Countering Kidnapping in a Globalised World:
a critical analysis of the production, transfer and application of high security knowledge

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2018

My first contact with criminology was by accident, back in 2010 when I was studying for my Bachelor in English Literature. Instead of going to the lecture room where introduction to literature was taking place, I opened the 'wrong' door, where Introduction to Crime, Law and Society was being held. Too embarrassed to leave, I decided to just sit there and wait for the lecture to end in hope of escaping with the rest of the students without being noticed. I loved how passionate the speaker was and how fascinating and thought-provoking the things discussed were. I never saw Cormac McCarthy, T. S. Eliott, or Albert Camus the same way again. During that lecture I made a mental note to myself to just finish my degree and then study Criminology. The person delivering that lecture, a few years later became my PhD supervisor, Professor Pete Fussey, and I became one of the class teachers for the criminology course I attended by accident. I would like to thank Pete for always being very positive and believing in this research more than I ever did. You are one of the most talented people I have ever met!

I would like to thank all those people who talked to me and help me gather my data and write this thesis. I wish I could thank each and every one of you with your name and last name, but I am going to stick to anonymity and hope that you know who you are. Special thanks are given to the Cypriot team of negotiators who opened their training for me and without my participation this research would not have been the same.

This journey wouldn't be the same without my fellow PhD superheroes and friends: Can Zuo, Jérémie Voirol, Andreea Moldovan, Gülçimen Karakeçi, Daniela Boraschi, Shovita Adhikari, Sergio Lo Iacono, Alejandra Beatriz del Carmen Diaz de Leon Cardenas, Aiko Ikemura Amaral, Tilotama Pradhan, Tatiana Sánchez-Parra, Bill McClanahan. I will always remember our discussions, the evening and night coffees we had in 5A.309, crying and laughing, sharing experiences, giving supportive hugs before board meetings and exchanging ideas for our researches.

My deep appreciation goes to my family, Ioanna Athanasiadou, Kyriakos Nikiforidis and Nikiforos Nikiforids for being un-boundlessly loving and unreasoningly supporting, I am definitely not as intelligent, talented, independent, or sassy as you think I am. Mom and Dad, thank you for all your sacrifices and for all your financial assistance throughout these 9 years of my education. The 18 year old me decided not to go to the Greek – and free– university to study Sociology because "that's so boring, who wants to study that?" and you supported my decision to study Literature which ended up being Sociology/Criminology after all, without telling me off, so thank you for that. I am very sorry for all the times I have missed family gatherings, birthdays, funerals and weddings. I will try to make up for that in the future.

Apart from dedicating this thesis to my parents, I also dedicate it to Georg Höhn who was next to me throughout the whole process of researching and writing, supporting me, reminding me that I need to get some fresh air, cheering me up, listening, discussing, drying my teary eyes more than I care to admit, and making me a better human being.

I would like to thank Jon Coaffee and Anna Sergi for their useful input and the non-traumatising viva.

Contents

Abstract

This thesis provides an investigation of the production, transfer and application of the knowledge associated with counter-kidnap. I examine the processes and contexts that shape transnational knowledge transfer and its application. As far as I am aware, this qualitative research is the first one adding an empirical detail to our understanding of these processes with respect to kidnappings for ransom.

The first two parts of the thesis provide a breakdown of the information provided by formal counter-kidnap documents, other ways of transferring high-security knowledge, and their barriers. A number of formal institutions and processes exist for transferring knowledge and practices around mitigating serious crime and I explain in detail in which respects they can be problematic. The third part identifies an implementation gap, since local practices and processes impede transnational initiatives. I discuss the effects of the specific police sub-culture which hinders the transfer and application of the relevant knowledge. In the final part I review the so-called risk management companies, which represent a fairly new private field responding to kidnapping risks, both preventatively and reactively. I suggest that the emergence of these companies results from the high prices of knowledge transfer and inter-institutional barriers to that transfer, as well as the poor outcomes of the responses to kidnappings by the public sector.

The overall picture emerging is that the transfer of high-security information is not as fluid as we might think. There are informal processes and practices that influence the transfer and application of knowledge and my data demonstrate the detail and complexity around the type of knowledge work police engage in.

Chapter 1: Introduction

 For this research I am using kidnappings as a vehicle for the analysis of knowledge dissemination and application. I am examining what can hinder or prevent the transfer and application of the kidnap-related knowledge and how these barriers have as a result led to the creation of the private counter-kidnap, kidnap prevention and risk-management businesses. The core areas of inquiry in this thesis are concerned with how kidnappings are understood and explained in formal documents, and also the role of state and non-state actors in the production, transfer and application of counter-kidnap knowledge. In more detail, I explore how knowledge is produced and then moved from one location to another, how this transfer takes place, how those who receive it make sense of it, whether this knowledge is modified, or whether people resist it, and the nature of how the operational environment actually integrates this knowledge.

A kidnapping can be for the purposes of extortion (a ransom kidnap), between or within criminal groups, for sexual exploitation, from within a family (domestic), as a form of revenge, for fraudulent purposes, or those which are politically and ideologically motivated (UNODC, 2003: 7-8). Interestingly, Briggs (2001: 3) has a more simplified (and maybe superficial) view of kidnapping-motivations and states that there are only economic and political

kidnappings, overlooking the crime-terrorism interrelation. Simplified or not, all kidnappings are about the illegal detention of a person against their will and there are different responses and prevention mechanisms towards most of the types.

A Kidnapping is a type of crime which does not have a broadly accepted legal definition (Wright, 2009: 32)[1]. Usually, a kidnapping refers to the illegal seizing of someone who is then taken to an unknown location, against their will, alongside deception or fraud, and the desire of something in return for the hostage. When it comes to English legislation, kidnappings are defined as 'an attack on and infringement of, the personal liberty of an individual' (The Law Commission, 2014: 2), with characteristics such as the taking or carrying away of someone by force or by fraud, without their consent and without lawful excuses. It is sometimes described as an aggravated form of false imprisonment. Practically, the way a kidnapping is framed is over-inclusive and vague. It overlaps with other types of crimes, such as abduction, and imprisonment, creating a legal loophole. This is also reinforced by the fact that in this law, by using the words 'fraud' and 'force', it ignores children and generally those who are mentally unable to give consent. In addition to that, there have been kidnapping cases where parents

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[1] Etymologically, kidnappings were originally related to the stealing or 'carrying off (of children or others) in order to provide servants or labourers for the American plantations', and later a broader meaning was given to this crime. In many cases there is confusion between the term abduction and kidnapping. An abduction, in most jurisdictions, is the unlawful taking of a young person under the age of 16 (Noor, 2013: 5), without a demand for ransom or anything else in exchange for the child's freedom.

consent to be kidnapped in exchange for their children. In these cases there is a form of consent but the kidnapping is still a criminal act, which highlights a grey area in the legal definition of kidnapping in the UK, which can be problematic. Similarly, the Greek law on kidnappings (article 322 on kidnappings and abductions), states that a kidnapper is someone who uses fraud, violence, or threats of capture, kidnaps, holds illegally someone, or takes them as a hostage and deprives them of personal freedom, preventing the state from protecting them, then this person will be punished with imprisonment.

Costa, in the UN manual (2005: 2), states that setting international trends around kidnappings is difficult and the number of cases is unclear. He also supports that 'there are different definitions of the term "kidnapping" and different recording and reporting systems used in some countries, […] which contribute[s] to a lack of clarity and difficulties in making comparisons'. There is indeed a lack of clarity surrounding kidnappings. Not only there is unclear data and statistics about kidnappings, but also there is a multiplicity of kidnap-types, and what can be called 'kidnapping' has a very vague and somewhat individual meaning. Through my research I found that police, possibly unconsciously, have a set of characteristics that need to be fulfilled in order to call something a kidnap. On the one hand, there is international knowledge (from shared training-events and formal documents), and on the other

hand there is a very domestically defined understanding and definition of what constitutes a kidnap from those who are in counter-kidnap positions. There is, therefore, a very selective interpretation of kidnappings based on the environment and the culture of the practitioners.

A kidnapping can be a multi-faceted crime which creates a variety of terminology, legal responses and counter-kidnapping strategies. This is why the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime argues that in order to be effective towards a counter-kidnapping strategy, there should be, amongst other elements, an attempt to harmonize the definitions and the constituent elements associated with kidnappings.[2]

> 'In 2006, with the contribution of law enforcement and judicial experts from 16 countries, UNODC developed the Counter-Kidnapping Manual, offering guidelines to policymakers and law enforcement authorities for sound and practical responses to kidnapping. The Manual addresses the typologies of kidnapping, policy and legislation considerations, coordination at the national and international levels and a framework for operational response. It also includes an aide-memoire offering practical and operational guidance to investigators and a trainers' guide for future capacity-building' (UN, Economic and Social Council, 2010: 19).

There is a lot of global fear around kidnapping ransoms being used to finance terrorist activities, but without following up the ransom it is not always possible to know how it will be used. From what the Greek police interviewees have said, in all cases the serial numbers

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[2] http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/law-enforcement.html (accessed 10.10.2013)

of the banknotes were registered in an attempt to later follow up the ransom. In most cases the ransom has later been found and returned to those who paid it.

There is an extended literature on knowledge transfer and policing, but this research will provide a number of contributions on issues linked to a specific police subculture and the kidnap-related knowledge that not many people have. Knowledge transfer is often seen as a process that comes quite naturally, or that it is a characteristic of all organisations which aims at ensuring that others have access to it. It is argued that knowledge transfer is the life-blood of policing (Bowling, Sheptycki, 2012) and although this might be generally true, in the specific context of kidnappings this is not something as straightforward as we might think. It is also suggested that there are factors beyond the nation-state which are influencing the way crime is dealt and controlled (Newburn, 2002). Contrary to these beliefs, it is argued that things are more complex, that globalisation is produced locally and then gets transferred and applied to other locations which leads to one place having layers of practices and knowledge coming from other parts of the world (Massey, 1994) and at the end states are those deciding if they will adopt the suggested practices (Valverde and Mopas, in Larner, Walters, 2004). There is also the view of specialised police knowledge as something that is retained in order to be used later on in someone's career (Papanicolaou, in Jones and Newburn,

2006). Workers from all professions develop their own occupational subculture which is a pattern of assumptions, ideas, beliefs, language, or behavior and this is how certain occupation-related tasks and events are managed (Schein, 1985; Van Maanen in Manning and Van Maanen, 1978). Police, like other organisations, do not have one common culture and as I will explore in this thesis the specific counter-kidnap police sub-culture is playing an important role in the transfer and application of knowledge.

In this thesis I discuss three distinct modes of moving knowledge around; formal documents, international trainings and intranational ones. From my research I found that the police culture itself is a primary barrier of the transfer and application of counter-kidnap knowledge, usually dismissing guidance coming from abroad. There is the idea of knowledge being borderless and shared seamlessly, but the reality is more complicated. There are filters of the flow of knowledge and the police counter-kidnap sub-culture is one of them, making the governance of counter-kidnap more complex. The role of the National Crime Agency in moving knowledge around is really interesting; it is a national body, that is also above the state (through collaborating with the United Nations) and below the state (through acting as a private cooperation and adopting commercial attributes). There are various filters and barriers mitigating the counter-kidnap knowledge and there are third parties coming in and private contractors aiming to prepare or

protect those who are one way or another affected by kidnaps. Garland's (1996) idea of resposibilisation is not something new, but we can see that when it comes to kidnappings, placing the responsibility on individuals is a tactic that is still present and prominent.

It is important to say that transferring someone's knowledge is not necessarily going to be useful to those receiving it, because it has been produced under specific circumstances and contexts. Although one might transfer knowledge, what the others receive is contextual information. The sender has knowledge but this knowledge is the result of a variety of factors, such as hard work, practice, research, and personal experiences, thus what is being shared and what the receiver gets is information. Knowledge is not transferrable and loses its character and value the moment someone decides to transfer it. All the people interviewed for this research have referred to the process of transferring and the content of this transfer as "knowledge transfer" and "knowledge" respectively. However, what is actually shared is information, which is an earlier version of knowledge. Although information and knowledge are two different terms, in this work I will be using the words and phrases of the interviewees, "knowledge", "knowledge transfer", and "knowledge production", in order to avoid any confusion between the two terms.

A way to explain the relationship between information and knowledge is through presenting them as a triangular structure. Knowledge is part of a hierarchical structure, with data at the very bottom, knowledge at the top and information in between these two. Data is the raw material and, for instance, it is everything that can or might be related to kidnappings. Information is data which is relevant to a specific case and has some purpose. Information is organised data and facts used to define and characterise a specific situation. This implies that the situation and its facts are interpreted and transformed from data to more meaningful information. Contrary to information, knowledge works at a higher level of abstraction, and it can easily be everything and nothing, appropriate or simply acontextual. Knowledge is made up of judgments, assumptions and expectations of the received information, and the way this information should be evaluated, analysed, or interpreted so it can be used. In addition to that, the information received, which is the theoretical understanding, is very different from the practical understanding, and the accuracy of the information does not, on its own, guarantee success in an operation. If we wanted to make this triangular structure more complicated, apart from data, information and knowledge we can also add intelligence on the very top of this structure. Intelligence is about problem solving through applying knowledge to particular problems, is about having the ability to understand and interpret

the environment. Intelligence is being goal oriented and having the ability to use information for specific purposes and at the same time be aware of what is going on in the world, as well as be able to understand and interpret the environment. The NCA is an intelligence oriented organisation which is using the collected intelligence in order to prevent or solve crimes either inside the UK or outside. With intelligence either a crisis can be prevented or managed in case their prevention is not possible.

For this thesis I am looking at the United Kingdom, and particularly at Greece and Cyprus. These nations have been chosen because I am interested in the ways knowledge moves around either across the geographical borders or inside a state. The UK has created and disseminates the counter-kidnap knowledge, Greece is both a receiver and later transmitter of knowledge, and last, Cyprus is receiving information from Greece or straight from the UK. I have no intentions on making any generalisations. I might be using different countries to talk about the transfer and application of knowledge, but it should be stated that I am not trying to compare these countries. I am analysing the gaps in the transfer and application of the counter-kidnap knowledge without comparing or telling how things need to be done. I am leaving the solution to the police makers and hopefully this research can be used by those who are in the position to make positive changes.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

2.1 Introduction

The processes of moving knowledge around are less transparent and straightforward than it has often been described in academic research. This literature review will focus on two major themes and their subsections which emerge throughout the analysis of the data, and even though they have been produced in a different context, in each case they will be used in relation to ransom kidnappings and the specific police group dealing with such cases. Although the criminological literature covers a plethora of issues, kidnappings have not received the same kind of attention. Compared to other types of crime, this specific type of crime and those dealing it have gone largely unnoticed and neglected by academic research. The point of this research is to use kidnappings as a case study and investigate how things work in reality in terms of knowledge transfer and application. To do so, this thesis will look at four different components of a broader discussion: how knowledge is produced and transferred, the general barriers towards the dissemination, reception and application of knowledge, the role of the police as a barrier of knowledge transfer, and, finally the limits of the states to protect their citizens.

2.2 Transnational Policing and Mobilities of Knowledge

In our globalised world, 'human action and interaction is no longer bounded by the territorial limitations of an earlier age' (Sheptycki, 2011: 154), and many varying forms of human conduct can have a transnational aspect. As Goldsmith and Sheptycki argue, with transnationalisation 'the boundaries between the internal and the external order of states have become blurred' (2007: 31). There is the idea that with the blossoming of globalization, there are also more criminal opportunities, leading to the production of transnational crimes and criminals, something which justifies the need for transnational policing (Sheptycki, 2002). Globalisation might facilitate the illegal collaborations, but it also assists the legal ones. Telecommunications have created a sense of global interconnectedness which 'opens up new possibilities for "horizontal" communication and collaboration among police officers' (Bowling, 2009: 151). For Bowling (2009), this ease in communications and collaborations can reduce the bureaucratic drag which often contributes to the lack of productivity.

In the original notion of policing, the police force was 'designed to control populations and secure territories' (Bowling, Sheptycki, 2012: 15), whereas in the modern notion it is argued that policing is regulating the 'internal order of states' (ibid), with external influences. The new dynamics created between the internal and the external influences might add extra complexity to the

already complicated picture of policing, creating a gap between ideas and actual practices. Bigo (2001) interestingly questions the dualism of internal and external security, arguing that these two are moving closer and closer to each other towards the point at which we are talking about their complete merging. Modernity is characterized by an increasing blurring of the boundaries between domestic matters and global affairs, taking policing beyond the geographical boundaries of a state, signifying the importance of international contacts, intrastate coalitions, knowledge-transfer networks and cross-state interactions (Bowling, Sheptycki, 2012: 23). Undoubtedly, our notion of borders and the differentiation between internal and external security is in transition, the once local security agencies are moving beyond their borders, while those from 'outside' can influence what is happening 'inside'. 'The international is now both a constitutive and explicative dimension of internal security and police work' (Bigo, 2000: 321). Specialized police forces and institutions from the various countries are driven towards a closer collaboration and an exchange of information Furthermore, for Bigo, this 'transnationalisation of security opposes national (and societal) security', creating border-related ambiguity, and underlying the need for the adaptation of policing (ibid). There are observable trends in the field of policing, where there is a shift from local to global policing. Global and transnational criminal actors are involved in criminal activities which are also usually

sustained and maintained by criminal networks spread across more than one countries. These networks can potentially become both domestic and international threats, which creates incentives towards a more internationally and globally constructed policing. According to Bowling and Sheptycki, policing has become transnational, characterised by global relationships where 'actions, activities and organisational structures transcend […] national boundaries' (2012: 23), and there are networks and coalitions which are not directly controlled by the nation-states. Mann recognised five networks of interaction which, although different, are not separate and tend to blend with each other (Mann 1997, in Bowling, 2009). These networks are the local, the national, the international, the transnational and the global.

Massey in her (1994) 'Global Sense of Place' refers to space compression and discusses its three different levels of influence: 'from the household to the local area, [and then from the local area] to the international'. From her point of view, all flows leave their traces and the local is not faceless, on the contrary, globalisation is actually produced locally (in specific locations such as the City of London and the Wall Street of New York). Places do not have only one entity, and Massey's sense of 'place' includes linkages with the global and different layers added in one place, all originating from different parts of the world. Although it is usually thought that the local is the 'victim' of the global forces, for Massey

however, global actions take place within local places, putting the responsibility of global happenings within the local level. A place is linked with other places beyond and a local place can have a global character, as well as a global sense of the local. On a similar note, what is internal or external, domestic or transnational is very complicated, creating a messy reality. There is a constant interplay between these, and now there are many knowledge producers. Nations are in closer collaboration but at the same time there is always a local sense of policing, of knowledge, or practices, as well as private security businesses dominating the security and crime management/prevention field. Newburn (2002) discusses the growing insignificance of the nation-state by stating that in a globalised world characterised by 'Atlantic crossings' (ibid), it is 'increasingly recognised that factors beyond the nation state are influencing and shaping domestic crime control policies'. Beck states that globalism, globality and globalisation are three important dimensions of global policing. Accordingly, globalisation is 'the process through which sovereign national states are criss-crossed and undermined by transnational actors with varying prospects of power, orientations, identities and networks' (Beck 2000, in Held, McGrew, 2003: 101).

Globalisation means global networks in local places from both the perspective of the offenders and those battling the crime. Globalism is defined by the neo-liberal rule of the world market

where, as Beck argues, the true meaning is reduced to a single economic aspect, while undermining other important dimensions such as culture, society and politics (Bowling, Sheptycki, 2012: 22-23). When referring to globality, it can be said that there are patterns of 'worldwide interconnectedness' (ibid). Apart from these three dimensions of global policing, it could be argued that there is also the aspect of 'glocality' (Hobbs and Dunnighan, 1998 in Ruggeiero, South and Taylor; Hufnagel, Harfield, Bronitt, 2012;) where the global meets the local, creating a link between the transnational and the local. At this point it should be stated that by "transnational" we refer to these activities which transcend 'national boundaries, passing through them without necessarily being affected by them' (Mann 1997, in Bowling, 2009: 152). Since in some cases crimes are transnational, it is often implied that there should also be transnational policing. It is widely believed that the globalization of crime should be accompanied by the globalization of crime-control, because otherwise all those efforts of combating transnational crime would remain fruitless (Robertson, Das, Singer, Raton, 2010; Block, 2008) For Bowling (2009), the current policing 'requires collaboration across international boundaries'. Similarly to Bowling, Block mentioned that the contemporary crimes might involve activity in more than one country and, in order to be more successfully tackled, 'police need to seek cooperation partners across borders to share intelligence, coordinate operations, secure

evidence, and track down suspects' (2008: 74). When it comes to the United Kingdom, there can only be speculations about the effects of Brexit in transnational policing. There might be big changes, although considering the role of that nation in organising collaborations and accomplishing transnational policing, it is quite likely that not many things are going to change in the post-Brexit era. The United Kingdom is a major producer of knowledge and a contributor of intelligence inside the European Union, and with Europol or the Shengen Information Services, information is being shared and knowledge is transferred, so it is definite that these will have to be modified strongly if the UK is excluded from these transnational policing networks.

When it comes to policing, there is a great diversity between countries and even between cities, because the politics of policing in one city are different from the politics of policing a few kilometers away. 'Policing is a set of practices that are experienced in localities and therefore the issues raised are very often local issues' (Sheptycki, 2002: 138). However, Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) believe that there is a pattern of similar experiences and methodologies followed by different nation-states, and this is accomplished through the process of sharing information and knowledge. This sharing is considered to be the 'life-blood' (Bowling, Sheptycki, 2012: 85) of policing, which underlines the importance of gathering key information, storing it, organising it

and of course transferring it and sharing it with the others who might be facing the same or similar issues. The transnational police cooperation and the collaboration between different policing organisations illustrates two things. First, it shows the increasing demand for managing the movement of information through sending it in different directions, and second, it shows the need to see how others respond to specific situations. My case study is going to interrogate these issues, and I am going to show how complicated and messy the reality actually is. In theory, knowledge is being transferred around in order to be used by different agents, however, the state plays a very big role, both as a recipient and as a producer of knowledge, which can become a filter of, or a barrier to knowledge.

At the moment, there are many different types of supranational governance institutions, such as Interpol, Europol, and the United Nations. In an era of globally illegal goods, mobile money, and mobile people (both victims and offenders) there is the need for cooperation between the police and the institutions of the various nations. As Guille supports, Europol has successfully managed to provide a broader 'information market, providing better quality data and more relevant and "hot" information for practitioners' (Guile, in Lemieux, 2013: 35), something which, as he argues, resembles an intelligence-oriented organization which provides knowledge sources and knowledge itself. Similarly to

Guille's point of view, Gerspacher and Lemieux (2013) argue that Europol is steadily turning into a knowledge broker, but they also add that it plays a more important role, since Europol fills the void between operational assistance and police cooperation. Europol has expanded over the years and it has gained credibility by assisting practitioners through creating CEPOL (European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Training). Europol's CEPOL develops, implements and coordinates trainings for police officers all across Europe. Europol, as Gerspacher and Lemieux believe, 'has contributed to the identification and shaping of the demand for coordination and joint investigations to compensate for a lack of adequate organization and national institutions and for the limited expertise of the national police services in the area of international cooperation' (Gerspacher, Lemieux in Lemieux, 2013: 75). International and transnational police cooperation organisations such as Europol and Interpol 'differ from the *adhoc* police cooperation initiatives by the resources they enjoy and the member government commitment that allows them to establish legitimacy' (Gerspacher in Lamieux, 2013: 145).

On a similar note, the United Nations is an intergovernmental organisation which was established in 1945, aiming to achieve international cooperation around a variety of issues. In the United Nations there are, at the moment, a hundred and ninety-three member countries, five of which have more power than the other

countries. China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States can veto any resolution, authorising a collective action. Puchala has been quite critical of the United Nations. As he has said, the organisation is an American creation, and 'many […] view it as the servant of a long-standing US hegemony' (Puchala, 2005: 572), which, practically, means that the United Nations tends to be controlled by the United States. It is part of a 'transnational alliance of elites' (576) and shows 'indifference to cultural differentiation' (581) while supporting universality. Just like other international and intergovernmental organisations, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), has produced a variety of manuals and documents. However, there seems to be an accessorial use of these documents, where the aim is to recycle trainings, information, and resolution-steps with a very homogenous mentality, neglecting other important factors (Puchala, 2005). In addition to that, the UNODC counter-kidnapping manual creates ambiguity by not fully explaining some things around kidnap-resolution. As McGoey has stated, this ambiguity is in some cases used 'strategically by those in the best position to take advantage of the fluidity of possible interpretations' (2012: 11). Ultimately, this intentional ambiguity creates difficult conditions for individuals or institutions when it comes to maintaining their fame and strategic advantages (ibid). When it comes to policing, a number of formal institutions and processes exist for transferring

knowledge and practice around mitigating serious crime. However, as I am going to show later on, my research identifies an implementation gap.

2.3 Knowledge Transfer

Risks are 'fluid' (Beck, 1999); they move across borders, and so does the approach to them. The police linkages which have emerged from the ease of travel, the expansion of communication networks, the joint training programs, the team trainings, the creation and dissemination of manuals and documents are being 'consolidated by supranational governance institutions and justified politically by persistent anxieties' (Bowling, 2009: 158). Rising anxieties over potential problems are motivating organisations and institutions so as to identify and later manage these –potential– risks. According to Ericson and Haggerty (1997), anxieties for safety and security are reinforcing the members of the so called "risk societies" to predict the future through probabilities and knowledge sharing. However, security is not something tangible which can be potentially based on probabilities. 'External institutions are able to routinely access police for knowledge useful in their own risk management' (Ericson, Haggerty, 1997: 5). In this thesis, among other things, I investigate the extent to which kidnapping practice is as future oriented as other policing approaches. Academics (Bayley, Bittner 1984; Ericson, Haggerty

1997), have talked about policing and the knowledge transfer as something that happens very smoothly and it is also future oriented. However, with my research I have identified some things that shape knowledge transfer within the police. Not only is information kept back because it is powerful for those having it, but also there is the existence of some filters and barriers which hinder both the transfer and the application of knowledge.

Knowledge transfer is seen as part of transnational policing and police cooperation. "Police cooperation" refers to the 'international or uninternational interaction between two or more police entities (including private and public agencies)' (Lemieux, 2013: 1), aiming to share criminal intelligence, information, knowledge and take part in investigations. When it comes to the public sector, knowledge transfer is an important process as it can lead to more efficient results and better performance through creating a knowledge base and developing the outdated information (Riege, Lindsay, 2006). In relation to police performance and knowledge transfer, the success or not of an investigation depends on the efficiency and effectiveness of that transfer (Glomseth, Gottschalk, Solli-Sæther, 2007: 100). At the same time, knowledge transfer can decrease the risk associated with the decision making, while at the same time as Riege and Lindsay (2006) believe, issues are resolved faster. When it comes to the planning of a police activity, whether it is kidnap-related or not, through knowledge

sharing, different facts and ideas can be integrated into the plan (Glomseth, Gottschalk, Solli-Sæther, 2007: 101). The final reason for the importance of knowledge transfer is that through the process of receiving and giving knowledge, one can achieve the most cost-effective delivery of services, showing responsibility towards the tax payers. At the individual level, when the knowledge that is derived by experiences is shared, it increases the cultivation and enhancement of the individual's skills (Cong, Pandya, 2003). At the organizational level, knowledge management is increasing the output, which is linked with the improvement of the performance of those employees using this specific knowledge (Seba, Rowley, 2010). At this point it should be stated that McAdam and Reid (2000) have constructed a model which is related to the knowledge management process, and it consists of four parts: the construction of knowledge, the embodiment of knowledge followed by its dissemination, and finally, the use of this knowledge.

Transferable knowledge tends to be based on 'regularities of some kind, patterns of events or observations which can be predicted to apply if certain conditions are present' (Ekblom, 2002: 145). It is important to have a clear understanding of the processes and contexts that inhibit and shape the transnational knowledge transfer, and my research adds empirical detail to our understanding of them. This transferable knowledge that Ekblom (2002) talked about is created through recognizing perpetual

patterns of activities and specific practices aiming to deal with a crime, while at the same time, the constant reforming of all these is a crucial aspect of creating and maintaining knowledge on this subject. Knowledge is created in a specific context and it does not exist in a vacuum. These things refer to the applicability of that knowledge in a different setting to the one in which it has been created. Ekblom has also identified five 'Ks' as types of crime-prevention knowledge. The first 'K' is the 'know-about' which is related with the "modus operandi" of the offenders, the 'consequences for victims and society, [and the] legal definition of offences, patterns and trends' (Ekblom, 2002: 142). The second is the 'know-what' which means knowing what works, mechanisms, techniques and their effects. The third 'K' is the knowledge of the legal powers or limits and the skills needed to achieve something (know-how). The fourth is the knowledge of the right people, potential collaborators, having many contacts and the needed service providers (know-who), while the final 'K' is the know-why which means trying to find the –symbolic or not– meanings underlying a crime.

Codified knowledge is usually used during knowledge transfer processes. This is an 'explicit' type of knowledge and it is the outcome of a long process of codifying what is known and it is also the result of different types and dimensions of knowledge. In order to achieve the transfer of knowledge, regardless of its type,

there initially needs to be the formation of this knowledge. In the epistemological dimension of knowledge formation, there is the 'tacit' type of knowledge which is informal, personal and subjective, and it is about those things which are not formally known. It might take years to develop this type of knowledge, and undoubtedly its prolonged period of production and its subjectivity are some characteristics which make this knowledge harder to be transferred. Tacit knowledge is based on the individual's perspective of the world and as Paz Salmador and Bueno (2007) state, 'it is entrenched in values, ideas, customs, routines, and emotions. Hence, tacit knowledge relates to the "right now" […] making it difficult to communicate' (368). One can add that tacit knowledge does not only relate to the 'right now', but it also relates to the 'right here', making it time and location centered. Tacit knowledge has some very technical details which, if not making it impossible to be transferred, definitely make it more difficult. However, on the other hand, the 'explicit' type of knowledge can be expressed both verbally and in written form, making it easier to be transferred from one individual to other(s), or creating instructional documents and manuals for a wider transfer of knowledge (Paz Salmador, Bueno, 2007: 369). From an ontological point of view, every human being has a certain form of knowledge, and individuals are very important because from their experiences they can create knowledge. Later, this personal knowledge can turn from tacit to explicit and become

written, codified and more collective, in order to be shared with other individuals. In a sense, knowledge creation is an interplay between tacit and explicit knowledge. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) discuss this interplay in more detail, and they refer to four modes of knowledge conversion: the socialisation, the externalisation, the combination and the internationalisation. "Socialisation" is when there is sharing of experiences (meaning that people are sharing their tacit knowledge on a specific subject). "Exteranlisation" is when there is the transformation of tacit knowledge into explicit knowledge. It is the 'process of articulating the knowledge gained from the experience, into concepts, hypotheses, models, metaphors and analogies, by means of communication' (ibid). 'Combination' of knowledge occurs when there is a transfer of different forms of explicit knowledge, of these concepts, hypotheses, models, metaphors and analogies, and, finally, 'internationalization is when explicit knowledge becomes tacit knowledge.

2.4 Criticisms and Barriers Associated with the Knowledge Transfer

A number of barriers exist in relation to the transfer of high-security knowledge, and in this thesis I will look at kidnappings as a way of identifying these barriers. In the second paragraph of article 28 of the Palermo Protocols, it is suggested that 'States Parties shall consider developing and sharing analytical expertise concerning

organized criminal activities with each other…' (30). It is also stated that states 'shall assist one another in planning and implementing research and training programmes designed to share expertise…' (31). On a similar note, in article 10, it is advised that authorities 'cooperate with one another by exchanging information…' (46) and Kofi Annan mentions in the foreword of the document that 'if crime crosses borders, so must law enforcement' (iii). Despite the formal claims of knowledge transfer and sharing between nations and institutions, this is not always happening. Criticism exists in the way knowledge transfer seems to take place, which is not free of values or politics, making its content dependent on the individual transferring it. Knowledge transfer takes place between different nations which are dealing with different variations of the same crime, different typologies, terminologies, legislations and approaches. There is a broad spectrum of kidnappings, from ransom kidnappings to piracy and bride kidnapping. Costa (2005), in a synopsis of the counter-kidnapping manual, supports that 'there are different definitions of the term "kidnapping" and different recording and reporting systems used in some countries'. All of these contribute to a lack of clarity and difficulties, since in many cases, kidnappers have connections to more than one country in order to carry out the different aspects of a kidnapping, such as hiding or money laundering. This creates a muddle of terminology, both within the legal response and in the counter-kidnapping

strategies. This is why the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime argues that in order to be effective towards a counter-kidnapping strategy, amongst other things, there should also be an attempt to harmonise the definitions and the constituent elements associated with kidnappings.[3]

Regarding the process of knowledge formation and 'best-practices', its realisation begins with the local police who are developing and sharing their existing knowledge with international policing organisations such as the UN, Interpol and Europol, in order for this knowledge to be transferred to others. These developments have led to the view of supranational organisations and institutions as knowledge brokers, even though these organisations produce their knowledge through the assistance of practitioners. The international policing organisations are collecting and compiling the data identified as useful, and later they make this data accessible to nation-states through a variety of ways. With the contemporary scenario of transnational policing, 'Interpol has expanded its activities significantly' (Newburn, 2008: 128) and there has been a similar change in many other transnational policing agencies. Valverde and Mopas (in Larner, Walters, 2004) have a different view, and they refer to Interpol-like institutions as flamboyant 'policeman's club[s]' (248). They also emphasize the '*non-global* character of much policing, even of supposedly

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[3] http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/law-enforcement.html (accessed 10.10.2013)

international policing', (italics in original, 236) since they believe states remain the key venues for adopting and using the suggested "best-practices". Sheptycki underlines the importance of knowledge within the police by saying that transnational police are mainly knowledge workers (2002: 49), The literature on policing is explaining superficially the knowledge-transfer processes, without looking deeper into how things work. This knowledge transfer is often explained as a process that runs very smoothly, without any issues or forces working as barriers, not only towards its transfer, but also towards its application. What I have seen from my research is that things are more complicated, and the counter-kidnap personnel are not matching Sheptycki's view of the police officer as a 'knowledge worker'. There is resistance, unwillingness to cooperate, antagonism and misinformation and knowledge does not get transferred easily.

Sheptycki (2011) also noted the distinction between information and intelligence. As it has been explained to him by a European Liaison Unit officer, background knowledge and experience are needed in order to transform information to intelligence. 'Being able to get the appropriate information, transform it into useful intelligence, and see that it reached the attention of an operational officer who could make use of it [… is] an essential part of contemporary police work' (Sheptycki, 2011: 91). In the same way that information differs from intelligence,

one can also posit that information differs from knowledge. Knowledge management researchers have referred to the different nature of knowledge, information and data. Earl (1996) has suggested that knowledge is information that is tested and validated, and it is information that can be meaningful and useful to other people. For Primiero, 'information has not in itself a truth value' (2008: 168), and on a similar note, others have discussed the hierarchical structure of data, information and knowledge: 'data are required to produce information, but information requires more than just data […] Similarly, information is required to produce knowledge, but knowledge involves more than just information' (Gupta, Sharma, 2004: 188). Many theoreticians have added another layer of complexity by also referring to intelligence. For example for Weinberg (1989) intelligence is about having problem-solving abilities, seeing all sides of a problem and generally keeping an open mind. It can be the ability to adopt effectively to new environments, to learn from experience and be able to overcome obstacles that might appear (Neisser et al., 1996). Sternberg (1999), among other things mentioned that intelligence is connected to problem-recognition and definition, strategy formation, resource allocation, and later the monitoring of the problem solving and its evaluation. Additionally, for Sternberg (ibid) an equally important role of intelligence is the analysis, the judgment, the evaluation and the assessment of the environment

around. Intelligence is goal-oriented and intelligence agencies are using their skills and knowledge to assess the world around them and solve the problems which are appearing.

When someone transfers knowledge to another person or group of people, in many cases the input is received similarly to the way in which a body receives an injection, like something alien being forced inside. Knowledge acquisition takes time and it is the result of something deeper. It is the product of long experience, personal norms, world-views, and belief systems. Knowledge is very subjective, and it is based on the way each person understands and analyses the world around him or her. My argument is that people receive information and then it is up to each individual to create knowledge based on the information received. This can happen through a variety of ways, such as extended personal research, and practice, or simply by personal skills and understandings. Although the input is the same, different people can produce different knowledge as the end product of data and information. If someone has no knowledge or experience of the informational context received, then they will have to rely on the knowledge of others. However, for information to become knowledge, one has to evaluate the received information against their prior knowledge or ideas. The mind cannot exist in a "tabula rasa" state, and the received information is difficult or even impossible to be handled with objectivity. The transition of received

information to knowledge is a very complex process. It is part of our human nature to project some elements of prior ideas to the incoming information, which can either become a burden to the transition or assist it and create knowledge from that information.

As it has been mentioned before, an important aspect of transnational policing is related to the processing and exchanging of information around specific types of crimes. However, there is some skepticism and a form of resistance related to the activity of sharing the 'best-practices' or simply sharing knowledge. Ekblom (2002) recognised some of the potentially problematic areas of sharing transnational knowledge. As he suggests, it is often assumed that the 'path of good practice' (Ekblom, 2002: 133) is a 'top-down implementation of detailed guidelines' (ibid). However, sometimes this implementation might be affected by a superficial and fragmented understanding, supported by inaccurate information (135). In many cases, information might be gathered by countries with different laws or different reporting and recording systems, leading to an incomplete criminological knowledge of the problem and consequently its solution as well. There is a 'passive dissemination' (136) of knowledge which is not enough in dealing with serious criminal activities. Toolkits and best-practice manuals should 'aim to supply a strategic and tactical framework for understanding local crime problems and contexts, and how to identify, implement and evaluate solutions' (137). In a sense, the

known knowledge is being forced by institutions, toolkits, protocols and best-practice manuals which just exist without offering any actual help. This knowledge becomes a fact, and it is a form of governance from institutions and organisations which have the power to influence and shape a reality.

A number of institutions, protocols, manuals and toolkits are developed to assist practitioners in their operational settings. However, there is debate regarding how effective these are and the degree to which they are instituted in practice, and this is something I intend to answer in this thesis empirically. When it comes to the "how-to" manuals, they have a series of rules to be followed, and intent to create copies of models which were successful under specific frameworks. This might often lead to failed replications of the allegedly named "best practices" which are usually good under particular circumstances. As Ekblom argues, 'one person's intervention method is another person's implementation principle' (149), and in the same way, when it comes to kidnappings, one country's counter-kidnapping practices might prove to be useless or even put the victim's life in danger if implemented in a completely different frame. Laycock and Webb (2000) maintain that organisations such as police, have the power to decide whether or not they are going to adopt and follow specific practices, but they are not always aware of the "know-how" practices. However, if one looks at this argument from a different

perspective, it can be said that those transnational organisations that supposedly have the "know-how" knowledge towards reducing, deterring and dealing with a crime, cannot always affect the local practices. On the ground level, the local policing activities appear to be different from what the transnational institutions are advertising as "best".

As Sheptycki has raised, when the collected data is removed from where they are locally situated, it becomes irrelevant, blurring their validity, veracity and reliability. 'Centralization raises the potential for erroneous information to be taken at face value, which can have negative consequences for […] police operations' (Sheptycki, 2011: 98). Also, there should be proportionality and subsidiarity in the information-traffic, which should be controlled by the policy makers who are interested in the transnational policing (ibid). When it comes to knowledge transfer, there is an interplay between the local and the transnational, a blend of formal and informal collaborations. There is also a distinction between strategies and operations, what national police are trying to do and what they are actually doing.

The police networks used for communication and knowledge transfer are enormous, dense, complex, and very powerful (Sheptycki, 2011: 97). With the evolution of information, communications technology, and the actual implementation of these two characteristics, came the 'stitching together [of] agencies

which historically have been quite separate' (ibid). However, Sheptycki is categorical of this "stitching", because he believes that some institutional dichotomies still remain, since the communication and knowledge transfer net has not developed homogenously. Supra-national institutions overlaying this patchwork have added another dimension to the institutional complexity, resulting in problematic communication 'and potential institutional friction' (ibid). The national policing structures of a nation-state already suffer from the administrative burden, and the macro-level institutions (such as UN, Europol, Interpol) definitely add another layer of complexity on top of that (Sheptycki, 2011: 98). He continues by noting that the best way to minimize the bureaucratic delay is through having 'centralized data exchange by direct point-to point communication at the local and regional level' (Sheptycki, 2011: 97) For Bowling, researches and public inquiries have 'raised questions about discrimination, corruption, incompetence and effectiveness in domestic policing and there is no reason to believe that policing "above government" will be immune from these problems' (2009: 158).

Stabell and Fjelstad (1998), and later Geoff Dean and Petter (2007), when referring to police knowledge transfer, refer to the idea of a "value shop". By that what they are saying is that police are problem-centred organisations trying to create value through providing a unique solution to unique problems. In the value shop

there are five primary activities, and these activities are: problem finding and its definition as well as information acquisition, problem solving, the solution choice, the solution execution and, finally, control. According to Geoff Dean and Petter (2007), these activities will define whether or not a police investigation has been or will be successful. However, through the modern knowledge sharing systems of documents, trainings and manuals, what is actually attempted is to eliminate the uniqueness of the solutions, with the goal to create "one size fits all" solutions. Even though the transfer of security knowledge offers a solution in the way a crime is addressed, the process of transferring knowledge does not always acknowledge the wide variety of factors affecting the application of this knowledge. In many cases, crimes are more complicated, and there is interaction between different variables. The knowledge about criminal activity and methods of combating crimes are derived from the output of very few countries and in the case of kidnaps, that knowledge is derived usually from just one nation[4]. Knowledge transfer in many cases offers a myopic view on problems, offering ill-suited customized solutions. Although knowledge transfer offers an insight to what is happening in other countries, it is still fragmentary and creates difficulties towards achieving the best possible results. In many cases the public sector is experiencing delays, there is no clear strategy or clear goal, and

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[4] That nation is the United Kingdom and a few people from the country's counter-kidnapping team in NCA has written the UNODC counter-kidnap manual

there might be noticed an inability to manage the knowledge received.

The reality of the counter-kidnap knowledge transfer is very messy. All these issues raise significant questions about the quality, relativity and applicability of the knowledge that is being transferred, and they will be explored in this thesis. Ekblom stated that in some cases the available training is superficial and the oral transmission of knowledge may be limited, inaccurate, and there might also be 'lack of contact and cultural common ground' between the trainers and the other officials (Ekblom, 2002: 135) hindering communication, collaboration and the transfer of information. An expected problem might be the misunderstanding of the transferred knowledge because of the fragmentary nature of interpretation and translation. Similarly, Guille (Lamieux, 2010) supports that the linguistic factor is an important aspect of cooperation and knowledge transfer. In many cases, as he explains, communication in a common language is more important than having common legislation and policies. Since most police officers are not multilingual, the linguistic factor becomes a central issue. 'Cooperation with Southern countries […], has been mentioned as being very difficult […] Even if practitioners can deal with border languages, the communication link can easily be broken by other linguistic combinations (such as Greek-Finnish), which is a point where organizations created at European level could demonstrate

their unique contribution if approached in the right way.' (Lamieux, 2010: 29) Apart from the linguistic factor, something which apparently has a significant importance is having the same culture. Yao Kam and Chan (2007) investigated the impact that culture can have towards knowledge sharing in a Hong Kong governmental department, and the outcome of this research was that the varying Chinese culture works as a barrier to the sharing of knowledge. This makes us think that if there is a barrier between those who share different Chinese cultures, then the barriers between those coming from utterly different backgrounds and cultures will be significant.

Police culture is about all those shared values and assumptions, and it can also include their special skills and knowledge, their vocabulary, their ways of thinking and operating, as well as written or unwritten rules. Police culture is often referred to as "cop culture" which is about the orientation of police officers or in other cases, referred to as "canteen culture" which can be used to describe the way that police officers talk about their cultural themes, their fears and frustrations (Bacon in Brown, 2014: 108; Hoyle, 1998: 75). However, others such as Crank (2015) and Newburn (2011), use the word 'cultures', showing that there is not just one single police culture. This plurality makes sense, since there are various police departments, there is specialist and generalist police, as well as high and low policing methods. Most discussions around police cultures have focused on the generalist,

low policing, and street-level police officers. The organisational culture or the sub-culture has been recognized as the main element affecting the successful or not so successful sharing of information and knowledge within the organisation (Abrahamson, Goodman-Delahunty, 2014: 4). High policing is an intelligence-based model that operates proactively, there is secrecy, extralegality, the use of informants, the state is identified as the victim or in threat and it is the job of those involved in high policing to protect the state (Brodeur, 1983; Brodeur, Dupont, 2006; Brodeur, 2007). These are some elements that Brodeur identified as characteristics of high policing and he insists that this particular mode of policing is carried out by the state and is about matters affecting it, such as terrorism or organised crime.

Generalist and low policing are usually about the protection of victims and citizens as well as the maintenance of order in the day to day life, whereas specialist and high policing are related to the hierarchical position of an agency dealing with the cases, the ethos, the use of intelligence, the secrecy that is involved and the fact that it is about national security matters. However, there is a complex environment of low policing entering the terrain of high policing and the other way around (Brodeur, in Williamson, 2008). Non-state actors participate in the field of high policing and also use high-policing techniques to protect their interests (O'Reilly, Ellison, 2006). There is fluidity of which agency or police section/unit is

dealing with which type of crime, and although kidnappings would not be considered a high policing matter, they are interestingly dealt as such. In the countries I have looked at, kidnappings are treated as a high policing matter by specialist police and agencies. National Crime Agency's Anti-kidnap and Extortion Unit is responsible for dealing with kidnaps in the United Kingdom and abroad. The NCA is an agency with a strong intelligence-led operational model and a police entity which attempts to deal with serious and organised crime proactively (Sergi, 2015). In Greece and Cyprus only specific people who have received training on kidnappings and negotiations participate at kidnap cases, along with the counter-terrorism squad. Some of the people I interviewed have been involved in the counter-terrorism department prior to moving to the department of crimes against life and property (in Greece this department is responsible for countering kidnaps). Kidnappings might be dealt with extralegality in some cases, there is the use of intelligence and informants, those participating (negotiators) are non-uniformed and there is secrecy around the details of the case. Such a reaction to what we would identify as non state-related and as a low policing matter, is possibly for funding purposes. By over-reacting to a crime that does not hold a threat to the state, and by putting up a show for the media and the people to observe with the heavily armed counter-terrorism squad, the helicopters, and the big white vans with expensive technical

equipment, all work as an excuse to ask for further funding, tools and means for those involved in the countering of the crime. In countries where there is little threat of terrorism, there is a high possibility that the funding, the tools, the technology and the knowledge is maintained by having a slightly exaggerated reaction to crimes that are not typically identified as major threats to the state. By reacting to kidnaps as a high policing matter, it possibly helps maintain a certain level of preparedness in case for instance a terrorist event happens.

When it comes to low policing, the police uniform itself becomes a tool, bestowing power and authority upon its wearers. De Camargo (2012) argues that the police uniform gives a 'celebrity' status to those wearing it. Police officers have a high rate of internal solidarity. This solidarity is something achieved through their training in the police academy where they acquire an "us against the others" mentality (Whitaker, 1982), as well as through wearing their uniforms. At this point it should be stated that although there has been discussion around the symbolic nature and the importance of police uniform, the non-uniformed, plain clothed police officers have not received the same attention. Kutz has stated that the uniform and pride are two things that are parallel to each other, even when as he argues 'our own contributions lie at the insignificant margin' (2005: 171). The individual pride of police officers 'makes sense because of [… their] participation in a

collective accomplishment' (Kutz, 2005: 172), and in a sense pride is the power of policing.

There is a plurality of police cultures even inside the same organization, and how police are going to deal with a situation is dependent on the specific institutional culture. Generally, police are sharing their knowledge with other international and global institutions. However, it is quite possible that they are sharing only selective parts of what they know. When it comes to police negotiators, it can be argued that knowledge of such a serious type of crime is very valuable, thus it might be kept for personal use. Police-culture researchers have talked about the blue 'code of silence' and police brotherhood among other things (Crank, 2015; Westmarland, 2006). Based on these findings, there is solidarity among police staff and those who do the opposite or complain about others tend to be ostracised as a form of punishment. However, as it was pointed out before, there are big differences between the various police cultures. Although in one culture police staff might remain silent to support another fellow police officer, in another police culture, staff might remain silent and secretive in order to keep information for themselves and move up the career ladder. Ericson has an interesting view on the issue of knowledge secrecy, and he refers to researches which have focused on the fact that 'lower ranking officers maintain "low visibility" of their knowledge to sustain some autonomy from their superiors'

(Ericson, 1994: 155). The occupational culture of police has a hierarchical environment where any form of specialised knowledge is shared at a price which is usually not of an economic nature, but it can assist someone's career ascendance. Knowledge and information are treated as intellectual properties which can distinguish one police officer (the knowledge holder), from the others. Information and knowledge are transferred very selectively through entrepreneurial structures, in informal networks, where the 'teacher' choses a small number of 'students' (or often only one), in order to transfer the knowledge acquired through time and experience. This means that it is possible that limited attention is given to the formal manual-like documents. Al-Athari and Zairi (2001) suggested that in many cases knowledge is regarded as a form of symbolic power, and thus knowledge is protected as a means of protecting and maintaining someone's work position. In addition, 'knowledge sharing is often seen as resulting in a loss of power, and, as a result, knowledge that should be transferred is often withheld, leading to inefficiency' (Duan, Nie, Coakes, 2010: 356). Especially in the public sector, knowledge is coupled with power and no one can force people into sharing their knowledge, since knowledge sharing might be regarded as a form of power loss. In the research of Seba and Rowley (2010) on the knowledge transfer in the public sector, an interviewee underlined the power of knowledge by saying:

…you might want to keep that knowledge and experience within so that you can perform better than someone else. Generally, people will hold on to the knowledge they have … People will hold back certain things it is human nature to do so. It makes you more employable […] It is a discretionary thing because if you want the organization to want to keep you and need you then you are going to want to hold a little bit back that makes you more employable… (621)

It is expected that people with the needed experience will train others, so as to share the information and not retain it, but when it comes to knowledge sharing, as Seba and Rowle's (2010) interviewee argued, it is noticed that specific strategies are adopted. They also suggest that the most important finding that their study can offer, 'is that no one of the organizations has an overarching knowledge management strategy or policy' (622). Intelligence goes along with policing, however, this intelligence, in some cases, is not defined by a free flow of information, due to the fact that 'much of this knowledge is considered so sensitive [that] it can only be disseminated on a "need to know" basis' (Sheptycki, 2002: 120). Secrecy becomes a tactic and, similar to Ericson's view, Sheptycki (2002) raises that knowledge is used as a 'mechanism of solidarity for a tainted occupation by shielding police agents from the unwelcome gaze of outsiders' (121). Interestingly, according to Hock, Ling and San (2009), something that can influence the process of knowledge sharing in the public sector is the notion of trust. Robertson believes in the coexistence of trust and cooperation: 'where cooperation exists, there is trust and

where there is trust, there is cooperation' (1994: 112). In a research on the factors which are affecting transnational knowledge transfer (Duan, Nie, Coakes, 2010), it was noticed that trust, combined with good communication and relationship, play an important role. Cultural awareness is significant, and also, as mentioned previously in this section, so is understanding the fact that having different language can be an extra barrier and an additional problem, especially when the quality of translation is poor. Other significant factors are the openness to accept new methods, the selection of the appropriate method to transfer the knowledge (seminars, workshops, case studies) and the selection of the right partners where there is not a significant knowledge distance between them and they all have a similar level. Also, there is the 'need to have clear objectives and focus' (Duan, Nie, Coakes, 2010: 362), and a common motivation or reason for collaboration, and in some cases the acceptance to get knowledge from outside. There is a lot of information around the production of knowledge, but there is less empirical emphasis on the reception and transfer of that knowledge. This is something that will be analysed in this thesis, and although it is difficult to make generalisations, it is quite likely that my findings can be applied to the transfer and application of all the high-security and sensitive policing knowledge.

There are cases where knowledge is not always welcomed by practitioners inside an occupational culture. As McGoey (2012)

states, 'knowledge is striated: always partial, always selective, and always vulnerable to dismissal or manipulation according to varying personal interests and structural constraints'. Nescience is a vital barrier when it comes to police knowledge transfer (Dilley, 2010). People do not always want to know and in some cases they might even prevent it. In other words, negative knowledge is the 'active consideration that to think further in a certain direction will be unimportant' (Gross, 2007). This strategic ignorance is a personal 'self-induced myopia' (McGoey, 2012: 3), as well as 'an institutional (in)action' (ibid).

2.5 The Governance of Security and the Private Industry

There is a steady and continuous tendency of nations to assign specific security-related jobs to private companies and individuals. Our traditional and archaic view of security being provided by the state is changing rapidly, even though Garland in 1996 talked about that change, and the new crime prevention approach. The "responsibilization strategy" as he said, was a new mode of governing crime which aimed at devolving the responsibility of security and crime prevention to organisations, agencies and individuals. Programmes like the "neighbourhood watch", or the "town watch" aim at creating active citizens, but this approach shows that the state alone is unable to prevent and control crime. On many occasions people are 'persuaded to change their practices

in order to reduce criminal opportunities and increase informal controls' (Garland, 1996: 453). The states are no longer the only providers of security and safety to their citizens inside or outside of their borders. Private organisations, individuals and companies have sensed the need to fill actual or even perceived gaps created by the states, and they are ready to provide a diversity of services and products. The feelings of insecurity or of those actual threats have led to the emergence of privately sourced security. Security and the fear associated with the perceived or real absence of security, have become a commodity which is being sold and bought by those who can afford it, just like any other goods.

Among other things, as commercial security we can include activities such as guarding, security consultancy, and investigations. These commercial security businesses can provide services to states, individuals, agencies, non-profit and non-governmental organisations (Jones, Newburn, 2006: 37-38). Jones and Newburn (2006) tried to explain what has led to this global expansion of private security and as they state, there are a number of reasons which have created this expansion. The reasons they provide are only some possibilities and nothing is certain or at least they do not apply in every society. Nevertheless, they state that this privatization might be deliberate, as a form of transferring responsibilities from the state to someone else, in this case to private security providers. The division of responsibilities is part of a

state's governance, where different actors have different responsibilities. Such a division of responsibilities can lead to a state-corporate symbiosis. The limited budget police usually have, and the expenditure constraints, have possibly created a gap and a need which has been covered by the private industry. Apart from the need to restrict public spending, they also state that late modern society, the changing nature of the spaces and structural shifts have led to the neo-liberal privatization of crime control (Jones, Newburn, 2006: 6-8). Other people have offered a different explanation, for example, a reason which has led to the privatization of security is the fact that our lives take place in privately owned places, which are consequently privately secured as well. These places can range from gated communities to shopping centres, universities, hospitals and airports (Shearing, Stenning, 1987). A big part of our daily lives takes place in such privately owned spaces and properties and, on a similar note, Jones and Newburn have stated that the weakening of our ties with local places and the decreasing of people's local interactions have created a 'heightened sense of (and fear of) the "other"' (2006: 8). This might potentially create a vicious cycle, since the more people see fences and security guards, the more insecure they will feel, at least those who cannot afford to keep up with the security-related developments. Fear, helplessness, and insecurity have become a characteristic of modern life and of course they have been

commodified in order to bring more capital to privately owned businesses. These businesses are using their reputation and connections to professionals across the world to create trust and produce a response to these feelings of insecurity and fear.

The USA and the UK have a history of plural policing, meaning that it is not just the national police who are responsible for policing, but there are also private businesses ready to offer security in a variety of ways and situations. However, other countries such as Greece have shown a more cautious approach towards the expansion of private security businesses. This is possibly due to the fact that security has a very strong political usage and is 'perceived as one of the core state functions' (Jones, Newburn, 2006: 7). There is no intention to say that Greece has no private security companies, but rather that their presence in the country has a short history. At this point it should be stated that public and private policing bodies have a complex relationship. In some cases they co-exist, in other cases they are co-operating or they are simply competing with one another (Shearing, Stenning, 1987: 51). The picture is complicated and it is constantly changing. As Ericson and Haggerty suggested (1997), there is information exchange between the public police and other private or public agencies where information is provided in order for others to base their strategies and activities. In addition to that, as Papanicolaou (in Jones, Newburn, 2006) has noted, although there is some

division between the police and the private investigators, there are also some similar characteristics and elements since 'some of the investigators are former police officers' (87). Papanicolaou carries on to say that having a second, parallel, and in many cases secret job, is not something new for police officers. Apart from secretly working for both the state and the private industry, the private firms are a place for those retirees who have established their position and have created a name whilst working in the police, in Special Forces, or in the Secret Intelligence Service. O'Reilly states that when it comes to those security consultancies 'informal access to powerful networks in their domicile states is another significant industry trait. The boardrooms of leading firms are often loaded with distinguished retirees from the political and security establishment' (2011: 184).

2.6 Summary and Conclusions

Within this section I have reviewed current literature and I have discussed four main themes which have emerged from my research. These themes are transnational policing, knowledge transfer and its barriers, and, finally, the privatisation of policing. These are the main key issues and there is a lot of scholarship on the movement of knowledge, there are documents and strategies on its importance, together with problems that might arise and the way to transfer it. However, these are only abstract theories but in

this thesis I am interested at what happens in real life, in the messy reality of police work, how information is received by practitioners, and how the protection of civilians from kidnappings has been transferred to private companies.

As some people have stated, in our globalised world police are influenced by external forces and there is a blurring of boundaries. Some research has discussed that the locale is becoming less and less important since organisations and actions expand beyond the national borders. Intranational organisations such as the UN, Europol and Interpol have contributed to the cooperation between nations and the shape of practices within them. Both policies and knowledge are being transferred, but policies are transferred and implemented in nations with similar cultures and backgrounds. Knowledge is being transferred more liberally and it is not necessarily being transferred between similar nations and contexts. Knowledge is first codified and then it gets transferred. This is done in order for the police to have better performance and efficiency. In addition to that, the decision making, according to some researchers, becomes easier and less time-consuming. However, there is criticism associated with the transfer of knowledge and its feasibility and a reason for that is because knowledge differs from information. There are different types of kidnaps, different definitions, as well as reporting and recording systems from one geographical location to the other, thus

is useful for one person can be utterly useless for the person receiving it. This uniformed approach is different from the general idea of what police do, which is to offer different and unique approaches to problems in order to achieve successful results. Research has been conducted around the police culture(s) and characteristics such as their pride, the uniforms they wear and the code of silence when it comes to supporting their colleagues. Some believe that a big part of police work is based on knowledge exchange and transfer. However, as it has been mentioned in this literature review, not all occupational cultures welcome new knowledge and also knowledge can have a symbolic power, hence it might be kept for personal use. This chapter concludes with the section on the privatization of policing, where security has created a complex environment. Both private and public organisations provide security, and they can have a competitive, co-existing or co-operative relationship. However, there is a tendency towards more and more private security businesses taking over the role of providing security to the public.

In this thesis I will be using kidnappings as an exemplar, whilst attempting to unpack the complex environment of high security knowledge transfer by discussing how policing practices are influenced by external factors. I will be looking at the range of influences affecting kidnapping responses. By using tangible evidence from my ethnographic research in Cyprus and the

interviews I held with counter-kidnapping practitioners, I will explain why the counter-kidnapping knowledge transfer is not useful and does not work. Finally, in the last section of the thesis I will be talking about the interconnectedness of public organisations and private businesses which are responsible for dealing with ransom kidnapping cases. This thesis aims to fill some gaps in our knowledge. There is a lot of conceptual and theoretical work towards understanding knowledge transfer, but not many people, to my knowledge, have looked at what these practices are and how that knowledge is interpreted by practitioners on the ground, in an empirical and very localized sense. There is academic discussion around globalisation and glocalisation, but my research looks at these things from a more practical viewpoint. I will not just look at how a high-security set of information is being transferred and what that includes, but I will also look at what happens when information lands somewhere and is expected to be transferred, understood and applied by practitioners. The thesis will conclude by looking at how certain barriers have led to the creation of a very strong private risk management and counter-kidnap sector, underlining the limits of the state and showing the responsibilisation of citizens to stay safe.

Chapter 3: Methodology

3.1 Introduction

This chapter describes the methods applied while researching the topic of this thesis. For this research a qualitative case study approach was chosen in order to investigate and analyse a variety of issues associated with the high security transfer of counter-kidnap knowledge. This specific type of crime was chosen in order to understand the way police are responding to it, and in order to critically analyse the literature and all the global processes that occur. I will look at how knowledge production, transfer and application are related to the ways of dealing with ransom kidnapping cases in Greece, the United Kingdom and Cyprus. However, it should be noted that this research is not comparative, and I am not planning on comparing the exact same variables in these three different nations. More specifically, in this thesis I am looking at the local production of the counter-kidnaping knowledge, the way it is articulated, the movement of information, and the reasons behind this movement, as well as the kidnapping practices in these three different locations. This thesis will be expanded with a thematic analysis of specific patterns within the collected data, as well as documentary analysis, and a small ethnography with police negotiators in Cyprus. In this chapter I will provide the justification for the chosen methodology, and I will give details of the study design, the data collection process and the data analysis, along with

problems I faced during the interviews, as well as some ethical considerations.

3.2 Justification of Methodology

This thesis is a qualitative research study, and the data came from a thematic analysis of interviews conducted in two nations, from the analysis of official documents associated with kidnappings, to a small ethnography with 28 participants in a third nation. As it is going to be explained in the following paragraph, I decided to conduct qualitative research because I had limited knowledge of the topic and also because I wanted to use an interpretivist approach for the analysis of my data.

Kidnapping for ransom is used as a case study for the interrogation of the existing literature on knowledge transfer and the analysis of what is actually happening around the transfer of counter-kidnap high security techniques. This case study is a means of examining the way knowledge is constructed and articulated by those who produce it and use it. There is an uneven application of different knowledge, and the local context has a big impact upon the shaping of this knowledge and the chosen approach. This research is not implying any generalisation of the findings towards other types of high security knowledge transfer, but it is specifically focusing on the ways of dealing with ransom kidnapping cases in the nations I have looked at, from the perspective of those

interviewed. A qualitative research method was chosen because it provides room for interaction with participants and it is also the only way to look at something which has not been investigated before, as I will explain further below. There has been a very limited research on kidnappings in the past, mainly by psychologists studying the effects of trauma to the hostages, which meant that I had no prior knowledge before starting my research. My limited knowledge created the need for an open-ended approach where meanings and answers emerge at the end of the process. With partial and imperfect knowledge, researchers do not know how things are or how they work until they start talking to people who are operating within the field. In addition to that, qualitative research can help towards questioning the initial ideas and rationales, and even go beyond them. When it comes to the transfer of high security knowledge, numbers are not important, whereas patterns or even a single informant can unfold key ideas and impel the analysis of the researched topic. In addition to that, the counter-kidnap field is extremely small, making it impossible to conduct any statistical research. Ontology tries to objectively answer how we measure the world around us. However, I believe that the world around us is not something that we can objectively measure. At least when it comes to the social sciences, the world is created by its inhabitants and the way they engage with and understand the world around them, and the effects this can have on

their practices. Social phenomena and their meaning are constantly being constructed by social actors, and this is what my research is interested in. (Crowther, Fussey, 2014: 42). I am using an interpretivist approach which means that knowledge and phenomena in general are subjective and there is not one single truth, but rather many interpretations which are internally and subjectively constructed by each individual. The focus of my research is on the subjective reality of the stakeholders, those involved in the counter-kidnap businesses and those who have been directly affected by the counter-kidnap practices. I am trying to understand the world in which these people operate, without any attempt to measure anything, simply because there is not an objective reality that we all share, and that can be measured. I am trying to understand how specific people make sense of their environment, how they interpret it, the ways in which they frame their interactions, the language they use, their resistance to knowledge and their acceptance of other things, as well as their culture. This thesis has been written based on how these individuals view themselves and the world around them. As Crowther and Fussey have perfectly summarised it 'interpretivists acknowledge the subjective and value-laden character of social action, people's beliefs, and the researcher' (2014: 41). I have tried to look at their world through their eyes, however this research is subjective and there is no attempt to over-generalise. This inability to generalise

might be seen as an issue, but this research focuses on a specific group of people who operate in a specific field, and other researches in the future can potentially check whether my observations apply to other fields apart from the counter-kidnap one.

Inductive thematic analysis is used to identify meaningful information that can provide an answer to the research question, aiming to construct meaning without being based on any preconceptions. Braun and Clarke, while discussing thematic analysis in the study of psychology, state that inductive thematic analysis is 'a process of coding the data without trying to fit it into a pre-existing coding frame' (2006: 89). I accept that it is difficult for researchers to work in a theoretical, epistemological or ideological vacuum, and neutrality is not always possible. However, in this research and in the responses of those interviewed, everything is subjective, and what I am interested in is how these people see the world through their own eyes. This research is looking at subjectivities, where the interviewees' linguistics, values, meanings and standpoints become part of the analysis. It is an epistemological analysis of how those who are somehow connected to dealing with ransom kidnappings interpret and make sense of the world around them. The subjective view has a high value because human actors affect 'the social world in multiple ways, and they interpret and construct meaning from their surroundings'

(Crowther-Dowey, Fussey, 2013: 41). A difficulty with working with an inductive thematic analysis is that the process of searching for themes and identifying the useful data which can be used in the analysis takes longer. First, I had to collect most of the data and then I had to look for significant themes to use so as to construct my thesis around them.

In this thesis there is also document analysis of official manual-style documents created by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the European Network of Advisory Teams (EuNAT). The United Nations Counter Kidnapping manual was not publically available, and after many requests to gain access to it in order to read it, always by using my status as a researcher, the law enforcement advisor from the anti-organised crime and illicit drug trafficking implementation and support section emailed me explaining that: '*when published, these* [the manual on kidnappings] *were made available to national competent authorities and later, further developed into a training course for first responders. Unfortunately this material is one of the few UN publications not freely available, rather it is only provided to national competent authorities of Member States.*' However, I managed to get hold of this manual when it unexpectedly appeared online for a few hours only, which possibly had been due to a system failure. The EuNAT prevention and coping strategies

manuals created by EUROPOL and, contrary to the UNODC document, is available online.

The final method used in this research is ethnography. I undertook a small ethnography with the Cypriot police negotiators, where I got the chance to spend five days with them, from eight o'clock in the morning until seven o'clock in the evening. During this ethnography, I observed the training and the exercises from the point of view of the participants, and I also got the opportunity to present an introductory three-hour session on kidnappings. This ethnography was a great opportunity to experience personally what these negotiators experience during these training-events, as well as to observe their practical aspect within the exercises and the presentations that take place. My observation and participation in the annual negotiators' training in Cyprus was a great way to see how useful knowledge transfer events are and how the practitioners viewed a variety of issues. Participant observation is a technique which is widely used in cultural ethnography because it is a great way to see how people behave in their natural environment. Police are very secretive and this is a characteristic that appears intrinsic if not throughout the world, then in most nations, however, my ethnography gave me the opportunity to write about an occupational culture which is not easily accessible and although people have discussed it, not many of them have actually had access to observe and participate in it. Not only did I experience the

content of their re-training, but I also became immersed in their occupational culture by having lunches with them and, in general, spending a big part of my days in Cyprus with them. Apart from experiencing how high-security knowledge-transfer events work, I also noticed things, heard comments and questions that otherwise I would not be party to. This gave me a better understanding of their specific police sub-culture, how they view themselves compared to others, as well as their knowledge and ideas around counter-kidnap.

3.3 Interviews

The interviews had a semi-structured format, with a set of questions asked of my interviewees during our discussion and, later, after I got more used to interviewing people (possibly after the fifth interview) I began noting themes which needed to be covered. Although the interviews were discussions where the interviewees were free to talk about whatever they wanted, at the beginning I had a set of a few questions (an interview probe) which I wanted to ask during our discussion, but later I refined my way of interviewing from questions to themes once my understanding for the field developed. Semi-structured interviews were preferred over structured interviews, because kidnappings and counter-kidnapping issues are under-researched, and the only way to penetrate the

field and gain knowledge on a very esoteric and hidden topic was through having a flexible conversation. Semi-structured interviews offered the opportunity of drifting and departing from the scheduled questions, and asking new ones which allowed me to explore more diverse areas. The semi-structured interviews enabled me to compare different responses, so that I could focus on particular themes for the thematic analysis. The interviews were as close to an everyday discussion as possible, where I would follow the replies of the interviewees and usually ask further questions or offer my view on the topic discussed, in the hope of further discussion. After making the interviewees feel comfortable for a few minutes, the interviews would usually begin with a general question aiming at understanding the level of knowledge of the person being interviewed. I would start with questions such as 'When did you initially receive your knowledge on dealing with this type of crime?', 'Were you trained specifically for kidnapping cases?', 'Who was the person who trained you?'. If the interviewees could answer these, I would go onto more specific questions and ask them if they had actually participated as negotiators in any case, and if they had, then in which one, or, if not, then why they think this might be the case. Other discussions were related to the content of the training events they have attended, if they found them interesting and helpful, why they think Greece is now training other countries, and why they have chosen to be kidnap-negotiators. Many people from

the Greek police were interviewed more than once, whereas all the other practitioners from Cyprus and the United Kingdom were only interviewed once. When it comes to the interviews of the kidnapped individuals and/or their families, I began the interviews by asking them to say a few words about their kidnapping, while at the same time we were having a normal conversation. At this point it should be mentioned that the only interview which was more structured was with the high ranking NCA official. The interview was still semi-structured but because of the fact that I could only talk to him during a fifteen-minute break (at the London counter-kidnapping, hijacking and hostage-taking event), I had to be prepared with a set of questions. Of course, during these fifteen minutes we also discussed other things, but the questions I asked him were these: 'What is the importance of the UK experience for other countries?', 'Why does the UK train other nations?', 'What is the importance of international standards?', 'Are other nations such as Greece and Cyprus well equipped to deal with such a crime?', 'Are nations facing similar problems (in terms of kidnap)?', and, finally, 'Are any problems with the sharing of practices?'. By asking these questions I took the advantage of meeting with one of the people conducting the knowledge transfer and dealing with kidnaps inside the United Kingdom, in order to find more information about the view of those who create and transfer the counter-kidnap knowledge. Within this interview, the official explained to me his reasoning behind the

importance of knowledge transfer, what he thinks of those who have received that knowledge, and whether these events have made a substantial difference to the way things are done.

3.4 Interviewees and Access

Timeline of events:

July 2013: Met with 5 police officers in two different cities, as well as a prison manager and a social worker who happened to be there when I visited the prison manager. All these people had very minimal kidnap-related knowledge.

September 2013: Interviews with ex-hostages and family members [interviewees 2, 3, 4]. One of the interviewees introduced me to the most experienced negotiator in Greece [interviewee 6] with whom I briefly talked in a couple of other occasions in the future.

October 2013: Police replied to a formal demand I placed in June 2013 in order to talk to police negotiators involved in kidnappings. They emailed with the name of a negotiator. After exchanging a few emails I flew to Greece to interview him [interviewee 7]. I also talked to two other negotiators [interviewees 8, 20]

February 2014: The Ministry of Public Order and Citizen Protection replied to an email I send a month ago stating that there are no statistics held on kidnappings.

November 2014: Met a high ranking police officer to ask for his assistance to help me identify and interview people who are involved in kidnaps. He immediately introduced me to a police psychologist who after a few of my questions said that he does not have any relevant experience. During my interview with the high ranking official he referred to two cities in Greece where re-trainings take place. Two days after I visited both places to talk to people.

November 2014: Interviewed and talked to people I have talked to in the past [interviewees 6, 7, 9] and also interviewed the person who is organising the trainings and re-trainings [interviewee 21] with whom we met a year later as well.

April 2015: An informant emails me saying that in five days there is going to be a re-training of the Greek negotiators by a team of three coming from England. Attempted to participate and/or observe at this re-training by emailing and calling the Minister of Interior Affairs, the minister of Public Order and Citizen Protection, ex-hostages, the head of the Greek police and contacts from those in the police without any success. The Centre of Security Studies which also was the donor of the re-training decided to deny my participation and I received a fax announcing that decision.

May 2015: Attended the 6th conference on Tackling Kidnapping, Hijack and Hostage Take in London which lasted for two days. There I interviewed many people mainly from the private sector

[interviewees 10, 13, 15, 25, 28]. With many of these people we met again in similar events in the future. In this event I also briefly met a former kidnap hostage [interviewee 29]

May 2015: Went back to Greece to talk to two police negotiators [interviewees 7, 16] who took part to the re-training I was not allowed to attend. They both said that the re-training was on terrorist incidents and focused on ISIS related exercises. I also met with the man organising the re-trainings who mentioned that the Cypriot negotiators have been trained in the location where he worked and promised to email me with the details of one of them.

July 2015: I received the email and phone number of a police officer in Cyprus and after a brief chat with the Cypriot officer he said he could not help me but offered to find someone who could. A few days later he emailed me with the details and the email address of the main negotiator in Cyprus [interviewee 12]

August 2015: Finally talked on the phone with the Cypriot negotiator [interviewee 12] and he mentioned the upcoming re-training. When I asked if I can attend to observe or even participate he offered to ask a high-ranking counter-terrorism official. He called a few days later to inform me about his positive reply and that I will have to present something. In September and October we talked and exchanged emails a few more times.

November 2015: Participation and observation of the re-training of the police negotiators of Cyprus where I interacted with all those

who participated and mainly with the main Cypriot negotiator who is organising there re-trainings [interviewees 11, 17, 18, 19, 22]. I also got the opportunity to talk to the mother of a former kidnap hostage from Cyprus [interviewee 5]

February 2016: Attended the Expert Analysis: Emerging Trends in Kidnap for Ransom in London, organised by KR Magazine, where I met and talked to many practitioners from the private sector and some others who were working in organisations and NGOs [interviewees 20, 26, 27].

April 2016: Attended the 7th conference on Tackling Kidnapping, Hijack and Hostage Taking in London where I met and interviewed and talked to many people [interviewees 1, 10, 13, 23, 24, 25, 30]

June 2016: I found and contacted through social media a retired police negotiator with whom we arranged for a skype interview the week after [interviewee 14].

This is a research with high heterogeneity, both in terms of the background of the people interviewed (public and private field practitioners, insurers, hostages and family members) as well as the various national units and agencies involved in countering kidnaps in the UK, Greece and Cyprus. United Kingdom is very organised, with a specialist unit in place, NCA's Anti-Kidnap and Extortion Unit. NCA is an agency and a police entity which works proactively and is using intelligence to deal with serious crimes. The

fact that the Anti-kidnap and Extortion Unit is a specialist one means that those countering the cases are experts on these particular crimes and their roles inside the agency are associated with these matters only. This is something that is different from the other two police units I have looked at, the Greek one and the Cypriot one.

In Greece those dealing with kidnaps belong to the Department of Crimes Against Life and Property which is responsible for various crimes such as crimes against life, crimes against property, extortion, disappearances and missing persons. This department is often otherwise called by police officers and the media as the "Homicides Department" because the majority of the cases investigated are about this particular crime. The people that I have interviewed in Greece belong to this department, and very few of them, those with adequate training and experience, will be called in case there is a kidnap. Those negotiators are the intermediaries between the family and the kidnappers, as well as have their eyes and ears open to gather any information or intelligence they can find and even in some cases interrogate suspects. In both Greece and Cyprus there is not a specific unit exclusively dedicated to countering kidnaps and those dealing with kidnaps have at least one more role inside the police. Cyprus has an Emergency Response Unit where a few people are trained negotiators, but only three have more specialised knowledge and experience in order to

participate to a kidnap. Greece and Cyprus both have a very small number of people who can be asked to participate to a kidnap case and their role in some cases can also involve intelligence gathering and informal interrogation-like conversations with people from the family and friends environment who are seen as potential suspects. In the United Kingdom, the role of people is more clear-cut and defined compared to Greece and Cyprus, of course this is because the two later countries have more restricted budgets and personnel so there is not willingness to have a team of people only working whenever there is a kidnap.

The majority of the people interviewed for this thesis were connected to kidnappings and they were either interviewed in the annual counter kidnapping, hijacking and hostage-taking events in London, or they were approached through snowballing. Apart from the 30 interviews that I am quoting from within my thesis, there are also 11 additional people who have been approached and interviewed without however using any quotes inside my thesis (from these 11 interviews). Seven (7) Greek police officers agreed to be interviewed in various parts of Greece, and one (1) Cypriot police officer was interviewed via phone, one (1) prison manager, one (1) prison social worker[5] both interviewed in a Greek prison, one (1) police psychologist. However, the interesting issue is that

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[5] I interviewed these two people because in many Greek cases of kidnappings, if not all of them, some of the organisers of the kidnaps are prisoners, making arrangements from inside the prisons. I wanted to understand what they think about that and why this happens. Both the interviewees explained that prisons are overcrowded and extremely understaffed.

all of these people have never been to a kidnapping incident, or a kidnap training-event, and they did not reveal that before the scheduled interview. Although I informed them about the topic of my research they agreed to meet me without informing me that they could not be of any help. In almost all cases I travelled to various Greek cities just for these interviews but without receiving the information I was hoping for. In most cases after having a quick chat in their offices or in cafes, they would simply tell me that they could not help me, or in other cases they would pretend they know things about kidnaps, but it would be the things they have read on the news, without having any personal experience of kidnaps themselves. All these non-helpful interviews demonstrate that these people wanted the status attached to being in the counter-kidnap team, however, once you scratch the surface through questions, there is not a lot of significant knowledge within. There is a value to them in terms of their self-esteem and the way they are viewed by their colleagues and outsiders. My understanding was that they would like to be viewed as part of those involved in the countering of a kidnapping, which demonstrates the range of people who claim to be kidnap practitioners and experts. There is a symbolic value in having the identity of a kidnap negotiator which is also shown by the fact that those involved into kidnaps were differentiating themselves from other police sub-cultures, showing that they are higher-up on the police career ladder.

Apart from those unhelpful interviewees, during my time in Cyprus I interacted with almost all of the participants of the training (28 people) in an ethnographic way. However, only three (3) of them have kidnap-related experience, after negotiating a kidnapping incident. For this thesis I have interviewed and spoken to a variety of practitioners in the counter-kidnap field, and I have received information from various stakeholders involved into kidnappings for ransom: hostages and their families, police-negotiators, police trainers, those who are organising the national police training-events and exercises, people responsible for creating contingency plans, those who are paid to evacuate people from dangerous situations, insurers, NGO representatives, and those who are responsible for managing risk. In this thesis there are interviews and quotes from people who operate in many different parts of the world, however it should be noted that there are not many practitioners in the counter-kidnap field. In each country there are only a few police negotiators who are equipped with knowledge around kidnappings, because they would travel to other areas of the country if there is such a kidnap case. Not only there are very few practitioners, but there is also a very small number of people who are trained and experienced enough to negotiate in a kidnapping case. In addition to that, there are few private companies specialising in counter-kidnap, and they tend to be based in one nation but work around the globe. I have tried to

provide a wide range of experiences in order to adequately interrogate my research questions concerning counter kidnapping practices, and the ways in which knowledge becomes transferred and imported into domestic contexts. The small number of kidnap-related research, shows that it is not that no one has taken interest in kidnappings before, but rather that the difficulty to access such a secretive world has prevented other researchers from doing so.

3.5 Greece: Access Rejection, Before, During and After the Interviews

Before my interviews in Greece I prepared myself by reading online about kidnap cases that have happened in the past. In this thesis, all the interviews have been case specific. This means that they were designed based on the characteristics of the interviewee. The location, the duration of the interview, the introduction of myself and my research topic, as well as the tone of the interviews, were all tailored to each individual subject. Regarding the timing of the interviews, it should be said that there was a variation in the duration of the interviews. The shortest interview lasted for around one hour, while the longest one lasted for two hours and thirty minutes in duration. Interestingly, the higher the interviewee's rank inside the police, the shorter the interviews were. This was obviously because of time restrictions, due to their heavy workload, but also it was potentially due to their fear of revealing too much

information, which can expose them and jeopardize their position. At this point it should be stated that I had to initiate a rapport-building process (Ceglowski, 2000; Liamputtong and Ezzy, 2005; Dickson-Swift, James, Kippen, Liamputtong, 2007) which involved around 30 minutes at the beginning of each interview to talk about irrelevant things before I could talk about what I was there to talk about. Glense and Peshkin have described rapport as a 'distance-reducing, anxiety quieting, trust building mechanism' (1992: 94) . Similarly to that, I could not just get up and leave after the end of the interview so each interview would end with a more general discussion of, usually, irrelevant to my research things. According to Daly, a qualitative researcher needs to be a 'fair exchange' (1992: 2) with both researcher and interviewees participating and contributing in the sharing process. I have used self-disclosure to enhance rapport and even though I could not have a 'fair exchange' with kidnap victims and police officers, I tried to be a compassionate and empathic active listener.

Interviewing police officers is not easy and as Pini (2008) believes interviews are not a straightforward extraction of information from an informant (36). Some men might use a research interview as a dramaturgical task (Schwalbe, Wolkomir, 2003); they might underline their masculine identity by trying to control the interview, by showing expertise and by sexualising the researcher. At this point it should be stated that I had to initiate a

rapport-building process (Ceglowski, 2000; Liamputtong and Ezzy, 2005; Dickson-Swift, James, Kippen, Liamputtong, 2007) which involved around 30 minutes at the beginning of each interview to talk about irrelevant things before I could talk about what I was there to talk about. Glense and Peshkin have described rapport as a 'distance-reducing, anxiety quieting, trust building mechanism' (1992: 94)[6]. Similarly to that, I could not just get up and leave after the end of the interview so each interview would end with a more general discussion of, usually, irrelevant to my research things. According to Daly, a qualitative researcher needs to be a 'fair exchange' (1992: 2) with both researcher and interviewees participating and contributing in the sharing process. I have used self-disclosure to enhance rapport and even though I could not have a 'fair exchange' with kidnap victims and police officers, I tried to be a compassionate and empathic active listener.

For this thesis, amongst others, I have interviewed police officers, and this specific group of people, characterised by their cop-culture, can be the epitome of machismo, shaping the interview process. Female researchers (Cmpbell, 2003; Horn, 1997; Oakley, 1981) have talked about the, not so rare, sexualisation of researchers by male research participants and interviewees.

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[6] Although I acknowledge it, I will not get into the details of Oakley's (1981) opposition on the use of rapport because of its manipulative nature. However I want to mention that the fact that some of my interviewees did not provide the data I was hoping for is a sign that the reason behind building rapport was not to manipulate the interviewees and force them to say things they did not plan on saying, but to create a relaxing atmosphere and build trust.

Sexualising is usually about control and even the physical site of an interview is yet another factor affecting power relations (Elwood, Martin, 2000). According to Schwalbe and Molstein (in Gubrium, Holstein, 2001), the researcher can reduce such a behaviour of male interviewees by showing symbolic control. This can be done through a business-like attire, by paying close attention yet at the same time showing a cool disinterest, by always returning the discussion back to the subject and by having the interviews in public locations. These are all things I did either consciously or subconsciously, apart from the fact that in a few occasions the interviews took place in their personal offices. However, two of my interviewees asked me to go out for drinks later that night of the interviews 'to meet [me] better and show me the city' as one of them said, which I politely refused in both cases, risking to miss interesting data, but making sure that the lines were not crossed.

Moving on to 'repair mechanisms' (Silverman, 1993:132), this was a technique that I had to use with two police offers who were quite senior within the police force. For instance, these two men remained silent for a few, uncomfortable, seconds in many occasions, not following the unwritten 'rules' of conversation, without responding to a question or a comment. Some repair mechanisms that I implemented were to try and fill the silence through speaking again and either rephrasing the question/comment or simply commenting on the difficulty of the

topic discussed. However, even those interviewees who said very little either referred me to other people who were more experienced in kidnappings, or said something which moved my research a step forward (such as saying that the counter-kidnapping training-events take place in two training centres in Greece, so I arranged visits to both of them in order to speak with people who might somehow be involved).

In April 2015, I was informed by one of my interviewees that in five days' time there was to be a negotiators' re-training workshop to take place in Athens. All I knew about the topic of this training was that it was going to be delivered by people from Greater Manchester police, and it was going to be related to hostage negotiations of cases where there are terrorist groups involved. Even five days before the training, my informant was not sure whether there was going to be any discussion about negotiating kidnapping cases, so I could not risk not being there. I only had a few days to negotiate my participation in the training, and to ask for official access to either present to or observe the event. In order to achieve that, I sent an official request to various people Greek ministries, and after finding, through my connections, the personal fax number of the head of the Greek police, I send a fax stating who I am, what I am doing and how I can help (for instance what I can present). At the same time I contacted a negotiator and trainer who I interviewed in 2014, and he is

regarded as the most experience negotiator in the country. In addition to these attempts, knowing that in most cases kidnap victims and their families maintain a good relationship with those who negotiated their release, I contacted one of the former kidnap victims to ask if he knew of anyone who could help me. All my efforts were fruitless and no one was able to offer any help. The day before the beginning of the training-event, someone from the Centre of Security Studies (KEMEA in Greek) called me, saying that they would not be able to allow any outsiders to attend the event and that this was to be an exercise for a very select few. Later I learned that the Centre of Security Studies was the sponsor of this specific training-event and that the head of the Greek police had asked them to make a decision and inform me. The second day of the event I also received a fax stating the reason why I was not allowed to attend. [check photo in section 6.5 for the fax received by the Greek police rejecting my application to observe and/or participate at the training]

A month after the training-event, I interviewed two negotiators who were there, and we briefly talked about the content and the exercises they did. They did not share much information, but they told me that it was mainly about general hostage-situations and the main focus was on ISIS, while the exercise was about a plane hijacking with hostages taken by the ISIS terrorists. When I asked them to tell me some titles of sessions, or enclose

more information, they both said that they could not remember details, but they really liked the trainers from the United Kingdom's Hostage and Crisis Negotiation Unit.

3.6 Cyprus: Access Acceptance, Before, During and After the Interviews

At the end of an interview with the person who was organising the police training and re-training-events in Athens, I asked him if there was any chance to interview anyone from Cyprus, because during our interview he referred a couple of times to the fact that the Cypriot kidnapping negotiators were trained in Athens. He could not help me at that point, but a week later he emailed me the contact details of someone who was on the team of trainees who had visited Athens a few years ago to receive kidnap-related information. He gave me the email address, as well as two phone numbers which belonged to a police officer, and immediately I tried to send an email to him, asking to arrange a skype interview. However, I soon found out that both the email and one of the phone numbers were wrong, while the second number was the landline of his house. When he answered the phone, he was very polite and he told me that he is not the right person for an interview, because he has never been to any counter-kidnap training-event, and he is not even a negotiator. However, he seemed to be very interested in my research and the fact that he

did his degree in an English university created a very positive atmosphere, so he promised to try and find information about someone who might be relevant to kidnappings. He kept his promise, and a few days later he sent an email with the name of a negotiator and his email address. This negotiator has taken part in a kidnapping, he is transferring his knowledge to other negotiators, and he is also organising the annual negotiation training-events. Our interview went really well, and although he refused to state that he was trained by the Greek police (something which confused me), he start talking about the annual re-training-events they hold. Sensing the opportunity, I asked if I could join in the next one (in 2015), and his reply was that he needed time to think about it. Two weeks later he called to tell me that I could join the re-training-event of the police negotiators, but I would have to present something as an exchange, which of course I agreed to do. On the last day of the five-day long event in Cyprus, he told me that it took him two weeks to inform me of his decision because, as he said, 'we checked your background. Not personal stuff, but we wanted to see if you are who you claim to be. It was necessary' [interviewee 12]. This negotiator informed me about conducting a quick background check and although no other interviewee referred to such a thing, I do believe that most of them, if not all, did the same before meeting me. This is potentially a sign that my research

concerns sensitive topics, but this will be discussed later on in this chapter (ethical considerations section).

A month before the annual re-training-event, he called me to talk about the details of my presentation, as well as its topic. He informed me that I would have to fill a three-hour slot with my presentation, and when I offered to give a more academic presentation, he said '*they will be bored*' [interviewee 12], meaning that the other negotiators would not like what I was going to say. I replied that I could talk about the United Nations manual and criticise it and I could talk about knowledge transfer and kidnappings. However, he said that my presentation should not include anything academic or any criticisms, that I also should not talk about what is happening in other countries in terms of kidnappings, and I also should not talk about any kind of definitions, because the participants '*don't care*'. Instead, what the other negotiators would love to hear is information about Greek kidnapping cases, but, as he suggested '*[I] should be very careful as [I am] not allowed to say anything about the way police dealt with these cases because [I] might confuse them* [negotiator/participants]' [interviewee 12]. In addition to that, he said that I could present on the kidnapping hostages and their families that I have interviewed, and '*have their picture as well*', and he also said that '*if there is any violent kidnapping case where the hostage got killed, they would love to hear about it*'

[interviewee 12]. In a way, he gave me a list of things that I should and should not say, but I tried to explain that there are ethical restrictions to my information, because when I interviewed the former kidnap-hostages and their families, I did not inform them that at some point in the future I might use their details and their photos for a police training-session. All this poses ethical questions and speaks volumes about the nature and the quality of the training-events, where the main goal is to attract the participant's attention with violence and blood-filled cases, rather than to see how they might improve their practices and further their knowledge of ransom-kidnappings.

I did not negotiate the content of my presentation, but I decided to do a presentation which was going to be slightly academic with a perfect balance of information that the participants might like (and also things that he told me not to talk about). The levels of speech scrutiny seemed to be high anyway, but it was quite obvious when he asked to see a draft of my power point presentation, only a week before the training. Excuses like, 'I have been really busy lately', and 'I haven't started the preparation of it yet' were used to prevent any changes to my presentation from happening. From my previous attempt to take part in the Greek training, I knew how difficult it was to be granted the access to participate, train and observe a group of police negotiators, and I felt that the crucial point was to get access. I believed that once I

was there, and after spending a few hours or a couple of days with them, it would be a lot more difficult and awkward to ask me to leave, in case me or my presentation was not in alignment with their needs and priorities. This meant that I had to do my best in order to maintain the granted permission, which in that case was because I agreed to do a presentation, with very specific content. After asking a few of the participants what they knew, and witnessing myself, on the first day of the training, how little the police negotiators knew about negotiating and kidnappings, I added a few more things in my presentation to give some background information on kidnaps.

In my three-hour session, some of the things I talked about were the different types of kidnappings and in which geographical locations we usually see each type, followed by examples from real cases found on the media or from anecdotal information gathered from people who were somehow related to the incidents (through friends from around the world). I also said a few things about the counter-kidnapping manual, and provided a small criticism on it. I commented on the fact that, although the UN said that the counter-kidnap manual is already in the hands of those who should read it in each police department, from what it seems from the people I have talked to who are working in various countries, only the two people who were in the team writing it had read it. Also, I commented on the fact that the manual is dated and does not

include a type of kidnapping, which, although not new, is currently being used extensively by kidnappers across the world. In addition to these, I tried to underline the fact that all kidnappings are different, and although they might be in the same geographical location or country, they can be very dissimilar, which is something that I also refer to and analyse later on in my thesis. This was done by closely analysing the characteristics of kidnappings which took place in Greece. Finally, we all closely analysed the letters sent to a hostage's family by his kidnappers. These letters were given to me by the former kidnapping hostage and his family, and the aim of the close analysis was to try and understand what information we get from those letters as well as assess whether the kidnappers were professionals or armatures. This is the first thing they will be asked to do in a case of kidnapping, where the kidnappers are contacting the family of the hostage through letters SMS messages, or phone calls and recorded messages. This exercise lasted a bit longer than it was planned because the negotiators were unable to identify the important parts of the letters. For example in the first letter of the kidnappers, it was quite obvious that they knew exactly what they were doing, which shows that they have possibly done it before, however the negotiators were unable to gather this clue. The presentation went really well, and although I presented everything I was told not to, the negotiators, including the person who organised the training, liked it very much. While I was

presenting, I even noticed that they were all keeping notes, which is something that did not happen in any other session prior or following mine. To my surprise, at the end of my presentation they all stood up and applauded, while afterwards the organiser of the training congratulated me. Interestingly, after my presentation, I noticed on the desktop of the police laptop which was being used, an icon with my presentation title on it. The organiser of these annual events had sneakily saved my presentation on the computer without asking me, possibly to be used in their future training and re-training-events.

The presentation was successful and those who were there felt that they have gained something useful, so I was in a better position to ask for "favours" or "benefits". After my presentation I capitalised on that, and I gained the advantage of interviewing the mother of a kidnapping hostage. During the break after my session, the group of the three negotiators (one of them was the organiser of the training) who worked with the mother of a Cypriot young man who was kidnapped in Athens, came to talk to me. We chatted for around thirty minutes, and after this chat I asked if it is possible to meet the former hostage or his mother. The organiser smiled, stood up, and walked a couple of steps away from where we were all sitting, and I could hear him talking on the phone to the mother of the former hostage. After greeting her, he said '*we are all here for our re-training, and there is someone here who wants to talk to*

you. Her name is Eleana and she is a researcher on kidnappings for ransom. Can you come? ' [interviewee 12]. She was there in around thirty minutes, and from what I understood she lived in a nearby town. At the beginning of the interview she told me that she came because these people helped her at a very difficult time in her life, so she owns them a lot, and that she would love to talk to me about something that stigmatised her for the rest of her life. Apart from getting access to interview the mother of the former hostage, I used my presentation to gain more data, and it was a gateway to a better ethnography. After my presentation someone informed the head of the Cypriot counter-terrorism team about the presentation's quality and content. This man is every year responsible for setting the big, formal exercise, which takes place throughout a whole day during the re-training event. The day before this exercise, he came to congratulate me for my presentation and asked me if I want to observe the exercise. Of course I said yes, and he arranged for a car to pick us up (himself, a driver, a negotiator to explain what is happening to me, and myself), and drive us to all the three different exercises which were taking place simultaneously in different parts of Cyprus. He also arranged for a negotiator to be with us in order to explain to me what was going on, and he gave permission for me to be on both the side of the negotiators and the side of the terrorists. I do not think I would have received such a warm reaction if I had presented

something that they would not have liked, or not have presented at all.

Just like in the case of the interviews with the Greek police officers and negotiators, in Cyprus I was definitely perceived as an outsider but I did not feel that my presence was not welcomed. I was there at my own expenses, aiming to offer a wider understanding of what happens in relation to kidnaps around the world which was something highly appraised. Attending the Tackling Kidnapping, Hijack and Hostage Take event in London and interviewing or talking to people whose life has been affected by kidnaps, equipped me with interesting things to discuss with the participants while I was there. Although I spend a lot of time with the Cypriot negotiators, I did not ask to get any phone numbers or email addresses for further questions.

3.7 United Kingdom: Before, During and After the Interviews

For the Greek and the Cypriot police I was perceived as an 'outsider' for a variety of reasons. I was a female in a mainly male environment, coming from academia, which is usually, from my understanding, quite alien to them, I was asking questions about a high security issue and there was no shared training, experiences, background or mentality. In any case, my presence was welcomed, but some of the interviewees were reluctant to share information

with me because as one of them said 'you are not one of us' [interviewee 9]. I researched on a group to which I was not a member of and I did not identify with any of the people interviewed. Horn (1997) who is a female researcher conducting research on police said that not being 'one of the boys' was beneficial since she was not seen as suspicious and threatening as her male scholars. The benefit of being an insider is direct acceptance to the group of people, but as Watson (1999) believes, it is more difficult to have a neutral stance. An external to a group of people or to an experience can have a wider perspective (Fay, 1996), and the absence of sympathy can add credibility to the findings. I do not imply that those who are 'insiders' are unable to, fairly, carry out their research or that it is going to be of a lower quality, but rather that the findings would be different from those of an outsider conducting research on the same group. Different people can get different data because of the interviewing relations, status and dynamics developed between the specific interviewer and interviewee. As Campbel cleverly pointed out: 'I can only speculate that had I been older (or younger maybe), male, a more experienced researcher, a police colleague, white, middle class, a Freemason, or any other combination of social identities, an entirely different set of interviewing relations would have prevailed' (2003: 297).

The counter-kidnap field is a predominantly male field, a good example is that in all the three counter-kidnap events in London that I attended, out of 30-40 people only around five of them were women including myself. This is another way that one might feel like being an 'outsider' and definitely comments on the clothing decisions of the other women in the room did not help me feel as comfortable as an 'insider' would feel. I found quite interesting the fact that people around me could understand someone's background and identity through small hints such as a particular tie which shows that one is a member of the US military aviation, or cufflinks, and a short haircut. Even though I did not share the same sub-culture with these people, those that I interviewed during the three different London conferences were more than happy to help me with my research. In Greece and Cyprus interviewees were also happy to help me, but I felt that my interviewees in Greece were slightly alarmed and in many occasions they said that what they will tell me is "off the record". The relaxed approach of those coming from the private field is possibly because from what I understood, all of the participants were more used to the presence of someone who is asking questions and keeping notes either through having worked with researchers or through studying and conducting their own research when they were studying. In many occasions I understood that my interviewees would talk slower in order for me to keep notes, or they would give me their business cards to call

them or email them in case of more questions coming us, which are signs showing their understanding of how qualitative research works.

3.8 Snowballing and its Issues

In order to find interviewees for my research, I mainly used snowballing sampling. Negotiators, and especially those working in kidnapping cases, have to keep a low profile, hence the only way to find them was by snowballing my way through the police-network. The initial interview subject was found through an interviewed kidnap-hostage who has a good relationship with the police officer who negotiated her release. This negotiator is the most experienced in the field of kidnapping negotiations, and as he said, he is also teaching other negotiators from other countries. In addition, another negotiator was found through a formal request to the Greek police headquarters in 2013 for a previous research (MSc dissertation). Even though the request was made on May 2013, the reply to this request came six months after (November 2013), when a negotiator called me to give me his name and phone number, in order to arrange an interview. This negotiator was interviewed three times, and he introduced me to another kidnap-negotiator and a psychologist with whom they usually work together in kidnap for ransom cases.

Snowball sampling was chosen because the researched topic is about a high security issue and it involved information which should not be available to people outside the secure circle of specific police officers. Snowball sampling can only flourish when there are relationships of trust and reliability and through each of my interviews I tried to put an emphasis on these characteristics. This was succeeded by various ways, which were related to the rank and the position of the interviewee. With those who were higher in the police ranking system (deputy commissioner and assistant commissioner), I was referring, at some point in the interview, to my father's previous experiences with the Greek military, which is always highly valued in police. With the other interviewees, the bond of trust was formed through talking about the other people I have interviewed (including some kidnap victims), and my position in the university as a graduate teaching assistant. In all cases, the interviews were starting with an introduction of myself, the significance of my research topic, and the importance of finding ways to bridge the gap between academia and the police work. Overall, although the mouth-to-mouth positive propaganda proved to be very helpful, getting access to a secretive field remained difficult. In a couple of occasions they encouraged me not to follow the official –and very bureaucratic– procedures, and either speak with them directly, or speak with specific people and emphasise particular aspects of my life (for instance that I was

raised in the Northern part of the country because the person with whom I had to get in contact with was from the North as well, and that I am teaching in a university abroad). Those who signalled interest in my research were happy to support me by introducing me to others in the field of kidnappings and negotiations, however this means that most of those interviewed in Cyprus and mainly in Greece had similar beliefs and ideas. The main issue with the snowballing method was that these networks of people have been potentially in the same police academy, they have received possibly the same training, and they also work together, which leads to people with similar responses on the topic of kidnaps. The only two interviewees who presented a different view was the man who is responsible for organising all the trainings [interviewee 21] inside the Greek police, and the retired police negotiator [interviewee 14]. In my analysis I am treating the other police negotiators as a group of people who are all members of the same police sub-culture, and their sharing of similar ideas is the characteristics of this particular occupational sub-culture. Although in other types of research snowballing can be problematic, in my research not only it was the only way to get access to a very small number of practitioners, but also it revealed an interesting pattern of views which is possibly taught or spread by word of mouth.

3.9 Technical Considerations

In my interviews, I avoided using a recorder. During the first few interviews I had the questions that I wanted to ask in front of me, but later I became more confident and did not need to do so. That was deliberately avoided, because I wanted to create the impression that we were having an informal discussion in their office or in the location of their choice. From previous experience of interviewing police officers, I realised that once the recorder started recording, they would start responding very tersely, will not speak openly, and only give vague comments. I tried to avoid any over-formalisation of the procedure and the environment, because I was aware of how delicate the dynamics were, and how off-putting formalities can be. Without this interviewing 'tool', my interviewees were feeling more heartened and comfortable to engage is a high-security issue. In relation to recording the interview, Bryman (2001) agrees that it 'may disconcert respondents, who become self-conscious or alarmed at the prospect of their words being preserved' (332). Again, from previous interviewing experience, those who refused to be recorded are those who provided useful information that other people tend not to disclose.

However, when it comes to the interviews of ex-kidnapping hostages and their families, there was a completely different approach. In most cases former kidnapping-hostages were the ones asking me to record them because there were many details in their

story, or because they wanted to be sure that I was able to remember every detail of what they were going to tell me. In all three cases they wanted me to test early on in the interview if the microphone and the recorder were working. They also wanted to have the microphone as close to them as possible. One of them started the interview by saying that she is aware of the fact that there is no academic research around kidnappings for ransom, which sounded like an attempt to justify her choice to meet me. In another case someone else tried to underling the importance of my research, because as she said '*this* [the kidnapping] *has destroyed us* [the family]' [interviewee 5], because after paying the ransom the bank took their house and now they do not have where to live.

3.10 Issues of Recall

Qualitative researchers almost always record their interviews, because without recording them, it is very easy to lose the exact phrases and language used by the interviewees. Of course the human memory has some natural limitations and it is impossible to remember the exact words used by someone. I was aware that recording changes the dynamics of the interviews, and after a few rejections to record the counter-kidnap related interviewees, I decided to use my memory and my writing. During the interviews with the Greek-speaking interviewees I had a piece of paper near me where I could write phrases which would later help me

remember exactly what the interviewee had said. After doing a few interviews I could understand when the interviewees were about to say something that could be useful for my thesis, and I would write it down. When it comes to the interviews with the English-speaking interviewees, I was taking full-notes during the interviews. Contrary to the interviews in Greek, the English interviews where done in a more formal context with only a few minutes available for the interview. These interviews where shorter, but I was taking notes during the interviews, acknowledging the limits of my memory when it comes to remembering quotes in a language other than my native tongue. However, there is always an element of intuitive glosses in all interviews which are not being recorded (Bryman, 2001). This implies that as a researcher I might have, unintentionally, applied glosses to what people have said during the interviews, and remember information in a particular way, yet this thesis is the closest anyone has been to counter-kidnap practitioners, and the only way to do it was through using my memory, a pen and a paper instead of a recorder.

3.11 Interview Questions

The interview questions covered various aspects of kidnappings. Some of these aspects are: the training of negotiators and the training of negotiators coming from other countries, the conditions of training, international links and transnational policing, the

usefulness (or not) of having neighbouring countries following the same actions with Greece in the case of a kidnapping, and finally, why Greece is perceived as a knowledge broker and is now training others from abroad. Since I conducted this research through interviewing various stakeholders, there were different questions for each category, while at the same time in many cases I had to quickly think of new sets of questions because the person who was being interviewed had limited knowledge, or, alternatively, hid the lack of knowledge before the interview. The interviews were characterised by fluidity both in terms of approaching the different practitioners and in the questions asked.

3.12 Ethical Considerations

According to Lee, a research with a sensitive topic is any 'research which potentially poses a substantial threat to those who are or have been involved in it' (1993: 4) and it can pose threats in three areas: be an 'intrusive threat', a 'threat of sanctions' or be a 'political threat' (ibid). By revealing to me high-security information about operational techniques, hypothetically speaking, my interviewees could be threatened in all three areas that Lee has referred to. It should be also reminded that kidnap negotiators want to keep their identities hidden. Even during a kidnapping they are invisible players, intermediating the discussions and directing the person who is in contact with the kidnappers in order to make

arrangements for the final agreement. In my thesis, informants have been protected by anonymising data, so as their identities are protected in the best way possible. This has been done by direct and indirect anonymity. In addition to that, in my thesis I do not refer to the rankings, their position inside their organisation, or the name of the company in which they work for or have created. I should not avoid saying that apart from a few planned interviews in Greece, the rest of this research was not planned, and my fieldwork was not expected. In the two counter-kidnap events or the week-long training I attended, I never expected to interview people. A good example is that I was in a Greek city for a planned interview, and on the same day, after receiving a phone call, I would travel to another city to talk to someone else who had suddenly agreed to talk to me. Regardless of the unexpected nature of my interviews I made sure that I complied with all the ethical aspects.

As has been mentioned before in this chapter, the counter-kidnapping field is extremely small at both the national and global level, and for this thesis I have interviewed people in five different cities around the world. However, I have tried to keep them anonymous by providing a number for each one of them as an attempt to conceal their identity. Apart from anonymity, confidentiality was accomplished by keeping some information secret. Whenever the interviewee provided information and stated that it was 'off the record', then this information remained secret

and I have not used it within this thesis (and will never use it in the future). Confidentiality aims at protecting individuals from harm and stigmatization, as well as protecting their privacy. If there is no confidentiality, this might have damaging consequences to the research participants. Bok (1982) noted that confidentiality and secrecy are interrelated since the first one indicates the methods that have been used to conceal (6). Secrecy exists to protect one's identity, plans, actions, and property, whether that is material or abstract, such as ideas (20). Baez (2002) is quite critical of the idea of confidentiality. For him, 'qualitative research should be transformative' (Baez, 2002: 36), and to do so researchers 'must subject to question the idea of confidentiality' (ibid). Of course this does not mean to discard confidentiality completely, but 'at every research opportunity confidentiality should be theorized for what it permits and forecloses' (ibid). Baez goes on to call it a hypocrisy when the researcher wants to know 'the respondent's secrets but promises to protect the respondent's identity' (2002: 46). Bok (1982: 27) and Kelman (1977: 169) have a more relaxed stance and argue that it is important to give the control to the respondents and let them decide the level of confidentiality and secrecy they want. Although this would be ideal, in the context of my research, this means that I would have to explain the methodological aspects of my research to people who might not fully understand what I am

saying. Simply stating beforehand that they will remain anonymous saves time and thwarts unnecessary complexion.

As qualitative researchers we are often concerned with people who in many occasions might be distressed or at a time of crisis and stress and we ask them, and expect them, to talk about an unpleasant experience in detail (Cannon, 1992; Dickson-Swift, James, Kippens, Liamputtong, 2007; Draucker, 1999). What I tried to do with my interviews was to be discrete, respectful and appreciate their willingness to talk to me. When it comes to the victims of kidnappings and/or their families, apart from making sure that their anonymity is secured, again by providing a number instead of their original names and changing minor details around their kidnaps, I made sure I protected them as well. I was aware that I was talking to vulnerable people under distress, so from the beginning they were informed about their right to choose the place of the interview and their right to cancel or end the interview whenever they wanted before or during our meeting. One of the interviewees, two hours before our interview, changed the location of our meeting three times in order to make sure that she was going to be safe. In all cases I got their oral consent first (via phone), and the atmosphere during the interviews was comfortable and relaxed. During the interviews with the former hostages and/or their family members, I was aware of their vulnerability so I allowed them to talk without any pressure or any questions. All the

interviews began by me saying that I would like to hear their story, and then at the end I would ask them if they were happy with the way that the police had responded to their case and if they think anything could have been done in a different way. Kvale (1996), has stated that the 'interviewer should also be aware that the openness and intimacy of the interview may be seductive and lead to disclose information that they may later regret' (116). Having Kvale's words in mind, I encouraged all my interviewees to contact me any time after the interview in case they have second thoughts or if they do not want me to talk about some of the things we discussed during the interview.

All interviews were very positive, but there was one small exception where at some point the mother of a former kidnapped man started tearing up whilst talking about the effects of the kidnap on their lives. At that point the interview stopped and I asked her if she was willing to continue but she replied that crying would make her feel better, and after talking about something else for a few minutes, we continued discussing her son's kidnapping. I understand that talking about such a sensitive and emotionally charged issue can potentially be upsetting for the informant, so I was always very gentle, giving space to people so that they could talk freely and stop whenever they wanted. Even before the interviews I knew that what my interviewees were going to tell me (at least those who had a personal involvement to a kidnap) where

more than just words, it was more than just a few sentences inside my thesis, it was a horrifying experience that they had to go through, both as individuals and as a family. In the case when the lady started tearing up, we immediately paused the interview, and after making sure that she was fine I asked her whether she would like to continue the interview or stop it completely. Although interviewing people who have been directly affected by a kidnap can be very distressing, in all cases those people wanted to be interviewed and talking about their stories seemed to be a form of catharsis or therapy for their trauma. It is important mentioning that with my interviews with kidnap victims and/or their families, I was not asking questions. I would only say 'Can you please tell me your story?' or something along these lines. In all cases I had my student identification with me to prove my identity as a researcher, as well as the ethical form, but no one seemed to care about these.

Closing the section on ethical consideration I would like to underline the importance of conducting research on sensitive topics as this is the only way to get a better understanding of all those issues affecting the people inside a society and shaping the society itself. As a researcher I believe that shying away from sensitive and controversial topics, is an avoidance of our responsibility to the discipline and the society.

3.13 Data Analysis

This thesis is based on a qualitative research study, aiming to shed some light on the knowledge associated with the practices of countering kidnappings for ransom. I was free from any constraint which might have occurred had I used fixed questions and responses. I have used inductive analysis because having decided to look into a field which has not been looked at before, I approached it in a tabula rasa state of mind. I did not have any pre-conceived notions or ideas about how things will turn out, what my interviewees were going to say or what my findings were going to be. I looked at the data and tried to see what comes out of it, what is it emerging out of the interviews, without assuming anything. This thesis has been developed after thematically coding the data, which has allowed me to provide my interpretation of themes. The thematic analysis of data received from my ethnography and from interviews in three nations has assisted me in identifying patterns and themes which could be used to describe the journey of knowledge and other issues related to its application. As it has been previously mentioned in this chapter, I did not transcribe the interviews because at the beginning all the interviewees opposed the idea of being recorded so after some point I stopped asking and only use a pen and a paper to keep notes. I was taking notes (during the interviews and afterwards), which were later read and coded into themes. The next step was to decide which of these

themes will actually make a contribution towards a better understanding of the chosen research topic. I looked at the repeated topics of the interview scripts and then ideas begun to emerge. The structure of this thesis has developed from these themes and the titles of the chapters are based on these thematic codes. As an outsider I had an imperfect knowledge of the environment I was researching which can even make the identification of the right people to be interviewed difficult.

In addition to using thematic coding for the analysis of the interviews, for this research I also conducted a qualitative document analysis. In theory documents have an important role as vehicles of moving information around. After searching and finding documents which are related to countering kidnaps, I looked through them and picked up the relevant themes which matched my research aims. This yet another form of inductive analysis where I am trying to generate new theory and information from the data I collected from the documents, the interviews and the ethnography in Cyprus.

3.14 Photos from Ethnography in Cyprus

First hostage incident where a lady is held hostage inside a house by someone who is an ISIS member. The lady started screaming and asking for help. Then the two negotiators and the two members of the counter-terrorism team decided to leave and go get the white board from the car without attempting to calm the situation down.

At some point they realised that they needed a white board and some pens from their car to keep notes and plan their next moves. They walked backwards towards their car which seemed to be more complicated than they initially thought

Whilst taking the white board to the place where they were going to plan their negotiations and keep notes about any hints given by the hostage-taker they took two more negotiators with them. These new negotiators were going to take over the negotiations (negotiators work in pairs in England, Greece and Cyprus). Here we can see six people being "protected" behind one shield.

For some reason five negotiators ended up all negotiating at the same time. On the right of the photo we can see the car of the hostage about which there was not made any discussion and they never asked for the bomb-defuse team's help even though the idea was that the car was supposed to have explosives inside.

Those who were not negotiating were either staying inside the bus on the right of the photo or outside. Also on the right we can see the person who is organising the trainings (he is the one who invited me to participate in their training) and at that point he is asking for the next two negotiators to replace two of those who have already practiced their negotiation skills. The bus which has moved the negotiators from one place to others around Cyprus and the cell of negotiators (which is behind the bus) are parked right outside the place where both the hostage and the terrorist are located.

On the left of the photo we can see the notes and the plan of negotiations being taken away by the wind (under the white gate). Also a nosy neighbor came to observe without anyone telling him that he should not be here.

Second exercise, where another terrorist is on a boat with explosives inside. Seven people "protected" behind a shield are seen to be approaching the boat without first negotiating anything. The next day the person organizing these trainings called this a suicide.

A team of negotiators have just arrived with a helicopter. The terrorist from the first exercise asked for a helicopter for his transfer and they failed to negotiate that. In the photo the negotiators stop for selfies and videos with the helicopter on the background.

The third exercise took place on a passenger plane. In the photo we can see all the passengers as well as the three terrorists staying still on the floor. The counter-terrorism team arrested only one of the terrorists. On the right-hand side we can see one of the negotiators taking a selfie.

At the end of the exercises the organizer of the training suggested me to take of photo with the four members of the counter-terrorism team and two of the negotiators (I tried to hide their faces) who took part in the exercises.

Chapter 4: The Dissemination, Reception and Application of the Counter-kidnap Knowledge

4.1 Introduction

After reviewing relevant literature and discussing my chosen methodology, this chapter will be divided in two sections. First, I will analyse the different ways in which counter kidnapping knowledge is transferred within a nation or abroad, to other nations. To do so, I will look at two documents, one from UNODC and one from EuNAT. These are the only[7] documents on kidnappings which have been created by formal organisations, and play an important role towards the transfer of counter kidnap knowledge. However, their importance is not limited to their formality and in fact they are produced and disseminated by well-known organisations in the field of crime and crime control. These documents, and especially the UNODC counter-kidnap manual, are vehicles for knowledge transfer. The UNODC manual has been produced by some of my interviewees [Interviewee 1, Interviewee 15], and during the interviews they referred to its importance and usefulness. This manual stands as the 'golden standard' of how a nation is advised to deal with a kidnap and it is an attempt by the UN to engage with its member-states.

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[7] Private companies working in the counter-kidnap and risk management field might possibly have produced their own booklets which are provided to their clients, along with the training and the safety checks they offer, but the UN manual and the EuNAT brochure are the only official documents on kidnappings.

The EuNAT brochure contains some very basic information around hostage-taking, extortion, and kidnapping prevention, but this information is often forgotten and overlooked in day to day life. Due to various circumstances, someone's life might be at risk and this brochure contains concrete advice for preventing or minimising the foreseeable risks. Moreover, the EuNAT brochure contains schematic information around kidnapping, extortion or hostage-related incident prevention, as well as recommendations for reacting to life-threatening situations once someone is kept as a hostage.

In addition, according to the foreword, everything that is included in the document is based on a series of 'good practices identified by experienced practitioners from many countries' (UNODC, 2006: iii). By stating that, one can assume that this manual includes the most effective tactics available on a global level, although, as will be explained later on, this is not entirely true. Not many people are aware of the fact that the manual has been created and based on one single nation and its own kidnap-related practices. This does not mean that the manual is not based on "best practices", but rather it means that it was created having in mind only what has worked in one specific context, in only one nation, the United Kingdom. This exclusivity of having a best practices manual created by the techniques of one nation does not

imply that the manual is useless to other practitioners, but it can be a good insight into what another counter-kidnap team is doing.

It does not matter if these guidelines are going to be used by others, but practitioners can get information on other ways of dealing with kidnappings and perhaps apply all or some of these techniques in the national counter-kidnap practices. The UNODC manual can be used as a practical instrument for policy makers, law enforcement officers and criminal justice practitioners and assist cooperation between different nations. As it is stated in the foreword to the manual, this document 'illustrates the importance of having in place suitable systems and procedures to improve international coordination and cooperation' (UNODC, 2006: iii) and this specific issue will be discussed in the next chapter of my analysis.

In the second section of this chapter I will be discussing Knowledge and information, which are two terms that are often used interchangeably, but knowledge is distinct from information. However, as I will explain, in this thesis I will be using the word 'knowledge', even though I believe that what is actually being transferred is 'information'. I will be explaining why the transfer of knowledge does not work, and in order to support that claim, I will be highlighting a variety of barriers preventing the transfer or making it more difficult. Some of the barriers which are going to be

discussed are the people's inability to absorb and apply what has been transferred, the fact that the language can sometimes block people's understanding, the low quality of work provided by the United Nations, the global role of the United Kingdom's National Crime Agency, and the difficulty to assess that which has been received by the trainees.

4.2 Mechanisms of knowledge transfer

When referring to knowledge transfer, it is implied that one has produced or acquired tacit or explicit knowledge, and that this knowledge is organised in order to make it transferable to someone else, whether it be an individual or institutions and organisations. The words 'move', or 'transfer' might suggest that the knowledge is removed from its original donor and given exclusively, to the recipient. In reality, it is actually copied from one place to the other, aiming to create a network of practitioners operating in a similar or potentially almost identical manner. The counter-kidnapping knowledge is transferred through a variety of ways from different donors who are considered to be the knowledge brokers, either in the global level or in a more localised context. Throughout my research I have noticed the move of knowledge cross-national, international and international through the use of manuals, and training.

4.2.1 Brochures and manuals as mechanisms of knowledge transfer

In theory, one of the ways that information can be transferred is through the intended vehicles of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) counter-kidnapping manual and the European Network of Advisory Teams [8](EuNAT of EUROPOL) brochure. The EuNAT brochure is available online, and the information contained is a translation of the original brochure created in German by the Federal Criminal Police of Germany (Bundeskriminalamt, BKA). This brochure 'aims to help you minimise potential and foreseeable risks and suggests how you can do this in order to be as safe as possible' (EuNAT, 2012: 4), while at the same time it 'contains recommendations for reacting to critical situations like a kidnapping' (ibid), and all that because, as they state at the beginning of the EuNAT manual, 'sharing knowledge saves lives'. Although not exclusively, the aim of this brochure is to prevent kidnappings, extortions and hostage takings, mainly of those travelling in hot-spot areas. It consists of approximately forty pages of very basic information, such as keeping a low profile, changing routes if needed, using licenced taxis, remembering the police phone number, not talking to strangers, and, in the case of kidnapping, regular eating, drinking and sleeping is suggested to those who are kidnapped. In more

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[8] EuNAT is a European platform which brings together various police departments in order to share best practices: 'a network of experienced law enforcement advisory teams from across Europe, who provide a mechanism for immediate international cooperation when responding to the threat of kidnapping, hostage taking and extortion, where life is at risk' (EuNAT, 2012: 2).

detail, this brochure consists of four chapters. These chapters are on prevention, kidnapping and hostage taking, extortion, and, finally, on checklists.

The first chapter begins with the phrase 'it's in your hands-don't be a victim' (EuNAT, 2012: 9), which is a phrase perfectly illustrating Garland's (1996) view of the state as having a tendency towards putting the responsibility of security and safety to the individuals, what he called 'responsibilization' of the people. This is an approach that not only puts the responsibility of staying secure and safe to the individual, but can also potentially lead to victim-blaming in case something goes wrong and someone ends up getting kidnapped. Individuals are advised not to be 'attractive' victims, and to avoid providing opportunities for offenders, and as it is stated inside the manual that having experience 'of a country does not guarantee your safety' (ibid).

The EuNAT brochure constructs panics and creates a sense of urgent duty for individual preventative action. This document shares a similar rhetoric with many people from the private field. One of them said in his presentation[9] that it is not a matter of if a kidnap is going to take place (in a business or organisation), but a matter of when this is going to happen, and in my observations during this presentation I noticed many heads nodding in agreement. The private industry is feeding on this panic-

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[9] In the annual London kidnapping, hijacking and hostage-taking event (2014)

construction and the constant fear of individuals. It seems that these private risk-management and counter-kidnap businesses have replaced the national security and safety provided to citizens.

The idea is that all the kidnap-related police departments of the UN member states possess the UNODC manual, and have read it[10]. When I asked for permission to read the manual, the United Nations law enforcement advisor of the anti-organised crime and illicit drug trafficking department wrote in an email he sent to me:

> *UNODC coordinated with experts from Member States to draft a set of response guidelines for authorities dealing with the incidence of kidnap. When published, these were made available to national competent authorities and later, further developed into a training course for first responders.*

By "experts from Member States" he means a very small group of counter-kidnap practitioners from the United Kingdom, whereas one of my interviewees who was in that group, said, '*we basically took our* [the UK] *manual, which is enormous, used as a door stopper, and we created a smaller version of it*' [interviewee 15]. In my interview with a member of the counter-kidnap and extortion team of the NCA, he underlined the importance of this UNODC manual for his team in NCA. He said:

> *Every day is a learning day. We are doing a lot of work with the UN, my department and my team have written the global counter-kidnap manual that has been send to every country in the world and it is always useful because we talk a lot of colours in the manual and at 3 o'clock in the morning if there is a case in Ecuador and we mention*

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[10] More effort has been put on the creation of the UNODC counter-kidnap manual, which is not accessible online, or to researchers, for fear of revealing too much information to those who should not possess it.

the word 'red', they know exactly what the concept is all about so this makes our focal point of concern.[interviewee 1]

Even though on the UNODC website it is specified that the manual is available upon request, I requested to UNODC, via email, to read the counter-kidnap manual four times (22.09.2013, 04.11.2013, 14.08.2014, 08.07.2015), in order to have the manual sent to me for research purposes. I received a reply to only the first email I sent (despite using different email accounts), where it was made clear that this manual is designed purely for specific people. In one of the emails I exchanged with the United Nations law enforcement advisor, he wrote, regarding the manual, that '*this material is one of the few UN publications not freely available, rather it is only provided to national competent authorities of Member States*'. On the UNODC website it is stated:

> *The manual presents a constructive tool for policy makers, law enforcement officers and criminal justice practitioners and is aimed at providing national authorities with guidelines on how to deal with a kidnapping case in a practical and effective manner. Legislative and national policies to target kidnapping are addressed, but focus is primarily on the key responses needed for success in prevention and investigation. The manual is available upon request.[11]* [interviewee 1]

Such an access restriction is very interesting because it shows that transnational policing knowledge can be filtered and disseminated very selectively. Only the UN member states have received, and have access to, the manual. However, up to the moment I

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[11] https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/tools-and-publications.html (accessed 28.05.2016)

interviewed police practitioners in Greece and Cyprus, no one had read it.

The UNODC manual was written in 2006, is thirty-eight pages long and consists of four chapters: introduction, policy issues, prevention and preparedness and the final chapter is on the key elements of responding to a kidnapping. The basic kidnap-related knowledge is set in the introductory chapter, beginning with the objectives of the manual. The first objective is to preserve human life, which is something that has been underlined by all the negotiators interviewed, the NCA member and all those from the public sector:

> *Our main concern is the safe release and return of the hostage, the rest is secondary, of course we want to get the needed intelligence to catch the kidnappers afterwards, but if someone's life is in danger, its preservation is what we are going for. Human life is also protected by the Greek constitution* [interviewee 7],

explained a Greek negotiator. Someone working in the private sector said '*we are paid for the return of the hostage, safe and sound, now how we are going to achieve that is another story, and the families [of the hostages] don't really care about that*' [interviewee 10].

Kidnappings can be used by organised criminal groups or terrorists, and are increasingly becoming international problems, 'with victims, [hostages], and criminals (as well as their demands) frequently crossing international borders'. (UNODC, 2006: 2) Also, Kidnapping is 'the fastest growing criminal business globally'

(UNODC, 2006: 6), and is a violation of the right to individual freedom, which can decrease the public's confidence. In various sections inside the manual there is an attempt to underline the importance of creating partnerships and cooperation between different nations and between the private and the public sector. In order to do all these things, there needs to be the right resourcing of knowledgeable people, of trainings and of the right equipment. '[J]udicial cooperation should be promoted to enhance information exchange and facilitate procedures and operations abroad' (UNODC, 2006: 7), specifically between neighbouring countries, also, there needs to be the creation of 'effective partnerships involving the public sector, the private sector, the community and the general public' (UNODC, 2006: 6).

In addition to that, the manual states that nations need to ensure that law enforcement authorities have received training and scenario based exercises, as well as create mechanisms and databases for knowledge and information exchange. An interesting point made as part of the key elements for the strategy development of nation states is the consistent provision of training to all the agencies involved or related to kidnappings. According to the manual 'there are indications that they [kidnappings] are increasing in frequency and complexity and will continue to do so' (UNODC, 2006: 12), thus 'embassies and consulates of other States' (UNODC, 2006: 14) inside or outside national borders

should establish communication systems and work together. Inside the manual there is an emphasis on the importance of constant training to those involved in the counter-kidnap field with 'joint training of law enforcement agencies at the national and international levels [because it] is useful in understanding the capabilities and constraints on organisations' (UNODC, 2006: 20). In addition to that, the trainings should have real–life simulation exercises and agencies need to be sure that through training, their staff can make informed and balanced assessments of the information.

4.2.2 *Brochure and manual weaknesses and disparities*

After reproducing and analysing the two official documents on kidnappings, it is crucial to provide their criticism and indicate some of their asthenic aspects. When it comes to the EuNAT brochure, it seems that there was not a lot of time and research invested into its creation; it is a small brochure with inaccuracies and, as was mentioned in the previous section, it contains very basic information, and the main point of its creation seems to be the placement of responsibility to each individual. At first I am going to analyse four inaccuracies that I noticed within the EuNAT brochure, and then I will discuss some knotty and questionable points from the UNODC manual.

In one of the first pages of the EuNAT brochure it is mentioned that one of the kidnap prevention goals is to 'react appropriately' (EuNAT, 2012: 9). This is a vain suggestion without any explanation following it. Appropriateness is different from person to person and by making such a statement without further explaining what is meant by that, it makes it pointless because it does not provide any valuable content. In addition, in the section regarding ways to deal with the offenders (in the case of someone being kidnapped), the recommendation is to establish a personal relationship with the kidnappers, and a way to accomplish that, according to the brochure, is through suitable topics, and one of them can be by reference to 'family (e.g. by showing photographs)' (EuNAT, 2012: 28). At this point, the brochure fails to provide the opposite view, which is that by giving family-related information, either through pictures or through other means, it can put these family members at risk. Revealing family information might be used against the hostage and from the various former kidnap-hostages interviewed for this research, most of them were trying to provide as little information about their family as possible, in order to avoid getting them involved. A good example showing that revealing information about family members can be used against a hostage is when a former kidnapped university student, accidentally revealed information about her sister. During our interview, the student, who

was kidnapped in 2011, said that at some point during her captivity

she mentioned that she could not wait to see her sister:

> *it was my fault because through what I said it was clear that we [the hostage and her sister] have a very close relationship and at points when they wanted me to cooperate and say specific things [to her father while they were negotiating the ransom through the phone], they would tell me that if I don't do what they say they would also kidnap her. I remember one of them [kidnappers] saying "we will bring her here to keep you company, we can have both of you", and then laughing. It was terrible; maybe they knew I had a sister before kidnapping me, they possibly did, but I showed that I care about her and I knew they could find her.* [interviewee 2]

A businessman and an IT expert who were both kidnapped were

very cautious about not revealing any family-related information.

The businessman who was got kidnapped in Greece (in 2008), said

than when he was asked for his wife's phone number in order to

notify her about the kidnap and make her aware about the ransom

demand, the businessman insisted he give his lawyer's number.

> *They [kidnappers] kept insisting to talk to her [his wife], but I was telling them that she has heart problems and they would kill her, which was not true and it didn't persuade them. Then I told them that she has no clue about our [his family's and his business'] finances, so they agreed to negotiate with the lawyer. But from the other side [his wife with the police negotiators] they decided that the best person to communicate with the kidnappers was my wife, so she got involved anyways.* [interviewee 3]

That was the businessman's attempt to keep his family safe.

Another former hostage [interviewee 30] who was interviewed said

something similar. The man was kidnapped in Iraq (in 2007), and in

our interview he explained that he had to invent a wife without

giving any information about real family members and friends. He

made up a wife who was far from Iraq or the UK, where he was originally from, and throughout his kidnapping he kept saying to his kidnappers that she could not be reached by phone. The former hostage said that it was an instinctive reaction, and by doing that not only did this appeal to his kidnapper's respect for family, but he also tried to keep his actual family uninvolved. These three examples show that informing the readers of the EuNAT brochure that establishing a personal relationship through various topics, without mentioning any information about the dangers of developing the Stockholm syndrome (which is luckily mentioned in the UNODC manual), or the dangers of putting the life of family members at risk, is naive.

The third inaccuracy inside the EuNAT brochure is the part where it is suggested that, in the case where someone is kept hostage, they should stay mentally fit by keeping a diary. Maintaining good mental health during the time one is kept hostage is very important, however, within the brochure, hostages are advised to '[keep] a diary, memorise the place where you are being kept, [observe] how the kidnappers are organised, or any other details about your captivity. Ask for a pen and paper...' (EuNAT, 2012: 30). Keeping mental notes and memorising some things connected to the conditions of captivity is different from physically writing down in a hard copy format this information. Finding or asking for a pen and a paper from your captors in order to keep

notes about them, their organisation, the location and the surroundings can be quite risky. The idea of keeping notes about the kidnappers and the incident contradicts that which is stated only two pages, which is that 'the offenders are afraid of being detected and pursued. Do nothing to reveal that you are aware of the offenders' identity or hiding place' (EuNAT, 2012: 32).

The fourth and final questionable point inside the EuNAT brochure is where it states that hostages should 'only try to escape if [they] are sure of [their] success'. At this point it would be good if the brochure provided the definition of "success', because escaping the place where someone is being held does not mean that they are free and safe to return back home. In an interview with an experienced Greek negotiator who has been involved in many recent kidnapping cases, he stressed the importance of staying calm and not trying to escape. He explained that:

> *This [escaping] is stupid. It will only make things worse for the hostage and a lot more difficult for us [the team working in a kidnap]. We try to communicate that to the hostage from the first contact they have with their family. We ask for the proof of life, so they [kidnappers] usually give the hostage on the phone, and the communicator [usually the family member receiving the demand] is already informed to say 'stay calm, don't try to escape, we are doing our best'. Escaping usually doesn't work out well; most people who die or get killed during a kidnapping are those who tried to escape at some point. Kidnappers might have crossed the borders without them [hostages] knowing. So you escape and you go where? And if you try to escape but they found out, usually the conditions of captivity will get worse; we have seen that in a few cases.* [interviewee 6]

This worsening of the conditions of captivity was also something which was mentioned by the young woman who, as stated previously, was threatened with having her sister kidnapped as well. During her recounting of her kidnapping, she referred to an incident where she had to choose between trying to escape and staying in her position without taking advantage of the lack of observation:

> I told you I was sleeping a lot, twenty hours a day, but one afternoon I woke up and I realised the guard [one of the kidnappers who was supposed to be observing her] was asleep. I didn't move from the bed [where she was for most of her kidnap] to see him, but I could hear him snoring from the next room. I knew the door [of the house] was very close to my room, but I had to pass in front of the room nextdoor [where the man was sleeping in] first. From the sound of it I knew the door was a heavy old metallic one, but every time they were opening and closing the door I could hear some keys moving. I think they [kidnappers] were leaving the keys on the door. Also, in the mornings I could hear animals, possibly sheep, which meant I was far from the city [from which she was kidnapped], maybe even out of the country. I could have run towards the door, but he would have possibly heard me. I decided to try to fall asleep again and forget about it. There was rope inside my room so if I tried to escape, at best they would have tied me. […] When we went for the autopsy of the house everything was the way I thought it was. […] The principal negotiator [of her case] said my choice [of not trying to escape] was wise. I am alive and unharmed […] I didn't want to risk the trust we [between the kidnappers and herself] had built so far. [interviewee 2]

Of course, each case is different, but escape is more than leaving the space where someone is held as a hostage. Thus, the inclusion within the EuNAT brochure that one can try to escape if he/she is sure of their success is misleading and can be dangerous. Maybe it could have been more helpful if there were a few more details

within the brochure concerning things to consider before deciding to escape.

After explaining why there are four points inside the EuNAT brochure which are either questionable or which need further clarification, I will do the same for the UNODC manual. The manual has a couple of interesting viewpoints and suggestions which contradict each other. At the beginning, the manual is in favour of partnerships and their development between the public and the private sectors, and which involve the public as well. As is stated inside the manual, where nations want to develop an effective way to tackle kidnappings, they should consider 'effective partnerships involving the public sector, the private sector, the community, and the general public' (UNODC, 2006: 6). At some other part of the manual it is also stated that a more effective response can be enabled by 'allowing the building and development of strategic alliances between interested parties, including these in the public and private sectors …' (UNODC, 2OO6: 10). Although it is not explained, when they refer to the private sector, they possibly mean the involvement of people from the risk management industry, private negotiators and investigators, kidnapping experts, as well as insurance companies. However, at some other point it creates confusion by stating that maybe nations should consider the need to regulate the 'private commercial enterprises that offer investigation and negotiation services for cases of kidnapping'

(UNODC, 2006: 7). This statement needs further clarification as it is not clear if regulation refers to the control and monitoring of the private negotiators and investigators in order to make sure that the same standards and quality is kept, or whether it indirectly means to slowly reduce their activity in the kidnapping-management field. It would appear that the latter might be a more valid reason, because UNODC, and the people who wrote the manual, believe that there needs to be a control of the business aspect and the opportunities to, legally, profit from kidnappings and its risk. My understanding is that through suggesting a regulation of a variety of kidnap-related businesses, they are ultimately trying to prevent kidnappings from happening, and this can also be supported by the fact that the manual is questioning the appropriateness of paying ransom and having a kidnapping insurance.

It is stated within the manual that where nations want to develop policies, they should consider to 'not legitimize the payment of ransom to secure the release of a kidnapping victim' (UNODC, 2006: 7), as well as highlighting the 'the need to assess the appropriateness of the provision of "kidnapping insurance", which experience shows may act as an encouragement to commit such crimes' (ibid). Both statements are in a bullet-point form without further explanation, so it is unclear whether there is approval for families and insurance companies to pay ransom for a kidnapped hostage.

A kidnapping insurance is not just a guarantee that part or all the requested ransom will be paid, but it is also accompanied by training in order to prevent a kidnapping, what can happen during a hostage incident, what one should expect and what the suggested reactions are. This means that if companies and individuals are not allowed to have access to such an insurance, it might be more difficult to have access to the information around kidnap-prevention and also managing being a hostage. Summarising the above points, although within the manual it is suggested that there should be a regulation of private negotiators, private investigators and the prevention of authorisation of ransom payment either from families or from insurance companies, at another point they are calling for the creation of partnerships. The UNODC manual has actually been created by the counter-kidnap team of the National Crime Agency in the United Kingdom, and even though they seem to be critical, at least within the manual, of private businesses, they are actually collaborating with private companies and the NCA has a commercial aspect. This will be looked at in more detail later in chapter 6 where I will have examples of these collaborations from interviews with individuals from the private industry.

After referring to the disparities within the UNODC manual above, it is important to point out some interesting insufficiencies. A manual is a guide which includes instructions and provides information on a specific issue. It is written by people who are

considered to be knowledgeable experts in their field, and aims to clarify who is doing what and when, provide definitions, updates and mainly educate practitioners. The manual is dated, because it does not include a type of kidnap which is steadily increasing in more and more countries, the "tiger" kidnap. This is interesting as the manual itself is calling nations to have a continuation of the learning around the issue of kidnaps and 'the training provided to all agencies is constant' (UNODC, 2006: 11). However, apart from the manual's dated content, it is also holding back information. In relation to the key investigative issues, the manual states that 'there are a number of issues that are particularly relevant to the investigation of the alleged kidnapping that the case officer [if there is a case officer, then this person is taking the main operational decisions towards responding to a kidnap]. Due to their sensitive nature, they are not described in detail in this manual' (UNODC, 2006: 27-28). After that, there are a few lines written about four of these "issues", which are related to communication, finance matters, technical support and media. At this point it should be remembered that this manual is one of the very few UN documents, and possibly the only one, which is not publically accessible, and it is designed only to be read by practitioners. However, by invoking the high security and sensitive nature of kidnapping investigations, the manual is giving insufficient information, leaving the people to whom it is designed to educate without the requisite information.

4.2.3 Transnational trainings as knowledge transfer mechanisms

International organisations such as Europol not only produce brochures on ways to avoid being kidnapped and what to do during a kidnap situation, but also organise training exercises. A second way of transferring knowledge is through this European and transnational training. Knowledge is transferred to other teams or countries who wish to receive specific knowledge, and to an extent, EuNAT, from Europol, is one such mechanism for transferring content-related knowledge. With EuNAT, member-states send a couple of representatives every year to meetings which are held in different European locations. In a follow up interview with one of the Greek members of the negotiators team, I was told that in December, 2015, he would have to present a kidnap for ransom case at a EuNAT training session in Romania. At the beginning of our meeting he presented me with two variants of a business card, which were in English, and he asked me to choose the one I preferred, as well as check the orthography. '*I don't want them to laugh with my English, or think that we are cheap, […] I am going to have them [the cards] glossed from both sides*' [interviewee 7]. He also commented on the fact that on the business card he will have "counter-kidnapping department", even though in Greece there is no such thing, but those looking at kidnappings are members of the homicide department (or formally called the

department of crimes against life and property). The negotiator

provided more details about these trainings, and he explained:

> *We [participants] are all together and we all present something. […] In the European level, there is collaboration only on trafficking and drugs, but Europol is organising these re-trainings and they ask for guys like me, from many countries, to participate. These re-trainings take place every year, and now it's my turn to go with a colleague of mine from the office upstairs. It will be good. We are going to present a case we had, in English. We will analyse everything about it, from beginning to end; what happened, how it happened, negotiations, problems, and research. […] Everyone will be very interested into what we've got to say because there aren't many kidnaps in Europe, and we've got a very good case to present.* [interviewee 7]

The interviewed NCA member was one of the founders of

EuNAT, and when I asked him if there are any issues related to the

transfer of practices, he began narrating the story behind the

creation of EuNAT, after, of course, saying that there is absolutely

not one single issue.

> *About twelve years ago I was in Berlin and I was in a conversation with colleagues from Germany, Switzerland, and Holland about kidnapping in general. In two o'clock in the morning in a bar somewhere in Berlin, we decided that we will create a European group called EuNAT. We got a paper napkin and we wrote the terms and conditions and the structure of EuNAT, there and then, at 2 o'clock in the morning, and we have evolved now to where we are now. Our motto is 'sharing information saves lives', and that's very important. When we have an incident, by bringing someone, anyone, even the tea lady, into that table, that environment, i do not have any problem with that, because if someone can contribute, it doesn't matter what the background is. The main point is sharing information is very important. The bottom line for me is that it doesn't matter where you are from, if there is a life at risk, then we should all contribute and do what we can to secure the safe release of the hostage.* [interviewee 1]

The United Kingdom still plays a very important role at these meetings where police counter-kidnap officers share their experiences and knowledge. Twelve years after the initial idea was conceived, a very small team of UK representatives are the chairs of these meetings, but although the initial aim is the European communication and response, it seems that this communication has expanded to a broader and global collaboration between counter-kidnap agencies.

> *Europe and EuNAT is a very important national advisory team that involves twenty-seven member states, we are the chair of that particular group, and it is very, very, effective. In the UK the NCA has a counter-kidnap and extortion unit and it makes sure European standards are equivalent. The beauty of that is that a kidnap happens in London and i can phone X in Madrid and all of a sudden we have surveillance and other assets put in place, so we deal with kidnapping response, cross-border surveillance, and negotiations not only in Europe but worldwide, so an inter-agency response to each and every incident is very important.* [interviewee 1]

The United Kingdom and, more specifically, the National Crime Agency and its counter-kidnap and extortion unit are considered to be knowledge brokers, both in the European and the global context. Not only do they chair the EuNAT meetings, but they are also asked to train other police counter-kidnap teams in a variety of locations. When I asked the NCA member what they do in relation to kidnappings, he underlined the fact that his job is related to transferring his counter-kidnap knowledge to other countries.

> *I travel a lot; I am in the country very few days a month. Since you asked me what we [the NCA] do I will say that we speak. It is very important to have a dialogue with partners nationally and internationally, in order that we*

can work together, we can get the hostage back safe and well. And also, we provide high quality support to our operational partners as well. […]There is a ton of training that we have delivered in the last 4 months, in Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Caribbean, Greece, Cyprus, Ecuador, where (in Ecuador)they now have their own counter-kidnap unit, so you should have that at the back of your mind. [interviewee 1]

Although in my interview with the NCA member there was no reference as to whether the training has a cost and what the price of delivering such a training would be, as I will explain later in this thesis (later in this chapter and in chapter 7), these trainings are actually quite pricy. Supposedly, after training the recipient team of negotiators in a country, and after this team has read the UNODC counter-kidnap manual, there is a deal done between the two nation states and counter-kidnapping teams that there will be collaboration in the case of an emergency. Each team should be capable of dealing with a kidnap incident, but the NCA has developed a service aiming to provide advice anytime, anywhere in the world. The NCA member interviewed explained how everything works in the UK:

In the UK, there are forty-four police forces and each police force has got responsibility to investigate kidnap. Within my team, we can deal with a kidnap in its entirety, but the nature and scale of kidnappings in the UK stops us from doing that on a regular basis. But we offer to the UK law enforcement system a 24/7 service that can provide tactical advice and considerations as well. So we don't tell investigation officers or the senior detectives how to investigate, but we point them to the right directions. If the job becomes complicated, we have set a system in the UK where each police force is responsible to deal with ransom kidnap, if it becomes difficult, then they will go to their regional resource and request further assistance from negotiators, surveillance, and so on and so forth. if

the job becomes very complicated they will call the National Crime Agency with an army of support and that's surveillance, firearms, officers, technicians, negotiators and so on and so forth, and it is very important to speak to each other, so the multi-agency response is absolutely critical in the way that we deal with a kidnapping in this country and overseas. [interviewee 1]

Amongst these teams which have been trained by the NCA is a small group of negotiators in Greece, and this team is considered to be the knowledge broker in the Balkan area. In the world of tackling kidnaping, the counter-kidnapping team of the United Kingdom was, and still is, considered to be a knowledge broker, transferring the team's pricy knowledge to other countries and fellow counter-kidnap police teams. Back in the early 2000s, a group of three people from the UK counter-kidnap team trained the first group of Greek negotiators. All the Greek negotiators from this initial group, after following a very successful career in the police, are now retired, with most of them currently working in the private security business. One of these negotiators is transferring his knowledge and techniques to students of business schools, in companies offering private seminars on negotiation skills, as well as to police officers. Yet, all of them, before retiring, had to train the next generation of police negotiators and the counter-kidnap team. Currently, according to what the interviewees have said, this second generation of police counter-kidnap negotiators is transferring its knowledge to the Balkan countries, Poland and Cyprus.

For this research, a significant number of Greek police officers were interviewed, and even though most of them were falsely claiming to be in the counter-kidnapping team, they all shared one common perception of the team. That perception was the team's excellent work. Every single negotiator interviewed mentioned the fact that the team is one of the best in the world, and the best one in Europe. Usually from the first minutes of the interview, negotiators and generally people working within the police would comment on the police's excellence by saying that '*when it comes to kidnappings we are the best and everyone here [Greece] and outside [other countries] knows that*' [interviewee 7], and this negotiator continued by saying '*they have a few kidnap cases abroad, and because they [the counter-kidnap teams abroad] listen, they have learned that here in Greece, we have become experts*' [interviewee 7]. As another police officer, interestingly, stated, '*we have a hundred present success on solving kidnap for ransom cases*' [interviewee 8], '*they [other Balkan countries] ask us to train them, they are asking for OUR help*' [interviewee 8]. A relatively young negotiator stated: '*we are the best, and in Europe there are no other cases of kidnaps, apart from those here* [in Greece]*. Greece is unique and that's why there is interest from outside; what we do, how we do it*' [interviewee 9][12].

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[12] This will be looked in detail in section 5.3

4.2.4 Intranational trainings as a knowledge transfer mechanism

A final way of transferring knowledge is through intranational trainings, which are taking place within particular countries. High Security knowledge transfer is moving both internationally and intranationally, within a country or across its borders, and this is usually manifested through state organisations like the police. This can either be in a form of training, or in a form of re-training in order to keep up to date the information and the knowledge that the negotiators and the counter-kidnap team already have. These knowledge-events are mostly done by people who have received their initial training by the knowledge brokers, which is usually those in the UK, and they are expected to disseminate to others what they have learned. In most cases, once there is demand for a knowledge transfer event, counter-kidnap knowledge brokers like the English NCA team, organise week-long trainings, or three-day trainings, and in these trainings, counter-kidnap teams receive knowledge straight from those who have developed it. In other cases, these knowledge brokers are invited to the country which seeks to receive knowledge on a specific subject matter. However, inviting the trainers is not always feasible, and that is due to the high cost of having a group of trainers carrying out the training. What is usually preferred is the payment of a few thousand pounds for the training of one person, and then the dissemination of knowledge and the things learned to the others by the person who

initially received it. This technique is done for both trainings and re-trainings of staff members.

Something similar happened in the case of the Cypriot team of negotiators. In 2011, a negotiator took part in a five-day training on negotiations in Manchester, and when he returned back to Cyprus he transferred the knowledge he had learned to the other negotiators of the country. First, in 2011 he trained a team of twenty negotiators, and two years later, in 2013 he trained another team of ten negotiators from across the country[13]. In my ethnography with the Cypriot negotiators' team I met twenty eight of them. As it was explained to me, it is mandatory for all of the negotiators to attend the annual training, and if, for any reason they fail to do so, they are suspended for a year. This means that they are not allowed to negotiate in any type of incident, and if they do not attend the next year's re-training, then their negotiation diploma is taken away and they are no long members of the Cypriot team of negotiators. After contacting the leading negotiator who is also organising these re-trainings, I managed to participate in and presented at this event, which lasted for four days.

Apart from seeing how knowledge transfer works and how it can be applied in mock exercises, I also transferred my knowledge about kidnappings and, specifically, kidnappings for ransom. In the re-training of the negotiators, four different types of knowledge

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[13] It should be noted though that the negotiators have only received training for general cases where negotiation skills might need to be used, and not specifically to kidnaps.

transfer techniques were used. One technique used was my presentation which consisted of two sections. It included some information which I thought might be useful to them, and it consisted of things I have learned from my interviews with former hostages, information I have received at the three London kidnapping-related events I have attended, as well as discussions I had during the breaks with practitioners from around the world. In addition, the third hour of my presentation was a close analysis of letters exchanged between the kidnappers and the wife of a kidnapped for ransom businessman[14]. The close analysis of anything given or sent by the kidnappers is something that they might be asked to do at some point in their careers as negotiators. The analysis also requires the application of skills they have learned as negotiators, such as "active listening", and paying attention at what one is saying, in order to use the information provided. The aim of this exercise was to make them imagine being responsible for negotiating in a similar case, and having to provide their incident management skills where they might have to deal with the kidnappers, the family and the media all at the same time.

The second knowledge transfer technique was the narration of a real negotiation incident that had happened in the past months by one or two of the negotiators. The negotiator(s) who took part in the incident had to stand in front of everyone and talk about a

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[14] When I interviewed the couple they gave me copies of all the letter exchanges they had, and after asking for their permission, I used these as part of my training session.

specific incident which had some kind of difficulty. The narrations usually started from the moment they were informed about a specific hostage situation, and the objective was to underline what went wrong and what should have been done in a different way. This technique is useful for both those who have experienced it and those who have not, because one group can reflect on their actions, and the other group is able to be deterred from making similar mistakes. The third technique of transferring knowledge was with small negotiation-activities at the end of each day, where all the negotiators had to negotiate in groups of two in turns, after which there was a discussion. They had to negotiate either in a hostage incident or in an incident with someone holding a knife or having a gun.

The negotiations were filmed, and after all the twenty eight negotiators had attempted to get information, relax the subject, and take away any guns or hostages, they would all sit down and watch the negotiation-attempts together, something which would last around two to three hours each day, and talk about mistakes, problems and possible solutions. The point of that was to see what mistakes they had done and what needed to be improved. The fourth and final knowledge transfer technique was the big exercise which took place in three different locations across the country simultaneously. This exercise, I was told, is supposed to be as close as possible to a real hostage incident where negotiators are

needed, and such an exercise is not just important to test the knowledge and techniques of the negotiators, but also because all the different teams have to work together. If there is a kidnapping, the group of three to four negotiators will have to work with the counter terrorism team, and the team gathering intelligence, which is what usually happens when there is any kind of hostage situation.

4.3 The Barriers to Transferring Knowledge

4.3.1 Subjective knowledge and stickiness of information

In most cases there is a schism and a big gap between information and knowledge, and in reality, what I believe is that when it comes to counter-kidnapping, the only thing that is transferred is information. In addition to that, when there is a "knowledge" transfer event, that "knowledge" is purified and distilled. What is transferred is someone's extract of a wide volume of data, which is later codified, and wrapped in a pretty package of "to do" lists and "five-step" solutions, aiming to get sold to or by a private or public organisation. These are presented as sophisticated tools which are said to be able to deal with a variety of issues, even though they have been created out of someone else's experiences in a specific context which does not imply that the knowledge is distilled, but rather it is sterilised and useless to different contexts. This codification was also seen in the two official documents that I have

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discussed in the previous chapter. However, every kidnap for ransom case creates an environment of uncertainty and imprecision, so relying solely on a specific pre-existing method or a schematic approach will be unreliable because everything, including knowledge, is a matter of subjective perception. The world is not a binary opposition, black or white. The world is messy, fuzzy, with blurred boundaries, there are many options, infinite combinations and many things that can go wrong and create ambiguities. When it comes to "knowledge" transfer, the goal should be to improve the recipients' understanding and logical thinking. In addition, if someone has no knowledge or experience of the informational context received, then they will have to rely on the knowledge of others. However, for information to become knowledge, one has to evaluate the received information against their prior knowledge or ideas, and work in order to update the information into knowledge.

The information received, combined with one's experience in a diversity of jobs, as well as the individual's learning abilities, can lead to the creation of knowledge. Individuals need to be acceptable to new ideas, flexible and open to learn and change what they already have as a preconception. In a sense, there are two components which can help someone receive information and later create personal knowledge of a subject matter; first is the need to be open and acceptable to what other people are saying and transferring, and second is the need to have the patience to work

hard in order to upgrade the information into knowledge through a variety of ways.

When it comes to knowledge (or rather information, as I have been arguing in this section of the chapter) transfer, there is stickiness, ambiguity and uncertainty as to whether the knowledge received can be used by those who received it or otherwise. There is also a lack of motivation by the donor to share their knowledge for various reasons, which is mainly connected to the idea that knowledge equals power. Recipients lack the capacity to absorb the knowledge transferred to them, either due to limited prior knowledge or to limited or no relevant experience, while in some cases recipients might realise that what is being transferred is not applicable to their national context. This can make them less likely to understand, absorb and apply the information transferred.

Additionally, during the last day of the Cyprus training, after finishing an exercise (where the negotiators had to try and calm a man down who held his wife hostage and was threatening to kill her with a knife), a negotiator asked if in such a case he could have started cursing the man or beating him. Such a question goes against any negotiating principles, which shows that although there is transfer, there is no capacity to effectively absorb what is being transferred. Recipients cannot remember and re-create the knowledge received, and there is no familiarity with the subject matter. In Cyprus, whenever a negotiator is invited to a case of

emergency, they have to take a heavy book with them which has possible sentences they can use to calm someone down, various questions they can ask in order to get more information out of them, as well as replies they can give to what the subject of interest is saying.

Another example where in practice I realised how sticky the process of sharing someone's knowledge can be is during my presentation in Cyprus. Language is very important and the linguistic factor in a training can definitely become a barrier or the opposite, make the process smoother for both the transmitters and the receivers. As is stated in the literature review chapter, Guille (in Lamieux, 2010) believes that when it comes to the process of transferring, and the cooperation between people, the linguistic factor is more important than having different legislations or policies. Hellenic Greek and Cypriot Greek are similar languages, although not the same. Many words have different meanings in the two languages, and, knowing that, I informed the audience before the beginning of my presentation that if anything was misunderstood, they should stop and ask for clarification. During my presentation I was stopped at various points because the words I was using were not known or did not have a clear meaning to the negotiators, yet I do not have the illusion that all of them understood completely what I was discussing. Because of the linguistic differences, there were some gaps during the transfer, so one can only imagine how difficult and

sticky the process is when it is done between two completely different languages with interpretations or through the use of English. There is a big distance between teaching and transferring knowledge to learning, understanding and retaining what has been transferred, and language can add extra difficulties. The fact that negotiation techniques, questions and phrases are not absorbed, but can only be used with the help of a book, is possibly a sign which shows that we are not talking about knowledge but the sharing of information. At this point it should be reminded that in this work, the word 'knowledge' will be used instead of 'information', only because this is how the interviewees have referred to what they do ('knowledge transfer') and what they receive ('knowledge').

4.3.2 The criticism of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime

As I have mentioned in the previous chapter on the ways of transferring the counter-kidnap knowledge, the EuNAT brochure and the UNODC manual seem to be ignored by those working in the counter-kidnap field, and they are degraded and treated as documents of minor importance. The EuNAT brochure, although it is openly accessible, offers very basic and common sense information which is mundane, and even those who are working within the travel-safety businesses seem to disregard it. In a discussion I had with two individuals, one who is the CEO of a risk management company in Holland, and another one from Belgium who is

providing training for those travelling in hostile environments, I brought up this brochure in our discussion. The man from Brussels immediately recognised what I was talking about and with a sarcastic smile on his face replied '*Oh, yes, I know that, I've read it. Have you [he asked his colleague from Holland]? It's amazing how little you learn after reading things like that. You should read it!*' [interviewee 10]

When it comes to the UN manual, the man who was in the team responsible for its creation had some conflicting ideas. At first he claimed that the manual is something that '*should be used*' [interviewee 1], but it is '*not to be used by every country*' [interviewee 1], even though it is allegedly sent to each and every UN member state around the world. More specifically, the NCA high-ranking official who also assisted towards the creation of the UN manual explained:

> *We've been doing that [the NCA kidnap-related work] for the last 10 years or so, and the UN asked if we could help them to write the global counter-kidnap manual, and we advocate that this [the manual] is something that should be used. But not to be used by every country, you have a look at it, read it and you take the learning and the content out of the manual and you adopt it then for Cyprus or for Greece, you take the UN model and say 'yes', 'yes', 'yes', these things will work, or 'i don't think that will work'. [interviewee 1]*

Based on what the NCA official said, I understood that the manual is not used as a standardised step-by-step approach for each and every nation, but it is more like an introduction to kidnappings, with some suggestions of responses. However, I was wrong, because, as

he explained later, when I ask for further clarification, he argued that the manual is offering a standardised approach. As he explained, this means that countries can follow the advice suggested by the manual model of operations, or another model similar to this one, without however explaining what the alternative model would be like. What he replied to my question was mainly an attempt to highlight how things have changed compared to the past when the manual, along with its suggestions, did not exist. The reply of the NCA official is stated below:

> *No, it is a standardised approach. All countries use this model or a variation of that model now. But before, if a kidnap happens in Sudan for example they thought it wasn't a problem, but then they realised that it is a problem, and they need to have a working model that they can use, and operate successfully to secure the release of hostages. So it is something that, fortunately, has been used by more and more countries around the world.* [interviewee 1]
> In relation to the UN manual, the reality is that from all those

interviewed who are working in the counter-kidnap, private or public, business, only the English trainer and the senior member of the NCA who both assisted towards its composition were aware of the manual's existence. Not only people have not read it or do not know that such a manual exists, but in the case of Cyprus, the trainers and the negotiators did not know what the UNODC stands for. I asked all of my interviewees from the public and the private sector, as well as the people who participated in the Cypriot re-training, and all of them replied in a similar tone '*what is that [the UNODC]?*' [interviewee 11], '*what is it about?*'[interviewee 11], '*can*

you find it for us?'[interviewee 12]. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the manual has some information about prevention methods, and the main focus is on the police response to a kidnapping incident. The manual begins by giving information and examples of some of the different types of kidnappings that exist around the world, but it is dated because it was written more than a decade ago, in 2005, and it does not include some prevalent types of kidnaps along with their characteristics, such as bridal kidnapping, and tiger kidnapping. The manual is of little use to someone who already possesses knowledge around the phenomenon of kidnappings, yet it can be useful for those who are at the first stages of receiving information on the topic, and it can potentially stimulate further discussions.

Interviewees working in the public sector were simply ignorant of the manual's existence, or what the UNODC is, while those working in the private sector have chosen to ignore it. A man who has worked with the UN in various occasions and currently owns his own security and risk evacuations company explained why practitioners might choose to ignore the UN and its documents, or policies:

> *They have terrible security. I work with the UN guys all the time, they are a mess. They have to re-do everything. Their security is bad, their procurement system is bad, their manuals and policies are bad. They lived off this whole legacy stuff from the 60s and they are just trying to figure out that they are not able to fund things right away, they are unable to run policies right away. [...] They don't have a recovery system. Once, when we considered doing*

a joint recovery centre, they don't have anything like that. So a lot of the stuff they are doing is pick-up games. So at one point we were doing a cargo services for them, and we offered that we do evacuations; they added it right to the contract because they didn't have it. There is nothing inherent to their system at all. I don't know how they have been operating all these years. On a wing and a prayer. And they are funded well, i mean they are funded from donors, but the way they manage it (their finances) has been really poor, so they are technically not really funded.
[interviewee 13]

The United Nations and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime are not seen as an important source of information and knowledge. Many of those interviewed from the public sector are not aware if or how the UN or UNODC can help them with their work in the counter-kidnapping field. In addition to that, those interviewed from the private sector are quite sceptical of the value of such an organisation or what it has to offer in terms of preventing or dealing with kidnappings. Contrary to the unintentional ignorance of the public sector, in many cases, people from private businesses just do not know what the UN and UNODC stands for, but have also done business with them and after that they have deliberately chosen to ignore them. As one of them explained, this ignorance is because of the UN's bad quality, lack of concrete ideas, techniques, and qualified staff. In more detail, the man who is working on the evacuations and the recovery of people who have been kidnapped or held hostages in various locations around the globe, explained:

They have an annual conference at the UN headquarters on kidnapping, asset taking and personal recovery and every year they come back and they try to find 'is there

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anybody here who will be able to help', you know they are trying to find people to write their policies, and manuals, because they don't have anything inherent. Policy writing is a big business; they have to do their policy first in order to get funding. If policy and manuals are not kept up, they just fall apart. [interviewee 13]

From the words of this recovery and evacuations business owner, it seems that the UNODC agency is just managing to get the job done in order to secure funding, possibly for other projects. Their policies are ineffective, and my understanding is that if a piece of information or legislation is coming from the UN, it is believed that it will be of a bad quality, due to the absence of inherent knowledge. Things are done just for the sake of doing them, and on a similar note, one can argue that the counter-kidnap manual was created in order to tick a box and say that they have done something for this type of crime.

The UNODC manual was created in 2005 by the National Crime Agency, and after that, and until the point of writing this, a more recent version has not been written. In addition to that, no one has had any interest in assessing the impact or the use of the manual from agencies such as the police. Interestingly, the NCA official referred to the constantly changing nature of this specific crime and he used phrases such as '*every day is a school day*' [interviewee 1], and '*every day is a learning day*' [interviewee 1]. More specifically the NCA interviewee said: '*I have been involved in this counter-kidnap role for the past 13 years, but I am not an expert. Every day is a school day*' [interviewee 1]. However the manual is not updated

and it has stayed the same over time, even though there are new

ransom-kidnapping styles that the various counter-kidnapping

police departments around the world have to deal with. A good

example of this constant change in the nature of kidnappings is a

new type of 'ransom' kidnapping case which was dealt by the NCA

team, and which resembles a case which took place in Greece in

2015.

> *We have been involved in various operations. Historically kidnap for ransom is for money, but Albanians here in the UK threatened to kill a hostage unless 5 kilos of cocaine was handed over to the organised crime group. There was evidence of torture and we had enough evidence showing that they were going to kill their hostage. But they were not persuaded to go for cash, or go to cash as opposed to cocaine, so we were in a dilemma as to the type of tactics we were going to use, but thankfully for us the hostage escaped and was safely recovered in London, but the lessons coming out of that is that all kidnappers don't go for the money, they can go for other forms of commodities as well.* [interviewee 1]

If the family of the hostage or the person to whom the demand is

made (victim) has easier and faster access to commodities such as

gold, diamonds, jewellery, or drugs, asking for something else

other than money is not just welcomed but is actually preferred to

cash by the kidnappers, because these commodities cannot be

followed up, and this makes it almost impossible to catch the

offenders. Another very interesting and unusual kidnapping case is

one which took place in London between a man and an organised

criminal group in 2016. During my interview with the NCA official,

he referred to the case to show that although he has been working

in this specific position for many years, he is still coming across

kidnappings which are of a unique nature. As he explained:

> *Honour is a major thing as far as they [the organised criminal group] are concerned. It's quite bizarre, but that's a real life situation where a husband left to go to work, text messages were coming in his wife's phone saying that her husband has been kidnapped, demands for £5000 were made and to be taken in Oxford Circus, tube station in the centre of London, and then for the money to be burnt. A question of honour, again, but with a serious risk to life, and reputational risk to the organised criminal group.* [interviewee 1]

On a similar note, an interviewee who, after retiring from the Greek

police started working in the private sector, talked about the

importance of being prepared by noticing what is happening in

other parts of the world. He explained:

> *Crime is evolving, just like everything else. Anything and anyone dealing with [crime] prevention and control should stay open with their antennas up high, receiving what is happening elsewhere [in other parts of the world] regardless if they have reached them or not. [interviewee 14]*

4.3.3 Criticisms of transnational training initiatives

When discussing transnational trainings and kidnappings, we mainly talk

about the role of the United Kingdom's National Crime Agency counter-

kidnap and extortion unit at the global level. They are considered to be

the knowledge brokers, and this is the reason behind their creation of the

UNODC counter-kidnap manual which is based on the English version.

Although not many people from the counter-kidnap sector seem to value

the opinion of the UN, the NCA official was proud of having his team

acknowledged by the UN as a knowledge broker in the field of kidnap-

response:

> *We do suffer from a lack of report, but arguably, in 2015, 411 lives were saved as a result of what we do and the successful structure of the operations we have been involved to. And the UK law enforcement has acknowledged us as the world leader in kidnap and hostage operations, and this is something which has been previously said by the United Nations. [interviewee 1]*

The NCA official referred to 411 kidnappings which took place in 2015 in the United Kingdom and had a positive outcome, although another interviewee said something slightly different. Undoubtedly there is a substantial number of kidnappings in the United Kingdom every year, and some of them might go unnoticed and unreported, however, the person who is training the counter-kidnapping police personnel and is based in Manchester, argued that the number of kidnappings is smaller than the officially reported one. As he argued, this is done because there are 'vested interests', however he did not explain what he meant by that. It might mean that through presenting a big number of cases, there will be more financial support for the counter-kidnap team, or the NCA team might have some other type of gain. The interviewee actually said:

> *Statistics here [in the UK] are messy. The anti-kidnap unit [the NCA unit] has a vested interest in having lots and lots of kidnaps, so they will say that there are 500 [kidnapping cases per year], but there really aren't. There are about 200 or 250, we have [kidnappings] mainly in Birmingham, Manchester and London. [interviewee 15]*

Going back to the quote from the NCA official, the UNODC manual is disseminating the English approach around the world, aiming to create a unified system of kidnap-related responses, so it can be easier for the English team to collaborate and offer their help when English citizens (although not exclusively) are involved in kidnaps

abroad. In addition to that, the manual seems to be a form of advertisement for the quality of the work and the services offered by a UK public organisation. The manual is not only there to make collaborations easier, but it is also proof of the National Crime Agency's expertise, and it is part of the transnational trainings offered by this national law enforcing agency.

There are many questions surrounding these trainings and their practical usefulness. Organising a training in a country which is in a different geographical location, with different types of kidnaps and stakeholders involved, does not imply that the knowledge transferred will be useful or appropriate. Preparedness is valuable, but it is very different from usefulness. Also, in some cases the terminology used is different, which can make the transfer even more complex. For instance, an important difference in the terminology is the word 'victim', which in the UK context is used for the person to whom the demand for ransom is made, whereas in all the other nations is used for the person kidnapped. In Greece, when the trainers are not providing the training in Greek, they have interpreters. However it is likely that these interpreters are not familiar with the difference between the terms, which can lead to a confusion of who is supposed to do what. Having these differences in the geographical location, kidnap case and terminology in mind, when I asked the NCA high-ranking

official if after the training countries are better equipped to deal with kidnaps, his reply was very positive:

> *Yes, yes! I am very impressed with the colleagues in Athens, I was there last year and this year as well. They have an awful lot of experience, and they've been very successful, but they've been unsuccessful as well. If you've got a machine that is programmed to deal with a kidnap and you stick to the policy that comes out of the creation of that machine, then as long as you adopt the principle of saving life as paramount, and everything else as secondary, you will become successful, because you will exhaust every little bit of intelligence so you will identify where the stronghold, the hostage, is kept. That's what the training and the UN manual is all about, so you've got to stick to that. [interviewee 1]*

According to what the interviewee said, by the '*well programmed machine*' he possibly means the UN manual and the trainings provided by his team and himself. As I have previously stated, Greece has not received the manual, or at least the counter-kidnap team is not aware of its existence. In addition to that, the Greek team working with kidnapping cases follows a different approach to the one the UK counter-kidnap team is following. A Greek negotiator said:

> *Our kidnappings are long. They last for many days, weeks, even months in some cases. We had one which was running for forty days. Everything was ready from day five; the ransom money, and the courier whom we have trained of different scenarios and how she will have to react to each one, but we couldn't identify where the hostage was kept and the most important who the kidnappers were, so we were waiting for more information to come in. We acted the last day, sent the money and received the hostage. [interviewee 16]*

This approach appears to be very different from the one followed by the UK, in their ransom kidnap cases, and used in their theoretical trainings, where usually they use the examples of kidnaps which

lasted only for a few days. In Greece, apart from the fact that everything lasts longer, the shortest kidnapping lasted for five days. There are of course cases which have never been solved and the hostage is still missing, but, the longest, successfully solved kidnapping was running for over a month. Usually the kidnappings last quite a long time because it takes time to collect all the ransom demanded, while in the meantime the team is trying to collect all the necessary information about the location of the hostage, and the identity of the kidnappers. Nevertheless, this is not always possible, so they can only rely on the fact that after paying the ransom, they will follow up the registered bank notes to find who the kidnappers are and their location. The NCA team has three options and, depending on the case, they either do one of them or try to do all of them at the same time. These options are to pay up the ransom, to pay up the ransom and follow the money, and, finally, to locate the stronghold aiming to intervene and set the hostage free. The interviewee from Greater Manchester police who has also assisted in the creation of the manual told me:

> *You do all three [pay up, pay up and follow, locate stronghold] at the same time, a team of people try to find the stronghold, if they cannot find it you wrap a bubble around the money so you can protect the courier. If you can securely follow the hostage takers you will do it. If you cannot locate the stronghold, depends how long the kidnap lasts for, obviously after 24 hours your chances of finding the stronghold run out, or you are trying to follow the money, you get the hostage back. If there is an opportunity to arrest people, you arrest people. Then the last thing you can do is to pay up, so you put a bubble of security around it [the money], and pay the ransom. […]*

> *You can't have a security operation if you don't know where they [the hostages] are.* [interviewee 15]

Going back to the comment of the NCA member who stated that he is 'impressed by the colleagues in Athens', it should be stated that some of the kidnap hostages and their families interviewed have a different view regarding that. Even though all of the three families interviewed argued that, at first, the team of negotiators was great and they did their best, later on in the conversation they made some interesting comments. In all the cases, the negotiators were selling, or giving information to the media, which led to the increase of the asking ransom by the kidnappers. In most kidnaps, during the first contact with the family of the victim, the kidnappers give the ransom price, and they also stated that any contact with the police might risk the life of the hostage or might increase the asking ransom. In one of the cases, during this first contact the kidnappers gave two prices, one without the police getting involved, and an increased ransom in case the police was informed and involved, so the family had to choose between the two options. The wife of the businessman who was kidnapped in Greece at first was very positive about the work of the Greek police, however when I asked her if there was anything she thought should have been done in a different way, she opened up and talked about two issues. During our interview she said:

> *The guys [police negotiators] were amazing; they were really helpful, very good at explaining things, they respected my need to be around people. At first they were strict [with the fact that she wanted to have friends and*

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family members in the house with her whilst her husband was kept hostage]. Later they saw I couldn't function without support. In my head I could only think the moment the kidnappers would call to tell me that they have killed my husband. If that happened police would leave and I would be alone, me and the girls [her two daughters]. That wasn't the plan [for the kidnappers to kill her husband], everything was done for the money but still I wanted people around me. [...] They accused my sister in law that she planned the kidnapping. My husband's sister is family, she would never do anything like that. I was offended; out of all the people who know us, they said that she did it, she planned the kidnap. I was there when they kidnapped him, I saw the body-types of the kidnappers, their guns, one of them had a particular accent. I was sure it was x [she told me the name of the main kidnapper who had a broad criminal history, including kidnappings, and the ransom money was traced back to him a few years after the end of the kidnapping]. I was saying that it was him from the beginning, I insisted, but they were suspecting my husband's sister. They kept saying it's early to say who the kidnappers are, but they were openly suspecting my sister in law. [...] You know we were having meetings just the three of us [the lady with the two main negotiators] in a room, we were the only ones who had access to that room, there were important and confidential things inside, sticky notes on the walls with things I should say to the kidnappers if they called me, and general things, details about the case, you know, the way we were going to deal with the kidnapping. We had a few sad cases where we were talking about specific things inside that room, the three of us, and then the next morning everything we said would be all over the media, so we had to change our plans because the kidnappers knew. There were a few leaks, but I didn't know who was leaking them to the media. It wasn't me so I guess it was one of them [the negotiators]. After three or four days I have had enough. It was very wearing, it was too much, so I asked the head of the Greek police for another team [of negotiators] and they send me two [negotiators] from Athens [the original team was from another city]. After that there were no leaks and we still talk every now and then. [interviewee 4]

Another woman that I interviewed in Cyprus about the

kidnapping of her son had some comments regarding the support of

the Greek police. This kidnapping case is particularly interesting

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because the kidnap took place in Greece, but the demands for ransom were made in Cyprus, so the woman had to travel in order to pay the ransom herself. I will refer to this case again in this chapter regarding the cooperation between the negotiators from Cyprus and those from Greece, but at this point it is important to mention what the mother of a young kidnapped man said.

> *x, x, and x [the three main negotiators of Cyprus], were coming here [in her house] every morning and they were staying here until very late. We were organising things, trying to find the money [for the ransom], preparing for the next phone call of the kidnappers. […] When we found the money, x, x, and myself book a flight [to Greece]. Each one of us had a backpack with a few millions of euros inside. When we landed I called the kidnappers and told them that I am in Greece with the amount they asked, and after that we went straight to the Greek police headquarters. I thought that the Greek team was going to train me or prepare me for being a courier, but they didn't do anything. They didn't prepare me for what to expect. I had to do everything on my own and there was no plan B. […] The kidnappers told me to go to a specific location, get into a taxi and ask the taxi driver to start driving and go outside of the city to the first toll way. […] I got into a 'taxi' which was driven by a police officer who was armed, but they called me and told me to get off that taxi and get inside another one which was waiting for me in another location. I paid the 'taxi driver' and got off. This is when I realised that I was completely on my own. I never learned if the taxi driver [the one who was waiting for her] was also involved in the kidnapping, I think he knew what was happening. Police could have followed the taxi I was on, but they didn't, I was very scared. They [the kidnappers] called me again and told me to get off the taxi and wait at a forest. There was no one there and throughout the motorway there were no other cars [it was late at night as well], the taxi I was on was the only one [the only car around]. That's why I think police haven't sent anyone outside to follow me and look after me. […] I left the bag with the money in the forest, just like I was told to do, and waited somewhere else near the toll gates. [interviewee 5]*

These two quotes from people who had to communicate with the kidnappers, cooperate with the negotiators and carry the ransom money, are used in order to show that offering a training and seeing how trainees work in a simulation exercise does not mean that you can actually know whether they would be good in a real life situation. The NCA trainer was impressed by the quality of the work of the Greek team and their success, but those family members of kidnapping hostages had a different view. The mother of the kidnapped young man, and courier of the ransom, felt unprepared for her role as a courier and completely unprotected. The wife of the businessman felt that the media leaks were putting her husband's life in danger. At the same time she felt that her voice was unheard since she was pointing them in the right direction in terms of who the leading kidnapper was, but police were suspecting her sister-in-law. In both cases the interviewees first talked about the fact that they were happy with the way police treated them and their cases. However, after talking they opened up and started pointing out some negative aspects which they wished hadn't happened. This might be because the overall outcome of the kidnapping was positive, with their loved one being safely released, so everything negative was buried and almost forgotten.

The NCA official, after talking about Greece and how impressed he was with the colleagues in Athens, referred to Cyprus to say how qualified the Cypriot negotiators are:

> *Cyprus doesn't have a great deal of experience as far as kidnap is concerned, but they have got a structure and they have got qualified negotiators, they have surveillance and they have an intelligence capacity as well through their technology. So, that has got to be fused together and used in the right way. People should never become complacent, because they [the Cypriot team] came to the EuNAT for a strategic board meeting, and i am casually talking to the chief negotiator about all aspects of a kidnap hostage taking, and then a week later the world's media and focus is on a hijacking. It wasn't a hijacking by a terrorist, but Cyprus reacted really well. Well, it wasn't a real hijacking. No, it was on an aircraft, let's face it, but it wasn't by a terrorist. The chief negotiator, i was very impressed by him. I have a lot of confidence that they will do the right thing [in the case of a kidnap].* [interviewee 1]

The NCA official seems to be very confident about the Cypriot team, in case a kidnapping takes place in the country. From my ethnography and the four days I have spent with the Cypriot team of negotiators, I would be quite reluctant to say that 'they have got qualified negotiators'. I have met the chief negotiator who is the person who invited me for my presentation/training in Cyprus, and he is the man who negotiated the hijacking that the NCA official referred to. With confidence I can say that he is a very passionate and hard-working negotiator, but he is the only one out of the almost thirty negotiators I have met who has such an attitude. The day after the end of the training the chief negotiator asked me what I thought of the training, so we had an interesting discussion. We talked about the negotiators who attended the training-event, those

who did not attend it, and during that discussion he started referring to a couple of things that went wrong during the kidnapping of the Cypriot man in Athens.

> *I never expected I would have to do it [be a negotiator in a kidnap case]. You go to training-events, I have been to trainings in England and here. It's different; YOU have to decide everything, and there is no one next to you telling you whether what you are doing is the right thing. Of course you discuss some things with the head of the counter-terrorism department [negotiators belong to this department], because a kidnap is a serious thing for a country like Cyprus, but it's a very difficult job. […] One day, I remember, we [by 'we' he means the mother of the young man, the negotiators were only listening to the conversation] have just talked to the kidnappers, and x [one of the two other negotiators involved in the case] comes to me and he looks like a ghost. No one knows that; now I am laughing when I think about it, but it is very serious. I asked him [the negotiator] what has happened and he told me that the moment the kidnappers hung up the phone instead of calling the head of the counter-terrorism department to inform them about the call, he basically called back the kidnappers from a police phone. We were very lucky they didn't call back to check who called them, but imagine what would happen if they knew police were involved in the kidnap.* [interviewee 12]

The other negotiator who was on the case wanted to comment on the fact that he called the kidnappers and he said '*if something like this happens in an exercise we would laugh about it. The exercise is different from the real thing. I think about it [him calling the kidnappers] and I freak out. It could have meant the end of my career, it could have meant the end of the hostage's life*' [interviewee 17]. Apart from the unfortunate incident with the phone call to the kidnappers, the chief negotiator also referred to the fact that they had not registered the numbers of the ransom banknotes. As a result of that, the millions of euros which were

given for the release of the young man were never found, even though the kidnappers and some of those involved in the case got arrested. From this particular quote it is discernible that attending trainings and exercises is very different from taking part in an actual incident. This is something that the chief negotiator and organiser of the annual re-training events in Cyprus is aware of, and no matter how close to reality they are, they would possibly never be close enough.

4.4 Summary

In this chapter I have analysed the different ways of sharing the high security counter-kidnapping knowledge. From my research I found that there are three methods of sharing counter-kidnap knowledge, and these methods are via documents, transnational trainings, and trainings within a country (intranational trainings).

In relation to the transnational trainings, I tried to explain how the EuNAT training and re-training work, and what their aim is. The objective of these knowledge transfer and sharing events is to create not just European communication and cooperation, but also to create a system of world-wide and cross-national surveillance, negotiations, and general assistance. The third and last method of moving knowledge around is through intranational trainings and re-trainings, which are all those knowledge-oriented events that take place inside a nation. As I explained in this chapter, there are three

techniques to passing the knowledge someone holds to other people. These techniques are through presentations, similar to the one I gave to the Cypriot negotiators, or through small and big exercises. During these exercises the negotiators have to apply what they have learned throughout the course of their training, followed by a criticism of those who are more experienced and more senior within the police hierarchy.

In the second section of this chapter I addressed some of the issues around the dissemination, reception and application of the counter kidnapping knowledge and, as I have explained, these issues are mainly related to things associated with the appropriateness of the training materials or the trainers. I began by discussing that although practitioners refer to what is being transferred as 'knowledge', in reality they are transferring 'information'. Knowledge is made out of personal beliefs, ideologies and a variety of other things, which means that when it is transferred it is acontextual to the person receiving it, thus what is being transferred is knowledge for the transmitter, but once it is received it becomes information for the receiver. However, I explained that in this thesis the word "knowledge" will be used instead of "information" in order to describe the context of what has been transferred. The word 'knowledge' is the chosen word of all those who were interviewed for this research, and in an attempt to avoid any confusion I decided to go by their chosen word.

In addition to the difference between information and knowledge I discussed the fact that knowledge can be sticky and there is a plethora of reasons which can contribute to its stickiness. This stickiness can be due to people's lack of experience, which can limit their ability to understand the content of what is being transferred and consequently make its application difficult. In other cases the transfer can be sticky because of linguistic barriers, where there is a different terminology used between nations, or simply because the transfer does not take place in the mother tongue of transmitters and/or receivers. The stickiness can also exist because trainers are usually unable to assess what has been received by the participants of the trainings and how they are going to implement the received knowledge in a real-life situation.

After the subjectivity and the stickiness of knowledge, I continued by mentioning some issues around the UNODC counter-kidnapping manual, which is one of the only two documents on kidnappings which have been produced by formal organisations. The UNODC manual is supposedly sent to all the UN member-states but from the interviews it became clear that practitioners have not had any contact with this document. Only the two interviewees from the United Kingdom have read it, and that was because they were in the team responsible for its creation. The other interviewees either did not know what 'UNODC' stands for, or they had decided to disregard it and not pay any attention to its

existence. As some of the interviewed private practitioners explained, that was because the organisation which is disseminating the manual is not regarded as being of great value. However, even if the practitioners had read the manual, they would have noticed its dated content and the lack of detailed explanations at certain points. These two characteristics, along with the fact that such formal documents are offering one-size-fits-all solutions to nations which do not have the tools or expertise to follow them, makes an official document to be regarded as an unimportant and possibly worthless source of information and knowledge.

In relation to the transnational trainings provided by the counter-kidnap team of the National Crime Agency, it was pointed out to me that there are some issues regarding the high number of kidnappings in the United Kingdom. This is because of the inability or indifference to arrest and prosecute the offenders. These, along with the fact that different nations have different types of kidnappings, duration, police capabilities and techniques, raise questions in terms of the usefulness and appropriateness of transnational counter-kidnap training. Providing a training to a few people does not mean that they will be in a position of reproducing or applying what they have been taught. Although the NCA high-ranking official was very positive with the work of the Greek and Cypriot team of negotiators, the interviewed families of former hostages had a different view. According to them, police negotiators

were wrongfully accusing family members, leaking investigation-related information to the media, accidentally calling the kidnappers on the phone instead of the police office, or sending the mother of one of the hostages to deliver the ransom without any prior preparation or coverage for her protection. It is not possibly for the trainers to assess if the training was successful, since they do not know how the trained team will behave in a real incident. Transnational trainings take place without anyone knowing to what extend they have an effect on the trainees, and if they work at all.

I have discussed and criticised the knowledge that is being transferred through official documents, mainly the one created by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and the training which is being provided transnationally between different nations, as well as intranationally within a state. I have tried to explain how perplexed, messy, problematic and biased knowledge transfer can be, even if it comes from organisations such as the United Nations. In the next chapter I will focus on how the police sub-culture itself can work as a barrier when it comes to the transfer and application of the counter-kidnapping knowledge.

Chapter 5: Police culture as a barrier of knowledge production and transfer

5.1 Introduction

So far in this thesis I have looked at two of the ways in which the knowledge of dealing with kidnapping cases is being transferred: the official and formal documents by Europol and the United Nations, and also those trainings which take place internationally, offered by specific organisations or individuals who are perceived to be knowledge brokers to other states and individuals. However, both of these ways of moving knowledge around have some problematic aspects which prevent knowledge from doing what it was created for.

In this chapter I will provide a critique of those trainings which take place intranationally within a state. Similar to the international trainings, the intranational ones have some sticky aspects which block the counter-kidnapping knowledge from moving around and being applied in real-life situations. The low quality of the training, the pride and the differentiation of those working in the counter-kidnap police departments, as well as the power and the value knowledge-holders have, are all some issues that affect the transfer and application of knowledge. This chapter is going to focus on police sub-culture, and more specifically, the sub-subculture of those plain-clothed counter-kidnapping police

officers who appear to be part of a unique sub-culture inside the police.

5.2 Intranational Trainings Criticism

Reiner has stated in relation to the British police that until the 1920s 'training was not taken very seriously' (2010: 71), but that after this era and even up to now, there is a 'stronger standardization and central direction' (ibid) within all aspects of policing. From my ethnography with the Cypriot negotiators I understood that the trainings were more related to what Reiner described about the police of the United Kingdom of the early 20th century, before the turn to a more professional police force. In the re-training in Cyprus, when the negotiators were referring to the big exercise, they were using the phrase '*it's show time*' [interviewee 12], while the person who organised the re-training event asked me sarcastically, at the end of the exercise, if I liked the '*Hollywood show*' [interviewee 12]. For him it was like a show because there was a mansion, a helicopter, a yacht, and a passenger plane involved. There seemed to be more emphasis on the spectacle rather the actual outcome of the training exercise, and the event was regarded in terms of its visual impact. The need for a strong spectacle was also clear from the organiser's demands to include in my three hour long session pictures, stories, information about people who died, guns and a lot of action.

Interestingly, in this exercise there where only four members of the counter-terrorism team of Cyprus, whereas in a real life incident there would have to be almost all the members of this team. The exercise lasted for around ten hours and it took place in three different locations of Cyprus almost simultaneously. I was lucky enough to witness parts of all of the three different hostage incidents because I was in a car with the head of the Cypriot police who was the person that planned the exercise, so he knew when, where and what was going to happen and we were going to the exact location of the incidents. In addition to these two people, there was also a female negotiator in the car who was responsible for explaining to me what was happening, and discussing what negotiators were doing and if that was the right thing to do, according to what they have learned in their training and re-training. The head of the police was there to observe what was happening and how the negotiators were dealing with the hostage situations.

To me they seemed that for this training they had put a great effort into arranging for the right permission for access to specific locations, but there seemed to be a lack of a story line, making the plot unelaborate and facile. Young police officers had to play the roles of the hostage-takers who were all part of a terrorist group, but that is all they knew about their role. I spent some time with one of those playing the terrorists who was in the mansion and was

keeping the maid of the house as his hostage. In the house with him were two negotiators whose role was to assist the 'actor' (who as I said was a young police officer) in terms of what to say and how to respond to those negotiating the case in order to make it harder for them. At first they told him to inform those negotiating that the maid is from the Philippines. In a real life situation this would mean that a translator will be called to the scene in order to be able to communicate with the hostage. Interestingly, after an hour, the negotiators and the head of the counter-terrorism department asked them to change the plot because it was not possible to find a translator. This raises questions about the level of preparedness in case an actual incident happens where there is a need for a translator.

In the second incident which took place a yacht which, according to the plot, contained explosives, as the head of the counter-terrorism team told me, the point of the exercise was to see if they were going to negotiate with the terrorist in order to ask him to step out of the yacht for his safety. However, what the negotiators did was to go inside the yacht (page 115), a decision which did not make the head of counter-terrorism very happy. In the final incident, which took place inside an Aegean passenger plane, according to the quite simple plot, there were three terrorists and around thirty passengers (those who were not negotiating in the final incident, some young police officers and me) who were

kept as hostages. In the three hours that we were waiting inside the plane to be "rescued", the other negotiators were observing and trying to explain to me the mistakes of those who were outside, trying to negotiate the case, which is a non-active method of learning. According to those observing, the negotiators dealing with the case did not try to find either the number of hostages nor the number of terrorists on the plane. The incident ended with a rescue operation by the four members of the counter-terrorism team, but instead of arresting all of the three "terrorists" who were on the plane, they only arrested one of them, and mistook the other two for hostages/plane passengers. This was something that also came up in the debriefing of the three incidents which took place the morning after the exercises. When I asked an experienced negotiator why there is such a shallow reaction, and superficial turnout to an exercise which I was informed was to be as close to reality as possible, he replied:

> *They [the counter-terrorism team] had something else to do today, and they couldn't come, but that's ok, if we have four representatives of the team, it is still fine. […] Yes, we have to be as accurate as possible, but we all know that this thing will never happen here [in Cyprus]. This is a show that we put up every year, and we both know that if something happens, I will be the one dealing with it. Not these negotiators. [interviewee 12]*

Not only is a hostage training exercise the closest training to a kidnapping incident that the negotiators will receive, but also these trainings and exercises are not perceived in a serious enough manner, because as the trainer said, this will never happen in

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Cyprus. Interestingly, a few months after the re-training and the exercise with the hostage incident on a passenger plane, something similar happened in reality, which actually proved that the location does not exclude specific crimes from happening. In addition to that, apart from my three hour session/training on kidnappings, there are no other trainings specifically focusing on this type of crime. The closest training they have to a kidnapping is hostage-taking, which is definitely not the same. The Cypriot negotiators are not prepared for a kidnapping case, and the chief negotiator seems to be at peace with the fact that he will be responsible for all the serious hostage and kidnapping cases on the island (or outside). Knowledge transfer does not produce the desirable outcomes, and that is partly because the process of sharing knowledge is done superficially. With such a superficial reaction they are only scratching the surface of the issue, without getting deeper into it.

The knowledge shared is often incomplete and it only involves obvious things, or already known to the participants/attendees of the training. There is a denial of finding out what happens in other countries in terms of kidnappings, although it is crucial to have a broader view of what the police techniques are, or what types of kidnappings other countries have, as a form of preparation. In the case of Cyprus, there are annual trainings in negotiating techniques, but kidnappings seem to be neglected as a potential type of negotiation incident. According to one of the participants in

the Cypriot police training, they are not specifically trained for negotiations in kidnapping cases because, as someone said, '*we don't need specific training on that, we are on an island; kidnappers will have nowhere to hide and that's simply the reason why we don't have kidnappings here*' [interviewee 18]. The United Kingdom is also an island and according to the numbers given by the English trainer of the counter-kidnap trainers, there are a few kidnappings taking place every week. At this point it should be mentioned that I initially became interested in Cyprus because in the summer of 2015 there were suspicions of an attempted abduction of a child from the United Kingdom[15]. Although there were only suspicions, and this was not an actual kidnapping case, it can show that the threat of a kidnapping is always there, either on the mainland or on an island. These perceptions of the training being a 'show', the need for a spectacle, possibly in order to keep the attention of the trainees, the idea that a kidnap will not happen on an island, and, as I have mentioned in the previous chapter, the fact that a negotiator asked if he can hit or curse someone who does not comply with what he says, are only a few signs which show a lack of credibility by people who would be responsible in case a serious type of crime occurs.

These Cypriot negotiators who attended the re-training will be the ones who will have to take part and advise the family of the

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[15] https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/jun/18/britons-hotel-cyprus-child-abduction-attempt
(accessed 12.08.2016)

hostage in the case of a kidnapping. According to the person organising the training, all of them allegedly know a few things about kidnappings for ransom. However, observing these negotiators throughout their whole re-training, and witnessing that in reality they do not know things they are supposed to know well, made me slightly change my presentation and include more basic information about kidnappings in general.

During my presentation, among other things, I talked about the different types of kidnappings, and where we tend to have each type of kidnap, what hostages should do to avoid getting killed, which are the first steps negotiators should do, and the importance of having professional kidnappers. I strongly believe that my presentation was too broad, which in a sense makes it superficial as well. However, interestingly, those who participated in the training had a different view. One of them actually approached me afterwards and, after shaking my hand and thanking me, he said that just by listening to my session on kidnappings, he believes that they all have more skills, and that they had gained something that others had not, '*after that [presentation/training], I feel we have advanced to the next level*' [interviewee 19]. This shows a lack of understanding of what meaningful knowledge of something is, and how this meaningful knowledge can be acquired. Sitting in a room and listening to a three-hour talk on kidnappings does not enhance someone's skills, and it will definitely not make them capable of

negotiating in a kidnapping incident or capable of calculating the effects of possible decisions in relation to the case.

Regarding Greece, although they are asked to train other Balkan countries on ways to deal with a kidnap for ransom case, they neglect training those negotiators in their own country. After the initial training a year before the 2004 Olympic Games which took place in Athens, there have only been two other trainings; the one aimed to extend the Greek team of negotiators, and the other one aimed at training the negotiators to deal with an ISIS-related negotiation-incident. All those kidnapping negotiators interviewed in Greece agreed that this is a very big drawback; '*It's like we have it [the negotiation skills] inherently, we are already very good without any training, so imagine our level of expertise if we could participate in a re-training event every now and then*'[interviewee 20]. Another negotiator, when asked if there are any problems or issues that need to get fixed, he replied:

> *I don't know what to tell you, the only think that comes to my mind now is that maybe we [police negotiators] are forgotten, the things we know are old, we need to refresh everything, not annually, but at least doing that every three or four years would be good. At least it would be better than what we do now, once every 9 years, or [for some] even never. We will be safer, and the public will be at better hands. Maybe we are satisfied with what we have achieved so far and we have relaxed, I don't know.* [interviewee 9]

Police training in the academy is mimicking military training, however, crisis intervention and negotiation is very different from what it is learned during the trainings in the police-academy.

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Negotiators deal with from cases of people who are mentally ill and suicidal, to cases of kidnappings, thus they need to be calm, use language and their voice, be patient and not use their force or their gun to handle a situation. It is a big transition which can require many hours of training and exercises as well as practical experience, which seems to be absent from the Greek police. In the case of Cyprus, as I mentioned before, the quality of the trainings is superficial, aiming to tick the box of the mandatory annual training, but in the case of Greece, training on kidnappings have ceased existing, even though they put the effort and the time to offer their knowledge to counter-kidnapping departments of other nations. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the nature of kidnappings is constantly changing, with methods which used to be implemented by offenders in Latin America now being used all over the world, and kidnappers asking not just for money as part of the ransom but other goods as well. Obviously the new wine cannot be contained in the old bottles and the knowledge needs to always be updated so practitioners will know what to expect and how to deal with the changing nature of this crime.

5.3 'We are the best'. Pride and Differentiation.

As it has been mentioned in the literature review chapter, Praveen Kumar, a former police officer, referred to pride inside the police as

being something very beneficial. He said that 'pride is the fuel of policing […] and] pride is the root of morale' (Kumar, 2011: 146), in addition to that, he also states that this professional pride 'is a sure way of nurturing and promoting high professional standards and efficiency' (Kumar, 2011: 50). However, Kumar is not talking about the effects of unjustified pride, which instead of creating efficiency and higher professional standards, might actually create arrogance and unnecessary sufficiency with what they know and how they deal with kidnappings. In various shapes and forms, pride was something expressed by all the interviewees and this non-supported competency can act as a barrier towards further improvement. The fact that there were certain aspects of pride seen across nations, agencies and departments means that kidnap units have potentially some similar characteristics across territories. Of course there is no attempt to make any generalisations, but I have looked at an intelligence agency and two police units which all appeared to have similar cultural characteristics.

5.3.1 The Case of the United Kingdom

From my interviews with the Greek police negotiators I was informed about the very practical and hands-on experience-based trainings. The retired Greek negotiator who is now working in the private sector compared the American FBI training the team received in Athens and the NCA training, and he explained:

> *In 2006 the Greek police brought trainers from the FBI for a five-day re-training but everything was theoretical. The Brits were extremely practice-based, they were saying five things and then through the exercise we were learning fifteen more. That was the analogy, they would only say the basic theory and then the rest was to be learned from the ground. […] The training was tough, starting at 8 in the morning and finishing between 12 and 2 the next morning, endless work, but amazing work. That was a good training. I have adopted the toughness in my trainings [when he was the leading trainer before his retirement], and at the beginning of my training I used to say 'welcome to hell'.* [interviewee 14]

The former negotiator and trainer praised the NCA method of training and especially the practical aspect of it. Yet, when it comes to the case of the United Kingdom's National Crime Agency and its counter-kidnapping team, although they seem to be the most professional and organised team between the three counter-kidnap teams I have looked at, there is still a drawback which prevents them from achieving their highest potential. This drawback is the fact that the emphasis is not put into arresting the offenders. In my interview with the NCA official, he seemed to be proud of the work of his team, even though they are still learning, and in more detail he said:

> *We are still learning, but we are very good at what we do. We don't say that what we do is the best. It isn't, but the module we use is successful and people have become aware of the work we've been involved in, so they just want to have a look at what we've got.* [interviewee 1]

According to the NCA official, they are '*very good at what [they] do*', but they are not able to eliminate or minimise the numbers of kidnapping cases inside the country because they '*do not have the opportunity to engage*' and ideally arrest those organising and

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executing a kidnapping. During the interview the high ranking official of the counter-kidnap team explained:

> *During the last 15 years, all hostages in the UK have been safely recovered, what i mean by that is that when we have a kidnap situation in the UK and calls are made to the family of the hostage or the friends, when the police has been alerted, we've been able to put in structure, and in all the situations the hostages have been safely recovered. But as we know sadly, kidnaps happen every single day for various reasons. I do not conclude that we will stripe off figures, because we do not have the opportunity to engage with the offenders.* [interviewee 1]

It is interesting that NCA, the world leader of kidnapping resolutions, is showing no interest in finding and arresting the kidnappers, and the work they can offer ends the moment the ransom money, or the commodities, are given to the offenders. They state that '*saving [one's] life is paramount, and everything else is secondary*' [interviewee 1], which places importance on the life of the hostage. However, this might be problematic as it might create the impression that those who planned and executed a kidnapping can carry on doing it, or that others can get involved in a crime with low risks and high rewards. The person who co-authored the UNODC manual and whose role is to train those who will later become counter-kidnap trainers, mentioned this issue during our interview, as well as the fact that, in some cases, it is difficult to prosecute the kidnappers. He said:

> *Regularly we do not catch the kidnappers, mainly because many kidnaps are done by criminals kidnapping other*

criminals. [...] We call them criminal vendetta-kidnaps [...] In most cases police are the last resource. The victim [the person who has to pay the ransom-not the hostage] will know who the kidnapper is, but they won't tell us. Sadly, that's the reason we don't catch that many, and if we do catch them, there are problems in prosecuting. [...] We can produce a victimless prosecution even if the victim does not want to. [interviewee 15]

This quote shows a fault in the United Kingdom's law enforcement and criminal justice system which makes it more complicated not just to arrest offenders, but also to prosecute them. It also raises the question of whether the perception of the NCA official about being 'very good at what [they] do' is a valid one.

5.3.2 The Case of Greece

Those in Greece who are involved in the trainings of the other countries, insisted that they are asked and specifically chosen to transfer their knowledge. That was due to their great practices, and as one negotiator and trainer said, they are asked because of their '*famous success rate*', but there is a different view which seems to be more realistic and plausible. There seem to be high levels of ignorance amongst those trainers; they were doing something, but they did not know exactly why they were doing it, and they were not interested in finding out why as well. There is anecdotal information in existence about the role of Greece in the trainings of other countries, with two training centres in the country and many police negotiators from other nations who have been trained in Greece by the Greek counter-kidnap team. As a police officer said,

this role of Greece is because 'we have exceptional success rate for solving kidnapping cases, it is almost a hundred percent' [interviewee 8]. This rhetoric was repeated throughout almost all of my interviews in Greece and no one seems to question this belief.

This allegedly successful rate is anecdotal, since we are talking about a nation which does not keep a statistical track of kidnappings and does not have a clear understanding of what a kidnap is, but it still seemed to be the most common rhetoric amongst those interviewed. At the same time, three negotiators mentioned an award which was allegedly given to the counter-kidnap team by the head of the Greek police. The award was given for the team's exceptional work and high rate of successful solution of kidnap for ransom cases, but although I asked a couple of times to see it, I was told that they do not know exactly where it is. One of the negotiators said: 'it is somewhere here, on the 11th floor [of the police building], but I am not sure exactly where, [...] I haven't seen it' [interviewee 7].

As I have been informed by all of my interviewees, the Greek team, contrary to the UK case, does not receive any type of payment in order to transfer its practical knowledge, and this is something that kept coming up in the interviews. Interviewees would seize every opportunity to underline the fact that they are volunteering as negotiators, and some of them actually argued that

they are very good at what they are doing simply because they are volunteering; '*it is coming from deep inside us, from our heart*' [interviewee 6], said the experienced negotiator and trainer of the Greek team, and he continued '*it is tough, [when there is a kidnapping] we have to be in the family's house for days or weeks in some cases, for twelve hours a day or more, preparing and waiting for a phone call [from the kidnappers]*' [interviewee 6]. The main meaning of volunteerism is doing something which is unpaid, e.g, those who are willingly offering themselves and their time. However, aside from what these negotiators say, what they are doing is part of their job, and since they have attended the negotiators' training, they have gained an extra skill, which also possibly means a slightly higher salary.

Both formal and informal transfer of knowledge is part of every job, and especially when it comes to policing, sharing what one knows has a vital role. With a tone of feigning naivety in my voice, I asked those negotiators who are also trainers, why would they agree to transfer their knowledge without any apparent benefit from doing it, and offer to train someone if they, and their team, are not paid to do it. Interestingly, when asked this question no one seemed to be able to give an explanation apart from the fact that sharing their knowledge makes them feel very proud of what they do and who they are. To me, this does not mean that the interviewees were withholding information, but rather that they

were doing something without knowing the reason behind it, as well as the importance of transferring the skills they have gained through their experience. For them the belief that they are the best seemed to be more than plausible. The former police negotiator and trainer was more open to mentioning the issue of unsupported pride inside the team of negotiators, and in our interview he talked about a case where he actually witnessed a team from another nation being better than the Greek team:

> *We had organised something like a workshop between teams from the Balkan countries and Cyprus. We didn't train them but we exchanged practices and ways of doing things [in relation to hostage takings]. It lasted for four days. We were practicing with cases of bus and plane hijackings. I was very surprised with the team of Serbs; they were very organised, the team was amazing and they were trained by the FBI. I am glad we were reserved these four days, we weren't bragging about how great we [the Greek team] are, or pretending we know everything. I was jealous of them [the team from Serbia]. Luckily we understood from the beginning how good they are so we didn't make fool of ourselves by bragging about our success.* [interviewee 14]

5.3.3 The Case of Cyprus

The issue of pride was obvious across all the counter-kidnap police departments in Greece, Cyprus and the UK. Pride was something reinforced through the alleged success, but also through their differentiation from the other police teams or the other police officers, which is something that was also obvious in the case of the Greek negotiators. Negotiators work in an office environment, and some of them even have their own offices. All of the main

negotiators in the capital cities of both Greece and Cyprus occupy a specific part of a building, in order for the whole group to be together, making it easier to cooperate during hostage cases. In addition to that, all the negotiators do not wear the formal police uniforms of the nation. As I have mentioned in the literature review chapter, De Camargo (2012) referred to the police uniform as the 'most powerful tool of the police trade' (1), which is very iconic. Clothing is a way of expressing one's authority, status and occupation and in the same way the police uniform produces particular stereotypes. Blumberg and Neiderhoffer (1985) also cite the fact that when a police officer wears their uniform, they are automatically entered in a subculture which has its rules and norms.

From my research with the Cypriot and the Greek police negotiators I have understood that there are many different sub-cultures within the police, and although there has been some research around the uniformed police, the non-uniformed police did not receive the same amount of attention. De Camargo (2012) in her research found that police officers 'whilst wearing their uniform, have a '"celebrity" status' (1). Nevertheless, in my research I have seen that in a work environment where wearing a uniform is the norm, not wearing one is seen as quite important, and actually those who are not wearing a uniform are the ones seen as having a

'celebrity' status. As mentioned before, the uniform produces particular stereotypes which do not fit the profile of a negotiator. In Greece police negotiators wear plain clothes of their choice without any individualising feature or a number. In the case of Cyprus all the negotiators need to wear a specifically designed t-shirt which discretely says 'negotiation team' on the one side of the sleeve, and also they all have a specific bag, so they can have their notes with them. However these uniform style clothes are not the typical police uniform.

To my understanding, the Cypriot t-shirt is to further distinguish them from the other police officers, and, as a matter of fact, on many occasions during their re-training, I heard negotiators saying that '*we [negotiators] are not like them [the other police officers]*' [interviewee 12], whilst further distinguishing themselves from the other police officers by saying: '*that's what the others [counter-terrorism team] are doing, we don't do that, we should be the good guys*' [interviewee 12]. Reiner has stated that 'the "them" and "us" outlook which is characteristic of police culture makes clear distinctions between types of "them" (as well as of "us")' (2012: 122). There are divisions inside police culture with the existence of various sub-cultures based on the organisational division of labour. The number of each police officer on the uniform is a feature contributing to recognisability and individuality, however, not having a number does not mean that there is no other

way of being recognised. From the re-training I observed in Cyprus, I heard that whenever a negotiator attends a hostage situation, whether it involves the family of a kidnapped hostage or a suicidal teenager, the first thing they say is their name: 'hello, I am x [name of negotiator] and I am here to help you', which is more personal compared to a collar number.

One can say that a uniform works as a barrier between the public and the police, police officers are depersonalised and their identity is shown through a number. However, when it comes to negotiators, showing their personality seems to be important for their work and the emotional connection with those who need their assistance. These small differences and also the fact that the negotiators say that they are not like the other police officers, because they are the '*good guys*' practically shows that there is a plethora of sub-cultures (or possibly sub-subcultures) within the police and each one has its own characteristics and norms. Perez and Moore have stated that 'there are as many different types of police subcultures as there are different types of police departments' (2013: 212)

5.4 Knowledge as Value

In theory, police are a service-based sector, they offer their knowledge and skills in order to provide services in the society.

Stabell and Fjelstad (1998), as well as Geoff Dean and Petter (2007) refer to the police as a "value shop", and by that they mean a problem-centred organisation which aims at the creation of value through solving unique problems and bringing the right results for the client, whoever this client might be. The value shop is characterised by five primary activities: problem finding/definition and information acquisition, problem solving, solution choice, solution execution and control. These five activities describe the effectiveness of the police investigative success. As Glomseth, Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther (2007) state, there is a 'cyclical nature of these five primary activities for managing the knowledge collected during and applied to a specific police investigation in a value shop manner' (98). The "value shop" is indeed designed to solve client problems by applying different methods every time, for the best solution in each case. However, this term cannot be applied to all the different activities of police. Stabell, Fjelstad, Geoff Dean and Petter are partially right, because although in some cases there can be improvisation, what they call a 'value shop' can possibly be applied in more mundane police work and not so much in kidnappings. When it comes to kidnappings, my understanding from my research is that although those responsible will go through all the five activities of the value shop, there is though a very fixed set of activities utilised to bring about the best possible solution. '*There is not a lot of free space to move, we know exactly what we*

have to do from the second someone informs us about a kidnapping incident, we do the same thing every time' [interviewee 21] said a negotiator in Greece.

During the break of a private counter-kidnap conference in London, a risk manager of an NGO working in Europe seemed to be quite baffled and stressed when other risk managers were saying that they had already created a set plan of moves in case of a kidnapping incident. By the end of the conference the risk manager of the NGO had already arranged a meeting with one of the leading crisis response companies in the UK and abroad. The aim of that meeting was to create an organisation manual with the steps and the approach the NGO is going to have in case of a kidnapping. This shows that public and private organisations seek to implement a pre-designed set of activities, and they are not interested in the aspect of the 'value shop' which addresses problems with a different approach every time. If there is a kidnapping case, my understanding is that they will attempt to address all of the five activities described in Gottschalk's (2006) value shop even though those involved into countering a kidnapping have pre-set activities.

In relation to problem finding/definition and information acquisition, when there is a problem, different people from a specific police section are involved to understand and determine the exact nature of the crime. When it comes to kidnappings, as an interviewed Greek negotiator explained:

when we look at the first signs and characteristics of a crime, we have to give a definition to the crime. By defining a kidnapping, we automatically upgrade it or downgrade it to serious, not very serious, a terrorist kidnap, an amateur kidnap, or a professional one, and this definition is going to determine our approach' [interviewee 6].

Interestingly, as we are going to look more in detail in the section which is on ignorance, a negotiator explained that for police officers, definitions are not important. However, the person organising the training-events in Greece, whilst commenting on the lack of a specialised counter-kidnapping unit, referred to the prioritisation of specific cases, such as the case of a 'serious' kidnapping, and said:

there is a bitter truth; there is no organised unit looking at kidnappings. The unit which looks at kidnappings is the Homicide department. There, they investigate homicide cases, and when there is a serious kidnapping case they will also look at it. […] When a case becomes publicised, they [the Head of the Greek police and the Minister of Interior] call the people in Homicide and ask them to look at the case and solve it, whereas for another case they might not show such interest. From the moment a serious case is solved, the feeling of safety and trust increase, police are congratulated and it is a publicity issue. [interviewee 21]

The interviewee pointed out the fact that there is an absence of a specialised police force which will be solely responsible for kidnappings in Greece. What happens instead is the dealing of kidnappings from the negotiators of the homicide department. In addition to that, from the above, we can see the first activity of the

'problem finding and acquisition' of the value shop, which is the process of determining the nature of the problem.

Those police officers who are working in kidnapping cases will never accept that there is a different approach when it comes to those kidnappings of minority groups or poorer individuals, and their double standards can be extracted from the words they use. Frequently, they might use the word 'serious' in order to refer to a kidnapping of a businessman or someone who is coming from a specific financial background or societal group. In another interview with a negotiator/trainer, he asked me if I am interested in serious kidnappings, or kidnappings of undocumented migrants and refugees, '*so what do you want to talk about? Are you interested in the serious kidnappings or the kidnappings of those coming here illegally?*' [interviewee 6]. During an interview with another negotiator who was trained by this negotiator/trainer, I commented on the fact that in the United Kingdom there are many kidnappings, he said '*do you mean between Pakis? These are not kidnappings*' [interviewee 7], and by that he revealed how certain ideas can also get transferred and disseminated along with knowledge. In addition to that, apart from the racism inside the Greek police, one can say that this will affect the problem finding/definition and information acquisition activity of the value shop.

In theory, whether a kidnaping is defined as serious or not so serious, the Senior Investigative Officer (SIO)[16], will have to form the team of specialists who will work on the case. In practice however, this is not always the case because the way they are going to define a kidnapping is going to determine how seriously they are going to look at the case, but also if they are maybe going to look at it at all. During my research I talked to many police officers in the corridors of buildings, or while I was waiting outside offices to be called inside. I also talked to some others trying to deceive me into thinking they are part of the counter-kidnap team, or those who were actually part of it, and as mentioned before, almost all of them referred to the 'one hundred percent of success'. One of the people interviewed said that there is quite a high success rate only to those kidnappings which are publicised through the media, '*yes, it is almost that high [almost a hundred percent success], but we only count those kidnappings which reach the ears of the public. And you [the public] learn about how many? One? Maybe two kidnappings [cases] a year*' [interviewee 21]. Kidnappings are seen all across the society, as well as towards people coming from the lower parts of societal structure, undocumented migrants, refugees, or drug traffickers and dealers, but no media outlets, no insurance companies, or counter-kidnapping teams seem to care. Cases like these go unnoticed and

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[16] There is not always a Senior Investigative officer. In Greece and Cyprus it is not very clear who the SIO is; in some cases is the chief negotiator and in other cases is the head of the police.

from the interviews they also seem to be unimportant or not serious enough to warrant care.

The definition given on the type of crime will set the direction of the approach, and later, the members of the specialist team will have to generate ideas which can solve the problem. In a value shop way of problem solving, it means that they need to create a specific plan of actions, which will set the tone of the negotiation and the approach to the kidnapping. Based on this approach, they also have to create the team of experts who will have a critical role on the outcome of the case. For example, based on what the negotiators have told me, if a kidnapping of a child is committed by a group of inexperienced amateurs, then it is usually advised to intervene with the counter-terrorism team and attempt to save the kidnapped child. As I have previously mentioned, when it comes to kidnappings there is a fixed set of activities, and there are not many things that can change in these practices. The only differentiation is that if there are minors involved in a kidnapping, the negotiators with the counter-terrorism team might attempt to end things as early as possible, which might be in two or three days. This can be either through paying the ransom without any negotiations, or through locating the stronghold and intervening, where they arrest those who are at the crime scene and free the hostage, however, the latter is not always possible.

In a "value shop" environment, when it comes to "solution choice", the SIO, along with the formed team, has to consider all of the alternative moves and make an informed decision based on logic. It is crucial that all the involved parties are aware of the criteria which led to a specific decision, and that this specific decision is the best possible option that can be followed. At the same time they need to keep in mind all the alternatives in case there is anything unexpected which demands a change of plan. In ransom kidnappings there are many different parties involved; the kidnapped individual, the kidnappers, the victims to whom the demand of money is made, the negotiators, the media, and the police in general. This creates the perfect environment for unforeseen circumstances. Of course logic is very important, but moves or approaches are pre-decided, and the only discussion is around whether or not the victims can pay the full amount of the asking ransom. In terms of "solution execution", the team, along with the SIO, need to have a specific goal in mind or a deadline, for instance, the return of the hostage in a couple of days, so they do everything in order to meet this deadline. A strategic execution of the plan involves perfect communication between the different parties, organisation of moves, and the implementation of decisions.

Finally, according to Gottschalk (2006), after monitoring and controlling the activities of the specialist team which is involved in

the case, there needs to be an evaluation of each individual member, while at the same time there should be a measurement of the outcome, and whether it agrees with the original goal planned. This is something which does not happen in the police after the end of a kidnapping case. From what I have seen in the re-training in Cyprus, this evaluation is partly what they do in a few sessions where they talk about a specific case which took place and then analyse what went according to plan or what went wrong. Although this is a great technique, the problem with this is that the sessions are held months after the incident, which makes it more unlikely to evaluate the actions of those involved in a case, making it difficult to assist towards their improvement.

In a way, the "value shop" approach and its five activities show the general investigative process every time there is a crime. First there is the assessment of the crime scene, where evidence is gathered, and other potential sources of evidence or information are identified. By investigating the crime scene and gathering information, it is attempted to create a hypothesis. With this hypothesis in mind, the SIO will develop a feasible line of moves, and prioritise actions while at the same time they will have to test various scenarios and their outcomes. What happens in kidnappings is a slightly altered approach where there is no need to have some activities, and there is a very specific pattern followed every time there is a kidnapping, '*we know what we have to do, so we will go*

straight to business and do it' said a negotiator in Greece [interviewee 7]. The problem with that is that so far, most of the kidnappings for ransom within a nation, whether that is Greece, or Cyprus, are of a similar, although not identical, nature. However, every time some of the variables change, there is chaos, simply because a fixed system of activities are implemented in every single case of kidnapping. This is particularly relevant in the case of the Greek police negotiators who, although follow almost all of the five activities of a value shop, usually have the same approach to all of the kidnappings, if of course they are, according to my interviewees, 'serious' kidnappings. Following the same techniques and approach means that if and when there is going to be a kidnap case that is different from the past cases, this is going to cause a mess and potentially the outcome is not going to be the desired one[17]. The counter-kidnap units are quite special in terms of policing culture. High policing agencies are increasingly involved in low policing and vice versa. Generally speaking, although kidnappings are not a high-policing matter, they are treated as one and even though in high policing intelligence is collected to create a plan of action that is unique, in kidnappings things are more mundane. Of course every case is different, but those involved in

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[17] I am currently (19.09.2017) reviewing the thesis before its submission and I would like to note that the past few months there has been a kidnapping going on in Greece which although has some similar characteristics with past kidnappings, there is an unrest. This is due to the fact that this kidnapping took place on a Greek island and is, at the moment, the longest kidnapping lasting for five months.

countering kidnaps tend to follow a specific set of activities rather than adapting their practices on every case. This seems to be the chosen approach for all those agencies involved whether they are an intelligence agency, a police unit or risk advisors from NGOs and private firms.

5.5 Knowledge as Power and the Secrecy Around it

Knowledge equals power, and those who have it are aware of its powerful qualities. Knowledge is a great driver for any kind of status rise, political leverage, personal gain, and exchange of services. When it comes to knowledge transfer, people usually know more than they can explain or transfer to others, but also in most organisations, having knowledge on something specific is a competitive advantage in the marketplace and can be exchanged for a high value return. This means that those who have specialised knowledge tend to protect it and prevent its exploitation, while at the same time they use it as a bargaining chip (Wood, Shearing, 2007: 110), both inside and outside an organisation. This shows that knowledge has a symbolic meaning. Knowledge as cultural capital is a symbolic good which is used for social mobility and as a way, for those who have it, to achieve a higher social and occupational status.

Especially when it comes to the Greek and Cypriot police, having specialised knowledge on something can prevent you from

being shared to other departments or in some rare cases to police stations in another city or town. There has to be something in it for someone to decide to share their knowledge, and they need to receive something in exchange, otherwise they will simply refuse to do it. Researchers in the past have said that police work involves the accumulation, analysis and transfer of knowledge, and that police are knowledge workers (Ericson, Haggerty, 1997). Similar to that, Reiner (2010) states that 'the police have become knowledge workers whose main function is to broker information about risks to the public and private organisations concerned with the regulation and governance of people and territories' (2010: 146).

Policing does involve the handling of knowledge and information which makes police personnel be knowledge workers. However, thus far I have used my gathered data in order to demonstrate that although police are knowledge workers, they engage in a complex type of knowledge work. All those who have written about police are partially right because, although there is knowledge involved, there are some particular details which make these processes more complicated than an outsider can understand. What I have seen from my research is that the police, just like other organisations, is a knowledge market where knowledge is bought and sold in return for other valuable things. These things can be intelligence and information, it can be other knowledge, a higher salary, respect, or a promotion. The symbolic meaning of

knowledge means that it has currency and value in terms of money, status and mobility among other things. There is an existing pricing system and the knowledge 'consumer' needs to state what they are willing to pay. In most cases, those seeking to buy knowledge are trying to solve a complex issue which requires specific knowledge for its resolution, and they are willing to pay for it. Usually for specialised knowledge they will approach the source of that knowledge, and those who have the reputation of being good at something, and a good example of that is what the NCA does.

Many might think that when it comes to knowledge transfer, police are different from other organisations because the exchange/transfer is based on altruism, their shared passion for a specific subject, and their fulfilment through sharing whatever they know. Altruism means genuine concern for the transfer of anything that is perceived as important, which is something that does not happen in the police units I have looked at. Mentoring can be a form of altruistic long-term knowledge transfer, however, the sharing of counter-kidnapping knowledge is more like a one-off event, without any follow up sessions, re-trainings or any close observation of how knowledge-receivers apply the knowledge they have received. At the transnational level, counter-kidnap knowledge brokers are apparently holding back some of the things they know. Knowledge of a specific practice appears to be a tactic and a tool of maintaining a visible counter-crime team and its reputation to the

neighbouring countries. It is also taking place because the "compensation" will be a way of receiving information which otherwise might have been difficult, if not impossible, to be acquired. In a sense, holding back information is going to maintain a nation's monopoly of knowledge in the counter-kidnap market; the United Kingdom can be the knowledge broker of America, parts of Europe and Africa, while Greece was aimed to be the knowledge-broker of the Balkan countries, as well as Cyprus. This was the original plan for Greece where, after the training provided by the FBI, the trainer advised the chief Greek negotiator to be responsible for the trainings of South-eastern Europe and the Middle east; the former negotiator of the Greek police talked about the conversation he had with one of the trainers of the FBI and said:

> *The last day x [name of FBI trainer] called me and said he won't have to come back, we are ready to create a school where we could train countries in the South-east of European and the Middle-east. The result is that we never did this school, although I have repeatedly suggested it to the Greek police.'* [interviewee 14].

In relation to the transfer of knowledge inside a nation, it is expected that experienced officers transfer their knowledge to the inexperienced ones, but in reality things do not work exactly this way. There seems to be a 'resistance' to share the known information. For knowledge or information transfer, there needs to be a high level of willingness, from both the side of the receiver and the transmitter, to co-operate and work with each other. Sheptycki

has argued that in many cases, police intelligence is only transferred on a "need to know basis" because of its sensitive nature (Sheptycki 2002:120). As I have seen from my research the same rule applies to the counter-kidnap knowledge only in this case it appears to be even harder for knowledge and expertise to move around. When transferring knowledge or information intranationally, there is a high chance of not transferring every aspect one knows, in order to maintain one's position in the specific team, and the specific department, in the city one is already in. Apart from that, maintaining part of one's knowledge equals power because it can help them enter into their desired position and maintain it. In the case of the former police negotiator and trainer, during our interview he explained that because of his views on certain things he was forced to retire earlier. He also referred to the fact that he was disseminating his knowledge without any hesitation which might have had an impact on his early retirement, but he did not want to provide more information on that, he only said:

> *I was saying some hard truths, pointing out things that they did not want me to, so they retired me. […] Yes maybe if I was smart enough I wouldn't have been in that situation, not everyone is like me [he possibly means police officers are not sharing everything they know]. They didn't need me any more so they got me retired. I was very angry for the first couple of years. Now I see it as an opportunity to do other things.* [interviewee 14]

Glomseth, Gottschalk and Solli-Sæther state in their research that in order to deal with the crime-related problems of the modern

world there needs to be cooperation, because complex types of crimes 'cannot be solved by the lone Sherlock Holmes. Traditional homicide could' (2007: 105). Interestingly, from my research and the people I interviewed, it became clear that when it comes to kidnapping negotiators, cooperation was almost absent. Reiner states that very often police are isolated by society, but despite that 'there are many conflicts *inside* the police organization. Some are structured by the rank hierarchy and the force division of labour, say between uniform and detective brunches' (2012: 122).

In relation to kidnappings, not only will the knowledge holder not offer help when an emergency appears, but they might also put obstacles in the way of their former trainees. For example, when there was the kidnapping of the Cypriot citizen in Greece, as I explained in the previous chapter, the mother of the young man, along with two Cypriot negotiators, travelled from Cyprus to Greece in order to pay the ransom. The Cypriot negotiators asked for police undercover protection from the airport to the police headquarters in Greece, but the Greek police refused to do it. The reply of the Greek counter-kidnap team to the chief negotiator of Cyprus was '*you've been working in the counter-terrorism team for fifteen years and you need protection?* '[interviewee 12]. The Greek team of negotiators declined to provide coverage and security while they also showed an antagonistic attitude towards a group of people who have been trained by them in the past. Police occupational culture

can also get in the way and affect the outcome of a kidnapping. The retired negotiator from Greece about the problems around his work, he referred to the fact that sometimes those who are higher up in the police hierarchy are not willing to listen to what other police officers, and more specifically the negotiators, have to say:

> *When you are a negotiator, sometimes you have to go against your superiors' views; you have to say what you think. Those high-ranking officers don't want to hear anything else but their own voices. If you are a careerist and you want to go higher up [in the police hierarchy] you won't spend time to think about the negotiations of a kidnapping.* [interviewee 14]

What the negotiator is trying to say here is that in many cases the decisions are taken by people who are higher up in the police hierarchy, even though those who are working on a case have a different view. When there is a kidnapping it is important for the various teams to cooperate and share information, but it seems that those working on kidnappings are not part of a team-oriented subculture. The retired police negotiator revealed that throughout his time as a kidnapping negotiator, this cooperation never actually existed, and some people inside the police did not want to use his experience and skills when there were kidnappings in Greece. In our interview he said:

> *I was the chief negotiator in many big cases. In these cases I didn't take part simply because police asked me to do it since I was the most experienced. No. I took part because I went and I told them "you need me, I am here, you have to use me, I am available". They [possibly he*

means the high-ranking police officers] didn't even know I existed. They didn't know what I could offer. They didn't want to use me to kidnapping cases. They used to put people who weren't able to deal with the kidnapping cases. There were many things that I had to face and the system never worked properly. Those doing the preliminary inquiry have to give information to negotiators, so that they [the negotiators] could work. This cooperation never existed, and for reasons of self-protection we never pushed for this [to happen]. [...] Self-protection because they [those doing the preliminary inquiry] might tell us something, and then some of them could leak it in the media so we would be charged with the leak. [interviewee 14]

Police are reluctant to share information and their knowledge because it is a powerful commodity. Only when no one else has it and by remaining silent or by a partial transfer of their knowledge, they will flourish as being the main knowledge holders. When it comes to high security policing and knowledge transfer, secrecy can be quite exaggerated. In general, there is a certain level of secrecy in policing and this secrecy increases as we move from visible policing to the less visible one where police officers are not dressed with uniforms and they are trying to maintain a low profile because they do not want to be targeted, which is the case for the counter-kidnap team. However, when it comes to the transfer of knowledge which is related to the counter-kidnapping practices, this secrecy is exaggerated and in a sense it is also hypocritical. Excuses like 'high-security information' or 'confidential knowledge' were often used during my interviews with counter-kidnapping practitioners, but these seem to be yet another mechanism put in place to reveal

information only to very specific people. The English trainer of the counter-kidnap unit agreed on that; '*I think we generally overdo the secrecy thing. Some of our tactics obviously if you don't keep them secret, people will defeat them, but there is a whole culture of secrecy around kidnappings*' [interviewee 15]. He continued by giving another example of why people sustain this secrecy in the UK law enforcement:

> *it is because people don't have a lot of experience […] people don't want to expose themselves to having not done a very good job. […] Very few jobs are de-briefed and then write down the learning. To my knowledge there has never ever been an independent review of someone with experience in investigating kidnap, reviewing the job of another senior investigator in kidnap. […] In homicides, another investigator will come and check what you've done in this case and review whether you've done the right thing, or whether you've missed opportunities when a case concludes. [… In the case of homicides] everyone in the UK learns the best practice and the things not to do. That is not replicated in kidnap […] people are much more reluctant to share that info with you, a lot of people feel vulnerable about sharing that information.* [interviewee 15]

What is clear from what the English trainer said is that by revealing information related to kidnaps, the vulnerability of those working in this field is increasing, either because they do not have the monopoly on that specific knowledge anymore, or because they will be open to criticism, either from inside the police unit, or from outsiders, and especially criticism coming from within academia. '*People will not talk to you Eleana, they are afraid of you, and I don't mean as a person because they don't know you, but because*

of your links to an academic institution' [interviewee 21], argued the person who is organising all the trainings in Greece.

I gained access to the Cypriot training of negotiators by offering to give a presentation on kidnappings as an exchange. However, the content of this presentation was controlled by the organiser of the training. When they called me to inform me about their approval of my attendance at the training, the organiser asked me specifically to prepare a non-academic presentation, saying '*we won't like it if it's academic*' [interviewee 12]. In addition to that, he gave me a list of things I must not talk about which included definitions, what happens in other countries in terms of kidnappings, and how the police should respond to a kidnap. Two weeks before the training he called me again to remind me that I should not refer to anything about the negotiation processes or what police are doing wrong. Instead his suggestion was to talk about violent kidnap for ransom cases in Greece because '*they [the negotiators] will really like that*' [interviewee 12], as well as '*use the real names of the hostages and have their pictures to make it more realistic*' [interviewee 12]. These superficial suggestions and their attempt to control what I am going to say and how I am going to present the police in general illustrates that there is censorship because of their fear of being criticised.

In addition to the above, although initially the idea was for me to open the one-week long re-training of the Greek negotiators team which took place in Athens (May 2015) and talk about the importance of transferring information, and if we can transfer knowledge, the plan changed when the head of the Greek police rejected my application to participate in the re-training. The reason for that rejection was because members of the public (non-police officers), are not even allowed to observe high security training, let alone have a session on it. In the answer that I received, via fax (page 215), the head of the Greek police states: '*in response to your request for your participation or observation of the training, we inform you that according to the existing legal frame governing the operation of the Hellenic Police, the observation of trainings, or even re-trainings, is not envisaged or allowed by individuals outside the Hellenic Police*'.

A very small group of negotiators were allowed to attend this training, and from what one of the participants told me a couple of months later, '*a female police officer asked to observe the training, but they didn't let her do it, so I can imagine that it was impossible to let you inside*' [interviewee 21]. The police seem to be unresponsive to the willingness of academics to help, and there is absence of any linear exchange of knowledge or possibilities for collaborations aiming for a better outcome. It seems that academic research and counter-kidnapping policing are fundamentally

disconnected. Holdaway (1983) has put some occupations in a group which he called 'challengers' (71) because they are allowed to challenge the work of police. Reiner (2012) later explained that these people whose jobs allow them to penetrate the police secrecy of their culture and can potentially challenge police are 'doctors, lawyers, journalists, and social workers […] (as are police researchers). Efforts will be made to minimize their intrusion, and presentational skills used to colour what they see' (124). Contrary to what is currently happening, I argue that there should be a broader development of knowledge based on the mutual sharing of practices and techniques. In order to facilitate that, there needs to be a combination of researchers and practitioners, so as to have a mutually beneficial outcome.

Fax from Greek Police

ΚΑΤΕΠΕΙΓΟΝ

ΕΛΛΗΝΙΚΗ ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ
ΥΠΟΥΡΓΕΙΟ ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΟΙΚΗΤΙΚΗΣ
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ΚΛΑΔΟΣ ΔΙΟΙΚΗΤΙΚΗΣ ΥΠΟΣΤΗΡΙΞΗΣ ΚΑΙ
ΑΝΘΡΩΠΙΝΟΥ ΔΥΝΑΜΙΚΟΥ
ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΣΗ ΕΚΠΑΙΔΕΥΣΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΑΠΤΥΞΗΣ
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ΤΜΗΜΑ ΜΕΤ ΕΚΠΑΙΔΕΥΣΕΩΝ ΚΑΙ ΔΙΕΘΝΩΝ
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ΑΡΙΘ. ΠΡΩΤ.: 1728 15/2721/2

ΑΘΗΝΑ , 27/04/2015
Ηλεκτρονική διακίνηση για τους αποδέκτες που
είναι συνδεδεμένοι στο δίκτυο POL.

ΠΡΟΣ: ΒΛΕΠΕ ΠΙΝΑΚΑ ΑΠΟΔΕΚΤΩΝ

Γ.Φ. Ε.Φ. Θεματολογίου: 6512/25

ΘΕΜΑ : «Προχωρημένη εκπαίδευση Ομάδας Διαπραγματευτών Ελληνικής Αστυνομίας».

ΣΧΕΤ :   Το από 22/04/2015 αίτημα της κ. ΝΙΚΗΦΟΡΙΔΟΥ Ελεάνας με τις επ'
αυτού 12378 από 22/04/2015 Επισημειωματική Διαταγή κ. Αρχηγού ΕΛ.
ΑΣ., 6591-α από 24/04/2015 ομοία κ. Προϊσταμένου Επιτελείου/Α.Ε.Α. και
847 από 24/04/2015 ομοία κ. Προϊσταμένου Κλάδου Διοικητικής
Υποστήριξης & Ανθρώπινου Δυναμικού/Α.Ε.Α., αντίστοιχα.

1. Σε απάντηση του ανωτέρω αιτήματος σας, για τη συμμετοχή σας ως
παρατηρήτρια - ακροάτρια στην αναφερόμενη στο θέμα εκπαίδευση, σας γνωρίζουμε
ότι σύμφωνα με το ισχύον νομικό πλαίσιο που διέπει τη λειτουργία της Ελληνικής
Αστυνομίας, δεν προβλέπεται η δυνατότητα παρακολούθησης των ιδιωτών, έστω και
ως παρατηρητές, σε εκπαιδεύσεις ή μετεκπαιδεύσεις του προσωπικού της Ελληνικής
Αστυνομίας.

2. Τα Γραφεία κ. Αρχηγού ΕΛ. ΑΣ., κ. Προϊσταμένου Επιτελείου/Α.Ε.Α. και κ.
Προϊσταμένου Κλάδου Διοικητικής Υποστήριξης και Ανθρώπινου Δυναμικού/Α.Ε.Α.
που κοινοποιείται το παρόν (υ.τ.α.), παρακαλούνται για την ενημέρωση τους.

Ο ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΤΗΣ
ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ
ΘΕΟΔΩΡΑΚΟΠΟΥΛΟΣ
ΑΣΤΥΝΟΜΙΚΟΣ ΔΙΕΥΘΥΝΤΗΣ

ΠΡΟΣ

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5.6 Ignorance

Although it can be said that the police are working with knowledge on a daily basis, I can argue that when it comes to police officers working in kidnappings, we should not simply talk about non knowledge, but about strategic ignorance. In relation to the Greek counter-kidnapping team, there is a strategic institutional ignorance of definitions. This ignorance was apparent in various cases where there seem to be a confusion of criminal activities such as trafficking, smuggling, abduction/hostage taking, and ransom kidnapping. Of course, having one criminal activity does not exclude another one, and there are cases where, for instance, smuggling has escalated into ransom kidnapping, spanning into multiple jurisdictions. However, the interviewed police officers had a very limited knowledge on the definitional differences, often ending up talking about trafficking instead of ransom kidnappings. Their dictionary knowledge should provide labels and definitions of different types of crimes, but in reality their criminological dictionary appears to be very limited, if not absent. At the same time there is a deliberate indifference towards understanding the differences between each definition.

During an interview with a Greek negotiator, when I commented on the fact that there are definitional ambiguities not only between different countries, but also between police officers inside the same country, the answer of the negotiator was:

To us definitions are not relevant, this is for academics. Kidnap is both taking you as a hostage, and transferring you to another place without your will. The point is that they take someone and they ask for money. We should make things simpler, one can call it kidnapping, the other can call it hostage taking or abduction or give it a different label. These are word games; we [police] are interested in the essence of things. When we [Greek police officers] talk about a kidnapping, we talk about ransom kidnapping. [interviewee 9]

What this negotiator in a way argues is that, contrary to police officers, academics are not interested in the serious points, whereas they tend to pay unimportant attention to small details, such as the labels of criminal offences and the types of crimes. However, at this point it should be remembered that, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the label they are going to put on a kidnapping case will determine whether it is serious or not, thus whether they will pay the necessary attention or not.

For police, researchers are focusing on issues that practitioners have little interest in, while for researchers, practitioners and the police need to have a clear understanding of definitions or how things should work, in order to achieve their highest potential. These institutional ambiguities are due to the ignorance of its members which is something that is also underlined by the comments of a negotiator in Greece. He said that in the United Kingdom there are no kidnappings because they last for very few days '*these aren't kidnappings, they last for two days only' [interviewee 7]*, at which point I commented that they are

kidnappings, they just happen to be short, and he continued by saying that when the English trainers, during the re-training of the Greek negotiators, referred to a kidnapping which lasted for three days, '*those of us who knew, laughed. That isn't a kidnapping*. It's too short' [interviewee 7]. The same person at some point of the interview told me that at that point they were looking at a kidnapping of a doctor, and when I asked if he could tell me more about the case he replied: '*you won't hear about that in the news. Some burglars entered his house, but he returned while they were still there, so they took all of his valuable things and they also kidnapped the doctor. We found him dead two days after*' [interviewee 7]. In that case the negotiator used the term 'kidnapping' to refer to a case where, although the person was moved, so there was a change of the location, there was no demand made for money or anything else. It was just a burglary going wrong, and not a kidnapping.

The UNODC manual is dated and does not include a quite prevalent type of kidnapping called "tiger", but one can read inside that there are many different kidnap types, and only some of them can be related to ransom money. Viewing kidnappings as a predominantly ransom-related crime appears wrong, hence I would argue that there needs to be a descriptive word specifying the type of kidnap (ransom, political demands, family disputes, fraud, etc.). From the definitional understanding of police officers, we can see

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that what one thinks as apparent "common knowledge", for someone else might be not so common.

In addition to the above, the quotes show the strategic decision of the police to ignore certain facts. An ignorant person is someone who does not know, someone who is not informed and chooses to remain this way. By strategic ignorance, it is implied that there is a decision not to be informed, and not to receive any knowledge as an input. This decision indicates that an individual is aware of the fact that there is useful information out there, or even worse, has decided not to acknowledge the fact that there is information available. There is a distinction between those things we are aware that we do not know and those things that we are not aware that we do not know. In a sense, knowledge and ignorance are different aspects of the same coin because one is about the things one knows, and the other one is about the things one knows that exist but chooses not to pay attention to and has no interest in finding out. They seek to preserve their ignorance and as long as they maintain "good", for their institutional standards, they want to remain ignorant. Ignorance helps to guard towards criticism and is 'useful to those seeking to conceal information while appearing transparent' (McGoey, 2012: 4), which is connecting both the secrecy around anything related to kidnappings and the ignorance inside the specific police sub-culture.

In this chapter I have discussed the different things that can prevent the sharing of knowledge or make it difficult. However, at this point it is crucial to talk about the choice to not implement what has been transferred. Supposedly, everything is working perfectly and all the conditions are ideal; the transfer of knowledge is done with no linguistic barriers, everyone has similar capacities to absorb what is being transferred, no one is holding back information and the training involves practice as well as theory, yet this does not mean that the receipted knowledge will be implemented. What is inside the transnational and intranational trainings has been created at the local level. For instance, the UNODC has produced a document which includes global practices, but it has been created locally, in the United Kingdom, based on kidnappings which mainly took place in Manchester, Birmingham and London. Connecting this idea to the literature review chapter, Massey (1994) supported that global actions can take place locally, which resembles the produced manuals and the global knowledge disseminated by NCA, in order to be applied in different locations. When it comes to the application of what has been learned, practitioners in Greece and Cyprus to a big extent ignore the content of the trainings (or from manuals).

Knowledge is shaped locally, then in some cases it can become part of global trainings in order to be transferred to a local context and either get accepted or rejected. It seems that

practitioners are rejecting that knowledge coming from abroad, but according to Massey, a place is a mixture of identities and everything is interconnected. There is a constellation of relations, people, social interactions, movements, communication and networks which are being interwoven in one particular place. A place and its practices are transformed at the local level by various international influences. In reality global ideas are not opposed to local ones and globalisation does not mean homogenisation (Dator, Pratt, Seo, 2006: 176; Benyon, Dunkerley, 2000: 25). Each place, culture, practices and knowledge are created as a result of blending global and local social reactions, and this hybrid mix is what some call "glocality" (Hufnagel, Harfield, Bronitt, 2012; Hobbs and Dunnighan, 1998 in Ruggeiero, South and Taylor). The locale is important, and the fact that practitioners have chosen not to consider the things transferred as important might be the result of pride and ignorance, or all those things transferred can unconsciously affect them to some level. Nevertheless, when it comes to counter-kidnapping, the local appears to be more powerful than the global.

The former police negotiator and chief trainer of the Greek police, when asked about the application of the received knowledge gave inconsistent answers. When I asked him if, after his trainings by the FBI and the NCA, he had followed exactly what the trainings suggested, he first commented by saying that he tried to apply

everything he could, but later in our conversation he gave a different answer:

> I tried to [to apply the shared global methods and knowledge]. Once, after the end of a training, x [the name of the trainer] approached me and told me to apply everything I have learned to the Greek reality and use it. I told him that we [humans] are all the same. I said: 'let me ask you something? You have been all around the world. Have you ever seen anyone crying when happy and laughing when sad?' He replied: 'No'. Humans are all the same everywhere. […] Albanians are very dangerous, the same is for Bulgarians. It is so easy for them to cut a couple of fingers and send them to the families of their hostages […] I will be honest with you, so, we do one thing [in a specific way], and after the trainings we carry on doing it [in the same way]. Old shoes are comfortable. [interviewee 14]

The honesty -and disparity in his words- of the former negotiator and trainer shows that global practices might be created locally, but once removed and transferred to another locale they can lose their power, and the local way of doing things is preferred. This means that Newburn's (2002) belief that the nation-state is steadily becoming more and more insignificant and its ways of dealing with crimes are shaped by 'Atlantic crossings' is not applicable when it comes to the counter-kidnap field. Police are often seen as being future oriented. Bayley and Bittner (1984) have stated that 'not only do police want to restore order, they want to lower the likelihood that future disorder, particularly crime, will occur. Though they tend to deny it, police officers are future oriented' (41).

My research demonstrates disagreement with this statement, and without feeling the need to make any generalisations, I have

seen that the police have a reactive approach to kidnappings. When there is a kidnapping they will respond to it, possibly and hopefully as best they can, but they are not prepared to respond to such an ever-changing type of crime. There is a neophobic attitude and a resistance to change inside the counter-kidnap teams. The dynamic nature of crime demands new approaches, new knowledge, new information, new skills and constant fluidity. Old shoes, as my interviewee said, might be comfortable but once they are old they stop being practical or function the way shoes are supposed to. There have been a few occasions where the Greek counter-kidnap team has been under duress because the kidnap cases they had to deal with where 'too unique' [interviewee 6]. One of these cases is the kidnap of a man who had his fingers cut and posted to his wife in order to make faster arrangements for the ransom asked. A week later after that case I re-interviewed some of my Greek interviewees [Interviewee 6, Interviewee 7] and they both said how unexpected that case was, and how unprepared they were to deal with such a kidnap. However, I said that this is a common practice in many countries in Latin America and asked them if they feel there is a need for practitioners to know the practices in other nations, but they both declined. Their response shows the fear of anything new, of change itself, and also illustrates that there is a common reactive approach. They seem to believe that once something happens they will then try to deal with it, but there is no

need to prepare in advance. This response resembles the Cypriot negotiator's belief that kidnaps will not happen on an island, but if they do happen, then they will see how they are going to respond.

5.7 Sub-culture

The specific occupational culture appears to have differences from what we would call 'police culture' or generalist and low policing. The sub-culture of those involved in countering kidnappings has interesting characteristics and the two police counter-kidnap units, in Greece and Cyprus are sharing these characteristics. Although I do not intend to make grand statements, this shows that other units across territories might do the same. Some of these characteristics also appear to be visible in the NCA kidnap and extortion specialist unit. All types of policing involve certain amount of secrecy, and particularly in high policing there is the retention of information until it can be used efficiently. However, in kidnappings it is noticeable that there are double standards, with media-leaks during kidnap investigations, but when it comes to the counter-kidnap knowledge there is secrecy and suspicion. Those involved in kidnaps say that their involvement is voluntary, but such a philanthropic attitude is unfounded, leading us to believe that its purpose is to further add to the image and prestige of the police negotiators. Through these trainings apart from maintaining the

status of those involved in kidnaps, units also manage to sustain their visibility and possibly their funding as well.

Knowledge is something personal that is kept to be used in the future for private gain. High policing involves intelligence gathering in order to shape the response according to the problem faced. In kidnappings, although there might be some intelligence gathering (the extend depends on the nation conducting the research), there are certain steps which are always followed, hence there is no space for improvisation, or problem-related solution. In the particular police sub-culture there is an attention to the spectacle, but everything, including the knowledge transfer events, takes place for the preservation of the status of those involved. The counter-kidnap units are treated as high policing and the police negotiators are seen as elites inside the general occupational culture of police. As Manning (1978) has noticed, police do not have one common culture, they are both culturally and structurally diverse. By undergoing trainings and participating in kidnap cases they create a 'we' which becomes part of their distinct identity inside the police. The reality might be slightly more complicated than how Brodeur (2008), O'Reilly and Ellison (2006) explained it. There are indeed complex networks with high policing agencies dealing low policing threats and crimes (and of course the opposite as well), but in the case of the counter-kidnap units, they are

perceived as high policing entities but they do not have all the elements appearing in typical high policing.

5.8 Summary

In this chapter I criticised those trainings which take place inside a nation, and I presented a different police subculture. The occupational culture of the police and the sub-culture of the kidnapping negotiators can work as a barrier when it comes to the transferring of knowledge. Training events and re-trainings inside a nation are not taken seriously, the reaction is superficial and they are organised just to tick some boxes. As it was explained by some members of the Cypriot negotiators team, this superficiality is because they believe it is unlikely that any serious type of crime, such as a kidnap, will ever happen on an island. This is also the reason why the closest training most nations receive in relation to kidnappings is on hostage-takings. In the case of Greece, they are more interested in training other nationals rather than training their own team of negotiators. As I have attempted to explain in this chapter, this lack of training, among other reasons, is also problematic because these negotiators have spent a maximum of five days of training developing their skills, although their training in the police academy lasted for at least four years. Dealing with a kidnapping is fundamentally different from dealing with street crime

or mundane police work; it demands the implementation of different skills and techniques.

Another negative aspect of the sub-culture to which police negotiators belong, is their apparently unjustified pride and their sense of superiority over others. There appears to be a mentality that each team is the best compared to others, and the fact that they are not wearing a police uniform (or a typical police uniform in the case of Cyprus) is adding to their feeling of differentiation. All the teams (from the three different countries I have looked at) appear to have some flaws, but this pride works as a barrier towards improvement. Being conceited and not realising that work for further improvement needs to be done can only create arrogance and keep them stuck in time.

In this chapter I also discussed the value of knowledge and the "value shop's" five activities which can lead to investigative success. Although these activities are followed, there are some flaws in the process; for example, in a police investigation in a value shop the solution is unique because each case is distinctive. However, in kidnappings they always follow the same techniques, even though there is a lot of diversity amongst them. Businesses and organisations are interested in this pre-designed set of steps and contingency plans which are to be followed in case of an emergency. After the talk about the value of knowledge, I continued by discussing the power of knowledge. Knowledge equals

power, which means that the people who are, in principle, placed in a position which aims at disseminating that knowledge, very often decide to hold it back. The knowledge that someone has can be used as a bargaining chip to receive something in exchange, to remain in their position or go even higher because of being the only one who is perceived as an expert in a specific field. The transfer is not based on altruism, and the more monopolised knowledge is, the better for those who have it, whether it is an individual or a team such as the team of NCA.

From my research I have also seen that there is a lack of cooperation, which was obvious in the case of the Cypriot negotiators who rejected the provision of protection while carrying the millions of ransom money from the airport to central Athens. Not only there is an absence of cooperation, but there is a competitive attitude between the police negotiators inside the team. This means that doing the job properly by placing the right person in the right position, for an appropriate work, is side lined due to expediencies. In a sense there is a lack of cooperation between academics and police officers. The secrecy around anything connected to counter-kidnapping practices and trainings might be due to their fear of being criticised. Interviewees were secretive towards me as well, which is potentially the result of my connections to an academic institution, and my capacity as a researcher. This secrecy towards me shows the schism between

police practitioners and researchers. The final section of this chapter focused on the preferred inclination of the police negotiators towards ignorance. They seem content with the things they know and the way they have been doing things, aside from their failures and problematic approaches. This strategic ignorance can be viewed as an unwillingness to make any effort towards personal and occupational improvement.

Chapter 6: The limits of the state and the limits of knowledge

6.1 Introduction

The previous three chapters of this thesis have focused on the way the counter-kidnap knowledge is being moved and transferred inside or outside a nation, followed by two chapters on what hinders the transfer and application of that knowledge. This chapter is going to analyse two main aspects around kidnappings. Through the arguments presented in this thesis so far, a question arises. After presenting and explaining why the counter-kidnap knowledge is either not properly transferred or if it is transferred then it is not always applied, naturally one might ask why organisations still try to do it. As I am trying to explain in the first half of this chapter, there is a variety of reasons behind this superficial, and maybe of a questionable usefulness, attempt to transfer knowledge. These reasons are connected to the police occupational culture.

Nations need to have a common understanding of the crime, and through these training exercises it is created the illusion that they achieve this common ground. In addition to that, there is possibly an exchange of services between nations. One nation for example can provide a training-event on kidnappings, and those receiving it can either provide a knowledge-transfer event on something else as an exchange or give intelligence information. Although trainings are not free, they possibly create a collaborative

environment and a line of communication between nations and police teams. As discussed below, another reason why the counter-kidnap knowledge is still being transferred though without any success, might be because the trainings are a way of improving work conditions and asking for further equipment. Finally, there might be an attempt to transfer and receive knowledge because it can enhance the position and the status of those involved in the process.

These knowledge-transfer difficulties which are related to the police sub-culture of those involved in kidnappings, are creating a sense of inability of nations to provide kidnap-related security and protection to their citizens. This has created a space for private companies to come in and do it on behalf of nations. At the same time the knowledge is not being transferred for free which makes nations unable to pay for the training fee making it even harder for knowledge to move around. These private companies are capitalising on fear and as I am going to explain knowledge is codified and distributed in a non-individualised way.

6.2 The Persistence of Practice

It is difficult to know for sure why knowledge transfer still takes place the way it is described in this thesis, with its issues and sticky aspects. I will now discuss three reasons I believe play a role in this

persistence of practice. These three reasons are connected with the police politics and the way kidnaps are used to enhance and assist in various other fields.

6.2.1 The illusion of common ground

During an interview I asked a member of the Greek counter-kidnap team whether it is important for police teams of neighbouring countries to share a common level of knowledge in relation to counter-kidnapping and have similar techniques, he took some time to think and replied: '*I have never thought of that before. I don't know why we should deal with things in the same way. I don't know. I don't understand why something like that can be important*' [interviewee 7]. This negotiator has also participated and presented in a collective training with representatives from other nations, and although he rejected the importance of equally trained and crime-aware nations, his reply can show the superficiality of these collaborations. On a similar note, every time I asked about the reasons behind the collaborative training-events, people would respond by saying the previously mentioned phrase '*we are the best*', and they would continue with the argument that other nations asked to receive training by the Greek counter-kidnap team. Although it is unclear if all those involved with counter-kidnaps in the national level share the same view, it is almost certain that there is an unawareness of the reason behind collaborations.

As it has already been mentioned, trainings are not always transferring useful knowledge, but they can raise awareness on the issue. In a "glocalised" (Robertson in Featherstone, Lash, Robertson, 1995; Hufnagel, Harfield, Bronitt, 2012; Hobbs and Dunnighan, 1998 in Ruggeiero, South and Taylor) world, local criminal activity can be linked to global networks or somehow be connected to another part of the world. In addition to that, people are constantly travelling around the world, changing borders and jurisdictions. The world is a global village and while police act locally, they should also think globally and train their minds to think beyond their territorial borders and boundaries. Being on the same page does not imply that neighbouring nations have to follow the same response to a kidnap case, but it rather means that they can have a common knowledge around the phenomenon and be aware of how other teams deal with the same type of problem. Kidnappings can start in one part of the globe and end in another one, hostages can be moved inside the geographical borders of a country or outside. Also in a few cases the hostage is in one country, whereas the demand for ransom is made to family members who live in another one. There is definitely a level of interconnectedness and there are cases in which nations might have to cooperate in order to deal collectively with a kidnap case, thus a common understanding of the nature of this specific crime, might prove very helpful and avoid future problems and

misunderstandings. In addition to that, based on the storytelling of cases from the negotiators in Greece, all of those kidnapping cases which took place inside the country had at least one kidnapper from another nation. In kidnappings usually each member offers something different, thus, the more diverse the group, the more foreign networks can be used for various stages during a kidnap.

Duan, Nie and Coakes (2010) have talked about the need to have common motivation, common reasons for collaboration, clear objectives and similar level of understanding whilst transferring knowledge transnationally. However my research shows that in practice these do not seem to have any significance to the practitioners. In practice it is difficult to make each and every nation have the same level of knowledge, but in theory this would be very helpful for collaborating in cases involving more than one nation. Having a common knowledge of the crime, the most prominent types of kidnaps in a geographical area, and which are the most common problems that might arise while dealing with a kidnap case, is quite important. However, there is a difference between having a common ground and indirectly forcing specific techniques of dealing with kidnappings to everyone. This is not just problematic, but it is also unachievable. As mentioned before, the NCA member argued that the EuNAT trainings are created to '*[make] sure European standards are equivalent*'[interviewee 1] which is not possible due to resistance to the received knowledge

and lack of understanding of the importance of collaborations. Valverde and Mopas (in Larner, Walters, 2004), have a view of transnational policing organisations and international policing in general which one might say is negative. They have stated that transnational organisations like Europol and Interpol have limited usefulness and that policing does not have a global character (236). My research proves the point of Velverde and Mopas, and thus far in this thesis I have proved that indeed states have the most significant role and are the decision makers when it comes to policing.

6.2.2 Exchange of services and intelligence

The person who is responsible for all the police trainings in Greece (kidnap or non-kidnap related trainings) [interviewee 21], gave a different view from all the other interviewees. He argued that these trainings are part of an exchange of various types of information between countries. There is a plethora of formal mechanisms designed to transfer information about specific individuals and general crime-related knowledge. From a variety of protocols, to SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at the National Entries), and the Schengen cooperation, people and institutions inside them had foreseen the importance of sharing information and techniques both at the global and the European level.

Regarding the Greek kidnap for ransom trainings, the knowledge of the Greek team is exchanged in return for intelligence from people who are inside the Greek borders. Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) have referred to the policing knowledge transfer as the 'life-blood' (2012) of policing, which is adding to its vitality. However, at least in regards to counter-kidnapping, it seems that the police are not willingly and voluntarily sharing knowledge and intelligence. The share is done as part of an agreement after long discussions on what a nation can offer and what should be the exchange for it. After all those agreements on sharing and transferring knowledge around, it seems that counter-kidnap knowledge is done forcefully, after meetings and agreements between nations of what can be offered from each side. When I asked the person organising the police trainings in Greece about his view on the topic of knowledge transfer through trainings, he replied with a rhetorical question '*what do you think the ministers of interior do when they travel to other countries to meet with other ministers of interior?*' [interviewee 21]. With an ironic smile embellishing his face he tried to make it clear that politics is related to the transfer of counter-kidnap knowledge. It is determined and driven by political imperatives and cross national agreements. This explains the true reason of police knowledge transfer behind the idea of pride and exceptionalism. In reality, the reason knowledge is moving around is not because of the great success rate of the

Greek police negotiators or in the case of the UK, the fact that the team offering the training has written the UN manual, but it is done as part of political agreements. The fact that knowledge depends on politics for its movement is yet another filter, adding another layer of complexity to its exchange and transfer.

In some cases, assisting a kidnapping case can be seen as a good excuse to be allowed to know more of what is happening inside other nations. Through building networks with other public or private organisations, it gives to the UK an advantage and easier access to other nations' surveillance and intelligence information. The NCA official argued that intelligence is very important for them when dealing with a kidnap case, and, as it has been previously stated, he referred to the positive impact of having cross-border surveillance:

> *So, what we say to other countries is that 'if there is an incident involving a company, an organisation, or individual anywhere in the world that potentially could impact the UK, or not, and you just want someone to speak to, then please feel free to ring one of my duty officers any time of the day or night'. For kidnappings and extortion, it doesn't matter where in the world, if there is anyone, someone from an organisation or locally employed staff as well, we tell them to call us and we can have a discussion and exchange information. Quite often, when an incident occurs, people are running around like headless chickens, not all the time, but sometimes. You can get the critical decision maker in order for him or her to start making decisions at a very early stage. We need to be prepared, we need to have plans in place, and we need to know who to contact, because in each and every incident, there are people waiting to use the information, the intelligent companies have got, or what's out there. [interviewee 1]*

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When there is a kidnapping, the intelligence team tries to gather information about the potential kidnappers, in order to assess the professionalism or unprofessionalism of the kidnappers [interviewee 6]. Understanding whether or not a kidnap is planned, organised and executed by a team of professionals or amateurs is going to define the moves the team is going to follow. If the kidnappers are amateurs, the team and the victim (person paying the ransom) will have to carefully plan the next moves because there is a high chance of the kidnappers killing the victim for a variety of reasons. In most cases, although not always, those who are professionals and whose only goal is to get the ransom and release the hostage, are possibly going to cooperate and let the negotiators do their job. Intelligence plays a significant role in the assessment of the kidnappers. My understanding from the interviews is that since someone has provided a training session or event, the nation receiving that knowledge can make available intelligence information. The idea is that by sharing a nation's knowledge and experience, there is going to be, of course, a fee for that, as well as a form of intelligence exchange. Another example supporting the argument that knowledge transfer is a way to gather intelligence is the recent training (May 2015) of the Greek negotiators from the Crisis and Negotiation Unit of the Greater Manchester Police, which aimed to supply more knowledge towards the understanding of ISIS related hostage situations. Someone who

participated in this training said that the first two days of the training were on methods to tackle ISIS related kidnappings and hijacks, and although the cost of this training was quite high, possibly after that training the Greek state has the obligation to share intelligence regarding potential ISIS members within Greek borders [interviewee 7].

On a similar note, the NCA member kept making references to the fact that they gather intelligence in other countries for cases which might have nothing to do with the UK. This is done directly through the UK or through sub-contractors from other nations. The NCA member called these sub-contractors 'contacts' who are paid by the UK in order to gather intelligence and he explained:

> *How can we get urgent cooperation without delay? That's simply done through the contacts we have got across the world, so we can pick up the phone and have a conversation and then get or give immediate support. [interviewee 1]*

According to the interviewee from the NCA, their mission is to '*provide tactical orders and support to any national or international investigation in the prevention of a crime in action with the UK's response*' [interviewee 1]. The NCA is positioned as the primary knowledge broker around the world, since not only have they created the counter-kidnapping manual, which is in theory globally disseminated, but they are also working as sub-contractors.

Interestingly, in the annual counter-kidnapping, hijacking and hostage-taking event in London, an NCA invited speaker did not

talk about kidnappings in general, but, in a way, advertised the

NCA's work and what they can offer, finishing his talk by giving the

NCA emergency phone number in case of a kidnap around the

globe. My understanding was that the NCA is definitely asserting

itself as the global knowledge brokers and counter-kidnap experts

and attending events such as the London counter-kidnap one is a

way to reach out to private companies which can use NCA as a sub-

contractor, or the other way around, eg, NCA using private sub-

contractors. Part of what the NCA can do when there is a kidnap

incident is to gather intelligence which will assist towards the safe

release of the hostage. By intelligence they mean a variety of

things, as the NCA interviewed official said:

> [We gather] photographs, details of local telephones,
> addresses, social media. So when one is in conversation
> with a member of my team [NCA team] at 3 o'clock in the
> morning, which might be dealing with more than one
> cases, with time differences, then if we have this
> intelligence available, then we can plan according to
> opportunities that may arise the next hour or so.
> [interviewee 1]

6.2.3 Trainings as tools for improving conditions and for personal future use

In any other context, trainings are done to transfer

knowledge and move the important aspects of it around. However,

in the case of kidnappings, the knowledge transfer events are

taking place in order for other things to happen. Usually, police-

organised counter-kidnaping knowledge transfer events are forced

to attend, and they seem to be more like an obligation which needs to be fulfilled rather than an event aimed to enrich their already existing knowledge. There are boxes which need to be ticked and activities which have to be done in order to show those higher up in the hierarchy that they are doing something. Police-organised trainings aim to achieve something different from what the obvious goal is. As has already been mentioned before, the trainings are organised because of the cross-national agreements in exchange for something else, either intelligence information or another training provided by those who have previously received the training. However, these training or re-training events have a symbolic value with little practical effect, as they can be an indirect way to put pressure on the right people and demand more equipment, tools and benefits.

From what I was told during my ethnography, in the 2014 training of the Cypriot negotiators, after completing the big exercise, on the final day the person organising the training spoke to the head of the Cypriot police who was there to observe the exercise, and asked for a "negotiating cell". This "cell" is a van used by police where negotiators can make all the negotiations from there if there is a long negotiating-incident, as well as record any conversation they or the hostage's family member(s) are having with the kidnappers. While I was in Cyprus, almost every participant commented on the fact that they have this "cell", which

can '*make [their] life easier*' [interviewee 11], and as a female negotiator told me, '*this distinguishes us from the others [negotiators of other countries, presumably those of Greece], because the others don't have it [the "negotiating cell"], and obviously we are good. That's why we asked for it, and we got it. We can show them [superiors of Cypriot police] that we are successful to what we do*' [interviewee 22].

In that Cypriot-police training of 2015, something similar happened at the last day of the training event. After the big exercise, the head of the Cypriot counter-terrorism team was asked to comment on what he witnessed from their exercise, and discuss any issues the negotiators had. The discussion ended with the head of the counter-terrorism department agreeing on buying more bulletproof vests for the negotiators. He also promised that there will be a chest in every main police station of Cyprus with tools and equipment to be used only by negotiators, and that they will be the only ones with a key to open that chest in case of emergency. From my experience during the Cypriot training, I got the impression that apart from making sure that after the end of the training they ask for more equipment in order to do their job, there was also a lot of attention paid to their informal team building. Although these negotiators do not necessarily work together, the organisers made sure that they all had lunch and dinner together, as well as a night out with music, food and alcohol. Team building and improvement

of work conditions are possibly the main aims of events like this one.

In principle, the aim of trainings is for teams to be better prepared and to use the received knowledge in future cases. However, as I have explained so far, knowledge transfer events can create the illusion of being on the same ground, they are used as tools for intelligence and exchange of services as well as a way to ask for further funding and equipment. Nevertheless, knowledge events have an extra purpose, both for those transferring the knowledge, but also for those receiving it. These trainings are a way to establish the status and the position of the trainers and the trainees inside their respective law enforcement agencies. As has been already mentioned in the previous chapter, this can be used towards boosting their pride whilst they are still working there, but it can also play a big role in their future careers. It is the case that very often people from the public counter-crime sector move to the private one once they are retired, thus by training others or receiving training, they build trust and a legacy around their name. These people are not simple police officers, but they have either received or given specialised knowledge on a type of crime which although is very profitable, there are very few people around the world who can offer assistance in case there is a kidnapping.

A great example illustrating this move from the public to the private sector is a woman I have met on a few occasions in

counter-kidnap events in London. In a male-dominated industry, she is the only female, thus I cannot reveal what her positions were in the public sector, but after retiring she went on to create her own counter-kidnapping and counter-piracy business. Although this happens quite frequently, the interesting part is that during her time in the public counter-kidnap sector, she had created such a legacy that she formed a brand name and later used her name as the label of her private company. On a similar note, when I interviewed the wife of the Greek businessman who was kidnapped, she revealed that apart from the Greek negotiators who were working on the case, a former Scotland Yard negotiator was also assigned in order to make sure that no mistakes were made by the Greek team. I did not want to ask if the family was insured for kidnappings or who approached the former Scotland Yard external evaluator, but it is very likely that insurance companies work with people who are coming from the counter-kidnap field and their presence during a kidnap is part of the insurance contract. Possibly the current NCA counter-kidnap official will take a similar role once he is retired from the public sector.

Similar to the future use of knowledge for personal benefit, it is quite common for police officers to moonlight for news agencies. Their position inside the police and their knowledge on various cases, as I have explained in the previous chapter, can help them agree on secretly giving information to the media, usually in return

for financial benefits or future favours. Training events and re-trainings do not have a real value but they do have a symbolic meaning; they assist towards team-building and the (re)assertion of the status of those working in the counter-kidnap field. In the counter-kidnap public and private business, there is a constant struggle for status, which can be used at this moment in time or in the future once they are retired.

6.3 Limits of knowledge transfer: Can the States Protect their Citizens?

With globalisation, as well as freer movement of people and capital, there are also increased efforts to transfer knowledge by organisations, through trainings or manuals. Organisations and individuals exploit their knowledge-related assets so as to become more competitive and have more advantages over others. Many are supporters of transnational organisations such as Europol, Interpol, and the UN, stating that they provide current information of high quality to practitioners, they are considered knowledge brokers and they fill the void between operational assistance and police cooperation (Guile in Lemieux, 2013; Gerspacher, Lemieux, 2013). However, in practice and in real life, high security knowledge transfer encounters obstacles, and there are some filters which make its movement harder. Transferring knowledge which can be potentially used in a different context from the one where it has

been produced is a lot more complex than it sounds and it can actually make things unnecessarily complicated and poorly suited.

The allegation of the reason behind knowledge transfer is that it is very important to have a common ground between all the public and private organisations in the world. Nevertheless, this seems to be just a mechanism which uses the transfer of knowledge as a vehicle for other things. For example it can be used for improving the work conditions through getting funding, or in some cases for getting access to intelligence information of other nation-states.

It is the role and the responsibility of the state to generate effective preventive strategies, to respond to risks and protect its citizens. Based on article 3 of the UN declaration of human rights, the primary responsibility of each state is to protect the right to life, liberty and the security of its citizens. Yet, when it comes to kidnappings, the power of the state and of the police seems to be very limited and there is a tendency towards what Garland (1996) calls the 'responsibilization' of individuals. A great example showing exactly this turn towards making people responsible for their own safety and security is the story of a German woman [Interviewee 29] who was kidnapped in Colombia whilst she was backpacking in the jungle with other tourists.

I heard the former-kidnap hostage talking about her story in one of the counter-kidnap events in London. After being held hostage for around two months, she was released and her

kidnappers asked those negotiating her case for a helicopter to take her from the jungle to the airport at Bogota. Her flight back to Germany was covered by her, but the helicopter ride was initially covered by the German state. The day after her return to her homeland, she received a call from the German foreign ministry where she was informed that she has been charged with the helicopter costs (around 13,000 €). The reason why she was billed for the helicopter fees was, according to the government, that she had put herself in a risky situation, that she was negligent and irresponsible, because there was a travel warning in place for that area. Before listening to this story I was not aware that if there is a travel warning for a location and something happens there, then this means that the nation to which you are a citizen is not obliged to save you. This definitely limits those academics who present, teach or research in locations for which there is a travel warning. The former hostage was released without a ransom, but if there was one, then I imagine she would also have had to pay it back to the German state after her release. Although it was not clear, my understanding was that her case was dealt with by a private company employed by the German state. The responsibilisation strategy 'merges neatly into strategies of privatization and public expenditure reduction' (Garland, 1996: 453). What the states do is create disparities in the distribution of security, which is something that it is going to be analysed in the following subsection.

Through looking at kidnappings as a case study, one can observe not only how the state has given away a lot of its responsibilities to individual citizens, but also what a big role the private sector companies have, and that nowadays the protection of citizens is not very centralised. Because of this boundary, different actors and intranational organisations, for example the United Kingdom through the United Nations, can get involved in the domestic affairs of other states, which is not always principled or helpful. The idea behind manuals like the United Nations Counter-kidnap manual and the formal knowledge transfer events are that they stop ambiguity or ignorance from being used as excuses for failing to protect individuals. While interviewing someone who works in a private US company which specialises in kidnapping cases, he said that the way kidnappings are dealt with by the public sector is dangerous and time consuming:

> *In the US they don't want to deal with it [kidnappings]. Everything falls to the state department within the United States and it is messed up. The FBI takes over and you cannot recover anyone if it falls to that level, it is really a mess. It is better for the private sector to recover people, just because it is easier. It's all about how you figure out the authorisation of the process so if you can figure that out you can have the job done, and that's the things that I mostly work with. Policy pieces caused David Foley* [sic] (It is James Foley) *to lose his head in Syria. That idea 'we don't pay ransom', ok, we get that, but in fact that they do, and it is based on who is brought to at a given time. Department state didn't want to entertain that because they had just funded a 220.000.000 dollars project to combat ISIS, and as soon as ISIS heard that, they raised the price to 220.000.000 dollars and then it went down to 20.000.000 dollars the next day. The family couldn't manage it. It was going private. [interviewee 23]*

Although the interviewee mainly works in the US, his example does not solely apply to that context.

Initially the states were responsible for the security within their borders, but now, with the growth of globalisation and neo-liberal politics, the state is becoming less and less central to the delivery of security. The state is reduced in its role to provide security, and it keeps devolving down. This limit and inability of the state to protect its citizens has generated the space for private businesses to work and flourish, creating ambiguities between where the state ends and where private companies begin. It might be the case that private risk management businesses can guarantee that they can try to avoid the "sticky" aspects of knowledge when it is being transferred to others, or guarantee that they will do whatever they can in order to get the best possible results. However, the existence of the private sector makes the landscape much more contested and complex. In another interview with the CEO of a private business specialising in emergency recoveries, he actually said that in the US there is not a choice between going private or using the state organisations to help save a hostage:

> *Trying to solve things by country is really important, so here in the UK they understand the situations you have to deal with, and your policies account for that. It's very fortunate. There is nothing like that in the US, you have to go private for that. If someone is kidnapped, the family goes to the state department; there is no middle men to buffer the changes in the policy. There is a lot of virtual kidnapping. [In virtual kidnappings] we have only a few hours to short it out before the family ends up paying the money. If you go to a private company, while you are*

> *busy working with the recovery of the hostage, and working out the ransom and all those things that go with it, but meanwhile you have to make sure with the state department that you comply with all the licenses and everything. That's why it's always good to have a third party and that's why the private part is so helpful in some countries, especially in the US. [interviewee 24]*

In the 7th Kidnapping, Hijacking and Hostage Taking event in London, I realised how interesting the relationship between the private and the public security sector is. There are very few people working on kidnappings around the globe, and this annual event is a place where counter-kidnap practitioners can offer and be offered jobs and kidnap cases. As Ekblom (2002) has stated, part of the crime prevention knowledge is to 'know who'. By that Ekblom underlines the importance of knowing the right people who can become collaborators and provide services in case of an emergency and this is the aim of events like the one held in London. It is not just the United Kingdom working for other countries and getting involved in cases abroad, where there are no English nationals involved, but also that the UK is offering jobs to other people from private businesses all around the world. As a matter of fact, I was offered a job during a break, and the same luck happened to the CEO of the private US company, who tried to explain to me how things work, and where the line is between public and private businesses:

> *We are sub-contractors; we deal with 4-5 cases a week. People get stuck in different places, business has been blooming. […] We are pretty busy. I just got another one [kidnapping case] to do from x [the NCA member], he said 'you can do this one for us because he [the hostage]*

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is an American', but that's how things work. I still think that UK is the best, there is no problems attached to the recovery or the arrangements and the negotiations with the kidnappers. [interviewee 24]

He continued giving examples of things his company has been

involved to, and how the nature of his job has changed over time:

We do work for John Hopkins university, and their academics for when they travel out. It is a new kind of business and it comes at different levels. Sometimes it is just the intelligence, sometimes it is going in and doing the recovery, sometimes you just write the action plan for a university, just a crisis action plan. Anything that they require, we can do it for them; it is a new game for us, for all the security companies out there. It started out as doing pure evacuations, just taking people out of bad places, now it has gone down to the micro level, doing individual travellers or company trainings. [interviewee 24]

He carried on by providing two very interesting examples of the

cases he is currently working on, one in Venezuela and the other

one in Pakistan:

Right now i am working in Venezuela for a Japanese company, they have at least around 1800 employees, the company wants their people out, and they are trying to do it in a discreet way. […] Also, There are these two girls, they are from Czech Republic, and i got approached by the ambassador of Czech Republic in Washington at a cocktail party. He said he had a problem, there are these two girls who got kidnapped in the Pakistani border, so I did some research, I talked to their travel agencies, and we worked very closely together. A private company is working with a government agency for a foreign government. In the US we have the FARA, the Foreign Agency Registration Act, and we have to fill out all these documents every time we are working for a foreign government. So now we are working for a foreign government, for the safe release of their citizens, and that actually works quite well. In the Czech Republic they don't have any counter-kidnap agency on a national level, they are always coming to the private side to do work for them. So as far as work is concerned, public and private has become something very, very, natural to do. [interviewee 24]

In theory, a state is responsible for providing security and protection for its citizens. However, the reality is a lot messier than that and international contacts, coalitions, and interactions, as Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) have stated, have a great significance. A kidnapping was once exclusively in the public police domain, but now there is a constellation of commercial and public institutions, either working together or, when it comes to kidnappings, assigning the work to private businesses. There is an emergence of complex networks of policing where there is an interplay of private and public security providers. The public police contract out a kidnap case to another state's public police, and later that public police contract out the same case to a private firm. Policing is no longer a state monopoly, and in many cases, the demand for safety and security exceeds the state's capacity to provide it. As a result of that, it is not clear any more where the state ends and where the private sector begins. The two examples provided by the interviewee perfectly illustrate the fluidity in the security territory where private companies take the role of security providers where sub-contractors are approached by a representative of one nation in order to save individuals in risk-situations in another nation. These rescue agreements are made informally during cocktail parties and conference coffee-breaks, possibly in an attempt to avoid the potential bureaucracy and delay of a response organised formally between two nations.

7.3.1 Private Companies

The number of kidnappings around the world is not something that can be measured, but in both the developing and the developed world, kidnappings are quite common, and this has created a market as a response to this type of crime. The need for safety and security has created a complex environment where there are public and private organisations providing services. These organisations can be competitive, co-exist, or co-operate at the global and local level, but there is a tendency towards more and more private security businesses taking over the role of providing security. The global movement of money and finances has become important to the private sector's interests, which is yet another sign of neoliberalism and globalisation. These private industries are treating knowledge as a commodity, and trading it for profit. Knowledge can be sold and bought, and counter-kidnap knowledge can have a very high price. Nevertheless, knowledge itself seems to have a different currency depending on where it is being delivered to and who is selling it.

Police are no longer the sole authority of counter-kidnap knowledge and practices, and actually the private sector is more associated with this specific type of crime '*we have to stay ahead of the game. We are obsessed with quality, if we don't do that, they [people/businesses/organisations] will find someone else who does it*' [interviewee 25], said a man sitting next to me at the London,

2016, Tackling Kidnapping event, who flew from Switzerland just for this event. The private counter-kidnap businesses are doing their best to be informed around this topic, so as to create and later sell their knowledge. This shows that the way of dealing with a security problem is completely turned into a commercial product and there is antagonism in a field in which there is no room for mistakes. Knowledge is sold by private risk-management companies run by self-labelled experts who used to work in the military or in the secret services of various countries.

Almost every year there is an international conference on kidnappings, hijackings and hostage-taking, which is a meeting place for all those "experts" which allegedly creates a space for sharing knowledge, but the reality is far from that. When it came to the 6th and the 7th International Conference on Kidnapping, Hijacking and Hostage Taking, taking place in London, it was apparent that many of those practitioners attending had a narrow-prismed understanding of kidnappings. According to the practitioners who took part in this conference, the type of kidnapping is based on the person or group who commits it. Hence, there are only two types of kidnappings, either the commercial ones which are those kidnaps committed by organised criminal groups or those committed by terrorist groups. In many countries however, kidnappings are not committed by either organised criminal groups,

or from terrorists, but they are organised and executed by opportunists.[18]

The fear of being kidnapped can be present within all the groups inside a society, and in many cases the threat of being kidnapped can be exaggerated and in a sense forced onto a big part of the population. Human fears are a constant source of profit and the security-related consumption has become a defensive mechanism against fear. This is a form of preventative consumption which mainly aims at reducing the feeling of fear and insecurity. Trainings on kidnapping prevention and management use terror language such as '*what price life [has]? - Only you can decide[.] Can you afford NOT to attend?*'[19]. In other cases, specialists on kidnappings underline the 'evolving' threat of this type of crime or the fact that 'the world is getting more and more dangerous', as a speaker in the conference said, supporting these views on the 'sole evidence [of] turning on the TV' (presenter at the 6th international conference on Tackling Kidnapping, Hijacking, and Hostage Taking in London). Someone who was working in a private risk-management business in the UK and is responsible for creating contingency plans for companies and businesses, said:

> *Secrecy is paramount and it's non-negotiable. We deal with tiger-kidnaps which thankfully are a very rare*

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[18] It should be added that most of those who were there (at the events I attended in London) seemed to not have a clear understanding of what it is meant by "organised crime" and "terrorism", while these terms were clearly used to suit specific agendas and to exaggerate the problem and the fear associated with it.

[19] http://rdc-uk.com/portfolio/taken/ (accessed 20.05.2016)

occasion here [in the UK]. I see naivety on a very regular basis: I was there and I hear the CEO ask to the head of security [of his company] -'when was the last time we had a kidnap situation?', -'we've never had one; the last one we had was five years ago' -'do we really need to invest all these resources in preparing for combat and prevent a kidnapping situation?', my answer is: the most definitely yes. Failing to do so will be rather naive in this day and age and the world we live in. [interviewee 26]

Although kidnappings happen to people from all social classes and backgrounds, only a limited number of individuals can do something about that. This division of kidnapped individuals as profitable or not, or as practitioners call them, 'high worth targets' or otherwise, gives an extra business-like aspect to a crime which is already very lucrative. Insurance companies are definitely not interested in the kidnappings of those who cannot pay their insurance fees for the incident of kidnapping, even though they reinforce the idea that a kidnapping can happen to anyone.

During the 6th annual conference on Tackling Kidnapping, Hijacking and Hostage Taking, it was repeated throughout the event that the world is a very dangerous place to be in, reinforcing the feeling of fear and feeding off paranoia. As a matter of fact, someone who is currently running his own insurance company said that for an organisation, '*it is not a question of "if" a kidnapping [of one of its employees] is going to take place, but a question of "when"*' [interviewee 27]. At a coffee-break, a Spanish female kidnapping insurer shed some more light on the business-earning aspect of kidnappings, saying, '*I am making money out of people's fear of being kidnapped and it feels very wrong, but then I think*

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that we also cover post-kidnapping expenses, psychological therapy, and it makes me feel better, but still in my job I am trying to sell insurance packages to people, after convincing them their lifestyle is dangerous' [Interviewee 28].

There is definitely a gap between those who can afford to be insured, secure or rescued in case something happens to them, and those who cannot afford to do so. There are some security inequalities which have been intensified through making both the prevention and rescue a privilege to be enjoyed only by those who have an elevated status in the society. This 'privilegisation' of security goes far beyond gated communities and alarm systems. This inequality is also depicted, according to O'Reilly (2011), in the distinction between the 'deviant' (2011: 181) traveller (often referred to as undocumented immigrant), and the affluent traveller (the tourist or the businessperson). The so called "deviant" ones are trying to go off radar in their attempt to secure a better life, but they are frequently captured and repatriated back to where they came from, to the life and the conditions they were running away from. Contrary to that, the affluent travellers are 'tracked and traced by security consultants oversees, who send security updates to their clients […] steering them away from emerging danger zones and pinpointing their global locations when incidents unfold' (ibid).

Most transnational corporations, and especially those with personnel in dangerous or high-risk locations, have the duty to protect their staff ('duty of care'). Failure to prepare their staff through trainings and by having a kidnapping-protocol can hold them accountable for corporate negligence. In case anything happens to the affluent traveller, they will be directly located and rescued. Adding to that, some corporations have insured their personnel for ransom kidnappings, with the precondition that 'the insured party [is] unaware of that cover' (O'Reilly, 2011: 188). Some affluent people have even had transmitters implanted under their skin in order to be found in case of an emergency or a kidnapping[20]. Both the deviant and the affluent traveller can be victims of kidnappings, but with security becoming a privilege, only the latter can afford to protect themselves. Risk consultants, private security providers, insurers, mediators, negotiators and evacuation experts are available to help only those who can afford it.

Garland has correctly stated that 'once "security" ceases to be guaranteed to all citizens by a sovereign state, it tends to become a commodity which, like any other is distributed by market forces rather than according to need' (Garland, 1996: 463). As it has been noted (Levitt, 1999; Thacher, 2004; Pantazis, 2000), those on the bottom of society, the poorest groups, are the ones most affected

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[20] http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mexico-crime-chips-idUSN2041333820080822 (accessed 24.03.2017)

by crime, yet they are those with the fewest resources to combat their victimisation. Big kidnappings, with many millions of ransom demanded usually attract a lot of attention, but many, if not most, kidnappings are done with very little ransom, or other material things, asked. A research on kidnappings in Mexico City (Ochoa, 2012) showed that it is not just the rich who are being kidnapped. Although initially there were more kidnappings of wealthy people, now the targets are coming from the middle and the working classes. Similar to that, Noor (2013) has stated that it is usually the lower parts of society that 'make the largest victim pool' (2), but these kidnaps tend to go unnoticed. Ochoa in her research talked about a change in the nature of kidnappings in Mexico, and one of the reasons she proposes as responsible for that change is that the elite have learned to protect themselves. This does not imply that they are no longer victims of crimes, and in that case kidnappings, but rather that they are victimised less frequently. Those who are more privileged can afford private securities, gated communities, security boots outside their properties, CCTV cameras, accompanied by a general awareness which all exacerbate the inequalities (Ochoa, 2012: 16).

Private counter-kidnap businesses attract the public's attention, and especially the attention of those who are seen as high risk targets. However, the evidence presented in this conference by those who are considered to be experts, was lay,

developed independently and was very subjective, with no academic input. The presentations were based on anecdotal evidence from the personal experiences of the practitioners, something which certainly adds another layer of complication when it comes to the application of these techniques into a real-life situation. Each one held their own understandings of how a kidnap for ransom case should be dealt. For example, someone, while presenting on the role of the media in kidnap cases, underlined the valuable help of having kidnap for ransom cases publicised through the media, because according to him it can create pressure on the kidnappers. Interestingly, he did not refer to the fact that this added pressure can lead into problems and might risk the hostage's life. In addition to that, when it comes to counter-kidnapping techniques, there has not been any integration of research evidence into the methods of preventing or solving a crime. Possibly this is the reason why there were some inaccuracies such as the one mentioned above, and an oversimplification of the information transferred, creating the illusion that, for instance, a kidnap for ransom case in an African country can be similar to a case in a European one. Overall, knowledge transfer is based on spurious evidence, as well as based on personal and individualised experiences which have been produced under very specific circumstances.

Even though the idea of having a universally applicable counter-kidnapping approach is definitely tempting, it is something that might lead to problems. The transformation of an individual's counter-kidnap knowledge created from their personal working practices into abstract systems of practices cannot be holistically applied throughout all cases and all nations. Linking the existence of the United Nations counter-kidnapping manual with the international conference on Tackling Kidnapping, it can be argued that having a universally applicable counter-kidnap approach has been instrumental in fostering both the creation of the manual and the international conference. Yet, having a universal application can also be the root cause of many problems and misapplications. From what I have seen in the conference, universal or wider knowledge and information transfer can be uncritical and underplay the complexities of events. There should be an acknowledgement of the shaping functions of the social and the geographical context in which a case took place, as these will influence the content and the direction of the knowledge produced.

Transferring knowledge is demanding and might be potentially problematic. When we talk about knowledge, we need to consider what is known and how this knowledge has been acquired, how this knowledge can be applied and how fast new knowledge can be created and applied in a different context. Knowledge is produced in the context in which it is used, so it is

pointless to transfer it in a different context as it becomes a void. In reality, very specific principles are being successfully marketed by big security corporations, and similarly with the allegedly public knowledge holders, the private businesses use their good name and their success to commodify their knowledge and sell it to those who need it.

7.3.2 The Commodification of Knowledge

Knowledge, as it has been mentioned previously in this thesis, is valuable and powerful. It can be used as a bargaining chip and the less people have it, the more powerful it can be. These characteristics are what lead to the commodification of knowledge, not only in the private, but also in the public sector. Knowledge is not simply transferred from one place to another, but it is commodified and transformed into something which can be replicated in exchange for money.

The Palermo convention of transnational organised crime (entitled the 'United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime and the Protocols Thereto'), (2000) is a convention against transnational organised crime where the importance of knowledge sharing has been highlighted throughout the document. Although, as has been previously mentioned in this thesis, at least in Greece, kidnappings are not always an organised criminal act per se, in many cases organised criminal networks are used in order to carry out other aspects of the kidnapping, for

example money laundering. Either security-oriented or not, organisations and institutions such as Europol, the United Nations , the OSCE and the European Commission have referred to the importance of sharing practices and information. The Organisation for Security and Co-operation (OSCE) with regard to kidnappings, has stated that states need to 'explore ways to facilitate the exchange of experiences, best practices, initiatives taken, and information at the strategic, operational and tactical levels between crisis centres, intelligence agencies, law enforcement…' (OSCE: 14). Conventions and declarations underline the importance of a free movement of knowledge and information, but the reality is far from that. There is a very interesting paradox between what is written on documents and protocols, and what happens in reality. From the moment something becomes a commodity, it becomes prohibiting for other nations to get access to that.

The freedom of movement of knowledge is dependent and companioned with its commodification. This is what hinders the movement of knowledge since states cannot always afford to pay for it. The person who is organising all the police trainings in Greece, when talking about a scheduled, ISIS-related training in Athens (in May 2015) by three religion extremism experts from the Crisis and Negotiation Unit of the Greater Manchester Police, said that they had to pay 18,000 euros for a three-day event.

> *This was prohibitive for us, especially in this day and age,*
> *but we still needed the training. It's a serious threat, it's*

> *outside our door, they [refugees] first come here, and I am sure we will have to deal with that problem [ISIS] soon. We were very lucky because we got funding from the [Greek] Centre for Security Studies, and then they sent some people [from the Centre] to take part in the training along with our negotiators.* [interviewee 21]

In the case of Cyprus, the fee was even higher and, as there was no one to externally fund the counter-kidnap training provided by the NCA, the experienced negotiator seemed to be very proud of the way he handled it. He explained how he managed to have the training without paying anything directly to the trainers and their organisation:

> *We are negotiators, that's what we do, right? I called them the next day [after he got informed about the cost of the training] and I negotiated. I said, look, the money you are asking for is not possible to be found, but we can pay your flight-tickets and your accommodation here, and you can have your holidays at the same time. For a week [the training lasted three days] we had them like kings, there was a car picking them up every day from their hotel, and we took them sightseeing and everything. We received the training and it didn't even cost a third of what they initially asked.* [interviewee 12]

The two quotes above are revealing of the nature of the transfer of high security knowledge. Even though NCA is not a private, commercial enterprise, it appears to have the profit-making aspect of one. It is ideal for information and knowledge to have a liberated movement. However, in reality, putting a price on knowledge makes it very difficult for it to be accessible to everyone who needs it.

Safety and security are treated as commodities, but what happens is a negative consequence of the neoliberal societies where such a value-oriented treatment of knowledge makes people less

secure and protected. Knowledge itself has become an object of trade and in relation to kidnappings, there is deliberately a very limited ownership of that knowledge. The counter-kidnapping experience, accompanied by associated knowledge, has a high value which translates into a very high price. This makes nations unable to pay such a high fee in order to receive that knowledge which leads to the expansion of private companies. These kidnapping insurance, risk management, or evacuations firms are almost predominantly run by former police counter-kidnapping, special forces or secret intelligence service personnel who, after retiring, have taken advantage of their specialised knowledge towards the creation of their own parasitic companies. When people from the counter-kidnapping field leave their jobs in the public sector, they tend to take their knowledge with them. The former Greek negotiator who is currently working mainly as a freelancer negotiator said:

> *No matter what you give, you should never give it for free. You have to put a high price on it, because after that people would value you more and appreciate your work. I used to give it for free [he means when he was a kidnapping negotiator for the Greek police] and no one was appreciating it. Now I sell it [his skills and knowledge] and I sell it expensively.* [interviewee 14]

It is difficult to trust statistics with regard to kidnappings, but it is safe to say that each nation has at least one kidnap case per annum. Although kidnappings do happen throughout the globe and they can have a serious impact on lots of individuals, whether

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involved or not, they are still not amongst the most prevalent types of crime. There are other crimes which happen more frequently. Thus, when there is a kidnapping, it might be more financially prudent for nations to give the cases to sub-contractors, instead of paying for the trainings and re-trainings of their counter-kidnap teams. By assigning the case to sub-contractors, the accountability and responsibility of the outcome is now moved to the private sector. The privatisation of knowledge ownership means that the state is not liable in case something goes wrong during a kidnap. At this point it should be stated that the role of a private company can be played by a national organisation, in that case the NCA. It is not very common nowadays to have a foreign public agency managing specific security threats on behalf of another nation. Two good examples of how the UK's NCA team is working for other governments, in this case the Nigerian one, and also how they have worked with private companies 'third party intermediaries' to secure the release of a hostage, is demonstrated below:

> *Last week, a 90 year old male was taken in Nigeria. He was there for vacations. Quite often they [police] shoot the courier* [sic] (i think he means the person receiving the money*), so ransom payment sequence, the currier then meets what appears to be the offender and their [police/counter kidnap team] objection is 'shoot to wound' in order that that individual can later be interrogated. We have tried to stop that and last week we were eventually successful in taking our message through in our colleagues in Nigeria, 'don't shoot, you might kill the wrong person'.*
> *[…] A fifty-year old man in Libya, with Somalian origin, was held against his will with demands going to his extended family in the UK. We engaged through third*

party intermediaries, and we were able to secure the safe release of the fifty-year old, and in fact he is flying back to London today. [interviewee 1]

As has already been mentioned in this chapter, knowledge is being treated as a commodity and the United Kingdom's NCA expertise is being used commercially. There is a very complex security landscape where national organisations can intervene in cases outside their national borders, possibly with a pricy service fee, as well as collaboration with the private sector.

The aim of creating knowledge is to transfer it so that everyone can benefit from it. There is an emphasis placed on the commercial value of knowledge and a price placed on it, which makes the specialised counter-kidnap knowledge harder to be accessed by everyone who needs it. Still, when knowledge is transferred, it is formed in such a codified way in order to make that transfer easier. The counter-kidnapping high security knowledge is produced and compiled in a very specific context, and at the local level, but then an identical "copy" of this knowledge is transferred and applied somewhere else.

Throughout the two international conferences on kidnappings that I attended, the way the information was transferred was very instrumental, with presenters enumerating and numbering actions, giving steps to be followed, and talking about the 'golden hour'[21]. Kidnapping consultants and so-called experts have managed to

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[21] This, according to a kidnap expert, is the first hours after a kidnapping has taken place

reduce all their knowledge into "five steps", and "eight moves", trying to barter knowledge and make everything fit into a short presentation. These presenters believe that they are transferring a normative basis of processes, with expected actions and outcomes, but this is not the actual reality. The codification of personal knowledge is difficult to be applied in the broad context of ransom kidnapping cases, and this way of transferring information is possibly the result of the military or secret-services background of most of these practitioners.

It is difficult to transfer knowledge because knowledge cannot be neatly packed into steps, bullet points, and schematic information. What these people do is to transfer knowledge taken from very specific contexts, but transferring knowledge which is based on personal "regularities" is not enough, because in the event of a change in one of the variables, there will be great uncertainty. Each kidnapping for ransom case is different; it involves different kidnappers, with different personalities, there is a different hostage every time, with differences in terms of personal characteristics and a different family which has to work with a group of negotiators. Kidnappings are like a game where in each round all the players change and they are replaced with very different ones. The rules are usually the same in every round, save the hostage and arrest the kidnappers, but there is little space for generalisations. Knowledge has become a commodity, and it is

easier to be transferred from one place to the other if it is neatly packaged in a 'moves' and 'steps' format; if it can be used though, is another issue.

6.4 Summary

The counter-kidnapping knowledge transfer does not work but it is still being practiced around the world. This is done because nations want to be on the same page. Nevertheless, these trainings have an accessorial role, and even those who are attending them are not certain of their purpose. In many cases those trainings are the result of political imperatives and agreements between nations. The nations and law enforcement teams receiving the training in most cases have to pay for it, and at the same time they either have to give something back in the form of another training, or provide intelligence information to the providers of the training. Of course it is expected that there is going to be cooperation between nations for information and intelligence in case it is needed, but it is also expected that nations will help one another and provide specialised knowledge transfer free of charge. From my experience with the Cyprus police-negotiators, it became clear that these annual training-events are taking place in order for police negotiators to ask for further funding, tools and improvement to their working conditions.

Attempting to connect this chapter with the previous one, all the interviewees from the three different countries I have looked at have, one way or another, mentioned how good they are at what they do in terms of kidnapping resolution. Training-events are enhancing both the status of those receiving the knowledge and of those transferring it. By doing that, these people can climb up the police hierarchy, and build a legacy around their names. Once these people are retired, this can turn into something useful towards a career in the public crime prevention and resolution industry.

With regard to kidnappings, it seems that there are some issues affecting the knowledge transfer and these issues are connected to the police culture. This is a sign that the states cannot any longer protect their citizens, at least from kidnaps. In the past it was the state's responsibility to provide safety and security, but now this is taken over by private companies. As a US interviewee explained, the government can be quite consuming and will not allow ransom payments, which might inevitably cost the hostage's life. What is being done instead is that families contact private companies without involving the state. An interviewee called the transition from the publically provided security to the privately provided one a '*new game*'. In this game, the private companies have taken over and they are capitalising on fear. Knowledge is commodified and in order to have a smoother and easier transfer it is codified into steps and ready-made solutions that apply

everywhere and in any case around the world. This knowledge is not always applicable or useful, and also not free.

There have been many formal agreements, protocols and documents supporting the importance of a liberal movement of information and knowledge, but similarly to the knowledge-transfer events, these documents are created in order to tick off boxes and gain symbolic value. Not only private companies and former law enforcement officers provide their expertise with a very high cost, but also the UK's NCA asks for a high fee in order to transfer the counter-kidnap knowledge. Nations are unable to pay the fee for the trainings, thus their only solution is to directly assign the kidnapping cases to private contractors. There is a very complex counter-kidnapping landscape where cases from around the world are initially assigned to the NCA, and then the NCA might assign that case to private contractors. There is a very complex environment where national organisations work as private companies and private companies are staffed by individuals coming from the public sector.

Chapter 7: Conclusions

This research gave an overview to the counter-kidnap high security knowledge transfer and the application of that knowledge. The literature on kidnappings is very limited, which is what initially attracted my interest to research this type of crime. Kidnappings have been used as a case study to interrogate a variety of themes such as knowledge transfer, policing culture and the neoliberal private approach to crime prevention and management. The United Kingdom is a generator of this transnational knowledge and Greece is both a recipient and disseminator of knowledge to other countries, including Cyprus. This is justifying my choice to look at the UK, Greece and Cyprus in terms of kidnapping knowledge.

In my research I have identified three different ways of sharing and circulating counter-kidnap knowledge. There are formal documents on kidnaps, as well as transnational and intranational training for specialised police officers. Documents are vehicles for knowledge transfer but through common sense information and phrases such as 'don't be a victim', the EuNAT document is placing the responsibility for security and safety to the individual, what Garland named 'responsibilization' (1996), which is an approach followed by more and more nations. Both these documents come with their own issues, questions of usefulness and sticky aspects.

When it comes to kidnappings, the United Kingdom with its National Crime Agency, is considered to be the main knowledge

broker in the field of kidnappings, not only at the European level, but worldwide. The USA has a different approach where, after locating where the hostage is, they intervene, which can lead to the death of both the hostage and the kidnappers. The UN counter-kidnap manual is used by NCA to show the team's expertise and capitalize on that with collaborations and training which are quite pricy. Both in Greece and Cyprus interviewees referred to the cost of these trainings, which are rather expensive considering their duration and the fact that such transnational trainings aiming at collaboration between nations should be free. Academic research has thoroughly discussed issues around transnational policing and its importance since there is a fluidity of risks, without referring to the fact that knowledge transfer and transnational policing in some cases comes with a financial cost. This cost is sometimes difficult to be paid by nations, which even resort to being unofficial "tourist-guides" to avoid paying the high fee.

At the same time, the training contains material which has been developed in one single nation and, as an interviewee explained, the UK itself is not perfect at what it does, hence the large number of kidnaps. Different nations have different types of kidnaps, different budgets to spent, as well as tools and technology to counter this crime. In a similar way, within the UNODC document there are references to tools that I know Greece does not own and is unable to utilise. Apart from the fact that knowledge has been

produced in a completely different context, and that it is being transferred with a very high price tag, language also plays an important role.

National presentations and practical exercises have as a goal to train and re-train practitioners inside the police. However, the reality of knowledge production and transfer is blurry, messy and complicated. What is being shared is information and not knowledge. People can share their knowledge but this does not mean that the person receiving it will be able to use it. There are very few, sporadic trainings, and usually the closest to a kidnap is on a simple case of hostage-taking. At the same time it is very difficult to assess what has been received by those taking part in the knowledge transfer.

In my research I have identified some characteristics of the specific occupational sub-culture which work as barriers. Kumar (2011) has talked positively about pride inside the police and has explained how it can power the police work, however, I have seen the opposite. There was a sense of pride in the work of the counter-kidnap teams of all three nations I have looked at, which as I have stated can work as a barrier towards any improvement. In the UK there are many problems around arresting and prosecuting kidnappers, in Greece although they might think they transfer their knowledge to others because they are very good at what they do, in reality it is because of police imperatives and in Cyprus pride is

associated with their differentiation from the other police officers. There are many different subcultures inside the police, but negotiators, as a police sub-subculture (or just subculture) have not been looked at before.

In addition, altruism inside the police does not exist when it comes to who has the necessary knowledge. There is an "us" versus "them" attitude that Reiner (2012) has also referred to. This attitude can be witnessed throughout the various police subcultures, but the interesting thing is that it can also be seen between the same teams of different nations (between the Greek and Cypriot counter-kidnap teams). Such an approach completely negates the idea of transnational cooperation and collaboration between nations in case there is a need for it, something that illustrates that in practice, things are a lot more complicated. In the sub-culture of people who hold high-security knowledge (which is not supposed to be disseminated freely), those who have that knowledge also have power, which can lead to people holding information in order to use their expertise as a bargaining chip in their current position, or later use their knowledge in the private industry once they are retired. An interviewee presented another explanation and said that there is secrecy around kidnappings and counter-kidnap, because people are afraid to be criticized due to their inexperience. Thus, secrecy not only means that people are

using the power that knowledge gives them, but that it can also be associated with vulnerability.

Bayley and Bittner (1984), among others, have said that policing and police work are future oriented, and later, Ericson and Haggerty (1997) subscribed to that view. Generally, a lot of scholarship on policing suggests that policing is about the future, but the data that I have gathered from my qualitative research suggests that it is actually the opposite. When it comes to kidnappings, police are reactive and very often they do not know what to do. There are some steps that they follow when there is a kidnap, but if any of the variables change from the previous kidnap(s) then they would not know what to do, and kidnaps are known to be very dynamic and ever-changing. My findings mean that grand statements like those of Bayley, Bittner, Ericson and Haggerty do not apply.

Future research can explore the extent to which policing in general is a retrospective activity. Practitioners usually value the incident and determine the seriousness of the problem. From my interviewees it became clear that kidnappings are divided between those of rich individuals and those of migrants, refugees or minority groups. Sadly, more attention is paid to those "high value" individuals or to cases which have been on the media. Sheptycki has called police 'knowledge workers' (2002), but when it comes to the counter-kidnap teams I have researched into, there is a lot of

ignorance involved. Kidnappings are already very complicated, but the ignorance of the practitioners and the lack of knowledge of important terminology makes their work even more fragmented. Not naming a type of crime properly is potentially going to affect its response. Strategic ignorance comes when people are aware that they do not know something, yet they decide not to fill that gap, even though it is of major importance to their work. Police and their occupational culture have a very important role and it works as a barrier to transferring and applying knowledge. Newburn (2002) has talked about the Atlantic crossings which make the states more insignificant, but my research has showed the opposite. Knowledge, or more appropriately information, is being transferred, but what is going to happen after that is at the local level. My findings are similar to Massey's view (1994), who supported that although we have global actions, they take place at the local level, and the locale has a very important impact on the application of these global actions.

There is a variety of issues hindering the transfer and application of the counter-kidnap knowledge. Those who are supposed to protect the safety and security of citizens are not capable of doing so. It is hard for the counter-kidnap teams to keep up with something that is constantly changing and evolving, especially since the maintenance of that knowledge will not come for free. Nations are unable to protect human life, at least from

kidnaps, which has led to the commodification of knowledge by the private field. From my research it became obvious that the risk-management and counter-kidnap environments are very complex, with private companies being created by former public-sector experts, and public organisations such as the NCA resembling something more akin to a private business. All these are perpetuating victimization for those who cannot afford to protect themselves, and lead to the security and protection of a small minority who can afford to be prepared for a kidnap or saved in case there is one. There is a constant neoliberal tendency of making people responsible for their security, especially for a crime which is, wrongfully, perceived as one that will only affect the rich few.

7.1 Findings and Theoretical Advancements

With this research I can claim contribution to a number of different literatures. This research is the first one of its kind, combining a crime which has been under-researched with subjects such as knowledge, policing and security, offering another point of view on topics which have already received academic attention. In addition to that, this research is the first empirical study of the way knowledge is used. There are assumptions that knowledge moves easily, that once you tell something to a practitioner then this is automatically absorbed and straight put into practice. Yet, my

findings show that the reality is far from that. Not only is knowledge not always relevant to practitioners because it has been created in a different context, or it is suggesting the use of tools which are not owned by those receiving the knowledge, but there are also many barriers involved. This ultimately raises a question about the utility and value in transnational knowledge transfer and the overarching protocols on kidnap. Documents and manuals are not as useful as they were believed to be when they were created. Knowledge is not put into practice, but as I have seen, there is a lot of resistance and mitigation where practitioners are reducing the importance and the seriousness of what has been transferred, as well as those who did the transfer of knowledge. There is much discussion around knowledge transfer in a globalized world with risks and threats, but my research has uncovered an interesting disparity between calling for a unified, standardised approach, underlining the importance of collaboration between nations and the almost forbidding fee asked for the knowledge-transfer events. The reception of knowledge is not an "all or nothing" scenario, but the locale plays a very important role.

The specific police occupational culture itself is a major barrier to the application of that knowledge into practice. As I have explained in this thesis, those involved in counter-kidnapping (or the team of negotiators in general) are a distinguished sub-culture with different characteristics. These people are seen as higher-up in

the police hierarchy, and the status associated with being a member of the counter-kidnap team explains why many interviewees initially said that they were police negotiators but later in the interview explained that they were not. In addition to being perceived by others and by themselves as superior, police negotiators tend to neglect their development in the field. Thinking that they are better than other nations' police-teams, acts as a barrier to their improvement in a crime that is constantly changing. Ignorance is definitely something visible in the specific police sub-culture where not only are they not aware of something, but they have strategically decided to ignore it in order to make it fit their understanding of things, which in some cases can be simplified. For example, definitions are not important to those interviewed, even though the way a crime is defined is going to determine their approach and kidnappings or refugees are just arguments between "illegal" people. Also there is a misunderstanding of why transnational trainings take place and although they are the result of political imperatives and exchanges of services, it is widely believed that they are asked to do so due to their perceived success rates.

Although there are all these systems in place for transnational knowledge transfer, my research has shown that on the ground, practitioners do not really recognize the importance of having a common understanding and up-to-date information on crimes that

can some way or another cross borders. Apart from that, when it comes to a type of knowledge that is not held by many, as an attempt to protect the safety of future kidnapped-hostages, there is further restriction to its transfer. Counter-kidnap knowledge is something that is not supposed to be shared by many but also those who hold that knowledge and are asked to share it with a few selected others tend to hold some things just for themselves. The police environment is quite antagonistic and in order for someone to secure their position, it is important for individuals to secure their position through access to privileged knowledge. This knowledge generates status in its own right but, potentially both this status and the knowledge it is derived from can be later used in the private field for commercial gain. This further convolutes the already highly complex field of counter-kidnap knowledge transfer. Any future policy or academic exploration of counter-kidnapping can take into account all of these complex operational and governmental aspects. Regardless of the knowledge one produces, if that knowledge is not associated to the local context, particularly the local way of doing things, then it is of limited value.

The private field is a major stakeholder in the prevention and dealing of kidnap. As criminologists have long noted there is a neoliberal tendency towards privatizing many things and security seems to be one of them. When it comes to kidnappings, my research identifies how, the responsibility of each individual (or

business) is devolved and shifted away from the state onto organisations in order to ensure they are prepared, insured or with the right connections in the private field in case of a kidnap. Not only is the individual in many cases responsible for their own safety inside or outside their home nation, but also there is a collaboration of nations with the private field. Risk management and insurance companies are working for various nations and later the fee is usually asked by the person who has received that help, in that case the kidnapped-hostages. In addition to that, the National Crime Agency, a public organisation perceived as the knowledge broker in the field of kidnaps, is both taking kidnap jobs whilst asking for a fee, and at the same time they assign jobs to other practitioners from the private field. In a security field that consists of private businesses, even a public entity resembles a more private one, leaving no options for those who cannot afford to protect themselves.

Attempting to summarise the above paragraphs, this research has contributed to three distinct areas of enquiry: first, the way information about kidnaps moves around, second, the police subculture, and finally how the problems of transferring knowledge and the police culture itself have led to the privatization of security, as well as the interconnectivity of private and public businesses.

7.2 Methodological Advancement

To my knowledge police negotiators are a group of people which has not been interviewed or researched in the past. The fact that these people are only very few, they are handling sensitive information and they are perceived to be higher up in the hierarchy of their occupational culture makes them 'elites'. Policing elites can be 'senior ranking officers influencing strategic direction […] specialist officers […] or those with discretion to influence or exert power without constraint' (Brunger, Caless, Tong, Gilbert, 2016: 139). Conducting research with police elites 'provides us with unique and rich insights into police practices and leadership through accessing the decision makers and keepers of specialist knowledge (Brunger, Caless, Tong, Gilbert, 2016: 140). Interviewing such a type of elites has particular difficulties both in terms of identifying the right people and approaching them. Elites of all kinds have not received the necessary attention throughout the years (Hunter 1995), and this might be because they are a group of people with the means and the power to protect themselves from outsiders and criticism. Research on police elites gives us a unique and useful insight in the police practices since we access the decision makers and specialist-knowledge holders (Brunger, Caless, Tong, Gilbert, 2016: 140). The most pressing concern and constant source of anxiety for the researcher is about gaining access. For people conducting research with elites it is better to assume that gaining

access will take even longer than expected, hence the access-gaining process can start as soon as possible in order to avoid wasting time waiting for bureaucratic procedures. It is always helpful to remember that as Laurila (1997) has stated, the fact that elites are visible does not imply that they are also accessible. Of course access can be denied which might create problems, but at the same time, gaining access is not the same as establishing trust between the interviewer and the interviewee. I found very useful the fact that I did online research on previous kidnaps in Greece prior to my interviews with the Greek police, and that I started my research by talking to some former kidnap-hostages. Hostages and their families gave me an inside view of how things work during a kidnap without fearing that they were revealing too much information. This way I learned what happens during a kidnapping and I was able to have a conversation with the police negotiators. At the same time, by looking into many kidnap cases in Greece I knew from a fact that them talking about the one hundred percent of success, was not based on facts.

In my case, moving closer to the people I interviewed in Greece, was not possible for financial reasons. Had I had funding to cover my expenses I would have moved closer to my interviewees for a period of around three to six months. The more people hear about a researcher or get used to the researcher's presence around them, the easier it will become to gain access to participate to even

more things. A Greek negotiator said during one of our interviews that if I lived there I might even get the opportunity to participate in a kidnapping along with the negotiators. If there was one thing that I would do differently, it would be to be geographically closer to my interviewees for the opportunities this might bring.

7.3 Future Research

This research, by exploring the way kidnap practitioners work, can help us understand how we look at a lot of transnational knowledge-flows around crime, and globalisation. When it comes to kidnappings, knowledge becomes a tradable commodity, and it would be interesting for a future researcher to examine whether the same characteristics are held by other types of crime where transnational knowledge plays an important role. Such crimes can possibly be trafficking, organised crime, terrorism or anything with transnational dimensions. A future researcher can investigate to what extent the locale is important in the way practitioners work and apply the knowledge that has been transferred, which can possibly shed some more light in the efficiency of Europe-wide and world-wide tools used.

Another way to add more usefulness to my research would be to expand the scale of what I have already looked at in this research. Such a research would have really important and substantial findings since it will not just look at three nations and

their practices, but it can comprise a bigger project with more nations involved and more practices. This study can, for example, focus on the European level, and it would be a great way to draw attention to complex narratives, practices and resistance to the transfer and application of the counter-kidnap knowledge.

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Taken: http://rdc-uk.com/portfolio/taken/ (accessed 20.05.2016)

Terrorism Act 2000
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/11/contents (accessed 05.03.2017)

The Law Commission, 2014, Simplification of criminal law: kidnapping and related offences
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/376860/44612_HC_797_Law_Commission_355_print_ready.pdf (accessed 04.03.2017)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, (2003), *International Cooperation in the Prevention, Combating and Elimination of Kidnapping and in Providing Assistance to Victims*
http://www.unodc.org/pdf/crime/commissions/12_commission/7e.pdf (accessed 03.03.2017)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime:
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/law-enforcement.html (accessed 10.10.2013)

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime:
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/tools-and-publications.html (accessed 28.05.2016)

Interviewees/Used Interviews

Interviewee	Occupation/role	Location of Interview
1	Member of NCA's counter-kidnap team	London
2	Young female university student. Kidnapped in Greece. Held hostage for five days. Ransom paid by her father, around 10,000€.	Greece
3	Kidnapped victim in Greece. Businessman. Held hostage for 17 days. A few million euros paid as ransom from his wife	Greece
4	The wife of the businessman	Greece
5	Mother of a kidnapped man from Cyprus. Kidnapped in Greece. A few millions paid as ransom (the ransom was not found)	Cyprus
6	Experienced negotiator and trainer in Greece. He has the most counter-kidnapping experience	Greece
7	Counter-kidnap police negotiator who also presented in the European Network for Advisory Teams (EuNAT) event in Romania	Greece
8	Counter-kidnap police negotiator	Greece
9	Counter-kidnap negotiator. He seemed to be the youngest and possibly the least experienced of those interviewed in Greece	Greece
10	CEO of a risk-management company in Belgium	London
11	Negotiator in Cyprus	Cyprus
12	Chief negotiator in Cyprus. He is the most experienced and also organises the annual week-long training-event on negotiations	Cyprus
13	Owns his own risk evacuations company and has worked, in a few occasions, with the United Nations	London
14	Retired member of the Greek police-negotiators team. He used to be the same trainer, with knowledge received from the UK and the US. He is currently working as a private negotiator and provides training sessions on negotiation techniques	Greece
15	Working in the Greater Manchester police and he is responsible for providing knowledge and training people involved in kidnaps. He has also helped produce the UNODC counter-kidnap manual	London
16	Greek-police kidnap negotiator	Greece
17	Negotiator for Cypriot police	Cyprus
18	Negotiator for Cypriot police	Cyprus
19	Negotiator for Cypriot police	Cyprus
20	A negotiator with whom I briefly talked with whilst I was waiting to interview another negotiator.	Greece
21	Responsible for the organisation of training and re-training events for police officers and students in the police academy	Greece
22	One of the few female negotiators	Cyprus
23	Ex-military in the US who now has his own counter-kidnap	London

	company	
24	Former secret intelligence US officer who now owns a company focusing on emergency recoveries	London
25	Retired UK military personnel who works for a Swiss counter-kidnap company	London
26	He is working for a private English company and is responsible for producing contingency plans for businesses and organisations	London
27	He owns an insurance company	London
28	Female Spanish insurer, working for a company in Spain	London
29	German citizen, kidnapped in the Colombian jungle. Held hostage for around 2 months. Released and later had to pay the costs of her release.	London
30	British citizen, kidnapped in Iraq. He was held hostage for around 2 years.	London

Sent to
REO
12/11/14

Application for Ethical Approval of Research Involving Human Participants

This application form should be completed for any research involving human participants conducted in or by the University. 'Human participants' are defined as including living human beings, human beings who have recently died (cadavers, human remains and body parts), embryos and foetuses, human tissue and bodily fluids, and human data and records (such as, but not restricted to medical, genetic, financial, personnel, criminal or administrative records and test results including scholastic achievements). Research should not commence until written approval has been received (from Departmental Research Director, Faculty Ethics Committee (FEC) or the University's Ethics Committee). This should be borne in mind when setting a start date for the project.

Applications should be made on this form, and submitted electronically, to your Departmental Research Director. A signed copy of the form should also be submitted. Applications will be assessed by the Research Director in the first instance, and may then passed to the FEC, and then to the University's Ethics Committee. A copy of your research proposal and any necessary supporting documentation (e.g. consent form, recruiting materials, etc) should also be attached to this form.

A full copy of the signed application will be retained by the department/school for 6 years following completion of the project. The signed application form cover sheet (two pages) will be sent to the Research Governance and Planning Manager in the REO as Secretary of the University's Ethics Committee.

1.	Title of project: Counter-kidnapping knowledge transfer.

2. The title of your project will be published in the minutes of the University Ethics Committee. If you object, then a reference number will be used in place of the title.
   Do you object to the title of your project being published?   Yes ☐ / No ☒

3. This Project is: ☐   Staff Research Project   ☒   Student Project

4. Principal Investigator(s) (students should also include the name of their supervisor):

Name:	Department:
Eleana Nikiforidou	Sociology department
Professor Pete Fussey	Sociology department

5.	**Proposed start date**: 18.11.2014
6.	**Probable duration**: 20.11.2014

7. Will this project be externally funded?   Yes ☐ / No ☒
   If Yes,

8.	What is the source of the funding?

9. If external approval for this research has been given, then only this cover sheet needs to be submitted

External ethics approval obtained (attach evidence of approval)   Yes ☐/ No ☒

Declaration of Principal Investigator:

The information contained in this application, including any accompanying information, is, to the best of my knowledge, complete and correct. I/we have read the University's *Guidelines for Ethical Approval of Research Involving Human Participants* and accept responsibility for the conduct of the procedures set out in this application in accordance with the guidelines, the University's *Statement on Safeguarding Good Scientific Practice* and any other conditions laid down by the University's Ethics Committee. I/we have attempted to identify all risks related to the research that may arise in conducting this research and acknowledge my/our obligations and the rights of the participants.

Signature(s):   *e Niшçopīσου*

Name(s) in block capitals   ELEANA NIKIFORIDOU

Date: 27/09/2014

Supervisor's recommendation (Student Projects only):

I have read and approved both the research proposal and this application.

Supervisor's signature: ....

Outcome:

The Departmental Director of Research (DoR) has reviewed this project and considers the methodological/technical aspects of the proposal to be appropriate to the tasks proposed. The DoR considers that the investigator(s) has/have the necessary qualifications, experience and facilities to conduct the research set out in this application, and to deal with any emergencies and contingencies that may arise.

This application falls under Annex B and is approved on behalf of the FEC	☑
This application is referred to the FEC because it does not fall under Annex B	☐
This application is referred to the FEC because it requires independent scrutiny	☐

Signature(s): ....

Name(s) in block capitals: ..... R. Hobbs ....

Department: ..... Sociology ....

Date: ..... 11/11/2014 ....

The application has been approved by the FEC	☐
The application has not been approved by the FEC	☐
The application is referred to the University Ethics Committee	☐

Signature(s): ....

Name(s) in block capitals: ....

Faculty: ....

Date: ....

Research and Enterprise Office (smp)   March 2010   Page: 2 of 6

Details of the Project

1. **Brief outline of project** (This should include the purpose or objectives of the research, brief justification, and a summary of methods. It should be approx. 150 words in everyday language that is free from jargon).

The purpose of this thesis is to look at the knowledge transfer that is related to the ways of dealing with ransom kidnapping cases in Greece. Kidnappings will be used as a case study in order to interrogate the existing literature on knowledge transfer and how the processes of moving knowledge around is understood in a variety of ways, by different scholars. I am going to examine the knowledge transfer related specifically for ransom kidnappings, but I am also going to talk about the broader issues of sharing knowledge and analyse all the contradictions in the way information and knowledge are shared.

The research will be a qualitative case study, expanded with a thematic analysis, through the use of semi-structured open ended interviews with various kidnapping practitioners in Greece. The aim is to explore how the knowledge has entered Greece from abroad, and how this knowledge is transferred from one practitioner to the other, or from a practitioner to another institution, possibly abroad. The goal is to look at a specific case study, so as to challenge how relevant are the global understandings of kidnapping, since the local itself is extremely complex and unique.

Participant Details

2. Will the research involve human participants? (indicate as appropriate)

Yes ☒   No ☐

3. Who are they and how will they be recruited? (If any recruiting materials are to be used, e.g. advertisement or letter of invitation, please provide copies).

Human participants will be police officers who also have the role of negotiators in kidnapping cases. After getting the permission from the Greek Ministry of Citizen Protection to speak with police officers, they will provide some names of negotiators who are eligible to be interviewed.

Will participants be paid or reimbursed?

No, they will not.

4. Could participants be considered:

(a) to be vulnerable (e.g. children, mentally-ill)?   Yes ☐ / No ☒

(b) to feel obliged to take part in the research?   Yes ☐ / No ☒

If the answer to either of these is yes, please explain how the participants could be considered vulnerable and why vulnerable participants are necessary for the research.

Informed Consent

5. Will the participant's consent be obtained for involvement in the research orally or in writing? (If in writing, please attach an example of written consent for approval):

    Yes ☒   No ☐

How will consent be obtained and recorded? If consent is not possible, explain why.
Their consent has already been given orally, prior to our meeting.

Please attach a participant information sheet where appropriate.

Confidentiality / Anonymity

6. If the research generates personal data, describe the arrangements for maintaining anonymity and confidentiality or the reasons for not doing so.

Police negotiators will be asked whether they want to be anonymised or not. For those who want to be anonymised, either another name will be given to them in the thesis, or I will refer to them by their ranking in the police hierarchy.

Data Access, Storage and Security

7. Describe the arrangements for storing and maintaining the security of any personal data collected as part of the project. Please provide details of those who will have access to the data.

I will be the only person who is going to have access to the data of the interviews. The data will be stored in a personal computer (in which a password is required, and I am the only person who knows the password). In addition, the files will be stored in a hard drive which will be protected by a password.

It is a requirement of the Data Protection Act 1998 to ensure individuals are aware of how information about them will be managed. Please tick the box to confirm that participants will be informed of the data access, storage and security arrangements described above. If relevant, it is appropriate for this to be done via the participant information sheet ☒

Further guidance about the collection of personal data for research purposes and compliance with the Data Protection Act can be accessed at the following weblink. Please tick the box to confirm that you have read this guidance
(http://www.essex.ac.uk/records_management/policies/data_protection_and_research.aspx) ☒

Risk and Risk Management

8. Are there any potential risks (e.g. physical, psychological, social, legal or economic) to participants or subjects associated with the proposed research?

Yes ☐   No ☒

If Yes,

Please provide full details and explain what risk management procedures will be put in place to minimise the risks:

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9. Are there any potential risks to researchers as a consequence of undertaking this proposal that are greater than those encountered in normal day-to-day life?

    Yes ☐   No ☒

    If Yes,

Please provide full details and explain what risk management procedures will be put in place to minimise the risks:

10. Will the research involve individuals below the age of 18 or individuals of 18 years and over with a limited capacity to give informed consent?

    Yes ☐   No ☒

    If Yes, a criminal records disclosure (CRB check) within the last three years is required.

    Please provide details of the "clear disclosure":

Date of disclosure:
Type of disclosure:
Organisation that requested disclosure:

11. Are there any other ethical issues that have not been addressed which you would wish to bring to the attention of the Faculty and/or University Ethics Committees

No

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