A COMPARISON OF THE CONCEPT OF GOD FOUND IN PAUL TILLICH, ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD AND CHARLES HARTSHORNE

David C. Crossland

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A COMPARISON OF THE CONCEPT OF GOD

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ABSTRACT

This Thesis aims to compare and contrast the doctrines of God found within the writings of Paul Tillich, Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne.

Chapter one is concerned with an exposition of Tillich's concept of God while chapter two examines the process view and explains the divergence of Hartshorne from Whitehead.

In chapter three I discuss general similarities of system structure and basic ideology between Tillich and Process but conclude that there are insurmountable difficulties in bringing the two systems into closer dialogue. The religious and philosophical similarities and differences are outlined and the judgement made that ultimately the difference is due to Tillich's insistence on symbolic language. I also argue in chapter three that while Tillich and Process cannot be brought together as systems they can benefit from one another at specific points. for example Tillichs' insight into the phenomenological threat of non-being can be included in process to enrich its ability to address the human situation.

In chapter four I analyse both Whiteheads' concept of Prehension and Tillichs' concept of participation and show how the latter can be clarified by reference to the former. I believe that Tillich uses participation to apply to different levels of relatedness from the mere 'having of relation' to the saving participation of the New Being. I conclude that if Prehension is used to interpret the basic levels of relationship then participation is free to be used for higher meanings only.

PREFACE

I would like to record my gratitude to all those whose help has made this work possible. to Professor D.W.D. Shaw for his criticism, advice and, above all, patience. To Ms. Julia Clarke, for her encouragement and assistance with the text, and to Ms. Wendy Davies without whose help and companionship it would never have been completed; obviously the many shortcomings that remain are my sole responsibility.

Hartshorne says: "Be creative ... Be everywhere and always seeking to bring new values to life." If this work has any value then the credit is due entirely to my parents, whose love and support I can never repay. It is dedicated to them with my thanks.

M. Phil. (Mode A)

(a) I certify that David Christopher Crossland has fulfilled the conditions of the Resolution of the University Court, 1981, No. 2, and is qualified to submit this thesis in application for the Degree of Master of Philosophy.

....
Signature of supervisor

(b) I was admitted as a research student under ordinance 350 (General No. 12) on 4th October 1981 and as a candidate for the degree of M.Phil. under Resolution of the University court, 1981, No.2 on 4th October 1981. The following thesis is based on the results of research carried out by myself, is my own composition, and has not previously been presented for a higher degree. The research was carried out in the University of St Andrews under the supervision of Prof. D.W.D. Shaw.

....
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INTRODUCTION

This thesis is the result of a year's full time research carried out in St. Mary's college between 1981 and 1982. My initial interest was in the theology of Paul Tillich, and it was while making exploratory investigations into his doctrine of God that I became fascinated by the apparent affinity between Tillich and process. There were obviously a number of avenues I could have taken, following tantalising suggestions such as Claude Stewart's, that process philosophy embodies the protestant principle, or Robert Scharlemann's, that being itself could be reinterpreted to bring Tillich more into line with process. I preferred, however, to make a general comparison, initially, to see how deep the affinities really went.

From this initial study I became convinced that while the two systems were extremely close in their intentions and basic structure the affinities could not be exploited to bring about any kind of unity. I realised that there was a fundamental gulf between the systems caused by Tillich's insistence on symbolic language.

I became aware, at the same time however, that the strengths of the two modes of thought lay in different directions. Process is one of the most comprehensive and rationalistic metaphysics ever developed, and yet it speaks little to man's spiritual experience; Tillich's brilliance, on the other hand, lies in his phenomenological insights into the conditions of human existence. This was where process and Tillich could benefit most from each other; by using the meaningful but murky insights of the latter to add richness and depth to the carefully defined and elucidated concepts of the former.

The thesis contains four chapters. In the first two I explain the different concepts of God. Chapter three deals with a general comparison, investigates the reasons for the irrevocable difference between the systems as systems, and attempts to illustrate some useful points of dialogue. Chapter four includes an analysis of the concepts of prehension and participation and suggests ways in which the one can clarify the other.

CHAPTER ONE

Tillich's Concept of God

It is important at the outset to understand Tillich's basic viewpoint. He is not constructing a philosophical system but a theological one, and he sees theology as a function of the church which must serve the needs of the church. He is writing from within the 'theological circle', that is, he accepts and affirms the universal validity of the christian message; he has made an existential decision of faith and works always from this standpoint. While he admits that no-one can put himself in a situation of faith, through his own personal decision, he stresses that to be a theologian one must have the christian message as one's ultimate concern.

The aim of theology is twofold, says Tillich, it is:-

"The statement of the truth of the christian message and the interpretation of this truth for every new generation". (1)

This explains why theology is an ongoing process, because the contemporary situation is always changing. Tillich sees the contemporary situation, to which each generations theology must speak, not as being the psychological or sociological state of the times but as being the interpretations of history given by non-theological disciplines. Theology must be able to relate its message to the understanding of human life given by the scientific, philosophical, economic, political and artistic disciplines. Tillich criticises Fundamentalism, Liberalism and Barth's Neo-orthodoxy for failing to

(1) Tillich, P. Systematic Theology I; p3 (hereafter referred to as S.T.)

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achieve this two fold aim. Fundamentalism, he claims, fails to achieve either aim. It fails to state the eternal truth because it identifies that truth with one of its past temporary expressions i.e. the Bible and because of this it cannot speak to the present time. It puts itself in conflict with the present situation by struggling against the insights of modern science and philosophy.

Tillich claims that Liberalism obliterates the eternal truth of Christianity by reducing it to certain aspects of the contemporary situation. For example Dewey reduced the meaning of God to certain ideals which we posit and certain natural processes that work towards the realisation of those ideals.

Tillich agrees with Barth's insistence that the revelation of God cannot be identified with any temporary expression of revelation. Both men would agree that revelation is experiential not propositional. The words of the Bible record the events of revelation but are not identical with it. They are human and finite and therefore open to error. Tillich's disagreement with Barth is that his kerygmatic theology fails to relate the eternal truth to the contemporary situation because Barth will not acknowledge any point of contact between theology and philosophy, between Christian message and situation. For Barth you distort the message if you try to make it reasonable, it is an affront to human reason, 'You throw the gospel like a stone'.

Tillich fulfils his twofold aim and brings the Christian message in contact with the present situation through his basic method, the method of correlation, which:

"explains the contents of the Christian faith through existential questions and theological answers in mutual interdependance". (1)

Tillich aims to analyse the human situation to discover the existential questions of existence and then show how the Christian symbols are the answers to these questions.

Tillich sees three levels of correlation in a general sense which are all echoed in a theological sense. These three levels are a) scientific facts, data, and statistics; b) the relation of one concept to another; c) the interdependance of objects and events in reality. In theology these levels are seen in, firstly symbolic religious language, secondly concepts pertaining to the human and the divine and thirdly in the factual sense between man's ultimate concern and that about which he is ultimately concerned.

This third level or meaning of correlation is the important one because it qualifies the divine-human relationship. God in his essence or in his "abysmal nature" is totally independant of man, but God in his self manifestation to man is dependant on the way man receives his manifestation. The divine-human relationship changes with the stages of the history of revelation.

"There is a mutual interdependance between 'God for us' and 'we for God'.... The 'divine-human encounter' means something real for both sides". (2)

Of ultimate importance for Tillich, however, is the correlation

(1) ibid. p68

(2) ibid. p68

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between questions and answers or specifically between the basic questions of being human i.e. questions about ones own being or existence and the answers of revelation. By utilising this correlation Tillich hopes to preserve the balance between fundamentalism and apologetic theology. His main concern is with the latter but he does not want to lose the kerygmatic nature of the message, hence his twofold theological aim.

By using the method of correlation theology makes an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and it demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these questions. This is where the theologian must become a philosopher, for:

"The analysis of existence, including the development of the questions implict in existence is a philosophical task". (1)

Here we must look at how Tillich defines philosophy and the relationship between philosophy and theology. In the absence of a generally accepted definition of philosophy Tillich defines it as:

"...that cognitive approach to reality in which reality as such is the object. Reality as such, or reality as a whole, is not the whole of reality; it is the structure which makes reality a whole and therefore a potential object of knowledge". (2)

Philosophy and theology ask the same question, both ask the question

(1) ibid. p71

(2) ibid. p22

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of reality as a whole and both share an identical ultimate. In the case of philosophy this ultimate is Being-itself and in the case of theology it is, of course, God. Tillich expresses the similarity thus:

> "There is a point of identity between the ultimate of the philosophical question and the ultimate of the religious concern. In both cases ultimate reality is sought and expressed conceptually in philosophy, symbolically in religion. Philosophical truth consists in true concepts concerning the ultimate; the truth of faith consists in true symbols concerning the ultimate". (1)

Theology must be concerned with that which concerns us ultimately and this must belong to reality as a whole, otherwise we could not encounter it or be concerned by it. It must also be the ground of our being or "being-itself" and not merely one being among others, otherwise it could not exercise infinite concern. This 'being itself' manifests itself through the structure of being and hence is the proper subject matter of philosophy; or at least of philosophy as Tillich sees it, which is better described as ontology. The ontological question asks: 'What is being itself?' and it implies an asking subject and an object about which the question is asked. In other words it presupposes the subject-object or self-world structure of everything that is. The basic structure of reality is dialectical, it is polar in character and the elements which compose this basic structure share its polarity.

(1) Tillich, P. Dynamics of Faith. p90 (hereafter referred to as D.F.)

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"Three outstanding pairs of elements constitute the basic ontological structure: individuality and universality, dynamics and form, freedom and destiny. In these three polarities the first element expresses the self relatedness of being... while the second element expresses the belongingness of being, its character of being a part of a universe of being". (1)

The basic polarity in this subject-object structure of reason, however, is the self-world polarity. Being a self means being separated in some way from everything else and at the same time being aware that you are a part of everything else. Every 'self' has an environment with which it has an active interrelation, but man has a world. Man, the completely centred self, the ego-self, has a world which is a structured whole, which includes and transcends all particular environments.

"Even in the most limited environment man possesses the universe; he has a world. Language, as the power of universals, is the basic expression of man's transcending his environment, of having a world". (2)

The parity of individualisation and participation follows on from this; every self is an individual and yet every individual self participates in its environment or its world. The two poles form a balanced whole because the more a self is individualised the more it can participate and it is through this participation that it becomes individualised. The level of complete individualisation is, at the same time, the level of complete participation.

(1) Tillich, P. S.T. I; p183

(2) ibid. p189

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"When individualisation reaches the perfect form which we

call 'person', participation reaches the perfect form which

we call 'communion'... Communion is participation in

another completely centred and completely individual self".(1)

The one side of the polarity is impossible without the other, if one

is destroyed then the other is likewise.

The form and content of a being are identical, the form of a thing is

what makes it what it is. The polar opposite of form is dynamics or

the potentiality of being. Tillich also refers to this as the

polarity of vitality and intentionality. Man's creative vitality is

bound by intentionality, it is directed and formed and always

transcends itself towards meaningful contents. Vitality and

intentionality are interdependent and could not exist in isolation.

"The dynamic character of being implies the tendancy of

everything to transcend itself and to create new forms. At

the same time everything tends to conserve its own form as

the basis of its self-transcendence". (2)

The third and possibly most fundamental polarity is that of freedom

and destiny. It is this polarity which makes existence possible when

linked with finitude. Finite freedom is the turning point from being

to existence. Freedom should not be regarded as the freedom of any

particular function, such as 'will' but rather as the freedom of the

whole person; indicating that every part and function of the self

participates in its freedom. Freedom is experienced by man because

(1) ibid. p195

(2) ibid. p199

only man is completely self centred. Destiny is not some kind of strange power controlling what will happen, it is not the opposite of freedom but rather its limits and conditions. 'Fate' is the simple contradiction of freedom and this could not be used in polar correlation. Destiny is that out of which our decisions arise

"... it is the indefinitely broad basis of our centred selfhood, it is the concreteness of our being which makes all our decisions our decisions... [Destiny] is myself as given, formed by nature, history and myself. My destiny is the basis of my freedom; my freedom participates in shaping my destiny". (1)

The concept of finitude is central to this question of being because it is the finitude of being which drives us towards God. The basic ontological structure and its constituent elements imply finitude; to be something is not to be something else; to be here and now is not to be there and then; to be is to be finite. Essential finitude is a necessary part of existence and leads to ontological anxiety. Anxiety in this sense must not be confused with dread or fear which are psychological, not ontological, phenomena. Anxiety is always present, although often latent; it is the self awareness of the finite self as finite. Disruption and despair, on the other hand, are not essential but existential. Finitude puts the ontological polarities into tension, it produces the possibility of a loss of one of the poles. Man realises this threat and oscillates from one pole to the other aware that the loss of one pole would lead to the destruction of the ontological structure. This is not the same as the simple, direct,

(1) ibid. p204

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fear of non-being but is rather the fear of disruption and self destruction. It is an existential possibility rather than an essential necessity.

> "The anxiety of finitude is not the despair of self destruction. Christianity sees in the picture of Jesus as the Christ a human life in which all forms of anxiety are present but from which all forms of despair are absent". (1)

The explanation of the structure of being is obviously fundamental to Tillich's system but he sees it as primarily a philosophical rather than theological area; although he has been criticised for blurring the distinctions between the two subjects. Heywood Thomas, for example, accuses Tillich of committing a tautology; he claims that Tillich defines theology and philosophy in the same way and then deduces that every theologian must be concerned with the basic questions of philosophy. This, I think, is too harsh, for Tillich goes on to point out the divergent and convergent trends in the relationship between theology and philosophy and while his convergent trends are, to say the least, dubious his divergent trends are more understandable and acceptable. Thus he claims that the two disciplines ask the question of being from different perspectives. The philosopher must be detached and objective, his passion, says Tillich is:

> "...the passion for a truth which is open to general approach, subject to general critisism... open and communicable". (2)

(1) ibid. p224

(2) ibid. p26

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The theologian on the other hand must work within the theological circle, he has a concrete commitment to the content he expounds, he is "existential" in that he is involved with the whole of his existence and is determined by his faith. The philosopher and theologian also differ in their sources. The philosopher assumes that there is an identity between the logos of reality as a whole and the individual logos working in him. The theologion, however, is not concerned with the universal logos but with the Logos "who became flesh", with the particular manifestation of logos in history.

Tillich's description of the point of convergence between philosophy and theology is that every philospher exists in the power of an ultimate concern. Every philosopher is a hidden theologian. What he seems to be saying is that the philosopher must be detached but he cannot be, he attempts to serve the universal logos but he cannot escape his existential situation, and he is a theologian to the extent that he cannot escape this situation. The theologian, on the other hand, turns towards his existential situation but can only function by being detached from it.

"The detachment required in honest theological work can destroy the necessary involvement of faith. This tension is the burden and the greatness of every theological work". (1)

Heywood-Thomas criticises this, commenting that:

"... it is like saying that a dog is an animal with four legs, a furry coat, and a tail, and that insofar as a cat has these characteristics it is a dog". (2)

(1) ibid. p30

(2) Thomas, J.H. Paul Tillich : An Appraisal. p43

Heywood-Thomas has a good point. There is a basic fallacy in Tillich's understanding of philosophy in that he refuses to see that it is distinguished from other arts and sciences by its methods rather than by its subject matter. The subject of philosophy is all reality, it cannot really be limited in the way Tillich tries to.

Tillich does maintain a final distinction between philosophy and theology. He claims that there can be no conflict or synthesis between the two disciplines because either of these would require a common basis which does not exist. Conflicts or alliances between philosophers and theologians may take place on either a philosophical or theological level but the two levels cannot conflict themselves.

As we have seen theology must be about that which concerns us ultimately. Tillich maintains two formal criteria to support this. Firstly, only those propositions which deal with their object in so far as it can become a matter of ultimate concern for us are theological. Secondly, only those statements which deal with their object insofar as it can become a matter of being or non-being for us are theological. For only that which has the power of threatening or saving our being, threatening or saving the structure, the meaning, and the aim of existence is of ultimate concern to us. The first of these criteria helps to distinguish between ultimate and preliminary concerns and thus between theological and scientific, historical or political questions which concern our relation to the world of existence. The second criterion does not point to any specific content or doctrine but remains open. At the same time though it excludes contents which do not have the power to express that which determines being and non-being.

For Tillich there is only one way to 'do' theology and that is systematically.

> "It has always been impossible for me to think theologically in any other than a systematic way. The smallest problem if taken seriously and radically, drove me to all other problems and to the anticipation of a whole in which they could find their solution". (1)

There are three basic parts to his system's structure. These are the sources, the medium and the norm. Tillich claims that the bible is not the only source, it could not have been understood and received apart from the preparation for it in the previous generations, so the systematic theologian must draw from Church history among many others. In fact the sources are almost unlimited but they are not all of equal relevance or importance. Their degree of importance is measured by the directness or indirectness of their relationship to the appearance of Christ.

The sources are not merely presented as informative. They are received by us through the medium of experience, which does not leave them untouched although it does not disrupt their message. Tillich makes experience a medium, and not a source, of systematic theology because he realises the dangers of asserting a religious experience which transcends the Christian message as bound to the unique event of Christ. Here Tillich joins neo-othodoxy in its rejection of Schliermacher's attempt to derive all the contents of the Christian faith from the "religious consciousness" but he believes that the neo-orthodox went too far in totally rejecting experience. As Heywood-

(1) Tillich, P. S.T. I p.ix (preface)

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Thomas puts it:

"Christian theology 'is based on the unique event of Jesus
the Christ' and this event is given to experience but is not
derived from it". (1)

With such a variety of sources and such an indefinite medium some kind
of a norm is necessary. The question of a norm is an old one and
their development has been an historical process. The norm must never
become, however, merely the private opinion of a theologian but must
be the expression of an encounter of the Church with the christian
message. In man's present situation of despair and self estrangement
Tillich sees the norm as the "New-Being" in Jesus as the Christ.

These three basic parts are all brought together by Tillich in the
following way:

"The Christian message provides the answers to the questions
implied in human existence. These answers are contained in
the revelatory events on which Christianity is based and are
taken by systematic theology _from_ the sources, _through_ the
medium, _under_ the norm". (2)

This systematic approach has been criticised by some as leading to a
conflict between the content and form of the system. The form, it is
claimed, becomes self sufficient and determines the content. David
Roberts criticises Tillich for this, but while Tillich is happy to
admit that it is an everpresent danger he refuses to accept that his
system suffers in any serious way. Tillich claims, rightly, that he
controls this possibility of conflict between content and form by

(1) Thomas, J.H. _op.cit._ p25

(2) Tillich, P. _S.T._ I p72

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beginning each part of his system with an existential analysis of the questions implied in human existence to which the theological concepts are supposed to speak. Perhaps a lesser mind may fall into the trap of adjusting his material to fit the systems but I think whatever other faults he may have this is not one of Tillich's.

A far more telling criticism of Tillich, levelled by Emmett, Hartshorne and others, is that he lacks precision and consistency in his terminology. He explains this by pointing out that much of his work has been produced in an ad hoc fashion by way of speeches and essays. This, however, he realises is no answer and he goes on to draw a distinction between kinds of consistency and precision. What he calls the 'definitional' and the 'configurational'.

"There are notions which resist definition and whose meaning can only be shown by configuration with other notions. The basic ontological concepts fall into this category. The philosophical task with respect to them is not to define them but to illuminate them by showing how they appear in different constellations. This way of "showing" may be precise or lacking in precision, consistent or inconsistent. But the criterion is not the definitional precision and consistency". (1)

This is sidestepping the issue. Tillich is right when he explains why there may be a lack of precision and consistency in his work but he is wrong in implying that he does not suffer from the problem. Hartshorne, for instance, does not criticise Tillich on purely definitional grounds over the use of the term symbol and on any

(1) Kegley, C.W. and Bretall, R.W. (eds.) The Theology of Paul Tillich p330

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measure of precision Tillich's concept of participation would be found wanting.

Any explication of Tillich's concept of God is necessarily complicated by his assertion that we can have no direct knowledge of God and can speak about him only in symbolic language. In fact Tillich does allow one non-symbolic statement about God, that is, that he is 'being-itself'. Tillich is not consistent on this point, however, and occasionally claims that all statements about God are symbolic. This was his original position in 1940 which he later modified. In his reply to interpretation and criticism in the Kegley and Bretall volume he acknowledged the criticism of Professor Urban which forced him:

"... to acknowledge that in order to speak of symbolic knowledge one must delimit the symbolic realm by an unsymbolic statement... the unsymbolic statement which implies the necessity of religious symbolism is that God is being itself, and as such beyond the subject-object structure of everything that is". (1)

Despite occasional departures from this statement (2) it has become accepted as Tillich's true position, and I will treat is as such.

The question we must now pose is, how helpful in understanding the concept of God is this equation of God with being-itself? Or what is being-itself? Rowe points out that although being-itself is used in an explanatory way with reference to the idea of God it is not a readily understandable concept. Indeed it too is ineffable and can

(1) ibid. p334

(2) See, for example, Rowe, W.L. Religious Symbols and God pp24-31
      (hereafter referred to as R.S.G.)

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only be spoken of symbolically.

We have seen how Tillich distinguishes between theology and philosophy and how the term 'God' is a religious symbol while 'being-itself' is a philosophical concept. We have also seen that the concepts in which philosophy expresses the ultimate are not totally non-symbolic and that the symbols of religion contain conceptual elements. Indeed, for Tillich, it is only because every religious symbol has conceptual potentialities that 'theology' is possible. (Theology is here seen as the elucidation of religious statements about God in terms of ontological statements about Being-itself). Of course, the fact that philosophical concepts about the ultimate cannot be completely non-symbolic makes it impossible for any elucidating ontological statements to be wholly non-symbolic. Hence Rowe's claim that the concept of being-itself is, in the end, as ineffable as the concept of God. This returns us to the problem of what use is it to speak of God in ontological terms? William Alston criticises Tillich at this point. He comments on Tillich's claim that the theological statement ascribing <u>'will'</u> to God can be interpreted as a symbol for 'dynamics in all it's ramifications'.

> "If they were intended to be simply the replacement of one
> symbol by another symbol they would be grotesque failures.
> No one would suppose that 'dynamics in all it's
> ramifications' is a better religious symbol i.e. performs a
> symbolic function better or more clearly than 'will'". (1)

Rowe defends Tillich, and I believe correctly, when he says that 'dynamics in all its ramifications' is obviously not a better religious symbol than 'will' because it is not intended to be a

(1) Quoted from Rowe, W.L. <u>R.S.G.</u> p185

religious symbol. It is an ontological symbol or statement and its purpose is not to provoke religious feeling but to explain reality, to attempt to get a conceptual grasp of the reality lying behind the imagery of religious symbolism. Although we cannot say that 'dynamics in all its ramifications' is a non-symbolic statement it can be claimed that it is, ontologically speaking, less symbolic than 'will'.

It is partly because Tillich equates God with the ultimate of philosophical questioning that he can say that:

"'God' is the answer to the question implied in man's finitude; he is the name for that which concerns man ultimately". (1)

This is how Tillich begins his phenomenological description of the meaning of the term 'God'. He continues,

"... this does not mean that first there is a being called God and then the demand that man should be ultimately concerned about him. It means that whatever concerns man ultimately becomes god for him". (2)

Tillich goes on to explain that the term "being ultimately concerned" implies a tension within human experience. On one hand one cannot be ultimately concerned about what one cannot encounter, about what is not concrete (for instance one cannot be ultimately concerned about the abstract concept 'love' unless that concept be embodied in some concrete reality i.e. family or friends). On the other hand ultimate concern cannot be directed towards something preliminary or finite, it must transcend the whole realm of finitude in order to be the answer

(1) Tillich, P. S.T. I p234

(2) ibid. p234

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to the question implied in finitude (i.e. ultimate concern must be truly ultimate, therefore, abstract).

To quote:

> "... this is the inescapable inner tension in the idea of God. The conflict between the concreteness and the ultimacy of the religious concern is actual whenever God is experienced... It is the key to understanding the dynamics of the history of religion, and it is the basic problem of every doctrine of God, from the earliest priestly wisdom to the most refined discussions of the trinitarian dogma." (1)

This inner tension which Tillich astutely notices in the phenomena of religion is important both for Tillich's system and, as we shall see later, for any comparison between Tillich and the process school. It is important within Tillich's system because it gives rise to his theory of religious language and knowledge i.e. his theory of symbols. This aspect of Tillich's thought is pivotal to his whole system and is one of the most criticised aspects of his work. I will give here a brief summary of his theory as outlined predominantly in 'Dynamics of Faith' and his much published essay 'The Religious Symbol' (2) and then look at some of the major criticisms.

(1) ibid. p234

(2) This article has a long publishing history, perhaps reflecting its importance for Tillich. It first appeared in Blätter fur deutsche Philosophie Vol.1, No.4. It has appeared several times in English; first in the Journal of Liberal Religion, II (Summer 1940), p13-33. It was published in Daedalus, LXXXVII (Summer 1958), pp3-21; in Symbolism in Religion and Literature, ed. R. May (New York : George Brazillier Inc. 1960); and in Religious Experience and Truth, ed. S.Hook (New York : N.Y. University Press, 1961). The references here are to its appearance in Myth and Symbol, ed. F.E. Dillistone (London: S.P.C.K. Theological Collections, 1966)

In 'The Religious Symbol' Tillich outlines four general characteristics of all symbols.

(a) First and most basic is the _figurative_ quality which implies that the inner attitude oriented towards the symbol is not aimed at the symbol itself but rather at what is symbolised.

(b) Perceptibility is also present in all symbols. This means that the symbols make perceptible, and gives objectivity to, something which is otherwise intrinsically invisible, ideal, or transcendent.

(c) All symbols have an innate power which distinguish them from mere signs which are impotent in themselves.

> "This characteristic is decisive for the distinction between
> a sign and a symbol. The symbol.... cannot be exchanged.
> It can only disappear when, through dissolution, it loses
> its inner power. Nor can it be merely constructed; it can
> only be created". (1)

(d) The last general characteristic is the symbols acceptability as such. A symbol must be socially rooted and supported.

> "Hence it is not correct to say that a thing is first a
> symbol and then gains acceptance; the process of it becoming
> a symbol and the acceptance of it as a symbol belong
> together". (2)

These four characteristics are shared alike by ordinary and religious symbols. The difference between them lies not in the characteristics but in the nature of the things symbolised. Ordinary symbols either stand for something that has an objective unsymbolic meaning of its

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(1) Tillich, P. 'The Religious Symbol' p16 (hereafter referred to as 'R.S.')

(2) _ibid._ p16

own; for instance a flag may symbolise a king and a king a state; or
they give expression to an invisible thing that has no existence other
than in its symbols; for instance works of art, scientific concepts
and legal forms. A religious symbol, on the other hand, expresses an
object which is totally transcendent; which, by its very nature, is
totally beyond the subject/object division.

> "A real symbol points to an object which never can become an
> object. Religious symbols represent the transcendent but do
> not make the transendent immanent. They do not make God a
> part of the empirical world". (1)

In 'Dynamics of Faith' Tillich stresses the difference between sign
and symbol.

> "Decisive is the fact that signs do not participate in the
> reality of that to which they point, while symbols do." (2)

This concept of participation is of vital importance in Tillich's
theory of symbols. It is the distinguishing feature between mere
signs and symbols, it is the reason symbols can function as mediators
of ultimate concern, and it is the reason why symbols cannot be
governed by convention but must grow out of the collective
unconscious. Tillich also introduces, in 'Dynamics of Faith', a two
fold function of symbols. The first function is that symbols open up
levels of reality which are otherwise closed to us. This is
especially true of the arts which reveal elements which science could
not. The second function is that symbols reveal dimensions and
elements of our soul corresponding to the new aspects of reality which
are revealed.

(1) ibid. p17

(2) Tillich, P. D.F. p42

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"A great play gives us not only a new vision of the human scene, but it opens up hidden depths of our being... There are within us dimensions of which we cannot become aware except through symbols". (1)

The theory of religious symbols must obviously be linked to the concept of faith, which Tillich describes as 'the state of being ultimately concerned'. For Tillich faith has no other language than symbols because ultimate concern can only be expressed symbolically and never directly or properly.

Why, for Tillich, must God be that which concerns man ultimately? For Tillich, man is existentially estranged from his essential self. All existent beings (God, of course, is not in this category) are a mixture of being and non-being; they are maintained out of non-being through participation in being-itself, which can therefore be described as the 'ground' or 'power' of being. Therefore creation cannot be seen as an isolated, once for all, event, it is a continuous creation, man is continually being supported against non-being. To be finite, concrete, contingent, in short, to exist is to participate in both being and non-being and is, therefore, to be under the threat of non-being. For Tillich this threat of non-being comes to man in the form of an ontological shock and leaves him in a state of fear. In "The Courage to Be" Tillich speaks of three forms of the fear on non-being, they are:

(a) ontic non-being - the fear of fate and death.

(b) Spiritual non-being - the fear of emptiness and meaninglessness.

(c) moral non-being - the fear of guilt and condemnation.

(1) ibid. p43

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The only thing that can overcome this ontological shock is faith, because the only answer to the conditions of finitude is God or Being-itself. God is the answer to the questions implied in man's finitude and, therefore, must be of ultimate concern.

All this stems from Tillich's method of correlation. The chief exemplification of which is, of course, the fact that the basic question of man's situation, the question or threat of non-being, is answered by Christianity's most basic symbol, God. Having said this we must account for Tillich's statement that 'whatever concerns man ultimately becomes God for him'. This is a phenomenological statement and points to the insight that, in practice, man treats many things as his god; for example, the unswerving way some people pursue power or money. Or to use one of Tillich's examples, the overwhelming nationalism shown by the Nazis in the 1930's. It can, of course, be said, using Tillich's thinking, that all these things, money, power, nation are potentially symbols for being itself, therefore, there is nothing wrong in them being treated as such. This is, however, a misunderstanding. True, anything has the potential to mediate being-itself and hence to be a symbol but the thing becomes a bad symbol, or perhaps Tillich would say an idolatrous symbol, when it is seen as embodying the holy ("the quality of that which concerns man ultimately") in itself and not in a mediating way. Hence we can say that money can be, and perhaps occasionally is, a symbol for being itself. But if it is seen as embodying the holy directly within itself, if it is seen as ultimate and not the mediator of ultimacy, then it becomes an idolatrous symbol. It is important to realise that it does not cease to be a symbol or become a dead symbol; for the person who directs ultimate concern towards it, it is still a live symbol. This is why Tillich can speak of the risk of faith. The risk

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comes from the uncertainty that one must always feel regarding the truth of one's symbols. To quote:

> "Ultimate concern is ultimate risk and ultimate courage. It
> is not risk and needs no courage with respect to ultimacy
> itself. But it is risk and demands courage if it affirms a
> concrete concern. And every faith has a concrete element in
> itself. It is concerned about something or somebody. (1)

The most basic of all religious symbols, the notion of God, contains two elements. Firstly the element of ultimacy which is a matter of direct experience and not symbolic; secondly the element of concreteness which we symbolically apply to God. As Tillich writes:

> "... the word 'God' involves a double meaning: it connotes
> the unconditioned transcendent, the ultimate, and also an
> object somehow endowed with qualities and actions. The
> first is not figurative or symbolic, but is rather in the
> strictest sense what it is said to be". (2)

The only way I can interpret this is that Tillich is allowing another non-symbolic statement about God other than 'God is being itself'. Here he quite clearly wishes to call God "the unconditioned transcendent, the ultimate", in a literal, non-symbolic way.

It is this double meaning in the notion of God which allows Tillich to introduce his thoughts on the non-existence of God. He asserts that,

> "... it is as atheistic to affirm the existence of God as it
> is to deny it". (3)

(1) _ibid._ p18

(2) Tillich, P. 'R.S.' p28

(3) Tillich, P. S.T. I p237

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Tillich can say this because he defines 'existence' in relation to the realm of beings. To exist is to be a being, to be finite and contingent. Of course this cannot apply to God, God is being itself, the ground and power of all individual finite beings. God transcends both the realm of existence and the realm of essence.

The important question is why does Tillich deny existence of God? What does he gain by doing so? I think one of the principle reasons is his cavalier attitude to, and dislike of, logic. He does not wish to get involved in any of the logical attempts to prove or disprove the existence of God as this is an area in which he is clearly very uncomfortable. The second reason stems from his description of the human condition as being under the threat of non-being. To exist is to be held out of non-being through participation in being itself. The ultimate being itself cannot therefore be part of the realm of existence or it too would face the threat of non-being which would obviously be a nonsense.

In effect Tillich's denial of the existence of God is a convenient technical tool which frees him from what he himself calls the "grave difficulties" which attend the attempt to speak of God as existing. He accomplishes this denial of existence, as we have seen, by limiting the definition of the word existence, and many of the difficulties and confusions between Tillich and his critics on this point stem, I believe, from differing understandings of the term 'existence'. We can see now why Tillich is accused of; on the one hand, denying existence to God and, on the other, speaking as though God existed. It is, to my mind, impossible to speak of anything we regard as real and non-ficticious as having qualities (whether actually or symbolically) without speaking as though it were existent, in the

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broadest sense of the word 'exist'.

We have so far looked only at the most basic religious symbol, God. Obviously some account must be taken of the plethora of lesser symbols and how these are used in symbolic language. Tillich's own explication of the various types of religious symbol distinguishes two separate levels.

"... a supporting level in which religious objectivity is established and which is based in itself; and a level supported by it and pointing to objects of the other level". (1)

The first level is the most important and Tillich calls these the "objective religious symbols". The second level, which becomes somewhat confused, he calls "self transcending religious symbols".

Tillich subdivides the objective symbols into four groups.

(a) First and most basic is the world of divine beings, principally the name God. These are representations of the unconditioned transcendent. This unconditioned transcendent is beyond even the conception of a supreme being.

"In so far as any such being is assumed as existent, it is again annihilated in the religious act". (2)

If this representative element, what Tillich calls the "atheism immanent in the religious act", is lost sight of then God is made into a 'thing' a 'being' and the religious and cultural life become enmeshed in idolatrous symbols and are destroyed.

(b) This second group are characterisations of the nature and actions of God. These presuppose God as an object and yet contain an element

(1) Tillich, P. 'R.S.' p27

(2) *ibid.* p27

which indicates the symbolic character of that presupposition.

(c) The third group are the natural and historical objects which represent the presence of the unconditioned transcendent in the empirical order. Like the first group there is a double meaning involved, there is an unsymbolic historical and empirical reality and also a symbolic representation of the unconditioned transcendent. For example in the crucifixion of Christ you have a non-symbolic historical event open to historical research but you also have a symbolic representation of the action of the divine in the realm of existence.

(d) This is where Tillich appears to become confused because he identifies the fourth group of objective religious symbols with the second level of symbols, namely, the self-transcending or pointing symbols. He calls the fourth group:

"the immensely large class of signs and actions of a special significance that contain a reference to religious objects of the first level". (1)

All of these can be thought of as symbols of the third group reduced to a lower power.

"They all had originally more than 'pointing' significance".(2)

Whether Tillich is saying that, before their reduction to a lower power, they were the fourth group of objective symbols or whether he is saying that the objective symbols include within themselves the 'self transcending' symbols is not clear. Either way he is unnecessarily confused at this point and could merely have delineated four types of religious symbol.

(1) ibid. p30

(2) ibid. p31

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A final element of Tillich's theory of religious symbols is his connection of symbol and myth. For Tillich myths are 'stories of the gods' and in them religious symbols are combined together in stories of divine-human encounters. Myths are present in every act of faith, they are inescapable. One myth may be replaced by another myth, as one symbol may be replaced by another symbol, but myth, like symbol, cannot be removed from man's spiritual life. If myths cannot be ignored then there are two possibilities; either they are seen as literal explanations of the ultimate in which case they become idolatrous, or they become 'broken myths'. A broken myth is one which is understood as a myth but not removed or replaced. Tillich distinguishes between 'natural' and 'historical' myths. A natural myth is one in which repetitive natural processes, such as the seasons, are understood in their ultimate meaning. A historical myth is one in which the ultimate is seen as acting in human history.

> "If the Christ - a transcendent, divine being - appears in
> the fullness of time, lives, dies and is resurrected, this
> is an historical myth.... Christianity speaks the
> mythological language like every other religion. It is a
> broken myth, but it is a myth; otherwise Christianity would
> not be an expression of ultimate concern". (1)

Tillich's concept of God and the inseparable theory of symbolism have been criticised by many people. Indeed although Tillich is one of the most influential minds of this century there is no such thing as a Tillich School or even a pure Tillichian. His influence lies in

(1) Tillich, P. D.F. p54

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provocation and in specific areas rather than in total acceptance of his system. It has been said that any theologian who wishes to seriously grapple with his subject must go through Tillich, he cannot be bypassed or ignored.

John Hick points out one of Tillich's weaknesses on symbolism and at the same time one of the possible weaknesses of any 'system'. He rather scathingly describes Tillich's theory of symbols as

"although valuably suggestive, scarcely constituting at this

point a fully articulated philosophical position". (1)

His criticism is that Tillich does not clearly work out how technical, theological, propositions function as symbols. He claims that Tillich's theory is more suited to the arts than to theological ideas. I think Tillich would reply that theology does not create symbols but deals with them as its raw material. The symbols of the community are the stuff of theology, which attempts to understand and clarify them. Theology cannot go beyond symbolism but it must always strive to keep the communities' symbols true and relevant. Most theological propositions are not in themselves religious symbols but are rather about symbols, descriptive of them.

Hick's criticism shows the difficulty of the systematic method. Tillich's system is so large that it is possible to find fault with specific areas, as no mind can encompass all areas of the system with equal expertise. As Bertrand Russell wrote:

(1) Hick, J.H. Philosophy of Religion. p74

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"If... books covering a wide field are to be written at all,
it is inevitable... that those who write such books should
spend less time on any one part than can be spent by a man
who concentrates on a single [area]". (1)

This is by no means an excuse for Tillich, he neither requires nor
would want one, but it is true to say that he could never have
followed to a conclusion every question raised by his work.

Hick's criticism is, like many others, crude and sweeping and due in
large measure to a lack of concentrated study. I agree that there are
unresolved confusions in Tillich's theory of symbolism but to dismiss
it out of hand is patently nonsensical.

William Alston makes several criticisms of Tillich's theory and
concludes that Tillich's errors are ultimately fatal to his entire
enterprise. Alston claims that Tillich lumps the traditional
symbolizanda, i.e. a personal creator and all his attributes, in with
the traditional symbols for these symbolizanda, namely, sun, kings,
mountains etc. He argues that Tillich fails to note that,

"Whereas the objective existence of natural objects is taken
for granted when they are treated as symbols, we can, in
Tillich's program, treat a supernatural God and his doings,
e.g., the incarnation, as symbols without making any
assumption of objective existence". (2)

It is, to my mind, of no concern whatever, for Tillich, whether or not
a symbol has objective existence. Any symbol, whether objectively

(1) Russell, B. A History of Western Philosophy. p5

(2) Alston, W. 'Tillich's Conception of a Religious Symbol', from
Hook, S.(ed.) Religious Experience and Truth. p16

existent or not, is a matter of risk; and this risk is the same whether the symbol be an existent object or the incarnation; it is the risk of whether or not ultimacy is expressed or embodied.

Alston goes on to ask what it means to say that a religious symbol 'points to' being itself. The concept of participation he finds of no help because all things participate in being itself. He also remains unclear on this point when Tillich talks about a symbol manifesting or mediating being itself because this means no more to him than participation. This is surely Alston's own problem. Tillich, clearly, does not mean participation and mediation to be confused. Everything participates in being itself to the extent that it is held out of non-being, but only a _true_ symbol can mediate ultimacy. It is not the symbol itself but the communities' view of the symbol that makes it valid, dead or idolatrous.

William Rowe believes that the most plausible interpretation of the term "points to" is _signifies_. This relation of signification may be the result of either conscious decision which gains unconscious acceptance or else the result of unconscious processes. Rowe rejects Alston's criticism that for 'X' to function as a symbol of 'Y' for 'S' then 'S' must be able to specify 'Y' as that which is being symbolised.

> "The inability of religious men to specify being itself as
> that which their sacred objects signify or point to does
> not, I believe, imply that these religious objects do not
> function as symbols for being itself. It does, however,
> show rather conclusively that the relationship of
> signification in which these religious objects stand to

being itself is <u>not</u> the result of conscious decision". (1)
The implication of this is, obviously, that one cannot distinguish between ordinary and religious symbols by what they signify; hence Tillich's assertion that a true symbol is one to which ultimate concern is directed.

One criticism of Alston's that I find sympathy with is his claim that Tillich fails to distinguish clearly between symbols and symbolic language. This is perhaps what Hick was crudely pointing towards. Symbolic language cannot be identified with <u>a</u> symbol but Tillich does not fully discuss language. This does not, however, detract seriously from his theory of symbols or from his phenomenological description of religions as the growth and decay of symbols because the theory of symbols can stand alone, independant of a theory of religious language.

Alston's criticism's are not destructive of Tillich's entire system they are, once again, principally concerned with clarity. Alston wishes to be able to speak directly to God, albeit in an analogous fashion, and this is his basic disagreement with Tillich, he objects to symbolic language being made the only form of religious utterance. By far a better criticism of Tillich on this point comes from Hartshorne, and I find it rather interesting that one of the most perceptive and pertinent critics of Tillich's concepts of God and symbolism should be the process theologian.

On a number of occasions Hartshorne has touched on the differences between Tillich and himself over the way in which we can speak of God.

(1) Rowe, W.L. <u>R.S.G.</u> p135

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Hartshorne starts with Tillich's two proposals for defining God; namely, (a) literally all that can be said of God is that he is being itself, and (b) functionally or pragmatically God can be described as the object of ultimate concern; and claims that these are not only mutually consistent but are actually equivalent : one makes deity the universal object of possible interest, the other of possible thought. From this position Hartshorne claims that we can draw a number of literal truths about God.

> "If God is literally being (reality) itself, then he literally has all the categorical features of reality, reality as conditioned and as unconditioned, as actual and potential, as relative and as absolute, as concrete and as abstract". (1)

Using Tillich's two fold definition Hartshorne claims that any assertion whatever must in some way qualify God. If this were not the case then one could not obey the commandment to turn one's whole mind, heart and soul to God.

> "...for if I recognise the fact of John running, I have turned that much of my mind to John; yet I must not have turned even that much of my mind away from God. Hence John running must be an aspect of deity, no more and no less". (2)

Hartshorne continues by objecting that it makes no sense to speak of "John running" as qualifying God only symbolically. If the literal facts about our neighbours are also facts about God then what is the

(1) Hartshorne, C. Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method. p149 (hereafter referred to as C.S.P.M.)

(2) Hartshorne, C. 'Tillich and the Other Great Tradition', p246

point of denying that they are facts literally obtaining of God.

"We are to love our neighbour as he literally is, and yet to
love God with that very aspect of our minds or hearts; and I
conclude that the neighbour must in some appropriate and
quite literal sense be a constituent of the divine life.
Very literally we are 'in' God, and all our properties are
divine possessions". (1)

Hartshorne is concerned to show that God includes within himself both
sides of the polar concepts of reality. He sees Tillich's, and
others, denial of God as not literally cause, or as not existing, as
an uncritical acceptance of the tradition of negative theology.

"There is a long, powerful tradition that God is the
infinite, absolute, unconditioned, and the oversimple
assumption that the disjunctions infinite-finite, absolute-
relative, unconditioned-conditioned are simply exclusive". (2)

Hartshorne sees the 'negative' theology as having a suspect modesty,
God is barred from sustaining relations, accepting the definiteness
that comes through limits, responding to the creatures and thus being
influenced by them. God may only do these things 'symbolically',
whatever that may mean. For Hartshorne this is to make God wooden,
stupid or an empty abstraction and he will accept none of these.

"The modesty of the negative theology is highly suspect. It
puts an infinite human veto upon the wealth of the divine
life, cutting if off from all but the purely abstract". (3)

(1) <u>ibid.</u> p246

(2) <u>ibid.</u> p248

(3) Hartshorne, C. <u>C.S.P.M.</u> p153

Hartshorne himself distinguishes three _types_ of term for God:

1)   plainly symbolic terms like shepherd or ruler,

2)   plainly literal terms like relative or absolute,

3)   'problematic' terms like know or love.

He prefers the term analogical to symbolic for the third type.   They are problematic because if our idea of, for example, divine knowledge comes from analogical extension of our idea of human knowledge then these terms are purely symbolic.   If, on the other hand, we follow Hartshorne (and Brunner) in the assertion that this is not the whole truth but that our idea of human knowledge, in the first place, comes from our intuition (Descartes' "innate idea") of God then, in so far as we have religious intuition, these terms are literal.

Hartshorne sees the major stumbling blocks to a clearer understanding of these ideas as being 'Etiolatry' (worship of cause) and 'Ontolatry' (worship of being-in contrast to becoming) but Tillich himself has shown us the answer through his twofold definition of God.   All that is needed is for this to be "followed out without deviation or contrary assumption". (1)   Tillich's own treatment of the problem was warped by his veneration for the traditional systems causing him to underestimate the problems.

One fundamental difference between Tillich and Hartshorne is their approach to logic.   Tillich knowingly and blatantly, at times, flaunted logical argument, as Heywood Thomas recalls, for Tillich to call someone his logical critic was to dismiss the criticism:

   "take no notice of him, he is my logical critic". (2)

(1) _ibid._ p157

(2) Thomas, J.H. 'Tillich as a Philosopher of Religion', p368

Hartshorne, on the other hand, is passionately concerned to make his thinking clear and rational - as he wrote in the introduction to 'The Logic of Perfection' he vowed at the age of seventeen always to trust reason and to make his thinking as logically correct and accurate as he could. The difference is very important if we agree with Heywood Thomas' assessment that Tillich expressed a vision in a schematic and sketchy way and that a task for philosophy of religion is to clarify this vision. I believe that at several points process concepts can be used to add clarity to Tillichian ideas but the problem remains, would Tillich recognise his clarified vision or in the process of attempting to make it more understandable do we destroy it? The pros and cons of the process concept of analogy as against Tillich's concept of symbol will be more fully explored later. Suffice to say, at present, that Ford sees Tillich's theory of symbolism as a necessary consequence of his denial of being to God which Ford believes is Tillich's principal mistake:

"In many respects Tillich's writings may be regarded as one
long polemic against the view that God is a being. We feel
this is his fundamental error. It is an error which
jeopardizes the success of his undertaking both religiously
and philosophically". (1)

For Ford, as for all process thinkers, Aquinas' doctrine of analogy is to be seen as a better guide.

[Aquinas] "... offers an alternative account of God based
upon non-univocal prediction, incorporating the principle
that God is a being. This is the key to the superiority of
analogy. It cannot be found in the methodological details

(1) Ford, L.S. 'Tillich and Thomas : The Analogy of Being'. p243

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of the theory of analogy contrasted with the theory of the symbol, but must be sought in the general continuity or discontinuity of being". (1)

As shall be seen later the doctrine of creation is also a major area of disagreement between Tillich and process. However, it is not only process writers who have been critical of Tillich's formulation of this doctrine. Tillich claims that Creatio ex nihilo is a rejection of paganism, it is the doctrine which distinguishes Christian thought from any form of paganism. The term ex nihilo serves two purposes; firstly it acts as a rejection of dualism and secondly it:

> "...says something fundamentally important about the creature, namely, that it must take over what might be called 'the heritage of non-being'. Creatureliness implies non-being, but creatureliness is more than non-being. It carries in itself the power of being, and this power of being is its participation in being itself, in the creative ground of being". (2)

Tillich sees the doctrine as containing two basic truths; firstly that the tragic character of existence is not rooted in the creative ground and so does not belong to the essential nature of things; and secondly that there is an element of non-being implicit in creatureliness so that although the tragic is not necessary it is always potential.

Heywood Thomas criticises Tillich on two points. Firstly, he rightly points out that there are numerous instances of such a doctrine in Greek thought, especially post Aristotelian, and that the only

(1) ibid. p243

(2) Tillich, P. S.T. I p281

biblical reference to creatio ex nihilo is II Maccabees 7 v.28, which

is pre-christian. Hence Tillich's claim that this doctrine;

> "... is the mark of distinction between paganism, even in
>
> its most refined form, and christianity, even in its most
>
> primitive form". (1)

is clearly spurious. Secondly, Thomas criticises Tillich for making

non-being into a personal matter.

> "He makes the 'nothing' out of which we come into a
>
> something with fatal power. Hence, as I suggested, we are
>
> once more faced with Dualism". (2)

Thomas sees no benefit to be gained from Tillich's concept of non-

being.

> "The only meaning we can give to 'non-being' is the denial
>
> of the 'being' of something. Therefore to say that
>
> 'creatureliness implies non-being' either is a useless
>
> tautology or is meaningless". (3)

It is, for Thomas, an example of a fallacy which is present throughout

Tillich's writings.

> "The fallacy that the existence of a word implies the
>
> existence of a thing results in a great deal of confusion in
>
> Tillich's thought". (4)

This is a telling criticism of Tillich but it only partially explains

his insistence on the necessity of non-being. The primary reason for

(1) ibid. p281

(2) Thomas, J.H. Paul Tillich : An Appraisal. p73

(3) ibid. p72

(4) ibid. p73

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this is not a linguistic error but rather Tillich's conviction that he had experienced the threat of non-being; and that this could only be explained by the ontological existence of non-being as a possibility, and overcome by the existence of God as Being itself. While it is outside the scope of this study it is interesting to speculate to what extent Tillich's thought on this point was influenced by his background in Germany and his emigration to America.

CHAPTER TWO

The Concept of God in Whitehead and Hartshorne.

This chapter is concerned with an exposition of the process concept of God. Firstly, though, a definition of what is meant by process is required. For the purposes of this study I will agree with what Lewis Ford calls the "many", for whom "process theology primarily means the joint impact of Whitehead and Hartshorne"(1). However, a note of caution needs to be sounded. It must be asked how uniform their thought really is. Can we, as has often been done, call Hartshorne a Whiteheadian? William Lad Sessions claims, rightly, that if by Whiteheadian we mean a disciple of Whitehead not merely a holder of similar views then the answer must be no.

"Historically or biographically speaking .... Hartshorne is

not a 'Whiteheadian'". He "simply did not derive most (nor

perhaps the most basic) of his philosphical tenets from

Whitehead"(2).

As Sessions also points out, this conviction leads to the necessity of considering

"whether Hartshorne's doctrines mean the same as

Whitehead's, even when they are couched in similar (or even

identical) language"(3).

As a result of an examination of Hartshorne's unpublished doctoral thesis Sessions has concluded that virtually all Hartshorne's mature

(1)   Ford,   L.S.   (ed)   <u>Two Process Philosophers : Hartshorne's</u>
       <u>Encounter with Whitehead.</u> p1 (hereafter referred to as <u>T.P.P.</u>)

(2)   Sessions, W.L. from Ford, L.S. (ed) <u>T.P.P.</u> p10

(3)   <u>ibid.</u> p10

philosophy was developed prior to his contact with Whitehead. The chief exception being his doctrine of God which did later come to be couched in Whiteheadian terms.

Even here though it is arguable whether Whitehead's influence was not one of clarification rather than alteration. Whichever be the case I believe it is safe to assume that the two men do in fact mean the same things apart from the areas of (quite distinct) disagreement. I shall therefore, investigate primarily Whitehead's description of the concept of God and look later at Hartshorne's areas of disagreement with this.

As far as Whitehead is concerned there is but one religious dogma in debate: "What do you mean by 'God'?", for him "that is the fundamental religious dogma and all other dogma's are subsidiary to it" (1). Whitehead approaches the concept of God from a philosophical rather than a theological angle. He begins with his metaphysical system and introduces God, not as an after-thought, but because he is required within the system as the principle of 'limitation' or 'concretion'. This immediately introduces one of the strengths of the process system as against classical theism. God is a necessary and integral part of the system, as Whitehead writes,

> "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification" (2).

(1) Whitehead, A.N. <u>Religion in the Making</u>. p56 (hereafter referred to as <u>R.M.</u>)

(2) Whitehead, A.N. <u>Process and Reality</u>. p486 (page nos. refer to C.U.P edition 1929) (hereafter referred to as <u>P.R.</u>)

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Whitehead's thought, quite naturally, develops through his writings. The first real exposition of his concept of God comes in 'Science and the Modern World' (hereafter referred to as S.M.W.) published in 1926 and based primarily on his Lowell lectures of 1925. Whitehead here agrees with Spinoza that there is one ultimate reality actualising itself in all the entities we can know or think. In this sense there is substance. Whitehead disagrees with Spinoza, however, as to the nature of this substance. For him it is not a static entity undergoing change but is the 'ongoingness of things'. Thus Whitehead calls this ultimate, "substantial activity" and affirms it as the ultimate reality at the base of things.

This substantial activity is totally formless yet can only occur as a definite entity which can be either an actual entity or an eternal object. Thus these forms are called attributes of substantial activity. Whitehead introduces, as a third attribute of substantial activity, the principle of limitation. This metaphysical principle he uses to answer the problem of determination in the world. For example, both substantial activity and the realm of pure possibility are neutral with respect to what kind of actual entities shall occur, and therefore, without some kind of principle of determination, concretion, or limitation there would be no explanation of consistency in the world:

> "...We must provide a ground for limitation which stands among the attributes of the substantial activity. This attribute provides the limitation for which no reason can be given: for all reason flows from it. God is the ultimate limitation, and His existence is the ultimate irrationality. For no reason can be given for just that limitation which it stands in His nature to impose. God is not concrete, but he

is the ground for concrete actuality. No reason can be given for the nature of God, because that nature is the ground of rationality." (1)

By identifying God with the principle of limitation it can be seen that Whitehead is breaking with traditional theism. Christian tradition demands that God be identified with the ultimate, i.e. with substantial activity and not with one of its attributes. Whitehead's reason for denying the metaphysical ultimacy of God is that he is convinced that the object of religious concern is more correctly characterised by goodness rather than ultimacy. Whitehead insists that if God be identified as the metaphysical ultimate then:

"...there can be no alternative except to discern in Him the origin of all evil as well as of all good. He is then the supreme author of the play, and to Him must therefore be ascribed its shortcomings as well as its success. If He be conceived as the supreme ground for limitation, it stands in his very nature to divide the Good from the Evil, and to establish Reason 'within her dominions supreme'". (2)

In 'Religion in the Making' (hereafter referred to as R.M.), the text of Whitehead's 1926 Lowell lectures, he describes how the principle of limitation works.

"The order of the world is no accident. There is nothing actual which could be actual without some measure of order.

(1) Whitehead, A.N. Science and the Modern World. p256-257 (page nos. refer to C.U.P edition 1926) (hereafter referred to as S.M.W.)

(2) ibid p258

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> The religious insight is the grasp of this truth: that the
> order of the world, the depth of reality of the world, the
> value of the world in its whole and in its parts, the beauty
> of the world, the zest of life, the peace of life and the
> mastery of evil are all bound together - not accidentally,
> but by reason of this truth: that the universe exhibits a
> creativity with infinite freedom, and a realm of forms with
> infinite possibilities; but that this creativity and these
> forms are together impotent to achieve actuality apart from
> the completed ideal harmony which is God."(1)

Thus God functions as the principle of limitation by ordering the
infinite possibilities of the eternal objects according to principles
of value which stem from his nature as the completed ideal harmony.

Cobb has pointed out a distinct and important change in Whitehead's
concept of God between the publication of S.M.W. and R.M. In the
former Whitehead regarded God as non-concrete or non-actual, but in
the latter God is described as an actual entity. The reason for this
seems to be that in order to function in any way as a limiting factor
to ensure order and value God has to be an actual entity as, according
to the ontological principle, only an actual entity can act. Having
described God as an actual entity it is to be noted that He is a very
special case.

> "God is that non-temporal actuality which has to be taken
> account of in every creative phase." (2)

This non-temporal actuality is needed because:

(1) Whitehead, A.N. R.M. p105-106

(2) ibid. p81

"...the boundless wealth of possibility in the realm of abstract form would leave each creative phase still indeterminate,... the definite determination which imposes ordered balance on the world requires an actual entity imposing its own unchanging consistency of character on every phase". (1)

God, to be non-temporal, must be free from internal inconsistency, hence, he must include within himself a synthesis of the total universe.

"There is, therefore, in God's nature the aspect of the realm of forms as qualified by the world, and the aspect of the world as qualified by the realm of forms. His completion, so that he is exempt from transition into something else, must mean that his nature remains self consistent in relation to all change." (2)

This would seem to imply that God is affected by the world, and Whitehead goes on to stress this point.

"His purpose in the world is quality of attainment. His purpose is always embodied in the particular ideals relevant to the actual state of the world. Thus all attainment is immortal in that it fashions the actual ideals which are God in the world as it is now. Every act leaves the world with a deeper or fainter impression of God. He then passes into his next relation to the world with enlarged or diminished presentation of ideal values." (3)

(1) ibid. p81-82

(2) ibid. p85-86

(3) ibid. p143

Cobb provides an accurate and succinct summary of the principle differences between S.M.W. and R.M. as follows:

"In S.M.W. we encountered four metaphysical principles: the underlying substantial activity and its three attributes — eternal objects, actual entities, and the principle of limitation. In R.M. subtle but important changes have occurred in the understanding of these four elements in the philosophic system. First, the underlying substantial activity is now called creativity (and plays a minor role). Whereas substantial activity was that of which all the other three were attributes, creativity is accorded no such favoured place. Complete interdependance of the four principles is stressed rather than the primacy of any one. Second, since God is now conceived as an actual entity, we might consider the four metaphysical principles as reduced to three: creativity, eternal objects, and actual entities including God as a special case. If we do so, however, we have to remember that there is a major philosophical difference between God and the temporal actual activities." (1)

This is essentially Whitehead's final position. God is an actual entity who orders and limits the realm of pure possibility so that each new entity can occur. The world in its turn, as we have seen, acts on God, affecting the way in which he in future will react with the world. Whitehead's greatest exposition of his concept of God, which is to be found in his 1927-28 Gifford lectures published as

(1) Cobb, J.B. A Christian Natural Theology. p149 (hereafter referred to as C.N.T.)

'Process and Reality' in 1929 (hereafter referred to as P.R.), adds nothing substantially new to this position but serves to expand and clarify.

In view of P.R. we can explore more fully the way in which God functions as the principle of limitation and the way in which this principle functions in the actual world.

Each actual occasion has a subjective aim at a determinate satisfaction. However, each occasion is necessarily limited in its choice of aim; otherwise order would not exist or would be due to sheer chance. The limits on the self determination of an actual occasion are set in the initial phase of the subjective aim. This is normally referred to, by Whitehead, as the initial aim. This initial aim is provided by the principle of limitation and determines what locus or standpoint will be occupied by each occasion and, therefore, which other occasions will be adjacent to it in the space-time continuum, and so prehended by it. The initial aim also determines the satisfaction initially aimed at and, therefore, influences the satisfaction eventually actualised. It cannot, however, determine this final satisfaction. The initial aim implies that each actual occasion is confronted by a range of related and relevant possibilities, which are determined by limits required for the maintenance of minimal order. One of the possibilities is, of course, ideal and it is this at which the initial aim is directed. However, the actual occasion is able to choose any possibility and the amount of self-determination it has is such that if it chooses to reject the ideal possibilities in favour of those of lesser value then higher levels of order are subject to destruction. In this way Whitehead accounts for the historical oscillation between order and decay and

shows how the cosmos is sensitively balanced between freedom and determination. Man is neither totally determined nor totally free, but his freedom is real, it is not illusory or fake. Man has the power to enhance or diminish the value of the cosmos.

It is time to examine more closely Whitehead's concept of 'eternal objects' especially as this is one of the major areas of disagreement between himself and Hartshorne. In P.R. Whitehead defines an eternal object as:

> "...any entity whose conceptual recognition does not involve
> a necessary reference to any definite actual entities of the
> temporal world." (1)

The eternal objects are very similar to Platonic 'forms', the principal difference being that Whitehead does not assign ontological status to them. For him ontological status belongs only to actual entities. However, because of the ontological principle which allows action only to actual entities there is the problem of how the merely potential eternal objects can have any effect in the world. They must in some way participate in actuality and yet their effectiveness cannot be dependant upon their prior actualisation, otherwise there could be no novelty. Whitehead's answer is that they participate in God's actuality. They are 'real' because they are envisaged by God. Here we have yet another reason for the necessity of God, without him there could be no eternal objects and no novelty. Thus God is both the "principle of limitation and the organ of novelty". (2)

Whitehead goes on to classify eternal objects according to their

(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p60
(2) Cobb, J.B. C.N.T. p161

primary modes of ingression into actual entities. He outlines three possible modes of ingression but only in two of these is the eternal objects' functioning unrestrictedly realised. These ways of functioning are:

"(i) it can be an element in the definiteness of some objectified nexus, or of some single actual entity which is the datum of a feeling; (ii) it can be an element in the definiteness of the subjective form of some feeling; or (iii) it can be an element in the datum of a conceptual, or propositional, feeling". (1)

In the third mode the function of the eternal object is not immediately realised. It is merely the conceptual valuation of the potential ingression in one of the other modes. When Whitehead examines the question of whether or not all eternal objects are capable of ingression in either mode he concludes that in fact they are not and he thus classifies eternal objects into two species, the 'objective' and the 'subjective'.

"An eternal object of the objective species can only obtain ingression in the first mode, and never in the second mode. It is always, in its unrestricted realisation, an element in the definiteness of an actual entity, or a nexus, which is the datum of a feeling belonging to the subject in question... Its sole avocation is to be an agent in objectification. It can never be an element in the definiteness of a subjective form. The solidarity of the world rests upon the incurable objectivity of this species

(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p412

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of eternal objects." (1)

Whitehead goes on to describe this species of eternal objects as the mathematical Platonic forms. They concern the world as a medium.

The subjective species of eternal objects, on the other hand, are primarily elements in the definiteness of the subjective form of a feeling. A subjective eternal object:

"...is a determinate way in which a feeling can feel. It is an emotion, or an intensity, or an adversion or an aversion, or a pleasure, or a pain. It defines the subjective form of feeling of one actual entity. A* may be that component of A's constitution through which A is objectified for B. Thus when B feels A*, it feels 'A with that feeling'. In this way, the eternal object which contributes to the definiteness of, A's feeling becomes an eternal object contributing to the definiteness of A as an objective datum in B's prehension of A." (2)

Therefore eternal objects of the subjective species can function in two ways. They can function subjectively and relatively and therefore are open to ingression through either of the two primary modes.

One final area of Whitehead's thought, regarding eternal objects, which requires attention is his definition of God's ordering of them as primordial and eternally unchanging. Infact, for Whitehead, God's primordial nature is constituted by this eternal envisagement of possibility. Later process writers have interpreted this in several

(1) ibid. p412

(2) ibid. p413

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ways. John Cobb in his 'A Christian Natural Theology' claims that the eternal ordering is not to be seen as a single order but as an indefinite variety of orders which foresaw and evaluated every possible state of the actual world. Thus God does not reorder the eternal objects for each novel occasion but the eternal objects are ordered from eternity for each possible novel occasion, and this ordering provides the initial aim which limits, but does not determine, the actual occasion. As Cobb writes:

"God's ordering of possibilities is such that every possible state of the actual world is already envisioned as possible...Thus one primordial ordering of eternal objects is relevant to every actuality with perfect specificity." (1)

Lewis Ford, on the other hand, sees this as an incorrect interpretation. For him the complete envisagement of all eternal objects was non-temporal or atemporal and never actually occurs in time.

"I think it would be more accurate to say that God _never_ (at no time) prehends all the eternal objects. There is no one particular time or other when he prehends all of them." (2)

Ford criticises Cobb's position for presenting a fully programmed future where one merely follows through a "crystalline structure of branching alternative possibilities". His own position can, however, maintain the temporal emergence of possibility in terms of propositions.

(1) Cobb, J.B. C.N.T. p151-156
(2) Ford, L.S. (ed) T.P.P. p59

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"In fact, all of God's conceptual entertainment of eternal objects with respect to time requires propositional feeling. The integration of his pure conceptual feelings of the eternal objects with indicative feelings derived from his consequent nature is the way in which portions of the primordial nature become temporally emergent. Since that nature is infinite and inexhaustible, at no time has it (or will it) become fully emergent in time. Whatever God physically prehends of the actual world, he experiences ever afterwards, but he conceptually prehends (in temporal propositional feeling) only those eternal objects relevant to his physical experience." (1)

Hartshorne interprets Whitehead in a similar way to Cobb but he shares Ford's dislike of such a position and so rejects the concept of eternal objects all together. I will return to this later, it is sufficient to point out at present that Hartshorne could never agree with Ford's interpretation because of his principle of temporal restriction which implies that if God's primordial nature exists then it must exist in time. Ford argues, and I think with some veracity, that:

"If all real possibility is dependant on past actuality, then it is temporally emergent, even for God. If there are also pure possibilities, they are grounded in what is purely non-temporal, and there is no need to assume (apart from the Hartshornean principle of temporal restriction) that these must be entertained by God at some time or other." (2)

(1) ibid. p61

(2) ibid. p62

This rejection by Hartshorne of eternal objects together with other implications of his more thorough going temporalism will be fully examined later. At this point I will return to Whitehead and examine a vital part of his concept of God so far only briefly mentioned. This is what Whitehead calls the consequent nature of God, in other words the effect that the world has upon God. As Whitehead writes that "analogous to all actual entities, the nature of God is di-polar" (1), it is firstly necessary to summarise the dipolar nature of actual entities.

An actual entity in the temporal world has two poles, a physical and a mental pole:

> "The actual entity on its physical side is composed of its
> determinate feelings of its actual world, and on its mental
> side is originated by its conceptual appetitions." (2)

Whitehead also refers to the mental pole as conceptual or consequent. Conceptual experience can, he says, be infinite but physical experience by its very nature is finite.

> "An actual entity in the temporal world is to be conceived
> as originated by physical experience with its process of
> completion motivated by consequent, conceptual experience
> initially derived from God." (3)

This dipolar nature of actual entities is also expressed in Whitehead's ninth Categoreal Obligation, the category of freedom and determination, which states that:

(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p488

(2) ibid. p62

(3) ibid. p489

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"The concrescence of each individual actual entity is
internally determined and is externally free." (1)

"Thus the process of becoming is dipolar, (i) by reason of
its qualification by the determinateness of the actual
world, and (ii) by its conceptual prehensions of the
indeterminateness of eternal objects. The process is
constituted by the influx of eternal objects into a novel
determinateness of feeling which absorbs the actual world
into a novel actuality". (2)

In what way is God's dipolarity analogous to an actual entities?
Whitehead refers to God as having a primordial and a consequent nature
where the primordial nature corresponds to the conceptual, mental,
pole of an actual occasion and the consequent nature corresponds to
the physical pole. Unlike all other actual entities God's nature is
firstly conceptual and is completed by the addition of physical
feelings.

"The completeness of God's nature into a fullness of
physical feeling is derived from the objectification of the
world in God. He shares with every new creation its actual
world; and the concrescent creature is objectified in God as
a novel element in God's objectification of that actual
world." (3)

Thus Whitehead can sum up the two sides of God's nature as follows:
On one hand his infinite, primordial nature is -

(1) ibid. p37

(2) ibid. p62

(3) ibid. p488

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"...free, completely primordial, eternal, actually deficient and unconscious."

On the other hand, his consequent nature -

"...originates with physical experience derived from the temporal world, and then acquires integration with the primordial side. It is determined, incomplete, consequent, 'everlasting', fully actual, and conscious." (1)

It is through God's consequent nature that he has a relationship with the world. God is tender, wise, and patient. He prehends every actuality for what it can be in a perfected system. He is the judgement of the world, through tenderness saving all that can be saved and through wisdom using what, for the temporal world, is only rubbish. God's infinite patience causes him to continue preserving the world as it passes away.

"The revolts of destructive evil, purely self regarding are dismissed into their triviality of merely individual facts; and yet the good they did achieve in individual joy, individual sorrow, in the introduction of needed contrast, is yet saved by its relation to the completed whole. (2)

God's role:

"...lies in the patient operation of the overpowering rationality of his conceptual harmonisation. He does not create the world, he saves it; or, more accurately, he is the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty and goodness." (3)

(1) ibid. p489

(2) ibid. p489

(3) ibid. p490

Obviously Whitehead is going against the traditional concepts of God but he maintains that he is being true to basic religious intuition. His system is only relevant if it can do justice to both science and religion, if it is a harmonious system in which all parts are necessary and nothing is added for reasons of pure faith. Whitehead claims that the classical concept of a static God and a fluent universe is a misrepresentation of religious insight, which is of permanence in fluency and fluency in permanence. For Whitehead the problem is that of:

"...actuality with permanence, requiring fluency as its completion; and actuality with fluency, requiring permanence as its completion." (1)

Although Whitehead sees God and the world as analogous and although he describes God not as an exception to metaphysical principles but as their chief exemplification he also sees God and the world as being contrasting opposites. God is not the world and the world is not God. However these opposed elements stand to each other in mutual requirement. God does not, in fact, have ontological superiority over the world.

"Neither God nor the world reaches static completion. Both are in the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty. Either of them, God and the world, is the instrument of novelty for the other." (2)

God and the world always move conversely to each other. God is primordially one and aquires a consequent multiplicity, which the

(1) ibid. p491

(2) ibid. p493-494

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primordial character absorbs back into its own unity. The world is primordially many and in the process it aquires a unity, which is a novel occasion, which it absorbs back into its primordial multiplicity. So Whitehead can write that:

"...the theme of cosmology, which is the basis of all religions, is the story of the dynamic effort of the world passing into everlasting unity, and of the static majesty of God's vision, accomplishing its purpose of completion by absorption of the world's multiplicity of effort." (1)

God is the great preserver. As each actuality attains satisfaction, and so passes into novelty, it is preserved in God; not as temporal actuality but as a living, ever present, fact. It is transformed and perfected by God into a fulfilment of his primordial vision. In this way God is completed by individual satisfactions of actual occasions, and the temporal occasions are completed by their everlasting unity with their transformed selves. This is the way in which God uses all that can be used and saves all that can be saved from each temporal occasion.

This is the consequent nature of God which is demanded by the principle of universal relativity (if the world is relative to God then God must be relative to the world). But this principle also implies that the world will, in turn, be affected by God's consequent nature. As Whitehead puts it:

"This nature itself [God's consequent nature] passes into the temporal world according to its gradation of relevance to the various concrescent occasions. There are thus four

(1) ibid. p494

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creative phases in which the universe accomplishes its actuality. There is first the phase of conceptual origination, deficient in actuality, but infinite in its adjustment of valuation. Secondly, there is the temporal phase of physical origination with its multiplicity of actualities. In this phase full actuality is attained; but there is deficiency in the solidarity of individuals with each other... Thirdly, there is the phase of perfected actuality, in which the many are one everlastingly, without the qualification of any loss either of individual identity or of completeness of unity. In everlastingness, immediacy is reconciled with objective immortality... In the fourth phase, the creative action completes itself. For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience." (1) Whitehead moves from philosophical to theological language when he calls the action of this fourth phase the outpouring of the love of God.

"It is the particular providence for particular occasions. What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world....The love in the world passes into the love in heaven and floods back again into the world. In this sense,

(1) ibid. p496-497

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God is the great companion - the fellow sufferer who
understands." (1)
And in this way it can be said that the kingdom of heaven is with us
today, it is here and now.

Another Whiteheadian concept requiring some clarification is that of
objective immortality. For Whitehead an actual entity is only a
feeling subject whilst it is in a process of becoming (this contrasts
with Hartshorne as shall be seen later), once it has achieved
satisfaction it loses subjectivity and becomes a being, a pure object.
An actual entity is both a subject and a superject. As a subject it
presides over its own immediacy of becoming, and as a superject it is
the atomic creature which can exercise its function of objective
immortality. As a 'being' it belongs to its very nature to be a
potential for future 'becoming'. Whitehead uses Locke's definition of
time as a 'perpetual perishing'.

> "In the philosophy of organism it is not 'substance' which
> is permanent, but 'form'. Forms suffer changing relations;
> actual entities 'perpetually perish' subjectively, but are
> immortal objectively. Actuality in perishing acquires
> objectivity, while it loses subjective immediacy." (2)

Immortality rests only in God, only God can overcome the ultimate evil
which lies in the very fact that the past fades and perpetually
perishes. Each actual entity is transformed in God into a living,
ever present fact.

> "In this way the insistent craving is justified - the

(1) ibid. p497

(2) ibid. p40

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insistent craving that zest for existence be refreshed by

the ever present, unfading importance of our immediate

actions, which perish and yet live forevermore." (1)

Of course only God enjoys the unfading importance of our immediate

actions, only God enjoys the ever present value of past actualities.

For us it must be sufficient that we contribute to the divine and

through him we contribute to the world.

As something of an aside at this point I think it important to mention

that while Whitehead explains the action of God in terms of a

principle of determination, and although God is seen as a constituent

element in a wider metaphysical system, his mystery is not destroyed.

He can never be fully explained, for as I have quoted previously:

"...his existence is the ultimate irrationality... No reason

can be given for the nature of God because that nature is

the ground of rationality... There is a metaphysical need

for a principle of determination, but there can be no

metaphysical reason for what is determined." (2)

This makes a fascinating parallel with Tillich which will be fully

explored later. Tillich would also see God as the ground of reason.

Perhaps the difference is that for Whitehead God cannot be explained

but he can to a large extent be analogously describe by metaphysics.

while for Tillich God cannot be explained nor can he be described,

except symbolically.

Apart from the major differences between Hartshorne and Whitehead,

outlined below, the above exposition will be taken as the description

(1) ibid. p497

(2) Whitehead, A.N. S.M.W. p257

of the process concept of God for the purpose of comparison with Tillich. As this latter comparison is the principle concern of this study I will take for granted Hartshorne's areas of agreement with Whitehead and examine only the areas of difference.

The two areas of disagreement which are vital for our purposes concern (a) the dipolar nature of God, and (b) the concept of eternal objects. Both men conceive of God as being dipolar, in other words they both wish to ascribe the two sides of the categoreal contrasts to him. The difference in their thought arises from the way this dipolarity is conceived. Whitehead believes that God is a 'primordial actual entity' who, analogously to all actual entities, has a primordial nature and a consequent nature which correspond to the mental pole and physical pole of an actual occasion. Hartshorne criticises this view as making God:

> "...precisely that sheer exception to categoreal principles
> which Whitehead says must be avoided." (1)

Hartshorne proposes a definition of God as a 'personally ordered society' of actual occasions.

> "Thus there is no one entity called God qua consequent, but
> an endless accumulation of consequent states of deity, each
> of which sums up all its predecessors." (2)

This difference is due in large measure to Hartshorne's more through going temporalism. Ford is correct when he points to a distinction between two modes of unification, which he calls, 'conceptual unification' and 'perspectival elimination'.

(1) Hartshorne, C. In answer to a question on process, from Rome, S.
    and Rome, B. (Eds.) Philosophical Interrogations p324
(2) ibid. p323

"In physical, spatiotemporal unification, where the physical pole is prior, incompatible aspects of the many occasions of the past actual world are perspectivally eliminated to conform to the specific standpoint of the concrescing occasion. In conceptual unification on the other hand, such incompatibilities are not eliminated, since everything is positively prehended within an all inclusive unity, and they are absorbed into a wider harmony of meaning... Such conceptual unification is non-temporal, not restricted to any one place or time by perspectival elimination." (1)

This non-temporal, conceptual unification is in fact, for Whitehead, God's primordial nature, his primordial envisagement of all pure possibility. For Hartshorne though this cannot be. All actuality must be temporal, therefore, conceptual unification cannot occur and to treat God as a single actual entity is impossible. He must be treated as a personally ordered society.

This position is, however, incompatible with relativity physics which denies any idea of a cosmic 'now', because the idea of a single strand of divine occasions implies a 'now' with a settled past and an open future. In view of this difficulty Hartshorne suggested a possible revision to his view, although it appears that his preference remained for the original position. His revision is to see God as a:

"society of societies, a multiplicity of persons - somewhat analogous to classical trinitarian views." (2)

(1) Ford, L.S. (ed) T.P.P. p66

(2) Hartshorne, C. 'Whitehead in French Perspective : A review article'. The Thomist 33/3, July 1969. p578 - Quoted from Ford, L.S. (ed) T.P.P. p36

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Griffin has pointed out that this is very similar to Ford's idea of God as a single actual entity, an 'everlasting concrescence'. Ford agrees but notes that it still sees:

"...the mode of divine unification as spatiotemporal rather than non-temporal." (1)

And as such it is a departure from Whitehead.

What then are the implications of the fact that Whitehead and Hartshorne construe God differently? In Whitehead the description of God as an actual entity allows him to make the claim that God is both analogous to the world (he is the chief exemplification of the metaphysical principles) and yet distinct from the world. In P.R. he writes:

"...an actual entity has a threefold character: (i) it has the character 'given' for it by the past; (ii) it has the subjective character aimed at in the process of concrescence; (iii) it has the superjective character, which is the pragmatic value of its specific satisfaction qualifying the transcendent creativity."

Hence the physical pole, of the prehension of past occasions, takes precedence. In the case of God, however:

"...there is no past. Thus the ideal realisation of conceptual feeling takes the precedence. God differs from other actual entities in the fact that Hume's principle, of the derivative character of conceptual feelings, does not hold for him." (2)

(1) Ford, L.S. (ed) T.P.P. p66

(2) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p121

For Hartshorne, however, the question of distinction between God and the world is perhaps a little more difficult and it involves our second major difference between the two men, namely Hartshorne's denial of eternal objects. For both men it can be said that what distinguishes God from the world is his primordial or, to use Hartshorne's term, absolute pole. For Whitehead God is distinguished from the world by both the content of the primordial nature (eternal objects or pure possibility) and the relationship of the primordial nature to the consequent nature. For Hartshorne on the other hand, God is a series of actual occasions and so cannot be dipolar in Whitehead's sense. Nor can his abstract pole be equated with the envisagement of eternal objects because Hartshorne denies any such concept. Therefore we must examine what, for Hartshorne, constitutes God's abstract pole inorder to discover what distinguishes God from the world.

As we have seen, God's dipolarity, for Hartshorne, cannot be conceived of as analogous to dipolarity in an actual entity but rather:

"...as analogous to the distinction between a man's enduring character, on the one hand, and the concrete states of his existence which instantiate this abstract character, on the other." (1)

Ralph James calls this example of human character a model, which Hartshorne analogically raises to its highest power.

"The basic difference [writes Hartshorne] between man and God can be seen in this, that whereas the character individual to a man cannot be stated in merely abstract terms... God's character on the contrary, can be described

(1) Griffin, D.R. from Ford, L.S. (ed) T.P.P. p36

in utterly abstract terms which yet are unique to him as the one divine individual. Only one individual can ever be omniscient, primordial - and - everlasting, all loving, supreme cause of all effects, supreme effect of all causes. Only one individual can ever be divine." (1)

According to James it is in Anselm that Hartshorne finds the key to God's abstract aspect; namely, the pure necessity of God's abstract identity. Hartshorne writes.

"The divine necessity is *that* such abstract traits or 'perfections' as 'knowing all there is to know' must be realised in some concrete form, with respect to some concrete world of knowable things, but not necessarily in the form or with respect to the world which actually obtains." (2)

Such necessity is:

"...abstract or impoverished to the uttermost, and only therefore does it conflict with nothing, being the mere point of agreement of all possible truths or realities." (3)

It is perhaps now possible to see why Hartshorne refers to God's two aspects as abstract and concrete, rather than primordial and consequent.

(1) Hartshorne, C. The Divine Relativity. p80 (hereafter referred to as D.R.)

(2) Hartshorne, C. Anselm's Discovery. p47 quoted from James, R.E. The Concrete God. p114

(3) Hartshorne, C. Anselm's Basic Writings. Introduction; Quoted from James, R.E. The Concrete God. p114

James sees Hartshorne's position as following logically from his method, which is rigidly followed and which James symbolises as C)A where:

C= the concrete

)= is greater than and includes

A= the abstract

> "C)A means that the inclusive concrete contains the abstract; is ontologically prior to the abstract; precedes the abstract temporally; and that the changing concrete is superior to abstractions which do not change." (1)

This is an excellent description of Hartshorne's method but it introduces a great question mark about the religious suitability of his concept of God. Obviously finitude is the concrete pole of the finite - infinite contrast and infinity is the abstraction. But, following Hartshorne's method, the finite aspect of God includes, and is greater than the infinite. In all aspects taken together, therefore, God is finite. Lewis Ford makes the same point.

> "Hartshorne's God, defined basically in terms of his consequent states, is at all times finite, even though this finitude is ever expanding and always includes all the actuality that is or ever was. Whitehead's God, defined basically in terms of his non-temporal actuality, is infinite. Spinoza was correct in arguing that an infinite God could only create an infinite world but wrong in identifying this world with the world of actuality rather than the world of possibility." (2)

(1) James, R.E. The Concrete God. p58

(2) Ford, L.S. T.P.P. p79

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Thus Whitehead's God is here perhaps superior to Hartshorne's because he is more worthy of worship, being essentially the infinite wealth of possibility aquiring finitude from the world. While the world is essentially finite, acquiring a measure of infinity from God. Obviously Hartshorne does not accept such criticism. For him classical theism has become somewhat side tracked into the worship of infinity. For him the God of religion is not, or should not necessarily be, abstract, immutable, and infinite. He attacks the "false modesty" of the 'negative theology' which claims that human concepts such as relative, definite, or finite, cannot properly apply to God.

> "I think, however, that the modesty is only apparent. We
> dare to forbid God to sustain relations, to accept the
> definiteness that comes through limits , to respond to the
> creatures and thus be influenced by them. He may, we
> concede, do these things 'symbolically', whatever that may
> mean, but we tell him in no uncertain terms that he must not
> literally do them! Is this modesty - or is it monstrous
> presumption? Have we this veto power upon divinity?" (1)

He admits that for some his theological standpoint will appear to neglect the infinite gulf between God and his creatures but defends himself by claiming that,

> "...between the finite - infinite individual and the merely
> finite individuals there is a gap in natures which is
> literally infinite... God both infinitely precedes and
> infinitely outlasts every other individual, so that all are

(1) Hartshorne, C. 'Tillich and the other Great Tradition' Anglican
    Theological Review. 43, 1961, p250

influenced by, and also influence, his actuality... The real
trouble is less in the exaggeration of literalness than in
the idolatry of infinity, being, cause, and absoluteness,
accepted as substitutes for the divine unity of the
contraries, finite - infinite, being - creativity, cause -
effect, absolute - relational, being as such and a being.
God is, in diverse aspects of his reality, on both sides of
these polarities." (1)

Thus Hartshorne will never admit that his God is unsuitable for
religious purposes. Although it is hard to see how his God avoids
being primarily finite the question seems unimportant. What is
stressed is the fact that God encompasses both sides of the categoreal
contrasts and must never be limited to just one.

The difference in Whitehead and Hartshorne's conceptualisation of God
at this point shows that the concept of dipolarity is used to resolve
different problems in their respective systems.

"Whitehead's God already enjoyed the entire wealth of
conceptual possibility, but he was only very thinly
personal... The problem was to render him more personal,
more involved in the world, and this was effected by adding
physical feelings to his conceptual feelings and integrating
the two. Hartshorne's God was already personal and all
inclusive. Dipolarity permitted a clear distinction between
the universal and the concrete, such that the divine essence
could be seen as included within (prehended by) God's
concrete states." (2)

(1) ibid. p259

(2) Ford, L.S. T.P.P. p8

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Another related point at which the two thinkers diverge is that of the nature of divine activity. Colin Gunton criticises Hartshorne's conception of God in the following passage.

"What is the polar opposite of God's supreme passivity? On the analogy of immutability being the abstract pole of the divine mutability, the natural term would be impassability. ... But the polar opposite that is most frequently used is activity." (1)

Gunton goes on to claim that Hartshorne is uneasy and inconsistent, and reverses the logic of his own position when he writes:

"Contemporary theology ascribes to God, with full deliberateness, supreme sensitivity, that is passivity, not as contradictory of supreme activity, but as a necessary aspect of it." (2)

According to Gunton's argument:

"...this will not do. According to the logic of the position, it is passivity that is concrete and therefore ontologically prior, and activity that is an (abstract) aspect of it... This can only mean that the activity of God is abstract. The notion of abstract activity is a difficult one." (3)

The outcome of all this, claims Gunton, is that Hartshorne's God is no

(1) Gunton, C.E. <u>Becoming and Being : The Doctrine of God in Charles Hartshorne and Karl Barth.</u> p40

(2) Hartshorne, C. <u>Man's Vision of God.</u> p273 (hereafter referred to as <u>M.V.G.</u>)

(3) Gunton, C.E. <u>Becoming and Being.</u> p40

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better that the unmoved mover of classical theism. What Hartshorne arrives at is the moved unmover.

Gunton is not alone in his basic criticism, i.e. how are we to understand divine activity in Hartshorne's theology?, but I find his formulation rather unsatisfactory. As far as I understand it, the dipolar concept of God is a way of positing both absolute and relative aspects of God. It is a way of ascribing both sides of the categoreal contrasts to the one entity, where these contrasts are otherwise mutually exclusive, e.g. necessary - contingent, abstract - concrete, infinite - finite, eternal - temporal. In other words the dipolar concept allows us to assert contradictory statements of the one God in two distinct respects. Now, the contrast which Gunton introduces, namely, passivity - activity .is not a mutually exclusive contrast. One can be active and passive in the same respect at different times but one cannot be finite and infinite in the same respect at different times. The contrast of activity - passivity is a relative one. A person reading P.R. may be said to be physically passive but he is certainly not mentally passive (at least not if he is reading properly). A person watching a football match on Saturday afternoon may be said to be a passive spectator, but he is active in comparison to the man who is asleep. Taken to the extreme it can be claimed that there is no passivity in a concrete occasion because one is only truly passive in death. Therefore Gunton is wrong to claim that passivity must be concrete and activity abstract. There is no illogicality in saying that God is both active and passive in the same respect (after all human beings are both - concretely).

This does not resolve Hartshorne's difficulties over divine activity. Lewis Ford criticises him by stating the problem thus:

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"...it is difficult to understand the religious significance of divine action on Hartshorne's view. God inspires our activities primarily by being the cosmic, all inclusive recipient of all our actions, preserving and enjoying them for evermore... The imposition of the laws of nature, [a fact which Hartshorne attributes to God] however, seems deficient in religious inspiration, even if it is God's primary mode of acting. While we may be comforted and reassured that God thereby protects us from chaos, this is primarily a matter for physics rather than for ethics and religion... There is no way to respond to a law of nature, particularly if imposed by God; it must simply be obeyed, willy nilly, for we have no choice in the matter." (1)

Hartshorne would obviously deny such criticisms and, I feel, rightly so. For Hartshorne God does lay down the laws of nature as parameters which limit the action of the created world, but he does not then retire to the wings and observe. God shares with all forms of life a social structure.

"No one has proved, or can possibly prove... that there is any 'matter' apart from social terms and relations. Electrons and protons are, for all that anyone knows, simply the lowest actual levels of social existence." (2)

Human nature then is just the highest created form of social interaction. Within the limits laid down by God in the laws of nature we react with each other and indeed with all classes of concrete objects. God too is part of this created world. He, however,

(1) Ford, L.S. T.P.P. p79

(2) Hartshorne, C. D.R. p29

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is the eminent or perfect example of social interaction. Whereas man reacts imperfectly with some other people and some objects, God can react perfectly with all creatures. God influences and is influenced by every actual entity.

At this point it would useful to explain how the process analysis of reality into temporal quanta clarifies the idea of human relatedness.

"Concretely I am a new reality each fraction of a second. Each time I say 'I' the word refers to a new concrete reality. From a more or less abstract point of view the same reality, the very same person, is denoted: but is not all actual value in the concrete - the momentary states, rather than the ever identical person? If I, as I am now, feel a concern for myself as I may be a year from now, this is a kind of sympathy felt by one unit of actuality for potential future units belonging to the same personal series. But by very similar bonds of sympathy, I as I am now can feel a concern for potential future units belonging to other personal series'," (1)

This makes perfect sense in process philosophy but for the absolute identity and absolute non-identity of substance philosophies it is nonsense. In this case love for others is love across a metaphysical gulf, for I simply am not you. Such absoluteness can make no sense of the obvious similarites between self sympathy and sympathy for others.

"we have relative self identity and self love and similary relative non-identity and love of others. In some ways I am

(1) Hartshorne, C. 'Process Philosophy as a Resource for Christian Thought' in Lefevre, P. (ed) <u>Philosophical Resources for Christian Thought</u>. p56

not myself two seconds running, and in some ways I am my
neighbour. My recollections and his often largely overlap,
our purposes, hopes and fears likewise: And as Royce so
eloquently argued, what is the self apart from its fund of
recollections and its hopes, aims, and fear for the future?" (1)
Within this continuous process of interaction, limited by the
parameters of the laws of nature, God acts upon actual entities as
they act upon each other and in turn upon God. In the final analysis
God's ultimate function is to enable each passing moment to have
abiding significance, not because we will continue to look back and
profit from it but because God will do so.

"In the long run - so I believe - we are nothing, except as
God inherits reality and value from our lives and actions.
In ultimate perspective all life other than divine is purely
contributory. We serve God is the last word, not, God
serves us. And our reward? Our reward for serving God is
simply that service itself. The essential reward of
virtue... is intrinsic and present." (2)

Thus there is, I believe, no real problem in Hartshorne's system about
the activity of God. The problem remains one of distinguishing
between God and the created realm and his answer to this has already
been examined.

It remains, however, necessary to explain the difference in the method
of God's activity between Whitehead and Hartshorne. The difference

(1) ibid. p56
(2) ibid. p52

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stems primarily from Hartshorne's denial of the existence of eternal objects. For Whitehead God acts by ordering the eternal objects and presenting each actual occasion with its possibilities for actualisation. In Hartshorne's system God cannot do this but the created realm does have real creativity. For Hartshorne an actual entity creates itself and does not merely choose between possibilities. The real possibilities for each occasion are set by its position in the spatiotemporal continuum, i.e. by the other entities it prehends. Thus an entity creates itself and therefore creates true novelty for God because the final actualisation of an entity is not a determinate possibility, even for God, before its concrete occurrence. Ultimately, however, for both men, it is through the idea of 'persuasion' that God acts. Hartshorne quotes Aristotle who wrote that the power of God over the world was that 'of the beloved over the lover'.

> "What does this mean? A great scholar, Chung - Hwan Chen, interprets Aristotle as taking his cue from Plato's dialogue on love, according to which love seeks 'absolute beauty'. Generalising this for the universe, Aristotle is saying that it is by his supreme beauty that God moves or inspires the world. He charms it into trying to imitate, as best it can, his own excellence." (1)

Although in the final analysis both men conceive of God's activity in similar terms despite Hartshorne's denial of eternal objects, Neville believes that Hartshorne's system is seriously damaged by the total rejection of all Platonic theories of universals. Hartshorne, the Aristotelian, for whom C)A, believes that universals are preceded by

(1) ibid. p62

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and abstracted from past concrete actualities. Neville believes that this is to ignore the question of why certain forms of togetherness are coherent and others are not, why certain forms have great harmony and others little or none.

> "Unless this kind of question is addressed, the ontological structure of the world is taken for granted, not made intelligible." (1)

He goes on to say that although,

> "...the question of how this or that form gets ingredient in the world is interesting, the more interesting question is what structure is, how it unifies multiplicity, how it stands related to chaos." (2)

Neville agrees with both Pierce and Whitehead that the only thing not requiring explanation is pure chaos. Although he does not agree with the explanations provided by either thinker, he believes that some attempt to account for the formal possibility of potentiality is necessary, and this Hartshorne cannot do.

I feel that Neville's criticism is based on a misunderstanding. Hartshorne does not need to account for the formal possibility of potentiality because potentiality is an inescapable fact of the 'creative advance into novelty'. The world and God are in process and the world and God must create, therefore, there is possibility and potentiality. Within the constraining limits of natural laws the question of why certain forms have greater harmony than others is an aesthetic question rather than an ontological one. It is wrong to see

(1) Neville, R.C. Creativity and God. p61
(2) ibid. p61

harmony and togetherness as absolutes.   If one studies the history of art one finds that harmony, completeness, or beauty are matters of aesthetic judgement which varies from individual to individual and from time to time.   Neville is wrong, therefore, to link such questions with the ontological structure of the world.

The bare minimum of structure is provided by the laws of nature and anything beyond this has been created, and could just as easily be destroyed, in the ongoing process.   If freedom means anything then it means freedom to choose beauty, harmony, and togetherness or to reject them.   If they are rejected continuously then the logical conclusion is chaos.   Neville's mistake, I believe, is that he does not see chaos as a real possibility.   He wants an explanation, not for why we do not have chaos but, for why chaos is impossible and structure essential. For Hartshorne, I am sure, chaos is a distinct possibility which does not obtain largely to the 'persuasion' of God and partly to the dim stumblings of the world as it attempts to live up to the vision of God.

There are two other points of difference between Whitehead and Hartshorne which require brief examination.   The first is the relationship between God and creativity.   For Whitehead, as we have seen, God is not the ultimate metaphysical principle, this position belongs to creativity.   This is not to say that creativity is a being beyond God, exercising power over him.   To be sure, Whitehead does claim that

> "...every actual entity, including God, is a creature
> transcended by the creativity which it qualifies." (1)

(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p122

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And also that both God and the world are in the grip of the creative advance towards novelty. But such statements must be interpreted in the light of Whitehead's ontological principle. We must not be put off by Whitehead's innovative language. Yes, he is going against tradition, but all he means by creativity is a description of reality - "the ongoingness of things'. This is ultimate and does qualify God in the sense that God is seen as always creating. As God he cannot cease to create something, but what is created is in no way determined by creativity.

Hartshorne seems to go against this position when he identifies God as the supreme abstract principle. In 'The Logic of Perfection...' he writes,

> "If the supreme abstract principle were not uniquely divine, then God would either come under no concept and be inconceivable (and the word 'God' without meaning) or he would be but another instance of the principle, which would thus in a sense be super divine. This seems blasphemous". (1)

Obviously Whitehead does not see God or the world as instances of creativity. Rather, creativity is a description, it is the universal of universals; characterising how,

> "...the many which are the universe disjunctively, become the one actual occasion, which is the universe conjunctively.' (2)

(1) Hartshorne, C. The Logic of Perfection and other Essays in Neoclassical Metaphysics. p5

(2) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p28

Hartshorne and Whitehead are not in disagreement here. For Hartshorne, no less than Whitehead, creativity is a _description_ applicable to the character of both God and the world. Neither man wishes to see God equated with creativity, or as the sole author of creation.

The final point of difference has to do with the being - becoming contrast which is of such importance for Tillich. Whitehead sees being as concrete and not solely as an abstraction from becoming. For Whitehead the process of becoming is not prehendable.

> "In prehending all the being experienced in the occasion's satisfaction, God 'loses nothing that can be saved'. What cannot be saved in divine consequent prehension is the occasions subjectivity inherent in its process of becoming... God prehends all occasions in their full immediacy of being, for there is no perishing of being in God insofar as this means 'the fading of immediacy as events cease to be present events'. But there is the perishing of becoming, which cannot be prehended by God because it is not prehendable." (1)

For Whitehead an entity's satisfaction is the same as its being. When an entity is complete it becomes a superject, an atomic creature, or a being. Hartshorne on the other hand, believes that the process of becoming _just_ _is_ the being of the entity. It is not a process of determination leading to static being. Ford correctly points out that the being which persists unchanged through a series of changes is abstract for both thinkers but the being of a single individual event

(1) Ford, L.S. _T.P.P._ p73

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is, for Whitehead, concrete. Hartshorne's becoming, which is the concreteness of successive occasions contrasted with elements of endurance, is Whitehead's change. becoming, for Whitehead, is concrescence, it is neither concrete not abstract.

> "To be sure (writes Ford) becoming includes being in the sense that each concrescing occasion prehends past being, but it is also true that becoming is included in the being into which it concresces. Becoming is the process of determination which terminates in determinate being, which could not be what it is apart from such becoming." (1)

For both men the basic unit of reality is described as 'event' or 'feeling'. for Hartshorne this is an abstraction from the general, concrete, process of becoming. For Whitehead, though, an event or feeling is a concrete actuality which has become and which has obtained objective immortality in God. Here we have the basic reason for this difference. For Whitehead the term 'becoming' applies to the individual entity. It becomes through a series of indeterminate phases culminating in the final determinate satisfaction. Hartshorne on the other hand, rejects any idea of genetic succession within an actual entity. For him an entity is internally single and coherent. Thus, for Whitehead, being is a concrete actuality contrasting with becoming and with nothing, it is what past occasions are and what present occasions become.

(1) ibid. p73-74

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CHAPTER THREE

Tillich and Process : A possible dialogue?

The aim of this chapter is an examination of the areas of dialogue between Tillich and process, in order to highlight the major points of convergence and divergence. It is my contention that while there may be remarkable similarities in system structure and in basic concepts there are also irreconcilable differences which prevent any kind of amalgamation. I will argue, both here and in chapter four, that the two systems can best benefit from each other at isolated points. For example, process can be given more richness and depth by utilising the Tillichian insights into faith and the shock of non-being, and Tillich's vital but vague concept of participation can, in some cases, be clarified by Whitehead's concept of prehension.

On an initial glance the two systems would seem to be worlds apart; Tillich, with his emphasis on the wholly transcendent God beyond God who cannot even be described as a 'being', and Whitehead whose God is a being, himself in process as lover, orderer and lure. It does not take too deep a probing, however, to reveal strong similarities in system structure and a mutual respect for each others viewpoint. Hartshorne, for instance, describes Tillich as one of a -

"...tiny handful of sane men in a world wonderfully gone mad, intoxicated with the (very real) glory of empirical enquiry." (1)

(1) Hartshorne, C. 'Tillich and the Non-Theological Meanings of Theological Terms'. Religion in Life, 35; p683

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It was John Lansing who noted that Tillich's basic ontological polarities of individualisation and participation, dynamics and form, and freedom and destiny are also present in Whitehead's metaphysics. Every actual entity involves both individualisation and participation. Although it is a process of becoming, each entity has a self identity constituted by its subjective aim. Each entity is also, however, constituted by its participation in the surrounding world. every actual entity is composed of individualisation, which, at each moment, is constituted teleologically and participation because every entity just is its prehensions and relationships. The polarity of dynamics and form is also clearly present. Everything that 'is' has no alternative but to be involved in the dynamic process of becoming, but every occasion must function within the limits set for it by the principle of limitation. Lansing sees the polarity of dynamics and form as being represented in Whitehead by actual entities and eternal objects and while I do not disagree with this I think it is better represented by the metaphysical principles of 'creativity' and 'the principle of limitation'. Tillich's idea of destiny as the "given formed by nature, history and myself" which each of us must deal with, is paralleled in Whitehead's idea of a given, settled past forming the datum for each novel occasion. The freedom of an occasion is, for Whitehead, that it creates itself, it decides itself how it is to deal with its destiny; for Tillich freedom is deliberation, decision, and responsibility. The relationship of the two poles is also seen in similar ways by Whitehead and Tillich. Whitehead sees each actuality as creating a unity out of past multiplicity, which is then added into the multiplicity. Tillich relates freedom and destiny in the same way when he writes:

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"My destiny is the basis of my freedom; my freedom
participates in shaping my destiny." (1)

Tillich and process also agree on the inadequacy of classical theism.
Tillich criticises theism for making God one being alongside others
(Whitehead, though not Hartshorne, would share this criticism) while
process criticises the classical concept of static perfectionism.
Both Tillich and process, in their different ways, wish to maintain an
infinite distinction between God and the creatures. Both maintain a
sense of mystery; for Tillich this is the abysmal character of God,
for process it is God's concrete character (namely, why he should be
my God now). Most striking of all, however, is that Tillich, no less
than process has a belief in the dynamic character of existence.

"... his (Tillich's) commitment to creativity and emergence
in his ontological concept of life puts him in line with the
evolutionary and organismic mode of thought characteristic
of process philosophy." (2)

It is this rejection of the actus purus of classical theism which
leads to both the strongest area of agreement and, at the same time,
one of the greatest disagreements between Tillich and process. Both
believe that God must contain the dynamic element of becoming, and
this is perhaps their closest similarity; but they differ greatly in
their elucidation of how God is related to becoming. Tillich insists
that God must be described as 'being itself', though conceived in a
non-static way and that 'becoming' on its own is an inadequate
concept. Process, on the other hand, maintains that 'being', no

(1) Tillich, P. S.T. I p204

(2) Inbody, T. 'Paul Tillich and Process Philosophy'. Theological
Studies 36. p473

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matter how it is defined, must eventually and ultimately be conceived of as a static absolute.

This difference will be more fully elucidated later when it will also be argued that there are major disagreements, between Tillich and Hartshorne especially, over the nature of religious experience and the concept of God required by this experience. It must here be pointed out, however, that there are certain religious similarities between Tillich and Whitehead. Both men see God as transcending the threats and limitations of finitude or as providing the ground of finite existence. For Tillich, God is the ground or power of being, who preserves man out of non-being. For Whitehead, God preserves the being of man as it passes away into something else; it can never pass into total non-being but it must always decay, apart from its preservation in God. We saw in chapter two how Whitehead and Hartshorne use dipolarity to solve different problems within their concepts of God and this has consequences for their understanding of finitude. For Whitehead finitude, or temporality, is the state of being in process, of always being in transition into something else. Hartshorne would agree with this with the important addition that, for him, God too is essentially temporal. We can then see similarities between the ideas of temporality in Whitehead and Tillich. For the latter, temporality (he would prefer the term finitude) is a mixture of being and non-being, with God as the preserver of being; for the former, temporality can be described in Tillichian fashion as a mixture of being (or completion) and becoming with God as the preserver of being.

There are also parallels between Tillich's basic ontological structure of self-world and Whitehead's tripartite distinction between 'the

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whole, that other, and this-my-self'. In Tillich the subject-object, or self world, structure is transcended by being itself or God, while in Whitehead the 'whole' transcends the other two elements and takes on a religious meaning in that the full value of something is its value for the totality. This similarity of basic system structure is all well and good and does provide us with a basis for dialogue and perhaps the hope that some fruitful interaction may be possible; but Tillich's being itself is not Whitehead's whole. Whitehead's whole is a mathematical totality of all that is, which transcends, contains and gives value to all individuals. The value of any individual lies in its contribution, however small, to the whole; the individuals constitute the whole. Tillich's being itself, on the other hand, transcends the self-world structure by not being part of it, by being beyond any such structures. In being itself there is no distinction between self and world or subject and object; as with the other ontological polarities the two poles are simply identical. Being itself is something other than a collection of beings, it preceded all individual beings and is in no way dependant upon them. For Whitehead the totality exists, it has ontological reality, while for Tillich being itself is beyond existence and cannot be spoken of as a being.

This in fact illustrates the principal and irreconcilable difference between the two systems, namely their conceptions of our knowledge of God. Both Tillich and process are concerned to do justice to the dynamic character of God, both reject the actus purus of the classical static absolute and both wish to apply the two sides of the categoreal contrasts to God. While process tackles the problems inherent in this through its dipolar concept of God and its insistence on the ontological superiority of becoming, Tillich uses his concept of

religious symbolism. The dialogue between the two modes of thought has, at this point, been direct, and it is Hartshorne who has both welcomed Tillich's rejection of classical ideas and criticised him for what he calls his "retreat behind the symbolic screen". (1)

Hartshorne sees this retreat as stemming from Tillich's failure to observe one of the prime rules of contemporary philosophizing, namely:

> "...do not use ordinary words with an extraordinary meaning
> without taking pains to understand the ordinary meaning and
> its relation to the proposed extraordinary one". (2)

For Hartshorne many statements about God are symbolic, for example, the biblical description of him as ruler, shepherd, father. These can be symbolic because they are specific images, and the fact that God is not literally a father opens up all sorts of possibilities having little, if anything, in common. Purely abstract terms, on the other hand, such as necessity, contingency, finity, infinity, absoluteness, relativity can have no useful symbolic meaning and can only be applied literally. These concepts may be asserted or denied of a particular thing in a particular aspect but there can be no third possibility. If a thing is not literally contingent then it is literally necessary; therefore, either God has contingent qualities in some respects or else all his qualities are necessary, it adds nothing to say that God is 'symbolically' contingent. This means, of course, that if our lives are intrinsic to the divine life, then either this much of that divine life is literally contingent or our lives are literally necessary.

(1) Hartshorne, C. op. cit. p677

(2) ibid. p677

"Spinoza's necessitarianism is literally right or its denial
is literally right. What else can one intelligibly say." (1)

It was noted in chapter two that Hartshorne also introduces a third
type of theological assertion when he explores the use of psychical
terms in relation to deity. It is his contention that:

"there is a legitimate broadest possible meaning of
psychical terms which is applicable to all individuals
whatever, from atoms to deity". (2)

In this broadest meaning these terms become almost categorical, like
relativity, but there remains an important difference; terms like
'know' and 'love' can only apply to individuals whereas 'relative' or
'absolute' can be applied to both individuals and abstractions. As a
result of this greater abstractness of purely categorical terms their
meaning does not vary from one level to another; to be contingent,
that is to be constituted in some way by contingent relations, means
simply and literally that. But to know, feel and love, here there are
qualitative differences.

"A dog knows in doggish fashion, and God knows in divine
fashion". (3)

Hartshorne prefers the term analogical to symbolic as a description of
these terms and he sees the analogical extension of such concepts as a
two way process. He does not believe that we take human concepts and

(1) ibid. p677

(2) Hartshorne, C. 'Tillich and the other Great Tradition'. Anglican
Theological Review 43 p253

(3) ibid. 254

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simply elevate them towards divinity but rather that our understanding of such concepts comes partly from religious experience, from some dim but direct awareness of deity.

> "Brunner, I think, has suggested or implied that it is God who is unqualifiedly personal, and human beings are only imperfect, fragmentary pointers toward true personality". (1)

To 'know' ought to mean, having conclusive evidence and shutting off the very possibility of error, as God does, but to apply this idea to man we must tone it down. Similarly -

> "It is God who loves - without any distorting antipathies or blind spots of mere indifference. God loves the creatures - period. We love a few creatures some of the time, and seldom or never wholly without complicating feelings of vanity, envy, irritation, fear and the like". (2)

I agree entirely with Hartshorne's criticism of Tillich's thorough going symbolism but I also believe that Tillich's description of religion as the constant birth, growth and death of religious symbols is well worth preserving; allowing, as it does, a measure of truth to all religions - something Hartshorne and Whitehead would both agree with. Thus, while Hartshorne does not deny symbolic language I feel he severely underestimates it. The term 'symbolic' must be maintained alongside 'analogical' because, as Tillich writes:

> "... in symbolic, the symbol-creating and destroying activity of man's spiritual life is presupposed, while analogy points to a static, calculable relation between the

(1) ibid. p254

(2) ibid. p255

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world and God". (1)

I do not think that Hartshorne would find this incompatible with his insistence that some terms must be applicable to God literally and some analogically; after all, the majority of our 'everyday' descriptions of God are undoubtably symbolic.

It is Hartshorne's dipolarity which enables him to escape from behind the 'screen of symbolism'. He sees no logical contradiction in a God who is universally independant, relative to nothing in one respect and yet dependant and relative in another. If we go from the ordinary to the extraordinary meanings of the terms dependant and independant then we see that while ordinary things are dependant or independant of some other things an extraordinary thing would be independant of, or dependant on, all other things. Hartshorne's God is both of these things, literally, in different respects.

> "Universal relativity or dependance is just as extraordinary
> as universal absoluteness or independance. Who but God
> could be influenced not by some, but by all individuals? He
> and only he is aware of them all and loves them all". (2)

While Hartshorne and Tillich differ as to whether the categorical contrasts should be applied literally or symbolically to God they also disagree over the relationship of the polar opposites. Tillich treats the two sides of the categorical contrasts as being in symmetrical tension, in ordinary cases, while both are equally transcended in the

(1) Rome, S. and Rome, B. (eds) Pholosophical Interrogations. p376

(2) Hartshorne, C. 'Tillich and the Non-Theological Meanings of Theological Terms'. p679

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case of God; whereas Hartshorne believes that one side of each contrast 'overlaps' the other in both the ordinary and extraordinary uses. His argument is as follows:

"If A is in respect I independent of B and in respect R dependent upon B, then A as a whole, or in all aspects taken together as one entity, is dependent on B. Thus R, the dependent aspect, is also the inclusive one, and I, the independent aspect, is non-inclusive, is but a partial or abstract factor in A". (1)

Therefore the dependent or relative includes the independent or absolute, it is subjects which possess their objects, contingent things which have necessary aspects, actuality which includes an aspect of potentiality. This imbalance in the contrasts is, for Hartshorne, fairly obvious but classical theism has for centuries attempted to invert it, has tried to subordinate the relative to the absolute, the contingent to the necessary, the temporal to the eternal, the subject to the object. From this it follows that, in the necessary-contingent contrast, the inclusive term is the contingent; and therefore, to identify God with 'necessary being' is to make him an extreme abstraction. God can be literally contingent as a whole and yet literally necessary in some abstract aspect. (2)

Here, I think, Hartshorne is mistaken. For example, in ordinary usage there are many levels of meaning in terms like dependent; some things we are dependant on for our fundamental character and outlook, while

(1) Hartshorne, C. op. cit p679
(2) See Ralph James' description of Hartshorne's method as A)C outlined in chapter two.

others may make a difference to us but are not so vital. If we follow
Hartshorne's method and begin with the ordinary usage of the term
dependence we can think of things upon which we depend. For example -
oxygen; unfortunately we depend upon oxygen in all respects, there is
no respect in which we are independent of it, so it is a poor example.
Perhaps a personal illustration would serve better: I am in respect
of transport dependent upon my car but I am independent of it in most
other respects.   Without a car I would be fundamentally the same
person, I would feel, think and act in basically the same ways,
although certain routines, certain individual instances within my life
would be different.   Following Hartshorne's logic one should say that
I am in all respects taken together dependent upon my car; but it
seems unrealistic to me to say that my basic personality, which is
independent of any car, is merely a partial or abstract factor in my
whole being.   This is obviously a very frivolous use of the term
dependence but it is an accepted, common usage. A better example
would perhaps be our dependence upon the media for news. We have all
experienced the pleasure of 'escaping' from the media for a few weeks
on holiday but is it really only the abstract, partial side of our
being which takes such a holiday? Surely the aspects of our
personalities which are independent of the media are as important and
real, if not more so, than the aspects which are dependent. A final
example of the 'equality' of the terms dependent and independent in
ordinary usage is the human brain. The two sides of the brain are
dependent on each other for perfect vision and total motor control but
are independent in terms of such functions as speech. The dependent
aspects of the two sides were only fully realised after several
unfortunate patients had experienced the severing of their corpus
callosum as a cure for epilepsy! but even so it seems ridiculous to

describe either the dependent or independent aspects as mere
abstractions. Surely the two sides of the dependence - independence
contrast are in symmetrical tension in ordinary usage and so should
also be in their extraordinary usage.

This is in line with Tillich's writing but when Tillich moves from the
ordinary to the extraordinary he completely changes meaning, as
Hartshorne accuses him of, and describes being itself as the simple
unity of such contrasts. I have to agree with Hartshorne that this is
inadequate. To be superior to the tension between the poles through
an infallible power to harmonise them is one thing; the mere identity
of them, or sheer non-polarity is another. Hartshorne is correct in
his assertion that -

> "...the togetherness of being and becoming can be stated in
>
> such a way that God can be literally conditioned and still
>
> absolute". (1)

Hartshorne believes that through this identification of the polar
opposites, and insistence on symbolic language, Tillich ultimately
overwhelms the concept of becoming and remains tied to a classical
philosophy of being. Hartshorne appeals to the nature of experience
in his criticism of the term being itself. Being cannot be taken
literally when our experience, itself a process, disclosed only
processes and what can be abstracted from them.

> "A 'being' which is not any process or any datum constituent
>
> of process cannot have literal meaning, for nothing of the
>
> sort appears in experience". (2)

(1) Inbody, T. 'Paul Tillich and Process Philosophy'. p476
(2) ibid. p480

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As he says elsewhere:

"At best, 'being' in this sense seems a reference to
traditional metaphysics, by faith taken as a symbol of what
no experience could exhibit". (1)

Tillich believed that many of the process criticisms of his work were
but emphases on particular points and were not vital. He saw this
problem of the ultimacy of being or becoming, however, as paramount
and believed that anyone who has experienced the shock of non-being
could make no concessions on the ultimacy of being.

Surely we can utilise the thought of both men here, and conceive of a
God who contains both sides of the categorical contrasts in perfect
symmetrical tension. In this case we can describe the eternal,
absolute, immutable aspect of deity as 'being itself' and the
concrete, relative, finite aspect as 'becoming'. This overcomes the
criticism of Hartshorne's position, that he ultimately has a finite
God, and, at the same time, preserves the dipolarity of deity. We are
at this point, however, faced with a dilemma; we cannot really combine
Tillich with Hartshorne, we must eventually choose between them. On
the description of God as including both being itself and becoming we
are not being true to Tillich unless we allow being itself to overcome
absolute non-being, and this would be to diverge from Hartshorne.
The dilemma then is whether we steer closer to Tillich, and allow the
existence of non-being, thus denying the necessity of some contingent
thing, or whether we steer towards Hartshorne and deny the existence
of non-being thus robbing being itself of its Tillichian character. It
is, unfortunately, true that we cannot unite the two systems at this

(1) Kegley, C.W. and Bretall, R.W. (eds) The Theology of Paul
Tillich. p195

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point, although, I believe, process certainly can still benefit from the dialogue, as shown above.

Tyron Inbody has isolated three reasons for Tillich's rejection of becoming as the metaphysical absolute; logical, phenomenological and religious. Firstly, being is logically superior to becoming because, while becoming overcomes relative non-being (me on), only being itself can negate absolute non-being (ouk on). Furthermore, anything particular can be denied but you cannot deny being, because even such negative judgements are acts of being and are only possible though being. For Tillich, to say that being is, means that it is the negation of possible non-being; "is means 'is not not'" (1). Secondly, Tillich criticises becoming on phenomenological grounds for ignoring the primordial intuition of all being and knowing.

"Man as an existing and knowing being experiences the power

of being at the depth of his own being and knowing". (2)

While process thought denies any such intuition Tillich sees it as obvious to a reflective person. Finally, Tillich rejects becoming as ontologically absolute in order to preserve the holiness of God. While Tillich defends the idea of dynamic elements within the being of God he rejects any notion of a becoming God, and maintains that any reference to God as finite must be symbolic.

"I cannot accept... [Hartshorne's] assertion that the

elements which characterise finite being can be applied to

God 'literally', because that would make God finite; and a

'finite God' is a contradiction in terms. Certainly, one

(1) Tillich, P. My Search for Absolutes. p81
(2) Inbody, T. op. cit. p482

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must say that God has the finite... 'within' himself, not
alongside himself - which would also make him finite. But
he is not subject to finitude; he is the infinite who
comprises his infinity and his finitude. If this is denied
he becomes another name for the process of life, seen as a
whole, and is subject to the tragic possibility which
threatens every finite process. Then not only is the world
a risk taken by God, but God himself is a risk to himself, a
risk which may fail". (1)

Tillich attempted to reduce this being - becoming disagreement to mere
verbal status by asking the process thinker to accept the power of
non-being.

"If being means static self identity, becoming must be the
ultimate principle. But if being means the power that
conquers non-being... then even the process philosopher must
acknowledge that being, namely, the negation of non-being,
precedes in ontological dignity the polarity of the static
and the dynamic". (2)

There are two basic disagreements here, one is a philosophical
disagreement over the existence of non-being and the other is a
religious disagreement about the concept of God required by religious
experience. The primary reason for Tillich's insistence on the
supremacy of being over becoming is his belief in the ontological
threat of non-being which for process thought is an absurdity. For
process philosophy 'being' is a wholly non-restrictive term and is,

(1) Rome, S. and Rome, B. (eds) op. cit. p376
(2) ibid. p377

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therefore, necessary. Being as such, namely God and some world or other (it doesn't matter what world) are necessary, they must exist. Two important consequences, for our purposes, follow from this. Firstly, the traditional Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is denied. God and the world are co-eternal, they both exist because they logically must exist, therefore, God, like man, creates from previously existent actuality, including himself. For Hartshorne, God's creativity must be analogous to man's otherwise it could have no meaning. This is obvious given what we already know of Hartshorne's theory of analogy but it is directly opposed to Tillich who sees creatio ex nihilo as the decisive Christian doctrine. The second consequence of the necessity of being is that any concept of non-being or absolute nothingness becomes absurd and meaningless. As Hartshorne claims, contingency is not the possibility of something or nothing but the indeterminacy of which 'somethings' will exist.

"Contingency just is the freedom of creativity as between positive options". (1)

This, of course, is alien to Tillich who holds that all finitude is a mixture of being and non-being with God, as the power of being, supporting all creatures out of non-being. It is only through or because of God that the finite world survives against the threat of non-being. Here we can see two different answers to Parmenides' ancient question : 'Why is there something, why not nothing?'. Tillich answers by claiming that God is the ground of the world, in the sense that, as the power of being, he is the presupposition of any world at all. While Hartshorne would not disagree with this he would

(1) Hartshorne, C. 'Could There Have Been Nothing? : A Reply' Process Studies 1. p28

have to add that some world is also a presupposition of God. Hartshorne's answer to Parmenides is that there _must_ be something; it is necessary that both perfection (God) and some (any) contingent thing exists. It is not only their answers to this question which are different but the appreciation of the question itself. Tillich sees the question as being essentially _religious_, he shares J.J.C. Smart's outlook:

"that anything should exist at all does seem to me a matter
for the deepest awe". (1)

It is, for Tillich, while we are confronted with this awe-full question that we come to an awareness of the necessity of being itself. For Hartshorne, on the other hand, the question of why anything should exist is logically meaningless and of no religious value at all.

A careful defence of non-being against Hartshorne comes from Houston Craighead who attempts to show that because non-being is a logical possibility Hartshorne's ontological argument is based on false assumptions. Craighead outlines six arguments in Hartshorne's writings for the impossibility of there being no concrete things at all.

(a) Fistly, that absolute nothingness is absolutely unknowable. Craighead accuses Hartshorne of winning the game by defining the real in terms of the knowable. He claims that Hartshorne redefines God's perfect knowledge in order to suit his ideas. Perfect knowledge means knowledge of all possible states but not knowledge of the future as

(1) Smart, J.J.C. 'The Existence of God'; New Essays in
Philosophical Theology; ed. Flew, and McIntyre p46

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this would deny real freedom. Craighead claims that if Hartshorne can define perfect knowledge however he wants to, then so can he and proceeds to define it as knowledge of all possible positive states. This, of course, means that the one possible negative state, total nothingness, is, therefore, unknowable to God and not contradictory of the idea of a perfect knower.

> "What I am saying is this: If Hartshorne can redefine the notion of perfect knowledge in order to retain both that notion and another notion, freedom, then I can also redefine perfect knowledge to keep both it and a notion I claim is meaningful, the possibility that there might have been (and yet might be) nothing at all". (1)

I find this extremely unsatisfactory as a definition of perfect knowledge. The Oxford dictionary defines the term "perfect" as being "complete, not deficient, faultless"; well surely this must mean, if it means anything at all, that perfect knowledge includes knowledge of all possible states and to insist that there is an unknowable possibility is to deny that perfect knowledge could exist at all. There is a great difference between Hartshorne's concept of perfect knowledge as complete knowledge of all possibility (which is surely not limiting perfect knowledge) and Craighead's concept of a perfect knowledge which is limited as to what possibilities it may know. It is not only the concept of human freedom which makes Hartshorne correct in asserting that God cannot know the future. God 'knowing' the future could only be achieved if the future were already a part of God's present, in which case the very idea of future (as anything

(1) Craighead, H. 'Non-Being and Hartshorne's Concept of God'
    Process Studies 1   p16

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other than a relative, purely human concept) is denied.

(b) Craighead dismisses this argument, that 'every statement must contain something positive, therefore, the statement nothing exists is necessarily false', as, once again, a case of definition of words.

(c) This argument is that God himself insures the existence of some world. For Craighead this is an explicit contradiction of Hartshorne's denial of creatio ex nihilo. He accuses Hartshorne of committing a petitio:

> "God exists necessarily if at least some concretum exists necessarily, and some concretum exists necessarily because God's power insures it". (1)

This is a misunderstanding of Hartshorne however, who is not claiming that God insures the world out of nothingness. God is 'being itself' in the sense that what things are for him is identical with what they really are.

> "Thus to be is to be for God, to fail to be is to fail to be for God. He is the definitive reality, the measure of all truth". (2)

Hartshorne is not using the idea of God to maintain a world out of non-being as Craighead claims.

(d) The fourth argument is called, by Craighead, 'psychological' and, by Hartshorne, pragmatic. It is that any belief which cannot be expressed in action is merely verbal and therefore unreal. Hartshorne claims no one can really doubt, except in words the inevitable

(1) ibid. p17

(2) Hartshorne, C. op. cit. p27

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existence of some concrete thing while Craighead argues that there are many who infact do.

(e) This argument, as outlined by Craighead, is that: the fact that the statement 'some concretum necessarily exists' is not contradictory proves that it is also true. Craighead argues that the non-contradictory nature of the statement does not make it true unless it is first shown that the existence of some universe is a question of necessity. Craighead again appeals to what we can or cannot conceive and claims that Hartshorne has not yet proved that we cannot conceive of nothingness.

(f) The final argument, principally elucidated by William Reese, is that all our negative statements can be handled on a model of 'othering' and that we never refer in ordinary language to non-being. Reese notes two kinds of denial: predicate denial and subject denial. In the case of predicate denial the predicate in question can always be replaced by something else, for example, "Socrates is not ill" can be replaced by "Socrates is well"; the 'not' does not refer in any way to non-being. In the case of subject denial things are more complicated, for example, "Socrates does not exist".

> "A denial in the subject means that one has a 'mental construct' which has no counterpart in the 'outer' world; one has an idea of Socrates but fails to be able to match it with anything 'outside'. The reference, thus, is not to non-being but to the fact that Socrates has only mental existence". (1)

Craighead has two criticisms of this argument; firstly, that in

(1) Craighead, H. op. cit. p19

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subject denial we do not replace what is denied by anything else.

"Socrates exists' really means 'Socrates has both physical
and mental existence'. The denial of physical existence,
therefore, is not to replace it with something... but to
deny it altogether. Is this not a reference to non-being?" (1)

Secondly, Craighead argues that ordinary usage is not an adequate
criterion for philosophical concepts and so lack of reference to non-
being in ordinary language does not prove its non-existence.

Craighead believes that Hartshorne's arguments fail to prove the
impossibility of non-being; he further believes that such a proof is
impossible because it can be shown that it is logically possible for
there to be no concretum at all. He advances two arguments for this
belief; in the first place there is a sense of wonder and awe that
anything should exist at all and here he cites Smart, Huxley,
Heidegger and others as evidence of this; secondly, that we can
conceive of there being nothing at all. The force of the first
argument is that necessarily existent things do not generate a sense
of awe, therefore, the existence of anything must be contingent. I
would seriously question, however, whether the sense of wonder and awe
testified to by Craighead's list of philosophers was not a sense of
wonder at the existence of some particular thing within our world as
we know it, rather than wonder that anything whatsoever should exist.
The second of Craighead's arguments is interested purely in logical
possibility; Craighead believes that we can conceive of total non-
being, therefore, it is a possibility. Hartshorne would not deny the

(1) ibid. p19

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force of this argument but he would disagree that we can conceive of non-being.

Here we can see the problem with the dialogue between Hartshorne and Craighead on this point; it ultimately boils down to personal belief and intuition. Craighead argues that he can conceive of total non-being and Hartshorne replies that Craighead thinks he can conceive of non-being. Both men throw lists of supporting thinkers at each other and both appeal to intuition, ultimately trusting their own intuition for the final answer. As Hartshorne so illuminatingly writes:

"...if I have not proved the impossibility of an unknowable, neither has he [Craighead] proved its possibility. And all proof rests on intuition somewhere. For me the proof on my side is strong." (1)

While the existence, or otherwise, of non-being as a possibility must remain, for the moment then, a logical imponderable, it seems to me that, if God is necessarily existent (which he must be inorder to be worthy of worship and fulfil traditional ideas), we can outline three possible options:

(a) Agreement with process that God is a being, therefore, being (in terms of perfection and some concretum) is necessary and non-being meaningless.

(b) Agreement with Tillich that God is not a being, therefore, being is not necessarily existent and non-being is a perfectly meaningful, ontological, possibility.

(c) One could, of course, deny the existence of God. Tillich, Whitehead and Hartshorne would all reject this third option although

(1) Hartshorne, C. op. cit. p27

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only Tillich would deny it as a possibility. For Tillich it is not possible that God does not exist because non-being requires being itself as its negation, the existence of finitude implies the existence of both non-being and being itself. Hartshorne and Whitehead would not deny that atheism is a formal possibility but they reject it, along with classical theism, as an imperfect description of reality. For them the truth lies in a higher synthesis of the categorical contrasts, namely, a God who is Absolute and Relative.

If we then discard the third option we are left with what appears to be a straight choice, although I would suggest that a fourth option which maintains the truth of both positions is possible. I would like to preserve the idea of God as a necessary being, and so avoid Tillich's difficulties of speaking of God as not existing, and yet to continue to affirm the possibility, or rather the actuality, of the threat of non-being. In this case, of course, absolute non-being is meaningless but each individual or individually ordered series of actual occasions is open to the possibility of non-being and is, therefore, open to Tillich's 'ontological shock'. If this is accepted then the much used example of process critics, that people feel awe at the existence of anything can be, more truthfully, expressed as a feeling of awe that they personally should exist or that some particular beautiful thing should exist. Although Hartshorne, in particular, has no need of such a feeling of awe it is not incompatible with his system. He does not share, as Tillich does, Otto's description of holiness as a numinous experience but rather describes it as "motivational adequacy". Hartshorne holds that, in God, virtue and knowledge are identical;

"If, then, God is adequately aware of all actuality as actual and all possibility as possible, he has adequate

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motivation for seeking to actualise maximal possibilities of further value... The holiness of God consists... in the single aim at the one primary goal, which is that the creatures should enjoy rich harmonies of living and pour this richness into ... the life of God". (1)

There is nothing here which would disallow such feelings of awe at the existence of something although Hartshorne may see them as rather unnecessary.

What we are aiming at then is an amalgamation of Tillich's 'shock of non-being' with a process concept of God. Tillich's language of participation and the idea that a finite being participates in both being and non-being is not necessary for the idea of the 'shock of non-being'. All that this requires is that non-being is a possibility for the individual, not just a logical possibility but a real and threatening one. These conditions are fully met in the real world and can be incorporated into Whitehead's system (as was seen at the beginning of this chapter Hartshorne is not as useful here). The shock of non-being, for Tillich, is answered by faith in God who, as the ground of being, supports us against non-being. In Whitehead completion, or being, is the final determination of an actual entity which is preserved in God. God acts as the preserver of being, making sure that nothing is lost, nothing disappears into the abyss of non-being. Whitehead may not be using non-being in a Tillichian sense here but both men use the term non-being to describe a kind of nothingness or emptiness and it is, more than anything else, a shock of 'nothingness' which Tillich is describing. It may be argued that

(1) Hartshorne, C. The Divine Relativity. pp 124-128

in the above analysis the threat of non-being is not a _real_ threat because (a) God necessarily exists, and (b) God preserves all being, therefore, all being is necessarily preserved. However, in Tillich's thought, the threat of non-being is counteracted by faith and ultimately, I believe, faith is all we have to 'prove' the necessary existence of God. Therefore, without faith there is no necessarily existent God, no preserver of being, and the threat of non-being remains as, at least, a possibility dependant upon faith; which is all Tillich's concept demands.

We saw earlier that the being – becoming debate between Tillich and process included two basic disagreements. Firstly, the philosophical argument over the existence of non-being, examined above, and secondly, the religious argument over the kind of God required by experience. For Hartshorne the religious concern is a total, unreserved concern about the supreme person not an ultimate concern about the ultimate; For Tillich on the other hand, authentic religious experience is the primordial intuition of being itself at the ground of all being and knowing; it is an awe-full experience based on the shock of non-being. For Hartshorne there is no primordial intuition as such, although there is an intuitive element in interpreting experience; the primary experience is that of the self as becoming in a world of becoming, anything 'beyond' this is an abstraction from the process. Hartshorne can then claim that the God of classical theism is not required by our religious experience; all that is required is an object adequate to justify unreserved love, and thus a God who is in some respects conditioned could still be worthy of worship. This means that the categorical contrasts do not have to be interpreted exclusively, as in, what Hartshorne calls, the 'negative theology of the great tradition'. Hartshorne's finite-infinite individual is, for

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him, perfectly acceptable to religious experience.

> "Between the finite-infinite individual and the merely
> finite individuals there is a gap in natures which is
> literally infinite.... The real trouble is... the idolatry
> of infinity, being, cause, and absoluteness, accepted as
> substitutes for the divine unity of the contraries, finite-
> infinite, being-creativity, cause-effect, absolute-
> relational, being as such and _a_ being". (1)

Hartshorne would be wrong totally to dismiss Tillich's description of
faith as ultimate concern, however, as the description of an inner
tension between concreteness and ultimacy, included in this, can be
used by process to provide a phenomenological basis for its
dipolarity. Although neither Whitehead nor Hartshorne have shown much
interest in a description of 'faith', they could benefit greatly from
Tillich's phenomenological insight. For Tillich, faith can only be
truly directed towards the ultimate but as we have no direct access to
ultimacy we must use a mediating concrete concern (the Tillichian
Symbol). Because process sees God as both concrete and ultimate, with
his concrete nature being the summation of reality, it can easily take
on board Tillich's description. Also worth preserving is Tillich's
realisation that while any concrete concern has the potential to
mediate ultimacy only a _true_ symbol does so _truly_. Hartshorne, with
his insistence that any assertion whatever is in some way an assertion
about God, and his restriction of symbolism, is in danger of missing
this insight. Tillich is right to insist that the risk of faith lies
in never being certain whether one's symbols, one's concrete concerns,

(1) Hartshorne, C. 'Tillich and the Other Great Tradition'. p259

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are infact true symbols for the ultimate God.

This same religious disagreement is at the root of the argument over whether God is a being or not. For Tillich he cannot be without losing his total transcendence and becoming finite, therefore, under the threat of non-being. For Hartshorne God does not need to be totally 'other', he is a being among beings albeit the perfect being. We must remember here that Whitehead's God is more transcendent than Hartshorne's, therefore, closer to Tillich's and less open to the criticisms of religious inadequacy which have been levelled at Hartshorne. If Hartshorne's were the only process conception of God then it would be worth while to attempt to use Tillich's emphasis on transcendence to modify Hartshorne's primarily immanent God. However, as Whitehead's God does not suffer from this potential problem I believe this is unnecessary.

Also involved in this dispute over religious experience is the question of God's freedom, that is his autonomy and power to ground a world. The question is whether God's freedom is dependant upon a doctrine of external relations and so necessitating the idea of aseity or whether such freedom can be defined and defended within a doctrine of internal relations. External relations are those which are totally non-constitutive of an event or persons being, whereas internal relations are so constitutive. Process philosophy, through Whitehead's concept of prehension, can allow and explain the existence of both types of relation. God, at any particular time, is internally related to all past actuality because of his prehension of this actuality, but he is externally related to all future actuality because he (as he is at this particular moment) does not prehend such

actuality (1). Obviously it is internal relations, for process, which are most important and distinctive about the concept of God. Tillich agrees that on a doctrine of internal relations God may be absolutely free or independent in his existence as such; but, he claims God cannot be adequately free, that is, free in the sense of being the autonomous ground of the world system, a source not dependent, in any way, upon the actuality of the world. For Tillich, Hartshorne's idea of God as independent of the actuality of any particular world but dependent on the existence of some world or other is religiously inadequate. Hartshorne, though, does not need a God who can ground the world in a Tillichian sense; God is the ground of the world in that he gives it value and meaning, and for this he does not need the classical attribute of aseity. Inbody rather nicely sums up the basic religious difference between process and Tillich when he asks which is the most intolerable situation:

"... denying that God is a being, and so not being able to apply directly any predicates to God, or making literal statements about God as a being, but not being able to distinguish absolutely God from all other actual beings"? (2)

It is interesting to note that John Lansing, when comparing Tillich and Whitehead, concluded that the basic difference between them was philosophical,

(1) Note the difference here between Whitehead and Hartshorne. Whitehead sees God as a single actual entity whereas, for Hartshorne, he is a society of entities.

(2) Inbody, T. 'Paul Tillich and Process Philosophy'. p492

"Whitehead's God answers the same religious question and performs the same religious function as does Tillich's God... The difference roots, I believe, in their differing understandings of the metaphysical ultimate". (1)

Whereas Tyron Inbody concluded that the difference between process and Tillich was basically religious.

"The fundamental difference between Paul Tillich and the process theologians, then, is a religious difference". (2)

While I believe that both Lansing and Inbody have hit on crucial differences between Tillich and process I would contend that neither has put forward the basic reason for these differences. It is too glib to label the differences between the two systems as 'religious' or 'philosophical' and then claim that if this basic difference could be overcome then process and Tillich could be brought closer together. The differences between Tillich and process rest ultimately on Tillich's systematic structure and you cannot 'tinker' with elements of the system without affecting the whole. Tillich himself described systematic thought as:

"...the unity in which every statement is under the critical control of every other statement". (3)

Beginning with his method of correlation and using tremendous religious, psychological and phenomenological insights Tillich

(1) Lansing, J.W. 'A Philosopher and a Theologian compared : Tillich and Whitehead on God'. A.A.R, Philosophy of Religion and Theology Proceedings. p102

(2) Inbody, T. op. cit. p490

(3) Rome, S. and Rome, B. (eds) Philosophical Interrogations. p409

produced a system which, in terms of its concept of God, lies somewhere between classical theism and process dipolarity. Separating him from classical ideas is his insistence on a dynamic God, his rejection of the _actus_ _purus_; and separating him from process dipolarity is his concept of non-being and his insistence on symbolism. It is, I believe, the latter which is crucial; because if we remove from Tillich's system the concept of symbolic language, which process demands, and apply the categorical polarities literally to God then Tillich is faced with a decision. He would be forced to either return to classical theism and apply only one side of the contrasts to God or he would have to follow through his convictions and become a dipolar theist proper; either way Tillich's unique system would be destroyed. When I began this research I was hoping for some kind of amalgamation of Tillich with process but as I started to realise that this was an impossibility I became appreciative of this very fact. Whatever the merits or demerits of the two ways of thinking theology is richer for possessing them both, and a straight forward union of the two could be true to neither tradition. Truth (whatever that word may mean) can only come through dialogue within multiplicity and diversity; and through dialogue between process and Tillich, I believe, concepts on both sides can be given greater clarity and strength. For example, in this chapter I have shown how Tillich's phenomenological insight into the threat of non-being can be included within process and in the next chapter I will attempt to clarify Tillich's concept of participation by using Whitehead's prehension.

CHAPTER FOUR

Participation and Prehension : Some Clarifications

It is my contention in this chapter that Tillich's fundamentally important concept of participation can, in some of its uses, be given much needed clarity through reference to Whitehead's concept of prehension. The chapter begins with an analysis of prehension followed by a careful study of participation and its numerous uses and concludes with an elucidation of how, in my opinion, the one can benefit the other.

I Prehension

According to Whitehead the term 'prehension' is used to express:

"...the activity whereby an actual entity effects its own concretion of other things." (1)

The concept is uniquely Whiteheadian and is seen by Hartshorne among others, as Whitehead's most important contribution.

"In a single conception it explains the spatiotemporal structure of the world, the possibility of knowledge, and the reality of freedom. It is, in my opinion, one of the supreme intellectual discoveries." (2)

Whitehead coined the term prehension, by dropping the first syllable from the word apprehension, in order to have a more neutral term to express the Lockian ideas of 'understanding' and 'perception'. He was

(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p71

(2) Hartshorne, C. Whiteheads Philosophy. p127

concerned to explain the notions of causality and relation which, while important in any philosophy, are vital in a philosophy of organism. Change, for such a philosophy, is a succession of distinguishable, momentary states rather than the variation of an individual with time. Causality, then, is the universal relation to the past not simple, individual identity.

"Reality consists, for precise analysis, of successions of states or events causally related to predecessors, only some of which were in the same individual series. Causality is not stopped at the boundaries of so called identity. In a special limited form causality is that entity... In short, within a person's body and mind, or psychophysical system, and between it and the rest of the world, there are many intersecting causal lines." (1)

Using the 'principle of reasonable anthropomorphism' we can investigate this causal relation through analogy with elements of our own experience. Within experience we find two clues to causality. These are:

(a) Memory - in memory, past experience (even if only immediately past) influences present experiences.

(b) Perception - when we perceive an event outside of the body it has already happened, it takes time for stimuli to reach the body and for perception to take place, therefore, we are being influenced by the past. The same can be argued for events perceived from inside the body; it is only an unproven and questionable hypothesis that our

(1) Hartshorne, C. 'Whitehead's Revolutionary Concept of Prehension' p.30

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perceptual experience is simultaneous with the bodily events perceived. It can, therefore, be seen that memory and perception both involve only past conditions, both share a common structure and, thus, Whitehead can affirm an analogy between human, personal experiences and non-human, non-personal ones.

Prehension, however is not simply a mere having of data; in every experience (although negligibly so on the lowest levels of nature) there is at least something like imagination and inference. Each entity responds to signs which are prehended in the ordinary perceptual way; on the higher levels of reality this sign usage becomes Whitehead's 'symbolic reference'.

> "We interpret, verbalise, theorise, make more or less 'educated' guesses about what is experienced. This is the how of experience rather than its what. In later memories the how can become a what, that is, itself experienced. Introspection is a reality in this sense. Self Awareness is not, for Whitehead, simultaneous prehension." (1)

Whitehead delineates two types of prehension; 'physical' prehensions are those whose data consists of past actual entities, while 'conceptual' prehensions are those which prehend eternal objects. Neither type of prehension necessarily involves consciousness in its subjective form and both are analysable in the same way. Prehensions are one of the eight categories of existence and are described as the:

> "Concrete facts of relatedness".(2)

(1) ibid. p32

(2) ibid. p34

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In Whitehead's twenty seven categories af explanation (1) we learn that, in its most concrete elements, an actual entity is a concrescence of prehensions which have originated in its process of becoming. Any further analysis of an entity, therefore, is, infact, analysis of prehensions and this Whitehead calls 'division'. Prehensions can be analysed as containing three factors:

"(a) the 'subject' which is prehending, namely the actual entity in which that prehension is a concrete element; (b) the 'datum' which is prehended; (c) the 'subjective form' which is _how_ that subject prehends that datum". (2)

Later, Whitehead describes 'positive' prehensions or 'feelings' as analysable into five factors, which are:

"(i) the 'subject' which feels, (ii) the 'initial data' which are to be felt, (iii) the 'elimination' in virtue of negative prehensions, (iv) the 'objective datum' which is felt, (v) the 'subjective form' which is _how_ that subject feels that objective datum" (3)

Positive and negative prehensions are called, by Whitehead, two _species_ of prehensions; one termed 'feelings' while the other is said to 'eliminate from feeling'.

"Negative prehensions also have subjective form. A negative prehension holds its datum as inoperative in the progressive concrescence of prehensions constituting the unity of the subject". (4)

(1) Whitehead, A.N. _P.R._ p30-35

(2) _ibid._ p31

(3) _ibid._ p312

(4) _ibid._ p32

The analysis in terms of prehensions is called division because it is a case of abstracting from a unity; all the elements of a prehension being mutually determined.

"there is a concrescence of the initial data into the objective datum, made possible by the elimination, and effected by the subjective form... The subjective form receives its determination from the negative prehensions, the objective datum and the conceptual origination ... The negative prehensions are determined by the ... subjective form and by the initial data." (1)

Hartshorne, because of his rejection of eternal objects, is obviously going to have to take issue with Whitehead over the subject of conceptual or mental prehensions. For Hartshorne the mental prehensions can be included within physical prehensions if the latter is taken as including:

"(a) at least a minimal sense of futurity and (b) at least a minimal sense of contrast, likeness and difference among the past data prehended." (2)

Futurity he defines as Aristotle's 'potentiality' or Epicurus' 'mixture of chance and necessity' where:

"The necessity is that the experience must somehow become datum for some further experiencing; the chance, ... is the freedom or indeterminacy as to just how or in just what further experiences this status as datum may be brought about." (3)

(1) ibid. p312

(2) Hartshorne, C. op. cit. p32

(3) ibid p.32

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This difference, however, is only important for a comparison of Whitehead and Hartshorne and is irrelevant for our purposes as it does not affect the theory of prehension or its usefulness for clarification of Tillich. (1)

Whitehead's theory can explain both the freedom and determination of causality. Each datum is a necessary condition for an experience but not even all the data taken together could constitute a sufficient reason for a particular experience. Together the conditions make the experience possible but they are insufficient to make it causally necessary or, in its concrete singularity, predictable.

> "Causes make what happens more or less probable, they do not necessitate it ... This is the freedom or creativity of all experiencing. It is not intelligible that a multiplicity could dictate, completely determine, a particular addition to that multiplicity." (2)

The theory also allows for both internal and external relations and causal connectedness. There are internal relations of events because, in so far as events prehend others, they are constituted by their relations to these others. There are external relations of events because an event prehended by a subsequent event cannot in any way be constituted by that event. Finally there is causal connectedness because, the occurrence of an event strictly entails that of those events which it prehends, and also, as process is bound to go on, subsequent events must be sufficiently alike their predecessors to be

(1) For the other consequences of Hartshorne's denial of eternal objects refer to chapter two.

(2) Hartshorne, C. Whitehead's Philosophy. p126

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able to prehend or objectify them. The necessary ongoingness of the creative process is affirmed for two reasons; firstly, to be present is to be destined to become past and secondly, for Whitehead, to be past is identical with being a datum for some future subject. Hence it is essential for an event to be prehended by some subject although what subject is immaterial.

> "Not only does the present prehending subject require a certain past, but that past required, not indeed this particular subject, but still, some suitable subject or subjects capable of prehending that particular past." (1)

This, of course, requires that the past be indestructible, it cannot be dismissed as unreal and so incapable of influencing the present. This I take to be self evident otherwise our history, science, art all become nonsense, how can they make sense if historical events are unreal or mere fancies? For Whitehead the past 'perishes' and becomes objectified by the present and in this way all entities have immortality. In the normal process of becoming such objective immortality loses the vividness of the past but in God this objectification is uniquely perfect and complete.

II Participation

Participation is used by Tillich very much as an 'umbrella' concept and it appears throughout his system with an apparent plethora of meanings. the following analysis is based on a study of all the references to participation found in the three volumes of Systematic Theology. Tillich's other writings were not included here for two

(1) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p29

reasons; firstly, the pragmatic limitation of time and secondly, I do not believe that there are any significant Tillichian meanings of the term participation not covered within Systematic Theology.

Although Tillich never provides us with a careful definition of what he means by participation it is possible to distinguish, within his writings, three primary uses.

1. Participation within the realm of existence; i.e. beings participating with one another.

2. Participation between the realms of existence and essence; beings participate with their perfect essences from which they are alienated.

3. Participation between existence and divinity; beings participate in being itself and are thus maintained out of non-being.

None of these types are ever, in practice, perfectly realised. The first two are always ambiguous because man suffers from existential estrangement; while the third, though not ambiguous, is fragmentary because the manifestations of the divine within existence are always fragmentary.

It can be seen that the second usage of participation, namely that between the realms of existence and essense, is not divisible any further; but is simply the straightforward statement of Tillich's rather Platonic assertion that every existent being

"participates in the essences which make it what it is under
the conditions of existence." (1)

The remaining two uses of participation, however, are both analysable into a number of different meanings. Consider first the concept of

(1) Tillich, P. S.T. I p196

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participation within the realm of existence; this is used in the following ways.

(i)   Participation in the sense of polar opposition to individualisation. This along with the idea that God participates in being as its ground is perhaps Tillich's most important usage of the term. The polarity of individualisation and participation is one of the three pairs of elements constituting the basic ontological structure of reality and is, therefore, fundamental to the system.

"Participation is essential for the individual, not accidental. No individual exists without participation, and no personal being exists without communal being" (1)

Tillich describes man, under the conditions of existential estrangement, as oscillating between the two poles, aware that he would cease to if either of them were lost.

"Man as finite ... Anxiously experiences the trend from possible loneliness to collectivity and from possible collectivity to loneliness. He oscillates anxiously between individualisation and participation, aware of the fact that he ceases to be if any one of the poles is lost, for the loss of either pole means the loss of both". (2)

(ii) Participation, in the biological realm, breaking down the boundaries of 'beside-each-other-ness', and 'after-each-other-ness'. In reality these do not have an exclusive character but all elements are linked both spatially and temporally through the concept of participation.

(1)   ibid.   p195

(2)   ibid.   p221

"The space of a tree is not the space of an aggregate of
unconnected inorganic parts but the space of a unity of
interdependant elements ... The distance between roots and
leaves does not have the quality of exclusiveness. In the
same way the exclusive after-each-other-ness of temporality
is broken by the participation of the stages of growth
within each-other." (1)

The present is seen as including the anticipated future and the
remembered past through participation.

"As the space of all parts of a tree is the whole tree, so
the time of all moments of a process of growth is the whole
process" (2)

(iii) Love as participation; Love is described as:

"...the whole being's movement towards another being to
overcome existential separation" (3)

This is the point of identity between the various forms of love,
philia, libido, eros and agape all contain this 'urge toward the
reunion of the separated' which Tillich calls the "inner dynamics of
life" (4). The difference between agape and eros (used as a general
term to describe the other kinds of love) is that agape is a creation
of the Spiritual presence.

"Agape is unambiguous love and therefore impossible for the
human spirit by itself. As faith, it is an ecstatic

(1) S.T. III p337

(2) ibid. p337

(3) ibid. p145

(4) ibid. p146

participation of the finite spirit in the transcendent unity

of unambiguous life". (1)

For Tillich, however, agape is primarily the love God has for the
creature and through the creature for himself rather than the love of
man for God. This latter is described as the drive toward the reunion
of the separated, but it goes beyond any specific form of love. The
love of man for God is best characterised as the union of faith with
love.

"Being grasped by God in faith and adhering to him in love

is one and the same state of creaturely life". (2)

If we turn from agape to eros we find something of a contradiction in
Tillich's assertions. He insists that love must include knowledge of
the beloved, where knowledge is seen as:

"...the participating knowledge which changes both the

knower and the known in the very act of loving knowledge". (3)

However, he also believes that emotional participation suffers from
the same oscillation and ambiguity as was found in the polarity of
individualisation and participation; and that, while in theory, there
may be no limits to the participation of a completely centred self,
this is not so in practice.

"In the state of estrangement man is shut within himself and

cut off from participation". (4)

This means that one is unable to participate in the centre of anothers
being and that the 'drive toward reunion' is bound to fail.

(1) ibid. p143

(2) ibid. p147

(3) ibid. p145

(4) S.T. II p75

"In reality, emotional participation in the other one is emotional oscillation within one's self created by an assumed participation in the other one". (1)

Tillich may well argue that, for him, love is more than mere emotional participation but this is no real defence for he has also admitted that:

"love without its emotional quality is 'good will' towards somebody or something, but it is not love". (2)

There is either a contradiction involved here or Tillich is denying the possibility of any kind of love other than agape under the conditions of estrangement. If it is the former that is correct than clarification is required, if the latter then I believe Tillich to be mistaken.

(iv) Participation in terms of knowledge and understanding. It is impossible to know or understand something we do not participate in. Tillich asserts that everything approachable by knowledge must have the structure of 'being knowable' and that this structure includes a mutual participation of knower and known.

"Man participates in the universe through the rational structure of mind and reality... Considered cosmically, he participates in the universe because the universal structures, forms, and laws are open to him". (3)

Through these universals man too becomes potentially universal. Man is microcosmos, the world is present in him directly and in conscious encounter.

(1) S.T. III p82

(2) ibid. p145

(3) S.T. I p195

"Through the universals man participates in the remotest stars and the remotest past". (1)

I understand this as meaning not that man <u>knows</u> the remotest stars and the remotest past but rather that there is nothing intrinsically unknowable about these things. Man has the potential to know anything which shares in the universal structures, forms, and laws but in practice is limited by existence.

In terms of understanding Tillich asserts that we can only understand anything to the extent that we have experienced it.

"Understanding demands one's participation in what one understands, and we can participate only in terms of what we are, including our own categories of understanding". (2)

To use one of Tillich's own examples; the only authentic way to understand another religion is through actual experience.

"The Christian theologian can understand Eastern mysticism only to the degree in which he has experience the mystical element in Christianity". (3)

We have no way of understanding what we have not participated in or experienced, although we may be able to appreciate something on an intellectual level. For instance, one cannot understand fear unless one has experienced it although it should be possible to apply an intellectual concept of fear to the actions or reports of others.

(1) <u>ibid</u>. p195

(2) <u>S.T</u>. II p120

(3) <u>S.T</u>. III p151. This, of course, assumes the phenomenological description of religions, typified by N. Smart, as being analysable into a number of common elements.

(v) Participation as a part of the ontological element of relation. "Every relation includes a kind of participation. This is true even of indifference or hostility. Nothing can make one hostile in which one does not somehow participate, perhaps in the form of being excluded from it". (1)

(vi) Participation as a moral imperative.
    "The moral imperative demands that one self participate in the centre of the other self and consequently accept his particularities even if there is no convergence of individuals as individuals". (2)

Tillich sees this as being the basis of love in the sense of *agape* when we use this term to apply to the fragmentary but essential love of man for his fellow men.

(vii) Participation as representation in the concept of symbolism. A symbol -
    "represents the power and meaning of what is symbolised through participation. The symbol participated in the reality which is symbolised". (3)

Participation is used by Tillich, in this case, to distinguish signs from symbols. The concept of prehension cannot be used to clarify what Tillich means here, but the importance of this concept and various criticisms of it have been fully elucidated in chapter one.

When Tillich uses the concept of participation to apply to the divine-

(1) S.T. I p196

(2) S.T. III p48

(3) S.T. II p10

human relation he does so in four distinguishable ways,

(a)   The participation of God as the ground of every life.

"God is the principle of participation... The divine life
participates in every life as its ground and aim. God
participates in everything that is; he has community with
it; he shares in its destiny... The divine participation
creates that in which it participates". (1)

This is not to say that there is something alongside God in which he
participates. These statements are symbolic and must not be taken as
implying that God's participation is in any way a spatial or temporal
presence.

"It is meant not categorically but symbolically. It is the
parousia, the 'being with' of that which is neither here nor
there". (2)

It is principally a symbol for God's omnipresence, for, "his creative
participation in the spatial existence of his creatures', (3) which
he is not subject to but transcends.

(b)   The participation of God in the suffering of man and in the
conditions of existential estrangement. This seems a rather curious
idea for Tillich to hold but he finds it necessary to answer the
question of theodicy.

"God as creative life includes the finite and, with it, non-
being, although non-being is eternally conquered and the finite
is eternally reunited within the infinity of the divine life.

(1)   S.T.   I   p272

(2)   ibid.   p272

(3)   ibid.   p308

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Therefore, it is meaningful to speak of a participation of

the divine life in the negativities of creaturely life". (1)

Thus if God participates in the destiny of creaturely existence, as

its creative ground, then the collective destiny must be one of

fulfilment.   This helps with the question of theodicy because Tillich

insists that the destiny of an individual cannot be separated from the

destiny of the whole in which it participates.   Therefore, ultimately

all individuals must be fulfilled and the fact that this is not

apparent is due to our lack of understanding.   It is not within the

scope of this present study to discuss the merits or otherwise of this

kind of theodicy, suffice to say that for Whitehead this problem does

not arise.   In terms of clarification by prehension this use of the

term participation is no different to the more general usage of God

participating in everything that is.

(c) The participation of man in eternal life.

"Participation in the eternal life depends on a creative

synthesis of a being's essential nature with what it has

made of it in its temporal existence". (2)

Tillich uses this meaning of participation when describing how, in the

ever present end of history, the positive content of life is elevated

into eternity while the negatives are excluded.   Whatever happens in

creation contributes in every moment to the eternal life.

"What happens in time and space, in the smallest particle of

matter as well as in the greatest personality is significant

(1) ibid. p300

(2) S.T. III p427

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for eternal life".(1)

But eternal life is direct participation in the divine life so that everything in creation is seen as participating in God in so far as it has been positive.

"In so far as the negative has maintained possession of it, it is... excluded from eternal memory. Whereas, in so far as the essential has conquered existential distortion its standing is higher in eternal life". (2)

(d) The participation of man in the New Being. Tillich uses the word 'experience' to describe this kind of participation. It is the experience or awareness of being grasped by the spiritual presence which gives the reason or spiritual foundation for our statements of faith. Tillich explains Paul's formula 'being in Christ' by reference to participation; Paul did not mean a psychological empathy but an ecstatic participation, through which one lives in the sphere of Christ's spiritual power. This participation in the Christ takes place in the realm of his own participation in God. It is the universality of Christ's relation to God that makes it possible for everyone to participate in it.

"In terms of personal participation in his being, we do not know anyone better because his being is the New Being which is universally valid for every human being". (3)

It is this participation of Christ in God and at the same time in the negativities of estrangement which guarantees salvation. Salvation

(1) ibid. p424

(2) ibid. p427

(3) S.T. II p134

and rebirth depend upon participation in the saving power of the New Being and in the new eon which Christ brought.

"... participation in the divine participation, accepting it and being transformed by it - that is the threefold character of the state of salvation". (1)

Participation in the New Being also serves another function however, that of validating the reality of the historical existence of Jesus the Christ, although it cannot guarantee his name to be Jesus of Nazareth!

"... participation, not historical argument, guarantees the reality of the event upon which Christianity is based. It guarantees a personal life in which the New Being has conquered the old being". (2)

This saving and, at the same time, guaranteeing participation in the New Being cannot be clarified in any way by prehension. Whitehead was not interested in the classical Christian doctrines of Christology and Atonement. Participation is better seen here as a 'sharing in', rather than a 'prehension of', New Being.

(1) ibid. p203

(2) S.T. II p131

III Participation clarified by prehension

I believe that the concept of prehension can be used to clarify what
Tillich means by participation in some of the uses analysed above.
Most notably in the case of Tillich's two most important uses of the
term: participation as a polar element with individualisation, and the
participation of God as the ground of being. I shall use the above
analysis and comment on each type of participation in turn.

1 (i)   For Tillich a being participates in proportion to its level of
individualisation, the more individualised a being is the more it can
participate. The ultimate example of this, other than God who
completely transcends such polarities anyway, is man.

> "When individualisation reaches the perfect form which we
> call a 'person', participation reaches the perfect form
> which we call communion". (1)

Tillich does not explain, however, how these two poles can be
maintained and related in man; he does not satisfactorily explain what
it means for a completely self centred being to participate and it is
here that process can render assistance. In process, the basic unit
of reality is the actual occasion, and an individual being (such as a
person) is nothing more, or less, than a closely related series of
such occasions linked together by prehension. This makes absolute
identity and absolute non-identity of creatures impossible because,
concretely, any individual is a new reality each fraction of a second.

> "Each time I say 'I' the word refers to a new concrete
> reality. From a more or less abstract point of view the
> same reality...is denoted: but is not all actual value in

(1) S.T. I p195

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the concrete - the momentary states, rather than the ever identical person?...In some ways I am not myself two seconds running, and in some ways I am my neighbour. My recollections and his often largely overlap, our purposes, hopes and fears likewise: and as Royce so eloquently argued, what is the self apart from its fund of recollections, and its hopes, aim and fear for the future." (1)

We can see then that any individual being must have individualisation, in the sense of relative identity, or else its series would end. Each element in the series must have sufficient in common with its immediate predecessors to be able to prehend them. At the same time a being must participate because bonds of sympathy and empathy are not restricted to a personal series. I can feel sympathy with a past occasion in the personal series of some other individual in exactly the same way as I can feel sympathy with a past occasion in my own personal series. These sympathies are literally identical in nature not merely analogical or symbolic.

To view participation in this way also gives clarity to Tillich's assertion that we cannot separate the destiny of an individual from the destiny of the whole in which he participates. Prehension helps us to see how, in a sense, individuals are part of the whole. The whole, the totality of all occasions, is part of God and individual series' within this totality all share in the same destiny; namely to be for God, to contribute to God's concrete being. I see no satisfactory way in which substance philosophies can make such sense

(1) Hartshorne, C. from Lefevre, P. (ed.) Philosophical Resources for Christian Thought. p55

of Tillich's statements. Similarly I see no problem for this analysis in Tillich's idea that man, while participating in all levels of reality participates fully only in the level of other persons. Obviously an occasion within a human life prehends many actualities but the bonds of empathy must be strongest towards occasions in another human life. This is because such an entity will have far more in common with an entity in a similar series than it will with a more 'distant' one, even though the bonds of similarity may be strong enough for prehension. Perhaps it may be argued that prehension does not help us to understand why individualisation and participation are proportionally related. However, I see Tillich's statements as asserting nothing more than that greater individualisation is identical with biological advancement. For Tillich, levels of individualisation are linked to biological hierachy and the more individualised beings are, what Whitehead would call 'high grade organisms'. Process would say that throughout the creaturely realm there it is a range of creative freedom rather than a progression of individualisation. Each occasion is given a range of possibilities for actualisation which are relevant to it. An occasion within a human beings personal series will, therefore, have a greater range of possibilities, a greater amount of creativity, than will an occasion within the personal series of a stone. Hence we can say that, for Tillich, the higher the grade of an organism the more individualised it is and thus the more it is able to participate; while for process the higher the grade of an organism then the more it can prehend of, contribute to, or participate in its environment.

The benefits of the dialogue between participation and prehension at this point are not totally one way. While the polarity of individualisation and participation may be explained along the lines

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of Hartshorne's relative identity and relative non-identity process philosophy can also be enriched by Tillich's astute phenomenological description of the constant tension between the desire for solitude and the desire for communion. This is a combination of strengths. Tillich is at his best when describing man's existential situation, and process is one of the most rigidly defined and articulated metaphysics.

1 (ii)   When Tillich speaks of participation overcoming the exclusive character of beside-each-other-ness and after-each-other- ness he does so in both the biological and psychological realm. In the latter case he can speak of experienced time, that is the time of a living being, as participating in both the past and the future.

> "...the experienced present...includes the remembered past
> and the anticipated future in terms of participation.
> Participation is not identity, and the element of after-
> each-other-ness is not removed; but its exclusiveness is
> broken, both in reality and in awareness." (1)

In a similar fashion Tillich claims that the apparent beside-each-other-ness of cause and effect, in the organic realm, is also broken down by participation.

> "Within an organism the conditioning precedent is a state of
> the organism and the conditioned subsequent is another state
> of the same organism.   There may be causal influences on an
> organic system from outside, but they are not cause of the
> consequent state of the organism; they are an occasion for

(1)   S.T. III   p337

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the organic processes which lead from the one to the other state."(1)

The relative identity and relative non-identity of process can also explain this element of participation. If we use Tillich's example of the parts of a tree we see that, for process, such things as leaves, branches and roots are all ordered series' of actual occasions. In reaching its concrecence an entity will prehend not only past members of its own series but also past members of other relevant series'. Thus the element of beside-each-other-ness, while not destroyed, is made non-exclusive. Likewise with Tillich's example of cause and effect. It is not the external factors which create a particular state of an organism. An entity within an organisms series prehends the past members of its own series plus external entities and creates itself; the cause and effect participate in each other through prehension, within the process of becoming. Similarly, with regard to the after-each-other-ness of temporality, Tillich claims that the experienced present includes the remembered past and the anticipated future. In process the past is included within the present as prehended data, as "immortal actuality", while the "future is involved in the present as 'potentiality'"(2). In other words there could be no present without a past, because each new present occasion requires the prehension of past actuality in order to create itself. Furthermore, to be is to become data for future potential actualities, therefore, given the present the future is necessary, not as specifically determinate but as a future of some kind. Thus the element of after-each-other-ness is maintained because actual

(1) ibid. p343

(2) Hartshorne, C. Whitehead's Philosophy. p127

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occasions follow each other temporally, but its exclusive character is broken:

> "First, because the occurrence of events strictly entails that of those events which they prehend; secondly, because process is bound to go on, and subsequent events must have enough in common with their predecessors to be suitable prehendors for these".(1)

Prehension here can not take account of one element in Tillich's use of participation, namely, the distinct difference between the organic and the inorganic. For Tillich, inorganic matter is subject to the radical beside-each-other-ness of space; whereas for process there is only a difference of degree rather than a difference of type between the organic and inorganic. I do not believe this invalidates the use of prehension to describe what Tillich means by participation as I do not think the distinction between organic and inorganic is of fundamental importance for Tillich.

1 (iii) In the analysis of Tillich's concept of love we discovered something of a contradiction. Tillich speaks of love as being participation in another personal centre and yet denies the possibility of such participation under the conditions of existence. If Tillich is denying the validity of any love which does not have the participation of the spiritual presence then, I believe, he is mistaken. This position goes against common sense, which experiences feelings and acts of love in our daily lives, and can only be maintained by using the word love in a non-ordinary sense. This problem arises in Tillich for two reasons; First, he is concerned to maintain a distinction between man's existential life and his

(1) ibid. p126

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essential being, and uses participation, among other concepts, to achieve this. Unfortunately you cannot assert a qualitative difference between existential and essential love without denying the reality or value of the former. If Tillich wanted to maintain this distinction within the concept of love he would have done better to suggest a quantitative difference. Thus, under the conditions of existence, an individual can love, in the sense of participate in the personal centre of, a very few other individuals; whereas essentially an individual is capable of loving all other individuals which it encounters. This maintains Tillich's distinction between essence and existence while at the same time allowing him to assert the phenomenological reality of love. It also does not contradict the reality of agape; used in the sense of love under the participation of the spiritual presence. Process philosophy cannot help us here because it does not contain any kind of essence/existence distinction; although Hartshorne would agree that love can be both perfect and imperfect. Only God can love perfectly; man loves in an imperfect or incomplete fashion having drawn his concept of love from an intuition of the divine nature.

The second reason for Tillich's contradiction is that he is using substance philosophy to explain aspects of reality which it cannot cope with. He is fettered by the limitations of a philosophy which he is attempting to break away from - while remaining loyal to. Substance philosophy is at a loss to explain how love can be spoken of in terms of participation in another self. In such philosophies I can love myself because I just am myself, but if I love another it is across a metaphysical gulf because I am not that other. Process, however, can make such descriptions perfectly understandable. There are strong similarities between feelings of love directed to either

past or potentially future occasions in my own personal series and such feelings directed towards similar occasions in another personal series. The metaphysical gulf between beings is bridged and the concept of relative non-identity can make sense of such feelings as sympathy, love, dislike and hate.

There is an unsatisfactory element in attempting to replace participation with prehension, in this case, because the act of prehending does not decide whether an entity will become an object of love, hate, indifference or whatever for the concrescing occasion. However, I think, part of the reason for this frustration lies in Tillich's apparent identification of love with participation. If love is to participate then what is hate? If hate is exclusion from participation then what is indifference? And between these extremes what of like and dislike and other subtler shades of feeling? Surely hate requires participation just as much as love and, infact, Tillich admits this. While indifference, like or dislike may be described as participation in the periphery there still needs to be a mechanism, other than participation, to distinguish between them. Hate cannot be brushed aside as participation in the periphery of another individual, it requires something stronger and if we are going to speak of hate and love as requiring the same type of participation then we need a mechanism to distinguish them. An entity or series of entities must be prehended before it can be loved or hated and in the same way an individual must participate in the personal centre of another before love or hate are possible. This is perhaps somewhat unfair to Tillich who does speak of love as the "dynamic power of life" (1), but his

(1) S.T. II p82

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over use of the term participation is bound to lead to such problems. He does have, within his concept of love, a usage of participation which can be viewed as a special case of participation within the concept of relation and this is explainable by prehension. Tillich's phenomenological description of the problems of emotional participation goes beyond this usage of the term, however, and is well worth preserving. Tillich describes attempted emotional participation in another individual as involving:

> "...chaotic self surrender which, in an act of throwing
> one's self shamelessly, brings everything to the other one;
> but he who receives it cannot use it, because it has lost
> its secrecy and uniqueness"(1)

1 (iv) When Tillich asserts that we can only know or understand something to the extent that we participate in it I can see no useful purpose in this other than can be explained by reference to prehension. For example I know Ben Nevis to be a mountain in the Scottish highlands but how do I participate in this fact other than in terms of prehension? Process would say that I know Ben Nevis to be a Scottish mountain because at some time in the past an actual occasion in my personally ordered series prehended and objectified a past entity, or group of entities, which contained this information. Knowledge is a function potential to all actualities during their concrescence, although this potential may not always be realised.

Tillich wishes to maintain a structure of 'being knowable' for all facts which are open to our knowledge. He sees this as combatting Nominalism which, for him, cannot make sense of the process of

(1) S.T. III p82

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knowledge. This is perfectly compatible with a description of participation as prehension. Every occasion must be prehended by some future occasions and, therefore, there must be sufficient similarities between prehended and prehender to make this possible. In Tillichian language the known must have the structure of being knowable and the knower must participate in this structure or, conversely, in order to know something the knower must have sufficient in common with it. In terms of understanding, however, prehension may not seem as applicable. Understanding is of a higher order than straight forward knowledge. It is obviously true that we cannot understand what we do not prehend but this is flippant, surely understanding requires more of participation than can be explained by prehension? I do not think so; if an entity has creative freedom in its concrescence than it can choose how to objectify its prehensions. It is the entity's own decision as to how much value is actualised. If understanding is actualised then knowledge is included and greater value ensues. Similarly, the actualisation of empathy, which goes beyond both understanding and knowledge, would include the other two categories and actualise still further value. Participation in terms of knowledge and understanding then is eminently understandable on a model of prehension.

1 (v) The meaning of participation as required by the ontological element of relation was touched upon in the discussion of love. This is a very poor usage of the term participation, because it says nothing more than the obvious tautology that one cannot have a relationship with what one is not somehow related to. To use the word participate to include exclusion, as Tillich does, is to confuse our ordinary usage of the term beyond recognition.

"Nothing can make one hostile in which one does not

participate, perhaps in the form of being excluded from it". (1)
This says nothing other than the fact that hostility is somehow linked
to participation or lack of it, perhaps we could state the obvious a
little better by saying that one can only be related to something
through prehension. To quote Whitehead:

"An actual entity has a perfectly definite bond with each
item in the universe. This determinate bond is its
prehension of that item. A negative prehension is the
definite exclusion of that item from positive contribution
to the subject's own real internal constitution... A
positive prehension is the definite inclusion of that item
into positive contribution to the subjects own real internal
constitution". (2)

This allows us to point out that in an absolute sense all things are
related to one another. However, it is only when an entity is
positively prehended that the relationship becomes important or
constitutive. It is, therefore, I believe, better both
philosophically and for Christian theology (where ultimately all
things must be related to God) to speak of the ontological element of
relation requiring prehension rather than the Tillichian
participation.

1 (vi) In the case of participation as a moral imperative there is
little prehension can do, it is hardly a moral imperative to prehend –
merely a fact of existence. It is, however, interesting to compare

(1) S.T. I p196

(2) Whitehead, A.N. P.R. p56

the moral imperatives of Tillich and process. For Tillich the imperative is to participate in, and accept the particularities of, other individuals even if these particularities do not coincide with your own. In other words we must accept people for what they are and love them in the sense of _agape_. This seems rather a case of preserving the status quo and is somewhat unsatisfactory when compared to process. For Hartshorne the moral imperative does not merely require acceptance but seeks to improve.

> "... be creative and foster creativity in others... Be everywhere and always seeking ways to bring new values to life, that is the true _imitatio dei_". (1)

Merely obeying negative rules or even accepting things or people as they are is insufficient, one should try to maximise value at every moment of life. Ultimately the enjoyment of such value is experienced by God alone, man's reward being simply the service of God.

> "The essential reward of virtue ... is intrinsic and present, not extrinsic or future". (2)

This is surely the highest moral imperative and does require, in every sense of the word, participation in the personal centre of other selves.

Prehension can be of no help in clarifying Tillich's use of participation in his concept of symbolism. However there are obvious parallels between Tillich's discussion of existent beings

(1) Hartshorne, C. from Lefevre, P. (ed.) Philosophical Resources for Christian Thought. p60

(2) _ibid._ p52

participating in their essences and Whitehead's talk of eternal objects as data for prehension. For Tillich a tree is a tree because it participates in the essence of 'treehood', while for Whitehead it prehends the eternal object of 'treehood'. Both men are equally Platonic here. Tillich's essences and Whitehead's eternal objects are Plato's forms. Obviously Hartshorne would disagree with all three; but prehension is not a Hartshornian concept and he can only utilise it by subsuming mental into physical prehension.

It is when Tillich speaks of participation between existence and divinity that we see the closest correlation between participation and prehension. For Tillich, "the divine life participates in every life as its ground and aim" (1) but, we are told, this only happens symbolically, whatever that may mean. Process provides the mechanism by which God can participate in creation. In process God provides an aim for each occasion as well as providing, as the principle of limitation or concretion, the framework of order without which there could be no occasions. Moreover God is, in a very real sense, the aim of each occasion because, to echo Hartshorne's sentiment 'to be is to be for God'. Tillich adds that God has community with his creatures, by community he means perfect participation. Surely this implies no more than the process statement that God perfectly prehends and preserves all completed actuality. Tillich also claims that God shares in the destiny of each creature. What stronger sharing of destiny between God and creation is there than that provided by process terminology. God is, we have seen, the aim or destiny of each entity; every occasion will be prehended by, and immortally objectified, in God; and, at the same time, God's destiny is created

(1) S.T. I p272

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by the world. God must use the data he prehends from the world to create himself anew at each moment, so, in a literal sense, the destiny of God and the world are indivisible.

This correlation appears to be reinforced when we examine Tillich's thinking on the participation of man in eternal life. His statements on this, quoted earlier, are extremly panentheistic and reminiscent of process. In fact, one could with ease replace participation with prehension in this case apart from two factors, one minor and one insurmountable. The minor factor is that Tillich speaks of negativity being excluded from the divine memory whereas, for process, there is no negativity as such. For process the only negativity is relative and relates to lack of fulfilled potential; an entity cannot create negativity but can fail to actualise high orders of value. The insurmountable factor is the difference between objective and subjective immortality. For participation to be translated into prehension in this usage we must posit an objective immortality; God cannot prehend and maintain an occasion's subjectivity. But this will not do for Tillich who sees immortality as being the subjective immortality of the spirit - symbolically of course!

This illustrates the ultimate impossibility of clarifying such a meaning of participation by prehension. Tillich insists that any talk of God participating must be symbolic and, as I argued earlier, if we remove symbolism Tillich must either move towards process or classical theism. The concept of prehension and Tillich's concept of participation in this usage are virtually interchangeable if one uses participation literally. However, this is making Tillich a process, di-polar theist, which he does not want to be. The problem remains

one of being unable to clarify any of Tillich's assertions about God without removing his all pervasive symbolism. but if we do this we do not clarify Tillich but create another theological position.

In conclusion, I believe that we can see in Tillich's concept of participation both a difference in _type_ and a difference in _level_. The different types of meaning are analysed, in detail, above but within these we find varying levels of participation. Tillich uses the one term to cover everything from a basic 'having of relation', which is inherent in all uses of participation, to the creating and sustaining power of God. I believe that much of the confusion and dislike over Tillich's concept of participation arises from such wide ranging usage. I further believe that the concept can be greatly clarified by using prehension to illuminate the lower orders thereby freeing participation from its cloying generality.

I have argued above how prehension can be used to interpret the use of participation in the areas of: polar opposition to individualisation, overcoming after-each-other-ness and beside-each-other-ness, knowledge, and the ontological element of relation. All of these are essentially basic relational uses of participation and do not require anymore than a coherent concept of relatedness such as prehension. Participation can thus be reserved for higher order meanings. By higher order meanings I am referring to, for example, the saving participation of man in the New Being, the participation of love in the sense of _agape_, and perhaps a more dynamic moral imperative freed from participation as simple relatedness. Of course the question of analysing exactly what is meant by participation in these cases is still necessary but a start can be made by clearing away the dead wood

of lesser meanings. By cleansing participation of elements of simple relatedness we can see more clearly what is left to analyse and understand.

CONCLUSION

There are several conclusions to be drawn from this work. First, the idea of a process concept of God is, in one respect, something of a misnomer in that Hartshorne and Whitehead have quite distinct differences brought about largely by Hartshorne's rejection of all Platonic forms. This causes the two men to use the concept of dipolarity differently. It enables Hartshorne to distinguish between God and the world, while for Whitehead it provides God with a consequent or immanent aspect. The similarities are so obvious, however, that, providing we keep this difference in mind, we can speak of a process concept of God.

Second, I believe that, because of this difference, the concept of God as expounded by Whitehead is closer to Tillich's then is Hartshorne's and, therefore, is more open to comparison.

Third, and most important, I believe that the attempts to unite Tillich and process are doomed to fail because of insurmountable differences between the two. Ultimately Tillich's insistence on symbolism separates him from process dipolarity, and only by distorting Tillich beyond all recognition can this be overcome.

Having said this I also believe that in certain areas the two systems have a lot to offer each other. I conclude that Tillich's strength lies in his phenomenological insights into the human situation, while process' lies in its coherence and definition. I believe these

relative strengths can be utilised and that some of Tillich's insights can be clarified using process terminology while at the same time giving more richness and depth back to process. Examples of this are Tillich's definition of faith as ultimate concern, his description of the ontological shock, and his concept of participation.

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