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Divided Diasporas: Southern Africans in Canada

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DIVIDED DIASPORAS

Southern Africans in Canada



DIVIDED DIASPORAS

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SPECIAL REPORT

Jonathan Crush, Abel Chikanda, Wade Pendleton, Mary Caesar, Sujata Ramachandran, Cassandra Eberhardt and Ashley Hill



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DIVIDED DIASPORAS: SOUTHERN AFRICANS IN CANADA

ACRONYMS		OPCC	Organisation des Professionels Congolais du Canada
ADAC	African Diaspora Association of Canada	RAI	Rural Action International
AFFORD	African Foundation for Development	SADC	Southern African Development
AFSUN	African Food Security Urban Network		Community
AU	African Union	SAJAC	South African Jewish Association of Canada
AUCC	Association of Universities and Colleges in Canada	SAMP	Southern African Migration Programme
BEE	Black Economic Empowerment	SANSA	South African Network of Skills Abroad
CAFSACK	Canadian Friends of the South African	SNSs	social networking sites
CANCORA	Chevrah Kadisha	SSN	Swaziland Solidarity Network
CANCOSA	Canadian Council for South Africans	TANA	Tanzanian Community Association of
CIC	Citizenship and Immigration Canada		Northern Alberta
CSAN	Canadian Southern African Network	TCA	Tanzanian Canadian Association
DKNs	diaspora knowledge networks	TESA	Tanga Education Support Association
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo	TOKTEN	Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals program
EWB	Education Without Borders	UCT	University of Cape Town
FDI	foreign direct investment	UN	United Nations
GTA	Greater Toronto Area	UNDP	
HTAs	hometown associations		UN Development Programme
IOM	International Organization for Migration	UNESCO	UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
IRB	Immigration and Refugee Board	ZANCANA	Zanzibar Canada Association
IRPA	Immigration and Refugee Protection Act	ZCAA	Zimbabwe Community Assistance
IYS	Ismaili Youth Soccer		Association
KCDF	Kenyan Community Development Fund	ZDC	Zambia Diaspora Connect
MAD	Make a Difference Foundation		
MAWO	My Arms Wide Open Foundation		
MIDA	Migration for Development in Africa		
MPI	Migration Policy Institute		
MTA	Montreal Tanzanian Association		
MYP	Masiphumelele Youth Project		
NGO	non-governmental organization		
NICI	Nextle Creatile In attitude		

- NSI North-South Institute
- OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Canada is drawing an ever-greater proportion of its new immigrants from countries in the Global South, including Africa. There is little evidence that Canadian policy makers have seriously considered the possible negative consequences of this trend for the development prospects of these countries. In part, this is because of a lack of coherence between Canadian immigration and development policy. As a result, Canada has traditionally been extremely defensive about charges that it, along with other industrialized countries, is responsible for a crippling "brain drain" of skills from the South. The idea that migration to the North inevitably leads to economic and social stagnation and decline in the South was extremely common a decade ago. Since then, however, a new and more positive prognosis has emerged about the nexus between migration and development. In the words of one commentator, there has been a "pendulum swing" from deep pessimism to unbridled optimism (de Haas, 2012).

The migration and development nexus has risen rapidly to the top of the international policy agenda over the last decade. Evidence for this includes the UN High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (convened in 2006 with a second scheduled for late 2013), the annual meetings of the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the formation of the multilateral Global Migration Group and the growing number of migration and mobility partnerships between blocs of states (Crush, 2013). Central to the new consensus that migration is, or can be, good for development is the empirical reality that migrants from the South to the North rarely cut their ties when they emigrate. There is growing evidence that these ties are responsible for massive, though uneven, transfers of remittances, direct investment, philanthropic capital, knowledge, skills, technology and personnel from North to South. Some have even argued that this process has been essential to the unprecedented growth of emerging economies in the South.

States in the North and South are increasingly concerned with how to tap the potential of migrant diasporas to facilitate social and economic development in the South. Various "diaspora engagement" initiatives are currently emerging in countries such as Canada and in many of the countries from which people immigrate to Canada. In order to better understand the potential for government support of diaspora engagement and to identify which kinds of activities are likely to bring the greatest return, it is extremely important to build knowledge on the links that diasporas currently maintain with their countries of origin. This report is presented as a contribution to that project by constructing a systematic knowledge base about Southern African diasporas in Canada. In addition to providing insights about the actual and potential development impacts of these diasporas, this report presents a new methodology for accessing information about diasporas which could be used for other national groups in Canada, and more broadly.

At present, the Southern African diaspora in Canada exceeds 120,000 people and continues to grow. Migration from the 15 countries of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) to Canada is certainly not a new phenomenon although it has accelerated rapidly in recent years. In the 1980s, for example, between 1,000 and 2,000 people emigrated each year from this region to Canada, a figure that increased to around 3,000 per year in the 1990s and rose again to over 4,000 per year after 2000. Since 1990, every SADC country has experienced a growth in emigration to Canada. The greatest increases came from South Africa, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Zimbabwe, Tanzania and Mauritius. By 2006, the Southern African immigrant population of Canada constituted 27 percent of the total number of African immigrants in Canada. Three countries dominate the flow, making up 72 percent of the total: South Africa (40,570), Tanzania (20,115) and the DRC (15,795).

Over the past three decades, more than half (55 percent) of SADC immigrants to Canada entered in the economic class. An additional 22 percent entered in the refugee class and 20 percent in the family class. Temporary migration from SADC to Canada has also increased considerably since the late 1990s. SADC migrants (including temporary workers and students) make up less than three percent of all temporary migrants in Canada but 31 percent of all African temporary residents in the country. Over 95 percent of SADC immigrants in Canada live in just four provinces: Ontario (48 percent), British Columbia (19 percent), Quebec (17 percent) and Alberta (12 percent). Francophone immigrants mainly settle in Quebec. Immigrants from South Africa and Zimbabwe are dispersed throughout the country. Over 90 percent of South Africans, Zimbabweans and Tanzanians live in Ontario, British Columbia and Alberta. Two-thirds of all Southern African immigrants to Canada settle in three main metropolitan areas: Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver.

In 2010 and 2011, the Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) conducted an innovative online and face-to-face survey of Southern Africans in Canada. The survey made extensive use of social media to identify members of the diaspora for interview. The questionnaire was completed by a total of 2,439 respondents. The information collected focussed on the demographic, social, economic, employment and educational profile of individuals and households; their reasons for leaving Africa and coming to Canada; their experiences in Canada and comparisons between Canada and countries in Africa; the linkages maintained with countries of origin, including remittances and other economic links, family ties, and frequency and reasons for return visits; involvement in development-related activities in countries of origin; and the likelihood of returning to Africa temporarily or permanently.

The survey revealed significant differences between South Africans and non-South Africans. The immigrants from outside South Africa fit the profile of a diaspora that is engaged with countries of origin. Among the key findings for the respondents from SADC countries outside South Africa are the following:

- While Canada has been accused of precipitating a brain drain from Africa, only 19 percent of the sample actually entered Canada in the economic class (20 percent). The bulk of the remainder entered as asylum seekers/refugees (34 percent), students (18 percent) and family-class immigrants (15 percent). Irrespective of the category of entry, 53 percent had acquired Canadian citizenship and another 35 percent were permanent residents.
- The immigrants had attained high levels of education before coming to Canada, and are more educated than the Canadian-born population. For example, 30 percent had at least a university degree upon entry to Canada, compared with 19 percent of the Canadian population. As many as a third had to re-certify or retrain in Canada in order to work in a field for which they were already trained. Furthermore, 30 percent were working in occupations that did not make full use of their qualifications.
- Only seven percent were unemployed, while an additional 21 percent were students. The most common occupations included sales and service, health and finance, business and banking. Almost a third of the respondents earn less than CDN\$25,000 a year. An additional 34 percent earn between CDN\$26,000–50,000 a year and less than five percent earn more than CDN\$200,000 a year. The income profile is consistent with the African immigrant population in Canada more generally.
- Almost two-thirds (62 percent) of the respondents said that they have an important role to play in developing their countries of origin. Only 15 percent thought that they had no role to play.
- Nearly 70 percent of the respondents remit money to their country of origin. One-quarter remit at least once a month, another third at least once a year and the rest occasionally. The average amount remitted is CDN\$1,000 per year. A smaller number (55 percent) also remit goods with an average annual value of CDN\$500. Remitting consists almost exclusively of private funds sent to immediate and extended family. Nearly all remitters (95 percent) send money to immediate family members, while 50 percent

also remit to extended family. Only 10 percent send remittances to community groups and organizations. Households receiving remittances from relatives in Canada spend the funds on their immediate needs: 61 percent of remitters send money for food purchase and 44 percent to meet other day-to-day household expenses. A significant proportion also remit to meet medical expenses (59 percent) and to pay for education and school fees (58 percent). A much smaller proportion send money for direct productive investment: for example, 12 percent send remittances for purchase of agricultural inputs, 10 percent for starting or running a business and six percent for buying property.

- In terms of diaspora engagement activities, nearly 50 percent of the respondents have participated in some kind of economic activity in their country of origin: 25 percent have exported Canadian goods for sale, 11 percent had invested in business, 11 percent have generated employment, 10 percent have engaged in research partnerships and nine percent have purchased local goods for resale in Canada.
- In terms of willingness to be engaged in the future, only nine percent said they had no interest. The favoured avenues of engagement included skills transfer (mentioned by 58 percent), investing in businesses (55 percent), participation in developmental projects (52 percent), educational exchanges (52 percent), volunteer work (48 percent), fundraising for development projects (46 percent), philanthropy (42 percent), export and import of goods to and from the country of origin (38 percent), investing in infrastructural development (39 percent) and providing distance learning (37 percent). Others specifically mentioned their desire to be involved in activities that would lead to greater empowerment for women and children.
- Despite high levels of citizenship and permanent residence in Canada, and the fact that Canada was rated more favourably on a wide range of economic, social and political indicators, 55 percent of the respondents had given return migration some or a great deal of consideration. However, only 15 percent thought it was likely within two years, a figure that rose to 27 percent within five years and to 57 percent at some time in the future (usually upon retirement).

In sharp contrast to immigrants from other Southern African countries, South Africans in Canada display a very different attitudinal and behavioural profile. The differences are so marked that they are referred to in this report as a "disengaged diaspora." The key characteristics of the South African diaspora in Canada are as follows:

- The dominant mode of entry into Canada by South Africans is as economic-class immigrants (56 percent of respondents). Most of the remainder were accompanying family members. Less than 10 percent of respondents said their primary reason for coming to Canada was economic; rather, the two main reasons that were given were concerns about safety and security in South Africa (34 percent) and the future of their children (26 percent).
- The South African diaspora in Canada is highly educated and dominated by skilled professionals. Before leaving South Africa, 54 percent of the respondents had obtained a university degree. After leaving South Africa, 47 percent continued with their formal education, primarily in Canada. Yet, as many as 25 percent of the respondents noted that they were working in a job that did not make full use of their professional qualifications and experience. Nearly a third of the respondents are health professionals, eight percent are employed in the education field, seven percent occupy management posts, six percent are employed in the sales and service industry, five percent occupy administrative or clerical positions and five percent are employed in the finance, business and banking industry.
- In comparison to immigrants from other Southern African countries, those from South Africa are high earners by Canadian standards. As many as 44 percent of the respondents said they earn more than CDN\$100,000 a year. Over a quarter earn more than CDN\$200,000 a year, yet they remit far less and far less frequently. Nearly 45 percent of the respondents have never remitted funds to South Africa and only 12 percent could be considered regular remitters, sending money to South Africa at least once a month. The rest remit only sporadically. Those who remit send the funds to immediate family members. Over a third (38 percent) of the remitters identified household expenses in South Africa as the major use of the remittances. Levels of savings and investment of remittances are extremely low and there is little evidence of collective remitting for development projects.
- Most South African immigrants in Canada maintain strong contact with their family members in the country and travel relatively frequently to South Africa. As many as 92 percent had visited South Africa at least once since immigrating to Canada and 59 percent had done so in the previous three years. More than 80 percent of the visits were for familyrelated issues and events. Although most regard themselves as South African and display high levels of nostalgia, they hold very negative views about most aspects of life in post-apartheid South Africa.

Some even portrayed themselves as persecuted victims of post-apartheid policies.

- About 40 percent still maintain bank accounts in South Africa, while 22 percent have investments, 14 percent own a house and nine percent own land in South Africa; however, half of the respondents indicated that they do not own any of these assets in South Africa. The survey also showed that the longer immigrants have lived in Canada, the less likely they are to hold assets in South Africa. In other words, over time they progressively disinvest and cut these links.
- Over 80 percent of the South Africans said that they had no interest in any role in the development of South Africa. The survey revealed very low levels of interest in activities such as educational exchanges, volunteer work, philanthropy, skills transfer, import and export of goods, fundraising for projects in South Africa, remitting for development projects and investment in South Africa businesses. Interest in return migration to South Africa is also very low. Only six percent said they were likely to return within the next two years, 10 percent within the next five years and 20 percent at some time in the future.

While the vast majority of South Africans in Canada do not participate in activities typical of an engaged diaspora and do not see themselves playing any role in the future of South Africa, a small minority (around 20 percent) does. What differentiates these engaged South Africans from their peers? There were no significant differences between the two groups on a range of indicators, including where they lived in Canada (city and province), gender, race, education and training (both inside and outside South Africa) and whether or not they had family members in South Africa. Other variables did seem to differentiate the two groups. First, more of the engaged group were in lower income brackets. Second, there is a marked difference between the two groups in terms of their main reason for coming to Canada. Disengaged South Africans were far more likely to cite concerns about safety and security and their children's future than engaged South Africans. Third, engaged South Africans in Canada tend to visit South Africa more frequently than their disengaged counterparts. Finally, they have a much stronger South African identity and hold more positive views about the country and its future. What kinds of links do engaged South Africans maintain with their country of origin?

• While engaged South Africans tend to be lower wage earners than disengaged South Africans, they remit more and do so more regularly. The average annual remittance of the engaged group is more than twice as much as the disengaged group.

- Engaged South Africans are more likely to participate in diaspora organizations and associations than the disengaged. There is a consistent pattern of greater involvement in South Africa on every measure used, ranging from buying property, to investment, importing South African goods for sale and, especially, philanthropy. The intention to engage in the future was also significantly higher among the engaged group. For example, 28 percent said it was likely they would work in South Africa in the next two years (compared to only three percent of the disengaged group). Forty percent said they would fundraise for projects in South Africa, compared to only six percent of the disengaged. Other major differences included sending funds for development projects in South Africa (39 percent versus four percent) and making charitable donations that benefit South Africa (55 percent versus 16 percent).
- Skills transfer was rated as the most important area of interest for future engagement through training programs in South Africa (55 percent of respondents) or working there (53 percent). Forty-four percent of the engaged group were interested in undertaking educational exchanges. Another area of preferred activity is philanthropy, with 54 percent willing to fundraise in Canada for projects in South Africa, 49 percent volunteering in South Africa, 42 percent participating in development projects in South Africa and 34 percent making charitable donations to South Africa. Other activities of interest included investing in South African businesses (34 percent), importing goods from South Africa (27 percent) and investing in infrastructural development (18 percent).
- Given that the engaged group is more favourably disposed towards South Africa on most measures, it is interesting to see if this translates into an intention to return. The engaged and disengaged groups think about this question very differently. Only four percent of the disengaged group have given it a great deal of consideration, compared with a third (34 percent) of the engaged group. Nearly 20 percent of the engaged group said it was likely they would return within two years, compared to only two percent of the disengaged group. At the five-year mark, the figures were 30 percent and three percent. As many as 65 percent of the engaged group thought it likely that they would return at some point (compared to only seven percent of the disengaged group). In other words, the likelihood of engaged South Africans returning to South Africa increases over time, while the likelihood of disengaged South Africans returning is low and static.

Diasporas are well known globally for forming diaspora associations and organizations with those who come from the same country. These associations allow for a range of social, cultural and economic interactions within the diaspora. Besides demonstrating an affinity with the country of origin, diaspora associations can provide an avenue for the diaspora to make meaningful development contributions to those countries. The final section of this report examines the development-related activities of Southern African diaspora organizations in Canada. The study focussed on those associations actively engaging in development initiatives or those with the potential for engaging in such development work. A number of diaspora associations or networks limit their activities to Canada and are given less attention.

The activities discussed here include initiatives by individuals who rely on their diaspora networks, as well as initiatives by groups that, as a collective, raise funds and material resources in Canada to support projects or institutions in their countries or communities of origin. Southern African diaspora organizations engage in a wide variety of collective formal and informal development initiatives in Africa. Most tend to be directed at the grassroots level and generally avoid any form of engagement with national governments. Despite their strong developmental focus and impact, very few associations and projects receive financial or material support from either the Canadian federal or provincial governments. Their main source of support and fundraising is the diaspora itself. These groups could have an even bigger impact if such support was available through, for example, fund-matching programs.

All of the 70 or so groups identified during the research play a role in building, maintaining or strengthening development activities in countries of origin. Given their diversity and function, their contributions to developmentrelated activities are wide-ranging and varied. A number of groups have been directly involved in community projects, from inception to completion, especially those established by diaspora-led charitable or non-profit organizations in Canada. Some diaspora organizations have played a supporting role to organizations or projects already set up in Africa, while others have provided support to Canadian organizations with development projects in SADC countries. In some cases, a collective of diaspora and nondiaspora actors have worked jointly to build up existing systems in SADC countries, such as education and health.

Diaspora-led charitable organizations have contributed to a variety of sectors, including education (school and college/university level), humanitarian assistance, gender and development, poverty reduction, environment and development, food security, basic amenities development and health. The number and strength of diaspora-led charitable/non-profit organizations is not necessarily related to the size of a country's diaspora in Canada. Smaller communities, such as the Zambian diaspora in Canada, have established similar or larger numbers of development-centred organizations compared with larger groups such as the South African and Tanzanian diaspora communities.

The report draws a number of conclusions about the nature and future of engagement in development by Southern African diasporas in Canada. First, redefining immigrants from developing countries in Canada as "diasporas" raises the interesting possibility that there might be real development benefits for those countries from emigration to Canada. This study set out to test this proposition with a subset of African immigrants in Canada. The primary reason for separating out the South Africans in this analysis is that it quickly became clear that there were considerable attitudinal and behavioural differences between this group and other immigrants from Southern Africa. When it comes to the maintenance of links with countries of origin, attitudes towards those countries and engagement in development, the differences are so stark that the term "divided diasporas" was coined.

Second, the South African diaspora in Canada - for all its wealth, privilege and skills — displays an attitudinal and behavioural profile which leads us to the conclusion that it is largely disengaged and unlikely to play a significant role in South Africa's development. The majority used their skills and training acquired in South Africa to immigrate to Canada. However, they do not feel that they owe their country anything in return. Their intention was to leave South Africa, not to look back. The majority of South Africans in Canada hold negative views about their country of origin, are divesting themselves of their resources there and show little inclination to be involved in its development. Our conclusion is that the majority of South Africans in Canada are lost to South Africa and that there is little point in trying to foster diaspora engagement for development among this group as a whole.

Third, the South African diaspora in Canada is itself divided with a minority showing a very different attitudinal profile. This minority, around 20 percent of those interviewed, are far more typical of an engaged diaspora with a genuine desire to be involved in the development of their South Africa. Their efforts and activities need to be profiled, encouraged and supported. Their views and activities are far more similar to those of immigrants from other Southern African countries in Canada than they are to other South African immigrants.

Fourth, immigrants from the Southern African region outside South Africa are characterized in this report as an engaged diaspora. Like many immigrants from Africa, they have a very strong affinity for their countries of origin (Baffoe, 2009-2010). The majority are comparatively recent immigrants to Canada and maintain close personal cultural and economic ties with their countries of origin. Most of these ties are focussed on family living in those countries. The clearest indication of this is their remitting behaviour. Individually, they do not remit large sums but, by the same token, they are not particularly high earners in Canada. They remit cash (and goods) extremely regularly and tend to use formal channels to do so. While most remit to meet the living expenses of relatives, remittances clearly have positive development implications at the household and community level, including contributing to improved food security and nutrition, medical expenses and education.

Fifth, only a small minority use their remittances in a broader development-related manner through investments in community projects, productive activity, entrepreneurship and so on. A significant minority, however, engage in other activities that have development-related implications. For example, a quarter have exported goods from Canada for sale in their countries of origin and one in every ten have imported goods for sale in Canada. The same proportion have invested in business, generated employment and engaged in research partnerships. These numbers could grow rapidly with the return of political and economic stability and opportunity in countries such as Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe.

How can the considerable potential for engagement be better tapped in the future? Disaporas, as individuals or groups, are unlikely to put words into action if it means supporting a government or political system that they consider unacceptable or unrepresentative; however, this does not mean that they will do nothing until the political situation is more to their liking. Highly motivated individuals and groups in Canada have already established a significant and impressive array of community-oriented projects throughout Southern Africa, particularly in education and health, with their own resources and through fundraising within and outside the diaspora. An evaluation of many of these initiatives would help to identify best practices and new ideas that could be scaled up, with appropriate financial backing, for broader impact.

Another challenge is that there is only so much that individuals can do unless they are independently wealthy or have major financial backing. Here, there is a critical enabling role for various types of diaspora organizations, which potentially provide the structure, ideas and resources to harness individual energy and enthusiasm. Diaspora organizations rely heavily on volunteer and pro bono work, and private donations, which affects their ability to develop systematic long-term projects. The Canadian government, in particular, needs to reframe the diaspora as development partners in new ways and to support their work and projects creatively, with dedicated funding and support. By identifying the kinds of activities that members of the diaspora are, or would like to be, engaged in, we hope that this report makes a contribution to this process.

CHAPTER 1: DIASPORAS AND DEVELOPMENT

BRAIN DRAIN OR DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT?

Although Canada is one of the world's most proactive countries regarding immigration, it does not appear to be overly concerned about the possible negative impact of its policies on the countries its immigrants come from (Kelley and Trebilcock, 1998; Green and Green, 2004). This is a legacy from the period when almost all immigrants came from Europe and the impacts of migration to Canada on European countries were fairly modest. This kind of thinking persists but is no longer tenable with more and more Canadian immigrants drawn from poorer developing countries (Biles, Bursten and Frideres, 2008). Canada needs to address the question of the impacts its own immigration policies have on those countries and, where these are negative, to consider how to mitigate them. Canada gives millions of dollars each year in international aid to developing countries. If, at the same time, it is pursuing an immigration policy that deprives those same countries of scarce skills, then its immigration and international development policies are seriously at odds with one another.

The term most often used to describe the emigration of skilled people from Africa to countries like Canada is "brain drain" (Maharaj, 2010; Gibson and McKenzie, 2011; Kalipeni, Semu and Mbilizi, 2012). It was coined in the 1950s and 1960s to describe the emigration of scientists from Britain to North America, but is now widely applied to any form of skilled migration deemed to have damaging consequences for the countries of origin and benefits for the countries of destination - usually advanced industrial nations, including Canada (Johnson, 1965; Gish and Godfrey, 1979; Wright, Flis and Gupta, 2008). The term has also been used in Canada itself to describe the movement of Canadian professionals to the United States (Devoretz, 1999; Finnie, 2001). The sense of moral outrage that brain drain elicits in Africa can be seen in a public outburst by anti-apartheid icon Nelson Mandela in the late 1990s. Lashing out at people who were leaving South Africa, Mandela called them unpatriotic cowards and intimated that the country was better off without them ("Good Riddance," 1998).

African politicians are not the only ones to rail against brain drain; so do the media and many researchers (Reynolds, 2005; York, 2011; McAllester, 2012). A contributor to the *British Medical Journal*, for example, suggested that brain "suction" rather than "drainage" would be a more apt metaphor (Richards, 2002). Others feel that Africa's skills are being "poached" or "looted" by the West in a "great brain robbery" (Patel, 2003; Singh et al., 2003; Snyder 2009). Health recruiters are labelled "global raiders" and "merchants of medical care" (Crush, 2002; Connell and Stilwell, 2006). Incentives to emigrate are called "grab factors" and the medical brain drain, in particular, is seen as a "fatal flow" for source countries (Muula, 2005; Chen and Boufford, 2005). Others argue that the brain drain produces "intolerable inequities" in health-care access between Africa and the West, and represents a "catastrophe" for African development (Mensah, Mackintosh and Henry, 2005; Bach, 2008). Some have suggested that the brain drain of scarce human resources from Africa should be viewed as an "international crime" (Mills et al., 2008). It has even been called a "sugar-coated" version of the old slave trade, a plundering of Africa's human resources for the benefit of the West (Benedict and Ukpere, 2012).

Beyond the rhetoric, critics have noted negative impacts, including the loss of Africa's "best and brightest," skill shortages in the public and private sectors, loss of public investment in training and skills development, and economic decline (Kapur and McHale, 2005). According to the World Bank:

High-skilled emigration can also impair development by reducing the supply of critical services; limiting productivity spillovers to both high- and low-skilled workers; reducing the potential for innovative and creative activities that are at the core of long-term growth; and limiting contributions to the health of social, political, and economic institutions. The loss of workers educated at public expense can represent a substantial fiscal drain, and the many universityeducated African emigrants who fail to obtain skilled jobs in high-income destination countries represent a lost investment in human capital. (Ratha et al., 2011: 7)

In the health sector, documented damages include reduced access to basic and advanced health care, a growing disease burden and under-qualified personnel performing tasks for which they were not trained (Awases et al., 2004; Schrecker and Labonte, 2004; Chikanda, 2006; Dovlo, 2006; Gerein, Green and Pearson, 2006; Kirigia et al., 2006; Chikanda, 2007; Connell et al., 2007; Khaliq, Broyles and Mwachofi, 2009; Naicker et al., 2009):

> Understaffing results in stress and increased workloads. Many of the remaining health professionals are ill-motivated, not only because of their workload, but also because they are poorly paid, poorly equipped and have limited career opportunities. These, in turn, lead to a downward spiral where workers migrate, crippling the system, placing a greater strain on the remaining workers who themselves seek to migrate out of the poor working conditions. (Labonte et al., 2006: 6)

Several researchers argue that the deepening crisis of health-care delivery in Africa is exacerbated by a combination of the increased demands of the HIV and AIDS epidemic and the medical brain drain (Bhargava and Docquier, 2008; Dambisya et al., 2009). The negative economic impacts of brain drain on developing countries have also been examined in some depth. The general conclusion seems to be that although the loss of a single skilled professional by a developing country is one too many, the economic impacts do vary from country to country. If South Africa loses 100 doctors, engineers and accountants, the overall impact is likely to be much less significant than if Lesotho or Swaziland loses the same number.

A group of European and American neo-liberal economists has challenged critics of high-skilled emigration, arguing that the way that brain drain is conceptualized and discussed is inaccurate and misleading. Michael Clemens, a researcher at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC, for example, suggests that it is time to bury the "unpleasant and judgemental" term in favour of a more "brief, accurate and neutral" term such as "skill flow" (Clemens, 2009: 34). In the context of a highly polarized debate, this alternative is neither neutral nor accurate, since it suggests that brain drain is a "natural" process without causation or direction. While the suggestion is unlikely to find much traction in Africa, it is certainly true that the term is not, and was never meant to be, value-free. Since its inception, the term has embodied a critique of the causes of skills migration and the impact on countries of origin.

Critics of the brain drain idea argue that there is little evidence to suggest it is responsible for the parlous state of African economies and health-care systems and counter, in fact, that the migration of professionals can have significant positive benefits for countries of origin (Stark, 2004; Skeldon, 2008). A Brookings Institute working paper, for example, maintains that "contrary to a lot of the worries expressed in the media and in aid agencies, the brain drain is probably a net benefit to the source countries" (Easterly and Nyarko, 2008). How can this be? First, the Brookings paper argues that the African brain drain "is not large enough to have much effect on Africa's skills gap relative to the rest of the world" (ibid.). Second, it suggests that the gains to the migrants themselves, and to their families who receive indirect benefits and remittances, more than offset the losses of the brain drain. Third, it argues that the value of remittances more than covers the cost of educating a "brain drainer" in the source country (ibid.). Finally, it asserts that the brain drain "has a positive effect on skill accumulation that appears to offset one for one the loss of skills" (ibid.). This means that a brain drain becomes an incentive for more people to acquire the education and skills that will allow them to leave. The pool of local skills expands, but since not everyone can or will leave, the result is a net expansion in a country's skill base (Fan and Stark, 2007; Schiff, 2006).

All of these arguments (with the possible exception of the second) are highly contentious and the subject of ongoing debate. African researchers and policy makers might argue that it is hardly surprising that economists in Europe and North America have attacked the whole idea of brain drain, given that these are the regions that benefit most from skills migration from Africa. Sometimes the debate is not between Africans and those in the North at all, but between researchers with differing ideological positions within the North. In late 2011, for example, a research team at the University of Ottawa attempted to calculate the magnitude of the financial savings (in terms of training costs avoided) provided by the brain drain from nine African countries to the United Kingdom, the United States, Canada and Australia (Mills et al., 2011). Based on the number of doctors working from these source countries and the average cost of medical education in the destination countries, the University of Ottawa researchers calculated a savings of at least US\$2.7 billion for the United Kingdom, US\$846 million for the United States, US\$621 million for Australia and US\$384 million for Canada, for a combined total of US\$4.55 billion (ibid.).

In a strongly worded rejoinder, Clemens noted that "it [made him] sad to see such unscientific analysis in a respected scientific forum like the British Medical Journal" (Clemens, 2011a). Clemens accused the University of Ottawa research group of making "back-of-the-envelope" calculations, asserting that aspects of their argument were "indefensible," "incoherent" and seriously mistaken: "If all this public investment were 'lost' to Africa, to say that 'migration' causes that loss is like saying that tires cause a car's movement" (ibid.). He concluded that "policy must not be based on simplistic arithmetic and unjustified economic assumptions, but on a fuller economic consideration of the subject" (ibid.). One of his substantive arguments was that the Ottawa study did not discount the substantial amounts of money that physicians are known to remit to their countries of origin - supposedly double what it cost to train them (Clemens, 2011b).

This dispute highlights a basic question about brain drain impacts: when individuals emigrate from Africa, are they an absolute loss to their families, communities and countries? The simple answer to this question is usually not, although the more general impact of their departure depends on who and how many people leave, what kinds of links they maintain with their home countries and whether they develop new links once they are settled abroad. This reality has led to the idea that the very real costs of the brain drain must be set against the compensating benefits in a kind of "balance sheet" approach. In Africa and Asia, there is growing interest in government and business circles in proactively forging mutually beneficial linkages with citizens or former citizens living in other countries.

DEFINING DIASPORAS

A decade after Mandela's renunciation of South African emigrants, a very different attitude is developing in Africa towards those who have departed. Throughout the continent, those who have left are increasingly viewed in a positive light for a number of reasons. The personal blame and finger pointing embedded in the idea of brain drain is being replaced by an acknowledgement that, in an increasingly mobile and globalized world, people with the means, desire and incentive to move will do so, and trying to stop them infringes on their freedom of movement. Skilled emigration has become a reality whose negative impacts need to be addressed urgently.

Individuals and groups who have left Africa clearly become significant contributors to the massive global flow of remittances to the continent (Maimbo and Ratha, 2005; Mohapatra and Ratha, 2011; Ratha et al., 2011). Many are independently and informally engaged in activities relating to their countries of origin that have positive development aims and outcomes. As a result, governments and international organizations are increasingly viewing these expatriates as important resources and agents of change and development, and are actively seeking them out. There is also evidence that brain drains can be partially reversed, as has happened in India and China, with returning migrants often bringing invaluable knowledge, skills, technology, capital and networks acquired abroad (Saxenien, 2005).

To break conventional ideas of immigration as a onetime, permanent move from one country to another, and immigrants as people who largely abandon their countries of origin for a new life in another country, a new language is needed to acknowledge that many immigrants maintain active links and interests with their countries of origin. The term diaspora has been increasingly used by migration researchers and policy makers to try to capture this reality. Central to the notion of immigrants as a diaspora is a continued identification with the country of origin: an attachment that facilitates the transfer of resources and ideas from the country of destination to the country of origin. Robin Cohen, an eminent international scholar on the subject of diasporas and a member of the South African diaspora in the United Kingdom, has suggested that diasporas have the following generic characteristics:

- dispersal from an original homeland, often traumatically, to two or more foreign nations;
- the expansion from a homeland in search of work, in pursuit of trade or to further colonial ambition;
- a collective memory and myth about the homeland, including its location, history and achievements;

- an idealization of the putative ancestral home and a collective commitment to its maintenance, restoration, safety, prosperity, even to its creation;
- the development of a return movement that gains collective support;
- a strong ethnic group consciousness sustained over a long period of time and based on a sense of distinctiveness, a common history and the belief in a common fate;
- a possibly troubled relationship with host societies, suggesting a lack of acceptance or the possibility that another calamity might befall this group;
- a sense of empathy and solidarity with co-ethnic members in other countries of settlement; and
- the possibility of a distinctive creative, enriching life in host countries with a tolerance of pluralism. (Cohen, 1997)

More recent definitions have focussed less on the common cultural characteristics identified by Cohen, and more on the material links that members of a diaspora maintain with one another and with their countries of origin. One definition consistent with this emphasis sees diasporas as "populations of migrant origin, who are scattered among two or more destinations, between which there develop multifarious links involving flows and exchanges of people and resources; between the homeland and destination countries, and among destination countries" (Van Hear et al., 2004: 3).

The African Union (AU) has designated the African diaspora as the "sixth region" of Africa (along with Southern, Eastern, Central, West and North Africa). In practice, the African diaspora is scattered around the world. Recently, it has been suggested that there are also significant African diasporas within Africa itself (Crush, 2011). Whether located inside or outside the continent, many now feel that the African diaspora is an untapped resource for African economic, social and human development (Kaplan, 1997; Ndofor-Tah, 2000; Newland and Patrick, 2004; Kuznetsov, 2006a; Brinkerhoff, 2009; Plaza and Ratha, 2011). This, in turn, has led to the idea of "diaspora engagement," which occurs when individuals or groups in a destination country participate in activities in, or relating to, their countries of origin that have positive development impacts and implications for those countries:

> Diasporas may act as "bridges" between the destination and the source countries, and they can stimulate trade, investments and the transfer of technology. The hypothesis that migration may generate positive externalities on the source country may be true not only with regard to trade, investments and technology diffusion but also for

other areas as well. In particular, migrants to more democratic societies may have a positive impact on the social, economic, and political institutions in their home countries...Although much work has investigated whether expatriate networks can induce trade, other issues remain almost entirely unexplored. Nevertheless, the literature does show that the diaspora may be important for the development of migrants' origin countries. (Lodigiani, 2009: 36)

There is now a growing emphasis on identifying and developing policies to encourage these forms of engagement as a way of contributing to the development of their countries of origin (Agunias, 2009; Newland and Tanaka, 2010; Brinkerhoff, 2011a; 2012; Agunias and Newland, 2012). Kuznetsov (2006a) notes that members of diaspora communities have three resources that position them to make potential contributions to the development of their countries of origin: an unusually high motivation to have a significant influence on the course of events in those countries; new knowledge and expertise that can be transferred in various ways; and financial resources to act on new opportunities and perceived needs. A useful starting point is to group diaspora home-country-focussed activities into economic, political, social and cultural dimensions (Table 1.1).

The AU (2005: 7) specifically defines the African diaspora as "people of African origin...who are willing to contribute to the development of the continent and the building of the [AU]." This seems a rather narrow definition since it precludes any consideration of those who choose, for whatever reason, not to contribute to development in Africa. A workable definition of diasporas, therefore, needs to include those who do and do not contribute to the development of the continent. One of the aims of this study is to find out why some members of a diaspora engage and others do not. The presence of a large immigrant community in a destination country, however, does not automatically translate into development impacts in their country of origin. It is therefore important to understand whether and under what conditions individuals, households and communities choose to maintain an active interest in the development of their country of origin. There is no easy or automatic answer to this question. Only by systematic research with those concerned can we begin to understand why some turn their backs on where they came from, why others take an active interest in the country left behind and how greater engagement might be encouraged and supported by policy makers.

DIASPORA REMITTANCES

Global remittance flows were estimated to exceed US\$440 billion in 2010, with developing countries receiving US\$325.5 billion (World Bank, 2011). This is three times as large as official development aid and almost as large as foreign direct investment (FDI) in developing countries. Remittance flows are much more stable than private capital flows and tend to be less volatile to changing economic cycles (Ratha, 2003). Remittances have been shown to reduce the level, depth and severity of poverty: a 10 percent increase in per capita official international remittances will lead, on average, to a 3.5 percent decline in the share of people living in poverty (Adams and Page, 2005). One study of the socio-economic impact of remittances on poverty reduction suggests that the two primary motivations for remitting are risk sharing and altruism, and the two main uses of remittances received are consumption and productive investment (Table 1.2) (Chimhowu, Piesse and Pinder, 2005). As Table 1.3 shows, potential impacts can be felt at different scales (household, community, national and international) and can be divided into poverty-reducing impacts and various other impacts (ibid.).

Economic	Political	Social	Cultural
financial remittances	participation in elections	• visits to friends and family	cultural events, including
• other remittances (for example,	• membership of political parties	social contacts	visiting performers from the home country
medicine or clothes)		social remittances	the nome country
investments		• contributions to newspapers	
charitable donations		circulated in home country	
• taxes			
purchase of government bonds			
purchase of entry to government programs			

TABLE 1.1: DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES IN COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

Source: Van Hear et al., 2004.

Motivation	Consumption	Productive Investment
Risk sharing	remittances help households cope with risks	remittances help households manage idiosyncratic risks
	 cash receipts are used to purchase daily food and luxury consumables or to purchase locally available essential services (health, education) 	• investment in liquid assets such as livestock, agricultural implements and new technologies help households to cope better in future
		• ensures the household functions day to day
Altruism	• goods and gifts are sent to the household to fulfill	remittances are used to expand available capital assets
	altruistic obligations to the family	• indirect benefit to the household, but long-term benefit to the wider community

TABLE 1.2: REMITTANCE MOTIVATION AND USE

Source: Chimhowu, Piesse and Pinder, 2005: 90.

TABLE 1.3: KEY IMPACTS OF REMITTANCES ON POVERTY AT DIFFERENT LEVELS

Recipient	Poverty-reducing Impact
Household	income and consumption smoothing
	• increased savings and asset accumulation (liquid and non-liquid assets), collateral for loans, liquidity in times of crisis
	• improved access to health services and better nutrition (potential for improved productivity)
	access to better education for longer, reducing child labour
	 increased social capital and ability to participate in social groups and activities, savings clubs, money rounds, reciprocal labour pools
	improved access to information
Community	improved local physical infrastructure
	growth of local commodity markets
	• development of local capital markets and availability of new services: banking, retail and trade, travel, construction
	development of new development institutions
	changes to cultural practices, especially attitudes toward girl children
	generation of local employment opportunities
	reduction of inequality between households, particularly for poor households
National	improved foreign currency inflows, in some countries up to nine percent of GDP
	employment creation as remittances are invested in the productive sectors
	increased human capital as migrants learn new skills and work practices
International	reduction in inequality among countries as remittances exceed official aid transfers in some regions

Source: Chimhowu, Piesse and Pinder, 2005: 95-96.

There is a growing amount of research into the variety of remittance patterns and remitting behaviours of immigrants in Canada, including from countries such as Haiti, Jamaica, Brazil, Vietnam, Ghana and Somalia (Hernández-Coss, 2005; Hamza, 2006; Wong, 2006; Simmons, Plaza and Piché, 2009; Todoroki, Vaccani and Noor, 2009; Goza and Ryabov, 2012). A recent Statistics Canada survey of the remitting behaviour of immigrants in their first four years in Canada confirms this observation (Houle and Schellenberg, 2008). The survey tracked the remitting patterns of migrants who entered Canada between 2000 and 2001. On average, 26 percent of Canadian immigrants remitted funds to their country of origin in their first four years in Canada; however, the incidence of remitting varied markedly from source region to region (Table 1.4). Immigrants from Southeast Asia (54 percent) and the Caribbean (50 percent) were the heaviest remitters, while those from East Asia, North Africa and the Middle East were the lowest (16 percent). Immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa were well above the overall average, at 39 percent. The average amounts remitted also differed considerably, from CDN\$1,500 per year in the case of Caribbean immigrants, to CDN\$3,600 per year in the case of South Asian immigrants. Statistics Canada also provides information on a selection of countries to illustrate the range of remitting behaviour. Immigrants from the Philippines and Haiti were most likely to remit (around 60 percent) and those from South Korea the least (less than 10 percent) (Figure 1.1). The only African country shown was Nigeria (at around 48 percent). Countries ranked very differently with regard to average amounts remitted: the United States, South Korea and India were top (at over CDN\$4,000 per year), followed by Mexico, Lebanon, Nigeria and China (all between CDN\$3,000


and CDN\$4,000 per year) (Figure 1.2). Another recent study on the characteristics of African remittance senders in nine Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries found that the average annual remittance sent by diaspora households was US\$1,263. Africans tend to remit more often than migrants from other areas and African migrants from poorer countries are more likely to remit than those from richer countries (Bollard, McKenzie and Morten, 2010).

TABLE 1.4: REMITTING PATTERNS FROM CANADA

Region	Proportion of Immigrants Who Remitted (%)	Average Amount Remitted per Year (CDN\$)
Southeast Asia	54	2,200
Caribbean	50	1,500
Sub-Saharan Africa	39	2,500
Eastern Europe	37	1,900
South Asia	25	3,600
Central and South America	24	2,000
East Asia	16	3,500
North Africa and Middle East	16	2,300
Total all regions combined	26	2,700

Data source: Houle and Schellenberg, 2008.

FIGURE 1.1: PROPORTION OF IMMIGRANTS IN CANADA WHO REMIT TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN



Data source: Houle and Schellenberg, 2008.





FIGURE 1.2: AVERAGE AMOUNT REMITTED BY IMMIGRANTS IN CANADA



The probability of remitting from Canada did not vary significantly with the immigrant's class of entry. Familyclass immigrants were just as likely to remit as economic immigrants (29 percent) and both were marginally less likely to remit than refugees (31 percent); however, the amounts remitted did differ significantly. Economic migrants had the highest average remittance (CDN\$3,000 per year) and the greatest proportion of those remitting over CDN\$5,000 per year (12 percent, compared with five percent of refugees). In contrast, refugees had the lowest average remittance (CDN\$1,900 per year) and the greatest proportion of those remitting less than CDN\$500 per year (45 percent, compared with 21 percent of economic immigrants). Another study used a subset of the Statistics Canada data and identified several other variables that affect remitting behaviour:

> Remittances rise with income, jobs and age, though at a decreasing rate — and, in the latter two cases, they eventually decline. Higher housing costs and more family responsibilities in Canada reduce remittances. Higher levels of educational attainment are also associated with lower remittances. Those identifying stronger intentions to support their family at home or who invest in their home country remit more, while those with seemingly stronger financial ties to Canada remit less. A migrant's region of origin is also important, although religion and attitudes towards integration seem to matter much less. (Unheim and Rowlands, 2010: 133)

"Collective" remittances by groups of immigrants to groups or communities in their countries of origin are thought to offer considerable development potential, although they tend to bear more resemblance to charitable and philanthropic donations than productive investments (Goldring, 2004). Remittances for collective projects generally fall into four categories: basic infrastructure and communications projects; public service infrastructure related to education, health and social security; recreational; and other community or urbanization projects. Most of the projects carried out to date with collective remittances thus focus on public goods. The best-documented case of collective remitting is from migrants to rural home communities in Mexico (Aparicio and Meseguer, 2012).

Migrants generally remit goods as well as cash. These remittances in-kind need to be seen as part of the overall remittance package for two reasons: first, most goods have a definite cost to the purchaser and cash value. In many cases, goods are purchased and sent because they are much more expensive or do not exist locally; however, most studies of remittances focus only on cash remitting. This is especially true of studies using International Monetary Fund and World Bank data, including those by the Bank itself. Second, the nature of the goods remitted is an important indication of the reasons they are sent and the needs of households in countries of origin. While some goods are unsolicited gifts, the vast majority of goods are sent in response to an actual or perceived need of the household itself. It is therefore important to know not only the cash value of goods remitted, but the character of the goods themselves.

DIASPORA ENTREPRENEURS

Members of the diaspora who have been particularly successful economically in other countries are in a

position to do much more than send remittances to family members in their countries of origin. Many developing countries are anxious to increase FDI and diasporas are viewed as potential "pioneer investors," especially when major capital markets regard these economies as too risky (Kuznetsov, 2006b). Other entrepreneurial activities of note include "nostalgia trade" (which meets the demand of diasporas for products from their country of origin) and "diaspora-led import/export businesses," which have a more diverse product base and clientele (Wong and Ng, 2002). The extent of global diaspora entrepreneurship and investment is not known with any certainty, although the cases of China and India are well-documented (Guha and Ray, 2000; Bajpai and Dasgupta, 2004; Smart and Hsu, 2004; Roy and Banerjee, 2007; Zhu, 2007; Tsai, 2010). A study in 2001, for example, showed that the diaspora provided an estimated 70 percent of FDI in China in the 1990s (Devan and Tewari, 2001). The Indian diaspora is estimated to have invested US\$2.6 billion out of US\$10 billion of FDI between 1991 and 2001 (Yingqi and Balasubramanyam, 2006). More recently, a global study of diasporas in the OECD found that a one percent increase in migration from a particular country leads to a 0.1 to 0.25 percent increase in FDI in that country (Gormsen and Pytlikova, 2012). While there have been some studies of African diaspora entrepreneurship, few have focussed on the Southern African region (Sheikh and Tanaka, 2009; Chaco and Price, 2009; Belai, 2007; Negash, 2009).

The Migration Policy Institute (MPI) has proposed five different levels of diaspora entrepreneurial engagement with countries of origin: networking, mentoring, training, investment and partnerships (Figure 1.3). These different levels describe "ascending levels of commitment" to the entrepreneurial project (Newland and Tanaka, 2010: 18). More passive forms of support towards the bottom of the pyramid "proliferate and dissipate" more quickly than the active forms of engagement at higher levels (ibid.). Diaspora entrepreneurship and investment have the following potential development impacts on the countries of origin:

- sustainable local business development, job creation and innovation;
- integration of developing countries into global economic, trade and knowledge networks;
- transfer of new technologies and skills from North to South (Kapur, 2001; Gueron and Spevacek, 2008; Nanda and Khanna, 2010);
- identification of new economic opportunities through their local knowledge, contacts and cultural familiarity (Leblang, 2001);
- diaspora members act as early innovators into a country, which may act as a catalyst for further investment by diaspora and non-diaspora members;
- contributions to the development of capital markets in countries of origin (Terrazas, 2010);
- encouraging FDI by providing market and operational information about the homeland to potential investors and brokering relationships with buyers, suppliers, partners, government officials and lending institutions in the homeland; and
- acting as sources of local knowledge about investment opportunities, information about regulations and procedures, or familiarity with language and customs decrease the transaction costs associated with investment (Newland and Tanaka, 2010; Debass and Ardovino, 2009).




FIGURE 1.3: LEVELS OF COMMITMENT TO DIASPORA ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Source: Newland and Tanaka, 2010.

Not much is known about what motivates diaspora individuals and groups to invest in their countries of origin and why levels of investment and entrepreneurial engagement differ considerably from country to country (Galetto, 2011). Two models have recently been proposed to try and understand the factors that influence the level and type of engagement by diaspora investors and entrepreneurs (Table 1.5). The first focusses almost exclusively on the availability (or absence) of investment opportunities in countries of origin and argues that it is the interaction among factors (or "nodes"), rather than the factors per se that create the conditions for investment (Galetto, 2011: 301). This model identifies four basic nodes: the earning capacity of the migrant and the amount of money remitted; a minimum level of local development; suitable investment opportunities; and intra-household arrangements that facilitate the adoption of new investment opportunities. Each node is, in turn, influenced by a set of sub-factors in countries of origin and destination. A second psycho-social model focusses more on the decision making of the potential entrepreneur investor, arguing that there are three specific categories of return likely to impact on the motivation to engage: financial, social and emotional (Nielsen and Riddle, 2007). The model also tries to take into account cultural and structural variables that might affect motivations to invest.

Both models help to identify factors that interact and impact on diaspora entrepreneurial engagement. Other important variables that need to be taken into account include: the reasons for leaving the country of origin; the opportunities for creating wealth and raising capital in the country of destination; the facilitating role of diaspora organizations; the degree of personal and community identification with, or alienation from, the political system of the country of origin; and financial and other incentives for investment put in place by origin governments (Riddle, Brinkerhoff and Nielsen, 2007; Nielsen and Riddle, 2008). Several studies have explored the motivations of diasporas to invest in the reconstruction of post-conflict societies (Mohamoud, 2007; Nielsen and Riddle, 2008; Hammond et al., 2011; Brinkerhoff, 2011b; Antwi-Boateng, 2012). Others have suggested that attitudes towards government and the political system more generally play an important role. Diaspora investors tend to be wary, for example, of countries with a "disabling environment" - high levels of bureaucratic red tape, corruption and political instability, even while they may be sizable remitters to their own family members still living there (Brinkerhoff, 2012). Not all countries are equally amenable to diaspora entrepreneurship and those that are "tend to have promising prospects for economic growth, as well as proactive diaspora engagement policies, good governance, positive socio-cultural perceptions of entrepreneurship, a critical mass of human and social

capital, and accessible financial institutions and pools of capital" (Newland and Tanaka, 2010: 1).

DIASPORA PHILANTHROPISTS

The growth of diaspora communities has generated a growing interest in the developmental potential of diaspora philanthropy (Brinkerhoff, 2008). Diaspora philanthropy refers to "the private donations of diaspora populations to a wide range of causes in their countries of origin" (Agunias and Newland, 2012: 187). There is no consensus on whether remittances should be included in the calculation of total diaspora philanthropy. The primary argument against viewing remittances as a form of philanthropy is that they are really private transfers to family members and are not meant for public benefit (Mehta and Johnson, 2011). Yet, totally excluding remittances from diaspora philanthropy could lead to an underestimation of the full extent of diaspora giving. A number of studies therefore see remittances as an integral part of diaspora philanthropy (Copeland-Carson, 2007; Newland, Terrazas and Munster, 2010).

The basic premise of diaspora philanthropy is that it converts private wealth into philanthropic capital (Johnson, 2007). Among its constituent elements are charitable giving from individuals who reside outside their homeland, who maintain a sense of solidarity with their home country, give to causes or organizations in that country, and give for public benefit (ibid.: 5). One study of diaspora philanthropic giving in the Philippines observed that it was motivated by the following factors: a desire to give back to the country of birth, motivated by a sense of gratitude for the life lived in the country of origin; compassion for the poor and underprivileged, especially in their hometowns; a desire to "pay back," especially among those who were themselves poor or underprivileged before they left for abroad; a wish to maintain their ties with their country of birth; a desire to prove that they have succeeded in their adopted country and are now in a position to be generous; an expression of their faith, which encourages sharing and giving to the less privileged; and a desire to provide humanitarian assistance to help victims of a natural disaster (Garchitorena, 2007). Amongst the Kenyan diaspora in the United States, the principle of ubuntu, which emphasizes common humanity, interdependence and mutual responsibility for others, is another driving force behind diaspora philanthropy (Copeland-Carson, 2007).

TABLE 1.5: DIASPORA INVESTMENT MODELS

Diaspora Investment Model One
Node 1: Investment is contingent on the earning capacity and amount of money remitted.
level of integration into labour market in destination country
access to employment through social networks
• legal status
time since immigration
level of social capital
level of human capital
economic situation of country of destination
economic sector in which migrant is employed
Node 2: Investment is contingent on a minimum level of local development.
provision of basic services
availability of physical infrastructure
minimum level of commercialization
market demand and accessibility of markets
availability of natural resources
public-private partnership opportunities
Node 3: Investment is contingent on suitable investment opportunities.
entry-level requirements that can be met by local population
prior local experience minimizes risks and uncertainties
Node 4: Investment is contingent on household arrangements.
pooling of income and capital
 split households with complementary roles in origin and destination countries
social norms about gender roles
• place of business activity within (where those who remain manage the business)
Diaspora Investment Model Two
Financial motivations
the potential for financial returns on investment in country of origin
 diaspora members' perception of "ethnic advantage" in business (knowledge of and social capital in the country of origin)
Social motivations
• the potential for social returns (e.g., social recognition, stronger social relations, "homeland duty")
• the density and strength of a diaspora member's social network ties within their diaspora community (or social embeddedness)
 the density and strength of a diaspora member's social network ties in the country of origin
Emotional motivations
• the potential for emotional returns (altruism, feelings of personal satisfaction, psychological rewards)
 the degree to which diaspora members are emotionally invested in their diaspora community
 the degree to which diaspora members are emotionally invested in their country of origin

Data sources: Galetto, 2011; Nielsen and Riddle, 2007.

Both individual and institutional actors are involved in diaspora philanthropy (Table 1.6). Prominent individual diaspora members, for instance, are known to raise cash to support various causes in the home country (Singh and Singh, 2007). Other diaspora members choose to channel their resources to intermediary agencies that support various initiatives and projects in the country of origin (Newland, Terrazas and Munster, 2010). Examples of such initiatives include the African Women's Development Fund, which raises funds from US-based diasporas and directs them to projects in Africa, and the African Federation Inc., a multi-ethnic, national intermediary designed to build the capacity of emerging US-African non-profits (Copeland-Carson, 2007). Three main donor actors have gained special prominence in recent years (Johnson, 2007). First, diaspora associations have emerged as powerful philanthropic players. They include hometown associations (HTAs), which are small voluntary associations organized by migrants from the same country of origin who reside in close proximity to each other and professionals' associations, whose main role is to support and protect the interests of its members. These diaspora associations may eventually develop strong philanthropic programs (Aikins, Sands and White, 2009). Second, diaspora foundations and philanthropic intermediaries have been established to encourage and facilitate philanthropic giving to a specific country or region. These organizations essentially connect diaspora donors with causes and organizations in the country of origin (Bakshi and Baron, 2011). Third, new actors and models are taking advantage of opportunities that have arisen in the diaspora philanthropic sphere. They include community foundations, whose main role is to support issues and organizations in a local or regional geographical area. The Kenyan Community Development Fund (KCDF), for example, was founded in 2001 by a coalition of Kenyan leaders interested in fostering and giving support to local development. KCDF established a US arm in 2006, called Friends of KCDF, which raises funds to support initiatives in Kenya (Copeland-Carson, 2007). New technologies, such as mobile phones, the Internet and other information technologies are likely to revolutionize diaspora philanthropy, as it has become easier for potential donors to identify causes to support. For instance, the website GiveIndia.org posts a list of approximately 100 certified non-profit organizations that donors can contribute to (Johnson, 2007).

A study of philanthropy by diasporas in the United States found several common features of diaspora giving (Najam, 2007). First, there is a strong desire among diasporas to give to individuals in need, rather than to institutional causes, despite the fact that they do not benefit from the economies of scale that come with pooling resources. Part of the reason is that most donors want to be more "hands on" and involved, while beneficiary institutions view them simply as donors, regardless of the fact that diaspora knowledge and experience may sometimes make a bigger contribution than their financial resources (Kapur, Mehta and Dutt, 2004). Second, many diasporas are distrustful of institutions in their countries of origin. The Pakistan diaspora, for instance, has responded by setting up its own non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the country, that not only channel the funds they raise, but also provide a role model of institutional governance (Najam, 2006). Third, philanthropic giving serves as a crucial psychological and cultural need for diaspora communities, whether in terms of national, regional/ community or religious identity. While this can potentially widen social, political or religious rifts in the country of origin, in some cases, such identity can be used to promote greater community good (Sidel, 2004). The Egyptian Coptic community in the United States, for example, raises funds to support Coptic orphanages in Egypt. By 2005, it had served over 10,500 children in Egypt with annual donations of over US\$1 million from the Coptic diaspora (Brinkerhoff, 2008). Fourth, constrained giving instruments are a key hurdle to greater diaspora giving. This is especially true in the aftermath of 9/11, which has made it more difficult to send money internationally. Thus, without cheap and easily available means of transferring funds, a large amount of philanthropic potential remains untapped (Najam, 2007).

The literature on diaspora philanthropy in Canada is much smaller, although Mehta and Johnson (2011: 4) argue that the phenomenon is growing as a result of "the pervasiveness of globalization, the changing composition of the Canadian population, evolving allegiances, and a growing global consciousness of diasporic buying power." A 2007 survey of Canadian gift-giving found that immigrants contribute 20 percent of all charitable donations in Canada and the probability and size of giftgiving increases the longer a person has been in Canada. This survey, however, did not distinguish between donations to local or overseas organizations. Indeed, "there are very few comprehensive statistics available about how Canada's diaspora is giving back to their countries of origin" (ibid.).

Individual Donor		Donor Aggregation		
		Individual Donor	Multiple Donors	
Donation Size	Small	Some remittances, individual donations	HTAs, online platforms, small foundations	
	Large	Direct donations from magnates, celebrities, sports stars; large foundations established by such individuals	Professional associations, family foundations, venture philanthropy funds	

TABLE 1.6: DIASPORA PHILANTHROPY MATRIX

Source: Newland, Terrazas and Munster, 2010.

DIASPORA KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS

One of the defining features of diasporas is that they are usually spread between two or more destination countries. This presents opportunities for diaspora members to network both within and across countries, furthering their economic and social interests. Among emigrant skilled professionals, knowledge networks can help diasporas build new establishments in their countries of origin. Diaspora knowledge networks (DKNs) have played a critical and highly visible role in accelerating technology exchange and FDI in China, India, Israel and the United States (Kuznetsov and Sabel, 2006). Advocates have promoted their broader potential for converting the "brain drain" into a "brain gain" (Meyer, 2001; Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006; Biao, 2005). DKNs also allow migrantsending countries to access the social capital accumulated by its expatriates (Meyer, 2007). These networks have also received support from international organizations such as the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the UN Development Program's (UNDP's) Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) program (Rizvi, 2007). The five most common DKNs are summarized in Table 1.7 (Meyer and Brown, 1999).

DKNs can make a number of important contributions to the development of the home country: the exchange of scientific, technical, administrative or political information; specialist knowledge transfer; "scientific or technological diplomacy," or promoting the home country in the research and development and business community of the host country; joint projects, partly on a virtual basis (distant working, simulations); training: attending homecountry sessions and meeting/mentoring students abroad (a feature shared by most networks of this type); enterprise creation (including multinational subsidiaries) to assist the possible return of expatriates on a part-time or permanent basis; and ad hoc consultations, for example on research/ development projects (peer review, job recruitment and technology assessment) (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006: 8).

The success of DKNs depend on a number of factors, including the nature and extent of the intellectual capital of the networks; the level of organization of the networks; the home country governments' commitments to "genuinely engage" their intellectual diasporas; the perceptions and attitudes of home communities toward their intellectual exiles; the existence of policy frameworks, resources, infrastructure and so on to involve networks in national development efforts; the technical and logistical issues involved in engaging the diaspora network; and the compatibility of the home and diaspora environments in supporting partnership and interaction (Teferra, 2004).

In 2007, at least 50 countries had developed, or tried to develop, networks for and with their diasporas (Leclerc

and Meyer, 2007). They include the well-known Caldas network of scientists and engineers abroad that was set up in 1991 with the aim of mobilizing, gathering and reconnecting expatriates with Colombia. At its peak, the network had over 800 members from 25 different countries (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006). In South Africa, the South African Network of Skills Abroad (SANSA) once seemed to be a promising initiative (Meyer and Brown, 1999). However, the effort to link diaspora South Africans with each other and with employers and potential partners in South Africa petered out when SANSA left the University of Cape Town (UCT) and moved to the Department of Arts, Culture, Science and Technology (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006; Seguin et al., 2006). Another example with a short lifespan was the South African Diaspora Network (Marks 2004; 2006). More recently, a network called Global South Africans has emerged to promote South Africa abroad and to link high-profile South Africans in the diaspora to pursue initiatives jointly that would benefit that country (Global South Africans, 2013).


It is difficult to establish exact trends in the formation of DKNs at the global level. Attempts to enumerate these networks at various times illustrate this complexity, as Figure 1.4 shows (Meyer, 2006). In 2006, the number of DKNs in Latin America, Asia and Africa was said to be 158 by one study, while another found 191 operational networks the same year. Africa seems to be doing well, relative to other continents, when it comes to the establishment of DKNs. In the first study, Africa had 51 of the 158 networks identified (Table 1.8) (Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006).

DKN	Description and Characteristics	
Student/scholarly networks	Offer assistance to students studying abroad and encourage the sharing of information and dialogue between scholars. They often facilitate studies abroad and reintegration into the highly qualified labour market afterwards. They have a limited scope in terms of activities and contributions to the country of origin.	
Local associations of skilled expatriates	Groups of highly skilled professionals who meet regularly on both a professional and social level. The aim is to promote the professional interests of members as well as to socialize on a more personal level.	
TOKTEN program	A UNDP program that uses the expertise of highly skilled expatriates by assisting them to return to their home country for short visits. These visits usually last between three weeks and three months, during which time the expatriates engage in various development projects or undertake teaching assignments at local universities.	
Developing intellectual/scientific diaspora networks	They share certain characteristics with intellectual/scientific diaspora networks, but due to certain constraints have not fully developed into this type of network. Their aim is to make use of the highly skilled expatriate pool of their countries to contribute to the development process of the home country.	
Intellectual/scientific diaspora networks	In order to be classified as such, networks must fulfill the following criteria:	
	 members must be mostly nationals of a particular country living and working or studying abroad; 	
	• members must be highly skilled, active in a number of professional fields, specifically conducting scientific research;	
	• the networks must have, as their main purpose, the economic and social development of the country of origin; and	
	• there must be a degree of connection or linkage between different network members and between network members and their counterparts in their country of origin.	

TABLE 1.7: TYPOLOGY OF DKNs

Data source: Meyer and Brown, 1999.

FIGURE 1.4: NUMBER OF DIASPORA KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS



Data sources: Meyer and Brown, 1999; Barré et al., 2003; Tobin and Sallee, 2006.

Regions	Identified Networks	Networks Active in 2005	Number in Home Countries
Latin America	25	15	9
Africa	51	27	11
Asia	82	56	18
Total	158	98	38

TABLE 1.8: BREAKDOWN OF DIASPORA KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS BY REGION

Source: Meyer and Wattiaux, 2006.

Even though DKNs hold much promise for a "brain gain," some researchers have observed that they have been more successful in emerging economies, mostly in Asia (Meyer and Brown, 1999; Barré et al., 2003; Tobin and Sallee, 2006). The success of the DKN programs in India, for instance, is often attributed to the crucial input provided by associations of Indians working in Silicon Valley, but does not take into consideration other factors such as the presence of cheap, highly skilled local labour (ibid.). Nonetheless, the growth of DKNs could increase the potential contribution of diasporas in many regions of the developing world, including Africa.

DIASPORA ASSOCIATIONS

Diaspora associations are playing an increasingly significant role in the affairs of diaspora communities, as well as shaping development activities in countries of origin. Diaspora organizations are extremely diverse but encompass associations of migrants originating from the same locality, ethnic affinity groups, alumni associations, religious organizations, professional associations, charitable organizations, development NGOs, investment groups, affiliates of political parties, humanitarian relief organizations, schools and clubs for the preservation of culture, virtual networks and federations of associations (Table 1.8) (Newland and Patrick, 2004).

HTAs of various kinds consist of groups of migrants from the same local community or country who, through their activities, maintain formal links to their village, urban area or nation (Sorensen, 2004). The HTAs of Mexicans in the United States are well-known, but they have also been reported amongst West Africans in both Europe and the United States (Owusu, 2000; Henry and Mohan, 2003; Van Hear et al., 2004; Mohan, 2006; Lampert, 2009; Reynolds, 2009). A large number of Ghanaian diaspora associations in the United Kingdom and United States, for example, comprise migrants from the same part of Ghana (Orozco, 2005). In some instances, associations in cities are branches of national associations, such as multi-ethnic or multicountry diaspora associations (Ellis, 2003; Biao, 2005; Sökefeld, 2006; McGregor, 2009). Another study has shown that hometown and ethnic associations are common among newer African diasporas, but absent among older African diasporas in the United Kingdom (African Foundation for Development [AFFORD], 2000). Activities pursued by diaspora associations vary according to the nature of ties

that they enjoy with the country of origin. General factors that influence the participation of individuals in HTAs include the emotional satisfaction of helping their country of origin, receiving recognition in that country for their contribution and making personal financial gains (Ghosh, 2006). Some associations also take on more overt, and often oppositional, political roles in relation to the country of origin (Glick-Schiller and Fouron, 2001; Guarnizo, Portes and Haller, 2003).

Diaspora business associations are another relatively common, though specialized, form of organization with development potential. A report by FOCAL in 2007 identified a range of activities common to many business associations including, most significantly, networking, trade promotion, business partnerships, lobbying and knowledge sharing (Figure 1.5). The members of these associations also tended to be involved in shared social and cultural activities and functions. A smaller number engaged in philanthropic and policy consultancies. Most work on associational formation among the African diaspora has focussed on diasporas from either East or West Africa and little is known about the possible associational linkages within the Southern Africa diaspora outside the continent (Bloch, 2008; Mercer, Page and Evans, 2009).

DIASPORA RETURN MIGRATION

Return migration is an increasingly viable option for those who have spent considerable periods of time in other countries (Diatta and Mbow, 1999; Thomas-Hope, 1999; Olesen, 2002; Iredale, Guo and Rozario, 2003; McCormick and Wahba, 2003; Potter, Conway and Phillips, 2005; Mayr and Peri, 2008; Dustmann, Fadlon and Weiss, 2011). In some cases, return is prompted by the end of a period of crisis or instability that forced people out in the first place (Basta, 2011). In others, return is prompted by the prospect of new economic opportunities. Empirical evidence shows that countries such as India and China have benefitted from the return of their citizens from abroad who have brought with them much-needed technical expertise, as well as the capital that is crucial for economic development (Kuznetsov, 2006b).

Professionals seem most likely to return permanently after reaching retirement age and therefore make limited contribution to resolving a country's human resource problems (Tettey and Puplampu, 2005). There have also





FIGURE 1.5: ACTIVITIES OF DIASPORA BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS



been reports of "brain waste" in some regions. Studies in the South Pacific, for example, have shown that between 10 and 20 percent of migrant health workers return to their countries of origin, but only a few return to the health sector (Ray, Lowell and Spencer, 2006). The rest are absorbed into non-medical fields. Furthermore, studies in India have shown that some of the returnees who rejoin the medical field are absorbed into the medical tourism industry, which serves the foreign, rather than the local population (Khadria, 2004).

Return is more likely to be beneficial when it occurs after a moderately long time away, between five and 10 years, a period of time that allows the migrant to save sufficient resources to ease reinsertion (UN, 2006). The return of professionals from abroad offers potentially numerous benefits to migrant-sending countries, especially those that have lost a substantial proportion of their skilled professionals to brain drain (Skeldon, 2008). The United Nations (2006) claims that return migration is more common than is widely believed; however, evidence from Africa seems to contradict this claim (Ammassari, 2005; Kirigia et al., 2006; Connell et al., 2007).

Programs that encourage the short-term return of professionals to their country of origin have received widespread institutional support. The UNDP ran the TOKTEN program, which supported the return of experts and technicians from the diaspora to their countries of origin for brief stays, ranging from one week to three months to engage their fields of expertise (Macalou, 2009). The UNDP covered travel costs and stipends and the diaspora consultants received great personal satisfaction from contributing to the development of their country of origin. Since 1998, about 150 Malian diaspora members have completed 381 teaching missions through TOKTEN (ibid.). Conflicting views have been expressed on the effectiveness of the program in facilitating development in migrant-origin countries. An evaluation report for the period 1998–2004 for Sri Lanka showed abuse of the program, with expatriates who planned to visit the home country using it as a way of defraying travel expenses (Wanigaratne, 2006). Another evaluation report painted a more positive picture. Between 2005 and 2007, 47 highly educated recruits from seven countries served as volunteers in Rwanda under the TOKTEN program and nine ended up resettling in that country (Touray, 2008).

Similarly, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) operates the Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) program, which supports the short-term return of African professionals from abroad. Capacity-building and training of local staff through skills transfer are important elements of the MIDA program. Under MIDA, for example, Ghanaian health professionals have been supported to return to work temporarily in hospitals and medical training institutions under the Ghanaian Health Project (Ndiaye, Melde and Ndiaye-Coic, 2011). In Ghana, more than 8,264 medical staff, consisting of doctors, nurses, medical assistants and students, have so far benefitted from the MIDA program.¹

¹ For details about the MIDA program, visit www. migration4development.org/content/mida-migration-developmentafrica.

CHAPTER 2: OUT OF AFRICA

MIGRATION FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA

The SADC is an economic grouping of 15 African countries with a total population of 258 million. As a region, SADC is characterized by large-scale movements of people within countries and across borders (Crush and Frayne, 2010; Crush and Tevera, 2010; Segatti and Landau, 2011). In 2007, an estimated 2.5 million SADC country citizens were living in another SADC country. Short-term, crossborder movements between countries number in the millions each year. With the collapse of apartheid and greater integration into the global economy, the region has also become a destination for migrants from the rest of Africa and other parts of the globe, including Asia and Latin America.

One of the greatest challenges facing the SADC region, however, is not migration within or to the region from other parts of the world, but the emigration of citizens seeking their fortunes elsewhere. In 2000, around 1.5 million people born in Southern Africa were scattered around the globe, the vast majority in only a handful of countries (Table 2.1); by now, this number probably exceeds two million. These emigrants are often among the most skilled and educated members of society and their departure has prompted considerable concern. There is also significant evidence that the departure of skilled professionals from Southern African countries will continue (Oberoi and Lin, 2006; Oosthuizen, 2006; Record and Mohiddin, 2006; Chikanda, 2007; Bezuidenhout et al., 2009; Crush and Pendleton, 2011).

Previous SAMP surveys have shown that the emigration potential of professionals and students in all SADC countries is very high (Table 2.2). In a 2000 survey of working professionals, for example, 67 percent of Zimbabweans, 20 percent of Batswana and 13 percent of South Africans said they would be likely to leave their countries within five years (McDonald and Crush, 2002). In another study, around half of final-year university and college students in six different SADC countries said they would likely leave within five years (Crush, Pendleton and Tevera, 2006). The proportion varied from 48 percent in South Africa to 60 percent in Zimbabwe. Medical students displayed marginally higher emigration potential than non-medical students (Crush and Pendleton, 2012). Finally, a survey of practising South African health professionals in 2007 showed extremely high emigration potential, a prospect labelled "brain flight" rather than "brain drain" by the authors of the study (Crush and Pendleton, 2011). The major reasons for continued emigration include: dissatisfaction with remuneration and job opportunities; better employment prospects overseas; high levels of local taxation; safety and security concerns; and the desire to provide children with better opportunities. Social networks - in which those who have emigrated facilitate and encourage relatives, friends and colleagues to follow them - have an increasingly strong influence.

Destination	Number of Emigrants	% of Total	Top Three Origin Countries
United Kingdom	314,921	21	South Africa, Zimbabwe, Tanzania
Portugal	265,210	18	Angola, Mozambique, South Africa
Germany	146,420	10	Angola, South Africa, DRC
United States	126,669	8	South Africa, Tanzania, Zimbabwe
Australia	118,414	8	South Africa, Mauritius, Zimbabwe
Canada	86,870	6	South Africa, Tanzania, DRC
France	75,068	5	Mauritius, DRC, Angola
Belgium	58,928	4	DRC, South Africa, Mauritius
Pakistan	38,985	3	South Africa, Angola, Mozambique
New Zealand	31,060	2	South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia
Subtotal	1,262,545	85	
Other	247,847	15	
Global Total	1,510,392	100	

TABLE 2.1: TOP 10 DESTINATION COUNTRIES FOR SADC EMIGRANTS, CIRCA 2000

Data source: Migration Development Research Centre, 2007.

	Within Two Years	Within Five Years			
Skil	Skilled professionals by country (2000)				
Zimbabwe	55	67			
South Africa	5	13			
Botswana	13	20			
Fir	al-year students by country (2003)				
Zimbabwe	70	60			
Lesotho	55	50			
South Africa	48	48			
Swaziland	55	59			
Namibia	48	58			
Botswana	40	50			
Final-yea	r students by intended profession	(2003)			
Medical students	65	65			
Non-medical students	58	62			
South African health professionals (2007)					
Physicians	24	50			
Dentists	41	85			
Pharmacists	41	72			
Nurses	31	50			

TABLE 2.2: EMIGRATION POTENTIAL OF PROFESSIONALS AND STUDENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA

Data source: SAMP Migration Database.




FIGURE 2.1: TOTAL MIGRATION FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA TO CANADA, 1980–2009

Data source: Citizenship and Immigration Canada (CIC) (see footnote 1 for details).

SADC IMMIGRATION TO CANADA

Migration from Southern Africa to Canada is certainly not a recent phenomenon, although the numbers have steadily increased over time.¹ In the 1980s, for example, between 1,000 and 2,000 people from the SADC region emigrated each year to Canada, a figure that increased to around 3,000 per year in the 1990s and rose again to over 4,000 per

This profile of Southern African immigration to Canada draws on 1 data from two main sources: Statistics Canada census data and CIC landing data. The Statistics Canada census data is used to derive the SADC immigrant population in Canada and the settlement patterns of the SADC immigrant population across the country's provinces. Statistics Canada has conducted the census every five years since 1871, and this report uses data up to the 2006 census, as the 2011 findings were not available at the time of the study. Landing data collected by the CIC was used to illustrate migrant flows into the country. The CIC provides a broad range of statistical information on migration admissions to Canada. Statistics are available on the admission of permanent residents to Canada for the three main categories of immigration: economic immigrants, family-class immigrants and refugees, as well as a fourth category for "other" immigrants. The CIC also provides landing data for temporary residents who enter as foreign workers, students and humanitarian (including refugee) claimants. Data was made available to SAMP by CIC for the years 1980 to 2009.

year after 2000 (Figure 2.1). Between 1991 and 2006, the number of Southern African migrants in Canada more than doubled, from 47,410 to 106,325, representing a 124 percent increase. Between 1991 and 1996, the overall number rose by 12,340; between 1996 and 2001 by 14,890; and by 24,445 between 2001 and 2006. At present, the number probably exceeds 120,000 and continues to grow.

Every SADC country also experienced a growth in emigration to Canada between 1991 and 2006. The greatest absolute increase over this period came from South Africa (21,345 emigrants), the DRC (14,155), Zimbabwe (6,100), Tanzania (5,685) and Mauritius (4,941) (Table 2.3). In proportional terms, the greatest increases were from the DRC, Botswana and Zimbabwe. Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe show particularly rapid increases over time, while several countries, including South Africa and Tanzania, had a relatively consistent increase over the period. By 2006, the Southern African immigrant population of Canada constituted 27 percent of the total number of African migrants in Canada. Three countries dominated the flow, making up 72 percent of the total: South Africa (40,570), Tanzania (20,115) and the DRC (15,795) (Table 2.4).

		Im	migrant Pop	ulation				Numerical	Percentage
Place of Birth	Before 1991	1991–1995	1996–2000	2001–2006	Total Immigrants	Non- permanent Residents	Total	Increase between 1991 and 2006	Increase between 1991 and 2006
Total Canada	3,408,415	823,930	844,625	1,109,980	6,186,950	265,355	6,452,305	3,043,891	89
Total Africa	136,235	54,800	66,310	117,215	374,565	23,535	398,100	261,864	192
Angola	1,405	160	300	1,175	3,045	225	3,270	1,865	133
Botswana	65	45	30	80	215	170	390	324	498
DRC	1,640	1,745	3,830	6,910	14,125	1,665	15,795	14,155	863
Lesotho	35	25	0	30	90	10	100	74	211
Madagascar	1,060	405	205	360	2,025	190	2,220	1,160	109
Malawi	215	75	50	90	425	80	500	285	132
Mauritius	4,995	1,060	740	2,860	9,660	280	9,935	4,941	100
Mozambique	825	55	85	85	1,050	35	1,090	285	35
Namibia	120	35	60	110	330	125	455	335	279
Seychelles	420	280	120	65	885	10	900	480	114
South Africa	19,225	5,445	7,105	6,525	38,305	2,260	40,570	21,345	111
Swaziland	50	25	15	50	140	25	165	110	220
Tanzania	14,430	2,050	1,345	1,935	19,770	350	20,115	5,685	39
Zambia	1,045	405	385	680	2,515	265	2,780	1,735	166
Zimbabwe	1,880	530	620	3,490	6,520	1,515	8,040	6,100	324
Total SADC	47,410	12,340	14,890	24,445	99,100	7,205	106,325	58,915	124

TABLE 2.3: CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF SOUTHERN AFRICAN IMMIGRANTS IN CANADA, 1991–2006

Data source: Statistics Canada, 2009 (see footnote 1 for details).

Place of Birth	ce of Birth Immigrants Non-		Total Migrant Stock	% of SADC Migrant Stock
Angola	3,045	225	3,270	3.1
Botswana	215	170	390	0.4
DRC	14,125	1,665	15,795	14.9
Lesotho	90	10	100	0.1
Madagascar	2,025	190	2,220	2.1
Malawi	425	80	500	0.1
Mauritius	9,660	280	9,935	9.3
Mozambique	1,050	35	1,090	1.0
Namibia	330	125	455	0.4
Seychelles	885	10	900	0.8
South Africa	38,305	2,260	40,570	38.1
Swaziland	140	25	165	0.1
Tanzania	19,770	350	20,115	18.9
Zambia	2,515	265	2,780	2.6
Zimbabwe	6,520	1,515	8,040	7.6
Total SADC	99,100	7,205	106,325	100.0
Total Africa	374,565	23,535	398,100	
Total Canada	6,186,950	265,355	6,452,305	

TABLE 2.4: SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRANT POPULATION OF CANADA, 2006

Data source: Statistics Canada, 2009. Note: Totals may vary due to rounding.

TYPES OF IMMIGRANTS

In 2002, Canada's Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) replaced the Immigration Act of 1976. Since then, Canada's immigration program has been governed by the IRPA, which shifts away from an occupation-based model in favour of a points-based model that takes into account education, knowledge of official Canadian language(s) and the transferability of skills sets. The IRPA defines four basic categories of entry for the purposes of permanent residence:

- economic class, defined as those individuals who are selected for their skills and ability to contribute to Canada's economy, including skilled workers, business immigrants, provincial and territorial nominees and live-in caregivers;
- family class, designed to reunite families and comprises foreign nationals sponsored by close relatives or family members in Canada, including sponsors and partners, dependant children, parents and grandparents;
- refugee class, designed to protect refugees, including government-assisted refugees, privately sponsored refugees, refugees landed in Canada and dependants of refugees landed in Canada who live abroad; and

• other class, where, on an exceptional basis, the IRPA gives CIC the authority to grant permanent resident status to individuals and families who would not otherwise qualify in any category, for example, in cases where there are strong humanitarian and compassionate considerations, or for public policy reasons. These discretionary provisions provide the flexibility to approve deserving cases not anticipated in the legislation.

In 2010, Canada accepted 280,681 immigrants, of whom 186,913 (67 percent) were economic class; 60,220 (22 percent) family class, 24,696 (nine percent) refugees; and 8,845 (two percent) other class.

Of the 106,325 SADC migrants to Canada in 2006, 93 percent were permanent residents or citizens and 7,205 were non-permanent residents (Table 2.4).² Migrants from SADC have entered Canada for permanent residence in each of the four categories, although the annual numbers in each category and the relative importance of each has

² Immigrants are legally defined as persons who are landed immigrants or permanent residents in Canada. A landed immigrant is a person who has been granted the right to live in Canada permanently by immigration authorities. Non-permanent residents are persons from another country who, at the time of the census, held a work or study permit, or who were refugee claimants, as well as those family members living with them in Canada.

varied over time (Figure 2.2). It is clear, for example, that since 1980, economic-class migrants have consistently been the largest category of entry every single year. Familyclass migrants have probably varied the least over time, though their absolute numbers are much lower. Although refugee-class migrants have been admitted since the mid-1980s, the numbers have dramatically increased since the late 1990s. Migrants entering in the special dispensation category are a more recent phenomenon.




FIGURE 2.2: TYPE OF MIGRATION FROM SOUTHERN AFRICA TO CANADA, 1980–2009

Data source: CIC.




FIGURE 2.3: TOTAL ECONOMIC-CLASS IMMIGRANTS TO CANADA, 1980-2009

Data source: CIC.

Economic-class Migrants

Between 1980 and 2009, more than half (55 percent) of SADC immigrants to Canada entered in the economic class, compared to 36 percent for Africa as a whole. Since the early 1990s, the number of economic immigrants has remained relatively consistent, or even declined slightly (Figure 2.3).³ The peak year for economic immigrants was 1994, with nearly 3,000. The number has remained at around 2,000 per year for most of the past decade. Prior to 2000, South Africans made up the majority of economic-class immigrants and these fluctuations were closely tied to general emigration flows from South Africa. South Africa has consistently made up the largest proportion of SADC economic-class immigrants (45 percent in total), although its numbers have fallen steadily since 2000

(Figure 2.4). The number and relative proportion from other SADC countries has risen. The reason for the South African decline is not any overall slowdown in emigration from South Africa, but rather the growing popularity of Australia and New Zealand as alternate destinations. The idea that there is an escalating brain drain from Southern Africa to Canada (as there is to Australia and New Zealand, for example) is therefore not really supported by the statistics. The flow is not insignificant, but it is not growing rapidly either.

Family-class Immigrants

A primary objective of Canada's immigration program has been family reunification. Individual family-class immigrants either accompany economic-class migrants, or are family members or close relatives who reunite with their families later. Under the family class designation, partners, dependant children, parents and grandparents can also be sponsored by a close relative or family member who is already in Canada. Entry to Canada from SADC under the family class peaked in the early 1990s, fell considerably towards the end of that decade, then recovered and has been relatively constant since 2000, between 500 and 700 immigrants per year (Figure 2.5).




FIGURE 2.4: ECONOMIC-CLASS IMMIGRATION TO CANADA BY ORIGIN, 1980–2009

Data source: CIC.

³ Economic-class immigrants enter Canada in one of four subcategories and are selected on the basis of demand for particular occupational skills in the Canadian economy. These categories currently include: skilled workers and professionals, selected as permanent residents based on their education, work experience, knowledge of English and/or French, and other criteria; investors, entrepreneurs and self-employed persons; provincial nominees, persons who immigrate to Canada under provincial nominee programs; and Quebec-selected skilled workers: under the Canada-Quebec Accord Relating to Immigration and Temporary Admission of Aliens, Quebec establishes its own immigration requirements and selects its own immigrants. New regulations were due to come into effect in January 2013.




FIGURE 2.5: SADC FAMILY CLASS IMMIGRATION TO CANADA, 1980–2009

Data source: CIC.

Asylum Seekers and Refugees

Once a refugee claim has been accepted, those individuals may make an application for permanent resident status in Canada. This application may include family members in the country or abroad. Acceptance or refusal of refugee claims is determined by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), an independent administrative tribunal that oversees claims for refugee protection made in Canada. While individuals in the humanitarian population are primarily refugee claimants, applicants under this class of entry also include foreign nationals allowed to remain in Canada on humanitarian or compassionate grounds under special considerations. Any person can apply to stay in Canada on humanitarian or compassionate grounds, including refugee claimants whose claims are not approved by the IRB.

Between 1980 and 2009, a total of 72,706 humanitarian claims were filed in Canada by people from SADC countries (Figure 2.6). Since 2000, refugees have made up the second-largest class of entry for SADC migration to Canada. In 1980, the number of SADC refugees did not even constitute one percent of total SADC migration to Canada. By 1991, refugees accounted for 18 percent of migrants, and by the turn of the century, 28 percent of migrants to Canada. While the number of SADC migrants entering as refugees may seem high, the proportion of SADC refugees is much lower than for Africa as a whole.

Of the more than 70,000 refugees to Canada between 1980 and 2009, 39,795 (55 percent) were from the DRC; 16,445 (23 percent) from Zimbabwe; 8,693 (12 percent) from Angola; 4,509 (six percent) from Tanzania; and 2,662 (four percent) from South Africa (Figure 2.6). Between 1980 and

1989, only 1,489 claims were filed by SADC citizens, mostly from South Africa (36 percent), Tanzania (27 percent) and the DRC (24 percent). Between 1990 and 1999, the number of claims rose to 18,078. Of these, 79 percent were filed by people from the DRC fleeing the war in their country. Between 2000 and 2009, the humanitarian population has come from more countries and increased significantly to 53,139 people. The share of the DRC fell to 47 percent, while Zimbabwe's share grew to 31 percent and Angola's to 14 percent.

The two countries that have generated the most refugees to Canada from SADC are the DRC and Zimbabwe. According to CIC, these countries continue to make the overall list of top source countries for refugee entries to Canada. The DRC and Zimbabwe also generate considerable numbers of refugees to other countries within SADC, notably to South Africa (Kadima, 2001; Amisi, 2006; Steinberg, 2006; Simpson, 2008; Idemudia, Williams and Wyatt, 2010; Bandeira et al., 2010; Rugunanan and Smit, 2011). The influx of refugees from the DRC to Canada started in the early 1990s, accelerated in the late 1990s and has remained relatively consistent for the past 10 years (Figure 2.7). Between 1991 and 2009, refugees comprised three-quarters (13,212 in total) of all migrants from the DRC.




FIGURE 2.6: REFUGEES FROM SADC IN CANADA, 1980–2009

Data source: CIC.




FIGURE 2.7: DRC REFUGEES TO CANADA, 1980-2009

Data source: CIC.

Canada has seen a significant increase in the number of refugee claims filed by Zimbabweans (Figure 2.8). After 2000, increasing levels of political violence and persecution coincided with an unprecedented economic meltdown in Zimbabwe, forcing many migrants to flee to other countries (Crush and Tevera, 2010). Even though the vast majority of victims of political persecution sought refuge in neighbouring countries, such as South Africa, a significant proportion have moved to more distant countries such as Canada. Zimbabweans currently make up the secondlargest group of refugee claimants in Canada and comprise just over 50 percent of all Zimbabwean immigrants to the country. The numbers of refugee claimants peaked in 2004 and then declined after the imposition of a visa requirement that made it very difficult for Zimbabweans to get to Canada.




FIGURE 2.8: ZIMBABWEAN REFUGEES TO CANADA, 1980-2009

Data source: CIC.

CITIZENSHIP

Canada recognizes multiple citizenship, but requires immigrants to meet several requirements before they can claim Canadian citizenship, including at least three years of residence in Canada and knowledge of an official language. The 2006 census showed that 870,255 individuals, or 2.8 percent of the Canadian population, held citizenship with Canada and at least one other citizenship. In SADC, only two countries, Mauritius and South Africa, recognize dual or multiple citizenship. In theory, citizens of all other SADC countries therefore lose the citizenship of their country of origin upon acquiring Canadian citizenship. In practice, 17 percent of the SADCborn population in Canada reported holding multiple citizenships. Most originate from Mauritius and South Africa, but not all (Table 2.5).

TEMPORARY MIGRATION TO CANADA

Temporary Workers

One of the major changes in migration to Canada over the past decade has been the rapid growth of temporary migration to the country (Thomas, 2010). In 2006, the census enumerated approximately 265,000 temporary residents in the country, compared to 143,000 in 1996. Of these, 112,000 were working (94,000 full time). In 2010, Canada admitted 183,322 foreign temporary workers and 96,147 students. Many temporary workers enter the country through various officially sanctioned programs, such as the Temporary Foreign Worker Program, the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program and the Livein Caregiver Program. These kinds of temporary work programs are hailed by the Canadian government as "winwin-win": good for Canada, good for home countries and good for migrants and their families. Anyone familiar with Southern African history will know, however, that temporary work programs have existed in that region for many decades and are especially associated with gold mining and commercial agriculture. They have been severely criticized for being highly exploitative and failing to protect the basic work and human rights of migrants (Crush, Jeeves and Yudelman, 1992). While it would be misleading to directly compare the South African migrant labour system with Canada's temporary work programs, it is important to note that the latter have attracted censure from researchers and human rights groups (Basok, 2001; 2004; Fudge and MacPhail, 2009; Goldring, Berinstein and Berhard, 2009; Nakache and Kinoshita, 2010; Prebisch and Hennebry, 2010; Hennebry, 2012).

Temporary migration from SADC to Canada has increased considerably since the late 1990s (Figure 2.9). While SADC migrants constitute a relatively small percentage of all temporary migrants in Canada (less than three percent), they do make up 31 percent of all African temporary residents in the country. Since 2001, the overall number of SADC temporary residents has increased by 10 percent. Findings from the 2006 census suggest that temporary migration has increased significantly from many SADC countries (Table 2.6), with some — Angola, the DRC, Lesotho, South Africa and Tanzania — experiencing a slight fall in numbers.

Country of Birth	Single Citizenship	Multiple Citizenship	Total	Multiple Citizenship as % of Total
Angola	1,360	125	1,490	8.4
Botswana	205	10	220	4.5
DRC	8,710	845	9,555	8.8
Lesotho	15	0	15	0.0
Madagascar	415	235	650	36.2
Malawi	130	15	140	10.7
Mauritius	3,210	1,335	4,545	29.4
Mozambique	65	20	90	22.2
Namibia	220	15	235	6.4
Seychelles	210	90	300	30.0
South Africa	9,370	3,195	12,565	25.4
Swaziland	45	10	60	16.7
Tanzania	1,825	320	2,150	14.9
Zambia	455	105	565	18.6
Zimbabwe	4,345	110	4,455	2.5
Total SADC	30,580	6,430	36,765	17.5
Total Canada	30,370,770	870,255	31,241,030	2.8

TABLE 2.5: CITIZENSHIP STATUS OF SADC-BORN PERSONS IN CANADA, 2006

Data source: Statistics Canada, 2009.




FIGURE 2.9: SADC TEMPORARY WORKERS TO CANADA, 1980-2009

Data source: CIC.

	Number of Tem	Change	
Place of Birth	2001	2006	%
Angola	680	225	-67
Botswana	70	170	+143
DRC	1,715	1,665	-3
Lesotho	15	10	-33
Madagascar	75	190	+153
Malawi	20	80	+400
Mauritius	135	280	+107
Mozambique	25	35	+43
Namibia	50	125	+150
Seychelles	10	10	0
South Africa	2,310	2,260	-2
Swaziland	15	25	+66
Tanzania	555	350	-37
Zambia	120	265	+121
Zimbabwe	675	1,515	+124
Total SADC	6,470	7,205	+11
Total Africa	22,085	23,535	+7
Total Canada	198,640	265,355	+34

TABLE 2.6: TEMPORARY MIGRATION FROM SADC TO CANADA, 2001–2006

Data source: Statistics Canada, 2009.

International Students

There has also been a consistent and significant increase in the number of post-secondary SADC students coming to Canada since the late 1990s (Figure 2.10). Throughout the 1980s, the number coming to study in Canada rarely exceeded 1,000 annually. This number rose in the early 1990s, falling again by mid-decade. Since 1998, however, the number has increased almost annually, and reached over 2,500 for the first time in 2009. While these students are classified as temporary residents in official immigration statistics, recent changes in Canadian immigration policy encourage international students to remain in Canada after graduation (Arthur and Flynn, 2011).

SPATIAL LOCATION OF IMMIGRANTS IN CANADA

Canada's 2006 census showed that 96 percent of the SADCborn population resided in just four provinces: Ontario, with 47,425, or 48 percent of the total enumerated; British Columbia, with 18,515, or 19 percent; Quebec, with 16,820, or 17 percent; and Alberta, with 12,010, or 12 percent (Table 2.7). The SADC francophone diaspora was settled mainly in Quebec (83 percent of immigrants from Madagascar, 63 percent from Seychelles, 57 percent from the DRC and 36 percent from Mauritius). Immigrants from South Africa and Zimbabwe were dispersed throughout the country. South Africans were found in largest concentrations in Ontario (18,155), British Columbia (12,090) and Alberta (4,950). Eighty-nine percent of migrants from Zimbabwe and 94 percent of those from Tanzania also lived in these three provinces.

Data on the place of first residence of all immigrants to Canada between 1980 and 2009 provides a complementary picture of patterns of settlement at the intra-provincial scale (Table 2.8). This is not necessarily an accurate representation of the actual numbers living in particular provinces and cities at present, due to later in-migration:

- Southern African migrants to Canada tend to move to three main metropolitan areas: Toronto (35,719), Montreal (16,255) and Vancouver (12,145). These three cities alone were the destination for two-thirds of all migrants to Canada.
- Toronto is a major gateway for migrants in Canada. In 2006, the city was home to eight percent of Canada's population and 20 percent of all immigrants. Threequarters of all SADC migrants arriving in Ontario went to Toronto. South Africans make up the largest

proportion, at 43 percent (15,469), followed by Tanzanians (5,993), Mauritians (5,754), Zimbabweans (2,917) and Congolese (2,656). Together, these five countries made up 92 percent of all SADC migrants arriving in Toronto.

- Vancouver has become a top destination for migrants. In 2006, the foreign-born population of the city was 831,300 — 40 percent of its total population. A total of 12,145 SADC-born migrants first settled in Vancouver, with three-quarters from South Africa (9,287, or 76 percent). Other smaller clusters of migrants in Vancouver include those from Tanzania (734), Zimbabwe (649), Mauritius (626) and the DRC (411).
- Montreal is the preferred destination for francophone migrants from African countries. African migrants make up 26 percent of Montreal's newcomers and 12 percent of the total immigrant population in the city. Migrants moving to Montreal came largely from four countries: the DRC (8,163), Madagascar (1,359), Mauritius (3,246) and Seychelles (953). Together, they make up 84 percent of all SADC migrants in the city.
- A total of 17,426, or 18 percent of SADC migrants first settled in other Canadian cities, a list that includes several provincial capitals and the national capital, Ottawa. In other words, 83 percent of all SADC migrants settle in Canada's urban centres on arrival in the country.
- There are variations in this pattern from country to country, but the major exception is South African immigrants. The majority went to Toronto (15,469), followed by Vancouver (9,287), Calgary (2,141) and Edmonton (1,188). Nearly one-quarter of South Africans (23 percent) did not go to any major urban centre. This is a reflection of the fact that many South African health professionals obtain their first jobs in Canada in underserviced smaller towns. This is particularly evident in Newfoundland, Manitoba, Saskatchewan and Alberta, where nearly half (47 percent) of all South Africans did not go to major cities.




FIGURE 2.10: SADC STUDENTS IN CANADA, 1980-2009

Data source: CIC.

TABLE 2.7: LOCATION OF SADC IMMIGRANT POPULATION IN CANADA, 2006 CENSUS

							Province							
Country of Birth	NL	PE	NS	NB	QC	ON	MB	SK	AB	BC	YT	NT	NU	Total
Angola	10	0	10	0	735	1,955	45	0	170	125	0	0	0	3,050
Botswana	0	0	10	0	10	115	0	10	40	20	0	0	0	205
DRC	0	0	30	195	7,980	4,325	300	75	785	430	0	0	0	14,120
Lesotho	0	0	0	0	0	60	0	0	10	15	0	0	0	85
Madagascar	0	0	10	0	1,680	195	0	0	50	95	0	0	0	2,030
Malawi	15	0	0	15	30	225	10	15	70	50	0	0	0	430
Mauritius	0	15	30	0	3,475	4,740	140	100	420	740	0	0	0	9,660
Mozambique	0	0	0	0	115	680	40	0	70	155	0	0	0	1,060
Namibia	0	0	10	10	10	110	20	10	85	85	0	0	0	340
Seychelles	10	0	0	0	560	240	25	0	15	45	0	0	0	895
South Africa	125	25	320	125	625	18,155	1,095	720	4,950	12,090	35	40	10	38,315
Swaziland	0	0	0	0	10	65	10	15	30	10	0	0	0	140
Tanzania	10	0	75	10	905	11,600	60	55	4,035	3,010	0	10	0	19,770
Zambia	0	0	25	20	215	1,370	50	90	270	470	0	0	0	2,510
Zimbabwe	0	35	25	10	470	3,590	110	65	1,010	1,175	10	10	0	6,510
Total	170	75	545	385	16,820	47,425	1,905	1,155	12,010	18,515	45	60	10	99,120

Table acronyms:

ionymo.	
AB	Alberta
BC	British Columbia
MB	Manitoba
NB	New Brunswick
NL	Newfoundland

Source: Statistics Canada, 2009.

NS

NT

NU

ON

PE

Nova Scotia Northwest Territories Nunavut Ontario Prince Edward Island Saskatchewan Quebec Yukon

SK

QC

ΥT

	ANG	BOT	DRC	LES	MAD	MAL	MAU	MOZ	NAM	SA	SEY	SWZ	TAN	ZAM	ZIM	TOTAL
Newfoundland		201	Dire								021	0.1.2				101112
St. John's	0	0	11						5	39		7		0	0	62
Other	5	0	1	0	0	6	0	0	7	359	0	0	7	0	12	397
Total	5	0	12			6	<u> </u>		12	398		7	7	0	12	459
PEI		Ū								070		-				107
Charlottetown			14			0	0	0		11	0		0	0	0	25
Other	0		0			0	0	0		11	0	0	6	0	0	17
Total			14			0	0	0		22	0		6	0	0	42
Nova Scotia			14			0	0			22	0		0	0	0	42
Halifax	0	0	58	0	0	0	0	14	0	131	0	0	22	5	36	251
Other	0	0	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	1113	0	0	0	5	8	153
Total	0	0	65	0	0	0	5	14	0	244	0	0	22	10	44	404
	0	0	65	0	0	0	5	14	0	244	0	0	22	10	44	404
New Brunswick																
Moncton	0	0	183	0	0	0	0		0	16			0	7	5	211
Fredericton	0	0	33	0	0	0	0		0	15			5	5	14	72
Other	0	0	39	0	0	0	5		0	84			10	14	16	168
Total	0	0	255	0	0	0	5	7	0	115			15	26	35	458
Quebec																
Montreal	554	0	8,163	0	1,359	0	3,246	40	0	735	953	5	414	101	685	16,255
Quebec City	17	0	910	0	87	0	48	5	0	11	0	6	5	0	0	1,089
Hull (Gatineau)	6	0	474	0	14	5	11	0	0	11	0	0	0	0	0	521
Other	30	8	1,063	0	206	27	160	11	11	107	60	0	59	73	43	1,858
Total	607	8	10,610	0	1,666	32	3,465	56	11	864	1,013	11	478	174	728	19,723
Ontario																
Toronto	956	503	2,656	15	5	155	4,754	141	47	15,469	103	27	5,993	1,798	2,917	35,719
Ottawa	93	5	1,511	0	6	46	348	41	15	606	0	0	220	169	210	3,270
Hamilton	78	0	275	5	0	0	0	8	14	733	0	0	64	25	487	1,689
Other	190	132	648	56	51	132	315	29	80	2,996	19	58	0	0	0	6,362
Total	1,317	640	5,090	71	62	333	5,417	219	156	19,984	122	75	6,841	2,288	4,425	47,040
Manitoba																
Winnipeg	0	11	673	0	0	13	104	50	0	593	0	0	59	97	110	1,710
Other	0	0	16	0	0	0	21	0	0	851	0	0	4	11	23	926
Total	0	11	689	0	0	13	125	50	0	1,444	0	0	63	108	133	2,636
Saskatchewan																
Regina	0	5	31	0		0	11		0	401	0	0	32	52	14	546
Saskatoon	0	0	110	0		0	6		0	332	0	0	0	25	0	
Other	0	2	48	0	0	5	22		8	1,356	0	0	32	26	35	
Total	0	7	189	0		5	39		8	2,089	0	0	64	103	49	2,553
Alberta																
Edmonton	16	8	322	0	0	10	186	18	15	1,188	0	0	781	72	357	2,973
Calgary	37	18	230	0	6	12	191		0	2,141	11	0	1,267	61	418	4,392
Other	15	55	79	0	0	23	75		47	1,621	0	6	109	61	172	2,263
Total	68	81	631	0	6	45	452	31	62	4,950	11	6	2,157	194	947	9,641
British Columbia																
Vancouver	26	39	411	0	0	27	636	25	0	9,287	16	30	734	265	649	12,145
Victoria	0	0	0	0	0	0	12	27	0	593	0	6	0	0	25	663
Other	0	39	59	0	0	10	47	-	24	2,203	0	12	79	75	193	2,741
Total	26	78	470	0	0	37	695	55	24	12,083	16	48	813	340	867	15,552
	0	0	0				32		0	13			0	6	16	67

TABLE 2.8: PERMANENT RESIDENTS FROM SADC COUNTRIES BY PROVINCE AND MAJOR URBAN AREAS, 1980-2009

Source: CIC.

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20

0

0

0

5

25

Note: In this table, cells marked (--) represent areas containing fewer than five individuals. In the judgment of CIC, this data could allow for the identification of specific individuals; in such cases, therefore, CIC does not provide the actual number. As a result, the table contains minor arithmetic errors.

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Table acronyms:

ΥT

ANG	Angola	LES	Lesotho	MAU	Mauritius	SA	South Africa	TAN	Tanzania
BOT	Botswana	MAD	Madagascar	MOZ	Mozambique	SEY	Seychelles	ZAM	Zambia
DRC	Democratic Republic of the Congo	MAL	Malawi	NAM	Namibia	SWZ	Swaziland	ZIM	Zimbabwe

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0

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CHAPTER 3: DIASPORAS ON THE WEB: STUDY METHODOLOGY

LOCATING DIASPORAS

Census and immigration data provide a valuable overall picture of diaspora flows and distributions. Privacy issues, however, preclude these sources from being used to provide disaggregated information on individual migrants or migrant households. Census data tells us the size of the population to survey, but not who the individuals are, where they live or how to contact them. Without a sampling frame, researchers tend to rely instead on techniques such as "snowball" sampling, moving from one respondent to another by following their social networks (Simich and Hamilton, 2004; Pasura, 2006; 2010; Faye, 2007; Mosaic Institute, 2009; Zohry and Debnath, 2010). This usually leads to a focus on geographically concentrated diaspora groups (Orozco, 2005; Schüttler, 2007; Schmelz, 2007; Makina, 2010; Warnecke, 2010). The diaspora research literature also tends to rely on small sample sizes, which raises questions about the generalizability of the findings (Arthur, 2000; Ndofor-Tah, 2000; Belai, 2007; Schlenzka, 2009).

The mail-out survey is the most common method of reaching members of a geographically dispersed diaspora (Bloch, 2005; Nworah, 2005). To contact members of the diaspora, mailing lists are compiled from groups such as diaspora organizations, embassies, alumni associations, immigrant service agencies and religious organizations that keep, and are willing to share, membership lists. This method of "accessing the diaspora through the diaspora" is unlikely to provide much information on "hidden" members of a diaspora who do not participate in or interact with any of these agencies (Bloch, 2007). Researchers have noted that members of vulnerable populations, such as asylum seekers and refugees, may be especially reluctant to participate in such surveys due to mistrust (Atkinson and Flint, 2001).

The potential of the Internet for diaspora research is considerable (Crush et al., 2012). More than one billion people are connected to the Web, creating seemingly limitless opportunities for communication and exchange (Wright, 2005; Weaver and Morrison, 2008). The past decade has also seen a major increase in the use of the Internet by diaspora individuals and groups, enhancing communication among diaspora members and influencing the formation of diaspora identities (Ackah and Newman, 2003; Bernal, 2004; 2006; Hiller and Franz, 2004; Parham, 2004; Ignacio, 2005; Georgiou, 2006; Kissau and Hunger, 2008; Mano and Willems, 2010; Peel, 2010). Online communication has become particularly valuable to diaspora communities, as it creates a meeting place of the private and the public, the interpersonal and the communal; through the Internet, diasporas have developed

"virtual communities" within and across national borders (Karim, 2003; Georgiou, 2006). One study of Eritreans abroad shows how they use the Internet as a "public sphere" to produce and debate narratives of history, culture, democracy and identity (Bernal, 2006). Another analysis of the use of websites, chat rooms and discussion forums by the Zimbabwean diaspora shows how the Internet has connected the diaspora to the homeland in multiple and imaginative ways (Mano and Willems, 2010). Zimbabwean online communities also use these forums to interrogate their own identities, citizenship, sense of belonging, politics and aspirations (Peel, 2010).

The Internet opens up new opportunities for researchers to study geographically dispersed diasporas with a strong online presence (Schmidt, 1997; Berrens et al., 2003; Wright, 2005). The online survey allows researchers to reach much larger numbers of widely dispersed individuals with common characteristics in a short period of time and at greatly reduced fieldwork cost. Other advantages of online surveying include the ability to post advertisements and invitations on websites, and to send invitations to listserv members. By automatically collecting and writing data to an online database file, the costs of data entry and cleaning are also eliminated (Wright, 2005). Low-cost, or even free, online survey companies provide technical and administrative support in research design, data collection and analysis. With the rapid advance in online survey technology over the past 10 years, collecting and storing data online is now more secure. Through the use of encryption, survey data can be stored without the possibility of sensitive and confidential data being accessed by the public. The advanced nature of some providers allows researchers to export data to a variety of data analysis programs. Some even allow researchers to conduct preliminary analyses on data while the survey is in progress.

This chapter describes the development of the SAMP survey methodology and the decision to adopt a mixedmethods approach combining traditional face-to-face interviewing, mail-out surveys and an Internet-based survey. The chapter first discusses the strategies used to locate and interview Southern African diaspora members in Canada. Particular attention is paid to the use of the Internet and social networking sites (SNSs), since this constitutes the most original part of the study (Crush et al., 2012).

DEVELOPING THE INSTRUMENT

The survey instrument used to collect the data for this study was collaboratively developed by the SAMP research team in Canada and Africa. The instrument and study methodology were submitted to, and approved by, the General Research Ethics Board at Queen's University in Canada. The questionnaire was pilot tested and refined prior to implementation. The survey consisted of a series of closed questions designed to gather information on the following:

- the demographic, social, economic, employment and educational profiles of individuals and households;
- reasons for leaving Africa and coming to Canada, including categories of entry to Canada;
- experiences in Canada and comparisons between Canada and African countries of origin;
- linkages maintained with countries of origin, including remittances and other economic transactions, family ties and the frequency and reasons for return visits;
- involvement in development-related activities in countries of origin; and
- the likelihood of returning to Africa, either temporarily or permanently.¹

An open-ended question was included at the end of the survey to allow respondents to write at greater length about their experiences, perceptions and aspirations.

As shown in Chapter 2, the Southern African diaspora in Canada is scattered across the country. Cost and time constraints prohibited a nationwide face-to-face interviewing strategy and an online survey instrument was designed instead (Evans and Mathur, 2005). The survey was hosted by StudentVoice© Canada and was accessible through a link on the SAMP website.² Data collected by the program was encrypted and stored on a Canadian server. The StudentVoice© Canada team assisted with questionnaire design, putting the survey online and troubleshooting technical difficulties that arose. In total, the project required the design and hosting of 14 country-specific questionnaires in both official languages, English and French (i.e., 28 questionnaires in total). When a survey was completed, the data set was easily downloaded and manipulated using SPSS, a statistical analysis software package.

INVITING DIASPORAS

With the survey online, a multi-pronged strategy was developed to contact members of the Southern African diaspora and invite them to complete the survey. These methods had varying degrees of success.

Degrees of Separation

The first strategy was based on the "six degrees of separation" concept, starting with the contact lists of the members of the research team itself (Watts, 2004). The research team included one member of the South African diaspora (Mary Caesar) and one from the Zimbabwean diaspora in Canada (Abel Chikanda). A third member was born in the United Kingdom, but raised in South Africa, Swaziland and Zimbabwe (Jonathan Crush). A fourth is a member of the Indian diaspora, whose partner is a member of the South African diaspora in Canada (Sujata Ramachandran). A fifth is Canadian and Australian, and has conducted research on migration to South Africa (Ashley Hill). A sixth (Wade Pendleton) is a member of the US diaspora living in South Africa (and prior to that, Namibia). The final member of the team is from the German diaspora in Canada and has conducted research on Latin American immigration to Canada (Cassandra Eberhardt). The team was therefore extremely heterogeneous, but has the diaspora experience in common.

Each member of the research team has friends, relatives, colleagues and acquaintances from Southern Africa in Canada. Using the six-degrees logic, an invitation list was drawn up of personal contacts. These contacts were then invited to complete the survey and to pass the invitation on to their own circle of personal contacts. The logic of the degrees of separation is that within a maximum of six steps of contact, every member of the SADC diaspora in Canada should have become aware of the survey. This method was not a great success, however, yielding only 80 respondents in the first six weeks of the survey. This number was not significantly greater than the original list of personal contacts of the research team (around 60). This suggests that while many of these contacts completed the survey themselves, very few passed on the invitation.

SNSs

Social media, especially SNSs such as Facebook, have profoundly reshaped Internet usage in the past decade (Brickman-Bhutta, 2009; Wink, 2010; Redmond, 2010). SNSs have become a way for users to connect and interact with family, friends and colleagues globally. They have also opened up opportunities to make contact with new individuals, both personal and professional, and with other diaspora members. In one recent study, Facebook data was used to define user subgroups by gender, race/ ethnicity and socio-economic status with distinct network behaviours and cultural preferences (Lewis et al., 2008). Facebook users themselves have the ability to form and join groups based on shared interests and activities, providing members with the ability to network with other members and to share information relevant to the group description.

¹ Copies of the survey are available from Jonathan Crush via email to jcrush@balsillieschool.ca.

² Access the SAMP website at www.queensu.ca/samp.

SADC Country of Origin	Number of Facebook Groups	Number of Facebook Group Members	Number of Individuals Messaged
Angola	3	34	22
Botswana	3	54	51
DRC	5	130	59
Lesotho	0	0	0
Madagascar	7	663	505
Malawi	1	26	26
Mauritius	15	1,639	911
Mozambique	1	27	4
Namibia	3	68	14
Seychelles	0	0	0
South Africa	36	5,371	2,581
Swaziland	2	506	7
Tanzania	4	201	132
Zambia	6	366	263
Zimbabwe	11	477	1,046
Total	97	9,562	5,621

TABLE 3.1: FACEBOOK PRESENCE OF SADC DIASPORA IN CANADA

Note: The number of individuals messaged may not correspond with the total number of individuals in a Facebook group for one or a combination of the following reasons: a person's Facebook profile prohibited sending them a message, the individual member was not living in Canada, the existence of duplicate profiles and individuals being under the age of 18. As some groups were more "global" in nature, only individuals who appeared to be living in Canada were sent a message.

Diaspora groups on Facebook have grown rapidly in number and size since 2004. In total, 97 SADC-related Canadian Facebook groups were located and contacted, most relating to South Africa (36), Mauritius (15) and Zimbabwe (11) (Table 3.1). Information about the survey and invitations to participate were posted on the message boards of the diaspora groups. Each member of a given group was then sent a personal message explaining the purpose of the survey and inviting their participation. Many people belonged to more than one group, but each individual was only messaged once. The overall response was extremely positive. A total of 5,621 people were messaged via Facebook with an overall response rate (in terms of completing the survey) of over 40 percent; however, the country coverage achieved via Facebook messaging varied considerably. In total, around six percent of the SADC diaspora was sent an individual message. Most countries were in the five to 15 percent range, although over 20 percent of migrants in Canada from Botswana, Madagascar and Zimbabwe were located and messaged.

Other SNSs target particular subgroups. LinkedIn and Academia.edu, for example, are directed at professionals and academics, respectively. LinkedIn, which also has diaspora groups, proved a useful tool for identifying and messaging professionals, primarily from the business, banking, legal and Internet technology sectors. The Academia.edu site proved less useful for recruiting diaspora academics, necessitating a time-consuming search of Canadian university websites using various keywords to try to identify faculty who had trained in Southern Africa.

Public Websites

Two diaspora websites, South Africans in Ontario and the South African Jewish Association of Canada (SAJAC), containing the names and mailing addresses (but not email addresses) of members were found. Hard copies of the survey were mailed to 554 addresses with a response rate of over 40 percent. Another subgroup that the study was interested in was health professionals, given the considerable amount of attention and controversy that surrounds the migration of health professionals from South Africa to Canada. Some health professionals were recruited during the Facebook campaign, but the numbers were insufficient to undertake any general analysis of the medical diaspora in Canada. Together, the websites of each province's College of Physicians and Surgeons provide the names and addresses of all physicians in the country. Using "languages spoken" and "degree-granting institutions" as search terms, it was possible to construct a large database of diaspora physicians. In the case of South Africans, for example, a total of 791 physicians were identified. The questionnaire was mailed to all physicians identified and 554 responded, an exceptional response rate of 70 percent, far exceeding the 32 percent response rate reported for the National Physician Survey conducted by the College of Family Physicians of Canada in 2007 (Grava-Gubins and Scott, 2008).




FIGURE 3.1: ONLINE RECRUITMENT OF SOUTHERN AFRICANS IN CANADA

The relative importance of the different online methods of recruiting diaspora respondents is shown in Figure 3.1. Without the innovative use of the Internet to identify and contact potential respondents, the study would certainly have been far less effective in accessing the SADC diaspora in Canada. At the same time, online recruiting was far more effective with some country diasporas than others.

Face-to-Face Interviews

Although the online methods used to identify respondents reached a sizable proportion of the SADC diaspora in Canada, certain groups were not adequately represented in the sample. Thus, a decision was made to hire researchers from the diaspora to conduct face-to-face interviews. Given financial constraints, all the interviews were conducted in Toronto. The first "scattergun" approach was to target the annual Afrofest in Toronto, as one of the research team members was on the festival's organizing committee. While the project had a booth at the festival with researchers ready to interview anyone willing to complete the survey, only a handful of questionnaires were completed. Community researchers were then hired and, under supervision, administered the questionnaire to individuals from countries that were poorly represented in the sample, such as Angola, the DRC, Tanzania and Zambia. Respondents were identified using social networks and snowball sampling. Data from the completed hard-copy questionnaires was then entered online on the StudentVoice© Canada server. This research method yielded an additional 345 respondents, bringing the study total to 2,439 (Table 3.2).

INTERVIEWING ORGANIZATIONS

The study also set out to collect information on diaspora organizations and their development initiatives. The specific objectives of this component were to compile a database on the size and origins of the diaspora organizations, to establish the general development potential of diaspora associations, to consider the role of diasporas in furthering the Millennium Development Goals, to examine the ways in which governments and regional organizations can engage with diaspora associations and to determine the potential for future diaspora engagement in development activities.

With no database of diaspora groups and organizations in Canada, SADC diaspora organizations were identified initially through intensive Web-based searches using a variety of keywords. Additional groups were located through Facebook and community-based contacts. In some cases, community identity is cohesive and several diaspora members are actively involved in more than one organization. Community-based contacts proved useful in these situations in drawing attention to diasporaled development-oriented initiatives. Conversely, in other SADC diaspora communities, where ethnic or racial identities play a strong role in the formation of group participation in activities, members are less

Country of Birth	Internet Respondents	Total Respondents	
Angola	10	47	57
Botswana	7	6	13
DRC	12	116	128
Lesotho	2	1	3
Madagascar	25	0	25
Malawi	9	0	9
Mauritius	52	0	52
Mozambique	8	0	8
Namibia	26	0	26
Seychelles	2	0	2
South Africa	1,635	0	1,635
Swaziland	9	1	10
Tanzania	37	89	126
Zambia	40	25	65
Zimbabwe	220	60	280
Total	2,094	345	2,439

TABLE 3.2: TOTAL SURVEY RESPONDENTS

familiar with or able to identify groups/organizations other than their own. Another challenge was the identification of diaspora-led organizations that focus on development projects in SADC countries and are largely independent of "ethno-national" community diaspora groups.

Some groups exist only informally and are not registered entities. Others do not have websites, or do not provide contact information about their executive members, raising problems of access in order to study them in depth, identify their activities or assess their development potential. One of the consequences of not having a comprehensive database was that it was not possible to determine the number of interviews that would provide us with a representative sample. However, the broader goal in this part of the study was not to make generalizations, but rather to collect and disseminate information on the range and diversity of organizations and initiatives. The results were therefore compiled into a database that included the organization's name, mission statement, contact details, office bearers and management, and fundraising objectives and programs, including international development initiatives.

As soon as a set of organizations had been identified and their activities assessed through material in the public domain, a selection was contacted in order to conduct in-depth interviews with a representative familiar with their work, structure, history and activities. In a few cases, despite expressing strong interest in the SAMP project and its outcomes, representatives were reluctant to be interviewed. Instead, they directed our attention to other material, such as website information, books and other information about the organization and its activities in their countries of origin. Some organizations did both, consenting to an interview and providing supplementary material.

In many cases, founding members of organizations were interviewed. In others, like ethno-national and ethniccultural diaspora groups, the interviewees had played an active role in these groups for several years and possessed a strong familiarity with the group's goals and practices. Respondents were typically members of the executive committee or the board of these organizations. Interviews were conducted in person or by telephone using a semistructured interview guide. Depending on the nature of the organization and its activities, interviews varied in length from 40 minutes to a few hours. Where respondents agreed, interviews were recorded and transcribed. Where they did not, the interviewer took notes.

CHAPTER 4: ENGAGED DIASPORA: SOUTHERN AFRICANS IN CANADA

DIVIDING THE DIASPORAS

When interpreting the results of the survey, it quickly became evident that there were considerable differences in the responses received from South Africans and migrants from other Southern African countries now living in Canada. Rather than treating the SADC diaspora as an undifferentiated whole, therefore, we have separated these two groups and present the survey results separately. Ideally, we would have liked to present a separate analysis for each SADC country; however, the number of responses from some countries was too small to allow for country-specific conclusions. Only the South African and Zimbabwean samples were large enough to permit single country analysis, thus, for this report, the Zimbabwean data has been combined with that from other countries outside South Africa. A separate report has been published elsewhere on the Zimbabwean diaspora in Canada (Chikanda, Crush and Maswikwa, 2012).

There are five major differences between the South African group of respondents and those from other Southern African countries now living in Canada (referred to here as "other Southern Africans"): immigration timelines, channels, reasons for coming to Canada, current employment profiles and earnings, and the type and intensity of connections that they maintain with their countries of origin.

Immigration Timelines

The two groups' timelines for immigration to Canada vary considerably (Table 4.1). Just over 43 percent of South African respondents immigrated before 1998, compared with one-quarter of the other Southern African respondents. This is consistent with Canadian census and CIC immigration figures that show that South Africans have a much longer history of migration to Canada and a major increase from other Southern African countries over the last decade (see Chapter 2).

Immigration Channels

There are significant differences in the immigration channels through which the two groups entered Canada (Table 4.2). For example, only 0.1 percent of South Africans entered as asylum seekers or refugees, compared with one-third of the other Southern Africans. The dominant category of South African migrants was the economic class (56 percent), compared to just under 20 percent of the other group. Other smaller differences were noted in the student class (18 percent versus four percent) and the temporary worker class (two percent versus seven percent).

Primary Reasons for Coming to Canada

The survey found major differences in the main reasons the two groups gave for coming to Canada, some of them counterintuitive (Table 4.3). For example, although over half of South Africans entered Canada as economic-class migrants, less than 10 percent of them said that their primary reason for coming was economic. In the other Southern Africa group, the proportion who entered as economic-class migrants (19 percent) was reflected in the proportion who said that they entered for economic reasons (18 percent). Conversely, while less than one percent of South Africans entered as refugees or asylum seekers, 40 percent said that their main reasons for emigrating related to personal safety and security, as well as political reasons. Among the other Southern Africans, the discrepancy was in the opposite direction, with one-third entering as asylum seekers or refugees, but only 23 percent of them citing politics or personal safety and security as primary reasons for entry.

Employment Profiles and Earnings

There are major differences in the employment profile and earnings between the two groups (Figure 4.1). Almost one-third of the other Southern African respondents earn less than CDN\$25,000 a year. An additional 34 percent reported earning between CDN\$26,000 and \$50,000 a year, and less than five percent earn more than CDN\$200,000 a year. A Statistics Canada report shows that the income profile of SADC-country respondents is consistent with its profile of the general African immigrant population in Canada (Lindsay, 2001). This report found that the average income for African immigrants was CDN\$24,000, almost CDN\$6,000 less than the average income for the Canadian-born population. Moreover, the report shows that 39 percent of African immigrants have incomes below Statistics Canada's low-income cut-off, compared to only 16 percent of the Canadian-born (ibid.).¹ South Africans in Canada, on the other hand, are relatively high earners. As many as 44 percent earn more than CDN\$100,000 per year, a figure that dwarfs both the five percent for Canadianborn people and the 10 percent for other Southern African survey respondents (Golombek, 2011). Over one-quarter of South Africans earn more than CDN\$200,000 per year, compared with less than five percent of the non-South African respondents.

¹ According to Statistics Canada, the 2011 low-income cut-off for an individual living in a metropolitan area of 500,000 or more is CDN\$23,298. See: www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/75f0002m/75f0002m2012002-eng.pdf for details.

	Other Southern Africans %	South Africa %
Before 1991	13.2	21.8
1991–1998	13.1	21.5
1999–2002	34.4	22.5
2003–2006	20.9	16.5
2007–2010	18.4	17.7
Number of Respondents	733	1,577

TABLE 4.1: YEAR OF MIGRATION TO CANADA

TABLE 4.2: OFFICIAL CATEGORY OF ENTRY OF RESPONDENTS

	Other Southern African %	South African %
Asylum seeker/Refugee	34.3	0.7
Economic class (skilled worker or professional)	19.5	56.1
Student	18.2	4.3
Family sponsorship/Assisted relative class	15.5	12.4
Temporary worker	1.9	5.6
Canadian experience class	0.5	2.0
Government sponsored	0.5	1.5
Provincial nominee	0.3	3.1
Other	5.9	8.8
Unknown	3.4	5.6
Number of Respondents	735	1,585

TABLE 4.3: MAIN REASONS FOR MOVING TO CANADA

	Other Southern African %	South African %	Total Southern African %
Children's future	18.1	26.2	23.6
Economic	17.8	9.7	12.3
Educational	22.5	3.3	9.5
Political	8.2	5.4	6.3
Professional	6.2	7.6	7.1
Religious	0	0.4	0.3
Safety/Security	14.4	34.5	28.1
Unite with relatives	6.7	3.7	4.7
Other	6.1	9.0	8.1
Number of Migrants	742	1,584	2,326




FIGURE 4.1: INCOME PROFILE OF RESPONDENTS

Maintaining Connections with Countries of Origin

Finally, there are significant differences between the two groups in terms of the type and intensity of connections that they maintain with their countries of origin. These differences are so significant that we have labelled the two groups accordingly: "disengaged" (South Africans) and "engaged" (other Southern Africans).

PROFILE OF AN ENGAGED DIASPORA

This section rounds out the immigration history and patterns discussed in the previous section by providing additional information on other Southern African migrants. South African migrants are considered separately, in Chapter 5 of this report.

As noted, these migrants entered Canada through a variety of legal channels. Compared with migration flows to Canada as a whole, Southern African asylum seekers and refugees are overrepresented (at 34 percent) and familyclass entrants are significantly underrepresented (at only 15 percent). Irrespective of the category of entry, however, the vast majority of respondents (81 percent) have made the transition to citizenship or permanent residence (Table 4.4). Only three percent of the respondents from these states were still in the asylum-seeker or refugee class at the time of the survey. This is a similar pattern to the sample as a whole, which includes South Africans. This suggests that most SADC migrants, wherever they come from, share the common goal of establishing permanent residence in Canada. In the context of the aims of this study, this is an important finding. Previous studies have found an inverse relationship between legal status in the destination country and commitments in the country of origin: immigrants with secure legal status are more likely

to be socially integrated in the host country and to send less in remittances, and they are less likely to return home (Chetsanga, 2003; Bloch, 2005; Chikanda, 2010).

Demographically, the sample is split almost evenly between males and females (Table 4.5). Racially, the majority are black (63 percent), while 17 percent are white and 12 percent are mixed race. The age profile of the respondents shows that they are generally young, with nearly two-thirds below the age of 40. Slightly more than half are married, while 39 percent have never been married. A further eight percent are divorced or separated and two percent are widowed.

Immigration Status	% of Other Southern Africans	All Respondents %
Citizen	53.2	58.8
Permanent resident	27.5	26.4
Work permit	7.0	9.0
Student	7.1	3.0
Asylum seeker/Refugee	3.1	1.1
Other	2.0	1.7
Number of Respondents	742	2,331

TABLE 4.4: CURRENT IMMIGRATION STATUS

TABLE 4.5: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF OTHER SOUTHERN AFRICAN MIGRANTS

	Number	%
Gender		
Female	394	50.3
Male	389	49.7
Total	783	100.0
Race		
Black	498	63.2
White	138	17.5
Indian/Asian	98	12.4
Other	43	5.5
Coloured	11	1.4
Total	788	100.0
Age		
17–30	298	39.0
31–39	194	25.4
4046	122	15.9
47–52	78	10.2
53–90	73	9.5
Total	765	100.0
Marital Status		
Married/Common law	406	51.4
Never married	311	39.4
Divorced/Separated	60	7.6
Widowed	13	1.6
Total	790	100.0

TABLE 4.6: LEVEL OF EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

	Other Southern Africans %	Recent Immigrants to Canada %	Canadian-born Population %
Less than high school	11	11	15
High school	33	22	26
College or trade diploma	26	31	39
University degree or more	30	35	19
Number	743	1,460,900	15,306,300

Data sources: SAMP survey data and Fleury, 2007.

The migrants had attained high levels of education before coming to Canada (Table 4.6), comparable to most recent immigrants to the country and exceeding the Canadian-born population. For example, 30 percent of the migrants had at least a university degree upon entry to Canada, compared with 19 percent of the Canadian population.

Three-quarters of the respondents indicated that they had continued their formal education outside Africa. The most common qualifications earned included bachelor's degrees (30 percent), technical or vocational diplomas and certificates (29 percent) and master's degrees (11 percent). For many, this was a matter of necessity rather than choice. As many as 33 percent of respondents said they have been asked to recertify or retrain in Canada in order to work in a field for which they were already trained. Furthermore, 30 percent reported that they work in occupations that do not make full use of their professional qualifications. One survey respondent observed that moving to Canada set them back a few years and that it took a long time to get to the point they were at before leaving Africa:

From a job point of view, my husband and I took a moment, on our 12-year anniversary of immigrating to Canada, to evaluate and compare where we were in our careers 12 years ago when we left South Africa (after leaving Zambia) and where we are now, 12 years later in Canada and we have still not caught up to where we were. Immigrating to Canada sets you back about 10 or more years in your career, unless you are a doctor. I think immigrating to Canada is most beneficial to doctors, in my opinion, because they seem to be the most successful here. (Respondent No. 61, Zambia)

The respondents face four main barriers in accessing the Canadian labour market: a lack of Canadian work experience, language problems, a lack of foreign credential recognition and a lack of job contacts in Canada. Access to the labour market has an influence on the level of integration in Canada, as well as on the migrants' capacity to send remittances. Only seven percent of the respondents were not employed, while an additional 21 percent were students. The most common occupations include sales and service (10.7 percent), health (8.4 percent), and finance, business and banking (7.1 percent) (Table 4.7).

TABLE 4.7: CURRENT JOB/OCCUPATION

Occupation	%
Management	8.1
Business owners	1.8
Finance, business, banking	7.1
Engineering and construction	3.0
Health	8.4
Legal	0.6
Sales and service	10.7
Information technology	2.3
Advertising, media, communications	0.9
Arts, sports and culture	0.6
Social services	4.7
Civil service	0.4
Technical and trades	6.3
Education	3.0
Student	21.4
Self-employed	2.8
Administrative and clerical	4.7
Other	6.4
Not employed	7.0
Number of Respondents	704

TIES THAT BIND

Emotional ties are central to the idea of diaspora-led development, as they prompt migrants to maintain social links with family and friends in their country of origin. Just over half of survey respondents (55 percent) said they have immediate family members living there (defined as a spouse, child, sibling, parent, grandparent or grandchild) (Figure 4.2). The majority of the immediate family members are siblings (19 percent), parents (19 percent) and grandparents (13.6 percent). Only a few respondents reported having their children (2 percent) or spouses (0.5 percent) living there.




FIGURE 4.2: FAMILY TIES TO COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

TABLE 4.8: IDENTIFICATION WITH COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

		%			
		Strongly Agree	Agree	Disagree	Strongly Disagree
T 1 4 4 4 1	Being from that country is an important part of	58.7	24.7	3.9	2.2
To what extent do you agree with	how I view myself.	Number of Respondents: 602			
the following statements?	I feel strong ties with people from that country.	50.1	30.1	4.3	2.7
statements:		Number of Respondents: 585			

TABLE 4.9: INTEREST IN CULTURE AND POLITICS OF COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

Do you:	% Yes
Want your children to know about the culture of your country of origin?	83.7
Listen to music from your country of origin?	82.1
Make or buy traditional foods from your country of origin?	74.6
Consult websites from your country of origin?	72.1
Want your children to learn the language(s) of your country of origin?	70.8
Read newspapers from your country of origin?	60.1
Closely follow political events in your country of origin?	59.2
Find that most of your best friends in Canada are from your country of origin?	48.1
Go to a cultural event or show in Canada with performers from your country of origin?	39.8
Read online newspaper(s) from your country of origin?	12.2
Participate in a social networking site associated with your country of origin?	12.0

Note: Multiple responses permitted.

Continued links with family and friends in the country of origin may be transformed into obligations, commitments and concrete actions for the diaspora, particularly if migration was used as a household livelihood strategy to diversify, secure and potentially improve livelihoods (de Haas, 2010). There may therefore be networks of mutual obligation and implicit contracts within families that ensure that migrants continue to send money home until family members emigrate, join them in the host country or pass away (Bloch, 2006; Crush and Frayne, 2007).

In the survey, respondents were asked a set of questions to measure the strength of their attachment and identification with their country of origin. Over 80 percent said they felt strong connections: 83 percent agreed with the statement that being from their country of origin is an important part of how they view themselves and 80 percent said they felt strong ties to other people from that country (Table 4.8). Over three-quarters of the respondents said they eat foods from their home country, listen to music from that country and want their children to know about the culture of the country (Table 4.9).

REMITTING BEHAVIOUR

Remittances are one of the most significant indicators of the strength of the ties that migrants maintain with their countries of origin. The critical role that remittances have played in the survival of households in Southern Africa is well documented (Chikanda, 2010). The weight of academic evidence, however, suggests that these remittances have had little developmental impact in countries of migrant origin. This study sought to measure the frequency, value, and the use of the money and goods that migrants remit. Nearly 70 percent of the respondents send money to their country of origin. The frequency of remitting is distributed fairly evenly: 25 percent remit once a month or more, 29 percent once a year or more and 10 percent remit occasionally (once every few years) (Table 4.10).

TABLE 4.10: FREQUENCY OF REMITTING

	Money % of Remitters	Goods % of Remitters
More than once a month	7.5	1.8
Once a month	18.0	2.7
A few times a year	26.0	18.1
Once a year	3.1	9
Occasionally	10.5	19.9
Never	32.2	44.6
Don't know	2.8	3.9
Number of Respondents	678	659
Median Value (CDN\$)	1,000	500

The average (median) amount sent is CDN\$1,000 per year. These amounts are low compared with West African migrants (Ghanaians, Nigerians and Senegalese) in OECD countries who remit an average of US\$2,500 per year (Bollard, McKenzie and Morten, 2009). More than 66 percent of the remitters send less than CDN\$2,000 in cash remittances annually, while only 21 percent of the remitters sent more than CDN\$3,000 annually (Table 4.11).

TABLE 4.11: CASH REMITTANCES SENT ANNUALLY

Amount (CDN\$)	% of Remitters	
1-999	42.0	
1,000–1,999	23.9	
2,000–2,999	13.1	
3,000–3,999	5.5	
4,000–4,999	4.0	
Over 5,000	11.6	
Number of Respondents: 398		

The study results show that a smaller, but still significant, proportion of the diaspora remit goods (55 percent), though they do so less frequently than with cash remittances. The reported average value of goods remitted was CDN\$500. Only 30 percent of the remitters sent goods with a value of more than CDN\$1,000 annually (Table 4.12). On average, therefore, the respondents remit about CDN\$1,500-worth of goods and cash each year, from an average annual income of CDN\$37,500, or four percent of their earnings.

TABLE 4.12: VALUE OF GOODS REMITTED ANNUALLY

Amount (CDN\$)	% of Remitters	
1–499	40.7	
500–999	28.5	
1,000–1,999	17.4	
2,000–2,999	5.6	
3,000–3,999	2.2	
Over 4,000	5.6	
Number of Respondents: 270		

The proportion of remitters who send money to immediate family members is 95 percent (Table 4.13). Significantly, nearly 50 percent also remit to extended family, which indicates that responsibilities for financial support extend to a broader circle of relatives. Only 10 percent send remittances to community groups and organizations, and six percent remit to their own bank accounts in their country of origin. In other words, remitting by this diaspora consists almost exclusively of private funds sent to immediate and extended family. Unlike other engaged diasporas, they do not remit for community projects or to build personal capital in their home country.

	% of Remitters
Immediate family members	95.0
Extended family	47.2
A personal bank account for future use	6.0
Community group or organization	10.0
Other people	8.5
Total	100.0

TABLE 4.13: REMITTANCE RECIPIENTS

Note: Multiple responses permitted.

Households receiving remittances from relatives in Canada tend to spend the funds on their immediate needs (Table 4.14). Sixty-one percent of remitters sent money for food purchases and 44 percent to meet other day-to-day household expenses. A significant proportion also sent money to meet medical expenses (59 percent) and to pay for education and school fees (58 percent). A much smaller proportion sent money for direct productive investment: for example, 12 percent sent remittances for the purchase of agricultural inputs, 10 percent for starting or running a business and six percent for buying property. In other words, not only are remittances essentially intra-family transfers, they are used primarily to help meet the basic needs of relatives in the country of origin.

TABLE 4.14: USE OF REMITTANCES

	% of Remitters
Buy food	61.5
Pay medical expenses	59.4
Pay educational/school fees	58.2
Meet other day-to-day household expenses	44.1
Buy clothes	34.6
For special events	33.4
Pay transportation costs	32.5
Build, maintain or renovate their dwelling	21.3
For agricultural inputs/equipment	11.6
Start or run a business	10.2
Buy property	6.3
For savings	5.3
Purchase livestock	4.6
Other	6.7
Number of Respondents	431

Note: Multiple responses permitted.

Remittances are a primary means by which diasporas engage economically with countries of origin. Remittances from Canada, however, are overwhelmingly private, small-scale transfers rather than activity motivated by a desire to further national or community development per se. Clearly, these funds contribute to the human development of the recipients (through ensuring greater food security and health and educational opportunities), but the investment of remittances in productive enterprises is not significant at present.

DIASPORAS IN DEVELOPMENT

Diaspora engagement is increasingly advanced as a way to enhance the positive impacts of migration and to minimize its negative impacts on developing countries (Chapter 1). Almost two-thirds (62 percent) of the respondents agreed that they have an important role to play in developing their countries of origin (Figure 4.3). Only 15 percent thought that they had no role to play.

In terms of actual activities, nearly half of the respondents said that they already participated in some kind of economic activity in their country of origin: 25 percent had exported goods there for sale, 11 percent had invested in business, 11 percent had generated employment, 10 percent had engaged in research partnerships and nine percent had purchased local goods for resale in Canada (Table 4.15).

TABLE 4.15: LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION IN ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES IN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

	% of Remitters
Exported goods for sale	25
Invested in a business in country of origin	11
Provided employment in country of origin	11
Carried out research with people based in country of origin	10
Purchased goods at home for resale in Canada	9

Note: Multiple responses permitted.

The respondents were then asked to identify developmental activities in which they were willing to participate (Table 4.16). Only nine percent said they had no interest in any of the activities. Among the most popular activities were skills transfer (mentioned by 58 percent), investing in businesses (55 percent), participation in developmental projects (52 percent) and educational exchanges (52 percent). Interestingly, 36 percent stated that they would like to contribute to development by sending remittances, suggesting that there is a willingness to see the development potential of remittances reaching beyond the migrant's own family.




FIGURE 4.3: LEVEL OF INTEREST IN DEVELOPMENT IN COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

TABLE 4.16: INTEREST IN PARTICIPATING IN SPECIFIC DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

	% of Respondents
Transfer skills through training people in country of origin	58
Invest in a business in country of origin	55
Transfer skills through working in country of origin	52
Participating in developmental projects in country of origin	52
Educational exchanges	52
Volunteer work	48
Fundraising for projects	46
Making charitable donations	43
Exporting goods	39
Invest in infrastructure	39
Importing goods	38
Provide distance teaching (via Internet)	37
Sending remittances	36

Note: Multiple responses permitted.

Others specifically mentioned their desire to be involved in activities that would lead to greater empowerment for women and children:

> I would play an important role, such as being able to help women and children and educate them about their rights because these are things that [the] Tanzania government is still failing to do and especially women and children who live in villages are still ignorant of their own rights and continue to face oppression. (Respondent No. 19, Tanzania)

> I will play a big role in African development, especially in education for women and children to help them reach their goals and more than that if I have an opportunity. My main goal is to improve women's ability to access their rights and equal opportunity and respect from men. (Respondent No. 20, Tanzania)

RETURN MIGRATION

Return migration has been proposed as a means by which developing countries can benefit from the professional expertise and material resources of their diasporas. The probability of return migration is related to a number of factors, including immigration status, number of dependants in the country of origin, age, income, gender and the original reasons for migrating (Bloch, 2007). The respondents in this survey have certainly given thought to returning: 55 percent said they had given it some or a great deal of consideration; only a third had given it little or no thought. Because thinking about return is no guarantee that someone will actually do so, the respondents were asked to specify a time frame within which they thought their return was likely. Only 15 percent thought it was likely within two years, a figure that rose to 27 percent for a return within five years and to 57 percent at some time in the future.

The qualitative responses suggest that many of those who contemplated return at some point were mainly thinking about retirement:

> I do not think I would go back to work but I most certainly would go back to retire...the beach, sun and sand. Family relationships are completely different...we were more family-oriented in Mauritius than here. If I have kids I would rather have them educated and instructed in Mauritius than here. (Respondent No. 33, Mauritius)

> I maintain links with home because I will always be an African and home is home. I don't see myself in those retirement homes. I would rather have family not workers to take care of me at an old age. (Respondent No. 9, Tanzania)

> I would go back once I feel I can retire comfortably as cost of living is not as high as Canada as well as social life is the best in Zambia. More time with friends and family being spent as well as the weather is excellent all year round. (Respondent No. 58, Zambia)

> I have family at home, as well as property and business interests, and I am likely to inherit my parents' property. I will return to Malawi permanently on retirement, so in around 10 to 12 years. (Respondent No. 76, Malawi)

The general evidence suggests that promoting large-scale return migration is problematic, particularly in countries that have been through protracted conflicts or crises, such as Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe in the Southern African context (Missika et al, 2010). This is because the social, political, economic and legal environment is often so dysfunctional that there is a serious mismatch between the demands and needs of the diaspora and the country's capacity to meet those needs.

A comparison between perceptions of living conditions in the country of origin and destination can also provide insights into return potential. An unhappy and marginalized diaspora is more apt to consider return than one that is not. When presented with 15 comparative quality-of-life indicators, the respondents indicated that their lives were better in Canada in all but two: social life and level of taxation (Table 4.17). A large majority felt that Canada offered better medical services, personal and family safety, a better future for their children, prospects for professional and job advancement, income and suitable jobs.

Despite the fact that economic and social conditions were viewed as far better in Canada, the respondents said they might consider returning to their country of origin if economic conditions improved (75 percent), with improved safety and security (74 percent), job opportunities (71 percent) and a change in the political system (66 percent). A small number related return to a feeling that they could be of more value in their countries of origin:

> I am strongly thinking of returning to Africa to live, particularly for work-related purposes, especially as it relates to my field of international development. I believe I have the necessary skills and strong passion to contribute to a more developed Africa. I hope to return within the next five to 10 years. (Respondent No. 69, Zambia)

> I think that I owe a lot to my home country, Madagascar. I believe that at some stage(s) of my life I will go back to Madagascar to help my fellow citizens. My ultimate goal is to practice my new skills in Madagascar, even if it would mean going back and forth between Canada and Madagascar. I feel strongly about being a Canadian as well. Canadians have values that are very similar to mine. I think that I have grown a lot and became stronger here in Canada. If I ever move back to Madagascar, I believe that I will never forget that I am also a Canadian. (Respondent No. 81, Madagascar)

In general, however, return migration does not seem very likely in the short or even the medium term.

	Better in Canada %	Better in origin country %	No difference %	Don't know %
Medical services/treatment	92	3	2	3
Upkeep of public amenities	88	4	2	6
My personal/my family's safety	87	3	8	3
Future of my children	86	3	3	8
Environmental protection	80	9	4	7
Honesty/integrity of politicians	76	1	13	9
Prospects for professional/job advancement	73	15	6	6
My level of income	71	12	7	9
Availability of a suitable job/job security	69	14	9	8
Attitudes to foreigners/immigration/refugees	60	18	12	11
Racial/ethnic/cultural tolerance	54	24	15	7
Cost of living	52	36	5	7
Affordable housing	49	33	7	11
Social life	44	46	7	3
Level of taxation	33	42	7	17

TABLE 4.17: PERCEPTIONS OF LIFE IN CANADA VERSUS COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

CHAPTER 5: DISENGAGED DIASPORA: SOUTH AFRICANS IN CANADA

WITHDRAWING FROM SOUTH AFRICA

The end of apartheid in 1994 marked the dawn of a new era in South Africa's political landscape. While the country celebrated the positive changes, emigration to countries like Canada began to accelerate (Weiner, Mitchell and Price, 1998; Brown, Kaplan and Meyer, 2001; Crush, 2002). The global South African diaspora has grown at a rapid pace post-apartheid, and Canada has emerged as one of the most important destinations for professionals leaving South Africa. This chapter provides a profile of South African immigrants in Canada and assesses their attitudes towards, and level of engagement with, their country of origin. As we have suggested, the South African diaspora in Canada is very different from the diaspora from other countries in the Southern African region.

In sharp contrast to their other Southern African counterparts, South Africans in Canada bear many of the hallmarks of a classic "disengaged diaspora," but more a result of their own choices than forced exile. To characterize all South Africans in Canada as "disengaged," however, would do an injustice to the minority who see themselves playing a significant role in the future of South Africa. This chapter first presents a profile of the South Africans who answered the research survey, then examines the nature of the linkages that South Africans in Canada maintain with South Africa. As we show, these tend to be personal. The majority of South Africans do not see themselves playing any role in the future of the country and some are actively hostile to the idea. The final part of this chapter shows that there is a minority of South Africans who do constitute an engaged diaspora and whose attitudes are similar to those of the other Southern Africans discussed in Chapter 4.

PROFILE OF A DISENGAGED DIASPORA

As noted, South Africans have a long history of migration to Canada (Figure 5.1). Data from 1980 onwards shows considerable fluctuation in annual flows over time. The numbers fell in the early- to mid-1980s and then rose dramatically from the mid-1980s as the armed struggle against apartheid intensified and political repression increased. The outflow stabilized in the late 1980s and then began to increase again in the run-up to the country's first democratic elections in 1994. The peak year of emigration to Canada was 1994, after which the numbers stabilized at 1,500 to 2,000 people per year. The number of migrations fell again after 2000, then stabilized after 2005 at 1,000 to 1,500 per year. Although the survey methodology targeted all South Africans irrespective of when they moved to Canada, a disproportionate number of the respondents were post-1994 immigrants (Figure 5.2).




FIGURE 5.1: SOUTH AFRICAN IMMIGRATION TO CANADA, 1980–2009

Source: CIC.




FIGURE 5.2: YEAR OF IMMIGRATION TO CANADA OF RESPONDENTS, 1953-2009

Although the survey respondents are from every Canadian province, the overwhelming majority live in Ontario (41 percent), British Columbia (26 percent) and Alberta (18 percent) (Table 5.1). The urban bias of the sample simply reflects the strong attraction of Canadian cities for South Africans. One-third of the sample live in cities with a population of more than one million, and 60 percent live in metropolitan areas with populations of more than 250,000 people. Less than 25 percent live in rural areas with less than 1,000 residents.

Slightly more males (55 percent) than females (45 percent) responded to the survey. Racially, the sample is largely white (88 percent of respondents) (Table 5.2), which is consistent with the past pattern of migration from South Africa. The respondents are mainly of working age, with more than 80 percent under the age of 53. The majority are married (78 percent).

TABLE 5.1: GEOGRAPHICAL LOCATION OF RESPONDENTS

	Number	%		
Province or Territory of Residence				
Ontario	665	40.7		
British Columbia	422	25.8		
Alberta	299	18.3		
Manitoba	109	6.7		
Saskatchewan	51	3.1		
Nova Scotia	32	2.0		
Newfoundland and Labrador	23	1.4		
Quebec	16	1.0		
New Brunswick	13	0.8		
Prince Edward Island	3	0.2		
Northwest Territories, Nunavut, Yukon	2	0.1		
Total	1,635	100.0		
Population of City/Town of Re	sidence			
>1,000,000	536	33.9		
500,000-1,000,000	340	21.5		
250,000–500,000	43	2.7		
100,000–250,000	133	8.4		
50,000-100,000	151	9.6		
10,000–50,000	194	12.3		
1000–10,000	160	10.1		
<1000 (rural)	23	1.5		
Total	1,580	100.0		

TABLE 5.2: DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONDENTS

	Number	%		
Gender				
Male	889	55.1		
Female	724	44.9		
Total	1,613	100.0		
Race (South African terr	ninology)			
White	1,438	88.5		
Indian/Asian	87	5.4		
Coloured	57	3.5		
Black African	28	1.7		
Other	14	0.9		
Total	1,624	100.0		
Age				
17–30	298	18.6		
31–39	346	21.6		
40-46	340	21.2		
47–52	315	19.7		
53–90	303	18.9		
Total	1,602	100.0		
Marital Status				
Married/common law	1,265	77.6		
Never married	250	15.3		
Divorced/separated	97	6.0		
Widowed	18	1.1		
Total	1,630	100.0		

The South African diaspora in Canada is highly educated and dominated by skilled professionals. Before leaving South Africa, 54 percent of the respondents had obtained a university degree. South African immigrants are therefore far more qualified than the general Canadian population, 23 percent of whom possess a university degree (Statistics Canada, 2009). After leaving South Africa, 47 percent of respondents continued with their formal education, primarily in Canada. Technical or vocational qualifications were either obtained or in progress by 29 percent of respondents. Other qualifications include professional degrees, mainly in law, medicine and business administration (19 percent), while others pursued bachelor's (16 percent) and post-graduate degrees (12 percent) (Table 5.3). As many as 25 percent of the respondents claimed that they were underemployed in jobs that did not make full use of their professional qualifications and experience.

Of the respondents' occupations, 30 percent are health professionals, eight percent are employed in the education field, seven percent occupy management posts, six percent are employed in the sales and service industry, five percent occupy administrative or clerical positions and another five percent are employed in the finance, business and banking industry (Table 5.4). As noted above, the South African diaspora in Canada are high earners by Canadian standards. Nearly one-quarter of respondents earn more than CDN\$200,000 per year and almost 40 percent earn more than CDN\$100,000 per year (Table 5.5). Only 12 percent earn less than CDN\$25,000 per year.

TABLE 5.3: EDUCATIONAL PROFILE OF SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONDENTS

	Number	%		
Highest level of education in South Africa				
Less than secondary school	132	8.2		
Secondary school	222	13.8		
Technical/vocational diploma or certificate	325	20.1		
Bachelor's/honour's degree	307	19.0		
Master's degree	93	5.8		
Professional degree (e.g., LL.B, M.B.A., M.D.)	443	27.4		
Ph.D.	36	2.2		
Other	56	3.5		
Total	1,614	100.0		
Qualifications achieved/in progress outside South Africa				
Less than secondary school	4	0.5		
Secondary school	28	3.8		
Technical/vocational diploma or certificate	219	29.4		
Bachelor's/honour's degree	121	16.2		
Master's degree	63	8.4		
Professional degree	143	19.2		
Ph.D.	32	4.3		
Other	136	18.2		
Total	746	100.0		

	%
Management	6.9
Business owners	3.8
Finance, business, banking	5.0
Engineering and construction	2.6
Health	30.4
Legal	1.4
Sales and service	5.8
Information technology	3.7
Advertising, media, communications	3.0
Arts, sports and culture	3.4
Social services	1.6
Civil service	0.5
Technical and trades	4.4
Education	8.4
Student	1.4
Self-employed	2.4
Administrative and clerical	5.2
Other	1.6
Unemployed	8.5
Total	1,529

TABLE 5.4: CURRENT JOB/OCCUPATION IN CANADA

TABLE 5.5: INCOME PROFILE OF SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONDENTS

Annual Income (CDN\$)	%
Less than 25,000	11.9
26,000–50,000	16.4
51,000–75,000	11.2
76,000–100,000	10.6
101,000-200,000	15.9
More than 201,000	22.8
Prefer not to answer	11.2
Total	100.0

REASONS FOR LEAVING SOUTH AFRICA

More than half of the respondents immigrated to Canada under the economic class of entry. A smaller number of respondents entered as temporary workers and later managed to secure permanent residence, especially in the health field:

> When I initially came to Canada it was supposed to be for a 30-month work exchange (so purely for professional reasons, rather than socio-economic factors). However, we decided to apply for permanent residency and remain in Vancouver, predominantly because of the amazing lifestyle here, rather than the conditions in South Africa (which according to all accounts has deteriorated

significantly since we left). The longer we stay in Vancouver, the more difficult it would be to give up the Vancouver lifestyle and return to South Africa. (Respondent No. 604)

I qualified as a family doctor in South Africa and came to Canada with the plan of staying for two years to save some money. After two years, I decided to stay for another year because financially, I was doing very well. I was about to go back to South Africa to specialize but then got offered a position as a resident in obstetrics and gynecology at the University of Alberta. (Respondent No. 39)

By contrast, only 10 percent of the respondents said that their primary reason for coming to Canada was economic in nature (Figure 5.3). Another eight percent said that professional reasons had brought them to Canada. The two most common reasons given for moving to Canada were safety and security (34 percent) and their children's future (26 percent). These findings confirm previous studies that suggest that concerns about personal and family safety are a leading driver of migration from South Africa (Awases et al., 2004; Grant, 2006; Joudrey and Robson, 2010).

Many of the respondents provided vivid anecdotes of their personal experiences with crime and violence in South Africa:

> I was personally attacked and assaulted eight times in one year. My eldest daughter was robbed and held at gunpoint three times in one year. My house was robbed twice in one year, whilst I was in the house. (Respondent No. 26)

> Crime was a big factor in my decision to move away from South Africa. Myself and four other family members had been carjacked over the years. My immediate family and relatives had been victims of robbery and or burglary of some sort. It was just a matter of time before someone was murdered. (Respondent No. 107)

> I realized that sleeping with a gun under my pillow was not normal practice. The statistics at the time were that one out of three women would be raped, and if you were raped, you would contract HIV/AIDS. That equals a death sentence for me. (Respondent No. 345)




FIGURE 5.3: MOST IMPORTANT REASON FOR COMING TO CANADA

I worked in a security armed response control room, and we would receive the distress calls from homes that we monitor. The things I heard as we would dispatch armed guards to try and help were unimaginable. There is no media out there, Canada included, that shows the true occurrences that take place in South Africa. I promised myself I would not have children in South Africa and took my entire family (mom, dad, brother, sister-in-law and wife) to Canada. I have never returned, nor will I ever. (Respondent No. 319)

I feel that I had no choice but to leave my beloved South Africa for reasons of safety. My children's lives and future are more important than living the South African lifestyle and being with my own family and friends. I hate living in Canada, I loathe the weather and the lifestyle but my children are happy here and have established themselves. I could never leave without them and they aren't going anywhere. I am stuck here! (Respondent No. 11)

Some argued that they were victims of affirmative action and that the future of white children in South Africa was threatened by the policies of the African National Congress government. None of the respondents showed any concern about either the future of black children or the fact that unemployment rates in South Africa are much higher among blacks than whites:

> I was laid off at Telkom on management level, because I'm white. They had to "correct" the numbers by having less white managers. (Respondent No. 32)

> My business was forced to employ Black Economic Empowerment (BEE) staff who did not fit into my practice or could not contribute in the improvement of our service to clients. The government's policies

forced our clients to discriminate against our firm and we could not afford the BEE changes forced upon us. (Respondent No. 423)

I struggled to find work mostly for not being black enough. The irony was that under apartheid, as an Indian I was not white enough. (Respondent No. 228)

COMPARING CANADA AND SOUTH AFRICA

The survey asked respondents to compare South Africa and Canada on 15 quality-of-life indicators (Table 5.6). Canada scored higher on every single indicator except social life, which was seen as better in South Africa. Predictably, both personal and family security were seen as significantly better (by 98 percent of respondents), as was the future of children (91 percent). Other indicators that were ranked significantly higher in Canada included the upkeep of public amenities (92 percent better in Canada), racial/ ethnic/cultural tolerance (85 percent better in Canada) and environmental protection (83 percent better in Canada). On nine indicators, less than 10 percent thought that South Africa was better. On no indicator (except social life) did more than one-third think South Africa was better.

	Better in Canada %	Better in South Africa %	No Difference %	Don't Know %
Personal/Family safety	98	0	1	1
Upkeep of public amenities	92	1	2	5
Future of my children	91	1	2	6
Racial/ethnic/cultural tolerance	85	2	9	4
Environmental protection	83	4	6	7
Availability of a suitable job/job security	79	6	10	5
Attitudes to foreigners/treatment of refugees	77	4	10	9
Prospects for professional/job advancement	77	7	10	6
Honesty/integrity of politicians	74	1	17	8
Medical services/treatment	72	18	7	3
Level of income	69	11	10	10
Cost of living	54	28	11	7
Affordable housing	44	32	13	11
Social life	35	44	17	4
Level of taxation	30	27	23	20
Number of Respondents: 1,533				

TABLE 5.6: PERCEIVED QUALITY OF LIFE IN CANADA VERSUS SOUTH AFRICA

The preference for living in Canada was reflected in the fact that 61 percent had acquired Canadian citizenship. Another 26 percent, more recent arrivals, are permanent residents (landed immigrants) who can be expected to acquire citizenship in due course (Table 5.7).

TABLE 5.7: IMMIGRATION STATUS OF SOUTH AFRICAN RESPONDENTS

	Number	%
Canadian citizen	975	61.4
Permanent resident/Landed immigrant	411	25.9
Non-permanent resident (work permit)	158	9.9
Not specified	25	1.6
Non-permanent resident (student)	17	1.1
Asylum seeker/Refugee	3	0.2
Total	1,589	100.0

What are we to make of the fact that South Africa scores so poorly in comparison with Canada on quality-of-life tests and that so many South African immigrants in the survey have taken out Canadian citizenship? It certainly does not mean that South Africans in Canada no longer identify in any way with their country of origin. A large majority of respondents (88 percent) said that being from South Africa is an important part of how they view themselves. Furthermore, 80 percent said that they felt that they have strong ties with people from South Africa. The survey also asked about various cultural activities and preferences, which again indicated high levels of personal identification. The vast majority (91 percent) make or buy traditional foods from South Africa, want their children to know about South African culture (82 percent) and listen to South African music (80 percent) (Table 5.8).

TABLE 5.8: INTEREST IN SOUTH AFRICAN CULTURE AND POLITICS

Do you:	%
Make or buy traditional foods from South Africa?	91
Want your children to know about the culture of South Africa?	82
Listen to music from South Africa?	80
Read newspapers from South Africa in print or online?	73
Participate in a social networking site that is associated with South Africa?	58
Want your children to learn the language(s) of South Africa?	48
Find that most of your best friends in Canada are from South Africa?	37

Three-quarters of respondents regularly consult South African newspapers online, while 48 percent want their children to learn a South African language.

The majority of respondents are integrated into Canadian society, but still maintain a sense of themselves as South Africans rather than Canadians:

There's also something about South African culture and the connection to the South African landscape that never truly leaves you. When I think of "home," I don't think of St. John's (where I've lived for the past seven years) — I think of Table Mountain, I think of the Drakensberg, I think of Kirstenbosch, I think of the highveld, etc. I'm only just starting to identify with Canadian culture. I don't think I'll ever feel truly Canadian, though. Not even after I receive my citizenship. (Respondent No. 362) I came over to Canada to see if the grass is actually greener on this side. My personal opinion is that it is easier for the white English-speaking people to immigrate, adapt and fit in than the Afrikaansspeaking people. South Africa is the only place in the world where the Afrikaners would ever feel at home. That would also be the main reason for returning home one day, and that is to be between my people, culture and to speak my own language. (Respondent No. 190)

South Africa is where I was born and spent intense years and my emotions run very deep there. I am very sentimentally attached to South Africa because I remember my parents and grandparents and all our shared memories and nostalgia. I miss the colour and vibrancy of the place, the nature and animals, especially the smell of dust and rain. So in a poetic way I am always linked to Africa and get excited to meet people from all over the continent. (Respondent No. 297)

A small minority claimed to have successfully shed their South African identity:

I feel very "North American" in many ways after studying and living in North America for my adult life. (Respondent No. 312)

Canada is the only home my children know. They are Canadian and can be the best they want to be if they apply hard work, respect and humility to their choices in life. My family is blessed in Canada. South Africa is one chapter in the book of our lives. We have many other chapters and many more to be written. (Respondent No. 87)

I only have a brother in my immediate family left in South Africa. He is all I personally care about in South Africa. The rest I do not care about really. I decided to distance myself from it. As the world doesn't care, neither do I. I do not have any other interest in that country. (Respondent No. 617)

FAMILY TIES

The overwhelming majority of respondents indicated that they have close family members in South Africa. These include siblings (74 percent of respondents), parents (69 percent), grandparents (45 percent) and children (13 percent). Most South African immigrants in Canada still maintain close contact with their family members in the country. The survey showed that they travel relatively frequently to South Africa. As many as 92 percent had visited South Africa at least once since immigrating to Canada, and 59 percent had done so in the previous three years. More than 30 percent visit South Africa every two to three years and 18 percent at least once a year. More than 80 percent of the most recent visits were for family-related issues and events. Only six percent visited for tourism and four percent for business purposes.

The survey also ascertained what other links South Africans in Canada maintain with South Africa. About 40 percent still maintain bank accounts in South Africa, while 22 percent have investments, 14 percent own a house and nine percent own land in South Africa (Table 5.9). However, half of the respondents indicated that they do not own any of these assets in South Africa. The survey also showed that the longer a person has lived in Canada, the less likely they are to hold assets in South Africa (Table 5.10). In other words, over time, South Africans progressively disinvest and cut these links.

TABLE 5.9: ASSET OWNERSHIP IN SOUTH AFRICA

	%
Bank account	41
Business	2
House	14
Investments	22
Property (land)	9
Savings	16

TABLE 5.10: ASSET OWNERSHIP LEVELS IN SOUTH AFRICA, BY YEAR OF MIGRATION TO CANADA

	Period of Immigration						
	Before 1980 (%)	1980– 1984 (%)	1985– 1989 (%)	1990– 1994 (%)	1995– 1999 (%)	2000– 2004 (%)	2005– 2009 (%)
Bank account	8.9	10.3	14.3	20.5	19.5	26.1	35.3
Business	2.5	0.0	0.0	0.6	0.6	1.6	2.0
House	5.1	0.0	3.8	7.1	6.4	9.2	13.0
Investments	3.8	3.4	9.8	17.3	12.8	17.3	15.3
Property	5.1	3.4	4.5	3.2	5.4	5.7	7.4
Savings	3.8	0.0	3.8	6.4	7.7	11.4	14.2

REMITTING BEHAVIOUR

Remittances are usually viewed as the most visible evidence of the material ties that migrants maintain with their countries of origin; however, nearly 45 percent of the South African respondents indicated that they have never sent remittances to South Africa. Only 12 percent can be considered regular remitters, sending money to South Africa at least once a month. Many of those who remit do so irregularly: 23 percent a few times a year and 18 percent less than once a year. The amounts remitted in the previous year varied considerably: just over one-third of respondents had sent less than CDN\$5,000, while only 12 percent had remitted more than CDN\$5,000 to South Africa (Figure 5.4).




FIGURE 5.4: VOLUME OF REMITTANCES SENT TO SOUTH AFRICA

The bulk of the remittances go to immediate and extended family members. In the previous year, more than half of the remitters (58 percent) had sent remittances to their immediate family members in South Africa, while 15 percent sent the remittances to their extended family. Only 13 percent sent them to a personal banking account in South Africa. Remittance usage is consistent with the private intra-family nature of the transfers. Over one-third (38 percent) of the remitters identified household expenses in South Africa as the major use of the remittances, followed by paying medical expenses (33 percent), buying food (31 percent), covering costs of special events (31 percent), buying clothes (21 percent) and education (16 percent) (Table 5.11). Remittances are focussed on meeting the consumption needs of family members and very little is spent on investing or savings.

More than half of the respondents (54 percent) had not remitted any goods to South Africa since migrating to Canada. In the year prior to the survey, only 39 percent had sent goods to that country. Just 24 percent reported sending goods to South Africa at least once a year. Very few (eight percent) sent goods valued at more than CDN\$500. The average value of goods sent was CDN\$415 for the whole sample and CDN\$1,045 for the remitters. Books and other educational material (sent by 40 percent of respondents) were the most common items sent to South Africa. Other goods sent include household goods and appliances (12 percent), food (nine percent) and equipment (six percent).

TABLE 5.11: USE OF REMITTANCES

	% of Remitters
Meet day-to-day household expenses	38.3
Pay medical expenses	32.7
Buy food	31.2
For special events	31.1
Buy clothes	21.3
Pay educational/school fees	16.3
Build, maintain or renovate dwelling	14.4
Pay transportation costs	13.6
For savings/investment	9.1
Buy property	3.7
Start or run a business	2.8
For agricultural inputs/equipment	1.4
Purchase livestock	1.1

In sum, South Africans in Canada are not a remitting diaspora in the conventional sense or in comparison to other Southern Africans in the country (see Chapter 4). The majority have not remitted anything since moving to Canada. And of those that have, the remitting frequency is generally erratic and the amounts relatively small, especially in relation to their earnings in Canada. Those who do remit clearly do so to meet the needs of immediate family members in South Africa. There is little evidence that remittances are seen as developmental in nature (i.e., designed to promote economic and social development of the country). Levels of savings and investment of remittances are extremely low and there is little evidence of collective remitting for development projects.

Disengagement in Development

The survey asked the respondents to indicate their interest in contributing to development in South Africa and the likelihood of their participating in development-related activities linked to South Africa. In sharp contrast to other Southern Africans, over 80 percent of the South African respondents said that they did not see themselves playing any role in the development of their country of origin. The survey revealed very low levels of interest in activities such as educational exchanges, volunteer work, making charitable donations, skills transfer, import and export of goods, fundraising for projects in South Africa, remitting for development projects and investment in South African businesses. More than 70 percent of the respondents did not see themselves participating in any of these activities; in some cases, the figure was over 90 percent. The lack of interest was consistent with the fact that over 80 percent of the respondents did not feel that they had an important role to play in development in South Africa. In justifying their position, some noted that they had already done so, while others were highly critical of the South African government and NGOs:

South Africa holds no allure for me any longer. I spent eight years of my professional life providing medical care to disadvantaged communities. I've paid any "debts" I may have had. (Respondent No. 32)

I have no role in South Africa's development...I invested 30 years of my life in South Africa that's enough! (Respondent No. 216)

The money goes into a deep dark pit, and does not contribute to self-development. Any help sent there lands in the bottomless pit of corruption. (Respondent No. 16)

I do not contribute to charities and NGOs, as I do not believe the money actually gets to those who need it; rather, the money lines the pockets of "higher-ups." This has been evident for numerous years and is often reported in the South African media. I do not believe it is the role of expats to aid in South African development; the change needs to come from within. (Respondent No. 33)

RETURN MIGRATION

Return migration is seen as one of the ways by which migrant-sending countries can benefit from their professional diasporas overseas (Van Houte and Davids, 2008). The survey found that the potential for return migration to South Africa is very low, with only 13 percent having considered it a "great deal" and 21 percent having given "some consideration" to returning (Figure 5.5). About 46 percent had never considered returning, while a further 19 percent had given it hardly any thought.

Even fewer respondents indicated that they are likely to return to South Africa in the near future. Only six percent

said they were likely to return within the next two years, 10 percent within the next five years and 20 percent at some time in the future. The absence of imminent plans to return to South Africa is confirmed by the fact that only two percent had applied for a job there in the previous year, although 10 percent said they had been offered employment. The evidence for "brain circulation" is also minimal, with only four percent having worked in South Africa in the previous year — and some of these were probably recent immigrants to Canada. Only one percent had been on an exchange program in South Africa in the past year, while two percent had volunteered there.

Consistent with the reasons stated for coming to Canada in the first place, the lack of safety and security was cited as the most significant obstacle to return. A reduction in crime levels in South Africa and the abolition of affirmative action were major preconditions for reconsidering a return to South Africa. Other reasons cited included an absence of family in South Africa, the respondent's age and a feeling that they owed nothing to the country:

> All my immediate family now live in Canada and my children (18 and 16) were born in Canada and for that reason I would not return there to live in South Africa. (Respondent No. 63)

> Emigration makes one start all over. We emigrated at age 36. It took four years to become somebody. Now, at age 50, we don't have motivation to try and start over again, in another country, not in Africa or anywhere else. (Respondent No. 554)

> I have never returned, nor will I ever. I served in the military for four years, as did my brother and my father and his father before him. We have paid our dues to South Africa...I love the country, but my new home is Canada. Canada has provided our kids with opportunity and our family with safety. The only time I am South African is when it is Rugby World Cup time. (Respondent No. 319)




FIGURE 5.5: CONSIDERATION GIVEN TO RETURNING TO SOUTH AFRICA




FIGURE 5.6: ANNUAL INCOME OF ENGAGED AND DISENGAGED SOUTH AFRICANS

THE COMMITTED MINORITY

Differentiating Engaged South Africans

While the majority of South Africans in Canada are not involved in the range of activities typical of an engaged diaspora and do not see themselves playing any role in the future of South Africa, a small minority does. What differentiates these South Africans from the rest of their peers? Do they display a different demographic, social or economic profile? Do they have a more positive view of South Africa and its future than the majority? What kinds of development-related activities do they engage in? To answer these questions, we differentiated between those who agreed (the engaged) and disagreed (the disengaged) with the statement: "I have an important role to play in the future development of South Africa."

The first task was to determine whether there were any differences in the demographic and socio-economic profiles of engaged and disengaged members of the South African diaspora in Canada. There were no significant differences between the two groups on a range of indicators, including where they lived in Canada (city and province), gender, race, education and training (both inside and outside South Africa), or whether or not they had family members still in South Africa. Other variables, however, did seem to differentiate the two groups. First, in some income brackets (i.e., CDN\$75,000–100,000 and over CDN\$200,000 per year) the proportions of engagement are very similar (Figure 5.6). However, proportionally more members of the engaged diaspora are in the lower income brackets: 38 percent earn less than CDN\$50,000, compared to only 22 percent of those who are disengaged.

Second, there is a marked difference between the two groups in terms of their main reason for coming to Canada. The disengaged diaspora was far more motivated by concerns about safety and security and their children's future than the engaged diaspora. Twothirds of disengaged South Africans gave these as their main reasons for coming to Canada, compared with 46 percent of engaged South Africans. In other words, these issues were important for both groups, but seem far more significant for those who see no role for themselves in the future of South Africa.

Third, engaged South Africans in Canada tend to visit South Africa more frequently than their disengaged counterparts (Table 5.13). Only 10 percent of the latter group visit the country once or more a year; in contrast, over one-third (36 percent) of the engaged diaspora group visit South Africa this frequently. Or again, 30 percent of the disengaged group have either never been back to South Africa or visit less than once a decade, in contrast to only 13 percent of the engaged group.

	Engaged	Disengaged
	%	%
Safety and security	24.5	37.6
Children's future	21.8	28.9
Economic	13.9	8.8
Professional	8.5	5.6
Educational	6.8	1.3
Unite with relatives	5.4	5.4
Political	4.1	5.6
Religious	0.3	0.3
Other	14.6	6.6
Total	100.0	100.0

TABLE 5.12: MAIN REASON FOR MOVING TO CANADA

TABLE 5.13: FREQUENCY OF VISITS TO SOUTH AFRICA

	Engaged	Disengaged
	%	%
More than once a year	8.2	1.2
Once a year	27.9	9.1
Every 2 to 3 years	32.0	30.2
At least once every 5 years	11.9	18.0
At least once every 10 years	7.1	11.4
Less than once every 10 years	1.4	11.4
Never	11.6	18.7
Total	100.0	100.0

IDENTIFICATION WITH SOUTH AFRICA

In theory, members of the engaged South African diaspora should exhibit more positive feelings toward, and identification with, South Africa. The vast majority of South Africans in Canada do exhibit a strong South African identity; however, the strength of that identity is even stronger among the subgroup who constitute the engaged diaspora. For example, 84 percent of the engaged group strongly agreed that being from South Africa is an important part of how they view themselves (Table 5.14). The equivalent figure for the disengaged group was only 48 percent. Or again, 79 percent of the engaged group strongly agreed that they felt strong ties with other South Africans, compared to just 33 percent of the disengaged group. In addition, they are more likely to continue with cultural practices that remind them of South Africa. On every measure used in the survey, engaged South Africans exhibit a stronger identification with South African culture. In other words, self-identification as South African, feeling

a strong affinity with other South Africans and with South African culture is strongly correlated with the degree of personal commitment to South African development.

TABLE 5.14: SOUTH AFRICAN IDENTITY OF ENGAGED AND DISENGAGED DIASPORA

	Engaged	Disengaged		
	%	%		
Being from South Africa is an important part of how I see myself.				
Strongly agree	84.4	48.3		
Agree	12.7	31.5		
Neither agree nor disagree	1.8	10.6		
Disagree	1.1	5.9		
Strongly disagree	0.0	3.7		
I feel strong ties with people from South Africa.				
Strongly agree	79.3	33.1		
Agree	17.5	33.6		
Neither agree nor disagree	2.9	19.5		
Disagree	0.4	9.2		
Strongly disagree	0.0	4.5		

The other question is whether engaged South Africans rate South Africa more highly than they do Canada. In fact, Canada is rated more positively by both the engaged and the disengaged groups on almost all quality-of-life indicators. The proportion that rates South Africa better, however, is consistently higher among the engaged group (Table 5.15). This holds true across all indicators, with the exception of personal income, although there is no difference in perceptions about the honesty and integrity of politicians and personal and family safety.

LINKS WITH SOUTH AFRICA

How strong are the links of engaged South Africans with their country of origin? The first and most obvious area is remittances. While engaged South Africans tend to be lower wage earners than disengaged South Africans, they remit more and do so more regularly. For example, while 53 percent of disengaged South Africans have never remitted, the figure for engaged South Africans is only 32 percent. The average annual remittance of the engaged group is more than twice as much as the disengaged group. Onehalf of engaged South Africans remit at least once a year, compared to only 29 percent of disengaged South Africans (Table 5.16).

A second important indicator of diaspora engagement is the extent to which members of the diaspora associate themselves with, and are involved in the activities of, diaspora organizations and associations. In the case of the South African diaspora in Canada, rates of participation in such organizations are generally low in both the engaged and disengaged groups; however, there is a relatively consistent pattern of greater involvement by the engaged group (see Chapter 6).

TABLE 5.15: PERCEIVED QUALITY OF LIFE IN CANADA VERSUS SOUTH AFRICA

	Engaged	Disengaged	Difference
	(% Better in South Africa)	(% Better in South Africa)	%
Social life	61	38	+23
Affordable housing	41	32	+9
Cost of living	35	26	+9
Level of taxation	31	26	+5
Medical services/ treatment	23	16	+7
Prospects for professional/job advancement	13	6	+7
Availability of a suitable job/job security	12	5	+7
My level of income	11	12	-1
Attitudes to foreigners/ immigration/treatment of refugees	10	4	+6
Environmental protection	7	3	+4
Racial/ethnic/cultural tolerance	7	1	+6
Future of my children	3	0	+3
Upkeep of public amenities	2	1	+1
Honesty/integrity of politicians	1	1	0
My personal/my family's safety	0	0	0

TABLE 5.16: FREQUENCY OF REMITTANCES

	Engaged	Disengaged
	%	%
More than once a month	2.4	0.6
Once a month	12.9	10.5
A few times a year	28.8	12.2
Once a year	5.8	5.8
Occasionally (<once a="" td="" year)<=""><td>16.6</td><td>16.3</td></once>	16.6	16.3
Never	32.5	53.0
Don't know	1.0	1.5
Total	100.0	100.0

Third, there is a consistent pattern of greater involvement by the engaged group than the disengaged group on every measure used, ranging from buying property, to investments, importing South African goods for sale and, especially, to charitable donations (Table 5.17). The intention to engage in the future was also significantly higher among the engaged group. For example, 28 percent of the respondents from the engaged group said they were likely to work in South Africa in the next two years (compared to only three percent of the disengaged group) (Table 5.18). Forty percent of the engaged said they would fundraise for projects in South Africa, compared to only six percent of the disengaged. Other major differences included sending funds for development projects in South Africa (39 percent versus four percent) and making charitable donations that benefit South Africa (55 percent versus 16 percent).

TABLE 5.17: DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES (IN THE PREVIOUS YEAR)

	Engaged	Disengaged
	%	%
Bought a house or property in South Africa	4.1	1.0
Carried out research with people in South Africa	12.2	1.5
Exported goods to South Africa from Canada	2.7	1.2
Invested in a business in South Africa	2.7	0.7
Purchased goods from South Africa to sell in Canada	3.7	1.0
Made a donation to a Canadian NGO/charity operating in South Africa	17.3	7.1
Made a donation to an NGO/ charity in South Africa	14.2	5.9
Made a donation to a religious organization in South Africa	13.2	5.6

TABLE 5.18: LIKELY DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES (IN THE NEXT TWO YEARS)

	Engaged	Disengaged
	%	%
Invest in business in South Africa	22.1	1.7
Work in South Africa	27.6	3.0
Participate in exchanges	31.2	3.7
Fundraise for projects in South Africa	39.7	5.9
Send money for development projects in South Africa	38.7	4.4
Make charitable donations that benefit South Africa	54.6	15.7
Volunteer work in Canada to benefit South Africa	40.7	5.6

Finally, the survey provides insight into the kinds of activities that the engaged South African diaspora are interested in participating in (Table 5.19). Skills transfer was rated as the most important contribution either through training programs in South Africa (55 percent of respondents) or working in South Africa (53 percent). Forty-four percent were interested in undertaking educational exchanges. Another area of preferred activity was philanthropy, with 54 percent willing to fundraise in Canada for projects in South Africa, 49 percent volunteering in South Africa, 42 percent participating in development projects in South Africa and 34 percent making charitable donations to South Africa. Less significant, but by no means unimportant, were entrepreneurial activities, such as investing in South African businesses (34 percent), importing goods from South Africa (27 percent) and investing in South African infrastructural development (18 percent). While the majority of engaged Canadian South Africans remit money to family in South Africa, only 23 percent see themselves remitting specifically for development projects.

	%
Transfer skills through training people in South Africa	54.7
Fundraising for projects in South Africa	54.3
Transfer skills through working in South Africa	52.5
Volunteer work in South Africa	48.6
Educational exchanges	43.8
Participate in development projects in South Africa	42.0
Making charitable donations	34.4
Invest in business in South Africa	34.0
Importing goods from South Africa	27.5
Sending remittances	23.2
Investment in infrastructure	17.7
Exporting goods to South Africa	13.4

TABLE 5.19: PREFERRED DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT ACTIVITIES

Additional insights into the thinking of the engaged South African diaspora group came from their verbatim comments:

I think a program where people could take their annual vacations in South Africa, including a week of volunteering paired with a week of holidays, would get lots of votes of popularity from South African transplants looking to contribute to change without putting their family, their lives and their economic futures at great personal risk. (Respondent No. 402)

I support two South African NGOs that focus on female empowerment and support, and I do a lot of fundraising and raising awareness for these issues. Last Christmas, I took a group of volunteers to KwaZulu-Natal and next year will be moving to Cape Town for the summer to work with the organizations I support. I think I have a crucial role to play in African development. I also work with an NGO that sets up education and support systems in Uganda and Kenya, because I am a South African who has been blessed with opportunities and it is up to me to use those to empower the people living there. I am passionate about volunteer work and international development, especially in Southern Africa. (Respondent No. 454)

I am still passionate about South Africa. Six years ago, I started a home-based travel agency. My core business is selling South Africa. Annually, I book many expats to South Africa for vacation and send Canadians on tours or safaris. For me, this is a unique way of contributing to South Africa and to focus on the positive. South Africa is an amazing country and has lots to offer to travellers. (Respondent No. 200)

We support an African school feeding program. This is an interest as my niece, who lives in the United Kingdom, is a director and fundraiser for the charity. For four years, I imported products from three self-help groups in South Africa to sell for them at fairs and through stores in Canada. (Respondent No. 285)

RETURN MIGRATION

Given that the engaged diaspora is more favourably disposed towards South Africa on most measures, it is interesting to see if this translates into an intention to return. As noted above, 46 percent of South Africans in Canada have given no consideration to returning, and only 13 percent say they have given it a great deal of thought; however, the engaged and disengaged groups think about this question very differently. For example, 64 percent of the disengaged group have given it no consideration, compared to only 17 percent of the engaged group. Similarly, only four percent of the disengaged group have given it a great deal of consideration, compared with one-third (34 percent) of the engaged group. The differences are also marked on the question of likelihood of return (Table 5.20). Nearly 20 percent of the engaged group said it was likely they would return within two years, compared to only two percent of the disengaged group. At the five-year mark, the figures were 30 percent and three percent, respectively. As many as 65 percent of the engaged group thought it likely that they would return at some point, compared to only seven percent of the disengaged group. In other words, the likelihood of engaged South Africans returning to South Africa increases over time, while the likelihood of disengaged South Africans returning is low and static.

	Engaged	Disengaged
	% Likely	% Likely
Within next two years	18.9	2.3
Within next five years	30.5	3.1
At some point in the future	65.3	7.4

TABLE 5.20: LIKELIHOOD OF RETURNING TO SOUTH AFRICA

What motivates people to consider thinking of return? Clearly it is not nostalgia or homesickness or the Canadian weather; rather, it is because potential returnees see a development-related role for themselves, as the following comments demonstrate:

> I am thinking of moving back to Cape Town since I have received a job offer there. I feel like I have to take the skills I have gained abroad back to my home, I have a responsibility to improve the country at this critical time for all South Africans. (Respondent No. 137)

> I have been considering moving back to South Africa for a year now and have finally made the decision. Despite an excellent income and good quality of life, I prefer to be home. I preferred to share an uncertain future with family, friends and people who share the same background as me. Despite making great friends and acquaintances and making progress in my field I still feel like an immigrant to Canada. And I don't blame any of its citizens for not making me feel at home... But because I was always interested in politics I couldn't help seeing a dark future. I realized that with my emigration to Canada I have also forsaken South Africa. I have realized in the last three years that the answers and solutions to South Africa's problems are far more likely to be found amongst the skilled and possibly therefore emigrants. (Respondent No. 176)

> Personally, I would like to go back to South Africa to hopefully play a role in its politics for the better — meaning making everything equal in that country, even though it seems like a goal that will never be reached. This is why I want to go back, because this situation needs to change in order for my kids and my family to one day go back to South Africa, their rightful home and live their lives in prosperity and safety. I do not want the situation that apartheid presented to ever happen again, so I hope something good happens in the future where I can actually play a role and make a difference. (Respondent No. 415)

> I love South Africa, and it will always be home. Even if nothing changes back there, I will still move back at some point. I believe everyone has to make

it work for himself. I have all my relatives back there, and they are all very happy and successful and will never move. (Respondent No. 562)

CHAPTER 6: DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT

ENGAGING COLLECTIVELY

Migrants are well known for forming diaspora associations and organizations with those who come from the same country. These associations allow for a range of social, cultural and economic interactions within the diaspora (Mercer, Page and Evans, 2008). Besides demonstrating an affinity with the country of origin, diaspora associations provide an avenue for the diaspora to make meaningful contributions to those countries. This chapter examines the development-related activities of Southern African diaspora organizations in Canada, focussing primarily on those associations actively engaging in development initiatives or those with the potential for engaging in such development work.1 The activities discussed here include initiatives by individuals who rely on their diaspora networks, as well as initiatives by groups that, as a collective, raise funds and material resources in Canada to support projects or institutions in their countries or communities of origin.

The chapter demonstrates that diaspora organizations engage in a wide variety of formal and informal development initiatives in Africa. Most tend to be directed at the grassroots level and generally avoid engagement with national governments. Despite their strong developmental focus and impact, very few associations and projects receive financial or material support from either the federal or provincial governments in Canada. Their main source of support and fundraising is the diaspora itself. There is significant overlap in the sectors and kinds of activities of diaspora associations, but the majority of them tend to support initiatives in the education and health fields.

The survey found that 52 percent of individuals from the Southern African diaspora outside of South Africa are involved in at least one of the different types of diaspora association (Table 6.1). The proportion of engaged South Africans is also relatively high, at 48 percent; however, as might be expected, disengaged South Africans do not participate in these organizations to the same degree (only 31 percent). When the general pattern of involvement is disaggregated by type of organization, none of the organizations has more than 20 percent involvement by the disengaged diaspora. Only one type of organization (alumni associations of African universities) has more than 10 percent involved. By contrast, more than 10 percent of both the other Southern African and the engaged South African diaspora are involved in at least five of the eight types of organization listed.

What is of interest is the patterns of membership between the two types of engaged diaspora. Southern Africans from outside South Africa are much bigger supporters of African diaspora associations (16 percent versus less than one percent of South Africans), ethnic, cultural or HTAs (18 percent versus eight percent), and religious organizations (18 percent versus 11 percent). Engaged South Africans are more likely to be members of alumni associations (17 percent versus seven percent of other Southern Africans), professional associations (17 percent versus five percent) and Canadian charitable organizations with African links (18 percent versus 13 percent). Both are equally involved with NGOs with links to Africa. While these numbers are not large and the differences are not very significant, they do suggest different potential channels for engagement by the two groups. The engaged South African group tends to be associated with more formal organizations that are exogenous to the diaspora itself while the other Southern African group tends to be more involved in self-organized institutions.

TYPOLOGY OF ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS

The various Southern African diaspora organizations in Canada can be classified using a modified typology suggested by the IOM (Ionescu, 2006). The classification is certainly not comprehensive and further research may help clarify the diversity of current and emerging initiatives; some overlap may also exist between these broad categories.

National/Ethno-national Associations

These associations are the most common form of diaspora organization in countries of settlement and numerous groups exist in Canada. For example, the Tanzanian Canadian Association (TCA) represents people of Tanzanian origin in the Greater Toronto Area (GTA); other ethno-national organizations for the Tanzanian diaspora community in Canada are the Montreal Tanzanian Association (MTA) and the Tanzanian Community Association of Northern Alberta (TANA) (MTA, 2013; TANA, 2013). Amongst Zimbabweans, associations include the Zimbabwe Community Assistance Association (ZCAA) for recent Zimbabwean migrants based in Hamilton, Ontario (ZCAA, 2013). Many associations are organized groups with their own websites and formal organizational structures, such as formal membership with dues, an elected board of directors, bylaws and constitutions. Other smaller, more informal, groups perform a similar function within migrant/diaspora communities.

¹ A number of diaspora associations or networks limit their activities to Canada and are given less attention in this chapter.

	Southern African Diaspora	Engaged South African Diaspora	Disengaged South African Diaspora
	%	%	%
African diaspora association	15.6	0.7	1.3
African students' association in Canada	7.4	2.2	0.1
Alumni association of African university	6.8	16.6	11.3
Canadian charitable organization with links to Africa	12.7	18.4	9.7
Ethnic, cultural or hometown association in Canada	17.8	8.1	4.4
NGO in Canada with links to Africa	10.6	10.0	2.5
Professional association in Africa	5.4	17.3	5.5
Religious organization with links to Africa	18.3	11.4	8.8
None of the above	48.0	52.0	69.0
Number of Respondents	735	271	636

TABLE 6.1: PARTICIPATION IN ACTIVITIES OF DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS

These associations play a meaningful role within the diaspora. Perhaps the most important role is community building. By organizing regular social events like picnics, dinners and celebrations of milestones in the countries of origin (such as Independence Day) and emphasizing cultural preservation, they help immigrants and their children to maintain symbolic and cultural ties with their countries of origin. They provide a vital platform for second-generation diasporans, contributing to the formation and development of diaspora identity and collectivity.

Ethnic/Religious Associations

Most members of these associations belong to a common ethnic, cultural and/or religious group. Examples include SAJAC and the Canadian Chinese Association (South Africa). The Tanzanite Association represents the largely Christian Goan community from Tanzania, who trace their roots to the western Indian state of Goa.

This category includes groups whose organization and activities are based on religious principles: there is an affiliation with a religious body and the group's mission statement derives from faith-based values. In some cases, the groups obtain financial support from religious sources. Examples include the Canadian Friends of the South African Chevrah Kadisha (CAFSACK) and the Ismaili Youth Soccer (IYS) group, founded by Tanzanian-born Amyn Bhulji to encourage Ismaili youth in Vancouver to play soccer (CAFSACK, 2013; IYS, 2013). A substantial percentage of the Ismaili community in Canada migrated from Tanzania and Zanzibar and other East African countries during the 1960s and 1970s ("Ismailis," 2012).

Although the research identified the existence of many ethno-national diaspora associations, it also showed generally weak involvement in development work in SADC countries, though further research may well find more connections. Many of the groups focus on the diaspora/immigrant community in Canada by providing social support to members, often helping diaspora members to adjust and integrate into receiving societies. Nevertheless, their potential to contribute to development in SADC countries is considerable. Several groups indicated that there was strong interest among members in supporting worthwhile projects "back home" and discussions had begun regarding participation in selected projects.

HTAs

HTAs are formal or informal associations established by diaspora members from the same town or region in the country of origin (Orozco and Rouse, 2007; Somerville, Durana and Terrazas, 2008; Mercer, Page and Evans, 2009). Our preliminary inventory of diaspora groups located very few of these associations, which may be linked to lower migrant numbers, diverse political histories of Southern African countries and disparate motivations for migration to Canada among diaspora members. Examples include ZANCANA, a community organization for people from the Tanzanian region of Zanzibar, and Outreach Zanzibar (ZANCANA, 2013; Outreach Zanzibar, 2013).

Alumni Networks and Associations

This diaspora group consists of alumni members from schools and universities in Southern Africa. Formal and informal alumni associations help to keep their members connected to their educational institutions, each other and to their diaspora communities. Examples in this category include alumni groups from South Africa's Rhodes University and UCT (Rhodes University, 2013).

Professional Networks

Examples of professional networks include the Organisation des Professionnels Congolais du Canada (OPCC). Formed in 1997, this organization's mission is to create a network of professional leaders, students and entrepreneurs in Canada and the DRC and to increase their influence through the activities and credibility of this network. It also seeks to promote cooperation and foster new partnerships between Canadian and Congolese organizations such as companies, universities and research institutions (OPCC, 2013).

Business Networks

Business networks link entrepreneurs and companies in Canada and elsewhere with business opportunities in Southern African countries. They play an important role in deepening foreign investment in the country of origin. For example, the Zambia Diaspora Business Group Inc., launched in Calgary in 2010, allows the Zambian diaspora to invest in business opportunities in that country (Zambia Diaspora Business Group, Inc., 2013). The group describes itself as "an investment vehicle with the objective of channeling investment funds into promising business opportunities in Zambia" and is based on the premise that the Zambian diaspora are "best positioned" to "direct and optimize investment opportunities that will benefit Zambia's development efforts" (ibid.).

Chambers of Commerce

Chambers of commerce are similar to business networks, in that they provide their members with opportunities for trade and investment in countries of origin. They also maintain strong links with businesses and governments in both countries of origin and settlement, and play a key role in trade missions between the two countries. An example is the Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business, which organizes regular events like the Mining Breakfast, Indaba dinner and seminars to achieve these objectives (Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business, 2013).

Collaborative Networks

Collaborative networks bring together a variety of diaspora and non-diaspora groups and institutions for specific projects on issues such as health care. The Ottawa-based North-South Institute's (NSI's) Diaspora Giving Back project, for instance, attempts to provide opportunities to Southern African diaspora health-care professionals based in Canada to contribute, on a short-term basis, to the national health systems of their country of origin (NSI, 2013). The NSI designed this project in collaboration with the South African-based Southern African Network of Nurses and Midwives and the Somerset West Community Health Centre, based in Ottawa.

Knowledge Networks

These transnational networks, established by members of the Southern African diaspora in Canada, aim to build linkages between research institutions - within and outside universities - in Canada and Africa. They build up knowledge systems about Southern African countries, provide research opportunities to scholars in these countries and build capacity by training researchers from SADC countries. Research institute and university exchange programs provide new opportunities for educators, students and academics in both Canada and Southern Africa. They help to increase scholarly and research expertise in developing countries and promote knowledge transfer. In 2004, South African diaspora members in Canada played a major role in facilitating an exchange agreement between Queen's University and UCT. In 2009, the Canada-based UCT Foundation helped facilitate a comprehensive exchange and collaborative agreement between UCT and York University in Toronto (UCT Foundation, 2009). A number of universities in Southern Africa are part of research and development partnerships with Canadian universities (Table 6.2). These are not diaspora initiatives per se, although diaspora academics are often centrally involved.

Significant diaspora-led knowledge networks include the Canadian International Development Agency-funded African Food Security Urban Network (AFSUN) that links six Canadian universities with university partners in Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe (AFSUN, 2013).

Community Initiatives

Community initiatives support local development and community-based projects in countries of origin, and include non-profit and charitable foundations engaged in development work.

Social-Philanthropic Networks

The Canadian Southern African Network (CSAN) is a representative example of this category. Established in September 2009, this Toronto-based non-profit organization has formed a social and philanthropic collective of Southern African diaspora members and other Canadians interested in their objectives. Another example is the Stephen Leacock Foundation for Children, which raises funds for education-based programs affecting more than 2,000 children in Toronto and South African schools (Waldie, 2011).

African Country	Canadian Partner	African Partner
Angola	Ryerson University	Agostino Neto University
DRC	Laurentian University	Université de Kinshasa
Madagagaan	Laurentian University	Université d'Antananarivo
Madagascar	Université de Montréal	Université d'Antananarivo
Malawi	Memorial University	Bunda College, University of Malawi
wialawi	Queen's University	Chancellor College, University of Malawi
Mozambique	University of Victoria	Eduardo Mondlane University
wiozanibique	Queen's University	Eduardo Mondlane University
Namibia	Queen's University	University of Namibia
	University of British Columbia	UCT, Stellenbosch University
	McMaster University	University of KwaZulu-Natal
	Concordia University	University of the North
South Africa	University of Alberta	University of Fort Hare
	Queen's University	UCT, Wits University, University of KwaZulu- Natal
	York University	UCT
Swaziland	Queen's University	University of Swaziland
Zambia	Queen's University	University of Zambia

TABLE 6.2: RESEARCH AND TRAINING PARTNERSHIPS BETWEEN CANADIAN AND SADC UNIVERSITIES

Umbrella Organizations

Umbrella organizations are national and international platforms for individuals in diaspora communities and diaspora-based associations whose objectives focus on diaspora involvement and development-based issues in their countries of origin. Examples include Zambia Diaspora Connect (ZDC) and the newly constituted Zambian Canadian Friendship Association. Efforts have been made recently to develop a similar structure for Tanzanian associations in Canada. Other umbrella groups have been created to forge a more integrated diaspora community identity. The Canadian Council for South Africans (CANCOSA) was established in 1995 as the umbrella organization representing South African groups in the GTA (CANCOSA, 2013a). The amalgamation of the South African Nationals in Ottawa and the Protea Club led to the formation of the South African Rainbow Association of Canada - Ottawa, which, since 2005, has been instrumental in the formation of the African Diaspora Association of Canada (ADAC), an umbrella organization for all African diaspora communities in Canada (ADAC, 2013).

NGOs in Canada

This category includes NGOs in Canada that are either founded by diaspora members or in which diaspora members play a prominent supporting or management role. Examples include:

• Tanga Education Support Association (TESA), which is supported by the diaspora alumni group of the Usagara School in Tanga, Tanzania (Sembony, 2010);

- Reachout to Africa, a Christian humanitarian organization operating out of North Vancouver (Reachout, 2013);
- Zanele Poverty Relief Effort, founded in 2007 focussed on poverty relief in rural Zimbabwe (Zanele Poverty Relief Effort, 2013);
- Rural Action International (RAI), dedicated to gender equality and women's empowerment in Zambia (RAI, 2013);
- Kuwasha Project, which aims to provide sustainable and cheap solar power in Tanzania;
- Vancouver-based Education Without Borders (EWB), which seeks to develop educational facilities in disadvantaged communities in South Africa;
- My Arms Wide Open (MAWO) Foundation, a Canadian charitable foundation created in 2009 to support comprehensive community-based projects in South Africa (MAWO, 2013);
- Outreach Zanzibar, which aims to provide development assistance to Zanzibar in partnership with Zanzibar Help Foundation (Outreach Zanzibar, 2013);
- South African Women for Women (2013), which runs a scholarship program for South African-born female students from poor backgrounds; and
- Zenzele (2013), a charitable organization based in Toronto that provides skills training, entrepreneurial

development and business support to women in Southern Africa.

Diaspora members also make donations to registered charities in Canada to support work either in their home country or in Southern Africa generally, depending on the focus of the charity. For example, the Torontobased Nirvana Cultural Society has raised funds to support the activities of the Stephen Lewis Foundation and the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund (Canada). The Stephen Lewis Foundation works with grassroots organizations in developing countries, strengthening and implementing HIV and AIDS initiatives in most of the countries included in this study. Similarly, the Nelson Mandela Children's Fund (Canada) was founded in 1998 to "give disadvantaged children and youth in South Africa a hand up to overcome the continuing effects of the previous apartheid government, disability, HIV and AIDS, homelessness and poverty" (Nelson Mandela Children's Fund, 2013).

Student Associations

These networks are made up of international students from SADC countries and youth from Southern African diaspora communities enrolled in Canadian universities. Like ethno-national associations, these networks emphasize social and cultural events, reinforcing connections with countries of origin. In some cases, these formal and informal associations may lead to the formation of ethnonational organizations. A case in point is the TCA, which emerged out of the Tanzanian Students' Association, formed by diaspora members studying at colleges and universities in the GTA during the 1970s (TCA, 2013).

Virtual Diaspora Associations

The Southern African diaspora in Canada has taken in large numbers thanks to the networking potential of social media platforms such as Facebook and LinkedIn. Almost 100 diaspora groups with Canadian-based administrators were identified on Facebook, with a total of 9,652 members in early 2011. Only two SADC countries (Lesotho and Seychelles) had no identifiable groups. The greatest number related to South Africa (36), followed by Mauritius (15) and Zimbabwe (11) (Table 6.3). The number of LinkedIn groups is much smaller, but includes groups such as the CSAN (with over 300 professionals as members from throughout Canada), SA Canada (over 150 members), Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business (around 80 members), Tanzanians in Canada (30 members) and Zimbabweans in Canada. The vast majority of social media groups aim to reach out and attract fellow individuals from the same country. All of the South African groups include a variation of the words "for South Africans living in Canada." This intention is also expressed in the title of the virtual diaspora associations, with names like "South Africans Living in Toronto," "South Africans Living in

Vancouver," "South Africans in the GTA," "South Africans in Ottawa," "Young South Africans in Vancouver," and "South Africans in Canada" (at least six groups with this name).

Most virtual diaspora associations are established to facilitate contact between diaspora members from the same country of origin. A common theme in the descriptions of the virtual diaspora associations is facilitating social connections between persons from the same country. In some instances, associations extend invitations to others. For example, the South Africans in Ontario Business Group on Facebook invites other Canadians to join the group, describing itself as a "non-invasive" space to share ideas about small business or new business ideas. Another group, Canadian Friends of South Africa, has a membership that clearly consists of a mix of South African and other Canadians.

TABLE 6.3: ONLINE DIASPORA GROUPS

Country	Number of Groups	Number of Members
South Africa	36	5,371
Zimbabwe	11	477
Madagascar	7	663
Zambia	6	366
DRC	5	130
Tanzania	4	201
Namibia	3	68
Angola	3	34
Botswana	3	54
Swaziland	2	506
Malawi	1	26
Mozambique	1	27

The research identified at least two cases where the associations have clearly stated political objectives. Both the Swaziland Solidarity Network (SSN) in Canada and the Zimbabweans Living in Canada Association describe the purpose of their associations as raising awareness about the political situation in their countries. The SSN, a virtual association on Google groups and Wikispaces, provides a collection of articles and documents that focus on political, social and economic issues in Swaziland. "As Canadians," they note, "we are hoping to increase public awareness of the oppressive government of King Mswati III and to demand that our government actively supports democracy in this corrupt kingdom" (SSN, 2013).

DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES

All of the 70 or so groups identified during the research play a role in building, maintaining or strengthening the transnational engagement of the SADC diaspora. Given their diversity and function, their actual roles and contributions to development-related activities are wideranging and varied. To begin with, it is clear that while the real and potential contributions of the SADC diaspora in Canada to their countries of origin has only recently been acknowledged, their involvement is not a recent occurrence. The historical dimension, however, is even more poorly studied and documented than the current patterns. The Forum Club, for example, now a dormant entity, was formed in 1976 by members of the South African diaspora in Ontario after the Soweto uprising. Its purpose was to aid victims of the "cruel and unjust policy of apartheid" and, until 1994, it contributed to various projects, including the Bishop Tutu Fund to help families of political prisoners, school feeding programs and homes for the aged (CANCOSA, 2013b). A principal project supported by this club for 15 years was the African National Congress-run school for children of exiles in Tanzania (ibid.).

As far as contemporary patterns of engagement are concerned, a number of groups have been directly involved in projects from their inception to completion. This is most clearly the case for community-based initiatives established by diaspora-led charitable or non-profit organizations in Canada. Several of these foundations have been, or are involved in, implementing projects in a number of countries at the same time. We identified 23 such groups, with the largest number involving South Africa and Zambia (six organizations each) followed by Zimbabwe, Tanzania and the DRC (four each). Other diaspora organizations have played a supporting role to organizations or projects already set up in Africa. Still others have provided support to Canadian organizations with development projects in SADC countries. In some cases, a collective of diaspora and non-diaspora actors have worked jointly to build up existing systems in SADC countries in areas such as education and health.

Diaspora-led charitable organizations have contributed to a variety of sectors, including education (high school and college/university), humanitarian assistance, gender and development, poverty reduction, environment and development, food security, basic amenities development and health (Table 6.4). The number and strength of diaspora-led charitable and non-profit organizations is not necessarily related to the size of a country's diaspora in Canada. Smaller diaspora communities, such as Zambians in Canada, have established similar or larger numbers of development-centred organizations compared with larger, more established communities such as the South African and Tanzanian diaspora communities.

Many diaspora associations have contributed to several of these activities rather than only one (Table 6.5). Education is clearly the most important area for diaspora engagement, with many groups contributing in various ways in an effort to improve existing facilities and access to education for vulnerable communities in Southern Africa. This decision to invest in education draws on the groups' beliefs that existing facilities are inadequate and that governments have failed to meet educational needs, particularly of rural and marginal communities. It is also motivated by the view that "young people are the country's future" (Mulenga, 2011). One respondent explained the decision this way:

> Education is the best way to break the cycle of poverty. Education provides the fundamental foundation otherwise you are wasting. There are people who say we should be giving money to AIDS, this, that or the other, but I think education is positive. It is enthusiastic and when you see the results of these kids and you talk to these kids and you see how smart they are and then you think if they hadn't gone to the Get Ahead, how miserable their lives would have been or how wasted that potential would be. (Anonymous respondent)

Thematic Focus	Activities	
Education	build/improve infrastructure (classrooms, buildings)	
(school-level support)	• improve or expand existing facilities (desks, books and computers)	
	special programs to enhance learning and improve standards of education	
	curriculum development in partnership with Canadian teachers and educators	
	additional teaching guidance and programs to address shortage of teachers	
	provide scholarships to outstanding students	
	• pay school fees for children from marginalized communities to reduce rates of attrition	
Higher education	improve resources, such as books and journals for university libraries	
	financial support for research and community-based projects at universities	
	collaborative projects	
	• contribute to scholarships and bursaries or create new scholarships and bursaries for students (based on merit and need)	
	build knowledge systems about SADC countries	
	enhance research potential	
	capacity building through participation of SADC university faculty and students	
Health	improve or expand existing facilities	
	train health professionals	
	• provide specialized services (like physiotherapy, occupational therapy)	
	HIV and AIDS prevention and sexual health projects	
	donate medical supplies and equipment	
	collaborative projects involving diaspora participation	
Humanitarian assistance	donations of food, money and supplies for accidents or disasters	
	projects for internally displaced populations	
	donate used clothing and supplies to impoverished communities	
Poverty alleviation	create short-/long-term employment for participating communities	
Food security	• feeding programs for vulnerable households, especially female-headed households and orphans	
	food garden program	
	diversified uses of existing foods	
Basic amenities	improve or increase access to amenities (clean drinking water, housing and electricity)	
Youth and development	programs that focus on at-risk youth from marginal communities	
Gender and development	programs targeting women	
	programs that support or enhance women's empowerment in communities	
	scholarships for female students in schools/universities	
Capacity building and skills transfer	provide new opportunities for research and participation	
	train local participants in projects	
Institutional development	• creating formal mechanisms for diaspora engagement with governments in countries of origin	
	developing and enhancing diaspora engagement with state structures in countries of origin	
Environment and development	introduction of eco-friendly technology, such as solar power	
	tree-planting schemes	
Fundraising	organize events to raise funds for projects and organizations	

TABLE 6.4: DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES OF DIASPORA ORGANIZATIONS

Diaspora networking groups can indirectly contribute to development processes by reinforcing the work carried out by other organizations based in Canada and Southern Africa. CSAN has organized several fundraising events, the proceeds of which have supported the expansion of educational opportunities for disadvantaged children in Southern Africa and Canada. Two past recipients are the Stephen Leacock Foundation and Make a Difference (MAD) Foundation. The South Africa-based MAD Foundation organizes financial support, especially for schooling, to youth from poor backgrounds and has a mentoring program pairing MAD members and volunteers with beneficiaries. So far, the Foundation has supported 79 students through scholarships (determined on the basis of merit and need) and more than 500 children from their educational programs in the Western Cape, Gauteng, Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal provinces. In 2012, CSAN's fundraising event supported ZimArt-in-Trust's Maori Primary School Project outside Harare (ZimArt, 2013). The Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business has similarly donated funds through special events to the African Preschools Society, a Canadian-registered charitable organization that develops primary schools and has built schools in Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal provinces in South Africa (African Preschools Society, 2013). In 2002, the South African Women for Women helped to raise money for the Phelophepa Train Project, whose objective is to improve health services in remote South African rural communities through a mobile medical unit providing primary medical care, including optometry, pharmaceutical and dental care.

Although diaspora alumni groups have raised funds for their alma mater institutions in South Africa, other diaspora-based organizations have also contributed financial resources to support educational institutions. The No Future Without Forgiveness gala event, inspired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu's book of the same name, was held in Toronto in 2002. It was organized by South African Women for Women, in collaboration with the Law Society of Upper Canada, raising more than half a million South African rands to support the Faculty of Women's Studies and Faculty of Law at the University of the Western Cape. The Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business has instituted a postgraduate bursary award at UCT (UCT, 2011).

Group initiatives, including the formation of organizations and foundations, have often emerged out of individual diaspora philanthropic efforts. Examples include the Enanae Foundation, Global Light Projects, Rural Action International, Qamer Foundation and ZDC. South African-born doctor Michael Hayden used his 2008 award from the Canadian Institutes of Health Research to fund the establishment of the Ripples of Hope trainee awards, including the annual Global Health Award, for recipients from African countries. These awards allow trainees to come to Canada to study various aspects of health at the University of British Columbia (Centre for Molecular Medicine and Therapeutics, 2011). He also helped to create and implement the Masiphumelele Youth Project (MYP) near Cape Town (MYP, 2010).

Philanthropic activities and development initiatives by the Southern African diaspora in countries of origin are often concomitant with similar activities in Canada. Several diaspora groups have contributed to developmentoriented or social projects in Canada, such as the Stephen Leacock Foundation-sponsored Triangle of Hope Program, which provides support to children from poorer families in two Toronto schools.

Diaspora groups in Canada raise funds for their projects through membership donations, corporate sponsorship and special events. Examples of activities supporting the sponsorship and member donations are:

- Qamer Foundation's Change for Change Campaign, which urges people to gather loose change or coins in old water bottles for their clean drinking water project;
- Outreach Zanzibar and MAWO's collected donations through a partnership with Tides Canada;
- MAWO's partnership program with You Change, which allows US and Canadian residents to recycle electronic items, whose equivalent monetary value is subsequently donated to the projects;
- from 2008–2010, Malamulele Onward received funding from the Social Justice Fund of the Canadian Auto Workers;
- the Simon Poultney Foundation has created supporting charitable organizations in Zambia and the United Kingdom; and
- the Zambian Canadian Foundation and TCA have changed their status to charitable organizations to enable them to issue tax receipts to donors and raise larger sums for their activities in Canada and countries of origin.

Although financial resources are largely raised and collected in Canada, in some instances international diaspora groups like TESA and ZDC, and projects such as the MYP have received funding from diaspora members outside Canada.

Country	Diaspora Association	Activity
Education		
DRC	Africa-Japan Chamber of Commerce	raised funds for a school in Kinshasa
DRC	Nyantende Foundation	improved primary and secondary school enrollment for children in Nyantende
South Africa	EWB	expanded educational facilities in two schools in the Western Cape province
South Africa	CAFSACK	 donated funds are used for existing social programs for the Jewish community in South Africa, like burial expenses support, senior citizens and youth welfare, and employment support
South Africa	Stephen Leacock Foundation	the Get Ahead Project provides special education programs for disadvantaged youth
Tanzania	TESA	• runs an independent learning centre (with a library and computers) and program at the Usagara School in Tanga
Tanzania	TESA	runs an after-school meal program for students at the Usagara School
Tanzania	TESA	• recruited retired Canadian teachers contribute to learning programs by revising, updating the curriculum and providing training to current teachers
Tanzania	TESA	raised funds to renovate school building
Tanzania	Qamer Foundation	donated school supplies for children from a marginal community
Tanzania	IYS	• in partnership with the Aga Khan Educational Society (Tanzania), raised funds to renovate the soccer field at the Aga Khan Primary School, Dar-es-Salaam
Tanzania	Zanzibar Canada Association (ZANCANA)	donated computers to two schools in Zanzibar
Tanzania	IYS	• raised funds in 2010 to revamp the soccer fields at the Aga Khan Primary School, Dar-es-Salaam
Zanzibar, Tanzania	Outreach Zanzibar	• raised funds and helped to renovate the Unguja Ukuu Primary School in Zanzibar
Zambia	RAI	helped to construct a new school building
Zambia	Simon Poultney Foundation	• built a new staff house at Sungula School in Chibwelelo in central Zambia
DRC	Fondation Lazare	donated computers to the University of Kinshasa
Zimbabwe	Hutano	organized a fundraising event to purchase textbooks and journals for the University of Zimbabwe medical library
Zimbabwe	Runyararo Zimbabwe Children's Charity	• provided scholarships (covering school fees and educational supplies) for children in three schools
Southern Africa	SAMP/AFSUN	 provides new avenues for collaborative research between diaspora and non- diaspora faculty at Queen's University and institutions in Southern African countries
South Africa	Canada-Southern Africa Chamber of Business	created a postgraduate business bursary award at UCT
South Africa	UCT Foundation/UCT alumni group	• helped to establish the research and student exchange program between UCT and York University
South Africa	UCT Foundation/UCT alumni group	• provided funds for scholarships, bursaries and various university-based projects
Zambia	Masomo Foundation	• provides university-level scholarships each year to a select number of students in Canada and Zambia
Health		
DRC	Fondation Lazare	donated medical supplies and equipment to the Kalembelembe Children's Hospital in Kinshasa
Lesotho and South Africa	Malamulele Onward	• provides specialized therapy such as physiotherapy, occupational therapy and speech therapy along with equipment and caregiver training in poor rural communities
Zanzibar	Outreach Zanzibar	opened a low-cost dental clinic with volunteer staff
Tanzania	Qamer Foundation	provided clean drinking water through construction of new wells
Humanitarian Ro	elief	
DRC	Shiloh Place	• provided housing and living needs for vulnerable groups, such as orphans and widows
Tanzania	ZANCANA	collected funds and supplies of families of victims of a ferry accident

TABLE 6.5: DEVELOPMENT ENGAGEMENT OF SADC DIASPORA

Country	Diaspora Association	Activity
Zambia	Mulenga Michael Sikombe/Enanae Foundation	• collected gently used items (including clothing, shoes and bedding) in partnership with Zambians in America group to donate in Zambia
Zimbabwe	Moonraiser Entertainment	donated clothes and other supplies to two orphanages
Poverty Reduct	ion	
South Africa	MAWO	implemented One Brick at a Time employment program for local communities in Berknok, Limpopo
Zimbabwe	Canada Rural Folk of Africa Foundation	donated poultry to small farmers in Rusape, Manicaland Province
Food Security		
DRC	Fondation Lazare	provided 40 acres of land for community farming and food production in the Mbakana rural community
South Africa	EWB	established a food garden program
Zambia	RAI	established an education program to make diverse foods using local crops like cassava
Environment a	nd Development	
South Africa	MAWO	established a tree-planting program
Tanzania	Carbon X Energy	implemented a solar energy program
Zambia	Global Light Projects	implemented a solar energy program

Diaspora engagement is also evident in the willingness of diaspora faculty at Canadian universities to leverage and establish institutional partnerships for international research collaboration and education capacity building in SADC countries. A 2008 symposium organized by the Association of Universities and Colleges in Canada (AUCC) with the World University Service of Canada and the IDRC recorded the specific advantages of diaspora faculty to set up such collaborative ventures and the large numbers of diaspora faculty who were leading projects in their country or region of origin (AUCC, 2009). The increasing numbers of SADC diaspora faculty appointed in Canadian universities reinforces this aspect (ibid.).

Prosperous migrants, such as many South Africans in Canada, are well positioned to generate sizable sums for development causes. There is already evidence of this in the work of groups like CSAN. Faith-based groups, many of which have ties to Tanzania, are another diaspora group with solid prospects for transnational development engagement. Ismaili communities in different parts of Canada possess a strong record of community and humanitarian work. They also have a very high profile within Canada for raising funds for development work in Canada and developing countries, including Tanzania, through the Aga Khan Foundation. The annual World Partnership Walk, organized by the Aga Khan Foundation Canada, has raised more than CDN\$70 million. In 2011, alone, some 40,000 participants raised more than CDN\$7 million for projects in Africa and Asia (World Partnership Walk, 2013).

PROMOTING AND IMPEDING ENGAGEMENT

While the range of projects and involvement is impressive, the depth and scale of engagement varies by group and country. Like individual engagement, diaspora group involvement is strongly influenced by conditions that enable or limit engagement in activities with development outcomes (Table 6.6).

The philanthropic efforts and development engagement of the Southern African diaspora communities clearly enhance the emotional, cultural and personal ties that they maintain with their countries of origin. A Zambian diaspora member living in Ontario who is involved with several diaspora-based groups, wrote recently that despite "living away from home for many years, they [the Zambian diaspora] have not forgotten their land of birth" (Sichilima, 2009). "I wanted to give back to my motherland" was how another respondent explained his engagement with Zambia.

These engagements reveal the multiple attachments of diverse Southern African diaspora communities to different geographic locations. For certain groups, especially those who can trace their origins to places outside Southern Africa, these emotional and cultural ties extend to several countries rather than one country of origin. A participant from the Tanzanian Goan diaspora explained the decision to support projects in different places: "I wanted to give back to Tanzania, India and Canada because all these three places have moulded who I am as a person." Funds raised at the Tanzanite group's annual event in 2010 were donated to projects in Goa, Tanzania and Canada. The Nirvana Cultural Society's annual dinner event has raised funds for victims of the Bhopal gas disaster in central India and contributed to initiatives in South Africa through the Stephen Lewis Foundation and Nelson Mandela Children's Fund.

Enabling	Constraining
emotional and cultural ties with Africa and/or countries of origin	weak mechanisms of diaspora engagement by African and
appreciation and ties to alumni institutions in Africa	Canadian governments
role of gratitude and privilege	limited funding for diaspora-led initiatives
 supporting diaspora and non-diaspora networks in Canada 	corruption and bureaucratic red tape
 support from family and friends in Africa 	skepticism of government agendas
social and economic integration in Canada	double burden on diasporas in sending and receiving contexts
diaspora skills and expertise	weakening engagement over different diaspora generations
familiarity and knowledge of countries of origin	small, isolated diaspora associations
importance of volunteerism and philanthropy for faith-based	divided communities and politics within
diasporas	political histories of African countries
Internet and social media	excessive reliance on volunteers
Canada's international engagement and humanitarian role	varying skill sets of volunteers
synergies of existing groups	longevity of involvement

TABLE 6.6: FACTORS AFFECTING DIASPORA ENGAGEMENT

Attachment to places of birth and places where they spent their formative years is a key factor in the selection of project locations by diaspora members:

> I think that with our knowledge of Zanzibar, the fact that we speak the language, the fact that we were born there and raised there and understand the nuances of the people, we can make the most impact on a lot of people, [more] than other people who try to help. (Anonymous respondent)

Unsurprisingly, many projects have been carried out in the home villages or towns of key members of diaspora organizations. The inaugural school lighting initiative of Global Light Projects was implemented in Chona village, the native village of one of the organization's founders. Another project is being planned in Mwanangonze village, the ancestral home of another Zambian-Canadian, based in Peterborough, who has raised funds for Global Light Projects.

To foster engagement, members of diaspora organizations have relied on their personal networks in Canada and Southern African in a variety of ways. To identify suitable projects and where these should be carried out, diaspora members have relied on their own knowledge, familiarity with the area and the advice of family and friends in Southern African countries. The education project of Outreach Zanzibar has focussed on the Unguja Ukuu School, where one of the organization's founders worked as a teacher in his youth. The founder of the Runyayaro Charity asked her sisters in Zimbabwe to identify schools where the scholarship program would be best implemented. Besides identifying worthy initiatives, target locations and project beneficiaries, family members, relatives and friends have been asked to join the executive committee of organizations in Canada. They have participated in similar committees or sister organizations in the countries of origin, overseeing the progress of projects and disbursement of project funds. The Qamer Foundation, Simon Poultney Foundation and MAWO are among the groups where family members are executive members and play an active role in organizational activities.

Diaspora members' networks have also proven beneficial in generating funds for development initiatives. Three examples of networks that extend beyond Canada and SADC countries are the Zimbabwe Gecko Society, which used its church-based contacts in Vancouver and Burnaby to sell wire ornaments to raise funds for its programs; Global Light Projects, which reached out to the congregation at the Royal View Church in London to collect funds for its school lighting projects in Zambia; and diaspora members who used the email list of Umoja Tanzanian Canadian Community Organization to raise funds for victims of a bomb blast in Tanzania.

With its large immigrant population, progressive outlook towards refugees and immigrants, and long-standing humanitarian engagement, Canada is well positioned to play a strategic role in facilitating and strengthening global diaspora linkages. Many reunions of diaspora communities in North America, Europe, Australia and elsewhere have been held in Canada. More than 350 former residents of Arusha, Tanzania now residing in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Australia and Canada attended the first global reunion in Toronto in mid-2010. That same year, Toronto hosted a similar reunion of diaspora Zanzibaris, and in mid-2012, the city also played host to Ismaili diasporans originally from Tanga, Tanzania.

The synergies of diaspora organizations, especially those working in similar geographical locations, can strengthen existing projects and initiatives. Global Light Projects and RAI plan to provide solar power to a rural community in northern Zambia in a joint project that will not only deliver electricity to the local school, but will also allow the community to dry cassava using solar heating technology, buttressing RAI's existing education and food security projects in the area. The success of small-scale projects can act as a stimulus for new projects. For example, the Chona village school lighting project and its immediate benefits for the community motivated one of its Canadian donors to establish a solar energy-based project in Zambia, using the solar water disinfection method to disinfect drinking water and reduce water-borne diseases.

By virtue of their dual association, diaspora organizations can function as bridges between countries of origin and Canada. In addition to raising funds, they can contribute to development work in other ways, including strengthening Canadian non-diaspora philanthropic efforts by providing volunteers for projects. Many groups have drawn on the large pool of Canadians interested in volunteering in these countries to participate in existing diaspora development projects. For example, Outreach Zanzibar engaged the voluntary services of two retired British schoolteachers to revise the English language curriculum at the Unguja Ukuu School. TESA organized and funded accommodation for volunteer Canadian teachers at the Usagara School.

The funds raised by diaspora groups vary considerably, from a few hundred dollars to much larger sums for worthy projects. The MYP solicited close to CDN\$400,000 globally; the Stephen Leacock Foundation for Children has collected more than CDN\$8 million in Canada for schoolbased programs in South Africa; Canadian UCT alumni donated close to CDN\$100,000 in 2009 and 2010 to support bursaries and other programs; and TESA has collected more than CDN\$50,000 for school improvement projects.

A striking feature of contemporary diaspora development engagement is the increasing role and innovative use of information and communication technologies in developing transnational networks and strengthening linkages with countries of origin. The ZDC conducted their second e-conference using the Zambia Blog Talk Radio, while the Yahoo groups messaging system was used to conduct the first conference. The ZDC has regularly informed the Zambian diaspora about its activities and mandate through Zambia Blog Talk Radio. The MYP involved UCT medical school alumni members living in countries including Israel, United States and Canada.

Notwithstanding these enabling factors, there are serious limitations and barriers to diaspora engagement. Because of the difficult histories of several countries tied to colonialism and apartheid, combined with the variable reasons that diasporas left these areas, these relationships are not as straightforward as might be imagined. They can be much more complicated and ambivalent, raising questions about who and how many in the diaspora community are willing to participate in organized development activities. It certainly cannot be assumed that all members of the Southern African diaspora in Canada have the ability or are ready to contribute to their countries of origin. One recent immigrant from South Africa who was opposed to fundraising for projects said, "Ihave just left that place. Why would I want to give back?" When diaspora communities are divided economically, racially or politically, the task of bringing them together under a common banner to work cooperatively can be challenging. Conflicts between members in an organization can disrupt its functioning as well as project continuity. These differences may be magnified when umbrella organizations are created for development engagement.

The question of attachment becomes even more important for successive generations. While several participants felt that their children's attachment to their country of origin was equally strong and would remain so over several generations, others were not as optimistic:

> My relationship with Zanzibar is very strong. But I am not sure about my children's attachment to it. They are born here and are much more interested in the Canadian culture. They know that their roots are there — in Zanzibar and Tanzania — but they may not feel the same as I do. When someone asks me where I am from, I always say Tanzania, but my children [when asked the same question] say Canada. (Anonymous respondent)

Diaspora-based initiatives and organizations often rely on the time and skills of volunteers, which may limit the scope and impact of projects. Some diaspora organizations have very limited funding, which may restrict their ability to contribute to and run projects.

Concerns about corruption and the lack of financial transparency can be a barrier to diaspora involvement in development projects in their countries of origin. One respondent said that there was "corruption at all levels" in Canada and African countries and that "money raised for such work did not always go where it was supposed to." An anonymous respondent gave the example of a wealthy South African relative living in Ontario who had given a substantial amount of money to an orphanage in South Africa, only to discover that the money had been misappropriated. The relative then had to spend additional funds to employ another manager to oversee the operations of the orphanage.

Weak state structures to engage the diaspora and the absence of dual citizenship provisions were deemed other hurdles to engagement. While many respondents indicated their keenness to work with local authorities to run their projects, others expressed equally strong concerns about excessive regulation, having to deal with corrupt officials and the indifference of state authorities. Organizers of a school-based project complained that, despite having followed the proper procedures for securing work visas, they were forced to bribe immigration officials to end the constant harassment over the immigration documents of their Canadian volunteers. A diaspora member suggested that African countries establish structures such as a diaspora ombudsman, with authority over government departments, to liaise with diaspora communities. Another respondent bemoaned the lack of support from local officials for a project in a government-run school: "We are working in a vacuum. There is no recognition from the government or ministry of education. If the government gives us support, we can work much better."

Divergent perceptions about diaspora initiatives are obstacles to engagement. One respondent said that diasporas were sometimes seen in their countries of origin as "money-making machines, which we are not. We are often using our personal resources to do the work." Diasporas are sometimes perceived as a threat and competition to citizens living in these countries: "People think that we want to be masters of [countries of origin]. But we don't, we only want to achieve our goals," was one interviewee's explanation. Another respondent wrote that "rather than seeing the diaspora as a miser doubly bent on benefitting from the Zambian resources, the Zambian government should see the diaspora as an integral part of its development strategy."

The high cost of sending goods, steep custom duties and shipping delays were identified as other barriers. One respondent indicated that the diaspora community in Toronto had been discouraged by the experience of similar groups in the United States. The respondent explained that an organization in Dallas, Texas, had raised money to send medical equipment to Tanzania, but the beds and equipment were held up at customs for over a year and the organization was unable to raise additional funds to get the consignment released. A different participant recounted a similar experience for Zimbabwe: "I know of a friend of an aunt of mine living in Michigan who had organized a book drive to send used books to Zimbabwe. Now all of the books are sitting in her basement because she has not found a way to be able to ship the books to Zimbabwe."

Some diaspora groups revealed that they were overwhelmed by the many needs of marginal communities in Southern Africa. "The biggest room in Zambia," remarked an interviewee, "is the room for improvement. When I reached the school, it was disappointing. There were no desks or chairs in the classroom. We had brought the technology [to electrify the school] but there were no desks or chairs for the children." Despite the great need, organizations may not always be able to implement programs in the most deprived communities in Southern Africa.

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

Since 1990, over five million people have immigrated to Canada, an average of 250,000 people a year. Of the three million who entered after 2000, 60 percent arrived as economic immigrants, 26 percent were in the family class of entry and 11 percent were given refugee status. Under Canadian immigration law, all three groups become permanent residents of Canada. Recent estimates suggest that the foreign-born population of Canada and their Canadian-born children (so-called second-generation immigrants) make up 20 percent of the total Canadian population. In other words, one in five Canadians can be considered a member of a diaspora.

While the number of immigrants to Canada has been relatively constant, the volume of temporary migration has grown rapidly over the past decade. The two main categories of temporary residents are workers and international students. Between 2000 and 2011, the number of temporary migrant workers in Canada increased from 90,000 to 300,000, and the number of students increased from 115,000 to 239,000. Neither group can really be considered members of a diaspora, however, unless they change their status and remain in Canada.

Advocates of temporary migration to countries like Canada argue that the temporary foreign worker program is a good example of migration and co-development, or a "triple win" for all the participants: Canada, the country of origin and the migrants themselves (Newland, 2009; Constant, Nottmeyer and Zimmerman, 2012; Zapata-Barrero, García and Sánchez-Montijano, 2012). While temporary work programs around the globe are notorious for the exploitation of migrants, there are clear economic benefits to source countries as well as migrants themselves from well-run, rights-based programs.

In contrast, permanent immigration has conventionally been seen only as a "double win," benefitting Canada, which gains skilled workers without spending on training, and the immigrants themselves, who are upwardly mobile and tend to earn more than they did in their countries of origin.

From the perspective of source countries, the movement of skilled and educated migrants from South to North has been seen as a negative and damaging phenomenon, encapsulated in the oft-used pejoratives "poaching" and "brain drain." By redefining immigrants as diasporas, researchers and governments are now trying to develop a more nuanced position on the global impacts of migration. The growing use of this term, including by many migrants themselves, is meant to draw attention to the emotional and material ties that those who relocate maintain with their countries of origin, and even pass on to their children. Immigration to Canada has been increasingly dominated by countries in the South over the past two decades. Between 2000 and 2011, for example, 1.45 million people emigrated from Asia to Canada (50 percent of the total). In addition, 612,000 people (21 percent) emigrated from Africa and the Middle East and 283,000 (10 percent) from Central and South America. In other words, just over 80 percent of Canada's immigrants come from developing countries. Conventional "brain drain" wisdom might suggest that Canada is guilty of "poaching" the brightest and the best from the South and negatively impacting the development of these countries and regions. Redefining immigrants from developing countries as diasporas raises the interesting possibility that there might be real development benefits for those countries, and that immigration, not just temporary migration, might constitute a "triple win" as well. This study set out to test this proposition with a subset of African immigrants in Canada — those from the southern part of the continent.

Various methodological difficulties made it impossible to collect a representative survey sample from all 15 countries of the SADC. In two cases (South Africa and Zimbabwe), there were sufficient responses to undertake an independent analysis of the diaspora (Chikanda, Crush and Maswikwa, 2012; Crush, 2012). In the South African case, the sample was large enough to undertake a separate analysis of health professional immigrants in Canada (Crush, Chikanda and Pendleton, 2012). This report focusses on the contrast between South African immigrants in Canada and immigrants from other countries in the Southern African region. The latter were aggregated into a single group for purposes of analysis in order to create a large enough sample. Further research would be needed to see how far the diasporas from individual countries fit the aggregate picture.

The primary reason for separating out the South Africans in this analysis is that it soon became clear that there were considerable attitudinal and behavioural differences between this group and other immigrants from Southern Africa. When it comes to the maintenance of links with countries of origin, attitudes towards those countries and engagement in development, the differences are so stark that the term "divided diasporas" was coined to describe them. The South African diaspora in Canada - for all its wealth, privilege and skills — displays an attitudinal and behavioural profile that leads us to the conclusion that it is largely disengaged in development. The majority used their skills and training acquired in South Africa to emigrate to Canada; however, they generally do not feel that they owe their country of origin anything. For some, life under a black majority African National Congress government was unpalatable after the benefits of apartheid for whites. Others left over fears of crime and personal lack of security. We could find no evidence of sympathy towards the black population of South Africa, however, who are far more vulnerable to crime than most whites. The majority of South African whites in Canada hold negative views about their country of origin, are divesting themselves of their resources there and show little desire to be involved in its development. Their contacts with South Africa primarily involve visiting family there; very few are interested in return migration. The majority of South Africans in Canada appear to be "lost" to South Africa.

At the same time, the South African diaspora in Canada is itself divided, with a minority showing a very different attitudinal profile. This minority, around 20 percent of those interviewed, are far more typical of an engaged diaspora, demonstrating a genuine desire to be involved in the development of South Africa. Their views and activities are far more similar to immigrants from other Southern African countries in Canada than they are to their fellow South Africans.

Immigrants from the Southern African region outside of South Africa are characterized by the findings of this report as an engaged diaspora. The majority are comparatively recent immigrants to Canada and maintain close personal cultural and economic ties with their countries of origin. The clearest indication of this is their remitting behaviour. They are not particularly high earners in Canada and individually, they do not remit large sums, but they do remit cash (and goods) extremely regularly, mostly through formal channels. While most remit to help meet the living expenses of relatives, remittances clearly have positive development implications at the household and community levels, including contributing to improved food security and nutrition, medical expenses and the education of children. Only a small minority use their remittances in a broader development-related manner through investment in community projects, productive activity, entrepreneurship and so on. A significant minority do engage in other activities that have developmentrelated implications: for example, a quarter have exported goods from Canada for sale in their countries of origin, and 10 percent have imported goods for sale in Canada. The same proportion have invested in business, generated employment and engaged in research partnerships. These numbers could grow rapidly with the return of political and economic stability and opportunity in countries such as Angola, the DRC and Zimbabwe.

The basis for this conclusion is the openness of the engaged South African diaspora and other Southern African diaspora participating in a variety of development activities in the future. Two out of every three survey respondents agreed that they have an important role to play in the development of their countries of origin. The most-cited activities of interest included skills transfer (mentioned by 58 percent), investing in businesses (55 percent), participating in developmental projects (52 percent), educational exchanges (52 percent), volunteer work (47 percent), fundraising for development projects

(46 percent), philanthropy (42 percent), export and import of goods (39 percent), infrastructural investment (39 percent) and providing long-distance learning (37 percent). One-third of respondents would also like to contribute to development by sending remittances, suggesting a desire to see the development potential of remittances reaching beyond their own families.

How can the gap between what members of the diaspora are actually doing and what they are interested in doing be bridged? The questionnaire did not ask what would help individuals or associations to bridge the gap, but some tentative answers can be advanced. The first challenge is an attitudinal one. Disapora individuals or groups are unlikely to put words into action if it means supporting a government or political system that they consider unacceptable or unrepresentative. Most diasporic Zimbabweans, for example, want to see major changes in the country's political dispensation before they will commit to supporting any development projects or programs involving the government. However, even if the members of a diaspora will not work with government, this does not mean that they will do nothing until the political situation is more to their liking. Chapter 6 of this report demonstrates that highly motivated individuals and groups in Canada have already established a significant and impressive array of community-oriented projects throughout the Southern African region, particularly in education and health, with their own resources and through fundraising within and outside the diaspora. An evaluation of many of these initiatives would help to identify best practices and new ideas which could be scaled up, with appropriate financial backing, to have a broader impact.

Another challenge is that there is only so much that individuals can do unless they are independently wealthy or have major financial backing. Here, there is a critical enabling role for various types of diaspora organizations that potentially provide the structure, ideas and resources to harness individual energy and enthusiasm. Such organizations rely heavily on volunteer and pro bono work, and private donations, which affects their ability to develop serious and systematic long-term projects and planning. The Canadian government, in particular, could reframe the diaspora as development partners in new ways and creatively support their work and projects with dedicated funding and support. By identifying the kinds of activities that members of the diaspora are, or would like to be, engaged in, this report makes a valuable contribution to this process.

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ABOUT SAMP

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BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH: THE EU-ACP MIGRATION RELATIONSHIP Jonathan Crush

In the space of a decade, international migration has shifted from being an issue that was of marginal interest on the international development agenda to one that is increasingly at its centre. This paper provides a context for understanding the nature of cooperation between the EU and ACP Group of States on international migration governance.



EAST ASIAN STATES, THE ARCTIC COUNCIL AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ARCTIC

James Manicom and P. Whitney Lackenbauer

All three major East Asian states — China, Japan and South Korea — have bid for Artic Council membership and have active polar research programs, but their interest has met with concern in several quarters. This policy brief suggests that the Arctic Council's member states should welcome East Asian states as observers to enmesh them into "Arctic" ways of thinking.



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THE MILLENNIUM DEVELOPMENT GOALS AND POST-2015: SQUARING THE CIRCLE

Barry Carin and Nicole Bates-Eamer

Based on a series of reports and discussions on the post-2015 development agenda, this paper reviews the history of the Millennium Development Goals, describes the current context and lists the premises and starting points. It concludes with some observations on each of the 10 recommended goals.

ARE SHORT SELLERS POSITIVE FEEDBACK TRADERS? EVIDENCE FROM THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS

Martin T. Bohl, Arne C. Klein and Pierre L. Siklos During the recent global financial crisis, regulatory authorities in a number of countries imposed short-sale constraints aimed at preventing excessive stock market declines. The findings in this paper, however, suggest that short-selling bans do not contribute to enhancing financial stability.

FALSE DICHOTOMIES: ECONOMICS AND THE CHALLENGES OF OUR TIME Kevin English

This report, from the CIGI and INET conference, focusses on how economists should work with other areas of study, such as history, law, psychology and political economy, to enrich research and provide more well-rounded answers to the questions facing the economic community today.

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COORDINATION CRITICAL TO ENSURING THE EARLY WARNING EXERCISE IS EFFECTIVE

Bessma Momani et al.

The need for stronger surveillance and better foresight in financial governance was made clear during the global financial crisis. The Group of Twenty initiated the early warning exercise, which is a critical mechanism for identifying systemic risks and vulnerabilities; however, several problems constrain its effectiveness.



THE G20 AS A LEVER FOR PROGRESS Barry Carin and David Shorr

The failure of many observers to recognize the varied scale of the G20's efforts has made it harder for the G20 to gain credit for the valuable role it can play. This paper offers five recommendations for the G20 to present a clearer understanding of how it functions and what it has to offer.

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