

**A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters
Degree in Economics from the Nova – School of Business and Economics**

Success in Higher Education
A discussion of selection criteria

Pedro Luís Marques Correia da Silva

682

Supervision of:

Ana Balcão Reis, Maria do Carmo Seabra e Luís Catela Nunes

June 2015

Success in Higher Education

A discussion of selection criteria

Abstract

This paper analyses the determinants of success of undergraduate Nova SBE students from 2008 to 2011. We account for the question of selection that is likely to occur when we just observe the success of those students who were admitted and enrolled at school. The main result of our empirical analysis is that the high school score appears to be a stronger predictor of the students' success than the national Math's exam score. In addition, the evidence also suggests that male students tend to have a better performance in Economics than female students and displaced management students have more difficulties in terms of their scores. Finally, it does not seem to exist a strong visible difference on the final GPA between students from public and private schools.

JEL Classification: I21, I23

Keywords: Higher Education; Selection; Public Schools; Determinants of Success

Acknowledgments

I am very grateful for the support provided by my advisors: Ana Balcão Reis, Maria do Carmo Seabra and Luís Catela Nunes. I would like to thank to Bertolino and Paulo Faroleiro, who provided the data base of this research. I need also to thank to Iva Matos from Rectory (SAS) for the information provided about the social support granted to the students. Finally I am very grateful to all the advice on Stata given by Marta Lopes.

I dedicate this work to all those who helped me during my master.

I. Introduction

Each year, around 3000 students apply to Nova SBE (recognized as one of best schools in Portugal in economics and business area), whereas around 400 are admitted. The selection criteria are defined by the Ministry, but Nova SBE has some control on that. Our purpose is to contribute to the discussion on admission rules to undergraduate courses at Nova SBE. The issue was raised by Alves (2014) – he was the first to engage in this appealing project: he showed that the internal score of the high school was a stronger predictor of success than the nominal exams' score. This fact was based on analyzing the students that enrolled on the cohort of 2009/2010. We want to extend Alves' results by looking for a longer period of time and taking into account the potential bias that might result from the fact that we only have information on results for the students that enrolled at Nova SBE. Alves had no data on candidates who were not admitted. Our data includes three cohorts, from 2008 to 2011, and candidates who applied to the University but were not admitted. The main point here is that we observe a group of students that enrolled in Nova SBE that is different from the whole group of students that applied to our school. This means that we face a problem of selection bias when we only look at those that enrolled in the school. This allows us to think about the factors that determine the admission of those students. In particular, it compels us to question whether the current admission criteria is the most appropriate or not. Nevertheless, it is crucial to first understand what the admission process for higher education in Portugal is all about.

Admission Process to Universities in Portugal

The Portuguese tertiary education system is essentially composed of Polytechnics and Universities, each of which offers courses related to different fields. When students complete their studies in High School, they have the option to apply to University. National Admission Process (*Contingente Nacional de Acesso – CNA*) is the national

system of applications for public universities¹. During that process, students can rank six different courses by order of preference. Each University has, for each course, a limited number of vacancies, which is a reflection of the *numerus clausus*, determined by the Ministry. They select their students on the basis of their admission criteria, which is defined by the Ministry of Education and the school. It involves two main components, one associated with the national exam and the other related to the internal score of high school. Moreover, in some schools students are allowed to choose between two or more national exams. When it comes to Nova SBE, the High School Score accounts for 50% of the overall score, and Math Exam represents the remaining 50%. One possibility is that the admission is determined by admission scores. However, just looking at that score does not allow us to conclude whether a student is accepted or not; it is necessary to take into consideration the order of preference. Indeed, having a student with an outstanding admission score does not necessarily mean that they will study Economics in our school (for instance) as they might have chosen other course, or even a different school, as preferred option. Students' preferences therefore play a meaningful role in the outcome of admission. Indeed, for some students it was the order of preferences that ultimately influenced their admission to the University as their high weighted average was not a serious cause of concern.

Another situation that might happen is the fact that a student, even if he has been admitted, decide not to enroll in the University as they preferred to study in a private school (or delay studies).

This report is therefore aimed at addressing some of these critical issues. It is relevant to understand the importance of the admission criteria as it may contribute to achieving our ultimate goal of analyzing the success of students after accounting for selection. The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, II, we explore some of the main results found in the literature. Section III presents descriptive statistics from our

¹ Since each private university has its own process

data base. Section IV describes the methodology, with the associated results exposed in section V. Finally, in section VI we postulate possible future extensions and conclude.

II. Literature Review

“The determinants of success on education” has been an intense topic of research. Several studies on education have been performed, each of which naturally focused on a specific different issue (different levels of education, incentives, period of analysis, etc.). Throughout this section we will attempt to explore some of the results achieved so far.

There is nowadays a large literature establishing a positive relationship between higher education and productivity. According to Mincer (1974), if we take productivity as measured by relative wages on the margin, we tend to observe increasing returns on wages from investing in education over time. Returns on education is a frequent topic of discussion. Oliveira (2014) finds a positive relationship between wages and education in Portugal. This result is in line with other studies done in different countries like Robinson (1994) in USA. Blundell et al. (2005) estimated a causal effect of higher education on wages. For the UK they estimated a return of 27%. Nevertheless, the point of our study is not to set up links between higher education levels and salaries but rather to analyse the drivers behind the success of higher education, that is which factors might ultimately determine the success of students, as measured, for example, by their final GPA.

Another important issue commonly referred to in the literature is the social economic background of the student. From Tinto (1975) to Nicpon et al. (2007), the vast majority of authors agree that high levels of social support can allow for a rapid student’s progression, particularly for those students from lower social background.

Some recent research has studied the impact of parental layoff on higher education investment. Pan and Ost (2014) argue that credit constraints might represent a setback for those students facing adverse economic conditions, which in turn imply that education turns out not to be so easy to access to. Several students under these critical circumstances actually have no choice but to get a part-time if they are to have any chance of paying the university's charges. Whether the student relies on external financial help or not might thus have important implications for their future performance at school.

More related to our study, Fernandes and Lopes (2008), based on data from another school on Economics and Management in Portugal, verified that the socioeconomic background does not appear to have a statistically significant influence on the academic performance. Apparently this contrasted what we wrote before, but the point is that the models from Tinto (1975) and Nicpon et al. (2007) are generic and not focus on higher education. Furthermore, the data used by Fernandes and Lopes is from 2007/2008 which means that with the crisis of 2008 can, maybe, imply different conclusions since the socioeconomic background is volatile and sensitive to the economic period. Moreover, they substantiate that "previous school trajectory's characteristics are the main determinants of academic performance", which meet the conclusion of Alves (2014) – the high school score is a better predictor than the national exam score.

Other studies found different conclusions. For instance, Smith and Naylor (2001) analyse the performance of 1993 student cohort in UK University. They conclude that personal characteristic (like age and marital status) influence significantly the performance of student (differently from what Fernandes and Lopes found), and the social class background influence positively the degree success. Hence, we can find different conclusions for the same questions in different studies maybe because the characteristics of students vary across countries and universities.

III. Data and Descriptive Analysis

The data set used in this work project was extracted from different sources. We aggregate two data bases, one that is internal to the school and provide information regarding the performance and personal characteristics of the students who were enrolled at Nova SBE and another that contains information about all the candidates that apply to the school.² Regarding Nova SBE students we have data on 1130 undergraduate students of Economics and Management, who were admitted the National Admission Process (National Contest) in 2008/2009, 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 at Nova School of Business and Economics, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, Portugal³. Regarding the candidates that applied for the school in these three cohorts (Ministry data base), we have 9015 applications. In relation to the structure of the courses (Economics and Management) there were no major changes during this period. Consequently, in the data set we have a time series structure, since we have different students in three different years. For each individual that enrolled at the school, the relevant information can be divided in five categories⁴: (i) *Personal information*: which includes gender, age and distance from home; (ii) *Academic Background*: type of school (public or private), previous track (if the student came from economics track or not) and the national exams scores, in particular math exam⁵; (iii) *Social and Economic Background*: parents' educational level, if the students applied to a scholarship, if the students received the scholarship, and in that case the value of the scholarship, the average income per year if the student received the scholarship and the number of scholarships that the student received over these three years. (iv) *Academic output*:

² SIGES is the internal data base of the school and CNA (Contingente Geral de Acesso) is the data base of applications and it is provided by the Ministry. Furthermore, for those students who enrolled in the school we gathered information about the social support given by the Rectory - SAS.

³Initially we had 1764 individuals, but we only considered the students who entered by *Contigente Geral*. In our sample we have different sources of entrance such as Transfer (*Transferência*), Athletes (Atletas de Alta Competição), *Erasmus*, *Palop*, among others. We chose only the normal status.

⁴For all students, we observe all variables but those regarding parents education and social support, which were only available for the enrolled students.

⁵In Portugal there were three different national Maths exams: Maths A, Maths B and Applied Maths Exam. The exam that was done by the majority of the students is Maths A. As a result, in this paper Maths exam always accounts for the Maths A exam.

academic situation in 2014 (graduated, drop, change the course, still studying, prescribed), final GPA and the scores of the representative courses in the first year (Calculus I, Principles of Micro, Principles of Macro and Principles of Management).
 (v) *Other information:* bachelors' degree (economics or management); order preference of application.

Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics about the student's characteristics. Some important conclusions can be drawn from this table: the number of students in economics and management is roughly the same, even though the number of male individuals in Economics is higher than that of the female and the reverse happens in Management; a significant percentage of our individuals come from public high schools and are local students, 74,6% and 46.4% respectively;

Table 1. Descriptive statistics of students' characteristics (in percentage)

	Enrollment			Applications		
	Eco.	Man	Total	Eco.	Man.	Total
Total	(559)	(571)	(1130)	(4054)	(4961)	(9015)
	49.6	50.5	100	45.0	55.0	100
Male	50.4	48.0	49.2	54.1	51.8	52.9
Displaced Students (<i>more than 40 km from Nova</i>)	58.3	44.8	51.5	55.8	52.6	54.1
Parents with HE (<i>at least one has higher education</i>)	69.6	70.0	69.7	-	-	-
Regular Age (<i>18 years old or younger</i>)	94.5	92.8	93.6	83.5	81.2	82.2
Applied to Social Support(SAS)	15.0	13.5	14.2	-	-	-
Received Social Support(SAS)	7.7	7.9	7.8	-	-	-
Economics Track (<i>at high school</i>)	67.3	62.5	64.9	58.3	53.1	55.4
Science Track (<i>at high school</i>)	29.5	32.7	31.2	31.1	34.5	33.0
Other Track (<i>at high school</i>)	3.2	4.7	4.0	10.6	12.4	11.6
Order Preference (as 1 st option)	91.9	89.1	90.7	31.0	39.6	34.7
Students who enrolled at 1st round	88.0	82.0	85.0	-	-	-

Comparing the enrolled students with the applicants we observe that we have more male students on applications than in enrollment. We also verify that, proportionally we have more regular age enrolled than the applicants. Besides that, it is clearly that we observe differences on the percentage regarding the track. This allows us to conclude that there is a difference between the group of students that applied to Nova SBE and the group of students that enrolled in the school.

Table 2. Descriptive statistics of students' performance⁶

	2008/2009 (N=385)			2009/2010 (N=340)			2010/2011 (N=405)			Total Sample		
	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
High School Score (N=1130)	166	130	193	168.3	126	200	170.4	132	197	168	126	200
Math Exam (N=1108)	185	100	200	175	137	200	177	116	200	179	100	200
Final GPA (N=918)	141	111	179	141	114	186	145	116	183	142	111	186

	Total Sample			Economics			Management		
	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max	Mean	Min	Max
Calculus I (N=996)	135	70	200	138	70	200	132	70	190
Principles of Micro (N=1003)	136	40	200	139	40	200	132	60	190
Principles of Macro (N=975)	131	50	200	135	90	200	127	50	180
Principles of Management (N=985)	135	100	190	137	100	180	133	100	190

Table 2 presents some statistics about the Final GPA and the two admission criteria: high school score and math exam. The students of economics of the first year obtain, on average, a higher score than that of the students of management, despite the higher average admission score of the latter. Factors such as different teachers, student's profiles, among others, might be potential reasons for this difference. Another particular aspect that is frequently mentioned in the literature is the difference between students that come from Public and Private schools. The table below (table 3) shows that this distinction is not of particular relevance. Moreover, the scores of the national math exam, as well as the final GPA, are not significantly different. On the Final GPA and in terms of admission scores we did not observe significant differences. However, we will see after on the regressions if we confirm this or not when it comes to the high school average.

Table 3. Descriptive statistics of Public and Private Schools

	Average Scores			Correlation Matrix		
	Total Sample	Public	Private	Final GPA	Math Exam	High School Score
High School Score	168	168	170	0.5	0.14	1
Math Exam	179	179	180	0.27	1	
Final GPA	142	142	143	1		

⁶ Notice that the variables (HS Score, GPA and Math Exam) were measured in a scale from 0 to 200.

One of the main questions of this paper is the extent to which the high school internal score is a better predictor of the student's performance during the bachelor than the score of the national math exam, since, as it was explained before, the degrees at Nova SBE follow a strong analytical and quantitative approach; as we can observe in table 3, there are no major differences on the variables of math exam and high school score between students than come from a private school and those that come to public schools. We observe that the national Math exam has a higher average than the High School Average. The evidence points to a stronger correlation between the final GPA and the high school score than that observed between the former and the math exam.

In table 4 we find out the number of applications per year and verify that there was some volatility in that period. We can hypothesize that the number of applications decreases from 2008 to 2009 because the admission score on 2008 as to high, around 172 (as you can verify in table 5) and this had a negative effect on the next year. Many people did not try at all, which may explain the decrease on applications.

Table 4. Number of Applications

	2008/2009			2009/2010			2010/2011		
	Econ.	Manag.	Total	Econ.	Manag.	Total	Econ.	Manag.	Total
1 st Round	1365	1646	3011	946	1140	2086	1132	1366	2498
2 nd Round	135	216	351	180	240	420	197	243	440
3 rd Round	-	-	-	50	57	107	24	53	102
Total	1500	1862	3362	1176	1437	2613	1378	1662	3040

Table5. Admission Scores (minimums)

	2008/2009		2009/2010		2010/2011	
	Economics	Management	Economics	Management	Economics	Management
1 st Round	173	171	164	163	166	167
2 nd Round	164	160	160	161	165	164
3 rd Round	-	-	151	156	163	161

It is important to note that the number of applications and applicants is not the same. Most applicants to Nova SBE included the two courses in their options. As a result, a high percentage of the students submitted two applications to study in this school, in the

same round. We can see in table 6 that only 67% of the applications, in the 1ST round of 2008/2009, accounts for “real” students. This difference is of vital importance when we discuss the question of selection on section V.

Table 6. Candidates

	Candidates that applied to the two courses			Percentage of students, from the candidates, that applied to FE UNL/Nova SBE		
	2008/2009	2009/2010	2010/2011	2008/2009	2009/2010	2010/2011
1 st Round	993	720	839	67	65.5	66.4
2 nd Round	120	157	157	65.8	62.6	64.3
3 rd Round	-	44	43	-	58.8	57.8

Students’ preferences play a meaningful role in the decision of being admitted. As we can see in table 1, around 90% of the students that were accepted in the school (and were enrolled) had selected their respective courses as first option. Thus the vast majority of the students fulfilled their ambitions, something that must be taken into consideration at the time of analyzing our results when we analyze our results. We also verify that at Nova SBE 85% of the enrolled students were admitted as 1st option. Notice that a student can be admitted to the school but not enrolled and this distinction will be important later. On table 1, regarding the internal data base, we are only looking for the students that enrolled at the school and excluding the students that were admitted but not enrolled.

IV. Methodology

The aim of this section is to describe the different econometric approaches that we followed to obtain our results, which in turn are presented in the following section. We started by employing Ordinary Least Squares to analyse the relationship between GPA and its predictors. Some controlling variables were used so as to provide a more reliable estimation. This estimation method has however the disadvantage of providing inconsistent estimates due to the existence of sample selection, that is, incidental truncation problem. One of the shortcomings of our data is that we just observe the GPA of those students that were admitted into Nova SBE and graduated. Furthermore, Nova SBE has a tendency to attract the best students as the vast majority of students applied to the school as first option, many of whom with remarkable admission scores. Consequently, as we mentioned before, we verify that the characteristics of those students for whom we observe final GPA are different from the overall higher education “population”, and more specifically from applications. To cope with this problem of bias selection we decided to estimate a Heckman selection model (1979).

Heckman Two-step Estimator

We should be focused on studying the GPA and its predictors but we need to account for the fact that we have the outcome (GPA) conditional being observed or not. According to Cameron and Trivati (2005) we have the outcome of interest, y_2^* , GPA, and we need to create a second variable, y_1^* , that accounts for whether the student enrolled at University and graduate when we look at GPA. As a consequence, we have an outcome equation (4.1) and a selection equation (4.2)

Outcome equation:

$$y_{2i} = \begin{cases} y_{2i}^*, & y_{1i}^* > 0 \\ Unobserved, & y_{1i}^* \leq 0 \end{cases}$$

$$\text{where } y_{2i}^* = \mathbf{x}_{2i}'\beta_2 + \varepsilon_{2i} \quad (4.1)$$

Selection equation:

$$y_{1i} = \begin{cases} 1, & y_{1i}^* > 0 \\ 0, & y_{1i}^* \leq 0 \end{cases}$$

$$\text{where } y_{1i}^* = \mathbf{x}'_{1i}\beta_1 + \varepsilon_{1i} \quad (4.2)$$

This is the bivariate sample selection model (Amemiya 1985, model Type 2). The goal of the model is to determine the probability of a student enrolling at University that in turn allows us to predict the success of students. It is important to point out that when $y_1^* = y_2^*$ we have a Tobit Model. This equality is the reason why some authors call the bivariate model a Tobit Model with Stochastic threshold (Nelson, 1977) or a generalized Tobit Model. The correlation between the errors terms, ε_1 and ε_2 , is usually referred to as one of the most serious problems of the model. Thus, estimation by maximum likelihood assumes that errors are jointly normally distributed and homoscedastic. Basically we assume a bivariate normal distribution with zero means and correlation ρ :

$$\varepsilon_{1i} \sim N(0,1) \quad \varepsilon_{2i} \sim N(0, \sigma^2) \quad \text{corr}(\varepsilon_{1i}, \varepsilon_{2i}) = \rho \quad (4.3)$$

An alternative estimation method of the bivariate sample selection model is the Heckman's two-step estimator, or simply the Heckit.

The key assumption of the Heckit estimator is that

$$\varepsilon_2 = \delta \varepsilon_1 + \xi \quad (4.4)$$

where ξ is independent from ε_1 . This indicates that the error of the outcome equation – estimates of the predictor of GPA - is a multiple of the error in the selection equation (that determines the probability of being admitted and enrolling in school) plus a noise that is independent of the selection equation. The conditional mean becomes

$$E[y_2 | y_1^* > 0] = \mathbf{x}'_2 \beta_2 + \delta E[\varepsilon_1 | \varepsilon_1 > -\mathbf{x}'_1 \beta_1] \quad (4.5)$$

Hence, the expected value of the latent variable, y_2 (GPA), given that the individual enrolled in the school, is given by the OLS estimation and a disturbance term that

comes from the selection equation. The error associated with the outcome equation is determined by the selection error. This can be corrected for by the Heckit estimator. The Heckit estimator augments the OLS by including the omitted regressor ($\mathbf{x}'_1\beta_1$). In particular, the following equation is estimated by OLS:

$$y_{2i}^* = \mathbf{x}'_{2i}\beta_2 + \sigma_{12}\lambda(\mathbf{x}'_{1i}\hat{\beta}_1) + v_i \quad (4.6)$$

$\hat{\beta}_1$ is obtained in the first step using a probit regression (estimate the selection equation) since $Pr[y_1^* > 0] = \Phi(\mathbf{x}'_1\beta_1)$ and $\lambda(\mathbf{x}'_1\hat{\beta}_1) = \phi(\mathbf{x}'_1\hat{\beta}_1)/\Phi(\mathbf{x}'_1\hat{\beta}_1)$ ⁷ is the inverse Mills ratio (the correction term). If the inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant there is a bias on the OLS estimation. The purpose of the Heckit method is to correct for such bias. We should bear in mind that the usual OLS standard errors and the heteroscedastic-robust standard errors of β_1 in equation (4.4) are incorrect and we cannot directly interpret β_1 (this means that in the selection equation we need to compute the marginal effects in order to interpret the coefficients). However, the results of β_2 are consistent and asymptotically normal (and the coefficients from the Outcome Equation can be interpreted as the OLS coefficients).

When it comes to an identification strategy, the Heckman two-step method requires an exclusion restriction. According Cameron and Trivedi (2005) the Heckman model is theoretically identified when we have the same regressors in selection and outcome equations. For practical reasons, we control for identification by using at least one regressor in the selection equation that does not affect (and it is not included) in the outcome equation. This allows us to say that, if the selection equation is not well specified, we are likely to obtain imprecise estimates in the outcome equation.

⁷ ϕ represents the probability density function and Φ the cumulative density function.

V. Results

This section presents the results that we obtained using the aforementioned econometric models.

Our first step was to check whether the results achieved by Alves (2014) were robust for different cohorts. We consider three cohorts, from 2008 to 2011 (with a total of 1130 observations). The baseline model is the following:

$$FINAL\ GPA_i = \beta_0 + \beta_1 Math\ Exam_i + \beta_2 HSScore_i + \mathbf{x}'_i \beta_3 + u_1, \quad (5.1)$$

where GPA is our measure of success, *Math Exam* and *HSScore* are the access criteria's and \mathbf{x}' is a vector of controls. *Math Exam* and *HSScore* will be analyzed both separately and jointly in order to see whether the conclusion reached by Alves (2014) - *HSScore* is a better predictor of final GPA than *Math Exam* – remain valid.

On table 8 we present the results. In the first two regressions, (1) and (2), we separated the effect of *Math Exam* from *HSScore*, and included 2 dummies, per cohort. In regression (3) we joined the two variables. From regression 4 to 7 we added some control variables: *displaced*, *male*, previous track of science (*Track_S*), if the previous school was public (*PUB*), Bachelor (*Bsc*), if at least one of the parents had a higher education course (*Parents HE*) and if the student received a grant (*Dreivedscholarship*) are dummy variables. Thus, the reference group is composed of female students of management from the cohort of 2008/2009 that live no more than 40km away from Lisbon and who has at least one of the parents with a higher education course. Moreover, those students who come from a private high school are not from Economics and did not apply (and did not receive) for any scholarship from SAS. The estimates of the regression 3 indicate that the scores of the Math exam and High School are both statistically significant and the coefficient of the latter is larger. These facts are in line with Alves (2014) which concluded that the high school score is a better predictor of final GPA than the Math exam.

Table 8. Determinants of Undergraduate Students' Success on the 3 cohorts.⁸

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
HSScore	0.60***	-	0.55***	0.57***	0.59***	0.59***	0.62***
Math Exam	-	0.32***	0.22***	0.23***	0.23***	0.23***	0.26***
D200910	-2.13**	2.13*	0.10	-0.29	-0.27	-0.26	0.19
D201011	0.67	5.32***	2.33**	2.07**	2.05**	2.05	2.37**
Displaced	-	-	-	-2.50***	-2.31***	-2.34***	-2.00**
Male	-	-	-	-	2.88***	2.90***	2.62***
Track_S	-	-	-	-	-0.18	-0.18	-0.04
Public	-	-	-	-	-	0.19	0.27
Age	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.18
Bsc	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.95
Dreceivedscholarship	-	-	-	-	-	-	-1.34
Parents HE	-	-	-	-	-	-	-0.76
Constant	41.28***	82.71***	7.32	6.18	2.59	2.33	-7.21
N	918	904	904	890	890	890	854
R ²	0.26	0.10	0.30	0.31	0.32	0.32	0.34
R ² adjusted	0.26	0.10	0.30	0.30	0.32	0.31	0.33

Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01

We can equally conclude from regressions (4) – (7) that the variable displaced is statistically significant and displaced students tend to have -2.3 (in 200) on the final GPA, when compared with non-displaced students. There is also evidence that, on average, male students end up obtaining a higher final GPA than their female counterparts.

To sum up, the high school score, the Math Exam, gender and being displaced should be taken into consideration when one wants to predict the GPA and the high school score is the most relevant. The link between these variables and the GPA corroborates the results achieved by Alves (2014). In addition, the effect of the student coming from a public school is not statistically significant. Another important conclusion that we can draw from the table is that previous track does not influence the final result.

To the extent that there might be some bias in these estimations, we decided, as explained into section IV, to employ the Heckman two-step estimator so as to correct for selection. However, we need to separate economics from management due to the fact that, the majority of students applied to both courses, economics and management.

⁸ We performed these regressions for each cohort separately and results were essential the same.

As mentioned in section II, we have 9015 applications over the period of analysis, representing however a smaller number of students. Hence, we applied the Heckman model to Economics and Management separately in order to avoid the problem of double counting. It is important to remind that the latent variable, GPA, is only available for the students that were admitted to Nova SBE and finished their course⁹. Thus, in the selection equation the coefficients should be interpreted as affecting the probability of a student that applied to Nova SBE being admitted and concluding their bachelor degree. Table 9 presents the different results. In regression (8) the GPA is used as an outcome variable and in regression (9) we use the average of some representative first year courses¹⁰. As mentioned before, there is no evidence that the previous track on high school tends to have an influence on students' success at Nova SBE. Nevertheless, we strongly believe that the track has an impact on the probability of enrolling, which compelled us to include the variable in the selection equation and not in the outcome equation. In addition, we consider that the order of preference only has an influence on the likelihood of being admitted, and not on the outcome (Alves (2014) also found that the order preference did not affect the outcome). This fact is particularly relevant to those students who have high admission scores as it is the order of preference that ultimately determines whether they are admitted or not. For instance, some students in our sample were not admitted since they had a different first option, such as medicine.

Thus, the order preference in the majority of the cases is essential to determine the admission but not the outcome. Hence, the order preference should be on the selection equation.

⁹An alternative way would be to create a dummy variable equal to 1 if a student was admitted and enrolled in the school and 0 otherwise. The problem of this option is that, for the sample that we regarded as admitted we did not observe the GPA. Notwithstanding this drawback, we decided to follow this alternative and the results were very similar. In appendix 1 we used that methodology and verified that the results were the same from table 9.

¹⁰ Principles of Microeconomics, Principles of Macroeconomics, Principles of Management and Calculus1.

It is relevant to emphasize that there is a set of variables in the selection equation that are statistically significant for management. Based on regressions (8) and (9), we can conclude that the admission's criteria and the order of preference are the only variables that appear to affect the probability of entering in Economics. When it comes to Management, the probability of a student entering and finishing their course tends to increase around 1% if they come from a public school. The evidence also suggests that being a displaced student has a harmful effect on this probability (in Management). However, we should bear in mind that at Nova SBE the majority of students were admitted in their courses as 1st option. Thus, it is far more interesting to only look for the outcome of those who entered in 1st option (regression 10). Additionally, it is interesting to verify a bias on selection in regression (10), which does not happen in the other two estimations. Such situation might likely be related to the order of preference that the student had when they applied to the university. As we mentioned in section III it was the order of preference that ultimately influenced their admission to the University. Nevertheless, what really matters to us is the results that we obtain from the outcome equation, controlling for the selection bias, that are common to the three regressions. In order to avoid that problem we decided to only look for the success of those that were admitted to courses of Economics and Management as a 1st option, and finished their course.¹¹ In other words, this approach solves the problem of a student not being enrolled in Economics but in Management, and vice-versa. This choice has therefore an impact on the nature of selection. When compared with regression (8), the significance of the variables on the selection equation considerably changes in regression (10), which is due to the fact that we are exclusively analyzing the students that ranked the course as 1st option. Now, on regression (10), the marginal effects from

¹¹ As it mentioned before, in regression (10) we should be focused on the outcome equation and not on the selection.

selection equation give us the probability of entering, considering that the students applied to the course as 1st option and they finished their course¹².

The first main result that can be achieved with the Heckman Model is that the high school score is a better predictor of the final GPA than the Math Exam, even after controlling for selection. This piece of evidence corroborates Alves (2014) results. However, looking at the outcome equation we can clearly see that two variables play a meaningful role in the outcome. In Economics, it suggests that male students obtain a better score than their female counterparts. Specifically, the former get 5 more points (in 200) on GPA and additional 6 points (in 200) on the average of some representative first year courses, when compared with the latter. As far as Management is concerned, unlike what we see in Economics, a displaced student loses, on average, 3 or 4 points on the GPA/Average of the first year courses. This final result is particularly intriguing as there is not a specific, immediate explanation for such finding. The structure of the two courses might be one of the possible reasons for the fact that displaced management students were more affected than displaced economic students. Traditionally, students of management have more group works to do when compared with the students of economics (in these 3 cohorts). At the same time, a displaced student spends some weekends per semester at home. These two factors imply that being a displaced management student negatively affects their performance at school.

¹² In appendix 1 we have the same but the probability is independent of finishing the course or not.

Table 9. Estimation Results 1

	(8)		(9)		(10)	
ECONOMICS	GPA		Average of 4 courses		GPA (1st Option)	
Outcome Eq.	Heckman	OLS	Heckman	OLS	Heckman	OLS
HSScore	0.69***	0.66***	0.68***	0.68***	1.02***	0.68***
MathsA	0.35***	0.32***	0.47***	0.48***	0.74***	0.33***
D200910	-0.23	-0.59	-0.22	-0.14	3.13	-0.74
D201011	1.99	1.75	1.04	1.12	4.88**	1.92
Displaced	-1.06	-1.05	-1.28	-1.28	-1.95	-1.26
Male	4.88***	4.94***	6.25***	6.24***	3.00**	4.60***
FirstRound	-0.87	-0.83	0.83	0.83	-0.28	-1.11
Public	-0.79	-0.88	0.60	0.63	1.13	-0.68
Dreivedscholarship	-2.42	-2.54	-0.31	-0.28	2.91	-2.31
Constant	-40.65	-28.0	-66.55**	-69.52***	-180.40***	-33.2**
Selection Eq. (Marginal Effects)						
HSScore	0.0002***		0.0001***		0.0131***	
MathsA	0.0002***		0.0002***		0.0167***	
D200910	0.0016		0.0013*		0.1616***	
D201011	0.0011		0.0014**		0.1207***	
Displaced	-0.0006		-0.0002		-0.0219	
Track_E	0.0001		-0.0001		0.0576*	
Preference	-0.0105***		-0.0063***		-	
Male	-0.0007		-0.0004		-0.0565*	
Public	0.0001*		0.0006*		0.0683**	
Age	-0.0005		-0.0003		-0.0420*	
Mills Ratio	1.28		-0.32		16.21***	
Number of Obs.	3680		3680		1142	
Uncensored Obs.	455		470		425	
MANAGEMENT	GPA		Average of 4 courses		GPA (1st Option)	
Outcome Eq.	Heckman	OLS	Heckman	OLS	Heckman	OLS
HSScore	0.50***	0.50***	0.63***	0.60***	0.85***	0.50***
MathsA	0.14***	0.14***	0.35***	0.31***	0.60***	0.17***
D200910	-0.46	-0.43	1.89	1.38	3.69*	-0.06
D201011	2.31*	2.34	4.07***	3.55**	6.09***	2.47
Displaced	-2.69***	-2.97***	-3.76***	-3.55***	-4.46***	-2.48**
Male	1.28	1.28	3.55***	3.58***	1.00	1.53
FirstRound	0.83	0.82	-0.55	-0.47	0.69	0.11
Public	1.08	1.10	1.89	1.70	4.38**	0.75
Dreivedscholarship	1.18	1.16	1.46	1.67	1.42	1.24
Constant	31.12**	30.10**	-41.15**	-26.91*	-129.68***	24.92**
Selection Eq. (Marginal Effects)						
HSScore	0.0010***		0.0008***		0.0070***	
MathsA	0.0012***		0.0012***		0.0086***	
D200910	0.0077*		0.0101**		0.0784***	
D201011	0.0057		0.0091**		0.0802***	
Displaced	-0.0087***		-0.0069***		-0.0367***	
Track_E	-0.0024		-0.0029		0.0460***	
Preference	-0.0321***		-0.0297***		-	
Male	-0.0052*		-0.0025		-0.0167	
Public	0.0094***		0.0079**		0.0716***	
Age	-0.0050***		-0.0049***		-0.0272***	
Mills Ratio	-0.12		1.63		15.34***	
Number of Obs.	4452		4452		1784	
Uncensored Obs.	435		451		394	

Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01

VI. Conclusions

The primary goal of this paper is to identify which factors most influence the success of students. In particular, the paper is designed to analyze the extent to which the results achieved by Alves (2014) were valid for different cohorts, accounting for the real possibility of selection in the sample.

One of the main results of this empirical analysis is that taking selection into consideration does not call into question Alves's finding that the high school score tends to be a much more reliable predictor of the students' success than the national Math exam. This phenomenon is particularly important to those students who were admitted in the 1st option due to the fact this group represent the majority of students of Nova SBE. This evidence might pave the way for an intense discussion about the current admission criteria, namely the percentage assigned to each criteria. Based on our results, we suggest that it could be beneficial to increase the percentage assigned to the high school score and consequently a decrease in that related to the Math exam. This suggestion primarily aims at selecting those students who were not admitted due to the traditional admission. The major drawback of this proposal is that the school would certainly captivate a potential different group of students in the sense that changing the rules can alter the incentives of students when they apply to university. We do not know if with a different admission criterion students would have chosen our school. In other words, those students who would not apply to our University owing to the previous admission criteria might eventually change their decision once we put forward a different rule. Even if the students do not change their options, we do not know if their behavior in high school might change. We can create an incentive to the students give less importance to the national exam (if it counts less for the admission score). However, it is important to discuss the issue of the admission criteria as Alves' results are corroborated for three different cohorts.

Another important result of our study is that being a displaced student tends to have a negative effect on the success of students in Management. This particularity must be taken into consideration when providing new students of Management with scholarships or other way of supporting. Indeed, the school should be deeply concerned about this problem and as a consequence design mechanisms that offset this negative impact. Such link was not visible in Economics.

Other results are worth mentioning. Firstly, the evidence points to a better performance of male students in Economics than their female counterparts, even after accounting for selection. Secondly, the fact that coming from a public school positively affects (more in management) the likelihood of being admitted and finishing their course. Last but not the least, being a displaced candidate has a detrimental impact on this probability.

The specific characteristics of the students from Nova SBE do not allow generalizing the conclusions of this study to the overall higher Portuguese education system. As we account for selection and analyze the candidates that were not admitted, we can however say that when it comes to the admission criteria may be it is relevant to assign a higher weight to the internal high school score. This higher percentage seems to more accurately reflect the characteristics of students and to be a better predictor of their success. It is frequently stated that the internal score is a weak measure of the success of students on the grounds that it might be substantially different from school to school. Moreover, there is some volatility in those scores. Notwithstanding this fact, we are assigning a substantial weight to the national exam.

It is important to bear in mind that the students of our school are not representative of higher education in Portugal. We analyzed a very specific group of students which does not allow us to generalize these conclusions to the overall higher education in these fields. The majority of Nova SBE's students were very well educated, with a solid background when it came to the previous trajectory school and socioeconomic terms.

VII. References

- Alves, Dino.** 2014. "Determinants of Success of Nova SBE's Undergraduate Students". UNL, Mimeo
- Amemiya, Takeshi.** 1985. "Introduction to Statistics and Econometrics". *Harvard University Press*.
- Blundell, Richard, Lorraine Dearden, and Barbara Sianesi.** "Evaluating the effect of education on earnings: models, methods and results from the National Child Development Survey." *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society: Series A (Statistics in Society)* 168.3 (2005): 473-512.
- Cameron, Colin and Pravin Trivedi.** 2005. "Microeconometrics: Methods and Application". Cambridge
- Cunha, Jesse M. and Trey Miller.** 2014. "Measuring value-added in higher education: Possibilities and limitations in the use of administrative data". *Economics of Education Review*, 42: 64-77.
- Dearden, Lorraine, Javier Ferri and Costas Meghir.** 2002. "The Effect of School Quality on Educational Attainment and Wages". *The Review of Economics and Statistics*, 84(1): 1-20
- Dolado, Juan J. and Eduardo Molates.** 2006. "Which Factors Determine the Grades of Undergraduate Students in Economics? Some Evidence from Spain". *InvestigacionesEconómicas*, 33(2): 179-210
- Smith, Jeremy and Robin Naylor.** 2001. "Determinants of degree performance in UK universities: a statistical analysis of the 1993 student cohort". *Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics*, 63: 29-60
- Fernandes, Graça Leão and Margarida Chaga Lopes.** 2008. "ISEG Undergraduate Students: Determinants of Academic Performance". *ECER Conference "From Teaching to learning"*.
- Green, William.** 2003. "Econometric Analysis, Firth Edition". *Pearson Education*, International Edition.
- Hassink, Wolter and Hannah Kiiver.** 2007. "Age-dependent Effects of Socio-Economics Background on Educational Attainment – Evidence from Germany". *Discussion Paper Series*, 07-26

- Heckman, James. 1979.** “Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error”. *Econometrica*, 47: 153-161
- Kane, Suzanne, David Chalcraft and Guglielmo Volpe. 2014.** “Notions of belonging: First Year, first semester higher education students enrolled on business or economics degree programmes”. *The International Journal of Management Education*, 12: 193-201
- Lunsford, M. Leigh and Phillip Poplin. 2011.** “From Research to Practice: Basic Mathematics Skills and Success in Introductory Statistics”. *Journal of Statistics Education*, Volume 19, Number 1.
- Nicpon, M., Huser, L., Blanks, E., Sollenberger, S., Befort, C., and S. Kurpius. 2007.** “The relationship of loneliness and social support with college freshmen’s academic performance and persistence”. *Journal of College Student Retention: Research, Theory & Practice*, 8(3): 345-358.
- Oliveira, Sofia. 2014.** “Returns to Vocational Education in Portugal”. UNL, Mimeo
- Pan, Weixiang and Ben Ost. 2014.** “The impact of parental layoff on higher education investment”. *Economics of Education Review* 42: 53-63.
- Parri, Janne and AasKadri. 2006.** “National Examination Scores as Predictors of University Students’ Performance in Estonia”. *Trames*, 10 (3): 255-267
- People for Education. 2013.** “*Broader Measures of Success*”.
- Todd, Petra and Kenneth Wolpin. 2003.** “On the Specification and Estimation of the Production Function for Cognitive Achievement”. *The Economics Journal*, 113: 3-33.
- Tinto, V. 1975.** “Dropout from Higher Education: A Theoretical Synthesis of Recent Research”. *Review of Educational Research*, 45 (1): 89-125.
- Triventi, Moris. 2014.** “Does working during higher education affects students’ academic progression”. *Economics of Education Review*, 41: 1-13.
- Robinson, Peter B. 1994.** “The effect of education and experience on self-employment success”. *Journal of Business Venturing*, 9 (2): 141-156
- Robst, John, Jack Keil and Dean Russo. 1998.** “The Effect of Gender Composition of Faculty on Student Retention”. *Economics of Education Review*, 17: 429-439
- Sartori, Anne. 2003.** “An Estimator for Some Binary-Outcome Selection Models Without Exclusion Restrictions”. *Political Analysis*.

VIII. Appendix

Appendix 1 Estimation Results 2

	(11)		(12)		(13)	
ECONOMICS	GPA		Average of 4 courses		GPA (1st Option)	
Outcome Eq.	Heckman	OLS	Heckman	OLS	Heckman	OLS
HSScore	0.69***	0.66***	0.68***	0.68***	0.97***	0.68***
Math Exam	0.35***	0.32***	0.47***	0.48***	0.71***	0.33***
D200910	-0.24	-0.59	-0.19	-0.14	2.61	-0.74
D201011	2.03	1.75	1.06	1.12	5.14***	1.92
Displaced	-1.06	-1.05	-1.28	-1.28	-1.34	-1.26
Male	4.89***	4.94***	6.24***	6.24***	3.31**	4.60***
FirstRound	-0.87	-0.83	0.83	0.83	-0.24	-1.11
Public	-0.79	-0.88	0.62	0.63	0.54	-0.68
Dreivedscholarship	-2.42	-2.54	-0.30	-0.28	-3.03	-2.31
Constant	-40.64	-28.0	-67.55***	-69.52***	-162.63***	-33.2**
Selection Eq. (Marginal Effects)	Enrolled		Enrolled		Enrolled	
HSScore	0.0001***		0.0001***		0.0148***	
Math Exam	0.0002***		0.0001***		0.0202***	
D200910	0.0010		0.0008*		0.1836***	
D201011	0.0010		0.0010**		0.1759***	
Displaced	-0.0002		-0.0001		-0.0014	
Track_E	0.0004		-0.0002		0.0431	
Preference	-0.0073***		-0.0041***		-	
Male	-0.0004		-0.0002		-0.0546*	
Public	0.0007*		0.0003*		0.0595	
Age	-0.0004		-0.0002		-0.0609**	
Mills Ratio	1.27		-0.21		14.58***	
Number of Obs.	3680		3680		1142	
Uncensored Obs.	455		470		425	
MANAGEMENT	GPA		Average of 4 courses		GPA (1st Option)	
Outcome Eq.	Heckman	OLS	Heckman	OLS	Heckman	OLS
HSScore	0.50***	0.50***	0.63***	0.60***	0.85***	0.50***
Math Exam	0.14***	0.14***	0.35***	0.31***	0.62***	0.17***
D200910	-0.46	-0.43	1.89	1.38	3.63*	-0.06
D201011	2.32*	2.34	4.04***	3.55**	5.98***	2.47
Displaced	-2.96***	-2.97***	-3.75***	-3.55***	-4.23***	-2.48**
Male	1.28	1.28	3.55***	3.58***	0.95	1.53
FirstRound	0.83	0.82	-0.56	-0.47	0.68	0.11
Public	1.08	1.10	1.86	1.70	3.93**	0.75
Dreivedscholarship	1.18	1.16	1.46	1.67	1.34	1.24
Constant	31.05**	30.10**	-40.63**	-26.91*	-130.25***	24.92**
Selection Eq. (Marginal Effects)	Enrolled		Enrolled		Enrolled	
HSScore	0.0009***		0.0008***		0.0070***	
Math Exam	0.0011***		0.0011***		0.0094***	
D200910	0.0075*		0.0096**		0.0898***	
D201011	0.0050		0.0078**		0.0831***	
Displaced	-0.0078***		-0.0064***		-0.0361***	
Track_E	-0.0035		-0.0037		0.0415***	
Preference	-0.0310***		-0.0285***		-	
Male	-0.0049*		-0.0026		-0.0178	
Public	0.0080***		0.0071**		0.0679***	
Age	-0.0050***		-0.0050***		-0.0332***	
Mills Ratio	-0.11		1.55		15.14***	
Number of Obs.	4452		4452		1784	
Uncensored Obs.	435		451		394	

Legend: *p<.1; **p<.05; ***p<.01