UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS

December 15, 1983

THIS IS TO CERTIFY THAT THE THESIS PREPARED UNDER MY SUPERVISION BY

ELIZABETH STATION

ENTITLED FROM WORLD WAR IDEALISM TO COLD WAR REALISM: THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCO, 1945-1950

IS APPROVED BY ME AS FULFILLING THIS PART OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE

DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS

William C. Widenor
Instructor in Charge

APPROVED: Richard W. Burkhardt

HEAD OF DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

FROM WORLD WAR IDEALISM TO COLD WAR REALISM:
THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCO, 1945-1950

THESIS

for the

DEGREE OF BACHELOR OF ARTS

IN

LIBERAL ARTS AND SCIENCES

College of Liberal Arts and Sciences

University of Illinois

1984

Errata

Page	
2	(mid-page) Should read, "*if* an alliance with that regime seems stragegically necessary and economically desirable."
14	(first sentence, second paragraph) "As a matter of tradition, the United States *conducted* its Spanish policy in conjunction with France and Great Britain"
18	(second-to-last line) "...that the best U.S. policy would be one that kept *Spain* on the Anglo-American side of the Iron Curtain."
57	(second line) "practical *concern* so much as duty"
63	(Potter quote) "...other movements were intrinsically at one with our own, despite local differences *of* complexion..."
70	(near bottom) "...for just a little too long in the late 1940s and early 1950s, *and their* refusal to foist the Hitler analogy upon Stalin" etc.
82	(mid-page) "Though an attempt to banish Franco from power, the United *Nations* resolution served only to increase his intransigence"
86	(note #17) "In *1945* he told a Madison Square Garden Audience that in April of 1931," etc.

"Here I am preaching what I have learned the hard way. To express collective indignation may bring the glow of moral principles vindicated without effort; but it is usually futile, and, more often than not, harmful."[1]

—Dean Acheson
Power and Diplomacy

Acknowledgments

Two of my undergraduate history professors, perhaps unknowingly, awakened my interest in the topic of this paper. The first was Manuel Espadas, whose course on contemporary Spain (which I took at the University of Madrid in 1982) gave me a unique understanding of Franco and Francoism. The second was William Widenor, who not only advised this project but delivered lectures in History 274 which helped turn my own inchoate criticisms of the American foreign policy-making process into (what I hope is) constructive commentary. For this and for his time and encouragement I am grateful to Professor Widenor.

I would also like to thank the James Scholars program for funding the typing of the thesis, and finally, I wish to express my appreciation to those members of the faculty of the Department of History and Spanish at the University of Illinois who have given so generously of their attention and support over the last four years.

Contents

Page

Introduction 1

Part One: The Condemnation 4

Part Two: Rapprochement and Embrace 39

Part Three: Relations with Franco and the American Foreign Policy Character 63

Conclusion 81

Notes 86

Bibliography 97

In 1945, Spain's Generalissimo Francisco Franco Bahamonde—soldier, patriot, Catholic zealot and dictator—was an international pariah without a single ally in the West. By 1950 he would become a belle to be courted by the United States Congress and military. While in 1945 Franco was dismissed as a cowardly cohort of Mussolini and Hitler, four years later he was hailed in the same circles as a "very lovely and lovable character." The man who had signed the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan, Germany, and Italy in 1939 would twenty years later shake hands with President Eisenhower. No one need remind us that Francisco Franco was a survivor. Yet the story of his journey from international rejection to Western acceptance—and the United States' role in that turn of events—is a subject which merits attention.

Indeed, the United States' Spanish policy largely determined the course of Franco's odyssey from international ostracism to Allied embrace. American idealism in the mid-1940s was partly responsible for Franco's diplomatic undoing. Wartime propaganda encouraged the American public to demand a Wilsonian peace in 1945, and few of the architects of that peace saw a place for Franco Spain—the shelter of the last earthly vestige of 1930s-style fascism—in the New World of democracy, self-determination, reconstruction and world organization. Similarly, when the exigencies of the Cold War replaced the hatreds of the World War, the United States found itself leading the way in welcoming Spain into the fold of anti-Communist allies.

The pages which follow seek not to tell Francisco Franco's tale so much as they attempt to describe and explain the American policy towards Franco. Several scholars have recounted the history of

American relations with Franco Spain, yet few have examined in detail the larger forces which led American policy-makers to first repudiate and then embrace the Spanish dictator. In dissecting Spanish-American relations as a particular and specialized set of diplomatic problems, many historians have forgotten that the United States' policy in Spain has more often than not reflected a broader American perspective of the world.

The study of Spanish-American relations during the period between World War and Cold War provides an excellent case study of the United States' shifting priorities in its postwar relations with all of Europe. The problems which confronted the shapers of America's Spanish policy became a part of the permanent repertoire of American foreign policy dilemmas. When, for example, should the United States press for democracy above all other considerations? And when should the internal character of a regime be disregarded, of an alliance with that regime seems strategically necessary and economically desirable? The answers were not clear in the 1940s and they are not clear today, yet the fact that such questions continue to exist indicates that the conflict between idealism and realism in American thinking is an unending one.

To understand the general, however, we must first contemplate the specific. The first part of this study is concerned with the circumstances which brought Franco to the foreground of the United Nations' debate in 1946, as well as the ideological setting which demanded his condemnation. Part Two describes the events which led up to the eventual policy reversal, with special emphasis upon the role of Congress and the military in initiating the policy change.

The third and final chapter examines both the Wilsonian and the pragmatic strands of the American diplomatic personality, and analyzes United States policy toward Franco Spain in the wider context of American economic, strategic, and political goals at the time.

As recent events continue to illustrate the growing influence of smaller nations upon the conduct of international relations, a study of Spain seems particularly warranted. Indeed, to investigate Spain's small role in postwar American policy formulation is to remind ourselves that the study of Cold War history is much more than the study of U.S.-Soviet relations.[3] The following pages will attempt neither to excoriate or exonerate General Franco, nor will they decide whether his condemnation was morally justifiable. What they will do is look at Spanish policy as a microcosm of the American world view of the 1940s, and suggest that the influences which guided policy-makers in that era are still a part of American diplomacy today.

Part One: The Condemnation

"We have much more than an ordinary moral responsibility in Spain. Our military security, our political stability, and our economic well-being in the post-war world are all intimately tied up to the fate of Spain. Let Spain emerge from this war as a free, non-imperialistic, people's republic, and both our security and our markets to the South will not be threatened."[6]

—Congressman John M. Coffee
(D-Washington)
1945

"The American leaders no longer found dictatorship abhorrent; they felt *responsible* for what happened all over the world. They were gripped again by messianic liberalism, the powerful urge to reform the world that is called Wilsonianism. They wanted a world both safe for liberal democracy and liberal capitalism."[7]

—Daniel Yergin
Shattered Peace

The outcry against Franco had begun long before 1945, but as the war came to a close his detractors became increasingly vituperative. The *Madison Capital Times* echoed the sentiments of many in calling the Generalissimo a "bloody dictator, protected by a wall of certified piety and the tanks of Hitler and Mussolini." World opinion viewed Franco as the last legacy of Fascism, the final scourge to be eradicated from the European scene. His regime was seen as an anachronism in the New World of the victors, and as the *Asheville* (North Carolina) *Daily Citizen* complained, Franco spoke "for a Spain of inquisitions and galleons that is out of place in the modern world."[7] The *New York Times* remarked that the regime was "a challenge to everything we fought for and an abomination to all who value freedom and democracy." There could be no doubt, continued the *Times*, that "the world would be a better place to live in if Franco were not in power."[8]

The Allies' indignance with Franco had essentially two sources. First, he was a constant reminder to liberals everywhere of their defeat in the Spanish Civil War. Second, it was commonly believed that Franco owed his power to Hitler and Mussolini and had aided and abetted the Axis during World War II as evidence of his gratitude and sympathy for their cause. In March 1946, the State Department released German documents which gave seemingly damning evidence of Franco's solidarity with the Axis. He had written Mussolini in 1940, for example, promising his "unconditional support for your expansion and your future."[9] He had assured his "dear Fuehrer" in 1941 that "I stand ready at your side, entirely and decidedly at your disposal, united in a common historical destiny, desertion from which would mean my suicide." Franco believed, or so he wrote Hitler, "that the destiny of history has united you with myself and the Duce in an indissoluble way."[10]

Certainly the Caudillo, the Duce, and the Fuehrer made an unholy alliance, an evil triumverate who the Allied people loved to hate. If Franco's verbal expressions of sympathy were not enough to convince skeptics of his perfidy, there was also the fact that he had cosigned the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan, Germany, and Italy. He had also ordered the Division Azul, a group of some 20,000 Spanish soldiers, to fight on the Soviet front and despite U.S. pressure to desist, Franco continued to authorize the sale of wolfram to Germany until as late as 1944. It was widely believed that Franco had granted facilities to German intelligence in Spain, and that Spanish factories hummed with the production of armaments to be exported to the Axis.[11]

When Franco shifted in 1942 from a policy of neutrality to one of "non-belligerancy," British and American diplomats worked feverishly to keep Spain from giving Germany carte blanche in the Iberian peninsula. Their efforts paid off; Franco in spite of his earlier leanings did nothing to prevent the Allied landing in North Africa in November 1942. He even seemed pleased when in that same month President Roosevelt wrote him a letter of thanks for his cooperation.[12] The American president assured Franco that "Spain has nothing to fear from the United Nations," and the closing lines were deferential: "I am, my dear General, your sincere friend . . ." promised Roosevelt.[13]

When the war ended three years later, however, these amenities were quickly forgotten. Spain had stayed out of the war officially, but public opinion had begun to believe that her flirtation with the Axis should not go unpunished. Roosevelt, with the Allies' military success assured, could now write the American ambassador in Spain, Norman Armour, that "Our victory over Germany will carry with it the extermination of Nazi and similar ideologies." And although it would not be the United States' province to interfere with Spain's internal affairs, Roosevelt admitted that "I should be lacking in candor . . . if I did not tell you that I can see no place in the community of nations for governments founded on fascist principles."[1]

Roosevelt's remark was strong and unequivocal, and in making it he spoke for a broad sector of the American public. Just as the "Spanish Lobby" would years later lead a crusade to bring Franco into the American sphere of influence, an organized group of anti-Franco liberals campaigned for his ostracism in 1945. Many of these anti-Francoists had opposed the dictator since the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in 1936, and were convinced that the end of World War II offered a new opportunity to rid Spain of fascism forever.

Four factors motivated the anti-Francoist group. First was their conviction that the United States had a moral responsibility to depose Franco—that the Second World War had been fought in order to wipe Hitler's brand of fascism from the face of the earth and that it must not continue to thrive in Spain. Many regarded the Spanish Civil War not as an indigenous conflict but as the first phase of the World War. The United States' refusal to supply the Spanish Republicans had been a serious mistake, they believed, for it had given Hitler his first European victory in Spain. Representative John Coffee, the Democrat who led the anti-Franco crusade in Congress, was one of many liberals who felt a personal responsibility to "erase the crime" of Spain. "We showered all of the blame for the Spanish tragedy on the appeasers," Coffee remarked in 1945. "What a convenient and easy way this was to absolve ourselves for our own sins."[15]

To eradicate Francoism would also be to deprive Nazi refugees of a shelter in Spain at the war's end, and this was a second tenet of anti-Francoism. A real fear existed among American liberals that Franco's continuance in power would keep fascism alive and ready to be rekindled in Europe. A third contention of the anti-Franco forces was that fascism, if left alone in Spain, would spread to Latin America, destroying American markets and security and possibly engendering a third world war in the Western Hemisphere. Finally, the group was convinced that unless democracy was restored to Spain, the United States would lose the Spanish market for American goods.[16]

The anti-Francoists advocated the use of international moral pressure to expel Franco, but also believed that such pressure must be accompanied by financial and military aid to the Republican rebels of the Spanish "underground." Their goal was to create a liberal democratic government, but not a monarchy, to replace General Franco.[17] Coffee himself thought that the best plan would be for the Allies to arm Spanish rebels and let them do their own fighting against Franco. In January 1945 he submitted H.R. 100 to the House of Representatives, which called for an end to American diplomatic recognition of Spain and proposed that as a "minimum program," Congress should appoint a military commission to send

> arms, ammunition, and medical supplies to the heroic republican guerilla armies of Spain when their revolt, timed to weaken the Nazi armies in the moment of greatest crisis, creates in Spain one of the active and decisive battlefields of this global war.[18]

Among the endorsers of H.R. 100 was the American Committee for Spanish Freedom, which had been organized in the autumn of 1944 for the purpose of "coordinating, developing, and clarifying sentiment in the United States with respect to the present government in Spain."[19] The Committee boasted a long list of prestigious members, many of whom were prominent artists, writers, scientists, and educators. The group's first activity was to issue a statement which approved H.R. 100 and warned that "the great war in which we are now engaged will have been in vain if German fascism is permitted to exist anywhere when this war ends." The endorsement demanded an end to U.S. recognition of the Franco regime and a beginning of American assistance to the Republican forces in Spain. Leonard Bernstein, Bennet Cerf, Aaron Copland, Ira Gershwin, Lillian Hellman and Max Weber were among the signatories,[20] but this is not to say that the anti-Francoists were no more than an elite group of American intellectuals. Eighteen thousand Americans attended a January 1945 rally at New York's Madison Square Garden to protest Franco's continuance in power, and demanded an American condemnation of the regime. The gathering was sponsored by the Nation Associates (the publishers of the Nation), but also by assorted civic, political, and labor organizations.[21]

Coffee did not really exaggerate when he claimed that H.R. 100 responded to a "feeling entertained by millions of Americans, that our appeasement of fascism anywhere should no longer be tolerated;"[22] indeed, his words echoed those of some of the more famous liberals of the day. As early as 1942, Vice President Henry Wallace had stated that just as in 1862 the United States could not remain half slave and half free, "so in 1942 the world must make its decision for a complete victory one way or the other."[23] Wallace believed that a military victory over the Nazis was not enough—he wished to build a new world which would be economically, politically, and spiritually sound.[24] In 1947, Wallace wrote Secretary of State George Marshall that

> what we need is a mobile offensive in our foreign policy, an affirmation of the revolutionary tradition out of which this country was born, a loud and ringing 'yes' to the change that the wrecked societies of Europe and Asia are demanding at once.[25]

Although by this time Wallace's influence in foreign-policy formulation had waned, he still spoke for many Americans when he urged Marshall that "we must act to implement the Atlantic Charter; we must help the colonial peoples in their struggle to free themselves; we must lead rather than follow in opposition to such men as Franco." Wallace considered American leadership crucial in the postwar world, and feared that if the United States did not respond to the needs of the hungry and oppressed across the globe, they would turn to the Soviet Union for support. "We must seek everywhere to find out what changes are needed in the devastated areas of the world to fill the stomachs and make busy the hands of the people;" Wallace proclaimed, "and we must be the first to sponsor them."[26]

Obviously there was no place for Franco in a world which was to be based upon the ideals of the Atlantic Charter. The *New York Times* zealously supported a condemnation of Spain; a typical editorial would praise the latest international denunciation of Franco and affirm that his end was only a matter of time. "Though the Franco regime may protest against this world judgment and attempt to defy it," the *Times* rejoiced, "there can be little doubt that the unanimous verdict is sapping its moral strength and crumbling the props on which it rests."[27] Such rhetoric encouraged many Americans to believe that the sacrifices of the World War had been too great to allow any "compromise with Satan" at the conflict's end.[28] Thus it is not surprising that by 1945, the Allied public generally shared the Times opinion that Franco and his sycophants must be brought to their knees. By isolating Spain and making Franco the target of international derision, the Allies hoped in the months ahead to replace the regime with a moderate, democratic state consistent with the rest of the West. The stage was set for a worldwide condemnation of the Spanish regime and of all that it was believed to stand for. The "noche negra"—the black night—of Francoism had begun.

* * * *

One of the first official manifestations of the "free world's" disgust with Franco came in June 1945, at the San Francisco Conference of the United Nations. The question of U.N. membership caused squabbles first in the case of Argentina, whose government had also been denounced for its fascist leanings and overly enthusiastic support of the Axis powers during World War II. Argentina had been the only nation in the Western Hemisphere which had refused to sever its ties with Nazi Germany during the course of the war—and its regime had seemed almost defiant of the American plea for continental solidarity.[illegible] But several months prior to the Conference, the U.S. had exacted an Argentine promise to liberalize its regime and cooperate in a common future policy of American nations, in exchange for an American vow to assure Argentina's membership in the United Nations. Stalin's vehement protest of the Argentine petition for membership was quickly overruled at San Francisco, when the United States joined with twenty other American republics to push through Argentina's inclusion.

Franco, on the other hand, was to have no such luck. If the conference revealed that there were embarrassingly irreconcilable differences between the Soviets and the West, it also provided a recommendation upon which the two sides could agree—that Spain must be excluded from the U.N. and its agencies. The conference also considered the possibility of breaking economic and diplomatic relations with Spain, and agreed in principle to take military action should Franco's regime become a threat to the peace.

The next step came soon after, at Potsdam. Certainly the representatives of the Big Three had more pressing worries than the fate of Franco Spain; nonetheless the question surfaced several times in discussion. Stalin was adamant, for example, that both diplomatic and economic relations with Spain be severed. He insisted that the Franco regime had been imposed upon Spain by the Axis, and he urged its destruction. "I am not proposing that we unleash a civil war there," the Soviet leader explained. "I should only like the Spanish people to know that we, the leaders of democratic Europe, take a negative attitude to the Franco regime." The Allies could demonstrate their disapproval, said Stalin, by recognizing the Republican government-in-exile as the only legitimate representative of the Spanish people, and by authorizing the Security Council to plan possible military intervention against Franco.

Churchill and Truman were less zealous, however. The British leader remarked that "considering that the Spaniards are proud and rather sensitive, such a step by its very nature could have the effect of uniting the Spaniards around Franco, instead of making them move away from him." Truman, though he made no secret of his own antipathy toward the Spanish leader, was also reluctant to come down too hard. "We should be very glad to recognize another government in Spain instead of the Franco government," he began cautiously, "but that I think is a question for Spain herself to decide."[30]

The discussion of the Spanish question at Potsdam revealed one of the chronic dilemmas of postwar foreign policy-making—whether it was wise, in Churchill's words, to "interfere in the internal affairs of a state with whom we differ in views."[31] Charles Mee has written that the Spanish conversations were "at the very least . . . a test of British and American honesty about their desire to see democratic governments in Europe,"[32] yet it can be argued that the Anglo-American wish for Spanish democracy was very real—but uncertainty as to what was the best means toward the desired end led to hesitation and indecision. In any event, after "relentless bickering," the three leaders finally agreed to a compromise solution. They issued a declaration which expressed their opposition to

> any application for membership to the United Nations put forward by the present Spanish Government, which, having been founded with the support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of

> its origins, its nature, its record and its close association with the aggressor States, possess the qualifications necessary to justify such membership.[33]

According to Mee, this declaration, though "presentable and meaningless," was nonetheless a victory for the Anglo-Americans, who had successfully refused to accede to Stalin's pressure for harsher action. The triumph was temporary, however, for the Spanish question would continue to be a point of perpetual disagreement. No one liked Spain's "fat little dictator," yet no one could decide what to do about him.

* * * *

As a matter of tradition, the United States continued its Spanish policy in conjunction with France and Great Britain; between August 1945 and November 1946 the three governments consulted with each other at virtually every step. Unanimous was the opinion that Spain should have a democratic government, "based on democratic principles, moderate in tendency, stable. . ."[34] The three powers were divided, however, as to how their objective could be attained.

In 1945, Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn asserted that the United States would only consider a rupture of diplomatic relations with Spain "provided the French and British Governments were inclined to adopt that course."[35] Yet the British especially feared that a consideration of the Spanish question in the United Nations, for example, would be construed as interference in the internal affairs of a sovereign nation. In an aide-memoire to the American State Department, the British expressed concern that "a dangerous precedent would be set" if the issue of Spain were brought before the Security Council. If a foreign country "could be arraigned before the Security Council solely because the form of its regime was distasteful to one or more foreign governments, it is not possible to surmise what might happen in the future," the memoire warned.[36] The British opposed a diplomatic break with Franco on the grounds that the Spanish people, ever-proud, would rally around their leader in the face of international condemnation. The French, on the other hand, had supported a break since 1945, and urged a tripartite effort to dethrone General Franco.[37]

The sine qua non of American policy can be summarized in a word—evolution. Throughout 1945 and 1946, American diplomats desired neither to eject Franco forcibly nor to adhere to strict non-interference. As Ambassador Armour told Franco in 1945, "we had hoped to see an evolution in the government . . . in line with the trend of events and the new spirit abroad in the world; an evolution that would enable Spain to occupy the role that properly belonged to it in the postwar world."[38] It was hoped that Franco, under pressure from the West, would "loosen" and "liberalize" his regime, gradually restoring civil liberties to the Spanish citizenry. Later that year, Armour even envisioned that Franco might "hand back the power to the generals from whom he had originally received it." Democracy could be restored "if those in turn were to call in some outstanding civilians and together work out a form of constitution, to be submitted to plebiscite."[39]

The call for evolution was echoed by Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of State to James Byrnes. It seemed that both Armour and Acheson believed that if liberal democracy were to infect Western Europe in 1945, with any luck it might be contagious in Spain. Acheson himself made a distinction (as did most of his colleagues) between the Spanish government—a corrupt dictatorship—and the Spanish people who, longing for freedom, could be convinced to rebel against their oppressor.

Both Byrnes and Acheson favored the idea of a three-power statement which would urge the Spanish people to take charge of their national government.[40] By March 1946 such a declaration had been issued, in which the United States with France and Britain expressed their hope that

> leading patriotic and liberal-minded Spaniards may soon find means to bring about a peaceful withdrawal of Franco, the abolition of the Falange, and the establishment of an interim or caretaker government under which the Spanish people may have an opportunity freely to determine the type of government they wish to have and choose their leaders.[41]

When evidence existed that the as yet unborn interim government had also restored civil liberties, granted political amnesty, and returned exiled Spaniards, the declaration continued, Spain "should receive the recognition and support of all freedom-loving peoples."[42]

Emmet Hughes has written of the tripartite declaration that "as an expression of beatific intentions, this statement was impeccable. As a declaration of policy, its principal flaw was that it made no sense."[43] Indeed, the three powers had hedged on the issue of maintenance of diplomatic ties with Franco, calling it "a matter to be decided in the light of events and after taking into account the efforts of the Spanish people to achieve their own freedom."[44] In other words, the people of Spain were to realize that the proverbial ball was in their court, and must take the initiative in changing their government. How they were to do so was a detail left unmentioned.

Within a month, the issue would come to the whole world's attention. Oscar Lange, the Polish delegate at the United Nations, addressed the Security Council on April 17 with a resolution calling for both the severance of relations with the Franco regime and a declaration that its activities constituted a threat to international peace and security. Lange contended that the U.N. had not only the right but the duty to take up the Spanish question. "Let us not repeat the mistakes of appeasement," he urged his colleagues in all-too-familiar language. "I appeal to you in the name of 23 million Poles who . . . have suffered death and torture at the hands of the Nazis whom Franco has helped."[45]

Lange purported that the existence of the Franco government endangered international security for a host of reasons. He claimed that "tens of thousands" of Nazi war criminals had taken refuge in Spain, and that two thousand former Gestapo agents had been absorbed into Franco's secret police. Further, said Lange, German scientists and engineers were at work in the Spanish armaments industry, perhaps constructing an atomic bomb that would reverse the Nazi defeat. Spain was "the center of propaganda and dissemination of the dangerous Fascist ideas which have led to war," warned Lange. Franco had been an Axis partner in World War II, and should not only be punished but eliminated.[46]

None of Lange's contentions was universally accepted by the U.N.; his tirade did, however, force every nation to take a stand on the

Spanish question. The United States found itself in a particularly difficult position. The State Department was against severing diplomatic ties, yet it would be dangerous both internationally and domestically to give the Poles and the Soviets a monopoly on moral indignation. American policy-makers did not consider the Franco regime a threat to the peace, but opposition to the Lange resolution was not consistent with the postwar American commitment to press for democracy in all of Europe.

Carefully, a policy was hammered out. United States delegate Edward Stettinius received instructions from Byrnes that while it was the United States' ultimate goal to eliminate Franco, it was not in American interests to bring the matter before the Security Council. The Soviets would benefit most from a discussion of the Spanish question, Byrnes intimated, which would "meet their keen desire to press for international interference in the Spanish situation in the hope that during the resulting confusion a new regime will emerge which will be more satisfactory to Soviet ambitions."

Thus as early as April 1946, Spanish policy had been touched by a Cold War rationale; the State Department had examined Franco Spain not only on its own merit but as a part of the wider East-West rivalry.[47] Only a month earlier Churchill had declared that "from Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the Continent," and Stalin's angrily defensive response seemed to further widen the gap between Eastern and Western Europe.[48] Although Franco's government was still undesirable to most American diplomats, it appeared that the best U.S. policy would be one that kept Stalin on the Anglo-American side of the Iron Curtain. Byrnes counseled Stettinius to ask the Security Council to form a subcommittee to monitor the Spanish question, and he advised the delegation to vote against any resolution requiring diplomatic or economic sanctions against Spain.

On April 29, 1946, the Security Council did create a subcommittee to investigate the Spanish question, and on June 1 of that same year it presented its ambiguous conclusions. Agreeing that the Franco regime's activities were a *potential* menace to the peace, it empowered the Security Council to "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment in order to improve the situation." The committee advised that unless Franco stepped down and political liberties were assured, the member nations should withdraw their ambassadors from Spain. If democratic institutions *were* restored, the U.N. could consider favorably any Spanish petition for membership.[49]

Essentially the report solved nothing; it was far too mild to be accepted by Lange's supporters and far too vague to have any practical impact. It did, however, set the scene for the final showdown of December 1946, which would result in the withdrawal of ambassadors. Before that confrontation is described, it would be useful to discuss the basis for Lange's accusations. Was the Franco regime "fascist?" Had Spain really been an Axis accomplice in World War II?

* * * *

The immediacy of the Axis defeat made the debate of such questions an emotional one. In retrospect, however, it can be seen that the attack on Franco was based not so much upon fact as upon feeling, and a pervasive belief that his government was an anomaly in the postwar world.

Contemporary historians basically agree that the term "fascist," though popularly used to describe Franco's regime, is a misnomer. "In spite of the Fascist trimmings of the early years—the goose-step and the Fascist salute—Francoism was not a totalitarian regime," writes Raymond Carr. "It was a conservative, Catholic, authoritarian system, its original corporatist features modified over time." According to Carr, the regime lacked most of the characteristics of a totalitarian state, for it made few attempts at mass mobilization and supported no single party. Franco's government "rested on the apathy of the public, the partial satisfaction of the pressure groups *within* the regime, and the systematic exclusion from power of those who did not accept the Principles of the Movement," adds Carr.[50]

The real pillars of Francoism were the army, the Church, and the conservative monarchists of the administration. In addition, the cold hard fact that Franco's side had won the Spanish Civil War gave the dictator what he considered the moral justification for and legal basis of his power. Furthermore the Falange Party, most closely associated with fascist ideology, was being phased out of power by 1938. "What Hitler called 'the clerical monarchical scum' was already floating to the top," claims Carr. In 1942, only 40 of the 106 members of Franco's National Council were members of the Falangist Party.[51]

Max Gallo has suggested that Franco was regarded as a fascist essentially because his rule coincided chronologically with the rise of Hitler and Mussolini. But Gallo calls Francoism a "*reactionary movement of the classic type*, expressing the interests of *all* the traditionally dominant strata."[52] Similarly, the Franco regime's activity during World War II can be explained as an attempt by the dominant strata—Franco and his ministers—to preserve Spain's political independence of action as well as serve the national interest.

Undeniably, the Franco government made overtures between 1940 and 1942 that revealed its ideological sympathy with the Axis powers. Franco and Hitler met at Hendaye in 1940 to discuss the feasibility of "Operation Felix," a plan that would have allowed the German army to pass through Spain in order to seize control of Gibraltar. Four months later at Bordighera, Franco and Mussolini exchanged pleasantries. Yet scholars have agreed that Franco's entry into the war would have come only at a high price to the Axis. The Generalissimo demanded food, grain, and war materiel as compensation for Spain's entry, as well as a promise that Spain would receive Morocco as one of the spoils at the war's end. "Spain is to promise to Germany, in return, her friendship," pledged the Caudillo.[53]

As long as it was not in Spain's interests to enter the war, Franco avoided commitments. While it is true that Spain supplied the Third Reich with valuable wolfram and a "Blue Division" of fighting men, Franco's cooperation with the Axis was essentially only verbal. Franco assured Hitler of his "unchangeable and sincere adherence to you personally, to the German people and to the cause for which you fight," but he never gave Hitler an explicit promise of collaboration.[54] What many Americans failed to realize at the time was that the Spain of the early 1940s had been utterly devastated by its own civil war, and doubtlessly would have found survival difficult if it had participated in a second conflict. While nations like Argentina, Sweden, and Switzerland had also contributed considerable moral and material support to the German war effort, only Spain was continuously harangued for her violation of wartime neutrality. The Allies accused Franco of being pro-German, when in fact he was pro-Spanish, courting both Axis and Allied diplomats in an effort to protect his country's best interests.[55]

Indeed, by the time the Allies invaded North Africa Franco had begun to hedge on his commitment to the Axis.[56] His energies, wrote Arthur Whitaker, "were to be devoted almost impartially to working both sides of the street while keeping Spain untouched by the war."[57] An important signal of Franco's desire for rapprochement with the Allies was the appointment of the pro-British Francisco Gomez Jordana as foreign minister. The Blue Division was recalled in November 1943, and by the summer of 1944 Franco's attitude toward the Allies had "evolved rapidly and favorably."[58] By 1944 Franco had also replaced the pictures of Hitler and Mussolini that hung on his office wall with a simple rendering of the Pope. The next year, Spain severed its relations with Japan.

Franco's success in keeping Spain out of the war has been both lauded as a "difficult exercise in brinkmanship" and disdained as an embarrassingly obvious attempt to "vestirse de la moda"—to dress in the fashion—of whichever side appeared to be winning the war.[59] If the Generalissimo's goal was to protect Spain from further bloodshed, he succeeded—but he failed to convince the victorious Allies that he had acted in self-defense. Juan Cardenas, the Spanish ambassador to the United States, wrote Byrnes in 1946 that "any action favorable to the Axis powers by Spain was taken in self-defense in order to prevent an

Axis invasion . . . on the other hand action taken favorable to the United Nations was prompted by a friendly feeling towards them."[60] Carlton Hayes, the wartime American ambassador to Spain, agreed in his memoirs that the Spanish had contributed considerably to the Allied victory in the final years of the war.[61]

Their cries for moderation in dealing with Spain were generally ignored. When Franco tried in 1945 to give his regime a more liberal appearance (he filled the Cabinet with monarchists and promulgated a Spanish "bill of rights"), his efforts were scorned as desperate, eleventh-hour attempts to appease the West. When the Spanish issue came to a head in late 1946, the United Nations revealed that they were neither willing to forgive or forget.

* * * *

If the 1946 Spanish resolution was indicative of the goals of the new internationalism, it was fitting that two of the Senate's most famous internationalists—Texas Democrat Tom Connally and Michigan Republican Arthur Vandenberg—should present U.S. policy on Spain. Vandenberg especially was a ubiquitous American voice in foreign policy matters, and if his opinion was not always respected, it was invariably heard. As the United States' delegates to the General Assembly, he and Connally were catapulted into the thick of the Spanish debate. They were not unprepared, for the State Department had armed them with a policy. The way they articulated it, however, was uniquely their own.

Vandenberg himself had drafted the official U.S. policy statement on Spain in November 1946. Essentially the statement reaffirmed old ideas—the condemnation of Franco, the hope for the democratization of Spain, the opposition to Spanish membership in the United Nations—and pledged to support the Security Council "in any action it takes against the Franco regime . . . if and when the Security Council finds that the regime is a threat to international peace and security." Pending such a finding, however, Vandenberg warned that the United States would oppose intervention, believing that it would unite the Spanish people against outside interference and "precipitate the Spanish people themselves into the disaster of civil war with unknown but inevitably costly consequences."[62]

Connally a month earlier had used almost exactly the same words in a speech to the U.N. Political and Security Committee; like Vandenberg he initially used scripts provided by the State Department when it came to Spanish policy.[63] By December, however, Connally's rhetoric began to take on a Wilsonian tone and emphasis; he did not abandon his Washington guidelines but he amplified them considerably. The "Connally resolution" for Spain, submitted to the U.N. on December 2, was an expression both of American policy and American prejudices. It said that as long as Franco remained in power, Spain would not be admitted to the United Nations. But what merits examination here is Connally's elaboration on this point, his choice of language and his perception of the situation in Spain.

The Connally resolution began with the United Nations' assurance of their "enduring sympathy" for the people of Spain and "the cordial welcome awaiting them when circumstances enable them to be admitted to the United Nations." Until this happy day, however, the Spanish people would have their work cut out for them. Because their government was "Fascist," because it had been imposed upon them by force and thus did not represent them, the Spanish people could not enjoy membership in the United Nations and its agencies. The General Assembly recognized that it was "for the Spanish people to settle the form of their government." Thus, went the Connally resolution,

> in the interest of Spain and of world cooperation the people of Spain should give proof to the world that they have a government which derives its authority from the consent of the governed; and that to achieve that end General Franco should surrender the powers of Government to a provisional government broadly representative of the Spanish people, committed to respect freedom of speech, religion, and assembly and to the prompt holding of an election in which the Spanish people, free from force and intimidation and regardless of party, may express their will.[64]

This was Connally's answer to the Lange proposal. The Polish and the Soviets might clamor for a diplomatic break with Spain, but the United States would show magnanimity and give the Spanish people a chance to prove that they really deserved to join the United Nations. Connally followed the presentation of his resolution the next day, with a widely publicized speech that rejected the call for collective action against Spain. According to Connally, "the restoration of the Government of Spain to the Spanish people cannot be achieved through action . . . involving pressure." Diplomatic and economic sanctions would "almost certainly produce economic and political chaos in that country . . . [and] would undoubtedly lead to widespread civil strife." The solution, said Connally, was to "banish" the Franco regime from the U.N. "until an acceptable government is formed by the people of Spain."[65]

In both resolution and speech, Connally had stated *what* was to be accomplished in Spain; *how* the conversion was to take place was still not clear. The Senator simply said that he was "confident" that "the democratic ideals of the Spanish people will reassert themselves to create the foundation of a stable government." He constantly assured all concerned that the United States was still "fully committed to the fundamental principle of non-intervention."[66]

Thus by December 5 the Political and Security Committee found itself with two drastically different resolutions. The American resolution asked the Spanish people to make themselves eligible for U.N. membership; the Polish proposal demanded that all U.N. members withdraw ambassadors from Spain. In addition the Committee had to consider eight different amendments to the Polish and American resolutions.

There seemed no alternative but to hand the matter over to a subcommittee; this was done and within three days the subcommittee had produced a draft which was an amalgam of all the proposals, amendments, and resolutions submitted in the past. In spite of Connally's heated protestations, the draft recommended severing diplomatic ties with Spain. Twenty-three nations voted to adopt the subcommittee's draft, four voted against it, and twenty, including the United States, abstained.

The draft thus became a resolution, and in its final form greatly resembled the Connally proposal. However, the last two paragraphs, borrowed from a Belgian amendment, were different in a major respect. The recommendation was that

> if within a reasonable time there is not established a government which derives its authority from the consent of the governed . . . the Security Council consider the adequate measures to be taken in order to remedy the situation and;
> Recommend that all members of the United Nations immediately recall from Madrid their Ambassadors and Ministers Plenipotentiary accredited there.[67]

On December 13 and after twelve hours of debate, the General Assembly voted on the compromise resolution. The final tally was thirty-four nations in favor, six opposed, and thirteen abstaining. The diplomatic isolation of Spain was a fait accompli. By the end of the year only Portugal and the Vatican would have ambassadors in Madrid, and the American presence in Spain was limited to a staff of embassy "charges," who kept in touch with Washington but shunned the advances of Spanish officials.

The United States, surprisingly, was among the nations voting in favor of this final resolution. Dean Acheson's telegram to the American charge d'affaires in Spain, Philip Bonsal, gives the most lucid explanation of the American delegation's apparent reversal. Although Acheson would have preferred the Connally resolution by itself and believed "it would have been more effective in accomplishing peaceful removal of Franco [sic]," he felt that

> in interest harmony and closest possible unanimity in GA on Spanish problem US will vote for resolution as whole with earnest hope peaceful change contemplated will soon bring freedom to Spanish people.[68]

The State Department had counseled a "yes" vote in the interest of unity, but another motive was their belief that an American veto would be perceived as pro-Franco and would thus fuel the fires of hungry Soviet propagandists.[69] In the nascent U.N. organization, the appearance of unanimity was imperative, and it seemed wiser to acquiesce on the Spanish question and save American energies for the battles ahead. The Franco issue had become confused, overinflated, and extremely emotional, and after all, there were bigger fish to fry in the Europe of 1947.

* * * *

The resolution of 1946 was an attempt to close the door on the Spanish problem, yet it seemed to suggest more questions that it answered. What, for example, was the resolution meant to accomplish? Was it seen as a means to force Franco out or as an end in itself—a way to punish an unrepentant regime for the crimes of its past? Would the diplomatic sanctions lead to further U.N. action? And if the U.N. were truly bound to a policy of non-interference, did it actually expect the Spanish people to oust Franco without outside help?

Such questions, though justified, were not to be answered in the General Assembly. Both the Spaniards and the New York Times agreed that the U.N. subcommittee had "made a policy where they should have made an investigation."[70] The final resolution was not a clearcut statement of unanimous purpose, but a hybrid of a half-dozen conflicting and incompatible proposals, combined not to insure continuity but to allow compromise. Nearly everyone involved in the proceedings admitted that the resolution was ultimately voted on because the debate was leading nowhere. The Spanish issue was being argued with a fervency that was disproportionate to its intrinsic importance, and the whole subject had become "confused and unrealistic."[71]

Such questions also suggest that the United Nations resolution on Spain constituted a serious discrepancy between words and actions, between idealistic hopes for the Spanish people and reasonable expectations for Spain. The United States' role in the condemnation of Spain must also be examined. Were Americans realistic in demanding that Spain "democratize" and "liberalize"? What made them believe that Franco would step down? Finally, what political biases and ideological traditions did the Connally resolution reflect?

On its own, the Connally resolution seems utopian to an extreme. It stated, for example, that the Franco government had been imposed upon the Spanish people by force—and simultaneously insisted that these same people "settle the form of their government" and "give proof to the world that they have a government which derives its authority from the consent of the governed." Its suggestion that General Franco "surrender the powers of Government to a provisional government broadly representative of the Spanish people" must have seemed ludicrous to people living in Spain at the time. Nonetheless, the Connally resolution followed a long line of similar pronouncements—from Wilson's Fourteen Points to FDR's Atlantic Charter and the Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe. The Atlantic Charter reflected an idea that was paramount to American war aims—"the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live." It spoke of a desire to "see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them."[72] The Yalta Declaration called for the extermination of fascist ideologies and the creation of democratic institutions in all of Europe. It promised to assist all liberated peoples in forming "interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment of governments responsive to the will of the people."[73] Although Byrnes would contend that the Yalta Declaration was intended not for Spain but for Eastern Europe, its language and objectives mirrored those of the Connally resolution.[74]

Self-determination was an American goal both in war and in peace. In his Navy Day speech of October 1945, Truman reiterated that it was a "fundamental" of American foreign policy to want sovereign rights and self-government to be returned to any nations that had been deprived of them. He spoke of his hope to attain "a world in which Nazism, Fascism, and military aggression cannot exist."[75] His words were seized upon by phrase-makers like Connally and Vandenberg who saw the Atlantic Charter as the heart and soul of American postwar policy.[76]

The Connally resolution had a number of precedents in its emphasis on Spanish self-government. A more striking phenomenon, however, was the widespread conviction that self-government would "evolve" in Spain, that if her citizens wanted a change then an authoritarian government should be no obstacle. This concept, too, had a history. Throughout the Second World War, for example, Americans expressed a peculiar hope that an evolution and improvement of internal conditions might lead the Soviet Union towards liberalization.[77] Another prevalent idea was that the spirit of international cooperation might infect domestic affairs as well.

The Spanish Republicans in exile were among those responsible for feeding the Allies' hopes that democracy could be restored to Spain relatively easily. Former Republican ministers toured the United States and Britain throughout the 1940s lecturing and lobbying to rally the opposition against Franco. In 1945, Pablo Azcarate, the former ambassador to London, told an Oxford University audience that Franco's "personal regime" should be immediately abolished. He expressed his confidence that

> anybody, a man, a group of men, a political party, a coalition, ready to get this thing done with speed and determination, would receive such an overwhelming support from the whole nation that any opposition coming from no matter what minority groups would be hopeless, and would fail if attempted.[78]

During February of 1946, Jose Giral met with Acheson to discuss the possibility of setting up a new Republican government in Spain. Giral, the president of the Republic-in-exile, was long a proponent of breaking diplomatic relations with Franco. He often insinuated that if the United States refused to support his opposition government, "the Giral ministry would find itself forced to enter into negotiations with the Communists in order that it might receive the support of Soviet Russia for its activities."[79]

Threats like these generally hurt the Republicans more than anything, for they seemed to give credence to Franco's claim that the Republican exiles were merely Soviet dupes, enemies of the "true" Spain of order and decency. Franco tended to view the international outcry against his regime as a temporary phenomenon, and predicted in his reply to the Potsdam Declaration that "once the passions inflamed by war and propaganda have died down, the injustices of the moment will be redressed." He considered Oscar Lange to be the "Warsaw mouthpiece of the Politburo," and dismissed Lange's allegations against Spain as "a brazen attempt to intervene in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation."[80]

It would be fatuous to believe that Franco's ostracism was the result of an international communist conspiracy as the dictator himself alleged. In 1945 the Western democracies were both anti-fascist and anti-communist, and the desire to "do something" about Franco grew out of public sentiment as much as private plotting. Equally inaccurate were claims that the Soviet vilification of Franco was part of a larger plan to establish a communist government in Spain. George F. Kennan wired Byrnes in 1946 that "there is still a vast psychological abyss between fierce personal pride of Iberian character and total personal sublimination of modern eastern Slav. Until something is done to bridge this void, I doubt the Russians can ever seize and hold the leadership they covet in Iberian affairs."[81] The Soviets reviled Franco not just out of sympathy for the Republican Left, but also because he had ordered the Blue Division to Russia where it had inflicted considerable damage.[82]

It must be noted, however, that much of Franco's criticism of the United Nations' condemnation was justified. There was a great deal of truth to his charge that the U.N. violated its own charter by barring Spain from participation in the proceedings which affected her.[83] The regime considered it "absurd that the accused be judged by any international organization of which it is not a part, before which it does not appear and by which it is not summoned."[84] Franco further observed that the powers had almost unanimously recognized the legitimacy of his government in 1939, with no mention of its "Fascist origins" or "unrepresentative" nature. His most compelling argument against the condemnation of Spain and the withdrawal of ambassadors was that the U.N.'s actions were capricious. It seemed farcical to Franco that the Soviet Union, far from being a democracy itself, could bar Spain from the U.N. because of Franco's "totalitarian" regime. Artajo, the Spanish foreign minister, would remark that "there was considerably more personal liberty in Spain" than in the Soviet Union and its satellites. It seemed to Artajo that the U.N. was no more than a victor's club, conducting its business by and for the benefit of the nations who had won the war.[85]

The most serious deficiency of both the Connally resolution and the U.N. resolution of 1946 is quite simply this—that they were not realistic. The Connally resolution, to say the least, was a tall order. It made difficult demands upon the Spanish people and gave them no idea as to how they should carry them out; it lent the opposition no practical, material assistance against Franco. Above all, both resolutions illustrated an amazing ignorance of the conditions in Spain which precluded the establishment of democracy. The obstacles to a popular rising against Franco were not only political, but economic, social, and historical.

To many outsiders it seemed that the Franco regime was a simple and monolithic structure imposed forcibly and tenuously upon the people of Spain by means of police and government repression. Actually, the system was highly complex, composed of several political and institutional "families" that supported it at many levels.[86] The army, the

Church, the ultra-conservative monarchists and the upper classes were the main pillars of Francoism; the Falange party and later the technocrats were also government mainstays. It was a structure fully integrated into Spanish society; the idea that the opposition could fell it with a single blow was far from true. Max Gallo has noted that it was not only the physical strength of the army and the police forces but their real *loyalty* to Franco which revealed that Francoism was "*something other* than the ephemeral dictatorship of a group or man . . . [It] was in fact the political expression of the economic and social situation in Spain."[87] The little opposition that existed within Spain had been eliminated or worn down by repression. The anti-Franco forces outside of Spain were divided, quarrelsome, and without material support. "There was literally no social stratum capable of envisaging the replacement of Francoism by a democracy of the Western type, uniting political and public liberties, parliamentary government and capitalism," Gallo writes.[88]

Franco's most effective weapon against rebellion was censorship. Spanish writer Fernando Vizcaino Casas noted that the problem with the U.N. resolution was not that Spaniards would be unable to implement it, but that the vast majority of them never read it in full. Only a handful knew that a government-in-exile even existed; fewer still knew that there was any organized opposition outside Spain. The Spanish pretender Don Juan issued a manifesto in 1947 protesting Franco's Law of Succession (a proclamation in which the Caudillo appointed himself dictator for life), but it was never published by the Spanish press.[89] Franco used censorship selectively, so that any outside news that was printed could be presented to his advantage.

Another obstacle to Spain's liberalization was her economic devastation. Following the destruction of her civil war and the isolation of the World War, Spain's main concern was sheer physical survival. The national income in 1940 was equal to what it had been in 1914; the population had increased but per capita income remained at nineteenth century levels.[40] Spain was plagued by chronic shortages of electricity, heat, and coal, and the strict system of food rationing gave birth to the "estraperlo" or black market. Productivity remained low while inflation climbed ever higher. A desperate lack of gold, raw materials, manpower and consumer goods characterized the economy. Reconstruction had never really taken place after 1939—two-thirds of the national transport facilities and one-third of the merchant marine had been destroyed in the civil war.[41] In addition the policy of autarky, a Franquist goal in the thirties and forties, had failed to spawn the expected industrial take-off.

The Spanish economy was starved, literally and figuratively, and it seemed as if the masses needed bread more than democracy. While Franco's ultimate aim was to win economic aid from the United States, it was Argentina who provided his sole support in the immediate postwar years. A 1946 commercial agreement between Franco and Juan Peron furnished much-needed wheat and foodstuffs. A year later, the Franco-Peron protocol extended Spanish credit, facilitating Spain's purchase of Argentine consumer goods. Argentina seemed to be the only nation that had not deserted Spain, and Spain showed her gratitude by according an ecstatic welcome to Peron's wife, Evita, when she visited in 1947.

Eva Peron's tour of Spain was in many ways the climax of the Franco regime's campaign against the condemnation of the United Nations.

Franco's response to the 1946 resolution was not meek but defiant; his reply to the Potsdam Declaration had been that Spain "neither begs for a place at international conferences nor would she accept one which was not in relation to her history, her population, and her services to peace and culture."[32] Franco warned the U.N. several months later that the withdrawal of ambassadors would be perceived as a violation of Spanish independence and an interference in her domestic affairs. He admonished that it would only serve to rally the Spanish people to his cause. Spain "would prefer to live in a difficult isolation rather than in a state of incomplete sovereignty," snified the regime's official reply to the U.N.[33]

A massive protest demonstration in Madrid's Plaza de Oriente followed the issuance of the 1946 resolution. Whether it was really "the most spontaneous and clamorous popular manifestation in the history of the regime" is not certain; skeptics have maintained that Madrilenos were given the day off work and only attended the rally because they wanted to keep their jobs.[34] In any event Franco's speech to the giant crowd contained the standard reply to outside criticism. "What happens in the United Nations cannot surprise us," the Caudillo proclaimed. "With the great force of our righteousness we join the fortress of our unity. With them and with the protection of God, nothing and no one can deny our victory."[35]

Contemporary observers have agreed that Franco's mobilization of Spanish pride and nationalism helped him not to win power but consolidate it. The U.N. resolution had a dispiriting effect on the opposition, who had hoped for an ultimatum but got a moral and symbolic gesture in its place.[36] The members of the Franco government who had hoped for "evolution" and the eventual replacement of the dictator perceived the revolution as a defeat for their cause. They believed that economic assistance, not diplomatic ostracism, would have encouraged Franco to open the regime. Vizcaino Casas has remarked that "It was the United Nations—paradoxically—who assented to and established the regime of Franco. This had been anticipated by Churchill, who proved to know us a great deal better than the gentlemen of the General Assembly."[97]

In fact, Franco's most important power base was not the nationalism and pride of the Spanish people but their apathy. The idea that the Spanish masses were poised and ready to throw off the yoke of oppression is almost absurd, yet the language of the U.N. resolutions seemed to assume that this indeed was the case. The exhaustion and resignation to defeat of the average Spaniard was a constant theme of postwar literature;[98] he found no hope in the political process because he had never seen it function effectively. Spaniards "were victims of hunger and want, of harsh exploitation by employers and landlords, and they found no echo of their day-to-day preoccupations . . . in programmes and aims that were too exclusively political." The Spanish people did not dream of liberation so much as they

> waited resignedly. Whole generations of active men had experienced defeat in 1939 and then repression, which had left on them an indelible imprint; the cadres of the working class had been systematically hunted down. The new generations had not yet reached manhood; they were not yet old enough in 1945 to fight.[99]

Historically there were few precedents to a successful Spanish revolt. In fact, history seemed only to legitimize Franco's victory in the eyes of the Generalissimo himself. Franco divided Spain into a society of victors and vanquished, and the memory of the victory and blood sacrifice of the Civil War was the constant theme of his speeches and private reflections. The uprising of 1936 was to Franco not merely a rebellion but an act of national salvation, and the subsequent triumph over the "anti-Spain" gave him his principal claim to power. His hold was not tenuous in 1945, for Francoism was "something more than the personal rule of a dictator. Franco gave his name to a political and social system that was much more complex and adaptable than his adversaries were willing to concede."[100]

The resolution of 1946 was not motivated by bad intentions, but its direct result was to magnify the poverty, isolation, and defiance of Franco Spain. It was meant to be a manifestation of the U.N.'s strength and unanimity, a decisive decree of displeasure and a moralistic mandate for change. In reality, the resolution was the lowest common denominator of a divided international opinion—and the show of unanimity was temporary. In the first half of the 1940s, the pendulum of world opinion had swung away from Francisco Franco. As the decade wore on, it would slowly but surely swing back.

Part Two: Rapprochement and Embrace

"There is a desire among Americans, when it comes to foreign policy, to find a single concept, a Commanding Idea, that explains how America relates to the world, that integrates contradictory information, that suggests and rationalizes courses of action, and that, as a court of the last resort for both policy-makers and public, almost magically puts an end to disputes and debates."[1]

—Daniel Yergin

"Every minute and every day that we hesitate to recognize Spain we are merely playing into the hands of the Communists over the world."[2]

—Representative Alvin O'Konski
(R-Wisconsin)
January 1950

No sooner had the resolution of 1946 been passed than American diplomats at many levels sought to change it. The American charge in Spain, Philip Bonsal, still had high hopes that anti-Franco forces would combine to form a moderate government in Spain, one "able to steer a course between the reactionary and fascist elements on the one hand and on the other the social revolution advocated from Moscow."[3] Nonetheless the feeling grew during 1947 that the resolution was doomed to fail. Franco seemed as intransigent as ever, and the "democratic" changes made in his government were cosmetic at best.

Careful study of the Spanish problem reveals that 1946 was the year of another conflict—that between the anti-Franco, Wilsonian posture of Dean Acheson and President Truman, and the increasingly pragmatic but still minority view of men like George Kennan and James Forrestal. This latter contingent advocated not the ostracism of Franco Spain but a gradual rapprochement, and hoped that through economic, diplomatic, and military channels Spain could be integrated into the American sphere of influence.

The story of this conflict unfolded between 1947 and 1950—the years in which Cold War tensions first began to be felt. During this three-year period American policy for Spain altered considerably, but historians have pinpointed the exact moment of the change at different times. In 1963 and without the benefit of access to relevant State Department documents, Theodore Lowi adduced that the official U.S. embrace of Franco came in January 1950.[4] More recently, James Cortada set the date at April 7, 1947, when a top-secret telegram from Dean Acheson arrived at the British embassy.

According to Cortada, Acheson's telegram contained the "germ" of a new American policy which was to lead to more intimate relations with Madrid.[5] The document expressed the standard objections to Franco but also, for the first time, the American suggestion that the U.S. and Britain agree upon a *positive* Spanish policy—one which "would act as inducement to Spain [sic] elements to bring about another form of change themselves and thereby render possible extension of our assistance in creating healthy economic and political conditions in the country."[6] In other words, the United States was rejecting negative pressure in favor of positive encouragement. Acheson spoke not of condemnation but of closer relations, and looked upon economic and diplomatic cooperation as a way to implement change and pave the way for Spain's membership in the United Nations.

Also emerging in 1947 was the admission that it would take more than an international outcry to force Franco out of power. An increasing acceptance of Franco as the "man in charge" was reflected by charge Paul Culbertson, who in the autumn of the year remarked that "this is not the opportune moment to develop antagonisms between [the] United States and Spain." Echoing a growing sentiment among American and British diplomats, Culbertson advised against a State Department attempt to "in any way upset applecart here regardless of number of rotten apples in cart."[7] The implication was that if Franco was rotten, he was also the only thing the U.S. had to deal with.

This was a pragmatic and realistic attitude—and one which Acheson did not yet share. The Undersecretary of State still held fast to the belief that Franco's presence precluded a change in U.S. policy, and thus Cortada is not completely correct in asserting that Acheson's

April telegram was a turning point in policy formulation. Acheson still pushed for the establishment of an interim regime in Spain, one that would hold elections, reinstate civil liberties, and grant amnesty to political prisoners and exiles. As long as Franco remained in power, declared the Acheson telegram,

> there can be no real improvement of economic stagnation in Spain. We will continue to be blocked from providing the effective assistance which would make possible the economic reconstruction of that country and thereby build an effective barrier to civil strife and communist domination.[8]

Acheson suggested that the Americans and British encourage dissidents to overthrow the "fascist" Franco regime, and held that the U.N. resolution of 1946 was still the basis of American policy.

Cortada has stressed that the Acheson telegram is important because it gives proof that the U.S. policy change came in 1946 rather than 1948, as historians had previously believed.[9] It can be argued, however, that Acheson's statement constituted no change at all. Because it repeated the obsolete Wilsonian principles of 1945 and 1946, because it showed an unwillingness to accept Franco's government as a viable bargaining partner, and because it promised American aid only under the condition of Franco's removal, the Acheson telegram was not revolutionary. Proof of an authentic change in policy came only in October of 1947. The instigator was not Dean Acheson but the Policy Planning Staff (PPS) of the State Department, headed by George F. Kennan.

Kennan himself had long been a proponent of friendly relations with Spain, and had told Forrestal that U.S. hegemony in the Mediterranean hinged greatly upon American access to the straits of Gibraltar.[10]

He considered himself a realist, and had often questioned the efficacy of fusing questions of morality with decisions of foreign policy as well as "the carrying over into the affairs of states of the concepts of right and wrong, the assumption that state behavior is a fit subject for moral judgment."[11] It is no wonder, then, that the Kennan staff's policy paper on Spain—a top secret document—was willing to acknowledge what Acheson would not.

Essentially the staff paper contained five new elements. First, it conceded that Franco remained firmly in power, that his regime had actually been fortified by the demonstration of international hostility, and that there was "no evidence of effective opposition to Franco either within or without Spain, which could bring about an orderly change in government." Second, the study declared, United States policy of withholding loans and restricting exports to Spain had contributed to that country's economic stagnation. Though the Truman Administration's official stance had been to discourage private American credits to and trade with Spain, the PPS advised that steps be taken "whereby the various controls we have imposed are quietly dropped, so that normal trade may be resumed between the two countries." The staff recommended as a third precept that the U.S. "minimize discussions of the Spanish question" in the United Nations and even "refrain from any mention of our previous support of the . . . United Nations in condemning the Franco regime." Where Acheson had previously supported reaffirmation of the resolution of 1946, the PPS prescribed that it be rescinded. George Marshall, the Secretary of State, repeatedly jotted the words "I agree" in the margin of the study.[12]

Fourth, the PPS study spoke of Spain's value as a potential Cold War ally. It claimed that prior U.S. policy was not in the national interest, and had served only to alienate Franco and "operate against the maintenance of a friendly atmosphere in Spain in the event of an international conflict." The fifth and most important statement of the paper spelled out the direction that future U.S. policy should take. "Instead of openly opposing the Franco regime, we should work from now on toward a normalization of U.S.-Spanish relations, both political and economic," the PPS proposed. "While no public announcement should be made of our views, we should have in mind the objective of restoring our relations to a normal basis, irrespective of wartime ideological considerations or the character of the regime in power."

This final statement is the key, for it contains an open admission that ideology should be secondary to national interest. The PPS paper was a policy milestone, and although it did not reflect a unanimous view within the State Department, it illustrated that an increasing number of diplomats were beginning to examine the Spanish question in a Cold War context. Marshall, for one, gave it his hearty approval, although three years would pass before the paper finally became policy.

* * * *

1947 was a year of many milestones. It was the year of communist insurgency in Greece, of Marshall Plan aid, and of "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" by an enigmatic "Mr. X."[13] 1947 was also the year of the Truman Doctrine speech—the President's momentous declaration that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[14]

With this statement, Truman had unwittingly implied that it would *not* be the United States' policy to aid peoples who were suffering from subjugation by inside pressure. It appeared that America would only aid "freedom fighters" who were in combat with the Left, not citizens already conquered by the Right, as was the case in Spain. Truman also quite ironically foreshadowed the eventual rapprochement with Franco when he stated that "We shall remain ready and willing to join with all nations—I repeat with all nations—in every possible effort to reach international agreement."[15]

Signs that the West was beginning to grudgingly accept Franco Spain appeared in November, 1947, after a U.N. resolution to reaffirm the condemnation of 1946 failed to win the required two-thirds majority in the General Assembly. The New York Times reported that in contrast to the heated arguments on the subject the previous year, the 1947 Spanish debate was "short and surprisingly lacking in fire."[16] Although the American delegation had kept silent during the proceedings, the United States joined a group composed largely of Latin American nations (Argentina, Brazil, El Salvador, Costa Rica, Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, and Peru) in opposing the reaffirmation. The negative American vote was based on the claim that the resolution of 1946 had failed in its intended purpose, and had proved ineffective in bringing a change in government to Spain. Officially the State Department's stance was still lukewarm, in spite of the recommendations of the Policy Planning Staff. The Department was willing to relax trade restrictions, but would continue to encourage an "orderly and peaceful evolution" in the Spanish government with the ultimate goal of a "free and democratic regime."[17] There were hopes that the Vatican would put pressure on Franco to step down, and the State Department promised "scrupulous compliance" with the U.N. ban on diplomatic relations until he did.

Hints of rapprochement were coming from other quarters. The British were inclined to believe that Franco's continuance in power was a lesser evil than the chaos and communist influence that would follow his forcible removal. Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin even suggested that the United States and Britain "commence quietly" to enlist General Assembly support against further negative action regarding Spain. In April 1947, the British recommended that the United States formulate its Spanish policy without consulting France, as French "prestige" in Europe had declined and the British were suspicious of its communist elements. Acheson agreed, and policy became—on an official level—cooperative.[18] By May of the next year both Britain and France had signed commercial treaties with Spain.

The crisis atmosphere of 1948 forced many diplomats to reassess Spain's value to the West. The Berlin Blockade and the Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia were two events that accelerated the process of treating Spain as a potential ally rather than a pariah. A worried Paul Culbertson cabled Marshall from Madrid that while political objections to Franco had always concerned the American diplomatic corps more than the military,

> military considerations in time of crisis may well override ideological objections and change purely political policy. It certainly looks to me as though we are in or very near a time of crisis, and I am wondering whether circumstances may not soon cause diplomatic thinking to be less concerned with ideologies of the Franco brand . . . to a point where our present policy may be sort of obsolete.[19]

The question was no longer whether Franco would remain in power, said Culbertson, but whether liberalization would be a condition precedent to any further moves. Indeed, remarked the charge, "with the iron curtain daily moving further upstage, the Regime becomes increasingly convinced of the correctness of its policies."[20]

For one sector of the American public, the question of Spanish liberalization was no longer a question at all. By 1948 a group had emerged which advocated not only a change but a complete rehabilitation of America's Spanish policy. This "Spanish lobby" sought the reintegration of Spain with the West via military, political, and economic agreements. It considered Franco not an obstacle to these goals but a prerequisite. According to Theodore Lowi, the Lobby was composed of five principal sectors: Catholics (represented by legislators like Pat McCarran and Alvin O'Konski), extreme anti-Communists (who "viewed Spain as the most zealous anti-Communist nation in Europe and probably the only 'reliable' ally in the cause"), a "pro-Spanish bases group" led by Admiral Richard L. Conolly (Most of these men were also Catholics, says Lowi, but "would no doubt have sought Iberian bases regardless of religion"), anti-Trumanists (led by legislators Robert A.

Taft and Owen Brewster), and finally an economic interest group, which sought the Spanish market for American products (namely, southern cotton).[21]

The Spanish Lobby was bipartisan and represented no single sectional, religious or economic interest—what its members did have in common was a desire to incorporate Spain into the American sphere of influence, regardless of the ideological character of the Franco regime. The Spanish Lobby made its international debut in March 1948, when the House of Representatives voted its overwhelming approval of the so-called O'Konski amendment. Calling for Spain's inclusion in the Marshall Plan, the amendment drew shocked protest from all over the world. And although a joint committee of the House and Senate rejected it a month later, the O'Konski amendment indicated that the Spanish Lobby was a force to be reckoned with.

The group's activities were of a highly visible nature in 1948, when a string of its members made unofficial visits to Franco Spain. By November six different U.S. delegations had paid calls on Spanish officials. O'Konski and Republican Senator Chan Gurney of South Dakota arrived in September, as part of a mission to examine the needs of United States military forces overseas. Gurney, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, spent an hour chatting with Franco behind closed doors while diplomat Culbertson sat patiently in the waiting room. When the Senator emerged, he issued a statement favoring economic aid to and diplomatic reconciliation with Spain. "Spain is the mother country of almost all the Western world," glowed Gurney, "and it is only natural that the West looks with interest in the revival of Spain that we knew in history."[22]

Upon his return to the United States, Gurney submitted a plan for Spain's inclusion in a global alliance against communism. He met to discuss his proposal with Forrestal and the secretaries and chiefs of staff of the three divisions of the armed forces. Meanwhile, the Congressional advocates of an alliance with Spain redoubled their efforts in 1949. Acheson, now Secretary of State, was grilled by a Senate subcommittee demanding the end to the U.N. ban on ambassadors. In July, McCarran urged the Senate to set aside $50 million in loan funds for Spain, to be made available through the Export-Import Bank. Acheson and Truman voiced their unequivocal disapproval of the McCarran amendment, but by August of the following year it would become law. September saw the first official American naval visit to Franco Spain, when four U.S. warships called upon the Caudillo at El Ferrol.

Admiral Richard Conolly had been requesting permission for the naval visit for two years, but the State Department had not given him the go-ahead until 1949. Though Conolly claimed to have discussed few specifics with Franco, he returned to the United States advocating the establishment of American naval bases in Spain.[23] Conolly's call on the Spanish leader was followed by yet another wave of visiting legislators, including McCarran and Representative James Murphy. Murphy, a Staten Island Democrat, recommended an American loan of $400 to 500 million to Spain. After meeting with the Caudillo, he told the press that Franco was a "mild-mannered man with an interest in and a grasp of world affairs." Murphy found the Generalissimo to be "a very, very lovely and lovable character."[24]

The objectives of the Spanish Lobby were threefold; to establish an American military presence in the peninsula, to arrange for U.S. loans to bolster an unstable Spanish economy, and to promptly restore diplomatic ties in order to facilitate the attainment of these first two goals. The Spanish Lobby's efforts were lauded by Connally and Vandenberg, who in 1949 urged a "nonpartisan" foreign policy on all issues. "Disunity or serious division on a political basis in the United States greatly weakens our hand abroad," Connally urged in December.[25] Vandenberg articulated the growing sentiment that the diplomatic isolation of Spain was an inconsistency of American foreign policy—recognition of other nations did not hinge upon American approval of their regimes. Yet the initiative to change Spanish policy must come from Acheson and Truman, said Connally, and until it did the Lobby's cause would be stymied.

Or would it? The President and the Secretary of State might withhold support, but the American military was a powerful behind-the-scenes patron of the pro-Spanish cause. It was true that the Air Force and the Army saw Spain as a low priority in 1948, but when the Soviets detonated an atomic bomb in 1949, bases in Spain were deemed imperative. The Navy, for its part, had long been aware of American weaknesses in the Mediterranean and Atlantic—and believed that British bases in Gibraltar, Malta, and Egypt should be matched with neighboring American establishments. According to Lowi, American naval strategists feared "being bottled-up in or sealed-out of the Mediterranean," and needed bases in Spain as a bargaining chip in the fight for control of the Mediterranean Sea. Indeed, Spain seemed ideal for naval bases—its location provided access to two oceans, its large army would provide a surrogate for American troops, and no new construction would be necessary.[26]

Secretary of Defense Forrestal, a former Navy man himself, was also a proponent of American bases in Spain. Forrestal was especially concerned that the United States have access to Middle East oil reserves, and considered Spain a vital link to the Mediterranean.[27] In 1948 he sent two officers to discuss the possibility of a loan to Spain with W. W. Aldrich, head of the Chase National Bank. The loan was intended to finance Spain's purchase and installation of modern air equipment for its three largest airfields—but if questioned the Office of European Affairs would state that it favored the loan "in the interest of promoting safety in international aviation."[28]

Thus, the fear of a negative public opinion forced even the military to proceed with caution. The European members of NATO were averse to Spain's inclusion in that alliance; this too prevented an overt attempt to draw Franco into the Western orbit. Military higher-ups found themselves caught between loyalty to the President—who staunchly opposed any agreement with Franco—and a conviction that Spain's strategic potential should not be wasted. As a result, says Lowi, a symbiotic relationship developed between Congress and military underlings. The latter provided Congress with "data and cogent arguments, and Congress, in turn, provided them with protection and encouragement."[29] Congressmen met with Pentagon officials to plot strategy, and the fragmented Spanish Lobby gradually coalesced into a group that was capable of "embarrassing" the State Department into action.[30] The final assault came in 1950.

* * * *

Many barriers prevented an easy embrace of Franco Spain; one was opposition within the State Department. By 1948 the Department was willing to concede that "a broadly free and democratic regime is both almost unknown in Spanish history and impossible of attainment at any time in the near future,"[31] and that the normalization of relations was among American desiderata. Yet a hesitancy to approve economic or military aid to Franco remained. Public opinion, both in the U.S. and Western Europe, constrained State Department policy; the military could go whole hog on bases, but diplomats knew no such luxury. When the question of ambassadors resurfaced in the United Nations in April 1949, the State Department advised that the American delegation abstain from any vote. Although the 1946 resolution had been "a departure from established American practice that the accrediting of an Ambassador does not signify approval of a government and is of course inconsistent with our maintenance of Ambassadors . . . beyond the Iron Curtain," the U.S. delegation was again counseled against even bringing up the Spanish question in the General Assembly.[32] Acheson felt that the most acceptable tactic was to build up the popularity of the United States with the Spanish people in order to secure "full cooperation in the event of a possible war." Spain's membership in NATO, the Marshall Plan, or MAP was still out of the question. Economic assistance might eventually be possible, suggested the Secretary of State, as a means of "popularizing" the United States in Spain. But such aid would be approved only if it gave Franco no cause for "antagonism or undue complacency."[33]

A second barrier to rapprochement was the very existence of the 1946 resolution. Marshall had publicly voiced U.S. willingness to support its repeal in 1948, but British and French foreign ministers

Ernest Bevin and Robert Schuman persuaded him to drop the idea when the three met in Paris. Though he preferred the repeal of the ban to its repeated violation, Marshall was forced to advise against American initiation of a change. In May 1949, a group of Latin American nations introduced a resolution which stated that the ban of 1946 had been a failure, and that members of the U.N. should be free to conduct relations individually with Spain. Neither the Latin American resolution nor a Polish proposal to reaffirm the guidelines of 1946 was able to win the two-thirds majority necessary for adoption.

Quite simply, Franco was still a "politically undesirable associate."[34] Though the Western military favored an alliance with Franco, Western governments considered these designs as a political impossibility. In 1949 the New York Times expressed the widespread opinion that "Franco is not only a bad credit risk. He is a bad moral risk . . . However much we might sympathize with the Spanish people we are not called upon to aid the mean and vindictive little man who now rules them."[35] In a press conference held during the General Assembly debate over the Latin American resolution, Acheson reaffirmed his conviction that Franco's was a fascist and dictatorial regime. He protested the lack of civil liberties in Spain and repeated that it was Spain's responsibility alone to get "back into the family of Western Europe." Acheson reminded his audience that his views represented official American policy—a policy which was "calculated to please neither group of extremists in the United States—either those who say that we must immediately embrace Franco, or those who say that we must cast him into the outermost darkness."[36] His statement surprised and displeased Franco, and the issue of Spain stayed on the back burner in the U.N.

until the following year.

The Acheson-Truman obstacle was perhaps the most formidable barrier to a change in relations with Spain. The President's opposition to a policy change was colored by his belief that Protestant minorities were mistreated in Spain, as well as a personal dislike for the dictator himself. Truman made no secret of his distaste for the regime, remarking in 1947 that "There isn't any difference in totalitarian states. I don't care what you call them—Nazi, Communist, or Fascists, or Franco, or anything else—they are all alike . . . The police state is a police state," repeated the President, "I don't care what you call it."[37] Truman consistently refused to give his approval for Congressional junkets to Spain, and frostily told the press in 1949 that Senator McCarran had visited Franco "on his own. He represents nobody in the Government of the United States except himself."[38]

Throughout 1949 and 1950, however, pro-Spanish pressure mounted from every quarter, making it increasingly difficult for Truman and Acheson to hold their ground. "Our official encouragement to liberalize and change is completely neutralized by the attitude and statements of such people as Senator Taft and Senator McCarran," complained Culbertson from Madrid. "Are we, in the face of the views of Senators Connally, Vandenberg, and others . . . going to maintain our position of abstention on the question of the return of ambassadors to Madrid?" Culbertson had written to Acheson in June 1949 with the advice that the United States abandon its attempt to "base policy on the concept of molding the rest of the world in our own democratic image." Arguing that "peoples the world over are not the same and won't mold the same," the charge contended that the Spanish needed economic, and not political, reforms.

"The refusal of material aid to Spain punishes the Spanish people, not Franco and his cohorts or the rich," Culbertson maintained. "There are lots of very hungry people in Spain today, and there are going to be more before the end of the year."[39]

When NATO was formed in 1949, Spain had been excluded by general conseneus. The political character of the Franco regime prevented its membership in an organization which was pledged to the defense of the "freedom, common heritage, and civilization" of its peoples as well as "the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law."[40] The Office of Western European Affairs issued a statement in April 1950 which declared that as long as NATO's policy was based on the concept of "strengthening and safeguarding democracy, and not merely on a negative reaction to Communism," it would be difficult to envisage Spain as a partner in the organization's "collective effort."[41] Nonetheless the American Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated Spanish participation in NATO, by means of the application of U.S. pressure upon the NATO countries who objected to Spain. In the absence of NATO approval the Joint Chiefs supported a bilateral military agreement with Spain.[42] By May 1950 they had collaborated on NSC-72, a very crucial policy paper which recommended that the United States immediately bring Spain into its orbit. "In the light of the worsening world situation," the document began,

> and the likelihood that the North Atlantic Treaty countries could not, now or during the next several years, defend France and the Low Countries successfully in event of Soviet attack, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider it of paramount importance that the United States and its allies take proper steps to assure that Spain be an ally in event of war.[43]

Spain's neutrality, warned NSC-72, would not be enough to protect the Allies in the air age. If the Soviets trampled over France and the Low Countries as the Germans had in previous wars, Spain would serve as "the last foothold in Continental Europe for the United States and its allies." Military arrangements with Spain were to be made without delay, for any hesitation would "cause a decrease in Spanish ability to resist an enemy attack."[44]

Truman's reaction to NSC-72 was that it was "decidedly militaristic and in my opinion not realistic."[45] The State Department objected that "A purely negative anti-Communist policy could not possibly command the popular support, or stimulate morale to the same extent, as a positive program of mutual cooperation to support and strengthen the western democracies." NSC-72 undercut the concept that NATO members were to consult and agree upon all relevant courses of action, said the State Department, and an agreement with Spain would cast doubt on the American commitment to strengthening the democratic—and not just the anti-Soviet—nations of the world.[46]

Despite these protestations, the Congress and pro-rapprochement press continued to clamor for action. Representative John Kee championed the cause of Spanish recognition in a speech to the House on January 9, 1950. "If a regime has the power to govern, it is a government," argued Kee. "Recognition is a neutral thing. It should imply neither approval nor disapproval of the regime receiving it."[47] The Washington Post agreed that the question of diplomatic recognition should not be "weighed according to the theoretic merits or defects of the form of government . . . but solely according to its advantages or disadvantages in the present state of world affairs."[48] For the

Washington Evening Star the issue of recognition was not a matter of practical concerns so much as duty: "In one breath we proclaim our greatness and our moral principles. And then we stultify ourselves by refusing to stand up and be counted on a clear-cut issue which bears not only on our own integrity but on the integrity of the U.N. as well."[49]

Acheson acquiesced on the question of recognition in January 1950. In a letter to Senator Connally the Secretary confessed that the United States had long questioned the "wisdom and efficacy" of the recommendations of the 1946 resolution. Admitting that the resolution had failed in its intended purpose, Acheson called the withdrawal of ambassadors a "mistaken departure from established principle," but although the U.S. was prepared to vote for a rescinding of the 1946 resolution, such a vote would not signify American approval of the Franco regime. Finally, Acheson stated an American desire for economic relations with Spain, for increased trade, U.S. investment and the extension of credits for specific projects. The Secretary closed his correspondence with a Wilsonian flourish, encouraging the Spanish regime to take "steps toward democratic government which offers the best hope for the growth of basic human rights and fundamental freedoms in Spain."[50]

For many, diplomatic recognition was not enough. The Spanish Lobby's raison d'etre was not the symbolic but the material assistance of Spain; its members wanted to send U.S. dollars, exports, and military aid to Franco in addition to an American ambassador. Their goal was not Spain's mere acceptance in the U.N.—they fought to support and ally her with the West. "While we are fighting communism on all fronts," wondered one Congressman, "why do we neglect this opportunity to give recognition to a nation which is so uniformly against communism?"[51]

If war broke out against the communist nations, continued a Senator, no nation could remain neutral. "We would be foolhardy indeed and plain foolish if we did not seek now and in the near future to coordinate and integrate the capacity of Spain with that of other nations in the North Atlantic community. To all intents and purposes," he continued, "Spain is a huge airfield surrounded by water."[52] No location would be more valuable than Spain in bringing about the ultimate defeat of an aggressor, predicted another Senator, for she was "put there as if by the Almighty."[53]

The February 1949 loan of $25 million to Spain by the Chase Bank, the Acheson letter favoring recognition, the passage of the McCarran amendment in August 1950—these were all victories for the Spanish Lobby. Although Truman would later attempt to block the $62.5 million loan to Spain which the McCarran amendment had provided, the battle was essentially won. The only remaining hurdle was the U.N. resolution, an obstacle fairly easily overcome. "The resolution will be repealed if we want it repealed, maintained if we want it maintained," remarked a cynical New York Times.[54] The Times saw in Acheson's struggle with the Spanish question the image of a man "resolutely carrying a load of hot coals as long as he could and then dropping them in a mixture of disgust and relief." By 1950 it no longer seemed worthwhile to the Administration to face controversy over a stale and relatively unimportant issue, the newspaper claimed,[55] and Acheson dropped the coals in March when he disclaimed the desirability of going "from one country to another with a piece of litmus paper . . . trying to see whether everything is true blue, whether the political, economic, and social climate is exactly, in all its detail, the kind that we would like to have either for them or for us."[56]

On November 4, 1950, the General Assembly voted to revoke the resolution of 1946, and gave its blessing for the return of ambassadors to Spain to any member nation which desired it. Much of the text of the original resolution remained (including the statement linking Franco with the Axis and the recommendation that the regime be replaced with a democracy), but thirty-eight nations including the United States had voted to allow Spain's inclusion in U.N. agencies. The power to name an ambassador remained with Truman, who claimed to have "no thoughts on that idea at all. It is going to be a long, long time before there is an Ambassador to Spain," the President told the press, "and you will have plenty of time to think it over."[57]

Truman's "long, long time" turned out to be about six weeks. On December 27 it was announced that Stanton Griffis—formerly the American ambassador to Egypt, Poland, and Argentina—would represent the United States in Franco Spain. The President's explanation for the appointment was that there had been "no change in policy with regard to Spain, except that we need an exchange of ambassadors which makes it a little more orderly way to do business with the two governments." And though Truman's attitude toward Franco "hadn't changed a bit," he confessed to Griffis that he had been "a little overruled and worn down by the Department."[58] By February of the following year, the United States as well as Britain and France had exchanged ambassadors with Spain. Franco had been in power for a dozen years, and within that time American policy had come full circle.

* * * *

"I was asked by every Congressman and visiting newspaperman if American aid to Spain was not in reality direct aid to Franco and the support of Franco," recalled Griffis in his 1952 memoirs. "There can only be one answer to this question, and that was unequivocally yes. Franco was Spain."[59] It seemed to make little difference in the 1950s whether American allies were true democracies or not; indeed, as Senator McCarran would remark, Americans could no longer be independent of those of whom it disapproved. "We announce we won't deal with the uncouth, and discover, with a two a.m. toothache, that the only available dentist beats his wife," was McCarran's analogy.[60]

The 1950 revocation of the ban on ambassadors was, for Franco, a moral victory. It seemed to vindicate the dictator's steadfast anti-Communism as well as his long-held conviction that the West "needed" Spain. Franco's courtship by the United States certainly came as no surprise to the Spanish leader; he had predicted as early as 1938 that the West would eventually orient its policy towards Spain due to a "geographical imperative."[61] Above all, the United States' embrace bore out the popular legend that Franco's chief occupation was transferring papers from one box to another on his desk. The first box was labeled "Problems Time Will Solve," and the second—"Problems Time *Has* Solved."[62]

Franco had not altered the character of his regime except superficially; the Law of Succession declared that Spain was a monarchy but also that Franco was to rule Spain until his death. The referendum to confirm the Law of Succession was a national joke, an event one critic-in-exile called a "heads I win, tails you lose" situation.[63] Franco was confident of his own survival, and knew it would be only a matter of time before the United States accepted his regime. "We see that the greater part of world opinion has come, even if it will not admit it explicitly, to adopt an ideological line which Spain has been maintaining for thirteen years," said Spanish foreign minister Artajo in 1948.[64] Once the ideological "adoption" took place, there was no need for the Spanish to court the West.

When examined within the context of early Cold War events, the seemingly sudden American embrace of Franco hardly needs an explanation. Arthur Whitaker has observed that the United States approached Franco when Cold War tensions superseded that ideological concerns of World War II. A more exact assessment is that one ideology—that of the national security state—replaced another—that of self-determination—in the late 1940s and 1950s. And while Theodore Lowi has written that the policy change towards Spain resulted from the efforts of the Spanish Lobby, it is important to note that it was the prevailing anti-Communist mindset which moved the Spanish Lobby to action. Some historians have hailed the embrace of Franco as a triumph of the new American realpolitik. But while the Spanish policy of 1950 was more pragmatic than its forerunner, it would be wrong to say that its anti-Communist origins were synonymous with political "realism."

The repeal of the 1946 resolution had at least one crucial, long-term consequence—it paved the way for the 1953 Pact of Madrid, in which Franco granted the United States bases in Spain in exchange for economic and military aid. The Pact's significance lies in the fact that it was a strictly bilateral agreement; in making it the United States both bolstered and defied the NATO nations who wanted no part of a military alliance with Spain. The United States courted

Franco without the consultation or approval of Great Britain; the two nations' previous cooperation on Spanish affairs was another casualty of the postwar rift between them.

The decision to form a working alliance with Spain did not, by any means, meet with unanimous American approval. The New York Times, anti-Franco to the finish, believed that even diplomatic recognition would strengthen the Caudillo's hold "at a time when slight cracks were beginning to appear."[65] Salvador de Madariaga spoke for thousands of Spaniards when he complained that the Western powers had presented Franco "with a moral victory on a silver platter." He warned the Cold War "realists" that Franco had not fought for Hitler and would not fight for them.[66]

Madariaga's admonitions were disregarded. Americans in 1950 perceived Communist expansion as a greater threat to democracy than totalitarianism in general; indeed, the concern for the preservation of a "free" world had given way to an emphasis upon the security of the "non-Communist" world. The utopian and illusory goals of the Connally resolution fell victim to the practical considerations of containment, yet both approaches to foreign policy have survived. The implications of their survival deserve discussion.

Part Three: Relations with Franco and the American Foreign Policy Character

"Consistently, throughout our history, we have assumed that we have a message for the world, a democratic message, and, some would say, a message of redemption. Consistently we have scanned the horizon, looking for signs that the message was being received. Hopefully we have attempted to convince ourselves that other movements were intrinsically at one with our own, despite local differences or complexion . . ."[1]

—David Potter
People of Plenty

"A politically mature people should be able to understand and evaluate accurately, in a foreign statesman, a kind of intelligence that is crafty, a sincerity that is fanatic, a tenacity that is ruthless, an integrity that is cruel. A politically mature people . . . should rebel against the cheap argument that any foreign political leader challenging or denying their way of life must, simply by view of his intransigence, be a pervert or a freak."[2]

—Emmet Hughes
Report from Spain

The United States' policy for Franco Spain provides an excellent example of how two seemingly conflicting philosophies—idealistic Wilsonianism and "realistic" and pragmatic anti-Communism—were applied to a single situation during a relatively short period of time. When dissecting the period as a whole, it becomes apparent that Spanish policy was a microcosm of a generally dualistic U.S. approach to foreign relations. American policy-makers mixed idealism with realism in Spain and in many nations during the transition from World War to Cold War. Inspecting the "two strands" of American foreign policy in the context of Franco Spain is a valuable exercise principally because it reveals a great deal about the postwar American diplomatic "character" —that set of traditions, ideals, assumptions, and perceptions which have shaped the American view of the contemporary world.

Dubious indeed is the assumption that one of these influences upon policy-makers was more desirable than the other; both can be criticized for a variety of reasons. The Connally resolution, which was the embodiment of the Wilsonian approach, has hypocrisy as a primary flaw. The entire discussion of Spain in the U.N. violated that organization's own charter; Spain was not invited to the debate which concerned her and none of her replies to the accusations made against her were taken seriously. Franco's most vocal detractors in 1946 were the Soviet Union and the Eastern-bloc countries—and their exclusion of Spain because of its repressive and unrepresentative regime was a case of the proverbial pot calling the kettle black. The Connally resolution demanded a string of prerequisites for Spain's membership in the U.N. which a good number of the member nations were themselves unable to satisfy.

American policy was based on the illusory hope that democracy would "evolve" in Spain, but if the State Department had heeded the warnings of its own men on the scene, perhaps its goals would have been a bit more realistic. Carlton Hayes, the American ambassador to Madrid during the Second World War, had long criticized official U.S. policy toward Spain. "Obviously, in the opinion of our government, the choice for Spaniards was to starve to death or revolt against their government," recalled Hayes. His objection to the 1946 condemnation of Franco was that it reversed the traditional American stance of non-interference and indicated policy-makers' "colossal ignorance" of Spanish affairs and history.[3] Hayes had always recommended that the United States accept Franco as the head of the Spanish government and give up hoping that the regime would collapse spontaneously at the war's end. "The memory of the horrors of the late Spanish Civil War is much too vivid, and the fear of doing anything to precipitate its recurrence, is with the exception of the Communist minority, almost a national obsession," wrote Hayes in 1946.[4]

Similar caveats were expressed by William W. Butterworth, the American charge in Spain during 1946. "There is no more likelihood of obtaining in Spain by sudden means a representative and democratic govt [sic]," Butterworth cabled Byrnes, "then there is of wiping out by fiat the bitterness engendered by 3 years of civil war." Butterworth also warned the administration against joining the U.N. condemnation of Spain, because by indulging in a public denunciation in one year the U.S. would tie its hands for the next several.[5]

Impervious to the warnings of diplomats, the administration continued its attempt to shake Franco out of power by using "nothing more lethal than adjectives."[6] The moralistic, self-righteous, and often arrogant language of resolutions on Spain was a sign of the times in the immediate postwar years; President Truman's 1945 Navy Day Speech bore a typically Wilsonian stamp. "The foreign policy of the United States is based firmly on fundamental principles of righteousness and justice," he avowed. "In carrying out these principles we shall not give our approval to any compromise with evil." Truman solemnly pledged "to bring the Golden Rule into the international affairs of the world . . . to pursue [our] course with all the wisdom, patience, and determination that the God of Peace can bestow upon a people who are trying to follow in His path."[7] Apparently the American president had chosen to ignore the God of Peace's recommendation that Christians judge not so as not to be judged.

Connally himself had somewhat pompously explained that although the Spanish people were barred from U.N. membership, he would be happy to provide them with an inventory of "the conditions which they themselves must create in order to remove these obstacles" to their entry.[8] But it was Dean Acheson who best articulated the moral exigencies of American postwar policy with the remark that "We are willing to help people who believe the way we do, to continue to live the way they want to live."[9] When the Spaniards were ready to prove their worthiness of American aid, they would receive it—but ironically, most Spaniards never knew about the demands being made on them. Even when the resolution of 1946 was rescinded, the average Spaniard was not aware that Spain was still barred from U.N. membership and that the censorious preamble to the resolution of 1946 still remained.[10] The lifting of the ban on ambassadors was met neither with popular jubilation nor euphoria in the Spanish press—indeed, Spaniards took the news serenely and as if they had quite confidently awaited it.[11]

So much for moralistic expressions of international disapprobation. But can the American policy which replaced the moralistic condemnation of Spain be accepted without criticism? Certainly the United States approached Franco more amiably because it perceived a Soviet threat, but was this Russophobia realistic? Some historians have viewed America's attempt to shape an alliance with Franco as part of a calculating and confident new realpolitik, but the fact remains that disagreement and confusion characterized even Cold War policy changes.[12] Accepting Franco as an ally presented many with a serious moral dilemma, and some Americans asked themselves whether the end—security—justified the means in the embrace of Franco, Darlan, Chiang Kai-shek and Tito. "Should we accept military aid from any source on the ground that the defeat of communism must be the primary concern of our national policy?" wondered the Saturday Evening Post in 1951.[13]

Apparently, the answer was yes. Senator McCarran interpreted Spanish history in a whole new way when he wrote that that nation's civil war was simply "Stalin's first European inning in a game whose subsequent innings were played and won in Poland, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and China, and whose latest inning is Korea." According to McCarran, the United States was destined to go from the Grand Alliance to a "strange alliance," made up of "Socialist British, ex-enemy Italians, Monarchical Norwegians, Falangist Spanish, Republican French, possibly ex-enemy German." The alliance would be redeemed, however, by the nobility of its common purpose: "the containment of Russia, the spawning bed of the most vicious political form in the history of man's search for the good society."[14]

If it seems hypocritical of the U.S. to have supported a dictator only four years after calling for his forcible removal, it must also be remembered that Americans, if forced to choose between right-wing totalitarianism and left-wing revolution, have on the average spoken in favor of the former.[15] Allowing the continuance of Franco's reactionary rule seemed a lesser evil to permitting Stalin's revolutionary expansion, and if the battle against communism was to be waged on every front, then the Iberian peninsula seemed strategically and economically suitable. The Spanish Lobby never asked itself whether bases in Spain would stop the Soviets; it simply assumed that their virtue as a deterrent was obvious and that aid to Franco was money well-spent.

Whether the "Spanish people" welcomed the American military and economic presence in Spain was immaterial; their actions had been of critical importance in 1946 but their opinion in 1950 was not solicited or considered necessary. Spanish liberty, which had seemed imperative four years earlier, was by 1950 a dated issue. When American policy-makers found a Commanding Idea, they stuck to it steadfastly—or at least until a better one came along.

* * * *

"Attitudes and opinions toward foreign policy questions are not only to be understood as responses to objective problems and situations," wrote Gabriel Almond, "but as conditioned by culturally imposed qualities of character."[16] Not only has the American national experience of World War and Cold War given us a unique and lasting world view, but both the American rejection and embrace of Franco reveal many traits of our foreign policy "personality."

The first set of traits falls under the "Wilsonian" heading, although Woodrow Wilson is most closely associated with American idealism because he articulated it rather than invented it. As the Second World War drew to a close, Wilsonian idealism permeated every expression of America's postwar aims. Many believed, like Harry Hopkins, that the peace meant "the dawn of the new day we had all been praying for and talking about for so many years."[17] This idealism was not the artificial creation of politicians but part of the outlook of an entire populace. In 1946 about 93 percent of Americans approved of the idea of settling disputes in an international organization, and 69 percent renounced the isolationist notion that the U.S. should "keep to itself and not have anything to do with the rest of the world."[18] A sense of mission and a sense of guilt drove Americans to the conclusion that they must take the lead in the formation of an international organization, for their failure to do so after the First World War seemed to have led to the disasters of the Second.[19] Such an organization would not only stop aggression, but would encourage the spread of economic prosperity and democratic ideals. Senator Connally believed that the United Nations Organization was "[b]older than the ideas of Kant, Rousseau, and other philosophers who devised utopias . . . it is even more substantial than the hopes of its modern father, Woodrow Wilson, and his follower, Franklin D. Roosevelt."[20]

Henry Wallace shared Connally's enthusiasm for the United Nations, and saw the organization as a form in which the United States could exercise both its moral and military leadership to press for peace, prosperity, and democracy.[21] Though he did not always mention Spain specifically as part of the world's "slave" half, Wallace included Franco in his condemnation of the "Quislings, Lavals, and Mussolinis" who believed in "one Satan-inspired Fuehrer" and thus had to be eliminated.[22] Not only anti-Francoists but a large sector of the American public believed that it was the United States' duty to wipe Franco like a blot from the political landscape, but once the war had ended they stipulated that it must be done without endangering the peace.[23]

The crusade against Franco had a huge appeal in 1944 and 1945, but as the Cold War progressed the more militant of anti-Franco Americans were not praised for their idealism but were often accused of being Communists. "As far as the FBI and the right wing were concerned, it was all right to be anti-Fascist once it became acceptable," wrote one historian, "but to have been anti-Fascist too soon, say, to have supported the Loyalists against Franco was tantamount to being a Communist and, thus, disloyal."[24] Similarly, liberals like Wallace seemed to have held on to militant anti-Fascism for just a little too long in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and for their refusal to foist the Hitler analogy upon Stalin and to support a foreign policy chiefly motivated by anti-Communism made them the object of almost constant suspicion.[25]

That Americans in 1945 believed democracy must be regenerated in Franco Spain reveals the missionary quality of their character. But Americans greatly underestimated the difficulty of the task, and this illustrates yet another tragic flaw of the American foreign policy complexion. Almond has written that the American is

> an optimist as to ends and an improviser as to means. The riches of his heritage and the mobility of his social order have produced a generally euphoric tendency, that is, the expectation that one can by effort and good will achieve or approximate one's goals.[illegible]

Americans have never believed in the long-term planning of foreign policy objectives, Almond continues, and the idea of

> taking the "long view," acquiring sufficient reliable information on which sound policy can be based, weighing and balancing the potential value of military, political, diplomatic, and psychological means in relation to proposed courses of action . . . has hardly taken root in the American policy-making process.[27]

In short, the United States pursued a policy of "democracy on demand" in Spain, believing that the virtue of the ideal was enough to spur the Spanish people to implement a change.

Countless historians have written of the missionary character of the American approach to foreign relations; David Potter in his classic People of Plenty described the phenomenon with particular understanding. "We continued to hope that American liberty could go abroad and still remain liberty as we knew her," wrote Potter. Americans have often seemed so convinced of the moral authority of their ideals of equality, freedom, and opportunity that they have believed that "for every aristocrat who disparaged us or condescended to us there were scores of plain men and women who shared in and were heartened by our aspirations for human welfare . . . [and] that the heart of humanity responded to the creed of our democracy."[28]

According to another historian, the tendency to believe that people across the globe wanted democracy emerged from the "common-man myths" of the American depression years. "The image of virtuous and decent little people fighting for their lives and integrity against predatory forces" was one of the most appealing ideas of the depression, and it continued to be popular not only in the war years but in peacetime, too.[29] Americans wanted to think that even "Chinese Communists were, at bottom, Jeffersonian democrats who mouthed the thoughts of the independent agrarian man," Potter observed.[30] It is no wonder then, that the ideal of a liberal and democratic Spain died hard among the American people.

Why have Americans—as in the experience with Franco Spain—so often been disappointed in their mission to spread democracy? Potter theorized that Americans think they have democracy because they *chose* it—but in reality it exists because favorable economic conditions permitted its growth. The fallacy that a nation can "choose" democracy "has consistently impelled us to proselyte for converts to the democratic faith in places where the economic prerequisites for democracy have not been established." Potter's theory applies accurately to Spain in the 1940s, which had neither the political, historical, or economic foundation for democracy, American style. Nonetheless the United States deepened its alienation of Franco Spain by blaming the Spanish for "failing to embrace the political ideals which our standard of living supports."[31]

William Appleman Williams has attributed the failure of the American mission to the choice of tactics employed by the missionaries. Even if the American way were the only effective approach to government, Williams argued, "the act of forcing it upon the other society—and economic and political pressure are forms of force—violates the idea of self-determination." Our humanitarian urge to assist other peoples is undercut, and even subverted, by the way we have gone about helping them, Williams claims.[32]

Robert Osgood has written that American idealists have been disappointed over the years because they have made the mistake of "confusing what was ideally desirable with what was practically attainable."[33] According to Osgood, Americans often have had good intentions in foreign policy but

> have never been consistently true in their ideals if the translation of those ideals into reality has required an important sacrifice of the national self-interest, as they have conceived it. America, like all other nations, has acted with positive and responsible idealism only when the great mass of the citizenry has been convinced that ideals and self-interest coincided.[34]

Perhaps the key to Osgood's assertion is that America is like any other nation in its hesitancy to pursue idealistic goals, unless it is clear that this pursuit coincides with the national interest. But particularly American is the tendency to leaven all self-interested policies with moral sentiment; indeed, writes Osgood, the ideals expressed in the traditional American mission have been as important to our stability in foreign relations as strategic interests.[35]

A final reason for the failure of the American mission, and especially for its miscarriage in Spain, is the fact that Americans have a strong tendency to identify every country's revolution with its own. Because the American is a self-made man, he expects others to be so, too.[36] If the thirteen colonies could shake off the yoke of oppression in 1776, armed with encouragement and moral rectitude other nations could do so as well. Issues in 1945 particularly seemed to be simple matters of black and white, good and evil, slave and free. According to the Atlantic Charter, freedom and self-determination "were synonymous and . . . no people, therefore, should be denied the right to independence."[37] Franco may have been "one of the most vicious enemies of the American way of life and American interests," but his eradication would convert Spain into a land "as secure and friendly, as hard-working, and hard-fighting as America itself."[38]

Self-determination—this was the ideal. Yet self-determination was a tricky matter after the Second World War, for it appeared that the American definition of freedom to choose a government was freedom to choose Western-style democracy. State Department officials had long frowned upon the idea of even allowing a restored monarchy in Spain—and if Spaniards had overthrown Franco to create a Communist government, the United States would not likely have called it "self-determination."

Yet victory would have meant little if the political conditions which had spawned the totalitarian regimes of the 1930s had remained in existence, observed John Gaddis, and Americans were "conditioned by wartime rhetoric" to expect a peace settlement that would restore democracy everywhere.[39] They felt that it was their responsibility to create a peace which would embrace the entire world—for Wallace the price of a "free world victory" was that the citizen had "the supreme duty of sacrificing the lesser interest for the greater interest of the general welfare."[40] In his now-famous Farewell Address, George Washington had warned that only American isolation from foreign conflicts would enable her to pursue a "different course." But the policymakers of the postwar world found America's salvation in internationalism, and the spreading of American political ideals, economic institutions, and military protection across the world. While Washington had opposed permanent alliances and the entanglement of American peace and prosperity with a corrupt and self-interested Europe, the internationalists believed in a global American mission which would embrace Europe as a common and permanent partner.[41]

American idealism about Spain indeed revealed a great deal about the United States' foreign policy personality. But if idealism is a trait which can be traced to our earliest origins, then the pragmatism which replaced it is a more recently acquired characteristic. This is not to say that American policy became self-interested for the first time in 1945. Yet it is true that the perception of the Soviet Union as a permanent threat to American interests became part of our set of foreign policy assumptions in the immediate postwar years. The other side of the coin of Spanish policy was the diplomacy of anti-communism, as we have seen in the examination of official statements, policy papers, and public speeches.

Historians have given many names to the emergence of anti-communism as a sine que non of American foreign policy. Arthur Schlesinger saw the phenomenon as a victory of "spheres-of-influence" thinking over "universalism." Kenneth W. Thompson analyzed the question as one of Churchillian realism versus utopianism. Daniel Yergin has pinpointed the change as the result of the triumph of the "Riga axioms" among policy-makers over the "Yalta axioms." Nearly all agree, however, that the "shaky peace" experienced since the late 1940s has been based upon an often clumsy combination of the two.[42]

It would seem that Wilsonian universalism and Kennanesque anti-communism make for somewhat strange political bedfellows. Yet both traits are quintessentially American, and were embodied unmistakably in Senator Connally, for example. Connally was an ardent supporter of the U.N. and believed it would greatly promote international stability, but an equally important component of his philosophy was that the Soviet Union had a "dream of world conquest" and was "the biggest problem facing the free world today."[43] Dean Acheson's idealism was undeniable, but the same man who swore loyalty to the ideal of "strict compliance" with U.N. guidelines also remarked that "we cannot avoid the fact that force will play a great part in the grand strategy of creating a workable non-communist world system."[44] Arthur Vandenberg and Harry Truman also displayed this idealist-realist dualism.

To say that anti-communism "replaced" idealism in the formulation of policy towards Spain is perhaps not a completely accurate assessment. No American politician could have totally abandoned universalism, for to concede that the world was divided into spheres of influence would have meant the betrayal of the principle of self-determination—a principle for which many Americans believed World War II had been fought.[45] The solution was to synthesize universalist principles with spheres-of-influence strategy and state that American interests would be served best by supporting Franco. A policy motivated solely by anti-communism was unpalatable to most Americans, but if it could be demonstrated that American ideals were protected by supporting Franco, then the embrace of the dictator could be rationalized. "Europe without American strength and leadership can neither preserve its own independence nor foster an international system in which anyone's independence will survive," Acheson argued.[46] The security of the United States was made to seem dependent upon the security of Europe, and to exclude Franco Spain from the Western alliance was tantamount to leaving "a broken link in the chain of defense around Russia to the West."[47]

Winston Churchill had for many years supported an Allied embrace of Franco. As early as 1944 he expressed his hope that Spain would be a "strong influence for the peace of the Mediterranean after the war." Churchill saw Spain's political problems as a matter for the Spaniards themselves to work out, and in 1948 he told the Commons that time had passed since the condemnations of Potsdam and the West should recognize that it now had a "different relationship" with Moscow. He publicly urged Spain's inclusion in the United Nations, and privately hoped for a military agreement as well.[48]

As Kenneth Thompson has noted, Churchill's outlook often ran against the prevailing political tides of the day.[49] If the British leader had no moral qualms about an alliance with Franco, it was because for him, moral questions were not simply "a choice between right and wrong but a choice between lesser evils."[50] Americans at first may have had some trouble adapting their own world view to this Machiavellian philosophy, but the Pact of Madrid signalled the ultimate acceptance of Churchill's "lesser evils" ideology. A decade before the

Pact of Madrid, Roosevelt had justified the United States' wartime alliance with Stalin as a case of crossing a bridge with the devil until safety was reached at the other side. When the Soviet Union became the enemy, Americans crossed the bridge with Franco, who was just one of a large assortment of seemingly satanic companions.

America's relationship with Franco was redefined when, as Yergin has written, national security against the Soviet threat became the Commanding Idea of U.S. foreign policy. When security is the primary objective of a nation's diplomacy, Yergin has theorized,

> desirable foreing policy goals are translated into issues of national survival, and the range of threats becomes limitless. The doctrine [of national security] is characterized by expansiveness, a tendency to push the subjective boundaries of security outward to more and more areas, to encompass more and more geography and more and more problems. It demands that the country assume a posture of military preparedness; the nation must be on permanent alert.[51]

Keeping Yergin's definition in mind, it becomes apparent that it matters little whether Spain was actually the strategic "gem" and "last foothold" of Western Europe. The point is that American officials perceived her to be so. Shoring up Spain economically and militarily meant securing the Iberian peninsula as part of the American sphere of influence.

The word "security" had crept stealthily into the American foreign policy vocabulary. Carlton Hayes was an easy convert to the creed of national security, and the ex-ambassador confessed in the 1950s that "sorry experience since 1945 has taught us that Communist Russia is bent on world domination and that is a far more dangerous threat to our security than Germany ever was."[52] Even Culbertson agreed by 1950 that "world security" was not improving. "If Spain has any value in that security," the charge remarked, "we and the other powers of the West should get away from emotionalism and study the Spanish problem from a practical, even selfish, point of view."[53]

Yet the components of the national security doctrine were not merely ideological and strategic. Economic considerations played an important role in the rapprochement with Franco, as revisionist historians have so ardently argued. The State Department saw economic stability in Spain as a prerequisite for her political and military advancement, and feared the chaos which would result from depression more than any Soviet invasion of the peninsula. Spain also represented a new market for U.S. exports and investments, and accompanying every loan to Franco Spain was a demand that she open up to foreign capital. Indeed, the revisionists would have had a field day with Stanton Griffis' speech to the American Chamber of Commerce in Spain:

> The government of the United States has stood, since its inception almost two hundred years ago, as the champion of private enterprise . . . we are hopeful that many of the restrictions now applied to American business operations can be ameliorated or removed. We hope that American corporations may be encouraged to make investments in Spain through permission to obtain larger interests in Spanish companies than is now allowed.[54]

There is some validity to the revisionist argument that the United States embraced Franco as part of a desire to plant the seeds of free enterprise in yet another ready and fertile field. Joyce and Gabriel Kolko have expressed justifiable distaste for the alliance of American democracy with Iberian authoritarianism. Yet the Kolkos' contention that it was the United States' aim to "restructure the world so that American business could trade, operate, and profit without restrictions everywhere" is somewhat extreme. Completely false is their claim that "on this there was absolute unanimity among the American leaders, and it was around this core that they elaborated their policies and programs."[55] The Kolkos have also written that the United States essentially traded its own recognition and aid for Spanish raw materials, disguising economic motives behind an anti-Communist facade.[56] But we have already seen that America's Spanish policy grew from a very real—albeit confused—political idealism, as well as the perception of Spanish bases as a strategic necessity. The American desire to enact a global New Deal existed to an extent, but the Congressmen who wanted an alliance with Franco pointed to a map of Europe and not a balance sheet.

In any event, studying the change in American relations with Spain reveals the newer attributes of our foreign policy personality. A pervasive belief in a Soviet threat, coupled with the conviction that national security must be the principal objective of American diplomacy, are an integral part of our policy character today. Whether they will remain so is yet to be seen, but at the time of this writing, anti-Communism—as much as Wilsonian idealism—is alive and well and living in Washington. A discussion of the legacy of America's policies toward Franco Spain is reserved for the concluding pages.

Conclusion

"Good intentions have rarely sufficed either to constitute a sound foreign policy or to justify its indictment."[1]

—Emmet Hughes

To study Spanish-American relations during the early Cold War is in many respects, as we have said, to study the United States' approach to diplomacy in many parts of the world. The moral dilemma posed by the alliance with Francisco Franco was not a new one; Americans had befriended dictators before and after their embrace of the Spanish leader. That Spain was suddenly perceived as a strategic bulwark against communism should also come as no surprise; since the 1940s the United States has defended tiny nations from Southeast Asia to Central America as "final footholds" of American security. What then is the unique legacy of the United States' policy in Spain? Can a special lesson be drawn from the American experience with Francisco Franco?

The answer, of course, is yes. Perhaps the greatest lesson of the failure of America's 1946 condemnation of Franco comes from Acheson's statement that moral condemnations of a regime are not only dangerous, but more often than not, futile. Though an attempt to banish Franco from power, the United States resolution served only to increase his intransigence and consolidate his power. When the American policy about-face came a few years later, Franco was not grateful but complacent. He had waited for the world to change and come back to him, and by 1950 it appeared that much of the world had done so.[2]

The question of Spain's real strategic value remains today a hypothetical one, and the American bases in Spain may never be more than a potential, and not a provable, asset. The issue that must be addressed is not whether the Pact of Madrid was worth the monetary expense, but whether making this "pact with the devil" meant that America's security was ultimately more important than political or moral considerations. Many Americans would like to believe that Franco's death marked the end of an era in Spanish history which is best forgotten. Yet Spaniards cannot forget Franco's rule any more than they can erase nearly forty years of their national history. The American bases in Spain—as well as Spain's tenuous membership in NATO—are to many Spaniards an unwanted legacy of the Franco years. To a growing number of Spaniards the bases are not a source of security but one of disquiet, and serve as a constant reminder of the dictatorship which made their political and strategic decisions for them for almost four decades.

To some extent the United States' Spanish policy can be excused because of the rapid change and confusion which characterised the era in which it was made. Cold War historians have remarked that coherent and consistent policy-formulation could not exist in the mid-1940s, for the American political culture had become "too complex, the spectrum of competing interest groups too wide, and the number of novel issues too great."[3] The advent of the atomic bomb, the problem of Germany, the formation of the United Nations and the administration of the Marshall Plan seemed to deserve more immediate attention. That Spanish policy was lost in the shuffle is thus neither surprising nor unforgivable. And although some of the era's "best and brightest" diplomats helped to forge the policy towards Franco, it nonetheless was almost destined to be a casualty of the more monumental concerns which took precedence over it. Franco's designs for Spain indeed seemed insignificant when compared with Stalin's aims for Eastern Europe, and even if diplomats had given their full attention to Spain it is doubtful that their thinking would have been completely clear. Kennan aptly summarized the essential problem of the time in a 1950 diary entry:

> Never before has there been such utter confusion in the public mind with respect to U.S. foreign policy . . . They all wander around in a labyrinth of ignorance and error and conjecture in which truth is intermingled with fiction at a hundred points, in which unjustified assumptions have attained the validity of premises, and in which there is no recognized and authoritative theory to hold on to.[4]

The chaotic foreign policy climate of the late 1940s goes far to explain the deficiencies of United States' policy for Spain. Yet in spite of this confusion, the criticism that American policy was too extreme must still be made. Extremely idealistic were the United States' continued proclamations that democracy must be restored in Spain. The anti-Communist policy which supplanted them was also undesirable, for it completely ignored idealism in the interest of American security-at-any-price. Spanish historians have observed these extremes bitterly, calling the 1946 resolution "spectacular and ineffective" and attributing Franco's final consolidation of power to the policy spelled out in NSC-72.[5] In dividing the Spanish problem into a question of good versus evil, the United States only reinforced the societal cleavage between victors and vanquished which had begun after the Spanish Civil War.

The tragedy of America's Spanish policy is not that Wilsonian idealism and fervent anti-Communism existed, but that the growth of the latter led to the practical impossibility of carrying out the goals of the former. In embracing Franco to protect their own security, Americans ironically demonstrated that democratic principles had to be denied in Spain in order that they could be preserved in the United

States. Perhaps the greatest irony is that democracy finally came to Spain in spite of, and not because of, American efforts in its behalf. The death of one man—Franco—and the political maturity of the Spanish people ultimately succeeded in restoring democracy to Spain where the proclamations, condemnations, and isolation of the rest of the world had failed.

Notes

Abbreviations Used in the Notes

CR	Congressional Record
DOSB	Department of State Bulletin
FRUS	Foreign Relations of the United States
NYT	New York Times

Introduction and Part One

[1] Dean Acheson, Power and Diplomacy (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), 80.

[2] Quoted in Theodore Lowi, "Bases in Spain," in American Civil-Military Decisions, edited by Harold Stein (Birmingham, Alabama, 1963), 679.

[3] Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits of Power (New York, 1972), 7.

[4] CR, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 91, Pt. 10, A690.

[5] Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace (Boston, 1977), 84.

[6] CR, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 91, Pt. 12, A3233.

[7] CR, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 91, Pt. 10, 1030.

[8] NYT, December 20, 1945, 22.

[9] DOSB (Vol. XIV, 1946), 415.

[10] Oscar Lange, The Problem of Franco Spain (Washington, 1946), 6.

[11] Max Gallo, Spain Under Franco: A History (New York, 1974), 107.

[12] Carlton Hayes, Wartime Mission in Spain (New York, 1946), 91.

[13] Ibid., 91.

[14] FRUS (Vol. V, 1945), 667.

[15] CR, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 91, Pt. 10, A360.

[16] Ibid., A360.

[17] American and Spanish liberals alike associated the monarchy with corruption and reaction in Spain. Coffee's own version of the Spanish Republicans' expulsion of King Alfonso XIII was particularly revealing. In 1845 he told a Madison Square Garden audience that in April of 1931, "the good people of Spain went to the ballot boxes and their collective decision went something like this: 'Alfonso, until today you've been

both a bum and a king, but from today on you're just a bum.' If there are any historians here tonight I think they will back me up." See CR, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 91, Pt. 10, A361.

[18] Ibid., A360.

[19] Ibid., A689-690.

[20] Ibid., A690.

[21] Ibid., A359.

[22] Ibid., A689.

[23] Henry Wallace, "The Price of a Free World Victory," in _The Century of the Common Man_ (New York, 1943), 14.

[24] Ibid., 19.

[25] Quoted in Walton, Richard J., _Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War_ (New York, 1976), 137.

[26] Ibid., 137.

[27] NYT, December 5, 1946, 23.

[28] Wallace, 22.

[29] Council on Foreign Relations, _The United States in World Affairs 1945-1947_ (New York, 1947), 207.

[30] Quoted in Charles Mee, _Meeting at Potsdam_ (New York, 1975), 143-144.

[31] Ibid., 143.

[32] Ibid., 144.

[33] Ibid., 332.

[34] FRUS (Vol. V, 1945), 672.

[35] Ibid., 702.

[36] FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1055.

[37] FRUS (Vol. V, 1945), 699.

[38] Ibid., 670.

[39] Ibid., 695-696.

[40] FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1030 and 1043.

[41] DOSB (Vol. XIV, 1946), 412.

[42] Ibid., 412.

[43] Emmet Hughes, Report from Spain (New York, 1947), 284.

[44] DOSB (Vol. XIV, 1946), 412.

[45] Lange, 19-22.

[46] Ibid., 8-16.

[47] FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1065-1066. George F. Kennan also warned, in March 1946, that any capitulation to the Lange demands would be a dangerous deviation from his conception of American interests as well as a giant propaganda victory for Moscow. See FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1045.

[48] Quoted in Stephen Ambrose, Rise to Globalism (Menasha, Wisconsin, 1976), 131-132.

[49] Ibid., 1073-1074.

[50] Raymond Carr, Modern Spain, 1875-1980 (Oxford, 1980), 165-166.

[51] See Carr, 166-167 and Gallo, 109.

[52] Gallo, 163.

[53] DOSB (Vol. XIV, 1946), 418.

[54] Ibid., 417-418.

[55] James Cortada, Two Nations Over Time: Spain and the United States (Westport, Connecticut, 1978), 206-207.

[56] Arthur Whitaker, Spain and Defense of the West (New York, 1961), 11.

[57] Ibid., 11.

[58] Ibid., 16.

[59] Raymond Carr takes the former view (see Modern Spain, 149); Manuel Espadas, professor of history at the University of Madrid, has claimed the latter view in his lectures during 1982.

[60] FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1027.

[61] Hayes, Wartime Mission, 298-300.

[62] FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1079.

[63] Connally's speech mirrored the Vandenberg statement; he opposed coercive measures by the United Nations "because they would either aid Franco by uniting the Spanish people against outside interference or would precipitate the Spanish people themselves into the disaster of civil war." (See Lowi, 672.)

[64] FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1081.

[65] Reprinted in NYT, December 4, 1946, 22.

[66] Ibid., 22.

[67] FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1084-1085.

[68] Ibid., 1090.

[69] Alger Hiss prepared a statement which alluded to this danger, and he submitted it to Acheson on December 9, 1946. See FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1086.

[70] Office of Information, Spanish Embassy, *The Spanish Question Before the United Nations: An Outrage of International Law* (Washington, 1946), 17.

[71] FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1086.

[72] Quoted in Ruth Russell, *A History of the United Nations Charter* (Washington, 1958), 975.

[73] U.S. Department of State, *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945* (Washington, 1955), 936.

[74] FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1057.

[75] *Public Papers of the President: Harry S. Truman, 1945* (Washington, 1961), 433-434.

[76] Lisle Rose, *After Yalta* (New York, 1973), 19-20.

[77] Diplomat Charles Bohlen predicted in 1946 that after a process of internal evolution, "the Soviet attitude towards the outside world in its policies and methods in international affairs will undergo progressive modification." According to Yergin, Bohlen also wanted to "induce the Soviet Union in its own interest and in the interest of the world" to act in the spirit of the U.N. Charter. See Yergin, 165.

[78] Pablo Ascarate, *Spain, Past and Future* (London, 1945), 13-14.

[79] FRUS (Vol. V, 1945), 704.

[80] Manuel Jimenez Quelez, *Wheels within Wheels: How Russia Uses United Nations Against Spain* (Washington, 1947), 9-18 and Office of Information, Spanish Embassy, *The Spanish Question Before the United Nations*, 17.

[81] FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1036.

[82] The Blue Division had participated in the destruction of several Russian historical monuments, including the palace of Catherine the Great at Tsarskoye Selo, said Kennan. See FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1034.

[83] Article 32 of the U.N. Charter reads as follows: "Any state which is not a Member of the United Nations, if it is a party to a dispute under consideration by the Security Council, shall be invited to participate, without vote, in the discussion relating to the dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such conditions as it deems just for the participation of a state which is not a Member of the United Nations." According to Article 2, the U.N. had no right under the Charter "to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state." See Russell, 1036 and 1041.

[84] Spanish Embassy, *The Spanish Question Before the United Nations*, 20.

[85] FRUS (Vol. III, 1947), 1054-1056.

[86] Juan Pablo Fusi and Raymond Carr, *Espana, de la dictadura a la democracia* (Barcelona, 1979), 33.

[87] Gallo, 163.

[88] Ibid., 164.

[89] Fernando Vizcaino Casas, *La Espana de la Posguerra, 1939-1953* (Barcelona, 1975), 173 and 191.

[90] Carr, 155-156.

[91] Whitaker, 33-34.

[92] FRUS (Vol. V, 1945), 683.

[93] FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1077.

[94] Vizcaino Casas, 185.

[95] Fernando Díaz-Plaja, *La posguerra espanola en sus documentos* (Barcelona, 1970), 212-213.

[96] Gallo, 173-174.

[97] Vizcaino Casas, 188.

[98] The examples are too numerous to name, but among the most famous of the postwar literature of "resignation" are Buero Vallejo's *Historia de una escalera* (1949), Martin-Santos' *Tiempo de Silencio* (1961), Cela's *La colmena* (1951), and Sanchez Ferlosio's *El Jarama* (1956).

[99] Gallo, 150-151.

[100] Fusi and Carr, 11-33.

Part Two

[1] Yergin, 196.

[2] CR, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 96, Pt. 6, 8557.

[3] FRUS (Vol. III, 1947), 1060.

[4] See Theodore Lowi, "Bases in Spain."

[5] Cortada, *Two Nations*, 221.

[6] FRUS (Vol. III, 1947), 1067.

[7] Ibid., 1091.

[8] Ibid., 1066-1067.

[9] Cortada, *Two Nations*, 221.

[10] Walter Millis, editor, *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York, 1951), 328.

[11] George Kennan, *American Diplomacy* (Chicago, 1951), 87.

[12] All quotes taken from FRUS (Vol. III, 1947), 1092-1095.

[13] Mr. X, i.e. George Kennan. The article which appeared in *Foreign Affairs* called for the "containment" of Soviet Russia by means of the "adroit and vigilant application of counter-force at a series of constantly shifting geographical and political points, corresponding to the shifts and maneuvers of Soviet policy." See Kennan, 99.

[14] Quoted in Ambrose, 150.

[15] *Public Papers, 1948*, 186.

[16] NYT, November 18, 1947, 25.

[17] FRUS (Vol. III, 1947), 1096-1097.

[18] Ibid., 1074-1075.

[19] FRUS (Vol. III, 1948), 1031.

[20] Ibid., 1032-1034.

[21] Lowi, 676.

[22] NYT, October 1, 1948, 9.

[23] Lowi, 678.

[24] See NYT, October 27, 1949, 15 and Lowi, 679.

[25] NYT, December 29, 1949, 1.

[26] Lowi, 674-678.

[27] Lowi, 674; Millis, 357-358; FRUS (Vol. III, 1948), 1030.

[28] FRUS (Vol. III, 1948), 1040.

[29] Lowi, 670.

[30] Ibid., 686.

[31] FRUS (Vol. III, 1948), 1041.

[32] FRUS (Vol. IV, 1949), 757.

[33] Ibid., 762.

[34] Ibid., 749.

[35] NYT, July 16, 1949, 12.

[36] NYT, May 12, 1949, 10.

[37] *Public Papers*, 1947, 238.

[38] Ibid., 479.

[39] FRUS (Vol. IV, 1949), 746-761.

[40] Quoted in Whitaker, 37.

[41] FRUS (Vol. III, 1950), 1559.

[42] Ibid., 1561.

[43] Ibid., 1560.

[44] Ibid., 1561.

[45] Ibid., 1562.

[46] Ibid., 1571.

[47] CR, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 96, Pt. 1, 240.

[48] Quoted in CR, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 96, Pt. 3, 3177.

[49] Ibid., 3176.

[50] FRUS (Vol. III, 1950), 1550-1555.

[51] Colmer to House, CR, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 96, Pt. 6, 8557.

[52] Cain to Senate, CR, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 96, Pt. 7, 9530-9531.

[53] Tydings to Senate, CR, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 96, Pt. 9, 11, 454.

[54] NYT, January 1, 1950, 4.

[55] NYT, January 21, 1950, 16.

[56] CR, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Vol. 96, Pt. 3, 3176.

[57] *Public Papers, 1950*, 697.

[58] Ibid., 762 and Stanton Griffis, *Lying in State* (Garden City, New York, 1952), quoted on 269.

[59] Griffis, 296.

[60] Pat McCarran, "Why Shouldn't the Spanish Fight for Us?" *Saturday Evening Post*, April 28, 1951, 138.

[61] Francisco Franco Bahamonde, *Franco ha dicho* (Madrid, 1948), 292.

[62] Whitaker, 1.

[63] NYT, July 8, 1947, 10. The voting in the referendum was not by secret ballot, and every voter received a certificate which was later requested by employers at the workplace.

[64] Quoted in Gall, 185.

[65] NYT, December 22, 1949, 22.

[66] Ibid., May 3, 1949, 24.

Part Three

[1] David Potter, *People of Plenty* (Chicago, 1954), 132.

[2] Hughes, 9.

[3] Carlton Hayes, *The United States and Spain* (Westport, Connecticut, 1951), 159-163.

[4] Hayes, Wartime Mission, 303-304.

[5] FRUS (Vol. V, 1946), 1041-1042.

[6] Hughes, 280.

[7] Public Papers, 1945, 433-438.

[8] Ibid., December 4, 1946, 23.

[9] Quoted in Lloyd C. Gardner, Architects of Illusion (Chicago, 1970), 205.

[10] NYT, November 12, 1950, IV, 4.

[11] Vizcaino Casas, 233.

[12] Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, in particular, have taken the view that the embrace of Franco was part of a monolithic American program to bring anti-Communist states into the United States' political, economic and military sphere. See The Limits of Power, 5 and 662.

[13] McCarran, 25.

[14] Ibid., 137-138.

[15] Robert Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II (New York, 1967), 32.

[16] Gabriel Almond, "American Character and Foreign Policy," in The Character of Americans, edited by Michael McGiffert (Homewood, Illinois, 1970), 405.

[17] Quoted in Rose, 26.

[18] Leonard S. Cottrell and Sylvia Eberhart, American Opinion on World Affairs in the Atomic Age (Princeton, 1948), 122-124.

[19] Divine, 183.

[20] Tom Connally, with Alfred Steinberg, My Name is Tom Connally (New York, 1954), 364.

[21] J. Samuel Walker, Henry A. Wallace and American Foreign Policy (Westport, Connecticut, 1976, 88.

[22] Wallace, 17.

[23] NYT, December 20, 1945, 22.

[24] Walton, 141.

[25] Ibid., 136.

[26] Almond, 407.

[27] Ibid., 411.

[28] Potter, 131-133.

[29] Rose, 5.

[30] Potter, 132.

[31] Ibid., 137-139.

[32] William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy* (New York, 1959), 14-15.

[33] Robert Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations* (Chicago, 1953), 444.

[34] Ibid., 431.

[35] Ibid., 446.

[36] Almond, 414.

[37] Quoted in Russell, 75.

[38] CR, 79th Cong., 1st sess., Vol. 91, Pt. 1, 775.

[39] John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War* (New York, 1972), 2 and 30.

[40] Wallace, 20.

[41] See Horace Binney, *An Inquiry into the Formation of Washington's Farewell Address* (New York, 1969), 223.

[42] See Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs* (October 1967), 22-52; Kenneth Thompson's *Winston Churchill's World View* (Baton Rouge, 1983), 26 and 52-55; Yergin, 336.

[43] Connally, 364-365.

[44] Acheson, 8.

[45] Schlesinger, 38.

[46] Acheson, 8.

[47] Griffis, 302.

[48] See Gallo, 141 and NYT, December 10, 1946, 4.

[49] Thompson, 5.

[50] Ibid., 45.

[51] Yergin, 196.

[52] Hayes, The United States and Spain, 177.

[53] FRUS (Vol. III, 1950), 1566.

[54] Griffis, 292-293.

[55] Joyce and Gabriel Kolko, 2.

[56] Ibid., 661-662.

Conclusion

[1] Hughes, 276.

[2] Charles Halsted, "Spanish Foreign Policy, 1936-1978," in Spain in the Twentieth Century World, edited by James Cortada (Westport, Connecticut, 1980), 79.

[3] Rose, 177.

[4] Quoted in Yergin, vii.

[5] Jose Antonio Biescas and Manuel Tunon de Lara, Espana bajo la dictadura franquista (Barcelona, 1980), 228-253.

About the Bibliography

Of the primary sources listed below, the most frequently consulted was undoubtedly the State Department's *Foreign Relations of the United States*. As my main concern was with the details of policy formulation—especially who was responsible for suggesting changes and when these changes came—I found this series to be indispensible. The *New York Times* provided a more multi-dimensional view and extensive coverage of developments in Spanish-American relations in the late 1940s. Truman's *Public Papers* were a helpful source of his public statements on Spain (which, incidentally, mirrored his private opinions as well) and also of his more famous speeches. The *State Department Bulletin* filled in gaps when *Foreign Relations* was not complete, and the *Congressional Record* was replete with speeches and editorials on Spain and Franco. The speeches especially enabled me to contrast the views of the anti-Franco liberals with those of the Spanish Lobby.

Official Spanish records of the policy-making process were, not surprisingly, unavailable. The few documents to be found were somewhat homogeneous; that is, they all gave Franco's official statements to press and public but provided little insight into the private workings of his ministries. The sources listed in the bibliography are general collections of Franco's speeches and writings on politics, government, and international relations. Spanish newspapers were not available to me, but contemporary historical works provided some reprints of news articles.

Perhaps the first point which must be made about the secondary sources is that the time of the research period and the required length of the thesis limited the bibliography to those sources which seemed most directly related to Spanish-American relations during the late 1940s, or to Cold War history. These can be separated into three groups: Books or memoirs by people on the scene, monographs on various aspects of American Cold War policy by contemporary authors, and general surveys of the period by Spanish and American historians. A fourth and smaller group of secondary sources included those which theorized about the nature of the American foreign policy character.

Of the first group, Hayes' memoirs were most valuable, for they contained not only a summary of the history of American relations with Spain but a valuable perspective as to why the American policy was destined to fail. Acheson scarcely mentions Spain in his memoirs, but his theories on international relations and American interests are still pertinent today. Connally and Vandenberg have left volumes which are excellent portraits of both themselves and the period in which they lived.

The secondary sources on Cold War history include both those volumes which reinforce the most widely accepted views of contemporary historians (Yergin's *Shattered Peace*, Gaddis' *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War*, Paterson's *On Every Front*) and some of the less-supported opinions as well (the Kolkos' *Limits of Power*, Gardner's *Architects of Illusion*, Williams' *Tragedy of American Diplomacy*). I think it was necessary to give consideration to both sets of viewpoints, as both were applicable to the situation with Spain. Of the Spanish and American surveys of the period, I found Cortada's works to be extremely helpful and concise. Any discussion of the condemnation of Spain would have been incomplete without the contributions of Fusi and Carr (*Espana,* *de la dictadura a la democracia*), and the writings of Madariaga and Biescas and Tunon de Lara reminded me that the American embrace of Franco was not universally appreciated in Spain. The books and articles in the bibliography which I have not mentioned served functions similar to the ones described above, although I must make special mention of Lowi's "Bases in Spain," which gave a very comprehensive account of the activities of the Spanish Lobby between 1948 and 1953.

Bibliography

Documents and Newspapers

Diaz-Plaja, Fernando. *La posguerra espanola en sus documentos*. Barcelona, 1970.

Franco Bahamonde, Francisco. *Franco ha dicho*. Madrid, 1948.

__________. *Palabras del caudillo*. Madrid, 1943.

__________. *Textos de doctrina politica*. Madrid, 1951.

The *New York Times*. Various editions between 1944 and 1951.

Public Papers of the President: Harry S. Truman, 1945-1953. Washington, D.C., 1961-1966.

U.S. Congress. *Congressional Record*. 1944-1950.

U.S. Department of State. *The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945*. Washington, 1955.

__________. *Department of State Bulletin*. 1945-1950.

__________. *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945-1950*. Washington, 1967-1977.

Books

Acheson, Dean. Present at the Creation. New York, 1969.

__________. Power and Diplomacy. Cambridge, Mass., 1958.

Ambrose, Stephen. Rise to Globalism. Menasha, Wisconsin, 1976.

Biescas, Jose Antonio and Tunon de Lara, Manuel. Espana bajo la dictadura franquista. Barcelona, 1980.

Binney, Horace. An Inquiry into the Formation of Washington's Farewell Address. New York, 1969.

Carr, Raymond. Modern Spain, 1875-1980. Oxford, 1980.

Connally, Tom with Alfred Steinberg. My Name Is Tom Connally. New York, 1954.

Cortada, James. A Bibliographic Guide to Spanish Diplomatic History, 1460-1977. Westport, Connecticut, 1977.

__________, editor. Spain in the Twentieth Century World. Westport, Connecticut, 1980.

__________. Two Nations Over Time: Spain and the United States, 1776-1977. Westport, Connecticut, 1978.

Cottrell, Leonard S. and Sylvia Eberhart. American Opinion on World Affairs in the Atomic Age. Princeton, 1948.

Council on Foreign Relations. The United States in World Affairs 1945-1947. New York, 1947.

Divine, Robert A. Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in America During World War II. New York, 1967.

Fusi, Juan Pablo and Raymond Carr. Espana, de la dictadura a la democracia. Barcelona, 1979.

Gaddis, John Lewis. Strategies of Containment. New York, 1982.

__________. The United States and the Origins of the Cold War. New York, 1972.

Gallo, Max. Spain Under Franco: A History. New York, 1974.

Gardner, Lloyd C. Architects of Illusion. Chicago, 1970.

Griffis, Stanton. Lying in State. Garden City, New York, 1952.

Hayes, Carlton J.H. The United States and Spain. Westport, Connecticut, 1951.

Hayes, Carlton J.H. *Wartime Mission in Spain*. New York, 1946.

Hughes, Emmet John. *Report from Spain*. New York, 1947.

Kennan, George F. *American Diplomacy*. Chicago, 1951.

Kolko, Joyce and Gabriel. *The Limits of Power*. New York, 1972.

Maier, Charles, editor. *The Origins of the Cold War and Contemporary Europe*. New York, 1978.

Mee, Charles. *Meeting at Potsdam*. New York, 1975.

Millis. Walter, editor. *The Forrestal Diaries*. New York, 1951.

Osgood, Robert. *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations*. Chicago, 1953.

Paterson, Thomas. *On Every Front*. New York, 1979.

Potter, David. *People of Plenty*. Chicago, 1954.

Rose, Lisle. *After Yalta*. New York, 1973.

Russell, Ruth. *The History of the United Nations Charter*. Washington, 1958.

Schneidman, J. Lee. *Spain and Franco, 1949-59*. New York, 1973.

Smith, Gaddis. *The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy*. New York, 1972.

Thompson, Kenneth. *Winston Churchill's World View*. Baton Rouge, 1983.

Truman, Harry S. *Mr. Citizen*. New York, 1960.

__________. *Year of Decisions*. New York, 1955.

__________. *Years of Trial and Hope*. Garden City, New York, 1956.

Vandenberg, Arthur H., Jr., editor. *The Private Papers of Senator Vandenberg*. Boston, 1952.

Vizcaino Casas, Fernando. *La Espana de la Posguerra: 1939-1953*. Barcelona, 1975.

Walker, J. Samuel. *Henry A. Wallace and American Foreign Policy*. Westport, Connecticut, 1976.

Wallace, Henry A. *The Century of the Common Man*. New York, 1943.

Walton, Richard J. *Henry Wallace, Harry Truman, and the Cold War*. New York, 1976.

Whitaker, Arthur. *Spain and Defense of the West*. New York, 1961.

Williams, William Appleman. *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*. New York, 1959.

Yergin, Daniel. *Shattered Peace*. Boston, 1977.

Articles, Essays, and Pamphlets

Almond, Gabriel. "American Character and Foreign Policy" in *The Character of Americans*, edited by Michael McGiffert. Homewood, Illinois, 1970.

Azcarate, Pablo de. *Spain, Past and Future*. London, 1945.

Halsted, Charles. "Spanish Foreign Policy, 1936-1978" in *Spain in the Twentieth Century World*, edited by James Cortada. Westport, Connecticut, 1980.

Jimenez Quelez, Manuel. *Wheels within Wheels: How Russia Uses United Nations Against Spain*. Washington, 1947.

Lange, Oscar. *The Problem of Franco Spain*. Washington, 1946.

Lowi, Theodore. "Bases in Spain," in *American Civil-Military Decisions*, edited by Harold Stein. Birmingham, Alabama, 1963.

Madariaga, Salvador de. "The Anatomy of the Cold War," lecture delivered in Queen's University, Belfast, April 21, 1955.

McCarran, Pat. "Why Shouldn't the Spanish Fight for Us?" *Saturday Evening Post*, April 28, 1951.

Office of Information, Spanish Embassy. *The Spanish Question Before the United Nations: An Outrage of International Law*. Washington, 1946.

Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. "Origins of the Cold War," *Foreign Affairs*, October 1967.