

HOW MEDIA STRUCTURE AFFECTS ONLINE USERS' REACTION IN TURKEY

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Abstract: Media has a crucial and dominant role to supply political information for citizens in democratic societies. Press freedom is a key component to evaluate the level of democracy and there is a positive correlation between democracy and press freedom (Karlekar & Becker, 2014). On our research, we look into the changes within the structure of media during the years between 2002 and 2015. By focusing on Twitter users' activities throughout the Turkish General Election of 2015, political activities are analyzed. Under violations of press freedom in Turkey, this study aims to find out which media outlets are preferred –mainstream and non-mainstream ones–, by Twitter users, for providing the political and social information to support their ideas. Our results show that there is a correlation between the users' ideologies and their media outlet preferences. The ones who sympathize the ruling party share the national mainstream media outlets' links whereas the ones who sympathize the opposing parties' share the international mainstream media outlets' links.

Keywords: Media, Democracy, Online User, Cascade, Turkey

1. The Relationship between the Media and Democracy

The definition of democracy we use in this article is inspired by Robert Dahl's (2000) book called "On Democracy". Dahl focuses on political equality in which equal rights and opportunities for everyone is given by the government. In Dahl's definition of democracy, one needs freedom of expression and access to alternative information sources to have that political equality (McLaren, 2008; Keyman & Gumuscu, 2014). This is where we witness the relationship between the media and democracy. From the very early stages of democracy and its practices in history, the political philosophers always prioritized and based democracy on the key concepts such as the freedom of expression and the right to freely discuss a public matter with others (Keane, 1991). All different thoughts, perspectives and ideas need to take part in media so that the politicians' political domination and influence on people would be restricted and the civil society structure would be in progress (Voltmer, 2005). As a democratic entity, media's another duty is to inspect and follow the politicians and political organizations. Media can act as 'the fourth force' or "monitor" that, if needed, can even publicly announce the ruling party manipulative, insincere or even guilty based on their observations and investigations throughout the party's political actions and statements (Kelley & Donway, 1990; Curran, 2011). The term 'the fourth force' stems back to the 19th Century in which it came about in relation to checks and balances, the three branches of the federal government; Executive, Legislative and Judicial. Media might run into challenging situations while trying to be the fourth force. The media themselves are often unable to survive without state subsidies, which might severely impair their ability to criticize political power holders (Voltmer, 2005: 4).

Aside from this, a lot of big media organizations in Turkey are owned by various holdings whose main profits are made in different sectors, not related to media at all. These holdings' unexplainable and unpredictable relationships based on mutual interests -with the ruling government- causes media to apply these core media duties mentioned above. Media has also the power to inform or manipulate people in our current democratic societies. James S. Fishkin defines manipulation as such:

A person has been manipulated by a communication when she has been exposed to a message intended to change her views in a way she would not accept if she were to think about it on the basis of good conditions —and in fact she does change her views in the manner that was intended (Fishkin, 2011: 33).

In our current age, one can have easy access to numerous kinds of sources to get information. The rise in reaching out to tons of sources today, increased the ways to find new techniques to express or shape up an idea in media (Le Cheminant & Parrish, 2011). By being aware of the power and impact that media have on people, the ruling parties are more likely to apply these techniques in media so that people would continue to support the ruling parties (Van Belle, 1997).

2. The Media Structure in Turkey

There is a correlation between the changes in media structure and the political changes in Turkey. In the first years of the Turkish Republic, the journalists with opposite views –against the system of the government– were put on trial in the special Independent Courts¹ (Sözeri & Kurban, 2014: 192). Media censorship were active during the 1950s one ruling party regime and also the Democrat Party (DP) government (Bek, 2004). Throughout the three main coup d'états in Turkey, the censorship was also observed.

¹Independent Courts were established in September 18, 1920 to stand those who are accused of spying, revolting, looting and following anti-independence propagandas against Turkey on trial.

Media outlets were mostly owned and run by either rooted, respected families or political organizations. In 1980s, this ownership status was shifted to the big companies which had huge investments in different sectors. Former Prime Minister Turgut Özal's new neoliberal economical reform played a big role in this change. The ideological differences had become less effective in this era. Companies acted only to maintain their business relationships with the ruling party so that they preserved and protected their current privileges given by the government. Thus, instead of being a powerful actor in politics, media turned into nothing but a tool that was used by the ruling party and the private equity. Erol Simavi, a media mogul, who owned one of the most respected newspapers in Turkey *Hürriyet* defines media as such: "The main power source in Turkey is not the Military. It is the media. Without media's role and efforts nothing can be planned. Even the military interventions..." (Demir, 2007: 260).

In 1990s, Turkish Media blossomed into the birth of numerous private radio and TV channels. This increased the role and impact of Media in politics. It gave rise to the development of "*clientelism*"² relationships between media patrons and the state (Christensen, 2007: 185). To be able to see the impact of the private radio and TV channels, it would be crucial to look into the data of TV ratings and print circulation. The data shows that 60% of people did not read newspapers while 90% of people did watch TV. With five hours of daily viewing, Turkey has one of the largest television audiences in the world (Terzis, 2007: 13). Another factor that increased the effect of this is about the fact that despite their competition in the media sector, most of these media patrons cooperated or worked together to protect their mutual interests. Although there are laws about the media inspection in Turkey, media markets lack overarching cross-ownership rules (Bayazit, 2016: 387). This way, the media market went through the direction in which only few companies would be the main actors in the sector. To increase its inspection and control over the media companies, a government agency Supreme Council of Radio and Television (RTÜK) was established in May 16, 1994. This agency had the aim of regularly sanctioning broadcast media for violating a very broad range of regulations (McLaren, 2008: 14). The best example that shows how media affected and was affected happened in the February 28 Process. The mainstream media, prompted by Turkey's Military, published fictitious content on the rise of Islamism during the late 1990s (Sözeri & Kurban, 2014: 195). The media's content published during these days played a major role in the military's soft intervention decision towards the ruling party.


AKP realized how media can affect people and politics landscape and changed the whole media outlets –in favor of them– that were owned by the supporters of the Military and secular elites. Media owners coming from different sectors have a lot to do with this shift. Via the major support of AKP, the Anatolian Islam Bourgeoisie members started buying these media companies. Their motivation was to gain power against the elite and also support AKP which they believe defends their identity and rights as Islamists (Lagendijk, 2012). AKP won the 2011 general election and dominated the political arena. This fact made it really hard for the big media moguls or groups to balance everything among the Military, the ruling party, and the opposition.

Since then, AKP has developed its own media by using administrative and legal power against critical media groups and journalists (Fuller, 2013; Gürçan & Peker, 2015; Yardımcı-Geyikçi, 2014). This caused a double-edged situation. Media started to have self-censorship and stopped having anti-government content (Tufekci, 2014). The Gezi Park Protests are the best manifest to that. These massive protests across the country have been widely ignored by the mainstream media. CNN Türk ran a penguin documentary while CNN International was broadcasting the event live on Taksim Square. Social media became the source for up-to-date information (Bergfeld, 2014; Kasper, 2014; Koese, 2014). Also, this era is the beginning of evolvement of the ruling party's intolerant manner against any kind of criticism (Taşkin, 2013). Actually, AKP is not the first

² Clientelism is a social order that depends on various forms of generous subsidies given by the government to businesspeople and the media control that government takes over the content.

party that had an intolerant manner against any kind of criticism about them in Turkey. There is a tradition in Turkey in which the state tends to silence opposition whenever it is perceived as being necessary and power is even wielded against citizens who are critical of state institutions (Alemdar, 2015: 432). However, this manner seems to contradict with the AKP Party Declaration that was written by the founders and other members of it. This intolerance manner revealed itself more via the practice of accreditation, namely the restriction of access to official press meetings to select media (Sözeri & Kurban, 2014: 194).

Figure 1. The Freedom Ranking between 2002 and 2015



*Fuente: The Grey dash line shows the national election years.
FH-I index has been published since 2009*

The data of *FreedomWorld* (FH-W), *FreedomPress* (FH-P), *FreedomontheNet* (FH-I) that were published by Freedom House (FH) between 2002 and 2015 and the index data of *WorldPressFreedom* that was published by Reporters Without Borders (RWB) between 2002 and 2015 can be all seen in Fig 1. The data was calculated based on the average of the changes seen between 2010 and 2012, because no data was found in 2011. To make sure the data is relative in RWB, the change between the country listed last and the ranking of the country was prioritized. The data given as in numbers from 1 to 7 in FH-W, has been converted into the system of 100. This conversion is made as 100 means best and 0 worst. FH-I and FH-P data show a decrease since 2009. But, a constant decrease, in the FH-W index is observed after 2012. This statistic proves that it was right to take 2011 as the year of the change. Also, RWB index remained in the same level –no change– between 2011 and 2014.

3. Methodology

3.1. Data Collection

The election times are always the periods in which the social and political events take up more space in individuals lives. Due to this fact, the data collection was intended to be made for the election happening on July 7th 2015. The data collection period was applied between May 8 and July 8. During this process, the tweets that were publicly accessible and contained the party slogan, party's name or the party leader's name were collected. Also, the hashtags that contain any data about the party's new campaigns were also added to this data collection. Stream API, one of the data collection methods provided by the Twitter for researchers, was selected to collect tweets that

contain wanted hashtags. The hashtags that were found during this collection process can be seen in the supplementary section.

3.2. Research Method

Cascade is a term used for a phenomenal or extraordinary situations. Usually described as ‘*InformationCascade*’, it can be seen in fashion/ fads, voting for popular candidates, and the spread of a technological choice as it can be the explanation in many types of imitation in social settings (Easley & Kleinberg, 2010). The cascade model we follow during this research will be based on sharing links which have the retweet and mention activities. A cascade that has l_0 and l_n and n number of steps is formulated as $C = [l_0, l_1], [l_1, l_2], [l_2, l_3], \dots, [l_{n-1}, l_n]$. The list that is gained via this formula, provides us to main cascade-related features. One of them is the *CascadeSize* and the other one is *CascadeLife*. Cascade size C_d , equals the total number links l_n ;

$$C_d = \sum_{l \in C} l_n$$

Cascade Life C_s , is formulated as in an ordered list of $i(1, t_2, \dots, t_n)$ that shows t_1 as the time gap between two sharing link actions. Cascade Life also equals the total time gap between t_1 and t_n ;

$$C_s = \sum_{t \in C} t_n$$

Cascade can break in some conditions. If time, that is in between two sharing link actions, is equal or bigger than 86,400 seconds ($t \geq one\ day$), then cascade breaks³. After forming cascade via the links of the data set, the links get classified based on the media outlets. The method on Table 1 was used for this purpose.

Table 1. Media Outlets' Categorization

	<i>in</i>	<i>out</i>
<i>alternative</i>	National small news media	International small news media
<i>mainstream</i>	National large mass news media	International large mass news media

Fuente: Media outlets are categorized as alternative-mainstream and in-out, based on their features

The main factors to form these groups were based on the answers for questions such as

- Which media organization does this media outlet belong to?
- What is their target audience?
- What is their target region?

Four different individuals made these categorizations and the ones that have more than 50% results were identified. During this process, the platforms such as *Twitter*, *YouTube* and *Facebook* were

³ It 's technically possible to tweet, retweet or mention a message that was shared a long time ago. If this time difference is ignored, then cascade's life can be too long (extended a lot). Thus, this difference may cause a negative effect and result in this study.


categorized under the social media title whereas the other social media links were grouped under *Others* category.


4. Result

The daily tweet volume collected based on our formula can be seen on Figure 2-Panel A. After looking into the daily tweet volume, primarily it was observed that the twitter users show great interest in political parties' election campaigns. A significant increase in the daily tweet volume was also seen especially in the beginning period of these election campaigns run by these parties. The AKP election slogan (Others only preach while AKP puts it into practice) became the main triggering effect that made AKP have a significant amount of increase between May 8 and 10. Similarly, the increase in CHP's daily tweet volume between May 20 and 23, 2015 is related to the popularity of their slogan (For a Prosperous Turkey). Also, as indicated in Figure 2-Panel A, the increase in the daily tweet volumes can affect the election campaigns differently. The fluctuation on AKP's daily tweet volume, on May 31st, has been observed because it has fallen on the second anniversary of the Gezi Park Protest. Hashtags such as "gezi2yaşında" (*Gezi is 2 years old*), "Ali İsmail Korkmaz"¹, "Geziyi Unutma" (*Never Forget Gezi*) and "Geziyi Hatırla" (*Remember Gezi*) have formed these peaks. Similarly, the fluctuation on HDP's daily tweet volume, on June 5th, was observed because of an explosion occurred during a HDP meeting in the city of Diyarbakır. Such fluctuations seen on these daily tweet volumes, prove that they can easily get influenced by sensational events.

The daily tweet volume was calculated by subsetting the data that was on Figure 2-Panel B, containing at least one link. The data set had a significant amount of decrease in Panel B. The volumes of each parties' data sets seem to be in similar amounts. The increase in Panel A's daily tweet volume was also observed in Panel B. Per the activities in the HDP's daily tweet volume on June 5, the link shares in the panel increased a lot.

Figure 2. Data of the Daily Tweet Volumes collected between May 8 and July 8, 2015





Fuente: The daily tweet volume based on hashtags gathered during the data collection process can be seen in Panel A. The daily tweet volume containing one link can be found in Panel B.

The change based on the link shares in the daily tweet volume is shown in Table 2, in details. Part A, contains the data gathered during the data collection process whereas; Part B, contains the data that only has links. When compared the total tweet volume in both parts, AKP’s 9.46% of the data contains links. Other parties have similar amounts of links in their volumes. CHP and HDP have the highest amount of link shares, 30% of unique users have at least one link shares. When looked into the ratio of the total unique user number to the unique user number who shares a link; CHP has the highest number (37.20%) while AKP has the lowest (31.95%). The same outcome applied when it came to the Retweet rates.

Table 2. The general data set (A), the data set containing a link (B) and the difference (%) in the data set’s volume, user and retweet amounts.


	Total Tweet Volume			Unique User			RT Number		
	A	B	%	A	B	%	A	B	%
AKP	672,907	63,702	9.46	76,557	24,464	31.95	234,536	23,586	10.05
CHP	249,651	71,693	28.71	77,429	28,809	37.20	180,413	48,363	26.80
MHP	283,102	60,685	21.43	79,527	27,769	34.91	217,901	44,754	20.53
HDP	373,300	103,439	27.70	114,160	41,921	36.72	249,724	68,198	27.30

The main difference between the two data sets showed us that there is no need for any extra element to support the AKP users’ perspectives. Meanwhile, similar behavior patterns were observed among the other parties’ users.

Each parties’ cascade life and size can be seen in Figure 3. To analyze the process well, cascade life calculation was made in “seconds”. Each data’s cascade life that falls on each time period was calculated by using log transformation. HDP has the highest number for each cascade’s life and has the lowest mean (4.26) of cascade life. Based on each cascade life numbers, CHP has higher number than MHP and AKP. The users that have HDP hashtags have more link shares. Although AKP has the lowest number for each cascade life, it has a significant peak around 4. In addition to this, cascade life directly affects the visibility of links in the network. Because of this idea, HDP and CHP link sharing activities are more effective than any other parties’.

Cascade size for each party can be found in Panel B. As mentioned before, cascade size shows how many users prefer to share the same link in the network. This action shows the power of the link, which strengthens a party's ideological argument. Panel B also shows the sizes of these chains formed by users. The cascade that HDP users formed is the longest. CHP has the second longest one whereas MHP and AKP are shorter and they both have significant amount of outliers. CHP and HDP have the highest median and their max values are also the highest among the parties. AKP has some high numbers in cascade size and it shows that some links are getting more attention from users. Besides this, the median of cascade size has the lowest value among all parties. CHP and HDP cascades are more impactful than other parties.

Figure 3. Cascade Life and Size for each party




Fuente: Log Transformation is applied so that cascade related activities would be more accurate

Figure 4 shows the alternative and mainstream cascades formed by the links of media outlets. Media outlets are categorized as alternative and mainstream and each section contains *in-s* and *out-s*. Figure 5-Panel A, shows the cascade life and size distribution rates based on alternative media outlets' *in* and *out* definition. The users that share links through AKP hashtags prefer alternative *in* media outlets. Although the ones who share links through HDP and CHP hashtags also prefer alternative *in* media links, the alternative *out media* links form a longer cascade life and size for CHP and HDP.

Panel B shows the cascade life and size distribution rates based on mainstream media outlets. Mainstream media outlets have a balanced distribution compared to the alternative media outlets'. HDP users have more *out* media outlets and these links have more cascade life and size. AKP users have the least in *out* media outlets. Regarding the alternative and mainstream media outlets, the *in* media outlets are the most popular source one among the AKP users. The situation is no different for other parties. HDP is the only one that uses the highest amount of alternative and mainstream *out* media resources. The main reason for this is about the presence of news pieces that are politically and ideologically parallel to theirs. The density that CHP users have in mainstream *out* ones, is related to the fact that there are not many news pieces present in mainstream *in* resources, which are parallel to CHP users' ideology and political view.

Figure 4. The in-out distribution of cascade based on alternative (A) and mainstream (B) according to cascade size and life



The distribution of cascade size and life, based on the alternative and mainstream media outlets, exposes a lot about the user preferences. Table 3 exhibits the total of cascades in this distribution. The number of links within the *in* media category is the highest, regarding the alternative media preferences. When we look into the ratio between the alternative *out* media number and the total alternative media number, HDP is the one that has the highest rate with 15.87%. AKP has the lowest number, 0.79%. Similarly, the number is also high for the *in* number within the mainstream media outlets. When we observe the ratio between the number of mainstream media *out* and number of the total mainstream media, HDP with 48.6% has the highest and AKP with 20.98% has the lowest percentages. Although there is a big difference between the media *in* cascade and media *out* cascade numbers, the values of cascade size and life have always been determinant in this analysis. When we look into Figure 4 Panel B, regarding the mainstream media outlets, *out* links of CHP and MHP –despite them being outnumbered by others– have the highest values of cascade size and life. It’s crucial to note that the diffusion feature, which allows the links to be visible for the users, is dependent on these values mentioned above.

Table 3. The cascade numbers, based on each parties’ media categories

Party	Alternative		Mainstream	
	In	Out	In	Out
AKP	375	3	64	17
CHP	725	42	249	126
MHP	639	40	151	78
HDP	1638	309	423	400

The plot made by the media outlets tell us a lot about the users’ media preferences. Table 4 shows top three links for each party based on the highest cascade life and size value. Alternative and mainstream outlets have similarities as well. It is interesting that an alternative media outlet called *asikurtlar.com* has a cascade on both AKP and MHP. This fact shows that the users who use both parties’ hashtags unite under one platform (almost act alike). AKP users express themselves on parties’ official website *akparti.org.tr* and also *sozlesme2023.com*, the one that is formed only for AKP users during the election process. Similarly, MHP users have shared the official MHP website *bizimleyuruturkiye.com* that has the same name as their party slogan. Users have preferred the mainstream *in* outlets that have had same ideological and political view as theirs. AKP users have preferred mainstream *in* media outlets that have close relation with AKP and government such as *yeniakit.com.tr* and *aksam.com.tr*. And *AnadoluAjansı* (*aa.com.tr*) is a government news agency.

CHP and HDP users have preferred to share links that belong to the ruling party-opposing mainstream *in* media outlets.

In the mainstream *out* category, *bbc.com* and *aljazeera.com* have been the most popular platforms that have been used as references by all parties except AKP. In addition to these outlets, a Russian based platform called *sputniknews.com* has also been popular in the *out* category. This shows that users did benefit using platforms from different parts of the world to support their ideas and views.

Table 4. The distribution rates of the highest cascade life and size for both alternative and mainstream media outlets

	<i>Alternative</i>		<i>Mainstream</i>	
	<i>In</i>	<i>Out</i>	<i>In</i>	<i>Out</i>
AKP	asikurlar.com	commentarymagazine.com	yeniakit.com.tr	tr.sputniknews.com
	sozlesme2023.com	nu.nl	aa.com.tr	spiegel.de
	akparti.org.tr	mashable.com	aksam.com.tr	*
CHP	sosyalfarkinda.net	kurdishquestion.com	sozcu.com.tr	bbc.com
	halkizbiz.com	thesocialhumanist.com	bugun.com.tr	aljazeera.com
	gazetekritik.com	anatolikotera.wordpress.com	hurriyetdailynews.com	tr.sputniknews.com
MHP	bizimleyuruturkiye.com	newgokturk.com	zaman.com.tr	bbc.com
	asikurlar.com	ibtimes.co.uk	samanyoluhaber.com	aljazeera.com
	gazete2023.com	comunicacion.e-noticias.es	bugun.com.tr	welt.de
HDP	medyapusula.com	armenianweekly.com	hurriyetdailynews.com	aljazeera.com
	birgun.net	clarionproject.org	t24.com.tr	cnn.com
	kinghaber.net	mosaik-blog.at	cumhuriyet.com.tr	bbc.com

*AKP mainstream out links have only two platforms, no third one.

5. Discussion

Since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923, ‘center vs periphery’⁴⁴ fight has always played an active role in the Turkish social and political structure. As the establishment took place, the secular elites were in the center and they were challenged to leave the center by various political parties in different terms.

Unlike the previous like-minded parties such as Welfare Party (RP), Happiness Party (SP) and Great Unity Party (BBP); AKP defined itself as a party that carries mission beyond a “religious party”. The AKP instead emphasizes a political style that rejects making one’s religious beliefs, sect, or ethnicity the center of the party’s platform (Akdoğan, 2006: 54). But, the polarization level in the country increased immensely after the 2011 election hegemony. Per the shift of AKP moving into the Center –used to represent the ones in the periphery– the fight between the Secular Elites and the Religious took a back seat. At this point, it is inevitable for this multi-part structure to go through a separation. Another factor that helped AKP shift into the center role is about media. Media, are effective and powerful ideological institutions that carry out a system-supportive propaganda function by reliance on market forces, internalized assumptions and self-censorship, and without significant overt coercion (Herman & Chomsky, 2002: 306). The Islamic Bourgeoisie and AKP during their presence in the periphery, realized this fact about the power of media and then aimed to own many media outlets. However, the current legal sanctions, inspections and the elaborate clientelism relationship with the ruling party; helped the ruling party gain more control over the people. Turkish media markets are dominated by a handful of vertically integrated conglomerates with cross-ownership in almost every segment, supported by influential religious sects (Bayazit, 2016: 414). Especially the insufficient performance that media had during the Gezi Park Protests, caused the public to lose faith in media outlets. Then, the anti-AKP people started to use the

⁴⁴The term “Center vs Periphery” was created by Serif Mardin in the Turkish Politics and then was recognized and used by many other academicians.

alternative media outlets instead of the mainstream ones. The local resources in the alternative media gained more interest during this process. There is a relation between the users' political and ideological approaches and the *in* or *out* status of media outlets. AKP users prefer the mainstream *in* media outlets whereas the other parties' users prefer the mainstream *out* media outlets. This shows that the current media structure does not provide the users information that criticize or oppose the ruling party. It is also projected that the number of those who oppose the ruling party will prefer the alternative *in* and mainstream *out* platforms will increase –if this current structure is kept. Despite the limited scope of this study –focuses on the June 7th 2015 general election and its Twitter activity during this election– this paper aims to tangibly explain how users react the current political landscape affecting the media outlets' behaviors.

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Supplements:

Table 5. The hashtags used during the data collection process, for each party

<i>akparti</i>	<i>onlar konuşur akparti yapar</i>	<i>ikinci yarı başlıyor</i>	<i>başbakan davutoğlu</i>	<i>millet geliyor</i>
Justice and Development Party	Others only preach while AKP puts it into practice	Second half begins	Prime Minister Davutoğlu	All for people
<i>chp</i>	<i>yüzyılın projesi</i>	<i>yaşanacak bir Türkiye</i>	<i>kılıçdaroğlu</i>	<i>oy ver gitsinler</i>
Republican People's Party	The Project of the Century	For a Prosperous Turkey	The leader's last name	To get rid of them, Vote for us
<i>mhp</i>	<i>bizimle yürü Türkiye</i>	<i>mhp geliyor</i>	<i>devlet bahçeli</i>	<i>oyum mhp'ye çünkü</i>
Nationalist Movement Party	Walk with us Turkey	MHP is coming	The name of party leader	I will vote for MHP because...
<i>hdp</i>	<i>demirtaş</i>	<i>bizler meclise</i>	<i>seni başkan yaptırmayacağız</i>	<i>bizler hdp</i>
People's Democratic Party	The last name of party's male co-chair	Headed to the parliament	We won't let you be the president	We're hdp

Table 6. Main Statistics regarding the values of Cascade Size and Life (Cascade Life units are calculated in *seconds*)

Party	Cascade Size				Cascade Life			
	μ	σ	Min / Max	Total Number	μ	σ	Min / Max	Total Time
AKP	6.78	44.63	1/ 1,497	9,396	21,695.74	41,903.49	1/ 481489	30,048,596
CHP	8.41	18.54	1/ 323	20,873	19,489.66	36,634.80	1/ 820585	48,353,837
HDP	7.99	20.48	1/ 880	34,015	18,322.89	31,254.70	1/ 329465	77,908,939
MHP	14.42	71.72	1/ 2,363	25,547	31,904.73	135,470.39	1/ 2149355	56,503,281