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**THE LEGISLATIVE REFORM  
MOVEMENT IN ILLINOIS, 1964-1977**

**BY**

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**THESIS**

**for the  
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A large number of reforms have been carried out in the Illinois General Assembly commencing with the COOGA Commission report in 1967 and continuing up until the present. Many excellent studies involving the background and nature of these reforms have been published in this time period. None of these has, however, managed to answer the question of whether or not these reforms has actually improved the performance of the General Assembly. This question along with the reform process in Illinois in the 1960's and 1970's is the subject of this paper.

For the purpose of this paper I have looked at the reform process in Illinois in a three step approach. First of all I have constructed an ideal model of a state legislative, one which performs all of the functions its constituents require and expect of it in the most efficient manner. To enable this to be done it was necessary to develop a theory as to what the constituents of state legislatures require and expect of these bodies.

The next step involved in the approach utilized in this paper consisted of analyzing the manner in which the Illinois General Assembly functioned before the bulk of these reforms were carried out and how it functions today. This was done in comparison with the model constructed in the first section of the paper.

The final and most difficult step involved the determination of the correlation between the reforms made in the time period studied and the change or lack of change in the performance of the General Assembly during that period. This determination was based upon two measures. One of these was a number of relevant

statistics gathered dealing with certain outputs of the General Assembly which are numerically measureable. The other tool used in analyzing change in the performance of this legislative consists of a series of three interviews conducted with three men who were members of the General Assembly during the time period in question and, in the case of two, who still are members of that body.

As has already been referred to before a model of an ideal state legislative can be constructed it is first necessary to determine what constituents expect and require of their state legislatures. Webster's definition of a legislature is: "a body of persons who make laws."<sup>1</sup> Though the average person would probably have difficulty stating what he or she did expect and require of his or her state legislature, unquestionably, it would be more than to merely "make laws."

The Citizen's Conference on State Legislatures begins the preface of its study of state legislatures entitled "The Sometimes Governments" by saying:

"As citizens of the United States we share in a precious inheritance - the legislative form of government. Though this system of self-rule has given us the oldest continuous form of government how in existence, we do not fully understand it nor do we use it well."<sup>2</sup>

In order to understand this system and, hence, determine what the average constituent wants and expects of his state legislature it is necessary to look at state legislatures in the historical and ideological perspective that has developed around them in the United States. This perspective is founded upon three fundamental concepts: representative democracy, federalism, and separation of

powers. Though these concepts have changed since their original inclusion in the American political ideology nearly two-hundred years ago they continue to provide the basis for the perspective we take concerning the role of state legislatures.

The concept of representative democracy refers to the ideal of placing the lawmaking function of government in a democratically elected body of representatives. Our belief in vesting such powers in our "representatives" can, of course, be traced back to our political forefathers in England. Today, that our legislatures be representative of us is just as important a demand upon these bodies as it was when the cry of "no taxation without representation" was first heard.

In their book The Legislative Process in the United States authors Malcolm Jewell and Samuel Patterson explain the representation aspect of legislatures as having three distinct dimensions. The "authority" dimension of representation refers to the authorizing of a person by a group of persons to represent them. In the case of state legislatures this authorization to represent the people of the state is given in the state constitution and is carried out by elections.<sup>3</sup>

Jewell and Patterson define the symbolic dimension of representation as: "When the characteristics and acts of one person in a position of power in the society are in accord with the desires expressed and unexpressed, of the individual." In application this refers to the degree of similarity between the legislators and their constituents. It also concerns the manner in which legislators are elected and apportioned.<sup>4</sup>

The final dimension of representation mentioned by Jewell and Patterson is the instrumental dimension. This had to do with the actions of the representatives. In other words, this means how people expect their representatives in their role as a state representative to behave. There is a conflict in this area as to how representatives should make their decisions. Are the interests and desires of the constituents the deciding factor or must a representative once in office serve the interests of the state as a whole.<sup>5</sup>

The second fundamental American political concept to be used as a foundation for the model state legislature is the doctrine of federalism. This doctrine outlines our governmental system as being divided into a national government sovereign in its sphere of powers and a number of state governments also sovereign in their spheres of powers. These spheres of powers are not, however, mutual exclusive and often overlap. In resolving the conflicts that arise out of these overlaps our systems of constitutional law has in the 20th century alone gone through several trends of pro-state decisions and several trends of pro-national decisions.

In The Sometimes Governments the Citizen's Conference on State Legislatures comes to the defense of the principle of federalism and the role of the state legislatures are given in it. Two reasons are cited for maintaining the present position of the states in the system. First of all, both our national and our state governments are so designed as to be unable to function correctly without the state governments functioning

correctly. Secondly, it would take what would amount to a revolution to reorganize this system.<sup>6</sup>

The Sometimes Governments also supplies a definition as to the correct role of the states within the federal system:

"The states, in short, ought to function under our system as middlemen and mediators, as means of avoiding both overcentralization and excessive localization."<sup>7</sup>

The doctrine of federalism, hence, places upon the state governments a fixed responsibility within the federal system. It follows that a correctly functioning state legislature must live up to its share of the duties required of it by this responsibility.

In addition to the responsibilities of a state legislature vis a vis the national government as a result of our federal system these bodies also must accept their responsibilities which proceed from the fundamental political concept to be discussed here, that of separation of powers. This concept outlines the relationship between the three traditional branches of government in the American political system: executives, legislative, and executive. In theory these three branches of government are roughly equal in power and as such "check" each other insure none abuses its power. As is the case with the division of powers between the national and state governments the division of power within these three branches is not definite but often unclear. Hence, as in federalism, the doctrine of separations of powers requires each branch to perform its function in order for the other branches to perform theirs.



The powers of the state legislators vis a vis the state executive branch has changed greatly since 1780. This process is traced thoughly in The Sometimes Governments in which it is pointed out that originally the state legislatures were the predominante branch of state governments. In the later half of the 19th century for a number of reasons a great deal of the power of these legislatures was stripped away. Distrust, often well founded, of state legislatures combined with the rise of both powerful business corporations and powerful city political bosses provided for the draining away of authority from the state legislatures. This authority flowed primarily into three sources. The first of these was the state governors who were believed as being more visiable and, hence, more trustable. The reforms of the early 20th century Progressive Era also resulted in the redistribution of power to the newly reformed city governments and to the people in the form of referendum and recall powers.

The Great Depression and WWII saw state legislatures reach their lowest point. The governor became the dominant policy-maker in state governments across the nation. In the 1960's, however, this process began to reverse itself. This reverse was mainly the result of a series of Supreme Court cases which required state legislatures to reapportion themselves. The reason for this is clearly stated in The Sometimes Governments

"As long as the state legislatures remained malapportioned and generally dominated by rural interests there had been little impetus to reforming the legislative organization and operations."

The state legislatures, hence, began the long process of becoming, once again, truly equal branches of state government in the 1960's, a process which continues today. It is only once they have done so, can state governments be considered to be functioning correctly in reference to the doctrine of separation of powers.

According to the broad outline so far laid down is this paper an ideal legislature is one which fulfills its duties in reference to the doctrines of representative democracy, federalism, and separation of powers. In order to compare the Illinois General Assembly to this ideal it is first necessary to break this model down into a series of more specific requirements of a legislature. In doing so this paper makes use of the requirements set down in two studies. One of these is the Citizens Conference on State Legislatures' "The Sometimes Governments" which has already been extensively quoted. The other study is that of the "Committee on the Organization of the General Assembly (COOGA) Report" dealing specifically with Illinois.

The Citizens Conference conducted a study of all fifty state legislatures. The result of this study was The Sometimes Governments published in 1971. The Citizens Conference divided the criteria which they used in ranking the fifty state legislature into five categories to which they applied the acronym FAIR. This acronym is taken from the five categories of criteria which were functionality, accountability, informedness, independence, and representativeness. These five categories have been rearranged and grouped into the three fundamental concepts used in this paper for analyzing the Illinois General Assembly.

Two of the Citizens Conference categories clearly refer to the doctrine of representative democracy. These are accountability and representativeness. Two others, functionality and informedness related to both the position of the state legislature in the federal system and in the separation of powers among the three branches of state government. The final category, independence, relates specifically to the doctrine of separation of powers, the relationship between the state legislature and the governor.

The accountability of a state legislature in the terms used by the Citizens Conference refers to the degree of control over legislators and their decisions which their constituents have and also the relationship within the legislature between the rank and file members and the leadership.

The first prerequisite of an accountable legislature according to the Citizens Conference is that it be comprehensible to the public. This comprehensibility requires, at least in most cases, single member districts. It also requires that the leaders of the legislature are responsive and representative of its membership. It is also recommended that the overall size of the legislature and the number of standing committees within it be kept down to a manageable level. The rules and procedures of the legislature need to be explicit, constant and well known. The conference strongly favor "antirambo provisions" to prevent bills from disappearing into a committee never to be heard from again. Finally, comprehensibility requires that the flow of legislation through a body follow a standard and regulated procedure.

A second criteria under accountability is that the legislature be open to public view. This refers to the needs of the

people to have access to the activities of their legislature and that records of voting and discussions to be kept and made public. This access also applies to the information media who act as the agents of the public. The Conference further emphasized the need to regulate and to open to public monitoring the activities of lobbyists and to have public information on any conflict of interest a legislator might exhibit.

The final criteria of the Citizen Conference related to accountability is the internal accountability of a legislature. By this it is meant that the authority of a legislature must not be overly centralized within the hands of a few leaders nor must the rights of the minority be unreasonably infringed upon.

The other category of the Citizens Conference's study which relates to the doctrine of representative democracy is that of representativeness. The first criteria of this category is that every person should be able to easily identify his representative and be able to have access to him. In this regard both single-member districts and district offices are recommended. A second criteria is that legislators should represent a good social cross section of their state and that the opportunity to run for office is not unreasonably limited. It is further recommended by the conference that legislators salaries be reasonable which also relates to how open the opportunity for legislative office is.

An additional series of criteria for a legislature to be representative relates to the effectiveness of its members. This involves the ability of individual members to actually accomplish something. For this to be possible it is necessary for a legislature

not to be overly complex, large, or controlled by the leadership. It is also necessary for all members to have access to sources of information and staff assistance. Finally, two points mentioned earlier, that the minority not be overly weakened and the rules and procedures be known and followed, also must be observed.

The category which the Citizens Conference refers to as functionability of a legislature falls under both the American political system's principles of federalism and of separation of power because in order for a state legislature to be upholding its responsibilities vis a vis either the national government or its component state branches of government it must itself be functioning correctly. The same can be said for the category of informedness. Both are included in the assigned role of the state legislature under both doctrines.

The first criteria mentioned under functionality is that a legislature meet often enough and to utilizes its time efficiently. Another important factor is whether or not the leadership and members of the legislature have adequate staffing. The physical facilities of the legislature are also important to its functionality. These include in addition to meeting chambers, adequate offices for each member, committee facilities, facilities for staff and facilities for support agencies. The size and committee structure once again need mentioning. The procedures for the ordering of the flow of legislature such as the form of bills, usage of committees and whether or not bill are "carried over" from session to session are important criteria of functionality. The powers of the leadership and the

communication between house is also a factor. Finally the dignity and public respect for the legislature are vital factors mentioned by the Citizens Conference as necessary for a highly functional legislature.

The category of informedness includes such criteria as adequate time spent in organizing for session as well as adequate time spent in actual session. The operation of the standing committees as units to successfully process and apply information also falls into this category. The utilization of the interim period is necessary for a truly informed legislature. The process of obtaining an adequately informed legislature also requires that bills be well researched and written and that they are available in sufficient quantity.

Professional staff is probably the most important criteria for an informed legislature as well as being related to the categories already mentioned. A final criteria of an informed legislature is that it be capable of performing fiscal review of the activities of the executive agencies of the state and that the fiscal effects of legislation be known to the legislators prior to their consideration of it.

The last of the five categories of criteria which the Citizens Conference used in its study was that of independence. The criteria in this area relate clearly to the doctrine of separation of powers. Independence as the Conference used it also involves the degree in which legislators are dependent upon lobbyists and other non-governmental authorities.

In order to meet the Citizens Conference definition of independence, a legislature had to meet five conditions. First

of all it had to be in control of its own activities, deciding its own procedures, expenditures and amount of time spent in session. Secondly, a legislature had to operate as a separate and coequal branch of government in relation to the governor. Going along with that idea it had to be able to oversee and study the state programs and spending it initiated. Those requirements relate directly to the separations of powers theory.

The final two conditions under independence related to the need of the legislature to be free of the undue influence of interests outside government. These included both any personal conflict of interest an individual legislator might have as well as to special interest groups.

The Citizens Conference study of state legislatures provides us with a large amount of very important criteria for evaluating legislatures. Based on these criteria the conference rated the Illinois General Assembly the third best state legislature in the nation in their 1971 study. The General Assembly received very high ratings in the categories of independence, accountability, and informedness and somewhat lower ratings in the categories of functionality and representativeness.

Whereas the Sometimes Governments was a study of the fifty state legislatures a very important study was made of the General Assembly alone in 1967. It is known as the COOGA report an acronym stemming from its author the Commission On the Organization of the General Assembly.

The legislation establishing the COOGA Commissions was introduced in the General Assembly by Representative Harold Katz, a North Shore

attorney. Katz's proposal met little or no opposition as the establishment of such commissions to study various state problems are fairly common. In contrast to many such commissions, however, the members of the Katz Commission who were appointed by the leaders of the General Assembly and included public members as well as legislators were both well qualified and genuinely dedicated to the task of their commission. This task was: "... study and evaluate the operation and organizations of the General Assembly, ... to recommend more efficient uses of manpower and facilities, [and] to study the operation of the legislature service agencies."<sup>9</sup>

The product of the commission was its report. Improving the State Legislature. The report was divided into six chapters: The Constitution and the Legislature, Legislature Procedures and Techniques, Modernizing Legislative Publications, Realizing the Potential of Committees and Commissions, Improving Tools for an Improved Legislature, and the Appropriations Process. The report contained eighty-seven specific recommendations which provided for in some cases constitutional or statutory changes and in others merely changes in the legislatures' rules or in the leaders actions. The Commission purposefully avoided certain very difficult areas. Among these were the question of conflicts of interest and the regulation of lobbyists as well as a number of controversial constitutional questions such as reapportionment, the size of the legislature and cumulative voting.<sup>10</sup>

Rather than dealing with the recommendations as a whole the General Assembly took action on them incrementally either by the



introduction of bills and constitutional amendments or by the incorporation of the recommendations into the rules of the legislature. The three measures considered by most of the commission members to be the most important were annual sessions, committee staffing and committee reduction.<sup>11</sup>

The recommendation for provided for annual session was included in the 1970 Constitution. The recommendation for the reduction in the number of committees turned out to be the most difficult measure to have enacted. This resulted mainly from the importance of the promise of committee chairmanship to supporters of a legislator attempting to be elected the leader of his house. For all practical purposes the number of standing committees in both the House and in the Senate actual increased substantially in number in the sessions following the issuance of the COOGA Commissions Report.<sup>12</sup>

At the time of the commission the idea of a professional staff was a rather new idea. After a slow start, however, staffing became established in the General Assembly at the end of the 1960's.<sup>13</sup>

The pre-COOGA General Assembly was by any means of analysis functioning very poorly. Author Trevor Armbruster visited the Illinois General Assembly in 1965 while preparing an article for the Saturday Evening Post on state legislatures. He had this to say in his section on Illinois:

"In no state do so many of the body sores afflicting state government festor quite so appealing as they do in Illinois"<sup>14</sup>

In his book Legislative Politics in Illinois Gilbert Steiner discusses on of the most common of these body sores afflicting

state legislatures, the handicap of legislative sessions being limited by law:

"Controversial bills are passed at the end of the session without as extensive a scrutiny as they would receive at an earlier date and some legislators deliberately delay passing certain bills until the last possible moment. Passage of a bill in Illinois depends in part at least, on the sense of timing of its adherents."<sup>15</sup>

Another major problem the General Assembly was forced to operate under was a crippling lack of staff and information. Thomas Anton makes reference to this difficulty in The Politics of State Expenditures in Illinois:

"Despite its formal authority of appropriations the 1963 General Assembly was virtually powerless in the determination of state expenditures. Pressed for time, lacking usable information and without leadership interest in examining appropriations the legislature did nothing more than pass appropriation bills."<sup>16</sup>

Aside from time constraint and inadequate staffing the major problem faced by the pre-COOGA General Assembly was malapportionment of its representatives. Though the 1870 Constitution required reapportionment it had not actually taken place between 1901 and 1954. Prior to the 1955 reapportionment Cook County with over half the states population contained only nineteen of the fifty-one legislative districts. These legislative districts ranged from 39,000 to 7000,000 in population.<sup>17</sup>

The 1955 reapportionment did allocate the districts in a more equitable manner but did not really change the composition of the General Assembly. It was not until the constitutionally mandated means of reaching a reapportionment plan failed in 1963 that reapportionment truly "shook up" the membership of the

As of 1981 the salary of members of the General Assembly was \$28,000.<sup>29</sup>

Recommendation 17) Prohibit proxy voting in committee.

Proxy voting was not allowed under either the House or Senate rules of the 82nd General Assembly.<sup>30</sup>

Recommendation 19) A formal consent calendar shall be used in both house.

Formal consent calendars are to be used according both the House and Senate rules of the 82nd General Assembly.<sup>31</sup>

Hence, as can be ascertained by the short summary of the recommendations of Citizens Conference are very similar to the recommendations of COOGA in both substance and intent. These recommendation could be just as easily arranged under the concepts of separation of power, federalism, and representative democracy as where the COOGA recommendations earlier in this paper. Also like the COOGA recommendations the majority of these recommendations have been carried out.

At this point it is now possible to identify a number of characteristics of the Illinois legislative reform movement of the 1960's and 1970's. These characteristics have become evident after studying the environment in which the reform movement got started in, the process the movement took (ie. COOGA and the Citizens Conference recommendations), and the results of this movement up until the late 1970's.

The first of these characteristics is that this reform movement was primarily an internal movement rather than a movement lead by forces outside the General Assembly. Though there was much criticism of the functioning of the General Assembly in

the media and public opinion of the body was low, there still was no large scale campaign outside the legislature working for reform. This is in clear contrast to the "Cutback" movement of 1980. Though obviously reacting to outside pressures the reform movement was actual began and carried out, for the most part, by the pro-reform members of the General Assembly itself. The 1964 at-large election served to set the stage for this movement by bringing into the legislature a large number of "blue-ribbon" candidates.

The record characteristic of the reform movement that should be mentioned is that it was not the product of a single person or small group of persons but rather came about due to a consensus on the part of the General Assembly. Illinois, unlike California, did not have a Jesse Unruh to lead a reform crusade. Harold Katz, though deserving of much praise for his original sponsorship of the COOGA bill and the subsequent chairing of that commission still must share the credit with many, many other individuals both inside and outside the General Assembly who worked for its reform throughout the 1960's and 1970's. These reforms could not have been carried out without the support of the leaderships of both parties.

Another point to make about the legislative reform movement in Illinois was that it was strictly a evolutionary process and not a revolutionary one. Though most of the eighty-seven recommendations of the COOGA commission were adopted they were not adopted as a whole but rather as has been thoughtfully discussed in this paper, dealt with more or less on an individual basis.

Though a large number of the COOGA recommendations were incorporated into the 1970 Constitution, the majority were enacted later on, incrementally. A likely reason for this is that the reform movement took the form of a gradually consensus and not a crusade.

The final characteristic of this process is that the reforms for all practical purposes affected primarily only the superstructure or procedures of the General Assembly and not its basic foundation or structure as Gove said in The Implications of Legislative Reform in Illinois:

The Commission did not explore any areas that the members felt were outside their jurisdictions and could better be left to other study commissions. These areas included conflicts of interest, regulation of lobbyists and such controversial constitutional questions as apportionment unicameralism the size of the legislature and Illinois unique cumulative voting method of selecting House members.<sup>32</sup>

The members of the Commission, perhaps, felt that in order to successfully deal with those areas which needed to be reformed immediately then it would be politically necessary to avoid such controversial issues as those mentioned above.

Having now completed an overview of legislative reform in the Illinois General Assembly from the mid-1960's until the late 1970's the next and final stage of this paper will consist of an evaluation of the correlation between these reforms and any measurable change in the performance of the General Assembly. As has already been stated this will involve the analysis of a number of statistical measures as well as interviews with three legislators who were in the General Assembly during the reform process.

For this paper I conducted interviews with three state legislators who had served in the General Assembly during the time period covered by this paper, the 1960's and 1970's. The fact that all three of those interviewed were Democratic members of the House of Representatives stems from a number of conditions. First of all, due to the two months I spent as a page on the Democratic side of the aisle I am familiar with a large number of Democratic Representatives and, hence, was met with much more cooperation on that side of the aisle. Secondly, because I was only able to spend one weekday in Springfield to conduct the interviews, time was a large constraint. I did talk to one republican representative who was willing to be interviewed, but was occupied during session and had committee meetings immediately after session making us unable to meet. This time constraint problem was also largely responsible the limitation upon interview subjects to members of the house only and not looking towards the Senate or Staff.

The final factor limiting the material to interviews was simply that there are no longer a large number of current members of the House who have served in that body since the mid 1960's. There are presently only eight representatives now members of the Eighty-third General Assembly (1983-1985) who were members of the Seventy-fifth General Assembly (1967-1969). It was, of course, during the seventy-fifth General Assembly that the COOGA Commission issued its report (1967). Of these eight two were interviewed for this paper, Representatives John Matijevich of North Chicago and Daniel

Pierce of Highland Park. The third interview was conducted with former Representative Harold Katz, the original sponsor of COOGA and its prime initiator.

Prior to the conducting of the three interviews five questions were formulated. These were the following:

(1) Do you think that the legislative reforms which took place in the General Assembly during the 1960's and 1970's had a significant effect on the performance of the General Assembly? Why?

This goes to the heart of what the final section of this paper was trying to determine. The next three questions asked were basically follow ups on this first question.

(2) Do you think that the performance of the General Assembly is better now than it was prior to the enactment of this reforms? Why?

This question was asked to allow the subject being interviewed to express a clear opinion as to whether or not the General Assembly has improved in performance and to allow the subject to expand on his answer given in question no. 1.

(3) Which of the reforms of the 1960's and 1970's do you feel was the most important? Why?

This was meant both to get an opinion as to which was the most important reform as well as to allow the subject being interviewed a chance to discuss that specific reform.

(4) What do you feel was the most important factor in encouraging the reform process in the General Assembly.

The pre-COOGA environment was discussed earlier in this paper along with some of the factors which encouraged the initiation of the reform process. The main factor discussed earlier was the large number of pro-reform legislators elected in the 1964 at-large House election.

(5) What is the most important reform which you feel has yet to be accomplished? Why?

The answer to this question can be interpreted as what the person being interviewed believes the reforms of the 1960's and 1970's failed to accomplish. It also serves as an indication as to where this person would place the emphasis as far as legislative reform.

An attempt was made to keep these questions both brief and concise due to the fact that these persons were being interviewed at their jobs. Though only five questions were asked these questions were designed to provide sufficient responses to enable their use in analyzing the performance of the General Assembly.

The first interview was with Representative John Matijevich from North Chicago and it took place, as did the other two interviews, on April 14, 1983. The interview with Rep. Matijevich was conducted on the House floor while the House was in session. Matijevich was first elected to the General Assembly in 1966 and spent two terms as chairman of the House Appropriations Committee.

In reference to the first question Matijevich said that he felt the quality of the General Assembly had improved as a result of the reforms of the 1960's and 1970's. He felt that these reforms resulted in more public input. He specifically mentioned



the changes which now require public notice before committee meetings whereas prior to this there was little public knowledge of what committees were doing. Matijevich used the term democraticization to describe these reforms. He also felt that the quality of legislators had improved not just the quality of the legislature itself.

Matijevich added that he did feel the performance of the General Assembly had improved. He said that though an outsider observing it would probably describe it as chaotic it is in his words "much, much better". He related to me how as a freshman legislator he had heard stories of the days before the reforms began which took place about the time of his first term giving to me a highly negative picture of those times.

Representative Matijevich believed the most significant reform of this era was the elimination of proxy voting in committee which he said had been a serious problem when it was allowed. He described how frustrating it was to sit in on a Senate Committee hearing a bill of his prior to the Senate's following the lead of the House and abolishing proxy voting. Another reform which he felt very important was the new requirements that committee chairman must give any member of the public who wishes to be heard on a particular, within reason, such as opportunity.

Representative Matijevich felt that the most important factor encouraging the beginning of the reform process was the bad public image of the General Assembly common at the time. He also mentioned the motivation provided by the work of

Harold Katz as well as the motivation provided by such outside persons as Professor Gove of the University of Illinois.

The huge number of bills being introduced in the General Assembly was the most important significant area which needs reform today according to Matijevich. He placed part of the blame for the recent surge in bill volume on the Cutback Amendment which, he feels had the result of having most bills now come from special interest groups rather than legislators. He described how these special interest groups now sometimes come to legislators and say: "introduce this". Matijevich said he would like to gather all the legislators and all the lobbyists into one room and say to them: "We've got a problem." He felt the General Assembly should be a problem solver, not just a bill factory and that it should be discussing problems, not reacting to them.

My second interview was with Representative Daniel Pierce of Highland Park who was first elected in the at-large House election of 1964. He was interviewed in his Springfield office. Representative Pierce agreed with Representative Matijevich in saying that the legislative reforms of the 1960's and 1970's had a significant impact on the General Assembly. The specific reforms he mentioned as having important affects were the providing of staffing, the upgrading of the rules of the General Assembly, and the elimination of proxy voting in committee.

Representative Pierce thought that the performance of the General Assembly was better than it had been before these reforms. He described the General Assembly as being more professional and

less dominated by a few individuals as the leadership formerly had done.

As far as which reforms Representative Pierce thought were the most important he mentioned the elimination of proxy voting in committee, the requirements that amendments must be distributed prior to being voted on, and the stricter rules now applying to conference committee reports.

The factor which Representative Pierce believed was the most important in initiating the reform process in the General Assembly was the 1964 at-large election in which he was first elected. He emphasized how this election brought a large number of new people into the General Assembly who were truly interested in reforming that body such as Harold Katz. He also mentioned Adlai Stevenson as being elected at this time.

Representative Pierce believes that the centralization of the staff under the control of the leadership is the most important area of present General Assembly practice which needs to be reformed. Though each committee is theoretically to have its own staff in his opinion, these staffers are overly utilized by the leadership at the expense of their committees.

In summation Representative Pierce pointed out some of the striking differences between the General Assembly of today and the General Assembly of his first term. At that time there were no officers for representatives and representatives shared telephones as well as a secretarial pool. According to Representative Pierce if you believe in state government you have got to believe in the value of these reforms.

Representative Pierce also mentioned one change now taking place in the General Assembly that can be attributed in part to a number of these reforms, this being the movement towards full-time versus part-time legislators. Though he believes that this movement was in some ways good he also feels that in that it was removing the General Assembly from its close ties to the people it could also be perceived as negative.

The final interview was with former Representative Harold Katz. His role in the COOGA Commission was discussed at length earlier in this paper. Mr. Katz retired from the General Assembly after serving from 1964 till 1982. My interview with him was conducted by phone to his Chicago law office.

Mr. Katz agreed with Representative Pierce and Matijevich in saying that the reforms of the 1960's/1970's had a significant impact on the performance of the General Assembly. He pointed out two specific areas in which these affects have been especially felt. The first of these was with the establishment of legislative staffs. Mr. Katz felt that prior to this movement the General Assembly was unable to deal effectively with such complex issues as mass transit and higher education.

The second group of reforms emphasized by Katz were those in the area he referred to as due process. To use Mr. Katz's words there is less "razzle dazzle" now than before. In other words everything is done more out in the open, the set procedures of the General Assembly are known and followed on a regular basis, it is simply more democratic. This interpretation of what Katz refers to as due process would include the bulk of

General Assembly. This failure did so by forcing a 1964 at-large election of the entire Illinois House of Representatives.<sup>18</sup>

The election brought about three factors which make up of the General Assembly which set the stage for the reforms of the COOGA Commission and the other reforms which took place. These three factors were an unusually high percentage of seats held by one party due to the large victory margin of the Democrats, an unusually high percentage of new members, and the election of a large number of pro-reform members.<sup>19</sup>

The first two of the three major problems afflicting the General Assembly prior to COOGA which were unnecessarily limited sessions and inadequate staffing and other sources of information can be considered to equally be failures in terms of the political concepts of separation of powers and of federalism.

In order to fulfill its assigned position as an equal to the executive branch in the state government the legislature must obviously be an independent entity able to determine its own work schedule. Clearly, it could not do so long as it was constitutionally required to be strictly a part-time body.

A similar case can be made for the necessity of adequate staffing and informational resources as a pre-requisite to legislative branch equality with the executive branch. Without such resources legislators will be totally dependent on the agencies and officials of the executive branch for the information necessary for lawmaking. This could be at best classified as 2 1/2 branches of government.

This argument need only be carried a step further to say that without a state legislature fulfilling its correct function

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within its own government due to the above mentioned handicaps, then the state government as a whole can function correctly within our federal system. This relates to the very heart of the theory of federalism because its component is that the national government can not perform its correct role unless the state governments are performing theirs.

The final problem, the malapportionment of the General Assembly prior to 1965 is clearly a gross violation of the entire theory of representative democracy. When you have a situation where the very basis of this theory is being ignored as was the case in much of the U.S. including Illinois before the early 1960's it would seem to have been questionable if the theory of representative democracy was still a living part of the American political philosophy as outlined earlier in this paper.

Reynolds v. Sims and a series of other Supreme Court cases in the early 1960's reaffirmed this theory and forced the reapportionment of state legislatures all across the nation. The principle of one man-one vote of the Reynolds case was directly applied to the Illinois legislature with the case of Germano v. Kerner which forced a new reapportionment of the General Assembly in 1965.<sup>20</sup>

In summation the pre-COOGA General Assembly as the result of several major problems mentioned here and other not so mentioned was a legislature in clear and flagrant disfunction with the ideal model legislature formulated earlier in this paper. In the mid-1960's forces both inside and outside the General Assembly began to move this body towards the model legislature of this

paper. These outside forces included the U.S. Supreme Court and various other groups such as academics. The inside forces consisted of the emerging group of pro-reform legislators.

The 1964 at-large election served as the spark which set off the legislature reform movement in Illinois. It did so because, as was stated earlier, a large member of the newly elected legislators were the so called "blue ribbon" or pro-reform legislators. In his Implications of Legislative Reform in Illinois Samuel Gove describes the situation faced by these new blue ribbon members of the General Assembly as they took office in 1965.

"Surrounded as they were by criticism from both inside and outside the legislature, the new members of the 1965 General Assembly could not help but be aware of the deficiencies of their institution. Due to the constant increase in the number of bills introduced in the General Assembly, the end of session "logjam" was becoming a serious and universally deplored problem. Even less progressive members were acutely aware that inadequate consideration was given to bills because of lack of time. Many members were openly critical of the functioning of the committees."21

The outcome of these feelings was the COOGA Commission.

(During the interview section of my research Rep. Pierce arranged for me to talk to former Rep. Katz on the phone. Prior to giving the phone over to me he jokingly referred to the commission as being called COOGA when he agreed with it and Katz when we did not). House bill 163 introduced by Representative Harold Katz and cosponsored by a large number of other representatives provided for the establishment of this commission. The bill itself attracted

neither much opposition or attention and was signed into law by Governor Kerner on May 29, 1965.<sup>22</sup>

Unlike the many other commissions created with little noticed by the General Assembly the COOGA Commission, unexpectedly did have some success in initiating actual legislative reform. Many of its recommendations were actual carried out several years later in the 1970 Constitution.

Of the eighty-seven recommendations of the COOGA Commission thirteen were either resolved or acted upon in some manner by the 1970 Constitution as can be determined by studying the excellent review of action taken on the original COOGA Report (1967) recommendations which is contained in the COOGA Commissions 1977 update COOGA: Ten Years Later. Most of these recommendations relate to the role of the General Assembly in state government. (Separations of powers) or have the intent of expanding the powers of and professionalization of the General Assembly within the functions of state government (federalism).

Recommendation no. 1 which was implemented by the 1970 Constitution called for annual sessions of the General Assembly unlimited either in length or subject matter. This, clearly serves to expand the functions of the legislative branch vis a vis the governor as well as to expand the scope of the matters dealt with by the General Assembly vis a vis the national government. Recommendation no. 2 provided for the presiding officers of both houses of the General Assembly to be able to call into special session that body which is clearly of the same intent as recommendation no. 1.



The suggestion that the constitutional debt limitations be increased to a more realistic level was contained recommendation no. 5 of the original COOGA Report. This is once again a method of attempting to expand the power of state government and give to it a freer hand within its sphere of operations. This provision was also included in the 1970 Constitution as was the suggestion in recommendation no. 3 that the allowances for legislators mileage and other expenses be removed from the constitution so that they could be henceforth set by law. This serves the purpose of increasing the independence of the General Assembly obviously fitting into the concept of separation of power as does recommendation no. 6 which when incorporated into the 1970 Constitution gave the legislature more power over state contracts.

This Constitution does provide for a later effective date for new laws as suggested in recommendation no. 11. The purpose of this was to allow the public access to the new laws prior to their taking effect a function of representative democracy. A very important action of the constitution relating to separation of powers and contained in recommendation no. 12 spells out a time table for gubernatorial review of bills following their passage. This clearly resulted in an increase of legislative power in relation to the authority of the governor.

In addition to the thirteen COOGA recommendations resolved in the 1970 Constitution an additional sixty more were acted upon in some manner by non-constitutional methods as of the 1977 COOGA: Ten Years Later report. That left a remaining fourteen

which had yet to be implemented. Of these sixty upon which non-constitutional action was taken their extents can be divided fairly equally into the headings of separation of powers, federalism, and representative democracy.<sup>23</sup>

Many of the COOGA recommendations dealt directly with the concept of separation of powers, as the suggestion of recommendation no. 76, since made law, that the governor must submit to the General Assembly his budget by a specific date. Though only partially adopted recommendations no. 78 provided that all major appropriation bills which are made to conform to the Governor's budget be identified as doing so. Both of these measures served to make the legislature a more nearly equal partner of the executive branch in state policy-making. Several other recommendations of COOGA are in this same view designed specifically to strengthen the role of the General Assembly in the appropriations process. For the most part these recommendations (nos. 80, 81 and 82) were also only partially implemented.<sup>24</sup>

There are an equally large group of the original COOGA recommendations that were acted upon by the General Assembly which fall into the category of affecting the federal system. Many of this reforms were seemingly minor procedural changes made with the goal of making the legislature more efficient which, however, in the long run, by increasing the capabilities of the General Assembly have an effect on the national state governmental relationship.

Another large category of these reforms relate to questions involving membership. Examples of these are recommendation

nos. 58 and 59 which provided for individual offices and more secretarial assistance for legislators. Two additional reforms involve changes affecting bills. One of these called for the utilization of computers to assist in keeping track of and in processing bills. The such reform required the inclusion of a Legislative Reference Bureau synopses with each bill.<sup>25</sup>

All of these reforms had an affect on our federal system of government. One of the main reasons for the tilting of the governmental balance of power in favor of the national government which became evident after 1929 was the increasing complexities of the demands put upon our governments. State governments did not have the capabilities to deal with these problems so a resulting shift in the balance took place. The reforms of the types mentioned above took place and are taking place in Illinois and all over the nation in order to attempt to swing the balance back toward the states.

The final category in which the original COOGA recommendations which were acted upon prior to COOGA 1977 update report are those which relate to the concept of representative democracy. They involve both major applications of these concept which are making the legislature more representative and accessible to its constituents and making the legislature more open and internally democratic.

Of the reforms that fall into the latter application these dealt primarily with reforms of the committee system. By far the most important of there was the adoption of COOGA recommendation no. 48 which prohibited the use of proxy voting in

in committee. Also adopted in part were COOGA recommendations requiring that a bill be heard in within sixty days of being introduced and that no bill be allowed to languish indefinitely in Committee.<sup>26</sup>

Many other COOGA initiated reforms relate to making the General Assembly more democratic externally. Some of these involved committees such as requiring public notice prior to committee hearings and requiring that the committee chairman provide an opportunity for testimony from all groups wishing to give testimony. Additional steps taken which made the General Assembly more representative and/or accessible included provisions for making available to the public and media copies of new laws as soon as possible. Another COOGA inspired reform provides for the annual and timely printing of the rules of the session. Additional space was also allocated to news media personnel covering the General Assembly reflecting the fact that in our modern society access by the electronic media to the actions of the legislature has become the most important method of access to the political system for the average citizen.

After looking at the legislative reforms made in Illinois which were initiated by the COOGA Commission in detail and studying the intent behind these reforms it becomes evident that these reforms were not merely a number of "band-aid" responses to particular malfunctions of our legislatures but rather a series of actions designed to produce a specific result. The desired result was to strengthen the General Assembly and the methods of attempting this were to make that body more nearly the equal of

the executive branch, to increase its capabilities to perform its function which also automatically, increases the capabilities of state government as a whole and finally to make it more democratic internally and more representative and responsive extremely.

As an addition measure of the legislative reform movement in Illinois the Citizens Conference's The Sometimes Government can be once again utilized. It has already been noted that the Citizens Conference ranked the General Assembly as the third best state legislature in the nations in the 1971 study. In its section on Illinois noted was the progress made in reform since the 1964 election and the formation of the COOGA Commission. The changes as included in the 1970 constitution are mentioned as well. Special merit is given to the General Assembly capabilities in the areas of professional staffing, access of the media and abilities for unlimited sessions. The final part of the Conference's report on the General Assembly consisted of its recommendations which were given to each state. In the case of Illinois twenty-one recommendations were given.

Of these twenty-one recommendations many overlap the eighty-seven recommendations of COOGA and as is the case with the COOGA recommendations must have been resolved either constitutional or by changes in the rules of the General Assembly. What follows is a summary of the more important of the twenty-one recommendations and their current states.

Recommendation 1) Reduce the overall size of the legislature.

There should be 100 or fewer members in the house and a combined size of both house between 100 and 150.

The Cutback Amendment reduced the size of the House from 177 members down to 111 for a combined total of 177.

Recommendation 5) Reduce the number of committees to between ten and fifteen in each house, parallel in jurisdiction.

The Handbook of the Eight-Second General Assembly lists twenty-one Senate committees and twenty-three House committees. They were not parallel in jurisdiction.

Recommendation 6) Provide single-member districts.

The 1980 Cutback Amendment accomplished this as well.

Recommendation 7) Provide private, individual office space for every member of the legislature.

This has been done.

Recommendation 9) Provide an electric roll call recorder for the Senate.

This has been done.

Recommendation 10) Require committees to issue reports describing and explaining the committees action on bills.

According to The Handbook of the 32nd General Assembly the rules of the House require the clerk of each committee to file with the clerk of the House. A "Committee History", a "Committee Action Report", and a "Record of Committee Witness" on each bill or resolution considered by the committee.<sup>27</sup>

The Senate required similar records.<sup>28</sup>

Recommendation 14) Establish a Washington D.C. office for legislation.

This had not been done.

Recommendation 15) Increase legislative compensation which in the better states should be in the \$20,000 to \$30,000 range.

the many changes in the regulations of the General Assembly which, taken together, have made it more democratic and open.

As far as what initiated the reforms which he is so closely related with Katz's initial response was that he did not know. He went on to say that legislative reform was a national movement during the 1960's and early 1970's but he still felt that it was impossible to determine how and why that process spread to Illinois at the specific time that it did.

When asked what he felt was the most important legislative reform yet to be made Katz again referred to due process. Due process, he said, especially in the area of committees has "a long way to go". Specifically, he mentioned the right of the people to be heard in committee hearings. Some other reforms Mr. Katz mentioned as being needed and yet to be acted upon involved what he referred to as "eleventh hour" conference committee reports and the continued use of "shell bills" or bills whose details are filled in at a later time. Also, Katz felt that the amendatory veto presented a significant due process problem.

Because of the special position of Harold Katz in the history of legislative reform in Illinois in addition to the five questions asked of the other two interview subjects I also asked Katz if he thought the COOGA Commission which he chaired had been successful. Katz said that he thought COOGA had accomplished a great deal, but that reforming the General Assembly was a "never ending struggle."

In summary of the interviews all three subjects agreed that the reforms of the 1960's and 1970's had a significant impact on the performance of the General Assembly and all three felt that the performance of the General Assembly was better now than before these reforms had been made.

In discussing the reforms they thought to be the most important all three mentioned reforms relating to committees first. Primary among these was the elimination of proxy voting in committee and more openness to public input both of which would surely fall within Harold Katz's definition of due process.

On the question of what initiated this process the three, however, seemed to divide with Matijevich stressing the bad image of the General Assembly, Pierce the 1964 at-large House election, and Katz saying he was unsure. The final question also resulted in three different responses as to what needs yet to be done in the way of legislative reform. Matijevich feels something must be done about the volume of bills. Pierce feels the same about the tendency of centralized control of the staff, and Katz again calling for additional reform in the area of due process. This can be interpreted as indicating two different areas of emphasis. Pierce and Matijevich emphasized reforms which relate directly to the output of the General Assembly and Katz emphasizing reforming the procedures of the General Assembly.

The clear conclusion then to be drawn, then, from the three legislators interviewed is that the reforms of the 1960's and 1970's did succeed in improving the performance of the performance of the General Assembly at least in the manner utilized by these three men in evaluating this performance.



The last point brings into question the fact that since all three of those interviewed were of such similiar backgrounds (ie. suburban Democrats) perhaps that way in which they evaluate the performance of the General Assembly does not accurately reflect the views of the body as a whole. To this I have two responses. First of all I feel that the issue of legislative reform is largely, but admittedly not entirely, cuts across parlisan and regional conflicts. Secondly, due to the limitations mentioned earlier, the three legislators interviewed were the best "cross section" of the current members of the General Assembly who had been members in 1967 available to me.

The next section of this paper is an attempt to analysis the results of the Illinois legislative reform movement through the use of relevant statistics. Though such an analysis, obviously, is made to obtain an objective consideration of legislative performance it can not claim to be totally so. From the very beginning, in the choice of what statistics are considered relevant, subjectiveness enters into the analysis. The four sets of statistics I have chosen as measures of the performance of the General Assembly: are the number of bills introduced into the General Assembly, the day spent in session by the General Assembly, the work load of the committee and the rates of bill passages.\*

The number of bill's introduced into the General Assembly can serve as a measure of the demands placed upon that body from the outside political environment. Without a measure of the level of these demands over the time we are studying, it is impossible to analysis the change in the performance over time.

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\* TABLES AT END

The second statistical measure the number of days spent in session is an excellent way of operationalizing the reaction of the General Assembly to any changes in the demands being placed upon it. It also demonstrates to what degree the General Assembly is utilizing its greater control over its own life, one of the most significant reforms.

The workload of the committee includes both statistics on the percentage of bills referred to committee and the percentage of bills reported favorably. These statistics provide a measure of the degree in which the General Assembly Committees are performing their functions of screening and studying bills an intent which many of the reforms hoped to bring about.

The final statistic is that of the percentage of bills introduced which are eventual passed by both houses of the General Assembly. This is a measure of the performance of the state legislature in the sense that a small percentage of bills passed should reflect an increased degree of consideration of the issues involved which is a clear method of determining an improvement in performance.

All of these statistics were taken from An Introduction to the General Assembly by Samuel Gove and Richard Carlson and cover the years 1965-1971 during which a large proportion of the reforms discussed in this paper were put into effect.

The first point of interest revealed by Table 1 is the substantial increase in bill introductions from 74th General Assembly (1965) till the 77th General Assembly (1971-72). If the number of bills introduced in the 74th General Assembly is

fixed at 100 then the number of bills introduced in the 75th General Assembly (1967-68) becomes equal to 141, the number of bills introduced in the 76th General Assembly (1969-70) 150, and the bills introductions of the 77th General Assembly (1971-72) 176. However, of important note is that a large proportion of this increase of bill introductions was not made in the traditional pre-reform January-June odd year sessions, but in the post-reform fall and even-year sessions of the General Assembly. In the 74th General Assembly (1965) 100% of the bills were introduced from January to June of the odd year. During the 75th General Assembly 84% of the introductions were made in this period. The 76th General Assembly (1969-70) introduced 78% of its bills during this time and the 77th General Assembly (1971-72) 76% of its introductions. What these figures seem to be saying is that in the late 1960's and early 1970's the General Assembly expanded its working time as allowed by the new reforms to meet increased demands being put upon it is the form of bill introductions.

The statistics given in Table 2 clearly reinforce this hypothesis. Since little in the way of legislative reforms took place prior to the 74th General Assembly the days spent in session in 1963 can be used as a base equal to 100. Using this method the days spent in regular session by the House in the 77th General Assembly (1971-72) are equal to 111. The days spent by the House in perfunctory session in which routine business such as bill introductions are performed becomes 2900. The corresponding figures for the Senate are even larger. In

the case of regular days in session the 1971-72 figure is 218 relative to 1963 and an increase up to a figure of 200 an even 200% more over 1963 for day spent in prefunctory session.

Table 3 appears to support the hypothesis that the General Assembly increased its work effort to keep up with the increasing demands being put upon it. The committee in both the Senate and the House dealt with (had referred to them) a larger number of bills each year from 1963 on. Once again using 1963 as a base year equal to 100 the increases in bills heard by House committees rose to 118 in 1965, 149 in 1967, 176 in 1969, and 200 in 1971. The corresponding figures for the Senate committees were 110 in 1965, 163 in 1967, 165 in 1969, and 176 in 1971.

As far as the percentage of bills introduced referred to committee and the percentage of bill referred to committee reported favorably there is no discernable one directional pattern over time. There is, however, a clear pattern on a year by year basis between the two houses.

The information in Table 4 dealing with bill passage does not on the surface seem to be helpful in determining the performance of the General Assembly. This is because for the figures of the percentage of bills failing to obtain passage in their chamber of origin there would not appear to be significant change in the ten years being compared. The same can be said in reference to the percentage of bills failing in the record chamber with the exception of the figures for 1971 which are so far out of proportion to the other percentages they can not be used in the analysis without further information. The fact that

there is little change in these percentages, however, is of interest. The number of bills introduced into the General Assembly increased from 2,680 in 1961 to 5,084 in 1971.<sup>33</sup> In other words though the percentages involved are roughly equivalent the actual amount of work done by the General Assembly is much greater due to the almost doubling of bills introduced. The fact that approximately the same percentage of bills are being "screened out" would seem to indicate that as much consideration was given to each bill in 1961 as it was in 1971. In order to do this, the General Assembly must have substantially increased its capacity.

In summarizing the statistical analysis utilized in this paper it is first necessary to point out that the manner in which the statistics used were applied follow a cause and affect relationship. The cause was looked at as what initiated the change in the performance of the General Assembly in a statistical sense. This was determined to be the increased demands placed upon the legislative body measured statistically in terms of the numbers of bills introduced over time. The affects looked at were days in session, committee workloads, and bill passage rates.

This statistical analysis indicates that the performance of the General Assembly did improve in the time period studied. The demands on the General Assembly increased in number of bills introduced and correspondingly the General Assembly increased the number of days in session to meet that increased demand. The performance of the body also improved in terms of committee

workloads and bill message rates. Though neither increased markedly in new terms, but the increased performance is measurable in the sense that the same levels of outputs in percentages were maintained for vastly increased levels of inputs. Hence, like the interview data the statistical data supports the hypothesis that the performance of the General Assembly has improved provided the way in which it measures performance is accepted as both accurate and applicable.

The question of how the performance of the General Assembly should be measured obviously must be answered before the question of whether that performance has improved or not can be truly decided. There are several ways of looking at the performance of the General Assembly or any legislative body. One of these is in a procedural way which is the primary means employed in this paper. The other method of judging this performance is in a substantive way.

Measuring the performance of a legislature substantively entails studying its outputs in comparison to a given reference point. More specifically this can be done by looking at the legislation produced by a legislature in the terms of how successful it is in meeting the goals intended for it. For the most part, the significant legislation of a state legislature consists of attempts to solve the major problems facing the people of the state. The performance of a state legislature, it follows, can be determined by selecting a number of social problems considered to be of prime importance and studying how their legislature has reacted in dealing with these problems. In Illinois

examples of such important social problems could be the metropolitan Chicago mass transit situation, the short falls facing the state budget as a result of the recession, and the difficult questions surrounding the storage of toxic waste.

In this paper the performance of the General Assembly has not been studying in such a substantive manner, but instead in a procedural manner. A procedural method of studying legislative performance refers to looking at the procedures employed in producing legislative outputs. This is clearly the primary method used in this paper since both the statistics that were used and the interviews related, for the most part to the way in which the General Assembly's procedures had changed. These included such factors as proxy voting in committee, days in session, staffing, due process, and bill passage rates. All of these factors apply only to the methods of producing the legislative outputs and not to the substance of the outputs themselves.

In judging the performance of a legislature substantively one need only look at how successful it has been at solving certain social problems. In using the procedural method, however, it is necessary to work from a set of givens as to what procedures are to be considered positive and which are to be considered negatively. In this paper, these givens were drawn from the three concepts of separation of powers, federalism and representative democracy.

Though studying performance in a substantive method would on its face appear more accurate, objective, and applicable than

doing so by looking only at procedures the substantive method has a number of serious drawbacks. These result from the fact that social, <sup>ethnic</sup> ethnic, partisan, economics, and cultural differences affect not only what a given person would believe to be the most important social problems which need to be studied, but also affect the point at which an individual would call the performance of a legislature successful. For these reasons a substantive analysis of the performance of the General Assembly would be an extremely difficult task and why a procedural analysis has been used in this paper.

As has already been stated both the statistics gathered and the interview data supports the hypothesis that the legislative reforms of the 1960's and 1970's did improve the performance of the General Assembly, in a procedural sense. One is, however, unable, due to the limitations of the data used in this paper such as the rather narrow background these interviewed and the sometimes indecisive nature of the statistics, to claim that this evidence can be claimed to be conclusive evidence of this hypothesis.

This paper began with pointing out that no work studying state legislatures has yet been able to reach a definite correlation between legislative reform and legislative performance. As has been just concluded neither does this paper in an exclusive sense. This paper has, however, accomplished three tasks. A model of a state legislature based upon a triad of fundamental political concepts was constructed in the first section of this paper to better understand how the legislature



in practice relates to the ideal legislature desired by its constituents. In the second part of this paper the reform process in Illinois during the 1960's and 1970's was reviewed and analyzed in the context of the model constructed in the first part of the paper. Finally, in the third section, the performance of the Illinois General Assembly was analyzed and how its performance was affected by the above mentioned reform process was studied. Also in the final part of this paper was presented two methods of analyzing the performance of state legislatures.

In conclusion, the history of legislative reform in Illinois serves as an excellent example for better understanding of state legislature reform across the nation when looked at in the context of nation-wide political concepts as this paper did.

ENDNOTES

- 1) Webster's
- 2) The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, The Sometimes Governments (Kansas City, MO., 1973 3rd Ed.), preface XI.
- 3) Malcolm Jewell and Samuel Patterson, The Legislative Process in the States.
- 4) Ibid.
- 5) Ibid.
- 6) The Citizens Conference on State Legislatures, The Sometimes Governments (Kansas City, MO., 1973 3rd Ed.), p. 18.
- 7) Ibid., p. 20.
- 8) Ibid., p. 27.
- 9) Samuel Gove, "The Implications of Legislative Reform in Illinois," Prepared for Symposium on the Impact of Legislative Reform on Public Policy, G.E. Hendrichs Lectures in American Government, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, March 11-12, 1976, p. 17.
- 10) Ibid., p. 21.
- 11) Ibid., p. 23-24.
- 12) Ibid., p. 26.
- 13) Ibid., p. 26.
- 14) Ibid., p. 6.
- 15) Gilbert Steiner and Samuel Gove, Legislative Politics in Illinois, University of Illinois Press, (Urbana, 1960), p. 21.
- 16) Thomas J. Anton, The Politics of State Expenditure in Illinois, University of Illinois Press, (Urbana and London, 1966), p. 246.

17) Gilbert Steiner and Samuel Gove, Legislative Politics in Illinois, p. 86.

18) Samuel Gove, "The Implications of Legislative Reform in Illinois," p. 9-10.

19) Ibid., p. 10-11.

20) Ibid.

21) Ibid., p. 16.

22) Ibid., p. 17.

23) Illinois Commission on the Organization of the General Assembly (COOGA), (Representative Harold Katz, Chairman), "COOGA: 10 Years Later", State of Illinois, 1977.

24) Ibid., p. 49-50.

25) Ibid., p. 46.

26) Ibid., p. 44.

27) Eighty-Second General Assembly, Handbook, (State of Ill, 1981) House Rule #26, p. 330.

28) Ibid., Senate Rule #7, p. 116.

29) The World Almanac and Book of Facts 1981, (New York, 1981), p. 305.

30) Eighty-Second General Assembly, Handbook, (State of Illinois, 1981), Senate Rules p. 117, House Rules p. 328.

31) Ibid., Senate Rules p. 113, House Rules p. 314.

32) Samuel Gove, "Implications of Legislative Reform in Illinois," p. 21.

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Table 1

ILLINOIS LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL  
1963-1972

Spring in odd year	Number of Bills			
	1965	1967	1969	1971
January	38	67	32	42
February	10	42	10	54
March	10	1,200	1,200	1,200
April	10	1,200	1,200	1,200
May	10	1,200	1,200	1,200
June	33	1,200	1,200	1,200
	1,500	4,200	4,200	4,200
Fall in odd year	*	10	10	10
Spring in even year	*	10	10	10
Summer in even year	*	10	10	10
Fall in even year	*	10	10	10
Totals	3,500	5,072	5,300	5,010

\*Legislature didn't meet.

<sup>2</sup>See Senate Rule 5 and House Rule 32(c) of the 77th General Assembly.

Table 2

DAYS IN SESSION, 1963-1972

	1963	1965	1967	1969	1971	1972	1963-1965	1967-1969	1971-1972
House									
regular	66	68	66	69	62	64	76	94	112
perfunctory	2	2	12	2	9	1	17	12	10
Totals	74	70	78	71	71	65	93	106	122
Senate									
regular	61	61	66	64	67	66	61	90	100
perfunctory	1	17	15	1	14	1	17	12	15
Totals	62	78	81	65	81	67	78	102	115

SOURCE: Illinois Legislative Council, clerk of the House of Representatives, and Secretary of the Senate.

\*Through June 30, 1972.

	Bills Introduced		Bills Passed		Bills Referred to Committee		Bills Passed by Second Chamber	
	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate	House	Senate
1971	4,117	3,111	3,114	2,117	3,114	2,117	3,114	2,117
1969	3,700	3,130	3,132	2,134	3,132	2,134	3,132	2,134
1967	3,321	3,111	3,115	2,117	3,115	2,117	3,115	2,117
1965	3,328	2,111	2,115	1,117	2,115	1,117	2,115	1,117
1963	2,540	2,111	2,114	1,117	2,114	1,117	2,114	1,117
1961	2,354	2,111	1,846	1,117	1,846	1,117	1,846	1,117

SOURCE: Illinois Legislative Council, "Final Status of Bills" (1961-69).  
 Illinois, Senate Journal (1971) III:4881-5194; House Journal  
 (1971) IV:7443-819.

<sup>a</sup>Includes bills introduced and bills received from the second chamber.

<sup>b</sup>Percentage of all bills considered.

<sup>c</sup>Percentage of all bills referred to committee.

Table 4  
 BILL PASSAGE BY HOUSE  
 1961-1971

Regular Session	Bills Failing Chamber of Origin <sup>a</sup>		Bills Failing Second Chamber <sup>b</sup>	
	House	Senate	House	Senate
1971	36%	38%	39%	43%
1969	36%	32%	14%	11%
1967	31%	25%	16%	13%
1965	28%	20%	13%	14%
1963	40%	30%	9%	8%
1961	34%	36%	11%	7%

<sup>a</sup>Percentage of all bills introduced.

<sup>b</sup>Percentage of all bills passed by the House of origin.

SOURCE: (Tables 5 and 6) Illinois Legislative Council, "Final Status of Bills" (1961-69). Illinois, Senate Journal (1971) III:4881-5194; House Journal (1971) IV:7443-819.