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TOWARD NAZI GERMANY DURING WORLD WAR II

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**SWEDEN'S FOREIGN POLICY
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BY

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INTRODUCTION

Sweden's foreign policy toward Nazi Germany during World War Two makes for an interesting case study because the country faced so many dilemmas. The country's foreign policy makers had to answer questions such as: Can Sweden afford to be neutral at a time when a ruthless dictator threatened all of Europe and who, if successful in his war, would undoubtedly attack Sweden sooner or later? What price should Sweden be willing to pay to stay out of the war in the face of German demands which infringe upon a "strict neutrality"? Is it morally justifiable to make concessions to Germany which contribute to its war drive, such as its occupation of Norway, in order to avoid German reprisals?

This paper will examine the manner in which Swedish foreign policy makers dealt with the above questions. In addition, the goals behind Sweden's neutrality policy will be examined, as well as theories of how Sweden avoided the war. They provide the framework in which the foreign policy makers had to work. The historical development of Swedish neutrality will be dealt with in Chapter 1, while the goals in which the policy was based on will be dealt with in Chapter 2. Theories of how Sweden avoided the war will be considered in Chapter 3.

After providing the context in which Swedish neutrality had to operate, the following chapters will examine specific cases in which Sweden's neutrality was tested by Germany. Chapter 4 discusses Sweden's controversial iron ore and ball bearing exports to Germany; Chapter 5 examines German troop transfers through Sweden to Norway; and Chapter 6 treats German troop transports through Sweden to Finland. Chapter 7 looks at German attempts to influence Sweden's domestic policy. Finally, Chapter 8 considers the question: Was Sweden's foreign policy morally justifiable?

PART I

**THE BACKGROUND
TO
SWEDEN'S FOREIGN POLICY**

CHAPTER 1

THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF SWEDISH NEUTRALITY

Swedish neutrality differs from the "traditional" neutrality in the sense that it is self-imposed and can be abandoned if the government decides to change its foreign policy.¹ In contrast, most neutral countries have their neutrality guaranteed by other countries through international treaties. Belgium's former neutrality was guaranteed by Russia, Britain, Austria, France and Prussia in the Treaty of 1839. Other countries following this pattern are Luxembourg and Austria. Even Switzerland's neutrality was granted through the treaty of Vienna in 1815, although according to Roderick Ogley, the country was "originally neutral by choice,"² and has been for the last century.

ORIGINS OF SWEDISH NEUTRALITY

Peter Lyon places the beginning of Sweden's neutralism at the end of its last war in 1813. According to him, the policy began after Sweden had supported Britain in the final Napoleonic war, "because realistic appraisals of national strength always moderated any initial impulse to adopt an adventurous foreign policy."³ Nils Andrén regards Swedish foreign policy at this time as "the peace policy of a small and weak state, (which) was as yet hardly a policy of deliberate 'neutrality.'"⁴ He also notes that Sweden had still entertained hopes of regaining Finland until the middle of the 19th century.

In fact, Sweden came close to entering wars several times in the mid 1800s. W. M. Carlgren points out that Sweden considered entering wars against the German Confederation in 1848, Russia in 1856 and Prussia-Austria in 1863.⁵ Since 1863 was the last time Sweden seriously considered entering a war, Rolf

Karlson chooses it as the starting point of Sweden's "strict" neutrality.⁶ However, the Swedish critic, Roland Huntford, mentions that "the Swedes did not make their profession as a neutral until the outbreak of the First World War."⁷

The discussion above shows that there is no wide agreement as to when Swedish neutrality "really" began. Huntford is of the opinion that Sweden waited until the war broke out, because it was an opportunistic decision based on the realization that Sweden's economy would benefit most by avoiding war, and subsequently carrying out extensive trade with Germany. Although this may have been the motivation behind many Conservatives in the government, it should be noted that Sweden had a growing peace movement which was heavily supported by Socialist and many Liberal politicians.⁸ The peace movement had been campaigning since the middle 1850's for officially declared neutrality on moralistic grounds. In fact, this movement is often given credit for preventing a war with Norway when the latter dissolved the Swedish-Norwegian union in 1905. So the conservative government's decision to declare itself neutral during World War I was probably influenced as much by the strong neutral sentiment within public opinion as by the calculation that it served the country's economic interests. Finally, it should be noted that this conflict between conservatives who were willing to follow a more economically opportunistic, pro-German policy, and a more moralistic Left favoring a strict neutrality, reoccurred during World War II.

SWEDISH NEUTRALITY DURING WORLD WAR ONE

Despite Sweden's declared neutrality, conservative and upper-class circles often displayed pro-German sentiment.⁹ During the early years of World War I, in which a Conservative government was in power, Swedish trade policy favored Germany.¹⁰ However, when the Liberals came to power in October 1917, they were attacked by conservatives for being pro-West. Regardless of whether a group was

"pro-German" or "pro-Nest," the overwhelming consensus was that Sweden should stay out of the war.¹¹

THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

After World War I ended, Sweden entered the League of Nations, with the hope that the international organization could guarantee Sweden's and Europe's security. Anrén claims that Sweden's entry into the League "meant at least in form a deviation from the deliberate policy of neutrality...."¹² The reason being that the League had the power to use military force against other nations. As a participant in the League, Sweden could consequently be called upon to send its soldiers to fight against a country in which the League demanded sanctions again. He adds that although the charter was originally set-up for the victorious powers of World War I, Sweden supported the defeated powers' entry into the League.

Once the immense military build-up by the super-powers began in the 1930's, Sweden started questioning the League's ability to maintain peace in Europe. The Swedes also worried that adherence to the League's sanctions could draw them into war, so in 1936 the country announced that it was no longer bound by the League's sanctions. In addition, the country began a rearmament program that year in order to dissuade the Great Powers from invading if war were to break out.¹³

THE SOVIET-FINNISH WAR

When the Soviet Union attacked Finland, on November 30, 1940, Sweden did not declare itself neutral. Irene Scobble characterizes Sweden's policy as having been "non-belligerent" during this war.¹⁴ At the beginning of the war, only humanitarian and economic aid was given to Finland, but eventually war materials and volunteers were sent.¹⁵ The total number of Swedish volunteers sent there has been calculated to be 9,000, while the amount of aid given has been estimated at around 400 million Swedish crowns.¹⁶ Lars Krantz lists 22 planes, 75 anti-tank

guns, 250 cannons and 90,000 rifles among Sweden's military aid to Finland.¹⁷ Sweden's assistance to Finland obviously deviated from its policy of neutrality.

Sweden justified its support of Finland in its "Winter War" with Russia on the ground of its "local character."¹⁸ In contrast to the German occupation of Denmark and Norway, which involved several superpowers (France, Britain and Germany), the Soviet-Finnish confrontation was seen as a conflict between two neighbors. Since Finland happened to be Sweden's neighbor and a Scandinavian one at that, it was Sweden's duty to help Finland fend off Russia's attack.¹⁹

Critics of Sweden's Finnish policy claim that the real objective was to fight communism rather than to help a neighbor. Many communists were particularly bitter that the government encouraged volunteers fight against communism, while only a few years earlier forbidding volunteers to travel to Spain in order to fight against fascism.²⁰

CONCLUSION

Even though Sweden has not fought in a war since 1813, the above examples show that its neutral policy has not prevented its leaders from sympathizing with warring countries. During World War I, the Conservatives were supportive of Germany, while many Liberals were pro-West. During the Winter War, most non-Communists favored Finland, and the Social Democratic government faced heavy pressure from Conservatives to sharply increase Sweden's Finnish commitment. In summation, it can be said that although most politicians accepted the idea of neutrality, they saw it in the narrow sense of not entering alliances or engaging in official military operations on the side of a warring nation. Furthermore, as this paper will show, when it appeared that Germany would win the war, some Conservative and military leaders even favored openly abandoning the policy of neutrality in order to help Germany's war against the Soviet Union.

CHAPTER 2

THE AIM OF SWEDEN'S FOREIGN POLICY

After the outbreak of World War II, the legal advisor to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, Östen Undén, stated that Sweden would follow a policy of strict neutrality based on the 1907 Haag Convention.²¹ In a speech given by Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson on June 29, 1941, he used a looser definition of neutrality by stating that "the central point in our (Sweden's) policy the whole time has been to seek to keep us (Sweden) out of war."²² Less than two months later, Defence Minister Per Edvin Sköld added retention of full independence to Hansson's goal of keeping Sweden out of war.²³ The statements by Hansson and Sköld imply that by 1941, Swedish leaders were already prepared to make concessions which could help one great power win the war against the others. Consequently, Sweden had already given up its goal of following a policy of strict neutrality, in favor of a policy aimed at keeping the country out of war and maintaining its independence.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs also felt that Sweden should be prepared to depart from a policy of strict neutrality in order to remain out of the war. It was felt that the great powers would not respect the rules of international law regarding neutrality. Not only could Germany be expected to disregard neutrality laws in its quest for world domination, even the Allies would likely disregard these laws in order to defeat Hitler. So Sweden's neutrality in the upcoming war would have to be different from the neutral policy it carried out during World War I.²⁴

Since the great powers could not be expected to respect the rules of inter-

national law, Sweden felt it could not be expected to follow them. Carlgren sums up Sweden's policy as follows: "The term 'a policy of neutrality' covered all measures which served to keep Sweden out of war, whether or not they were consistent with the rules of neutrality in international law."²⁵ Consequently, Sweden was willing to make large concessions to Germany, such as allowing the transfer of German troops through Sweden to Norway and Finland, in order to prevent an invasion. In both of these cases, remaining out of the war proved more important for Sweden than maintaining its neutrality.

CHAPTER 3

HOW SWEDEN AVOIDED THE WAR

In retrospect, it is rather surprising that Sweden was able to avoid being dragged into World War II. All three of its Scandinavian neighbors became involved in the war, even though they also tried to maintain a policy of neutrality when the war broke out. After the Soviet Union invaded Finland on November 30, 1940, many Swedes worried that the Soviets would try to extend themselves westward. Consequently, the Swedes were willing to help their neighbor fight off the "Bolshevik threat." Sweden gave Finland military aid which included sending volunteers.²⁶ In addition, a unity government was formed involving all of the non-Communist parties in parliament, so that the country would be united in its willingness to defend itself.²⁷ Even though the Soviet threat seemed very real to many Swedes, few believed that either Germany or the Western Powers would consider invading Scandinavia. They assumed that it was in both sides' interests to keep the area neutral as they did in World War I.

The German invasion of Denmark and Norway on April 9, 1940 changed the situation drastically. At the time of the invasions, Swedish forces had not been mobilized because the country's leaders had still thought that they were safe from invasion, despite intelligence reports that such an invasion had been planned.²⁸ The Swedish leadership now realized that they were in fact susceptible to attack so they began mobilizing their military forces.

When Sweden was busy mobilizing its forces in April of that year, Germany demanded that it be allowed to send troops to Norway through Sweden.²⁹ Sweden refused, arguing that it would be giving up its neutrality by helping one nation

defeat another. However, once Norway capitulated, the Germans argued that the transports would no longer be helping it in a war. Fearing that a negative answer would lead to an invasion, Sweden agreed to the transport of both sick and vacationing soldiers through Sweden to and from Norway, as long as the number coming always equaled the numbers leaving.

After the transports were allowed in the summer of 1940, relations between Germany and Sweden were fairly good. Sweden became almost totally dependent on Germany for its imports after the Nazis blockaded the North Sea, but Norway received favorable trade rates from Germany in return for Sweden's iron ore and ball bearing exports.³⁰ Relations between the two countries worsened the following spring when Sweden noticed that Germany was sending more soldiers to Norway than were returning. The transports continued from the end of February to the end of March because Germany needed to mobilize troops in preparation for its upcoming invasion of the Soviet Union. Sweden reluctantly agreed to the transfers but was able to set a limit which was much lower than the original German demands. When Germany was ready to launch its invasion in the summer of that same year, Sweden was faced with similar demands, only this time Germany demanded permission to transfer its troops from Norway to Finland through Sweden.³¹ Again, Sweden consented and 15,000 soldiers were sent to Finland, although later requests were turned down.

With German soldiers in Finland, Sweden found itself completely surrounded by Germany. Germany was supporting Finland to Sweden's east, while occupying Norway and Denmark to Sweden's west. In addition, Norway and Finland border Sweden's northern boundary, while Germany itself lies to Sweden's south. In spite of Sweden's weak bargaining position, the Finnish transfer was the last major concession that it made to Germany.

As the Allies improved their standing in the war, Sweden began receiving pressure from them to lower their trade with Germany and to cancel the troop

transport agreements.³² In 1943, Sweden cancelled its troop transport agreement with Germany, and the following year trade levels dropped off. By the end of 1944, Swedish-German trade had almost completely stopped. A few months later, the war ended, and Sweden had managed to be one of the few European countries which had avoided the war.

How could a small, isolated country, which was surrounded by one of the world's most powerful and expansionistic countries avoid attack in a war in which the powerful country was aiming for world domination?

Many reasons have been given for Sweden's ability to avoid a Nazi attack. The most important of these can be classified into four different categories: luck, military, economic and political explanations.

LUCK

It has been argued that factors outside Sweden's control played a large role in the country's ability to escape being attacked. The most commonly given factors pertain to the balance of power, Sweden's geography, and Hitler's military priorities.

Supporters of the balance of power theory, claim that the power balance was upset when the Soviet Union signed the non-aggression treaty with Nazi Germany. Once the power balance was disturbed, the countries which lay between the power blocks became most vulnerable. Thus, Russia attacked Finland because it needed a buffer zone to protect it from a possible war with Germany. Similarly, Norway and Denmark were attacked by Germany because they were situated between the two largest power blocks: the German and British. Sweden was lucky enough not to lie in an area which was needed to maintain the balance of power. If, for example, Britain had attacked Norway and Denmark, then Germany would have been forced to attack Sweden in order to protect itself from Britain and thus maintain the power balance.³³

A problem with the balance of power theory is that it over-estimates military factors in keeping Sweden out of the war. Although an unbalance of power could have caused an invasion, it is very likely that political and economic factors also could have brought about an attack. Since Germany was rather dependent on Swedish iron ore and ball bearing imports, a decision to cut off this trade could have likely led to a German invasion, regardless of how "balanced" the powers were.³⁴

Sweden's geography made it a less appealing target than the other Scandinavian countries. It is much larger than them in both land and population.³⁵ More important than its size was its geographic location. Both Norway and Denmark provided a buffer zone between England and Germany, making them useful as launching pads for attacking Britain. In contrast, Sweden could not be used as a launching pad against any of the great powers. Even though Sweden's geography may have acted as a disincentive to Hitler, it certainly would have not have been a strong enough one to prevent an attack, since the Soviet Union is certainly larger than Sweden in both land and population.

A more important factor which helped keep Sweden out of the war was Hitler's military priorities. France, Poland and Russia were all more populous than Sweden, but were attacked because they were higher priorities for Germany, even though they brought higher costs than an invasion of Sweden. As Gunnar Hägglöf put it, Sweden wasn't attacked due to "the simple fact that Hitler had other plans to pursue."³⁶ He argues that when Hitler attacked Norway and Denmark, he also had plans to attack France, and too many military units would delay it.³⁷ After the Norwegian and Danish invasions April 9, 1940, the next big war scare for Sweden occurred in February, 1942. During that month, rumors of a pending German invasion began floating.³⁸ Erik Boheman, who was then Secretary-General of the Swedish Foreign Ministry, believes that Hitler decided against an attack because it would take away too many soldiers from the spring offensive against Russia.³⁹ Even if other military engagements were not the deciding factor in keeping Hitler


from attacking Sweden, there is little doubt that the country would have eventually faced the ultimatum of joining the Nazi's New Order or being invaded if Germany had won the war.

MILITARY EXPLANATIONS

A Swedish invasion would have been more costly for Hitler than the invasions of either Denmark or Norway, because the former had a much stronger defense system than the latter.⁴⁰ When Norway and Denmark were attacked, Sweden had already mobilized around 90,000 soldiers. A few weeks later, more than 320,000 men were under arms.⁴¹ As rumors spread of a German attack in February, 1942, the armed forces quickly increased their totals from approximately 160,000 in the previous month to nearly 260,000. (See the graph below).

GRAPH 1

Swedish Military Mobilization⁴²



Even though there is little doubt that Sweden could not hold out more than a few months at most against a German attack, many observers feel it was long enough to dissuade Hitler from invading since the drain on manpower would slow down his operations elsewhere.⁴³ Again, if Sweden were a higher military priority, it still would have been attacked, despite its military strength, since it was much

weaker than other countries which Germany invaded.

Not everyone is in agreement that Sweden was able to mobilize sufficiently enough to act as a deterrent. Bengt Åhslund writes, "That (Sweden's) military preparedness was insufficient in the presence of the threat which Sweden faced during the Second World War's beginning, and during its first year, is beyond any doubt."⁴⁴ General Olof Thörnell, who was Commander-in-Chief of the Swedish Armed Forces during World War II, has also claimed that the rearmament program which began in 1936 was "unsatisfactory."⁴⁵

Despite warnings of a possible German attack in Scandinavia which reached Sweden as early as March, 1940, Foreign Minister Christian Günther convinced the government to turn down Thörnell's request for increased southern mobilization, because he still did not believe that an attack was likely.⁴⁶ Boheman argues, at the time of the German attacks on Norway and Denmark, Sweden was actually weaker militarily than at the beginning of the war.⁴⁷ Captain Christer Wahlgren claims that when the invasion began on April 9, 1940, almost no troops had been assembled in Southern Sweden - which was a short boat ride away from the German occupied Copenhagen.⁴⁸ Even after the rapid mobilization occurred in April and May, Günther gave a "defeatist" talk at a June cabinet meeting while discussing Sweden's possibility of defending itself against Germany. At the same meeting, Gustaf Andersson i Rasjön, who was then the Liberal Party's leader as well as Communication Minister, actually favored demobilization so that Swedes would not become tired of being mobilized and hence lose the will to defend themselves.⁴⁹ The following month, the armed forces were reduced by over 120,000 men.⁵⁰

Even if Sweden had fully mobilized itself, that alone could not have prevented a German attack. Former Norwegian Foreign Minister Trygve Lie, admits that if he had known of the pending German offensive, he would have increased his country's military preparedness. Yet he feels that Hitler would have attacked anyway. Furthermore, he notes that Holland's mobilization of approximately

400,000 soldiers didn't prevent a Nazi invasion.⁵¹

Lie shows that a greater military mobilization could not in itself have prevented a Nazi invasion. Still, in Sweden's case, the country's ability to defend itself might have been a greater dissuasive for Hitler than it could have been in Norway, because Norway was of greater strategic importance than Sweden. Norway could be used to launch attacks on England. In addition, Norway's capture enabled Germany to have greater control over the North Sea. The Norwegian shipping town, Narvik, was also of great importance, enabling Germany to secure its iron ore imports from Sweden. Sweden was only of strategic value because of its iron ore and ball bearing exports, which Germany was able to acquire without military action. (See the discussion below of the importance of Swedish exports to Germany in keeping Sweden out of the war.) Since Sweden did not have the strategic value of Norway, Hitler was less interested in invading it. So, if Sweden were able to put up a reasonable amount of opposition, it may have been enough to dissuade Hitler from attacking. Similarly, if Sweden's defenses had been as weak as Norway's, Hitler might have considered an invasion worth the trouble in order to be assured of Swedish exports. The only thing that can be concluded for certain is that despite the fact that Sweden was stronger militarily than either Denmark or Norway, this alone cannot explain why Sweden was not attacked while the others were.

ECONOMIC FACTORS

Roderick Oglethorpe theorizes that if a belligerent country is dependent on a neutral country's resources, but its enemies are not, then that belligerent country is not likely to invade the neutral country if the resources can be obtained through trade.⁵² Germany and Sweden found themselves in this situation during the war. Germany was dependent on Swedish iron ore and was able to trade for it. Meanwhile, none of the Allied Powers imported a major share of its iron ore from Sweden before the war and, after Denmark and Norway were invaded, virtually

all of Sweden's exports to the west were cut off.⁵³

In this situation, Germany had a lot to lose by attacking Sweden and little to gain - at least in the economic sphere.⁵⁴ Gunnar Hägglöf, who was head of the commercial department of the Swedish Foreign Ministry from 1939-1941, warned German delegations on several occasions that even if the iron ore mines were not quickly destroyed, their power stations could be blown up in a matter of moments.⁵⁵ In addition, once Sweden fell under Axis control, it would be subjected to an Allied blockade which would threaten German supplies.⁵⁶ Since the Allied Powers weren't dependent on Swedish trade, they wouldn't be hurt by a German occupation of Sweden. The only advantages Germany could have received from an invasion would be in the military sphere. Of course the military sphere is a very important one, and if Hitler felt military considerations warranted it, he undoubtedly would have attacked Sweden in spite of the economic consequences.⁵⁷

POLITICAL FACTORS

Using a fairly broad definition of the political sphere, one can come up with five reasons which are most commonly given for Sweden's success in avoiding war. They are: 1) the country's political unity, 2) Sweden's ability to convince Germany that it would defend itself against a British attack, 3) Sweden's skillful diplomacy, 4) the government's mass media policy, and 5) the personal and cultural ties between the two countries.

Political Unity

Shortly after the Soviet invasion of Finland, the Social Democratic Prime Minister, Per Albin Hansson, formed a coalition government with all the parties in parliament represented except the Communists. The basic idea behind the coalition was the old notion that unity gives strength.⁵⁸ With a national consensus reached, the government could be assured the populace would support its policy. Unlike Norway, there was no organized opposition of any significance which could be used

by the Nazis to divide public opinion and thus weaken Sweden's willingness to defend itself.⁵⁹

Defense Against the British

According to Ogley, a neutral country must convince the belligerents that it will defend itself from attacks and encroachments from the opposing belligerents if it wants to remain outside a power conflict.⁶⁰ Ogley's theory appears most convincing in Sweden's case in regards to the country's relationship to Nazi Germany. Hitler had good reason to fear that Britain would launch an invasion or at least a blockade against Sweden to prevent iron ore exports to Germany.⁶¹ In order to alleviate German fears, Admiral Fabian Tramm visited Berlin several days after the Norwegian/Danish invasions in order to convince Hitler that Sweden would defend itself against a British attack.⁶² Despite Swedish assurances, the Germans were still doubtful of Sweden's attitude toward Britain. Åke Uhlin points out that Sweden's envoy to Germany, Arvid Richard, wrote to the Swedish Foreign Ministry in August, 1941 warning of German fears that Swedish troops would connect with British troops in a Norwegian landing. According to Richard, German mistrust could lead to "military action."⁶³ Even during the so-called "February Crisis" of 1942 in which rumors of a German attack made mobilization necessary, Sweden assured Germany that the mobilization occurred in order to meet possible British actions.⁶⁴ This last example can be interpreted as merely an example of Sweden's fearfulness of Germany, but it also shows that Sweden consistently emphasized its willingness to defend itself against Britain and that this emphasis played a central role in the country's German relationship.

Skillful Diplomacy

Andrén argues that in order for a neutral country to avoid war, its neutrality must be believable.⁶⁵ As argued above, it was especially important during World War Two for Germany to be convinced that Sweden would remain neutral even in face

of a British attack. The fact that Sweden had been neutral for so many years also added to its credibility. Not only did it add to Sweden's credibility, it also gave the country a lot of practical experience with neutral politics. According to several authors, Sweden's practical experiences along with its well informed and skillful diplomacy contributed to the country's ability to prevent a German attack.⁶⁶

Martin Fritz gives an interesting example of Sweden's diplomatic skills in one of his studies on Sweden's trade with Nazi Germany.⁶⁷ He uncovered documents which show that when Sweden denied Germany's requests to send weapons and troops to Norway through Sweden, the Nazis responded by cutting off war material exports. Sweden countered that they wouldn't be able to defend themselves against a British attack.⁶⁸ Of course the continuation of war material trade increased Sweden's ability to defend itself against Germany, while at the same time improving the two countries' diplomatic relationships.

Another example of Sweden's diplomatic skill was its ability to conceal Allied influence on its German trade and transit policies. After Sweden agreed to Allied demands of discontinuing German military transits through Sweden to Norway, as well as giving assurances that German trade levels would be lowered, Foreign Minister Günther presented Sweden's position to the Nazis in the summer of 1943 as being in his country's own interests.⁶⁹ No mention of the Allied demands were made. Instead, he gave the adverse effects that Germany's occupation of Norway had on both Norwegian-Swedish relationships and on German-Swedish relationships as the main reasons for Sweden's decisions. By avoiding any mention of Allied demands, Sweden was able to avoid Nazi reprisals for following the Western Powers' wishes. Nevertheless, even in this case, Hitler's reaction might have been different if he weren't preoccupied with Mussolini's fall. It is therefore doubtful that Sweden's diplomatic skill alone could have prevented a Nazi attack.

Mass Media Policy

The Swedish government's attempts to influence the mass media during the war

have often been heavily criticized.⁷⁰ Regardless of this policy's "rightness" or "wrongness," many observers think that a certain amount of censorship was needed if a Nazi invasion was to be avoided. Former Svenska Dagbladet newspaper reporter, Ivar Anderson, reports that Gunther was aware of the fact that Hitler was abnormally sensitive to his prestige and that since he had absolute power, he could be provoked by an anti-Nazi press campaign.⁷¹ The Swedish Ministry in Berlin was told that Hitler had been kept informed of anti-German articles in the Swedish press⁷² and during the two month period, July - August 1940, 25 protests were made against Swedish radio and press reports.⁷³ Another example of the importance Hitler placed on press coverage concerns the February Crisis. On February 5, 1942, the German legations's counselor named the Swedish press' position on Hitler's East campaign as one of the main reasons for the deterioration of German-Swedish relations.⁷⁴ Whether or not an untamed Swedish press would have caused Hitler to attack cannot be known; it is known that negative press reportage upset Hitler and consequently affected his attitude toward Sweden.

Personal and Cultural Ties

Sweden has had cultural ties with Germany which may have given Nazi leaders a more favorable disposition toward the country. Swedish is a Germanic language and until the Second World War ended, German was the first foreign language taught in Swedish schools.⁷⁵ German culture was the dominating influence on Swedish culture before the war, especially on the upper-classes. Similarly, Germany was not without Swedish influences. Sweden occupied a good portion of Germany during the reign of Gustav II in the 1600's. In addition, the writings of such authors as Selma Lagerlöf were glorified by Nazi propagandists trying to portray them as good "aryan" writers.⁷⁶ One might even assume that Hitler admired Sweden's supposed homogeneity (i.e. race purity).

Even though Norway and Denmark also share a Germanic heritage, it was Gustav II and Karl XII country which interested the Nordic oriented German

Thulstrup argues that this phenomenon can partially be explained by the fact that Sweden had not had conflicts in recent times with Germany. In contrast, Denmark had aroused the anger of German nationalists after receiving land from Germany in a referendum held in accordance with the Versailles Treaty.⁷⁷ Unfortunately, Thulstrup does not discuss why the Nordic-oriented Germany liked Sweden more than Norway.

Despite the cultural interest some Germans had for Sweden, it is doubtful that they had much influence in shaping Nazi foreign policy. A former Hitler associate wrote of Hitler's attitude toward Sweden: "What interested Hitler in Scandinavia in every case was not the pure Aryan blood, not the Nordic myth of Viking temperament and hero inclination (hjaltesinne). What interested him was iron ore!"⁷⁸

Personal ties between Swedes and Germans probably played a greater role in determining Nazi policy than cultural ties did. The most famous example of a Nazi having personal ties to Sweden is Herman Göring's marriage to a Swedish woman, Carin Fock. Not only did Göring have relatives in Sweden, he could also speak Swedish.⁷⁹ It is unclear to what extent Göring's Swedish sympathies affected Nazi policy. For example, Sweden's Minister in Berlin, Arvid Richert, attributed Göring's "benevolence" as one of the main reasons for the stabilization of Swedish-German relations a few weeks after the Danish/Norwegian invasions.⁸⁰ Still, Göring was often very critical of Swedish policy⁸¹ and it is doubtful that he would have let his Swedish sympathies get in the way of his ambitions for the Third Reich.

Göring isn't the only Nazi known to have Swedish sympathies - even Hitler is thought to have been sympathetic to Sweden. Prime Minister Hansson received a report from Berlin on a speech by Hitler in which he showed himself positively disposed toward Hansson.⁸² According to the report, Hitler had a weakness for people from the working class who became "folk leaders," even if they chose a different path than himself.

If Hitler's sympathies for Sweden affected his foreign policy, it is more

likely his sympathies for the king than for the prime minister which influenced him. King Gustaf V's wife was German and Hitler probably thought that the king would use his influence to keep Sweden's policy friendly toward Germany. As the German plenipotentiary Karl Schnurre once said to Sweden's Commander-in-Chief Olof Thörnell, "We can trust the king but not your politicians."⁸³ The king took advantage of his standing in Germany by giving his personal guarantee of Sweden's neutrality after the German invasion of Norway and Denmark.⁸⁴ Similarly, one and a half years later, the king gave his "warm thanks to the Führer," for his decision to wipe out "the Bolsheviek epidemic."⁸⁵ Gustav V may have been Sweden's most respected personality in Nazi Germany, but it is unlikely that this respect was placed higher than the Nazis' respect for iron ore, not to mention their desire to place Sweden under the New Order.

SUMMARY

All of the above mentioned factors probably contributed to Sweden's ability to remain outside of the war. It is clear, however, that certain factors contributed more than others. In the long run, it was circumstances outside of Sweden's control which prevented a Nazi invasion. If Hitler had won the war, a Swedish occupation would have almost certainly followed. The Norwegian and Danish invasions, along with repeated Nazi demands which encroached upon Sweden's neutrality (such as military transits through Sweden to Norway and Finland), show that Hitler had little respect for declarations of neutrality. Even though the circumstances which saved Sweden from war in the long-run were outside of the country's control, many circumstances in the short-run were inside of Sweden's control. Although Sweden was not considered strategically important in the short-run, Germany's priorities could have quickly changed if Sweden decided to cut-off iron ore exports or if Sweden had refused to allow troop transports through its territory.

PART II

FOUR CASE STUDIES

In regards to Sweden's foreign policy toward Nazi Germany, four subjects are often considered most controversial. One is the sale of iron ore and ball bearings to Germany, which the Nazi's used for its military industry. Another is the transport agreements which allowed the Nazi's to send troops through Sweden both to and from Norway. A third is the permission given to Germany to send 15,000 troops through Sweden to Finland, in preparation for the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union. A fourth is the Nazi attempt to influence Sweden's internal politics, including Sweden's censorship policy, a Communist Party ban, and the internship of Communists. Since each of these subjects are central to understanding German-Swedish relations during World War II, they will be treated in detail as individual case studies.

CHAPTER 4


CASE 1: IRON ORE AND BALL BEARING EXPORTS

Perhaps no aspect of Sweden's foreign policy was more harshly criticized by the Allies than its trade with Nazi Germany. The allies charged that Sweden's iron ore and ball bearing exports were of great importance to the Nazi military machine. In order to explain the context in which this trade occurred, Sweden's trade dependence on Germany will be examined, as well as the possible Nazi reactions to a cut-off in trade and Germany's dependence on Swedish trade. After examining the context in which the trade occurred, Sweden's trade policy will be analyzed.

DEPENDENCE ON GERMANY

When Germany invaded Norway and Denmark on April 9, 1940, it laid minefields in the northern tip of Denmark and the southern tip of Norway. According to economic historian Martin Fritz, "Sweden's foreign trade was thus at a stroke denied access to the West, whither 70% of its trade had previously been orientated."⁸⁶ Sweden became almost completely dependent on Germany for its imports of coke and coal, steel products, chemical products, oil, machinery and instruments.⁸⁷ Sweden was particularly dependent on Germany for fuel imports. Economic Historian Sven-Olof Olsson writes that during most of the war, "Sweden had to rely on German goodwill for its imports of fuel."⁸⁸

GRAPH 2



Gunnar Hägglöf claims that Sweden tried to offset its dependence on Germany by increasing trade with the Soviet Union, but it was not believable that the Soviets could deliver a "meaningful" amount of goods.⁹⁰ Sweden did, however, work out a 100 million crown trade deal with Russia on September 7, 1940.⁹¹

GERMAN REACTIONS TO IRON ORE CUT-OFFS

It is impossible to know exactly how Germany would have reacted if Sweden had cut-off all its iron ore exports. The answer depends in part on when the cancellations would have taken place. For example, in the second half of 1944, when Germany's defeat was already assured, Sweden was able to reduce its exports drastically without suffering a Nazi retaliation.⁹² If Sweden had made the same reductions at the beginning of the war, it is unlikely that the Nazis would have given such a benevolent response. At the very least, Sweden could have expected a discontinuation of German coal, coke and chemical deliveries. This was made clear when a German War Commission announced on September 7, 1939 that a delay in delivering iron ore would hurt Sweden's chances of receiving German exports.⁹³ It is extremely likely that an early cancellation of iron ore exports could have led to a German invasion. As early as 1937, Göring warned that Germany had four-year

plans to fulfill which counted on continuance of the iron ore deliveries, and therefore the iron ore would be secured at "all costs."⁹⁴ Further evidence of the importance that Germany placed on the iron ore deliveries can be seen in a document which was uncovered by a Danish parliament's investigatory commission. The document shows that the Nazis had originally planned to occupy both the important iron ore exporting town of Luleå and the railway leading from Luleå to Narvik (the other important shipping town in which Germany received most of its iron ore exports from.) In addition, the document shows the planned occupation of the northern iron ore mine fields. (See below for a reproduction of the document.)

DOCUMENT 1
THE PLANNED OCCUPATION OF
NORTHERN SWEDEN⁹⁵

Berlin, den 26. W. 4)

2. 27

Politisches und Verwaltungsausschuss bei einer Besetzung Norwegens, Dänemarks und Schwedens.

2. Bef. angriff

Januar 41

Polizentralstelle

H. Aufw. Rep. Abteilung

17. 11. 41

Hande.

17. 11. 41

1.) Den Erhebungen ist zu Grunde gelegt, daß die Existenz der nördlichen Staaten zunächst in folgendem Umfang beabsichtigt ist:

a) Norwegen.
Gesamtes strategisches Gebiet wird besetzt.
In erster Linie werden deutsche Stützpunkte geschaffen in Oslo, Arendal, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, Trondheim und Narvik.
Daneben ist gesicherter Betrieb folgender Seehäfen wichtig:
Oslo - Idsätteren - Trondheim;
Narvik - Rindögrenen - (Luleå).

b) Dänemark.
Besetzung beschränkt sich auf die Stützpunkte Helsingør und Frederiksborg.
Seeverbindung von Schweden durch Jütland nach Skagen und Seeverbindung durch Balto und Sund müssen gesichert sein.

c) Schweden.
Nur Luleå und Bahn Luleå - Narvik müssen sicher zur Verfügung stehen.
Sonst keine Besetzung.

2.) Die Erhebungen gehen von der Annahme aus, daß

a) Norwegen sich der Besetzung fügt, ohne daß es zu schwereren Kämpfen unter Beteiligung der Bevölkerung an Komplikationen kommt;

b) Dänemark von Schweden den deutschen Forderungen auf Sicherstellung der Verbindungen Deutschland - Norwegen

Der 2. Teil wird...


ausgeführt

(Sweden was stricken off the occupation plans on March 1, 1940).

GERMAN DEPENDENCE ON SWEDEN

Fritz's survey on Germany's reliance on Swedish iron ore exports shows that Germany was much more dependent in the war's beginning than it was even a year later. (See the graph below)

GRAPH 3
Imports from Sweden as Percentage
of German Iron Ore Supplies (1940-1944)⁹⁶



Once the war broke out, most of Germany's imports were stopped. Total supplies were cut by one-third, so Sweden became an extremely important source of imports.⁹⁷ With the surrender of France, Germany was able to count on a steady supply of iron ore from the French mines, so the importance of Swedish exports was sharply reduced. Fritz concludes: "We can therefore say that an acute shortage of ore never constituted a bottleneck in German steel production."⁹⁸

Fritz goes on to show that the importance of Swedish imports cannot be determined merely by looking at their quantity. It was their quality that made them so valuable to Germany. Swedish ore had approximately a 60% iron content compared to Germany's 30%.⁹⁹ In addition, Germany needed low-phosphorus ores for its arms industry which could only be imported. As the war progressed, low-phosphorus ores comprised an increasingly larger share of Swedish ore exports.¹⁰⁰

The value of Swedish ore exports cannot be simply measured in terms of the direct effects of their quantity and quality; indirect factors must also be measured. Fritz discusses three important ways in which the ore imports contributed to the German economy.¹⁰¹ First of all, the country suffered from an acute labor shortage, so Swedish imports freed German workers for other jobs. Secondly, the imports freed German train traffic. Fritz estimates that in 1937 around 20% of German railway traffic was used for the steel industry. Since Swedish imports were transported mostly by boat, they didn't require as much railway usage. Finally, Swedish ore was much cheaper than that produced domestically. Consequently, even if Germany could have produced enough domestic iron ore along with its French imports to make up for a loss in Swedish imports, it would have damaged the German economy.

Even though Sweden was also highly criticized for its ball bearing exports, Fritz argues that they weren't nearly as significant as the ore exports. It is correct that Sweden was Germany's largest supplier of ball bearings. In fact, in 1943, 70% of Germany's ball bearing imports came from Sweden. Yet even in this peak year, Swedish exports amounted to less than 10% of Germany's total supply.¹⁰² Boheman claims that the quantity of the ball bearing exports to Germany were not large enough to be meaningful for their military.¹⁰³

TRADE ANALYSIS

Those who defend Sweden's trade policy claim that the country was forced to trade heavily with Germany in the beginning of the war when it was surrounded by Germany and cut-off from its trade routes. Once Germany's fortunes changed and the Nazi weren't able to exert as much pressure, Sweden was able to cut back sharply its German trade.

Fritz describes Sweden's foreign policy as follows:¹⁰⁴

Sweden's foreign policy during these years may be regarded as a balancing act between the interests of the belligerent blocks and the direct demands upon neutral Sweden that could be dictated by the interplay of power politics. (Therefore, Sweden) had to make significant concessions to German interests and desires during the first half of the war...By the same token, the Swedish attitude towards Germany became less compliant after the military balance had shifted in favour of the western powers.

Even though Fritz writes this about Sweden's foreign policy in general, he implies that the same is true of Sweden's trade policy in particular.

Hägglöf, who was Sweden's chief trade negotiator during the war, supports Fritz's theory in his book, Svensk krigshandels politik under andra världskriget. He claims that at the war's out-break, Sweden had a "vital need" to import from Germany.¹⁰⁵ German coal, coke, commercial iron, chemicals and fertilizer were especially needed. Of course, in order to import, the country had to export. Despite the tough position in which Sweden found itself, it tried to limit its ore exports to Germany. While German negotiators demanded that ore exports be kept at the previous year's (1938) levels, Swedish negotiators insisted on holding the level of exports to the average yearly level from 1933 to 1938.¹⁰⁶ This implied a decrease of 3 million tons (from 10 to 7 million). The Germans became so angered that they refused to continue negotiations.¹⁰⁷ Sweden gave in to German demands after much pressure, and on December 22, 1939, both sides agreed at the original 10 million ton level.¹⁰⁸

During the following year, Sweden's trade position strongly deteriorated. Before the German occupation of Norway and Denmark, Sweden could attempt to play off Britain against Germany in the hope of receiving the most favorable trade terms from each country.¹⁰⁹ Once Sweden became isolated by Germany, without any possibility of exporting to the West, the former had to pursue a more positive trade policy with the latter. In fact, Sweden faced great German pressure to join the New Order.¹¹⁰

German pressure increased, and in 1941, Sweden gave in to demands to grant

Germany export credits of up to 30% for certain products.¹¹¹ Granting the credits obviously put Sweden at a trade disadvantage, since it implied that Sweden had to give up more goods than it received. Nevertheless, Sweden was able to minimize its losses by procuring the delivery of 10.5cm howitzers which beefed up its defenses. In addition, no credits were given on Sweden's most important export product - iron ore.

In spite of the unfavorable trade terms which Sweden was forced to accept, the German weapons deliveries greatly helped the country's military build-up.¹¹² In turn, the following year when Sweden had achieved a stonger military build-up and Germany's military situation had worsened, Sweden found itself in a much stronger bargaining position. Confident that Sweden could cut off its credits to Germany without risking reprisals, Hägglöf announced on December 15, 1942 that the Swedish Government had to hold back foreign credits in order to "fight inflation."¹¹³

As Germany's continental dominance continued to decline, Sweden took an increasingly hard line in its negotiations. In the beginning of 1944, Sweden decided to lower ore exports to 7.5 million tons - a decline of 2.5 million tons.¹¹⁴ Furthermore, all boat exports to Germany were discontinued. During June, ore deliveries were reduced by 40% and on September 27, the government decided to close all harbors in the Baltic Sea.¹¹⁵ By the end of 1944, when Germany's defeat had been assured, Hägglöf reports that all trade with the country had ended.¹¹⁶

The defenders of Sweden's trade policy are correct in claiming that the amount of exports corresponded to Germany's military strength; however, it is questionable as to whether Sweden had any desire to lower its ore exports. On the contrary, one could argue that Sweden tried to export as much as possible to Germany, and the decreases during the war's later years were caused by Allied pressure rather than a moralistic wish to help fascism's defeat.

Evidence of Sweden's desire to export a large quantity of ore can be seen in a speech Foreign Minister Günther gave nearly one month before the Danish and Norwegian invasions. He argued against lowering ore exports because it would not be consistent with Sweden's neutralism.¹¹⁷ If this was Sweden's attitude before its Western trade routes were closed, it was obvious Sweden would have no intention of limiting ore exports afterwards.

The above example can simply be taken as a case of Sweden following a realistic strategy. After all, a meaningful reduction in ore exports could provoke German military action. Moreover, German imports acquired from these exports were necessary in order for Sweden to build up its defense. A look at the extraordinary measures Sweden took in order to maintain high ore exports, though, challenges the "realistic strategy" defense. For example, the Swedish navy actually helped with the German ore deliveries. Even Fritz admits that the help was "to an extent which went far beyond the framework of the (ore export) agreement."¹¹⁸

Sweden's determination to keep ore exports at a high level continued even after Allied pressure near the end of the war forced Sweden to lower its exports. So, although an agreement was reached with Great Britain and the United States to decrease ore exports in 1944 to 7.5 million tons, Sweden secretly increased the quality of its export.

Fritz describes German-Swedish trade relations - after the decision to lower ore exports - in the following manner:¹¹⁹

The German negotiators protested, of course, and to comply with German wishes and also because the Swedish side considered it desirable to continue a large-scale trade with Germany, deliveries of low-phosphorous ores suitable for armaments were increased - which could be done easily since the Allies had no idea of the significance of the different grades of ore.

According to Fritz, Sweden did not even want to comply with its ore export agreement it had made with the Allies. He writes that¹²⁰

Sweden certainly endeavoured formally to comply but at the same time in fact employed a variety of expedients, most of them hidden to view and not susceptible to control on the part of the Allies, in order to maintain its trade with Germany at as high a level as possible.

These last two quotations by Fritz seem to contradict his statement that "the Swedish attitude towards Germany became less compliant after the military balance had shifted in favour of the western powers." (See page 25, footnote 95.) It is probable that the decrease in Swedish exports to Germany at the end of the war was more dependent upon increased Allied pressure than on a Swedish attitude change. Furthermore, even though Sweden would have faced severe consequences if it failed to export ore in the beginning of the war, the same would not have been true if the country failed to increase the ore's quality in 1944. It is also doubtful that Germany would have reacted strongly if Sweden had not used its navy to help in the exports.

It can be concluded that Swedish trade policy was not aimed at keeping German trade to a minimum. Actions such as giving navy escorts to German ships and increasing the quality of ore shipments after Germany's defeat had become a certainty, show Sweden's determination to keep its trade at as high a level as possible. Sweden was probably not motivated by a desire to help Germany, but rather by its dependence on German imports. Since almost all of Sweden's imports during the war came from Germany, it wanted favorable trade relations with the Axis power.

CHAPTER 5

CASE 2: GERMAN TRANSPORTS TO NORWAY

It is not in accordance with strict neutrality to allow a warring nation to utilize Swedish territory for its attack.... If such a demand is made, it must be denied.

(Radio speech by Prime Minister Hansson, on 12 April 1940, see footnote 121.)

...Sweden's declared neutrality makes it impossible to allow the passage of troops or transports of war material of any kind to any of the warring nations.

(Swedish Foreign Ministry press release from 22 April 1940, see footnote 122.)

Despite the official proclamations against allowing the use of Swedish territory to carry out military transfers, the Swedish government yielded a few months later to German demands which clearly contradicted them. From the summer of 1940 to the summer of 1943, Germany was allowed to transfer a limited number of soldiers through Sweden - both to and from Norway. The transfers will be examined by dividing them into three different time periods: 1) the first demands and agreements in spring/summer 1940; 2) the March Crisis in 1941; and 3) their termination in summer 1943.

THE FIRST DEMANDS

Shortly after the war broke out in Norway, Germany demanded to be allowed to transport military supplies through Sweden to Norway.¹²³ It even offered to send Sweden weapons in southern Sweden if Sweden sent the Germans Swedish weapons in Norway. Despite Göring's warnings, Sweden refused to allow weapons transports. Germany was so intent on sending weapons through Sweden that they attempted to smuggle them in through the German Red Cross. In spite of the consistent press-

ure, Sweden only agreed to transport civilian goods which were on a scale consistent with normal peace time requirements. Ivar Anderson reports that 40 nurses were also permitted to travel to Norway.¹²⁴ In addition, 600 "shipwrecked" (skeppbrutna) sailors and 150 injured soldiers were allowed to return to Germany.

The following month German pressure increased. On May 13, Germany requested the use of 3 trains carrying between 30-40 sealed cars containing military equipment for transport to Norway.¹²⁵ Both Prime Minister Hansson and Conservative Party leader Gösta Bagge opposed the request, but Foreign Minister Günther was doubtful and said that it would be hard for him to take the responsibility that a "no" implies.¹²⁶

Six days later a new request was made. This time the Germans wanted 100 railway cars for military transport to Norway.¹²⁷ Richert, who was then Sweden's envoy to Germany, warned that he felt that it was a question of prestige for Hitler. His admonition went unheeded, however, and the cabinet voted unanimously against granting the requests.

Once Norway capitulated, Sweden faced new demands. German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop argued that since the fighting had ended, Sweden would not be helping one belligerent against another. Therefore, Sweden had no excuse not to allow transports. Furthermore, a refusal would have been seen as an unfriendly act.¹²⁸

Sweden found itself in a very difficult situation. The risks of a German attack were considered very high if the requests were denied. Richert felt that it was necessary to allow transit traffic if Sweden were to avoid an invasion.¹²⁹ Moreover, government officials remembered Hitler's warning from two months previously, in which he reminded a Swedish delegation that he had crushed two countries already and would do the same to any country which stood in his way.¹³⁰ To make matters worse, word had just come in from Britain that France was about to surrender.¹³¹ Thus, England was to be the only European country actively resist-

ing the Nazis. Yet even Britain's resistance could no longer be counted on. Britain's Under-Secretary of State, Richard Austin Butler, hinted that his country would negotiate a peace treaty with Hitler. He is reported to have said, "Common sense, not bravado would dictate the British government's policy."¹³²

Since Germany dominated the continent and Sweden could not count on any outside help if attacked, the country was hardly in a position to display boldness. In fact, some prominent officials, such as Gunther, favored forming a closer relationship with Germany, in order to strengthen Sweden's position in Scandinavia, especially in regard to the USSR.¹³³ The Soviet Union was still feared by many conservatives because of its invasion of Finland and it was believed that a better relationship with Germany would at least protect Sweden from the Eastern threat.

The "pro-German" line did not prevail; nevertheless, the government did decide that concessions would have to be made and Gunther was given the task of negotiating with the aim of giving up as little as possible. After the decision was made, Hansson wrote in his journal that "thus we broke our dear and strictly held neutralism because of our knowledge that it would be unreasonable in the current situation to take the risk of having a war."¹³⁴

Günther succeeded in limiting the concessions. Originally, the Germans wanted to have the railroads at their disposal. The final agreement on July 8 had five main points according to Carlgren.¹³⁵ 1) Transports would be limited to what is "technically feasible." Presumably, Carlgren means that no trains would be taken off their normal routes and therefore Swedish passengers would not have to make any sacrifices. 2) The soldiers must travel without any weapons. 3) Single travelers must give prior notice. 4) The transports cannot be used to send reinforcements to Norway. Instead, the number of soldiers entering Norway must always equal the number leaving. Although Carlgren does not mention it, the transports were also supposed to be limited to "permit" transports, i.e.

soldiers going to Germany in order to receive medical treatment or take a vacation, and soldiers returning after doing so.¹³⁶ 5) A limited number of troops can be transferred between Trondheim and Narvik (both located in Norway) through Swedish territory. Krister Wahlbäck reports that the agreed number of permit transfers was to be 500 per day plus an additional 55 per week from Narvik to Trelleborg (the port city in Southern Sweden.)¹³⁷

After the July 8 agreement, Sweden received occasional requests for extra single transits. Carlgren admits that such requests were usually accommodated.¹³⁸ An SS battalion was even given permission to travel through Sweden. Not all requests were granted, however; and during October, Sweden refused a request to transfer 15,000 troops to Norway. Carlgren estimates that 260,000 German soldiers traveled through Sweden during 1940.

THE MARCH 1941 CRISIS


In the beginning of March, 1941, a discrepancy was found between the number of soldiers entering and leaving Norway. Germany had been obviously using the transports during late February, and early March in order to mobilize troops for an upcoming attack on the USSR. German officials gave assurances that this trend would only continue to March 10.¹³⁹ They claimed that ice problems made it hard to transfer soldiers by boat and that there would be no more need to use the railway once the sea had cleared up.

Once the deadline expired, the Germans quickly changed their tone. Suddenly they demanded permission to send 76,000 troops through Sweden from March 10 to March 29.¹⁴⁰ Günther knew that such a large number would not be acceptable to the Swedish government. At the same time, he knew that the Germans were determined to send the troops in preparation for an invasion of the Soviet Union. He solved the problem by agreeing to the transport of 15,000 troops by railroad while the remaining could be sent by ship through Sweden's territorial waters.¹⁴¹

Günther favored sea over land transfers because they would be harder to observe and would not imply as strong an encroachment on neutralism as land transfers would.¹⁴²

On March 20, an additional concession was made: Germany was allowed to transport artillery to Norway.¹⁴³ It was told by the Swedish Foreign Ministry to make the transfer at night so that it could be kept secret. Leif Björkman claims that Günther favored the artillery transport for tactical reasons: Germany had announced that new negotiations on the transit agreements would be opened, so it would be better if they had a favorable attitude toward Sweden during the negotiations.¹⁴⁴ Immediately after March 29, the number of troops transported through Sweden to Norway went back to previous levels, and during April, there was only a surplus of 2,000 German troops entering Norway. (See Table 2).

GRAPH 4:
THE NUMBER OF GERMAN SOLDIERS
TRANSFERRED THROUGH SWEDEN IN
MARCH 1941¹⁴⁵



(During March, 1941, a total of 27,783 soldiers came to Norway via Sweden while 6,817 left Norway).¹⁴⁶

TRANSIT TERMINATION

As the Allies became more successful, they began to exert pressure on Sweden to cancel the transit agreement with Germany. During the trade negotiations in London during May and June in 1943, they threatened to annul the agreements if the transfer traffic was not terminated by October 1.¹⁴⁷ Even though the German

TABLE 2:

THE NUMBER OF PERMIT TROOPS
TRAVELING THROUGH SWEDEN
(1940-1943)¹⁴⁸

Year	Month	To Norway	From Norway	Surplus To Norway
1940	juli	2 839	9 022	- 6 183
	aug	9 708	14 681	- 4 973
	sept	27 378	22 344	+ 5 034
	okt	32 408	28 534	+ 3 874
	nov	30 811	28 865	+ 1 946
	dec	22 592	26 891	- 4 299
1941	jan	26 548	31 320	- 4 772
	feb	33 440	17 520	+ 15 920
	mars	27 783	6 817	+ 20 966
	april	6 688	4 471	+ 2 217
	maj	7 361	4 742	+ 2 619
	juni	6 333	4 645	+ 1 688
	juli	5 871	8 307	- 2 436
	aug	23 020	24 464	- 1 444
	sept	28 080	31 061	- 2 981
	okt	35 514	35 256	+ 258
	nov	32 847	33 292	- 445
	dec	34 992	34 855	+ 137
1942	jan	34 439	33 017	+ 1 422
	febr	25 489	19 247	+ 6 242
	mars	19 044	12 870	+ 6 174
	april	43 351	40 746	+ 2 605
	maj	37 863	30 963	+ 6 900
	juni	41 241	39 463	+ 1 778
	juli	32 388	32 011	+ 377
	aug	32 653	33 005	- 352
	sept	39 896	41 677	- 1 781
	okt	35 462	34 302	+ 1 160
	nov	32 760	33 744	- 984
	dec	41 199	46 979	- 5 780
1943	jan	36 877	32 884	+ 3 993
	febr	26 574	25 813	+ 761
	mars	23 075	24 434	- 1 359
	april	21 964	25 287	- 3 323
	maj	27 588	28 794	- 1 206
	juni	39 718	42 045	- 2 327
	juli	33 528	33 274	+ 254
	aug	28 636	24 680	+ 3 956
Total		1 037 198	1 004 422	+ 32 776

blockade had kept Allied trade at a low level, Sweden was aware that trade with the West could once again become important since it was apparent that Germany would lose the war. Consequently, Sweden desired good trade relations with the West. On July 29, the Allies' wish was granted as Günther announced that the transit would not continue.¹⁴⁹ Around one week later, the German negotiator, Karl Schnurr, signed an agreement stipulating that the traffic would cease within the month.¹⁵⁰

Since the decision to discontinue the permit traffic was made in connection with the Allied trade agreements, it is tempting to conclude that Allied pressure was Sweden's main motive behind the decision. Rune Karlsson, in his study on the transit traffic, concludes that this hypothesis is correct, but he points out that growing opposition displayed in mass meetings along with the growing parliamentary opposition also motivated the cancellation decision.¹⁵¹

Finally, it should be mentioned that despite the train transfer cancellation, Germany continued to send troops over Sweden with airplanes. Lars Krantz points out that these "courier flights" continued until September, 1944.¹⁵²

CHAPTER 6

CASE 3: GERMAN TRANSPORTS TO FINLAND

While the iron ore sales to Germany may have been Sweden's most controversial act for the Western Powers, and while permitting military traffic to Norway may have been the most controversial act for Norway, it was clearly the decision to allow the transport of approximately 15,000 German soldiers¹⁵³ from Norway to Finland which became the most controversial act for Sweden's internal political debate. Unlike the Norwegian transit which could be somewhat justified since the fighting had already stopped there, the Finnish transit was obviously done in connection with an imminent attack against the Soviet Union. The transit was such a divisive question that it threatened to end the national unity government. The only other issue which posed such a threat was the proposed ban of the Communist Party.¹⁵⁴ Even the last mentioned case proved to be less divisive than the Finnish transit, since the Social Democrats' refusal to support a ban did not cause the government to fall, but a similar rejection of the Finnish transit would have undoubtedly caused the government to fall.

Since the debate over the Finnish transport was the government's most divisive during the war, a look at the various political groups' standpoint on this particular issue gives a good indication of the general attitude differences they held. Therefore, after quickly summarizing the events which took place, a longer discussion will follow on the government's internal debate. In this unique case, it was not merely the elected politicians who influenced the debate, but also the king and military leaders. Consequently, their influence must also be included in the discussion. Finally, since the majority of Sweden's political

leaders feared that denying the Germans permission for the transport would have severe consequences, it is of historical interest to see whether those fears were justified.

TRANSPORT TO FINLAND

On June 22, 1941, Germany demanded permission to transfer one military division through Sweden from Norway to Finland.¹⁵⁵ Gunther recommended that they transfer the division by sea, but Schnurre immediately refused.¹⁵⁶ That same day both Hansson and Gunther consulted the king on the matter. Hansson claimed that the king had threatened to abdicate if Germany was turned down. Gunther, however, has always denied Hansson's interpretation of the meeting.¹⁵⁷ Carlgren suggests that while the king's exact words will never be known, Hansson was able to use the threat in order to persuade a reluctant parliament and Social Democratic Party to approve the transport request.¹⁵⁸

After consulting with the king, Hansson called a special meeting of his Social Democratic Party's parliament members on July 24. The prime minister persuaded his colleagues to take two votes. The first vote would decide whether or not the party would support the transport request. The second vote would decide whether or not the party would switch its position in the interests of "unity," if the other parties differed with them. An overwhelming majority voted against the transports in the first vote. Wahlbäck reports that the total was 159 against and only 2 in favor.¹⁵⁹ However, on the issue of unity with the other parties, there was 72 to 59 plurality with 39 abstentions. Hans De Geer and Jarl Torback argue in their book on modern Swedish history that the abstainers wanted to wait for the bourgeois parties' answer before making a decision.¹⁶⁰

Once the Social Democratic parliament members made their decision, Hansson conferred with the other party leaders. Both the Conservative and Agrarian Party leaders reported that an overwhelming majority in their parties favored granting

the German request. Meanwhile, the Liberal Party leader reported that about 2/3s of his party also favored an approval.¹⁶⁴ Since all the bourgeois parties favored an approval, the Social Democrats were obliged to follow suit (because of the second vote they had taken). So it was only a matter of formality when the parliament was allowed to debate and vote on the issue.¹⁶²

Immediately after being informed of the Swedish government's decision, the "Engelbrecht Division" began its journey on the night of June 25.¹⁶³ That night Hansson made a speech in which he emphasized that the government would try to maintain its independence. The word "neutrality" was no longer appearing in Hansson and Gunther's speeches.¹⁶⁴ Meanwhile, the government asked the press to describe the decision as being made mainly to help Finland, since the country had allied itself with Germany in the hopes of regaining land lost in the previous war with Russia.¹⁶⁵ It was also emphasized that it was a one-time deal and would not be allowed again. The government stuck to this declaration on July 31 when Germany requested permission to send more troops,¹⁶⁶ but they were allowed to ship extra troops through Swedish territorial waters.¹⁶⁷

SWEDEN'S INTERNAL DEBATE

Four major people or groups contributed most to Sweden's "Engelbrecht" debate: 1) the king, 2) the military, 3) the bourgeois parties and 4) the Social Democratic Party with Hansson as its most important representative. Even though the first three groups were united in their support of the transfer, the Social Democrats were a potential stumbling block since they held a majority in both houses. Since the Social Democrats were the most decisive factor in the debate, the first three groups will be examined first so that one can see the context in which the Social Democrats' decision was made.

The King

Even though it is not known whether or not the king would have abdicated

if the German's transfer request were denied, it is known that he favored its approval. It was considered greatly desirable by all politicians (except the communists) to have the king's support for their policies. During the crisis which the world war brought, the king was seen as a national symbol who could guarantee the country's unity and provide moral leadership.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, he insured that Hitler would have a more favorable attitude toward Sweden since the Nazi leader saw him as a guarantee that Sweden would carry out an acceptable or at least tolerable neutral policy.¹⁶⁹ Hansson and the Social Democrats were well aware of the king's importance, even if they did not necessarily like it. Furthermore, they had to keep in mind the bourgeois party politicians whom according to one Social Democratic journalist, "could not even think of vetoing the king."¹⁶⁰

The Military

The military leadership was strongly in favor of approving the transit. One former cabinet minister wrote in his memoirs that the military generally saw a negative response as being "adventuristic."¹⁷¹ Some officers recommended doing more than simply approving the transfer. Per G. Anderson notes that General Axel Rappe, who was then chief of staff, argued that since Sweden was encircled by Germany and had little chance of defending itself against an eventual invasion, the country should accept the roll as Germany's "flank" and support the war against Russia.¹⁷²

An even more far-reaching stance was taken by Commander-in-Chief Thörnell. Already several months before the invasion of the USSR by Finland and Germany, he recommended that Sweden actively support Finland if and when the invasion took place. Leif Björkman gives two reasons for Thörnell's position.¹⁷³ First of all, if Sweden voluntarily helped Finland, the country could avoid German pressure to do so. It is better to choose a policy than to be forced into it by a power. Secondly, if Finland received Swedish assistance, it would be less dependent on

Germany.

Åke Uhlín names three factors that caused Thörnelli to support military aid to Finland.¹⁷⁴ The first factor was prestige: if Sweden voluntarily helped Finland, it couldn't be humiliated by German demands to make concessions. The second factor was strategy: if Finland received a "safer" Eastern boarder, then Scandinavia would be better protected from invasion. The third factor was ideological: Sweden should help fight communism. He even suggested banning Sweden's Communist Party so that Germany could not interfere in the country's internal politics by demanding such a ban.

Needless to say, when German demands finally came for transporting the Engelbrecht division, Thörnelli advised compliance. He argued that it was absurd to have a war with Germany to prevent them from helping Finland.¹⁷⁵

Twenty-one years after the Engelbrecht transfer, Thörnelli defended the decision without mentioning aiding Finland.¹⁷⁶ Instead, he claimed that Sweden hadn't sufficiently armed itself to face a German attack. Once the rearming was accelerated, Sweden was able to display more courage in its German policy.

Björkman's historical research casts doubt on Thörnelli's version. He points out that during the period in which Sweden was considering granting Germany transport permission to Finland, Thörnelli actually cautioned against mobilization because Germany could perceive it as a "hostile" act.¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, Hansson recorded in his journal that approximately one month before approving the transport, he needed to emphasize to Thörnelli that Sweden's policy hadn't changed and that it needed military plans to defend itself against all (ie. even German) aggression.¹⁷⁸

The Bourgeois Parties

As mentioned above, the bourgeois parties all favored allowing the transport. For the most conservative elements, the thought of having a war with Germany in order to prevent that country from helping Finland was especially repugnant.

In retrospect, wrote the Conservative Party leader Gösta Bagge, he was "convinced that ... the Swedish population would never get involved in a catastrophic war against Germany if the German demand was to help Finland."¹⁷⁹ Unlike Thörnell, Bagge only favored granting a one-time transfer and was opposed to all concessions which would not be only one time.¹⁸⁰

Günther agreed with both Thörnell and Bagge that risks should not be taken to prevent Germany from helping Finland.¹⁸¹ He did not think that there was an immediate risk of German retaliation if their demands were denied, but he worried over the implications it would have for future German-Swedish relations.¹⁸² He had no reason to assume that Germany's eastern blitzkrieg would be any less successful than its northern, western and southern ones had been. Both British and American military experts had only given the Soviet Union a few months to live.¹⁸³ Once Russia was conquered, Sweden would be seen as a country which must be liquidated under the New Order if it had an unfavorable relationship with Germany.¹⁸⁴ While denying that the transfer would hurt German-Swedish relations, its approval would not hamper Sweden's relationship much with the Western Powers, since they too would like to see communism defeated.¹⁸⁵ (It should be remembered that at the time in which the transport was being debated, the Soviet Union had not yet joined the Allies, instead they still had a non-aggression pact with Germany).

Even though not all of the non-Social Democratic cabinet members shared Günther's viewpoint, they were united in their desire to grant the Engelbrecht transport.¹⁸⁶ Furthermore, since he was foreign minister, he carried great influence among the bourgeois cabinet members. So Günther and Bagge are good examples of the attitudes held by the conservative cabinet members. In fact, Andreen claims that the cabinet members from all three bourgeois parties had fairly similar viewpoints.¹⁸⁷

The Social Democrats' Strategy

The Social Democratic policy was determined by two different goals: 1) a desire to prevent the transport of the Engelbrecht division, and 2) a wish to maintain unity within the government. The unity goal insured that the Social Democrats would have to consider their coalition partners' position when making their decision. The situation can be with the help of the diagram below.

DIAGRAM 1:

Should Germany be allowed to transport the Engelbrecht division through Sweden?

		Social Democrats	
		No	Yes
Bourgeois Parties	No	unity 1	disunity 2
	Yes	disunity 3	unity 4

If the bourgeois parties could be persuaded to refuse the transport, then both goals could be achieved at once (box 1). This was what the Social Democrats were hoping for when they voted overwhelmingly against the transport during the first vote taken at their meeting.¹⁸⁸ Hansson was doubtful that the bourgeois parties could be persuaded and therefore anticipated the goal conflict when he requested that a second vote be taken.

When the Social Democratic members in parliament voted the second time at their meeting, they had to choose between their two goals (boxes 3 and 4). In order to explain why the unity goal was chosen over the goal of preventing the transport, the perceived consequences of each choice will be discussed.

DISAPPROVAL:

If the Social Democrats had refused to permit the transport, then disunity would have been created within the government. The bourgeois parties would have undoubtedly left the government before taking responsibility for leading Sweden into such a large conflict with Germany, especially when it also meant going against Finland's wishes. Since the king also opposed a conflict with Germany on the issue, a constitutional crisis could occur. The king would have had two choices: either appoint a minority bourgeois government or abdicate. The former would lead to an ineffective government since the Social Democratic majority could veto all government acts; while, the latter would be a great blow to the country's morale.

Even if the king did not abdicate and the Social Democrats were allowed to continue running the government alone, it would present some very difficult problems. First of all, the government would lose much support and it would be hard to govern efficiently with the king, the military and all the bourgeois parties in opposition. Secondly, the emergence of purely Social Democratic government would be considered a hostile act by Hitler. Without the king's support, Hitler would have lost his guarantee that Sweden would pursue an "acceptable" policy. Hitler would certainly consider Sweden a country worth liquidating when given the chance, and a disunified Sweden would not be able to defend itself very well.

On the other hand, there were valid reasons for disapproving the transport. First of all, it was the morally correct choice in their opinion, because the country's neutrality should not be given up in order to help a fascist victory. Secondly, it did not matter much if Sweden had favorable relationships with Germany if Sweden helped them win the war. A fascist dominated Europe would have no room for Social Democratic politicians. Some Social Democrats even suggested handing over the government to the bourgeois parties so that "Germany's friends" could take responsibility for the pro-German decision.¹⁸⁹ With the Social

Democrats' respect saved, they would be able to offer the Allies a reputable, anti-fascist alternative once Hitler was defeated. As mentioned above, if Hitler was not defeated, they would have been eliminated as a political organization regardless of their decision on the Engelbrecht transport.

UNITY:

A unified government would be in a much better position to deal with the Nazi threat. The populace would show much greater willingness to defend itself if it had faith in its leaders. In contrast, disunity could be exploited by the Nazis if they played one side against another. For example, the Nazis could find collaborators by announcing that if certain people were in the government and certain internal political measures were taken (such as banning the Communist Party) then an invasion would be avoided. If all the major political groups united, then it would be much harder for the Germans to find collaborators.

Unity would also present some immediate advantages. It would prevent a constitutional crisis at a time when Sweden could least afford it. A unified government which allowed the transport would also insure that Sweden would not be attacked in the near future. Meanwhile, it would give the country more time to improve its defenses so that it could be bolder against the Nazis later on. Moreover, if favorable relations could be maintained with Germany in the short run and the Allies won the war, then German occupation could be avoided. A wrong move now could lead to German occupation even if the Allies eventually won the war.

If Germany's success continued against the allies, it would still be wrong to hand over the government to the "German friends" in the cabinet. The Social Democrats received a majority of the population's votes and the party had a responsibility to protect these people's interests. As long as Sweden was allowed a semblance of independence, the Social Democrats should continue their responsibility for the country's future.

THE DECISION:

The day before the Social Democratic meeting was held, Justice Minister Karl Gustaf Westman observed that Hansson opposed the transit on moral grounds, but was willing to "transform" his feelings in the negotiations if the consequences of his refusal were too big.¹⁹⁰ Hägglöf was also given the impression that Hansson was willing to accept the transfer.¹⁹¹ Tage Erlander, who eventually became Hansson's replacement as party leader and Prime Minister, writes in his memoirs that Hansson did not try to force his opinion at the party's meeting.¹⁹² But he concedes that Hansson was "even more convincing" when he gave the arguments for approving the transfer than when giving the arguments against it.¹⁹³ Moreover, Erlander records that after Hansson's analysis, he was convinced that the decision would be in favor of the transport.¹⁹⁴ Although it is impossible to know whether Hansson was the deciding factor in the Social Democrats' vote, many members must have found it hard to oppose their own leader. A more important reason may have been the realization of the risks which disunity brought. Only a few months previously, Hitler had taken advantage of Yugoslavia's disunity by launching an invasion.

GERMANY'S STRATEGY

Since the supporters of allowing the Engelbrecht Division's transfer often used their fear of German reprisals as the excuse for supporting it, it is interesting to see how the transfer was seen from Germany's viewpoint. Björkman's research shows that during the planning stages of the Soviet invasion, Hitler did not think that it would be possible to transport a division through Swedish territory.¹⁹⁵ He favored sea transport, but the Navy opposed the idea, so he suggested using air transports. The German military leadership eventually drew up three plans.¹⁹⁶ The first two counted on transports through Sweden, while the second called for the transports to be carried out by sea. The third alternative was the worst from a military standpoint, especially because during the planned

invasion time - in the middle of May - it would be too icy. Nevertheless, as the planning progressed, it was built on the assumption that Sweden would not allow a transfer through its territory.¹⁹⁷ On April 7 of that year, the plans were changed so that all the transfers would occur by sea.¹⁹⁸

From the evidence Björkman gives, it appears that the Germans were not expecting to receive Sweden's approval. In addition, they do not seem to have considered taking any kind of military action against Sweden if approval to transfer troops was not given. Since sea route was the worst military option for Germany, a refusal would have hurt Germany's campaign against Russia. Therefore, Germany would have become more hostile toward Sweden for not helping the crusade against Communism. Swedish leaders undoubtedly feared that the worsened relations would have caused Hitler to consider invading Sweden after his expected victory in the east. The problem with this rationale is that an eastern victory would have made Hitler so powerful that he would have invaded Sweden afterwards regardless of how good Swedish-German relations had been unless Sweden would have been willing to voluntarily give up its independence.

SUMMARY

The German demand to transport the Engelbrecht Division through Sweden turned out to be the most controversial issue for the Swedish government. The bourgeois party leaders were fearful that a denial could lead to German reprisals. Even though Germany had not counted on receiving Sweden's approval and had no plans for reprisals if approval was not given, Germany would probably have taken revenge later on in the war if given the chance. The majority of Social Democrats were willing to take this chance and favored rejection of the German demand. While the Social Democrats showed themselves willing to take the risk of future German reprisals, they were not willing to give up the government's unity which had been such an asset to the country's war policy.

CHAPTER 7

CASE 4:

GERMAN INFLUENCE ON SWEDEN'S INTERNAL POLITICS

Critics of Sweden's policy during the war often point to what they perceive to have been Germany's influence on the country's internal politics. These accusations are usually made concerning three issues: 1) censorship, 2) the discussion of banning the Communist Party, and 3) the internment of Communists. The validity of these charges will be examined while discussing the context in which these policies were carried out.

CENSORSHIP

Life would have been much easier for the Swedish government if it could have claimed that free speech was allowed in the country, and that it had no responsibility for what individual citizens said or wrote. Unfortunately, Sweden was not allowed off the hook so easily by the warring nations. As Hansson said, "It doesn't help us if we believe that foreign policy and freedom of the press should not be mixed together. The others do in any case."¹⁹⁹ The German government, in particular, held the Swedish government responsible for what was printed in the press. Whenever articles appeared which were negative toward Germany, the German delegation was quick to issue a protest.²⁰⁰ As early as November, 1939, Sweden's Minister in Berlin reported that the Swedish press was the main reason for the deteriorations in German-Swedish relations.²⁰¹ Under such circumstances, the Swedish government felt that it was necessary to exercise censorship over the mass media.

Censorship was carried out in different forms. In the print media, one of the most open forms was confiscation. Gustaf Andersson i Rasjön, who as Communications Minister as well as the Liberal Party's leader, recorded in his memoirs that it was Günther who ordered the confiscations and Justice Minister Westman who executed them.²⁰² In total, over 300 newspapers and magazines were confiscated from 1939-1943.²⁰³

Another open method of controlling the press was the issuance of transport bans. The Communist Party's five newspapers in addition to the anti-fascist Trots Allt were forbidden to be transported through Sweden.²⁰⁴ Although the Communist papers could not be transported until 1943, the ban on Trots Allt was lifted in the beginning of 1941.²⁰⁵ Thus, the ban for the most part involved Communist papers. Historians Krister Wahlbäck and Göran Boberg report that the pro-Nazi newspaper, Sverige Fritt, was also banned for a while.²⁰⁶

In addition to the open methods of curbing the press, the government practiced some less obvious methods as well. In 1940, an information bureau was formed (Statens informationsstyrelse) with the tasks of reporting to the press on the state's activities and with the further task of fighting foreign propaganda.²⁰⁷ In addition, the board kept tabs on the country's newspapers and reported on them to the authorities. Furthermore, the board gave instruction and advise to the newspapers on "publishing questions."²⁰⁸ A press jury (pressnämnden) was also set-up by members of the press to act as a self-policing organization.²⁰⁹

Self-censorship was also encouraged by cabinet members. For example, Günther once said in a speech that "nothing gives me greater fear for the future than the Swedish press' attitude to and the way it represents the transformation process which is now going on in Europe."²¹⁰ One of the most persuasive techniques was used by Hansson. He took advantage of his position as the Social Democrats' leader and wrote to all of his party's newspaper editors and informed them that as representatives for the nation's largest party, they had a special responsibility

for what was written.²¹¹

In the most extreme cases in which neither the less coercive methods of censorship nor the more coercive ones worked, newspaper editors were prosecuted. Trots Allt's editor Ture Nerman was once jailed several months for his paper articles.²¹²

Prosecution and censorship were not limited to newspapers and magazines. It included books, films, theater and even public speeches. One former parliament member was prosecuted for a speech he made claiming that the Nazi were planning a state coup.²¹³ Norway's exiled president was not even allowed to give a public speech even though it had been planned before the German invasion.²¹⁴

While it might have been embarrassing for the government to forbid their neighbor's president to speak, it may have been even more embarrassing for Sweden's prime minister when a book which was published by his own party's publishing company was censored.²¹⁵ The book, Om ock tusen falla (Even Though Thousands Fall), was written by a Hungarian refugee who wanted to stimulate opposition to fascism.

Not only were several books banned, several films and plays were banned as well. Among the most noteworthy of the plays was John Steinbeck's "The Moon Has Gone Down."²¹⁶ The most famous film which was forbidden was Charlie Chaplin's "The Great Dictator."²¹⁷ In fact, the film was not allowed until November 1945 - six months after Germany's surrender - and even then many scenes had been clipped out.

Criticism Of The Policy

Critics of Sweden's censorship have emphasized two points: either they believe that it weakened the population's willingness to defend itself or that it was unnecessarily pro-German. The most outspoken advocate of the former viewpoint was Undén. He thought that if people were not made aware of how horrible the Nazis were, then they would be less willing to fight against a German occupation.²¹⁸ For example, if Nazi propaganda were not countered, then people

might actually believe that the Norwegians liked being occupied. If the press were prevented from reporting the truth about Nazism, then the population would be less able to resist Nazi propaganda.

According to Casparsson, the press was, in fact, prevented from describing the Nazi atrocities.²¹⁹ It could not even describe the concentration camps. In regards to Undén's Norwegian example, one book shows that the Swedish population was not allowed to read about the torture going on there. In just one day, 17 papers were confiscated for reporting about a tortured Norwegian.²²⁰

Even though many Swedes opposed censorship, even those who could accept it were critical of what they perceived as the government's pro-German bias. Statistics show that around 80% of the confiscations occurred against anti-Nazi articles.²²¹ In contrast, the Nazi press accounted for only 10% of the confiscations.²²² A communist member of parliament complained of this one-sidedness in a speech. He reminded the parliament that when Russia complained about the Swedish press during the Soviet-Finnish war, the government responded that the country had a "free" press.²²³ In contrast, when Germany complained, the government complied with their censorship requests.

Social Democratic journalist Casparsson was also critical of the government's one-sidedness. He writes that "One was not permitted to say what one knew to be the truth on the conditions in German prison camps or about the work and business relationships in the countries which Germany had conquered. At the same time, one could, in spite of the censorship law, say just about whatever one wanted on Soviet Russia's government, its high officials and ambassador."²²⁴

Casparsson found the lack of censorship against the pro-German press especially objectionable since journalists were not able to counter the propaganda. He cites an example from an article written by Aftonbladet, which at the time was the nation's largest evening paper:²²⁵

Because of the steps that Germany has now taken, it is the Germanic races among the world's many races which can save the world's cultured people from the danger hanging over us which comes from the asiatic Soviet Russia's terrorism; Sweden's position in the campaign is beforehand clear and given.

Aftonbladet was even allowed to print an article praising the Germans' policy in the Warsaw ghetto.²²⁶

In order to counter the paper's propaganda, Casparsson helped the Swedish Trade Union publish a competing evening paper. Even though the union was connected to the Social Democratic Party, the party opposed the paper. According to Casparsson, Hansson felt that the paper would hurt German-Swedish relations.²²⁷

Of course, Casparsson's case is not so extreme since it was at least allowed to be published - despite the lack of support from the Social Democratic Party. A more extreme case is shown by Åke Thulstrup.²²⁸ He mentions that Trots Allt carried out a campaign against Der Deutsche in Schweden for its anti-British attacks which contravene Sweden's neutrality. Instead of censoring Der Deutsche, the government censored Trots Allt for its campaign.

Perhaps the most extreme example of the government's unwillingness to censor Nazi propaganda concerns Uppsala professor Israel Holmgren.²²⁹ He wrote a book entitled Nazisthelvetet (The Nazi Hell). The book was confiscated because of its anti-German title and he was sentenced to four months imprisonment although he was later pardoned. Since the government did not approve of his title, he changed it to Nazistparadiset (The Nazi Paradise) and the book was allowed to be published.

Defense of the Policy

Defenders of the government's policy can point out that not all the censored articles were anti-Nazi. On various occasions, newspapers were censored for articles attacking the Allies.²³⁰ Moreover, extreme forms of anti-semiticism were not allowed, even if Aftonbladet did publish articles praising the Warsaw ghetto. For example, the German anti-semitic film "Jud süß" (Sweet Jew)

was banned.²³¹ If the government had censored the pro-German press more extensively, it would have angered Germany, and the main reason for incorporating censorship was to prevent German reprisals.

Against critics of this seemingly accommodating attitude toward Germany, it can be argued that a little censorship was better than a Nazi occupation. Ivar Anderson, who was a journalist and Conservative member in parliament, uses Norway as a good example of the need for Swedish press restraint. He claims that Günther was very strongly "personally engaged" in working to prevent persecution of Norwegians and Danes during their occupation.²³² When he asked the Swedish press to be cautious in reporting on the occupation, it was to prevent reprisals in those countries.

Justice Minister Westman argued that all countries exercised censorship during the war, and Sweden's censorship was not as strict as that in most countries. He claimed that during the war that Britain censored its press much more than Sweden.²³³ He added that the communist press was outlawed in England, but it was permitted in Sweden. In spite of the limited censorship, Hägglöf argues that²³⁴

The Swedish press was more unrestrained in its attacks against the Nazi regime than that of any other country, and this press campaign was continued when the war had started.

COMMUNIST PARTY BAN?

When the Soviet-German war broke out, many Swedish politicians feared that the Nazis would demand that the Communist Party be banned. Leaders of the Conservative Party, the Agrarian Party and Gunther all felt that it would be better to ban the party than to wait for an embarrassing German ultimatum.²³⁵ For the Conservative party, it was also a chance to actuate an old demand to ban the communists dating back to 1933.²³⁶ Both the Social Democrats and the Liberals opposed to the idea, but were willing to consider a ban if it included the pro-Nazi organizations as well.²³⁷ The Conserv-

atives were more concerned over the Communists than the Nazis because the former was much larger than the latter; nevertheless, they were willing to consider a double ban.²³⁸ During the negotiations, the different parties could not agree on which organizations should be banned for being pro-Nazi.²³⁹ Later it became known that Berlin would rather have no Communist ban than one which included National Socialists.²⁴⁰ The Swedish parliament finally passed a law which sharpened the penalty for treason, and consequently, neither the communist nor Nazi organizations were banned.²⁴¹

COMMUNIST INTERNMENT

Once the Soviet-Finnish war began, the Swedish government began taking repressive measures against Communists, because of their support for Russia. They were often interned by the police and many were forced to spend time living in internment camps.²⁴² Per Francke claims that although the original internments were related to Nazi demands, the arrest of Communist leader Sven Linderot during the summer of 1941 was "ordered from Nazi Germany."²⁴³ He points out that during that period, an increasing number of Communists were interned and attributes it to the military's desire to cooperate with Hitler's holy crusade against Communism which was about to begin with the Soviet invasion.

In defense of the internments, Tage Erlander claims that Communists were involved in acts of sabotage and did present a legitimate security threat.²⁴⁴ He adds that their sabotage was motivated by their desire to fight Nazism. If this is correct, then one could expect attempts to sabotage the transfer of the Engelbrecht Division through Sweden which of course would have had great consequences for German-Swedish relations.

SUMMARY

Germany was able to influence Sweden's internal politics more than any other

country. Attempts to curb free speech were carried out mainly to prevent German reprisals. The proposed Communist Party ban along with the internment of Communists was also influenced by German pressure; however their support of Russia in the Soviet-Finnish war along with strong anti-Communist feelings in the military and conservative politicians were also factors. Fear of Communist sabotage was another factor in the actions taken. Therefore, it would be wrong to blame the internments and proposed party ban merely on German pressure, although their pressure made it much easier for these policies to be carried out.

PART III

CONCLUSION

CHAPTER 8

WAS SWEDEN'S POLICY MORALLY JUSTIFIABLE?

Supporters of Sweden's policy toward Nazi Germany claim that it was realistic, while critics claim that it was opportunistic and pro-German. Those who adhere to the former viewpoint claim that Sweden's policy saved many people's lives by preventing a Nazi invasion and by taking in refugees. Those who adhere to the latter viewpoint claim that Sweden's policy caused the death of many by allowing Germany to transport soldiers through its territory and by refusing to take in more refugees. Any evaluation of Sweden's policy toward Nazi Germany should take these arguments into account.

IN FAVOR OF SWEDEN'S POLICY

Christer Wahlgren admits that Sweden's policy was not heroic, but it put the country's safety first.²⁴⁵ From 1939 to 1942, it was not advisable to challenge Hitler because the country hadn't satisfactorily rearmed. After the United States entered the war and it became apparent that Germany would not open a new front, Sweden became more critical of Germany.

Hägglöf supports Wahlgren's viewpoint. In the beginning of the war, Sweden had to try to gain time while it rearmed.²⁴⁶ During the first few years of the war, Sweden tried to make as few concessions as possible. At the same time, Sweden's trade with Germany was "kept within the limits of her own needs."²⁴⁷ In 1943, when Sweden had rearmed and Germany began losing the war, the transit agreements were cancelled.²⁴⁸ Meanwhile, Sweden began reducing trade with Germany and by the end of 1944, all trade had stopped.

In reviewing Hägglöf and Wahlgren's arguments, it should be kept in mind that

Sweden is a small country, which was much weaker than the Great Powers and during much of the war, it was surrounded by Nazi Germany. Furthermore, if it provoked an attack, it could not count on much help from the Allied forces and would therefore not be able to hold out much longer than a few months at most. The atrocities that a Nazi occupation would have brought the Swedish population hardly need to be mentioned.

Not only did the avoidance of a Nazi occupation save many Swedish lives, it saved many foreign lives as well. The most important example of this is the refugees whom Sweden took in. Tage Erlander points out that by December 1, 1944, 91,520 refugees were in Sweden in addition to over 83,000 Finns.²⁴⁹ Out of the 91,520 refugees, 31,520 were Baltic, 30,000 Norwegian, 15,000 Danish and almost 5,400 German.²⁵⁰ Moreover, the Swedish government helped approximately 7,000 Danish Jews escape Denmark when word got out about Nazi intentions to transport them to concentration camps.²⁵¹ The Swedish government's help in organizing the escape lead one Danish Jew to write that the Danish Jews could not have been saved "without the Swedish people and Swedish authority's consent and help."²⁵² In addition, many Norwegian students escaped deportation to Germany by fleeing to Sweden.²⁵³ The refugees also included many well known political leaders, such as Willy Brandt and Bruno Kreisky as well as many Norwegian politicians and labor leaders.²⁵⁴ At the end of the war, the Swedish Red Cross also assisted in the evacuation of many prisoners from concentration camps.²⁵⁵

In addition to saving lives by allowing in refugees and helping to evacuate people from concentration camps, Sweden provided special assistance to its neighboring countries. The greatest amount of help was given to Norway.²⁵⁶ In the beginning of the German invasion, Sweden sent helmets, compasses, maps and other military aid to Norway. After Norway was defeated, money was funneled to their underground organizations through Stockholm.²⁵⁷ According to Gjöres, an average of 750 care packages a day were also sent to Norway.²⁵⁸

Another important way in which Sweden helped Norway was to train "police units" which were really troops that could enter the country once the occupation ended.²⁵⁹ They would be able to quickly establish order in the country so that no extremist groups could hinder the return to democracy. Former Cabinet Secretary Erik Boheman adds that approximately 3,000 Norwegians were flown to England so that they could unite with British military units.²⁶⁰

Military aid also went to Denmark. Danish military personnel were trained as well as Norwegian.²⁶¹ A study by Ulf Torell finds that five comprehensive batalions in total were trained in Sweden.²⁶² In addition, Erlander claims that Sweden police helped smuggle weapons to the underground in Denmark.²⁶³ He gives the total as 7.3 million cartridges, 4,100 machine guns and 5,100 grenades.²⁶⁴

The above mentioned actions which Sweden took to save the lives of many people and help its neighbors could only be taken because Sweden managed to avoid occupation. Supporters of Sweden's policy argue that it took a realistic foreign policy which unfortunately required certain concessions to the Nazis in order to be able to provide its assistance. Thus, Sweden was of greater help as an unoccupied country than it could have been as an idealistic conquered one.

AGAINST SWEDEN'S POLICY

Critics of Sweden's foreign policy claim that it was pro-German, opportunistic, and that not enough was done to help its neighbors and others suffering from the war. According to Leni Yahil, when Günther became foreign minister, "Swedish neutrality took on in degree the character of a caretaker for Hitler's interests."²⁶⁵

An even harsher critique comes from Krantz, who writes:²⁶⁶

It is easy to see that "neutrality" in the war's beginning was none other than opportunism. One counted on a German victory and it was intended to keep Sweden in good terms with the new world rulers.

Krantz continues his critique by mentioning that Sweden continued granting

Germany favors even after the great loss at Stalingrad when it became obvious that Hitler would lose.²⁶⁷ An example of how much Sweden helped Germany, Krantz points to a paper written by Staffan Söderblom from the Swedish Foreign Ministry. The paper was given to Germany in order to show all the help Sweden had given them in the war against Russia. According to the paper, during 1941, the following aid was given to Germany: 700 courier planes were allowed to fly over Sweden to and from Finland; 525,000 soldiers were carried between Germany and Norway by train; 4,000 train cars carrying war material were allowed to travel from Norway to Finland; and 48 troop and war material ships carrying 650,000 tons of war supplies were transported through Swedish territorial waters under Swedish escort.²⁶⁸

Rune Karlsson's study shows that oil products were also transferred through Sweden to German submarines in Northern Norway.²⁶⁹ Furthermore, during the war over 2,140,000 German soldiers were carried by Swedish trains in addition to 100,000 cars carrying war material.²⁷⁰

It isn't only the concessions to Germany which made critics feel that Sweden's policy was overly pro-German; certain statements made during the war seem to reveal pro-German feelings. The most extreme case is the king's congratulatory note sent to Hitler after he began his Soviet invasion.²⁷¹ Another example is Günther's declaration that it was not in Sweden's interests for Germany to face total defeat because it would upset the balance of power.²⁷² Once Günther even recommended setting up a new apolitical government which would have a better understanding of Germany's needs.²⁷³


In addition to the accusations that Sweden carried out a pro-German policy came accusations that not enough was done to help others. The harshest criticism in this regard concerns Sweden's refugee policy. Particularly tragic is the fact that Jewish refugees were not admitted into the country until after the war started, and by that time, it was too late for most of them.²⁷⁴ Although no statistics are available on the number of Jews refused entry, Hilding Hagberg shows that

of 26,000 people (including a large number of Jews) seeking entry permits in 1938, only 7,661 received them.²⁷⁵ As late as 1942, only 18,831 out of 63,000 visa applications were accepted.²⁷⁶ Sweden's border restrictions were so strict at the beginning of the war that a female Jewish doctor was refused entry even though she had planned to fly immediately to England where she had a job offer.²⁷⁷ The authorities feared that she might stay in Sweden. Yahl points out that by the end of 1942, there were only approximately 3,000 Jewish refugees in Sweden.²⁷⁸

Sweden's restrictive refugee policy was not limited to Jews; even Norwegians had a hard time fleeing from Hitler during the first few years of the war. Shortly after the Nazi invasion, Sweden began closing its Norwegian borders.²⁷⁹ When the fighting stopped, Norwegian refugees were encouraged to return.²⁸⁰ In fact, until the opposition parties were forbidden on September 1940, some refugees were actually forced to return to Norway. Norwegian emigration was also discouraged once the borders were opened through such methods as interning refugees for a long time and asking them to name friends and contacts in Norway.²⁸¹ The latter method often made them suspicious that the information would be passed on to the Germans.²⁸² It was not until Germany began losing the war in 1942 that Sweden began following a liberal refugee policy.²⁸³

GRAPH 7

THE NUMBER OF NORWEGIAN REFUGEES ENTERING SWEDEN IN A 6-MONTH PERIOD



Sweden's refugee policy was not the only action which caused criticism from Norway. A Norwegian government report reveals that the country requested 750,000 liters of oil and gas from Sweden during the April invasion.²⁸⁵ When the request was denied, Norway asked for 500,000 liters. After being turned down the request was dropped to 100,000 with the same result.

Another incident which caused resentment occurred when the Norwegian king and several ministers tried to seek temporary refuge in Sweden.²⁸⁶ They only wanted to stay a few days in order to avoid German bombing. They were told they could come in, but no guarantee was made that they could leave. They later sneaked in and were allowed by the local authorities to leave without Stockholm's knowledge.²⁸⁷

The Danes were not as bitter as the Norwegians, particularly since the occupation was not as harsh in the beginning so that there weren't as many people seeking refuge in Sweden. Of course the main reason that they were less resentful was that Germany didn't use Swedish territory to send troops to Denmark as it did in Norway's case. Still, Sweden can be criticized for not doing as much as it could to help Denmark, especially since it followed a very restrictive refugee policy as long as Germany was winning the war.²⁸⁸

Sweden's refugee policy toward Denmark, Norway, and especially, toward Jews has been very heavily criticized. It is used as an example of how Sweden supposedly followed an opportunistic policy, guided by self-interest instead of helping people in need. The large concessions made toward Germany as well as the willingness of many Swedish leaders to openly support the Nazi crusade against Communism has led to further charges of opportunism.

CONCLUSION

Any evaluation of Sweden's policy toward Nazi Germany must take into consideration the harsh circumstances Sweden found itself in. It is a small country which was surrounded by one of the most ruthless and powerful war machines in modern

history. The country would have had little chance in stopping a Nazi invasion, and the consequences of the resulting occupation would have brought great misery to the Swedish population. Under such circumstances, it is understandable that the country would make some concessions that did not coincide with a strict neutrality.

Critics of Sweden's policy have claimed that it was not only opportunistic, but even that it was counting on a German military victory. Sweden's policy was opportunistic in the sense that it attempted to limit the country's hardships as much as possible. In retrospect, however, what country - apart from those adhering to the Axis - did not follow such a policy? It may be asking too much of Sweden to show great boldness when the much stronger countries did not do the same. France and Britain did not show much boldness when they signed the Munich Pact. The Soviet Union did not show much boldness when it signed the non-aggression treaty with Germany. The United States did not show much boldness when it turned away Jewish refugees and declared itself neutral until it was bombed by Japan. So how can one expect a small country, which was surrounded by Germany and economically depended upon it, to show great boldness?

The charge that Sweden's policy was guided throughout most of the war with the belief that Germany would win the war may be correct. Some prominent officials such as Günther and Thörnell, seem to have been motivated by such thoughts. Ironically, the policy that Sweden actually followed was much more suitable for a country counting on an Allied victory. If Germany had won the war, then the result for Sweden would have probably been so horrendous that it would have been much better for the country to give up its neutrality and actively oppose the Nazis. On the other hand, if the Allies were to win, it would have been best for Sweden to choose the policy it did: one of making as many concessions as needed in order to avoid occupation.

Even if Sweden's policy was realistic, given the country's situation, it doesn't make it morally justifiable. One can argue that no country should make concessions

that help a fascist victory. The lives saved by avoiding an occupation, along with the thousands of refugees whose lives were saved can be used as justification for Sweden's policy. The biggest moral problem with Sweden's policy was the country's unwillingness to make sacrifices in order to help others at a time when millions were making sacrifices to fight fascism. According to Erlander, Sweden followed a restrictive refugee policy mainly because of fears that a large Jewish immigration would have caused "deep going changes in Swedish society."²⁸⁹ As someone of German-Jewish descent, I find it hard to accept that the death of half of my family can be morally justified by pointing to the "deep going changes in Swedish society" that their immigration could have brought.

Sweden's attitude towards refugees shows that the country's policy was not based on morally justifiable grounds. On the contrary, the policy was motivated mostly by self-interest. It was not entirely motivated by self-interest, however; otherwise no action would have been taken to save the Danish Jews. It should also be remembered that Sweden's policy was not comprised of one man, but rather several different men with different viewpoints who favored different policy directions. As the decision to allow German soldiers to travel through Sweden to Finland shows, the bourgeois party leaders and cabinet members favored following a more conciliatory policy toward Germany than the Social Democrats wanted. In fact, the Social Democrats used mostly moralistic arguments to oppose the transfer. However, the Social Democrats cannot escape responsibility for what happened because they had a majority in both houses of parliament, in addition to the post of prime minister. In most cases they chose to support unity with the bourgeois parties over a policy based on morality - with the refusal to back a ban of the Communist Party being the major exception. Finally, it should be added that the decision not to let in Jewish immigrants was made by a Social Democratic government* before the unity government was formed. Consequently, none of the political parties which

took part in the war-time coalition can claim to have supported a morally justifiable policy during World War II.

*The Agrarian Party was a junior partner in the Social Democratic government before the coalition government was formed, but it did not hold any of the ministries which dealt with immigration or foreign policy questions.

NOTES

¹Torgil Wulff, Neutralitet och alliansfrihet, (Stockholm, Sweden: Centralförbundet Folk och Försvar, 1971), p. 4.

²Roderick Ogle, The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century, (London, UK: C Tilling and Co. LTD, 1970), p. 3 for the quote. The other examples come from p. 2.

³Peter Lyon, Neutrality, (Great Britain: Leicester University Press, 1963), p. 155.

⁴Nils Andrén, Power-Balance And Non-Alignment, (Uppsala, Sweden: Almqvist & Wikser AB, 1977), p. 18.

⁵W. M. Carlgren, Swedish Foreign Policy During The Second World War, translated by Arthur Spencer, (London UK: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1977), p. 2.

⁶Rolf Karlbom, Svensk neutralitetspolitik i historisk belysning, (Karlstad, Sweden: Utrikespolitiska Foreningens i Karlstad skriftserie, 1979), p. 6.

⁷Roland Huntford, The New Totalitarinas, (London, UK: Allen Lane, 1972. Paperback edition used is from 1975), p. 33.

⁸Per Anders Fogelström, Kampen för fred, (Stockholm, Sweden: Svenska Freds- Och Skiljedomsföreningen, 1983) second edition, see the first three chapters.

⁹Karlbo, Svensk neutralitetspolitik, p. 7. Carlgren, Swedish Foreign Policy, p. 3, lists Queen Victoria, as well as several government officials and academics among those who favored a pro-German policy.

¹⁰Carlgrén, Swedish Foreign Policy, p. 3; and Andrén, Power-Balance, pp. 19-20.

¹¹For a discussion of Sweden's political debate, see: Herbert Tingsten, Sveriges utrikes debatt mellan världskrigen, (Lund, Sweden: Berlingska Boktryckeriet, 1964), especially p. 10.

¹²Andrén, Power-Balance, p. 22, Karlbo, Svensk neutralitetspolitik, p. 8, H. Gunnar Hägglöf, "A Test of Neutrality: Sweden in the Second World War" from the Stevenson Memorial Lecture number 9, delivered to the London School of Economics and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, reprinted in International Affairs, April 1960, which was in turn reprinted in The Theory and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century. (See footnote 2). He claims on p. 155 that "there is in my opinion little doubt that Sweden would have abandoned the polity of neutrality for good if Great Britain, the country which during the period between the two world wars had the greatest moral influence in Scandinavia, had given a strong lead to the movement for an effective international security organization."

For a discussion of Sweden's political debate on the League, see Tingsten, Sveriges utrikes, especially pp. 16-18.

¹³Andrén, Power-Balance, p. 24. For a more detailed discussion of Sweden's rearmament debate see Karl Molin, Försvaret folkhemmet och demokratin, (Uddevalla, Sweden: Bohuslänningens AB, 1974), pp. 21-23.

General Olof Thörnell who was commander of the Swedish military, said in an interview that the rearming carried out before the war was "unsatisfactory." For the interview, see Uppsala Nya Tidning, 18 October 1967.

Klas Åmark points out that the fear of being brought into war against Germany dominated Sweden's debate on leaving the League of Nations. See his book Makt eller moral, (Stockholm, Sweden: Allmänna Förlaget, 1973), p. 244.

Östen Undén, who was legal advisor to the Foreign Ministry and member of parliament, claims that it became clear that the sanction system was no longer obligatory, so Sweden decided to follow a "strict" neutrality. See his Tal från krigsåren, (Stockholm, Sweden: Rabén and Sjögren, 1970), pp. 16-17, and p. 48.

¹⁴Irene Scobble, Sweden, (London, UK: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1972), p. 128. See also Andrén, p. 28; Lyon, p. 157; Carlgren, p. 28; and Karlbom, p. 6.

¹⁵Andrén, Den totala, p. 29.

¹⁶Leni Yahil, Et Demokrati på Prøve, translated from Hebrew to Danish, (Denmark: Gyldendals Forlagstrykkeri, 1967), p. 279.

¹⁷Lars Krantz, När tyskarna flög i luften, (Uddevalla, Sweden: Bohuslänningens AB, 1977), p. 142.

¹⁸Undén, Tal, p. 28. Foreign Minister Christian Günther made the same justification in a speech on 19 January 1941. Reprinted in Lundström, Svenska utrikespolitik, p. 34.

¹⁹Speech by Prime Minister Per Albin Hansson on 17 January 1940 reprinted in Lundström, p. 45. See also speech by King Gustaf V on 19 February 1940, reprinted in Lundström, Svenska utrikespolitik, p. 124.

²⁰During the Spanish civil war, travel to Spain was punishable with a possible six month jail sentence. The Swedish government was against sending volunteers because it would be wrong to interfere in another country's "internal conflict." See Arvid Rundberg, En svensk arbetares memoarer, (Göteborg, Sweden: Västan Tryckeri AB, 1973, third edition), pp. 40 and 46.

²¹Undén, Tal, p. 49.

²²Reprinted in Ragnvald Lundström and Sven Dahl, Svenska utrikespolitik andra världskriget, (Stockholm, Sweden: Kooperativa förbundets bokförlag, 1946), p. 376.

²³Speech of Defense Minister Per Edvin Sköld on 21 August 1941. Reprinted in Lundström, p. 376.

²⁴Carlgrén, Swedish Foreign Policy, p. 12.

²⁵*ibid.*, p. 5

²⁶See chapter 1, section d

²⁷See chapter IV, section d (1) and chapter 3, section b.

²⁸Wilhelm M. Carlgren, Svensk utrikespolitik 1939-1945, (Stockholm, Sweden: Allmänna Förlaget, 1973), pp. 143-144.

²⁹See chapter V.

³⁰See chapter IV.

³¹See chapter VI.

³²See chapter IV.

³³Hägglöf supports the balance of power theory. See "A Test of Neutrality...." p. 170. Hägglöf discusses the feats and consequences of a British attack on Denmark and Norway in his book Samtida Vittne, (Stockholm, Sweden: P.A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag, 1972), p. 117.

³⁴See chapter IV.

³⁵Hägglöf, "A Test of Neutrality....", p. 163

³⁶Gunnar Hägglöf, Britain and Sweden, (Stockholm, Sweden: P.A. Norstedt & Söns Förlag, 1966), p. 35.

³⁷Hägglöf, "A Test of Neutrality....", p. 163.

³⁸Ake Uhlin, Februari krisen 1942, (Stockholm, Sweden: Allmänna Förlaget, 1972), the whole book deals with the rumors of an impending German attack and how Sweden dealt with it.

³⁹Erik Boheman, På vakt. Kabinettssekreterare under andra världskriget, (Stockholm, Sweden: P.A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag, 1964), p. 19.

⁴⁰Hägglöf makes this point in "A Test of Neutrality...." p. 163. Nils Andrén emphasizes the need for neutrals to have a strong defense in order to maintain their neutrality. See Den totala säkerhetspolitiken, (Stockholm, Sweden: Rabén & Sjögren, 1972), pp. 100-109. The importance of Sweden's comparatively stronger defense is emphasized by Karl Molin et al, Norden under andra världskriget, (Denmark: Nordisk Ministerråd, 1979), p. 50.

⁴¹"ÖB under andra världskriget Hans instats värd tacksamhet," by Stig Synnergren, in Svenska Dagbladet, 26 July 1977.

⁴²ibid. and Leif Björkman, Sverige inför Operation Jarbarossa, (Uddevalla, Sweden: Allmänna Förlaget, 1971), p. 473. Evabritta Wallberg claims that there were 359,058 men in total in the armed forces during 1942 compared with 51,717 in 1937. See "Den militära strafflagstiftningen och beredskapen," in Sveriges militära beredskap (Militärhistoriska Förlaget, 1983), Carl-Axel Wangel editor, p. 611.

⁴³Molin et al Norden, argues that Sweden's defense was important in keeping it out of the war in general. See p. 50. Boheman argues that Sweden's defense helped dissuade Hitler from attacking during the February 1942 crisis. See p. 19. Carlgren argues that the same is true of Spring 1940. See p. 63.

⁴⁴Bengt Åhslund, "Det militärpolitiska läget vid krigsutbrottet 1939," in Sveriges militära beredskap, p. 15.

⁴⁵Uppsala Nya Tidning, 18 October 1967. Thörnelli wanted a larger increase in mobilization in 1939. See Svenska Dagbladet, 26 July 1977. For a look at the reasons why Sweden was militarily unprepared, see Arvid Cronenberg, "1936 års försvarsbeslut och upprustningen 1936-1939," in Sveriges militära beredskap, pp. 52-55. The main problems he sees are 1) the economy was based on consumer demand and couldn't easily be switched to a war economy; 2) there was a shortage of the specialized labor needed for the arms industry. Molin discusses the political parties' viewpoints on rearming. See Försvaret, pp. 21-23. Compare with Amark especially p. 160. He points out that all parties wanted to increase defense spending, but the degree to which they wanted it increased corresponded to how great they perceived the risks of an attack to be.

⁴⁶Carlgren, Swedish Foreign Policy, pp. 55-58; Yahl, p. 279; and Carlgren, Svensk, pp. 143-144.

⁴⁷Boheman, På vakt, p. 11.

⁴⁸Christer Wahlgren, På skilda fronter, (Sweden: Sydsvenska Dagbladets Aktiebolag, 1970), p. 80. Today Malmö can be reached from Copenhagen by boat in less than 1/2 hour.

⁴⁹Per G. Andreen, De mörka åren, (Stockholm, Sweden: P.A. Norstedt & Söner, 1971), p. 32.

⁵⁰Björkman, Sverige inför, p. 473. Uhlin gives the combined total with the navy and air force included to be 300,258. See p. 197.

⁵¹Trygve Lie, Leve eller dø, (Oslo, Norway: Tiden Norsk Forlag 1955), pp. 279-280.

⁵²Ogley, Theory and Practice, p. 8.

⁵³Boheman, p. 44. See Chapter IV of this essay.

⁵⁴Ogley, Theory and Practice, p. 14; and Scobble, p. 130.

⁵⁵Hägglöf, "A Test of Neutrality....", p. 163.

⁵⁶Carlgren, Swedish, p. 13.

⁵⁷Boheman concludes that during the February crisis, military considerations were more important than economic ones in Hitler's decision not to attack. The main reason was that a Swedish attack would have delayed the Spring Offensive against Russia. See Boheman, p. 19.

⁵⁸Amark, Makt, p. 269. Hägglöf sees political unity as a prerequisite for a neutral to avoid war. See "A Test Of Neutrality....", p. 170.

⁵⁹The National Socialists were stronger in Norway than in Sweden, so it was easier for the Nazis to find collaborators there than in Sweden. In addition, Norway was unable to form a unity government which made it harder to rally the populace behind the government's defense program.

⁶⁰Ogley, Theory and Practice, pp. 14-15.

⁶¹Carlgren, Svensk, p. 56; Hägglöf, Samtida, pp. 43-46; and Lennart Hirschfeldt, "Kringränd neutralitet," Uppsala Nya Tidning, 30 November 1983, p. 14.

- ⁶² Carlgren, Swedish, p. 61.
- ⁶³ Dispatch to the Swedish Foreign Ministry from Arvid Richard on 27 August 1941. Reprinted in Uhlin, Februari Krisen, p. 58.
- ⁶⁴ Uhlin, Februari Krisen, p. 205. At the time, Germany feared a British attack on the north coast and ore mines. See Uhlin, pp. 152-153.
- ⁶⁵ Andrén, Den, pp. 100-109.
- ⁶⁶ Molin et al, Norden, p. 50.
- ⁶⁷ Martin Fritz, German Steel and Swedish Iron Ore 1939-1945, translated by Eva and Allan Green, (Göteborg, Sweden: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1974), p. 116.
- ⁶⁸ Fritz's sources are: "Handlingar rörande Sveriges utrikes politik under andra världskriget," in Transiteringsfrågor, pp. 83ff. (He doesn't give the publisher's name or year of the book). Walter, Schnurre and Wied to Auswärtiges Amt. 2714-40, Handakten, (Iodius CA, A), Aufzeichnung Schnurre 28/4-40, Aufzeichnung Wiehl 11/5-40, Handakten Wiehl Ba (A,A).
- ⁶⁹ Carlgren, Swedish, pp. 147-157.
- ⁷⁰ See chapter VII for discussion.
- ⁷¹ Ivar Anderson, Från det nära föreflutna, (Stockholm, Sweden: P.A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag, 1969), p. 142.
- ⁷² Carlgren, Swedish, pp. 20-21.
- ⁷³ Ibid., pp. 84-85.
- ⁷⁴ Uhlin, Februari Krisen, p. 152.
- ⁷⁵ Jan Myrdal mentions that German was the first foreign language taught in Swedish schools even during World War Two. See his Tyska frågor, (Stockholm, Sweden: Oktoberförlaget, 1976), p. 10.
- ⁷⁶ Ake Thulstrup deals rather extensively with this topic in Med lock och pock, (Sweden: Bonniers, 1962). Lagerlöf was not a Nazi sympathizer herself.
- ⁷⁷ Thulstrup, Med lock, p. 17.
- ⁷⁸ Krantz, p. 128. The quotation was taken from Herman Rauschnig's book, Samtal med Hitler, (1940). Krantz does not give the publisher's name, nor does he mention the city in which the book was published.
- ⁷⁹ Carlgren, Swedish, p. 30.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 63.
- ⁸¹ Ibid., p. 99.

- ⁶² Carlgren, Swedish, p. 61.
- ⁶³ Dispatch to the Swedish Foreign Ministry from Arvid Richard on 27 August 1941. Reprinted in Uhlin, Februari Krisen, p. 58.
- ⁶⁴ Uhlin, Februari Krisen, p. 205. At the time, Germany feared a British attack on the north coast and ore mines. See Uhlin, pp. 152-153.
- ⁶⁵ Andrén, Den, pp. 100-109.
- ⁶⁶ Molin et al, Norden, p. 50.
- ⁶⁷ Martin Fritz, German Steel and Swedish Iron Ore 1939-1945, translated by Eva and Allan Green, (Göteborg, Sweden: Elanders Boktryckeri Aktiebolag, 1974), p. 116.
- ⁶⁸ Fritz's sources are: "Handlingar rörande Sveriges utrikes politik under andra världskriget," in Transiterings frågor, pp. 83ff. (He doesn't give the publisher's name or year of the book). Walter, Schnurre and Wied to Auswärtiges Amt. 2714-40, Mandakten, (Iodius CA, A), Aufzeichnung Schnurre 28/4-40, Aufzeichnung Wiehl 11/5-40, Mandakten Wiehl Ba (A,A).
- ⁶⁹ Carlgren, Swedish, pp. 147-157.
- ⁷⁰ See chapter VII for discussion.
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- ⁷² Carlgren, Swedish, pp. 20-21.
- ⁷³ Ibid., pp. 84-85.
- ⁷⁴ Uhlin, Februari Krisen, p. 152.
- ⁷⁵ Jan Myrdal mentions that German was the first foreign language taught in Swedish schools even during World War Two. See his Tyska frågor, (Stockholm, Sweden: Oktoberförlaget, 1976), p. 10.
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- ⁷⁷ Thulstrup, Med lock, p. 17.
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- ⁷⁹ Carlgren, Swedish, p. 30.
- ⁸⁰ Ibid., p. 63.
- ⁸¹ Ibid., p. 99.

⁸² Krister Wahlbäck, Regeringen och kriget. (Stockholm, Sweden: Bokförlaget Prisma, 1972), p. 92. Taken from Hansson's journal entry on 21 May 1940. Hitler's speech was on 24 April 1940.

⁸³ Uppsala Nya Tidning, 18 October 1967.

⁸⁴ Carlgren, Swedish, p. 63.

⁸⁵ Uhlin, Februari Krisen, pp. 36-37.

⁸⁶ Martin Fritz, "The Swedish Economy 1939-1945. A Survey." in The Adaptable Nation. (Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell International, 1982), p. 6. Hägglöf gives the figure at approximately 2/3 instead of 70%. See his Svensk krigshandelspolitik under andra världskriget. (Stockholm, Sweden: P.A. Norstedt & Söners Förlag, 1958), p. 116.

⁸⁷ Hägglöf, Svensk, pp. 39 and 59; Hagglof, "A Test of Neutrality....," p. 165; Carlgren, Swedish, p. 19; Undén, pp. 30-31; Martin Fritz, "Swedish Iron Ore And Ballbearings In The German War Economy," in The Adaptable Nation, p. 25; Sven-Olof Olsson, "German Coal In Swedish Energy Consumption," in The Adaptable Nation, p. 44.

⁸⁸ Olsson, German Coal, p. 44. Hägglöf adds that Germany supplied almost all of Europe's coal. See Svensk, p. 135.

⁸⁹ Hägglöf, Svensk, pp. 152-153.

⁹⁰ Ibid., p. 128.

⁹¹ Ibid., p. 164. Hägglöf claims the trade deal ~~with~~ contribute to Sweden's economic needs, but it showed Germany that Sweden ~~was~~ finding alternative trading partners. Of course Sweden's problem ~~was~~ in reality it could not find alternative trading partners.

⁹² Fritz, "The Swedish Economy....," p. 5; Fritz, German, pp. 54-56; and Carlgren, Swedish, p. 167.

⁹³ Hägglöf, Svensk, p. 39.

⁹⁴ Ibid., p. 21.

⁹⁵ Reprinted from Wahlgren, På skilda. No page number is given since it is a photo.

⁹⁶ Fritz, German, p. 53; also reprinted in Fritz, "Swedish Iron Ore," p. 20.

⁹⁷ Fritz, "Swedish Iron Ore....," p. 20.

⁹⁸ Ibid., p. 21.

⁹⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid., pp. 22-23.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., pp. 28-29.

- 103 ~~Bohman~~, p. 267.
- 104 Fritz, "The Swedish Economy....," p. 5.
- 105 Hägglöf, Svensk, p. 59.
- 106 Ibid., pp. 83-84.
- 107 Ibid., p. 88. They discontinued negotiations on 11 December 1939.
- 108 Ibid., p. 93.
- 109 Ibid., p. 132.
- 110 Ibid., p. 133.
- 111 Ibid., pp. 207-208.
- 112 Ibid., p. 235.
- 113 Ibid., p. 245.
- 114 Ibid., p. 262.
- 115 Ibid., p. 300.
- 116 Ibid., p. 282.
- 117 Speech in the Swedish parliament on 11 March 1940. Reprinted in Lundström, Svenska utrikespolitik, pp. 157-158.
- 118 Fritz, German, p. 128.
- 119 Fritz, "Swedish Iron Ore....," pp. 26-27.
- 120 Ibid., p. 32.
- 121 Reprinted in Lundström, Svensk Utrikespolitik, p. 319.
- 122 Ibid., p. 321.
- 123 Carlgren, Swedish, p. 64.
- 124 Anderson, pp. 42-43.
- 125 Krister Wahlbäck and Göran Boberg, Sveriges sak är vår, (Stockholm, Sweden: Bokförlaget Prisma, 1966), pp. 105-106. Scobbie claims that the soldiers returned in May, not April. See Scobbie, p. 131. Krantz claims that 290 medical orderlies were allowed to travel to Narvik. Sweden wanted to send their own, but Hitler refused. The reason: the "medical orderlies" were really explosive experts. See Krantz, Nar tyskarna, p. 149.
- 126 Gustaf Andersson i Rasjön's journal, reprinted in Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, pp. 105-106. Date of journal entry is 13 May 1940.
- 127 Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 107.

- 128 Carlgren, Swedish, pp. 68-69.
- 129 Karl Gustaf Westman's journal, reprinted in Wahlbäck, Regeringen, p. 104. Date of entry given is 18 June 1940.
- 130 Swedish Admiral Fabian Tamm visited Hitler in April, 1940. See Andersson i Rosjön's journal 18 April 1940, reprinted in Wahlbäck, Regeringen, p. 75.
- 131 See Westman's journal in Wahlbäck, Regeringen, p. 105.
- 132 Telegram from Björn Prytz, 17 June 1940. Cited in Wahlbäck and Boberg, p. 120. See also Westman's journal, 18 June 1940, reprinted in Wahlbäck, Regeringen, p. 105.
- 133 Gösta Bagge's journal, 29 June 1940, reprinted in Wahlbäck, Regeringen, p. 100.
- 134 Hansson's journal, 18 June 1940. Reprinted in Wahlbäck and Boberg, p. 114. Andreev also claims that Hansson admitted the decision meant giving up neutrality. See Andreev, p. 82 for several speeches in parliament against the decision, see Lundström, pp. 342-3. For a look at speeches by Social Democrats against the decision, see Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, pp. 16-17.
- 135 Carlgren, Swedish, p. 70.
- 136 Thus Günther became angry when he found out that replacements were being sent to Norway instead of permits during March 1941. See Björkman, p. 94.
- 137 Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 125.
- 138 Carlgren, Swedish, p. 84. See also Krantz pp. 14-15 for examples.
- 139 Björkman, Sveriges inför, p. 94.
- 140 Ibid., pp. 114-120.
- 141 Ibid., pp. 107-146. Günther presented the sea alternative to the Swedish government as if it were a Nazi proposal even though it was his own. See especially pp. 145-156 in Björkman, Sveriges inför.
- 142 Ibid., p. 115.
- 143 Ibid., p. 143.
- 144 Ibid., p. 142.
- 145 Ibid., p. 103.
- 146 Ibid., p. 151. Krantz claims that on May 15, 1941, the total surplus of Germans going to Norway had been 24,568. See Krantz, När tyskarna, p. 119.
- 147 Rune Karlsson, Så stoppades tysktågen, (Uddevalla, Sweden: Allmänna Förlaget, 1974), p. 308
- 148 Björkman, Sveriges inför, p. 453. His sources are: weekly reports from Fst/k. Fst/A archives, and Jan Ekman, "De tyska personaltransiteringarna genom Sverige 1940-1941," an unpublished essay from SUAV's archives.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 154.

¹⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 155.

¹⁵¹ Ibid., p. 11 (he admits here that Allied pressure was Sweden's main motive for stopping the traffic) and p. 307 (he explains here how Swedish opposition contributed to the cancellation).

¹⁵² Krantz, När tyskarna, p. 209.

¹⁵³ Scobble gives the total to be 18,000, while Krantz gives it to be 13,712. See Scobble, Sweden, p. 136 and Krantz, När tyskarna, pp. 120-121.

¹⁵⁴ See chapter VII for a discussion of the debate on banning the Communist Party.

¹⁵⁵ The other demands included: permission to fly single aircrafts over Sweden; planes making emergency landings may not be interned nor may the aircrafts be impounded; minefields must be laid in concern with the German authorities; Swedish protection must be given in its territorial waters; German naval units must be allowed shelter in Swedish territorial water or harbors and may not be interned even if they stay longer than international law permits; war supplies must be allowed to be transport through Sweden to Finland. See Carlgren, Swedish, p. 114. He points out on p. 118 that "on the whole the German demands were accepted." Krantz points out that German air traffic was allowed until March 30, 1943. See Krantz, pp. 43-44. In the same book, he claims that the absolute minimum number of German flights over Sweden was 3,157. It is unknown how many more flew over because the chief of staff's monthly reports are incomplete. See p. 72.

¹⁵⁶ Carlgren, Swedish, p. 115.

¹⁵⁷ Telegram from Prince Victor zu Wied, from 22 June 1944. Cited in Wahlbäck and Boberg, p. 150. For an interpretation supporting Hansson, see Axel Gjöres, Vreda Vindar, (Stockholm, Sweden: P.A. Norstedt & Söners, 1967), p. 88. Compare with: Andreen, pp. 162-166; Ragnar Casparsson, Brinnande horisonter, (Stockholm, Sweden: Tidens förlag, 1963), pp. 74-78; Tage Erlander, 1940-1949, (Stockholm, Sweden: Tidens förlag, 1973), pp. 102-103; Ernest Wigforss, Ur mina minnen, (Stockholm, Sweden: Bokförlaget Prisma, 1964), excerpts from an original 3 volume collection which came out between 1950-1954, p. 347.

¹⁵⁸ Carlgren, Swedish, p. 116.

¹⁵⁹ Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 146.

¹⁶⁰ Hans De Geer and Jarl Torbacke, Sverige, (Lund, Sweden: Akademisk Förlag, 1976), p. 252.

¹⁶¹ Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 148.

¹⁶² Marquis Childs points out that it was good strategy to have formal hearings in parliament so that its members would feel bound by the transport decision and therefore would have to defend it publicly. See his The Middle Way On Trial, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980), pp. 122-123.

- ¹⁶³ Carlgren, Swedish, p. 116, and Uhlin, p. 17.
- ¹⁶⁴ Carlgren, Swedish, p. 116.
- ¹⁶⁵ Casparsson, Brinnande Horisonter, p. 68.
- ¹⁶⁶ Uhlin, Februari krisen, p. 17.
- ¹⁶⁷ Uhlin, Februari krisen, p. 33.
- ¹⁶⁸ De Geer, Sverige, p. 206 and Gjöres, Vreda vindar, pp. 88-89.
- ¹⁶⁹ Gjöres, Vreda vindar, pp. 88-89. See also footnote 74.
- ¹⁷⁰ Casparsson, Brinnande Horisonter, p. 74.
- ¹⁷¹ Gjöres, Vreda vindar, p. 92.
- ¹⁷² Andreen, De mörka åren, p. 91.
- ¹⁷³ Björkman, Sverige inför, p. 177.
- ¹⁷⁴ Uhlin, Februari krisen, p. 23.
- ¹⁷⁵ Björkman, Sverige inför, pp. 185-186 and Carlgren, Svensk, p. 270.
- ¹⁷⁶ Uppsals Nya Tidning, 18 October 1967.
- ¹⁷⁷ Björkman, Sverige inför, p. 328.
- ¹⁷⁸ Hansson's journal, 2 May 1941. Cited in Björkman, Sverige inför, p. 192.
- ¹⁷⁹ Ibid., p. 190. Andreen points out that the bourgeois parties felt that Sweden had a special responsibility toward Finland, since the breakdown of the proposed joint defense pact with the two countries forced Finland to turn to Germany for help. See Andreen, pp. 108-109.
- ¹⁸⁰ Gjöres, Vreda vindar, p. 92.
- ¹⁸¹ Björkman, Sverige inför, p. 187.
- ¹⁸² Andersson i Rasjön's journal reprinted in Wahlbäck & Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 148, and Westman's journal 23 June 1941, reprinted in Wahlbäck, Regeringen, p. 173.
- ¹⁸³ Carlgren, Swedish, p. 118.
- ¹⁸⁴ Westman's journal 23 June 1941, reprinted in Wahlbäck, Regeringen, p. 173; Andreen De mörka, p. 106-107; Andersson i Rasjön's journal reprinted in Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 148.
- ¹⁸⁵ Andreen, De mörka åren, pp. 106-107.
- ¹⁸⁶ The term "non-socialist" is used here because Günther was not elected to parliament as a bourgeois candidate. Instead, he was a career bureaucrat who nevertheless shared a foreign policy outlook which was closest to the Conservative and Agrarian parties.

187 Andreen, De mörka åren, p. 109.

188 See footnote 150.

189 The term "tyskvänlig" (Germany's friends or friendly toward Germany) was often used by Social Democrats when attacking bourgeois politicians who recommended taking a more accommodating attitude toward Germany. The bourgeois politicians denied the charges and argued that they were merely being more realistic.

190 Westman's diary, 23 June 1941. Reprinted in Wahlbäck, Regeringen, pp. 173-174.

191 Hägglöf, Samtide, p. 103. See also Anderson, p. 120.

192 Erlander, 1940-1944, p. 102.

193 Ibid.

194 Ibid., p. 104.

195 Staffan Söderblöm wrote on October 22, 1943, that Hitler had announced before the Soviet invasion that "Geschiet ohne Schweden." Cited from Björkman, Sverige inför, p. 147.

196 Björkman, Sverige inför, pp. 133-136.

197 Ibid., p. 203.

198 Ibid., p. 282.

199 SSU's förbundsstyrelses prot. from 25-26 April 1942 (Arb A). Reprinted in Molin, Försvaret, p. 256, footnote 3.

200 See Footnotes 63-65. See also Thuistrup, Med lock, pp. 71-72. Scobbe, p. 134 writes that the German foreign office in Sweden "took a great interest in the Swedish press and articles critical of Nazism, conditions in German-occupied countries, and especially of the Führer were reported by the German Legation in Stockholm and quickly led to official complaints and often implied threats."

201 Carlgren, Swedish, pp. 20-21.

202 Cited in Bengt Owe Birgersson, et al, Sverige efter 1900, (Stockholm, Sweden: BonnierFakta Bokförlag AB, 1981, 9th ed.), p. 170.

203 Lars Furhoff and Hans Hederberg, Dagspressen i Sverige, (Stockholm, Sweden: Bokförlaget Aldus/Bonniers, 1965), p. 56. They give the total number of confiscations at 319. They also write that the last confiscation occurred on June 6, 1943. Birgersson, p. 170, writes that from 1940-1943, there were 315 confiscations.

204 Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 188. See also Furhoff, Dagspressen, p. 56; Birgersson, Sverige efter, p. 169; Per Francke, "Då kommunisterna gjordes fredlösa" in Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv, Tema: Kommunism i Sverige, (Stockholm, Sweden: Arbetarrörelsens Arkiv och Bibliotek, 1982), p. 55.

- ²⁰⁵ Wahlbäck and Boberg, p. 188. For a discussion of Trots Allt, see Molin, Försvaret, p. 260; Louise Drangel, Den kämpande demokratin, (Stockholm, Sweden: Liberförlag, 1976), especially pp. 34-46 and 122-128, as well as 57 and 63; and Thulstrup, Med lock, p. 102.
- ²⁰⁶ Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 192.
- ²⁰⁷ Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 192; and Birgersson, Sverige efter, p. 169.
- ²⁰⁸ Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 192.
- ²⁰⁹ Drangel, Den Kämpande demokratin, p. 143; and Birgersson, Sverige efter, p. 169.
- ²¹⁰ Carlgren, Svensk, p. 218.
- ²¹¹ Ibid., p. 217.
- ²¹² Drangel, Den Kämpande demokratin, p. 63.
- ²¹³ Drangel, Den Kämpande demokratin, p. 146; Krantz, När tyskarna, pp. 230-231. The speech was on April 12, 1940. He was fined 2,000 Swedish crowns. He was also originally sentenced to four months in prison for a book he wrote, but was later pardoned.
- ²¹⁴ C. J. Hambro, De förste månader, (Oslo, Norway: H Aschenoug & Co., 1945), p. 73.
- ²¹⁵ The book was published by Tidens förlag in which the Social Democratic Party was the majority owner. Social Minister Möller was the company's chair for the board of directors. See Casparsson, pp. 150-151.
- ²¹⁶ Thulstrup, Med lock, p. 117.
- ²¹⁷ Ibid., p. 112.
- ²¹⁸ Undén, Tal, pp. 44-47.
- ²¹⁹ Casparsson, Brinnande Horisonter, pp. 148-149.
- ²²⁰ Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, pp. 186-187.
- ²²¹ Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 185 give the number at 80%. Birgersson, Sverige efter, p. 170, gives it at 79%.
- ²²² Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 185.
- ²²³ Speech by Communist Party member of parliament, Linderot, on March 21, 1942. Reprinted in Lundström, p. 487.
- ²²⁴ Casparsson, Brinnande Horisonter, p. 149.
- ²²⁵ Aftonbladet, 23 June 1941. Reprinted in Casparsson, p. 185.

226 Krantz, När tyskarna, pp. 36-37.

227 Casparsson, Brinnande Horisonter, p. 190 and Furhoff, p. 55 have the same interpretation.

228 Thulstrup, Med lock, p. 101. The citations following are also from the same page.

229 Krantz, När tyskarna, pp. 230-231. The following citations are also from the same pages.

230 Speech by Westman on March 21, 1941. Reprinted in Lundström, p. 460.

231 Thulstrup, Med lock, p. 113.

232 Anderson, Från Det, p. 85.

233 Speech on March 21, 1941. Reprinted in Lundstrom, Svenska Utrikespolitik, p. 472.

234 Hägglöf, "A Test of Neutrality....", p. 156.

235 Wahlbäck and Boberg, Sveriges sak, p. 154; Birgersson, Sverige efter, p. 166; Uhlin, Februari krisen, p. 31; Carlgren, Svensk, p. 124, claims that Günther originally favored a Communist ban, but later feared that it could be seen as drawing closer to Germany; Andreen, De mörka aren, p. 183 argues that Gunther changed his mind when he realized that it could have lead to an invitation to join Hitler's anti-Communist pact. Karl Molin points out that Himmler had called Stockholm the "main contact point for international Communism." See his article "Den svenska antikommunism," in Tema: Kommunismen i Sverige, p. 51.

236 Wigforss, Ur min, p. 350.

237 Andreen, De mörka aren, pp. 172-173; Casparsson, Brinnande Horisonter, p. 161; Uhlin, Februari krisen, p. 31; and Molin, "Den svenska....," p. 51.

238 Molin, Försvaret, p. 298; Andreen, p. 165; and Uhlin, Februari krisen, p. 31.

239 Andreen, De mörka aren, p. 181, claims that the Conservatives were against banning Svensk opposition, while Molin, Försvaret, p. 303, says they agreed to banning Svensk opposition but no Nationella Förbundet.

240 Uhlin, Februari krisen, p. 31; Molin, Försvaret, p. 300; and Wigforss, p. 352.

241 Uhlin, Februari krisen, p. 31

242 Francke, "Då kommunismen," pp. 57-58. For personal experiences, see also: "Kräver upprättelse," in Folkviljan, number 42, 1983, p. 3; and Jan Mårnson, Harry Persson kommunist, (Stockholm, Sweden: Bokförlaget Paul Norstedts, 1974), p. 67.

243 Francke, "Då kommunismen", p. 58.

244 Erlander, 1940-1944, p. 31.

- ²⁴⁵ Wahlgren, På skilda, p. 125. The citations below are from the same page.
- ²⁴⁶ Hägglöf, "A Test of Neutrality....," p. 165.
- ²⁴⁷ Ibid.
- ²⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 168.
- ²⁴⁹ Erlander, 1940-1944, p. 116.
- ²⁵⁰ Ulf Torell, Hjälp till Danmark, (Stockholm, Sweden: Allmänna Förlaget, 1973), p. 36, writes that in May, 1945, there were 18,000 Danes and 43,000 Norwegians in Sweden. Childs, p. 126 writes there were between 30,000 and 35,000 Norwegian refugees and between 6,000 and 11,000 Danish refugees who came to Sweden. Ole Kristian Grimnes, Et flyktingesamfann vokser fram, (Oslo, Norway: H Aschehoug & Co., 1969), pp. 300-302, claims that 46,184 Norwegian refugees entered Sweden from 1941-1945. Scobble, p. 137, finds that 15,000 Danes and 36,000 Norwegians received refuge in Sweden and the total number of refugees surpassed the 300,000 mark. Ronald G. Popperwell, Norway, (London, UK: Ernest Benn Ltd., 1972), p. 158, footnote 1, says that approximately 50,000 Norwegians received assylum in Sweden although some were turned down in the beginning of the war.
- ²⁵¹ Carlgren, Swedish, p. 158; Carlgren, Svensk, pp. 422-423. Torell, p. 36, claims that around 7,000 Jews escaped to Sweden, while 500-600 were sent to Nazi concentration camps. Scobble, p. 137, writes that around 6,500 Jews escaped to Sweden. T. K. Derry, A History of Modern Norway, (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1972), p. 395, claims that only around 900 Jews escaped to Sweden.
For a description of how the escapes were carried out, see Erlander, pp. 110-111; and Yahil, pp. 278-283.
- ²⁵² Yahil, ET Demokrati, p. 278.
- ²⁵³ Ole Kristian Grimnes, Hjemmefrontens Ledelse, (Norway: Universitetsforlaget, 1977), p. 115.
- ²⁵⁴ See Erlander, p. 111; Grimnes, Et flyktingesamfann p. 13; Grimnes, Hjemmefrontens, p. 122; and Hambro, pp. 38-39.
- ²⁵⁵ Hägglöf, Britain, p. 36. See also Carlgren, Sweden, pp. 215-216; and Carlgren, Svensk, p. 567; and Hägglöf, "A Test....," p. 169.
- ²⁵⁶ But no weapons were given. See Kgl. Utenriksdepartement, Norges forhold til Sverige under krigen 1940-1945, volume 1 of 3, (Oslo, Norway: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1947), pp. 125-126.
- ²⁵⁷ Grimnes, Hjemmefrontens, p. 254.
- ²⁵⁸ Gjåres, Vreda vindar, p. 145.
- ²⁵⁹ Boheman, På vakt, p. 284 gives the number at approximately 30,000. Carlgren, Swedish, p. 159, claims appropriations were made for 1,500 police troops and up to 8,000 reserves. T. K. Derry, A History of Scandinavia, (London, UK: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1979), p. 348, gives the total number at 8,700. Popperwell, p. 158, writes that 1,500 police were trained and 10,000 reserves. Daniel Woker, Die Skandinavischen Neutralen, (Switzerland: Verlag Paul Haupt Bern und Stuttgart, 1978), p. 71, puts the number at 12,000.

- 260 Boheman, På vakt, p. 284.
- 261 Carlgren, Svensk, p. 424; and Carlgren, Swedish, p. 158.
- 262 Torell, Hjälp till Danmark, pp. 324-325.
- 263 Erlander, 1940-1944, pp. 129-131.
- 264 Ibid., p. 133.
- 265 Yahil, ET Demokrati, p. 279.
- 266 Krantz, När tyskarna, pp. 248-249.
- 267 Ibid., p. 249.
- 268 "Understöd för den tyska och finska krigsföringen i nordn," 20 January 1942, cited in Krantz, pp. 191-192.
- 269 Karlsson, Så stoppades, p. 12.
- 270 Karlsson, Så stoppades, p. 10. Derry, Scandinavia, p. 341, claims over 2 million passengers were carried.
- 271 See footnote 76.
- 272 Carlgren, Swedish, p. 46; and Krantz, p. 143.
- 273 Uhlin, Februari krisen, p. 189.
- 274 Yahil, ET Demokrati, p. 281; and Hilding Hagberg, Röd bok om svart tid, (Uddevall, Sweden: Bo Cavefors Bokförlag, 1966), pp. 241-243.
- 275 Hagberg, Röd bok, p. 243.
- 276 Ibid.
- 277 Ibid.
- 278 Yahil, ET Demokrati, p. 281.
- 279 Grimnes, Hjemmefrontens, p. 13.
- 280 Ibid., p. 25.
- 281 Ibid., p. 26. See also Erlander, 1940-1944, p. 113; Derry, Modern Norway, p. 390; and Carlgren, Swedish, p. 212.
- 282 Erlander, 1940-1944, p. 113.
- 283 Torell, Hjälp till Danmark, p. 35.
- 284 Grimnes, Flyktningsesamfann, pp. 300-302.
- 285 Kgl. Utenriksdepartement, vol. 1, pp. 184-185.

286 Kgl. Utenriksdepartement, Norges forhold til Sverige under krigen 1940-1945, volume 2, (Oslo, Norway: Gyldendal Norsk Forlag, 1948), pp. 75-76; and Lie, pp. 154-155.

287 Lie, Leve eller dø, pp. 154-155.

288 Torrell, Hjälp till Danmark, pp. 34-36.

289 Erlander, 1940-1944, p. 110.

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