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**THE FALKLAND ISLANDS (MALVINAS):
A NEEDLESS WAR, A NECESSARY PEACE**

by

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
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
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Map 1--The Falkland (Malvinas) Islands. Taken from: UNITED KINGDOM, HOUSE OF COMMONS FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, 24th Report, Falkland Islands, Nov. 21, Session 1973, London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 29 October 1974.

Map of the South Atlantic and Antarctic Peninsula, showing the routes of the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) expedition, 1956-57, and the Argentine Antarctic expedition, 1956-57. The map includes the Antarctic Peninsula, South Sandwich Islands, and the South Atlantic Ocean. The routes are marked with letters and numbers, and the map shows the locations of the bases and the ships used.



Distances in nautical miles	
Falkland to (Port Stanley) to	
United Kingdom (Plymouth)	8778
Aberdeen	7379
St Helena	2771
Rio de Janeiro	1888
Buenos Aires	1470
Ushuaia (Argentina)	517
Pointe Anquetin	497
South Georgia (Grytviken)	788
Graham Land (Draughton I.)	898
South Georgia (Grytviken) to	
Graham Land (Draughton I.)	998

ANTARCTIC TREATY AREA

Antarctic Peninsula

Antarctic Coast

PREFACE

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Senor Javier Perez de Cuellar, once commented that the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Falkland Islands could be resolved in ten minutes if only the two sides were willing. Unfortunately neither Britain nor Argentina has demonstrated the flexibility in its negotiating stance necessary to reach a mutually acceptable accommodation. Consequently, the conflict has perpetuated over 150 years. Chapter One looks at the long and tortuous history of these Islands, beginning with their discovery and subsequent colonization attempts by France, Spain, and Britain. After Spain abandoned the Islands in the early 1800s, Argentina assumed her title. At the same time, Britain sought to reassert her own sovereignty claim. Chapter One traces the history of these competing sovereignty claims up to the 1982 outbreak of hostilities. The intensity and duration of this historic rivalry impinges directly on current attempts to find a solution to the Falklands dispute.

Chapter Two chronicles the course of the 1982 Campaign, beginning with the events on South Georgia Island that foreshadowed the larger conflict of April-June, 1982. Chapter Two also follows the search for a negotiated settlement in the time prior to direct military conflict. Finally, the costs and damages incurred by each side are assessed in the aftermath of the Campaign.

In his 1968 book Argentina, H.S. Ferns described with astounding accuracy and prescience the factors which could precipitate an escalation of the Anglo-Argentine dispute into armed conflict:

If the problem of the Falkland-Malvinas Islands leads to tragedy,

the disaster will be a prime instance of the effects of non-communication all round; a national dilemma rendered lethal by separate and total ignorance.

Chapter Three analyzes the misjudgments and misunderstandings which lead to the complete break-down of conflict deterrence. The British government erred both in failing to consider how its Falklands' policies would be perceived in Argentina and in wholly disregarding the qualitative change in Argentina's approach to the Falklands dispute. Argentina, for its part, both critically underestimated Britain's commitment to the Islands and seriously miscalculated what the international reaction would be to an invasion. Thus, erroneous assumptions and faulty intelligence assessments combined to increase drastically the likelihood of hostilities erupting.

Chapter Four traces the frustrating course of negotiations and attempts at a normalization of relations since the end of armed conflict in June, 1982. The almost complete lack of progress in restoring relations and reducing tensions reflects the fundamental incompatibility of the two governments; approaches to the negotiation process. Firstly, Britain considers the self-determination of the Islanders to be the crux of the dispute, while Argentina believes sovereignty is the central issue to be resolved. Secondly, Britain insists that talks can only cover the normalization of relations, while Argentina insists that negotiations which fail to address the sovereignty dispute are pointless.

The prospect for resolving this dilemma is the bifurcation of negotiations, where one set of talks would address the normalization of relations while the other would allow for discussion of the sovereignty dispute. Still, the prospects for improved relations in the near future are slim. The current governments in Buenos Aires and, especially, in London have invested too much political rhetoric to allow adequate flexibility in negotiations.

The last chapter--Chapter Five--evaluates the feasibility of a variety of

long-term options for the Islands. The possible solutions fall into three distinct categories: status quo options, internationalization of the dispute, and shared sovereignty. The status quo schemes (maintaining the status quo, integration, free association, and associated statehood) all prove unsatisfactory because they ignore, rather than resolve, the dispute at hand. The various means of internationalizing the conflict (providing guarantees for independence, transforming the Islands into a military base, creating a South Atlantic Treaty Organization, forming a tripartite government, incorporating the Islands in the Antarctic Treaty, arbitration, mediation, and forming a Trust) ignore the claims of either self-determination or sovereignty or both. Still, incorporation in the Antarctic Treaty does appear to be a viable long-term solution to the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Dependencies, but not over the Falkland Islands themselves. Of the three categories, the shared sovereignty options best address the core of the Anglo-Argentine dispute (that is, abandonment, condominium, alternating sovereignty, the Andorra Solution, sovereignty transfer with guarantee, and leaseback). Of these schemes, leaseback appears as the most viable option and the one most likely to garner support from all involved parties (Britons, Argentines, and Islanders). However, the leaseback would have to be supplemented by a buy-out option for those Islanders who adamantly refuse to live under Argentine rule. Support for this option is growing among all the relevant parties. However, such a substantive resolution of the Anglo-Argentine dispute can only be achieved after a normalization of relations. For the time being, the main task is to get involved parties to sit down at a negotiating table with their minds open to compromise.

CHAPTER 1:

History of Conflict

Introduction

The Falklands Campaign¹ of April-June 1982 pitted great Britain--a Western democracy with an undeniably Eurocentric strategic orientation--against Argentina--a developing country under military rule--in what could be described as an anachronistic struggle over an obscure colonial territory. To the outside world, it seemed almost ludicrous that Britain and Argentina would expend such effort and resources disputing the possession of, as Samuel Johnson once described it,

...an island thrown aside from human use, stormy in winter and barren in summer; an island which not the southern savages have dignified with habitation; where a garrison must be kept in a state that contemplates with envy the exiles of siberia...²

Yet, the 1982 conflict was not the first time that the Falkland Islands were the object of hostilities. Throughout their history, disputes over possession of these islands have involved not just Britain and Argentina, but also Spain, France, the United States, and Germany. An awareness of the Falkland Islands' complex history is essential if one is to understand the contemporary conundrum.

The Falkland Islands are actually an archipelago of approximately 12,000 square kilometers,³ composed of two large islands and about 200 smaller islands.⁴ The two large islands are the East and West Falklands (referred to as

Soledad and Gran Malvina, respectively, by the Argentinians); these two islands are separated by Falkland Sound (the Strait of San Carlos). The archipelago is situated about 300 miles southwest of the South American mainland and 250 miles from the Straits of Magellan. Geographically, the islands' surface is rocky and hilly, with scattered grasslands, but few trees. The 1980 census revealed a population of 1,813 that is essentially British in origin. The mainstay of the economy is sheep farming (the island is home to some 650,000 sheep).⁵ The islands are administered locally by a crown-appointed Governor (Sir Rex Hunt), an Executive Council (6 members), and a Legislative Council (8 members).

The Dependencies

Before considering the history of the Falkland Islands themselves, a cursory examination of the Falkland Island Dependencies is worthwhile. The Falkland Island Dependencies comprise South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands, the Shag Rocks and the Clerke Rocks. These islands, actually, are British dependencies, but they are administered through the Falkland Islands' government as an expedient. The Argentinians include these Dependencies in their assertion of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, although the legitimacy of the claim to the Falklands' Dependencies is much more doubtful than is the claim to their Falklands themselves. While the Argentinians have claimed sovereignty over the Falkland Islands since 1811, they did not assert a similar claim with regard to the Dependencies until 1937. Further, until the 1982 conflict, the Argentine government had never settled on any of the Dependencies; whereas the British have continuously occupied South Georgia since 1909. Thus, the Argentine claim to the Dependencies is much more tenuous than is their claim to the Falkland Islands alone.

Discovery

The history of the Falkland Islands is subject to a variety of interpretations and this confusion extends back as far as the question of discovery.⁶ Because the physical characteristics of the Islands offered little to entice the numerous explorers who traveled the South Atlantic in the 16th and 17th centuries, the title of discoverer is attributed on the evidence of a first sighting rather than on an actual landing. The first possible sighting of the Islands may have occurred during Amerigo Vespucci's third voyage (1501-2) when, on the 7th of April, he sailed in the general vicinity of the Falklands (53 degrees south latitude). Vespucci claims: "...we sighted new land, about 20 leagues of which we skirted; and we found it all barren coast; and we saw in it neither harbor nor inhabitants."⁷ Magellan, for his 1520 expedition, and Friar Francisco de la Ribera, for his 1540 expedition in Incognita, have also been credited with the first sighting of the Islands. Unfortunately, the inaccuracy and infrequency of navigational records during this period preclude a scientific determination of the true discoverer of the Falkland Islands. While many Argentines credit the Incognita expedition with discovery,⁸ the British acknowledge their own explorers--John Davis in 1592 and Richard Hawkins in 1597--as the true discoverers of the Falkland Islands. While Davis, if indeed he saw the Islands, made little note or observation of them, Hawkins did sight some territory--believed by the British to be the Falklands--and named it Hawkins' Maiden-Land (after Queen Elizabeth I). Again, the validity of these claims rests upon imprecise navigational records. The 1598 voyage of the Dutch explorer Sebald de Weert is generally conceded by all sides to have sighted the Islands, although they continue to dispute whether this constituted an original discovery or merely a rediscovery.

Throughout the 1600s, the Islands were visited by numerous parties of

sailors and pirates, and especially were frequented by French sailors from St. Malo--from whence the name Malouines (and thus the hispanization, Malvinas) derives. In his 1690 visit to the Islands, the British Captain John Strong named the sound separating the two large islands Falkland Sound (after Viscount Falkland, the Treasurer of the Navy) and the name Falkland soon came to be applied to the Islands as well.

Although the question of discovery continues to be disputed, the issue is essentially moot as far as the right of sovereignty is concerned. Unless discovery is supplemented by actual occupation, claims of discovery alone do not confer sovereignty.

Discovery alone...without a subsequent effective display of state functions over the new land, was generally understood to confer only an inchoate title which, in practice, represented only an option or temporary ban to occupation by another state....(An inchoate title of discovery is required to be completed within a reasonable period of time by effective occupation...(or) the inchoate title could perish.⁹

Yet, neither Spain nor Britain made an effort to occupy the Islands for over 150 years--which clearly surpasses the "reasonable period of time" restriction. While the official status of the Islands was to remain in limbo, the rocky shores were utilized as a haven for wayfaring sailors from many nations.

The Falklands and Imperial Strategy

Although the Falkland Islands may have been considered relatively valueless during the 1600s, as Britain's imperial naval strategy developed during the eighteenth century, the potential value of the Falklands became apparent. Whereas both previous and subsequent empires (e.g. Roman, Napoleonic) concentrated on the consolidation of land mass, the British empire was to become a collection of islands and continental outposts--with a few significant

exceptions (e.g. India). The master plan of the empire was not that, through the sea, Britain would forge an empire. Rather, through its empire, Britain intended to dominate the seas.

Let us in God's name leave off our attempts against the terra firma. The natural situation of islands seems not to consort with conquests of that kind. England alone is just empire. Or, when we would enlarge ourselves, let it be that way we can, and to which it seems the eternal Providence hath destined us, which is by the sea.¹⁰

Following his 1740 expedition around the Horn, Admiral Lord George Anson advocated the acquisition of a base south of Brazil on either the Pepys or the Falkland Islands. Anson felt that such a settlement was

...necessary to the success of...future expeditions against the coast of Chile, and as of such use and importance that it would produce many advantages in peace, and in war would make us masters of the South Sea.¹¹

The 1748 Expedition

In order to investigate this proposal, the British sought to dispatch an expedition, ostensibly, for the purposes of exploration in 1748. But the Spanish Court was quick to protest that such actions would be

...a direct violation of the last peace (the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle),...an act inconsistent with amicable intentions, and contrary to the professions of mutual kindness which then passed between Spain and England.¹²

The Spanish feared that the expedition was not merely for purposes of exploration, but, instead, would include the occupation of territory in the region. The Spanish were aware of Anson's proposals concerning a base in the South Atlantic and, consequently, rejected British assertions that the voyage

was intended solely for exploratory purposes. The Spanish felt that: "... to go so far only to come back was no reasonable act...if (the British) left the places as (they) found them the voyage was useless; and if (they) took possession, it was a hostile armament...."¹³ Eventually, in the face of these Spanish protests, the British cancelled plans for the expedition. Subsequently, the Argentinians have cited this incident as a British concession of Spanish sovereignty over the Islands. Yet, the right to settle was never discussed. Instead, the issue at hand was the right of Britain to enter the region. This right Britain conceded to Spain; however, the British assert that this concession did not affect British rights to settle in the region subsequently.¹⁴

French Occupation

While Britain and Spain wrangled over various regional prerogatives, the French, in 1764, effected the first official settlement of the Falkland Islands. After erecting a settlement at what is now Port Louis, formal possession was taken of the Islands in the name of the French King Louis V. The Spanish government was quick to protest the French action, fearing that the settlement both might pose a threat to Spanish trade and would inspire a similar British endeavor. After protracted negotiations, the French agreed to surrender the colony in exchange for the payment of a sum of 680,000 livres.¹⁵ A Spanish colony was established in 1765 on East Falkland. While the French concession is frequently cited as evidence of Spanish sovereignty over the Islands, the fact that Spain had to purchase the evacuation casts doubt on the strength of the Spanish claim.

The Byron Expedition

Meanwhile, the strategic value of the Falkland Islands--having a propitious

location for controlling navigation along the South Atlantic trade routes--had come to be appreciated in London. The first Lord of the Admiralty, Earl John Egmont described the Falklands as "...the key to the whole Pacific Ocean...It will render all our expeditions to those parts most lucrative to ourselves, most fatal to Spain and no longer formidable, tedious, or uncertain in a future war...."¹⁶ Consequently, in the spring of 1764, plans were made for an expedition, with Commodore John Byron (grandfather of the poet) directed to call at

His Majesty's Islands called Falklands...situated in the Atlantick Ocean near the Streights of Magellan, in order to make better surveys thereof, than had yet been made, and to determine a place or places, most proper for a new settlement or settlements thereon.¹⁷

In January, 1765, Byron landed on West Falkland at Port Egmont (named after the First Lord of the Admiralty) and took possession in the name of King George III. In 1766, a British settlement was established on this same site under the command of Captain John McBride.

For three years, this British settlement and the Spanish colony on East Falkland lived side-by-side with both either unaware of or ignoring the existence of the other. This state of affairs continued until November, 1769, when Captain Hunt--the Islands' military governor--ordered withdrawn a Spanish schooner exploring the western island. Thus, a series of claims and counter-claims to possession began which ended with the Spanish expulsion--by virtue of superior military force--of the Port Egmont settlers in June 1770.

1771: The Threat of War

"Fortune often delights to dignify what nature has neglected, and that renown which cannot be claimed by intrinsic excellence or greatness, is

sometimes derived from unexpected accidents."¹⁸ So wrote Samuel Johnson in 1771, when it seemed as though Spain, Britain, and perhaps even France might go to war over "...the empty sound of an ancient title to a Magellanick rock..."¹⁹ Yet, while both sides prepared for war, there was a hesitancy to initiate hostilities. Both Britain and Spain were uncertain as to what had actually transpired on the Islands, as to the validity of their sovereignty claims, and even as to whether the Malvinas and the Falklands were one and the same!²⁰ Spain, while earnest in its desire to maintain good relations with Britain, feared the consequences of allowing an infringement of its territorial prerogative in the Americas. Britain on the other hand, sought a redress of the humiliation allegedly inflicted upon the Crown and, with the powerful Lord Chatham leading the Opposition, a success for the Government was a political imperative:

...it would be comparatively easy for the opposition to represent...that the prestige of the country had been materially and needlessly diminished...such accusations (would)...probably find a ready hearing with a people quite prepared to believe the worst of the ministers, and to accept their incompetence as an article of faith; and thus, whether war was declared or peace maintained, the future of the administration might be materially affected by a trivial encounter on a desert island in a remote region of the globe.²¹

The Resolution of the Dispute

In January of 1771, following extensive and involved negotiations, Britain and Spain reached an accord. After attributing the hostile activities of the Spanish at Port Egmont to the independent and unauthorized initiative of the Governor of Buenos Aires, the Spanish government disavowed the action and agreed to restore Port Egmont to the status quo ante 10 June 1770--the time of the incident. The declaration which announced this, however, emphasized that the

restoration of Port Egmont to the British "...cannot nor ought in any wise to affect the question of the prior right of sovereignty of the Malouine islands, otherwise called Falkland Islands."²²

A Secret Promise

Thus, Britain received satisfaction and had her settlement restored, while peace was preserved. But the Spanish insist that there was more to the compromise than was explicitly declared. They maintain that, in exchange for the restitution of Port Egmont, the British had agreed secretly to abandon the settlement later, Lord North supposedly told Frances, the French chargé d'affaires in London, who served as an intermediary in the negotiations, that "...if Spain would only give satisfaction without condition England would abandon the Falklands to them, as she did not desire to make war for the islands."²³ Whether any such promise was ever made by the British continues to be disputed. While no official documentation has appeared, the fact that, in 1774, the British did withdraw from the Falkland Islands is seen by many as evidence of such a promise and, consequently, of an implicit British concession of Spanish sovereignty over the Islands. Yet, the British contend that the 1774 abandonment was motivated purely by economic considerations and was not a concession of sovereignty: "It (the colony) is neither more nor less than a small part of an uneconomical naval regulation."²⁴ As evidence, they cite a plaque which was left when the colony was abandoned that stated:

Be it known to all nations that the Falkland Islands, with this fort, the storehouses, wharfs, harbors, bays and creeks thereunto belonging are the sole property of His Most Sacred Majesty George the Third, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of the Faith, etc. In witness whereof this plate is set up, and his Britannic Majesty's colors left flying as a mark of possession....²⁵

Withdrawal

Clearly, the 1774 withdrawal from the Falklands and the subsequent British absence for 59 years, when combined with the failure of the British to match Spanish reservations of sovereignty in its own 1771 declaration and the conclusion of the 1790 Nootka Sound Convention (which excluded British settlement in the region), greatly weaken Britain's claim to the Islands. The Spanish, on the other hand, maintained their colony on East Falkland until 1811, when internal political circumstances forced their withdrawal. As one expert on international law later noted, "(It) is difficult to see how an international court...could have held that an inscription on a piece of lead constituted a better title than the open, continuous, effective and peaceful display of state sovereignty over the archipelago generally on the part of Spain during the thirty-seven years which followed the British withdrawal."²⁶

During Spanish rule, the Islands were administered by a Spanish Governor as a settlement, a penal colony, and as a naval station. In 1776, the Islands were incorporated into the Buenos Aires viceroyalty. Ironically, when domestic political conditions forced a Spanish departure in 1811, the Spanish also left a plaque as a symbol of continued sovereignty, which said: "This island together with its Ports, buildings, outbuildings and everything in them belongs to Fernando VII, King of Spain and the Indies, Soledad de Malvinas, February 7th, 1811, being governor Pablo Guillen."²⁷

Argentine Occupation

Following the Spanish withdrawal, the Islands were essentially unoccupied until, in 1820, the government of the newly created United Provinces sought to extend its jurisdiction over all the territory which had been included in the Buenos Aires viceroyalty. In November, Colonel Daniel Jewitt formally took

possession of the Islands on behalf of Argentina. The failure of the British to protest this action was, in the eyes of some, a derogation of the British claim to sovereignty. Yet, one must recall that the British had not yet recognized Argentina officially and, thus, had no official representation in Buenos Aires to monitor such activities.

Argentina based her claim to the islands on the principle of uti possidetis (Latin for "as you possess") wherein a colony succeeds to the same territory encompassed by the colonial administrators. Under this principle, since the Viceroyalty of Buenos Aires had incorporated the Falklands during Spanish rule, the successor state to the viceroyalty--Argentina--also should inherit the Falklands. The Argentines assert that they inherited this territory as of the Spanish withdrawal in 1811, although "(the) war of independence and the problems derived from internal struggles prevented an effective occupation of the islands...until the end of 1820...."²⁸ After 1820, however, the Argentines did exercise administrative control over the Islands through three military commanders, the allocation of exploration rights and concessions, and the establishment of a settlement.

A British Reassertion of Sovereignty

Although Britain granted Argentina diplomatic recognition in 1823, she did not object to these activities until 1829, when the appointment of Luis Vernet as Governor of the Political and Military District of Malvinas finally elicited a protest from the British representative in Buenos Aires, Woodbine Parish. The British rested their claim to sovereignty on discovery followed by occupation. The British defense of their claim in 1771 and the subsequent restoration of their settlement by the British were cited as evidence of the British title. The 1774 departure was "temporary and their claim to sovereignty "...a

dormant right of which they intended to avail themselves when convenient."²⁹

Thus, the British response to the Argentine claim was that

the Government of the United Provinces (Argentina) could not reasonably have anticipated that the British Government would permit any other state to exercise a right as derived from Spain which Great Britain had denied to Spain itself...³⁰

The already tenuous British title undeniably was further weakened by their absence from the Islands for over half a century. The declarations of 1771, one must recall, did not resolve the issue of sovereignty. Rather, the declarations restored the status quo ante 10 June 1770 and merely suspended resolution of the sovereignty dispute. Thus, the validity of the British title was still in question at the time the settlement was abandoned and nothing occurred in the interim years to alleviate this uncertainty. Consequently, the legitimacy of Britain's reoccupation of the Islands, in 1833, is suspect, especially since the Argentine claim is bolstered by their effective exercise of sovereignty over the Islands for thirteen years.

The American-Argentine Dispute

The return of the British was preceded by an American/Argentine dispute over fishing rights in the Islands. In an attempt to protect the seal population, the Argentine Governor of the Falklands, Luis Vernet, attempted to terminate the sealing concession. In 1831, when his orders were ignored, the Governor seized three American ships (the Harriet, Superior, and Breakwater). The Americans claimed the arrest was executed violently; Vernet denied this. The dispute provided a convenient opportunity for Britain to reassert its claim to the Islands, a desire motivated partially by a heightened strategic interest in establishing a naval depot on the Falklands. For the United States,

supporting British sovereignty claims over the Islands--and, thus, implying the illegitimacy of Argentine rule--allowed her to escape the dispute over the sealers' actions. Thus, the Americans initiated a dialogue with the British, supporting their claim for the Islands in order to diminish American culpability. An 1831 letter from the U.S. State Department to the American chargé d'affaires in Buenos Aires, John Forbes, urged Forbes to advance the British claim to the Argentine government:

...You should address an earnest remonstrance to that Government (the Argentine) against any measures that may have been adopted by it...which are calculated.. to impose any restraints whatever upon the enterprize of our citizens.... The Government of Buenos Ayres can certainly deduce no good title to these Islands. from any fact connected with their history. 31

With respect to the Monroe Doctrine, the Falklands were considered to be a pre-revolutionary possession of the British, thereby making the Doctrine inapplicable.

The United States had dispatched the USS Lexington to the region in November as a response to the detention of the American ships. In December, the commander, Silas Duncan forcibly disassembled the Argentine settlement on the Falklands and declared the Islands to be free of government, apparently all with the connivance of the British.³²

The Return of the British

In mid-1832, the British chose to take advantage of the dissolution of the Argentine settlement and reclaim the Falklands. Two Warships--HMS Clio and Tyne were dispatched under the command of Captain J.J. Onslow. In December, Captain Onslow officially took possession of the Islands and the remaining Argentines were expelled in January, 1833. Thus, the British reoccupied the islands and

have administered them to the present. Although the legitimacy of the British claim to the Islands was questionable, in the 19th century world of power politics, the British hold was undeniable. As one Argentine has noted: "The English position was very weak from a political and legal point of view but very strong from a military and naval stance."³³ Still, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee has acknowledged that

the weight of the evidence argues in favour of the view that Argentina's title to the Falkland Islands (or at least to East Falkland) was, at the time of the British occupation in 1833, of greater substance than is or has been credited by official United Kingdom Government Sources.³⁴

Strategic Interest in the Falklands

The nineteenth century saw the apex of the Falklands' strategic contribution to the British empire. The Falkland Islands possessed only a minimal potential for economic development (beyond sheep-raising and fishing). Their importance was as a coaling station and naval depot along the strategic Cape Horn trade routes. As Medford suggests, "the Falklands were acquired at a time when a base near the Straits of Magellan was essential for naval control of the Pacific Coast of South America and the South Atlantic."³⁵ The contribution which the Falklands made to British imperial defense was acknowledged in numerous governmental reports throughout the 1800s, including those of the Carnarvon Commission,³⁶ the Select Committee on Colonial Military Expenditure, and an 1881 Report on Coaling Stations. Both the location of the Islands and their own natural formation contributed to their value as a naval depot. The glowing descriptions offered of the Islands were numerous, Commander George Grey, upon visiting the islands in 1836, commented that

It is impossible to imagine a finer harbour than this, land locked on every side, easy to approach and capable of holding the whole English Navy.... Professionally considered as lying as it were in the highway of vessels bound round Cape Horn and in containing the finest harbours in the world their value is not to be doubted.³⁷

Not surprisingly, then, the Carnarvon Commission reported that the Falklands "... could be made an admirable coaling and refitting station for the royal Navy and mercantile Marine."³⁸

Although the Islands' primary value was military, some sort of permanent settlement had to be erected to ensure continued British sovereignty. Yet, the bleak conditions and meager economic prospects, made it an unattractive option for would-be settlers. The government considered both importing Chelsea Pensioners to develop the colony³⁹ and establishing a penal colony (as the Spanish had done during their administration of the Islands). Neither of these schemes enjoyed much success and the population of the Islands has remained consistently small.

The Falklands in World War I

The Battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December, 1914 was, in the eyes of some, the decisive naval battle of World War I, for the British success secured shipping and communication lines in the southern hemisphere.⁴⁰

(Success) in war at sea was largely determined by the security of communications and...the security of communications depended upon the maintenance of naval bases located at useful points around the world. Furthermore, a battleship's radius of action depended upon her coal supply and this again depended upon the availability of fuel at set places along the communication lines.⁴¹

The Falklands represented such a center in the South Atlantic, so it was the logical meeting place for opposing sea forces in the South Atlantic in 1914.⁴²

The Battle of the Falklands was the British response to the 1 November sinking of two British cruisers by the German East Asiatic Squadron, under the command of Vice-Admiral Graf Von Spee, at the Battle of Coronel. By dispatching a large task force to the Falklands, the British were able to surprise the Germans and avenge Coronel by sinking four German ships, forcing the withdrawal of the German's East Asiatic Squadron for the remainder of the war. The Falkland Islanders contributed to this success by manning the signals station and warning the British force of the approaching Germans. As a result, the 8th of December is celebrated still in the Falkland Islands in commemoration of the great British victory.⁴³

The Falklands in World War II

The Falkland Islands also made an important contribution to World War II. In December, 1939, the British were able to sink the German battleship Graf Spee off the Falklands. Churchill, too, recognized the Islands' importance for protecting Britain's strategic position in the South Atlantic. In a telegram to Lord Halifax, Churchill stressed "... the vital necessity of the (Falkland) Islands to us."⁴⁴

20th Century Decline in Strategic Value

Although the Falkland Islands played an important role in both World Wars, their value decreased markedly in the twentieth century for a number of reasons. The opening of the Panama Canal reduced the importance of the trade route past the Falklands. The emergence of strategic air power diminished the role of the navy in power projection and, consequently, decreased the need for naval outposts like the Falkland Islands. Finally, at the end of World War II, Britain revised her strategic outlook from an imperial to a Eurocentric orientation: colonies--like the Falkland Islands--no longer received priority

consideration in defense decision-making and resource allocation. All of these reflect the fact that, for Britain, the global environment at the end of the Second World War was vastly different from that which had existed at the opening of the twentieth century. Britain had fallen to the ranks of a second-rate power; Britain's economy had weakened--she had been surpassed industrially; and, both internationally and domestically, empire had become ideologically passe.

Despite the intensity and widespread nature of the post-World War II decolonization drive, the Falkland Islands were essentially unaffected. The Islands' population wished to remain tied to Britain, recognizing, perhaps, the infeasibility of existing as an independent state due to their small size and bleak economic potential.⁴⁵ The British Government, for its part, could hardly force 2,000 of Her Majesty's loyal subjects into an independence they neither desired nor could maintain. So, while Britain shed her most valuable colonial possessions--India, Egypt, Aden--she retained this obscure collection of islands in the South Atlantic.

The Dispute in the 20th Century

Throughout the 1800s and 1900s, the Argentinians continued to protest British occupation of the Falkland Islands. Formal protests were issued in 1833, 1834, 1841, 1842, 1829, 1884, and 1888, and at regular intervals after 1908.⁴⁶ On a number of occasions, hostilities were threatened in the region. For example, in February, 1952, a group of British scientists attempting to land on Hope Bay (a Falkland Islands Dependency) were fired upon by an Argentine expeditionary force. The British Government feared that these actions resulted from the pugnacious approach of the Argentine President Juan Peron to the Falkland Islands dispute. In 1951, Peron had declared that Argentina would retake the islands through scientific expeditions "step by step."⁴⁷ In response

to the Hope Bay incident, Prime Minister Churchill dispatched 30 Royal Marines and a Royal Navy frigate in a secret deployment. The conflict was resolved quietly and, by July, the crisis was over.

In February, 1976, a British research ship--HMS Shackleton--was accosted by an Argentine ship for allegedly traversing in Argentine territorial waters. Later, a naval aircraft fired shots over the ship's bow. This led to a serious diplomatic dispute, with the British ambassador being withdrawn from Buenos Aires.⁴⁸

In 1977, an illegal Argentine settlement on Southern Thule (a Falklands' Dependency) was discovered and hostilities were threatened again. Prime Minister Callaghan responded by secretly dispatching a nuclear-powered submarine as a precaution, in case the diplomatic situation deteriorated. Talks in July proved disappointing and the domestic Argentine situation suggested military action might be taken by the Argentines. A Foreign Office report suggested that:

"The Argentines are clearly pursuing their interest at two levels--on the surface a dialogue and negotiation; beneath the surface they are planning action against the Falklands.."⁴⁹

By December, the potential for conflict had disappeared.

The Progress of Negotiations Prior to 1982

The twentieth century has also witnessed numerous attempts at resolving the dispute through negotiations. The Argentine government first raised the issue at the United Nations in 1964 at a meeting of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People (a.k.a., the Committee of Twenty-Four). In 1965, the U.N. advocated a negotiated settlement to the

dispute in accordance with its 1960 resolution on decolonization (Resolution 1514 (XV)) and reiterated this policy in resolutions in 1966, 1969, 1971, 1973, and 1976.⁵⁰ Anglo-Argentine talks also took place between 1964 and 1982 but enjoyed little success.⁵¹ The only substantive agreement was the 1971 Communications Agreement, the negotiations for which specifically excluded the central issue of sovereignty. The Communications Agreement was to promote closer ties between Argentina and the Falkland Islanders and, towards this end, it was agreed that the Argentines would construct a landing strip on the Falkland Islands to facilitate transport; the Argentine Navy would provide shipping service to the islands; an Argentine/Falkland Islands student exchange would commence; and tourism would be promoted.⁵² Beyond this, though, negotiations had markedly little success. While Argentines sought quickly discernible results and immediate discussion of the sovereignty issue, the British recognized that a surrender of sovereignty over the Islands, in the short-term, was--at the very least--politically infeasible. The Falkland Islanders garnered a great deal of support from the British populace. Thus, for the British, any solution would have to extend over the long-term. The resolution of an exceedingly complicated dispute was further hampered by the different negotiating approaches of the two parties. For nearly a century and a half, the Argentines had been frustrated by the apparent intransigence of the British concerning the Falkland Islands dispute and, in April, 1982, that frustration was transformed into an active militancy.

CHAPTER TWO:

THE CONFLICT

Prelude to Invasion

The mid-March arrival of 41 Argentine scrapworkers on South Georgia Island initiated a diplomatic dispute between the United Kingdom and Argentina, prior to the actual outbreak of hostilities on 2 April. While the expedition had been cleared with the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, the workers' failure to register at Grytviken upon arrival at South Georgia and their hoisting of the Argentine flag caused the British to order the workers' evacuation. The British government dispatched HMS Endurance (the Antarctic supply ship) to Grytviken to ensure Argentine compliance. As a response, the Argentines directed the supply ship Bahia Paraiso to protect the Argentine citizens on South Georgia. As regional tensions exacerbated, the British deployed a destroyer (Exeter) and a nuclear-powered submarine (Surabit). The Argentines subsequently answered with the dispatch of two frigates (the Drummond and Granville). By 2 April, however, the dispute had become just one aspect of the larger conflict which involved both the Falkland Islands and her Dependencies.

The Beginning of Conflict

By 9:13 in the morning of 2 April--within three hours of landing on the Islands--the Argentines had forced the surrender of the British forces on the Falkland Islands and the Governor, Sir Rex Hunt. The following day, at a special session of Parliament, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher informed

the House of Commons both of the invasion and of her decision to dispatch a task force to the region. Because it would take the task force from two to three weeks to reach the Falklands, there was leeway for a negotiated settlement to the conflict and, indeed, neither the British nor the Argentine government believed that actual armed conflict would ensue. In an address to the House of Commons, Prime Minister Thatcher commented: "I stress that I cannot fortell what orders the task force will receive as it proceeds. That will depend on the situation at the time."¹

Attempts at Peaceful Resolution

Attempts at a peaceful resolution began with the passage of the United Nations Security Council Resolution #502, which called for an immediate cessation of hostilities, an Argentine withdrawal, and a peaceful solution to the dispute. The passage of the resolution represented a significant moral victory for the British because it labeled Argentina the aggressor and legitimized Britain's military response.

Following the passage of Resolution #502, the American Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, commenced a shuttle diplomacy between Buenos Aires and London. Unfortunately, Haig's attempts at negotiation soon foundered; he was unable to find a middle ground between the demands of the two sides. Argentina would not budge without concrete British concessions on the issue of sovereignty. Britain, on the other hand, would never defer to negotiating demands which were based on the coercive force of military aggression and forceful occupation. The peace proposals forwarded by President Belaunde of Peru and by the United Nations Secretary General, Senor Perez de Cuellar, faced a similar fate. While neither government wanted military confrontation, it is not surprising that diplomatic efforts between Britain and Argentina had quarreled over sovereignty

for almost a century and a half; to expect major concessions from either side when each was negotiating under duress and in the spotlight of world opinion was somewhat unrealistic.

Military Conflict Commences

Britain's military response began with the establishment of a maritime exclusion zone on 12 April. This was upgraded to a total exclusion zone on 30 April. On 25 April, British troops landed on South Georgia and reclaimed it without loss of life on either side. This military success was followed by a political success for Britain. On 30 April, the United States' government abandoned its neutral stance and officially announced its support for Britain.² British satisfaction at this move was matched only by the feelings of disgust and betrayal held in Buenos Aires. The Argentine leader, General Leopoldo Galtieri, stated: "I feel much bitterness towards Reagan, who I thought was my friend."³

The campaign on the Falkland Islands began on 1 May with a British bombardment of the Port Stanley airfield. With this attack, the British clearly manifested their resolve to retake the Islands. In the eyes of some analysts, this act terminated the prospects for a negotiated settlement.⁴

The 2 May sinking of the Argentine cruiser, General Belgrano, is more widely associated with ending hopes for a negotiated resolution. The sinking marked a clear escalation of the conflict: 368 crewmen were killed while the ship was both outside the exclusion zone and steaming away from the Falklands and the British task force. As a containment tactic, the sinking was a success; the Argentine fleet remained in coastal waters for the duration of the conflict and the British gained control of the sea before their forces attempted to land on the Islands. Yet, the political costs of the attack were high. Previously,

Britain had garnered a great deal of support by portraying itself as the victim of Argentine aggression. By inflicting the first major loss of life in the conflict and by doing so outside its own prescribed exclusion zone and beyond its original rules of engagement, Britain's image of innocence quickly dissipated and the blame for the failure of negotiations is laid at her feet. The political cost of this military action has continued to mount as investigators of the General Belgrano sinking have uncovered inaccuracies and inconsistencies in the government's statements on the sinking.⁵ From a strategic viewpoint, the Belgrano sinking was a success; from a political perspective, it was, at best, a Pyrrhic victory. In any conflict, balancing political dictates and military exigencies is difficult. This problem exacerbates, especially for open societies, when the campaign is waged within the arena of world opinion. Lawrence Freedman acknowledged this difficulty when, in reference to the Belgrano sinking, he commented that "Any military action which is not self-evidently for defensive purposes, even if it is pre-emptive, becomes an outrage."⁶

The Argentines quickly responded, in kind, to the sinking of the General Belgrano. On 4 May, a missile attack destroyed by fire HMS Sheffield. On 21 May, the Campaign's focus switched from that of a naval conflict to that of a land-based campaign when the British established a beachhead at San Carlos.⁷ This stage of the conflict saw the Royal Navy involved in its biggest battle since World War II.⁸ The ensuing Argentine air attacks saw one British Type-21 frigate (HMS Ardent) sunk and four more damaged. The airborne assault on the Royal Navy continued until 25 May, while, onshore, a logistic build-up was underway.

Finally, on 28 May, the reoccupation battle commenced as the British moved

against Goose Green and Darwin. At this point in the campaign, the British forces found themselves battling more than just the Argentines. Military commanders also were fighting deteriorating weather, logistical difficulties, and intense political pressure for a rapid end to the campaign. One commander even noted that "There was a real fear that we might be gazing at each other for months around Port Stanley."⁹ The battle for Port Stanley--the last major Argentine stronghold--began on 11 June. On 14 June, the Argentine General Mario Menendez surrendered to the British at Port Stanley. On 20 June, the British removed from the dependency of Southern Thule, an Argentine research station which had been operating without authorization since 1976.

The Aftermath of the Conflict

The campaign cost Britain 255 dead and 777 wounded. The operation cost 700 million pounds plus 900 million pounds in lost ships and planes. The Argentines claimed 652 dead or missing.¹⁰ The surrender left Britain in charge of over 11,000 Argentine prisoners-of-war. The British returned all but 600 of them immediately. The remainder Britain retained in custody until Argentina declared a cessation of hostilities. The Argentine response was that:

The total cessation of hostilities will be achieved only when the United Kingdom agrees to lift the naval and air blockade and the economic sanctions...and when it withdraws the military forces occupying the Islands.¹¹

However, the Argentines said they would observe a de facto cessation of hostilities and this was accepted by Britain as a sufficient guarantee for the return of the remaining prisoners. Thus, the military--but clearly not the political--campaign for the Falkland Islands had ended. The British had sent the Argentines a clear message, the essence of which was reflected in a statement

by a Falkland Islander to a young Argentine soldier: "Don't you come planting your little flag here again, Jorge."¹²

CHAPTER THREE:

The Failure of Deterrence

Introduction

For 149 years prior to the 1982 campaign, the British and Argentines had prevented the escalation of their dispute into active hostilities. What minor skirmishes had occurred were brief, of low intensity, and never officially sanctioned. But, due to mismanagement, misjudgment, and misinterpretation on both sides, crisis prevention faltered and, consequently, military conflict ensued. Although the fighting has stopped now, the underlying generative dispute remains unresolved. Until negotiations can produce a substantive solution to the problem, conflict management represents the sole means of averting further bloodshed. An awareness of the mistakes--both British and Argentine--which led to the outbreak of hostilities in April, 1982, is essential, if repetition of past errors is to be avoided.

"The Falklands war will be presented by history as a classic example of a war that need not have happened."¹ The miscalculations and misjudgments which led to this conflict are numerous, but, essentially, they center on the failure of both Britain and Argentina to assess correctly the motivations of the other regarding the Falklands. Until the British task force engaged the Argentines in the South Atlantic, neither Argentina nor Britain actually expected to be involved in a full-scale military campaign. Indeed, as Philip Windsor notes, the Falklands campaign was

...one of the very few wars in history in which one nation had no real intention of invading, and the other fought for territory which it had spent twenty years saying it did not really want.²

The British, for their part, erred both in the signals they sent Buenos Aires and in interpreting the signals coming from Argentina. A number of British actions contributed to the Argentine perception that the British were not wholly committed to the Islands' protection. Failing to consider how their Falklands policies were perceived in Argentina was the fatal British flaw, for this assumption of declining British interest in the Islands underlay all Argentine diplomatic and military calculations in early 1982.

The Significance of the Islands for Britain

For some time, Britain's negotiating stance had reflected a growing desire (at least in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office) to reach an accommodation with Argentina in the dispute. The end of World War II saw Britain's withdrawal from an imperial role and the development of a Eurocentric strategic outlook.³ Yet, much to the frustration of the Argentine's, Britain's retrenchment did not include the Falkland Islands. A number of factors help explain why, when Britain had surrendered the heart of her empire--India, Aden, and the remainder East of Suez--she retained the relatively insignificant Falkland Islands. Because the Islands population is almost wholly of British ancestry and desires to maintain ties with the United Kingdom, neither indigenous nor significant international pressure for decolonization developed. The desires of the Islanders have occasioned the curious marriage of imperialism and self-determination. On 20 May 1968, the Falkland Islands Legislative Council affirmed

...the desire of the Falkland Islanders to remain British, under

the British crown and ever closely linked to the homeland of the United Kingdom.⁴

Until the 1980s--when a fall in wool prices hurt the Islands' economy--the Falklands were self-supporting, debt free, and contributing to the British balance of payments.⁵ Finally, the Islands themselves possess an inherent value. In the event of a crisis which closed the Panama Canal, the Falklands would represent an important strategic outpost along the South Atlantic transport route. The Islands already possess some strategic importance, standing, as they do, at the doorway to the Antarctic. Rumors of potential mineral discoveries have further enhanced the Islands' perceived value. To the Argentines, the territorial value of the Falklands is considered substantial. As one Argentine diplomat noted, "There is not the least doubt that the territory of the Falkland Islands is much more important than the population."⁶ Yet, the geographic significance of the Falklands has been greatly exaggerated by some Argentines who believe Britain's sole interest in the Islands is as a regional military base. While the Islands do possess some innate physical importance, considering Britain's Eurocentric strategy and the immense cost of garrisoning the Islands, the Falklands represent a liability. The tie that binds the Falklands to Britain is a human one: "(no) British political party (is) willing to assume responsibility for turning British citizens out of their homes to appease a foreign power."⁷

Britain's Negotiating Stance

While Britain asserts continually her claim to the Islands, government officials--especially in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office--have become increasingly aware of the need to reach an accommodation with Argentina. This belief was reinforced in 1976 by the Shackleton Report, which stated that a

resolution of the dispute was essential for the Islands' economic development.⁸ Thus, through negotiations, the British have sought a solution which would gradually assimilate the Island residents into the Argentine population. Only in this manner could Britain resolve its dispute with Argentina without seemingly sacrificing the Islanders. The 1971 Communications Agreement, then, was a means of increasing the ties between the Islands and Argentina. The British hoped that this increased contact would decrease the antipathy which Falklanders held for Argentina. More than diminish local aversion for Argentina, however, the Agreement increased Islander fears of a Foreign Office sell-out. The Falkland Islanders have a very strong lobby group in Parliament which is able to play both sides of the political spectrum by appealing both to the imperial nostalgia of Conservatives and to Labour's abhorrence of military dictatorship. This lobby ensures that the Islanders' views are considered in Falklands policy formulation.

By 1979, when Margaret Thatcher assumed power, leaseback appeared to be the only possible solution to which both Buenos Aires and the Falkland Islanders might agree. The remaining options--either discontinuing negotiations and garrisoning the Islands (a.k.a.: Fortress Falklands) or preserving the status quo under a facade of negotiation--were untenable and "...carried a serious threat of invasion."⁹ Islander reaction to the leaseback idea was cool. While many seemed unsure about the idea, a large and vocal group virulently opposed the proposition. The 1981 elections to the Falkland Islands Legislative Council reflected a growing opposition to negotiating sovereignty with Argentina. By the time negotiations commenced in 1981, those involved in the Falklands' government supported freezing the dispute and were decidedly opposed to leaseback. The Falkland Islands Joint Councils expressed this view in no

uncertain terms:

While this House does not like any of the ideas put forward...for a possible settlement of the sovereignty dispute with Argentina, it agrees that Her Majesty's Government should hold further talks with the Argentines at which...the British delegation should seek an agreement to freeze the dispute over sovereignty for a specified period of time.¹⁰

Britain Unaware of Argentine Impatience

While Britain's flexibility for negotiating a settlement decreased, pressures for substantial progress in the negotiations increased in Argentina. Eventually, the imperative of progress would compel an Argentine resort to force in the hope that military action would serve as a catalyst for sovereignty negotiations. The British, however, failed to appreciate the changed Argentine mood, despite the numerous indications of its nature. General Galtieri--then Army Commander-in-Chief--vocalized this mood in May, 1981, when he commented: "Nobody can or will be able to say that we have not been extremely calm and patient... However, after a century and a half they (negotiation delays) are becoming more and more unbearable."¹¹ Almost immediately upon his assumption of power in December 1981, Galtieri resurrected an old blueprint for a military invasion of the Falklands.

After nearly 149 years of seeking a peaceful resolution to the dispute, the resort to force was motivated by more than mere impatience. Still, irritation and frustration with the lack of progress did serve as an impetus to action. The 150th anniversary (1983) of the British occupation of the Islands loomed ahead of the Argentine rulers as a deadline¹² for the restoration of Argentine sovereignty. Because Argentine political culture emphasizes the almost sacred character of national territory, the anniversary of the loss of the Islands

would only underscore a sense of national humiliation and frustration over the issue.

The explosive potential of the approaching anniversary was not recognized by the British due to a lack of comprehension of this aspect of the Argentine political character. "British public and political opinion has persistently underrated the strength of feeling in Argentina about the Falklands."¹³ While, in Anglo-Saxon political culture, territorial sovereignty is viewed in the context of promoting the welfare and security of the individual, Argentines consider territorial sovereignty an end in itself.¹⁴ This tradition is reflected in the attitude of the citizenry regarding the Islands. Beginning in their childhood, Argentines are inculcated with the theme: "Las Malvinas son nosotros"- The Malvinas (Falkland) are ours. In Britain, prior to the conflict, few people were even aware of the Islands' existence, let alone their location. According to one opinion poll, the majority of Britons thought the Falkland Islands lay somewhere off the Scottish coast!¹⁵

Britain: Sending the Wrong Political Signals

The military leaders of Argentina were well aware of the British public's disinterest in the Falklands and undoubtedly this knowledge reinforced the perception that Britain would not respond militarily to an Argentine occupation of the Islands. To the Argentines, an air of official unconcern complemented the apathy of the British public. Throughout the years, preceding the crisis, a number of significant Falkland Islands' policy changes were made in Britain that suggested to the Argentines that the Falklands were of minor import to Britain. Whether or not Britain intended to convey this attitude is irrelevant; how British actions were perceived in Buenos Aires is what provided a major impetus for the Argentine invasion. Had the Argentine leaders not been convinced of a

muted British response, the invasion would not have occurred. One Argentine officer commented "The truth is that the junta never believed that the British would really fight."¹⁶

One of the most consistent signals of Britain's disinterest was their negotiating position. Through the years, the stance changed gradually from one of an adamant refusal to discuss sovereignty, to a declared willingness, in 1976, to cede sovereignty in accordance with the Islanders' wishes, and, finally, to attempting to persuade the Islanders to accept a plan which entailed the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina (leaseback). In the course of negotiations, Argentina was allowed to vastly increase contact with the Islands through the provision of essential services. Argentina provided the Islanders with air and sea transportation; postal, telegraphic, and telephone services; education in Argentine schools; commercial services; and documentation for free Islander travel within Argentina. In Buenos Aires, Britain's willingness both to discuss sovereignty and to increase Argentine relations with the Islands was interpreted as declining concern for the Islands' future. The treasury demonstrated little interest in the Falklands' development and, consequently, none of the Shackleton report's suggestions for expanding the economy were implemented. An Argentine intelligence report concluded that "Great Britain is in a desperate economic situation and would like to be able to cut off the Malvinas."¹⁷ The failure of the 1981 British Nationality Bill to grant the Islanders British citizenship represented a further lack of British commitment to the Falklands and the effect, which did not go unnoticed in Buenos Aires, was to make the Islanders virtual "Argentine passport holders."¹⁸

Under the Thatcher government, the negotiating process stagnated as the Islanders became more obstinate in their opposition to sovereignty talks. Had

the Thatcher government openly supported leaseback, the pressure to adopt a more flexible position might have persuaded the Islanders to support leaseback, or at least have made them more amenable to compromise. Initially, an estimated one-third to one-half of the Falklands' population was not opposed to the leaseback proposition and British pressure might have converted more in favor of the idea. Instead, the British government refused to pressure the Islanders, thereby, precluding a negotiated settlement to the dispute, at least in the short term.

Britain: Sending the Wrong Military Signals

In addition to political indications of declining official interest in the Falklands, the British government's military policies signalled a decrease in both its desire and ability to assert sovereignty over the Falklands. As British defense policy contracted to the European theatre, deployments and activities beyond the NATO area decreased markedly, and the Falkland Islands were no exception. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, as Argentina's military capabilities increased--in part, due to British arms sales and the provision of training facilities in the United Kingdom--the British presence in the South Atlantic dwindled. In 1968 the Commander-in-Chief, South Atlantic was withdrawn, along with the Royal Navy's frigate deployed in the region. In 1974, the termination of the Simonstown agreements removed the closest British base (which was already one week's sailing time away) to the Falkland Islands. Cuts in financing for the British Antarctic Survey and the threatened closure of its base at Grytviken, South Georgia further suggested an intention to abandon the South Atlantic. With only one detachment of Royal Marines and an ice patrol ship left to defend the Islands, the Argentines could not help but infer that the Falklands were of little value to Britain. The needs of the Falklanders seemed

as far from the minds of ministers as the Islands physically were from Whitehall.

The 1981 Defence White Paper announced the sale of the carrier HMS Invincible to Australia, an act with serious implications for Britain's ability to independently conduct an amphibious assault outside the NATO area. An earlier decision to scrap the amphibious assault ships, HMS Fearless and Intrepid, had drawn such intense criticisms from Parliament and the defense community as to reverse the policy. Since an invasion of the Falkland Islands could be countered only with an amphibious campaign, the significance of Thatcher's reduction of the surface fleet was appreciated in Argentina.

The 1981 Defence Review also called for the withdrawal of HMS Endurance, the Antarctic ice patrol ship. While the ship contributed only marginally to regional defense, HMS Endurance had a symbolic value wholly disproportionate to its military capacity. The ship represented a continued British interest in the South Atlantic and, relatedly, in the Falkland Islands. In essence, HMS Endurance performed the age-old function of "showing the flag"; and its planned withdrawal was widely interpreted in Argentina as yet another indication of Britain's desire to shed the Falklands' burden. One Argentine diplomat noted that the decision was read in Buenos Aires as a

...deliberate political gesture; they did not see it as an inevitable economy in Britain's defence budget since the implications for the Islands and for Britain's position in the South Atlantic were fundamental.¹⁹

Fears that such a conclusion would be drawn in Buenos Aires prompted heated debate of the policy in London. Prime Minister Thatcher insisted that the Royal Marine garrison on the Falklands and occasional ship visits would reflect

British interest in the region and that budgetary constraints had forced this re-evaluation of priorities. However, opponents of the policy considered more than mere economics to be at issue. As Admiral of the Fleet, Lord Hill-Norton argued:

The consequence of (the withdrawal) will almost certainly be disastrous in the political, military, and economic fields alike, and equally probably it will be irreversible...(It) is my view that to withdraw the Endurance would be the clearest signal imaginable of our lack, or loss, of interest, not only in the Falklands but in the whole area. . that signal will at once be read with anguish by our friends and with delight...by any potential opponent.²⁰

Even the Foreign Secretary, Lord Carrington, called three times for a reconsideration of the policy, but to no avail. His opposition to the policy continued, even until his resignation at the beginning of the conflict. The Falkland Islanders, too, expressed opposition to the policy. One Islander, B.G. Frow from the Falkland Islands Office, wrote to John Nott, the Defense Secretary, imploring him to reconsider. "We would most earnestly request that you review the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance, which has further damaged the morale of the Islanders and confirmed their fears that the British Government is deserting them."²¹ The protests went unheeded; however, Endurance was given a reprieve following the Campaign.

The British reaction to the Argentine occupation of Southern Thule in 1976 and 1978 and of South Georgia in March 1982 was mild. In fact, the muted nature of the British response in both cases seemed to confirm the Argentine belief that the British reaction to an invasion of the Falkland Islands would be equally impotent. General Galtieri even described the likelihood of a substantive British response as "scarcely possible and totally improbable."²²

The Thatcher government failed to respond decisively to the South Georgia incident out of fears that military action on their part would precipitate an attack on the Falkland Islands. In actuality, this lack of response helped motivate the invasion by convincing leaders that no firm British response would be forthcoming. Members of the opposition suggested that Thatcher should have resurrected the 1977 policy of dispatching a covert submarine to the area. Yet, the only type of response which might have been effective was an overt display of commitment to the Islands and to preserving British sovereignty.

Through its political, economic, and military policies in the Falklands, the British government had convinced Argentine leaders that Britain's interest in the Islands was on the wane. "If ever a nation was tired of colonial responsibility, this was it."²³ Much of the British public was ignorant even of the Islands' existence and, until the invasion sparked an atavistic jingoism, they were apathetic about their fate. Through negotiations, the British government had ceded responsibility for much of the Islands' provision to Argentina and had indicated a willingness to transfer sovereignty if the Islanders concurred. The Falklands population was the sole remaining obstacle to Argentine sovereignty. Beyond suggesting an official disinterest in asserting sovereignty rights, Britain's policies reflected an unwillingness both to guarantee the Islanders' well-being and to uphold their ties with Britain. The Islanders were denied British citizenship, funds for economic development were scarce, and the British military presence had dwindled to trivial levels. Britain's post-World War II retrenchment had left the Falklands "...increasingly exposed, dependent not on real military power but on the memory of it. They were protected by a form of historic bluff."²⁴ These measures were read in Argentina as a virtual guarantee that Argentine action against the Islands would

be opposed only by futile protests and feeble indignation. While the British may not have intended to portray this image, their fault lies in failing to consider how their actions would be interpreted in Buenos Aires.

Britain Misreads Argentina

Along with Britain's failure to represent clearly to Argentina its intentions regarding the Falkland Islands, the British government committed a second fatal error. Because Britain failed to appreciate the qualitative changes which had occurred in Argentina's approach to the Falkland Islands dispute, the government did not effect the modifications in its own policy necessary to deter a conflict. As the 1980s opened, the Argentine government desperately needed an issue which would divert public attention from the domestic woes which challenged the government's stability. As noted earlier, territorial disputes--such as the Falkland Islands and the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile--possessed an immense capacity to arouse the passion of Argentine citizens. As the military regime became more desperate and when the International Court of Justice found in favor of Chile in its adjudication of the Beagle Channel dispute (a decision Argentina renounced), a positive development in the Falkland Islands dispute was increasingly viewed as a means of restoring the government's credibility. While substantial British concessions at the negotiating table would have sufficed, the inflexible position of the Islanders left Britain with little maneuverability. In response to Argentine calls for concrete developments, Britain offered only a freeze on the status quo. Had Britain correctly interpreted the changed mood in Buenos Aires, the government might have been more willing to pressure the Islanders and to make firm commitments at the negotiations. Instead, the Thatcher government remained convinced that Argentine bellicosity was mere bluff and felt little

pressure to make immediate concessions.

Argentine Motivations

The main cause of Argentina's changed attitude was the emergence among the military leaders of a "Nuremberg mentality."²⁵ Since assuming power in 1976, the junta had compiled an appalling governmental record. Their human rights record was atrocious, around 15,000 persons were arrested and then simply disappeared (the desaparecidos). In addition, the economy was in a state of collapse and even crashed in April 1980. The foreign debt quadrupled to an estimated \$40 billion while interest rates skyrocketed (current estimates place inflation at around 900%). After the war, the popular sentiment was that the Economics Minister, Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, should be arrested for "crimes against the country."²⁶ The junta greatly feared the public fury democratization or a human rights investigation might unleash. The junta hoped that a negotiated settlement or, when that proved untenable, a military success in the Falklands would appease the public's desire for retribution. Since the 150th anniversary of British occupation was approaching, an Argentine reclamation would have a special appeal. The Argentine newspaper, La Prensa, in February 1982, even stated that "The only thing which can save this government is a war."²⁷

In addition to the belief that Britain would not respond militarily to an invasion, British intransigence at the negotiating table influenced the final decision to invade. Indeed, the intent of the military action was not so much to wrest the Islands from Britain as it was to force serious progress in negotiations. "It (the invasion) was based on the assumption that the British would come to the negotiating table rather than accept the high costs and casualties of a war."²⁸ When the February 1982 talks in New York ended without

appreciable progress, the junta became convinced that only military action could accelerate negotiations. At the New York meeting, the Argentines had presented a plan for monthly talks on a regular basis and a firm timetable for the establishment of Argentine sovereignty. In January 1982, a La Prensa article warned that if these requests were not met, "Buenos Aires will take over the islands by force this year."²⁹ On 1 March, the Argentine Foreign Affairs Ministry issued a unilateral communique, coinciding with the issue of the joint communique on the New York talks, which asserted that, if the Argentine negotiating suggestions were ignored, "Argentina retains the right to terminate the function of such a negotiating mechanism and to resort to whatever procedure is commensurable with the interests of Argentina."³⁰ Numerous other newspapers and journals in Argentina echoed these same sentiments.

Argentina Not "Crying Wolf"

The British government justified its failure to respond to these threats on the numerous previous instances where the Argentines had feigned militancy on the issue. As the Foreign Minister, Lord Carrington, commented, "Had this been the first time over the past 20 years that some allusion to the use of force had been made from the Argentine side it might have struck Britain as more significant than it did."³¹ What the British failed to appreciate, however, was the qualitative change that had occurred in Argentine pronouncements and in Argentina's domestic situation. While hints of force and unofficial harassment had occurred in the past, no previous Argentine rulers had coupled a government's contemplation of the use of force with a concurrent denunciation of the negotiating process. That the government issuing these signals was in a desperate struggle for domestic survival only added to the signals' portentous nature. Whereas previous governments were satisfied that time would vindicate

their claim and maintained that negotiations were the proper mechanism for resolving the dispute, the Galtieri regime both needed immediate success in the dispute and disparaged the role of negotiations in procuring a solution. In January 1982, the Islas Malvinas Institute first signalled a semi-official denunciation of negotiations when its chairman, Rear Admiral Jorge Fraga, issued a call that the "...endless rounds of negotiations be ended."³² As noted previously, large numbers of newspapers and journals began to report that the government might resort to military action if talks with Britain were not successful. That the British failed to note the substantive change that had occurred in Argentine rhetoric was a tragic miscalculation. An Argentine government's approach to negotiations--whether they support or disavow them--can serve as a litmus test³³ to determine the amenability of that government to a peaceful resolution of the Falklands dispute. Yet, the Thatcher government ignored the results of this test in 1982. The consequence was an inability to adequately assess the military threat to the Islands.

Argentine Signals

Not only did the British government underestimate the likelihood of an Argentine attack on the Falklands, but also the government's erroneous preconceptions about the events precipitating such a crisis blinded ministers to the military signals emanating from within Argentina. British intelligence reports all had predicted that any military action would be preceded by a long, gradual build-up of tensions which would include the suspension of Argentine services to the Islands. Throughout early 1982, a possible suspension of services was the only immediate potential threat to the Islands in Britain's opinion.

The Build-up to Invasion

Argentina's gradual increase of pressure consisted of three stages, as did Britain's predicted scenario. But the only common factor between the two was that the final stage of both envisioned a military attack on the Islands. Argentina's campaign began in January 1982 with the first press statements renouncing negotiations and hinting of possible military action. Britain expected the first stage to consist instead of increased diplomatic agitation in the international arena and, especially, in the United Nations. The second stage occurred when the Argentine government offered its support to the landing party on South Georgia and even dispatched three warships to prevent HMS Endurance's evacuation of the workers. Britain's second stage of the scenario predicted the suspension of Argentine services to the Islands, which never occurred in the pre-invasion period. When the third stage--invasion-- was actuated, Britain was caught "sleeping in her hammock."³⁴ British intelligence reports in early 1982 had suggested no military action would occur for months, and potentially not for a year. In March, Thatcher had written on a telegram from the Ambassador in Buenos Aires, that "We must make contingency plans." Since no immediate action was taken, however, the statement probably referred either to the plans for supplying the Islands in the event of an Argentine withdrawal of services or to preparations for a future crisis, which was still considered to be months away.

Because the numerous other indications of an impending Argentine invasion did not conform to Britain's expected scenario, subsequent intelligence assessments undervalued the significance of the signals. The problem lay not in a lack of indicators, but in a failure to correctly interpret the intelligence. As Ted Rowlands disclosed in a 3 April 1982 House of Commons debate: "As well as trying to read the mind of the enemy, we have been reading its telegrams for

many years."³⁵ Those who attempted to alert the British as to Argentine intentions found their warnings unheeded or discounted; they were modern-day Cassandras. The commander of HMS Endurance, Captain Barker, sent a number of warnings to London about the increasingly bellicose stance of Argentine rulers, but his messages were interpreted merely as an attempt to save his ship from withdrawal. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires had sent a number of letters urging that substantive progress in negotiations be made, lest the Argentines become restless. "Talks for the sake of talking," noted the Ambassador, were a privilege Argentina granted Britain and not vice versa.³⁶

Subtle Indicators of Invasion

Other incidents occurred which appear more ominous with hindsight, but nevertheless, when considered in conjunction with the copious stream of hostile signals emanating from Buenos Aires, these incidents were significant. On 11 March 1983, an Argentine transport aircraft landed at Port Stanley claiming technical difficulties. While the Franks report (report of a committee of Privy Councillors on events leading up to the crisis) considered this an insignificant incident,³⁷ rumors persist that some members of the Argentine Chiefs of Staff were on board at the time. The Franks report also denies an Argentine bulk purchase of maps of the Islands in Britain prior to the invasion.³⁸ Yet, 300 copies of a Public Record office produced map of the Falkland Islands--presumably purchased by the Argentine Air Attache in London--were found on the Islands by British soldiers after the Argentine surrender.

British Intelligence Failure

The Franks report euphemistically charged British intelligence machinery³⁹ in the pre-invasion period with being "too passive in operation."⁴⁰ More specifically, the failure of British intelligence involved both neglecting to

consider how British Islands' policy was being interpreted in Buenos Aires and wholly misinterpreting the signals coming from Buenos Aires. Falkland's policy formulation gave little consideration to how actions would be read in Argentina. The decision to withdraw HMS Endurance, for example, was made solely on an economic basis, despite innumerable indications of the dangerous manner in which the policy would be interpreted in Argentina. As noted previously, British actions had been indicating, at best, an irresolute approach to the Islands and their defense for many years. Yet, when calculating the likelihood of an Argentine invasion of the Falklands, Argentine perceptions of Britain's commitment to the Islands were not accorded serious consideration. The Franks report underscored this error when it expressed doubt as to "...whether the Joint Intelligence Org. attached sufficient weight to the possible effects on Argentine thinking of the various actions of the British Government."⁴¹ The serious nature of this oversight cannot be exaggerated, since the belief in Buenos Aires that Britain would not respond militarily to an invasion was a constant theme of Argentine military planners and was perhaps the most significant factor in motivating the invasion. In the words of some Argentines, "Britain had given the junta nothing but 'come-on' signs.... There was no indication whatsoever that it (an invasion) would be met with massive retaliation."⁴²

Britain seriously miscalculated Argentina's intent to invade the Falklands. While British intelligence could not have been expected to predict the exact date of the invasion, neither did it foresee the imminence of Argentine military action when negotiations stagnated. Evidence--both British and Argentine--suggests that the date of the invasion was not determined until shortly before it occurred (around the 26th of March). The decision was

motivated by two factors: increased domestic turmoil, in the form of strikes and protests, coincided with increased tensions on South Georgia. With the arrival of HMS Endurance at South Georgia, Argentina was forced to choose between an escalation of tensions or an ignominious retreat. The domestic situation meant backing down would be political suicide; the invasion option was more appealing since it would make the South Georgia position tenable and only a mild British reaction was expected anyhow. Thus, the late determination of the invasion time made the prediction of the exact date virtually impossible. However, British intelligence failed to even adequately assess the high probability of Argentine military action. A major cause of the failure was the Joint Intelligence Committee's (JIC) fear of repeating the 1977 error, when an Argentine invasion was predicted, but never materialized. The fear of again mislabeling Argentine intentions blinded the JIC to the innumerable indications--even more than in 1977--of an impending invasion.

"Assessments...were based on a crucial input: the intelligence community's fear of crying wolf."⁴³ Indeed, the reports, that the JIC submitted to the Cabinet were distinctly less alarmist than the raw intelligence material on which they were based.⁴⁴ Accurate intelligence gathering and interpretation is an essential component of crisis deterrence. The Falklands conflict reflects the dangerous effects myopic intelligence gathering and, especially, analysis can have on crisis deterrence.

Argentine Miscalculations

The Argentine government, too, committed some serious miscalculations which involved it in a campaign Argentina was not prepared to fight. Much of the blame can be attributed to the desperation of a crumbling regime. Suffering from a horrendous humanitarian and economic record, exploiting the people's

nationalism offered the best prospects for salvaging the government in the face of calls for democratization. As George Oester notes,

"The recovery of the Malvinas is viewed as an issue of pride, with the ordinary people of Argentina sharing with their otherwise unrepresentative government an excessive attachment to issues of symbolism and national dignity."⁴⁵

Consequently, the junta's judgment was obscured and its diplomatic flexibility constrained. Much of the intelligence the government received was modified so as to tell the junta only what it wanted to hear, especially concerning the allegedly marginal possibility of British retaliation. Military intelligence consistently underestimated the British capacity to retake the Islands. Argentina's own analysis of the campaign recognized the misjudgments in Argentine policy and concluded that the campaign was "conceived and executed in an absolutely false framework."⁴⁶

The most serious miscalculation made was that Britain would not respond militarily to an invasion of the Falklands. By presenting a fait accompli, Argentina hoped to induce substantive British concessions at the negotiating table. What the junta failed to comprehend was that Britain could never allow such a precedent to be established. If Britain were to capitulate to coercive force on the Falklands, her interests in Gibraltar, Belize, and elsewhere would be susceptible to similar challenges. Beyond that, Britain's credibility as an ally would be diminished by a perceived hesitancy to respond to military aggression. One look at Northern Ireland should have convinced the junta that force inhibits, rather than aids, the resolution of territorial disputes. Argentina's resort to violence frustrated its own objective of increasing the pace of negotiations. Any significant British concession would have validated

the use of aggression as a diplomatic tool. The two themes which resounded throughout Britain during the campaign were that "aggression must not be allowed to succeed" and "freedom must be protected against dictatorship."⁴⁷

Argentina had expected that world opinion would be essentially receptive to an action aimed at eliminating one of the last vestiges of colonialism. The junta failed to understand that world opinion would classify its actions as aggressive, regardless of the effort Argentina expended to insure that no casualties were inflicted. What appeared to Argentina as a relatively peaceful reoccupation of its own territory was interpreted by international opinion as an unprovoked act of raw aggression perpetrated against an essentially defenseless population by a brutal military dictatorship. Further, the action extended instability and armed conflict to yet another corner of the globe. Argentina's major error, then, was the failure to adequately assess the response of Britain and the world to the use of military force to resolve disputes. Had the junta been cognizant of this attitude, they would have realized that an invasion would obstruct, rather than promote, efforts to obtain the substantial concessions from Britain needed to restore some sense of legitimacy to military rule.

Although the invasion was largely motivated by Argentine domestic politics, neither the junta nor its intelligence community seriously contemplated the potential influence of domestic politics on the British response. At the time of the invasion, the Thatcher government, too, was in serious political straits, due largely to economic problems. Indeed, an April 1982 poll revealed that 48% of the British population considered Margaret Thatcher the worst Prime Minister in British history.⁴⁸ Therefore, to shrink from the Argentine challenge would have been political suicide: the people of Britain had suffered a national humiliation and they expected their government to redress it. As one Cabinet

member commented at the time, "I don't see how she (Thatcher) can survive if she shrinks from a military showdown."⁴⁹

Public pressure--in the forms of hostility directed at the regime and the passionate nationalism which the Falklands aroused--greatly influenced the junta's decision to invade the Falkland Islands. Yet, the junta failed to consider how public pressure would affect the British response to an invasion. Nationalism was a driving force behind Argentine actions, yet the junta overlooked its British counterpart. Admittedly, the British public had demonstrated a general apathy toward the Falkland Islands for many years. But few things could inflame nationalistic passion in Britain as readily as a blatant act of aggression directed against people of British origin living on British territory. For year, the British people had witnessed their nation's decline as an economic, political, and military power. The years of colonial withdrawal were painful. The British saw their institutions, customs, and investments abused and abandoned while the international status declined. But the Falklands were different: here was a distant people yearning to remain British and retain her aegis. While offering a distraction from the problems of Northern Ireland, European Community relations, and economic decline, the Falklands crisis also provided an outlet for suppressed jingoism. When assessing the likelihood of a British military response to an invasion, the junta neglected to consider how military action can influence and transform attitudes, both within governments and in the public. "What reason did the Junta have for believing that Thatcher and her Government would be that much more able than they had been to ignore the demands of what was certain to be aroused if not enraged public opinion?"⁵⁰

Argentina seriously underestimated the character of Britain's leader, Prime

Minister Margaret Thatcher. Whether this was the result of Latin machismo, a mere misperception, or, most likely, a combination of both is a moot issue. What is relevant is a consideration of the effect an accurate picture could have had on Argentine decision-making. The hope of compelling accelerated and substantive negotiations motivated the invasion, in great part. The Argentines had no desire--nor expectation--to go to war with Britain. Yet, a cursory analysis of Thatcher's personality--as reflected in her governing style--would have revealed to the junta that she is neither easily intimidated nor prone to compromise. Thatcher's handling of Britain's rather militant labor unions and dissent within her own party reflects her strong will and unyielding character. To believe that military force could coerce concessions from Margaret Thatcher was a monumental misjudgment. Margaret Thatcher was an "Iron Lady" long before the Falklands Campaign made this label her trademark.

As well as underestimating the will of the British government, the Argentines also miscalculated Britain's ability to respond militarily to an invasion. The continual contraction of the surface fleet and of Britain's out-of-area capabilities had not gone unnoticed in Buenos Aires. General Galtieri was personally doubtful of Britain's capacity to actively defend the Falkland Islands. However, some Argentine intelligence reports exaggerated the extent of Britain's military contraction and deficiencies, probably in an attempt to please superiors.⁵¹ British success in the Falklands campaign manifested the inaccuracy of Argentine assessments, although those evaluations of Britain's military capabilities would have been more truly reflective in a few months when further British reductions were scheduled to go into effect. Still, a better determination of British strength might have promoted a more cautious attitude in Buenos Aires.

Finally, Argentina wholly miscalculated the position of the United States in the conflict. The neutrality which Buenos Aires expected was short-lived. The junta, in so doing, misinterpreted American strategic interests and commitments. American/Argentine relations had warmed markedly under the Reagan Administration, and Galtieri was especially liked by the Administration. Reagan sought Argentine cooperation and support for his policies in Central America. In return, Reagan increased arms sales and aid levels from those of the previous administration. However, American ties with Britain were stronger. Britain is one of the United States' longest-standing allies, and these ties were reinforced by the common ideological ties between Reagan and Thatcher. While ties with Argentina promote regional interests, Britain, as a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, represents a key factor in America's larger strategic interests. While Central America is an important political issue, East-West relations represent Washington's most critical foreign policy area. (Indeed, the Reagan Administration sees the Central American crisis as merely an outgrowth of East-West competition.) Of the two, alienation of Argentina would least threaten American interests. What is more, America could never let Britain lose such a conflict--failure to recognize this in Argentina was an extremely serious miscalculation. The defeat of a major NATO member by a developing country would not be tolerated by an American administration intent upon increasing its own strength--and that of NATO's--vis-a-vis the Soviet Union. Also, with Cruise and Pershing missile deployments in Europe just twenty months away, Reagan did not want to jeopardize their installation, as he described it, over "that little ice-cold bunch of land down there."⁵² Finally, sentiment in Congress and the public at large was distinctly pro-British and Reagan was not inclined to challenge this consensus. Had Argentina more

accurately understood what the American position would be in such a conflict, the knowledge would have had a strong deterrent value. The generals may have been desperate, but they were not foolhardy; when the United States announced its support for Britain, Argentina's defeat was virtually assured.

The central assumptions upon which Argentine policy was based were largely erroneous. The junta wholly miscalculated the response of Britain, the United States, and even world opinion to its actions. Further, Argentina would not concede to the British government and public the same passions which had molded Argentine policy. Buenos Aires also failed to comprehend that much of world opinion would judge its actions as nothing more than gunboat diplomacy and its rhetoric as an attempt to have the end (destroy a perpetuation of colonialism) justify the means. Finally, Argentina displayed a myopic understanding of American strategic interests. Because of these misjudgments, Argentina was unable to achieve its goal of substantive progress in sovereignty negotiations. Instead, Argentina was defeated in a campaign it never wanted nor expected to fight, and, as a result of defeat, found itself farther than ever from regaining the Falkland Islands.

The Falkland Islands campaign began through a series of miscalculations and misinterpretations. Neither country wanted to be involved in a military campaign, but their miscalculations drew them into it. As Philip Windsor describes it, "...the two countries went to war because each concluded that the other was not really prepared to do so."⁵³ Britain sent the wrong signals to Buenos Aires and, at the same time, grossly misread the indications of impending military activity emanating from Argentina. Argentina, for its part, based its policies on a number of wholly unsound assumptions. Unfortunately, these errors resulted in tragedy when men began dying because of political misjudgments. What is

worse, when the conflict ended, Britain and Argentina were farther than ever from resolving the dispute. Britain found itself more committed to the Islands--economically, politically, and militarily--than it ever wanted to be. Argentina not only found itself a long way from regaining sovereignty, but also saw all the efforts that had been expended to improve relations with the Islanders destroyed.

The mistakes that led to this conflict need to be understood if either side wants to ensure that the tragedy is not repeated. Until diplomatic negotiations are able to resolve this dispute, both Britain and Argentina will have to manage the peace and practice crisis deterrence more efficiently than previously, but these measures can be effective only if the errors that initially led to conflict are understood. Until Britain and Argentina come to understand each others' goals and motivations concerning the Falkland Islands, there can be no communication, and an ability to communicate is essential for the successful conduct of negotiations.

CHAPTER FOUR:

Short-Term Prospects for Peace

The military campaign for the Falkland Islands was simply the physical manifestation of a long-simmering diplomatic dispute: the military conflict was just one battle in a larger political war. Indeed, the Campaign intensified the controversy over the Falkland Islands. What had been, at best, a secondary matter for the British and Argentine governments suddenly became a primary political issue. The Campaign was both the coup de grace of the Argentine military junta and the saving grace of Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative Party.

International Calls for Progress

Armed conflict brings with it greater international pressure for a resolution of the dispute. In the present age, the frighteningly destructive capabilities of modern weaponry and the already fragile superpower balance cause the world community to view with serious concern the eruption of hostilities anywhere on the globe. These calls for compromise are focused more intensely on the United Kingdom, for its government is expected to demonstrate magnanimity in victory. Yet Margaret Thatcher has shown markedly little willingness to negotiate and compromise; she adamantly refuses to even contemplate a discussion of the core issue: sovereignty. At the same time, those who backed Britain in the conflict--mainly Western nations--are finding it increasingly difficult to continue their support. At the beginning of the Campaign, Argentina's

culpability was blatant: A brutal military dictatorship had invaded an essentially defenseless territory. But now, nearly three years have elapsed since Britain reoccupied the Islands and, in December, 1983, a democratically elected government--headed by President Raúl Alfonsín--replaced the military junta in Buenos Aires. Still, there has been no progress towards even normalizing relations, let alone negotiating a solution. Meanwhile, support for the British in the international community waned. In reference to declining support for Britain in the United Nations on the Falklands issue, the former British United Nations Ambassador, Sir Anthony Parsons, conceded that

With the (Argentine) government having changed to one of democratic respectability and the memory of the invasion beginning to fade it will certainly become more difficult for us to maintain such a good record in the General Assembly as we have done in the last two years.¹

The Argentine Approach to Negotiations

While the pressures to resolve this conflict increased, the capacity of each government to make concessions decreased. Although the failures of the campaign were blamed on the military junta, the Argentine people still feel a great allegiance to those who died during the fighting. The democratic government shares its predecessor's commitment to regaining the Falklands; however, Alfonsín and his government have wholly disavowed the use of force to achieve their goal. The Argentine Foreign Minister affirmed this policy when, in January, 1984 he promised that Argentina "shall not take the initiative to recover (the Falklands) by force...we shall only use all our diplomatic possibilities."²

The British Approach to Negotiations

As far as the British are concerned, a case of selective amnesia has set-in

concerning their earlier willingness to negotiate sovereignty. Now that the military conflict is over, the government has sought to invest the Islands with a status and value sufficient to justify both the campaign effort and the government's subsequent investment in the Islands' welfare. Thatcher's attitude has been that "If they're (the Falklands) worth fighting for, they must be worth keeping."³

Thus, the government's policies have provided the Islands with significant military support and economic aid. Thatcher has invested 215 million pounds⁴ in the construction of an airport which can accommodate long-haul, wide-body jets (both civilian and military) flown from Europe. (The airport is due to open in April, 1985--ahead of schedule.)

The cost of garrisoning the Falklands represents 2.5% of Britain's defense budget.⁵ For a country whose defense is almost wholly NATO oriented--only 5% of the defense budget is allocated for non-NATO tasks⁶--this constitutes a significant diversion of Britain's defense effort. The British government asserts that additions to the defense budget fund the Falkland Islands' garrison and, thus, money is not diverted from other defense needs. However, considering the government's announcement that, shortly, it will be incapable of meeting NATO's goal of a 3% real increase in defense expenditure annually by each member nation, the funds being invested in the Falklands' garrison become an increasingly expensive drain on NATO resources. If that 2.5% currently going to the Falklands could go to NATO, Britain might be able to avoid renegeing on its obligations to the Alliance. The Islands also are receiving development and reconstruction aid, so that the grand total of British expenditure on the Falklands' represents nearly 2 million pounds, spent over three years, for each Falkland Islands family!⁷ Such a massive investment greatly inhibits the

government's flexibility in negotiations; they now have much more to lose.

Megaphone Diplomacy

The course of negotiations since the end of the Campaign reflects the dual nature of the pressures on both governments. Both Buenos Aires and London desire talks and a normalization of relations. Yet, the extent of each government's investment in the Islands--whether it is measured in human lives or in budgetary allocations--diminishes the desire of either side to compromise. In response to a congratulatory telegram from Margaret Thatcher on the occasion of his inauguration, Argentine President Raúl Alfonsín recalled an English colloquialism: "Where there's a will, there's a way." Unfortunately, the will displayed by both sides thus far has appeared as more an eagerness to have their own demands met than as an inclination to compromise.

The character of Argentine/British relations since Argentina's surrender on 14 June 1982 can be described best as "full of sound and fury, signifying nothing." Both sides have issued warnings, propagated statements, set conditions, and declared intentions with regularity. Yet, amazingly little communication has passed between the two governments as a result of this, as it is often described, "megaphone diplomacy". Three years have elapsed since the Campaign and relations have not been normalized yet nor has an end to hostilities been declared. Still, some confidence-building measures have been enacted and contact between government officials at a variety of different levels has occurred.

The Course of Relations in 1982

Since the end of the conflict, Britain has expressed a willingness, through the International Red Cross, either to return the Argentine dead from the Falklands or to permit, under the auspices of the International Red Cross, a

visit to the Islands by relatives of the dead.⁸ Argentina, however, has demonstrated little interest in accepting the British offer.

Immediately after the close of the Campaign, General Reynaldo Bignone replaced General Galtieri as President of Argentina. Until the election of a democratic government in October, 1983, the Argentine junta perpetuated its bellicose approach to the Falklands dispute. On 4 January 1983, for example, Senor Francisco Manrique, warned that "One must not discount a second armed conflict over the Islands."⁹ The present government in Argentina disowns such pronouncements as meaninglessly provocative, and has advocated a peaceful resolution of the issue. Still, the threatening noises emanating from Buenos Aires prior to December, 1983, partially explain the lack of progress in normalizing relations during that period.

On 18 June 1982, the Argentines recognized that a de facto ceasefire was in effect, which allowed Britain to repatriate Argentine prisoners-of war.¹⁰ Still, there has never been an official, de jure cessation of hostilities by the Argentines, much to the consternation of the British. The Argentines feel that, since hostilities were never actually declared, an official cessation is unnecessary. The Argentines frequently cite, in support, the failure of the British to announce a ceasefire at the end of the Suez conflict in 1956. Instead, the United Kingdom recognized the authority of United Nations' pronouncements on the conflict. Since the democratic government assumed power in 1983, the tone of Argentine statements has been markedly less caustic.¹¹ Indeed, the Argentines elected a man President who had denounced the junta's invasion, at the time, as "an illegal act by an illegitimate government in a just cause."¹² While the British have noted this change in tone, they remain adamantly committed to hearing Argentina declare an end to hostilities.

On 21 June 1982, the European Economic Community lifted the sanctions which were imposed upon Argentina at the beginning of the conflict. This was followed, on 12 July 1982, with the termination of American sanctions on Argentina. Finally, in September, Britain and Argentina agreed to suspend the financial restrictions each had imposed on the other.¹³

On 22 July 1982, Britain lifted the exclusion zone around the Falklands and replaced it with a protection zone. Argentine warships and military aircraft still were prohibited from entering and civilian vehicles could enter only with British permission. The Argentines have not, as yet, sought such permission for either ships or aircraft.

The Course of Negotiations in 1983

January, 1983 saw British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher visit the Falkland Islands. During this trip, her allegiance to the Islands increased dramatically, a critical factor in her present unyielding stance on negotiations. A Gallup poll released the same month in The Daily Telegraph revealed that 63% of Conservatives advocated efforts to reach an agreement with Argentina.¹⁴ On 5 January, the Argentine Ambassador to the United Nations, Carlos Muniz, announced that Argentina would press its claim to the Falklands through various international fora, such as the Organization of American States, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the United Nations. Noting the extent of international support for Argentina's claim, he commented that "Great Britain may take its time to arrive at this decision (to grant Argentine sovereignty) but in the end it will have to yield to the will of the majority of the countries of the world."¹⁵

Following American intelligence reports which predicted an Argentine harassment campaign against the Falklands, Britain increased the daily number

of RAF Phantom flights and beefed-up its defenses. The intelligence reports alleged that Argentina planned to launch commando raids against the Falklands and to attack British aircraft outside the 200-mile exclusion zone as a response to Thatcher's Falklands visit. The Argentine government labeled the charges as "crazy" and as an attempt by the British government to divert attention from the Franks committee's report on the 1982 Campaign.¹⁶ The following day, on the 20th of January, the Argentine government announced that it would not declare an end to hostilities until Britain displayed a willingness to negotiate on the Islands.¹⁷

During March, 1983, a Non-Aligned Summit meeting was held in New Delhi. In the closing declaration, the organization expressed its support for Argentina's position: "The Conference reaffirms that the Malvinas (Falkland Islands), South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands are an integral part of the Latin American region."¹⁸

The House of Commons Select Committee on Defence released a report on the future defense of the Falkland Islands on 12 May 1983.¹⁹ In the report, the Committee noted that the failure to procure an official cessation of hostilities from Argentina had serious implications for the Islands' future. The report also recognized that the short-term prospects for negotiations were poor due both to the continued hostility of Argentine military rulers and to Margaret Thatcher's unshakeable commitment to supporting the Islanders' wishes. Said the report,

There can be...no certainty that fighting for the Falkland Islands and Dependencies will not be renewed...We must conclude that over the next few years the dispute between Her Majesty's Government and Argentina as to the future status of the Falklands will remain as insoluble as ever.²⁰

A general election was held in Britain in June, 1983 and Margaret Thatcher and her Conservatives were returned to power with the largest majority since World War II.²¹ The large majority ensures that the next election will not be forced prematurely by a lost vote in the House of Commons. The Falkland Islanders were granted the aegis of Margaret Thatcher's hardline approach to the Falklands issue for another five years. With her majority (of around 200 votes), the potential for parliamentarians to pressure for change via the voting lobby is severely curtailed. If Margaret Thatcher wants to maintain her resolute attitude on the Falklands issue, Westminster can do little to force a compromise. The British Nationality Act of 1983 reflected this commitment by granting the Falkland Islanders British citizenship, something denied them two year previously.

In September, 1983, the first in a series of meetings between Members of the British Parliament and of the Argentine Congress was held at the University of Maryland, under the auspices of the Center for International Development. This forum was uniquely conducive to a frank exchange of views because those in attendance were policy-influencers rather than formal policy-makers. Consequently, the progress of the Conference was not impeded by official rhetoric and political promulgations. This first conference investigated Argentina's goals concerning sovereignty and noted that the symbolism of sovereignty (i.e. the presence of the Argentine flag on the Islands) was as desirable as its actual exercise. Therefore, a solution to the dispute which allowed a symbolic display of Argentine sovereignty while perpetuating British administration to guarantee the Islanders' interests might represent a feasible alternative to the present stalemate in Anglo-Argentine relations.

Argentina: Democracy Revisited

The 30th of October, 1983 marked a watershed in contemporary Argentine politics: genuine democratic elections were held in which the military's candidate was defeated resoundingly.²² The outcome of the voting was the election of Raúl Alfonsín of the Radical Party as President of Argentina. Alfonsín had denounced the junta's decision to invade the Falklands in 1982 and his election marked Argentina's return to a reliance upon the negotiating process to resolve the Falklands dispute. On the day after the Argentine elections, Britain's Foreign and Commonwealth Office issued a statement welcoming the return of democracy to Argentina, a sentiment which was echoed in Margaret Thatcher's reply to a Parliamentary Question on 1 November. On 7 November, Thatcher outlined the prospect for talks with the new government:

...I am willing to enter into talks. We want good commercial relations, diplomatic relations, we want normal relations. But I am not entering into talks about sovereignty."²³

Alfonsín was inaugurated as President on the 10th of December. In a message delivered through the Swiss Protecting Power (Brazil is serving as Argentina's interest representative until the two resume diplomatic negotiations), Thatcher commented that "Today brings new hope to your country." In his inaugural address, Alfonsín referred directly to the Anglo-Argentine dispute:

"Regarding the issue of the Malvinas (Falklands), South Georgias, and South Sandwich Islands, our unyielding objective is and will always be the full recovery and the definitive integration of these islands to our sovereign national territory.. our position in this regard is inflexible."²⁴

The critical difference, however, was that now the Argentine cause would be advanced by peaceful means and diplomacy.

Negotiations in 1984

Britain opened the new year and greeted the new Argentine government with specific proposals for normalizing relations, issued via the Swiss embassy in Buenos Aires on 26 January 1984. Although the message was confidential, the proposals undoubtedly covered the resumption of direct air flights between Britain and Argentina; the removal of Argentine supervisory personnel (inter ventores) from British businesses in Argentina (these were supposed to be removed when economic restrictions were lifted in September, 1982); the repatriation of the Argentine dead or else a visit to the Islands by their relatives; and the curbing of restrictions on economic and cultural contacts. The note also probably included a reiteration of Britain's unwillingness to suspend the protection zone or resume diplomatic relations until Argentina officially declared an end to hostilities. Thatcher reaffirmed this conviction in her answer to a Parliamentary Question on the 30th of January:

"We do not envisage keeping the 50 nautical mile protection zone around the Falkland Islands indefinitely, but we will not lift it prematurely. We need to be fully satisfied that Argentina renounces the future use of force, and we have noted recent Argentine statements that they intend to pursue their claim by peaceful means."²⁵

The proposals were rejected by Argentina on 3 February because Britain refused to participate in talks which included the question of sovereignty on the agenda.

The beginning of the year also saw the Falkland Islands garrison reduced from a high alert to a more moderate--and sustainable--level. The British Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Heseltine, visited the Falklands early in 1984. He arrived on the Islands at the end of a record eighteen hour

non-stop flight in a RAF Nimrod, thus demonstrating Britain's capacity to rapidly reinforce the Islands by air. During his visit, Heseltine broke with precedent and stated that an Argentine declaration of the end of hostilities was no longer requisite for a dialogue to commence. However, this was never repeated by other government officials.

On February 1, during a visit to Venezuela, President Alfonsín delineated a six-point plan for rebuilding relations. He proposed that: Argentina and Britain initiate contacts through their United Nations missions; attempts be made to restore relations to the status quo ante bellum; talks be conducted within the framework of the United Nations' resolutions; Britain lift its exclusion zone and freeze its fortification of the Islands; a United Nations peacekeeping force be considered as a means of guaranteeing the security of the Islands; and the implementation of these steps would effect a de jure cessation of hostilities and a normalization of relations.

Britain responded to the Argentine proposals with a statement issued the following day by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. The response clearly rejected the idea of a United Nations peacekeeping force: "there is no role for the United Nations in the protection of the Islands." Instead, Britain asserted that the improvement and eventual normalization of bilateral relations was the key to ending the dispute.

Charging that the Royal Air Force was harassing--"buzzing"--Argentine fishing vessels outside the protection zone; Argentina protested to the United Nations. The protest came in mid-February concerned an incident alleged to have taken place on the 5th of November and the 24th of December.²⁶ At the same time, an Argentine diplomat extended an invitation for Labour Members of Parliament to visit Argentina.

In a memorandum issued to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee on the 15th of February, the Falkland Islands government proposed that Britain normalize relations with Argentina, provided that sovereignty over the Falklands was not a matter for discussion. The memorandum suggested that after a period of normalization and reconstruction, then "...the Falkland Islands Government and people could assess their position in the framework of improved international relations and decide how they wanted to...exercise their right to self-determination."²⁷

On 17 February, Argentina delivered a confidential response to the British proposals of 26 January. The central point of contention was Britain's refusal to discuss sovereignty and Argentina's insistence that the subject not be excluded from talks. One Argentine diplomat told the Sunday Times that "We cannot leave sovereignty out of account in the final solution, but it could be first or last on the agenda." Argentina, then, appeared willing to postpone sovereignty discussions temporarily, so long as their eventual inclusion in talks was not precluded. On the 19th of February, Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo noted that "...we cannot accept that the beginning of talks may imply a tacit drop of our sovereignty claims."²⁸ The 14 March issue of La Nacion published the text of the Argentine response, much to the dismay of government officials. The text described the British proposals as a "positive step", but suggested that such issues as the suspension of the protection zone, the termination of British fortification of the Islands, and the withdrawal of all nuclear weapons from the area also be included in discussion. Finally, the reply stressed the "extreme importance" which Argentina attached to relations with the United Kingdom and its consequent desire "...to peacefully end the dispute on the Malvinas Islands, the South Georgias, and the South Sandwich

Islands".²⁹

On 23 March, Osvaldo De Stefanis, the zealous leader of Argentina's Center for Volunteers for the Fatherland, landed surreptitiously on the Falklands and hoisted an Argentine flag, buried three rosaries, took pictures, and left. "I wanted to let the world know that the Malvinas (Falklands) are still Argentine and that we want them back by peaceful means," De Stefanis stated, in justification of his actions.³⁰ Both London and Buenos Aires downplayed the event as neither wanted the incident to inhibit attempts to improve relations.

On 6 April, Britain delivered a confidential response to the Argentine letter of 17 February. In the letter, Britain essentially reiterated the proposals outlined in its original communication of 26 January. The response also is believed to have detailed the preconditions for Britain's lifting of the protection zone, the main requirement being an Argentine cessation of hostilities. The Argentine newspaper, El Clarin, described these proposals as "unacceptable and unsatisfactory" in its 15 April 1984 issue.

During a trip to Paris, the Argentine Foreign Minister Dante Caputo, advocated a "small steps" approach to improving Anglo-Argentine relations. Through such confidence-building measures as the removal of the protection zone or a halt in the construction of the Mount Pleasant airfield, Caputo felt that a foundation for talks could be established. He further proposed a series of informal talks with an open agenda (i.e. neither specifically including nor excluding the issue of sovereignty). His comments reflected an Argentine desire to end the political stalemate and to effect substantive progress in Anglo-Argentine relations. "The important thing," Caputo stressed, "is to get around the table.... I am optimistic about the capacity for dialogue of civilized governments."³¹ The British government had suggested earlier that

negotiations would be a piecemeal process. On the 20th of February, a Foreign Office spokesman stated that "We...see the process as one of step-by-step diplomacy."³²

April also saw the second meeting of British Members of Parliament and Argentine Congressmen at the University of Maryland's Center for International Development. While many issues were discussed, special attention was focused on how the Campaign's success affected Britain's self-image. Considering the difficulty of persuading Margaret Thatcher and Raúl Alfonsín to sit down together, lower-level contacts like those made at the Maryland conference are the foundation upon which improved relations can be built. The participants avoid becoming entangled in official rhetoric and are able to confront the issue directly and in a forthright manner.

Argentine Foreign Minister, Dante Caputo, on 6 May, revealed Argentine dissatisfaction with the British note of 6 April when he commented that "we are not at all in agreement with the British answer" to the Argentine proposals of 17 February.³³ Subsequent statements reaffirmed Argentina's commitment to resolving the conflict through diplomatic means only. On 9 May, Members of the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs met with the Argentine representative to the United Nations in New York as part of the Committee's investigation of future options for the Falkland Islands.

On 7 June, President Alfonsín signed a pact with seventeen political parties in an effort to gain opposition support in confronting Argentina's problems and in preserving its fledgling democracy. The agreement was especially significant because the Peronist Party--with its large union backing--signed the pact. By signing the agreement, these parties demonstrated their support for Alfonsín's efforts to negotiate on the Falklands issue and

their shared concern over Britain's Falklands policy. These convictions appeared in the twelfth part of the accord:

The Argentine Republic condemns and deplores the notion of "Fortress Falklands" and the so called "exclusion zone". Diplomatic action will be intensified, searching for (a) peaceful solution that should acknowledge our rights over these portions of national territory."³⁴

While this statement reflected the hard-line nationalism of the opposition parties, the agreement demonstrated multilateral support for advancing Argentina's claim to the Islands in a peaceful--rather than militant--manner.

Changing Attitude in Parliament

On the 8th of June, the Falkland Islands were the subject of the House of Commons' adjournment debate. That the issue was no longer in the forefront of most Members' minds was reflected in the small turnout for the debate. (The scheduling of the debate for a Friday undoubtedly accounted for a great many absences, as well, as Members returned to their constituencies for the weekend.) Since the nationalist élan of the campaign has worn-off, many Members of Parliament--on both sides of the Chamber--have recognized the immense burden that Thatcher's Falklands policy places on the nation and, more specifically, on their own constituents. Without the specter of a fascist dictatorship in Buenos Aires, accommodation with the Argentines becomes much more feasible politically. A Harris poll conducted in February revealed that 43% of the British population supported a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, with only 3% more opposed and it 11% were undecided.³⁵ While few Members of Parliament advocate abandoning the Islands without any consideration or guarantees for the Islanders' welfare, a pragmatic assessment of costs and benefits reveals to many Members the impracticality of present policy. One Member of Parliament, while questioning a

witness before the Foreign Affairs Committee, revealed the exasperation many feel with the policy of "Fortress Falklands":

How do I explain to my 50,000 electors with 20 percent unemployment, the need for roads in my constituency..., and the need to provide jobs and coal mines, that many billions of their money has to be spent on 1,800 people?"³⁶

With Britain facing serious economic problems--including a weak pound and high unemployment--Members are finding it increasingly difficult to justify the Government's expense of 1.28 million pounds on each Falkland Islander since April, 1982,³⁷ and they are anxious to curb future levels of expenditure.

The debate on 8 June revealed not only increasing concern for the exorbitant cost of "Fortress Falklands", but also the emergence of a bipartisan consensus on the need for progress in negotiations. With the advent of democracy to Argentina, many Members feel the time is propitious for reaching a settlement that is satisfactory to the Argentines and which protects the rights of the Falkland Islanders. Denis Healey, Labour's shadow Foreign Secretary, stated during a television interview in February, that the British "...should be prepared to talk about transferring sovereignty and the conditions under which this might happen."³⁸ The leader of the Liberal Party concurred in this sentiment: "I don't know whether it is wise to exclude sovereignty in the way that Mrs. Thatcher keeps insisting on doing."³⁹ During the debate on 8 June, the opinions expressed on both sides of the House reflected the emerging bipartisan consensus. A Labour Member argued that "we should try to secure a solution that would be in the interests of the British public, the Falkland Islanders and--dare I say it?--the Argentine population."⁴⁰ Later, a Conservative Member recalled an appropriate quotation of Winston Churchill's in

support of his pleas for progress in negotiations: "Agree with thine adversary quickly whilst thou art in the way with him."⁴¹ The government's response (presented by Minister of State, Ray Whitney) to the debate, however, indicated no changes were planned in its approach to relations with Argentina.

On the 11th of June, Argentina celebrated a national holiday dedicated to the reaffirmation of Argentine claims to the Falklands. In a speech marking the holiday, President Alfonsín charged the British with "inflexibility and unwillingness to negotiate."⁴² Earlier, Alfonsín had described the status of Anglo-Argentine relations concerning the Falklands as "bad, very bad."⁴³ The apparent inability of the two governments to find even a common ground upon which to base negotiations was frustrating officials on both sides of the dispute.

Mid-June saw the arrival of the Argentine President in Madrid, Spain. One outcome of this visit was the "Madrid Declaration", promulgated on the 13th of June. This document was an expression of shared Argentine/Spanish concerns and values. As both governments are involved in territorial disputes with Britain, the Declaration included a section recognizing diplomacy as the sole legitimate instrument of resolving these disputes

Spain and Argentina are the victims of an anachronistic colonial situation and support their respective claims to sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands and Gibraltar, to restore the integrity of their national territories by peaceful means in accordance with the pertinent U.N. resolutions.⁴⁴

The following day, in response to a Parliamentary Question, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher responded to the issue of the Declaration: "Naturally we take exception to the terms of the joint communique in so far as it distorts the true position of Gibraltar and the Falklands."⁴⁵

In a speech on the 13th of June, President Alfonsín announced that Argentina would not declare an end to hostilities unless Britain ceased fortification of the Islands and lifted the protection zone. He also expressed concern that British policy might transform the region into an arena for East-West competition, as occurred in the Indian Ocean.⁴⁶

From 25 June to 1 July, three Members of Parliament visited Argentina as guests of the Argentine Senate. The three were Cyril Townsend (Conservative, House of Commons), George Foulkes (Labour, House of Commons), and Lord Wayland Kennett (Social Democratic Party, House of Lords). During their visit, the idea of Argentina declaring an end to hostilities and Britain lifting the protection zone simultaneously was discussed and was warmly received by the Argentines. The delegates also discovered a "bursting wish" among Argentines for a normalization of relations with Britain.⁴⁷ The talks are widely believed to have cleared the path for the subsequent meeting of British and Argentine representatives in Berne. At the end of the Britons' visit to Argentina, their trip was described as a "gesture of good will which promotes a dialogue between the two countries on the more-than-a-century-old conflict on the Malvinas Islands."⁴⁸

On 2 July, at the United Nations Conference on World Fishing, the Argentine Undersecretary of Marine Resources, Hector Traverso, condemned Britain's maintenance of the protection zone as an illegal and unjust barrier to the development of Argentina's marine resources. Argentina charged that the continued enforcement of the zone constrained attempts to formulate an agreement on national fishing rights and that their actions were detrimental to the preservation and conservation of animal resources. Argentina claimed that the maintenance of the zone had resulted in no less than two instances of harassment

by British airplanes of Argentine fishing boats. In their address to the conference, the British made no reference to the problem of the protection zone and relations with Argentina.⁴⁹

In an address opening the Tenth World Baptist Youth Conference in Buenos Aires on 11 July, President Alfonsín appeared to have moderated his approach to talks with Britain. The hard-line pronouncements of previous months were abandoned temporarily as Alfonsín declared that Argentina "...is suffering from a disease, which is arrogance," and that to cure this disease, his government "...is seeking and will achieve a reconciliation...with Great Britain concerning the South Atlantic conflict."

Face to Face at Berne

For the first time since the 1982 outbreak of hostilities, high-level officials from London and Buenos Aires met for direct talks. The meeting took place over two days--the 18th and 19th of July--and was held in Berne, Switzerland under the auspices of the Swiss Protecting Power with Brazilian representatives also in attendance. While the talks lasted their scheduled two days, the outcome was disappointing. The meeting ended in mutual recrimination without any progress made towards ending the diplomatic stalemate. Indeed, the failure of the first direct contact between the two governments to effect any positive results boded poorly for hopes of any immediate improvement in relations. The cause of the talks' failure was the fundamental incongruity of the two governments' approaches to the process of normalizing relations. The Argentines believe that talks which completely ignore the sovereignty dispute are fruitless. As Foreign Minister Caputo states, "...to deny the nature of the conflict is to deny the conflict itself.... No type of negotiation, if it is to be taken seriously and responsibly, can ignore the nature of the conflict."⁵¹

Still, the Argentines have expressed a willingness to discuss other issues first--i.e. the normalization of relations--so long as the sovereignty issue is not wholly excluded from an agenda. To this end, Argentina has continually asked that talks be conducted with an open agenda--as was supposed to occur in Berne.

At the Berne talks, Argentina wanted to discuss "the mechanisms that would allow for the future discussion of issues of substance i.e. sovereignty."⁵² The Argentines accepted that the sovereignty issue could not be resolved immediately, but felt that discussing the steps which would allow for the future consideration of the issue was as worthwhile a concern as normalizing current relations. The British, however, have been wholly inflexible in their refusal to discuss sovereignty or even to consider the steps that would lead to a future discussion of the issue.

The British blame the failure of the talks on Argentina's insistence that sovereignty not be excluded from discussion.⁵³ When the British insisted that sovereignty could not be discussed in any form during the talks, the Argentines' felt the meeting had become pointless--an exercise in treating symptoms while ignoring the disease. International opinion generally concurred with the Argentine view; Britain was widely accused of unwarranted intransigence, both at home and abroad. The talks ended with the issue of a joint Brazilian-Swiss communique which revealed the crux of the dispute:

The British side said that Her Majesty's Government was not prepared to enter into discussions on the issue of sovereignty...The Argentine side stated that it was not prepared to discuss such issues (as normalization of relations) for a long time if there is no discussion of the manner in which the subject of sovereignty is to be discussed.⁵⁴

The British approached the negotiation process with a short-term view concerned only with a normalization of relations while the Argentines were preoccupied with discussing the long-term question of sovereignty, without which they saw little advantage in repairing diplomatic relations. The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee agreed that the failure of the Berne talks uncovered the "fundamental incompatibility of the Argentine and British approaches to the means of re-establishing relations."⁵⁵

The Aftermath of Berne

In an interview with The Financial Times on 8 August 1984, the Argentine Foreign Minister stated that he had no expectations of an immediate follow-up on the Berne meeting so long as Britain ignored the core of the dispute--the sovereignty issue. The same month saw clear demonstrations of Argentina's commitment to curbing the power of its military and, consequently, of Argentina's reliance upon diplomatic methods to resolve the Falklands dispute. On the 15th of August, the Argentine Defense Minister announced that he would gradually abolish conscription.⁵⁶ This measure was followed in January, 1985 by a 50% reduction in the defense budget.⁵⁷

On 24 September, President Alfonsín addressed the United Nations General Assembly and referred to Argentina's dispute with Britain over the Falklands. He made mention of British "intransigence" in negotiations and reiterated Argentina's commitment to regain the Islands through peaceful means. Alfonsín repeated his concerns over British fortification of the Falklands and described the process as "...threatening the interests and stability of the entire area and constituting a dangerous intrusion of the East-West conflict into the region."

Two days later, Sir Geoffrey Howe, the British Foreign Secretary, presented

the British side of the dispute to the General Assembly. He asserted the right of the Falklands' inhabitants to self-determination. He also asserted that the military forces on the Islands posed no threat to other countries and, indeed, were only there for defensive purposes. Finally, he expressed Britain's desire to improve relations between the two governments: "The only way forward is to find a way of taking such practical steps as will enable confidence to be re-established between our two peoples."

During October, statements made by government officials in both Britain and Argentina reflected the continued inability of the two governments to find a common basis for negotiations. On 11 October, Foreign Office Minister of State, Lady Young, reiterated British unwillingness to discuss sovereignty: "We do not believe that it is realistic to insist that Britain and Argentina should begin tackling the most sensitive issue between us and the one on which our positions are diametrically opposed and quite incompatible." Later, during a trip to Italy, Argentine President Alfonsín stated that "I do not think there can be any new alternative to the proposals that have already been made."⁵⁸

The United Nations General Assembly passed an Argentine sponsored resolution on the Falkland Islands on 1 November. The resolution passed by a large majority (89 to 9, with 54 abstentions), reflecting increased international impatience with Britain's unwillingness to discuss the central issue of sovereignty with Argentina. The resolution called upon Britain and Argentina to resume negotiations on their differences, including the sovereignty dispute, and requested the Secretary-General to continue in the use of his good offices to help facilitate contacts between the two governments.

On 27 November, Britain agreed to discuss with Spain the issue of sovereignty over Gibraltar. The following day, in response to a Parliamentary

Question, the Foreign Secretary denied that this decision had any relevant implications for the Falklands dispute. The Secretary suggested that Britain's ties to Spain through NATO and, prospectively, the European Economic Community plus Spain's willingness to protect the interests of Gibraltar's inhabitants made the analogy with Argentina inappropriate.⁵⁹ On the 30th of November, the Argentine Foreign Minister stated that Britain's new Gibraltar policy could represent a significant precedent for the future of Anglo-Argentine relations.

On the 12th of December, the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs released its report on the Falkland Islands. While the report was generally supportive of the Government's policies, the report did request a more concerted effort be made to normalize relations and stated that it considered some sort of compromise with Argentina unavoidable. The Committee agreed that the prospects for an early resolution of the dispute were remote, but that

...the present solution. .can only offer an uncertain future for the Islands in the long-term, and that some kind of accommodation with Argentina is not only inevitable, in view of the cost of the present policy to the United Kingdom, but also desirable if the Falklands are to have any prospect of long-term economic prosperity and political stability.⁶⁰

The Committee further suggested that: 1) as soon as Argentina declares an end to hostilities, the British government should lift the protection zone; 2) the Government should freeze its fortification of the Islands while announcing that any signs of renewed Argentine aggression would reverse the policy; and 3) simultaneous declarations offered the best prospect for progressing towards a normalization of relations.⁶¹

On 17 December, the Argentine Foreign Minister outlined his government's new diplomatic strategy with respect to the Falklands dispute. The Argentine

now plan to pursue a virtual public relations campaign to play upon the growing perception of Thatcher's intransigence and bring pressure upon her government to demonstrate more flexibility in negotiations. As well as acting through various international fora, the Argentines plan to direct their efforts at domestic opponents of Thatcher's policies. To influence British public opinion, the Argentine government has enrolled a publicity agency to advance its case via the British newspapers. The government also established a Center for the South Atlantic to conduct informational seminars and coordinate cultural events to promote the Argentine position in the dispute.

Relations in 1985

On 1 February, 1985, Keith Best, a Conservative Member of Parliament, met with President Alfonsín and Senator Berhongary (President of the Senate's Defense Committee) in Buenos Aires. He pressed for an Argentine cessation of hostilities, but the demand was rejected by Berhongary. During talks, means of re-establishing a dialogue were discussed. One suggestion was that permanent consultative bodies operating under an open agenda be established. While the immediate effect of the talks is unknown, the Argentines seemed pleased with this expression of Britain's desire to resume negotiations. On the 6th of February, the President of Argentina's Lower House Foreign Relations Committee, Federico Storani, announced the Committee's intention to create an internal working group to examine various means of ending the current diplomatic stalemate.

From the 18th to the 20th of February, 1985, British Members of Parliament and Members of the Argentine Congress held their third meeting at the University of Maryland. A representative of the Falkland Islanders also attended this session. Both sides agreed that the present situation was unacceptable because

of the potential for conflict. They also agreed that a normalization of relations could not be realized until there was an agreement to discuss all aspects of the Islands' future, including sovereignty. During the conference, the representatives considered numerous options for the future of the Falklands. They called for immediate action by both governments in implementing measures which would allow a normalization of relations, such as declaring an end to hostilities or lifting the protection zone.

In February, the Argentine government released a statement which condemned the planned revisions in the Falkland Islands Constitution. The Argentines charged that the plans violated United Nations resolutions⁶² which called upon both governments to refrain from implementing policies which unilaterally altered the status quo. The statement charged that plans to reform the constitution were yet another instance of Britain's unwillingness to reach an accommodation with Argentina and that Britain's actions inhibited attempts to resume negotiations.

"A Larger Stalemate"

The Anglo-Argentine conflict over the Falkland Islands, in the words of one former Minister of State, possesses "certain insoluble characteristics."⁶³ The 1982 Campaign exacerbated the dispute; over 1,000 lives were lost and millions of dollars in armaments were exhausted as each government asserted its claim to these bleak Antarctic rocks. No matter how pacific the intentions of each government are now, neither can forget or forsake the domestic sacrifices made on behalf of the Islands. When militancy replaces diplomacy as the vehicle for resolving a dispute, "one only jumps from a smaller conflict to a larger stalemate at greater expense."⁶⁴ The course of Anglo-Argentine relations since the Campaign vividly demonstrates the accuracy of this statement.

An Untenable Status Quo

The prospects for a comprehensive resolution of the dispute during the life of the present British government (the next elections are scheduled to take place by Summer, 1988) are remote. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's policies and rhetoric concerning the Islands have committed her to an inflexible hard-line stance on the subject of negotiations. Thatcher has refused adamantly to discuss the issue of sovereignty or even, as Berne demonstrated, to tolerate future consideration of the issue. Such a position is not only uncompromising, but also is unrealistic. The exorbitant cost of the present policy--defending one Falkland Islander is a thousand times as expensive as defending a Briton⁶⁵--is beginning to weigh on the minds of Members of Parliament and the British public at large. At the same time, both domestic and international opinion are recognizing the destabilizing nature of the present stalemate. Without a resolution of the dispute--or at least a normalization of relations between London and Buenos Aires--the Falkland Islands have little hope of enjoying significant political or economic development, while Britain's relations with Latin America and much of the developing world will continue to be tainted by the specter of the Falklands dispute. With a democratic government sitting in Buenos Aires, the time is propitious for the conduct of substantive negotiations. While it is not the British government's responsibility to support Argentine governments, British interests undoubtedly are better served by the existence of a democratic Argentina. Any progress made in resolving the dispute would help vindicate Alfonsino's commitment to a peaceful assertion of Argentina's claim and would accrue popular support for Argentina's democracy. A pragmatic assessment of British interests reveals the futility of present policy and the necessity of reaching an accommodation with

Argentina.

Argentina, too, needs to end its dispute with Britain. Struggling under a \$45 billion foreign debt and skyrocketing inflation, Alfonsín is anxious to restore trade links with Britain and to improve its ties with this international economic power for the purpose of rescheduling Argentina's debt. Beyond that, achieving progress in the dispute with Britain would be a great political boon to Alfonsín's government.

Despite the motivations for each government to reduce tensions, the fundamental divergence between Britain's and Argentina's approach to the dispute frustrates attempts at progress. The differences exist, firstly, in each country's view of the nature of the dispute and, secondly, in the goal each seeks to attain through the negotiating process.

Self-Determination vs. Sovereignty: The British Position

Britain considers the self-determination of the Falklands' inhabitants to be central to the dispute. As an Assistant Undersecretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs explained to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, "...the whole question of the Islanders' wishes, paramountcy or otherwise of those wishes and their interests is so much the kernel and heart of the political problems regarding the Falklands."⁶⁶ Argentina, on the other hand, views sovereignty--that is, territoriality--as the crux of the Anglo-Argentine dispute. Since the 1982 Campaign, the Thatcher government consistently has insisted that progress in resolving the sovereignty issue can only be achieved in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders. While the government has not gone so far as to grant the Islanders a veto over Falklands policy, Thatcher has made their self-determination a sacred cause through her staunch support for the Islanders' wishes. The transcript of a Foreign Office Minister's testimony to

the Foreign Affairs Committee reveals the de facto veto power the Falkland Islanders have over government policy: Mr. Foulkes (a Member of the Committee) asked if the British government "...would be willing to restart negotiations, including a discussion at least of the question of sovereignty?" Mr. Onslow (Minister of State of Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs) replied: "Not without the consent of the Islanders whose rights are involved." Mr. Foulkes: "So they have a veto?" Mr. Onslow: "They have, in effect, the right to say to the House of Commons what they think of any actions proposed which affect them."⁶⁷ In subsequent testimony, another Minister, Baroness Young, further asserted that "...it would be inconceivable for it (Parliament) to take a decision on sovereignty over the Falkland Islands against the wishes of the Islanders."⁶⁸

The British government bases its allegiance to the Islanders' rights upon Article 73 of the United Nations Charter and Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (to which Argentina is not a signatory). Article 73 of the United Nations Charter charges those governments with administrative responsibility for external territories to "...recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of the territories are paramount...." In Article 1 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, signatories affirm that: "All people have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural development."

Self-determination As An Obstacle To Progress

While Britain's commitment to protecting the Islanders' rights is admirable and few would suggest that the British government should abandon the Falklanders, Thatcher has allowed the issue of self-determination to become an

obstacle to the negotiating process rather than a factor in negotiations. The concept of self-determination is to ensure that the interests of territorial inhabitants are respected by the administering power and to prevent a domestic population from being treated like "chattels in real estate"⁶⁹ during consideration of the territory's political future. Self-determination does not imply, however, that the wishes--something quite distinct from "interests"--of native inhabitants must be the sole determinant of the administering power's policy.

The applicability of the self-determination tenet to the Falkland Islands case is itself rather spacious. Whether the Islands population actually constitutes a distinct "people" in the context of the UN Charter is highly questionable.⁷⁰ As noted earlier, the Islands have no indigenous inhabitants, but always have been populated by their administering power. The history of the present population extends back only as far as British rule (1833). The Islanders are, as of the 1983 Britain Nationality Act, British citizens, who happen to be living on dependent territory rather than in the United Kingdom proper. Yet, the 1,800 Islanders possess a greater influence on policy than any other sector of the British population or, for that matter, any other colonial population. The people of Gibraltar and Hong Kong have nothing comparable to the influence the Falkland Islanders exercise regarding the political future of their respective territories; the Yorkshire miners have nothing tantamount to a de facto veto over Thatcher's national policies. The British government is obliged to protect the rights which the Islanders possess by virtue of their British citizenship. However, the government is not required to sacrifice the interests of the remaining 50 million British citizens on behalf of the 1,800 Falklanders. Unless the government pressures the Islanders, they will have no

motivation to compromise and will opt for a continuation of the status quo, regardless of the cost to Britain. The Islanders must come to recognize that, as British citizens, they can have no greater veto on government policy than any other minority group in Britain.⁷¹ Britain cannot abandon the Islanders, but neither can the government allow itself to be enslaved by Islander opinion.

Self-determination vs. Sovereignty: The Argentine Position

For the Argentines, sovereignty--as an essentially territorial concept--is the central point to be resolved in its dispute with Britain. In Argentina's opinion, the present inhabitants are merely an outgrowth of British imperialism and do not represent an indigenous population: "...there are no Falkland Islanders, only colonists...."⁷² Consequently, the self-determination argument advanced by Britain is viewed as inapplicable and as an attempt by Britain to justify continued possession of the Falklands. Argentina's goal is the restoration of its territorial integrity by the acquisition of sovereignty over the Falklands and this goal cannot be subordinated to the desires of an artificial and alien population.

If the Argentines are to succeed in their quest for sovereignty, however, they must recognize the need to accommodate the present inhabitants. As the British government is committed to protecting the interests of the Islanders, Argentina's sole prospect for reaching an agreement with Britain is a solution which takes into account the welfare of the Islands' population. Indeed, British Foreign Secretary Howe referred to Spain's respect for the wishes of Gibraltarians as an important factor behind Britain's willingness to negotiate sovereignty.⁷³ A similar demonstration by the Argentine government would affect positively Britain's inclination to admit the sovereignty issue to a negotiation agenda. In recent statements, the Argentines have continued to challenge the

identity of the Islanders by charging that they are merely an extension of the occupying power whose presence reinforces an illegitimate occupation. At the same time, official pronouncements have implied that special administrative arrangements could be made to ensure the Islanders' way of life and interests. Just as the British government must recognize that protecting the Falklanders interests does not preclude entering into sovereignty discussions, so must the Argentines learn that their sovereignty aspirations are inextricably linked to the provision of guarantees for the Islands' current inhabitants.

Short-term vs. Long-term Concerns

The second-level of the negotiation impasse is the divergent approaches of the two governments to negotiations: Britain is concerned essentially with the short-term, Argentina with the long-term. The British government has demonstrated, at least for the time being, a willingness to discuss only the normalization of relations with Argentina and a restoration of limited contacts (along the lines of the 1971 Communications Agreement) between Argentina and the Falklands.

Besides insisting that sovereignty is not negotiable, many in the British government believe that negotiating such a decisive issue as sovereignty, for the time being, is doomed to failure and that the effort could be invested more profitably in talks on normalizing relations. In an address to the United Nations General Assembly, Foreign Secretary Howe explained the British negotiating position. He said that if talks were

...not to founder at the outset on the very issue that divides us, they (can) not address the question of sovereignty.... We have sought ways of improving relations with Argentina by tackling practical issues where real progress is possible to the benefit of both sides..., the only way forward is to find a way of taking such practical steps as will enable confidence to be

re-established between our two peoples.⁷⁴

Argentina, on the other hand, considers talks which exclude the issue of sovereignty to be pointless as they deny the very essence of the dispute. Any improvement in relations with the United Kingdom would be artificial because the Falklands would remain an ever present point of contention, casting a permanent shadow over Anglo-Argentine relations. In addition, the Argentine government fears that their participation in negotiations which exclude the question of sovereignty might be interpreted as an implicit abandoning of Argentina's sovereignty claim. Although Argentina has shown a willingness to participate in a dialogue designed to improve relations with Britain, they have insisted that, while the discussion of sovereignty can be postponed, it cannot be explicitly excluded from the agenda.

Means of Achieving Short-term Progress

The failure of the Berne talks seem to demonstrate the fundamental incompatibility of Britain's and Argentina's approach to talks. Yet, opportunities do exist which will allow the parties to overcome the obstacles to negotiations. However, both sides must recognize that this is neither purely an issue of territorial sovereignty nor is self-determination for the Islanders the sole point of contention. Instead, the two issues are inextricably linked and any practicable solution will have to address both problems.

If progress is to be achieved in normalizing relations, the subject matter for talks cannot be all-inclusive. The more issues covered in a single negotiating session the more opportunities there are for the dialogue to collapse due to seemingly irreconcilable differences. An over-burdened negotiating agenda is often more of a hindrance than a boon to improving

relations.⁷⁵ The Berne talks failed, in part, because, with an open agenda, each side immediately raised what it considered to be the most critical issue. Unfortunately, the questions raised were also the most contentious and, as a consequence, the parties became deadlocked. By focusing solely on the major points of contention, both Britain and Argentina neglected the smaller issue on which agreement could be reached.

The Bifurcation of Negotiations

The Anglo-Argentine dialogue should be divided into two sets of negotiations. The first would deal with the normalization of relations; the second would cover the political future of the Falklands. At the outset, talks would be placed under what has been described as a "sovereignty umbrella,"⁷⁶ That is, both governments would recognize that participation in talks does not prejudice prior claims to sovereignty. Assured both that the essence of the dispute is being addressed and that Argentina's participation in talks does not involve a tacit acknowledgement of British sovereignty, Alfonsín's government would be free to discuss means of normalizing relations with Britain. Britain would have a forum in which to address the restoration of normal relations, which Britain considers a prerequisite for the conduct of more substantial discussions. At the same time, taking part in talks on the Islands' political future would allow Britain to consider the long-term prospects for the Falklands without necessarily debating sovereignty: preservation of the status quo is as much an option for the future as is a transfer of sovereignty. The talks on normalization would very probably progress at a faster rate than the more contentious discussions on the future of the Islands, but this disparity will not prevent the dialogue from proceeding. The benefit of having bi-level talks is that a stalemate in one arena does not jeopardize the success of the other.

In the short to medium-term, the only talks with a prospect for success are those on normalization. The present government in Britain has invested too much money and rhetoric in the status quo to allow adequate flexibility for successful negotiations on the long-term future of the Falklands. The most likely first step in negotiations would be a simultaneous declaration, wherein Britain would lift the protection zone and Argentina would announce a formal cessation of hostilities. President Alfonsin expressed his support for such an exchange as early as March, 1981.⁷⁷ The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee advocated that Britain lift the protection zone once Argentina ended hostilities.⁷⁸ Once these declarations have been made, the normalization of diplomatic, economic, and cultural relations can proceed more smoothly.

Confidence-Building Measures

Both sides have available to them a number of confidence-building measures which could be undertaken both as a demonstration of good faith during the negotiation process and to create an atmosphere more conducive to dialogue. Britain has consistently expressed a willingness either to return the Argentine war dead or to arrange a visit by the families to the Falklands. The acceptance of such a humanitarian offer by Argentina could create a better climate for relations between the two countries. Continued low-level contact, such as has occurred already between Members of Parliament and Members of the Argentine Congress, allow the two sides to come together for talks in a more casual and open manner, without the pressure and rhetoric which accompany official meetings. Discussions between Britain and Argentina on such non-sovereignty issues as fishing rights and, perhaps, joint exploration projects (e.g. for minerals and hydrocarbons) would demonstrate their common interest in improved relations. To advance the cause of normalized economic relations, Argentina

could remove the overseers (interventors) who were installed in British businesses at the outbreak of hostilities, as a sign of their good faith and commitment to achieving better relations. In recognition of President Alfonsin's attempts to curb Argentina's military power, the British should reduce the rate at which they are fortifying the Islands, as a good faith gesture. Finally suggestions have been made that a visit by the United Nations' Decolonization Committee both to monitor Britain's administration of the Islands and to discover the Falklanders' opinion of their own future might be helpful. The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee endorsed the idea of the Committee visiting.⁷⁹ Still, this visit would be more for the propaganda race within the United Nations than it would be a tool for improving Anglo-Argentine relations.

While the normalization talks will proceed faster than the future policy talks, they still must be approached with patience and caution, in a very piecemeal fashion--dealing with one aspect of the dispute at a time. In Britain, opinion is shifting in favor of reaching an accommodation with Argentina, and in Buenos Aires, Alfonsin is anxious to demonstrate that his peaceful approach to the Falklands dispute can enjoy success. A normalization of relations would benefit both countries and their differences can be bridged easily through cooperation and compromise. However, the failure to separate talks on normalization from the conundrum of the Islands' political future has obstructed progress, thus far. By initiating bi-level discussions, progress in one set of talks will not be limited by the slower pace or stalemate of the other. At the same time, progress in the restoration of relations may give impetus to the discussions on the Falklands' political future.

CHAPTER FIVE:

Long-term Solutions to the Conflict

The Imperative of Progress

"The Falkland Islands' misfortune has always been to be wanted more than they are loved."¹ The durability and, at times, intensity of the Anglo-Argentine dispute over this dismal Antarctic archipelago vividly reflects this characteristic of the Falkland Islands conundrum. Throughout 150 years of disagreement, Britain and Argentina have been unable to devise a mutually acceptable resolution to the problem. The seventeen years of talks which preceded the 1982 conflict effected little substantive progress. Since the conflict, however, both international and domestic pressure have been placed on the two governments to commence a serious dialogue so that further bloodshed can be averted. The ominous force which contemporary governments can unleash against each other has made the international community extremely sensitive of threats to peace: the Falklands dispute represents just such a potential menace. Modern technology and weaponry have reduced the entire globe to a single battlefield, making a conflict in the South Atlantic as destabilizing as one in the Middle East. World opinion, then, is anxious to see the two sides sit down together in an attempt to resolve their dispute peacefully and thereby eliminate the latent threat to regional and international stability.

As a result of the numerous post-mortems conducted on the Falklands Campaign, many in Britain are coming to recognize that their victory in the

Campaign was a "damned close-run thing"² and that Britain's capacity to repeat the effort, if needed, is diminishing while Argentina's is increasing. Many believe that, unless an accommodation is reached with Argentina during the next twenty to thirty years, Britain will be unable to enforce militarily its claim to the Islands. Time is perceived to be on Argentina's side. As one Member of Parliament suggested, "I do not want our forces to be engaged in such a venture two, five, 10 or 20 years from now, because next time we may not be so fortunate."³

Argentina is, of course, eager to begin substantial talks on the long-term future of the Falklands. The commencement of these talks would strike a major victory for Alfonsín's government and for his commitment to diplomatic means of resolving the dispute. The Argentines, however, are unwilling to participate in talks which fail to address the essence of the dispute while dealing only with superficial questions. Argentina will not concede its claim to sovereignty, but the Alfonsín government is willing to be more flexible in its interpretation of the claim.⁴ Many officials share a common sentiment: "The one thing we are not going to tolerate is another 17 fruitless years of talks."⁵ Still, Argentina must be careful not to misinterpret British opinion. While many Britons support an accommodation with Argentina, they believe that negotiations should progress slowly and patiently so that both Britain's and the Islanders' interests can be protected. Britain's presence at the negotiating table will not imply that the British are ready to surrender immediately by the pen that which Argentina failed to procure by the sword.⁶

The political future of the Falklands could take a number of forms, some of which offer a better prospect for success than do others. By analyzing the merits and failings of the most frequently discussed solution schemes for the

Falklands, one is able to determine the limits of feasibility within which the Anglo-Argentine dispute must be resolved. By considering which aspects of the various solutions are most practical and viable, one can piece together a novel resolution of the dispute, tailored to the unique specifications of this conflict. The Falkland Islands dispute is an unorthodox problem, so any practicable solution will likely be unconventional as well, combining the most promising features of numerous proposed solutions.

The Status Quo

The most obvious option for resolving the dispute is actually a non-solution: that is, a continuation of the status quo. Britain would keep on fortifying the Islands and funding their development while Argentina would continue to protest and remonstrate against British policy. The rift in Anglo-Argentine relations would go unrepaired and the good relationship enjoyed prior to the Campaign would be forgotten.

The Falklanders and the Status Quo Option

The disadvantages of this policy are so numerous as to leave it virtually devoid of support in either Britain or Argentina. What support does exist for this policy emanates almost wholly from the Falkland Islanders themselves. To some Islanders, the present policy is reassuring. The military's presence deters further Argentine incursions against the Falklands while economic investment demonstrates Thatcher's commitment to retaining the Islands. During testimony to the Foreign Affairs Committee, one member of the Falkland Islands Committee (Mr. Cheek)--a Falkland Islands based pressure group dedicated to keeping the Islands British--described the satisfaction of some Islanders with their new-found British security blanket:

Mr. King: "Would your committee be quite happy with the continuation of what has been described as Fortress Falklands forever and ever?"

Mr. Cheek: "Yes...as long as there is any risk at all to the Islands, yes, we want that, we want to remain British as we are now and be defended as we are now.. ."7

The British View of the Status Quo Option

However, neither Britain nor Argentina considers preserving the Anglo-Argentine to be a tenable long-term solution to the dispute. For Britain, the present policy is expensive both in economic terms and in damage to Britain's international standing. As noted previously, the cost to Britain of restoring, developing, and garrisoning the Islands is exorbitant. With Britain's sagging economy and the government's strained budget, the annual investment in the Falklands of an amount equivalent to 40 pounds per British taxpayer⁸ represents a serious drain on the limited financial resources of the government with little hope of ever recouping its investment. Significant economic development requires external investment, but the tenuous future of the Islands dissuades most would-be investors.

At the same time, prices for wool--the Islands' main product--have decreased and are expected to remain low for some time. The Islands also suffer from a shortage of labor, partially resulting from high emigration (especially of females) rates of around 1.5% annually.⁹ Thus, the economic prospects for the Falklands are bleak until a resolution of the conflict permits both external investment in the Islands and a normal trade relationship with South America. Without a practicable solution to the dispute, economic development of the Islands is impossible and the Falklanders' fate is to become wholly dependent on an "...expensive, complex and time-consuming life-line over 8,000 miles of

ocean to the United Kingdom."¹⁰

The Island garrison also represents a serious distortion of British defense priorities. Since the close of World War II, Britain's strategic orientation has focused on Europe and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The massive diversion of military resources and personnel to the Falklands since the 1982 Campaign has detracted from Britain's contribution to NATO. In an alliance already wracked by financial squabblings, Britain's Fortress Falklands policy carries with it both a price tag-NATO members can ill afford and a strong potential for initiating yet another Alliance debate on finances.

Officials in the Ministry of Defence insist that the Falkland Islands garrison does not represent a serious distortion of British defense policy. They argue that, whether they are stationed on the Rhine or on the Falklands, the costs of feeding and quartering the troops is comparable. However, this argument ignores the excessive transportation costs--measured in both time and money--involved in fortifying the Falklands. What is more, troops stationed in the South Atlantic simply are not available for use in situations where Britain's interests may be more seriously challenged than they are in the South Atlantic (e.g. Northern Ireland, NATO exercises).

Proponents of the current policy also suggest that the Falklands provide invaluable training for the troops. While this may have been true during the actual campaign, the alleged benefits of stationing troops on the Islands permanently are obscure. If the Falklands provide such a ripe training ground, why were successive governments so anxious to deplete the Islands' garrison prior to April, 1982? No one propounded the training advantages of the Islands before the Argentine invasion. Besides, if the Island garrison represents such a boon to military fitness, why is the government so anxious to create a defense

infrastructure which will decrease the demand for troops (e.g. through the construction of the Mount Pleasant airfield)? Rather than representing a genuine strategic concern, the Fortress Falklands policy is an instance of "military activity expanding to fill the resource allotted to it."¹¹

Finally, as a military policy, Fortress Falklands is a losing proposition for the British. Fortifying the Islands is just one small aspect of British defense policy. Britain cannot afford to provide the Islands with its most advanced military hardware and best troops: this would be too great a distortion of policy. For Argentina, the situation is quite different. Argentina's entire military capability represents a threat to the Islands as long as the dispute goes unresolved. The Argentines do not have to transport their forces 8,000 miles or quarter them on a physically inhospitable island in order to pose a challenge to Britain. The mere existence of armed forces in Argentina threatens the Islands. In order to counter this, Britain's military capability on the Islands must be updated continually to counter Argentina's growing might. As Argentina's rearmament proceeds, Britain's ability to match Argentina's military capability will involve an increasingly substantial diversion of resources from other defense concerns. Argentine rearmament has already replaced most of its losses from the 1982 Campaign and has improved its capacity to engage in a low intensity war of attrition for the Falklands. While the present government is not contemplating any such action, a long-term refusal by Britain to negotiate the dispute will make such an option more attractive to future governments. Time is definitely on Argentina's side in any regionally contained arms race.¹²

In addition to the high monetary costs of the policy, maintaining the status quo hurts Britain's international standing. While Britain's relationship

with Argentina has not been a prime concern of foreign policy, the damage to Britain's relations with Latin America is significant. Trade has suffered and her position vis-a-vis Guatemala in the Belize dispute has deteriorated. International support for Britain is waning as reflected in declining support for Britain's position in the United Nations. With the advent of democracy in Argentina, pressures for a negotiated solution have increased and, since Berne, Britain has been charged with intransigence. A long-term attempt to avoid negotiations and support the status quo would see Britain more frequently condemned and scolded by other nations for its stubborn perpetuation of regional instability. Britain's standing with members of the Developing World would deteriorate since many of them consider the Falklands to be an anachronistic relic of imperialism. A long-term continuation of the present policy also would weaken Britain's position in the upcoming (1991) renegotiation of the Antarctic Treaty. Many opponents of Britain's Islands' policy will be present at the Antarctic negotiating table and they would feel no obligation to reward British intransigence on the Falklands with compromise and cooperation in the Antarctic. Thus, maintaining the status quo incurs serious political costs which extend beyond the South Atlantic. In 1983, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee acknowledged the larger repercussions of the government's policy when it noted that "...present policy...carries with it unfortunate implications for the wider conduct of foreign policy both now and for the future."¹³

Increased pressure from Britain's closest ally--the United States--can also be expected. While Britain may consider its Latin American relations to be of secondary importance, the same cannot be said for the United States. The Reagan Administration has made Latin America a primary focus of its foreign policy and American support for Britain in the 1982 conflict seriously undermined its

regional standing. Anxious to regain credibility, the United States has cooled its support for Britain and has advocated the resumption of negotiations.

Domestically, a continuation of the status quo has marginally more credibility, if only because it avoids the appearance of conceding to either Argentine or international pressure. But as the British population becomes aware of the extremely high price of Fortress Falklands, public support will diminish and domestic pressure for an accommodation with Argentina will grow. Members of Parliament already are becoming disenchanted with the drain on British finances and resources involved in the present policy. One Member of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee lamented the diversion of

...money which would keep (coal) pits open, electrify railways and create new roads and jobs for my unemployed constituents. How do I explain to them that...we are going to provide roads, jobs and other facilities nearly 8,000 miles away in the South Atlantic with their money?¹⁴

This Member is not alone in his frustration with present governmental policy on the Falkland Islands. The British are coming to realize the illogical nature of a policy which denies the very dispute itself. The present government is exhibiting an "ostrich with his head in the sand" mentality by perpetuating the status quo. Refusing to negotiate the long-term future of the Islands does not dispose of the conflict; it merely postpones its resolution.

Islander opinion, while appreciative of recent British investment in the Falklands, is quite divided on the long-term viability of current policy. A majority of the population is perfectly content with Fortress Falklands, viewing it as a guarantee of the Islands continued link with Britain. The more zealous Falkland Islanders oppose any accommodation with Argentina whatsoever on the

rather naive assumption that, since they do not recognize the Argentine claim to the Islands, they need not acknowledge the existence of an Anglo-Argentine conflict at all. Said one Islander: "We do not recognise any problem and do not recognise that there is any legal dispute or any claim with Argentina."¹⁵ However, some Islanders are beginning to acknowledge the need to reach some sort of agreement with Argentina. The vast majority of the population still wishes to retain its British identity, but there is a growing awareness that the current policy only perpetuates a state of instability and is infeasible as a long-term solution. One Falklander told the House of Commons' Foreign Affairs Committee that

It is our turn to face up to the fact that we cannot remain a colony and cannot strengthen our ties with Britain, and we cannot continue to be a drag on the British people.¹⁶

The majority of the Islanders wish to see a normalization of British/Argentine relations but have no desire to reestablish Argentine/Falkland Islands links. They would rather live amidst a British garrison than under Argentine rule.

The Argentine View of the Status Quo Option

Maintaining the status quo as a long-term policy option would frustrate the Argentines as much as it would please the Falkland Islanders. In contrast with its effect on Britain, the status quo represents for Argentina a political, rather than a financial, liability. The funds dedicated to Argentina's post-Campaign rearmament may well have been dedicated to the enhancement of her military capabilities anyway as the necessary outgrowth of a nation's modernization drive. Argentina has suffered some from trade restrictions, but the dispute has not inhibited attempts to renegotiate Argentina's immense foreign debt. Indeed, British banks have facilitated the renegotiation of the

Argentine debt. Britain's protection zone around the Falklands, however, has cost Argentina some revenue from their fishing industry. Still, opposition to the status quo policy is based primarily on political, rather than economic, factors.

As occurred in Britain, the 1982 Campaign brought the Falklands issue to the forefront of the national consciousness. A failure by Alfonsin's government to achieve progress on the issue during his term could be exploited by opponents in the next election. Beyond this, the Falklands dispute is a very emotional, nationalistic subject. A tangible success for Argentina in resolving the dispute could unite the nation behind both its young democracy and Alfonsin's government. Argentina is growing impatient with British intransigence and, thus, the government is under increasing pressure to begin substantial negotiations with Britain. Consequently, a long-term policy which continued the current stalemate would have serious political repercussions for Buenos Aires. Still, time is generally felt to be on Argentina's side since Britain is forced to bear the brunt of the financial and political burdens of a status quo policy. The general acceptance of this view in Argentina counsels patience to those elements in the population which are demanding a rapid resolution of the conflict.

The Status Quo Option Assessed

The status quo option, then, appeals only to the Falkland Islanders--and not even to all of them--as a long-term policy. The financial and political costs on both sides are burdensome. In addition, both sides seem to recognize that this option is really no solution at all since it leaves unresolved the crux of the dispute: competing Anglo-Argentine claims of sovereignty over the Islands. Under this policy, the disease is not cured, it merely is forced into

remission. Britain and Argentina must find a long-term policy for the Falklands which will bring peace to the region. A continuation of current policy would lead only to a "...protracted and venomous cold war in the South Atlantic...."¹⁷

Variations on the Status Quo: Integration

A number of other options which have been forwarded as possible long-term solutions are actually just variations on the status quo policy. These include integration with the United Kingdom, free association, and associated statehood. Choosing one of these options as a long-term solution to the dispute would alter only minimally the current situation and would neither alleviate the enormous costs of the present policy to Britain, nor would they be acceptable to Argentina. The dispute would continue, only the name of the Islands' political status would alter.

Integration with the United Kingdom would make the Falklands a Dependent State of the British Crown similar in status to the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands. For Britain, such a measure would institutionalize the enormous expenditures presently dedicated to the Islands. The garrison costs would continue because Britain would have to make the Islands as secure as the rest of British territory. Of course, the likelihood of an Argentine invasion would diminish. Buenos Aires would be in no doubt as to Britain's commitment to the Islands. An invasion of the Falklands would be tantamount to a direct assault on Great Britain and Britain would be at liberty to invoke any relevant defense treaties in her support. In addition to military costs, integration with the United Kingdom would obligate the government to provide the Falklands with the same social services as are available to the rest of the British population. The Falklanders unavoidably would be given disproportionate representation in

Parliament. The vote of their Member of Parliament, representing just 1,800 people, would carry the same weight as the vote of a Member representing some 50,000 electors.¹⁸

Since this solution is in accordance with the ideals of self-determination and adheres to the tenets of the United Nations Charter, international pressure on Britain would cease to come from some quarters (e.g. the Western nations). But to Argentina and many of its Latin American neighbors, this would be perceived as nothing more than a neo-colonialist tactic and a gross violation of Argentina's territorial integrity. Rather than resolve the Anglo-Argentine conflict, this policy would only antagonize the Argentines and perhaps even incite them to military action, since the incorporation would preclude reaching a satisfactory settlement through negotiations. The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee acknowledged the imperative of finding a long-term solution which would be acceptable to both Argentina and the other countries of the region. "In the long run a solution acceptable to the Falklands' immediate neighbours is essential...; neither independence nor incorporation in the United Kingdom could conceivably achieve that objective."¹⁹

Integration Assessed

As with the status quo, the Falkland Islanders are the greatest proponents of integration with the United Kingdom. Under such a policy, Britain's commitment to the Islands would be permanently guaranteed. The uncertainty and instability of their colonial status would end as the Falklands' future would no longer be affected by changes in Britain's ruling party. Yet, the Falklanders must recognize that integration with the United Kingdom will not diminish Argentina's dedication to possessing the Islands, but it may instigate a change in the method of recovering the Islands from peaceful to military means. In the

event of another invasion, Britain's commitment to defending the Islands will not be in doubt, but her capacity to successfully dislodge the Argentines a second time is highly uncertain. Argentina has learned the lessons of the 1982 conflict very well and her rearmament has increased greatly her ability to repel a British counterattack. While Britain has invested heavily in the Falklands, her amphibious assault capability beyond the NATO area has continued to deteriorate. Thus, incorporation with the United Kingdom suffers from the same disadvantages as a continuation of the status quo; that is, the policy merely gives a sense of satisfaction to the Islanders without addressing the heart of the Anglo-Argentine dispute.

Variations on the Status Quo: Free Association

The free association of the Falklands with the United Kingdom would involve the development of internal autonomy for the Islands, while Britain would retain responsibility for foreign and defense matters. The decision to form a free association would be based upon an expression of the Islanders' will, probably measured by a referendum.²⁰ The Falklanders would retain the right to terminate the association later if they so desired. However, this policy assumes a large degree of internal self-government exists prior to the formation of the association. Thus, the Falkland Islands government would have to evolve from an institution serving the administrative needs of a colony to an autonomous self-governing body for the Falklands. Whether such an expansion is feasible considering the Islands' small population and the fact that those currently in government serve on a part-time basis (in addition to their professional careers) is a very serious question. In the opinion of some Islanders, population size already limits their ability to meet their governmental needs and the idea of assuming further governmental responsibilities, without a

population expansion, is absurd. Said one Islander,

...much will have to be done within the Islands before any form of self-government can be democratically achieved, as a population of 1,800 cannot begin to contemplate this... (The) present system of government does not work, as there are too few people with the time to afford away from their employment attending meetings...²¹

At present, due to the fall in wool prices and the inability of the Islands to conduct trade with their South American neighbors, the Islands lack the economic and human resources to support complete self-government. The current policies of the British government are making the Islanders even more dependent on the British, further increasing the length of time required for self-government to become a feasible proposition.

Free Association Assessed

Beyond the difficulties of preparing the Falklands for free association, the policy would perpetuate many of the disadvantages of the current stalemate. Further, free association would not offer an acceptable resolution of the dispute since it represents a unilateral move by Britain and ignores the Argentine role in the conflict. Free association would not eliminate the financial burden placed on Britain since the British government would still be responsible for the Islands' defense. The problem of matching Argentina's military expansion and the increased likelihood of Argentina resorting to military action--since free association would also preclude a negotiated settlement with Britain--would perpetuate costs already present in current Falklands policy. What is more, Parliament would also have to finance the Islands' budget, further increasing the costs of this policy option.

Through free association, the Falklanders would be guaranteed equal

representation in the British Parliament, which would encounter the same problem of disproportionate representation as would happen with the integration option. Also similar to integration with the United Kingdom, free association would enjoy the support of much of the international community since the ideal of self-determination would be fulfilled. The support of Latin American nations again would be withheld.

The idea of free association appeals to Falkland Islanders because it permanently guarantees their ties to Britain and would demonstrate to Argentina Britain's commitment to their defense. Argentina, of course, denounces free association with Britain for the Falklands since it would ignore their claim to the Islands. The prospect of the Islands forming a free association with Argentina is incomprehensible since a free association can only be entered into upon the freely expressed will of the inhabitants of the territory. The Falklanders have never demonstrated even an inkling of a desire to bind themselves to Argentina. Indeed, their opposition to Argentine rule is at the heart of the Anglo-Argentine dispute.

Variations on the Status Quo: Associated Statehood

Associated statehood is a concept similar to free association, in that the Falklands would exercise self-rule while Britain would provide for their defense and foreign affairs. Associated statehood, however, allows for a modified degree of self-government and does not require that the territory be economically viable.²² These less stringent qualifications seem more relevant to the characteristics of the Falkland Islands' situation. However, associated statehood generally represents a temporary stage for territories progressing to full independence, which is neither a feasible nor a greatly desired goal of the Islanders. What is more, associated statehood is a unilateral move in the

dispute and, thus, fails to resolve the difficulties inherent in the previous three policy options. Britain's burdensome expenditures would continue, Argentina's desire to repossess the Islands would not abate, and the solution would lack regional support. In fact, many countries consider associated statehood to be nothing more than veiled colonialism, so broad international support--at least in the developing world--would be lacking.

Integration with the United Kingdom, free association, associated statehood, and a continuation of the status quo all represent impracticable long-term policies since, as unilateral actions, they do not address Argentine desires or concerns. The Falklands dispute is a bilateral conflict, so the only feasible resolutions to the problem are those which address the goals and interests of both governments. Any other solution could deal, at best, only with peripheral aspects of the dispute and would ignore the heart of the controversy. Bilateral conflicts require bipartisan solutions.

Independence

Independence for the Falkland Islands, while always a theoretical possibility, represents an impractical policy option for the future. The Islands simply lack the resources to support an independent state. The Islands have little prospect of ever being economically viable as an independent nation. Until the 1980s, the Islands did generate sufficient revenue internally to be self-supporting. However, as a colony, their revenue did not have to cover the expenses of operating an autonomous government, defending themselves, or providing social services for the population. With the fall in wool prices on the international market, the Islands cannot even generate enough revenue to meet the reconstruction costs from the Campaign,²³ let alone support themselves as an independent nation. The Islands require a substantial development effort

before they will have any prospect of becoming economically viable. The investment needed for such a program, however, is lacking. The political uncertainty engendered by the Anglo-Argentine dispute makes the Islands too serious a risk to attract the investors and capital needed for their development. Further, unless some sort of mineral discovery is made in the Falklands' territorial waters, the Islands have no inherent economic value upon which to develop an economy.

The Falklands also lack the human resources needed to support an autonomous nation. While the number of small nations with diminutive populations has grown rapidly since the end of World War II, the Falklands would be, by far, the least populous independent nation in the world.²⁴ The problems faced by these micro-states are enormous and the challenges to their independence frequent (e.g. Grenada, Vanuatu).²⁵ The Falklands would be under a direct threat of invasion from Argentina and would have no hope of independently securing themselves against this threat: the Argentine armed forces are nearly one hundred times the size of the entire Falklands' population.²⁶

Proponents of independence suggest that it could only occur after a great deal of economic development has taken place and the population has expanded through immigration. Yet, the prospects for increasing immigration sufficiently to make independence a viable option are minimal. The Islands are physically inhospitable, with their rough terrain, abhorrent weather, and total isolation from other nations. Further, the instability and uncertainty of the Islands' future makes the Islands an even more unattractive destination for would-be immigrants. Finally, relocating to the Islands themselves would involve great expense with little hope of recovering that loss in the Falklands. The irrationality of expecting a significant population expansion--and of basing a

policy on an expected expansion--was noted by one incredulous Member of Parliament:

Do you really think people will make the sort of commitment we have been talking about--125,000 to establish a farm for their children--with that political uncertainty...?²⁷

Independence would not prove a cost effective policy option for Britain until the very distant future. Vast expenditure to create an economic infrastructure would be a prerequisite for granting independence. Both before and after independence, Britain would still be obligated to provide most of the Islands' defense, as she is doing already in Belize. Without external support in defense, the Falklands' independence very likely would be short-lived.

Independence With an Agency Agreement

The Falklands' independence could be modified to include an agency agreement, whereby Britain would be designated the Falklands' agent in defense matters. Britain, then, would be obligated permanently to provide for the Islands' defense. At the same time, the British government would find itself in the embarrassing position of having a tiny, distant nation dictate part of Britain's defense policy.²⁸

Independence With a Treaty of Guarantee

Another option would be formulating a treaty of guarantee for the defense of the Falklands prior to the grant of independence. Britain is, of course, the most obvious candidate for the position as guarantor, although its record in Cyprus is not encouraging. The United Nations has also been suggested as a potential guarantor; however, past failures in peacekeeping (e.g. Lebanon) and its lack of effective sanctions reflect doubt on its ability to fulfill such a duty. The United Nations option does enjoy strong support from Argentina but

not from Britain. The creation of a Falklands/Malvinas Commission under the auspices of the United Nations Security Council to monitor a guarantee and to resolve disputes concerning the guarantee has also been proposed. Prospective members are Britain, Argentina, the United States, the Organization of American States (OAS), and other interested United Nations' members.²⁹ What is more, since developing nations--generally supporters of Argentina's position in the dispute--hold a vast majority in the United Nations, mobilizing support for action against an Argentine threat would be difficult. Mention has been made of the Organization of American States serving as guarantor, but neither Britain (who sees the OAS as hostile to British interests) nor Argentina (who suspects that the United States would act as Britain's proxy) seems particularly enthused by the suggestion. Finally, the Commonwealth's regional members (Bahamas, Canada, Guyana, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago) and Britain could serve as guarantors, as they already serve essentially this purpose with regard to Belize. However, little interest has been displayed by the relevant governments in this idea.

Independence Assessed

The Islanders are cognizant of the risks involved in independence and, accordingly, offer little support for this option. Argentina and many of its neighbors would refuse to recognize the Islands as an independent nation, thereby adding isolation to the difficulties which would be faced by the new nation. As with previous policy options, neither Argentina's desire to reclaim the Islands nor the consequent threat posed the Islands by Argentina would diminish. Because the Falklands lack the resources to support an independent country, especially in the face of an Argentine threat, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee rejected independence as a viable long-term solution

to the Anglo-Argentine dispute.³⁰

The Islands as a Military Base

An extension of the current Fortress Falklands policy would be the complete transformation of the Islands from a colony into a military base, along the lines of Gibraltar. Some discussion has centered on transforming the Falklands into a NATO base. The Islands do possess some inherent strategic value by virtue of their location both along the South Atlantic trade route and at the mouth of the Antarctic. In the event the Panama Canal were closed, the Falklands would represent a strategic base for guarding the South Atlantic traffic lanes. In addition, the 1982 conflict demonstrated the critical contribution strategically located island airfields (such as Ascension) can make to the success of a campaign. The existence of a base on the Falklands would increase aerial reconnaissance capabilities in the region, as well. The Falklands could become NATO's South Atlantic "unsinkable aircraft carrier."³¹

Proponents of this plan exaggerate the contribution the Islands would make in the event of a conflict involving NATO. While control of the sea lanes is essential for reinforcement, the South Atlantic is not expected to be a major route for reinforcements. Most ships will be sent from Atlantic ports in the United States. Those items coming from the western United States could be transported faster and more securely by rail across the United States to the Atlantic ports than they could going around South America. Finally, a hostile Argentina could wreak havoc on Allied shipping as it passed through the South Atlantic. According to one Member of Parliament, there is "...little likelihood that the South Atlantic would play a large role in any NATO conflict."³²

The Latin American nations--especially Argentina--would greet the establishment of a regional NATO base with intense hostility and condemnation.

Argentina's anger would stem from the loss of the Falklands, since the creation of the base both would end any prospects for a negotiated return of the Islands and would preclude any military action aimed at recovering the Falklands. Argentina ardently desires the return of the Falklands, but she is not about to challenge the combined forces of NATO for the sake of a few desolate Islands. All of Latin America would be incensed by the militarization of the region and the expansion of East-West competition to the edge of the Antarctic. The Latin Americans would further fear that the militarization could eventually introduce nuclear weapons into the region, which could constitute a violation of the 1967 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (Tlatelolco Treaty). Some Latin Americans fear that, once nuclear weapons are introduced into the region, little can be done to deter Argentina (who did not sign the Tlatelolco Treaty) and Brazil from developing atomic weapons.³³

Transforming the Falklands into a military base is an expensive proposition, and whether the other NATO members actually desire a South Atlantic base, let alone are willing to fund its development, is unknown. To adequately fortify the Falklands, a deep water port, dock facilities, fuel and ammunition depots, an early warning system, and enlarged airfield all need to be constructed.³⁴

While the transformation of the Islands into a NATO base would offer the Islanders their greatest security against an Argentine invasion, the Islanders seem less than enthusiastic about this proposal. The ostensible purpose of the 1982 Campaign was, in Prime Minister Thatcher's words, to guarantee the Islanders' way of life. Yet, the complete militarization of the Islands would destroy their earlier lifestyle. The population would be swamped by military personnel (there are already more than two British soldiers for each Island

inhabitant) and the economy would inevitably come to depend on the garrison for the Islands' economic livelihood. The Islanders would prefer a return to the status quo ante bellum rather than witness their Islands' conversion into a military base.

A South Atlantic Treaty Organization

Another military option for the Falklands that has been contemplated is the formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization which would guarantee the security of the entire region, including the Falkland Islands. The arrangement probably would be less formal than NATO. Prospective members include the United States, United Kingdom, Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and South Africa. Such an organization would protect the South Atlantic trade routes in times of international and regional tension and, during peace, could maintain the stability of the region through which passes nearly 70% of all goods destined for North America and Western Europe.³⁵ The concept of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization is not new; original discussion of the idea dates back to 1966. The events of 1982, however, revived interest in the organization.

The obstacles to the effective implementation of this proposal are enormous. For the idea to succeed, both Britain and Argentina would have to be members. Yet, both governments reject outright their mutual involvement in a defense pact.³⁶ The Falkland Islanders, too, are opposed to the participation of Argentina in any regional security organization. None of the other potential members have demonstrated much interest in the proposal.

South Africa's system of apartheid has made it an international pariah and many nations (e.g. the United States and the United Kingdom) would invite domestic and international criticism by aligning themselves with her, although South Africa's participation in any South Atlantic security pact is considered

indispensable. While participation in such a scheme partially could relieve Britain of its defense burden on the Falklands, the British government is less than enthusiastic about obligating itself militarily beyond the NATO area. To do so would contradict Britain's post-World War II Eurocentric defense strategy. Thus, even bringing the relevant nations together to form a South Atlantic Treaty Organization appears to be an insurmountable obstacle. As one expert noted, "It is evident that the interests and perceptions of the countries involved are so divergent that it is hard to envisage any kind of closer or more tightly-knit system."³⁷

The formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization, in the long run, could destabilize, rather than secure, the region. The introduction of a defense organization could undermine adherence to the Antarctic Treaty which, since 1959, has governed the region based on the principles of international law and governmental cooperation. At the same time, the formation of the treaty organization could lead to the militarization of the region by prompting an increased Soviet and East European presence in the South Atlantic. The expansion of East-West competition into the South Atlantic could increase, rather than reduce, tensions in the region (the Indian Ocean offers a relevant analogy) and, in the opinion of the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, could "...possibly bring about the very conflict that it would be designed to prevent."³⁸ The formation of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization does not represent a practicable or reliable means of ensuring the long-term security of the Falkland Islands.

Tripartite Government

On a smaller level, the creation of a tripartite agreement between Britain, Chile, and Argentina covering rival claims to the Beagle Islands, the Falklands

and Dependencies, and Antarctic territory has been proposed. This agreement would involve the suspension of sovereignty claims in favor of joint administration and cooperation in the region's economic development. Argentina, however, considers that such an arrangement for regional cooperation could only be made after its respective disputes with Britain and Chile have been resolved bilaterally.³⁹ Furthermore, relations between Argentina and Chile historically have been bitter. The likelihood of such an extensive cooperative effort succeeding is small, especially as long as Chile is ruled by Pinochet's military dictatorship. Britain would oppose Argentine attempts to link the Dependencies with the Falklands dispute, since the validity of Argentina's claim is distinctly different (weaker) for the Dependencies than it is for the Falkland Islands.

The formulation of a separate treaty dealing with the three countries' claims to Antarctic territory while the Antarctic Treaty is still in effect (Britain, Argentina, and Chile are all signatories) undoubtedly would be resented by the other signatories to the Antarctic Treaty. If the three waited until after the 1991 review of the Treaty to enact their agreement, international cooperation in the region would end as individual nations competed with the tripartite club for rights to Antarctic territory. Thus, the formation of a tripartite agreement would not bode well for continued international cooperation in the Antarctic region.

Finally, tripartite government has been rejected explicitly by the Falkland Islanders. The Islanders oppose any arrangement which would subject them to Argentine administration and, even more so, they wholly oppose the idea of both Chile and Argentina exercising some measure of administration over the Islands. These sentiments were expressed to the British government in 1983 through a note

submitted to the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee. Insisted the note: "Tri-partite Government not acceptable."⁴⁰

Incorporation in the Antarctic Treaty

Extending the Antarctic Treaty to cover the Falklands and Dependencies is an oft discussed long-term policy option for the Islands. Under the Treaty, both Britain's and Argentina's sovereignty claims would be suspended, while the British would continue to exercise administrative responsibility. The Islands would be demilitarized and all signatory nations would cooperate in scientific exploration and economic development of the Islands.⁴¹ For the Treaty to be extended, the unanimous approval of all the consultative countries must be given and this would undoubtedly be a long process. Another option would be to postpone incorporation of the Falklands and Dependencies until the review of the Treaty takes place in 1991.

While this proposal represents a practicable solution to the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Dependencies, the character of the Falkland Islands conflict renders an extension of the Antarctic Treaty an infeasible long-term solution. The territories presently under the jurisdiction of the Treaty have no permanent inhabitants (like the Dependencies) and the structure of the Treaty is not designed to meet the needs of administering a population (the most fundamental exercise of sovereignty). Furthermore, the other signatories to the Treaty might not wish to risk the continued successful operation of this rare instance of international cooperation by introducing so controversial a territory into the Treaty.

The Antarctic Option Assessed

Argentina opposes the idea of the Antarctic Treaty incorporating the Falklands because she would have to freeze her sovereignty claim while Britain

would continue to exercise administrative rights--an unappealing notion for a country which already has waited 152 years to reassert sovereignty. Britain rejects this solution as well, since it would have to demilitarize the Islands, thus leaving them vulnerable to a second Argentine invasion.⁴² Further, the unrestricted access of Argentine scientific personnel to the Falklands could lead to an effective occupation force prior to a military attack by Argentina, reminiscent of President Peron's 1960s vow to reoccupy the Islands, one at a time, through scientific expeditions.

Because the Dependencies are neither populated nor militarized, extending the Antarctic Treaty to cover just these Islands is a feasible solution to this part of the Anglo-Argentine dispute. Argentina's claim to the Dependencies is significantly weaker than its claim to the Falklands, so compromise is more likely. The House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee considered that this is a proposition worthy of further consideration.⁴³ However, Argentina would only be willing to consider this option after British concessions were made on the central issue of sovereignty over the Falklands.

The International Court of Justice

In testimony before the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee, Eric Deakins, a Member of Parliament, described as "astonishing" the fact that neither Britain nor Argentina have used such international machinery for the resolution of disputes as the International Court of Justice.⁴⁴ Yet, the lack of effective sanctions of this body and both Britain's and Argentina's uncertainty as to their claims' validity cast doubt on the utility of seeking an International Court ruling. In 1947, Britain suggested that the dispute over just the Dependencies (where Britain's claim is much stronger than Argentina's) be submitted to the Court, but the Argentines refused. In 1955, Britain applied

unilaterally to the International Court for a judgment on the Dependencies' claim but, since neither government was subject to compulsory jurisdiction, the request was denied.⁴⁵

If the question were submitted and the Court were to find in favor of Argentina, Britain would comply by offering to relocate any Islanders who wished to leave. However, if the Court found for Britain, Argentina very probably would reject the decision, as it did with a previous unfavorable verdict on its Beagle Channel dispute with Chile. Of course, international support for Argentina's claim would decline as a result, but Argentina's dedication to recovering the Islands is indifferent to the disapprobation of other nations. Still, neither Britain nor Argentina has shown any willingness to submit the issue of sovereignty over the Falklands to the International Court of Justice. During a press conference in September, 1984, President Alfonsín specifically stated that "...no type of arbitration is appropriate,"⁴⁶ In October, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee similarly rejected the idea of arbitration on the grounds that this is "... essentially, a political rather than a legal dispute."⁴⁷

Mediation

Attempts to introduce mediators into negotiations generally have been supported by Argentina but rejected by Britain. Still, both sides agree that substantive negotiations need to be bilateral the mediator would assist in bringing the two sides together and would only participate in the early stages of negotiations.

Numerous candidates for the mediator role exist. At times, the Italian and Portuguese governments have been the subject of mediation rumors.⁴⁸ The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Senor Perez de Cuellar is favored by

the Argentines.⁴⁹ Britain specifically rejects the idea of United Nations mediation, but, according to one expert, this does not preclude using the "...good offices of the Secretary-General in a very quiet and unobtrusive fashion."⁵⁰ The United States also has been suggested as a possible mediator due to its regional leadership role. Yet, American support for Britain in the Falklands Campaign makes Argentine opposition to American mediation a virtual certainty. The Organization of American States, serving as a single body, also has been suggested as a mediator. Britain, however, would oppose the appointment due to the OAS's support for Argentina during the 1982 Campaign.⁵¹ The Commonwealth and the European Economic Community have also been proposed, but neither organization has expressed an interest in assuming the role and both would be seen as too pro-British for Argentina to accept them. Finally, mediation by the Non-Aligned Movement has been proposed, but this would be rejected by Britain since the Movement views Britain's presence in the Falklands as an illegitimate relic of nineteenth century colonialism. Thus, even though the role of a mediator would be limited, finding a candidate acceptable to both Britain and Argentina is an extremely difficult task.⁵²

Further, there is concern that the involvement of a mediator may complicate, rather than facilitate, negotiations. Noted a former British Ambassador to the United Nations, "...intermediaries ultimately tend to develop a momentum of their own and become part of the problem, rather than simply 'post offices'."⁵³

The Trusteeship Option

An oft suggested but never seriously considered option is placing the Falklands under United Nations Trusteeship, as provided for in Chapter Twelve of the United Nations Charter. No precedent exists for the voluntary placing of a

dependent territory under United Nations trusteeship, although the Charter provides for it in Articles 87 and 88. Submission to the United Nations, however, would require the consent of both Britain and Argentina, and Argentine approval is unlikely unless the Trusteeship were only for an interim period prior to Argentina acquiring sovereignty.

A British Administered Trust

Without a promise of sovereignty transfer for Argentina, the organization of the trusteeship theoretically could assume six different forms. The first option would be to have Britain administer the trust. However, initial Argentine agreement to place the Islands under trusteeship would not be forthcoming if Britain were to be granted administrative rights. Such a concession would be tantamount to abandoning Argentina's sovereignty claim. Furthermore, this arrangement would have to be approved by the United Nations General Assembly and that likely would be denied under this scheme since British administration would be viewed as a perpetuation of colonialism. Britain, on the other hand, would certainly not accept Argentine administration of the trust since this would conflict blatantly with the rights of the Islanders to self-determination.

A Jointly Administered Trust

The second option is joint British/Argentine administration of the trust. However, the Islanders would vehemently oppose any Argentine participation in their administration. Argentina, in turn, would not tolerate being excluded from administration unless perhaps Britain were similarly excluded. Further, the bitterness in Anglo-Argentine relations over the Falklands makes it difficult to imagine the two cooperating on the administration of the Islands.

An Administrative Council

A third design for the trust's administration would be the creation of a council, with Britain, Argentina, and a limited number of other interested nations as members, which would oversee the trust. The difficulty of finding third-party countries which are acceptable to Britain and Argentina was displayed vividly by the search earlier for a satisfactory mediator for the dispute. If formed, this council would supervise the operation of the current Falkland Islands governmental system. Despite the obstacles to its successful implementation, those Members of Parliament who visited Argentina in June, 1984, recommended that this "... possibility be seriously pursued."⁵⁴

United Nations Administration

Along with submitting the Islands to a United Nations trust, Britain and Argentina could also surrender administrative rights to the United Nations, as stipulated in Article 81 of the United Nations Charter. However, the United Nations' past experience with administering a trust territory (West Irian) set a disastrous precedent for this proposition. Since the United Nations is dominated by supporters for Argentina's position, British and Islander support for this option is likely to be withheld.

A Strategic Trust

United Nations supervision of the trust could take a second form which would diminish the level of anti-British sentiment influencing administration of the Falklands. Under Articles 82 and 83 of the United Nations Charter, the Falklands could be designated a strategic area (by virtue of its location at the door of Antarctica and along the South Atlantic trade routes), whereby the Security Council would assume responsibility for the Islands' administration. Since Britain holds a permanent seat on the Security Council and, thus, enjoys a veto right, administrative decisions which curtailed the Islanders' right to

self-determination or threatened British interests could be rejected. Argentina undoubtedly would oppose this scheme as patently discriminatory towards Argentine rights and interests, since Argentina is only an occasional member of the Security Council and has no power to veto policies adverse to Argentine interests.

An Associated Trusteeship

The final option for the trust's administration is, in essence, making the Falklands an associated state with the United Nations. The Islands would enjoy internal self-government while the United Nations would be responsible for foreign and defense policy. However, the historical inability of the United Nations to defend territory or respond effectively to incursions against its forces would leave the Islands vulnerable to an Argentine attack. Furthermore, the difficulties for so small a population to support an autonomous governmental system are enormous, as noted previously. These problems would multiply since any change in the Falklands' political status which weakened or eliminated British control would lead to the emigration of many Islanders.⁵⁵ In addition, anti-British sentiment in the United Nations potentially could pervade foreign and defense decision-making for the Islands.

Placing the Falklands under a United Nations trusteeship, regardless of the administrative design, does not provide a feasible long-term policy for the Falklands. This option, like the other proposals for internationalizing the dispute, merely embroils more nations in the conflict and complicates the very issues at question. The only realistic long-term options for the Islands are those that directly address the issues of sovereignty and self-determination. The various status quo options fail because, as unilateral moves, they neglect the two-sided nature of the conflict and also they ignore the contested

sovereignty claims at the heart of the Anglo-Argentine dispute. Similarly, the different means of internationalizing the conflict variously ignore both sovereignty and self-determination claims. Direct compromise on the sovereignty and self-determination issues--flexibility on one side for concessions on the other--represents the only means of truly resolving the Falklands dispute.

Abandonment

The simplest such solution is also the least palatable to Britain and the Islanders--that is, that the United Kingdom just abandon the Islands. While the idea does have a few supporters in Britain, such action would be political suicide for the government that initiated it. To abandon the Islands would make a waste of the lives lost in the recent Campaign. The enormous human and financial resources which have been dedicated recently to the Falklands makes it virtually impossible for any government to turn its back on the Islands. Many in Britain already complain about the exorbitant cost of current policy on the Falklands, but for a government suddenly to declare that this investment was all for naught would incite domestic outrage and could have fatal political repercussions. Beyond that, international opinion would condemn loudly so flagrant a violation of the Islanders' rights to self-determination. Any government disposed to surrendering the Islands could enter more profitably into negotiations which at least would protect the rights of the Islanders. Clearly, the current government feels no inclination to leave the Islands--otherwise there would be no stalemate now in talks with Argentina.

Shared Sovereignty: Condominium

A less drastic option which frequently has been suggested is for Britain and Argentina to share sovereignty over the Falklands. Under joint sovereignty, administration of the Islands could assume three different forms: condominium,

alternating, or an Andorra-type administration. A British/Argentine condominium over the Falklands would not partition sovereignty between the two. Instead, sovereignty would be exercised by a single-body--the condominium--which is composed of the two governments sharing sovereignty.⁵⁶ This artificial entity, then, would be in charge of administering the Falklands.

Condominium first was discussed in relation to the Falkland Islands in 1974. The British government (then under Labour Prime Minister Wilson) broached the issue with the Falkland Islands Council, which, while not objecting to Anglo-Argentine talks on condominium, excluded Islander participation in the discussions. The subject was raised with the Argentines, but the Islanders' continued refusal to participate ended the talks in August.⁵⁷ Since the 1982 Campaign, the option has been revived.

Condominium has little prospect of success. Eliciting the extensive cooperation needed for this venture would be exceedingly difficult considering the bitterness and hostility which this dispute has created between the two governments for over a century and a half. The successful experiences which each government has had with joint sovereignty (e.g. Britain in the New Hebrides and Argentina with the island of Martin Garcia) have come about due to the amicable and cooperative atmosphere which existed between the involved governments. What is more, divisions would result almost inevitably from the wholly divergent interests of two nations separated both physically and culturally. Condominium also contradicts assertions by both governments that sovereignty is indivisible. Condominium, thus far, has found little support among Members of Parliament.⁵⁸ Islander opposition to the proposal very likely would obstruct joint administration due to their deep-rooted antipathy towards any Argentine role in governing the Islands. Thus, the cooperation and

consensus needed for a successful condominium are, at least for the time being, absent in the Falklands dispute.

Alternating Sovereignty

The second scheme for implementing shared sovereignty would be to have sovereignty alternate between Britain and Argentina over specified time periods. Considering the vastly divergent approach each government has to the Islands and the Islanders', such a format could subject the Falklands to "see-saw" administration. As each nation resumed control, they would revoke the policies of the other and initiate new programs. On issues such as immigration, defense, and economic development, the differences would be profound between the two governments and, consequently, the programs would have abbreviated lives. During periods of Argentine rule, the intensity of Islander opposition to Argentine administration could obstruct effective government. Thus, alternating sovereignty could perpetuate instability in the region rather than eliminate it.

The Andorra Solution

The third form which joint sovereignty could take one is where Britain and Argentina, essentially, would form a condominium to deal with the Islands' defense and foreign affairs, while the Falklands would enjoy self-government on domestic issues. A contemporary example of this is French and Spanish joint sovereignty over Andorra. Yet, foreign and defense policy are two areas where British and Argentine cooperation would prove most difficult to achieve, due to their distinctly different national interests and strategic concerns.

Furthermore, as noted previously, the Falklands lack the human and financial resources to support a fully autonomous domestic government, especially since any abridgement of British sovereignty undoubtedly will spur a wave of Islander emigration. In spite of the apparent inapplicability of an Andorra-style

solution for the Falklands, the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee still considers this to be an "... approach which merits further study."⁵⁹

The problem with applying joint sovereignty solutions to the Falklands conflict is that, to succeed, they require that a cooperative relationship exist between the involved governments and a common perspective be held on the territory's significance for national interests. A domestic population on the territory which is unbiased in its regard for the administering powers is also needed. None of these criteria is present in the Anglo-Argentine dispute now nor are they likely to emerge in the near future.

Sovereignty Transfer with Guarantee

A much more promising long-term policy for the Islands is the idea of transferring sovereignty to Argentina, but with guarantees made for the maintenance of the Islanders, British lifestyle. The government of the Aaland Islands represents a contemporary instance of this policy, where Finland enjoys titular sovereignty while the inhabitants are able to preserve their distinctly Swedish lifestyle.⁶⁰ Under this scheme, the Falkland Islands would be essentially autonomous in the administration of the Islands, although Argentina would control foreign and defense affairs.

Under this plan, the same difficulties in vesting a tiny population with the costs and demands of full self-government, as appeared previously under other options, would pertain. The small population on the Islands requires that the sovereign country supply funding and personnel for the enormous service and developmental functions demanded of a government. The present Falklands government would be vested with the task of governing the Islands. The Council would legislate on property acquisition (thereby controlling large scale Argentine immigration which would threaten the Islanders' special status),

education, administrative matters, taxation and electoral law, labor law, water rights, land law, business activities, public health and public order standards, social services, road construction, and urban/rural development. The Islanders would enjoy a regional citizenship of the Falkland Islands--those who already enjoy British citizenship at the time the policy came into effect would have dual citizenship but would be subject to Argentine administration on national questions. The official language of the Islands would remain English and any resident Argentine officials would have to speak English. Any change in the Islands' status would have to be approved by the Islands' Council. The Islanders would participate as a separate constituency in Argentine elections. Buenos Aires would retain jurisdiction over Islands' issues which impinged on national policy and for the administration of justice. Thus, Argentina would achieve its goal of sovereignty while the British identity of the Islands' population would be preserved.

The option of a transfer of sovereignty with guarantees for the Islanders has a strong chance of gaining support from Argentina. Much of the force behind the Argentine claim is emotional: British presence on what is considered Argentine territory is a national embarrassment. The Argentine objective is to have the British removed and to have the international community recognize Argentina as sovereign over the Falkland Islands. The desire is not to conquer a people or exploit the resources of the land. The Aaland plan would satisfy Argentina's desire to have its sovereignty claim respected: the Argentine flag would fly over the Falklands.⁶¹

The British and the Islanders are less enthusiastic about this option. They fear that, once sovereignty is transferred, Argentina would renege on its guarantees to the Islanders. The Argentines have offered to amend their

constitution to include specific provisions for the Islanders' way of life, but the Islanders and Britons are quick to point out that Argentina's constitutional guarantees frequently have been denied Argentine citizens by their own governments.⁶² Another possibility is to have Argentine compliance ensured by a treaty of guarantee. While this could guarantee the Islanders' way of life throughout Argentine political changes, the difficulty of finding governments to provide the guarantee, which are acceptable to both Britain and Argentina, has been noted previously.

A main draw back of the Aaland solution is that it entails an immediate transfer of both sovereignty and administrative rights. Many officials, both in Britain and Argentina, consider the idea of guarantees for the Islanders' lifestyle linked with a sovereignty transfer to have great potential. However, the scheme would work better if linked with a delayed transfer of sovereignty implemented through a leaseback arrangement.

Leaseback

Leaseback represents the most attractive and viable option for the Falklands' long-term future. However, the leaseback arrangement would have to be qualified by a buy-out option for the Islands' inhabitants who adamantly refuse to live under Argentine rule. Under leaseback, sovereignty technically would be transferred to Argentina, while responsibility for administering the Islands would continue to reside with Britain for a designated length of time (the lease). Before expiration of the lease, guarantees would be inserted in the Argentine constitution, similar to those embodied in the Aaland option, for the preservation of the Islanders' British lifestyle. Their current legal, political, fiscal, and cultural institutions would be retained and the Islands would constitute an autonomous zone in Argentina. While those now holding

British nationality could retain their citizenship, those born or those who moved to the Islands after British administration ended would hold concurrently Argentine national and Falkland Islands regional citizenship. Both the British and Argentine flags would fly during the lease.

Any time prior to the transfer of sovereignty or during the period of British administration, inhabitants of the Islands who wished to leave should be duly compensated by the British government. Noted one Islander, "If you ask us to talk (with the Argentines) then I think you have to say to us, 'If you do not want anything to do with them (the Argentines) then you can have compensation and resettlement.'"⁶³ An Argentine agreement to help finance the relocation of Islanders could be negotiated during talks on leaseback.

Again, the problem of guaranteeing that Argentina fulfills her obligations to the Islanders arises. The main concern in Britain and on the Islands is not that a democratically elected government in Buenos Aires would renege on the deal, but that the military might return to power with all its disdain for civil rights and constitutional guarantees. The agreement on leaseback could stipulate that, in the event of a return to military government or to any government abusive of civil rights during the period of the lease, the agreement could be terminated unilaterally by the British. The responsibility of determining if a military or abusive government sits in Buenos Aires could be given to the United Nations (e.g. the Secretary-General's Office) or to an affiliated organization (e.g. Amnesty International, which has consultative status with the United Nations or the International Peace Academy, which trains United Nations peacekeeping forces). Annual visits to the Islands could be made by the same organization to ensure that the Islanders' rights are being respected. Britain would be allowed to retain a reduced defense force on the

Islands throughout the lease period. During the early years of Argentine rule, an Anglo-Argentine-Islander committee could be established to clarify the technical application of the guarantees to the Islanders. The time period for compensated emigration from the Islands (only for those who inhabited the Islands prior to the creation of the leaseback agreement) could be extended to include the first few years of Argentine rule.

The most contentious issue in leaseback negotiations is the period of the lease. The British want an extended (e.g. 100 year) lease, similar to the Hong Kong arrangement. Such a lengthy period would ensure that those inhabitants who endured the invasion would not be subjected again to Argentine rule during their lifetimes. In addition, the time period would allow for new generations to be raised with the knowledge that they are Argentine citizens (in addition to their Island citizenship), so the loss of British administration would not be so shocking. The Islanders who support leaseback also want a long lease to ensure that Buenos Aires' commitment to democracy and human rights is genuine and enduring.

The Argentines advocate a shorter lease, along the lines of the Panama Canal treaty, of about 20-25 years. The Argentines have grown tired of British dilatoriness and are anxious to have the Islands by the end of the century or shortly thereafter. Said President Alfonsín, "We would like this return to take place during the lifespan of our generation."⁶⁴

The solution would be to compromise at 50-60 years. This would allow sufficiently for a generational change in the present Islander population and would offer an adequate period to judge Argentina's commitment to democracy. Argentina undoubtedly would object, but if this was presented as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition, they would probably acquiesce. After all,

their main goal of achieving sovereignty would be realized immediately. Further, Britain would be making the largest sacrifice--surrendering sovereignty--and, consequently, can expect an element of compromise on Argentina's part.

The British View of Leaseback

Support for leaseback exists among all three concerned parties. While the Thatcher government is not now supportive of leaseback, her government seriously contemplated the option at the beginning of her administration. In November, 1980, Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Nicholas Ridley, visited the Falklands to discuss options for the Islands' future, including leaseback. The response of the Islanders and the House of Commons to this visit and the leaseback proposal was rather unreceptive. While the House of Commons was vociferously opposed to the idea, the extent of Islander opposition was exaggerated by their advocates in Parliament. Noted the Franks Committee in its investigation of the 1982 Campaign, "it would be tragic if the Islands' chances of escaping from economic blight were to be diminished by the attitude of their champions at Westminster."⁶⁵ Since the conflict, many in Britain have become more anxious to find a viable long-term solution to the Anglo-Argentine dispute which will end the exorbitant diversion of Britain's limited financial resources. To the British, leaseback is appealing because it resolves both the self-determination and the sovereignty questions. Noted the Foreign Affairs Committee in 1983,

The option of leaseback remains the most elegant solution of all, for it combines the principles of British administration with the immediate introduction of the principle of notional Argentine sovereignty.⁶⁶

Some in Britain oppose the idea of forcing the Islanders to either accept Argentine rule or leave the Islands, albeit with financial compensation. But, the sentiment in Britain is changing--the interests of the British nation cannot continue to be subordinated to the wishes of 1,800 Islanders. Even as a government has the right to build a highway on one's land, as long as adequate compensation is made, so the British can give the Islanders a choice between accepting leaseback or being compensated to leave the Islands. As British citizens, the Islanders can no longer expect to dictate a foreign policy which is adverse to the best interests of the entire British nation. Noted one Member of Parliament, "Just as British public opinion is changing, so too might that of the Islanders."⁶⁷

Islander Opinion on Leaseback

Islander opposition to leaseback, although still strong, is decreasing, especially among the younger generation which will be most affected by the implementation of a leaseback arrangement and the subsequent transition to Argentine rule. Even at the time of Ridley's visit in 1980, significant support for leaseback existed: one estimate even suggested as high as 50% supported leaseback at the time.⁶⁸ Those who originally objected to leaseback became even more vociferous in their opposition after the Argentine invasion: their worst fears, it seemed, had been confirmed. Still, many of the Islanders oppose any form of Argentine rule at all and would rather leave the Islands than join Argentina, regardless of the guarantees arranged for the maintenance of their way of life. Said one Islander, "I do not believe that were a leaseback to be imposed...there would be a viable community left in the Islands. I believe that most people would leave."⁶⁹

The Argentine Approach to Leaseback

The Argentines have shown great interest in the leaseback option, mainly because it provides immediate recognition of sovereignty, albeit without administrative rights. Recently, government officials have been giving deep consideration to leaseback. In a February interview with La Razon, the President of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Adolfo Gass, expressed support for leaseback "because that would imply recognition of our sovereignty."⁷⁰ Beyond that, the Argentines have expressed a willingness to amend their constitution to create a special status for the Falklands and its inhabitants within Argentina. They have also expressed support for a treaty of guarantee to ensure the Argentines would not renege later on their promises to Britain and the Islanders.⁷¹

Conclusion: "The Way"

Leaseback combined with a buy-out option for Islanders opposed to the change in their status represents the most viable solution to the Anglo-Argentine dispute over the Falkland Islands. The Dependencies, on the other hand, should be placed under the Antarctic Treaty. Unlike status quo options or internationalization, this plan addresses both the issues of self-determination and the sovereignty dispute. At the same time, leaseback enjoys significant support from all three concerned parties: Britain, Argentina, and the Falklanders. As bitterness over the military campaign fades, the desire for a concrete solution to the dispute will increase and leaseback will appear as one of the most practical options, increasing its appeal. In reference to the Anglo-Argentine dispute, President Alfonsín commented in a note to Margaret Thatcher after his inauguration that "Where there is a will, there is a way." Clearly, the way exists--leaseback best meets the demands and protects the interests of involved parties. The problem now is waiting for the

will to emerge--for Britain and Argentina to recognize that cooperation and compromise, not rhetoric and obstinacy, are the keys to a just and lasting resolution of their protracted, bitter dispute over the Falkland Islands.

ENDNOTESChapter One:

¹My use of the name "Falklands", rather than "Malvinas" in reference to the Islands is not intended to display a pro-British bias, but rather is to reflect the present state of the Islands as a British administered and controlled territory. In addition, I shall refer to the 1982 conflict as a Campaign since neither Britain nor Argentina officially declared war during the conflict.

²Dr. Samuel Johnson, Thoughts on the Late Transactions Respecting Falkland's Islands, (London: published in 1771), p. 58.

³Laurio H. Destefani, The Malvinas, the South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands: the Conflict with Britain, (Buenos Aires: Edipress S.A., 1982), p. 25.

⁴The Disputed Islands--The Falkland Crisis: A History and Background, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1982), p. 1.

⁵Ibid, p. 22.

⁶For a detailed analysis of the various discovery claims, see Julius Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, (London: Yale University Press, 2nd. ed., 1982), Chapters 1 & 2.

⁷Vespucci Reprints, Texts and Studies, cited in *ibid*, p.3.

⁸See Destefani, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

⁹Adrian F. J. Hope, "Sovereignty and Decolonization of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands," Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 6, no. 2, 1983, pp. 399-400.

¹⁰Paul M. Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery, (London:

The MacMillen Press Ltd., 1983), p. 27. This book offers an excellent account of British naval and imperial history.

¹¹Samuel Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 38.

¹²*Ibid*, p. 41

¹³*Ibid*.

¹⁴See Julius Goebel, *op. cit.*, p. 201.

¹⁵*Ibid*, p. 229 in footnote 23.

¹⁶Cited in *ibid*, p. 236.

¹⁷*Ibid*, p. 231.

¹⁸Samuel Johnson, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

¹⁹*Ibid*, p. 61.

²⁰Julius Goebel, *op. cit.*, p. 240.

²¹D. A. Winstanely, Lord Chatham and the Whig Opposition, (London: Frank Cass & Co., Ltd., 1966), p. 371. This book offers a detailed account of the course of negotiations and the role of domestic politics therein. See also, Peter Burley, "Fighting for the Falklands in 1770," History Today, V. 32, June 1982, pp. 49-51.

²²Cited in Julius Goebel, *op. cit.*, p. 359.

²³*Ibid*, p. 310. Goebel offers an indepth analysis of whether or not this secret promise actually was made, see chapter 7.

²⁴Ian J. Strange, The Falkland Islands, (London: David and Charles Limited, 1981), p. 54.

²⁵Julius Goebel, *op. cit.*, p. 411.

²⁶Adrian Hope, *op. cit.*, p. 412.

²⁷Cited in Destefani, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

²⁸*Ibid*, p. 75.

²⁹Julius Goebel, op. . 443.

³⁰Viscount Palmerston, cited in Ibid, p. 457.

³¹Cited in Lord Victor Mishcon, "An Historic Title not recognized", The Times (London), 8 June 1982, p. 11.

³²See House of Commons Foreign Affair Committee (Hereinafter referred to as HCFAC), Minutes of Evidence: Falkland Islands, 17 January 1982, p. 128.

³³Destefani, op. cit., p. 84.

³⁴HCFAC, Minutes of the Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee, session 1982-1983, HC-380, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office), p. xxiii.

³⁵J.C.J. Metford, cited in Julius Goebel, op. cit., p. xxv.

³⁶The official title of the committee was "The Royal Commission on the Defence of British Possessions and Commerce Abroad," 3rd and Final Report issued in 1882.

³⁷Cited in "Raising the Flag in the Falklands," Observer Review, 2 May 1982, p. 25.

³⁸Captain Loftus F. Jones, "Report on the Defensive Capabilities of the Falkland Islands as a Coaling and Refueling Station for the Royal Navy and Mercantile Marine," submitted to the Carnarvon Commission, 3rd and Final Report, 1882, p. 415.

³⁹Actually, the settlers were "out-pensioners"; their only connection to Chelsea was that their army pensions were issued by the Chelsea Royal Hospital. For more, see Memorandum of Conditions on which it is Proposed to Enrol Pensioners for Service in the Falkland Islands, Public Record Office document Woll 483-6849. See also, T. St. Johnson, The Falkland Islands (and Dependencies): An Illustrated Handbook (Port Stanley, Falkland Islands:

Government Printing Office, 1920), pp. 29-30.

⁴⁰D.H. Schurman, The Education of a Navy: The Development of British Naval Strategic Thought, 1867-1914, (London: Cassell), p. 187.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Ibid.

⁴³For detailed accounts of these battles, see Laurie Hanton, "Coronel and the Falklands", The Military Crest, vol. 1, no. 2, Nov./Dec. 1982, pp. 34-47. See also, Charles Lucas, The Empire at War, vol. 2, (London: Oxford University Press, 1923), pp. 457-78.

⁴⁴Defence of the Falkland Islands, Public Record Office document WO 106/2849-35936.

⁴⁵For more on the Falklands and decolonization of small states, see Jean Houbert, The Falklands: A Hiccup of Decolonization, University of Aberdeen, United Kingdom. See also George H. Quester, "Trouble in the Islands: Defending the Micro-States", International Security, vol. 8, no. 2, Fall 1983.

⁴⁶HCFAC, "Minutes of the Proceedings," op. cit., p. xxvii.

⁴⁷Peter Hennessy, "How Churchill Sent a Falklands Task Force," The Times (London), June, 1982. See also, Robert Low and Paul Lashmar, "Secrets Revealed of Churchill Clash with Argentina", The Guardian, June 1982, p. 4.

⁴⁸See Peter J. Beck, "Cooperative Confrontation in the Falkland Islands Dispute", Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, vol. 24, no. 1, February, 1982, pp. 37-58.

⁴⁹Ted Rowlands, M.P., "Five Years Before the Invasion: Why the Navy went to the Falklands", The Times (London), 15 January, 1983. See also, Julian Haviland, "Submarine Was Never Off the Leash Says Owen", The Times (London), 31 January, 1983, p. 1. See also, Ian Aitkin, "Check Confirms Owen's Falkland

Story", The Guardian, 1 February 1983.

⁵⁰HCFAC, "Minutes of the Proceedings," op. cit., p. xxviii.

⁵¹For a more detailed analysis of this period of Anglo-Argentine negotiations, see House of Commons, Report of a Committee of Privy Councillors, Falkland Islands Review (aka. The Franks Report), Cmd. 8787, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, January 1983), Chapters 1 and 2.

⁵²Destefani, op. cit., p. 108.

Chapter Two

¹"Speech by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher Opening an Emergency Debate on the Falklands Crisis in the House of Commons on 3 April 1982", in Britain and the Falklands Crisis: A Documentary Record, (London: Central Office of Information, 1982).

²For more on the type and extent of American aid to Britain during the Campaign, see "America's Falklands War", The Economist, 3 March 1984, pp. 29-31.

³Leopoldo Galtieri, cited in Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (London: Cox and Wyman, Ltd., 1983), p. 167. This book offers an excellently detailed account of both the political and military aspects of the Falklands Campaign. See also, a translated interview with General Galtieri in the Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), vol. 11, April 1982, 89-19.

For an Argentine analysis of the Campaign, see Leo Kanaf, La Batalla de Las Malvinas (The Battle of the Malvinas/Falklands), (Buenos Aires: Tribuna Abierta, 1982). See also, Daniel Kon, Los Chicos de la Guerra (The Boys of War), (Buenos Aires: Editorial Galerna, 1982). This book offers an insightful analysis of the failures of the Argentine war machine through interviews held with Argentine soldiers upon their return from the Campaign.

For the official British analysis, see The Falklands Campaign: The Lessons, Cand. 8758, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, December 1982).

⁴See Dr. Robert L. Scheina, "The Malvinas Campaign", Naval Review 1983, pp. 98-117.

⁵Mr. Tam Dalyell, Member of Parliament for Linlithgow, has been perhaps the most vociferous and persistent critic of the government. For example, see his

contribution to the South Atlantic debate in the House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, 8 June 1984, Columns 598-614, pp. 311-19.

⁶Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982", Foreign Affairs, Autumn 1982, p. 209.

⁷For more on the San Carlos landing, see Edgar O'Ballance, "The San Carlos Landing", Marine Corps Gazette, October 1982.

⁸Hastings and Jenkins, op. cit., p. 236.

⁹Lieutenant-Colonel Hew Pike, cited in *ibid*, p. 323.

¹⁰*ibid*, p. 358.

¹¹Letter from the Charge d'Affaires of the Argentine United Nations Mission, addressed to the President of the Security Council, 18 June 1982, UN Document S/15234.

¹²Arina Bernstein, cited in Hastings and Jenkins, op. cit., p. 354.

Chapter Three

¹John Laffin, Fight for the Falklands! (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1982); p. 179.

²Philip Windsor, "Diplomatic Dimensions of the Falklands Crisis", Millenium: Journal of International Studies, vol. 12, no. 1, spring 1982, p. 88.

³See the Supplementary Statement of Defence Policy, 1968, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office), July 1968.

⁴Cited in Sir Bernard Braine, "The Future of British Foreign Policy in Relation to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies, Antarctica, and Adjacent South American States", memorandum to the House of Commons Select Committee on Foreign Affairs (HCFAC), Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, session 1982-83, HC-31-xiii, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1983), p. 349.

⁵Ibid.

⁶Cited in Sir James Cable, "The Falklands Conflict", U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 1982, p. 36.

⁷Ibid, p. 37.

⁸This report was updated following the 1982 campaign. See Lord Shackleton, Chairman, Falkland Islands Economic Study 1982, Cmd. 8653, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office,) September 1982.

⁹Lord Franks, Chairman, Report of a Committee of Privy Councillors, Falkland Islands Review, Cmd. 8787, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, January 1983), p. 21.

¹⁰Ibid, p. 23.

¹¹Ibid, p. 25.

¹²Lawrence Freedman, "The War of the Falkland Islands, 1982", Foreign

Affairs, Autumn, 1982, p. 198.

¹³"Falkland Islands: The Origins of a War", The Economist, 19 June 1982.

¹⁴See Carlos Andfes Escude, "National Sovereignty: Only a Means or an End in Itself?", Buenos Aires Herald, 21 September 1983.

¹⁵Cited in Dexter Jerome Smith, "The Falklands Conflict: A Strategic Synopsis", Defence Looks at the Falklands Conflict (Special Edition of Defence magazine), (United Kingdom: Whitton Press Limited, November 1982), p. 8.

¹⁶Cited in Flávio Tavares, "Argentina's Recovery Struggle", World Press Review, November 1982, p. 25. That the Argentine government honestly believed Britain would not oppose actively the invasion was confirmed in the Argentine Army Commission's post-mortem on the conflict. For more on the Commission's Report, see Informe Oficial Ejercito Argentino: Conflicto Malvinas (Argentine Army White Paper: The Falklands/Malvinas Conflict), tomos (volumes) 1 and 2, Argentine government publication, 1983.

¹⁷Cited in Laffin, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

¹⁸The Economist, 19 June 1982, op. cit.

¹⁹Cited in Lord Franks, op. cit., p. 34.

²⁰Cited in United Kingdom, House of Commons Hansards Official Daily Report, 25 January 1983, col. 811, p. 423.

²¹HCFAC, Falkland Islands: Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence, session 1982-83, HC-31-xv, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 11 May 1983), annex to Appendix 10, p. 345.

²²Cited in Sir James Cable, op. cit., p. 36.

²³Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (London: Pan Books, 1983), p. 64.

²⁴ibid, p. 22.

²⁵Guillermo Makin, "Argentine Approaches to the Falklands/Malvinas: was the resort to violence foreseeable?" International Affairs, vol. 59, no. 3, Summer 1985, p. 398.

²⁶Flávio Tavares, op. cit., p. 26.

²⁷Cited in Hastings and Jenkins, op. cit., p. 83.

²⁸Flávio Tavares, op. cit., p. 26.

²⁹Cited in Hastings and Jenkins, op. cit., p. 65.

³⁰Cited in Guillermo Makin, op. cit., p. 400, (emphasis added).

³¹Richard Ned Lebow, "Miscalculation in the South Atlantic: The Origins of the Falkland War", The Journal of Strategic Studies, p. 8. For more of Lebow's analysis of deterrence failure, see his article "Deterrence Reconsidered: The Challenge of Recent Research", in Survival, vol. 27, no. 1, Jan./Feb., 1985, pp. 20-8.

³²Guillermo Makin, "Was Argentina Warlike before 1982", Appendix 21 in HCFAC, Falkland Islands: Appendices to the Minutes of Evidence, Session 1982-83, HC-31-xv, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 11 May 1983), p. 476.

³³Interview with Ted Rowlands, M.P., former Labour Party Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, held on 12 October 1984.

³⁴Ibid.

³⁵United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, 3 April 1982, vol. 650, p. 343.

³⁶Lord Franks, op. cit., p. 30.

³⁷Ibid, p. 92.

³⁸Ibid.

³⁹The branch of the British intelligence service with which we are most concerned here is the Joint Intelligence Committee--which operates out of and

serves the Cabinet office--and its subcommittee, the Latin American Current Information Group (CIG).

⁴⁰Lord Franks, *op. cit.*, p. 85.

⁴¹*Ibid.*

⁴²Hastings and Jenkins, *op. cit.*, p. 90.

⁴³*Ibid.*, p. 76. For evidence of the late-timing of the decision to invade, see "Statements, Demonstrations Mark Falklands War", Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 4 April 1983, p. 81.

⁴⁴See The Economist, 19 June 1982, *op. cit.*

⁴⁵George H. Quester, "The Falklands and the Malvinas: Strategy and Arms Control", ACIS Working Paper No. 46, (Los Angeles: University of California, Center for International and Strategic Affairs, May 1984), p. 29.

⁴⁶Cited in Phil Williams, "Miscellaneous, Crisis Management and the Falklands Conflict", The World Today, April 1983, p. 145.

⁴⁷Richard Ned Lebow, *op. cit.*, p. 26.

⁴⁸*Ibid.*, p. 27.

⁴⁹Cited in *Ibid.*

⁵⁰*Ibid.*

⁵¹See John Laffin, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

⁵²Hastings and Jenkins, *op. cit.*, p. 167.

⁵²See Philip Windsor, *op. cit.*

Chapter Four

¹Anthony Parsons in "Minutes of Evidence: 11 April 1984", in 5th/Report from the House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (HCFAC), Falkland Islands, vol. 2, session 1983-84, HC-268II, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 25Oct 1984), p. 72.

²Cited in *ibid*, p. 166.

³Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (London: Pan Books, 1983), p. 297.

⁴John Leonard, "Islanders Show their Faith in the Future", The Times (London), 14 June 1984, p. 36.

⁵Written answer from British Secretary of State for Defence, Sir Michael Heseltine, to Bruce George, M.P., August 1984. For a detailed description of Britain's military deployment in the Falklands, see Statement on the Defence Estimates 1984, vol. 1, Cmd. 9227-I, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1984), esp. pp. 29-33. See also 3rd/Report from the House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, The Future Defence of the Falklands, session 1982-83, HC-154, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 12 May 1983).

⁶*Ibid.* (Written answer).

⁷Denis Henley, M.P. in United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, 25 January 1984, Column 904, p. 467.

⁸See comments by British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Geoffrey Howe, in United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, 25 January 1984, columns 903-4, p. 467.

⁹For more, see Foreign and Commonwealth Office, "Argentine/Falklands: Bellicose Statements and Frustration of Attempts to Normalize Relations", Background Brief, March 1983.

¹⁰See letter from the charge d'affaires of the Argentine United Nations mission, Arnola M. Listre, to the President of the Security Council, 18 June 1982, U.N. Document S/15234.

¹¹For more on the content of these statements, see Guillermo Makin, "Commitment by President R. Alfonsin and Minister for Foreign Affairs D. Caputo to Peaceful Means to Solve Dispute with U.K. and to Cessation of Hostilities", Appendix 11 in 5th Report from the HCFAC, Falkland Islands, vol. 1, session 1983-84, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 25 October 1984), pp. 165-70.

¹²Cited in Eduardo Crawley, "The Ball is Now in the British Court", The Listener, 29 March 1984.

¹³For more, see "Argentina and Britain agree to end financial sanctions", Latin America Weekly Report, 17 September 1982, pp. 1-2.

¹⁴See Cyril Townsend, M.P., in United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, 8 June 1984, col. 589, p. 307.

¹⁵Muniz interview with Telam, cited in "U.N. Ambassador Interviewed on Falklands Issue", Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS): Argentina, 7 January 1983, p. B1.

¹⁶Robert Hutchinson, "U.S. Reports Prompt Falklands Alert", FBIS: Argentina, 20 January 1983, pp. B1-3.

¹⁷Ibid, p. B1.

¹⁸Cited in Peter J. Beck, "Britain's Falklands Future--The Need to Look Back", The Round Table, (London: Butterworth and Co., Ltd., 1984), p. 148.

¹⁹See The Future Defence of the Falkland Islands, op. cit.

²⁰Ibid, p. vii., paragraphs 9 and 10.

²¹For an analysis of the election results, see Ivor Crewe,

"Post-mortem--1983 Election: The Disturbing Truth Behind Labour's Rout", The Guardian, 13, June 1983.

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²³Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher's interview in The Daily Mail, 7 November 1983.

²⁴President Raúl Alfonsín's Inaugural address, cited in FBIS: Argentina, 19 December 1983, p. B-34.

²⁵Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, in United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, 30 January 1984, column 12.

²⁶See Douglas Tweedale, "Argentina Complains about RAF 'buzzing'", The Times (London), 14 February 1984.

²⁷Memorandum by the Falkland Islands Government Representative in London, "The Falkland Islands", in Falkland Islands, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 12.

²⁸Robin Gedye, "Argentine Response is Studied", The Daily Telegraph, 20 February 1984.

²⁹See Guillermo Makin, Appendix II in Falkland Islands, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 169.

³⁰See Susana Sende Laredo, "De Stefanisi No Patrols in Exclusion Zone", The Times (London), 1 April 1984.

³¹See "Argentina Proposes Steps to Peace", The Times (London), 25 April 1984, p. 6.

³²Robin Gedye, "Argentine Response is Studied," The Daily Telegraph, 20 February 1984.

³³Guillermo Makin, Appendix 11 in Falkland Islands, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 179.

³⁴Cited in *ibid.*, p. 172.

³⁵See "Modest Hopes for Falkland Initiative", The Guardian, 20 February 1984, p. 1.

³⁶George Foulkes, M.P., in HCFAC, Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, session 1982-83, HC-31-viii-xii, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 14 February 1983), evidence taken on 3 February 1983, paragraph 981.

³⁷See "U.K. Per Capita Costs on Falkland Islands", Janes Defence Weekly, 24 November 1984, p. 917.

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⁴⁰Bruce George, M.P., in United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, 8 June 1984, column 594, p. 309.

⁴¹Robert Rhodes James in United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, 8 June 1984, column 598, p. 311.

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⁴³*Ibid.*

⁴⁴Guillermo Makin, Appendix 11, Falkland Islands, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 173.

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⁴⁷See John Ezard, "Visit to Argentina Raises Hopes of Peace", The Guardian,

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⁴⁸"Radicals Hail MP's Visit as Gesture of Goodwill", Buenos Aires Herald, 29 June 1984.

⁴⁹See "Reclamo de la Argentina por la zona de Exclusion", El Clarín, 3 July 1984.

⁵⁰See "Argentina: Alfonsín Promises Solutions to Beagle, Falkland", in FBIS: Asunción, 12 July 1984.

⁵¹See "Argentina: Foreign Minister on Berne Talks Break-off", FBIS: Asunción, 20 July 1984.

⁵²Cited in Falkland Islands, vol. 1, op. cit., p. xxxvii.

⁵³For more on the British assessment of the talks, see United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, 20 July 1984, columns 639-645.

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⁵⁵Falkland Islands, vol. 1, op. cit., p. xxxvii.

⁵⁶"Argentina to Scrap Conscription?", Jane's Defence Weekly, 1 September 1984, p. 310.

⁵⁷"Defence Budget Halved", Jane's Defence Weekly 5 January 1985, p. 8.

⁵⁸President Raúl Alfonsín, cited in The Times (London), 27 October 1984.

⁵⁹See Sir Geoffrey Howe's response to Denis Healey, M.P., in the United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, 28 November 1984, vol. 68, column 929.

⁶⁰Falkland Islands, vol. 1, op. cit., p. lxii.

⁶¹*Ibid*, p. lxiii. See also vol. 2 of the report for more on the

Committee's deliberations.

⁶²The relevant resolutions are 37/9, 38/12, 39/6, and 31/49 from the General Assembly. For more on the proposed revisions in the Falklands' Constitution, see Hon. L. G. Blake, "The Constitution of the Falkland Islands: Past, Present, and Future", The Parliamentarian, vol. LXV, no. 1, January 1984, pp. 43-7.

⁶³Interview with Ted Rowlands, M.P., former Labour Party Minister for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, held on 12 October 1984.

⁶⁴General Omar Bradley, cited in Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, *op. cit.*, p. 290.

⁶⁵Lord Hatch of Lusby, in United Kingdom, House of Lords, Hansards Official Daily Report, 17 January 1985, vol. 458, column 1071.

⁶⁶Mr. J.B. Ure in HCFAC, Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, session 1982-83, HC-311, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 10 November 1982), question #60. For more on the self-determination issue and the Falklands, see Denzil Dunnett, "Self-Determination and the Falklands", International Affairs, 1983, pp. 417-28.

⁶⁷See HCFAC, Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, session 1982-83, HC-31-xiv, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 21 February 1983), question 1982 and 1983.

⁶⁸See Falkland Islands, vol. 2, p. 136, question 577.

⁶⁹Ambassador C. G. Maina (Kenyan Ambassador to the United Nations), cited in Editorial Comments, "Dulce Et Decorum Est: The Strategic Role of Legal Principles in the Falklands War", The American Journal of International Law, vol. 77, 1983, p. 117.

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⁷¹See Viscount David Montgomery, "The Falkland Islanders Cannot have an Indefinite Veto," The Guardian, 2 July 1984, p. 7.

⁷²J.C.J. Metford in Julius Goebel, The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, (London: Yale University Press, 1982), pp. xxiv.

⁷³See Sir Geoffrey Howe's response to question from Mr. Denis Healey, M.P., in United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansard's Official Daily Report, 28 November 1984, vol. 68, column 929.

⁷⁴British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Sir Geoffrey Howe, address to the United Nations General Assembly, 26 September 1984.

⁷⁵Henry Kissinger has applied this same theory to superpower relations, where arms control talks mistakenly have been allowed to serve as the sole negotiating forum for East-West relations.

⁷⁶See HCFAC, Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, session 1982-83, HC-311, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 10 November 1982), question 40.

⁷⁷See Peadar Kirby, "Alfonso Pushes on with Reforms", The Irish Times, 5 March 1984.

⁷⁸See Falkland Islands, vol. 1, op. cit., p.pxxxix, paragraph 97.

⁷⁹Ibid, p. xli, paragraph 103.

Chapter Five

¹Max Hastings and Simon Jenkins, The Battle for the Falklands, (London: Pan Books Ltd., 1983), p. 13.

²Robert Rhodes James, M.P., in United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, 8 June 1984, columns 596, p. 310.

³Bruce George, M.P., in United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, column 593, p. 309.

⁴See Guillermo Makin, "The Current Views of Argentine Civilian Leaders", in House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee (HCFAC), 5th/ Report, Falkland Islands, vol. 2, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 11 May 1983), p. 484.

⁵Dr. W. Little, in HCFAC, Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, session 1983-84, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 15 February 1984), question #10.

⁶Interview with Bruce George, M.P., Member of House of Commons Select Committee on Defence, delegate to Anglo-Argentine Conferences at the University of Maryland, held May-August, 1984.

⁷See HCFAC, Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, session 1982-83, HC-31viii-xii, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 14 February 1983), question #907.

⁸See Cyril Townsend, M.P., in United Kingdom, House of Commons, Hansards Official Daily Report, 8 June 1984, column 589, p. 307.

⁹See Lord Shackleton, Chairman, Falkland Islands Economic Study, Cmd. 8653, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1982), p. 41.

¹⁰HCFAC, Minutes of the Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee, session 1982-83, HC-380, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 11 May 1983), p. xxxvi.

¹¹Paper submitted by Dr. Rodolfo H. Terranzo, to the Conference on the Falklands/Malvinas, School of Advanced International Studies, The Johns Hopkins University, Maryland, 14-15 February, 1985.

¹²For more on Argentine rearmament, see Paul Rogers, "A Note on Argentine Rearmament", Peace Studies Briefing Number 12, 10 May 1983, School of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, United Kingdom.

¹³Minutes of the Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., p. xxxvi.

¹⁴Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, 14 February 1983, op. cit., question 982.

¹⁵Ibid, question 1197.

¹⁶Ibid, question 1092.

¹⁷Tony Allen Mills, "Can Argentina Afford Another Fight", The Daily Telegraph, 23 February 1983, p. 16.

¹⁸See Bruce George, M.P. and Walter Little, "Falklands/Malvinas: Future Options", unpublished manuscript, February 1985, pp.8-9.

¹⁹See HCFAC, Falkland Islands, vol. 1, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 11 May 1983), p. xliv.

²⁰For more on this policy option, see Roger S. Clark, "Self-Determination and Free Association: Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust?", Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 21, no. 1, winter 1980.

²¹S. R. Miller, "Views of the Political Status and Future of the Falklands", Appendix 27 in HCFAC, Falkland Islands, vol. 2, session 1982-83, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 11 May 1983), p. 491.

²²See George and Little, op. cit., p. 9.

²³See Lord Shackleton, op. cit., p. 39.

²⁴There are a number of dependencies, colonies, etc. with smaller populations, but the smallest independent nation at present is the Republic of Nauru, with a population over three times that of the Falklands (7,128).

²⁵For more on the problems facing micro-states, see George H. Quester, "Trouble in the Islands: Defending the Micro-States", International Security, vol. 8, no. 2, Fall 1983.

²⁶See International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance: 1984-85, (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1984), p. 114.

²⁷Jim Lester, M.P., in Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, 14 February 1983, op. cit., question 974.

²⁸George and Little, op. cit., p. 10.

²⁹H. V. Hodson, "Sovereignty Demoted", The Round Table, (London: Butterworth and Co., Ltd., 1984), p. 136.

³⁰See Falkland Islands, vol. 1, op. cit., p. xlv.

³¹George and Little, op. cit., p. 11. Some Argentines are convinced that transforming the Islands into a NATO base has been the goal of the U.S. and Britain since long before the 1982 Campaign. See Rear Admiral Horacio Zaratiegui, "Was the Malvinas a NATO Trap?" in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS): Argentina, 17 June 1983, p. B1.

³²George and Little, op. cit., p. 11.

³³See "Reflexiones en Torno a la Guerra Malvinas", Mission, vol. 1, no. 2, July-September, 1982, pp. 5-7.

³⁴George and Little, op. cit., p. 12.

³⁵Commander Nick Kerr, "The Falklands Campaign", Naval War College Review, 1982, p. 21.

- ³⁶See Minutes of the Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., p. xlix.
- ³⁷Andrew Hurrell, cited in Peter J. Beck "Britain's Falklands Future - The Need to Look Back", The Round Table, (London: Butterworth and Co., Ltd., 1984), p. 149.
- ³⁸Minutes of the Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., p. xlix.
- ³⁹See "The Current Views of Argentine Civilian Leaders", op. cit., p. 484.
- ⁴⁰"Note by the Falkland Islands Committee", in Minutes of the Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee, 3 February 1983.
- ⁴¹See The Antarctic Treaty, Cmnd. 8652, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, September 1982).
- ⁴²See Minutes of the Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., p. lv.
- ⁴³Falkland Islands, vol. 1, op. cit., p. xliii.
- ⁴⁴Eric Deakins, M.P., "Falkland Islands Inquiry", Appendix 7 in Falkland Islands, vol. 2, p. 157.
- ⁴⁵See Adfian F. J. Hope, "Sovereignty and Decolonization of the Malvinas (Falklands) Islands," Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, vol. 6, no. 2, 1983, p. 395.
- ⁴⁶President Raúl Alfonsín, New York Press Conference, 24 September 1984.
- ⁴⁷Falkland Islands, vol. 1, op. cit., p. xli.
- ⁴⁸David Stephen, "Falklands: Beware the Mushrooming Myths", The Times (London), 2 April 1984, p. 12.
- ⁴⁹"Current Views of Argentine Civilian Leaders", op. cit., p. 484.
- ⁵⁰David Watt, HCFAC, Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, session

1983-84, HC-2681, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 15 February 1984), question 25.

⁵¹See Sir Nicholas Henderson, in Falkland Islands, vol. 2, p. 62, question 315.

⁵²For more on potential mediators, see Minutes of the Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., p. xlix-lif.

⁵³Sir Anthony Parsons, in Falkland Islands, vol. 2, p. 159.

⁵⁴"Memorandum by Mr. Cyril Townsend, M.P., Mr. George Foulkes, M.P., and Lord Kennet", Appendix 8 in Falkland Islands, vol. 2, p. 159.

⁵⁵See T. J. D. Miller, "Possible British Foreign Policy Options Following the Conflict over the Falkland Islands", Appendix 28 in Falkland Islands, vol. 2, p. 492.

⁵⁶For more on the operation of a condominium, see D.P. O'Connell, "The condominium of the New Hebrides", in The Yearbook of International Law, 1968-9, esp. pp. 77-88.

⁵⁷For more on past consideration of the condominium option, see Lord Franks, Chairman, Report of a Committee of Privy Counsellors, Falkland Islands Review, Cmd. 8787, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, January 1983), p. 8, paragraphs 29-30.

⁵⁸See George and Little, op. cit., p. 19.

⁵⁹Minutes of the Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee, p. xlvii.

⁶⁰For more on Aaland's style of government and its applicability to the Falklands, see Dr. Clive Archer, "Falkland Islands: A Long-Term Solution", unpublished manuscript.

⁶¹That this is the emotive force behind Argentina's claim has been perceived by the British M.P.s who have met regularly with Argentine

representatives at the University of Maryland. Based on an interview with one Member of Parliament who participated in these talks, Bruce George, held May-August 1984.

⁶²George and Little, p. 21.

⁶³D. Evans, in Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, 14 February 1983, question 1471.

⁶⁴President Alfonsín, New York Press Conference, 24 September 1984.

⁶⁵Lord Franks, op. cit., p. 23, paragraph 82.

⁶⁶Minutes of the Proceedings of the Foreign Affairs Committee, op. cit., p. xlviii.

⁶⁷George and Little, op. cit., p. 24.

⁶⁸D. Watt. in Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, 14 February 1983, question 1541.

⁶⁹S. Wallace in Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, 14 February 1983, question 994.

⁷⁰Adolfo Gass, interview with La Razon, 5 February 1985.

⁷¹See Dr. G. diTella, in HCFAC, Falkland Islands: Minutes of Evidence, (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 22 November 1982), question 281.

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