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**The Social and Political Implications
Behind the Popular Rebellion
in Peru in 1895**

**By
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Thesis

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I. Introduction

On a foggy March morning in 1895 in Peru, the forces under Nicolás de Piérola began a two-day siege on the capital city, Lima. This siege led to the overthrow of the military regime of President Andrés A. Cáceres and the eventual presidency of Piérola himself from 1895 to 1899. The rebellion brought to an end almost ten years of national rule by Cáceres, including four years from 1890 to 1894 when a hand-picked supporter Remigio Morales Bermúdez held the presidency. Between the end of the War with Chile in 1883 and the end of Piérola's presidency in 1899 Peru experienced dynamic change. Evolving from a country with suspended foreign debt payments and a weak central government, she greeted the twentieth century with a vigorous economy and a government that was firmly entrenched.

This turn around hinged on the civil war of 1895. The war featured two contributing elements which had not previously come into play to bring about a change of government in Peru's history: a political coalition, and active involvement of the population. Understanding the significance of this civil war lies in understanding the role these two key elements played. The coalition between Piérola's Democratic Party and the Civilista Party representing the coastal agricultural exporting elite and Lima commercialists brought an end to over twenty years of animosity between these two groups. This coalition became the driving force behind the economic

turnaround during Piérola's presidency. The active and crucial involvement of the popular montonera fighting forces against Cáceres' army brought to the fore the importance of the popular sector in government. The challenge for the Piérola administration then lay in the complicated task of representing the interests not only of the members of the coalition, but the newly mobilized population as well.

Scholars have studied the events of 1895 from differing angles and in varying depth. Of those historians who have covered Peru's history more extensively, Jorge Basadre is surely the most prominent. In his Historia de la república del Perú he offers an extensive factual account of the rebellion giving some insight into the attitude of the times. Basadre sees the civil war as falling into the same pattern as those before it since Peru's independence. Yet he does recognize that with 1895 there is a subtle change. He asserts that this rebellion is an alliance of the "real state" (the citizens themselves) with the "legal state" (the political elite) in opposition to Cáceres' government.¹ While not exploring the causes for this alliance or its implications for the Piérola administration he does make this critical observation.

The Peruvian sociologist Julio Cotler, offers an enlightening insight into this era in his book Clases, estado y nación en el Perú. Concerned with the formation of a Peruvian nation he considers the effects of the civil war on this process. Toward this aim Cotler views the Piérola administration as a purely transitional one that relieved Peru of the militarism of Cáceres and turned state control over to the

exporting elite.² In explaining the cause of the extensive mobilization of the population he cites the depreciation of silver.³ With the drop in the value of silver the urban populace, artisans and the "proletariat" suffered a substantial loss in their purchasing capacity. This, he says, led in 1893 to a surge of popular anti-Cácerista groups whose cause Piérola captained, eventually overthrowing Cáceres in 1895. Yet, while the Piérola administration may have brought about the transition of power to the exporting elite, it had its own objectives as well. And while the depreciation of silver was possibly one of the precipitating causes of the massive popular uprising it was not the sole cause. Thus, while Cotler has correctly pinpointed two significant aspects of the civil war of 1894-95, in failing to see its other causes, he also fails to perceive the larger implications of this event.

Dealing with more specific issues, Florencia Mallon's The Defense of Community in Peru's Central Highlands is helpful in relating the experiences of the serrano population of Peru. Yet in looking at the rebellion of 1894-95 she deals only with the effect Piérola's government had on this region once he was in office, completely ignoring the role this region's montonera groups played in the rebellion itself. Mallon characterizes Piérola's government as a "reconstructionist coalition."⁴ She claims that it represents Limeña, coastal, and regional elites in search of new opportunities for investment and greater control over the lower classes.⁵ While this group was interested in part in new investments, she views the

members of the coalition far too homogenously. Further, her assertion regarding the lower classes is a contradiction to the fact that it was exactly these people who helped this coalition achieve power.

Rory Miller addresses the period 1895-1919 which he calls the "república aristocrática," in an article entitled "The Coastal Elite and Peruvian Politics: 1895-1919."⁶ In this article he attempts to define the social and political elements which the Civilista Party represented. Although he concentrates on the 1914-1919 period he does make the relevant assertion that the ruling oligarchy of this whole period is composed of elites from the north coast and Lima as well as the sierra and the South. In this way he recognizes the coalition of interests that Piérola assumed upon taking office. Yet he portrays Piérola's administration as representative of the elite only and neglects consideration of the Democrat's popular support.

Finally Ronald Berg and Frederick Weaver in one article, and Stephen Gorman in another, on political change in Peru in the nineteenth Century offer an overarching interpretation of Piérola's coalitional government and its implications. Both articles see the government of 1895 as composed of coastal exporting elites in conjunction with elites from other regions of Peru. While the authors differ on the historical strength this group possessed they conclude that this group guided the state toward its particular exporting interests once in power. But they fail to recognize the contribution of the middle and lower class citizens in bringing about "political

change." Thus, while numerous studies have looked at the civil war of 1895, and its implications in part, so far no one has written specifically on the factors leading to this rebellion and the immediate as well as long term implications of its success for the parties involved and the nation as a whole.

The purpose of this paper is to define the economic, political, and social factors which prevailed during the time of Peru's civil war in 1895, and in considering these factors to determine the role they played in bringing about this war. I will look at the effects of these factors on the coastal elite represented by the Civilista Party, as well as the southern and other provincial landowners and merchants who represented the Democratic Party, which also received support from middle and lower classes. Beyond looking at the motivating factors drawing these groups into civil war I will also discuss the significance of the new ruling class after the civil war, in terms of how it affected these various sectors.

After a brief overview of the trends leading up to the civil war in 1895 the heart of the paper will begin with a look at the nature of politics in Peru prior to the civil war. I will then go on to discuss the civil war itself and the political and economic significance of the coalition between Piérola's Democratic Party and the Civilista Party of the oligarchy. A discussion on the montonera fighting forces from various regions of Peru who supported Piérola will follow. Here I shall try to determine the factors which motivated them to take up arms and fight. Finally the paper will close with a look at the

Democratic - Civilista coalition, how it functioned once in power, and what policies it pursued. In this way this paper will analyze the political, economic, and social factors which converged to bring an end to the Cáceres regime and to install the Piérola administration, which launched Peru into modern times.

II. Peru's Economy and Society in 1895

Peru, located on the Pacific coast of Latin America is a nation of extreme geographical diversity. Her coastline runs 1,200 miles from north to south, consisting mostly of desert, interrupted only by rivers running into the Pacific.⁷ Less than 100 miles inland the landscape takes on an abrupt change as one enters the Andean mountains. With some peaks as high as 21,000 feet in elevation, and many reaching 18,000 feet these ranges run from the northwest to the southeast for the length of the country. This region covers about one fourth of the area of the country.⁸ Passing through the mountain ranges, heading eastward one comes upon the vast montafia, or forest-land. This area comprises fully two thirds of Peru's land surface.⁹ In the nineteenth century this area was, and still is, largely uninhabited, consisting of rugged foothill and lowland tropical jungles. Thus while Peru covers more than 600,000 square miles,¹⁰ large portions of this area cannot be put to productive use because of geographic conditions. At the turn of the century the population of Peru stood near 3.67 million people. The smallest sector was attributed to the montafia, 400,000, and the largest to the sierra region, 2,360,00, while the coast was reported to have 800,000 people.¹¹

Off the central and southern coast lay a number of small islands. These islands are the traditional resting place for the huge

flocks of sea birds in the region. Over time the dung of these birds, called guano, was deposited in huge quantities on these islands. Peru began to export this guano to Europe as fertilizer in the 1840s.¹² Through the 1860s Peru earned huge profits from the sale of guano, and was able to obtain loans for infrastructural investments based on future sales of this fertilizer. Guano became the magic money-maker for Peru. But as the 1860s came to a close the quality and quantity of guano began to decline rapidly. In 1868, even after having received a loan for 16 million soles (Peruvian currency worth about 1 U.S. \$ each at that time) based on future guano sales, Peru faced a budget deficit of 17 million soles.¹³ This was only the beginning of Peru's financial problems.

In 1869 young Nicolás de Piérola, finance minister of President José Balta conceived a dramatic plan to rectify the financial crisis. He cancelled the consignment contracts held by coastal commercialist groups who would later form themselves into the Civilista Party. The rights that had been held by these individuals to sell guano on the international market, he then sold as a unit to the Dreyfus Company of France. In return, Peru received an immediate payment of 2.4 million soles, and future remittances of 700,000 soles per month for 20 months, as well as other obligations.¹⁴

While this stopgap measure helped for a time Peru soon faced financial troubles again. By the time Civilista President Manuel Pardo took office in 1872 the external debt, which had been 8 million pounds sterling in 1868, had reached 23 million pounds sterling.¹⁵

But in 1873 the European banking system met with a period of crisis, making it impossible for Pardo to borrow in order to pay for Peru's outstanding debts. Through the mid-1870s Peru's exports and imports continued to fall, due primarily to the decline of guano. In addition to this there was a general loss of confidence in the Peruvian paper currency leading to a collapse of the banking system in Lima.¹⁶ On the first of January, 1876 Pardo finally had to suspend payment on the foreign debt.¹⁷ In a period of one decade the Peruvian economy had devolved from an ailing economy to full scale collapse.

And, as the 1870s drew to a close Peru's difficulties were far from over. In 1879 Peru entered into a war with Chile known as the War of the Pacific, which did not end until 1883 with Chile's withdrawal from a devastated Peru. The war was a result of a dispute over valuable nitrate fields along the Bolivian and southern Peruvian coast. After Bolivia's nitrate fields had been invaded by Chile she called on Peru for assistance, based on a mutual defense treaty the two countries had signed in 1874. After extended efforts at negotiating a peaceful settlement Peru finally grudgingly declared war on Chile.¹⁸

For Peru the war resulted in the loss of one nitrate rich department (Tarapacá) and the Chilean occupation of two others (Tacna and Arica). But that was only a small measure of Peruvian losses. The war had a devastating impact on most aspects of the Peruvian economy and society:

Thousands of the nation's young men had been killed or maimed. The transportation system was in shambles. Irrigation works and farm equipment on the coastal estates had been destroyed, spoiled, or neglected. The war had uprooted and dispersed the labor force. The mining industry almost ceased to exist and the commercial establishments of Lima lacked the capital to resume their activities. The national treasury remained empty and the towering public debt seemed unbearable with the loss of the nitrate industry. The people had no confidence in their political institutions and the republic's civilian leadership A deep despair and mortification permeated the country¹⁹

In 1884, with the collapse of her economy compounded by the devastation of the war Peru was impotent to revitalize the nation. As a consequence Peru found herself dependent on direct foreign investment to fulfill this role. During the mid-1880s a number of foreign investors from England, Germany, Italy and North America began purchasing large coastal sugar estates. This led to the concentration of landholdings in these areas, displacing many smaller landowners. It was these investors who had access to the capital which would turn the sugar industry into its modern and mechanized form by the 1890s.²⁰

While these investments restabilized and improved the agricultural exporting sector, Peru realized after the fall of guano exports that she could no longer rely on a single export sector for revenue. The government saw the need to invest in a variety of

export sectors such as other agricultural products and mining. With this in mind Peru sought to clear her foreign debts and reestablish access to the international capital market. As the 1880s drew to a close Peru was finally able to agree upon a plan which would bail her out of her depressing financial straits, at a dear price. The plan, signed in 1889 is called the Grace Contract. It was named after Englishman Michael Grace who along with a group of foreign investors organized together to form the Peruvian Corporation with whom Peru signed the contract. The contract accomplished two important goals. First, the signers agreed to assume Peru's external debt of fifty million pounds sterling, thus restoring her external credit and allowing her to obtain foreign capital. Secondly, the signers agreed to repair the railroad lines damaged in the war and expand them into the mining districts, thus stimulating investment. In exchange for this assistance, Peru granted to the investors: 1) ownership of the railroads for 66 years, 2) rights to export three tons of guano 3) free use of seven secondary ports, 4) permission to navigate lake Titicaca, 5) one million acres of land in the Montaña, and finally, 6) payment of 80,000 pounds sterling a year for 33 years.²¹

But even as Peru was signing the Grace Contract another problem in her economy began to take on greater proportions. The price of silver, the base of Peru's currency and mainstay of her economy was on a steady decline. By the early 1890s this was becoming a serious problem. One obvious result of the depreciation

of the price of silver on the world market was the distortion it brought about between the coastal exporting economy and the economy of the interior. The depreciation of silver actually strengthened the coastal export economy. Because they exported their goods (sugar and cotton), receiving payment in gold reserves, they had a much greater domestic purchasing power. On the other hand, southern landowners, who produced goods for the internal market, or whose goods (wool) were purchased with silver by commercial houses in Peru who then exported them to Europe and the U.S., were comparatively losing purchasing power. Since nearly one fourth of foodstuffs were imported,²² the proletarian and artisanal classes who operated solely within the domestic economy felt the pinch as they lost purchasing power as well.²³

After the signing of the Grace Contract until the collapse of silver prices, which occurred in 1892, Peru experienced a steady stream of foreign investment. British capital entered Peru and was invested in the railways, the oil industry, mining, and the cotton textile industry, with investment in sugar having already begun in the mid-1880s.²⁴ But with the collapse of silver prices British investment fell off. The appeal of the silver mines, a central British concern, had waned and Peru's credit-worthiness came back into question. In 1893 the world economy experienced a depression. With these prospects facing Peru, she was forced to rely on her own resources to stabilize her economy.

But, in the remaining year and a half of Bermúdez administration, 1893-94, the economy saw no immediate recovery. During the latter part of this period the montonera forces began to take up arms in the provinces, interrupting the stability of the country as it became obvious that Cáceres intended to retake the reins of government. As the potential for civil war increased, tensions rose and trade began to falter. At the close of Bermúdez' administration the Peruvian economy, shaken by the decline in silver prices in 1892, the world depression of 1893, and the internal upheavals in 1893-94, was in poor health.

As the mid-1890s came to a close Peru was on the verge of calamitous change. But this was a country of not only geographic diversity, but of cultural and economic diversity as well. It had a population of almost 4 million people with more than half (57%) consisting of Indians and another 23% being of mixed Indian and white or Indian and negro blood. The remaining 20% were descendents of the Spanish settlers.²⁵ On the verge of modernity, Peru was one of the oldest of Spain's former Latin American possessions, and her city-scapes reveal this fact. This is best evidenced in the Lima Cathedral founded in 1535 by Francisco Pizarro himself, the "conquerer" of Peru.²⁶ In the grand city of Lima in 1894 could be found members of Peru's most prosperous and progressive families; the Miro Quesadas, the Aspillagas, the Prados and the Pardos.²⁷ At the same time, working on a hacienda high in the central sierra one could see some of the poorest of Indian

peasants. In the South, lay the "quaint city of Arequipa," home to the devoutly Catholic descendents of Spanish aristocracy, marked by its poverty.²⁸ And on the north coast lay the booming sugar and cotton plantations owned by progressive exporting hacendados.

While these sectors seemed to have little in common given in the above description, the civil war of 1895 proved this assertion to be false. After the unexpected death of Morales Bermúdez and Cáceres illegal re-entrance to the presidency, the country rose up in opposition. For members of the exporting elite as well as provincial hacendados and middle to lower class working groups, Cáceres' military backed, clientelistic regime was no longer acceptable. Rather than allow Cáceres to further his own and his supporter's interests, these groups banded together to oust him and install in his place a legal, democratic government.

III. The Dynamics of Contemporary Politics.

Politics in Peru in the nineteenth century was historically very personalistic and regionalistic. The political strongman who arose in the mid-nineteenth century was the "caudillo." He was often a man of mestizo birth who "was a petty-bourgeois entrepreneur who could afford to finance his own start in the profession of arms, assumed the title of colonel, and then sought a political-military base of operations in one of the provincial centers of the interior."²⁹ Once in power this caudillo would orient the privileges of the state toward his own goals and those of his regional supporters. In this way power over the state became the key to personal security and regional hegemony.

Over time the various regional elites became transplanted permanently in Lima where they began to develop economic and social roots. After a time this more nebulous group began to take on particularized interests of its own, primarily in commercial and exporting activity.³⁰ While even into the 1890s, elements of personalism prevailed, Peruvian politics had begun to take on some aspects of diffusion into at least group interests if not party interests.

But the political system in Peru was a system of the "elite" and for the "elite." Even as late as the turn of the century, after a direct suffrage law had been passed in 1896, the voting population was just over 100,000 people -- in a nation of 4 million!³¹ In talking about

"politics in Peru" one is very clearly discussing a very small, albeit powerful minority.

By the last decade of the nineteenth century, three viable political parties had been formed in Peru: the Democrats, the Civilistas and the Constitutionals. The Democrats were founded and led by Nicolás de Piérola in conjunction with some Lima and southern coastal aristocratic elites. In addition to representing this group, the Democrats also claimed the support of the urban artisanal and proletariat class as well as some traditional landowners and merchants in the interior. The Civilistas represented the "Lima elite," with commercial interests in Lima, and the producers of coastal export crops such as sugar and cotton. Finally the Constitutionalist party was a clientelist party run by Andrés Cáceres and maintained through the distribution of political favors in exchange for support. This party enjoyed the backing of the military.

The civil war of 1895 represented the eclipse of the interests of the Cácerista group by those of a combined Democrat-Civilista movement. Yet, to understand how this configuration came about it is important to look briefly at each of these parties and their programs.

It was not by a fluke that Cáceres obtained the presidency in 1886, a few years after the war with Chile. Cáceres had emerged as a great national hero. After the defeat of Peru's regular army, he bravely fought on as "Political and Military Chief of the Central Highlands" in what is known as the "Battle of La Brea." He

organized montoneras in the sierra to combat the Chilean invaders from May 1881 to February 1882. In 1884 President Miguel de Iglesias signed a peace treaty, the Treaty of Ancón, with the Chileans, conceding Peruvian territory to Chile. Cáceres then launched a military campaign to overthrow Iglesias, finally ousting him on December 2, 1885. On the tenth of August, 1886, Cáceres and his constitutionalist party were legally installed into power signifying the final restoration of peace.³² Cáceres had won with the support of Civilistas who saw him as a stabilizing force, but faced total opposition from the Democrats.³³ Yet in ten short years there would be a complete shift of alignments, and the Civilistas, who so quickly embraced the stability of the military-backed regime of Cáceres would begin to feel stifled by this same regime and seek to improve their situation through an alliance with the Democrats.

But in 1886 many Peruvians welcomed a military strongman as president with open arms. Cáceres had the support of the montonera forces from the central sierra, consisting of the Indian peasants and the lower and middle class citizens of the small communities of the region, whom he had lead so valiantly in the battle against Chile. He also had the backing of the Lima exporting elites who saw in him the guarantor of stability so desperately needed to revitalize the economy. In addition to supplying a stabilizing force with the army Cáceres professed as a goal the restoration of Peru's republican institutions.³⁴

Yet while he fulfilled the former he did not keep with the latter. Shortly after coming into power Cáceres' administration devolved into an "ironclad dictatorship," quickly losing its civilian support.³⁵ Under this authoritarian guise Cáceres instituted an austerity program alienating the population even further. He imposed new taxes and currency reform to stabilize the inflated paper sol (Peru's national currency). The stabilization of the sol hurt the exporters by increasing the price of their goods in foreign markets. Thus Cáceres lost support among the powerful coastal exporters.³⁶ Furthermore he moved to suppress all municipal elections, installing instead appointed town councils from the ranks of his own supporters.³⁷

But the most significant and controversial accomplishment of the Cáceres administration was the signing of the Grace Contract. Based on the terms discussed above, the majority felt that Peru was far too generous in the agreement with her foreign creditors. Most importantly the people felt that national pride had been damaged with the loss of the national railroads for 66 years.³⁸

The policies of the Cáceres administration during the late 1880s had two significant results. First, although they were highly unpopular, the measures contributed to the economic stability which the Piérola administration would later take advantage of, and to the political cohesion, which even if brought about by force, the country needed to revitalize itself. Secondly, in taking these steps the Cáceres administration distanced itself from all but a handful of

supporters and provoked the opposition that would eventually lead to its own downfall.

One of the key sectors of support from which Cáceres was gradually severed was that of the coastal elites of the Civilista party. It is ironic that this group would ever have been associated with Cáceres' military regime given its obvious bias toward civilian government, the capstone of its political credo. The party was founded in 1872 by Manuel Pardo, a businessman from Lima who came from a family of statesmen. It was formed to support Pardo's candidacy for president in 1872, and from the outset represented the interests of the commercial bourgeoisie. This was an attempt to rise above the "personalism" which was so prevalent in Peruvian politics up to that time, and to present a party program in its place.³⁹

The members of the party consisted of the group often referred to as the oligarchy. This group consisted of successful businessmen, and "well-connected members of the liberal professions."⁴⁰ It was the party of those who had "arrived." The concerns of this party were in the modern sectors: the coastal plantations, mining, Lima commercial houses, bankers and manufacturers. This party represented the upper crust of Peruvian society. In this sense it was more forward looking than the Constitutionalist party, although it was founded more than ten years earlier.

The Civilista party was also "modern" in another sense. Unlike the personalistic style of previous parties, the Civilistas had a program which laid out their priorities and goals. Stephen Gorman

has summarized the three major tenets of Civilism and what they meant in real practice as follows: (1) Democracy: "an aristocratic republic in which the great families would have kept under their tutelage the inert peasant masses, the soldiery and the Lima proletariat, (2) Modernization: an expansion of export and its supporting infrastructure (ports and railroads) together with the establishment of industries to process export products and increase their prices, (3) The absolute subordination of the military to civilian authority. . . to be achieved through scaling back expenditures for the army."⁴¹ In addition the Civilistas objected to the intervention of clergy into politics.⁴²

Thus the Civilistas' program was directly opposed to that of the Constitutionalist in a number of ways. The Civilistas promoted modernizing investments while the Constitutionalist imposed austerity measures. The Civilistas promoted improving the agricultural exporting economy while the Cáceristas initiated programs which countered this economic sector. Finally, by design the Civilistas supported a civilian government, while, the constitutionalists supported a military-backed, highly personalistic government.

By the early 1890s, during the Bermúdez administration, the differences between these two parties began to overcome the bonds that held them together. The Civilistas were interested in pursuing export production and commercialization while the Constitutionalist were obsessed with maintaining power. Yet, the Civilistas did not

have wide enough electoral support to win the presidential election of 1894.⁴³ The alternative was to join with the Democratic Party to form an electoral coalition. This coalition must have come as a surprise to contemporaries. Historically the Democrats and the Civilistas had been archenemies. This animosity began in 1869 when Piérola, acting as finance minister under President Balta, cancelled the guano consignment contracts of this same Lima commercialist group, as mentioned above. Further, in December 1879, Piérola slighted this group when he staged a forceful takeover of the government from Civilista President Mariano Ignacio Prado during the war with Chile.⁴⁴ As a result of his actions Piérola and this group had been in opposition. And as late as the elections in 1890 there was still animosity between the Piérolistas and the Civilistas. On March first of that year, for example a mob of Piérolistas attacked a crowd of the Civilista presidential candidate's supporters during a political rally held in Lima.⁴⁵ Obviously the interceding years between this event and the coalition formed in 1894 brought about a change in attitude in the leadership of both parties which we need to explore below.

When Piérola formed the Democratic Party in July of 1884 the contrast between this party and both the Civilista and Constitutionalist Parties loomed large. Piérola's party was meant to promote the "democratic" ideas of its founder and his associates. As a result of the political chaos of the War of the Pacific and the humiliating Treaty of Ancón Piérola and his followers were anxious

to reestablish stability for the country and regain Peru's honor.⁴⁶ In their eyes the establishment of a political party offered the most effective means of achieving this goal.

José Nicolás Baltasar de Piérola y Villena was born on the fifth of January, 1839 in the southern city of Arequipa, the country's second city and perennial launching ground for rebellions. Being a devout Catholic he entered the seminary in 1853. He decided not to complete his training though and instead became involved in business and printing in Arequipa.⁴⁷ Arequipa is a city with a large number of aristocratic Spanish descendents. Because of this heritage these are a conservative people. Piérola was no exception. He saw the world order as preordained by God. This view included economic inequalities and racial differences. Thus while he sought to protect the poor and the Indians he was not compelled to bring them equality.⁴⁸

Piérola first came on the political scene as the Minister of Finance under President Jose Balta in 1869.⁴⁹ Even at the young age of 30 he was called a "vendor of hopes," referring to his charismatic style of speech before Congress.⁵⁰ Yet the financial situation of the Balta government had little hope to offer due to the decline in guano exports and the increasing foreign debt the government faced. So, to generate revenue Piérola made a daring move. In one fell swoop Piérola he cancelled the consignment contracts and signed with the Dreyfus Co. under the terms listed above, to set Peru back on stable financial footing, at least temporarily. But, while Piérola solved the

immediate financial problem, he simultaneously brought on himself the long term animosity of the coastal merchant groups, the core of the future Civilistas whose consignment contracts he had cancelled.

After resigning his ministerial post in 1872 Piérola spent the rest of the decade in a seemingly incessant effort to topple the national government, now controlled by his recently made enemies, the newly formed Civilista Party. But the uprisings incited by Piérola in 1874, 1876, and 1877, failed to receive sufficient support to achieve their goal. Finally, with the onset of the War of the Pacific in 1879 his hour had come. As Chile invaded, President Mariano Prado left for Europe, supposedly to acquire arms for Peru. Within days Piérola and his forces, called the Guardia Peruana attacked Callao. After a day-long battle against the forces under General Luis La Puente, to whom Prado had turned over power before leaving for Europe, Piérola's forces finally took Callao. Donning the title "Supreme Chief" Piérola took power on the 23rd of December.⁵¹ But his hold on power, referred to as "the Dictatorship," lasted only two years. It came to an end when he was forced to retreat into the mountains after being defeated by the Chilean army.⁵²

In 1884 Piérola gathered with his closest political allies to form the Democratic Party. After his defeat at the hands of the Chileans in 1881 and his subsequent loss of power, Piérola had looked to the political system as a legitimate pathway to government. This group published the tenets of their new party in a pamphlet entitled

"Declaración de Principios."⁵³ Of the eleven men who signed the document, information on two is available. Benjamin Boza, one of the signers was a lawyer from the southern coastal province of Ica. He worked as the superintendent of the railroad from Pisco to Ica until 1881, then moving to Lima.⁵⁴ The other identifiable signer was Ricardo Flores who was a doctor as well as a politician from Lima.⁵⁵ Both of these men were definitely of the upper class, judging from their education and employment. Yet while one was a Limeño the other was from a southern department. This I think gives an accurate impression of the type of party leadership the Democrats had: rich, aristocratic, but representing the southern departments as well as Lima (especially Arequipa).

The "Declaración" itself discusses four elements: Political parties: these should not represent personal interests, but the good of the whole; Democracy: means that all people are equal before the law; The Population: emphasizing the need to improve the life of the Indians and increase immigration to spur development; and Land: emphasizing the importance of infrastructure building and agriculture for prosperity.⁵⁶ In these four areas the Democrats found their greatest concerns. Also in these principles the paternalistic tendency of this class is evident. They saw it as part of their duty to protect the less fortunate classes.

One of the principles which reveals this protective tendency of the Democratic elite is that of democracy -- equality before the law. This had a great appeal to the peasant population which was

normally considered inferior. But even more revealing is the emphasis this party's program placed on the improvement of the Indian. This was novel in the area of politics and most likely drew positive feedback from the large Indian population. To the middle classes, the emphasis on development was an appeal to their needs. Thus in this basic document the Democrats put forth their program, and did so keeping in mind the lower classes, whom they feel bound to protect. As an addendum to its "Declaración" the Democrats detailed their party's "Constitución e Instituciones Políticas" in 1889. Within this section is listed a large number of rights due the citizens, and first on the list are individual guarantees: life, property, liberty and honor.⁵⁷ For the leaders of this party such virtues as honor are of the utmost importance. Honor is described as "moral sensibility, in sum, without which man is not possible, much less society."⁵⁸ This gives some insight into the truly aristocratic nature of the leadership of this party. On a more practical, goal-oriented level the "Constitución" lists as objectives: the right of direct election by "able" citizens; the very important duty of maintaining internal and external credit for the state; the need for the currency to be based on the gold standard with silver and copper used only as auxiliary currency; an emphasis on the importance of moving away from the production of only primary products toward industrialization; and education of mind, body and spirit.⁵⁹

By the 1890s the Democratic Party had a large following. While its leadership tended to be recruited from wealthier and more

socially prominent families, the rank and file came from the middle and lower classes. Support in the urban areas came from small merchants, moderately successful professional men, white collar workers, artisans and other skilled workers. In addition Piérola was very popular throughout the provincial areas. Traditional landowners and provincial businessmen offered him their support. And he was especially popular in his home department of Arequipa where he had been a businessman and printer.⁶⁰ In addition to these, Piérola, being a devout Catholic was supported by the clergy,⁶¹ and staunchly Catholic laymen.

In looking at their agenda it becomes clear that the Democrats had a number of things in common with the Civilistas. Both represented the upper class in their leadership, while the Civilistas tended to be of the more progressive Lima commercialist group and the Democrats of the more traditional gentile aristocracy. In addition both were concerned about international trade and development of the country. And both parties were civilian parties who ~~did~~ not want to make fundamental changes in the structure of society.⁶² As the Bermúdez administration progressed and the Civilistas and Constitutionlists drifted apart the possibility of a Civilista - Democrat coalition began to seem more real.

The administration of President Remigio Morales Bermúdez from 1890-1894 is often overlooked in terms of its policies. This is because it is assumed to have been a puppet front for Andrés Cáceres who held the presidency before, and for a brief period, after

Bermúdez' administration. But in terms of the civil war of 1894-95 this time period was crucial in the formation of the rebellion.

On turning over the presidency to Bermúdez in 1890, Cáceres was apparently considering a plan for his own reelection in 1894, after staying out of power for the constitutionally required term. By putting in a fellow party member and his own vice-president from 1886 -1890, Cáceres insured compliance for his bid again in 1894. But it was only through the political influence of Mariano Nicolás Valcárcel, president of the House of Representatives, that Bermúdez was elected.⁶³ In the Congressional elections of 1890, all but one of the senators elected were of the Civilista Party, while a majority of the men elected to the House of Representatives were Constitutionlists.⁶⁴ Thus the Bermúdez administration from the beginning was faced with divisive political support.

Beginning in 1890, one year after the signing of the Grace Contract, the economy experienced an encouraging period of growth. Although it wasn't by Bermúdez' design his administration enjoyed the beginning of a turn-around in the economy. The most notable improvement was in the railroad extensions arranged through the Grace Contract. The Central railroad was extended to La Oroya in 1893, creating a transportation network for the silver and copper mines. The railroad was extended from Puno to Sicuani in the South by 1894.⁶⁵ In addition to this, British investors put money into a number of export sectors in the first two years of the 1890s, such as sugar and cotton. But with the collapse of silver prices, on which

Peru's monetary system was tested, on the world market in 1892 the economy slumped once again. The world recession of 1893 only reinforced these strained economic conditions.

Because of this aborted economic recovery Peru's economy simply plateaued during the 1892-94 period. After reaching a post-war peak of 16 million pesos in 1887-88, government revenues fell to 7 million in 1892 and remained at that level through 1894.⁶⁶ Even though mining export taxes had been frozen for twenty-five years in 1890,⁶⁷ and the railroads had been extended, the Peruvian economy lay dormant in 1894, waiting for new capital to bring it back to life.

In addition to the disappointing performance of the economy, Bermúdez began to face stronger political opposition. In the congressional elections of 1892 even Valcárcel, who still professed to be pro-Cácerista, supported the candidacies of some of the opposition members. In this same year Valcárcel would eventually shift his support to the Civilista party.⁶⁸ This marked the point in which legitimate political support of the Bermúdez administration began to dissipate. This shift in support, which I will discuss in depth resulted from an unavoidable conflict of interests between the Bermúdez government and the Civilistas. While the Civilistas saw a blatant need for emphasis on investment in the economy to revitalize it, the Cáceristas were simply too preoccupied with maintaining power and placating their own support groups to attend to this need. Bermúdez was prepared to withstand the opposition

with force. With the next presidential election coming up in 1894 Cáceres' military party needed to reassert its authority to insure its hold on power. Thus when, in municipal elections in the provinces in 1893, some Cáceres supporters lost the election, the Bermúdez government stepped in to replace the victorious officials with "juntas of notables" who were Cáceristas.⁶⁹

As the Bermúdez administration drew to an end and the elections of 1894 grew closer, tension increased. With a preponderance of Civilistas and the new anti-Cáceristas followers of Valcárcel in congress, the political balance had swung away from the Constitutionals. As the Bermúdez government began to resort more and more to force in order to maintain its hold on power the middle and lower class sectors of the communities as well as the leaders of the political opposition were provoked into action. As the election of 1894 drew near speculation about Cáceres' intentions was rampant and tensions were high. No one knew what would happen but each side was ready to see its own scenario played out.

IV. The Civil War of 1895: The Events

While, during his administration, Cáceres had received cooperation on the part of the Civilistas, with the elections of 1890 this tide turned. The Civilistas proposed their own candidate, Francisco Rosas, in opposition to Cácerista, Morales Bermúdez.⁷⁰ And after the elections, when Rosas was serving as president of the Senate, he proposed offering amnesty to Piérola for the "criminal" dictatorship during 1881-82 which Cáceres had accused him of.⁷¹ In 1886 Cáceres had passed a law which declared the acts of the Piérola dictatorship and Iglesias' regime as criminal and had even imprisoned Piérola in 1890 for this "crime."⁷² When Rosas suggested the amnesty offering, Piérola was in exile in Chile. This is evidence of the growing desire for administrative independence and control on the part of the Civilistas who had previously contented themselves with supporting a favorable administration.

In an effort to consolidate opposition to the Cáceristas further, two opposing factions joined together. Mariano Nicolás Valcárcel, who had been a Cácerista supporter up to this point, had a large following among deputies as president of the House of Representatives. He informally joined these deputies in the so called Parliamentary Circle.⁷³ The other faction was headed by Francisco Rosas the Civilista president of the Senate, almost entirely made up of members of this party. In a meeting held on October 14, 1892

these two groups joined forces calling the new party the Civic Union.⁷⁴ It seems clear that this was strictly an electoral coalition. These two groups joined in anticipation of the upcoming presidential elections in 1894. Fearing that each group alone could not defeat the Cáceristas, they chose this defensive tactic of joint opposition.

As early as 1892 the Civic Union began to discuss with the Democrats the prospects of a coalition for the upcoming election in 1894. Finally, on March 30, 1894, two days before the election was to take place, the Democrats and the Civic Union signed a coalitional pact. The objective of this pact was to insure the freedom to vote for all citizens, in opposition to the expected corruption of the upcoming election.⁷⁵ As the election drew near it became clear that Cáceres intended to win by any means. This attitude on Cáceres' part rendered the seemingly minor goal of the coalition for electoral freedom a major consideration.

But, President Morales Bermúdez' unexpected illness and subsequent death on April 1st lead to a postponement of the election. Confusion now set in among the political elite. First Vice-President don Pedro Alejandrino del Solar was constitutionally obliged to assume the presidency, but instead Bermúdez' cabinet conferred the powers of the state on the Second Vice-President, Justinio Borgoño. While at first it was asserted that Solar had declined the presidency it soon became clear that Borgoño, and Bermúdez' cabinet had purposely barred Solar from power, allowing Borgoño to take office.⁷⁶ Cáceres had supported this move. Solar, it

seems, had offered some signs of support for Piérola in the past, supporting him in the War with Chile and, while in the Bermúdez administration, proposing that Piérola be appointed to the *Corte de Juicio*.⁷⁷ This pro-Piérola attitude would have worked against Cáceres in his effort to enlist assistance from the administration in his bid for election. A strike against him that Cáceres could not afford.

Upon assuming the presidency, Borgoño dissolved Congress and slated presidential and congressional elections for June 3, 1894. In addition to this, censorship measures were taken to the extreme in Lima.⁷⁸ And the prisons were filled with political prisoners.⁷⁹ In reaction to these extreme measures both Solar and Valcárcel went into exile to join the opposition headed by Piérola in Iquique, Chile. There they formed a "coalition cabinet" asserting themselves as a genuine opposition force.⁸⁰ Nevertheless, Cáceres managed to be elected President in an extremely fraudulent election. In addition to being the only candidate, and having replaced opposition electors with his own hand-picked supporters, the number of people voting was very small also, with a large number of the electorate abstaining.⁸¹ Thus as 1894 drew to a close Peru found herself again in the hands of a man she had welcomed as a hero only ten years before. But now Cáceres' heroics had faded from memory while the repressive deeds of his military regime were still fresh in everyone's memory.

It was at this point that the infamous montonera groups sprang up throughout the various regions of Peru in opposition to Cáceres. Florencia Mallon describes the montoneras as "bands of armed men organized informally in the countryside to support a particular political cause."⁸² In the central sierra they were formed as a result of a meeting held by peasants of the community. Such groups elected a merchant or a priest as a leader. This happened in 1894-95 just as it had under Cáceres in opposition to the Chilean invasion. These groups reacted, not with a national conscience, but to a local economic and political concern. Because these montoneras rose up in force again in 1894-95 it is clear that the overthrow of Cáceres had larger implications than just for the exporting elite. Rather it affected the entire nation.

On the evening of October 19, 1894, a small boat, made for travelling within the port, departed from Iquique, Chile en route to Peru. Among the passengers on the boat was Nicolás de Piérola, the ever-plotting revolutionary. Landing at Puerto Cabellos, some 200 Kilometers south of Lima in the department of Ica, five days later, Piérola began his campaign against the government of Andrés Cáceres.⁸³ On November 3rd, at the head of a group of montonera forces from the South, he waged his first battle, taking the province of Chíncha in Ica.⁸⁴ As he moved northward with his montonera troops toward Lima, the government began to concentrate its own forces there, more than 3000 soldiers, in expectation of a fierce

battle.⁸⁵ Cáceres was not ready to give up the position he had fought so hard to keep.

Under a dense fog on the morning of the seventeenth of March, 1895, Piérola led a force of about 2000 montonera troops in a siege on the capital. On this first day of battle they took a number of strategic church towers as well as the government palace. The fighting stopped as darkness fell. Again the next day fierce battles were waged from dawn until dark. On the third day, the 19th, after even more fierce battles had been waged throughout the morning, the Diplomatic Corps called for a twenty-four-hour truce. With the truce, peace negotiations began. It was agreed that Cáceres would step down and that an interim government consisting of a five-man council would be selected. Two members were to be nominated by Cáceres and two by Piérola. This group of four would then elect the fifth man who would serve as president of the council.⁸⁶

As calm returned to the battle-torn capital, the council moved into action. It declared that elections for president, vice-president and Congress would take place on the first Sunday in June. Soon, trade, which had nearly come to a halt due to the rising tensions and fears prior to the attack on Lima, began to revive also with the restoration of peace.⁸⁷ In the election for president, Piérola received 4150 of 4310 votes cast. Elected as 1st and 2nd Vice Presidents were, respectively, Guillermo Billinghurst and Augusto Seminario y Váscones.⁸⁸ Piérola's inauguration into the presidency on

September 8, 1895 marked the end of ten years of military government and the beginning of Peru's leap into the modern world.

V. Political Strategies in Lima

In 1890, the Minister Plenipotentiary of the U.S. to Peru wrote that Piérola "is considered a dangerous man and the ruling classes here will unite to keep him out of the presidency"⁸⁹ and that "this man is regarded as an unscrupulous demagogue by the better class of citizens."⁹⁰ Yet, five years later he became president on a wave of popular support. This seemingly dramatic turn of events is explained by the convergence of three elements. A primary contribution to Piérola's rise to power was the growing disaffection which the Civilista Party had with the Cácerista Party, most notably during Bermúdez' administration, which lead to the Democrat - Civilista coalition. At the same time the popularity of Cáceres military-backed government was waning among the general populace. Complementing these two was the indomitable spirit of the ever-present Piérola, who had sought control over the reins of government for twenty years, beginning with his first attempted coup in 1874.

The monied class (represented by the Civilistas), as Julio Cotler asserted, did not have the political influence in 1895 to put the apparatus of government to its own designs.⁹¹ The Civilistas had a history of alliances with the various elements of government which held political sway at the time.⁹² Thus, after Cáceres came to power in 1886 the Civilistas cooperated with his administration in an aim

to improve their political and economic position. But during the Bermúdez administration they opted to join with the influential Valcárcelistas in opposition to the weakening Bermúdez government. Finally, as the elections of 1894 drew near they formed a coalition with Piérola and the Democrats in order to overcome the power of the entrenched Cáceristas, bringing Piérola one step closer to achieving his goal.

The poor reputation of this Cácerista government aided Piérola in his bid for power. In 1886, as Cáceres began his first presidency, Peru, for the first time in a number of years could breathe a sigh of relief. The strife of the civil war between Cáceres and Iglesias and the ravages of the Chilean occupation were now behind them. The new military-backed government established order and put Peru back onto the right track of peacetime activities. Throughout his tenure, Cáceres made steady if painful improvements. These included an effort at reducing debts and stabilizing the currency, and the signing of the Grace Contract, which reestablished access to international markets.⁹³ But under the administration of president Morales Bermúdez the tide began to turn. As another four years of military supported rule ensued, the people began to tire of the restrictions they felt. In response to growing dissent Bermúdez reacted with oppression, such as his replacement of anti-Cáceristas electoral council members with pro-Cácerista figures. When Cáceres himself then attempted to return to the presidency after Bermúdez' death, the popular support he had enjoyed from groups such as the

montonera forces in the Battle of La Brea, was not only lacking, these people simply would not allow it. And who better to offer their support to than Piérola, who instantly championed their cause? Thus, the declining popularity of Cáceres played right into the hand of Piérola, who stood ready to play it.

But Piérola was not the only political leader interested in ousting Cáceres. What of the Civic Union leaders including Rosas, Valcárcel, or the deposed Vice-President Solar? The difference between Piérola and these men was that he had been planning for this moment for many years while they had simply come upon the situation. In his repeated attempts at overthrowing the government he had cultivated the skill for such ventures. His tenacity at this undertaking had situated him in a prime position to take on the mission. Throughout the years he had built up a type of legendary reputation for his activities. In the rebellion of 1895 he had but to implement these well honed skills in order to overthrow the Cáceres government. But this aspect alone would not have been enough. It was only in complement to the other factors that his revolutionary skills were rendered effective. Thus, with the combination of Civilista support, universal anti-Cácerista support, and his own constancy and revolutionary energy, Piérola went from the ranks of a "dangerous man" to a celebrated president in a matter of five years.

Of these three, the element of greatest political import was the signing of the coalition by the Democrats and the Civilistas, who now

were known as the Civic Union after joining with the Valcárcelistas in 1892. Although Piérola had been offered a part in a coalition with the Constitutionalist party, in which Cáceres would take the presidency, he had rejected it asking only for the "fulfillment of the law" on Cáceres part.⁹⁴

This was precisely the goal of the coalition Piérola did make with the Civic Union-- "the fulfillment of the law." The coalition was not a joining of the party elements themselves, rather it was a joining of forces to form a "watch-dog" group to insure free and fair elections. Its aim was very specific. It was formed to insure that the presidential election in 1894 was carried out legally. Toward this goal the coalition identified five objectives. The first was a simple statement of their purpose: to insure a free and legal election. The second was equally important. It made clear the fact that both parties were completely free to designate their own candidates for the election. Thus, the coalition was not made to eliminate competition. Rather its aim was to make the competition fair. And in this vein the coalition was aimed directly at the Constitutionalist Party which, it was suspected, might corrupt the elections to insure its own success. The third point was more a formality, stating that the head of the coalition would be the head of the Democratic Party (Piérola). The fourth point was a direct appeal to the president to, appoint a three-man council consisting of one man from each of the Democrat, Civic Union and Constitutionalist parties to oversee the elections and insure their fairness. In addition to this he was to

implement a law of direct suffrage and set the elections for June. And the final point was an invitation to the constitutionalists to join the coalition. This coalition represented the Democrat and Civic Union joint effort to insure a fair and peaceful transition of power.

With the signing of the coalition in 1894 between Piérola and the Civic Union, both sides sought to gain. For Piérola this was a means of legitimating his rally to oust Cáceres with the political support of the Lima commercialist elite. For the Civic Union the Democrats represented an additional force which they could employ to pressure Cáceres into holding a legitimate election. If the elections were fair the Civic Union stood a good chance of winning a large number of positions, judging from their previously large numbers in Congress. The signing of the coalition marked an outward sign of solid opposition to the Cácerista government.

As early as 1890 it was said of Piérola that ". . . he has a very wide following among the lower and uneducated classes, and . . . the church people look upon him with favor."⁹⁵ But while he held the support of the masses Piérola seems to have been lacking in support in Congress. As mentioned above, in the elections of 1890 all but one of the Senators were Civilista (the exception being First Vice-President Alejandrino del Solar), and the majority in the House of Representatives were Cácerista.⁹⁶ There is no mention of Democratic Senators or House members. Thus, through the coalition with the Civic Union, Piérola forged an invaluable link to Lima politics. As for the Civic Union, while they obviously had some sway in

Congress, this influence was blocked by the Cácerista administration, which was more interested in perpetuating itself than in working with the the Civic Union.⁹⁷

Through a coalition with the Democrats, the Civic Union availed themselves of an opportunity to place a new, possibly more receptive administration into office. If the coalition was successful, the Civic Union realized that this would mean that the Democrats had a stake in the new government as well. But, in looking at the alternative of a renewed Cáceres presidency, the Civic Union had much to gain, even if the new administration were Democratic. The Democrat's program came much closer to that of the Civilistas than the Constitutionalist. In addition, (judging from its representation in Congress before the 1894 elections) the Civic Union was assured of regaining a substantial number of seats in Congress during the election which would balance out a Democratic executive branch. Thus, for the Civic Union the coalition was a positive move also.

But this coalition, formed to achieve the short-term goal of free and legal elections evolved into a full-fledged joining of forces after Cáceres usurped the presidency. The friendly bonds that had been formed between these two groups became solid as their opposition grew more threatening. As the civil war began, these two parties were working in unison to coordinate the montonera forces throughout the provinces. Thus while Oswaldo Seminario, an ardent Piérolista, lead montonera troops in the North, Mariano Nicolás

Valcárcel leader of the Civic Union, helped to lead the battle in the South.⁹⁸

VI. The Regional Fighting Forces (Montoneras)

Politics centered around events in Lima, but included the involvement of the rest of Peru. In fact, during the civil war of 1895, nearly all of the activity took place outside of Lima, with only the culminating battle occurring in the capital. Thus, it is vital to look at the role that the provincial sectors of Peru had in bringing about Cáceres' overthrow as well as Piérola's influence here.

Piérola himself was not from Lima, but from Arequipa, a department which had a long history of involvement in national politics. By the time of the civil war of 1895 Piérola was no stranger to revolutionary activity and had developed a strong network of support.⁹⁹ The leaders of the montoneras and of the Democratic Party in the provinces were often educated men who were landowners, businessmen, or politicians.¹⁰⁰ But while they were the driving force of the party, this group alone could not undertake a civil war. They could be successful in union with the local peasant communities though. It is here that the "Principles" of the Democratic party take on their importance. While Piérola was a "congenital aristocrat who shunned close contact with the multitude. . . (he) paternalistically sought to ease the suffering of the poor and protect their limited rights."¹⁰¹ Thus, part of the policies of his party had an inherent appeal to the lower classes. The Democrats claimed that "public institutions ought to put as a top priority the betterment of

the moral and material conditions of the poor. In addition to this, Piérola proclaimed himself the "protector of the Indian race," stating that if any Indian should have his rights violated, he should seek out Piérola himself for assistance.¹⁰² Through methods such as this the Democratic party was able to win over the lower class -- montoneras, who were faced with the alternative of Cácerista repression

Although party policies are more concrete ground on which these montoneras could base their support, Piérola won much support as a result of his own charisma which constantly inspired the men onward. For the average man especially, Piérola was like a legend. With the tales of his heroic deeds during the war with Chile, of his undaunting leadership in his numerous rebellions, and of his bravery in battle and concern for the down-trodden, the people became caught up in romanticism. Piérola was a messiah in the eyes of the masses claimed José Galves in his work "1895."¹⁰³ Piérola could make men move with his words. He once gave a speech in Peru in which he delivered the famous quote "Our fathers gave us freedom (made us free), the charge has been bequeathed to us to make ourselves grand."¹⁰⁴ Although it is difficult to relay the essence of a man through words, one biographer, Alberto Ulloa divined, in his own terms, the meaning behind the endearing title "Califa" (Caliph) which was given to Piérola. Ulloa saw "Califa" as a romantic title, and "expressive of faith, which were confused, imprecise but shining memories, thoughts, attitudes: his battles, his speeches, his galloping horse, the road travelled towards the horizon, time , the

representation of God, a people looking toward the point where their hopes lie."¹⁰⁵ This was the embodiment of Nicolás Piérola, imprecise but very real in the impact he had on the people of the Peruvian provinces.

It is clear that the civil war of 1894-95 involved the whole of Peru with montonera bands forming across the country in opposition to Cácerista forces.¹⁰⁶ However, it is not easy to determine which group these montonera forces represented. Were they purely peasant groups? Did they include merchants and white collar workers? Who stood to gain the most from the ouster of Cáceres? There had been purely Indian uprisings in 1885 in Ancash, with the Atusparia uprising. But the scale of this uprising was nowhere near that of 1895.¹⁰⁷ The civil war of 1895 was a large scale political and social upheaval. The people were not coerced into battle they entered with a will to overcome their alienation by a clientelistic system which allowed political access and financial advantage only to a privileged few. Basadre offers insight into a number of motivations the montoneras had for taking up arms: hatred of abusive authorities, vengeance against an extortionist state apparatus, the waste of the ruling regime and, on a more emotive level, the prestige of local montonera leaders, the legend of Piérola as "Caudillo of the people", and the "romantic desire for a Peru that's more just, healthy, clean... better."¹⁰⁸ Thus, just as in any conflict this civil war had its practical, critical aspects as well as its romantic side.

Yet most importantly, this rebellion was one with political power motivations tied in with the events centered in Lima.¹⁰⁹ This is seen in the universality of the uprising and its effective organization, shown most clearly in the simultaneous convergence on Lima by forces from the North, Center and South. The U.S. Envoy to Peru observed that the montonera groups are a coalition of groups on the "outs" with Cáceres government.¹¹⁰ This statement reinforces the view that because these montonera forces were barred from access to political power in the provinces, and oppressed by the military regime, they took up arms to rectify the situation. This represented a new chapter in national politics. While montonera groups had risen up previously to fight for local concerns, they had never been organized on a national scale. Through the networking of Civilista and Democratic support, the center managed to coordinate these pockets of local opposition into a national event.

In the North the adamant Piérolista supporter Oswaldo Seminario took up the cause in 1894 with his brothers Ricardo, Eduardo, Teodoro and Edmundo and his uncle Augusto.¹¹¹ Oswaldo Seminario had been trained as a lawyer and had practiced in Lima. He had been a Senator in Lima representing the department of Piúra on the extreme north coast for several terms by the time of the civil war in 1894-95. He also owned a large farm in Piúra. It is very obvious that Seminario and his family benefitted directly from their activity in the war. In 1895, after the final confrontations Oswaldo was elected as a Representative while his uncle, Augusto was named

Prefect of Piúra.¹¹² Seminario's forces fought in Piúra using sabotage as a weapon. They cut telegraph wires and cut off train transportation by damaging the rails.¹¹³

Simultaneously, montonera forces were rising up in Lambeyque and Ancash, coastal departments just south of Piúra, but north of Lima. By July of 1894 the Department of Lambeyque was reported to be under montonera control.¹¹⁴ But, moving closer to Lima, the department of Ancash proved harder to subdue for the montoneras. Led by Carlos de Piérola, brother of Nicolás, the montonera forces rose up en masse upon the reelection of Cáceres to the presidency. These people were unwilling to endure another four years of military supported rule. Cáceres' attempt to suppress this revolt only incited the montoneras further. As local support for the local government in Huaráz washed away, with only Cáceres to back it up, the government collapsed.¹¹⁵ Here again was a situation where political power was an issue. After a majority of the citizens took up arms against the Cácerista supported local government, it became clear that the government of Huaráz had no local support and had only retained power through its links to Cáceres. And by October of 1894 Seminario and his forces had occupied the town of Huacho which lay only 80 miles north of Lima.¹¹⁶ Thus, after the struggle to topple the local Cácerista powers, the forces from the North began converging near Lima to take the ultimate political prize, the capital.

In the Central provinces of Peru, the primary montonera leader was Augusto Durand. He was the first to "raise the banner against

the military regime."¹¹⁷ In mid-1894 he was named by Piérola as Military and Political Chief of the Departments of the Center, an undertaking which he accepted with honor.¹¹⁸ Starting in the serrano mining town of Cerro de Pasco with 200 men, Durand worked his way south, attacking numerous towns along the way, for a period of seven months. At the end of this campaign he had 2000 montoneras under his command and was prepared to march on Lima with Piérola.¹¹⁹

Of course the central sierras are precisely where Cáceres had raised his montonera fighting groups only ten years before this event. But in 1894 in place of these were Cácerista soldiers and in opposition to these soldiers were some of the very montoneras who had fought by Cáceres side against the Chileans ten years before.¹²⁰ By 1888, according to Mallon, it became obvious to the montonera forces who had fought with Cáceres that he had abandoned them not intending to reward them for their assistance with either access to political power or financial resources.¹²¹ Thus, with the battle call of Durand on one side and their apparent neglect by Cáceres on the other these montonera forces had seemingly little choice but to act in an effort to bring about a change for their betterment. In addition to this, through his creation of districts and hand-picked representatives, Cáceres had excluded a number of merchants and politicians from access to political power.¹²² With the outbreak of the rebellion, these people who had been excluded were given the opportunity to redirect the power network in their favor and gladly

took it. So, just as in the Piérolista North, access to political power played a role in the formation of the montoneras in the Center, while the legacy of La Breña played a role as well.

As the North and the Center were steeped in battle, the conflict in the South began to pick up momentum as well. Although there were a number of montonera leaders here, it was the montonera band of Eduardo Yessup that made a sweep across the South. Starting in Puno, on lake Titicaca in the southeast, Yessup and his men next attacked the far southern coastal town of Moquegua, then swept northward, finally capturing Arequipa on 27 January, 1895.¹²³ At this point Yessup was ready to join with Piérola's forces who had taken the town of Chíncha in the northern province of the department of Ica which lay just south of the department of Lima. The base from which the attack was to be launched was the town of Cineguilla in the department of Lima.¹²⁴

As with the other provincial areas, information on this region in terms of political preferences and economic conditions is scarce. But some conclusions may be drawn. In one study of the area, it is noted that the landowning, farm goods production class in the South maintained its precapitalist system, but that members of a new commercial class were beginning to emerge who were tied to the international market.¹²⁵ Under the restrictive Cáceres regime, this group had been isolated from political power, having come onto the scene too late to obtain access to his tightly run political network. They had no means at their disposal to achieve greater commercial

success. Thus, with the advent of the coalitional campaign it was to the advantage of this group to offer its support, at least financial, if not in manpower. In addition to this, Piérola had the support in his home department not only of the lower classes, but also of the aristocracy.¹²⁶ Thus, in the South, the budding commercialists jumped at the opportunity for a piece of the pie while the masses gave full support, as the aristocracy (at least in Arequipa) looked on approvingly.

During the first months of 1895, tensions in Lima grew while the montonera forces gathered from all directions. The impetus to the civil war had been created in the capital city, and its conclusion was to take place there, but if it were not for the innumerable battles fought and won over time by the montoneras in the provinces, the events in Lima would have had much less significance. The montoneras represented the national aspect of this civil war. While each region had its particular problems to which these montonera groups formed in response, it became obvious that these problems were the result of a national crisis centered in Lima, and not only a regional issue.

VII. The Coalition in Government.

After the civil war had come to an end no more mention is made of the Civic Union. Because this coalition between the Valcárcelistas and the Civilistas was formed with the election of 1894 in mind it lost its importance after this point. Although no mention is made of a formal dissolution it is logical to assume that, the time for its purpose having passed, the members of this coalition then pursued their own paths. The path that the Civilistas pursued was that of forging a new government in conjunction with Piérola.

While the Democrat-Civilista coalition was effective in bringing about the overthrow of Cáceres, they next had the task of forming a new and viable government. With Piérola's election to the presidency this task was underway. But which of the varied support groups would this administration come to represent, and who would get lost in the shuffle?

In answering this question it must first be determined what the goals of each of the two parties in the coalition were. The Democratic party has been described above as the "party of the people" and in a sense it was. More correctly it was a party guided by the upper class but taking in the considerations of the poorer classes, where its electoral support lay.¹²⁷ This party also favored the southern provincial cities, because this was the home of many

of them. The Civilistas, on the other hand represented the coastal exporting elite and the commercial bourgeoisie of Lima. Yet, with slight differences the aims of these two parties were not that far apart. Both parties held in high regard the theories of economic liberalism, wished to follow an export development model, and drew their leadership from the wealthier classes.¹²⁸ Thus, in forming the coalition these two parties had more difficulty in patching up old personalistic feuds than in compromising on political programs.

As this coalition established a new government it also implemented new reforms. In an important move Piérola adopted the gold standard for the Peruvian currency. This stimulated foreign capital as a result of a stabilized exchange rate. In addition to this Piérola called in a French military mission to professionalize the armed forces.¹²⁹ And in keeping with this reform pattern, in 1896 Piérola established a committee to revise the electoral laws. The new electoral law became Title VIII of Article 90 of the constitution, reading "The president of the Republic will be elected by direct suffrage in the form prescribed by the law".¹³⁰ Finally the coalition had achieved direct suffrage for the country. Therefore, on coming into office the coalitional administration managed to set things in motion in order to bring about changes that the leadership of both parties supported.

Yet, even if the party leaders were comfortable with the goals they were setting and the development paths they were taking, what of their constituents? Upon coming into office Piérola was quick to

adopt a favorable stance toward the importation of capital to improve the export sector. He also raised no objection to the Grace contract, which he had so adamantly opposed as a sellout at its signing.¹³¹ While these moves were in keeping with the aims of the constituents of the Civilista party they did not satisfy the needs of the artisanal and proletariat classes who supported the Democrats. In addition to this, Piérola went against a prior vow when, after imposing a salt tax he sent a military mission to put down the Indian uprising which resulted .¹³² The irony is clear. The "protector of the Indian race" who had promised to safeguard the Indian from abuse, sent a military mission to brutally extinguish their uprising. Thus upon coming to power Piérola wasted little time in distancing himself from the very group who had fought to bring him to power.

The effect of this attitude by Piérola was the strengthening of the Civilista party. Upon coming to power Piérola made the conscious choice to support the exporting elite sector. In doing so he was directing his government to satisfy the needs of the Civilistas. As the economy turned around and this sector became stronger they would eventually no longer need the support of the Democrats. This has prompted Basadre to observe that "The governing class which had overthrown a military regime by using the popular caudillo, discarded this caudillo when the right moment arrived, and seized control of political power."¹³³

But the most important question to ask in evaluating the new government which replaced Cáceres is: "What had changed?" In this

case the two greatest changes that came about were in economic activity and the political atmosphere. Whereas Cáceres, and Bermúdez before him were more concerned with maintaining the status quo, the Piérolista government had as one of its goals, export development. Thus, while Bermúdez or Cáceres may have weakened the export sector by taxing it to compensate for poor finances, Piérola would encourage it to invest in order to increase profits in this way, rather than tax it directly.

As for politics, it was clear under Bermúdez and Cáceres both that in order to effectively accomplish anything, one had to be among those who were connected politically, either in Lima, or as districts heads in the provinces. Under the Piérola administration this was not so true. This attitude can be seen in his policies, such as his support for direct suffrage, and in the freedom with which he allowed the coastal elite to operate financially. Thus, with the Piérola administration the government in Lima took on a sense of security about itself and its position in the scheme of things.

Upon the rise to power of the Democratic party the nature of its support system became more clear. The founders and leadership of this party were generally of the wealthier class, being from Lima as well as having a large concentration in Arequipa. This group represented the more traditional of the Peruvian upper class and this fact manifested itself in some aspects of their party's program. The most distinctive of its traditional views was its sense of paternalistic duty to the lower classes, especially the Indians. Because of these

values this party emphasized the betterment of the Indian's condition and Piérola donned himself "the protector of the Indian race." But, when it came to acting on the interests of the party, Piérola considered his most immediate friends and allies of the aristocratic class, forgetting it seems, his own and his party's commitment to the Indian and the lower classes. Thus, the activities Piérola's administration undertook represented the interests of the Civilista Party as well as the elite segment of the Democratic Party, but neglected the concerns of the lower and middle class elements of the Democratic Party.

VIII. Conclusion

The Civil war of 1894-95 in Peru was a result of a complex combination of elements. The most apparent element acting in this war was the coalitional force formed between the Piérolistas - Civilistas. Initially beginning as a vehicle to bring about electoral reform this compact became the guiding force behind the campaign to bring to an end the militaristic Cáceres government.

The tools by which this coalition achieved this goal were the provincial fighting forces, or montoneras, which rose up across the nation in opposition to Cáceres. These forces rose up for various reasons; often for economic or political gain, but also out of frustration against the repressive regime of Cáceres. Throughout the war there was a constant cooperation between the central leaders of the coalition and the regional forces, with the ultimate goal of converging on Lima. And it was under the inspirational leadership of one man, Nicolás de Piérola that all of this came to fruition. As someone remarked during his exile in Chile shortly before his return to Peru: "without Piérola's immediate presence the revolution could fail."¹³⁴ It was just such a personality that the times needed in order to draw together the variant elements in opposition to the Cáceres regime.

Yet, on coming into power, the Piérola administration did not fulfill its obligation to all of its constituents. Piérola opted instead to

support the commercial interests of the Civilistas and the upper echelons of the Democratic Party. He proved unable or unwilling to address the interests of the lower classes of Peru, even though it was with their help that he had obtained power.

But the Civil War of 1895 takes on an even deeper meaning when the implications of the event are considered. In their effort to do away with the oppressive militarism of the Cáceres regime this coalitional force, in union with the montoneras brought about the birth of modern Peru. In her new cooperative and more open government, Peru began to involve herself in the pursuit of progress. With the imposition of direct suffrage, the importation of new capital for the exporting sector and a stable political atmosphere Peru launched into a new era.

NOTES

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- 3 Cotler, p. 127.
- 4 Florencia Mallon, The Defense of the Community in Peru's Central Highlands (New Jersey: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983), p. 133.
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- 36 Werlich, p. 120.
- 37 Werlich, p. 129.
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- 42 Miro Quesada Laos, p. 30.
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- 45 Jorge Basadre, Historia, p. 2825.
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- 84 Ulloa, p. 335
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- 98 Paz Soldan, p. 389-390, 359-360.
- 99 Ulloa, p. 409.
- 100 Paz Soldan ---- This is evidenced in the brief biographies of Durand, Augusto, Oswaldo and Ricardo Seminario, as well as Pierola's own son Isaias.
- 101 Westich, p. 129.
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- 124 Ulloa, p. 334; Miro Quesada Laos, p. 237.
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