


CHRISTIAN CONCEPTIONS OF SIN AND JUSTIFICATION IN THE LIGHT OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

James Stanley Barlow

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD
at the
University of St Andrews



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J. Stanley Barlow

THESIS PRESENTED BY MR. J. STANLEY BARLOW FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

I certify that the conditions of the Ordinance and
Regulations have been fulfilled.

Supervisor.

January, 1961.

CHRISTIAN CONCEPTIONS OF SIN AND JUSTIFICATION
IN THE LIGHT OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

A thesis presented

by

James Stanley Barlow

to

The Senatus Academicus

The University of St. Andrews

in partial fulfillment of the requirements

for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

in the subject of

Divinity

August, 1960

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

As I submit this thesis on an aspect of theology in the light of depth psychology, I wish to acknowledge with deep gratitude the patient and scholarly assistance of the two professors who were my supervisors: the late Professor Donald M. Baillie and the Very Reverend Professor Edgar P. Dickie, of the University of St. Andrews.

I am deeply grateful for the privilege, since 1954, of being able to continue through correspondence my conferences with Professor Dickie. He has been most gracious in taking time to supervise over such a distance, and to read the entire draft of this paper before its final revision. His criticisms and suggestions have been invaluable.

I wish also to express appreciation to Professor and Mrs. Dickie and to other members of the faculty of St. Marys College and their wives for their kindness to me and my family while we were in St. Andrews. More than teachers and advisors, they were friends who made us feel completely at home in Scotland. It would be impossible to say how much I owe to them, to the University and town in which I studied during the first two years of this research.

I am indebted to members of the department of psychology at United College for their help to me as I tried to find my way in the vast literature of psychoanalysis. Besides the libraries in St. Andrews, the National and New College libraries in Edinburgh provided access to resource material.

Since returning to the United States I have been able to continue research in the two fields, using first the facilities of the University of Oregon, and now during a year's leave of absence, the libraries and other resources open to me at Harvard Divinity School and University. For these and for the grant provided for this purpose by the Danforth Foundation, I am grateful beyond words. Also, I must thank the Westminster Foundation of Oregon for generously allowing me a year's leave of absence for the completion of this study.

To my wife Nell, who has borne so patiently with the many inconveniences attending so long a project, and who has, with her sister, Mrs. Mildred Umberger, typed the final draft, I pay tribute. And to both I express my enduring gratitude, especially as I reflect on the manuscript which I placed before them.

Also I think gratefully of my three children, each of whom has influenced the undertaking. Susan, who was born in St. Andrews, did have an economic effect upon our plans. Though the completion of the thesis was delayed, the range of material was lengthened and perhaps broadened by the added years of reading and contemplation. James Stanley, III, who was born in Oregon, has been of invaluable assistance in helping me stay close to reality in the study of the psychology of the young child. David Matthew, born a year ago, while we were at home--with relatives--in Tennessee, has caused me to re-think critically some of the postulates of Melanie Klein, for instance. I have somehow missed seeing in him any clearly defined "nodal depressive position." Here, much of my writing, re-writing, and annotating has been done down in a cellar study directly below these three at play. Their influence has been extensive.

In one final note I wish to pay added tribute to the late Professor Baillie, whose book God Was In Christ helped lead me to "grey St. Andrews by the sea." As far as we know, our Susan was the last infant he baptized, July 4th (of all dates, for an American baby), 1954. He dandled her before we had to leave our Scottish home. Earlier I had heard him deliver the paper on infant baptism, included in The Theology of the Sacraments. In many respects my re-reading of his writings and my inclusion of some of their exposition in these pages ^{are} ~~is~~, in my own mind, a memorial to him, a teacher par excellence, a friend of students.

J. S. B.
102 Holden Green
Cambridge, Massachusetts
1 August, 1960

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INTRODUCTION



The Relevance of Sin and Justification Today

In a symposium on "The Role of the Concept of Sin in Psychotherapy," Dr. O. Hobart Mowrer, a distinguished research psychologist, makes the following statement.

For half a century now we psychologists, as a profession, have very largely followed the Freudian doctrine that human beings become emotionally disturbed, not because of their having done anything palpably wrong, but because they instead lack insight. Therefore, as would-be therapists we have set out to oppose the forces of repression and to work for understanding. And what is this understanding, or insight, which we so highly prize? It is the discovery that the patient or client has been, in effect, too good; that he has within him impulses, especially those of lust and hostility, which he has been quite unnecessarily inhibiting. And health, we tell him, lies in the direction of recognizing and expressing these impulses.¹

Dr. Mowrer calls for a rediscovery of the concept of sin. He anticipates the objections to such a concept: sin cannot be readily defined; it is an unscientific concept; and morality is relative. As he both defines and defends the concept he says:

If it proves empirically true that certain forms of conduct characteristically lead human beings into emotional instability, what better or firmer basis would one wish for labeling such conduct as destructive, self-defeating, evil, sinful?

In light of the total situation, I see no alternative but to turn again to the old, painful, but also promising possibility that man is pre-eminently a social creature (or, in theological phrase, a child of God) and that he

¹Dr. Mowrer is research professor of psychology at the University of Illinois. His paper was read in a symposium. Other participants were Dr. Charles A. Curran, of Loyola University, Dr. Edward Joseph Shoben, Jr., of Teachers College, Columbia University, and Dr. Albert Ellis, of New York City. The quotations used here are from the News Release and transcripts published by the American Psychological Association, Washington, D. C., September 4, 1959.

lives or dies, psychologically and personally, as a function of the openness, community, relatedness, and integrity which by good action he attains and by evil action destroys.¹

He praises Alcoholics Anonymous as a realistic therapeutic program. Future psychotherapy, whether secular or religious, will have to "take guilt, confession, and expiation seriously and will involve programs of action rather than mere groping for 'insight'."

However, as we shall see in our study of depth psychology, we cannot accept the inference that Freud teaches that "human beings' become emotionally disturbed, not because of their having done anything palpably wrong, but because they instead lack insight." There may be a sense in which Dr. Mowrer's statement is appropriate, but, in the main, we must recognize the cardinal importance of the concept of guilt within the Freudian system of psychology. Freud considered guilt as the shaping dynamism of the mature psyche.²

Mowrer seems to be calling for a recovery of an instrumentalistic--or functional--conception of accountability.

In the debate Dr. Albert Ellis, a psychotherapist, of New York, counters with the contention: "There is no place for the concept of sin in Psychotherapy." He says that no human being should ever be blamed for anything he does.

Nevertheless he agrees that "there is such a thing as human wrongdoing or immoral behavior." He concedes that "as members of a social community, we must have some standards of right and wrong."

¹Ibid., p. 2.

²See infra, Chapter Five.

But these should be based on "long-range or socialized hedonism." Yet he would accept "any other rationally planned, majority-approved standard of morality that is not arbitrarily imposed by an authoritarian clique of actual men or assumed gods." Psychotherapists should show their patients that "they have often acted wrongly, badly, self-defeatingly by their antisocial actions."¹

Dr. Ellis describes two elements in the sense of "sin":

- "(a) I have done the wrong thing and am responsible for doing it; and
- (b) I am a blackguard, a sinner a valueless person."

He seems to be objecting to the second element. The psychotherapist's duty is to help the patient to focus on "the only real problem at hand--which is: How do I not repeat this wrong deed next time?" The patient should come to feel that wrong actions are no cause for guilt feeling or self-blaming. This is not to say that he should deny responsibility for his actions.

Dr. Ellis concludes with a statement which seems somewhat ambiguously to advocate a retention of something of the first element in the "sense of sin" as he defines it.

If, in this thoroughly objective non-guilty manner, we can teach our patients (as well as the billions of people in the world who, for better or worse, will never become patients) that even though human beings can be held quite accountable or responsible for their misdeeds, no one is ever to blame for anything, human morality, I am sure, will be significantly improved and for the first time in history civilized people will have a real possibility of achieving sound mental

¹News Release, p. 3, 4, and the Transcript of Dr. Ellis' address.

health. The concept of sin is the direct and indirect cause of virtually all neurotic disturbance. The sooner psychotherapists forthrightly begin to attack it, the better their patients will be.¹

Semantic confusion abounds in this debate as in many discussions of the concept of sin. Ellis seems to be attacking principally a compulsive sense of shame, which may or may not accompany one's awareness of having offended some person, some institution, or some rule of safe conduct. But in his attack he leaves unanswered a question which he himself seems to force into the discussion. How can we assume responsibility for "misdeeds" and not feel "blameworthy"? In the light of what we are learning about what actually goes on in one's intrapsychic world of emotions, can we expect realistically ever to be able to evoke an awareness of wrongdoing without evoking at least some degree of self-blame?

Perhaps this exchange is more illustrative than informative for our inquiry into the meaning of the Christian conceptions of sin and justification in the light of depth psychology. Mowrer favors what he considers to be a realistic concept of sin as an instrument in the psychotherapeutic technique. Ellis is repelled by any thought of using such a tool if it risks a deepening of shame

¹Transcript, p. 2.

Cf. "Emotionally disturbed people are hopeless just as long as they make no effort to change. For change, virtually by definition, requires effort; and effort usually requires a goal, an idea, a concept It is the concept of hope that negates hopelessness." Albert Ellis, "Helping Troubled People," part of a chapter, from Ellis' book How To Live With A Neurotic, reprinted in Pastoral Theology, IX, 82 (Great Neck, N. Y., March, 1958), pp. 33-41.

feelings in the patient. Perhaps the two views can be reconciled. Aside from his plea for a "socialized hedonism," Ellis' statements seem to argue that the issue is the meaning of the element of self-condemnation, the shaming sense of blameworthiness.

The term sin is further confused by that frequent use by evangelists and theologians who seem to say: "You are guilty for simply being who and what you are; you should feel responsible and guilty for things which you really cannot have avoided: your heritage, your self-concern, your twisted emotions." Sin seems to include what are often called fate and conditioning.

In the history of Christian theology we find such terms as "original sin," "total depravity," "mortal and venial sins," and "unpardonable sin," to say nothing of such categories--sometimes transferred to cinema marquees as "the seven deadly sins."

The Mowrer-Ellis exchange serves to illustrate what seems to be relevant for contemporary man in any use of the term sin. Both psychologists and theologians are dealing with this phenomenon: If a person perceives what he regards--or comes to regard--as evil, or "bad," especially when it follows his own choices and deeds, does he not seek its cause within himself and feel compelled to right what he considers to be wrong? Is not the very awareness of such "wrong" accompanied by a compulsion to undo it? Beyond this observation we face another question: How can we account for the frequent compulsion to take the blame for something even when in the objective it is not reasonably possible? Professor Archibald MacLeish, in his play J. B., is among

many--including Sigmund Freud in his own way--who insist that man in becoming man seems ever to be "in quest of guilt."¹ These questions will occupy much of our discussion to follow.

Although the concept of sin is somewhat confused in this dialogue between Mowrer and Ellis,² it does include the element of guilt (feeling): "I have done wrong. I must make restitution." Dr. Ellis takes pains to point out that another element is often interwoven with guilt feelings, namely a sense of unworthiness: "I am unclean, unworthy, valueless." Like most psychotherapists he could cite numerous examples of morbid self-flagellation, even self-hatred which has been imposed on the patient by his social environment. Self-hatred is suicidal, and by the mechanism of projection it can be murderous. It negates life and meaning.

Perhaps Christian theology in its genius can distinguish between guilt and shame (feelings). We shall examine later this possibility in the light of depth psychology. The aim of our study is somewhat "instrumentalistic." What practical, realistic, responsible use is possible for Christianity and society in its inherited conceptions of sin and justification? To be sure, these are terms of art

¹Archibald MacLeish, J. B., "A Play in Verse" (Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1957). The present writer has heard Professor MacLeish--in a broadcast interview--discuss J. B.'s quest for guilt.

²"Sin," a religious term, is used here in one way by Dr. Mowrer, and in another by Dr. Ellis. Hence they are not arguing pro and con a precise concept. To Mowrer, it is more or less the awareness of having done some wrong either by commission or by omission. Ellis stresses the element of self-condemnation. The lack of precise definition characterises much of the historical and contemporary discussion of sin. See infra, Part One.

in theology. Sin is before and against God! Justification is before and by God! In the realm of theology proper depth psychology says comparatively little. What it says most explicitly--in Freud, especially; even in Jung--can have value only in suggesting the psychic "mechanisms" and "archetypes" by which one arrives at conceptions--images (!)--of God. Yet, if we are to speak of theological conceptions of sin and righteousness, we must speak of "theological" conceptions of God.

Christian Theology and Depth Psychology

We shall pursue these conceptions not as abstractions. Our inquiry is basically concerned with the motivation, behavior, and possibilities of what Christian theology has characteristically described as "man as sinner."¹ Without over-working the explosive terminology "sinner, sinful, sin," we can focus our inquiry on the problem of man-in-his-existence-and-in-society. It is man the psyche-soma, the specifically human organism vis-a-vis his milieu.

Theology should seek light on this man not only from psycho-analytical psychology but also from others among the prolific theories of personality: including Kurt Lewin's Field Theory;² the careful, eclectic system proposed by Gardner Murphy, who is at present the

¹A characteristic hamartiological phrase: See, for example, George F. Thomas, "Man As Sinner", Chapter 8, in his Christian Ethics and Moral Philosophy (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), pp. 165-196; also, other works, to be cited in Chapter Two, notes, infra.

²For example, Kurt Lewin, A Dynamic Theory of Personality (New York and London, McGraw-Hill, 1935).

director of research for the Menninger Foundation,¹ H. A. Murray's personology,² Gordon Allport's "psychology of the individual" and "ego psychology,"³ H. J. Eysenck's cautious, critical, experimental view which treats the subject in terms of "dimensions of personality."⁴

Our study will confine itself to the schools of "psycho-analysis," including some which have grown up in reaction to certain Freudian doctrines. In our usage psychoanalysis will be roughly synonymous with depth psychology, although Freudians in Great Britain have succeeded pretty much in reserving the term "psycho-analysis."

¹For example, see Gardner Murphy, Personality: A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure (New York, Harper, 1947). Murphy edited An Outline of Abnormal Psychology (New York, Modern Library, 1929).

²For example, H. A. Murray (and collaborators), Explorations in Personality (New York, Oxford U. Press, 1938). Murray, (at Harvard), is a pioneer in relating clinical psychology, depth psychology, and social psychology.

³Some of Gordon Allport's writings which are especially relevant to theology are listed in the Bibliography, infra.

⁴Some of H. J. Eysenck's writings which are especially relevant to our study are listed in the Bibliography, infra.

Perhaps the best recent survey of contemporary personality theories is: Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindsey, Theories of Personality (New York, John Wiley & Sons, Inc., London, Chapman & Hall, Ltd., 1957), xi plus 572 pp. with index.

Pioneering in personality theory was William McDougall.

Cf. also William Brown, Mind and Personality (London, London University Press, 1926), 244 pp. He argues a unity in personality-as-such, "a unity of the mind from every point of view." He contends also for careful distinctions between "normal" and "abnormal" psychology. They are two different sciences, even as are physiology as such and pathology (pp. 267-268).

for themselves. In the United States, for instance, the term "psychoanalysis" is used for the theories and practice of the various "schools," including those founded by Karen Horney and Harry Stack Sullivan. For our purposes it seems legitimate to say simply "schools of psychoanalysis," rather than "psychoanalysis and its derivatives."¹ Sigmund Freud is regarded as the founder of contemporary depth psychology, with his theories of the meaning of dreams and his clinical interpretations of slips of the tongue and behavior which can be described as "acting out" some unconscious or irrational intent.² He himself on occasion referred to the new "science" and art as "depth psychology." It is exploring the inner world of the patient, going deep into his personal history and into his unconscious, irrational problems and motivations.³

¹Cf. H. Crichton-Miller, Psycho-Analysis and Its Derivatives, "The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge," No. 164 (London, Oxford University Press).

²A. A. Brill has translated and edited six of Freud's early formative, treatises, including The History of the Psycho-analytic Movement, in The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud (The Modern Library, New York, Random House, Inc., 1938, 1001 pp.). Freud himself did not consider these as all of his basic writings to that date. Brill did not present them as the whole story, certainly. They all appear in other translation. The works in German are found in Sigmund Freud Gesammelte Werke, Chronologisch Geordnet, Banden 1-17 (London, Imago Publishing Co., Ltd., 1948). The collection edited by Brill includes The Psychopathology of Everyday Life, The Interpretation of Dreams, and Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious, along with Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex, Totem and Taboo, and the History.

³Is psychoanalysis more "scientific" than theology? Certainly Freud, for example, thought his methodology was. However some of his confidence was perhaps illusory. See, for example, J. W. N. Sullivan, The Limitations of Science (New York, Viking, 1933, a Mentor Book, 1949-), at p. 127. Sullivan sees the dogmatic character of psychoanalytic-metapsychological theories,

Probably we are well into a new era of communication between depth psycholelogy and theology, although some of the dialogue suggests as in former times no real dialogue at all. Psychologists may inveigh against the worst in theological dogma as though it were contemporary theology at its best. At the same time theologians may be guilty of misrepresenting the insights of psychology. There should be no more reason for psychologists to attack outdated formulations as though they were contemporary theology than there is for theologians to bore in on the absurdities of a bygone psychology. Perceptive theologians of the Protestant "ecumenistic" persuasion, especially, do not ignore the correlative disciplines, including depth psychology. Too often however they fail to understand what is actually being said by someone in depth psychology, even as depth psychologists can misunderstand each other. In our study we shall attempt with diligence to avoid misrepresenting what either depth psychology or theology seems to be saying about a common concern: the problem of man-in-his-existence-and-in-society.

At the same time we shall keep in mind the corrective value in mutual criticism. Truth is served by the quick discernment by one discipline of any offensive literalism and crude reductionism present in another.

specifically, the libido theory. He says, rightly, that the Freudian libido theory is no more or less "scientific" than theological determinism (which asserts that all comes about by the will to steer clear of the excesses of deterministic formulations). There is much more to Freud's thought than his determinism, even as there is more, for instance, to Calvin's!

Nowadays we find a number of corrective disciplines in the field. Obviously depth psychology has hardly confined itself to any one clearly defined academic discipline. Nor has it seemed content to function merely as a therapeutic technique. It has been like a volcanic eruption, from which lava has flowed over the surrounding terrain. True, it functions primarily as a practical healing art.¹ Yet Freud, Jung, Rank, and the others to some extent, have provided a metaphysics and assumed a quasi-scientific posture; in short, they offer, each, his own Weltanschauung. Professor Talcott Parsons, of Harvard, points out how Freudian psychoanalysis has from its imaginative use of clinical material extrapolated social theories inadequate for the sociological and anthropological studies which they have stimulated.²

The sorties into theology proper have been dealt with by many.³ Later we shall review Freud's theory of racial guilt.

¹Of course, there is more to psychiatry than "depth psychology." Cf. for instance, Sir David K. Henderson, The Psychopathic Personality, Inaugural Postgraduate Lecture, Session 1951-52 (Oxford University Press for the U. of St. Andrews, 1952, 23 pp.). Psychiatry's view of the patient must be both broad and deep, with regard for the mysteries of inheritance and for the teleological and purposive (McDougall).

²Talcott Parsons, "Psychoanalysis and The Social Structure" - a paper written in 1950, reprinted as Chapter XVI in Essays in Sociological Theory, revised edition (Glencoe, Illinois, The Free Press, 1954), pp. 336-347.

Cf. also Sidney Hook, ed., Psychoanalysis, Scientific Method, and Philosophy (New York, N. Y. University Press, 1959).

³See, for instance, Edgar P. Dickie, Revelation and Response, The Kerr Lectures for 1937 (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1938), pp. 31-36. Also, L. W. Grensted, Psychology and God, Bampton

It is erroneous to assert or to assume that there is no God simply because he may be conceived via images of the parent and the parentifying society. "The God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ" may be conceptualized through the "mental mechanisms," including "projection." However, we still have the question: "What must we do in the presence of such a concept?" What on earth can account for such an image except the experience of mankind? Here the perception of C. G. Jung is more helpful.¹ Yet even he may be trying to conquer too much hidden territory by assumed knowledge. Clinical concepts,

Lectures, 1930 (London, Longmans, Green & Co.). Cf. David E. Roberts, Existentialism and Religious Belief (Roger Hazelton, editor, New York, Oxford University Press, 1957), at page 224, apropos of the atheism of Jean-Paul Sartre: Sartre's refutations of belief in God partake of "the genetic fallacy that how a belief came about explains just what the belief is and means." See infra, Chapter Fourteen, notes.

The works of L. W. Grensted are especially helpful and perceptive, in psychology and religion, including also: The Psychology of Religion, "The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge" (London, Oxford U. Press, 1951). Grensted and, for instance, also R. S. Lee, in Freud and Christianity (New York, A. A. Wyn, 1949), pp. 125-139, see a possible constructive use of the projection-of-the-father-image hypothesis.

¹C. G. Jung's writings on religion are numerous. Representative of his method and point of view are: Modern Man in Search of A Soul, trans. W. S. Dell and Cary F. Baynes (A Harvest Book, New York, Harcourt, Brace, and Company, first published in 1933, a collection of essays translated from the German); Psychology and Religion, The Terry Lectures (New Haven, Connecticut, Yale University Press, 1938, London, Oxford University Press). Two Essays on Analytical Psychology (revised edition, Collected Works, edited by Herbert Read, Michael Fordham, and Gerhard Adler, Bollingen Series, No. 7, New York, Pantheon Books, Inc., 1953), gives a good introduction to Jung's "Analytical Psychology." Other works especially related to our kind of inquiry are: Psychology and Alchemy (Collected Works, Bollingen Series, No. 12, 1953); The Integration of Personality, trans. Stanley M. Dell (N. Y., Farrar & Rinehart, 1939), and Answer to Job, trans. R. F. C. Hull (London, Routledge

even of mental mechanisms and of archetypes, cannot erase the fundamental mystery and the existential anxiety in which one's very nature poses its question of meaning. The theological answer to this question may well touch the "mechanisms" of the awakening mind. This much is granted: One's concept of God, as well as his lens through which he sees all social and vocational meaning, is shaped by his own experience. The lens continues to be pliant under the hand of continuing experience. But the conception of God may be either opaque or transparent with respect to the agape--the love and grace of "the God and Father of Our Lord Jesus Christ"--which seeks the individual and the society.

Organized, as well as private, religion has fostered both kinds of conception of God, the opaque, idolatrous image, and the transparent, liberating image. The Hebrew conception of God as Yahveh may well be the leaven of our expanding knowledge of nature and the universe! Perhaps we are able to muster courage to go into the unknown only because we have--however faintly--a conception of ultimate reality which is able to go with us, indeed to be there at every stage before we arrive. No idol will do. No opaque image is adequate. "He Who Creates" or "He Who Is Who He Is" is a liberating conception of God. To go one step further and to say that Yahveh is

& Kegan Paul, 1954). Writings on religion, including some of those mentioned above, have been collected in a volume entitled: Psychology and Religion: West and East, trans. R. F. C. Hull, (Bollingen series No. 31, 1953), an anthology of Jung's writings, selected and edited by Jolande Jacobi.

revealed in the realm of persons as present in Jesus as the Christ is to link power and love in our vision of ultimate reality.

The Justification of Our Comparative Study

How can depth psychology be related to Christian theology? Can these two disciplines be compared in a way that does no violence to either's genius? Our argument is simple; yet perhaps it is cogent enough.

Christian theology is essentially soteriology. The Christian gospel is a message of soteria: "deliverance," "making whole and well," "salvation." Systematic theology, or dogmatics, and philosophical theology are both derived from practical theology and beholden to it. Its concern is the communication and the implementation of this saving gospel: the gospel of "justification by grace" to man-in-his-existence-and-in-society.

Justification is the saving act and process.¹ Grace is its cause and mode. Faith is the channel. It is the subjective aspect of justification by grace. The governing concern of theology therefore is to perceive, elucidate, proclaim, and express the actual presence of the saving grace of God. At times the form which this grace takes may seem more "secular" than "sacred." The servants of the visible Church are ever in danger of saying, "He casts them out by the power of Beelzebub."² Even though they may avoid such

¹See infra, Part Three, note.

²Cf. Mk. 3:22, Mt. 12:24, Lk. 11:15.

blasphemy they frequently fail to see the soteria even when it is taking place before their very eyes.

Now, depth psychology makes no claims to be the finger of God, the saving grace of God as he is conceived by Christian theology. Yet the "art" of emotional and mental healing is in fact soteriological. Some may argue that it can be merely analogous to the dynamics of the Christian gospel. However, the practical working out of "saving grace" is beset with ambiguities, regardless of who tries to describe it, whether theologian or psychologist.

The saving act and the word about it are to be distinguished, at least logically, regardless of how they may be intertwined in our experience. The therapist's relationship with his patient (or client), as a person with a person, is perhaps the dynamic factor in the healing process. The grace of healing is incarnational regardless of what the therapist's theoretical frame of reference may be. The bringing of salvation is informed by his "theology," his philosophy, and his psychological theory, to be sure. But healing takes place; it is essentially a saving act and process.

Theologians are "justified" in attempting a comparison between the anthropologies and the soteriologies of the two disciplines. Each is essentially a soteriology. Each has both explicit and implicit anthropological assumptions and insights. Of course they differ markedly in their larger frames of reference. For instance, Harry Stack Sullivan's idea of salvation for his patient may be at the most progress through the psychological phases of developing out of infancy

into an adult heterosexual pattern of adjustment.¹ Quite obviously, the goal of Christian salvation cannot be reduced to this. Nevertheless genuine soteria may be taking place through the ministrations of a psychotherapist with a limited, or "bracketed," goal of therapy.

Were the comparison possible only via mere analogy it would be justified. Each discipline analyzes and tries to save man-in-his-existence-and-in-society.

Traditionally Christian theology has discussed this problem under the rubric of sin--or better, sin and evil. Sin is before-and-against-God, against-the-neighbor, and against-the-self. Each aspect of sin implies the other two.

We cannot expect psychology to adopt this same rubric, although Dr. Mowrer seems to argue for some inclusion of it in the methods of psychotherapy. Freud actually believed that the individual psyche comes already laden with the feeling of guilt, a racial guilt.² He chose to define it as Oedipal or parricidal. Jung takes seriously all the traditional religious and theological symbols, including the conception of sin.³ Even the more "sociologically-oriented" therapists seem to presuppose something like sin and something like justification. A "wrong" way of life

¹Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry (Washington, D. C., The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1947), pp. 28ff.

²See infra, Chapter Five.

³For example, in "The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man," "Psychotherapists or the Clergy," Chapters 10 and 11 in Modern Man in Search of a Soul, especially at p. 198 and pp. 233-244.

can be changed. The twisted emotions and "will" must be straightened out and strengthened in the "right" direction.

We do not find the depth psychologists arguing that, for this or that reason, it is better to heal than to allow the psyche to deteriorate! They simply assume that man as psyche-soma is intrinsically worth saving. Hence, without being consciously theological, the depth psychologists do seem to presuppose a kind of theology, in the sense of a presupposition of ultimate meaningfulness and value in our common existence.

Meanwhile theologians may not be conscious of the fact that they are also psychologists, at times perhaps rather poor ones. They do assume certain things about the psyche of the individual whenever they speak of him. They assume a kind of group psychology whenever they speak of man collectively. They may assume that man is highly reasonable or that he is mostly irrational in his attitudes and behavior. They may assume that he is free to choose the good if he is convinced of its goodness, or they may assume that he is relatively enslaved by the evil so that he is unable to choose the good even if he recognizes it. Some may say that he is so blinded that he cannot even recognize the goodness of the good over the badness of the bad. Variants of these psychologies have found expression within Christian theology. Regardless of their position on such traditional questions all theologians have assumed the role of psychologists in the very act of discussing man.

Hence we must see the theologian in the psychologist and the psychologist in the theologian as we approach this study. It

may well argue that each discipline should seek enrichment from the other. Despite the excesses and occasional darkening of counsel with words without knowledge in depth psychology, it goads us to a depth theology, with an ever deepening appreciation for the complexity of the human psyche, a more profound anthropology, and a more understanding soteriology.

Christian theology may in return offer assistance to depth psychology in helping it discover the sources of its own presuppositions. If the insights of theology are in any sense true for all of human life, then both disciplines can serve the same ultimate cause. In Christian language this is the Kingdom of God. Its immediate expression is the bringing of "the glad tidings of salvation."

Both Christian theology and depth psychology have a faith that human life is somehow justified, that it is redeemable or, that, in a profound sense, it has already been redeemed from the forces which would degrade and destroy its essence. They do not get together liturgically and recite the same credal phrases. But perhaps they do believe basically in the same reality. They may both be essentially agapeistic in their genius. There can be no doubt of the fact that the admitted concern and raison d'etre of each is soteriological.

What May Be Gained from Our Study?

This comparative study may bring a clearer idea of the mutual enrichment possible for theology and depth psychology.

Also it may provide criteria for a meaningful reformulation of the Christian conceptions of sin and justification. It should be of help in the semantic difficulties. Is the problem of man-in-his-existence subsumed under the rubric sin alone? Or must it be analyzed under the twin conceptions of sin and evil?

Not only should we rediscover the interrelatedness of the conceptions of sin and justification but we should see them both in the practical, though limited, light of depth psychology. We can then hope for pointers along the way to a more responsible and realistic implementation, as well as communication, of the Christian gospel of grace.

The Limitations for Our Study

As we have already seen, the Christian concern for the problem of man-in-his-existence-and-in-society seeks light not only from the exciting depths of psychoanalysis. The tragic element in existence pervades society. The "Kingdom of Evil"¹ seems to involve dynamics greater than those even of collective individual evils.

¹Here our terminology is influenced by the writings of Walter Rauschenbusch. Opposing the Kingdom of God is the Kingdom of Evil. Rauschenbusch, influenced by the Schleiermacher-Ritschl-Harnack tradition, wrestled with this idea. His idea of sin came to be virtually a concept of evil in general. Evil is that which violates the will of God, which is known to us in terms of the best interests of the "treasure of heaven," namely, human life. See Chapter IX, A Theology for the Social Gospel (New York, Macmillan, 1917). Cf. John C. Bennett, "The Social Interpretation of Christianity," in S. M. Cavert and H. P. Van Dusen, eds., The Church Through Half a Century (N. Y., Scribner, 1936), at pp. 120-121; Arthur C. McGiffert, "Walter Rauschenbusch: Twenty Years After," in Christendom, III, 1, Winter number, 1938, pp. 96-109; John C. Bennett, Social Salvation (New York, Scribner, 1935), p. 4.

Hence, as we inquire into the motivational and topographical aspects of man-in-his-existence-and-in-society we are ever conscious of the complexities, many of which are not accessible to our researches.

We shall discuss the origins and the contemporary expression of the Christian conceptions of sin and justification in order to set the stage for the more exhaustive study of the aspects offense and guilt in the light of depth psychology. Hence we risk too cursory a treatment of the vast history of the conceptions. We do neglect their expression in Roman Catholic theology. This is a calculated risk, since we have chosen to limit our study to contemporary Protestant "realistic" and "corrective" theology's use of the doctrines. However we have both Roman Catholic and Protestant legalistic expressions of these conceptions in mind during much of our critique.

Likewise the treatment of depth psychology is limited. Perhaps it should be even less sweeping.¹ But we have tried to bring together certain representative points of view, since the phenomenon of depth psychology itself is undergoing continual change.

¹As, for instance, a comparative study of the thought of one theologian with that of one depth psychologist. Since the near-completion of this thesis we have read two doctoral theses which cover some of the same ground, though in quite different ways. They are: (1) Robert E. Elliott, Sin and Neurosis: A Study of Two Perspectives Upon the Problem of Human Brokenness (Thesis, University of Chicago, 1958) - unpublished, though available in microfilm. Elliott's material is principally Augustine and Richard Niebuhr (theology) and Freud, Rank, and Fromm (psychotherapy). He seeks the common ground: viz. "brokenness." (2) Robert C. Kimball, Implications of the Thought of Tillich and Freud for Relating Theology and Psychotherapy (Thesis, Harvard, 1960). Kimball expresses the hope that other comparative studies will be made. He also focuses on the common ground, the boundary area, where Freud and Tillich seem to be viewing and trying to solve the same problems

Freud's writings are still read with seriousness. Many of his disciples seem to treat them as "scriptural" authority. However other "Freuds" have arisen, leaders of original genius, who offer for theology both challenge and insight. Perhaps we neglect C. G. Jung too much in our exposition, especially since he says much about religion and has considerable knowledge of Christian theology. Our reluctance to treat him at greater length is due (1) to the limitations of space and (2) to the highly speculative character of what he says that is different from what the others are saying. Jung says much of what the others say, perhaps. He is making unique contributions to psychotherapy as such. But his vast treatment of culture and psychology would seem to carry us beyond the scope of our limited inquiry. Such writings are more properly in the range of cultural anthropology, even as some of Erich Fromm's works are more properly to be regarded as ideological tracts for the times than as clinical depth psychology.

We have also neglected somewhat to include former studies of religion and psychotherapy. By now there is an abundance of literature by theologians which relates especially practical theology to depth psychology.¹ The work of David Roberts on Psychotherapy

(anthropological). He goes so far as to suggest that though Professor Tillich's expression is "theological," the substance of his message is from psychotherapy (p. 235). This observation seems a bit too selective and circular; i. e., seeing as substantial only that which is psychotherapeutically substantial. This nevertheless valuable study will soon be available in microfilm.

¹Books which have been consulted include the following: Seward Hiltner, Pastoral Counseling (N. Y., Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1949);

and a Christian View of Man seems outstanding in coming to grips with the theoretical--or doctrinal--dimension.¹

Our research has been stimulated by this literature. A general reading of such works and of the journals devoted to religion and psychotherapy² is presupposed throughout our discussion, although we have limited occasion to cite these works.³ Our research has been primarily in the writings of practicing depth psychologists themselves, notably, Freud and Freudians, Jung, Alfred Adler, Otto Rank, Karen Horney, Harry Stack Sullivan, and a man who founded no school of analysis, Ian Suttie. His papers, included in his posthumously published volume The Origins of Love and Hate were such a rewarding find for this research that we have consulted them at every stage

John G. McKenzie, Nervous Disorders and Religion: A Study of Souls in the Making, The Tate Lectures, 1947 (London, Allen & Unwin, 1951); John G. McKenzie, Nervous Disorders and Character, The Tate Lectures for 1944 (London, Allen & Unwin, 1946).

Other relevant works are: J. A. C. Murray, An Introduction To A Christian Psycho-Therapy (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1938); Leslie D. Weatherhead, Psychology, Religion and Healing (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1951); And earlier works: H. Crichton-Miller, The New Psychology and the Preacher (London, Jarrolds, 1924); W. Fearon Halliday, Psychology and Religious Experience (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1929); Thomas Hywel Hughes, The New Psychology and Religious Experience (London, Allen & Unwin, 1933); Clifford E. Barbour, Sin and the New Psychology (London, Allen & Unwin, 1931).

¹David E. Roberts, Psychotherapy and a Christian View of Man (N. Y. Scribner's Sons, 1950). Another book which deals with the two disciplines systematically is: William Graham Cole, Sex in Christianity and Psychoanalysis (Oxford University Press, 1955).

²These include: Pastoral Psychology and The Journal of Pastoral Care (see Bibliography, infra).

³Provocative theological treatments include also: W. R. Matthews, The Problem of Christ in the Twentieth Century, The Maurice Lectures (London, Oxford University Press, 1950), in

of our inquiry.¹ Suttie, himself a psychiatrist, developed his own theories out of his extensive clinical practice and his wide reading, but vis-a-vis Freud, Freudians, Jung, and Adler.

Freudians included in our treatment of depth psychology include thinkers as different as Melanie Klein and Erik H. Erikson. They are studied not so much because of their differences but because of their depth of perception within their particular frame of reference. This guiding principle holds true for the inclusion of the several differing schools of depth psychology: Jungian, Adlerian, Rankian, and the so-called revisionist (Horney and Sullivan and others). It is the principle which accounts for our inclusion of Ian Suttie.

which he deals with the inferences for Christology of both Freudian and Jungian theories of libido and the unconscious; especially: Albert C. Outler, Psychotherapy and the Christian Message (New York, Harper, 1954); and Lewis J. Sherrill, Guilt and Redemption, The Sprunt Lectures, (Richmond, Virginia, The John Knox Press, 1945). Sherrill makes a constructive application of the implications of agape in therapy.

Provocative also are the writings of Anton Boisen, a minister and sociologist, who himself has suffered psychotic illness, from which he recovered, and which he has interpreted autobiographically with reference to the experiences of men like George Fox and John Bunyan: Anton Boisen, The Exploration of the Inner World (New York, Harper, 1936, 1952); Cf. his Religion in Crisis and Custom (New York, Harper, 1945, 1955).

Also, we mention the significant work of the Academy of Religion and Mental Health. E. g., Religion, Science, and Mental Health, "Proceedings of the First Academy Symposium on Interdiscipline Responsibility for Mental Health - A Religious and Scientific Concern" (New York, N. Y. University Press, 1959), 107 pp.

¹Ian D. Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate (London, Kegan Paul, Trench Trubner, 1935, 148-). Although in some respects a

Our research in the writings of these various thinkers has been guided by our basic question: Is there light for the Christian conceptions of man-as-sinner and of justification-by-grace-through-faith?

The Method--or Path--of Exposition

In Part One we shall try to bring into clearer focus the Christian conceptions of sin and justification by reviewing their Biblical origins and suggesting important facets of their contemporary expression.

In Part Two we proceed to examine "man-as-sinner" in the light of depth psychology. How does man-in-his-existence-and-in-society appear through the lens of depth psychology? We must examine the nature of man as subjective-self-within-his-psyche-soma-world of feelings and constructs vis-a-vis his milieu, as this is elaborated by the various schools of depth psychology. Hence the opening question will be: Who is the sinner? meaning: From whence within the complex inner world of the individual comes culpable--accountable, as well as non-culpable, wrongness? We are in quest of the subject-self. Then we must examine the nature of guilt feelings, the individual's own assumption of guilt and responsibility. We encounter complications such as that which we have already seen in

difficult book to read, it is remarkably extensive in both range and depth of perception. Cf. L. W. Grensted, The Psychology of Religion, pp. 61-62.

See also Part Two, notes, infra, re: Suttie's work.

Ellis' definition of a sense of sin. Hence study of the nature of guilt feelings will lead us on in our quest to consider the complications of shame, of anxiety, the meaning of despair, and the complications of self-concern.

Following this our principal question, we shall treat in Part Three, somewhat more briefly, the presence of justification in the act and process of psychotherapy.

In the Conclusion we shall bring together the threads of our inquiry and suggest certain "realistic" and responsible directions for Christian theology's use of these two conceptions: sin and justification.

We now proceed to Part One and first to our review of the Biblical origins of the ideas of sin and justification.



PART ONE



THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTIONS OF SIN AND JUSTIFICATION

CHAPTER ONE

THE BIBLICAL ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPTIONS OF SIN AND JUSTIFICATION

Sin in the Old Testament

We do not find one systematic doctrine of sin in the Old Testament. Most of the terms for "sin" are objective, simply describing error or the deviation from a norm. The most common words are based on the root חטא (h t '). It refers not to motive or inner quality, but simply to mistake, missing the route, or failure to do something in particular. Thus, as Gottfried Quell says, "the commonest expression for sin in Hebrew lacks the deep religious quality of our word."¹ These חטא words were used for breaches of civil law, deviation from the moral standards of the group, and the breaking of the rules governing personal relationships.

¹A principal source for our linguistic study of the conceptions of sin and justification is Gerhard Kittel, editor, Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament. Our references are to Bible Key Words, translated and edited by J. R. Coates (New York, Harper, 1951).

Alan Richardson, editor, A Theological Word Book of the Bible (London, SCM Press, 1950), has also been consulted, along with various other commentaries and studies. The reference to Gottfried Quell is to Gottfried Quell, George Bertram, Gustav Stahlin and Walter Grundmann, "Sin," in Bible Key Words, III, p. 7. Cf. Richardson, A Theological Wordbook, p. 227.

A smaller group of words translated sin are built on the stem שׁוּׁ (p sh '). This root word seems to go beneath the surface act to get nearer the underlying motive. It means rebelling and connotes a more active and less formal aspect of behavior. Human responsibility is stressed. In Isaiah 1:2 it is used in describing the sons rebelling against the fathers. Jeremiah (2:29) uses it to depict man trying to initiate legal proceedings against God.¹

A term that occurs two-hundred-and-twenty-seven times in the Old Testament is שׁוּׁ (' v h,) which has both a secular and a religious use: to twist. The noun has more of a religious connotation, stressing guilt. Cain says, "My שׁוּׁ (' a v o n) is greater than I can bear."²

A verb meaning to err is שׁוּׁ (' sh gh h). Its noun is used to express "creaturely going astray."³ Although it describes a deviation from the right path, it implies a good intention. In Job 12:6 we encounter the term, where it connotes something like the Greek idea of fate: man is entrapped in a kind of wrongness which prevents him from reaching his goal. God denies him the ability. This term is used in Isaiah 28:7f for example, where the drunken priest and prophet are described as reeling to and fro.

¹Bible Key Words, III, p. 10ff.

²Ibid., pp. 5-6, p. 22. The reference is to Genesis 4:12.

³Ibid.

Other roots which are used in describing irrational wrongness are

הָרָחַק (h r h) and שָׁחַט (p sh ').

In the Wisdom literature the conception of sin seems to be of a kind of wayward ignorance.

The term used most often for "sin" ("evil"!) is שָׁחַט (r sh '), which occurs two-hundred-sixty-one times.¹

Leaving the study of the Old Testament's terms for "sin" and "sins," we seek the origins of the Christian conception also in the over-all mentality of the developing Hebrew religious culture. The story of Adam's fall has been regarded as the locus classicus for the idea of sin as the "original sin." It has been used to describe the condition of man as sinner. The story of Noah is another account of mankind's falling into sin.²

The story in the third chapter of Genesis, of Adam and Eve in the garden of Eden, yielding to the temptation to eat of the forbidden fruit and thus incurring the punishment of eviction and denial of the fruit of the tree of life, deals with the problem of evil in general as well as that of specifically culpable wrongness. There hangs over this story an air of inevitability. Like Prometheus, man-in-Eden wishes to be as God. Here he wants the added faculty of knowing good and evil. He gains it but at the price of great suffering. Knowing good and evil proves to be too much for

¹See Ludwig Köhler, Theologie des Alten Testaments, (Tubingen, Verlag J. C. B. Mohr--Paul Siebeck, 1947), pp. 159-160.

²Genesis 6:1-8 and following.

man. He seems to lose something: "In the day thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." As we read the story we cannot help identifying ourselves sympathetically with the characters. It is an intensely human, although metaphorical, account of what the author has experienced himself.

First, one is in a state of innocence. Then he is jolted into a state of tragic knowing and of mental suffering. The exit, as described in the tale, coincides psychologically with one's own strivings. Hence, the almost universal conviction is: I am what I am by willing it so whether I like it or not. The exit is from dependent harmony out into guilt and enforced independence. "By the sweat of thy brow shalt thou earn bread." Such an awareness of having been evicted--such conviction of "sin" (?)--lives side by side with the attitude which absolves the self from guilt in the name of determinism. This is in the story too: Adam refers to the determining influence of "the woman 'thou gavest me'; Eve blames the serpent. The serpent represents the sinister presence of evil in human life even before human culpability.

Nevertheless the story does seem to stress Adam's free choice. His disobedience was voluntary. He is culpable--if what he did was actually wrong. There seems to lurk a doubt about whether it was really sinful. There is no question but that it was a free and wilful act in defiance of an injunction. But was the injunction right? The serpent seems to be the only spokesman who is in direct opposition to it. But the narrator leaves some doubt as

to his own opinion. Would man be man without the knowledge of good and evil? What kind of being is this Adam of paradise?

The temptation is described as being practically irresistible. The serpent--with whom also the reader, if not the narrator, is able to identify himself as a "reasonable" creature--talks reasonably, voicing man's grievance against the fate decreed. The penalty is surely out of all proportion to the offense. "Yea, hath God said" God must be trying to hold man under, to deny him further development. Surely the command is a selfish one on God's part. The serpent urges Eve to break her "bondage" by eating the fruit, thus receiving what God tries to keep for himself only. "Ye shall be as God, knowing good and evil."

Is this story supposed to read backwards as follows? We are deprived of the benefits of Eden simply because we tried to be ourselves, knowing good and evil. Therefore we must have been forbidden the privilege of knowing good and evil, a privilege which we indulged anyway. The story does seem to describe roughly the introduction to life which everyone who develops beyond infancy seems to get. By nature we are in a state of eviction from paradise; that is, we who are no longer infants.

What are the consequences of the woman and man's yielding to the temptation to indulge their "humanity," to partake of what seemed good for food, good to look at, and a probable source of wisdom?

(1) One consequence is that sense of shame, which Dr. Ellis has described as the second element in the sense of sin.¹ "They saw that they were naked."

(2) They are suddenly overcome with loneliness, the sense of being cut adrift, separated from God. They have fallen from their accustomed security, the erstwhile harmony of life in Eden. Their friend has become their judge. He is now as a hostile stranger to them. They have no one else to take his place, and they had depended on him. This is his world. Without him they can do nothing. Hence they are hopelessly alienated from the very creator of their being. He now stands over them as a judge.

(3) A third consequence is their coming to know how absolute is this disparity between themselves and God. They are aware of their total inadequacy in the mysterious universe. Tragic is the disparity between their actual powers and their new knowledge.

(4) A fourth consequence is their overpowering sense of doom. The sentence is hard and final, however unjust it may seem. They are evicted from the beautiful, peaceful garden. They are denied the assurance of continued life. All the woes of mortality are seen as the direct consequence of their disobedience, their one act of rebellion against the will of the erstwhile friendly Creator of life.

Mankind's fate is luridly set beside that of the snake, which crawls on its belly in the dust. What an eloquent, almost

¹Supra, Introduction.

obscene, description of the banality of man's existence! The author, or authors, reads as theology what he sees the actual lot of humanity to be.

As the personality develops out of early infancy, he seems urged from within and from the outside to realize his own individual destiny, to grow in knowledge and to conquer the world so to speak, by knowledge. Ian Suttie calls the process "psychic weaning."¹ Freud sees a series of clearly defined crises, climaxing in the Oedipus complex.² Otto Rank sees it as the emergence of the individual will--via counter-will, necessary for progress in individuation.³

The story of Adam's fall assays to tell more than the story of an individual's psychogenesis. Yet how could the author's own experience of infancy and of emerging from its innocency have failed to inform his narration? In any case, the perception of the allegory seems to be profoundly that of an introspective genius. The story says that for man as man the situation of his existence seems impossible if he risks knowing the awful truth. The story unmercifully pits man against God. Everyone who reads it at all sympathetically must relive his own unequal conflict: a mere mortal--who is nevertheless ambitious to overcome his mortality and to establish his own inner strivings as being essentially related to the very meaning of the universe--confronts the actual universe. He

¹Infra, Chapter Four.

²Infra, Chapter Four.

³Infra, Chapter Five.

finds it indifferent to him, if not hostile. He is at once urged on to fulfill his strivings. This is depicted by the argument of the serpent. At the same time he is urged to recognize his place as a mere creature who must adapt to the will of God--he must simply fit into the greater design of animals and things. To be in any sense an individuated being he must assert himself. He does. In asserting himself he takes on too much. He experiences feelings of unworthiness, inadequacy, alienation, hopelessness, doom. He suffers throughout his life and finally dies. The more elevated his vision of himself, the more drab and tragic seems the death to which he must inevitably yield. To believe in himself as he aspires to be is to contradict the end fact of his existence. This is the dilemma with which the story of the Fall deals. Man makes a poor substitute for God when he falls back upon himself. His self-image is as woefully inadequate as an idol.

Taken by itself this story is a pessimistic--or at least a realistic--allegory which ties up all the evils of man's existence with the fact of death. Man can choose between continuing in a kind of post-natal, even fetal, stupor (the state of innocence in the garden) and becoming conscious of his relative independence and responsibility (knowing good and evil). To be homo cogitans he must pay the price of lonely suffering and death. To exist is to exist. But to know that you exist is to know that you die.

Quell makes much of the story's emphasis on "knowledge." He sees it as what Kant defined as practical reason, the power to

make judgments and to act on them, "which exalts man to a divine sovereignty in the sphere of his own affairs."¹ It is possible to interpret this story as teaching that such knowledge is the germ of sinful behavior. The qualitative leap is into practical reason! However the Old Testament doctrine as a whole does not focus on knowledge as such as the locus of sin. It is the will. Lucifer said, "I will be like the most high."² The prophets addressed their hearers as wilful collectives and wilful persons who should change their goals and their behavior.

Certainly, however, the name given to the forbidden fruit in the garden story is by no means a merely incidental and arbitrary detail. We may see here a further correspondence with depth psychologists' descriptions of the child's mounting desire to know, even to achieve godlike power through knowing.³

As it is appropriated by Christianity the story of the fall of Adam emerges as a part of a new optimism. "As in Adam all die,"

¹Bible Key Words. III, p. 26; Cf. p. 30.

²Isaiah 14:12ff.

³Cf. Freud's conceptions of omnipotence feeling, gnosiphilia, or epistemophilia, to which we shall refer again in Part Two, infra.

says the apostle Paul, "even so in Christ shall all be made alive"¹

The "sin" of Adam--and of all of us--is overcome in Christ.²

We need only mention the long history of the theological commentary on the third chapter of Genesis and the argument over what essentially was the nature of the eating of the forbidden fruit. To Augustine it was the fall from rational control of one's will into sensual irrationality: concupiscence.³ To the Reformers this fall, even if it did involve man in concupiscence, was a fall into the bondage of the will to the sinister power of evil, a twisting of the whole personality away from its center in God back upon itself as center.⁴ The characteristic term of this arrogant willing to be like the Most High is hubris, sometimes almost synonymous with pride.

Our way of interpreting the Old Testament literature is influenced more by textual and critical studies than was that of the

¹I Corinthians 15:20-28.

²Our discussion of the story of the Fall follows that of Quell in Bible Key Words, III, p. 23ff., consulting also: Cuthbert A. Simpson, "Exegesis," Genesis, Chapter Three, and Walter Russell Bowie, "Exposition," The Interpreter's Bible, Vol. I (New York, Abingdon, 1952), pp. 501-515. Cf. G. Ernest Wright and Reginald H. Fuller, The Book of the Acts of God, "Christian Faith Series" (New York, Doubleday, 1957), pp. 60-64 (scholarly, while stressing the doctrine of original sin). Cf. Robert Mackintosh, Christianity and Sin (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1914), pp. 50-53. He says that original sin was not a dominant pre-Christian doctrine.

³Cf. a representative statement by Paul L. Lehmann, that Augustine's view of original sin and the fall is complex, although it does come close at times to being the libel which Pelagius contended it was against human nature, especially in Augustine's writings on Marriage and Concupiscence. - Lehmann, "The Anti-Pelagian Writings," in Roy W. Battenhouse, A Companion to the Study of St. Augustine, Chapter VIII (New York, Oxford U. Press, 1955), pp. 203-234, at p. 221.

⁴See infra, Chapter Two.

Reformers, not to mention their more Biblicistic successors of the Seventeenth Century. We are warranted in taking a fresh look continually at the Biblical sources themselves, which are the anchor of the Church's tradition, with its various explanations of the nature of man-as-sinner and of his possible justification.

The Old Testament is the cumulative library of a national religion. "Sin" against God can include minor violations of ceremonial laws, even hygienic laws, all of which take on a religious significance. We have a conception of sin in the priestly tradition, as in the prophetic one. The Wisdom literature links righteousness with the virtue of rational foresight and discipline. In certain of the psalms we read of "sinners" as a group or class of people contrasted with the "righteous." The dutifully righteous in ceremonial and moralistic, external, matters seem to have been the "spiritual" leaders who most obstructed the "Spirit of Christ," to whom the New Testament bears its witness.

Of course the dominant theme in the Old Testament is God and His community Israel. The community stands before God. Israel is in a covenant--b^crith--relationship with God. The community is like a person who has "cut a covenant"--made a solemn indenture or contract--with his neighbor. In another figure, the nation is likened to a wife toward her husband. Israel is in a marital-like relationship of love and loyalty to God.¹

¹Notably, Hosea.

According to Deuteronomic religion in the Old Testament, national sin is a breach of the covenant. The sin of the individual is to be interpreted in the context of the national stance. The individual, in a sense, represents the community. His wrong is the community's wrong against God. Hence, his guilt is primarily for having offended God--the God of the community. It is, secondarily, against the community--which he has misrepresented.

The stories of the fall of man from the state of innocence and harmony actually serve the function in Genesis of pointing up the drama of reconciliation. The real story of "the Beginnings" of Israel is that God by grace provided a way for the alienated community (Adam and Eve; the people, after a purging, in the days of Noah) to be restored to a good relationship with Himself.

Genesis traces the covenant from the situation of Adam to the saga of Abraham, whose descendants were to be as the stars and as the sands in number. The promise is repeated to Isaac and to Jacob--or Israel. In this covenant idea we confront the "chosen people" mentality, which is by no means restricted to the Israelites. Indeed, as it is appropriated by Christianity in the concept of a "new Israel" it continues to be used for good and perhaps also for ill in Christendom.

In the prophets, like Isaiah and the Isaiah "school" of writings,¹ we meet an elevated and expanded view of Israel's

¹Without entering into the discussion as to how many different prophets may be represented in succeeding generations in the Book of Isaiah, we refer here to what may be called the Isaiah corpus of writings.

relation to God. Israel is His servant with a mission to the world, a religious mission which transcends nationalism and imperialism. In the context of this higher prophecy sin is offense against the vocation of Israel to be a kind of spiritual savior for the world. "Sin" is acting against the "will of God," which is defined in terms of harmony, justice, and peace. It covers a world larger than Israel alone. Even in Jeremiah,¹ and Ezekiel,² who say that everyone will henceforth be accountable for his own "sin," the guilt is against the God of the community of Israel. It is the sin of the community against its soul and mission, which derive from God.

In conclusion we may say that in the Old Testament sin is defined as offense against God and against the community as God wills the community to be. Sin is disobedience to God, the God who stands over the community and commands by event and by the word which correctly interprets the event.³ The truth in the interpretation appeared in subsequent validation of the prophet's word by events. The understanding of the will of God developed through a process of "word" and event.

The consequence of disobedience, breach of community, offenses, is alienation. The covenant, even that marked by the giving

¹Jeremiah 31:27-30.

²Ezekiel, Chapter 18.

³We must not overlook the obvious fact that in the life of Israel the prophet himself was an event as well as the interpreter of events.

of the tables of the Law to Moses, is always a covenant of grace. God offers the reconciliation, the restoration. The community and its members are called into a new obedience.

Traditionally, Christian theology has regarded the covenant as a symbol of the restoration of meaning to the human race after the loss of essential harmony and direction. This is quite explicit in the writings of Paul, as we shall see in the discussion of the conceptions of sin and justification in the New Testament.

Sin in the New Testament

The New Testament follows the Septuagint in using hamartia as the principal term to denote offense against God and its accompanying guilt. It is used to denote sin (1) as a single act, (2) as a characteristic of human nature, and (3) as a personal power of evil.

In its Greek usage it connoted failure or mistake. Plato used the term to express wrongness as flaws of art and poetry, contrasting it with orthotes. Aristotle meant by hamartia "missing the mark," through lack of strength, skill, or knowledge.¹

The New Testament writings reflect knowledge of the Septuagint and of the Apocryphal writings--many of which, no doubt, were regarded as a part of "The Scriptures." The Greek rendering of the

¹Gustav Stahlin, "Greek Usage," Chapter IV of Book Three, Sin, in Bible Key Words, III, pp. 46-52, at p. 46.

Old Testament probably presents a more concise and unified conception of sin than does its Hebrew antecedent. It emphasizes sin as that which separates man from God.¹

Of course we do not find one systematic conception of sin spelled out in the New Testament as a whole, although we do see considerable development beyond the pre-Christian Hebrew theology. The Synoptics and The Acts of the Apostles do not present a unified doctrine of sin. Hamartia is used for specific actions. Jesus spoke of sin as debts in Matthew's rendering of the disciples' prayer and in the parable of the debtors.² Over against man's debt Jesus places God's forgiveness. God offers forgiveness to man the debtor. In the legal system to which sin-as-debt alludes, the debtor must suffer punishment. If he refuses forgiveness of his debt he must face the judgment. God is man's judge. He offers to forgive the debt. Jesus is using an old Judaistic idea. Judaism had long insisted on the readiness of God to forgive the truly repentant. But in Jesus' use of the concept: God takes the initiative, seeking out the debtor and offering him the forgiveness! Jesus demonstrates this by himself mingling with the so-called "sinners" of society and eating with them. He was known as a "friend of sinners." Thus he offended the tastes of the recognized spiritual leaders of the times.

¹George Bertram, "The Doctrine of Sin in the Septuagint," Sin, *ibid.*, pp. 33-38.

²Matthew 6:12, Luke 7:41ff., Cf. Walter Grundmann, "Sin in the New Testament," Sin, *ibid.*, at pp. 68-70.

In speaking of "sin," Jesus addressed his harshest remarks to those who liked to be recognized as "the righteous" in contrast to "the sinners."¹ The self-righteous were "righteous" only in the sense of being compulsively devoted to the external religious code of the would-be theocratic nation. They were actually sinful because their spirit was opposed to the Spirit of God.² They went so far in their opposition to the good work of Jesus--his bringing of health and wholeness--that they accused him of being the instrument of the Devil. This confusing of goodness with badness was the extreme of obscurantist opposition not simply to the agent of the goodness, but, said Jesus, to God himself.

Jesus saw the worst offenses as (1) leading others astray;³ (2) self-congratulating, play-acting, hypocritical, formalistic, hence obscurantist, "righteousness";⁴ and (3) actual--if not conscious--blasphemy against the presence of God in our midst: the failure to expect Him, to recognize the good as it actually does overcome the evil.⁵

¹For example, Matthew 23. Cf. discussion in Richardson, op. cit., p. 228.

²For example, Mark 3:20-30.

³Matthew 18:7ff., Luke 17:1ff.

⁴Matthew 16:3ff., Matthew 23, Luke 11:44.

⁵Mark 3:28-30, Matthew 12:31-32, Luke 12:10. Cf. discussion in Robert Mackintosh, Christianity and Sin (New York, Scribner, 1914), p. 72 (after Canon E. R. Bernard, "Sin," in A Dictionary of the Bible--see Bibliography, infra).

Although Jesus did not formulate an elaborate doctrine of sin, his mission seemed to focus on removing its power. "I came not to call the righteous but sinners to repentance."¹ "The Son of Man came to seek and to save the lost."² His battle was not only against culpable wrongness, but also against illness of body and mind, and against the despair in death.³

In the parable of the Forgiving Father, whose elder son failed to share the Father's compassion for the "prodigal son," Jesus treated of theology proper as well as hamartiology and soteriology.⁴ God--the God whom he served and represented--is like a loving Father toward the very elements in society whom the "elder brother" status elements condemn out of hand. No one and no attitude represent God truly unless they actually rejoice at the prodigal's return; indeed, unless they actually go out to meet him. The context of the parable, with the stories of the lost sheep and the lost coin, seems to say: the truly "righteous"--or Godly--goes out to try to find the erring one, the straying sheep, the lost something of value. The truly "righteous" tries to restore the "unrighteous" to harmony and meaningful existence.

In the parable of the sheep and the goats, or "The Last Judgment," Jesus teaches that the truly justified way of living is

¹Matthew 9:13. ²Luke 19:10.

³Traditionally, the distinction is between sin as guilt and the power of sin (and evil).

⁴Luke 15:11-32.

to accept "the least of these my brethren"--the least "like me" (?) of humanity.¹ Both groups are surprised in this scene of krisis, of judgment--as separation of the good from the bad, of the worthful from the worthless! The "blessed" have not been conscious that they have followed the way that leads to life and worth as contrasted to death and waste. "When saw we Thee?" Inasmuch as they accepted their neighbor (including the stranger) in his need they accepted the Christ! The "cursed" are equally surprised. They have not been conscious of following the path away from life and meaning as they rejected and ignored their neighbor (including the non-status elements, and the stranger) in his need! In rejecting or refusing to accept the least like the "son of man on his glorious throne"--the essential humanity, the Christ--they have rejected Him and life itself! Men and nations--groups of men, collective man--are judged, separated (:), by their acts of choosing, even when they may be unaware of the implications of their attention and "selective inattention."²

The God whom Jesus proclaimed and demonstrated is agapa-
istic! Jesus approved and infused new meaning into the ancient summary of the Torah: Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy being and thy neighbor as thyself.³ The Fourth Gospel depicts him

¹Matthew 25:31-46. See the discussion by T. W. Manson in Major, Manson, and Wright, The Mission and Message of Jesus (New York, Dutton), pp. 540-544.

²Harry Stack Sullivan's phrase. See infra, Part Two.

³Matthew 22:37-39.

as giving a new commandment: "Love one another as I have loved you," he said to his disciples shortly before he was taken captive by his enemies.¹ He washed his disciples' feet.² He served them. Greater love has no man than this: that he lay down his life for his friend!

Quite clearly therefore Jesus' teaching about sin stressed the wrongness in refusing or failing to accept others in their need and to serve them. His view of "others" and of "need" was profound beyond all subsequent attempts to trivialise it. It is as he said, according to the Fourth Gospel, "The words that I speak to you; they are spirit and they are life."³ His impact on our problem of man-in-his-existence-and-in-society is spiritual in its genius and in its power. The neighbor's need is for sustenance in realising his essential humanity.

Jesus invited persons to seek the Kingdom of God and His righteousness.⁴ By inference then, not to seek it is to lose out on the meaning of life.

The stories of his own temptation disclose Jesus' triumph in his own personal battle with the anxieties that form the temptation to offend against the essential humanity in one's self, in neighbor, in society, to offend against God. Jesus refused these three responses to anxiety:

¹John 15:12-17. ²John 13:1-20. ³John 6:63.

⁴Matthew 6:33.

(1) To live by bread alone. The neighbor is not simply man in his economic need.

(2) To fall down and worship the power of evil, the sinister destructive forces that affect and inform our existence, whose "justification" seems only power as power though corrupt. The neighbor is not simply man in his need to get along, to have power in adjustment with the powers that be.

(3) To put God to the test, by leaping off the pinnacle of the temple, trusting God's angels to bear him up. The neighbor is not simply man in his need for security, desiring a magic sustenance in all his undertakings, demanding supernatural verification: "sight" instead of "faith".¹

Paul expanded the Synoptic view of sin, perhaps without materially changing it.² To him hamartia is an active force, often personified, as a rival power holding man in its sway, trying to keep him from the salvation offered by God in Christ. It is a dynamic, dictatorial regime under which all men are enslaved. It is the elan behind man's alienation from God his Creator. Paul spoke of Adam's sin in the garden of Eden as the original sin for the whole race of mankind. Sin reigned from Adam to Moses.³ With his

¹Matthew 4:1-11, Luke 4:1-13. The allusion in our last statement is to II Corinthians 5:7.

²Sin is viewed both formally and materially. Paul's major contribution to hamartiology seems to be in his analysis of the sinister power of evil.

³Romans 5:12-21.

Judaistic orientation Paul taught that sin had taken on a special character since the time of Moses and the giving of the law. Any breach in the harmony of life prescribed in the decalogue is recognised as sin. The law therefore is a device not for creating sin but for detecting it. By the law is the knowledge of sin.¹ Paul goes beyond the pharisaism of his times when he denies that righteousness by legal observance is even possible. Like Jesus,² the Apostle understood the interior character of sin. It could actually motivate its assumed opposite: legalistic perfectionism.³

The salvation desired and offered is deliverance from the dominion of this sinister, pervasive, enslaving power: hamartia--sin and death. The Synoptics depict Jesus as proclaiming the good news of the reign of God and urging men to have metanoia--a change of heart, a change of direction--and to accept the forgiveness offered by God.⁴ Paul casts the theme in the theological perspective of God-in-Christ. He can go so far as to describe himself in his erstwhile self-righteousness as the chief of sinners.⁵

The Synoptics speak of the death of Jesus as being for the remission of sins and for the ransom of sinners.⁶ In both the more explicit theology and the implicit teaching of the Synoptics, as

¹Romans 3:20; 7:13. ²Mark 7:1-13.

³Romans 3:27-31, Chapter 4, and I Corinthians 13:1-3.

⁴Mark 1:14-15. ⁵I Timothy 1:15.

⁶Cf. Gustaf Aulen, Christus Victor, trans. A. G. Hebert (London, 1931).

Professor Donald Baillie reminds us: Jesus' life was integrated with his death in a redemptive mission. He lived for sinners. He died for sinners.¹ There was no change in character in Jesus' manner of dying. It is simply the consequence of his manner of living. Paul says that God was in Christ--living, dying, rising from the dead--reconciling the world unto himself.²

In Romans, Paul describes the two realms: sin and righteousness, identifying the latter with Christ, and with being en Christo.³ Christ, whose realm is righteousness, liberates man, who is in bondage to sin. The man who is liberated shares Christ's death as though it were his own death to sin when he by baptism is identified with Christ.⁴ The result is a redirection of desire. The dynamic of sin for Paul, as for John and James, is in the emotions, when sin is seen in the subjective dimension. Underlying

¹Donald M. Baillie, God Was In Christ, "An Essay on Incarnation and Atonement" (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1948), p. 183.

²II Corinthians 5:19. See Baillie, ibid., p. 201ff.

³Romans 16:7; II Corinthians 5:17.

Cf.: James S. Stewart, A Man in Christ (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1935); Albert Schweitzer, The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle (London, Black, 1931), pp. 205-226: Paul's "en Christo" is like Jesus' "Kingdom of God," p. 223 and pp. 376-396. Rudolf Bultmann construes the phrase to refer to being in the "body" of believers, the "body of Christ." We see it as primarily "an eschatological formula."--Rudolf Bultmann, The Theology of the New Testament, Volume One, trans. Kendrick Grobel (London, SCM Press, 1952), p. 311; also Bultmann, Primitive Christianity in Its Contemporary Setting, trans. R. H. Fuller, Living Age Books (New York, Meridian, 1957), pp. 197-198.

⁴Romans 6:4ff.

hamartia is epithumia, translated lust or desire. Epithumia has a broad meaning which includes the kind of self-assertiveness against God which classical theology has seen in the Fall.¹

Although Paul describes sin as a state into which man is born and as an independent force which enslaves him, he does not lose sight of human freedom. Yet such freedom seems to be possible only for the liberated, the Christian, man, as Luther later expounds it.² The person who is free from the bondage of sin is he who has accepted the grace of justification offered by God in Christ.

The apostle teaches that sin and its temptation persist even in the life of the Christian. He speaks of the "old man" or "old nature," the Adamic nature--or "old Adam," and describes the ongoing struggle between the two laws within man: sin versus righteousness; the law of the flesh (the mortal man) and the law of the spirit.³ It is possible to sin against the community, the ideal of community--the body of Christ, other Christians, and Christ himself.

¹Cf. Galatians 5:17: It "must be understood in a comparative sense as the mania for self-assertion over against the claim of God, which bursts into flame when challenged by the commandment." Grandmann in Bible Key Words, p. 79. Loosely, epithumia is libido in depth psychology. Freud never broke clear from identifying psychic "life" energy with sensual, sexual desire.

Jung has given libido a less reductionistic meaning. See, for instance, Jung, "Freud and Jung--Contrasts," in Modern Man in Search of a Soul (Harvest Books edition), pp. 120-122.

²Infra, Chapter 2.

³Romans 7:7-25.

Sin, as in the Old Testament, is primarily against God, the creator and source of life and of righteousness. As in the Old Testament, sin is a breach of community. It is against others in that it mis-represents essential humanity before God.

Paul cannot speak of sin apart from death. Death too is depicted as a power which enslaves man and robs him of the meaning which is possible for his life. Death is the crowning evil, the end result of the law of sin. It is described as the consequence of the disobedience by Adam and Eve in the garden. The "law of sin and death" is defeated only by Christ and his resurrection. In Adam all die. In Christ shall all be made alive.¹

In the Epistle to the Hebrews the prevailing idiom differs from that of Paul. We find ourselves in the world of the Old Testament priestly ritual, yet with a compelling reinterpretation. Our guide seems to be steeped in Hellenistic culture. "Sins" are acts of wrongdoing. But the underlying idea of sin is that it is running counter to the will of God as it is revealed in Christ. The unforgivable sin is to refuse forgiveness, to reject God's mercy--indeed, his specific implementation of that mercy in the priestly and sacrificial work of Christ--and the free way of life which it opens for the individual. The unpardonable sin is to spurn "the Son of God."² This strong metaphor is used for the attitude which turns indifferent to the good news of justification by the grace of God in Christ. Sin is self-justification, or else, indifference to

¹I Corinthians 15:22.

²Hebrews 10:29.

justification. Eternal death is the price one must pay who rejects the gospel after he has once received it. Hebrews more than implies that one may fall from this grace of justification. "It is a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God."¹

The Epistle of James, which has often been contrasted with the writings of Paul, which Luther called "an epistle of straw," speaks of sin in dynamic terms. Psychologically the root of sin is epithumia (desire), even as it is for Paul's discussion of the subjective dimension of hamartia. James' treatment is pragmatic and not so theological as Paul's, however. The writer sees the following progression: desire, then sin, then death.²

Both First Peter and the Johannine writings stress sin as the negation of love. It is all but identified with hatred, but hatred as rejection. Sin is the rejection of the love of God and is manifest in the failure to love others! This hateful offence against God can be overcome only by His love as forgiveness. But to receive justification, the sinner must be born anew, so to speak. He must have a change of heart so that he can receive God's love. In the Johannine literature the symbol of light³ is dominant, along with life and love. Faith is a response to the Light of Life, the love, grace, and truth in Christ.

¹Hebrews 10:31.

²James 1:15. Epithumia, in James, "corresponds exactly to the [rabbinical] evil inclination," says Grundmann, op. cit., p. 85.

³Cf. Edgar P. Dickie, God Is Light (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1954).

The Fourth Gospel uses, along with hamartia, anomia and adikia to denote the attitude and behavior which run counter to the law or commandments of God. Sin is lawlessness and unrighteousness. Man is in a state of darkness, of condemnation, a state of sin, thus separated by his very wont from God. Jesus said to the self-righteous leaders of the nation, who boasted in being descended from Abraham: "You are of your father the devil."¹ Only those who receive Jesus Christ are allowed to become the children of God.² The sin described is a deep-seated emotional force. To receive Christ is to receive the power, or active right, to become the children of God. "You do what your father did!"³

God's coming to man in Christ--Ho Logos, the word of God in personal expression--is the invasion of darkness by light, giving opportunity to those condemned already to accept a new nature. The judgment of sin is the krisis: the separation of light from darkness. "They are condemned already"; that is, they who sit in darkness are in darkness already. If they choose the light they are saved from the darkness. If they love darkness rather than light and choose to sit in darkness still, they judge themselves. They choose not to be caught up into the new aeon which the light brings.⁴

If a man rejects this proffered salvation he simply remains in his sin and dies in his sin.⁵ Rejecting the grace of God is the

¹John 8:44. ²John 1:12; John 8:39ff. ³John 8:41.

⁴John 3:19. ⁵John 8:24; John 3:18b.

sin unto death.¹ Christ opens a way out of darkness. The sin unto death is refusing to use the exit, which is the entrance to life.

All unrighteousness is hamartia.² However, not all hamartia is unto death! A momentary lapse into the ways of darkness need not mean the rejection of the Light and of the salvation which it gives.

He who acknowledges his guilt is forgiven. Sin is made worse if it is denied.³ Indeed, the Johannine writings, by their use of the darkness-light motif and their insistence on honest confession suggest that sin is essentially obscurantist choosing against the light, against the grace, against the way of life. Darkness, self-defeating misery, "death," are by choice where the Light has come! Indeed there is an obscurantism unto death. Death is the opposite of the reality which the believer sees in the Light, in the Christ.

In the Apocalypse we see the dramatic conflict of sin against righteousness. The latter gains the complete victory in the end. This is a deeply joyful affirmation in the midst of suffering. Sin, by the individual and by the group, is rejecting God as he is revealed in Christ. The choice is depicted as being a clear-cut either/or. One can reject the revelation of God in Christ by adulterating it with the idolatry of the culture which it confronts. Rejection can take the form of simply being indifferent

¹I John 5:16ff. ²I John 5:17.

³Cf. I John 1:5-10, 2:1-14.

or undecided, lukewarm, toward the new reality which has broken into the world of human affairs.¹ Sin is essentially rejection of Christ as King, rejection of his Kingdom, which is the only, authentic telos of human effort and history. The elements of life which are not caught up into this realm will be destroyed as waste.

The Kingdom of God may appear to be weak. But it is the only lasting reality.

It seems almost a travesty to try to thread all of these strands together regarding the nature of sin as it is treated by the various schools of thought in the New Testament. We note differing emphases, but little if any contradiction. Nowadays, in the light of depth psychology and under the mandate to deal with our problems with as lucid a terminology as possible, perhaps we should subdivide the conception--or category--of sin as we find it especially in Paul and the Johannine theology. Instead of denoting by our term sin all of the phenomena which they could subsume under hamartia, perhaps we can serve better the cause of truth and clarity by using two categories: sin and evil! Evil is the larger, inclusive category, which they call darkness and the way of death, which Paul treats as an independent force, a demonic counter-force to the saving, loving, grace of God. Evil is the tragic element in our existence. Sin may better be reserved for that wrongness which

¹Cf. Revelation 3:15-22.

is culpable: the culpable, accountable, relatively free, choosing of despair against the hope offered by the grace of God.¹

Sin is eminently a religious category. It is offense against that which alone is worthy of the devotion of human beings. It is settling for some anxiety short of concern for the Kingdom of God. It is failure to love God with one's whole being and to love one's neighbor as oneself. Since Christ is the fulfillment of the Law--the Torah--sin is failure to accept him, his way, his ethos, his grace!

In the Pauline writings the sin seems to be, for man as he confronts the new reality which Christ represents; refusing to leave in spirit the old Adam--the old way of thinking and planning, in order to partake of the new, to be in Christ rather than in Adam. Yet the thrust of Paul's writings seems to be toward community in

¹Compare with such an "instrumentalistic" argument for our own contemporary use of the term sin the following conclusion as to the doctrine of sin in the Bible, in the book by Quell, Bertram, Grundmann, and Stählin:

"(i) Sin is as fundamental a characteristic of this world as the fact that it has been created; (ii) sin is man's rebellious self-assertion over against the claim of God, not only on the part of certain Promethean individuals, but universally, as an essential of all human existence; and (iii) the whole meaning of redemption is concentrated in the forgiveness of sins. This is what distinguishes Christianity from Hellenism and from Judaism. To understand this is to understand the fact of Christ." Bible Key Words, III, p. 87. Italics, ours.

Our own contention is that if we are ever to get at the problem instrumentalistically we must make a clear distinction logically between accountability and over-all evil--or "the demonic." Contrary to the frequent objection, however, such a distinction by no means requires a surrender of the larger category: it merely insists upon careful distinctions within it.

Christ, rather than private, insulated, piety--or simply sainthood in isolation from the community. The meaning of life is not to be seen in the ancient saga of Eden and the Fall but in the recent account of Jesus of Nazareth and the Resurrection. The meaning is not to be discerned so much in the Torah--the Law of Moses--as in the righteousness of God revealed in Jesus Christ.

Yet, at the same time, the man in Christ, though a new creature, with old things having passed away and all things having become new,¹ is nevertheless, in his existence, still the man in Adam. The law in his members continues to do violence to the law of his spirit, but his faith is that he is forever delivered from the law of sin and death in its telos. He is being saved. His is the telos of God's salvation en Christo.

Everyone is a sinner. The sinner "being saved" is still a sinner but one who sins only despite his new orientation. He desires to live in harmony with God and with his neighbors, a harmony which is beyond mere adjustment out of fear. It is the harmony due to the agape of God being shed abroad throughout his psyche.² He chooses the Kingdom, the grace, the justification of God.

Actually the New Testament conceptions of sin presuppose throughout the evangel, the gospel of salvation. In other words, the Christian conception of sin presupposes the Christian conception

¹II Corinthians 5:17.

²Admittedly we are taking great liberty with the phrase "en tais kardiais hemon." Romans 5:5.

of justification by grace! Hence, when we treat of the contemporary expression of these conceptions we shall treat them together. Meanwhile we shall review the origins of the conception of justification in the Old and New Testaments.

Justification in the Old Testament

The term justification derives from the word for righteousness. Righteousness is that positive, affirmative, harmony to which sin is the negation. Justification is not a prominent term in the Old Testament. However the idea is there. Psalm 51, for instance, expresses fervently the desire for justification. Here the desire for forgiveness, as in Psalm 130, for example, includes the yearning for restoration to whatever relationship has been breached and disrupted by the "sin."

Righteousness, judgment, and justice are frequent renderings of Hebrew words used to describe such harmony with the will of God. Hebrew terms like מִשְׁפָּט (mishpat), "judgment," צְדָקָה (cedheq), "justice," "to be right," "to justify," חֶסֶד (hesedh), "mercy," or what George Adam Smith called "leal love,"¹ and חֻק (hoq), "statute," like בְּרִית (berith), "covenant," have both a theological and a juristic use. It is not known what the relationship may have been originally between the two kinds of usage. Whatever the

¹Hosea and Micah come to mind especially. Cf. George Adam Smith, The Book of the Twelve Prophets, new and revised edition, 2 vols. (Garden City, New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1929).

relationship, God is depicted as the Judge, as one who defines righteousness by his very nature, and as the mind behind the events of nature and history. Hence a personal or national misfortune is often interpreted as an unfavorable verdict by God.¹

Martin Luther's momentous rediscovery of the Pauline doctrine of "justification by faith" has impressed on theology the importance of one of the many statements which support the Lutheran interpretation, the succinct summary text: "The just shall live by faith." Actually Paul was quoting Habakkuk 2:4 and rendering the meaning quite freely to express his theology.

Gottfried Quell expounds the saying in Habakkuk as meaning simply: Man escapes the death which his enemies have planned for him, by maintaining an unflinching faithfulness to God's commandment.² The Old Testament word for faith is אֱמוּנָה (emunah), which means "steadfastness," "fidelity." "Abram believed God and it was reckoned to him for righteousness."³ He depended on God. He trusted Him. He committed himself to a way of life which relied on God.

The righteous man is the man who is appraised to be what he should be by the eternal and ultimate Judge of human value. "Justice" in the Old Testament is defined by this theology. Hence

¹Our discussion here follows rather closely the presentation in Gottfried Quell and Gottlob Schrenk, Righteousness, in Bible Key Words, IV (New York, Harper, 1951). Cf. Norman H. Snaith, "Just, Justify, Justification," in Richardson, ed., A Theological Wordbook of the Bible, pp. 118-119.

²Bible Key Words, IV, p. 7.

³Genesis 15:6.

righteousness in a person, as in a nation, means inner wholeness, health, harmony, the order which was believed to prevail throughout the universe--God's creation. Thought presupposes God: He is the beginning of all reflection. In the beginning God was active. God created. All that He created was טוֹב (Tov), "good."¹ Righteousness is the integration of self which is at peace with God and with the community that demonstrates his will. Righteousness means right relations.

Hesedh, the Old Testament term which lies behind the New Testament words for mercy and compassion, includes the idea of loyal love. It denotes the inner quality of the righteousness which the prophets emphasized, notably Hosea, who appealed to a responding love in wayward Israel, who was like an erring wife, whose husband continued to forgive her and to seek to restore her to a right relationship.

The events of history were interpreted in a way which pointed up the meaning of righteousness as well as that of sin. Goodness was sanctioned by peace and prosperity. Evil was bound to be somewhere in the life and attitude of the community whenever bad times prevailed or calamity befell the nation.

But we do have the paradox which is featured in the book of Job. Why do the righteous suffer? The dualism between God and his adversary--righteousness and evil as forces behind the scenes, dramatically depicted anthropomorphically--is introduced. Thus

¹Genesis 1:18.

culpable wrongness and tragic evil seem to be distinguished. The book ends proclaiming the justification of God, while underscoring the finitude of man. Job's suffering had not been because of his sin. However, in the midst of his suffering he had sinned. The tragic, non-culpable wrongness that had swept into his life occasioned culpable wrongness. This sin was not so much his ignorance as his wilful, too exclusive, reliance on his own inadequate knowledge about the meaning of the plight of man in his existence under God. The story says that he should have recognized his inadequacy and foregone the agonizing censure which he directed against God.

The story of Job teaches that justification, the act of being considered righteous, is not necessarily manifest in the life circumstances of a person or of a nation! In other words, death and the shocks that flesh is heir to, though they are often thought to be the effects of sin, are by no means to be regarded as the sure sign of unrighteousness. They may actually accompany righteousness. They are the lot of the justified as well as the unjustified. Despite the lesson of Job however, there is, even in the epilogue, a disposition to reward righteousness by rescinding the sentence which seems so irreparable as the destiny of man according to the Genesis story of the Fall. There may be a tendency in the epilogue to undo a bit the profound doctrine that evil is one thing and sin is another with respect to material prosperity. Without sinning one may be the victim of tragic evil. The epilogue hints that without sinning one may be temporarily deprived but that his

righteousness will win for him in time even the material prosperity. Yet the man Job died--at least we do not gather that his latter good fortune included a kind of return to Eden with access to the tree of life.

Both Job and the man of fidelity in Habakkuk must have died, on this side of Eden. The manifest dimensions of justification in the Old Testament are temporal and this-worldly, although not without spiritual significance of a high order. Later, Christian constructions placed upon the conception a beyond-death significance, which transcended the emphasis on achieving meaning via progeny, the perhaps dominant telos for the individual in patriarchal Israel.¹ In the Christian era, the promises given men in the Old Testament are spiritualized and applied to eternal dimensions.²

The Old Testament as a whole is not greatly concerned with eschatology. Therefore the admonitory passages about death as the reward of the wicked should be read in a temporal sense. To live may mean, in addition to living on in one's progeny, to have honor and to have a "stay of execution" before the inevitable "sleeping with the fathers." Death is as a sleep. The wish of the righteous was for a peaceful sleep. Perhaps such a wish served often as a motive for devotion to the law.

¹Cf. "Familial immortality" as the hope of the Jewish people, according to Otto Rank, Psychology and the Soul, trans. by William D. Turner from Seelenglaube und Psychologie (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1950), p. 77.

²Cf. I Corinthians 15:42-50.

To be righteous, to be justified in the eyes of God, meant to live in harmony with God and with the community which is beholden to him, as he revealed himself in event, in word, and in tradition.

In later Judaistic legalism the conceptions of sin and justification became somewhat hardened. They were first given a spiritual twist. But then they were externalized. To be justified, to be righteous, seemed to be an obsession with the pharisees of the New Testament period. Indeed, the very force of Paul's corrective theology may be in part due to his own conditioned concern for justification. Luther's reforming zeal was that of a monk and priest who centuries later came to the discovery after a similar conditioning in a time when the official religion had become quite externalistic in its conceptions of sin and justification.

No doubt every age has had a great many who have simply taken their justification for granted. In the Old Testament, as in later periods, we encounter the quest for justification in those men who for some reason have an urgent desire and need for forgiveness. They must make restitution; they feel compelled to undo their wrongs or the wrongs of society. For examples, we think of David, after he had Uriah murdered in order to take Bathsheba, of Hezekiah after he witnessed the profanation of the temple, of the remnant of the Southern Kingdom, which finally returned from the Babylonian captivity to the ruins of Judah. These all sought justification in the sense of restitution and restoration to their former situation. They desired a return to a "righteousness" which they felt

they had squandered or betrayed. To their minds "righteousness" represented a situation of well-being and right relations. Nevertheless justification by grace does not appear as a fully developed doctrine in the Old Testament. It is introduced to us as a specific conception in the New Testament, notably by the Apostle Paul.

Justification in the New Testament

The New Testament meant more by the term dikaïos than did the Greek culture, from which it borrowed the word. For Greek writers it meant "right," "being in line with tradition," and at times "beautiful," "good," "fitting," and "justice."

The Septuagint pictured ho dikaïos, "the righteous man," as one who obeys God in the theocratic community.¹ God himself is described as dikaïos, also.

By the time Christianity burst upon the scene, Judaism had introduced teachings about rewards and punishments and drawn a legalistic boundary between "the righteous" and "the sinners," as we have noted earlier. The term dikaïos was used to describe teachers and prophets. The synagogue loved the expression "Messiah our righteousness."²

Jesus seemed to recognize, at least for purposes of discourse, the traditional Jewish contrast between the righteous and

¹Bible Key Words, IV, p. 16.

²Cf. Jeremiah 23:5, 6; 33:15; Zechariah 9:9; Bible Key Words, IV, p. 17.

sinner. But he emphasized love as the ultimate test of righteousness.¹

As we saw, during our discussion of Jesus' conception of sin, there are implicit criteria in the stories of his own temptation: in the wilderness, right after his baptism, and later in Gethsemane, we should add, when he prayed for the cup of suffering and death to be taken away from him, yet conquered the wish with the prayer: "Not my will but Thine be done."² Jesus' conception of justification, his "doctrine" of meaning in life, of reconciliation, of salvation, is radically opposed to three kinds of reductionism: (1) economic, (2) political, and (3) "religious." He was opposed to economic reductionism for an anthropology, to political relativism for an ethics, and to religious arrogance for a "philosophy." Hence, we can say, Christianity in its genius is opposed to ideas of salvation (1) by bread alone--by mere economics or by materialistic melioration alone; (2) by uncritical adjustment (bowing down to worship "Satan") to "life as it is" - by opportunistic relativism; and (3) by faith in magic (putting God to the test, making of him a kind of great magician!)--by arrogant, superstitious presumption.³

¹Cf. Luke 14:4; See Bible Key Words, ibid., pp. 22-23.

²Mark 14:36.

³Cf. supra, pp. 42-43.

Doubtless the stories of Jesus' temptations¹ are in the New Testament literature to point up the contrast between the new order and the old, the "new Adam" and the fallen Adam. The "second Adam" was tempted even as was the first. But he refused a self-seeking, self-centered solution. Somehow he was strong enough to respond in a truly "righteous" manner to temptations which human nature seems incapable of resisting--at least without radical reorientation, like that which he himself taught, namely a pervasive concern for the Basileia tou Theou, the Kingdom of God. The temptations were all real: Jesus felt the pull of "bread alone" reasoning, of submissiveness to the powers that be, of religious showmanship. In Gethsemane he was for a moment--or for alternating long moments--toying with the idea of avoiding, perhaps by escaping, the ordeal he knew was coming. He resisted the temptation by refusing to leave his chosen orientation. He continued to pray, to battle it out with the temptation--the anxiety, and to force himself again and again to the chosen goal of his ministry: "Thy will be done."

"Not that my hunger should be satisfied, but that life should be given to men." This was Jesus' orientation. "Not that I should rule over the visible order of the world by submitting to its obvious sanctions, but that God-and-goodness alone should be served!" "Not that I should demonstrate that God is with me, but that God's agape--love--should be revealed to those who do not feel that He is with them."

¹If these are reports of actual happenings, they must be based on Jesus' own account of his ordeal.

Paul was overwhelmed by such a vision of righteousness, the dikaiosune tou Theou in Jesus Christ. He then reacted strongly to the Judaistic tradition, which he himself had been representing with arder. He began reiterating an almost forgotten note within the heritage of Judaism: "There is none righteous; no not one."¹ Yet he described the Christian way of life by the term righteous.²

Dikaiosune in Greek usage meant "justice in government" and, also, "judgment." In the Septuagint and in the New Testament it often means simply "doing right in the sight of God." The Johannine literature stresses the definitive nature of Christ's righteous life for the Christian conception of righteousness. Righteousness is a gift of the Kingdom of God.³

James, who is intent on refuting both legalism and quietism, stresses that righteousness is practical love and obedience to the will of God. His idea is far removed from the tendencies in Judaism to think of righteousness as earning merit by obsequious legal and ceremonial observance.⁴

As was indicated earlier, the doctrine of justification by grace through faith was given its fullest expression by Paul. His interest in the problem was fostered by his own knowledge of and former long adherence to the rabbinic tradition. Saul the pharisee had been accustomed to look for "a righteousness of the Law"-- construed in terms of the careful observing of precepts. As we

¹Romans 3:9-20. ²Cf. Romans 10:1-4; 6:12-14.

³Schrenk, ibid., p. 37. ⁴Bible Key Words, ibid., pp. 38-40.

have noted, according to the Synoptics' and the Fourth Gospel's portrait of Judaism, the official emphasis on righteousness was concerned with externals, outward show, rather than inward love. Jesus could call it whitewash for sepulchres.¹

After his conversion from Jewish legalism Paul began using his keen dialectical powers to point out the satisfying change his new faith was making in his accustomed mode of thinking. As Gottlob Schrenk says, "Justification became the battle-cry of his mission because it expressed a new understanding of the relation of Christ to the Law. Paul uses the sacred word of Judaism--righteousness--in the service of his polemic against the Jewish conception of the Law."²

The Pauline reaction to Judaism is regarded in many ways as a recovery of the Old Testament prophets' emphasis on righteousness as hesedh--an inner dynamic of loyalty and love which impelled a person toward the wholeness and harmony implied in the conception of "the righteousness of God." But Paul dealt more directly with the Old Testament idea of God as Judge, demanding obedience and rewarding it while punishing disobedience.

In Paul the rabbinical idea persists that only "the righteous" can have fellowship with God. But Paul departs from rabbinical orthodoxy when he says that therefore no one is actually eligible for such fellowship. No one can achieve righteousness on the basis of his own merit. Only God's grace, taking action through

¹Matthew 23:27.

²Bible Key Words, ibid., p. 41.

Christ, can bring about the desired relationship. This righteousness by faith in Christ includes both justice and mercy. The Hebrew understanding of michpat, gedheq, and Desedh are all implicit in the Pauline conception of justification.

The solution to the problem of sin which Paul construed as (1) guilt, (2) the power of evil and (3) death, is justification by grace, the grace of God in Christ! All men are in a state of rebellion against God. Even the cosmos reflects this state of affairs.¹ Likewise the righteousness of God is to be seen in a universal setting. Even as the state of sin began with an act and continues as a dynamic force in man's very nature, so the righteousness which confronts it is primarily an act of God in Christ, a dynamic which affects the entire human race. It is a dynamic as active as "the wrath of God" and the sinister result of sin, namely, death.² The saving act of righteousness as it did battle with sin and won the victory once and for all was hilasterion--propitiation, restitution!--identified by place and time at the cross of Christ,

¹Romans 8:19-22. Cf. Allan D. Galloway's brilliant study, The Cosmic Christ (New York, Harper, 1951).

²Viewing Romans as a development of the theme announced in 1:17, rendered "He who through faith is righteous shall live," Anders Nygren sees the liberation as (a) from the wrath of God (Romans 5:1-21); (b) from sin--through baptism to serve righteousness (6:1-23); (c) from the Law (7:1-25); and (d) from Death (8:1-39)--Part Two, of Commentary on Romans, trans. Carl C. Rasmussen (Philadelphia, Muhlenberg Press, 1949), pp. 187-349. Cf. "When the faithfulness of God encounters the fidelity of men, there is manifested His righteousness. There shall the righteous man live. This is the theme of the Epistle to the Romans."--Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, trans. by Edwyn C. Hoskyns (London, Oxford U. Press, 1933), p. 42.

where the way of the Law has met its logical end.¹ Always, in Paul, God is the source of righteousness. It is defined in terms of Him.

At times, it is true, Paul speaks of righteousness in a juristic, forensic sense, as though it is the innocence which is declared by a Judge who finds the defendant not guilty. But this very figure, though it smacks of legalism, serves to point up the radical nature of the dikaiosune tou Theou, since it suggests that its effect is to accept as innocent one who is not righteous in and of himself. Hence, there can be no room for arrogant self-righteousness even on the part of the man who tries to live by faith. He depends on a righteousness which is not his but God's.

By justification Paul means forgiveness, reconciliation, and the very character--as righteousness--of God in action. Justification is a continual communication of the very substance of eternal life to man, not however as an infused grace hardly distinguishable from man's own energies.²

¹Bible Key Words, IV, p. 43. Cf. Romans 3:21, 25, 26; 5:9ff., II Corinthians 5:18; Galatians 3:13.

²The so-called dialectical or crisis theology is probably right in insisting that the very life of the Christian "conception" goes out of it when the grace is conceived as resolving the dialectic, the "God-over-against-man-ness." Here is the ancient problem of nature and grace. If the two are identified, the dialectic--with its creativeness (?)--is lost. Yet even in this view there is an essential humanism. According to Karl Barth, "The humanity of Jesus is the image of God. We cannot, however, find God's image in other men as it is in Him."--David Cairns, The Image of God in Man (New York, Philosophical Library, 1953), p. 173, where he is discussing Barth's Dogmatik, III, 2.

Cf. Paul L. Lehmann's critical study of Ritschlian theology in the light of the early writings of Karl Barth, Forgiveness,

All men die. Death seems a denial of the ultimacy of justification. Therefore justification can be accepted as such only by faith, by depending on God to affirm it beyond the apparent negation implied by death. "The wages of sin is death," says Paul, "but the gift of God is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord."¹

Yet Paul does not simply declare and elaborate a doctrine of justification and teach that it should be assumed in spite of contradictions. He himself believed it to be a dynamic force which fights against the sinister evil which he has described as sin. Even as sin works within man, so justification works within him giving him access to the tree of life, to the "fruits of righteousness" even on this side of death. Faith is not simply a hopeful assumption, a kind of hopefulness about life. It is part and parcel with the grace of justification, "the means whereby the individual is drawn into participation in the consequences of the saving event," says Schrenk.²

To be justified means to become forthwith a member of "the Body of Christ." Justification by faith is itself dynamic, although it is not conceived as being a special psychic force. It is the determination of the whole personality to rely upon God's saving

Decisive Issue in Protestant Thought (New York, Harper, 1940). Guilt is the tension between man's disobedience and his responsibility in the face of the divine command (p. 150). But with the command comes the forgiveness, the grace, which is the affirmation of the possibility en Christo; "no excuses can be accepted" (pp. 151ff.).

¹Romans 6:23. ²Schrenk, in Bible Key Words, IV, p. 47.

act in Christ. But this determination is movement, not a listless, passive surrender. Rightly understood, there seems to be no contradiction between Paul and James: justification by faith is no excuse for idleness; it is actually a new dynamic for meaningful activity.

The term dikaioo¹ and the family of terms based on dikaioo--including dikaioisune, dikaiois, and dikaiois--belong first to the language of salvation and only subsequently to that of ethics, in the New Testament, especially in the mind of Paul. Yet he seemed to take for granted the rabbinic idea of the Last Judgment according to deeds (works) and saw no contradiction between it and justification by the pure mercy of God.²

Although they belong first to soteriology in the logic of the New Testament the dikaiois family of words is used to describe the ethics of life. In this connection it is important to remember that righteousness is, first and always, a dynamic concept. It does not denote quietism at any stage. It is teleological, leading to the royal domain of grace, whose law is agape--love and acceptance, and to eternal life, the life of the new aeon, the new reality, the new creation.³ Dikaioisune means "both the righteousness which

¹As in Romans 5:16, for example.

²Romans 3:19-20; 5:18-19; 8:33; II Corinthians 5:10, 15; Galatians 2:16. Schrenk, Bible Key Words, IV, p. 64. Also, ibid., p. 17.

³The "new aeon" or "new age" is in contrast to "this present age" or aeon. Cf. I John 2:17: "Ho kosmos parageitai . . . ho de poion to thelema tou Theou menei eis ton aiona."

acquits the sinner and the life-force which breaks the bondage of sin."¹

Righteousness is the law of the universe to which everyone must be subject on pain of "death." It is the completely objective norm which exercises the authority of life and death over a man. It is not a part of his own endowment, at least not since the eviction from Eden. Hence the euangelion is good news of reconciliation through faith in Christ to the authority under which man has been suffering the penalty of death. In Paul's doctrine therefore righteousness is depicted as the power of new life.

As Schrenk points out, Paul's idea of justification is closely related to his en Christo terminology.² Paul's "mysticism" continues to be a matter of debate. We may interpret his idiom "in Christ" as a figurative way of expressing the state of justification. Otherwise we find two different theologies in Paul. It may well be that the mystical terminology is used by way of illustration and must not be pressed to its logical conclusion any more than his law-court terminology.³ The conception of justification

¹Ibid., p. 52.

²Ibid., p. 51.

³Ibid., p. 52; 44-46. Cf. Albert Schweitzer, in The Mysticism of Paul the Apostle, where he says that in Paul there are two independent conceptions of the forgiveness of sins: "According to the one, God forgives in consequence of the atoning death of Jesus; according to the other, He forgives because through the dying and rising again with Christ He has caused the flesh and sin to be abolished together, so that those who have died and risen with Christ are, in the eyes of God, sinless beings. The former of these doctrines is traditional, the latter is peculiar to Paul, and is a consequence of the mystical being-in-Christ" (p. 223).

cannot be separated from "the Spirit" terminology, as we see it, for example, in I Corinthians 6:8 and Romans 8.

Schrenk lists Paul's different uses of the term dikaion-- "to justify": (1) forensic, as in Romans 8:33-34, where its opposite is katakrin-- "to condemn"; (2) experiential, as in Romans 5:1, 2 and 12:1, 2; (3) eschatological, as in Romans 8; and (4) redemptive, especially when the preposition apo is used with the verb dikaiothenai: justification is deliverance from the power and consequences of sin.¹

This fourth use is seen for example in Romans 6:7, where Paul says, "He that is dead is justified from sin." The same idea is strikingly presented in Acts 13:38, 39, where in the synagogue at Antioch, Pisidia, Paul says, "Be it known unto you therefore, men and brethren, that through this man [Jesus] is preached unto you the forgiveness of sins; and by him all that believe are justified from all things, from which ye could not be justified by the law of Moses."²

In this sermon Paul was linking justification with Christ's resurrection. It is an act once and for all. It is the meaning of the resurrection. Dikaiosis, which is used only twice in the New Testament, both times in relation to the resurrection, is God's

¹Schrenk, Bible Key Words, IV, pp. 61-65.

²Following the argument of Schrenk, ibid.

absolving judgment. It brings life out of death and thus affects the whole of man's existence.¹

Paul characteristically makes justification correlative with life.² Hence it seems legitimate to read him as teaching that justification is the giving of meaning to existence. Its telos is life rather than death. Justification is the Christian answer to the question of meaning for personal existence, vis-a-vis suffering and death.

Sin and Justification in Christian Scriptures

As we have seen, the conception of sin presupposes the fact of justification. Justification is the dynamic act of God as he comes to sinful man in the person and work of Jesus Christ. Its meaning is demonstrated by the Resurrection, which is the reversal of the implications of death. Though objective to human nature, this dynamic can become the basis of man's existence and thus free him from "the law of sin and death." However such justification, as

¹Romans 4:25 and 5:18. Cf. Schrenk, ibid., p. 71.

²Romans 5:17-21; 6:4; 8:2, 6, 10. Cf. Schrenk, ibid., p. 73. "A general review of Paul's usage shows that the formula, "the righteousness of God," carries with it the conviction that at the very moment of justification the believer is admitted into the status of righteousness in the new life: justification is the means whereby he is brought under the creative power of the righteousness of God." Such a theology is consistent with the "fundamental discontinuity between God and man" by our understanding the new reality in a "futuristic indicative" mood: "Man is not yet what he is" (Paul L. Lehmann, Forgiveness, pp. 133, 140, 141ff.). The possibility is only in Christ. The Christian man lives in a kind of "eternal future," according to Paul's theology (expounded in the so-called "Barthian" manner).

deliverance, is by faith alone. Neither the actual "first fruits" nor the hope of complete redemption as confirmed in the Resurrection are produced by human effort or good works. Self-justification is no justification at all. We see this in Jesus' approach to the pharisees, for instance. Both the Johannine and Pauline writings are quite explicit about the inadequacy of self-justification. Yet the man who is through faith justified gives himself to the cause of righteousness. This is the cause of Christ, of self-giving agape, love¹ and dedication to the wholeness and harmony of the Kingdom of God.²

¹Cf. the systematic treatment of agape: Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, two volumes (London, S. P. C. K., 1932-1939). Though his distinctions between agape and eros seem to be too categorical and over-drawn, Bishop Nygren has helped establish the term agape as symbol for the love which Paul eulogizes in I Corinthians 13. It is the love of God revealed in Christ. Cf. Nygren, Commentary on Romans, p. 199.

See also the brief but representative comments on the agape-eros issue in David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, p. 174.

Professor Nels Ferre, now of Andover-Newton Seminary, insists that agape is also the norm, not simply the motif, of essential Christianity. Although Ferre's writings have not been a source for our present study, his name is frequently associated with the recent emphasis on agape, especially in the wake of Nygren's studies.

See Gottfried Quell and Ethelbert Stauffer, Love, Bible Key Words, I, notably in this commentary on the story of the Good Samaritan: "Jesus destroyed the whole centripetal grading system, in which the centre was 'I', but retained the idea of the neighbor as organizing principle and founded a new system, in which the centre was 'Thou.'" This is not a mechanical system. The neighbor-concern is with need: whoso-ever and whenever! (p. 47).

²"The Kingdom of God" which has been so important a symbol in Ritchlian and liberal theology may have fallen into comparative disuse in the wake of the telling criticisms of liberalism by the

Justification cannot be attained by human effort. It can only be accepted. Yet it can be defined as God's acceptance of his estranged creature. The writer of Ephesians begins with a doxology which extols the grace of God that makes us "accepted in the beloved." Man's justification by God is described as God's acceptance of him into the relationship of Jesus Christ and God.

Justification is forgiveness and acceptance as they are depicted in Jesus' encounter with the "sinners"--"publicans and harlots." By being accepted the sinner gains a sense of security; his feet are set upon a rock; his way is established. He can relax from his former futile strivings, which Paul describes as strivings governed by the law of sin and death. Now the justified man can live as one who is being made whole. He does not wait passively for his salvation to be completed. The man who is justified by grace through faith can live by imaginative steadfastness.

Sin, as described in the New Testament, is both a universal condition and an active, volitional rejection of the will--and the proffered grace--of God. Men are in darkness and the valley of the shadow of death. But they may love darkness rather than light because they identify their worth with their wrongness. The Light

protest of so-called neo-orthodoxy. However, it is interesting to note that Professor Tillich uses it as the symbol in the final part of his system: "The Problem of History and The Kingdom of God," which is to be Part V in his projected Systematic Theology, of which three parts have been published, in two volumes, to date. In any case, the symbol continues to have considerable life in it. Both "agape" and "the Kingdom of God" will have prominent use in our exposition and conclusions.

shines in the darkness, and the darkness is revealed as darkness; the wrongness, as wrongness. Sin is seen to be sin by its encounter with God's righteousness. Adam confronts Christ. If man rejects the Son-of-God--Son-of-Man he confirms himself in his sin. On the other hand, if he receives Christ in the sense of accepting Christ's acceptance of him, he is brought out of darkness into light; he is saved from his sin.

Justification affects both the condition of tragic evil and that wrongness which we describe as accountable or culpable, resulting from freedom of choice.¹ Justification is imputed. It is not acquired. It is given. Yet it can be accepted or rejected. Man cannot justify himself; yet he can refuse to be justified. He can reject God's free gift. Hence the essence of sinfulness as culpable wrongness is the rejection of the grace of God!

The New Testament does not offer us besides Jesus a perfect example of "the righteousness of God." Paul himself does not seem to be completely free from "the law of sin and death" nor from the subtle intrusions of self-justifying tendencies. It is in a context which warrants this latter observation that we come upon one of his most eloquent epitomes of his conception of justification by

¹In Latin terms, justification is effective for both the vitium and macula and the reatus, both the corruption and the guilt. See the writings of Professor Oliver C. Quick; for example, Doctrines of the Creed (London, Nisbet, 1938), pp. 218-19, 236.

grace: "I worked harder than any, though it was not I, but the grace of God which is with me."¹

At the same time, despite the bold contrasts given in parables, sermons, and epistles, we may not find an incontrovertible example of one who lives completely under the sway of sin, of self-justification and rejection of God's grace, with no trace of faith as the acceptance of justification. Indeed, the faith of the Christian is that he need not founder on the rocks of his own strivings. He can live with his self-justifying nature by maintaining an ongoing inner revolution against the dictatorial law of sin, death, and meaninglessness. As Paul said, "O wretched man that I am! Who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God through Jesus Christ our Lord. So then with the mind I myself serve the law of God; but with the flesh the law of sin The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus hath made me free from the law of sin and death."²

The composite Biblical view of sin and justification sees the subtleties present in the phenomena of human existence which it helps to explicate. For instance, self-righteousness can be present even in the more impressive confessions of sin. Sin can be the power behind "righteous" causes. By holding to the paradox of justification in the midst of guilt we can at least be comparatively safe from oversimplifying either concept: sin--sin-and-evil--or its antidote justification.

¹I Corinthians 15:10.

²Romans 7:25; Romans 8:2.

"Justification by faith" means justification "by grace through faith." It is the righteousness of God as it is given and imputed to man without being produced by him. It can be accepted or rejected in every day's attitude and behavior. Quintessentially sin is the rejection of the grace of God. Quintessentially justification is that grace, the agape of God as it comes to man in his existence.

CHAPTER TWO

THE CONTEMPORARY EXPRESSION OF THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTIONS OF SIN AND JUSTIFICATION

The Background for the Contemporary Expression

As we have noted, the Biblical origins are the anchor of the tradition which informs the contemporary conceptions of sin and justification. Yet even our study of the Biblical sources is dependent on contemporary textual scholarship. Nevertheless this contemporary interest in the world of the Bible is a kind of returning to the spring for water. Contemporary theology is ever in dialogue: with the past, primarily with the Biblical origins, and with the exigencies of the present.

This contemporary dialogue with the Biblical context of theology is mindful of former dialogue, the long history of thought within Christendom, the former returning to the Biblical springs, and the continual reappraisal of what those springs actually are. We have already spoken of the Reformers and of Augustine, their mentor as they journeyed back to Paul and the New Testament in their quest for renewal in the Church. Thorough treatment of the tradition would consider the history of dogma from Paul through the Greek and Latin Fathers, Augustine, Lombard, certainly Anselm and Abelard, to

the Summa of Thomas Aquinas, which represents the height of the Medieval synthesis of Biblical and Aristotelian thought, and through the precursors of the Reformation, the Reformers, taking cognizance of the third force in that era--the Anabaptist type of protest, the post-Reformation hardening of "Reformed theology," the post-Kantian corrective theology of Schleiermacher, Ritschl, Herrmann, who restored to some considerable degree the humanistic genius of the Christian faith, the emphasis on essential humanity, on to the more recent "Barthian" type of corrective, which has called for a recovery of the kind of reverence for God as transcendent, over against, above, and totally other than His creation. The present mood of theology includes:

- (1) The Christian humanism with its emphasis on experiential religion along with rational volition, which the Nineteenth Century theologians seemed to invoke;
- (2) The recognition of the transcendent reality beyond the mere experience of mankind--the awesome technological advances now even into outer space reinforce this conviction; and
- (3) The increased recognition of both the inner and the external limitations of reason and volition. The philosophy of Kierkegaard, the intuition of non-verbal artists, of writers like Dostoyevsky, and the explorations of the depth psychologists, encourage this latter recognition.

Before we examine the contemporary expression of the Christian conceptions of sin and justification we should perhaps look a bit more closely, though briefly, at the thought of the reformers: Luther and Calvin. Protestant theology continually refers to their

formulations, especially on these particular subjects. It also follows them in disagreeing with St. Thomas Aquinas--while taking time to criticize and in some cases to re-evaluate his system.¹ It continues to take St. Augustine seriously. Yet, like the Reformers and the Bishop of Hippo himself, contemporary theologians are in conversation with the tradition only as it elaborates the formative insights--and proclamation--found in the Bible.

Martin Luther, in his Treatise on Christian Liberty, set down two propositions concerning the liberty and the bondage of the spirit: "A Christian man is a perfectly free lord of all, subject to none. A Christian man is a perfectly dutiful servant of all, subject to all."² Here is a new freedom, not so much of the basic biological energies of the Freudian psyche, but of the controlling

¹Thomas Aquinas is by no means ignored even in Protestant theology. The so-called "neo-Thomists" (among Roman Catholics), Jacques Maritain, Etienne Gilson, and others, have brought him to the fore in theological conversation. An example of his relevance to our question is the following passage from Karl Adam: "It is possible that a man's practical reason may sometimes fail, not recognising God's will plainly and clearly as such or being involved in invincible error. In such a case he is not bound to the objective law, but to that which appears to his conscience to be God's will, although the judgment of his conscience be objectively false. No less an authority than St. Thomas stresses this obligation of the erroneous conscience. Even in so vital a matter as belief in Christ a man would act wrongly who should profess this faith against the judgment of his (erroneous) conscience (Summa, Prima Secundae, Q. xix, A. 5)" - Karl Adam, The Spirit of Catholicism, translated by Justin McCann, O.S.B. (revised edition, Image Books, Garden City, New York, Doubleday), p. 207.

²Martin Luther, A Treatise on Christian Liberty, many editions: E. g., Three Treatises (Philadelphia, The Muhlenberg Press, 1943), p. 251ff., the edition used in Vergilius Fern, ed., Classics of Protestantism (New York, Philosophical Library, 1959), pp. 39-66, at p. 41.

self--more like the Freudian ego. It is at the same time a new servitude, of the self, not to the demonic and irrational energies of existence, but to the community of mankind, to the God of the community and of the universe of which it is but a part.

What, to the Reformers, was the nature of sin? Adolf Harnack, in discussing the history of dogma, admittedly from a point of view, says that the sin in all sin and the guilt in all guilt is godlessness in the strictest sense of the word. It is that unbelief which is not able to trust God. In Luther's frequent mention of concupiscence as a component in the sin of unbelief Harnack sees an emphasis not on sexual desire, but on the pride of the heart, the lust of the world, and the selfishness of the spirit. He holds that Luther discarded the Augustinian emphasis on concupiscence as sexual desire.¹

"Inasmuch as man is created to and for God, the 'original righteousness' is accordingly fear, love and trust. . . ." By "fear" we understand "reverence," in this statement by Harnack. Luther's concept of the fall of man was that man lost these virtues. The "righteousness of God" includes grace, truth, mercy and holiness. God bestows on man whatever faith he can have. God actually creates the penitence which brings him to receiving the grace of forgiveness and restoration. God does the work, not man, "propter Christum," for Christ's sake. Conscious guilt and misery are

¹Adolf Harnack, History of Dogma, trans. from 3rd German edition by William M'Gilchrist (London, Williams and Norgate, 1899), VII, pp. 200-201.

replaced by gracious standing and blessedness. Justification is an ongoing process in the Christian's life. It is answer to the condition of sin. It is a given state of grace. It is answer also to sin as offense. It produces the conviction that God alone can bring forth good works. Thus has Luther's protesting theology propelled the force of individualism in the western world. "The Christian is through his God an independent being, who is in need of nothing, and neither stands under bondage to laws nor is in dependence on men. He is priest before God, taken charge of by no priest, and a king over the world."¹

But Luther could have benefited, even as theologians today must, from a more realistic sense of social structure and the actual functions of institutions and associations with respect to "the grace of God," even when they are corrupt. As R. H. Tawney says in Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, Luther himself "was conscious that he had left the world of secular activities perilously divorced from spiritual restraints." Christian morality was to be maintained by the State, while the Church continued a means for introducing people to that grace whose fruit was to be good works.² The question of justification by grace was not answered instrumentalistically even by its stentorian herald, Martin Luther.

¹Ibid., pp. 201-212; 212.

²R. H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism (first published in 1922, a Pelican Book, West Drayton, Middlesex, Penguin Books, 1938), pp. 89-110.

The following quotation illustrates the Reformers' use of Augustine, as well as John Calvin's own manner of treating the subject of sin. Writing with reference to the controversy between Augustinian and Pelagian anthropologies, Calvin summarised the argument of Augustine, which of course he himself adopted:

The matter cannot be more briefly summed up than in the eighth chapter of his Treatise De Corruptione et Gratia, where he shows, First, that the human will does not by liberty obtain grace, but by grace obtains liberty. Secondly, that by means of the same grace, the heart being impressed with a feeling of delight, is trained to persevere, and strengthened with invincible fortitude. Thirdly, that while grace governs the will, it never falls; but when grace abandons it, it falls forthwith. Fourthly, that by the free mercy of God, the will is turned to good, and when turned, perseveres. Fifthly, that the direction of the will to good, and its constancy after being so directed, depend entirely on the will of God, and not on any human merit. Thus the will (free will, if you choose to call it so), which is left to man, is, as he in another place describes it, "a will which can neither be turned to God, nor continue in God, unless by grace; a will which whatever its ability may be, derives all that ability from grace."¹

Calvin went on to dispose of the problem of dualism. His solution sounds strange to our ears today. God blinds and hardens "the reprobate" by deserting them or by delivering them over to Satan. Satan is dynamic evil. God turns his monstrous work to his own glory. Calvin begins this discussion with a recapitulation of his doctrine of sin, using Augustine's example of the horse and the two riders. Man is the horse. He can choose either God as his rider, or the devil. The Satanic rider is not a skilled but a careless, foolish rider. This illustration itself shows an understanding of dynamic psychology, long before the present era.

¹John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. by Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids, Michigan, Eerdmans, 1953, Book II, Chapter III, 14), Vol. I, p. 264.

That man is so enslaved by the yoke of sin, that he cannot of his own nature aim at good either in wish or actual pursuit, has, I think, been sufficiently proved. Moreover, a distinction has been drawn between compulsion and necessity, making it clear that man, though he sins necessarily, nevertheless sins voluntarily Augustine compares the human will to a horse preparing to start, and God and the devil are the riders. "If God mounts, he, like a temperate and skillful rider, guides it calmly, urges it when too slow, reins it in when too fast, curbs its forwardness and overaction, checks its bad temper, and keeps it on the proper course; but if the devil has seized the saddle, like an ignorant and rash rider, he hurries it over broken ground, drives it into ditches, dashes it over precipices, spurs it into obstinacy or fury."¹

Certainly the bondage of the will as described by Calvin and, before him, by Augustine, was a bondage to a certain kind of ignorance--as want of insight--as well as to reckless disorientation.

The influence of Calvin's Geneva has helped to confuse law and gospel, morality and grace. In the post-Reformation history there have been other influences as well, which have tended to externalise sin and justification in a way that confuses any study, philosophical or psychological, of these conceptions. We need only listen to some of the most publicized evangelistic preaching of today to realize how widespread are various legalistic, superficial conceptions of sin and of its antidote God's saving grace.

The subjective dimension of moralistic guilt is properly described under neurosis and compulsions. If one feels guilty because he has broken a commandment he may, it is true, be simply aware of his offense against the society to which he is beholden. But if he actually lacks a deep love and appreciation for the order

¹Ibid., Chapter IV, 1, pp. 265-266. Cf. Plato, Phaedrus 246 (where there are two horses with one charioteer). Professor Dickie calls this to our attention.

which that commandment represents, his guilt may likely be a neurotic ego-defense against a deeper fear of the removal of some benefit which the quasi-theocratic society-image is supplying him. Also, today, as in former times, there is a common notion that to be blessed with material wealth and success is a sure sign of justification--that God is with one. "He who is industrious shall prosper" can take on the force of a religious credo. Indeed it has.¹

Needless to say, the conceptions of sin and justification have been in need of corrective formulation from time to time, even since Luther and Calvin.

The Issue: How to Speak Theologically
to the Problem of Man

Quite simply, the question before theologians today is whether Christianity can formulate a true analysis of the problem of man-in-his-existence-and-in-society and state clearly and implementingly solutions to this problem.

A forceful, if highly philosophical, way of presenting Christian theology in view of this challenge is employed by Professor Paul Tillich, now of Harvard. He follows systematically what he describes as a method of correlation. Dialectical in method, it proceeds as an effort to correlate existential questions with theological answers.²

¹Cf. the studies made by Max Weber, Ernst Troeltsch, and Tawney.

²Professor Tillich introduces his method in Systematic Theology, Vol. I, pp. 3-76. Cf. Vol. II, (1957, pp. 14-18.)

Many others, including, notably, Professor Karl Heim, of Germany, are trying to meet the same challenge.¹ The late Professor Donald Baillie, of St. Andrews, for example, speaks of a malaise which characterizes man, which perhaps can be searched out best by depth psychology. But it is for theology to discern its meaning and to speak to it the gospel of meaning.²

Professor Karl Barth, of Basel, prefers to begin with the answer, or rather, with the "revelation"--"the Word of God" via the Church-creating event. Theology is ever a restatement of the Kirchliche--Churchly--faith.³ With the tradition, Barth says--as indeed does every theologian, it seems, today--"Sin means to reject the grace of God as such What is done by men in individual

¹Professor Karl Heim has continued in the perhaps controversial tradition of "Christian apologetics." Among his works are Spirit and Truth and God Transcendent. Two works, published in English in 1953, are: Christian Faith and Natural Science; and The Transformation of the Scientific World View (See Bibliography, infra).

Heim contends for an understanding that the self ("the Ego") and "the personal God" belong to a dimension which is different from those of every thing which is accessible to "scientific investigation." --Christian Faith and Natural Science, p. 34.

²Donald M. Baillie, God Was In Christ, pp. 162ff.

³Cf. for example, Karl Barth, The Doctrine of the Word of God, Vol. I, Part I of his Church Dogmatics, trans. from the 2nd German edition, by G. T. Thomson (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1949). His point of view is stated in conscious contrast even to that of Emil Brunner's "eristics"--or the ad hominem, accomodating, approach which attempts to show the dead-end of reason and the meaning of revelation with respect to "reason," p. 28. "The task of theology would then consist in the 'struggle against the self-assurance of the modern spirit,'" says Barth. Theology's task is to measure the Church's language about God by the measure of her own essence, the event of revelation, "the Word of God in Christ."--Ibid., and following.

actions, from the action of Pilate down to that of Judas, is the rejection of the grace of God."¹

Barth reiterates the theology of the New Testament, especially of Paul, using quite consistently the same terminology. Hence his must be a "Churchly" audience, hearers and readers who have already become steeped in the thought-forms and language of the earliest Christian theologians. For this Barth has little apology, since theology is the Church's--and the tradition's (?)--conversation with itself about its faith.²

Approvingly Barth quotes the Heidelberg Catechism at Question 60: "How art thou righteous before God?" The answer is:

Only by true faith in Jesus Christ: that is, although my conscience accuse me that I have grievously sinned against all the commandments of God, and have never kept any of them and that I am still prone always to all evil, yet God, without any merit of mine, of mere grace, grants and imputes to me the perfect satisfaction, righteousness and holiness of Christ, as if I had accomplished all the obedience which Christ has fulfilled for me, if only I accept such benefit with a believing heart.³

The alternative to self-justification is to live by forgiveness alone.⁴ Both sin and justification are understood as such only

¹Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, trans. by G. T. Thomas (London, SCM Press, 1949, 1952), p. 105.

²According to Professor Barth, Dogmatics investigates the language which the Church uses, and seeks to measure its conformity to the essence of the Church, which is not what she can "dream up" about God, but what God says to her; i. e., Jesus Christ.--The Doctrine of the Word of God, p. 3ff.

³Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline, p. 159.

⁴Cf., for example, ibid., p. 152.

by the person who has already crossed over into an understanding of grace. Thus does Barth reiterate with conviction the traditional understanding of sin and justification. He says, further, dramatically, that the Judge will one day put the question, "Did you live by grace, or did you set up gods for yourself and perhaps want to become one yourself?"¹ Sin is rebellion against God and rejection of his grace. The doctrine of the fall of man, of "original sin," is simply that man in being born is placed in a situation where this rebellion is the order of the day.

Although the actual content of Tillich's doctrine may be quite similar to that of Barth's elaborate, reiterative, system, his way of discussing the phenomenon is markedly different. Sin is "the act in which we turn away from the participation in the divine Ground." Here we encounter a recognition of the difficulty which contemporary minds have with the very term God. Sin is "the turning toward ourselves, making ourselves the center of the world and of ourselves the drive in everyone, even the most self-restraining one, to draw as much as possible of the world into himself."²

¹Ibid.

²Paul Tillich, "The Good I Will, I Do Not" published in both The Union Seminary Quarterly Review, XIV, 3 (March, 1959), pp. 17-23, and Religion In Life, XXVIII, 4 (Autumn, 1959), pp. 539-545. In his Systematic Theology, this way of describing sin would come under "Estrangement as Concupiscence." Cf. ibid., II, p. 59ff. Tillich identifies the Christian conception of sin with the contemporary conception of "estrangement," to which he gives content as follows: estrangement as "unbelief," "hubris," "concupiscence," the three traditional modes, and as "fact" and as "act," individually and collectively. Then he discusses it with respect to tragic

He agrees with Barth--as with the whole tradition--that sin is understood only by those who have been delivered from its power: "We can speak of sin, because its power over us is broken."¹

We see in Barth and Tillich an illustration of contrasting ways of dealing with the conceptions of sin and justification, although both men think of sin in dynamic terms and regard justification as its dynamic solution.

Sin: Condition or Offense? Sin-and-Evil and Justification

Apart from method in theology, other issues affect the temporary use of the conceptions of sin and justification. We have already referred to the Augustinian-Pelagian debate, which actually does persist into our own times.

We need not review the many ramifications of the controversy between the ancient theologians. However we must confront the issue which they represent to contemporary theology. Pelagianism stands for the insistence on essential freedom of the will. "If I should, I can!" Man can be enlightened as to what is evil; he then can be exhorted to be righteous, to do the good, with confidence that he can. Pelagian and semi-Pelagian thinking has often led to

self-loss and world-less, separation and individualisation, finitude, and despair.--Systematic Theology, II, pp. 51-90. Although our own approach to the question is aware of Tillich's writings and no doubt influenced by them, our treatment does not follow along the route of his system. The present study is but a theological fragment, and it is perhaps more fragmental than systematic.

¹"The Good I Will, I Do Not," ibid.

self-justification, on the one hand, and to discouragement to the point of unredeemable despair, on the other.

Reinhold Niebuhr calls F. R. Tennant's thought an elaborate restatement of Pelagianism.¹ Yet Tennant does credit the worthy in both traditions. Tennant says that Pelagius stressed one side of the truth: "the inalienable rights and responsibilities of personality." But he credits Augustine with laying hold on the side of the truth which has had the "infinitely greater spiritual fruitfulness." Augustine, like Paul, and unlike Pelagius, recognised "the existence of the power of sin as habit, and our inability, in spite of formal freedom, to do the things that we would" and "the social nature of man and the physical unity of the race."² Nevertheless, Tennant maintains that the will is free. It is affected by inheritance, but it is not in bondage to it.³

Tennant represents those who cannot appreciate the linking of culpability--or guilt--with dispositions and actions over which

¹ Reinhold Niebuhr, Human Nature, Vol. I of The Nature and Destiny of Man, "A Christian Interpretation" (Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), p. 247.

² F. R. Tennant, The Origin and Propagation of Sin (2nd edition revised, Cambridge, University Press, 1906), p. 15, quoted in Mary Frances Thelen, Man As Sinner in Contemporary American Realistic Theology (New York, King's Crown Press, 1946), p. 17.

³ Both Pelagius and Augustine missed the truth held by the other, according to Tennant: "Augustine (and after him Schleiermacher and Ritschl) sacrificed the moral accountability of the individual in his mistaken conception that racial solidarity in wrong implies the inheritance of sin. Tennant claims that the "problem" of sin can be solved and the insights of Augustine and Pelagius reconciled by seeing that whereas inheritance affects our outlook in innumerable ways, and may even shape our disposition, it does not control the will itself. The will is free." Thelen, ibid.

the subject-self has no control. Niebuhr, on the other hand, seems to misinterpret the obvious capacity of man to assume guilt, even for that over which he has no control. Should the fact that he can feel guilt mean that he somehow is culpable? With Tennant we contend that such a conception of guilt is hardly enlightening. Indeed, in the light of depth psychology its logical fallacy is compounded as we discover the neurotic, defensive uses to which guilt feelings are put. Indeed, the assumption of guilt may on occasion be an expression of that very arrogance which is the sin with which Niebuhr's analysis is most concerned.¹

¹Reinhold Niebuhr says: "Yet in the Christian interpretation of moral evil guilt is attached not only to actions in which the individual is free to choose a higher possibility and fails to do so, but in which higher possibilities, which the individual is not free to choose, reveal the imperfection of the action which he is forced to take. Thus the simple moral guilt of conscious evil is transmuted into a sense of religious guilt which feels a general responsibility for that for which the individual agent cannot be immediately responsible." An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (1935, Living Age Books edition, Meridian Books, New York, 1956), pp. 75-76.

He goes on to illustrate in terms of international, political, and business ethics. These illustrations carry his point quite well. Hence he can say: "A general sense of religious guilt is therefore a fruitful source of a sense of moral responsibility in immediate situations." Ibid.

It is true that Niebuhr's doctrine of sin was not fixed when he wrote An Interpretation. In Human Nature (Vol. I of the Gifford Lectures, The Nature and Destiny of Man) he stresses sin as pride, as pretension. It can be shared by citizens in collective national pride. Ibid., pp. 208-227. A religious sense of guilt is "a fruitful source of a sense of moral responsibility" in view of this phenomenon.

Yet, despite his constructive use of this idea Niebuhr fails to relieve the confusion which makes difficult any clear analysis of

Augustinianism represents to us today the emphasis on sin as a condition of absolutely helpless entanglement. Allow to man the clearest possible vision of truth, goodness, and life, and he, though perhaps longing for their reality, will choose falsehood, evil, and the way of spiritual death. It is this law within his very "members" which drives man away from God. It can be overcome only by a kind of intrusion by the grace of God into his life. Even Augustine's libel against the human race, committed in his treatise on marriage, and his persistent near-reduction of sin to "concupiscence," express this insight--affirmed in our time by Freud: Man is basically not, or not simply, rational. He is an irrational being. Even the anti-Freudian Otto Rank affirms the insight, as does C. G. Jung. Each draws his own inferences from the conclusion.¹ Yet, we would

the conceptions of sin and guilt. Is "a sense of guilt" to be distinguished from "a feeling of guilt"? If so, our criticism may not hold. But if one should feel guilty, responsible, blameworthy for that over which he has had no control, how can he escape "moral and religious morbidity"? Niebuhr's answer may be as in Interpretation: Moral complacency toward those things over which one has no control "is even more false to the human situation" (Interpretation, p. 76). Again his argument is cogent enough. But there seems to be a thick cloud over the whole question in its depth psychological dimension. It is this cloud which our present study seeks to penetrate. See Part Two.

In his The Self and the Dramas of History (Scribner's, 1955), Dr. Niebuhr as theologian again "transcends" himself as psychologist!

¹Cf. Ira Progoff, The Death and Rebirth of Psychology (New York, Julian Press, 1957), pp. 251-252, et passim.

Rank taught that one is blessed with "irrational" depths which mean spiritual power within himself upon which he can rely.

Apropos of this discussion we quote the following from Carl R. Rogers, who, unfortunately, is neglected in our subsequent

run the risk of misrepresenting both contemporary theology and depth psychology if we tried to distinguish points of view along Augustinian and Pelagian lines. As Cherbonnier argues, it is doubtful that the real issue is here at all.¹

Nevertheless there is a genuine issue demonstrated in our times by the debate between what has been called liberal theology and what has been called neo-orthodoxy.² For better or for worse

discussions of psychotherapy: "I have little sympathy with the rather prevalent concept that man is basically irrational, and that his impulses, if not controlled, will lead to destruction of others and self. Man's behavior is exquisitely rational, moving with subtle and ordered complexity toward the goals his organism is endeavoring to achieve." "A Therapist's View of the Good Life," The Humanist, 1957, No. 5, p. 299--quoted by Rogers in Carl R. Rogers, "Concluding Comment" following his "Reinhold Niebuhr's The Self and the Dramas of History: A Criticism": Bernard M. Loomer, Walter M. Horton, and Hans Hofmann, "Reinhold Niebuhr and Carl R. Rogers-- A Discussion," Pastoral Psychology, IX, 85 (June, 1958), at p. 28.

Progoff, and, according to him, Rank, and to some considerable extent, Jung, see the "irrational" in a way that hardly fits the debate implied in Rogers' remarks. Indeed a reconciliation may be possible of his views and those of the more "human nature"-affirming among depth psychologists and theologians as well. Cf. also, for example, among Jung's many writings on the subject, his The Undiscovered Self (Boston, Little, Brown & Co., 1958).

¹Infra, this chapter.

²Representative of a responsible use of this descriptive nomenclature is the popular treatment in William Hordern's A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology (New York, Macmillan, 1956), in three chapters: (6). "Neo-Orthodoxy: The Rediscovery of Orthodoxy"--in which he discusses Karl Barth and Emil Brunner; (7). "American Neo-Orthodoxy: Reinhold Niebuhr; and (8). "The Boundary Between Liberalism and Neo-Orthodoxy: Paul Tillich"--pp. 118-184. Interestingly, Hordern follows these with (9). "Orthodoxy As a Growing Tradition"--pp. 185-209. Theologians who illustrate this growing tradition are, according to Hordern, George Hazmar, William Temple, and D. M. Baillie.

the participants in the debate have used the old epithets: "Pelagian" and "Augustinian."

A persistent tendency, which sometimes is laid at the door of the Augustinian anthropology-and-soteriology and at other times is laid at the door of the Pelagian outlook, is the externalizing, legalistic, institutionalizing, trivializing uses of the "means of grace," including the Church, its sacraments, and the Scriptures. As the Christian movement became increasingly a quasi-political and regimented society, in time recognized as the official religion of the Roman Empire, and of the Medieval world, its discipline came to reflect its current conceptions of sin and justification and, what is more, to embody them. Externalistic, mundane mentality persists, even since Jesus' encounter with it in the pharisees and chief priests, in claiming for itself, blasphemously, the power of the Keys to the Kingdom of Heaven. We need not refer to any one stage in the history of sacramentarian ecclesiology. The error is present enough in non-sacramentarian expressions of "God's people." "The Church"--or "the true believers"--in the name of God listens to confession, absolves and condemns. To be "in Christ," to be in a state of grace, is to be among the Chosen, either in the visible Church and obedient to it or among the elect--who discern election by their own selected criteria. To be "in sin," hopelessly entangled, still writhing in mortal sinfulness, is to be outside such a "Church" or group of "the elect."¹

¹This point needs no documentation, so patent are the facts. Sectarian and pietistic exclusivism are not dead. The so-called

Yet, despite the tendencies, even within Protestantism, to externalize, even to trivialize, Christianity's conceptions of sin and justification, there is a latent, at times dominant, insight within the conceptions themselves which can bring a new liberation, a new reformation, a deeper plunge into the gospel.¹

Reinhold Niebuhr, in his Gifford Lectures, states his corrective anthropology, using the traditional Augustinian-versus-Pelagian frame of reference. He describes as Pelagian or at least semi-Pelagian such diverse representatives as the following: Friedrich Schleiermacher, Walter Rauschenbusch, F. R. Tennant, as we have noted, and official Roman Catholicism.²

The "heresy" is represented succinctly by Thomas Aquinas in the following statement, which Niebuhr quotes: "Sin cannot take away entirely from man the fact that he is a rational being, for then he would no longer be capable of sin. Wherefore it is not possible for this good nature to be destroyed entirely."³

Niebuhr's objection to what he calls neo-Pelagianism is that its adherents try to steer away from the logical difficulties and "the peril of denying the structure of freedom in the assertion of its corruption." He suggests that the arbiter between the two traditions

"Fundamentalist-versus-Modernist" controversy in America, which resulted in church schisms, illustrates the problem within Protestantism.

¹This phrase is from Philip Schaff.

²Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, pp. 245-248.

³Niebuhr quotes this in a footnote (from Summa Theologica, I, 2, 33, 2), ibid., p. 248.

should be the truth: whatever is true "to the psychological and moral facts in human wrongdoing."¹

It would seem that here the depth psychologists should be called in as expert witnesses. Niebuhr's references to them are far from exhaustive, although incisive and perceptive.²

There seems to be no argument against his reiteration of the observation that the subjective dimension of "sin" is despair. Indeed it is possible that this very subjective phenomenon itself is what has exercised the minds of both "Augustinians" and "Pelagians" down through the years of the debate. Is the despairing self the entrapped, entangled, helpless self in Adam? Is the desperate, asserting self, the offending guilty expression of this condition?

As we shall see in the discussion to follow in Part Two, almost everyone seems to have strong feelings of shame, nonculpable shame, produced by the very process of growing out of infancy. It may be aggravated by an oppressively shaming environment. In the light of this dynamism, does the extreme Augustinian say to the shame-ridden that his sense of unworthiness is fully justified?

"You say you are as dung. You are right. You are capable of no good

¹Reinhold Niebuhr, ibid., p. 248.

²Mary Frances Thelen, in her thesis, finds Niebuhr's exposition wanting, for instance, in his treatment of the theories of Karen Horney, as she expressed them in The Neurotic Personality of Our Time (infra, Part Two)--Thelen, Man As Sinner, pp. 186, 201. For other critical, yet appreciative discussion of Reinhold Niebuhr's treatment of other men's ideas, especially psychologists', see Pastoral Psychology, IX, 85 (1958), which designated Reinhold Niebuhr "the man of the month."

in and of yourself." Does the Pelagian, on the other hand, say the opposite? "You feel you are worthless and helpless. Actually you are not. Be enlightened as to your true worth and possibilities."

Either position seems to leave out something essential to the actual state of affairs. The "Augustinian" fails to see the break in logic between the inner conviction of unworthiness and the presupposition that the subject is in fact unworthy. Hence such a theologian, especially-as-an-"evangelist," may mistake a pathological sense of unworthiness for an insightful "conviction of sin." The "Pelagian" on the other hand fails to credit the inner conviction with the substance of reality which it actually has throughout the psyche, affecting determinatively the person's pattern of life regardless of disguises. Hence the theologian-"evangelist" may be encouraging a kind of dishonesty within that veers away from authentic selfhood.

If we return to the New Testament, what kind of "evangelism" there speaks to the shame-ridden individual? "Neither do I condemn thee. Go and sin no more," Jesus said to the woman who was almost stoned for adultery.¹ What is the significance of the story of the woman who loved much because she had been forgiven much?² What is the import of the Zacchaeus incident?³ How are we to interpret the

¹John 8:11--in a passage which, though disputed, conveys sensitively the genius of the Christian message.

²Luke 7:47.

³Luke 19:1-10.

words of Jesus to the paralytic: "Be of good cheer; thy sins are forgiven thee"?¹

Certainly these incidents can bear both "Pelagian" and "Augustinian" commentary. But they seem on their own to say: "You are not simply an adultress; you are essentially someone quite different from what the would-be stoners chose to see in you." "You are not essentially a parasitic publican." "You are not worthless; you still have life and opportunity." Certainly they say more, but they as certainly say at least this much. Interestingly enough Niebuhr says, "It is not unfair to regard all Christian thinkers before Augustine as more or less Pelagian."² It seems more enlightening to say that they represent the truth before the Augustinian-Pelagian fission! Perhaps the Christian community held, not a

¹Matthew 9:2.

²Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature of Man, p. 245 (citing J. B. Mozley, The Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, p. 125).

Cf.: "The Bible is not Pelagian. The doctrine of 'original sin' is not merely contained in the myth of the Fall of Adam. It is a presupposition of all Biblical thinking. But despite this fateful necessity men are held responsible for their sin."--Reinhold Niebuhr in "Biblical Thought and Ontological Speculation in Tillich's Theology," in The Theology of Paul Tillich ("The Library of Living Theology," Vol. I, edited by Charles W. Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, New York, Macmillan, 1952), pp. 216-227, at p. 218. Niebuhr's statements immediately following this quotation suggest that sin is directly and inevitably the resultant of human finitude, and that the sinfulness of it is evidenced by the uneasy conscience which man has in any act. This is somewhat like Otto Rank's conception of "ethical guilt"--infra, Chapter Five.

moralistic view of sin, but rather a dynamic faith in victory over both guilt and the "power of darkness."¹ Such an intuition is strengthened further by the numerous accounts of Jesus' healing of demoniacs. The "patients" were victims of evil. It was no less evil than if they had been culpable. But their intrinsic worthfulness before God seems to be assumed in the very narration of the events.

Niebuhr acknowledges some truth in the "Pelagian" conviction "that actual sins cannot be regarded as sinful or as involving guilt if they do not proceed from a will which is essentially free."² Yet he insists that "absurd as the classical Pauline doctrine of original sin may seem to be at first blush, its prestige as a part of the Christian truth is preserved and perennially reestablished, against the attacks of rationalists and simple moralists."³ With Kierkegaard, he sees sin as both a condition and a qualitative leap. Sin presupposes itself.⁴

¹See Aulen, Christus Victor, pp. 164-167.

²The Nature of Man, p. 245. ³Ibid., pp. 248-249.

⁴Ibid., p. 254. Although Niebuhr stresses self-love, sensuality, and, especially, pretension and pride as the modes of original sin, indeed, describing these with extraordinary perceptiveness as a theologian-psychologist, he does teach that the basis, the root, of sin is "unbelief." He makes it explicit in passages like this: "The sin of the inordinate self-love thus points to the prior sin of lack of trust in God. The anxiety of unbelief is not merely the fear which comes from ignorance of God." With Kierkegaard he sees the anxiety as "the dizziness of freedom" (Concept of Dread). Cf. Hans Hofmann's study of Niebuhr's conception of sin, The Theology

Speaking for the orthodox conception of sin, while taking note of "the new psychology" as of value to theology but only as a method of describing human conduct, E. J. Bicknell, two decades before Niebuhr's lectures, says, "Sin is the disorder of man's inward being." Human nature must be remade, refashioned. "Man can no more remake himself than make himself." He says that faith in Jesus Christ is the answer, that being in Christ--which for him includes being in the visible Church--is the condition of justification.¹

Despite the dangers of determinism and ecclesiastical externalism which may lurk in these statements in Bicknell's treatment of sin and salvation, we note the corrective emphasis on faith as "belonging." Alexander Miller, of Stanford University, in his essay on justification, stresses this aspect of belonging. Essentially,

of Reinhold Niebuhr, trans. by Louise Pettibone Smith, (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1956).

Elsewhere Hofmann says, "'Self-love,' if one should even continue to use this highly ambiguous and misleading term, is not sin--original or otherwise. Nor is it a mere bad habit of man. Niebuhr and other theologians could greatly profit from listening patiently to psychopathologists who make clear to us that undue self-concern is the symptom for a far more profound lack of self-realization and self-confidence."--Pastoral Psychology, IX, 85 (June, 1958), p. 24. Dr. Hofmann is Director of the University Project on Religion and Mental Health, at Harvard University.

We shall discuss "the complications of self-concern," infra, Chapter Nine.

¹E. J. Bicknell, The Christian Idea of Sin and Original Sin in the Light of Modern Knowledge (London, Longmans, Green, 1922), pp. 113, 115; cf. pp. 50-78, 113-129.

Christian faith is a matter of belonging more than believing. Of course he means belonging in a profound--yet eminently realistic--sense.¹

If Christian faith is essentially belonging, "unfaith" is not belonging. The condition may be described as tragic and wrong. But whether it be sinful--as accountable, culpable--depends on whether there is rejection by free choice, of the grace of belonging.

Miller's statement may appear to be in marked contrast to the exposition by Bishop Lesslie Newbigin of the Church of South India, who says that sin is basically unbelief.² Actually, however, there may not be a real contradiction here, since Newbigin speaks of unbelief as failure to trust.³ In the Christian conception "unbelief" is "sin" when it is refusal or failure to trust that which is ultimately trustworthy!

Can trustworthy agape be encountered without being actually experienced? Can there be belief-as-trust apart from belonging to the reality expressed by the agape tou Theou, symbolized in the phrase: the Body of Christ? If we are to suppose that one can

¹Alexander Miller, The Renewal of Man, "Christian Faith Series" (New York, Doubleday, 1955).

²Lesslie Newbigin, Sin and Salvation (London, SCM, 1956), pp. 25ff.

³Ibid. Cf. Newbigin's discussion of "Justification," p. 104 ff. and, under the question: "How does what Christ has done for men become mine?" "It becomes mine when I become part of this society, this fellowship, He left behind Him to be the continuation of His life on earth." --ibid., p. 93. Cf. also Newbigin's The Household of God (1954).

guiltily refuse to trust the ultimately trustworthy, it seems reasonable to require first that the ultimately trustworthy must disclose itself to him. Failure through ignorance to trust is one thing. Refusal to trust, if by it we mean a culpable wrongness, must be against the Light. This logic seems to press toward the conclusion that by definition sin as culpable rejection of agape-and-belonging must in some sense be a fall from the grace of belonging! For his act to be culpable, the subject must know in his experience the grace which he is refusing. The Christian conception of sin as culpable choice does seem to presuppose for the sinner the experience--or existential knowledge--of grace. This, though perhaps a neglected inference, is an extremely important one. As the Fourth Gospel puts it, in the words of Jesus: "If I had not come and spoken to them they would not have sin."¹ The Light has shone into the darkness. It has been experienced as light. This must be true before the one sitting in darkness can be regarded as actually culpable in his failure to become one of the children of light.²

Justification is the grace which reaches down to the entangled, benighted, isolated, stranded soul of the individual--and of collective humanity--to lift it up into a new reality of belonging en Christo to ultimate reality, to God.

¹John 15:22. "If I had not done among them the works which no one else did, they would not have sin; but now they have seen and hated both me and my Father."--John 15:24; Cf. John 9:41 (RSV).

²I Thessalonians 5:5, Luke 16:8. Cf. II Corinthians 4:4, 6 and the Johannine passages.

Although contemporary theologians do not all make it explicit, they must allow a distinction between culpability and non-culpability when they speak of evil or wrongness in the soul of mankind. It makes no sense to invoke guilt-feelings for non-culpable tragedy. The old question about whether "the unenlightened heathen are lost" comes to mind.¹ There the context is a rather primitive belief that without an intellectual acknowledgement of Christ as the Western world knows him they are doomed to Hell. Such a belief is slipping away from serious consideration except among "fundamentalistic" groups. Nevertheless there is a question which our study, among many others, should help theology to elucidate and face, namely: Does an experience of the agape of God-in-Christ mean "life" in contrast to "death"--as Light to Darkness? Does being without grace, in however large the measure, mean "death"--or the failure of the "life" and meaning which are the destiny of essential humanity? If the Christian conviction is that these questions must be answered in the affirmative, then what can be its concern as to whether the "being without" is culpable or non-culpable? Surely valid interest is not for the purposes of a kind of spiritual jurisprudence, in which confessed Christians can condemn some of the "condemned already." Such would be contrary to the very genius of Christian faith, to the agape upon which it rests. Any legitimate concern must be that of applied or practical theology!

¹See Edgar P. Dickie, God Is Light, pp. 225-235.

If guilt feelings can be in any sense a means of grace, a means by which the subject may be effectively invited to trust the ultimately trustworthy, then theology must have a clear idea as to what should properly exercise them.

To what extent, and in what constructive manner can and should one be aware of his own actual guilt in remaining in the darkness of despair and self-destructiveness? If guilt-feeling is irrelevant to the Christian understanding of sin--that is, if the Christian conception arose without reference to the individual's inner capacity to judge himself, then it would not matter whether we say sin or evil. However, since the conception of sin has traditionally and Biblically evoked the conviction of sin, it seems proper to reserve the term for that wrongness for which one can and should come to feel guilty. Hence in speaking of evil, theology deals not only with sin, even though it may often use the term in a double, confused sense. The gospel of justification is to be proclaimed to the condition of both sin and evil, wrongness both blameworthy and simply tragic!

Sin as Idolatry

In a recent critical restatement of the Christian conception of sin, E. La B. Cherbonnier argues that the Augustine-versus-Pelagius controversy was over a question that can be no real issue for our way of thinking. The debate tended to place in partial eclipse the Biblical understanding of sin. Sin has been misconceived

as breaking rules. It has also been misconceived as being intrinsic to human nature.¹ The Biblical origins do not support either of these contentions. Sin as depicted in the Hebrew-Christian tradition is clearly idolatry, choosing the wrong god, for worship, adoration, devotion, fear. The hallmark of idolatry is "a hard heart."

Cherbonnier commends Karl Menninger, a psychoanalyst in America, who seems to him to be an exception among depth psychologists, for saying that some forms of guilt should not be eradicated.² Christianity should preach confession and forgiveness.

The redemption which the Church offers to all men is deliverance from bondage to the idols which have blinded and enslaved them. It liberates by conferring upon them the one thing which they can scarcely acquire by effort, agape. It thereby hastens the day when it will be fully what it already is in part: the fulfillment of God's ancient promise, "I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you a heart of flesh (Ezekiel 36:26)."³

Certainly, as the first commandment of the decalogue clearly says, idolatrous attachment is the sin against God as he was conceived in the Law and the Prophets. The Christian conception of sin has characteristically continued the Jewish emphasis on idolatry. The "sinner" is devoted to a wrong cause, whether it be himself

¹E. La B. Cherbonnier, Hardness of Heart, Christian Faith Series (New York, Doubleday, 1955), pp. 61-145.

²Ibid., p. 187. Cherbonnier quotes from an article, "What the Girls Are Told", by Karl Menninger (The Saturday Review, October 26, 1953, p. 30).

³Hardness of Heart, p. 188.

as object, himself in satisfaction-seeking, or whether it be other "idols" on this side of ultimacy.

However, can we say that idolatry itself is more than the form which wrongness takes? True, the idol stands in the way of the Light. It stands as an obstruction between "God" and man. This is the difference between an idol and a symbol. The symbol can be transparent. The idol is opaque. The idol is a temporal, finite, substitute for ultimate reality. The deeper question which concerns us is: What are the dynamics which land persons and societies in idolatry? Idolatry as a category itself seems but another way of denoting descriptively the darkness which we have discussed. Yet, perhaps, it does say more. It is possible to make an idol of one's conception of the Light which overcomes the darkness, to institutionalize the Christ, to harden the evangel into dogma, to externalise and trivialise the whole event. Indeed this has been done. Yet the question persists: From whence comes this objectifying, idol-making tendency? Is it substantive wrong? Or is it merely aberrational? Is it somehow a despairing use of the capacity to imagine and to symbolise? We shall seek light on this question in our inquiry into depth psychology.¹

¹Infra, Chapters Nine and Ten.

Expressions: Liberal, Realistic, Corrective

Frederick R. Tennant, early in this century, argued cogently for clearing up the terminology. Sin has been virtually equated with imperfection. It is properly only accountable wrong against morality, says Tennant. Yet, his doctrine of the freedom of the will seems a bit too unjustifiedly hopeful in the light of depth psychology. The weight of the Christian tradition itself discourages us from defining sin simply as accountability before the "moral law." Nevertheless we can appreciate Tennant's by no means superficial effort to establish a workable definition of sin for contemporary Christianity and society.¹

William Ernest Hocking, in his Human Nature and Its Remaking, expresses a theology which has been markedly influenced by philosophical idealism. Sin is essentially a denial of selfhood. The individual follows the path of least resistance. For some reason it is easier to deny selfhood than to affirm it. By selfhood Hocking means essential humanity.²

Under the influence of John Dewey's instrumentalist philosophy Harrison Sacket Elliott has called for the repudiation of the

¹In addition to The Origin and Propagation of Sin, from which we have quoted earlier, he wrote: The Sources of the Doctrines of the Fall and Original Sin (Cambridge, University Press, 1903); The Concept of Sin (Cambridge, University Press, 1912); and Philosophical Theology, 2 vols. (Cambridge, University Press, 1928-30).

²We follow Mary Frances Thelen's discussion in Man As Sinner, pp. 22-27. She considers William Ernest Hocking's Human Nature and Its Remaking (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1918).

conception of sin. It is untrue to the spirit of Christianity. Of course the phenomena are still present in human existence which gave rise to the doctrine of sin. But the rubric is outworn. It simply will not do for contemporary thinking. He gives a social-psychological doctrine of salvation, calling for "those social arrangements by which security is maintained through the character of the group or inter-group life."¹

Notwithstanding the growing dissatisfaction with the reiterative use of the Biblical conceptions, especially of sin, contemporary theology has for the most part tended to reformulate rather than discard them. For several decades now two other anthropologies have been proclaiming a doctrine of "original sin," of a fall from some kind of primordial state of harmony or innocence into a state of disorientation and wrongness. The first is Marxism, which sees the fall in terms of economic distortion, from which mankind must be rescued. The other is Freudian psychology, which sees the fall as a racial, parricidal guilt beginning with a primordial herd, from which society has evolved. Other anthropologies suggest something of a fall. However these two have become dominant influences in secular "theology." Martin Heidegger's concept of "Verfallenheit" and its influence on theologians like Rudolf Bultmann suggest the prominence of the motif in both existentialist philosophy and

¹Harrison Sackett Elliott, Can Religious Education Be Christian? (New York, Macmillan, 1940), p. 215. See discussion in Thelen, op. cit., pp. 27-32.

"existentialist theology."¹ In our study, we shall deal with Freud at greater length in subsequent chapters. The Marxian doctrine can only be mentioned in passing.

Under the stimulus of world events, which disappointed liberal hopes for the imminent coming of the Kingdom of God, and under the stimulus of secular ideologies, such as Marx's and Freud's and the "existentialists," Christian theologians have been rediscovering the insights of the Reformers, of Augustine, and of the New Testament theologians. We have already mentioned Karl Barth, Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, and Donald Baillie.

In speaking of the Freudian myth of the fall, Professor David Cairns, of Aberdeen, says, rightly, that the Freudian idea of the original sin as incest and parricide, along with Freud's later hypothesis of a primal death instinct, is far from being corroborative

¹See Professor Ian Henderson's illuminating discussion of the issues involved in Bultmann's correlation of the Christian conception with Heidegger's "fallenness": Ian Henderson, Myth in the New Testament (London, SCM Press, 1952, 54), pp. 33-38. Principal references are to Kerygma and Mythos and Heidegger's Sein und Zeit (see Bibliography, infra).

A longer, more recent comparison of Bultmann and Heidegger is John MacQuarrie, An Existentialist Theology (see Bibliography, infra); Re: Verfallenheit: pp. 100-111.

Bultmann's provocative essay on "The New Testament and Mythology" is now available in translation (see Bibliography, infra).

Obviously, our study could draw many lines to Heidegger. As we shall see (Chapter Seven, infra), he has influenced depth psychology directly (for example, Medard Boss, of Zurich).

of the state of sin described in Christian theology.¹ Cairns, along with Niebuhr, and Emil Brunner,² sees perennial truth in the conception of "original sin" in polarity with the conception of "original righteousness." The condition is imperfection, in a certain sense of the term. Man's fall into sin is every-man's failure before the temptation occasioned by anxiety. It is rebellion against the built-in limitations of human life in its temporal existence.³

Niebuhr takes direct issue with the kind of definition which Tennant gives. Yet Niebuhr too is concerned with the "moral dimension" of sin. The individual in fact may be more "moral" than the society.⁴ It is conceivable that he may be more "moral" than the "morals" of the society. It is possible to sin even by refusing

¹David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, p. 232; pp. 223-237.

²For example, Heinrich Emil Brunner, Man in Revolt: "A Christian Anthropology," trans. by Olive Wyon (London, Lutterworth, 1939).

³Cf. Niebuhr, The Nature of Man, Chapters 7-10, pp. 178-300; Brunner, Man in Revolt, especially as cited in Professor Cairn's discussion; Karl Barth, Die Lehre Von Der Versohnung, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik, Vierter Band, Erster Teil (Zollikon-Zurich, Evangelischer Verlag, 1953), Sections 59-61; especially "Des Menschen Fall", pp. 531 ff., "Das Problem der Rechtfertigungslehre," pp. 573 ff., and "Die Rechtfertigung allein durch den Glauben," pp. 679 ff., and the refreshing Barth essays, "The Humanity of God," and "The Gift of Freedom," in Karl Barth, The Humanity of God, trans. by John N. Thomas and Thomas Wieser (John Knox Press, Richmond, Virginia, 1960), pp. 37-96, at pp. 46-52 and pp. 78-83. Barth continues to see the essential humanity only in "the man Christ Jesus." Cf. Cairns, op. cit., pp. 164-179.

⁴Cf., Reinhold Niebuhr, Moral Man and Immoral Society: "A Study in Ethics and Politics" (New York, Scribner's, 1932).

"on moral grounds" to take responsible action within the dull-
 grayness of our existence. Yet as it has already been pointed out,
 some of the difficulties in such debate are due to the semantic
 confusion, the ambiguity which characterizes much of the use of
 such terms as morality and moral, for instance. In our present
 study we are trying to avoid this confusion by distinguishing between
moral and agapeistic--which refers to the "morality" of the Kingdom
 of God. In ordinary parlance, moral seems more appropriate for de-
 scribing the customs and norms of society, derived from its long
 history of trial-and-error wisdom. The law of agape is the substance
 of what we consider the Christian revelation of the "will of God,"
 God in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself.

Professor H. Richard Niebuhr, of Yale, comes to grips with
 the problem of relating the two orders: "culture" and "the Christ"
 in his study Christ and Culture.¹ Morality is correlative with
 culture. The Christ is the revelation of the transforming grace of
agape--and the "law" of agape. Sigmund Freud, as we shall see in
 subsequent discussion, thinks of "the fall" as a fall into culture.
 Culture itself is collective neurosis.² However, Christian the-
 ology does not say that culture and morality are without the agape.
 At the same time it refuses to risk losing its understanding of

¹H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York, Harper, 1951).

²This assertion is our inference from his Civilization and Its Discontents, as well as the earlier Totem and Taboo; infra, Chapter Five.

that agape by simply equating it with morality, even with the highest known morality.

Reinhold Niebuhr declares a "moral dimension" for sin. It is injustice. He is thinking of justice--nishpat, dikaionune--in its Biblical sense but also in its eminently practical sense.¹ He is thinking of essential justice as it is included in justitia originalis, the original righteousness, which, for Niebuhr is a here-and-now reality, not simply a state of soul lost in history and pre-history. It is all but overcome by the "second nature," all but lost under escapist patterns of response to the fundamental question posed by existence. But it is in everyone, while deriving only from God.

But aside from its "moral dimension" sin has what Niebuhr insists is its "spiritual dimension," not that Tennant or any other serious theologian would disagree. But the question remains open as to what this "spiritual dimension" actually is. Niebuhr, resorting to the Old Testament, Pauline, and Augustinian voluntaristic descriptions, calls it rebellion. In the light of the contribution of depth psychologists like Otto Rank, we wonder whether a reductionistic use of the idea of rebellion may not be misleading. At any

¹The Nature of Man, p. 179; The Destiny of Man, Chapter 9, "The Kingdom of God and The Struggle for Justice" (The Nature and Destiny, Vol. II, pp. 244-286). Cf. Emil Brunner's criticism of the indefiniteness of Niebuhr's conception of justice, in Charles Kegley and Robert W. Bretall, Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought (The Library of Living Theology, Vol. II, New York, Macmillan, 1956), pp. 27-33, at pp. 29-31. See infra, Chapter Fourteen, note.

rate, the tradition does support such a usage, even if the insights of depth psychology issue a caveat.¹

Niebuhr says that the spiritual dimension of sin is against God in the sense of rebelling against the limitations of creaturehood. One of these limits, we may infer, may be the inability "in this life" to achieve the perfect agape. Hence even to assume its perfection in oneself or in some institution is a form of the rebellion which is sinful. However, justice is possible under the aegis of agape. Yet it fails under the presumptuousness of pride on the one hand, and the twisting by sensuality, on the other.

To avoid the confusion caused by too indiscriminate a use of designations like "liberal" and "conservative" Professor Walter M. Horton, of Oberlin, called his first book Realistic Theology.² He adopts Gustav Aulen's thesis in Christus Victor and applies it "realistically," or "instrumentalistically"--to use a term which has been adopted for our present study. Christ fought and fights the power of evil. Christian action must include aggressive attack upon the evils in society. Thus does salvation come to mankind. The Christian message is of salvation from the power of evil. Those who put their faith in the message profess it by helping it in its mission. They are to be wise as serpents however, always aware of the complexities of modern society and its institutions,

¹Infra, Part II.

²Walter M. Horton, Realistic Theology (New York, Harper, 1934).

in which they are involved as participants.¹ Horton seeks light from the work of the depth psychologists as he inquires into the theology of human nature.²

Some of the theologians we have considered have been compared in a careful study by Dr. Mary Frances Thelen.³ She also discusses the thinking of Professor John Coleman Bennett, with whom she seems

¹We follow Thelen's careful study of Horton's theology, Mary Frances Thelen, Man As Sinner, pp. 117-129.

²Pastoral Psychology, VII, 68 (November, 1956) calls Professor Horton "the man of the month," and includes an article by him, "A Psychological Approach to Theology--After 25 Years" (pp. 22-28).

³She includes a study of the theology of Professor Robert Lowry Calhoun, of Yale. Like Hocking, he sees sin as an attempt to deny, to disobey, the "deepest law of man's own being." He says it is universal because of man's "more superficial, so-called 'natural' inclinations . . . toward self-indulgence and self-glorification." Man needs salvation from his second nature, which keeps him from loving God and his neighbor aright. Only God can save him, God as Love, quickening and guiding his love in return. In the experience of salvation, vision and insight are the dominant means by which the grace of God overcomes the power of sin. Like Tillich, Calhoun describes this salvation in terms of "blessedness." It is more than progress and in some sense less than "virtue" because it cannot be "sinless" in this life. Justification, in its subjective dimension, can be described as "the peace of God which passes all understanding." Thelen's references are principally to essays including, "The Dilemma of Humanitarian Modernism," The Christian Understanding of Man (Oxford Conference Book, Chicago, Willett, Clark and Co., 1938); God and the Common Life (New York, Scribner's, 1935); and What Is Man? (Hazen Books on Religion, New York, Association Press, 1937). --Thelen, op. cit., pp. 129-138.

Cf. John Tulloch, The Christian Doctrine of Sin (Edinburgh and London, Wm. Blackwood, 1876). Principal Tulloch (of St. Mary's College, University of St. Andrews) gave these Croall Lectures before the Freudian era and before the current wave of theology. Yet, in his day, he saw the issue science-or-theology as unrealistic. Both science and theology serve (or should serve) the truth (pp. 199-200). "Sin" springs out of the depths of human personality (p. 92). Yet man is not a "mere mass of corruption." Despite sin, there is a

to be most in agreement.¹ Bennett, of Union Seminary in New York, is concerned with the strong ethical imperative "within the gospel." It must not be lost in the rediscovery of the more deterministic implications of man's existence. Yet he "joins with the others in a new appreciation of the forgiveness of God which must follow as well as precede ethical achievement within the Christian life."²

H. Richard Niebuhr reiterates the insight of Schleiermacher, sensing that the theological trend with Ritschl and also with much of current thinking has lost something in failing to stress the problem of man as man in terms of his "absolute dependence" on God.³ We are reminded of the Old Testament emphasis on hesedh and of the hamartiology of the Epistle to the Hebrews in Niebuhr's definition of sin as essentially disloyalty to Him who is wholly loyal and on whom man is absolutely dependent.⁴ He adds to his analysis of sin the

"a divine potency" in man. He quotes F. W. Robertson on "the divine order" below the "chaos" in the human personality (pp. 131-2). Sin is inward and experiential. Already in the Old Testament sin is conceived as being "in its nature destructive. It bears death in it as its natural working or outcome" (p. 95).

¹Ibid., p. 201.

²Ibid., p. 148. Thelen cites many articles by Bennett, along with the following books: Christian Realism (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941); Christianity and Our World (Hazen Books on Religion, New York, Association Press, 1936); and Social Salvation (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935). See Thelen, op. cit., pp. 139-148.

³Ibid., p. 160.

⁴Ibid., pp. 153-155.

dynamics of "evil imaginations." The reason is led astray by evil imaginations, which introduce new corruptions in man's attitude to his life and to the God upon whom he is wholly dependent.¹

H. Richard Niebuhr, like Principal John Baillie and many others, urges the corrective function of theology? It tends to over-correct, risking the loss of the truth in the error it attacks. In our own time perhaps the corrective "Barthian" tendencies may stand in need of a corrective which recovers some of the humanistic truth in the so-called liberal "error."

In her comparative study of what she calls liberal and "realistic" theology on the question of "man as sinner," Miss Thelen chides theologians for assaying to use borrowings from the approach of psychoanalysis without understanding the content of psychoanalytic teaching and its relationship to philosophical anthropology.³

¹H. Richard Niebuhr, The Meaning of Revelation (New York, Macmillan, 1941). We follow Thelen's study to this point: Thelen, op. cit., pp. 148-163. She cites several articles by H. R. Niebuhr, along with The Meaning, and The Kingdom of God in America (Chicago, Willet, Clark & Co., 1937).

²Cf. for instance, John Baillie, "Looking Before and After," The Christian Century, LXXV, 14 (Chicago, April 2, 1958), pp. 400-402. The present writer has had occasion to hear Professor Niebuhr recently in addresses and forums, in one of which, at Harvard Divinity School, in November, 1959, he made "Corrective Theology" his theme.

³Probably we can say with considerable assurance that the situation has improved since the mid-forties, when Miss Thelen completed her study of the material at hand. Her critical statements are incidental to her appraisal of what contemporary "American realistic" theologians were saying about the problem of man in his existence and in his society.--Thelen, op. cit., "Reflections at the End of an Essay," at pp. 199-203.

Thelen contrasts "liberal theology" with the subsequent corrective theology, which she calls "realistic" as these are expressed, especially in recent decades in America.¹ Whereas "liberal theology" teaches that man finds fulfillment in the service of God, "realistic" theology sees God as standing over against man in the relationship of both Judge and Redeemer. "Liberal theology" has dropped the conception of original sin and teaches that man can either conform to the moral law or at least construe moral law in terms of what is actually possible of achievement. "Realistic theology," on the other hand, believes that man cannot avoid an uneasy conscience in some form or other and that he must, "within his sin," seek forgiveness from God. "Liberal theology" thinks of the human will as being free to choose the good, although it is tempted by forces which reflect both biological endowment and cultural lag. "Realistic theology" insists that there is a bias within the will itself which makes yielding to such temptation inevitable in every action. "Liberal theology" tends to view sin as moral wrongness with a religious reference. Big and little sins are to be distinguished. Liberal optimism holds that sin is on the way out, since God is curing it in the transformation of individual lives and in the progress of society. "Realistic theology," on the other hand, sees it as a wrongness in man's relationship to God. It is idolatrous presumption. It is to be taken seriously because of the

¹Cf. H. Shelton Smith, Changing Conceptions of Original Sin, "A Study in American Theology Since 1750" (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955), 242 pp.

amount of evil and destruction it causes in the world. Sin is at least analogous to neurosis as psychoanalysis describes it. Depth psychology helps us to a clearer understanding of the sinfulness in the "sins of the righteous."

"Liberal theology's" doctrine of justification and of the grace of God as it brings "salvation" holds that the effect is transformation--or the traditional conception of sanctification. God confers the power to work more valiantly for the coming of the Kingdom. "Realistic theology," on the other hand, stresses reconciliation as the effect of the saving grace. The experience of grace consoles the individual and his society in the failure of their best efforts. Moral improvement may be a secondary effect. But it is not the primary effect, nor the criterion.

"Liberal theology" views social salvation in terms of a possible application of the ethics of Jesus to group life. "Realistic theology" sees this as too simple and wishful and thinks that it is necessary to proceed, even soteriologically, in a kind of dialectic between the ultimate goal of love and a realistic social ethic which is based on the persistence of power politics.¹

The Recovery of Perspective: "Sin," "Righteousness," "Grace"

Reinhold Niebuhr probably exaggerates the positions which he seeks to contrast. Yet his rhetorical manner of analysing the

¹We refer to the entire study Man As Sinner, especially to pp. 167-8 ff. and pp. 182-198.

problem and its attempted solutions has penetrated to a depth which does seem to be the level on which theology should pursue correctively its perennial task of addressing the "lost." He appreciates "how infinite may be the shades of awareness of guilt from the complacency of those who are spiritually blind to the sensitivity of the saint who knows that he is not a saint." He chides both "most Pelagians" and "many Augustinians" for their failure to see the truth in balance.¹ His suggestion for this balance is to be found in statements like this, reminiscent of the Reformers, Augustine, and Paul: "Man is most free in the discovery that he is not free."² Man's sin then is his refusal to recognize his inherent limitations, his essential creatureliness.³

As we have pointed out, original sin is a meaningful designation only with respect to an original righteousness. Sin is a fall from man's essential nature. Contemporary theology seems to give this a present significance without getting bogged down in the ancient debate about the phylogenetic aspects of some primordial racial event.

¹The Nature and Destiny, I, p. 260.

²Ibid. Cf.: "Human freedom is the joy whereby man appropriates for himself God's election."--Karl Barth, "The Gift of Freedom," in The Humanity of God, p. 79.

³Cf. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, II, pp. 77-86. For instance, Tillich says, "Sin does not produce death but gives to death the power which is conquered only in participation in the eternal." "The structure of finitude is good in itself, but under the conditions of estrangement it becomes a structure of destruction." --p. 77.

Augustine himself affirmed that "esse qua esse bonum est."¹ This is the prevailing doctrine of the Hebrew-Christian tradition, including emphatically, the first chapter of Genesis. Evil is a distortion, though it is a dynamic distortion, of the good. In the beginning, according to the logic of Christian faith, all things are good.²

According to Niebuhr, the original righteousness, in human, theological-psychological terms, is the opposite of the "sinful self" which is observed by the transcendent self--the "conscience" (?). It is the "transcendent possibilities" regarded classically as "law." In Christianity it is the law of agape, the law of love, as Jesus represents it to us, and as he summarised it: "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart and all thy soul and all thy mind; and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." The justitia originalis contains "(a) The perfect relation of the soul to God in which obedience is transcended by love, trust and confidence"; (b) the perfect internal harmony of the soul with itself in all of its desires and impulses"; and (c) the perfect harmony of life with life."³

¹We are indebted to Professor Tillich for this reference. The thought occurs also in St. Augustine, Confessions, VII, 12. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny, I, p. 267; Paul Tillich, "The Theological Significance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis," in Theology of Culture, edited by Robert C. Kimball (New York, Oxford University Press, 1959), pp. 112-126, at pp. 118-119.

²Cf., Genesis 1:18.

³Reinhold Niebuhr, The Nature and Destiny, I, pp. 288-295.

The self which is essentially righteous is the I of momentary self-transcendence.¹ Since Niebuhr in explaining what he means cannot avoid speaking as a psychologist, we are all the more encouraged to inquire of depth psychology what it postulates as the inner psychic "anatomy" of the self. This we must do before we are able to go far into our inquiry concerning guilt.²

Probably Niebuhr is quite right in saying that the twin conceptions of original righteousness and original sin provide a continual corrective both to extreme pessimism and to extreme optimism. "Against pessimistic theories of human nature which affirm the total depravity of man it is important to assert the continued presence in man of the justitia originalis, of the law of love, as law and requirement."³

¹Indeed, this is a doctrine of an Über-Ich. It is not the same as Freud's. In fact Niebuhr's conception of the I of self-transcendence and Tillich's conception of the self which is ec-static to itself (Tillich, Systematic, Vol. I, pp. 124-127) do not enter into dialogue with Freud's conception of the superego. The present writer has heard Professor Tillich, in conversation, dismiss the Freudian concept as virtually untenable. This is not to say that either theologian refuses to recognize the increasing general use of the term as a kind of synonym for "conscience." The Freudian particularity of the concept is far from their views of conscience, however. Cf., infra, Chapter Ten. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, "Human Creativity and Self-Concern in Freud's Thought," Freud and the Twentieth Century, (Benjamin Nelson, editor, New York, Maridian Books, 1957), pp. 259-276, at p. 263, pp. 266-267.

²Infra, Chapter Four.

³The Nature and Destiny, I, p. 296.

The conception of original righteousness is also "in refutation of modern secular and Christian forms of utopianism, to recognize that the fulfillment of the law of love is no simple possibility."¹ To obey completely the law of love requires a freedom which man does not have. Niebuhr credits the Reformation with the recovery of the insight that "the fact of sin is a perennial category of historic existence." Divine grace is not an infused power within man to enable him to fulfill the law of love, as medieval Roman Catholic theology held generally. The Reformers saw "divine grace" as that divine mercy which brings man's "uneasy conscience to rest despite the continued self-contradiction of human effort upon every level of achievement."²

Professor Tillich, because of what he regards as an almost hopeless semantic confusion for the contemporary mind, regrets Niebuhr's choice of the term "original sin." Tillich's construction is that the essential I is set over against the estranged I in the experience of the moral--ethical--imperatives.³

What is the gospel of grace to "sinful" man? Even according to Reinhold Niebuhr, who seems to be stronger on analysis than he is on solution, it is that "God takes man's sin upon Himself and into

¹Ibid. ²Ibid., p. 299.

³We are relying here on conversation with Professor Tillich. He also correlates "justification" with "acceptance of acceptance"--for instance, in Paul Tillich, The Courage to Be, "The Terry Lectures," (New Haven, Yale, University Press, 1952), pp. 164-165. See infra, Part III.

Himself."¹ Justification is not something to strive for; it is simply a gift to be accepted. Here again, in our own time, is the doctrine of "justification by grace through faith." Theology must continue to seek out its actual dynamics, in terms of social dynamics--the Gestalt of grace,² the actual form which it takes in its saving work and in terms of psychodynamics and interpersonal-dynamics.

¹The Nature and Destiny, I, p. 143.

²"The Gestalt of grace" is a theological, sociological concept used by Professor Paul Tillich and others in the so-called "Kairos circle" in the Christian socialist movement, which unfortunately was not able to stem the tide of "demonic" Nazism. The use of the term suggests the influence of Gestalt psychology. See Paul Tillich, "The Formative Power of Protestantism," in The Protestant Era, a collection of essays translated by James Luther Adams (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 206-221.

CHAPTER THREE

THE CHRISTIAN CONCEPTIONS OF SIN AND JUSTIFICATION INTERRELATED

The Conceptions of Sin and Justification in Relation to the Biblical Origins and to the Present

As it speaks to the contemporary situation, corrective theology finds its way back to the Biblical origins and reviews the history of its characteristic motifs, including the conceptions of sin and justification. Its task is perennial. Its essentially soteriological concern is always informed by its Christology, since this is the elaboration of God's presence, in event and symbol, overcoming the power of sin-and-evil in human existence. The late Professor Donald M. Baillie keeps this basic soteriological concern ever in the foreground in his book on the Incarnation and Atonement.

In relating the Christian doctrine of Atonement to the problem of human sinfulness and the need for forgiveness, Baillie says, after a carefully human consideration of the dynamics of forgiving love, "There is an atonement, an expiation, in the heart of God Himself, and out of this comes the forgiveness of our sins."¹

He follows with a historical review of the sacramental tradition in the world of the Bible. Christianity sees the climax

¹Donald M. Baillie, God Was In Christ, p. 175.

of this tradition in the Christ-event. There it merges with the prophetic message of absolutely free forgiveness, which comes from a God who actively seeks the sinner to bring him to receptive repentance.¹ The sacramental message is that "now it is God Himself that makes the sacrifice." The old terms are used, but now with a radically new interpretation.² The Divine Shepherd goes out to find the lost sheep.

The seeking shepherd and the Lamb of God are one and the same. It is love that seeks and love that suffers in the process of forgiving, of receiving back that which was lost. In the purely human sequence, Jesus "went straight on as the 'friend of sinners,' and got deeper and deeper into trouble, until in the end He was condemned to death He died for sinners: it was his love for them that brought Him to the Cross."³

The "sinners" whom Jesus befriended and for whose sake he died were primarily those whom the "righteous" of Israel called "sinners." Yet Christianity sees in his life and death an ultimate interpretation: he died for all sinners, for the sins of the whole world. Even in the thinking of the Apostle Paul, says Baillie with C. H. Dodd, the sacrifice was not really to appease an angry God.

¹Cf. Luke 15; John 3:16, 17.

²God Was In Christ, pp. 171-179. Of course it can be said that such a conception of God, as seeking the one estranged from him, is also present to some extent in the Old Testament, notably in Hosea, also in Jonah.

³Donald Baillie, God Was In Christ, p. 183.

"God's merciful attitude towards sinners is never regarded as the result of the process, but as its cause and source."¹ Paul's idea of the wrath of God was of what can be identified "with the consuming fire of inexorable divine love in relation to our sins." The New Testament is never able to stop tracing upstream the love that was shown in the Cross of Christ, to its source "the eternal love of God dealing sacrificially with the sins of the world."²

The traditional idea of "Atonement" makes sense only if "in the last analysis it is an eternal work of atonement, supratemporal as the life of God is, but not 'timeless' as an abstraction is; appearing incarnate once, but touching every point of history, and going on as long as sins continue to be committed and there are sinners to be reconciled." The symbol is "The Lamb slain from the foundation of the world."³ Thus we see in Western, Protestant theology a recovery of an emphasis which has been kept vital within

¹Ibid., p. 188. Cf. C. H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans. "The Moffatt New Testament Commentary Series," (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1952), re: Romans 3:24 f.: "Being justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, whom God hath set forth as a propitiation (hilasterion) through faith, by his blood" (Baillie, God Was In Christ, pp. 187-189). Re: the wrath of God--Dodd, Romans, pp. 20 ff. (Baillie, God Was In Christ, p. 189). Baillie also cites Vincent Taylor, The Atonement in New Testament Thought (London, Epworth Press, 1940), pp. 133 f., and H. Emil Brunner, The Mediator, translated by Olive Wyon (London, Lutterworth, 1934), pp. 519 ff.

²Donald Baillie, God Was In Christ, p. 189.

³Revelation 13:8--See Baillie's note, Note 2, ibid., p. 192.

Eastern Christianity through the centuries, especially through its liturgy.¹

Justification by grace through faith is not self-justification. It is experienced as coming from outside one's self, from beyond. Even as the subjective side of sin is despair, so the subjective side of justification is hope. It is hope which says that one is being lifted up out of his despair and beyond the power of tragedy and evil, not for mere euphoric bliss, but for active fulfillment of the meaning of life. Justification is transcending one's despairing situation, being borne out of the concentration camp of despair. Christian goodness "is never conscious of its own merit but only of God's mercy."²

More than a historic moment of personal revelation by God of his love for man, the Christ-event is a dynamic force. "God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself, not reckoning unto them their trespasses."³ The attitude which such gospel creates within the individual is described as the "paradox of grace." "Because God does not reckon unto us our trespasses, we will not reckon unto us our virtues." The paradox of grace is, in the words

¹Ibid., pp. 196-197.

²Ibid., p. 201. Baillie adds, "That is the very secret of Christian character."

³II Corinthians 5:19, quoted, Baillie, ibid., p. 202.

of Paul, which we have quoted earlier, ". . . I, yet not I, but the grace of God" ¹

While looking to its heritage, theology must also seek the Gestalt of this saving grace even within the so-called secular order. In the more consciously "sacred" or religiously-oriented community we are witnessing creative attempts to implement the gospel through Agape communities, movements within the Church like the Iona community, in Scotland, attempts to bring healing to the inner-city, like the East Harlem Protestant Parish, in New York, and serious grappling with political dynamics in such theologically-inspired projects as the Institute of Ethics and Politics, which is centered at Wesleyan University, in Connecticut. ² The problem of sin and grace extends to these and other expressions of grace-in-action. Our present study seems more in touch with the movement called, variously, pastoral psychology, pastoral psychiatry, and pastoral

¹I Corinthians 15:10; Donald Baillie, God Was In Christ, p. 202.

"It seems plain, then, that there is a quite luminous and practical truth underlying the mysterious statement that only by the aid of divine grace can a man be free to do and be what he ought to do and be. It means at least this, as a mere matter of psychological description: that the best kind of living, or the finest type of character, does not come through sheer volitional effort to realize an ideal, but in a more indirect way, as the fruit of a life of faith in God."--Donald M. Baillie, "Philosophers and Theologians on the Freedom of the Will," reprinted from The Scottish Journal of Theology, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June, 1951), in the posthumously published papers: D. M. Baillie, The Theology of The Sacraments and Other Papers (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1957), pp. 127-137, at p. 136.

²In Middletown, Connecticut, under the leadership of a theologian-social scientist, Dr. Kenneth Underwood.

counselling. However the implications even for so limited a comparison as the present one are far-reaching, beyond the simply "psychotherapeutic" function of the Church's ministry.¹

Preliminary Inferences: The Relation of the Conceptions
of Sin and Justification To Each Other and to the
Problem of Man in Existence and in Society

Our study of the Biblical origins and of the contemporary expression of the conceptions of sin and justification leads to the following conclusions.

(1) As Professor Edgar P. Dickie, of St. Andrews, puts it:

"It is only from the experience of grace that the depth of sin opens up before us."² The conception of sin depends on the conception of justification. Although misery precedes joy in much of human experience, it is understood as misery when it is contrasted with joy. The gospel of justification by grace comes as joy into the midst of despair to lift the person into a sense of meaning despite the anxieties and ambiguities of his existence.

(2) Justification is by grace alone through faith, according to the Christian conception. As the Augsburg Confession puts it:

¹Writings which are representative of this concern for the actual, practical, "implementational," "incarnational" implications of the conception of justification by grace, or what we have referred to as the "Gestalt of grace" in action, are these: H. R. Mackintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness (London, Nisbet, 1927); Donald M. Baillie's God Was In Christ--we note especially the "Epilogue: The Body of Christ"; and The Theology of the Sacraments (Part II, but the other papers as well).

²Edgar P. Dickie, God Is Light (London, Hodder & Stoughton, 1953), p. 13.

"God imputes this faith for righteousness in his own sight."¹ God gives the faith that accepts the justification. The entire event of justification is rescue from the outside, as it were. Rescue is first experienced; then it is made a topic for reflection.

(3) Justification presupposes original goodness in the "creation" itself; that is, in the essential nature of man as a part of creation. Theologians differ as to the locus of this essential nature. Some see it only in the Christ, qualitatively different from man's usual nature. Others see it in every man as a human being over against his own distortion of his "human-hood." The original righteousness which is the content of justification is essential humanity. Christianity undertakes to define the quintessence of humanity in the law of agape and the grace of agape. It is as Reinhold Niebuhr describes it: (a) the perfect relation of the person to God in love, trust, and confidence; (b) the perfect internal harmony of the person in all his desires and impulses; and (c) the perfect harmony of life with life.²

(4) Justification includes Divine forgiveness for actual guilt and Divine deliverance from the power opposed to the original righteousness.

¹Augsburg Confession, IV--Henry Bettenson, ed., Documents of the Christian Church (New York and London, Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 297.

²Supra, Chapter Two.

(5) The justification is by the Christ-event-and symbol,¹ by what Donald Baillie has described as the Incarnation and the Atonement seen together. As Emil Brunner, in speaking of God's self-disclosure, says, "Jesus Christ is what God says to us."² It is in the idiom of humanity that the meaning of justification and sin is disclosed. In the vision of Jesus as the Christ the Church sees essential humanity. The three elements of original righteousness are present. The center for man's selfhood is not himself as an isolated entity. It is God, or ultimate reality. Suffice it to say, for our study: It is beyond the person's own plexus of psychic energies, beyond his own subjectivity. He both loses and finds himself in relationship. This does not mean that he is to lose himself in a kind of nirvana, or death to individualized selfhood. The Christian conception of justification holds to both aspects of the fundamental mystery and the fundamental anxiety: Man is distinct; yet he is dependent. Justification means partaking of a new humanity en Christo.

(6) Sin as offense, or "actual sin," is basically a refusal to accept justification by grace through faith. It is a rejection of the grace of God. This includes elements traditionally described as "unbelief," "rebellion," "rejection of Christ," "hubris" or

¹Here the term symbol is used in the sense proclaimed by Professor Tillich--"The symbol participates in the reality which is symbolized." Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 10. Cf. Tillich's discussion of Christological symbols, ibid., pp. 125-130, 136 ff.

²We are unable to locate the exact reference. However, see similar statements in Brunner, The Mediator, pp. 236, 320-1.

"The pride of life." "Concupiscence"--the lust of the eye and of the flesh--is regarded more as a manifestation of the basic offense. Blind nature, or "animal nature," may provide much of the temptation to sin, but it is not what Christianity means by sin, or the sin. Sin may be described as (a) self-justification or (b) despair of the justification for one's self which is possible by grace.

(7) Breaches of moral law, breaches of the transcendent law of agape, may be regarded as instances or incidents within the pattern of rejecting the grace of God.

(8) The practical, psychological use of the conception of justification by grace through faith seems to be much as it has been suggested by the late Professor Donald Baillie, for example. One can go through life (a) with an arrogant fiction of complete self-reliance, (b) with an irresponsible resignation, or (c) with an attitude which says, "I, yet not I, but the grace of God."¹ (a) He can try to preempt the place of the Almighty (hubris). (b) He can fictionalise his need for reunion and refuse to be an I in any responsible sense. Or (c) He can acknowledge both his absolute dependence and his solitude--the state of being cut adrift from the other--and commit himself to the meaning which God gives him to see in such ambiguous tension and uncertainty. Critics of theology may be inclined to suspect in this kind of a solution but another fiction. Theology's only answer can be the commitment itself.

¹I Corinthians 15:10.

As with despair (sin) so, with hope (justification), a "choice" is involved. But if, on reflection, one looks back upon his own choice in itself as the "saving act," he risks a return to despair.

Despite the appearances at times, theology's guiding concern is for truth defined as "the ultimately trustworthy," that which is trustworthy for human beings! It is only in the interest of discovering, rediscovering, explicating and helping to implement, this trustworthiness-trustworthy agape--that there is valid reason for reiterating and reformulating these twin conceptions of sin and justification.

(9) It may well be that sin as a designation should be reserved for "culpable, accountable wrongness." However, justification attacks the larger problem of tragic evil: sin-and-evil, including both culpable and non-culpable wrongness.¹

¹The traditional distinctions: "original sin" and "actual sin," continue to be misleading, terminologically.

PART TWO

"MAN AS SINNER" IN THE LIGHT
OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

COTTON FIBER CONTENT

CHAPTER FOUR

WHO IS HE?--CAN WE ASSUME A SUBJECT-SELF?

"Our Knowledge of Ourselves" in Theology and Depth Psychology

Theologians have inquired into the nature of revelation, of God, of man and society. They have tried to analyze the problem of man-in-his-existence-and-in-society and to understand the Christian gospel as solution. Their understanding of the psychology of man is often profound, though perhaps at times open to the charge of being tendentious.

John Calvin begins his systematic treatment of Christian faith with a discussion of the psychology of man as it affects and reflects theology proper--or "our knowledge of God."

Our wisdom consists almost entirely of two parts: the knowledge of God and of ourselves. But as these are connected together by many ties, it is not easy to determine which of the two precedes, and gives birth to the other.¹

Man is conscious of that in himself which is "something like a world of misery," a "feeling of ignorance, vanity, want, weakness, in short, depravity and corruption." If one remains oblivious to these

¹John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, Bk. I, Ch. I, 1 (Beveridge translation, Grand Rapids, Michigan, 1953), pp. 37-38.

he tends to rest in himself, to imagine himself as self-sufficient. But if he is awake to them he is being led "as by the hand" to seek God.¹

But Calvin goes on to say that no one ever truly understands himself until he has first "contemplated the face of God." Self-understanding is seeing oneself in contrast to one's understanding of God. Hence, by necessity, Christian psychology must derive from Christian theology.²

Today, four centuries after Calvin, theologians continue to subordinate the study of man's nature to theology proper. It is within the context of theology that Christianity describes man's condition and behavior by the terms sinfulness, sinful, sinning, sinner, and sin. Yet today, as in Calvin's time, we recognize at the outset that "our knowledge of God" and "our knowledge of ourselves" are so interrelated that "it is not easy to determine which of the two precedes, and gives birth to the other."³

Depth psychology suggests some mental mechanisms by which we conceptualize God, but it sheds no direct light on what we have called theology proper.⁴ However the various schools of psycho-analysis do allege considerable light on "the nature of ourselves." It is upon the problem of man-in-his-existence and in-his-society that we focus

¹Ibid. ²Cf. ibid., paragraphs 2 and 3, pp. 38-39.

³Supra, Note 1.

⁴Cf. supra, in our Introduction; also, infra, Chapter 14.

our inquiry. In what sense is it proper to our understanding of ourselves to speak of man as sinner? We find that depth psychology encourages us to appreciate the complexity of the very concept ourselves. It forces then the question, "If sin, who precisely, is sinner, sinning, sinful?" It helps us in the finding of the question and its answer.

Both to illustrate and to pursue this dialectic of theology with depth psychology our discussion will pursue the question: Who is the sinner? or What is the nature of the subject-self, the I of accountability? It is helpful to cite an incident in which easily recognizable wrongness as offense is displayed.

One sees a frightful altercation, a one-sided attack, in a public place.¹ A man-in-sudden-rage knocks another down and unconscious. He continues to pound and kick his victim until the slowly alerted passers-by force a halt. He then turns on them, with his fists clenched. Like Goliath, he is ready to take on anyone else.

What is going on in his inner world? His victim is innocent. Why has the man-in-rage chosen one of the crowd and assaulted him so viciously, so compulsively, repetitively, tragically?

We are indebted to the psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan for the concept parataxic distortion, akin to the Freudian idea of projection.² The man-in-rage is seeing things! True, his pent-up

¹The following is our own "eye-witness report", admittedly with considerable editorial comment. The altercation was witnessed in a Boston subway, on a night in November, 1959.

²Infra, this chapter.

rage can cite a wisp of a provocation in the victim's mild retort or rebuke at his loud behavior. But the victim cannot as himself mean this much to his attacker. He is attacked not as he is in himself but as he is as an object that represents by projection, distortion with disassociation, some threatening presence already in the aggressor's own psychic world. Common-sense psychology says that one hates what he most fears. The victim is seen through the distorted lens, the peculiar inner constructs, of the attacker. This troubled psyche--the inner world or "mind" of the aggressor--in its inability to contain itself externalizes its conflict and casts in the role of villain the handiest person-object present. To the attacker the victim seems the agent of a hostile world. "Parataxic distortion" is seeing things in terms of one's own peculiar experience. Borrowing from the terminology of rhetoric, Sullivan described as syntactic the objective sequences of things or events as they are. Prototaxic impressions are characteristically the earliest infant's mode of experiencing objects and events as unrelated. These objects and events as they appear in the individual's own peculiar, distorted arrangement are parataxic.¹ "Subjective" seems to be clear enough as a descriptive in many cases. However, it does not carry the connotation of pathogenesis which such a violent incident suggests.

¹Syntaxis, prototaxis, and parataxis are "modes" of experience. See, for example, the discussion of Sullivan's conception in Ruth L. Munroe, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, "An Exposition, Critique, and Attempt at Integration" (New York, The Dryden Press, 1955), pp. 399-402.

Yet even after we have granted such a description of the attack upon an innocent person, how can we get at the rage, its intensity, its obviously murderous telos?¹ This kind of question seems to express the reason for one's dwelling on such an incident long after witnessing it, and indeed during the moment of the awareness.

There can be no doubt, in this instance, but that the man-in-rage is actually in the process of destroying his victim when he is forced to stop. An elderly woman, one of the more courageous of those standing nearest the fray, calls for an immediate cessation of his senseless pounding of a victim who may already be dead as far as the crowd can see.

"You have no right to do that," is the almost curious refrain. Yet, how profound a judgment! It speaks the more "syntactic" valuation of this encounter of two worlds. No one has a right to hit another, especially when he is down, and never without just cause, such as, perhaps, a provocation "syntactically" at least commensurate with the reflexive retaliation. "You have no right; you are not justified in tearing down the investment of others; the person of another is not yours to destroy. How can you presume to destroy that which is not yours even to touch?" These are the questions of the, alas, too weakly protective onlookers, the social milieu around the crime.

¹The term telos is used in the literature of depth psychology: E. g., Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, p. 272. However our own use of the term telos does not derive directly from any of the depth psychologists we have read, so far as we know. (We may have been influenced by William McDougall's "hormic" theory.) Hence, its use generally throughout our exposition and commentary is in the interest of our own theologically-oriented description and interpretation. Here it means quite simply, intent or goal.

But the attacker seems not to be asking such questions. His rage is saying to all the world, "I am destroying this person-object. I am ready to turn my asserted right-to-destroy upon you!" Here is the acting out of a might-is-right doctrine, however irrational it may be in its articulation. Here is an example of the problem of evil, certainly of moral evil!

Yet to his own parataxic vision the man-in-rage is destroying a bad and threatening object. At least this is what most depth psychologists seem to be saying. Threatening in what sense? To whom? Or to what? Even if we take into consideration the biochemical effects possibly of alcohol, perhaps even narcotics, if we allow for the neurological tensions arising from organic disturbance, even if we see the incident as determined glandularly, we nevertheless must recognize that in the "thinking" of the man-in-rage the threat is conceived by his whatever-conceives-of-things to be directed against his own inner strivings, his own struggling, despised "self." He "defends himself."

To say that he manifests hostility, that his action bespeaks hatred is true enough. But what is hostility? Why is it? here depth psychology has more than one answer. Yet there seems to be a concerted light in the very recognition of the inner dynamics involved.

Freud eventually posed as explanation a primitive death instinct.¹ The urge to destroy operates as a part of the given in

¹Infra, this chapter.

the human psyche, with all the force of a need. It may be conceived as resistance to change, an urge to return to earlier stages of development, eventually to "dust."

It may be more than merely analogous to the destructiveness of the lion as it stalks its prey, falls upon and devours it. It may have been part of the survival equipment of the cave man's psyche. Destroy to survive!

Certainly some such theory of an instinct of destructiveness seems to be the simplest explanation, formally at least. Society's task vis-a-vis crimes of passion becomes almost simply to control and channel the ineradicable aggressive instincts of human beings. Against the apostle we may have to say with increasing insight, "Exercise profiteth much!" Contrived outlets for aggression must be improved and made available to all.

The hypothesis of a primitive drive to destroy is regarded variously, even by the Freudians: as not proved, disproved, unprovable, and improvable.¹ Yet all depth psychologists recognize the phenomenon of "aggressiveness." Most however regard destructiveness as a synthetic impulse. It may be derived from more primitive urges that flow together toward some wrong, perhaps clinically correctible,

¹Patrick Mullaney, who, it is true, cannot be described as a "Freudian," makes the following statement, which is representative of critiques made by so-called "revisionists" (and by clinical psychologists like Professor H. A. Murray, of Harvard, who is also a biologist and physician, who has actually gone through a Freudian psychoanalysis):--"This theory has no empirical proof at all. No competent contemporary biologist we know of has ever claimed that living matter has an inherent tendency to die, in Freud's sense. The

goal. All psychoanalysts recognize the compulsive aspect of rage and hostile aggression.

What seems to get lost is the focus of accountability. As we approach a focus we lose the accountability or culpability! Who commits sin? In our "street attack" incident the readiest answer

theory is purely speculative, put forth in order to 'explain' the enormous amount of aggressiveness and destructiveness which he actually observed."--Patrick Mullahy, Oedipus: Myth and Complex, "A Review of Psychoanalytic Theory" (1948, New York, Grove Press, 1955), p. 323.

Cf. appreciative treatments of the Freudian dualism--without blanket acceptance of it in the form which Freud gave to it: "Freud looks deeper into the human predicament than many of his followers and critics."--Paul Tillich (Systematic Theology, Vol. II, p. 61). Lionel Trilling, in Freud and The Crisis of Our Culture (Boston, Beacon Press, 1956), pp. 25-26; and Will Herberg, "Freud, the Revisionists, and Social Reality," Chapter 10 in Freud and The Twentieth Century (Benjamin Nelson, editor, New York, Meridian Books, 1957), pp. 143-163, especially at p. 157.

For respected, qualified, endorsement of Freud's dualistic theory, see: (1) Franz Alexander, "Development of the Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis," Dynamic Psychiatry (F. Alexander and Helen Ross, editors, University of Chicago Press, 1952), pp. 3-34, at p. 17, where Alexander says that the theory became simply "a philosophical abstraction," valuable in distinguishing two basic vectors in the life process (anabolic and catabolic); (2) Karl Menninger, "An Anthropological Note on The Theory of Pre-Natal Instinctual Conflict," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XX, 1939, pp. 439-442.

See also Lewis Samuel Feuer, Psychoanalysis and Ethics (Springfield, Illinois, 1955), for a constructive, hopeful, critique of Freud's philosophy of civilization (pp. 72-115); re: The Freudian "primitivistic" theory of civilization (pp. 105-113); re: The innateness of "hatred and aggression" in men (pp. 109-113).

A militantly Freudian socialistic, even utopian, philosophical-historical study is that of Herbert Marcuse (Professor of Political Science at Brandeis University), Eros and Civilization (Boston, The Beacon Press, 1955).

is: the man-in-rage, the aggressor. Where would society be if this were not the answer? But who is the aggressor--what in him is the I of accountability? It is precisely here, as we enter the strange world of his kaleidoscopic selfhood, that we get lost. He as a responsible self, a "free moral agent," all but dissolves before our search. Yet, if we withdraw again to the outside where we observe him leave off battering his victim, we see an apparent unity, a man, reluctantly desisting, facing around to the crowd, such in the manner of a trapped animal. His clenched fists, after a long moment, fall. He heads for the nearest exit. Who drops his fists? Who heads toward freedom from the eyes of the crowd? Freudians say it is the ego--the agency of reason--recovering control after a momentary loss of it to the surging forces of the biological organism--the id--perhaps allied with the destructive superego (the repressed introjected threatening parent-image).¹ These had stormed the capitol and overthrown the executive ego and effected a coup d'e'tat. The release of aggressive energy and the effect of the counter-stimulus of the reproving crowd force a restoration of ego control. Obviously this man's ego is relatively weak, possibly divided or "split."²

Karen Horney, Sullivan, and others among the so-called "revisionists" and "neo-Freudians" would say that it is the "actual

¹Infra, this chapter.

²Infra, p. 166.

self" or "waking self," who leaves off beating the victim, after some kind of coup and restoration.¹

Carl G. Jung, of Zurich, who left the Freudian persuasion to develop his own metapsychology, would say it is the conscious ego with its persona after a violent eruption of unconscious drives in assertion of the unconscious ego. There has been a frantic disoriented attempt within the man-in-rage to deflect on to an outside object the outraged unconscious' assault. Or the outside world is the target for the unconscious' rebellion, since the societal environment has been the force shaping the persona in relative violation of the inner, endopsychic, life. This has been an incident in the painful process of the individual's dynamic self, his psyche's unceasing struggle to become integrated and "individuated."²

Alfred Adler, who was the first disciple to leave Freud and found his own school of depth psychology,³ would see it as a failure to arrive at a socially approved means of asserting oneself against the feeling of inferiority. The now prone victim has been appropriated by his aggressor's fear of inferiority or of the failure to be superior. The man-in-rage has struck out against that

¹Infra, Horney's concept of "actual self," Sullivan's concept of "waking self," this chapter.

²Infra, this chapter.

³Adler is discussed at greater length in Chapter Six, infra.

fear and failure. At the same time he has made a pathetic bid for some kind of social recognition of his fiction of superiority.¹

Ego-psychologists² among the Freudians may describe this incident in terms of a prolonged identity--or in this particular aggressor's psyche, pre-identity--crisis, involving the driving need to repudiate.

The so-called "English school" of Freudians, led by Melanie Klein, would say that this is likely an infantile attempt to rid the inner world of a bad object which it had introjected--or internalized. This acting out is to eject an inner persecutor. The persecutor stands for death, extinction by mutilation. The victim is merely a screen upon whom the aggressor projects his own color slide of the "bad mother," perhaps the "cannibalistic" images retained from infancy, a "bad object" which carries the threat of extinction. Even as a child smashes a toy suddenly invested with evil, so the aggressor tries to smash the innocent victim. Sullivan would agree that the victim is experienced, through parataxic distortion, as the bad mother--or bad father, bad sibling, bad peer, bad significant person.³ Horney could see

¹The sources for our exposition of Adler's thinking are indicated in notes for Chapter Six.

²Ego-psychologists as represented by Erik Erikson; see infra.

³Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry (Washington, D. C., The William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, 1947), pp. 78-79.

the victim as being cast in the role of the shaming, rejecting social environment.¹

Probing further into the intra-psychic aetiology of this crime, the Freudians would probably relate the near-murder to the aggressor's narcissism.² Since the man-in-rage has been heard before selecting his victim to proclaim loudly, "I am going to destroy myself," there is added reason to suspect that the victim does actually represent something close to, or substitutive for, the aggressor's own self-image. Is not this destructiveness of an object likely to be self-destructiveness which suddenly veers away from the self outward to any object in sight? What makes it veer? It is the residual self-love, the primary narcissism, reinforced by "secondary narcissism" or emotional attachment to one's own body. To Freudians, the self-concept is derived directly from one's own body-concept as it is formed through experience in early childhood and mirrored by the milieu.³

Hence a kind of self-concern forces the rage outward to the near destruction of an innocent person. Then the threat which is

¹Infra, Chapter Six.

²Infra, Chapter Nine.

³See, for instance, Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id. Our immediate reference is to the edition in A General Selection From the Works of Sigmund Freud (edited by John Rickman, Psycho-Analytical Epitomes No. 1, London, Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1953), pp. 245-274, at p. 251.

Pioneering work on this relationship was done by Paul Schilder. See subsequent references and Bibliography, infra.

represented by the disapproving onlookers alerts the same primary self-love to spare the victim any further destruction.

Who then is the aggressor? It is the impersonal, misshapen, chaotic, aggregation of energy forcing its way through the censor-controls of the socially-aware, waking self. Who is the victim? He is a substitute for the aggressor's own self-concept.¹

Representative of the kind of understanding which depth psychology seeks in viewing any such incident may be the following reconstruction of the event, based on the method of Ian Suttie. Suttie died before his collection of papers was quite off the press, in 1935, The Origins of Love and Hate. He founded no school of his own. He was hardly given a hearing by the Freudians. He was simply an independent, though highly respected, psychiatrist and theorist, who developed his views vis-a-vis, both the Freudians and the "deviationists."²

According to Suttie, love is prototypically the love of the mother for her child. Rooted biologically in the symbiotic relationship of parent organism with offspring it is the basis of all future relationship for the child. Rage and hatred are derived, though negatively, from the experience, need, and quest for love.

¹"Self-concept" is our own interpolation here. Freudians might not object to its use. They speak characteristically of the ego as object or of the "ego-cathexis" (of libido withdrawn from outside objects). Infra, Chapter Nine.

²Many of Suttie's emphases--"the mother," striving for affection, its relation to fear and hatred--are coming into their own within the psychoanalytic movement. Others in their own way were arriving at the same type of correctives. Indeed Suttie was not unaware of the work being done by Melanie Klein.

The venting of rage is in its prototype a device, however distorted and violent, for getting attention. In this Suttie seems to agree somewhat with the theory of the Adlerians. However, he says, the intention of the child-in-rage is not to gain recognition and a sense of power, as the Adlerians say. It is simply to try to win back the love which he feels he has lost. Hence his fear of having been abandoned by the source of Love, cut off from the springs of life as it were, results in rage and hatred. Hence, with the Johannine writer in the New Testament, now with the Freudian pastor-psychoanalyst Oskar Pfister, with Professor John MacMurray, and indeed with a host of psychologists, theologians, and philosophers, Suttie regards the fundamental polarity as not love and hatred, but love and fear, with hatred's being derived from the fear of losing or of being unable to regain love!

The attention which a child's rage seeks is of course the mother's, symbolically at least. The emotional drama in the background is typically that of the displaced infant's attack upon the mother (hence, society) and her suckling infant, the usurper, the sibling of the child-in-rage. The fundamental desire is for a psychic restoration to the bosom of the mother. Otto Rank, Sullivan, Erich Fromm, even Freud (!), each in his own way, among the depth psychologists, and Paul Tillich, notably among the

¹Infra, Chapter Seven.

theologians of our time, stress reunion as a goal or telos of seemingly irrational striving.¹

Is the brutal pounding and kicking of an already prostrate victim in some sense a bid for the crowd to pay attention to the actor, for society whose prototype is "mother" to put down her other nurslings and pick him up? Is this not the story of Cain and Abel? The victim here is the aggressor's brother-image Abel. "Cain-" or sibling jealousy, as Suttie phrased it, is a paragon of hatred. Actually, however, it is love unrequited, simply trying to remove what it sees as the obstacle to the restoration of love. The sibling is hated never for what he is in himself but only for what he is as an obstacle.²

Is jealous rage not properly described, at least partially, as attention-getting and love-seeking in its telos? Certainly the loud exhibitionist behavior of the aggressor before he strikes down his victim gives credibility to the suggestion that he is bidding for the crowd's attention, though obviously, his inner construct, or image, of that crowd is distorted. Is it distorted backward toward

¹This emphasis is already present in Tillich's writings. It will be elaborated in his forthcoming Volume Three of Systematic Theology, in the Part on "Life and the Spirit"--our reference is to his lectures at Harvard, 1960.

A representative statement is: "Love is the power in the ground of everything that is, driving it beyond itself toward reunion with the other one and ultimately with the ground itself from which it is separated."--Paul Tillich, Dynamics of Faith (Torchbooks edition, New York, Harper, 1957), p. 114.

²Ian D. Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, Chapter VII, pp. 97-111; also pp. 113-114 (referring to Freud's own treatment of sibling rivalry in Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego); p. 130; Chapter IX, pp. 127-158, and passim.

the primal image of the "mother"--or nurturing environment? Is he acting out a nursery scene, snatching the hated sibling image from the mother's embrace as in the phantasy of the child who smashes a toy, saying to the mother by his action, "I do not want you and-him or you-and-toys. I want you with-me, me in your arms where he is. Can't you see? Can't you see? I'm smashing it, smashing it, smashing it!"

Destroying sibling images and toys can be a substitute for getting satisfaction from the mother. It can be distorted substitute behavior for the very pattern of play which she has introduced in her effort to "wean" the child. Some may see special significance in the fact that the attacker's compulsive kicking was directed at the victim's mouth.

As we view the many theoretical constructions available for our use in the quest for the subject-self of this or any individual we may be tempted to give up the proffered "light" of depth psychology because of the apparent disagreement. Yet taken even all at once the several theories may actually be flowing into a practical consensus, which theology may well consult as it approaches the problem which it has traditionally called that of "man-as-sinner."¹

¹Cf. expository studies of the various schools in Hall and Lindsey, Theories of Personality, Ruth Munroe, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, Mullahy, Oedipus: Myth and Complex; which we have cited earlier; and Robert S. Woodworth, Contemporary Schools of Psychology (New York, Ronald Press, 1948). Munroe and Mullahy discuss only the schools of "psychoanalytic" thought. We shall not try to duplicate or improve upon the kind of critical evaluations they attempt. Munroe's seems to be the most thorough and objectively fair attempt to date. Also, by now, there are a number of so-called

A distinctive feature of Christian theology has been its concern, not only with the obvious, external dynamics of such an episode, but with the interior aspect! What is going on in the inner world of the aggressor and of the victim?

As we have seen, Christian conceptions of sin and justification describe the tragedy in much of human existence. Certainly they can see it in this incident. Professor Tillich, for example, says that the Christian conception of sin includes basically two convictions: the universality of estrangement and man's responsibility for it. It is man's self destructiveness, involving self-loss and world-loss.¹ He also traces the doctrine on the interior situation: Sin is "the act in which we turn away from the participation in the divine Ground the turning toward ourselves, making ourselves the center of the world and of ourselves the drive in everyone to draw as much as possible of the world into himself."²

Professor Reinhold Niebuhr says that the human passions are distinguished in their "demonic potencies" from those of ordinary

objective studies of Freudian theory. They have gone beyond the report of Robert R. Sears, ed., Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts (New York, Social Science Research Council, Bulletin 51, 1943), 156 pp. Since our aim is not to establish any one of these theories or systems and our concern is practical-theological, we shall be content with a kind of cautious journey through the theories in search of "light" on the Christian conceptions of sin and justification, and now, on the locus of accountable selfhood.

¹Using Tillich's phrasing, Chapter XV, in his Systematic Theology, Vol. II, at pp. 69-72, also at pp. 45, 47.

²Also quoted in Part One, supra, Chapter Two.

animal life.¹ Presumably this distinction is due to the very fact of humanity--and what we have called essential humanity, that power of homo sapiens, homo faber, man the rationaliser, the "reasonable," the finder and user of language (!),² the self-transcending, "spiritual" being. The religious dimension of sin is man's "will-to-power which overreaches the limits of human creatureliness." The "moral and social dimension" is injustice.³

In the example of a man-in-rage attacking an innocent victim, we witness the passions which Niebuhr says are overreaching and the self-imperialism which Professor Tillich describes. The aggressor has preempted the place of God in taking authority over the very life and death of the victim. By his act of knocking him down, beating and pounding him, he arbitrarily is determining the victim's destiny. He decides whether he shall keep teeth in his head, whether his brain will be damaged, his ribs broken, and, except for the forceful intervention of the onlookers, he is deciding whether he shall continue to breathe. The concern for justice is expressed by the voice of the crowd. "You have no right!"

¹Reinhold Niebuhr, Human Nature, pp. 178-179.

²Cf. Susaane K. Langer, Philosophy In A New Key, "A Study in the Symbolism of Reason, Rite, and Art" (1942, New York, Mentor Books, 1948-); and Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (Based on the Gifford Lectures, Aberdeen, 1951-2, Chicago, The University Press, 1958). Chapter 5: "Articulation," pp. 69-131, Chapter 9: "The Critique of Doubt," pp. 269-298; and Chapter 13: "The Rise of Man," pp. 381-406. "We owe our mental existence predominantly to works of art, morality, religious worship, scientific theory and other articulate systems which we accept as our dwelling place and as the soil of our mental development."--p. 286.

³Reinhold Niebuhr, Human Nature, p. 179.

Examples may be cited which change dramatis personae. We think of some lynching episodes, of racial violence, mob-action, genocide, where the crowd-in-rage or a whole society-in-rage rationalizes its rage as a concern for a brand of "justice." The crowd and the collective may preempt the place of God.¹

In the example we have used, the area of responsibility, of accountability, of actual culpability, eludes us when we try to bring it to a focus. Who struck the victim? A man whose reasoning will or ego may well have had no control over his actions. Who dropped his fists and went away? It was the same man, whose reasoning will had been forced back into control either by his primary self-love or by some inner principle of self-preservation, inherited from the centuries of phylogeny. A law at work in his members was finally suppressed by another law enough for him to make a rather staggered course away from the continued offense. The law that did the suppressing was probably fear of the consequences, what Freudians have called the reality principle.²

Depth psychologists are agreed that the subject-self of responsible behavior is the self to which therapy must appeal. All psychotherapy is ego-therapy. But where there is "irresponsible" behavior as in the example we have described, a realistic,

¹A cogent suggestion of this phenomenon is in Alan Paton's "As Blind As Samson Was," New York Times Magazine, April 10, 1960, pp. 9, 104-109.

²See infra, this chapter.

responsible subject-self is not in control. Hence in all theories we find the same difficulty in any attempt to bring to a focus the self of accountability. At the same time depth psychology may be read in a way that encourages the formulation of instrumentalistic conceptions of guilt, as a capacity for guilt-feeling, a device, practically a faculty, by which the subject may be helped into a realistic, responsible centeredness before God and society. Subsequent chapters will deal with this possibility.

The light of depth psychology seems to discourage any glib talk about sin and sinfulness.¹ We can speak sensibly of human tragedy, of foul circumstances, and of pathological wrongness. But culpable wrongness is a narrow topic indeed. Like Christian soteriology, depth psychology is concerned with greater evil than that which can be categorized as accountable, or culpable.

The example of the man-in-rage illustrates the tragic evil in which the non-culpable and the culpable are entwined. The scene depicts estrangement, both within the self and between it and the outside world; it displays disoriented volition. On both sides:

¹At the same time we may hope that a deepening theology will discourage the kind of summary dismissal of Christian theology which we suspect in the following by the late Ernest Jones: "It is well known what a central part the conviction of sin plays in religion; without it, and the consequent necessity for salvation, the Christian religion, for instance, would be well-nigh emptied of meaning." This follows his earlier description of the origin of the "conviction of sin" in the child's endeavor "to make all his impulses conform with adult standards."--"The Psychology of Religion," in Psychoanalysis Today (Sandor Lorand, editor, New York, International Universities Press, 1944), pp. 315-325, at p. 318.

the aggressor's and the victim's, there is tragedy--or the tragic element. The episode illustrates also the perennial insistence, however faint, on moral responsibility.

Probably the very emergence and re-emergence of the executive ego--actual self, waking self, conscious ego--carries an insistence on the will-to-be-responsible! Perhaps here we see guilt redeeming shame. The very process of assuming guilt, or at least of grudgingly acknowledging being beholden to the crowd--to society, is an attempt to save the self from complete world- and self-loss. It is almost impossible to avoid tautology in our analysis, since we seem to presuppose that which is the object of our inquiry. Yet we make at least a logical distinction between self--the whole person--and subject-self, the I of accountability, which is the mooted question. By feeling, or by asserting, guilt--accountability--one affirms value and a belief in some underlying meaning to his existence. This may be a trembling, wavering, even neurotic assertion. Nevertheless it is an assertion of meaningfulness. "That I am responsible, that I am an I and I am beholden, if not to my victim, to the society that holds us both, and to whatever undergirds us all, this conviction--this faith (?)--is all there is between me and dissolution, utter worthlessness, complete self-destruction. If I cannot feel or assume guilt I am not I and I am not free!"

The aggressor in this case may have experienced some such modulation from a sense of shame and self-loss into quasi-guilt

feeling, which served him as a salvaging operation. Our only evidence is his bowing belatedly to the will of the aroused onlookers. Their perhaps all too passive attitude did contain a protest: "The individual in society must control his passions because he has no right to hurt others with them." Under this coercive stimulus the aggressor again may have invested his victim with his own self-image, this time, more favorably to the victim. Now the aggressor has left off killing "himself"! This insight is not too different from that of common-sense psychology, as in Adam Smith,¹ which understands altruistic love in terms of identification and sympathy.

Although this example of a man-in-rage does represent elemental man in his existence and in society it may seem somewhat atypical. Certainly it is restrictive, perhaps even for the sweep of speculation we have allowed here. The man-in-rage seemed not to be among the more privileged in society. This very fact, however, lets in the vast problem of society's offense against the underprivileged. It argues also the case in Freud's The Future of An Illusion--not that specifically against religion--the thesis of philosophers like John Dewey, for example, and certainly of many depth psychologists today, namely, that whatever salvation is

¹Adam Smith, Theory of the Moral Sentiments (see Bibliography, infra). The tendency to imitate is an early manifestation of one's ability to participate in the feelings of another. This sympathy is the psychological basis of moral judgments, according to Smith. We have used the appellation "common-sense" not as a formal designation.

possible for "civilized" mankind must come by the strengthening of the ego, the waking, perceiving, reflective, "prospective" self, the reasoning will, in its tasks of integration and control. The spirit of the enlightenment is still with us even after Freud, but not without Freud.

A greater limitation on our example is its failure to illustrate poignantly the too frequent immorality of society itself. What if the crowd's fascination with the crime had prevented justice from stopping it? What if the crowd had cheered the man-in-rage? People have! What is the explanation when the crowd has approved of murder and other un-sapient action and attitudes? Do they assume that the victim gets what he deserves? If they do, why do they reach their conclusion without "due process"? Do they rationalize outrageous "approved" offenses, including murder? Can they sometimes enjoy it as a kind of entertainment, through which they can drain off some of their accumulated hostility? Do they identify so completely with the aggressor that they show no pity on the victim? Can he be so easily commandeered for the role of "everybody's" bad object? Depth psychologists see in such behavior a collective use of the "mental mechanism" of displacement.¹ They provide us with perceptive means for describing the phenomena of racial hatred and persecution, the kind of thing Hitler's group psychology represents to us. Here again is the crucifixion!

From whence does the voice of justice come when society itself does not raise it? Is justice itself relative to a particular

[?]
¹Infra, p. 132.
 173.

culture?¹ Or is there a fourth compass to guide us in addition to these three: (1) the prevailing cultural tradition; (2) the attitude of the contemporary society; and (3) the "conscience" of the individual?

As we saw in earlier chapters, Christianity is concerned primarily with soteriology in terms of such a fourth dimension. The idea of "The Kingdom of God" is of an order of good, of compassion, of justice, which is not bound to the particular mores, nor to the group and individual consciences. Its law, according to Christianity in its genius, is the law of agape, the law of Love. However it is effective soteriologically not as law but as gospel, as grace.

The God to whom Christianity in its genius bears witness is "The-God-and-Father-of-Our-Lord-Jesus-Christ." This is the more complete symbol for the Deity in Christian faith. This God reaches out and saves not only the victim but also the man-in-rage. Theology speaks of grace, of salvation, of justification, of "the Mind of Christ." But how does this come to the victim and to the man-in-rage? How does the saving grace take form in our midst hic et nunc?

¹Oswald Spengler said: "In the world-as-nature there are eternal truths; in the world-as-history there is an eternally changing trueness."--The Decline of the West, Vol. II (see Bibliography, infra), p. 274. Elsewhere he spoke of Pilate ("World of Facts") encountering Jesus ("World of Truths"), pp. 216 ff. But cf. Karl Heim, Jesus the World's Perfecter (see Bibliography), pp. 143-4. Heim points out that the two worlds are not the empirical

A Closer Look at Freud's Psychology of the Self

Some of the "schools" of psychology were introduced in our discussion of the man-in-rage. We may now examine more extensively their search for a center of responsibility in the human psyche. Our treatment of the already vast literature of depth psychology runs the risk of oversimplification. This risk is due not merely to the usual limitations of space and preoccupation but also to the frequent want of consistency on the part of the theorists.¹ It is not easy to decide whether to treat Freud, for example, as a builder of a systematic psychology or as a producer simply of psychological fragments. He seems at times to incline markedly toward a system;²

and the merely metaphysical (Spengler) but the " 'olām hāzē" contrasted with the " 'olām hābī"-- הָעוֹלָם הַזֶּה and הָעוֹלָם הַבָּי --
 "This age as contrasted with the age to come" (Heil, ibid., p. 144).

¹Perhaps much of Freud should be read as literature, not even as especially "scientific" literature, although he had a wealth of clinical observation to weave into his imaginative speculations. Increasingly we come to appreciate the truth in Patrick Mullahy's perhaps slightly over-strong statement: "Freud was a great literary stylist. His writing flows smoothly, vividly. It abounds in picturesque imagery. At first blush it seems as if his thoughts are expressed with crystal clarity. However, as soon as one begins to analyse some of his fundamental concepts such as libido, instinct, affect, psychic energy, one becomes bogged down in a maze of elusive or analogical notions, few of which are defined with any clarity."
 --Patrick Mullahy, Oedipus: Myth and Complex, p. 317.

²Cf. the many "systematic" treatments of the subject by analysts themselves: for example, Otto Fenichel, The Psychoanalytic Theory of Neurosis (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1945); also Freud's own Introductory Lectures, and New Introductory Lectures, and his posthumously published, brief, unfinished, yet highly refined outline of his "system," Abriss Der Psycho-Analyse, translated by James Strachey, An Outline of Psychoanalysis (New York, W. W. Norton, 1949). Cf. also the curriculum of the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, London (Session 1953-1954).
 Excerpts from the

hence it is legitimate to speak of "the Freudian system." Yet he often tends toward a fragmentarian psychology.¹

Sigmund Freud, the "father of psychoanalysis," developed his metapsychology and his anthropology out of his medical practice along with his own reading and research interests. In his therapy

catalog description of lectures and seminars in the first year course are: "The id and primitive functioning within the id (primary process). The ego and functioning within the ego (secondary process). The division between ego and super-ego The pleasure principle and reality principle as principles of mental functioning The development of Freud's theories on instinctual drives Narcissism and the development of object relationships. The Oedipus complex. Bisexuality. Pre-genitality. Genitality. Castration complex. Female development Theory of trauma. Freud's theories of anxiety. Danger. The ego as the seat of anxiety. Successful and unsuccessful defence Character formation. Neurotic character. Neurosis and Psychosis. Metapsychology and psycho-analytic technique Symbolisation. Function of dreams in treatment." It should be noted that the school is divided into two "schools" of thought. They are able to thrive under one roof by ordering two courses: A and B. Our brief visit to the school in 1953 accounts for our reference to the syllabus for that year.

¹See Heinz Hartmann, "Psychoanalysis As A Scientific Theory," Psychoanalysis and Scientific Method (Sidney Hook, ed.,--see Bibliography, infra), pp. 3-37 at p. 4.

Freud seemed to prefer stitching his new theories to the old, rather than retracting them. His "needles" are "speculation" and "swift generalization," even by his own admission. For example, we find this statement: "Making a swift generalisation, we might conjecture that the essence of a regression of libido, e. g. from the genital to the sadistic-anal level, would lie in a defusion of instincts, just as conversely, the advance from an earlier to the definitive genital phase would be conditioned by an accession of erotic components." Ambivalence is probably a state of incomplete fusion of these components of instincts--The Ego and the Id, "authorized translation" by Joan Riviere (London, Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1949, International Psycho-Analytical Library No. 12), pp. 57-58.

and theory are entwined. It is fair to say: Freud's temperament, his therapeutic insights, and his theoretical constructions are intertwined.¹

He came to view the patient, ergo the human being, in terms of (1) "psychical apparatus," (2) "mental qualities," (3) "instincts." Also he spoke of quantitative economics, of dynamics (qualitative) and of mental mechanisms, especially as ego-defense mechanisms.²

Psychical Apparatus: The "trinitarian" psychical apparatus is described as groupings of energy in functional centers, which eventually were given these names and descriptions: (1) the id (das Es), or the basic organismic energy of the evolved human being; (2) the ego (das Ich), or the emergent "self-conscious" agency within the complex inner world of the organism; and (3) the superego (das Über-Ich), which, to Freud, included the conscience--his earlier designation for which was "ego ideal," a concept, which has been preserved separate from the superego in the thinking of contemporary Freudians. It seems generally agreed that the superego includes the repressed, oppressive "conscience."³

¹Of course his many critics are quick to say this. But we note that it is recognized by so loyal a disciple as Ernest Jones in his three-volume biography: The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud (London, Hogarth, 1953-), passim.

²Although Freud could speak of the "normal" over against the neurotic and the psychotic, he formulated an anthropology for which his analysis of the "neurotic" was normative.

³In The Ego and the Id, Freud gave the third chapter the following title: "The Ego and the Super-Ego (Ego-Ideal)." Ernest

The id is the organism in its most primitive strivings. It is the collection of all that has gone before in the evolution of the organism from unicellular beginnings. Hence it is a genetic, inherited organisation of instincts. We cannot define it too simply however, since its definition becomes nebulous when brought into relation with the ego and superego, which seem to have almost independent strivings of their own.¹ One distinction seems to be

Jones, among others, has preserved the concept of the ego-ideal as distinct from that of the superego. Cf. Jones, Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, pp. 282-3, 337, 339, and other references.

There is some debate about whether J. C. Flugel is right in calling the "conscience" simply "the conscious part of the super-ego" (J. C. Flugel, A Hundred Years of Psychology, London, Gerald Duckworth, second edition, 1951, p. 289). Cf. also Flugel's Man, Morals and Society (same publisher, 1945).

Karen Horney's criticism of the concept of superego underlines some of the difficulties in any attempt to collate it with that of the ego-ideal. In New Ways in Psychoanalysis she suggested that Freud had mistaken for a special agency within the "ego" what is but "a special need of the individual." She later developed her own concept of the "ideal self," which is a societally-imposed goal or internalised portrait of what one should be.--Infra, Chapters Five and Six and following. Our reference here is to New Ways in Psychoanalysis (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1939), pp. 207-231, at p. 216.

An "orthodox" Freudian treatment which illustrates the confusion of the concept, by differentiating between the "superego" and the "conscience," is Edmund Bergler's The Superego--with the by-line: "Unconscious Conscience--The Key to the Theory and Therapy of Neurosis" (New York, Grune & Stratton, 1952).

¹The following statement from one of Freud's own more lucid treatments of this subject illustrates the problem of precise delineation. "The power of the id expresses the true purpose of the individual organism's life. This consists in the satisfaction of its innate needs. No such purpose as that of keeping itself alive or of protecting itself from dangers by means of anxiety can be attributed to the id. That is the business of the ego, which is also concerned with discovering the most favorable and least perilous method

made consistently however. The forces in the id are basic to the organism as a biological entity. The id is a sort of inner dynamo, made of the stuff of life itself. Freud's mechanistic, materialistic bias in biology and physical science accounts for the want of dimension in his description of the id.¹

The ego is basically id, but it is shaped by external forces, or rather, by the interaction of the id with the milieu down through the centuries of human development. Hence, the infant seems to be

of obtaining satisfaction, taking the external world into account. The superego may bring fresh needs to the fore, but its chief function remains the limitation of satisfactions."--Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p. 19.

¹Mullahy speaks of Freud's "inveterate practice of reifying his concepts; i. e., representing them as a substance."--Mullahy, Oedipus, p. 318.

Cf. Freud's statements introducing the concept of id in his reflective summary of his ideas in An Outline: "We assume that mental life is the function of an apparatus to which we ascribe the characteristics of being extended in space and of being made up of several portions--which we imagine, that is, as being like a telescope or microscope or something of the sort We have arrived at our knowledge of this psychical apparatus by studying the individual development of human beings. To the oldest of these mental provinces or agencies we give the name of id. It contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is fixed in the constitution--above all, therefore, the instincts, which originate in the somatic organization and which find their first mental expression in the id in forms unknown to us." The word translated "instinct" is "Trieb." Strachey says he renders it "instinct" with some misgivings.--An Outline, p. 14.

Freud himself came increasingly to emphasize ego-psychology. Cf. "It is difficult to say anything of the behavior of the libido in the id and in the superego. Everything that we know about it relates to the ego, in which the whole available amount of libido is at first stored up."--Ibid., p. 23. We recall that he first elaborated his tripartite "self" topography in 1923, with The Ego and the Id. The "self" up to that time seems to be more id than ego, in Freud's tracing of the exploits of blind "libido." To be sure, the ego is there, often even dominant.

born with an ego capacity, or embryonic ego. The ego is a kind of "head" on the id. It has arisen out of the id to protect its interests in the face of the demanding outside world; i. e., reality. It is a kind of psychic epidermis--indeed, Freud gives it a materialistic, mechanistic origin. At any rate it becomes, functionally, vis-a-vis the irrational id and the coercive-permissive, satisfying-denying, outside world, the executive of the self. It is not equivalent to the self, as we have seen; it is the deciding, reasoning, censor-self. Its task is to deflect the darts hurled from outside assailants, to assimilate the stimuli which crash into the organism, and, at the same time, to control the instinctual forces of the id. Such control is necessitated by the restrictive effects of the outside. If the task is too great too early, the ego may split, resulting in more than one apparent self, as in psychosis. The theory of ego-splitting came late in Freud's long career as a theorist. It was his way of dealing with the phenomena of divided "self-systems" as in some psychoses.¹

¹An Outline, pp. 115-119. W. Ronald Fairbairn, contends that the egos (!) should be defined by the objects chosen in earliest infancy. He prefers to the Freudian model, the following description of the psychical apparatus: "Central Ego," "Exciting Ego" (the libidinal ego), and the "Internal Saboteur."--Psychoanalytic Studies of The Personality (London, Tavistock Publications, 1952), throughout and pp. 159-161.

Cf. Harry Stack Sullivan's concept of "self system," also his view of self-dynamisms--Clinical Studies in Psychiatry (New York, W. W. Norton, 1956), pp. 3-4; Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, pp. 20 ff. and passim.

Cf. also, Bernard Hart's conception of complex, which seems analogous to some aspects of the later Freudian conception of the splitting of the ego, and certainly analogous to the theories of

The superego has developed out of the ego because of intimate social factors in the organism's relationship with the environment. The individual comes a helpless, uncoordinated infant into an environment of relatively strong, coordinated adults. He must depend on them and adjust his inner strivings to their demands on him. He goes through various crises, or complexes, in developing out of helpless infancy into adulthood.¹ To Freud the climactic stage of development is that of the young child somewhere between the ages of three and five, extending, if unresolved, to the end of one's life. This is the Oedipus situation or complex. According to the Greek legend of Oedipus, he answered the riddle of the sphinx and also killed his own father Laius and married his own mother, Jocasta. The Oedipus phase is analogous to learning the riddle of sex, to eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. The infant has a competitive, incestuous longing for his mother and consequent hatred for his father. By phantasy he kills his father and stands under the judgment of an outraged "murdered" father who is actually still alive and able to avenge himself by killing--castrating--his child. Oedipus veers toward his doom. But he is rescued, if all goes well, by identifying with his father: "I, yet not I, but my father-within-me" is the changing self-concept. The "father within me" is the introjected father-image, the threatening, avenging image

dissociation in Sullivan.--Hart, The Psychology of Insanity (Fourth ed., New York, Macmillan, 1931), Chapter V, "Complexes," pp. 74-92, and throughout (especially his description of dissociation and the "'splitting off' of a system of ideas."--p. 67).

¹See infra, this chapter.

of the father. It is the father's standards and desires as the child interprets them at this critical juncture. The ego surrenders some of its sovereignty to this internalized father-image. It is the I which sits in judgment on the executive-I.

Later, as we consider the nature of guilt-feelings we shall consider the formation of a kind of racial superego as well as the individual superego as Freud viewed the phenomenon of guilt.¹

Henceforth, after the resolution of the Oedipus complex, which, by the way, determines both male and female character formation, the individual lives the rest of his life as a kind of anthropological trinity: The ego tries to keep order in a field of conflicting forces both internal and external: with the id as the organization of irrational drives and the superego the quisling which links irrational destructive tendencies with the puerile image of the outside authority. The individual is ever in a state aptly described by hell, torment, purgatory, familiar symbols of religious usage.

Mental Qualities:--Another and complementary way of describing the psyche is by what Freud calls "mental qualities." These are the unconscious, the preconscious, and the conscious. With the coming of psychoanalysis the term unconscious became a positive category. It is that greater part of the psyche which is beneath the surface, or

¹Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents (trans. Joan Riviere, London, Hogarth, 1930), pp. 118, 120.

Infra, Chapter Five. Cf. The Ego and the Id (trans. by Joan Riviere, Hogarth and the Institute of Psychoanalysis, 1949), p. 48.

threshold of consciousness. The iceberg is an analogy. In Freud the conceptions of the unconscious and the irrational are closely related. Often too, it seems, the topography or apparatus: ego, id, superego may be correlated with conscious, unconscious, and pre-conscious. But this is hardly clear, since the ego is not only conscious: it is the id as it has become shaped by interaction with the milieu. The ego is both unconscious and conscious. The superego is unconscious and preconscious. The preconscious is readily accessible to the conscious. The unconscious is hidden, kept down by the trap-door of censor control exerted by the reality principle; i. e., the ego.

The Theory of Instincts:--It is clear that Freud thinks of the human psyche as a world of energy. Life, to the mind of Freud, is simply the energy of matter in some special organization.¹

¹Freud, An Outline, p. 123.

Of the many passages with which we can illustrate this orientation in Freud we select this from The Ego and the Id, apropos of his hypothesis of a primal death instinct: "As a result of theoretical considerations supported by biology, we assumed the existence of a death-instinct, the task of which is to lead organic matter back into the inorganic state; on the other hand, we supposed that Eros aims at complicating life by bringing about a more and more far-reaching coalescence of the particles into which living matter has been dispersed, thus, of course, aiming at the maintenance of life."

E. B. Strauss is certainly not alone when he says, "Most psycho-analytical works give the impression of being a curious salad of empirical findings, inferences, interpretations, philosophical ideas and technical directions, and give no clear guidance as to the correct category to which the various statements belong." Introduction to Roland Dalbiez, Psycho-analytical Method and the Doctrine of Freud trans. by T. F. Lindsay, (London, University of London Press,

Psychoanalysis is dynamic psychology. The ego tries to control the inner personality so as to permit hedonic, or instinct-satisfying participation in a complex relationship.

The instincts are described as the forces behind the tensions caused by the demands of the id.¹ They are the basic energy of the organism, although their form is cast by the whole situation of tension. For example, according to Freud, one basic demand of the id is to be left alone. This demand is diametrically opposed to the moving, pushing demands of the environment. The instinct then behind the tension caused by these mutually exclusive demands is what Freud calls "the Death Instinct," at least in his last attempt to formulate what he meant by this somewhat controversial hypothesis.²

Earlier Freud had thought of the instincts as being basically erotic, closely related to his concept of libido as

2 Vols., 1941), Vol. I, pp. v-vi. Cf. Freud's own appraisal of psychoanalysis vis-à-vis "science," and "philosophy."--"A Philosophy of Life," Lecture XXXV, New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, trans. by W. J. H. Sprott (New York, W. W. Norton, 1933), Chapter 7, pp. 216-249.

¹Freud, An Outline, p. 19.

It is difficult to correlate all of Freud's statements about instincts.

²Ibid., p. 20 f. Cf. New Introductory Lectures, Chapter 4; pp. 146 ff. For example, Freud says, "You will perhaps shrug your shoulders and say: That is not natural science, that is the philosophy of Schopenhauer. But, Ladies and Gentlemen, why should not a bold thinker have divined something that a sober and painstaking investigation of details subsequently confirms?"

life-energy¹ whose goal is pleasure. The only dualism in the early Freud was that between the id and the ego, between eros and reality. Reality was actually in the service of eros. But the later Freud introduced an instinctual dualism: eros versus destructiveness.

The erotic instincts are sometimes described as life instincts. Freud resented any attempts to de-sexualize his theory of libido. Yet, despite his protectiveness of the specifically "sexual" telos his argument tends to support simply a somatic, bodily basis for irrational striving.² Libido, therefore, is biological satisfaction-seeking energy.

Psychic "Mechanisms":--Freud discussed the dynamics of emotional and mental life in terms of what he called psychic or mental

¹I. e., before Jenseits des Lustprinzips (1920), when he introduced the idea of a primitive death instinct.

In An Outline, he says: "There can be no question of restricting one or the other of the basic instincts to a single region of the mind. They are necessarily present everywhere. We may picture an initial state of things by supposing that the whole available energy of Eros, to which we shall henceforward give the name of libido, is present in the as yet undifferentiated ego-id and serves to neutralize the destructive impulses which are simultaneously present. (There is no term analogous to "libido" for describing the energy of the destructive instinct.)"--pp. 21-22.

²Cf. Merton Gill, "The Present State of Psychoanalytic Theory," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 58 (1959), pp. 1-8. Dr. Gill says, significantly, "What is really being defended by analysts is not the libido theory as such but the overwhelming importance of relatively primitive bodily drives in motivating behavior."--ibid., p. 7.

mechanisms. These, as they are recognised generally by "Freudian" therapists today, are as follows:¹

(1) Repression. Some conscious desire is denied when it is finally conceded to be impossible of fulfillment. It is expelled from consciousness into the unconscious, where it strives to get back into consciousness. The expulsion from consciousness is known as "repression."

¹There is no systematic treatment of all of the proposed "mechanisms." Our list reflects both our reading and notes from seminars conducted by psychotherapists. "Suppression" is perhaps not usually included. However it frequently appears as a "mental activity" at least for the theorist to contrast with "repression." For example, it is discussed in Karl Manninger, The Human Mind (third edition, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948), pp. 277-278.

Munroe's discussion of the mechanisms is especially discerning.--Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, pp. 90-95, 243-271.

Freud himself gives credit to his daughter Anna for giving "us our first insight into their multiplicity and their manifold significance."--"Analysis Terminable and Interminable," trans. by Joan Riviere, reprinted from International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, 18, 1937, pp. 373 ff.; in Collected Papers, V (London, Hogarth and Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1956), pp. 316-357, at p. 338. The reference is to Anna Freud's influential The Ego and the Mechanisms of Defence (London, Hogarth, 1937). She lists: regression, repression, reaction-formation, isolation, undoing, projection, introjection, turning against the self, and reversal. See Munroe's evaluative discussion.

Munroe lists: repression, reaction formation, isolation, undoing, denial, compromise, displacement, rationalization and camouflage, and "character," Munroe, op. cit., pp. 243-266.

Healy, Bronner, and Bowers, as early as 1930, listed and discussed many of these, referring to them as "dynamisms." They included: condensation, dreamwork, transference, isolation, undoing, unconscious phantasy, and idealisation, along with these--except for "suppression"--which we list (see Bibliography, infra).

(2) Suppression. Whereas repression is experienced as the sudden disappearance of a painful tension--like the sudden disappearance of a toothache, suppression is voluntarily putting a thought out of one's mind. Suppressed material can pop up at any time.

(3) Sublimation. This is diverting a drive into a channel more acceptable to the superego (or Ego Ideal) and to society as it is reflected by the ego. It is seen, for example, in the professional boxer, who in boyhood was conditioned to expect physical buffeting and who developed a way to express his resultant aggression. It may be seen in the school teacher whose strong maternal drives have not been fulfilled in her own home.

(4) Displacement. Emotion may be separated from the repressed desire. But the detached emotion which it had produced is attached to another goal or object with which it can again sport in the consciousness of the individual. A common example of this is "kicking the cat." A hostile, aggressive desire toward someone has been repressed; its energy has been detached and attached to the nearest object--the cat; it emerges in the act of kicking it out of the way. To Freud, at one stage at least, love-as-tenderness was itself displaced or "aim-inhibited" sexuality.¹

(5) Rationalization. This is a universal characteristic. It is finding a "good reason" for an action, indulgence of a

¹cf. Sigmund Freud in Contribution II, "Infantile Sexuality" in "Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex," trans. by A. A. Brill, The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, at p. 591. Seventeen years

phantasy or allowing a forbidden desire to be fulfilled. It is giving "a reason"--a "justification"--to a motivation.

(6) Projection. The repressed desire, fear, or hostility is projected on to the outside world of persons and objects. It is experienced as coming from the outside rather than from within. An illustration of projection is the mental activity which produced the superego, according to Freud. Perhaps a more generally accepted illustration is the familiar "ideas of reference" so insistent in paranoia: "They are talking about me," which really means, according to depth psychologists, "I have desires which I cannot permit or admit." By projection these inner demands are experienced as though they were suggested by the outside world. In everyday, "normal" life projection plays an important role. As we have noted, it is similar to what Harry Stack Sullivan has called "parataxis."

(7) Introjection. This is the mechanism by which one assumes the characteristics of another. The objects of the outside world are internalized. Introjection is complementary with projection in the formation of the superego. The "antiphonal" process of projecting emotional intra-psychic reality onto the outside objects and introjecting those object-images is the process of ego and superego development, according to theorists notably of the "London School," led by Melanie Klein.¹

after he wrote this Freud was still saying the same thing, even though he had already introduced his instinctual dualism:--"The Libido Theory" (1922) in Collected Papers, V, pp. 131-135, at p. 134.

¹See infra, this chapter.

(8) Identification. This is more conscious than introjection, although, to Freudians, it involves the same phenomena. An example is conscious imitation of another person. Little boys may say they wish to be like their fathers. They may act like them. Children imitate their parents and teachers. The empathetic understanding of another's feelings seems to involve a mechanism at least analogous to that which we see in the act of imitating.

Identification is a term used for both. It is important in both aspects especially during the process of establishing one's own identity, one's own self-concept or self-image in relation to his environment.

(9) Compensation. This is a mechanism important in the system of Alfred Adler.¹ It is concentrating one's energies on some goal or desire which seems realizable when contrasted with some disappointment, failure, or deficiency. A common example is the girl who, convinced that she is ugly, becomes a "bookworm."

(10) Symbolisation. This is that mental process by which one idea or thing comes to represent for an individual a whole constellation of things. National symbols illustrate this faculty. In psychosis a repressed idea may get mixed in with others in such a configuration. Thus, for example, a neologism or a persistent phantasy may represent a disturbing constellation.

(11) Reaction Formation. The repressed desire or drive emerges in the guise of its opposite, which is "approved."

¹Adler is to be discussed in greater detail, infra, Chapter Six.

(12) Regression. This is going back emotionally to some former stage of development. A "normal" regression is seen in almost any illness because of the relative increase in dependency and other factors.¹

Freud's characteristic use of the theory of mental mechanisms was in trying to see behind the manifest behavior and attitude and to interpret what he considered resistance to therapy. "Ego-defense mechanisms" is another term used. Mechanisms serve the ego and reality principle in fending off the attacks from the outside world and in holding back the floodtide within (the id forces). With the introduction of the concept of the superego, the picture is necessarily somewhat more complicated. The superego adds to the pressures on the ego, thus requiring use of the mechanisms.²

If we think of Freud's theories at all systematically, as both he and his followers frequently do, then we must presuppose a subject-self, or center of control within the psyche, the ego, which

¹Cf. Freud's discussion in Mourning and Melancholia, infra, Chapter Nine.

²An Outline, pp. 109-112, 120-124, describes the ego in relation to the id and to the superego in the external and internal conflicts. Therapy and the resistances are discussed in An Outline, Chapter Six, pp. 61-79. "The ego shrinks from undertakings that seem dangerous and threaten unpleasure."--at p. 73. In "Analysis Terminable and Interminable" (Collected Papers, V, pp. 316-357), and earlier papers on therapy and technique, Freud has dealt at length with the ego-defenses, or resistances to analysis. Freud tended to characterize often serious criticisms of his theories as "resistances". Jones himself was prone to use this method of rebuttal. C. G. Jung, for example, resisted the "truth" about the tyranny of sexual striving. Cf. Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, II, pp. 139, 151. Cf. Freud, "The Resistances to Psycho-Analysis" (1925), Collected Papers, pp. 163-174.

tries to assume a responsible attitude toward the outside world and toward the world of whirling drives within. It tries to maintain itself both by mechanisms of defense and by integrating--absorbing, fusing--the conflicting dynamisms within.¹

Yet, the ego of Freudian man seems to act automatically according to the rules which the mechanisms imply. Whatever freedom there may be is circumscribed indeed. The ego's freedom seems to be like that of "unconscious" life--whether in flora or fauna, the freedom to be what it is determined to be. Man-in-society is like a flower in a weed patch. But his ego capacity is slowly mutating toward a strength to withstand the encroachment of society and culture until the flower has come to its full bloom (heterosexual and sublimational fulfillment) and can wither and die at its own cadence. Such a view is at least analogous to ideas of freedom and "Christian liberty" frequent in theology.² Christian freedom is

¹"The Anatomy of the Mental Personality," Lecture XXXI, in New Introductory Lectures, pp. 82-112. One analogy is reminiscent of that which we have quoted from Augustine and Calvin (supra, Chapter Two): "One might compare the relation of the ego to the id with that between a rider and his horse. The horse provides the locomotive energy, and the rider has the prerogative of determining the goal and of guiding the movements of his powerful mount towards it. But all too often in the relations between the ego and the id we find a picture of the less ideal situation in which the rider is obliged to guide his horse in the direction in which it itself wants to go" (ibid., p. 108).

²The prayer book phrase comes to mind: "Whose service is perfect freedom."

This idea seems prominent in the thinking of Martin Luther, for example (supra, Chapter Two).

Cf. Karl Barth: "Human freedom as a gift of God does not allow for any vague choices between various possibilities. The

said to be simply the freedom to serve God--the Kingdom of God.

Justification liberates from the weeds, so to speak. Sanctification is the fulfilling of the destiny of the liberated psuche.

The Way In Which the Self Develops

Freud insists on the multiple ties which bind the rational to the irrational and the "spiritual" to the somatic. In his thinking we do not find an arbitrary dichotomy of soul--psuche (psyche)--and body--soma. He is more Hebraic than Hellenistic in his basic psychology. The psyche is somatic, although it is defined too materialistically and mechanistically, as we have seen. Today his successors seem to be moving into a larger frame of reference for the complexities of human nature. Taking Freud's conception of the ego and its mechanisms and even modulating his theory of psychogenesis, some contemporary ego-psychologists among the Freudians seem to be developing a model for psychology which is relatively free from the deficiencies of the earlier period, while still preserving the basic realism of a somatic foundation.²

reign of chance and ambiguity is excluded. For the free God Himself, the giver of man's freedom, is no blind accident, no tyrant, He is the Lord, choosing and determining Himself unmistakably once and for all. He is His own law Human freedom is freedom only within the limitations of God's own freedom." Karl Barth, "The Gift of Freedom" in The Humanity of God, pp. 77-78. Especially constructive seem to be two statements between these that we have quoted: "Human freedom is not realized in the solitary detachment of an individual in isolation from his fellow men God is pro me because He is pro nobis Human freedom is only secondarily freedom from limitations and threats. Primarily it is freedom for."--ibid.

²Ruth Munroe gives a careful account of the two directions in this ego-psychology. One direction is that followed by Anna

Man-in-society develops through traumatic experiences or crises. The first of these is birth itself.¹ "Fundamentalistic" Freudian psychogenesis proceeds according to stages, each of which has its crisis.² Insofar as the psyche is arrested, perhaps only partially, at any one stage, it is said to be fixated at, and

Freud, with emphasis on the mechanisms of defense. The other is in elaboration of what Freud called the "secondary process": "the development of those aspects of the ego that seem to derive from maturation of the reality-adapted aspects of the organism (rational thought and action, perception, attention, memory, cognition, locomotion, and the like) and that may be considered conflict-free in essence, however intimately they are interwoven with drives (instincts) in the course of living." Heinz Hartmann and Ernst Kris are leaders of this movement. For various reasons we have chosen Erik H. Erikson's writings to illustrate this emphasis, see infra. Our reference to Munroe is Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, pp. 89-108.

David Rapaport has done much to bring together the academic and the clinical methods in the study of mind and emotion. E. g. "Toward a Theory of Thinking," in his Organization and Pathology of Thought, Austen Riggs Foundation Monograph, No. One (New York, Columbia University Press, 1951), Conclusion: pp. 687-730.

A significant article is Rapaport's "The Structure of Psychoanalytic Theory (A Systematizing Attempt)," in Psychology: A Study of a Science, III, edited by Sigmund Koch (New York, McGraw-Hill, 1959). See also: Rapaport's "Paul Schilder's Contribution to the Theory of Thought-Processes," The Schilder Memorial address, New York, 1951, International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXII, 1957, pp. 291-301.

¹Freud, New Introductory Lectures, Lecture XXXII, at pp. 122 f. Cf. A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, Lecture XXV (1915-1917, PermaBooks edition, 1953), pp. 403-405. Otto Rank is discussed most fully in Chapter Five, infra. He, of course, is credited with the theory of Geburtstrauma as the prototypical psychological (as well as biological) trauma. The concept seemed to become increasingly symbolic (rather than literal) in the later thought of Rank.

²Other terms used with practically the same meaning are "complex," "fixation," and "stage." Of course these are to be distinguished in their precise meaning within the context of their use. However, we read of oral, anal, and Oedipus crises, complexes, stages, phases, and fixations.

characterized by, that stage. Hence, Freudians speak of "oral character," "anal character," and so forth. The crises of the development of personality-character-psyche are: (1) Oral, and oral-sadistic, as well as oral-masochistic, associated with suckling, teething, biting; (2) Anal-urthral, also both sadistic and masochistic in its phases; (3) Phallic--for both boys and girls, climaxing in the Oedipus situation or complex, as we have noted; and (4) Genital--separated from the phallic stage by a long period of latency, corresponding to the childhood and pre-adolescent years, when after years of trying to assimilate the trauma of the Oedipal situation, the individual at last achieves suitable heterosexual patterns of adjustment and healthy outlets via his relatively smooth-working mechanisms, including notably, sublimation.¹

According to classical Freudian theory--that is, Freudian theory before the introduction of instinctual dualism,² psychogenesis is supposed to be governed by two principles or rules: pleasure and reality. The painful denial of pleasure has been the cause of awareness of "reality." The ego serves under the reality principle. Each crisis is the height of the tension between pleasure and reality at a certain stage in the development of organismic man. Good to the child means satisfaction. Evil is the want or denial of

¹Freud, New Introductory Lectures, ibid., pp. 133-137, for but one instance of this kind of exposition.

²That is: the positing of a primal aggressive as well as pleasure-seeking instinct. Freud based his thesis on the inferences he drew from what he noted in the so-called "war neuroses" (notably what has commonly been called shell-shock) in which there were repetition-compulsions in dreaming and in "waking."

satisfaction. Ego-control is simply overcoming evil in the interest of the good. This may be simply by holding back the good, defined hedonistically, until it can be realized. The feeling of pain can be projected and thus vested in outside objects, which may be in fact quite neutral. At the same time outside evil may be introjected with the images of "bad" or "threatening" objects. Self-destructiveness may be introjected destructiveness. Hostility may be projected pain.

According to the later theory of Freud, each crisis is the height of the tension between pleasure- and pain-seeking(!) drives within the psyche. The environmental forces interact, allying variously with the two inner groupings of impulses: eros and destructiveness. The ego is the eros-seeking-but-reality-aware executive. The superego is the agent of destructiveness toward the ego, while the id is the source of all the energy for the conflict. Perhaps Freud's relegating the conscience to the negative category of destructiveness may account in part for objections like that of Mowrer, mentioned earlier.¹ Yet with Freud, the presence of

¹Therapy seeks to release the ego from the oppressive injury inflicted on it by the superego. But cf. the following later statement by Freud, "If the patient puts the analyst in the place of his father (or mother), he is also giving him the power which his super-ego exercises over his ego, since his parents were, as we know, the origin of his superego. The new superego now has an opportunity for a sort of after-education of the neurotic; it can correct blunders for which his parental education was to blame." Then he issues a caveat: "However much the analyst may be tempted to act as teacher, model and ideal to other people and to make men in his own image, he should not forget that that is not his task . . . indeed that he will be disloyal to his task if he allows himself to be led on by his inclinations . . . he will only be replacing

life, eros, satisfaction-seeking energy and destruction-seeking energy is simply the unavoidable given, endopsychically. The organism writhes in inner tension toward its death because it desires both (1) to be stimulated, hence activated, and (2) to return to its original, unstimulated, inanimate state, hence to be destructive but teleologically passive!¹ Surely whatever made Freud develop his saga of love and death, of eros and thanatos,² has been kin to that which exercised the minds of theologians like Calvin, Luther, Augustine, and Paul,³ when they saw a destructive opposition to life-- as Zoe⁴--deep within the human psyche. Yet, as Professor Cairns says,

one kind of dependence by another. In all his attempts at improving and educating the patient the analyst must respect his individuality." --in chapter on "The Technique of Psychoanalysis," An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p. 67.

Ernest Jones correlates Freud's concept of the superego with Nietzsche's "bad conscience" (The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, pp. 283-284).

¹Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle; our reference is to the edition in A General Selection From The Works of Sigmund Freud, pp. 162-194, at pp. 173, 183-190. Increasingly Freud seemed to assimilate this "speculation" into his psychology, although when he first introduced it he did say: "I am neither convinced myself, nor am I seeking to arouse conviction in others." --ibid., p. 190. Cf. An Outline, pp. 19-24. Cf. also Freud, The Ego and the Id (London, Hogarth and Institute . . . , 1949), p. 67.

²In conversation sometimes Freud referred to the so-called death instinct as thanatos (according to his biographer Ernest Jones). In his published writings he seems to have avoided using the Greek term. He simply spoke of "death," "destructiveness," "aggressive instincts" or "eros." Cf. Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. III, p. 273.

³Cf. Tillich in Systematic Theology, II, p. 61.

⁴Zoe in Biblical theology generally connotes life in the sense of essential life, life-from-God, "life in Christ."

there is a radical difference between the Freudian doctrine of depravity and the Christian understanding of "original sin."¹

The human organism's last judgment--or crisis--is death! The life instinct finally surrenders to the death instinct, thus proving the superior strength of the latter. According to the death instinct theory, in every case, sooner or later, the dead weight of basic matter pulls the aspiring creature down to the grave. Freud's reverence for the superior death instinct seems at times to tempt him away from the eros-thanatos dualism to a pessimistic monism in which he tries to define life in terms of "death." Perhaps the life instincts too are derived ultimately from the resistance which matter offers to the forces that try to shape it.²

¹Supra, Chapter Two. "Freudian man is not fallen; he is merely brutal, in the stuff of his nature" (David Cairns, The Image of God in Man, p. 232).

²This inference can be drawn from numerous passages in Freud's writings after 1920. Freud correlated his thesis with the theory of alternating love and strife as principles which govern events in the life and the universe, according to Empedocles of Acragas, after a work by Wilhelm Capelle (Die Vorsokratiker, Leipzig, 1935, c. p. 186). --"Analysis Terminable and Interminable," Collected Papers, V, at pp. 348-350.

In his New Introductory Lectures, Freud leaves unanswered the question as to the conservative character of the erotic instincts-- i. e., whether they do not "seek the reinstatement of an earlier state of things" ("Anxiety and Instinctual Life," New Introductory Lectures, p. 148).

In "The Libido Theory," he teaches that they are conservative; i. e., that both eros and destructiveness are in their telos striving to return the organism to former state. Death is one form; and reproduction is another of the "expression of an inertia or elasticity present in what is organic." Collected Papers, at p. 135. Cf. also An Outline, pp. 108-109.

Nevertheless Freudian therapy aims at victory for the life forces at least in the measure which they in their telos seek victory.

Critiques and Modifications of Freudian Psychogenesis

Some depth psychologists depart altogether from the model which Freudians use to recount the development of the psyche. Others alter it considerably.¹ Yet some model seems to be required.

Jung sees the psyche in continual development to the end of its time on earth. Especially valuable seems to be his thesis that a major--often creative--change characteristically takes place in middle-life, when the latent self emerges and often reverses the former conscious pattern of life, much of which has been but a false front, too adaptational to an outside world, whose partially misconstrued pressures have become reduced in their relative strength against the inner forces--the libido as elan vital.²

¹Cf. C. G. Jung, "The Stages of Life," in Modern Man In Search of a Soul, pp. 95-114.

Cf. Lewis Sherrill, The Struggle of the Soul (New York, Macmillan, 1952).

²Cf. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution (1907). It is not quite fair to say that any of the depth psychologists has equated libido with elan vital. Yet the analogy with Bergson's thought is possible. Cf. Manroe, op. cit., p. 541 ff. Jung thought of libido as life energy. He refused to reduce life energy to eros as did Freud. Cf. Jung, "Freud and Jung" in Modern Man in Search of a Soul (Harvest Books edition), pp. 120-122. Also, Frieda Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology (a Pelican Book, 1953-), pp. 17 ff.

Jung believes there is more to vital energy than mere biological energy. He refuses Freud's reduction of the psychological to the biological--his derivation of the psychological from the biological. Jung uses the phrase to which Bergson has given special

In a later chapter we shall consider Alfred Adler's view of the developing self and its three major crises. He views the infant and young child as a unity--psyche and organism--striving for superiority.¹

Ian Suttie, whom we discussed earlier, has made a penetrating critique of Freud's theory of Oedipal conflict. Suttie suggests that "Laius jealousy" and "Cain jealousy" are equally appropriate for describing certain manifestations in child-parents-sibling relationships. According to the Greek legend, Laius had tried to kill Oedipus his son in infancy. Perhaps the male child senses actual Laius-like envy in his father which is not to be explained by the highly involved theories of the projection and introjection of hostility and a regressive Oedipal feeling in the father which projects his own father's image on to his small son.² It is even conceivable that the theorist who is attracted by the Oedipus reductionism is being motivated by his own Laius feelings toward his sons and his younger colleagues. We have already discussed Suttie's theory of Cain--or sibling jealousy.³ Cain in jealous rage killed his brother Abel.

Perhaps the social crisis is that of psychic weaning, when the child envies every person or object which takes any of the mother's

significance, vis., elan vital, and toys with the temptation to call it God, in "Analytical Psychology," Modern Man in Search of a Soul, at p. 188.

¹Infra, Chapter Six.

²Ian Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, pp. 110-111 and elsewhere. Suttie's spelling is "Laios."

See also, infra, Chapter Five, notes.

³Supra.

attention. Most parents of young children and others who tend them can attest to the frequency of such "jealousy."¹

Suttie, along with Karen Horney--to mention but one of the many other critics, attacks the highly involved, question-begging Freudian view of female psychology.² The orthodox Freudians speak of the castration fears of the boy and of the penis-envy of the girl, who is all but overcome by a sense of having already been

¹Domestic animals sometimes give evidence of a similar malady, viz., "jealousy."

"Jealousy" may not be quite the word for the phenomenon. As Professor Dickie suggests (in correspondence), it is--or includes--"plain bewilderment." the child is not accustomed to the kind of separation which the parents' other interests imply. His world becomes suddenly strange--or more strange--as he becomes aware of the facts of separateness.

²Suttie's arguments are in his op. cit., pp. 107-111, pp. 223-227, and elsewhere. Karen Horney's thought developed. Her more "orthodox" treatment of female sexuality was a paper in 1923: Karen Horney, "On the Genesis of the Castration Complex in Woman," (translated from the German), International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, V (1924), pp. 50 ff. Later she wrote "The Flight from Womanhood" (trans. from the German), ibid. VII, 1926, p. 324 ff. While he commended Horney's paper of 1923, Freud took issue with the later one. In typical fashion he had this to say: "Thus, for example, Karen Horney (1926) is of opinion that we greatly over-estimate the girl's primary penis-envy and that the strength of her subsequent striving towards masculinity is to be attributed to a secondary penis-envy, which is used to ward off her feminine impulses, especially those connected with her attachment to her father. This does not agree with the impressions that I myself have formed those first impulses have an intensity of their own which is greater than anything that comes later and may indeed be said to be incommensurable with any other force And if the defence against feminity is so vigorous, from what other source can it derive its strength than from that striving for masculinity which found its earliest expression in the child's penis-envy and might well take its name from this?" In the same paper, Freud criticised Ernest Jones' "The Early Development of Female Sexuality" (ibid., VIII, pp. 459 ff.). Freud commended the views of the women-analysts Jeanne Lampl-de Groot ("The Evolution of the

castrated. Suttie says it is fully as logical, indeed probably more so, to suppose that the male's real envy is of the female's biologically superior body. Even Freudians have supposed that the mother's breast is the first object cathected by the infant, during the oral phase.¹ Why not suppose that the boy is troubled by "Zeus jealousy"? Zeus devoured Metis in order to bear her child Pallas himself. Pallas was born from his head, according to Greek legend. The male is what he is in western society partly because of his repressed envy of the female because of her biological superiority.²

By now there are many impressive critiques of Freud's Oedipal theories.³ When we discuss guilt-feelings, whose prototype he considered to be Oedipal guilt, we shall have to use his frame of

Oedipus Complex in Women," *ibid.*, IX, 1928, pp. 332 ff.) and Helene Deutsch (*Psychoanalyse der weiblichen Sexualfunktionen*, Vienna, 1925, and "The Significance of Masochism in the Mental Life of Women," translated from the German, *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis*, XI, 1930, pp. 48 ff.).--Sigmund Freud, "Female Sexuality" (trans. by Joan Riviere, *ibid.*, XIII, 1932), pp. 281 ff. Horney's more liberated refutation of Freudian female psychology is Chapter Six of her *New Ways in Psychoanalysis* (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1939), pp. 101-119. Cf. also Horney, "The Dread of Woman," *International Journal of Psychoanalysis*, XIII, 1932, pp. 348-360; and Horney, "The Denial of the Vagina," *ibid.*, XIV, 1933, pp. 57-70.

¹Sigmund Freud, Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex. Our reference is to The Basic Writings, at p. 614.

²Ian Suttie, loc. cit.

³For example, Suttie, op. cit.; Bronislaw Malinowski, Sex and Repression in Savage Society (1927, Meridian Books edition, New York, Noonday Press, 1955); Roland Dalbiez, Psychoanalytical Method and the Doctrine of Freud, Vol. II, pp. 184 f., 295-312; and William McDougall, Psycho-Analysis and Social Psychology (London, Methuen, 1936), especially Appendices I and IV, pp. 115-124, 158-193. Also see McDougall's An Outline of Abnormal Psychology (London, Methuen, 1926, 572 pp.) where he makes his criticism of Freud's system, especially at p. 421.

reference, although critically, of course.¹ Suttie's critique seems to underline the fact that one can "prove" almost anything by Greek legend just as one can "prove" most anything by the Bible, as the popular allegation has it. Yet something is lost if we deny ourselves the power of the probing insights and illustration which the ancient Greek lore offers. Suffice it to say, nevertheless, it is extremely doubtful that what Freud described as the Oedipus complex is universal. It is improbable that its presence even in the most patriarchal patterns of culture can account fully for the distinction between female ego and male ego--between the female "body-ego" and the male "body-ego," to use Paul Schilder's terms.²

Harry Stack Sullivan avoids such difficulties in his outline of the development of the "self system." The stages are as follows: (1) Infancy, from birth to the maturation of the capacity for language behavior; (2) Childhood, to the maturation of the capacity for

¹Infra, Chapter Five.

²An example of the use of the term "body ego" is by Sylvan Keiser, "Body Ego During Orgasm," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, XXI (1952), pp. 153-166.

Paul Schilder has contributed much to the psychology of body-awareness. See The Image and Appearance of the Human Body (1935, New York, International Universities Press, 1950).

See also Ernest Jones, "Psycho-Analysis and The Instincts," reprinted (from British Journal of Psychology - XXVI) in Ernest Jones, Papers on Psycho-Analysis (Fourth ed., London, Bailliere, Tindall and Cox, 1938), pp. 203-220, at p. 209.

Also: Arminda A. Pichon Riviere, "House Construction Play, Its Interpretation and Diagnostic Value," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXIX, 1958, pp. 39-49. One's house-concept is related to his three-dimensional body image: "Our way of representing our body to ourselves" (p. 39).

living with compeers; (3) Juvenile, to the maturation of the capacity for intimacy with one's own sex, "isophilic intimacy"; (4) Pre-adolescence, to the maturation of the capacity for intimacy with a member of the other sex; (5) Early Adolescence, to the patterning of "lustful behavior";¹ (6) Late Adolescence, to maturity in heterosexual adjustment; (7) Adulthood.²

Sullivan cannot be accused of neglecting the somatic and the hedonistic criteria so important to Freud. His outline of stages "along life's way" suggests his gauge for emotional health. "Inter-personal" is a key concept with him. Since to him persons are living somata,³ "inter-personal" is "inter-organismic." The self-system is formed by these stages. The determining factors are the milieu and the organism's two goals: (1) Security and (2) satisfaction-seeking.⁴

¹"Lust" in Sullivan's terminology seems to be simply "sexual desire." It does not have a reductionist use. It is merely descriptive of what in common parlance is regarded as "sexual" in behavior, affect, and attitude. For instance, he speaks of "the genital lust dynamism." Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry (second edition, first published in 1940-1947, 1953), p. 63.

²Harry Stack Sullivan, "The Meaning of Anxiety in Psychiatry and in Life," Psychiatry, XI, 1 (1948), p. 5.--cited and elaborated in Patrick Mallahy, Oedipus: Myth and Complex (New York, Grove Press, 1955), pp. 301 ff. See also, Harry Stack Sullivan, Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry, passim.

³For instance, Lecture II "The Human Organism and Its Necessary Environment," Conceptions, pp. 30-56. He suggests early in the lecture that his view is to be distinguished from that of William McDougall, Otto Rank, Alfred Adler, Sigmund Freud, and C. G. Jung--ibid., p. 30. In reading Sullivan we infer however that to him the emphasis is on the psychological dynamics of this "organism."

⁴Sullivan reiterates his conceptions throughout his papers and lectures. He wrote no books as such; though many of his thoughts

To Sullivan the "waking self" and the "self-system" of which it is a part is produced through a continual interaction of the organism with its environment.

Among the Freudians the same kind of insight seems to be present in the theory of Melanie Klein. Formerly of Berlin, later of London, she is considered a highly imaginative, original thinker within the Freudian fold. Yet her theories are quite controversial even among Freudians. She shocked the world of psychoanalysis with papers, followed, in 1927, by a book, on the psychoanalysis of children. Freud taught that psychoanalysis was possible only with subjects who had passed the Oedipal crisis and become possessed of a superego. The therapeutic agent is the analyst's parent-role. The analyst undertakes to re-form the too oppressive superego--or internalised parent. True to Freudian orthodoxy, Klein tried to remove the anomaly by pushing the ontogenesis of the "superego" back all the way to the oral stage. Not the father, but the "hated breast" is the nucleus of the superego. The "loved breast" is, as with Freud, the first good object.¹

(via lecture notes and papers) have been compiled into books edited by his students. Another useful volume, in addition to those we have cited earlier, is Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry (New York, Norton, 1953).

The goals or end states of human behavior are divided into two actually interrelated classes.--Mullahy, Oedipus, p. 280. These are satisfaction and security (ibid., and, for example, Sullivan, Clinical Studies, pp. 9-11). Sullivan is noted also for his recognition of what he terms "the need for intimacy" (passim, especially as he describes cases).

¹Melanie Klein, Developments in Psycho-Analysis, pp. 278-279. Cf. Melanie Klein, Psychoanalysis of Children (1927, trans. by Alix Strachey, London, Leonard and Virginia Woolf at Hogarth Press & the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1932)--Part II, especially Chapter VIII,

A colleague in Edinburgh, a psychoanalytic original thinker in his own right, Dr. W. Ronald Fairbairn, has complemented Mrs. Klein's theories with an even greater stress on the process of object-cathexis and image-splitting.¹

"Early Stages of the Oedipus Conflict and of Super-Ego Formation," pp. 179-209. Representative statements are: "The orthodox view is that the formation of the super-ego begins in the phallic phase My own observations have led me to believe that the formation of the super-ego is a simpler and more direct process. The Oedipus conflict and the super-ego set in, I believe, under the supremacy of the pre-genital impulses, and the objects which have been introjected in the oral-sadistic phase--the first object cathexes and identifications--form the beginnings of the early super-ego. Moreover, what originates the formation of the super-ego and governs its earliest stages are the destructive impulses and the anxiety they arouse" (pp. 194-195). Through her breast the mother originally represented the external world for the infant (p. 208). Later, in Chapter IX, Klein says that the early ego's two ways of behavior are: (1) turning away from its object, out of fear and out of desire to protect it from his own sadism toward it; and (2) turning towards it with greater positive feeling. "An object-relation of this kind is brought about by a splitting up of the mother-image into a good and a bad one." This ambivalence toward objects is a further step in the development of object relations, and it is a mechanism of fundamental importance in the child's overcoming his fear of his superego by distributing it so that it becomes more clearly divided into good and bad components: certain objects are conceived as good and others, as bad. The good, of course, is prototypically the good, kindly, protecting, mother.--*ibid.*, p. 215.

Other works by Melanie Klein which inform our exposition of her views include:--Melanie Klein and others, Developments in Psycho-Analysis (edited by Joan Riviere, with preface by Ernest Jones, London, Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1952); Melanie Klein, Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, 1921-1941 (with introduction by Ernest Jones, London, Hogarth and the Institute, 1948); and other articles by Klein and analysts sympathetic to her views as published in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, London.

¹We have already had occasion to cite the contributions of W. Ronald Fairbairn, a psychoanalyst, of Edinburgh. Many of his papers have been published in the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, and The British Journal of Medical Psychology. A collection of twelve papers to 1951 are published in W. Ronald Fairbairn,

Klein's view seems to be that the twin mechanisms of introjection and projection effect the construction of the superego, and the ego, building them substantially out of the objects experienced from the moment of birth, if not even earlier. The ego in effect becomes a world of objects organized by eros and thanatos. Thanatos-controlled images are the inner persecutors, the "bad mother," "bad father," "bad objects" that give imagery and symbol to the cause of death and destruction. The good objects, split images of those experienced in contact with the outside world, are the life-images, the symbols of love, goodness, purposiveness: "the good breast," "the good mother," and so forth.

Although the theories of Klein are sometimes called grotesque, by non-Freudians and even by some Freudians, and are scored for "unorthodox" stretching of "the system," they are rich in suggestive

Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality (with Preface by Ernest Jones, London, Tavistock Publications, 1952).

There are significant differences between Fairbairn and Klein. For instance, he has never adopted Freud's instinctualism, either classical or dualistic. Cf. ibid., pp. 152-153. Hence his emphasis is on the object itself (objects themselves) in the early experience of the child rather than on the play of the supposed "instinctual" energies upon them. There may be a resemblance here to Sullivan's emphasis on the "inter-personal" (i. e., to the "objects" and interaction with them in the shaping of the "self system," rather than the organism's "instinctual" drives per se).-- Cf. Frieda Fromm Reichmann, Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy, p. 83 n.

Cf. Klein's criticisms of Fairbairn's views: Melanie Klein, Developments in Psycho-Analysis, pp. 293-295.

insight.¹ Despite Klein's sometimes perplexing anthropomorphisms she does present the reader with a concept of the ego which is at least as complex as are its formative encounters with objects which satisfy, tease, threaten, and give pain.²

Like Melanie Klein, and also Erich Fromm, Karen Horney studied under Freud's disciple Karl Abraham, in Berlin.³ Horney came to America and before long founded her own school of psychoanalysis, although she continued for years to be listed as a member of the

¹For instance, see Ruth Munroe, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, pp. 211-215, especially at p. 215. Cf. the appraisal of Klein's work in Ives Hendrik, Facts and Theories of Psychoanalysis (Third edition, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1958), pp. 270-272, 337 f.

Cf. also, Robert W. White, "Psychoanalysis and Children: A House Divided," Contemporary Psychology: A Journal of Reviews, III (Washington, American Psychological Association, 1958), pp. 81-84. White speaks of M. Klein's "objectology." He has respect for therapists of the so-called English school in their attempt to feel their way into the mind of the infant. But he chides them for their insularity (i. e., not feeling a need to learn from Piaget, Anna Freud, and Hartmann).

²Indeed, Klein must be distinguished from the ego-psychologists. The child's psyche is coterminous with his organismic striving. As Munroe says, Klein, in effect-- our qualification "largely ignores the autonomous institutions of the ego" Munroe goes on to say that she also ignores the institution of the superego. This seems incorrect. Yet, as we have seen, Klein has revised the concept radically.--Munroe, ibid.

³"The outstanding feature of Abraham's work is the amount of interest displayed in all matters concerning pregenital development as represented by primitive ego-formations and early libido imprints." --Edward Glover, "Review" of Karl Abraham, Selected Papers of Karl Abraham, M. D. (trans. by Douglas Bryan and Alix Strachey, with introductory memoir by Ernest Jones, London, Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1927), International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, Vol. IX (1928), pp. 121-124, at p. 121.

International Association of Psychoanalysts.¹ She rejected Freud's instinctual dualism, as did the Freudian apostle Ernest Jones and many who have been relatively free of charges of deviationism.² But Horney,

¹It is interesting to compare two obituary articles about Karen Horney: the one by Norman Kelman, in Psychoanalytic Review, 40, 1953, pp. 191-193 and that by C. P. Oberndorf, in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXIV, 1953, Part II, pp. 154-155. Kelman describes her thought as developing through her five books. The Neurotic Person of Our Time (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1937), develops further her already deepening understanding of cultural influences on the neurotic process and their importance in therapy. New Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939), elaborated her acquired conviction that Freud's instinctivistic orientation is too mechanistic to explain what is essentially a dynamic process. Sexual difficulties, though often obvious in the clinical picture, cannot be considered as the dynamic center of the neurosis.

Self-Analysis (some publishers, 1942) illustrates her vision of psychoanalysis as a helping discipline, not merely a theoretical system. Our Inner Conflicts: A Constructive Theory of Neurosis (some publishers, 1946) "brought together in systematic form the directions which appeared in her earlier books. She saw that every neurosis, no matter what the symptomatic picture, was a character neurosis recognised the crucial importance of contradictory neurotic trends and the attempts at solution of inner conflict." Her last book, Neurosis and Human Growth, was subtitled "The Struggle Toward Self-Realization" (some publishers, 1951). Kelman describes it as a statement of Horney's affirmative belief that man wants to grow, is a purposing organism out to realise himself."

Oberndorf, who like Horney, practiced in New York, said, "Because of her conclusion that neuroses are generated by disturbances in the inner-human relationships, she was moved to write several books with popular appeal." In the last one she appeared to return to her earlier thinking, defining a neurosis "as a disturbance in one's relation to self and others'." Oberndorf, representing the "orthodox" Freudians, nevertheless voices the common appraisal of Horney as a clinician. He says, "Notwithstanding her defection from the American Psychoanalytic Association there seems little doubt that Horney retained a strong devotion to Freud's procedure of a thorough-going investigation of psychic conflict and did not sacrifice conscientious work with patients to rapid or superficial methods."--Oberndorf, in loc. cit.

²"So far as I know," says Ernest Jones, "the only analysts, e. g. Melanie Klein, Karl Menninger and Hermann Nunberg, who still

like Adler, has been accused of leaving the somatic moorings and going off the sociological "deep end." It is true that she came to emphasize almost exclusively what now is the major stress of many Freudians, the executive-self. She refused the ego-id-superego formula as erroneously conceived and spoke of the self, personality structure, and trends. By the time she wrote her last book, in 1950, she was using a tri-focal formula in her own description of the self.¹ But conceivably all three foci can be loosely correlated with the ego-superego, although the id is perhaps implicit; that is, if any good purpose can be served by attempts to correlate differing frames of reference. Horney posited for the self, these three aspects or agencies: "the actual self," "the ideal self," and "the real self." The "actual self" is the pilot-self, the self in the storm of life, at the wheel, steering according to whatever guidance it gets from the charts and weather. The "ideal self" is like Freud's earlier idea of an Ego Ideal. It is the self which the actual self is convinced by his environment that he ought to be. Emotional illness and character disorders result from the imposition of an unrealistic ideal self image on the psyche of the individual. The "real self" is the actual, realistic, possible self of fulfillment. In positing it Horney expresses her hopeful outlook. She is a liberal,

employ the term 'death instinct' do so in a purely clinical sense which is remote from Freud's original theory."--The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, p. 277.

¹Neurosis and Human Growth (The U. S. publisher is Norton, New York, 1950), pp. 156-158 and elsewhere.

melioristic, humanistic "theologian," in believing that the person is essentially good. Evil comes from the storm of life and from the negative results of other persons' anxieties, the oppressive ideals which are relativistic and self-seeking in the worst sense.¹ Against the actual, which cannot be avoided, and against the false ideal, which may be cured, psychotherapy should evoke, nourish, and support the real in the patient.

Horney sees the early, formative, years as important but not as all important. They establish a pattern. But an adult's problems are his present inter-personal ones. They are not simply a regression to unresolved problems of early childhood.² Sullivan's

¹"The ideal self" is also called the pride system. It too has inner conflict, not between self-glorification and self-contempt, since these are complementary (infra, Chapter Six), but between self-images that vie for answering the question: "Who am I?" The person experiences himself in multiple ways. But they are resolved into two: his glorified self and his despised self.--Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 189. In her last book, Horney presents the picture with the "self" more as the protagonist, though society's role is formative. Cf. Our Inner Conflicts, pp. 46-47 and elsewhere.

Having introduced what she terms a morality of evolution, Horney pictures the child as determined to grow "in accordance with his real self," except for the effect of a variety of adverse influences. "When summarized, they all boil down to the fact that the people in the environment are too wrapped up in their own neuroses to be able to love the child, or even to conceive of him as the particular individual he is; their attitudes toward him are determined by their own neurotic needs and responses They may be dominating, overprotective, intimidating, irritable, over-exacting, overindulgent, erratic, partial to other siblings, hypocritical, indifferent, etc. It is never a matter of just a single factor, but always the whole constellation that exerts the untoward influence on a child's growth."--Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 18.

²For instance, Horney speaks of "personality trends," "personality structure," even as Freudians speak of "character" types (meaning: oral, anal, both "sadistic" and "masochistic"). Horney did not leave the child-in-the-man out of the picture, but

view of the psyche has the same flexibility.¹ Certainly Adler's does. We have noted Jung's view of a never-ending psychogenesis.²

Jung depicts a microcosmic psyche: the conscious and the unconscious. To him the deep unconscious is racial or collective. It is a dynamic inner "universe" for the individual unconscious. The self, as we have noted, is not a static category but a continual process of integration, what Jung calls "individuation." In the whirling, never-ending process of integration are the unconscious desires and aims as well as those of the more societally-conditioned conscious sphere. Jung's concept of persona is perceptive and widely appreciated. The persona is the individual's front to the world, his mask. Indeed Jung's doctrine of the shadow, and of the anima/animus--the opposite self-image in the unconscious which maintains a kind of antiphonal relationship with the conscious self-image or persona, is based on valid observations of personality trends--both conscious and

her approach became increasingly neo-Adlerian rather than neo-Freudian, though it does seem to be remarkably similar to the preoccupations of contemporary Freudian ego-psychologists (to be discussed infra, this chapter). Her emphasis came to be on what Freudians term "secondary process"; that is, the accessible modes of psychic life (behavior); i. e., ego-psychology.

¹Together with Horney, Sullivan has been called "revisionist," "neo-Freudian," even "neo-Adlerian," perhaps. He chose to be less committal about the "structure" of the self; hence his terminology: "self system," "self dynamisms," and "waking self," and the "not me." Sullivan will be discussed further in subsequent pages.

²"Personality, as the complete realization of our whole being, is an unattainable ideal," says Jung. "But unattainability is no argument against the ideal, for ideals are only signposts, never the goal." --"The Development of Personality," (paragraph 291) in volume by same title, Bollingen Series XX, p. 172.

unconscious, as revealed in dreams and symbols.¹ The woman in a man's dreams may represent his mother or sweetheart. But, even more deeply

¹Munroe, who states a preference for the Freudian approach, gives a more balanced critique of Jung than that of Edward Glover, a Freudian psychoanalyst who takes up the cudgels against Jung in Freud or Jung? (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1950).

Of course, the Jungian "apologists," Jolan Jacobi in The Psychology of C. G. Jung (London, Kegan Paul, Trubner, 1942), Frieda Fordham in An Introduction to Jung's Psychology (a Pelican Book, London, Penguin, 1953)--to name but two--give sympathetic and forceful presentation of his insights. The Cutting Lectures at Andover Newton Theological School, Newton, Massachusetts, were delivered by Carl Alfred Maier, of Zurich, on Jung and Analytical Psychology, Andover Newton Bulletin (June, 1959), pp. 1-80; Dr. Maier was of course stressing the relevance of Jung's psychology to the practical theology of ministers. Jung himself has done this, notably in Psychology and Religion (1938), and in "The Spiritual Problem of Modern Man," and "Psychotherapists or Clergy", the final chapters in Modern Man in Search of a Soul.

Munroe's exposition and criticisms are in Munroe, op. cit., pp. 539-574. The inference of what we regard the more circumspect critiques of the imposing Jungian corpus of writings is that it is not in accord with science to accept uncritically his formulations, because actually what evidence he gives (as for instance, for the archetypes) could fit other formulations. The fact that some symbols seem to have a universality in experience does not necessarily indicate a racial unconscious, for instance (as many critics point out, including those cited, and Mullahy, Oedipus, p. 326). Yet, Jung, in his own, original, unique, and imposing way, has kept before our minds the mystery and the depth of the human psyche, which he links with the religious idea of soul (psyche!).

Munroe divides her discussion into two parts, dealing first with that which she finds most difficult to understand in Jung's writings--viz., "what Jung actually means by the collective unconscious and the deep inheritance of mankind" (p. 554). She has considerably less difficulty in appreciating what she calls his subsidiary concepts: his psychic topography, ego-persona over against shadow-anims/anima, and the self as the integration of the personality in which ego, shadow, and the collective unconscious come together.

As we have said for Freud, we also say for Jung: in much of his writing he seems to be more helpful to laymen if they read him as literature--Jung is "a man of letters." Of course we must not ignore the important fact that his kind of literature is informed by his psychological, therapeutic, religious, and ethical concerns.

within his unconscious self-process, she represents himself! It is the self which biologically and psychologically is most neglected in his waking life.¹ She also represents the archetypal woman of the racial unconscious. This latter construction may be rejected or held in suspended judgment. However we are not compelled to suspend or to discard Jung's suggestive insights as to the nature of the individual unconscious.²

¹Cf. Jung's discussion in Psychology and Religion where he interprets "the woman" in the patient's dream (in the edition published by the Yale U. Press, 1938), pp. 29-37.

²Ruth Munroe makes this confession: "I began the reading of Jungian material with an antipathy not uncommon among American psychologists, especially those who take their orientation mainly from Freud The specifically Jungian concepts I knew seemed to me mainly mystical balderdash.

". . . . I shall remain critical of Jung's basic theoretical position. To my way of thinking he turns important dynamic systems into 'universals.'" He too is a reductionist, though in a pluralistic manner.

She goes on to say, "What I have learned from the study is the profound importance of the concrete systems he observes I came to see Jung's rubrics as creative syntheses of observable trends which I might explain differently but which I had to respect. Since reading this material, I have developed a few new 'uncanny insights' of my own. In trying to get across workable psychological generalizations to students of projective methods, I find myself consciously inhibiting a tendency to use Jungian concepts. I often feel that if they had read Jung I would not have to struggle so hard to convey a sense of underlying trends revealed in the test materials instead of the direct linkage of test data with behavioral trait or identifiable instinctual drive, role, or diagnostic entity which students trained in academic psychology tend to expect. The trends can usually be explained in other terms, but they lose the vividness and focus of the Jungian formulation." The Jungian system as a whole, however, she finds too lacking in "the fluidity characteristic of a developmental psychology."--Munroe, op. cit., pp. 566-7.

One of the most serious criticisms of Jung--as therapist--is voiced by Clara Thompson, for example, in her somewhat sketchy account

Toward an Integrated View of the Self

The clinical relevance of any psychogenesis or psychic topography is in the attempt to locate or explicate an emotional illness. Freudians, for example, may see an "oral" fixation in the alcoholic, as in the manic-depressive.¹ Compulsion neurosis may stem from emotional traumata during the "anal" stage, the time of ritual for the child, as parents well know. Sadism, masochism, obsessions to hoard, to grasp, to collect, revert to fixations during the "anal" period. "Oral sadism" suggests the dental phase of orality. An unresolved "Oedipus complex" may account for obsessive rebellion against authority. Humiliation fear and the surging hostility which accompanies it hark back to both the "anal" and the "phallic"-early "Oedipal"-stages.

of the development of depth psychology. She says, "Another unfortunate aspect of Jung's method is the indoctrination of the patient. If the analyst contributes his associations to the patient's dreams and he starts with a theory about collective unconscious imagery, the end result will usually be indoctrination of the patient with the analyst's theory." Thompson agrees that a similar charge can be leveled at the Freudians. To some extent any analyst has some influence on his patient's associations. "But at least other systems do not as actively undertake indoctrination as the Jungian method does."--Clara Thompson, M. D., with the collaboration of Patrick Mullahy, Psychoanalysis: Evolution and Development (New York, Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1950), p. 169.

¹Melanie Klein and her school have given great emphasis to this Freudian hypothesis (after Karl Abraham). Klein considers the depressive position (a prototype of the psychosis) as the universal "central position" of the emotional life. In literary dialogue with W. Ronald Fairbairn she adopted his view that the primary stage is schizoid (characterized by the splitting of objects into "good" and "bad"). Hence, she now says that the primary phase is both "schizoid" and "paranoid." However the central or nodal position is "depressive." Her critics object to what they regard unwarranted over-use of the analogy of the psychoses in describing "normal" states in infancy. See references already cited.

The Freudian psyche is emergent from the soma. It cannot be described in one simple figure or statement. It is multifarious and complex. The Freudian man can say: "I am all that I have met, 'cathected,' and taken into myself." Like the Gerasene demoniac he says, "My name is Legion; for we are many."¹ With few exceptions other depth psychologies seem to agree at least that the individual's psychic world is complex.

Psychoanalysis describes the psyche as only partially developed, even when it is relatively healthy. Everyone's psychogenesis is somewhat stunted by fixations. A person may appear to be "well balanced," integrated, adjusted, until he is hit by some traumatic event which forces him back to a phase of his emotional development when the affected components of his impulses were fixated on some object or solution which is the only one he knows appropriate for the kind of trauma he is again experiencing. We may liken the Freudian "component instincts" and their ego to an army, some of whose contingents have had to remain behind at various stations along the march. Setbacks mean retreat to places manned by friendly troops along the route.²

The Freudian reductionism of the psyche to mechanistic systems of energy seeking satisfaction by and against whatever objects happen

¹Cf. Mark 5:9.

²Cf. Freud, in "The Theory of Dreams" (1916), Collected Papers, IV, p. 138; later, in "The Anatomy of the Mental Personality," New Introductory Lectures, pp. 82-112. The analogy to the army we shall have to refer to our own imagination, although we have the impression that it occurs somewhere in the Freudian literature.

to be in the way leads to a curious explanation even for the disciplines of psychology and medicine. Even the desire to discover the dynamics of the human unconscious, to spin psychoanalytic webs of theory in which to trap the impulses for closer examination, is a variant of infantile gnosiphilia or epistemophilia.¹ This is a development by displacement of the infant's forbidden desires to see and to explore the bodies of his parents. His frustrated energy is attached to the socially acceptable exploration of one of the many disciplines being plied within society. Thus in its most speculative moments psychoanalysis assays to explain a Plato, an Augustine, A Kant, and a Sigmund Freud.

Despite the intrusion of the grotesque into his brilliant probing of the psyche and its genesis Freud has stated with cogency the undeniable interrelation of the rational with the irrational. Otto Rank says that he goes further unfortunately and tries the impossible, to render as rational the essentially irrational.² But Freud has made a lasting contribution to "our understanding of

¹Perhaps epistemophilia is the preferred term though both have been encountered in the literature. Representative passages include: Melanie Klein, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, p. 208.

Cf. Freud, in "Infantile Sexuality," Basic Writings (A. A. Brill, ed.), pp. 594-5, and p. 602. Cf. Freud, Collected Papers, III, p. 380. The desire to know has been linked with infantile "sexual" (!) desire to see--scoptophilia or voyeurism. See Jastrow's amusing account and criticism.--Joseph Jastrow, The House that Freud Built (London, Rider, 1933), pp. 197 ff. He discusses Karl Abraham's lengthy disquisition on scoptophilia.

²Otto Rank, Beyond Psychology (published privately by Friends and Students of the author, Camden, N. J., 1941), pp. 30 ff. Cf. Rank, Psychology and the Soul, pp. 1-12, 47-48, and elsewhere.

ourselves" in insisting that the process of conscious thinking always be seen as interrelated with the continuous somatic desiring and feeling. Who can dispute the assertion that human behavior proceeds somatically, even beyond the formative era of infancy? Does anyone go without food, drink, sleep, sexual release? How incalculable is the determining power of the appetites, the nervous system, the vital organismic, biological "selves" of even the most soma-denying ascetics! We know, for instance, that the verbalised descriptions of mystical experience depend on the analogy of the biological satisfactions of hunger, thirst, muscular tension, warmth, and the desire for intimacy or physical union with another.¹

To Freud the basic organism--or id--knows not time. The Kantian categories are "graspers" by which the ego learns its milieu. Freud could agree with his arch opponent Jung that the past and the present are alike to the unconscious.² A generation to the unconscious is but as a day. It is the ego, the socialized or acculturated

¹Merton Gill, "The Present State of Psychoanalytic Theory," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology (Vol. 58, 1959), pp. 1-8.

²In his comparison of Freud with Jung on Religion, Erich Fromm, favoring the former as the more constructive, underlines the implications of Jung's "doctrine" of the unconscious, especially as it veers toward a theology proper of the unconscious.

The unconscious is "not merely a part of the individual mind but a power beyond our control intruding upon our minds." Interestingly enough, Fromm likens Freud's ethical interest, accompanied by his devastating criticisms of what he sees as "religion," to that of John Dewey. Jung's view of the unconscious reflects the attitude of William James, who also could compare it with the God of the theologians. We shall deal more with Freud's view of a phylogenetic

area of the id, which anticipates and reminisces. It is the ego that suffers. This is certainly true if consciousness is a requisite for what is generally meant by suffering. The ego alone is conscious, although it is partially submerged in the unconscious. Psychotherapy is essentially ego-therapy. The goal of therapy is to strengthen the ego in its control of the irrational id as well as the irrational superego. The ego is the agency of reason, of conscious volition and of planning. It is the executive self, weak though it may be.¹

The so-called ego-psychologists among contemporary Freudians are trying to maintain Freud's basic insights, while they elaborate the study of the ego. As we have pointed out, this emphasis within

memory in the next chapter. Our reference to Fromm's critique is Erich Fromm, "Freud and Jung" in Psychoanalysis and Religion, pp. 18-28, including a footnote, p. 28, re: Dewey and James: Freud's anti-religious "religious" (qua "ethical") concern is like Dewey's in A Common Faith and John MacMurray's in The Structure of Religious Experience. Jung, on the other hand, is reminiscent of William James and a relativistic, generally approving attitude toward any and all religion. Cf. a much more appreciative study of Jung's psychology of the unconscious: Hans Schaer, Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung's Psychology, trans. by R. F. C. Hull (Bollingen Series XXI, 1950), especially pp. 32, 36, 37, 57, 197-221.

¹It is important to note that with all their emphasis on the inner energies, "instincts," "mechanisms," "dynamisms" and so forth, present-day psychoanalysts do focus their clinical and therapeutic attention on the "executor"--or executive self--the ego. With some qualification this can be said even of Melanie Klein. It is the ego--the "centered self" (to use Tillich's term)--that she is trying to help. Nevertheless Klein preserves a kind of pluralistic model, which may be even closer to suiting the facts of psychodynamics than her critics seem to allow. See her remarks apropos of ego-psychology: The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child (An Annual publication), VII, 1952, pp. 51-53 (abstracted in International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXIV, 1953, p. 278).

Freudianism seems to be assimilating the insights of other schools such as Horney's which have not been using the Freudian frame of reference.¹

A prominent psychoanalyst among those who are exploring the concept of ego-development and seeking correlation and correctives from academic psychology is Erik Erikson, who has recently been appointed Professor of Human Development at Harvard University. He has specialized in the treatment of adolescents and young adults who have serious emotional problems. In addition to numerous papers he has written Childhood and Society,² and a suggestive study of Martin Luther. In Young Man Luther, interestingly enough, he, a Freudian psychologist, studies Luther's conception of sin and justification, discussing the reformer in terms of psychogenetic crises.³

Erikson presents a refined psychogenesis in an outline of seven stages, only three of which are in infancy and early childhood, although they are basic hurdles for the emerging ego. There seems a reluctance to make these stages hinge on the precise

¹"Far from acknowledging her significant contributions, the mood of the 'Freudians' is to repudiate the Horney approach in toto. 'Freudians,' mostly under the label of ego psychology, are just beginning to give proper theoretical weight to concepts which Horney has been shouting from the housetops for twenty years."--Munroe (1955), op. cit., p. 458.

²Erik H. Erikson, Childhood and Society (New York, W. W. Norton, 1950). He dedicates this fascinating, responsible, foresighted study "to our children's children."

³Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: "A Study in Psychoanalysis and History" (New York, W. W. Norton, 1958).

biological erogenous dynamics depicted in the early formulation: orality, anality, and phallicism. Nevertheless the revised theory does not leave the basic somatic, biological ground of psychic development. The seven stages are described as follows.

(1) Early Infancy. The pattern of basic trust and basic mistrust is established during early infancy, when the child is most dependent on mothering care.

(2) Infancy. The infantile sources develop for what in time becomes a human being's will, in its variations of will-power and wilfulness. "The resolution of this crisis will determine whether an individual is apt to be dominated by a sense of autonomy, or by a sense of shame and doubt."¹

(3) The Identity Crisis. This is the "Oedipus" situation. "Love for the maternal person who awakens his senses and his sensuality with her ministrations, and deep and angry rivalry with the male possessor of this maternal person" characterize the child at this stage.² During this crisis stage "the child can manage the fact that there is no return to the mother and no competition with the father as a father" only if and to the degree in which "a future career outside of the narrower family can at least be envisaged in ideal future occupations: these he learns to imitate in play, and to anticipate in school."³

¹Young Man Luther, p. 255. ²Ibid., p. 113.

³Ibid., p. 258.

The identity crisis is long and protracted. It precedes the stage of proficiency with some tool or tools, which marks its resolution. With Luther, as with other religious and political reformers, the identity crisis is especially prolonged. It is the principal subject of the book on Luther.

Whoever is hard put to feel identical with one set of people and ideas must that much more violently repudiate another set; and whenever an identity, once established, meets further crises, the danger of irrational repudiation of otherness and temporarily even one's own identity increases.¹

(4) Learning, corresponding to latency. The child "becomes able and eager to learn systematically, and to collaborate with others," when he develops his sense of industry or work completion, his sense of tool-competency, his desire to know the reason for things and to learn to use techniques and tools that will prepare him most generally for the tasks of his culture, with which--with whose significant persons--he is coming to identify himself.²

Luther's chosen tool, according to Erikson, was his literacy in both Latin and German. His proficient use of the tool of language was not enough however to tide him safely over the identity crisis. In finding himself suddenly the leader of a religious revolution he continued his struggle to find his identity.

The three overlapping crises that follow and attend this crisis of identity when it is prolonged continued in Luther to rage short of resolution. They seem to be an elaboration of the Freudian "genital phase."

¹Ibid., p. 259.

²Ibid., pp. 258-9.

(5) Intimacy. A person is driven by the desire-and-need to be intimate with another and others. In Luther the dynamism is evident in his supreme ability to reach into the homes of his nation as preacher and table-talker.

(6) Generativity. This crisis may be fused with that of intimacy when the identity crisis is prolonged and sexual intimacy is delayed or denied. It is marked by productivity. Both Luther's writings and his fathering of children demonstrate this phase. The special hazard of generativity is a resultant sense of stagnation, often a sense of futility, of having been drained of life. Erikson says that Luther felt this acutely in a manic-depressive form.

(7) Integrity. This is the final crisis short of death. It is the desired goal of psychotherapy, if not of ethics, for the individual. The ego has been striving to bring into its own wielding all the diverse drives and trends which are at work within. Or, in another figure, the central ego tries to bring together all the ego-fragments. This process corresponds, at least by analogy, with the self-process described by Jung. Ego strength is measured relative to the strength of drives and trends at variance in the psycho-organism. It is measured by its power to direct and control them. A so-called "strong personality" may actually be one whose ego in this sense is relatively weak because of the domination of id and superego energies not yet assimilated by the executive, waking, "prospective" I of awareness.

Erikson says that he knows of no better term than ego integrity for the condition of one "who in some way has taken care of

things and people and has adapted himself to the triumphs and disappointments adherent to being, by necessity, the originator of others and the generator of things and ideas," who "may gradually grow the fruit of these seven stages": (1) early infancy, (2) infancy, (3) identity, (4) learning collaboration and choice of tools, (5) intimacy, (6) generativity, and (7) integrity.¹

It may well be that in this movement within psychoanalysis we are witnessing a kind of integrity crisis for the genius of depth psychology. The Adlerian individual psychology with its emphasis on life style, the Jungian emphasis on life energy and a dynamic selfhood moving ever toward integration, Horney's brilliant clinical descriptions of neurotic trends revolving about conflicting self-images (striving for identity!), Sullivan's concept of the waking self within the self-dynamism which is shaped by the process of inter-organismic--inter-personal--relations, Fromm's emphasis on the individual's quest for meaning in his own life, and Rank's recognition of the necessity for the ego to implement the expression of the self-validating irrational in human nature, and his insistence on the ego as will, all these directions in the world of depth psychology may be assimilated by ego-psychology within the Freudian movement. At least we can say that all these insights seem to be in a considerable measure accessible to it and assimilable.

¹Ibid., p. 260. Cf. "Eight Stages of Man"--Chapter VII of Childhood and Society, pp. 219-234--which Erikson lists as: (1) Trust vs. Basic Mistrust; (2) Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt; (3) Initiative vs. Guilt; (4) Industry vs. Inferiority; (5) Identity vs. Role Diffusion; (6) Intimacy vs. Isolation; (7) Generativity vs. Stagnation; and (8) Ego Integrity vs. Despair.

The Optimum of Conscious Subject-Selfhood

In speaking of "Ego integrity" Erikson says that there is no clear definition for it. But he ventures to name some of its constituents.

. . . . The ego's accrued assurance of its proclivity for order and meaning. It is a post-narcissistic love of the human ego--not of the self--as an experience which conveys some world order and some spiritual sense, no matter how dearly paid for. It is the acceptance of one's one and only life cycle as something that had to be and that, by necessity, permitted of no substitutions: it thus means a new, a different love of one's parents. It is a comradeship with the ordering ways of distant times and different pursuits, as expressed in the simple products and sayings of such times and pursuits. Although aware of the relativity of all the various life styles which have given meaning to human striving, the possessor of integrity is ready to defend the dignity of his own life style against all physical and economic threats. For he knows that an individual life is the accidental coincidence of but one life cycle with but one segment of history; and that for him all human integrity stands or falls with the one style of integrity of which he partakes. The style of integrity developed by his culture or civilization thus becomes the 'patrimony of his soul,' the seal of his moral paternity of himself Before this final solution, death loses its sting.¹

If Erikson should go on to say with Paul that the sting of death is sin, we would have a good inference for correlating the hamartiology of depth psychology with that of Christian theology. Perhaps we do have something like a doctrine of sin and justification in the approach of the ego-psychologists. The tragic, if not the sinful, condition is the failure to surmount these seven crises. Integration is analogous to "complete" salvation and sanctification. The ego of ego integrity is the optimum subject-self, or accountable I, according to this philosophy within depth psychology.

¹Young Man Luther, pp. 260-261.

Yet the religious man, "homo religiosus," is likely the victim--and/or hero--of a life-long, chronic integrity crisis.¹ Because of only partially resolved infancy and childhood crises and a prolongation of the identity crisis, the "religious man" becomes older in one respect than his peers, his parents and teachers. Suddenly he focuses on what others take a life time to gain a mere inkling of perhaps, namely "the questions of how to escape corruption in living and how in death to give meaning to life." We think of the story of the boy Jesus discussing such weighty matters with the doctors in the temple. "The chosen young man extends the problem of his identity to the borders of existence in the known universe"; while others "bend all their efforts to adopt and fulfill the departmentalized identities which they find prepared in their communities."²

Christian theology may have a question, as does C. G. Jung, for instance, among depth psychologists, concerning the realism of expecting complete integration within the self. Does not existence itself, fragmented and ambiguous as it is, with respect to being and essence preclude any genuine perfection in the process of what Jung calls integration or individuation? He thinks it does.³ However, ego-integrity, according to Erikson's own description, seems a

¹Ibid., p. 261.

²Ibid.

³cf. C. G. Jung, The Development of Personality (Bollingen Series XI, 17), pp. 179 and 196-197. Also, Psychology and Alchemy, trans. by R. F. C. Hull (Bollingen Series XX, 12), 208.

realizable goal, at least logically, since in its definition it is more poetic and carefully psychological than ontological. Nevertheless a question remains as to whether the optimum "state of soul," if not the optimum of subject-selfhood, is that which Erikson describes as ego-integrity. Does this ego of integrity open sufficiently to that fourth dimension with which Christian theology is concerned? Without homo religiosus and his never-quite-resolved integrity crisis where would the prophetic element be in society's progression? Is agape woven into the life of the completely self-contained individual? Is he necessarily a means of grace to others? We can see reason for venturing both affirmative and negative answers to these questions. Hence we shall leave them open, at least for the time being.

Conclusion: Who is the Sinner?
Can We Assume a Subject-self?

We return now to our original question concerning the identity of the subject-self, the I which assumes responsibility and accountability. Our special context is the conception of "man as sinner." Depth psychology helps both to raise the question and to seek out answers for it: "Who--or what in a person--is accountable?" Later we shall deal with the matter of culpability, or guilt. In the present chapter we have been inquiring as to the nature of the self, the psyche, and the subject-center--if one can be supposed.

In our opening example of the man-in-rage we confronted the difficulties in trying to focus the culpability even for an obviously outrageous offense. What in his confused world was accountable?

Our discussion of Freud's psychology, and of the various schools' critical and corrective views, leads us to a choice between two "faiths" or working suppositions: (1) A commitment to the idea of determinism which approaches a degree that denies for all practical purposes any freedom or responsibility to the waking self except possibly the kind of freedom seen by analogy in the flower which "tries" to grow and to "fulfill its destiny" even in a patch of weeds;¹ (2) A commitment to the idea of a significant though limited area of free choice for the waking self, or ego, with the accompanying responsibility. Certainly the logic of the Freud who posited a primal, victorious death instinct and probably the logic even of the earlier Freud, support the first position. The spirit of Freud the therapist and "philosopher" and the genius of depth psychology in general throughout its various schools favor the second "faith."²

¹Cf. Freud's letter to Frederic Van Eeden, December, 28, 1914, quoted by Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. II, pp. 368-369. Freud saw the "evil" (the weeds?) as being from within the psyche-soma--the human organism.

Cf. Mark 7:1-23.

²Cf. Harold Palmer, "Psychiatric Prolegomena: A Plea for the Help of Philosophy," Philosophy (The Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy, London, Macmillan, 1951), Vol. XXCI, pp. 311-332; Vol. XXCII, pp. 39-50.--especially at II, p. 49.

Re: Freud's determinism: cf. Ernest Jones, "Review of M. Hamblin Smith's The Psychology of the Criminal (London, Methuen, 1922), in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, IV, p. 346.

If we do assume that there is a centered-self which says, I, which rationalizes even irrational behavior when pressed for a reason, which assumes responsibility, we introduce the problem of guilt, of accountable wrongness. As we explore, with the help of depth psychology, the nature of guilt, we find complications, including feelings of unworthiness, pervasive anxiety, and the danger of falling into despair--a complex phenomenon in itself. Then we are puzzled still by the problem of how to interpret and to deal with that non-guilt-assuming kind of self-assertion which can be described both by any man's introspective "case study" and by less confessional case study. It is the attitude which persists in saying, "Myself right or wrong!" What in a person voices such a driving conviction? Is it primary narcissism, is it an innate aggressiveness instinct, is it purposive libido, is it compensating energy trying to reverse an inner conviction of inferiority or "Myself wrong!", is it the executive self, the ego, perhaps in the service of irrational drives?

The problem which Christianity addresses soteriologically is not simply that of the conscious assumption of guilt and responsibility but also that of actual wrongness against rightness as 'agape.

As we explore this problem we begin with the subjective side of accountability, first with conscious guilt-feelings and with possibly unconscious or repressed guilt-feelings.

CHAPTER FIVE

WHAT IS HIS GUILT? - I - THE NATURE OF GUILT FEELINGS

Conscious Guilt

What is happening when a person's conscience hurts him?

Again, we proceed by citing an incident. A two-year-old, on being reprimanded at the breakfast table, gets down from his high chair crying. He protests through his tears, "Me good boy!" Who said he was not? Something in the event of correction itself says to him in effect, "You are a bad boy." This he can hardly tolerate. He bursts out for all the world to hear, "Me good boy!"¹

Meanwhile his father suffers intense inner pain. The fierceness of his reprimand has more than met the "crime." He came to breakfast irritable. He likens himself to an artilleryman who has brought down a sparrow with a cannon ball.

The inner pain continues as the father rides in to work. At his machine or at his desk he finds himself coming back to the incident. All day long he cannot leave, emotionally, the breakfast table where he spoke in anger to his tiny child.

¹Cf. a somewhat similar example given by Theodore Reik in The Confessions of An Analyst. Our reference is to the edition in The Search Within (New York, Farrar, Straus & Cudahy, 1956), pp. 231-233.

How is the troubled, troubling conscience quieted? Is not the problem how to satisfy it? The inner cry is for righting a wrong, for justification, if not of the deed, at least of the I behind it. The mechanism of rationalization is usually in frantic operation as the victim of guilt feelings tries to resume his normal efficiency at his work.

However the justification which guilt feelings seek is not a fictional one. They would turn the clock back--indeed, they do in phantasy, compulsively, repetitively--and reseat the man at the breakfast table, run the scene again, correcting the reprimand. The child would be addressed in a quiet, loving manner. Then and only then could the father feel truly "justified" in the sense of being made righteous in the situation. The portrait of his injured infant son persists before his mind's eye. "If only I had not been so harsh! If only I could go back and do it right!" Are not these what his conscience is exclaiming? Regret in some situations may even turn into remorse.

Obviously he cannot go back to the event and undo it. What then can he do? He will try to be especially loving to the boy when he goes home tonight. He will make a kind of reparation, a restitution, hence an expiation. The making of restitution, while never a perfect "justification," is as near as one can come to it on his own.

In the evening when the father sees his son again and in his own way does the work of reparation, thus showing his son that he does love him--and thus probably reassuring the small boy that he is

accepted by his father as "good" instead of "bad," he is rewarded by the son's affection--tantamount to forgiveness. The son is accepting him as the "good" father. How like the child's spontaneous outburst of the morning, "Me good boy," is the father's work of reparation! It seems to express, "I am a good father." In his psyche the image of his injured son is close to his own damaged self-image.¹ The son's accepting him as the good father is the forgiveness sought, even as the father's accepting, attentive, demonstration to the son is the forgiveness-reassurance desired by the son, at least at the moment of injury. The day's soothing events, possibly including his mother's comfort along with the continual distractions of the nursery, may seem to have done the job already. Yet even the mother's help can have been but the adumbration of the desired reconciliation with the father.

Freud's Understanding of Guilt

Freud as an anthropologist supposed guilt to be universal, specifically Oedipal guilt. We may regret that he spelled out the nature of guilt in so reductionistic a manner,² but we can hardly

¹Cf. typical Freudian discussions, such as Ernest Jones' "The Significance of the Grandfather for the Fate of the Individual" (1913), and "The Phantasy of the Reversal of Generations" (1913), Chapters 27 and 28, Papers on Psycho-Analysis (Fourth edition, London, Bailliere, Tindall, and Cox, 1938), pp. 519-524; 525-530.

²We shall not attempt to better the critique of H. L. Philp, Freud and Religious Belief (see Bibliography, *infra*), 1956. He attacks with cogency and vigor Freud, not as psychotherapist, but as anthropologist and "philosopher of religion." It is not surprising that Ernest Jones saw this book as "an extremely adverse criticism." He even

study his "findings" on the subject of guilt and guilt-feelings without the Oedipal frame of reference. He speculated that it was not merely individual, but racial, in its genesis. In Totem and Taboo, he relates these two primitive institutions to the origins of religion and morality.

He likens the totem sacrifice and meal directly to the Christian service of Communion and the theology it represents, even as he relates the accompanying taboo directly to Christian ethics. Of course, Christianity is not alone in this regard. To Freud all religion and all other "compulsion neuroses" are directly related to the primitive drama reenacted in the customs of totem and taboo.¹ Superstition is a vestige of primitive taboo.

For us the meaning of taboo branches off into two opposite directions. On the one hand it means to us, sacred, consecrated; but on the other hand it means, uncanny, dangerous, forbidden, and unclean taboo expresses itself essentially in prohibitions and restrictions. Our combination of "holy dread" would often express the meaning of taboo.²

The basic taboo is against incest with the mother or father's wife. All other taboos stem from this one. The origin of the taboo

likened Philp's "sweeping condemnation" of Freud's psychology of religion to a "similar appraisal" by someone of Darwin's On the Origin of Species.--Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, p. 362.

¹Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo (1914): - With some apology we are using the English translation by A. A. Brill. The "authorized translation," is by James Strachey. Sigmund Freud, Totem and Taboo: "Some Points of Agreement between the Mental Lives of Savages and Neurotics," (New York, W. W. Norton, 1952, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950). Of course Brill's earlier translation was with Freud's approval. It is in Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, pp. 805-930.

²Basic Writings, p. 821. Cf., Totem (Strachey), p. 18.

was the primal father's own will. Incest is integrally related to murder, within the racial psyche. In discussing the evolution of culture, Freud says:

We have spoken of the hostility to culture, produced by the pressure it exercises and the instinctual renunciations that it demands. If one imagined its prohibitions removed, then one could choose any woman who took one's fancy as one's sexual object, one could kill without hesitation one's rival or whoever interfered with one in any other way, and one could seize what one wanted of another man's goods without asking his leave: how splendid, what a succession of delights, life would be! True, one soon finds the first difficulty: everyone else has exactly the same wishes, and will treat one with no more consideration than one will treat him. And so in reality there is only one single person who can be made unrestrictedly happy by abolishing thus the restrictions imposed by culture, and that is a tyrant or dictator who has monopolized all the means of power; and even he has every reason to want the others to keep at least one cultural commandment; thou shalt not kill.¹

In his anthropology Freud conceives of just such an arrangement in the primal horde. The primal chief or father holds down the sons. Their own desire for his power, specifically for his women, is forbidden on pain of death. This is the forbidden fruit. Hence, the primal taboo is against incest: against playing the role of the father-chief in the fundamental expression of life, sexual love with the father-chief's women, the mothers of the community. The incest crisis in the dawn of human society, along with the repetition of an incest crisis in the psychogenesis of every individual who develops beyond the "phallic" stage, accounts for the prevalent association of sin with sexual offenses and desires.

¹Sigmund Freud, The Future of An Illusion (1927), trans. by W. D. Robson-Scott, International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 15, editor: Ernest Jones (London, Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1949), pp. 25-26.

Furthermore, the primitive desire to commit incest, essentially an offense against the tyrant-father, is equivalent to parricide, since its fulfillment would require the father-chief's removal. Freud sees, not only in the behavior of other mammals, but in Hebrew, Greek, and Persian myths, and in the practice of taboo and totem ritual in primitive societies, a compelling witness to an early murder of the father of the race and the emergence of a society of brothers. According to Freud's speculation, parricide occurred for every race. The original sin was murder of the father. It was followed immediately by the fear of retribution. The father image could not be killed. It remained--and has remained--to haunt the imagination of the sons. In order to ward off the threat of retribution, the sons consolidated their fraternity and formed a father-worshipping cult in an attempt to appease him, to undo the murder. The father was identified with a certain animal, the totem animal, after which the tribe was likely named. By projection the animal and its image were invested with deity. Henceforth the father-image--or totem--was viewed with ambivalence: (1) reverence and even tenderness; and (2) the old hatred of the domineering, restrictive tyrant. In other words, the father-image is approached with guilt-conditioned emotions and also with renewed hatred. This ambivalence of emotions is seen in the totem, which includes: worship, sacrifice of the totem animal, festivities in which taboos are temporarily removed, and then a reinstatement of the taboos and fear of the totem. The sacrifice of the animal serves a double purpose.

First, it is a reenactment of the primal murder. Second, it is retributive execution of one of the sons--a representative "son"--on behalf of the father, the avenging of his murder, the appeasement of the projected fear as though it were the wrath of the tribal father-god, ever-present in pursuit of his parricidal sons.¹

In the community of brothers two taboos form the basis for "morality." Freud expounds his theory:

One day (in a mythical if not a historical sense) the expelled brothers joined forces, slew and ate the father, and thus put an end to the father horde. Together they dared and accomplished what would have remained impossible for them singly. Perhaps some advance in culture, like the use of a new weapon, had given them the feeling of superiority. Of course these cannibalistic savages ate their victim. This violent primal father had surely been the envied and feared model for each of the brothers. Now they accomplished their identification with him by devouring him and each acquired a part of his strength. The totem feast, which is perhaps mankind's first celebration, would be the repetition and commemoration of this memorable, criminal act with which so many things began, social organization, moral restrictions and religion.²

The brothers had both hated and loved the father, because he too was an object--indeed a prominent one--for libido attachment from

¹Cf. Dostoyevsky, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. by Constance Garnett (New York, The Modern Library). Freud wrote a preface to Die Urgestalt der Bruder Karamasoff, a supplementary volume to the complete German edition of Dostoyevsky's works ("Dostoevsky and Parricide," Freud, Collected Papers, V, pp. 222-242). Actually Freud did not allude as much as we might expect to Dostoyevsky's striking pre-corroboration of his own parricidal motif. Hanns Sachs, of Berlin and later of Boston, says that Freud's aloof attitude toward Dostoyevsky, whom Sachs greatly admired, was due not to any lack of appreciation for the profundity of Dostoyevsky's intuitive psychology but rather to Freud's dislike of self-laceration.--Hanns Sachs, Freud, Master and Friend (London, Imago, 1945), pp. 104-105. Cf. also Theodor Reik, From Thirty Years with Freud (London, Hogarth Press and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1942), pp. 142-157.

²Basic Writings, pp. 915-16; Totem (Strachey), pp. 141-2.

earliest infancy. When the sons had satisfied their hatred by removing him and had carried out the previously frustrated wish by devouring him--identifying themselves with him by literally incorporating his body, their suppressed tender impulses began to assert themselves. The crime was in many respects a failure. But failure is more conducive to moral reaction than success, says Freud.

The suppressed tenderness emerged in the form of remorse, whose acute expression was in conscious guilt feeling.

The dead now became stronger than the living had been, even as we observe it today in the destinies of men. What the father's presence had formerly prevented they themselves now prohibited in the psychic situation of "substantial obedience" which we know so well from psychoanalysis. They undid their deed by declaring that the killing of the father substitute, the totem, was not allowed, and renounced the fruits of their deed by denying themselves the liberated women. Thus they created two fundamental taboos of totemism out of the sense of guilt of the son, and for this very reason these had to correspond with the two repressed wishes of the Oedipus complex. Whoever disobeyed became guilty of the two only crimes which troubled primitive society.¹

Here Freud quotes his principal authority among the outstanding anthropologists recognized at the time of his writing Totem and Taboo. W. Robertson Smith, in The Religion of the Semites, says, "Murder and incest, or offences of like kind against the sacred law of blood are in primitive society the only crimes of which the community as such takes cognizance."²

¹Basic Writings, p. 917; Totem, p. 143.

²Footnote, ibid. A recent edition of Smith's work is W. Robertson Smith, The Religion of the Semites (1889, 1894), Meridian Library, No. 4 (New York, Meridian Books, 1956), 507 pp. Freud refers to p. 419. Smith adds, we should note here: "The offenses of man against man are matters of private law, to be settled between the parties on the principle of retaliation or by the

Incest prohibition had another strong support, besides the desire to appease the dead father.

Sexual need does not unite men; it separates them. Though the brothers had joined forces in order to overcome the father, each was the other's rival among the women. Each one wanted to have them all to himself like the father, and in the fight of each against the other the new organization perished. For there was no longer any one stronger than all the rest who could have successfully assumed the role of the father. Thus there was nothing left for the brothers, if they wanted to live together, but to erect the incest prohibition--perhaps after many difficult experiences--through which they all equally renounced the women whom they desired, and on account of whom they had removed the father in the first place.¹

Thus exogamy and prohibition of murder, the determinants of morality, according to Freud, have their basis in racial guilt.

Freud accepts Robertson Smith's observation that the old totem feast returns in the original form of sacrifice.

The meaning of the rite is the same: sanctification through participation in the common meal. The sense of guilt, which can only be allayed through the solidarity of all the participants, has also been retained. In addition to this there is the tribal deity in whose supposed presence the sacrifice takes place, who takes part in the meal like a member of the tribe, and with whom identification is effected by the act of eating the sacrifice.²

The idea of God is primarily the father-image, according to Freud. Here it is interesting to notice that Freud's thought holds

payment of damages." However, murder and incest have a community and religious consequence. Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 419-420. Cf. more recent anthropological studies such as Malinowski's Sex and Repression in Savage Society, cited earlier; Ruth Benedict's Patterns of Culture (1934), (New York, Mentor Books, 1946); Margaret Mead's Coming of Age in Samoa (1928, London, Penguin, 1943); Growing Up in New Guinea (1930, Penguin, 1942); and Sex and Temperment: in Three Primitive Societies (1935, New York, Mentor, 1950).

¹Basic Writings, p. 917; Totem, p. 144.

²Basic Writings, p. 919; Totem, p. 147.

to a primal monotheism, with polytheism coming only with the growth of culture.¹ In his last book, Moses and Monotheism, Freud discusses the genesis of the Hebrew and Christian religions. He assumes after a statement once made, and possibly later effectively retracted, by E. Sellin,² that Hebrew faith developed out of the assassination in the wilderness of the great leader and father-image Moses.

It would be worth while to understand why the monotheistic idea should make such a deep impression on just the Jewish people, and why they adhered to it so tenaciously. I believe this question can be answered. The great deed and misdeed of primeval times, the murder of the Father, was brought home to the Jews, for fate decreed that they should repeat it on the person of Moses, an eminent father substitute. It was a case of acting instead of remembering, something which often happens during analytic work with neurotics. They responded to the doctrine of Moses--which should have been a stimulus to their memory--by denying their act, did not progress beyond the recognition of the great Father and barred the passage to the point where later on Paul started his continuation of primeval history. It can scarcely be chance that the violent death of another great man should become the starting point for the creation of a new religion by Paul. This was a man whom a small number of adherents in Judea believed to be the Son of God and the promised Messiah, and who later on took over some of the childhood history that had been attached to Moses We do not know if he was really the great man whom the Gospels depict or whether it was not rather the fact and the circumstances of his death that were the decisive factor in his achieving importance.³

The two religions are different in that the Jewish expression of monotheism amounts to a denial--a repression--of parricidal guilt, a self-justification, while the Christian faith looks back to the

¹Sigmund Freud, Moses and Monotheism, trans. by Katherine Jones (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1939), p. 134.

²Cf. Ernest Jones' account in Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, pp. 363-374.

³Freud, Moses and Monotheism, pp. 144-5.

death of "the Son of God" as the enduring sacrifice which appeased the Father by giving life for life. The Son bore the guilt of the race on the cross. Freud who himself suffered bravely as a Jew,¹ in the somewhat anti-semitic culture of Vienna and later in the encroaching anti-Jewish hysteria of Hitlerism, wrote, toward the end of his eighty-two years:

The poor Jewish people, who with its usual stiff-necked obduracy continue to deny the murder of their "father," has dearly expiated this in the course of centuries. Over and over again they heard the reproach; you killed our God. And this reproach is true, if rightly interpreted. It says, in reference to the history of religion; you won't admit that you murdered God (the archetype of God, the primeval Father and his reincarnations). Something should be added, namely: "It is true, we did the same thing, but we admitted it, and since then we have been purified."²

The Christianity which Freud describes is principally its expression in Roman Catholicism, as would be expected since he lived a member of the Jewish minority in a Roman Catholic country practically all of his life. The Christianity he observed seemed to re-introduce the "mother goddess" which the Hebrew religion had discarded.³ Also, it seemed to regard sexual desire as evil in

¹See, for instance, S. Freud, An Autobiographical Study, trans. James Strachey (London, Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-Analysis, 1935), p. 14, where Freud reminisces about his experience on entering the University of Vienna, made unpleasant "because I was a Jew."

²Freud, Moses and Monotheism, p. 145. Cf. also, at p. 215.

³Cf. C. G. Jung, Psychology and Religion, West and East (Bollingen Series XX), pp. 62-63.

Freud seems not to have seen the significance of the Virgin in the same way as Jung. He viewed the phenomenon of religious experience through his patriarchal lens. Jones says he was from his youth up "a natural atheist."--Jones' chapter on Religion in

itself, in insisting on the celibacy of the priesthood and in defining sin as originating in sexual lust. In his last writings Freud reaffirmed his convictions expounded a generation earlier in Toten and Taboo. Moses and Monotheism is an elaboration of the theories in the former work, especially as they relate to Judaism and Christianity. But his interpretation of Christianity is expressed succinctly in the following quotation from the earlier treatment.

In the Christian myth man's original sin is undoubtedly an offense against God the Father, and if Christ redeems mankind from the weight of original sin by sacrificing his own life, he forces us to the conclusion that this sin is murder. According to the law of retaliation which is deeply rooted in human feeling, a murder can be atoned only by the sacrifice of another life; the self-sacrifice points to blood-guilt.¹

Here Freud has a footnote which calls attention to a theory in the realm of psychic economics--further developed, notably in

Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, pp. 349-374, at p. 351. Cf. also, Ian Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, pp. 137-138, 157.

Cf. Otto Rank, The Trauma of Birth (New York, Robert Brunner, 1952), the chapter on "Religious Sublimation," especially pp. 121-123. When Rank wrote this book (Geburtstrauma, 1923) he was still within the good graces of Freud. The attitude toward the "mother goddess" (of whom the Virgin Mary is a symbol) is patriarchal; the father image for deity is prior--see Freud, Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego--1920, trans. by James Strachey (London, Boni & Liveright, n. d., also included in A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud, edited by John Rickman, previously cited, pp. 195-244). This work was written before Freud had completed his structural model, in The Ego and the Id (1923).

Cf. also, "A Religious Experience" (1928), Collected Papers, V, pp. 243-246; and Freud's preface to Theodor Reik's Das Ritual, "Psycho-Analysis and Religious Origins" (1919), trans. by James Strachey, Collected Papers, V, pp. 92-97.

¹Basic Writings, pp. 924-925; Toten, p. 154.

Mourning and Melancholia.¹ "The suicidal impulses of our neurotics regularly prove to be self-punishments for death wishes directed against others."² By reverse reasoning Freud follows the means of reconciliation to the crime which must ultimately demand such expiation.

The death of the Son implies the death of the Father by the hand of the Son.³ The initial, and later suppressed, role which Jesus played, then, was that of usurper.⁴ Only by elaboration is he placed in the role of savior. He is savior by virtue of being victim. Nevertheless, Jesus is given a dual role in the ordeal of the cross. He is both the hated father-image and the usurper-son giving himself up to the retributive wrath of the father. In this dual role in which he receives both the hostility and the narcissistic identification of the worshiper, even as the totem animal--the lamb (?), and the human sacrifices before him, he brings to a common focus the dual forces of existence: aggression and fear, murder and remorse, death and libidinous sympathy--life, hatred and love, sin and justification.

¹This paper has been cited before: Mourning and Melancholia (1917, in A General Selection, at pp. 152-153).

²Basic Writings, p. 925 n.; Totem, 154 n. After he introduced the hypothesis of a primitive death instinct, Freud regularly ascribed this phenomenon to the operation of this inner force. Mourning and Melancholia, like Totem and Taboo antedates his theory of an instinctual dualism.

³Basic Writings, ibid., Totem, ibid.

⁴Ibid., and Moses and Monotheism (1938), p. 140.

This paradoxical reenactment of parricide in the form of fratricide in the crucifixion is followed by the emergence of the suppressed impulses of tenderness. This accounts for the ambivalence.

The reconciliation with the father is the more thorough because simultaneously with this sacrifice there follows the complete renunciation of woman, for whose sake mankind rebelled against the father. But now also the psychological fatality of ambivalence demands its rights. In the same deed which offers the greatest possible expiation to the father, the son also attains the goal of his wishes against the father. He becomes a god himself beside or rather in place of his father. The religion of the son succeeds the religion of the father. As a sign of this substitution the old totem feast is revived again in the form of communion in which the band of brothers now eats the flesh and blood of the son and no longer that of the father, the sons thereby identifying themselves with him and becoming holy themselves. Thus through the ages we see the identity of the totem feast with the animal sacrifice, and the Christian eucharist, and in all these solemn occasions we recognize the after-effects of that crime which so oppressed men but of which they must have been so proud. At bottom, however, the Christian communion is a new setting aside of the father, a repetition of the crime that must be expiated. We see how well justified is Fraser's dictum that "the Christian communion has absorbed within itself a sacrament which is doubtless far older than Christianity."¹

If not compelling, Freud's account of Christian theology is at least impressive. Were it convincing to theologians they would

¹Basic Writings, p. 925; Totem, pp. 154-5. (Freud quotes from Sir James Fraser's The Golden Bough, third edition, Part V, London, 1912, Vol. 2, p. 51).

Cf. also Moses and Monotheism, pp. 214-215.

Cf. A. N. Prior, "Can Religion Be Discussed?" in Antony Flew and others, New Essays in Philosophical Theology (New York, London, Macmillan, 1955), pp. 1-11. "Rabbi" Duncan, a 19th century "Scottish Calvinist" who has been compared with Karl Barth, said that sin "designs deicide" and seeks "to slay Being at its roots". Says Prior, "A better description of parricide could hardly be found" (p. 7 n.).

immediately redefine, not only their conceptions of identification with the Son but also the Pauline idea of 'en Christo'. We shall not take time to elaborate the anthropological theories offered by Jung and Rank¹ and their implicit recognition of innate conscience, or capacity for guilt. We have elaborated Freud's theories not because they are true. In fact they can be questioned at many points and often refuted outright.² Highly speculative is his loose

¹For instance, in Jung's Psychology and Religion: West and East (Bollingen Series XX), Part Two; and Rank's earlier writings and his Psychology and the Soul, and Beyond Psychology.

²Notably by Bronislaw Malinowski, as we have noted.

Of course Freud's speculation tended to stimulate anthropological research. The late Geza Roheim (in Psychoanalysis and Anthropology, New York, International Universities Press, 1950, and other works) is outstanding as a research anthropologist who has tried to adhere to the Freudian theory of the universality of the Oedipus complex. In 1935 Suttie described his approach as "applying the Oedipus 'blinkers' to research." (Suttie, op. cit., p. 137).

Obviously, there can be more than one interpretation of puberty rites. Although Suttie's treatment at times seems to be a bit disjointed (partly because the volume is made up of perhaps somewhat hastily assembled papers, which were written over a period of thirteen years), he offers, nevertheless, alternative theories to balance what he calls "patriarchal" (Freudian, Oedipus-complex-universalistic) interpretations. For example, why cannot the so-called "horror of menstruation" apparent among men in some cultures, be explained not in terms of "castration fear" but in terms of "reaction formation" of basic envy (of women)? Even patterns which show no taboo on menstruation--as that of the Aranda tribe, which assert that men can bear children, that include ritual bleeding from a subincision of the penis, with women excluded from the ritual, are interpreted by Roheim as castration-anxiety, homo-sexual displacement of incestuous love for the mother. (Roheim, Australian Totemism). But J. C. Flugel's review of Roheim's later War Crime and the Covenant, Journal of Clinical Psychopathology, Monograph Series, No. 1 (Monticello, N. Y., Medical Journal Press, 1945), calls attention to Roheim's moving away from his former adherence to a phylogenetic bias (with Freud) and, specifically, to the

logic in tracing back from the idea of human sacrifice to a primal murder. Certainly capital punishment has often enough been given for lesser "crimes," to the disparagement of humanity, to be sure.

It is interesting to note that Freud actually believed his highly speculative theories, although he recognised them as speculation.¹ He saw in them symbolic truth beyond possible historic truth. Judged by his own logic--and theology proper--Freud's theory of racial guilt, incestual and parricidal, and his interpretation of ritual and sacrament within Christianity are a projection of his own repressed desire to kill and eat his own father and to avoid suffering by identifying with a brother-image victim of the father's retaliatory wrath.²

reviewer's opinion that Ian Suttie himself "holding as he does that the social impulses are in some way derived from or connected with dependence on the mother, seems to stand very near to Reheim. In Suttie's works, as in this recent book of Reheim's, the mother assumes a relatively much greater importance than she does in most of Freud's work."--International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXVII, 1946, pp. 159-161.

Another "freudian" anthropologist is Abram Kardiner. Cf. The Psychological Frontiers of Society (New York, Columbia University Press, 1945, International Universities Press, 1950).

¹Cf. Last paragraph of note, Basic Writings, p. 916; Toten, p. 142.

²This statement may seem almost presumptuously bold. But it represents almost countless appraisals by critics, along with the so obvious inference from Freud's own "hermeneutics." One of the many biographies which his followers do not seem to appreciate is Helen Walker Puner's Freud: His Life and His Mind- "A Biography" (London, Grey Walls Press, 1949). Cf. Jones' criticisms of this book, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, I and II, passim; e. g., I, pp. 8 n., 25 n.; II, p. 386). Mrs. Puner goes so far as to suggest that Freud's preoccupation with Moses, who was "really a gentile," suggests that subconsciously Freud fancied himself "a gentile prince," so great was his resentment at being of a minority community.--Puner, op. cit.,

Sin and justification in the more explicit "theology" of Freud may be described as follows: Guilt is basically Oedipal,

pp. 186-187; cf. also, pp. 118-120. Even Joseph Jastrow halts at the work of one he regards "a more extreme, a less restrained, Freudian than a more responsible representative of the movement," Charles E. Maylan's The Tragic Complexes of Freud--Jastrow, op. cit., pp. 220 ff. (our quotation: p. 222 n.).

A recent, rather devastating criticism of Freud is by Erich Fromm in Sigmund Freud's Mission: "An Analysis of His Personality and Influence," World Perspectives, Vol. 21, (New York Harper, 1959). This psychoanalyst, former Freudian, says that Freudians themselves repressed their own ambition to conquer the world with a messianic ideal of salvation, "and thus were caught in ambiguities and dishonesties, which are bound to follow from such repression" (p. 109). They assumed an "authoritarian," "fanatical," posture with their limited scientific data (limited in validity to but a certain section of middle-class society, p. 110). Fromm regards the Freudians as generally blind to what he calls the "social unconscious," while Marxists have been blind to individual motivations (p. 111).

Nevertheless, we have seen how Totem, Moses, and other writings including Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, reflect an awareness of a social "memory." Fromm goes on to say that "psychoanalysis became a substitute satisfaction for a deep human yearning, that of finding a meaning to life, of being in genuine touch with reality. It became for many (especially in urban upper and middle classes) a surrogate for religion! (pp. 111-112). By now western thought is impregnated with Freud's discoveries. Indeed the Freudian movement has been a part of the liberating movement within our culture; it has thirst for truth (p. 115). Freud himself was limited by his own peculiarities of temperament. Fromm sees Freud's preoccupation with the so-called Oedipal formula even for female psychology as due in part to his native lack of understanding of women. This "puritan type" man regarded as a scientific study of women what actually was but his own "naive rationalizations of male prejudices" (p. 31). Freud lacked any genuine appreciation for the meaning of love for one's neighbor; viz., his argument in Civilization and Its Discontents is that it is against reason to love one's neighbor as one's self. Fromm notes also that he had an egocentric preoccupation with his own death (citing, for instance, Jones' biography of Freud, I, pp. 190-192).--Fromm, Sigmund Freud's Mission, p. 37.

Alluding again to our statement in the text above, we sense in Freud's own writings that he would be the last to deny his own

both for mankind and for the individual. Guilt feelings are already in the individual psyche at birth,¹ although they become acutely activated during his own encounter with forbidden desire and hatred for authority. Society as well as the individual tries by ritual to win freedom from the fear in guilt. In their compulsive religious practices they both reenact their sins and achieve a kind of temporary feeling of atonement. Justification comes by "keeping the feast," whether in the observance of the communal sacrament or in private phantasy.

In the individual, atonement with the parental images is effected by psychic incorporation, or introjection. The introjected disapproving, threatening images form the nucleus for the I which transcends, often uncontrollably, the I which is supposed to be in rational control. The introjected norms of society are the inner moral law, the conscience. Much of any individual's behavior can be described as his attempt to satisfy his inner, introjected, critic.

Although we do not take as scientific truth Freud's speculations about the nature of guilt and its universality, we do see

Oedipus complex. But our question would be: Did he go deep enough to find that trauma or "repressed" complex against which his "Oedipus guilt" protected his ego?

¹This is an unavoidable inference from Freud's Toten, Moses, and similar writings. We do not seem to be able to separate their theses from the more "clinical writings," since he tended to carry over his doctrines from one context into another; i. e., psychoanalysis itself became for him a method of "research" as well as a technique of therapy. Cf., infra, when we discuss his first criticism of Otto Rank's theory of Geburtstrauma.

in them the extensive implications of his system, the range possible for his own "gnosiphilia." They tell in grandiose chords his saga of human and racial psychogenesis.

Conscious guilt may become repressed, unconscious, after the ego has given up the attempt to make restitution. Being the seat of reason, the ego may be forced to recognize under the law of the reality principle, that any further quest for restitution and justification is futile. Yet psychic economics will provide some expression for the irrational, unconscious guilt, even if it is simply in the form of periodic acute attacks of anxiety, or, worse, a sudden explosive, perhaps destructive bursting forth of the damned up energy. Mechanisms of displacement, sublimation, and projection may be used for the control of repressed guilt and its frequent companion hostility. We have seen how Freud utilized these concepts of mental mechanisms in explaining the origin of religion and culture. Compulsion neurosis is a way of controlling the tension between inner drives and outside "reality." By compulsive, substitutive behavior the individual and the society are held together, by corporate expression in alternation, both of the sin and of the "justification," both the offense--hostility--and the "resolution" of guilt-feelings.

Despite the restrictive frame of reference in which we find Freud's doctrine of sin and guilt, we see a perceptive delineation of the components in guilt feeling. It is composed of (1) the fear of being destroyed, of self-loss, of mutilation, of retaliation by

the offended one--or by the powers that pursue his interests; (2) the fear of object loss; that is, the loss of the loved image of the person-object offended; and (3) compulsion, often oppressive and "sadistic," toward the ego: As "repetition compulsion" in re-enacting the offense, it may be interpreted as a form of hostility.¹

¹Indeed, even before he introduced the more controversial death instinct theory, Freud taught consistently that hatred precedes love for others, that love for others (regardless of how low or high one's view of "love" may be) comes only after his self-love. Introductory Lectures (1915-17, A General Introduction, pp. 211-217).

Because he came to view the "repetition-compulsion" as the behavior of the death instincts, Freud qualified a theory of Melanie Klein, Susan Isaacs, Ernest Jones, Theodore Reik, and Franz Alexander, that "privation, thwarted instinctual gratification results in a heightening of the sense of guilt or may do so," by saying that such a rule can apply only to the aggressive instincts! He came to view the origin of guilt feelings as restricted to the aggressive--death, destructiveness--instincts.--Civilization and Its Discontents, pp. 130 n.-131.

We quote, as representative, the following statements concerning guilt feelings: "First of all, when one asks how a sense of guilt arises in anyone, one is told something one cannot dispute: people feel guilty (pious people call it 'sinful') when they have done something they know to be 'bad'. But one sees how little this answer tells one

"What is bad is, therefore, to begin with, whatever causes one to be threatened with a loss of love; because of the dread of this loss, one has already committed the bad deed or only intends to do so; in either case the danger begins only when the authority has found it out, and the latter would behave in the same way in both cases." This is the state of mind which we call a "bad conscience." --ibid., pp. 106-107.

Later there is a passage which also suggests--though in a rather negative and perhaps depressing way--the psychological perceptiveness of the Sermon on the Mount. "The more righteous a man is the stricter and more suspicious will his conscience be, so that ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried holiness farthest who reproach themselves with the deepest sinfulness. This

Guilt, even for Freud, presupposes love, although it is eros, libidinous object-cathexis. Guilt feelings acknowledge the claims of a relationship which has been violated. Guilt feeling is a confluence of other feelings or emotions: specifically, love, fear, and possibly hatred. If Suttie and others are right in deriving hatred from fear or the loss of love the simple definition of guilt as "fear of the consequences" may not be far from being the correct formulation.¹

means that virtue forfeits some of her promised reward; the submissive and abstemious ego does not enjoy the trust and confidence of its mentor, and, as it seems, strives in vain to earn it A relatively strict and vigilant conscience is the very sign of a virtuous man, and though saints may proclaim themselves sinners, they are not so wrong, in view of the temptations of instinctual gratifications to which they are peculiarly liable--since temptations do but increase under constant privation."--p. 109.

"Renunciation of gratification does not suffice here, for the wish persists and is not capable of being hidden from the super-ego Feelings of guilt will be experienced, and this is a great disadvantage economically of the erection of the super-ego, or, as one may say, of the formation of conscience. Renunciation no longer has a completely absolving effect; virtuous restraint is no longer rewarded by the assurance of love; a threatened external unhappiness--loss of love and punishment meted out by external authority--has been exchanged for a lasting inner unhappiness, the tension of a sense of guilt."--p. 112.

"In the beginning conscience (more correctly, the anxiety which later became conscience) was the cause of instinctual renunciation, but later this relation is reversed. Every renunciation then becomes a dynamic fount of conscience; every fresh abandonment of gratification increases its severity and intolerance."--pp. 113-114.

Melanie Klein, of course, agrees with the theory that hate precedes love.--E. G., The Psycho-Analysis of Children, p. 193.

¹Cf. infra, especially as we review Karen Horney's views, and the conception of guilt in Otto Rank's thinking, a conception which is correlative with his theory of anxiety.

"The consequences" are, prototypically, the loss of the love on which one depends for his life--or for what he deems his life.

Authentic Guilt Feelings, Pseudo-Guilt,
and Pathological Guilt

Leaving the Freudian frame of reference, we may welcome the comparatively simple de facto definitions of guilt provided by Harry Stack Sullivan, for instance. First, he takes care to distinguish guilt from what he calls "sublimational or rationalistic guilt," which he regards merely as a defense against some other distress. To Sullivan genuine guilt feeling is, by definition, a gnawing, sleep-disturbing kind of awareness of having committed an offense against one's own "personality organization." Genuine guilt feeling is awareness of an actual "crime in an interpersonal sense," an injury felt by the self-dynamism. The waking, conscious, active person is the sum of all his interpersonal relationships. Life consists of relationships. We may see a resemblance here to the thought of Martin Buber, in I and Thou.¹ Guilt is the awareness that one has actually done something or failed to do something and thus threatened the security of these relationships in their external and internalized form. Thus described, guilt must be dealt with

¹Cf. "In the beginning is relation," says Dr. Buber.--Martin Buber, I and Thou, trans. Ronald Gregor Smith (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark, 1937), p. 18.

realistically in terms of the actual offense. Genuine therapy cannot gloss over its importance.¹

Freudians too have recognised a pseudo-guilt from which they distinguish a more authentic guilt. Guilt, focused compulsively or obsessively upon trivial matters, is a symptom of a deeper distress.²

It is pseudo- or "sublimational" and "rationalistic" guilt. Hortatory ethics and religion, programs of careful indoctrination, political, confessional, social, and cultural, often evoke, enlist and exploit it. It is used in erecting an elaborate, often deceptive, superstructure which serves functionally as an easily available externalistic "conscience" for the individual and for the group. If a certain "authority" decrees a course of action as right, it is

¹Harry Stack Sullivan, Clinical Studies in Psychiatry, pp. 112-115. Cf. Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 257.

²Freud speaks of the ego's taking flight into neurosis, being on good terms with the neurosis, being protected from a worse ill by a neurosis. Hence, it would follow that neurotic guilt--i. e., "guilt" as in compulsion-neurosis--would serve the ego as a defense against some worse ill. However, Freud came to view guilt--as self-condemnation--as the behavior of the death instincts, which of course war against the life instincts. It is a bit difficult to correlate "guilt" as neurotic defense of the ego with guilt as evidence of continued self-destructiveness. Pertinent references include: Introductory Lectures, A General Introduction to Psycho-Analysis (New York, PermaBooks, 1953), pp. 390 ff.; Totem, pp. 67-69; "Obsessive Acts and Religious Practices" (1907), Collected Papers, II, pp. 25-35; and Inhibition, Symptoms and Anxiety (1925), trans. by Alix Strachey, International Psycho-Analytical Library, No. 28 (also, now, Standard Edition of the Complete Works of Sigmund Freud, XX, London, Hogarth and the Institute, 1949). Cf.: A. A. Brill, Freud's Contribution to Psychiatry (New York, Norton, 1944), pp. 140-184, 201 ff.; J. C. Flugel, Man, Morals and Society (London, Duckworth, 1945); Karl Menninger, Man Against Himself (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1938); Love Against Hate (same publisher, 1942).

ipso facto right. To do what is forbidden by the external authority is ipso facto wrong. Such a use of the human capacity for guilt feeling is degrading. It is guilty in itself of offending against what we have described as essential humanity.

Here the insight of Freud in relating compulsion neurosis and ritual seems to toll like an unrelenting bell. Generally, depth psychology also recognizes the inevitability of ritual and its healthful properties. Yet the inference is also clear that the human psyche can lose itself tragically in trivializing the capacity for guilt feeling, in dulling and warping a basic tool.

It seems that no depth psychologist who treats this phenomenon of guilt feeling and awareness deals simply as a therapist with it. In fact psychotherapy itself implies a certain faith and soteriological commitment, as we have noted.¹ Freud pressed his speculative inquiry all the way to a primal "theology" with an original racial guilt of incest and parricide. Sullivan speaks of "crime in an interpersonal sense," allowing for his concern with guilt a bracketed range, to be sure: The right is the harmony possible for this patient's interpersonal relationships and for his resultant "self-system."

Karen Horney and Erich Fromm are avowedly informed by a hopeful Weltanschauung.² They are by no means alone in such a

¹Supra, Introduction.

²See for example, "A Morality of Evolution," (Neurosis and Human Growth, pp. 13-16). Fromm's writings proclaim this Weltanschauung.

quasi-theology. Indeed, as we have said earlier, every theorist is implicitly a theologian, although he may disavow the designation.

According to Freudian therapists, a strong, healthy, waking self or ego is relatively free from guilt feelings. Yet they do not teach that these are to be eradicated once and for all even in the healthy-minded. Indeed, an apparent absence of the capacity for conscious guilt feeling is a fairly sure mark of immaturity.¹

Horney has been especially helpful in elucidating the nature of pathological guilt, at least in its more conscious and accessible manifestations. She sees the psyche as "personality structure." The actual self tries more or less futilely to divert "the urge to grow" from the distorting mold which society forces upon it, into its "natural" direction. She assumes that this potential real self is the right one for the individual. His fall into "sin" is his being squeezed into a societally-determined mold.² The tragedy is that he feels guilty for any resistance to that artificial selfhood and for any failure to satisfy its demands. Hence the conscience itself is distorted, wrong, in urgent need of salvation, of reconstruction. The most far-reaching offense of all is that committed

¹As we have noted earlier, the Freudian study of "character" is via the model of psychogenesis, or stages of libido-cathexis, developed by Karl Abraham and others. By "immaturity" we mean a character-type which is pre-Oedipal, or fixated before either the crisis or the resolution of the so-called Oedipus complex. With Klein and her collaborators, of course, this complex is established much earlier (although "the superego", the agency for "guilt" seems to be another "flower" but of the same name!); a child is capable of guilt feelings quite early comes to mind.

²Romans 12:2a (trans. by J. B. Phillips).

by society and especially by those who of necessity shape the lives of others, when they inculcate unrealistic, irresponsible norms or ideals. Yet the offense is committed uncsciously by action, attitude, and word. The most guilt-ridden person may in fact be the most sinned-against.

As Erikson, of the Freudian school, says, in his work on Luther:

The most deadly of all possible sins is the mutilation of a child's spirit; for such mutilation undercuts the life principle of trust, without which every human act, may it feel ever so good, and seem ever so right, is prone to perversion by destructive forms of conscientiousness.¹

Karen Horney agrees with Freud that guilt is produced by fear. But she disagrees with his elaborated theory and with his concept of a nuclear agency of guilt in the superego. She distinguishes, although none too clearly, between the dynamics of "normal moral strivings" and the "tyranny of the should."² Perhaps her best contribution to the subject is her keen description of this tyranny. She scores the Freudian theory for its adoption of the common view that the inner dictates are the inner construct of morality in general. Commands for moral perfection cannot be separated from those, just as insistent, that argue no moral aim, such as for example, unconscious arrogance's pressure that may say, "I should always get the better of others." "I should be able to paint without laborious training

¹Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther, p. 70.

²Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 73.

and working." "I should be able to get away with anything."¹ To disobey the shoulds is to feel guilt, as "fear of the consequences." Guilt is basically anxiety, for Horney. One's security is threatened, his over-all satisfactions are apt to be cut off. Is such security-defensiveness possibly a partial answer to our persistent question regarding the "Myself right or wrong" mentality?²

These coercive forces, the shoulds, whose real nature is never clearly discerned by the person who is enslaved by them, receive various patterns of obedience. Horney describes these according to the types of personality organization she has noted in her patients. They are: (1) the expansive types, who are bent on mastery at all costs; (2) the self-effacing types; (3) the resigned types, to whom the idea of freedom has special appeal, who rebel actively or passively against all demands upon them; and (4) the alternating types who vacillate between self-castigating goodness and a wild protest against any standards, constantly shuttling between "I should" and "No, I won't."³

Internal conflicts, derived formally from early environmental pressures may appear again as external social conflicts. The feeling

¹Ibid.; and pp. 64-85.

²A question which will be dealt with further in Chapter Nine, infra.

³Horney, ibid., pp. 76-78.

of guilt is but a symptom of a deeper emotion, the fear of rejection, of separation, of the return by one's own action or neglect to an intolerable basic anxiety due to the earliest trauma of separation and its many recurrences.

The Nature of Guilt, According to Ian Suttie and Others

Ian Suttie developed his theoretical psychology from his own keen observation and research but vis-a-vis the Freudian theories. Hence, as would be expected, he pursues Freud in the kind of speculation we have dealt with at length earlier in the present chapter. Religions may derive from Oedipal guilt and expiation, but primal matriarchal religions reflect Laisus and Cain-type guilt and appeasement by offering up innocent infant-Oedipus and Abel-sibling victims in trying to maintain or to regain security and love.¹

With the increasing recognition of the formative effect of mother-images, both good and bad, nowadays guilt feelings are described, not simply in terms of ambivalence toward the father figure, but also in terms of the fear of the "bad mother" and the loss of the "good mother." In the spirit of the critique offered by Suttie, depth psychology is rediscovering the matriarchal springs of culture. "Woman" is not, as for the early Freud, merely or predominantly a sexual object.²

¹Ian Suttie, Origins of Love and Hate, discussed supra, Chapter Four.

²Cf. John Klauber, "Review" of Paul Halmos, Solitude and Privacy: "A Study of Social Isolation, Its Causes and Therapy" (London, International Library of Sociology and Social Reconstruction,

Suttie's portrait of the infant in his dilemma during the crisis of psychic weaning suggests that guilt feelings occur in some such manner as this: "If I do not love her then she will increasingly refuse to let me share with him (the sibling) in her love and care." The child cannot endure such fear. Yet he finds it difficult to control his rageful way of bidding for her love, his Abel-murdering way of trying to get back into his mother's good graces. Rage is self-defeating. Every instance of its failure causes fresh regret. He blames himself for the loss of the mother's cherishing love, especially when this seems to occur directly as the result of his censured behavior.

The child is faced with the problem of learning the riddle of "psychic weaning." His problem is to understand and to adjust to the calamity which it seems to be. His sources are limited as he tries to work out a solution. Obviously he needs all the help his mother and the nurturing, loving environment can give him. "If only I had not done this or that then she would have taken me up and loved me. Something is wrong about me." How else can the

Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1952). Klauber pays tribute to Suttie.-- International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXIV, 1953, pp. 339-340. Cf. Freud's own correlation of "Mother" image with "Mother Earth" and "Death." This is done strikingly in "The Theme of the Three Caskets" (1913), Collected Papers, IV, pp. 244-256.

The constructive approach, which we have described, is illustrated in such works as these: John Bowlby, Child Care and the Growth of Love (based on his report to the World Health Organization on Maternal Care and Mental Health, 1951, London, Penguin Books, 1953); and Margaret A. Ribble, The Rights of Infants (New York, Columbia University Press, 1943). Cf. also, Rene A. Spitz, "The Psychogenic Diseases in Infancy,"--The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child (New York, International Universities Press, VI, 1951), pp. 255-275.

impoverished self of the infant account for his change of status with the mother?

Good and evil are learned in this crisis of psychic weaning. "Good and evil must be my good and evil." The infant lives in an undifferentiated world. Even the mother image is merged with the "mothering" image of the father and of other significant persons. "I and my mother are one." There is no I apart from her. This symbiotic union is broken, and society is born anew. The infant is forced to differentiate, to conceive of life in terms of "you and I." This is painful. The I retains mother images; indeed they are its portrait of itself. He experiences the mother increasingly not simply as the warm, nurturing, loving influences of his milieu, but as a complex image. The mother of reality is not simply love and adoration of him. She has other interests as well. He can either invest her with the predominantly good images he has of her as she was experienced before psychic weaning began, or he can invest her with the predominantly bad ones. Hence the primal conscience is shaped according to the infant's reflected pattern of what mother likes and what she does not like.

The more he thinks of his real mother as good, the more he will look for the evil--the cause of dissatisfaction--within. The more he thinks of his real mother--and mother surrogates--as bad and denying toward him, the more he will look for the good within himself, where he has retained the good mother image.¹

¹Admittedly our construction here is a "variation on a theme by Suttie." However it seems justified by the following references: Origins of Love and Hate, pp. 38-57; 61-67; 129-132; and passim; but especially at p. 43. Suttie differs with the Freudians in saying

Regardless of the explanation, evil, by definition, may be a force outside the self or a force inside. Although in everyone it is both "from the outside world" and "from within," there is considerable variety in emphasis. Its individual definition may well be one of the indices by which we distinguish temperament.¹

If the outside world seems so hostile that no effective good mother image is internalised, the individual so deprived even of minimal loving care may be doomed to a hate-ridden, enemy-collecting existence, with rage as his way of life, because hostility more than love has been the order of the day from his birth. In him guilt feeling will be almost entirely lacking because he has known so little love.² He has never achieved enough trustfulness to be able to experience the more complex emotion of guilt-feeling.

that love precedes hatred in the development of the child. The child needs to give (p. 53).

¹We are aware of the analogy here to C. G. Jung's psychology of types (Psychology of Types, trans. by H. Godwin Baynes, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1923). Although psychologists differ widely in their appraisal of this theory of Jung's, the terms: introvert, extravert, and "ambivert" are now a part of the language. The more introverted person, for instance, is likely to be one whose early experience of the outside world was such that he soon tended to look for the "good" within; he was thrown back upon himself. Cf. Freud's theories of narcissism: infra, Chapter Nine.

²Nowadays especially, this construction of the theories relative to love and guilt feeling represents something of a consensus except among the instinctual dualists. Yet, even among them the theory persists that the only antidote to hostility is love. Cf. Melanie Klein and Joan Riviere, Love, Hate and Reparation (London, Hogarth, 1937), and works cited earlier.

Cf. also the following succinct statement which offers a window through which we may appreciate Mrs. Klein's system: "Fantasy is the mental corollary to the instincts (Susan Isaacs). Like the instincts, fantasy operates from the onset The building up of a world of good and bad internal objects leads to internal persecution

Otto Rank's Understanding of Guilt

The prototypal event which sets the pattern of tension within the psyche is separation. All the schools of psychoanalysis seem to support this assertion. It is cardinal in the doctrines of Horney, Fromm, Sullivan, Suttie, and Otto Rank. Guilt feelings include the fear of another separation, from a loved object or constellation of objects--mother, father, and the objectified self. The fear of separation also includes the fear of pain and extinction (destruction). Melanie Klein's writings emphasize this aspect of the fear.¹

We have seen how basic is the concept of guilt in the thought of Freud, and of other depth psychologists. It is, if anything, even

as well as to internal riches. This influences ego development in general.

"The internalized objects felt by the young infant have a life of their own. Persecution, suspicion, trust, and confidence result from their interaction. All three regions of the mind, id, ego, superego, exert their influence on each other from the beginning of life."--"The Mutual Influences in the Development of Ego and Id--Discussions," abstracted by W. Hoffer (from The Psycho-analytic Study of the Child, VII) in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXIV, p. 278.

Cf. also, what seems a most constructive discussion from a contemporary Freudian viewpoint: Michael Balint, "On Love and Hate," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXIII, 1952, pp. 355-362. Balint, who reflects also somewhat the influence of Sander Ferenczi, suggests a reexamination of the status of the death instinct. Love is primary. "Hate is a measure of inequality between object and subject; the smaller the inequality, the more mature the subject, the less is his need for hate."--at p. 359.

¹Melanie Klein, The Psycho-Analysis of Children, pp. 184-185; Developments in Psycho-Analysis, pp. 276, 278-9; and elsewhere.

more developed and instrumentalistic in the rather involved and ponderously articulated thought of Freud's brilliant erstwhile disciple Otto Rank.

Freud took a special interest in young Otto Rank, while he was attending a technical school in Vienna. Freud saw marked perceptiveness in him and helped see him through the University, where he specialized in social studies and philosophy. He was considered the intellectual giant of the Freudian "twelve" after the defection of Jung. He became a lay analyst and contributed journalistically to the cause, especially of relating psychoanalysis to cultural and anthropological studies. He was the editor of Imago, the journal devoted to such interests, and was on the editorial staff of the International Journal of Psycho-Analysis.

However, by 1925, Rank, like predecessors: Adler, Jung, and Wilhelm Stekel,¹ was the center of controversy within the inner circle of Freud's apostles. The final break with the master himself was delayed until early in 1926. Arch-Freudians like Ernest Jones have analysed Rank's growing independence in theory and his "defection" in terms of his own neurotic Oedipal striving with the father figure. Freud had taken a paternal interest in him, and Rank had been among Freud's closest associates for over a decade. But many less committed

¹Wilhelm Stekel has a rather "bad press" among some Freudians like Ernest Jones (in contrast to his "good press" among others, like A. A. Brill). The reader does take comfort that there are other representatives of depth psychology besides Stekel, when he reads his autobiography, for instance. The Autobiography of Wilhelm Stekel, ed. by Emil A. Guthell (New York, Liveright, 1950).

observers outside the circle of Freudian solidarity are impressed with the content of Rank's thinking which excited the controversy and which continued to grow and stimulate discussion. His so-called will-therapy developed into something of a school on its own. He was striking out in directions, which now, among the ego-psychologists, for instance, can be regarded as "orthodox."

We can begin to appreciate the emotional as well as intellectual dimensions of the separation of Rank from Freud in the correspondence quoted by Ernest Jones in his biography of Freud. On February 15, 1924, Freud addressed a circular letter to all members of the central committee of the International Psychoanalytical Association, to try to quell the Berlin-centered (Karl Abraham, especially) dispute over Rank--and at that time, over Sandor Ferencsi, also. Ferenczi was a pioneer psychoanalyst in Budapest. He has had a great influence on various thinkers in the field, including Ian Suttie, Freud himself, Jones, Klein, Horney, and Rank.¹ Freud wrote concerning a book that the two men had written together and the most recent book by Rank himself, in which he had suggested the experience of birth as the basic psychic trauma. Here is a significant paragraph from the letter.

Now for the incomparably more interesting book, the Birth Trauma by Rank. I do not hesitate to say that I regard this work as highly significant, that it has given me much to

¹Sandor Ferenczi, Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, trans. Ernest Jones (Boston, Richard G. Badger, 1916), and Further Contributions to the Theory and Technique of Psycho-Analysis, compiled by John Rickman, trans. Jane Isabel Suttie and others (London, Hogarth, 1926).

think about, and that I have not yet come to a definitive judgment about it. We have long been familiar with womb phantasies and recognised their importance, but in the prominence Rank has given them they achieve a far higher significance and reveal in a flash the biological background of the Oedipus complex. To repeat it in my own language: some instinct must be associated with the birth trauma which aims at restoring the previous existence. One might call it the instinctual need for happiness (Gluckstrieb), understanding there that the concept "happiness" is mostly used in an erotic sense. Rank now goes further than psychopathology and shows how men alter the outer world in the service of this instinct, whereas neurotics save themselves this trouble by taking the short cut of phantasying a return to the womb. If one adds to Rank's conception the one of Ferenczi, that a man can be represented by his genital, then for the first time we get a derivation of the normal sexual instinct which falls into place with our conception of the world.¹

Freud goes on to discuss Rank's divergence from his own views.

But he chooses to keep the matter open for discussion.

I derived the barrier against incest from the primordial history of the human family, and thus saw the actual father the real obstacle, which erects the barrier against incest anew He (Rank) refuses to consider the phylogenesis, and regards the anxiety opposing incest as simply a repetition of the anxiety at birth, so that the neurotic repression is inherently checked by the nature of the birth process. The birth anxiety is, it is true, transferred to the father, but according to Rank he is only a pretext for it.²

In this statement we can see the line of Freud's increasing disagreement with his disciple, later elaborated in Hemmung, Symptom und Angst.³ We see also an example of the way Freud linked his speculations concerning racial guilt with his theories of pathogenesis.

¹Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vol. III, pp. 59-63, at pp. 61-62.

²Ibid.

³Translated: Inhibition, Symptom and Anxiety (also, there is an edition entitled The Problem of Anxiety), which has been cited earlier.

In August, 1924, Freud wrote to Ferencsi, during one of the crises in his relationship with Rank:

I simply don't understand Rank any longer. Can you do anything to enlighten me? For fifteen years I have known him as someone who was affectionately concerned, always ready to do any service, discreet, completely trustworthy, just as ready to receive new suggestions as he was uninhibited in the working out of his own ideas, who always took my side in a quarrel and, as I believed, without any inner compulsion to make him do so Which is the real Rank, the one I have known for fifteen years or the one Jones has been showing me in the past few years?¹

Rank moved to Paris, later to the United States, where he became a leader in his own right of a "school" of psychoanalysis. Careful, appreciative evaluations of his thought and influence have been made by Ruth Munroe,² who is also appreciative in her treatment of Freud and other theorists, and by Ira Progoff, among others.³

Progoff considers Rank's Psychology and the Soul, written in 1929 and 1930, an important statement of a system of thought which interprets both man and culture within a single historical framework.⁴ The book presents a problem to the reader because of its form and style. But the insight may be profound. Rank goes "beyond psychology" in the sense of moving beyond what he considers the "futile attempt" to rationalize what is essentially irrational. It

¹"Jones" is Ernest Jones. Jones, Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, p. 69.

²Ruth Munroe, Schools of Psychoanalytic Thought, 1955, pp. 575-600.

³Ira Progoff, The Death and Rebirth of Psychology, 1956, pp. 168-253.

⁴Ibid., p. 208.

is beyond the grasp of mere reason.¹ Mental processes are mysterious, beyond our probing. Freud violates the mystery, the essentially "spiritual." However Rank does not treat the terms irrational and spiritual as synonyms. The "spiritual" should have primacy over the "irrational" and the "rational." Its manifestation in the psyche is in the "will to believe." Rank at times speaks of this "third principle" as the "will to immortality." It moves beyond individuality. The artist-life is the proper condition of health for the individual as for the society. By this Rank seems to argue for recognition and affirmation not only of one's human nature with all its mystery and potential but also of the shared humanity, that of the community, or potential community, of mankind.² Alfred Adler, on a considerably less profound level of insight, argued for community feeling.³

Rank has had considerable influence on social psychology and social work because of his emphasis on the sociological dimension and his insistence on love--agape is the term he uses!--as the therapeutic agent in psychotherapy as in social melioration.⁴ In this he was in agreement, quite independently, with the British psychiatrist Ian Suttie, as with his own former associate Ferencsi. However Rank

¹Since it cannot be gathered into "rational"--"reasonable"--form.

²Cf. Rank, Psychology and the Soul, pp. 91-93; Beyond Psychology, pp. 17-61; 271-291; Proffoff, op. cit., p. 229.

³Infra, Chapter Six. We are reminded also of systems of ethical mysticism such as that of Albert Schweitzer.

⁴For instance, in Beyond Psychology, p. 175.

developed the concept further, using insights not only from fellow-therapists but from philosophers like Baber¹ and the theologian Anders Nygren.²

Like Adler, Rank views the individual in a way often described as "holistic."³ He treats the psyche as a unit, even though he seeks to avoid oversimplification of that unity. This is in contrast to Freud's multiple-foci conception of the self, which eventually could posit the splitting of the ego. It contrasts also with the multifarious psyche depicted by Klein and Fairbairn, although their emphasis on the splitting of images may not be incompatible with an overview such as Rank's.⁴ Rank's presupposition also may be contrasted

¹Rank says, for instance, "The ego needs the Thou in order to become a self."--ibid., p. 290.

²Ibid., p. 175. Among other Christian scholars quoted is T. W. Manson.

³The term derives from Jan Christian Smuts' Holism and Evolution (New York, Macmillan, 1926).

⁴This movement in psychoanalysis has come into its own, so to speak, since the "Rankian schism." His criticism would perhaps be that Klein and Fairbairn too have tried to rationalize the irrational in terms of objects. "The whole question of psychological therapy resolves itself, in the last analysis, to the philosophical problem of a deterministic versus a vitalistic point of view."--Beyond Psychology, p. 47. He regards Freudian therapy as deterministic.

However Rank traces the neurosis back to the trauma of birth, even as Klein has tracked the so-called Oedipus-produced superego back to the first few months of infancy. Fairbairn sees little edification in this psychogenetic schema, preferring to see the stages of ego development in terms of the object-relationships without depending on the libido and instinct theories (e. g., instead of "oral" phase, why not "breast phase"? Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, p. 155 f.).

Contrasts are suggested by the interpretation of dreams with reference to objects and the "irrational." The Freudians, in contrast

with Sullivan's view of the "self system" or "self dynamism" with its "waking Self" determined by social interaction. Rank, like Jung, assumes a mysterious depth for the self of every person, even though circumstances may prevent a true development of the potential for individuated selfhood.¹ The important aspect is the volitional. Rank thinks of the ego as the will.

The theories of Rank are of interest to us in this stage of our inquiry not primarily because of his relationship with Freud nor because of his holistic presuppositions, although these facts are relevant. But he is introduced because of his strong emphasis on what he termed ethical guilt.²

to Rank and Jung, leave little room for the so-called "spiritual." This contrast extends perhaps to include Klein and Fairbairn on the "Freudian" side. For instance, Fairbairn says that Melanie Klein's influence helped him to come to regard dreams and waking phantasies as endopsychic situations dramatised--involving both relationships between ego-structures and internalised objects, and interrelationships between ego-structures themselves. His theory developed to include the ideas of splitting objects.--Fairbairn, op. cit., p. 170 and following.

Rank's holism, despite his leaving the ceiling open to the sky, so to speak (i. e., the "spiritual") is seen in his concept of will. He defines it as "an autonomous organizing force in the individual which does not represent any particular biological impulse or social drive but constitutes the creative expression of the total personality and distinguishes one individual from another."--Rank, Beyond Psychology, p. 50.

¹Ibid., p. 289. There are many passages which make the point.

²Otto Rank, Truth and Reality, edition in Will Therapy and Truth and Reality, trans. Jessie Taft (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1945, pp. 209-305) - "The Birth of Individuality"; "Creation and Guilt"; "Happiness and Redemption," edition cited, pp. 209-220; 292-305. Will Therapy, "Separation and Guilt," edition cited, pp. 71-85. Munroe's discussion is especially helpful. She relies on a disciple of Rank, F. B. Karpf's The Psychology and Psychotherapy of

Rank believed that the telos for the human being is to become individuated. The trauma is separation: at birth and later at weaning and at other stages of development, Geburtstrauma is the basic injury, the matrix of anxiety. But there is within the very nature of the separated one a capacity and potential for relative independence and self-reliance. From his very formation as an embryo he has been destined not only to separation but to individuation. Individuation and independence are as much a part of the logic of human existence as are union and dependence.

The tragedy is that narrow is the way and few there are who find it. Many go so far, only to come pathetically short of the possibility implicit in their nature. Those who miss the way range from "average men" to neurotic, psychotic, and psychopathic.

The elect, as it were, are those who are creative in their response to the challenge of individuation in the midst of separation

Otto Rank (New York, Philosophical Library, 1953), clinical writings by Rankian therapists, including works of the late Jesse Taft (The Dynamics of Therapy in a Controlled Relationship, Macmillan, 1933, and Family Casework and Counseling: A Functional Approach, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1948).--Murroe, op. cit., pp. 575-598.

Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread (1844), trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton, N. J., Princeton U. Press, 1957), especially re: "the dread in which the individual posits sin by the qualitative leap; and the dread which entered in along with sin, and which for this reason comes also into the world quantitatively every time an individual posits sin" (p. 49); "The relation of freedom to guilt is dread [anxiety!] because freedom and guilt are still a possibility" (p. 97, cf. infra., Chapter Seven). Kierkegaard's treatment of anxiety and guilt is both "psychological" and "ethical." Here he stresses his psychological interest (at p. 105). One is (becomes?) what he does. There is dread in the doing.

anxiety. Rank calls these the "artist" type.¹ The "neurotic" and the "artist" are alike in one respect. Both recognize the awful fact of separation from the womb and from "the herd." The "average man" somehow fails ever to assimilate this fact. He rejects the truth in the fact of separation and the implicit possibility of individuation. He is unable to stand "ethical guilt." Thus Rank explains both mob psychology and slavish conformity. The "average man" escapes the terrifying awareness of his separateness by incorporating unreflectively the views of his society, regardless of what they happen to be. He cannot bear the thought of being in any sense cut off from the fictional unity which he supposes in society. Here we are reminded of recent tracts for the times, notably David Riesman's study of the individual and the crowd.²

Rank's theory developed in much greater depth than his influential technique in therapy, which he called Will therapy.³ His emphasis on the will, on the conscious mind, and on a much shorter term for analysis than is common among Freudians, is

¹Rank's intellectual history is marked by a preoccupation with the "artist." His first book was Der Künstler (1907). He prefers this designation for the most healthy humanity because it conveys (or can convey) "a sense of creative integration as the highest goal of man" (Munroe, op. cit., p. 586).

²For example, the popular volume: The Lonely Crowd (by David Riesman and others, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1950). We shall not list the growing number of books which have been much in vogue in the United States.

³This seems to be Ira Progoff's opinion, which we tend to share, from our limited understanding of the mind of Otto Rank. Progoff, op. cit.

reminiscent of Adler's therapy, which also was appreciated by many social workers, who must bring "therapy" to those who cannot afford long courses of treatment.¹

Psychogenetically the will emerges as counter-will. Here there seems to be a correlation with the infancy crisis posited by some contemporary Freudian ego-psychologists.² Counter-will emerges with the small child's discovery of his power to say No and to frustrate the desires of his environment, his society, which, to Rank, is the will against which he develops his own.

As the infant grows he gradually abandons his efforts to recreate through phantasy his recent intra-uterine state. He gradually comes to experience himself as a totality. This self as the I of self-recognition is what Rank seems to mean by the Will. As it emerges it is largely negative, behaving vis-a-vis the will it experiences from the outside.

Not only can he say No to others, he can refuse his own impulses. Hence we may understand the frequent "cutting off of the nose to spite the face" behavior of small children. What is happening is the fascinating development of individuality. Thrown more and more on his own by the fact of increasing relative separation, the small child begins to rise to the occasion, to assume responsibility for his own actions. He is becoming, however gradually, a person in his own right in the world of personality where he finds

¹See Manroe, op. cit., pp. 588-594.

²Supra, Chapter Four.

himself. Rankian therapy values the counter-will for individuation above the goals of "personal happiness" and "social adjustment" when these are based on the illusion of the "average man" pattern. Therapy has a higher calling than to turn out "average men." Service to the highest human value will be in a kind of psychic obstetrics: bringing into the world of reality, creative individuals who are willing to take the risks of anxiety and guilt.

What is the role of guilt feeling in the process of individuation? Rank says that any assertion of counter-will necessarily arouses feelings of anxiety, specifically guilt. Guilt feeling is essentially fear of separation. Guilt feeling is at once inevitable and healthy if the person is to fulfill his destiny and become individuated.

Like Harry Stack Sullivan, Rank takes pains to distinguish what he means by guilt feeling from other phenomena that bear the same label. The necessary guilt incurred by allowing the counter-will to develop is to be distinguished always from that feeling which one has when he has committed an act considered wrong by society's code or even by his own. This latter guilt, which characteristically is in the service of conformity, is moralistic guilt. It also is inevitable because of the fact of relationship, of being in society, whose collective will is represented in both code and conscience.

But ethical guilt is a much deeper problem. It accompanies any expression of one's own will as it distinguishes itself from

that of the environment or of any important segment thereof. But the constrictor can reverse itself; ethical guilt is felt also with any compliance with the outside will which abrogates the counter-will, the will of the developing individual, which need not remain negative.

Does Rank give us another insight into the question about that persistent attitude which can be expressed as "Myself right or wrong--Myself always right"? Possibly. True enough, such an inner assertion can be experienced in a way which suggests that to deny it would be to surrender to guilt. One can feel guilt even when he does what he knows is right in terms of what society wills or desires. Is this because his guilt dynamism is more oppressive when he goes against his own "counter-"will than when he goes against society?

Guilt feeling is unavoidable if one is either self-assertive or self-denying. It represents the tension between separation and union. Union was and is "good." But separateness has its blessing also and its opportunities. To offend either principle is to be the victim of the appropriate anxiety: separation from others or separation from one's own developing individuality. That individuality soon comes to represent quite an emotional investment. It has come to stand for both security and meaning to one's existence.

The injunction of a responsible ethics, as well as that of Rankian therapy, may be: Take courage and live with "ethical guilt." We recall Martin Luther's insightful dictum: "Therefore sin bravely." Significantly, to Rank, the greater sin is to refuse to risk the

anxiety of separation, the inevitable guilt one feels if he tries to become what he by nature is destined to be--an individual. Rank's soteriological concern is to save both the neurotic and the average man from the fate which G. B. Shaw has described as simply being lived by one's life. Salvation is unto life: life as lived by the individual in responsible relationship with others. Is this not at least analogous to the "life and life more abundantly" which is the reason which the Fourth Gospel gives for the soteriological coming of the Christ?¹

Like Horney, though philosophically more profound, Rank is reminiscent of the apostle Paul, in the twelfth chapter of Romans, where he enjoins men not to be conformed to this world--not to be squeezed into its own mold, as the Phillips translation has it.² Yet Paul and indeed Christianity say more: "But be transformed by the renewal of your mind that you may prove what is the will of God, what is good and acceptable and perfect." Another will is introduced!

Toward Integration of Depth Psychology's
Understanding of Guilt

Contrary to the opinion of some commentators, including theologians,³ depth psychologists, generally, do regard guilt feelings

¹Cf. John 10:10. ²Romans 12:2a (Phillips trans.).

³For example, Cherbennier, who calls Karl Menninger an exception to the rule in contending that some guilt feeling cannot realistically be eradicated. Supra, Chapter Two (under "Sin as Idolatry").

seriously as inevitable for anyone who must struggle with his existence as an individual. However the voice of psychoanalysis is by no means univocal and clear on the subject, as we have seen. Yet the tendency nowadays is to discuss the matter with greater care for constructive distinctions: between pathological guilt, pseudo-guilt, and "authentic" (Sullivan) or "ethical"(Rank) guilt. Even orthodox Freudians like Edmund Bergler, find themselves positing two consciences: the oppressive superego, and the "conscience."¹ Ernest Jones insists that good Freudian theory never dropped the concept of Ego-ideal, distinguished from the negative superego dynamism which Freud later introduced. Bergler treats the superego as the repressed conscience, the unconscious "devil" in everyone. The pre-Oedipal identifications with good objects form the healthy conscience.²

Again, we find in the writings of the Freudian ego-psychologists, the tendency to include insights that in former years, were developed as correctives at the price of schism.

Erik Erikson reiterates the wisdom of the "oldest Zen poem":
 "The conflict between right and wrong is the sickness of the mind."³

¹Edmund Bergler, The Superego: "Unconscious Conscience-- The Key to the Theory and Therapy of Neurosis."

²Either under the rubric of "ego-ideal" or, in the Kleinian frame of reference, under the rubric of "good objects."

³Erikson quotes from Seng-ts'an, Hsin-hsin, Ming. in Allen W. Watts, The Way of Zen (New York, Pantheon Books, 1957)--Young Man Luther, p. 263.

But the conflict rages in everyone. Hence the question is not whether conscience, but what kind. The child is bound to develop ideas of good and evil. The answer does not lie in attempts to avoid or deny a sense of badness in the child. "The denial of the unavoidable can only deepen a sense of secret, unmanageable evil. The answer lies in man's capacity to create order which will give his children a disciplined as well as a tolerant conscience, and a world within which to act affirmatively."¹

The identity crisis involves not only love, fear, and their combining in guilt, but also compulsive hostility which strikes out often offensively, as in familiar episodes of juvenile violence, and less tragic youthful aggression against both ideological and human targets. Erikson explains some of Luther's verbal excesses by this general observation. He calls it the necessity to repudiate.² It is a part of the individuation process.³

The need to repudiate is the reverse side of the need to devote oneself. The small child--like the adolescent--is looking for a way of devotion. His repudiating behavior is often but a part of this process of testing the possibilities for identification. In trying to resolve his "identity crisis," which continues often through the years of adolescence, the individual devotes himself,

¹Ibid.

²Supra, Chapter Five.

³Cr. both Jung and Rank relative to the process of individuation.

perhaps by fits and starts, to a variety of causes. He may change quickly from one loyalty to another, repudiating today what he would have given his life for yesterday. The need to repudiate may persist into the twenties and beyond. It manifests itself even when there may be no explicit ideological commitment or interest. This offers explanation for the sometimes puzzling phenomenon of young people offering devotion to individual leaders and teams, to activities and techniques that call for sacrifice and concentration, which may seem to the objective observer to be hardly worth such effort. At the same time the youth who is still struggling with his identity problem is likely to show "a sharp and intolerant readiness to discard and disavow people" including, at times himself. "This repudiation is often snobbish, fitful, perverted, or simply thoughtless."¹

Erikson illustrates the point with prominent examples like Augustine and Freud, who chose moratoria of the resolution of the crisis, who "do not necessarily know that they are marking time before they come to their crossroad, which they often do in the late twenties, belated just because they gave their all to the temporary subject of devotion." We recall that Freud was a laboratory physiologist, more or less deliberately putting off the completion of his medical training. "The crisis in such a young man's life may be

¹Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther, pp. 42-43.

reached exactly when he half-realises he is fatally overcommitted to what he is not."¹

In his attempt to achieve identity, the individual often settles for a time of diffusion of role, a diffusion of identity. During this period he may feel that he is committed to a cause which will catch his whole being up into its meaning and fulfillment. Luther's calm period, according to Erikson, was right after he went to the monastery. We are reminded of the guilt feeling which Rank says is inevitable in the process of individuation, as we read Erikson's description of Luther during this era of diffused identity.

Most of all, this kind of person must shy away from intimacy. Any physical closeness, with either sex, arouses at the same time both an impulse to merge with the other person and a fear of losing autonomy and individuation."²

Ideological leaders, who are likely to be among those whose identity crisis is prolonged, seem to be "subject to excessive fears which they can master only by reshaping the thoughts of their contemporaries; while those contemporaries are always glad to have their thoughts shaped by those who so desperately care to do so."³ Here the light of ego-psychology seems to turn upon that larger context of evil in society, the "Kingdom of Evil." Perhaps our readiest example is the Third Reich with its Adolf Hitler. Erikson

¹Ibid.

²Ibid., p. 101.

³Ibid., p. 110.

does not miss this one, even in his study of Luther, who was spiritual leader for the same ethnic community four centuries earlier.¹

According to Erikson, who offers impressive documentation for his thesis, Hitler was suffering from an unresolved identity crisis, in which the negative aspect of the devotion-repudiation dynamism was dominant, and tragically, due to the times and

¹Ibid., pp. 105-109. See Erik H. Erikson, "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth," Psychiatry, V., 1942, pp. 475-93, reprinted in Clyde Kluckhohn and Henry A. Murray, editors, Personality: In Nature, Society, and Culture (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, London, Jonathan Cape, 1949). Erikson says here that "Hitler's adolescent imagery attracts: first, chronic delinquent adolescents. Not too numerous, they are the Nazi sub-leaders. They will live and die for an order that justifies and glorifies their type. Second, a crowd of once good and friendly--in fact, too good and too friendly--Germans in whom no one suspected a poisonous complex of suppressed adolescent rebellion: Hitler 'freed' them. Third, a mass of neither good nor bad people who want bread and a spectacle. They had blindly believed in the German sergeant's obedient world. When that world was defeated, they found their revolutionary energy paralyzed and poisoned. They could not kill aristocrats. Hitler gave them the Jews instead. Fourth, a small but influential group whose burgher sense of values is offended by the spectacle of Nazism but who would not dare to raise their hand against a leader who resembles the pure knight, whom they wanted to be, way back, in--later betrayed--adolescent dreams.

"The leading group, however, in party and army is probably untouched by this imagery. They constitute a very small group of cynicists, Machiavellis German style, who use the ideological fool-heartedness of all the other groups and flatter themselves that they are using Hitler himself."--Kluckhohn and Murray, Personality, pp. 507-508.

See also Chapter IX, "The Legend of Hitler's Childhood," in Erikson's Childhood and Society, pp. 284-315.

Cf. Karl Heim's Sprunt Lectures (1935), The Church of Christ and The Problems of the Day (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1935), pp. 172; see especially chapters: (II) "The New 'German Faith'"; (III) "Luther and the Problems of Today"; and (V) "Christ, His Church and the World."--pp. 21-72; 97-124.

circumstances, was allowed to harness itself to a powerful potential, the German nation. Hitler's childhood reveries were dominated by the impulse to tear down and rebuild. From the age of fifteen to nineteen he was preoccupied specifically with the idea of tearing down certain buildings in his hometown of Linz and rebuilding them according to elaborate plans which he himself drew up. He was especially interested in destroying and rebuilding the opera house there. In fact, it has been discovered, says Erikson, that he had returned to this specific preoccupation shortly before his death. He was emotionally and psychologically back where he was at fifteen, drawing plans for a new opera house in Linz. Germany had come under the tyranny of a disturbed fifteen-year-old boy who was devoted to his own cause of rebuilding an opera house after he had destroyed it --after he had satisfied his urge to repudiate it. The fact is all the more painful when we realize that Hitler turned to matters political only after he had been refused admission to a school of architecture in Vienna.

If Otto Rank is right, guilt feeling is prominent; indeed it is the basic emotion in the person as he struggles for identity. Here we are cautiously aware that two different frames of reference are involved, the Freudian and the Rankian. But identity, complemented by crises of intimacy, generativity, and integrity, resembles what Rank calls the struggle toward individuation. The unresolved identity crisis involves a prolonged and painful failure to resolve guilt feelings.

The parental environment provides the first image for identification striving. Does devotion to the image entail guilt because of the offended ego, or that particular segment of ego which feels negated by any compliance with the parent-image? Repudiation results from the coup effected by this guilt. The anti-parent ego wins only partial control. The individual is both "the elder brother" and the prodigal. "The younger son" has asked for his portion of the inheritance. Guilt is felt because of the segment of ego which represents a libido-cathexis of the parent image. The "elder brother"--the "parents' own child"--is also offended by the repudiation of the image. The analogy is to the union-versus-individuation tension within the self, the Janus-faced guilt.

Generally, depth psychologists seem to agree that for man-in-society some guilt feeling is inevitable, and that regardless of whether it is to be regarded as good, bad, or indifferent in itself, it must be utilised therapeutically, even instrumentalistically, in the directions: (1) of integration within the individual and (2) of relationship--if only as "adjustment"--with the social milieu. Guilt is a form of fear or anxiety. It presupposes a prior relationship, hence, in some measure, love. Guilt feeling asserts for the subject that he is beholden to someone or to society, if not to God. The implications of Rank's theory, and also of Horney's, is that failure to become one's "individuated" or "real" self is a tragic wrong against whatever is ultimate in terms of human value.

It is against "God." Whether it is accountable or culpable depends on whether the individual has to some extent chosen against individuation and "reality."

Guilt Feelings, Complications, and Accountability

In inquiring; "What is the nature of guilt?" we have been sifting the various "answers" as to the nature and significance of guilt feeling. Theology's concern is with actual guilt or accountability regardless of what may be the inner conviction of the subject-self. However, as we concluded in an earlier chapter, our instrumentalistic concern with accountability, in the interest of soteriology, involves the analysis of the subjective, interior dimensions of guilt feeling, along with other dynamisms involved.

We have now to probe further into the emotions of guilt and shame, distinguishing them from each other as we can. Then we must search out in more detail the pervasive fear--or anxiety--and the implications of this fundamental dynamic. Such a study will bring us into the psychology of despair, a condition in which destructive emotions seem to have done their lethal work almost to the finish.

Meanwhile we keep in mind the problem of man as sinner in the larger context of evil and tragedy. From whence do offenses come? It is imperative that we see the individual's responsibility in terms of the social evils which can be cast out only "by much prayer and fasting" and by perceptive social action. The effectual, fervent prayer of the "righteous man" which avails much involves a

commitment to social action, to practical "social" work, even to political involvement both in legislation and in the enforcement of a critically Christian concern for justice and agape.¹

¹This perspective for our study is restated because of the somewhat valid criticism that along with an increased emphasis on pastoral psychology there may be a lessening of activist concern with matters social and political, in the Church. Furthermore, deterministic Freudianism may well be conducive to reactionary politics and even to quietism.

See the "debate": Robert E. Fitch (a professor of Christian Ethics), "To Pee the Foul Disease" arguing that the tendency of secularism within and outside the Church, including the influence of works like Fromm's The Art of Loving, is to apotheosize 'the ego,' to glorify self-love and self-centeredness, versus Earl A. Loomis (Director of Union Theological Seminary's program in psychiatry and Religion), "The 'Foul Disease' is No Respector of Persons: A Reply to Mr. Fitch," in Christianity and Crisis, XVIII, 8, May 12, 1958, pp. 63-68. Cf. our discussion infra, Chapter Nine.

Also cf. Philip Rieff, Freud: The Mind of the Moralist, (New York, Viking, 1954): "Freud undermined the ancient concern of a political philosophy and substituted for it the inquiry of a political psychology, asking in what manner and degree must the individual be constrained within his social relations." Italics are ours (at p. 256).

CHAPTER SIX

WHAT IS HIS GUILT? II THE COMPLICATIONS OF SHAME

The Contributions of Alfred Adler

As we have seen, guilt feelings are a fusion of fear, love, and hatred-turned-inward. They are a compulsion to make restitution, to effect a restoration, to "be justified." The theorists we have discussed in the preceding chapter have recognised guilt feelings as important in the aetiology of emotional illness and in psychogenesis, the actual formation of the waking, socially-aware, "prospective," self and what Sullivan refers to as the "self dynamism" or "self system."

Alfred Adler, the first disciple to leave Freud, had a considerable influence on psychotherapy, educational psychology, and social work, especially in the United States and in Great Britain--where he died, while in Aberdeen for a series of lectures.¹ His thought continues to thrive in the work of Rudolf Dreikurs, for example, of Chicago. Dr. Dreikurs says there are five assumptions or distinctive features to Adlerian psychology today. They are:

(1) "The social embeddedness of man," in contrast to assumptions of a simply hereditary and biological basis for an anthropology.

¹See Phyllis Bottoms, Alfred Adler: Apostle of Freedom (London, Faber and Faber, 1939, 2nd edition, 1946), pp. 176-200; 231-240; and p. 241 ff. Also: Lewis Way, Adler's Place in Psychology (London, Allen

(2) "Self-determination and creativity," in opposition to "mechanistic-deterministic concepts," whether they are focused on environmental or hereditary causality.

(3) "Subjectivity of perception," in opposition to absolutism, which depends on authority."

(4) "Teleo-analytic interpretation of behavior," in opposition to "a causalistic evaluation of behavior."

(5) "The holistic approach," in opposition to "reductionistic efforts to explain man by any one of his partial attributes."¹

Because of Adler's apparent neglect of an explicit emphasis on guilt feelings as such, his doctrine of psyche and character should be re-examined. Was his an important counter-insight that led him away from the guilt-oriented Freudian model of his time?²

& Unwin, 1950); Ruth Munroe, *op. cit.*, Part Three, especially pp. 333-343; 370-380; 423-438; 507-511.

¹Rudolf Dreikurs, "Are Psychological Schools of Thought outdated?" The Journal of Individual Psychology, XVI, 1, 1960, pp. 3-10, at p. 7.

²A significant statement which Freud made with respect to Adler's major emphasis and his own constructions on the theme of guilt is the following:

"The sense of inferiority has a strong erotic basis. The child feels itself inferior when it perceives that it is not loved, and so does the adult as well. The only organ that is really regarded as inferior is the stunted penis--the girls' clitoris. But the major part of the sense of inferiority springs from the relationship of the ego to its super-ego, and, like the sense of guilt, it is an expression of the tension between them. The sense of inferiority and the sense of guilt are exceedingly difficult to distinguish."

New Introductory Lectures on Psycho-Analysis, p. 93. The present chapter is focused on the very attempt-to-distinguish, which Freud called "exceedingly difficult." Though our task is difficult, it

Adler approaches the aetiology of neurosis with a sense not only of biology but also of sociology. Though he calls his psychology "Individual," his aim in therapy is to bring the patient into social equilibrium.¹

Adler's writings consist largely of addresses and monographs, all illustrating the same clear-cut hypotheses. We can see the point at once when we approach Adler's work, more so perhaps than in any of our representative psychologists. He can say, in one brief preface:

Individual psychology covers the whole range of psychology in one survey, and as a result it is able to mirror the indivisible unity of the personality . . . we modestly lay claim to the formulation of fundamental principles which have hereto never found expression in psychological literature . . . all forms of neurosis and developmental failure are expressions of inferiority and disappointment . . . We Individual psychologists are in a position, if a proper procedure is observed, to get a clear conception of the fundamental psychic error of the patient at the first consultation. And the way to cure is thus opened.²

In searching out the basic causes of neurosis, Adler presupposing the essential unity of the human psyche, perceives the infant organism as it must compare itself with its towering environment.

need not be made more so by phallic, Oedipal, and superego "blinkers" which Freud seemed to be wearing in this passage (1933).

¹Our discussion of Adler relies on works which are cited in footnotes. Recently there has appeared a valuable compendium of his thought. It too has been consulted. The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler: "A Systematic Presentation in Selections from His Writings," edited and annotated by Heinz L. and Rowena R. Ansbacher (New York, Basic Books, 1956), 503 pp. Significantly, Chapter 5 is entitled "Social Interest," and the final chapter (19) is "Problems of Social Psychology."--pp. 126-162; 446-464.

²Alfred Adler, The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology, trans. by P. Radin (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1924), pp. v-vi.

The feelings of discomfort, the "fear of degradation," of "lack of knowledge and orientation," the feeling of want, the frustrations related to using the sense organs and mechanisms of speech, lack of cleanliness, relative invalidism and the consequent fear of death are added up to make what he calls the feeling of being beneath, the feeling of uncertainty. These negative emotions are what compose the "infantile feelings of inferiority."¹

The infant-child-adult is striving in a social milieu. This very fact means that he is working to overcome, to compensate for, that inner awareness of being "beneath others." "I am vulnerable to accident, illness, open abasement." Hence, as he is hurled forward in a developing life, he should become, through the very process of growth and imposed adjustments, actually less inferior, at least to the infantile state. Yet he maintains an unrelenting inner sense of inferiority! It is a feeling of dependence which he somehow rejects as degrading dependence.

Naturally, normally, inevitably, the infant will feel weak and helpless. But normal, healthy growth should mean normal and healthy--non-neurotic--adjustment to life. Adler was concerned as a physician with the healing of neurosis. Yet he produced in his "philosophical"--psychologic "fragments" an anthropology based on the supposed universality of the feeling of inferiority.

Adler's early research into the problem of organic inferiority was recognized by Freud himself as an important contribution

¹Alfred Adler, The Neurotic Constitution trans. by Bernard Glueck and John Lind (New York, Moffat Yard, 1917), p. 73.

to the new "science" of depth psychology.¹ The master felt, however, that his erstwhile disciple had substituted the appendix for the body of the truth, when Adler began to spin his inclusive theory from the research. Adler, in turn, felt that Freud had failed to see the "lowest common denominator" of the causes of neurosis as the sense of inferiority.² Adler became a "depth psychologist" of "the shallows," in the eyes of those who considered depth psychology by definition a probing of the deep unconscious. Adler felt that for the therapist's purposes the unconscious expressed itself clearly enough in the conscious and in the pattern of life of the patient.³

¹This praise is limited indeed! In his critical "demolition" of Adler as "depth psychologist," Freud does actually include this phrase: "his valuable studies about the inferiority of organs." "The History of the Psychoanalytic Movement" (1914), Basic Writings, pp. 931-977, at p. 965.

²For example, in "Psychical Hermaphroditism and the Masculine Protest," Individual Psychology, pp. 16-22.

³Cf. the contemporary mood in counseling psychology, opposing depth techniques, as not necessary and unrewarding (to be referred to in Part Three, footnotes). Contemporary ego-psychology, indeed much in the mood of contemporary "depth psychology," suggests a shift away from concentration on the unconscious as such. Even Freud came to regard it as but a partial category. (Supra, Chapter Four).

The more serious counter-charge made by the Freudians against their critics--whether Adler, or these present-day counseling psychologists who deplore the time-consuming "depth" techniques--is that the sacrifice of "depth" means losing the perspective of the "primary process," the endopsychic world of personality. Adler, Horney, revisionists, and even the Freudian ego-psychologists--according to instinctualists like Melanie Klein--risk losing sight of what Freud gave the rather non-descriptive, indeed, non-psychologic, name Das Es--the id.

Yet, Otto Rank, who gave up the Freudian nomenclature, seems to be not so vulnerable to a counter-charge, despite the similarity of his short-treatment therapy to that of Adler.

This feeling of inferiority is linked with the fact that the individual is psychically bisexual while desiring to be wholly masculine. Here we see in Adler the same disposition we saw in his fellow Viennese, Sigmund Freud. Both are temperamentally patriarchal rather than matriarchal in their approach to sex differences. Adler links inferiority with femininity while Freud links fears and envy with the lack of a penis in the girl and the threat of castration felt by the boy.¹

Today as we read Adler, and to some extent even as we read Freud, we wonder how really necessary is this emphasis on the superiority of the male, for the actual application of any particular aetiology of neurosis. As we have seen, Ian Suttie, Karen Horney, and others emphasise the positive aspects of femininity.

We may better appreciate the thrust of Adler's emphasis on inferiority feeling and superiority striving if we are not distracted by his naivete with regard to the adjectives "feminine" and "masculine."²

¹Their most fundamental point of agreement, we recall, was on biological "organic inferiority." Adler, Understanding Human Nature trans. by Walter Beran Wolfe (London, Allen and Unwin, 1927-), p. 132.

²Cf. Søren Kierkegaard's circumspect use of the "womanliness-manliness" polarity in Sickness Unto Death (Anchor edition), pp. 183-4 note. This work will be cited infra, Chapter Eight.

This is not to ignore his anchoring his theory in biological sources of inferiority feeling. During his research into the causes of the common phenomena of infantile "pretending" to be ill he had it "regularly and inexorably" forced upon his attention "that the possession of inherited inferior organs, organic systems and glands with internal secretions, created a situation, in the early stages of a child's development, whereby a normal feeling of weakness and helplessness had been enormously intensified and had grown into a deeply-felt sense of inferiority."¹

The feeling of inferiority--based on the awareness of constitutional-and-psychic-inferiority demands a compensation before the tribunal of what Adler calls "ego-consciousness." An imagined goal is established, which he calls a "fiction."² It evolves, along with self-awareness. This goal is implied in the child's need for security, for love as tenderness.

¹Adler, Individual Psychology, p. 18. Cf. The Neurotic Constitution, Chapter 1, pp. 1-34.

²Adler was influenced by reading Hans Vaihinger's Philosophy of 'As If' (Berlin, 1911); so much so that the Ansbachers have included selections from Vaihinger's book in The Individual Psychology of Alfred Adler, pp. 77-87. They say that it is impossible to gain a full understanding of Adler without a knowledge of Vaihinger's fictionalism (p. 76). "The main influence on Adler was to provide him with a philosophic foundation for his developing subjective finalism" (p. 77). Vaihinger's approach is somewhat like James' pragmatism and John Dewey's instrumentalism (p. 87).

Cf. a theologian's review (and critical appraisal for theology) soon after the publication of The Philosophy of As If: Karl Heim, "Zur Philosophie des Als-Ob" (1912), in Glaube und Leben (Berlin, Furche-Verlag, 1926), pp. 63-72.

The child has found a meaning in life towards which he strives and whose still indistinct outlines he is forming, and starting from which he derives that quality of prevision which is calculated to direct and give worth to his actions and impulses.¹

Life and growth mean that there is a special force at work, bent on making compensation. This force is that which Nietzsche described as the "will to power."² Adler's eminently pragmatic system sees the dynamics, not in terms of libido, life and death impulses, pleasure-versus-pain antinomies. He sees it in terms of what he considers every mortal's preoccupation: solving his problem of inferiority, the negative conviction about his own worth. This is the problem regardless of how it may manifest itself.

Instead of outlining an elaborate series of psychogenetic stages, Adler suggests three crises for the life of the individual. These three ongoing crises are actually the same crisis. They are interrelated, representing the triple encounter of the individual with his environment as a whole, with his family, and with himself. They are: (1) the crisis of establishing oneself in a meaningful relationship with society; (2) the crisis of establishing oneself in a love relationship; and (3) the crisis of establishing oneself in an occupation which assures one of significance.³ Success in mounting these hurdles is determined somewhat by the individual's

¹The Neurotic Constitution, p. 52. ²Ibid., p. 24.

³Following a suggestion made by Professor Dickie (in a letter to the present writer), we note the three Christian doctrines which speak to these three (Adlerian) crises: (1) The Kingdom of God: "relation to society"; (2) ἀγάπη: "love relationship"; and (3) Christian vocation: "significant occupation."

early introduction to society, "love," and tools in early childhood where he finds himself within a "family style of life." Neurotic, psychotic, and criminal behavior indicate failure to mount one or more of these related crises. It is common for one to find his meaningful relationship with society only as he imagines and delimits society within his own mind. It is common for one to try at least in the imagination to alter the loved partner, even to substitute phantasy or compulsion entirely for reality in the sphere of "love." It is common for one to place highly unrealistic constructions upon his own occupation in life.¹

Adler became a social ideologist, a "preacher." He worked toward the goal of social "inter-cooperation," mutually edifying love relationships, and progress-making occupation for the patient and for mankind. By temperament he was optimistic, positive, constructive. Nevertheless he realized that society measured by his ideals was sick.

Adler believed that the will to power, the drive for compensation, could largely be transformed by therapy into the will to cooperate. Human beings should learn to strive for the happiness of others. He thought there was lasting wisdom in the Biblical

¹Cf. his discussions in such popular treatments as: Alfred Adler, The Science of Living (1929, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1930), Chapters IX, X, XI, and XII, pp. 199-262; What Life Should Mean to You, ed., Alan Porter (London, Allen and Unwin, 1932), Chapters X, XI, and XII, pp. 252-286.

aphorism: "It is more blessed to give than to receive."¹ Through education and re-educative therapy cooperation can transplant superiority striving.

As we have seen, the fiction established by the infant ego as a much-to-be-desired reversal of inferiority is superiority. The goal is seen in the vision of an ideal self--the "self ideal," which stands for a continual feeling of being above. These feelings of being above are composed of such wished-for attainments as joy, victory, knowledge, wealth, art, cleanliness, life envisioned as immortality, and esteem.²

The ego refuses to take its situation lying down, so to speak. While the infant maintains a measure of "the eternal, real and physiologically rooted community-feeling" from which "are developed tenderness, love of neighbour, friendship and love," he cannot bear the feeling of inferiority which seems to be his lot.³ This painful and negative feeling takes different forms with different individuals. according to the nature of the organic inferiority, the neurotic compensations sought by members of the family--often at the infant's expense, and the general impact of the initial encounters with the environment. The sense of inferiority thus objectified in the individual's own infantile idiom declares its

¹Acts 20:35. Cf. Adler, Understanding Human Nature, p. 211, and Chapter III, pp. 33-43, et passim.

²Cf. the diagram in The Neurotic Constitution, p. 73.

³Individual Psychology, p. 9.

opposite simply by removing the negatives. "Whatever I am not I shall be," expresses at once the goal and the lust for power. Hence the style-of-life manifests the "as if" attitude which demands the fruits of superiority even though it has never been achieved.

This goal is a fiction, a positive image created out of a negative reality. The infant is in fact inferior to the adult. What is more, everyone, the adults included, is more or less inferior to his fellows in some regard. There is no denying this. Nor can it be denied that everyone rebels inwardly against his inferiority. It may not be too oversimplifying to suggest that this inner rebellion finds unmistakable expression in a relentless drive for mastery, a lust for power which must be understood in the context of the individual's own private world of inner conflict. But, according to Adler, such power-crazed rebellion, however it may be disguised in neurosis, psychosis, criminality, or inoffensive complacent dream-world satisfaction, is in fact trying to establish the ego in the haven of the self ideal, to uproot inferiority-feeling and to plant a certainty of superiority. This superiority is in form, though not in essence, "over others." It is a vision of a triumphant opposite to the inferiority which terrorised the infant. But its sweep fells "others" along with the despised image of one's own inferior self. Hence it is anti-social, detrimental to the common good; it is the very source of social evil.¹ Adler's optimism is

¹Ibid., p. 8. Cf. What Life Should Mean to You, p. 69, where Adler makes a characteristic statement, accenting the positive aspects of both superiority-striving and "cooperation."

that although such a motivation is practically universal, its evil effects do not have to dominate the individual. The community feeling should be evoked to counteract them successfully.

He tells us that we must face the fact that "this fiction of a goal of superiority so ridiculous from the view-point of reality, has become the principal conditioning factor of our life as hitherto known."¹

Although, according to Adler, the setting up of the fiction does introduce hostility and aggressiveness in our nature, the results are not altogether negative. It "teaches us to differentiate, gives us poise and forces our spirit to look ahead and to perfect ourselves." We compare this statement with one by a Freudian, Margaret Harries, in an article on "Sublimation in a Group of Four-Year-Old Boys": "The impulses originally causing the children to indulge in unacceptable behavior are the same ones which later provide the driving force of their socially acceptable and enjoyable activities, namely, the aggressive drives and the pregenital component instincts."²

To Adler the individual evolves and becomes caught up in a plan of life, or "life style," which is a concept similar to Horney's

¹Individual Psychology, p. 8.

²Margaret Harries, "Sublimation in a Group of Four-Year-Old Boys," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child (London & New York, International Universities Press), VII, 1952, pp. 230-240.

Cf. Individual Psychology, pp. 32-50.

later suggestion: "personality structure." It is chosen in infancy. Its motive force is the lust for mastery, the will to power.

The therapist should be able to fit the symptoms of his patient into a "plan of life," which spells out the nature of the inferiority and of the imagined goal. Armed with such knowledge the therapist attempts to re-educate the patient, carrying him back--as in other kinds of "psycheanalysis"--to the origin of the neurosis, where he can see with adult eyes the infantilism of the inferiorities felt and feared at the dawn of ego-consciousness. The patient, all the while feeling the encouraging support of his therapist-friend, should then be able to recognize his self-ideal as a simple goal of superiority, utterly impossible of achievement.¹

¹The Ansbachers say: "Adler introduced the term 'guiding self-ideal' in 1912 in The Neurotic Character [Über den nervösen Charakter; Grundsüge einer vergleichenden Individual-Psychologie und Psychotherapie (Wiesbaden: Bergmann, 4th ed., Munich, Bergmann, 1928)--translated The Neurotic Constitution] where, to all appearances, he used it interchangeably with the fictional goal.

In 1914 Freud formulated his "ideal ego" in "on Narcissism: An Introduction," trans. by Cecil M. Baines, Freud, Collected Papers, IV, pp. 30-59, at p. 50-51 and following. The "ego-ideal" is the ego of perfection, to which narcissistic love is attached, and "over which his conscience keeps guard" (p. 53) which later became the super-ego (Supra, Chapter Five, this dissertation). Adler acknowledged this by inserting the following statement in a revision of The Neurotic Character: "A replacement [of the self-ideal] by 'ego ideal' as Freud attempts would have to be rejected on several grounds" (the German edition, p. 41).

To Adler the "self ideal" was an integrating principle for the personality. He chose not to regard it topographically, as

Re-education means a revising of the life style or plan for living. There is a change in the inner economy. Energy that was used in self-seeking is diverted into seeking the happiness of the group with which one identifies himself. The former goal of individual superiority is replaced with the more attainable goal of social constructiveness, of finding one's place in the larger destiny of community. Fiction, according to Adler, is replaced by reality.

As we have seen, the manifest neurosis is but an expression of the will to power, which has been excited by infantile feelings of inferiority and is directed toward an impossible superiority. This is true regardless of how the neurosis may be classified, whether, to take a few examples, as compulsion neurosis, hysteria, or melancholia. Also, both psychotic and criminal behavior reflect the dynamism of lust for power.

Freud came to view his own emerging concept (1914-1923--The Ego and the Id).

Adler discusses his therapy in many passages. He said he sometimes used the following method, because he regarded the patient in terms of his total social situations, not as the sole--isolated--object of therapeutic concern. "I tell them, 'You can be cured in fourteen days if you follow this prescription. Try to think every day how you can please some one! See what this means to them. They are occupied with the thought 'How can I worry some one!'"--What Life Should Mean to You, pp. 259-60.

Adler also published volumes of case histories. Nowadays, see The Journal of Individual Psychology, founded by Rudolf Dreikurs, now edited by Heinz and Rowena Ansbacher. The journal is devoted to "a holistic, phenomenological, teleological, field-theoretical, and socially oriented approach to psychology and related fields" (paragraph, back of cover: e. g., Vol. 14, 1958).

Depth psychologists seem to see compulsion as a basic phenomenon in all neuroses, not merely in the so-called "compulsion neurosis." In every neurotic sufferer there is an inner sense of being commanded.¹

In the Adlerian man emotional conflict rages on two fronts. It is the tension between the individual and his environment, and within the self between the lust for power and community feeling.

Adler taught that the conflict could be resolved, at least in a measure, by ministering to the infant within the psyche. He can be given the security for which he feels he must contend, the security represented by his fiction of superiority. Such therapy is by personal encounter, which may be interpreted as the community's meeting with the individual and bringing about the reconciliation so deeply needed.

By implication therefore the original alienation of the self is from his social environment. Hostility and aggressiveness are directed against the environment to which the infant feels inferior. This inferiority feeling has its biological and organic basis, but it is social in its implications. The goal of superiority is the vision of turning the tables, reversing the positions. It is the fiction that the last becomes the first and that the first becomes the last, that the inferior, insecure infant becomes the

¹Cf. Adler's thinking on compulsion: "Compulsion Neurosis" in the Individual Psychology, pp. 197-207; Compulsion in other neuroses and in "normal" conditions is discussed, for example, in "Melancholia and Paranoia" (*ibid.*, pp. 246-262) and "New Leading Principles for the Practice of Individual-Psychology" (*ibid.*, pp. 26-28).

superior, secure "adult" who can look down upon that environment which formerly looked down upon him. The same energy of life gives force to both sides of the inner conflict. The solution is to overcome the fiction with the fact. But the fact must be the practical undoing of the terror and tyranny of the inferiority feeling. We are reminded of the later, Freudian thinker Melanie Klein who teaches prevention of neurosis by early environmental support and strengthening of the "love instincts" in their struggle with the "death instincts."¹ Adler, of course, tried to steer away from an instinctual dualism. His polarity was of goals. When he first broke away from the Freudians their emphasis was on the healthful effect of giving optimum environmental support to the "pleasure" instincts to enable the child to become as friendly as possible with reality. We have noted also how Suttie stressed the necessity of overcoming with reassuring love the hatred excited by psychic weaning. It

¹Cf. for instance, Melanie Klein's representative essay, which brings together almost unbelievable anthropomorphisms, grotesque constructions from so-called "play analysis," and the life- and love-affirming orientation of her clinical work, in "The Early Development of Conscience in the Child" (1933), reprinted in Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, pp. 267-277, and in Psychoanalysis Today (Sandor Lorand, ed., New York, International Universities Press, 1944), pp. 67-74. Mrs. Klein says that psychoanalysis should bring personality and character development to the healthy genital level with a mild (not overly severe, not overly sadistic) superego, which by its nature is "sadistic" toward the ego (Psychoanalysis Today, pp. 72-73). She then preaches a kind of gospel of psychoanalysis, envisioning what it can do for character and for the world. Its work of lessening infantile anxiety "not only lessens and modifies the child's aggressive impulses but leads to a more valuable employment and gratification of them from a social point of view the child shows an ever-growing, deeply-rooted desire to be loved and to love, and to be at peace with the world about it" (ibid., pp. 74-75).

seems a bit more difficult to compare Adler with Rank, in this regard. Is Adler's power-seeking neurotic, when converted, not likely to be something like the "average man" who misses the way, along with the neurotic?

Adler's theory sees man's basic inner problem of living as an emotional conflict between his inferiority feeling and his community feeling. To Adler, the social philosopher, the good, obviously, is whatever makes for both individual and social well-being. The inferiority feeling complains that an offense of privation has been committed against the self at the very dawn of life. Measured by the principle that reality delineates the good, the self ideal, with its goal of superiority, is evil, practically in the same sense in which Christianity has traditionally spoken of sin as self-seeking instead of Kingdom-of-God-seeking. Adler says it is wrong because it is fiction over "reality." But he ascribes to his idealistic vision of community the quality of reality rather than fiction, even as Christian theologians consider the Kingdom of God as a symbol for ultimate reality as far as community is concerned. We may go even further and call the fictional superiority-striving, evil because it is ultimately, and logically, suicidal toward the potential self, the justified self, which requires no defense before God. The will to superiority, the will to power, is destructive of the "essential humanity" which is "accepted in the beloved."¹

¹Ephesians 1:6.

It is perhaps even too easy to translate Adler into Christian theology. The "neurotic life style" is analogous to the "state of sin," to the "Adamic nature." Conversion to community-constructiveness-seeking is like conversion or accepting Christian justification and entering the process of "being saved" or sanctification. By receiving insight and being re-educated the individual leaves the fictional pattern. He learns to accept both his weaknesses and his strengths and to give his all to the good of a much greater cause.

It is often said that Adler was a "one-idea-only" theorist. But it is an idea that under some guise or other is being given prominent place in the systems of the various schools of depth psychology, as we shall note. The understandable tendency of these schools is to credit Adler with insights which they consider as properly belonging to their own frame of reference.

The "inferiority feeling" so important to Adler is due primarily to an early sense of deprivation. Every person seems to be oppressed somewhat by his relative weaknesses as he becomes increasingly aware of himself as distinct from the other. We have already discussed the classical Freudian doctrine of female psychology as determined by penis envy--a sense of organ privation, and the rejoinder by Suttie that it is as reasonable to suppose that male psychology is determined by "Zeus" envy of the female's "superior" anatomy. To Freudians male psychology is determined by the boy's awareness of his inferiority when he compares his body with that of his father. They stress that the crisis of late infancy does involve an acute sense of privation, of organ inferiority.

In waking to life the nascent ego witnesses a power of the environment which seems to increase while his own seems relatively to decrease. His omnipotence phantasies appear increasingly to be mere phantasies. Growing in realism means being pared down in power and glory. There is a sense of loss. This is evidenced clinically by the frequent allusion to childhood memories that feature something's being taken away. A part of the price of maintaining and further developing a sense of I-ness, or individuation, is to mourn for the loss of something. "There hath past away a glory from the earth."¹

The Significance of Shame Feelings

The emphasis of various schools of depth psychology on the primary of separation as the formative cause of emotional conflict suggests a sense of deprivation as well. Perhaps hopefulness itself and preoccupation with "new heavens and new earth" is explained at least partially by the memory of a state before the near-crippling awareness of privation.

If we follow Melanie Klein, Freud himself, C. G. Jung, with his belief in determinative archetypes, and Rank, in their contrasting ways, we place the primal sense of privation no later than the very moment of birth. Freud and Jung, with their growing belief in a phylogenetic "fall," seem to imply that the deprivation feeling is written into the embryo-psyche itself.

¹William Wordsworth, Ode: Intimations of Immortality from Recollections of Early Childhood, II.

Although she is often referred to as "neo-Freudian," it is appropriate in one sense to speak of Karen Horney as "neo-Adlerian." Her thinking is often associated with that of Adler, although she has taken pains to try to distinguish their positions. To her the "basic anxiety" is not a sense of organ inferiority or body inferiority, which must be overcome even if through the plying of a fiction. The basic distress is separation anxiety, but in a social sense.

Ian Suttie propounded a similar view. In fact his discussion of the problem seems to preserve the somatic, or biological, factors more explicitly, perhaps resulting in a more balanced picture of the genesis of separation anxiety.¹

¹In terms of the "schools" and their leaders, Suttie's constructions seem conducive to a creative blending of Freudian, Adlerian, and Kleinian insights. The biological is not left out of the picture; nor is the psychological reduced to mere biology. The mother perhaps is dominant over the father-image as the father is over the mother in Freud's system. The crisis of psychic weaning is described in such a way as to suggest that Suttie was in dialogue, at least privately, with Melanie Klein. Unfortunately, Suttie's manner of annotation and documentation (in Origins of Love and Hate) has not made it easy to track down all of his allusions. Clearly, he does acknowledge Freud (whom he nevertheless takes to task in many areas), Adler and Ferenczi. Klein is also mentioned in his book.

Dr. J. A. Hadfield, another eminent British independent psychopathologist and theorist, has written a helpful preface to the work. Dr. Suttie's introduction, though brief, is a helpful direction, also. See, for instance Hadfield, Psychology and Mental Health, A Contribution to Developmental Psychology (see Bibliography, infra), 1950, at pp. 23 ff., where he discusses his own selectiveness.

In a letter to the present writer, dated 29th August, 1953, Mrs. Jane Isabel Suttie, herself a psychopathologist, said:

Horney published her first popular presentation of her views two years after the publication of Suttie's book, which, as we have

"I knew he considered "The Origins of Love and Hate" merely a preliminary sketch for a much more systematic exposition of his views; it was in fact largely a compilation and restatement of all of his earlier papers of any importance and he had intended a much more consistent and extended treatment of his philosophical and psychological interests in a second book.

"Until he had actually got down to the drudgery of composition my husband was not a fluent writer, and as his time was always fully occupied in the clinical work he had not, up to his sudden and brief last illness, sketched out on paper matters that would already be shaping themselves in his mind. With you I deeply regret that this would have been so."

It is significant that eighteen years after it first appeared in Britain, Suttie's book was published also in the United States. In Pastoral Psychology (Great Neck, N. Y., IV, 1953-1954) it was hailed as a revelation. Cf. "Review," by Paul E. Johnson, Professor of Pastoral Psychology, at Boston University (No. 38, pp. 63-64); and the article based on the book (by its title) by Ashley Montagu (No. 39, pp. 46-48).

Cf. early reviews: Karin Stephen, in The British Journal of Psychology, Medical Section, XVI, 1936-37, pp. 149-151. For instance, the reviewer regrets that Suttie's criticisms, though many are penetrating, are apt to be seen in the form of a personal attack on Freud himself and hopes that psychoanalysis will not be deterred from benefiting by them.

Roger Money-Kyrle, A Freudian analyst, reviewed the book in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis (XVII, 1936, pp. 137-138). At the end the reviewer says: "Dr. Suttie's book will be well received by all who wish to under-estimate the extent of infantile sexuality and aggression: at the same time, psychoanalytical theory is admittedly tentative in many ways, and his criticisms are near enough the mark to stimulate research."

John Rickman, in his "Obituary: Ian D. Suttie" (British Journal of Psychology, Medical Section, XV, 1936, p. 265), speaks of his "almost boyish gusto," "passionate advocacy of ideas." "To vigour of mind and power of penetration was added an almost feminine delicacy of appreciation, supported by a shrewd understanding of human nature." He had "deep affection for his colleagues and his patients." His book--to whose publication he looked forward (in hospital)--appeared a few days after his sudden death. His wife helped him much in its preparation. It was but part of a larger scheme they had in preparation (says the review).

pointed out, never received much attention from the Freudian analysts.¹ It seems to be relatively unknown to "revisionists" in America, including Horney. Hence we consider the two presentations separately.

Horney taught that the basic anxiety is caused by the experience of being rejected by the parent or parent-surrogate. A pattern of rejection-feeling is determined by the primal experiences of early childhood and also by subsequent experiences of feeling rejection. The psyche internalises this rejection, even though it may be actually a subjective misconstruction of the remembered event which symbolises it. Here, without elaborating them, Horney leaves room for possible theories of phylogenetic and somatic factors in the aetiology of "neurosis." Her reforming zeal led her to stress the inter-personal aspects of the experience from cause to cure. Harry Stack Sullivan also emphasized the role of the "significant persons" as they wittingly or unwittingly help shape the personality of the infant-child-juvenile-adolescent.²

The idealised self image formed within the psyche, according to Horney, is analogous to Adler's "fiction" of superiority. Her idea of trends, personality type, and personality structure suggest his concept of life style. We can see Adler's influence in Rank and in the ego-psychologists who use such terminology as "style of life."

Admittedly we risk oversimplification in any attempt to correlate the views of Adler, Horney, Sullivan, Freudians, Jung, Rank,

¹Supra.

²See infra.

and Suttie. But since our concern is with possible insight for a theological perspective, we take the risk. All of these psychologists find a distress within the psyche which underlies the "faculty" of guilt awareness. It is logically and psychogenetically prior to guilt feelings, though it has a profound, and often distorting effect on their nature.

Adler sees this underlying dynamism as the feeling of inferiority. The infant ego inevitably comes to the conclusion that he is deprived to begin with, inferior, hopelessly behind even as he enters the race. Somehow convince the psyche of man that he is worth something though inferior to his composite milieu and you solve his problem and the problem that he is for society. Do this for enough persons and the problems of society are solved. Overcome that curious threat within man due to his one-talent kind of perspective. Provide the security which inferiority feeling seems to threaten. Then and only then will he be able to live creatively but realistically--instead of fictionally--with his awareness of deprivation.

Horney stresses rejection as the operative form of the deprivation. Man is built to endure the thousand natural shocks that flesh is heir to. He cannot endure the insult of parental rejection that may be added to the injury. What does this rejection do? It threatens his security. This is in the sense of at-one-ness with his milieu. Because the milieu is overwhelming in its magnitude and power, his being cut off from it is tantamount to being put out with the rubbish. He is rubbish, a mere nothing, worthless!

The Freudians see the same phenomenon in the failure of the ego to surmount any one of the crises of infancy. The threat is always to the organism from forces that would destroy it either from within or without. Guilt characterizes the individual who has at least partially resolved the oral--trust-mistrust--and the anal--autonomy-degradation--crises and entered the phallic--initiative-guilt--phase, the identity crisis. Generally, a failure to overcome crippling guilt with a strong life style of healthy initiative, failure to emerge whole from "infancy" into "childhood," is due to previous failure to win through on trust over mistrust or, if that hurdle has been fairly well made, failure to win the battle for will power over the sense of shame (inferiority!) and doubt. The ego has fixated itself at some earlier stage. In Melanie Klein's world of split objects, failure to overcome evil objects with good objects in the inner pantheon results in despair, or pessimism, a sense of futility, indeed, often, a driving, terrifying sense of futility.

Hence, the privilege of being able to feel what these psychologists call guilt is open only to those who have not been overcome by insecurity and shame. Reverting again to the helpful latticework provided by the ego-psychologists, we may say that a protracted identity crisis reflects the fact that the obstacle shame has never been successfully removed from the path to meaningful identification and integration of the self. Internalised ego-ideals dominate a weak ego. Some apparently selfless persons are "leaners," who try,

perhaps not quite consciously, to be a part of someone else's psyche, someone else's destiny, because their own is so impoverished.

Rank, Suttie, and Jung, each in his own way, emphasize the basic trauma for the psyche as separation: from symbiotic union, and within, from the basic structure of selfhood (Jung). Jung, like Horney, sees society as the agent of the separation. Rank emphasizes the event of birth. Suttie places the greater emphasis on "psychic weaning," as does Melanie Klein, and most of the students of the psychoanalytic treatment of the child.¹ Intimacy needs are fundamental. Separation from warmth, from physical closeness to a "mothering" influence, is formative in the extreme.²

¹We mean to include here also the specialists in therapy for children who adhere more to the approach of Anna Freud and to the ego-psychologists.

By "psychic weaning" we mean here, rather loosely, the transition from almost complete dependence on "mother" and "mother-substitutes" to a relatively greater independence. In Erikson's terms it is the transition from the stage of trust-distrust patterning to that of initiative-doubt.

²Cf. The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child, an annual which we have already cited.

Studies are being made of the effects of so-called "group upbringing." Anna Freud--with Sophie Dann--has studied the apparently successful identification of six orphaned children with each other. --"An Experiment in Group Upbringing" (ibid., VI, 1951, pp. 127-168). This is a fascinating study of the anomalous experience of six Bulldogs Bank children (refugee-orphans), in their relationships and their oral satisfactions, stability in their relationships and their surroundings. Though far from being healthy youngsters, they are surprisingly "neither deficient, delinquent, nor psychotic" (p. 168).

Cf. Harry F. Harlow, "Love in Infant Monkeys," Scientific American, Vol. 200, No. 6, June, 1959, pp. 68-74. Experimental psychology--by this example--suggests formative "social" effect of early "mothering." The monkeys were studied in their response

Sullivan says that the "waking self" cannot accept as truly a part of the self dynamism dissociated "shameful" or "not me" elements left along the trail of "development."¹ As Patrick Mullahy faithfully expounds Sullivan's view:

The self may be said to be made up of or at least circumscribed by reflected appraisals. The child lacks the equipment and experience necessary for a careful and unclouded evaluation of himself. The only guide he has is that of the significant adults who take care of him, and who treat and regard him in accordance with the way in which they have developed from their own life experience. Hence, the child experiences himself and appraises himself in terms of what the parents and others close to him manifest. By empathy, facial expression, gestures, words, deeds they convey to him the attitudes they hold toward him and their regard or lack of it for him.²

The child "naturally" accepts these attitudes as they are conveyed, because he is not yet equipped to question or to evaluate them objectively. If the significant people express a respecting, loving attitude toward him he will have a similar attitude toward himself. If they are derogatory and hateful, then he will acquire a derogatory

to a "cloth" dummy-"mother" and a "wire" dummy-"mother." The monkeys that were deprived of early mothering (that is; for 250 days after their birth) showed less marked preferences before their separation from the dummies and no significant preference after three months' separation (actually a slight preference for the wire dummy). Yet monkeys reared with both cloth and wire dummies and nursing bottles displayed as much interest in the cloth 'mother' as they did in another monkey. Monkeys reared with no mother found both dummies less interesting than another monkey.

¹Cf. Mullahy, Oedipus: Myth and Complex, p. 294.

Sullivan, like other depth psychologists, has pursued the psychology of shame considerably further than the pre-Freudian intensely introspective "depth" psychologist Søren Kierkegaard, who nevertheless was no stranger to the "shame dynamism" [our term, so far as we know.] - See Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, pp. 61 ff.

²Ibid., pp. 297-8.

and hateful attitude toward himself." Sullivan believes also in the ongoing formative power of subsequent experience. Perhaps this can be especially significant for theology as it addresses its inquiry to the problem of implementing "saving grace" for those who in early life may have been "scared out of" authentic selfhood. Nevertheless the general prognosis is that throughout his life, unless extraordinary circumstances and a forceful change in the pattern of the inter-personal relations intervene, the child will carry to the end of his existence the attitudes toward himself which he learned in early life.

Freudians see the psyche's front to the world as shaped by inner drives in their reality-conditioned effort to wrest satisfaction from the milieu. A persistent sense of unworthiness may well indicate that in infancy and early childhood the developing individuated self-image was subordinated to a reflected image of society. The greatest fear for such a person is the fear of humiliation, which spells abandonment. Humiliation experience elicits the greatest rage.

Jung's persona is the self in its attempt to be acceptable to society. It emerges from the tension between the society-image and the unacceptable self-image such as Adler's "fiction of superiority" is derived from "inferiority feeling."¹

¹"The process of civilizing the human being leads to a compromise between himself and society as to what he should appear to be, and to the formation of the mask [the persona] behind which most people live."--Frieda Fordham, An Introduction to Jung's Psychology, p. 47.

The "average man" type as well as the "neurotic" type, in Rank's system, fail to develop a healthy individuated will not simply because of the painfulness of "ethical guilt" but also because of an instilled conviction of shame: "I am nothing, absolutely nothing by myself alone; therefore I can find meaning only in being bound inextricably, by identification, to society or, by a fiction of reunion, to 'my mother's' body."

To Horney, the real self, integrated and whole, is denied fulfillment because of internalized rejection: a sense of unworthiness, shame! To Adler, an individual's life style is a pursuit of a fiction derived from his sense of inferiority: a sense of unworthiness, shame. To Jung, an individual's persona is his makeshift mask which protects him from being discarded by society: a sense of danger in asserting his real self (process) in the face of a powerful society which rejects it as unworthy, shameful. To Freud and Freudians, the very process of ego formation may be effectively stunted by being flooded with a sense of shame before it is far enough along to channel such degradation into some other dynamism, such as guilt. The shame-driven may avoid a consciousness of inner persecution by losing himself in some other identity. Should this identity fail him and force him back upon his "shameful" self, he could break, even suicidally or psychotically. His own ego is undeveloped. It may be a mere puppet government, so to speak, in abject service to some expression of the outside world. In some cases this outside center may be a narcotic ring, or other demonic structure. He may be little

more than id thrown on the mercy of the court of "the world." Though weak in ego--or "ego consciousness"--he may be overridden with distorted ego-ideals, the infantile reflection of his society. He tries to satisfy them under fear of abandonment. His dominant infantile hostilities may never have been curbed adequately (by guilt). Hence he may easily be a man-in-rage.

Nevertheless, shame in a measure--and everyone has it in a measure--can work for good. For instance, in reading the autobiographical writings of Albert Schweitzer, a man who is universally esteemed as a credit to humanity, one is struck by the recurrent theme of shame. In his Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, a book which resulted from a request made by his psychoanalyst friend Oscar Pfister, he recalls many instances of feeling acutely ashamed.¹ When one feels ashamed, consciously, he is "ashamed" of some impulse or deed, and, sometimes, of just being what he pictures himself to be.² This feeling is often quickly caught up in the larger dynamism of guilt, which seems to assert a power--fictional though it may often be--to rectify the "wrong."

In some cases, the shame "fixation" may be at a stage of relatively positive, benign ego-development. The young child may have identified with the nurturing, generally satisfying image of

¹Albert Schweitzer, Memoirs of Childhood and Youth, trans. by C. T. Campion (London, Allen and Unwin, 1924), for example, at pp. 41, 44.

²Cf. John Masefield, The Everlasting Mercy (June, 1911): Saul Kane says after his encounter with Mrs. Jaggard:
 ". . . This old mother made me see
 The harm I done by being me."

his environment, the "good objects." His failure, whether by a fearful refusal or by want of opportunity, to introject a more threatening image, means that he has halted, in the process of identification, before having to make an acute acknowledgement of any psychic separation from the parental, nurturing, social environment. Hence, he goes through life trying not to appear to that environment as the bad, unworthy, kind of thing that should be abandoned, cut off from the land of the living. His defenses against this fear may include hostile attacks which are awkward cries for help, for continued nurture and sustaining love. Here Suttie seems especially perceptive in his derivation of rage from the intolerable fear of separation and abandonment. Horney, among others, posits the interaction of anxiety and hostility. The shame-driven individual may range in personality type from the "socio-path"¹ to the self-effacing, altruistic angel of mercy in our society. Shame, like guilt feeling, cannot be the end of our research into the subjective dimension of "sin and evil." Other factors determine their genesis. However these forces work in concert with the dynamism of shame, the feeling of inferiority and unworthiness.

As he nears utter despair, the shame-driven, in his protests against abandonment and fatal separation, may become bitter, antagonistic, rageful in his actions and in his verbalizations. He seems to be saying to the whole world: "You have no right to abandon me. I am worth something. I will not let you abandon me. I will make you hold me." Since he has not developed the faculty of relatively

¹A term, which is used by some social psychologists.

mature "guilt feeling,"¹ which is closer to the "adult" attitude, he cannot do what society expects of him and be genuinely repentant. Guilt feeling presupposes relationship, reciprocal love, and the specific fear of separation by what one does rather than by what one is.

Shame feeling also reflects an early experience of love, but it harks back to earlier childhood. Hence the love is less "ego-conscious."

We are tempted to introduce here some of the more publicized criminal cases of the present time. One example suggests a shame-driven mentality, despite the frequent use in news stories of the adjectives: "egotistical," "arrogant" and "self-centered" in describing the criminal.² From our understanding of the facts in his case, he could be spared capital punishment by a personal plea for clemency. For several years now he has refused to use this comparatively simple device. He has chosen rather to attack his rather monolithic image of society. In this long maneuver against the sentence of death he has performed an almost unbelievable feat in becoming highly skilled in the knowledge and use of legal procedure. Without

¹Some psychotherapists have described the social deviant as having a "Swiss cheese" type superego, that is, a conscience (unconscious conscience?) with lacunae.

²Since the writing of this paragraph, the Caryl Chessman case has reached its tragic denouement (May 2, in San Quentin Prison, in California, after the Supreme Court of that state rejected in a vote of four to three, his last appeal to it). Actually Chessman's many attempts to escape the death penalty apparently never included any hint of "penitence" or personal appeal for "mercy." The tragedy

presuming to judge his case for him and for society, and without presuming to be able to analyse him through the news accounts, by any of the techniques represented in the theories we have been reviewing here, we can at least see in his situation the suggestion that shame feelings may work deep within the unconscious, deeper in the psyche than specifically "guilt feelings." Distrust of life and of others works on a deeper level still.

Speaking of the difference between the "guilt-driven" and the "shame-driven" neurotic individual, Dr. Gerhart Piers, in a careful study of the problem, says, "Guilt-engendered activity is at best restitution (sacrifice, propitiation, atonement) which rarely frees, but brings with it resentment and frustration rage which in turn feed new guilt into the system." He contrasts with this, shame-engendered activity.

which was dramatised so throughout the world can hardly be regarded as unambiguous. We allude to the case here not to discuss the issue of capital punishment, nor even the shortcomings of a judicial system that could have allowed twelve years to transpire--admittedly on the prisoner's own initiative--before execution of so lethal a sentence. The man Chessman is representative of the failure of love, finally of society's love: he was rejected--officially, fatally--as a "bad object." The slang expression, actually heard in some of the lay discussions of his case, was: "He is a bad egg." Society--indeed, the individual in inter-personal relations--does tend to discard so-called "bad eggs."

The present chapter argues that social deviates are not worthless though, deep within themselves, they feel that they are; in a psychologically profound sense, they are no more sinful--guilty--than the society that condemns them. (They have what psychoanalysts call "character disorders"); and Christian theology, in its genius, especially in the light of depth psychology, sees them as victims (although agents as well) of "the demonic" (in Tillich's sense of the term).

The shame-driven individual has better potentialities as to maturation and progress. His primary identifications may be healthier to start with, his later identifications may permit him to proceed from the original images to siblings, peers, and broader aspects of the social environment. If his ambitious drive is coupled with creativeness, it may actually lead to a spontaneous curing of the original narcissistic wound. The guilt-ridden person introjects and expels ("extrojects"); the shame-driven identifies and compares. Whereas the shame-driven might be propelled beyond his natural limitations and break, the guilt-ridden as a rule will not even reach his potentialities.¹

Such a comparison represents the kind of distinctions which today's Freudians are seeking in their study of the ego. The "shame type" individual is marked more by the pre-"identity crisis situation," with possibly less of an identity (Oedipal?) problem than the "guilt type." Adlerian man, if forced into this frame of reference, is "shame driven." However, he represents a competition-oriented culture. Indeed Milton Singer suggests that so-called "shame" type cultures can be as industrious as so-called "guilt" cultures.²

It is one thing to be shamed out of existence, shamed out of authentic selfhood and individuation, shamed out of the possibility of constructive initiative, and quite another to be forced to recognize the fiction in striving for superiority (Adler). Depth psychologists seem to be agreed that as a matter of fact almost

¹Gerhart Piers and Milton Singer, Shame and Guilt (Springfield, Illinois, Charles C. Thomas, 1953), p. 28.

²Perhaps Max Weber's thesis (re: "The Protestant Ethic") can bear some re-study in the light of recent studies of shame and guilt, notably this one, which in many respects, is pioneering, especially in insisting on a distinction--often glossed over--between guilt and shame. Cf. ibid., pp. 76-79.

See Helen Merrell Lynd, On Shame and the Search for Identity (New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1958), p. 20 and passim. She calls attention to this distinction made by Piers (also by Franz Alexander)--

everyone does retain some sense of shame. As we have seen, it may be present even in those who have little sense of guilt. By reaction formation and compensation the shame-driven may ply an oppressive fiction of glory and superiority. This may accentuate his tragedy and society's. In some cases the fiction may mitigate the tragedy, but rarely without some risk to society's health.

Erikson tries to take us all the way back to the crisis of early infancy in the story of Martin Luther. His saving faith was possible, Erikson surmises, because he retained a basic pattern of trust established during the earliest stage of development. This was before either the predominantly shame-producing or the predominantly guilt-producing events of later infancy and early childhood. Nevertheless the man Luther seems to have made his way to some degree past the bogs of shame and guilt. According to Erikson, he

which seems to be obscured by the definitions of Freud, Ruth Benedict, and others; viz., "Shame occurs when a goal . . . is not being reached." "Guilt anxiety accompanies transgression; shame, failure." (Piers and Singer, op. cit., p. 11, quoted by Lynd, at p. 22).

The older clinical and anthropological use of the concept of shame in contrast to guilt stressed the external cause of shame and the internal dimension of guilt. Piers rightly insists that shame is also essentially internalistic. Thus, we are all the more inclined to see in Alfred Adler's corrective an implicit awareness of the error in the Freudian distinctions. Shame is felt not simply because one's nakedness is being viewed--or may be viewed--with scorn, not simply because one is being subjected to ridicule, but because an inner identification, a goal is threatened. Erik Erikson seems to be employing the same corrective when he stresses the conflict between initiative and shame (and doubt) in the so-called anal stage of libido-cathexes (psychogenesis).--supra, Chapter Four. Yet the distinction is by no means clear, even in Erikson. Cf. Young Man Luther, p. 256.

never arrived at that inner serenity which characterizes integration of the conflicting forces within. But there was an abiding trust in the smiling mother-image.¹ Of course we cannot validate a psychoanalytic study of Luther. However we can appreciate its lucid expression of the growing faith among psychoanalysts in the possibility open to mankind via patterns of basic trust.² Man may yet mature to meet the awful challenge of his situation. Depth psychologists, as well as theologians, seek for the struggling self-within-the morass-of-mind a foothold!

Theologians will not settle for a reductionism by means of any kind of psychology or psychologizing, of the religious truth to which they are committed. They are on firm ground when they define truth as trustworthiness--the New Testament 'aletheia. They do not have to say that the "God" of Martin Luther was in the end his smiling mother-image, but they can see in such a suggestion at least the challenge to the institutions and associations of religion to implement their gospel by taking care to be the agents of trust--instilling love, to reverse over-shaming tendencies in any who perhaps unwittingly allow themselves to be those "by whom offenses

¹"I have implied that the original faith which Luther tried to restore goes back to the basic trust of early infancy. In doing so I have not, I believe, diminished the wonder of what Luther calls God's disguise. If I assume that it is the smiling face and the guiding voice of infantile parent images which religion projects onto the benevolent sky, I have no apologies to render to an age which thinks of painting the moon red. Peace comes from the inner space."
--Erikson, Young Man Luther, pp. 265-66.

²Perhaps new cogency is being given to the Christian understanding of faith as trust.

come," and to provide graciously for responsible, realistic identification, intimacy, generativity, and integration.

The shame-driven is propelled by a sense of unworthiness, which is suppressed only as he loses himself in his ego-ideal. Hence his object relationship may in some cases well be more positive in the sense which Dr. Piers suggests. He looks to his ideal rather than to his impoverished ego for his sense of value. Much then depends on the nature and content of the ideal.

In contrast, the guilt-driven is more inner-directed. His troubles are due to his having gotten his own way as it were despite the disapproval and threats of his environment. The young Oedipus, for instance, has pitted himself against his father-image for the possession of the mother-image. In the process he feels as though he has lost the "good father" and is pursued ever by the "bad father." He is a marked lad. He is impelled to restore relationship with his father, to enjoy the "grace" of being with the "good father." He must appease the offended father. According to Freud, he does this by "incorporating" him, by identifying with the threatening father in his real or supposed ire at him his jealous son. But, in phantasy at least, like Jacob, he has already stolen Essau's birthright. Incidentally, the Freudians have not overlooked this Biblical analogue. Essau is treated as a father-figure in conflict over the mother.¹ In Suttie's spirit, we can make the appropriate criticism and

¹Theodore Reik, "The Wrestling of Jacob," Dogma and Compulsion, pp. 229-251, especially pp. 245-246.

suggest that here again despite its obviousness is an expression of sibling- or Cain-jealousy.

The "guilty" one has asserted himself. He has tried to force the outside world to conform to his values. Since he "loves" that society and feels beholden to it, when he sees that his bold assertion has backfired, he tries to make amends. Life was better on the other side of the offense. But the true self spoke first. The social self speaks out later, as guilt feeling.

By contrast, "Enoch walked with God"! Does he represent the more healthy among the shame-driven, whose shame has been fostered by a benign, instead of an evil, influence?¹ Such a shame-driven person early recognizes his own inadequacy and seeks his values from the outside-ego² as it were. His selfhood derives from what he early perceives in significant others about him.³ In Freudian terms, he can best continue with "mother" if he never yields to the temptation to vie with "father," but chooses rather to walk with him always as a son.

Taking the insights of the many schools together, we conclude that the dynamism of shame should be distinguished from that

¹Genesis 5:24. Perhaps Enoch is more a symbol of the triumph of trustfulness.

²Cr. Sigmund Freud's Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, along with William MacDougal's criticism of it: Psycho-Analysis and Social Psychology (London, Methuen, 1936).

³"Selfhood" in this context is self-concepts and self-images.

of guilt. Regardless of how repressed or disguised it may be, a pervasive sense of being inferior or worthless is due to an early internalization of privation and rejection, which operates as self-degradation and self-rejection. It is fought to a truce, characteristically, by a style of life which assumes the opposite, superiority and glory, or else loses the "self" in some other "self," ideal, or cause. Guilt, on the other hand, is an awareness of having offended against a relationship of reciprocal love, with the consequent danger of retaliation in kind. It operates as a compulsion to reconstitute the situation as it was before the offense, to undo the wrong, to make restitution. The characteristic fear of shame is of being abandoned. The characteristic fear of guilt is of being mutilated--it is a more melodramatic view of abandonment perhaps; at least this is the picture which the Freudians draw for us. Both shame and guilt as conscious emotions seem to presuppose at least a rudimentary experience of love as reciprocal trustfulness.

CHAPTER SEVEN

WHAT IS HIS GUILT? III THE COMPLICATIONS OF ANXIETY

In guilt feeling, with its "I am sorry I did that; I must make restitution!" anxiety is present with its "Something disastrous may happen!" Guilt says, "Disaster awaits if I do not make restitution." Shame says, "Disaster awaits if I assert myself as worthy in and of myself alone." The ego or the self of self-awareness feels that it cannot endure the consequences. Guilt predicts mutilation as well as separation. Shame predicts abandonment, "being cast into hell." Both are forms of separation anxiety. Both may be present, as in the commonplace illustration of guilt feeling with which we began the opening chapter on the nature of guilt.¹ The father's painful "conscience" over the treatment of his small son, included, no doubt, feelings of unworthiness. Indeed, it is fair to say that guilt feelings contain some degree of shame, whereas shame feelings may not always be accompanied by that sense of responsibility and compulsion to make restitution which characterize guilt.

Psychoanalysts generally acknowledge non-neurotic anxiety, but they rarely suggest that it is qualitatively different. First,

¹Supra, Chapter Five.

we shall review their varying use of the term before we examine the implications for theology.

In A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, his first series of published introductory lectures, Freud says:

We believe we know what this early impression is which is produced as a repetition in the anxiety affect. We think it is the experience of birth--an experience which involves just such a concatenation of painful feelings, of discharges of excitation, and of bodily sensations, as to have become a prototype for all occasions on which life is endangered, ever after to be reproduced again in us as the dread or 'anxiety' conditions. The name Angst--angustiae, Enge, a narrow place, a strait--accentuates the characteristic tightening in the breathing which was then the consequence of a real situation and is subsequently repeated almost invariably with an affect. It is very suggestive too that the first anxiety state arose on the occasion of the separation from the mother. We naturally believe that the disposition to reproduce this first anxiety condition has become so deeply ingrained in the organism, through countless generations, that no single individual can escape the anxiety affect.¹

To Freud, at the time of his first Introductory Lectures, normal anxiety is the affect commonly called fear which one has when acutely aware of danger. The prototype for the physical response is the affect which the infant has as he is born, experiencing the painful separation from the mother. Neurotic anxiety is "expectant dread," without an appropriate conscious danger situation.

Increasingly, Freud stressed that the ego is the place of fears.² It develops in the interest of life-preservation and is

¹A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis (Permapooks edition), p. 404. Cf. New Introductory Lectures, pp. 121 ff.

²See Sigmund Freud, "Female Sexuality" (1931), Collected Papers, V, pp. 254, 266. Cf. C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul, p. 123 (in the essay on "Freud or Jung"), where Jung agrees with Freud that the ego is the place of fears.

governed by the reality principle, the natural cause for what we call reason. The ego is the place not only of fears, but of "reasonableness," created, we recall, from the interaction of organismic striving with a rewarding-punishing milieu.

Although Freud was critical of Rank's constructions upon the birth trauma, he saw in it the prototype for both normal and neurotic anxiety. Although the general disposition is phylogenetically determined, specific anxieties are learned. The cardinal "learned anxiety" for Freud was castration fear or fear of mutilation. The learned anxiety which causes a psychosis may be some over-powering "pre-castration" fear: if during the oral phase, possibly the fear of being eaten or of being left to starve; if during the later infancy phase, possibly the fear of being flushed down the drain as nothing but a despised object. Melanie Klein seems to be true to the Freudian logic when she describes basic anxiety as the fear of extinction (by being eaten, smashed, torn to pieces, split up, and so forth), especially since she elaborates the theory with the benefit of Freud's theory of a primary death instinct, which was formulated after his first Introductory Lectures.¹

The fear of expulsion or abandonment is also a fear that precedes the childhood, Oedipal-fear which focuses on the threat

¹See discussions cited under notes, supra, this chapter. Also, Melanie Klein, in works cited: e. g., "On the Theory of Anxiety and Guilt," Developments in Psycho-Analysis, pp. 276, 278-9; The Psycho-Analysis of Children, pp. 184-187, 189, 193; "The Early Development of Conscience in the Child," Psychoanalysis Today, Sandor Lorand, ed., pp. 64-74.

of mutilation. Mutilation fear, rejection fear, the sense of inferiority, privation awareness, and extinction fear may all be derived from separation anxiety. Neurotic anxiety is fear of mutilation. It is typically Oedipal fear, with perhaps complementary fears of being discarded. At times, in reading Freud, one feels that he is really saying that Oedipal fear is actually all the former fears rolled into one. He stresses that the ego can appreciate a state of separation as well as a suffering of pain. It cannot be genuinely occupied with a fear of death as such, because it has never experienced it. It has experienced pain and separation. Hence Freud prefers these foci for anxiety. Neurotic anxiety was at some time a real fear of a specific danger. This traumatic fear has continued to be active within the unconscious.

Freud did not have simply one use for the term anxiety. He came to speak of it as a warning or signalling mechanism in the ego-dynamism which helps it mobilize resistance. Thus, one feels anxious--restless, fearful--when the outside world, perhaps even as represented by the psychotherapist, seems to be making some demand on the ego which it is not accustomed to facing head-on. A person feels anxious when repressed drives press back against the ego, threatening to overthrow its control. These insurgent forces may be allied id-and superego-organized energy. The ego serves the psyche in the face of outside reality. It continues its struggle in order to try when possible to satisfy the inner demands. Like politics, the ego's practice is "the art of the possible."

Freud, whose insights seem at times to come close to foundering on the Oedipus complex upon which he insists, teaches that castration fear develops into fear of conscience. The ego that has navigated safely between the Scylla of shame and the Charybdis of Oedipus guilt, fears the anger, punishment and loss of love which are continually threatened by his own Über-ich, the superego.¹

Does repression create anxiety, or does anxiety itself do the repressing? Freud changed his mind about the role of anxiety in repression. He came to feel that anxiety creates the repression, in the service of the ego.²

¹Perhaps, again, we should take care to distinguish Freud's Über-ich from other conceptions: For instance, the I that transcends itself, in Reinhold Niebuhr's thinking, is an over-I; yet it is quite different in concept from the superego in Freud.--Supra, Chapter Two.

Neither is Freud's superego equivalent to the "self" as defined in Percival M. Symonds' The Ego and the Self (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1951). See the review by Hyman S. Lippman in The Psychoanalytic Quarterly, XXI, 1952, pp. 564-6. Freud's I-over-I is "unconscious" and hostile to the ego. Nevertheless, we have seen how the Freudians have tended to keep his earlier concept of "ego-ideal" along side the later, sadistic superego. Perhaps the "self" which Symonds describes, the transcending I which Niebuhr describes, and the conscience (transcendent) as described by Tillich and Donald Baillie--infra Chapter Fourteen--can be correlated better with the Freudian conception of ego-ideal. Yet, in our opinion, there is no single Freudian concept which approaches an adequate accounting of this phenomenon, viz., the-self-transcending-itself. Our discussion, however brief, takes this into account in the Conclusion, infra, Chapter Fourteen.

²The discussion in Ernest Jones' biography is helpful as we try to follow the "vicissitudes" of Freud's theories of anxiety. Jones, Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, pp. 254-257.

Dr. Charles Brenner suggests what he calls a "minor revision" of the theory of anxiety offered in Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety (Freud's final stance with regard to the subject):

"(1) Anxiety is an emotion (affect) which the anticipation of danger evokes in the ego. (2) Anxiety as such is not present

Rollo May, in his study of The Meaning of Anxiety, sees as especially important in Freud's views on anxiety the emphasis on the child's fear of the loss of the mother and her love, by separation.¹

To Alfred Adler, anxiety had at least two meanings. As the Ansbachers say, Adler's use of the term was usually in describing a conscious symptom, such as a phobia. He could also speak of anxiety as a device, or means, for gaining power over others. An example is a wife's sudden "anxiety neurosis" by which she gained control over the activities of her husband.² Adler taught

from birth or early infancy. In such very early periods the infant is aware only of pleasure or unpleasure as far as emotions are concerned. (3) As experience increases, and other ego functions develop (e. g. memory, sensory perception), the child becomes able to predict or anticipate that a state of unpleasure (traumatic situation) will develop. The dawning ability of the child to react to danger in advance is the beginning of the specific emotion of anxiety, which in the course of further development we may suppose to become increasingly sharply differentiated from other unpleasant emotions."--Charles Brenner, "An Addendum to Freud's Theory of Anxiety," adapted from a paper read before the New York Psychoanalytic Society, Nov. 28, 1950, The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXIV (1953), Part I, pp. 18-24, at pp. 23-24.

¹Rollo May, The Meaning of Anxiety (New York, Ronald Press, 1950), pp. 112-127.

²By her "anxiety neurosis" she succeeded in hindering her husband's business and gaining his greater attention to herself. Adler goes on to say, strangely enough, "But she paid for this success by very painful anxieties, so much so that her husband had been able to persuade her to come and see me." The italics (underlining) are ours.--Problems of Neurosis; a Book of Case-Histories (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1929), p. 154, quoted in Adler--Ansbacher and Ansbacher, op. cit., p. 304.

that fearfulness could be overcome "solely by that bond which binds the individual to humanity. Only that individual can go through life without anxiety who is conscious of belonging to the fellowship of man."¹

Freud occasionally spoke of the feeling of helplessness.² Adler spoke of the feeling of "not being able," relating it to anxiety.³ Freud's anxiety was a dynamism which defended the ego against this feeling of helplessness.

C. G. Jung sees anxiety as basically the conscious ego's reaction to the invasion of the conscious mind by irrational forces and archetypal images with which it is not prepared to cope. Jung criticizes Freud for stopping at the question of Nicodemus.⁴ The

¹Understanding Human Nature, p. 238, quoted by May in The Meaning of Anxiety, p. 134.

²As for instance, in Inhibitions, Symptom and Anxiety, where he elaborates the distinction between the helplessness and the vague fear--or anxiety, which serves as a warning to protect oneself against the fall into helplessness (via trauma). See Jones' discussion, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, III, pp. 255-6.

³Adler, who taught "the dynamic unity of mental disorders" (which is the title to a chapter in the Ansbachers' book), said that the compulsion neurotic is really trying to protect himself from anxiety (!) because he "has a feeling of insecurity and inadequacy, a feeling of 'not being able.'"--"Compulsion Neurosis" (1931), International Journal of Individual Psychology, II, 4 (1936), pp. 3-10, quoted in Adler--Ansbacher and Ansbacher, op. cit., p. 305.

⁴C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul (in the essay on "Freud and Jung"), pp. 122-124.

resolution of anxiety is in a kind of new birth, by which Jung means the reconciliation of the conscious with the unconscious world, a never-ending process of integration, of dynamic selfhood in which it is nevertheless possible to make great, transformational, progress.¹

Karen Horney posits as a "basic anxiety" which underlies neurosis and other emotional disturbance, the fear of separation, caused by the experience of "rejection." She distinguishes this,

¹See also Rollo May's discussion of Jung on anxiety. Anxiety is the ego's "fear of the dominants of the collective unconscious." It is the individual's reaction to the invasion of his conscious mind by irrational forces and images from the collective unconscious, says May, relying on Goodwin Watson's formulation of Jung's concepts.--May, The Meaning, pp. 136-7.

See for example, Jung's entire discussion of western religious ritual (specifically, the Mass): "The Sequence of the Transformation Rite," Psychology and Religion: West and East (Bollingen Series XX, 1958), pp. 208-296, especially under "The Psychological Meaning of Sacrifice" (pp. 252-273)--also to be contrasted with Freud's treatment of the sacrifice in Totem and Taboo (supra, Chapter Five). Anxiety is not the explicit theme. The ego is to the self as the "moved" is to the "mover" (p. 259), as the son (Isaac) to the father (Abraham). Cf. Søren Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling, which deals with the theme of the near-sacrifice of Isaac, but from a different angle, though implicitly not so different from Jung's use of the story perhaps! In religious sacrifice, the self sacrifices the ego to the larger reality! Jung, ibid., (pp. 261 ff.).

How does Jung mean "ego"? The following quotation illustrates his usage: "It is the self that causes me to make the sacrifice, nay, more, it compels me to make it" (p. 261). It is because Jung cites "Abraham's sacrifice of his son" and "Christ's decision in Gethsemane" that angst seems to us an implicit theme.

It is more explicit in Jung's "Psychological Commentary on 'The Tibetan Book of the Dead,'" Jung, ibid., p. 521, where Jung says, "Fear of self-sacrifice lurks deep in every ego, and this fear is often only the precariously controlled demand of the unconscious forces to burst out in full strength."

however, from angst der Kreatur, one's "natural" dread before the obvious power and mystery of nature and the other. The situation of "normal anxiety" is helplessness, or utter dependence, together with the awareness of the danger of being removed from that upon which one depends. The implication therefore seems to be that even the non-neurotic anxieties are basically separation anxiety.¹

The basic anxiety which underlies neurosis, however, is in its incipency a wound to the spirit of the young child. It is not

¹Karen Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, pp. 94-95. Cf. Schleiermacher's emphasis on faith as absolute dependence.

Cf. also Paul Tillich's three classifications of anxiety in The Courage to Be (pp. 32-63, and throughout). His analysis of the subject has been applied to therapy.--Hanna Colm, "Healing As Participation," Psychiatry, XVI (1953), pp. 99-111 and R. D. Laing, "An Examination of Tillich's Theory of Anxiety and Neurosis," British Journal of Medical Psychology, XXX, Part 2, pp. 88-91. Laing says, for instance, that in clinical terms, the threat of annihilation is closest to the "threat of non-being" (Tillich). --at p. 89.

Mary Frances Thelen commends Reinhold Niebuhr's insight that anxiety is "the temptation" to sin, as "the most significant advance in the doctrine of sin in his Gifford Lectures. But he is mistaken in contrasting his view too categorically with that of Horney" (Man As Sinner, p. 185). The same may be said of Tillich's perhaps too hasty dismissal of Horney's "basic anxiety" as not "basic."--our reference here is to colloquium discussions with Professor Tillich. Though he has a high regard for Dr. Horney's work (he was a personal friend; he conducted her funeral, 1952), he regards her definitions of anxiety as failing to distinguish properly between "normal" ("existential") and "neurotic" anxiety. Niebuhr's complaint was that her formulation limited anxiety to a sociological causality and significance. Actually, at least according to our reading of her works, and, apparently, also according to Dr. Thelen's, Horney's appreciation of anxiety is deeper, broader, and more complete than these distinguished critics seem to allow. (The references in Niebuhr are: The Nature and Destiny of Man, Vol. I, pp. 44 n. and 192. These, in the light of her writings even to that date, 1939, seem indeed to be rather glaring misconstructions of her over-all meaning).

a once-and-for-all experience, but a pattern, which is shaped in early childhood. This basic anxiety is repressed. "The more unbearable the anxiety the more thorough the protective means have to be."¹ Horney's views on this seem consonant with those of the ego-psychologists among contemporary Freudians. The threat to the ego's defences is the underlying anxiety and basic hostility which it generates.²

As we have seen, the trauma is rejection. Hence the basic anxiety coincides with a feeling that the world is hostile. We see here a view which correlates reasonably well with the teaching of the ego-psychologists, as represented by Erik Erikson. The first stage or crisis of infancy determines the pattern of trust-mistrust. We find the same insight elaborated by Melanie Klein, in her own distinct way. The question is not: "To be or not to be?" but "To trust or not to trust? Is the world basically trustworthy or untrustworthy?" The basic anxiety which pervades any neurosis is the traumatically induced fear that the world is hostile. It amounts to a conviction that it is. Yet, at the same time, it is a frantic denial.³

Horney recognizes the drive for superiority which Adler makes the dynamism for all neurosis. But she sees it as one of two dominant patterns, the other being the craving for affection. Indeed, the underlying drive is for affection, even when the pattern has

¹Horney, The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, p. 93.

²Ibid., p. 96. ³Ibid., p. 89.

developed far away from any apparent concern for it.¹ We recall Suttie's reduction of the problem to the desire for affection and love.² For Horney, the basic anxiety asks: "Am I loved?" It does not begin as for Adler, with the conviction: "I am deficient." The sequence of convictions is, rather: "I am not loved; therefore I must be deficient." Then it has no difficulty in finding foci for its feeling of rejection-ergo-deficiency. The neurotic is like a drowning man in his preoccupation with being an acceptable self. This preoccupation, along with the dammed-up hostility, accounts for the neurotic's characteristic "disregard of the other's personality, peculiarities, limitations, needs, wishes, developments."³ Because of his own deficiency of love he cannot love his neighbor as he loves himself. He hates himself, blaming it for the primal rejection and cumulative pattern of rejection which its very aspect has seemed to invite. He seeks for himself and for the view of others another "face," a goodness which he can never find. He is hard on himself; he is hard on others.

Melanie Klein believes that a child can be helped to overcome his fear of being destroyed. What she recommends is a kind of love--

¹Ibid., pp. 95-100, 105.

²Suttie, op. cit., especially at p. 49. Suttie says, "Instead of seeking other peoples' love for the sake of the power it confers upon us of getting them to do things for us . . . it often comes to be the other way about. We get them to do things, perhaps needless things, for us in order to be assured of their love." Suttie's corrective here to Adler seems no less telling than his challenge to Freud's constructions.

³Horney, The Neurotic Personality pp. 110 f.

'agape (?)--therapy. As she puts it, the child's instincts can be placed under the sway of his life-and-love instincts by the environment's tipping the scales in favor of them in their battle with the "death instincts." Horney distinguishes "normal" from "neurotic," but her writings leave one guessing as to whether there can be any qualitative distinction. In Klein's system there is no such problem. Since patterns of trust and mistrust are woven by a dynamic interplay between the organism and the milieu, hostility seems to come from within the psyche itself, though of course it may be vitiated by too much outside hostility.¹ The infant is born "with a chip on the shoulder," so to speak. But he also wears a smile. Perhaps Klein's view blends with the idea of angst der Kreatur. At least, this seems to be what she is elaborating, not exclusively "abnormal" anxiety.

The infant comes into the world crying for oxygen. He needs warmth, like that in the womb. As he develops, each area of his appetite needs satisfaction, including the natural drive to exercise himself against (i. e., the "death instincts"); he meets negation, hence "evil." Anxiety is the fear of the bad external and

¹It seems true that Melanie Klein, like Freud, tends to reify emotions.

"The analysis of small children between two-and-a-half and five years clearly shows that for all children in the beginning external reality is mainly a mirror of the child's own instinctual life If I were asked to give in a few words a valid generalisation for the psychoses, I would say that the main groupings correspond to defences against the main developmental phases of sadism."--"The Psychotherapy of the Psychoses" (1930), reprinted in Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, pp. 251-253, at p. 251. See also "The Oedipus Complex In the Light of Early Anxieties" (1945), ibid., pp. 339-390; and works cited previously.

internalized "objects." Hostility is both the exercising against "objects" and the projection of anxiety.¹

It is interesting to note that Klein makes the life forces dominant. She offers a corrective to the easily pessimistic tendency of the death instinct theory, she adopted from Freud.² Freud's idea

¹See works by Melanie Klein, cited earlier.

Also, see the discussions on anxiety by a student of Fairbairn's, Dr. Henry Guntrip: Psychotherapy and Religion (New York, Harper, 1957), Part I - "Anxiety," pp. 17-88. It reflects the influence of both Dr. Fairbairn and Melanie Klein, along with others. The study shows a knowledge and understanding of a vast literature on the subject of anxiety, together with the author's own clinical experience and insight. The over-all description which Dr. Guntrip gives for "The Nature and Origin of Anxiety: Needs and Fears" seems to support the reconstruction we offer here. Of course, like Fairbairn, he places the emphasis on the object-ego encounter, rather than "personified" instincts (Melanie Klein).

²See, for instance, Melanie Klein, "On Theory of Anxiety and Guilt," Developments in Psychology, pp. 271-291. She says that "the death instinct (destruction impulses) is the primary factor in the causation of anxiety." There is continual interaction between "libido" and "aggression." Healthy weaning and education results in mitigation of aggression (thanatos). "Anxiety arising from the perpetual activity of the death instinct, though never eliminated, is counteracted and kept at bay by the power of the life instinct" (p. 291). Nevertheless it is doubtful that one has to adopt the same view of the instincts (in the Freudian and Kleinian sense of the term) in order to derive helpful insight from Mrs. Klein's elaborations of her clinical observation.

See Marjorie Brierley, Trends in Psycho-Analysis (London, Hogarth, 1951), where she offers critical evaluations of the work of Melanie Klein, and also of theories such as those of Dr. Fairbairn. To the latter's stress on "object-seeking" libido she offers the corrective: "object-relation-seeking," (in "Psycho-Analysis and Integrative Living," ibid., pp. 180-293, at p. 289). Relative to Klein's pioneering, if not revolutionary, theories, she makes the following statement: "If we cannot be bound by an Old Testament according to Freud neither can we profit by a Gospel of the Good Object." She says Klein's theories should be tested carefully, but appreciatively, before a final evaluation can be made. She argues against a dogmatic acceptance of anyone's theories. See pp. 57-89; our quotation is from p. 89.

of salvation-by-sublimation is reminiscent of Schopenhauer's doctrine of "contemplation" as the way "out of," or perhaps more fairly, the way "through," this existence.¹

Otto Rank also rejects the logic of pessimism. He says that his own thought was to Freud's negative voluntarism as was Nietzsche's to Schopenhauer's and to that which Rank sees as "Old Testament" negative voluntarism. Rank takes care to distinguish his concept of will from that of Nietzsche, however.² We recall his defining genuine "guilt" as "ethical guilt." Rank was drawn to an 'agapeistic ethic.

To Rank, the basic anxiety is modulated into two forms of fear, what he calls "death fear" and "life fear." This primal ambivalent fear "is derived on the one side from the experience of the individual as a part of the whole, which is then separated from it and obliged to live alone (birth), on the other side, from the final necessity of giving up the hard won wholeness of individuality."

¹See Sigmund Freud, "The Libido Theory" (Collected Papers, V, at pp. 132-133).

"Sublimation" of course has its limits (Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, 354 f., 384-5; New Introductory Lectures, pp. 132-134; An Outline of Psychoanalysis, pp. 31-32 and passim. Cf. his discussion in "On Narcissism" (Collected Papers, IV, pp. 51-2).

²Otto Rank, in Truth and Reality, Will Therapy and Truth and Reality, trans. Jessie Taft, pp. 226-227.

This necessity of self-loss as individuality-loss is death itself. Unlike Freud, Rank can conceive of a genuine fear of death.¹ "This universal human primal fear which varies only in accordance with life age and difference of sex, seems to lead to two different life forms which are conditioned by the manner in which the individual can solve this part-whole problem."²

Rank's concern for individuation corresponds somewhat with Horney's for the real self. His appreciation for the fear of individuation seems to be larger in dimension than either Adler's idea of basic inferiority feeling or Horney's concept of basic anxiety. Yet her hypothesis of a neurotic displacement of the "real self" by idealized self-images or the "ideal self" because of rejection-feeling seems consonant enough with Rank's doctrine of "average man" type, "neurotic" type, and "artist" type. The "average man" settles perhaps for a more "realistic" "ideal self," namely, that which is merely reflection of the countenance of society. He surrenders his selfhood to his particular society. The "neurotic" tries ever frantically to identify with some impossible "ideal-self" imposed on him by early experience which denies to him both wholeness and

¹Melanie Klein also conceives of a genuine "death fear," the fear of extinction. Cf. the discussion in Guntrip, *op. cit.*, p. 41 f. Characteristically, Guntrip modulates it into an instance of that anxiety which is our reaction in the face of any threat of destruction of the possibility of good-object relationships, either by the destruction of ourselves or of our love-objects and the experiencing of the loss of good-objects coupled with being left at the mercy of inescapable bondage to persecuting bad-objects."

²Rank, Will Therapy, p. 134.

individuation. The "artist" accepts the challenge of his "real self" at all costs, but not without anxiety. He fears the loss of society and the loss of his real self. But he takes the risk and lives creatively, ever aware of the risk which life is, with death inevitably in the offing.

Harry Stack Sullivan, who is noted for his relative success in work with schizophrenics, seems to have held his theories always close to his clinical practice. He tried to avoid too elaborate a metapsychology. Although Sullivan was influenced by Freud, he purposely chose his own vocabulary. To Sullivan, anxiety is a term simply denoting "apprehension of danger." In neurosis it is apprehension of disapproval in interpersonal relations. We recall that to Sullivan the personality is essentially an interpersonal phenomenon. Anxiety arises out of the infant's apprehension of disapproval by "significant persons" in his interpersonal world.¹

Sullivan's special contribution to the topic of anxiety is his emphasis on its effect on awareness itself. Security, based on non-separation from the personal environment, is the driving

¹"One fears a punch in the nose, atomic bombs, the loss of a job in depression." One gets anxious when he anticipates, "whether rightly or not, that the regard of another person will decrease, that his regard and respect for you will become less, or that one's own regard for oneself will decrease. Anxiety is related to the loss of esteem for one by oneself or by others."--Patrick Mullahy, in "The Theories of Harry Stack Sullivan," The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan, edited by Mullahy "a symposium on interpersonal theory in psychiatry and social science" (New York, Hermitage House, 1952-53), p. 33.

concern of the developing "waking self" within "the self system." The anxiety of infancy and early childhood both shapes the "self" of "self system," and sets the pattern for attentiveness and "selective inattention."¹

The Swiss Freudian psychoanalyst and pastor, Oscar Pfister, was in a unique position as clergyman and member of the International Psychoanalytical Association. He was a close friend of Freud himself. Pfister has made a voluminous study of Christianity and anxiety.² He brings to the study considerable knowledge of both Christian theology and the psychoanalytic movement.³ Two notable differences

¹See Rollo May's discussion in The Meaning of Anxiety, at pp. 149-150.

Cf. also, the highly respected work of Frieda Fromm-Reichmann (of the "Sullivan School"). She speaks of the "fear of psychological death," and correlates it with Tillich's fear of "non-being," and Kurt Goldstein's fear of "nothingness" (Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1940; The Organism, New York, American Book, 1939).--"Psychiatric Aspects of Anxiety," in Clara Thompson, et al., eds., An Outline of Psychoanalysis (New York, Random House, The Modern Library, 1955), pp. 113-136, at pp. 119-120; 123-125. Cf. also Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1950).

²Oskar (Oscar) Pfister, Das Christentum und die Angst, 1944, trans. Christianity and Fear by W. H. Johnston (London, George Allen and Unwin, 1948), 589 pp.

³At one time he was offered a chair in theology at the University of Zurich. Apparently he kept up a running debate with Freud regarding the nature and uses of religion (see Ernest Jones' The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, Vols. I and II, passim). Freud tolerated Pfister's role as a clergyman, but he professed not to be able to share his view of "the sublimation" he (Freud) called "religious." A revealing passage from their correspondence is from Freud to Pfister, in October 1918; Freud first praised, then criticized Pfister's book, just published, Was bietet die Psychoanalyse dem Erzieher? (Leipzig, 1917).

"Now, praise is always short; strictures have to take longer. I am dissatisfied with one point: your contradicting my sexual

with Freud allow him to venture an original psychoanalytic theory of anxiety and its meaning in the history of religion and culture.

We recall that Freud at one time regarded anxiety as transformed libido, or aim-inhibited erotic energy. He later chose to think of anxiety as though it were practically an ego-mechanism; it is not the repressed but the represser.¹ Pfister accepts the eros-reality polarity and rejects the instinctual dualism of Freud, as

theory and my ethics. I grant you the latter; ethics is far from my interest and you are a pastor. I don't cudgel my brains much about good and evil, but I have not found much "good" in the average human being. Most of them are in my experience riff-raff, whether they loudly proclaim this or that ethical doctrine or none at all. That you cannot say out loud, perhaps not even think it, although your experience of life could hardly have been different from mine. If we must speak of ethics I admit to having a high ideal, from which most people I know sadly deviate."--Quoted by Ernest Jones, in The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, II (Appendix), p. 457.

Freud, in a lucid paragraph, then defends his component- or partial-instincts theory against any attempt (including Pfister's) to think of libido without correlating it to the "erotogenic zones." (pp. 457-458).

Though Pfister replied to this and to other criticisms and continued to make his own interpretations and applications of the psychoanalytic doctrines, the correspondence offers good background for our understanding his study of anxiety vis-a-vis his mentor of Vienna.

¹In A General Introduction (the First Introductory Lectures) Freud distinguished "neurotic anxiety" from normal anxiety (Twenty-fifth Lecture, edition cited, p. 405). Anxiety is one form which repressed (dammed up) libido can take as it presses against the ego (p. 417 and passim; pp. 405-418). "There is only one unconnected thread, only one gap in our structure, the fact, which after all can hardly be disputed, that 'objective anxiety' must be regarded as an expression of the ego's instinct for self-preservation." (p. 418).

By the time Freud gave his New Introductory Lectures, over fifteen years later (i. e., from 1915-17 to 1933) his theory of

did Suttie. Then, he chooses to broaden the meaning which Plato gave the term and which he finds in the German word Liebe.

Pfister places the psychoanalytic concept of angst into context with the Johannine love-versus-fear theology, epitomised in the text: "There is no fear (phobos) in love (agape); the perfect love casteth out fear; because fear hath torment. He who feareth is not made perfect in love."¹ Pfister says that the two chief causes of anxiety are (1) an interference with "the impulse toward love in general," and (2) "a sense of guilt (a special form of this interference) in particular." The offenses against humanity due to anxiety as it has tried to lose itself in hostility have resulted primarily from the damming up of "primary, moral or of religious love as well as inhibitions of self-love, love of others, and love of God."²

Pfister couples guilt with love because of the dominance of love in the emotion of guilt. Christian love, agape, is the proper

anxiety had indeed unraveled and changed, as we have noted (Supra, this chapter). Pfister's treatment of the subject seems more to presuppose the older theory; viz., that of anxiety as transformed libido ("transformed love"?).

¹I John 4:18. See Pfister, Christianity and Fear, p. 46.

²Ibid., p. 52.

answer to anxiety. Such love includes reverence. It is not in the radical contrast suggested by Anders Nygren in Agape and Eros. Pfister finds Emil Brunner's Eros and Liebe more helpful to his thesis.¹ Whatever fault there is "does not lie with original Christianity," he says, "but in its neuroticization at the hands of neurotic Christians, whether theologians, clerics or laymen, and in the de-sublimation which occurred even when neuroses were absent."² Through the centuries crimes in the name of Christianity, including Geneva's burning of Servetus, have been committed by way of defences against the free flowing love dammed up by erroneous dogma about the wrath of God.³ Dogmas tend to hold back love and to defeat the gospel.⁴

Another Freudian, Theodore Reik, has written a commentary on the phenomenon of dogma. According to Reik, "dogma," as rigid, propositional adherence to religious symbols, is a compulsive effort to overcome religious doubt. "It is a reaction phenomenon, a means of repressing impulses of filial rebellion and revolution and a compromise formation for their repression and fusion with veneration

¹Ibid., pp. 515-518.

²Ibid., pp. 574-575.

³Ibid., pp. 210-215, 268-269, 453-454.

⁴Ibid., p. 572 and passim.

and love."¹ Reik's doctrine is more consistent than Pfister's with Freud's own "aetiology" of religious phenomena.

Despite the brilliance of Pfister's work, the term angst, rendered fear in the English translation, does at times become elusive of precise definition. Generally, it seems to mean fear of danger, especially from within because of an erroneous conviction about reality. Hence the anxious ego is aware of the reality of neurotic hostility in the world and of hostility in general. It is governed by such "neurotic" realism. But the healthy ego should be aware of the reality of pervasive love--"the love of Christ"!--in the world and thus be governed by that reality. The ego should be free to allow the id (?) forces of love to express themselves even as the paragon of such ego-strength and outgoing love, Jesus, did. Hence Pfister, while using a Freudian frame of reference, speaks nonetheless as a liberal Christian theologian. Man is by nature good and genuinely loving. It is his acculturation that has made him fearful and hostile toward others.

Unanswered seems to remain the question: Why does society fall short of complete freedom in allowing love to express itself? Freud himself "answers" the question by restricting the id energy of "love" to (1) desire for pleasure from objects (object-cathexing, object-appropriating, even as hunger is food-consuming) and (2) that

¹Theodor Reik, Dogma and Compulsion (New York, International Universities Press, 1951), pp. 56-57.

desire when sometimes fused with still another dynamism at work in the organism, namely, "deathfulness," which destroys and exploits against the interests of "lifeliness."¹

Both the somewhat Freudian Pfister and the independent theorist Ian Suttie consider anxiety to be the source of hostility, as do Karen Horney and others. They see the polarity of good and evil in terms of love and hate. This conviction is expressed eloquently and somewhat cogently in Pfister's work on anxiety and Christianity.

Rollo May, an impressively literate psychotherapist of New York, carries his study of the meaning of anxiety also beyond the range of clinical concerns. To psychoanalytical evaluations of the phenomenon he adds those which have been made recently by cultural anthropologists, historians, learning theorists like O. Hobart Mowrer who, characteristically, places the problem of neurotic anxiety in its cultural and historic nexus, relating it "specifically to man's

¹Freud's description of eros seemed to veer slightly away from a crassly materialistic, mechanistic, hedonistic model. For instance, in An Outline of Psychoanalysis, he says that its aim "is to establish ever greater unities and to preserve them thus--in short, to bind together;"--p. 20. His having introduced instinctual dualism accounts in part for the modification of his descriptions of erotic aims. Even before he posited his theory of the death instinct he was saying that hatred was prior to love, as we have seen. This destructiveness (then) was inherent in the erotic libido. The dualistic theory allowed for a fusion of the binding and destructive elements in instances of "love," and "hate."--Cf. "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes" (1915, Collected Papers, IV, pp. 60-83), and "The Theory of the Instincts" (in Freud, An Outline, pp. 19-24).

distinctive problems of social responsibility and ethics,"¹ and theologians like Paul Tillich.²

May treats of the theories of Erich Fromm, as a cultural interpretation of anxiety, although he is a psychoanalyst. His numerous writings, including Escape From Freedom, The Sane Society, and The Art of Loving, stress the cultural determination of anxiety. The distress which contemporary culture causes or tends to confirm is basic individual isolation, despite the many "groupish" manifestations which may seem to argue to the contrary. For Fromm, as for others, the "basic anxiety" is separation anxiety. Like Rank, however, he calls for courage to become individuated in responsible relationship.³

¹May, The Meaning of Anxiety, pp. 102-111, quot., p. 105.

Subsequently Dr. Mowrer has written with appreciation of Rollo May's study. See O. Hobart Mowrer, "The Problem of Anxiety," IV - "Fear and Anxiety, Normal and Neurotic," in his book, Learning Theory and Personality Dynamics (New York, The Ronald Press, 1950), pp. 531-561, at pp. 550-7. Significantly, Part I of this paper by Mowrer is "A Guilt Theory of Anxiety," in which he insists that anxiety comes, not from acts which the individual would commit but does not, but from acts which he has committed but wishes that he had not. It is, in other words, a "guilt theory" of anxiety rather than an "impulse theory" (p. 537). Cf. J. G. McKenzie, Nervous Disorders and Character, pp. 76-77, where an experienced psychologist-and-minister says there can be no advance in psychotherapeutic theory until the neurotic's need for moral security and religious assurance is more widely recognized:

Part II of Mowrer's paper deals with "Kierkegaard on Anxiety" (pp. 540-545). Part III treats of "Freud's 'Two Theories of Anxiety'" (pp. 546-550).

²For instance, The Meaning of Anxiety, at p. 193.

³May, ibid., pp. 169-176. Cf. this statement by Fromm, "The awareness of human separation, without reunion by love--is the source

Agreeing with Karl Mannheim, and Abram Kardiner,¹ Rollo May asserts that the "quantity of anxiety prevalent in the present period arises from the fact that the assumptions underlying modern culture are themselves threatened."²

May distinguishes between "normal" and "neurotic" anxiety. Yet he defines anxiety generally as apprehension aroused by a threat to some value which one holds essential to his existence "as a personality." Man can live without neurotic anxiety, but not without normal anxiety.³

In a later book Dr. May says succinctly, "Anxiety is the human being's basic reaction to a danger to his existence, or to some value he identifies with his existence."⁴ This statement reflects May's increasing interest in what is being called "existential analysis."⁵

of shame. It is at the same time the source of guilt and anxiety." --Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (World Perspectives, IX, New York, 1956), p. 9. Other works are listed infra, Bibliography.

¹May, The Meaning of Anxiety, pp. 177-189. He refers to Kardiner's "Anxiety and Western Man's Psychological Growth Pattern" in The Psychological Frontiers of Society (1940). His reference to Karl Mannheim is chiefly to his Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction.

²The Meaning of Anxiety, p. 188; p. 221.

³Ibid., p. 227. See also pp. 194-7.

⁴Rollo May, Man's Search for Himself (New York, Norton, 1953), p. 40.

⁵For instance, Dr. May has helped to introduce so-called existential analysis to readers in the United States. See May, et al., eds., Existence (New York, Basic Books, 1958).

This trend in depth psychology follows the pioneering work of the Swiss psychiatrist, Ludwig Binswanger. Although he was a respected member of the Freudian international association of psychoanalysts and a close friend of Freud himself, he blazed a path of his own. It is said that he is the only radically differing theorist who could continue in the good graces of Freud.¹ From their first acquaintance they respected each other's originality, without expecting too much in the way of that type of agreement which is essentially compliance.

In some respects Binswanger's approach to therapy parallels that of others, including American theorists, notably Harry Stack Sullivan. However Binswanger was more in touch with currents in philosophy, being influenced most by the kind of philosophical existentialism propounded by Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers (who himself is a psychiatrist) after Søren Kierkegaard.²

Binswanger spoke of the patient's Umwelt, Mitwelt, and Eigenwelt. Later he largely replaced these categories with "existential

¹Ibid., pp. 48, 121 ff. (the latter reference is in III "A Clinical Introduction to Psychiatric Phenomenology and Existential Analysis," by Henri F. Ellenberger).

²Ibid.

An important book, expounding the existential analysts' approach to dream psychology is Medard Boss, Der Traum Und Seine Auslegung (Bern und Stuttgart, Verlag Hans Huber, 1953). He acknowledges his debt to Ludwig Binswanger. "Die Möglichkeit, ein solches Wagnis zu unternehmen, verdanke ich der Auseinandersetzung mit dem daseinsanalytischen Denken Martin Heideggers" (p. 8).

See also: Boss, Psychoanalyse und Dasein Analytik (Bern, Verlag Hans Huber, 1957).

modes"--reflecting the existentialists' dasein. These modes are as follows: (1) The dual mode, which is somewhat like Sullivan's "need for intimacy" in inter-personal relations and like the intimacy need and concurrent intimacy crisis, stressed by Erikson among the Freudian ego-psychologists, and much like the I-Thou relationship which Buber considers as basic; (2) The plural mode, which is consciousness of being one among many, with resultant patterns of competitiveness, and (3) The anonymous mode, which is characterized by broken identity, depersonalization trends, and the like.¹

This movement in depth psychology derives from pre-Freudian Swiss psychiatry, Freudian psychology, as well as the philosophical existentialism, mentioned earlier.

The "existential anxiety," or, as we prefer to call it in this paper, "the fundamental anxiety,"² is born of the risk of existing as a human being. It is more than merely analogous, perhaps, to the derivation of the German word for it, angst, from the Latin word for narrowness. "Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way that leads to life" is still the Christian insight. Does fundamental anxiety bespeak the way to authentic life?

The "existential analysts" consider the therapist's task:

(1) to investigate the entire structure of the patient's existence

¹May et al., Existence, loc. cit.

²The term "fundamental anxiety" is used for two reasons: (1) It points to the fundamental mystery of man's existence. (2) It is fundamental to man as man: the anxiety that is peculiarly human.

in order to help him determine its basic meaning and direction; (2) to understand the various worlds in which he lives; and (3) to give him the biographical kind of psychoanalysis, which the Freudians stress.¹

We recall William James' analysis of the why of religious institutions: "The warring gods and formulas of the various religions do indeed cancel each other, but there is a certain uniform deliverance in which religions appear to meet."² It consists of two parts: the problem and the solution. The problem is "an uneasiness--a sense that there is something wrong about us as we naturally stand."³

This is akin to that restlessness of which Augustine spoke in his Confessions: "Our hearts are restless till they find their rest in Thee."⁴ It is also like the "inner world of misery" which Calvin described.⁵

Existential fear seems to be like Tillich's "fear of non-being." Tillich's conceptions of anxiety and courage⁶ are influential

¹May, et al., loc. cit.

²William James, The Varieties of Religious Experience, Gifford Lectures, Edinburgh, 1901-02 (New York, Random House, Modern Library, 1929), pp. 497-8.

³Ibid.

⁴Augustine, Confessions, I, 1.

⁵Supra, Chapter Four.

⁶See Tillich, The Courage to Be, and other works, including lectures and essays on Christianity and psychotherapy, for instance in Pastoral Psychology, passim; for example, "The Theological Significance of Existentialism and Psychoanalysis," in Tillich, Theology of Culture, pp. 112-126.

on psychotherapists, including Rollo May, and others especially of the "school of thought" founded by Harry Stack Sullivan.

Something of "the fundamental anxiety" seems to be what Joseph Haroutunian, a Presbyterian theologian, is depicting when he says that man's awareness that he has had a beginning and will have an end conditions and qualifies his total existence.

I was born. I was not, and then I was. I am, but I was not. I am, but I shall not be. Having not been, I am; I am coming to be what I was not; I am coming not to be what I was; I am coming not to be; I virtually am not. I was not, and I shall not be. I am as he who was not and shall not be. Therefore, I act necessarily not as I-am-and-was-and-ever-shall-be, but as I am-and-was-not-and-shall-not-be."¹

Rollo May, extrapolating from case studies, theorizes that "neurotic anxiety" arises not from rejection alone, but from rejection in contradiction to expectations. Subjects who experienced, unmistakably, rejection by their parental milieu, have been known to be relatively free from "neurotic anxiety." Victims of this distress are likely to be persons who feel rejected but for some reason continue to expect to be accepted.²

What we have called "the fundamental anxiety" born of existence itself has in it the element of expectation. Anxiety presupposes hope,

¹Joseph Haroutunian, The Lust for Power (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1949), pp. 50-51.

Cf. also the view of Martin Heidegger, which is a stimulus to so-called "existentialist theology."

²Rollo May, The Meaning of Anxiety, pp. 235-355, especially at p. 343.

even as guilt presupposes love, and shame presupposes trust.¹ However, in examining these three psychological phenomena, we realize again that anxiety is pervasive. Shame feelings are a form which it takes. Guilt feelings are a form of anxiety. Guilt awareness is complicated by underlying shame and mistrust.

Probably no one can do "justice" to the fundamental anxiety who has not been given the grace of trustfulness. If there has been little or no experience of the trustworthiness necessary for the human infant to grow on, then it is doubtful that he can even confront the fundamental mystery and the anxiety which is the strait and narrow path toward individuated-life-in-community. He can hardly develop beyond being anxious about what he will eat and what he will wear. How can he be concerned for the Kingdom of God?

In that Johannine dialogue of Jesus with Nicodemus, was Jesus not saying, "Go all the way back to birth and start over again"?² Certainly he was saying this in some sense. The Synoptics emphasize the requisite: Become as little children. Does not the Christian soteriology teach that one must be established in a pattern of basic trust in order to be made whole? Does not Christology say that here in the Christ, and en Christo, is trustworthy love, altheia and

¹Supra, Chapters Five and Six. Mrs. Lynd (after a discussion of Erikson's views) says, rightly, it seems, "In shame there is a doubt, a questioning of trust. Shame may be said to go deeper than guilt; it is worse to be inferior and isolated than to be wrong, to be outcast in one's own eyes than to be condemned by society."--Helen Merrell Lynd, op. cit., p. 207. She goes on, then, to discuss what she calls the "guilt axis" and the "shame axis."--Ibid., pp. 208-210.

²John 3.

agape? In telling his disciples not to be anxious about what they will eat or what they will wear Jesus tells them to seek the Kingdom of God and simply to expect that their security will be provided. He does not say that the Kingdom of God is an alternative to any and all anxiety. Is he not rather announcing that it is the only concern worthy of essential human nature? It is as though the invitation were worded: Channel all your anxieties into one great anxiety. Man is invited to live with and through his anxiety, anxiety more profound than "neurotic" anxiety.

In the Fourth Gospel Jesus prays that his disciples will be "one"--at one--with each other and with God even as he is at one with God, whom he addresses as "Father." He says that he and the Father are one. The meaning seems to be: "I and my Father are at one." No guilt separates him from the Father.² "Glorify the son."³ There is no shame. Yet, according to ancient Christian affirmation, he took upon himself the "guilt" of mankind and endured the "shame" of the cross.⁴ Shame is in polarity with glory. As we noted in Part One, Jesus' "guilt" before the self-righteous leadership of his people was his friendship for "sinners." His legal "guilt," technically, seems to have been what was then construed as a kind of "illegal" assertion. The "reality" which he represented was put to the test.

¹Luke 12:22-40, which includes also the motif of expectancy.

²See John 13-18. John 8; and 10; especially, John 14:8-14 and 17:11, 20-26.

³John 17:1.

⁴Hebrews 12:10.

In the prayer to which we have referred, not only does Jesus pray for the at-oneness of the disciples, but he prays not that they be removed from "the world" but that they be kept from "the evil."¹ Surely the evil is not individuation as such, involving as it probably does, the kind of "guilt" feeling which Otto Rank describes.² The evil, for Jesus, is the kind of wrongness that was about to crucify him and the kind of evil which tempted him before he was taken by the crucifiers. It is the evil (1) of trying to live by somatic satisfaction alone, (2) of worshiping one's own self-image, or any other image on this side of ultimacy, and (3) of insisting on absolute verification before committing oneself to "the Kingdom of God."³

Here, the evil, including life-negation and meaning-negation, is not the tribulation--the tragic element in existence (?). Jesus said: "In the world you shall have tribulation. But be of good cheer: I have overcome the world." The evil is in being overcome by the world, refusing--or failing perhaps non-guiltily--to partake of that triumph which Jesus represents. Tribulation occasions anxiety. But anxiety per se is not the evil, not even the subjective evil. The evil is in settling for the negative possibilities, a wrong use of, or response to, the fundamental anxiety. Surely, speaking quite objectively and perhaps even extra-psychologically, we can say that the evil is in avoiding for oneself the narrow gate

¹John 17:15.

²That is: guilt anxiety, which accompanies deciding and acting either pro or contra the emerging, individuated will.

³Supra, Chapter One.

that leads to life, and, what is more, in diverting one's neighbor from that way, and, still more, in failing to seek the neighbor who has somehow missed it, to help him find the way and to endure.



CHAPTER EIGHT

WHAT IS HIS GUILT? IV THE MEANING OF DESPAIR

Whereas anxiety is that restlessness of spirit which says, "Something disastrous may happen," despair is the conviction that "something disastrous has happened." Guilt, fallen into despair, says, "No restitution is possible." Shame, when lost in despair, is the conviction: "There is no worth in me, nothing for me, or with me, or around me." Despair is hopelessness. It is the triumph of distrust.

Søren Kierkegaard, who had much to say about sin, anxiety, and despair, defined sin as despair, the guilt before God. "Sin is this: before God, or with the conception of God, to be in despair at not willing to be oneself, or in despair at willing to be oneself."¹ It is despair at the limitations which one faces in any direction as he tries to realize--fulfill--himself as a person. The despair "of weakness" refuses the risk of separateness, or individuation. This is the theory which Otto Rank elaborates. The despair "of strength" is a defiant willingness to be "individuated" to the extent of

¹Søren Kierkegaard, The Sickness Unto Death, trans. by Walter Lowrie, Anchor edition, Fear and Trembling and The Sickness Unto Death (New York, Doubleday, 1954), p. 208.

denying dependence, inter-dependence, relationship.¹ This must be the "despair" which motivates the Adlerian man of "a neurotic style of life."

One aspect of the fundamental anxiety says, "I risk being separated." The despair which refuses to risk becoming individuated, says, "I am destroyed if I am separated; therefore I cannot be separated." The anxiety says, "I am dependent although forced to assume independence." The despair says, "If I assume independence, I am completely stranded; being thrown on my own I am nothing. There is nothing in me to contain, nothing upon which to rely." Despair is the painful affirmation of nothingness--or acquiescence in a kind of nihilism. The fundamental anxiety also says, "I must become myself, individuated; or I will be swallowed up, lost, put out of control like an aircraft without a pilot." The despair says, "Any softness toward others or toward the importuning of community-feeling or the claims of existing in relationship means being swallowed up, lost, put out of control like an aircraft without a pilot." Hopelessness can be destructive of both individuation-potential and community-potential.

The clinical terms which suggest despair include depression and depressive state. Mrs. Klein makes the depression state pivotal in the formation of the ego-superego structure of the individual. The infant's anxiety is like that which is seen in the depressive syndromes of both psychosis and neurosis. It is superimposed on both paranoid and schisoid characteristics. The paranoid depression

is a kind of despairing sense of persecution by the "bad objects" which have been internalised--introjected--in the first few months of life. Klein adopts W. Ronald Fairbairn's conclusions as to the primacy of a schizoid stage, in which the objects are split.¹ The depressive state is that in which the evil seems to be victorious over the good, or, in Klein's system the death instincts threaten supremacy over the life instincts. Hence, depression is anxiety nearing despair.²

¹Supra; W. Ronald Fairbairn, Psychoanalytic Studies of the Personality, cited previously. Melanie Klein, "Notes on Some Schizoid Mechanisms," Developments in Psycho-Analysis, pp. 292-320, and other papers.

²Mrs. Klein calls the depression state "nodal" or "central" in the development of the personality.--"A Contribution to the Psychogenesis of Manic-Depressive States," Contributions to Psycho-Analysis, pp. 282-310. See also "Some Theoretical Conclusions Regarding the Emotional Life of the Infant," Developments, pp. 198-236.

Of course Klein is unrelenting in her brand of instinctualism. At least, it does convey "dynamistic" psychology. For example, we quote:

"The fluctuations between the depressive and the manic position are an essential part of normal development. The ego is driven by depressive anxieties (anxiety lest the loved objects as well as itself should be destroyed) to build up omnipotent and violent phantasies, partly for the purpose of controlling and mastering the 'bad,' dangerous objects, partly in order to save and restore the loved ones."

She says that both destructive and reparative omnipotence phantasies are at work from the beginning and pervade the life of the infant.--"Mourning and Its Relation to Manic-Depressive States," in Contributions, pp. 311-338, quoted at p. 316.

Recently she has written, for instance, "Part of the death instinct which is retained in the ego causes aggression to be turned against that persecutory object." Interaction of life and death instincts governs the whole of mental life. The statement reflects the necessity of communicating her insights vis-a-vis the ego-psychology wing of Freudian psychoanalysis.--Melanie Klein, "On the

In dealing with this subject, Karen Horney looks for insight in philosophy, if not theology. She draws upon Kierkegaard and Professor John MacMurray, of Edinburgh, and states that despair is fundamentally "at being ourselves." The only true significance possible to our existence is "to be ourselves fully and completely."¹

Horney describes "hopelessness" as the painful failure to realize this significance. Despair then is "an ultimate product of unresolved conflicts." She depicts an inner war between contrary impulses and self-image. There is no victory for the will to become one's true self. With Kierkegaard she describes the man who may seem to function normally although he really is in despair.²

One pattern which despair takes is what Horney describes as resignation. It is portrayed in John Marquand's novel So Little Time and Charles Jackson's The Lost Weekend. The latter depicts a man who tries to lose himself in alcoholism.³

Another pattern of despair is what Horney describes under the "rubric" of destructiveness. As we have noted, she feels that both of the Freudian theories as to the instincts are inadequate for explaining the dynamics of this phenomenon. Destructiveness is a pattern established in an individual by the societal influences which he experiences as rejection. The destructive individual has been

Development of Mental Functioning," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXIX, 1958, pp. 84-89, at 85.

¹John MacMurray, Reason and Emotion (London, Faber & Faber, 1935), quoted in Our Inner Conflicts, p. 183.

²Horney, ibid., p. 185.

³Ibid., p. 192

deprived of a healthy, objective self-appreciation. Horney sees the mental mechanisms at work in the interest of maintaining somehow one's impoverished selfhood vis-a-vis his social milieu. Despair can be destructive of others. It is present, obviously, in sadistic trends. Varieties include: striving to enslave others, to play on or with the emotions of others, to exploit, to frustrate others, to disparage or humiliate others. A ready example of this type of despair is Ibsen's Hedda Gabler.¹

This despairing, destructive, person, according to Horney, is one who has been overcome by the feeling of being left out, forever excluded, defeated, and at the same time, not able to become resigned. Instead of despairing at becoming himself, he despairs at not becoming himself. He becomes utterly resentful.

"Hence he starts to hate life and all that is positive in it. But he hates it with the burning envy of one who is withheld from something he ardently desires. It is the bitter, begrudging envy of a person who feels that life is passing him by."² Horney relates hopelessness to Nietzsche's Lebensneid. The destructive man-in-despair is trying to realize himself destructively through others. He has nothing to lose, he "reasons" he can only gain, according to his desperate logic.

Rarely, however, do sadistic tendencies characterize the total outward personality. They can be mixed with manifestations of

¹Ibid., p. 196-7.

²Ibid., p. 201.

the inner fear of their destructiveness. We recall the mechanism of reaction-formation. Sadistic impulses can be so repressed that the person may lean over backward, so to speak, to avoid frustrating others.

In her later work, Neurosis and Human Growth, Horney speaks of self-hate and self-contempt as she elaborates her doctrine of the idealized self-image. This "self hatred" is essentially the same "destructiveness" which she has described in her earlier writings as sadistic and despairing, when it is turned against the self. It corresponds to masochistic trends.

The self-accusations appear similar to "normal" guilt feelings. But they are greatly exaggerated. They are manifestations of despair. Their "neurotic" focus on externals indicates their true purpose, which is to protect the actual self from complete submersion in despair, from complete debilitation by the oppressive self images. Hence, the self-accusations may assume every listener to be a jurist, as it were.

Horney's picture of despair shows one who hates himself not simply because his self-reproach may be in part valid. Instead, he accuses himself because he hates himself.¹ This, as we saw earlier, is internalized rejection, self-rejection derived from actual--or felt--rejection by the societal environment.²

¹Karen Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth (1950), pp. 128-129.

²Supra, Chapter Six.

One self-accusation may follow another, says Horney, listing examples as follows:

He does not take revenge; therefore he is a weakling. He is vindictive; therefore he is a brute. He is helpful; therefore he is a sucker. He is not helpful; therefore he is a selfish pig If he externalises the self-accusations he may feel that everybody is imputing ulterior motives to everything he does. This may be so real to him that he resents others as unfair. In defense he may wear a rigid mask so that nobody will guess from his facial expressions, his tone of voice, or his gestures what is going on within him. Or he may even be unaware of such externalizations. In his conscious mind then everybody is very nice. And only during the analytic process will he realize that he actually feels under constant suspicion. Like Democles, he may live in terror lest the sword of some severe accusation fall on him at any moment.¹

Horney takes up where she feels Erich Fromm left off too soon in his "analysis" of K in Kafka's The Trial.² We may be inclined to extend her criticism to the K in The Castle, though the K there may represent a somewhat stronger initiative. Fromm points to the lack of autonomy, the dullness in K's drifting, guilty existence. K is always looking for someone else to solve his problems instead of turning to his own resources. He should feel the guilt projected in the continual imminence of the trial says Fromm, he is guilty! The guilt is precisely that which has already been suggested in our study. It is his failure to accept the fundamental anxiety as a

¹Neurosis and Human Growth, p. 129.

²Ibid., pp. 129-130. Horney refers to Fromm's discussion of Kafka in Man For Himself.

part of the given and to take it on into authentic involvement in the life that is possible.¹

But Horney completes the literary diagnosis of K, saying of Fromm's analysis: "It leaves out the point that Mr. K's very attitude toward his guilt is in turn unconstructive, and it is so because he deals with it in the spirit of self-hate," though not apparently.²

Despairing "guilt" and/or "shame" is self-hatred. At base self-hatred is "neurotic pride," according to Horney. It is castigation of that self which has been rejected by the self which aspires to acceptability and glory.³ The person who is propelled by "neurotic pride" may seem the personification of hubris. Actually, however, he is a victim of "society's" sin. Self-accusation tries to rid the self of its perhaps "real" image. It inveighs against the mirrored likeness in the name of the romantic portrait painting which it fails to resemble. Neurotic pride smashes the mirror and sees the "self" only as the portrait.

Hubris refuses to accept the implications of the fundamental anxiety, specifically, the facts of dependence and relationship, along with the potential for individuation. Denied most consciously,

¹Horney, ibid. This, our own construction, seems fair although Horney and Fromm do not speak of "fundamental anxiety."

"Existential anxiety" may indeed be a preferable phrase. We have given our considerations earlier (supra, Chapter Seven, notes).

²Horney, ibid.

³Ibid., pp. 130-132.

defiantly, is the desire--and need--for union. This is the "despair of defiance" to use Kierkegaard's terminology.¹

In her last book, Horney again discusses both resignation and destructiveness patterns. To the alcoholics and to Hedda Gabler she adds the State in George Orwell's 1984 as conveying what she sees as the self-demolishing potential of the oppressive idealized images.²

Self-pity may at times be a warning against the tragedy of despair. The actual self may be protesting, "Unfair!" This may well be the case when such self-pity appears in dreams. Again, we may be reminded of the dreamlike tales of Franz Kafka. Horney would agree with both Freud and Jung and definitely with the existential analysts, but in her own way: "In dreams," she says, "we are closer to the reality of ourselves."³

Probably Horney voices something of a consensus from depth psychology as she closes her discussion of self-hatred.

Surveying self-hate and its ravaging force, we cannot help but see in it a great tragedy of the human mind. Man in reaching out for the Infinite and Absolute also starts destroying

¹The Sickness Unto Death, edition cited earlier, pp. 200-207. Kierkegaard has had profound influence on contemporary philosophy and theology, and, increasingly, we can now add, on psychotherapy.

²Neurosis and Human Growth, pp. 148-154.

³Ibid., pp. 152-3. If Horney is right here, we should place different constructions (from those ordinarily placed by the "reasonable prudent man") on the phenomenon of "self-pity,"--viz., that it "is half scandal." More accurately, authentic self-pity is the expression of an inner protest against despair.

himself. When he makes a pact with the devil, who promises him glory, he has to go to hell--to the hell within himself.¹

This is the hell from which depth psychologists as therapists make it their business to save their patients and clients. It is this torment which Dr. Albert Ellis rightly insists on regarding as the state from which salvation--as rescue--is needed.² Stirring up the fires of such hell can hardly be a technique in the deliverance. Obviously, Dr. O. H. Mowrer does not regard a certain sense of guilt as the torment.³ Rather, authentic guilt-feeling is the victim's grasping upward for a saving hand, perhaps.

Christian Theology's Understanding of Despair
in the Light of Depth Psychology

If it is desirable, from the standpoint of Christian theology, that a person be able to maintain a responsible relationship with society--and certainly it is according to the very genius of Christianity, it is--then absolute despair is the last precipice.

Depth psychology, especially as actual therapy, recognizes utter hopelessness, regardless of how it is manifested, as the last stop before either suicide or a psychotic break with reality. In Horney's last book she follows her discussion of the more accessible despair, with a description of self-alienation. This term is expanded

¹Ibid., p. 154.

²Supra, in the Introduction.

³Cf. discussion supra, Introduction.

to apply to conditions short of amnesias, depersonalizations, and other distortions. The nerves are cut between the real self and its front to the world. The actual self becomes increasingly lost in its fictions.¹

We recall the Freudian observations which led to the positing of a splitting of the ego and the Kleinian conceptions of fragmented images "incorporated" from childhood. We begin to appreciate Jung's complex diagram of selfhood and his and Otto Rank's perceptive emphasis on the determinancy of the irrational.

The therapists of the many schools see the same phenomena of brokenness. Sullivan interprets psychosis as a falling back into prototaxic modes of perceiving and behaving. He also sees the self system as divided into dissociated "selves" each considering the others as "not me."²

Karen Horney equates the loss of the real self with what Kierkegaard called "the sickness unto death." Yet hopelessness is sickness, not death, but moving toward death, death to the real self, to the potential that has been given to the human soul, the psuche.³ Theologians go further than the depth psychologists and

¹Horney, Neurosis and Human Growth, pp. 155 f.

²Supra, Chapter Six; cf. Mullahy, Oedipus, p. 294.

³Cf. Jung's correlation of the psyche with the psuche, of theology.--E. g., Modern Man In Search of a Soul, pp. 201-2 ("The Modern Spiritual Problem"); cf. ibid., pp. 181 ff. ("The Basic Postulates of Analytical Psychology"); and excerpt (quoted from Jung's Allgemeine Gesichtspunkte zur Psychologie des Traumes, p. 178) in Psychological Reflections (Bollingen Series XXXI), p. 8, fourth reference.

speak of the death of the possibility of essential humanity. Despair moves in depth through intensifications of guilt, of shame, of anxiety, toward utter distrustfulness.

Little wonder, therefore, that Christian theology continues to insist, like an ever tolling bell, that the alternative is faith as trustfulness.¹ However, it bases its message not on the need which despair enunciates. It tells its invitation because it is convinced that there is gospel: the grace of trustworthiness has come for all mankind. Beyond merely proclaiming such a reason for trustfulness, essential Christianity seeks to implement the gospel, to serve the trustworthiness by being an instrument for its taking form, for its Gestalt in the lives of human beings.²

The Christian Gospel is a ringing affirmation that it is possible for one to live with anxiety in hope rather than without "anxiety" in some kind of despair. There is little expectation in despair. Anxiety is the question. Despair is its negative, life-denying answer. Hope is its affirmative, life-affirming, answer. Perhaps culpable wrongness when present in the phenomenon of despair is in the mode of answering the question posed by anxiety. Despair both as resignation and as destructiveness is the judgment, the krisis: Light has come into the world.³ Do some continue in the

¹This is consistent of course with "faith" as "commitment." Cf. J. H. Oldham, Life Is Commitment (New York, Harper, 1953).

²Supra, Chapter Two.

³Our allusions here are to Johannine passages, predominantly, and to the discussion of them in Chapter One, supra.

darkness of despair because they "love" it--they are "cathected" to "bad objects"--rather than Light, because they have "lost themselves" in evil, in deathfulness? The only answer seems to be, in its original profound and spiritual--pneumatic--sense: Back to the womb! You must be born anew, established in a pattern of basic trustfulness. You must know what it is to be loved, to be in "symbiotic union," in order that you may be a child of God-who-is-Agape. We note that the injunction to Nicodemus is not that one must be reunited to "the mother" without an ensuing separation. "You must be born" One must go through the trauma of separation again and with renewal in trustfulness, venture through the narrow gate of his fundamental anxiety--receive and accept the invitation to a pilgrimage.¹ In another Johannine passage, as we noted earlier, this insight is expressed: "We love Him because He first loved us." With the elaborated insights of Suttie, Pfister, Horney, Rank, and the whole psychoanalytic movement, we are encouraged to see the practical agent of salvation as love, agape. So-called "spiritual regeneration" must surely mean, in its proper Christian usage, an actual "justification"--as-acceptance of the rejected-despairing self. The despairing one must be lifted up out of the miry clay and have his feet set upon a rock. The essential self must have his way established.²

¹Cf. John Baillie, Invitation to Pilgrimage (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1942).

²Cf. Psalm 40.

If anxiety is the questioning by the basic human possibility as it confronts the ambiguities of existence--Dasein¹--and despair is the wrong answer (according to Christianity), then the heralds of the gospel--as the good news of hope--must understand the question in its situational idiom, its existential dimension and translate the message into the vernacular, if they are to make it plain. Interestingly enough the theological "answer," the "Christian answer," has always been, in its genius, not a propositional, textbook-type answer but a reverent, responsive, concern for the person who asks. The gospel is, in a profound sense, good news of how to ask the question! The soteria which Christianity proclaims is deliverance from the kind of bondage which either covers before the question or seeks to evade it.² The agape Tou Theou en Christo enables the individual to face the question of meaning, the question posed by anxiety, and to commit himself to hope as the answer, symbolized in the phrase: "The Kingdom of God"--He Basileia Tou Theou.

Our study of despair adds to such a challenge one further observation. It is an insight not peculiar to depth psychology, although it is forcefully employed by it. Despair is never final so long as there is life. Even suicidal phantasies show a wish to

¹Dasein as used by Heidegger seems to be close to what we mean here, although our less formal use of the term "existence" is, loosely, "life," "living," "situation."

²To become as a little child--to enter the Kingdom of God--must surely include becoming trustful enough to be a questioner, one who asks the questions of meaning and purpose.

be born over again.¹ The tendency nowadays in psychotherapy is to regard no psychotic as completely inaccessible. Perhaps no psychopathic character, no so-called socio-path, is inaccessible to the gospel of life and meaning.²

¹Regarding suicide, a contrary view is that of Joachim Flescher, who says that although suicide is associated with return to the womb, the underlying cause is the death instinct: "The 'Primary Constellation' in the structure and Treatment of Psychoses," Psychoanalytic Review, 40, 1953, pp. 197-217, at p. 214. Such a construction depends, of course, on acceptance of Freudian instinctual dualism.

Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics, edited Eberhard Bettige, New York, Macmillan, 1955, p. 123; and the perceptive discussion by Clyde A. Holbrook, Faith and Community, "A Christian Existential Approach" (New York, Harper, 1959), pp. 18-19.

²Addenda to our discussion, thus far, of the meaning of despair:

In Otto Rank's frame of reference, both the average man and the neurotic seem to be despairing types.

In the Biblical-Christian conception of sin we can discern that which may be described as "the will to estrangement." But, at the same time, we see that which may be described as "the will to parasitic dependence." Biblical-Christian "virtues" or states of "rightness" if not "blessedness," include what can be appropriately called "individuation," on the one hand, and "relationship," on the other.

Reinhold Niebuhr discusses one form of sin as despairing escape into sensuality. (The Nature and Destiny of Man, I, pp. 228-240). Karen Horney discusses sensuality as a strategy for avoiding the "basic anxiety" (The Neurotic Personality of Our Time, pp. 147-161, and in later writings).

Professor Tillich discusses the meaning of despair (Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 86-90) in terms of suicide, and the symbols of "the wrath of God" and "condemnation."

Much more can be said about suicide, especially in its probable psychological correlation with the desire for re-birth. Both

Of course the condition of those who are gravely injured mentally, perhaps organically, gives us pause. They pose another problem to our analysis. It seems proper to describe their condition as tragic, despair which is not culpable so far as they are concerned, except for whatever free choice there may have been which was "proximate cause" of their condition. Even were there culpability, it would now be in the past tense and therefore at an end. As we saw earlier, the genius of Christianity--of the Christ, Ho Soter--is not punitive. It is "soterial." Hence the culpability and non-culpability of victims of despair should be of interest to theology only for helping it to understand the way of soteria. The non-culpable instances of despair, along with all other instances, partake of the "darkness" of which Christianity speaks.

In those who are accessible at all to depth therapy despair is never absolute. The most resigned, the most destructive, the most despairing among men that breathe, is still "in the game" for some "reason." There is still enough of an affirmation of fundamental anxiety to keep him in the quest for hope. While there is life there is hope. Whereas despair cries--or moans--"Castastrophe has struck!"

sensuality and suicide can be studied in relation to the dual processes: individuation and relationship.

Making yet another observation on this general theme, we may see in the drama of Jesus' fateful encounter with his arraigners and crucifiers: the courage of individuation-in-relationship opposed by the will-to-parasitic-dependence (the sin that kills the prophets?), rationalizing itself as "righteous indignation" against a "will-to-estrangement" (the alleged crime of the Prophet? Cf. Jeremiah). Thus to characterise the encounter does involve gross oversimplification, perhaps. Nevertheless, it is suggestive of some truth.

life itself seems to go on saying, "Perhaps some hope will come to me redemptively and save me from utter meaninglessness!" Merely continuing to exist says this much.

CHAPTER NINE

WHAT IS HIS GUILT? - V - THE COMPLICATIONS OF SELF-CONCERN

Since the conception of sin has expressed itself often with reference to "self-centeredness," "self-love," and "self-conceit,"¹ our inquiry takes us to depth psychology for possible correlation here. What is the phenomenon of self-concern? We have already confronted it in our analysis of guilt feelings, shame, anxiety, and despair. It seems to be expressed in the attitudes: "Myself right or wrong!" and "Myself always right!"²

Classical Freudianism gives pretty much the following description of self-love. It is "primary narcissism" augmented by "secondary narcissism." Borrowing the term from Havelock Ellis, Freud views narcissism as erotic love for the self--the physical, organismic, self.³ Primary narcissism is considered normal and implicit in being an organism. It is the organism's instinctual

¹Supra, Part One, passim.

Also, for example, Paul Ramsey, in Basic Christian Ethics, (Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1954), p. 291 (Sin means anxious self-centeredness or self-centered anxiety).

²Cf. recurring allusions to this question, beginning in Chapter Four, supra.

³The Freudians took this term over from Havelock Ellis, Cf. Havelock Ellis, Psychology of Sex (1933), A Mentor Book, (New York,

concern with its own satisfaction. Secondary narcissism is "erotic involvement with oneself resulting from interference in the development of the love impulse toward others," according to Clara Thompson's glossary definition.¹ Freud spoke of this kind of narcissism when he construed a person's self-concern as tantamount to sexual attachment to one's own body as though it were an outside object. The theory has been refined to mean attachment to one's own ego--more or less as "self image" derived from one's "body concept"--or body image--first established in infancy and early childhood.

Freud considered narcissism as the libidinal complement of what is popularly called "egoism." Its force varies with the individual. A person may be markedly "egoistic," but with a relatively strong libidinous attachment to outside objects. His narcissism is chiefly of the primary type. Another "egoist" may have a relatively strong libidinous attachment to himself--to his own body, "body-image" (body-ego).²

In discussing "narcissistic" symptoms especially marked in "normal" persons during a situational neurosis, Freud says, "Certain conditions--organic illness, painful excesses of stimulation, an

New American Library, 1938), pp. 102-103, where Ellis himself reviews the evolution of the term and its use by himself and later by Freud (1910) and Rank (1911).

¹Clara Thompson, "Glossary" in An Outline of Psychoanalysis, (Modern Library, 1955), pp. 615-19, at 617.

²Freud seems not to have used the term "body ego," though it does not seem to be heterodox.

inflammatory condition of an organ--have clearly the effect of loosening the libido from its attachment to its objects. The libido which has thus been withdrawn attaches itself again to the ego in the form of a stronger investment of the diseased region of the body."¹

As one reads what Freud wrote both before and after his introduction of instinctual dualism, one gets the impression that such elaborate descriptions of ego-dynamics are at their base attempts to systematize an unavoidable assumption, or presumption, about the "lone individual." He does seem to have an ingrained self-concern. If this should ever depart from a person it would be at the moment of suicide, it would seem. Freud discusses this question specifically in "Turning and Melancholy."

Indeed it may be confusing. As we have noticed, it is close to the concept of "body image," Supra, Chapter Four. Paul Schilder, who was a creative associate of Freud, has elaborated this concept. (The Image and Appearance of the Human Body, and other works).

Cf. Freud's ego-oriented psychology, for example in The Interpretation of Dreams, Brill's translation in Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud at p. 280f.; Outline of Psycho-Analysis, pp. 23 (narcissism), p. 24 ("the whole body is an erotogenic zone"), pp. 89-91 (narcissistic and object cathexes in early infancy), pp. 112-114 (affects, good and ill, of repression of the instinctual demands).

"It has only been within fairly recent years, to a large part as a result of the work of Schilder,....that the 'body image' has assumed a role of importance in psychological thinking. The body image is now felt to be an integral aspect of the person's concept of self existence in relation to the world." --Helen D. Sargant and Ernest A. Hirsch, "Projective Methods" in L. A. Fenington and Irvin A. Berg, eds., An Introduction to Clinical Psychology, 2nd edition, (New York, The Ronald Press, 1954), at p. 208.

¹Freud, A General Introduction to Psycho-analysis, p. 426; see also pp. 423-5.

We have come to recognize a self-love of the ego which is so immense, in the fear that rises up at the menace of death we see liberated a volume of narcissistic libido which is so vast, that we cannot conceive how this ego can connive at its own destruction..... Now the analysis of melancholia shows that the ego can kill itself only when, the object-cathexis having being withdrawn upon it, it can treat itself as an object, when it is able to launch against itself the animosity relating to an object--that primordial reaction on the part of the ego to all objects in the outer world.¹

After 1920, when Freud introduced the concept of a primitive death, or destructiveness, instinct, it is hardly accurate to assume that his explanation of self-love continued to be simply as it was stated over a presupposition of hedonistic monism. However he did not repudiate the earlier theories. They seem to be the accepted doctrine among Freudians today. After he posited an instinctual dualism within the psychic dynamism, Freud assumed that the so-called libidinous forces, the sexual, erotic, instincts, oppose the organism's bent toward death. As they persist in prolonging the journey toward death, they are narcissistic. As they attach to the ego--or self-concept--as object, they are narcissistic in the secondary sense.

The Ego and the Id was the definitive work in which Freud modulated the concept of the "ego-ideal" into that of the superego, making the latter a structure within the psyche, with relative autonomy and independence from the ego.² As we have seen, it is

¹Sigmund Freud, "Mourning and Melancholia," "A General Selection from the Works of Sigmund Freud, John Rickman, ed., pp. 142-161, at 152-153; also, Collected Papers, IV, pp. 152-170, at 162-3).

²Discussed supra, Chapters Four and Five.

not always clear whether he intended to fuse his earlier doctrine of ego-ideal with superego. Nevertheless his first enunciation of the superego doctrine does seem to supersede the former postulate.

Freud went so far as to say, "It would be possible to picture the id as under the domination of the mute but powerful death-instincts, which desire to be at peace and (as the pleasure-principle demands) to put Eros, the intruder, to rest; but that would be to run the risk of valuing too cheaply the part played by Eros."¹ As we have noted many of Freud's followers halted before the dualistic concept. Nevertheless, they generally do employ the term superego, although it was formulated in the framework of instinctual dualism. Perhaps it is not logically dependent on the theory of instincts. However the superego was defined by Freud as the inner agency-or organization-of the death instincts. We infer that they have found their "embodiment" in the milieu in the threatening, oppressive, "father," both individually and phylogenetically.

A study of Freud's posthumously published An Outline of Psychoanalysis suggests that toward the end of his life he was still trying to bring together the theories which were propounded before and those born after his positing of an instinct of destructiveness. He describes the instincts in terms of drives which become fused into

¹Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id (London, Hogarth, 1923) pp. 87-88.

²See supra, Chapter Five; also Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, pp. 92, 112f.

more complex dynamic patterns. He described "sexual life" in terms of "component instincts."¹

In the end, the distinctions between eros and destructiveness² seem to be more poetic than coldly scientific--or pseudo-scientific. The one semi-hopeful passage in Civilization and Its Discontents is the following "recitative":

The fateful question of the human species seems to me to be whether and to what extent the cultural process developed in it will succeed in mastering the derangements of a communal life caused by the human instinct of aggression and self-destruction. In this connection, perhaps the phase through which we are at this moment passing deserves special interest. Men have brought their powers of subduing the forces of nature to such a pitch that by using them they could now very easily exterminate one another to the last man. They know this--hence arises a great part of their current unrest, their dejection, their mood of apprehension. And now it may be expected that the other of the two 'heavenly forces,' the eternal Eros, will put forth his strength so as to maintain himself alongside of his equally immortal adversary.³

¹"Component instincts" are the "partial instincts" or drives implicit in the erotogenic zones of the body--the sensitive organs of the organism, notably: oral, anal, and genital, according to Freud. For example, looking--scopophilia or "sexual gazing"--even includes sexual motivation. "Instincts and Their Vicissitudes," 1915, Collected Papers, IV, pp. 60-83, at pp. 72-76. Also, see "Psychogenic Visual Disturbance According to Psycho-Analytical Conceptions," 1910, trans. by E. Colburn Mayes, Collected Papers, II, pp. 105-121.

The instincts "represent the somatic demands upon mental life,"--An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p. 19. Also p. 24. As we have noticed earlier, Freud added "male," deathful components to the picture of dynamic mental life.

²These became the governing polarity in Freud's thought after he became firmly convinced of an organismic drive toward death--i. e., the death instinct(s). That these two forces are often described as plural reflects and "component" consideration we have noted in the footnotes above.

³Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontent, 1929 (London, 1930), pp. 143-4.

The inference of instinctual dualism is that the destructiveness of self-concern derives from a deep irrational force.

What seems to survive the most rigorous critical examination of Freud's psychology and logic, is the clinical phenomenon itself. Indeed, it is the near universal phenomenon expressed in the attitude of the individual: "Myself right or wrong!" It may or may not be accomplished by what Freud calls "secondary narcissism." But primary self-concern--regardless of whether the term "narcissism" is accepted for it--is presupposed by every school of psychoanalysis. Such concern seems to be implicit in the psyche-soma, the human organism itself.

Freud related pre-verbal autistic "thinking" to the phenomenon. The infant has what he called "omnipotence" feelings and phantasies.¹ Harry Stack Sullivan describes the "prototaxic," autistic, pre-logical mode.²

No psychologist seems to dispute the supposition that the infant is at first not able to differentiate between himself and

¹Cf. "One of the Difficulties of Psycho-Analysis" 1917, trans. by Joan Riviere, Collected Papers, IV, pp. 347-356. In this intriguing little paper, written before he arrived at his instinctual dualism (life and death), Freud describes three historic occasions or movements which have wounded the narcissism--self love--of mankind: (1) Cosmological (Copernicus); (2) Biological (Darwin); and (3) Psychological--i.e., psychoanalytical (Freud, we infer, although the only name he mentions in this section is that of Schopenhauer, whom he regarded as the most prominent of the predecessors of psycho-analytical insights--"whose unconscious 'Will' is equivalent to the instincts in the mind as seen by psycho-analysis"--p. 355).

²Supra, Chapter Four.

his environment. He has no development concept of himself as differentiated from the milieu. Psychologically, therefore, he continues in a quasi-symbiotic state. Events simply happen in his world. He is hungry. He is fed. He is cold. He is warmed, eventually. Hunger--eating, coldness--warmth, thirst--quenching-of-thirst, in short, nurture and biological satisfaction, along with their occasional privation, are even to the normal infant the near-total of experience until he reaches a certain plane of awareness. Objects and persons gradually do emerge from this field. He grasps them, withdraws from them, and relates himself to them in varying ways. Some he assimilates within his own psychic world. Others he rejects, resists, sometimes without success, since they may be imposed on him. The autistic mode of "thinking," the mode of "prototaxis," is probably what one is re-experiencing, resorting to it, perhaps, when he is drawn by "magic." It is the matrix for belief in magic. The Jungian concept of introversion is at least somewhat in correlation with Freudian theories of primary autism with its omnipotence mentality.²

¹Many studies--including so-called objective studies--can be cited. However, from her vast clinical undertaking of children, Melanie Klein makes an interpolative judgment: "I believe that babies have altogether more intellectual capacity than is assumed."--"Weaning" in John Rickman, ed., On Bringing Up Children (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner, 1938, pp. 51-56, at pp. 54-55).

²This resembles Piaget's "ego-centric": its cause and its effects on learning. The ego-centric child is a neglected child, in not being properly introduced to other centers of interest.--Jean Piaget, The Language and Thought of the Child, 2nd edition, 1930, trans. Marjorie Gabain (New York, Meridian Books, 1955).

Probably such insight, even in Freudian terms, except for the mechanistic, materialistic crudities with which they abound, is one of the most helpful to Christian theology as it addresses the problem of "man-as-sinner." The understanding of primary self-concern, and primary autism, bears directly on the hubris, or "Lucifer" mentality, which says, "I will be like the Most High." It elucidates the more overtly affectional forms of self-love, the covert forms, the persistent, underlying concern which defends against the threats of starvation, separation, and abandonment. It is that deep motivation for warding off censure, rejection, privation. It is self-concern which is patent in the attitude: "I must be satisfied, secure, right at all costs--at least 'right' in the sense of being 'right' in order to be secure. I am what I am. I want what I want when I want it. I must be in a position to endure--and conquer--this or that situation."

Tempting though it may be, to define this aspect of human nature as the culpable wrongness of persons--sinfulness--is both logically and psychologically unrewarding. True, even Freud, the man, seemed to regard narcissism--presumably "secondary narcissism"--with less patience than he had for other weaknesses.¹ Yet, the omnipotence feeling and the patterning of behavior which one sees in unattractive "selfishness" and "egoism" is logically no more blameworthy than attractive-object-adoring, rather than self-as-object-adoring

¹Cf. Ernest Jones, "Obituary of Hanns Sachs," The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXVII, 1946, pp. 168-9.

behavior. Object-adoring may well be object-consuming. We think of "Uncle Screwtape" who could close his letters to his nephew Wormwood with both "Your affectionate uncle," and "Ravenously yours." The "egoist" who "loves" others as objects more than himself as object may actually be far more dangerous than the person who is lost in erotic self-appreciation. The latter is more like a vegetable. The former is like a ravenous wolf or a roaring lion.

The Christian conception of sin is addressed, not so much to the question, important though it is, as to who is the more dangerous to society, but to the question: Wherein is the wrong and how can it be righted?

Probably the depth psychologists are right in assuming that "primary narcissism"--or some aspect of Horney's "urge to grow," Jung's self, with its life force, Rank's counter-will, Suttie's solipsist but potentially social self,² Sullivan's waking self and self-system--is intrinsic to human nature. Probably they are right in describing erotic "self-love," and much of what we commonly call "self-seeking," even "pride," and "egoism," as but the symptoms of early environmental disturbances which somehow have forced the innocent, deprived infant to retreat into himself or else to fixate on

¹C. S. Lewis, The Screwtape Letters (New York, Macmillan, 1945), passim.

²Ian Suttie, objecting to Freud's hypothesis of a primary narcissism, prefers a primary solipsism, marked simply by the inability to discriminate between "self" and "other."--Origins of Love and Hate, pp. 30 ff.

object-relations that are detrimental to himself and to the health of society.¹ The self-adoring and the object-exploiting individuals are pitiable. They may function somewhat helpfully within society, but they do not represent its optimum health. Though their attitude is wrong, they are not paragons of sinfulness! They cannot be properly blamed for circumstances, aetiological and psychogenetic, over which they have had no control. Theirs is an imposed, infused wrongness, ugly though it may be.

This is true in any abstract consideration of the phenomenon. However, in the concrete instances of such wrongness, there is no doubt some culpability. But it is so limited in its actual scope that it would seem a travesty against the truth to call what they represent the essence of what is meant by sin as accountable wrong.

Therefore we are forced to conclude that, if we admit as insight the weight of depth psychology, and indeed of practically any responsible developmental psychology, we cannot properly define

¹For an engaging and lucid exposition of applied Freudian psychogenetic theory, see O. Spurgeon English and Gerald H. J. Pearson, Emotional Problems of Living (New York, Norton, 1945). For example, the authors describe a "brilliant," "dependent" type, who, though he makes a good first impression, fails to "wear well" with his acquaintances because of "the dependent attitude which arises out of the oral phase of development when the needs of the infant child have not been sufficiently gratified, have not been given enough friendly attention by the mother or nurse."--Ibid., pp. 26-27.

Cf. "The Study of Character," including selections from Freud, Adler, Karl Abraham, Erich Fromm, Horney, Viola Klein, and Clara Thompson, which illustrate both Freudian and "revisionist" approaches to the subject--Clara Thompson, et al., eds., An Outline of Psychoanalysis, Chapters 17-24, pp. 277-418.

sin as "self-love" or "selfishness" per se. These may be manifestations of the effect of the offense committed by the child's milieu. They are not the wrong for which the subject himself can be held accountable.

This insight of depth psychology also weakens the time-honored reduction of sin to idolatry, if by it is meant idolatry, per se. Idolatry is analogous to, if not psychologically derived from, the infant's relation to the objects of his slowly objectified milieu during that stage of "autistic," "prototaxic," "pre-logical,"¹ thinking, when everything that happens seems to happen by magic. Idolatry, like "egoism" partakes of omnipotence yearning, of superstition, of often tragic immaturity in one's understanding of his milieu, of the objects and images which are its very countenance, its visage to the seeking infant. The infant's world is physiognomic, highly personal, but without the realism which can come only with development.²

¹Cf. Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Primitive Mentality, trans. Lilian Clare (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1923), pp. 59ff, and his earlier work: Les Fonctions Mentales Dans Les Societes Inferieures (1910).

As Professor Edgar P. Dickie comments (in a letter to the present writer), Levy-Bruhl overstated his case. If the primitive man had been completely alogical he would never have survived. The term "pre-logical" is suggestive, however, for attempts to describe not only the "mentality" of the primitive but also that of the young child.

²Heinz Werner, The Comparative Psychology of Mental Development, (New York, Harper, 1940), p. 262; and the discussion of Werner's "physiognomic" stage: Gardner Murphy, Personality.

Omnipotence feelings and yearnings, superstition, incantations, over-investment of objects, and the like may be "neurotic," but they are nostalgic, regressive, or fixated and cannot properly be regarded as accountable wrongness in themselves. Unless Christianity means merely a kind of symptomatology when it speaks of sin, these are not the sin of humanity.

Self-concern and immature relationship with the world of objects provide complications for our inquiry into the nature of actual guilt--before God, self, and neighbor.¹ Earlier we met the

A Biosocial Approach to Origins and Structure (New York, Harper, 1947), pp. 266, 268, 336, 358, 365, 387, and 994.

See also Werner's op. cit., revised edition (Chicago, Follett Publishing Co., 1948), pp. 382-3 et passim.

Also Harry Stack Sullivan, The Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry edited by Helen Swick Perry and Mary Ladd Gawel (New York, Norton, 1953), pp. 145-148.

¹Cf. The "debate" between Erich Fromm and Paul Tillich over the use of the term "self-love." Tillich argues for "self-affirmation" or "self-acceptance" as less ambiguous phrases than "self-love." Fromm counters with a vigorous defense of his terminology, appealing to the Biblical conception of a proper "self-love" implicit in the "Love" commandment: "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." See Paul Tillich, "Erich Fromm's The Sane Society," Pastoral Psychology, VI, 56, September, 1955, pp. 13-16, at p. 14; Erich Fromm, The Art of Loving (New York, Harper, 1956), p. 57n. "Self-love," in the sense argued by Fromm, implies the kind of self-transcendence which seems to be characteristic of the human "self-consciousness" in which one can look on oneself as a person, even as he can regard others as persons outside himself.

See Fromm, Man For Himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of Ethics (London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1949); especially a selection published in Clara Thompson's An Outline of Psychoanalysis, pp. 320-337. Like Horney, and perhaps in contrast to Reinhold Niebuhr, Fromm argues there that "the failure of modern culture lies not in the idea that moral virtue is the same as the pursuit of self-interest; not in the fact that people are too much concerned with

complications of shame feelings which have been imposed on the subject-self. As Reinhold Niebuhr and others argue, anxiety may be the occasion or temptation for sin. However it is inevitable if one is to become essentially human. It is the operative force in both shame and guilt feelings.

We have suggested that a wrong response to the "call" of anxiety is a form of despair. To the extent that this response is a free choice to despair when to hope is possible, it can properly be described as culpable. Instrumentalistically speaking, we may be able to say that if one has chosen to despair he may be open to being "convinced" of his "sin" and moved to change his heading, to accept the grace of basic trustworthy agape. In principle, his trust

their self-interest, but that they are not concerned enough with the interest of their real self; not in the fact that they are too selfish but that they do not love themselves"--Thompson An Outline, p. 336 (we have omitted italics). See Man For Himself, pp. 119-140.

Fromm takes to task, not only Calvin and Luther, but also Immanuel Kant. Here Fromm tries to distinguish categorically "selfishness" from "self-love."--Fromm, ibid., pp. 129ff. The selfish person does not love himself; he hates himself. Correlating this "doctrine" of Fromm with that of Horney, we can say that "selfishness" is a form of despair--or an attempt to escape the ravages of despair-at-being-oneself. The selfish person is a victim of a deep inner hopelessness. Fromm describes Peer Gynt's devotion to self. He lost the self which he sought (again we are within the New Testament thought). "To thyself be true" was twisted and lost in a way of life that read, "To thyself be enough." Love of things and of fancies--grasping for objects--is tantamount to rejection of one's real self--as of no intrinsic worth. Hence it is lost.

See also Alexander Reid Martin, "Why Psychoanalysis?" in Are You Considering Psychoanalysis?, Karen Horney, editor, (New York, Norton, 1946), pp. 15-36, at p. 35.

and commitment will then be not "ego-centric" but "Kingdom-of-God" centered. In fact, he will have two foci of concern: himself and "the Kingdom of God."

Although the subject-self has no choice in the matter of intrinsic self-concern nor in much of the twisting of that concern by a nightmarish introduction to the world of events and objects, his accountable offense is always committed in the supposed interest of his self-concern or in despair of that interest. The story of Adam's fall into sin suggests that "the serpent," some outside or "transcendent" evil force or principle, deceives self-concern into choosing a way of despair over a way of hope. The deception is in the very guise of hope.¹

¹Supra, Chapter One. The serpent is depicted as being more subtle than any "wild creature" in the garden. He tempts Eve to eat of the forbidden fruit, telling her that it will open up to her a fuller life instead of ushering her to death. Perhaps there is an added lesson here that the "food" to which she was tempted was a kind of despair, or despairing self-loss, in the supposed interest of finding a more adequate (less dependent!) selfhood, which proved illusory. --Genesis 3.

CHAPTER TEN

"MAN AS SINNER" IN THE LIGHT OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

From our study of "man as sinner" in the light of depth psychology we can make the following inferences for the Christian understanding of sin.

(1) There is within the complexity of the self-dynamism (Sullivan) that which we can assume to be centered subjectivity when we define it by such characteristics as:

- awareness
- reflection
- anticipation
- "prospectiveness"
- reasoning (and rationalising)
- managing (a kind of vigil which ever attempts to control the situation).

The "situation" for this subject-self is a dynamic field which includes impulses from within the organism, within the psyche, and stimuli-demands from the outside, together with the interaction of these two "fronts." Hence, we may say, by way of supposition of course, that there is within limits for almost everyone a "self" - a subject-self, capable of making choices, assuming responsibility for them, and of trying to reconstruct "the situation."

(2) Guilt feelings are anxiety, love, and possibly hatred-turned-against-the-self, fused in a compulsion to undo an event or its result.

(3) The capacity for assuming responsibility and for feeling guilt is affected by a distinct dynamism which we have called shame, an inner conviction of unworthiness or inferiority, which derives initially from an early sense of privation or rejection.

(4) Both guilt feelings and compulsive shame feelings involve anxiety, which is a pervasive fearfulness. Fundamental anxiety is that which seems inevitable in the risk of life itself. Its two aspects are: fear of separation--individuation--and fear of (re)union--responsible relationship.

(5) Despair is the refusal, failure, or inability to endure anxiety. In terms of the fundamental anxiety it is refusal or failure to endure one or both aspects of the risk of becoming an individuated person in responsible relationship with others.

(6) So-called "self-love," "egoism," and "selfishness" are derived (1) from intrinsic, hence non-culpable, self-concern and (2) from immaturity in one's relations to "his objects," to the milieu of early childhood, hence also largely non-culpable.

In terms of the Freudian theory of psychogenesis: despair harks back to a fundamental pattern of distrust. Shame reflects fixation during the "toddling" stage. Guilt patterns suggest later infancy and early childhood formations of character. Anxiety is present where there is even rudimentary trustfulness. Hence it pervades the dynamisms of shame and guilt.

Although we can distinguish these various emotional "dynamisms" or conditions we know that they are often not experienced as being distinct. Shame feelings more often than not reinforce guilt

feelings. Distrust predisposes the subject-self to immaturity, to shame and possibly to distorted guilt. Despair is present to a degree in almost any instance of shame or guilt. Self-concern is a basic determinant in the whole process.

In any "style of life" the goals and hopes suggest the nature of the despairs, as Adler pointed out in his doctrine of inferiority-feeling and superiority-striving.

Depth psychology helps us distinguish between authentic guilt feeling--as awareness of having done wrong, willing to make restitution, to become reconciled--and shame feeling, which bespeaks a deep wound within the psyche. Capacity for what Sullivan calls genuine guilt feeling, and, more profoundly, for what Rank calls "ethical guilt," can be a means by which a person grows in realistic freedom and responsibility.

To despair at individuation is wrong with respect to the possibility. We can say it is culpable, or accountable, wrong only to the degree in which it is a way chosen in relative freedom by the subject-self.

To anyone who answers the call to individuation there seems to be no way of avoiding anxiety. Indeed the fundamental anxiety bespeaks a fundamental mystery, the fundamental mystery into which science and scientific psychology cannot find a sure route (Rank). The fundamental anxiety asks the question to which there is no textbook answer. The question itself insists on reverence before the mystery, the mystery of existence, of the meaning of the

possibility and of the unknown. This anxiety seems to point the very road which man must take if he is to fulfill his humanity, if he is to be true to essential humanity. Perhaps it is his capacity to appreciate the fundamental mystery which makes him man.¹

It is possible from our study to correlate concepts within depth psychology with various reductions that have been suggested in Christian theology for the conception of sin. Theologians have said that the sine qua non for sin is: idolatry, selfishness, unbelief, pride (hubris), rebellion ("revolt"-according to Emil Brunner²), breach of community, hatred-murder-failure-to-love, and

¹Cf. Erich Frank, Philosophical Understanding and Religious Faith (London, Oxford University Press, 1945), p. 39, where he discusses the implications of the fact that human reason does not rest upon itself. "Rational conclusions are dependent on certain premises which reason itself is unable to prove because they are rooted in a deeper stratum of the human mind." They spring from a more or less unconscious belief or instinct, the justification of which is one of the principal tasks of the philosopher, says Frank. "The real proof of God is the agonized attempt to deny God," he argues.--Ibid., p. 43.

Grace Stuart says significantly, in a book which deals chiefly with Freudian and other depth psychological doctrines and insights, Homo faber preceded homo sapiens: man emerged; yet we are uncertain how and in what way his consciousness developed.--Conscience and Reason (London, George Allen & Unwin, 1951), pp. 35-47. Later she states succinctly her optimistic credo (reminiscent of Pfister's) concerning the nature of man (including potentially the ethical quality of "the repressed"): E. g., at p. 220: Man may arrive at true humanity if he learns to handle the stuff of his life without ignorance, shame, or fear. Her essay is not an exercise in facile optimism. It was born of suffering and agonizing contemplation, along with much and varied reading.

²Actually, "Widerspruch" ("contradiction," "opposition," "disagreement").

In fairness to Professor Emil Brunner, we should discern his influence in the revival of the dynamic concept of sin as a defiant, aggressive, denial of finitude, defiance of the limitations

failure to accept the grace of God in Christ. It would be no feat to find analogies for the so-called "seven deadly sins." However, our concern is considerably too reductionistic itself for such a preoccupation.

The following seem possible correlations:

<u>Sin: both as condition and offense</u>	<u>The "mental" condition</u>
Idolatry	Autistic, pre-logical stage Fixations during infantile stage of object-cathexis
Selfishness, egoism, and the like	Ego-as-object--cathexis Omnipotence phantasies (Freud and others)

of human creatureliness. See Emil Brunner, "Reinhold Niebuhr's Work As a Christian Thinker," in Kegley and Bretall's Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought, pp. 28-33, where the author of Man in Revolt tactfully takes Niebuhr to task for not acknowledging his indebtedness to that work (which he had read prior to delivering the Gifford Lectures on The Nature and Destiny of Man, see supra, Chapter Two). Professor Niebuhr's equally tactful confession and attempt to make restitution ("some amends for a grievous omission") are in his "Reply," Kegley and Bretall, ibid., pp. 431-451, at pp. 431-2. See also Hans Hofmann, The Theology of Reinhold Niebuhr, p. 145.

Of course, this is not to say that this view of sin (either Brunner's or Niebuhr's) does full justice to the entire Biblical conceptions, which include also the despair which is resignation from authentic involvement in "life" (a denial of both being and becoming!). There is more to this kind of "wrongness" than "sin as sensuality," (see supra, Chapter Two), as Niebuhr today would surely agree. We draw from recent impressions while hearing Dr. Niebuhr, especially as a preacher.

See Brunner's recent, brief treatment of "original sin" in The Scandal of Christianity (London, SCM., 1951), Chapter III, pp. 51-72.

Cf. Karl Heim, Jesus The World's Perfecter (1939), trans. D. H. Van Doolen (Edinburgh and London, Oliver and Boyd, 1954), pp. 3-52.

Sin: both as condition and offenseThe "mental" conditionPride or hubris

Omnipotence feelings and yearnings (Freud)

Neurotic pride (neurotic denial of shame due to rejection--Horney)

Superiority fiction derived from inferiority feeling (Adler)

Rebellion (revolt)

Attempts--in phantasy--to replace: the father (Freud), the mother (especially those who speak of "an Electra complex"¹), the sibling (Suttie, among others).Inferiority compensation (Adler)
The will to power (Adler)
The Counter-will (Rank)

Breach of community

Oedipal guilt (and Suttie's analogues)
Aggression, destructiveness (considered as a primal instinct, by the later Freud)

Destructiveness as a form of despair (Horney)

Inaction ("Sloth") in the cause of "righteousness"

Resignation as a form of despair (Horney)

¹Freud himself resisted the use of the term. Yet it is used. As we have seen, he felt that the girl's "complex" was at root the same as the boy's, viz., desire for the mother and rivalry with the father. The solution--and "resolution"--is different because of the avenue of identification.--Sigmund Freud, "The Psychogenesis of a Case of Homosexuality in a Woman" (1920), trans. by Barbara Low and R. Gabler, Collected Papers, II, pp. 202-231, at p. 211 n. Cf. Freud, An Outline of Psychoanalysis, p. 99.

Sin: both as condition and offense

Obscurantism (in the presence of the Light)

Irrational "waywardness"

The "mental" condition

Repression, Suppression
("mechanisms")

Selective inattention
(Sullivan)

Parataxic distortion
(Sullivan)

Rationalization as ego-defense
(Freud, and consensus)

The assertion of "the Shadow"¹
(Jung)

The un-rationalizable ir-
rational (Rank)²

Weakness of subject-self
(consensus)

"Polymorphous perverse"³
(Freud)

The return of the repressed
(Freud)

The dominance of irrational,
unconscious forces (Freud,
Jung)

¹For example, in "Psychotherapists or the Clergy" (Psychology and Religion: West and East, pp. 324-347, at p. 341; Modern Man in Search of a Soul, pp. 221-244, at p. 237).

²As, for instance, in Rank's discussions of "the spiritual" and the "irrational" in Psychology and the Soul and Beyond Psychology. Yet Rank had come to look on the "unrationalizable" aspects of the psyche as the springs of creative, indeed authentic selfhood. Hence it seems inappropriate to seek correlation with the conception of sin, except with reference to "the irrational" when--and if--out of control.

³This description is akin to Freud's statement, as late as his posthumously published An Outline of Psychoanalysis (p. 24), that the whole body is an erotogenic zone. "Polymorphous perversity" (normal for early infancy, manifest in some prostitutes and in other types, according to Freudians) is discussed in the following, among other, works: Sigmund Freud, "Infantile Sexuality" (in Three Contributions to the Theory of Sex), Basic Writings, at p. 592-3; A. A. Brill, Freud's Contribution to Psychiatry (New York, Norton, 1943), pp. 125-139; Paula Heimann, "Certain Functions of Introjection and Projection in Early Infancy," reprinted in Melanie Klein et al, Developments in Psycho-Analysis (Jean Riviere, editor, London, Hogarth and the Institute, 1952), pp. 122-168, at p. 163 et passim.

Sin: both as condition and offense

Hatred, "murder," failure to love

Lustfulness (Concupiscence)

Rejecting--the grace of GodUnbelief--"unfaith", mistrust,
despairThe "mental" conditionThe death or destructiveness
instinct (Freud)

Internalized rejection (Horney)

Rage due to fear of the loss or
continued deprivation of
love (Suttie, and others)The nature of the life forces
as libido-eros-satisfaction-
seeking (Freud)

Instinctualism (Freudians)

Displacement of anxiety (Horney)

Displacement of other emotion--
love (Suttie)Resistance by ego-("subject-
self")-defensiveness (Freud,
and probably the consensus)¹Negative transference²Pattern of distrustfulness
(Freudian ego-psychologists)Relative fixation on objects
during the depressive stage
of infancy (Melanie Klein)Failure of the primal, pre-
psychic-weaning "love
relationship" (Suttie,
and probably the consensus)

Most psychoanalytical thinking supports the rule that one
learns to love by first being loved and that one learns to hate by

¹See infra, Part Three.

²Here we are anticipating our discussion of transference phenomena in Part Three (infra). The concept of "negative transference" is akin to those of parataxic distortion, seeing another as a "bad object," and reciprocal rejection.

first feeling that he is hated, that his physiognomic milieu is hostile to him. Even the dualistic Freud and the dualistic Jung can be cited in support of this rule. However their positing, each in a distinct way, of a dualism within the psyche itself, independent of environmental influences, calls for some qualification.¹

Perhaps one of the most embarrassing lessons taught by both depth psychology and Christian theology is that the "ugly," the "hateful," the persons and groups most noticeably evoking hostility and evil images, are those who have been most deprived of love and goodness. As lepers, in New Testament times and since, aroused fear of illness, so the love-deprived arouse fear of some "psychic" danger. The practical logic of Christian thought and, strikingly, corroboratively, the logic also of depth psychology, is that the evil is distinct from the person who bears it. He may wear it as a garment or as a mask. He may be dominated by evil so as to appear its very personification. But he is, in every case, its victim. "Hate the sin but love the sinner" is no paradoxical slogan. The so-called "sinner" is the beleaguered self who has been taken slave by the sinister and destructive in human existence. He stands in need of rescue. But his deliverance can be effected only through "saving

¹See, for instance, the correspondence between Jung and H. L. Philp, in the latter's Jung and the Problem of Evil (London, Rockliff, 1958), 271 pp. Jung thinks something is lost from our grasp of the problem of evil if we try to reduce it to a simple statement of evil as the privatio boni. In Answer to Job he had called it a nonsensical doctrine, derived from a naive assumption about the nature of God (as "a conscious being"). (Psychology and Religion, West and East, pp. 367-470, at 383n).

acts" which in their "physiognomic" aspect seem to understand him in all the dimensions of his existence.

Therefore no hortatory or mere superficial heralding of so-called "saving knowledge" can bring him up out of prison. His situation cannot be transformed by a magic wand of words even when it is proclaimed in stentorian voice that it is "the Word of God." Such an appeal is only to the magic stage of infancy to which he may have already made his regressive pilgrimage. The Gospel--the actual Word of God--to him must be a reaching down and embracing of his whole being. He must feel it through and through, if but for a moment or a composite of moments.¹ He must be loved from the earliest-infant-self-of-him to his waking selfhood if he is to love, if he is to enter the joy of the Lord.

¹Here the Wesleyan theology has preserved an insight which should not be lost. Our construction of it is, simply, that to experience "saving grace" one must receive the taste, the "joy" by which he discerns the wrongness and despair of the condition of "unfaith" from which he is being delivered. He "grows in grace." (Caveat: Formalizing the experience--like formalizing the doctrinal statements of former eras--risks the losing of the very dunamis Theou, which cannot be continued by any rigidification--or dissociation from the rest of "reality.") -Cf. John Wesley, "A Plain Account of Christian Perfection," The Works of the Rev. John Wesley (ten volumes, New York, 1827), Vol. VIII, pp. 5-67; at passim.

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PART THREE

"JUSTIFICATION" IN DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER ELEVEN

THE "SOTERIOLOGICAL" DYNAMICS OF PSYCHOTHERAPY IN DEPTH

The Process of Psychotherapy

Justification is the act and the process of bringing forgiveness, worth, hope, and meaning to man-in-his-existence-and-in-society. Theologically, it is the bringing of "righteousness" to replace "unrighteousness," or, simply, ultimate rightness to replace wrongness, ultimate goodness to replace badness. It resolves not only the punitive power of guilt but also the destructive power of evil. In the ordo salutis it is the health of the healing, the being delivered of the deliverance.¹

In Depth psychology we see it most dramatically in the psychotherapeutic relationship itself. The agent of therapy is another person. According to present theory, the crucial phenomenon in psychotherapy is the patient's transference of emotion from certain objects--preeminently, person-objects--of his physiognomic milieu onto the therapist himself.

¹Often justification has been distinguished as the act--once-and-for-all, with regeneration and sanctification denoting more the "process" aspect of the saving grace." However, we are taking the liberty to call it both act and process, in consonance, we feel, with the Biblical origins of what was always a dynamic concept.

Psychoanalytically-oriented therapy¹ is essentially a personal relationship: one in which the patient is self-revealing and dependent, while the therapist is understanding, supportive, and accepting. Freud called the "reexperiencing" of repressed emotion, abreaction.²

No matter how gently and permissively the analyst attends the patient during abreactions, he will be put to the test. The first climax is the "negative transference," when the patient has succeeded by the mechanism of projection in casting the analyst in the role of villain. After all, the neurosis was "caused" by a primal villain; namely, the early environment of bad images. The role always manages

¹"Psychoanalytically-oriented" therapy is to be contrasted with the so-called client-centered--and non-directive--"Rogerian" therapy, whose foremost theoretician is Carl R. Rogers. Of course Rogers has been influenced by the teachings of the depth psychologists, especially Otto Rank. His method too, is dependent on personal dynamics, whether Sullivanian "participant observer" or Freudian "transference" or some other "phenomena" are to be preferred in describing what happens in the process of therapy via therapist. (See supra, Chapter Two, notes).--Carl R. Rogers (Professor of Psychology and Exec. Secretary, Counseling Center, U. of Chicago), Client-Centered Therapy, with chapters contributed by three others (Boston, N. Y., Houghton-Mifflin, 1951). Cf. Hall and Lindzey, Theories of Personality, pp. 467-502.

²This term was used more in the early practice of psychoanalysis, when Freud was still using the so-called cathartic treatment (See for instance, Sigmund Freud, "Psycho-Analysis", 1922, under "Two Encyclopaedia Articles," in Collected Papers, V, pp. 107-130, at pp. 108-109). Josef Breuer and Freud used the term in their Studies in Hysteria (1895) trans. by A. A. Brill, Monograph series, (New York, Nervous & Mental Disease Publications, 1936). Breuer had cured a hysteria patient by hypnosis and "mental" catharsis.

Brill says, "to ab-react literally means to re-act or work off something repressed, thereby unburdening oneself of unconscious, strangulated feelings."--"Introduction" to Freud, Basic Writings, trans. by Brill, at p. 9n.

See Clara Thompson, An Outline of Psychoanalysis ("Glossary").

to be filled. In the setting of psychoanalysis a time comes when the patient "transfers" his hostile feelings principally on to the analyst, allowing him the "honor" of representing the collective villain. Such transference can be more or less violent,¹ more or less openly expressed. It is that phase when the patient insists that the analyst-- however he may try to disguise his attitude toward the patient--is like the rejecting parent, the very personification of all that has been negative, repressive, cruel, and threatening to him from the very first day of his life. This negative transference marks the patient's reaching the very source of the poisoned waters, all the bitterness that has gone into his making. He has come to the very devil in his conflict.

The analyst seeks a positive transference! A sustained, positive transference should follow the negative phase because of the therapist's expert handling of the negative transference. The patient should be made to feel--not by a magic wand of words, but by a general attitude, which of course uses words skillfully and creatively--that the analyst, though at first cast in the role of earliest negative-parent image and ergo society, is accepting instead of rejecting toward him.

Most therapists assume that a positive transference is required before the therapy can attain any measure of deep success. Such transference of positive feelings toward the analyst, now being

¹Robert Lindner nearly lost his life under the hands of a prisoner-patient, who had come to see him (his therapist) in a spontaneous "need for help." But suddenly the therapist was cast in

cast in the role of the good parent, the good images of society, must not be overextended. The danger is a too dependent relationship. Some critics of Freudian analysis suggest that long courses of analysis do perhaps over-extend the positive transference phase, thus delaying the proper terminus of the therapy.¹

A common interpretation of the therapeutic use of the positive transference is somewhat as follows. The patient makes a psychic return to infancy, or to the beginning of his twisted route. He gets on the other side, as it were, of his trauma and proceeds again forward "without" it.

The new self is at least superimposed on the old one. The injured child continues to be in the picture, much as in Pauline theology, the "old nature" continues to assert itself even for the man en Christo. But a "healthy child" comes into the picture.

the role of a hated object ("the bad breast," "the bad mother").
--Robert Lindner, The Fifty Minute Hour (New York, Rinehart, 1955, Bantam Books, 1956), pp. 1-47.

¹An example of such criticism is: C. H. Patterson, Counseling and Psychotherapy: Theory and Practice (New York, Harper, 1959), 322 pp., especially chapter 11, "Is Depth Psychology Necessary?" (the author answers in the negative), pp. 253-278.

Frank Barron, in a review entitled "The Freedom in Determinism" (on Charles Berg's Being Lived By My Life, something of an autobiography by a psychoanalyst), scores psychoanalysts for what he calls their loftiness, assuming a god-like know-it-all attitude in the practice of their "art" and in their theory. He suggests that, a la their own--Freudian--theory, they are motivated by a repressed guilt. Barron is a prominent research psychologist, with a special interest in experimental studies of creativity and "creative" personalities.

Many of such representative criticisms of "depth" therapy can be cited.

In Horney's language, the patient comes to understand his basic anxiety. She is thinking of "neurotic anxiety" which derives from an original fear of being abandoned. A possible reconstruction of what takes place is that the patient is enabled to release the burden of his neurotic anxieties and at long last to confront what we have called the fundamental anxiety which points the way to individuation.

In terms of privation-distress and separation-anxiety as well, the positive transference when handled carefully by the therapist, can mean that the patient is taken back emotionally to the other side of the privation and the threat of being abandoned. "Spiritually" he receives back that which was taken away from him or denied him from the beginning. The "soul" of that for which he has ever been in quest, though dimly, that which was somehow left behind on his journey through existence, is the belongingness, the love, like that which Suttie describes. The "cured" patient can say: "Whereas I was rejected, now I am accepted. Whereas I was deprived, now I am made whole."¹

¹Our exposition of psychotherapy draws on sources which have been cited previously. In addition, others should be cited, including: Lawrence S. Kubie, Practical and Theoretical Aspects of Psychoanalysis (New York, International Universities Press, 1950), 252 pp.; Melanie Klein, "The Origins of Transference," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXIII, 1952, pp. 433-438; W. Ronald Fairbairn, "The Effect of A King's Death Upon Patients Undergoing Analysis" (1936), Psycho-analytic Studies of the Personality, pp. 223-232; Franz Alexander and Thomas Merton French, Psychoanalytic Therapy (New York, The Ronald Press, 1946); Franz Alexander and Helen Ross, editors, Dynamic Psychiatry (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1952); Edmund Bergler, "On A Clinical Approach to the Psychoanalysis of Writers," The

The Development of Depth Psychology's Understanding
of the Dynamics of Psychotherapy

Sigmund Freud recognized transference as crucial in analysis. His characteristic use of it was somewhat different from that which we have described. He interpreted the patient's casting him in the role of the parent as an acting out of the request of the small child to be told what to do. The child is suggestible and fearful before

Psychoanalytic Review (New York), XXXI, 1944, pp. 40-70; Klein, Heiman, Money-Kyrle, New Directions in Psychoanalysis, 1956; Sandor Rado and George E. Daniels, editors, Changing Concepts of Psychoanalytic Medicine, Proceedings of the Decennial Celebration of the Columbia University Psychiatric Clinic, 19-20 March, 1955 (New York, Grune & Stratton, 1956); Alice and Michael Balint, "On Transference and Counter-Transference," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XX, 1939, pp. 223 ff.; articles by Paula Heimann, Michael Balint, Annie Reich, Edith Buxbaum, Marion Milner, W. Hoffer, John Rickman, and Sylvia Payne on counter-transference (Heimann), and on aims and techniques, especially with reference to the termination of analysis, in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXI; James Strachey, "The Nature of the Therapeutic Action of Psycho-Analysis," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XV, 1934, pp. 127-159; Benjamin Wolstein, Transference: Its Meaning and Function in Psychoanalytic Therapy (New York, Grune and Stratton, 1954), abstracted by the author in The Annual Survey of Psychoanalysis - "A Comprehensive Survey of Current Psychoanalytic Theory and Practice," V (New York, International Universities Press, 1954), pp. 555-571--Paula Heimann, "Review of Benjamin Wolstein, Transference," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXXVII, 1956, pp. 491-493 (The reviewer is generally favorable. But she thinks Wolstein is seriously mistaken in his view of Freud's own use and construction of transference phenomena); Selma Fraiberg, "Clinical Notes on the Nature of Transference in Child Analysis," Psycho-Analytic Study of the Child, VI, 1951, pp. 286-306; Harry Stack Sullivan, The Psychiatric Interview, ed. by Helen Swick Perry and Mary Ladd Gavel (New York, Norton, 1954), 246 pp.; Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Principles of Intensive Psychotherapy (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1950).

Lucy Freeman's Fight Against Fears (New York, Crown Publishers, 1951; other editions, including "Cardinal," New York, Pocket Books 1953) is an engaging account of psychoanalysis from the retrospective viewpoint of an analysand.

Especially informative are selected articles included under "Therapy" in An Outline of Psychoanalysis (edited by Clara Thompson,

the awesome father-figure. His negative transference reflects the rivalry of the young Oedipus. But the positive transference suggests the healthier resolution of the Oedipal complex. The analyst is able to undo some of the oppressiveness of the injuring superego. This is the "parentifying" type of therapy, which "suggests" to the suggestible patient the cause of his distress and thus helps him lift it into consciousness where the ego can control it in the light of what it actually is. This makes for ego-strength. Although his interpretation of the dynamics of therapy was continually subject to review and to revision, Freud maintained from the beginning that it was ego-therapy; in other words, the bringing of health to the reality-governed executive I within the psyche.¹

It is not surprising that Freud considered those who had never made it to an Oedipal-type crisis as being inaccessible to his

Milton Mazer, and Earl Witenberg), which we have cited previously: - "Goals of Therapy"--Michael Balint, Franz Alexander, Otto Rank; "Transference and Countertransference"--Michael Balint, Janet Mackenzie Rioch, Thomas M. French ("The Transference Phenomenon"), Clara Thompson, and Mabel Blake Cohen; "The Psychoanalytic Process"--A. H. Maslow and Bela Mittelman ("Psychoanalytic Therapy"), and Sandor Rado (Recent Advances in Psychoanalytic Therapy).--pp. 423-614.

Also helpful have been Julian H. Pathman and Vernon Clark, "Psychoanalytically Oriented Therapy," and Sidney W. Bjou, "Therapeutic Techniques with Children," in Pennington and Berg's An Introduction to Clinical Psychology, Chapters 21 and 23, pp. 557-585 and pp. 608-631.

¹It seems fair to say, "From the beginning," although Freud did not elaborate his conception of the ego until after some of his early contributions to therapy.

Cf. New Introductory Lectures, pp. 111-112 (" Where id was, there shall ego be").

technique. Psychoses and the so-called narcissistic neuroses are interpreted in terms of libidinous attachment to the subject's own body. Attachment to the mother as an object has somehow been frustrated or forestalled of completeness, as has been the possibility for the introjection of the individual father-image--superego.

Nevertheless psychotherapy has reached into the world of the psychotic. Harry Stack Sullivan and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, have had outstanding success with schizophrenics, for instance.¹

To Freud the transference itself--sometimes described as the "transference neurosis"--would terminate when it was explained by the therapist to the patient. Such analysis could be achieved only when the patient was able to receive the interpretation. Barriers to this optimum stage are the various resistances to analysis. The weak ego which the therapist hopes to reach in order to strengthen, is covered by layers of neuroses. When one is peeled off, another is there. These layers are what Freud calls "defenses." By definition, it would seem, neurosis is ego-defense. We recall the delineation of the various "mental mechanisms" which can be employed in the defense of the ego.² Hence, it is understandable how theologians can suggest neurosis itself as the analogy to "sin."³

¹Clara Thompson discusses the implications for the theory of transference in Psychoanalysis: Its Evolution and Development, pp. 104-105.

²Supra, Part Two, especially Chapter Four.

³See Mary Frances Thelen, op. cit., pp. 183-186, 200-213.

Theoretically, Freud's therapy removed the defenses one by one. Before it could allow a defense to be taken away the ego would have to become strong enough to rely on another one. The cure was in the ego's assimilating the new understanding of the problem biographically. The understanding gained by the analyst, when imparted to the patient and assimilated by him would be self-understanding.

Freud's "parentifying" technique developed out of his experience with hypnosis, under Charcot, for instance.¹ During hypnosis the patient is most suggestible. His post-hypnotic behavior will obey the therapist's suggestions made during the sleep. Later, after giving up hypnosis, Freud still used the technique of suggestion, interpreting it in terms of the child's responsiveness to the parent during the unresolved Oedipus phase before the external parent has been effectively replaced by the introjected parent.

The extensive development in psychotherapy for children has forced a revision in the classical Freudian understanding of therapy. Melanie Klein and her school speak of positive transference in children just as Freud could speak of it in adults. Anna Freud, daughter of the founder of psychoanalysis, is another pioneer in the field of child therapy. She and her school speak of "transference phenomena" but consider them qualitatively different from the classical "transference."²

¹See Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, I, pp. 227 ff. and passim.

²Anna Freud sees the analyst as sharing the parent-image and thus becoming a part of the introjected "parent"--or super-ego--Psycho-Analytic Treatment of Children (London, Imago Publishing Co., 1946).

Sandor Rado speaks of "resistance transference" in describing the classical doctrine. He himself goes on to develop what he calls adaptational therapy, which can be used for those patients who for some reason cannot be given the longer "parentifying" analysis. Adaptational therapy concentrates on keeping the patient on "the adult level," trying to avoid an emotional regression to an infant-parent relationship. He admits that this is not possible for every patient. Rado says he is backing up to Breuer, the Viennese physician, with whom Freud discovered via a case of hysteria the phenomenon elaborated as "repression." He thinks that the Freudian theory of repetition-compulsion obstructs the path of therapy.¹

Breuer's method was to allow and encourage a complete "mental" catharsis.² Freud did not abandon this technique. But he felt that the patient was continually reliving his early traumatic experience, deep within his repressed unconscious. The therapist intrudes into this drama, while lifting the stage to view, so to speak.

Franz Alexander, for many years the leader of the so-called Chicago school of psychoanalysis, emphasizes flexibility in therapy. Intense transference situations are to be avoided more often than not

¹Sandor Rado, "Recent Advances in Psychoanalytic Therapy," An Outline of Psychoanalysis (ed. by Clara Thompson et al.), pp. 593-613 (reprinted from Psychiatric Treatment--Proceedings, Association for Research in Nervous and Mental Disease, 1951, New York, Baltimore, Williams and Wilkins Co., 1953).

²We have referred to the work which Breuer and Freud wrote together. See Ernest Jones, "The Breuer Period" (1882-1885) in The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, I, pp. 243-294. Also, Sigmund Freud, "A History of the Psycho-Analytic Movement," (Basic Writings, ed. by Brill, at p. 934).

for successful therapy, he contends.¹ Yet no analysis is complete without a careful interpretation and manipulation of transference phenomena.

Clinical psychologists, like Maslow and Millelmann, can describe for the layman the actual process of psychoanalysis almost without describing "transference." But they depict as crucial the analyst's understanding the patient's attitudes toward the therapist himself.²

Alfred Adler taught a method of quick analysis, using the Freudian concept of "screen memories," a bit too superficially, according to his critics. The patient's earliest conscious memory was an important clue. He considered the patient's style-of-life as based on an error, which could be readily identified, explicated, and rectified, if the patient had the moral support of the therapist and friends.³

Jung's theory of psycho-dynamics reveals his interests in therapy. The patient's world is fascinating. His self-concern should sustain him in his increasing freedom to be himself. The patient is encouraged in a new philosophy of himself by his skilled

¹Franz Alexander, "Analysis of the Therapeutic Factors in Psychoanalytic Treatment," Psychoanalytic Quarterly, XIX, 1950, pp. 482-500, reprinted in Thompson et al., An Outline of Psychoanalysis, pp. 436-454.

²A. H. Maslow and Bela Mittlemann, "Psychoanalytic Therapy," from their Principles of Abnormal Psychology (New York, Harper, 1941, '51), reprinted in Thompson et al., An Outline, pp. 565-592, especially at pp. 588-9 ("Effects of Investigation of Attitudes Toward the Analyst").

³Supra, Chapter Six.

and wise counselor. Analysis is somewhat like an exciting journey to the center of the earth.¹

Otto Rank's theory should be distinguished from his therapy. His so-called Will therapy may seem somewhat like Rado's adaptational therapy and like Adler's "quick conversion" technique. He believed in setting a terminus to the analysis and using the date as a part of the technique, as a goad to the forces of reconstruction already at work in the patient. His technique has been criticized as expecting more of some patients than they were capable of undertaking. But his theory does reflect his driving faith in the meaning implied in the very fact of individuation. The therapeutic agent, according to Rank, is love. He even uses the term agape, as we have seen.² His emphasis reflects the therapeutic technique employed--somewhat over Freud's protests--by Sandor Ferenczi, who thought the "parentifying" should be demonstrably "loving," though not physically.³

¹See, for instance, the first eleven essays in the volume: C. G. Jung, The Practice of Psychotherapy, "Essays on the Psychology of the Transference and Other Subjects" (Bollingen Series, XX, 16, New York, Pantheon, 1954).

²Supra, Chapter Five. Rank taught that the crucial handling of the transference situation is successful when the analyst accepts the patient's counter-will.--Otto Rank, Will Therapy.

³Sandor Ferenczi was a pioneer in the appreciation of acceptance-love as a technique. Hardly a paper that we read on the therapeutic process (certainly by Freudians and so-called "revisionists") fails to mention him with appreciation. For Freud's (and Jones'--who was psychoanalysed by Ferenczi) "ambivalent" appreciation of the famous Hungarian analyst, consult Ernest Jones, The Life and Work of Sigmund Freud, II, III, passim, especially, III, pp. 59-60, 148-9, 171-73, 176-77.

In a paper on "Psycho-Analysis of Sexual Habits," Ferenczi wrote: "The aim of analysis is the development of a personality with

Ian Suttie interpreted psychoanalytic therapy, regardless of what the theoretical frame of reference was, operationally as "love therapy." The prototype for such love is the "breast-feeding," mothering love of the parental milieu.¹

Most if not all analysts agree that without some positive transference by the patient of his feelings from the erstwhile environment to the therapist the prognosis is not hopeful. They agree also that the therapist's careful skill is required in interpreting and manipulating such transference phenomena.

The Significance of the Therapist's Attitude

Increasingly nowadays psychotherapists are concerned with the very obvious presence of transference phenomena in the attitude and behavior of the therapist himself in his relationship with his patient. The classical analysts had hoped and often assumed that their own psychoanalysis while in training would mean the relative absence of serious counter-transference--that is, of the therapists' projecting emotional roles on to the patient. Any noticeable emotion toward a

powerful instinctual trends but at the same time with great capacity for controlling them. We might say that a successfully educated or analysed individual is one who does not repress his desires but at the same time does not become their slave."--International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, VI, 1925, pp. 372-404, at p. 400. In this article Ferencsi went so far as to recommend (for some patients) privation--abstinence--in order to increase inner tension to facilitate the reaching of a definite crisis in the "positive transference."

¹Ian Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, Chapters XII ("Psychotherapy") and XIV ("Freudian Practice Is A 'Cure' By Love"), pp. 202-217, 242-255.

patient was, logically, a signal that the therapist must have some unanalysed, "unweeded-out" patches in his own personality. Gradually they came to realise that no analysis can be thorough enough to eliminate the possibility of counter-transference.¹ The problem became one of understanding and interpreting for oneself the counter-transference and directing it to profitable ends.² Indeed, many agree that there must be a positive response to the patient ("counter-transference"?) or else therapy is impossible.

¹See, for example, Lawrence Kubie, Practical and Theoretical Aspects of Psychoanalysis, Chapters VII and VIII, pp. 44-67, and XXV, at pp. 239-40.

We have referred earlier to Freud's "Analysis Terminable and Interminable," Collected Papers, V, pp. 316-357. In this paper he actually recommends that the analyst himself be re-analysed every five years.

²The term "counter transference" is technical nomenclature for the therapist's own transference reactions to the client or patient. However, an accepting response to the patient is a requisite to successful therapy.--Bruno Bettelheim, "Harry--A Study in Rehabilitation," The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology (Albany, American Psychological Association, XLIV, 1949), pp. 231-265. See infra, Chapter Twelve. Cf. Bettelheim's Truants from Life (1955).

Mabel Blake Cohen's article gives quite a thorough review of contributions to the subject of counter-transference. She offers a list of sixteen situation-signals of anxiety-defensiveness responses on the part of the therapist. This article should be helpful to pastoral-counselors as well as to psychotherapists, generally.--"Counter-transference and Anxiety," Psychiatry, XV, 1952, pp. 231-243, reprinted in Thompson et al., An Outline, pp. 539-561.

See Leo Berman, "Countertransferences and Attitudes of the Analyst in the Therapeutic Process," and Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, "Notes on Personal and Professional Requirements of a Psychotherapist," in Psychiatry, XII, 1949.

The inferences for our theological study of this process, include the rather obvious, but all-important, consideration: Theologically, agape must be actual, not simply conceptual.

Harry Stack Sullivan speaks of the therapist as a "participant observer." His whole emphasis on inter-personal relations, with concepts of prototaxic, syntaxic, and parataxic modes, is built on the awareness of the dynamics of both transference and counter-transference phenomena.¹

The importance of the different theoretical frames of reference must not be overlooked. Hence we avoid too summary a conclusion as to the sine qua non of good psychotherapy. As Rank protests, "good" therapy may not always be the best for the patient, relative to the possibility of individuation.² However, our study of the dynamics of the psychotherapeutic relationship suggests for us certain inferences for the Christian theology of justification.

¹Harry Stack Sullivan, The Psychiatric Interview, pp. 3-27. See also Clara Thompson's argument for a distinction between "counter-transference" (Freud et al.) and Sullivan's description of the therapist's response (and initiative): "In the interpersonal situation, the analyst is seen as relating to his patient not only with his distorted affects but with his healthy personality also" (Psychoanalysis: Its Evolution, p. 108).

²Supra, Chapter Five.

CHAPTER TWELVE

"JUSTIFICATION" IN DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

The Meaning of Psychoanalytic Therapy

Dreams,¹ chance remarks, failures of memory, mistakes, and apparent accidents in everyday life--"every idle word"²--reveal unconscious motives! Free association in "conversation" with the analyst is the route for serious therapeutic discovery of the patient's unconscious disturbances. He may come to the analyst with an apparent organic complaint or "nervous trouble" such as obsessions, compulsions, hallucination, disturbances of memory, tics, feelings of depression, or of unreasonable fatigue. Unless the physical examination reveals organic illness, the complaints are interpreted as symptoms of

¹In addition to works already cited, on dreams, we should refer to two other representative approaches; Erich Fromm's The Forgotten Language, "An Introduction to the Understanding of Dreams, Fairy Tales and Myths" (New York, Rinehart), and J. A. Hadfield, Dreams and Nightmares (A Pelican Book, London, Penguin Books, 1954). To Freud goes the credit, of course, for introducing the dream into the technique of psychotherapy.

²Both chance remarks and actions ("parapraxis") disclose the "state of soul." Freud's first extensive work on this was Psychopathology of Everyday Life (1904) included in Basic Writings (Brill), pp. 35-178.

Cf. Wit and Its Relation to the Unconscious (1905) (Basic Writings, pp. 633-806).

Cf. Jesus, on evil and its disclosure by careless words, for instance (Matthew 12:33-37).

emotional conflict within the personality, the psyche, the unconscious world of the patient.

Analytic therapy demands patience on the part of two human beings,¹ one of whom is especially unwell. The fact that analysis takes from weeks to months to years² for satisfactory results may be due partly to the tremendous distance the patient must traverse through his own inner world of emotions. It is due also to the fact that he is traversing this distance with another person, the analyst, who "represents" the society which helped shape these emotions. The analyst is the object alternately of love and hatred and also of various

¹Group psychotherapy is also being attempted nowadays. Pioneering work has been done at the Tavistock Clinic, in London. See, for a brief description of this trend, Hubert S. Coffey, "Group Psychotherapy," Pennington and Berg, op. cit., pp. 586-607.

See also Leo Berman, "Mental Hygiene for Educators: Report on an Experiment" in group psychotherapy in Boston, Psychoanalytic Review, 40, 1953, pp. 319-332.

In the same issue of Psychoanalytic Review, see Benjamin Kotkov, "Analytically Oriented Group Psychotherapy of Psychoneurotic Adults," pp. 333-350. He deals with "repression as therapy," the oldest, most widely disseminated form of psychotherapy in the world. He points to religious groups as examples of its use.

²The length depends on the technique of the particular analyst (along with his criteria for "cure" or termination of analysis), and also, of course, on the nature and depth of the emotional problems of which the patient is a victim. In Part Two we referred to Adler and Rank's comparatively short-term analyses. Wilhelm Stekel said, "I have seen severe compulsive neuroses resolve after two months of treatment, because I was able to uncover the motives of the will to illness in time."--Wilhelm Stekel, Compulsion and Doubt, authorized trans. of Zwang and Zweifel (New York, Liveright, 1949), p. 623.

See Kubie, op. cit., pp. 39-43.

Cf. also J. D. Sutherland, "Scientific Tasks for the Psychological Clinic" in Current Trends in British Psychology, ed. by C. A. Mace and P. E. Vernon (London, Methuen, 1953), pp. 223-233. The

emotions that fuse the two.¹ The patient sees himself laid bare and looks at his psychic nakedness. He views it with another person, society's surrogate, the analyst. It is not surprising that his "unconscious" defenses resist such invasion by his own conscious and by another person. Resistance takes many forms: blocking, complaining, changing the subject, becoming acutely hostile to the therapist, and often, breaking off the analysis altogether.

If in the process the patient is made to feel that the analyst-- in the role of earliest parent image, or, according to Harry Stack Sullivan, the composite of images from the crises of interpersonal relationships--is accepting instead of rejecting, loving instead of hating, affirming instead of negating toward existence, he can be established in a pattern of basic trustfulness and "be saved" from the destructiveness that has heretofore overtaken him in his existence. His emotions undergo a change of direction. He now feels that he is accepted. His emotional structure is rebuilt from the foundation up. This is true if the analytic therapy has approximated a psychic return to the nursery, or to wherever the "personality structure" or "life style" has gone awry.

As we have noted in Part Two, psychotherapy presupposes that many so-called emotional, mental, and character disorders have their

author, the Medical director of the Tavistock Clinic, in London, discusses analytic procedures and also the experiments in group therapy. He and his colleagues have found Freud, McDougall, and especially, now, Kurt Lewin (Field theory) most helpful in providing the theoretical frame of reference for the formulation of needs and goals.

¹There is "ambivalence" of emotion in the interaction, not simply "positive" and "negative" transference phenomena.

origin in an early feeling of deprivation and rejection, which has never been overcome in subsequent interpersonal relations. The "sinner" is what he is because he has been "sinned" against. Effective psychotherapy means emotional restitution, restoration, and acceptance. The patient is saved by being loved. He learns to love by being loved.

A graphic picture of personal dynamics in psychotherapy is given in the case study of a pre-adolescent unusually disturbed truant, named "Harry."

While his truancy can be explained as the avoidance of actual and psychological dangers, it had also the connotation of a search for the "good" mother of whom he was in need and who had probably been available to him before the arrival of his sister. This "good" mother was accessible to him only in fantasy. He sought his in the dream world provided by movie theaters. There he could enjoy the warmth of the room, the softness of the chair in which he curled up as in a crib, and was relatively happy and secure, either eating--if he had something to eat--or sucking his thumb. But even this haven was full of anxiety-creating experiences--the threatening and incomprehensible events on the screen--so that all of his efforts at escape only increased his difficulties and forced him to additional acts of delinquency.¹

The therapist was a woman, whose "counter-transference" was positive. Harry was an unusually destructive, dangerous, and suicidally inclined youngster, to say the least. But he was rehabilitated. The "rehabilitation" process was long and painstaking. In Bettelheim's description of it we see that the therapeutic agent was love--yes, we shall have to call it agape.

¹Bruno Bettelheim, "Harry--A Study in Rehabilitation," The Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, pp. 231-265, at p. 238.

From our study of the theoretical formulations and the therapeutic dynamics, we conclude that there are basic presuppositions and affirmations in depth psychology which suggest the same kind of genius which informs the Christian understanding of justification by grace through faith.

(1) The therapist presupposes that the life and personality of the patient have meaning, inherent and potential. His existence and his possibilities are considered as justified already. This is not argued. It is simply presupposed.

(2) The therapist enters the world of the patient; he goes with him through his hell, like Vergil with Dante. He seeks to help him undo that hell.

(3) The therapeutic agent is love, agapeistic--in principle, certainly. True, it is structured by the clinical situation. It accepts the patient and his hell. It supports and encourages him in the encounter with his own subterranean world.

(4) The therapist tries to bring the patient to the strength that can bear insight into his deepest distress.

(5) Along with the bringing of insight the emotional support must continue if the patient is to assimilate his new knowledge. The therapeutically-instilled insight becomes genuine understanding.

(6) The patient is thus delivered from a fictitious concept of himself and his worlds.¹ The way is opened to a realistic world-and-life view and to a kind of realistic--even if not "high"

¹Cf. John Oman, Grace and Personality (Macmillan, 1925), p. 209: "The essence of being justified is emancipation from moral

commitment. He is brought "body and soul" to the threshold of authentic adulthood.

Alfred Adler and Otto Rank, among others, go further and suggest the kind of life-commitment which the "saved" man should have. In this they are speaking as ethical philosophers, indeed, as "theologians."

Despite the many, often valid, criticisms of psychoanalysis¹ it abounds in analogies to the Christian understanding of salvation and its 'elan, justification by grace.

Ian Suttie goes so far as to say: "The ideal attitude (of the therapist) is very like that of Christ serene without being aloof, sympathetic without being disturbed; exactly what the child desires in the parent."²

Sin and Justification in the Light of Psychotherapy

In our study of "man as sinner" in the light of depth psychology we considered the views of various theorists on the subject-self, the nature of guilt feelings, shame feelings, anxiety, despair, and self-concern. Without again elaborating the views and theoretical differences of opinion which we noted there, we nevertheless draw

juggling with ourselves by giving us the power to look all reality in the face, but as a mere legal fiction, it would only be another illusion, and could do nothing to deliver us from hypocrisy."

¹We have already referred to some of these criticisms: supra, Chapter Eleven, notes.

²Ian Suttie, The Origins of Love and Hate, p. 217.

the two studies of depth psychology together in their inferences for the Christian rubric of justification by grace.

(1) In presupposing a subject-self, centered-self,¹ or ego, which can and must be strengthened vis-a-vis existence and society, we assume that there is within the "normal" individual an I which says, yes insists: "I though inadequate am nevertheless capable of being responsible to the call of meaning in my existence insofar as that meaning confronts me."

(2) Guilt feelings cry out for forgiveness and restitution. Psychotherapy encourages the patient to live by some such conviction as this: "I can be both realistic and responsible, striving to avoid fictional guilt, making 'restitution' realistically and not slavishly at the beck and call of inner 'shoulds' which may actually be destructive in their aim. In the main, I shall assume that I am accepted; I shall accept myself."²

(3) Psychotherapy seeks to explicate the basis of inferiority and shame feelings and to provide, at least temporarily, partially, in the structured relationship of the clinic, the kind of acceptance-love which may enable the patient to take courage to live with his privation and his sense of inferiority, to face realistically and constructively the problem of his "worthfulness." It seeks to share with him its own conviction that he is "worthful."

¹Supra, Chapter Four. We recall that Professor Tillich's favored term is "centered-self."

²Cf. Robert Bonthius, Christian Paths of Self-Acceptance, (New York, King's Crown, 1948).

(4) Psychotherapy works toward the goal of "rehabilitation" for the patient. It aids him in his progress toward a taking hold of life, a faith-as-commitment to some goal or cause.¹ In trying to remove neurotic defenses, neurotic anxiety, it tries to strengthen the subject-self for purposeful living. In more enlightened therapy, as we see it, the patient is encouraged to throw off his neurotic anxieties and to confront with courage, what we have called, his fundamental anxiety.

(5) Psychotherapy's concern is to redeem the patient from despair and to activate all of the resources available to him in setting him upon a hopeful path.

(6) Psychotherapy does not try to eradicate the patient's inherent self-concern. It does try to remove his illusions about its presence and its nature. Some psychotherapists may take a further, most constructive step and try to lead the patient into a kind of devotion to the essential humanity present in himself and in others.²

¹Rollo May goes so far as to say: "The therapist's aim, with regard to ethical standards, is to help the other person to remove distortions and the various forms of neurotic contradictions within himself that he may arrive at and choose freely the value judgments and ethical standards which are most constructive for him."-- "Historical and Philosophical Presuppositions for Understanding Therapy," in Psychotherapy: Theory and Research, O. Hobart Mowrer, ed. (New York, Ronald Press, 1953), pp. 9-43, at p. 43.

Also specific "character disorders" seem to be accessible to treatment in depth. For instance, Edmund Bergler writes of his conclusions (which tend to be hopeful as well as melioristic) on the effectiveness of psychoanalysis with homosexuals: Bergler, Edmund, Homosexuality: Disease or Way of Life? (New York, Hill and Wang, 1957).

²To our understanding, Horney, Rank, Jung and the "existential analysts," and many others, seem to fit this description.

(7) Psychotherapy looks realistically on the unfortunate events and circumstances that affect the patient in his emotional distress. He is to be strengthened in his efforts to mitigate their ill effects and to avoid morbid self-condemnation for that over which he has little or no control.

The inferences are strong enough to encourage practical soteriological theology to see the conception of justification in dynamic terms.

CONCLUSION

TOWARD A RESPONSIBLE USE OF THE CHRISTIAN
CONCEPTIONS OF SIN AND JUSTIFICATION
IN THE LIGHT OF DEPTH PSYCHOLOGY

CHAPTER THIRTEEN

SUMMARY

As we try to bring together the threads of our theological research into the psychological understanding of the nature of man-in-his-existence-and-in-society, we shall first summarize the leading inferences drawn from each of the three parts of the study.

Admittedly our exposition of the contemporary expression of the conceptions of sin and justification has been selective, from what may be described, generally, as a Protestant, ecumenically-oriented, and practical, "instrumentalistic" point of view. Our attention to the theologians has been necessarily somewhat sketchy, since our inquiry has been primarily into depth psychology. It has been necessary, however, to present for the purpose of comparison what we find to be representative in theology today.

Our orientation to the Biblical origins is, of course, basic, since the conceptions are anchored in the "world of the Bible." Our study of the Biblical origins has been quite dependent on what are considered reliable authorities. Of course there is some limited venturing forth from these sources into inferences of our own.

Likewise, there is a serious limitation to our treatment of depth psychology itself, since the present writer is not a psychoanalyst.

With these limitations in mind we shall review the implications yielded by our study thus far.

I. The Christian Conceptions

(1) The conception of sin is properly understood only from the side of grace--or after entering the process of being delivered from the power of sin and evil.

(2) Justification is the act and process of bringing "righteousness," worth, goodness, and meaning.

(3) It presupposes the essential goodness of essential humanity.

(4) It includes forgiveness and healing.

(5) It proceeds via the Christ--as event and symbol.

(6) It bespeaks the living presence of the Christ as soter--savior.

(7) Sin is by definition before and against God--as-the-God-and-Father-of-Our-Lord-Jesus-Christ, God as Love--Agape.

(8) Sin is offense against the law and the grace of agape, against the fulfillment of essential selfhood, essential humanity as it is defined--according to Christian faith--in the Christ.

(9) Sin, though still a confused term in theological writings, should be distinguished from the greater, inclusive category of tragic evil in human existence.

(10) Sin, as culpable offense, is rejection of the grace of agape, the grace of God in Christ. The logic seems to require

that the grace in some sense be experienced, "tasted," known, if its rejection can be considered culpable.

(11) So-called "sins" may be instances of the basic offense and condition (of being in "darkness").

(12) The Christian conceptions together say that one is truly free and participating in "righteousness" only when he depends on the grace of God for ultimate worth and meaning for his life and efforts.

II. "Man As Sinner" in the Light of Depth Psychology

Our study of depth psychology brought us to the following inferences for the questions: Who is sinner? and What is the nature of his guilt?

(1) The subject-self, although it may be much less of a unity, much less in actual control, and less centered than many philosophers and theologians have been wont to imagine, is nevertheless presupposed. It has a limited freedom of choice, varying with the individual.

(2) Guilt feelings presuppose relationship and love. They may be distorted. When "realistic" they represent a capacity for freedom and responsibility.

(3) Often fused with guilt feelings, and sometimes present without them, are compulsive shame feelings, which derive from internalized privation and rejection in infancy and early childhood.

(4) Restless fearfulness, or anxiety, is present in both guilt feelings and compulsive shame feelings. Anxiety may be neurotic;

that is, it may be a device for protecting the subject-self from reality. Some psychologists, especially therapists influenced by contemporary "existential analysis," recognise the anxiety, which we have dared to call "fundamental anxiety." It is like that which is described by the existentialist philosophers, theologians like Paul Tillich, and depth psychologists: Otto Rank, Ludwig Binswanger, and Rollo May. It is the anxiety which is implicit in the potential for individuation. Following Rank, we have seen its twin aspects as fear of separation and fear of union.

(5) Despair means destructiveness of the potential for individuation. It may be relative. In a sense, it is never absolute so long as there is life. It harks back, psychogenetically, and aetiologically, to a basic pattern of distrust, set in earliest infancy. We may speak of "culpable wrongness" with regard to despair--this subjective dimension of what Tillich calls tragic self-loss and world-loss--only insofar as we may assume that the subject-self has been free to choose a way of despair when a way of hope was a "visible" alternative. Yet our concern, theological, soteriological, is not with placing blame, but with bringing salvation. Hence the only interest which theology can have properly in the question of culpability or accountability is the "instrumentalistic" implications for the bringing of "salvation."

(6) Although Christian theology has indulged in reductionist definitions for sin, such as "selfishness," "egoism," and "idolatry," it need not, indeed, it is not encouraged by the insights of depth

psychology to accept such reductions. Intrinsic self-concern is implicit in individual existence. Secondary, "unattractive" self-concern is largely imposed upon the subject by an indifferent, depriving, rejecting, or irresponsibly pampering "parental" milieu. Belief in magic and idolatry, even sophisticated idolatry, suggest infantile fixations during the autistic, highly undeveloped stages of early object-relations.

III. "Justification" in Depth Psychology

We find that no school of psychoanalysis makes a systematic attempt to demonstrate why healing is to be preferred to allowing the psyche to deteriorate. There is an implicit commitment, a quasi-theological, soteriological, foundation for the art of psychotherapy.

A partial description of the dynamics of psychotherapy is as follows.

(1) The therapist tries to achieve in depth an understanding of the patient's problems.

(2) He gradually shares his insights into these problems, in terms of the patient's biography, as he finds him becoming able to receive and assimilate them.

(3) He supports the patient as he helps him to orient his life to reality and to possibility.

(4) By being a participant with the patient in this task of emotional and volitional reorientation he helps right some of the wrongs inflicted by the physiognomic social milieu.

(5) The goal of therapy is to help the patient take hold of his life and face with courage the possibilities for purposeful living open to him in his limited freedom from crippling neurosis.

There is structured acceptance, agapeistic concern, a kind of "rescue," "deliverance," "making whole (again)," "salvation," within the context of clinical healing and rehabilitation.

We proceed now to a concluding study of the Christian conceptions of sin and justification in the gathered light of depth psychology.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

CONCLUSIONS

The Christian Conception of Sin in Perspective

Theologically, sin is conceived as offense primarily against God. The conception seems more difficult to understand and to communicate in a day when the meaning of the term God eludes our grasp. Certainly the apostles and the Hebrew prophets did not seem to have the kind of struggle the modern mind is "blessed" or "cursed" with in defining the use of the awesome name.

The foundation of Christian theology is the conviction that Jesus Christ as depicted in the New Testament writings is the revelation of what "God" means for humanity. Christologies vary as to their opaqueness and transparency in presenting Jesus Christ as a lens through whom we see "God," as the source of meaning and life. Certainly regardless of whatever the relationship may be between the Christ of Christian faith and God as God-beyond-all-conceptions-of-God, it cannot be demonstrated indisputably through theological or philosophical exposition. The assertion that Jesus Christ is "the revelation of God" is a part of the articulation of that trustfulness which we have described as the subjective dimension of the grace "of God in Christ." Having received it, being established in

it, having left the "darkness," one reflects upon what has happened and is happening. Thus, in former ages the doxologies, the creeds, the didache, yes, even the kerygma itself have found their verbal expression. Arguments for the existence of God can never win their case in the court, either of "pure reason," or of the so-called "scientific method." They may be used in the articulation of one's faith.¹ But Christian faith is by its very nature naive faith, with a somewhat "calculated" naivete to be sure. The credo is: "I believe--we believe--in God. What is more, I believe in the God who is behind the Jesus Christ of the New Testament portraiture. In this I do not put forth an 'argument'--if it were such a proposition, of course it would be 'question begging'--since that there is (a?) God behind Jesus Christ as portrayed in the New Testament is already presupposed. I am simply making my religious confession. I am making a 'religious statement.'² I believe in God--the reality--that God represents as Jesus bore witness to such reality. By 'Jesus Christ' I mean all these: a person, an event in history, a symbol,³ I mean his teaching--

¹Cf. J. C. Smart, "The Existence of God," in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. by Antony Flew and Alasdair Macintyre (New York, Macmillan, 1955), pp. 28-46.

²The linguistic analysts goad us to examine the nature of the meaning of our terminology. Our implied argument here is that there is a language expressive of human reality and "personal knowledge" (Polanyi) which may be described as "religious." It is a language of devotion.

See also Ian T. Ramsey, Religious Language (London, SCM, 1957). He discusses "justification" (pp. 179-182) as a relational term, with a special meaning (for "religious language").

³I. e., Symbol, in the sense in which Tillich uses it. "The symbol participates in the reality which is symbolized." Systematic Theology, II, p. 10. We do not mean Jesus as mere "symbol."

his life--the whole story about him and what they convey to me. I believe in the continued presence of this reality in the world, the 'Spirit of God.'

The guiding star for theology has its haze about it, to be sure, often difficult if not impossible to penetrate: The grace of God in Christ is the way out of darkness into light, the rescue of mankind from meaninglessness. What is the way of life for our situation, hic et nunc? Such causes as "Christian pacifism" illustrate the ambiguity. What do we mean by the phrase "which is seen in Christ"? This is a never-ending problem for Christology. It is easy to oversimplify, to sentimentalize, the impact of "Jesus as the Christ, the Son of Man, the Son of God, the Savior of the World."

Theologians will not likely abandon their telescopes, which do seem to be improving with the aid of Biblical criticism. "Bible students" who prefer not to use such equipment are numerous in the United States, for instance.¹ They say the star is lost to view when the "modern" telescope is used. The response to their criticism is that Light and obscurantism can hardly be compatible.

The theologians who do not cover before any new discovery and plausible new hypothesis in research into the antiquities still do

¹This fact hardly needs documentation. Some of the "free mail" on any clergyman's desk, in the United States at least, is evidence enough. Along with the more non-intellectual literalism evident in some revivalism, there is an impressive scholastic fundamentalism, with centers of learning, often of a "non-denominational" character. See Hordern's discussion of a more respected representative of this stance: William Hordern, A Layman's Guide to Protestant Theology, pp. 56-76.

not deny the star. But its location and bearing are for every generation the subject of most painstaking contemplation. Indeed the conceptualizing, symbol-rediscovering enterprise can be relevant only if the conceptions and symbols of the Christian faith are continually re-interpreted even as the "science" problems of mankind are subjected to change in their aspect.

Yet, as we have suggested, the inquiry is made within the circle of faith.¹ Christianity's conception of its gospel, its conceptions of sin--and of all tragedy--are on this side of the experience of grace.²

It is true, Paul says that by "the law" is the knowledge of sin.³ What does he mean? He answers: "If it had not been for the law, I should not have known sin. I should not have known what it is to covet if the law had not said, 'You shall not covet!'"⁴ In the Epistle to the Galatians he says, "The law was our custodian until Christ came, that we might be justified by faith."⁵ The word for custodian is paidagogos--a trusted servant or slave who watched over the child, accompanying him to school and supervising his outward behavior. Paul continues: "But now that faith has come, we are no longer under a custodian; for in Christ Jesus you are all sons of God through faith." Paul's use of the law was instrumentalistic. The essence of righteousness is revealed by grace. Being "baptized

¹Cf. Tillich's "theological circle" (for instance, in Systematic Theology, I, pp. 3-7).

²Supra, Part One. ³Romans 3:20. ⁴Romans 7:7.

⁵Galatians 3:24.

into Christ" is like "putting on Christ." "There is neither Jew nor Greek; there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus," spiritual heirs of Abraham and therefore parties to the covenant promise made to him.¹ There is neither this kind or that kind of person-object, but all are one in Christ.

Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans, describes the gospel as the power of God for salvation to everyone who has faith. "For in it the righteousness of God is revealed through faith for faith; as it is written, 'He who through faith is righteous shall live,'"²

Later he elaborates the point.

Now the righteousness of God has been manifested apart from the law, although the law and the prophets bear witness to it, the righteousness of God through faith in Jesus Christ for all who believe They are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus, whom God has put forward as an expiation by his blood, to be received by faith. This was to show God's righteousness, because in his divine forbearance he had passed over former sins; it was to prove at the present time that he himself is righteous and that he justifies him who has faith in Jesus.³

Here the apostle is expressing at once what is simple and what seems intricate in his understanding of the Christ, both over against the law and in fulfillment of it. In Galatians he reiterates the same thought. In Christ we see and partake of righteousness--as fundamental meaning and essential humanity. In the apostle's thought this is not simply moral righteousness, "a righteousness of my own, based on the law," but a righteousness "which is through faith in Christ, the righteousness from God that depends on faith."⁴

¹Galatians 3:23-29. ²Romans 1:16-17. ³Romans 3:21-27.

⁴Galatians 3:11-14.

Likewise, the writer of the Fourth Gospel enunciates a soteriological revelation, via grace rather than via law, in Christ:

The word [Ho Logos] became flesh and dwelt among us, full of grace and truth; we have beheld his glory, glory as of the only Son from the Father And from his fullness have we all received, grace upon grace. For the law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through Jesus Christ. No one has ever seen God; the only Son, who is in the bosom of the Father, he has made him known.¹

Christianity, in its genius, regards sin as offense against this God. In such a context, "failure to accept Jesus Christ as Lord" makes sense as a definition of sin. Likewise understandable are the familiar descriptions of sin as "unbelief" and "disobedience," when they connote failure via free choice to commit one's life to "the Kingdom of God" as it manifests itself. Surely there must be encounter before there can be accountable offense. Wrongness is sin when it is against the Light. As Professor Edgar P. Dickie, of St. Andrews, says: "Light is a symbol of the self-communicating, self authenticating goodness of God."²

With Robert Mackintosh and others, we can appreciate the significance of the fact that Jesus' only denunciations of sin were against (1) hypocrisy, which is a kind of inner dishonesty and obscurantism, (2) leading others astray, and (3) blasphemy against the Holy Spirit, which is treating goodness as though it were evil.³

¹John 1:14-18. ²Edgar P. Dickie, God Is Light, p. 39.

³Supra, Chapter One. The reference here is to Robert Mackintosh, Christianity and Sin, p. 72.

"Who sinned, this man or his parents?" the disciples asked Jesus, according to the Fourth Gospel.¹ In context they are asking him to explain by a familiar "logic" the tragic condition of a man born blind. Jesus shuns the type of answers given by Job's comforters. He says: "Neither this man nor his parents." He goes on to speak about the glory of God. Perhaps his answer raises other questions, but it corrects the error that confuses culpability with tragic situations where evil, though present in perhaps its most ugly and frightening form, is not proper cause for blaming the one who bears it, nor necessarily, for blaming those who are in a causal relation to him-in-his-plight.

The Christian gospel addresses not only that condition which we describe as sin but also the tragic helplessness in which man finds himself. "The son of man came to seek and to save the lost."² The lostness is not simply culpable straying away. It is having been carried or snatched away by foul circumstances, by "the demonic" in man's existence.³

Tragic circumstances are fertile soil for what may be described under the rubric of sin. But they are to be distinguished sharply from accountable wrongness. As we have seen in our study of depth psychology, guilt feelings do assert accountability, culpability. But it is possible, even common, for a person to feel guilty for that over which he has had no control and on which he can have little or no effect in

¹John 9:1-3.

²Matthew 18:11; Luke 19:10.

³Cf. Gustaf Aulen, Christus Victor (1931).

the future. It is possible for "spiritual" leaders, in politics, religion, and other spheres, to inculcate and/or evoke such distorted guilt feelings. Hence the fact that man feels guilt "for this or for that" does not begin to prove that he is in fact guilty. The fallacy of equating objective guilt with subjective guilt has sometimes led hortatory theologians astray and done injury to the integrity of the Christian insight.¹

The very "guiltiness" in too much assumption of "accountability" may itself be "sinful" if the person who feels guilty for that over which he has no control is trying to protect infantile omnipotence feelings from the purging light of reality. Whether "accountable" or merely "neurotic" his attitude is strangely like that of "Lucifer": he is trying to be "like the Most High," to be over all circumstances and all events, determined to find the cause for every fateful event somewhere within his own constricted area of freedom. He is despairing because of his own finitude.

Yet Christians have reflected that Jesus took upon himself the sins of the whole world. Without digressing here to search out the vast problem for New Testament scholarship of determining what

¹The confusion, which may sometimes be hard to avoid, especially in "hortatory" preaching, is in the failure to discern the categorical differences between "emotional" (psychological) and "actual" (objective dimension of the ethical). Hence "guilt" and "guilt feeling" must be distinguished carefully in our discussion of culpable wrongness. Generally, in this paper, we have italicised (underlined) the word when we have meant to convey primarily the subjective or emotional dimension of "guilt."

was the conscious--or unconscious (?)--intention of Jesus,¹ we can safely allow that the ancient confession does not depend on his having assumed a "guilt feeling" for that over which he had no control. The idea seems rather to be that he was likened to a sacrificial lamb, a representative of the people in his death-at-passover-time. He did take action against the evil in the world. We may assume, from the gospel accounts, that he did, in some profound sense, feel the burden of the world. It was sorrow, sympathy, empathy, love. The line may be fine indeed between "sorrow-and-love" and "the feeling of guilt," but it must be drawn qualitatively. Indeed, with the help of depth psychology, it can be drawn.²

¹Besides the writings of Baltmann and some of his fellow heirs of "form criticism," we refer to other works, including: John Wick Bowman, The Intention of Jesus (Philadelphia, Westminster, 1943); and Principal George S. Duncan's highly readable Jesus, Son of Man (London, Nisbet & Co., 1947). Amos Hiven Wilder, Eschatology and Ethics in the Teaching of Jesus (New York, Harper, 1939).

Earlier we cited the suggestive thesis presented, though briefly, by W. R. Matthews in The Problem of Christ in the Twentieth Century.

Works that bear on the subject, in varying ways, include: William Manson, Jesus the Messiah; W. A. Curtis, Jesus Christ, the Teacher; and John McLeod Campbell, The Nature of the Atonement (which is being reprinted, although it antedates modern critical studies)--see Bibliography, infra.

²This is not to say that depth psychology is the only discipline (or even the only kind of psychology) that can be of such aid to theology and ethics.

The point to be salvaged is that the insights of depth psychology encourage theologians to distinguish between objective wrongness and subjective guilt and to try to help man's capacity for the latter to advantage in overcoming the former. Certainly, for instance, one can be responsible in his attitude toward evil forces and events

The Light of Depth Psychology

Despite the much discussed Freudian hypothesis that God is but a projection of the Laisus-father image, and the various refinements which may be possible for such a reductionistic "Theology proper," it is beyond the purview of depth psychology to deny the being of God.¹ Nor can its technique find him for our gaze. Can there be any light in such a discipline for the basic aspect of the Christian conception of sin, the before-and-against-God aspect? The analogy of alienation from the parent-image and of healing via reconciliation with the parent image may be of some help. However in our inquiry we have concentrated on the anthropological aspect of the problem.

The waking self, the subject-self, or ego, insists on assuming responsibility for the navigation of the vastly irrational

without necessarily feeling the "I-personally-am-guilty" kind of guilt for every instance of evil which he recognizes. Yet at the same time he should be helped to awareness of his failures to become authentically involved in the "business of living." These statements may help complement our earlier critical note on a possibly "careless" use of the concept of "guilt" by Reinhold Niebuhr (supra, Chapter Two, notes).

¹Cf. however, C. A. Campbell, On Selfhood and Godhood (Gifford Lectures, St. Andrews, 1953-54, 54-55, London, Allen and Unwin, N. Y., Macmillan, 1957): "To exhibit the merely factual origination of an idea in subjective processes raises no presumption against its objective validity. To exhibit its explanatory origin does. Even then, the object may have independent existence. But our having an idea of it can no longer be taken as establishing any presumption to that effect." He goes on to say that the task of arbiter is laid at the door of the philosopher (at p. 22 and preceding pages).

Cf. also, Professor J. G. McKenzie's use of Spearman's principle of "correlated education," in view of the Freudian "projection" argument.--J. G. McKenzie, Nervous Disorders and Religion, pp. 145-6.

psyche of a man. Guilt feelings when viewed as dynamism behave almost like a "faculty," revealing (a) a will to freedom, (b) the primacy of relationship, hence (c) love, and (d) the assertion of responsibility. Early experiences of deprivation and rejection, along with later negative experiences are internalized as a sense of inferiority and of shame. When compulsive, the sense of shame, as self-hatred, reinforces guilt feelings. It may be dominant when the "capacity for guilt feeling" is comparatively undeveloped.

Shame reflects the injuries inflicted by circumstances--organic, societal, and historical. When turned outward it often assumes the form of active hostility toward society. The shame syndrome suggests more the nonculpable tragic element in a person's existence. It does hold the possibility of striving "for glory." This is interpreted by depth psychologists as striving for psychic restitution to the deprived self and as seeking acceptance for the rejected self. This striving delineates some specific needs which justification must meet if it is to be the bringing or confirming of a raison d'etre. Hence the cry of the shamed, as of the guilty, is for justification. One seeks justification for his impoverished self as he experiences himself. The other, the guilt-assuming, seeks justification for his culpable self. Shame is the burden of an "offensive" self. Guilt is the burden of an "offending" self. The burdens may be compounded. The "guilty" person feels compelled to justify himself before the "law"--of inter-personal relations, for instance--which he has broken. The shame-ridden person feels compelled to

justify his very existence. His behavior reflects, though often not directly, the constellation of his fears. For example, obsequious, acceptance-oriented, behavior suggests an inner sense-and-fear of rejection tantamount to the loss of meaning to existence. One's style of life may be governed by his internalized privation and rejection.

As Professor Reinhold Niebuhr, like Kierkegaard, over a century ago, points out, anxiety provides the temptation "to sin." However, the offensiveness of the offense is in the particular response to the fundamental anxiety. That anxiety is the basic awareness of the risks one must take at each step in his pilgrimage of individuation and responsible relationship. The "pilgrimage" begins in mystery and ends in mystery; it is surrounded by it. To refuse to confront the anxiety and respond to it creatively is to despair before the mystery and to reject any meaning which may be offered by it. Anxiety may disclose--by the questioning mode--the possibility and challenge of essential humanity. But the fundamental anxiety may become buried under neurotic and other more superficial--less human (?)--anxieties which can work to prevent one from becoming authentically involved in realizing and fulfilling the meaning which is implied in his being.

The last precipice before self-loss through a psychotic break with reality or through suicide is the condition we have described as despair. It harks back to a pattern of distrust,

perhaps inflicted on the young "psyche." It may be manifest in complete resignation from the enterprise of living or from some essential part of that enterprise. It is manifest often in destructiveness. Indeed destructiveness may be a way of "life."

Although suicide is a ready symbol for absolute despair, even suicidal phantasies can be interpreted as expressing the wish to be born over again. Further, where there is life there is not complete, or absolute, despair. This fact is significant for any soteriological concern.

Despair seems to be destructive of self-concern, although sinfulness has often been characterized as "self-love."

Certainly Christian theology has regarded self-concern as being wrongful when it fails to be united to, or "lost in," genuine concern for "The Kingdom of God." However so-called "selfishness," "self-centeredness" and "ego-centrism" have been determined largely by a failure of the "fostering" environment to center the growing child on other concerns and to relate him to persons and values. He has been forced to withdraw into himself and/or to "rely" too much on his own extremely limited resources during a strategic formative era when his psyche's need has been to be related authentically to persons. At an early age he has been deprived of realistic, responsible relatedness. This deprivation is continued throughout his life. Idolatry and superstitious phantasies and practices also suggest such a stunting of "psychic" growth.

The Conception of Sin in the Light of Depth Psychology

What is required of man? Christianity says: To love God with all one's being and to love one's neighbor as one loves himself.¹ Reformed symbols elaborate the injunction: "Man's chief end is to glorify God and to enjoy him forever."² "To glorify God" suggests a polarity with shame-driven behavior. Rather than to glory in his shame and be buried in it or to seek glory for himself, man is to glorify God.³ He is enjoined by his very construction as a human being to seek the essence of humanity. In Hebrew and Christian theology this is conceived as the imago Dei--the image of God.⁴ "To enjoy Him forever" must include "to fulfill the essentially human meaning in life." This surely is included in the content of the Christian goal-symbol: "the Kingdom of God." Man's chief end is to be loyal to it and to "enjoy it."

What is sin? The Westminster catechisms say, "Sin is any want of conformity unto, or transgression of, any law of God, given as a rule to the reasonable creature."⁵ This may not tell the story

¹Implicit is the injunction "to do justly, to love mercy, to walk humbly with God" (Micah 6:8).

²Westminster Shorter Catechism, Question 1.

³Cf. Dietrich Bonhoeffer's moving discussions of shame in contrast to remorse and shame and conscience.--Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Ethics (ed. by Eberhard Bettge, New York, Macmillan, 1955), pp. 145-154.

⁴Cf. David Cairns, The Image of God in Man.

⁵Westminster Larger Catechism, Question 24.

in all its complexity. It is not the clearest idiom for our times, to be sure. However, it does give a working definition which informs the issue. It recognises the sine qua non of culpability. It does not require guilt feeling. Actual guilt is deliberate want of conformity or transgression of law given as a rule to reasonable human beings. Sin is a certain choice, even if the choosing is a defaulting. The law of God--or "any law of God"--is also identified with "the will of God," although "the law" as given to mankind is the "expression" of the will of God. To the minds of the Reformers and to the Westminster Divines it was present certainly in both the decalogue and the portrait of Jesus the Christ in the New Testament. The genius of Christianity, to be sure, is opposed to a precept-minded conception of "the law of God" and "the will of God." No doubt the debate will continue as to the relevance of ideas of "natural law" to what Christian faith has called the law of God. The distinctive emphasis in Christian appropriations of conceptions of law is that the law of God-in-Christ is the law of agape. "Thou shalt love God neighbor thyself."¹ "A new commandment I give to you, that you love each other as I have loved you."² The Sermon on the Mount enunciates a law of forgiving, edifying love, radically different from so-called "justice" as lex

¹Matthew 22:37-39.

²John 13:34; cf. John 15:17; II John 5.

talionis.¹ That Christian agape is "law" as well as grace is evidenced by its imperative quality. It commands.

By agape or the perhaps too hackneyed expression "Christian love" is meant compassion and justice²--with mercy for all humanity. It is subject-to-subject, I-Thou, love in its social and religious dimensions.

Much human evil can be described as the failure of love, although it would be too over-simplifying to subsume the entire problem under the category of the failure of love, even after expanding the definition, with the use of other Greek words: philia and eros.³ Not all the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune seem to spring simply from the failure of love. Yet the despair of the shame-driven person is a failure of love insofar as it is internalized rejection. To be sure, the tragic sense of worthlessness which we witness in the shame-ridden is not his sin, although it has resulted from someone or society's failure to love him. It is rooted in such a failure, even the most blatant and "offensive" self-justification-seeking behavior.

¹Matthew 5-7. Cf. Luke 6:12-49.

²"Justice" in the sense of effective rightness, measured by the law-and-gospel of agape. Cf. Emil Brunner's criticism of Reinhold Niebuhr's undeveloped concept of justice--Kegley and Bretall, editors, Reinhold Niebuhr. Cf. Brunner's Justice and the Social Order, which he himself mentions in his friendly criticism of Niebuhr's too indefinite use of the term justice. We shall forego here an examination of Brunner's own proposals.

³Cf. the concepts of love in Pfister's Christianity and Fear, Suttie's The Origins of Love and Hate, supra, Part Two; also our discussion of the Biblical conceptions of love, supra, Chapter One.

Sin is culpable failure to love aright. It is failure to love God-and-essential-humanity. Essential humanity is offended as it is present both in the subject-individual and in his neighbor--others. Sin traditionally has been defined as failure to love God with all one's being and failure to love one's neighbor as oneself.

However, the victim of a pattern of despair which has been inflicted on him by his conditioning circumstantial and societal environment cannot love God and neighbor or self aright! He cannot as a unity, as a centered-self, choose the way of agape. If he cannot he is not so much blameworthy as simply tragic. To sin is to choose freely against loving aright. Such a statement seems on the verge of losing itself in inner contradiction: To be free to choose against loving aright one must first have experienced the right kind of love. If he has been loved aright can he choose against love? Our assumption seems to be a qualified yes because of the presence of that which is experienced as the opposite of the agape, namely the accumulation of evil which is a part of the given for any generation, along with the apparently unavoidable negation and destruction which plague the most agapeistic enterprise. Agape wages continual war with evil. Perhaps the free choice against agape, if and when it occurs, is possible because of the evil, which is also in the field bidding for the allegiance of the psyche. But the dialectic continues: If anyone should choose the evil over the good, having experienced the good, can he have received enough of the good? The perennial debate over determinism moves in on our question. However,

there seems to be a rallying ground for the Christian insight; namely, the soteriological concern, which may well find an instrumentalistic use for the conception of sin as culpable wrongness. We have seen how both Christianity and psychotherapy are concerned with soteria-- as rescue and as healing. Although it may not be quite accurate to say that all the schools of depth psychology employ an instrumentalistic conception of accountable wrong analogous to sin, it is true that they all assume the capacity for a responsible taking hold of the helm of one's life (psyche). There is a sense in which the subject-self which refuses the task of helmsman for his own sailing is lost at sea. The Christian conception of sin is focused not on the culpability so much as the opportunity to have metanoia: to change one's course and to navigate according to the chart and compass of agape--the Kingdom of God--as-revealed-in-Jesus-Christ. If "authentic" guilt feelings can be evoked for offense against agape, then perhaps the subject-self is already being moved to correct his heading. He knows the agape of God; he regrets that he is off course. He feels compelled to get on course. It is difficult to find any other valid reason for including the emotional dimension of accountability or culpability in a theological analysis of human wrongness. Yet, restrained though the "doctrine" may be, it is of crucial importance in the matter of addressing and implementing the invitation to live by grace through faith. We recall that guilt feeling presupposes the presence of some love and loyalty.

Hence we must conclude that for the individual and for collective man the area of freedom, responsibility, and accountability is limited indeed. It seems to vanish altogether in some cases. Nevertheless it is "normally" there, implicit in awareness, reflection and anticipation. It is both definite and "necessary." Indeed, as we have seen: the very compulsion to make restitution is a kind of assertion of freedom and responsibility even when they are fictional. When the capacity for guilt is denied or suppressed, so is the capacity for freedom and responsibility which it seems to accompany. Man is not man without the possibility of guilt.

The problem of psychotherapist and pastor includes: "Why does this person feel guilty?" It often includes also: "Why does this person not feel guilty?" Our principal concern in the present study of the conception of sin has been with the question of objective guilt: Wherein is the centered-, waking, more or less responsible self of this person in his attitude, choice, decision, action, accountably wrong? For what should he feel guilty unto salvation; that is, unto changing his course?

As we have seen, even a thorough-going determinist--if there could actually be such a phenomenon, and perhaps Freud in some moods came nearest the position--recognizes the psychological fact that man at least seeks and actually insists on his own guilt, his own responsibility, his own freedom. Shame without guilt and the will-to-freedom veers toward self-loss and world-loss in despairing both of individuation and authentic relatedness.

We have also seen the other side of the problem. Both moralists and theologians meet the insidious fact that man often (1) either asserts responsibility for more than he can assume realistically or (2) denies that responsibility which he should rightly and realistically assume. Sometimes these two phenomena occur together. The "faculty" of guilt is continually being manipulated in the interaction of the subject-self and his milieu.

A child is conditioned to feel guilty for certain specific thoughts and actions, although, in the objective, they may not be wrongful. Both shame feelings and guilt feelings can be instilled and directed by significant adults, by peers and by society in general. A member of one religious denomination may actually have a strong sense of guilt if he should find himself in a service of worship sponsored by other denominations. Society's power to build superstructures of guilt upon the fundamental anxiety is a fearsome power indeed! Though we may object to the speculative framework in which he announces it, Freud's insight is prophetically helpful: that the so-called "conscience" itself can be a destructive agent against the potential for "love" within the individual.

Although guilt feelings do disclose an underlying dependence upon love and relationship with some other or others, the sense of guilt itself is often the most "guilty," the most "culpable" in the situation. Karen Horney's portrait of "the tyranny of the should" eloquently illustrates the fact. The "conscience" is the place of prejudice as well as "justice." Yet if this "faculty" of guilt is

distorted, as it is inevitably to some degree in everyone, can we say that its bearer may on occasion be culpable for obeying his conscience--his own inner tribunal?

Some, including Professor Paul Tillich, with his concept of a transcendent moral conscience,¹ and the late Professor Donald Baillie, in his Kerr lectures Faith in God,² suggest another "conscience" besides that which is simply relative to internalized fears and societal mores. There is an inner sense of right which transcends the "conscience" that is determined by one's particular culture. This may be difficult to demonstrate by consulting the depth psychologists. Certainly the systems which allow for presentational as well as representational unconscious "thinking" within the psyche,³ including, notably, those of Jung and Rank, leave room

¹"The Transmoral Conscience," Tillich, The Protestant Era, pp. 136-149, especially at p. 145.

Paul Tillich, "Moralisms and Morality: Theonomous Ethics," in Theology of Culture (Robert C. Kimball, ed.), pp. 133-145. With a not uncritical deference to Kant, Tillich argues for "morality unconditional" despite our increased understanding of the extensiveness of "moralisms conditioned." "The moral command is unconditional because it is we ourselves commanding ourselves. Morality is the self-affirmation of our essential being."--at p. 136.

²Donald M. Baillie, Faith in God and Its Christian Consumption (Kerr Lectures for 1926, Edinburgh, 1927, "Faith and Moral Conviction," pp. 151-188).

"This Conscience of which we speak is not . . . a thin and isolated voice crying in the wilderness of our human nature. It is the moral consciousness; the apprehension of absolute values; which traverses the whole field of life, making the wilderness to blossom as the rose, reducing confusion to order and beauty, bringing cosmos out of chaos . . . 'If any man will do his will, he shall know'; 'He that doeth the truth cometh to the light'; and this is faith" (pp. 181-2).

³Again we refer to Susanne K. Langer's Philosophy in a New Key.

for such a possibility. Horney's idea of a real self hints at least an analogy to the view. Freud's positing of a phylogenetically produced and transmitted "conscience" is certainly a doctrine of innate conscience. But, on the whole, there is little in the way either of explicit corroboration or of exhaustive contradiction of the thesis we find in Tillich, Baillie, and others.¹

The problem of finding a distinctly "Christian conscience" which is not dependent on a "society conscience" is somewhat like that which exercises H. Richard Niebuhr in his penetrating study Christ and Culture.² It is in the question famously mooted by Karl Barth and Emil Brunner.³ Is there a point of contact within human nature for the gospel of agape in Christ? To what in man can the "law" of agape appeal? Or, is such a question poorly conceived? Should we ask, rather, "Does not the coming of the grace of agape, the acceptance of the grace of God-in-Christ, transform the "conscience," or at least orient the self to a "conscience" outside--or

¹The hypothesis does not seem to be suited to either laboratory or clinical verification (or refutation!). Yet, as we have noted, at least inferentially, especially in Chapters Four and Five, supra, the Freudian hypothesis of a sadistic "conscience" (superego) and the classical Freudian fragmentary hypothesis of a pleasure-determined "ego-ideal" are hardly adequate to account for the phenomena of "conscience" as they are seen by theologians like Tillich and Baillie, along with Reinhold Niebuhr (whose self-transcendent I we discussed, supra, Chapter Two, and again in Chapter Seven, note).

²Cited previously, in Chapter Two, supra.

³See the discussions in David Cairns, op. cit., pp. 146 ff. and passim and Edgar P. Dickie, God Is Light, p. 223 and passim.

beside itself, "the mind of Christ"? The debate perhaps should continue, although our own tentative conclusion for this study has been that the "image of God in man" has remained, with essential humanity still present within the psyche to respond to the Son of Man.

Aside from the question of accountability, we find profound validation within Depth Psychology for the ageless conviction that the essence of sin is unbelief. By unbelief is meant failure to trust, not intellectual failure to know the unknowable--the erroneous cast which is sometimes given to the "doctrine," subverting the original insight which it held. One may refuse intellectually to affirm "the Christ," the "agape," the description which Christianity customarily uses in expressing its genius. He may be a thorough-going pessimist in his intellectual philosophy but nevertheless a believer-in-fact if he affirms with-his-life "the love of Christ." The parable in Matthew of the Last Judgment is apropos of this truth.¹

Christianity teaches that it is wrong and tragic for one to refuse to commit himself to that meaning which is asserted to be by the life-death-and-resurrection of Jesus Christ. Existence, suffering and life itself find their meaning and justification only by faith-as-commitment to the "law" and "grace" of agape, the grace of God in Christ. This is the genius of Christianity. It can never be proven by "science" or even "by logic" to the satisfaction of every "science"

¹Supra, Chapter One, notes.

and every method of "logic." Yet it can be expressed understandably. It can be lived. It can be articulated with a kind of saving clarity and transparency, since it bears witness to an order which it considers to be ever present. It is reflected in the lives, in the moments of men's lives, that can be described as "en Christo."

We ask again the question: Who is the sinner? The non-blameworthy element of tragedy is so profound and pervasive in the human situation, in the psyche and its field, that we cannot easily focus the I of responsibility. Non-culpable wrongness may dominate the whole picture as it entwines itself with choice. Theologians will do well to distinguish clearly between the over-all power of evil and the sin which they mean when they speak of accountability. Man-as-man is subject to the troubles of the world. Man-as-sinner is the self who chooses in freedom against whatever ground there is for hope, to despair. The Christian gospel is that there is such a ground, the trustworthiness in agape disclosed for all human life in Jesus Christ.¹ The "sinner" is the self that chooses against this meaning, against this Christ.

Sin and the Law of Agape

The law of agape is expressed in the summary of the law:
Thou shalt love the Lord thy God and thy neighbor.
"Not to love one's neighbor as oneself" sounds, in one sense an

¹Inherent in Christian theology is the conviction that its gospel in its genius is universal in scope and soteriologic al concern.

anomaly to depth psychology. The neighbor is in the line of fire of projected self-hatred. To love one's neighbor is to love oneself aright. Love for neighbor may mean comparatively healthy object-cathexis, to use Freudian terminology. Healthy self-concern has not been twisted from its normal outgoingness by being turned through circumstances back upon itself. To love oneself aright is to love one's neighbor.

In another sense, however, "not to love one's neighbor as oneself" is a statement of the obvious and irreversible "nature of the brute." Any assumption to the contrary is merely indulging in self-deception, regardless of how "saintly" and altruistic one's pattern of life may seem. Freud considered the so-called love commandment as against nature.¹ Some innate quality or bent, which Freud calls primary narcissism, Horney calls "the urge to grow," Suttie calls "solipsism," others have called "the instinct of self-preservation,"² seems to preclude any complete displacement of the self with others. This quality may be what has puzzled theologians

¹S. Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, pp. 86-87.

²The instinct(s) of self-preservation Freud called the "ego-instincts"--de-sexualized drives for preservation of life (and ego). After he introduced a primitive death instinct into the psyche-field-of-force, he combined the sex drives and the life-preservation drives in eros, or "life instincts."

"Life preservative instincts" have been given a place in theories of W. H. R. Rivers (Instinct and the Unconscious, Cambridge University Press, 1920) and William McDougall. For a concise review of McDougall's "hormic" psychology, with his elaborate doctrine of instincts--though without exhaustive exposition of the "life-preservative" instincts, see J. C. Flugel, A Hundred Years of Psychology, 1833-1933 plus 1933-1947 (London, Duckworth, 2nd ed., 1947), pp. 272-278.

down through the centuries, bringing such unfortunate descriptions as "total depravity" for the nature of "fallen" man, who is unrelentingly "self-centered," "selfish," "egoistic." Our critique sees two unrelated facts which must be included in any balanced handling of the problem. (1) If the quality or "bent" is innate it is not in itself "culpable," "accountable," unless we are willing to land in the absurdity of saying, "I am to be blamed--and punished--for being 'me.'"¹ (2) There are instances of heroism and sacrifice, if we may still capture meaning with such over-used banner words, that suggest that the commandment may be realistic, after all, in some transcendent dimension. Indeed the classic instance, the one which has continued to emblazon the love commandment, is the man on the cross, who died for sinners, who forgave his persecutors, who chose not to live by bread alone, not to "sell out" to the powers that be, not to demand "sight" instead of "faith."² But the presence of "average man" type crucifiers,³ the average man that is so much in

¹This does not reflect on the poetic use of the idea in Masfield's The Everlasting Mercy, for instance (cited earlier). Saul Kane should indeed have come to see the harm "I done by being me" (the Saul Kane he was before his conversion). An awareness of one's "objective" image in the perspective of relationships (both distorted and potentially healthy) need not be self-loss through overwhelming guilt or shame. Awareness may indeed be the first step toward freedom.

²II Corinthians 5:7.

³Our allusion here, of course, is to Rank's characterisation of those "normal" and relatively "healthy" ("non-neurotic") persons who have been stunted in their growth toward authentic "individuation."--Supra, Chapter Five, and passim.

everyone "late and soon," suggests the truth in Freud's appraisal of the "law" of agape.

The commandment does express the norm which Christianity envisages in the transformed nature of things. Therefore, we must ask: In the light of depth psychology what is the offense against the neighbor? For a moment we suspend the question of culpability. We shall think of offense as an act, a failure to act--a malfesance, misfesance--or an attitude, which causes injury to another person, especially when it is beyond comparison with any "actual" provocation. Such an offense is committed when the offender is pursuing one or a combination of the following patterns:

(1) Protecting himself from a threat, perhaps an inner threat (as from internalised bad objects, persecutors, and from unconscious drives) that is projected on to the outside world, implicating the victim.

(2) Trying to remove an obstacle from his path as he "moves toward" some goal, such as "self advancement" or satisfaction of some specific appetite, or as he moves away from some threat. He may be "moving away from" the fact of dependence and finitude as though it were a threat to any possibility of meaning for his life. He may be "moving away from"--recoiling from--the fact of solitude and individuation.

(3) Trying to appropriate an object which he "needs" or desires for his own satisfaction or gain in pursuit of some goal, such as "self advancement" or satisfaction of some specific appetite.

The exploitation may be predominantly pleasure-seeking or predominantly destruction-seeking. In either case its effect on the "object" is destructive insofar as it denies to it potential for subject-to-subject relationship and authentic individuation.

We notice at once that in some measure each of these patterns is "natural" for animals as well as for men. Hence if they are to be identified as such with fallen human nature it may seem appropriate to some to describe the fallen state or condition as merely animal as distinguished from human. But other paths open to our inquiry.

Simply by being what he is as mankind, distinct from creatures that live by "the law of the jungle"--of threat-obstacle-object and defensiveness-pertinacity-exploitation--man has placed himself under another law, even as animals in certain relationships, as that of the herd, obey another law.¹ For man it is societal, cultural, moral. Its principle is social wisdom, which acknowledges both "enlightened self-interest" and the rights and privileges which must be allowed others.² Hence, aggression and exploitation within given cultures and societies may be considered morally wrong; that is, against custom, against the conscience and against the actual health of that society.

However, according to Christianity, not to exclude other faiths--which variously may include something of the same genius,

¹Cf. "Social Psychology of Animals" in David Katz, Animals and Man, trans. Hanna Steinberg and Arthur Summerfield (a Pelican Book, London, Penguin Books, 1953), pp. 138-163.

²See, for instance, the arguments of Ruth Benedict in Patterns of Culture, pp. 1-19.

mankind is under still another law: the law of God-as-love, of subject-to-subject love. One is "called" to realize and fulfill his own individuality-in-relationship, to love the individuality of his neighbor as he does his own. He is to reverence persons in reverencing God-as-agape.

Hence, aggression and exploitation are wrongful because in pursuing such activities the subject is violating the subjectness of his fellow creature, preempting the role of "Nature"-"Fate"-and-"God" over him and reducing him to mere object. Thus the offense is against the sine qua non of humanity itself, against that which seems to distinguish man as a being. This is the essence of human-ness, or essential humanity. In religious language, the offense is before and against God, who is regarded as the Giver of the essence. It is against neighbor, because he shares this essential humanity and what we may call, again in religious language, the language of devotion, "the grace of life"--"the grace of God." Man is to love his neighbor as himself.

What then is the problem of evil as Christianity persists in describing it? It is two-fold: (1) The over-all problem of tragic evil in human existence,¹ and (2) Sin, or culpable, accountable

¹Cf. Whitney J. Oates' theory of the tragic. Our reference is to his lecture "The Greek Sense of Tragedy," published in The Princeton Seminary Bulletin, LIII, 1960, No. 3, pp. 23-32. His basic three assumptions are: (1) The individual possesses dignity and worth. Thus "the tragic can easily be distinguished from the pathetic" and also from unmitigated horror. "Dignified and worthwhile man and his human predicament are always to be found at the center of the tragic." (2) Man "in some sense possesses freedom of the will." "And . . . there is the inescapable corollary of moral

wrongness. Both involve aggression and exploitation. Both offend against the law of love. The victim is wronged as much if his assailant is blind circumstance, savage animal, demented neighbor, or culpable neighbor. Most often the offense comes as a mixture of "blind" evil and accountable wrong. What Christianity has heralded as salvation must surely be from the power of both kinds of evil. It is the making whole of broken humanity both in its helplessness and in its freedom.

Within the context of mores, societal codes, custom or moral law, "moralizing" is perhaps among the effective control factors. It is unrealistic when it exhorts and punishes to no purpose the man who is "sociopathic," incapable of assuming guilt or responsibility. Society must be protected from its more harmful deviates as it must be protected wherever possible from foul circumstance and wild animals. Meanwhile moralists, theologians, and therapists together can study and try to remedy the subjects' mal-alignment.

responsibility which goes with any doctrine of the freedom of the will." (3) "Man lives under some kind of super-human power over which he has no control, though it in part can control him" (Fate, God, Zeus, Providence, Moral Order have been suggested designations). Obviously then, "the tragic is always and inevitably religious. Finally, the concept of "the tragic" addresses itself to the problem of man "as he faces the awfulness of evil." Professor Oates (of Princeton University) is thinking primarily of the tragic as conceived and portrayed in Greek and subsequent tragic drama. He sees in it a profound optimism and argues for a definition that will preclude despair (i. e., that man is doomed to ultimate abject defeat). "The tragic," according to Professor Oates, asserts "the existence in man, somehow and in some sense, of a power or a grace . . . which will enable him in the end to triumph over evil." The author goes on to document his theory with selections from famous tragedies.

Probably no one is without some accountability. But the psychopath's outrageous crimes against his society, against essential humanity, against love, are a manifestation of his being possessed by the simply tragic, more than by sin--as "accountability." He is not able as a healthier personality would be to choose the right. Christian theology should concede readily that society's deviates and "incorrigibles" are ill; indeed often the victims of society's own "accountable" offenses. This is not to say that such persons do not act as agents of destructive evil. Just as carriers of lethal contagious diseases and as ferocious dogs are agents of the tragic element in existence, so are the moral deviates of society. It should protect itself from their threat, even while it learns that their evil is as "innocent," in a real sense, as is an infant's teething on the hand of its mother. This insight, which has been both deepened and broadened by depth psychology, is being increasingly accepted by both theology and social philosophy.¹ Yet

¹Pauline and Augustinian theology (indeed Christianity in its genius) have had the insight, despite the occasional, if not frequent, beclouding of it. Social studies, including social psychology, tend to be carefully aware of this distinction. Indeed critics of theology may at times wonder why a "theological" model--to use the characteristic terminology of science and "social science"--is being retained by enlightened observers.

We cite but one, representative, example of the social concern of non-theologically-oriented disciplines, influenced, though not uncritically, both by the genius of Christianity and by the teachings of depth psychology: Alexander H. Leighton, et al., Explorations in Social Psychology (New York, Basic Books, 1957). These "explorations" are the type that should be helpfully suggestive to those who seek ways to implement the Christian gospel.

perhaps some of the most publicized spokesmen for religion often leave the hearer in considerable doubt as to whether the insight is being assimilated as it should be.¹

The Christian Conception of Justification:
The Grace of Agape

The solution to human evil comes only as actual deliverance. This is the cardinal insight of Christian faith. Its theology is essentially soteriology. The salvation is from the slavery and meaninglessness which are the power of sin and evil over men's lives. Man has to be lifted out of mere-object mentality. This deliverance comes not primarily by intellectual enlightenment. It comes in the experience of being loved as a subject--a person--rather than an object. It comes as grace and truth--as 'aletheia, trustworthiness. It must be more than a theory, more than a pipe dream. It must actually come to the victim of evil. There must be what Professor Tillich has called a Gestalt of grace.

In a sense, it is learned, but not simply by the intellect. It must be learned by the whole person and eventually, it is hoped, by all mankind, the whole community. The initial coming of salvation is an event followed by a more or less lengthened crisis of

¹We are thinking of that American radio phenomenon (extending to Radio Luxembourg): "the radio preacher." The designation, so used, does not extend to the more thoughtful presentations via radio and television of the Christian message.

integration, analogous to the integrity crisis described by ego-psychologists like Erik Erikson.¹

It is the gospel of crucifixion and resurrection that is good news to the despairing subject-man. His hope, spelled out simply by his continuing to exist, is that he is not alone, that somewhere he is understood, loved, and being given worth and meaning.

Look down, O Lord, on me poor man,
In thee I live, I move and am.
O clear my soul and conscience,
That I in thee my peace may find,
Rest to my heart, Joy to my mind,
Freed from my sin, and mine offence.²

The Christian saga is that the essential humanity has borne the pain of "human" offense against it, the pain of aggression and exploitation unto death. "He was despised and rejected of men." Then "God raised him from the dead." "Alive forevermore!" "As in Adam all die; even so in Christ shall all be made alive!" "The lamb of God!" "The lamb slain from the foundation of the world!" "The lion of Judah fought the fight and hath prevailed." These are the poetic Christian affirmation. The Church's theologians continue to try to understand and to express the meaning of the formative conviction of the Christian movement.

¹This analogy extends, of course, to the Christian conception of sanctification, with which we have not dealt too explicitly in the present study.

²Sir William Leighton (1614) - Look Down, O Lord.

The Christian conviction is that had we not known grace we should not have known the polarity: "the righteousness of God" over against sin and evil. This is the fundamental supposition of the Christian theology of sin and justification. The "righteousness of God in Christ" is that righteousness of trustworthy love--agape, with charis and 'aletheia ("grace," and "truth"-in-the-sense-of-trustworthiness).¹ It affirms and undergirds essential humanity against the forces of degradation and destruction.

Yet this principle which the New Testament writers formulated seems to apply to morality as well, even as the rationale of morality often supports--though at times it subverts--that Grace. Societal rules, the mores of a culture, are inculcated--and obeyed--not only by fear but also by love, by what we understand in Christian theology as grace. For example, can we not say though with qualification, that civil laws are being obeyed out of gratitude for the blessings of that order which they establish. The offender, the blatant law-breaker, may be one who does not fear or who suppresses his fear. But he is also likely not aware of the "grace" of the society whose laws he violates. Depth psychologists give cogent support to the notion that love--eros (?)--is basically gratitude.²

¹Our principal reference here is to the Prologue of the Fourth Gospel.

²Alice Balint can say this without leaving an almost rigidly Freudian frame of reference.--"Identification," International Journal of Psycho-Analysis, XXIV, 1943, pp. 97-107 at p. 99.

"Love is gratitude Identification removes tension between ego and external world and recollects the happiness of the

Had we not known grace we should not have known sin. This is the stance of Christian faith. Now knowing grace we behold it everywhere we look; yea we look for it beyond the evil through which we must pass, and for which, alas, we shall continue to be agents both unwittingly and culpably so long as we live. We look to God for deliverance and thus daily confess our guilt--our sins, believing that He is "faithful and righteous to forgive our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness" as we commit our lives to that faithfulness and that righteousness. Thus, in "religious language," the language of devotion, the Christian conceptions find their expression. Christian faith does not argue itself into being. Having been produced by saving event, it simply tries to express its guiding conviction about life itself.

Sin and Justification

To be justified by grace through faith means to be caught up into that meaning of life disclosed in Jesus Christ. As sin is basically a part of the problem of despair and meaninglessness, so justification is basically the bringing of hope and meaning to the individual and to society. To be justified by faith means, for the

sucking period. The relation to the self develops in the same way. In narcissism there is a secondary self-love by identification with people who are fond of the child The gratifications of identification facilitate a child's social adaptation. Obedience is the result of identification"--quoting from the abstract in Psychoanalytic Review, XXXI, 1944, pp. 475-6.

Cf. The Heidelberg Confession gives as title to Part III (on Good Works): "Concerning Thankfulness" (Dankbarkeit)!

individual, not that he can escape his anxieties, including the fundamental anxiety, but that he can live with them and through them as a victor over the threat of meaninglessness, over despair. Such justification is not escape from the risks of guilt, from all the painfulness of shame, from the temptations and suffering of doubt, nor from all the ravages of self-concern. It is an armor one can wear in passing through them. It is a reliance which says, "Our citizenship is in Heaven,"¹ not removed from this world, but within it, in the realm of God as agape both here-and-now and eternal, where "the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ" is God indeed.

Therefore the basic conception of sin which is held by Christian faith is: Sin is choosing a despairing response to the fundamental anxiety when a hopeful response is possible. The only true ground for such hope is trustworthiness. Hence, sin as accountable offense is against trustworthiness, against the grace that is offered.

Concern for the Kingdom of God is a proper anxiety. It means a commitment to take the risk of becoming individuated-in-responsible-relationship. The relationship is with the milieu, significantly, with other persons. They are revered as persons, fellow "subjects," just as though all men share one life together.

This united life is perhaps still best expressed by the symbols "en Christo" and "the Kingdom of God." The individuation aspect

¹Philippians 3:20.

is reflected in symbols such as "child of God." The telos for the community (of mankind?) is "the fullness of the stature of Christ."¹

In a sermon called "Pride and the Grace of God," Donald M. Baillie reiterates the conviction, which elsewhere he calls "the paradox of grace."² As the pearl diver can remain dry and secure from the dangers of the sea by wearing a diving suit, so can the subject-self wear protective armor through the anxieties and responsibilities of this life without escaping his fundamental task. One kind of armor suggested is pridefulness or "self-conceit." As in depth psychology, so in theology, men of discernment see this as a kind of reaction-formation, a compensatory fiction, hardly suitable for the enterprise; that is, if fundamental anxiety and responsibility are to characterize the enterprise. But the armor which Christian faith sees as suited to the awful challenge is justification by grace through faith.

"I am crucified with Christ--enduring the shame and self-loss in the sense in which he endured them, but by identification with him; nevertheless I live; Yet, not I, but Christ liveth in me," the contemporary Christian can say with Paul. But he says it with great care, it is hoped, not to oversimplify or to "primitivize" the meaning of the poetic statement "Christ liveth in me." Pastor

¹Ephesians 4:13.

²Donald M. Baillie, Out of Nazareth (ed. by John Baillie, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1958), pp. 55-61.

Pfister says of Albert Schweitzer that he has "introjected" Christ.¹ However, perhaps "introjection" is not quite the meaning either.

The pilgrimage to which Christianity invites one can be both realistic and responsible. One does not escape guilt. If Otto Rank is right, to decide, to choose, and to act in any sense on one's own, mean to have "guilt feelings," the "ethical guilt" which derives from the vill's genesis as counter-vill. Although he does not escape such anxiety, the "Christian man" can rely on a strength beyond his own. He says, realistically and responsibly, "I commit myself to be what I must be, individuated. Yet, not I alone; I depend on the undergirding relationship of life with life grounded in ultimate meaning, in agape-love. I am depending on it. Henceforth I am being freed from the compulsion to justify myself before others, even before God. I assume that my life is already justified. I say "I", the waking, "prospective" self of me. But I know its limitations only too well. It is significant however that I can "transcend" it enough to discuss it as I do now. Yet the subject-self of me is earthbound, object-bound. Not I but a much greater identity is my center of devotion and my service: Not I but the grace of God." The original statement, by Paul, was in an activist vein. "I labored more than they all." It sounds self-congratulatory. More significant however is its mood of action, productive action for the cause, the very cause which, he said, sustained him.²

¹Oscar Pfister, Christianity and Fear, p. 549.

²I Corinthians 15:10 and context.

The Practical Questions

How can we see and assist this grace, in our time, as it seeks to take form among us? This is the question asked by the theologians. What is the Church's responsibility in being authentically a means of grace? How is "the community of faith" to be continually reshaped as an instrument of God's peace, of the soteriological revelation in Christ?¹

What is society's collective responsibility in becoming transformed in the image of Christ--as the vision of true humanity--rather

¹We refer again to H. R. MacKintosh, The Christian Experience of Forgiveness; and to Donald M. Baillie, The Theology of the Sacraments (Our reference is especially to Lecture III, "The Sacrament of Baptism," pp. 72-90, at pp. 86-88 and throughout).

Baillie says, "Perhaps modern psychology has given us a clue beyond what Calvin could possess" (p. 88). He follows the "clue" he picked up from a child psychologist, who quoted a woman in India who advised--out of her wealth of common (maternal) sense, "'Why don't you let the nurses dandle the babies? A baby must have love'" (pp. 86-87).

This insight is reinforced by the various schools of depth psychology. Objective longitudinal studies are being made of the progress and regress in health made by children in various relationships (which vary in how and how much they provide maternal love). Some have been cited.

A volume which has recently been compiled by abstracting a large number of longitudinal studies (under the aegis somewhat of ego-psychology, with the inspiration of the late Ernst Kris) is Alan A. Stone and Gloria Cochrane Onque, Longitudinal Studies of Child Personality (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1959). Needless to say, such volumes invite the researching eye of theologians concerned with the practical problems of implementation of the evangel of agape.

Cf. also J. S. Bezzant, "Sin and Infant Baptism," Theology: A Monthly Review, London, LXII, November, 1959, pp. 446-452.

than being conformed again and again to the "wisdom" of mere custom. Can social morality be caught up in grace so that the community of mankind may in any sense be en Christo? The important questions are the practical ones, since Christianity is, after all, a way into life and meaning, a way both of acceptance and of commitment.¹

Both our study of the Biblical origins of the conception and our resumé of the dynamics of psychotherapy encourage the understanding of justification in dynamic terms. It is the process of bringing forgiveness, healing, rescue, and meaning to man-in-his-existence. The gospel of grace is good news of trustworthy love and hope. If it has substance, the grace of God is actually experienced. Therefore the "servants of God" have as their mission the implementing of this grace. Where and how does it take form in the midst of social, racial, international, political, problems? The implication of depth psychology is that the saving agape must somehow reach into the victim's inner world and convince him that life is worth living, that he is loved, that he is "justified" in existing, and,

¹Cf. Suttie (who is not alone): The infant is basically structured for "give-and-take" in basic community (The Origins of Love and Hate, p. 53 et passim).

"The mother-child relationship . . . is a true, 'balanced', Symbiosis; and the need to give is as vital, therefore, as the need to get. The feeling that our gifts (love) are not acceptable is as intolerable as the feeling that others' gifts are no longer obtainable."

Not only child-therapists but also parents of young children (including the present writer) find such an observation corroborated. At times one is tempted to assume that the child learns not to give, giving seems so native to the infant! At other times, the balancing truth is only too evident, that he learns to let go ("to share" as his "socialization" progresses).

beyond that, in being. Such a gospel is proclaimed: it finds expression in meaningful symbols of worship,¹ verbalizations, and "institutions." But these must grasp with personal genuineness the very being of the individual and of the society.

Practical Implications

Any attempt to apply our insight involves us in the ambiguities which infest the concrete situation. Hence the examples used never fully represent the potential of justification by grace.

Surely one instance of the problem of evil, both in its simply tragic and in its culpable forms, its demonic and its accountable aspects, is the "Apartheid" or "segregationist" syndrome in South Africa, parts of the United States, India, and elsewhere. At great risk of oversimplification we suggest the following construction on the phenomena.

So-called "Christian" segregationism,² regardless of how "cool" and rational it becomes as a social and political philosophy,

¹"Worship," we recall, is a contraction of "worthship" and focuses on intrinsic worth.

²It is common--though embarrassing--knowledge that some so-called "White Citizens' Councils" assume the designation "Christian." The leaders of apartheid in South Africa call themselves "Christian." Acts 17:26b has been used (by clergymen of a segregationist persuasion) to "justify" their social philosophy. The damaging statement: "God that made the world . . . hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth . . . they all but eradicate by the way they construe the added phrase: "And hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation." --Acts 17:24-26. It is wrenched out of its context (Paul's sermon in Athens). The present writer once heard such an "exegesis" in an address by a learned professor of Church History, of a segregationist persuasion.

is at base a wrong response to the fundamental anxiety--and its disguises. "If we change our accustomed way toward the negroes among us, then we lose our own security and our own individuality--our envisioned 'destiny.' True, we are accustomed to speak about ultimate reality in terms of 'Christianity.' We are 'Christians.' We are 'God's people.' We love 'the Church,' the Bible, and so forth. We cannot, ergo we should not, allow negroes 'equality.' Therefore (via rationalization) our fear as to the consequences of any change in our policy toward the negro is ipso facto 'righteous concern.'"

The fallacy is in accepting justification for the response--or for the "answer"--to the anxiety which poses the question of meaning. Christian justification is only efficacious for the question itself. The segregationists' response is self-justification: a raging resistance to the Scylla--which is the calamity they associate with the loss of the kind of pattern which they identify (idolatrously) with security and meaning. Their Bible-quoting, all-out avoidance of any "conviction of sin" backs them into the Charybdis of destructive self-loss and world-loss. He that seeks his life in such a manner loses it! Yet he is accustomed to fear most of all, change as carrying the threat of self-loss and world-loss.

The implication of our study is that the segregationist-mentality should be changed and reason (having metanoia!) somewhat as follows:

"Our error has been the following 'logic':

"(1) We cannot put our hearts into giving what the injunction to integrate the races requires.¹

"(2) We are justified--we are righteous--in refusing to do that which we cannot do sincerely.

"(3) Therefore the injunction is wrong. The ethic it represents is the source of any evil there is in the tension arising now.

"(4) With courage and resolution, with zeal for 'the right' as we see it, we shall fight to the end the principle of integration.

"If we insist that our reasoning is to be Christian, then we must examine it in the light of the Christian gospel, the gospel of grace. Its logic for our situation is:

"(1) The law of agape--'the righteousness of God-as-He-is-in-Christ'--is that the negro is sharer with us of essential humanity, and regardless of our fears, we must grant him 'equality.'

"(2) Of course we must view with honesty the actual probability of our feeling this agape for the negro. We, perhaps not without ambivalence, have identified him as a 'bad object,' a symbol of danger, within our 'concept' of ourselves and of our milieu. We simply are not accustomed to think of him as an equal, as 'a friendly power,' or as a bearer of the same kind of essence which distinguishes us from other beings. Our fear, our dread, our anxiety is

¹For instance, the interpretative (yet binding) statement of what the law actually is (in the United States), as given in a famous decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, in April, 1954. By 9 to 0 the court found against the "separate-but-equal" doctrine, specifically as applied to public education in the United States.

understandable. But it is wrong, in the objective. The law of agape alone determines what is right.

"(3) Therefore the evil, the wrongness, is in our attitude, even though we ourselves are not altogether accountable for it, since we were conditioned by a society which twisted our conscience away from the law of agape with respect to this particular matter. Although our attitude toward the negro is condemned--it is wholly pathological, a 'falleness' within us, we ourselves are justified in our being (though not in our prejudices).

"(4) Our problem now is simply what to do about the total situation: Our ingrained attitude is counter to that of the Kingdom of God. What can we do? The answer is: In the midst of our anxiety, our misgivings, our conditioned fears, and geysers of hostility, we must simply give the negro the justice which the law of agape requires. True, we are not able to give it with our whole heart. It is not sincere as from us-in-ourselves. But it is required.

"(5) How can we? 'By the grace of agape,' is the only answer. We are not required to delude ourselves into thinking that we feel in accord with this policy which we must serve. Authentic, valid faith cannot require such dishonesty. Whereas our logic has been: I cannot; ergo I should not; it can and should be: I should; ergo I shall, although in a sense I cannot; I shall, yet not I but the grace of God! As God has loved me and established my way, restoring unto me the goodness and meaning that are the telos of my essential 'humanness'

before God, I rely on Him--his grace, his trustworthiness, his love, not on my own conditioned response to the anxiety which the specter of integration has always aroused in me. This slavishly segregationist I is crucified with Christ. It must be crucified again and again.

'Nevertheless I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.'

Some such route seems implicit in the genius of the Christian conception of justification. In time, the I may come to feel the agape, winning control over "the law in my members." It may some day be transferred by the "spiritual law." "Who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" asks Paul. His "answering theology" to his "existential question" is:

Thanks be to God through Jesus Christ our Lord! So then, I of myself serve the law of God with my mind, but with my flesh I serve the law of sin. There is therefore now no condemnation for those who are in Christ Jesus. For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free from the law of sin and death All who are led by the Spirit of God are sons of God. For you did not receive the spirit of slavery to fall back into fear, but you have received the spirit of sonship The Spirit helps our weakness I am sure that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor powers, nor height, nor depth, nor anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the agape [tes agapes] of God in Christ Jesus our Lord.¹

¹Romans 7 and 8 (selections).

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