus are experienced uniquely and directly by God the Son. The reciprocal identification and obedience of Jesus is a response that presupposes this prior activity of God. Interpreting this in terms of the historical life of Jesus it may be said that Jesus responded to the claims of his Father through the power of the Spirit and the Son

identified completely with his perfect response of obedience and gratitude.(36)

By suggesting that the concept of identification is the presupposition of the unity of Christ within an address and response christology the attempt is being made to forestall the criticism, raised against Baillie's approach, that any perfectly obedient life would therefore be an incarnation of God. For the life of Jesus cannot be separated from God's prior identification, nor from the divine address which comes to him, and precedes him, and which comes to no other individual in this way. And it is stressed that it is only to Jesus of Nazareth that the particular address by which God constitutes and incarnates himself as the human life of God comes. This is a basic datum point for every adequate christology. No other individual is called or addressed by God to incarnate the divine life.

John Robinson developed his account of personality in relation to the incarnation by focussing upon the concept of a particular divine address to Christ. Robinson's theory shows the possibilities for such a christology as is described here within a 'call and response' situation. Robinson argues that God himself constituted himself in the "Thou" relation to himself. To

be a fully personal individual is to live in this "Thou" relationship to God. Therefore it is Christ's taking upon himself this "Thou" existence in responsibility which is the fundamental meaning of the incarnation. "He (Christ) was man simply because He stood in the human relation to God, other men and the world. Yet He who existed in this relationship was none other than God himself. God constituted himself man by assuming the "Thou" relation to God."(37)

Robinson is quite clear that in his theory the divinity of the Son is not, and must not, be impaired, and his attributes are not to be abandoned. Yet in agreement with the theory outlined in this chapter he wishes to argue that these attributes come to expression solely through the medium of the human faculties which condition the existence of Jesus of Nazareth. In other words, Christ has no awareness of God except as a "Thou" in polar relation to himself, an awareness which is given through the normal processes of a developing religious consciousness. All he knew and all he was was built up out of his relations in which as a child he found himself. Like every human being he was his relationships. "To become man was for Christ to change his status from being the subject of the Divine relation to men to being also the analogue of his own Word."(38)

It is easy to misunderstand Robinson's terminology at this point perhaps because he is attempting to deal with problems which do not arise from his construction and which lead him to attempt to solve the dilemmas of Greek metaphysics from a very different starting-point. For it is clear that for Robinson, in agreement with the position outlined here, existence in this "Thou" relationship is necessarily individual and is historical. Christ is a man in every sense of the word historical, particular and individual, a product of a particular age and society.

Despite the broad agreement with Robinson's approach it is only by uniting it with the concept of God's prior identification with Jesus of Nazareth that we can justify talk of an ontological unity of person between God and man in Christ. Robinson tries to achieve such a unity by stressing the function of Jesus as a human being living in response to a specific word addressed to him and to which he is the analogue. Such an 'analogical' response might create a life that reflected God's will and purpose but it would not be experienced by God as uniquely his own. Consequently, the unity between God and man in Christ would be a unity of will and purpose but not experience. As such there would be a duality of persons in the incarnate figure of Christ. It is the contention of this discussion that only the notion of identification, or some

such related concept, can provide the unity of the underlying hypostasis which constitutes the one person, God incarnate, whilst retaining the integrity of the real historical human existence of Jesus of Nazareth.

As intimated earlier there are significant implications attached to this approach. In taking a relational view of the person it is necessary to abandon as untenable the anhypostatic viewpoint of the Alexandrian position. There can be no human nature without a human person that is formed and mediated through the fabric of social and personal relations. Jesus of Nazareth is an historic individual. Indeed using this terminology we would have to reverse the traditional order and speak of an anhypostasis of the Son in the incarnation.(39) Through the process of identification the Son has made the life of Jesus his own human hypostasis. This identification is so complete that everything we wish to say about the Son is an implication drawn from what we know of his activity in the life of Christ. This position of course accords with the actual history of the development of Trinitarian reflection where language concerning the Son follows from, and is a reflection upon, the life and impact of Jesus. It also testifies to the true element in the claim of neo-orthodoxy that everything we wish to say about God(and man) is shaped by the revelation of Jesus Christ.(40)

Yet there is an element of truth in the related concept of enhypostasia. For the relational view of the person reveals that all persons properly speaking are enhypostatic in that they find themselves as persons only in relation with other persons. Indeed in a prior sense we are all constituted by the address of God which defines our personhood and is found only in relation to it. And our future lies in the realisation that the full story concerning the persons that we are can only be known at the end of our story. But the true end of the story is not the end of our temporal lives but lies in the future with God. This is surely the significance of the resurrection of Jesus. It is not primarily a claim about a continuing temporal bodily existence. It is a claim that the full story about the person of Jesus, who he is and was, can only be told from the perspective of its telos in the future of God. It is the claim that the identification made by God with Christ, the specific address made to him and the response which he encapsulated, have become part of the divine existence and cannot be separated from it. God's future and Christ's future are bound together in this reciprocal process of identification which shapes our understanding of the event of the divine life as a being for others in love. This is the meaning of the resurrection of Jesus from the perspective of identification.

Similarly our personhood might be said to be anhypostatic in that it is grounded in, and won through, relations with others and ultimately it is found in God's gracious call to us which enables us to be the people we are . For human existence is existence before God, and in responsibility to God, whether this is acknowledged or not. God's identification with Jesus Christ and his identification with us reveals that God is for us and that our future, our completion lies in the future of God too.

The relational theory of the person and the concept of identification may go some way towards clarifying the mystery of God's gracious address to man which yet allows for a genuinely free human response. This dichotomy lies at the heart of Baillie's 'paradox of grace' that we are never more free than when we live in obedience to God. Such an understanding of freedom implies the well-worn distinction between freedom from something and freedom for something. From the Christian perspective we are beings set free by God who live in relation to him and his gracious call. The proper response to God is to exist as 'beings-in- gratitude' who actualise the call and address of God in the concrete form of their existence. This freedom is not freedom from God but freedom for God to whose gracious call we are called to correspond.(41)

Yet it has been argued that the primary locus for the mediation of the grace and call of God to us is the social world.(42) That is, we encounter the grace of God in our encounters with others in relationships of trust and openness which point beyond themselves to the claims of the infinite "Thou" beyond. The claim of God encounters us as we become persons in dialogue with others, as we are open to significances, evaluations, concepts and thought forms which make up the 'public space' which we must inhabit. The reference to 'must' here is important for we are not free not to inhabit some 'public' space if we are to engage upon the project of the creation of our person. And the space which we inhabit has to be coherently formed if we are to act in a uniform and purposeful manner rather than in a random, arbitrary fashion. Therefore, freedom properly understood is not unlimited freedom, for we must choose certain paths rather than others if we are to inhabit a well formed 'public space'.

But of course we do not perceive the fact that we must make some evaluations rather than others, that we must be open to certain significances rather than others, to be a limitation of our freedom. Rather our freedom is found precisely in the fact that we choose certain paths, make certain evaluations and are affected by certain

significances. And in choosing them they do not stand over against us but become ours, freely chosen, as we identify ourselves with them. The ongoing project which is the creation of the person within a publicly defined space is the mediation and sedimentation of these choices into an enduring self which conditions the future choices that the person will make. But this conditioning of future choices is not a limitation of personal freedom. For that would be to desire a freedom from having to make some choice and this is not possible. Instead it is the freedom for certain choices against others.

The essential thrust of what has just been said was anticipated in Pannenberg's elaboration of the distinction between the spontaneous ego and the socially mediated self. In this distinction we find that the mystery of grace and freedom is mirrored in the mystery between the socially created self and the spontaneous ego. The spontaneous ego represents our understanding of ourselves as free agents acting in the world, in Pannenberg's terminology it is the 'for-itselfness' of the individual. The socially mediated self testifies to our awareness of ourselves as exocentric beings, as coming to be in relation to society and others.

In other words we know ourselves to be neither totally free, self-realising individuals nor totally bound and constrained by society's pressures. The Freudian concept of identification was utilised by Pannenberg to describe the process by which the ego internalised the demands of society to create an enduring self. Here we may have a key to the mystery of God's gracious address to us which calls us to realise ourselves as the persons he desires us to be. The gracious address is not co-ercive but is rather internalised through an identification with the claim of God which makes the claim our own claim and which then becomes part of the normative identity of the self. In this way a continual response of obedience is sedimented into the self which finds its freedom in faithfully responding to God 's address.(43)

To say that Jesus Christ freely chose to obey God at every point and that he therefore incarnated the purpose and love of God is neither to deny his genuine freedom nor to restrict the prevenient claims of God.(44) It is through Christ's identification with the address of God, mediated through the religious and cultural concepts of his time, issuing forth in love and solidarity with others, that the incarnation took place. The address of God was not co-ercive, it did not force the response that Christ made. But neither was the response that Christ made random and

arbitrary, it was a possibility for him only because of the prevenient activity of God. Christ chose to identify with the address of God and so to internalise the claim of God that it no longer stood over against him as something separate but was part of his person. This freedom of choice was the freedom of his spontaneous ego choosing certain significances and making certain evaluations from within his cultural world. The mediation and sedimentation of those choices was part of the project of the ongoing creation of the self in obedience to God which led to the growing realisation of the will and purpose of God in the life that Jesus lived.

If it is felt by some to be impossible for a human being freely to choose to manifest the will of God on every occasion then one is tempted to offer a paraphrase of a very famous argument originally developed as a criticism of theistic belief. That is, if there is no logical impossibility in a man freely choosing to obey God on one or several occasions, then there cannot be a logical impossibility in him doing so on every occasion.(45)

It has to be stressed that everything that has been said so far about Jesus' identification with the address of God presumes a perfectly normal mental life on the part of Christ. There is nothing abnormal in his psychological

framework. The claim of God came to Christ in the same manner as it came to the prophets and as it comes to us. Without claiming to know anything about the historical consciousness of Jesus this theory requires no awareness of a continuity on the part of Jesus with the pre-existent activity of God the Son. Jesus knew how to live and to respond to God as a faithful son of the Father, but no claim is being made that he knew himself to be the eternal Son of God. That Jesus was overwhelmingly aware of the presence of the Father seems to be a justifiable historical claim even in these radical times.

But all that is required for the issuing forth of the will and purpose of God in the life of Jesus is a relationship which is indistinguishable from that of prophetic inspiration except perhaps in intensity, (and of this we can never know). The proviso that must continually be restated, however, is that the identification made by Jesus in the perfect life of obedience which he lived is an outworking and is not the basis of the unity established by God's prior identification with him. As such a christology based on God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth does not embrace the 'two-minds' approach of the first chapter, at least in the sense that there is no continuity of memory and life on the part of Jesus of Nazareth that he was the pre-existent Son of God. In as

much as most contemporary theories of the incarnation allow a human mind which is limited in range to Jesus of Nazareth this could be said of most accounts. If all the 'two-minds' accounts of the person of Christ eventually wants to maintain is that God was aware of the continuity of experience between his divine mode of existence prior to the incarnation and thereafter during it, it is hard to see how any incarnational account can dispute that claim.

The concept of identification has proved to be a legitimate conceptual tool which can clarify our understanding of the incarnation. It does so primarily by providing a basis for the unity of person in the prior identification of God the Son with Jesus of Nazareth. Yet it allows for a genuinely free and reciprocal identification on the part of Jesus with the claim of God that neither diminishes the prior activity of God nor destroys the integrity of the humanity of Christ. It is the type of theory that is in the best tradition of Theodore and Baillie and is a legitimate development of the christologies that they offered. The concept of identification without doing violence to the basic thrust of their positions, and without claiming that either one of them would have so developed their own position, does provide the conceptual support and explication that many commentators have felt their theories required.

The continuing value of the concept of identification is found in the suggestion that as the appropriate underpinning of the type of position offered by Baillie it represents a genuine middle way between absolute rejection of Chalcedonian christology and blind acceptance of it. That this is so is perhaps demonstrated by the fact that it is able to unite the best insights of the 'two-minds' defences of Chalcedon with an unequivocal assertion of the complete humanity of Christ in the best 'Antiochene' tradition. Furthermore the fact that it suggests itself as a suitable concept for explicating the root-claim of the New Testament that 'God is Love and his love was disclosed to us in this, that he sent his only Son into the world to bring us life'(1Jhn 4:9) testifies to the need for the type of examination of the concept that has taken place in this thesis.

The concept of identification then is a term suggested by the theory-constitutive metaphor of the incarnation as a way of articulating the claims made by that metaphor. That it brings real explanatory power to the nature of the unity between God and man in Christ, and to the integrity of the true humanity of Jesus, whilst accounting for his genuinely free response to the gracious activity of God, indicates that it is a concept which is faithful to the lively suggestiveness of the metaphor of incarnation and

that it has a real role to play in 'accommodating our christological language to the causal structure of the world' as it is pervaded by the divine reality which is constantly coming to us in the 'public space' which we inhabit.

CHAPTER SIX

ATONEMENT, TRINITY AND UNIQUENESS

6.(i) Identification and Atonement

Having offered an account of the incarnation based on God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth it is necessary to show how that theory impinges upon the related doctrines of atonement and the Trinity. Obviously this can only be very briefly alluded to at this point, in broad brush-stroke fashion, but some indication will be given of the implications of the discussion so far on these related matters.

For many learned readers this work will already have committed the grave sin of separating the account of Christ's person from his work. The author has much sympathy with that criticism yet the demands of space and time necessitated that the principal focus of discussion should be the manner of God's presence in Christ.

With respect to the doctrine of the atonement, no particular model will be suggested here, instead some hints and pointers will be given as to how the concept of identification might usefully be developed in the area of soteriology. Already in the writings of McIntyre and Juengel the single most basic principle of the concept of identification has been discussed. God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth is an identification with and for

humanity as a whole. The event of God's identification reveals that God is for us and with us, he is completely involved and immersed in the human situation. In the death of Christ God has involved himself in the darkness and the pain and the ambiguity and negativity of our world and he has taken it to himself in his identification with the despised, rejected and crucified Jesus of Nazareth.

This is the most basic presupposition of atonement that God is for us and with us in his identification with Jesus of Nazareth. This basic conviction underlies all models of the atonement. In a recent article entitled "Christology Today" Richard Bauckham has argued that the combination of Jesus' unique identification with the will of the Father and his unlimited loving identification with men and women make him the one who embodies God's loving identification with all humanity. Jesus is "God's solidarity with the world."(1)

But this solidarity with the world has to be expressed and made available to people who never met Jesus; it has to be articulated as a possibility before it can be a live issue for men and women today. In the terminology of the previous chapter the concept of atonement, the idea of forgiveness, has to be part of a 'public space' which

the individual can inhabit and take hold of. Bauckham's answer to this dilemma is to suggest that it is through the proclamation of the narrative of Jesus that Jesus' potential universality, God's solidarity with the world, becomes known.(2)

Obviously Bauckham's appreciation of a 'narrative theology' sits easily with the earlier discussion of the role of metaphor and the text in the expansion of our horizon of being in the world. To have the possibility of forgiveness, the concept of redemption, expressed in the narratives of the New Testament is to offer a redescription of reality to the individual and to make possible for him a new mode of existence in the world as one who is the object of God's Fatherly love, as one who is redeemed. And this is not just telling stories to one another so that we feel good. The metaphors of incarnation and atonement disclose reality as being a world of grace and forgiveness, a world in which God is with us and that he is engaged upon the process of recreating us as persons, as new creatures in Christ.

If incarnation and atonement are ultimately about the recreation of us as persons in the image of Christ then we are reminded of the discussion of the previous chapter where it was discovered that the development of the

person takes place in social and public space. The person inhabits a world of possibilities which are opened up to him as real possibilities through language, concepts and images. In this sense the present Christ is the narrated Christ, present forgiveness is narrated forgiveness.

For it is through the creation of a 'public space' of redemption by language that forgiveness becomes a possibility for us. In the hearing of the narrative promise of forgiveness we hear the address of God and the possibility of redemption is mediated to us. In entering into the promise of the narrative we identify with Jesus Christ as God's solidarity with the world and are in turn identified by God as being in Christ.

In response to the charge that this is a wholly subjective theory of the atonement we return to the claim that this is accomplished and made known through God's real identification with Christ. This event is a real objective event in the life of God which affects the very being of God as he knows and experiences human frailty and finitude and transcends it through the resurrection of Jesus Christ. Indeed the objective/subjective side of the atonement should not be overstressed. For Ricoeur alerted us to the fact that the expression of human possibility, human transcendence, through words, images

and concepts is a truly real, and indeed truly human, mode of existence. If atonement is a possibility for us as individuals then that possibility has to be mediated to us in language which is the peculiarly human way of actualising possibilities so that they become real for us.

Forgiveness then, presented to us as a gift of God finds its outworking in the life of the individual in the process of sanctification through the indwelling power of God as he leads us into becoming the people he wants us to be. If the project of person formation is to be open to certain significances, to make certain evaluations, then through embracing the narrative promise of the New Testament we become open to the significances and evaluations of the Kingdom. As individual persons we are open to the future and our destiny is to be conformed to Christ by the sanctifying power of the Holy Spirit. We are to become new creatures in Christ.

Yet this project of sanctification, of the practice of discipleship, takes place in a 'public space' shaped by the scripture narratives and the church's practice of those narratives. This is not to rule out the indwelling power of the Holy Spirit in the life of the believer, (after the manner of Alston), but it is to acknowledge

that one of the ways (if not the main way) in which the Spirit prompts us to growth is through making us aware of certain significances and evaluations which are displayed for us in the 'public space' of the church.

In identifying with Christ we identify with his resurrection which is to know that the full story of Christ's person did not end with his death but belongs to the future of God and his Kingdom. In this sense the full story of the people that we are does not end with this life but can only be fully known from the perspective of God who is drawing us to realise ourselves as the people he wants us to be. It is from the perspective of God's future that the ultimate story of our personhood, our identity, is known and made safe and this is the hope of the resurrection.

6.(ii) Trinity and Identification

Perhaps the most vexed question arising from the treatment offered here of the incarnation is what is its effect on the traditional understanding of the Trinity? For a full-blown relational theory of the person was developed to give an account of the incarnation and this relational theory of the person was shown to have

received an original impetus from Trinitarian discussions.

There is no doubt that recent treatments of the Trinity have stressed the social and relational aspects of Trinitarian relations .(4) David Brown is even prepared to say that each of the three persons of the Trinity have separate minds and wills. In this sense they share a generic identity.(5) Brown should at least be accorded the virtue of consistency, as there is no doubt that the 'two-minds' position as advocated by himself and Morris does seem to imply that the members of the Trinity can act separately and distinctly from one another.(6) The Trinitarian adage opera ad extra sunt indivisa would seem to be being violated here. Whether or not such theories of a social Trinity must necessitate some form of Tritheism cannot be decided here as it would require an in depth analysis of the contemporary state of play in Trinitarian discussion.

Suffice it to say that an incarnation based on identification is ultimately neutral on the issue of a social or unitive model of the Trinity. If the discussion of the relational concept of the person is felt to incline it towards the social view of the Trinity then it is necessary to remind ourselves of Baillie's warning

that God is always personal but is not a person in the sense that we are persons.(7) As such discussions of the nature of God should always begin with the clear affirmation that no matter which model is being used, the ultimate story about the nature of God in his purpose, will and activity is that he is one unified reality. Personally the author inclines towards the view of Baillie and sees the whole being of God involved in God's identification with Jesus of Nazareth, although recognising the appropriateness of the attribution of this work to the Son. However, there is no essential logic in the concept of identification which rules out the social model of the Trinity in advance of any further discussion about its suitability.

The concept of the Trinity should perhaps be viewed as a theory-constitutive metaphor which has itself been generated by the theory-constitutive metaphor of the incarnation. That is to say there is an inherent tension in the claim that God is one yet in some sense three which is not resolvable apart from the metaphor of the Trinity. For as soon as one stresses absolutely the unity of God one fails to encapsulate the Christian claim about the nature of God's activity in Christ and in the world today through his Spirit. Yet stress upon the threeness immediately runs the risk of tritheism and fragmentation

of the unity of God. It would seem that as soon as one begins to resolve the metaphor one is incapable of making the same claim about God apart from the metaphor. As such it may be that the church will have to accept the multiplicity of interpretations, some stressing unity, some stressing tri-unity, in order to say everything that it wants to say about the ultimately mysterious nature of God.

6.(iii) Uniqueness - A Concluding Scientific Postscript

One of the most perplexing issues facing christians today is undoubtedly the uniqueness of Jesus Christ. How can one historical figure be of unique significance for everyone else in human history? Is this not a claim which denigrates the truth claims and spiritual value of other faiths? Obviously the account of the incarnation provided here argues that Jesus is unique. For it is the life of Jesus of Nazareth that God identifies himself with and allows himself to experience, in a unique and distinctive way. In this unique identification a change is brought about in the very being of God himself as he knows and experiences this particular human life as his own human life.

Jesus is thus unique in the sense that God's presence and activity in him is unique to him. The Christian conviction is that at no other point and in no other life has God so incarnated himself so as to take within the divine life a fully human experience. Therefore the uniqueness of Jesus and his universal relevance are based not on his maleness, Jewishness or any other incidental feature of his person, but on the activity of God in him. Obviously this is a claim of faith made by the Christian community and is not strictly demonstrable.

Yet it is felt that this claim to uniqueness excludes other faiths and denigrates their claims to truth. There are a number of possible responses to this dilemma. One could allow the possibility of multiple incarnations in the lives of men and women of different faiths. But this brings its own problems. For although it seems to accord other faiths the same status as Christianity it is not at all clear that they would all wish to make an 'incarnational' claim for the leader or pioneer figure of their faith. It is not clear, for example, if Islam would make, or wish to make, any such claim for Mohammed.

Perhaps a more serious difficulty is the question what precisely is gained by multiple incarnations? If the point of the incarnation is that God has taken to himself

the full reality of human existence then once he has identified himself completely and fully with an individual human life and taken it into the very life of God, God's purpose is accomplished. Nothing further is added to the life of God by a series of incarnations, for God's identification with humanity in Jesus of Nazareth is complete and total. Even God can go no further than this.

If the response is still made that this seems to exclude other faiths then further responses could be made. It could be argued that the ultimate truth about each religious system is ultimately expressed in the Christian story of an incarnate God and that therefore each sincere believer is in some way in Christ already. But this would seem to be a rather patronising attitude in arguing that 'sincere believers' are ultimately Christian whether they acknowledge Christ or not. Yet there is a modified response which is less patronising. This is to make use of the patristic notion of Christ as the fulfilment of the activity of the Logos spermatikos of God which is constantly reaching out to men and women everywhere at all times. Here the claim is that Christ is the fullest expression of God's universal activity and that consequently, although there may be alternative ways of articulating God's nature and activity, nothing that

fundamentally conflicts with the message that God loves us and is with us, as revealed in Christ, can be true of God. Here God's particular and concrete identification with Jesus of Nazareth is the culmination and completion of that going forth to identify with his whole creation which is the eternal life of God itself.

Support for this type of approach can be found in the earlier discussion of faith as a research programme. This theory, drawn from the work of Imrie Lakatos in the philosophy of science with his theory of scientific research programmes, argues that faith can be understood and characterised after the manner of scientific research programmes. Such a programme is constituted by a set of core hypotheses which constitute the identity and shape of the programme and suggest the way that it should proceed forward.(8) These hypotheses which constitute the hard-core of the programme cannot be modified or abandoned without in effect ending that particular programme and initiating another.(9) Tensions and problems surrounding the application of the programme are resolved through the modification and discarding of a series of auxiliary hypotheses which constitute the presuppositions which support the hard-core of the programme.(10) To modify or extend the auxiliary hypotheses does not end or radically reshape the

programme. In Lakatos' theory embarking upon such a programme implies commitment to its truth as is evidenced by the decision not to abandon the hard-core of the programme unless absolutely necessary. Any inadequacy that is found in the match between the research programme and the experience of the real world is contributed not to the hard-core hypotheses but to some other part of the theoretical structure.

Christian faith understood as a 'research' programme in this way can be seen to be a programme whose essential core is constituted by the theory-constitutive metaphor of the incarnation. This is the hard-core of the programme, incarnation and atonement, the goal of which is the re-creation of the individual person in lives that issue forth in worship of God and service of others. It is part of the nature of embarking upon this programme that the individual confesses it to be the programme which he thinks will ultimately prove to be true. In other words there is an implicit truth claim upon joining a programme that this programme is the correct one and that its essential core hypotheses point in the direction in which one should move. This is not to be unaware that there are other programmes pointing in different directions. One may even acknowledge that they 'theoretically' might prove to be successful programmes,

but it does not negate the fact that choosing one programme rather than another makes at least an implicit claim that this programme will prove to be the true one.

And this aspect of choosing is important. For the individual has to choose one programme rather than another, or at least make the choice that there is no 'true' programme which is available. Yet if the religious research programme is to issue forth in a concrete life of worship and service then the individual has to occupy an identifiable and coherent 'public space' which is opened up by the hard-core hypotheses which shape the programme. If the argument is offered that the individual's programme could become the search for the programme that combines all other programmes, then this is to effectively end involvement in the particular programme upon which he was engaged and to initiate a new one. And there is the demand in the concrete life of the individual that the religious programme maps out a coherent way of being in the world, serving God and loving others. It is not clear that a synthesis of various programmes with very different core-hypotheses will provide the individual with the coherent and clearly articulated 'public space' that he needs.

The search for a grand unified programme may also, in religious terms, mean the exchanging of a research programme which is meant to involve the individual in a life of worship and service for one whose aim is not this but is rather the search for the ultimate programme. In religious terms this may be thought of as exchanging the ultimate object of faith, which is worship of God, with a penultimate object, which is the harmony of all religious research programmes.

In as much as religious programmes involve the worship of God, and given the presupposition that worship should only be directed to that being which has an absolute claim upon the individual, it is hard to see how any faith, any particular programme, can avoid the claim to truth. The individual believer can acknowledge these other claims to truth as real possibilities, they may in the end prove to be valid 'research' programmes. However, as long as the believer is about the business of serving God in the concrete and coherent public space upon which he has embarked and that this is a progressive programme issuing forth in a life of worship and service, then this acknowledgment of the possible truth of other programmes can only be a theoretical acknowledgment. For the 'truth' of the matter is that he has embarked upon a specific programme with an identifiable shape and direction and

for as long as he remains with that programme there is an implicit claim that it is the programme which will ultimately prove to be true.

As such there is no real escape from the problem of uniqueness. The way of life opened up by the metaphor of the incarnation makes certain claims about the nature and purpose of God which cannot be made apart from that particular metaphor, they are integral to the programme which that metaphor opens up. To say that we are less than committed to the ultimate truth of that programme is to do less than justice to the claims of the metaphor and is likely to prove religiously less than satisfying. However, this is true of other faiths too. For they are embarked upon programmes which are distinctively shaped by certain metaphors and stories and the claims which they make are constitutive of their faith. The demand that each faith sacrifices its own distinctive claim in order to satisfy some 'nobler' demand to find the true heart of all faith is to misunderstand that the nature of faith is not to seek a universal explanation of all religious yearning, but to call people into lives of service and worship and this necessitates an implicit claim to truth.

At this point the discussion of contemporary questions on the incarnation begun in the first chapter draws to a close. It is admittedly a brief and unsatisfactory treatment of these vital issues and much more should and could be said. However, the point was not to provide an exhaustive treatment of these subjects but to suggest how a theory of incarnation based on the concept of identification might approach them. As such the hope is that the concept of identification has shown both its appropriateness as a model of the incarnation and its potential explanatory power in the areas of atonement, Trinity and uniqueness.

EXCURSUS

The Logical Concerns of the Patristic and Mediaeval Ages

It is not my intention at this point to offer a detailed account of the development of christological doctrine in the centuries leading up to the Council of Chalcedon in 451 A.D. That subject has been covered at length in many standard text books on the subject.(1) My concern at this point is merely to shed some light on the contemporary logical debate by examining how similar concerns were dealt with by certain patristic authors through a representative sampling of their texts.

It may help at this point to set down the Chalcedonian definition so that it will be before us as we consider the issues which generate so much concern. It reads as follows:

"Therefore, following the holy fathers, we all with one accord teach men to acknowledge one and the same Son, our Lord Jesus Christ, at once complete in Godhead and complete in manhood, truly God and truly man, consisting also of a reasonable soul and body; of one substance with the Father as regards his Godhead, and at the same time of one substance with us as regards his manhood; like us in all respects, apart from sin, yet as regards his manhood begotten, for us men and for our salvation, of Mary the Virgin, the God bearer; one and the same Christ, Son, Lord, Only-begotten, recognised in two natures, without confusion, without change, without division, without separation, the distinction of natures being in no way

annulled by the union, but rather the characteristics of each nature being preserved and coming together to form one person and subsistence not parted or separated into two persons, but one and the same Son and Only-begotten God the Word, Lord Jesus Christ; even as the prophets from earliest times spoke of him, and our Lord Jesus Christ himself taught us, and the Creed of the Fathers has handed down to us."(2)

Here we have in nuce everything that generates the charge of logical incoherence. God and man in one person without confusion or division. The two natures complete in themselves yet not combining to form a hybrid third. The manhood of Jesus begotten in time, a category which obviously does not apply to the eternal Word. The definition itself offers no suggestions as to how one might deal with these problems, it merely states the boundary conditions and indicates what is definitely ruled out in any christological theory.

Although Chalcedon does not offer a solution to these dilemmas it is a response which attempts to outline the framework within which any solution to the problems must be found. The problems, dilemmas and difficulties, which are inherent in the Chalcedonian definition were the subject of great debate in the centuries prior to the formation of the definition. The definition itself is often viewed as a compromise between two conflicting

responses to those difficulties, the celebrated Alexandrian/Antiochene divide on christology.

In the writings of Athanasius, easily the most celebrated figure of the Alexandrian tradition, we find the beginnings of a response to the logical difficulties of the incarnation which persists in Chalcedon and which is being advocated again today. An examination of book three of the Orations against the Arians and sections of De Incarnatione Verbi Dei reveals that many of the charges which are being levelled today against the coherence and meaningfulness of Chalcedon were being made by the Arian and Jewish opponents of Christianity in the time of Athanasius.

For example, we find Athanasius dealing with the question of how the incorporeal Word can become incarnate in a fleshly body.(3) Athanasius is forced to give an account of how the impassible Word can suffer in the flesh. Similarly, the ignorance of Jesus as revealed in certain New Testament passages requires explanation if Jesus is truly the omniscient Word of God. Again, in addition to the question of suffering, Athanasius is forced to consider how it is possible to speak of the Word of God enduring death on the Cross. Finally, Athanasius reveals that his Jewish opponents were asking the very same

question that is being asked by modern commentators, namely, "...How, being human, can he be God?"(4)

Athanasius' response to these difficulties is well known and it shaped the development of Alexandrian Christology for the succeeding generations. He begins by arguing that as the Word of God was immanent in the whole of creation there was no particular difficulty in conceiving of him being enfleshed in a particular body. An analogy is drawn between the indwelling of the incorporeal soul in the human body and the Word's indwelling of Jesus. This enfleshment, however, does not detract from the Word's transcendent qualities for the Word is still the rational and governing principle of the cosmos whilst at the same time being enfleshed in Jesus of Nazareth.(5)

Athanasius attempted to defend both the impassibility of the Word and the oneness of person in the incarnate Christ by drawing a sharp distinction between what could be predicated of the Word qua Word and what could be predicated of the Word qua the body which had been assumed. On this theory Christ performed miracles and healings by virtue of his divine power. He grew in knowledge, suffered and died by virtue of the flesh which the Word made his own. We can then rightfully speak of Jesus healing and performing miracles and the impassible

Word suffering and dying for they are one person, provided we realise that a proper attribution of the properties will distinguish between what is appropriate to the Word as Word and what is appropriate to the Word through the flesh which it has made its own.

Athanasius outlines it in the following words:

"..Though he was God he had a body for his own and using it as an instrument he had become man for our sakes. Thus it is that the properties of the flesh are said to be his, since he was in that flesh; hunger, thirst, pain, weariness, and the like, to which the flesh is liable; while the works belonging to the Word himself (raising the dead, restoring sight to the blind, curing the woman's haemorrhage) he himself did through his own body. The Word 'bore the weakness of the flesh as his own; for the flesh was his flesh: the flesh assisted the works of the godhead, for the godhead was in the flesh; the body was God's.'" (6)

This distinction between what belongs to the Word properly and what belongs to him by virtue of the flesh which he assumed is a hallmark of the Alexandrian approach to christology. It has distinctly docetic features and consequently it is always accused of doing less than full justice to the humanity of Christ. Note that Athanasius constantly refers to the flesh which was assumed and never the man. It is a matter of debate whether or not this means that Athanasius attributed a rational soul to the person of Jesus. Certainly, as Canon

Kelly has argued, it plays no part in his theological scheme.(7)

Apollinarius in his development of Athanasius' thought was to explicitly deny a rational soul in the person of Christ as he felt that not to do so resulted in a possible conflict of wills in the incarnate figure of Christ which he felt was untenable.(8) What is becoming increasingly clear is that Apollinarius, rather than being a wilful heresiarch, may just have been making explicit what was in fact implicit in Athanasius' christology. For although certain properties are amenable to the type of division of attribution that Athanasius envisages, others are not. Take, for example, Jesus' ignorance of certain issues as revealed in the gospels. Athanasius is forced to argue that the Word feigned ignorance, although the Word itself remained omniscient, because ignorance is appropriate to the flesh.(9)

Athanasius' manoeuvre here, reveals, that for him, the ultimate subject of thought and action in the incarnate figure of Christ is the Word. It is this insistence upon the priority of the Word, vital though it may be for maintaining the reality of the incarnation, which eventually leads to the doubts concerning the full and true humanity of Jesus of Nazareth under this scheme.

As is well known the Apollinarian development of Alexandrian thought was checked by the Cappadocian insistence 'that what is not assumed is not healed.'⁽¹⁰⁾ This insistence by Gregory of Nazianzus upon a rational soul, upon a complete and undiluted humanity in the incarnate Christ, was never subsequently gone back on, although it remained a feature of Alexandrian christology that no useful function could be assigned to it.

The next major development in Christological thought arose out of the dispute between Nestorius and Cyril of Alexandria. In this dispute Alexandrian christology reaches its apex in Cyril's notion of a hypostatic union in the incarnate figure of Christ. Nestorius representing an Antiochene tradition stretching back through Theodore of Mopsuestia to Diodore of Tarsus stressed the full and complete humanity of Jesus of Nazareth. Jesus was a man assumed by the Word through his gracious initiative or Eudokia. Each nature, the human and the divine, was complete and entire in itself and they were not to be confused before or after the union. They were united in a single person or prosopon.⁽¹¹⁾

The Antiochene stress upon the full humanity of Christ was in part a response to Apollinarius' diminution of the true and full humanity of Christ, but it was also

conditioned by an unswerving belief in the impassibility of the divine nature. The Alexandrian scheme never lost the taint of Apollinarianism to the Antiochenes and its attribution of suffering to the impassible Word seemed a contradiction in terms. The Antiochene response to the dilemma of the sufferings of Christ was to draw a sharp distinction between the two natures. As such it was the man assumed who suffered and died, grew in knowledge and was tempted etc. The hypostatic union of Cyril seemed to involve the Word far too closely in the sufferings of the flesh for the fathers of Antioch.(12)

As is well known the issue came to a head over Nestorius' refusal to allow the term theotokos or God-bearer to be applied to Mary. In accord with his principle of distinguishing between the natures it made no sense to say that the Word had been born, it was the man Jesus who was born. Therefore Mary was not theotokos but rather should be designated christotokos or Christ-bearer.(13)

To Cyril and the Alexandrian school this sounded very much like a splitting asunder of the person of Christ into two distinct individuals and he repudiated it. In an early instance of the principle of communicatio idiomatum Cyril argued that it was appropriate to transfer attributes which belonged to the human nature to

the divine nature and vice versa because of the unitary nature of the subject of the incarnation. The principle of the hypostatic union, wherein the person of the Word united himself personally to a human body, made such a sharing appropriate.

In Cyril's terminology the hypostasis of the Word meant the concrete instantiation of the divine ousia in the second person of the Trinity. The hypostatic union, therefore, was a union which took place personally or naturally in the Word. The Logos took to himself a human nature with a rational soul which found its hypostasis, its concrete instantiation, in the hypostasis of the Word.(14) The Alexandrian scheme tended to think not of two natures coming together but of two phases of the eternal existence of the Word - a phase prior to incarnation, and a phase in which the Word became enfleshed (ensarkos) in a particular human life.

In contrast to this the Antiochene stress upon the complete humanity of the man assumed tended to lead them to deal with the problem from the perspective of attempting to show how two distinct natures could come together and yet retain their respective integrities. Ultimately the difference is one of perspective. The Alexandrian insistence upon the hypostatic union is due

to their conviction that in the incarnation we have to do directly with the Word of God. To them the Antiochene idea of the assumption of an individual man seemed to threaten that fact. To the Antiochenes such a direct association of the Word with suffering humanity threatened the impassibility of the divine nature. To their credit the Antiochenes also saw that anything less than a complete and individual humanity threatened the completeness of our salvation.

Although Cyril triumphed in the early debates, and at the council of Ephesus in 431 A.D., it is clear that Chalcedon represents a move back towards certain of the Antiochene concerns. This was due in no small measure to the influence of the Western theologians, who had, since the time of Tertullian, been used to acknowledging a duality of natures (substances) in Christ. Consequently, Chalcedon affirms that the two natures are to be clearly distinguished, yet, in favour of Alexandria, there is clearly only one person at the centre of the incarnate Christ, no division of the person is to be countenanced.

As intimated earlier the point of this discussion is not to give a detailed account of the early development of doctrine but to attempt to show that it is the logical difficulties which are being raised today which, in large

measure, shaped the development of christological doctrine. How can God become man and remain God? What does it mean to say that a particular man can be the embodiment of God the Son and remain a man? How can two complete natures form one person? What does it mean to say that the eternal Word died? What involvement by God is necessary for our complete salvation? These questions undergird the christological disputes of the fourth and fifth centuries. Apart from the last they are remarkably similar to the logical questions which are being asked today. The answers given to these questions may not be our answers, but it is foolish to suggest that the fathers were unaware of the difficulties, or that they did not deal with them within their own framework of thought.

Chalcedon did not entirely settle the christological issue. Large parts of the church remained Nestorian and went off into schism eventually to be lost when Islam spread into Asia minor. Controversies raged on as to whether or not there was one or two wills (monothelite/dyothelite) in the person of Christ. In part these disputes were due to the Alexandrian legacy contained in Chalcedon. This legacy, the doubt as to whether or not there is a hypostasis for the human nature has been termed the vacuum at the heart of

Chalcedon by John McIntyre. (15)

There is no doubt that the concept of anhypostasia, implicit in Cyril's notion of an hypostatic union, has been the majority interpretation of Chalcedon. But this theory, wherein the Word assumes an impersonal humanity that has no independent existence apart from the Word, cannot fail but threaten the full humanity of Jesus of Nazareth. It was the inadequacy of the theory of anhypostasia which led to the development of the theory of enhypostasia by Leontius of Byzantium in the sixth century. The theory of enhypostasia does not say that the human nature of Christ did not have a hypostasis but that the human nature found its hypostasis in the hypostasis of the Word.(16)

It has been suggested by John McIntyre that Chalcedon, (and by implication both the theories of anhypostasia and enhypostasia), breaks the logical categories of Aristotelian philosophy. In Aristotle's discussion of primary substance (prote ousia) and secondary substance (deutera ousia) there can be no instantiation of secondary substance without a particular instantiation in a primary substance. In the terms of physis and hypostasis in which Chalcedon was framed, this means that

there is no physis without a hypostasis ,or no nature without a person. (17)

Despite this logical lacuna at the heart of Chalcedon the definition imposed a framework upon christological discussion which lasted until modern times. The mediaeval discussions of the subject although intricate in their own right, tended to repeat the pattern of the early fathers. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries we find that three theories of the incarnation were propounded.

The assumptus theory associated with Abelard maintained that the Logos assumed a complete man at the incarnation. This is essentially the Antiochene/Nestorian position represented.

The habitus theory which is attributed to Peter Lombard understands the incarnation after the old image of indwelling or the putting on of a garment. This idea has a long history and the analogy of a garment was a favourite image of the Alexandrian school, but its fault lies in a merely external assuming of humanity without a real change in the person of the Logos. Indeed some proponents of this theory did argue that the Logos did not add anything substantial to himself in the

incarnation. As such this theory veers towards a docetic interpretation of the humanity of Christ.

The subsistence theory is the theory associated with Thomas Aquinas. According to this theory the rational soul and body of Christ were taken on by the Logos and united by him. They have no concrete subsistence apart from the Logos.(18) Thomas here is expounding a version of the classical theory of enhypostasia . Thomas is of interest in that he shows a deep awareness of the difficulties that the theory might run into. The foremost difficulty is that he wishes to acknowledge a rational soul and body in the person of Jesus of Nazareth and this would seem to lead to the conclusion that, as the union of soul and body constitute a person, hypostasis or suppositum , we must then have two persons in the incarnate Christ, the person of the Word and the human person.(19) (For Thomas, person, hypostasis and suppositum have very similar meanings. A person is a hypostasis of a particular type, namely, a hypostasis with a rational nature. Every person is a hypostasis but not every hypostasis is a person. A hypostasis is a particular instantiation of an abstract nature. A suppositum is a bearer of properties and as such is very close to the meaning of hypostasis .

Thomas solves this dilemma by arguing that there is a unique union in the case of the incarnation. The Word is united to the human nature (body and soul) of the man Jesus personally and hypostatically. Although this would normally suffice to produce two distinct persons it does not in this case for the body and soul of Christ are united in the person of the Word.(20)

Thomas' theory, like its classical counterpart, argued that a separation of properties between what is proper to the Word qua Word and what is proper to the assumed human nature saves the doctrine from impugning the impassibility of the Word. Like its classical counterpart it seems to threaten the complete humanity of Jesus by arguing that the human nature only found its individual instantiation in the person of the Word. It also has the deficiency of arguing for a unique and distinctive use of the term person in this instance. The insistence on the 'oneness of person' has become a shibboleth for christological theories, but its value has surely to be questioned when what is meant by the term 'person' is different from every other use to which the term is put.

A similar type of approach to the doctrine of the incarnation can be seen in the writings of William of Ockham. Ockham, like Aquinas, favoured the subsistence

theory of the incarnation and sought to explicate it by distinguishing between the terms homo and humanitas. In the case of individual humans such as Socrates or Plato, or you and me for that matter, homo and humanitas represent precisely the same thing. However, in the case of the hypostatic union they refer to distinct entities.(21)

In the case of the incarnation, homo refers to the substance of the Son of God as a divine person; humanitas refers to the human nature which is carried by the divine person. As Alistair McGrath writes of Ockham's theory, "... within the context of the hypostatic union- and in no other context - homo refers to the substance, and humanitas to the form, of the humanity of the word incarnate."(22) Again we return to the idea that within the unique and specific context of the hypostatic union the human nature of the man Jesus has no independent existence outside of the union with the Word.

Although this account is far from being exhaustive it does indicate the main lines of development of christological theory. It would be true to say that the Reformers accepted the classical development as given and did not themselves dwell upon the nature of the person of Christ in any great depth. However, the principle of the

communicatio idiomatum was transferred from its early christological application into the discussions of the real presence in the Eucharist. The Lutheran principle of ubiquity demanded that there be a real participation in attributes between the divine and human natures. The extra Calvinisticum of the Reformed tradition argued that the finite could not be contained in the infinite and therefore although the principle of communicatio idiomatum was a valid turn of speech it did not describe a real transference or sharing of attributes.

Footnotes to Chapter One

(1) There is a surfeit of literature outlining the difficulties facing the contemporary articulation of christology. For a representative sample see CHRIST, FAITH AND HISTORY (Ed) S.W.Sykes & J.P.Clayton Cambridge University Press 1972; J.P.Mackey JESUS THE MAN AND THE MYTH SCM Press 1979; GOD INCARNATE STORY AND BELIEF (Ed) A.E.Harvey SPCK 1981. From a more positive perspective see W.Pannenberg JESUS GOD AND MAN (E.T.) SCM Press 1968; P.Schoonenberg THE CHRIST (E.T.) Sheed & Ward 1972; E.Schillebeeckx JESUS (E.T.) Collins/Fount 1983. All of these works deal with the question of the New Testament evidence for classical christology. The possibility or impossibility of a classical christology, that is to say a christology dominated by Greek-Metaphysics, for today. They also seek to address what might be termed the post-enlightenment questions of finality, uniqueness and the rationalistic refusal to allow divine interventions in the causal nexus of world history. That these questions continue to dominate the question of christology can be seen from their treatment in the recent work of J.MacQuarrie JESUS CHRIST IN MODERN THOUGHT SCM Press 1990 see also J.Moltmann THE WAY OF JESUS CHRIST (E.T.) SCM 1990 for a rejection of the classical

categories of christology in favour of a biblical and narrative christology.

(2) THE MYTH OF GOD INCARNATE (Ed) J.Hick SCM Press 1977 Hereafter referred to as M.G.I For a pertinent review of the issues involved here see G.M.Newlands "On the Myth of God Incarnate" p.180-192 in NEW STUDIES IN THEOLOGY 1 (Ed) S.Sykes & D.Holmes Duckworth 1980

(3) A.Harnack expresses his thesis of the "Hellenisation" of the original gospel message in WHAT IS CHRISTIANITY (E.T.)Harper & Brothers 1957 p.199-215 He writes, "The identification of the Logos with Christ was the determining factor in the fusion of Greek philosophy with the apostolic inheritance and led the more thoughtful Greeks to adopt the latter. Most of us regard this identification as inadmissible, because the way in which we conceive the world and ethics does not point to the existence of any logos at all." Again "The proposition that the Logos had appeared among men had an intoxicating effect, but the enthusiasm and transport which it produced in the soul did not lead with any certainty to the God whom Jesus proclaimed."cf his HISTORY OF DOGMA (E.T.) Vols 3-5 Williams & Norgate 1898. Also D.F.Strauss in THE LIFE OF JESUS CRITICALLY EXAMINED (E.T.) Fortress Press 1972 In this work Strauss utilised the concept of

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myth to interpret the N.T. "With respect to our own opinion...we are prepared to meet with both legend and mythus in the gospel history;.."p.63 Strauss also anticipated the contemporary rejection of an absolute and final christology in any idealised sense "This is indeed not the mode in which Idea realises itself; it is not wont to lavish all its fulness on one exemplar,... it rather loves to distribute its riches among a multiplicity of exemplars which reciprocally complete each other.."p.779/780 For E.Troeltsch's discussion of the issues of absolutism and relativism see THE ABSOLUTENESS OF CHRISTIANITY (E.T.) SCM Press 1972

(4) The idea of a 'functional' christology is developed by Oscar Cullmann in his THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT (E.T.) SCM 1977 p.3f "When it is asked in the N.T. 'Who is Christ?' the question never remains exclusively, or even primarily, 'What is his nature but first of all, what is his function?" Cullmann argues that the biblical writers primarily thought in terms of Christ's role in salvation history rather than dwelling upon his person or nature which was a Greek concern. He acknowledges however, that the titles used in the N.T. raise the question of the relationship between God and the origin and person of Jesus Christ. R.H.Fuller in NEW TESTAMENT CHRISTOLOGY Collins/Fount 1979 p.247/248

agrees that many of the N.T. titles are functional in nature, stressing what Christ is doing or will do as Israel's eschatological ruler. The predominately Gentile mission advanced beyond this to make ontic statements about Christ, but this need not be an illegitimate move as action implies being and therefore 'functional' titles demand ontological clarification. See J.P.Mackey op cit p.214 who argues that the distinction between function and nature is overstressed arguing that 'Nature' is as functional a word as any used of Jesus in the New Testament. See also J.A.T.Robinson THE HUMAN FACE OF GOD SCM Press 1973 p.183f for a contrast between 'mythological', 'ontological' and 'functional' ways of speaking about Christ. Robinson argues that functional language is an equally serious way of asserting identity as ontological and mythological language.

(5) F.Young "A Cloud of Witnesses" M.G.I. p.22-23

(6) D.Cupitt "Stanton on Incarnational Language"
INCARNATION AND MYTH: THE DEBATE CONTINUED (Ed) M.Goulder
SCM Press 1979 p.167

(7) G.Stanton "Cupitt on Incarnational Language" ibid
p.170

(8) M.Goulder (Ed) op cit This volume is a response to the original M.G.I. debate involving the original contributors in discussion with commentators more sympathetic to the classical doctrine.

(9) The diversity of opinions that exist on the interpretation of the christology of the N.T. is vast and makes it exceedingly difficult for the non-specialist to arrive at an estimation of what the N.T. may reasonably be held to say about Jesus Christ. For example, C.F.D. Moule in his THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTOLOGY Cambridge University Press 1977 p.4-9f argues that a 'high' christology can be detected from the earliest strata of tradition and that such a christology is historically true of Jesus himself. Moule feels that the approaches of Cullmann and Fuller already cited support his approach. A more nuanced estimate of the N.T. evidence can be found in the work of J.D.G. Dunn especially his CHRISTOLOGY IN THE MAKING SCM Press 1980 p.254f Dunn argues that first century expressions of christology were appropriate reflections on Jesus' sense of sonship and eschatological mission. p.255 Dunn argues that there is not a full-blown incarnational christology in the writings of Paul who offers a second Adam christology (he doubts if Paul teaches the pre-existence of Christ p.114-117) p.256-258 Dunn proceeds to argue that an incarnational christology is only achieved

at the very end of the first century with the emergence of a Logos christology. cf. W.G. Kummel THEOLOGY OF THE NEW TESTAMENT (E.T.) SCM Press p.169 Kummel argues that Paul does teach the pre-existence of Christ. See also I.H. Marshall JESUS THE SAVIOUR SPCK 1990 p.169 where Marshall specifically takes issue with Dunn's reading of Philippians 2:6-11 and argues that Paul clearly believed in Christ's pre-existence. Marshall goes so far as to say that the concept of incarnation is the principal christological explanation of the N.T. p.175 The non-specialist's dilemma in knowing how to interpret the N.T. picture of Christ is increased by recent studies of Jesus which place him firmly within the socio-cultural milieu of first century Palestine. See G. Vermes JESUS THE JEW Fontana 1981 p.223f which clearly places Jesus within the tradition of Galilean prophetic 'holy' men. Another recent work which places Jesus decisively within the Jewish setting, particularly Jewish 'restoration eschatology', is E. Sanders JESUS AND JUDAISM SCM Press 1985 p.335f. The clear implication of both these works is that the later ontological development of the person of Christ are alien to Jesus' own Jewish self-understanding and also unnecessary once the Jewish setting of Jesus's teaching is understood.

(10) W. Pannenberg op cit p.335

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(11) D.Brown THE DIVINE TRINITY Duckworth 1985 p.147

(12) D.Brown ibid p.146f

(13) D.Cupitt "The Finality of Christ" THEOLOGY 78
1976 see also "Jesus and the Meaning of God" in
M.Goulder (Ed) op cit p.31-40 for a fuller treatment
of the logical difficulties of the incarnation. cf. J.Hick
GOD AND THE UNIVERSE OF FAITHS Fontana 1977

(14) D.Cupitt "The Finality of Christ" p.625

(15) J.Hick "Jesus and the World Religions" M.G.I
p.178

(16) N.Lash "Jesus and the Meaning of 'God' - A
Comment" M.Goulder (Ed) op cit p.41

(17) For a contemporary analysis of the theory of identity
statements see T.V.Morris UNDERSTANDING IDENTITY
STATEMENTS Aberdeen University Press 1984 also
D.Wiggins SAMENESS AND SUBSTANCE Blackwell 1980 p.21
Wiggins makes the self-evident point, "How if a is b could
there be something true of the object a which was untrue
of b. After all, they are the same object?" In a similar
vein Richard Cartwright has argued that the principle of

identity is a self-evident truth in "Identity and Substitutivity" PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS The Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press 1987 p.133. For an outline of the relative identity thesis where to say that 'a' is identical to 'b' has to be expanded into the expression 'a' is the same F as 'b' where F is some sortal kind term. On this theory 'a' and 'b' are identical with respect to F but may differ with respect to some property G. see P.T. Geach LOGIC MATTERS Blackwell 1972 p.238ff This thesis holds that there is no such thing as absolute identity between two objects. Objects are identical with respect to a particular property and may not be identical with respect to another property. The relative identity thesis therefore rejects the principle of indiscernibility of identicals and the principle of substitutivity which belong to strict identity theories. Wiggins op cit has rejected the thesis of relative identity as it violates the principle of the indiscernibility of identicals which is the majority position of most contemporary philosophers.

(18) To see how the thesis of relative identity can be used to defend the doctrine of the Trinity see A.P.Martinich "Identity and Trinity" JOURNAL OF RELIGION 58 April 1978 p.169f Martinich argues that the doctrine of the Trinity can be saved from logical contradiction by the thesis of relative identity by asserting that The Son

is the same God as the Father but not the same person. Cf R.Cartwright "On the Logical Problem of the Trinity" op cit p.187f for a response to this argument. Interestingly, T.V.Morris in THE LOGIC OF GOD INCARNATE Cornell University Press 1986 p.29 suggests that the denial of the principle of indiscernibility is too high a price to pay to save the doctrine of the Trinity, or by implication the incarnation, from the charge of incoherence. He argues that the only reason for denying the principle of indiscernibility in the case of the incarnation is to allow that there are certain properties which Jesus had which God the Son lacked. Such a move he argues would be vulnerable to Cyril of Alexandria's attack upon Nestorians for dividing the person of God incarnate. It is interesting to note for the further development of the argument in this chapter that Morris clearly states that it was the view of Cyril which became recognised as orthodoxy at Chalcedon. THE LOGIC OF GOD INCARNATE will hereafter be referred to as L.G.I.

(19) M.Wiles & H.McCabe "The Incarnation : An Exchange"
NEW BLACKFRIARS 58 December 1977 p.543f

(20) A.D.Smith "God's Death" THEOLOGY July 1977
p.262-268

(21) A.D.Smith ibid p.264

(22) A.D.Smith ibid p.264

(23) A.D.Smith ibid p.265

(24) A.D.Smith ibid p.267

(25) A.D.Smith ibid p.267

(26) B.Hebblethwaite "Incarnation - The Essence of
Christianity" THEOLOGY March 1977 p.86

(27) T.V.Morris L.G.I. op cit See also the
author's treatment of the logic of incarnation in
UNDERSTANDING IDENTITY STATEMENTS op cit and
ANSELMIAN EXPLORATIONS University of Notre Dame Press
1987 and in "The Metaphysics of God Incarnate" in
INCARNATION, TRINITY AND ATONEMENT (Ed) R.J.Feenstra &
C.Plantinga Jnr. University of Notre Dame Press 1989

(28) T.V.Morris L.G.I p.20 Morris takes as one
of his principal opponents Don Cupitt unaware that
subsequent to the 'Myth' debate Cupitt expressed
reservations as to whether or not the doctrine of the
incarnation could be said to maintain a logical

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contradiction. cf. D.Cupitt THE DEBATE ABOUT CHRIST
SCM Press 1979 p.25-26

(29) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.39

(30) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.40

(31) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.40-45

(32) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.42

(33) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.65-66

(34) K.Barth CHURCH DOGMATICS Vol. IV part 1 (E.T)
T & T Clark 1956 Hereafter referred to as C.D. p.16
Barth argues that "...This means that all the concepts and ideas used in this report(God,man,world,eternity,time....) can derive their significance only from the bearer of this name and from His history and not the reverse.They cannot have any independent importance or role based on a quite different prior interpretation.....They can serve only to describe this name - the name of Jesus Christ" For Barth's argument that the covenant, which is God's decision to be man for us in the person of his Son, is the internal basis, or necessary presupposition, of creation see K.Barth C.D. Vol. 3 part 1 p.230 Here

Barth argues that human existence is not accidental or contingent but was essential in that it realises the plan and purpose of God to be God for us and with us. It is interesting that a contemporary work of rational philosophical theology should mirror at so many points Barth's monumental dogmatic construction.

(35) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.65

(36) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.66

(37) K.Barth C.D. Vol. 3 part 2 p.225-226
Barth states "When we ask: What is humanity, human creatureliness? we must first ask: What is its basic form? In other words, to what extent does human essence correspond to the determination of man to be the covenant partner of God? Our criterion in answering this question is the humanity of the man Jesus."

(38) S.Kripke "Identity and Necessity" in PHILOSOPHY AS IT IS (Ed) T.Honderich & M.Burnyeat Pelican 1979
p.495f In a difficult and technical essay Kripke separates the traditionally associated concepts of necessity and the related notions of a priori and analyticity. He argues that there are certain truths which we can only discover a posteriori but which

nevertheless are necessary truths. For example, the discovery that Hesperous is Phosphorous is obviously a truth which can only be known from experience. Yet once it is known it is undoubtedly a necessary truth about Hesperous and Phosphorous. Similarly, a person's natural origins are such that they can only be known after the fact. However, once they are known they constitute the necessary truth about that person that he had that manner of origin and no other.

(39) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.69-69 John Hick responds directly to Morris in his article "The Logic of God Incarnate" RELIGIOUS STUDIES 25 p.413f Hick argues that all that is required to counter the difficulty that Morris raises is that our definition of humanity should read 'being Adam or Eve or a descendant of Adam or Eve'.

(40) T.V.Morris L.G.I p.69

(41) J.Hick "The Logic of God Incarnate" op.cit p.413 Hick pertinently asks, if an orthodox christology requires Morris' admittedly optional intuition at this point, is it not weakened rather than strengthened?

(42) J.Knox THE HUMANITY AND DIVINITY OF CHRIST
Cambridge University Press 1982 p.67-68

(43) J.A.T.Robinson op cit p.41 Note also that
J.Hick "The Logic of God Incarnate" op cit p.412 agrees
with Knox and Robinson that sharing in the biological pool
of humanity is a necessary criterion for being human.

(44) J.Hick ibid p.414

(45) J.Hick ibid p.414

(46) J.Hick ibid p.414-415

(47) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.70

(48) For the distinctively British development of Kenotic
theories see C.Gore THE INCARNATION OF THE SON OF GOD
Murray 1891 p.159-161; P.T.Forsyth THE PERSON AND PLACE
OF JESUS CHRIST Independent Press 1961 p.291f;
H.R.Mackintosh THE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST T & T Clark
1912 p.463f

(49) For a contemporary philosophical defence of kenotic
theories of the incarnation see D.Brown op cit p.245f

also R.J.Feenstra "Reconsidering Kenotic Christology" in
(Ed) R.J.Feenstra & C.Plantinga p.128f

(50) That contemporary defences of kenoticism often
revolve around the vexed issue as whether or not
omniscience is an essential or relative attribute of God
see S.T.Davies LOGIC AND THE NATURE OF GOD Macmillan
Press 1983 p.125f also R.J.Feenstra op cit p.140-
141. Both argue that although omniscience may be an
essential attribute of God it is somehow possible for the
Son of God to freely divest himself of that attribute
and yet remain divine. I remain unconvinced by the lack of
anything other than sheer assertion that this is a valid
or even meaningful statement.

(51) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.71

(52) D.M.Baillie GOD WAS IN CHRIST Faber & Faber
1948 p.95

(53) W.Pannenberg op cit p.311

(54) The "two-consciousness" strategy for interpreting the
person of Christ is utilised by B.Hebblethwaite "The Moral
and Religious Value of the Incarnation" (Ed)M.Goulder
p.90 and also by K.Rahner in FOUNDATIONS OF CHRISTIAN

FAITH (E.T.) Darton, Longman & Todd 1978 p.224f. Earlier this century a Freudian version was suggested by W.Sanday CHRISTOLOGIES ANCIENT AND MODERN Oxford University Press 1910.H.R. Mackintosh op cit p.470 rejected this theory of a double consciousness in Christ as did P.T.Forsyth op cit p.319. For a modern response to Rahner and Hebblethwaite see A.T.Hanson "Two-Consciousnesses: The Modern Version of Chalcedon" THE SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY Vol. 37 no 4 1984 p.471f

- (55) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.102
- (56) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.103
- (57) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.148
- (58) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.149
- (59) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.150
- (60) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.154
- (61) T.V.Moriss L.G.I. p.157
- (62) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.158

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(63) T.V.Morris L.G.I. p.161-162

(64) T.V.Morris "The Metaphysics of God Incarnate" op
cit p.126

(65) T.V.Morris ibid p.126

(66) T.V.Morris ibid p.125

(67) J.McIntyre THE SHAPE OF CHRISTOLOGY SCM Press
p.137f McIntyre (arguing against the 'two-minds' theory
of E.L.Mascall) makes a similar point to the one being
made here. "...if it is assumed that the divine person
is the subject of knowledge of both the divine mind and
the human mind, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion
that he both knows and does not know the same fact at the
same time." (With Mackintosh, Forsyth, Baillie and
McIntyre all rejecting a 'two-consciousness' theory of
Christ one can almost speak of a twentieth century
Scottish tradition of rejecting this particular approach.)

(68) J.Hick "The Logic of God Incarnate" op cit p.423

(69) J.McIntyre charges Morris with advocating a
Nestorian account of the person of Christ(unless Morris
explicitly embraces a theory of enhypostasia) in a review

of Morris' ANSELMIAN EXPLORATIONS in THE SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY No 4 March 1990 p.601

Interestingly, given the similarities between Morris' and Barth's theories already noted, a recent monograph by C.T.Waldrop on KARL BARTH'S CHRISTOLOGY : Its Basic Alexandrian Character Mouton Publishers 1984 p.7f takes as one of its interpretative strands the differing readings of Barth offered by John McIntyre and Claude Welch. Waldrop suggests that McIntyre reads Barth as 'Antiochene', even Nestorian, in character whereas Welch reads Barth as Alexandrian in character. It is no part of this thesis to enter into this debate save to note that the ambiguity found at the heart of Morris' christology would also seem to apply to that of Barth leading to these conflicting readings of their christologies. This continuing ambiguity can only reinforce my suggestion that it is exceedingly difficult for a contemporary scholar to maintain a consistent Alexandrian position, despite the best intentions, given the modern understanding of the person as an individual centre of consciousness, will and activity.

(70) R.Swinburne "Could God Become Man" THE PHILOSOPHY IN CHRISTIANITY (Ed) G.Vesey Cambridge University Press 1989

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- (71) R.Swinburne ibid p.59-61
- (72) R.Swinburne ibid p.59 see also p.54
- (73) R.Swinburne ibid p.60-61
- (74) R.Swinburne ibid p.61
- (75) R.Swinburne ibid p.55f
- (76) D.Brown op cit p.261
- (77) D.Brown ibid p.263
- (78) D.Brown ibid p.264
- (79) D.Brown ibid p.264
- (80) D.Brown ibid p.264
- (81) D.Brown ibid p.265
- (82) D.Brown ibid p.265-266
- (83) D.Brown ibid p.266

(84) D.Brown ibid p.266

(85) D.Brown ibid p.230

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(1) J.Hick "Jesus and the World Religions" M.G.I. op cit p.177

(2) J.Hick ibid p.178

(3) T.F.Torrance SPACE, TIME AND INCARNATION Oxford University Press 1969 p.1-2

(4) N.Lash "Interpretation and Imagination" M.G.I. p.23 Lash cites the interesting observation of Bernard Lonergan that the term "substance" was transferred into Christological discourse by a process of metaphorical transference.

(5) P.Ricoeur THE RULE OF METAPHOR (E.T.), (Trs) R.Czerny, University of Toronto Press 1977 Hereafter referred to as T.R.M.

(6) G.Vico THE NEW SCIENCE (E.T.), (Trs) T.G.Bergin & M.H.Fisch, Cornell University Press 1948 p.118

(7) F.Nietzsche "On Truth and Lie in an Extra-Moral Sense" THE PORTABLE NIETZSCHE (E.T.), (Trs) W.Kaufmann, The Viking Press 1969 p.47

(8) H.Gadamer TRUTH AND METHOD Sheed and Ward 1981
p.388f

(9) Aristotle (Poetics chapter 21) in ON THE ART OF POETRY, CLASSICAL LITERARY CRITICISM (Trs) T.S.Dorsch, Penguin 1965

(10) Aristotle Rhetoric (1111,1406b) (Trs) W.R.Roberts, Vol XI of WORKS, (Ed) W.D.Ross, Oxford University Press 1924

(11) P.Ricoeur T.R.M p.46 Ricoeur's study of metaphor is massive and difficult to summarise. I do not intend to enter deeply into the 'in house' debate' between his theory of metaphor and those of I.A.Richards, Max Black, Nelson Goodman etc., save where an important point of difference is to be found. All hold to the basic notion that metaphor is an indispensable cognitive tool that cannot be literally paraphrased without a consequent cognitive loss. In a similar fashion both Janet Soskice in METAPHOR AND RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE Clarendon Press 1985 p.88/89, and Elizabeth Kittay METAPHOR- ITS COGNITIVE FORCE AND LINGUISTIC STRUCTURE Clarendon Press 1987 p.303-311, agree that metaphor is a vital cognitive tool but differ from Ricoeur on the question of whether we can therefore speak of a separate

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metaphorical reference. For the purposes of this chapter this group can be taken as a 'broad church' holding similar enough views to be taken together.

(12) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.78f

(13) I.A.Richards THE PHILOSOPHY OF RHETORIC Oxford University Press 1936 p.100f

(14) M. Black "More About Metaphor" METAPHOR AND THOUGHT (Ed) A.Ortony, Cambridge University Press 1979 p.28

(15) J.Soskice op cit p.46/47 Soskice is right to point out that the idea that there is always a 'principal' subject and 'subsidiary' subject in a metaphor is only true of simple 'A' is a 'B' type metaphors. She cites the example of 'a writhing script' as an obvious metaphor which does not have two subjects. Whilst agreeing with this ,(one might cite 'Eternal Generation' as another example),the point is overstated as she herself concedes that there are always two or more networks of associations in the metaphorical process.(p.49f) Soskice also overstates her criticism of both Ricoeur and Black when she rejects the idea that the sentence is the primary unity of discourse.(p.21) Her

insistence that a larger context of meaning is sometimes required to decide whether or not a particular phrase is metaphorical -she offers the example 'that is a cold coal to blow at'- does seem to ignore the fact that Ricoeur, at least, does place the event of metaphorical predication within the larger framework of the meaning offered by a narrative text.

(16) J.Soskice ibid p.20

(17) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.21f

(18) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.27

(19) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.74

(20) P.Ricoeur T.R.M p.78f In order to support this idea of the polysemy of words Ricoeur draws attention to the difficulty of translation. Translating is not just the replacing of a word in another language by a word in your own language. The translator has to attempt to find an identical constellation of meaning to the original work so that each word in his translation is influenced and acted upon in the way that the original words influence and interact with one another. This task will involve the translator in a creative process which

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is almost as original as the creative moment of the first work.

(21) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.217-220

(22) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.219

(23) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.220

(24) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.220

(25) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.221

(26) P.Ricoeur "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling" ON METAPHOR (Ed) S.Sacks, University of Chicago Press 1979 p.150

(27) P.Ricoeur "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling" ibid p.151

(28) P.Ricoeur "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling" ibid p.154

(29) P.Ricoeur "The Metaphorical Process as Cognition, Imagination and Feeling" ibid p.152

(30) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.255

(31) cited in K.J.Vanhoozer BIBLICAL NARRATIVE IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR Cambridge University Press 1990 p.70

(32) K.J.Vanhoozer ibid p.71

(33) W.V.O.Quine "A Postscript on Metaphor" ON METAPHOR (Ed) S.Sacks op cit p.159-160 Quine argues that metaphor flourishes in poetic art but is also vital at the growing edges of science and philosophy. It also governs both our acquisition of language and the growth of language and therefore it is a mistake to see our language as primarily literal and only metaphorical at the edges. However, cognitive discourse attempts to explicate the mystery of metaphor by clearing away the 'tropical jungle' of metaphorical predication.

(34) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.295

(35) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.296

(36) P.Ricoeur T.R.M p.300

(37) P.Ricoeur T.R.M p.303

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- (38) P.Ricoeur T.R.M. p.313
- (39) D.Davidson "What Metaphors Mean" ON METAPHOR
(Ed) S. Sacks op cit p.29
- (40) D.Davidson ibid p.31
- (41) D.Davidson ibid p.39
- (42) D.Davidson ibid p.43
- (43) As previously stated both Soskice op cit p.93f,
and Kittay op cit p.325f, argue for metaphor's ability
to convey cognitive information. Both locate this
cognitive ability within the multiplicity of
interpretations that every lively metaphor offers. As
there are no other linguistic tools to carry out this
task metaphors are cognitively irreplaceable. However,
at least some explication of the metaphor is necessary if
we are to speak of a genuine cognitive gain achieved
through metaphorical predication.
- (44) J.Soskice op cit p.95
- (45) D.Cooper METAPHOR Basil Blackwell 1986 p.229

(46) D.Cooper ibid p.95

(47) Ian Ramsey's debt to the work of Max Black is readily acknowledged in MODELS AND MYSTERY Oxford University Press 1964 p.ix. Ramsey makes particular use of Black's account of analogue models which he redesignates 'disclosure' models. p.10.

(48) M. Black "More About Metaphor" op cit p.29-30

(49) M. Black ibid p.31

(50) M.Black ibid p.29

(51) M.Black ibid p.40

(52) The influence of Black's theory on Ian Ramsey's theory of models has already been noted. However, it is worth pointing out that Ramsey explicitly links 'disclosure' models with metaphors. op cit (p.48) 'Disclosure' models and metaphors are born in moments of insight when the universe reveals itself to us in a particular way. (p.50) The function of such models and metaphors is to enable us to be articulate about some mystery which previously eluded our description. However, this articulation is not a straightforward picturing or

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copying.(p.53) Such models and metaphors are not incidental to scientific investigation but play a crucial role in its development.(p.50) Although metaphors and models arise in moments of insight and imagination there is a certain ontological and objective reference which they help to disclose.(p.58)

John McIntyre in THE SHAPE OF CHRISTOLOGY op cit developed Ramsey's insights in a way which prefigures much of what I have attempted to do here with theory-constitutive metaphors. Of particular interest is the way McIntyre develops the descriptive, normative, and integrative function of models. (p.67-74) Similarly McIntyre's discussion of the criteria governing the use of models accords with much of what I have said concerning root-metaphors of the New Testament and in particular the role of Scripture in the experience of the christian community and its practice of the christian narratives in its 'pedagogy of discipleship.'(P.78-81) Although I have refrained from offering an explicit discussion of metaphor and analogy I would agree with McIntyre that the theory of models(and by extension theory-constitutive metaphors) is a modern presentation of the traditional doctrine of analogy.(p.65) Much of the discussion of metaphorical predication subsumes topics which were once treated under the problem of analogical

language. This point becomes obvious if one agrees with McIntyre when he says that in every analogy there is a negative as well as a positive pole, an 'is and is not' aspect.(p.66) To show the closeness of McIntyre's treatment of models and analogy to the account offered here of irreplaceable metaphors I quote, "...at no point is it quite possible to extract the positive analogy and to state it in a non-analogical way, the end product is such a two-dimensional superficial account that it cannot compete with the analogy even as a description.....This difficulty, namely of transcending the model, the metaphor, or the analogy, prevents us from ever assuming that we have exhaustively described or defined the mystery of the Word made flesh. We never grasp it in the immediacy of non-analogical language."(p.67)

(53) R.Boyd "Metaphor and Theory Change : What is Metaphor a Metaphor for?" METAPHOR AND THOUGHT (Ed) A.Ortony op cit p.356f Boyd's theory has decisively influenced the treatment of metaphor offered by Soskice op cit p133f, and more recently Colin Gunton's treatment of metaphor in THE ACTUALITY OF ATONEMENT : A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition, T & T Clark 1988 p.45f

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(54) R.Boyd ibid p.356

(55) R.Boyd ibid p.357 It is interesting that Boyd's assertion that metaphors develop and articulate theories in mature research programmes although we are typically unable to specify exactly what the relevant similarities and analogies are, corresponds closely to Ramsey's argument that models articulate insights without in any way presenting a naive copy or picture of the referent described. Ramsey op cit (p.10-12) Similarly, there is a striking parallel between Boyd's argument that the function of theory-constitutive metaphors is to develop terminologies which 'accommodate our language to the causal structures of the world so that they cut the world at its joints' and Ramsey's insistence that the model must chime in with and echo the universe in some way. Ramsey op cit (p.15)

(56) R.Boyd ibid p.357

(57) R.Boyd ibid p.358

(58) Cited in J.Soskice op cit p.127

(59) R.Boyd op cit p.358

(60) R.Boyd ibid p.358

(61) R.Boyd ibid p.358

(62) R.Boyd ibid p.362

(63) R.Boyd ibid p.366

(64) R.Boyd ibid p.361

(65) E.Juengel "Metaphorical Truth : Reflections on the theological relevance of Metaphor as a contribution to the hermeneutics of narrative theology" THEOLOGICAL ESSAYS (E.T.) (Trs) J.B.Webster, T & T Clark 1989 p.58-60 Juengel's account of metaphor is very similar to that offered by Ricoeur. He rejects the classical correspondence theory of truth as this can only say what is actual. But truth must include the element of possibility as well as actuality for in God's coming to the world in Jesus Christ we must say what is more than actual. Unlike Ricoeur he offers a criterion for distinguishing between valid and invalid theological metaphors. "Thus the cross of Jesus Christ is the ground and measure of the formation of metaphors which are appropriate to God. Every theological metaphor must be compatible with the cross of Jesus Christ.(p.65)

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(66) S.McFague METAPHORICAL THEOLOGY SCM 1982
p.108/109 McFague is another scholar who has been
deeply influenced by Ricoeur's theory of metaphor.

(67) D.Tracy "Metaphor and Religion: The Test Case of
Christian Texts" ON METAPHOR (Ed) S. Sacks op cit p.99

(68) S.McFague op cit p.51 McFague writes that
"Metaphorical statements are never identity
statements;hence idolatry, "Jesusolatry", is avoided,
and while we look through the story of Jesus to gain an
understanding of what it means to live under God's rule,
we cannot make the illegitimate move of identifying Jesus
with God" McFague here is stressing the negative rather
than the positive aspect of metaphors,the 'is not' rather
than the 'is'. One must ask if sufficient attention has
been paid to the cumulative effect of the New Testament
metaphors. For they do not just ask that we look Godward
through Jesus, but assert that God has come to us in
Jesus. Certainly a thesis based on theory-constitutive
metaphors would question whether McFague can extract the
positive aspect of her theory from the parables of Jesus
if she discards the central core that God is decisively
present in the activity and life of Jesus. The conceptual
articulation of this insight in the later creeds and
dogmas of the church are attempts to explore the

implications of the basic conviction that God was in Christ. Although the work of interpretation is not committed to the precise language and concepts used in the credal statements, it is committed, if it is controlled and guided by the suggestiveness of the root-metaphor of incarnation which is at the heart of Scripture, to explicating the cognitive claim involved in God's presence in Christ. cf Surin op cit below p.99-100

(69) E.Sanders JESUS AND JUDAISM SCM 1985 Although Sanders places Jesus firmly within Jewish 'restoration' theology he does acknowledge that Jesus associated himself and his ministry extremely closely with the coming of that Kingdom and the subsequent rule of God to the extent that he foresaw a place for himself and his followers in the coming Kingdom p.155f & p.234f. However, Sanders doubts that this feeling was unique to Jesus as other eschatological prophets probably also associated themselves with the will and activity of God. Whilst this may be true, it is nevertheless the case that, after the impact of the resurrection,(which Sanders does not consider) the earliest christian community was compelled to clarify precisely what this identification between the will and activity of God and the person of Jesus Christ involved.

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(70) E.Juengel "Metaphorical Truth" op cit p.67

(71) E.Juengel ibid p.67

(72) K.Surin "Some aspects of the 'grammar' of 'incarnation' and 'kenosis' CHRIST, ETHICS AND TRAGEDY ; ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF DONALD MACKINNON Cambridge University Press 1989

(73) K.Surin ibid p.97

(74) K.Surin ibid p.99 Surin acknowledges that opponents of incarnational doctrine will oppose this proposal of pragmatic presuppositions undergirding incarnational discourse. Nevertheless he insists that it is proper for the incarnational theologian to assume them in order that christological discourse can be properly transacted.

(75) K.Surin ibid p.99

(76) K.Surin ibid p.99

(77) K.Surin ibid p.100

(78) In support of my thesis that the concept of incarnation once formed became a theory-constitutive metaphor that dominated and controlled the suggestions offered by other New Testament metaphors I cite the following passage from J.D.G.Dunn CHRISTOLOGY IN THE MAKING SCM 1980 p.249f "It is lasting testimony to the inspired genius of the Fourth Evangelist that he brought together the Logos poem and the Father-Son christology in such a definitive way. Without the Fourth Gospel all the other assertions we have been looking at would have been **resolvable** [my emphasis] into more modest assertions. Of the canonical literature it is pre-eminently the Fourth Gospel which prevents Christian thought from settling for a more accommodating faith, more straightforwardly conceptualised, of Jesus simply the eschatological prophet, climax of God's revelation to man, or of Jesus simply God(or a god) appearing on earth in human guise."

(79) I.Lakatos "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes" CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE (Ed) I.Lakatos & A.Musgrave Cambridge University Press 1974 Lakatos argues that the hard-core of a research programme is rendered unfalsifiable by "the methodological decisions of its protagonists" p.133 Note the similarity here with Surin's pragmatic presuppositions the truth of which have to be assumed

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before the christological project can get be initiated .
Surin op cit p.98-99. A fuller development of Lakatos's
conception of a research programme will be offered in the
final chapter

(80) Lonergan on homoousios "down to the Council of
Nicaea "homoousios " was understood in one sense and in
one sense only: it meant "of one stuff"; and as applied
to the Divine Persons, it conveyed a metaphor drawn from
material objects. The Fathers at Nicaea, then, did not
find ready to hand a sharply defined, immutable concept
which they made into a vehicle for the Christian
message: on the contrary, they found a word which they
employed in a metaphorical sense." B.J.F.Lonergan "The
Dehellenisation of Dogma" A SECOND COLLECTION (Ed)
W.F.J.Ryan & B.J.Tyrrell Darton, Longman & Todd 1974
p.23

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- (1) D.M.Baillie GOD WAS IN CHRIST Faber & Faber 1948
Hereafter referred to as G.W.I.C
- (2) See R.A.Norris, Jr. THE CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY
Fortress Press 1980 p.113ff for selected fragments of
Theodore's doctrinal works.
- (3) D.Brown THE DIVINE TRINITY op cit p.236
- (4) S.T.Davies (Ed) ENCOUNTERING JESUS : A DEBATE ON
CHRISTOLOGY John Knox Press 1988
- (5) J.Hick "An Inspiration Christology" ENCOUNTERING
JESUS p.22
- (6) J.Hick ibid p.21
- (7) J.Hick ibid p.22 Hick's reading of Baillie's
work has not changed substantially from that offered in
his first review of G.W.I.C in "The Christology of
D.M.Baillie" THE SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY Vol. 11
1958 p.1-12. Hereafter referred to as SJT. However, it
would be true to say that Hick's estimation of its value

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has changed significantly reflecting Hick's own theological pilgrimage.

(8) S.T.Davies "Jesus Christ Saviour or Guru" ENCOUNTERING JESUS p.75/76 That Baillie continues to play an important role in contemporary discussion is evidenced by the recurring mentions of his approach throughout this work. Cf p.27f J.M. Robinson in his response to Hick's article argues that Baillie's picture of Christ is a recognisably N.T. picture. Robinson perhaps overpraises Baillie's book when he suggests that Barth's CHURCH DOGMATICS has been overtaken in importance by G.W.I.C . Similarly, Baillie's rejection of Kenoticism, anhypostasia and his views on the Trinity are criticised in R.J.Feenstra & C.Plantinga (Ed) TRINITY, INCARNATION AND ATONEMENT op cit p.4f

(9) D.Brown op cit p.236

(10) F.A.Sullivan THE CHRISTOLOGY OF THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA Gregorian University Rome 1956 p.287/288 Sullivan forcefully argues that Theodore's teaching is substantially the same as Nestorius.

(11) Theodore "ON THE INCARNATION" Book VII Fragment 2, cited in THE CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY (Ed) R.A.Norris op cit p.114

(12) Theodore ibid p.114

(13) Theodore ibid p.115

(14) Theodore ibid p.115

(15) Theodore ibid p.116

(16) Theodore ibid p.116-117

(17) cited in J.N.D Kelly EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES A & C Black 1985 p.307 cf Theodore Book V Fragment 1 op cit p.113

(18) cited in J.N.D.Kelly op cit p.307

(19) J.N.D.Kelly ibid p.307

(20) Theodore Book VII Fragment 4 op cit p.117f

(21) Theodore ibid p.118

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(22) J.N.D.Kelly op cit p.298/299

(23) H.Cuncliffe Jones (Ed) A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE T & T Clark 1978 p.126

(24) H.Cuncliffe Jones (Ed) ibid p.126

(25) Theodore Book VIII Fragment 7 op cit p.120
cf.J.N.D.Kelly op cit p.306 Kelly says that we are bound to regard the Syriac version here with extreme suspicion as the linking of prosopon and hypostasis is unparalleled anywhere else in Theodore's writings. His true teaching, Kelly thinks, is that the Incarnate is 'one prosopon'.

(26) Theodore Book VIII Fragment 8 op cit p.120

(27) Theodore Book VII Fragment 3 ibid p.118

(28) F.A.Sullivan op cit p.239

(29) F.A.Sullivan ibid p.225

(30) F.A.Sullivan ibid p.201

(31) F.A.Sullivan ibid p.218

(32) F.A.Sullivan ibid p.254

(33) R.A.Norris MANHOOD AND CHRIST Oxford University Press 1963

(34) R.A.Norris ibid p.196

(35) R.A.Norris ibid p.201

(36) R.A.Norris ibid p.201

(37) R.A.Norris ibid p.216ff

(38) R.A.Norris ibid p.222

(39) R.A.Norris ibid p.222

(40) R.A.Norris ibid p.222

(41) R.A.Norris ibid p.223

(42) R.A.Norris ibid p.229

(43) cf D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C for a contemporary development of what Norris is suggesting here

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(44) R.A.Norris MANHOOD AND CHRIST p.231

(45) R.A.Norris ibid p.232

(46) R.A.Norris ibid p.232

(47) R.A.Norris ibid p.232

(48) R.A.Norris ibid p.234

(49) J.N.D.Kelly op cit p.305/306

(50) Like Theodore, Donald Baillie draws his analogy of the "paradox of grace" from the realm of human religious experience. G.W.I.C p.114. Baillie may have been influenced in this direction by the work of Schleiermacher who argued that if the believer acknowledged the possibility of the divine encountering the human in his own life, in terms of his own experience of the Holy Spirit, then there could be no impossibility of the same encountering taking place in the life of Christ although to an absolutely different degree. Cited in K.W.Clements FRIEDRICH SCLEIERMACHER Collins 1987 p.203

(51) D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.114

- (52) D.M. Baillie G.W.I.C. p.117
- (53) D.M. Baillie G.W.I.C. p.117
- (54) D.M. Baillie G.W.I.C. p.126
- (55) D.M. Baillie G.W.I.C. p.130
- (56) D.M. Baillie G.W.I.C. p.131
- (57) D.M. Baillie G.W.I.C. p.131
- (58) R.A. Norris MANHOOD AND CHRIST p.238
- (59) J. McIntyre "A Tale of Two exchanges: the Christology of D.M. Baillie" IN DIVERS MANNERS (Ed) D.W.D. Shaw ST Mary's College 1990 p.152-153 McIntyre pertinently asks if Baillie has addressed the central question raised by Chalcedon and the theory of anhypostasia, namely, who is the subject of the experiences which we describe as having a divine and human nature. Since Baillie does not address this adequately McIntyre suggests that he does not solve the main problems raised by Chalcedon.
- (60) J. Hick SJT op cit

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(61) J. Hick SJT p.10-11

(62) J. Hick SJT p.10

(63) J. Baillie "Some Comments on Professor Hick's Article on 'The Christology of D.M. Baillie'" SJT Vol 11 p.269

(64) J. Baillie ibid p.269

(65) D.M. Baillie G.W.I.C p.106f

(66) D.M. Baillie G.W.I.C p.109 Baillie draws an analogy between the necessary distortions involved in talking about God and those involved in the making of maps. As we need two different maps to accurately reflect the spherical shape of the earth on a flat surface sometimes we need to say two seemingly contradictory things to capture the full reality of God.

(67) D.M. Baillie 'Unpublished lecture notes and draft version of God was in Christ .' Envelope 28A Archive Material, University of St. Andrews Library. Cf G.W.I.C. p.109

(68) D.M. Baillie G.W.I.C. p.106

(69)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.109-110

(70)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.129

(71)J.Hick SJT op cit p.8 For a response to Hick see J.McIntyre's article in D.W.D Shaw (Ed) op cit p.155f

(72)J.Baillie SJT op cit p.269

(73)H.R.Mackintosh THE PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST p.432-434

(74)See J. Robinson THE HUMAN FACE OF GOD SCM Press 1973 p.209f Robinson faces the degree/kind distinction full square and argues for a similar approach to the one taken here."If one had to choose, I should side with those who opt for a 'degree'-however enormous the degree."

(75)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.20

(76)cf J.Robinson op cit p.113-114 "The formula we presuppose is not one of a superhuman person with two natures, divine and human, but of one human person of whom we must use two languages. Jesus is wholly and completely

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a man, but a man who speaks truly of humanity and of God: he stands in God's place, he is God to us and for us." And again "The pressure to say divine things about Jesus in some form is inseparable from saying that he is the Christ." p.99 Another theologian who has made extensive use of the two languages approach is E.Schillebeeckx in JESUS: AN EXPERIMENT IN CHRISTOLOGY (E.T.) Collins 1974 who argues that when we speak of Jesus we use two languages about the one event, one secular language and one faith language. p.656f

(77) I owe this example of the differing levels of a computer programme to P.Davies GOD AND THE NEW PHYSICS Penguin 1983p.62

(78) J.L.Mackie "Evil and Omnipotence" GOD AND EVIL (Ed) N.Pike, p.56. Mackie's article first appeared in Mind Vol LXIV No 254

(79) J.McIntyre THE SHAPE OF CHRISTOLOGY p.140 McIntyre regards both Pittenger and Baillie as exponents of what he terms a psychological model of christology. Whilst recognising his intention it is important to note that Baillie explicitly thought that he was seeking to offer, not a psychological explanation of God's presence

in Christ, but a deeper and more ultimate analysis.
D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C. p.20

(80)J.McIntyre op cit IN DIVERS MANNERS p.159

(81)D.Davidson "Psychology as Philosophy" THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIND (Ed) J.Glover Oxford University Press 1976

(82)D.Davidson ibid p.102

(83)A.Thatcher TRULY A PERSON, TRULY A GOD SPCK 1990
p.101 The concerns and issues of Thatcher's work are similar to this thesis. However, he prefers to attempt to defend Chalcedon via an 'analogical' theory of the person. I have attempted to present Donald Baillie's approach as a genuine middle way for christology. Thatcher makes no reference to Baillie at all.

(84)For the characterisation of Donald Baillie's theory as essentially Antiochene and in agreement with Theodore see W.N.Pittenger THE WORD INCARNATE James Nisbet and Company p.197. Pittenger is expressly developing a theory in relation to Theodore's account of the incarnation and his criticism of Baillie is that he has insufficiently attended to the ontological grounding of

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God's presence in Christ. This does not mean that Pittenger wishes to return to the category of substance for such an ontological grounding, he argues that God in the depths of his being is love. Therefore, the union is grounded ontologically in the loving relationship between God and the man Christ. Similarly, J. Robinson op cit argues that "Theodore grounds the incarnation in the personal purpose of God without sacrificing either the distinctiveness of Christ or his continuity with other men. He would have agreed with Augustine when he boldly said 'Every man, from the commencement of his faith, becomes a Christian by the same grace by which that man from his formation became Christ.'" p.206 Robinson acknowledges that this quote is at the heart of Baillie's position. See also A.T. Hanson THE IMAGE OF THE INVISIBLE GOD SCM Press 1982 p.21

(85) D. Brown op cit p.235 Brown feels that Baillie's position is just the Antiochene/Nestorian position in modern guise.

(86) D.M. Baillie G.W.I.C. p.90

(87) D.M. Baillie G.W.I.C. citing Augustine p.118

(88)D.M.Baillie Unpublished lecture notes on christology.Archive Department, University of St.Andrews

(89)D.M.Baillie Unpublished lecture notes on christology.

(90)A.Harnack HISTORY OF DOGMA (E.T.) (Trs) J.Millar 1898 p.129

(91)J.McGuckin "Did Augustine's Christology depend on Theodore of Mopsuestia" Heythrop Journal 31 1990

(92)J.McGuckin ibid p.40

(93)cited in J.McGuckin ibid p.46

(94)J.McGuckin ibid p.45/46

(95)J.McGuckin ibid p.45

(96)cited in J.McGuckin ibid p.48

(97)J.McGuckin ibid p.48

(98)cited in J.McGuckin ibid p.48

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(99)D.Brown op cit p.235

(100)D.Brown ibid p.264f

(101)D.Brown ibid p.264f

(102)D.Brown ibid p.266

(103)D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.20

(104)J.McIntyre ON THE LOVE OF GOD Collins 1962
p.186f

(105)J.McIntyre op cit IN DIVERS MANNERS p.159

Footnotes to Chapter Four

(1) E. Juengel GOD AS THE MYSTERY OF THE WORLD (E.T.)
T & T Clark 1983 In particular the sections which deal
with God's unity with perishability and the humanity of
God. Juengel argues that if God's identification with the
crucified Jesus is believed then an ontological question
is put to our thinking as to how God can be united with
death and perishability. p.210f. Hereafter GOD AS THE
MYSTERY OF THE WORLD shall be cited as G.M.W.

(2) E. Juengel G.M.W. p.326

(3) E. Juengel G.M.W. p.228

(4) E. Juengel G.M.W. p.228

(5) E. Juengel G.M.W. p.228

(6) E. Juengel G.M.W. p.298

(7) E. Juengel G.M.W. p.219/220

(8) E. Juengel G.M.W. p.220

(9) E. Juengel G.M.W. p.220

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(10) E.Juengel G.M.W. p.327 I am considerably foreshortening Juengel's convoluted argument here and may therefore be guilty of doing less than full justice to every precise nuance of his thought.

(11) E.Juengel G.M.W. p.327

(12) E.Juengel G.M.W. p.329

(13) J.McIntyre ON THE LOVE OF GOD Collins 1962

(14) J.McIntyre ibid p.198/199

(15) J.McIntyre ibid p.192

(16) J.McIntyre ibid p.197

(17) J.McIntyre ibid p.202/203

(18) J.McIntyre ibid p.204

(19) J.McIntyre ibid p.199 (My emphasis)

(20) J.McIntyre ibid p.211

(21) J.McIntyre ibid p.201

(22) J.McIntyre ibid p.199

(23) J.McIntyre ibid p.199

(24) For an indication as to how the divine life might permeate and pervade an individual human life see W.P.Alston "The Indwelling of the Holy Spirit" in DIVINE NATURE AND HUMAN LANGUAGE Cornell University Press 1989 p.246f Alston's concern is to show how the Holy Spirit might be at work in the sanctification of the individual in such a way that respects personal freedom. He suggests a 'sharing' notion whereby the individual's life is interpenetrated by the divine life. Such interpenetration is less that what is being suggested here as a possible model for the incarnation but that is appropriate as Alston is not dealing with a unique incarnation of God in a single life but with his sanctifying presence in every believer's life. However, the model suggests what could possibly be achieved

(25) For a very similar approach to the idea that shall be developed here see K. Rahner THEOLOGICAL INVESTIGATIONS Vol 1 (E.T.) Darton, Longman & Todd 1961 p.149-185 Rahner develops from a basic anthropological insight of human openness towards God a position which argues 'that only a divine person can possess as its own a freedom really

Footnotes to Chapter Four

distinct from itself in such a way that this freedom does not cease to be truly free even with regard to the divine person possessing it, while it continues to qualify this very Person as its ontological subject'(p162).

(26) For an example of an address and response christology see the following chapter where J.A.T.Robinson's unpublished doctoral thesis THOU WHO ART is examined. Robinson's thesis undergirds the type of approach he was later to suggest in THE HUMAN FACE OF GOD

(27) H.A.Wolfson THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE CHURCH FATHERS Vol 1 Harvard University Press 1956 P.420f Wolfson argues that the most accurate translation of perichoresis is penetration at all points. Wolfson cites the original christological use of the term in the writings of Gregory of Nazianzus, Pseudo-Cyril, Maximus the Confessor and John of Damascus. Wolfson concludes that the term perichoresis is a physical analogy suggesting thorough penetration as a means of explaining the communicatio idiomatum. Perichoresis is always a mutual act but the penetration of the divine into the human is always prior to, and is the basis of, any human penetration (participation) in the divine.

(28) G.W.F.Hegel THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION (E.T.) (Ed & Trs) Peter C. Hodgson Scholars Press 1979 p.95 It will be immediately obvious from the prior discussion of Juengel that his understanding of the self-differentiation within the eternal being of God is directly influenced by the thought of Hegel.

(29) J.McIntyre THE SHAPE OF CHRISTOLOGY op cit p.100f, see also his article " A Tale of Two Exchanges: the Christology of D.M. Baillie" in IN DIVERS MANNERS (Ed) D.W.D. Shaw, St Mary's College 1990 p.153 for McIntyre's continued support for the composite hypostasis theory of Ephraim of Antioch.

(30) cf. W.P.Alston op cit p.251-252

(31) The rejection of the notion of divine impassibility is most famously associated with Jurgen Moltmann and his development of the implications of a theologia crucis in his seminal THE CRUCIFIED GOD (E.T.) SCM 1974 p.267f. Moltmann's thesis has been so influential that the idea of God suffering in his identification with human suffering has become almost paradigmatic for contemporary theology.

Footnotes to Chapter Five

(1) The idea of a divine incognito in the life of Christ is most famously associated in our century with the thought of Karl Barth. However, Barth almost certainly took the idea from Soren Kierkegaard who argued that in Jesus Christ God appeared 'in a strict incognito, an incognito impenetrable to the most intimate observation' S. Kierkegaard TRAINING IN CHRISTIANITY (E.T.) Princeton University Press 1946 p.27 The whole notion of a divine incognito was questioned by Donald Baillie who asked what was gained in the incarnation if nothing of the nature of God was revealed through it. D.Baillie GOD WAS IN CHRIST p.49

(2) D.W.D.Shaw "Identification and Incarnation" Unpublished lecture to New College Union, October, 1986 p.4. Shaw's paper though unpublished forms the beginning point of this study of a christology of identification.

(3) D.W.D.Shaw ibid p.5

(4) Boethius TRACTATES Trs. H.f. Stewart, E.K.Rand & S.J. Tester Harvard University Press 1973 p.85

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- (5) R.Descartes DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS
Penguin 1968 Meditation 2 p.105
- (6) G.W.F.Hegel THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION p.95
- (7) J.MacMurray PERSONS IN RELATION Faber & Faber 1961
p.17 For an interesting development of MacMurrays
position in relation to christology which parallels some
of the approaches taken here see A.Shutte "Indwelling,
Intersubjectivity and God" SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF THEOLOGY
Vol. 32 1979 p.201f
- (8) J.A.T.Robinson THOU WHO ART Unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation submitted Cambridge University 1946
- (9) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.24f
- (10) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.8/9
- (11) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.67
- (12) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.114
- (13) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.142
- (14) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.142

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- (15) J.A.T.Robinson THOU WHO ART p.214
- (16) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.215
- (17) J.A.T.Robinson ibid p.215/216
- (18) A.I.McFadyen THE CALL TO PERSONHOOD Cambridge
University Press 1990
- (19) A.I.McFadyen ibid p.19
- (20) A.I.McFadyen ibid p.21
- (21) A.I.McFadyen ibid p.25
- (22) A.I.McFadyen ibid p.41
- (23) A.I.McFadyen ibid p.69ff
- (24) W.Pannenberg ANTHROPOLOGY IN THEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
(ET) T & T Clark 1985 Hereafter referred to as A.T.P.
- (25) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.62
- (26) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.67

(27) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.158

(28) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.185

(29) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.191

(30) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.235

(32) W.Pannenberg A.T.P. p.241

(33) C. Taylor "The Person" in THE CATEGORY OF THE PERSON
(Ed) M. Carrithers, S. Collins, S. Lukes Cambridge
University Press 1985 p.296f

(34) For the classic expression of growth and development
in the incarnation of Christ see J.A. Dorner HISTORY OF
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSON OF CHRIST Vol iii (E.T.)

T & T Clark 1861 p.328f " Since Christ exhibited true
humanity in an actual human life, a truly human growth
pertains to Him. Since, on the other hand , God can only
be perfectly manifest in Christ when the whole fulness of
the Divine Logos has also become the proper fulness of
this man in knowledge and volition, and therefore has
become Divine-human, with the growth of the human side
there is also necessarily given in Him a growth of the
God-humanity; and the incarnation is not to be thought as

at once completed, but as continuous , nay augmentative.."
This idea of Dorner's is picked up and developed by H.R. Macintosh in the PERSON OF JESUS CHRIST p495ff where it forms the basis of his kenotic theory. In a passage that strikingly prefigures the treatment I have offered here "Hence we may regard the union alternately and equally from two points of view, each of which is defined by the other. As the Father's gift, in a purpose infallibly sure of execution, it is Divinely real from the outset and sub specie aeternitatis . But also it is humanly actualised in time; it comes to fruition in One who "passes from a destiny to a perfection through a career." (p.502) This type of approach is similar to that of Karl Rahner who argues that Jesus is more completely at the disposal of the Logos than anyone else. op cit p.171/172f In his openness towards God Jesus lives a life of absolute unique surrender to God which presupposes an absolute self-communication of God to man and this is incarnation. It will be obvious from the text that I am in very broad agreement with these approaches with the constantly stated proviso that growth and development in Christ is not growth into unity but a growing realisation and expression of an already constituted unity.

(35) W.Panneneberg JESUS GOD AND MAN (E.T.) p.334f I am in broad agreement with Pannenberg's view that Jesus's

personal community with the Father reveals his essential community although the essential community is of course an implication drawn by the community of faith after the resurrection. I am less convinced by his argument for a resurrection that is retroactive in its effects.

(36) W.Pannenberg ibid p.334 I am again in agreement with Pannenberg on the indirect nature of Jesus' sonship if this means that the person Jesus knew himself to be obedient to, was God his Father. However, to read off from Jesus' historical filial relation to God the Father an eternal ontological relationship of Sonship is less than persuasive. I would prefer to follow Juengel and to find the basis of differentiation in the eternal being of God in thinking through the implications of God's identification with the death of Jesus on the Cross.

(37) J.A.T.Robinson op cit p.227ff

(38) J.A.T. Robinson ibid p.229/230 cf McFadyen op cit for an essentially similar position " Christ is not only the second person of the Trinity, but divinity and humanity together, a human as well as a divine person. From the divine side, Christ is God's address to us: but from the human side, he is the perfect human response to that address. Christ is therefore the

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place where divine address and undistorted human response coincide, the place where God's call and proper human response meet." p.46

(39) P.Schoonenberg THE CHRIST (E.T.) p.87

"Now not the human but the divine nature in Christ is anhypostatic, with the proviso, moreover, that this is valid inasmuch as we do not know the person of the Word outside the man Jesus." Schoonenberg goes to describe what he terms the enhypostasia of the Word in the human life of Jesus. Much of this is essentially in accord with the position developed in this thesis.

(40) The most famous exponent of the idea that it is from Jesus Christ that we understand what is divine and what is human is, of course, Karl Barth. He writes "We cannot then, from the standpoint of a previously clarified conception of God, or of a previously clarified anthropology, understand what it means when in the New Testament the Son of God is called Jesus of Nazareth.... The incarnation of which the Holy Scriptures speaks can be understood only from the standpoint of Holy Scripture, ie., of the name Jesus Christ, or of the simple, once for-all reality indicated by this name." CHURCH DOGMATICS Vol 1 part 2 (E.T.) T & T Clark 1956 p.14/15

(41) The idea that man finds freedom in obedience, in correspondence, to the gracious call and demand of God finds support in Karl Barth's treatment of man's action in response to the gracious call of the commanding God. In this response of obedience to God's call man, as a Christian, both acquires and exercises his freedom. K. Barth THE CHRISTIAN LIFE (E.T.) T & T Clark 1981 p.42-43.

(42) P. Schoonenberg op cit p.34ff Engages in a profound analysis of Nature and Grace and argues that no sharp division can be drawn between nature and God's gift of grace. With particular relevance to my thesis that God's grace comes to us in encounter with others see p.41 " Only in the other man, in his giving relationship to me and in my giving relation to him, does God's grace stand before me as giving."

(43) W.P.Alston op cit p.248f Alston develops the idea that an internalisation of the promptings of God through the interpenetration of the human and divine life can influence human actions yet respect human freedom

(44) W.Pannenberg JESUS GOD AND MAN p.350f Pannenberg here effectively denies a genuine freedom of the will in Jesus Christ as a freedom of choice for Jesus'

will would make his unity a work of human will instead of that unity being experienced as a work of God. Despite what I have already said about finding broad agreement with Pannenberg's position I must reject this concept of Jesus' freedom in favour of the one I have outlined in the thesis. It seems that Pannenberg's stress upon the filial obedience of Jesus has led him to effectively give that obedience a constitutive ontological role as the foundation of the unity of the person of Christ. If Pannenberg wishes to say that Jesus's personal obedience and community with God the Father reveals a prior essential community then I would have to agree. But if this were the case he would not have to deny a free-will to Jesus for the type of unity presupposed in a christology of identification is established prior to Jesus' response though it reaches ever greater realisation in the perfected obedience of Christ. To be sure Pannenberg is correct to say that when a mission has siezed a man unconditionally he no longer has any choice with respect to that mission. This may be thought of as corresponding to the account given in the chapter of the sedimentation of past significant choices contributing to the enduring person which is the self so that in future certain significant choices are sure to be made.

(45) This is of course a paraphrase of J.L. Mackie's

famous refutation of the free-will defence in " Evil and Omnipotence" GOD AND EVIL (Ed) N. Pike Prentice Hall 1964. For a response to Mackie's argument see my "Evil and the Logic of Freedom: Tensions Unresolved" THE SCOTTISH JOURNAL OF RELIGIOUS STUDIES Vol XI No.2 Autumn 1990 where it is argued that only a being with the attributes of God could be ensured to always act rightly.

Footnotes to Chapter Six

(1) R.Bauckham "Christology Today" in SCRIPTURA 27
(1988) p.24

(2) R.Bauckham ibid p.25

(3) W.P.Alston op cit p.223f

(4) For a social view of the Trinity see D.Brown op cit
p.289f see also his "Trinitarian Personhood and
Individuality" p.48f in (Ed)R.J.Feenstra & C.Plantinga
op cit In the same volume see C.Plantinga "Social
Trinity and Tritheism" p.21f for another development of
the relational model of the Trinity.

(5) D.Brown op cit p.294

(6) D.Brown ibid p.294f see also T.V.Morris
L.G.I. p.213f Although Morris inclines towards a
social view of the Trinity he argues that his theory does
not require it. I am not convinced that it does not but
nevertheless a similar position is being maintained in
this thesis in that although I incline towards a unitary

understanding of the Trinity the theory of identification does not require it.

(7) D.M.Baillie G.W.I.C p.136

(8) I.Lakatos "Falsification and Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes" op cit p.91-196

(9) I.Lakatos ibid p.133

(10) I.Lakatos ibid p.135

Footnotes to Excursus

(1) There are many books covering the development of early Christian doctrine but see especially J.N.D.Kelly EARLY CHRISTIAN DOCTRINES A & C Black 1985; F.Young THE MAKING OF THE CREEDS SCM Press 1991; A.Grillmeier CHRIST IN CHRISTIAN TRADITION Mowbrays 1975; (Ed)H.Cunliffe Jones A HISTORY OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE T & T Clark 1980

(2)cited in H.Bettenson DOCUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH Oxford University Press 1977 p.48

(3) Athanasius THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD OF GOD (Trs. & Ed) C.S.Lewis Mowbray 1982 p.76f see also Book III ORATIONS AGAINST THE ARIANS cited in THE CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY p.85f

(4) Athanasius Book III ORATIONS ibid p.83/84

(5) Athanasius ibid p.85

(6) Athanasius THE INCARNATION OF THE WORD OF GOD op cit paragraph 8 p.33 & paragraph 17 p.45/46

(7) Athanasius Book III ORATIONS cited in THE EARLY CHRISTIAN FATHERS (Ed) H.Bettenson Oxford University Press 1969 p.288-289

(8) J.N.D.Kelly op cit p.288f

(9) Apollinarius FRAGMENTS cited in R.A. Norris op cit p.108-111. At a number of points Apollinarius makes it clear that the intellect or rational soul of God the Son is the directing principle of the incarnate Christ. This point is not affected by the discussion as to whether or not Apollinarius had a dualistic or tripartite view of human nature.

(10) Athanasius Book III ORATIONS cited in THE CHRISTOLOGICAL CONTROVERSY op cit p.96-97

(11) cited in H.Bettenson DOCUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH op cit p.45

(12) The Hypostatic union teaches that the union between the divine and human natures in Christ is substantial and takes place in the hypostasis or person of God the Son. Confusion surrounded the meaning of the term hypostasis as it covered a number of meanings ranging from underlying reality or substance of a thing,

where it is an equivalent term to ousia, or it could mean an the individual instantiation of an ousia. Its use in Trinitarian discussion tended to drive the christological use of the term towards the second of these two senses. In the context of christological debate the Antiochene/Nestorian understanding of hypostasis tended towards the first of these two senses. Therefore a hypostatic union seemed to them to necessitate some sort of change to the divine substance or nature. This threatened the impassibility of the Word and the Antiochene response was to argue that each nature possessed its own hypostasis, ie. were concrete instances of their respective natures. They could not be united hypostatically for this would mean a change into a hybrid type of creature. The Antiochene solution was to respect the integrity of each nature and consequently each hypostasis and to argue that the union was prosopic. Prosopon also has the sense of individual or person but its root meaning is that of face, mask or external appearance. To the Alexandrians a prosopic unity seemed to speak of a union which was one of external appearance only and therefore posited an unwanted duality in the person of Christ. Also the Antiochene structure seemed to suggest to them that in the incarnation we did not have the direct and unqualified involvement of God the Son. For a fuller

account of the derivation of these terms see G.W.Lampe
A PATRISTIC GREEK LEXICON Clarendon Press 1961

(13) J.N.D.Kelly op cit p.312

(14) J.N.D.Kelly ibid p.311

(15) H.Bettenson 'The Anathemas of Cyril of Alexandria'
cited in DOCUMENTS OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH op cit
p.46

(16) J.McIntyre THE SHAPE OF CHRISTOLOGY p.94

(17) The interpretation of Chalcedon which argues that the human nature of Jesus had no hypostasis came to be known as the theory of anhypostasia. A development of this position was offered by Leontius of Byzantium who argued that the human nature found its hypostasis in the hypostasis of the Word as was thus enhypostatic. For a modern defence of the concept of enhypostasia see K.Barth CHURCH DOGMATICS Vol. 4 part 2 T & T Clark 1958 p.49f. Barth argues that hypostasis does not refer to the personality of Christ but rather to the independent existence of Christ. Accordingly the theory does not mean that the humanity of Christ was

'impersonal' but that it had no separate and independent existence apart from the Word of God. This is certainly a helpful addendum but it does not solve the central issue about how one resolves the fact that if Christ is truly human then there would appear to be two complete individuals in the one person of Christ.

(18) J.McIntyre ibid p.88/89f

(19) W.Pannenberg op cit p.295/296 Gives a brief outline of the mediaeval discussion. See also H.Kung THE INCARNATION OF GOD (E.T.) T & T CLark 1987 p.530f

(20) T.Gilby (Ed) St. THOMAS AQUINAS THEOLOGICAL TEXTS
Oxford University Press 1955 p.289-290 & p300-301

(21) Aquinas SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES Book Four
University of Notre Dame Press 1975 Chapters 38-44
p.185-202, cf. Gilby op cit p.300

(22) A.E.McGrath "Homo Assumptus? A Study in the Christology of the Via Moderna with particular reference to William of Ockham" p.291 EPHEMERIDES THEOLOGICAE LOVANIENSES Vol. 60 1984

(23) A.E. McGrath

ibid p.292

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