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**The Israeli-Jordanian Tacit Alliance
from 1967 to 1984**

by

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This thesis will examine the tacit alliance of cooperation that has evolved between Israel and Jordan through clandestine negotiations. It will focus particularly on the period from the Six Day War of 1967 to the end of the Likud administration of 1984. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to explain how, while officially at a state of war, Israel and Jordan have negotiated on significant matters and have cooperated for their mutual benefit. Also, this thesis will analyze this adversarial partnership in terms of its cost and benefit to each party. In addition, the paper asserts that these negotiations are greatly influenced by the prevailing faction in Jerusalem and Amman. The two Israeli factions are comprised of the Likud and Labor blocs. Within the Jordanian ruling elite, the two opposing groups consist of the minimalists and maximalists. These respective factions within their nations strongly influence what is perceived as each nation's self-interest. Though this paper is not a study of Jordanian or Israeli internal politics, it will also examine the character of the negotiations to prove that they reveal the objectives of both Jordan and Israel as well as the two opposing factions within each nation.

The thesis divides the post-1967 relationship into four general time periods. The first period, from 1967 to the election of the Likud government in 1977, can be characterized by intense secret contacts and by a high degree of collaboration between high officials of the two states. The existence of a Likud government from 1977 to 1984 marks a period where negotiations faltered, almost becoming nonexistent.

Aharon Klieman, in Statecraft in the Dark: Israel's Practice of Quiet Diplomacy, describes the basic conditions of unwritten and therefore undocumented negotiations. The relationship that evolves from such secret

contacts arises in circumstances of "no war, no peace." Klieman defines the secret or quiet diplomacy as:

veiled collaboration involving two or more international actors pursuing essentially peaceful high policy objectives, and which express itself in explicit communications, business-like exchanges, and tacit understandings of arrangements of such sensitivity as to preclude sharing these confidences with either domestic constituencies of other outside parties" (10).

Klieman further states that an examination of Middle Eastern tacit alliances reveals that such relationships usually are transitional in nature: either they will regress into open hostility or further proceed to the open diplomacy of normalized relations. However, the Jordanian-Israeli framework reveals a third possibility where that clandestine partnership solidifies into a permanent state of relations (2, 94).

The existence of such tacit alliance merits praise because it signifies a shift from open hostility to covert cooperation. However, secret ties like those that exist between Amman and Jerusalem can be criticized because they often do not resolve the underlying political differences that remain nor do they encourage the development of an official, open declaration of peace between the parties (2, 94).

The benefits of the Jordanian and Israeli tacit partnership have accrued over a long period. Israel and Jordan have an enduring history of discreet contact which predates the establishment of either nation as sovereign state. This relationship between the Hashemites and the Zionists was established in the early days of the British mandate in Palestine. Therefore, one of the most salient features of this clandestine collaboration is the long-standing and durable relationship which has weathered numerous crises. In fact, with the single exception of 1967, Israeli and

Jordanian officials have pursued a policy of de facto disengagement and conflict avoidance, illustrating both sides intense desire to avoid future armed conflict (Klieman 2, 103).

The nature of the coexistence and degree of cooperation between Israel and Jordan makes the relationship a unique phenomenon in the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. The tacit alliance is characterized by a series of covert, direct, and indirect contacts which act as binding agreements between the two nations. These contacts serve an instrumental role in avoiding potential friction along their shared border. Also, the direct exchange of information eases concerns that either parties' intentions will not be misunderstood. Furthermore, direct communication allows for clarification of the other parties actions. Moshe Dayan, in his autobiography Breakthrough, expressed the importance of mutual communications. Even as an avowed critic of the dialogue with Jordan, Dayan conceded that the continual discreet contact produced a better understanding of "what we could expect from Jordan-or rather, what we could not expect" (55). As for King Hussein, Samuel Lewis, in a 1987 edition of Foreign Affairs, claims that "No Arab leader understands as well as Hussein the intricacies of Israel's domestic and foreign Middle Eastern policy nor has any other spent as much time talking candidly with senior Israeli leaders" (601). Although the clandestine exchanges across the Jordan have not produced an official peace document, they have brought a substantial reduction in tension along the joint border.

Klieman also states that the tacit understanding has nurtured a greater sensitivity in Amman and Jerusalem toward their counterparts. This in turn, has permitted both Jordan and Israel increased freedom in back-channel diplomacy. Klieman asserts that given the stability of the

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functional collaboration obtained through secret diplomacy, "more substance has been achieved de facto by Israel and the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan along the secret back channel than by Israel and Egypt in a formal state of peace" (2, 112).

Another advantage of the atmosphere of cooperation between Israel and Jordan is that it has been able to efficiently resolve many of the smaller, mundane problems which have arisen. The secret partnership has produced concrete results in such areas as the development of Eilat and Aqaba as commercial and recreation centers, family reunifications, visits by East Bank Palestinians in Israel and promotion of the transfer of Israeli-designed and manufactured equipment used in advancing Jordanian irrigation.

The case of the Israeli-Jordanian tacit alliance demonstrates a overriding recognition of affinity of interests. Aharon Klieman argues that had both parties base their mutual cooperation on a larger sense of complementary needs and corresponding interests. At times, the parallel nature of the two states' interests is a function of each nation carrying out its separate foreign policy, rather than a mutual agreement. For example, both Jordan and Israel encourage the United States to play a mediatory role in the Middle East peace process in hopes of improving relations with the United States and gaining all the benefits that enhanced status provides (2, 107). At other times, Israel and Jordan find both parties' interests are served through secret collaboration thereby establishing a mutual policy. The Israeli and Jordanian combined efforts to suppress the establishment of a separate, independent Palestinian state illustrates this mutuality of shared interests. On other issues, the positions of Israel and Jordan are diametrically opposed. Jordan's support for, and occasional leadership in

anti-Israeli resolutions in world forums and the Israeli opposition of Jordan's acquisition of sophisticated weapons exemplify the conflicting interests of the two governments (Klieman, 2, 107).

David Bar-Illan in an August 1988 demonstrates another salient advantage of the Israeli-Jordanian clandestine ties: occasionally one state has played an intermediary role for the other. For example, Jordan has reportedly mediated talks between Israel and Syria as well as other Arab states.

Given the complementary relationship, Israeli and Jordanian contacts have often intensified during times of heightened crisis which involved political and security issues, such as Jordan's 1970 confrontation and violent expulsion of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Also, crisis involving shared economic interests like the numerous water problems of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers are often solved through continuous negotiations between lower level government officials. Furthermore, low-level contacts often take place in an attempt to regularize or order the daily affairs along the common border (Klieman 2, 55).

Farid al-Khazen, in "The Middle East in Strategic Retreat," stated that although the alliance is unofficial and undocumented, it is only "natural" that a degree of rules and assumptions have evolved between the two parties. He states that such negotiations need not be formalized before they may acquire validity. Al-Khazen further points out four rules that have become apparent in his examination of the Israeli-Jordanian functional collaboration. The first law is that neither side is asked to relinquish its ultimate claims of ideological commitment for the purpose of dialogue. Secondly, neither Israel nor Jordan should consciously attempt to press extreme demands that the other side could never meet. Also, neither side

should seek to embarrass or compromise the other (i.e. Israel should avoid major indiscretions that might expose Hussein to Arab condemnation as a traitor). Lastly, each party retains the right to explore and establish contacts with other involved actors (155).

The clandestine negotiations and working relationship have allowed for many benefits as well as numerous risks. The greatest risks that touches both Israel and Jordan stems from the apparent success of the back channel partnership. This occurs when the two parties make their peace without pressing onward to a formalized statement of that peace. Klieman notes that at this point, the secret diplomacy functions so well in satisfying the essential needs of both governments such as de-escalation, stabilization and clarification that it becomes a disincentive against incurring greater risks by pushing on to the official peace document. Another possibility that exists is that the regimes' leaders who have grown accustomed to the discreet understanding may falsely perceive that the relationship is not strong enough to produce the final stage of the peace process. Therefore, Jerusalem and Amman may accept the present status quo permitting the tacit alliance to become converted into something that it was neither intended nor designed to be: "a hiding place from decision; a quasi-permanent structure" (Klieman, 2, 111).

Historical Perspective 1921-1948

As noted previously, the tacit alliance between Israel and Jordan has had a long history dating back to the British mandate of Palestine. Historian Avi Shlaim, in Collusion Across the Jordan, stresses that the first distinct period of collaboration dates from the creation of the Transjordan emirate in 1921 to the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948. This stage formed the foundations for which all other negotiations rested. These

foundations were the twin geographical and political 'constants' of close physical proximity of shared borders and a common search for security and viability through exclusion (or subordination) of the Palestinian national movement (2-5).

During this period, Abdullah secretly met with Ben-Gurion and Golda Meir in November, 1947 and in May, 1948. They met in an effort to exchange information and coordinate their response to the United Nations General Assembly's endorsement of the partition of the Palestinian Mandate. These two meetings did not result in a lasting understanding. Instead, Shlaim indicates that the talks revealed that the two sides were working for diametrically opposed objectives. Jordanian leadership wished to gain control of all the West Bank without being forced to accept the existence of the Jewish state. While at the same time, the Zionist leaders desired to neutralize the Arab Legion without fighting, or if possible without conceding the West Bank to Transjordan (Shlaim, 110-121). The significance of this period was proven when this stage came to an end. The conflict between the two parties in 1948 demonstrated the inadequacy of the secret diplomacy.

Historical Perspective 1948-1951

Like the previous period, this framework revolved around the person and politics of King Abdullah of Jordan. In fact, Abdullah's assassination on July 20, 1951 drastically altered the covert exchange across the Jordan. After cessation of the hostilities in September 1948, Transjordan and Israel found themselves copartitionists of Palestine. This unique relationship, according to Klieman, required that the two states develop a strategy aimed first at stabilizing and then legitimizing the new status of their territorial possessions. Consequently, both states perceived that the only viable means

to achieve their respective goals was through a resumption of talks. The first contacts occurred almost immediately after the fighting ended. Unlike the previous secret diplomacy, the discussions were conducted with a sense of purpose: to arrive ultimately at a bilateral peace treaty. However, the respective leaders realized that before such monumental step could be taken, there were more immediate pressing problems which needed attention. Therefore, the first phases of the negotiations were conducted in hopes of agreeing on a interim armistice solution (2, 96).

During this time of covert negotiations between Jordan and Israel, public truce talks were being held under the auspices of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization. Military officers of the conflicting Arab nations and Israel met in Rhodes from 1948 to 1949. Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv in Behind the Uprising, assert that the formal negotiations were a facade for the covert contacts. The true negotiations consisted of a series of direct meetings with Abdullah accompanied by his closest advisors and Ben-Gurion at Abdullah's winter palace and later in Jerusalem. The secret meeting centered on administering the Rhodes cease fire lines. Occasionally, matters of hostile neighborliness such as dealing with the theft of farm animals from Israeli settlement or the infiltrations and small arms firefights were addressed in these preliminary meetings. During these early negotiations it became clear that both sides wanted to avoid an externally imposed solution where Jerusalem would be turned into an international city (50). Klieman states that the meeting lasted for three months and their results were incorporated in the armistice agreement signed in Rhodes on April 13, 1949 (2,96).

Having addressed the most pressing difficulties presented by the armistice accords, Ben-Gurion and Abdullah began to focus on establishing

a more permanent arrangement (Shlaim, 575-581). They utilized the same secret, direct channels as before. The talks continued throughout Abdullah's life, but reached a peak between November, 1949 and March, 1950. These clandestine encounters produced a five year nonaggression pact. The final treaty was drafted and even initialed. However, it was never consummated because of the reluctance of either Jordan or Israel to make compromise further, particularly on the subject of territorial concessions. Klieman stated that after this period of intense negotiation, this talks proved to be lacking in purpose and substance (2, 96).

Historical Perspective 1951-1967

Except for two minor exceptions, the period covering the assassination of King Abdullah to the Six Day War was void of vigorous clandestine exchanges between Amman and Jerusalem. Aharon Klieman noted that this lack of contacts was caused primarily by the instability and political upheaval which followed the lose of the central actor, King Abdullah (2, 97). The bloody assassination of his grandfather outside the Al-Aqba mosque in Jerusalem on July 19, 1951, thoroughly convinced the young and still insecure King Hussein that direct negotiations should not be renewed (Melman, 50). The king not only feared that he was not politically strong enough to negotiate any significant breakthrough in the peace process, but feared for his life if he was exposed talking with the Zionists. This rightly guided fear has continued to strongly influence Hussein in his dealings with Israel.

Upon Abdullah's unfortunate demise and the ensuing instability of the new regime in Amman, the Israeli leadership also realized that the time was not right to reaffirm its tacit alliance with the Hashemites. Klieman claims that the Israelis realized that it would take many years before the

new monarch could feel sufficiently confident to accept the personal and¹⁰ political risk of initiating a direct reproach with Israel. Consequently, the reluctance of either government to extend an invitation to restore the clandestine collaboration across the Jordan created a situation where the respective policymakers had no other viable alternative but to accept the many and obvious imperfections of the status quo (2, 97).

Klieman also suggests that both parties accepted the existing state of affairs because they viewed the situation as beneficial in achieving their national goals. The Hashemites in particular, saw that the fulfillment of their immediate dynastic interests were served by the status quo. The state of affairs empowered King Hussein to concentrate on securing his throne against opponents inside Jordan as well as within the Arab world. Further, the situation allowed Hussein to concentrate on other internal matters, namely the realization of expanding the kingdom in the West Bank and the removal of its Mufi-led Palestinian opposition (2, 97).

The status quo also permitted Israel to pursue its national interests without the added weight of the secret diplomacy with Jordan. Jerusalem during this period sought international recognition of its occupation of the West Bank and establishment of a framework for administering the occupied territories. Klieman further notes that the lack of any real collaboration between the two parties was evidenced in increased border incidents and armed reprisals (2, 97).

In sum, the period from King Hussein's accession to the Hashemite throne to the open hostilities of the Six Day War was marked by Israeli and Jordanian compatibility of interests: each was insecure and defensive. Also, each was intent on pursuing its own internal objectives of consolidating its economic, social and political structure. Paradoxically,

Israel and Jordan collaborated by not reestablishing their discreet alliance but by permitting its clandestine partner to accomplish its separate policy objectives. Only matters of minimum possible risk such as the preservation of stability along their shared, permeable border invited the parties to cooperate (Klieman 2, 98).

The two notable exceptions in the lull in exchange across the Jordan occurred after several attempts on King Hussein's life by agents of the Arab world. Melman and Raviv state that these assassination attempts pushed Hussein closer to the Israeli camp. Hussein quickly acknowledged that of all the actors in the Middle East, the Israelis were the most reliable and trustworthy: "They might not be his friend, but at least they did not appear to be trying to kill him" (56).

Later, the overthrow of the Hashemite Faisal of Iraq in July, 1958, prompted King Hussein to extend indirect contacts with Israel. Observing that the spreading Nasserist revolution imperiled his throne, the monarch sought and gained Israeli permission for Great Britain to activate the Anglo-Jordanian defense pact by overflying Israeli airspace in order to aid Hussein with arms and troops (Melman, 65).

The first direct contact came from King Hussein's initiative to seek Israel's assistance to improve his image in Washington. Moshe Zak in "Israeli-Jordanian Relations" published in the Winter 1985 volume of the Washington Quarterly, states Hussein wished to win support for increased American financial and military aid. He met with the special emissary of Prime Minister Levy Eshkol, Dr. Yaacov Herzog, in September 1963. In the London meeting, Hussein hoped that if an Israeli backing could not be obtained, he could at least convince Jerusalem not to attempt to block American aid to Jordan. During the initial negotiations, Hussein explained

to Herzog that he had deep doubts as to his present ability to finally rid himself of the external threat of Nasserism and the internal challenge of the Palestinians (168).

Melman and Raviv assert that during the talks, Hussein argued that in order to compensate for his weakness, Jordan needed the most modern and sophisticated tanks produced: the kind that only the United States could provide (71). Zak notes that the Israelis were extremely reluctant to support Jordan's acquisition and stationing of modern tanks in the West Bank because they were viewed as an immediate threat to Israel's "tight hip" in the Tul Karem-Natanya region (168).

The Americans were solicited to pressure Israel to consent to the Jordanian tank purchase. Zak states that Acevele Harriman and Robert Komer visited Jerusalem to win Israel's acquiescence to the American plan to equip two Jordanian brigades with U.S. tanks (168). Klieman reveals that with the help of American pressure, Hussein was able to receive Israel's tacit consent for the purchase in return for a written pledge that the tanks would never be positioned on the West Bank (2, 98). Moshe Zak states that technically, this promise was kept even during the Six Day War when the tanks were placed on the West Bank. He claims that Hussein did not break his promise; the order to move the tanks originated from the Egyptian general who was stationed in Amman following the military pact signed between the king and Nasser on May 30, 1967 (169).

1967-1977: An Era of Intense Covert Negotiations and Cooperation

The ten year period from the end of the Six Day War to the Likud victory in 1977 was characterized by intense dialogue and cooperation between Jerusalem and Amman. The policymakers on both sides of the Jordan recognized that their national goals could be best attained through

tacit collaboration. Political and strategic matters were the main focus of the secret negotiations. The economic concerns were placed on the backburner as more immediate issues forced Israel and Jordan concentrate on crisis management.

Klieman states that the clash between Israel and Jordan during the Six Day War resulted largely from King Hussein's "defection" from the discreet partnership to his reversal of an "adversarial" role against his western neighbor (2, 105). Fortunately, the fighting did not permanently sever the secret ties, rather the armed struggle had the odd effect of intensifying the dialogue and broadening the tacit cooperation. Klieman states that this definite turning point in the alliance can be attributed to the war's shock effect on each of the parties. Both nations would have preferred to avoid the hostilities through negotiation, yet the confrontation forced the two partners to realize the vast inadequacies of the previous system and the frailty of the semi-permanent truce (2, 95-106).

The framework that resulted from the heightened awareness of mutual objectives and the subsequent contacts allowed for a greater degree of flexibility. Klieman suggests that this was evidenced by both parties' willingness to "agree to disagree" on the larger political questions such as the fate of the occupied territories while exploring possible areas of common concern such as stabilizing the shared border via secret dialogue. The war also created a sensitivity to the partners' mutual interests of avoiding any further armed conflict, administering the West Bank and coping with the renewed Palestinian activism as well as improving economic ties (2, 107).

In fact, the tacit alliance evolved into a genuine working relationship deriving from a common belief that the prevailing relationship, however

imperfect, nevertheless represented the least possible evils. Melman and Raviv maintain that the secret understanding created an atmosphere where Israel and Jordan were "no longer enemies, [rather] they became good friends"(96). However, due to the risks which would result from public recognition of the concealed contacts, the states preferred that their other Middle Eastern neighbors be oblivious to the true facts. The principles of discretion and confidentiality of back channel diplomacy offered the best medium to continue their collaboration.

Initial Contacts

Moshe Zak in "Israeli-Jordanian Negotiations" asserts that the first meeting after the Six Day War was held in September 1967 in London. This meeting took place with Yaacov Herzog acting as an emissary between Foreign Minister Abba Eban and King Hussein (196). This was the initial encounter in a series of discussions involving the highest officials from each nation. Deputy Prime Minister and later Foreign Minister Yigal Allon met with Hussein on fourteen different occasions. During the decade, Eban saw Hussein twelve times while Yitzhak Rabin met with the King on eight occasions. Numerous sources maintain that King Hussein held at least seven face to face talks with Israeli prime ministers. Melman and Raviv explain that King Hussein, despite his strong desire for secrecy, expanded the circle of Jordanian participants. King Hussein permitted his brother and designated successor, Crown Prince Hassan to accompany him during most of the veiled contacts. Occasionally, the Jordanian monarch allowed a few other highly trusted Jordanian officials to become involved in the talks when their specialized skills were required (Melman, 114).

Amman and Jerusalem employed elaborate measures to throw probing journalist off their scent. The diversification of remote, highly

secure meeting sites such as the Gulf of Aqaba, the Judean Desert not far from Massada, and a secret government guest house on the outskirts of Tel-Aviv exemplifies the numerous precautions to insure confidentiality (Klieman 2, 99).

According to Zak, the last concealed negotiations were held in Israel between Hussein and Labor Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin. The covert ties were cut two months later primarily as a result of the Likud election victory changing the government, and with it, the sympathetic stand toward the Jordanians (167).

The View from Amman: Minimalists and Maximalists

Throughout the post-1967 period of the covert relationship, passionate debates raged in the respective governments over the nature and scope of the Israeli-Jordanian tacit alliance. The primary point of contention centered around the influence that the respective governments hoped to exert in the occupied territories, especially upon the degree of collaboration between the two states in administering the West Bank.

In Jordan the two factions that squared off over its ties with Israel were known as the minimalists and the maximalists. Klieman, in a 1981 article published in the Washington Papers entitled Israel, Jordan, Palestine: The Search for a Durable Peace, describes the minimalists' position which argued that the West Bank could only be a liability for Jordan. Crown Prince Hassan is considered the main spokesman for the group which argued that the costs of enhancing Hashemite prestige through cooperative administration of the West Bank with the Israelis could never produce substantial benefits. Therefore, this faction advocated for a renewed concentration on the East Bank while allowing ties with Jerusalem concerning the joint administration of the West Bank to wane (15).

Historian Ian Lustick in Israel and Jordan: The Implications of an Adversarial Partnership states that during the years 1967 to 1977 a second opinion held sway in Amman. This maximalist cause championed by King Hussein, bases its position on confronting Jordan's three major post-1967 problems. The war had cost Jordan the majority of its most productive fertile soil and the holy places of Islam with the loss of the West Bank (5). Melman and Raviv state that the second and third aspects of Jordan's crisis were intertwined: how to preserve the Hashemite throne when the Palestinian population on the East Bank had outgrown any other and would swell further along with how to cope with the Israeli occupation of the West Bank (84). The maximalists felt that through a tacit understanding with the Israelis, the Hashemites could triumph over their complex problems.

According to Melman and Raviv, Hussein also sensed a strong duty to rule over a Jordan which spanned both sides of the river. The maximalists were further described as being: "deeply pained by the loss of the Temple Mount and its mosques in East Jerusalem" (153). They argue further that the Hussein's sense of serving as the Islamic guardian for Jerusalem's holy sites had a tremendous influence in shaping Jordanian policy toward the Jewish state (153). In fact, the two historians state that sentiments, more than a rational analysis of the political and economic reality, guided the Hashemite policy decisions. They use Hussein's frequent public statement of his moral duty to carry out Abdullah's tasks. The hope for a truly "Transjordan" Hashemite state was one of Abdullah's goals which Klieman notes has endured throughout in Jordanian strategy (1, 19). Therefore, it appears that the Hashemites sought the tacit understanding whereby they believed that could gain a foothold on the West Bank either through the

administration of public services in the occupied territories or through negotiation of an exchange of land for peace.

The Israeli Jordanian Option

Israel's Labor party has historically been associated with a policy sympathetic toward Jordanian interests. This salient feature was highlighted after the Labor party was displaced from the ruling government and the subsequent breakdown in cooperation across the Jordan. The leading figures of the Labor party perceived the best course of action to achieve Israel's overall political, economic and strategic objectives was through the "Jordanian Option." Professor Shlomo Avineri, the one time Labor Director General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, outlined the main components of this doctrine in two articles in the Fall 1987 edition of Foreign Affairs and a late 1979 issue of The Nation. He justifies the Jewish state's policy of making King Hussein the keystone in its Middle Eastern policy of political compromise by placing the problem in a wider context than the occupied territories. It is the Israeli perception, claims Avineri, that a Palestinian homeland already exists on the east bank of the Jordan River. He further claims that Israeli security and political issues dictate that there is no land available between the two states for a sovereign Palestinian entity. The establishment of an independent Palestinian homeland would quickly degenerate into a PLO terrorist bases aimed at inflicting its violent anger at Israel and Jordan (Foreign Affairs, 7-22, The Nation, 36-49).

According to Avineri, the other reason for Labor's insistence on the Jordanian option was that Jordan alone can answer the Jewish state's overriding security concern. Assuming that an independent Palestinian state would be permitted to exist on the West Bank, Avineri states that all

Israeli policymakers vehemently insisted that it be completely demilitarized. However, those looking toward Amman argued that a Jordanian-Israeli collaboration could be better able to insure the demilitarization of the West Bank than an independent Palestinian state.

The clearest formal expression of Labor-advocated pro-Jordanian posture was delivered on July 21, 1974. The official Israeli government statement made the following remarks:

- The Israeli government would work for a peace agreement through negotiations with Jordan:
- The peace would be based on the existence of only two independent states:
- One of these states would be Israel with a unified Jerusalem as its capital
- The other nation would be a "Jordanian-Palestinian" state with the borders which would be determined in negotiations between Israel and Jordan "east of the Jordan" River;
- In this state, "the specific identity of the Jordanian people would find expression in peace" ;
- Lastly, Israel would continue to regard Jordan as "our natural neighboring partner in negotiations for peace on our eastern border" (Sinai and Pollack, 135-136).

Following this statement, the Arab Rabat Conference explicitly canceled Jordan's claim as the Palestinian representative in any peace talks signifying Arab concern over the Jordanian-Israeli complementary interests on the West Bank.

Like the maximalists in Jordan, the Labor-led Jordanian option met with stiff opposition within Jerusalem. The Likud bloc adamantly argued against Israeli-Jordanian rapproach. They ultimately desired the annexation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into the "Land of Israel." They believed

that any exchange across the Jordan severely hampered their goal. Intra-government debate was acerbated during the period of the National Unity government of Prime Minister Eshkol. Moshe Zak indicates that the dissension within the cabinet was so uncompromising that it often paralyzed the government. In fact, Menachem Begin resigned from the National Unity government due to his opposition to the covert talks with Jordan (169). Zak also reports that throughout Hussein's diplomatic endeavors with Israel, and especially during the Likud government, the Jordanian monarch feared that the Israelis would bypass Amman and conduct separate talks peace talks with Egypt, eliminating Hussein's influence on the peace process' direction (174-175). Hussein's fears were latter proven correct during the Camp David Accords which were drawn and signed without the Jordanian monarch's presence.

As stated previously, the Israeli Labor party and the Jordanian maximalists faction held common goals and perceived that those goals could be best obtained through a solid, working, yet undisclosed alliance. These two groups' positions converged on realization that both Israel's and Jordan's political security rested on the shoulders of its neighbor. Klieman explains this mutuality of security interests by examining the nature of the two states within the Middle Eastern geopolitical framework. He points out that both Jordan and Israel are small and highly vulnerable. This forces both nations to be predominantly defensive and therefore predisposed in favor of a status quo in regional politics. To further illustrate his point, Klieman states that both nations view themselves as potential victims of internal political extremism, Islamic fundamentalism and revolutionary Arab nationalism. In sum, the Israeli and Jordanian joint perception of a mutual security zone took into account the larger conception of the

strategic state of affairs in which both Jerusalem and Amman would lose much from another armed conflict, and that a radical, militant and expansionist Syria poses a direct danger to the existence to the sovereignty of both and that a independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories cannot be tolerated (1, 16-17).

Israeli intentions have been clearly spelled out in the numerous public statements by successive Israeli cabinets which claim that the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Hashemite Kingdom on the East Bank of the Jordan River is vital to the Jewish State's national interests. Dan Horowitz in Israel's Concept of Defensible Borders asserts the Jewish political leaders view a responsible and moderate regime in Amman as a security belt and "defense-in-depth" for Israel on its vulnerable eastern front. He also notes that Israel regards the possibility of Jordan's destabilization either by attempted coup by forces hostile to the Hashemites or the permanent stationing of foreign Arab troops in Jordan as a direct security threat to the Jewish state (10). In light of this risk, Israeli prime ministers have continued to announce in no uncertain terms that it reserves the right to directly intervene if Jordan is invaded by foreign forces (Ben-Gurion, Address). Horowitz further maintains that Israel's explicit declarations hinging its own security on the integrity and sovereignty of Jordan, backed up by Israeli's actual military strength has been a powerful deterrent for any would-be opponent of Jordan (10).

Israel's announcements have benefited Jordan because they have supplied the Hashemites with the power to confront domestic turmoil free from outside Arab responses. King Hussein's forcible treatment of the Palestinians during the later months of 1970 exemplifies the role that the tacit alliance plays in freeing the Jordanian monarch to punish Palestinian

improprieties with relative impunity. According to Melman and Raviv, after the huge migration of Palestinians to Jordan following Israel's gaining statehood, Hussein's closest aides urged him to "wage an all-out war on the Palestinian guerrillas." These advisors feared the existence of the Palestinian nationalists was eroding Hashemite authority on the East Bank. They further warned Hussein early in 1970 that an attempted PLO insurrection was imminent. These two writers state that King Hussein was "loath" to subject his beloved nation to the horrors of a likely civil war on a gamble for a total victory (108-109).

Zak states that Hussein heeded his aides warnings and on February 17, 1970, secretly contacted Israeli officials through American intermediaries. The urgent message, which was conveyed to Foreign Minister Yigal Allon, requested precise notification of Israeli intentions if Jordan were to move against the Palestinians. Hussein asked whether Israel would not exploit the situation for its own advantage if Jordan moved its forces from its western border to forcibly act against the Palestinian guerrillas. Further, Hussein requested that Israel refrain from reacting to hostile acts directed toward the Zionist state by the armed Palestinians. Lastly, the monarch asked for Israeli military assistance if Syria or Iraq invaded his kingdom in support the Palestinians (169).

Hussein's message touched off another round of heated debate between the two factions over the Israeli-Jordanian clandestine dialogue in the National Unity Government. Professor Zak states that during the ensuing debate, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan held the greatest reservations to extending Israeli assistance because, as of February, he did not believe that Hussein could survive a fight with the Palestinian nationalists. In a rare exhibition of sympathy, Menachem Begin and his

fellow Likud ministers nevertheless acquiesced to the replies sent back through the American channels. Zak explained the three replies as follows:

- Israel would not take advantage of the thinning of forces on the Jordanian border by attacking;
- In the case of terrorist activity across the Jordan, Israel reserved the right to respond "vigorously;"
- Israel was willing to discuss the question of assistance to Jordan, if the "need should ever arise" (170).

Edgar O'Ballance in "The Jordanian Wars" states that the events of early September 1970 broke Hussein's legendary patience. First, the September 1 assassination attempt by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine strained the monarch's resolve against violence. Then the hijacking and subsequent explosive destruction of three airliners at Jordan's Dawson Field, televised around the globe deeply embarrassed the Jordanian king. These events forced Hussein to conclude that his only remaining available option was armed retaliation (47). In Melman and Raviv's opinion, Hussein, bolstered by the Israeli pledge of noninterference, felt confident enough to launch a massive armed counteroffensive against the Palestinians (107).

Lustick points out that during the civil war, the substantial overlap in the Zionist and Hashemite interest became apparent when Syrian tanks "hastily emblazoned with Palestinian markings" invaded Jordan in support of the embattled PLO groups. Hussein was justifiably concerned that the nearly 250 Syrian tanks posed a serious threat to the Hashemite dynasty. Furthermore, Melman and Raviv assert that the Jordan leader also feared that an Iraqi armored brigade based at the strategic Jordanian base of Mafraq might join in the fight to assist the Palestinians (109).

An urgent message requesting emergency assistance was sent from Amman through Washington. It stated that if the tanks were supported by Syrian air protection, the armored invasion would likely bring about a collapse of the Hashemite regime. Lustick writes that the Israelis then requested that the American Sixth Fleet move toward the area to strengthen Israeli's western front. After this request was granted, Israeli Defence forces were transferred out of the region in response to the growing Jordanian crisis (8).

According to Melman and Raviv, the Jordanians sent an explicit message through White House Security Advisor Henry Kissinger that Hussein would not object to an Israeli air attack on the Syrian tank invasion. However, the king strongly warned that this was not an open invitation to send ground forces across the Jordan River. Israel's leaders were caught off guard by Hussein's surprise request for an airstrike. They found it very peculiar that any sovereign leader would ask a hostile nation to bomb his own territory (110).

Arguments raged between the two groups in the Israeli cabinet and military establishment who had knowledge of the request. Melman and Raviv stated that some of the army officers opposing any assistance to Hussein, suggested that if Israel decided to act, it would be in Israel's long-term interests to help the Palestinians topple the Hashemites (110-111).

However, the anti-Jordanian lobby was countered by those who wished to aide their embattled Hashemites partners. Members such as Golda Meir, Yigal Allon, Abba Eban and Yitzhak Rabin advocated a plan to support the Jordanians. After this faction finally gained the upper hand, the Israelis mounted an implied challenge to the Syrians by transferring an armored division from southern Israel to the Syrian border near Bet

She'an. All veils of normal military secrecy were purposely disregarded according to the account offered by Melman and Raviv. This was to show the Syrians that it would face a formidable tank force if matters in Jordan escalated out of control. Furthermore, the Israeli forces in the Golan Heights were openly put on highest alert. This potential invasion force, barely fifty miles from the Syrian capital, compelled the Syrians to halt its advance in order to be able to defend the narrow strip of land between the Golan Heights and Damascus. Also, to back up its strategic moves the Israeli Prime Minister publicly declared that the Syrian invasion endangered the Jewish state's vital national interests (Melman, 110).

Israel's response of "flexing...its military muscle" writes Melman and Raviv, deterred the possible Iraqi intervention and limited the Syrian armored attack (110). Lustick claims that once these two problems were overcome with the assurance of the Jerusalem government, the outcome of the hostilities was certain (8). In fact, the Jordanian forces loyal to the Hashemites drove the Syrian armored units back across the border in a rout. Klieman stated that once freed from the external threat, Hussein was able to concentrate his energies upon reasserting Hashemite control over the East Bank and expelling the Palestinians (1, 45).

In sum, the Jewish leadership's consent to aid their eastern neighbor, according to Lustick, demonstrates the overlap of Israeli and Jordanian interests rather than exhibiting American use of Israel as a instrument for the United States' foreign policy in the region (8). The result of the collaboration of a unified front against hostile Arab action against the Hashemite throne in the months following "Black September" strengthened the tacit alliance across the Jordan.

Melman and Raviv in Behind the Uprising describe a series of events during the 1973 war which reveals the importance Israel placed on a sovereign and viable King Hussein in regard to their broader national security interests. During the Yom Kipper War, the Jordanian monarch sent Jordanian tanks to the Golan Heights. Hussein's actions against the Jewish state could be viewed as a symbolic gesture taken to avoid being branded a traitor by the Arab world. In order to achieve their military objective, the Israelis had planned an airstrike to bomb the area where the tanks were deployed. Melman and Raviv report that by sheer coincidence, one of the officers at the front was Zeev Bar-Lavie, head of the Israeli Defense Force intelligence branch's "Jordanian Desk." After looking at the Jordanian position through binoculars, Bar-Lavie realized that unusual activity of the odd crowd of soldiers and vehicles proved that the Jordanian monarch was making a front line inspection of his troops. Bar-Lavie quickly moved into action to prevent the airstrike. He notified IDF intelligence chief El Zeira and Chief of Staff General David Salazar and convinced them that although the Jordanian assembly offered an easy target, Israel's long term goals could be better achieved with a living rather than a deceased King Hussein. Melman and Raviv note that by postponing the attack, once again Israel had saved Hussein's life (121-122).

Cooperative Administration of the West Bank

The cooperative administration of the West Bank during 1967-1977 offers one of the most concrete examples of the Israeli-Jordanian tacit alliance. Ever since the first contacts between Abdullah and the Zionists, both parties have felt threatened by the rise of Palestinian nationalism. Throughout the enduring history of clandestine negotiations, both Israel and Jordan have worked to deny either power or territory with the

Palestinian movement. This common cause was passed down to successive generations of leaders on both sides of the Jordan and largely governs their outlook toward one another. Aaron Klieman notes that the overriding security consequences of a Palestinian state have been the major thrust of the formation of the tacit alliance. According to Klieman, both nations are opposed to political independence for the Palestinians because it would entail partitioning geographic, demographic and historical "Palestine" and would also include the secession of land from both sides of the Jordan River (2, 105). The result of these common interests has been that Israel and Jordan see each other as a "kindred spirit as well as a source of moral, political and diplomatic support" (Klieman 2, 106).

The symmetry of interests regarding the West Bank and the Palestinians was reflected in the symmetry of stands adopted by the two neighbors in response to the repeated calls for the internationalization of the divided Jerusalem. As Israeli Ambassador Rafael explains, "During the United Nations debates on the status of Jerusalem in 1950 and 1951, we kept in close touch with the Jordanian chief representative, Fawzi Mulki and Toukan [because] the interests in our two countries converged in preferring the existing status quo" (qt in Rabinovich, 14).

The greatest incentive for closer contacts between Jerusalem and Amman in the post-1967 period was the reemergence of Palestinians, particularly the Palestinian Liberation Organization as more independently minded and politically active, whose grievances and claims extended to the Hashemites and the Israelis. In an effort to counter the renewed Palestinian activism, Israeli and Jordanian officials developed a scheme for the administration of the territories which could be described as one of shared rule involving the Jewish state directly and the Hashemite kingdom

indirectly. Klieman states that the underlying constants of the mutual administration of the West Bank Israel's need to have Jordan's support in moderating the inevitable stresses of a prolonged military occupation and the Jordanian wish for Israeli assistance to act more aggressively in expanding its influence throughout the region at the expense of the PLO. Both Israel and Jordan viewed the only alternative to an unpleasant yet, unavoidable confrontation over the issues of the permanent status of the occupied territories and the shape of a lasting peace settlement was a tacit alliance maintained through secret diplomatic discussions (2, 107).

The Zionists and Hashemites have effectively utilized the secret working arrangement to combat Palestinian terrorism originating from the West Bank. Lustick asserts that following the Israeli Defense Force's occupation of the West Bank, Fatah and other Palestinian guerilla originations attempted to launch a massive campaign of violent resistance and civil disobedience in the occupied territories. Yet, as noted previously, the two secret services collaborated whereby Jordanian political files were mysterious transferred to the Israeli authorities. The cooperation resulted in the deportation of nearly one thousand political figures from the West Bank and the demolition of hundreds of West Bank residents' homes who had provided aid to the guerrillas. Lustick further states that by the end of 1968, both the Israelis and Palestinians knew the cooperation allowed the IDF to crush the West Bank-centered resistance movement (7). The resistance within the Gaza Strip which began a short time later than that of the West Bank, also was brought under control through similar means by late 1970. The resistance to Palestinian uprisings continually was at the center of the Israeli-Jordanian talks during the period of 1967-1977.

The two neighbors sought to transform the hostile territories into tranquil regions through the restriction and manipulation of the local political leadership in favor of moderates who retained close ties to the Hashemites in Amman. Israel saw that such a leadership would be a calming influence on the often radical atmosphere while the Hashemites favored the ties as a means to preserve Jordanian influence on the West Bank. Lustick claims that the Israelis quickly established close and cooperative contacts with the pro-Hashemite patriarchal elites in the villages and with the heads of notable families in the towns and cities. The Israeli administrators rewarded their efforts to discourage dissent with favors such as preferential access to Israeli officials. Lustick notes that the policy was relatively successful in that throughout the occupation, the traditional power brokers maintained good relations with both the Israeli authorities and King Hussein, often shuttling back and forth between Amman and Jerusalem to exchange messages and information (9).

Such visible examples of the Jordanian-Israeli tacit alliance reveal the contradictory desire of the Hashemite regime following the Six Day War to maximize its survival changes while making use of the alliance-induced stability to advance the Hashemite interests throughout the Middle East, particularly in the West Bank. According to Klieman in Israel, Jordan and Palestine: The Search of a Durable Peace, the Hashemite claims on the West Bank rest on three central foundations: geographical proximity and an extensive involvement in the history of Palestinian affairs; a profound sense of duty toward the Arab world and a moral obligation to the Palestinian people; and above all, self-interest (15).

Lustick states that throughout these years, the liberation of the occupied territories remained Jordan's highest foreign policy objective.

Jordan had hoped that through negotiations with Israel it could establish a foothold in the West Bank which could be latter translated to regaining control of most of the West Bank, especially the Muslim holy places in East Jerusalem (5). Melman and Raviv claim that Hussein's desire transcended practical reasons for the reestablishment of Hashemite control of the West Bank. Hussein had placed his prestige, authority and self-respect on the reunification of Jordan. They also explain that Hussein was willing to barter peace in exchange for regaining control of his territory. These designs were clearly outlined in the Jordanian monarch's "United Arab Kingdom" plan of march providing for Hashemite rule over a federation between the East Bank, West Bank and Gaza Strip. Lustick states that the scheme was a reflection of the long standing Greater Hashemite tradition of his grandfather Abdullah (6).

Klieman points out that Hussein perceived that the West Bank offered economic as well as strategic assets that Jordan did not wish to see controlled by any other actor, particularly a militant and irredentist PLO leadership. For example the loss of the West Bank following the Six Day War cost Jordan its most productive agricultural lands. Amman hoped that negotiations with the Israeli occupiers would permit the valuable food supply to continue to flow westward. In addition to the agricultural losses, the country's tourist industry, previously based on visits made to the Muslim and Christian shrines around Jerusalem was nearly crippled after 1967. The Jordanians wished to recoup some of their losses by providing safe passage to Muslim holy places in the West Bank negotiated in agreements between the two neighbors (Lustick, 5).

The Jordanians were able to establish a strong de facto presence in the West Bank through cooperation with the Jewish officials. It was

manifested in such tangible economic signs as salaries paid directly to West³⁰ bank civil servants; the retention of the dinar as legal tender for business transacted in the occupied territories; the preservation of the pre-1967 banking system and the flow of investment capital and subsidies from the East Bank to the West Bank. Also, Jordan sought to maintain a lasting influence with future generations of Palestinians through the use in the West Bank of school texts published by the Ministry of Education in Amman which were screened for offensive material by Israeli officials. Also, Hashemite sway was secured when Israel allowed Jordanian law to be enforced on the West Bank (Rabinovich, 16).

The Jordanians not only wished to reap economic and strategic rewards through the functional arrangement with Israel over the administration of the West Bank but also hoped to ease Jordanian internal pressures. Jordan feared that a harsh Zionist rule in the occupied territories would force Palestinians to migrate to the East Bank. With over 200,000 new refugees from the 1967 fighting crowding the slums and camps of Amman any additional Palestinians would pose a substantial threat to Hashemite authority in the capital. Rabinovich explains that later, the Palestinian problem was further acerbated from the residual animosity of the 1970 war where Hussein became the new arch-villain of Palestinian movement (). Within a matter of a few months, the so-called "dwarf of Amman" had killed more Palestinians than the Israelis had killed since the establishment of the Jewish state in 1948. The Jordanians realistically perceived that only cooperation with Israeli occupation authorities could provide some guarantee that the volatile Palestinians would remain on the West Bank.

Relevant to this point is that following the 1974 Rabat decision stripping Hashemite authority to represent the Palestinians, the Amman regime was able to counter this explicit rejection of its status and retain its presence in the administered territories only through Israel's tacit consent and practical cooperation (Klieman 2, 105).

In return for Israeli willingness to allow Jordan to continue its presence in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the Hashemite regime took a number of significant measures which made the burden of occupying the territories less onerous for the Jewish state. According to Lustick, Israel's acquiescence to the preservation of the Jordanian influence can be attributed to parallel Israeli policy interests (9). Klieman explains that the only question discussed in public debate and within the inner circle of Jewish policymakers related to the issue of the extent and on what terms to offer in pursuing a compromise with King Hussein over the West Bank. These officials were united in the view that Jordan was the lesser of the two possible evils (1, 34-35). Israel sought to use Jordanian cooperation to regularize the most irregular situations of its military occupation of land belonging to another country with which it shared many interests.

The ultimate goal pursued throughout this period by the Israelis was to retain control of strategic lands in the West Bank without being forced to deal with the Palestinian population. For all Israelis this was a matter of national security. Dan Horowitz asserts that Israeli decision makers felt that the only way to insure Israel's defensible borders was to permanently station its armed forces at the Jordan River. They pointed out that the United Nations Security Council's November 1967 Resolution 242 could not protect the Jewish state's destruction from a concerted Arab attack (35). This objective was revealed in the many plans of cooperative

administration of the West Bank and partition of the region between the clandestine partners. Moshe Dayan explicitly outlined the Jewish state's policy during talks with the Hashemites: "You don't have to concede one inch of your soil, let us have our settlements and military positions necessary for our security without giving up land. Call it whatever you like foreign presence or not, we are not interested in ruling over your people" (qt. in Zak, 172). Dayan later acknowledged that the Jordanian-Israeli cooperative administration in the West Bank provided the best assurance of suppressing resurgent irredentist Palestinian nationalism in West Bank-Gaza Strip areas (State of Israel, February 13, 1979).

In addition, Israeli strategists believed that the implementation of Hashemite influence on the West Bank would bolster the king's image which the Jordanian monarch could use to supplant the PLO leadership (Rabinovich, 17).

Melman and Raviv state that the Israeli position was based on the Jewish leadership's desire to pursue a compromise agreement with Jordan over the future of the West Bank. Golda Meir calculated that the after the Israeli tacit aide ensuring Hussein's triumph over the PLO guerilla would translate to vast improvements in the clandestine ties, leading to public declarations of peace. She supposed that the significant moves that forced the Syrian retreat and helped keep Hussein on the throne would leave the King with a sense of gratitude (84).

In conjunction with these strategic and political goals, were Israel's aim to persuade Hussein to accept a permanent settlement, permitting the Jewish military and civilians to remain in the West Bank on religious and biblical connections with the land.

After the 1967 war, in discussions among high ranking officials from Jerusalem and Amman both sides attempted to reach a working compromise that embodied their respective aspirations for the future of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Lustick states that even during these secret meetings which were often punctuated with sharp words, a certain degree of implicit coordination was achieved (6).

However, the Israelis did not always rely solely on the "Jordanian Option." Melman and Raviv maintain that immediately after the Six Day War, Dayan, Allon, and even Prime Minister Eshkol considered bypassing Hussein while negotiating directly with the Palestinians. Eshkol went so far as to assign a working committee under the direction of David Kimche, of Mossad intelligence agents to explore the sentiments of influential West Bank and Gaza Arabs. They state that Kimche and his associates met with wealthy merchants, mayors and intellectuals to determine their willingness to hold talks regarding the future of the occupied territories (85). Their final report to Eshkol's cabinet suggested that the Zionist government could take advantage of the "shock of humiliation" among the Arabs and their new, close "encounter with the Israelis," by engaging in discussions with these Arab leaders (qtd in Melman, 85). This report was confirmed by military administrators who had been appointed to the territories. Dayan sought and won approval for a plan that focused on two local Arab mayors: Sheikh Jaabri, mayor of Hebron and Hamadi Kenaan, mayor of Nablus. Melman and Raviv point out that this was the first realistic effort where Israel pursued a "Palestinian Option" rather than a "Jordan Option" for a peace arrangement on their eastern front (85).

Hussein was not oblivious to his western neighbor's designs. However, Melman and Raviv explain that the king was enraged with Israel's official

annexation of East Jerusalem, after which he was in no hurry to reestablish contacts to pursue an immediate settlement with the Jewish state (85). Furthermore, Hussein had guessed correctly that the Israeli attempts to negotiate with local Palestinians would bare no fruit. The two mayors were unwilling to consider any accord that would allow the continued presence of Israeli troops in the occupied territories. Plagued with these major setbacks, even the Israeli politicians who were opposed to the Jordanian Option conceded that there was no realistic Palestinian venue for peace (Melman,87).

In light of no other choice, Prime Minister Eshkol sent several messages to Amman through Yaakov Herzog. Even though there was a brief meeting between Hussein and Herzog in early July 1967, very little was accomplished (Melman, 86).

The Hashemite king's attitude was altered in November 1967 in response to the United Nations Security Council's Resolution 242. After the resolution's passage, Hussein publicly welcomed the idea of exchanging land for peace. It was against this backdrop that Hussein finally agreed to renew his secret dialogue with Israel (Melman, 87).

Israeli internal politics were undergoing significant changes as well. The Zionist Labor movement realized its long-time dream forming, in January 1968 a united Labor party. This occurred when the Moshe Dayan and Shimon Peres' Rafi faction and Ahdut Ha'avava of Yigal Allon merged into a coalition with the mainstream Mapai. According to Melman and Raviv, this change affected Israel's relationship with the Hashemite Kingdom because the moderate Mapai leadership of Levi Eshkol, Golda Meir and Pinhas Sapir were interested in making a deal with Jordan. However, this view was countered by pressure from inside the expanded

party by those like Dayan who put Israel's security above all other interests (92). The cost of the first unity government of Israeli workers representatives was high, diplomatic paralysis.

However, the new leadership later realized that even after the changes brought about by Resolution 242, Hussein was not likely to contact them first. After consultations with his senior ministers, Prime Minister Eshkol decided to take the initiative and renew the covert dialogue across the Jordan. Yaakov Herzog arranged a meeting with Hussein of May 3, 1968. The Jewish leadership at the London talks consisted of Foreign Minister Eban and Herzog. Menachem Begin threatened to resign if a summit between the two head of government were to take place, forcing Eshkol to remain in Jerusalem. Begin agreed to Eban's representation of Israel on the strict condition that the foreign minister not be empowered to reach any agreement with Hussein (Melman, 87-88).

In Behind the Uprising, Raviv and Melman assert that Herzog prepared an unsigned secret memorandum for Eshkol detailing Israel's objectives. Some of the key elements of the note include:

- to assess Hussein's resolve and ability to conduct separate negotiations with Israel, and his willingness to sign a peace treaty absent the support of other Arab state;
- to clarify whether the monarch would agree to the demilitarization of the West Bank;
- to test Hussein's position on Israel's continued control of a united Jerusalem;
- to agree that Israel would not change the status of the West Bank's residents without Hussein's consent;

and finally even before the ratification of a formal peace settlement, begin to set up temporary means to prevent terrorism, to encourage quick communication in the event of border tensions flared, and to work for mutual economic development (87-88).

As early as 1968, Hussein was accompanied to his London meeting with Eban and Herzog by Zeid al-Rafai. During these clandestine contacts, Eban presented these objectives in statements where Israeli would return a portion of the West Bank to Jordan in return for retaining certain strategic positions, devoid of any population. Hussein had previously learned from western diplomats about the internal divisions within the Israeli cabinet. He questioned Eban on his authority to negotiate on behalf of the entire government. Melman and Raviv report that the foreign minister returned a vague reply that related his limitations while insisting on the possibility of future negotiations. Hussein agreed to such terms insisting on a mutual transfer of land, even if the arrangement meant "swapping a mouse for an elephant" (qt. in Melman, 92).

Eban flew home to persuade the Labor government to approve the principles outlined in the London talks. The proposal was met by stiff resistance from the hawkish ministers, particularly Menachem Begin and Moshe Dayan who rejected the very first principle Eban had suggested to Hussein: that Israel would return most of the West Bank to Jordan. According to Zak, the ministers reflected the general opinion in post war Israel which held that with the additional territorial buffers captured in 1967, time was on the Jewish state's side. They therefore refused to see the urgency in agreeing to a separate peace settlement with Jordan, especially with regard to these strategic lands (173).

Though the Jerusalem government could not reach a consensus on the exact nature of the talks' objectives, all factions felt that it was still in Israel's best interests to continue the clandestine dialogue. Melman and Raviv note that this was evidenced at the end of September 1968, when a three man team comprised of Eban, Allon and Herzog engaged in talks with Hussein and al-Rifai. They state that during this second London exchange, Allon proposed his famous Allon Plan which set the River Jordan along with a line cutting through the Dead Sea as the borderline between Israel and the Kingdom of Jordan (93). This proposal also contained provisions whereby a "strip of land between 10 and 15 kilometers wide, the length of the Jordan Valley up to the Dead Sea, should be connected to Israel itself. North of the Dead Sea, the border should run toward the West, so as to avoid Jericho and extend to the northern boundary of Jerusalem so as to include the highway from Jerusalem to the Dead Sea within Israel" (qt. in Melman, 94).

Allon's carefully crafted border exemplified Israel's enduring hopes of gaining strategic without the Palestinian population. The foreign minister in submitting the Allon Plan to the Israeli cabinet on July 27, 1967, estimated that the expanded territory of the Jewish state would incorporate only an additional 15,000 Palestinian Arabs. Allon did not include in this figure the tens of thousands in the already annexed East Jerusalem (Melman, 94). In addition, it would appear that Allon hoped his scheme to include a strip along the river in Israeli sovereign territory would provide essential security while preserving the vital Jewish majority in the Land of Israel. These concessions were to also function as inducements to Jordan to keep the peace process going.

The Hashemite ruler refused to consider Allon's proposition. According to Melman and Raviv, the king had insisted that he had returned to London specifically to hear partner's replies to the plans drawn up previously with Eban and Allon, including mutual exchange of territories to modify the pre-1967 borders. Hussein felt that he was being forced to listen to an entirely different plan. The king responded, demanding that he no longer wanted seventy percent of his lost land returned as previously agreed, rather he required that the entire West Bank and East Jerusalem be handed back to the Hashemite Kingdom. This demand completely ignored Israel's annexation of the Old City (93).

Melman and Raviv write that Hussein and Rafi returned to Amman disappointed that their primary aim, the recovery of all of the West Bank and East Jerusalem, was gradually slipping from their grasp (95). Hussein's attention would be diverted as the Palestinians used this period to build their own power centers which felt no loyalty the Hashemite throne.

The Israeli contingent reported back to the cabinet regarding Hussein's complete rejection of the Allon Plan's principle of territorial compromise. However, Melman and Raviv note that the three did not paint totally disheartening pictures; they suggested that the king's disapproval was not final and immutable (95-96).

The London meeting during the late months of 1968 are especially important because they reflected what became typical of the secret contacts between Jordan and Israel. For the Israelis the meeting taught them very valuable lesson that though Hussein was willing to negotiate in private, his fear of Arab reprisals of an open agreement severely limited his bargaining power. In addition, the Jewish leadership realized that the Hashemite king could always resort to demanding the return of all captured territories

when he sensed he was being backed into a corner. Lastly, they began to contemplate whether the true road to peace ran through Cairo and not Amman.

The 1968 meeting demonstrated to Hussein that the Israelis were strong and confident after their victory, and therefore unwilling to realistically sacrifice large portions of their newly won booty. The talks also provided Hussein with a degree of understanding and appreciation for the inner workings of the Israeli political struggles. The monarch used this knowledge to estimate the degree of Israeli flexibility toward their eastern neighbor. Given the division which split the united Labor government, not to mention the numerous divergent factions that comprised the Israeli political scene, Hussein quickly recognized that a territorial compromise was difficult for the Jewish state to accept, yet without wider Arab backing, the monarch had to demand every kilometer of his lost territory (Klieman 1, 23).

When Prime Minister Eshkol died in Jerusalem in February 1969, Israeli internal politics were transformed, affecting the tacit alliance across the Jordan. During the subsequent Golda Meir administration, Moshe Dayan increased his influence over the direction of the Israeli-Jordanian dialogue. Melman and Raviv state that Dayan had always been "fervently attached to the 'Land of Israel'" and believed that the Jewish state had every right to build settlements on the land captured in the Six Day War. They also assert that Dayan was less than enthusiastic about Hussein's leadership (101-102).

After reaching the post of defense minister in the Meir government, Dayan asserted these beliefs along with his opinion that a diplomatic solution based on territorial compromise with Jordan would not be

beneficial for his nation. He proposed an alternative to the Allon Plan which became known as "functional compromise." The functional compromise would better serve Israel by agreeing with Amman on a division of responsibilities in the territories rather than returning parts of the lands to Jordan sovereignty. Dayan called for the Jewish state to be responsible for the territories' defense and protection of the new settlements. The Hashemite role under the plan was to manage the day-to-day lives of the Arab majority. The plan was to entice the Jordanian monarch by permitting him to once again rule over the West Bank's commerce, education, health and legal affairs (Melman, 96).

Dayan's proposal was similar to the Allon Plan in that both wished to meet Israel's long-standing desire of defensible borders without being forced to deal with the Palestinian populace. Both schemes wished Jordanian influence in the West Bank to quell the inevitable Palestinian resistance. It would also seem that both Israeli statesmen formulated an Hashemite presence in the territories to legitimize the protracted occupation. The two plans diverged in similarity in their design to accomplish this complex task (Melman, 96).

Dayan attempted to convince Hussein of the merits of his plan during September 1970 exchanges. The talks, according to Zak, included the Israeli delegation, headed by Prime Minister Meir and the usual Jordanian team, consisting of Hussein and his closest advisors. The proposals presented by the Israelis, reflecting the new strategy included the following principles:

- local pro-Hashemite authority would be established in Gaza while allowing for Jordanian administration to be set up over most of the West Bank;

- Jordan would retain special rights to oversee Muslim holy places in East Jerusalem, including the right to appoint the Supreme Muslim Council whose authority extended over the mosques of the Temple Mount
- in order to maintain adequate control over Gaza, Israel would permit Jordan to station its army and police forces in the Strip.
- Gaza residents would receive Jordanian citizenship;
- lastly, Israel promised to seek international financing to build new housing for the Palestinians on the West Bank and Gaza (Zak, 119).

Moshe Zak in the Winter 1985 edition of the Washington Quarterly, claims that the Israelis sought in return for the concessions Jordanian acceptance to proposals that would allow Israeli bases to remain in the West Bank, providing that they did not interfere with civilian life. Further the scheme allowed Jewish settlers to build homes in the West Bank. Jerusalem promised that such settlements would not expel any Arabs. Zak states that although the plan does address significant issues, it left open important questions like the permanent status of Jerusalem (119).

Melman and Raviv state that the Prime Minister viewed the proposal to be mutually beneficial to the secret partners. They conclude that Meir believed that upon the agreement of the plan, the Jordanians would sign a peace treaty and would establish open diplomatic relations. Meir also felt that the stationing of Israeli troops in the West Bank would alleviate some of the Jewish state's security concerns (119).

Meir's perceived the new proposal to benefit both clandestine partner and according to Melman and Raviv, was shocked by the Jordanian response that it was not willing to consider any permanent settlement that included anything less than a complete withdrawal of Israeli forces and the return of the West Bank to Hashemite control (120). Moshe Zak explains

that Hussein raised the question of a partial settlement or an interim agreement which would consist of special guarantees such as demilitarized zones and even minor adjustments, to help his western neighbor feel more secure (119). All three historians concur that Hussein demanded that any Jordanian concessions would be met with a mutual exchange of territory.

The Israeli countered with an offer similar to the Allon Plan, but the king rejected this new proposal categorically (Zak, 172). In sum, Hussein was willing to discuss everything, including the character of Jerusalem. However, the king made it clear that his willingness to reach an all-encompassing agreement was based on his insistence of internationale borders which would be almost exactly follow those before the Six Day War.

Melman And Raviv note that having been thwarted in his negotiations with his Jewish partner, Hussein placed a new plan out into the international forum. The authors insist that the Hashemite scheme which called for a federal plan to be based on a united Arab kingdom in two parts had "great propaganda value but little practical effect" (120). In Hussein's March 1972 plan, the western sector would be "Palestine" incorporating the West Bank and any other part of pre-Israel Palestine that could be liberated. The eastern portion of the united kingdom would be comprised of post-1967 Jordan (Melman, 120). The Jordanian monarch appeared to demonstrate his loyalty to the Palestinians while giving the Israelis a strong indication of his dissatisfaction with prior talks. Also the federal plan, writes Raviv and Melman, contained a message to Israel, the Arabs and the international community that Jordan was to remain a dominant actor in the West Bank and that the king had no intentions of surrendering his authority to represent the Palestinians who lived there (121).

Melman and Raviv assert that Rabin rejected both Jordanian plans. Instead, Shimon Peres in discussions in the Avava desert, suggested another cooperative administrative plan where the covert partners would collaborate in governing the West Bank. After the king summarily rejected this proposal, Allon offered a similar idea put forward by Golda Meir earlier. The foreign minister proposed that Israel allow Jordan set up a civil administration in a smaller part of the Jordan Valley, specifying that Jericho function as the headquarters for the Jordanian administrator (130). Hussein was intrigued by the possibility of regaining even a small portion of the West Bank. As the 1974 talks concluded, Hussein simply stated that he would think about Allon's proposal and return his considered response at the next session.

Hussein returned Amman and turned his attention to another pressing matter, the upcoming Arab Summit in Rabat Morocco whose agenda was topped by the Palestinian issue. Melman and Raviv state that analysts in Jerusalem concluded that the summit would explicitly remove Jordan's right to speak on behalf of the Palestinians. In the subsequent debate that followed, two groups developed. Allon led the first camp which insisted on the Jordanian Option and demanded that the government intensify its efforts to reach an agreement with Jordan. The second faction anchored by Rabin and Peres' leadership stressed another alternative to the Jordan Option. They called for an Egyptian-oriented policy which would build on the earlier separation of forces along the Suez Canal (130-131).

Hussein realized that the clouds over the alliance were growing darker as the Israeli cabinet began to lean toward Cairo to obtain a peace settlement. Yet, it appears that the Rabat summit confirmed this shift and

destroyed any realistic chance to solve the Palestinian issue before the 1977 Likud victory.

The Rabat decision "to confirm the right of the Palestinians people to establish a national, independent authority on any Paestinian soil which shall be liberated under the leadership of the PLO, which is the sole legal representative of the Palestinian people" sent Hussein to believe that his friends had betrayed him, according to Melman and Raviv. He refused to met with Israeli officials and demonstrated his frustration over the whole Palestinian problem, declared that Jordan no longer felt the duty to be responsible for Palestinians living under Israeli occupation (Melman, 132).

Moshe Zak states that only after sensing the situation was slipping entirely from his control, Hussein agreed to met with his Jewish counterparts. The Hashemite leader voiced his strong displeasure with the apparent lack of Israeli support on the eve of the Rabat Conference: "We are out of the picture, please talk to the PLO and then we will see" (qt. in Zak, 173).

Hussein quickly realized that he was also losing his position in the discussion of the Middle East peace negotiations. On May 28, 1975, in a meeting with Rabin, Peres, and Allon, Hussein expressed his concern about another interim accord Israel was preparing to sign with Egypt (Melman, 132). Throughout Hussein's reign, the king was constantly worried about being kept out of the diplomatic picture. These last contacts could be viewed as the Hashemites' last ditch effort to avoid this isolation.

Zak notes that Hussein had every reason to keep up the dialogue. President Ford had just declared a Middle East policy reassessment implying an American move toward Israeli-Jordanian negotiations. Melman also explains that Jordan was not entirely out of the picture and

had not resolved to be placed on the margins of the peace settlement. Jordan hoped that the clandestine talks would enable the Hashemites to prevent a separate peace between Israel and Egypt which would decide the fate of the West Bank without regard to Jordan's interests.

High level negotiations continued after the interim agreement was signed by Israel and Egypt in Geneva in September 1975 on the West Bank even though Hussein lacked formal authority to act on behalf of the Palestinians. During these sessions, which lasted until March 1977, new proposals were offered but nothing substantial was accomplished. Melman and Raviv state that the importance of these meetings was simply their existence (123). The gap in policy interests was to allow for a settlement over the West Bank. Zak elaborates on these opposing positions: Hussein wanted to regain every inch of his land and the Israelis were unwilling to even consider returning to the thin and unsafe borders of their state's birth (173).

As elections were being held in Israel, both partners decided to meet after the new government was formed to discuss the future of the occupied territories. These talks did not materialize as the May elections toppled the Rabin government, bringing Menachem Begin into power.

Mutual Security Interests

Another example of the commonality of perceived interests was illustrated by the Israeli-Jordanian cooperation in securing the permeable border against hostile border attacks by armed Palestinian guerrillas. Melman and Raviv note that Israel has always been highly sensitive to such armed incursions and were deeply concerned following the late 1970 Palestinian ejection. Following the Palestinian expulsion, the Israeli leadership questioned Jordan's ability and resolve to stop the Palestinian

guerrilla organizations from returning to their bases along the border. They feared based on the eastern bank of the Jordan, the Palestinians would launch terrorist attacks against Israeli cities and Jewish settlements on the West Bank. King Hussein shared a similar interest in eliminating the terrorist activity originating from his border (134).

Melman and Raviv reveal elaborate cooperative measures taken by the two states to strengthen their fight against Palestinian terrorism. It was reported that the intelligence agencies of the two countries reinforced their covert ties by installing direct telex and telephone lines between the Jordanian intelligence service in Amman and Mossad stationed in Tel Aviv (134). Also included in the heightened collaboration were the direct exchange of information between the two services when Israeli intelligence officers traveled to Amman. In fact, Jordanian intelligence files on Palestinian nationalists mysteriously fell into the Israeli intelligence service's hands through the veiled efforts of their Jordanian counterparts following establishment of the occupation after the Six Day War (Klieman, 1, 45).

During this period between 1967 and 1977, the best illustration of the Israeli-Jordanian working understanding in opposing Palestinian terrorist actions across the Jordan River came in response to a massive Israeli armored and infantry raid on March 21, 1968. The raid, which was also supported by the Israeli air force, crossed the Jordan and proceeded to open fire against the Palestinian-controlled village of Karemeh. The Israelis sought to punish the Palestinians for escalating the border attacks. Melman and Raviv maintain that even though the headquarters of the Palestinian organization was completely destroyed, this large raid was deemed an embarrassing setback for the Israeli army. During its retreat

back across the Jordan, the Israelis were attacked by Jordanian forces and suffered large losses; thirty Israeli soldiers were killed and another eighty were wounded as Jordan's Arab Legion countered the Israel raid with an impressive fight (100).

Israel's Chief of Staff, General Chaim Bar Lev was outraged. He accused Jordan of aiding the Palestinian fighters by purposely permitting them to cross the border with impunity. Klieman further stated that the general sent a message to Hussein explaining that Israel did not intend to erode or threaten the Hashemite throne by reprisals directed at the Palestinians located on Jordanian soil. However, having no other option available, Bar Lev asserted that Israel was acting in its own legitimate self defense (1, 102-103).

The Hashemites warned Jerusalem that the two partners were on the verge of open warfare and used their back channels to request a meeting with their Israeli counterparts. The subsequent encounter took place in London between Hussein and Bar-Lev. Hussein pointed out that presently, he was engaged in open clash with the Palestinian guerrillas and was taking all possible steps to prevent further armed incursions into Israel. Melman and Raviv state that Bar-Lev replied that if Hussein could not halt the attacks, then Israel would be forced to continue its retaliatory raids (101). During the London talks detailed by Melman and Raviv, serious negotiations on the larger issues involving a diplomatic compromise were nonexistent. These long-term issues were instead replaced by crisis management focusing on dealing with the hostilities across the border (102).

Necessary follow-up discussions were conducted in the Gulf of Aqaba in March 1970 between the highest officials from both sides. Dayan, who

dominated the talks, arrived at a unique solution. The foreign minister proposed a plan whereby the Israeli army would withdraw from two villages east of the Jordan. These two towns, al-Safi and Fifi, were captured a few months earlier in punitive attacks against Palestinian guerrillas. Melman and Raviv assert that the Israelis seized these particular villages after Palestine Liberation troops loyal to Arafat fired Russian-made Katayush rockets directed at the nearby Dead Sea Works, the Israeli chemical factory. They also mention that the Israelis appeared to have every intention of staying; the Israeli army had even paved a road across the border to it (106). Klieman states that if the Israeli forces were withdrawn from the area, Hussein and his chief of Staff, General Shaker, promised to restore order not only in al-Safi and Fifi area, but along the entire border. The Jordanian leaders paid particular attention to reassuring the Israelis that they would concentrate their efforts in the Arava Valley and the territory between Eilat and Aqaba which had experienced heavy Palestinian attacks (2, 103).

Later on in March, the Israeli defense force (IDF) evacuated the two towns in response to the joint agreement with Hussein whereby Jordanian forces would replace the retreating Israeli army, preventing the region from being used as a base for terrorist activity in the future (Melman, 107).

Zak notes that although the withdrawal of IDF troops was derived through negotiation, Hussein attempted to claim that he had personally directed the Jordanian attack which successfully ousted the Israeli military from al-Safi and Fifi. Zak also reported that many Israeli officials, who were privy to the plan, were understandably taken aback. Dayan however, convinced them not to challenge Hussein's boasting, declaring, "If the King

of Jordan actually decides to take things into his own hands and order his forces to clear the area of terrorist, it should be seen with favor. If he succeeds, the IDF will have no reason to cross the cease-fire lines..." (qt in Melman, 107).

Melman and Raviv concur that after gaining control of the two towns and surrounding areas, the Jordanians kept their promise. Jordan's Arab Legion quieted the entire 125 mile section of the border from the Dead Sea through the Arava Valley to the Gulf of Eilat. They note however, that Jordan was unable to stop guerrilla attacks on the West Bank and northern Israel. In fact, the Israeli self-restraint was seriously tested as the severity of the attacks worsened (107).

During this period Israeli and Jordanian officials not only worked toward limiting hostility over the armed incursions, but cooperated in solving the potentially dangerous problem of defining the shared border. The collaboration was exemplified during a 1975 meeting, where King Hussein voiced concern over border rectification in the Arava region. Zak states that the problem had arisen after a team of Japanese surveyors, planning a new road to Aqaba, discovered that the border had been mistakenly moved several kilometers to the east. At the King's request, Rabin and other Israeli leaders examined the area and the documents, concluding that the Jordanians were correct. The prime minister informed the king that the mistake would be rectified, returning to Jordan a small parcel of land (173).

Common Ties with the United States

Lastly, the Jordanian-Israeli tacit alliance was promoted and strengthened by their common ties through the United States. The American government proved to be instrumental in the operation of covert

contacts following the Six Day War. Melman and Raviv assert that this unique relationship between the two countries began when Israel and Jordan separately confided in the top echelons of the Johnson Administration. Through these contacts the United States became privy to the secret negotiations which were taking place between Amman and Jerusalem. In fact, they note that Hussein had suggested in 1968, that a secret report be sent to President Johnson regarding the status of the recent clandestine exchanges (103).

The two covert partners began to rely so heavily on the American communications channel that they almost completely stopped using their previous British contacts. Klieman states that because both countries are viewed as pro-western and are dependent of American economic and military aid, it is only natural that they would look favorably on a more active American role in their secret contacts (2,106). Melman and Raviv give similar reason why the two countries would prefer the United States as an intermediary. The United States officials changed the venue for the covert exchanges from the Europe to the Middle East. Hussein approved this change because it provided some reassurance in light of the monarch's reluctance to leave his country, increasing the possibility of unrest during his absence (104).

Another advantage of the American involvement was demonstrated later when most contacts between Amman and Jerusalem were arranged through United States intermediaries, allowing each party to take advantage of the powerful American communications technology. The United States had installed computerized communication systems by the early 1970's between the two officially hostile capitals in order to facilitate cooperation. With the aid of American technology, the leadership of the two states could

directly contact each other via scrambled telephones and telexes, which according to an April 24, 1986 Jerusalem Post article entitled "The King and his Riddles," were linked to encoding devices for both oral and written communications.

Secrecy was always a major concern for both sides especially regarding these communications. The Israelis limited access to only the highest members of the government, while Hussein's extreme paranoia permitted only his closest advisors to even know of the system's existence (Melman, 105).

Another advantage the two parties quickly recognized was American intermediaries were efficient in setting up a clandestine contacts. Melman and Raviv write that after learning that either side wished to meet, it would typically take the United States ambassadors stationed in the Middle Eastern capitals no more than two or three days to arrange a meeting (105).

Zak states that first such meeting arranged through American channels was aboard an Israeli missile boat in the middle of the Gulf of Eilat. The March 1970 meeting's participants were Moshe Dayan, Abba Eban, Chaim Bar-Lev and Yaakov Herzog along with King Hussein and General Zeid ibn-Shaker (105).

Both the Jordanian and Israeli policymakers continued to direct their negotiations through the Americans because it served their nations' interests to be able to call on United States assistance when needed. This was clearly illustrated during this period during the September 1970 Palestinian crisis in Jordan. Hussein directed all of his questions through Washington to Jerusalem because he not only sought Israeli assistance, but also wished to inform the Americans of his dire situation, requesting an American guarantee to protect his throne (Zak, 170).

Economic Benefits of the Tacit Alliance

Although political and security issues dominated the secret contacts during the ten year between 1967 and 1977, there were significant negotiations involving economic matters. Typically, during the covert negotiations, the top echelons of both governments concerned themselves with the most pressing issues of their mutual security and strategic interests. Occasionally, during this period, general outlines for economic cooperation were agreed upon and then delegated to subordinates to work out the specific details (Klieman 2,104).

Yossi Melman and Dan Raviv claims that both the Hashemites and the Israelis originally intended that economic development would further enhance the general understanding between the partners. They also state that the policymakers in Jerusalem and Amman based their call for cooperation on their common assessment that both countries had similar economic needs and natural resources. These shared resources included the Dead Sea, blessed with great mineral wealth and the valuable waters of the Jordan River. Furthermore, both hoped to develop an economically viable method to exploit the shale oil in the Arava and Negev deserts, and each have a common commercial interest in the future of the Gulf of Eilat-Aqaba. Therefore, Melman and Raviv state that is only "natural" that Israel and Jordan have worked to jointly develop these resources (179-180).

Melman and Raviv acknowledge that one of the first instance where economic issues were discussed between the top Israeli and Jordanian policy makers was during a secret 1971 meeting between Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin and Crown Prince Hassan, the Hashemite minister for economic development and housing. The exchange centered on cooperative

means to develop the Jordanian River Valley. Prince Hassan was particularly interested in gaining up front, an Israeli guarantee that the Jewish state would not interfere in with the Jordanian development on the river's edge. He also sought to obtain Israeli specialized knowledge in construction and irrigation as well as its insight in raising funds through the international finance markets (179).

In a May 1973 meeting, Chaim Givati, Israel's Minister of Agriculture and Development, Mordecai Gazit Director-General of the Agriculture Ministry and Ephraim Shila, director of Farm Planing in the Ministry of Agriculture, met with Hassan and Jordanian Prime Minister Rifai. The leaders again discussed in detail, the Hashemite plans for developing the river valley, including Hassan's request that Israel assist in building home for Palestinian refugees, many who had been forced to leave their homes on the East Bank during the civil war. Melman and Raviv note that Givati sympathized with the Jordanians but responded that his nation was not wealthy enough to contribute financially. However, Givati did pledge to assist by providing essential advice stating: "We are prepared to give you all the knowledge we have." The Israeli Minister of Agriculture then suggested that Jordan send its farming experts across the Jordan to learn modern farming and irrigation techniques (181).

One of the most significant economic benefits that has resulted from the tacit alliance was cooperation over their common water resources. In this arid region, prosperity and productivity depend on access to the precious commodity of water, making water rights one of the most bitterly contested issues. The collaboration centers around the Yarmuk River which runs from Syria through Jordan and the tiny Dan River located in Israel and the vital River Jordan. Melman and Raviv note that both sides

realize how important these rivers are to their neighbor and have taken care, even during the worst diplomatic times, to settle water disputes as rapidly as possible. The disputes were usually resolved through direct face-to-face negotiations between Israeli and Jordanian technical experts through the arrangements made by U.S. officials (184).

The agreement over water rights is based upon the American-proposed Johnston Plan which dates back to the early 1950's. Though the plan was officially vetoed by the Arab league in 1954, its tenants form the foundations for the distribution of the Jordan and Yarmuk Rivers.

Another benefit of the covert economic cooperation is the peaceful agricultural production pursued on both sides of the Jordan Valley. Melman and Raviv state that after the formation of the Jewish state, these fertile lands were largely ignored because the Jordanian owners constantly feared the threat of reprisal raids by the Israelis. The valley was transformed from a green cultivated area to a barren waste land devoid of agricultural output. This fear combined with the artillery fire and air raids in response to Palestinian guerilla attacks on Israel, were a tremendous disincentive for any type of agricultural development as the Jordan River Valley (117).

The Jordanians had hoped to restore the East Bank's agriculture production in an effort to compensate for the loss of the West Bank's output after 1967. The defeat and expulsion of the PLO gave the Hashemite regime the needed confidence and control to begin to achieve this goal. In 1973, Amman announced its first development plan aimed at encouraging farmers and other Jordanians to return to the East Bank to begin farming and other agricultural enterprises. In Melman and Raviv's opinion, the Hashemites clearly recognized that any efforts to develop the

land required an Israeli pledge not to destroy the efforts by a continuation of the past attacks. Throughout that same year, the Jordanian monarch and the Israeli prime minister, Golda Meir, held talks resulting in an understanding making it possible for the farmers on both sides of the Jordan to return to the land. They note that like most of the secret economic agreements between the states, the precise details of the program were later arranged by lower officials. Both nations strove to induce a period of calm along the river valley border, allowing the cultivation right up to the edge of the water. After the subsequent decline in tensions, farmers on both sides began to benefit from the hundreds of additional arable acres which the military had returned for agriculture (117-120).

Later, Melman and Raviv state that the cooperation across the river became well established and regulated. This was demonstrated when villagers and farmers on both banks of the river complained that the mosquitoes, growing in the river had become an intolerable nuisance. Representatives from Amman and Jerusalem met on the riverbank and surveyed the mosquito situation. Their joint solution involved massive spraying of poisons on the mosquitoes and their hatching grounds from both sides of the river. The sprayings were conducted by light aircraft; Jordanian pilots worked on the East bank while their counterparts from the Israeli Chemavir concentrated on the West Bank. The two historians quote an senior Israeli official who stated that the collaboration from 1967 to 1977 between the secret partners ranged "from anti-mosquito to anti-terrorist tactics" (117-118).

Also, Jordan and Israel felt that the hidden cooperation would be beneficial to both parties if it was extended to aviation in the area. After a number of joint contacts between aviation officials, Israel and Jordan were

able to agree on procedures to greatly reduce the danger of midair collisions between aircraft operating out of the perilously close airports of Eilat and Aqaba. One important safety aspect was that the control towers of the two facilities would monitor each other's frequencies, listening for any potential accidents (Melman, 135).

There were some commercial negotiations which were unable to transcend the regional hostilities to produce mutually advantageous results. Klieman reports one occurrence where cooperation on the development of a chemical plant was smothered by the 1973 war. In a May, 1973 meeting, Crown Prince Hassan notified Chaim Givati that the Jordanians were planning to build a new potash plant on the Dead Sea. However, difficulties had developed. Hassan therefore asked for Israeli assistance learned from the construction and operation of their own potash plant, the Dead Sea Works. Klieman states that after various plans were proposed and summarily rejected, Israeli officials agreed to be secret partners in the Jordanian factory. The factory was to produce potassium-based chemical products for export to be used in industry and agriculture. In return, the Israelis promised to utilize their connections with Americans and West Europeans to raise funds for the plant's construction. The two parties agreed to meet again to formalize the partnership on Sunday October 7, 1973. Unfortunately, the Yom Kipper War broke out and the meeting was never held, destroying the plan (1, 25-27). Melman and Raviv claim that after the war, business contacts between the two capitals concerning mineral development and finance all but diminished. The Israeli offers to assist the Jordanians were ignored and construction of the plant began in 1976. By 1977, it was producing a million tons of potash each year. Still, Israel's similar Dead Sea Works on the western shore, was producing three

times as much potash demonstrating the costs of the two neighbors' inability to agree on a joint understanding to exploit their mutually held natural resources (Melman, 182).

During the decade, Israel and Jordan not only worked out commercial arrangements but also cooperated on ecological matters as well. This was evidenced in the agreement to maintain the cleanliness of the shared waters of the Gulf of Eilat-Aqaba. The understanding consisted of a mutual pledge to inform the other nation's officials immediately in the event of a oil spill at either of the ports' the loading facilities. The agreement was utilized several times when Israeli authorities alerted the Jordanians that an oil slick was headed toward Aqaba beach (Melman, 135).

In sum, negotiations related to economics, natural resources and ecological matters were secondary issues, often overshadowed during high level discussions between Amman and Jerusalem. They were very significant however, because they were concrete symbols of the tacit alliance. Though seemly mundane, they were significant because often they involved a regular pattern of discussion which in the opinion of Melman and Raviv are "the stuff of peaceful coexistence in the Middle East-even without a formal peace treaty" (185). Also, the secret contacts over these issues were important because without prompt resolution of such mundane problems, hostility or violence could arise seriously jeopardizing any hopes for a permanent peace agreement between Israel and Jordan. Therefore, the case of the Jordanian-Israeli tacit alliance during the decade from 1967 to 1977 was not one where the road to peace and normal diplomatic relations was paved first with economic cooperation. Rather than an agreement in one subject matter translating to an agreement on another issue, the covert partnership was characterized by efforts to cooperate

wherever possible without making strides in related or unrelated fields. In fact, throughout the history of the tacit alliance, Israel and Jordan have not forced the often successful handling of economic matters to be translated into a comprehensive statement ending the official state of war.

Risks of the Tacit Alliance

Both parties incurred tremendous risks as a result of the clandestine exchanges across Jordan. However, the Israeli government and the Hashemite throne both perceived that even with these potential costs, the benefits obtained by the tacit alliance far outweighed even the risk of death of one of the partners. For the Israeli, especially the Labor party who had usually supported the Jordanian option equivocally, the domestic costs were paramount. The Labor leaders were well aware of the liability of their negotiations with their eastern neighbor. They could publicly brandish a being "soft" on the Arabs by the Likud or other right-wing parties. Also, the possible political cost for a land swap for peace with Jordan could cost a leader or party any future hope of leading the Israeli government. Because of personal and party risks, the Israeli government paid particular attention to keeping the knowledge of their friendly contacts between their most trusted friends, namely the United States and Britain.

Also, the Israeli policymakers realized that any revelation of the clandestine discussions to a world audience might jeopardize their security belt on their eastern border. Israel worried about a leak which would result in a Arab reaction, toppling the Hashemite dynasty and leading to the establishment of a radical and belligerent regime in Amman.

The king was confronted with the ultimate risk in meeting with the Israeli officials, his life. Moshe Zak states that a myth spread throughout the Middle East that any Arab ruler conducting negotiations with the

Jewish state would be killed, such as the case with Hussein's grandfather Abdullah and later Egyptian President Sadat, has nurtured the Jordanian monarch's insistence of tight security and secrecy (168).

Realistic death threats from their Arab brethren has been a major problem for the Hashemites in publicly resolving their differences with the state of Israel ever since King Abdullah. In Statecraft in the Dark: Israel's Practice of Quiet Diplomacy, Klieman identifies three concentric circles of opposition forces which have constantly confronted the Hashemite throne in its efforts to publicly resolving their differences with the Jewish state: internal opposition from the monarch's own advisors and ministers and external pressures stemming from rival Arab ruler and from Palestinian nationalists (2, 97).

Melman and Raviv as well as Klieman concur that the assassination of King Abdullah, witnessed by the young prince, had a tremendous impact on Hussein that has lasted to present: "His death would serve a warning and a powerful deterrent for years to...his own grandson and successor on the Hashemite throne, King Hussein" (Klieman 2,97). According to Melman and Raviv, Hussein's fears, confirmed by uncountable threats and numerous assassination attempts, kept to a minimum the number of associates who were privy to the king's secret encounters with the Israelis (156).

It appears that Hussein harbors a special concern regarding the Syrians over his contacts with Jerusalem. Lustick confirms this notion by asserting that if Jordan or Israel were to publicly confirm their veiled collaboration, Amman would be exposed to Syrian intrigues and intervention. Lustick explains that this concern stems from the Hashemites' realization that the Syrians are empowered to employ serious political and commercial reactions to punish any separate dialogue with the Jewish state.

For example, Syria has the power to close its airspace to Jordan and halt all traffic between Amman and Baghdad which would be very costly to Jordan. Also, during this period Crown Prince Hassan strove to establish Amman as a financial, corporate and tourist center. Lustick notes that any such strained relations with its northern neighbor would have had disastrous effects, cancelling the Hashemite plan for the development of its capital (14).

Furthermore, the Jordanian acknowledgement of its alliance would probably have a negative impact on its relations with its Arab neighbors; if Jordanian-Israeli covert ties might lead to a separate permanent peace settlement, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia would likely suspend the substantial subsidies on which Amman relies. According to figures provided by Loren Jenkins in "Jordan Drops Funding for West Bank," the Kuwaiti and Saudis have provided these subsidies, which in the years of 1974-1976 amounted to \$386 million to Jordan as a "confrontation state." The Jordanian government relies heavily on these funds to provide for basic services; the monies accounted for 22 percent of Jordanian public expenditures during the two years of 1974-1976. Lustick stated that the Hashemite dependence grew in 1977 to nearly 40 percent of all government expenditures were financed by foreign, mostly Arab subsidies (15).

Israel for its part, has assisted Jordan in maintaining the deception through some extraordinary measures such as the selection of meeting sites and limiting the number of Israeli officials who have access to knowledge of the covert contacts. Moshe Dayan illustrated the working tacit cooperation which existed during this decade. During one of the early secret meetings after the reestablishment of ties across the Jordan in the late 1960's, Jordanian Defense Minister Colonel al-Tal requested Dayan's intervention with the editors of the Israeli press asking them to attack al-

Tal for his stubborn hostility to Israel. Al-Tal had made this seemingly strange request to preserve his reputation at home and within the Arab community (136).

Given the potential consequences the Hashemites could face as a result of its covert alliance with Israel, the minimalist view gained influence in the early part of the 1970's. Finally, upon the May 1977 election of the Likud bloc's leader Menachem Begin, the minimalists position overcame the maximalist stance to be dominant policy in Amman. These two internal changes within each of the neighboring states had a profound impact upon the relationship across the Jordan. The carefully crafted understandings of the 1967-1977 period was left to erode into neglect as the two countries pursued an independent policy of disengagement.

1977-1984: The Era of Diminished Cooperation Across the Jordan

The election victory of May 1977 saw the first non-Labor government in Israel's 29 year history. The installation of Menachem Begin to power brought a change in attitude toward the Jordanian role in the Middle East. The traditional Labor-led strategy of the Jordanian Option almost disappeared from late 1977 until 1984. During this period, there were few contacts between the governments of Israel and Jordan. The change in perspective on both banks of the Jordan allowed the long-standing working framework for communications to wither and nearly die. One of the few aspects from the 1967-1977 period which carried over after the Likud victory was the exchange of intelligence information. Melman and Raviv write that even this vital mode of cooperation was carried out to a much more limited degree (143).

Minimalist Preeminence in Jordan

The change in character in the relationship across the Jordan could be attributed to a shift in power away from the maximalist position to the minimalist stance. Lustick states that in the wake of the Jordanian civil war of 1970-1971, a powerful circle emerged within the royal court which favored a more realistic outlook of Jordan's role in Middle Eastern affairs. As noted before, this group strongly advocated a substantial reduction of Hashemite ambition. This faction, led by Crown Prince Hassan and included such influential supporters as Hassan's uncle Sharif Nasser, Queen Mother Zein and leading army officers and security officials, welcomed the 1974 Rabat Arab Summit's declaration relieving Jordan of responsibility for representing the Palestinians on the West Bank (6). Melman and Raviv note however, that many like Prime Minister Zeid al-Rifai were close to the minimalist position but they viewed themselves more as pragmatists rather than "slaves to ideology" (154).

The Crown Prince was quoted in "The Dilemma of the Hashemites" published in the Spring 1974 edition of the Journal of Palestine Studies clearly outlining the minimalist opposition to the Hashemite's persistent claim to represent the Palestinians and its long-term desire to recapture the Holy City of Jerusalem and the West Bank. Hassan argued that this policy will "sooner or later, [lead] to the throne collapsing either under a Palestinian-Jordanian nationalist attack, or within the framework of a new map for the area in which Arab and international factors will play a fundamental role." The only possible strategy to avoid this disastrous fate, advocates Crown Prince Hassan is to "disengage" from the Palestinians (164).

Klieman states that Hassan's statement acknowledged that the finality of the 1967 occupation of the West Bank and Rabat decision. Hassan

realized that they effectively denied Jordan possible control or legitimacy to speak for the Palestinians (1, 17). Melman and Raviv assert that the minimalists based their stance on the geopolitical reality which confronted the Hashemite Kingdom. These factors included Jordan's relative inability to ever regain control of the West Bank. Also, Jordan was compromised by the fact that the majority of its two million people were Palestinians whose aspirations for a Palestinian state could not be forever denied (154).

Therefore, the reevaluation of Jordan's policy objectives no longer included cooperating with Israel to establish the foothold west of the Jordan River that was hoped to be expanded to include all of the West Bank. The minimalists no longer believed that the Israeli-Jordanian collaboration which administered the West Bank was advantageous to Jordan. Rather, the Hashemite Kingdom must attempt to disassociate itself with its western neighbor over this matter and instead, concentrate all its energies into the development of the Hashemite Kingdom on the East Bank only.

The minimalists, according to Lustick, argued that from an economical and political standpoint, the West Bank was better off without the East Bank than with it (11). Politically it would appear that such an argument is sound because not until recently, the only expression of discontent to erupt in the kingdom was a brief and minor incident involving army grievances over pay and command appointments. Otherwise, since the loss of the West Bank and the forced Palestinian migration, Jordan has experienced almost no internal unrest since the spring of 1971.

Also, it would appear that economically the Jordanian state has fared better since the loss of the West Bank. Figures from the Central Bank of Amman show that the Jordanian economy has flourished since 1967. The

impressive pace of economic development was spawned by massive loans provided by the wealthy Arab oil states of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. Lustick notes that Jordan was considered "an international basketcase" before 1967. However, Lustick further asserts that with a disciplined and effective economic development plan for the East Bank, the kingdom was able to show some impressive signs of recovery. Figures from the Central Bank of Amman and confirmed by the Economic Intelligence Unit's statistics proved that Jordan's gross national product grew at an average rate of seven percent from 1967 to 1976. Later, Jordan's GNP doubled in the years between 1978 and 1981 to reach five billion. A study done by Kannavsky of the East Bank economy published in 1976 concluded that barring no major internal or regional upheavals, the East Bank's prospects appear to be favorably high for rates of growth of investments, production, exports and higher standards of living. Lastly, inflation remained extremely low with the Jordanian dinar holding its value against the dollar (121, 128). This evidence adds further credibility to the minimalist argument that the Hashemites should give up all claims and hope for the West Bank.

It would appear that such economic evidence during 1977-1984 convinced King Hussein to accept the reality of the Rabat Summit decision and to concentrate on developing the remaining kingdom situated on the East Bank. Therefore this group, which began to include the king, perceived the Hashemites' interests as best achieved through a disengagement from the thankless, unprofitable and ultimately self-destructive championing of the Palestinian cause. They sought to instead focus their energies on the objectives of strengthening the East Bank politically, militarily and economically in part by replacing Beirut as a

center of Arab and international finance and investment. Melman and Raviv state that after Lebanon became a "living hell" in the civil war of 1975-1976 and subsequent violent repercussions, the Hashemite was partially successful in taking over Beirut's role as a regional financial center (155). Later, Jordan's economy improved as a result of the Iran-Iraq war as foreign investors perceived the Hashemite Kingdom as a rock of stability in the region, funnelling large sums of capital into the country, particularly into Amman. As a result of this prosperity, political dissidence was calmed. Conveniently for Hussein's regime, the capital which in the decade following the Six Day War swelled from 250,000 to over one million, was the chief beneficiary of the economic upswing (Melman, 156).

Hassan's supporters also believed that an agreement with Israel over the West Bank would have major repercussions on Jordan's economic relations with its Arab neighbors. As noted above, Jordan became particularly reliant on Arab monies given to it as a confrontation state. If such the scope of the alliance became public knowledge, the Arab states would probably cut all needed capital funds, destroying any Hashemite hopes to improve and modernize the economy. Jordan would become an pariah in the Arab world, similar to the situation faced by Egypt, causing the investments to be pulled from Amman. The result of which would destroy Hassan's hopes to make the Jordanian capital the Middle East's financial center.

Hassan who was in charge of economic development in Jordan, viewed the increased territory on the West bank of the Jordan River would threaten the dramatic economic gains achieved following the loss of these lands. The prince, according to Lustick, hoped to continue to broaden the financial foundations of Jordan, but realized that the economy and its

growth were entirely dependent on the East Bank's political stability which would be jeopardized by the inclusion of the West Bank: "Even if the Hashemites resolved their internal differences and united behind a territorial compromise, the added weight of hundreds of thousands of bitter Palestinians would be a heavy and perhaps unbearable political burden for the kingdom" (16).

The future of the Middle Eastern economy might undermine the Hashemite rule of a united kingdom spanning the Jordan. Jordan which has few exports besides potash mined from the Dead Sea, relies heavily on remittances sent home from Jordanian citizens who went abroad to find employment. The minimalists realized that the present boom in the oil industry could not continue indefinitely. Once the oil-based economies of the Arabian Gulf slowed, many would expel foreign workers. The Jordanians who were once sending paychecks from the gulf would return to an economy which could not absorb them, therefore becoming an unemployed underclass in cities like Amman (Melman, 154-155). After experiencing substantial improvements in living standards through foreign employment, these unemployed multitude could become a dissatisfied and unruly force capable of causing serious harm to the Hashemite throne.

Another reason why Crown Prince Hassan and his supporters did not see the West Bank as an asset to be regained, but as a heavy weight which the kingdom could happily live without, was their calculation that if the West Bank could somehow be repossessed, it would be ungovernable. They cited that the old established families of the West Bank who were the Hashemite's chief supporters were rapidly losing influence to the PLO. Hassan told the king that the problem would worsen as the younger

generations believed more in the PLO than in the Jordanian authorities (Melman, 154).

In addition, the minimalists explained to the king that with the PLO influence widespread on the West Bank and the deep enmity toward the Hashemites still ingrained in the Palestinians, the repossession of the land including these iridescent factors, would ultimately pose a real threat from within the nation (Lustick, 17). The minimalists state the inclusion of the West Bank back into Jordan would ruin the delicate demographic balance maintained in the East Bank since 1967. Thus, already a binational state, Jordan would become more a Palestinian state, whose people did not share the loyalty to the Hashemite throne, especially in light of the king's violent September 1970 actions. In addition, according to population projections, the demographic factor threatened to worsen as the Palestinian proportion of the East Bank was to rise above sixty percent. Amman's projected Palestinian component was to total close to eighty percent (Lustick, 16).

Lustick points out that the East Bank Palestinian majority is held in c

Not only would the compromise threaten Jordan's economy, military and social structure, Lustick notes that it could also cause sharp divisions within the Hashemite regime. He states that Hassan's success in developing the Jordanian economy would be cancelled by such arrangement, likely causing intense resentment. Therefore, Lustick believes that the differences between the king and his brother and between Palestinian and Jordanian social elites of the relationship among the Palestinians and Hashemites which were conveniently muted by the Israeli occupation, would quickly rise to the surface following the negotiation of such a settlement (15-16). The ensuing power struggle within the royal court and

within Jordan's elites would likely result in weakening the Hashemite regime.

Likud's Dismissal of the Jordanian Option

The Israeli policy during the the Likud government was based upon the estimation that Israeli objectives could not be substantially improved upon through negotiation with Jordan, especially on talks regarding territorial compromise. Since 1967, it became apparent that Israeli energies were directed toward asserting the territorial demands drawn from the traditional Jewish religious, historical and security claims to Judea and Samaria as integral parts of the "Land of Israel." Lustick states that Begin held the belief that the Jewish nation had a historical right to all of Palestine. The complete satisfaction of Zionist ideological claims to the Land of Israel requires that the West Bank and other occupied territories be incorporated into Israel proper. Lustick further notes that these historical claims revert to the fact that Judea and Samaria formed the heart of the ancient kingdoms of David and Solomon. In addition, those who wish to see these areas included in the Jewish state point out another religious-historical fact that the "Tomb of the Patriarches" where Abraham, Isaac and Jacob were supposed to be buried in Hebron (17).

These beliefs appear to have had a significant impact in the formation of Israeli policy. Ian Lustick states that from the left-wing Mapam to the right-wing Herut, nearly all of the major Israeli political parties support Knesset resolutions proclaiming the superiority of Jewish rights in occupied territories over any historical claims asserted by any other nation. Rather than debating existence of Jewish rights in these lands to build settlements and purchase land, discussion has centered around the manner in which these rights should be exercised at the particular time (17).

Statements by the Likud government indicate that the occupation enables Israel to implement its historical mission to settle the Jews throughout the land of Israel. In fact, Melman and Raviv state that the Likud wasted no time to work for this goal; a few days after winning the May 1977 election, Begin visited the West Bank settlements of Elon Moreh. While there, the new prime minister promised that there would be many more Elon Morehs" (qt. in Melman, 143).

The statement was echoed throughout the new government, in particular, from the Agricultural Minister Ariel Sharon, who spoke of "establishing facts on the ground" so that Israel would never have to leave the West Bank. The importance of this statement became apparent during the seven years of Begin's premiership when under Sharon's authority, more than one hundred new settlements were erected in the occupied territories.

The rapid settlement following the Likud victory saw approximately 55,000 Jews settle in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Most of these settlements are concentrated in a ring of modern apartments complexes, surrounding East Jerusalem which stretch from Ramot and Neve Yaacov in the north through French Hill and East Talpiaz to Gilo in the south on the outskirts of Bethlehem. The location of these settlements in the West Bank and Gaza reflects the overriding security concerns of the Jewish state. The vast majority of the settlements were begun as paramilitary encampments which were eventually transformed into civilian towns. For example, the town of Kiryat Araba was built on hills overlooking Hebron and Kadum in the Damarian hills not far from Nablus; both began as groups of civilians living within the confines of army camps (Lustick, 25).

Not only does the location of the Jewish settlements reflect the goals of the Likud's position, land confiscated which has been consistently placed into the hand of Jewish settlers for security purposes. Lustick closely links the confiscation of land and the establishment of the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, to the campaign by the Israeli government the Jewish National Fund, the arm of the World Zionist Organization responsible for land acquisition and development. He states that the purpose of these purchases is to gain as much land as possible in the occupied territories under Jewish control. This policy has been relatively successful as secret and semi-secret land purchases made by undisclosed companies fronting for the Jewish National Fund have resulted in the transfer of large tracts of land throughout the West Bank. Lustick estimates that up to eighty percent of land in the Jordan Valley north of Jericho was transferred to Israeli hands (26-27). It would appear that the occupation and the Likud's consent, provided these institutions with extraordinary opportunities for large scale land purchases and expropriation. Therefore, even if the occupied territories are not openly claimed by the state of Israel their control and ownership were to place them in the Land of Israel.

Instead of a cooperative administration which was negotiated during the 1967-1977 period where Israel would control the occupied territories' security and the Hashemites would govern the daily lives of the Palestinian residents, the new Likud leadership advocated annexation of the lands into the Jewish state. These politicians believed that they no longer needed Jordanian assistance to control the Palestinian population. They further felt that the established presence of an Arab state undermined Israeli control, creating a severe security risk. Given this posture, Jerusalem no longer needed the secret exchanges across the Jordan to fulfill its new objectives.

Rather, the Israeli policy makers perceived that the tacit alliance proved to be a potential hindrance in accomplishing its annexation plans.

Annexation, was claimed by the Likud faction as tempting from a military point of view. The Jordan River was declared to be Israel's "permanent security frontier" while the Gaza Strip was an "inseparable part of Israel" for security reasons (Horowitz, 37). Horowitz points out that the Jordan River is not an impressive body of water but is a satisfactory tank trap and the hills in the Jordan Valley, providing an excellent second line of defense against attacks from over the river (36). In addition, annexation would ensure that radar stations placed atop the hills of Samaria would give the nation an excellent early warning system from Jordanian, Syrian and Iraqi air attacks (Lustick, 17-18).

Another military advantage gained by the annexation was painfully proven during the sustained accurate bombardment from the Arab section of Jerusalem during the 1948 and 1967 wars. Lustick points out that during the 1967 war, the heart of Tel Aviv was only twenty miles of Jordanian artillery and tanks while the Knesset was well within the range of mortar fire (19). The annexation of the West bank would eliminate these potential liabilities during times of war.

These new perceptions and objectives were reflected during the negotiations that followed the May 1977 elections. These talks were held under the direction of Moshe Dayan. As noted earlier, Dayan did not believe that Hussein would ever sign a peace treaty without the impossible condition that all the captured lands be returned to Jordan. Moshe Dayan was joined in his disbelief of the Jordanian Option by Prime Minister Begin. Both questioned the logic of the talks aimed at reaching a permanent settlement which must include such harsh demands. They felt

that given Judea and Samaria were justly part of Israel, why then negotiate their future with Jordan (Melman, 139).

Melman and Raviv state that the two leaders saw some benefits continuing the negotiations. According to the two historians, Dayan and Begin hoped for a diplomatic breakthrough to start the Likud administration on a positive note. Therefore, they were willing to explore to a very limited extent, the Jordanian option to see for themselves where the road through Amman might lead (139-140).

In London on August 22 and 23, 1977, Dayan met with the Jordanian to assess the possibility of obtaining a settlement on Israeli terms. Moshe Zak notes that the meeting were fruitless and confirmed Dayan's original estimation that Hussein would not consider any permanent settlement without regaining every inch of the territory he had lost in 1967 (173). The king had insisted that he could not possibly recommend that a single Arab village become formally part of the Jewish state. Hussein vigorously asserted that a territorial compromise would be seen as treachery within the Arab world. He would be accused of betraying the Palestinians, giving land to the Jews for the sake of expanding his own kingdom (Melman, 140). Dayan states in Breakthrough, that the king also rejected a possible partition of the West Bank between the two neighbors, due to a genuine obligation to help the Palestinians. However, the king noted that since the Rabat conference stripped him of his authority to take any initiative on their behalf (34). Having meeting with the Jordanian monarch, Dayan returned to Jerusalem and told Prime Minister Begin probably what he wanted to hear: that there was nothing to discuss with the king (Melman, 141).

Throughout Hussein's long reign, he had always worried over being isolated while other actors negotiated the fate of the West Bank and the future of his throne. During this period Hussein had his reasons fear that such concerns would come to fruition as the Israelis no longer rested their foreign policy on the Jordanian Option but instead, looked toward Egypt for a peace settlement. Klieman asserts that in the latter half of 1977, Dayan had persuaded Jerusalem to shift its diplomatic efforts to Egypt (1, 101). The tacit alliance was no longer viewed with the same importance that it had garnished in the past; Dayan's encounter with Hussein was the last known direct, top level contact until 1984.

Klieman states that although such high level negotiations no longer continued, the flow of indirect communication continued, albeit at much decreased volume. He cites the Camp David Accord, where in Hussein's absence, no less than fourteen references to Jordan appear, "reflecting Israel's implicit respect for the interests of the Hashemite Kingdom, its special status and future role in either power-sharing or peacemaking" (1, 107). Yet it also serves to demonstrate the Israeli ideological and political ambivalence toward Jordan during the Likud era, ranging from a studied indifference to a special sensitivity to the reality of the overall Israeli-Jordanian indifference.

Risks of the Benign Neglect

Like the positions carried by the two parties in the previous period of tacit cooperation following the Six Day War, the benign neglect of the collaboration also imposed risks on Israel and Jordan. For the Hashemite regime, time appeared to be running out to regain the lost lands. Under the Likud government, accelerated construction of the settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip made it clear that its neighbor was making plans

for a permanent stay. In light of this the minimalists prefer to make demands which could be realistically won. Therefore, in the beginning of the Begin era, the Likud position seemed complementary with the minimalists in Amman who did not want the West Bank. Later, according to Melman and Raviv, the Jordanian of both factions came to realize that the Likud actions were not entirely beneficial to Jordanian interests. They state that after Begin became prime minister, the taking of Arab-owned and "empty lands" in the West Bank and the subsequent resettlement a record number of Jewish citizens in those lands were perceived in Amman as a gradual annexation of the occupied territories which worsened the living conditions of the Palestinians (153-157).

Jordanian authorities became increasingly concerned by the more frequent and vocal statements of the Likud government, calling on the transfer or expulsion of a large number of Palestinian Arab from the West Bank. Rabbi Meir Kahane, of the extreme right-wing Kach party, openly called for the mass expulsion to separate permanently, the Arabs from the Jews. Others in Israeli politics voiced the possibility of persuading the Palestinians to leave even by offering financial incentives to those Arabs who move ("Expelling").

Melman and Raviv note that a paradox developed in that the minimalists believed that they needed the Likud to become the leading force in Jordanian politics yet, the more they realized that the Likud's policy could destroy the remaining Hashemite kingdom. The minimalists were willing to give up the West Bank in exchange for order and economic development on the East Bank. However, the Likud's policy of keeping the West Bank would entail the expulsion of hundreds of thousands of angry Palestinians who would angrily take residence on the East Bank.

With this massive migration, all hopes for peace would vanish as the political scene would once again destabilize. The influx would also increase the Palestinian majority in Jordanian bringing to question the Hashemite's ability to govern a population that largely holds it in contempt (157).

As time went on Hussein and his closest aides understood that the chances of recovering the West Bank and East Jerusalem were diminishing with each passing week that saw more and more settlements established and the Israeli authorities consolidating their power with the settlements on the West Bank. It appears that the Hashemites concluded that if they gave up on their continuing demands for the return of the West Bank, they would eventually lose the East Bank.

While certain Israeli interests during 1977-1984 could be served by the annexation of the West Bank through a dismissal of the Jordan Option and the subsequent neglect of the tacit alliance, others Israeli goals could only be achieved through Israeli withdrawal from the occupied lands. One of the most significant concerns that arose with the continued occupation and possible annexation was that the country's demographic composition would be jeopardized. In a New York Times article entitled "A Forecast for Israel: More Arabs than Jews," Thomas Friedman maintains that Zionism was rooted in the strong desire by Jews to end their "abnormal" form of national existence as minority in all countries and a majority in none. The Zionist goal was to be achieved by concentrating enough Jews in one place, Palestine, where the Jewish nation would become a clear, unassailable majority. As a result of the 1948 exodus of some 750,000 Arabs and subsequent migrations during Israel's early years of statehood, the Zionist nation was able to create a substantial Jewish majority. However, according to Ian Lustick, a demographic problem arose

concerning the large Arab population residing in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Lustick notes that the "demographic problem" worried all Jewish political parties in this period and continues to concern them today (17). Friedman notes that if the Jewish state annexed the occupied territories the Jewish majority would be seriously threatened. High birth rates of Arabs in these landsacerbate this problem. To illustrate his point, Friedman explains that there are fifty thousand Jewish babies born every year compared to some sixty thousand Arab babies. At that rate, there will be 4.1 million Jews and 1.2 million Jews in Israel proper by the year 2000. If these totals for non-Jews are added to those 1.9 million Arabs living in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, the Arab population in the annexed lands would almost equal the Jewish total. Friedman quotes Ron Caslo, a writer for the Hebrew daily Ha'arets: "Jews will become the minority in Greater Israel. Then there will only two possibilities: Israel will become like South Africa in which the Jewish minority will rule over an Arab minority denying its civil and political rights, or the state of Israel will become a Palestinian state." Caslo advocates a withdrawal from the occupation and vehemently abhors any idea of possible annexation because he asserts that the only way to prevent the inevitable Arab majority in the Jewish state is for Israel to give up heavily Arab-populated territories: He further states that in only this manner can Israel remain what it was established over four decades ago: a democratic Jewish state.

Conclusion

The Jordanian-Israeli tacit alliance can be best characterized as the outward extension of the two nations' foreign and domestic goals. When the leaders of the two states perceived the cooperation to be in their best interests, they were willing to assume the risks that the collaboration

intails. This situation was evidenced in the period of 1967-1977. Latter from 1977 to 1984, upon internal changes which occurred in both capitals, created an atmosphere where the tacit alliance was no longer perceived as essential to the two nations' needs. In fact, the collaboration was viewed as posing a threat to achieving the neighbors' respective policy goals.

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