

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

November 27 1989

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY


Stacy Dale VanDeveer

ENTITLED Poland in the 1980s: Challenges to Soviet Foreign Policy


and Intra-Bloc Relations

IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF Bachelor of Arts in Liberal Arts and Sciences



Instructor in Charge



APPROVED

Political Science

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF

**Poland in the 1980s: Challenges to
Soviet Foreign Policy and
Intra-Bloc Relations**

By

Stacy Dale VanDeveer

Thesis

**for the
Degree of Bachelor of Arts
in
Liberal Arts and Sciences**

**College of Liberal Arts and Sciences
University of Illinois
Urbana, Illinois**

1989

Contents

Introduction	1 - 7
1. Setting the Stage for "Solidarnosc"	7 - 20
2. The Soviet Threat	21 - 28
3. The Road to Martial Law	28 - 33
4. The Changing Face of the 1980s	33 - 38
5. Solidarity's Reemergence	38 - 55
6. The Gorbachev Era	55 - 66
7. The Backlash of Reform	66 - 73
8. Concluding Statements: Where To Go From Here?	73 - 79
Appendixes	
Chronology: July 1980 - December 1981	80 - 95
Letter from CPSU Central Committee to PUWP	96 - 100
Gorbachev Addresses...	101 - 104
Notes	105 - 115
Bibliography	116 - 120

Introduction

The decade of the 1980s witnessed a broad range of historical changes within all cultural, social, and political spheres of post-war Poland. Virtually every institution and ideological element of Polish society has been challenged and/or revised. The significance of these events with regard to regional and global affairs can not be overestimated. This does not mean, however, that concrete formulas, causal relations, or predictions of future events can be constructed and applied throughout Eastern Europe. Poland is Poland. It is not Hungary, Czechoslovakia, East Germany or any other country. Important conclusions can be drawn, however, from examination of the Polish events of the 1980s. More specifically, this essay will attempt to improve understanding of the past role the Soviet Union has played in Poland and the new role on which the Gorbachev leadership seems to have embarked. Through a comparison of Soviet involvement in the Polish events of the 1980-1981 Solidarity crisis with their role in the liberalization and restructuring of Polish society in the later half of the decade, significant reversal regarding several key elements of the Soviet-East European relationship will be demonstrated. Poland has challenged Soviet leadership and Bloc dominance throughout the decade. Thus, Soviet-Polish relations have evolved toward a situation in which the Kremlin must react to, rather than attempt to dictate, Polish policy and events.

By 1980 Poland was unparalleled as an important element in the strategic structure of the Warsaw Pact. Poland contains the largest

population of any Soviet Pact ally. In addition, as of 1980, its Gross National Product was \$146.1 billion and the military contained 317,500 uniformed personnel.¹ Its geographic location between the USSR and East Germany and the historical position of the "Polish corridor" through which Western forces have repeatedly invaded Russia and the USSR, have combined to push Poland to the forefront of Soviet concerns throughout the post-war period. Thus Poland has been considered essential to Soviet defense since 1945.

Despite differences in strategic importance, culture, politics, and society, Soviet hegemony has created one commonality among the nations and peoples of Eastern Europe, namely; a sense of oppression and constraint. Anti-Soviet sentiment can be found among large segments of the populations of virtually every East European country. In addition to Poland's history of discontent, reformist movements with anti-Soviet behaviors and rhetoric occurred in Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. In addition, Yugoslavia and Albania chose "roads to socialism" which were not paved by Moscow. However, the temptation to over-simplify Soviet dominance as having had a unifying effect on the East European nations is perilous and unfounded.

In one sense the vast differences in culture, history, language, and society of the Soviet-dominated nations of Eastern Europe have proven to be insurmountable obstacles to any unforced cooperation between the countries. Secondly, situational elements have played a large role as well. In the event that one country's government attempted to stray from existing levels of Soviet hegemony, other Pact members have been

unwilling to form any unified support for such change. Generally, however, it can be stated that, with the exception of the short-lived Czechoslovakian reforms prior to the Soviet invasion of 1968, Yugoslavia, Hungary, and Poland have been the most consistently vocal in their plans and calls for reform and change. However, these countries have only very recently begun to cooperate with and support each other's respective reforms. This lack of cohesion has traditionally stemmed from fear of tying their own fates to risks taken by another government that might overstep Soviet parameters and bring down condemnation on all.

In examining these complex relationships it must first be understood that writing from the western vantage point brings with it certain limitations. Obviously much of the available information must be gathered through intelligence sources. The analysis of political and military situations and decision making proves increasingly problematic when it involves regimes retaining a tight hold on information throughout the society. Oftentimes it is very difficult from the outside to determine the importance of various situational elements that shape development.

The Sidney Ploss text Moscow and the Polish Crisis, employs an analytical study of Soviet propaganda in an attempt to reconstruct "the Soviet leadership's hidden policy objectives in the Polish crisis of 1980-1981."² Ploss states, "The main function of Soviet opinion-makers, it is clear from educational texts, is to build confidence in the Politburo among officials and the public."³ He further asserts, "it is safe to assume that the Soviet audience must be supplied with data and commentary serving to justify policy decision that are extant or imminent."⁴ Thus Ploss examines

Soviet propaganda because it prepares the Soviet populace for impending government action, justifies present or past action, and advances the perception that the government remains in control of any given situation. This essay will attempt to draw similar supporting evidence emerging from the Soviet media throughout the 1980s. It will also rely heavily on Ploss' evidence and reprints of Soviet sources from the early part of the 1980s. While the Soviet media may have achieved greater freedom under Gorbachev it is by no means autonomous. Thus its news coverage, editing practices, and commentary may still be said to offer clues to the Soviet leadership's decision making and policies. In fact, the increased tolerance for divergent views with the Soviet media allows for even greater insight into policy debates and disagreements among the leadership.

Propaganda analysis can not be said to be without its limitations. Without direct access to information through unrestrained freedom of speech, printed records of high level meetings, and/or direct intelligence or spying on the top leadership, gaps remain in the informational picture. It is important to avoid filling these gaps with mere conjecture by submitting to the temptation to oversimplify in analysis of social and political problems.

Several historical events and conflicts have helped to shape the popular opinion of the Soviet Union within the minds of the Polish people. Prior to the twentieth century, there were several prolonged periods of Russian dominance of Polish society. The 18th century was characterized by an almost complete control of Polish affairs and territory by the Czarist empire, while Russian troops repressed popular uprisings in Poland in

1830 and 1863. Throughout centuries of Russian-Polish relations there has been a continuous adversarial relationship between the Roman Catholicism of Polish society and pre-revolutionary Russian Orthodoxy. This fact becomes especially important because it establishes a centuries old role for the Polish Church as a voice for oppressed Poles against Russian dominance.

The 20th-century historical wounds to the Polish consciousness have proven more difficult to reconcile because they were perpetrated by Soviet governments; thus blame cannot be cast on the imperialism of Czarist regimes. Events such as the 1920 Soviet-Polish War lie just under the surface of the "socialist family" propaganda pushed by Moscow. It is the events surrounding World War II and Stalin's atrocities that seem to have done the most permanent damage to the attitudes and opinions of the Polish people. The 1939 Ribbentrop-Molotov non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany, that agreed on the partitioning of Poland between the two signatories, coupled with the massacre at Katyn of thousands of Polish military officers have remained unresolved points of antagonism for over 45 years. In addition, Stalin refused to aid a Polish uprising in Warsaw in 1944, allowing hundreds of thousands of Poles to die fighting the Nazi's as the Red Army sat a few short miles away. The Soviet forces wanted the Nazi's and the Polish Home Army to burn themselves out fighting each other before the Red Army push to "liberate" Warsaw was attempted. Stalin did not want the Poles to be governing themselves before the Soviets took control of Warsaw. Thus he could install a government answerable only to Moscow. Finally, Stalin's regime

forcibly deported thousands of Poles to Soviet territory after the war, further inflaming Polish sentiment. The latter half of the 1980s has witnessed the advent of open discussion of these topics.

These events serve to reinforce the deep resentment of Russian/Soviet oppression. From the Polish perspective, imperialism has been no less a threat following the advent of Communist Russia than it had been during the Czarist period. Through a complex combination of these socio-political issues and economic factors to be discussed later, Poland has a post-war history full of unrest and dissent. The Committee for Worker Self-Defense (henceforth referred to as KOR) has maintained a small group of dissenters and government opponents. The KOR has traditionally based its opposition on ideological and socio-political areas. It has attempted to challenge both Polish and Soviet communists to account for the inconsistencies within their systems.

In Poland however, as elsewhere in the world, it has been economic issues and crises which have catalyzed popular unrest and social and political friction. Poland experienced periods of popular discontent and worker unrest in 1956, 1968, 1970, 1976, and 1980-81. Thus, in the twelve year period from 1968 through 1980, there were no less than four Polish national movements making demands upon the respective communist regimes. In 1976, when the Gierek regime rescinded the price hikes which triggered the unrest, the situation seemed to resolve and blow over. This fact seems to have reinforced the tendency in both Poland and the USSR to attribute discontent solely to economic factors. Hence, in 1980 when price hikes once again brought on mass uprisings, the feeling was

that the public and government would come to terms with the cost increases and the situation would gradually normalize.

Interestingly, Soviet willingness to allow a measure of economic reform in Eastern Europe throughout the 1970s and early 1980s in hopes of improving the region's economic performance may have led to the events that Soviet leaders most wanted to avoid - political reform which reduced the USSR's dominance of Eastern Europe. By allowing the governments of Eastern Europe to pursue more realistic commodity pricing, the Soviets may have created the economic impetus for unrest within Poland. Once the economic issues brought the populace into the streets, reform momentum became an accelerating phenomenon. As support for change grew and people saw that they could affect it, the scope of concerns and issues expanded to encompass the social and political realms as well. Thus from Solidarity's birth through its activities of the entire decade, it was and remains an organization aimed at affecting and transforming virtually all aspects of Polish life.

1

Setting the Stage for "Solidarnosc"

As stated previously, the Polish government continued to assert throughout the later half of the 1970s and into the 1980-81 crisis that Poland's problems were mainly economic. The communist regime repeatedly ignored the increasingly apparent political and social conflicts growing within both the population and the government. By the late

1970s observers of the Polish situation became convinced that the People's United Worker's Party (henceforth referred to as the PUWP) was in striking disarray on several key issue areas involving economic and social reform.¹ The moderates within the Party were increasingly put on the defensive and they became dangerously polarized in opposition to the old guard hardliners. A serious conflict developed between domestic pressures and Soviet policy assertions. The PUWP fell into an internal struggle over Soviet communist orthodoxy's opposition to specific reforms and actions needed to address Poland's growing problems.

Criticism of Soviet domination of all areas of Polish life was extensive in samizdat publications by the late 1970s. In fact, by 1978 at least twenty regularly circulating samizdat publications with over 20,000 subscribers were in existence.² There was a growing feeling that Poles should attempt to make Poland a model for East European development rather than an example of Soviet hegemony.

The mid-1970s dealt Gierek's Poland several economic blows from which it could not recover. The Soviets moved to raise the price of oil exported to Eastern Europe in order to bring it more in line with the world market price. In addition, Western Europe experienced a recession which greatly reduced any demand for Polish exports. In 1976 Gierek attempted to reduce domestic consumption and product subsidies by raising food and other primary commodities costs. Food prices shot up an average 70% and Gierek was forced to rescind the increases when nation wide strikes and unrest broke out.³ His regime largely wasted huge sums of capitol and subsidies for socialized agricultural programs which make up only 30% of

the country's total agricultural sector.⁴ For the 70% of Polish agriculture which remained private, Gierek did almost nothing to improve conditions or raise productivity.

Economic mismanagement and lack of reform were accentuated by gross overborrowing from the West. Use of the loans for subsidies and mere maintenance of the economic status quo, rather than investment in future growth, wasted this capital and forced additional borrowing to cover debt services.⁵ This economic downturn was accompanied by several important political factors. Throughout the 1970s the overt Soviet control of Eastern Europe began to decline as Detente increased the region's contacts with the West. Western interaction affected virtually every aspect of Eastern European societies. Cultural, economic, even political information began to be exchanged on levels with at least some popular accessibility.

In Poland, with the advent of the 1980s, production actually began to decline and goods shortages reached chronic levels.⁶ In the years from 1970-1975, wages in Poland increased 56% while the cost of living rose only 12.7%.⁷ In comparison, the average wage hikes from 1976-1980 of 33.4% coupled with a cost of living increase of 27.2% look dismal.⁸ Through the squandering of loan capital Gierek raised expectations to unsustainable levels in the early 1970s. When economic realities failed to match these high expectations, people's faith in the regime became further undercut.

Even more damaging to public's confidence in the government, the loan capital, which was being used for price supports, came up short in

1980 resulting in inflation in the prices of food and domestic goods.⁹ The final blow to popular sentiment towards Gierek's economic policies seems to have come in February of 1980. Following the eighth PUWP Congress of February 11-15, 1980, it became clear that the Gierek government refused to accept any responsibility for Poland's declining economic situation. Furthermore, no substantive plan of action was adopted to fight off the impending crisis.¹⁰ The effect on the people, especially the workers, could not help but be significant. Faced with economic crisis, their government simply refused to acknowledge the problems. By attempting to free itself from any responsibility for past, present, or future actions, the PUWP reaffirmed its inability to affect change in Poland.

Complete public dissatisfaction proved to be perilous for the regime. Public support for government, its officials and its policies, can be said to be largely based on the concept of legitimacy. This is not to say that governments can not rule without legitimacy; they can and do. However, the distinction between power and legitimized authority became so wide within Polish society in the early 1980s that control suffered measurably. In Poland the legitimacy of the communist system has never been grounded in public satisfaction or participation. The ideological, socio-economic, and political structure were all imposed by the Soviets. Thus, ideological legitimacy, if it ever existed, had no real chance of being sustained.¹¹

Eastern European regimes, Poland being no exception, have relied heavily on military security and economic gains to legitimize their rule. With the advent of the Prague Spring and Brezhnev's succeeding

statements, military legitimacy became questionable as the distinction between Eastern Europe's "enemies" and "allies" grew unclear. With the relatively sharp economic downturn of the late 1970s, the Eastern European countries, most notably Poland, found themselves facing a complete legitimacy crisis. The point being, when some form of legitimacy exists the populace is more likely to accept short term economic or social problems by deferring gratification of their material and/or ideological wants. Lacking this confidence and trust in their government, Poles sought avenues for the expression of their mistrust and disillusionment. As evidence of this legitimacy erosion, Solidarity published its "Thesis" on April 20, 1980, stating that a vast majority of Polish workers considered communist ideology to be irrelevant.¹² Since the Polish government attempted to build political, economic, and social structures around communist ideology, it was very significant that the workers expressed such a profound lack of confidence in their society's supposed foundation. Obviously, this continuing demoralization could have no other effect than to enhance the countries falling production, alcoholism, and an ever increasing cynicism toward the communist institutions.¹³

The Eurocommunist movement of the 1970s also contributed to the legitimacy problems of the Eastern European regimes. As a result of Poland's greater media openness (relative to many of its Pact allies) this movement may have had a more significant impact within Poland. The Eurocommunists challenged the notion that the Soviet model of communism was the only or best path. In January of 1978 a Eurocommunist seminar entitled "Problems of the History of the USSR" was

very critical of Soviet style socialist development.¹⁴ It launched a direct attack on Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe and Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia in 1968.¹⁵ Throughout 1979 Kremlin leaders attempted to pressure Bloc regimes to close ranks with regard to the Eurocommunists.¹⁶

The stage was set for a major conflict between the Polish populace and the ruling communists. After all, unrest, rioting, and striking in Poland had previously led to leadership changes in 1956 and 1970. Furthermore, widespread worker opposition to the government created civil strife in 1968, 1970, and 1976 as well. Prior to the price hikes that would eventually trigger nationwide strikes and launch the country into a crisis, there emerged increasing conflict in two other traditional problem areas of post-war Polish society. The first was the issue of censorship and the repression of dissent. These two characteristics of Soviet style communism have met with constant and persistent opposition in post-war Poland.¹⁷ With the advent of Detente and the lower Soviet profile of the 1970s, the Polish movement to loosen control of information and the exchange of ideas gained momentum. Secondly, with the election of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla of Krakaw to the Papacy, the Church's position in Poland was greatly enhanced. The Church's place as the centuries old protector of Polish identity took on increased significance. The position of the Polish Pope in the Vatican enhanced the international power of the Polish Church as well as reinforced the perception that it is Poland's only institution worthy of popular confidence and trust. In fact in 1977 then Cardinal Wojtyla openly supported the KOR dissident group following the beating death of a student by government personnel.¹⁸

As political and economic factors waxed simultaneously in 1980, Edward Gierek was forced to reduce subsidies and raise food prices. He resolved to bring meat supports to manageable levels. Amidst other cost increases the price of meat jumped 30-90% on July 1, 1980.¹⁹ Work stoppages began immediately. Gierek committed his government to these policies and vowed not to reverse the price hikes.²⁰ On July 2, Warsaw's Ursus Tractor workers went on strike. By August 14, over 50,000 workers at the Gdansk shipyard had halted production. On August 15, the Soviet news agency TASS announced what would prove to be the first of many well publicized Warsaw Pact military exercises in the territory surrounding Poland.²¹ The meat price hikes of July 1, 1980, signaled the beginning of the end of the Gierek regime. Despite the widespread unrest and opposition which created similar price increases in 1970 and 1976, Poland's communist leaders did not seem to anticipate the reaction of their citizenry. Only by rescinding the 1976 increases was Gierek able to diffuse the situation. When he resolved not to take this path again, he committed the government to a showdown with the workers.

It is interesting to note how quickly the political, cultural, and social issues of the period joined ranks with the economic agenda that sparked the uprising. The Polish Catholic Church and Pope John Paul II emerged almost instantly as involved actors. It is impossible to determine the effect of these religious players on the situation, but it seems worthy to note that the 1980-81 movement proved to be much less violent and bloody on the part of the protesters that were the riots of 1970.²² The continuous calls for peace and restraint from both the Vatican and the

Polish Church coupled with the strong links the emerging opposition leaders developed with Church leaders, may have been significant factors in avoiding violence. In fact, in a November 6, 1980 issue of London's The Guardian, Lech Walesa listed many individuals from within the Church establishment as his leading advisors.²³ He also credited the 1979 Papal visit as having helped fan the flames of the growing nationalist sentiments and provoking the subsequent striking.²⁴ Given Soviet ideology and views toward religion and religious institutions, indeed any relatively autonomous institutions, this heavy Church involvement can only have been a source of anger and apprehension in the Kremlin.

Small established opposition groups such as the KOR may have been initially surprised by the strikes which swept the nation, but they soon closed ranks to support the strike organizers. Poland's underground information dissemination and its samizdat publications proved very effectual. Organized opposition figures exploited their connections with Polish intellectuals and Western media personnel in order to spread strike information throughout the country.²⁵

By mid-August 1980 strikes, protests, sit-ins, and work stoppages became widespread across the entire nation. Virtually no aspect of the economy remained unaffected as strikes expanded from their industrial base to include many key aspects of the service sector. Calls for independent labor unions also began to escalate. Gierek's commitment to holding his ground on the price hikes was reinforced by his hardline response to KOR and strike leaders as they attempted to advise strikers about labor unions. Key figures in the KOR opposition were arrested on

August 20 and 21 in an attempt to squash the activists from spreading the idea of free trade unions. In conjunction with the aforementioned August 15 announcement regarding military exercises, Moscow began launching attacks on revisionist communists reminiscent of rhetoric prior to the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. This initial posturing set the stage for the events of the succeeding 16 months. The Polish workers, led by Solidarity, continued to make demands that their communist government was unable to meet as Moscow cranked out a continuous stream of warnings, threats, and policy assertions. Poland's communist government remained locked in the impossible position between its people and the Kremlin.

The agreements between strikers and the Polish government on August 30, 1980, here after referred to as the Gdansk Accords, launched the country on the path toward independent trade unions and mass participation in demands for political and social change. Polish government negotiators accepted demands for the curbing of official censorship and the organization of independent labor unions with the right to strike and the curbing of official censorship. In return, the work delegates officially acknowledged the PUWP's leading role in Polish politics and society and proclaimed their adherence to the socialist alliance and the responsibilities of said alliance. Although the Soviet press refused to report that Polish workers were to be allowed to form self-governing labor unions, a September 1 article in Pravda implied that Poland's leadership had mistakenly agreed to "examine" some terms put forth by "antisocialist elements" linked to Western intervention.²⁶

On September 6, 1980 Stanislaw Kania, Politburo member and Party secretary for Security and Church Affairs, was elected First Secretary of the PUWP during an emergency meeting of the Polish Central Committee. Just as in 1956 and 1970, popular unrest forced a leadership change as Gierek was ousted from power. Brezhnev quickly sent a letter of congratulations to Kania. The letter, reprinted in Pravda, appeared to be more an outline of what the Soviets expected of the new Polish leadership than a congratulatory message. The letter calls on Kania to be a "staunch fighter" in favor of "strengthening the leading role of the Party."²⁷ Kania, however, did not launch himself headlong into the traditional rhetoric of a Soviet disciple. He did not concentrate his criticism of the striking workers on supposed "antisocialist" or "Western" forces. Unlike Gierek, Kania does not seem to have dismissed the unrest as a phenomenon that could simply be repressed and/or waited out. This lack of an immediate hardline response to the situation may have created instant doubts within Moscow and Polish conservative circles in Kania's ability to deal with the growing crisis.

In Kania's initial statements, including his inaugural address, he praised the Soviets' understanding and support as they allowed the Poles to solve their own problems.²⁸ Statements of this kind were directed at both the Soviet leadership and the Polish people. Kania attempted to buy more time and Soviet patience even as he reminded Poles of the threat of Soviet intervention if the situation proceeded too far. As has often been the case within the Soviet press, its omissions were as important as its inclusions. For example omitted aspects of Kania's inaugural speech,

including his statements on reform negotiations, the role of the Polish Church, and the Gdansk accords, might have caused concern in Moscow that he was too lenient and open to discussion of issues which Moscow considered non-negotiable.²⁹

Throughout September and October reform momentum continued to grow within both the popular movements and the government. On September 17, hundreds of free trade unions converged on Gdansk to register as one large labor movement called "Solidarnosc" or Solidarity. The fact that these unions registered as a unified group could not help but strike fear into Polish and Soviet officials alike. By early October, Kania was addressing a spectrum of problematic issues confronting, in varying degrees, all of the socialist states. He acknowledged low productivity, shortages, low levels of discipline and public information, the shortfalls of central planning, and the entangled lines of Party-State authority only to name a few. However, potentially more shocking to the Soviets were his proposals for "partnership" or "co-management" of power and decision making between workers, professionals, and young people coupled with discussions of reform within the inner-party's roles and terms of office.³⁰

Kania's continued reformist positions placed him firmly in the line of fire between Solidarity and the Kremlin. He was faced with the impossible task of attempting to please these opposing forces. As soon as November of 1980, it became painfully clear that he was failing to please or appease either side. The end of October 1980 was dominated by controversy over the Polish high court's recognition of Solidarity's official registered status. Solidarity issued a demand stating that the Polish premier must travel to

Gdansk to negotiate with the union or face a new wave of national strikes. The strikes were set for November 12. Although, the strike was avoided, Solidarity's issuance of an ultimatum to the government moved the union yet another step closer to control of some aspects of political power. This fact, coupled with Kania's acceptance of Solidarity's legal status may have sealed the fate of the 1980-81 Solidarity movement by solidifying Moscow's complete opposition to it. These events were immediately followed by an intense push by both the Polish and Soviet media to encourage the Party's hardline supporters and discredit Solidarity as "antisocialist" in nature.

The Soviet official statements continued to adhere to their traditional assertion that Western subversion was inciting the Polish situation. On December 4, 1980 a spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry accused Western governments and officials of "waging psychological warfare on Poland."³¹ Just four days later a fabricated TASS report appeared, carried by Czechoslovak, East German, and Bulgarian media, detailing an ousting of representatives of official trade unions in favor of "antisocialist" replacements.³² A U.S. Department of State document claimed that this falsified report was intended to evoke "the memory of similar fabrications as part of Soviet preparations for the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia."³³ In other words, the accusations against the West and the report may have been intended to point out to Polish leaders that Moscow had taken action before to bring a Pact member back in line and they could do so again.

Kania fought to maintain his position on his political tightrope throughout early December in an attempt to allay some Soviet fears. In a

December 2 speech to the Central Committee of the PUWP, reprinted in Pravda the following day, Kania proclaimed that Solidarity was a "worker's movement" dominated by law abiding citizens with few links to "imperialist subversion . . . hostile to socialism."³⁴ He went on to state that the Polish government "shall act resolutely against all symptoms of ideological unity and actions against the Party's ability to act."³⁵ Despite its omission of Kania's more conciliatory words, Pravda's lengthy coverage of his statements seemed to indicate that there remained, among the Soviet leadership, some level of support for his continuation in the leadership of the Polish government. However, it became increasingly difficult for the Kremlin to trust the PUWP to resolve the crisis in favor of communist power as the majority of Party rank and file members joined Solidarity.

Richard Krickus, in conjunction with the ideas of Abraham Brumberg, has developed seven general factors, to be expanded upon later, to explain the Solidarity phenomenon of 1980-81. In summary, they are the following:

1. The Gdansk shipyard workers were undaunted by fears of the regime. They were better educated and young - a testimony to the failure to create legitimacy of the communist controlled educational and socialization systems.
2. Intellectuals such as KOR members and university faculty worked and communicated well with workers and their leaders. (This continued in earnest even after the martial law declaration.)

3. Intellectuals, workers, and PUWP rank and file were appalled and disenchanted by the level of corruption and repression within the regime.
4. Twenty years of increasing levels of education and urbanization increased both the awareness and acuteness of Poland's problems. (Even Marx said these were factors leading to revolution.)
5. High levels of economic growth and consumer expectation, which were fueled by Western loans, were crushed as the economy failed to sustain either one.
6. Trade unionism has a relatively significant history in Poland. From the 19th century through the interwar period, Polish workers have organized in pursuit of economic and conditional demands.
7. The Polish government failed to eradicate or discredit the role of the Catholic Church. The Polish Church, as the only institution in Poland possessing mass legitimacy and support, played a key role in Solidarity's rise.³⁶

In a matter of only a few months following the coastal strikes, Solidarity had acquired 9 million members within an electorate totaling only 26 million.³⁷ From spontaneous strikes spawned by price increases, Solidarity rapidly became a massive centralized organization working for across the board societal change. Simply stated, Solidarity completely usurped the Party's claimed role as the voice and protector of the masses.

2

The Soviet Threat

Soviet reaction to the growing crisis in Poland was partially based on the fear that the "Polish disease" might spread to other East European countries and/or into the USSR itself. In short, the Kremlin had a great deal at stake with regard to the risks of reform or unrest. Even as the Soviets refused to report the initial strike activity in Poland there were reports of limited illegal strikes within the USSR as well.¹ These reports remained unconfirmed; however Soviet Labor Organizer Vladimir Borisov happened to be expelled from the country in late June 1980. When Polish unrest was finally acknowledged by the Soviet media, the Soviet public remained ignorant of the Polish government's recognition of strike committees as negotiating partners. It is clear that the Kremlin worked to avoid popular knowledge of Polish government acceptance of strike negotiations because of the fear that Soviet workers might choose to embark on a similar course. Even as the media attempted to avoid inciting the Soviet workers it began calling for greater emphasis on consumer goods production. Pravda ran theoretical articles on October 2 and 3 and November 21 suggesting that the Soviet economy had attained a stability that would allow it to place higher levels of resources into the area of consumer products in order to alleviate shortages.² By omitting and editing the events in Poland and simultaneously calling for domestic economic changes desired by consumers, the Soviets exposed their anxiety regarding possible parallels between the Polish crisis and their own

situation. Ploss stated that his "propaganda analysis" also suggests that Brezhnev and the leadership's moderates became increasingly concerned about the possibility of unrest in the absence of any real gains in the standard of living.³

Through Pravda, 15 September 1980, the Soviet leadership was able to encourage Polish hardliners to wrestle control of the PUWP while at the same time warn members of the CPSU of the fate of liberalists or reformists. The article, in support of purging the PUWP ranks, states the following:

Unity must first of all be ideological unity. This means that there must be unanimity in the party's ranks with respect to the main principles of Marxist-Leninist ideology . . . There is no place in the party's ranks for those who failed to pass the tests of recent events, those who were not only unequal to the occasion but also took non-party positions on a number of basic questions . . . The question now on the agenda is that of purging the party's ranks.⁴

Clearly the Soviet party-state hierarchy was attempting to insulate the USSR from Poland's problems as it created ever increasing pressure on the Polish government to crack down and halt reformism.

To minimize the threat of any spread of the Polish reformist ideals and unrest, the Soviets, in conjunction with their other Pact allies, devised several means by which to seal off Poland. These containment practices included extensive military maneuvers which virtually encircled Polish

territory, jamming Radio Free Europe, and implementing travel and currency restrictions to and from Poland, its Bloc allies, and West Germany.⁵ This isolation put pressure on the PUWP to hold the line against reform and pushed other East European nations closer to the Soviet alliance in the event that consolidation for military intervention was needed.⁶ This unified front within the Pact allowed the Soviets to appear prepared to act in the event that the Pact alliance was disrupted by a national Polish transportation strike or the country's deterioration into violence and/or anarchy. Again, placing blame on Western subversion served as the rationale for cutting off contact with Polish ideas and events.

This consolidation of the Warsaw Pact with regard to Poland was consistent with all accepted tenets of the "Brezhnev Doctrine." This doctrine of relations among East European socialist nations emerged following the Soviet led Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. It was formulated through several media and policy statements following the 1968 invasion and occupation. The following are statements from a Brezhnev speech at (ironically) the 5th Congress of the PUWP on 12 November 1968:

Socialist states stand for strict respect for the sovereignty of all countries. We resolutely oppose interference in the affairs of any states and the violation of their sovereignty . . . (but) when external and internal forces hostile so socialism try to turn the development of a given socialist country in the direction of the restoration of the capitalist system, when a threat arises to the cause of socialism in

that country . . . this is no longer merely a problem for that country's people, but a common problem, the concern of all socialist countries.⁷

In addition, Bloc supremacy over national sovereignty can be traced to the following excerpt from the letter sent to Prague on 15 July 1968, signed by the leaders of five Pact countries:

The undermining of a Communist Party's directive role leads to elimination of socialist democracy and the socialist system. That creates a threat to the foundations of our alliance and the security of our countries' community.⁸

The Brezhnev Doctrine serves as the source of such warnings as the one sent by the Warsaw Pact Emergency Summit of 5 December 1980 in the form of a communique. After stating confidence in Poland's ability to solve its own problems, the Pact leaders asserted, ". . . Poland had been, is and will remain a socialist state, a firm link in the general family of the lands of socialism."⁹ Such statements made it clear that Polish governmental power would not pass into non-communist hands and reminded the Poles of their place in, and responsibilities to, the Warsaw Pact. Whether or not other Bloc leaders agreed that Poland should or could solve its own problems became relatively unimportant as the Soviets reasserted their ultimate control of the alliance.

The period from the Prague Spring to the mid-1980s was characterized by statements and catch phrases indicative of "Brezhnev Doctrine" philosophy. For example, Eastern Europe was said to exist in the realm of the "limited sovereignty" of "socialist internationalism" which was to be enforced by "fraternal assistance."¹⁰ These terms tended to be defined by the Soviets on a situational basis to justify the means being employed at the time. These policies were usually said to preserve the "historic gains of socialism." Given this background, it did not prove difficult for the Soviets to hang a persistent threat of military intervention over Poland simply by recreating the rhetoric and policies that preceded the Czech invasion in 1968.

The Soviets have pushed ideological unity throughout the post-war period. Only during Khrushchev's tenure and his "separate roads to socialism" were doctrinal variations permitted. During the 1970s the Brezhnev regime oversaw a growing emphasis on ideological consolidation and orthodoxy. As a result of the Czech invasion and the growing importance of Detente era Western contacts, ideological socialization was dramatically expanded.¹¹ The political and economic crisis in Poland demonstrated the rejection of this increased Sovietization.

Soviet reactions became distinctly more hard line and intolerant as Kania's government continued to negotiate with and concede to Solidarity in November and December of 1980. On November 10, high level meetings took place at the Soviet embassy in Warsaw between Polish and Soviet officials. Despite Soviet demands to reject legal registration of Solidarity the Polish Supreme Court decided to legalize the independent union just

hours after the meeting.¹² Then Politburo member and Party Secretary Konstantin Chernenko immediately condemned Kania's "capitulation" stating that Solidarity was incompatible with the Polish system of government and must be subjugated.¹³ "Capitulation" is a negative term for conceding or buckling under on an ideological issue. Allowing the legalization of Solidarity may very well have been the beginning of the end for Kania. Unlike Gierek whose fateful move was in conflict with the demands of the Polish people, Kania opposed the desires of his Soviet Allies.

Kania, however, was also trying to demonstrate his own strong-arm tactics by raiding Solidarity headquarters to confiscate documents and make arrests. Many of those taken into custody were soon quietly released. Military intervention became an increasing concern through the second week in December. Soviet and Pact troops massed on the borders and set up communication and supply posts as Walesa and other Solidarity leaders began to caution strikers about possible military actions they might incur.¹⁴

Sidney Ploss outlined four general options for the Soviet course of action at this and subsequent critical points in the Polish crisis. They are the following:

1. A little or no action option accompanied by verbal condemnation and criticism. This could result in a loss of control and influence throughout Eastern Europe and lead to discontent in other Bloc nations.

2. Demonstrate military force on the borders and put the PUWP under intense pressure to resist reform and hold to hard line.
3. Demonstrate military force on the borders and induce the Polish government to crack down on reformists and "normalize" the situation. (This option will eventually be the one of choice in December 1981.)
4. Use direct military intervention as in 1956 and 1968 to crush opposition forces and place pro-Moscow hard-liners in leadership positions.¹⁵

Each option has its own risks. However options 3 and 4 appear especially ominous as they contain the possibility of inciting anarchy or civil war which could lead to heavy casualties and Soviet occupation. In December of 1980, the Soviets chose option 2 and avoid the risks of military involvement or the duplication of the quagmire in Afghanistan. However the voices of intolerance and orthodoxy continued to gain strength throughout the months to follow.

The events of February 1981 solidified the path down which Solidarity was to travel. As Brezhnev reasserted the Brezhnev Doctrine at a CPSU Congress he treated the situation in Poland as an attack on all Bloc "socialist gains."¹⁶ At the same time the Eighth PUWP Congress, under pressure from the Soviet supported hard liners, failed to produce any substantive plans for reform in any political, social, or economic spheres. Vladimir Wozniuk posits that, had the Soviets permitted gradual reform to

emerge from this Congress, there might have been a chance of avoiding the eventual crack down.¹⁷

3

The Road To Martial Law

On 9 February 1981 Polish Defense Minister General Jaruzelski ascended to the premiership as social tensions continued to grow. Obviously this appointment of a traditionally hard-line general served to appease some Soviet fears. By March the Polish economy was experiencing chronic shortages of raw materials, spare parts, and foodstuffs as both worker and farmer productivity decreased.¹ At the same time Moscow kept the pressure on by expanding and extending military maneuvers around Poland. On March 3 and 4 Kania and Jaruzelski led the Polish delegation to high level talks in Moscow. Le Figaro reported that the Polish leadership was expressly informed that their policies and concessions were completely unacceptable.² The Kremlin's ability to intervene reinforced the notion of "limited sovereignty" and drove the point home.

The Soviet policy of encouraging Polish hard-liners continued in earnest. Stanislaw Kociolek, installed as the new First Secretary of the Warsaw Communist Party, repaid the Kremlin for its support by condemning all strikes as political in nature.³ The New York Times, 14 April 1981, reported that only through a direct call by Brezhnev to Kania during a recess of the March 29-30 PUWP Central Committee Plenum were

Party Secretaries Tadeusz Grabski and Sefan Olszowski, both hard-line traditionalists, not ousted from power.⁴ Thus the evidence suggests that Kremlin anxiety regarding the Polish crisis had resulted in almost direct Soviet control of Polish Party-State affairs.

By placing the Polish government over a barrel, the Soviets effectively created an atmosphere of tension involving all of Poland's principle actors. Moscow was trying to prevent further concessions by the Polish state. In early 1981 the Polish government was avoiding the issues of Rural Solidarity's recognition, the reduction of the work week's total hours, the elimination of Saturday from the work week, and greater Solidarity access to the media. As summer approached Kania was negotiating all of these points and showing signs of conceding. In fact, the Polish media and Solidarity publications were becoming increasingly pointed in their criticisms of many Soviet taboo subjects in political and social, as well as, economic arenas. However, some aspects of the Soviet policy intentions were effectual. For instance, Solidarity was growing factionalized and defiant. By July, some trade groups were defying Walesa's advice to refrain from striking.⁵ This created the lack of a unified opposition the communists so desired and the out of control feeling they most feared. This lack of control would later contribute to the end of the early 1980s reform period.

On 5 June 1981 a pointed and threatening letter from the CPSU to the PUWP summed up the Soviet view of the situation in Poland (see Appendix 2). The letter expressly attacked the leadership and policies of Kania and Jaruzelski. Furthermore it warned the Polish leadership of the fate

awaiting sympathizers of the reform. The letter so resembled one sent to Czechoslovak leaders in 1968 that the Polish leadership could not ignore it.⁶ This type of correspondence illustrated that the Brezhnev Doctrine remained the rule of order in Moscow. As expected, Kania, Jaruzelski, and other moderates retreated slightly to allow conservatives a greater voice.⁷

July, however, brought Polish moderates back in force as the Party attempted limited democratization at its Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress. A new Central Committee consisting of 20% Solidarity members and only 8.5% Party professionals emerged from the Congress.⁸ After becoming increasingly ostracized, Kania was replaced as First Secretary of the PUWP on 18 October 1981 by General Jaruzelski. Jaruzelski continued much of Kania's course while emphasizing order and control in Polish society. He seemed to earnestly seek reconciliation between Poland's citizens and the regime. Jaruzelski, much to the dismay of the Soviets, pursued talks with both the Church and Solidarity in search of ways to resolve the situation.

Solidarity called its own two-part congress in September and October. Sidney Ploss summarized the major Solidarity demands which emerged from these congresses as follows:

- free national and local elections
- public control of mass media
- economic reform through authentic self-management
- elimination of the Party's right to make appointments
- Westernization of the legal system.⁹

These demands, accompanied by an expression of support for those working for the establishment of free trade unions in other Bloc countries, were characterized by the Pact as an overt threat to socialist systems throughout Eastern Europe. Undoubtedly even the moderate communist leaders of the region were shocked and outraged by these statements. Following the second session of the Solidarity Congress the movement's leaders stated their intention to uphold Poland's responsibilities to its Pact allies, but this seems to have been too little, too late.

Several days after the issuance of Solidarity's demands a "Statement of the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Government" was delivered to Kania and Jaruzelski. Summaries of the text were carried by Warsaw Radio and Pravda. The letter called for the elimination of any public or Solidarity access to the media, the disbanding of Solidarity, and the end of "anti-Soviet" activities.¹⁰ The letter, once again, made it clear that the Soviets were prepared to actively intervene via the Warsaw Pact if communist control in Poland was not reasserted.

On 13 December 1981 General Jaruzelski's communist government declared a state of emergency in Poland and invoked martial law. The majority of liberal reforms gained during the previous seventeen months were abolished. Solidarity, as a legal institution, was crushed. Its founders, leaders, and sympathizers found themselves imprisoned. Prior to the martial law declaration Solidarity had taken on an increasingly demanding and confrontational tone. However, it is commonly acknowledged that preparation for the crackdown must have been ongoing

for several weeks. U.S. President Ronald Reagan, on 23 December 1981, stated that intelligence sources indicated that the martial law declaration had been written in Moscow in September.¹¹ In any case outside forces greatly influenced the decision to halt reforms.

It is important to note that conservative communist throughout the Bloc played a role in pushing for a crackdown. Their official and media statements were highly critical of the Polish reforms. By mid-1981 most moderate Bloc leaders had ceased to assert Poland's sovereign right to solve its own problem. Anxiety regarding the possible spread of unrest pushed the Bloc communists toward the Soviets' anti-reform stance.

From a Soviet standpoint, the martial law option appeared to be an excellent choice. Direct military intervention seems to have been only a last ditch option, to be used in the event that the imposition of martial law had failed. Direct intervention would have greatly damaged Moscow's Western agenda and destroyed ties with Western communists. In addition, there was a risk that Poles would resist a Soviet invasion and transform the situation into a high casualty operation.¹² This was especially unattractive given the Soviet involvement in Afghanistan. Finally, a massive invasion of Poland could have unified the NATO countries and enabled Reagan to lead them into a relatively severe diplomatic and economic reaction. Ironically, delivering a speech at a Kremlin dinner in honor of a Jaruzelski-led Polish delegation on 1 March 1982, Brezhnev claimed that the martial law imposition was a "national decision taken by our Polish friends."¹³

Given the Polish history of unrest and the regime's lack of legitimacy, a mass movement in support of governmental and societal change may have been inevitable. In 1980-81, however, the prevailing international and intra-Bloc relationships did not permit such demands to be realized. Kremlin philosophy continued to operate on the basis of the Brezhnev Doctrine whereby the internal developments of East European nations are subject to evaluation and approval from Moscow. In addition, Solidarity, or the Polish populous as a whole, seems to have underestimated the communist's power to subjugate the movement. As a result, the Polish reform experiment of 1980-1981 came to a close, driving its leadership and ideology underground.

4

The Changing Face of the 1980s

The execution of the martial law dictates appeared, from the Soviet vantage point, to be extremely successful. Solidarity was outlawed and disbanded and political and social reforms were greatly turned back. Although the opposition's direct access to the media came to an end, relative to other communist-state bureaucracies the Polish media remained fairly open and trustworthy. Perhaps most significantly, these measures were accomplished with almost no violent confrontation or casualties. "Solidarity," however, remained within the consciousness of the Polish people. In the years following the crackdown it came to symbolize the freedom and hope of the Polish struggle. The imposition of martial law

by the Polish army enhanced the Polish populace's disillusionment with their governmental institutions. They were shocked that the armed forces allowed itself to be used against its own people. The martial law declaration confirmed the Polish Communist-state's reliance on military force, rather than public legitimacy, as the determinant for governing power.

Martial law produced relative political stability on a short term basis. Jaruzelski moved quickly to normalize Polish society, even releasing Lech Walesa and other Solidarity leaders as early as 1982. However, the prevailing conservative atmosphere refused to allow progress toward reform within the economic structures. Since the economic situation did not improve and political stability was maintained by force or the threat of it, a majority of the integral elements leading to recurrent Polish unrest remained unaddressed. Economic reform became virtually non-existent in the first years following martial law. Poland experienced a decrease in the standard of living and was unable to create enough wealth to maintain already inadequate levels of societal infrastructures such as education, water, electricity, and other public services.¹

Once again, Poles turned to the Church as the only legitimized structure in their society. They looked to Church leaders and priests to protect the Polish nation and culture.² In addition, the Church's role as an ongoing link to the West was perpetuated by the Polish Pope's continued presence and outspoken support in the Vatican. Throughout the "normalization" period, Catholic priests developed a reputation as the only individuals able to speak frankly about the regime. Jozef Cardinal Glemp,

Roman Catholic Primate of Poland, walked the fine line between defiance and acceptance. The 1984 murder of Father Jerzy Popieluszko by Polish security forces, however, further drove the Polish people toward the church and the Polish clergy toward links with underground Solidarity activists.³

In addition to the ever-increasing ties between Solidarity activists and the Church, the 1980s witnessed growing ties between the activists and Polish intellectuals as well.⁴ Throughout Eastern Europe, and especially in Poland, intellectuals and professionals have traditionally been grossly underpaid and de-emphasized by official Soviet-style economic doctrine. In fact, Polish intellectuals experienced a disproportionate fall in their standard of living as a result of a rising cost of living which remained unmet by increases in their regulated salaries.⁵ Furthermore, as the highly educated sector of Polish society, intellectuals stood to benefit from the liberalizations called for and achieved by Solidarity prior to the crackdown.

The single most important factor in the evolving face of Polish-Soviet relations was Gorbachev's ascension to power. Almost immediately he began to set a new tone for Kremlin leadership. For the first time in the post-war period sweeping economic and political reforms were being led by Moscow. Gorbachev openly acknowledged the inadequacies and shortages which have characterized communist economic and political systems. It became increasingly clear that the hard-line conservatives in Eastern Europe were out of step with the growing reformism in the USSR. Czech dissident Jiri Dienstbier characterizes this phenomenon by referring to the aged and stagnant East European leaders as "Brezhnev's orphans."⁶

In addition to domestic economic and political reforms, Gorbachev renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine and called on the East European Communist Parties to pursue reformist paths of their own.

Popular negative perceptions of the communist-led governments throughout the region rose as cracks in the wall of censorship and repression began to surface. Housing shortages and poor construction quality, inadequate water, electric, telephone, and other public services, growing urbanization, and their governments' lack of effective plans to confront these problems all contributed to citizenry dissatisfaction. A growing environmental crisis and a younger generation which grew up with unmet expectations and exposure to Western culture solidified the perception that change must be affected. As in the pre-crisis era of late 1970s Poland, long-standing political and social issues seem to be waxing in importance at precisely the same time.

Gorbachev continued to push out the old guard within the USSR. By example, he placed indirect pressure on Eastern Europe to do the same. In addition, he strongly criticized the policies of hard-liners in all areas, both domestic and international. Although spoken in reference to Soviet conservatives, his words, "Restructuring and reform demand new men," echoed throughout Eastern Europe.⁷ Reconfirming the changing relationship of Soviet-East European relations, the Soviet Union signed the East-West Stockholm Agreement on 19 September 1986. Article 15 of this document, expressly aimed at intra-Warsaw Pact relations, states the following:

(The signatories) will abide by their commitment to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations with any state, regardless of that state's political, social, economic or cultural system and *irrespective of whether or not they maintain with that state relations of alliance* (emphasis added).⁸

Clearly, Soviet rhetoric and expressed policy toward Eastern Europe had changed under the Gorbachev leadership. The sincerity of those policies, however, can only be confirmed if put to the test. During the late 1980s Poland became that test, continuing to challenge the extent to which Moscow was willing to relinquish control in Eastern Europe.

The catalyst for change within Poland was once again affected by Solidarity. Driven underground, but not destroyed, by martial law, Solidarity activists and demands became increasingly republicized. As Gorbachev consolidated his power in the USSR, Jaruzelski openly expressed his support for the Soviet leader's ideas for reform in an attempt to create publicized PUWP support for communist-led reform. The Solidarity members' commitment to its ideals and the underground's growing ties with other sectors of Polish society allowed it to first survive and then flourish throughout the normalization period. The fact that Solidarity's leaders were able to keep the 1980-81 activities non-violent demonstrated one aspect of the membership's devotion and the leadership's ideological control.⁹

Although technically an independent trade union in 1981, Solidarity took on social and political implications from the beginning. This is best

expressed by in the organization's own words from its platform of late 1981. The following statement demonstrates Solidarity's acknowledgement that it was not a mere economically based labor organization. "What we had in mind were not only bread, butter, and sausage, but also justice, democracy, truth, legality, human dignity, freedom of convictions and the repair of the republic."¹⁰ Given this foundation and the growing openness touted by Gorbachev and endorsed by Jaruzelski, it is not surprising that Solidarity re-emerged as a movement of social, political, and economic scope. The surprise came as Solidarity emerged from seven years in the underground to directly challenge the PUWP for power.

5

Solidarity's Re-emergence

Jaruzelski's support for Moscow's calls for reform began to be tested in 1987 and 1988. As limitations on speech, public gathering, and protesting were gradually loosened in Poland, ex-Solidarity leaders, intellectuals, and youth organizations moved their grievances from the alternative press into a more public forum. More importantly, worker unrest became a perpetually growing phenomenon. Run away inflation and rapid pay increases threw the economy into an inflationary spiral. Solidarity signs and symbols, as well as those of other newly founded and more radical organizations appeared with growing frequency.

In an attempt to demonstrate a Polish version of Gorbachev's glasnost, restrictions on the public dialogue regarding social and economic issues were curtailed. In fact, on 30 November 1988 Lech Walesa appeared on a live televised prime-time debate with Alfred Miodowicz, the government's head of the All-Poland Trade Union Alliance and a member of the Politburo. Walesa clearly implied that the former Soviet leadership was to blame for the imposition of martial law and the crushing of Polish reforms in 1981. He stated the following:

In 1980-81, external conditions did not allow the reforms Solidarity wanted. As I said once, Brezhnev lived two years too long. (Brezhnev died in 1982.) Now those opportunities exist, but we are not taking advantage of them. Instead, we are trying to save the Stalinist model.¹

With their increased exposure, opposition leaders continued to push for the return of Solidarity's legalized status. Although the government engaged in dialogue regarding political, social, and economic issues during 1988, only after Jaruzelski committed to serious round-table discussions, do these negotiations produce significant results.

Jaruzelski and Prime Minister Rakowski pushed the Communist Party and Parliament to agree to engage in talks designed to lead to some type of legalization for Solidarity. Rakowski informed other Party leaders that the "risks" of relegalizing Solidarity were necessary if Poland was to emerge from its crisis state.² There were reports in Polish and Western media that

Jaruzelski threatened to resign if the Party rejected negotiations with opposition leaders. As a result of Gorbachev's more open leadership, Polish Communist moderates were now able to express their belief that Poland needed the support of its people to rebuild the economy after years of abuse.

Walesa, although conscious of his limitations, refused to take on a conciliatory tone toward the Communist government. On February 6, in his speech addressing the opening session of round table negotiations, Walesa attacked Poland's governmental structure and its inability to manage the economy. Walesa remarked,

We know it - the country is ruined . . . but it wasn't some elves who ruined it, but a system of exercising authority that detaches citizens from their rights and wastes the fruits of their labor.³

Even in this atmosphere of ongoing negotiation, economic factors were forcing workers toward unrest. On 8 February 1989, two days into the round table negotiations, a government spokesman confirmed that 173 pay disputes and 39 strikes were ongoing.⁴

As a clear sign of Polish frustrations, these small protests and isolated strikes were becoming increasingly violent. Clashes between security police and strikers and/or protesters grew more frequent. This violence, however, most often occurred during non-Solidarity organized activities. Younger, more militant groups such as the "Federation of Fighting Youth," "Confederation for Free Poland," and "Independent

Students Union" provoked security police and denounced Solidarity's willingness to negotiate with the Communists. As a result of this recurrent striking and unrest, Jaruzelski, in a speech to military and security personnel on 27 February 1989, made it clear he would once again use military force to ensure stability in Poland.⁵

Throughout these Polish developments Moscow remained supportive and encouraging, calling on the PUWP to lead the country toward economic recovery and greater political freedoms. Early March 1989, witnessed the printing of an interview with Lech Walesa in the Soviet weekly publication New Times. Walesa was cautious in his responses, concentrating on Solidarity's desire to work with the PUWP for the betterment of Poland.⁶ Walesa had experienced a remarkable recovery within the Soviet media from his 1981 status as one of the "provocateurs" and "hirelings of Washington," to his 1989 characterization as a "man of principle."⁷ Through this forthright and historically open coverage of Polish events and opposition leaders, it was clear that the Soviet leadership supported the path Jaruzelski was pursuing.

Following five weeks of ongoing negotiations, the government announced in early March 1989 that an agreement had been reached on democratic reforms within the government and the restoration of Solidarity's legal status. The deal called for the resurrection of Poland's upper house of Parliament, or Senate, to be made up of freely elected representatives. Furthermore, 35% of the seats in the lower house of Parliament were to be opened up to free and open elections. The remainder were to be retained by the Communists and their allied parties.

In exchange for these reforms, Solidarity accepted the creation of a presidential position of broad powers of domestic and foreign security. In addition, the president retained the right to dissolve the Parliament. The position was to carry a six-year term with the option of election to one additional term.

It is clear that the intention to elect Jaruzelski to the presidency remained ever-present throughout negotiations of the agreement. This pacified Polish hard-liners and other communist leaders throughout the Warsaw Pact. Furthermore, by retaining control of 65% of the lower house, the communists never imagined that they would lose power following the elections. Thus, the agreement was originally designed to give Solidarity a strong voice in government and force it to take on some responsibility for Poland's problems while retaining the ultimate control of the PUWP. Bronislaw Geremek, senior Solidarity negotiator, characterized the atmosphere surrounding the agreements by stating, "A process has begun under which democracy is to be rebuilt in an evolutionary manner, not upsetting the political balance or stability."⁸

One month later, 5 April 1989, the pact was signed and its scope became clearer. In addition to electoral and governmental restructuring, the agreement authorized a legal opposition media. There were to be daily newspapers and weekly television and radio programs reserved for opposition's views. In addition, general reform goals were mapped out in the areas of agriculture, health care, and environmental clean up. The formation of other legal, non-communist groups was also spelled out. Furthermore, the government announced that it had reached an agreement

with the Church by which legal status would be granted the Polish Catholic Church for the first time in communist history.

At least on paper, the round table pact established planned reforms to affect all aspects of Polish life. Noticeably absent, however, were substantive steps to improve the economy. These issues were put off until the establishment of Solidarity as a participant in government. Despite the fact that the PUWP had every intention of retaining government control, it would need the support and involvement of Solidarity to aid in gaining public acceptance of the painful steps toward economic recovery.

If Poland's government is to move toward economic reform, it must first attain some level of legitimacy and/or support from the populous. If every step is met with striking and unrest the Polish economy will never expand. Wałesa and other Solidarity leaders continued attempts to gain public confidence while, at the same time, retaining Kremlin support by attempting to establish and maintain a sense of controlled, gradual change (in contrast to the unrestrained reform momentum of 1980-81). Wałesa's saying, "the safe road is the evolutionary road," characterized the opposition's new, less revolutionary approach to reform.⁹ Detailed Soviet media coverage of the round table agreements indicated their interest and support for Polish reform. Despite the fact that Polish reforms began to far outstrip those within the USSR, the entire spectrum of Soviet media continued to encourage and accurately report the changes within Polish society.

Despite the fact that the Polish Communists pushed for June elections rather than give Solidarity until the fall to organize, the PUWP suffered the

most resounding defeat in communist history. The Solidarity movement did not experience any splintering, producing unified support for all of its candidates. Opposition candidates won 99 of the 100 available seats in the newly created Senate and virtually all of the contested seats in the lower house. The message from the Polish populous to the PUWP was clear; pure dissatisfaction had produced a mandate for change. Such a complete rejection of a power-holding communist party had never been experienced before. The future of Poland's leadership was thrown into uncertainty.

In an attempt to organize the new government, General Jaruzelski was formally elected to the office of the presidency on July 19 by a joint session of the Polish Sejm (the lower house) and the new Senate. The opposition made it clear that they would not serve in a rubber-stamp legislature. Following extensive debate, Jaruzelski was elected by a vote of 270 to 233 with 34 abstentions.¹⁰ Never before had so great a legislative fraction publicly voted against the advancement of a communist leader. When he assumed the presidency Jaruzelski remained First Secretary of the PUWP. However, he quickly relinquished this position and officially separated the leadership of the Party from the leadership of the state.

Under the leadership of former Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski, who took over following Jaruzelski's resignation, the PUWP continued to make uncalculated political mistakes in the weeks of disarray which followed the election. Rakowski named General Czeslaw Kiszczak as Poland's next Prime Minister. This position, however, is subject to the approval of the Parliament. Walesa led the attack on Kiszczak in order to halt his confirmation as Prime Minister. The choice of General Kiszczak

proved to be unwise given his close association to the military's execution of martial law. The opposition took advantage of this perception with masterful skill. Parliament rejected General Kiszczak's appointment to the position thus becoming the first legislature in the Bloc to refuse such a nomination.

After rejecting PUWP offers to join a grand coalition government, Solidarity began courting the small parties allied to the communists. Since the communists had offered Solidarity none of the most powerful cabinet posts in the Coalition, it was a simple matter for Solidarity's leadership to justify refusing to form a government under the PUWP's conditions. The nomination and subsequent rejection of General Kiszczak, however, gave Solidarity the issue it needed to pry the United Peasant's Party loose from its alliance with the PUWP. The Democratic Party followed the United Peasant's lead and jumped ship to join Solidarity. Suddenly Solidarity had control of the necessary votes to elect a Prime Minister from among its ranks. Given the resounding defeat suffered by the communists, it was understandable that its allies would desert to the other political camp. However, given the context, it was a bold step. Poland had definitely tested the lengths of Soviet tolerance for reform and independence.

Solidarity leader and editor of its weekly newspaper, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, was elected Prime Minister by the National Assembly. Immediately, Mazowiecki began to form his cabinet. In order to pacify both Moscow's anxiety and the PUWP, the Ministries of Defense and Interior were earmarked for communist control. This was an attempt to assure both domestic and Bloc communists that Poland's military and

police establishment would not be dismantled or significantly tampered with.¹¹ Mazowiecki's cabinet emerged in the following manner:

- 11- members from Solidarity
- 1- Independent-Solidarity Sympathizer (Foreign Ministry)
- 4- Communist - PUWP
- 4- Peasant Party
- 3- Democratic Party.¹²

During their confirmation hearings, cabinet members pledged themselves to return Poland to a market-based economy, the privatization of government monopolies, and the search for war reparations from the Soviets.¹³ In addition, members from all parties continued to warn Poles that inflation and unemployment would worsen before they improved. Prime Minister Mazowiecki appealed to the West for aid and advice even as he reaffirmed Poland's commitment to its Warsaw Pact responsibilities.¹⁴ In the end, Mazowiecki's cabinet was confirmed by a large majority of the National Assembly as communist floor leader Marian Orzechowski called on his party to support the cabinet appointees.

Once the new government was established, Polish officials turned to the country's dire economic situation. The economic crisis forced the government to take immediate steps toward reducing subsidies, encouraging private investment, and closing and or scaling down unprofitable enterprises. Polish Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz, Poland's "architect of economic policy" assured Polish officials and citizens

alike that the government was prepared to pursue these painful policies.¹⁵ The nation's food system was the first to experience restructuring to incorporate market forces. In past years wage increases greatly outstripped food price hikes. Consequently food markets were greatly destabilized.¹⁶ Demand increased without a corresponding growth in the amount of product as private sector Polish agriculture became less profitable. By releasing the food system to market forces the government hoped to alleviate shortages in production and profitability problems.

The United Peasants Party strongly supported the switch to market based economic forces within the agricultural sector because it created monetary incentives for producers. The All-Poland Trade Union Alliance, however, remained opposed unless a wage indexing law was also put into effect.¹⁷ The Sejm passed such a law providing for quarterly wage hikes of 80% of the price increase index. The new food structure system went into effect in August of 1989. Producers withheld their product for weeks prior to market value increases causing further shortages and longer lines. Initially prices shot up at an extraordinary rate. For example, in one week sugar rose 42%, butter 77%, flour 100%, and ham 277%.¹⁸ In the weeks that followed prices tended toward stability and, in some cases, slightly decreased.

Jeffrey Sachs, professor of economics at Harvard University and advisor to Solidarity, stated that such realistic market pricing must also occur for gas, fertilizers, and rent if the governmental budget is to be balanced.¹⁹ Sachs warns, "it's not impossible to imagine chaos in Poland leading to some form of Soviet intervention, which could risk the entire

Gorbachev experiment throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe."²⁰ Professor Sachs made these points in arguments for large scale Western assistance for Poland. Nevertheless, his point is well taken. Poland has only begun its path toward a market economy and possible prosperity. The worst and most painful steps lie ahead. Some Polish government officials estimate that fully one-third of Polish workers will lose or change jobs as a result of upcoming economic reforms.²¹

Solidarity is banking on its political legitimacy, gained through free elections and substantive plans for reform, to encourage patience and short-term sacrifice within the Polish citizenry. The fact that these price hikes are being led by a government of democratically elected origins may aid Poland in avoiding the unrest brought on by Communist led price increases in 1956, 1970, 1976, 1980 and 1987. If the reaction to the food product inflation of August, 1989 is any indication, Poles appear, at least for now, to being willing to cooperate with and trust their new government.

J. F. Brown asserts that aside from political and economic reforms, Eastern European countries must change the nature of their relationship to the Soviet Union in order to gain significant legitimacy levels.²² The new leadership in Poland seems to be aware of the importance of establishing distance between itself and the Kremlin. Despite Gorbachev's popularity and dynamic leadership, Poles want a government that calls its own shots, rather than one that falls in line behind Moscow's lead.

Both Solidarity and the Polish communists have been quick to point out the boldness and history making quality of Polish reform. Polish

Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski (Solidarity), in his first major policy statement given at the U.N. General Assembly, stated that Poland "has no intention of destabilizing the existing international order," however he also asserted that "spheres of security can never mean spheres of influence."²³ Foreign Minister Skubiszewski further assured his Pact allies that Poland would adhere to "existing treaties," however, "such respect does not impose any limitation regarding the choice and change of the system of government."²⁴ Clearly, the Polish government has attempted to establish its sovereignty in both domestic and foreign affairs. Skubiszewski attempted to place Poland not only at the forefront of reform within the Bloc, but also as a leader in Europe as well. He stated, "We (Poland) shall contribute to the re-creation of a united Europe in which Poland should have her place."²⁵

The present Polish leadership must operate entirely in uncharted political and economic territory. As Lech Walesa stated, "Nobody has previously taken the road that leads from socialism to capitalism . . . We have Western nations as an economic and political model."²⁶ The West may serve as an eventual model, but it offers few answers as to how to execute the transformation. In addition, the question of how deeply the Soviets are willing to allow Western influence to run remains to be answered. As a result of the dismal state of the Soviet economy, Poland has only the West to turn to for large sums of additional aid and investment.

This loss of some dependence on the USSR can only result in further Polish independence from Soviet dominance. Tens-of-thousands of Polish

bureaucrats owe their positions to the Party, as do the vast majority economic managerial job holders. These people may become anxious and uncooperative if reform penetrates too deeply into Polish state structure. For now, Solidarity leaders have assured Party bureaucrats that they will not purge them from the government. However, moves toward a market economy and the elimination of party privileges will undoubtedly threaten thousands of party bureaucrat positions within Polish society. One 1981 Solidarity demand which broke Soviet taboos regarding the nomenclature system was the call for open, "competitive appointment procedures."²⁷ Gorbachev too, has placed the party's control of appointments to important posts out of the reach of perestroika. The maintenance of the nomenklatura system in Poland perpetuates the exclusion of groups such as the intellectuals and young people from the bureaucratic and administrative positions.

As Polish reforms surpass the scope of those proposed in the Soviet Union, evidence of a growing Soviet anxiety emerged. In the months preceding the June elections Soviet media treated Solidarity leaders with encouragement and support, often praising their efforts to work in conjunction with the PUWP. This was in sharp contrast to the negative coverage they received during the 1980-1981 crisis. However, with the crushing defeat of the PUWP some discord appears to have surfaced within Soviet coverage and reactions to Polish developments. Both Pravda and Izvestia reported the election results with accurate and frank statements; however, praise for past PUWP accomplishments, work for "one Poland," and commitment to reform was extensive.²⁸

The Izvestia coverage by L. Toporkov reported that the PUWP had "suffered a defeat unprecedented in the 45 year history of people's Poland," however, he went on to say that the election results were an "injustice" because the PUWP had shown a willingness to institute reform.²⁹ These remarks were consistent with opinions stated in a January 1989 article praising Polish reforms and dialogue. The column characterized Poland as "entering a quantitatively new stage of the renewal of its political system. Thanks to the bold steps it is taking the Party again commands authority and trust."³⁰ Before and after the election, the Soviets refused to acknowledge the failure of the Polish communist party. There was no evidence to suggest that the PUWP possessed any degree of public support, confidence, or legitimacy for at least 15 years prior to the election. Yet Moscow, even in a period of openness and reliability within the media, refused to acknowledge this fact.

Izvestia went so far as to suggest a number of causes for the PUWP's defeat in order to avoid the Polish people's lack of attachment to or trust in the Party. Reasons such as the opposition's campaign style, rhetoric, emotional appeal, and attacks on past communist regimes were cited as was the PUWP's inexperience in a competitive electoral setting.³¹ The article asserted that the election results would paralyze the Polish government and render it unable to execute progressive reforms. In addition, Izvestia launched a scathing attack on Solidarity for refusing to join Jaruzelski's proposed coalition government.³² The latter point was made prior to Solidarity's formation of a non-communist government. The

feeling in the Kremlin appears to have been one of fearful apprehension regarding the destabilizing effects of Solidarity's pursuit of power.

During the period of Solidarity's negotiations with the United Peasants Party and the Democratic Party a spokesman for the Soviet Foreign Ministry admitted that the Kremlin leadership was "very concerned" about the Polish situation.³³ He added, "we do not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of that country."³⁴ Soviet editorials from this period repeatedly imply that a Solidarity government could destabilize the Bloc and all of Europe.³⁵ Although careful to clarify that the formation of a government was an internal Polish affair, both Pravda and the Soviet Foreign Ministry accused Solidarity of complicating the Polish situation with political moves in pursuit of governmental power.³⁶ Moscow's unqualified praise and support of Polish reform was interrupted as Solidarity approached governmental control. In addition, the Soviets never conceded that the Polish people's rejection of the PUWP was understandable given the state of Polish affairs and historical events. Poles have never taken up the flag of communist revolution on a massive scale. The 1989 election was the first opportunity they were given to express their political frustrations.

It seems highly unlikely that Jaruzelski would have given support to a Solidarity-led government without having had some type of approval from Moscow. The least that can be said, given the relatively low levels of anti-Solidarity rhetoric in Soviet media and government statements, is that Gorbachev did not attempt to block the non-communist government

ascension to power. Very likely he gave explicit consent for such an arrangement after Solidarity gained Parliamentary control.

In terms of a strict definition, the Brezhnev Doctrine can be said to be dead. This is not to say that Soviet military or political intervention will never re-occur. It is to say that the term "Brezhnev Doctrine" carried with it a level of expectation as to what was permissible within the Bloc. The reforms and structural changes now taking place in Poland, as well as elsewhere in the Bloc, most definitely fall far outside anything that would have been acceptable during the Brezhnev era. This period of Soviet leadership was characterized by the Kremlin's struggle to maintain Soviet hegemony in Eastern Europe. Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze summed up the Kremlin's new attitude toward its Bloc allies in remarks regarding Poland. In an address to the U. N. General Assembly he stated the following:

It is no secret that we were not enthusiastic about the election setback of the Polish Communists. Nor should it be a secret that we hope that they can overcome the crisis. Nevertheless we see nothing threatening in the fact that in accordance with the will of the Polish people a coalition government has been formed . . . We are in no way prejudiced against that government. We wish it every success and are ready to cooperate with it most actively. Tolerance is the norm of civilized behavior.³⁷

Following an initial period of uncertainty, Moscow again attempted to present unified support for Polish reforms.

Two phrases in Mr. Shevardnadze's speech stand out as worthy of examination. The first is his assertion that Moscow was not threatened by Polish events. It seems clear, from both media and governmental statements, that this was not initially the case. As a result of the innovative character of the new policy toward reform in Eastern Europe, traditional anxieties and ideas appear to have surfaced in the confusion following the PUWP's crushing defeat. The second phrase of note is "Tolerance is the norm of civilized behavior." The choice of the word tolerance may be important. "Tolerance" rather than "cooperation", "coexistence", or "understanding" implies unequal relationship. Tolerating the Polish reforms still carries with it the implication that the Soviets retain the option to stop being tolerant if their patience with Poland expires. Although matters of linguistics or semantics, these details from the U. N. address lend insight into the changing Kremlin's attitudes and the retention of remnants of traditional philosophy.

Given recent developments throughout Eastern Europe it can be said that the Soviets relinquished their claim as the one, true socialist model. Consequently, the CPSU will not serve as the only structural model for East European Communist Parties. The PUWP was forced to reevaluate virtually every aspect of its structures, policies, and membership. The Party, having recently begun to formulate plans for its future, will assuredly emerge in a vastly different role than it has traditionally played. As in the case of the Hungarian communists, it may choose to so

completely reorganize itself that it actually becomes almost unrecognizable as a Bloc communist party. It remains to be seen whether it can gain a significant following among the Polish populace allowing it to survive in the increasingly competitive arena of Polish Politics.

Solidarity, conversely, must effect a level of change and economic prosperity in order to retain its popular support. Change within the Polish political sphere was radical and rapid in 1988 and 1989. Solidarity must transform the inadequacies and inefficiencies within the Polish economy without upsetting the tenuous political situation. Attaining governmental power in Poland is a decidedly mixed blessing; Solidarity has assumed responsibility for Poland's economic performance. It must execute the painful steps toward economic efficiency. It must also avoid raising economic expectations that it cannot meet. Solidarity will be forced to walk a tightrope of drastic economic reform while attempting to maintain public confidence and order.

6

The Gorbachev Era

On 6 July 1989, in the midst of the Polish electoral and governmental confusion, Gorbachev delivered what may be his most important statement regarding Bloc relations. During his Strasbourg address to the 23-nation Council of Europe in Strasbourg, Gorbachev stated the following:

Social and political orders in one country or another changed in the past and may change in the future. But this is the exclusive affair of the people of that country and is their choice. Any interference in the domestic affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of states - friends, allies, and others - are inadmissible.¹

(See Appendix 3)

In light of the reforms in Poland, as well as Hungary and East Germany, Gorbachev's words can not be dismissed as rhetoric aimed solely at Western public opinion. Clearly he stands committed to Eastern European reform and the expansion of political and economic opportunities previously closed to large sectors of communist ruled populations.

By examining Soviet statements over time it is clear that Kremlin policy with regard to Eastern Europe has continued to evolve throughout the decade. As Bloc nations challenge Soviet foreign policy by exerting greater sovereignty, they systematically pursue and destroy previously understood limitations. It is not enough to say that Gorbachev does not subscribe to the Brezhnev Doctrine. One must search Gorbachev's policies for definitions and possible limitations regarding reform. Through examination of his statements and actions, as well as those of other government and media officials, it is clear that Gorbachev's intra-Bloc policy has been defined as much by the East European challenges of reform as by Kremlin decision makers.

In addition to the Polish and Hungarian events during the summer of 1989, the Chinese Communist's crackdown in Tiananmen Square in early

June may have contributed to Gorbachev's strong statements in Strasbourg. He took the opportunity to further distance himself and his country from Soviet totalitarian history. At a time when world opinion was strongly critical of the Chinese events, Gorbachev was able to stand on the side of freedom, unified, at least on the Chinese issue, with the Western leaders.

Finally, it must be noted that the Soviet Union can not afford any increase, or even a continuance of the economic dependency into which Eastern Europe has fallen. Due to the dismal state of the Soviet economy, Moscow has become unwilling and unable to support prices, funnel economic aid, or pay for a large military presence throughout the Bloc. Statements such as those in Strasbourg serve to reassure the West of Moscow's commitment to reform, thus enhancing the possibility of needed economic assistance from the West.

Gorbachev's rhetoric changed over time in several significant ways. Prior to the reforms in Poland and Hungary, Mr. Gorbachev was quick to assert that all Bloc reforms would be conducted under the auspices of each nation's respective communist party. For example, in a 1986 speech to workers in Budapest the Soviet leader stated that economic reforms could only be judged successful in terms of their "strengthening of socialism in all areas, political, economic, spiritual."³ This was interpreted as a clear warning that movement toward a free market economy should only be conducted under the control of the Party-state structures.

In Poland within weeks of the Budapest remarks, Gorbachev praised Jaruzelski's crackdown of December, 1981, asserting that strong action had given the Polish people a victory in the "struggle for the very existence of

socialism in Poland."⁴ East European scholar Hélène Carrère D'Encausse stated that, by the time these remarks were made (June 1986), Moscow considered the Solidarity phenomenon as one relegated to Polish history.⁵ The movement was considered simply a product of Poland's long history of periodic unrest. Thus, as was apparent in governmental and media statements, the Kremlin leadership awarded nearly unqualified support to Jaruzelski and the PUWP. However, speaking at a 1989 meeting with Alfred Miodowicz, Chairman of Poland's official trade unions, Gorbachev made it clear that he favored expanding contacts with all party, union, and popular organizations within Poland.² This sharply contrasted with the traditional policy of maintaining contacts with only the Party and the Party controlled state in Eastern European countries. With the PUWP's loss of complete governmental control, the Soviets were forced to establish channels of international relations with non-communist political actors in Poland.

Within a year of Gorbachev's praise of Jaruzelski, it became clear that Solidarity had not been eliminated. Polish dissident Jacek Kuron, KOR member and advisor to Solidarity, coined the phrase "self-limiting revolution" to describe Solidarity's activism and demands.⁶ In 1981 Solidarity refused to accept limitations imposed by the Kremlin leadership. With the advent of the late 1980s both the external restrictions and Solidarity's organizational structure had changed. Thus a more cautious, experienced, and well advised movement emerged from years in the underground into an international atmosphere more tolerant of dissent, reform, and change.

Finally, the latter half of the 1980s witnessed a much greater emphasis on the issue of a united Europe. As Western Europe grew increasingly integrated, the East appeared more isolated and behind its Western counterpart. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s the voices of Western European countries took on a more independent tone regarding NATO and World affairs. NATO, although remaining US dominated in many respects, came to represent an alliance of politically divergent and sovereign powers. Here too the East lagged behind. Increased Western European ties further instilled the feeling among Eastern Europeans that, culturally, it is the West, not the East, to which they can relate. As Gorbachev released restrictions on Bloc countries encouraging them to pursue more sovereign foreign and domestic policies, it was to the West that they turned. Even Mr. Gorbachev spoke of "a common European home" in which the continent would no longer be grossly divided and pitted against itself.⁷ He further stated, "Europe's historic chance lies in peaceful cooperation between the states of that continent."⁸ He called for dramatically increased contacts and ties that would transform the dynamics of East-West relations by incorporating all of Europe's states rather than limiting significant dialogue to superpower dominated alliances.

Clearly Gorbachev desired both political and economic change in Eastern Europe. Questions remain, however, as to the depth and pace of these permitted transformations. In addition, there exists a concern that the region's volatility could threaten reform by lending an uncontrolled quality to the changes. The Soviets retain a large stake in the

developments throughout Eastern Europe. They have important motives for encouraging reform as well as great risks in its eventual course.

If Eastern Europe can be characterized as volatile, the Soviet republics can be said to be explosive. Violence has been constant in some Soviet republics since 1987 and it shows no signs of abating. The danger for the Kremlin lies in popular understanding of the distinction between the expanding sovereignty of Eastern European nations and the limited autonomy of Soviet Republics. Gorbachev has shown no signs that he is willing to relinquish the Baltic Republics to form their own independent states. Furthermore, ethnic and worker violence in the central and southern republics could be ignited by the political and economic gains of their East European "socialist brothers." If only by example, popular dissent and mass participation movements in other Bloc nations could encourage fledgling opposition organizations within the USSR. Thus there exists some incompatibility of policy among Bloc countries. What is good for Eastern Europe may not be good for the USSR, and vice-versa. As the events of 1989 have demonstrated, reform and liberalization have the potential to spread at an inconceivable pace. Gorbachev must maintain constant vigilance and control if he is to continue to determine the course of Soviet politics and economics.

One of the original impetus for Bloc economic reform, aside from the Soviet's inability to maintain the present cost of the dependency relationship, was the idea that economic growth and recovery would bring greater economic integration. It was thought that the economic whole would be greater than the sum of its parts. In addition, increased

economic integration would produce a greater Soviet ability to determine Bloc policy. As late as 1987 and early 1988, Bloc economic integration remained an important goal within Soviet foreign policy and economic circles.⁹ With the advent of substantive economic reform and a growing trend toward free market systems in some East European countries, it became apparent that this could never be achieved through the CMEA. In fact, at a summit of Warsaw Pact nations in the summer of 1989, Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Ryzhor expressed a complete lack of faith in the CMEA's ability to build or maintain constructive economic growth and integration.¹⁰ Following this summit it was clear to all Pact members that neither the organization's structures nor its practices could be of service to economic markets dictated by the forces of supply and demand.

The Soviets are only too aware that risks of economic openness and reform can produce situations in which control has been lost to reform momentum. Conversely the East European leaders can no longer hide behind Soviet control in order to avoid domestic economic and political responsibility. Moscow has called on other Bloc nations to forge their own culturally and societally based paths to prosperity. As Mr. Ligachev stated in Budapest, "every country must follow its own road . . . If it was once possible to think that the conductor of this orchestra was to be found in Moscow, that is no longer true."¹¹

Michael Mandelbaum, East European specialist at the Council on Foreign Relations, made the following comments regarding Soviet impetus for reform and liberalization within the Bloc:

We (the West) must keep in mind, though, that the Soviets have not come to such an understanding for our sake. It is the least worst option for them, because the cost - both to their own reform programs and physically - of keeping Poland and Hungary in line are too great.¹²

Interestingly, given the events of September - November of 1989, Mandelbaum asserts that East Germany will prove to be the true test of Soviet liberalization.¹³ As of this writing, the Democratic German Republic now finds itself in the midst of rapid political change and growing involvement with its Western brother the Federal Republic of Germany. Gorbachev and other Soviet officials have repeatedly warned that any discussion of German reunification would prove premature and destabilizing.

Gorbachev's address to a plenary meeting of the Central Committee of the CPSU demonstrates the Soviet inability to continue financial support of East European economies or the cost of greater involvement and intervention. He stated that not only had the recent rates of Soviet economic decline reached "a critical point" but, in actuality, the economy of the USSR had not grown at all for over two decades.¹⁴ The Soviet leader pointed out that, minus the inflated world price for Soviet oil exports and the growth of retail alcohol sales, the national income of the USSR had ceased to grow over twenty years ago.¹⁵ Valerie Bunce quotes a figure of \$133 billion in Soviet assistance to Eastern Europe between 1971-1981 which does not include the bill for the large Soviet military presence in the

region.¹⁶ The cost of periodic re-enforcing conformity must also be considered. The combination of the above factors help to explain Soviet economic stagnation and falling growth rate.

The Soviets realize that Pact countries must gain Western assistance if Bloc reforms are to be achieved without widespread unrest. This assistance will not be limited to loans and grants, but may include Western private investment and fiscal and economic advice as well as favorable trade legislation. Political patience and cooperation between Eastern and Western governments will be necessary if this assistance is to be coherent and consistent. Increased East-West trade will play a significant role in any progress toward Bloc economic recovery.

The spirit of increased cooperation was expressed in the 13 June 1989 joint Soviet-West German Political Declaration. The main thrust of the document, as reported by Barbara Donovan of Radio Liberty, was to present a "common view of Europe's future" that could emerge from "concessions and compromises."¹⁷ The West German catch phrase equivalent to Gorbachev's "common European house" used in the joint declaration was "a European peace structure."¹⁸ The West German idea carries with it the implication that the United States and Canada would also play a part of this "peace structure." The document stated that it is "a matter of the highest priority to try to overcome the division of Europe" and based the "peace structure" on the following criteria:

. . . absolute respect for the integrity and security of each state . . . , the right (of each state) to choose freely its own political and social system . . . , and respect for a people's right to self-determination.¹⁹

The joint declaration did not address the issue of reunification or specific policy elements concerning Soviet-East European relations. The document gave no hint of the extent to which Bloc nations may stray from the Soviet model or control. Often in the history of Soviet signatures on East-West documents the statements agreed to on paper have had little or no effect on intra-Bloc relations in practice. However, the liberalization now underway within various Eastern European nations illustrate that Gorbachev's foreign policy may be in line with the statements and joint agreements he endorsed.

Political developments in Poland and Hungary demonstrate Gorbachev's readiness to allow development of multi-party democratic systems. In addition, both countries have embarked on plans to deconstruct many Soviet style economic structures in favor of a free market approach. At the very least it can be said that, in contrast to the Brezhnev era, these reforms have not produced Soviet military intervention or forced crackdowns. As Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov stated on Hungarian television, the path chosen by each Bloc nation "is in its own hands."²⁰ He attempted to clarify the future Soviet role in the domestic affairs of Pact nations by saying, "we can give advice, we can discuss issues, but the right to decide is not ours."²¹ Thus it

appears that the Eastern Europeans will not be obstructed as they abandon established definitions of communism.

There has been a great deal of speculation as to the limits of Soviet toleration for sovereignty and independence within the Bloc. Many assert that the Pact nations may act unhindered by Moscow as long as they do not attempt to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact. However, Soviet reaction to such a move by one of the Bloc members would be situational. The Kremlin's reaction would be affected by factors such as NATO's posture toward the withdrawal, the withdrawing nation's future plans, and a myriad of other domestic and international elements. In other words, just as Gorbachev's policies toward Eastern Europe have become at least partially determined by the challenges presented by nations such as Poland, so to will future policies and action be greatly affected by situational elements. During the days of the Brezhnev Doctrine a great many policy options, if taken, could and did provoke Soviet intervention. Present day Soviet-Eastern European relations operate in an arena of fewer restrictions and greater uncertainty. This is in stark contrast to the era of limitations and threats which emerged from statements designed to retain Soviet dominance throughout the region.

Gorbachev introduced ideas concerning the transformation of the Warsaw Pact into something other than a militarily dominated organization.²² He wants to encourage the growth of political, cultural, social, and economic ties among the Bloc societies. If a new organization is needed to fill the gap left by the CMEA's inadequacies, Bloc countries may begin the search for new forms of economic integration.

Despite both political and economic evidence that the Brezhnev Doctrine is no longer in use and Soviet attempts at regional hegemony have come to an end, many questions remain unresolved. Vladimir Kusin, for example, contends that Gorbachev must repudiate the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia in order to convincingly denounce the Brezhnev Doctrine.²³ Since the leadership installed by the Soviets following the invasion has been replaced, the chances of a public re-examination of the military intervention may have increased. A denunciation of the Hungarian invasion appears less likely, however. The Hungarian reformists of 1956 professed their intention to leave the Warsaw Pact. Consequently, a repudiation of this invasion would leave open the door to Pact withdrawal. Mr. Gorbachev's domestic existence is too tenuous and problem-ridden to take such a risk. As stated previously, the Kremlin appears quite willing to simply relate to its allies on a situational basis allowing them to select their own paths and challenge traditional taboos.

7

The Backlash of Reform

Liberalization and reform in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has allowed for the emergence of long-standing grievances and injustices. Consequently, both in Eastern Europe and the USSR the historical bill coming due for atrocities and injustices committed by past Soviet re Stalin's legacy has been especially damaging to the Soviets' reputation throughout the Bloc. Poland serves as an excellent illustration of the

Soviet backlash produced by the greater openness of both Polish and Soviet societies. Through a continuing dialogue, many historical grievances are being re-examined and exposed in order to allow a societal healing process to begin. For decades, the Soviets refused to accept responsibility for past actions or to propose forms of compensation. The refusal to acknowledge injustices may have contributed to the legitimacy problems of East European communism because it appears to the region's citizens to be yet another example of Soviet hegemony.¹ In Poland, for example, the post-war communist government consisted of Poles who had spent the war in exile and training in the USSR, rather than Poles who remained to fight the Nazi occupation.

Much of the modern anti-Soviet sentiment in Polish society stems from Stalinist policies and atrocities surrounding World War II. The so called Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact of August 1939 is a frequently cited symbol of Soviet disregard for the sovereignty of Central Europe. Secret protocols attached to the document separated the region into spheres of influence and control for Germany and the USSR. The agreement led to the Soviet occupation of Polish territory following Hitler's invasion of western Poland.

The Soviets under Mr. Gorbachev have, for the first time, acknowledged the existence of these protocols and their establishment of spheres of influence. However, official government statements stopped short of calling the Pact a mistake or an injustice.² Scholars such as Dmitrii Volkogonov, the head of the Institute of Military History at the USSR Ministry of Defense, stated that research and analysis dictate that the

Hitler-Stalin pact was "a great political mistake."³ Despite the injustice of the pact, the Soviets continue to claim that Red Army invasions and annexations in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, were desired by the indigenous peoples and necessary given the situation of the time.

World War II issues place the Soviet government in a difficult position between Eastern European concerns and domestic affairs. It is difficult for the Soviets to approach condemnation of the Pact and the subsequent invasion given that the Baltic states were annexed into the Soviet Union as a result of these events. Since the Baltic republics have been pushing for greater independence, denouncing the invasion could further destabilize the situation. Calls for a re-examination of the invasion are growing within the Soviet Union, however. M. I. Semryaga of the Institute of the International Workers Movement of the USSR Academy of Sciences condemned the Red Army takeover of Eastern Poland; thus adding the support of an official government organization representing socialist workers.³

On 17 September 1989, the Polish Government and the PUWP joined the growing list of voices criticizing the Soviet invasion. The Polish communist party newspaper, Trybuna Ludu, referred to the pact and the PUWP's condemnation of it as breaching one of "the most secret taboo subjects."⁴ If the PUWP is to gain credibility among the Polish citizenry it must continue to distance itself from the Soviet Union by establishing independence from Kremlin domination. Thus, the future is likely to bring increased denunciation and opposition to policies and statements originating in Moscow.

A joint Soviet and Polish historical commission was established to examine and fill in the "blank spots" in the two countries' relations.⁵ These "blank spots" include such events as the Polish-Soviet War of 1919-1921, the origins of World War II, the Katyn massacre, the Warsaw uprising of 1944, and the mass deportation of Poles following the Red Army invasion. To date the commission has produced few results. It seems that there are an insufficient number of reformers to advance research and publication of results.⁶ Consequently, evidence and opinions emerging from the commission have been published only in Poland. Some of this material was produced by more liberal members of the Soviet team who were refused publication in their country.⁷ As a result, reports of wide ranging disagreement between the Polish and Soviet delegations have surfaced. Clearly this inhibits any reconciliation of these historical conflicts within the consciousness of the Polish people.

Poles have moved forward with the publication of sensitive materials without the permission of the joint commission, thereby demonstrating the challenge Polish reform presents to Soviet policy. As Poles move forward with reforms which are deeper and more radical than those of Mr. Gorbachev, implicit pressure is placed on Kremlin leaders. Again, Polish changes serve as innovative examples of the extent to which reform may progress. Furthermore, Gorbachev has styled himself to be the leader and voice of Bloc reform, yet in Poland and other Pact nations his changes and plans are outstripped on a daily basis.

These historical and cultural issues are, by nature, difficult to measure as to their actual level of importance. However, given their

extensive press coverage and the fact that these issues have survived over forty years of repression, it can at least be said that they are significant in their ability to shape overall public perceptions. These issues effect the view of Soviet control and the affiliation of the domestic Party with the Kremlin. Even as Polish television under the Solidarity government documents Stalinist atrocities following the 1939 Red Army invasion, the Soviets further damage the communist reputation by continuing to spout the same rehearsed answers to growing accusations.⁸ For example, Moscow continues to blame Western appeasement of Nazi Germany for advent of World War II and still dismisses charges that the Red Army perpetrated the Katyn massacre of thousands of Polish officers.

Soviet patriotism regarding their own resistance to the Nazis is immense and widely displayed. Soviet recognition of the 200,000 Poles who died in the 1944 Warsaw Uprising against Nazi occupation is almost nonexistent. Even as the Nazi's struggled to crush the uprising, the Red Army waited within sight of Warsaw rather than aid the resisting Poles. They refused to act, say many Poles, because the uprising was not led by communists. The Red Army desired to install a communist government in Poland which could be dependent and sympathetic to Moscow's commands. Given the destruction wrought by both German and Soviet forces, the affect of these issues on the citizenry's consciousness can not be dismissed.

As reformists grow in number and power throughout Eastern Europe, the possibility exists that they will discover their common bond as members of the historically repressed. Signs of this phenomenon have already begun as Poland and Hungary express mutual support for each

country's respective reforms. In addition, both countries have attempted to encourage reformists in hard-line nations. The Hungarian decision to open its borders to the West and the subsequent allowance of mass East German emigration into the West via Hungary, placed intolerable levels of domestic pressure on the G.D.R. government. Poland also allowed all East Germans seeking refuge in West German facilities within Poland to emigrate. The two countries acted in accordance with their reformist ideals by criticizing the Soviets as well. Both Poland and Hungary publicly and officially condemned the 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. In addition, they called on the Soviets to do the same. It is only a matter of time until East European reformers vocalize opposition to current Soviet policies or actions.

The danger of a reform backlash within the USSR also exists. The combination of Soviet volatility and complete media coverage of rapid and radical reforms in Eastern Europe increases the possibility of unrest with the USSR itself. For example, the widespread Soviet coal miners strike of 1989 required direct intervention and concession by Mr. Gorbachev in order to reach a settlement. Furthermore, strike leaders have begun attempts to break away from the communist controlled All-Union Council of Trade Unions to establish the USSR's first independent trade union.⁹ The events in Eastern Europe cannot help but encourage such activity.

The striking coal miners were quick to reject Solidarity-type roles which take on broad social, political, and national issues. To illustrate this point strike leader Yuri A. Boldyrev said of the strike movements, "We are demonstrating our loyalty (to the state) . . . We insist on all our demands

being met, but we represent a force with well defined boundaries."¹⁰ Nevertheless, some political demands were put forth. This type of large scale strike activity coupled with demands for independent trade unions can only create anxiety within the Kremlin. Thus, on a grass roots level, radical reform in Eastern Europe presents challenges to the Soviet leadership through the precedents it sets. The newly forged party-state-populous relationships may serve as possible models for Soviet workers to pursue.

Soviet independence movements have also been encouraged by the decrease in Soviet dominance over its Bloc allies. Independence activists have received overwhelming popular support in the Baltic Republics. In addition they appear to be slowly gaining in strength in the Ukraine. Mr. Gorbachev has repeatedly warned these movements as to their limitations; however, the issues they articulate continue to grow in popularity. Evidence that the "Polish disease" may be spreading appears to be mounting. Throughout Eastern Europe and the USSR Polish reformers have actively supported independence movements. For example, well known Solidarity activist and new member of the Polish Parliament, Adam Michnik yelled the slogan "Long live the free, just Ukraine" at a September 1989 rally in Kiev.¹¹ Such overt displays of unity between East European and Soviet opposition movements fuel the fire of Soviet hard-liners in their arguments against reform.

Kremlin condemnation of Baltic independence movements has been especially threatening in light of their tremendous popular support. Gorbachev accused them of creating hysteria and the prospect of "civil

conflict" through the use of the "virus of nationalism."¹² Both the Lithuanian and Estonian legislatures voted to declare their annexation by the Soviets as one accomplished by force; thus, invalidating it. This move stops just short of attempting to secede and declaring full independence. Gorbachev must strive to avoid any further spill-over of East European reform influence into these republics.

It is clear then, whether in Eastern European nations or within the Soviet Union itself, there exists a danger that reform may backfire and produce anti-Sovietism. This risk affects all governmental and popular levels of society. These dangers present unique challenges to Soviet policy makers. Even as developments in Poland and elsewhere in the region push for ever-increasing national sovereignty, Kremlin leaders must walk the line between pressures which stem from their stated policy on Bloc relations, and the awareness that external forces could ignite tensions within the USSR. Now the Soviets must worry about the effects of outside pressures on domestic affairs, as well. Ironically it is Eastern Europe which presents this new challenge to Soviet policy makers.

8

Bloc Relations: Where To Go From Here?

Poland is by no means the only country in Eastern Europe to experience radical reform. The entire region has been affected. Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and East Germany are rapidly transforming many political and social institutions into more open and accessible structures. In

Bulgaria, long a model of Soviet-style party-state bureaucracy, reformers are ascending to positions of power and pushing out the older hard-line generation. As developments in Bloc countries occur at a striking pace, the entire world, including the Soviets, scramble to keep track of the changes. The reforms in Eastern Europe transform the very foundations of East-West relations. So too are they transforming the nature of Soviet foreign policy and its formulation. As the Kremlin relinquishes its powers over Communist parties and states in the region, Soviet intra-bloc relations begin to work on a reactive basis. No more will Moscow attempt to dictate foreign and domestic policy to its allies. Today, the Soviets, as the rest of the international community, must determine foreign policy on a continually changing basis. Rather than determined by Moscow's agenda, the Kremlin's actions with regard to Bloc nations will now emerge as a result of a combination of Soviet goals and the actions and statements of other sovereign nations within the Pact.

Hungarian communists have led the country to the brink of multi-party democracy. Elections have been scheduled and opposition groups approved. Member of the four man presidium which governs Hungary, Rezso Nyers, stated that his country must rid itself of "the dead hand of statism," adding that the Party must be "willing to put (its) case before the people in an election."¹ In September of 1989, U.S. campaign officials conducted a seminar in Hungary for opposition parties. Clearly the taboo of Western political influence and "bourgeois democracy" has been cast aside.

Although not tied to or controlled by the Soviets as the Pact countries were, Yugoslavia also offers an example of the growing liberalization. Members of the Party leadership are calling for a new constitution which does not dictate the Party's leading role in society.² This as they prepare for May, 1990 elections in which non-communist groups will compete. The Party's leading role may be relinquished in reformist Bloc nations as well. The East German transformation has been staggering. Following a mass exodus of almost 200,000 East Germans to West Germany via other Bloc countries and the almost non-existent Soviet public response to it, the GDR replaced its hard-line leadership and invited opposition figures into cabinet posts.

The scope of Bloc reform widens on a daily basis. With every additional step away from the party-state model, the region becomes more susceptible to Western influence and increased involvement. As Izvestia commentator Aleksander Bovin stated, "not only security is at stake, but ideology, as well."³ Thus the Soviets have abandoned much more than their traditional view of Bloc control as indicative of security. They have released Eastern Europeans to pursue their own socialist models, as well. No longer does the Soviet system and the CPSU stand as the one model for socialist development. The Kremlin can not point to Bloc nations as evidence of the unalterable spread of Soviet-style communism.

Consequently, the West is gaining opportunities for involvement in the Bloc. Eastern European nations thus become more susceptible to Western influences. Aside from political support of democracy and electoral rights, economic issues open up Pact societies to the West, as well.

As Bloc governments look for aid, advice, and trade from the West, economic ties develop on all levels. In addition, as the debt to the West grows, entanglement with Western governments and institutions increases as well. The introduction of democratic practices and free market forces transforms East European societies making them more difficult to externally control because public opinion and consumer demand, not unrestrained political power, determine many elements of political and economic policy.

The importance of Eastern Europe on the international scene must not be underestimated. The region has become an increasingly important element of U.S.-Soviet relations. Although recent reforms were accompanied by superpower cooperation, history has demonstrated that East-West relations can quickly change. Eastern Europe is no longer viewed as hopelessly within Soviet control or as a symbol of the cold war. Thus the region should assume its rightful importance in American and West European foreign policy. President Bush has been extremely cautious in his approach to recent developments. He does not want to over-involve America in Bloc countries, thereby increasing Soviet anxiety. Nevertheless, East European issues were deemed important enough to prompt a Bush-Gorbachev summit in early December, 1989. This caution reflects the volatility within the region, Gorbachev's precarious position atop the CPSU, and the significance of the remaining Soviet involvement in Eastern Europe.

The dynamics of East-West relations have begun to show signs of transformation. For example, the visit by President Bush to both Poland

and Hungary prior to a formal summit with Mr. Gorbachev is highly unusual.⁴ In the past, Western leaders, especially the American President, were expected to meet the Soviet leader prior to visiting other Bloc countries.

Hungarian intellectual George Konrád spoke of the growing independence and importance of Eastern European nations as follows:

- (a) gradual, controlled transformation of the Soviet Bloc into a looser community of nations capable of interacting with Western Europe on a partnership basis.⁵

Clearly, this description of a new East-West relations structure increases contacts and ties. Consequently, just as the American government must consider and attempt to anticipate the reaction of its allies to a given action or policy statement, so too the Soviets will be forced to take Bloc member response into account. This additional accountability will affect policy in a way that the Kremlin has yet to experience. As in the NATO alliance, the Warsaw Pact may develop into an organization without an absolute leader in all policy areas.

Vladimir Kusin asserts that Gorbachev may have underestimated the force with which reform would take hold, assuming that, as liberalization was carried out, the advantages of remaining within the Bloc would be self-evident.⁶ He further suggests that the Kremlin may have been lulled into unawares regarding bloc countries as a result of the relatively uneventful nature of Gorbachev's first two years in office.⁷ It appears that

Gorbachev's leadership was struck by the rapid and far reaching reforms of Poland. They seem to have put him on the defensive by forcing the Kremlin to react to East European developments, rather than attempt to determine them. Nevertheless, Gorbachev's reaction has licensed these reforms by allowing them to continue uninhibited by Kremlin intervention.

The vast differences in Soviet posturing toward Eastern Europe are striking as the 1980-1981 period is compared and contrasted with 1987-1989. Poland, because of its repeated challenges to both Soviet dominance and Soviet-style reform, has been a barometer for Soviet-East Bloc relations. The Kremlin attempted to create in Eastern Europe, communist systems in the image of the USSR. As Polish and other Bloc reforms surpass those of the Soviets, this too must change. Gorbachev and other Soviet officials have stated that they would look to Eastern Europe for successful reform models and policies. Perestroika and glasnost have begun the acknowledgement of Soviet-East European common problems, the acceptance of societal differences, and the search for individual as well as intra-bloc resolutions.

To construct generalized formulas or predictions for all of Eastern Europe on the basis of the Polish experience would be a gross error. Due to their significant situational and cultural differences, one model, as the attempted Soviet hegemony proved, will not suffice for Bloc development. Unique phenomenon such as the power of the Polish Catholic Church, a recent history of independent trade unionism, and a disastrous economic crisis distinguish the Polish social, political, and economic environment from that of its East European allies. What can be drawn from the Polish

events of the 1980s is the nature of the relationship between Moscow and the Bloc countries. The leadership of Eastern Europe can be expected to continue on paths toward reform and sovereignty. As a result, Soviet allies will assume a growing importance in the formulation of Kremlin foreign policy. No longer will all Pact members mechanically fall into step behind Moscow.

As structural transformation continues, the ability to return to the prior relationship grows more distant. The underlying fear that Soviet domestic problems or unforeseen events might cause a change in the Kremlin leadership may help drive the rate of reform momentum. Bloc countries want to construct and stabilize their new structures to insulate them from future Soviet interference. Mass movements fueled change in Poland as well as East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary. In other words, huge segments of the population are gaining a voice in their countries' domestic and foreign policy formulation. Economic crisis or success may determine the level of political reforms to be carried out. Nevertheless, it can be said that the decade of the 1980s witnessed the emergence of Eastern European nations onto the international scene. The challenges presented by Polish unrest, opposition, and reform greatly contributed to this transformation. Soviet-East European relations have evolved away from Soviet dominance into an atmosphere of transition toward a more balanced relationship.

Appendix 1
Chronology
July 1980 - December 1981

1980

- 2 July-14 August Polish workers went on strike to protest increased meat prices.
- 1-2 August Communique of Brezhnev-Gierek meeting in Crimea ignored the Polish strikes.
- 15 August TASS announced Warsaw Pact maneuvers in the Baltic region and G.D.R. Soviet reservists were called up during the month.
- 20 August Pravda summary of a Gierek speech broke Soviet media silence on Polish labor unrest and stressed the resolve of Polish rulers.
- 26 August Gierek's self-criticism omitted from Pravda version of his speech on Polish TV.
- 28 August Soviet media reported Polish Government - labor talks on Baltic coast.
- 31 August Gus Hall in Pravda blamed Polish strikes on leadership "weaknesses."
- 1 September Pravda article by "A. Petrov" tacitly criticized the Gdansk accords.
- 2 September Lech Walesa assailed by Moscow TV as "one of the members of an opposition group."

- 6 September **Pravda** rejected use of "fist in a dispute over principle," urged "caution and prudence . . . ability to . . . keep cool in the most critical situation."
- 8 September 40,000 Warsaw Pact troops began 4-day maneuvers in the G.D.R.
- 8 September Kania inaugural in **Pravda** omitted his criticism of Fuehrerprinzip. Also toned down was his readiness for political debate and reform.
- 10-11 September Polish Politburo member and Deputy Premier Jagielski visited Moscow, met Suslov and Brezhnev. Soviet economic aid committed to Poland.
- 18 September Western intelligence reportedly detected signs of unusual military activity in the G.D.R. and USSR.
- 20 September "A. Petrov" in **Pravda** warned that anticommunist subversion would increase in Poland as the situation there became more stable.
- 23 September Radio Free Europe was sending orders to antisocialist elements in Poland, according to V. Bolshakov in **Pravda**.
- 25 September Lenin's attack on advocates of free trade unions under socialism was stressed by Prof. G. Alekseyev in **Pravda**.
- 27 September "A. Petrov" of **Pravda** saw a division of "patriots" and "enemies" among Poles.
- 7 October **Pravda** version of Kania's report to the Polish Central Committee detailed internal failings like those in USSR but muted the reformist policy proposals.
- 19 October Romanian Pa.ty head Ceausescu's confidence in the PUWP reported by **Pravda**.

- 21 October Brezhnev addressed the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. A full text was not released and the summary ignored Poland.
- 30 October TASS Statement on Soviet-Polish summit in Kremlin. Brezhnev voiced confidence in Poles and Kania joined him in attack on Western meddling.
- 5, 21, 23, November Gen. Moczar, Polish symbol of law and order, given favorable publicity in Pravda.
- 6 November Soviet Premier Tikhonov disregarded Poland in his leadership report for Bolshevik Revolution day.
- 7 November Kania was disdainfully referred to as Party "first" rather than "First" secretary in Pravda.
- 10 November Joint Soviet-Polish army maneuvers noted by Pravda as Solidarity deadline of November 12 for general strike approaches. Signs of high-level meetings at Soviet Embassy in Warsaw, probably over Solidarity legalization dispute.
- 19 November Pravda reported that PUWP meetings were calling for "urgent measures" to ensure the "full restoration" of the Party's "leading role and authority."
- 21 November CPSU Politburo member and Secretary Chernenko attacked "capitulationists" and quoted Lenin against free trade unions under socialism, in Kommunist article.
- 24 November TASS warned that a general strike on Polish railways could disrupt land communications through Poland.
- 26 November Solidarity's theft of official secrets hinted in muted Pravda account of the union's demand for curbing

the State security service. Another item hit at the Polish Government for neglecting pro-regime unions.

- 28 November Pravda cited Polish war veterans' demand for "a halt to anarchy." In the paper's theory article, a "timely response" was urged to actions of "anti-socialist forces."
- 28 November Dissident leader Kuron in Warsaw warned strikers of the danger of Soviet military intervention.
- 30 November Pravda softened a Czechoslovak press commentary on Poland.
- 1-5 December Soviet troop activity in western military districts was reportedly stepped up and some reserves mobilized.
- 1 December Warsaw Radio announced a Soviet promise of \$1.3 billion aid package.
- 2 December Romanian Foreign Minister Andrei flew to Moscow for an unscheduled meeting with Brezhnev.
- 3 December Pravda summarized at length Kania's report to the Polish Central Committee. The tough passages were reprinted and innovative ones bowdlerized.
- 5 December Warsaw Pact emergency summit in Moscow. Statement hinted that Polish leaders should be given more time to reassert their authority.
- 5 December Alarmist lines in the Polish Central Committee's appeal to the nation were not in the Pravda version. But a "grave threat" to internal stability was claimed in the communique of the Polish Defense Ministry's Military Council, also cited in Pravda.

- 5-7 December White House vigil on Poland after intelligence reports warned of impending Soviet armed intervention in Poland.
- 8 December Moscow Radio broadcast a TASS cable from Warsaw stating that Solidarity had begun to move against Party and management officials. The Soviet press did not run this item, later denied by Polish officials and Solidarity sources.
- 10 December Soviet Politburo member and Defense Minister Ustinov told military Communists that reactionaries were trying to hurt Poland.
- 12 December Pravda's brief text of a CPSU Politburo resolution on results of the 5 December Warsaw Pact summit lacked a "political evaluation," suggesting leadership dissension.
- 18 December "A. Petrov" told Pravda readers that NATO was eager to launch military intervention in Poland.
- 18 and 28 December Kommunist and Pravda commentaries on Poland diverged on whether the social conflicts there were both "antagonistic and nonantagonistic," that is, if regime-Solidarity clash was inexorable.
- 19 December Fidel Castro cited by Pravda on the "explosively dangerous situation around Poland" and need to avoid "concessions" to "the class enemy."
- 26 December Polish Foreign Minister Czyrek visited Moscow and met with Brezhnev, who voiced confidence in the PUWP.
- 26 December Pravda theory article on trade unions held that strikes in Poland benefited antisocialist elements.
- 30 December Pravda and Izvestiya's weekly magazine Nedelya differed on the socio-political climate in Poland.

1981

- 9 January Gromyko in the CPSU journal Kommunist seconded Brezhnev's confidence-in-Poland line.
- 13 January Marshal Kulikov was received by Kania and Premier Pinkowski. Gen. Jaruzelski took part in the talks.
- 13-20 January Zamyatin-led delegation visited Poland and discussed Party control of media.
- 29 January Pravda neutrally cited the French President on the wisdom of non-intervention by all powers vis-à-vis Poland.
- 7 February Solidarity was instigating anti-Party violence and harassment, according to Pravda.
- 8, 10 February U.S. intelligence sources said Soviet troops alerted for crisis in December (26 divisions) remained in a high state of readiness on Poland's border.
- 11 February Oktyabr ran an article by old ideologue Bugayev linking Polish events with those in Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968.
- 12 February Pravda Ukrainy reported a harsh indirect criticism of Solidarity at the Ukraine Party Congress.
- 17 February New Polish Premier Gen. Jaruzelski met with Warsaw Pact ambassadors to Poland.
- 23 February Brezhnev Report at 26th CPSU Congress ignored Kania's "line of agreement" formula and vowed support of the weakened Polish regime.

- 24 February Kania reassured the Soviet Party Congress that Polish leaders had both patience and resolve.
- February Soviet Army divisions along the Polish borders were reportedly put on a much lower state of alert.
- 4 March Soviet-Polish summit held in Moscow. PUWP was to "turn the course of events" and the doctrine of limited sovereignty was reaffirmed.
- 8, 13, 14 March Pravda hit at Solidarity for creating armed bands, sheltering renegades, taking C.I.A. funds, and backing the legal defense of right-wing dissident Moczulski.
- 9 March Soviet trade union chairman Shibayev stated in Kommunist that trade unions under socialism must recognize the Communist Party's leading role.
- 11 March Warsaw Pact command-staff exercise in Poland and elsewhere scheduled for second half of March, Pravda announced.
- 19 March PAP reported Warsaw Pact "Soyuz-81" maneuvers in Poland, G.D.R., USSR and Czechoslovakia.
- 20 March One day after Polish police attacked protestors in Bydgoszcz, a Pravda editorial cited Brezhnev's harsh rhetoric about Poland at the CPSU Congress.
- 22 March Soviet press disarray on whether Walesa made an "instigatory" statement in Bydgoszcz.
- 22 March Pravda cited without criticism the West German Foreign Minister's praise of the Polish leader's nonviolent internal course.
- 23 March CPSU Secretary Ponomarev in Kommunist deplored the idea of power-sharing in a socialist society.

- 26-29 March **Pravda** criticized Solidarity and Polish media for gravely disrupting public order. A rare personal criticism of Walesa surfaced on the 27th.
- 26 March USSR Defense Ministry journal Voyenny Vestnik compared the Polish events to those in Czechoslovakia 1968.
- 29 March U.S. State Department reported signs of Soviet military moves for possible armed intervention in Poland.
- 30 March Unsuccessful challenge to Kania by hardliners Grabski and Olszowski concealed in TASS report of Polish Central Committee session.
- 2 April **Pravda** alleged PUWP tolerance of anti-Soviet seminar at Warsaw University.
- 3 April Bydgoszcz Solidarity leader Rulewski accused of a criminal past and pro-Nazi family ties in **Pravda**.
- 3 and 4 April U.S. media cited intelligence sources to effect that Soviet military was upgrading its capability for rapid action against Poland.
- 4 April Soviet press discordance on the chances of a Polish solution to Poland's crisis.
- 5 April **Izvestiya** claimed Solidarity "terror" and lack of effective regime resistance to "creeping counter-revolution."
- 7 April Brezhnev voiced qualified confidence in Polish leaders during a speech to the Czechoslovak Party Congress.
- 7 April TASS announced the end of Warsaw Pact exercises.

- 7 April U.S. State Department reported unusual levels of Warsaw Pact military activity, increases in Soviet troops near Poland, the establishment of a Soviet communications and command network, and supply stockpiles in Poland.
- 13 and 16 April Pravda informed that at the East German Party Congress Suslov ignored Poland while Bulgarian guest speaker Doynov gave the confidence-in-Poland line.
- 2 June Pravda favorably cited an attack on Polish Politburo guidelines for the special Party Congress by the hardline Katowice Party Forum.
- 5 June CPSU Central Committee Letter to Polish Central Committee criticized Kania and Jaruzelski by name for pursuing a "policy of concession and compromise." Polish leadership needed "revolutionary will" to "reverse the course of events."
- 11 June Marshal Bagramyan in Znamya recalled the Red Army's low-damage campaign to liberate Poland in 1944.
- 12 June Pravda ran the Kremlin Letter to Warsaw and failed to summarize Kania's essentially moderate speech to the Polish Central Committee session held 9-10 June.
- 20 June Zamyatin on Moscow TV saw the Polish situation as worsening and urged vigorous corrective measures.
- 22 June Marshal Kulikov in Red Star assailed "counterrevolutionary forces" in Poland.

- 23-24 June USSR Supreme Soviet met without the usual preliminary meeting of the CPSU Central Committee.
- 25 June Pravda and Red Star differed on the gravity of Polish events in comment on a World War II anniversary.
- 25 June In contrast to Zamyatin on 20 June, Agitator claimed that Polish leaders were implementing resolution of their 9-10 June Plenum and positive results were a cause for rejoicing.
- 25, 29, 30 June Polish media reported Polish-Soviet military exercises and the East German press reported military maneuvers in G.D.R.
- 3-5 July Gromyko met with Polish leaders in Warsaw and heard about the PUWP Congress preparations. The limited sovereignty doctrine was restated in communique.
- 11 July Pravda gave far more coverage to a four-hour strike of Polish airlines workers than a Polish Central Committee session recommending PUWP to democratize itself.
- 15 July Pravda ran Kania's report and Soviet Politburo member Grishin's speech to the Polish Party Congress. Reformist and nationalist lines omitted from Kania text. Grishin warned against rejection of the Soviet model of governance.
- 19 July Brezhnev's congratulatory message to Kania on occasion of his re-election as Party head did not laud him.
- 19 July Western subversion against Poland was "proven" by a Czechoslovak intelligence officer at a press conference in Prague reported by Pravda.

- 21 July **Pravda** did not list the names of Polish Politburo and Secretariat members elected by the new Polish Central Committee.
- 22 July **Pravda** showed Grishin in his Warsaw speech more uncertain about Polish leaders' competence than were colleagues who greeted the same leaders in connection with their national day.
- 25 July Defense Minister Ustinov in a **Pravda** article cited the Polish events as an example of "direct threat to the security of the USSR and its allies."
- 31 July **Pravda** version of PUWP Congress resolution edited to accent orthodoxy, disregarding criticism of systematic ills and remedial formulas.
- 31 July **Pravda** theory article by **Kommunist** editor Kosolapov rebuked Communists blind to danger in Poland and portrayed Walesa as a great hope of anti-Communists in the West.
- 5 August **Pravda** reported anti-regime street demonstrations in Warsaw.
- 7 August The last article by **Pravda's** Warsaw correspondent about PUWP cell activities until imposition of martial law in December.
- 7 August Polish leaders reportedly got letters from Soviet, East German and Czechoslovak leaders urging reassertion of authority and offering technical assistance for that purpose.
- 8 August Marshal Kulikov met with Jaruzelski in Warsaw.
- 13-14 August **Pravda** coverage of Polish Central Committee meeting held on August 11. Kania's readiness to

discuss change of the constitution toward democracy was ignored.

- 14 August Pravda announced Soviet military maneuvers led by Defense Minister Ustinov for 4-12 September, or during Solidarity Congress's first stage.
- 16 August Communique of Soviet-Polish summit in Crimea featured by Pravda. Brezhnev withheld an expression of confidence in Polish leaders.
- 31 August-3 September Gen. Yepishev, chief of the Soviet Armed Forces' Main Political Directorate, visited Poland, met with Kania and Jaruzelski.
- 1 September Pravda quoted Jaruzelski's irritation over social unrest during speech at military college: "Enough of this disintegration!"
- 4-12 September USSR hosted "Zapad-81" military exercises.
- 5 September TASS reported Jaruzelski among allied military leaders at Ustinov's war-games headquarters in Belorussia.
- 7 September CPSU Secretariat official Rakhmanin in Voprosy Istorii KPSS voiced confidence that PUWP leaders could solve their internal problems.
- 8 September Unlike Voprosy Istorii KPSS article by Rakhmanin, one by V. Chernyshev in Partiynaya Zhizn ignored Kania and Jaruzelski, as well as the confidence-in-Poles line, and warned of NATO plans to seize Polish territory.
- 12, 13, 19, 22, 24 September Pravda reported factory meetings in USSR voiced extreme anger over Solidarity Congress (5-10 September). Polish workers were exhorted to throw false friends onto "the refuse heap of history."

- 19 September **Pravda** summarized a CPSU Central Committee and USSR Government Statement given to Kania and Jaruzelski by Soviet ambassador Aristov. An immediate halt to anti-Sovietism in Poland was demanded.
- 22 September Jaruzelski received Gen. Gribkov, Chief of Staff of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces.
- 22 September Soviet Gosplan chief Baybakov began a 5-day visit to Poland and reportedly threatened to curtail raw material exports to Poland if its economic slump continued.
- 22-25 September **Pravda** denounced Solidarity as a fascist-style body with close Church ties and nearing a takeover of State power.
- 29 September-11 October **Pravda** comment on Solidarity Congress (27 September-8 October). Union activists were said to be anticipating "martial law and outside intervention."
- 13 October TASS announced that a Polish Central Committee meeting would open on 16 October.
- 13 October "A. Petrov" in **Pravda** ridiculed the Kania-linked slogan of "socialist renewal" and urged "effective rebuff to counterrevolution" in Poland. The limited sovereignty (Brezhnev) doctrine was reiterated.
- 14 October TASS reported a Warsaw regional PUWP plenum which accused Solidarity of seeking confrontation and political dominance, using regime mistakes; Polish authorities were hit for lack of consistency and effectiveness. Decisive steps were needed to guard socialism.

- 15 October **Pravda** text of Suslov speech at ideology conference in Moscow assured that Polish Communists could rely on Soviet support in struggle with counterrevolutionary forces.
- 18-20 October **Pravda** coverage of 16-18 October Polish Central Committee session. Kania's resignation was accepted and Jaruzelski elected to head the PUWP. Jaruzelski's speech was the only one reported at length in **Pravda**, along with the plenum's stiff resolution.
- 19 October Brezhnev's cable of congratulations to Jaruzelski expressed trust that at "this historic moment" he would use his "great prestige" to roll back "encroachments of counterrevolution."
- 10 October Marshal Kulikov met with G.D.R. Party leader Honecker in East Berlin.
- 22 October USSR Interior Minister Army Gen. Shchelokov met with Honecker in East Berlin.
- 27 October **Partiynaya Zhizn** alleged "ransackings of the premises of State bodies" throughout Poland.
- 30 October **Pravda** omitted from its version of Jaruzelski's speech to the Polish Central Committee his professed intent to broaden the Government's coalition dimension.
- 4 November Jaruzelski, Walesa and Primate Glemp held an unprecedented summit. **Pravda** ignored the event.
- 5 November **Pravda** ran the Statement of a Soviet bloc ideology conference, which backed PUWP's "struggle against the antipeople forces of counterrevolution and anarchy."

- 6 November Ustinov stressed in his report for Bolshevik Revolution day that counterrevolutionaries would not win in Poland and resolve was growing there to rebuff antisocialist forces.
- 14 November Pravda review of readers' letters hinted impatience with toleration of Solidarity by the Polish regime.
- 16 November Brezhnev spoke to the CPSU Central Committee Plenum. A summary ignored Poland.
- 20 November Pravda began a series of attacks on Solidarity for campaigning to evict Party committees from industrial works.
- 23 November Ustinov and Andropov outranked Chernenko in a Pravda photograph with top leadership line-up. Chernenko that same day made a Soviet election speech and referred to Poland without mentioning "crisis," "counterrevolutionaries" or "antisocialist forces."
- 25 November Marshal Kulikov met with Jaruzelski in Warsaw.
- 4, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13 December Pravda directly attacked Walesa as a political extremist.
- 7 December Kommunist editorial linked events in Hungary 1956 and Czechoslovakia 1968 with those in Poland. "Acute class struggle" was said to be raging among Poles. Czechoslovak Party Secretary Bilak in an article for Brezhnev's 75th birthday quoted him on the need to "smash and destroy" counterrevolution.
- 10 December Pravda ran a TASS item without dateline accusing Solidarity of arming itself for a coup and giving specific dates on which anti-regime actions would be undertaken (17 and 20 Dec.). Soviet

communication lines through Poland were allegedly targeted by "counterrevolutionaries." Also, a Pravda "historical" article asserted the necessity of repressing internal foes of socialism.

13 December

Radio Moscow reported a state of emergency was invoked in Poland. Soviet media were silent on Marshal Kulikov's reported presence in Poland.

Chronology source: Ploss 157-169.

Appendix 2

"TO THE POLISH UNITED WORKERS' PARTY CENTRAL COMMITTEE."

Pravda, 12 June 1981, 2.

Dear Comrades! The CC of the CPSU, out of a feeling of deep anxiety for the fate of socialism in Poland and for Poland as a free and independent state, addresses this letter to you.

Our appeal is dictated by comradely interest in the affairs of the party of Polish Communists, the entire fraternal Polish people and socialist Poland as a member of the Warsaw Treaty and the Council for Mutual Economic Aid. Soviet and Polish Communists stood shoulder to shoulder in the battle against fascism and have been together throughout the post-war years. Our Party and the Soviet People helped their Polish comrades to build a new life. And we cannot but be alarmed at the mortal danger that hangs over the Polish people's revolutionary gains today.

Let us say frankly that some tendencies in the development of the Polish People's Republic, especially in the fields of ideology and economic policy of its former leadership, have given us concern for a number of years. In full accordance with the spirit of the relations that have evolved between the CPSU and the PUWP, the Polish leaders were told about this during summit talks and at other meetings. Unfortunately, these friendly warnings, like the sharply critical statements made within the PUWP itself, were not taken into consideration and were even ignored. As a result, a profound crisis has broken out in Poland, one that has extended to all political and economic life in the country.

The change in the PUWP's leadership and the endeavor to overcome the flagrant errors related to violations of the laws governing the construction of socialism, to restore the confidence of the masses of the

working class first of all- in the party, and to strengthen socialist democracy met with out full understanding. From the first days of the crisis, we considered it important that the party administer a resolute rebuff to attempts by the enemies of socialism to take advantage of the difficulties that arose for their own far-reaching aims. However, this has not been done. Endless concessions to the antisocialist forces and their importunities have led us to a situation in which the PUWP has retreated step by step under the onslaught of internal counterrevolution, which relies on the support of imperialist subversion centers abroad.

Today the situation is not simply dangerous, it has brought the country to a critical point-no other evaluation is possible. The enemies of socialist Poland are making no special effort to hide their intentions; they are waging a struggle for power, and are already seizing it. One position after another is falling under their control. The counterrevolution is using the extremist wing of Solidarity as its strike force, employing deception to draw the workers who have joined this trade union association into a criminal conspiracy against the people's power. A wave of anti-communism and anti-Sovietism is mounting. The imperialist forces are making increasingly brazen attempts to interfere in Polish affairs.

The extremely serious danger that hangs over socialism in Poland is also a threat to the very existence of the independent Polish state. If the worst happened and the enemies of socialism came to power, if Poland was deprived of the protection of the socialist commonwealth, the imperialists' greedy hands would at once reach out for it. And who then could guarantee the independence, sovereignty and borders of Poland as a state? No one.

Comrades, you know about the December 5, 1980 meeting in Moscow of leaders of the fraternal parties of the countries of the socialist commonwealth. On March 4, 1981, the Soviet leadership held talks with the PUWP delegation to the 26th CPSU Congress. On April 23, 1981, a CPSU delegation met with the entire Polish leadership. During all these meetings, and also in other contacts, our side emphasized its growing concern in connection with the intrigues of counterrevolutionary forces in Poland. We spoke about the need to overcome the confusion in the PUWP's

ranks, to firmly defend its cadres against enemy attacks, and to stand up staunchly in defense of the people's power.

Special attention was called to the fact that the enemy had virtually taken control of the mass news media, the overwhelming majority of which have become tools of anti-socialist activity used to undermine socialism and to demoralize the party. It was noted that it is impossible to win the battle for the party as long as the press, radio and television are working not for the PUWP but for its enemies.

The pointed question was raised of the need to strengthen the prestige in the country of agencies of public order and the army and to protect them from encroachments by counterrevolutionary forces. To permit attempts to defame and demoralize the security agencies, the police and then the army to be crowned with success would mean, in effect, to disarm the socialist state, to put it at the mercy of the class enemy.

We want to emphasize that S. Kania, W. Jaruzelski, and other Polish comrades voiced agreement with our opinions on all the questions raised. But in fact everything remains as it was, and no corrections have been made in the policy of concessions and compromises. One position made after another is being surrendered. Despite the fact that the materials of the recent plenary sessions of the PUWP CC recognize the fact of the counterrevolutionary threat, no actual steps to combat it have been taken so far, and the counterrevolution's organizers are not even being named directly.

The situation within the PUWP itself has recently become a matter of special concern. A little over a month remains before the congress. However, the tone of the election campaign is increasingly being set by forces that are hostile to socialism. The fact that frequently casual people who openly profess opportunistic views become the leaders of local party organizations and are among the delegates to conferences and the congress can only cause concern. As a result of various manipulations by the PUWP's enemies and by revisionists and opportunists, experienced personnel who are devoted to the party's cause and have unblemished reputation and moral qualifications are being shunted aside.

The fact that, among the delegates to the forthcoming congress, the number of Communists with a worker's background is extremely small is also alarming. The course of preparations for the congress is complicated by the so-called movement of horizontal structures—a tool for splitting the party that is being used by opportunists to get people they want picked for the congress and divert its work into a channel advantageous to them. One cannot exclude the possibility that an attempt may be made at the congress itself to decisively defeat the Marxist-Leninist forces of the party in order to liquidate it.

We would like to make special mention of the fact that in recent months counterrevolutionary forces have been actively spreading all kinds of anti-Soviet fabrications designed to nullify the fruits of the work done by our parties and to revive nationalistic, anti-Soviet sentiments in various strata of Polish society. These slanderers and liars stop at nothing. They even claim that the Soviet Union is "plundering" Poland. They say this, despite the fact that the Soviet Union has given and is continuing to give enormous additional material assistance to Poland in the difficult time. They say this about a country that, with its deliveries of petroleum, gas, ore and cotton at prices one-third to one-half lower than world prices, is to all intents and purposes provisioning the main branches of Polish industry.

Esteemed Comrades! In addressing this letter to you, we proceed not only from our concern over the situation in fraternal Poland and over the conditions of and prospects for further Soviet-Polish cooperation. We, as well as the fraternal parties, are no less concerned about the fact that the offensive of hostile anti-socialist forces in the PPR threatens the interests of our entire commonwealth, its cohesion, its integrity, and the security of its borders. Yes, our common security. Imperialist reaction, which supports and encourages the Polish counterrevolution, does not conceal its hope of thus sharply changing in its favor the alignment of forces in Europe and in the world.

Imperialism is actively using the crisis in Poland to discredit the socialist system and the ideals and principles of socialism and to make new attacks against the international communist movement.

Thus, the PUWP bears a historic responsibility not only for the fate of its homeland, its independence and progress and the cause of socialism in Poland. Comrades, you also bear an enormous responsibility for the common interests of the socialist commonwealth.

We believe that there is still a possibility of staving off the worst, of preventing national catastrophe. There are in the PUWP many honest and steadfast Communists who are in fact ready to struggle for the ideals of Marxism-Leninism, for an independent Poland. There are many people in Poland who are devoted to the cause of socialism. The country's working class and working people, even those who are being drawn by deception into the enemies' machinations, will ultimately follow the party.

The question is to mobilize all the healthy forces of society to repulse the class enemy, to combat the counterrevolution. This requires, first of all, revolutionary determination on the part of the party itself, its activists and its leadership. Yes, leadership. There's no time to be lost. The party can and must find in itself the strength to change the course of events and, even before the Ninth PUWP Congress, direct them into the proper channel.

We would like to be confident that the CC of the fraternal Polish party of Communists will measure up to its historic responsibility!

We want to assure you, dear comrades, that in these difficult days, as always in the past, the CPSU CC, all Soviet Communists and the entire Soviet people are in sympathy with your struggle. Our position was clearly expressed in Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's statement at the 26th CPSU Congress: "We will not abandon socialist Poland, fraternal Poland in its time of trouble—we will stand by it!"

Signed: THE CC OF THE CPSU.

Source of translation: *Soviet Foreign Policy Today* (Selections from the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*), (Columbus, Ohio: 1983), 149-50, rpt. in Wozniuk 135-138.

Appendix 3

Excerpts from Gorbachev's Strasbourg Speech 6 July 1989

It is not enough now to merely state the interdependence and joint destinies of the European states. The idea of European unity should be collectively rethought in the process of the concerted endeavor by all nations, large, medium and small.

Is it realistic to raise this question? I know that many people in the West regard the existence of two social systems as the major difficulty. But the difficulty is rather in the very common conviction, or even a political directive, that overcoming the split of Europe implies the "overcoming of socialism." This is a course toward confrontation, if not worse. There will be no European unity along these lines.

The belonging of European states to different social systems is a reality. Recognition of this historical fact and respect for the sovereign right of every nation to choose freely a social system constitute the major prerequisite for a normal European process.

Competition Is Healthy

Social and political orders in one country or another changed in the past and may change in the future. But this change is the exclusive affair of the people of that country and is their choice. Any interference in domestic affairs and any attempts to restrict the sovereignty of states-friends, allies or any others - are inadmissible.

Differences among states are not removable. They are, as I have already said on several occasions, even favorable, provided, of course, that the competition between the different types of society is directed at creating better material and spiritual living conditions for all people.

Due to its restructuring, the U.S.S.R. will be able fully to take part in this honest, equitable and constructive competition. Given all the existing shortcomings and lagging, we well know the intrinsic strengths of our social system. And we are sure that we will be able to put them to use for the benefit of ourselves and for the benefit of Europe.

File Away the Cold War

It is time to deposit in the archives the postulates of the cold war period, when Europe was regarded as an arena of confrontation, divided into "spheres of influence," and somebody's "outpost," and as an object of military rivalry, a battlefield. In today's interdependent world, the geopolitical notions born of another era turn out to be just as useless in real politics as the laws of classical mechanics in quantum theory.

Meanwhile, it is on the basis of out-dated stereotypes that the Soviet Union is suspected of planning domination and intending to tear the United States away from Europe. There are some who would like to place the U.S.S.R. outside Europe from the Atlantic to the Urals, by limiting its expanse "from Brest to Brest." The U.S.S.R., it is alleged, is too big for coexistence. Others would feel ill at ease with it. The present-day realities and prospects for the foreseeable future are obvious. The U.S.S.R. and the United States constitute a natural part of the European international-political structure. And their participation in its evolution is not only justified, but is also historically determined.

The philosophy of the "common European home" concept rules out the probability of an armed clash and the very possibility of the use of force or threat of force - alliance against alliance, inside the alliances, wherever. This philosophy suggests that a doctrine of restraint should

take the place of the doctrine of deterrence. This is not just a play on words but the logic of European development prompted by life itself.

Our goals at the Vienna talks are well known. We consider it quite attainable - and the U.S. President, too, supports this - to secure a substantially lower level of armaments in Europe in the course of two-three years, with the elimination of all asymmetries and imbalances, of course. And I emphasize - all asymmetries and imbalances. No double standards are admissible here.

We are convinced that it is also time to begin talks on tactical nuclear systems between all countries concerned. The ultimate objective is to fully remove the weapons, which threaten only the Europeans, who by no means intend to wage war on one another. Who then needs them, and what for?

To eliminate nuclear arsenals or to keep them at all costs are the options. Does the strategy of nuclear deterrence strengthen or undermine stability? The positions of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty on these issues look diametrically opposed. However we do not dramatize the divergences.

Stage-by-Stage Approach

We are looking for and invite our partners to look for ways out. We regard the elimination of nuclear weapons as a stage-by-stage process. Without abandoning their positions, the Europeans can jointly cover part of the way separating us from the complete elimination of nuclear weapons: the U.S.S.R. while remaining loyal to non-nuclear ideals, and the West while remaining committed to the concept of "minimum deterrence."

However, it is worthwhile to find out what is behind the "minimum" notion and where is the limit beyond which the potential of nuclear deterrence turns into an attack capability. There is much ambiguity in this respect, while the lack of clarity is a source of mistrust.

Why don't the experts of the Soviet Union, the United States, Britain and France, as well as the countries on whose territories nuclear weapons are stationed, discuss these issues in depth? If they arrive at some

common evaluations, the problem would become simpler at the political level as well.

If the NATO countries are seen to be ready to enter into negotiations with us on tactical nuclear weapons, we could, upon taking counsel with our allies, of course, make further unilateral cuts in our tactical nuclear missiles in Europe without delay.

Source: New York Times, 7 July 1989, Sec A: 6.

NOTES**Introduction**

¹The Military Balance: 1980-1981 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1980) 16, in Sidney I. Ploss, Moscow and the Polish Crisis: An Interpretation of Soviet Policies and Intentions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986) 9.

²Sidney I. Ploss, Moscow and the Polish Crisis: An Interpretation of Soviet Policies and Intentions (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986) 9.

³Ploss 3.

⁴Ploss 3.

Chapter 1

¹Vladimir Wozniuk, From Crisis to Crisis: Soviet-Polish Relations in the 1970s (Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1987) 71.

²Wozniuk 73.

³Arthur R. Rachwald, Poland Between the Superpowers: Security vs Economic Recovery (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983) 109.

⁴Rachwald 109.

⁵J. F. Brown, East Europe and Communist Rule (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989) 450.

⁶Ploss 11.

⁷Wozniuk 97.

⁸Wozniuk 97.

⁹Rachwald 109.

¹⁰Wozniuk 87.

¹¹Janina Frentzel-Zagórska and Krzysztof Zagórska, "East European Intellectuals on the Road to Dissent: The Old Prophecy of a New Class Re-examined," Politics and Society 17 no.1 (March 1989): 99.

¹²Robert L. Hutchings, Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict 1968-1980 (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983) 226.

¹³Rachwald 133.

¹⁴Wozniuk 73.

¹⁵Wozniuk 73.

¹⁶Wozniuk 78.

¹⁷William P. Avery, "Political Legitimacy and Crisis in Poland," Political Science Quarterly 103 no.1 (Spring 1988): 120.

¹⁸Ploss 35.

¹⁹Ploss 11.

²⁰Ploss 11.

²¹U.S. Department of State Bureau of Public Affairs, Soviet and Soviet-proxy Involvement in Poland: July 1980 - December 1981 (Washington D.C.: GPO, 1982) 1.

²²Brown 10.

²³Ploss 35.

²⁴Ploss 35.

²⁵David S. Mason, "Solidarity as a New Socialist Movement," Political Science Quarterly 104 no.1 (Spring 1989): 44.

²⁶Ploss 16-17.

²⁷Pravda, 7 September 1980, in Ploss 18-19.

²⁸Ploss 19.

²⁹Ploss 19-20.

³⁰Ploss 27.

³¹U.S. Department of State 2.

³²U.S. Department of State 2.

³³U.S. Department of State 2.

³⁴Ploss 45.

³⁵Ploss 45.

³⁶Richard J. Krickus, The Superpowers in Crisis: Implications of Domestic Discord (Washington: Pergamon-Brassey, 1987) 65-66.

³⁷Mason 45.

Chapter 2

¹Ploss 12.

²Ploss 29.

³Ploss 29.

⁴Trybuna Luda editorial, Pravda (16 September 1980.) in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 32 no.37 (15 October 1980) 12, in Thomas M. Cynkin, Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis (London: Macmillan Press Limited, 1988) 49.

⁵Thomas M. Cynkin, Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis (London: Macmillan Press Limited, 1988) 52-54.

⁶Cynkin 66.

⁷Pravda, (13 November 1968) in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 20 no.46 (4 December 1968): 3-5, in Hutchings 43.

⁸Spravochnik partiynogo rabotnika (Moscow 1968) 21, in Ploss.

⁹Ploss 47.

¹⁰Hutchings 41-42.

¹¹Hutchings 65, 219-220.

¹²Ploss 33.

¹³Ploss 38.

¹⁴Ploss 41-44.

¹⁵Ploss 50-51.

¹⁶U.S. Department of State 2-4.

¹⁷Wozniuk 130.

Chapter 3

¹Ploss 70.

²Le Figaro (31 March 1981) in Ploss 68.

³Ploss 37.

⁴Karen Dawisha, Eastern Europe. Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988) 105.

⁵Ploss 104.

⁶Ploss 97-98.

⁷Ploss 102.

⁸Rachwald 114-115.

⁹Ploss 121.

¹⁰Ploss 122.

¹¹Ploss 121.

¹²Wozniuk 125-126.

¹³Ploss 141.

Chapter 4

¹Brown 196-197.

²Dawisha 60.

³Brown 193.

⁴Frentzel-Zagórska 93.

⁵Frentzel-Zagórska 94.

⁶Craig R. Whitney, "Prague Tries to Cut Off All but the Party Line," New York Times 17 September 1989, sec. Y: 13.

⁷Hélène Larrère D'encausse, Big Brother: The Soviet Union and Soviet Europe (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1987) translated by George Holock; 316-317.

⁸Vladimir Kusin, "Gorbachev's Evolving Attitude toward Eastern Europe," Radio Liberty Research on the USSR 1 no.31 (4 August 1989): 10.

⁹Mason 53.

¹⁰"Program NSZZ Solidarnosc," Tygodnik Solidarnosc, 16 October 1981, in Mason 52.

Chapter 5

¹Jackson Diehl, "Walesa v. Warsaw in Prime Time," Washington Post 1 December 1988, sec. A: 1.

²Jackson Diehl, "Polish Premier Sets Terms for Legalization of Solidarity," Washington Post 18 January 1989, sec. A: 17.

³John Tagliabue, "Walesa Opens Parley with Solidarity," New York Times 7 February 1989, sec. Y: 3.

⁴Jackson Diehl, "New Wave of Strikes Grips Polish Industry," Washington Post 9 February 1989, sec. A: 29.

⁵Jackson Diehl, "Jaruzelski Threatens to Use Army if Protests, Strikes Jeopardize Socialism," Washington Post 1 March 1989, sec. A: 17.

⁶John Burns, "Soviets Praise Walesa, Printing First Interview," New York Times 3 March 1989, sec. Y: 7.

⁷Burns, "Soviets Praise Walesa. . . ," 7.

⁸John Tagliabue, "Poland's Senate to be Resurrected in Election Pact," New York Times 10 March 1989, sec. Y: 4.

⁹Leon Wieseltier, "Totems and Taboos," The New Republic 7 & 14 August 1989: 21-25.

¹⁰V. Volkov, "W. Jaruzelski Elected PPR President," Pravda 21 July 1989: 7; rpt. in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 41 no.29 (16 August 1989): 28.

¹¹Charles T. Powers, "Polish President Endorses Plan for Solidarity's Cabinet," Los Angeles Times 18 August 1989, sec. 1: 1.

• ¹²John Tagliabue, "Pole Approve Solidarity-Led Cabinet," New York Times 13 September 1989, sec. Y: 3.

¹³John Tagliabue, "Polish Cabinet Nominees Pledge Market Economy," New York Times 14 September 1989, sec. Y: 8.

¹⁴Serge Schmemmann, "Exodus Galls East Berlin," New York Times 14 September 1989, sec. Y: 8.

¹⁵John Tagliabue, "US to help Warsaw Lure Private Investors," New York Times 24 September 1989, sec. Y: 4.

¹⁶M. Tretyakov, "The Market Dictates the Price," Pravda 2 August 1989; rpt. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 41 no.31 (30 August 1989): 31.

¹⁷Tretyakov 31.

¹⁸Associated Press, Newsweek 14 August 1989: 26.

¹⁹Jeffrey Sachs, "Lack of Solidarity," The New Republic 7, 14 August 1989: 21.

²⁰Sachs 21.

²¹Tagliabue, "US to Help Warsaw. . . ," 4.

²²Brown 42.

²³Marvine Howe, "Polish Foreign Minister Pledges No Withdrawal From the Warsaw Pact," New York Times 26 September 1989, sec. Y: 6.

²⁴Howe 6.

²⁵Howe 6.

²⁶Roberto Livi, "Uncharted Territory," Il Messaggero, rpt. in World Press Review (October, 1989): 15.

²⁷Frentzel-Zagórska 98.

²⁸Current Digest of the Soviet Press 41 no.23 (5 July 1989): 23-24; rpt. of Oleg Lesoto, "Both Reform and Accord," Pravda 9 June 1989, 6 and "First Round Voting Results in Poland," Izvestia 9 June 1989, 12.

²⁹L. Toporkov, "Broad Coalition Needed," Izvestia 22 June 1989: 4; rpt. in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 41 no.25 (19 July 1989): 28.

³⁰L. Toporkov, "The New Political Situation in Poland," Izvestia 20 January 1989: 5; rpt. in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 41 no.3 (15 February 1989): 21.

³¹Toporkov, "Broad Coalition. . . ," 28-29.

³²Toporkov, "Broad Coalition. . . ," 29.

³³Powers 1.

³⁴Powers 1.

³⁵Charles T. Powers, "3 Parties Endorse Walesa as Premier," Los Angeles Times 17 August 1989, sec. 1: 18-19.

³⁶"Soviet Reaction to Creation of New Government in Poland," Pravda 14 August 1989 and comments by Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuri Gremitskikh of same date; Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR 1 no.34 (25 August 1989): 38.

³⁷Eduard A. Shevardnadze, "Excerpts from the Speech by Shevardnadze Before the General Assembly," New York Times 27 September 1989, sec. Y: 6.

Chapter 6

¹Wieseltier 25.

²Mikhail Gorbachev, Speech in Moscow 30 July 1989, summarized in Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR 1 no.32 (11 August 1989): 36.

³D'encausse 308.

⁴D'encausse 311.

⁵D'encausse 312.

⁶Mason 48.

⁷Kusin 8.

⁸Dawisha 211.

⁹D'encausse 321.

¹⁰Kusin 9.

¹¹D'encausse 321.

¹²Thomas Friedman, "East Europe Accord," *New York Times* 28 September 1989, sec. Y: 6.

¹³Friedman 6.

¹⁴Elizabeth Teague, "Gorbachev Tells Plenum Soviet Economy has Stopped Growing," Radio Liberty Research Bulletin no.9 (3474): 2 March 1988, RL 74/88, 22 February 1988: 3.

¹⁵Teague, "Gorbachev," 3.

¹⁶Krickus 64.

¹⁷Barbara Donovan, "The Soviet-West German Political Declaration," Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR 1 no.25 (23 June 1989): 10.

¹⁸Donovan 11.

¹⁹Donovan 18.

²⁰Gennadii Gerasimov, speech on Hungarian television, 6 March 1989, rpt. in Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 1 no.11 (17 March 1989): 36.

²¹Gerasimov 36.

²²Kusin 8.

²³Kusin 9.

Chapter 7

¹Dawisha 59.

²Thomas Sherlock, "New Thinking on Nazi-Soviet Pact," Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR 1 no.30 (28 July 1989): 12-15.

³Colonel General Demitrii Volkogonov, Interview on Radio Moscow, 17 February 1989, summarized in Radio Liberty Report on the USSR 1 no.8 (24 February 1989): 61.

⁴John Tagliabue, "With a New Freedom, Poles Mark Soviet Invasion of '39," New York Times 18 September 1989, sec. Y: 6.

⁵Vera Tolz and Thomas Sherlock, "Latest Attempts to Review History of Soviet-Polish Relations," Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR 1 no.25 (23 June 1989): 1.

⁶Tolz 7.

⁷Tolz 7.

⁸Tagliabue, "With a New Freedom. . . ," 6.

⁹Bill Keller, "Soviet Miners Seek Control of Union," New York Times 17 September 1989, sec. Y: 6.

¹⁰Keller 6.

¹¹Peter Miller, "Solidarity backs a free Ukraine," The Sunday Times (London) 10 September 1989, sec. A: 6.

¹²Francis X. Clines, "Gorbachev Urges Baltic Compromise," New York Times 16 September 1989, sec. Y: 5.

Chapter 8

¹Fred Barns, "Affable Abroad," The New Republic 7, 14 August 1989: 11-12.

²"Yugoslav Communists Anticipate Competition," New York Times 13 September 1989, sec. Y: 6.

³Dawisha 23.

⁴Stanislav Kondrashov, "New Relations, New Hopes," Izvestia 15 July 1989, 4; rpt. in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press 41 no.28 (9 August 1989).

⁵George Konrád, interview by Richard Falk and Mary Kalder, "The Post Yalta Debate," World Policy Journal 11 no.3 (summer 1985): 461; Dawisha 211.

⁶Kusin 10.

⁷Kusin 10.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Associated Press, Newsweek. 14 August 1989, 26.

Avery, William P., "Political Legitimacy and Crisis in Poland." Political Science Quarterly. 103 no.1 (Spring 1988): 111-130.

Barns, Fred. "Affable Abroad." The New Republic. 7 & 14 August 1989: 11-12.

Brown, J. F. East Europe and Communist Rule. Durham: Duke University Press, 1988.

Burns, John. "Soviets Praise Walesa, Printing First Interview." New York Times. 3 March 1989, sec. Y: 7.

Clines, Francis X. "Gorbachev Urges Baltic Compromise." New York Times. 16 September 1989, sec. Y: 5.

Cynkin, Thomas M. Soviet and American Signalling in the Polish Crisis. London: Macmillan Press Limited, 1988.

Dawisha, Karen. Eastern Europe, Gorbachev and Reform: The Great Challenge. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

D'encausse, Hélène Carrère. Big Brother: The Soviet Union and Soviet Europe. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987, translated by George Holoch.

Diehl, Jackson. "Jaruzelski Threatens to Use Army if Protests, Strikes Jeopardize Socialism." Washington Post 1 March 1989, sec. A: 17, 19.

Diehl, Jackson. "New Wave of Strikes Grips Polish Industry." Washington Post 9 February 1989, sec. A: 29, 31.

Diehl, Jackson. "Polish Premier Sets Terms For Legalization of Solidarity." Washington Post 18 January 1989, sec. A: 17, 20.

- Diehl, Jackson. "Walesa v. Warsaw In Prime Time." Washington Post 1 December 1988, sec. A: 1.
- Donovan, Barbara. "The Soviet-West German Political Declaration." Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR. vol. 1, no.25: 23 June 1989. 10-12.
- "First Round Voting Results," Izvestia 9 June 1989, 12; rpt. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 41 no. 23 (5 July 1989): 23-24.
- Frentzel-Zagórska, Janina and Krzysztof Zagórska. "East European Intellectuals on the Road of Dissent: The Old Prophecy of a New Class Re-examined." Politics and Society. 17 no.1 (March 1989): 89-113.
- Friedman, Thomas. "East Europe Accord." New York Times. 28 September 1989, sec. Y: 6.
- Gerasimov, Gennadii, speaking on Hungarian television. 6 March 1989; quoted in Radio Liberty Report on the USSR. vol.1, no.11: 17 March 1989. 36.
- Gorbachev, Mikhail. Speech in Moscow on 30 July 1989, summarized in Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR. vol.1, no.32: 11 August 1989. 36.
- Gorbachev, Mikhail. "Excerpts From Speech By Gorbachev in France," New York Times 6 July 1989, sec. A: 6.
- Howe, Marvin. "Polish Foreign Minister Pledges No Withdrawal From Warsaw Pact." New York Times. 26 September 1989, sec. Y: 6.
- Hutchings, Robert L. Soviet-East European Relations: Consolidation and Conflict 1968-1980. Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1983.
- Keller, Bill. "Soviet Miners Seek Control of Union." New York Times. 17 September 1989, sec. Y: 6.
- Kondrashov, Stanislov. "New Realities, New Hopes." Izvestia. 15 July 1989, 4; rpt. in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. vol. 41, no. 28: 9 August 1989.

- Krickus, Richard J. The Superpowers in Crisis: Implications of Domestic Discord. Washington: Pergamon-Brassey, 1987.
- Kusin, Vladimir. "Gorbachev's Evolving Attitude towards Eastern Europe." Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR. vol. 1, no. 31: 4 August 1989. 8-12.
- Lesoto, Oleg. "Both Reform and Accord," Pravda 9 June 1989, 6; rpt. in Current Digest of the Soviet Press 41, no. 23 (5 July 1989): 23-24.
- Livi, Roberto. "Uncharted Territory." Il Messaggero; rpt. in World Press Review. October 1989, 15.
- Mason, David S. "Solidarity as a New Social Movement." Political Science Quarterly. 104, no.1 (Spring 1989): 41-58.
- Millar, Peter. "Solidarity backs a free Ukraine." The Sunday Times (London). 10 September 1989, sec. A: 6.
- Ploss, Sidney I. Moscow and the Polish Crisis: An Interpretation of Soviet Policies and Intentions. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1986.
- Powers, Charles T. "Polish President Endorses Plan for Solidarity Cabinet." Los Angeles Times. 18 August 1989, sec. 1: 1, 14.
- Powers, Charles T. "3 Parties Endorse Walesa as Premier." Los Angeles Times. 17 August 1989, sec. 1: 1, 8-9.
- Rachwald, Arthur R. Poland Between the Superpowers: Security vs. Economic Recovery. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1983.
- Sachs, Jeffrey. "Lack of Solidarity." The New Republic. 7 & 14 August 1989: 20-21.
- Schmemmann, Serge. "Exodus Galls East Berlin." New York Times. 14 September 1989, sec. Y: 8.
- Sherlock, Thomas. "New Thinking on Nazi-Soviet Pact." Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR. vol. 1, no. 30: 28 July 1989. 12-15.

- Shevardnadze, Eduard A. "Excerpts From the Speech by Shevardnadze Before the General Assembly." New York Times. 27 September 1989, sec. Y: 6.
- "Soviet Reaction to Creation of New Government in Poland." Summarized comments from Pravda. 14 August 1989 and from comments by Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Yuri Gremitskikh on same date. Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR. vol. 1, no. 34: 25 August 1989. 38.
- Tagliabue, John. "Poland's Senateto be Resurrected in Election Pact." New York Times. 10 March 1989, sec. Y: 1, 4.
- Tagliabue, John. "Poles Approve Solidarity-Led Cabinet." New York Times. 13 September 1989, sec. Y: 3.
- Tagliabue, John. "Polish Cabinet Nominees Pledge Market Economy." New York Times. 9 September 1989.
- Tagliabue, John. "US to Help Warsaw Lure Private Investors." New York Times. 24 September 1989, sec. Y: 4.
- Tagliabue, John. "Walesa Opens Parley with Solidarity." New York Times. 7 February 1989, sec. Y: 3.
- Tagliabue, John. "With a New Freedom, Poles Mark Soviet Invasion of '39." New York Times. 18 September 1989, sec. Y: 6.
- Teague, Elizabeth. "Gorbachev Tells Plenum Soviet Economy Has Stopped Growing." Radio Liberty Research Bulletin. no. 9 (3474): 2 March 1988. RL 74/88, 22 February 1988. 1-4.
- Tolz, Vera and Thomas Sherlock. "Latest Attempts to Review History of Soviet-Polish Relations." Radio Liberty: Report on the USSR. vol. 1, no. 25: 23 June 1989. 1-8.
- Toporkov, L. "Broad Coalition Needed." Izvestia. 22 June 1989, 4; rpt. in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. vol. 41, no. 25: 19 July 1989. 28-29.

- Toporkov, L. "The New Political Situation in Poland." Izvestia. 20 January 1989, 5; rpt. in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. vol. 41, no. 3: 15 February 1989. 21.
- Tretyakov, M. "The Market Dictates the Price." Pravda. 2 August 1989; rpt. in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. vol. 41, no. 31: 30 August 1989. 31.
- United States Department of State. Bureau of Public Affairs. Soviet and Soviet-proxy Involvement in Poland: July 1980 - December 1981. Washington: GPO, 1982.
- Volkogonov, Colonel General Dmitrii. Interviewed by Radio Moscow. 17 February 1989; summarized in Radio Liberty Report on the USSR. vol. 1, no. 8: 24 February 1989. 61.
- Volkov, V. "W. Jaruzelski Elected PPR President." Pravda. 21 July 1989. 7; rpt. in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press. vol. 41, no. 29: 16 August 1989. 28.
- Whitney, Craig R. "Prague Tries to Cut Off All but the Party Line." New York Times. 17 September 1989, sec. Y: 13.
- Wieseltier, Leon. "Totems and Taboos." The New Republic. 7 & 14 August 1989: 21-25.
- Wozniuk, Vladimir. From Crisis to Crisis: Soviet-Polish Relations in the 1970s. Ames, Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1987.
- "Yugoslav Communists Anticipate Competition." New York Times. 13 September 1989, sec. Y: 6.