

**A CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON EU'S
DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN TURKEY**

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Tese de Doutoramento em Relações Internacionais

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
Tese apresentada para cumprimento dos requisitos necessários à obtenção do grau de Doutor em Relações Internacionais, realizada sob a orientação científica do Professor Doutor José Esteves Pereira e da Professora Doutora Teresa Maria Resende Cierco Gomes.



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“It is a nuisance, but God has chosen to give the easy problems to the physicists.”

(Lave and March, 1975)

“There is no such thing as a perfect democracy.
Democracy is not an all-or-nothing affair, but rather a shifting continuum.”

(IDEA, 2008)

To Sara – my old friend, partner, lover and wife.
To my parents and brother – my pillars of support.
To those who departed from this world, but who remain in my heart.

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A CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON EU'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN TURKEY

André Pereira Matos

The European Union, as a regional actor and an example of stability and well-being, has embraced a set of principles it has stood for and which constitute its own identity. The diffusion of these values among third countries is one of the objectives of EU's External Policy. Democracy can be found among the principles that are sought to be exported through comprehensive and complex strategies within different frameworks, such as neighbourhood relations, trade partnerships and the accession process. Focusing on the latter, candidates are object of an intensive process of Europeanisation that operates through different mechanisms like socialisation and conditionality.

Turkey, on the other side, has decided to apply for full membership several decades ago and, ever since, it has been pressured to Europeanise, which includes improving its unstable democracy. This case, however, is different from all other previous enlargements; for its special socio-cultural and civilisational features, Turkey constitutes a more complex novelty for the European Union.

Therefore, this thesis aims to study the influence of the European Union on the democratisation process of Turkey, focusing on the period ranging between 1999, the year the European Council recognised Turkey's candidacy status, and 2009 that marks the 10-year period of that condition. It is the intention of this project to assess the impact of the European Union at that level through the study of the democratic evolution of the country and its co-relation with other variables related to the presence or pressure of the EU.

As this is a challenging objective, it will require a deep reflection upon central concepts like democracy and democratic consolidation, and a diversified use of methodological techniques, such as statistical analysis and mathematical co-relations, historical analysis, literature review and in-depth interviews. This study will privilege a Constructivist approach, emphasising the social construction of reality and the role of the ideational aspects – identity, perceptions and the broader socio-cultural dimension – in Turkey-EU relations.

Keywords: Accession process; Constructivism; democracy; democratisation; European Union; Turkey.

A CONSTRUCTIVIST PERSPECTIVE ON EU'S DEMOCRACY PROMOTION IN TURKEY

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A União Europeia, enquanto ator regional e exemplo de estabilidade e bem-estar, representa e defende um conjunto de princípios que constituem a sua própria identidade. A difusão destes valores junto de países terceiros é um dos objetivos da Política Externa da UE – o princípio da democracia e os valores democráticos no geral estão entre essa promoção e existe uma tentativa de exportá-los através de estratégias abrangentes e complexas, enquadradas em contextos diferentes, tais como as relações de vizinhança, parcerias comerciais e o processo de adesão. Os candidatos a este último tornam-se, assim, objetos de dinâmicas intensivas de Europeização que atua através de diferentes mecanismos como a socialização e a condicionalidade.

A Turquia, por outro lado, decidiu candidatar-se à adesão plena há várias décadas atrás e, desde então, tem sido, também ela, objeto de pressão no sentido de europeizar-se, o que obrigatoriamente inclui melhorar a sua democracia instável. O caso turco, contudo, apresenta traços que o distinguem de todos os alargamentos anteriores, nomeadamente devido às suas características socioculturais e civilizacionais, que transformam este país num caso inédito e mais complexo para a UE.

Assim, um dos principais objetivos desta tese consiste em estudar a influência da União Europeia no processo de democratização da Turquia, no espaço cronológico que medeia entre 1999, o ano em que o Conselho Europeu reconheceu o estatuto de candidata à Turquia, e 2009, que marca o final da primeira década nessa mesma condição. Nesse sentido, é intenção deste projeto avaliar o impacto da União através da análise cuidada da evolução democrática do país e a sua correlação com outras variáveis relacionadas com a presença ou pressão da UE.

Atendendo à natureza especialmente complexa deste objetivo, será necessária uma reflexão profunda acerca de conceitos centrais como os de democracia e de consolidação democrática, assim como a utilização de um conjunto diversificado de técnicas metodológicas, tais como a análise estatística e correlações matemáticas, análise histórica, revisão de literatura e entrevistas qualitativas. Este estudo privilegiará uma abordagem Construtivista, caracterizada por relevar a construção social da realidade e o papel de aspetos ideacionais – como a identidade, as perceções e toda uma dimensão sociocultural abrangente – nas relações UE-Turquia.

Palavras-chave: Construtivismo; democracia; democratização; processo de adesão; Turquia; União Europeia.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

- AI – Amnesty International
- AKP – Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
- ANAP – Anavatan Partisi (Motherland Party)
- APR – (European Commission’s) Annual Progress Report
- BDP - Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)
- CEECs – Central and Eastern European Countries
- CHP – Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party)
- CIRI - Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset
- CMR – Civil-military relations
- CUP - Committee of Union and Progress (İttihat ve Terakki Cemiveti)
- DB – Democracy Barometer
- DP – Demokrat Partisi (Democratic Party)
- DSP – Demokratik Sol Parti (Democratic Left Party)
- DYP – Dogru Yol Partisi (True Path Party)
- EBT - Eurobarometer
- EC – European Commission
- ECHR – European Convention on Human Rights
- ECtHR – European Court of Human Rights
- EFW – Economic Freedom of the World
- EU – European Union
- EUCLIDA – EU Cycles and Layers of International Democratic Anchoring (Magen & Morlino, 2008)
- EUST - Eurostat
- FH – Freedom House
- FP – Fazilet Partisi – Virtue Party
- GNAT – Grand National Assembly of Turkey
- HP – Halkçi Parti (Populist Party)
- HR – Human Rights
- IO – International Organisation

IPA – Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance
IR – International Relations (discipline of)
MDP – Milliyetçi Demokrat Parti (Nationalist Democracy Party)
METU – Middle East Technical University
MHP – Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi (Nationalist Movement/Action Party)
MPs – Members of Parliament
NATO – North Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO – Non-Governmental Organisation
NPAA – National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis
NSC – National Security Council
ODA – Official Development Assistance
OECD - Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE - Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
RoL – Rule of Law
RP – Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
TAF – Turkish Armed Forces
TI – Transparency International
UN – United Nations
USDS – United States, Department of State
WB – World Bank
WEF – World Economic Forum

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INTRODUCTION

1. Problem Statement

The European Union¹ constitutes an international organisation that, in the world scene, seeks to promote the values and principles it stands for, such as Human Rights and democracy. Over time, this concern increased and began to be a cornerstone in its relations with third countries – neighbours, trade partners and candidates. For the latter, the EU was more demanding and the results are considered by many as the most successful policy in terms of foreign action, due to the appealing reward the Union offered: membership. On the other side, Turkey applied to membership and has been going through a process of democratisation for decades. Nevertheless, as a candidate country, many doubts emerge regarding the role of the Union in this process. Thus, it is the final aim of this thesis to find out to what extent the European Union successfully contributed to the Turkish democratisation within the scope of the enlargement process – between 1999, the year the European Council declared Turkey a candidate country, and 2009 that marks the 10-year period of that condition.

Turkey constitutes, therefore, a case study to assess EU's influence. It was not a random choice: for the country's nature and features, it seems to be one of the most problematic cases of interaction between the Union and a candidate. Several reasons justify that complexity and simultaneously the choice for this case study – among them: Turkey-EU relations are uncommonly long and turbulent; the country's Muslim majority is something completely new in a candidate country; Turks' euro-enthusiasm vs. the lack of interest on the European side; the geo-strategic power of Turkey and its problematic neighbourhood; a territory divided between two continents; a weak democracy in consolidation but without an established and solid democratic culture; an unstable economic situation despite its growth; a tradition of participation in Western-linked organisations (NATO, Council of Europe, etc); unusual civil-military relations; some difficulties in dealing with Human Rights and certain freedoms; and a very heterogeneous population. These are some of the reasons behind this choice and the ones that make this a special case that provoke the European Union to re-analyse its

¹ Henceforth, European Union, Union and EU will be used interchangeably.

own project, identity and position in the world scene, as most situations it is facing are new and have never been considered before.

In order to achieve the final result mentioned above, it is necessary to clearly define “democracy” and to operationalise it, so that it eventually becomes clearer the country’s evolution in terms of its democratic performance. Later, it will be necessary to co-relate that development with the European Union’s commitment. Developing such a model comprises a very challenging task, given, among others, the complexity of this reality, the number of the actors involved and the theoretical divisions among academics. In fact, achieving some of the objectives proposed for this work is a challenge as well, due to the different limitations that can hamper the efforts made to achieve them. For instance, as mentioned, there are various (external) actors involved in the promotion of democracy in Turkey. However, this work attempts to study the influence of the European Union, which means that the contribution of other institutions or organisations has to be isolated, so that the conclusions are not contaminated by their action.

The reasons for undergoing this complex study are linked to various aspects. First, at the time this thesis began to be developed, there was lacking a systematic and holistic approach to the theme, and more encompassing studies were scarce – as it can be perceived after reading *The State of the Art*.

Second, as Soares (2005: 28) mentions, to innovate in Social and Human Sciences can also include presenting the same subject in a different way, through a different look.² This means that, in this particular case, as most approaches to the subject focus on material questions and interests of both parts, my intention is to highlight the ideational side of the problem (although not disregarding the material one), applying a Constructivist perspective. Therefore, Constructivism is expected to generate fresh hypotheses on the issue and to provide less used concepts, such as identity, norms, motivation and perception, which will certainly help develop a different and complementary angle to analyse the question through, probably reaching some explanations missed by other analyses. This view aims to combine material forces and the power of ideas, which implies a delicate awareness of cultural differences and similarities so that it is possible to establish a stronger connection between both sides

² Unless stated otherwise, all the translations from Portuguese, French, Germany, Spanish and Italian are of my own.

and therefore to promote a healthy and profitable dialogue that enhances the relationship between European Union and Turkey.

Third, despite the growing attention to the topic by academia, the ongoing debate is far from being solved in terms of a solid, widely-accepted answer to the question: if many authors believe the EU has exerted considerable influence on the democratisation process of Turkey (or even more broadly in the country's general development), many others do not accept this premise³, creating a clear split among researchers. This thesis pretends to be another contribution to the discussion and hopefully to facilitate reaching a broader consensus. In fact, Magen (2004: 9) wrote that the effect of external factors on Turkey still needs to be studied.

Finally, and after carefully analysing the questions involved in this general subject, it would also be very positive if this work would strengthen the ties between both parts, while contributing to a more aware, informed and responsible public and private decision-making. In this sense, the present thesis seeks to provide another input to the development of a more general framework of analysis of the questions here involved and to be able to go beyond this specific case, extending itself to other case studies in the future – be it in terms of academic research or of political decision-making.

Thus, this work, although focused on a subject already studied by many researchers, tries to bring a fresh perspective to the discussion in progress, developing the knowledge concerning Turkey-European Union relations, more precisely in what comes to the improvement of the Turkish democracy as a response to European impulses.

2. The State of the Art

In order to pursue the achievement of the objectives of this thesis, four different areas of study had to be dealt with: democracy and democratisation; European Union and democracy promotion; Turkish culture and democracy; as well as Turkey-EU relations. These diverse but interconnected fields constitute the keystones of the whole project and their joint analysis is expected to bring the answers to the raised questions. Therefore, scrutinizing the most recent and relevant literature on the above mentioned

³ That will become perceptible throughout the thesis.

fields was part of the research project: the first two will be approached in their respective sections; and the last two are to be deepened in this section, as they constitute the central hub of this thesis.

The knowledge already produced by other authors was taken into consideration and composed the foundations of this work; it is unfair to consider any type of scientific production without the influence and insights of previous studies and contributions. Nevertheless, the intention of this thesis is to enlarge and deepen the whole corpus of knowledge with an alternative perspective and new considerations on the subject – even though many of which are eclectic approaches inspired by other authors' work.

Turkey constitutes the case study of this thesis and, therefore, had to be object of a deep analysis that sought to comprehend this entity in its whole in order to reach the most faithful results it is possible for a study of this kind. Thus, the first step was an initial incursion into Turkey's history, making use of the contributions of various authors in this area, who were able to provide a valuable insight on the background of the country.

In his book, Kitsikis (1985: 3) reflects upon the history of “one of the most important civilisation of the second millennium” – the Ottoman Empire – and deals with its historical evolution, as well as with more specific subjects, such as the Ottoman multinational features, religion and its relations with the West. Similarly, Quataert (2000) described in detail the history of the Ottoman Empire since its birth to its end, whereas Faucompret & Koning's (2008) began their study after the fall of the Ottoman Empire and finished with Erdogan's government. Fernandes (2005) included the history of the Ottomans and highlighted, in a sociological and historical perspective, Atatürk's construction of a nationalist and secularist Turkey. Andrew Mango (2005) began his study in the 11th century and reached some recent events of Turkey, and Mario Losano (2009) also devoted some attention to the history of the country always *vis-à-vis* its relations with Europe. Burdy and Marcou's (2008) book contextualised the evolution of the Turkish state since the birth of the Ottoman Empire and although this does not constitute a novelty *per se*, what is interesting in their work is that they (successfully) sought to co-relate that evolution with Turkey's identity and with the relationship with the West. The authors even devoted a chapter to analyse the country's choice of Europe, studying the dynamics of interaction between both parts since the World War II, as well

as the social and cultural changes that have been occurring in Turkey at various levels (women's rights, education, media, etc.). Another important contribution comes from Yurdusev (2010) whose main argument is that the Ottoman Empire and Europe (since the emergence of the state system) have never been isolated from each other – both have influenced and interacted with each other. The author provides some examples of this statement and seeks to demystify some conceptions regarding Ottoman-European relations. Focusing on identity issues, Yurdusev analysis the Ottomans' otherness in relation to the Europeans and concludes that they were *in* Europe, but not *of* Europe.

In terms of Turks' identity, Fernandes (2005) called it a “fragmented identity” in line with Grigoriadis (2009) and Waxman (2010), who scrutinise the evolution of this repeatedly reformulated and reinterpreted identity. Kentel (2011) reflects upon nationalist questions and the idea of *alterity*, while Losano (2009) focuses on the secularism/Islamism debate. Andrew Mango (2004) used his knowledge and experience about Turkish studies to elaborate a book in which the profile of today's Turks could be drawn. Beginning with the birth and development of the Ottoman Empire, Mango analyses in depth several aspects that he regarded as fundamental for the construction of the Turkish identity. In that sense, Mango presents the historical evolution of the Turkish modern state through the ruling of Kemal Atatürk and İnönü, and reflects upon the introduction of free elections (its causes and consequences), the military coups and the elections until 2002. Particular subjects are also scrutinised, including women's rights, Turkish lifestyle, religion, torture, etc.

Also linked to Turks' identity, Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007) conducted a research project that resulted in their 2007 publication about religion, politics and society in general in Turkey. In this work, they approached various fundamental questions that enable the reader to realise how the Turkish society is currently shaped in terms of their position regarding the turban issue, the Islamist/Secularist debate, identity issues, early and forced marriages, the role of women, the role of the military, Islam, terrorism, internal politics, democracy and many other fields that resulted in a very interesting and relevant work to understand Turkish society. On the other hand, noticing the high proportion of autocratic regimes among Muslim countries, Moataz Fattah (2006) led an impressive study about the Muslims' opinion about democracy and how it would hamper their countries' democratisation. Through a survey conducted in 32 Muslim countries (including Turkey), discourse analysis, interviews and other

techniques, Fattah was able to reach several important conclusions. For example, that Muslims are highly influenced by opinion-makers (Idem: 7) and that there are three patterns of Muslims' attitudes towards Islam and democracy (traditionalist Islamists; modernist Islamists and Secularists) (Idem: 9-25). He also carefully analyses the impact of various factors on the support for democracy (demography, income, age, gender, etc.), reaching very interesting conclusions, like the profile of the typical prodemocratic Muslim (Idem: 33-64).

Concerning Turkey's democracy, many authors study its evolution in time, its limitations, the perception of the population in relation to this regime, etc. Fernandes (2005) explores the Turkish political-constitutional system, Düzgit (2009) mentions the decline in the democratic efforts since 2005 and the constraints to the consolidation of Turkey's democracy and Evin (2005) wrote a chapter on Turkish history since the late 1970s to the early 2000s, mainly focusing on Özal's contribution to the Turkish political culture, but also including a brief glance at Erdoğan's European vocation and Turkey's secularism.

In an extensive and deep work on Turkey's internal dynamics focusing on the balance of powers, Isabel David's PhD thesis scrutinises in detail the country's Westernisation since the Ottoman era and includes the description and reading of key moments, such as the *Tanzimat*, the Young Turks movement and the creation of the Modern Republic with Kemal's decisions during his ruling. David also studies the recent history of the country, Turkey's accession process and the path of AKP in government. Conjugating all these fronts, the author is sceptical concerning the consolidation of Turkey's democracy, since late developments have revealed the continuation of old habits and practices – for example, the tradition of the strong leader and the reinforcement of the authoritarian culture, indirectly promoted (or at least allowed) by the EU that has been undermining the remaining Kemalist principles, strengthening other political drives like the AKP.

Another article related to the country's democratic evolution (and the EU process) is “The Impact of European Union 2007 Enlargement on Turkey's Democratic Commitment” (Matos, 2012), whose conclusions point to a noted decrease in Turkey's democratic performance from the first (2004-2006) to the second (2007-2009) periods. The breaking point was the 2007 enlargement of Bulgaria and Romania, which is believed to have negatively affected the Turkish democratic commitment (as well as its commitment to the European accession) due to the lack of motivation and the feeling of

frustration caused by the perception of double standards and lack of coherency on the European side. Besides, these issues of coherency, credibility and clearness were more carefully analysed in Matos (2013a).

A very prolific area in terms of academic production is security and civil-military relations. In general, theorists think about the evolution in time of the civilian control over the military (or the lack of it) (Akay, 2010; Greenwood, 2006; Gürsoy, 2010; Heper & Güney, 1996, 2000), compare those relations with practices of other countries (Duman & Tsarouhas, 2006; Gürsoy, 2008), pay attention to the military involvement in politics and their interventions (Brown, 1987; Gürsoy, 2010), try to figure out the reasons behind the military's popularity (Sarigil, 2009, Varoglu & Bicaksiz, 2005), consider the position and criticisms of the European Union (Greenwood, 2006; Güney & Karatekelioglu, 2005), correlate civil-military relations and democracy consolidation (Demirel, 2005; Gürsoy, 2008; Matos, 2013b; Satana, 2008), analyse the theory of civil-military relations *per se* (Burk, 2002; Schiff, 1995), etc.

Regarding Turkey-EU relations, Usul (2011: 144) recognises that “there has been an underdevelopment in studies that analyse the role of foreign factors on democratic consolidation in Turkey”. Even so, wide-ranging studies regarding this field can be found in the work of Düzgit & Keyman, 2007; Faucompret & Konings, 2008; Losano, 2009; Sarokhanian & Stivachtis, 2008; and Stivachtis, 2008. In this literature, it is possible to find, among others, the evolution of Turkey-EU relations since its beginning in the 1950s, the conundrums of those relations, some technical and procedural aspects of the accession process, the actors involved and comparisons with other previous candidates.

More specifically, the works of Düzgit & Keyman, (2007); and Faucompret & Konings (2008) consider the changes operated in Turkey caused within the framework of its accession to the EU and the application of the European criteria. Moreover, another abundant area of research is the question of identity and how the otherness of Turkey, societal perceptions, socio-cultural constraints, Islam, euro-scepticism, etc. can affect the process of membership. This problematic can be found in Akşit, *et al.* (2010); Çarkoğlu (2004); Cenker (2008); Duran (2004); Kuran-Burçoglu (2007); Onis (1999); Robins (1996); Spiering (2007); Tacar (2007).

Magen and Morlino published in 2009 a book entitled “International Actors, Democratization and the Rule of Law: Anchoring Democracy”. This commendable work constitutes an attempt to create a model that assesses the evolution of democracy in countries with different types of relations with the EU. The authors’ hypothesis was that autocracies have tended to transform themselves into hybrid regimes, mere electoral democracies, to avoid international stigma and criticism. Therefore, the editors proposed to study a specific dimension of democracy (what they call the “prima inter pares”): Rule of Law. But the evolution of this dimension, divided into five indicators to allow the comparison, had to be linked to the role of international actors. Magen and Morlino announced their position in relation to the old domestic/international debate, clarifying that the premises of their study and combining both Rationalist and Constructivist approaches, reached the eclectic middle ground of “democratic anchoring”. In other words, according to the authors’ views, there is an interaction between the two dimensions, but the international actors are constrained by the domestic context, the stage where everything happens, and dependent on domestic actors, which means that they cannot be perceived as independent variables in a country’s democratisation process; their actions as democracy promoters are limited by the internal context. Nevertheless, the international dimension is not disregarded. In fact, it is taken into consideration and conceived as an external “democracy anchoring”.

In order to assess its role and leverage power, the authors developed the EUCLIDA⁴ model that combined three layers of impact, cycles of change and other variables to apply to the five dimensions of the Rule of Law in a set of countries: Romania, Turkey, Ukraine and Serbia (each of the countries is at a different stage or type in its relationship with the EU). It is noteworthy that this model encompasses not only formal rule adoption, but also its implementation and internalisation, that, despite de difficulty to observe, were included in the scheme. In the same volume, Baracani makes a general overview of EU’s role as a democracy promoter, mainly in relation to the case studies encompassed in the book, and includes the institutional relations, financial assistance, socialisation through specific projects and even compares these with other international democracy promoters

Aydin and Çarkoğlu (2006), in the same line of reasoning of Magen and Morlino, state that reforms in Turkey cannot only be explained by external factors, but

⁴ EUCLIDA: EU Cycles and Layers of International Democratic Anchoring.

by their interaction with the domestic realm. Therefore, these authors analysed the role of domestic actors in Turkish democratisation, such as the AKP, civil society and the military. However, these authors also recognised that, despite Turkey's relations with various international organisations, "the EU is undoubtedly the most influential external actor" (Idem: 83), putting the responsibility of EU's success in the credibility and consistency of its conditionality process.

Kubicek (2005) studies the role of forces "from below", i.e., the author focuses on Turkey's civil society and political culture. His conclusion is that, although in the last decades Turkish civil society has been being reinforced, as well as the popular support for democracy, the EU-led changes are not a "revolution from below", but rather a set of reforms taken without public support. However, if that means the EU plays a major role in the country, it also raises doubts concerning the depth of those reforms. In the same line of thought, Amichai Magen (2004), in a 2004 paper, analyses the evolution of the consideration of the external factors in the democratisation process and seeks to understand how influent they were on Turkey's abolition of death penalty – mainly the EU. The study's conclusions point out that the changes are hardly the result of normative external pressure alone; the existence of real incentives, on the other hand, helps trigger the reforms and decrease the lack of motivation on the Turkish side, However, the EU is important to set the agenda and the pressure it puts on certain subjects usually leads to reforms that are undertaken without internal "genuine and legitimate" (Idem: 79) acceptance.

Tocci (2005) concluded from her study that the change process in Turkey is an endogenous one, but recognises that its timing is tightly linked to the accession process – sharing Magen's views regarding the power of the EU as an agenda settler. However, these changes are increasingly perceived as taken for Turkey's sake and not due to the process. Tocci believes that what the EU does is to give a "European twist" to the democratisation process of the country. Buhari (2009) adopts a very critical position towards the EU as a democracy promoter in Turkey, claiming (and trying to prove) that the studies that believe changes in the country would be impossible without the EU have several faults – they only adopt a top-down approach, they do not distinguish between policy adoption and implementation, they overlook EU's internal dynamics. Besides, Europeanisation studies in general have various shortcomings and the lack of a clear definition produces different "academic results".

McFaul (*et al.*, 2007) and his team share with Buhari the concerns over the shortcomings in the study of the international dimension. According to this paper, current works need to overcome the traditional domestic/international dichotomy and open up the research to an interdisciplinary approach; moreover, academics tend to focus on the democratisation efforts of individual countries (that are never alone in this task), even creating geographical and temporal fragmentation that create disconnecting findings. Besides, the authors point out the tendency to study successful cases and to mix explanations with different types of outcomes. Therefore, they propose an approach that takes into consideration the internal/external interactions, specifying the type of transition, including cases of success and failure, among other suggestions that aim to improve the quality of these studies.

More specifically about Turkey-EU relations, Kalaycıoğlu's (2011) opinion is that "it is also fair to argue at the same time that Turkey's relations with the EU have correlated with the country's democratic reform process" (Idem: 265). To reach this conclusion, the author analysed the Turkish Constitutional amendments between 1982 and 2009 and postulated that one should distinguish between two periods: 1993-2002 was marked by a multi-partisan approach to the reforms in the country; and since 2002, in which the AKP monopolising the project and ignoring the opposition's legislative initiatives. In a similar vein, Müftüler-Baç (2005) argued that Turkey's candidacy "has stimulated the Turkish political and legal reform and intensified the Europeanization project in Turkey" (Idem: 17). Therefore, this author attributed to the EU an effective leverage power over Turkey, based on the study of the political reforms between 2001 and 2004. Diez (2005), after warning about the existence of four different meanings of the concept of Europeanisation (and not only one as most academics treat it – policy, political, societal and discursive Europeanisation), shares the view that the European dimension has influenced Turkey's democratisation.

Similarly, Özbudun and Gençkaya's (2009) book links Turkish democratisation and Constitution-making. They analyse the Constitutional amendments achieved under the EU pressure and conclude that the Union is "a significant external actor that promotes democracy in Turkey" (Idem: 43). The authors scrutinise not only the Constitutional amendments, but also other legislative reforms, and devote particular attention to the impact of EU's conditionality on legislative change in Turkey. They assume the efforts to improve the country's legislation come from the European

Union's stimuli and from the internal demands of a society that looks for a more democratic regime.

As far as the main theme of this work is concerned – the influence of the European Union on the Turkish democratisation in the scope of the accession process –, there are three main works that come very close to it in terms of the subject they approach and that are, for that reason, analysed in detail: Açıkmese (2010), Börzel & Soyaltin (2012), Usul (2011). In common, these works have their recent publication – two of them were published after the beginning of this thesis – and the fact that they came to fulfil a gap in the literature. Despite some similarities, these pieces of academic literature also present several differences.

Beginning with the most recent, Börzel and Soyaltin (2012) wrote the paper “Europeanization in Turkey. Stretching a concept to its limits”⁵ using Turkey as a case study to understand the conditions for EU-induced domestic change, focusing on the Europeanisation process. The authors use the lens of rational choice and sociological institutionalism and claim that the conditions for domestic change are power asymmetries, regime type, domestic incentives and degrees of statehood. The conclusions point out that the *acquis* adoption in Turkey is selective, “decoupled from behavioural practices” and that domestic actors use the EU to legitimise their own political interests. Therefore, domestic change in Turkey is led by the domestic political agenda – there is a “Europeanisation *a la carte*” (Idem: 16).

On the other side, the central thesis of Açıkmese's (2010) “Cycles of Europeanization in Turkey: the domestic impact of the EU political conditionality” is that this mechanism alone cannot result in domestic change – only when combined with internal and external factors. The author presents a set of perspectives on Europeanisation (historical, anthropological, and economic) and sums up stating that it constitutes an interactive process of change and a synthesis of top-down and bottom-up approaches. However, real change involves the implementation, acceptance and internalisation of those changes, and the impact of EU conditionality has to be perceived through a set of mediating domestic and external factors, such as the costs of compliance, government's commitment, EU legitimacy, etc. Using this model, Açıkmese studies two periods of Europeanisation (1999-2005 and from 2005 onward)

⁵ As a working paper and for its nature and characteristics, this article cannot be compared to a thesis – the common point is the subject under consideration.

and concludes that the first period was the “golden-age” of Europeanisation in Turkey (mainly since 2002), due to several constitutional amendments, harmonisation packages and other changes prompted by a favourable domestic and international environment. However, since 2005, Açikmese claims that Europeanisation was reversed, again because of internal and external conditions that diminished the enthusiasm and the results in terms of domestic changes. The present thesis will reassess these questions and seek for its own conclusions that may, or may not, confirm Açikmese’s findings.

In a longer and more developed work, published as a book, Ali Usul (2011) analyses EU’s impact on Turkey democracy focusing on the conditionality process. After considering some theoretical concepts such as democracy, democratic consolidation and conditionality, the author divides Turkey-EU relations in two periods: pre and post-Helsinki, listing the reforms led by Turkey triggered by the influence and pressure of the EU.

In the first period, Usul concluded that the EU was not an anchor for Turkish democratisation due to the lack of response and feedback from the side of the Union. The Helsinki summit, however, was the turning point of this situation. Afterwards, in the second period (1999-2007), there was higher compliance with European standards, which ended up being used by political elite to legitimise the changes. The new status of Turkey as a candidate and the employment of mechanisms to assess its performance increased EU’s influence on the country. Nevertheless, that influence could have been stronger if there was a clear signal regarding the beginning of negotiations, if conditionality did not become harder with time and if some European politicians would not have questioned Turkey’s Europeaness and the country’s possibility to join the Union. These raised doubts and harmed the Turkish effort. Usul’s conclusions partially match the ones reached by Açikmese (2010) but a comparison between the two works has to take into consideration their different lengths and the researchers’ options concerning time limits and periods.

As it seems clear, this book touches some points that will be developed and matured in this work and some line are actually really close to this project. There are, in Usul’s book, very interesting points and approaches that this thesis does not ignore: it is a very good source of tertiary data and useful information or conclusions. For example, the analysis of democracy as a concept, the review of the existent literature on that field and the final conclusions constitute valuable arguments that will be presented at

opportune moments, enriching the discussion. Nonetheless, there are some differences that have to be highlighted.

First, the author opted for emphasising material objective aspects (“material and political incentives”) in a “logic of consequences”; as showed, the approach of this work recognises this side, but also values ideational aspects, such as identity and the meaning attached to those material realities. Second, the separation of the issues proposed may have created an over-partitioning of all the measures and changes and hence losing the bigger picture, i.e. a more holistic perspective. Third, and although the results of this research have not become known yet, it seems that Ali Usul expected too much from Turkey, considering that the EU failed because the country “has not been radically transformed” (Usul, 2011: 163). However, one should be aware of the complexity of processes such as Europeanisation; it takes time (and much time) to accept, adopt, implement and internalise a whole set of new values, beliefs and practices. Any radical transformation, besides the high probability of its immediate rejection, could jeopardise all the efforts made in the last decades and develop a “reform fatigue” that may be already occurring currently. Finally, Usul’s work provides neither the perspective nor the action of other international organisations in the country and they should be taken into consideration as they revealed themselves very useful as an “alarm bell”, as it will be showed later. Therefore, Ali Usul’s work of deepening the understanding on this subject proved to be very important, as the research on the topic had been clearly insufficient, and it constitutes another relevant contribution to the improvement of the knowledge and the enrichment of the related literature.

Thus, it became clear that this research area has been object of the academics’ attention in its diverse aspects. All the above mentioned studies contributed to the improvement of the comprehension of these questions and all of them constitute a solid base on which this work has been founded. In relation to them, this thesis has the advantage of being able to be inspired by a bigger amount of literature and to extend the study until the end of 2009, including some dynamics that occurred in the meanwhile. Moreover, it aims to fulfil the gaps that were mentioned in due course and to seek to clarify the greyer and blurred areas that divide the community and create difficulties in establishing theories widely accepted that consolidate and strengthen the knowledge about the subject.

3. Questions, objectives and concepts

Taking into consideration what was mentioned above, there is one major question that this work seeks to answer:

The European Union seeks to promote democratic transition and consolidation through its enlargement process; Turkey, as a candidate, has been required to improve its democracy. Therefore, in this context, which role has the EU played in Turkey's democratisation process?

This main question embraces the more important aspects this research pretends to cover and thus it includes a reference to the actors involved (European Union and Turkey) and the core dynamics under analysis (accession, democratisation and external influence). Moreover, several other subsidiary questions emerged when reading the literature in question. The function of those queries is also to pave the way to the final answers; they constitute guiding lines for the present research and the outline of this work respects this inquiry. Some of the questions are the following:

1. *What is the role of IR theories in research?* [Part I, Chapter 1]
 - 1.1. *What are the main assumptions of the most important IR theories?*
 - 1.2. *What does Constructivism propose at the epistemological, ontological and methodological levels?*
2. *What are Constructivism's main contributions to the thesis?* [Part I, Chapter 2]
 - 2.1. *What are Constructivism's main contributions to European integration?*
 - 2.2. *What do substantive theories of European integration propose?*
 - 2.3. *What are Constructivism's main contributions to Turkey-EU relations?*
3. *What is democracy?* [Part II, Chapter 3]
 - 3.1. *What is democracy transition? And democracy consolidation?*
 - 3.2. *What is the difference between transition and consolidation?*
 - 3.3. *How can democracy be measured?*

4. *How does the European Union promote democracy abroad?* [Part II, Chapter 4]
 - 4.1. *What is the importance of democracy for the European Union?*
 - 4.2. *What is the role of the accession process in promoting democracy abroad?*
 - 4.3. *How do Europeanisation and conditionality work?*
5. *How can EU's democracy promotion be assessed?* [Part II, Chapter 5]
 - 5.1. *What variables need to be considered?*
 - 5.2. *What are the main methodological concerns to take into account?*
6. *How has Turkey's state evolved since the Ottoman Empire?* [Part III, Chapter 6]
 - 6.1. *What have been the main changes of Turkish society?*
7. *How has Turkey's relationship with West evolved since the Ottoman Empire era?* [Part III, Chapter 7]
 - 7.1. *How have Turkey and the West related to each other?*
 - 7.2. *How were the beginnings of Turkey-EU relations?*
8. *What are Turkey's social and cultural characteristics?* [Part III, Chapter 8]
 - 8.1. *What is the role of identity?*
 - 8.2. *What are Turkey's current main social, cultural and political issues?*
 - 8.3. *What is Turkish political cultural like?*
9. *How have Turkey – EU relations evolved since 1999?* [Part IV, Chapter 9]
 - 9.1. *Which legislative changes have been accomplished since 1999?*
10. *How has the model to assess EU's influence on Turkey been built?* [Part IV, Chapter 10]
 - 10.1. *How has Turkey's democracy evolved from 1999 to 2009?*
 - 10.2. *How have the independent variables evolved from 1999 to 2009?*
11. *How co-related are Turkish democratic performance and the independent variables?* [Part IV, Ch. 11]
 - 11.1. *What may the results epitomise in terms of the EU's role on Turkish democratisation?*
 - 11.2. *What are the most and the least important factors for the consolidation of Turkish democracy?*
 - 11.3. *What lessons can be drawn from these results?*

As a consequence, many research objectives come out as well with the same function of leading this research and targeting it towards the final aim of bringing new answers or supporting existing ones. The research objectives of this thesis are the following:

- To understand Constructivism's main ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions [Part I, Ch. 1];
- To present the main aspects of the inter-paradigmatic debate [Part I, Ch. 1];
- To analyse the research problem under the Constructivist perspective, introducing concepts used by this theory, such as identity, socialisation and norms [Part I, Ch. 2];
- To define and operationalise key-concepts, such as 'democracy', 'transition' and 'consolidation' [Part II, Ch. 3];
- To analyse the evolution of democracy as a central value for the European Union [Part II, Ch. 4];
- To understand the functioning of external democracy promotion [Part II, Ch. 4];
- To explain EU's enlargement policy and its relation with democracy promotion [Part II, Ch. 4];
- To understand the dynamics of mechanisms and processes involved in democracy promotion by the EU, such as Europeanisation and conditionality [Part II, Ch. 4];
- To create a model that seeks to assess EU's action as a democracy promoter [Part II, Ch. 5];
- To explore Turkey's historical, cultural, political and philosophical background [Part III, Ch. 6, 7 and 8];
- To describe the recent history of Turkey [Part III, Ch. 6];
- To understand Turkey's approach to Europe [Part III, Ch. 7];
- To describe the characteristics and dynamics of the Turkish society (identity, representations, values, beliefs, culture, etc.) [Part III, Ch. 8];
- To analyse the history of Turkey-EU relations prior to 1999 [Part III, Ch. 7];
- To analyse the history of Turkey-EU relations since 1999 [Part IV, Ch. 9];
- To assess the evolution of Turkey's democracy according to different sources [Part IV, Ch. 10];
- To correlate Turkey-EU relations with different phases of europeanisation/ domestic change [Part IV, Ch. 11];

- To understand EU's influence on the Turkish democratisation process [Part IV, Ch. 11];
- To recognise the strengths and weaknesses of EU's mechanisms of democracy promotion in Turkey [Part IV, Ch. 11].

Regarding concepts, these are, as Blaikie wrote (2001: 129), the “building blocks” of social theories. And, according to the same author, there are four traditions regarding the use of concepts in Social Sciences. In harmony with our research project, both the operationalisation and hermeneutical traditions fit our purposes.

Following the first one, the concepts are defined and transformed into measurable variables. This approach aims to reach a considerable level of accuracy and replicability. Variables are conceptualised and operationalised through their identification, establishing relations, hypotheses, specifying measurement procedures, indicators, and so on. This tradition is, understandably, criticised by the fact that it assumes that a limited number of selected values reflect all the aspects, ignoring the interpretation of those values and data. Therefore, the hermeneutical tradition is eclectically used, putting more emphasis on the interpretative process. For this approach, researchers constitute a mediator between daily language and the Social Sciences' technical language. This bottom-up approach implies, more than a translation, an interpretation of the gathered data, capturing people's concepts and their meanings: “the social actors have to teach the researcher how they understand their world, i.e. what everyday concepts and interpretations (lay theories) they use to make sense of it.” (Idem: 139).

As usual, these concepts have to be displayed in theories or theoretical assumptions that relate them, in order to reach the answer to the central problem. Our theory development is based on the “researcher's theory” type (Idem), according to which the researcher uses the theory as a source of hypotheses to be tested, usually including a set of connected statements about the relations between concepts, with a certain degree of generalisation and possibly empirically testable.

In this sense, the central concepts for this project are the following: conditionality; democracy; democratic transition and consolidation; enlargement/accession; Europeanisation; identity; perception; socialisation.

4. Research strategies: methodology, sources and investigation cycle

From the four options of research strategies (induction, deduction, retroduction and abduction) Blaikie (2001) presents in his book on social research, this study will adopt two of them: *deductive* and *abductive*.

The European Union is considered to be a regional power that promotes democracy in third countries worldwide – it is, as matter of fact, one of the main objectives of its Foreign Policy. This is the central assumption that will lead this work to the analysis of a specific case: Turkey. This case study will provide the arguments to support or refute that main assumption, in a deductive manner. In other words, the goal is to confirm if the general theory that states that the EU effectively promotes democracy among candidate countries is correct in this particular case. In this case, data will be gathered not simply to accumulate knowledge, but to test the theory. This is the logic of a deductive case study:

“The analyst begins with a theory, uses it to interpret a case, and simultaneously utilizes the case to suggest important refinements in the theory, which can then be tested on other cases or perhaps even on other aspects of the same case.” (Levy, 2002: 136)

It is this perspective that will take us to the already stated objective of measuring democracy and democracy quality, as well as to use quantitative data and statistical analysis, for instance, in order to evaluate the evolution in time and the path of Turkish democracy, having always in mind the presence of the Union in the process. Other methodologies will be used too, namely qualitative ones.

Nevertheless, apart from this side of the analysis, it matters to understand not only the formal aspects of EU’s influence on Turkish democracy, but also the population’s perception in relation to democracy and European Union itself. It is precisely at this point of the investigation that concepts like identity and perception will take the lead, as it is sought to find out and to describe an internal vision of the problem and not only imposing an external one – discourse analysis and interviews, together with other mainly qualitative tools will be used here in the scope of an abductive research strategy – our second choice. Once statistical patterns and correlations are not understandable *per se*, it is necessary to discover the meanings and motives people give their own actions, reinforcing and consolidating the conclusions. As Blaikie (2001: 115) writes:

“Interpretive social science seeks to discover why people do what they do by uncovering the largely tacit, mutual knowledge, the symbolic

meanings, motives and rules, which provide the orientations for their actions.”

It is this research strategy that meets the ‘intersubjectivity’ concept that constitutes one of the cornerstones in the Constructivist reasoning:

“Members of a particular group or society share common meanings and interpretations, and they maintain them through their ongoing interaction together. Therefore, social explanations need to go beyond the specific meanings that a social actor gives to his/her actions and needs to deal with typical meanings produced by typical social actors. This involves the use of approximations and abstractions.” (Idem: 115).

In this sense, it is found a close connection between the Constructivist thought and the principles of the abductive research strategy.

Thus, bringing together these two research strategies, this work is pretended to reach the explanations, predictions and evaluations allowed by the deductive thought, at the same time abduction permits the exploration, description and understanding of the problem.

In terms of data sources and types, this research will include primary, secondary and tertiary data: primary data in the form of interviews and official documents; secondary data will consist of statistics and other figures presented by institutions; and finally, tertiary data will be based on other authors’ contributions.

Both quantitative and qualitative research strategies will be used, as already mentioned. The analysis of numerical data (like indexes, evaluations and other scores from international institutions that provide information on democracy or any of its components) is included in the first type of data collecting. This kind of figures will be transformed into scales and indices, used to build graphs and to provide information for further understanding of the reality in question.

Focused and in-depth interviews and content analysis are two examples of qualitative data whose results are to be carefully analysed so that it is possible to describe, associate and categorise the information and reach the project’s research objectives.

As mentioned above, one of the tools used to pursue the objectives of this thesis was interviewing. The reasons behind this choice are various, but interconnected. First of all, collecting data through interviews is a way of bringing new information and perspectives to the study. Not only that: data collected represents the vision of insiders, that is, the perceptions of Turks that are either somehow more directly related to the

process of democratisation or are affected by it. This is one of the most important reasons why interviewing was chosen – it aims to “understand the meaning of the phenomenon under analysis in the way it is perceived by the participants” (Savoie-Zajc, 2003: 279). More than recognising the “reform fatigue” caused by a long accession process, it matters to listen to those that feel the lack of motivation and the frustration for working with the EU in a daily basis.

Theoretically speaking, opting for interviewing as one of the research methods implies sharing a set of assumptions. As Warren (2002: 83) wrote, it is a more constructionist than a positivist approach that regards participants not as “passive conduits of information”, but “meaning makers”. Therefore, the aim of the interviews was “to derive interpretation, not facts or laws, from respondent talk” (Idem: 83). In this context, Foucault’s conception of discourse as something that overcomes mere speaking emerges; it constitutes a social practice itself (Iñiguez, 2004: 90). Again, this implies another previous assumption: language is more than a representation of reality; in fact, it constructs reality itself or, as Ibáñez (2004: 33) stated, it “makes realities” and, when something is said, “there is always a sense that goes beyond the meaning those words convey” (Iñiguez, 2004: 64), which is part of the phenomena under scrutiny. There is, Part I presents, some significant Constructivist proposals about the role of language and its meaning for reality and research.

Thus, and having these and other authors in mind, interviewing was a research option that sought to enrich the thesis. The interviews were conducted during the visits to Turkey. The first set of inquiries was done in Istanbul in April 2013 and the second round was conducted in Ankara in May 2013. On the European side, a stay in Brussels (March 2013) allowed the conduction of brief interviews (or rather almost informal conversations) with officials working at the European Commission who used to deal with the Turkish accession process. However, as these interviews have not been recorded and as the interviewees asked for anonymity, their content is only used in very specific contexts and in broad lines. There was also another interview to the Turkish Ambassador in Lisbon, in March 2013. The planning of the interviews took into consideration the suggestions given by the relevant literature on the subject and they were conducted in the institutions of the interviewees for about an hour each. The selection of the interviewees was based on their distribution among four groups: Turkish academic elite; Turkish political elite; Turkish civil society representatives and EU representatives in Turkey.

Concerning the first group, interviews had been led to several academics from the University of Ankara, Fatih University and METU and focused on their academic vision as regards the general subject of Turkey-EU relations and more specific questions about the EU's influence on the country. The Turkish political elite's group embraced diplomats and officials from the Ministry for EU Affairs; finally, the representatives of civil society came from different types of organisations: a Business Editor from a media group; a member of the Journalists and Writers Foundation and a coordinator of a women's rights NGO⁶. The visions of these interviewees helped the reinforcement of some arguments; they provided fresh and different opinions on the subject and all of them have positively contributed to the improvement of this thesis – they revealed their perspectives, their interpretation of the events and offered some real examples to support their discourse.


Yet, qualitative interviews were not the only method used to gather data. In fact, a very brief on-line survey has been made and asked to be answered by Turks⁷. The objective of this approach was not to introduce a representative study on how some people perceived the role of the European Union on their country (or on the country they, as researchers, were studying). The results from this survey will only be used to support or weaken other arguments and hypotheses; it matters, most of all, to realise whether different types of individuals and their occupation (as academics, university students, government officials, etc.) see the EU differently and whether there is a consensus regarding this organisation's contribution to the improvement of the Turkish democracy.

As a conclusion, these research steps are schematised below (Figure 1):

⁶ More details on the interviews can be found on Appendix 1, Table 1 (page 391).

⁷ Appendix 2 (Figures 2 to 6) provides the characterisation of the respondents at various levels (geographical origin, education, age, etc.).

Figure 1: Research strategies



Source: Adapted from Blaikie, 2001: 158

5. Thesis outline

Taking into consideration the problem, questions and objectives delineated for this work, its structure was developed around four main parts, each of them divided into chapters and sub-chapters. Part I, *Constructivism and the inter-paradigmatic debate*, constitutes an attempt to contextualise the subject in the light of International Relations theories, which are known for embracing a very active and dynamic debate. In this sense, the main tenets of Social Constructivism are analysed, as well as some of the divergences within the Constructivist group (Chapter 1). At the same time, this approach will be compared to other theoretical proposals, like Realism and Liberalism. In the end of the first part, the theoretical considerations earlier analysed are linked to the subjects under study (Chapter 2).

In Part II, *Democracy and the European Union*, theoretical considerations regarding the concept of ‘democracy’ are made, in order to clarify its definition and utilisation in the present context. Many authors’ contributions are taken into account to achieve the most comprehensive definition that will guide the rest of the thesis. The same happens with the reflection upon the concepts of ‘transition’ and ‘consolidation’, whose boundaries are rather blurred, harming the academic work (Chapter 3). After the definition of these initial assumptions, some thoughts are devoted to the possibility of measuring democracy – one of the objectives of this thesis. As a matter of fact, matching a good definition with the best operationalisation possibility is one of the key elements of the work, given the fact that it will provide the tools needed to achieve its main objectives (Chapter 5). Besides, the European Union will be studied in the context of democracy promotion – how important this value is for the EU and how it promotes democracy abroad are two questions to be developed on chapter 4, as well as the investigation of the accession process and the mechanisms of conditionality and Europeanisation involved. The model that resulted from the operationalisation of the concept of ‘democracy’ and that will be applied to the Turkish case is presented on chapter 5, together with some important considerations regarding this conceptualisation.

Part III, *The case study: Turkey*, encompasses a wide approach to this country: Chapter 6 is a brief survey on the Turkish history since the Ottoman Empire until the 2000s, with a special emphasis on construction and consolidation of Modern Turkey and on Mustafa Kemal’s action and the first steps of the Turkish democracy. On chapter 7, it is possible to find the country’s history *vis-à-vis* its relations with the Western world – mainly Europe and the European Union (until 1999). The socio-cultural profile of the country is outlined in the following section (Chapter 8) and provides a set of information and interpretation of some features of both the country and its population. It is important to understand here what is Turks’ mindset like, how their identity has been interpreted and re-interpreted in time, their views on many important subjects - their integration in the European Union, the way they perceive their democracy, the relation with the military, the role of Islam, etc. The contextualisation provided by this third part is of utmost importance because it is only through it that it is possible to understand some fundamental dynamics.

Finally, Part IV is *Bringing everything together: EU, Turkey and democracy*. Therefore, it will be in this last section that all the components of this thesis will after

all meet and intersect with the aim of finding answers for our initial questions and doubts. The history of Turkey-EU relations since 1999 will bring the moments of change induced by the EU and the Turkish reaction to those requirements (Chapter 9), the model created and presented previously will be further explained and applied on chapter 10 and in the end Chapter 11 will embrace the interpretation and final results of all the process. It is part of the plan to find answers to the questions raised initially, to look again at the hypotheses proposed and ultimately to come to important conclusions regarding the initial theory.

PART I – IR, CONSTRUCTIVISM AND THE INTER- PARADIGMATIC DEBATE

1. International Relations and the theoretical debate

1.1. Acknowledging a reality, building a science

Relations between states are not a recent phenomenon. Batistella (2006: 21) traces back to the seventeenth century the birth of a real international system; real in the sense that only then were the interactions between sovereign states “sufficiently regular so that the behaviour of each and all of them would be a necessary factor” to take into consideration when studying one’s behaviour (Idem). This international dimension was further consolidated with the Treaties of Westphalia which politically organised the European societies and emphasised the principles of both internal and external sovereignty (Idem: 22). From that moment onwards, interactions at the international level have grown: trade, politics, diplomacy, war and peace were some of the domains in which this increasing exchange between states has been noticed. In fact, interactions were intense enough to trigger the First World War some centuries later.

After the War, in 1919, the discipline of International Relations (IR) was created at the University of Wales in Aberystwyth, as an attempt to assemble a corpus of knowledge that would contribute to prevent atrocities like the ones experienced in the recent war. The emergence of IR within this context supports Schmidt’s (2005: 4) argument that important developments in international politics shape the evolution of IR as a science. However, Schmidt (Idem) also warns about the more complex and less known history of the discipline; according to him, the contribution of several authors have been erased from the memory of theorists and sometimes contemporary approaches are the repetition of past discourses.⁸

Although the discipline was formed in the early twentieth century, its autonomy from other fields has been questioned ever since (Idem: 5). As a matter of fact, various other sciences dealt partially with what would have become International Relations’

⁸ The historiography of IR exceeds the scope of this thesis and cannot be developed here. For further details, cf. Schmidt, 2005.

object: International Law, Diplomatic History, Geography, Anthropology, etc. But IR emerged with a transdisciplinary character and as a means to build a coherent body of knowledge, synthesising the other disciplines. Yet, and although in the UK it has been created as an independent field, American IR have been developed under the scope of Political Science (Idem: 6).

As Batistella (2006: 15-15) explains, IR's object of study is widely accepted either; on the contrary, it is quite controversial, mainly due to philosophical considerations about science. The international (or global) phenomena are not reproducible in a lab and therefore cannot be considered irrefutable. These assumptions are based on the belief that social sciences should follow the model of exact or natural sciences, even though their objects of study represent completely different phenomena. But the point here is that not only scientists outside IR think like that; there are internationalists who conceive IR in that way, supporting one of the several divisions within International Relations. The lack of unity of this discipline is also another matter for concern when trying to prove its autonomous status. On the other hand, however, it is due to these major inter-paradigmatic debates that this so recent discipline has been able to mature its assumptions and to develop the body of knowledge it is already able to provide in less than a century of existence. Schmidt (2005: 15) recognises that these debates contributed not only to the consolidation of the intellectual autonomy of the science, but also to the split between political theory and the theories of IR.

Since the beginning of IR, theorists started to establish their own paradigms (Idem: 9). Idealism was the first approach to the discipline, the one that emerged in-between the two world wars. The first grand debate of IR was exactly between Idealism and Realism (defined by many as the "traditional paradigm" and created after the II World War) (Idem). This opposition was unavoidable since "the central features [of Idealism] are the exact antithesis of the tenets attributed to Realism" (Idem: 10): the former sought to build institutions that would prevent war and the latter focused on states as "power-maximiser" actors.⁹ The second debate was influenced by the behaviourist turn in other Social Sciences and was based on methodological issues that opposed traditionalists and behaviourists (Kurki & Wight, 2010: 18; Schmidt, 2005: 11). The latter were against a historicist and interpretive approach in IR; on the contrary, they supported Positivism in the sense that only observable data would allow its

⁹ Further details on these theories will be provided later on the chapter.

collection and the subsequent disclosure of patterns that, in turn, would allow the discovery of laws. They would even criticise the realists for not adopting measurable core concepts that would bring a scientific character to their theories (Kurki & Wight, 2010: 18). Morton Kaplan was on the positivist side (Schmidt, 2005: 11), while Hedley Bull and Morgenthau argued that the study of IR, on the contrary, “involved significant conceptual and interpretative judgements” (Kurki & Wight, 2010: 19). Kurki and Wight (Idem) concluded that behaviourism has lost its impetus in IR theory; yet, it left enduring principles still nowadays reflected in the emphasis put on hypothesis testing, statistical analysis and data manipulation as very common and widespread practices.

Finally, concerning the third debate, opinions diverge. Schmidt (2005: 11) quotes the literature that conceives the third debate as the opposition between realists, structuralists and pluralists. In this trend, Realism began to be questioned and alternatives criticising its premises arose. Kurki and Wight (2010: 19-20) adopted a different perspective: a third debate occurred in the 70s and 80s and was based on theory choice questions (since paradigms cannot be compared, which one to choose?). As Realism, Marxism and Pluralism were incommensurable, “theory choice became largely a matter of aesthetics” (Idem: 20). From the mid-1980s onwards, the debate was, in fact, several “sub-debates”: explaining *vs.* understanding; Positivism *vs.* Postpositivism; and rationalism *vs.* reflectivism (Idem: 20-25).

The first sub-debate opposes a “scientific” and an “interpretive/hermeneutic” approach. The dilemma a researcher faces in this regard is whether to choose or to follow the model and methods of natural sciences (interpretation is not able to be included within a scientific framework, as it implies empirical¹⁰ justification) or to focus on internal aspects that require their interpretation, such as beliefs, measures and reasons (Idem: 21, 22).

Another choice an IR theorist is faced with is between Positivism and Postpositivism. Postpositivism, as mentioned, values systematic observation and collection of data. It is important to safeguard, nevertheless, that positivists do not have necessarily to be empiricists. On the other side, postpositivists cannot be said to constitute a group *per se*; in fact, they share the rejection of Positivism to study social processes, but they subscribe to a wide variety of intellectual traditions (Idem: 22-23).

¹⁰ Empiricist epistemology supports that valid knowledge is built from facts experienced by human senses.

Accepting the importance of meaning, beliefs and language, they are automatically in line with the interpretive approach, the best way to “uncov[er] the deep meanings that exist beneath the surface appearance of observed reality” (Idem: 24).

Rationalism and reflectivism are two concepts used by Keohane in 1988 to represent a theoretical debate that was taking place: rationalism was methodologically linked to Positivism and regarded individuals as utility maximisers, whose social dimension was ignored by a deductive strategy that sought for universal laws; reflectivism was pointed out as having rejected Positivism and emphasising reflexivity. Nonetheless, reflectivists were criticised by the same internationalist for not presenting a coherent research programme (Idem: 24, 25). In truth, more than two decades have passed since this criticism and reflectivists (organised in several schools) have started to present theoretical proposals and to make important contributions to IR – one just needs to consider the growth of Feminist School, the Green Theory or, more significantly, Constructivism. This fourth debate can, therefore, be summarised under these two concepts: rationalism and reflectivism. They are the most abstract denominations between which all theoretical discussions have taken place over the past two decades. In fact, Fearon and Wendt (2005: 52) highlight that both rationalism and Constructivism should be “viewed *pragmatically* as analytical tools, rather than as (...) empirical descriptions of the world”. This implies that neither one nor the other can be regarded as substantive theories of IR; on the contrary, they may be seen as meta-theories.

Meta-theories make general ontological, epistemological and methodological proposals (Segbers, *et al.*, 2006: 11) and, through those assumptions, they guide how researchers see the world and theorise it (Kurki & Wight, 2010: 15). For example, rationalism has an individualist ontology, while Constructivism prefers a social (holist) ontology (Fierke, 2010: 180,181). These positions bring effective consequences for the research activity – whether the individual is the centre of the research as the unit of analysis (and ‘individual’ here can also mean ‘state’) or he needs to be framed within a broader social context and, in that case, the environment has to be taken into consideration as well, shifting the focus of attention. Other differences between both meta-theories will certainly become clearer when the Constructivist premises are presented later on. However, it is worth emphasising that both contribute to IR indirectly; substantive theories play a more direct role and are based on meta-theories,

although they cannot be “read off of it” (Wendt, 1999: 6).

As Finnemore and Sikkink (2001: 393) confirm, Constructivism has a different level of abstraction than the one of theories like Realism or Liberalism, for example, and, since it is based upon the Social Theory, it “offers a framework for thinking about the nature of social life and social interaction, but makes no claims about their specific content”. Wendt (1999: 7) had already stated that “Constructivism is not a theory of international politics. Constructivist sensibilities encourage us to look at how actors are socially constructed, but they do not tell us which actors to study”.

As mentioned above, Rationalism follows an individualist ontology, a kind of reductionist approach that stresses smaller composing elements rather than the whole system. Besides, for rationalists, actors are pre-social beings and the only role the environment plays is to constrain the action of those same actors, who are perceived as followers of the logic of consequences (Barnett, 2008: 167) – individuals, thus, are “self-interested utility maximizers” (Guzzini, 2000: 163) and choose rationally based on a (rational) ranking of preferences, which eases the deduction of their behaviour, since their preferences are acknowledged (Idem: 163). Truth is, therefore, possible to be achieved through scientific methods of observation that allow the establishment of causal links. These premises certainly inspired theories such as Neo-realism and are tightly related to Positivism – hence its distance from the post-positivist schools of thought.

Positivism, similarly, recognises that reality is exogenous to the scientific endeavour, but that it is not impossible to be grasped through the correct methods of investigation; through Rational Choice, for instance, all elements can be described and analysed and although the output of actors’ behaviour may not necessarily be wise, the input that originated it was rational, because the principles behind the decision-making process are based on their own roadmap, which allows their analysis and subsequent predictability (Segbers, *et al.*, 2006: 8, 9). Empirical data about reality can be, according to positivists, extracted through operationalisation (Behnke, 2006: 52) and knowledge arises from gathering observable data that is, in its turn, transformed into patterns and subsequent laws (Kurki & Wight, 2010: 18). This is not something unexpected for a researcher, but the difference from pos-positivists, for example, lies in the fact that the latter consider data the very reality; rather than representative of a reality, data (in the form of discourses and narratives) is “productive of that reality” (Behnke, 2006: 52).

In fact, both within the rationalist and reflectivist or positivist and post-positivist fields, it is possible to find some theories that, based on those meta-theories, draw more specific considerations about international relations. Idealism was the first and inspired the creation of the discipline, but Realism followed it and gained a great importance in IR theoretical debate. Others made their contribution as well, strengthening IR maturity and widening its answers (sometimes too broadly to be considered one single discipline or science).

Thus, along the axis whose extremes are constituted by the concepts of Rationalism and Reflectivism, a wide variety of ontological, epistemological and methodological assumptions are discussed and negotiated, fulfilling that line with various options for all IR researchers to be able to frame or contextualise their investigation, because, as Sørensen (2008: 5) wrote, “since facts do not speak for themselves, theories are necessary in the discipline of International Relations (...), in order to structure our view of the world”. Segbers, *et al.* (2006: 5) go further on this consideration and argue that even if the researcher is not aware of IR theories, it is not possible to produce knowledge without them, as they constitute general assumptions about the reality one is trying to produce theoretical knowledge about.

Yet, when reflecting upon the current state of theoretical debates, Wæver (2010: 311) stated the following:

“The [IR academic] journals do not want to publish new theories all the time – the disciplinary rationality is that we should have a relatively limited set of theories (produced by the scholars at the top of the pyramid), and then others are supposed to use, test, and modify mildly. (...) Today, articles use lots of theory, and apply or test it – only it is not *IR*¹¹ theory! The IR theory map lurks in the background as meta-references, but the operative theory in a typical *IO* article is a branch of sociological Institutionalism, then a theory from economics, and then an ad hoc home-made model of norms or institution building”.

These considerations are worth being taken into account. Although meta-references are present (and this applies to this thesis), there are room for manoeuvre in terms of combining different perspectives and (hopefully) producing innovative accounts on such a complex and dynamic reality that is the one analysed by the International Relations discipline. Thus, and as it will be explained in the next chapter,

¹¹ *IR* in this context signifies the academic journal “International Relations” and not the discipline. Similarly, below, *IO* signifies the journal “International Organization” and not the institutions.

this thesis combines Constructivism with Sociological Institutionalism, and not only uses postpositivist methodologies, but also some more traditional ones, such as data manipulation and statistical analysis. In an article in which the authors sought to combine Rationalism and Constructivism and show that these two conceptions may have some common points, Fearon and Wendt wrote that “there may be much to be gained by using the tools of one to try to answer the questions that tend to be asked primarily by the other. Such cross-paradigmatic exchange (...) is (...) the most fruitful way to advance”. Yet, as it will be shown, not all constructivists (and rationalists, probably) agree with this eclecticism.

1.2. IR theories: several options

This section does not pretend to provide a complete guide through all the theories of IR available to a researcher or student of the discipline. In point of fact, it pretends to formulate very briefly some of the main arguments of a couple of schools of thought, as well as to justify why those proposals were not selected for this thesis. Another important disclaimer at this level is that the choice of Constructivism to guide this work does not constitute a militant position for this theory (or meta-theory) and a stance against all the others. As mentioned above, researchers are given room of manoeuvre to choose the best theory that fits their purposes in terms of investigation given the subject they select or even the objectives they have in mind – improving knowledge and diffusing it among the academic peers is different from intervening politically and influencing the decision-making policies; although possibly complementary, these rationales are not commonly conjugated and they may entail different theoretical approaches too.

Idealism was the first grand theory of IR. Although Cravinho (2002: 107) recognises that it is reductionist to call the set of intellectuals that devoted their research to IR between the two world wars ‘idealists’ for they were too diverse, the fact is that this school was named like that because there was a strong commitment by the intellectuals to “understand and influence” (Idem: 108) the changes at the international level. Norma Angell (Nobel Peace Prize in 1933), in her IR best-seller “The Great

Illusion”¹², argued that the changes the world was experiencing reshaped the way the objectives of war were able to be achieved; in other words, Angell believed that the use of force was not an effective way to reach those objectives anymore and that, therefore, it would be necessary to focus the efforts on an internationalist education and on the development of pacifist techniques of conflict resolution (Idem: 110). Due to this normative and idealist approach, the first generation of IR intellectuals have been regarded as the followers of a “nice but absolutely naïve” Idealism (Idem: 108).

Batistella (2006: 155), despite de considerations of the previous author about the lack of a common ground among all idealists, puts forward some fundamental principles of this school, such as the belief in the progress and the equality of all individuals; they emphasised cooperation, the existence of an international community and believed that there would not be social or political obstacles to a rational external policy (Idem: 156). In 1918, Woodrow Wilson’s speech originated the creation and development of the liberal idealist approach that stressed its pacifist tenets, the belief in human kindness and the need to institutionalise the international society to eliminate anarchy, war and injustice (Idem: 158, 159). Based on the Kantian thesis, liberal idealists supported the theory of democratic peace and favoured the creation of the Society of Nations, emphasising the importance of civic education and interdependence (Idem: 164-168).

Andrew Moravcsik, influenced by Locke, reinforces the role of individual Liberalism by postulating that the state simply represents the individual at the international scene – it is not the main actor, it is not the only actor and it is not a unitary actor (Idem: 176). In this sense, Moravcsik moves away from the state-centric version of Liberalism of Hedley Bull (follower of the English School, the first variant of the modern Liberalism) (Idem: 157, 171). In fact, these represent Idealism’s evolution towards Liberalism; the latter denied Idealism’s normative character and the privilege of the institutional dimension (Idem: 157), even though the promotion of peace (and democracy) remained as a central principle of Liberalism, since it was a major condition for trade.

Idealism and Liberalism do not constitute, given the above presented characteristics, the most suitable theories for dealing with the subject under consideration in this thesis. In fact, and when dealing with Turkey-EU relations and the democratisation of this candidate country, Liberalism would emphasise the role played

¹² This book was originally published in 1909 and sold 2 million copies (Cravinho, 2002: 110).

by the economic dimension in the development or improvement of Turkey's democracy and would, as well, base all the interest of the Turks concerning the accession on its material (economic) dimension. From our perspective, that seems reductionist; a wide variety of other variables need to be taken into consideration when analysing these relations: their historical tradition and context, the socio-cultural profile of the country and of the organisation, their mutual need for adaptation, etc. Democracy is a major value for Liberalism, but not in the way it is used here. Besides, Idealism has long been discredited as a theory of IR *per se*. It does not mean that it does not constitute a valuable "lens" to look at reality and to provide the enthusiasm for any researcher to pursue with a pacifist agenda of an institutionalised world; however, the construction of an interdependent world (which it already is these days) is not necessarily synonym with peace or mutual understanding; it goes beyond that and implies the actors' perceptions on each other's attitudes and behaviours.

Yet, the major rupture with Idealism was made by realists. As the denomination itself reveals, realists did not share the utopian side of the existing trend and proposed a different (sometimes opposing) view on the international reality. One major point of contend is the belief in human nature: idealists trust in the possibility of change (or improvement) of human behaviour, as long as the external conditions it is embedded in are changed. Following that reasoning, the highest thoughts of humans are of peace and international institutions should listen to that and represent that (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 2003: 82, 83). On the other hand, realists underline power and interests instead of ideals; Realism is "essentially conservative, empirical, prudent, suspicious of idealist's principles and respects the lessons of history" (Idem: 84). Through this description, it is easy to realise how far these two conceptions were and are from each other. As the same authors continue, power is the central concept of Realism and it adheres to a more pessimistic rather than optimistic vision; hence its criticism regarding idealists' visionary objectives instead of a scientific analysis (Idem: 84). Carr wrote that "the most profound meaning of the contemporary international crisis [between the two world wars] is the collapse of all utopian structure based in the concept of the harmony of interests" (Carr *cited in* Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 2003: 84). This debate was extended to neo-realists and neo-liberals. At this new level, the disagreement between both does not lie on the recognition of the existence of anarchy (which the two did), but on its meaning and implications, as well as on the capacity of international

organisations to overcome the anarchical structure of the international system (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 2003: 85).

This leads to the main principals and assumptions of one of the most influential theories in IR: Realism. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr. (2003: 87) trace Realism back to the Ancient World and Thucydides' considerations regarding war and power; they quote major names of the Philosophical thought like Machiavelli, Hobbes, Hegel and Weber, who are said to have contributed (indirectly, through their intellectual productions on several subjects) to the consolidation of the realist perspective (Idem: 87-89).

After the Second World War, Realism became the dominant paradigm of International Relations (Batistella, 2006: 113). Some of the arguments of this theory have already been disclosed in the previous pages, but a more systematic presentation of this approach is needed to understand why it has not been used as the main orientation for the development of this work either. One of the first concepts that may be associated with Realism is anarchy. For realists, the international system constitutes a set of individual states (independent political units) that co-habit in an anarchic environment due to the lack of a central authority accepted by all (Sørensen, 2008: 6). Hence, as there is no central authority capable of preventing armed conflicts, the "natural" state of the international system is at war (which is a legitimate means of conducting foreign policy). As Waltz wrote (*cited in* Batistella, 2006: 129), "war exists because nothing prevents it", implying that the state of peace that some countries may experience is nothing more than a (more or less enduring) break in the violence between states (Batistella, 2006: 496).

This topic leads to other central tenets of Realism, namely state-centrism. For this school, states are the main actors of international politics. In fact, states' agency is so emphasised by realists that even international organisations are not regarded as actors since they are only able to exert some influence through states, according to this vision (Idem: 114, 115). Behind this conception, in fact, there are two very relevant assumptions. The first is rationality: states, seen as the only actors, are perceived to act rationally, since they are led by a representative whose main concern is to maximise the national interest (defined in terms of power). This individual, responsible for important decision-making processes at the external level, behaves rationally too and, weighing the alternatives, objectives and interests, makes the decision guaranteeing the maximisation of the advantages and minimising the disadvantages (Batistella, 2006:

114, 115, 325-328). This Machiavellian approach also discloses the conception that clearly divides and separates foreign policy from domestic policy – the former is high politics, whereas the latter is low politics; in that sense, public opinion is an obstacle to diplomacy due to the importance given to the internal factors, but also due to its unpredictability, incoherence and instability (Idem: 115, 347; Schmidt, 2005: 9).

The role attributed to individual units, such as the individual that represents the state or even the state as a unit among several other states, reveals Realism's individualist ontology, as well as the realist conception of human nature: the human being is willingness to survive (and strives for it), but his willingness to have power and pride is even greater (according to Niebuhr) (Batistella, 2006: 117). Morgenthau defined human nature as the set of elementary bio-psychological instincts of life, reproduction and domination, added to a selfish character that, contextualised within a world of limited resources, leads to an attitude of dominance (Idem: 117). Thus, the balance of power in international politics is the only way to ensure the (precarious) state of non-war and, since progress is not possible (human beings are condemned to those instincts), states seek to guarantee their own security as their top priority – according to realists, the list follows with the search for tranquillity, profit and power (Waltz *cited in* Batistella, 2006: 131). As a consequence of these assumptions, states, faced with a hostile environment surrounding them, cannot count on any other state or entity but themselves (Cravinho, 2002: 141)¹³. Besides, in a criticism to the normative dimension of idealists' research, realists opted for studying international relations not how they ought to be, but how they truly are. This "true" means that Realism accepts the fact that there are true facts and universal laws about international phenomena; actually, for this school, international politics are governed by objective laws rooted in human nature (Morgenthau *cited in* Kurki & Wight, 2010: 18) and the role of science is to disclose those rules and patterns.

As a response to several criticisms concerning the weaknesses of Realism, some authors introduced alterations to the paradigm and originated a renewed version of this paradigm, Neo-realism. One of the most visible changes was the acceptance of a new dimension: economy (Batistella, 2006: 135) was aimed to be used along with the key-concepts of power and the centrality of politics. For example, Gilpin argued (contrarily

¹³ "Un système du chacun pour soi est un système dans lequel ceux qui ne s'aident pas (...). La peur de telles conséquences non voulues incite les États à se comporter de façon à créer des équilibres des puissances" (Batistella, 2006: 131, 132).

to other realists) that only a unipolar system would be able to provide the international system some stability, making both military and economic powers the pre-conditions for the achievement of that stage. Using this newly introduced concept, this neorealist believed states make cost-benefit calculations with the options they have, and that is how they reach their decisions (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr., 2003: 103) – it is nonetheless interesting to notice that, despite the introduction of this economic variable, the realist postulation about the rationality of the actors remained. Moreover, he also recognised that the system (and its regulation) can change and the state is not the only actor in international politics (Batistella, 2006: 136-138). These assumptions constitute a meaningful adaptation of the paradigm to a difficultly deniable reality, shaping it to the demands of a growingly complex international system.

Mearsheimer developed what later would have been called the offensive Realism. According to him, states' ultimate objective is to survive and as there is no central authority common to all states, they get involved in continuous fights for power not to be destroyed. This vision implies a slight shift in the realist thinking because it presupposes that it is the need for survival that makes states aggressive and not their nature (Idem: 142, 143). Still, this originates a “security dilemma”: in the pursuit of their own security, states create a feeling of insecurity in other states (“instrumentally rational behaviour”) (Sørensen, 2008: 7). Thus, neo-realists maintain their materialist approach, arguing that “state behaviour is largely shaped by the *material structure* of the international system. The distribution of material capabilities among states is the key factor for understanding world politics” (Mearsheimer *cited in* Sørensen, 2008: 7).

Although realists and neo-realists emphasise this materialist dimension and consider material forces as agents in themselves, the truth is that they cannot speak for themselves; they imply interpretation, as the mere physical description of the phenomenon is not enough (Sørensen, 2008: 7) to understand it deeply. For example, national interest depends on national identity, which is a mental construction. When shared with other actors, it helps create patterns of interaction, which proves that some factors – interests, in this case – are not a product of material factors only (Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr, 2003: 124). This is not, however, the only flaw of the realist tradition. In fact, several authors point out some of the weaknesses of this approach by enumerating them through a critical analysis.

Realism does not accept the importance or at least the interference of ideologies

and values in the Social Sciences (Cravinho, 2002: 143). Since the phenomena studied by IR (a Social Science itself) are nothing but social phenomena, this may bring some disadvantages to the realist perspective. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr (2003: 124) argue that realists focused so much on the structure that they ignored the social basis and the social limits of power. In summary, they are a paradigm of a Social Science and refuse the social dimension of the phenomena they study. Limiting IR only to political rules is reductionist, because the international phenomena involve people with psychological and spiritual concerns; they imply economic transactions (already recognised by neorealists) and juridical structures, among other factors that are belittled by this paradigm (Cravinho, 2002: 144).

Besides, the realist account that it is possible to clearly divide the domestic and the external domains when analysing a certain phenomenon is illusory and, as Cravinho (Idem: 143) wrote, it is an “easily contested idea”. Excluding the domestic factors from the scientific analysis of the phenomena (Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff, Jr, 2003: 120) is another shortcoming of this paradigm at the ontological level, as well as the taken for granted rationality of the state (Idem: 120). As it will be perceived through other theories, the state (regarded as comparable to human beings or not) cannot be said to be a rational actor, since it is led by men who do not always act rationally, but based on a set of other fundamental variables – some of them social, which are disregarded by realists *a priori*. Maybe also because of that, some authors believe Realism was not able to explain adequately the Cold War (Idem: 119), especially the dynamics that led to its end.

Epistemologically speaking, Realism, in its demand for eternal truths, makes it hard to explain change in the international system, as its theorists intend to prove that rules are valid for all epochs, which does not leave much room for change (Cravinho, 2002: 144). Concerning realists’ approach to history, Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff, Jr (2003: 124) call it an “alleged disregard” for the discipline as the school has difficulties in accepting history as a process that is constantly redefined and in which individuals give their contribution to shape each and every historical epoch (Idem: 124). Finally, and the list is not exhaustive, two further weaknesses pointed out by the same authors who consider first that several historical events contradict (Neo)realism and second that theorists (such as Cusack and Stoll) have identified several inconsistencies among realists, namely concerning the degree of importance attributed to power distribution

(Idem: 120-122), which reveals lack of cohesion of the paradigm – although this criticism is not only applicable to Realism.

As a response to these “mainstream” approaches, several other theories emerged to give their insights to IR. As it goes beyond the scope of this thesis, they will not be analysed with detail here. However, it is important to know that mainly since the 1960s and 1970s Realism began to be seriously questioned as its focus and premises seemed not be adaptable to a changing reality of growing interdependence and interaction between states and other actors. Functionalism and Neofunctionalism made their proposals on the liberal side; Critical Theory made other contributions to the debate adopting a more radical stance (Cravinho, 2002: 171). They are all under the reflectivist and postpositivist umbrellas. Critical IR Theory, for example, is a set of theories that includes postmodernists, constructivists, neo-Marxists and feminists (Wendt, 1995: 71). Despite the differences between these theories or approaches, believing in the social construction of world politics is what brings them together. Two main positions derive from this: “fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material” and “these structures shape actors’ identities and interests, rather than just their behaviour” (Idem: 71-72). In other words, they deny both materialism and rationalism. However, there are differences among them, which led to different theories: some are statist, others are non-statist; some believe in science, others do not; some emphasise the process, others the structure; etc. (Idem: 72).

This section aimed to provide a brief overview of the several theoretical options available to deal with the subject of this thesis. Only with a structured approach and a presentation of those options is it possible to select the one that has been selected to develop the study. In fact, theoretical debates continue to play a major part in IR theory, since this incipient science is still being defined through these reflections. As Constructivism emerged as an appropriate framework to embed this theory in, it is of much relevance to briefly describe its main considerations and assumptions, so that the rest of the work and the choices made in the meanwhile are understood in the light of this meta-theory.

1.3. Constructivism: main assumptions and internal divisions

In the context of the postpositivist critique, emerged a “new generation of internationalists” (Batistella, 2006: 284). Constructivism has begun to have some influence on IR since the 1980s (Adler, 2005: 96), but it took more years for it to strengthen its position among the other theories of International Relations. Although it was mentioned above that Constructivism constituted a meta-theory, Adler (Idem: 90) argues that it entails three levels and that therefore it is not accurate to define it merely as a meta-theory. Besides that, it is also a social theory, as well as a theoretical and empirical perspective of IR. In this latter case, Constructivism is based upon solid ontological and epistemological foundations and focuses on the role of identities, norms, national interests, etc., which justifies, for the author, its inclusion at this level.

Constructivism in IR is also the result of a set of influences that shaped the way this (meta-)theory has developed for the last decades and their analysis matter to realise the importance of some key aspects for this theoretical proposal.¹⁴ For some authors, Kant is the pioneer of Constructivist thought, for his objective hermeneutics and for having introduced the concept of social construction, as well as the intersubjective nature of knowledge (Idem: 96), even though usually this philosopher is linked with Idealism, namely due to his work in “Perpetual Peace”. The second influence is linguistics’ subjective hermeneutics, which highlights the role of language and subjectivity; according to this trend, social facts are constituted by language structures. This assumption would be followed by several Constructivists who would maintain their approach very close to this conception, as it will be showed ahead. Moreover, it also subscribed to the preposition that science is incapable of producing objective knowledge (Idem: 97). In fact, when considering the influences received by Constructivism, one realises that the different approaches within this theory also come from its diverse influences; combining Kantian objective hermeneutics and linguistic subjective hermeneutics allows much room for theorists to conceive the Constructivist assumptions one way or another.

Thirdly, Critical Theory, as already mentioned in this chapter, (through the School of Frankfurt and the contributions of Jürgen Habermas) emphasises the social

¹⁴ The list here presented is based on the four influences received by IR Constructivism listed by Adler (2005: 96-97).

theory of communicative action and deliberative democracy (Idem: 97). Finally, Pragmatism also influenced the development of Constructivism – through the focus on the role of choice, deliberation, judgement and interpretation (Idem: 97). It is important to underline, however, that although these are the influences Adler recognised as having some impact on the Constructivist thought, the truth is that their varied origins and positions gave rise to an also varied set of types of Constructivism, as it will be further developed.

As a matter of fact, neither the inspirations of Constructivism nor its origins are unifying or consensual. Several hypotheses are raised by several authors; some of them are complementary, some others are not. Guzzini (2000: 154-155) selects the end of Cold War as a decisive moment, since it brought to light important Constructivist assumptions, such as that status quo is not inevitable and, subsequently, that change is possible; Adler (2005: 98) points out the popularity of the postpositivist Constructivist message after the Cold War and Guzzini refers to a modernity that has become reflexive, disappointed with progress and with Rationalism's incapacity to solve the problems it had somehow created (Guzzini, 2000: 153). However, it is also possible to trace the beginning of a more influential period of Constructivism with Onuf and Wendt, who raised this perspective to another level with widely read and commented articles and books which included Scientific Realism in the discussion and tried to find a common ground between the two approaches (Idem: 98). Or should it be traced back to Deutsch and Haas' contributions in the 1950s, who underscored the importance of identities and social communication (Adler, 2005: 98, 99)? Or with Adler himself who introduced the concept of cognitive evolution as the interpretation of social collective meaning (Idem: 98, 99)? Nogueira and Messari (2005: 169) contemplate the possibility of including the English School as a Constructivism's predecessor, since the former had already pushed norms into the debate in IR – however, they also dismiss that option, because Constructivism stresses discourse analysis more than the English School and the latter attributes to power a centrality that it does not have for Constructivists. Yet, for having these differences does not make it impossible for Constructivism to have originated from the English School, after which it had made other choices, for example. Concerning the presence of Constructivism in IR, the same authors (Idem: 162) point its *première* in the works of Onuf in 1989 (with the *World of Our Making*) and Wendt in 1992 (with *Anarchy is What States Make of It*), and despite the initial difficulties to be

recognised among IR theorists, Constructivism gained an important stance in the meanwhile and, in the second half of the 1990s, it already had a visible position in ISA meetings (Idem: 164-165). Alexander Wendt (1999: 3), on the other hand, postulates that the Constructivist thinking can be found in Grotius, Kant and Hegel; in Idealism and in Deutsch, Haas and Bull. Such varied contribution, however, (as stated above and explained ahead) originated different types of “Constructivisms”, according to different types of inspirations.

Apart from this debate and the real origins of Constructivism, what really matters is that a theory has been able to question Rationalism and to present a viable alternative that has been increasingly used by IR theorists since the 1990s. When wondering about the significance of Constructivist contributions to IR, Adler (2005: 101-103) refers the improvement in the understanding of important concepts (such as of knowledge, change, rationality, language and power) and the amounts of literature this approach has created on empirical investigations within the discipline. Besides, Stefano Guzzini (2000: 148) believed in the early 2000s that Constructivism was a promising theory to provide IR theory with important insights, as it is a middle-ground that avoids the extremes: it is theoretically located between empiricism and Idealism; individualism and holism; truth and relativism.

1.3.1. Constructivist ontology

1.3.1.1. Social construction of reality

As mentioned above for more than once, Realism is not the only paradigm with internal disagreements; Constructivism is also known for its wide variety of positions within its field. In truth, Nogueira and Messari (2005: 184) conclude their chapter on this theory by arguing that it is even difficult to talk about a Constructivism in singular. Therefore, it is of much relevance to move forward to the main assumptions shared by most Constructivists and later on to present the main divisions among them, in order to get the whole picture of the theoretical debate.

The central tenet of Constructivism is the social construction of reality. This premise is among the few that are accepted by all Constructivists and constitutes the core of this theory. It follows that one of the main interests of Constructivism is to study

the way objects and practices are socially constructed, especially those that are usually taken as natural (Fearon & Wendt, 2005: 57). It basically means that, when studying any phenomenon, even when one is dealing with material, tangible facts, they always mean something that goes beyond their materiality; they are a construct subject to human action and they attributed a meaning by the individuals. The world itself is a social construction that results from the action of the agents (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 166). This is a central aspect of the Constructivist ontology. As Adler (2005: 98) puts it, all versions of Constructivism converge ontologically in the sense that all accept the idea that “material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded” (Wendt *cited in* Adler, 2005: 98). This leads to another important ontological question: whether Rationalism adopts an individualist approach, Constructivism follows a holist perspective. Even though Fearon and Wendt (2005: 53) do not regard this division as useful, it reflects one of the central differences between both, because, as they recognise (Idem: 53), they see society from different “strategic positions” – Rationalism from the bottom to the top; Constructivism from the top to the bottom. These options involve focusing on different aspects of social life and consequently of different images of world politics, and they are a direct consequence of the ontological choices each (meta-)theory makes. Although it is possible to subscribe the view of the authors when they consider that the two visions may involve complementary accounts on the international life, it is not possible to ignore that those same accounts come from different ontological positions.

Another fundamental premise that derives from this analysis (and also shared by all Constructivists) is the postpositivist character of Constructivist ontology. This implies a set of important assumptions that need to be clarified.

1.3.1.2. Intersubjectivity and language

First, as Batistella (2006: 285) explains, a postpositivist ontology means accepting that reality is neither objective nor subjective; it is intersubjective. In other words, reality and the meanings attributed to it are not “merely the aggregation of individual beliefs but have some independent status as collective knowledge” (Fierke, 2010: 183). Social facts are, therefore, things that exist only because people collectively

believe they do and act accordingly (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 393). Money, rights and sovereignty are examples the authors give to explain this premise: unless there is a shared understanding of what a note or a coin is, money would not have any particular meaning and would not be capable of being used as an exchange tool to get something one wants. There is nothing intrinsically given to any object that would make it suitable for any purpose unless its perception is collectively shared. Sovereignty is another example: if neither a certain group in a certain territory nor the other national communities recognise it, it has no meaning, no value, and no actual existence. Fierke (2010: 179) uses wood to exemplify it: wood exists in nature, but it is only through human action that it can acquire different forms to which different meanings, according to different contexts, are attributed; “explicitly social phenomena (...) may build on the basic material of human nature, but they take specific historical, cultural, and political forms that are a product of human interaction in a social world” (Idem: 179).

This is another important difference between Constructivism and Rationalism, since the latter focuses on the rationality of decisions and the former brings the social dimension to the individual. The individual (human being or state) does not act alone or based on his or its belief; rather they act within “intersubjective structures (...) constituted by collective meanings” (Zehfuss, 2004: 40). Therefore, intersubjectivity emphasises the social dimension of humans and the shared ideas constrain and shape their behaviour (Copeland, 2006: 3). As Guzzini (2000: 149) explains, an action “cannot be reduced to cognitive psychology or to choice, based on interests”; on the contrary, the general context has to be taken into consideration; the individual knows, thinks and feels “only in the context of and with reference to collective or intersubjective understandings, including rules and language” (Adler, 2005: 100).

Stefano Guzzini (2000: 164) provides an insightful example of a case of intersubjectivity.¹⁵ A first assumption is that language exists and cannot be reduced to the material support of communication, whether it is voice or a printed newspaper. Secondly, it does not exist independently from its use, but, at the same time, it cannot be reduced to the individuals’ choices, i.e.: language is neither reducible to objective materialism nor to subjective individualism; it is intersubjective. Batistella (2006: 286)

¹⁵ Although this constitutes a good example of intersubjectivity, it is important to highlight that it is certainly not shared by all constructivists, since language is a disputed theme inside the paradigm and, therefore, it cannot be included in the field of the general assumptions of Constructivism. However, it is an astute analogy and will also be used to introduce the subject of language and structure.

recognises that Constructivism pays much attention to speech as it reflects the societies and is capable of shaping the beliefs and interests of the individuals as a group, establishing the patterns of the accepted behaviour. However, as mentioned in the footnote, language and the linguistic turn constitute one of the divergences among Constructivists; it is a fundamental subject for theorists like Onuf, Kratochwill and Fierke, for example, but not for Wendt (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 168). Kratochwill, influenced by Linguistics, Critical Theory and Habermas, “sought to identify in the discourses – more particularly in the rules that guide and organise those discourses – the rules that enable us to understand the reality we live in” (Idem: 170). For theorists like Kratochwill, language is action *per se* (Idem: 170) and for Onuf, it is mandatory to analyse the rules that guide behaviour for “acts are the expression of the discourse and of meanings, and cannot be understood outside of or independently from them” (Idem: 173).

Thus, and despite the disagreements on the subject, accepting that all events are socially constructed and that even material realities are given meanings, language seems to play a major role, since actors (individuals and states) need language to reflect upon and to interpret that reality, pushing this variable into an important spotlight when studying social phenomena.

1.3.1.3. Ideas, identity and interests

As it is not difficult to realise through the above stated assumptions, ideas (or ideational factors) acquire a fundamental role in the Constructivist paradigm: ideas define the meaning of material factors. In other words, material objects are not only their materiality, but also the meaning the individuals (collectively and within a context) attribute to them. However, as Fearon and Wendt (2005: 57) remind, Constructivism is not pure Idealism; instead, Constructivism underlines the role of ideas over the emphasis traditionally put on material factors (like technology and geography, for example); it does not mean that materiality is refused – on the contrary, it is believed by Constructivists alike that the impact of material conditions is always mediated by the ideas that give them meaning: “material factors matter at the limit, but *how* they matter depends on ideas” (Idem: 58).

Nonetheless, as Barnett (2008: 163) emphasises, ideas in this context are not psychological states or personal beliefs; instead, they are social phenomena, collectively held, such as knowledge, symbols, language and rules. Guzzini (2000: 159) reinforces these assumptions: Constructivism accepts “a phenomenal world external to thought”, what it does not accept, however, is that those material (usually natural) phenomena are able to constitute themselves objects of knowledge independently from discursive practices; moreover, their existence can be independent from thoughts, but their observation is not “language-independent” (Idem: 159).¹⁶ What is also relevant in terms of ideas is that they are considered as constitutive of actors’ identities and interests – this is the reason why these three concepts are linked and why they have been brought together in this section.

On Chapter 8, there will be some reflection upon the concept of identity and its application to the case study. Yet, what it is worth underscoring at this point is that Constructivism regards identity as a central issue in the study of International Relations. First off all, because it is an ideational factor; secondly, because it is essential to understand the behaviour, the practices and the changes at the international level (Adler, 2005: 103); thirdly, as a social construct, identity is object of change – contrarily to the realist conception – and, therefore, if identity is mutable, it can create or promote different dynamics and develop security communities, for example. In a 1994 article, Wendt (*cited in* Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 176) explains the process of construction of collective identities endogenously; for this author, identity is the product of processes of interaction that may change in time. Thus, identities are shaped in the relation with the “other”; the feeling of “commonness” of collective identities is, by extension, emphasised by the difference in relation to other communities (Risse, 2005: 167) – these relations may change over time, as identities do as a consequence.

A more positive or negative identification with other peers propels a state to be more or less willing to engage in collective structures (Zehfuss, 2004: 40). And although Constructivists recognise the change of identities is not an easy endeavour, as “transforming definitions of self is more than altering behaviour and therefore a demanding process”, identities are “not carved in stone” (Idem: 41). When dealing with the mechanisms that promote identity change, Wendt defines the social acts as

¹⁶ This final premise is not accepted by all Constructivists, as it will be explained in the section on epistemology.

processes of signalling, interpreting and responding that, through repeated interaction, create and sustain identities and interests (Idem: 43). This repeated interaction along with the willingness to change identity and a more passive social learning contribute as a whole to transform identity and, subsequently, interests (Idem: 46). The novelty of this assumption in relation to the realist proposals is that national interest is defined according to the identities that are in its origin, making it not a previously determined factor, but a dynamic one that is able to be altered (Idem: 176, 177). The rationalist vision of a static world with asocial egoists primarily concerned with material interests (Fierke, 2010: 182) is opposed to the Constructivist perspective according to which “neither identity nor interests can be detached from a world of social meaning” (Idem: 182). As Fierke (Idem: 182) epitomises, a state’s identity as a liberal democrat cannot be separated from its interest in complying with Human Rights; comparatively, an identity as a capitalist cannot be isolated from the interest in generating profit. These two examples illustrate how identities and interests are tightly related and, given the mutability of social constructions, they may be object of change.

The concept of power, associated to Realism, has also a different interpretation in the Constructivist paradigm: as mentioned repeatedly, Constructivists do not deny the materiality of some factors and their influence on international relations, such as natural resources, technology and others. But for these theorists, power is constituted by the distribution of the actors’ interests; interests are, in turn, constituted by ideas; therefore, there is a close connection between material aspects (even power) and ideational structures; ultimately are ideas that determine whether a certain distribution of these material capacities will end up in a violent conflict or not (Sørensen, 2008: 10), depending on how the actors see the others, how they perceive their moves and how they respond, in accordance with their identities and interests.

1.3.1.4. Agency and structure, institutions and norms

Another (postpositivist) Constructivist ontological assumption shared by all its theorists is the co-constitution of agents and structures. This means that both agents and structures play an important role in shaping the development of international life – structures constrain (or frame) the behaviour of agents and are part of them; but the

latter also shape the structures through their interaction, decisions, etc. (Batistella, 2006: 289; Adler, 2005: 100). As Wendt put it: “as social structures are ontologically dependent upon and therefore constituted by the practices and self-understandings of agents, the causal powers and interests of those agents, in their own turn, are constituted and therefore explained by structures” (Wendt *cited in* Adler, 2005: 105).

The debate around the ontological antecedence of agents or structures is based on the question about who influences and limits who; in other words, are agents the ones that constrain the options of structures or vice-versa? For Classic Realists, agents do; for Structural Realists, structures determine the agents’ actions (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 163). The answer given by Constructivists, as stated above, combines these two positions, denying the ontological antecedence to either of them. In fact, this denial includes the antecedence in terms of time and capacity to influence the other. This approach signifies that there is no determinacy in international relations: agents can interfere and shape the structures they are embedded in, and structures are not pre-determined or unchangeable, having a role to play in the construction of states’ identities and interests. Thus, agents have the possibility of choice, which is, nonetheless, a limited one, since they “coexist in a social relationship, and their choices are partially dependent on the response of the other. The space for choice can thus be said to be mutually constituted” (Fierke, 2010: 182).

According to Onuf (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 172), between the agents and structures are rules or norms, which is a central concept in the Constructivist theory – “norms are standards of appropriate behaviour for actors with a given identity” (Barnett, 2008: 169). They provide the agents with the possible choices and, at the same time, guide their behaviour. In case they are not respected, consequences are expected (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 173). At a certain extent, rationalists agree with the idea that norms change the actors’ behaviour, but their perception is different in the sense that they believe it is the result of the coercive material power and the change is forced (Herrmann, 2005: 128). On the contrary, Constructivists subscribe to the premise that norms are actually capable of influencing an actor’s behaviour by changing its motivations and beliefs; they do not only determine the consequences of its violation, but they also (and mainly) set the appropriate behaviour (Idem: 128). Another important function of norms, according to Kratochwill (*cited in* Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 171), is to make actions and decisions possible and acceptable or not.

This leads to the different approach that theorists support to justify the states' compliance with norms: are individuals like a "homo economicus" that carefully evaluate the costs of the decisions and rationally chooses the most efficient option, following a "logic of consequences" or are they rule followers that consider how a person or a state in their position should act under those circumstances, pursuing a "logic of appropriateness"? (Fearon & Wendt, 2005: 60). These two logics of action are not incompatible (Barnett, 2008: 163); depending on the context, agents may calculate the consequences of their actions and be, at the same time, constrained by the norms and roles they are attached to (Fearon & Wendt, 2005: 60).

In fact, the reason why individuals follow norms or rules is not linear. As Fearon and Wendt (2005: 61) concluded, neither the rationalist nor the constructivist accounts are completely correct: human behaviour is not always selfish, but it does not always seek for legitimacy either. And more important than standing consistently for one or another is to be able to identify which one is at stake in each specific case. Besides, it is possible that these two motivations interact with each other in time, originating different situations: whether "actors repeatedly comply with a norm, then over time they may internalize it to the point of acquiring a preference to comply for the sake of doing right or acting appropriate" (Idem: 62) or their "desires to do right may also decay over time if there is not enough enforcement against norm violators" (Idem: 62).

This is a central question, as compliance with norms is something theorists and researchers from diverse fields of the Social Sciences seek to understand. Human minds are unattainable through direct means, but human behaviour is an outcome that may reflect the actors' attitudes; carefully analysing that behaviour, its evolution and the agents' explanations and reasoning eases the process of generalisation to reach the possible reasons behind their choices. Widening the focus to the international level, in the absence of a central and unique authority that ensures the application of its own rules to all its citizens, there is only one way international norms are followed and respected: through international organisations. For that reason, institutions occupy, along with norms, a major place in the Constructivism paradigm.

International organisations, as norm diffusers, contribute to the construction of the interests of the states that adopt those norms through the integration in a certain institution; in that sense, institutions help coordinate and standardise the behaviour, establishing new identities, new practices and interests (Adler, 2005: 103, 104).

Finnemore & Sikkink (*cited in* Simmons & Martin, 2005: 198) compare this pressure to comply with norms with a “norm cascade”, as international organisations pressure “actors to adopt new policies and laws and to ratify treaties and (...) [to monitor] compliance with international standards (...). In this way, IOs can be ‘chief socializing agents’ pressuring violators to conform” (Idem: 198). It is interesting how Constructivists bring to the jargon of IR the concept of “socialisation” used by many social sciences, but usually applied to individuals. In this context, however, socialisation is applied to states that are, therefore, anthropomorphised – as humans, states are also object of the pressure from their peers to converge with them in a common, standardised behaviour. This pressure has effects as long as they want to be integrated in the community (as individuals want to be part of the society) and to avoid the consequences of not being part of it (whether they are sanctions or not fulfilling the others’ expectations about them). This pressure, together with the interaction between states, promotes the internalisation of norms by states, which, at a certain point in time, do not question about those internalised norms, as they already are part of their identity (Barnett, 2008: 170). Countries like the United Kingdom and France do not question about the centrality of values such as democracy and human rights as an integrated part of their own identity.

International organisations can also be very helpful in terms of diminishing or bypassing the “security dilemma” that rationalists claim to exist among states by dealing with the risks and the problems with communication between them (Herrmann, 2005: 128). They verify the accomplishment of rules, they apply sanctions, etc.; after all, institutions are mediators that contribute to the success of more intense exchanges between its members. However, as Herrmann (Idem: 128) reminds, international organisations not only socialise its member states, but also the ones that seek to join them. Both are under the pressure the institution exerts to create a feeling of what they should do and how they should behave. The interaction in time within a specific context of rules and patterns is a major triggering factor for states to reshape their identities and interests (Simmons & Martin, 2005: 198).

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002) make an interesting comparison between Rationalism and Constructivism in terms of their opposing ontologies regarding international institutions in general and enlargement in particular. For the first paradigm, institutions occupy a secondary place and do not provide reasons for states’

behaviour – only constraints and incentives for them (Idem: 509); Constructivists, on the other hand, underline their role in shaping the agents' identities and interests and their normative commitment (Idem: 509). While for Rationalists, international organisations are only instrumental means for states to achieve their national interests, for Constructivists, they are not only autonomous and powerful actors, but also the “community representatives” that are able to define the standards of legitimacy and appropriateness (Idem: 510). Finally, whereas Rationalism only conceives enlargement as a mechanisms accepted by countries that see it as a creator of net benefits (greater than non-enlargement); Constructivism, for the above mentioned reasons and assumptions, believes that what really matters are the ideational factors, embodied by concepts like identity, values, culture and beliefs (Idem: 513).

Independently from the vision one may be tended to agree with, the complexity of the international life is undeniable: individual states, international non-governmental organisations, transnational organisations, public opinion, economic, political, cultural and social flows, and an enormous variety of other agents, structures and phenomena attribute to these interactions a high level of complexity. Anarchy is what usually describes international relations, in the sense that there is no single central authority all the above mentioned entities are subject to.

First of all, the existence of an international society is accepted by Constructivism because, following the theory's postulations, “those who speak and act in the name of states assume that it does” (Simmons & Martin, 2005: 197). Secondly, Constructivists have suggested some forms to organise the study of international politics, but what they all have in common is that the theoretical strategy of moving the domestic structures to the international level needs to be overcome, as those structures are not appropriate for that different context (Adler, 2005: 104).

Thirdly, and related to anarchy, Constructivist paradigm is quite coherent: if every phenomenon is a social construct, anarchy cannot be faced as something different; ergo, anarchy is socially constructed and, consequently, it is not something predetermined or automatically given. The title of Wendt's seminal work “Anarchy is What States Make of It” is quite revealing in terms of how (at least a part of) Constructivists perceive anarchy, or the international system in general. Being anarchic is a possibility, but cooperation is also feasible, as long as the units of that system want it to be like that (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 167). Processes of interaction between

agents and structure (according to Onuf, *cited in* Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 172) can change the anarchic (or better, heteronomous) nature of the international system. That is why anarchy is what states want it to be, in the sense that they are able, through their intersubjective interference, to modify the system (or the structure) they are embedded in. The development of macro-level structures depends on how “others” are conceptualised; changes at this level imply a redefinition of the position of the self in relation to the other (Kratochwill, 2006: 31). This happens because homogeneity diminishes the likelihood of conflict and the acknowledgment that the other is unlikely to use force reinforces mutual trust (Idem: 33).

In the same work cited above, Wendt presents three different cultures of anarchy: Hobbesian, Lockean and Kantian (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 179, 180). They diverge in the type of culture they are based upon: culture of enmity, rivalry and friendship, respectively. Depending on what states are willing to do at the international level (permanent competition and self-help; resource and power competition; positive predisposition towards the others), the outcome can vary between those three types, each of which may entail three levels of internalisation (by force, by interests and by legitimacy) (Idem: 180). The key aspect to retain from this theory (as it is not possible to deepen it here) is that anarchy is not denied by Constructivists as a reality that reflects the state of world politics; however, contrarily to other paradigms, that is not the “natural” or unchangeable state of affairs – as a social construction, it can be modified.

1.3.2. Constructivist epistemology

Although the majority of the ontological assumptions of Constructivism are shared by almost all of its theorists, in what comes to epistemology, that is no longer the case. As mentioned earlier on this chapter, Constructivism in IR emerged as a postpositivist critique to the positivist theories or paradigms that dominated the field and which became less suitable to a changing (and challenging) international scene. At the ontological level, all theorists subscribed to a postpositivist approach, but epistemologically speaking, some divisions among Constructivists arose between the supporters and the opponents of a positivist approach.

The main concern of epistemology and this division is related to two main questions Fearon and Wendt (2005: 57) pose: first, “whether knowledge claims about social life can be given any warrant other than the discursive power of the putative knower” (question of relativism) and; secondly, whether causal explanations are appropriate to social research (question of naturalism). The authors concluded that, depending on the answers given by the investigators, three epistemological positions were born inside Constructivism: the positivist (says ‘yes’ to both questions); the postmodernist (says ‘no’ to both questions) and the interpretativist (says ‘yes’ to the first and ‘no’ to the second) (Idem: 57). These differences between the epistemological perspectives originate significant differences at the level of production of knowledge within Social Constructivism in IR.

For example, Adler (2005: 101), in a chapter devoted to this paradigm in IR, wrote that interpretation is an intrinsic part of any Social Science and that it matters more how things became what they are, rather than what they are. Additionally, the author recognised that in practice, theories are far away from being true images of the world. Adler believed these aspects were shared by most Constructivists and that some (other) divergences existed. Yet, and having as background the comments of Fearon and Wendt, these assumptions made by Adler reveal that the author possibly endorses these postulates, which makes him, following the above proposal, a postmodernist – in opposition to Wendt himself, who subscribes to a positivist account and who is criticised by some Constructivists for preferring causal explanations rather than constitutive ones (Idem: 106).

This leads to the debate about the nature of explanations: causality seeks to establish conditions that relate a cause and an effect (more or less mechanically); constitutive theorisation attempt to disclose how the objects or events are made of or how they are organised – they are, therefore, an effect of the conditions that made them possible, but do not exist independently from them (Fearon & Wendt, 2005: 58). Fierke (2010: 188-189) wrote that putting the emphasis of the research on causality is another inconsistency of Wendt: instead of asking individual reasons for a phenomenon that is being studied, the focus should be, according to Fierke, on the social fact that happened and how it became possible, highlighting the importance of language and intentionality.

Another question tightly related to scientific explanations, and that cannot be dissociated from it, concerns interpretation or hermeneutics. Constructivism (or at least

some constructivists) does not assume the (rationalist) claim to search for an “all-encompassing truth”; therefore, they create “small-t” [truth] claims, which are partial and contingent (Finnemore & Sikkink, 2001: 394), because “for constructivists, understanding how things are put together and how they occur is not mere description. Understanding the constitution of things is essential in explaining how they behave and what causes political outcomes” (Idem: 394). Thus, explanations are permissive and probabilistic.

The same authors believe all Constructivists agree on the need of interpretation in research, i.e., that there is “no neutral stance from which they [the researchers] can gather objective knowledge about the world” (Idem: 395). The divergence, according to them, is in how this interpretation is done: modernists accept the world is always interpreted, but some explanations are logically more plausible, empirically more persuasive, etc.; on the other hand, postmodernists do not accept to assess the validity of analytical and ethical knowledge claims (Idem: 395).

The generally accepted hermeneutic tradition implies a major epistemological assumption: that natural sciences are different from social sciences and that, therefore, their approaches and methods need to be different as well. Guzzini (2000: 149) reinforces this theory by stating that social sciences “interpret an already interpreted world”. Therefore, interpretivism copes with the reflexive character of the social human being – the object of study of social sciences. For Guzzini (Idem: 161), human action cannot be understood unless it is interpreted, i.e., without understanding the meaning individuals attribute to them. The author provides a very illustrative and meaningful example: when the traffic light is red, a car stops and a pedestrian crosses the street. Under the behaviourist perspective, both in Italy and in Germany, the phenomenon was the same – there was a stimulus and then a response. Through a Constructivist “lens”, in Germany the car stopped because the traffic rules demanded it; while in Italy, it stopped not because of the red sign or the Code, but to avoid overrunning the pedestrian (Idem: 161). This example shows how the same action, in different contexts, varies. The meaning of the action was interpreted in the light of that context and provided a different explanation – the comprehensiveness of this theory was only reached thanks to what Guzzini (Idem: 162) calls a “double hermeneutics”. The double hermeneutics includes the level of action (one interprets the behaviour trying that it makes sense

inside the agent's own world) and the level of observation (not at the individual level, but inside the language shared by the community of the observers).

Constructivism, in general, opts for a holist research strategy – “we need to make social wholes and internal relations rather than individuals the primitives in social scientific explanation” (Fearon & Wendt, 2005: 58), but that opposes to the individualist approach of other paradigms. Holism presupposes that the world is “irreducibly social” (Barnett, 2008: 163) and therefore it cannot be decomposed in its parts – even though it does not deny the autonomy or the interaction of agents (Idem: 163). This holistic approach is also reflected by the methodological choices followed by Constructivists – as diverse as their epistemological opinions.

1.3.3. Constructivist methodology

Constructivist methodology reflects the diversity within the paradigm. The methods used are varied and range from the positivist to the postpositivist approach; from the qualitative methods to the quantitative ones. Interpretative methods, such as genealogy, ethnography, discourse analysis, narrative analysis and interviews are usually chosen by interpretativists; but case studies, process tracing, comparative methods and other can be found among the Constructivist research projects. The combination of both quantitative and qualitative methods is also possible, as they are capable of providing both causal and constitutive inferences through historical narratives, for example (Adler, 2005: 101). Kratochwill (*cited in* Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 168) considers that methodological choices can be made individually by each constructivist, according to his or her preferences and the context of the investigation. As Finnemore and Sikkink (2001: 396) put it,

“there is no single constructivist method or research design. Constructivism opens up a set of issues, and scholars choose the research tools and methods best suited to their particular question. (...) Constructivists, like any other researchers, use the full array of available tools”.

1.4. Several *Constructivisms*

1.4.1. *Divisions among Constructivists*

A theoretical paradigm is, by definition, a unitary corpus of assumptions that guide a research. However, like many of the IR theories, and as already noted frequently in the previous sections, Constructivism does not have (at least yet) a cohesive body of ontological, epistemological and methodological premises – even though epistemology is its weakest point and some level of coherency can be found at the other two levels. Nogueira and Messari (2005: 184, 185) metaphorically compared Constructivism to a refuge to which several IR orphans have gone for being unsatisfied with the traditional approaches that depreciate concepts like identity and culture. Consequently, it embraced a wide variety of perspectives.

Due to these differences, some authors started to create “sub-groups” inside the grand group of Constructivism. One proposal has been showed earlier and is presented by Fearon and Wendt (2005: 57): according to the understanding on the two epistemological questions formulated above, a researcher could fit the group of positivists, interpretivists or postmodernists. However, this is not the only proposal. In fact, in another major work, Alexander Wendt (1999: 3, 4) labelled the three main streams of Constructivist IR theory: modernists (Ruggie and Kratochwill); postmodernists (Ashley and Walker) and feminists (Peterson and Tickner). Wendt acknowledged that the only commonality between these three lines was the perception of Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism as “undersocialised” theories, because, apart from that, there were many differences between them.

Adler (2005: 97, 98) argues that, due to the varied philosophical and sociological approaches several authors opt for, Constructivism can be divided up to five different subgroups: modernists (Adler, Barnett, Finnemore, Risse and Wendt); modernist linguist (Onuf, Kratochwill, Welds, Carawford), radical constructivists, critical constructivists (Linklater, Cox) and pragmatic realists.¹⁷ Nogueira and Messari (2005), in their analysis, did not divide the whole group into smaller ones, but into some key authors and presented their own visions, differences and similarities: Zehfuss is said to

¹⁷ Adler explains briefly each of these groups in this chapter, but it does not seem relevant to present it here with detail. Through the labels attributed by Adler, it is not difficult to denote the different choices made by the groups.

be theoretically closer to Onuf and Kratochwill for emphasising the role of language and the critical feature of empirical research; Fierke also underlines the need of this critical approach, but recognises that it should adapt to the demands of the research (and criticises the lack of coherence in Wendt's mixed positivist/postpositivist proposal); Wendt, on the other hand, did not support the linguistic turn and therefore has distanced himself from Onuf and Kratochwill; etc. (Idem: 168-185).

Fierke (2010: 183) stated that "Constructivism has occupied a 'middle ground' between rationalist and poststructuralist approaches to IR". Understandably, when a field is in-between two other circles, even though there is an intersection, there may be a tendency to bend over one side or the other. In that context, Fierke created two groups: the "conventional constructivists" and the "critical or consistent constructivists" (Idem: 184). The first group, in which Wendt can be fitted, has not rejected the positivist epistemology; their opposition to rationalists is merely based on ontological aspects. However, Fierke (and the other Constructivists that do not share this vision) wonders to what extent it is consistent to combine a postpositivist (constructivist) ontology putting the emphasis on the social dimension with a positivist epistemology, accepting the empiricist proposal regarding the possibility of construction of objective knowledge (Idem: 184). This perspective leads to the subject of the next section.

1.4.2. Wendt: eclecticism or lack of coherence?

In his analysis of the two types of Constructivists, Fierke (Idem: 185, 186) noted that, when Wendt attempts to create a "Social Theory of International Politics", not only was he mixing Positivism and Postpositivism in the same place, but he was also comparing the Constructivist "theory" he built with other substantive theories of IR, which is like "comparing apples and oranges" (Idem: 185). On the other hand, consistent constructivists do not abdicate of the inseparability of a social ontology and a social epistemology (Idem: 186) and maybe therefore Fierke self-entitled group as "consistent".

Wendt is undoubtedly one of the most well-known names of Constructivists, maybe because he tried to rebuild an entire meta-theory, consolidating it and transforming it into a theory of IR – although claiming it was a meta-theory. By doing

this, Wendt gathered a lot of supporters, but also a handful of critics that did not share his theoretical assumptions. It would not be unfair to state that Wendt's attempt to create an eclectic version of Constructivism ironically deepened the divisions within the paradigm.

In an article written in co-authorship with Fearon, the authors compare the two approaches and are aware of their differences, but do not consider it pragmatic to promote a so strong opposition between both, as they can be, according to them, combined and used complementarily. For instance, the individualist *vs.* holist opposition was faced as a not useful division, since a researcher can, according to them, develop his research without previously thinking about its ontological implications. This would imply adopting a pragmatic position and a pluralist ontological perspective (Fearon & Wendt, 2005: 53). In general, they do not consider the division (and even the theoretical debates) between Rationalism and Constructivism necessary, as "there may be much to be gained by using the tools of one to try to answer to other. Such a cross-paradigmatic exchange (...) is (...) the most fruitful way to advance" (Idem: 53).

Throughout the article, the authors enumerate a set of subjects with the intent to demystify the incompatibility between the two paradigms. After analysing the question of the emphasis on the material or the ideational side, they conclude that after all the differences are not that deep (Idem: 59) and when weighing the importance of the logic of consequences and of appropriateness, their insight was that there is a comparative advantage in both approaches, depending on the circumstances (Idem: 60). These and other considerations that tend to make Constructivism closer to the positivist side of the theoretical debates have originated, as already mentioned, several criticisms to Wendt's work.

In the 1992 article on anarchy, Wendt criticised the traditionalist theories and proposed a new approach to the subject (as briefly explained in the previous section) and, among other things, denied the ontological antecedence to both the agents and the structures. However, by giving the state such a central role in international politics in relation to the broader structural framework (in that case, anarchy), he ends up recognising the major contribution of states – the first criticism is that Wendt's Constructivism is too state-centred (Nogueira & Messari, 2005: 176). Secondly, the author was also pointed out for having ignored or belittled the linguist turn, as mentioned above as well, removing discourse from his analysis (Idem: 177). Zehfuss

(2004: 60) critically observes that Wendt does not focus on language but on physical action and that, besides, he does not interconnect the domestic and the international levels (Idem: 76).

Kratochwill, a linguist constructivist, reflects upon the question of acquiring knowledge in the Social Sciences and reaches the conclusion that it is not possible simply to describe things only through purely observational categories or measurement procedures, “rather their descriptions must make reference to the shared representations underlying the actions of actors” (Kratochwill, 2002: 21, 22). He provides the example of a signature, which is different from an autograph because it binds the person to a document and, if there was only description, there would be no difference between them – physically or at the observational level they are exactly the same, but their shared representation implied a different meaning and the subsequent effects. Kratochwill, after these thoughts, considered surprisingly that Wendt claims to be a scientific realist and points out that “Social Theory” relies on problematic foundationalist notions (Idem: 23).

Moreover, Wendt recognises the difference between social and natural objects, but defends the application of the same methods, which is, for Kratochwill (Idem: 34), *non sequitur*. This reminds Wendt’s lack of coherence in terms of the postpositivist ontology and the positivist epistemology mentioned above. In fact, Kratochwill argues that his ontology of social life is consistent with Scientific Realism (Idem: 35), which leaves Wendt with no attachments to Constructivism – following this reasoning. Besides, his rationalist models are considered to simplify the premises concerning identity and interests, enabling some issues (such as interest-formation, roles and identities) to be neglected (Idem: 34).

The same author wonders in his article whether Wendt’s version of Realism is compatible with Constructivism, and provides some arguments towards a negative answer to that question, namely that there are differences among realists and there is no defined notion of a realist philosophy; secondly, Scientific Realism ignores the social dimension of the phenomena on which Wendt relies; thirdly, Wendt aims to found the Social Theory, but that endeavour is old-fashioned and out of synchrony with recent developments in Social Sciences; fourthly, realists accept truths and whether Wendt accepts them, which makes him incoherent with Constructivism, or he does not, and then he goes against a realist premise (Idem: 36, 37). Contrarily to Wendt’s arguments (that things exist independently from their descriptions), Constructivism postulates that

descriptions are necessary (even mandatory) to talk about things; however, these descriptions are not neutral and it is difficult to say what an object “is” unless we understand their uses and roles in our practices (Idem: 42) – “in short, what is at stake is not the existence of the ‘thing’ in itself, but its recognition as ‘something’ which can only be established by bringing it under a description” (Idem: 42).

Copeland (2006: 11) enlarges the list of weaknesses of Wendt’s theory and adds that the theorist assumes that states know much about what the others are doing and thinking, but that is empirically unsupported and ignores the question of deception, present in social relations. Behnke (2006: 49) draws even tougher criticisms to Wendt’s work and states that

“as an attempt to offer an authoritative disciplinary guidebook to IR, *STIP* [*Social Theory of International Politics*] is a failure. Its conceptualizations and definitions are confusing and contradictory, its basic assumptions about international politics misguided, its meta-theoretical discussion misleading and contradictory, its ambition old-fashioned and out of sync with recent developments, and the theoretical and substantial questions it raises perhaps simply irrelevant”.

The author develops his arguments and explains his position throughout the chapter, concluding with three major considerations: Wendt cannot reconcile Constructivist with science, his framework does not constitute a neutral ground for his objective of being a meta-theoretical arbiter, and he does not contribute much to understand current world politics issues (Idem: 55, 56). At the philosophical level, criticisms go even further and are related to Wendt’s attempt to join or bring together two sides that seem, for most authors, to be irreconcilable: “very simply put, his contention in this respect is that, like neo-realists and neo-liberals, he is on the side of science, but that, unlike them, he is not an individualist” (Suganami, 2006: 60). Nevertheless, Wendt does not subscribe to radical holism either, opting for a moderate holism that Suganami (Idem: 70) calls instead a “moderate individualism”. Hence, as his opposition to Neo-realism and Neo-liberalism is also based on individualism, Wendt’s concessions to individualism weaken his stance (Idem: 71).

Thus, although Alexander Wendt is seen as one of the most prominent Constructivists, there are several criticisms that target his attempts to make Constructivism more “scientific” through the concession of several rationalist assumptions. Creating a middle-ground, however, has not been seen by many

Constructivists as a positive development for the paradigm, since it promotes an incoherent approach that is not in line with Constructivism's main tenets – such as assuming a postpositivist ontology based on the social dimension and simultaneously a positivist epistemology that weakens some of the central aspects of the theory. Yet, Wendt's contribution cannot be demeaned, as his efforts to reinforce the boundaries and the content of Constructivism also inspired the work of many researchers. This dilemma reveals the internal divisions of the (meta-)theory, but if one considers the development of such an incipient approach over the last two decades, its improvements and capacity of affirmation among IR theories, it is possible to believe that its further consolidation may be achieved through the fruitful debates that have been occurring around this theme.

2. Bringing theory and research together

In the previous chapter, a brief reflection upon the theories of IR was made, especially upon Constructivism and its epistemological, ontological and methodological proposals, as well as its internal divisions. For being outside of the scope of this thesis, a deeper theoretical debate is not possible, but this chapter aims to establish a closer link between the mentioned premises and the content and development of this thesis. Thus, first, Constructivism will be linked with the more specific issue of European integration; then, (Neo-)Institutionalism will be introduced as a substantive theory that may be used to support constructivist more abstract considerations; and finally, Constructivism will be associated with other aspects of the thesis, as a continuation of first section, but no longer limited to the field of European integration.

2.1. Constructivism and European integration

Thomas Risse (2005: 159) wrote that the study of European integration under the Constructivist perspective was very recent and that sometimes it had been used as a substantive theory, comparable to Intergovernmentalism or Neo-functionalism. However, and contrarily to Andreas Adler's opinion (mentioned earlier), Risse insists that Constructivism is a meta-theory that occupies an "ontological middleground between individualism and structuralism" (Idem: 161) and should not be treated like a substantive theory.

As such, and given its ontological assumptions explained earlier, Constructivism avoids the emphasis studies of European integration usually put on material dimensions (economic, mostly), underscoring instead its societal aspects (Idem: 161). In fact, if one considers the Constructivists propositions and seeks to import them into the European studies, the stress put on societal and ideational aspects come to the surface very quickly, meaning that the material dimensions that often dominate the debates (the economic benefits of joining the Union, for example) are put aside. On the other hand, the impacts on, and the changes of, the identities and interests of the countries somehow involved with the EU are more carefully analysed and taken into account. As Risse

(Idem: 162) concluded, Constructivism seeks to understand European integration as something that shapes collective identities.

Moreover, under the logic of appropriateness and the principles of the co-constitution of agents and structures, institutions like the EU are not seen by this perspective as external or exogenous to actors, as these are “deeply embedded in and affected by the social institution in which they act” (Idem: 163). Subotic (2011: 311) makes a very pertinent question related to this issue: “why do States Europeanise?”. The rationalist account would justify it with the (material) benefits of accession, but that does not explain several cases of Europeanisation (such as the different outcomes of Croatia and Serbia, as the author mentions). So, the alternative answer is that they Europeanise (in the sense that they are willing to institutionalise and internalise EU rules, values, etc.) because they regard those rules and procedures as inherently appropriate and legitimate (Idem: 311) – “candidate states then adopt EU rules over time through socialization, persuasion, or habit” and social variables arise to provide a deeper understanding that goes beyond cost and benefit calculations (Idem: 311).

These thoughts were of much relevance for the selection of Constructivism, as it is our belief that materialism’s approach does not provide a fully satisfactory answer to the question on the reasons behind accession. Furthermore, the principles of the co-constitution of agents and structures and the denial of antecedence to both of them were also important for that decision, since states do not seem to be merely controlled by the institutions they are part of, nor are they only interested in making them their means to reach the national interests. The 2004 and 2007 enlargements are illustrative of this postulation: all the countries presented an economic performance (and also societal, at the level of Human Rights, for example) much lower than the EU average, but they acceded nevertheless. Those accessions implied a re-distribution of funds that harmed member-states’ interests (as they were reduced), but that did not prevent the twelve countries to join the Union, shaking its institutional balances too.

Concerning the accession process, several Constructivists’ arguments can be used to study it. First, Schimmelfennig and Sedelemeier (2002: 503) define enlargement as “a process of gradual and formal horizontal institutionalization of organizational rules and norms”. This definition entails some key aspects that are worth highlighting: the concepts ‘process’ and ‘gradual’ reveal that it is a dynamic that takes time, that is progressive. Wendt, as seen in the previous chapter, said identities are not “carved into

stone”, but they are difficult to change. Hence, aiming to reshape a collective identity implies patience and a gradual process. That process comprises a dynamic of institutionalisation, which means that actors, through interaction, become “normatively patterned” (Idem: 503). This assumption is very close to Constructivism: not only because Constructivism argues that it is through interaction that states modify their identities and interests, but also because this meta-theory stresses the role of norms and how important they are at the international context.

Secondly, if norms are important, the way they are conveyed should occupy a central position as well; in that sense, the study of institutions is encouraged by the Constructivist theoretical body, since they are responsible for diffusing the norms that regulate states’ behaviour and, ultimately, influencing the international scene. The accession process is nothing else but the diffusion of norms through the interaction between actors within the scope of an institution. Through socialisation (and other mechanisms), actors learn rules of appropriate behaviour and “norms become normal” (Risse, 2005: 164).

Third, the accession process necessarily involves another process – Europeanisation. Radaelli’s (2000: 4) definition of this concept¹⁸ includes a set of typically Constructivist notions, such as ‘construction’, ‘rules’, ‘procedures’, ‘shared beliefs and norms’, ‘discourse’ and ‘identities’, which are central to that paradigm, as clarified on Chapter 1. This constitutes an important Constructivist insight to a fundamental notion of the European studies; Europeanisation is not perceived, at least for this author and the many that follow him, just as the cumulative transference of legislation from the EU to a Europeanising country – rather, it involves some other dimensions as important as (or even more important than) the material, legalistic dimension. Being a construction, actors can be involved in that process, as it is not something taken from granted or given; identity issues are not ignored here, as well as the beliefs that are also transferred.

This definition leads to the fourth issue Constructivism is able to contribute to and that is the emphasis on ideational aspects. The European Union is not only worried

¹⁸ Radaelli’s (2000: 4) definition of Europeanisation is widely viewed as one of the most complete and coherent proposals and states the following: “Processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”. It will be further developed and analysed on Chapter 4.

about rule adoption, but also about rule implementation – Commission’s Annual Reports reflect that concern, as it will be proven later on when dealing with the case study. Kohler-Koch (cited in Radaelli, 2000: 9) considered the biggest impact of EU’s policies to be cultural. That meets Radaelli’s opinion that the Union is not only able to influence formal structures, but also the values, the norms and the discourses (Radaelli, 2000: 12). Simultaneously, he recognises that the preferences of policy-makers can change, causing modifications in the process of integration too. As Radaelli (Idem: 26) concludes,

“Europeanization is a process. It is a process where the cognitive dimension of political life matters. Hence the current emphasis on mechanisms and variables should not preclude the dimension of evolution, learning and the social construction of politics”.

Fifth, Constructivism perceives international organisations as autonomous, powerful actors with constitutive and legitimacy-providing functions (Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier, 2002: 509). Only with this perspective is it possible to study the impact of an international organisation on a certain country, for that IO is perceived as being “able to impose definitions and purpose upon governments” and to create new interests (Idem: 510) – in this specific case, to appeal to values such as democracy and to convince Turkey to adopt and internalise them.

Sixth, as the last point allowed to foresee, the constitutive nature of IOs means, more broadly, that “applicants and members ‘construct’ each other and their relationship on the basis of the ideas that define the community represented by the international organization” (Idem: 523). In other words, this is the application of the principle of the co-constitution of agents and structures and the socially constructed nature of the phenomena. Besides, the more the state identifies with the community and shares its values and norms, the stronger the institutional bonds are and the more willing it will be to pursue institutionalisation (Idem: 513). Hence, identity plays a major role in relations between institutions and states – between structures and agents. The same authors (Idem: 514) elucidate that this identification varies among the external states and the community actors: the former have to conciliate their national and international identities and the latter are usually tightly related to and influenced by norms. This is clearly the case of the European Commission, for example, and the subsequent lack of coherence between its discourse and the national leaders’ discourse on Turkish

accession.¹⁹

When it comes to define the identity of a state or organisation, there are several possibilities. Subotic (2011: 312) enumerates a set of viable definitions of state identity; taking into consideration the context of this section, perceiving it as a collective understanding of what are appropriate political principles and practices seems to make sense. More importantly is that this identity cannot be considered in a vacuum, but rather as influenced by both the national and international frameworks (Idem: 312). Subotic seeks, therefore, to understand how state identities influence the Europeanisation process and, to find the answer to that interrogation, she proposes two concepts: identity convergence and identity divergence (Idem: 313). Very superficially approaching Subotic's thesis, it matters to retain that domestic actors pursue their objectives through these mechanisms of convergence and divergence; in the first case, they underline and promote the shared beliefs and values, avoiding contradictory ones. On the other hand, identity divergence is achieved through the promotion of national values and norms as opposed to the ones conveyed by the international actor present in the country (Idem: 313, 314). In other words, domestic actors, in the context of Europeanisation, promote or defy the values that come from abroad.

This example was provided here to raise the awareness of how important identities may be; Subotic's conclusion was that "state identity provides a fuller explanation of Europeanization's success or failure than does the concept of external incentives" (Idem: 314). This is a major finding that supports the Constructivist belief that identities matter; besides, if domestic actors can influence its population's inclination towards the acceptance of or the resistance against Europeanisation, it means that not only is their involvement essential to strengthen European values and norms internally, but also that a change in domestic actors' opinions would mean more pressure on the society towards one side or another – identities and interests are mutable; and they are also responsible for defining the boundaries of groups and determining who is in and who is out, as it will be developed on Chapter 8. In spite of existing a certain degree of normative unity among the members of a group (and the acceptance of the values and rules implied in their accession), it does not mean that there are no conflicts within the group or organisation. As Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2002: 514) wrote, in that case, "the decision-making process will not be a

¹⁹ Cf. Chapter 11.

bargaining process but a process of arguing”, which leads us to the next point: discourse.

The seventh and last aspect to be added to this list is discourse. Although it is not a widely accepted concept among all Constructivists, discourse occupies a significant place within the Constructivist paradigm. Discourse is then one of the differences between the interaction of elements within a group and of elements from different groups. Presenting arguments, challenging the others’ statements and struggling for consensus based on the best argument (Idem: 515) are part of the process of arguing that takes place within the organisations and discourse has thus the “potential to modify old, or construct new, identities and norms” (Idem: 515). Additionally, as Risse (2005: 164) puts forward, it is through discourse that the agents attribute meaning to their world and their actions. Applying Habermas’ theory of communicative action, Risse (Idem: 165) envisages EU’s institutions as a discourse more than business or bargaining arenas; besides, discourse practices can be a means “by which relationships are established and maintained” in the sense that discourse is seen as a process of meaning construction.

In Turkey-EU relations, discourse is an important component. This is why it will be taken into consideration when analysing Erdoğan’s 2011 official visit to Europe²⁰ and in the inclusion of the interviews among the methodological choices of the thesis. It is through discourse that agents and structures interact; it is through discourse that domestic elites convince (or discourage) the masses to fight for the integration into an international organisation and that the latter will seek to make it possible or not. Risse (2005: 161) considered that Constructivism could be useful in the study of European integration as complementary to (even more than replacing of) other approaches. In that sense, and after considering the diverse options available, for fitting the Constructivist meta-theory, (Neo-)Institutionalism was chosen as the substantive theory to embody these considerations into something more concrete.

2.2. Substantive theories of European integration

The broader theoretical context used to study not only European integration, but also the whole subject under scrutiny has been chosen, and the reasons behind it were

²⁰ Cf. Chapter 11.

partially presented in the previous section (some others will be put forward in the next one). However, it was lacking a more substantial theory that would concretise the abstract considerations of Constructivism. In that sense, Institutionalism seemed to fit the spirit of the thesis and to be adaptable to the meta-theory that had been chosen.

In fact, Grigoriadis (2009: 7) considers that there are four main theories of European integration: Functionalism, Liberal Intergovernmentalism, Historical Institutionalism and Constructivism. Interestingly, the author included Constructivism in the list together with substantive theories, which contradicts most theorists' understanding of the subject (like Risse, for example). Therefore, Constructivism will not be conceived here as comparable to other theories, even though its principles match the considerations made by (Neo-) Institutionalism, for instance. Going very quickly through the list used by Grigoriadis (2009), it is possible to realise which theories would not fit the purposes and the conceptualisation of this thesis.

Functionalism emphasises the autonomous power and the energy of society; the main subjects in politics are economy, society and the individuals' determination to solve problems. This theory also adopts the concept of "spillover", according to which initial efforts of cooperation increase with internal dynamics and originate further integration (Idem: 7); in other words, integration is like a vicious circle, in which the dynamics of integration promote more integration. Neo-functionalism introduced the political dimension to this spillover, proposing a more politicised version of functionalism (Telò, 2009: 95). As Professor Otto Holman said in a lecture in Turkey (September, 2011), European integration is like riding a bike: as long as the biker keeps riding it, it will move; if he stops, he would necessarily fall down. Functionalism is influenced by and close to Liberalism (Idem: 93). If peace is to be achieved, cooperation is required; this cooperation has to be based on economic and social needs and to be limited to specific fields (Idem: 94). However, this theory was criticised, among other things, because the developments in the EU were not smooth or cumulative.

Liberal Intergovernmentalism regards states as the primary decision-makers and is based on three main ideas (brought by Moravcsik): state's behaviour is rational; it is a liberal theory of national preference formation; and interstate negotiations are studied under an intergovernmentalist approach (Grigoriadis, 2009: 8). According to this perspective, agreements between states are achieved due to asymmetrical interdependence and, moreover, the ones responsible for influencing EU politics are not

its institutions, but its member states (Idem: 8). This vision denies institutions the capacity to interfere in preference formation or identity definition.

On the other hand, (Neo-)Institutionalism conceives institutions as “collections of standardised structures and operative procedures that define and stand for values, norms, interests, identities and beliefs”²¹ (March & Olsen *cited in* David, 2012: 12). This means that this approach regards institutions as relevant actors in the international scene and associates them with the Constructivist idea of being responsible for establishing the “appropriate behaviour that is learnt and internalised through socialisation and education” (David, 2012: 12). Also similarly to Constructivism, Institutionalism is a top-down approach (Grigoriadis, 2009: 9) that sees institutions as political vehicles that influence the political structures and policies (Idem: 9).

Institutionalism, as Constructivism, has been inspired by the English School and shares its historical and sociological interpretation of the systems theory, according to which the international system involves such a high level of interaction that all states need to take into consideration the other states’ behaviour to determine their own actions (Telò, 2009: 91). Moreover, Europe is given as an example of a situation of anarchy that evolved into a “society of states” since the Treaties of Westphalia in the sixteenth century and now it is comprised of “a group of states who, aware of certain common interests and values, consider themselves bound by a set of common rules in their mutual relations and participate in the proper functioning of common institutions” (Idem: 92). Therefore, expectations, preferences, interpretation and other variables are included by this theory to understand and explain the actors’ behaviour (David, 2012: 13).

In that sense, institutionalisation promotes change at the international level and is not limited to the scope of states, but includes other types of actors as well (Idem: 96, 97). Mario Telò (2009: 98) enumerates a list of the functions of institutions according to the institutionalist view, among which one can find: to decrease the uncertainty in international life and the security dilemma, to facilitate negotiations, to promote socialisation and learning between their members, to diminish the transaction costs and to stimulate the construction of collective identities. It is perceptible the importance (neo-)institutionalists attribute to organisations and it is also interesting that they share Constructivism’s holist approach and regard institutions as whole, different from the

²¹ Translation made by the author from the Portuguese version presented by David, 2012: 12.

simple addition of its parts: “once established, institutions provoke inertial dynamics. To a certain degree they take on a life of their own and become political actors in their own right” (Idem: 98). What seems to be different from Constructivism, however, is this primacy given to structures over agency. Yet, there are still many points of contact between the two theories and the way they perceive the world.

Nonetheless, inside Institutionalism, there are some nuances that originate the existence of several types of Institutionalism. Historical Institutionalism is one of them. This version accepts that states are not the only players in international relations and prefers to stress the development and historical uniqueness of institutions; besides, it recognises the mutability of states’ preferences, but they are criticised for the limited applicability of their conclusions, only suitable for a small number of cases (Idem: 99-102). Historical institutionalists also believe that, although it is possible that setbacks occur, institutional choices succeed in the end, and that they cannot be considered in a “vacuum”, but rather within a specific social and historical context (Grigoriadis, 2009: 10). This emphasis given to history is reflected in the adoption of the path-dependency theory, according to which “early decisions provide incentives for actors to perpetuate institutional and policy choices inherited from the past, even when the resulting outcomes are manifestly inefficient” (Idem: 10, 11). This implies that the costs to reverse a path that has already been begun by a certain country are very high and that ultimately history is important to understand the evolution of institutions, as well as their current options. Their role in international relations is to diffuse norms and expectations (even against the wishes of domestic institutions) (Idem: 12, 13) and therefore they acknowledge that “the European Union can sometimes become involved in domestic politics and have considerable impact on policies and institutions” (Idem: 13).

A second possible type is Rational Choice Institutionalism. Its name already reveals the foundations of this version which, contrarily to the previous one, considers individual states as utility maximisers that pursue self-interested objectives, act in accordance with cost-benefit calculations and regard institutions as means to diminish the transaction costs (Jönsson & Tallberg, 2008; Telò, 2009: 99). This perspective justifies the existence of institutions only because they fulfil the functions of states and, thus, Rational Choice Institutionalism refocuses the general institutionalist assumptions on the states’ actions within institutions (Telò, 2009: 99).

Finally, a third type of Institutionalism has three possible denominations, according to the authors, who name it differently, but who are clearly talking about the same version: for Schimmelfennig and Sedelemeier (2002) it is “Constructivist Institutionalism”; for Jönsson and Tallberg (2008), it is “Normative Institutionalism”; and for Mario Telò (2009), it is “Sociological Institutionalism”. Independently from the name given to this branch, the fact is that the three denominations also reveal that it is tightly connected to Constructivist and its assumptions. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2009: 513) provide a summarised overview about this type of Institutionalism that is worth quoting:

“According to constructivist Institutionalism, enlargement politics will generally be shaped by ideational, cultural factors. The most relevant of these factors is ‘community’ or ‘cultural match’, that is, the degree to which the actors inside an outside the organisation share a collective identity and fundamental beliefs”.

The comparison to the Constructivist assumptions is unavoidable and does not need to be explicitly referred to here. However, it is necessary to emphasise a set of issues, such as the fact that Constructivist/Normative/Sociological Institutionalism focuses on the role of norms and values and on the logic of appropriateness (Jönsson & Tallberg, 2008); besides, institutions are regarded as “normative cognitive structures: they express shared values” (Telò, 2009: 102) and their existence is shaped and constrained by their culture, context and functioning in a clear emphasis on the socio-cultural context of international institutions (Idem: 102).²²

As Telò (2009: 104) concludes,

“the neo-institutionalist schools mark a turning point in the long history of realist and neo-realist dominance. It is no longer possible to study twenty-first century international relations without taking institutional variables into account”.

Thus, taking in Institutionalism to concretise the more abstract considerations given by Constructivism was a need that proved to be valuable, as its insights have corroborated, to a large extent, the theoretical premises presented in the previous chapter. Next, and last, section will wrap up this first abstract contextualisation by presenting more thoughts about the connection between the thesis in general and the Constructivist proposals.

²² In fact, Telò (2009: 103, 104) still adds another type: Discursive Institutionalism. It was not included in this list for two reasons: first, he is one of the few authors that highlight this variant and second, as it is connected to discourse, it would be acceptable to include it within the Constructivist Institutionalism since discourse is related to it and would only enrich it.

2.3. The Constructivist proposal in Turkey-EU relations

In order to close this chapter on theoretical considerations, some issues still need to be addressed. Constructivism revealed to be one of the most adequate (meta-)theory of IR to study EU's impact on the Turkish democratisation process. Previously, several aspects of this paradigm have been connected to the subject of European integration and it was also even possible to establish close links with the Sociological Institutionalism.

Adler (2005: 90) argued that, besides being a meta-theory and a social theory, Constructivism also entailed a third level – as a theoretical and empirical perspective of IR. This is a valuable insight as most theorists only look at Constructivism as a meta-theory and, somehow, limit its application to the concrete study of IR phenomena, making it harder for a researcher to use it in an actual case study. In that sense, Constructivism in this thesis is seen as a theoretical perspective of International Relations that provides the investigation with a framework for the analysis of tangible phenomena – tangible not in the logic of material phenomena, but rather as any phenomenon that is justifiably included within the scope of IR object of study. In the specific case of this thesis, and besides the aspects already mentioned, Constructivism is present throughout the chapters and usually that connection is briefly and opportunely referred to; sometimes it may remain only implicitly.

Constructivism asserts that it has not been proved that reality is accessible. Also this thesis follows the principle that all knowledge is an attempt to come as close as possible to reality, but simultaneously recognising that it is difficult (if not impossible) to truly know it and apprehend it. So complex are social phenomena that what a researcher can do at most is to seek to understand their constitution through a small part of its whole and to contribute to the enlargement of the knowledge on the subject through its theoretical representation in the form of hypotheses or statements. This leads to another epistemological aspect: all knowledge is mediated by language, as those hypotheses and statements need to be formulated somehow and thus complete objectivity, despite the attempt to be followed as much as possible to guarantee the most serious and reliable results, is an illusion. The choice of a research theme and the theoretical approach to deal with it cannot be objective, they are purely subjective in the sense that they resulted from the free choice of the researcher depending on his or her interests and preferences, aligned with intellectual curiosity – when not constrained by

institutional and material limitations, such as budget and other requirements.

From these thoughts derive two important considerations. First, the recognition that social and natural sciences are different. Different because their objects of study are incomparable: a human being contextualised within a larger group, besides his reflexive capacity, entails much deeper and more complex dynamics than those represented by a bee, an ant or a rock. Furthermore, if social sciences' object of study is the human social being contextualised, it necessarily means that the researcher is himself part of the larger group he is studying, which raises obvious problems of impartiality that, for being impossible to be completely erased, have to be accepted and recognised in order to be bypassed in the most "scientific" way available.

Secondly, human beings interact with each other in the social environment through language. The importance of language is a Constructivist assumption shared by this thesis. Unfortunately, and for several reasons, it was not possible to include discourse analysis, but what people think about reality and say about it, their vision and perspective were taken into consideration. One example of that are the qualitative interviews led to several Turks. They pretended to illustrate the different angles Turks may look at the accession process and how they perceive it concerning their own country's efforts to enter the Union or even the Union's role in promoting democracy in Turkey. Paraphrasing a known expression, the accession process is what Turkey and the European Union make of it and think about it, so the role domestic actors play within this context is fundamental to assess the development of those relations and to envisage how they can be improved so that there are benefits (not only material ones, obviously) for both parts, making it a win-win situation.

In Turkey-EU relations, identity and interests matter. Chapter 8 will take that into consideration, as well as other socio-cultural aspects essential to understand the background in which those relations operate. If identity and interests were fixed, Turkey would be as undemocratic as it used to be in the early phases of its history – which did not happen. As a matter of fact, if there is a country whose identity has been being constantly adapted to new conditions and contexts, that country is Turkey – the historical context made in Part III illustrates that. Additionally, there has been, over the last centuries, a certain tendency of Turkey to be more prone to cooperate with the West. Naturally, so many centuries of history with relations with Europe imply that these have not always been smooth or peaceful, but rather object of the inherent

dynamics of history.

Individuals, states and the European Union have their own visions and interpretations, and this thesis will attempt to prove whether they really matter. When Turks feel displeased with the state of the relations with the EU, one wonders if that may have an impact on the accession process, or even in the country's democratisation that is entailed in the former. Also, the Union's discourse may have an impact on people's perceptions: stating that Turkey is a candidate to full membership, but that other options are available, certainly does not create the same feeling than affirming that full membership is the only possibility for a country that fulfils its obligations as a candidate. The interpretation of accession negotiations interferes with them. Despite the difficulty implied, there will be an attempt to realise if these ideational factors really matter more than material ones – are money transfers from the EU more persuasive or influential than a friendly, understandable and encouraging approach by the Union?

Furthermore, Constructivism takes norms and institutions with high regard. In this thesis, the European Union is the institution under scrutiny and as March and Olsen (*cited in* David, 2012: 22) wrote, the EU is historically the highest institutionalised organisation; democracy is the value that it diffuses through the accession process and the *acquis communautaire* are the norms that have to be imported by Turkey. Buhari (2009: 111) reminds that Sociological Institutionalism acknowledges that EU's effects include ideational, normative and cognitive factors, which goes far beyond the mere transference of legislation. Therefore, before this scenario, there is an international institution that diffuses its values and norms to a country that decided to apply for full membership to that institution and was granted the status of candidate. Despite all conundrums, it remains in the race to reach the target and its reasons for having begun it may be several and are under lively debates: a cost-benefit calculation, prestige to be part of the European Union, technical and technological development, cultural affirmation, normatively attracted by the organisations' values (such as democracy), continuing the logic of its historical heritage, etc. are among the several possible explanations for that. However, after so many years of interaction with the European Union, the reasons and the logic for carrying on the process may have varied.

Truth is that, despite the ups and downs in the relationship, a high degree of interaction has been occurring for various years and the way the Union may spread its norms and beliefs can happen through different mechanisms, like coercion,

conditionality or socialisation. The latter is a concept related to Constructivism, as it integrates social learning and interaction as an effective and enduring manner to modify a country's identity and interests. It is within an environment of close relationship with other peers and international institutions that those dynamics may take place. As Buhari (2009: 111) reminds, the EU is a model of socialisation and of norm diffusion. Another important ontological consideration present throughout this work is the co-constitution of agents and structures. The division of Chapter 3 clearly exposes that assumption. The European Union is composed by several individual member states, but has acquired, during decades of integration and consolidation, a life of its own; at the same time, the individual actors that compose it (and that relate to it somehow, like Turkey) have an intersubjective influence over it. Therefore, beside the co-constitution, neither agency nor structure precedes the other. Turkey-EU relations are the proof that anarchy (or the interaction between international actors) depends on what they pretend to build; both had several options – isolation, cooperation, conflict, integration – but they chose the ones that seemed appropriate according to their own internal contexts and dynamics.

Methodologically speaking, this thesis follows the Constructivist suggestion too: it embraces a combination of several techniques that range from the quantitative to the qualitative analysis. It does neither ignore statistical data nor historical analysis; it includes a model with indicators and numerical evaluations of democratic aspects, but it also comprises the theoretical, qualitative and fundamental contributions of several authors for the definition of the model of democracy. It tried to be methodological eclectic; not for the sake of preferring one over the other, but to search for an academic theorisation that would be as faithful as possible to the complex reality it proposed to deal with.

Thus, and to conclude this chapter, it is important to remember that choosing both Constructivism and Institutionalism as theoretical frameworks to guide the study of Turkey-EU relations and the specific question about the latter's impact on Turkish democratisation does not pretend to be an inflexible or dogmatic approach; on the contrary, it simply meant that, given the complexity of the phenomena involved, a theoretical background would be valuable to help conduct this endeavour. Several lenses could be used to see this problem; those were the chosen ones.

PART II – DEMOCRACY AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

3. Democracy – conceptual analysis and assessment

3.1. Introduction

The concept of democracy is known for representing a particularly complex and dynamic reality. It is reasonable to consider that it constitutes one of the most challenging concepts within the vocabulary of Social Sciences, not only due to the wide range of phenomena it encompasses, but also because of the dynamics it represents, as well as the different and diverse approaches many researchers have developed to comprehend the subject theoretically, creating various divisions among those who propose themselves to analyse it. However, it is simultaneously of much relevance to many studies, requiring the special attention of researchers and academics when dealing with the notion, as it is the case of this thesis, due to its objectives and central argument: in order to understand the evolution of a country's democracy, one needs first to try to delimit the boundaries of such a blurred concept, so that it is possible to develop a coherent approach to the subject under consideration.

There is a multitude of different proposals to conceive, understand and operationalise the concept of democracy, which makes any attempt to embrace it academically a hazardous endeavour. Notwithstanding, it is impossible to regard any approach better than other, simply because each of them is based on different choices and perspectives, according to the researcher's beliefs and purposes. As Ross Harrison (1998: 867) explains, democracy is "an essentially contested concept (...) whose analysis is unresolvable because different analysts read into it their favoured rules". Based on this premise, the objective of this chapter is to provide a set of thoughts regarding the concepts of democracy, transition and consolidation as the theoretical core of the thesis, relying on the inputs of different authors, eclectically combined, keeping in mind the final objective of assessing the evolution of a specific country's real democracy and hopefully using that final proposal to contribute to a profitable discussion around the subject.

This is not, however, a recent debate. On the contrary, it can be traced back to

the Hellenic Era – Athens is considered to have created a system of rule that based the classical model of democracy. This first democratic paradigm (the Greek or Aristotelian one) was founded on principles of equality before the law and of political equality, in which all citizens were entitled to participate. Plato was very pessimistic regarding this regime, due to the levelling equality that would harm the society through the instability and unpredictability of the popular demands (Hermet, 1997: 15). Aristotle, on the other hand, believed the choice of political regime should be pragmatic and take into account the circumstances. And, although he rejected the idea of the people's incompetence, sovereignty ought not to be dependent solely on the (unstable) mood of the people's majority, according to Aristotle's view. Therefore, the ideal system would combine popular legitimacy with rulers coming from a minority, chosen for their skills and moral qualities, in order to soften the possible consequences of the majority's volatility (Idem: 16).

The second model, the Romanistic-Medieval, continues the development of the democratic principles founded in the previous one, namely through the theoretical contributions of William of Ockham (ca. 1255-1350) and Marsilius of Padua (ca. 1275-1342) (Lopes, 1989: 1318). Although these authors are not frequently mentioned, their theoretical contributions, when considered within the framework of the Medieval period, are *avant-garde*: William of Ockham, member of the Franciscan Order, was, unexpectedly, in favour of church/state separation, arguing that despite the origin in God of the religious and civil powers, the latter did not have to submit to the Pope's intervention. This thesis was particularly relevant for strengthening the Empire's laicisation and to weaken the papal authority (Gonçalves, 1989: 961). Marsilius of Padua was a follower of Aristotle and proposed a relatively populist conception in terms of a rather inclusive political participation, stating that law had to be enforced by the population's approval, which was also a condition for the establishment of a government (McGrade, 1998: 112). It should be highlighted how both approaches revealed a serious concern for the principle of the rule of law, contributing to the improvement and development of the conception of democracy. Furthermore, the influence of the Catholic Church that supported the equality of all men and some main events during the Middle Ages, such as the *Magna Carta* (1215) and the first model of Parliament in the Kingdom of León proposed by King Afonso IX (1188), constitute examples of the development of the democratic system, even though there were not, in

this period, democracies as they are nowadays understood.

Finally, the creation of the Modern model of democracy is attributed to Locke (1632-1704) and Rousseau (1712-1778), who allowed the concept of democracy to go beyond the political domain, including economic, social and cultural dimensions. Locke was concerned with natural rights and emphasised the right to life, liberty and property, and therefore believed only property owners should be entitled to vote; besides, and in order to protect the individuals from the abuse of power, Locke proposed the separation of the legislative power from the executive one. On the other side, Jean-Jacques Rousseau focused on the principles of freedom and of equality (both political and economic), and emphasised that the legislative power belonged to the people through the Social Contract. Therefore, Rousseau believed democracy was only possible in small states, due to his suspicion about the value and feasibility of representation (Hermet, 1997: 20-25; Heywood, 2002: 67-84; Lopes, 1989: 1317-18).

As it can be perceived, progressively, the notion of democracy had been reformulated and its meaning and implications deepened. Other authors, such as Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832), John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859), provided with their contributions, as well. For example, in 1835 Tocqueville published one of the most notable works on democracy; as João Carlos Espada explains in the Preface to the latest Portuguese edition of *De la Démocratie en Amérique* (Tocqueville, 2007: 12), “Tocqueville did not provide an accurate definition of the concept of democracy. He gave us more and better: instead of defining the word, he described the phenomenon”. Over the centuries, these and many other thinkers paid attention to the phenomenon of democracy and to its definition too.

The spread of democracy, along with the studies on democracy, has been a reality, mainly since the nineteenth century. Samuel Huntington (1991) divides this “democratisation of the world” into three different and widely referenced waves, whose analysis permits to realise the increasing number of democratic regimes. Mainly after the two World Wars, both triggered by unstable democracies and susceptible social situations, democracy started to be perceived as the only regime that seemed to work, since both Fascism and Communism failed and the longest established democracies showed relatively success in providing their citizens with conditions for them to fulfil their needs and wishes. And if in 1974 there were only 40 democracies in the world, this

number has progressively risen; the 1990s democratisation processes made this regime a “global phenomenon” and currently three fifths of the countries are democratic (Diamond, 2003: 2). As Campbell (2008: 7) also concludes, “democracy, after 1980, represents the dominant global regime type”.²³

Nevertheless, as Diamond (2003: 10) argued, democracy is global with the exception of the Middle East: “Only in the Middle East is democracy virtually absent. In fact, among the sixteen Arab countries, there is not a single democracy, and with the exception of Lebanon, there never has been”. This fact may be relevant for the study of the Turkish case, as the country’s surroundings may exert some type of negative influence on the democratic performance of Turkey if one follows the reasoning of this author. And even though the Arab Spring may have brought important democratic transitions to some neighbour countries, the fact is that Turkey’s surroundings cannot be regarded yet a a stable environment capable of inspiring and promotion democracy in Turkey. However, it raises another important and broader question: is democracy a universal value?

Cortona (2008: 454) wrote that democracy diffusion is part of a broader process of exchange between cultures of models and products of different kinds in a globalised world. If it is perceived in this way, then the export of democracy and the choice to democratise may be seen as a dynamic comparable to other exchanges, such as soap operas or fast food chains. Therefore, if democratisation occurs, it means that it exerts some type of appeal that justifies some populations’ fights to achieve, install and consolidate democracy in their countries. According to public opinion surveys cited in Larry Diamond (2003: 12-13)²⁴, the appreciation of this regime is shared by different cultures: for 69% of Africans, democracy is “always preferable” to authoritarianism, as well as for 57% of Latin-Americans, and Muslims are as supportive of democracy as non-Muslims. Besides, “Amarta Sen [Nobel Laureate in Economics 1998] argues that

²³ In fact, one should be cautious when mentioning the success or the numbers of democracies in the world, as this counting depends much on the definition and the understanding of the different political regimes. For example, Pasquino (2010: 320-21) is not so optimistic in his analysis and despite his agreement with the thesis that the number of democratic regimes has been growing in the last decades, this author considers that non-democracies are still the majority of the political systems. According to Pasquino’s reading of the Freedom House data, in 2007 there were 90 democracies and 192 non-democratic states. Therefore, it should be recognised that there are different visions on the subject (due to different definitions of democracy), despite a general agreement on the increasing number of democracies, as a result of a broad movement of democratisation around the world.

²⁴ The data mentioned by the author was presented by different surveys, such as the Afrobarometer, the East Asia Barometer and the New Europe Barometer. For further information, cf. Diamond, 2003.

the mark of a universal value is not that it has the consent of everyone, but that ‘people anywhere may have reason to see it as valuable’” (Sen, 2001 *cited in* Diamond, 2003: 14). “By this measure, there is growing evidence of all kinds that democracy is becoming a truly universal value” (Diamond, 2003: 14). Although the notion of democracy may vary and, with it, the number of countries considered democratic or not, it is noticeable a general tendency to democratise and to consolidate existing democracies, even though some may claim that nowadays political and economic crises lead to some doubts regarding the value and validity of this regime – whose discussion would direct us to another issue that is not of relevance to this work.

Coming back to the discussion over the tendency to democratise, there are various reasons behind this scenario that will be pointed out in due course, but one of the dimensions that is explored in this thesis and that will be focused upon is the international influence on the democratic experiences of democratising countries, as it is the case of Turkey and the European Union.

3.2. The path towards democracy: the transition phase

Democracy can be defined by what it is not: an autocracy²⁵ (Jagers and Gurr, 1995: 496). This premise follows a logic that traces a political *continuum* in which one of the extremes is democracy and the other an autocratic regime²⁶. Throughout that line, different political systems would be displaced, defined by their democratisation degree. Thus, any non-democratic regime could be understood as a form of governance that, denying their citizens the possibility of political participation, has as priority the state’s interests, exercising the power arbitrarily (Giddens, 2000: 428; Pasquino, 2010: 320). Inside this wider group, it is possible to find more specific political systems, such as authoritarianisms, totalitarianisms, post-totalitarianisms and the sultanates (Linz & Stepan, 1996 *cited in* Pasquino, 2010: 334).

²⁵ The noun “autocracy” will be used throughout this thesis to mean, in a general fashion, all non-democratic regimes.

²⁶ Figure 7 (below) is a graphic representation of the above mentioned *political continuum*.

Figure 7: The political regime's line I



Source: Author's elaboration based on Jagers e Gurr, 1995.

If a non-democratic regime is established, some changes have to occur in order to modify that situation, so that the country enters in a transition period that might eventually lead it to democracy. However, this change is not easy and has to overcome the obstacles of the resistance of the previous regimes, such as the economic success, the repressive logic or the power of the leaders, for example (Diamond, 2003: 20). Sooner or later, nevertheless, some internal and external dynamics begin to come up and to promote a favourable context to transition. This movement becomes of utmost importance, since the institution and quality of the future democracy depend, to a great extent, on the development of this phase. For Geoffrey Pridham and Tatu Vanhanen (2003: 2), and to provide an initial definition of the concept that will be dealt with in the next pages, 'democratic transition' is

“a stage of regime change commencing at the point when the previous totalitarian/authoritarian system begins to collapse, leading to the situation when, with a new constitution in place, the democratic structures become routinized and the political elites adjust their behavior to liberal democratic norms.”

However, neither is this definition unanimously accepted. The complexity of this concept's definition is reflected, among others, by existing theoretical approaches, such as the functionalist and the genetic schools. The latter emphasises the political aspects that, in the short term, influence the process of transition – political choices and the actors' strategies, for instance. On the contrary, the functionalist approach prefers a broader vision that takes into consideration the socio-economic environment that works as preconditions for the regime change in the long term (Idem: 2-3). As Pridham (2003: 16) put it, one is macro-oriented and structural, whereas the other is micro-oriented and conjunctural.

Despite their differences, both sides can complementarily contribute to a more detailed and complete analysis of the process in question, given the fact that

functionalist direct their attention towards a timing prior to the concrete transition and immediately after its conclusion, whereas the genetic school completes it with the study of the period since the collapse of the autocratic regime until the beginning of the new-born democracy. In that sense, both structural conditions that undermined the disintegrating regime and the political choices that constrained the process (political choices and decisions that did not achieve the desired results, for example) would be comprised in the study of the transition (Idem: 16).

This discussion, however, is followed by another relevant question to the study of democratic transitions related to the limits or boundaries of the process: when do transitions end? When do they start? Including the study of the broader context is one of the proposals presented above, but it is not certain how further back it is necessary to go to get to the roots of the process. Janine Reinhard (2008: 10) recovers the opinion of prominent scholars (O'Donnell, Pridham and Merkel) and distinguishes the transition period from the prior liberalisation and from the subsequent consolidation. But, according to Schmitter and Schneider (2004: 4), these stages overlap in different ways, which makes it difficult for any scholar to disentangle all the moments.

Rustow (1970) postulated that the active and lively character of transition processes should be attempted to be incorporated in a more dynamic model. Therefore, the author developed a proposal that perceives the whole process as the result of four sequential phases (meaning that the process itself was divided into four different stages): background, preparatory phase, decision phase and habituation phase. Each of them consists of a set of specific dynamics; the latter would then represent the internalisation of the democratic norms and values to an extent that the population would regard the regime as the only one capable of providing the solutions to the problems of the community, with a generalised feeling of trust in democracy and its institutions.

In contrast, Pridham (2003) and Pridham and Vanhanen (2003) claim that transition is a rather short period encompassing the moment in which the previous regime starts to breakdown until the proclamation of the Constitution or the election of a government under the auspices of the new Constitution. Transition would be followed by consolidation, a slower, deeper and wider process that implies a progressive internalisation of the democratic norms and the complete institutionalisation of the new regime.

These divisions among the academics regarding the conceptualisation and departmentalisation of these phenomena are illustrative of the difficulty to academically separate what in real life constitutes a logical and continuous process with the advances and retreats characteristic of such complex reality. Nevertheless, and for academic purposes, democratisation will be understood henceforth as the conceptual umbrella that covers all the moments related to regime change in a country. Thus, democratisation includes pre-transition (or liberalisation), transition and consolidation in a logic that follows the proposal above presented; regarding Rustow's conceptualisation, it is possible to integrate what this author comprised only in the transition period as parts of other phases. In this sense, the background and the preparatory stages match the pre-transition period; the decision phase overlaps the transition itself and finally what Rustow called 'habituation' is one of the main features of post-transition, i.e., the consolidation period (analysed with more detail ahead).

Our proposal combines both the functionalist and the genetic approaches, as it takes into consideration not only the macro-environment of the broader structural background that triggered the change, but also the shorter-term decisions, actions and strategies that constitute what is referred to as the transition moment, here understood as the gap between the collapse of the previous regime (be it due to a *coup d'état*, popular revolutions, political leaders renouncing, etc.) and the establishment of a democratically elected government and the approval of a new (democratic) constitution. Only after these formal moments does the society enter a consolidation period, a deeper and slower process that implies the internalisation and institutionalisation of the democratic values and norms that will be analysed further on.

3.2.1. Conditions behind transitions

The backgrounds that contextualise the different transitions are various. Once again, given the complexity of this reality (not reducible to a mathematical equation), academics' attempt to build an explanatory model with predictive capabilities results in a multitude of explanations, definitions and theses – as many as the factors at the disposal of theorists.

Eclectically based on various authors, our proposal of systematisation of the conditions that promote democratic transitions consists of dividing them into two main

groups that influence each other mutually: agents and structure – following the Constructivist premises.

3.2.1.1. Agency

Human agency is a relevant variable that, along with structural conditions, contributes to explain (or at least to understand better) regime change situations. Both elites and mass public tend to play a major role in the democratisation of their societies, becoming therefore a *sine qua non* condition for this phenomenon.

“Since democratization is so uncertain and can easily be affected by human agency within the process or by some combination of those diverse actors, many scholars now agree that actors within the transition process are often more important than any societal or civil prerequisites” (Whyte, 2009: 66).

This vision clearly reflects the choice of some authors for the genetic approach, as they attribute the antecedence and the biggest importance to actors, belittling the role of the structural context.

a) Civil Society

Civil society is of great relevance in every phase of democratisation: during pre-transition, it is fundamental that they start to become aware of the existence of other alternatives to the autocratic regime that rules them and, consequently, start pushing for the disintegration of that same regime. During the transition period, demonstrations and revolutions are frequently the symbol of the fall of non-democratic rulers, and during the consolidation phase, masses are the ones to internalise the new practices and to apply them in their daily actions, so that the democratic regime develops and deepens its roots, guaranteeing the success of the new political system.

Epstein (*et. al.*, 2007: 14) and his team agree with this idea and emphasise how important a vibrant civil society is to promote, deepen and consolidate democracy. Paxton (2004), using the concept of “social capital”²⁷, adds the relevance of social connections (during the transition) to the diffusion of ideas and to dissemination of an anti-governmental speech that undermines the institutionalised powers, promoting the

²⁷ “Social capital” is understood by this author as the “notion that social relations can facilitate the production of economic or noneconomic goods” (Paxton, 2004: 256). As a matter of fact, the concept of “social capital” is originally attributed to Putman, who defines it as “[...] features of social organization, such as trust, norms, and networks that can improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated actions” (Putman, 1993 *cited by* Cierco, 2013).

resources needed to lead a large scale action; and the role of an active social capital to the maintenance of a healthy democracy through a lively political participation by the citizens (Idem: 257-58)²⁸. Finally, Cortona (2008: 436) recognises that, among other domestic factors, an “articulated and autonomous” civil society is key to the democratisation process.

b) Elites

However, masses do not act alone: as most of the previously mentioned authors also claim, elites play a vital role in democratisation, as well. First, national elites are, in this context, perceived as “persons who are able, by virtue of their (...) positions in powerful organizations and movements of whatever kind, to affect national political outcomes regularly and substantially” (Higley and Burton, 1989: 18). In fact, elites are more or less involved in the maintenance of the regime in power, usually for economic or strategic reasons. They help the rulers repress the masses and control them, and, therefore, their support to the democratic cause is very paramount. Besides, there are the military elites, whose alliance is fundamental for a successful transition. The point is that groups with different types of power can facilitate or hamper the intentions of the supporters of democracy and, hence, constitute a valuable help to consider when planning a regime change.

Campbell (2008: 6) includes the involvement of elites as a necessary condition for transition, just as Diamond (2003: 20) claims too; Haggard and Kaufman (1997: 265) give emphasis to the role of political elites, considering that the “new institutions are bargains among self-interested politicians” and Higley and Burton (1989: 17) point out that some authors believe the success or failure of transitions depends on the national elites’ choices – the loyalty of the military is of much relevance for the survival of the regime and the behaviour, as well as the support, of the economic elites is very unpredictable, as they can become opponents of the regime very quickly (Haggard and Kaufman, 1997: 268).²⁹ Thus, despite the differences in the stress put in their relative importance, there is a widespread agreement that elites play a key role in democratic transitions.

²⁸ The author’s argument is that the relationship between social capital and democracy is reciprocal: both contribute to each other’s strengthening.

²⁹ This argument supports the Constructivist premise that interests are mutable, not fixed.

There is, nonetheless, a divergence within the academic field: some authors, like Huntington, argue that consensus among the elites is essential for the establishment of a stable democracy, because this group only cooperates when its members feel it is their duty or in their interest. Other academics (like Roeder), on the other hand, postulate that fragmentation is preferable, as it would avoid the process to be controlled only by one group (Whyte, 2009: 65-66). Higley and Burton (1989: 17) call these situations, respectively, a “consensually unified” and a “desunified” national elite and share Huntington’s perspective that only a unified elite produces a stable regime that can progress towards a modern democracy.

On the other side of the discussion, there are the authors that believe elites have to be helped by the masses to achieve their objectives (Higley and Burton, 1989: 22) and that the elites’ role has been “overvalued” by academics (Pridham and Vanhanen, 2003: 3). For the proponents of this argument, the discussion should focus on the interaction between these two groups of actors within the framework of a larger context (Idem: 3) – the structure. Following this logic, Emma Whyte (2009: 68) considers different methods of democratic transitions, according to the different possible roles played by these actors. As Table 2 below schematises, combining the role of elites and masses and their approach (more or less unilateral), it is possible to achieve four different outcomes: transition by reform (masses/multilateral), revolution (masses/unilateral); pacts (elites/multilateral); imposition (elites/unilateral). It is clear that the two first results are bottom-up and the other two top-down approaches, and that different situations create different degrees of stability of the future regime.

Table 2: Methods of democratic transition

	Masses	Elites
Compromise/multilateral	Reform	Pacts
Force/unilateral	Revolution	Imposition

Source: Author’s elaboration (according to Whyte, 2009: 68)

3.2.1.2. Structure

But it is not only direct human action that constraints these complex processes of democratic transitions. In fact, there is a set of structural conditions that also contribute to shape the dynamics of the movement. Even though they are constituted or constructed by human beings, their presence above the individuals is a reality and

should be taken into consideration when analysing certain phenomena.

a) Economic development

Economic development is regarded by many researchers as one of the most important factor triggering the transition from a non-democratic regime: Dahl and Huntington (*cited in* Whyte, 2009: 59) share this view and Campbell (2008: 207-20) includes national wealth among his ten domestic conditions for democracy, for example. Epstein (*et al.*, 2006: 560) concludes that the “GDP seems to have a significant impact on the probability of transition both into and out of democracy” – and, therefore, supports the focus and theses of many researchers who, during the 1990s, privileged the economic dimension of regime change, such as Rustow, Kuznets, Chenery, Taylor, and Przeworski’s. Furthermore, Epstein and his team (Idem: 564) claim that “the key to consolidation of a new democracy (...) is a strong economy”.

This emphasis, however, is not given by all authors and some nuances or even oppositions can be found in the work of several academics. Muller (1995) prefers to underscore the relevance of income equality for the constitution of a stronger middle-class, the true pro-democracy group. Therefore, the economic variable here is interpreted in a more specific reality, and income inequality is viewed as having a “negative impact on the stability of democracy over time” (Idem: 967). Haggard and Kaufman (1997: 266-67), on the other side, do not perceive any connection between economic crises and regime change; for them, they are neither sufficient nor necessary for the withdrawal of a previous non-democratic government. Lipset (*cited in* Whyte, 2009: 59) reached the same conclusion, as well as Diamond (2003: 14, 15), who believes that if there is any type of correlation between economic development and democracy is through an indirect way, such as the subsequent education or stronger civil society; economy is not a condition by itself, as the petro-states epitomise – rich but not educated and with hybrid regimes. The economic performance, however, can be a relevant variable when considering the disintegration of the autocratic regime, since its establishment is frequently associated with economic goals; consequently, there is a dilemma: if they fail, they lose the justification for ruling; if they reach the goals, they can be perceived as not anymore necessary and become “victims of their own success” (Idem: 15).

Hence, since autocracies resist thanks to repression, the power of their leaders, the lack of education of its population, etc., it would undermine their consistency if the citizens were exposed to the rest of the world (Idem: 20-21) that is constantly exporting its ideas and values and would, as a result of some cultural change, contribute to the strengthening of a “culture of democracy”, which recalls what Emma Whyte (2009: 59) thinks about the economic variable: it is necessary but not sufficient.

b) Social, civil and psychological pre-requisites

Thus, there is a set of other variables (such as this “culture of democracy”) that can be included within the framework of the “social, civil and psychological pre-requisites” for democracy (Idem: 59). This expression means that both the masses and the elites are framed within a certain broader context that can either encourage or dishearten the actors to pursue their democratisation impulses. It is clearly a variable that underlines the value of the ideational side of the arguments, among which one can find some other contributions to this on-going discussion about the promoting factors behind democratic transition.

Pamela Paxton (2002) links social capital and democracy, stating that these emotional connections between citizens increase their cooperation and reinforce civil society through the promotion of democratic values and collective action (although the influence of social capital on democracy is reciprocal). Rustow (1970) argues that any genetic theory needs to include a two-direction causality flow between political conditions, and economic and social ones. However, he is against the idea of creating democrats first: “Instead, we should allow for the possibility that circumstances may force, trick, lure, or cajole non-democrats into democratic behaviour” (Idem: 344). The only condition that seems to matter to Rustow is national unity.

‘National unity’ is regarded by this author as the only background condition that should precede any phase of democratisation, because it is fundamental that, despite the variation of different governments that come to power and leave it, citizens remain a cohesive group (Idem: 350). Cortona (2008: 436), in the same line of reasoning, considers the absence of conflicts related to national questions one of the domestic conditions necessary for regime change. It is, as a matter of fact, another valuable

variable to take into consideration; however, the process of establishing a new democracy is frequently very fierce in what comes to social cleavages and instability and, although national unity would be a key to avoid a society's disintegration, several times it simply does not exist. This reminds of the stability-democracy dilemma: democracy is a prerequisite for stability, but the path towards it (democratisation) very often consists of disquieting times. This argument is supported by Mansfield and Snyder's (2002) study that reached the conclusion that during the initial phases of democratisation, there is a higher likelihood of a country to involve in a war, meaning that transitions can be a tricky phase for the country's peace. Moreover, if transitions fail and create weak institutions, there are higher risks for foreign policy, which leads the authors assert that, before allowing free and competitive elections, it is necessary to promote the rule of law, an independent judiciary and other democratic principles (Idem: 334).

There is, then, besides national unity, a wide range of other conditions that are believed by many academics to facilitate the transition to democracy. Education appears at the top of the list as a factor that strengthens the democratic character of a certain society – as the previously mentioned authors argued, to create a democratic background is of utmost importance to avoid weak institutions, overpowered elites and armed conflicts. Consequently, education, urbanisation, social equality, national unity and others constitute a set of broader pre-requisites that, although not sufficient for the establishment of a new regime, increases its likelihood.

c) History

The weight of history and previous experiences gather a wider than the economic arguments consensus among academics – even though those are more supported by functionalists. Living under the scope of a non-democratic regime leaves its marks and different political systems shape the society and their habits differently, originating very diverse contexts – it is, therefore, easier to democratise from an authoritarianism than from a totalitarianism (Whyte, 2009: 63). Prior failed democratisation attempts undermine the population's confidence; they are responsible for leaving a potentially negative legacy, weakening future attempts to democratise (Epstein, *et al.*, 2006: 556). As Morlino (*cited in* Pridham, 2003: 18) wrote: “the previous democratic experience affects deeply the new democratic arrangements; it is

part of the historical memory of the people preserved, in turn, by the mechanisms of political socialisation”.

Moreover, history is important to understand the dynamics behind democratisation, as it helps the analyst know more deeply that society’s political culture, namely, for instance, if there is a tradition of respect for the rule of law, of power concentration or even of defined boundaries between the Church and the State (Cortona, 2008: 436). No democratic history, ethnic differences and difficult economic conditions make it harder to democratise (Epstein, *et al.*, 2007: 15) and, therefore, many authors value this approach and criticise (like Pridham and Vanhanen, 2003) when historical explanations are ignored, as the roots of democratisation habitually stretch back to the past heritage of the country.

These two aspects – the legacy of the previous regime and the history of attempts to democratise – support Rustow’s (1970: 348) argument, according to which it should be pursued a historical-political approach, as well as the constructivist conceptions on the socialisation boosted by organisations. In fact, and although Rustow does not mention it directly, Cortona (2008: 435) also defends that “democratisation is always the result of a combination of internal and external factors”³⁰ and, in that sense, international organisations (and the broader international context) should be included in this analysis too.

d) International environment

Domestic factors play an important role in creating the conditions for transitions, but they are not alone: international dynamics are also essential to determine the broader framework in which democratisation will occur – and this environment can either be a favourable one or it can jeopardise the internal efforts (when they exist). Traditionally, the domestic factors used to be emphasised over the international ones; this trend, however, due to major changes in the global scene during the last decades and to the growing importance and strengthening of the discipline of International Relations, has been changing. Despite the criticisms that remain regarding the role of international conditions, there are already many theorists who started to recognise the importance of

³⁰ Translated from the Italian by the author. Original version: “Le democratizzazioni sono sempre state il risultato di una combinazione di fattori interni e di fattori esterni (o internazionali)”.

the external conditions to understand more deeply and broadly such complex reality: Dimitrova (1996) quotes Schmitter when he admitted, in 1995, that the international impact on regime change may have been more significant than he previously (in 1989) thought; and Attila Agh, who, in the late 1990s, already considered the external factors the prime catalyst behind democratisation (Idem). The debate about the precedence of either the domestic or the external conditions seems to be of little relevance (as well as outdated) to the development of the study of democracy and democratisation, as it is our belief that only the combined action of both sides, difficult to disentangle, allows a successful transition and consolidation. However, there is a growing recognition that the international side of democratisations should be included in the analyses: Campbell (2008), Diamond (2003), Pasquino (2010), Börzel and Risse (2009), Cortona (2008) and Fossati (2010) are some examples of relatively recent works of authors that incorporate the international dimension of democratisation in their central arguments.

It is important to notice that the role of democracy promoter is not only to be attributed to the European Union, but also to other very relevant organisations, such as the Catholic Church that seeks to promote social justice and human rights among different countries, especially in South America or Africa. Besides the EU and the Catholic Church, it should not be ignored the role of individual states (USA, Japan, Sweden, etc.) and other organisms, such as the United Nations, the OSCE or NATO, that illustrate the willingness of various entities to support and maintain democracy. Moreover, there are the changes in norms and international conventions, elements that have a significant impact on the regulation of international actors' behaviour and to the constitution of their identity. They have always attempted to progressively highlight human rights and democracy, including these in the international discourse, in treaties and in collective action, being in part responsible for a "shared normative expectation", according to which all the states that look for international legitimacy have to rule with the consent of the governed – a principle that is increasingly more explicit in legal documents (Diamond, 2003: 16-17).

Although this subject of the role of foreign organisations or the external environment will be more profoundly scrutinised in the next chapter, it is to say that, as the broad domestic context, the international framework can work either as a supportive or debilitating factor (Pasquino, 2010: 364) and, as the same author recognises, despite the difficulty to apprehend it theoretically, "the effect seems to be of positive contagion

among close countries” (Idem: 365). It is therefore more likely to exist a positive domino effect rather than a negative one, according to this perspective, that can be explained by the interesting work developed by Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse (2009) regarding the international diffusion of ideas, norms and values, among which one can find democracy, through processes (better explained in the next chapter) of socialisation, persuasion and emulation (Idem: 9). As a matter of fact, the proposals to frame the different models of international influence on domestic process are various and progressively more detailed and encompassing, due to the efforts of an increasing number of scholars that dedicate to the issue, such as Whitehead and Schmitter (1995 *cited in* Dimitrova, 1996), Cortona (2008), Fossati (2010), McFaul (*et al.*, 2007) and Magen and Morlino (2007), for example.

Thus, and due to the current state of the world, full of exchanges and interdependences supported by impressive networks of communication and transports, the international dimension has been gaining weight in the analysis of the democratisation processes. Hence, the conclusion that could be drawn by this section (and reinforced on chapter 4) is that, despite some disagreement on the relative influence of each side, the processes of democratic transition are the result of the interaction of domestic and external dynamics and it is in the study of both that lies an answer closer to the intricate reality here investigated, in order to enrich the existing knowledge on the theme.

3.3. Democracy

Hopefully, a successful transition process ends up in the establishment of a democratic system, abandoning, at least officially, the previous autocratic regime. Recalling the line traced to represent the political *continuum* mentioned in the last section, it would mean that a certain country would be moving from the negative to the positive side of the scheme. But, once again, the institution of this regime is neither linear nor homogeneous: on the contrary, there are nuances that distinguish the different types of democracy, since the limits of that line are ideal and hardly achievable, allowing different gradations in between. For that reason, it does not exist a consensus regarding the number of democracies in the world and their geographical distribution, as

already mentioned, simply because there is no common definition that enables a pattern in the measurement or assessment of political regimes.

However, as an academic work, and even despite these difficulties, it is important to present a coherent model that clearly explains what democracy is and how it can be measured, so that it becomes possible to replicate this study and to verify its conclusions or even to apply it to another case study. Therefore, this section aims to provide a conceptual analysis of the term ‘democracy’. The idea is to clarify the meaning and understanding of all its components through a more precise and accurate definition of the related concepts, of democracy’s types, degrees and levels, so that, on chapter 5, it is possible to build a model for assessing the evolution of the quality of a real democracy. For this initial analysis, the works and contributions of several authors will be used and cited, mainly the ones presented by Leonardo Morlino (2002) and Marc Bühlmann, Wolfgang Merkel and Bernhard Wessels (2007). The final purpose is to reach a more precise and accurate orientation for the case study and to contribute to the lively and ongoing discussion on the definition and operationalisation of the concept of democracy.

3.3.1. A confusing concept: types, levels and degrees

A first concern lies in the type of definition: some authors prefer a procedural definition, considering it enough to embrace only technical questions (such as the respect for norms and procedures – formal democracy) whereas others believe it is insufficient – and hence it would be better to take into consideration the effects that result from those procedures for the citizens, such as their well-being. Bühlmann (2007) calls them the minimalist, the medium and the maximalist concepts of democracy; Kekic (*cited in* Campbell, 2008) uses the terms “thin” and “thick” concepts; Campbell (2008) labels them as “focused democracy” and “comprehensive democracy”. In common, these authors have the notion of the different types and possibilities of defining democracy.

Jagers and Gurr (1995) wrote that, in simple terms, democracy has to be regarded as the opposite of autocracy; for Diamond (2003) the democratic regime is nothing but (and paraphrasing) a system in which people choose their representatives through elections; in the same line of thought, Joseph Schumpeter (*cited in* Pasquino,

2010) sees democracy as a method in which some people gain the power to decide and to make political decisions through a competition.


On the other hand, Leonardo Morlino's (2002) definition of minimum democracy includes, besides the elections, the existence of more than one political party and of more than one source of information. Although this "thin" definition is "thicker" than the one proposed by the previous authors, for Morlino it is nonetheless a minimum definition, given the fact that, from his perspective, to consider a maximum definition, would involve assessing the degree of the application of the two main objectives of a liberal democracy: freedom and equality. It implies, in this sense, a focus not only on the procedures, but also on the content and on the result. Richard Haass (*cited in Epstein, et al., 2007*) shares this view and states that democracy is more than elections and includes the diffusion of power among different societal groups, a system of "checks and balances", independent media, trade unions, freedom of expression, etc. Sodaro (*cited in Campell, 2008*) incorporates the limits to the government and its accountability in his definition of democracy. Therefore, and even with a blurred limit between "thin" and "thick" definitions, there is a first division in the approaches to the concept of democracy marked by the inclusion or exclusion of certain attributes to the regime – the more the attributes, the thicker the definition, and vice-versa.

To distinguish the baseline of what is (or is not) a democracy is a second relevant task: combining the proposals of different academics devoted to the subject (Schedler, 1998; Diamond, 2003; Epstein, *et al.*, 2007; Pasquino, 2010) emerges a central division between the two major types of democracy: liberal and electoral. A liberal democracy represents a system in which democratic principles are observed, such as the respect and affirmation of the citizens' political and civil rights, pluralism and the rule of law, whilst the electoral form of democracy is limited to the existence of suffrage without the actual application of the liberal democracy's principles. Elections constitute, thus, the minimal requisite for the consideration of a democratic regime. There, notwithstanding, other possible and valid divisions. For example, David Epstein and his associates (2006: 555) adopt the division found in Polity IV and work upon the division between autocracies, democracies and partial democracies.³¹ Although the

³¹ Partial democracies are sometimes called hybrid regimes or semi-democracies. This constitutes an intermediary stage for some authors and another typology. O'Donnell and Schmitter (*cited by Usul, 2011: 9*) also differentiate between the "dictablandas" and the "democraduras", two concepts that mix features of both democracies and dictatorships that may coexist in the same society.


point made by these authors makes sense and the relevance of an intermediary field between the two opposites (democracy and autocracy), for this initial and major division, the introduction of a third group would only make it harder to categorise reality, as the boundaries would again become more blurred. As it is possible to see in Figure 8 below, the non-consideration of an intermediary field is the price to pay for the attempt to achieve the clearest division possible in terms of the types of democracy. In this sense, electoral democracy is guaranteed by the mere existence of free and fair elections (a procedural approach), advanced or perfect democracy is the other (ideal) extreme in which all the possible democratic principles are respected and applied and, in between these two points, one can find liberal democracy.

Figure 8: The political regime's line II



Source: Author's elaboration based on Pasquino, 2010; Epstein, *et al.*, 2007; Diamond, 2003; Schedler, 1998; Jagers e Gurr, 1995.

Figure 9: The political regime's line III



Source: Author's elaboration based on Pasquino, 2010; Epstein, *et al.*, 2007; Diamond, 2003; Morlino, 2002; Schedler, 1998; Jagers e Gurr, 1995.

It is then clear that the suffrage constitutes the minimum level of any democracy, the null in this scale, and that, from that point on, the functions of democracy, materialised through specific procedures, will grow until the ideal extreme of perfect democracy. The denominations of those intermediate points (that are located, nonetheless, within the field of liberal democracy and that represent the degrees of a liberal democracy) can be diverse – as diverse are the proposals of different authors. Here, the concepts used are the ones presented by Leonardo Morlino (2002: 20): effective, responsible, legitimate, free, egalitarian and perfect – graphically represented in Figure 9 (above). It is now possible to say that the initial question of determining what is democracy and what it is not has already been overcome and now the focus is on another (and perhaps even more complex) question: the quality of democracy, that leads us to attribute adjectives to the noun, in order to embrace this reality.

The inevitability of the attributing adjectives to democracy to specify its different degrees had been already foreseen by Collier and Levitsky (1997: 430-31), who were concerned about the conceptual validity of the term in question and the proliferation of the conceptual alternative forms. Evoking Sartori and his “ladder of generality”, those academics refer to the going up and down that same ladder as acts that interfere with the conceptual differentiation – increasing it means refining it, but diminishing the number of applicable cases; decreasing the differentiation causes the opposite. Creating “classical sub-types of democracy” augments, in turn, the risk of stretching the concept too much (“concept stretching”). David Collier and Steven Levitsky, therefore, advise to differentiate between degrees and types of democracy (Idem: 435), which was precisely what was attempted to be done above. There are two (three if the perfect one is included) types of democracy and one of them, for its encompassing and complex character, will be scrutinised using different degrees that will be able to provide higher accuracy to that type of democracy, through the study and analysis of the basic principles of democracy, as well as the different components and indicators they refer to.

3.3.2. Scrutinising the meaning and the content

For Morlino (2002: 4), a “good” democracy entails “a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms”; it means that its quality has to

be assessed in terms of its results (to satisfy the citizens), of its content (a certain level of freedom and equality) and of its procedures (where the citizens have the actual power to evaluate the government's performance according to the rule of law). Therefore, the evaluation of the quality of democracy has to be done in accordance with five dimensions, central to the empirical analysis, proposed by the author: rule of law, accountability, responsiveness, rights and freedoms, and equality.³²

The degrees of liberal democracy, according to Morlino, depend on the dimensions that are respected and exercised in the case under consideration³³. If only the rule of law is respected, it is an effective democracy; if accountability is also present, there is an upgrade to a responsible liberal democracy; and so on and so forth, until all the principles are observable at a high degree, revealing a “perfect” democracy. It is worth to mention that every dimension is carefully explained and analysed by the author in the same work.

Despite the quality of Morlino's model, the analysis of the meaning and content of democracy (as well as its operationalisation) would be enriched if the contribution of Bühlmann, Merkel and Wessels (2007) was added. In that sense, these authors present a conceptualisation of democracy developed in different levels.³⁴ The first level of analysis encompasses the three fundamental and most abstract principles of democracy: equality, freedom and control. Equality is regarded as one of the most important within this triad and means the equal treatment of all citizens in the most diverse moments of social life. Freedom comes as the value responsible for the protection of each one of these individuals against the violations either committed by other individuals or the state, since it includes a wide range of rights that became indispensable for any democratic regime. At last, and as a balance between the tension that may rise from the combination of the two previous principles³⁵, control emerges as a form of vigilance of

³² Although Morlino, together with Magen, published a later work (Magen and Morlino, 2009) in which the dimensions that determine what is a “good democracy” were increased to 8, we decided to remain with his initial proposal, at least for now, as it eases the systematic presentation of the content of the concept of democracy.

³³ Cfr. Table 3, Appendix 3.

³⁴ Table 4 (Appendix 3), a simplified version of the original, given the detail it was initially created with, schematises the whole model and allows a more general overview. The original table still includes a column with sub-components and another one with the suggestion of indicators for the operationalisation of the concept.

³⁵ It is worth mentioning that the question of combining freedom and equality originated countless philosophical discussions on the importance and relative weight of each of them in the lives of individuals and of society in general, given the fact that it is impossible the maximisation of both at the same time and the point of equilibrium of their intersection is not consensual among theorists. Hobbes, Locke and

the political institutions, warning the decision-makers that their power is limited and constrained by the popular will and jurisdiction. Inside each one of these basic principles, one can find a set of partial regimes that are responsible, in their interaction, for the normative and operational functioning of the complex institutional structures of modern democracies (Idem: 14). Due to this chain, the model is conceived based upon a notion of "embedded democracy". The idea is that stable democracies are "embedded" in two ways: internally (the interdependency between the different regimes that ensure the good functioning of the principles) and externally (the embeddness of those regimes in more concrete conditions that make democracy possible).

The democratic principle of equality encompasses, according to Bühlmann's model, the partial regime of political rights. It means that these are a necessary condition for the observance of equality. Political rights are regarded by many authors³⁶ as one of the core areas of any democratic regime: "without the presence of the highest patterns and of the institutional mechanisms that guarantee the defence of these values, it is not possible to assert that one is in the presence of a democratic regime" (Cruz, 2003: 67).

The importance attributed to political rights is related to their connection with the electoral regime, in the sense that they are the pre-conditions for elections: political rights include a set of freedoms without which free and fair elections would not be possible, such as the freedom of expression and of the press (Bühlmann, et al., 2007: 17). These freedoms allow the citizens to formulate and express their preferences, which is, for Dahl (1971 *cited in* Pasquino, 2010: 360), the requisite for the establishment of democracies.

In terms of functions, this partial regime includes participation, responsiveness and transparency. The first implies the formal equality of all citizens to participate politically; the second is the "capacity to satisfy the governed by executing its policies in a way that corresponds to their demands" (Morlino, 2002: 12). The freedom to associate and of opinion (the lack of censorship, for example) are essential to create, promote and diffuse the citizens' preferences and opinions, so that the ones in charge are aware of what is demanded. Finally, transparency closes this set of functions with a reference to the need for an open public sphere with informational openness of the

Rousseau, to name a few, postulated different conjugations of these variables.

³⁶ For this purpose, cf., for example, Bühlmann, et al (2007), Cruz (2003) or Morlino (2002).

political process that guarantees the actual evaluation/observance of the prior functions (Bühlmann, *et al.*, 2007: 17).

Moving to the opposite side of the balance of partial regimes, there is freedom, whose unique partial regime is civil rights. These are intended to protect the citizen against possible abuses from the executive or legislative powers and only when these rights are applied it is possible to enjoy political rights (Bühlmann, 2007: 18). Inside this partial regime, one can find two functions that permit its concretisation: individual freedom and rule of law. The first is self-explaining, as those freedoms (not to be subjected to any type of pressure or constraint) aim to safeguard the individuals against harmful political decisions.

On the other hand, rule of law emerges as a vital function of any modern democracy. This institution ensures formal equality before the law and limits the power of the state, guaranteeing the supremacy of individual rights and of the law above any political stakeholder (Cruz, 2003: 71-73). The exercise of power is constrained through its division and the “state is bound to the effective law and acts according to clearly defined prerogatives” (Bühlmann, *et al.*, 2007: 18). In other words, the rule of law forces the authorities to follow and respect the laws. Moreover, it requires a set of conditions to be effective, such as the ones presented by Morlino (2002: 7): the existence of non-retroactive, universal, stable and non-ambiguous laws, the civilian control over the military, an independent judicial system, equal access to justice, fair trials, no corruption, efficient police forces, etc.

The final democratic principle introduced by this model is control. As said before, this “third wheel” works as the intermediary field whose aim is to balance the other two, avoiding or diminishing the conflicts they frequently arise, due to the opposing views each one stands for.

The electoral regime is one of the clearest instrument for controlling the political power (Idem: 73) and its function is to allow the access to power after free and fair elections (Bühlmann, *et al.*, 2007: 16). From the competition of different visions represented by different political groups or parties, “a necessary evil in democracy” (Schmitter and Karl, 1991: 78), emerges the population’s choice, the result of their sovereignty. This is what Bühlmann (*et al.*, 2007: 31) calls “vertical accountability”, i.e., rulers are accountable to those who elected them and who periodically control them in competitive elections. Thus, the vote is a way to punish or reward politicians

(Morlino, 2002: 9-10). As Schmitter (2003: 4) puts it: “the more politically accountable that rulers are to citizens, the higher will be the quality (or better, the qualities) of democracy”. Obviously, the functioning of vertical accountability is only possible when representation is respected. In other words, both active and passive suffrages have to occur fairly and without any types of constraints, so that the results of the elections respect and reflect the real preferences of the voters, and hence become the manifestation of the popular sovereignty.

There is, however, another type of accountability: horizontal accountability is control's second partial regime and is based on a more continuous form of supervision of the government or other democratic institutions, allowed by a network of autonomous and accountable institutions that are meant to control the action of each other. This dimension of power enables the different actors to be mutually responsible for controlling possible abuses by other institutions. It becomes, for that reason, essential the existence of well established structures, such as political parties, independent media, civil society associations, autonomous courts (Bühlmann, *et al.*, 2007: 19; Morlino, 2002: 10-11).

This system of checks and balances implies, therefore, that a strong opposition, an independent judiciary and all the mechanisms that guarantee a healthy rule of law contribute to constrain the autonomy of the executive power, because, as Schmitter and Karl (1991: 76) admit, what “distinguishes democratic rulers from nondemocratic ones are the norms that condition how the former come to power and the practices that hold them accountable for their actions”.

There still is inside the scope of control another (and a final) issue that should be taken into consideration. Although the executive has to be constrained in its exercise of power by other accountable institutions that protect the law and the citizens above other interests, it is also necessary that the executive has got effective power to govern, which means that the ones that were chosen to rule are not anyhow constrained or limited by extra-constitutional actors not subject to democratic accountability (Bühlmann, *et al.*, 2007: 20). In fact, the government should be freed from any type of influences, both internal and external, in order to ensure full control and autonomy over its own policies.

Obviously, all these principles, partial regimes and functions are interconnected in a way that makes it really hard to disentangle each part or level from the others. However, it is precisely that inextricability that should not be disregarded when reading

the model. For example, Morlino (2002: 15) proposes a triangle that relates three fundamental aspects of any democracy: the rule of law provides the basis for the citizens' demands of accountability; in turn, accountability fosters improvements in the legal system and in the respect for law; responsiveness becomes a pre-condition to assess accountability and the rule of law an essential premise of responsiveness.

Democracy is, therefore, a set of mechanisms, institutions and actors whose aim is to rule in benefit of the citizens of a certain society. For its nature and comprehensiveness, it embodies an extremely difficult and complex reality, analysed and studied over and over again by various academics who interpret it according to their own mindset and principles. From countless approaches that were available, Bühlmann's (*et al.*, 2007) proposal has been chosen to scrutinise the concept, adding some nuances to seek to improve the model, already thinking about its application to the case study. The choice was made based on the completeness and comprehensiveness of the approach, although it is always a challenging task to schematise and theorise such wide and dynamic reality.

3.4. The path afterwards: consolidation

As discussed above, democratisation constitutes an "umbrella" concept that covers a set of different phases, whose blurred boundaries make it difficult to separate from each other.³⁷ However, in accordance with our proposal, consolidation would be the process that follows the establishment of a democratic regime and that consists of

"transforming the accidental arrangements, prudential norms, and contingent solutions that have emerged during the uncertain struggles of the transition into institutions, i.e. into relationships that are reliably known, regularly predicted and normatively accepted" (Schmitter and Schneider, 2004: 5).

Or, in other words, consolidation can also mean the

"gradual removal of the uncertainties that invariably surround transition and then the full institutionalization of the new democracy, the internalization of its rules and procedures and the dissemination of democratic values" (Pridham and Vanhanen, 2003: 2).

From both definitions is possible to infer some of the process' characteristics.

³⁷ "The processes of liberalization, transition and consolidation tend to overlap in different ways and this makes the whole process of regime change much less predictable than the "over-determined" politics of countries with stable regimes" (Schmitter and Schneider, 2004: 4).

Due to what consolidation is about and what it involves, this phase is slow and uncertain (Cierco, 2008: 73). It is also less linear than the previous stage, mainly if transition is regarded as a mere regime change. This slowness comes from the wideness and deepness of consolidation; and if the list of conditions included in the latter definition is taken into consideration, it is not difficult to realise the complexity of defining clear boundaries for this process. Furthermore, the possibility of a backward movement towards an autocracy must be ruled out at a great extent, at the same time citizens start to act according to the new framework they are in, creating (or strengthening) a democratic civic culture committed to the maintenance of the new regime. Nonetheless, defining or even measuring to what extent does it already happen in a certain society is another tricky task for theorists.

As Ali Usul (2011: 11) explains, “various conceptualizations of consolidation are possible, depending on how the concept of democracy is framed”. It is, for example, feasible to approach consolidation as a positive or negative process, i.e. as a phase in which the efforts are put on strengthening (or consolidating) democratic features or, in the second case, as a period in which the main objective is to reduce the likelihood of a breakdown, aiming therefore to solve remaining problems and challenges to democratisation (Idem: 12-13).

Moreover, there are authors, such as Linz and Stepan (1996 *cited in* Usul, 2011: 13-14), that prefer to analyse and study the consolidation process in terms of the actors’ behaviour, the citizens’ attitudes and the country’s constitution. On the other hand, Diamond (1999 *cited in* Usul, 2011: 14) distinguishes the dimensions (norms and behaviour) and the levels (elites, intermediate or masses) at which consolidation occurs.

These different (not always necessarily incompatible) approaches meet with Andreas Schedler’s (1998: 92) criticisms, who, in an article dedicated to this subject that will be used as a model, argues that the concept has been used indiscriminately to mean a wide number of phenomena, distorting it and condemning its study to stagnation. Consolidation has been employed as a synonym for popular legitimacy, neutralization of anti-system actors, civilian control over the military, etc. Therefore, in order to create a pattern in this field, Schedler proposes a structured approach to the various possibilities of democratic consolidation.

First of all, the author borrows Collier and Levitsky’s terminology and determines the division between electoral and liberal democracy as the empirical

references for all the research on democratic consolidation (Idem: 93). This division coincides with what has been previously proposed – consolidation begins after the regime change; and means that both a democracy where one can only find free and fair elections, and another one where many democratic features are already solid, all of them are object of the attention of theorists, as they find themselves in the process of maturing their regimes – even though they might be at different levels of development and accomplishment. That is the reason why it may take several decades for a country to consolidate its democracy and, as Schmitter and Schneider (2004: 3) put it, “democracies are not supposed to be fully consolidated – ever”, because being “fully consolidated” would mean achieving the level of a perfect democracy in all of its dimensions – an utopia. In fact, consolidation does not have to happen simultaneously at all levels (Pridham, 2005 cited in Usul, 2011: 14); some fields may be more matured than others.

Thus, with these considerations, it seems reasonable to reinforce our previous assumption: since a country formally adopts a democratic system, it is no longer in the transition moment, but in the consolidation process, during which it has to struggle not to backslide and, simultaneously, to complete and deepen its regime.

As it is possible to understand by watching Schedler’s scheme (Appendix 3, Figure 10), the period of consolidation can evolve in two directions: negative or positive. The author’s idea is that the establishment of a democracy is not a guarantee for its endless maintenance. In other words, all the actors should focus on holding what has been achieved, avoiding a breakdown until guaranteeing enough confidence that democracy will resist (Schedler, 1998: 95). This is, in fact, the first line of the scheme. “Avoiding a democratic breakdown” is one of the possible movements, during which the main fears concentrate, among others, in possible *coup d’états*, guerrillas or drug cartels: “It is basically pre-occupied with keeping democracy alive, with preventing its sudden death” (Idem: 96).

The danger or threat to democracy may not mean a completely visible backslide to a non-democratic regime, but rather a “democratic erosion” that ought to be prevented, for being considered by Schedler as the real danger for the regime, given the less visible (or “less spectacular” in the author’s words) character of the changes, capable of causing a slow erosion, different from the more tangible discontinuity of the previous situation. This constitutes a “less transparent for[m] of regression” (Idem: 97)

that is very likely to end up creating a hybrid regime that swings between a democracy and an autocracy.

Schedler's model is not only about negative consolidation. On the contrary, a country can complete its democracy and deepen it. The first case is, according to the author's explanation, a kind of second transition; however, this time, it is from a democratic government to a democratic regime (Idem: 98). This means that the electoral nature of the system is complemented with a set of reforms that allow an evolution towards the liberal type of democracy. This moment represents the result of the adoption and application of democratic reforms that allow the improvement and maturation of the regime.

Furthermore, in the case a country (imaginarily, let us say) fulfils all the conditions to become a "perfect democracy", it is called by Schedler "deepening democracy" (Idem: 99) and which is also a positive movement in the line of democratic consolidation.

Finally, the author proposes a third possible reading of democratic consolidation; one that is neither positive nor negative – it is a "neutral" consolidation and is represented under the concept of "organising democracy". To organize a democracy means, therefore, focusing on more specific aspects of the regime in order to strengthen them, to avoid democratic breakdowns and to consolidate the democratic achievements. This type of democratic consolidation resembles the process of "institution building" (reinforcing the political party system, the legislative entities, the judicial system, etc.), "turn[ing] its attention from the procedural minima that define democratic regimes to the concrete rules and organizations that define various forms of democracy" (Idem: 100). If the focus changed previously from the democratic government to the regime, now it moves from the regime to more concrete subsystems (or partial regimes).

Ali Usul (2011: 15) also associates consolidation with institutionalisation and considers this process one of the most important components of democracy, because it is the one responsible for establishing norms and rules. Within this field, political parties play a fundamental role, as they represent civil society and avoid excessive concentration of power (Idem: 16) – as long as political parties are institutionalised and follow and apply democratic norms.

Civil society, in its turn, here understood as a set of “citizens acting collectively in a public sphere” (Diamond, 1994 *cited in* Usul, 2011: 21), influences the success of democracy in the sense that it has got the capability of monitoring the state’s power, stimulating political participation. (Idem: 22) and also because citizens, remembering the initial considerations about consolidation, are, in general, the ones who have to intermediate the new values and principles, acting according to the new context they are embedded in. Without a really democratic mindset among the citizens, it is not possible to talk about a real democracy: “democracy cannot be regarded as consolidated unless there exists unconditional mass support for democratic values, culture and institutions” (Usul, 2011: 20)³⁸ – this is clearly at the attitudinal level.

Thus, and in the light of the different contribution from various authors mentioned above, the process of democratic consolidation appears as the subsequent moment after transition. In that sense, it is believed that a certain country that has completed its moment of transition (conceived as the stage reached after the empowerment of a democratically elected government) moves automatically to the phase of consolidation of its democracy. It does not necessarily mean, however, as proved by Andreas Schedler’s model, constant movements forward towards the positive extreme of the line initially traced. The process is slow and complex, and implies advancements and retreats in the application and execution of the democratic principles.

Regardless of what is believed to be a truly consolidated democracy, many years are necessary for an incipient democratic regime to improve and mature – maybe decades, or even a generation, in the opinion of Pridham and Agh (2001: 2). Besides, it is difficult to determine which stage a country is at, or what type of movement it is developing. This means that concepts like these (democracy, transition and consolidation) become extremely challenging (not to say virtually impossible) to operationalise.

This chapter, for its nature and content, is especially paramount. It constitutes the theoretical foundations for the following chapters and, ultimately, for the entire work. The theoretical and methodological choices presented in the previous pages will be crucial for the analysis of the case study and for achieving the answers that triggered this study.

³⁸ Nonetheless, this vision is not shared by all academics. Schmitter (1995 *cited by* Usul, 2011: 21), for example, regards democratic culture not as a cause of democracy but as a result of it.

The definition and conceptualisation of democracy is still nowadays an ongoing debate and a controversial issue, even though this discussion is not new. Due to the evolution of time and of reality, the analysis (or even the assessment) of today's democracy cannot be compared to that of a century ago. A set of new or at least different phenomena have been occurring and changing the nature and the features of that object of study. Globalisation, for example, is one of the most visible changes and the access to various means of communication, the new international actors (like a more active and aware public opinion) and other factors reshaped the way democracy has been regarded and approached. The new achievements and improvements in the quality of many democratic regimes, as well as citizens' participation made it a different reality with different characteristics, including other fields within its scope, such as social protection. Lately, current international crisis prompted a deeper reflection upon this phenomenon and some critical opinions started to be voiced – is it really the best regime to cope with every society's problems? Is it a real universal value that should be implemented worldwide?

To bring as much theoretical clarity as possible, democracy was conceptually analysed as an opposite to autocracy. The motives that promote and trigger democratic transitions were mentioned, as well as the possibilities behind the consolidation process. It became clear that it does not only mean a positive movement without backslides or erosions. Furthermore, democracy was divided into three types (electoral, liberal and perfect) and different degrees were attributed to liberal democracy, thus respecting Sartori's advice not to mix the types and the degrees of this concept. Many authors were cited to formulate the clearest and most inclusive approach possible and, pursuing these premises, democracy's operationalisation will be developed also keeping in mind the theoretical considerations and the feasibility of the application of the model to a concrete situation. Thus, it is believed that these theoretical foundations will be capable of supporting a solid construct when it comes to study the evolution of Turkey's democratic commitment.

4. The European Union as a Democracy Promoter

4.1. International organisations and democracy promotion

The establishment and consolidation of a democratic regime is a compelling task. As mentioned in the previous chapter, democratisation is a process achieved by the interaction and conjugation of internal and external variables that, combined, push for its concretisation, at the same time they seek to neutralise toponymic forces. Nonetheless, the international dimension was, until very recently, the “forgotten variable” (Magen and Morlino, 2009: 11). That may have happened also because democracy promotion as a foreign policy priority has only begun to be developed a few decades ago. Therefore, academics used to put the emphasis on the domestic factors to understand domestic democratisations. However, with globalisation, the increase of transnational networks and a wider dialogue between different theorists (Magen, 2004: 4), the international dimension began to gain some weight and importance in the explanations.

The current debate, nevertheless, does not focus anymore on which of the dimensions should be emphasised over the other (international or national), but how they interact concerning the promotion of a country’s democratisation. Magen and Morlino (2009: 11) argue that the knowledge about external-internal linkages of democratisation needs to be developed, in order to avoid the separation of the two dimensions. Thus, these authors created a model to analyse EU role as a democracy promoter based on the concept of “democratic anchoring”³⁹ (Idem: 28). The idea, that we subscribe to as well, is that the international influence exists, but it is constrained by the framework of the internal conditions:

“in the contemporary international system nation-state regimes are subject to variably dense external (...) linkages, pressures and stimuli influencing internal conditions of democracy, yet democracy and processes of democratization exist solely within national systems, so that the proper level of analysis of democratization processes remain essentially domestic and the correct nexus of inquiry ought therefore to focus on identifying empirically discernible external-internal agency interaction” (Idem: 28-29).

This means that a change in the regime is essentially domestic – even in cases of external interventions, according to the authors – and, therefore, “it is difficult to view

³⁹ More details on this model can be found in next chapter.

international factors as truly independent variables, since democratization processes (...) are ultimately always carried through domestic actors, institutions and procedures” (Idem: 29). This conception does not mean a setback for international theorists in the sense that the domestic context is perceived as the most important variable; on the contrary, this approach proves the advantages of different branches of the Social Sciences to join forces in order to contribute to a more solid body of knowledge in which different spheres or dimensions are taken into consideration when studying the phenomenon. As the international influences on national (and even on sub-national) realities are a recognised fact, the stage in which these influences operate, as well as in which their interpretation and adoption take place is at the domestic level, whose dynamics will filter the external contributions in a way that external suggestions or impositions can be more or less successfully implemented and, consequently, democracy promotion can be more or less supported and reinforced at the internal level.

Nevertheless, in terms of external impulses, international organisations are among the most relevant actors and have assumed a growing importance during the last decades. Both governmental (such as the EU, IMF, WTO, African Union, World Bank, etc.) and non-governmental (Amnesty International, Reporters Without Borders, various churches, etc.) play an outstanding role in today’s world, helping shape the international environment, as more or less influent (but always present) actors. Their voices, together with the international public opinion, are taken into consideration and, although sometimes they are not followed by some states, the fact is that international organisations contextualise the states’ behaviour, defining the ones that are acting in accordance with the established international society and those that are not. Herrmann (2005: 127) believes that the way international organisations promote certain ideas affects how states understand the problems and identify their own interests. Besides, these organisations are also capable of promoting cooperation among states, as they verify the accomplishment of the rules, recognise the deviant behaviours, apply sanctions,... At the same time, they may constitute security communities and help the actors overcome certain disagreements, as they deal with the risks and problems of communication that are embedded in international relations (Idem: 128).

This conception implies a prior assumption that identities and interests change. For example, the adoption of a democratic regime in many countries over the last decades epitomises the fact that those states changed their identities, introducing new

features like the respect for the rule of law, civil liberties and human rights. As a consequence, their interests and preferences also changed, as well as their behaviour and position within the international community. The reasons for this to happen are many and depend on the particular context of each country. Nevertheless, norms are an important fact for this change – of course if democracy is imposed by (material) force, it is not the case anymore. As again Herrmann (Idem: 128) explains, norms influence states' behaviour as they change their motivations and beliefs, shaping a new understanding of their interests. International organisations are able to do this due to a socialisation process that produces a feeling of how states should act, defining the “rules of the game” (Risse, 2005: 163), determining the appropriate behaviour and the consequences of its violation. It is important to highlight that accepting a certain set of rules and values (*sine qua non* condition to be admitted into a certain organisation) does not mean that states will always respect them – as a matter of fact, when accepting the accession to a particular organisation, states are simultaneously subscribing to a specific pattern of behaviour and the consequences of eventually having a deviant attitude.

But norms are not only useful to regulate behaviour: “they also constitute the identity of actors in the sense of defining who ‘we’ are as members of a social community” (Idem: 163). This leads us to the initial idea that international organisations have the ability to change states' identities, but there is also another acceptable explanation: “identity can refer to the relationship a collective actor assumes *vis-à-vis* other collective actors”, combining both self-image and the other's image. The question that remains to be answered, nonetheless, relates to the reasons behind the willingness to join an international organisation, i.e. why do states decide to commit themselves to follow the norms and rules, respecting treaties and other agreements they will be bound to. There are two distinct, but at a certain degree complementary, logics to explain this behaviour: the logics of consequences and appropriateness – both already described on Chapter 1.

Thus, international organisations constitute a vital element in the diffusion of ideas, norms and patterns of behaviour. Among these, democracy and human rights are two key-elements that various organisations promote worldwide, as they are believed to constitute the best way to respect one's natural rights and to safeguard human dignity through the institutionalisation of those rights, ensuring their application – Council of Europe, OSCE, World Bank are a few examples. It is widely accepted that the number

of democracies has been growing over the last decades and that phenomenon proves that first, there is diffusion of political regimes; second, processes like socialisation have effects on this growing number; third, states want to be part of the international community and therefore adapt their interests and identity to be accepted; and fourth, international organisations have, at least partially, succeeded.

The major question at this point is how democracy has been promoted, so that it has spread to many non-democratic countries over the last decades. The Italian author Pietro Cortona (2008: 435) argues that democratisation is “always the result of a combination of internal and external factors”⁴⁰ and although this might seem like an obvious conclusion, it is a relatively recent general assumption. Focusing on the external dimension of democratisation, several authors have developed during the last decades various approaches and conceptions of the modalities or mechanisms of external democratic diffusion. Renowned academics, like Whitehead, Schmitter, Pridham, Schimmelfennig & Sedelmeier and Morlino & Magen⁴¹, present different models that pretend to embrace every possible situation of external influences on domestic democratisation processes. Despite the unquestionable intellectual interest of these works, two models have been chosen for reasons that will become clear after the interpretation of both proposals.

First, Fossati’s model (Fossati, 2010) comprises a division of the mechanisms of external diffusion into four categories: inertial emulation (contagion if spontaneous or convergence if intentional), control (direct or indirect), political conditionality and rewards. Emulation is related to the example provided by certain countries that can be, more or less intentionally, followed by the democratising state. In this case, external examples undermine non-democratic regimes and supply a model to imitate. On the other side, control is connected with imposition, whether by direct military intervention (like Iraq in 2003) or indirect with military assistance (as it initially happened in Libya during the Arab Spring). One of the advantages of this model is precisely the sub-categories that help specify the conditions in which these mechanisms may occur. On the other hand, however, our concern lies in the distinction between political conditionality and rewards, as political conditionality (that will be further developed) cannot only be linked with negative sanctions, framing the rewards within another

⁴⁰ Translated from the Italian by the author. Original version: “Le democratizzazione sono sempre state il risultato di una combinazione di fattori interni e di fattori esterni (o internazionali)”.

⁴¹ For further details on this division, see Fossati, 2010.

category. In fact, it is in the balance between sanctions and rewards that one can find the leverage power of this mechanism. Therefore, conditionality limited to sanctions would not encourage any kind of change because there would be no incentive. For this reason, it is believed that Morlino & Magen’s model provides a complementary approach and, although it does not encompass as many sub-categories as Fossati’s, it seems to be better organised. There are, in this perspective, four main fields as well: military control, conditionality, socialisation and emulation. In this context, control implies any kind of external coercive imposition usually, but not necessarily, military; conditionality includes both sanctions and rewards. Moreover, socialisation is a category that the authors considered relevant to include, as this mechanism may start to develop over time in a spontaneous form; finally, emulation is the fourth modality and the one in which one can find a more intentional acceptance of the democratic example and experience from another country by a certain population.⁴² As the lack of sub-categories may be considered the weakness of this model, compensated by the inclusion of socialisation, this thesis proposes an eclectic model that pretends to combine the best of each author.

Table 6: Mechanisms of external democracy promotion – proposed model

<i>Mechanisms of external democracy promotion</i>	
Proposed model	
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Hard power <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Direct intervention ▪ Indirect intervention ✓ Conditionality <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Negative (sanctions) ▪ Positive (rewards) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Socialisation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Elites ▪ Civil society ✓ Emulation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Contagion (spontaneous) ✓ Convergence (intentional)

Source: Author’s elaboration.

Thus, the model (Table 6, above) also combines four categories, including two possible sub-fields in each of them. Hard power is the field that merges direct and indirect interventions. In this case, the willingness of an external actor is imposed, implying that a certain degree of coerciveness is applied to a particular democratising country, not necessarily with the latter’s internal consent.

⁴² For a schematic comparison of the two models, cf. Table 5 (Appendix 4).

The second field joins positive and negative conditionality, which means that it encompasses both sanctions and rewards, for the above mentioned reasons. Socialisation is the third category of this model and, together with emulation, constitutes the opposite situation of hard power; it represents a learning process that, based on the active interaction between two societies, allows the exchange of experiences, of perceptions, values and patterns of behaviour. At the national level, it is possible to distinguish between elites and civil society, as these groups represent different factions of the same society and frequently adopt different (if not opposite) positions regarding the democratisation of the country. Therefore, both are of utmost importance to the process of democratisation, despite their different types of contributions. And although elites and civil society can be object of different mechanisms of socialisation, certain contexts are able to supply important and influential sources that foster a more “democratic mind” or a deeper democratic culture among these groups, such as education, the ability to travel and learn from other experiences (exchange programmes are very fruitful in this regard) and access to information, namely through Internet.

Finally, emulation is the method of democracy diffusion that can be pointed out as the one in which the promoter actors do not need to actively pursue a democracy promotion strategy. In other words, democratising countries, when inspired by the example of their peers, seek to mimic them in order to be linked to them somehow (Magen & Morlino, 2009: 38). Usually, psychological and geographic proximity eases the process of “voluntary lesson drawing” that can either be more intentional or more spontaneous. Unlike socialisation, emulation is not about learning through interaction, but more mimicking observance. Frequently, these types of democracy promotion encourage the society to act and undermine non-democratic regimes by weakening its popular support and people’s resignation. Indeed, emulation and socialisation are categories that, by nature and definition, can overlap – nonetheless, this final mechanism is more related to an imitation than to an active process of interaction and exchange, as it happens with socialisation⁴³.

It is nevertheless important to notice that, although these mechanisms are presented here as detached from each other, any country object of democracy promotion can be influenced by a set of different mechanisms that correlate to each other and

⁴³ Conditionality and socialisation will be more deeply analysed in section 4.2.4.

which creates the particularities of each case. Bearing in mind the Turkish example, it is possible to congregate some influences: the EU uses conditionality as a tool to foster democracy in the country, but at the same time the intense relationship between the Union and Turkey has led to a socialisation process in the country that progressively comes closer to the European patterns; furthermore, the example provided by the Central and Eastern European Countries⁴⁴ may constitute an incentive to Turkey in the sense of creating the perception of the necessity to make real efforts to join the EU (emulation). This brief overlook attests the possibility of co-existence of different mechanisms in the same case of democratisation and all of them contribute in a more or less direct, active and conscious form to strengthen democracy.

These four categories are able to be parted into two main groups: hard power and conditionality are cases that imply a more direct external presence and pressure in the country to democratise, constituting, in different degrees, external impositions that create power asymmetries; whereas the other two mechanisms (socialisation and emulation) can be perceived as both coming from inside the society, i.e., a more natural, progressive and genuine way of interiorising democratic values. In this regards, Cortona (2008: 447) explains that external actions have different levels of intentionality, can be more or less direct and reach a higher or lower consensus of the state, as it can be seen in Table 7 below.

Table 7: Intentionality of the international actors and consensus of the state

	Intentionality of the international actors	Consensus of the state
Emulation	No	Yes
Promotion	Yes	Yes
Imposition	Yes	No

Source: Cortona, 2008: 450

Regarding socialisation, the application of Cortona's division is not as clear as it is concerning the other mechanisms – and although it is able to be fitted somewhere in-between emulation and promotion, the fact is that socialisation does not compulsorily imply an intentional action of the international actors, neither the consensus of the state. In fact, socialisation is the result of socio-cultural influences for many years, sometimes decades or centuries of mutual interchanges between countries or societies. The power

⁴⁴ Excluding the example provided by Bulgaria and Romania, as these countries are very likely to cause the opposite effect (cf. Matos, 2012).

of socialisation depends on the deepness of the process within the receptive society and is part of a broader process of democracy diffusion that not only includes what was mentioned above, but also this exchange and contamination between cultures, political-institutional models and products of all kinds (Idem: 454).

The differences in the impact of the international factors (according to Levitsky & Way, *apud* Cortona, 2008: 448) can be explained through the concepts of “Western leverage” and “linkage to the West”. The first represents the degree of exposure of a particular country to the external pressures and depends on the balance of strengths, strategic interests and alternative pressures between the subject and the object states. “The linkage to the West” is related to the deepness of the relations that country has with Western countries or institutions and that can assume different dimensions – economic, geopolitical, social, communicational, etc. As Cortona (Idem: 449) explains, the stronger these bonds are, the costlier they are for an authoritarian regime, given the fact that if there are strong relations with Western countries, the likelihood of an intervention (more or less direct) will be higher, as well as the internal discontent of the society that has been autocratically ruled.

But “in which ways and with which limits can democracy be exported?” (Cortona, 2008: 436). This question raised by Cortona is a point of great relevance to understand the role of international organisations in regards to democracy promotion: basic principles such as national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs may be violated when supporting certain social groups (frequently considered terrorists, dissidents, rebels,...) against their rulers and, in that case, international organisations are themselves breaking the rules they established. Therefore, there are many voices against this method of democracy exportation as a clear violation of the UN’s “Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States” (General Assembly of the United Nations, 1981: article no. 1) which asserts that “No State or group of States has the right to intervene or interfere in any form or for any reason whatsoever in the internal and external affairs of other States”, just to quote one example of an international treaty regarding this subject. In fact, some types of democracy promotion can be viewed as violations of such principles, in the sense that they may be perceived as an interference in domestic affairs of a third state – the American intervention in Iraq in 2003 was pointed out by many of its opponents as an illegal action and one of the arguments was precisely this international norm. And, due

to this attitude from Western countries, the initially accepted democracy diffusion started, at the end of the 1960s, to be perceived as ethnocentric and as an imposition of the Western model (Cortona, 2008: 440). The initial problem remains: are the international organisations and individual countries entitled to actively promote their style of democracy even in places where socio-cultural traditions and contexts differ so much from the pattern they try to implement?

On the other hand, proponents of the international diffusion of the democratic regime point at the globalised world to justify the role of some actors in the establishment or maturation of democracy abroad. At the same time, they argue that the separation of the effective influence of international actors in democratising processes is not linear, because, first, they combine both domestic and international factors, making a distinction hard to achieve; and second, because the role of the international community can be different in quality and intensity (Idem: 445). Moreover, the recent “Arab Spring” phenomenon provides an example of how some countries’ populations felt unhappy with the political regimes their respective countries used to have, and, the cases in which NATO intervened for instance, can this intervention be regarded as an international interference on domestic affairs? It is possible, nevertheless, that this action has been led due to humanitarian questions against the brutal oppression of the people by the regime. In this case, that reason is foreseen in international documents, such as the Charter of the United Nations or even the above mentioned Declaration, according to which it is the “duty of States to observe, promote and defend all human rights and fundamental freedoms within their own national territories and to work on the elimination of massive and flagrant violations of the rights of nations and peoples” (General Assembly of the United Nations, 1981: article no. 2, III, c). In that sense, the international community not only did not disrespect international norms, but also contributed to the application of other fundamental principles (included in international treaties as well), such as self-determination. Thus, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs and the right to be helped by the international community to be freed from despotic regimes are two sides of the same coin and democracy is involved in both.

4.2. The European Union as a democracy promoter

4.2.1. The origins and developments

The European Union, as the international organisation it is, has got a peculiar character: it is neither a common Westphalian sovereign state nor a merely intergovernmental organisation. Jan Zielonka, in his book *Europe as Empire* (2006), solves this dilemma by arguing that the enlarged Union constitutes a “neo-medieval empire”. It means that this institution presents typical characteristics of the medieval system but with post-modern adaptations. The idea of the Empire comes from the fact that the EU exports its rules and relates itself very intensively with the rest of the world; simultaneously, the Union cannot be seen like a centralised state, as its authority is shared and diffuse, and as it embraces cultural and identity diversity (Zielonka, 2006: 10-13).

Being an international organisation, the Union is expected to have its own identity. This is, however, a much contested idea due to the fact that there are doubts concerning the possibility of building an identity with so many individual member states and their own individual interests and features (– the diversity Zielonka mentioned above). Although the issue of identity is not to be developed at this stage, it is important to underline the fact that European integration has only been possible due to a certain degree of shared ideas. Not ignoring the differences that certainly exist among the European countries that constitute the organisation, the EU would not make sense if there was no common general set of values and principles, among which one can find freedom, peace, democracy and human rights.

From this point of view, the most important factor for the development of this phenomenon is Europe’s historical legacy. The history of the countries that today compose the European Union overlaps several times and cannot be understood without mentioning the events in the rest of the continent. They have shared the territory, and this geographical proximity was responsible for alliances, friendships, trade, struggles, wars and centuries of mutual interaction and communication. A natural heritage emerged from these ideational and material flows and, to a certain extent, a sense of belonging and of community matured too. If one focuses on democracy, this regime is linked with the foundations of the European political culture and societal identity, as

Emerson (2009: 4) explains. Personal freedoms and equality before the law started to be developed in Ancient Greece; the freedom of speech came with the Roman Empire; in Sweden, in 1018, an assembly established the principle that the power of the king came from the people; the English Magna Carta, the Habeas Corpus Act, the Bill of Rights, the French Revolution, etc. (Idem: 4-6) are examples that the author provides to show how this concept has evolved in Europe and as it is something shared by different countries. Both World Wars were struggles directly related to democracy – whether prompted by the European fragile Empires of the early twentieth century that did not respect nationalities or about the more flagrant Second World War that united democracies against totalitarianisms. All these experiences contoured the way the European countries, as well as the rest of the world, perceive political regimes, rights and freedoms.

Alternative ideologies failed in Europe; they did not bring the prosperity or happiness they promised. In the field, they proved to be less efficient than democracy. Moreover, the old continent was also the place of intellectual reflections on political ideas. The Enlightenment period and its philosophers are an illustrative example. Kant developed the democratic peace theory that was echoed all over Europe and, like him, many other philosophers from all the continent spent great effort on this subject, developing and improving it. Together with democracy, human rights, human dignity, peace, solidarity and other values became part of the European way of thinking. Therefore, in order to finish with the past conflicts that so many times opposed European countries against each other, they decided to pursue a policy of integration, in which the search for the common good would prevail (Soares, 2009: 102).

The EU started to build its own identity based on this set of shared beliefs that actually led to the unification of Europe. The Union seeks to promote a certain image whose aim is to reflect its identity⁴⁵, ensuring some degree of coherence in its action in the scope of the most varied policies – commercial, neighbourhood, enlargement, etc. As the EU Treaty puts it and the member states subscribed to: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights (...)” (Official Journal of the European Union, 2007, article 2). This implies that, despite the unavoidable diversity regarding the constitution

⁴⁵ The doubts about the existence of a single European identity will not be developed here, as it extrapolates the logic of this section.

of the organisation with its twenty-eight members, there is some coherence in its action eased by the principles all the member states accepted.

In fact, one of those principles is democracy, whose importance has been growing in legal and practical terms during the last decades. As a result, the worldwide promotion of democracy arises as one of the most important objectives of the External European Policy:

“The Union's action on the international scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.” (EUT, article 21)

Thus, the European Union is worried about democracy not only within its borders, but also in its relations with the exterior. For both situations, the EU has a “strong juridical basis” (Baracani, 2004: 8) that include the Treaties, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and other documents that support it.

In what comes to promote democracy abroad, Elena Baracani (Idem: 8) considers the EU “unique in developing the most diverse and advanced set of legal and institutional strategies”. Citing Morlino’s work, Baracani argues that there are a set of internal and external reasons that led the EU to adopt this responsibility as a democracy promoter, such as its willingness to stand for Western-democratic values, its own evolution towards a “community of values”, its military weakness that resulted in the reinforcement of the economic and trade ties, and its capability to offer attractive incentives (Morlino *cited in* Baracani, 2004: 8).

As a respected and powerful organisation, the EU plays an important role in the international arena: “International institutions define who the players are in a particular situation and how they define their roles, and thus place constraints on behaviour.” (Simmons & Martin, 2005: 198). They function therefore as a framework for international actors, having the capability to change their identities and interests as a result of the interaction on time limited by a set of rules and norms. In other words, there is a promotion of the adequate behavioural patterns that reminds us of the socialisation process, making international organisations part of the states, at the same time states can also influence the organisations they are in.

If one really assumes the idea that the European Union constitutes an international organisation with its own identity and image, it is then understandable that those values, principles and beliefs are worldwide promoted as a fundamental part of EU's external relations. In what comes to democracy, Emerson, *et al.* (2005: 2) believe that the Union started with a “near zero role in foreign policy” and raised its importance since the collapse of the communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe. The same authors present some developments in the field of external relations in the three main institutions of the organisation: the Commission improved the instruments of economic and technical assistance and began to play a more important role in the enlargement process; the European Parliament increased its influence and has been a key voice for democracy and Human Rights; and finally the Council that created new posts to reinforce its position (Idem: 3).

Although Jan Zielonka (2006: 52, 53) argues that sometimes the EU gives in to parochial pressures and thus its foreign policy is defined by domestic and individual agendas, the action of the EU has been considered very important for the spread of democracy, which is regarded as a “universal appeal” increasingly accepted by the international community as the most effective way to guarantee peace, security and stability (Göksel & Çepel, 2006: 2). And although there are many actors that promote democracy, the methods they use to achieve this end vary: generally speaking, the great divide is between top-down and bottom-up approaches, in which the first targets the political sphere and elites, and the second aims to promote a democratic consciousness inside de civil society. At the same time, the promotion can be either domestic (horizontal) or international (vertical) (Idem: 4, 5). As mentioned earlier, some international actors prefer to intervene more directly and take control over the situation, whereas others prefer to convince democratising states through their own democratic example.

The European Union is an example of the later group; as a mainly civilian power (the so called “soft power”), it uses civil means to promote its goals and to export its own *Weltanschauung*, rather than imposing the rules internationally (Zielonka, 2006: 143). This is the reason why Börzel and Risse (2009: 5) consider the European Union an “almost ideal laboratory for investigation processes and outcomes of diffusion”. Thus, it is possible to affirm that the EU diffuses its image rather than imposes it, and maybe it is one of the reasons why it has become so attractive as a partner. In this

context, Zielonka (2006: 55) defines the Union as truly imperialist (as the organisation seeks to spread its message), but a “voluntary and cooperative” empire, different from others in the sense that its diffusion is a more positive one, based on rewards and on the improvement of other countries’ democracies, instead of a more coercive action against democratising states.

One of the most successful ways of effective democracy promotion by the European Union, according to many authors, is the offer for membership. It is considered one of the strongest leverage mechanisms in the field of democracy promotion. Nevertheless, in its external relations, the EU also diffuses its ideas in the realm of the neighbourhood policy or through any other kind of relations with third countries, whether they are diplomatic, economic or other. In every context, the Union demands for change and reforms; the difference, however, lies in the incentives (Baracani, 2004: 20): full membership is obviously much more attractive than good relations or slight improvements in trade agreements, for instance.

These processes are not, nonetheless, exempted from criticism: many authors present great amounts of failures on the European side. Jünemann (2007) accuses the EU of changing its strategies and instruments according to the country it is dealing with, following a low or high profile of democracy promotion. The idea is that the Union opts for a “low profile” when member states have tighter relationships with those countries (namely trade, economic or historical links), which diminishes the EU’s room for manoeuvre, namely when it comes to apply sanctions (Idem: 3). On the other hand, in countries that have no impact on the national interests of member states a “high profile” promotion is followed and sanctions are more hardly applied (Idem: 3). Richard Youngs (2008) also supports this negative vision *vis-à-vis* the European democratisation policies. The author claims that the EU has no effective strategy towards the promotion of democracy: the incentives have a limited impact and are not accurately distributed; sanctions are often not used in cases of democratic abuses, not being equitably applied; and finally democracy assistance in general constitutes a minor part of the development cooperation and aims at very soft reforms (Idem: 2). A possible explanation for this lack of commitment is given by Jan Zielonka (2006: 52, 53) that points at the EU’s internal diversity as the reason beyond the difficulty in creating wide strategic objectives and to clearly define them: “This has created (...) an impression that the Union negotiated more

with itself than with the applicant countries” (Idem: 53) or with the democratising countries, in this case.

Notwithstanding, there are many other voices that contradict this perspective, arguing that “it is easy to criticize the EU for being incoherent and using double standards, but it is not quite as easy to propose better strategies” (Jünemann, 2007: 7). What can replace the enlargement policy as a successful leverage tool? How should the EU deal with regimes that utterly resist to any reform? These questions are raised by the same author and are backed by Jora (2006: 3) that considers the EU “the most persistent, articulated and influential” democratising actor in the world. And finally Teresa Cierco quotes Attila Agh, who believes the Union is the most important and well succeeded external factor for democratic transitions (Cierco, 2008: 72, 73). Thus, academia is split up by the assessment of the success of EU’s democratising effort and this study intends to contribute to this debate, using the case of Turkey. Emerson and Noutcheva (2004) identified Europe as the empirical proof of their “model of democratic gravity”, using the case of the Eastern enlargement, for instance, in which the democratic example provided by the Union worked as a centre of gravity that gave a particular impetus to the Central and Eastern countries’ democratisation. The incentive of accession was combined with the example the rest of the continent provided and, so far, these democracies seem to be in a good condition⁴⁶.

Concerning the EU, democracy promotion has been developed and reinforced over the last decades. Europe has, in its own history, “a long tradition of contagion of ideas and revolutionary political movements” (Emerson, *et al.*, 2005: 1), whether it was the Renaissance, Liberalism or Communism, to name some examples. As the same authors emphasise, the maturation of those revolutions took decades and “the regime changes were often long and drawn out processes, especially when they were not introduced by war (...) and this seems to be true also of the current episode from 1989 onwards” (Idem: 1). It is precisely in this social and cultural environment that the ideational-constructivist approach finds the impulse for democracy diffusion, based on the member states pre-disposition to act in a normative way that emerges from their identity as a “norm community” (Tafel, 2008: 7).

⁴⁶ According to the Freedom House 2012 Report (Freedom House, 2012), from all the ten countries of the 2004 enlargement, only Hungary and Latvia did not score the best punctuation. Nevertheless, both are still considered “free countries”.

This EU's pan-European vocation (Idem: 7) is translated into a democracy promotion strategy that is based on three pillars, according to Youngs (2008: 1): positive incentives to promote changes, careful use of sanctions and diplomatic pressure, and funds for democracy programmes. These are able to be used by the European Union, most of the times conjugating more than one at the same time, from two different perspectives: the top-down approach that aims at the state level and elites and a bottom-up approach, whose objective is to strengthen civil society activities related to democracy and democratic principles.

In this context, the EU has developed a set of different policies and instruments that vary according to the geographical area and the type of relations with third countries. The European Neighbourhood Policy and other policies with countries from all over the world can range from simple bilateral trade agreements to deeper relations that may include some form of conditionality to ensure the respect for democracy and Human Rights. As already argued, the lack of a membership perspective for these cases diminishes in a great extent the possible influence of the EU in any field, as the reward is not strong enough. On the other hand, enlargement is considered the “most potent and unique democracy promotion instrument” (Idem: 2), which proves its capacity to exert some considerable degree of influence in terms of democracy promotion. Youngs is, however, very critical in regards to other policies beyond enlargement, stating that the logic of democratic reward is not implemented and, more seriously than that, most aid is given to authoritarian or semi-authoritarian regimes (Idem: 3). Youngs provides some examples and reveals that more money was awarded to Serbia and Montenegro than to Croatia that performed better and argues that in Africa, for instance, the demands for democratic development are absent from the aid given, agreeing with Emerson, *et al.* (2005: 6) that consider that member states give priority to countries geographically, culturally or historically closer to them. This situation can damage the final goal of democracy promotion, once incentives and rewards are reversed and the targeted countries do not feel necessary to implement reforms to improve their democracies. Youngs (2008: 5) wrote that “EU member states do not currently have any considered view on the importance they attach to democracy as a condition for aid distribution” and that states tend to favour same countries based on their cultural links.

Notwithstanding, and although the author provides some data regarding his point, some efforts should not be belittled and it seems exaggerated to argue that

democracy is forgotten when dealing with aid distribution. The “Cotonou Agreement” that entered into force in 2003 reveals EU’s intention to foster democracy, Human Rights and sustained development in the African, Caribbean and Pacific States. This document discloses a concern with these questions and makes them central in the relationship the EU has with the ACP countries. It is a fact that membership is not a possibility for these countries and that can somehow diminish the Union’s leverage power among them, but it does not necessarily mean that these relations ignore those values. Some excerpts of the Agreement can prove this point:

“The Partnership shall actively support the promotion of human rights, processes of democratisation, consolidation of the rule of law, and good governance.” (Article 9, no. 4)

“If, despite the political dialogue conducted regularly between the Parties, a Party considers that the other Party has failed to fulfil an obligation stemming from respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 9, it shall, except in cases of special urgency, supply the other Party and the Council of Ministers with the relevant information required for a thorough examination of the situation with a view to seeking a solution acceptable to the Parties. To this end, it shall invite the other Party to hold consultations that focus on the measures taken or to be taken by the party concerned to remedy the situation.” (Article 96, no. 2a) (Cotonou Agreement, 2000).

Youngs’ conclusion that “the EU urgently needs to reassess how it can best ‘incentivise’ democratisation in the current international context (...) [as well as] to evaluate the capability for European leverage through other and new types of rewards” (Idem: 2) constitutes a wise statement. Indeed, the improvement of the application of the criteria and a more coherent action of the whole Union as an international actor are questions that need to be tackled and improved. Still, it does not seem reasonable to blame the European Union for not regarding values such as democracy, Human Rights and sustained development in third countries, even though in these places their influence may not be as strong as in the neighbourhood or in the candidates.

Even though EU’s enlargement policy is regarded as the most powerful tool for democratisation, there is no consensus about the effective capacity of the membership appeal to achieve changes and reforms. For example, Raik (2004: 568), referring to the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) enlargement, argues that many studies over-evaluated EU’s impact: “In the 1990’s, an average of only 1 percent of the total EU aid to the CEEC’s was directed toward democracy” (Idem: 568). On the other hand, Schimmelfennig & Scholtz (2008) consider enlargement the most successful EU’s external policy and that “in many cases the Union’s external incentives have been

instrumental in overcoming domestic obstacles to further democratic reform” (Idem: 188). Tafel (2008: 2) and Baracani (2004: 9) share the same reasoning and assess EU’s action in the CEEC’s as a very well succeeded task.

4.2.2. The Enlargement Process

Mattli & Plümpfer (2002: 55) furnish us with a very interesting and valuable definition of enlargement: “a process by which the gap in rules and institutional arrangements between insiders of a union and outsiders progressively becomes narrower”. Thus, enlargement implies diminishing the hiatus between insiders and outsiders. In the context of the European Union, this progression occurs (not only, but more intensively) during the accession process. In other words, the accession process is the period during which the candidates undertake the reforms and changes necessary to comply with EU’s demands, in order to reach as quick as possible the final end of full membership. If this definition is scrutinised, one will find that it entails many clues to the understanding of the accession process.

First of all, as the name already reveals, it constitutes a process, i.e., a period in time during which different phenomena dynamically take place and create changes that are supposed to reduce the gap between the applicant country and the organisation. As a process, it takes time, effort and patience, since the differences between both entities can be quite tangible and difficult to overcome, which is clearly the case of Turkey and the European Union. Furthermore, this effort to change can also be costly, in economic, political and societal terms – austere economic measures to achieve some financial objectives, the political cost for a party to stand for the organisation that is requiring so many sacrifices and possible considerable changes that may affect social structures, habits and routines are some of the quandaries that may undermine the entire process.

The cornerstone of the accession process lies precisely on the reforms and changes it implies. These changes have to be conceived within the general concept of Europeanisation. As it will be further developed, Europeanisation is a very complex process tightly linked to accession and a perfect finished example of how the above mentioned gap is supposed to be tightened. At the same time, Europeanisation is linked to the normative influence of the EU, meaning that more aggressive mechanisms of leverage are absent.

The third part of the definition includes the compliance with the organisation's demands. In this sense, and in order to achieve the already referred domestic changes, the European Union, for example, applies a policy of sanctions and rewards that combined are supposed to motivate the country to carry out the required transformations, being sanctioned when fail and rewarded when certain aims are achieved.

Finally, the ultimate goal of a candidate country is to reach full membership. After years (or decades) of efforts and sacrifices, achieving full membership constitutes the greatest trophy – mainly during the process of accession, the sight of membership and the prospect of achieving it can successfully work as a key element for real and true commitment. On the contrary, blurred or uncertain perspectives of accession can hamper the whole process.

Therefore, so that all this complex mechanism is able to function properly, these four parts have to be considered and work effectively – it follows that changes, reforms and compliance with the demands do not work with efficacy if the final end is not perceived as an almost certain outcome. The idea is that, if the stick is present, the perception of the possibility of achieving the “carrot” is essential. In fact, the carrot of membership is valuable due to the idea of a rewarded effort, but also due to what being a full right member means and implies in a symbolic manner: internationally, being held in consideration by the community and finally being able to participate in the decision-making process raises the country's self-esteem and reinforce its position within the international society, not to mention the financial advantages (accession to funds, for example) that also work as an important catalyst.

The complexity of accession is present in all the three parts that constitute the process: in the EU as an organisation that welcomes the country, in the candidate country and in the member states. As a result, the process becomes very slow and sometimes painful for some or all the parts involved. An enlargement means to the Union an adaptation of its institutions, treaties, funds allocation, political balances, borders, etc. No matter the benefits of a new membership, different levels or degrees of change are always implicit. For member states, their national interests, their position within the Union, the vision of Europe and concerns like security, prosperity and their domestic public opinion are always at stake when it comes to accept or refuse a new enlargement. Not only economic interests and preferences are taken into consideration,

but also cultural and historical bonds can promote or erode the support for a new country to join the EU – a very illustrative example can be provided by Germany's diverging positions regarding two accession processes: the CEEC's and Turkey's. The support or lack of it, respectively, is namely based on the above mentioned reasons taken together and responsible for shaping the country's very assertive position. In what comes to the candidate country, it was already stated that a candidacy process has, apart from all the benefits and advantages that it may entail, its costs and, given its complexity, its outcome can be extremely unpredictable.

The 2002 Eurobarometer showed that, for EU's population, enlargement represented more an opportunity than a problem: 50% were in favour of enlargement and only 30% against it (Eurobarometer, 2002: 67). Moreover, although 65% of the respondents believed further accessions would make it more difficult to reach decisions, 63% and 61% of the EU's citizens considered them important to (respectively) strengthen the Union's position in the world and to culturally enrich the organisation (Idem: 88). In 2010, the support for future enlargements dropped to 40% and the number of those against them raised to 48% (Eurobarometer, 2010: 221). On the population side, the issue of enlargement seems to be quite controversial, but the values fluctuate over the years which reveals some lack of consistency and variation in the population's interests and perceptions.

The Turkish case, as it will become clearer during this work, comprises a challenge for all the three parts: the European Union, Turkey and Turks. A 2006 Special Eurobarometer revealed that 48% of the EU's population would oppose to the accession of Turkey even if it complied with all the conditions defined by the organisation (Eurobarometer, 2006: 70). The European Union fears unbalances and the importation of some of the country's problems. Some member states do not feel culturally, economically, socially or politically identified with Turkey and even this candidate faces internal problems regarding the accession. Consequently, the Turkish case exacerbates all the common inherent difficulties of the process, making it even more difficult to develop and apply.

Jan Zielonka (2006) points out some situations that contribute to that intricacy from the side of the EU. First, the author considers it an empire without emperor, referring to the lack of a "single centre of government" (Idem: 59), which makes it harder to have some important decisions made. And if the European Council is a

powerful institution, the veto power of member states, with both ideological and material motives for opposing accession, delays the process or freezes it. On the other side, the European Commission is a valuable force towards enlargement and counts with the support of external actors like the United States (Idem: 61), that understand the advantages of the European integration. Nevertheless, there are many fears to overcome: the fear of weakening integration, of economic chaos, of the erosion of democratic patterns, etc. and “at the centre of these anxieties is the perceived level of diversity between the old and new EU members” (Idem: 66), which is, in other words, the fear of heterogeneity. Turkey, in this respect, constitutes another conundrum, as the country involuntarily raises the notion of the “other”, creating a psychological reaction on the European side, as it will be developed. As Zielonka concludes, Europeans are afraid of exporting their values and importing the others’ problems (Idem: 65).

José Ignacio Torreblanca (2003) proposes an eclectic model to better understand the accession process and the motives behind member states’ support for it. “The dynamic model of negotiated accommodation” has three basic assumptions: first, EU member states have two types of preferences: instrumental and normative; second, the set of principles and norms that guides their normative preferences is not absolutely constant (they change over time), is not precise (it is subject to different interpretations), is not coherent (there can be conflicts among principles) and is not strongly institutionalised (without central authority); third, the Union’s ‘culture of consensus’ complicates the achievement of a final decision (Idem: 32, 33). According to the author:

“EU member states are simultaneously negotiating how to best advance or maximize their particular economic, security and institutional interests and, at the same time, negotiating among them how to adapt, further develop, and institutionalise the general principles and constitutive norms which they share. Therefore, in some cases we may need to hold structures constant and look at how agents negotiate or accommodate their interests while, in other cases, we need to pay attention to how norms change as a result of the negotiations between actors and how they impact on actors’ preferences.” (Idem: 34).

Ignacio Torreblanca’s position fuses both interest-maximisation and principle-satisfying behaviours. In fact, one should not ignore the material forces that frequently drive member states positions regarding accession. At the same time, the principles those same countries agreed on when they acceded and that they still share and promote worldwide as part of their image are a fundamental piece to understand this jigsaw puzzle as well. It is relevant to remind that this position is not contrary to the

constructivist assumptions. Indeed, Constructivism accepts the influence of material and ideational forces and this is precisely a case in which both have to be considered, because if they are not, there will be the risk of not fully understand the problem.

The path to achieve the inclusion in the EU is a very challenging one. In order to join, “the applicant country must adhere to the principles of Article 6(1) TEU which all the Member States subscribe to and on which the EU is based: freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law”.⁴⁷ In a first moment, the country applies to the Council that hears the opinion of the Commission and of the European Parliament, having to reach afterwards a unanimous decision in the case the country is allowed to begin the process of accession. Member states and the applicant sign (and have to ratify) the Accession Treaty that includes the conditions for accession and adaptation. But it is only after the Copenhagen criteria are met that negotiations can be opened; these criteria entail the stability of democratic institutions, the rule of law and human rights, a healthy market economy, the capacity to assume the membership’s obligations and to adapt the administrative structures.

The next phase, negotiations, consists of adopting, implementing and applying the *acquis communautaire* – a very long document with 35 chapters on the most diverse areas that need to converge with the European practices. The main objective is to prepare the country to be a full member of the Union and “negotiations are conducted individually, based on the own merits of each applicant country”. This means that, after screening the country to evaluate its status, negotiations take place within the context of inter-governmental conferences and each chapter is closed when the country fulfils the targets defined for each of them. However, it is important to notice that both single chapters or negotiations in general can be “suspended in the event of a serious and persistent violation of the principles on which the EU is founded” and even if a certain chapter is closed, it can be re-opened in case the country no longer satisfies its benchmarks.

The completion of all the chapters marks the end of the accession process and an Accession Treaty is signed and ratified by all the member states and the applicant country after a unanimous decision at the Council level. This final treaty includes the

⁴⁷ The information conveyed in this section on the steps of the enlargement process is based on the Official Website of the European Union under the following link: http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/enlargement/ongoing_enlargement/114536_en.htm [Acceded on 19.03.2012].

accession date, the results of the negotiations, the adaptation of the European institutions and legal documents (distribution of votes, number of seats in the Parliament, etc.).

During the entire process, the European Union deploys a set of mechanisms to help the candidate comply with all the conditions, as well as tools to assess its evolutions: there are the pre-accession strategy, bilateral agreements, political and economic dialogues, accession partnerships and national programmes for the adoption of the *acquis*, the participation of the applicant in various agencies and committees, annual reports, financial assistance and the project of “Civil Society Dialogue” that aims to “increase mutual understanding and knowledge” between the European and the candidate’s populations.

As proven by this brief summary of the accession process, it represents a long and time-consuming set of procedures that, therefore, should placate the fears of the member states, once the moment of accession is *a priori* a time in which countries should no longer be considered a threat or menace. Portugal, Spain, Greece and, more recently, the CEECs are some good examples of how many fears were and are groundless, also given the fact that “an application can be interpreted as a very public act of commitment to continuing deep institutional reforms that fully align outsiders to EU norms and rules” (Mattli & Plümper, 2002: 559). As the countries showed interest in joining the Union, they reveal a true commitment to the process and make enormous efforts in order to reach that final goal.

4.2.3. Europeanisation and normative power

All these documents and steps towards accession are also part of a wider process called Europeanisation. The Copenhagen criteria and the *acquis communautaire* are good examples of guiding documents in which the main principles and values of the European Union are officially stated – they base the criteria the countries need to fulfil not only to accede, but also to Europeanise. The fulfilment of these conditions requires major changes that involve the EU’s presence and massive financial support – as mentioned above, the programmes of assistance are diverse and encompass immense flows of money. Therefore, the EU ends up having a determinant role to play in the

definition of national agendas and Europeanisation is able to, at the same time, interconnect two other major processes: transition and integration (Cierco, 2008: 78). The latter refers to the fact that these reforms contribute to the inclusion of the country in the Union by diminishing the gap between that country and the member states; simultaneously, those changes may create or strengthen a process of transition – to a better democracy, to a better economy, etc. It should be highlighted that Europeanisation does not only include the adoption of formal rules and their tangible transposition for national law, but also their internalisation, which is more related to the social learning of the new realities and perspectives that are behind the adoption of those rules – more than requiring free elections, developing a democratic culture and being interested and actively taking part in the democratic process are also fundamental.

Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (*cited in* Subotic, 2011: 311) frugally define Europeanisation as a “process by which states adopt EU rules”. This definition does not certainly pretend to be complete, but, even so, reducing Europeanisation to the mere adoption of rules does not seem to be accurate, as it ignores one of the most important parts of the process, related to the internalisation of the European values, principles and practices. Radaelli (2000: 4) provides a more complete, accurate and widely used definition that has been adopted in this work:

“Processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the making of EU decisions and then incorporated in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies.”

Although this is a very commented and analysed definition, some aspects should be highlighted to pursue with this study. First, the plural in the beginning of the definition emphasises that many “sub-processes” are embedded in the large group of Europeanisation. As such, there are many dynamics and movements occurring at the same time. Furthermore, the use of words like “construction and diffusion” confirms that Europeanisation is more than the simple adoption of rules, because it implies the building of something, which is not the same of externally imposing a set of norms. And what is, according to the definition, constructed and diffused? Both formal and informal rules; both material and ideational aspects. Again, not only procedures, but also beliefs. Finally it is remarkable as well the idea of progression implicit in the author’s definition: first those changes are defined by the EU, but then they are incorporated domestically. From our perspective, this incorporation does not uniquely mean that they

are imported without a reflexive and critic attitude, but rather received by the population, interpreted and only then internalised, giving some meaning to it and borrowing some collective identity to the norms, rules or ideas that came from abroad. Utterly, this denotes that, given this vision of Europeanisation, this process (or set of processes) encompasses a slow movement of social learning, implying that any attempt to simply impose EU's perspective with no regard for the other side should not be considered as Europeanisation, but just an ethnocentric and imperialist way of making the European culture prevail.

Claudio Radaelli seeks to be even more precise with his definition and determines, in the same article, what can and what cannot be considered Europeanisation. In that sense, the author distinguishes Europeanisation from convergence, harmonisation, political integration and EU policy formation (Idem: 6). Convergence is, according to Radaelli, a consequence of Europeanisation, in the sense that the latter can result in convergence, but can also generate divergence, making the two concepts different from each other, although correlated. In the same line, Europeanisation is not harmonisation either: the first is capable of improving the state's capacity to deal with problems, but it is still possible that national institutions produce different solutions. Regarding political integration, although Europeanisation would not exist without integration, it embodies a "post-ontological focus", meaning that Europeanisation is more concerned about what happens once the institutions are established and produce effect, rather than the ontological phase in which countries share their sovereignty. Finally, Europeanisation cannot be confused with EU policy formation, given the fact that they are conceptually different: policy formation is the process that leads to the development of a certain policy, whereas Europeanisation constitutes a consequence of that policy at the domestic level (Idem: 6).

Thus, Europeanisation is, from our perspective, a set of processes that promote transformations in the recipient countries in order them to be closer to and share the European political-economic and socio-cultural patterns. At this point, the question that needs to be posed is how that closeness is reached.

Caporaso, Cowles and Risse (2001) wrote that the major condition for Europeanisation to take place is a gap (or misfit) between European and domestic patterns. The wider the gap, the higher the pressure for the country to europeanise. Therefore, it can be assumed that, in order to europeanise, there must be a lack of

compatibility with the European structures, which means a misfit between the two parts and, consequently, the pressure that arises is responsible for creating the impetus needed to foster domestic change. This idea of promoting internal change is realised, in the case of the European Union, through the conjugation of two mechanisms.

As Emerson and Noutcheva (2004: 4) postulate, socialisation and conditionality contribute to the interaction of the three dynamics that help achieve the final aim of Europeanisation⁴⁸ and which are a) legal norms usually associated with the political and economic realms and *sine qua non* conditions for the accession; b) objective changes both in the economic structures and in the individuals' interests that resulted from the growing integration; c) and finally, subjective changes that are related to the individuals' beliefs, expectations and identity at the societal level (Idem: 4). As discussed above, these dynamics combine material and immaterial changes, respecting therefore Radaelli's definition and our own understanding of this phenomenon. Besides, Emerson and Noutcheva (Idem: 5) recognise that this process is interactive, which means that member states begin and shape the process at the same time they are themselves influenced and affected by it. Again, the constructivist conception of the co-constitution of agency and structure.

As an expert committed to this subject, Claudio Radaelli (2000) proposes a more complex and complete model of the mechanisms of Europeanisation⁴⁹. Although it will not be object of a deep analysis, it is worth mentioning that there are three main mechanisms in this model: presence of a European model; absence of a European model and soft framing mechanisms. These three large groups encompass the means to reach that specific type of integration: for example, the presence of an European model constitutes a "positive integration", but the EU's suggestion of a model implies whether some degree of coercion so that the country adopts it or "mimetism", if a country is allowed to choose whether to follow the model or not. In the two cases, there is a subsequent adaptation pressure towards the Europeanising country.

This model is in accordance with what was mentioned above related to the idea that not only rules and norms are able to help Europeanise a country – ideational factors constitute a relevant side of this question. Subotic (2011) wrote an article based on a comparison between Croatia and Serbia, according to which the final aim of accession

⁴⁸ Morlino and Magen (2009), from the 4 mechanisms of external democracy promotion, also chose socialisation and conditionality to apply to the European case.

⁴⁹ A reproduction of Radaelli's "mechanisms of Europeanisation" can be found in Figure 11 (Appendix 4).

is not enough to determine the success of Europeanisation. Although both countries were on the run towards accession and had to go through the same procedures, Croats “were willingly to adopt rules they disagreed with because the feeling of belonging to a shared European family trumped other concerns they had with the Europeanisation process” (Idem: 311). On the other hand, and despite the importance of accession in Serbia, its post-Yugoslav “uncertain and transitional identity, the contested meaning of Europe, and the presence of alternative domestic identity claims (...) can best explain cases of stalled Europeanisation” (Idem: 312). Therefore, the success of Europeanisation as a set of processes that include the participation of the EU and country’s elites and civil society depends on all the parts involved and not only on the European side as some authors assert. Identity is, according to Subotic and to our own position, a key element to understand this phenomenon and what can in fact distinguish an easier and quicker Europeanisation process from a more difficult and slower one.

As it was already mentioned, identity is mutable and, although many academics believe that Europeanising is something natural and desired by all countries, the fact is that some collective identities do not perceive the EU as owning a set of principles and norms that fit the country’s features and characteristics. Serbia was the example provided by the author, but Turkey is another case to consider: although the Turks have historically wanted to join the Union, most of them do not regard European’s identity as superior to their own identity and therefore do not consider relevant or necessary to change or alter it. Moreover, there is a widespread dilemma that opposes Turks’ willingness to enter the EU and their fear of losing part of their identity once they believe they are assumed to adopt a different identity. Being aware of this dilemma that concerns Turks’ minds, elites seek to convey their message, according to their interests, promoting whether identity convergence or identity divergence mechanisms.⁵⁰ Thus, if some pro-Europeans sponsor an identity convergence dynamic, emphasising the similarities between both parts and omitting some differences, Euro-sceptics would highlight the Turkish identity in contrast with the European values, trying to convey their message of incompatibility between them and Europe.

The previous pages referred to Europeanisation at very different levels – the adoption of formal rules and identity issues were brought within the scope of the same “umbrella” concept. Diez (*et al.*, 2005) noted that and, after concluding that

⁵⁰ These concept were used by Subotic (2011) and have already been explained.

Europeanisation is a complex concept that embraces different realities or dynamics, attributed four different meanings to it, differentiating between policy, political, discursive and societal Europeanisation (Idem: 2). According to the authors, these dimensions should be clearly identified when studying a Europeanisation case, as they are “different ways in which Europe becomes a common reference point increasingly referred to in domestic debates, or to the alignment of policies, political processes or social identities within Europe” (Idem: 2).

This process, however, is also not consensual in terms of academics’ assessment. Didem Buhari (2009), for example, adopted a critical stance regarding Europeanisation studies. According to the author, there is an ambiguous approach to the term, blurred boundaries with other concepts and even different perceptions that classify it whether as a process or an outcome. (Idem: 100). Besides, there is a tendency to face the phenomenon as top-down, ignoring the bottom-up sub-processes that also compose it, as well as the interactivity of the relationship (Idem: 103). Therefore, a set of variables should be taken into consideration, as they too may help explain some variations in the success of the application of Europeanisation, such as: EU’s stimuli (hard/soft law), type of integration (positive or negative) and national structures. The latter are fundamental, as the country’s identity and history, political ideology and the associated socio-economic costs can create a more positive or negative favourable environment to europeanise (Idem: 104, 105). In that sense, and given the complexity behind the changes necessary to pursue with Europeanisation (whether they are legal and formal or more cognitive and ideational), it is through this process that “EU stimuli are received, translated and adopted or rejected” (Idem: 107). This conception of Europeanisation presents it as something that is not only received, but also interpreted; that is imposed, but that can be rejected. It is a more dynamic and interactive reading of the phenomenon that avoids the formality and unidirectionality of some conceptions.

Related to Europeanisation and the way the European Union promotes its ideals, one can very often find the EU’s normative character. Normative action is the opposite option of coercive military imposition; the well-known “soft-power” phenomenon. To be a normative actor signifies that it “act[s] in a normative way that transcends instrumental rationality and projects values as a means of inducing international change” (Tafel, 2008: 2). A normative power does not mean basing one’s action on discourse and speech, although cognitive aspects really matter, but rather use the economic power, institutions, diplomacy and other non-belligerent means to achieve the

final goal of diffusing a certain idea or value as well. There is an impact anyway, but the focus is on the ideational side of the question, which avoids an objective and sometimes violent material imposition, because as Manners (2002: 238) wrote: “Cold war (...) ended with the internal collapse of regimes (...) – by the collapse of norms rather than the power of force”. There are other examples all over the world that epitomise this idea, given the fact that some of the external military-driven impositions of democracy ended up creating some fragile regimes based on formal democratic institutions without the public democratic support needed behind them – Iraq is an example of this kind of situation.

Making use of declarations, treaties, policies, criteria and other conditions (Idem: 242), the European Union diffuses its norms and tries to convince the others that they can be regarded as “normal”, as a “pattern” for the other members of the international community –

“not only is the EU constructed in a normative basis, but importantly that this predisposes it to act in a normative way in world politics. It is built on the crucial, and usually overlooked observation that the most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is” (Idem: 252).

Democracy is one of the fields in which Europeanisation operates and constitutes one of the values that EU tries to promote worldwide through a normative way. And more than just another field of Europeanisation, it is one of the most complex examples: first, democracy is a wide-ranging concept that includes quite diverse realities from the civil-military relations to the learning of the democratic culture; from free and fair elections to the trust in political elites. Secondly, there is no single model of democracy in the European Union; in fact, there are many differences among the European countries, namely regarding dichotomies like Parliamentarianism/Presidential system, more or less centralised, more or less intervenient state, etc. And finally the EU is itself object of strong criticisms regarding the lack of democratic practices in its institutions and how poorly representative they are. As a result, it becomes quite difficult for the Union to constitute a credible and coherent example.

Although “normative power” is different from the common classic version of “hard power”, the true is that only powerful international actors have the capability to shape or determine what can be considered normal and that constitutes, therefore, a type of power as well: “norms become agents and expressions of state power” (Seppo & Tyrväinen, 2008: 10). According to Tocci (*cited in* Seppo e Tyrväinen, 2008: 10), an actual normative power is the one that fights for normative objectives, uses normative

means and possibly reaches a normative impact. Thus, it is our strong belief that it is fundamental that the EU acts coherently in terms of promoting values, such as democracy. Only when the Union is perceived as a true role-model that implements and practices the highest standards of the democratic regime within its own borders and institutions, will it be possible to exercise the normative pressure on third countries and, therefore, to promote democracy across the world namely through serving as an example of good democratic practices with positive results, such as peace, economic stability and popular satisfaction. In this context, the EU can convince others of the validity and genuineness of its action as a democracy normative diffuser, enabling its Europeanisation practices to be more effective and successful.

4.2.4. Conditionality and Socialisation

The proposed definition of accession includes a reference to the candidate's compliance with the organisation's demands. The European Union, as the recipient of those candidates, establishes the goals they need to achieve in order to be considered in conditions to accede. Accession, in its turn, is only possible when the gap between the applicant and the organisation is diminished; in the case of the EU, the Europeanisation process seeks to decrease that difference through two main mechanisms: conditionality and socialisation. Although the first may be easier to recognise and quantify, the latter is also very important for the process because Europeanisation (and diminishing the gap) is not only about adopting formal rules⁵¹, but also internalising them.

The EU employs conditionality as the mechanism responsible for controlling the steps taken by the countries, using it more widely and systematically to assess their evolution, namely through the European Commission Annual Progress Reports, and reward their efforts or punish a possible retrocession. Conditionality is considered one of the most successful policies of the Union in the context of its foreign policy, and more precisely of accession, given the fact that the final reward, full membership, is very appealing and maybe the only one that is worth struggling for, despite the costs of the process.

⁵¹ In fact, as it will be explained in Chapter 5, Magen and Morlino (2009) differentiate between rule adoption, implementation and internalisation.

Conditionality is the name of the mechanism behind the “carrot and stick” policy. In other words, and bringing together definitions of diverse authors, the Union provides appealing benefits to countries it deals with (not only in the scope of accession, but in every type of relation) if those countries fulfil the accorded conditions, usually focusing on the development or improving of human rights and democracy. This strategy of reinforcement seeks to promote changes and stabilisation in the recipient countries, granting them benefits that range from financial aid, technical assistance, full membership, etc (Schimmelfennig & Scholtz, 2008: 190; Smith, 1997: 1; Sunay, 2008: 2).

In case the conditions are not accomplished by the country involved, there is the possibility of applying sanctions. Nevertheless, this situation is very exceptional on what comes to the EU and very rarely sanctions are applied (Youngs, 2010: 3). Altering the assistance programmes, postponing payments and other aids, imposing embargos, suspensions, etc are examples of measures included within negative conditionality (Smith, 1997: 17), which frequently do not work in the expected manner. As a matter of fact, negative conditionality is very controversial and authors believe that it is very likely not to directly target the causes of the violations of the conditions and usually even worsen the situation of the population (Idem: 17). Positive conditionality, on the other hand, emphasises the rewards when certain aims are successfully achieved by the countries and is usually considered more productive. And although the “denial of an expected reward is not always seen as qualitatively different from the removal of an existing preference” (Youngs, 2010: 7), there is a more optimistic approach implied, which promotes further efforts on the countries’ side.

One of the problems this distinction may raise, and which constitutes a first criticism, is pointed out by Richard Youngs, who wrote that

“However, what is presented as incentives-based political conditionality often crosses the line into largely unconditional engagement: rewards are invariably granted on the basis of no more than the vaguest of promises of future reforms” (Idem: 7).

The previous assumption that human rights are universal values that every country should follow is another question raised by some authors, as well as the fact that judging other countries may be somehow unfair and very subjective – a pattern to assess all the countries could probably grant more objectivity, but on the other hand applying it to all countries would also ignore their intrinsic and specific features (Smith, 1997: 5). In this sense, Usul (2011: 64) argues that meritocracy and consistency are fundamental

to an effective process of conditionality and, therefore, “double standards” are responsible for weakening the process and EU’s image as a serious and committed actor as long as “high-politics or geopolitical considerations, along with individual member state pressures, are sometimes prioritized over a merit-based accession process” (Idem: 64). This was the case of Bulgaria and Romania’s accession when compared to the procedure towards Turkey.⁵²

In fact, this “double standard” comes from other problems of conditionality, which are power asymmetry and uncertainty. The relationship between the Union and the candidate is not even: the EU sets the rules and conditions without consulting the candidate, at the same time the vagueness of those same rules makes it even harder for the countries to know how to behave. They are object of a “*ex ante* conditionality”, being accepted only after fulfilling all the imprecise conditions. Uncertainty comes from this environment of lack of coherence on the EU’s side and can easily undermine all the process and the country’s commitment (Sunay, 2008: 4,5; Usul, 2011: 65). Thus, “candidates’ domestic actors are likely to challenge conditionality (in one way or another) if the process is uncertain and asymmetrically structured” (Sunay, 2008: 3).

These problems contribute to a negative image of the European Union. The lack of consistency and of a systematic approach, power asymmetry, uncertainty regarding the observance of the promise of accession, etc. cause a credibility deficit in the Union that is aggravated by the democratic deficit of its own institutions, as well as some faults of its own members. Furthermore, adopting the EU rules and measures does not guarantee that the population truly internalise them and apply them in their lives. If the first situation only encompasses the institutional level and is easy to assess, the individual or societal adoption of those norms is not so simple. As Teresa Cierco (2011: 145) explains, “The EU as an external actor can demand to establish the legal framework for the protection of human rights, but its real implementation and respect on a daily basis lies beyond the scope of governmental influence”. Therefore, despite the government intentions, the real application and internalisation of the reforms and changes the elites pursue in order to get closer to the Union are not easy to assess nor to achieve by the mere adoption and imposition, as these changes on a societal level require much time and systematic contact with the new frameworks that are not rooted

⁵² The study’s results proved that the 2007 enlargement has negatively impacted on Turkish democratic performance, possibly also due to the frustration created by the perception of unfairness and of double standards *vis-à-vis* the EU’s treatment towards different countries (Matos, 2012).

in people's habits and mindsets – “a change of mentality and culture cannot be reached by a state-centred top-down approach as conditionality” (Idem: 146).

Nevertheless, EU's conditionality process has not only faults, but also some strengths that allow it to be followed as a good example of leverage power by other countries or regional organisations. Seppo and Tyrväinen (2008: 5) believe this strategy constituted an essential tool to reach peace, stability and economic prosperity all over the continent, assuming that it helped countries facing important transitions. Schimmelfennig and Scholtz (2008: 207) concluded that conditionality is an effective process that, although in need for some reassessment, “even when the membership incentives lacked credibility, i.e. when the membership promise was uncertain and accession was distant, the impact of EU political conditionality was statistically strong and robust”. Indeed, as an incentive mechanism with a very appealing reward, conditionality has to be credited for some accomplishments, namely in the CEEC's enlargement and it cannot be ignored its contribution to various reforms and changes, because they were, in the context of accession, the only possible way to reach the so desired full membership.

EU's conditionality did not always work the same way. As any other policy, it has undergone through many changes and improvements, in order to adapt to the new realities the European Union itself has to deal with. An incipient form of conditionality was firstly presented in the Birkelbach Report in 1962, a document written by a European Parliament committee that considered democratic regimes *sine qua non* conditions for candidacy. From that moment onwards, the EU started to take conditionality into account, using it as a means to strengthen democracy across Europe (and the world), providing help in transition and consolidation processes. In the early times, namely in the enlargements to Portugal, Spain and Greece, conditionality was rather informal, with no monitoring and a limited conception of democracy was applied in a mainly political process in which states prioritised their national interests over the organisation's (Usul, 2011: 45, 46). With time, this mechanism starts to take the shape of a more systematised and less political tool, with regular monitoring and a stronger presence of EU's institutions in the development of the whole process. In the 1990's the then EEC accepted to establish association agreements in case the countries would satisfy a set of prior conditions: rule of law, human rights and multi-party system figured among them (Smith, 1997: 9). It was in this same decade that the Copenhagen

criteria were established and the Maastricht Treaty included this concern with human rights in the Community's external policy (Idem: 11). Nevertheless, since the 2004 enlargement, conditionality became stricter: the possible enlargement fatigue and the efforts implied in the membership of ten new countries at once were certainly behind this new approach –

“the increasing Euro-fatigue in the post-enlargement period led to the emergence of a non-friendly environment for new enlargements. Together with this new European environment, EU decision-makers have started to apply more stringent conditionality for new candidates and potential candidates” (Usul, 2011: 59).

In the case of Bulgaria and Romania, that acceded three years later, a special safeguard clause was introduced with the aim of extending the Commission's influence over a longer period of time; in that sense, the Union opened the possibility of postponing up to one year the accession date (Jora, 2006: 12). Both political and economic costs of this delay are not tempting at all and, together with the post-accession clauses valid for three years after the accession moment and mentioned in the Accession Treaties, European institutions extend their leverage power in time and ensuring their demands are accomplished.

Besides those tools the EU has at its disposal on the brink of the moment of truth, others are used to operationalise political conditionality. Usul (2011: 59) perceives the European Union as an “active democratic hub” that improved over time its leverage capacity due to the establishment of a more comprehensive and systematic strategy to support democratisation among candidates. The same author (Idem: 60-62) lists a set of instruments that are employed in the scope of conditionality. They consist of demarches, opinions, progress reports, accession partnership and national programmes, and screening and negotiations. Demarches were the first tool to be developed by the EU and included diplomatic notes and official protests; the Opinions describe and assess the country in accordance with the conditions involved; the Progress Reports evaluate the evolutions of the country within the context of its path towards accession, i.e., they praise the improvements and call the country's attention to the areas that need to be more carefully addressed or solved, always having the Copenhagen criteria as background; the Accession Partnership states EU's demands in the short and medium term, which are included in the National Programmes designed by the candidates; finally, the screening process critically scrutinises the *acquis* in order to prepare the accession negotiations during which the candidate is monitored and helped

to implement the *acquis* so that it fulfils all the conditions (included in the many chapters that compose it) to accede when it is ready (Idem: 60-62).

Democratic socialisation, more specifically, is a mechanism of democracy diffusion. Unlike democratic conditionality, socialisation operates more at the societal and cognitive levels, as it is the result of the interaction with other actors. According to Magen and Morlino (2009: 34), it is “a process of inducting individuals and states into the democratic norms and rules of a given regional, international or transnational community”. The above-mentioned interaction can occur at different levels and through different channels: economic connections, geopolitical relations, social linkages, means of communication and transnational civil society (Idem: 34). The idea is that, through interaction, individuals and groups acquire or internalise a set of principles and norms that are in force among the members of the groups they are dealing with. It is not mere mimicking the others’ actions; it is being inspired by them and absorbing some of their characteristics. Obviously, there is behind this conception the Constructivist principle of the “logic of appropriateness” and the assumption that “domestic decision-makers are themselves cognitive-social actors that respond, at least in part, to [this] logic (...)” (Idem: 37). Moreover, if the entity that is inspiring the other community is seen as a legitimate actor in the field it is promoting, interactions are eased (Idem: 37) and internalisation too.

It is important to notice, though, that these interactions can take place at different levels: both elites and civil society can be part of programmes of exchanges, networks and learning processes, for instance. Therefore, and if this mechanism is effectively promoted and applied, the top-down and unidirectional approach of conditionality can find in socialisation the other side of the coin – a softer, interactive and bottom-up approach. It does not mean, however, that this mechanism, academically speaking, is easier to identify and assess; on the contrary, the deepness, slowness, symbolic and subjective character of this social learning make it truly difficult to evaluate – it is only perceptible in the longer-term mentality changes, revealed in modified behaviour.

Thus, the real promotion and application of both mechanisms combined – democracy conditionality and socialisation – seem to be, at least theoretically, the best approach, as both together embrace different sides and aspects of external democracy diffusion and if formal rule adoption is induced, the not least important rule internalisation is also taken into account and completes the process that, in this scenario,

comprises both formal/legal and cognitive/individual domains. Besides, the critiques against conditionality are softened with the application of socialisation and the less strict and systematic approach of the latter is compensated by conditionality's organised application and assessment. The rigorous application of these mechanisms within the broader context of Europeanisation would guarantee the European Union a more coherent and powerful action at the global scale.

4.2.5. The ultimate aim: full membership

Any process of accession takes many years or even decades of efforts and sacrifices. Making the average of all enlargements, since the moment a country is officially considered a candidate, it takes nine years until membership. Turkey is a candidate since 1999, which means about 14 years of waiting and reforming, not to mention the pre-accession period. Nevertheless, there is no clear perspective of full membership yet.

Sacrifices only make sense if the compensation is achievable or, using a common metaphor, it is only worth it to be under the constant threat of the stick if the carrot is able to be reached at some point in time. Therefore, the trophy of accession is of utmost importance in the framework of all the accession process. Turkey is a very peculiar case, as this work pretends to prove – as a result, a higher complexity was and still is expected in this particular enlargement. Notwithstanding, not even the final accession is something clear in the Turks' minds: the European Commission embodies a position of rewarding reforms and opening the door of the Union, but some member states publicly declared their opposition to this membership, making it unclear or doubtful to the eyes of Turks.

Once conditionality entails financial, political and social costs, “the prospect of membership lies at the heart of this incentive” (Sunay, 2008: 2). Thus, coherence and clear perspectives of accession play a fundamental role in the dynamics of conditionality in particular and in the accession process in general. Political questions should not be so limitative as the country has already been considered an official candidate and at this point only technical questions of accomplishing the chapters of the *acquis* should be under consideration.

Romania, one of the newest countries of the EU and whose development is comparable to Turkey's, constituted an example that, according to the researcher Silviu Jora (2006: 14),

“EU conditionality has maximum efficiency after an accession date has been on the visible horizon (...). When a candidate state receives a possible accession date, the “carrot” is shining there, within touchable distance, and the candidate will do anything to complete the leap.”

In the Turkish case, determining an accession date would raise many concerns due to the country's recent performance in many chapters and therefore it would be wiser to analyse the question very carefully before that move. However, the certainty of accede in case Turkey fulfils all the conditions should be unambiguous, as otherwise the conditionality process may cause reform fatigue and the discredit of the population towards the EU, creating a lack of interest in the accession, given the fact that nowadays Turkey may have other possibilities of consolidating its position in the world, namely through the Middle East and the Arab world.

The European Union seeks to promote democracy in its foreign relations, whether in the scope of accession or of any other policy. Using a normative approach that tries to convince the others of the value of its positions, namely in what concerns democracy and human rights, the EU employs some mechanisms when dealing with third countries, as it is the case of socialisation and, more formally and systematically, political conditionality. Despite some problems in this last policy, the Union has proved to be a valuable external anchor and capable of exerting influence on the domestic processes of democratisation and on other realms, namely in the Central and Eastern European countries that generally improved their performance. Turkey, a more complex case, has gone through many changes under the scope of conditionality and other diffusion mechanisms, but the uncertainty of its actual accession may jeopardise the achieved results and improvements, and change the country's interests and perceptions towards other possible fronts of its foreign policy after discrediting the Western choice.

Although the aim of this work is not to analyse deeply the prospects of accession, their existence is an important variable that may help justify Turkey's commitment to democratise – or the lack of it. Thus, it becomes fundamental that this and other variables are taken into consideration when analysing the stimuli given by the

Union, and Turkey's responses to understand how influent EU can be on Turkey's democratisation.

5. Creating a model: democracy assessment and EU's impact

5.1. Operationalising democracy

Any attempt to transform into numbers a subjective reality entails a high risk. Nonetheless, taking the risk of quantifying the concept of democracy had several reasons. First, to contribute to the ongoing debate; second, to avoid using only non-quantified data, usually associated by positivists with a less objective and less serious analysis of reality; and third, to conjugate both quantitative and qualitative approaches to enrich the final results. The latter argument constitutes the strongest reason for combining both types of methodology; it is what Michael Bamberger (2012) calls “Mixed Methods in Impact Evaluation” that inspired this choice. On this paper, Bamberger presents the advantages and disadvantages of both qualitative and quantitative designs and reaches the conclusion that, when combined, they complement each other in the sense that they mutually help each other overcome their shortcomings.

While a quantitative approach ignores contextual factors and reduces everything to numbers (possibly causing the non-consideration of underlying causes), qualitative methods are more flexible, holistic and allow the understanding of more complex situations. However, on the other side, quantitative designs are able to generalise their findings, to be replicated and compared, whilst qualitative approaches present subjective conclusions whose validity is difficult to assess and whose findings are also difficult to generalise, often lacking a consensus due to the various perspectives brought up (Idem: 4). Therefore, Bamberger concludes that bringing both designs together and converging their strengths increase the credibility of the research conclusions, extend the comprehensiveness of the findings, generate new insights and highlight diversity (Idem: 4-5), which is precisely what it is sought to be achieved with this work. Mixed Methods is, therefore, helpful to “captur[e] complex processes of organizational and behavioural change, (...) taking into account how programs change in response to how they are perceived and used by different sectors of the target population” (Idem: 7).

The team that edited the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance's Practical Guide (Beetham, *et al.*, 2008) also believed this mixture of approaches to “provide as rich and robust a portrait of the democratic experience as possible within the resources constraints of any one assessment project”. This question

of resources constraints is also fundamental, as sometimes the use of certain indicators or sets of data is limited by the sources at disposal, the number of years provided, etc. Yet, the use of qualitative methodologies in this work will be further explained and justified. In terms of the quantitative approach, the challenge will be taken into parts and explained with detail and as accurately as possible.

David Campbell, in 2008, assessed a set of initiatives to measure democracy worldwide: Freedom House, Polity IV, Vanhanen's Democracy Index and The Economist's Democracy Index. These were scrutinised by Campbell and his conclusions, as well as his suggestions, will be mentioned and taken into consideration later on when the question on the choice of the indicators arises. However, Campbell's list is not exhaustive. Many other organisations, institutions and academics tried to give their contributions to the discussion, creating a proliferation of methods, rankings and approaches. For example, Gerardo Munck (2009) wrote a book entitled "Measuring Democracy" in which he reflected upon this subject. A couple of ideas are worth sharing to help the construction of our own model.

With the end of the Cold War, democracy promotion began to be perceived as a major concern for international actors and "measuring democracy has ceased to be solely an academic matter" (Munck, 2009: 1), receiving a growing attention by political actors with countless objectives, such as assessing the impact of a programme or to supervise its conformity regarding certain aims (Idem: 5-7). However, as the author recognises, data has also been misused, allowing the critics to point the finger to the existence of hidden political interests behind this measurement. The list of misuses of data in democracy promotion includes, among others, the employment of techniques to disguise the inclusion of ideological bias, the non-application of rigorous and tested scientific methodologies, as well as the lack of transparency in what comes to open and public data (Idem: 8-11).

In the same book, Munck (Idem: 120) asserts that "the measurement of democracy is inextricably linked with the definition of the concept of democracy" and compares Robert Dahl's and Joseph Schumpeter's widely cited definitions to exemplify how the initial conceptions may influence or even determine the choices regarding measurement. Furthermore, Munck recognises that a minimalist (Schumpeterian) definition is better for analytical clarity (Idem: 13), although later in the book he

reckons that an “analysis of democracy calls for measures that capture the full meaning of democracy” (Idem: 134) and that is only achievable when one goes beyond the electoral type of democracy. In addition, Munck postulates that one of the disadvantages of a minimum definition is to include in the group of democracies countries that are not democratic (Idem: 131), but which gained the status thanks to the coarse filter of the definition.

Thus, the researcher seems to prefer theory-driven measures over a data-driven approach and advises that the unit of analysis should be the country, as it still is the clearest unit at our disposal (Idem: 136). In this regard, Munck proposes a three step process for analysing data: “conceptualisation” (which means to identify the components of the concept⁵³), “measurement” (selection of indicators) and “aggregation” (to determine the levels and rules of aggregation) (Idem: 14-31). As it will become clearer further on in this work, the first step has already been begun in the previous sections and will be schematised soon; the second step will be applied when choosing the variables for the model developed and the aggregation phase will include the construction of indices, as well as the final statistical analysis.

The whole process requires that the attributes capture the meaning of the concept and that the measurement mirrors the content of the concept (Idem: 138), so that this quantitative approach becomes a reliable contribution for the study of democracy, and since the “human element cannot be removed from the measurement process” (Idem: 142), in order to overcome it, the researcher has to be explicit about his methodological choices and their theoretical justification, keeping in mind that “measurement is a precise but not a perfect science” (Idem: 143).

When a researcher is planning his methodological approach to develop a model to assess the evolution of a real democracy, it is vital that the limitations of the research are taken into consideration. As in the case of this thesis, if one wants to evaluate the democratic performance of Turkey, one has to rely on the data sources that are available to fulfil and concretise that same model. Therefore, and in order to make the project feasible, Bühlmann’s model had to be adapted and conjugated with other contributions, as well as with our own input.

⁵³ Munck (2009: 21) uses the metaphor of a tree: the concept is the tree, the attributes represent the branches and the leaves are the components of the attributes.

In that sense, Bühlmann's (*et al.*, 2007) model turned out to be particularly complex to operationalise. In fact, despite the various indicators the team proposed, the difficulty lied in the possibility to collect that type of data. Besides, as this evaluation pretends to cover a ten-year period (1999-2009), this wide-ranging gap makes things even more difficult. Therefore, the choice was to combine different proposals, as mentioned above.⁵⁴ The presented model aims to assess the evolution of any democracy based on the evaluation several sources provide and its development has been object to various transformations – a first attempt created an extremely complex set of concepts with many levels of dimensions and sub-dimensions; the second try was too simplistic only with democracy's three main key areas. This final version seeks to avoid those extremes and, gathering the options of many authors, it encompasses the main concept and three further levels. Applying Munck's (2009) tree metaphor, democracy is the tree, the three principles are the branches, the eight dimensions are the leaves and 13 attributes concretise the preceding level. Notwithstanding the inclusion of this last echelon, data will be aggregated around the previous level. In other words, although there are three levels, the last one aims only to specify the previous concepts and to help choose the appropriate indicators, but when it comes to gather and present the data, it will be aggregated at the level of the dimensions and not of the attributes.

Figure 12 below schematises our proposal in terms of conceptualisation of the notion of “democracy”. It represents our understanding of the concept based on different authors' contributions; it is an eclectic version of reorganised levels of conceptualisation.

Thus, the three main democratic principles were maintained as the most abstract democratic fields – equality, freedom and control. The attributes to these principles are eight and were inspired by different authors⁵⁵, such as Bühlmann (*et al.*, 2007), Morlino (2002), Cruz (2003), as well as by the suggestions made in the *Democracy Barometer* website⁵⁶. There are, in fact, some differences between our model and the one provided


⁵⁴ Notice that the fact that Bühlmann's model was not chosen as the only possibility for operationalising the concept does not mean that the conceptual analysis previously made should be changed. On the contrary, it is a valuable contribution to scrutinise the concept and its different dimensions, and the addition of further visions to its operationalisation can only enrich the whole model and process.

⁵⁵ Cf. Table 8 (Appendix 5).

⁵⁶ DemocracyBarometer.org is the website of a project that brings together a set of experts in democracy studies (renowned names such as Wolfgang Merkel, Marc Bühlmann, Bernhard Wessels and Daniel Bochsler compose the team) from different research institutions and funded by the Swiss National Science Foundation. This project aims to analyse the concept, proposes its own approach and assesses several democracies over the years, based on their own model. More details can be found here:

by other authors individually⁵⁷. Comparing it to Bühlman, Merkel and Weßels' (2007) proposal, right in the first dimension – Equality –, political rights entail a set of other sub-dimensions that do not correspond to our view to operationalise the concept, in the sense that responsiveness seems to fit better in the category of control, as it works as a constraint to the exercise of power. This dimension has been divided into two further attributes: participation and representation – both related to the desired equality of opportunities to be part of the political process, to apply for political positions and to be equally represented by the elected peers.

Figure 12: Concept's operationalisation in 3 levels: principles, dimensions and attributes



Source: Author's elaboration.

Political rights are accompanied by social rights in an attempt to overcome what can be considered a shortcoming of the above-cited model: we perceived the lack of a

<http://democracybarometer.org/index.html>. Henceforth, this team's work will be cited as Bühlmann (*et al*, 2012), as this publication clarifies in detail most choices regarding the model and explains it.

⁵⁷ Cf. Table 8 (Appendix 5).

differentiation between formal and substantive equality. While political rights only ensure formal equality, the inclusion of social rights in the table means widening the focus towards substantive equality. Morlino (2002: 17-18) makes that distinction, explaining that the latter type of equality is the only that can ensure that economic and social differences are softened, in order to allow “the full development of the human person and the effective participation of all workers in the political, economic and social organization of a country” (Italian Constitution *cited in* Morlino, 2002: 18). Therefore, the inclusion of social rights in the realm of equality seems to be of much relevance, since substantive equality constitutes an important component of the more general principle of equality, and only when guaranteeing a certain level of economic and social levelling, it becomes possible to achieve (or at least to promote) a higher degree of political participation that would be otherwise replaced by more urgent needs with the danger of subjecting the people to the will of wealthier and more powerful individuals that would, subsequently, impoverish and harm the quality of democracy.

Despite the difficulty and the costs of pursuing these objectives, they are the best way to diminish inequality, which is another democratic ideal. Social rights should thus promote physical and mental well-being, assistance, human dignity, the right to work, to study, to have a home, etc. (Morlino, 2002: 17; Cruz, 2003: 88). Cruz (2003: 85) reinforces that “without minimal economic and social conditions a democracy cannot exist” and Campbell (2008: 5-6) considers that economic democracy is one of the components of every democracy. Therefore, and to reach a balance with other democratic principles, not only economic freedom is important, but also some social concerns with the possible negative impact of economic freedom on wealth distribution that would create a section in society that would be incapable of exercising the rights they were entitled to enjoy (Idem: 86).

Having that said, a new partial regime has been introduced in the model, “social rights”, that embed the function of social protection that, in turn, includes a set of fundamental rights present in most European constitutions, such as the rights to education, health, work and social assistance in the name of key values European countries have been standing for, namely human dignity and the possibility every single human being should have to prompt and develop his skills and potentialities.

In the scope of freedom, the original model only foresaw civil rights as partial regime, but, following the reasoning of the previous paragraphs, another one was added

– economic rights. Besides civil rights, economic rights are also included within the principle of freedom, as it encompasses a set of liberties that are supposed to foster an economic environment that allows the usufruct of political, individual and electoral freedoms, usually believed to be better developed within a market economy (Cruz, 2003: 85-86) that, nonetheless, has to be frequently intermediated by democratic mechanisms to protect other fundamental democratic principles, as mentioned above. Furthermore, and following the logic of Magen and Morlino (2009), the rule of law was removed from inside the wider field of civil rights and, in our model, figures among economic and civil rights. The reason behind this choice is related to the importance of this component for any democracy, that led these authors to name it the “prima inter pares”, which justifies occupying its own dimension. Therefore, and according to this division, freedom is ensured when economic rights are applied and everyone is entitled to act without this type of constraints; when civil rights protect the citizens against the abuses by the executive or other bodies; and when the rule of law is applied, which means that corruption is controlled and the judicial system reveals the necessary quality to ensure the stability of the law and equality before the law both in its accession and treatment.

Finally, control encompasses both horizontal and vertical accountabilities, which means that both forms of limiting the exercise of power – through elections or other forms of popular control (petitions, manifestations,...) and the action of other constitutional bodies that constrain an arbitrary ruling through an equilibrium allowed by a system of checks and balances – are equally important and at the same level. It includes as well the dimension of responsiveness (originally found within the scope of equality); in this case, however, responsiveness is viewed as a way of exerting pressure over the rulers to make them comply with their promises and to meet the population’s demands; having to respond before the electorate means, at the same time, that the government cannot be under the influence of extra-constitutional entities to ensure its effective power to govern.

Subsequently, to each dimension is given a set of indicators that contribute to a higher concretisation of each level of the hierarchy and that, in principle, will allow a better understanding of the main (and more abstract) concept under study – democracy. Having this model as a guide, a set of sources were selected to provide it with the data needed to fulfil each of the items created by the indicators chosen for each attribute. The

major concerns behind each choice were to include a) only scientific evaluations; b) sources based on geographically distributed organisations (this was intended to avoid geographic concentration and to allow more diversified approaches); c) different sources for the same indicator to strengthen the results; d) sources that offered quantitative data; and e) sources that provided at least a set of years within the period under analysis to assess the evolution of the indicator in time⁵⁸.

The first criterion was related to the scientific character of the sources; indeed, all the organisations selected are recognised by their assessments of different democratic assets. The *Democracy Barometer* project is led by recognised scholars, experts on the field of democracy assessment; Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset (CIRI) aims to provide quantitative information on government respect for Human Rights in 195 since 1981 and claims to have a reliability of 0,944, basing their evaluation both on the US Department of State's Country Annual Reports on Human Rights Practices and Amnesty International's Annual Reports. In fact, the major criticism that these institutions may face is related to their links with certain countries' governments, which is the case of Freedom House and the US' Foreign Policy.⁵⁹ However, the inclusion of Freedom House, despite this widely known criticism, was intentional, as its presence is balanced by other institutions not so tightly linked to the USA, such as the European organisations. Figure 12 (above) reveals the concern of widening the origin of the sources, as stated in the second criterion. Furthermore, Campbell (2008: 16-17) criticises the lack of sensitiveness of Freedom House's 7 point-scale. That shortcoming is overcome by the consideration of other sources for the same indicator or other indicators that may help specify the first. For example, recognising that Freedom House's "political rights" score is somehow dubious, it is only one among eleven or twelve other indicators from various sources that are able to specify and concretise more deeply the former one, such as "women's political rights", "political terror", "freedom of association and assembly", etc. This meets the requirement of the fourth criterion.

Besides, all the sources used provided quantitative information – and that is the

⁵⁸ In Appendix 6, a set of figures and tables can be found to help justify the choice and, simultaneously, assess the validity of the indicators included in the model: Table 9 shows all the indicators selected according to their source, their geographical origin, the scale they use, the number of years provided and some explanations regarding their methodology; Table 10 assembles the indicators and their distribution across the different dimensions; and finally Figures 13 and 14 schematise the sources' geographic and institutional distribution.

⁵⁹ This is one of the criticisms Campbell (2008: 16) makes regarding Freedom House.

reason for the exclusion of other sources (at this point of the evaluation), like the Human Rights Watch and the Bartelsmann Stiftung, for example. Finally, the amount of years with data available also weighed in the choice of the sources. Vanhanen's Democracy Index, as well as The Economist Democracy Index were left aside due to the very limited time scope. There is, however, one exception: the World Economic Forum. This source only offered a set of 4 years (between 1999 and 2009) when compared to the majority of the other organisations that counted on more than 6 years for an 11-year-period, but some of the indicators that were considered relevant have been included, as it is the case of the "global competitiveness index", the "macroeconomic environment", the "public trust in politicians", the "reliability of police services" and the "quality of education". Due to their importance to the respective dimensions, they were included even despite the small number of years provided.

The allocation of indicators or even sets of data to the categories created for the model is not an easy task. The necessary compartmentalisation of such a complex concept often creates some grey areas that may overlap. However, more important than being stuck by those deadlocks is to reflect upon them and make decisions coherent with the project and clear to the reader or the researcher for future reproduction of the study – although these decisions, despite being supported by literature, may not be consensual, as they result from the interpretation of very abstract and general theoretical principles. Political rights encompass participation and competition, and, as they are embedded in the principle of equality, they are related to the need for equal access of citizens to the electoral process and to compete for political posts. Also, they imply an equal (fair) representation of the citizens in the elected bodies. In that sense, the freedoms that guarantee that people can truly engage in the political process and compete for a political career were included in this section, such as the freedom of assembly or of association, women's political rights or other rules related to political parties, women's representation, etc. As these indicators embody fundamental freedoms, it would be possible to include them in the principle of freedom, namely in civil liberties. However, we found particularly relevant for the equality in the accession to the political competition that these freedoms would be guaranteed, without which a fair contest would not exist.

In terms of social rights, this field encompasses indicators related to social

protection (expenditure on health and education, for example), workers' and women's rights, trade unions and general development. Economic rights were operationalised through a set of indicators that illustrate the general macroeconomic environment to create wealth and to have the freedom to invest and succeed at this level – GDP, (un)employment, competitiveness, investment, property rights, etc.

Civil rights include a wide range of indicators, such as torture, imprisonment, politically motivated disappearances and persecution, freedom of religion and of the press – all necessary conditions to ensure citizens are protected against arbitrary ruling; that they are free in their movements, in the access to knowledge and information, from persecutions, etc. Again, the rights associated with the press and with speech overlap with the scope of responsiveness, for example: if the government needs to meet the demands and wishes of its citizens, the latter have to be free to publicly express their views and to criticise the rulers, based on accurate, serious and reliable sources of information, because, otherwise, responsiveness would only be a façade. Nevertheless, this set of freedoms was moved to the more general dimension of civil rights; and, if responsiveness is perceived as the need for the elected to be aware of the real demands of their population in order to judge the convergence or divergence of their policies, the best indicators for this dimension are the electors' opinions regarding the trust in those institutions. If they do trust in them, it means their needs and wishes have been met. Besides, for a government to answer to their citizens and to be able to make real decisions, it needs both stability and an effective capacity of implementing those decisions (two further indicators).

Rule of law is a very broad field; in order to operationalise it, it was divided into two attributes: transparency and corruption, and the quality of the judicial system. Both attributes are fundamental for the concretisation of the rule of law and for binding the politicians and all the political institutions to the law in force; transparent institutions and corruption-free decision-making processes, together with an effective legal system that warrants independent and accessible courts are *sine qua non* conditions for this dimension. Separation of powers is traditionally linked to the rule of law, as well, but it was rather included in the horizontal accountability dimension, as the process of checks and balances allowed by that separation is a form of mutual control of the democratic institutions. In that sense, any interference in politics of extra-constitutional actors (the military, religion) that may harm the executive's autonomy was included here.

Finally, vertical accountability is a field that somehow overlaps political rights, as both are tightly related to the more general concept of “electoral regime/rights”. However, the main distinction lies in the principles each of these dimensions is embedded in: political rights in equality and vertical accountability in control. This means that, while the former are more concerned with the equal conditions to accede to the electoral process in terms of being capable of competing for political positions, the latter focuses on the electoral act *per se*, i.e., if electoral participation entails main obstacles, if women are represented in the elected institutions and, more broadly speaking, if people can participate in demonstrations and petitions to exert some type of influence over the elected.

In fact, these options may not be shared by everyone, as they imply an interpretation that can vary. However, it is crucial to find a compromise in order to achieve this challenging task of operationalising the concept. Thus, we have created this model to assess the evolution of democracy and the first two steps proposed by Munk (2009) are already complete: democracy was conceptualised and, based on that conceptualisation, its measurement was proposed having in mind a set of criteria to guarantee the geographic variety and the scientific quality such assessment should entail. The third and last stage is aggregation. As already mentioned, all the values provided by the about 80 indicators selected will be allocated at the dimensions’ level and not at the attribute’s, in order to simplify the reading of the results. It means that the unit of analysis is each of the eight dimensions attributed to the three main principles. It is likely, nevertheless, that the results may be aggregated at the principles’ level, but it will depend on the clearness of the final results and the possible need to make their reading more general to understand the bigger picture.

Another important aspect to take into consideration is related to the transformation of the values; as each source opted for its own scale, and different scales are not able to be directly compared, those values will be converted in a 100 index in which 0 represents the lowest and worst scenario or quality or performance and, on the other side, 100 is the best score regarding that particular indicator. This may seem quite obvious, but there are indirectly proportional scales in which the opposite is true and that would make all the findings erroneous.

This is just, however, the evaluation of a particular democracy – the one that will be applied to the Turkish case to assess its performance over the years. The next

fundamental step is to connect this evaluation with the influence or impact of an external actor whose aim is to give impetus to that performance in order to improve it. That will be task for next section.

5.2. Assessing the EU as a democracy promoter

Analysing the influence of an international organisation on a domestic process involves taking into consideration the interaction of two different spheres that may seem to be evidently defined by more or less physical barriers. However, their influences and mutual interactions make it difficult to distinguish one from the other clearly. This endeavour of assessing to what extent a particular international organisation has an impact on a country's democratic performance has been pursued and sought by several academics. These studies lack a systematic and somehow holist approach.

Before even proceeding with the possible ways of evaluating the external impact, it is worth making a break to reflect upon the concept of impact itself and to justify its employment. Ali Usul (2011: 69) describes its meaning as the "EU's effect on a candidate sate's domestic political regime as a result of the EU's transformative effect or influence". According to this view, impact is the "mirror image of compliance". However, the utilisation of the word 'impact' in the context of this work is slightly different. In fact, it is closer to a maximalist understanding, as it includes the cultural shifts and the changes in mentalities and does not perceive this dynamic as unidirectional (Idem: 70). The author wisely writes that these cultural shifts take decades to be measures and that, therefore, only rule adoption and implementation are the indicators that allow the evaluation. Nonetheless, and despite the recognition of the length of mind-related changes, as it will be explained later, this work also constitutes an attempt to comprise this ideational side, in order to enrich the final conclusions.

Contrary to Usul, the European Union and the pressure it exerts to promote democracy abroad is not only regarded as a mere external imposition, but also as a flow of suggestions, interchanges and mutual interactions that are frequently adopted by the recipient country after interpreting them and adapting then to their own context. In that sense, impact is not seen as an external imposition to which correspond a set of passive domestic changes; on the contrary, as sugar that is poured into water, not only the water

becomes sweeter, but, after the necessary time to solute and to be incorporated in the new context, the sugar is itself object of a transformation.

One of the most methodical models to assess that influence (or impact) is the one proposed by Magen and Morlino (2009), several times cited in this thesis. The EUCLIDA model recognises the primacy of the domestic sphere, but wants to understand the degree of influence of the European Union. For that purpose, it defines a set of three layers of impact, intermediate variables and attempts to isolate the influence of other international actors. In terms of research design, the creators of the model argue they pretended to develop a “qualitative empirical analysis, using structured, focused comparison of case studies” (Idem: 18). The strategy includes a first moment in which a detailed report is constructed for each country with economic, historical and political contexts, shorter-term indicators and international connections of the country; and a second step that is constituted by an exhaustive questionnaire, whose answers are required to be supported by reliable data. With these two steps, the idea is to ensure the same pattern is applied to every country that is object of this study. Understandably, the levels of impact, the rule of law dimensions and all the conceptualisation developed by Magen and Morlino are the framework that constrains all the study (Idem: 18-ff). Düzgüt and Çarkoğlu (2009) apply the EUCLIDA model to study the EU’s influence on Turkey’s rule of law. This is a pretty complete model whose strength lies in its capability of being applied to different countries and of allowing the comparison between the different countries that are object to this study. Their conclusions will be compared to the results of our model at the end of the thesis.

Other authors, such as Müftüler-Baç (2005), opt for correlating domestic formal/legal changes with the EU’s criticisms or suggestions – although they ignore their implementation or internalisation. Açıkmese (2010) and Usul (2011) choose a historical approach that analyses the evolution of Turkey-EU relations, its ups and downs, and subsequent transformations at the domestic level; this methodology usually divides broader time periods into smaller units and labels them according to the mood of the relations. Still, both of them prefer a focus on conditionality and the logic of consequences. Another possible approach focuses on specific issues – like Magen’s (2004) study: death penalty was selected as the case study to evaluate the EU’s influence. This choice was justified by the author due to the visibility of the subject (changing legal rules regarding the death penalty is easily observable) and because it

excludes one of the international influences Turkey usually counts on – the United States (that do not promote abolition, hence eliminating it as a potential external source of pressure).

Our proposal follows some of the previous examples, captures some of their suggestions and introduces some different options and is developed as follows.

The European Union is an international actor concerned with the spread of, transition to and consolidation of democracy among third countries – be them candidates, neighbours or simply partners. This concern is embedded in the wider concept of Europeanisation – already reflected upon on last chapter. As seen, to Europeanise means to embrace a set of principles, norms, ideas and structures typically European and, after their interpretation and adaptation, to internalise them in the domestic formal, legal, societal and cognitive structures. Among the several mechanisms that are used to make this engine work, and as already mentioned on Chapter 4, conditionality and socialisation are the ones that gather the widest support to be studied as the ones used by the Union to promote democracy abroad – besides, socialisation is far less complex to study academically when compared to emulation, for example. When covering up these two mechanisms, several dimensions or aspects of democracy promotion are included in the approach: conditionality incorporates the more formal, legal, material changes and interaction; whereas socialisation, despite more difficult to spot than the previous mechanism, widens the study to less formal, cognitive and ideational transformations.

Thus, any study about the European Union's presence on a domestic environment needs to focus on these two mechanisms that require, therefore, to be operationalised. When dealing with conditionality, some specific phenomena have to be observed more carefully, such as money transfers, domestic legal reforms and relevant landmarks in the development of the relations with the democratising country (declaring the candidacy status or the opening of negotiations); whilst, when dealing with socialisation, the focus highlights more concrete and bottom-up projects that involve the population and promotes, at that level, the internalisation of the modifications introduced by the formal reforms. Furthermore, choosing these two mechanisms as the cornerstone of the external promotion of democracy implies the recognition of the impact at three different levels: macro, meso and micro. Conditionality and its formal changes operate at the state's level (macro), while socialisation influences the meso-

level of smaller units like specific communities, social segments or the society in general (meso). The both combined are able to set in motion alterations at the individual cognitive level that, due to their action, face changes in mentalities, opinions and identities (micro) – although truly difficult to be assessed, this latter level is the ultimate proof of democratic principles acceptance, internalisation and consolidation in a sustained way.

The dynamics that occur within each of these levels, as well as between them, are complex and, in some cases, particularly complicated to identify and evaluate. Nevertheless, our model associates the macro level with money transfers, legal reforms and rewards – the first two studied through a quantitative analysis and the latter through the interpretation of historical events. At the meso level, the number and strength of societal projects and programmes funded by the EU may constitute a valuable indicator of assessment, couple with the results and improvements that stem from them. Finally, the micro-level can only be perceived through the comparison of opinion surveys from different years, which include their statistical analysis and the interpretation of the meaning of the observed changes, achieved through an inductive approach; besides, all the interviews conducted in Turkey will reveal helpful to achieve some comprehension at this level.

5.3. The model

Although, as mentioned previously, the task of operationalising democracy is not an easy one, assessing an external influence on a domestic set of variables is even more challenging, mainly because it implies correlating those two sets of conceptualisations and operationalisations. Besides, isolating the impact of an external actor in a globalised era in which countless transnational flows occur incessantly seems to be an impossible mission. Therefore, and to sum up the preceding sections, our model aims to bring a fresh, or at least a slightly different, approach to this not new problem, based on the contribution of several authors who devoted their efforts and knowledge to the issue, but also conveying new inputs and thoughts that seek to construct a systematic and replicable approach that points out the strengths and weaknesses of the current

European approach, as well as the current Turkish reception model, in order to improve both.

In fact, this is a very sensitive and prolific area of Europeanisation, within which the main objective is to find if there is a correlation between a set of independent and dependent variables. The dependent variable is the development (hopefully the improvement) of a candidate country's democracy – in this case, Turkey's democracy. The independent variables were selected in accordance with the two main mechanisms believed to be used by the European Union to influence a third country's democratic performance (conditionality and socialisation). These two mechanisms, due to their major differences, operate at the three possible levels: macro (state), meso (society) and micro (individual). It is only in the conjugation of these echelons that one can truly assess the influence on the evolution of a democratisation process, since this involves a truly complex phenomenon – not only formal and visible changes are necessary, but also their implementation and internalisation by the population.

That assessment congregates two types of methodology (quantitative and qualitative) to follow up and be capable of embracing the comprehensiveness of the phenomenon. In that sense, the EU allocation of funds to Turkey (especially the ones directed to democracy), the reforms undertaken in the country, the positive and negative evolutions of the relations between the two, as well as the rewards and punishments that complete the process will be analysed. Furthermore, projects at the societal level and changes in opinions, perceptions and identities will be used to complete the whole approach and get the big picture. Simultaneously, other international and national actors have to be under our consideration, as they may (and certainly do) interfere in the whole process – contact with Turks, their experiences and perceptions are a valuable tool to isolate these variables, as well as keeping record of the donations the country receive from external entities to promote its democracy.

Nonetheless, this presence (as the independent variable) only matters if the outcome variable is also considered; thus, the above-mentioned indicators will be compared to and, possibly, correlated with the evolution of Turkey's democracy in terms of its quality. This evaluation will be based on the reports and findings of several organisations that devote their efforts to accompany the ups and downs of democratising states, as presented in the first section of this chapter. Besides, all the quantitative data gathered from them will be analysed taking into consideration the

perspective of some other (qualitative) sources – and that means including progress reports, official documents, experts’ opinions and analysis, stakeholders’ positions regarding the theme, etc. The idea is to bring together in a time line all the changes, reforms, programmes, money and historical events that marked the period between 1999 and 2009 and, establishing a timeline, is possible to compare the democracy’s evolution with the other variables under study.

It is our true belief that only following all these steps and conjugating these variables through a serious and informed interpretation of the results and the findings will bring results that are closer to reality, in order to provide valuable conclusions. When does Turkey commit more efforts to improve its democracy? Is EU’s contribution fundamental, important or merely secondary? Does a more visible presence and pressure from Europe mean a more dedicated pursue of the democratic achievements? Does more money mean more legal changes? Are other international actors as essential as the EU in Turkey? Or is full membership the only goal that is worth pursuing? Or not that much anymore? These are some of the questions that inundate our mind when thinking about these phenomena and hopefully some of the ones that will have an answer after this thesis is completed.

PART III – THE CASE STUDY: TURKEY

Part III has been divided into three chapters. However, Chapters 6 and 7 may seem redundant due to the overlapping time periods they encompass. Notwithstanding, the difference between both lies in the focus that is given in each chapter: Chapter 6 adopts a domestic perspective to analyse the development of the construction of the country since the Ottoman Empire, whereas Chapter 7 emphasises Turkey's dynamics in the light of its relationship with the West. Finally, Chapter 8 bypasses this historical analysis to provide the thesis with a socio-cultural profile, underlining concepts like identity and culture and their importance to a deeper understanding of the realities under study.

6. The construction of Modern Turkey

6.1. The Ottoman Empire

Turks were first recognised as a group of nomads among the tribe in Northeast China in the sixth century AD. However, the history of Turkey only begins with their migration from Mongolia and Central Asia to the Anatolian Peninsula some centuries later (around the tenth and eleventh centuries) (Mango, 2004: 15; Mango, 2005: 15; Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 15). Attracted by the wealth of the territory, this group of nomads settled in the Northwest of Anatolia and starts populating the peninsula (Mango, 2005: 15). Their spread, however, was constrained by the presence of the Byzantine Empire that used to control, in its apogee, all the Middle East (except Iran) (Quataert, 2000: 37).

During this migration movement, Turks have been influenced by various contacts they made, mainly with the Muslim world, getting in touch with Islam through Persian and Arab merchants and preachers. Their conversion triggered a new sense of expansion, headed to the West and encouraged by the fight against a Christian domain⁶⁰ (Mango, 2004: 16). In this context, an army led by the Seljuk ruler Alp Aslan defeated the Byzantine emperor Romanos IV Diogenes in 1071 and that “date marks the

⁶⁰ It is important to remind that “Turks were originally animists” (Mango, 2004: 16).

beginning of the history of Turkey”, according to Andrew Mango (2004: 17). From this moment onwards, the movement of conquest progressively developed, in order to occupy the territory (Idem: 17).

When the warlord Osman declared independence from the Byzantine Empire, he was establishing the foundations of the new empire and attributed his own name to the new dynasty (Osmanlı). Osman was able to enlarge and expand through conquest (Mango, 2005: 15) and the 1435 fall of Constantinople at the hands of his descendant, Mehmet II, marked the extinction of an empire, the end of the Middle Ages and the birth of a new powerful empire in a new era. Thus, the expansion initiated in the thirteenth century was successful and able to reach three continents in its peak: South-Eastern Europe, Asia and North Africa (Fernandes, 2005: 34, 35). As Quataert (2000: 38) noted, “Byzantine Christian Anatolia, where Greek was the predominant language, transformed profound and inexorably, eventually becoming Muslim and adopting the Turkish language.

It is already possible to perceive how this empire was marked by the intersection of three different continents and their dissimilar civilisations. It combined a very diverse set of nationalities, ethnicities and creeds: “this civilisation was not only transnational; it was also trans-religious” (Kitsikis, 1985: 15). More interestingly, the Empire was inhabited by as many Christians as Muslims and the possible clash that may have arisen was mitigated by the creation of a synthesis that originated a neither Muslim nor Christian society, but essentially an Ottoman major group or identity (Idem: 15). Kitsikis (Idem: 18, 19) provides an example of this synthesis: in the 1839 Ottoman territory, there was no official language; besides, the Sultans recruited officers and ministers among the minorities of the empire (Albanians, Macedonians, Armenians, Greeks and Jews) (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 16, 17). The *millet* system also granted that minorities were not forced to convert; on the contrary, they enjoyed a certain degree of autonomy in terms of worship, legal and educational systems, etc. Greek and Orthodox, Armenians, Jews and Latin Christian were the four recognised *millets* (besides the Muslim majority), but several others have been included in the list during the nineteenth century (Idem: 18).

It is worth emphasising two aspects from this brief outline of the birth and development of the Ottoman Empire: first, its belligerent character. The establishment and survival of the empire was directly related to its capacity to defend itself from, and

to conquer the hostile neighbours. In fact, this perception of continuous external threat remained in the following centuries and the trust in the military to protect the country from foreign threats is a recollection of the unstable neighbourhood, but also of this heritage. Secondly, and despite this character marked by force, the co-habitation of several nations, ethnicities and religions has not been repressed in the sense of abolishing internal differences; on the contrary, the *millet* system recognised an important set of rights to each minority living in the empire.

What the elites have attempted to do, in a very clever way, was to unite all the different groups under a “supranational” identity, as Ottomans. This attempt worked at a certain extent, but in the unstable period of rising nationalisms it was not enough as it is going to be explained further on. Nonetheless, in an era of clashes of civilisations and struggles between religions, the respect for minorities that could undermine the stability and cohesion of the empire was an exception: “for centuries, the minorities of the empire enjoyed more rights and legal protection than their congeners under the domain of the French King, for example” (Quataert, 2000: 202) – that is why the author considers inter-group relations in the Ottoman Empire fairly good in comparison to the patterns practiced at that time.

In the nineteenth century, however, the Ottoman Empire was struggling to survive to the threats of Frenchs, Russians and Austrians. According to some authors, like Faucompret and Konings (2008: 1) and Mario Losano (2009: 11), the Ottomans’ awareness of the difficulties to survive to the pressure led them to believe that importing the European model would help improve their situation, as they considered the key of the European success and supremacy to lay on its military and economic models. Paul Dumont (1992: 459) stated that the reforms the empire undertook to get closer to the European patterns were an attempt to answer the question Sultans had been posing for very long: “how can we save the empire?”. Kitsikis (1985: 116), on the other hand, explains this approximation to Europe with the pressure the United Kingdom and France were exercising for the empire to create a constitutional regime. Burdy and Marcou (2008: 9) prefer to look at “that will to modernise [as] a form of obsession of the Ottoman ruling class”.

Regardless of the reasons behind it, the truth is that the Ottoman Empire made a big effort to modernise having Europe as a model. Losano (2009: 11) wrote that the empire *eruopeanised*, using a concept that would be applied to Turkey only several

decades later. These changes were based on a couple of central ideas: administrative centralisation, modernisation of the state apparatus, westernisation of the society and secularisation (Dumont, 1992: 459). The reforms began with the Sultan Selim III around 1792, who copied the European military structures and who brought to the empire schools to teach the European science and techniques. This policy was interrupted by Mustafa IV (1807-1808) and resumed by his brother, Mahmud II (1808-1839), who initiated the second phase of the process (Kitsikis, 1985: 112-ff). The reforms led by these Sultans were not as systematic and intense as the ones taken by his successors: Abdülmecid I (1839-1861) and Abdülaziz (1861-1876) ruled in the Tanzimat period (1839-1876), which constituted a structured and intensive attempt to modernise the Ottoman institutions and practices, aligning them with the European standards. The reforms aimed at the Armed Forces, central bureaucracy, taxes, education, judicial system, etc. (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 1) and were responsible for creating the first structures of a secular state, promoting a very unusual separation between politics and religion in Muslim countries (Fernandes, 2005: 36).

Among the specific measures triggered by the Tanzimat edict, one can find the foundation of the Superior Council of Justice (1838) to prepare legislative texts and ensure their application, a new criminal code (inspired in the French model, 1848), the inauguration of schools for civil servants (1859), the abolition of censorship (1864), the institution of the Supreme Court of Justice (1868), a new Civil Code (also inspired by the French), the reorganisation of the military and of the judicial system (mainly guaranteeing equality before the Law), the creation of several ministries (in 1870, among others, the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, of the Interior, Justice and Finances have been created), the secularisation of education, the reorganisation of provincial administration, etc. (Losano, 2009: 13, 14; Dumont, 1992: 473-484).

All these changes and many others culminated in the proclamation of the first Ottoman Constitution in 1876 that, although only in force for two years, constituted an important mark in the westernisation and secularisation of the Ottoman state. At a certain extent, it also meant the first signals of an incipient democracy. As written on Chapter 3, in order to move from an autocratic to a democratic regime, some changes need to be made and the obstacles that hampered democratisation have to be removed. This is an example of how there has been an attempt to modernise the regime as an incipient and early form of transition.

At the end of the nineteenth century, the reforms have approximated the Ottoman Empire to the European states, and the real power had been, after the process, transferred from some specific social groups, like the military elite, the *uleman*, the *mufti* or the *sheiks* to a secular state bureaucracy (Fernandes, 2005: 37). This author, however, is very critical regarding the results of Tanzimat, as he concludes that, although ruling elites had become closer to the European patterns, the Muslim population, in general, remained attached to its past, creating a kind of time gap – they were still in the pre-Modern era (Idem: 37). Mario Losano (2009: 12) adopts a more optimistic stance and considers that these reforms launched the foundations for the reforms taken during the Republic. Nevertheless, he recognises that these “reforms are presented as a compromise with tradition and not as a rupture with it. Their architecture and their hesitant execution led the empire to ruin” (Idem: 12). Thus, and combining both reflections, one may conclude that the empire’s intention to be Europeanised succeeded in the sense that it accommodated several new institutions and laws, important to modernise the state. Moreover, as Losano (2009: 12) and Burdy and Marcou (2008: 21) add, these reforms were also key for future modernisation phases, namely under the Young Turks movement⁶¹ or Mustafa Kemal’s reconstruction of the Turkish identity. In terms of saving the empire from collapse, nonetheless, they did not succeed, as it only lasted for less than half a century.

The decline of the Ottoman Empire is the result, as in any other complex phenomenon, of a set of reasons and contexts. Although it may have been considered “one of the most powerful [empire] of the globe” in the fifteenth century (Quataert, 2000: 100), three hundred years later, it was the “sick man of Europe” (Idem: 100). In 1878, the Congress of Berlin resulted in the reduction of the European territories of the Ottoman Empire; besides, the social agitation and the economic crisis of the epoch led the Sultan to be on constant alert for fearing coup attempts. In that context, Abulhamid II (1876-1909) increased his absolutist position, strengthened censorship and repression, namely against the Armenians (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 21). This undemocratic move also included the dissolution of the Parliament, justified by the Sultan as due to the threat of Christian Ottomans’ nationalist ideologies (Mango, 2005: 16). In fact, and despite (or maybe because of) the empire’s openness in terms of nationalities, they ended up being one of the reasons behind its collapse. The nineteenth century faced a

⁶¹ Further details can be found below.

considerable degree of instability, cause by internal upheavals and the violence between different communities – not to mention the territorial losses and the external threats (Quataert, 2000: 77-82). Burdy and Marcou (2008: 18) also point out the nationalist claims of non-Muslim minorities – encouraged and supported by European powers – as one of the reasons for the empire’s decline. The lack of a strong army also made it difficult to control this unstable context (Idem: 17). The *millet* system revealed to have harmed the empire’s unity, because the citizens were, according to the same authors, more tightly linked, in identity terms, to their communities rather than to the Sultan and the Ottoman Empire (Idem: 18). In the century of raising nationalists, that was fatal.

Furthermore, the attacks against the Ottoman Armenians “were unparalleled” (Quataert, 2000: 214). Several massacres during the last years of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the following one originated the deportation to Syrian deserts and the killing of thousands of Armenians (Idem: 215) – still today a very sensitive issue in turkey. Also due to this violent approach, Europeans reinforced their negative perceptions on the Ottomans as the “barbarians” (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 17).

However, a small group within the Ottoman elite started to voice their discontent regarding the authoritative character of the Tanzimat reforms, as well as their opposition to the Sultan’s despotism. Those were the above mentioned Young Turks, who, basing their ideology and action on the Comtean Positivsm, the European nationalisms and presenting a programme very close to the French Revolution’s outline, claimed for the return of the Constitution and to the democratisation of the perishing empire (Idem: 22; Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 1; Kitsikis, 1985: 118; Losano, 2009: 14). Even though within the Young Turks’ movement was possible to find some divergences, namely between a more pro-Western and a pro-Islamic wings, they started to attack the Sultan using leaflets and newspapers and, in 1908, they surprised the regime with a revolution that replaced the Sultan by his brother – this was known as the “French Revolution of the East” (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 23). This example illustrates some of the theoretical considerations made on Chapter 3 concerning the importance of elites (and civil society) for promoting transition. Besides, the broader context in which the Ottoman Empir was embedded in also empitomises that the structural environment is an important variable to take into consideration when studying democratic transitions.

This revolution brought several transformations, such as the freedom of reunion and an increase in the number of parties and associations, not without the opposition of

the more conservative sectors of society, which were defeated by the military (Losano, 2009: 16). The installed regime pursued a modernisation and westernisation agenda, recovering what had been the first steps in this direction, in terms of schooling, secularism, etc. “The Young Turks prepared thus the terrain for several of the further Kemalist reforms. But the internal tensions and the ongoing territorial losses quickly put an end to the period of freedom” (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 24), originating a phase of quasi-dictatorship. In 1913, the military intervened and led a *coup* that seized the real power from the Sultan, handing it to the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, *İttihat ve Terakki Cemiveti*, Young Turks’ party) (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 2). As Losano (2009: 16) wrote, the Sultan lived in a type of internal exile, as the one in charge was a military – Şevket – and this event is considered by the same author as the beginning of the military tendency to act as guardians of the Constitution, even though this *coup* and the exercise of power were everything but constitutional. However, still in the same year, Şevket is murdered and freedoms are affected, namely through the prohibition of parties and associations. Yet, reforms continued; the power of madrassas was diminished and Arab and Persian words were replaced by Turkish, as the prior came from the Islamic law and the military were decided to continue the incipient process of secularism (Idem: 16).

The following year brings the First World War. The Ottoman Empire aligned with the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy in the hope of revenging the territorial losses and the diplomatic humiliations it had undergone in the decades before the war (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 25; Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 2). For the Ottomans, the conflict also entailed a religious connotation of a *jihad* as the enemies were accused of oppressing Muslims (Losano, 2009: 17). Nevertheless, they could not avoid the defeat and its consequences: further territorial losses, the birth of the Armenian state, Greece’s territorial expansion, President Wilson’s willingness to attribute the autonomy to Kurds, the demand for the proportional representation of the minorities and a strong setback in the empire’s sovereignty. Besides, as the German and Austrian advisors were expelled, it also meant increasing the distance from Europe (Losano, 2009: 17, 18; Fernandes, 2005: 41). These (and other) provisions figured in the Sèvres Treaty, which now gives name to the syndrome some authors (like Kubicek, 2007: 371) attribute to Turks: the Sèvres syndrome is basically the fear of dismemberment of the country, as it happened with the empire.

Notwithstanding, in the post-war, the Allies could not agree on the division of the territory among them and Greece invaded Turkey, which ironically may be seen as a first step towards the construction of modern Turkey, if one takes into consideration that the Greek defeat paves the way for new treaties, new conditions and for a fresh and enthusiastic population, grateful to one of the most important persons for this revenge: Mustafa Kemal.

6.2. The birth of Modern Turkey

6.2.1. *Kemal and Kemalism*

The War of Independence, as it is known in Turkish historiography, began in 1919 and lasted for three years with the military operations being led by Kemal. But it was not only the military operations that mattered for the success in the conflict; Mustafa Kemal also played a very wise diplomatic game with the Greece's allies: he signed in 1921 friendship or peace treaties with Russia, France, Italy and the UK. Being aware of the Italian discontent with the Sèvres Treaty, of the English lack of public support for another armed conflict or even the French lack of interest in the territories in dispute, he was able to isolate Greece and succeed (Fernandes, 2005: 42-43).

This conflict was of major importance for Turkey, as it was, at the same time, a way to become independent from the European powers, a *jihad* against Greeks and Armenians and also a civil war between several remaining Ottoman factions (Idem: 42-45). The war created a certain degree of national unity (getting together Turks and Kurds, for example) and it meant the transition from a multi-nationalist empire to a Muslim nation-state (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 30), due to the population exchange that occurred between Turkey and Greece: 500 000 Muslim Turks were exchanged for 1,5 million Greek Orthodox and the rate of Muslims in Anatolia increased from 80 to 98% (Idem: 30). This exchange was one of the provisions of the new Lausanne Treaty that replaced the out-dated Sèvres Treaty, signed in 1923.

As mentioned above, Mustafa Kemal played a very important role in several fronts of this conflict. First, he was in charge of the military operations; second, he used the Allies' division in his favour and played a clever diplomatic game. As Mango (2005: 17) explains,

“he persuaded the Allies to evacuate Istanbul, the Straits and Turkish Eastern Thrace without a fight, and after arduous negotiations he secured the international recognition of a fully independent Turkish state within the borders still held by the Ottoman troops when the First World War ended in November 1918”.

Psychologically and socially speaking, Mustafa Kemal was also capable of channelling the Turkish anger against the European powers in general and the Sèvres Treaty in particular against the Greeks when they tried to occupy Izmir (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 3). Fourth, the Turkish leader was responsible for shaping the new identity of Turks and the features of this newly established regime, as soon as he entered in its political life.

In the 29th of October 1923 the Republic of Turkey is proclaimed by the Grand National Assembly, but this institution was not born in this moment. In fact, its existence dates back to the beginning of the 1920s. When Turkey and Greece begin the war, the situation of the empire was truly difficult and Mustafa Kemal convenes a national congress in which he declares that if the government was not able to maintain national unity, then it should be replaced by a revolutionary one. In response, the sultan leads some changes, but these are perceived as insufficient, and the signature of the Sèvres Treaty worsens the situation. In this scenario, is created the Grand National Assembly (April, 1920) in Ankara, the new capital of the state, in defiance of the sultan’s authority. This institution declared itself as the only representative of the Turkish people and of national sovereignty and nominates Kemal as its President. The sultan sends loyal troops to Ankara, but this brief civil war is won by Kemal’s military body, strengthening this new establishment with more legitimacy. Nevertheless, until the international successes of the new regime and the new Treaty, the Turkish state lives in a dual system in terms of power – the sultan in Istanbul and Kemal in Ankara (Losano, 2009: 24-25). It is interesting that the new political centre chooses this city as the new capital; Burdy and Marcou (2008: 39) believe this is due to the centrality of its geographical location, as well as the lack of mixed cultural and other influences, in opposition to what happened (and still happens) in Istanbul. Mango (2004: 21) adds the geostrategic position of Ankara as a safe place, protected from the Allies’ warships. Kemal’s actions towards the establishment of a Republic can be considered another attempt to democratise the regime, even though his means cannot be considered democratic. This situation reminds some theoretical aspects discussed on Chapter 3,

namely (again) the relevance of the role played by elites, the type of previous regimes and how difficult it was to shift mentalities towards a more democratic mindset. It also reveals that there was lacking a democratic culture among Turkish citizens and that the weak levels of education were also hampering the process.

The young Republic, with new institutions, a new capital and possibly with a new ideology, was however still a “Third World country with a First World elite of administrators inherited from the Ottoman Empire” (Mango, 2005: 18), a very poor and illiterate country that needed to be rebuilt from its deepest foundations. In order to accomplish that, Turkey’s first President, Mustafa Kemal, established a “rational government” (Idem: 17) based on a new political party – the Republican People’s Party (CHP, *Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi*) –, whose premise was that only one civilisation represents the material and moral progress of humanity (Idem: 18) and that was the Western civilisation. Inspired in the French Revolution, the technical-scientific European rationality and in rupture with the Ottoman heritage in all the fields⁶² (Fernandes, 2005: 48), the doctrine developed by Kemal – the Kemalism – oriented the action of the party and all his followers. The doctrine is based on six main pillars: reformism, secularism, republicanism, nationalism, populism and statism (Idem: 48); as it is visible, democracy did not figure among these core values of Kemalism and it allows to foresee how democratic values were supplanted in the name of the other principles. Thus, several changes needed to occur so that the country Kemal found when he came to power would become the one he had dreamt of.

A new constitution was adopted in 1924 and several reforms were already introduced in that document inspired in the Western models. New civil and penal codes were approved (1926), also following the European examples – the Swiss and the Italian, respectively. Women’s rights were improved, for instance, and in 1930 they were allowed to vote in local elections. Secularism was one of the pillars of Kemalism and one of the areas of more intensive changes – although José Teixeira Fernandes (2005: 39) believes that Kemal was more inspired by the French laicism with some secularist nuances⁶³. In that respect, several measures were taken: the caliphate was abolished (1924), religious courts were closed (1924), all Muslim institutions became

⁶² Burdy and Marcou (2008: 33) argue that it was also inspired by the USSR and Italian fascism.

⁶³ For further details on the differences between secularism and laicism, Cf. for example, Fernandes, 2005: 39. In this work, as the Kemalist doctrine chose “secularism” for one of its pillars, that is the word that will be used for meaning the separation between politics and religion or the primacy of politics over religion.

subject to the state's control (1924), the reference to Islam was removed from the constitution and the call to prayer was mandatorily in Turkish (1932). Besides, citizens were dissuaded to wear headscarves; on the contrary, they were encouraged to wear Western-type clothing. In fact, long beards were forbidden in public buildings for being considered religious manifestations. In line with the European practices, the adoption of surnames became mandatory (1934) and that is when Mustafa Kemal is attributed the surname of Atatürk (meaning the *Father of the Turks*).

In the cultural and scientific fields, and in line with the identity changes the Turkish President pursued, the Latin alphabet was introduced (1928), the Society of Turkish History was created to write (or re-write) the national history and the Society of Turkish Language was established with the aim of purifying the language from Persian or Arab influences that derived from Islamic Law⁶⁴. Learning Arab and Persian at the university level was forbidden, following the same line of reasoning. Furthermore, the first census of the population occurred in 1927 and concluded that there were 14 million Turkish citizens; the European calendar was introduced (1925), polygamy was forbidden and women became entitled to ask for the divorce.⁶⁵

These are just some of the many examples of measures and reforms undertaken by the Parliament. However, as it is easily deduced, such changes must not have been straightforwardly introduced or imposed in the citizens' lives; they were achieved because of a set of conditions that created the ideal momentum for them, such as Atatürk's internal and external prestige (Fernandes, 2005: 49). And as it was not enough, the opposition was suppressed and the Grand Assembly enjoyed a very high degree of power, naturally controlled by the President (Mango, 2005: 19). Besides, pseudo-scientific studies allied with the idealisation and mythologizing of Turkish history, for example, worked as a strong propaganda tool to shape the Turks' consciousness and a feeling of Turkishness, supported and reinforced by a "Father state", populist and threatening. As Fernandes (2005: 50) analyses, legitimating the Turkish identity was a very difficult task; even legitimating historically the Republic in the Anatolian territory was not easy. Turkish identity, that was intended to be purified

⁶⁴ Professor Losano noticed that this linguistic depuration was juridically relevant as it tried to find Turkish words that express the new juridical institutions imported from Europe through the replacement of Arabic.

⁶⁵ The changes and reforms presented in the previous chapters were assembled from different authors: Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 39-44; Fernandes, 2005: 48-49; Losano, 2009: 26-28; Mango, 2004: 21-22; Mango, 2005: 18.

(as with the language), was the result of a varied set of influences and could not be based on language or religion or the territory, as all of these criteria would raise other questions. Therefore, some historical discoveries were “incorporated and developed by Kemalist historiography, anxious to inculcate a Turkish national identity in its population” (Idem: 53).

These efforts aimed to replace the Ottoman multinational feature and, for that reason, there was even a pecuniary penalty to those who used any other language but Turkish. In addition, European teachers were hired to accelerate Europeanisation (Losano, 2009: 22) – therefore, these endeavours to create a new identity (and a new Turkey, after all) were also aligned with and following a strong aspiration to approach it with the European models and standards. Ironically, this process was being developed with no regard what so ever for the European democratic practices. Burdy and Marcou (2008: 34-35) assess these modernisation efforts as follows:

“Kemalism (...) is a form of enlightened despotism in the classic meaning of the expression: modernisation is carried out proactively and authoritatively. The Republic is not synonymous with liberal democracy. (...) Kemal is too authoritarian to tolerate a true political opposition within a democratic system.”

On the other hand, Mario Losano (2009: 26) adopts a less critical position regarding the efforts of Atatürk, as, according to this author, the Turkish leader “cannot be placed at the side of the tyrants that devastated Europe in the twentieth century” if the political tradition of Turkey is taken into consideration and the fact that he was “an autocrat, but not a tyrant: because his power was not illegitimate or violent; because he was more of a ‘*sui generis* prince’ than an ‘anti-prince’” (Idem: 26).

On the whole, this first phase of modern Turkey was a truly important period in Turkey’s history – not only in formal aspects and legal changes, but also as it meant a tangible twist in the development of the state. And although it is not possible to talk about a political culture in the country, some of its seeds may be believed to be thrown at this moment. As a matter of fact, in terms of democratic achievements, one cannot claim that Turkey has developed a lot during these first years: it was a top-down approach, the Constitution did not foresee institutional balances and the country looked more like a single-party system; but, on the other hand, it is not possible to ignore the improvements in terms of the citizens’ real lives: the introduction of the Western clothing style meant the end of the visibility of social differences and Turkey was a

completely transformed country by the time Atatürk died, in 1938, and is replaced by İsmet İnönü.

The conclusions about this process that lasted for more than a decade are controversial. For example, Burdy and Marcou (2008: 33) distinguish Kemalism from a “revolutionary rupture”, as it was, according to the authors, the continuation of the willingness to modernise began with the Ottoman elites. Rupture with the past or not, the truth is that “between 1925 and 1935, the Turkish society was transformed from its roots. And it was transformed in the European sense” Losano (2009: 26). However, these transformations could not be achieved within a democratic framework –

“as they [Turks] waited for democracy, the Turkish people benefited from rational government (...). Atatürk’s policy brought peace to Turkey and laid the foundations of progress (...). It is hard to imagine them [the reforms] winning approval in a popular referendum” (Mango, 2004: 22).

Interestingly, this poses another problem concerning the democratic validity of the reforms. The paradox lies in this confusing relation between the non-democratic imposition of norms, rules and practices in order to approach the democratic standards of (Western) modern societies. It raises doubts about the deepness and solidity of the measures in the citizens’ practices and, mainly, minds. The consequences of this strange relationship flourish in the following decades – aspiring to reach the Western standards of democracy with non-conventional (and non-democratic) tools or mechanisms. This paradox began with the establishment of a Republic with a single-party system (only interrupted very briefly by an authorised opposition that was very quickly eliminated) and will continue in the country’s history for several decades – and the military interventions in the second half of the twentieth century illustrate that very well, as it will be further explained.

“It was within this firm framework of a hierarchical state which was an amalgam of French republicanism and Ottoman authoritarianism that the Muslim inhabitants of Turkey were moulded into a Turkish nation made up of citizens equal before the law, but manifestly unequal in wealth, educational attainment, lifestyle and access to power” (Idem: 26).

However, one may wonder whether there was an alternative: Turkey was the sick man of the Bosphorus and

“Kemal Atatürk’s therapy gave [him] back some health (...) and accompanied him in the early stages of recovery. That therapy consisted of an autocratic government with some of the seeds for democracy in the future, which developed not without difficulty. It could not be otherwise, because five centuries of theocratic despotism could not be replaced overnight by a European-type of democracy. (...) it was necessary a gradual transition from a ‘dictadura’ to a ‘dictablanda’” (Idem: 26, 67).

History and time will judge the alternatives that could have been used, but it seems rather certain that not even the seeds of democracy would have been thrown unless these “revolution/continuation” policies were not applied in a perishing Turkish state.

6.2.2. The Second World War

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk dies in 1938 and is replaced by İsmet İnönü. Despite the set of reforms initiated by his predecessor, İnönü did not find the most appropriate environment when he came to power to pursue with such an intensive pace of reforms due to the Second World War and the subsequent unstable post-war period. President İnönü used to be Kemal’s military subordinate, his Prime-Minister and, despite his dismissal, a man upon whom Atatürk relied. Known abroad as “Mr. No”, İsmet İnönü’s top priority was to maintain the achievements of his predecessor (Mango, 2004: 27).

Concerning the world conflict, İnönü adopted a neutral position (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 6) – at least in the beginning of the conflict – despite the United Kingdom’s and Germany’s requests for aligning with each of them. Between 1939 and 1941, Turkey signed a set of trade and non-aggression agreements with Britain, France, USSR and Germany (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 87). Besides, the earthquake of the late 1930s and its human and physical destruction, together with serious economic problems (Mango, 2004: 30-31), were major reasons for making İnönü less prone to enter the war. Nevertheless, keeping neutrality was almost impossible in a disputed world mainly after the Soviets cancel the Soviet-Turkish alliance of 1929, so that they could recover some former territories now under the Turkish control. The recent republic had no alternative but to turn itself towards the USA (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 88-89).

In this context, Turkey declares war to Germany and Japan in 1945, “in order to be able to participate in the Conference of San Francisco, founder of the United Nations” (Idem: 89). Furthermore, it begins a period marked by the membership of

several Western institutions, such as the World Bank (1947), the International Monetary Fund (1947), the Council of Europe (1949), NATO (1952) and the OECD (1961). Also very important for determining Turkey's next steps was the acceptance of the support provided by the Truman Doctrine to contain Communism (Idem: 89; Mango, 2004: 38).

Despite the success of İnönü's external policy – “[he] had lost nothing through his policy in the world war”, on the contrary he gained the Western support and independence, his country was not destroyed by war, etc. (Mango, 2004: 38) – the assessment of his domestic policies are not so consensual. In 1932, a law limited the foreigners' freedom to exercise several professions; in 1942, a ten-time higher tax was applied to non-Muslim businessmen and those unable to pay it were sent to labour camps. Consequently, half of the Jewish population in the country had emigrated to Israel by 1948 (Idem: 33). On the other hand, it was also İnönü who promoted the establishment of an institution to translate and publish classics of world literature, as well as he created institutes to train young people to spread skills in rural areas (Idem: 35). In terms of democratic advancement in the country, the President was responsible for allowing the creation of political parties and implementing the multi-party system in 1946 (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 89).

Isabel David (2012: 140-145) brings other important aspects of İnönü's domestic policies. For example, in spite of the President's personal beliefs and religiously devoted practices, he kept faithful to the secularist principle of the Kemalist doctrine. Nevertheless, there was a wider openness to religious aspects, such as it is perceived by the introduction of optional religious education. This and other similar measures were criticised by Republican intellectuals who saw it as a violation of Kemalist principles and, in fact, the religious feeling re-emerged in the country, which translated into a wider spread religious education and the establishment of more religious orders and parties, to name a few. In what comes to democratising efforts, the author still highlights the less severe censorship, the increasing of the autonomy of universities, paid holidays, advantages or protection in motherhood, the permission for trade unions to be created, changes in legislation to make it more difficult for the executive to close newspapers, etc. (Idem: 143-145).

Thus, İsmet İnönü was a controversial ruler whose decisions did not please all the sectors of the Turkish society. He weakened the ethnic and cultural diversity of the country with discriminatory measures at the same time he reinforced the Muslim

mercantile class. Besides, his religious policies revealed his personal preferences and re-introduced in the country the feeling of belonging to the wider community of Islam, despite his attempt to respect and maintain the legacy of his secularist predecessor. On the other hand, however, İnönü accomplished some important changes in the democratic landscape of Turkey – something Atatürk was not able to: to allow political opposition, to diminish the strength of censorship and to permit the existence of trade unions and more rights to the workers. The seeds of democracy seemed to be starting to grow, slowly.

Yet, the context in which the second President of Turkey operated was not a particularly easy one, as he followed a very charismatic and popular leader, the founder of the Republic, and, at the same time, as he had to protect the country's autonomy, safety and interests in a very unstable world, with hostile neighbours and enemies in an extremely violent conflict. And when this conflict ends, the following period of the Cold War will shape very strongly the country's relations with the rest of the world and its own future.

6.3. Turkey in the Post World War II

6.3.1. The Cold War

After the Second World War, Turkey has good economic indicators (balanced budget, surplus in the foreign trade, etc.), but its citizens lived in very bad conditions with the subsequent discontent, which was controlled by the single party of the country, very rigid with strikes and demonstrations – that were simply forbidden (Mango, 2004: 39).

The introduction of the multi-party system in 1946 was an important step towards the improvement and europeanisation of Turkish democracy. It is also a signal of democratic transition since, until then, it would be difficult to talk about a democratic regime (cf. Chapter 3). Nonetheless, it also meant an open door to nationalist and Islamic non-democratic parties (Losano, 2009: 40) that wanted to reach powerful positions in an “attempt to deconstruct secularism” (Fernandes, 2005: 59). The elections held in that same confronted the party in power, the CHP, and a recently created centre-right party, the Democratic Party (DP). According to Isabel David (2012: 147, 148), the differences between the two political parties were not very significant; both wanted a

modern Turkey. The difference lied in the way to achieve it: for Democrats, Kemalism was seen as a flexible ideology and should be interpreted according to the circumstances, for example, replacing statism by free enterprise. The DP also demanded more democratic practices in the Turkish political life.

In the 1946 elections, there were accusations of fraud due to the secret counting of the votes – allegedly, the Republicans won 400 seats and DP conquered 40 seats in the Assembly (Idem: 43). As Mango (Idem: 43) wrote, “civilizes politics had been short-lived”: İnönü was re-elected, despite the DP’s attempt to contest the results. However, the already not good economic situation of the country started to worsen. It is in this framework that Turkey accepts the Marshall plan’s help and becomes an OECD member, having received, by 1950, around 200 million dollars in American aid (Idem: 44).

Bowing to internal and external pressures, the electoral law was amended and the vote counting became open to public scrutiny. The 1950 elections were the first really democratic suffrage in the country and brought a volte-face in the distribution of seats in the Parliament: Democrats won 408 seats and the Republicans only 69 (Idem: 45).⁶⁶ This change meant not only a new political distribution, but also the first time the democratic character of the Republicans, as well as, their role as an opposition party was put to test. Moreover, it also implied a modification of the social profile of Turkey’s rulers – they were not a bureaucratic elite anymore, but from other social groups and included lawyers and businessmen, for example, seen as closer to the common citizens and their needs (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 48). These results were perceived in the rest of the world as “a sign of the soundness of the foundations laid by Atatürk and a proof of Turkey’s maturity” (Mango, 2004: 45). Whether that democratic maturity was real or not, the truth is that Turks finally were allowed to freely express their wishes in terms of political choice that was actually respected.

Fernandes (2005: 60) wrote that this new political era began a “counter-revolution” led by the Democratic Party since 1950. In fact, some symbolic measures were rapidly taken by the new government led by the Prime-Minister Adnan Menderes: they re-introduced Arab in the call to prayer, public schools provided religious teaching,

⁶⁶ Andrew Mango (2004: 45) tells an interesting short story about this victory: “It is said that when the results came in, a leading general came to İnönü and asked him whether the army should intervene to prevent a change of government, and that İnönü refused”.

banks were re-privatised, among others (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 49). Moreover, as the power was concentrated in the Grand National Assembly since the 1924 Constitution and given the absolute majority won by the DP, Menderes ruled in a dictatorship of the majority (Mango, 2005: 19-20), disregarding the role of the opposition party – even though they had previously, as the opposition party, claimed for more democracy.

With ruinous policies in the economic field that worsened an already difficult situation in four years, the government, in order to ensure its re-election, starts to adopt a set of undemocratic and populist measures: they limit the opposition's rights, diminish the freedom of the press and the independence of the judiciary, appeal to religious feelings and were able, in this fashion, to win the 1954 and the 1958 elections – the first with an absolute majority, but the second with a relative majority only. Both suffrages concerned the international observers for alleged frauds. And they may have been achieved because the government hid the gravity of the economic situation through an inflationary public spending (Idem: 20; Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 49-50; Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 8; Mango, 2004: 51). Burdy and Marcou (2008: 50) synthesise:

“the errors of the ‘democratic decade’ (1950-1960) bring to light the difficulty of the Turkish political system to accept the mutual respect and the moderation necessary to the functioning of a pluralist regime that assumes alternation. The Democratic Party gradually began to behave like a single party, applying to the opposition and the press the treatment itself experienced before it came to power”.

Thus, as the Turkish context at the end of the 1950s was so critical in several domains, elites and students were becoming increasingly unsatisfied. The students' lack satisfaction reflected in manifestations that were suppressed by the military under the orders of the government. This action against the demonstrators and the general repressive environment, coupled with military's discontent with the erosion of the founding principles of the Turkish Republic (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 8), led to the first military *coup d'état* in modern Turkey in May, 1960. This intervention, although aiming to safeguard democracy and end corruption, was rather violent and ended up with the death penalty of the dismissed Prime-Minister and two of his ministers after an eleven-month trial that also included over 400 long imprisonment sentences (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 50; Mango, 2004: 53).

After Mustafa Kemal's death, the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) reinforced their perception as guardians of the Turkish Republic and the Kemalist principles; and they used this argument to legitimise their political involvement, although Atatürk had

proclaimed that "...all officers wishing to remain in the Party must resign from the Army. We must adopt a law forbidding all future officers having political affiliations" (Atatürk *cited in* Brown, 1987: 235). Despite this wish of their ideological leader, a decade of abuses against the Kemalist doctrine spoke louder and originated the intervention. Adopting a new more liberal Constitution and founding the II Republic were among the military's objectives and they achieved it. Menderes was removed from power, a new (and liberal) Constitution that reduced the excessive authority of the Assembly was approved in the next year and this involvement of the military was supported by the majority of the educated public opinion (Mango, 2005: 20). Not only at home, but also from abroad, the military rule was not disputed (Mango, 2004: 57) and, since that moment, the TAF realised how powerful they were.

The 1961 Constitution, despite being a military's project, was approved in referendum by 61,7% of the voters. In the one that was considered the most liberal Turkish Constitution, article 2 stated that the country should be ruled based on its nationalist, democratic and secular features, in accordance with the principle of rule of law and human rights. It also determined Turkish as the official language; it foresaw every citizen's equality before the law and forbade the use of religion for political purposes. Moreover, the right to strike, to collective negotiations, as well as the proportional representation at the Grand National Assembly were introduced in this new document that approached Turkey to its Western European counterparts. The idea was to avoid another situation of abuse of power and it revealed some concerns regarding a social state (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 8-10; Mango, 2004: 58).

Nevertheless, the approval of the Constitution had at least one unexpected consequence: it was followed by a set of weak coalitions whose action was rather limited by the new establishment. The first elections held after the military give the power back to civilians, in 1973, were an example. Ecevit's CHP granted only 37% of the votes, which did not enable the party to rule alone, but in a coalition with Erbakan's Islamist party, the MSP (*Millî Selâmet Partisi*, National Salvation Party) (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 52; Mango, 2004: 59). There was a new party structure that tended to reflect more accurately the population's claims, but which caused a high degree of political fragmentation (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 51). The new Justice Party (AP, *Adalet Partisi*) succeeded the DP and its leader, Süleyman Demirel, was a very popular

politician who was able to win the 1965 and the 1969 elections – the first with an absolute majority (Mango, 2004: 64-66).

In the social and economic fields, the 1960s were a very prolific decade. Economic growth and urbanisation promoted several social reforms and improvements, but there was also domestic instability caused by leftist movements inspired in the Soviets. In 1968, the Turkish students imported the radicalism that was occurring in Western Europe and caused some disturbance in their manifestations and quest for the answers to the capitalism/socialism debate (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 11; Mango, 2004: 67; Mango, 2005: 21). All this instability and the imminence of violence started to concern the military that issued a memorandum to President Sunay demanding a strong government. This constituted an attempt to make Demirel resign, what actually happened; afterwards, the Armed Forces install a technocratic government more or less visibly controlled by them and dissolve two parties (an Islamic and a communist), beginning in 1971 a 29-month period of martial law to ensure the normalisation of the country in terms of stability (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 51-52; Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 11).

During the military ruling, in response to the unexpected consequences of a more liberal Constitution, the ones responsible for the first version introduced some changes in the document that became more restrictive to ensure national unity, the National Security Council became more powerful, universities lost part of their autonomy, civil liberties were curtailed and the military's influence was reinforced (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 12; Mango, 2005: 21).

The following decade was not as quiet as the military would like it to be. At the international level, two events would contribute to that unsteadiness: the oil crises and Cyprus invasion⁶⁷. The first worsened the already existing economic crises in the country, unemployment and inflation were high and the citizens were discontent. The second originated nationalist feelings and developed (or reinforced) the perception of we-Muslims against they-Christian Greeks. Coupled with this international environment, Turkey was also facing a considerable polarisation in terms of secular vs. Islamist education. This was a symptom of a broader struggle between the two factions in an epoch of the growing threat of Islamic fundamentalism and political violence. Religion recovers some place in the stage of politics and social life; Erbakan, MSP's leader, saw

⁶⁷ For more details on the Cyprus question, Cf. Fernandes (2008).

the support for his party increasing during the decade and he became a necessary partner for coalitions. He believed that the return to Islam was fundamental to achieve the stability Turkey needed so much and that was lacking in the country for decades – his religious agenda was not even a secret. Islam was still used as a political tool to unite the country against the Soviet threat. Furthermore, the creation of the separatist Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK, *Partiya Karkerên Kurdistan*) and beginning of their armed struggle against the state contributed to the very unstable 1980s too (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 13; Fernandes, 2005: 70-71).

In this context, the military, who perceived themselves as the only cohesive and incorrupt elite (Dagi, 1996: 125), believed it was time to involve in politics again and stage another *coup*:

“The country had been riven by ideological conflict. The military decided that the remedy lay in confining politics to the inner councils of a few, preferably only two, political parties, just as religion had been confined to the interior of mosques under state control. Society was to be depoliticized” (Mango, 2004: 81).

Turkey was then ruled by the military during the first three years of the 1980s. In this period, the Turkish Armed Forces established the foundations of a new order through “draconian means” (Idem: 81). In the name of the reasons the military claimed to be behind their intervention – to preserve the country’s integrity, avoid a civil war and safeguard democracy – all political activities were banned, martial law was extended to all country, press was monitored and several newspapers were closed, the legislative power was transferred to the National Security Council, strikes and became illegal, the leaders of the four biggest parties were imprisoned, as well as other politicians and journalists, academics were fired,... By the end of the regime, 48 executions were carried out and over 60 000 people were considered suspect of terrorist or illegal political activities and were detained (Dagi, 1996: 125-126; Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 13,14). As Dagi (1996: 126) explains, “all these aimed first to suppress the domestic opposition against the military intervention and then to re-form the whole political structure”. Nevertheless, as other authors put it, there was no real opposition to this *coup*, even after a very politically prolific epoch, because Turks were tired of the instability and violence (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 53).

At this time, however, the Constitution was not amended; there was a brand new Constitution that resulted from the intervention and was approved by the population in

1982. This new document was much less liberal than the previous one; it attempted to avoid allowing the same problems the latter had created: Presidential powers increased, freedom of association was limited, trade unions were not authorised to involve in politics, a bicameral system was introduced, the military reinforced their roles and positions in the political landscape of the country and the Constitution became a security-oriented document. It was also introduced a 10% threshold under which no party could be able to be represented in the Grand Assembly (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 13-14).

Contrary to the previous military *coups*, the international reactions were much less enthusiastic and showed serious concerns about the development and maturation of the Turkish democracy. Dagi (1996: 126-128) assembles the position of several Western countries: both France and the United Kingdom were worried about democracy and human rights, and used their diplomacy to mitigate the effects of the *coup*; the Scandinavian countries severely condemned and criticised the intervention and brought it to the agenda in the European institutions; West Germany was an important economic and military partner and the regime did not want to deteriorate these relations, but Germans hosted several political refugees and blocked some help to Turkey; finally, the United States, despite showing their concern for the development of the democracy, expressed their trust in the Turkish Armed Forces. There were obviously strategic interests behind this support and the country lobbied before the Council of Europe to avoid Turkey's expulsion. In fact, the American economic support increased during the military ruling.

“In short, democracy and human rights issues were repeatedly expressed publicly and privately by the West European states in their bilateral relations with Turkey. At the beginning they showed a rather mild reaction, but as time passed, without much progress, and as the generals took harsh policy decisions they became tougher. (...) Turkey's relations with Europe were tense and sometimes strained, and even deteriorating, while Turkish-American relations developed along a perfect line” (Idem: 127).

It is interesting to notice in this practical example how the foreign policies of different Western countries reacted to the same event in Turkey. The concerns over democratic issues or mere strategic interests made a difference in the diplomatic response. The European Commission was also paying attention to the respect of human rights and democracy, but the European Parliament was more vocal when it came to reveal its opposition and reminded Turkey that those were essential conditions for any

possible candidate to the Community. In general, however, it was a policy of “wait and see” (Idem: 129) with some pressure for the military to give the power back to civilians, in order to restore order and the natural distribution of power.

Apart from this not so positive reaction mainly from the European counterparts (contrary to what have happened in the previous interventions), the Armed Forces’ attempt to reorganise the political arena of Turkey had a set of unintended consequences: first, the electoral system they adopted was not changed by the civilian governments that followed the *coup*, as it favoured the winning parties with far more seats than the proportional system would allow them to have. In that sense, the distribution of seats in Turkey’s Grand National Assembly did not respect (or reflected) in proportional terms the citizens’ choices; secondly, unstable coalitions continued to form the successive government; and, finally, the 10% threshold was not able to diminish the number of small parties that originated the much contested political fragmentation that characterised Turkey’s politics in the previous decades: in 1987 there were seven parties running for elections, in 1991 they were six and in 1999 the number rose to twenty (Evin, 2005: 33).

When the military decided to return the power back to the civilians, another attempt to influence on the political future of the country (and another objective they could not achieve) was to allow only the competition, in 1983, of three parties being two of them directly and clearly supported by them. Therefore, the three parties that ran for the elections were the MDP (Nationalist Democracy Party, *Milliyetçi Demokrat Partisi*), a centre-right party led by a retired general; the Populist Party (HP, *Halkaçı Parti*), a centre-left party led by a retired senior civil servant; and finally the liberal Motherland Party (ANAP, *Anavatan Partisi*) which was coordinated by Turgut Özal and allowed by the military, although not supported by them. Özal enjoyed foreign creditors’ support and the success of his stabilisation programme during the military rule (he resigned in 1982 to be able to build his party and run for the elections) guaranteed him this opportunity (Mango, 2004: 82). This time, Turkish citizens did not follow the military’s advice and elected the only party that was not supported by them; maybe they were already tired of their very aggressive ruling and wanted them not to interfere in politics. The 91% of popular support in the Constitutional referendum may have had the same justification, as its rejection would mean the continuation of the military rule (Idem: 83).

Özal was a very popular and successful Prime-Minister in Turkey, mainly in the economic field. During his two terms in the office (1983-87; 1987-89), his policies had very positive results in reducing the deficit, more than tripling the exports in seven years, increasing tourism, building or updating energy and communication infrastructures and, therefore, the economy grew in average 7% per year (Idem: 85). According to Faucompret and Konings (2008: 14), these measures were made through a bottom-up revolution that involved people in the country's modernisation. He was also a big supporter of EU's accession and developed the cooperation with the Balkans. Moreover, his actions increased the public understanding about the concepts and practices of civil society and pluralism – previously seen as something that would not fit Turkey's unity (Evin, 2005: 36).

However, some authors (like Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 15) claim Özal was not capable of controlling the growth and enthusiasm he began; therefore, the high degrees of consumption led to a great increase of inflation, incomes decreased and the accusations of corruption and nepotism started to abound. To worsen the situation, the gap between secularists and Islamists widened again. In a private conversation with an academic, Mango (2004: 86) quotes him when he declares: "I blame Özal for taking ethics out of Turkish society by idealizing money". This statement is certainly related to what Evin (2005: 34) wrote: the Prime-Minister helped Turkey prepare for entering the global markets, but he did not care much about rules and laws and would easily overcome them if needed to. This action also meant a rupture with the Ottoman tradition; now the emphasis was on the economic activity itself and he moved away from statism and the culture of dependency on the state (Idem: 35).

Unfortunately, these changes and improvements did not last very long, because the "deeply rooted characteristics of Turkish political culture" (Idem: 36), such as clientelism in politics and the lack of tolerance for political opposition, re-emerged and undermined the results of Özal's policies. Besides, when General Evren's term as President ended in 1989 and Özal was a candidate to the post, the opposition accused him to want to "escape before the bubble burst" (Mango, 2004: 88), as he had left a country in a difficult economic situation, mainly due the high levels of inflation. That was not, however, an obstacle for his election and he became the second civilian President of the Republic of Turkey. In this new position, Turgut Özal focused his efforts on foreign policy: he applied for membership to the European Community

(which was refused), he sought to convince the West of the importance of Turkey after the end of the cold War and in 1990 allowed NATO to use the base against Iraq, despite wide criticisms and the resignation of two Foreign Ministers for his interference (Idem: 89-90).

After the 1983 elections and the withdrawal of the military, several parties were created or reformulated. Demirel renamed his party as “True/Right Path Party” (DYP, *Dogru Yol Partisi*) with some religious influences but not supported by the most religious voters who preferred Erbakan’s Welfare Party (RP, *Refah Partisi*); in the centre-left spectrum, İnönü created the Social Democracy Party (SODEP, *Sosyal Demokrasi Partisi*) that took in the Populist Party and was challenged by another leftist party, the new Democratic Left Party (DSP, *Demokratik Sol Parti*) founded by Mrs. Ecevit (Ecevit’s wife) (Idem: 84). Therefore, during the 1980s, this was the main political scenario in Turkey; two centre-right parties (DYP and RP) and two centre-left (SODEP and DSP). However,

“the policies of all these parties resembled each other in their vague formulation. The divisions among them were not ideological, but personal. The parties were mutual protection societies among which the voters made a choice on the basis of affinity and in the hope of personal benefit” (Idem: 84).

This statement actually agrees with the previous assumption that, despite the Özal’s changes, the democratic maturity of the country remained rather incipient and that it is particularly difficult to change the political culture of a nation overnight. Even if one looks at the evolution of the Turkish constitutions since the birth of the Republic, it is noticeable a rapid pace of change – but it is very likely to occur only on paper and its internalisation in the citizens’ minds and practices remains another problem. The 1924 Constitution was amended right in 1928 and in 1937; in 1961 it was adopted a completely new document after the *coup*, revised ten years later and replaced by another one in the following decade, during the military rule (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 58-59). Yet, the 1990s do not show signs to be quieter or more stable than the previous phase. This instability, when contrasted to the theoretical aspects proposed on Chapter 3, prove that a country’s democratic consolidation may be a difficult, hazardous and uncertain process which is able to entail backslides.

6.3.2. *The Post-Cold War Era*

Turkey was a strategic fundamental partner for the Western countries during the Cold War against the Soviet Union. That role granted the country a widespread international prestige and support. However, with the fall of the Berlin Wall and the implosion of the USSR, major changes occurred in the international system and Turkey needed to find its place in the new concert if it wanted to keep playing a relevant role in the new distribution of power among the nations of the world. It seemed that, when the waters of the pond looked like they were calming down, another stone is thrown against it and Turkey needed to redefine its dynamics, interests and even its identity to cope with these new turbulent times. Kazancigil (*cited in Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 13*) calls the 1990s the “lost decade” – economy, society, politics,... – nothing had had enough time to consolidate and this new era threatened their fragile stability.

When, in 1989, Özal became President, the opposition was right: he left the country in a very difficult situation, in spite of his initial successes. Mesut Yılmaz replaced him, but had to abandon the post after losing the 1991 elections, won by a coalition led by Süleyman Demirel (Mango, 2004: 92). Unexpectedly, however, Özal dies in 1993 and Demirel replaces him in the Presidency in the same year. Tanşu Çiller fills the vacant position as Prime-Minister. This “attractive, US-trained woman economist (...) saw herself as a Turkish Mrs. Thatcher” (Idem: 94), but, on the contrary to the English counterpart, Çiller continued to overspend, rapidly increasing Turkey’s foreign debt in a time creditors were not inclined to lend more money to the country. With the decrease in the interest rates, markets panicked, capital fled out and the IMF was asked to help. Its assistance had the price it usually has: Turkey needed to begin a policy of devaluation and retrenchment. As a consequence, the GNP shrank by 8% and prices grew 106%: “It was seen as the gravest economy crisis in the history of the republic” (Idem: 94) and they could already count a couple of them, despite the short life of the regime. Regardless of these setbacks, Tanşu Çiller achieved one major success during her legislature, which was the signature of the Customs Union with the European Union that entered into effect in 1996. Besides, she was able to fight the Kurdish insurgency, with the popular support, giving the military green light to suppress it (Idem: 95).

Still, they were not enough for the party to remain in the power and the Welfare Party won the 1995 elections. Erbakan was the first openly Islamic Prime-Minister and, therefore, his agenda to gather the support of Muslim countries, as well as to reinforce the role of religion, namely in education, was not hidden or disguised. Being aware of this context, the military were on alert and began a campaign to demand the government's resignation. Simultaneously, they gave the Prime-Minister a list with their demands, so that the executive would not forget that Turkey was a secular state based on a set of principles foreseen by the Constitution. In spite of his promises, Erbakan did not alter his path and pursued with his measures (Idem: 97). Isabel David (2012: 189) provides several examples of how Erbakan's attitudes may have upset the Armed Forces, when, for example, he visited Iran (defying the United States), when religious leaders were invited for the meal that breaks Ramadan fast in his official residence and went wearing religious clothing or even the plans to build a mosque in Taksim Square. These are a few examples of how the tension between the two sides was growing almost immediately since the Welfare Party was empowered.

In February 1997, the military decided to intervene; this time, it was in a more subtle way. After realising their warnings had not been listened to, the Army sent tanks "ostensibly on exercise", but in reality they wanted to "readjust the balance delicately" (Idem: 97). The process of 28 February, as it is now known, constituted therefore in a "campaign to eradicate Political Islam from education, business and other activities" (Idem: 97) and was supported by the majority of the intellectual elite. Wilkens (*cited in* Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 16) called it the "bloodless coup", but it also labelled as the first "post-modern coup" (Mango, 2004: 97), as this symbolic pressure from different society sects, coupled with the imminence of an actual *coup*, ended up in Erbakan's resignation in June. Furthermore, the Constitutional Court banned the Welfare Party – later replaced by the Virtue Party (FP, *Fazilet Partisi*) – and the Mayor of Istanbul, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was imprisoned for ten months for reciting a poem by a nationalist poet.⁶⁸

In the 1999 elections, and after the arrest of the PKK's leader, Abdullah Öcalan, which caused massive patriotic feelings, a coalition began to rule the country. It was composed of the three parties led by Yılmaz, Bahçeli and Ecevit. Despite the good

⁶⁸ "The mosques are our barracks, their minarets our bayonets, their domes our shields" (by Ziya Gökalp) (Mango, 2004: 98).

beginning of this period, which also ensured the status of candidate to the EU, the 1999 earthquake started a less happy moment with the devastation of Izmir and the death of 17 000 people. This natural disaster revealed several weaknesses in Turkey: first, the late reaction of national rescue team (in opposition to the prompt response of the foreign teams) and second the realisation that urbanisation planning and building regulations had not been respected due to bribes that violated the law (Idem: 99).⁶⁹

In fact, the 1990s were an extremely difficult decade for Turks. Economy stagnated (not to say worse), one big financial crisis was not completely solved, immigration movements from the Southeast overpopulated cities and raised social tension, nationalist Kurds and radical Islamists were become more violent with an also very unstable neighbourhood, old political parties changed their names, but remained in politics, weak governments were frequently not capable to take the necessary decisions to develop the country in the right direction (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 13). Thus, reforms were urgent and people knew it, but they were not expecting that a new strong economic crisis hit the country again and would change its landscape – one more time.

6.3.3. *The 2000s*

Despite the disquieting moments of the first years of the first millennium, the 2000s meant to Turkey a major about-turn in all the field of the country's life – from politics to the economy; from culture in general to religion in particular. It also due to the dynamics of this new era that 1999 was set as the beginning period of study of this thesis. For example, Düzgit and Keyman (2007: 69) argue that there are two different images of Turkey: 1995-2000 and since 2000 – and this year marks, according to them, the turning point. In the first phase, Turkey is a very state-centric, security-oriented and crisis-ridden country whose political elite is seen as corrupt and whose conflicting identities create a great deal of instability. On the other hand, and from 2000 onwards, Turkey is a changing country, mainly in the democratic field, but also in its economy and external policy. Two general dynamics are responsible for triggering these changes,

⁶⁹ The only “positive” side of this disaster was the rapprochement between Turkey and Greece. The Greek availability to help created a new environment of dialogue and cooperation, which began to be known as the “earthquake diplomacy” (Mango, 2004: 99).

although one cannot forget all the way the country has gone through in the previous decades.

In 2000, the IMF's aid was achieving the first positive results (the economy grew 6%). However, a weak banking system and the increase in the imports made it difficult again to control inflation and private banks began to fail (Idem: 100).

In the political domain, a public disagreement between the newly elected President Necdet Sezer and the Prime-Minister, Ecevit, during a National Security Meeting agitated the markets and the Turkish lira halved in value. The Prime-Minister, to calm down the situation asked the vice-President of the World Bank, Derviş, to be in charge of the country's economy and to negotiate with the IMF new credits. 2,5 million jobs were lost, the state expenditure diminished and the situation slightly improved, but the confidence on the coalition was still low (Idem: 101). Therefore, and also because the DSP and the MHP were not able to find a compromise regarding EU reform packages, Ecevit calls for early elections, scheduled for November 2002 (David, 2012: 255). As Düzgit and Kayman (2007: 70) wrote, this context created the perception among Turks that the macroeconomic stability and a democratic, efficient political power were tightly linked.

In the 2002 elections, none of the parties of the coalition were able to overcome the 10% threshold to be represented in the Assembly. To everyone's surprise, only two parties accomplished that condition: the AKP and the CHP. These results, as well as the events of the previous years, may reveal a more positive phase of the country's democratic consolidation, as they imply that citizens were likely to act within the framework of the democratic regime and their attitudes and behaviour have been democratised too – which is an important part of consolidation, as mentioned on Chapter 3.

The AKP (Justice and Development Party, *Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi*) won 362 out of 550 seats in a 550-seat National Assembly, which meant a share of 66% of all seats, when the party has only won 34% of the votes. This discrepancy is justified by the Turkish electoral system and the 10% threshold that benefits the bigger parties. It was the first time since 1987 that a party achieved a majority (Idem: 103). This very recent party presented itself with a pro-Islamic tradition (that also influenced the Welfare Party or the Democratic Party some years before) and gathered its support mainly from Central Anatolia (more conservative and traditional area), but also some from Istanbul,

Ankara and Bursa (Fernandes, 2005: 120); its typical voter is young and religious, comes from poor neighbours of big cities and is reluctant to support Turkey's European bid⁷⁰. Isabel David (2012: 259) quotes a survey that reveals some interesting data: 90% of the AKP's electorate prays at least once per day, 99% do the fastening in Ramadan, 81% see themselves first as Muslims and only then as Turks, and 60% prioritise religious values over national ones, democracy, secularism or even human rights.

On the other side, the opposition party, the CHP (Republican People's Party, *Cumhuriyetçi Halk Partisi*), has gathered its support among a not so young electorate, with a more leftist, secularist and pro-EUU viewer. Usually with higher levels of education, CHP's voters include teachers, independent workers, lawyers, engineers, medical doctors, etc. (Idem: 259; Fernandes, 2005: 120).

Recep Tayyip Erdoğan only became Prime-Minister in 2003, because he had been banned from any political activity until then (Mango, 2005: 25). A former disciple of Erbakan, from whom he separated in the 1997 *coup*, the new Prime-Minister has had a difficult relationship with the military since the beginning of his legislature (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 17) and, therefore, some divergences with the secularist opposition party. Nevertheless, and mainly in the first years of this new epoch, both countries were capable of negotiating, discussing and approaching several measures and reforms driven by the EU. Actually, the EU used to be for the AKP one of its top priorities (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 97), which was something sceptics usually do not believe in, as they

“question whether the reforms were primarily driven with the objective of subordinating the state elite, particularly the military, to the political leadership, and then revert to AKP's hidden anti-secularist agenda. After all, it was Mr Erdoğan who had described democracy in 1993 as a ‘vehicle which you ride as far as you want to go and then get off’” (Evin, 2005: 39).

Although these are worrying statements to be pronounced by an individual with political responsibilities (even though he was not in charge yet), this may remind that, despite the AKP's interest in the relations with the Union, it pursues a realist foreign policy that does not ignore history nor geography and which, therefore, focus on Turkophone Central Asia, the Muslim Middle East and the United States as well (David, 2012: 262). Besides, and according to Isabel David, this party recognise and are

⁷⁰ In fact, the AKP always showed itself as a EU supporter, so this feature of its voter seems to be at odds with that position.

enthusiastic about the elaboration of a new Constitution for the country, one that pretends to have a “bottom-up approach that would reflect the popular demands in accordance with democratic patterns” (Idem: 265).

In addition, the AKP perceives itself as a conservative party that seeks a gradual transformation of the society and that follows the example of Christian Democrat parties in Europe or the Republicans in the USA; this implies that the AKP does not want to be seen as a religious party *per se*, but as a political institution inspired by a Muslim matrix. Therefore, Kemalist secularism is a principle that needs to be reinterpreted in the sense that it has to be conceived, following this logic, as providing the conditions for everyone to be entitled to freely practice and express his own religion (Idem: 265-66).

During his first term in office, the AKP, together with the cooperation of the CHP, has approved several harmonisation and reform packages, as well as constitutional amendments, that aimed to promote the convergence between national law and the EU’s demands. Although these legislative changes will be analysed with more detail in Part IV, it is worth emphasising that the first term was prolific in terms of democratic measures. However, after the elections held in 2007, the reform pace is slower and the government begins to be criticised for the first time by the EU for not being committed to the accession process.

AKP’s first term in office,

“[have] revealed the fact that the possibility of political and economic stability (as well as internal and external security) in Turkey lies in democracy and its consolidation in state-society/individual relations” (Düzgüt & Keyman, 2007: 70).

It may be, therefore, considered one of the greatest achievements of the beginning of the twenty-first century for Turkish citizens in terms of learning or internalising a different political (democratic) culture. In fact, and as Evin (2005: 42) states, since Özal there has been a “dynamic tension between continuity and change” that has resulted in a “slow but far-reaching” transformation of the country. According to the author, this is mainly due to four factors: the arrest of Öcalan, the 2001 crisis (that led to reforms), demographic changes – with a younger generation more willing to compete and debate within the political and democratic framework – and “the fourth, and the central one, is the prospect of membership of the European Union, which helps to reinforce and consolidate political reforms” (Idem: 43).

It is precisely this relationship between the internal and the external domains that the present thesis aims to reflect upon – for that purpose, this chapter very briefly outlined the domestic dynamics of the country, since its Ottoman origins, in order to provide a broader and more complete comprehension about its nature and characteristics, essential to a more accurate acknowledgment and understanding of the its broader relations with the Europe in the light of the development or improvement of the Turkish democracy.

7. When Turkey met the West

7.1. Following the European model

7.1.1. The very beginning: the Ottoman Empire

Despite the topicality of the problem this thesis proposes to embrace, its deepest roots can be found back in the Middle Ages. In fact, European political units (empires, kingdoms, princedoms, etc.) had had relations with the Ottomans since their expansion; these relations may have been peaceful sometimes and warlike in other times, but the interchanges between both have existed for centuries and it would be limiting not to acknowledge how the two parts (Europe and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey) have influencing each other way longer than under the scope of the institutionalised relations since the 1959 request.

If one recalls the events narrated in the previous chapter, it is not difficult to perceive that the Ottoman Empire established its domains at the costs of the Byzantine Empire. In other words, its expansion meant diminishing what had been perceived as the European territory, right since the moment when, in the fourteenth century, “the Ottoman Turks crossed the Dardanelles and stepped on to the European continent” (Yurdusev, 2010: 277). However, this idea of confrontation between the two rival civilisations constitutes the result of a retrospective interpretation, because, as Yurdusev (Idem: 278) wisely reminds, there was no such thing as a European identity; only in the twenty-first century Europe began to be linked with Christianity. Even more interestingly,

“the term ‘European’ is said to have been used for the first time in connection with Turks. Pope Pius II in his letter to Mehmed II in 1458 used the ‘European’ interchangeably with the ‘Christian’. From then on, it is said, the words European and Europe began to be used in connection with or in contrast to, the Turk” (Idem: 278).

This explanation for the beginning of the utilisation of the concept is tightly related to the construction of an identity dichotomy between the Europeans and the Ottomans/Turks, very relevant to consider at this point, although approached with more detail in the next chapter. The definition of the boundaries of what was Europe was then achieved through the opposition of the two societies. Understandably, they used to see themselves as enemies and most literature points out the confrontation side of their

relationship: the expansion of the Ottoman Empire was feared by the Europeans as a dangerous threat to their territory and safety (Idem: 278). It is worth to highlight in this regard that the Ottoman Empire until the Treaty of Carlowitz (in 1699) is very different from the Ottoman Empire after the treaty in terms of its own identity and self-perceived image, as well as in the relations with others, namely with Europe, as it will be explained later on. And sometimes authors focus on the Ottoman Empire that undertook a set of reforms to westernise but they do forget about the previous period in which the Ottomans felt as the superior civilisation.

Still in this first period (somewhere between 1400s and the end of the 1600s), although some animosity was common and frequent, cooperation was also present between the two entities. When, in the fifteenth century, in Europe began to emerge a state system, the Ottoman Empire has influenced its shape: they

“actively and intensively engaged in European affairs (...) the Empire played a major part in the formation and working of the European state system and this shows that a process of mutual dependence operated between the two systems, despite the historical prejudices of the Europeans towards the Turks and the pretensions of self-sufficiency on the part of the Ottomans” (Idem: 279).

In this context, the Ottoman Empire was allied with France against the Habsburgs, and with the England against Spain in the mid-fifteenth century (Mango, 2005: 15). In the Westphalian order, the anti-hegemonial nature of the European state system was also possible thanks to the Ottoman pressure on the Habsburgs (Watson *cited in* Yurdusev, 2010: 282), given the fact they constituted a counter-weight to possible unifying tendencies of some European states, reinforcing the freedom of smaller states (Yurdusev, 2010: 282), as one should not forget that at that time, the Ottoman Empire was “one of the most powerful of the globe, maybe only supplanted by China”, according to the historian Quataert (2000: 100). Moreover, it was present in the history of the Italian reunification (Losano, 2009: 5), as Italians asked for the Sultan’s help against France and gave the Sultan’s Ambassador a place as an observer during the signing ceremony (Yurdusev, 2010: 282). During the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, Constantinople made several alliances, supporting the English, the Dutch, Protestants and Calvinists, etc. Simultaneously, the Ottomans were also an important hub between Europe and India – therefore, if they fought against European monarchies, they also negotiated silk and spices with them as well (Losano, 2009: 5). As Stivachtis

(2008: 23) put it, there were war and trade interactions, despite no common interests or values.

Thus, and despite those divergences, authors agree that the Ottoman Empire was a European power and part of the European state system as well (Idem: 23; Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 1; Losano, 2009: 5). As seen, the interactions between the two parts were very frequent at the political, diplomatic, warfare and trade levels. Yet, there was a clear opposition whose traces may be said to still remain in today's relations, as if the events of a several century-long process were still imprinted in the collective memory of both peoples. Yurdusev (2010: 283-284) claims very assertively that the Ottoman Empire "was considered *in* Europe but not *of* Europe (...) because, despite the intensive engagement in the process of making the modern European identity (...) the Turk was 'otherised'". This is true, but it is not all the truth about this so complex subject.

As a matter of fact, during the Renaissance there was an anti-Ottoman rhetoric in Europe (Stivachtis, 2008: 25). For example, several Popes used to claim for the Europeans' action against the Ottomans; Pope Nicholas is said to have called the Sultan "the cruellest persecutor of Christ's Church, (...) the son of Satan", wanting them to be out of Europe (*cited in* Frazee, 1983 *cited in* Stivachtis, 2008: 21). Besides, it is also true that those who constantly attacked the European territory and who actually made it to the gates of Vienna were seen as the "'perfect barbarian' for the Europeans in order to readily affirm the civilised nature of Europe" (Yurdusev, 2010: 285), as Turks revealed a very strong connection to a religion perceived as an heresy in Europe, as they constituted the most feared threat against the European civilisation (Idem: 284) and, therefore, using the Ottomans as the group that delimited the European boundaries in terms of civilisation (culture, religion and territory) was an fundamental tool to achieve a reinforcement of the European identity in construction. As Stivachtis (2008: 23) synthesises:

"the dominant 'Other' in the history of the European society of states has been 'the Turk'. The military might and physical proximity of the Ottoman Empire, combined with the strength of its religious tradition, made it a particularly relevant 'other' and instrumental in the process of the rise and evolution of European identity".

However, and recovering Yurdusev's thoughts about the Ottomans that were not *of* Europe due to being "otherised" by the Europeans, it is key to add that the they, until the end of the seventeenth century, considered their civilisation superior than any other

(Quataert, 2000: 100) – including the European one. They even did not accept the European practices and norms (Stivachtis, 2008: 24). A sign of that can be found in the diplomatic exchange: although the European courts had already sent diplomatic representations to Constantinople since the 1500s, the Ottomans only sent their diplomats to Europe at the end of the eighteenth century (Idem: 104; Yurdusev, 101: 279). Therefore, the opposition or some animosity between the two sides is pretty much due to the use of the concept of the Ottoman/Turk to build or strengthen the European identity by giving the Europeans a common enemy, but it is also due to the superiority complex of the Ottomans who did not even consider treaties as bilateral agreements, but as unilateral ones that they concede to the inferior monarchies of Europe.

The volte-face happens in 1683. That year marked the beginning of a century of defeats that ends with the Napoleonic invasion of Egypt in 1798 (Quataert, 2000: 60). 1699 is also a fundamental year: the second failed siege of Vienna meant the end of the Ottoman expansion in Europe (Mango, 2005: 15) and the following Carlowitz Treaty constitutes a turning-point for Europe-Ottoman Empire relations. As they lose their military superiority and they have to retreat from Central Europe, the Ottomans' perception about the new balances starts to change at the same time they have to recognise the European's influence in their own territory (Losano, 2009: 10). As Quataert (2000: 60) alerts, the territorial losses that resulted from the consecutive defeats could have been even worse, but as the Europeans were rival between each other, they did not want that other peers from the continent would increase their power considerably by Appendixing Ottoman domains, what ended up by benefiting the sultan's territories.

In the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire was, therefore, the “sick man of Europe” and the elites began to think how it was possible to solve its problems and to avoid the ruin of the empire. They envisaged the solution: if Europe was succeeding (in military, economic and cultural terms), then it would be profitable if the empire followed the European example. Thus, from that moment onwards, the “Ottoman Empire chose to be bound by the rules of the European state system” (Stivachtis, 2008: 27) – and it is precisely because of this new condition and the Ottomans' self-awareness of that, that the end of the seventeenth century means a rupture with the traditional posture of the *Sublime Door*. The idea of civilisational superiority is left aside and

Europe is looked upon as the model from which to import new ideas and new ways of doing things. Interestingly enough, however, is that the lower the Ottoman self-esteem, the more Europe felt a sense of superiority that reinforced its unity (Stivachtis, 2008: 27).

Here one can find the first steps the Ottomans took towards their approximation to the European patterns – one can actually say that this stage marked the first attempts to europeanise, as a set of measures and reforms began to be undertaken by the Sultans in order to achieve that aim. However, as Isabel David (2012: 76) emphasises, this implied an “imposition of reforms to the society in a top-down process, demanding a great effort that originated deep gaps in the Ottoman society”.

The period of reforms that began in the eighteenth century was already scrutinised in the previous chapter – the reforms began with Sultan Selim III (who ruled between 1789 and 1807) and were pursued by his successors (with the exception of some breaks in-between) until the *Tanzimat* period begins in 1839. This period is of special relevance for what happened in this phase (described on chapter 6) constituted a reorganisation (literally, the meaning of the Ottoman name of the period) in the European sense, i.e., following the European model and standards: the army, the penal code, science, technology, state bureaucracy, etc. were objects of more or less deep reforms that aimed to trigger the development of the Empire and, ultimately, to safeguard it from extinction. The first Constitution and the first Parliament were created at this time and, therefore, one can retrospectively picture very incipient forms of both westernisation/modernisation/europeanisation and, more specifically, democratisation. Turkey (or the Ottoman Empire) met the West at this phase in a different way it had met it in the previous centuries; the technical, cultural or other exchanges (although they were not reciprocal) were different from the political or trade cooperation or confrontation that marked the period before the seventeenth century. Values and principles were imported – methods and technologies, equality between all men, etc. (Quataert, 2000: 86-89) –, but even the Western life-style was copied by the Ottoman elites who initiated a phase of a real enthusiasm (or even obsession, as it was quoted in the previous chapter) namely “reflected in the importation of goods that represented the Western life-style, such as sofas and chairs that replaced traditional furniture, trousers and dresses, the artists” (David, 2012: 84-85), and so on and so forth.

These “profound changes reflected something more than the willingness to avoid the decline of the Empire. Instead, they revealed the bureaucratic elite’s fascination for the Western culture, in a fundamental change of mentality, based upon the recognition of the Ottoman’s inferiority that did not happen, however, among the masses, separated from the elites by high rates of illiteracy and by the distance from the big cultural centres, sticking to tradition” (Idem: 102).

At a more political level, the ideals of Liberalism and democracy were imported from the French Revolution and although sultans and grand-viziers were very keen on importing European knowledge and technology, they were, understandably, reluctant to the liberal and democratic ideas. However, when importing the Western education, they were unexpectedly seeding the dissemination of Western ideas, including Liberalism and democracy (Dodd, 1992: 17). In that context, in 1839, an important advisory council started to work with free speech and majority vote, in 1868 was created a State Council very similar to the French model and in 1876 a limited in power but with very lively debates Parliament takes place and starts to operate under an also new Constitution (Idem: 17). These were small but important steps towards a democratic regime, as they may have started to develop some awareness about this regime, even though it was not shared at a great extent by the masses. Yet, and due to the decrease in the Ottomans’ self-confidence, the importation of these (and other) structures meant that “during the first half of the nineteenth century, the impact of Europe on the Ottoman Empire was profound and overwhelming” (Stivachtis, 2008: 29).

At the end of the nineteenth century, the Sultan closes the Parliament in an attempt to control the dissemination of nationalist ideology that had been being spread in the empire by the Christian Ottomans (Mango, 2005: 10). This was a real problem the empire had to deal with – and, ironically, a problem imported from Europe, as well. From Europe had also come in 1856 an effort to avoid the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire through its inclusion in the Concert of Europe⁷¹, because already at that time there had been several internal upheavals and independence movements (many of them supported by European states) (Quataert, 2000: 78-80). However, to be included in the Concert, the empire was asked to make some internal reforms, which is a demand that reminds the conditionality policy of the European Union, if one tries to make a

⁷¹ “While being admitted into the European Concert, the Ottoman Empire did not achieve equal legal status until 1923, when the Treaty of Lausanne abolished the unequal treaties that the Europeans had imposed on the Ottoman Empire. Meanwhile, the European states demanded changes to conform further to European standards. The result was a series of long-run reforms that enabled the Ottoman state to modernize and attain the standards set by the European powers” (Stivachtis, 2008: 29).

parallelism between both situations – and this comparison seems unavoidable. The Paris Agreement recognised the importance of those reforms and ensured the integrity of the empire (Stivachtis, 2008: 29), but was perceived as a foreign imposition (the parallelism could be extended here) and led to a failed attempt to overthrow the sultan. Europeans were, in fact, afraid of Russia's intention to dismember the empire; in that case, the possible gain of the Russians led the Europeans to provide help and to contribute to the Ottomans' integrity.

The modernisation efforts mentioned earlier were not welcomed equally by all the elite's groups. Young Ottomans, for example, wanted it, but as long as traditional Islamic values were also respected and applied. The 1908 revolution ("the French Revolution of the East") revealed some more open dynamics and its perpetrators constituted a nationalist, secularist and modernist generation (Losano, 2009: 15), i.e., a generation really close to its European equivalents, who also stood for these values. The Parliament reopens four decades after it had been closed by the Sultan and it was composed of 288 deputies that represented the structure of the Ottoman society: 147 Turks, 16 Greeks, 60 Arabs, 14 Armenians, 27 Albanians and 4 Hebrews (Idem: 16). It is interesting to notice how there was an attempt to follow the democratic principle of representativeness and its meaning for the several ethnicities or nationalities that inhabited the empire back then. Yet, the Young Turks' liberalisation efforts, due to internal reasons, had to be abandoned and the Empire entered a period of quasi-dictatorship (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 24). These and other internal dynamics and the defeat in the First World War triggered the end of the Ottoman Empire, as written on chapter 6.

All the centuries covered very briefly on the last pages constitute a set of events, changes, reforms and volt-faces that marked the evolution of the Ottoman Empire since its beginning. As it was hopefully proved, the contacts between Turkey and the West, more precisely Europe, have not begun in the twentieth century when the country is established as the modern Republic as it is known today; Turkey, through its imperial past, met the West and had with it very diverse, complex and more or less friendly dynamics, creating important flows that would mark the history and development of Europe, but mainly of Turkey – both negatively (the prejudices and the negative images of an identity built from the 'otherisation' of the Turk) and positively (thanks to the

imports of technology and knowledge and improved the empire and the country's socio-economic, as well as political, standards.

7.1.2. Turkish Republic: since the foundation to the 1950s

The leading figure of the creation and first developments of the Turkish Modern Republic is indisputably Mustafa Kemal Atatürk; maybe nobody else in Turkey's history does embody so well the spirit of the country's transformation. As explained in the previous chapter, Kemal was inspired by the European values and the French revolution, the nationalist wave of the nineteenth century and by the European progress at the technical and scientific levels. In order to apply this ideology to his own country, he had to break with the past, that is, Mustafa Kemal had to eliminate the Ottoman influences and hence one of his doctrine's principles was reformism. This reformism would be achieved through the implementation of Western-inspired measures to change and adapt the country's political, cultural and economic structures.

These constituted important steps towards Turkey's modernisation in the European/ Western sense even though several authors frame this phase as a continuation of the Westernisation efforts that already came from the Tanzimat period: Burdy and Marcou (2008: 33) consider that Kemalism is not a "revolutionary rupture" but the "continuation of a century of the Ottoman elites willingness to democratise". Dodd (1992: 17) also agrees that Atatürk inherited the Ottoman tradition of modernisation, but enlightens that that tradition was "insufficiently radical for him", as he preferred a faster rate of reforms, without the religious participation in the state institutions and a liberal democratic system (Idem: 17).

The abolition of the caliphate and the sultanate, the gathering of the National Assembly, the introduction of the Latin alphabet, the wide set of secularist reforms, the Codes inspired in the European models, etc. were several measures already quoted on chapter 6 and that marked the beginning and the following development of this phase that led to a more or less genuine transformation of the society during the first half of the twentieth century. It is important to emphasise, nevertheless, two main fields in which these changes are particularly controversial. The first is religion. One of the central principles of the Kemalist doctrine was secularism, but even Atatürk realised

how crucial religion was to unite Turks; in such a multi-ethnic country, religion was the key to many problems, the so-called “social cement” of the country. Therefore, religion was tried to be apart from the state, but Islam was introduced as part of what was considered being a Turk, which originated an innovative approach to the religion, the “Turkish-Islamic synthesis”.

The second field is democracy. In this period, Turkey met the West through the hands and action of Mustafa Kemal. However,

“Atatürk wanted radical change first, and democracy only after Turks had come to realize, through his party’s leadership and education, their true role as patriotic citizens. Atatürk’s idea of democracy was essentially idealist, and required acceptance of the need revolution first” (Idem: 18).

Thus, in the mind of the Turkish President, in order to implement the changes necessary to approach the civilisation Kemal was inspired by (which included democracy), he had to adopt (or at least he opted for adopting) a dictatorial style. This question is not consensual, as one may wonder whether he had to because it would be impossible to modernise otherwise or, if it had to be imposed, it would mean the population was not ready or did not want to change. In this latter case, it would imply that this constituted a top-down imposition only successfully achieved at the formal level and not truly internalised by the population, just forced by the elites.⁷² It is possible to affirm that Mustafa Kemal, considering his democratic intentions were authentic, used undemocratic tools to achieve a democratic end, which raises several ethical and political questions.⁷³

In this context, it is not difficult to realise that, despite the attempts to modernise and europeanise, democracy was not a concern at the beginning of the Republic: the inexistence of political parties and opposition, the single-party system, a high concentration of powers by the executive, some control of the press and other signals showed how deficient this regime was in terms of democratic standards. It seems that the price to pay for achieving the civilisational standards of the Western communities was this lack of democratic quality. The first Constitution (1924) was pretty authoritarian and did not foresee the necessary institutional balances for a healthy and

⁷² For example, in 6.2.1. *Kemal and Kemalism*, it is already stated the opposition between the opinions of Losano (2009: 26) and Marc & Burdy (2008: 35) regarding this subject.

⁷³ The military, during their political interventions, also played this type of paradoxical game. Cf Chapter 8.

balanced democracy. As Burdy and Marcou (2009: 35) write, “the Republic was not synonymous with liberal democracy”.

Both aspects (religion and democracy) reveal that there is an opposition between what the Kemalist regime claims to be theoretically and what it really is – being a secular state but using Islam to unify its citizens and aiming to achieve democracy while using undemocratic means. In fact, this reveals that the importation of Western institutions and practices, such as secularism, human rights and democracy, did not take into account that those concepts are embedded in a broader context that includes the meanings and perceptions attributed to them by the population that has built them over the centuries, resulting in the creation of a regime with fragile foundations (David, 2012: 138). Yet, Mario Losano (2009: 28) believes that several measures meant more than just their formal adoption, comprising some deepness in terms of infiltration or dissemination at the societal level.

Ironically, with the death of Atatürk and his replacement by İsmet İnönü, the country takes a really important step towards democratisation when the new President introduced the multi-party system, enabling the creation of political parties and of truly democratic elections that take the Democratic Party to power for the whole decade of 1950s. This change in the political scenario brought a different style of governing and naturally some policies’ changes, namely and mainly in the realm of religion, introducing some revivalism and a great amount of populist measures, in part responsible for the military intervention of 1960.

After the foundation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, the policy of Westernisation or Europeanisation reflected into a set of measures and reforms that aimed to promote the rapprochement of the country with Europe and to modernise it. However, it was not until the end of the 1950s that Turkey really started to embrace this approach to Europe in a more systematic, or at least more formal, way: in 1959, Turkey asks for associate membership to the then European Economic Community.

7.2. Institutionalised relations: Turkey and the EU (1959-1999)

In a seminal work published in 2009, Atila Eralp (2009) analysed Turkey-EU relations through the introduction of two not often used factors: temporality and interaction. The author considered these variables important to explicate the “cyclical nature” (Idem: 150) of those relations. In this context, he divided them into four periods. The first, named “harmony in the relationship”, encompassed the phase between 1959 and 1970 and represented a positive moment, marked by Turkey’s alliance with the West and by the elites’ support who envisaged this approach in a “broader civilizational context”. Besides, at this point, nobody would question the country’s cultural and religious differences (Idem: 151-152).

According to Burdy and Marcou (2008: 93), even before the 1957 Rome Treaty did Turkey want to participate in the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC). Therefore, in 1959 Turkey applied for associate membership of the EEC. However, the following year brought the military *coup* which was, nevertheless, not responsible for worsening the relations between the two parts, as in 1961 a new (and more liberal and democratic) Constitution is approved and the power returns to the hands of civilians. Possibly, this democratic improvement may have influenced the next step: the signature of the Association Agreement (also known as the Ankara Agreement) in 1963, as well as the first Financial Protocol. The first document foresaw the constitution of a customs union and full EEC membership.

After a positive decade, the end of the 1960s raises some difficulties to Turkey-EEC relations. Despite the 1970 approval of an Additional Protocol and the second Financial Protocol, the Turkish government was not satisfied yet (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 27). In the same year happens another military intervention that began to worry the European Community (EC) due to the political instability of the country. This is one of the reasons why Atila Eralp called this new period (1970-1999), the “emergent discord” (Eralp, 2009: 153), as both domestic and international contexts were not favourable to the positive development of the relations. The military *coup* was one of the events, but not the only; problems in international economic relations (oil crises), the EC’s growing divergences with the USA regarding political and economic issues and the lack of consensus on Turkey’s European vocation fostered a less enthusiastic environment (Idem: 153). At the internal level, economic problems, Cyprus invasion in

1974 and new political tendencies against Turkey's relations with the West completed the darker picture. A pro-Islamic party, the MSP, claimed the EC was a Christian Club and proposed an "Islamic Community"; at the same time, Turkey interpreted the European insistence on democracy and Human Rights' issues as interference in internal affairs and the rest of the century was marked by a growing distance between Turkey and Europe (Idem: 154-156).

The 1980s were still problematic – the third military *coup* in a thirty-year period worsened the European perception towards the country's political instability and lack of democratic maturity. Therefore, relations were frozen until the mid-1980s. The European Commission and the European Parliament were worried about democracy and Human Rights; and the member-states' Ministers for Foreign Affairs also voiced their concerns, but were convinced that democracy would be established soon and, therefore, did not suspend the Association Agreement nor the Fourth Financial Protocol (Dagi, 1996: 129). As Dagi wrote,

“the EC's mild initial attitude can be attributed to uncertainties about the policies of the new regime in Ankara. Thus, the Community adopted a policy of wait and see. They also did not want to alienate the new regime immediately after the coup and push it away from the sphere of influence of the European Community” (Idem: 129).

This opinion reveals a very important fact: the EC already in the 1980s was trying to maintain the country under its leverage power, namely in terms of promoting or helping improving its democracy.

However, in 1981 a first more serious warning came from the European Parliament which adopted a resolution, demanding the restoration of democracy within two months and threatening with consequences. Even harsher was the position of the Socialists who asked for the suspension of the Association Agreement (Idem: 129), but which did not come to happen. In May 1981, the EC and Turkey agreed on a draft of the fourth financial protocol and the Turkish Ambassador declared the government was ready to accelerate the internal changes to become a candidate as soon as democracy was re-established. In June, the Protocol was prepared and increased in 94% the help for Turkey; nonetheless, this contribution would only be given according to the democratic developments in the country (Idem: 130). This promise was kept and, after criticising the lack of advancements in Turkey and the still very tough measures adopted by the military regime, the Commission decided not to resume the discussions for the

application of the fourth Protocol. Turkey became more and more politically isolated in Europe (Idem: 131).

In 1982 came an attempt of rapprochement. The 10 Ministers for Foreign Affairs decided to send a mission to Turkey, mainly to discuss the subjects of democracy and Human Rights. The country's authorities ensure the EC they would return to democracy within two years. Moreover, a new Constitution was approved in a referendum and general elections were scheduled for November 1983. Yet, the request to give green light to the fourth Protocol did not succeed among the European institutions, which believed their interference in domestic politics was legitimate, since Turkey was applying for full membership of the Community (Idem: 131-132). In April 1981, the President of the European Parliament visited Turkey and his report concluded that it was not necessary remove the country's status as candidate to accession, but that the discussions and negotiations needed to continue. Some other diplomatic movements made both parts impatient regarding the whole process and there had been an increasing pressure on Turkey to improve its democratic and Human Rights' standards – that pressure came from the European Community, but also from other major international organisations, such as the Council of Europe and the Amnesty International (Idem: 133-137).

As Dagi concluded, Turkey was not capable of escaping this pressure which had its effects. General Evren appeared to be pretty anxious not to seem submissive to the EC's influence, but

“this oversensitivity is also a sign that European pressure was there and influencing his decisions, or at least that he had the European response in mind when he made decisions. (...) The argument, therefore, is that in the absence of any significant popular demand for a speedy return to civilian rule at the home front, a very important factor was the international-European environment and pressures from it. (...) the present danger of losing the gains and the accumulations of two hundred years constituted a long-term thinking that was behind the Generals' decision to return to democracy” (Idem: 140-141).

It is interesting to observe, thus, that the European presence was already felt in Turkey at the end of the twentieth century and even more revealing is Dagi's last conclusion regarding the role of a European Community whose leverage capacity over Turkey was rather limited due to the lack of mechanisms of conditionality and other tools it had, in the meanwhile, developed.

Even despite all these conundrums, Turgut Özal decided to apply for full membership in 1987. The answer came two years and a half later and brought a “*non courtois*” (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 94), blaming the country’s economic and political situation for its unpreparedness and the subsequent refusal. Besides, there were also other issues that concerned some European countries, such as the access of Turkish labour force to the European market, the Cypriot problem and the fresh enlargement of the Mediterranean countries (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 31). This European stance and the collapse of the Soviet Union that ended a strategically important Cold War for Turkey created a new international context in which the EC began to be more focused on the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) that had just come from the Communist influence rather than on the Turkish application. The opinions on Turks’ reaction to this response are divided: Eralp (2009: 157) wrote that it originated a feeling of resentment; on the other hand, Ali Usul (2011: 77) the Commission’s report seemed, in a vague way, to accept the country’s eligibility for membership if it would undergo further reforms, creating an “overwhelming optimistic reaction to the report”. Nevertheless, according to Özal’s speech in September 1989, Turkey was ready to implement the reforms needed to improve its conditions (Usul, 2011: 76).

Whether Turks in general were optimistic or not, the fact is that the 1990s did not show sound developments in Turkey-EU relations. In June 1990, the European Commission proposed a package of economic and political measures to be implemented by Turkey in order to overcome the stalled situation of Turkey-EU relations, but it was rejected by the Greek veto and it could not come into effect (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 31). In spite of this obstacle, the negotiations for the Customs Union were being developed; they were, however, very slow: the EU demanded several changes to Turkey’s legislation (and Turkey asked for more money to concretise them) and there were political problems (like the detention of Kurdish deputies) that the EU wanted to be solved. In that context, the Turkish Parliament adopted a set of Constitutional amendments (namely the mandatory amendment of the Article 8 on the Anti-Terror Law, that was a sensitive issue, but a *sine qua non* condition for the European Parliament’s ratification) that convinced the European institutions.⁷⁴ The Customs Union was finally reached, coming into force in 1996 (Idem: 35-36; Usul, 2011: 80).

⁷⁴ The Greek blockage was overcome by the guarantee that Cyprus would be offered full membership (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 36).

This was a fundamental step for Turkey to come closer to the European Union. However, the following years were full of setbacks that shook the relations between the two: in 1997, from a meeting of EU foreign ministers came a consensus decision that shocked Turks: “Turkey is not a candidate to become a member of the European Union, short term or long” (*cited in* Usul, 2011: 81) for civilisational reasons. The weight of this communication should not be undervalued, as important individuals took part in this meeting (Kohl, Aznar and Prodi) and also because it re-agitated the waters of the “clash of civilisations” – the Christian club that would not allow a Muslim country to join. Some months later, EU President, Jacques Poos, declared in Ankara that accession would depend on solving one of the most sensitive problems in the country – the Kurdish issue (*Idem*: 81-82). Furthermore, and according to the Agenda 2000, adopted in 1997 as well, Turkey was not ready yet due to political and socio-economic problems that the document listed and among which one could find the macroeconomic instability, taxation system, state of agriculture and social security, the lack of freedom of expression, conflicts Greece and Cyprus, civil-military relations, etc. (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 36). And finally, at the end of that same year, the Luxembourg Summit did not include Turkey in the group of countries to accede in the next round of enlargements and that would not happen in the foreseeable future. In the following day, the Turkish government freezes the political relations with the Union and 1998 revealed to be a particularly difficult year for Turkey’s relations not only with the Union, but also with several individual countries (*Idem*: 37; Usul, 2011: 82-83).

The same summit had decided to write annual progress reports on Turkey and the first document of this type divulged a set of problems that needed to be tackled by the country if it really wanted to join the Union, namely: lack of fair trials, slowness of the judicial process, judges’ impartiality, the role of the National Security Council, problems with the freedom of expression, women’s status in the Civil Code, discrimination of non-Sunnis, the non-recognition of Kurds as a minority, Cyprus question, economy, corruption, clientelism, etc. (David, 2012: 195-196). Thus, Turkey had ahead a very long path to go through in order to meet all these (and other) demands and expectations on the Turkish side were rather low concerning their successful adoption and implementation and even lower when thinking about the final aim of membership.

Nonetheless, the country approved in 1999 the fourth Constitutional Amendment Package with several important reforms and the 1999 Helsinki Summit reached a not expected decision, accepting Turkey as a candidate country, since the country was regarded as having fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria. Faucompret and Konings (2008: 38) establish another causal link to justify this twist in the European position; according to these authors, the enlargement to the CEECs implied its acceptance as NATO members, which would be very naturally blocked by Turkey – already a member. Therefore, if the European Union wanted to have its candidates as NATO members, it had to convince Turkey to allow their accession. In return, Germany, Austria and Greece would give up their blockage and Turkey would become a candidate to full membership, what actually happened in 1999. This new status granted Turkey a set of new tools and mechanisms to help its development, such as a Pre-Accession Partnership, enhanced political dialogue, the country's participation in European programmes and agencies, etc. (Idem: 39).

Thus, it seemed that the difficult decades that ended the twentieth century saw a meaningful U-turn in Turkey-EU relations and in the country's approximation to Europe. As a matter of fact, the "emergent discord" phase terminates here and gives its place to a brand new era of a "positive turn", using the same time division proposed above (Eralp, 2009: 157). As this new phase coincides with the beginning of the period this work aims to study more carefully, the dynamics since 1999 will be thoroughly analysed in the fourth and last part of the thesis. Yet, it seems relevant to mention Ali Usul (2011: 89-92) considerations regarding the influence of the European Union on Turkey in the pre-Helsinki period. According to the author, the European pressure had little success, as Turkey had, before that, a very vague and confusing condition and it is membership (or the perception of achieving it in the future) that constitutes an effective triggering factor for political transformation. Besides, there were no monitoring mechanisms, EU's criticisms were "sporadic and non-systematic" and the country's legal reforms were "insubstantial and not enough" (Idem: 90). As the same author concludes,

"the EU (...) did not become an anchor for Turkey's democratization during this period [before the Helsinki summit]. Turkey's aspiration for EU membership did not receive a clear response from the Community. Its position vis-à-vis Turkey's application for membership remained vague. (...) [However,] providing a full membership perspective to Turkey represented a paradigmatic change

in relations and thus the EU really began to function as a leverage to promote democracy in Turkey” (Idem: 98-99).

It is precisely this premise that the current work seeks to study and assess. Since 1999, Turkey became an official candidate for membership and this incentive is supposed to have encouraged further reforms in the country to approximate it to the European patterns. This hypothesis will be under scrutiny in Part IV. For now, Turkey will continue to be the object of the attention of this thesis as a case study.

7.3. A long learning process

The relations between Europe and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey until 1999 were, one can say, *ad hoc*. It was only when the Ottoman Empire perceived to be under the threat of disintegration that it decided to come closer to the block of countries that were better succeed. Following that logic, the Ottoman elite started to import and imitate the technologies, the knowledge and the life-style of a wealthy Europe. When the empire collapsed, the establishment of modern Turkey by Mustafa Kemal was based on a set of principles whose application aimed to develop the country, having as background the Western/European civilisation model. And then, Turkey progressively became closer to Europe and even started to engage in its organisations and institutions. The application for association membership and even for full membership reveal the country’s intention to formalise these relations, to make them more systematic and, after all, to be part *of* Europe.

This thesis aims to understand, among other objectives, to what extent the European Union influenced the Turkish democratisation process between 1999 and 2009. However, it would be rather reductionist to limit the relations between the two, as they date back to the formation of the Empire Ottoman itself. It is in this intersection of conflict and cooperation that a synthesis of the relations can be found, even though they were not formalised or institutionalised – it is true that the request for membership is a form of institutionalisation of the relations, and the European Union had been present at that times, as well, but it is also undeniable that its leverage power and the intensity of those interactions are much higher in the post-Helsinki era, as, from that moment, the EU presents a strategy for the country with mechanisms and tools to accompany Turkey’s development both in terms of funding and of monitoring.

It is, therefore, possible to envisage an evolution in the interactions between Europe and Turkey since the expansion of the Ottoman Empire. In other words, one can postulate that Turks began to want to be part of the European international system and then developed towards integrating in the European international society. This is a conceptual distinction made by Hedley Bull that fits this case study; according to the author, an international system consists of “two or more state [that] have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another’s decisions, to cause them to behave as parts of a whole” (Bull *cited in* Stivachtis, 2008: 18); on the other hand, an international society implies other requisites: “when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations within one another, and share in the working of common institutions” (Idem: 18). As Stivachtis (2008: 19) infers, the European Union represents a homogenous international society within a broader heterogeneous European international system. Therefore, the enlargement process means transforming the heterogeneous system “into a more homogeneous regional European international society” (Idem: 19). When it comes to Turkey, and since its European nature is not questioned, it is not difficult to perceive this evolution in the history presented on the last pages. In fact, after belonging to this international system, Turkey has been making the necessary changes to align with the European principles and values and, in that way, to share a common set of rules and institutions.

As it happens with individuals that need to learn the rules of the society they are embedded in through a process of socialisation, states, in this situation, also undergo through that same process. Interacting with other states in joint programmes or exchanges in the most varied fields promote closer links between the parts involved and help shape the countries’ identities and preferences in the sense that, although frequently the learning process is not conscious, they are object of the action of other peers. As it is written on chapter 4, socialisation results from the more or less long and intense interaction between different societies, fostering the absorption of models, values, institutions, principles, lifestyles, etc. Usually, this mechanism takes place when there are concrete projects that unite the two societies and Turkey’s history narrated earlier provides several examples of that, such as the European experts that went to Istanbul to help modernise the army, the state bureaucracy and education, and the

diplomats and other Ottomans who went to Europe to study and learn foreign languages and the Western scientific developments. In fact, besides the migratory movements, namely from the Balkans to Istanbul, the Ottoman Empire and Turkey also hosted several refugees and exiles. Two examples of how Europeans shaped the empire or the country with their presence, at the same time they were also influenced by Ottomans or Turks, are the Jews who fled from the Iberian Peninsula around 1492 because of the Catholic *Reconquista* and the over thousand Jews and non-Jews that sought for asylum in Turkey to flee from Nazi Germany. The latter were responsible for the development of several universities and several of them – philosophers, jurists, scientists, economists,... – received the Turkish nationality (Burdy & Marcou, 2008: 139).

As the same authors explain, the more recent Turkish emigration to Europe has a two-side impact: besides the sometimes negative perception about Turks it creates at the hosting country and the also very visible remittances, the “come-and-goes between the European Union and the motherland promote the diffusion of reference norms or of the behaviours of the host country. These migration movements are, therefore, an element of social and cultural change in Turkey” (Idem: 142-143). These flows of people and, coupled with them, of ideas and renewed perceptions are of utmost importance for the socialisation process of an entire group or nation, as they start to be spread by some of their members and, possibly, reach the rest of the society. More interestingly, a study conducted in thirty-two Muslim communities around the world about their position regarding democracy concluded that

“in almost all cases Muslims who lived in a democratic country for a year or more were supportive of both democratic institutions and democratic norms than were Muslims who had never enjoyed this experience. This result indicates that travel and living in a democracy are among the most, if not the most, influential agents of democratic socialization” (Fattah, 2006: 52).

These moments and flows, that began in the Ottoman period and continued over the centuries more or less intensively, can be described as incipient forms of europeanisation – in the cases they are related to interchanges with the European continent, naturally. Recalling Radaelli’s (2000: 4) definition, what was described above were

“processes of construction, diffusion and institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’ and shared beliefs and norms which are (...) incorporated

in the logic of domestic discourse, identities, political structures and public policies”.

Obviously, it is only since 1959 (and even more systematically since 1999) that one may refer to the role of the EEC/EC/EU as a source of formal directives to be adopted by Turkey; however, if europeanisation is here understood in its *lato sensu*, one cannot disagree that the diffusion and domestic incorporation of European values, procedures, knowledge, etc. have been happening for centuries.

Europe has been working for Turkey as its “norm entrepreneur” (Börzel & Soyaltin, 2012: 9) that socialises the domestic actor through persuasion and learning mechanisms that take time. Besides, there are several conditions that facilitate or hamper domestic change; one of them, according to the same authors (Idem: 11-13) are power asymmetries – if the country has much to gain, the institution’s influence will be higher, for example. In the case of Turkey, belonging to the Concert of Europe, avoiding the disintegration of the empire, creating a secular Republic and achieving the international recognition as a full member of the European Union are gains that, over time, triggered the reforms. In the last part, it will be assessed how powerful the incentives are these days and if they are powerful enough to induce change and improve the country’s recent democracy.

8. A socio-cultural profile

After having analysed the construction of Modern Turkey and the role the West played in those internal dynamics, a broad overview of the twenty-first century Turkey is needed to complete this approach to the case study, in order to proceed to the following and last part, in which all the knowledge gathered so far will be applied to find the answers to the initial questions. This chapter aims to provide the general landscape of current Turkey in its social and cultural dimensions mostly; given the wideness and complexity of the subject, as well as the distribution and weight of the chapters, this will be an analysis that will only touch upon the main issues according to the literature, to the opinions of the interviewees and to the scope of this thesis.

Besides, and also due to the importance attributed to the ideational factors by Social Constructivism, it seemed appropriate to highlight those aspects to better understand this reality. In fact, the perceptions and perspectives offered by the Turkish interviewees constitute a very relevant contribution to the study of the country's internal dynamics. Recalling the debate on the internal/external dimensions of the sources of democratisation, and as the conclusions pointed towards a process whose external influences are contextualised internally, deepening the knowledge on those internal phenomena comes out as a natural consequence. Furthermore, only when that internal side is acknowledged, is it more feasible to isolate, as much as these interconnected dimensions allow, the domestic and international dynamics from each other. And as Campbell (2010: 216) recognises, the politics of identity is fundamental to understand global affairs.

Samuel Huntington's (2002) thesis of the *Clash of Civilizations*⁷⁵ is worldwide known and cited as a theoretical model to comprehend international events. According to this work, "culture and cultural identities, which at the broadest level are civilization identities, are shaping the patterns of cohesion, disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world" (Idem: 20). Therefore, and in line with this statement, culture and identity emerge as two of the key concepts of global politics after the Cold War. For Huntington (Idem: 21), the most important distinctions between peoples are not

⁷⁵ As the author explains, this book resulted as the development of an initial thesis constructed in a *Foreign Affairs*' 1999 article.

political, ideological or economic anymore, but rather based on culture and, therefore, they tend to group with (and struggle against) each other in terms of civilisation⁷⁶:

“A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have (...). It is defined by common objective elements such as language, history, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people” (Idem: 43).

Having this definition in mind, the current chapter will somehow follow its components and apply them to the study of Turkey: language, history (and also territory), religion, customs, institutions and self-identification will be therefore included in the structure of this chapter and more or less deeply developed on the following pages.

8.1. Culture and identity

Democratic consolidation is not only about adopting formal rules and institutions. It is also, as written on Chapter 3, about democratic values being internalised by the citizens' mind-sets and practices, so that this society is committed to maintain the new regime.

Culture, in very broad terms, can be defined as everything produced by human action; in that sense, it is the opposite of nature. Woodward (2002: 31) gives the example of food: nature provides men⁷⁷ with food, but its consumption varies according to the cultural context someone is embedded in. The way food is prepared and eaten depends on that specific society's gastronomic traditions and the social status, for example. Therefore, according to the author, cooking is a way of transforming nature into culture.

Thus, and as culture embraces all kinds of human production, several assumptions can be deduced: first, through culture, men organise reality; second, it takes us to the Constructivist conception that “materiality always signifies something

⁷⁶ In fact, although the value of Huntington's thesis is recognised and the importance the author attributes to culture and identity to analyse international events, we tend to disagree with the way he develops his arguments and the conclusions drawn from them, according to which the division of this multi-civilisational world in cultural lines leads to a clash between those entities.

⁷⁷ The word “men” is, in this context, used as a synonym with human being, including both male and female genders.

that goes beyond itself” (Santos, 2007: 112) – an object is a physical material differently perceived and used by different communities. In other words, the material world is more than its tangibility. A certain reality or phenomenon (for example, the role of the Armed Forces in Turkish democracy) is perceived differently depending on the person who is judging it, because the tools they were given to interpret the world make them understand it in a way or another. But this perception and the relation I-world are not unchangeable, according to this perspective. On the contrary, it is a continuous, dynamic and complex process that is developed in the interaction with the others. In a more systematic and deeper form, during the socialisation process, the individual acquires a symbolic code that will frame his vision of the world (his *Weltanschauung*) from the above mentioned interaction with the society he is embedded in. As Dubar (1997: 31) explains, this process is interactive and encompasses permanent renegotiations and adaptations, as the individual progressively develops his representation of the world: socialisation constitutes the “gradual and slow construction of a symbolic code that (...) constitutes (...) a system of reference and assessment of the real that allows [the individual] to behave in a certain manner in a given situation”. In principle, the group’s attitudes are assumed as one’s attitudes and will tend to guide one’s behaviour more or less consciously. Third, culture becomes fundamental to produce meaning and reproduce social relations, embodying therefore the role as responsible for the maintenance of social order (Woodward, 2002: 31, 33; Santos, 2007: 112).

Paula Santos (2007: 113-115) selected a set of attributes to culture: territory, language and blood. In that sense, she linked these three realities with the distinction character of each culture. Territory is the variable that links the individual with the place; usually this relation entails a feeling of belonging and possession. In the case of Turkey, the appeal of Mustafa Kemal for recovering the sovereignty over the territory they had lost triggered a nationalist response against the occupiers, for example. Language is obviously related to the specificity of the communication between the members of the group and one of the strongest markers of identity as it implies a socialisation process in which these symbols are shared. Finally, blood represents the human body and the symbolic cultural value of a biological object.

Given all these attributes and the strength of culture in the post-Cold War era, Huntington chose the broadest cultural units – civilisations – to understand global

politics and his arguments are really strong in that realm, as he states that “cultural identity is what is most meaningful to most people” (Huntington, 2002: 20) and therefore global affairs are constrained by these divisions of a multi-civilisational world. Civilisation and culture are a people’s way of life and includes their values, norms, institutions and so on (Idem: 42). Besides, what is also interesting in this approach is that the author recognises that cultural identities can be redefined and the composition of civilisations changes over time, as well as the fact that they are not political entities (Idem: 43, 44).

The West has been one of the most powerful civilisations for the last centuries; it was able to develop and modernise, mainly since the eighteenth century, and to become a powerful organisation ever since. But, in addition to its modernisation (in terms of education, wealth, technology, etc.), the West kept its core values and principles that existed way before the modernisation: the classical legacy, Catholicism and Protestantism, the separation of spiritual and temporal authorities, the rule of law, individualism, social pluralism and representativeness (Idem: 68-71). In fact, this distinction is important to highlight that the modernisation and westernisation of non-Western societies due to the expansion of the West are two separate things. Subsequently, it is possible to find three reactions to the Western impact, according to Huntington (Idem: 72-76): refusing both modernisation and westernisation (rejectionism); accepting both (Kemalism); and embracing modernisation but not westernisation (reformism). These three dynamics are truly relevant for understanding a wide range of phenomena in international relations.

Obviously, Turkey (and the name attributed to the dimension is quite revealing) epitomises the Kemalist approach: the country, under the rule of Atatürk, sought to modernise and westernise. However, that strategy, for Huntington, failed and originated a torn country: “a society which was Muslim in its religion, heritage, customs, and institutions but with a ruling elite determined to make it a modern, Western (...) [through] the difficult and traumatic task of destroying a culture that has existed for centuries” (Idem: 74).

It is evident that Huntington does not believe in the success of the Turkish movement from one civilisation (the Islamic) to another (the Western). He presents, before explaining the Turkish case, the three requirements for this dynamic to occur successfully: the support of the elites, the support (or at least the acquiescence) of the

citizens and the willingness of the host civilisation to accept the new comers (Idem: 139). In Huntington's view, Atatürk's attempt to modernise and westernise Turkish society – and subsequently to avoid all the Ottoman and Muslim roots – was criticised by Muslim and Arab countries, and also not truthfully welcomed by the hosts. The latter were the weakness of the whole process, since the “elites of the recipient, Western civilization were not receptive” (Idem: 148-149), despite the internal support both from the elites and the general citizens.

“Turkish leaders regularly described their country as a ‘bridge’ between cultures. (...) A bridge, however, is an artificial creation connecting to solid entities but is part of neither. When Turkey's leaders term their country as a bridge, they euphemistically confirm that it is torn” (Idem: 149).

From this hard comment on that so-used metaphor, it remains implicit that the artificial linkage is religion. Turkey, as belonging to the Muslim civilisation, is incompatible with the West and will never belong to that other group, according to this view. However, as Bütke and Gençer (2009: 12) stress, this does not have to be an obstacle, for Bulgaria, Greece and Cyprus belong to another civilisation (the Orthodox, in Huntington's division) and they are still part of the European Union. Moreover, Greece's religion was used as well in the 1970s to impede its integration and these days nobody notices that difference. Therefore, this division or even the artificiality of the Turkish bridge is not so linear and straightforward and it is here that the theory of the clash of civilisations may fail: the integration of a Muslim country in a Western organisation can only prove that cooperation is a feasible reality between different civilisations and that a closer relationship would improve the quantity and quality of the interactions between the two peoples, providing a sounding example to other countries and to the perspective of the inter-civilisation dialogue.

Yet, there is a phenomenon that needs to be taken into consideration and that may aggravate an already fragile balance between Turkey and the EU – or even the Islamic and the Western civilisations in general – and that is the resurgence of national identities. In fact, Kemalism began to be challenged in Turkey within the scope of a broader dynamic that was affecting the whole post-Cold War World. New nationalisms emerged as a natural consequence of globalisation, as a reaction to it (Juergensmeyer, 2002: 4); some groups sought to reinforce ethnic and religious identities usually using transnational means and strategies (Idem: 4). They took advantage from that nation-state crisis, the general loss of trust in secularism and in the perverse side of modernisation

(Idem: 5-6) – exploitation, unemployment, urbanisation... –, so that traditional values and practices would replace the “savagery” caused by years of modernisation under the influence of the Western powers: “[the post-colonial generation] wanted to complete the process of decolonization by asserting the legitimacy of their countries’ own traditional values in the public sphere and constructing a national identity based on indigenous culture” (Idem: 7).

Samuel Huntington shares this view on the resurgence of anti-Western movements and calls it “indigenization” (Huntington, 2002: 91); in fact, it is a movement of using the Western decay to reinforce their position in the world scene. As the author wisely asserts (Idem: 92), “as Western power declines, the ability of the West to impose Western concept of human rights, Liberalism, and democracy on other civilizations also declines and so does the attractiveness of those values to other civilizations”. Furthermore, this originates an interesting paradox, as non-Western societies use Western-imported (democratic) institutions to have access to power and thus pursue their anti-Western agendas (Idem: 94). In the same line, the failure of modernisation is attributed by them to the separation from God, leading to a re-evangelisation movement – the aim is “no longer to modernize Islam but to ‘Islamize modernity’” (Idem: 96). Religions in general and Islam in particular provide a source of identity and of comfort for people whose roots were lost in their pursuit for modernisation and better life conditions: “Re-Islamization ‘from below’ is first and foremost a way of rebuilding an identity in a world that has lost its meaning and become amorphous and alienating” (Lewis *cited in* Huntington, 2002: 98). Religions, thus, try to provide solutions for social problems; modern emptiness is filled up with religious precepts, fostering a feeling of relief and satisfaction for those who believe to be returning to their original, traditional identity and customs. Moreover, in most Muslim countries, there are no real, credible political alternatives for the well-organised and promising Islamic parties.

It is in this context that Huntington develops his major theory: “In this new world, local politics is the politics of ethnicity; global politics is the politics of civilizations. The rivalry of the superpowers is replaced by the clash of civilizations” (Idem: 28). In this regard, he sees the inevitability of conflicts between different civilisations – not recognising therefore that “anarchy [or the relations between the civilisations] is what states [and other actors] make of it”, recalling Wendt’s expression,

and that differences in identities do not necessarily lead to conflicts; peaceful co-habitation is possible.

Nonetheless, each culture embeds a particular identity (or set of similar identities) and the practices and identity of a specific culture are delimited by the boundaries of other cultural groups, through what Woodward (2002: 33) names a binary opposition between insiders and outsiders. Identity comes therefore as another fundamental concept in this study.

Identity is a concept used in diverse Social Sciences and Humanities, such as Psychology, Sociology and Anthropology. International Relations also borrow this concept and use this variable in order to supply a fresh perspective to its problematic. However, identity, both as a concept and a social construction, has to be contextualised. It is not something given or completely frozen and, as a mutable variable, Science has to take that into consideration when analysing it. On the contrary, identity results from a process of construction that is never finished or complete. An individual's identity is therefore developed within the context of his own culture; what surrounds him shapes the way he perceives the world and the meaning he attributes to certain phenomena and realities.

As identity develops interacting with the others in the context of a larger group and as there are many groups, it is not possible that the individual only possesses a single identity, but rather many coexisting identities. Despite the co-existing identities, belonging to one group often implies the exclusion from another one. This dynamic allows the above mentioned dichotomies and others, such as “us”/ “them” and “self”/ “other”. These oppositions set boundaries and establish who belongs to “our” group and who does not: “identities are forged through the making of difference” (Woodward, 2002: 29). Paradoxically, knowing who “we” are not is the way of providing a feeling of belonging and knowing who “we” are. Each group has its own way of classifying the world, i.e., it is its culture that differentiates it from other groups and thus makes the individual distinct from a member of other cluster.

In fact, these oppositions set frontiers, determining who is in and who is out, and this differentiation can be regarded more positively, accepting the other, or more negatively, emphasising the lack of identification with the other and thus marginalising

the outsiders⁷⁸. The feeling of alterity develops being the antonym of the “self” (Ferréol & Jucquois, 2004: 4) and implies the following reasoning: there are the others and I am not their similar; the other is the “*non-moi*” whom I am not linked to (Idem: 4). Thus, collective identities are developed so that the group is clearly defined in relation to its “alters” or others. Once a set of people believes they share the same values, attitudes and perceptions, they establish their identity and try to maintain it, as there is always “a basic fear about the mortality of the collective institution” (Robins, 1996: 61), that is what frequently happens, for instance, when citizens like the Turks or any other European people are afraid of losing their identity through being absorbed or integrated in a wider group like the European Union.

From an individual standpoint, to change an institutionalised identity can only be explained by a motivation that makes him believe that “the benefits of taking on the new identity must be expected to be greater than the likely costs of sticking with the old” (Zehfuss, 2004: 56) – these costs are not only material ones, but mainly ideational: feeling of identification with other group that provides a stronger sense of security and belonging, realisation and accomplishment. As a result of a set of social interactions (and learning) emerges a consciousness of “*soi*” that promotes the cognitive process of identification in the moment the individual perceives the similarities with the group (Ferréol & Jucquois, 2004: 20; Woodward, 2004: 14). It is in this context that collective identities emerge. As mentioned above, the existence of many groups means the existence of multiple identities and therefore it is inaccurate to attribute a single identity to each individual. Thomas Risse (2005: 168) proposes three ways in which different identities are able to relate to each other: a) “nested” identities are pictured as concentric circles, according to which identity A is within identity B, which in turn is embedded in identity C and so forth; b) “cross-cutting” identities refer to some members of one group that are simultaneously members of another group⁷⁹; c) the “marble cake” is a metaphor that resembles the fact that different elements of an individual’s identity are inter-related and cannot be clearly separated from each other, as they are blended.

Thus, from this perspective raising a European identity does not automatically mean a decrease in the involvement with the national identity, which is one of the

⁷⁸ Hence, the clash of civilisations is not a fatality.

⁷⁹ In order to clarify this second conceptualisation, the author quotes the following example: “Some women might feel a strong gender identity, but only a subgroup of them might also identify with Europe, while the latter group also encompasses women without a strong sense of gender identity” (Risse, 2005: 168).

nationalists' fears. As well as each individual has multiple sub-national identities, a supranational identity can be added to this set of multiple identities. In a globalised world with blurred boundaries, so the feelings of attachment may also be blurred due to communication technologies and travelling possibilities. Nevertheless, globalisation also meant the reinforcement and re-strengthening of national identities, given the fact that it was (and still is) perceived as a threat to national identities that reacted coming back to origins and traditions. Frequently, these reactions may lead to the development of imagined communities, that are, according to Woodward (2002: 18), the outcome of the wish for restoring a unity that never existed as such. In that sense, they are imagined and not real.

Poststructuralism also provides an interpretation of the role of identity, arguing that human experience is structured by dualisms (interior/exterior; domestic/foreign; East/West; etc.) and that the outside is central to the constitution of the inside (Campbell, 2010: 225). In that sense, identity is, also for this theory, "culturally constructed through a series of exclusions" (Idem: 225) – again the idea that the 'other' establishes the boundary. As Constructivism postulates, identity is a construct that comes from that interaction. As long as the groups are formed, positive or negative identification with other groups (or states in IR, for example) makes the group more or less willingly to engage with others (Zehfuss, 2004: 40). It is through repeated interaction that identities and interests are created and maintained, giving origin to certain social structures that constrain choices and guide actors' behaviour. These structures become objective social facts and are only capable of changing through social learning and with conscious efforts to change it (Idem: 43-46).

Hence, it is not difficult to understand that identity constitutes a valuable variable for the study of world politics: it provides a relevant input regarding a not so common approach that values culture, ideas and the contributions of Social Psychology as a way of understanding the purpose of an actor's action. Therefore, events are more deeply scrutinised and a more superficial approach is overcome, so that the actor's behaviour is more comprehensively understood, making it easier to realise its position within the international system, as well as to predict possible future behaviour, according to that actor's images, perceptions, values, etc. – its mindset. The use of this variable and this broader cultural approach, on the other hand, helps understand "when, how, to what degree and why the cultural norms, standards and values play a significant

role in foreign policy and international relations” (Bugrova, 2000: 254) – alliances emerge from shared beliefs and values, i.e. similar identities, and clashes come from perceived threats, meaning that the way the countries or other actors perceive each other is very influential on how they relate to each of other members of the international system. As a result, identity constitutes an added value and an additional approach to study international relations.

8.1.1. Being “a Turk”


Being “a Turk” is something not clearly defined nor widely accepted – “is a puzzling phenomenon” (Cagaptay, 2006: 1). This uncertain identity constitutes a socio-cultural synthesis that was constructed and re-constructed over time. As Yavuz (*cited in* Waxman, 2000: 3) wrote, “few countries in the modern period have had their identity contested as bitterly and interpreted as variously as the Republic of Turkey”. It can be added that not only in the Modern period has Turkish identity been contested, but since the creation and affirmation of the Ottoman Empire, where multiple influences reached from both sides of the Empire, shaping the way Ottomans used to see the world and themselves. In terms of *Turkishness*, all Muslims are considered Turks, but non-Muslims, even if they do speak Turkish, are not seen as “real” Turks (Cagaptay, 2006: 1). It follows that other religious groups are discriminated against in this perception of *Turkishness* and also that religion is a central aspect of the definition of this identity.

It is interesting to notice the evolution of Turks’ self-perception of their “main” identity. To the question “Would you primarily describe yourself as...?” (Figure 15, below), 44.6% answered they are first Muslims; on the other hand, 29.9% see themselves as citizens of the Turkish Republic and 19.4% as Turks (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 44)⁸⁰. The first conclusion that can be drawn is that religion plays an outstandingly important role in the definition of who is a Turk (and, simultaneously, who is not). Islam is still able to be used as a useful social unifying drive and cannot be disregarded in this function by political decision-makers. However, even more

⁸⁰ These values come from the published results of a survey led in Turkey during 2006 to about 1 500 individuals in face-to-face interviews. They also compare the 2006 results with the ones of the 1999 survey. More details on this survey and its methodologies can be found in Çarkoğlu and Toprak, 2007.

important is the comparison with the results of the 1999 survey: in this short period of 7 years, the two options of the national identities (as a citizen or as a Turkish) decreased their representation 4.2% and 1.4% respectively. In contrast, the three options that stood for ethnic-religious identities – as a Muslim, as a Kurd or as an Alevi – increased their supporters (8.9%, 1.5% and 0.2% respectively) (Idem). These results sustain Huntington’s theory that post-Cold War era has been facing an “indigenisation” process with the reinforcement of local identities in a reaction to more globalised flows. Contrarily to this tendency, and when analysed the education level of the respondents, the higher the education level, the lower the first identity is linked to Islam and the more they see themselves as citizens of the Turkish republic: 76.8% of the illiterate define themselves first as Muslim whereas only 24% of the graduates do it; conversely, only 8% of illiterates think of themselves as citizens of Turkey, while the value raises to 44.3% among the graduates (Idem: 46).

Figure 15: Turks’ primary identity



Source: Çarikoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 44

These constructions and re-constructions depended both on the actors involved in the process and on the dynamics and emphasis that were privileged. This means two things: first, identities are mutable and this example epitomises that premise; second, there is a lack of stability regarding the meaning of being a Turk. These two phenomena combined are of utmost importance to understand the Turks’ difficulties in dealing with others: should they emphasise their Islamic side and consequently improve their relations with the Arab counterparts or should Turks highlight their Westernised character and therefore widen their relations with the USA and Europe?

Any collective identity embraces a long and extremely complex process of formation, development, internalisation, sometimes contestation and continuous redefinitions. As it was previously stated, identities have to be contextualised within a broader framework that contributes to a better understanding of this social construct. From the reading of the previous chapters, it is not difficult to realise how especially complex the Turkish case is, given the multiple and frequently contradictory contributions to the construction of its current identity(ies).

After the fall of the Ottoman Empire (and even during its existence), Turkey tried to modernise. This effort of modernisation was inspired in the Western model. At the same time, the country had to cope with its own peculiarities, mainly its Islamist-oriented culture. On the European side, values such as democracy and Human Rights, as well as the concept of modernism, are part of an entrenched and anciently rooted identity with a strong Jewish-Christian background and a product of centuries of maturation and development that led the continent to the stage it nowadays occupies (apart from any moral judgement of that state of development). Understandably, trying to follow a certain model, to adopt and adapt it to a different reality results in a bigger effort, as there is the danger of merely imitating and not comprehensively internalising it. Besides, there is the natural tension and opposition on the side of the population to change their deep-rooted habits. Almost a century has passed since Kemal's first efforts of modernisation and some other centuries have also gone since the Ottomans decided to "Europeanise"; and a reflection needs to be made.

Nowadays, Turkish society constitutes a very special case where many different influences are melted and mixed to form what it is today. José Teixeira Fernandes considers that Turkish cultural-national identity is fragmented. In order to prove his point, Fernandes mentions some of Turkey's social key problems: the division between the majority of Sunnis and the Alevi minority; the separatist problem with the Kurds and the denial of the Armenian's genocide (Fernandes, 2005: 79-97). Indeed, these problems reflect a certain degree of lack of identification of some minorities with the major definition of Turkishness, at the same time the majority of the population does not include in their definition of collective identity other sub-groups that could be embedded in their sense of being a Turk. Kentel (2011: 52) argues that Turks' uncertainty of belonging leads to the use of two solid references: the secular Turkishness and Islam. The apparent incompatibility between both visions seems not to

affect that feeling of belonging, as they consider it possible to combine both. Turkish nationalism should be regarded as a synthesis of all these (and other) influences. Although this may seem a socially fragmented society, which is actually the case to a certain extent, the inclusion of these groups is certainly part of a learning process the Turkish society is undergoing at the moment of its candidacy to the European Union. Thus, Turkish identity and nationalism, despite being still in a consolidation and readjustment process, is likely to change towards a more inclusive definition if the country, again, truly commits to the European standards defined in the Copenhagen criteria and present throughout the process of integration. In the meanwhile, once more, Turkey faces another moment of redefining who Turks believe they are. How they perceive themselves will influence their relations with other international actors and subsequently their position in the world. Some of those dimensions will be briefly covered in the following sections.

8.2. Lifestyle, women and human rights

People's attitudes and behaviour are also object of democratising drives, in the sense that they are supposed to adopt a certain set of values and practices that reinforce the country's democratic regime (as written on Chapter 3). The continuous shaping and re-shaping of Turkey's collective identity, and even of its narrative, creates a certain degree of instability regarding the endeavour to know who Turks are. They have been modernised at the time of the foundation of the new Republic, but then, as noticed in the previous section, Islamic, ethnic and traditionalist movements' resurgence nuanced the results of that modernisation: polygamy was only forbidden since the adoption of a Swiss-inspired Civil Code by Atatürk, but Andrew Mango (2004: 119) reveals that in Turkey's countryside there are still some cases happening. On the other hand, however, divorce has become progressively more common in the country, as well as the social acceptance of the co-habitation of unmarried couples (Idem: 120). At the same time, in the countryside, "honour killings" continue to be a way to show the social discontent with some situations and, even more shocking, minors are used to perpetrate them in order to reduce the risk and the length of the imprisonment. Again, on the other hand, brothels are licensed and inspected (Idem: 120-121). These facts are paradoxical; they

reveal a Turkey with several gaps in terms of the coherence of its positions. As a Turkish academic (Interview, 2013e) stated when talking about these issues,

“I do not think that a Turkey like this would have a place in European society. It is so far, so conservative. (...) three years ago, two guys killed 44 members of another neighbourhood. 44 members in a wedding ceremony inside their house for black feud. They were relatives. 44 members with Kalashnikovs. It happened in Turkey three years ago. (...) How can you explain it to a citizen in Porto? In Copenhagen?”.

These thoughts reveal some important issues that still need to be addressed in Turkey. Besides, there is also another question regarding Turkey’s lifestyle which should be reflected upon and that the same interviewee focused on (Idem): “Istanbul, Ankara and Izmir are the most developed three cities in Turkey, but if you go outside Ankara, that is not the EU, actually, and it is most of the country”. This comment points out the regional differences and the state of development of less urbanised or developed areas which, in fact, seem to be a considerable part of the country.

Nonetheless, even in more developed cities, conservatism appears to be rising again. Two interviewees (one academic (Interview, 2013e) and one women’s rights’ activist (Interview, 2013g)) recognised that pattern, but highlighted that it is a different type of conservatism:

“Culturally, Turkey is not improving; it’s getting more conservative in a way. But this is a different kind of conservatism; this came with the post-modern age, the conservatism of a global world. You see more women with headscarves, but with more iPhones, with more SUVs. This is a different kind of conservatism; it’s more materialised” (Interview, 2013e).

In the same survey quoted above, in a question about marriage, it is interesting to notice that still around 22% of the respondents considered a better option (“more appropriate” is the designation of the question) if the family arranges the marriage (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 72). Yet, if one looks closer to the distribution of these options, 28% of these respondents came from rural areas and almost 19% were from urban areas. The same pattern can be found in the literacy variable (the more educated, the less prone they were to support arranged marriages) and in the left-right political spectrum (the more to the right, the higher the agreement with them) (Idem: 73). These values reveal a considerable degree of conservatism and some social fractures regarding issues of this kind. These results may be one of the reasons why the same interviewee explained that, in the last six years, her organisation has been committed to “early and

forced marriages” (Interview, 2013g). There have been a set of initiatives to bring the subject to public debate and to the general awareness in coordination with a platform of 64 other NGOs called “Say No to Child Marriages”; internationally, they also have a project entitled “Girls not Brides” which allows exchanges and interactions at a broader level to tackle to problem.

Concerning the same issue of marriages, Çarkoğlu and Toprak’s (2007) survey divulged that 50,5% of the surveyed would oppose their children to marry a Muslim from another sect and this value almost achieves the 70% when it comes to oppose their daughters to marry a non-Muslim. In what comes to marriage, a Turkish academic (Interview, 2013e) highlighted the fact that still today there are girls forced to marry and that in the same day of the interview some news were reporting the murder of a nineteen-year-old girl who refused to marry the man she was supposed to as his third wife in Southeast Turkey. Besides, he alerted, “look at the rate of women killed by their husbands in Turkey; this is so widespread” (Idem). Women are also object of several restrictions, mostly in less developed areas – “young girls cannot go out in the evening in many parts of this country” (Idem). In fact, this opinion is supported by the data: in a poor working district of Istanbul, Ümraniye, 44% of women need a man’s permission to leave home in daytime and that value increases to 96% in the evenings (Mango, 2004: 118). There is not, therefore, gender equality in Turkey, except in a very particular section of the society, the urban middle-class, in which these cases are not so common (Idem). Still, girls study in average two years less than boys (Idem: 117), justifying why *Flying Broom* and other organisations develop such a serious work all over the country to overcome these issues (Interview, 2013g). Not only at school, but also in politics, for example, are women unevenly represented: only 2 out of 81 mayors in Turkey are women and only 14% of the Parliament is composed by female deputies and “nobody speaks about this” (Idem). Despite the efforts of the NGOs and the important achievements in the adoption of legislation in line with the European standards, that

“brought really really good on rights to women (...), we are a country where all looks good on the paper (...), but when you look at the *de facto* equality, we are at the bottom. (...) [The gap] is so big because the hardest thing is to change the attitude. You can change the laws, but if you don’t implement them, it does not work at all” (Idem).

Therefore, one of the main issues regarding women’s rights in Turkey is the implementation of the already adopted measures and their internalisation by the

population, as the lack of a tradition of respect for women and for their equal treatment is a very time consuming task.

Human rights in general suffer from the same problem. This is a major issue in Turkey and in its relations with the European Union, which considers it one of the country's biggest weaknesses (Cf. Chapter 9). Minority rights are another field Turkey is usually much criticised about – the difference between their recognition in theory and practice is one of the problems (Fernandes, 2005: 18). According to this author, the *other's* identity is frequently subject to distortions that may bring harming or even aggressive behaviour towards the other. In that sense, a real and effective rule of law is mandatory to protect the minorities from these situations, also granting them more political, religious and linguistic freedoms (Idem: 18). Turkey's uneasiness with minority rights has an important historical background; for decades, human rights in the European language only meant for Turks granting more freedoms to Kurds (Interview, 2013e), which is a very sensitive subject among them. Understandably, they used to look at requests to improve minority's rights suspiciously, afraid of the Kurds' separatist line. According to the same academic, this is not the case anymore.

Yet, another relevant factor for this stance lies in the country's security-centred perspective. Being surrounded by an unstable neighbourhood and also with internal enemies, Turks had to adapt to a constant alert position, aggravated by the military's *coups* and the subsequent state-centred and security-centred Constitutions (Interview, 2013h). Security concerns were prioritised over individuals' interests and the freedoms of organisation and expression, for instance, were limited in the sake of the state's security (Idem). Citizens used to be afraid of the police – the Ministry for EU Affairs' official conveyed the generalised feeling during the time of the military's rule when a friend was arrested for wearing a scarf in his neck due to a sore throat, which was interpreted as a political symbol⁸¹; people were afraid of the police (Interview, 2013i), as cases of abuse of power and mistreatment were not rare. Even much later, in the early 2000s, Andrew Mango (2004: 124) reveals that between January 2000 and April 2001 from the 1 500 policemen prosecuted for mistreating prisoners, only 113 were convicted and only 26 out of the 160 accused of torture were formally convicted. And although these numbers are low, coupled with the instruction security forces have been receiving on human rights, they have an impact on police behaviour.

⁸¹ Again, the importance of interpretation and perception in social relations.

Freedom of expression is another particularly sensitive issue in Turkey: a Turkish academic recognised that the European criticisms on that area were “quite fair” because the country had problems at that level (Interview, 2013h); another academic was harder on his comments and argued that “journalists cannot publish the news freely because they can be fired”: in fact, several journalists from *Hizmet*, *Taraf* and *Sözcü*⁸² have lost their jobs like that (Interview, 2013b). The interviewed editor of a Turkish newspaper asserted that the issue of imprisoned journalists needs to be seriously addressed but that Turkey’s special context of the military *coups*, which cannot be ignored yet, that scenario is still possible, justifies the carefulness towards the military (Interview, 2013c) – it can be assumed for this statement that, from his point of view, some media control is necessary for security reasons. On the other hand, when talking about the freedom of expression, the official from the Ministry for EU Affairs recalled the case of Fazil Say⁸³ and the Prime-Minister’s reaction who, despite disagreeing with the pianist, stated that there “should be freedom also for bullshitting” (Interview, 2013i), in a reference to the healthy environment of the freedom of expression in Turkey. Besides, as the interviewee highlighted, Fazil Say was sentenced to ten-month imprisonment, but he did not go to jail literally; the sentence was postponed for five years “just supposing he misbehaves” (Idem). If the “misbehaviour” the official referred to was related to the pianist’s comments, then Turkey should address this issue more carefully as an imprisonment sentence sounds like an overreaction to the statement. This position regarding freedom of expression can be reinforced by some other statements by the official: “So, there are some general values, but, especially for freedom of expression and everything, people might feel irritated through some reading materials” (Idem).

⁸² *Hizmet* is a newspaper linked to the Gülen Movement; *Taraf* is a liberal newspaper, the one that revealed the Ergenekon case and *Sözcü* belongs to the radical left wings, close to the CHP and the Worker’s Party, with the support of secularists and nationalists.

⁸³ “In April 2012, Say posted controversial tweets asking whether heaven in Islamic tradition is like a brothel or a pub because the Quran says there are rivers of wine and huris (very beautiful women) in the afterlife for those who commit good deeds while on Earth. Say also tweeted about a muezzin who recited the evening call to prayer in 22 seconds, wondering whether he was in a rush to reunite with his lover or go to a raki table. Say explained his controversial tweets as verses from a poem by Omar Khayyam, a Persian poet. The prosecutor’s office has found that Say’s statements run contrary to the first and third points of Article 216 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK). These points concern the offenses of “inciting hatred and enmity among the public” and “insulting religious values.” (Today’s Zaman, 16/04/2013, <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-312831-erdogan-refuses-to-comment-on-pianist-says-sentence.html>)

Thus, human rights in Turkey, one of the most severely criticised domains by the European Union in its reports, need to be dealt with in a particularly thorough fashion, given their current state in the country – the assessment by different international organisations may be observed in the next part of the thesis. Freedoms of expression, association, torture and ill-treatment, as well as minorities, constitute a set of fields Turkey apparently needs to invest on. Again, as the women NGO representative said, the *de facto* application of the laws is still the major problem behind human rights (Interview, 2013g).

8.3. Kurds, Cypriots and Armenians

A democratically consolidated democracy entails the recognition of democratic practices both inside and outside its borders. Once committed to democratic principles, they have to be applied, among others, in the country's foreign policy, accepting and complying with the institutionalised international law (cf. Chapter 3). These are three issues that also help understand much of Turkey's choices in terms of internal and external policies. Although the subjects under consideration in this section may seem unrelated, the truth is that all of them have a direct impact on the country's European integration, as well as all of them somehow result from the Turkish difficulty to deal with the *other*, in the sense that the solution of all these problems would imply accepting the *other's* point of view, concede and compromise in several fields and deal with the *other's* peculiarities and differences in relation to the Turkish identity and perception.

Kurds are a minority indeed, but a significant one. The numbers vary; however, Bahcheli and Noel (2011: 101) point to a total of 15% of the whole population. Interestingly, Kurdish sources raise it to 25% and Turkish ones lower it to 10% (Idem: 118). Kurds are of Iranian origin and this issue goes back to the establishment of the Republic in 1923. The Sèvres Treaty foresaw some degree of autonomy (and even the independence), but Mustafa Kemal always revealed to be against any type of self-determination. As a consequence, the Lausanne Treaty was not so bold in terms of granting rights to Kurds, who were not even considered a minority, as they were included in the group of the Muslim majority (Fernandes, 2005: 84-85). The fear was

that the newly established Republic suffered the same problem that contributed to the decay and fall of the Ottoman Empire – opening a precedent for other nationalist movements, such as the Bulgarians, Arabs or Greeks.

At the end of the Second World War, Kurds organised themselves politically and established the PKK (in 1974 – the *Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan*, the Kurdistan Workers' Party) (Idem: 85-87). In the 1980s, the PKK began a guerrilla war as a reply to the state's prohibition of the Kurdish New Year's celebrations (Idem: 88), beginning an era of bloody conflicts between the two factions and the declaration of state emergency in ten provinces in the Southeast of Turkey (Usul, 2011: 153). In 1999, the party's leader, Öcalan, is captured and the conflict smoothes with this psychological defeat, although its violence has never completely disappeared, being particularly intensive again during the 2000s. As Yeğen (2011: 67) summarises,

“The Turkish Republic has, since its establishment in the early 1920s, wrestled with the Kurdish question, which has assumed many forms since then, including armed resistance, massive political discontent, lack of cultural integration and acute poverty”.

The same author divides the development of the Kurdish issue into three phases: the *pre-denial* phase, in the years before 1923 and some willingness to recognise the minority; the *denial* period, until the 1990s, when cultural and political rights were refused to Kurds, as well as their ethnic status; and finally the *post-denial* stage, since the 1990s with some efforts to recognise the Kurdish question and to deal with it (Idem: 67).

Kurds are, for Usul (2011: 151) one of the reasons why Turkey performed so poorly in terms of human rights and democracy in general in the 1980s and 1990s: torture, extra-judicial killings, evacuation of villages, arbitrary detentions, etc. Besides, their identity was rejected by the state itself and the Turkish elites perceived it as a “product of the Great Powers abroad” (Idem: 151). So, the Kurdish issue was not only a matter of internal security, but also a reason for the country to be suspicious about the Western involvement – hence all the European attempts to talk about human rights used to be seen with some discomfort, as written earlier.

The strategies used by successive governments have failed, since the problem still exists, maybe because they constituted an “amalgam of old and new, blending assimilation and oppression with discrimination and recognition” (Yeğen, 2011: 67).

Solving this issue is not uncomplicated; in fact, on the other side of a peaceful compromising solution, there are “proposals proved too contentious and politically unrewarding to be adopted” (Bahcheli & Noel, 2011: 101). The violent response by the state to the demands of the Kurdish people has brought nothing but more violence and tension between the two parts. Nevertheless, the willingness of several political leaders to find an end to this struggle only led “their efforts [to arise] more suspicion and hostility than support” (Idem: 102) and the political costs of decisions of this kind is always well balanced before their adoption: nationalists, the Constitutional Court (usually close to the Kemalist line), the consensus with other political parties to achieve a Constitutional amendment, voters from all factions and Kurds are several variables that jeopardise the solution of this conundrum. The official from the Ministry for EU Affairs recognised the weight of this subject on the domestic affairs:

“The Kurdish issue has always been a part of the Turkish democratic problem starting from the 1980s (...) because, as the famous saying, violence breeds violence. (...) And if you think that the average age in Turkey is 29 right now – and the PKK is actually 29 years –, so we grew up with this and it has become part of the Turkish population daily life” (Interview, 2013i).

Similarly, for a Turkish academic, the Kurdish issue and minority rights, coupled with the need for a new Constitution, are “the major issues in terms of the Turkish democracy” (Interview, 2013h).

Another important issue for Turkish democracy and its accession process, as it involves a conflict with a member-state of the organisation, is Cyprus. This small island in the Mediterranean always attracted foreign powers for its strategic location that allows the control of the Eastern side of the sea. In 1914, it was transformed by the United Kingdom in a type of colony. Cypriots, however, were discontent with this situation; they did not want independency, rather they preferred to unite with Greece whom they had become independent from a century before. Greek-Cypriots still felt Greece as their homeland, in opposition to the Turkish-Cypriots who chose the division of the island in two different states (Losano, 2009: 43). Mario Losano (Idem: 43) wrote that the unification of the island was hard due to the tension between the two parts caused by their socio-economic, linguistic and religious differences, by the legacy of their respective “homeland” (Turkey and Greece) and finally by the Turkish-Cypriots’ “historically reasoned” fear of being oppressed by the Greek-Cypriots.

Despite the apparently jubilant moment of the formal independence of the country in 1960, the truth is that the lack of a foreign power to keep the country's unity in its dualism led to a growing manifestation of those cultural differences (Idem: 44). Losano explains the situation: "At the roots of the tension is probably the fact that there is not a true and actual Cypriot nationality, but rather the two communities of the island that felt part of a different nation due to their language, religion and culture" (Idem: 45). From 1964 to 1974 the Greek-Cypriot community dominated the political and economic life of the island and the tension between the two peoples grew during that decade. In 1974 the Greek military dictatorship planned to Annex the whole island, but in July the Turkish troops occupied the Northern part of Cyprus. From that moment onwards a Turkish-Cypriot community rules the Northern part of the territory, never recognised by the Greek-Cypriot government. Still, in 1983, within the scope of the international principle of self-determination, they proclaimed the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Idem: 46-49), only internationally recognised as such by Turkey.

This brief outlook of the history of the island and its division is important to frame the question⁸⁴. As known, in 2004, Greek-Cypriot side of the island entered the European Union, creating a serious obstacle to the Turkish accession process and its natural final outcome of full membership. It is relevant, however, to emphasise that the EU was in favour of a resolution with the unification of the island and that there was an international plan for this crisis sponsored by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, the Annan Plan, which was actually supported by both the EU and the United States (Mango, 2005: 26). This plan was subject to a referendum to all the citizens of Cyprus in April 24, 2004 and despite the Northern support and formal approval, the Greek community refused it, making unviable its application and the settlement of the dispute.

Cyprus is then a serious obstacle to the Turkish accession and when asked about the possible double standard approach of the EU towards Turkey in several issues, the interviewee from the Ministry for EU Affairs chose Cyprus to prove that point: "they [the EU] use a small island, a semi-state according to the Constitution" to create problems to Turkey – namely blocking chapters – and

"Merkel and Chirac used the Cyprus issue as a scapegoat (...) You don't do that, because the Turkish community voted yes for the Anna

⁸⁴ For further details on this issue, for example, cf. Fernandes, 2008.

Plan. The other community voted no for that. And the EU backed the Annan Plan and so double standards started from there” (Interview, 2013i).

Turkey has also quandaries with other neighbours: Armenians. After the First World War, almost all the Armenian population of the Ottoman Empire disappeared (Fernandes, 2005: 90). They comprised approximately 10% of the inhabitants of Anatolia and were since the nineteenth century targets of the Muslim hostility against the Christians. In the hope to become an independent state, Armenians joined the Russian Army in the First World War fleeing the Ottoman Army; the Ottomans reacted to this “betrayal” through deciding to extradite all the Armenian population from the war zone to Zor, at the centre of the Syrian Desert. As a consequence, between 1915-17 a considerably high number of Armenians died (Idem: 91-91). The controversy begins right here in the number of deaths among this community. Still today the Turkish government does not recognise this collective murder as genocide, despite Armenia’s attempts to force the authorities to publicly accept it. In fact, when other countries (and that happened with the United States, the United Kingdom and France more recently) have tried to recognise the Armenian genocide, the Turkish state reacted negatively raising some diplomatic tension and lobbying for that official recognition not to happen.

In spite of the controversy surrounding the number of deaths (and if it was a deliberate plan or not), it is interesting to notice this social phenomenon in which Turkey in general and Turks in particular seem not to deal naturally with its less bright past. Teixeira Fernandes (2005: 95) wrote that the explanation for this fact may lie on the Islamic ethics which “favour honour and shame over truth”. This position is seconded by some groups within the Turkish society, mainly secularists, who would prefer their state to recognise the genocide, similarly to what the Catholic Church has done with Inquisition, France with colonialism, the USA with native Amerindians and Africans (Idem: 96-97) or even Germany with the Nazi period.

Thus, and in terms of good relations with its neighbours and minorities within its own borders, Turkey has some issues to solve or at least to show enough maturity to deal with in a democratic way, through dialogue and diplomatic and political means. Dealing with these sensitive and key situations would help the country overcome most of its ghosts and strengthen its position in the world scene – as well as improving its image before the European Union.

8.4. A polarised society: Secularists vs. Islamists

The polarisation of Turkish society between secularists and Islamists constitutes a fundamental axis when seeking to understand the internal and external phenomena of the country. That can be perceived through academic literature, news and even some interviewees' comments. Islam, as already written, has been the main religion of the then Ottoman Empire since its own foundation, and this tradition has continued so far without signs of fading away. One of the most (when not the most) systematic attempts to deconstruct this long-established tight relationship between religion and state affairs was made by Mustafa Kemal in the 1920s. Nonetheless, even in that period, religion was used as a strong social unifying force to bring the Turkish population together. The Islamic tradition among Turks always made it a key element concerning Turkish democracy and often one of the reasons that split up Turks and Europeans.

As Waxman (2000: 8) reminds, Islam was supposed to be put aside by Kemalism, but Mustafa Kemal was aware of the importance of religion in Turkey and of the fact that he would not be capable of creating a feeling of togetherness without this component. Therefore, a "Turkified Islam" (Idem: 9) was developed in order to strengthen national identity. Two examples can be provided to prove it: first, the population exchange with Greece following the establishment of the Turkish Third Republic and secondly the Capital Tax regulation that set religion and ethnicity as the criteria to determine the amount to pay to the state, according to which non-Muslims had to contribute ten times more than Muslims (Idem: 10, 11).

Thus, even with Kemal's attempt to secularise the country, this feature was not (and is not yet) disregarded as a fundamental element of *Turkishness* and ultimately what distinguishes between a 'Turk' and a 'Turkish citizen' – "Turk designates an ethno-religious characteristic of the political community, an attribute" (Idem: 14). Since there is this distinction, a subsequent discrimination is to be expected. Again two further examples can prove this point: Turgut Özal's 1989 statement and Turkish Armed Forces' measures during their ruling period. Özal stated that "Everybody who lives in this land (...) is a first class citizen (...) with no distinction (...) but what holds our nation together [and] what serves in a most powerful way our national cohesiveness (...) is Islam." (cited in Waxman, 2000: 17), revealing how important religion was. On the other side, the historical defendants of secularism, the Turkish military, included

compulsory religious education in the 1982 Constitution, so that an “official” version of Islam was conveyed, instead of a more fundamentalist one and, therefore, enabling it to be used as a tool by the government.

Nevertheless, the secularisation attempt by Atatürk is still nowadays widely criticised; the new Turkey he wanted to be born disregarded its Ottoman heritage and ended up promoting “no less than the annihilation of the past” and the emergence of a state without history, as Robins (1996: 68) put it. According to this author, the Republican elite ignored the positive aspects of the Ottoman Empire for the sake of the implementation of a new society. In that sense, the new state retrogressed in terms of the previously allowed pluralism of identities and, when regarding Islam as a threat to modernisation, its replacement for secularism was an “empty substitution” in which nothing equally symbolic was put in its place (Idem: 69). To these two examples Robins provided, he added a third one related to democracy: for the author, repression was applied in the name of democracy and it has been installed a paternalistic and authoritarian regime where there was no place for social or political differences (Idem: 70).

Waxman (2000: 6-7), on the other hand, assumes that, although Turkish modernisation was not a process, but a top-down, state-led, elitist project that led to the creation of a too synthetic and too superficial “Republican Turkish identity” (Idem: 7), elites had had into consideration the population’s characteristics and that the authoritarian drive was in the name of the future democracy. Therefore, according to Waxman, “the Turkish national identity is an outcome of these accommodations, a product of the perpetual negotiations between the state and society” (Idem: 8). This is an open debate and what is most relevant to underscore in the present context is the whole framework the Turkish identity has developed within and that, as the author argued, it is the result of multiple influences, moments, bargains, processes and projects. More precisely, it is not about whether Islam is part of *Turkishness* or not, but how important it is; consequently, it is a “question of emphasis” (Idem: 22) rather than one of a zero-sum situation, which has important political consequences.

In actual fact, and despite the considerable number of Turkish flags with the image of Atatürk all over Turkey, Kemalism started to be challenged still in the twentieth century, giving origin to a long period of the already mentioned secularist-Islamist debate. Recalling Huntington, in the first half of that century, modernisation

achieved a retrocession in terms of attachment to religions worldwide; but, when modernisation begins to be perceived as having failed, the fault was attributed to the separation from God (Huntington, 2002: 95-96). Thus, in reaction to secularism and relativism, religions re-emerged to reaffirm their values in an unstable world – as “the vitamin of the weak” (Debray *cited in* Huntington, 2002: 101); Huntington borrows the concept from Gilles Kepel for this phenomenon: *La revanche de Dieu* (Idem: 95). For this reason, the author realises that, in the re-Islamised societies of the second half of the twentieth century and onwards, “among Muslims, the young are religious, their parents secular” (Idem: 101). Robins applies this indigenisation dynamic to the Turkish case and explains that, since the mid-1980s one assists to the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and an increased recognition of the country’s ethnic heterogeneity and of the references to the Ottoman legacy, what the scholar calls the “return of the repressed” – religion, ethnic diversity and Ottoman past (Robins, 1996: 72-73).

Islamists were against Turkey’s European integration: Europe was the Islamists’ *Other* and they rejected its type of civilisation, for considering it materialistic, destructive and morally decadent (Duran, 2004: 126). In that sense, their discourse was anti-Europe and in favour of the return to old values and practices. It was part of what Huntington labelled the Islamic “declaration of cultural independence from the West” (Huntington, 2002: 101). This declaration meant the rejection of the West, but not of modernisation; it was the rejection of the “Westoxification” emanated from Europe and the USA (Idem). The Islamists’ discourse was truly anti-European regarding Turkey’s integration; it “rests upon the premise that Islamic civilization is ontologically and epistemologically different from the West” (Duran, 2004: 127). Besides, for them, integration equalled the country’s assimilation and its maintenance in “the periphery [to] control it” (Idem).

The discourse was hard on the West and was able to capitalise the national and international contexts (namely the consequences of the oil crises, severe internal political and economic crises or the state of Turkey-EU relations) to gather broad popular support. Democracy was frequently the pathway Islamists used to reach to power – legally and within the Western-like political structures. The Welfare Party (RP, *Refah Partisi*), for example, was banned in 1998 for being considered anti-secular by the Constitutional Court (Duran, 2004: 128). Its successor, the Virtue Party (FP, *Fazilet Partisi*) changed its rhetoric and voices its support for EU membership,

democratisation, human rights and personal liberties (Idem). And even though the party had to face the obstacles left by the Kemalist heritage and its guardians (the military and the Constitutional Court, to name two), they looked forward to being supported by the European Union in the sense that this institution would force the country to increase the individuals' freedoms and curtail the limitations of the high degree of secularisation Turkey was living.

Despite these efforts, the FP was also banned in 2001 and two other political parties were constituted from its heritage: the Felicity Party (SP) and the Justice and Development Party (AKP). The traditionalist members of the FP composed the first, whereas the latter included its reformist section and was led by the former Mayor of Istanbul, Erdoğan (Idem: 133). Although they have their differences, the support for Turkey's European integration was a policy common to both. Definitely, the Islamist discourse had changed in order to take advantage of the framework they were embedded in; otherwise, they would have had many difficulties in trying to achieve their objectives in terms of political power.

Based on an extremely large survey to over 31 000 Muslims of 32 countries, Moataz Fattah (2006) wrote a book entitled "Democratic Values in the Muslim World", in which the author seeks to comprehend whether "the values and attitudes of Muslims obstruct or decelerate the democratization process in Muslim countries" (Fattah, 2006: 2). As this scholar recognises in the beginning of his book, Muslim countries are "disproportionately autocratic" (Idem: 1) and there is not in the world any Muslim country with a consolidated democracy these days. One very interesting result of the survey is that Muslims are "highly influenced by opinion leaders who present ready-made intellectual meals for consumption" (Idem: 7). In other words, opinion makers in Muslim countries enjoy a wide prestige among their audience and high levels of influence over them. This is particularly important when one considers the effect of discourse and speech on the population's opinions and consequently on their interests and choices. Therefore, the author's conclusion is that opinion leaders (or makers) are "agents of political socialisation" (Idem) – hence the media plays a major role in these questions as well, and also maybe because of that are they so frequently subject to the control or limitation of autocratic regimes.

A second important finding of this study comes with the three patterns of Muslim attitudes towards Islam and democracy. According to this division, a Muslim's

attitude can be framed within one of the following patterns: traditional Islamists, modern Islamists and secularists (Idem: 9). For traditionalist Islamists, democracy is seen as “a replacement of the will of Allah with the will of people” (Idem: 12); as they interpret the holy texts literally and regard themselves the guardians of their religious traditions, the adoption of democracy constitutes a betrayal and a sin since it is forbidden to imitate non-Muslims. Traditionalists can opt for a violent or a pacifist approach to stand for their beliefs (Idem: 12-14). Modernist Islamists, on the other hand, are willing to take on non-Muslim concepts, as long as they do not contradict Islam’s precepts. In that sense, for them, democracy can be applied if it is Islamised (Idem: 17-18).

Secularists occupy the other extreme of these perceptions in the sense that they recognise that Islam does not provide governance suggestions. In fact, as Sharia does not include political issues, it means Allah allows humans to work those fields and that “Muslims need to follow the paths of the most successful societies in order to outdo them” (Idem: 20), which is exactly what the West had done by learning from ancient cultures. There are two types of secularists: the ones that would rather support a strong government to defend the state’s unity. This does not imply a democratic government though, since they are afraid of democracy because of the Islamists’ threat to mobilise and manipulate electors and because of their unpreparedness for this regime – they are illiterate, prone to apathy, nostalgia, tribalism, etc. –; these are the statist secularists (Idem: 19-22). On the other side, pluralist secularists do not share the previous assumptions, as they believe there are “Muslims who are politically closest to the Western concept of liberal democracy” (Idem: 24). Therefore, modernist Islamists should be involved in the democratisation process of their own countries (Idem: 24, 25) to contribute with their perspectives and inputs.

In what comes to Turkey, its first position in the democratisation potential ranking is revealing (Idem: 29). Among the 32 countries surveyed, Turkey occupies the first place with a high degree of potential, due to the distribution of its population among the four mentalities: traditionalists – 1% (the lowest value of all countries); statist – 5%; modernists – 31%; pluralists – 63% (the highest value of all countries). Thus, if one adds the proportion of traditionalists and modernists to find the total percentage of Islamists, the number reaches the 32% (the lowest value of all countries); on the other hand, if modernists and pluralists (both with a high potential to promote

democracy and tolerance and not to adopt extremists stances on the two directions) are united, Turkey achieves an impressive value of 94% of the surveyed population who can be truly regarded as democrats – again the highest value of all the countries that participated in the study (Idem: 29).

This study deepens these perceptions regarding democracy and analyses the correlation of side variables, such as age, gender, education, previous political participation, religiosity, etc. As it is not possible to go through these results thoroughly, Fattah (Idem: 64) presents a symbolic conclusion of the medium, typical profile of a pro-democratic Muslim:

“a female who is affluent and better educated (...) [who is] likely to have experienced democracy through previous voting and/or living in a democratic country (...) to believe that democracy is an extension or application of (...) Shura, and to have a negative attitude toward undemocratically elected Muslim rulers”.

Obviously, this figure is the stereotype of the results of the study, but it helps realise how important several factors are for the shaping of a pro-democratic Muslim or, otherwise, for an anti-democratic Muslim. These variables are to be taken into account when one seeks to realise how democracy should be promoted among Muslims. Furthermore, and regarding Turkey, this study revealed a key factor: Turks are the most meaningful democratic tendency among Muslim people in the entire world, suggesting that, as a Turkish academic stated, “if democratisation works here, it does not necessarily mean that it will work automatically in other societies. But if it fails here, then we will have a problem” (Interview, 2013e).

When analysing more specifically Turkish Islamists and their stance regarding European integration, Duran (2004: 136) divides them into three main positions: the ones that support it, the ones that deny it and the ones who hesitate. The elements from the first group, such as Gürdoğan and Koru, stress the democratic importance for Turkey to be linked with Europe and argue that it would mean the strengthening of its identity and not the opposite (Idem: 136). Opponents to integration see it as an external imposition, a retreat from spirituality, a clash of civilisations whose cultural differences are not possible to be overcome, a decline of the Islamic culture and compare the Copenhagen criteria to a second Sèvres Treaty (Idem: 137-139). The latter group is afraid of the country’s assimilation into the European culture, but accepts that the accomplishment of the criteria would only benefit Turkey (Idem: 139).

When Turks were asked to place themselves between the Islamist and Secularist sides, the results partially support the theory of the polarisation of the society: 48,5% included themselves within the interval 6 to 10 (where 10 is Islamist); 20,3% placed themselves between the values of the scale 0 to 4 (where 0 is Secularist), and 23,4% opted for the middle-ground, level 5, do not revealing a clear tendency towards any of the two options under consideration (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 42). Not surprisingly, Turks who feel more connected to the Secularist are more educated, more leftist, younger and richer. CHP sympathisers are also much more prone to support this side. Following the same reasoning, AKP supporters are more inclined to the Islamist side and reveal the opposite profile (less educated, more rightist, older and less wealthy) (Idem: 43). In one of the interviews, a Turkish academic drew a general draft of today's Turkey stating that there is "a polarisation between the AKP voters and the non-AKP voters" (Interview, 2013b); according to him, the latter are seen as "supporters of the military and not trustful" (Idem).

It is perceptible, therefore, that groups are formed in Turkey and opinions are divided on several issues, like the use of turban, the EU process or even religious education, to name a few. In the early 2000s the situation was not like that – the AKP was able to join several sects of this divided society through a moderate speech which used to please both conservatives (it was a Muslim party, after all) and secularists (excited in the support the party revealed in terms of the EU accession process). However, and after an initial phase of enthusiasm with the positive economic and political results, the party's more secularist supporters started to become increasingly concerned with the development or the direction of some measures: "the AKP government publicly denounced the online ultimatum in 2007, and former military officers have been prosecuted by civilian courts for conspiracy against the government, both of these being a first in the country's history" (Somer, 2011: 28). It is true that the military frequent interferences in the Turkish political life did not improve its democratic quality at all; however, the military were also, besides a tremendously respected social group among Turks, the guardians of the secularist sect; the ones people were relying on to avoid the country to backslide into a more religious type of state.

In that context, "the pro-secular actors turned suspicious of the reforms led by the government, while the government lost its reformist zeal and seemed resort to

‘illiberal’ means in order to pacify the opposition and consolidate its power” (Idem: 29). In 2007 the AKP began a campaign to amend the Constitution to lift the ban on the use of headscarves at Turkish universities, but the CHP took recourse to the Constitutional Court that decided to declare the amendment unconstitutional for violating the secularist principle (Idem: 30). In fact, the AKP also survived an attempt to be banned, which was not accepted by the same Court, even though it recognised some members’ activities were suspicious and warned and fined the party (Idem: 30). Several other events could be added to this list: Prime-minister’s calls to boycott a media group, a scandal with a charity organisation and its links with the AKP, the opposition warnings about a “deep-state” within the country, etc. (Idem: 31). This opposition between the two factions has several effects and, as Somer (Idem) wrote, “a sure sign that democratization is the victim of the religious/secular confrontation is the deterioration in the level of media freedom” whose scores and position rankings when compared to the rest of the world have been decreasing. In one year (2007 to 2008), the number of prosecuted for “thought-related ‘crimes’ doubled from 254 (...) to 435” (Idem), which is quite revealing of the general environment of freedoms of expression in the country. Among them, of course, one can find journalists, politicians and writers.

In the same chapter, Murat Somer proposes a solution for Turkey: using Stepan’s concept of “twin tolerations”, the author concludes that a consolidated democracy demands both the state’s autonomy from religion, but also freedom of religion and of conscience (Idem: 35). Therefore,

“the key question for the success of Turkey’s continued democratization is whether or not it can produce the emergence of twin tolerations between state and religion on the one hand, and between the pro-secular and religious-conservative social-political actors on the other hand. (...) This, in turn, requires normative adjustments of the dominant narratives of both types of actors, in addition to strong institutional and political checks and balances” (Idem: 36, 42).

In fact, both are European Union’s requirements; however, Turkey, with an apparently growing centralised power is making it hard for that to happen. Yet, it has to do with the country’s political culture and not only with its religious and secularist debate.

8.5. Turkish political culture

On Chapter 3, it has been written that, for some scholars, the development of a country's political culture is essential for its successful democratisation; others, on the other hand, believed this would only develop with a real democratic experience and that, therefore, political culture was not a *sine qua non* condition for democratisation. In either cases, this variable should take into account when studying the process of democratisation.

The existence of a political culture in a certain country implies that its citizens have already learnt (considering it is possible to have learnt such dynamic and abstract reality rather than following its continuous and changing nature) how to cope or deal with the political process, usually the norms and practices of the democratic regime, in the sense that they are able to play the rules of the game and to act accordingly. This learning process, as any other social phenomenon, is achieved through a broader socialisation process. Socialisation entails the internalisation of a symbolic code through individual-society exchanges in an interactive and multidirectional process that allows the person to develop a representation of the world he or she lives in (Dubar, 1997: 30, 31). Under the influence of several socialisation agents, this interaction permits that the individual builds structures of identification with several groups, builds his or her own identity and develops bonding relationships with others (Idem: 31).

In the same way, political culture is also learnt and it is built over the years with different experiences depending on the context one is embedded in. Percheron (*cited in* Dubar, 1997: 31) defines socialisation as “personally assuming the group's attitudes so that, without realising it, it leads our behaviour”. Although it is also true that individuals contribute to the development and reshaping of the groups they belong to as well – recalling the Constructivist thought –, it is relevant to stress that these groups constitute an important major structure in which the individual fits and which provides his or her major patterns of behaviour. Political socialisation, more specifically, conveyed through political representations and choices, is not a one-time phenomenon, but it is built

“as if they were periodic rearrangements resulting simultaneously from the new assimilations (...) and from the adjustments to the evolutions (...) which allows to reorganise sufficiently coherently the elements (...) of a system of political representations progressively more

internalised and constitutive of the social identity (...)” (Percheron *cited in* Dubar, 1997: 33).

Turkey is not, as Dodd (1992: 16) put it, a newcomer to Liberalism and democracy; since the Ottoman Empire they imported indirectly these Western concepts and Atatürk inherited this tradition of modernising and westernising the country. Maybe because of that democracy is Turkey’s twelfth most significant problem in the eyes of Turks (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 48). Only 0,8% of the respondents were worried about democracy in the country and 0,6% with the lack of opposition, for example. The top concerns were whether related to economy (unemployment: 38%; inflation: 12%) or to security (terrorism: 11%). This may be a good sign in the sense that the state of Turkish democracy is satisfactory for its inhabitants. Moreover, when asked about the democratic system, almost 79% of respondents agreed that democracy, despite its problems, is still much better than any other regime. 7,4% disagreed and 13% didn’t decide (Idem: 55). These numbers match Fattah’s findings regarding the high level of democratisation potential in Turkey.

Turgut Özal is one of the examples of a Turkish leader that reconfigured the country’s political culture (obviously not to mention Mustafa Kemal). Isabel David (2012: 179) wrote that his term in office brought a political and economic restructuring to the country. Özal embodied a break with the Ottoman tradition of the state as the biggest consumer and of the culture of the people’s dependency on the state (Evin, 2005: 34). Therefore, the 1980s marked a shift away from etatism and an emphasis on the economic activity and entrepreneurship. Moreover, he was able to raise the citizens’ perception and understanding of the civil society and pluralism (Idem: 36). Nonetheless, this legacy did not remain for long, as political clientelism and intolerance towards political opposition, two “deeply rooted characteristics of Turkish political culture” (Idem: 36) were not able to be overcome and jeopardised the previous efforts. Özal prepared Turkey for international economic competition, but he would not mind to ignore the law if he needed to (Idem: 34). And besides his strong religious character, a novelty in modern Turkey, he regarded democratic transition as a detail, which led to a petition signed by prominent Turks who asked for the prohibition of laws against democracy (David, 2012: 180).

Another important aspect of Turkish political culture is the country’s Constitutional tradition – the first dates back to the Ottoman Empire in 1876, as Ali Usul recalls (2011: 155). Then, there were the 1924, the 1961 and the 1982


Constitutions, none of which were prepared by a Constituent Assembly though, granting them a very “weak political legitimacy” (Idem: 156). Despite the undemocratic nature of the last one, for example, as it was produced by a military regime after the *coup*, several amendments in the meanwhile have progressively democratised: from 2001 to 2004, there were 43 amendments which equalled changes in over 170 laws, most of which were due to the European Union’s pressure (Idem: 156). And although Ali Usul (Idem: 156) believes that these improvements do not necessarily mean the regime’s democratic consolidation, the truth is that the existence of these procedures *per se*. are already important benchmarks to consolidate Turkey’s political culture, since those political decisions implied democratic debates, bargaining and compromise between political parties and the society within the democratic structures and institutions. When conveyed to the public, these democratic moments also constitute key moments of socialisation, given the fact that the population realises how their political representatives work within the system trying to solve the country’s problems.

The agents of socialisation in this field are political parties. In Turkey, they resemble the European peers, but, as Fernandes (2004: 111) reminds, the country’s Islamic character and Atatürk’s legacy introduce influential idiosyncrasies in the Turkish partisan system, which is responsible, from the perspective of Usul (2011: 157), for the weakening of institutionalisation due to its increasing volatility and ideological polarisation. Moreover, the same author argues that a signal of the lack of a strong political culture in the country is the electorate’s volatility, as 20% of the electors vote in different parties at each election (Idem: 157). Teixeira Fernandes’ (2004: 74) concern, on the other hand, is not about the electorate, but rather about whether the Islamic parties achieved the level of democratic maturity required to integrate the partisan system accepting its rules and practices. In fact, this is a pertinent question, but at least during the first decade of the twenty-first century, generally speaking, the AKP, as an Islamic party, has played the democratic game, even though some less democratic tendencies have emerged from time to time.

Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007: 81) asked in their survey whether “political parties that base their policies on religion should be a part of the Turkish political party system”, and in 1999 only 24,6% agreed with that; however, the 2006 numbers changed and 41,4% agreed. Conversely, the opponents to the participation of religious parties decreased from 60,6% to 53,6%. Although these numbers may signify a retrocession in

terms of the popular willingness to involve religion in politics, they are coherent with the rest of the survey and with the Islamic resurgence worldwide in the last decades. Figure 16 below shows another major issue concerning political Islam, which is the existence of a regime based on Sharia. As these numbers clarify, the majority of the population, and in a growing number over the years, do not want a Sharia-based state in their country. That increase has been steady since 1998, even though the other answers show a different behaviour and are more volatile.

Figure 16: “Would you want a Shari’ah-based religious regime to be established in Turkey?”



Source: Abridged by the author from Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 81

Thus, the consolidation of Turkey’s political culture is, as in any other country, a very long and complex process. The war against the PKK, for example, fosters a “negative atmosphere for democratic political culture” (Usul, 2011: 154) as it frequently implies ignoring fundamental rights protected by the democratic regime. As the official from the Ministry for EU Affairs stated, “our political culture is a bit prone to clashes, especially from the 1970s onwards” (Interview, 2013i) and when asked if it was caused by a lack of political tradition in Turkey, the interviewee answered positively (Idem).

One of the Human Rights Turkey has been performing poorly is related to freedom of expression. According to the same study, 80% of the surveyed agreed with the statement according to which “the freedom of people to express themselves freely should not be limited by any means” and only 7,3% disagreed with it (Çarkoğlu &

Toprak, 2007: 55). This is an impressive number, mainly if one compares it to the results of another question in the same survey: “Do you think that the repeated publication of the cartoons of Prophet Mohammad by a Danish newspaper, despite strong opposition from the Islamic world, is an inevitable consequence of democracy and the freedom of thought?” (Idem: 54). 73% of the respondents opted for the option “Such publications must be prevented”, against the mere 15% who considered that a result of the freedoms granted by democracy. Therefore, these results are paradoxical; in actual fact, it seems that Turks theoretically believe that there should be freedom of expression, but then when that freedom is exercised by someone who does not share their beliefs, i.e. who satirised their prophet, their decision is to prevent those publications, curtailing someone’s freedom of expression. Moreover, if one scrutinises these results, it is possible to notice that those 73% can reach and overcome the threshold of the 80% in some particular sections of the Turkish society: AKP supporters, literates without a diploma, rightists, Islamists and women who wear a *çarşaf*. They overcome the 90% of the respondents from Aegean, Black Sea, Eastern and South-eastern regions and even the 100% of the ones who stated that they would want their wives to wear a *çarşaf* (Idem: 55).

A Turkish academic commented in one of the interviews on the Islamists’ difficulties to embrace the democratic principles:

“Turkish Islamists did not have an idea of democracy in their political culture and through EU instrumentality and conditionality. With the support and promotion of the Turkish liberal circles (intellectuals and big business), they tried to make up or convert the former not very democratic (I wouldn’t say undemocratic) Islamist into democratising agents. This is obviously not an easy process to achieve in anyway, in any country, in any social context. They tried to create a democratic culture from a non-democratic political movement, which used to be very hierarchical, very leader-oriented and democracy is something Western, of course. It was not very easy for the Turkish Islamists to embrace the principles, the idea and practices of democracy” (Interview, 2013e).

Still linked to the religious component of Turkish democracy and its political culture, it is important to highlight the role of religious brotherhoods, which are frequently pointed out as part of the “deep state” in Turkey. One example is the Gülen Movement or the *Fethullacılar*, considered by many as the “Islamic modernisers”

(Mango, 2004: 130) and led by Fethullah Gülen.⁸⁵ This group “seeks to convert contemporary society by the example of its good works” (Idem: 130). Hence, they support a wide number of schools, universities, dormitories, hospitals, media groups and other social facilities; they are funded by donations and contributions (mostly from businessmen) and claim not to be a political movement. The representative of the “Journalists and Writers Foundation” talked about the *Hizmet* movement (*Hizmet* means The Service, another name to the Gülen movement) during the interview and presented it as a civic moment that was born in the context of the 1970s instability (Interview, 2013d). As this foundation is one of the branches of the *Fethullacılar* (another possible designation), he introduced some of the main ideas behind the project, namely that it opted for a more traditional approach, accepting, nevertheless, modern ideas and tools in a “love-oriented, not normative, interpretation of Islam” (Idem). As an organisation, they are not hierarchical and compose a very loose network – so loose, that the number of members or followers is not even estimated, according to him. With the slogan “peace through education”, the Gülen movement has two main binding rules: to serve all human beings in the world (and hence all the international projects on the most varied fields) and not to have political ambitions (Idem).

Yet, although they claim not to be politically involved, as long as they emphasise the Turkish nationalism and reject the Kemalist doctrine, underlining the Ottoman heritage and the religious component of the country’s identity (David, 2012: 268), it is natural that “most secularists fear them” (Mango, 2004: 130). In fact, in an anonymous and off the record interview (not included in the references for its anonymous character), a Turkish secularist drew very hard criticisms on the Gülen movement. According to him,

“the Gülen movement is one of the biggest threats to democracy in Turkey. (...) the Gülen movement scares me. They are not open (...), they can tap your telephone conversations, they can follow your e-mails, (...) they control the police department intelligence (...). So, this is a hidden power which tries to dominate and there is also an internal fight between the government and the Gülen movement. (...) Of course this is a political movement. They talk about dialogue, they talk about tolerance, so why do you want to control the intelligence service of the police department? (...) They tell us this is a civil society organisation, they are not political, they have no political ambition, etc, but this is bullshit. I mean, it has to be... I mean, I am not against people having a political agenda. You can pursue a Sharia order – I don’t care. I mean,

⁸⁵ For more details on the premises of this group and other relevant information on their work and development, cf., for example, David, 2012: 268-276.

there are people that want to live in a very religious Islamic order, but that's ok. But they [the Gülen] are not open. They say... Their language is so friendly, but their agenda is so aggressive, so hostile; if they target you, they dig on your history. (...)"

In fact, there are widespread rumours that the Gülen movement has some type of involvement in the political and social structures of the country. However, a Turkish academic stated that the organisation has a role in democratisation, but its aim is not a revolution or political participation: "If he [Fethullah Gülen] wanted to be in power, he could already be in 2003 after the crisis. He was powerful and with strong popular support. The real aim is to develop a strong civil society in Turkey" (Interview, 2013b). In addition, this scholar also answered to Erdoğan's accusations that the movement was part of the deep state, arguing that Gülen has invested in education for 30 years to create a better society and that Gülen was an intellectual, not a charismatic politician; besides, he said that all the strong political institutions that arose from the 1980 *coup* are all in the hands of Erdoğan (Idem), suggesting it would be difficult to penetrate in such a state.

8.5.1. Civil society – a brief context

Civil society has been regarded by some authors (as explained on Chapter 3) as a cornerstone of any democratisation process. They are fundamental to promote transition and to support consolidation; without its true commitment, it is hard to find a real democracy established.

The Turkish Ambassador to Portugal stated in her interview that "in the 1990s, they [civil society and NGOs] were seen as trouble makers" (Interview, 2013a), due to the generalised distrust towards them. Besides, Usul (2011: 159, 160) explains, the historically strong state tradition in Turkey was responsible for the lack of a vigorous and active civil society in the country; for elites, strong NGOs would mean a threat to a secular and united state, so their existence and development was not supported by the state until very recently – the 2004 Association Law (Idem: 160, 161). Another Turkish scholar (Interview, 2013e) agrees with this vision and adds that "civil society has been mostly directed and manipulated by the state". According to him, they play, however, an important role in Turkish politics, but only the powerful big business (who force

Turkey to attach to the EU) and a more recent conservative Islamist civil society that is already linked with the political process and the government itself, revealing an ambivalent position towards the EU – when “they realised that there are limits for their aspirations or demands to the EU” (Idem).

The official from the Ministry for EU Affairs, when asked about the lack of a strong civil society in Turkey, denied it:

“I do not really agree with that. (...) Turkish culture is a long-standing culture and actually in 1911 the law of associations was more liberal than the 1982 law of associations. Now we have a liberal law of associations since 2004; (...) but to say that Turkey is lacking a civil society culture would not be true” (Interview, 2013i).

On the contrary, the more recent positive developments on Turkish civil society is attributed by the same interviewee to a “success of the European tools” (Idem), given the fact that before 2005 or 2006, the state was

“a bit suspicious about the NGOs receiving grants, but after the new law and after having a new department of associations in the Ministry of Interior, they understood that this may constitute a threat, but it is also an opportunity. (...) So, European dynamics have created a momentum of NGOs. So, what I am saying is that there was a civil? Yes, but it was broken down to pieces in the 1980s and the 1990s and, with the accession process, this NGO moment has also triggered bureaucratic movements, so they wanted to respond to the NGOs, they wanted to work with the NGOs; but at least if they don't want to work with the NGOs, they want to listen and to control the NGOs. The bureaucracy also started to be involved in meetings of NGOs, they go there giving speeches. If you check back 10 years, 15 years, you don't see many Ministers going to some small NGO meetings. But today every minister, in his everyday programme, has at least one or two NGOs' meeting or some people from NGOs speaking with them” (Idem).

This involvement of the civil society in the political process is corroborated by the Turkish Ambassador to Portugal, when she affirms that there are signs of change in Turkey and that NGOs and civil society have been included in the creation of the new Constitution and have been asked about what they want (Interview, 2013a). Additionally, one of the interviewees related to an NGO also recognised that in the last ten years there was a positive evolution of the civil society to operate: when the military were in power, individuals could not voice their opinions; however, more recently, “the quality and size of civil society increased substantially” (Interview, 2013d).

The women's rights activist, on the other hand, was not so optimistic. According to her, despite the difficulties to raise money for the organisation, there were positive

developments “on paper. But the attitude, the thinking... (...) In the last ten years we are really feeling the difference in the field. Before, everyone was welcoming us; now, with this rising conservatism, they say ‘we do not have any women’s problems here’” (Interview, 2013g). Moreover, she discloses that there is not a charity tradition in Turkey in what comes to organisations, because Turks, after three military *coups*, do not believe in organisations and look at them as terrorists or anarchists (Idem).

Therefore, the feedback from the interviews was somehow contradictory, but all seem to point to a set of partial conclusions: first, there was not a tradition of a strong civil society in Turkey, mainly to the constraints imposed in the military-created Constitution of 1982 that limited freedom of association; secondly, the Turkish tradition of a strong state was not supportive of that dimension either; third, there have been legal improvements during the period under study in the field of freedom of association and then NGOs and representatives of the civil society had the possibility to develop and improve their status; fourth, despite these developments, Turks’ mentality is still stuck in the previous phase of the country, as they are suspicious about the intentions and goals of their country’s organisations and, probably, that hampers their willingness to cooperate with those organisations; fifth and finally, this whole question is contextualised within the broader framework of the Turkey’s political culture, which seems not to be as developed as in many other consolidated democracies; yet, one has to take into consideration the country’s idiosyncrasies that stem from its history and its socio-cultural features, namely religion. As Usul also concludes, tolerance towards difference and interpersonal trust in the country are very low (Usul, 2011: 163); besides, the same author quotes a 2004 study that concluded “Turkey does not at present possess a broad-based democratic culture” (Tessler and Altinoglu *cited in* Usul, 2011: 163).

8.5.2. *Civil-military relations*

Another fundamental field when analysing a population’s political culture are civil-military relations. The military have played an influential role in Ottoman/Turkish society since the thirteenth century – the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey also had a military background. Forming the elite and entrenched in the spirit of Kemalist heritage, they have considered themselves the guardians of secularism and democracy in

Turkey since the twentieth century. Nevertheless, a particularly ardent pursuit of the defence of these principles very often lead them to relatively direct forms of intervention in political and civil issues, in complete accordance with the views of the general population. In regards to the implications for the European Union, however, this situation is not conducive to the consolidation of Turkish democracy and, consequently, for the process of accession. In fact, it creates an outcome that is diametrically opposed to it, eroding the quality of democracy and perverting this group's ideology.

Although the Turkish military were important in the early stages of democratisation (as "guardians"), any political involvement at this point would only harm the quality of democracy. The historical background of the role of the military has been presented in previous chapters and is particularly relevant to understand the current state of civil-military relations in the country: their modernisation, their political involvement, the military successes, the popular support, among other variables are important to be kept in mind when analysing this subject.

According to Dagi (1996: 124), there are two conflicting political traditions within the Turkish military: one which is marked by an interventionist strategy, less trusting in politicians, and assuming the role of "guardians" in a considerably authoritative sense; the other political tradition may be termed a "moderniser", highlighting the importance of democracy and being comprised of Western-oriented governance. This dilemma derives from the declaration made by the TAF stating that they are the "only cohesive and uncorrupted state elite" (Idem: 125), and according to most opinion polls, the majority of Turks feel the same way. Sarigil (2009) concludes that the military are very popular in Turkey⁸⁶, not only among common citizens, but also within specific professional groups, such as the academics. The answer again lies in the popular perception – the Turkish military are seen as "the most egalitarian, non-politicised, and professional public institution compared with the political class that was often unstable, corrupt and unreliable." (Aydin & Keyman *apud* Sarigil, 2009: 709).

For the author, the dynamics behind this phenomenon are unknown, but the prestige the military enjoy is fundamental to their capacity for influencing the political process, as their actions can be regarded as legitimised by popular support. So, in order to decrease the military's influence over the population and politics, as well as to

⁸⁶ 61% of the Turks have a "great deal of confidence" in the military, in contrast with the 33% of the Americans and the 7% of the Spaniards (Sarigil, 2009: 709,710).

enhance the trust in accountable, democratic institutions, it is very important to understand why the Turks still feed those perceptions. Geography and security are two of the reasons (unstable neighbourhood, PKK terrorism, Aegean disputes, etc. create a perception of continual external and internal threat, putting the survival of their State in the hands of the military); religion and the polarisation of the society due to the threats to the Kemalist principles and secularism in general are another important hint.

Another reason for the positive light in which the population perceives the Armed Forces is rooted in Turkish culture and identity. However, as outlined by Constructivism, both facets are changeable and it is therefore possible that these traditions which shape the relationship between the military and the populace may be altered and replaced by a different kind of relationship. Kuloğlu & Şahin (2006: 89) explain that patriotism and ceremonies are a very important part of the Turkish culture: values like loyalty, self-sacrifice, courage and strength are esteemed in this society and allow further rationalisation of the military's popular support. Turks also emphasise the collective rather than the individual (Konijnenbelt, 2006: 161) and the education system itself reinforces ideas such as "all Turkish heroes are warriors" or that "every Turk is born a soldier" (Idem). These, and others, are social phenomena that apart from being of academic interest, might be an important element in explaining the intimate relationship between both parts – the celebration of a son's departure for and the return from the military service or his letter with a photograph in uniform received with joy and pride (Varoglu & Bicaksiz, 2005: 585) exemplifying the social importance given to the fact.

Finally, the historical and political legacy: the role of the military during the Cold War, the alliance with the United States and accession to NATO improved the TAF's prestige both worldwide and within the country. Furthermore, the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, the Independence War and Kemalism, as well as the lack of a strong democratic tradition (Güney & Karatekelioğlu, 2005: 442, 443) reinforce the military's role in the country and its wide acceptance. Regarding this last point, they emerge as an alternative to the "petty party politics" (Idem: 442, 443), to corruption, or the civilian's alleged inability to solve crisis. Bringing together this legacy and Demirel's thesis that "the nature of an outgoing authoritarian regime has a significant impact on a new democracy" (2005: 246) and that a positive evaluation of a military rule makes it very hard to regard democracy "the only game in town" (Idem: 246), logical reasoning brings

us to the very complex relationship between the military and democracy, and mainly between the common Turk and the democratic system. As Narli wrote:

“Cultural and institutional factors offer a clear explanation of civil-military relations in Turkey. (...) This ruling style is the product of Turkey’s specific cultural, social and institutional context, featuring a stratified society and political culture as well as historic conflicts with neighbouring states. Such conditions significantly influence the military’s role in the nation.” (Narli *apud* Güney & Karatekelioğlu, 2005: 442)

Democracy has been central in the discussion regarding civil-military relations, an occurrence resulting from the rule of law and its principle of civilian control over the military as one of the cornerstones of the democratic regime. The most common theory regarding civil-military relations centres around the principle that the military should be subordinate to civilians and never encroach on politics. In Turkey, notwithstanding, the situation is not as transparent as this basic rule dictates, as it has been realised. Civil-military relations in Turkey are especially difficult to manage and to categorise, due to all those above mentioned specificities. In regards to democratic consolidation, though, the TAF’s political participation is a serious impediment, and this area remains very problematic, for example, in the European Commission Annual Reports – as it will be seen further on. And although authors like Satana (2008: 358) affirm that “absolute military disengagement from politics is unrealistic for countries like Turkey”, the European Union is not very likely to take that into consideration.

With the end of the Cold War and the approximation to Europe, Turkish civil-military relations had to be redefined, as Turkey no longer played the same role as it used to play during the struggle between the East and the West; in the words of Satana (2008), they needed to shift to a “post-modern military paradigm”. Satana analysed the different dimensions of civil-military relations in the country and assessed if it was at this advanced level, or still in the “late modern paradigm”. In order to do so, Nil Satana used ten indicators and concluded that “the Turkish military is in transformation and is following the Western trend slowly but eminently. The armed forces seem to realise the changes from modern to postmodern realities and adapts in time.” (Idem: 380).

So, if Satan’s reasoning is to be followed, the TAF are transforming, i.e. there have been changes and improvements. However, according to the EU, they haven’t reached a desirable stage. What has failed, or is still failing? The central point is that,

aside from what happened in Greece, the power of the Turkish military after the 1980 intervention remained considerable, complicating the consolidation process, given the fact that the Armed Forces should not keep tutelary powers within the context of a healthy consolidated democracy (Gürsoy, 2008: 312). This power has been used over the last few decades to allow the TAF to exert some influence on political issues, not directly connected with the military institution, namely political Islam. Akay (2010: 6) exposes the key problem of the Turkish civil-military relations:

“Security has been and is a problematic and contentious area in the Turkish political system due to both the structural, functional, and organizational significance of the security sector within this system and to the autonomous and leading role that the security sector plays.”

Therefore, one of the problems concerning these relations is the 1982 Constitution, stemming from the military *coup* and consisting of a legal system characterised by a focus on national security within the society, transforming Turkey into a “state of security” (Idem: 8).

A second issue, tightly linked with the previous one, concerns the Ministry of Defence and the fact that this institution has to act according to the defence policy of the Armed Forces and in line with the principles and priorities of the Chief of Staff (Idem: 9), who, in turn, answers directly to the Prime-Minister and not to the Minister of Defence (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 153). This is undoubtedly a question of an authority that is diverted from the democratically elected government to a body that not only is not directly accountable to the population, but that is also very poorly controlled by accountable institutions: “This situation can be described as a textbook case of ‘distorted authority-accountability relationship’.” (Bayramoğlu *apud* Akay, 2010: 9).

The influence of the National Security Council (NSC) (*Milli Güvenlik Kurulu*), on the other hand, has been decreasing due to EU proposals, but since its creation, this body set the perfect example of how the TAF wanted to intervene in politics: essentially composed of military staff, its decisions had priority in the Council of Ministers and both the Prime-Minister and the Chief of Staff had the same power to set the agenda of the NSC. As mentioned above, this situation has changed in recent years; nevertheless, Faucompret and Konings (2008: 153) believe this institution is (or at least was) a “shadow government through which the generals can impose their will on Parliament and the government.”. In actuality, the status of this body detracts from the healthy functioning of democracy, again subverting the rule of accountable institutions.

In practice, the Internal Service Law, which states in its article 35 that “The role of the Armed Forces is to guard and protect the Turkish homeland and the Republic of Turkey” (Akay, 2010: 15), is in practice regarded as superior to international agreements (Idem). The Internal Service Regulations of the Turkish Armed Forces is another legislative document that one can regard as supportive of the military interferences (Heper & Güney, 2000: 637), but, although these famous articles are quoted to legitimise the interventions, article 43 of the Internal Service Law also forbids military staff to enter politics – and there are few who cite it. The concept of the Armed Forces as the protectors of the Turkish Republic has, as realised, historical groundings; however, that need to protect the state from the profusely mentioned internal and external threats no longer makes sense, as the Turkish democracy has matured enough to protect itself against those threats, even more so if the country is looked at as a European Union candidate. So, the action of the Armed Forces (or their eventual opposition to the changes in their institution) generates the result they pretend to avoid, damaging the country’s path towards a consolidated democracy.

Some other issues might be pointed to as clear threats to that consolidation: for instance, the parliamentary oversight is problematic (Akay, 2010: 15, 16), obviously raising concerns regarding democracy. The range of the Parliament’s action is very limited in practice – the Parliament’s commission responsible for the military does not possess the authority to deal with the budget or security policy and is only authorised to review the drafts of the legislation (Idem: 15, 16); the same happens with investigations and inquiries which are very rarely subject to control. The existence of a “military judiciary” and blurred boundaries within the civil courts (Idem: 16, 17) are two other important factors which should not be disregarded, as well as the military schools that are outside the scope of control of the Ministry of Defence. In addition, it is still possible to mention the TAF’s monopoly of arms’ production (Idem: 19) and the fact that some personnel, despite not being trained, are armed and very often enjoy a high degree of impunity (Idem: 20-24).

These are some of the failures that Akay reported in the quoted document, but many others can be located therein. They have a single aspect in common: the TAF’s high degree of independence is contrary to the European pattern of civil-military relations. That autonomy also means that a body that is not accountable exerts a lot more influence than it is supposed to in a democratic society – even though they believe

they are protecting that same society. The consolidation of democracy and the path towards the European Union are the ones that suffer most from the excessive influence of the military.

Bastiaan Konijnenbelt's (2006) article, in which the author analyses the public statements of the Turkish General Staff (an informal mechanism of public influence) and of the government, in seven different fields. The results are meaningful: in contrast with the EU practice, the Turkish General Staff adopts positions on national policy issues not in accordance with the position of the government, making statements before the government cleared its position and on matters outside the scope of defence and security, never alluding to the fact that the statement is under the authority of the government (Idem: 189). Such an example is very significant, because it shows how the military perceive themselves, acting completely independently from the civil authorities: the TAF are "acting as an autonomous actor in Turkish politics. Not *de iure*, but *de facto*" (Idem) and this situation is not in line with the European model.

As a state that was born and developed through bellic means, in Turkey, the military have always had a level of prestige attributed to them, garnering the support of different social groups, and therefore perceiving themselves as the guardians of a state, perpetually in peril, both internally and externally. As an important pillar against political Islam and other threats, the TAF have indeed played a vital role in safeguarding democracy.

Nevertheless, in the present context of European candidacy and democratic consolidation, the political interference of the military is regarded as negative, because their involvement deteriorates basic fundamental features of a Western-like democratic country, such as the rule of law. In this sense, the EU, despite the vagueness of its orientation, has been very critical of the state of Turkish civil-military relations (as it is understood by the reading of the Commission's progress reports) and has demanded a range of changes and reforms – some of which have already been institutionalised, while others are to follow, but many are still to be appropriated. As the Armed Forces' popularity was heavily reliant upon the perception of continual threat, the more peaceful environment that is offered by the European Union could only placate this feeling. Democracy will only be truly internalised when, among other signals, it is perceived as the "only game in town" and when Turkish citizens trust the democratic institutions are

able to solve internal or external threats that may emerge – in fact, this perception will only strengthen and legitimise democracy.

Furthermore, the positive evaluation of the military by the population damages the ‘habituation phase’ as people will fail to internalise the habits of democracy. This perception of the military rule as a success, together with TAF’s self-perception that it is part of their duty to safeguard certain principles, make it harder for democracy to be truly consolidated. The Greek episode shows that it is possible for the military to remain in their barracks, but this is not very likely to occur until their own notion of what constitutes a prospective threat is diminished, and the general population as well as the elite refuse to support their interventions.

Nonetheless, Turkey is not starting from zero; as already stated, the Turkish government has accepted many European suggestions and made many reforms over recent years, even if some of them hoisted opposition to the military. In 2007, the diaries of a former Commander of the Navy were published and revealed a military conspiracy against the AKP in the years 2003 and 2004: more than 100 people were involved (not only military staff, but also journalists and academics) and the trial began in 2008. The reasons behind this conspiracy were the reforms led by the AKP government to meet the Copenhagen political criteria, which decreased military independence, creating their discontent – they believed this was part of the AKP’s hidden agenda to weaken the guardians of the secular Republic. The adoption of European rhetoric, the recognition of minorities’ rights and the revision of the policy regarding Cyprus were other AKP measures that displeased the TAF. But the AKP’s strength and the divisions within the Armed Forces led to the abortion of the *coup* and the judicial investigation brought the role of the military to the public arena.

In relation to the topic of EU membership, the Turkish Armed Forces are in favour of the economic benefits, but they will not accept concessions on issues such as the Kurds, Cyprus, Armenia or the Aegean Sea. Furthermore, the military believe that some of the EU’s requests endanger secular democracy, as they curtail the action of the TAF who, completely submitted to the civil forces, would not be able to defend secularism. The European Union considers it one of the democratic failures of Turkey, which means that Turkish civil-military relations are an impediment to accession and also a setback in the country’s democratisation process, as well as an obstacle to the maturation of its political culture.

8.5.3. *A strong state, a strong leader*

Whether one thinks about the Sultanate regime of the Ottoman Empire, the vigour of Mustafa Kemal's policies as Turkey's leader during the establishment of the new Republic or even the charismatic and popular Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, it is not difficult to conceive the Turkish state as a traditionally strong entity with a high emphasis on the image of a strong political leader. Currently, there is even a heated debate on the new Constitution and the introduction of a Presidential system, which would follow this logic of a relatively high concentrated level of power in a single state's figure.

A Turkish scholar asserted that traditional political elites are "too state-centred, as they considered the life and security and survival of the state were above all the benefits, the well-being and the freedom of each individual" (Interview, 2013e). In fact, this situation has not completely changed over the years under analysis (1999-2009); the same interviewee pointed it out:

"the problem in Turkish democracy is not about civil-military-relations, etc etc etc. (...) The point is this: the government itself and its Prim-Minister have a very strong tendency to monopolise power. This is the main weakness of Turkish democratisation process; even his ministers cannot make autonomous decisions without asking him first. (...) His authoritarian tendencies are the weakest point of Turkish democratisation efforts today" (Idem).

In fact, and from the several interviews and informal conversations with Turks during the field work, there seems to be a generalised feeling (not among AKP's most obvious supports, of course) that this "authoritarian" tendency has been being revealed over the years in a growing way.

Erdoğan became a full-time politician in 1983 linked to the *Refah Partisi* and his aim was to change the party's image. In a speech to party's members at that time, he said:

"Greet everyone. Don't forget to greet all your neighbours in the block where you live or passers-by in the street. If you say *es-selâmü aleyküm* [Peace Be Upon You – the traditional Muslim greeting] and get no response, you must understand that the man you address does not like this form of greeting. Then say *merhaba* [Hello – a word of Arabic origin]. If again there's no sign of understanding, substitute *İyi günler* [Good day – the modern pure Turkish form]. If there is no response either, then perhaps you are speaking to George [an English-

speaking foreigner]. So, greet him [in English] with ‘Hello, good morning!’” (Erdoğan *cited in* Mango, 2004: 110).

This excerpt from Erdoğan’s speech is revealing of the kind of politician the future prime-minister would become. In a simple way, he enlightened his party colleagues how to please everyone; it does not matter who you are dealing with, the person in front of you can possibly vote for you and it is not difficult to empathise with people – you just tell them what they want to hear: a Muslim greeting, an anti-Kemalist greeting, a pro-Kemalist greeting and even a greeting for foreigners. The message is clear: if a politician wants to be elected and popular, he or she cannot distinguish people based on their political and philosophical affinity, the politician should please everyone and respect their origins or choices. This is identity politics. It is not possible to know for sure if Erdoğan truly used the advice he had given, but, in case he did, it is a successful political strategy, as in 1994 Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the mayor of Istanbul at the very early age of 40 and, at that moment, he began to shave his long beard and to wear suits – although his wife did not give up on her headscarf (Mango, 2004: 110). Again, voters may identify themselves either with a beard-shaved, neat suit-wearing man or with his more conservative, head-covered woman. “As a mayor, Erdoğan learned to work effectively within the system” (Idem: 110).

In truth, there was a mistake regarding “working within the system” and that was when the then mayor of Istanbul was arrested for quoting Gökalp, a Turkish nationalist theorist. But prison “taught him a lesson in prudence” (Idem: 110) and he emerged as a more moderate politician – the one who would reach the governance of the whole nation right in the beginning of the new millennium. His victory is frequently attributed to the unstable country he inherited from his predecessors, since the party was fairly recent and for the first time a bipartisan Parliament was able to be built. Both the AKP and its opposition party, the CHP, were engaged in Turkey’s modernisation and integration and had to face serious quandaries during the legislature: Cyprus issue, military’s interferences, Human Rights’ violations and the implementation of minority rights (Çarkoğlu, 2004: 20). Yet, they seemed committed to continue their predecessors’ work on the way to the European full membership; naturally, economic measures were also prioritised given the country’s context.

The novelty, after several military *coups* that deposed more or less assumed religious parties, was that the AKP, despite not considering itself a religious party, had a strong religious tendency – or, as they used to put it, they were to be compared to the

“conservative democratic” parties of Europe (Duran, 2004: 134). At that time, they rejected the “ideologization of Islam” and did not convey bold Islamic discourses; instead, Erdoğan claimed to be for democracy, freedoms, pluralism, secularism and tolerance (Idem: 134) – at least, those were the words he used in 2002. In that sense, his message was truly appealing to the both sides of a divided society. The party’s foreign policy intentions and popular support has already been mentioned in a previous chapter and therefore it is not worthy to repeat it here, but it should not be forgotten that both the European Union and the approval of a new Constitution were two of the most powerful flags of the party in what came to its earlier election campaigns. One of the controversial issues of that new document, as written above, is the presidential system. As a political scientist noted, Turkey already has a semi-presidential system, “but it has no tradition of using those presidential powers” (Interview, 2013b). However, the doubt lies in the current Prime Minister’s intention regarding this change. Some theories believe that this is part of a plan for Erdoğan to leave the government in order to become President in a system in which his powers would be reinforced over the ones of the Prime Minister. However, that does not please the current President, who, many people conjecture, will run for the executive (Idem).

An important issue of checks and balances are therefore at stake when talking about the new Turkish Constitution. The result of that process will extraordinarily influence the quality of the country’s democracy. Nonetheless, the current status of Turkish democracy does not thrill many people who are sceptical about the government’s intention. According to that line of thought, “since 2006-2007, we do not see a government keen on democratising Turkey’s political system, but which tries to undermine the democratisation process which itself contributed a lot to” (Interview, 2013e). The interviewee gives the example of the pressure on the media and summarises with the conclusion that “Erdoğan is a powerful leader and, if you want something to change in Turkish politics, you have to do it with Erdoğan” (Idem) – reinforcing the thesis that the tradition of a strong state, a strong leader is still rooted in current Turkish political culture, and which may be harmful for the country’s democratic standards. However, this concentration of powers may also be due to the unhealthy working of the checks and balances system, given that a Turkish political scientist affirmed that there is no real democratic alternative to the AKP (Interview, 2013b) and that, therefore, its self-confidence increases as it is aware of being the only viable option for the electors.

Additionally, “internal actors in Turkey do not have confidence in themselves” (Idem), strengthening that feeling.

On the other hand, and that may recall what Usul wrote about the political parties in Turkey, the AKP cannot be a strong party, because, as its leader is so strong and charismatic, AKP’s MPs have to be “low profile” (Idem), originating a really dangerous political situation, mostly when a Turkish political scientist asserts that “our democracy is only as strong as Erdoğan wants it to be” (Idem). For that, he has a solution: the fundamental role of the European Union as an intermediary actor between the polarised internal actors: “the EU is the only alternative that can stop the *Erdoğanisation* of Turkey” (Idem), i.e., the continuation of the ongoing process of power concentration in the figure of one single man and the overshadow of also accountable and representative democratic structures, such as the political parties, the Parliament, the Courts or even the President of the Republic.

As Isabel David (2012: 292) rightly defended, Kemalism is preserved by three guardians: the military, the judicial power and the Presidency of the Republic. However, even in these structures, the government was able to introduce its sympathisers, reducing the power of the secularists – the Presidency of the Republic and the choice of Abdullah Gül almost caused the party to be banned⁸⁷, but they survived and became stronger as a party and with a President close to it. The military have been seen their influence on the political process diminishing⁸⁸ with the Europeanisation of Turkish civil-military relations. The judicial power is a more complex structure and, it would not be untrue to say, maybe the only resisting bastion of Kemalism in general and secularism in particular – even though their presence among its institutions have also been weakened.

On the population’s side, nevertheless, the levels of support for the government are still high. Çarkoğlu and Toprak’s (2007: 92) survey results may be slightly different at the end of that decade; yet, its figures are unambiguous: 67% against 24% consider the AKP government changed for the better the country’s economic conditions; for 66% the relations with the EU improved with AKP and for 62% the Turkish politics improved as well. Concerning the evaluation of the party on different issues, almost 54% of the respondents agreed that the AKP is a party committed to democracy and

⁸⁷ Cf. Isabel David, 2012: 304-ff.

⁸⁸ The Ergenekon case, for exemple.

over 50% of the surveyed believed the party that supported fundamental rights and freedoms the most – the ones who disagreed composed 26% and 31% of the answers respectively (Idem: 94).

Isabel David's (2012: 377) conclusions are particularly straightforward and touch the essential aspects of all this complex debate:

“the result has been the maintenance, or even the reinforcement, of the authoritarian culture, based on a strong and charismatic leader, which means that, without the EU's condition, there is no longer an incentive to the country's democratisation. (...) AKP's project of democratisation is limited, therefore, to the “tyranny of the majority” (Tocqueville) in which all the powers are controlled by the party.”

Thus, so that Turkey's political culture matures and achieves the levels of consolidated democracies, the country has to overcome several social and political obstacles and to enter a new phase in a way people deal with politics and trust each other.

PART IV - BRINGING EVERYTHING TOGETHER: EU, TURKEY AND DEMOCRACY

9. Turkey-EU relations and legislative changes since 1999

The institutional relations between the European Union and Turkey have already been approached on Chapter 7 with the aim to contextualise the period under study in this thesis. This chapter, not ignoring the knowledge gathered in that part of the work, will attempt to list the key moments of those relations since 1999. Its development before the application of the model – which will take place in the following chapter – is justified by the relevance of the events here presented for a better understanding and interpretation of the model. Secondly, constitutional and other legislative reforms that happened in this period will be included here as well. They have not been presented on Chapter 6 on purpose, since their existence can only be understood in the light of Turkey's relations with the European Union to a great extent, as the timing of their adoption discloses.

The structure of this chapter reflects a division of the larger period into three main smaller units: the first encompasses the years between the Helsinki Council and the general elections (1999-2002); the second represents the first term in office of the newly elected AKP party (2003-2007) and the last one includes the beginning of the party's second term in office until the end of the period under consideration (2007-2009). This division is merely an attempt to organise all the data and the events that occurred in the proposed phases of this eleven-year period. As it may be possible to conclude, these different stages meant different types of relations with the EU and different levels of reforms and changes at the domestic level. Only further data, presented in the next chapter, will prove whether this division makes sense in terms of the fluctuations of the institutional relations between the two actors.

9.1. From Helsinki to the AKP (1999-2002)

Since 1998, the European Commission started to issue Annual Progress Reports (APR) on Turkey and the first document of this type already identified a set of fields on which the country should focus to improve its performance. These included human rights, civil-military relations, death penalty, several freedoms and minorities issues (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 83-84). As a response, Turkey adopted some measures during 1999, amending some articles of the Penal Code, dealing with the definition of controversial concepts like terrorism and abuse of power, increasing freedom of expression, etc. (Idem: 84). As a follow-up of this general environment surrounding the country's approach, the European Council in Helsinki, in December 1999, and after Germany, Austria and Greece having given up their opposition (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 38), the EU declared Turkey had fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria and allowed the country to move towards the new stage in the accession process: Turkey became an official candidate. Thus, after recognising Turkey its new status, the Council sought to combine of all types of assistance to the country in a single pre-accession framework. Besides, the Council also advised the improvement of the political dialogue and the permission for the country to participate in European programmes and agencies (Idem). This means that, since 1999, there was a shift in the paradigm of the European Union's approach towards Turkey and also vice-versa. This shift implied that both factions would need to cooperate more closely to pursue the path of enlargement/accession. This was an important benchmark achieved by Turkey and one that would initiate a significant momentum in Turkish democratisation process as well.

In the 2000 APR, the Commission wrote that several meetings between Turkey and the EU had taken place during that year and that the annual allocation to Turkey would reach the 177 million Euros in 2000 (European Commission, 2000: 7, 8). Moreover, the same document notified that the "compliance with the Copenhagen criteria is a prerequisite for the opening of accession negotiations. So far, Turkey has not fulfilled these political criteria" (Idem: 7). In fact, there were several criticisms regarding the country's shortcomings in terms of its performance at various levels: the Constitution needed to be revised (namely regarding freedom of expression), judicial processes were still too long, the Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure needed to be adopted, the widespread practice of corruption demanded more efforts to be fought

against, the civilian control over the military was not aligned with the European practices and the National Security Council still interfered in politics, death penalty had not been abolished yet, prison conditions were cause of concern, there were many problems regarding freedoms of expression and of the media and of association, minorities were not treated equally, there were no developments in the fights against drugs and fraud, etc. (Idem: 12-64).⁸⁹

Nevertheless, on the other hand, some improvements were also praised by the Commission, *inter alia*, the internal coordination on EU matters and the creation of the General Secretariat for EU Affairs, the increasing number of judges and prosecutors, several programmes to train judges on human rights and the ECHR, human rights education was also included in the curricula of police academies, authorities were in the process of restructuring the prison system and the legal change that allowed parents to choose their children's name freely (Idem). The document concluded that overall "since the last regular report, progress in transposition of legislation in these areas has been limited. As a candidate country, Turkey has to start making substantial progress in alignment with the *acquis*" (Idem: 70).

In March 2001, the European Council adopted an Accession Partnership for Turkey (Council of the European Union, 2001). The document foresaw a set of requests for the country to fulfil in the short and medium terms. As Usul (2011: 62) explains, this type of documents constitutes a roadmap for the candidate country to guide the process of accession. As it can be read in the document, the fields on which the European Union insists to be dealt with are related to the judicial system, different freedoms, torture, ill-treatment and death penalty. These issues were not new for Turkey, but they were emphasised in the Accession Partnership as goals in the short-term, i.e., to be tackled during that same year (Council of the European Union, 2001). In what comes to the medium-term goals, they included broader questions such as border disputes, international conventions, cultural rights, the state of emergency in the country's

⁸⁹ It is important to highlight that the analysis of the European Commission's Progress Reports on Turkey was made taking into consideration mainly the fields more directly related to the issue of democracy. In that sense, the sections on "Democracy and Rule of Law" (which includes the Parliament, the Executive, the judicial system, corruption and civil-military relations), on Human Rights and Protection of Minorities (including civil and political rights, economic, social and cultural rights, and minority rights), as well as on the Chapters 23 and 24 of the *acquis* were the ones chosen to be analysed with closer attention to achieve a broader understanding regarding their evolution in time. Table 12 in Appendix 7 contains a schematic, non-exhaustive, analysis of these fields. Henceforth, any references to the Progress Reports can be completed with more details through the reading of that table.

Southeast, the National Security Council, etc (Idem). This official document can be seen as the first one developed within the scope of the newly acquired status of candidate and as a relevant attempt to promote change and reforms in Turkey towards its own democratisation.

The Council also advised the country to elaborate a national programme for the adoption of the *acquis* in accordance with the Accession Partnership document. That request was accomplished in the same year with the government's approval of the Turkish National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis (NPAA) (Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2001). Prioritising Constitutional Amendments, the document stated that "in 2001, the Turkish Government will speed up the ongoing work on political, administrative and judicial reforms and will duly convey its legislative proposals to the Turkish Grand National Assembly" (Idem: 5). This statement reveals the willingness of the government to pursue with the demanded changes and constituted a positive reaction to the previous document. Yet, some authors (like Usul, 2011: 119) claim that it fell "behind what the EU requested from Turkey in terms of democracy and human rights" and that the lack of precision in the definition of timetables and deadlines also harmed the quality of the first NPAA. Nevertheless, still in 2001, the Turkish Grand National Assembly took several measures to change the country's Constitution, in what appears to be one of the first and most successful moments of conditionality.

The new coalition government built after the 1999 elections created an All-Party Accord Committee, which was composed by two members from each political party and aimed to develop a common ground for the needed Constitutional amendments (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 49). This committee was able to find a consensus on 37 out of 51 amendments, later approved by the Turkish Parliament. According to Özbudun and Gençkaya (Idem: 49-50), one of the motives behind these changes at the Constitutional level was to meet "the economic and political criteria and adopting the required legal regulations in the process of full membership in the EU". In general, the reforms included in this package were more focused on diminishing the legal constraints to human rights, in order to improve their standards (Faucompret & Konings, 2008: 42).

In concrete, and not presenting an exhaustive list⁹⁰, the 2001 Constitutional Amendments included several important steps towards the improvement of the country's democracy:

- Article 1 was amended to diminish the restrictions on freedom of thought and expression;
- gender equality was reinforced with a new text for article 41;
- the number of civilian members of the National Security Council was increased;
- pre-trial detention period was diminished (article 19);
- death penalty was abolished except in cases of war (article 38);
- it was introduced the right to a fair trial (article 36);
- it was established the principle of proportionality;
- articles 13 and 14 were reformulated to limit the abuse of fundamental rights and freedoms
 - namely that not only individuals, but also the state could be charged with the accusation of not respecting them, in line with ECHR recommendations –;
- detainees became able to inform their relatives about the detention some guidelines were introduced some guidelines for the registration of their custody;
- the alteration of article 26 removed the phrase “language prohibited by law”, therefore improving freedom of expression and minorities' rights;
- some parts of article 28 were erased concerning the freedom of the press; article 33 was improved to avoid several restrictions on the establishment of civil society associations;
- article 34 eased the freedom of assembly.
- the amendment of articles 68 and 69 made it more difficult to forbid or dissolve political parties;
- rights of privacy, of family life and the inviolability of the domicile were also developed (articles 5, 20 and 21);
- the restrictions on meetings and demonstration were reduced (article 34);
- and the right to petition was modified to guarantee that petitions would be dealt with more quickly and allowing foreigners resident in Turkey the same right.

(Usul, 2011: 124-125; Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 50-62).

These constitute some of the articles of the Turkish Constitution that were amended in 2001 after the approval of the country's Grand National Assembly. Düzgit and Keyman (2007: 73) assess these reforms as “the first crucial responses to EU conditionality”. Nevertheless, and maybe even more important than that, is the fact that, to achieve this degree of changes in such a fragmented political scenario, Turkish political elites had to overcome some differences and, within the framework of a

⁹⁰ For an extensive work on these amendments, for example cf. Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009.

coalition government and of a not consolidated democratic culture, to be able to join forces to accomplish this endeavour. Besides, the beginning of the 2000s was being marked by a severe economic crisis. As Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009: 62-63) wrote:

“The 2001 constitutional amendments were the most extensive changes that the 1982 Constitution has undergone so far, involving 34 articles. While some of them were relatively minor ‘cosmetic’ changes, others were important steps in the liberalization and democratization process. (...) Also significant is the fact that these amendments were the product of intense negotiations and compromises (...) and that they were adopted through broad inter-party agreements”.

This also meant, according to Kalaycioğlu (2011: 272), that

“there has been relatively large-scale support among Turkish political elites of almost all ideological backgrounds for the deepening of relations between Turkey and the EU. Full membership in the EU is a project that transcends partisan politics and carries multi-party consensus”.

These efforts paid off; the 2001 Progress Report recognised the changes achieved through the above-mentioned reforms and, despite still recognising Turkey’s weaknesses in various domains (asking for their improvement), the document stated that

“since the last Regular Report, further alignment has taken place in these areas. (...) Turkey gained greater understanding of the *acquis* and the government has started an intensive process of preparation of new legislation” (European Commission, 2001: 93, 95).

This positive evaluation was also shared by the European Council, whose conclusions recognised that “good progress has been made in implementing the pre-accession strategy”. (Council of the European Union, 2001a: 2).

Probably due to the impetus created in the previous year, 2002, which began with the entering into force of the new Civil Code (Düzgit & Keyman, 2007: 73), was marked by a set of three harmonisation packages (in February, March and August) and further Constitutional amendments by the end of the year. The main changes brought by the new Civil Code focused on “gender equality, protection of the child and vulnerable persons and the freedom of association” (Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2007: 5). The first package included the amendment of seven articles (7, 8, 16, 107, 128, 159 and 312) that dealt with Laws on the Trial Procedures, the State Security Courts or the Anti-Terror Law (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 128). In this sense, the penalties for some crimes against the state were reduced, propaganda became criminalised only when it is used to encourage terrorism, the pre-trial detention in areas

in state of emergency was reduced from seven to four days, it was given the possibility for the detainees to contact a relative after their arrest, etc. (Usul, 2011: 126, 127).

The second harmonisation package embraced a broader set of 23 articles⁹¹ and concerned fields such as the Press Law, the Law on Associations, on Civil Servants, on Provincial Administration, on Political Parties, on Meetings and Demonstration Marches, among others. These amended articles aimed, for instance, to increase the civilian role in local administration, to limit the Gendarmerie's action in some areas, to prevent torture and ill-treatment, to narrow the possibility to close or ban a political party, to shrink the limitations on the freedoms of association and of expression.

The third harmonisation package, adopted in August, was even broader in terms of the number of articles it was able to change: 43 articles were modified with the aim to approximate the Turkish laws to the European standards. The Press Law, the Law on Associations, the Penal Code, the Law on Foundations, on Foreign Language Teaching and Education, on Forestry, etc. were amended (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 128, 129). As a consequence, death penalty was only kept for cases of war and the cases which it had been applied to were converted into life imprisonment without parole (Usul, 2011: 128). Article 159 was modified so that it would not constitute a crime to criticise state institutions or state personalities, including ministers or even the military – although a safeguard was maintained for the use of insults; non-Muslim minorities recognised in the Lausanne Treaty were granted more rights and freedoms; Kurds were allowed to broadcast in their mother tongue and minorities could create language courses (Idem: 128-129).

These (and other) changes were fundamental in the realm of human rights and fundamental freedoms. For the first time in modern Turkey, Kurds were recognised as a different ethnic group. Besides, both internal and external commentators praised these changes. The Human Rights Watch (*cited in* Usul, 2011: 125) stated that “much what passed as reforms since the beginning of Turkey's candidacy for EU membership has been little more than cosmetic gestures; these new reforms are truly significant”.

In November 2002, general elections were held and, as already written on chapter 6, they were won by the recent AKP. Turkey would enter a new phase in its domestic politics. In fact, as soon as the new party was in charge, some Constitutional

⁹¹ The number of articles included in each harmonisation package presented here comes from the reading of Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009.

amendments were made. Nonetheless, these changes to the 1982 Constitution did not aim to please the European Union or to improve the country's accession process; on the contrary, they planned to allow Erdoğan to become a deputy and, ultimately, the Prime-Minister – since he had been banned from any political activity, as explained previously. Amending articles 76 and 78 and replacing “ideological and anarchistic actions” with “terror actions” as crimes that would exclude someone from the run to political positions, it would be possible to concretise that wish. However, President Sezer (2000-2007) vetoed the law in December on the grounds that it was not in accordance with the principle of rule of law and that rules should not aim a particular individual; they should be objective and general. Still, the AKP passed the amendments with no change and they ended up being adopted (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 63-64).

This first episode with the AKP revealed a tendency that would be confirmed later in the party's action: as they did not need to involve the opposition or other political actors in their choices, some measures would be taken even if they were not supported by the opposition or even the President of the Republic, almost ignoring the system of checks and balances or the symbolic power of the head of the state.

Even before this event, the European Council of Seville (Council of the European Union, 2002: 7), in June, unveiled the possibility of the good news that were to come: in its Conclusions, the Council “encourages and fully supports the efforts made by Turkey (...) [and added that] New decisions could be taken in Copenhagen on the next stage of Turkey's candidature”. The 2002 Progress Report (European Commission, 2002) was also relatively positive regarding the efforts made by the country to pursue with the accomplishment of the Accession Partnership and its path towards the EU. The same document listed the changes led by Turkey:

- State Security Courts improved;
- training programmes for judges continued
- anti-corruption measures taken by the government achieved some results;
- there was a new strategy to promote transparency and good governance;
- National Security Council became formally an advisory institution;
- several Conventions were signed and ratified;
- death penalty was abolished in peacetimes;
- dialogue with civil society was reinforced;
- no disappearances were reported;

- there were projects to reintegrate former prisoners;
- freedom of expression was improved;
- broadcasts in other languages were allowed;
- gender equality was improved;
- public organisations became entitled to hold meetings and demonstrations;
- there were some improvements in the visa policy, as well as in the migration and asylum fields.

Nonetheless, on the other hand, the 2002 Progress Report was also very critical concerning some areas in which Turkey had not done enough⁹²: the duration of judicial procedures was still too long, some articles of the Penal Code originate lack of clarity and legal certainty (allowing diverse, and sometimes opposite, readings), the judiciary did not act independently, corruption remained a serious problem, some important conventions on several issues were not signed or ratified, in practice, the military continued to exert much influence through their interferences in the political life, the sentences for the ones accused of torture and ill-treatment were light, between January and May, 40 books were banned or subject to investigation, it was introduced censorship to Internet content, the authorities still controlled the international relations of Turkish organisations, in practice, also remained many obstacles to hold marches and demonstrations, there were no improvements in the status of Alevis, trade unions were subject to restrictions, etc.

In a nutshell, the 2002 Progress Report stated in its general evaluation that Turkey achieved some improvements, but that there still are “major discrepancies between the *acquis* and Turkish legislation” (Idem: 134). This conclusion implied that, despite the several steps that had been already taken by Turkey, several more would need to be taken if the country really wanted to join the Union. Yet, the Conclusions of the European Council of December (Council of the European Union, 2002a: 5) gave some encouragement to the pursuit of those changes:

“It strongly welcomes the important steps taken by Turkey towards meeting the Copenhagen criteria, in particular through the recent legislative packages and the subsequent implementation measures which cover a large number of key priorities specified in the Accession Partnership. (...)The Union encourages Turkey to pursue energetically its reform process.”

⁹² Again, more details on the content of Progress Reports can be found in Table 12 (Appendix 7).

Thus, between 1999 and the election of the AKP, Turkey led several reforms to harmonise its laws with the European demands, even though the country was facing some internal difficulties and the general environment provided some hurdles, such as the internal opponents to the process, the financial crisis or the fragmented political scene. Yet, as Kalaycioğlu (2011: 273) put it, “It is uncertain whether such progressive changes in the status of women could have taken place under the reign of conservative AKP”. Next section will focus on the party’s first term in office and the development of Turkey-EU relations within that time limit.

9.2. AKP’s first term in office (2003-2007)

General elections were held in Turkey in November 2002, less than two months before the end of the year. For that reason, this section will only begin in 2003, avoiding the partition of 2002 and considering that the new government took the rest of that year to settle down and to find out about the state of the nation.

It was written in the 2003 Progress Report (European Commission, 2003: 16) that these elections were monitored by the European Parliament and the OSCE, which found they had met the international standards as well as reflected the improvements of the reformed legislation on elections. Besides, the same report highlighted the fact that “the goal of EU accession has been amongst the government’s main priorities. On several occasions, the government reiterated its commitment to fulfil the Copenhagen political criteria” (Idem: 18).

In January 2003, the Fourth Harmonisation Package was adopted. Amending a total of 38 articles, it included a set of changes on legislation, such as the Law on Criminal Records, the Press Law, the Law on Penal Trial Procedure, the Law on Associations, the Law on the Establishment and Trial Procedure of the State Security Courts, the Law on Political Parties, on Foundations, the Penal and Civil Codes, etc. (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 129-130). The Fifth Harmonisation Package was published in the following month and presented eight reformed articles within the scope of the Law on Penal Trial, on Associations and on Civil Trial Procedure, among others (Idem: 130). In fact, these two sets of new legislation reflected the priority given by the government to the European process, as well as the opposition’s willingness to

cooperate in that realm. The European Commission recognised that effort in the 2003 Progress Report, when it stated that “Turkey’s alignment has progressed in most areas”, even though the institution is aware of the fact that the development “remains at an early stage for many chapters” (European Commission, 2003: 128).

In concrete, these two packages brought important changes to align the Turkish legislation with the demands of the European *acquis*. For example, the presence of a lawyer after detention in the State Security Courts was reinforced; journalists became entitled not to reveal their sources; creating an association was eased and its connections with foreign counterparts was facilitated; banning a political party turned out to be a more difficult task; penalties on Associations became less punishing, etc. (David, 2009: 283-284; European Commission, 2003).

In March 2003, the AKP sought to amend three articles of the Constitution: to reduce the minimum age to be eligible to the Parliament (from 30 to 25); to allow the management of state forests by private actors; and to permit the sale of public lands that used to be forests (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 64-65). In an uncommon move, the opposition did not support the amendments, mainly the last one, and even the President of the Republic returned that law to the Parliament, arguing that it was in conflict with the public interest and the principles of the rule of law and of justice; besides, it would promote the destruction of forestry in the country. Nonetheless, and after some changes, the law was adopted at the Parliament. President Sezer vetoed it again and ultimately it was not approved (Idem).

In what comes to Turkey-EU relations more specifically, the Council adopted the revised Accession Partnership and, subsequently, Turkey revised its NPAA as well. Given the reforms adopted by the country in the previous years, both documents needed to be reviewed taking those adjustments into consideration. As the Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council stated,

“with a view to helping Turkey achieve this objective [of continuing its efforts to progress], the Council adopted recently a revised Accession Partnership, which sets out the priorities that Turkey should pursue, supported by substantially increased pre-accession financial assistance” (Council of the European Union, 2003: 11).

Despite the above-mentioned punctual obstacle in the process of legislative change, in July and August, two further harmonisation packages were adopted and officially published. The sixth and seventh packages concretised a set of 23 and 38

amended articles, respectively, in a broad variety of covered fields: Law on Criminal Records, Penal Trial Procedure and State Security Courts, Death Penalty, Public Works, Census-taking, Anti-Terror Law, Turkish Penal Code, Law on Foundations, Military Courts, Law on Associations, on Audit Courts, anti-Terror Law, Civil Code, Law on Foreign Language Teaching and Education, among others.

These focused on various important fields of Turkish democracy, namely the judicial system and Human Rights (death penalty, freedom of association, etc.). In concrete, these changes brought increased penalties for honour killings, the reformulation of the notion of terrorism (only crimes can be included in its definition, enhancing freedom of expression), other languages and dialects were allowed to be broadcasted in public and private media, investigations in cases of torture and ill-treatment gained the status of ‘urgent’, and the penalty for insulting Turkey, the National Assembly, the government or other national entities became less punishing. Regarding minorities, these reforms brought improvements, such as the recognition of non-Muslim communities to build places of worship; on the other hand, parents gained the right to name their children more freely, as restrictions at this level were eased and which constitutes an improvement for Kurds, for example. Concerning civil-military relations, this package emphasised the NSC’s consultative nature, diminished the frequency of its meetings, shrank the military courts’ jurisdiction over civilians and strengthened the civilian control over the military expenditure. Furthermore, the rights to demonstrations were enlarged and the limitations to establish an association were lessened; the maximum age to be tried in Juvenile Courts rose from 15 to 18 (David, 2012: 284-286; Usul, 2011: 131-132; Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2007: 13-18).

As the 2003 Progress Report (European Commission, 2003: 17) reminds, besides the harmonisation packages, the Turkish Parliament has adopted 143 new laws, which reveals the quick pace of the legislative reforms that were taking place in Turkey during the early 2000s. Moreover, the establishment of a Parliamentary Committee responsible for ensuring the compliance of the adopted legislation with the European *acquis* (Idem: 17) is also illustrative of the concern devoted to the accession process. The Commission’s Report assessed positively, in a general fashion, the efforts made by Turkey, praising them, although it did not overlook the faults or shortcomings of the compliance with the required goals. In what comes to civil-military relations, “fundamental changes have been made” (Idem: 18), although the military continued to

exert political influence and the measures taken needed to be effectively implemented (Idem). At the judicial level, “structural changes have been made” to improve its efficiency, but some inconsistencies remain in the interpretation of some articles of the Penal Code (namely limiting the freedom of expression), as well as some problems of impartiality had not been addressed due to the still existing links between the judicial system and the executive (Idem: 21). Yet, the Commission highlighted the importance of this sector of the society for their role in implementing the political reforms through their practices and judicial decisions (Idem: 21).

Some progress has been achieved in the fight against corruption, in Human Rights and political rights; there were improvements in economic and social rights – despite the remaining problems with the overspread gender inequality (Idem: 22, 36). However, the report also draws attention towards the lack of progress regarding the learning of other languages and dialects besides Turkey (Idem: 38) and the discrimination against minorities (Idem: 38-41). The report is much longer than these brief comments, but, in general, the tone of the evaluations was positive, even though the Commission’s rapporteurs emphasise the weakness of implementation (Idem: 13), leaving it implied that, more than just adopting a wide list of measures, these need to be concretised.

2004 reinforced this positive environment between Turkey and the European Union. The AKP continued its effort to keep its word and seriously commit to the accession process, which also happened with the opposition. A small setback occurred in April with the referendum on Cyprus that invalidated a solution for the island due to the refusal by the Greek Cypriots⁹³. Yet, in May it was approved a set of Constitutional Amendments and in July another, the eighth, harmonisation package.

Ten amendments were included in this new set of changes. Kalaycioglu (2011: 268) believes the 1995, 2001 and 2004 Constitutional amendments were the ones with the biggest impact, since they targeted the restrictions on liberties, thus increasing the citizens’ freedoms. Besides, Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009: 66) wrote that

“The 2004 constitutional amendments were also strongly motivated by the process of Turkey’s accession to the EU, as was clearly stated in the reasoning of the amendment proposal. The amendment package that involved changes in ten articles was one of the most significant steps in Turkey’s liberalization and democratization process”.

⁹³ More details on the referendum, cf. Chapter 8.

This opinion justifies the presentation of domestic reforms within the context of the country's relations with the EU, since they have been promoted by the organisation within the scope of the country's accession process and constituted a response to the demands of the Union.

In this case, the alterations comprised the total abolition of death penalty, the reinforcement of gender equality, the reduction of the military power (through the elimination of the NSC representation on the Higher Education Board, the abolition of State Security Courts and the reinforcement of the Court of Auditors over the military expenditure), the enhancement of the freedom of the press and the recognition of the supremacy of the international jurisdiction (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 66; Usul, 2011: 134). The Eighth Harmonisation Package that followed aimed to harmonise the legislation with the previously adopted amendments and, therefore, seventy articles have been changed or adopted: on the Execution of Penalties, on Attorneyship, on Penal Trial Procedure, on the Protection of Minors from harmful publications, on Juvenile Courts, on Anti-Terror Law, on Higher Education, etc. The Turkish Penal Code itself was responsible for the change of 45 articles (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 132-133).

Nevertheless, besides this package, several other laws were introduced. The European Commission (2004: 19-20) estimated that, between October 2003 and July 2004, the Parliament had adopted 261 new laws, stressing that its activities were dominated by political and economic reform with the overall support of the opposition. In 2004, therefore, press freedoms increased, restrictions on the establishment of new associations decreased, the military's budgetary transparency was reinforced and freedom of expression was strengthened through improvements in the Penal Code, to name a few of the improvements. The respective Progress Report praised the achieved results but it also pointed out, as usual, the weaknesses that needed to be corrected or overcome. As a general evaluation, the Commission (Idem: 160-164) wrote that

“Turkey's alignment has progressed in many areas but remains at an early stage for most chapters. (...) Turkey has continued to make efforts to align with the *acquis* (...) [but] implementation of legislation formally aligned with the *acquis* continues to be insufficient. Administrative capacity in most areas needs to be strengthened to ensure that the *acquis* is implemented and enforced effectively”.

This stresses the importance given by the European institutions to the implementation of the measures that are adopted, as mentioned above, in a sense that the democratic

(or other) improvements in the country need to be real and tangible to its everyday routine and its citizens. Nevertheless, the Communication from the Commission to the Council in October 2004 (European Commission, 2004a: 3) concluded that:

“In view of the overall progress of reforms, and provided that Turkey brings into force the outstanding legislation mentioned above, the Commission considers that Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be opened.”

However, the same document alerts for the possible impact of this accession, due to the country’s specificities (military power, demography, borders, economy, etc.) (Idem: 3-6), and warns:

“the Commission will recommend the suspension of negotiations in the case of a serious and persistent breach of the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and the rule of law on which the Union is founded.” (Idem: 6).

These safeguards constitute a tangible evidence of EU’s conditionality and the importance attributed to certain values in these relations, as much as the lack of respect for them would mean the suspension of negotiations. Besides, it is also written that the development of the accession negotiation does not depend exclusively on Turkey, but rather also on the EU itself, as the Union’s absorption capacity is an issue to take into consideration as well (Idem: 8). These statements disclose that, despite the generally positive environment boosted by the Commission’s recommendation to the Council and the Parliament, some doubts start to arise, mainly concerning Cyprus, that became a full member of the EU in this year and that the final outcome of the whole process not only is does not depend on Turkey alone, but also that it is uncertain.

Nevertheless, in December 2004, the European Council follows the Commission’s recommendations and decides to open the accession negotiations in October of the following year (Council of the European Union, 2004). That decision constituted a major development in Turkey-EU relations; Turkey entered a new phase with positive signals sent by the European institutions, even though, as mentioned above, the enthusiasm ought to be moderate, given EU’s reservations. And although some voices have been heard at this point concerning the possibility of Turkey not joining the Union, Enlargement Commissioner Oli Rehn affirmed in a press interview in December 2004 that there was no Plan B for Turkey, meaning that the EU has “the responsibility to accept the country as a member if it fulfils the criteria (...). It will be a

long and difficult process and no one can guarantee that it will be successful” (EurActiv, 2004).

Accession negotiations represent a new dynamic in the accession process: they imply that the European Union (more specifically, the Commission) monitors the country’s behaviour and, simultaneously, contributes to the preparation it for full membership (through financial assistance, technical support or other mechanisms). Having the *acquis communautaire* as the general background and as a guiding document, whose chapters are analysed individually, negotiations develop depending on the progress achieved in each field. Opening and closing a chapter requires a unanimous decision at an intergovernmental meeting (Usul, 2011: 63). As it can be perceived with more detail in the next chapter, the amounts of pre-accession financial assistance to Turkey increased significantly after the country has moved to this new stage⁹⁴.

In May 2005, Turkey’s Economy Minister was named as Chief of Accession Negotiations (Hürriyet, 2005) and started his functions in a difficult epoch: as the 2004 Report stated and the Conclusions of the European Council reminded, the opening of negotiations depended on the fulfilment of two conditions – one was bringing into force six pieces of legislation approved (in the fields of Human Rights and the Judiciary) and the other was signing the Adaptation Protocol that would extend the Association Agreement to all new member states, including Cyprus. This latter condition raised a quandary between Turkey and the EU. Although the legislation was adopted and the Protocol to the Ankara Agreement was signed, Turkey issues a declaration in July 2005, in which the country states the following:

“Turkey remains committed to finding a political settlement of the Cyprus issue and has clearly demonstrated its resolve in this regard. (...) The Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol is not the original partnership State established in 1960. (...)Turkey declares that signature, ratification and implementation of this Protocol neither amount to any form of recognition of the Republic of Cyprus referred to in the Protocol” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey 2005).

⁹⁴ In 2004, the annual value of the financial support from the EU was €250 million; in 2005, that amounted to €300 million, whereas in 2006 it increased to €500 million. (Source: Source: European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement (in Million €). These values are, however, different from the ones Table 15, since these are the amounts intended to be allocated and those of the table are the values actually transferred).

As a response to this declaration that, ultimately, meant that a candidate did not recognise a full member of the organisation, the European Council releases a counter-declaration:

“1. The European Community and its Member States acknowledge the signature by Turkey of the Additional Protocol. (...)They regret that Turkey felt it necessary to make a declaration regarding the Republic of Cyprus at the time of signature. 2. The European Community and its Member States make clear that this declaration by Turkey is unilateral, does not form part of the Protocol and has no legal effect on Turkey’s obligations under the Protocol. 3. The European Community and its Member States expect full, non-discriminatory implementation of the Additional Protocol. (...)Turkey must apply the Protocol fully to all EU Member States. The EU will monitor this closely and evaluate full implementation in 2006. (...)Failure to implement its obligations in full will affect the overall progress in the negotiations. (...) 5. Recognition of all Member States is a necessary component of the accession process” (Council of the European Union, 2005).

It was made clear with this counter-declaration that the European Union would not accept the non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey and that that diplomatic position would harm and jeopardise the whole accession process. Nonetheless, and despite this obstacle, negotiations opened in October and the screening process began. Still in this year, GNAT (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) approved seven Constitutional amendments on higher education institutions, the Court of Auditors, state budget, among others (Kalaycioğlu, 2011: 269), but Özbudun and Gençkaya (2009: 67-68) qualified these reforms as technical amendments regarding the budgeting process rather than deep, important content measures to improve democracy and human rights.

In October, it was adopted a Negotiation Framework. In this document, a few key sentences can be found: “the shared objective of the negotiations is accession. These negotiations are an open-ended process, the outcome of which cannot be guaranteed beforehand” (Council of European Union, 2005a: 1). This initial warning is very important in the sense that it introduced a new variable in Turkey-EU relations: the process is open-ended, i.e., there are no guarantees (at least according to this document) that full membership is achieved by Turkey. Secondly, another aspect that is worth to be highlighted is the introduction of “long transitional periods, derogations, specific arrangements or permanent safeguard clauses, i.e. clauses which are permanently available as a basis for safeguard measures” (Idem: 5). These mean the intensification of conditionality or, from another perspective, widening the room for

manoeuvre for the EU to punish the country's lack of achievements, delaying its accession. This same document also provides some information regarding the mechanics of the process (Idem: 7):

“The Commission will undertake a formal process of examination of the *acquis*, called screening, in order to explain it to the Turkish authorities, to assess the state of preparation of Turkey for opening negotiations in specific areas and to obtain preliminary indications of the issues that will most likely come up in the negotiations. (...) the *acquis* will be broken down into a number of chapters, each covering a specific policy area. (...) the Council, acting by unanimity on a proposal by the Commission, will lay down benchmarks for the provisional closure and, where appropriate, for the opening of each chapter. The Union will communicate such benchmarks to Turkey. Depending on the chapter, precise benchmarks will refer in particular to the existence of a functioning market economy, to legislative alignment with the *acquis* and to a satisfactory track record in implementation of key elements of the *acquis* demonstrating the existence of an adequate administrative and judicial capacity.”

Further information is provided in the Negotiation Framework, namely that, when a chapter is closed, it is only provisionally closed, as it may be re-opened by the Council, making nothing from the process definitive. Atila Eralp considered this document one of the reasons behind a negative turn this author believes to have happened since 2004 in Turkey-EU relations. According to Eralp, it damaged the enthusiasm of this phase because it established stricter conditions and fewer incentives. Besides, the newly introduced derogations and open-end character of negotiations were seen as a sign of double standards, also contributing to the politicisation of the process, instead of being a technical one (Eralp, 2009: 162-163).

Yet, the 2005 Progress Report published by the European Commission continued to assess positively both the government and the opposition's commitment and enrolment in the EU accession process (European Commission, 2005: 11). It also praised the meeting the Prime-Minister Erdoğan and Minister Ali Babacan had with 85 NGOs to discuss ways to improve the dialogue with the civil society (Idem: 12). The field of civil-military relations was assessed with “good progress” (even though some advice was given to consolidate these changes) (Idem: 15); the judicial system was also object to a positive general comment – “important progress was made” –; “some progress” was achieved in the area of anti-corruption (Idem: 17) and “further progress” was made concerning the observance of international human rights law (Idem: 18). Regarding civil and political rights the situation is particularly complex: there are still

cases of torture and ill-treatment reported, although their number has been decreasing; extra-judicial killings have increased; there have been improvements in prisons' facilities, but they are still overcrowded and under-resourced; positive development in the freedom of the press; limited progress in broadcasting; improvements on freedom of association, but still several technical requirements that hamper the creation of new associations; no change on the Alevis situation; etc. (Idem: 22-32). Women's rights showed little progress, some shortcomings regarding children's rights, constraints to trade unions' work, remaining problems with non-Muslim minorities and other issues have also been reported by the Commission in the section of Economic, Social and Minorities Rights (Idem: 32-40). Finally, "as regards the judiciary, substantial progress has been made" (Idem: 110) and "further progress" in the field of justice, freedom and security (Idem: 114). Overall, "as regards Turkey's ability to adopt and implement the EU legal order, there has been some, though uneven, progress since 2004" (Idem: 134).

Although the Report is much more extensive than the few comments chosen in the previous paragraph, and several other issues are praised and warned about, the general tone of the report is relatively positive and recognises the improvements in the areas Turkey has actually progressed. Besides, it insists on some other fields that require further attention in order to align the Turkish legislation and practices with the EU's standards. Another major concern, also written in the report, and taking into consideration the increased financial aid to the country, is the need to "further improve its capacity to manage and use these funds effectively" (Idem: 7), as well as to improve the implementation of the assistance, since a European Committee assessed it as "barely satisfactory" (Idem).

In January 2006, the Accession Partnership is revised again, "setting out priorities that Turkey should address in the short- and medium-terms in the preparations for accession" (European Commission, 2006: 5). In April, the Ninth Harmonisation Package was announced by the then Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Abdullah Gül, and included several issues, such as the Laws on Court of Audit, on Administrative Legal Procedures, on Establishment of a Political Ethics Commission in the Parliament, on Foundations and on Ombudsman (Secretariat General for EU Affairs, 2007: 23). Besides, it was also foreseen in the document the signature or ratification of several international conventions and protocols. According to the 2006

Progress Report (European Commission, 2006: 5), the Turkish Parliament adopted a total of 148 laws, including some of the above-mentioned changes.

In June, concrete negotiations began and Chapter 25 (Science and Research) was provisionally opened and closed (Idem: 4). However, the 2006 Progress Report was less positive regarding the effort of the country over the last year. Published in September, the report counted 148 laws adopted by the GNAT during the reporting period (Idem: 5) and assessed with “little progress” or “no progress” the following fields: aligning civil-military relations, fight against corruption, situation of the Alevis, difficulties of non-Muslim communities, trade unions’ rights, approach to minorities’ rights, minorities’ education, approach to Syriacs and Greeks, on establishing a body responsible for implementing the policies on Internally Dislocated People, addressing the problem of village guards, ensuring cultural diversity, fundamental rights, institutions for monitoring and promoting human rights, protection of personal data, conscientious objection to military service, right to property of non-Muslim minorities, anti-discrimination and children’s rights (Idem: 5-ff.).

Although it will be more accurate to test this hypothesis with the quantitative analysis of the next chapter, it seems that the 2006 report was more critical regarding a wider variety of areas and less praising, possibly indicating a decrease in the pace of reforms. Still in 2006, there was another (technical) Constitutional amendment that lowered the age of eligibility to become a deputy from 30 to 25 (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 68).

In November, a serious setback hit Turkey-EU relations, since the European Commission recommends the Council to partially suspend negotiations (European Commission, 2006):

“The Commission notes that Turkey has not fully implemented the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, and that restrictions to the free movement of goods, including restrictions on means of transport, remain in force. In these circumstances (...), the Commission recommends that the Intergovernmental Conference on Accession with Turkey should not open negotiations on chapters covering policy areas relevant to Turkey's restrictions as regards the Republic of Cyprus⁹⁵ until the Commission confirms that Turkey has fulfilled its commitments. (...) Moreover, the Commission recommends that no

⁹⁵ The chapters mentioned in the Recommendation are Chapter 1 (Free movement of goods), Chapter 3 (Right of establishment and freedom to provide services), Chapter 9 (Financial services), Chapter 11 (Agriculture and rural development), Chapter 13 (Fisheries), Chapter 14 (Transport policy), Chapter 29 (Customs Union), and Chapter 30 (External relations).

chapter be provisionally closed until the Commission has confirmed that Turkey has fully implemented its commitments with respect to the Additional Protocol”.

Thus, and due to the lack of progress on the Cyprus question, this recommendation is accepted by the European Council (Council of the European Union, 2006: 8-9):

“The Council takes note of the Commission's report of 8 November 2006 and welcomes the findings and recommendations contained therein. Council welcomes the continued progress made by Turkey in the reform process, but regrets that the pace of reforms has slowed down in 2006. (...) The Council agrees that the Member States within the Intergovernmental Conference will not decide on opening chapters covering policy areas relevant to Turkey's restrictions as regards the Republic of Cyprus until the Commission verifies that Turkey has fulfilled its commitments related to the Additional Protocol.”

In fact, the European Council not only accepted the Commission’s recommendations, but it also showed it regretted the slower pace of the reforms, confirming the above-mentioned hypothesis. To worsen this negative environment that started to develop between the two entities, the election of Nicholas Sarkozy in France and his vocal opposition to Turkey’s accession gives rise to an anti-Turkey discourse across Europe, including in Germany⁹⁶ – “the election of Nicholas Sarkozy (...) inaugurated a turning point in France’s official position on Turkey’s membership to the EU” (Akşit, *et al.*, 2010: 18).

At the domestic level, April brings a Constitutional crisis in the country due to the Presidential election. President Sezer’s term was reaching its end and the AKP was powerful enough in terms of number of seats to elect its own President (Abdullah Gül). Yet, some “manoeuvres of dubious legal validity” (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 97) began in order to save a key position of the defenders of the secularist republic from an “Islamist” – this fact about Gül (his wife wears headscarf and he is considered very religious) led the military to oppose to this election, as well (David, 2012: 304). In the first round, the opposition boycotted the election which did not reach the necessary quorum and the case was even taken to the Constitutional Court, which (controversially) agreed with the complaints of unconstitutionality. Simultaneously, the military issued an E-Memorandum highlighting the Kemalist values of the Republic of Turkey, and, once again interfering in the political life of the country. But the military

⁹⁶ For more details on the opinions of member-states about the Turkish accession, cf. Akşit, Şenyuva & Üstün, 2010.

were not alone in this struggle against the empowerment of an Islamist: one million secularists marched in Istanbul against this candidacy. However, since a meeting between the Prime-Minister and the Chief of General Staff, the latter became less aggressive in his discourse against this election (David, 2012: 306).

The AKP reacted to these obstacles with the presentation of three Constitutional amendments that were adopted by the Parliament: shortening the legislative period to four years, electing the President for a maximum two terms for five years each and the minimum quorum requirement for all subjects would be one third of the assembly's full membership. The President returned the second proposal to the Parliament on the grounds that changing the election of the President would imply changing the political system of the country. It was approved nevertheless, but Sezer submitted it to a referendum. However, before the referendum, general elections were held in July 2007 (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 98-99) and their results ended up shaping the resolution to this deadlock.

9.3. The beginning of the second term (2007-2009)

2007 early elections granted the AKP 340 seats in the Grand National Assembly, which meant that its power in that organ has been strengthened. Therefore, the first subject to be dealt with in the new legislature was the election of the President. However, the problem persisted as the opposition's boycott would hamper the whole process. Yet, the MHP changed its attitude and attended the Parliamentary sessions, so that the country would not have to face another Constitutional crisis. That did not solve the problem *per se*, since each party voted for its candidate and the deadlock maintained. It was only on the third round, in August, that Abdullah Gül was elected (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 101). As David (2012: 308-309) wrote, "the fundamental bastion of the kemalist establishment was thus broken, ending the dual sovereignty" that pretended to protect the secularist nature of the Turkish state. Facing these problems, the AKP realised that the Constitution that resulted from the 1980s military coup needed to be changed and its campaign promised the creation of a brand new civilian Constitution that would protect citizens' rights and liberties, safeguarding

democracy, secularism, the rule of law and the social state (Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 103).

The draft of the new Constitution was delivered by a group of Constitutional Law Professors who were asked by Erdoğan to prepare it. According to the same authors (Idem: 104), the main innovations were the improvement of the standards for fundamental rights and freedoms (aligning it with the ECHR), the enhancement of the rule of law, the reinforcement of the democratic legitimacy of several state institutions (Constitutional Court, Supreme Council of Judges, etc.) and the removal of the excessive presidential powers. Even though these changes that were suggested by the party to be introduced in the new document seem rather democratic, secularist and pro-Western, there are still some sectors within the Turkish society that continue to be suspicious concerning AKP's hidden agenda to weaken the judicial independence and to politicise the judiciary (Idem: 105). The debate on the new Constitution continued over the following years and raised fundamental questions about the Turkish identity, social life and political system discussed both among the political elites (between the parties) and among the citizens. Some of the articles were put into a public scrutiny in a referendum that took place in 2010, already outside of the time scope of this thesis. The key aspect to retain from this Constitution issue is the political and social debate it has stirred, as well as a major division it brought to light between the two major factions of the Turkish society – the traditionalists/religious/Islamists and the secularists/kemalists. This struggle would characterise much of Turkish political life ever since.

Concerning the referendum on the Constitutional alteration of the type of the Presidential election and term, as well as the other provisions submitted by Sezer before the general suffrage, the result was positive: 68.95% of the voters supported the changes (Idem: 102). In the meanwhile, and returning to Turkey-EU relations, in June, two chapters had been opened in the accession negotiations (Chapter 18, Statistics; Chapter 32, Financial Control). This was, in fact, a positive development, although these chapters cannot be considered central to the process.

The 2007 Progress Report confirmed the legality and transparency of the elections held in July and the fact that the government's programme continues its commitment to the reforms (European Commission, 2007: 7). However, in the field of civil-military relations, they alerted to the attempt of the Turkish Armed Forces to

interfere in the Presidential election, even though the democratic structures were able to overcome the problem. Besides, the military tried to restrict academic research and public debate, they targeted the media and there was no progress in reinforcing the control over the Gendarmerie and the military budget (Idem: 8-9). Some progress was achieved in the judiciary – efforts to modernise and to increase the funds, but concerns regarding its independence and impartiality remain (Idem: 9-10). There was also no progress on the development of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy and Parliamentary immunity and the transparency of political parties funding remain to be addressed (Idem: 11). The Commission also exerted the country to work on the public awareness concerning human rights and to improve their institutional framework (Idem: 11-13). On the other hand, positive results have been achieved thanks to the adopted legislation on torture and ill-treatment and the number of reported cases dropped. In this area, several other recommendations are made to overcome some shortcomings; prisons were improved and the access to justice progressed, whereas the number of prosecutions on due to the non-violent expression of opinions increased, promoting a generalised feeling of self-censorship. Positive results were accomplished in the scope of the freedom of association, with an increase in the number of associations and membership, but freedom of religion is not fully implemented yet (Idem: 13-18). According to the document, there has been progress on protecting women from violence, but little progress on labour and trade unions' rights; children's rights need to be reinforced and implemented, as well as the rights of disabled people; no progress on the situation of Syriacs regarding property (Idem: 18-21). "Turkey has made no progress on ensuring cultural diversity and promoting respect for and protection of minorities" (Idem: 22) and there has been no progress on cultural rights (Idem: 23). Migration and asylum made limited progress, as well as in the field of external borders, Schengen and police cooperation; there as progress or some progress concerning the visa policy, fight against organised crime, trafficking in human beings, drugs and terrorism. There was no progress on the judicial cooperation in criminal matters (Idem: 63-67).

As a matter of fact, the 2007 Progress Report was not more positive that its predecessor. As usual, the achievements were recognised, but the negative evaluation of several fields was cause for concern in an already difficult year for Turkey-EU relations. The following year, 2008, began with a controversial judicial case, the

Ergenekon. As Isabel David (2012: 339-ff) explains, the deep state and the connection between the government, organised crime and the police began to be discussed due to some information leaks. In January 2008, military personnel (including important generals), lawyers, journalists and mafia members began to be arrested (Idem: 341). In March there were other detentions, but, at this time, the common denominator among the detainees was their opposition to the AKP government; among them one could find important individuals from the media, academia, business or the military.

“The first process, despite the incongruities (...), had 2455 pages and 441 evidence proofs, and accused formally 86 persons for being members of an armed terrorist organisation with the aim to overthrow the government through violence and coercion, for inciting to an armed rebellion against the government, for encouraging the military to insubordination and to incite the people to the hatred and enmity” (Idem: 341-342).

A second process was presented in March 2009 and was based on the accusation of 56 individuals for belonging to an armed terrorist organisation, for attempting to overthrow the government, for stealing documents related to national security, for attempting to close the GNAT, hampering its functioning, etc. (Idem: 342). A third process (with 52 accused) was still added to the previous two and the three together, now merged into one big judicial process, raises several doubts concerning the real purposes behind it. On the one hand, it may constitute a good opportunity for Turkey to punish those who have acted outside the scope of the law and to reinforce the country’s democratic principles, such as the rule of law and political rights. On the other hand, and this represents another possible (and undesirable) scenario, it may be seen as part of a hidden agenda of the Turkish government to undermine and weaken its opponents, mainly those more connected to the kemalist/secularist side. In this latter case, not only this politically motivated hunt would be illegal, but it would also mean that the judiciary is so dependent on the executive, that its political objectives are able to be instrumentalised through the judicial power. This would be a very setback for Turkish democracy, its quality and development. The European Union, for example, believed this is a good opportunity for the country to show how its democratic institutions work effectively, but it revealed some unease regarding this case: “there were reports regarding the insufficient safeguarding of the rights of defence and the excessive duration of detention period without indictment” (European Commission, 2008: 7); “Concerns have been raised

about effective judicial guarantees for all the suspects” (European Commission, 2009: 7).

Returning to the timeline of Turkey-EU relations, in February 2008, the Council adopted the third revision of the Accession Partnership. This document divides the short-term and medium-term priorities and gives more specific ideas about the necessary reforms in all domains. This document was elaborated so that it would be adapted to the new situation of the country, that has gone several changes since the last Partnership, and points out as short-term priorities, changes such as: reform of public administration, implementation of the Ombudsman system, strengthening civilian control over the military, improving training to judges and prosecutors to ensure legislation is interpreted in line with the ECHR, to develop a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy, to improve the implementation and protection of several freedoms, etc. (Council of the European Union, 2008: 6-14). In the medium-term, other priorities are set and they include privatisations, postal services, intellectual property rights, liberalisation of communication markets, etc. (Idem: 15-17). This revised Accession Partnership also foresaw the continuation of the allocation of financial support for Turkey, as well as the continuation of the monitoring activities, namely through the Progress Reports. The document also reminded about the conditionality mechanism, in the sense that the assistance is dependent on the respect for the commitments under several Agreements with the Union (Idem: 17-18).

A deadlock that occurred in 2008 as well was the lift on the headscarf’s ban. The use of the headscarf in schools and universities was prohibited because its use conflicted with the secularist principles the Turkish Republic was founded upon. However, in February, the government presented the amendment of two Constitutional articles aiming to lift this prohibition. In June, the Constitutional Court annulled these reforms and there was even an attempt to legally ban the AKP proposed to the same Court, on the grounds that it had been violating fundamental principles of the Turkish Republic, i.e. secularism (David, 2012: 311). Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court did not ban the party in a very tight decision: from the seven votes necessary to ban a political party, the Court only gathered six, which allowed the AKP to pursue with its political activities. Yet, it warned the party that, although not in a sufficient extent to be closed, it had revealed some anti-secular tendencies (Hürriyet Daily News, 2008) and cut AKP’s budget in half (Voucheva, 2008). The European Union, which had

already opened negotiations in two further chapters (Chapter 6, Company Law; Chapter 7, Competition Policy), praised this decision, saying it was a good day for Turkey and for Europe (Idem). At the end of the year, the Turkish government, in response to the revised Accession Partnership, adopted a revised NPAA to adopt the country's strategy to the renewed demands of the new European document.

The 2008 Progress Report commented on these events in Turkey and, as always, analysed the adoption and implementation of legislation in the different fields, continuing its monitoring process. For the first time since 1999, the report criticised the government approach to the European process⁹⁷ and the lack of compromise between the parties in the Parliament that were considered to be responsible for a negative impact on the functioning of political institutions; besides, the Secretariat General for EU Affairs continued to be under-resourced and with limited staff (European Commission, 2008: 7-8).

As far as the other issues are concerned, this report kept a rather critical tone: public administration, civil-military relations, anti-corruption, ratification of human rights' instruments, prevention of torture and ill-treatment, ensuring cultural diversity and promoting respecting for and protection of minorities rights, cultural rights, Roma situation, management of irregular migrants in Turkey, asylum, visa policy, external borders and Schengen, judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation were all areas which the *rapporteurs* assess with a clear "limited progress" or "no progress". It is important to notice that this list only includes the subjects with these denominations. For example, there were other cases, such as the work on a draft judicial reform strategy (Idem: 10), that were praised for their developments, but which raised, on another level, concerns, as it is the example of the independence and impartiality of the judiciary (Idem: 10). Following the same reasoning, the Report mentioned progresses on the executions of the ECtHR judgements, but alerted simultaneously to the need for further efforts in this realm (Idem: 11-13). Another example that epitomises this situation in which an improvement is accompanied with a suggestion to continue the efforts, as what has been done was not enough, is freedom of expression: the amendment of article 301 reinforced this freedom, limiting more arbitrary interpretations, but Turkey was asked to ensure these and other reforms are

⁹⁷ "However, despite its strong political mandate, the government did not put forward a consistent and comprehensive programme of political reforms" (European Commission, 2008: 7).

fully respected in practice (Idem: 16). Several other cases could be added, from women's rights to the Alevis situations or even children's rights⁹⁸.

In January 2009, Egemen Bağış was appointed Minister for EU Affairs and Chief Negotiator. In July, Chapter 16 of the *acquis* (Taxation) is opened and as an important improvement, a law limiting the power of military courts was adopted (EurActive, 2009). This legal change is here highlighted, because it was approved despite the military's threat that such move would create an increased tense between them and the government – it meant, therefore, that the accountable government did not succumb to the pressure of a non-accountable actor and pursued with the European measures to align with the *acquis* requirements. Notwithstanding this positive development, the EU showed serious concern over a \$2.5 billion tax penalty the Turkish government imposed to a media group, whose annual sales are around \$2 billion. The official reason behind this fee was that the group did not properly pay its taxes, but some associations believed it was, in fact, caused by “its often hostile news coverage of the incumbent AK Party government” (EurActive, 2009a).

To finalise this section, the 2009 Progress Report stated that, despite the continuation of the debate on the Constitutional reforms, there was no consensus between the parties yet (European Commission, 2009: 7). Besides, the appointment of a full-time Chief Negotiator with the status of Minister and the reinforcement of the Secretariat General for EU Affairs in terms of resources and staff did not mean actual progress, because “despite the government's strong popular mandate and large majority in parliament, overall limited concrete progress was made on political reforms” (Idem: 8). Public administration reform only provided limited progress (Idem: 9), civil-military relations achieved some progress (Idem: 11) and the judiciary too. However, the document reported that concerning the independence of the judiciary there was no progress and further efforts were still required (Idem: 12). Fighting corruption, extending ethnic rules to other civil servants, limiting the MPs' immunity, adopting legislation on the Court of Auditors and the improving the transparency of political parties' financing were all negatively assessed with “limited” or “no progress” (Idem: 12-13).

On the other hand, there was some progress on the observance of international human rights law (Idem: 15) and improvements in torture, ill-treatment and fight

⁹⁸ More details, cf. Table 12 (Appendix 7).

against impunity in those cases. Nevertheless, the report warned for the need to implement the legislation (Idem: 15-16). Besides, although the access to justice has been eased, it continued to be geographically uneven (Idem: 16) and problems with prisons' overcrowding and high levels of pre-trial prisoners hamper the achievements of the improvements on training, hiring staff and infrastructures (Idem: 17). Regarding freedom of expression, article 301 is no longer used so frequently to constraint this freedom due to its revision and prosecutions based on this article diminished. Yet, journalists still face prosecutions, websites are often banned and other articles from the Criminal Code have been used to curtail freedom of expression (Idem: 17-18). Further developments have been reported in the field of freedom of assembly and of association (even despite some limitations) (Idem: 19-20), as well as in the government's attitude towards the Alevi community: the document reports the participation of the Minister of Culture on the opening of an Alevi Institute in which he apologised for past suffering caused by the State to that minority and the Prime-Minister attended the Alevi fast-breaking ceremony, followed by workshops to discuss the problems and expectations of this community (Idem: 20-21). The legal framework for women's rights is in place, according to the report, but its actual implementation remains weak; serious problems, such as domestic violence, honour killings and early forced marriages still occur, mainly in some areas of the country (Idem: 24). Children's rights need to be improved (Idem: 25) and anti-discrimination policies need to align with the EU *acquis* (Idem: 26).

“Overall, full respect for and protection of language, culture and fundamental rights, in accordance with European standards have yet to be fully achieved. Turkey made limited efforts to enhance tolerance or promote inclusiveness vis-à-vis minorities” (Idem: 28) and there has been reported no progress regarding the Roma situation. Migration, asylum, visa policy, external borders and Schengen, judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters and fight against organised crime were all classified as “limited progress” areas that remain to be addressed; conversely, there has been some progress in the fight against drugs and in the customs cooperation (Idem: 73-78).

Thus, Turkey-EU relations, during this decade under analysis, have been quite unstable. The positive moments of the candidacy status or the opening of negotiations or even the major legislative reforms have been counter-balanced by some other less

positive moments, such as the lack of commitment from both sides, the European side's lack of a coherent position in relation to the accession process and Turkey's refusal to recognise a member state of the Union, Cyprus. These examples epitomise the instability of these relations. The aim of this thesis, concretised in the two following chapters, is to find out if there is any co-relation between the state of those relations and the commitment of both parts to the accession process on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the development of the country's democratisation process.

10. Gathering the data and applying the model

10.1. Recalling the model and building the table

The model to assess the evolution of the Turkish democracy from 1999 to 2009 was presented on Chapter 5, on which the methodological choices have been explained and some considerations regarding the selection of indicators and their sources clarified and justified. In the meanwhile, however, it was necessary to reflect upon the case study which this model would be applied to. The object of the scrutiny was Turkey, its modern construction and interaction with the West, in general, and with the European Union, in particular. Having that background outlined, it is necessary, at this point, to apply the model to the Turkish case.

To ease the operationalisation of the concept of democracy, we divided this phenomenon into three dimensions, eight attributes and eighty-five indicators from fourteen different sources. The choice of the origin and application of these indicators and sources was particularly careful, in order to promote the most reliable and trustworthy set of values. Those concerns have already been explained on chapter 5, namely through the worries about the geographical distribution of the source. It is also important to stress that it would be impossible to create such a wide table in terms of years and indicators with all the gaps fulfilled. The data gathered⁹⁹ represents 81% of completeness; it means that 19% of the data was not possible to be found and there are several reasons for the difficulty to find a source with the data for the whole period of eleven years: first, several reports may have begun to be published some years after 1999; secondly, on the contrary, some others do not have the data up-to-date and their results are only available a couple of years before 2009; thirdly, there are also some reports and statistics which are not published annually, creating some gaps in-between. Nevertheless, despite the carefulness to include as much data as possible, it would not be feasible to fulfil the entire table.

Furthermore, it should be emphasised that some indicators only provided data for the last four years of the period in cause, but their inclusion was based on two criteria: the fact that it represented particularly relevant data and to compensate the considerable number of reports and sources that have not published results until the first

⁹⁹ Cf. Table 13 (Appendix 8).

years of the 2000s. Having overcome this initial question of what including and what not including in the final table, a set of other obstacles has been raised when completing it and transforming it into something readable and useful, namely the comparison between the indicators.

As it is known, different organisations use different scales in their assessment: Freedom House and the Economic Freedom of the World use a scale from 1 to 7, but the first is reversed and the latter is not; Transparency International uses a 0 to 10 scale and the Amnesty International a 1 to 5 scale. A serious problem emerged from these differences, which is comparability. This issue was solved by transforming all the scales into a 0 to 100 scale that would respect the pattern of the original one. Besides, when the scales were reversed, the values needed to be inverted (by subtracting them to 100). The objective was that a 60 value in Freedom House new scale would be something positive and not negative, as it would mean without this transformation. Another example is the Infant Mortality Rate: the higher this rate, the less efficiently the country was performing; hence the need to convert the values and reverse them as well. The lowest point of all created scales became 0 and therefore, even when it used to be a negative value or a 1, for example, all of them would mean the same after all. The schematic explanation of all conversions can be found below¹⁰⁰:

▪ Economic Freedom of the World

$$[1, 7] > 100/6 = 16.67$$

$$1 = 0; 2 = 16.67; 3 = 33.34; 4 = 50.01; 5 = 66.68; 6 = 83.35; 7 = 100.$$

$$\text{Ex.: } 5.3 = 66.68 + 0.3 * 16.67 = 71.68$$

$$4.5 = 50.01 + 0.5 * 16.67 = 58.35$$

$$[0, 10] > 100/10 = 10$$

$$0 = 0; 1 = 10; 2 = 20... 10 = 100.$$

▪ Transparency International

$$[0, 10] 100/10 = 10$$

Reversed

$$0 = 100; 1 = 90; 2 = 80; 3 = 70; 4 = 60 ...$$

$$\text{Ex. } 3.1 = 70 - 0.1 * 10 = 69$$

$$3.2 = 70 - 0.2 * 10 = 68$$

¹⁰⁰ I would like to thank Diogo Lourenço for his valuable suggestions for the improvement of this section.

▪ Freedom House

[1, 7] $100/6 = 16.67$

Reversed

7 = 0; 6 = 16.67; 5 = 33.34; 4 = 50.01; 3 = 66.68; 2 = 83.35; 1 = 100.

Ex. $2.5 = 83.34 - 0.5 * 16.67 = 75$

$5.6 = 33.34 - 0.6 * 16.67 = 22.34$

▪ Amnesty International and US State's Department

[1, 5] $100/4 = 25$

Reversed

5 = 0; 4 = 25; 3 = 50; ...

▪ CIRI

[0, 3] $100/3 = 33.33$

0 = 0; 1 = 33.33; 2 = 66.67; 3 = 100

[0, 2] $100/2 = 50$

0 = 0; 1 = 50; 2 = 100

▪ Democracy Barometer

[0, 2] $100/2 = 50$

0 = 0; 1 = 50; 2 = 100

[0, 1] $100/1 = 100$

0 = 0; 1 = 100

[0, 3] $100/3 = 33.33$

0 = 0; 1 = 33.33; 2 = 66.67; 3 = 100

[0, 4] $100/4 = 25$

0 = 0; 1 = 25; 2 = 50; 3 = 75; 4 = 100

[0, 30] $100/30 = 3.33$

0 = 0; 1 = 3.33; 2 = 6.66; 3 = 9.99; 4 = 13.32; ...

[-1, 2] $100/3 = 33.3$

- 1 = 0; 0 = 33.33; 1 = 66.66; 2 = 100

[1, 7] $100/6 = 16.67$

1 = 0; 2 = 16.67; 3 = 33.34; 4 = 50.01; 5 = 66.68; 6 = 83.35; 7 = 100

[0, 6] $100/6 = 16.67$

0 = 0; 1 = 16.67; 2 = 33.34; 3 = 50.01; 4 = 66.68; 5 = 83.35; 6 = 100

[0, 10] $100/10 = 10$

0 = 0; 1 = 10; 2 = 20; 3 = 30; 4 = 40 ...

[0, 5] $100/5 = 20$

0 = 0; 1 = 20; 2 = 40; 3 = 60; 4 = 80; 5 = 100

▪ World Bank

[-2.5; 2.5] $100/5 = 20$

-2.5 = 0; -1.5 = 20; -0.5 = 40; 0 = 50; 0.5 = 60; 1.5 = 80; 2.5 = 100

Ex.: $0.16 = 60 - (0.5 - 0.16) * 20 = 53.2$

$-0.33 = 40 + (0.5 - 0.33) * 20 = 43.4$

▪ World Economic Forum

[1, 7] $100/6 = 16.67$

1 = 0; 2 = 16.67; 3 = 33.34; 4 = 50.01; 5 = 66.68; 6 = 83.35; 7 = 100

Ex.: $4.29 = 50.01 + 0.29 * 16.67 = 54.84$

▪ European Commission

[0, 100] **Reversed.**

Ex. $35.2 = 100 - 35.2 = 64.8$

$28.4 = 100 - 28.4 = 71.6$

Another concern was regarding the transformation of the absolute values into a comparable scale of some indicators; for example, it would not be judicious simply to use the public expenditure on health or on research and development (as a % of the GDP) in the way these values were presented. In other words, although the 100 of the scale used for all indicators mean the possible best in a democratic regime, 100% of public expenditure on any field would make no sense. The same for employment rate, the number of hospital beds, the evolution of GDP per capita, the number of newspapers per one million inhabitants, membership in humanitarian organisations, participation in demonstrations and petitions or even the rate of women in Parliament. These are cases whose maximum value of 100 would be unachievable or unfeasible given their nature. Therefore, in order to overcome this problem, the same sources were used to find, in the same indicator, the best result achieved by a European Union's member state. That value became, in each year, the top of the scale. The following case of the number of

newspapers per one million inhabitants is a good example: in 1999, the best result of a member state was 11.62 newspapers achieved by Luxembourg; thus, the 11.62 was transformed into the 100 value in a [0, 100] interval. In this case, Turkey's value, which had in that same year 0.62 newspapers, was adapted to the new scale and increased its final figure to 5.95. In fact, this number is still quite low and far away from the ideal 100 (the equivalent of 11.62); however, it would be unfair to demand from Turkey to achieve 100 newspapers per one million inhabitants when the best performance in the European Union was almost 12 newspapers. The other indicators in the same situation were solved and adapted through this procedure. Notwithstanding, it is also important to clarify another methodological choice concerning this subject and that is why the top of the scale was tantamount to the best of the member states and not the average of the EU. The rationalisation for that lies in the meaning of the top of the scale: 100 represents the best possible outcome of a democratic regime in that field. Comparing Turkey with the average of the European Union would misrepresent that conception and would, simultaneously, create an unequal situation with the rest of the indicators in which 100 is the best any country is able to reach.

Finally, one last consideration is related to the previous case: when comparing the results of the EU member states, some of them performed better in a certain field (like Sweden in education spending), but their values were not used for the simple reason that there were footnotes alerting for the fact that that result had some particularities, such as differences in the definition of the concepts or even methodological specificities. In that sense, and not to create an uneven situation, that value was not taken into consideration. After all this data was transformed into a comparable scale¹⁰¹, a table has been created and the subsequent graphs and charts, analysed further on, have been based on this table¹⁰².

10.2. Introducing other variables

The European Union, as already mentioned several times during the previous chapters, seeks to promote democracy among third countries, with a special focus on its candidates. Europeanisation, as a process of construction and diffusion of the European rules and values – paraphrasing Radaelli's definition –, implies the building and

¹⁰¹ All values have been reduced to two decimal places.

¹⁰² Cf. Table 14 (Appendix 8).

consolidation of EU's patterns by triggering new dynamics. Among the four mechanisms referred to on Chapter 4, two of them can be considered the most widely used (and the easiest to recognise) by the Union: socialisation, less formal, more cognitive and more difficult to spot; and conditionality, more formal, more connected to legal aspects and more tangible.

Therefore, if one pretends to study the influence of the European Union as a democracy promoter, it is necessary that these two mechanisms are taken into consideration. Conditionality can be traced paying attention to specific dynamics: the transfer of financial assistance from the EU or its monitoring, for example, can signal the presence of an external pressure aligned with the organisation's normative pressure conveyed by public statements and official documents, such as the Progress Reports. Some crucial moments of Turkey-EU relations can be seen as rewards or punishments for the country's performance at this level. In a functioning conditionality system, reforms and changes are awarded with improvements in those relations, with more money or supportive statements; on the other hand, Turkey's lack of commitment would be object of criticisms and of a hampered accession process.

Socialisation overcomes the formal and legal transformations and focuses on the real changes at the societal level. These modifications are not easy to identify – quantitative data usually lags behind the real phenomenon, a foreigner's perception may not be the most accurate and the closest to reality and such short time span does not help either. However, the consideration of this mechanism is of much importance, not only due to the Constructivist regard concerning this dimension, but also because of the notion of democracy itself. For democracy to be truly consolidated (or in the process of consolidating), rules and legislation are not enough; it requires the involvement of the whole society and, to a certain degree, its habituation to this new system. Democratisation can be assessed positively in case the individuals reveal they have embraced the new democratic values and principles, even if they are adapted to their own reality.

When choosing these two mechanisms, it is implicit the recognition of two (possibly three) layers of impact: the macro-level (with conditionality, formal changes, institutional pressures, etc.) and the meso-level (attitudinal and behavioural changes operated at the community/societal level). The micro-level is even more difficult to grasp, but the aggregated changes within the scope of the individual in terms of

mentality and opinion has an impact on the society in general. Thus, to a certain extent, these individual changes are able to be perceived somehow through the upper level in an aggregated manner, as long as the deductive reasoning behind it is accepted.

Keeping this logic in mind, the second part of the model constitutes an attempt to operationalise it. In fact, the above-described model is not enough to find answers to the thesis' initial questions. Data gathered and presented in the previous section only provides the evolution in time of Turkish democracy. In order to more deeply comprehend the dynamics behind that evolution, it is mandatory to include a set of independent variables that may have hypothetically contributed to those findings. The aim is to look for any possible correlations between the development of the country's democracy and the chosen (external) factors¹⁰³.

The two first variables come from the European Union – they include the values of the EU's financial assistance to the country and another specific amount allocated to the political criteria. Comparing these values with Turkey's democratic evolution will allow finding out if this financial support was decisive. Besides, the Union's evaluation in its Progress Reports is included here as well. This variable is important, for two purposes: first, to find out whether a more critical stance by the Commission negatively impacts the country's democratisation; secondly, to realise whether Turkey's democratic performance is fairly assessed by the EU in its reports, praising or condemning in appropriate time, putting the conditionality process in practice. This variable was achieved by counting the frequency of positive and negative expressions associated to the word "progress": "further progress", "some progress", "important progress" are examples of the positive evaluation; on the contrary, "no progress", "limited progress", "further progress required" were considered negative assessments. At the end, the percentage of positive in relation to negative expressions was calculated and introduced in the table.

As this variable has not been used in this way before, it may cause some concerns in terms of its validity – how linguistic expressions become, of a sudden, a set of numbers, a percentage and a meaning for something else. In fact, this usage is based on some premises: first, the relevance attributed to language by Constructivism. As

¹⁰³ Table 15 (Appendix 8) provides a list with the other variables selected for this process and their absolute values. In this case, the figures were not transformed into a 100-scale because the idea is not to join them or compare them among each other, but to correlate their individual evolution with the progress of the Turkish democracy.

known, language is reality in itself and not only a representation of it; this means that the choice of the words and expressions by the *rapporteurs* is not innocent: “some progress” is not the same as “limited progress” and these nuances signify that their perception on the state of a certain reality is more or less positive, making it possible to considerate a rather positive or negative evaluation of each topic, allowing their division into two main fields and their subsequent counting. Secondly, the meaningful differences between the values permit to realise that the utilisation of those expressions cannot be randomly chosen or not related to the perception of the authors of the reports. In 2000, the percentage of positive evaluations was slightly above 22; on the contrary, in 2004, that value was over 66%. This wide gap carries a meaning and it is this meaning that matters take into consideration on next chapter.

On the other hand, and to avoid ignoring the influence of other external actors on the process, OECD’s data provided the financial assistance given to Turkey in the period under study in the form of grants and of technical cooperation. These values may reveal if the contributions of other countries have a bigger impact on the country’s democratisation process in case they are more positively correlated to that evolution than the EU’s funding, for example.

At the domestic level, three variables are combined to present the number of legislative reforms in the country; they include constitutional amendments and laws adopted within and outside the scope of harmonisation packages. Considering that a great extent of these measures were adopted following the European pressure, as concluded in the previous chapters, these figures will permit analysing the correlation between the number of legislative reforms and the democratic consolidation of the country. The intuitive reasoning would be a positive correlation between the two variables, but this hypothesis still needs to be tested by data, as several other factors may interfere and originate a lack of consistency at this level.

Two further variables are related to the European and the Turkish public opinion regarding Turkey’s accession process. The objective of these sets of data is to understand what kinds of connection exist between democratic results and the public opinion. Furthermore, they will also allow a better understanding of the role played by the public opinion in the development of the accession process or even of Turkey-EU relations (and vice-versa). Finally, and also at a societal level, the final variable reveals the number of Turkish beneficiaries of a European youth programme and its evolution.

The choice of this variable was based on the importance attained to social interactions between the two sides to overcome the lack of mutual understanding; the more Turks connect to Europe, the more linked they will be with the European values and practices.

These are the factors chosen to complete the model presented on chapter 5. In the following section, the preliminary results of these figures will be presented in summary. Chapter 11 will be enriched with qualitative variables (historical analysis of Turkey-EU relations, EU Progress Reports, qualitative interviews, academic literature, etc.), so that the fundamental nuances given by these sources are not ignored, but rather included in the final analysis and interpreted in the light of the rest of the whole thesis, in order to guarantee that the final conclusions come as close as possible to reality.

10.3. Preliminary results

This final section aims to briefly analyse the graphs produced by the two tables created for the application of the model to assess the influence of the European Union on Turkey's democratisation process. Figures 17 to 37 (Appendix 9) follow a pattern: one graph represents all the indicators of a certain attribute and the next one draws the annual average of those same indicators, illustrating the general tendency of that attribute¹⁰⁴.

Figure 17 shows the evolution of the several indicators that compose the attribute of Political Rights. The lines drawn in the graph reveal a wide variety of dynamics that do not allow an easy reading; however, the subsequent figure aggregates the data in a single line and registers a steady behaviour in this field with a variation between the 57 and 64 until 2007. However, what calls the attention in this chart is the accentuated decrease in 2008, somehow compensated in 2009, but still not enough to recover the medium threshold of the 50 points. Overall, Political Rights have maintained a positive performance with the exception of the two last years.

This tendency is not observed in the following figures (19 and 20). In fact, after a decreasing tendency from 2000 to 2004, the aggregated values revealed a not

¹⁰⁴ Figures 17 to 37 (with the exception of Figures 34 and 35) mentioned in the following paragraphs can be found on Appendix 9 (pages 513 to 522). They have not been inserted here for they constitute a large number of graphs that would jeopardise the reading.

accentuated but steady growth that reached the positive threshold in 2009. Nevertheless, ten out of eleven years, Social Rights were assessed negatively.

Figures 21 and 22 reflect the economic instability of the country in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The most visible indicator, the evolution of GDP per capita, epitomises that situation and aggregated data shows a difficult improvement in the field of Economic Rights, with a positive peak in 2005 that was not able to be kept in the following years. This attribute also developed most time among negative results.

Figure 23, due to the high number of indicators of Civil Rights, becomes slightly difficult to read, but allows the realisation that the variety in the number of indicators also means variety in terms of assessments. All those numbers combined, however, reveal a generally growing tendency (exceptions in 2001, 2005 and 2007), but always below the 50 threshold.


On the contrary, Rule of Law (Figures 25 and 26) presented some instability concerning its results – some years faintly above 50 and some others below that level. Also contrary to the previous attribute, since 2007 it manifested a decreasing tendency until 2009.

The next two graphs (Figures 27 and 28) exemplify a different dynamic: with relatively steady values until 2002, mainly since 2005 the indicators average combined in a declining curve that finished in 2009 with the negative value of 22.7. Taking into consideration the initial value of 63.26 or the one achieved in 2005 (68.74), this decrease of Horizontal Accountability is the most accentuated fall of all attributes.

On the other hand, and despite the low values presented by Figures 29 and 30, Vertical Accountability faced an intensive growth from 2007 to 2008, which allowed this attribute to come closer to the 50 threshold.


Finally, Responsiveness (Figures 31 and 32) performs positively in a first period until 2005, following afterwards a fading trend whose lowest result, in 2008, was 37.24 points. In 2009, there is an improvement of this situation, but the attribute remained in the negative half of the chart. Figure 33 summarises the development of the eight attributes aggregated. From a glance at the shape of the several lines combined, it seems that there is a growing tendency in a first period, followed by a shrinking trend; interestingly, 2008 appears to be the point which most attributes converge to. This preliminary consideration is reinforced by Figure 34 (below).

Figure 34: Dimensions aggregated – annual evolution



Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 35: Democracy data aggregated – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

In fact, when analysed each dimension, it is even more perceptible that their values, despite the lack of a clear pattern of development in the previous years, converge in a point slightly above the 40. Interestingly, 2009 brings different paths to each dimension: equality recovers and increases more visibly; freedom pursues a more modest improvement and control continues its negative curve. Combining all these values, it is possible to build a graph that represents the average of the all the indicators from all the dimensions. Thus, Figure 35 (above) constitutes the broadest representation of Turkey's democratic evolution from 1999 to 2009, based on the model presented earlier.

The annual results of this chart reveal a line which cannot be considered as linear. The development of Turkish democracy was, in the reported period and as a result of the chosen model, an uneven process. From 1999 to 2000, there was a considerable improvement, followed by three less positive years, a recovery in 2004, a stable phase until 2007, an accentuated fall in 2008 and what seems to be a new positive progress in 2009. Two preliminary conclusions can be drawn by this initial reading: first, the instability of the democratisation process and, secondly, the average values lag below the line of the 50 threshold. Figures 36 and 37 (Appendix) will be more closely observed on Chapter 11, but they tend to confirm these initial considerations.


The second set of charts represents graphically the data from Table 15 (Appendix 8) and concerns the variables whose correlation with the previous information will be tested further on. Figure 38 (below) discloses the growing tendency (since 2002) of the EU funds transferred to Turkey; figure 39 (below) reveals that the instability of Turkey-EU relations have been reflected by the Commission’s Progress Reports (2000 and 2004 epitomise these extremes).

Figure 38: EU financial contributions



Source: Author’s elaboration

Figure 39: EU Progress Reports - % of positive “progress”



Source: Author’s elaboration

The graph of Figure 40¹⁰⁵ calls the attention not for the usually even distribution of external assistance to the country, but for the uncommon value of 2003. Figure 41 is interesting for its pyramid-shape, disclosing the increase, the peak and the decrease of the legislative reforms adopted, as well as the concentration of the harmonisation packages in 2002, 2003 and 2004. The public opinion both from the European citizens and the Turks came without surprise: a declining support from the latter and a stable, but very low, support from the first (Figure 42). Finally, the numbers of the “Youth in Action Programme” epitomise the growing interest of Turks to take part in activities and projects in other European countries.

Having undergone this brief analysis of the produced graphs and the detailed explanation of the methodological choices and processes behind it, next chapter will deepen the interpretation of these results and will provide the thesis with other perspectives, so that the final conclusions arise as accurate and solid as possible.

¹⁰⁵ Figures 40 to 43 can be found in Appendix 10 (pages 523 to 524) for the same reason mentioned above. Figures 38 and 39 have been inserted here, as they deal with data related to the EU, which is the object of study of this thesis and, therefore, the relevance of their contribution justifies their inclusion.

11. EU, Turkey and mediating factors: an interpretation

11.1. Turkish democratic evolution and the EU

On the previous chapter, the evolution in time of Turkish democracy has been drawn from the data achieved by the application of the proposed model. Besides, some other variables were introduced in order to find the answers to the initial doubts this thesis raised. However, more than merely reading those results, they need to be interpreted in the light of the knowledge gathered throughout this work.

Recalling Figure 34, the evolution of the three dimensions of the Turkish democracy was regarded as volatile, since their development is not parallel, despite their interesting convergence in 2008. When analysing the following line graph (Figure 35), it is not perceptible the existence of a clear pattern. However, there are some tendencies that may be disclosed from its attentive reading, namely its division into three main periods: 1999-2005 reveals an average growth rate of 1,16%; whereas the next phase (2006-2008) is marked by a decrease of -2,98%; the final year, 2009, shows signals of recovery in terms of democratic quality with a 2,09% growth.

This division constitutes an important initial step towards understanding the dynamics of the development of the Turkish democracy; only through that is possible to establish links with the external actors' role. Yet, focusing first on the domestic reality, it is important to highlight some aspects of these values. First, and with the exception of 2005, all the values are below the threshold of 50%. In fact, even 2005 is above that limit for a very tiny difference. This reveals that, according to the sources and indicators chosen, Turkish democracy has not performed so positively during the decade under analysis.

Secondly, it is necessary to establish a bridge between the conceptual discussion held on Chapter 3 and the case study: although the values of its performance have been low, it would be unfair to qualify the Turkish system as autocratic – the elementary division proposed in Figure 8 presents elections as the baseline to divide these two notions. Since the European Commission's APR always assessed positively the elections that occurred in the country (stating that they fulfilled the international requirements of free and fair elections), it means that Turkey is, at least, an electoral democracy. Given the values mentioned above, it is not possible to frame it within the

scope of a perfect democracy, but, regarding its evolution since its establishment, it is justifiable to posit that Turkish democracy is able to be covered by the notion of “liberal democracy”. This is possible to state because it has been proven, on the previous chapters, that its system goes beyond the mere existence of elections; Turkey has shown to be capable of improving its democratic accounts, even though its results are poor when compared to consolidated democracies.

Nevertheless, a reservation needs to be made: it is difficult (and probably even impossible) to compare Turkey with European democracies. The latter had several centuries to mature, whereas Turkish socio-cultural (maybe civilizational) environment is quite different; its peculiarities give the country a nuanced version of democracy, which does not belittle its efforts to align with the European practices nor imply that it does not need to reach those standards to be able to join the Union – that is a clear requirement for several decades.

By process of elimination, if Turkish system cannot be regarded as an autocracy, electoral democracy or perfect democracy, the challenge now is to determine which degree, inside the liberal type, it can be found at. Adapting Table 3 (Appendix 3) (based on Morlino’s work) to the available data is a way of attempting to search for it: the average evaluation of Rule of Law is around 49%; Accountability (average of both vertical and horizontal) is 50%; Responsiveness: 52%; Freedom: 41% and Equality: 48%. Thus, based on these values and on Table 3, the closest match possible to the proposed degrees would be “legitimate liberal democracy” – a plus would be inserted in the fields of accountability and responsiveness, and since all of them are positively marked in the Rule of Law (and the value was very close to the threshold), it seems to be the most appropriate level to frame the Turkish democracy in terms of its degree.

This is, however, an attempt to frame a reality within a theoretical model; it would imply, for the sake of accuracy, a deeper analysis and another combination of positive evaluations (the set of accountability and responsiveness is not available without Rule of Law, for instance). Furthermore, Morlino’s scheme suggests that a plus in each field represents a high degree of that dimension, which is clearly not the case given the low values – even if they are positive, they do not overcome the threshold with much significance. This reveals that Turkish democracy, despite being a liberal one, reveals several weaknesses – some of them have been tackled, but some others remained to be addressed.

Due to the quest for reinforcing its democracy and improving it at various levels, it is possible to talk about a consolidation process; as argued in Part II, consolidation embodies the latest phase of the democratisation process – after the transition to a democratic regime, it is object of improvements. This does not mean that the process is linear, quick and irreversible; on the contrary, it is unstable, slow and with the possibility of backslides (as mentioned on Chapter 3, as well). Recovering Schedler’s consolidation model (Figure 10), Turkey can be perceived as in the process of deepening its democracy – the inclusion of this process at this level certainly pleases both the sceptics (that would regard it as an electoral democracy) and the optimists (that see it as a liberal democracy), because it means that whether as an electoral or a liberal system, Turkey is working on its structures and mentalities to improve its quality towards the achievement of the best possible democratic performance.

When asked about the development of the Turkish democracy between 1999 and 2009, the two Turkish academics shared the same view: democracy improved but not throughout the whole period in the same pace. Professor Uzgel stated that “Turkey is more democratised today than it was back in the 1980s and 1990s. But, in general terms, Turkey’s democratic consolidation has been weaker in the last four or five years” (Interview, 2013e). Professor Eralp also recognised that “from 1999 until 2005, Turkey, in terms of political reforms, in terms of democratisation, was doing impressively” (Interview, 2013h). Therefore, these opinions actually match the above mentioned findings in the sense that it has been perceptible (at least to those who study these phenomena) that there has been a variation in the country’s commitment to its democratisation. Sevna Somuncuoglu, a women’s rights activist, is not so optimistic; in fact, she recognises the improvement of Turkish democracy but focuses on the lack of implementation – as Somuncuoglu said, everything “looks good on paper (...), [but] there are a lot of steps towards implementing it” that still need to be taken (Interview, 2013g).

This leads to the debate on the weaknesses of Turkey’s democracy. The lack of implementation is certainly one of them. It has been mentioned by this interviewee and supported by the Progress Reports (as written on Chapter 9) that complained about the problem too. Yet, this issue of implementation can also be linked to another essential aspect, mentioned by the Ministry’s official: the lack of a democratic political culture or tradition in the country, “because our political culture is a bit prone to clashes,

especially from the 1970s onwards” (Interview, 2013i). For some authors quoted on Chapter 3, the pre-existence of a democratic culture is key to allow both democratic transition and consolidation. Nevertheless, the non-existence of such culture in Turkey is possibly caused by a long and firm tradition of a strong state and a strong leader – in these cases, it becomes truly difficult for an active and critical civil society to mature and step forward using the tools and mechanisms allowed by the democratic system, reinforcing the citizens’ connection with democracy. When asked about the subject, a non-identified interviewee told that

“the problem in Turkish democracy is not about civil-military relations, etc. etc. You can categorise them and you can read the EU annual reports concerning democratisation or human rights issues in Turkey. But the point is this: the government itself and its Prime-Minister has a very strong tendency to monopolise power. (...) His authoritarian tendencies are the weakest point of Turkish democratisation efforts today”

This, in fact, matches what Professor Uzgel mentioned about the decreasing pace of democratisation in a second half of the period under study; what happened, according to this academic, was a “quite contradictory process in Turkey: the more power the government accumulated in its hand, the less democratised actor it has become” (Interview, 2013e).

The results of an online survey¹⁰⁶ disclose that Turks and EU citizens alike believe the Turkish democracy has improved from 1999 to 2009. Using a scale from 1 to 10, respondents classified Turkey’s democratic performance with 4,40 in 1999 and with 5,93 ten years later. When analysed individually, the results show that both groups recognise this improvement, as well.

Taking into account both the survey and the interviews, it is interesting to notice that almost everyone perceived a positive evolution of the Turkish democracy when comparing 1999 to 2009, which does not match the results of the model showed above.

¹⁰⁶ This survey has been conducted online and ranged a total of 30 responses from Turks and EU citizens from diverse institutions and backgrounds. As any online survey, it has its faults (it did not reach people without internet, nor those who did not speak English, for example) and therefore its results are always used carefully. More than pertaining to see them as representative of the whole country’s opinion, it will be used mostly as another indicator of the aggregated opinion of several Turks and Europeans on some key issues, taking into consideration that the opinions included are mostly from well-educated and informed people that may have, somehow, felt or assessed the phenomenon under study – Turks have been included as those who are affected by their country’s democratisation and relation with the EU (or even as a partial responsible for that – in the case of the surveyed that work at the Ministries or the EU delegation, for example) and Europeans who answered it have some type of connection with the country – mainly as a researcher devoted to the country. In fact, 80% of the European respondents are affiliated to an academic institution. More details on the characteristics of the respondents can be found in Appendix 2, Figures 2 to 6. The results can also be found in Appendix 12, Tables 16 to 22 and Figures 45 and 46.

If one compares the values of the initial and the final years, the necessary conclusion is that Turkish democracy has not improved nor worsened: in 1999, the general evaluation was 43.05 and the 2009 value reached 43.17, an almost imperceptible variation. Also interestingly, however, is that about 17% of the people who responded the survey assessed the democratic performance of the country with the same value in the two years – sharing the results provided by the model. For these people, who came both from the EU and Turkey, there has not been any improvement in the country's democracy and this is a vision not to ignore, since it involves a negative appreciation of both Turkey's development in terms of its political system and the EU's work in the country. Probably, more information and analysis of other variables will help clarify this situation.

Despite that, the majority of the opinions believes in a consolidation of Turkish democratic performance during that decade. Ali Usul (2011: 15) wisely links consolidation to institutionalisation. In fact, democracy can be consolidated through the establishment and reinforcement of norms and rules among its citizens; in turn, promoting the compliance with norms and rules is the function of international organisations. Thus, it is logical to argue that international organisations (in this case, the EU) is supposed to play a role in the consolidation of a country's democracy, even more among its candidates with whom relations are usually closer (and demanding, to a certain extent).

Turkey-EU relations have been debated profoundly over the last chapters and will continue to be analysed. However, they are embedded in a broader (theoretical) question that concerns IR theorists and gives origin to several debates: the interaction between the domestic and the international spheres. The major (traditional or classical) doubt that exists in this regard is whether the domestic aspects are shaped by the international forces or vice-versa. Debate has evolved and, as written earlier, to clearly distinguish the two realms may not be easy in a globalised, interconnected world. Moreover, nowadays, it seems that the discussion has shifted away from this absolute or zero-sum question towards a more meaningful and even harder one – it makes no sense to wonder about which sphere shapes which, but rather the degree or the extent to which existing interactions mutually affect both domains. Recalling the Constructivist premise of the co-constitution of agents and structures, states as actors influence the

international organisations (structures) they are included in, but are, at the same time, shaped by them.

Therefore, the interrogation here has not to do with the mutual influences the EU and Turkey exert on each other, because they are generally recognised, but what kind of role does the European Union play in the country. In other words, the challenge of the endeavour lies in the attempt to find out whether the EU constitutes a direct or an indirect influence on the country's democratisation – which is, after all, a domestic process; are the external influences mediated or constrained by the national context? Or re-interpreted by the nationals and, consequently, adapted to their vision and perception? It is also important to discover whether the pressure an international organisation may exert is more effective through its economic leverage power over the country or through its discourse and the peer pressure in terms of image and position within the international context. Other possibilities are related to the opposition between being an anchor or a triggering factor – the EU can function as an external stakeholder that supports in the background the country's democratisation in the sense that the example is there for serving as an inspiration; on the other hand, as a triggering factor, its role may be more proactive in the case its action induces change, its messages and advice are followed, its rules are complied with.

In order to become closer to the answers to these inquiries, it is necessary to look for possible correlations between the Turkish democratic progress and the role of the EU and other international organisations. A set of additional variables was added at the end of Chapter 10 to introduce the external dimension that was missing in the model. For example, Figure 38 schematises the amounts of grants and other financial contributions given by the EU to Turkey; contrarily to what any realist hypothesis would state, EU financial assistance is not linearly correlated with the country's democratic progress, in general¹⁰⁷. The statistical methods mentioned below looked for a mathematical correlation between the three democratic dimensions (individually and aggregately – Figures 34 and 35, respectively) and EU's assistance (Figure 38). Except

¹⁰⁷ The correlations mentioned in this section are the result of the application of the *Student's t-test* (a statistical hypothesis test) to the data gathered and provided on the previous chapter through the method of the slope of a regression line. The aim of this method is to verify whether the data sets are correlated with 95% of confidence (which means a margin of error of 5%). The correlations are assumed as linear only; therefore, when it is stated that data sets are correlated, it means they are linearly correlated. There are other types of correlations not used for being outside the scope of the thesis. For the elaboration of these mathematical operations, I would like to thank Ana Rebelo e Ricardo Sousa for their indispensable help and support.

for the Control, no significant mathematical correlation has been found. What is interesting in this exception is that Control is the only dimension that, in 2005, begins an irreversible downward path – in case this is not just a coincidence (as appears, since it is the only dimension with a correlation and the EU pressure on this field is not as intense as on others, such as Human Rights and Freedoms, for example), it reflects not only the alleged existence of a direct influence of the EU on Turkish political life, but also a diminishing presence of the Union in the country since the middle of the first decade of the twenty-first century.

If this study is deepened, statistical tests do not find any correlation between the number of laws adopted in the Turkish Parliament and the EU economic assistance (Figures 41 and 38, respectively). This reinforces the hypothesis that there is no direct causal link between the economic assistance and the country's democratic performance. However, the indicator randomly chosen to represent Turkey's socialisation within the European system, the participation in the Youth Programme, does not reveal a correlation either, except again in the case of Control. This is interesting, because this dimension appears to be linked to the EU's pressure both through economic and the societal means. This implies a deeper scrutiny of these relations, namely through a historical analysis that matches the democratic evolution with crucial moments of that relationship.

Two further correlations have been calculated to analyse the role of OECD. The intention is to bring to the discussion the possible role played by other international actors. Correlations did not find any particular connection between the number of laws adopted and the investments made in Turkey¹⁰⁸ by other countries. The same happens with Freedom and Control. However, there is a linear correlation between OECD's money transfers and the dimension of Equality. However, when asked about the importance of other actors for Turkish democratisation, the respondents of the online survey did not take into account individual states or other organisations besides the EU – Figure 46 (Appendix 12) shows that USA, Japan, Sweden and other countries are at the bottom of the table, meaning that Turks (and Europeans) do not regard them as important to Turkish democratic consolidation – they gathered around 2 or 3 points out of 10. International non-governmental organisations have been considered more

¹⁰⁸ It is important to notice that OECD financial aid does not aim democracy only, but a wide set of other fields as well.

important than these countries or even international governmental organisations, such as OSCE.

In what comes to the interviews, the general opinion matches the findings of the survey and also the correlations (with the exception of Equality). A Turkish academic said that any type of foreign involvement in Turkey is not exempt from internal (negative) reactions; as such, international actors may possibly be helpful at the institutional level, but not at the societal level (Interview, 2013e). Ms Yüksel believed that the EU is the only external actor that seeks to improve democracy in the country (Interview, 2013f) and Ms Somuncuoglu included the United States and Japan as countries from which some funding comes from – even though it does not mean that the aid comes from official state sources, but rather from some (non-governmental) organisations or other donations. Professor Eralp (Interview, 2013h) discredits the possibility of an impact of countries like the USA on the Turkish democratisation; even though they may be more worried about democracy questions now than during the Cold War, they are “not much involved” (Idem). On the contrary, the Council of Europe may play some role, but indirectly. The criticisms of the Council of Europe are contemplated by the European Union in the Progress Reports, for instance (Idem).

Official Ege Erkoçak also included these two actors in his answer to the question on the external influences: the USA are said, by this official, to be “always there”, although they do “not really care after the negotiations started” (Interview, 2013i). They have pressured Turkey to join and both Presidents Bush and Clinton lobbied for the country’s accession. Secondly, he mentioned the Council of Europe too, as an “important factor for democratisation, because Turkey has been a member since 1949” (Idem), which gives this organisation an extra leverage power, since Turkey may be afraid to be expelled from it (Idem). This is a curious remark, because usually academia perceives the offer of membership to be more influential than the threat to be expelled from an organisation. Also interestingly, the interviewee mentioned Iran – not as a magnetic attraction, but as a “magnetic distraction”, to use his words (Idem). Erkoçak’s point was that Iranian ideology and reality helped Turkey to follow the Westernisation and democratisation processes, in order to prevent from happening what it used to see (and still sees) in its neighbour Iran (Idem). It is the mechanism of emulation – but a negative type of example that leads the country to perform contrarily, so that it avoids the unintended situation.

Therefore, it is possible to infer that the European Union constitutes the most visible (and possible effective) international actor in the promotion of democracy in Turkey. Although the role of other individual countries, mostly the USA, may be brought to the debate, they cannot be considered as relevant actors; their role is subsidiary at this level. Neither the general public nor the academics attribute them weight enough for them to be regarded when analysing this phenomenon. The Council of Europe is an interesting case, as Turkey has been a member for several years, but it is more or less directly related to the EU, making their disentanglement more difficult to operate. It would not be unfair or exaggerated to say that this institution has played a role mainly on Human Rights and has exerted some influence also through the EU, as a partner to promote democracy in the country.

Recalling the subject of legislative transformation started above, Kalaycioğlu (2011: 268) studied with detail the Constitutional amendments in Turkey and concluded that the major ones (in terms of being more meaningful for the improvement of democracy) were the 1995, 2001 and 2004 amendments. If one reminds the history of Turkey-EU relations presented above, these years are close to important moments between the actors: 1995 can be associated with the establishment of the Customs Union; 2001 was right after the declaration of candidacy status and in the year of the Accession Partnership and the NPAA; and 2004 was before the opening of negotiations. And although the number of laws adopted by the Parliament and the EU economic assistance are not linearly correlated, the truth is that timing constitutes an important variable, as the previous examples epitomise and as Eralp (2009) had already concluded. It is because of this connection between time and interaction that it makes sense to divide Turkey-EU relations (and more specifically, EU's influence) into different time gaps, as done in the beginning of this Chapter. As a matter of fact, even more importantly than discovering the absolute impact of the Union on Turkey's democratisation may be to realise in which moments its pressure has been more effective and led to real improvements and in which the opposite has happened. Identifying these smaller time units will allow a deeper understanding of the events behind the fluctuations in the pace of reforms, in case they are directly related to the EU accession process.

One of the requests in the online survey was to classify EU's impact on Turkish democratisation (Table 19). The results are interesting: Turks and Europeans disagree

on the subject. The former perceived the role of the Union to have grown from 1999 to 2009, as their average answers were 4.53 to 5.88. Besides, their evaluation began as negative and shifted to positive. On the contrary, Europeans always assess EU's role positively, but with the opposite trend, i.e., decreasing during the decade (from 5.83 to 5.50). The difference is not significant, but reveals some perception of a less active European Union at this front. The opinions conveyed in the survey do not help to clarify the role of the EU either – in terms of the general average, its presence has been evaluated from 5 in 1999 to 5.73, which means being in limbo. Respondents did not perceive that influence, in general, to be tendentiously positive or negative; and although this may not solve the dilemma concerning the role of the organisation, it certainly reveals how uncertain Europeans and Turks are about it and that is a signal *per se*.

Back on the comparison between the events of Turkey-EU relations and Turkey's democratic evolution, some matches, besides the ones already pointed out, should be highlighted. In 1999, candidacy status was attributed to Turkey and, in the next year, its democratic evaluation improved by more than 4%. In 2000, there has not been much progress in relations and in 2001 the value almost did not vary. Despite the positive developments in 2001, 2002 and 2003 in terms of legislation adoption and revised official documents, Turkey's democratic performance remained more or less around the same values, increasing by over 3% in 2004 – possibly as a result of the accumulated reforms undertaken in the previous years. Political changes continued in 2005, the year of the best evaluation, and since then until 2008, the values have steadily decreased. Interestingly, it was in 2005 that major problems surfaced in Turkey-EU relations: the Turkish declaration of non-recognition of Cyprus and the EU's response, the adoption of a harder Negotiation Framework with new conditions; in 2006, there was the suspension of negotiations on some chapters, Sarkozy is elected and voices his opposition to Turkish accession, the Presidential crisis begins in the country and the Progress Reports recognise that reforms' pace has slowed down; in 2007 there has not been much change and in 2009, the *Ergenekon* case begins and for the first time the APR criticises the lack of commitment of the Turkish government in relation to the European process.

Therefore, it is possible to unveil some parallelism between the volatility of these events and the general evaluation of the Turkish democracy. However, this

perception is not shared by everyone: the Director of the Directorate for Political Affairs of the Ministry for EU Affairs said he did not “really believe democratisation process has always been in parallel with the EU accession process” (Interview, 2013i). Again, the analysis of this question is stuck – opinions are divided, data is not clear or conclusive and literature has not provided a categorical answer as well.

The role of international organisations on domestic realities has been debated on Chapter 4. At that moment, it has been written that, based on the literature available, it seems that it would be fair to conclude that international influence exists, but it is constrained by domestic conditions; besides, IOs promote cooperation, shape the international environment, apply sanctions and the consequences of deviant behaviour and work as mechanisms of external democracy promotion through different dynamics, such as conditionality and socialisation – the two tools preferred by the EU. Constructivism also provided some important insights on this question, highlighting that IOs embody the set of rules and norms their members subscribed to, and therefore, they act as the patterns of adequate behaviour those members need to follow. Hence their relevance as diffuser of norms and rules.

According to the data, it is not possible to say (straightforwardly) that the EU has had a direct impact on the consolidation of the Turkish democracy. However, it would be very coincidental that a mathematical correlation would reflect the complexity of such a set of events, since many nuances have been introduced during that decade and reshaped the whole process.

Some of the contributions made by the interviewees may help capture these nuances that numbers have overlooked. Ege Erkoçak (Interview, 2013i) is rather sceptical concerning EU’s role: “it’s not like Europe really affected Turkey to be a democratic country. Everyone in Turkey knew that Turkey is almost a founder of the Council of Europe and part to many of the European conventions”. By stating this, the official was acknowledging that Turks wanted to democratise, but that willingness has not to do with the European process or pressure. Besides, according to the same interviewee, Turkey does not only want to democratise, but also to develop economically following the European model. For him, the EU is essentially a “litmus test” for Turkish democracy, as it is an external institution that monitors the Turkish progress; nevertheless, EU’s Progress Reports have become a magnet for journalists and

academics, but “unfortunately not everything is very well written in these reports; it’s not objective” (Idem).

Ege Erkoçak was the only interviewee with such a sceptical position towards the role played by the EU; even concerning the Reports, a Turkish journalist, when asked about the Union’s double standards and unfairness towards Turkey, answered with another question: “Has Turkey done enough? In the last couple of years, I would say no” (Interview, 2013c). Erkoçak recognises, however, that the EU has been important to involve the civil society in the accession process – so that the decisions made are accepted by the general public, even though EU’s approach is top-down and its proposals “are not really based on the realities of Turkey” (Interview, 2013i). That approach, according to the Head of the Directorate for Political Affairs, sometimes has effective results, but sometimes not (Idem).

This vision, on the other hand, is not shared by the rest of the interviewees. A Turkish diplomat posited that, even though the process has lost its momentum, the EU contributed to a “radical transformation in Turkey” namely in the promotion of “better democratic standards” (Interview, 2013a). A Turkish academic gave the EU a relevant role as a democracy promoter in the sense that the institution is the only intermediary position that can balance and mediate the socio-political polarisation in the country; besides, “the EU is the only alternative that can stop the *Erdoğanisation* of Turkey” (Interview, 2013b). This concept reminds the negative influence of the tradition of a strong state with a strong leader discussed earlier. In fact, and according to this view, the European Union, as an external actor, is capable of mitigating the gap that can hamper Turkey’s democratic consolidation.¹⁰⁹

Another Turkish academic recognises the importance of the EU’s pressure, but also acknowledges that “the EU membership process and the harmonisation packages have been instrumentalised, not internalised” by the government (Interview, 2013e). The theorist named torture as one of the most positive improvements in Turkish democracy that came from EU’s pressure, but also emphasised how media and intellectual life have been under the control of the government in a clear lack of

¹⁰⁹ During the field work in Turkey, this social polarisation was perceptible even for a foreigner: the interviewees, the general public and even the media reflect this constant opposition between the two factions of the society. Every issue debated at the public level (the Constitution, the headscarf issue, new legislation, the *Ergenekon* case and even societal questions) always had as a background this greater division. It was a particularly tense period, which eventually led to the Gezi Protests a couple of weeks after I left Turkey.

democratic quality at this level – worse, “Turkey is going backwards in this area” when compared to previous years (Idem). Therefore, it can be inferred from these opinions that EU’s success has been partial, because there is a negative interference made by internal actors that end up jeopardising the process as a whole. However, the author reminds that societal aspects and mentalities of democratisation are very slow: “in practice, embracing and internalising the democratic principles takes time. There is nothing the EU can do” (Idem).

The Turkish Ambassador, on the other hand, extended the Union’s influence to the cognitive domain: “mentality has changed as well” (Interview, 2013a), as taboo themes started to be talked about and discussed, like death penalty – which was ultimately abolished under all circumstances. And Madam Ambassador Gökdenizler goes even further when stating that Turkey would reach that point somehow, “the EU speeded it up” (Idem). In other words, the role played by the EU in Turkey is to trigger the reforms and the changes necessary to improve its democracy – in a Western/European way. Turkey allegedly has the means to consolidate its democracy; it would only have taken longer for the country to achieve it (probably also due to its growing polarisation) and this may be the key aspect of EU’s behaviour in the country. Without the EU, Professor Uzgel foresaw,

“Turkey’s democratisation wouldn’t definitely be quicker. Without the EU pressure, conditionality, support... – whatever you call it –, Turkey would have been less and less democratised. The EU was critical in Turkey’s democratisation process. It was kind of an anchor, a kind of a reference point that contributed enormously to the democratisation process (...). [The EU was] important to open the way, to prepare the ground for more democratisation in Turkish society” (Interview, 2013e).

Professor Eralp also believes the EU is important for Turkish democracy and

“if Turkey stays in the EU process, it will be easier to consolidate Turkish democracy. Democracy is always an internal process, internally driven; but in the case of Turkey, a country very polarised in this way (there are major political frictions), we need an important anchor and the EU has been an important anchor in terms of restraining political polarisation in Turkey. And when EU process is more positive, you see less polarisation in the country” (Interview, 2013h).

Eralp shares, therefore, the vision about the role of the organisation in helping overcoming Turkey’s polarisation; more interestingly, he directly links its stableness with EU process – when it is at a more positive or stable stage, society is more unified, which gives the Union an addition responsibility in terms of its impact on the country’s internal politics and society as well. This set of opinions corroborates the hypothesis

mentioned above: as an internal process, democratisation in Turkey is also heavily influenced by the EU as an external actor that stimulates and encourages the process, inherently complicated by the country's features, such as its tradition as a strong state, strong leader, its immature (or maturing) civil society and its polarised socio-political environment. Besides, another conclusion that has been reached is that the evolution of the evaluation of Turkey's democracy has been as unstable as the process of accession to the EU. Time and interaction, as proposed by Atila Eralp (2009) emerge as two fundamental variables to take into consideration when studying the subject. The logic of "action-reaction" or "impulse-response" arises as a possible explanation: the Turkish democratic evolution, even though shaped and led by domestic stakeholders, has been externally impelled by the European Union in the sense that (at least some of) its demands are complied with, bringing an improvement to the country's democratic performance.

Accepting the interference of time as a mediating variable can also lead to the acceptance of the division of the major period into some smaller units – as already done on this Chapter. Recalling that division, the aggregation of sets of similar dynamics allowed the creation of three different periods: 1999-2005; 2006-2008; 2009. These divisions arose from the analysis of quantitative data. When it comes to the interviewees, who were asked about differences in the intensity or quality of EU's presence in Turkey and its subsequent more intensive pressure at the democratic level, their perceptions match the data – at least the main division.

Professor Eralp said that "from 1999 to 2005. Turkey, in terms of political reforms, in terms of democratisation was doing impressively well. (...) [it] started to change after 2005 (...)" (Interview, 2013h). Another academic, Professor Uzgel, stated that "Turkey's democratic consolidation has been weaker in the last four or five years [of the general time gap between 1999 and 2009] than in the previous 2002-2006 period. (...) In 2004-2005 there is a peak point and then it starts to slowdown" (Interview, 2013e). The answer of the representative of the Directorate for Accession Policy of the Ministry for EU Affairs to the question about the strongest period in which EU's presence has been felt in Turkey was also clear: "It was before the declaration of opening the negotiations in Turkey and the period afterwards until the blockage" (Interview, 2013f). Another interviewee from the Ministry agreed: "after 2004 or 2005, you see that parallel structure [between EU and democracy] less" (Interview, 2013i).

When asked about a breaking point in Turkey-EU relations, Ms Cakir chose 2006 – since then “we see a change in the attitudes of the EU” (Interview, 2013j). On the EU side, all the interviewees pointed 2005 and 2006 as the turning point in the relations. However, they believed this shift has been caused by a change in the Turkish government’s commitment to the accession process.

After becoming a candidate country, “democratisation became the most important element of that Europeanisation” (Interview, 2013h) and, until 2005, both political elites (government and opposition alike) and civil society engaged intensively in the process of democratisation; at that point in 1999, relations with the EU became less formal and involved other stakeholders that reinforced the process itself (Idem). There was, until 2005, what Eralp called a “mobilisation in the country in terms of Europeanisation”. The academic goes even further when asserting that the “EU became a domestic actor in Turkish politics when we look after 1999” (Idem). This is a major consideration, since it implies that the influence exerted by the Union is not to be perceived as something externally imposed, but as some internal dynamic that is part of the domestic process of democratisation. It is as if the EU was so close to the country and its citizens and elites that it was like another domestic stakeholder. Since 2005, nonetheless, this mobilisation began to change. Surprisingly, negotiations have just been opened and that usually means more involvement of all actors, because “the EU process is linked to a process of democratisation” (Idem), as it happened in countries like Portugal, Spain and Greece. Conversely, however, “we start to see problems in terms of the EU process and this affected also the process of democratisation” (Idem). That is visible in the lack of enthusiasm towards the process and in the decrease of the popular support (Idem).

As perceptible, the breaking moment in Turkey-EU relations of the period under analysis, according to both quantitative and qualitative data, was 2005. However, what the numbers cannot tell, contrarily to the interviewees and literature, is what happened so that this volte-face occurred and changed both the accession process and Turkey’s democratisation. Cagri Cakir provided her view as a person used to deal with this subject very closely:

“We were going with great enthusiasm in 2005. We started the screening in January 2006 and we have devoted the whole year to that process and at the end of that year we had our homework done: we saw what were our faults, what are our shortcomings, and we were trying to overcome these faults – I

should say shortcomings – and then came the declarations that Turkey should conform to the Additional Protocol, etc. and right then our negotiation process has been blocked due to the Cyprus problem. And it is something exterior; it's old. We backed the Annan Plan and the only one rejecting it is a member state and right now things are out of control. They locked down the negotiation process. Our negotiation process has become a political one. We moved away from the technical issues.” (Interview, 2013j).

Cyprus is a central issue in Turkey-EU relations and one of the biggest obstacles to the pursuit of the negotiation process, due to the blockage created by this situation. In an informal conversation with another worker from the Ministry (not recorded or included in the used interviews), he unburdened himself by saying that the Additional Protocol, and the consequent obligation to officially recognise Cyprus, was a humiliating issue that prompted very negative reactions among Turks. Another Ministry's official declared, in relation to this question, that

“they [the EU] use a small island, a semi-state according to the Constitution (...) for the Customs Union issue. Eight chapters were blocked; then, Cyprus blocked six chapters and interestingly important chapter on Human Rights and security plus energy. (...) Having Cyprus as a member was a mistake. And after that mistake, Sarkozy and Merkel and Chirac used the Cyprus issue as a scapegoat and you cannot have decisions like we are suspending eight chapters and not chapters shall be closed if this problem is not solved. You don't do that because we voted yes for the Annan Plan. The other community voted no for that. And the EU backed the Annan Plan” (Interview, 2013i).

But Cyprus was not the only problem mentioned during the interviews to support this twist: “the rise of Merkel and Sarkozy” (Interview, 2013e) has also been pointed out as a serious setback in Turkey-EU relations. One interviewee even mentioned that “European political leaders sometimes use Turkey for their election campaigns” (Interview, 2013f). Another one included the “negative statements about enlargement and Turkey” by Sarkozy and Merkel in a broader negative context (Interview, 2013i). EU's officials, when asked about the impact of these statements, were rather sceptical concerning their effects and believed that, even despite these affirmations, Turkey is committed to an international organisation and not to the individual states that compose it, which means that the candidate should have continued to pursue its path nevertheless. In sum, “it was a vicious circle, several things coming together” (Idem), including internal dynamics within the EU (non-ratification of the Constitutional Treaty, criticisms about the enlargement, debates on integration issues),

which made Turkey “an easy target, a scapegoat in the domestic debates, in the elections” (Idem).

According to this academic, the general negative context in Europe was taken too seriously by the government and

“as a result, the government also started not to implement some of the expectations of the EU. So we start to see a vicious circle: Turkey complained about the EU; EU officials complained about Turkish performance... (...) and then came in 2008 the economic crisis in Europe (...) and the EU turned more inward; (...) Turkey became a less important matter on the agenda (...) and started to get closer to its neighbourhood (...) and they [Turkish politicians] realised they were treated much better in the neighbourhood than in the EU; it also became a psychological matter” (Idem).

It is interesting to notice that all the conditions that are believed to have affected Turkey-EU relations mentioned by Professor Eralp come from Europe – the general negative environment that worsened the state of those relations seems to have been triggered by the EU itself and its internal problems. That position, largely shared by the interviewees, implies a former assumption: that the EU affects Turkey’s behaviour and its democratic commitment; only then is it understandable that a more negative approach by the EU has led to a decrease in the country’s political reforms and in its concern about democracy. EU’s officials stated in the interviews that the shift in the paradigm has been caused by a visible lack of interest by Turkish officials who did not make the necessary changes to successfully continue the process.

The online survey contained a question about the link between Turkey’s accession and the improvement of its democracy. The average of the respondents’ answers, in a scale from 1 (nothing dependent) to 10 (completely dependent), was 6.83. If the two groups – Turks and EU citizens – are analysed independently, that value is lower for the former (6.41) and higher for the latter (7.92). This difference shows that Turks, despite recognising the role of the EU in the consolidation of their democracy, do not regard that role as considerable as Europeans do. However, for both groups, the connection between these two variables has been positively assessed and about 70% of the respondents evaluated it with 7 points or more, which implies that a significant share believes the European Union is highly responsible for promoting democracy in the country – similarly to what has been heard in the interviews.

Another question related to the presence and impact of the organisation on the country focused on two different years (1999 and 2009). The objective was to

understand whether Turks and Europeans had perceived any type of evolution between those years. Interestingly, the tendency was diverse: when asked to classify (from extremely low or absent to extremely high or influential) EU's presence and impact on Turkish democratisation, EU citizens were rather critical, as they considered that influence had been higher in 1999 (5.83) than in 2009 (5.50). This slight decrease does not match the 1.35 increase in the Turks' opinion, which regarded the initial role of the EU as negative (4.83) and believed it had improved during that decade, achieving a 5.80 evaluation. If these results are contrasted with the quantitative data of the model and the interviews, it is possible to observe that the tendency conveyed by the Europeans matches both the interviewees' opinions (who mentioned the growing problems between the two actors after 2005) and the quantitative data, which also disclosed a downward inclination of the quality of the Turkish democracy – even though other variables such as financial assistance remained high. On the contrary, the positive Turkish opinion seems not to match the rest of data. Yet, it is of much relevance to take that signal into consideration: despite the problems in Turkey-EU relations and all the obstacles to accession, the Turkish perception was that the organisation not only stayed in the country, but also that it continued to exert some degree of pressure or influence over it.

The first conclusion to draw from this reflection is that Turkey-EU relations, accession and Turkish democratisation are not linear or straightforward processes. Quantitative and qualitative data prove this argument in the sense that several fluctuations can be found within this ten-year period. Besides, the individuals involved or affected by these phenomena almost unanimously share the perception of the breaking point in which the trend begins to change. This leads to a second possible conclusion: despite the sensibility and volatility of all the processes, there is a clear division into two main phases – pre and post-2005. It matters now to dig even deeper in order to find out what made this route not so linear and straightforward. In other words, and recalling the Constructivist proposal, this already interpreted world, needs to be interpreted as well; i.e., what things became what they are is more important than what they are and, therefore, the processes behind these apprehended dimensions need to be taken into consideration.

Institutions, at the international level, are norm diffusers. Their role, according to Constructivism and Institutionalism (Chapters 1 and 2), is to contribute to identities and

interests' formation through the socialisation of their agents; socialising also those who want to join them and who need to overcome some benchmarks to be able to achieve that goal. The European Union seeks, as stated on Chapter 4, to export its values and principles; its normative approach leads the organisation to try to diffuse them among its candidates through conjugated mechanisms of conditionality and socialisation. However, if democracy – one of those values – has not been reinforced successfully in Turkey, it means that something failed in EU's strategy. It is understandable that the mentioned processes do not present linear developments, but, after ten years, considering the possibility of the Turkish democracy not have advanced enough, seems to be a failure in terms of EU's approach; it is as if the Union has not been able to reshape the identity and the interests of the country, even though they have been being in contact for several decades. In fact, the evaluation of the action of the EU in the country has been, in general, positively assessed in an earlier phase, but a set of conditions have taken place for the alteration of the direction of those dynamics and it is of utmost interest to try to discover and understand them, so that this tendency may be reversed and both actors become able to reinforce their cooperation and to regain the momentum of the accession process, as well as the continuation of the country's consolidation (that seems to have been affected by this remoteness).

11.2. Mediating factors

It has been argued, for multiple times, that the evolution of Turkey-EU relations, as well as of Turkish democracy, cannot be justified merely by material factors: money and self-interest are not enough to understand the dynamics behind the development of these variables. Therefore, this section uses a set of mediating factors, which are nothing more than group of variables that are regarded as useful, after the reflection made upon the subject throughout the last chapters, to interpret the numbers and to allow a deeper comprehension of the phenomena under study. These factors have contributed to the construction of Turkey-EU relations and of Turkish democratic consolidation as they are known; they are intrinsic parts of them and need to be analysed.

11.2.1. Internalisation

The success or failure of a project like an accession process, as it implies the adoption of different formal rules and norms, but also a wide set of cognitive structures filled with (sometimes) new principles and values is particularly difficult to assess. It cannot be said that Turkey used to have a long and strong tradition of a consolidated democratic system. The study of the country's history (on Chapter 6) unveiled this reality: from an autocratic Sultanate to a pluralist democracy, the path had been intricate and not exempt from ups and downs. The creation of a Modern Turkey has sometimes involved the painful process of re-creating an entire country, its identity, roots and socio-cultural features in a strong denial of its heritage. The implementation of a democratic system itself was a product of a non-democratic process conducted by a powerful leader and the establishment of a pluralist democracy had to deal with several military interventions and internal clashes.

When the country's relations with the EU became more systematic and intensive, in 1999, due to its new status, it also became implied (actually, it was explicitly formulated in official documents) that European legislation needed to be adopted in the country. However, the broader process of Europeanisation (which democracy is a part of) also required that those legal changes would be implemented and internalised cognitively – the definition of Europeanisation provided by Radaelli on Chapter 4 included this component, i.e., shared beliefs and ways of doing things needed to be incorporated not only in the legal body of the country being Europeanised, but also in its identity and discourse, which requires a level of adoption that goes beyond mere importation; it requires internalisation.

Internalisation may be, therefore, one of the factors that failed during the decade and that originated that the quality of the Turkish democracy by the end of the period, in 2009, was not significantly different from its evaluation in 1999. Internalisation is a *sine qua non* condition for the consolidation of democracy among the individuals of a certain society, since this system has to be perceived as the only possible “game in town”, as mentioned earlier. Professor Canan Balkir, during a Seminar¹¹⁰ in Turkey, said that only

¹¹⁰ Seminar held in the scope of the Gediz University International Summer School “Turkey and the EU's New Borders”, 15-22 September 2011, Turkey, organised by Gediz University, University of Amsterdam, University of Jena and supported by the European Commission.

history will be able to say if Europeanisation has been being genuinely internalised by Turks. And this is true, since it is rather difficult to disclose imperceptibly small changes at the level of collective mentalities. Still, it is not impossible to expose some potential cognitive transformations by holding opinion surveys and inquiries.

Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007) led such study (already presented) and some interesting findings may be imported to this context in order to bring some light to the question, since some of their questions have been replicated from a previous survey (in 1999). The evolution of the opinions between the two can give important hints regarding the internalisation of some changes. One of the interesting findings of the study is related to the question whether political parties that base their policies on religion should be in the party system (Idem: 81): in 1999, 24.6% believed they do (against 60.6% who oppose it) and, ten years later, the fear of religious parties to integrate the system has vanishes, since 41.4% supported them (against 53.6% who did not agree with it). Noticeably, the number of people who did not answer this question has sharply dropped from almost 15% to 5%. This two-thirds decrease reveals that respondents who were previously not sure about the benefits or dangers behind the empowerment of religious parties became less worried about it and began to support it. This modification of Turks' attitude towards religion and politics cannot be considered democratically positive, since the separation of the two realms is essential for the consolidation of democracy. It is possible to affirm that there has been a retrocession in this field. Although the percentage of people who refuse to have a Sharia-based regime in Turkey has steadily increased¹¹¹, this growing willingness to see religion and politics intertwined does not seem to be a signal of democratic maturation. On the contrary, it would be expected that political parties and politics in general would be regarded as a sphere apart from religious life and, for that reason, clearly separated.

Nevertheless, there are more signals that Turks' religious feelings have been reinforced during that decade. Concerning Turks' self-perceived religiosity, data provided by Çarkoğlu and Toprak (2007: 41) proves to be very enlightening: when comparing the results between 1999 and 2006 (Appendix 11, Figure 44), the percentage of respondents who said to be "not religious at all" and "not very religious" decreased (12,1% in 1999 to 4,5% in 2006). Even more perceptible is the fall in the numbers

¹¹¹ "Would you want a Sari'ah-based religious regime to be established in Turkey?" The percentage of "No" answers increased over the years: 1999: 67.9%; 2002: 71.1%; 2006: 76.2% (Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 81).

regarding the “middle-ground” religious, the ones who put themselves in the middle of the scale (55% to 34%). On the contrary, the share of highly religious advocates almost doubled (31% to 59%). These figures are informative *vis-à-vis* the evolution of Turks’ religious self-perception; the amount of people who consider themselves religious increased significantly, which proves again Huntington’s argument that indigenisation caused reinforced religious feelings. This constitutes another symptom of how Turkish mentalities towards religion and politics did not improve, at least in the light of the European standards.

Interestingly, however, when it comes to the number of women who do not cover their heads, it does not match the findings above. In all the cases (simple headscarves, *çarşaf*¹¹² and turbans), the percentage of women wearing them decreased (Table 11, below). Still, it cannot be ignored that a decrease in this number is not generally shared by the older groups, who tend to embody a different tendency; besides, it may not represent the predisposition of rural areas.

Table 11: Age distribution of women and head covering

Age/Year	Do not cover		Wear a headscarf		Wear a turban		Wear Çarşaf	
	1999	2006	1999	2006	1999	2006	1999	2006
18-24	40.5	50.7	36.1	34	20.6	11.3	2.3	0
25-39	28	41.5	53.3	42.9	15.6	13.1	2.9	0
40-54	22.9	28.3	61.1	58.5	12.5	9.1	3.2	3.1
55-69	14.1	13.7	65.5	70	13.7	12.3	6.7	2.6
+70	17.4	12.7	69	80.6	8.3	6.7	5.3	0

Source: Abridged from Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 63

A growingly religious Muslim society with a decreasing number of women covering their heads can only imply that that religious reinforcement is accompanied by a developing sense of freedom or, possibly, a different, more liberal, interpretation of their religion. Younger generations, despite being more attached to religion, are capable of enjoying their freedoms, even though this scenario would have not been easy to foresee. What it enables, however, is to realise that attitudes towards politics, democracy and even religion may change in a short period of seven years and that it may also be the result of changing perceptions and interests – Turkish mentality has

¹¹² A piece of clothing very similar to the niqab. It covers both the head (hides the lower part of the face) and the whole body.

been changing for the past years. Whether or not it is the result of Europeanisation is what this thesis has been trying to find out.

Implementation and internalisation of the democratic practices are, as seen, pretty difficult and time-consuming processes; but both the EU and the Turkish government are aware of these difficulties. The Coordinator of the Directorate for Political Affairs explained in detail how the work of the Ministry has been done with Chapters 23 and 24 of the *acquis* (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights; Justice, Freedom and Security):

“Sometimes the reforms follow the projects, sometimes first we make the legislation and then for the implementation... to get the implementation in line with the EU practices, we use the projects. One of the most important ones are, as I remember, is the training given to the judges and prosecutors, because they were trained about the European Court of Human Rights case law. (...) You can amend the legislation, but if it is not understood by the judges, there is no meaning... So, that project was really important to change the mind-set of these justice actors. (...) We have also implemented measures and reforms in the area of Fundamental Rights, for example, women rights was one of the focus. (...) We have designed a training program for these young conscripts to get their training on women’s rights... It was like an obligatory training, so some people, especially in rural areas, choose to go complete their military service when they are 18 or 18, so they are so young, but they got the culture from their families, so they can be harsh on women. (...) And also we have now local boards for human rights. There are like 900 all over Turkey. They work both at the district level and the provincial level (...). We have designed as well a project to increase the institutional capacity of these boards, they are also very active and compose a very important project. They are composed of NGO representatives and they produce a report and we have a Human Rights’ Presidency and these boards get the complaints from the citizens and they convey these complaints to the Human Rights’ Presidency and they try to solve these complaints” (Interview, 2013j).

Therefore, it is possible to recognise an effort on the Turkish side truly implement (and through implementation, reaching internalisation) of the legislative changes the country has been making. The Turkish Ambassador to Portugal, who also has much experience in dealing with the EU for some past positions she has occupied, recognised that ten years ago, Ministries’ officials and administrative were not ready to work with and to implement EU’s measures and initiatives, but now, due to, for example, twinning projects, all workers at Ministries became experts in EU (Interview, 2013a). According to the same diplomat, “although we are not a member of the EU, we are already part of the system, as all these years of contact and interaction created a lot of accumulated knowledge” (Idem). This illustrates how Turks perceive their country has been undergoing a long process of rule adoption and implementation; eventually, all

these measures and alterations, after being put in practice for some time, will be internalised by the Turkish population. Yet, some obstacles have been hurdling both the accession and the democratisation processes, so that the alterations at the level of the democratic quality and the Turkish mentality have not been the ones expected after the ten-year period of the candidacy status.

11.2.2. Mutual perceptions, identity and culture

Turks and Europeans have been in constant interaction for the last decades (not to mention earlier periods of cooperation and war). It happens that how they perceive each other – or better: how their mutual perception has evolved in time – is a fundamental variable to take into consideration when studying these relations and what has been affected by them. In turn, those perceptions have been filtered and constrained by their general visions about the world and their wishes, which means, in other words, their identity and interests. These are embedded in a broader context: culture. Therefore, these entangled concepts sustain the environment that contextualises Turkey-EU relations.

EU's strategies to improve democracy in Turkey in 1999 were negatively perceived by Turks (4.71 out of 10), but they started to convince them during the decade and, in 2009, they were assessed with 5.71. This improvement signifies that Turks believe the strategies the European Union have used in the country have become more effective, even though the EU has lost popularity and accession is not as appealing as it used to be. Among Europeans, the tendency is the same (5.25 in 1999 and 5.50 in 2009) – their enthusiasm, despite greater at the beginning, did not increase much. Ultimately, both societies agree when assessing the effectiveness of EU's policies to foster democracy in Turkey.

Notwithstanding, that harmony cannot be observed in the question regarding the obstacles to Turkish accession¹¹³. The top three motives that, for Turks, prevent them from entering the European Union, according to the online survey conducted, were the European public opinion (8.18), the lack of political will among European elites (8.00); and EU's absorption capacity (7.35). On the European side, the first motives were

¹¹³ Cf. Table 21 and Figure 45 (Appendix 12),

Human Rights (8.75) and the lack of political will among European elites (8.75); freedoms and liberties (7.42); and culture and identity (7.35).

Again, and even recognising that the sample gathered by this survey may not be representative, these results involve very interesting findings about the perceptions both towards the accession process and towards the “other”. First, it is interesting to notice that Turks’ top three reasons blame Europeans. Among the long list available, the three highest rated put Europeans at the centre of the obstacles that prevent Turkey to join the Union, which is rather thought-provoking, since Turks seem, therefore, not to find that the main responsibility is theirs. This has repercussions in terms of their relationship with Europe, because, when believing they are mostly not the ones to blame, they have nothing (or very little) to change. On the contrary, Europeans recognised their elites’ fault in terms of lack of political will, but more significantly pointed out the state of main democratic principles: Human Rights, freedoms and liberties. Simultaneously, they acknowledge the interference of cultural and identity divergences as a hurdle that hampers the whole process. Secondly, these results also reveal a difference in the perception concerning fundamental questions: for Turks, Human Rights, freedoms and liberties figure, in the Turkish ranking, among the sixth and eighth positions, respectively. There is, hence, a significant gap between what Europeans feel as Turkey’s problems (namely their performance at those levels) and what Turks believe they are. More generally speaking, the option “state of the Turkish democracy” ranked fourth (7.00) in the European ranking and ninth (5.59) in the Turkish ranking, almost at the bottom of the thirteen options contemplated.

This mismatch in terms of European and Turkish sensitivities about what is causing the obstacles for the improvement of their relations and the development of the candidate’s path towards full membership is very significant, because, as mentioned repeatedly, the way actors perceive reality affects the way they respond and behave, creating different dynamics, depending on their vision. It is not difficult to realise that, as long as Turks feel that European have been unfair or lifting barriers for accession, they will not be as enthusiastic to engage in the process as they would be if they see the EU committed as well.

A Turkish academic, in one of his answers, gave an example of these different perceptions:

“for many years, the term of ‘Human Rights’ was taken negatively in this country. (...) Human Rights equalled Kurdish Rights. (...) When the [European] officials say ‘You have to improve your Human Rights’, that means ‘You have to grant more freedoms to the Kurds’” (Interview, 2013e).

This example illustrates what has been considered above: Turks do not regard Human Rights in the same way Europeans do – due to their own historical and cultural context – and EU’s comments and reactions are received with the filters of those contexts and perceptions history has been creating in Turks’ minds. The mismatch in the understanding of the same concept originates difficulties in the relationship.

Another example, given by a Ministry’s official, is related to Fazil Say’s polemic statements about Islam and his 10-month imprisonment sentence¹¹⁴. He was complaining that several institutions were against the verdict, but, according to Ege Erkoçak, the sentence has been suspended and “postponed for five years, just supposing he misbehaves” (Interview, 2013i). It is interesting the use of the concept of “misbehaviour” in this context, as it implies that Fazil Say has misbehaved when he made those statements. Nevertheless, the interviewee’s point of view was that

“one should not forget, when we talk about freedom of expression, that it is dependent on the culture of it; there are certain rules. (...) there are some general values, but, especially for freedom of expression, people might feel irritated through some reading materials” (Idem).

Again, this position with respect to freedom of expression reveals the opinion of some societal segments in Turkey and how they struggle with this “recent” right that has been introduced (or at least reinforced by implementation) in Turkish life and which has originated several debates, in a healthy democratic fashion. This discussion has also pointed out the high proportion of jailed journalists and intellectuals. Professor Genç stated that journalists cannot publish news freely, as they are afraid to be fired; professionals from *Hizmet*, *Taraf* and *Sözcü*¹¹⁵ have lost their jobs for publishing unpleasant news, which means that there is no opposition in Turkey (Interview, 2013b). Another Turkish academic (anonymously) has reiterated this situation in the country

¹¹⁴ “In April 2012, Say posted controversial tweets asking whether heaven in Islamic tradition is like a brothel or a pub because the Quran says there are rivers of wine and huris (very beautiful women) in the afterlife for those who commit good deeds while on Earth. Say also tweeted about a muezzin who recited the evening call to prayer in 22 seconds, wondering whether he was in a rush to reunite with his lover or go to a rakı table. Say explained his controversial tweets as verses from a poem by Omar Khayyam, a Persian poet. The prosecutor’s office has found that Say’s statements run contrary to the first and third points of Article 216 of the Turkish Penal Code (TCK). These points concern the offenses of “inciting hatred and enmity among the public” and “insulting religious values”” (Today’s Zaman, 2013).

¹¹⁵ *Hizmet* is a newspaper linked to the Gülen movement; *Taraf* is the liberal publication that denounced Ergenekon case and *Sözcü* is a radical-left newspaper, close to CHP and the Worker’s Party, secularists and nationalists.

and revealed that Turkey is going backwards in terms of freedom of expression, since the Prime-Minister is capable of firing a journalist, shifting the logics behind this liberty and the balance of powers in the country. The editor of *Today's Zaman* also argued that the problem of journalists in jail needs to be addressed, but that Turkey is a very special case due to its military *coups*, as there still is, according to him, the fear of a *coup*, which justifies the need to be careful and to pay attention to the military (Interview, 2013c).

The differences in the perceptions between Turks and Europeans are not limited to these subjects. In fact, when asked to classify a list of several actors according to their contribution to democratisation, there have been some divergences, as well¹¹⁶. Ranked as the first place by both Europeans and Turks are Turkish economic elites (7.67; 7.65, respectively). EU citizens also assessed Turkish civil society *ex aequo* in the first position. Their second and third choices were the EU (7.08) and Turkish NGOs (6.83). For Turks, the main contributors for their democracy were, apart from the economic actors, the AKP (second, 7.35) and Turkish civil society (third, 6.88). Again, some interesting findings can be highlighted from these results.

First, Turks have only included in the top-three list Turkish domestic actors. Therefore, it follows that they perceive their national actors (economic elites, AKP and civil society) as the main engines of the Turkish democratic evolution. On the other hand, the European Union comes only in sixth place with 5.82, which means that this international organisation has barely reached the positive evaluation threshold. Secondly, Europeans regard their organisation as the second main democratic drive in the country. Given these results, either Turks and underestimating the value of the EU or Europeans are overestimating it. Thirdly, the bottom lines of the ranking are occupied by individual countries, which seem irrelevant for the Turkish democratisation process. The military can also be included in this lower ranking by the Turks, but not so much by the Europeans, who granted them the sixth position.

The fact is that Turkey and the European Union have fed, for centuries, a set of mutual socio-cultural constraints: for the EU and its citizens, Turkey usually means an assemblage of negative clichés that, besides the historical otherness that is conveyed at school, range from fundamentalist Muslims that occupy European jobs to psychological factors like the difficulty in creating empathy. On the Turkish side, the fear of losing

¹¹⁶ Cf. Table 22 and Figure 46 (Appendix 12).

national sovereignty, as well as its cultural identity, the resentment of the discriminatory attitudes of the Europeans and the lack of hope of being treated equally are some of the constraints that “may lead to cultural conflicts, to the cleavage gap between Europe and Turkey, to alienate from Europe, and to a clash of civilizations” (Kuran-Burçoglu, 2007: 154). Although the idea of a clash of civilisations may be an exaggerating extension of the argument, the point is that these differences may affect the general environment of Turkey-EU relations.

The image Turks have of the European Union has become less positive: in 2004, 56% of the Eurobarometer’s respondents used to have a very or fairly positive image (and 12% a very or fairly bad); while five years later, in 2009, the positive view dropped 10% and a negative image was chosen by 28% of the respondents (Eurobarometer, 2004a; Eurobarometer, 2009). In relation to the knowledge about the EU, Turks performed very poorly, even when compared to other candidates or recent member states: it had the lowest score in a quiz about the Union (1.96 out of 10) (Eurobarometer, 2004a: 34); only 29% agreed with the sentence “I understand how the EU works” (36% did not) and 76% felt they were not very well or not at all informed about enlargement (Idem: 45, 78). This lack of knowledge may be one of the reasons behind the obstacles raised by Turks in terms of their approach to the EU. That is also clear in the question regarding the fears connected to the building of Europe – 53% of the Turks are afraid that integration would mean abandoning their language and 49% fear they will lose their national identity and culture (Idem: 84).

These fears are, apart from interesting, very meaningful. They constitute ideational aspects only (culture, identity, language) and it is very likely that they result from lack of knowledge. The EU has been very prone to support and defend national languages and there is not, within the EU, attempts to destroy or homogenise the diverse cultures and identities that compose the Union. Robins has been quoted on Chapter 8 to mention the basic fear of mortality every collective institution presents and it is a fact that the accession process may be perceived as a means to do that – but one should also remember the fact that some coherence in terms of core values needs to be maintained for the functioning of the organisation; besides, the EU has never tried to alter the Turkish costumes and habits or traditions – except for those who contradict the essence of the European Union, such as death penalty, honour killings and early forced marriages.

On the other hand, and probably justified by these fears, the majority of Turks (57%) only consider maintaining their national identity and do not think about introducing, to some extent and cumulatively, a European identity, which is also below the levels of acceptance of other candidates and recent member states (Idem: 48). Çarkoğlu and Toprak's study has been quoted on Chapter 8 to show that the majority of Turks first and foremost felt as Muslims and only 22.9% as citizens of the Turkish Republic. Therefore, if they struggle to conjugate their religious and civil identities, it is understandable that embracing a third type of supranational identity may constitute a challenge. Furthermore, Turks also feel suspicious about the image of the EU in the Turkish media: 42% believed it was too positively and only 29% regarded it as objective (Idem: 43). In fact, almost one third of the respondents believe they receive too much information about the EU from the media (Idem: 41) – even though they claim not to know enough about the Union and the enlargement process.

In contrast, the majority of the respondents (51%) feel they will become politically more stable as a member of the EU (Idem: 91) and 48% is whether very or fairly satisfied with the way democracy works in the European Union (Idem: 98). Still, the EU means for them economic prosperity (55%), freedom to move (49%) and social protection (49%) (Idem: 72). Although these values change in the 2009 Eurobarometer inquiry, their ranking positions remain exactly the same. Besides, when asked about the most important values for them personally, Turks and Europeans revealed the same top-three options: respect for human life, peace and human rights (Eurobarometer, 2009). The only difference is the ranking position of peace (second for Europeans, third for Turks) and human rights (vice-versa). Considering the other choices, the widest gap between the average of the EU citizens' answers and Turks' is religion, since Europeans only granted it 6% of their votes, whereas 25% of the Turkish respondents chose it as one of the most important values (Idem).

These considerations lead to the inclusion of two other main aspects in Turkey-EU relations: identity and culture. As Subotic (2011: 314) wrote (and as it was already quoted in Part I), “state identity provides a fuller explanation of Europeanization's success or failure than does the concept of external incentives”. In fact, this study supports the thesis defended by Subotic (and reached through a comparative study). The examples provided above and the lack of connection between the external financial incentives illustrate how important these variables are.

The alterity character of Turkey/Ottoman Empire and Europe is, as repeatedly mentioned, a historical reality: in 1883, James Lormirr said that trying to extend rights to the barbarians (the Ottomans) was in vain, as they “proved to be incapable of performing its duties, and who possibly do not even belong to the progressive races of mankind” (*cited* in Stivachtis, 2008: 31). Nowadays, there are still debates about the commonness or otherness between Europeans and Turks. Onis (1999: 107) calls it a “Christian-Muslim divide as a central line of demarcation between Turkey and contemporary Europe”. This issue is even aggravated by the association of Islam with terrorism after the 9/11 attacks or other equally condemnable assaults perpetrated by fundamentalists that promoted all across Europe (and the Western world in general) the spread of fear of Islam, fostering fanatic positions both on the sides of Muslims and Christians (Kuran-Burçoglu, 2007: 154), which is a real, cultural and civilisational obstacle difficult to overcome.

However, Turkish identity, as any other identity, is not unchangeable. It is object of the action of several types of interactions and dynamics that shape and re-shape it over time. Honour killings and increasing divorces co-habit in Turkey; polygamy is forbidden but there are still some cases in the countryside. Moreover, there is a meaningful societal polarisation in Turkey, whose developments are difficult to foresee; what is possible to figure out, however, is that it will raise serious oppositions at diverse fronts: politics and decision-making, religion and society are facing lively times and are being constantly redefined – as written above, probably the role of the European Union is to function as a mediator that will enable this growing polarisation to come to some positive results in the sense that each part does not constantly block the other and prevents the country to develop and improve its democracy. Fattah’s study (quoted on Chapter 8) revealed that, among the Muslim countries, Turkey has the least percentage of Islamists and the highest of democrats. It means that it has the potentiality to become a truly succeeded democracy and to work as an example to other Muslim countries. Its identity is not incompatible with democracy, after all. As the socio-cultural profile traced for Turkey proved, there are many differences and obstacles that need to be overcome, but also several opportunities that can be used to achieve it, such as the reinforcement of the civil society and the collective positive attitude towards democracy and democratic values.

The online survey conducted for this thesis also questioned about the importance of democracy for Turks in two different years (1999 and 2009). The results (of the answers given by Turks only) revealed an increase from 6.88 (out of 10) to 7.24. Although this is a slight increase, these values represent a high consideration of democracy for Turks. Europeans are also aware of the Turkish valorisation of democracy, as the results are really close (6.00 to 6.92). This means that it is possible that Europeans recognise that Turks are also interested in consolidating their democracy and to commit to that process, which is a positive perception – that meets Fattah’s conclusions regarding the democratic potentiality of Turkey. Maybe because of this, has Professor Uzgel stated that “if it [democracy] fails here, then we will have a problem” in the other Muslim societies (Interview, 2013e).

A Turkish Ambassador goes even further and states that “EU is the final frontier to consolidate our European vocation. We are already part of the system; we want to be acknowledged as part of Europe” (Interview, 2013a). This position, certainly shared by many pro-European people in Turkey, indicates that there is this perception that Turkey belongs to Europe and that several centuries of transformation need to be concretised through the international recognition of the country as member of the European system – possibly not as an Asian country, not as a Muslim country, but as a country that belongs to Europe and which has embraced its principles and values (or at least which is struggling to). When asked about the reasons behind the decrease in the public support for membership, Professor Uzgel was clear: public opinion’s support will rise, as soon as the EU shows the door is open to Turkey, because “for the Turkish middle-class, it is a matter of identity (...); they want to be recognised as Europeans. To be European means to be modernised” (Idem). Therefore, it is possible to connect this willingness to join the Union for identity matters. The representative for the Ministry for EU Affairs also believed identity plays a role in Turkey-EU relations, “because of the prejudice issue. (...) And history shows it matters. Today maybe less than in the 1990s, but it still matters” (Interview, 2013f).

Nonetheless, as the same Turkish academic posited during his interview, it is not only that:

“The common perception here in Turkey is that the Europeans don’t know Turkey well. If they knew Turkey well, they would accept Turkey. I think the opposite: they know the Turkish society well; they are definitely against Turkish membership. Look at the rate of women killed by their husbands in

Turkey... There was a news today on the TV, in Southeast Turkey (...) young girls are forced to marry a man as a third wife, so he killed a young woman, that was 19 years old. This is so widespread. How can you culturally place Turkey inside the EU? If the EU's societies in EU countries knew what was happening inside Turkey... I don't think that a Turkey like this would have a place in European society. It is so far, so conservative" (Interview, 2013e).

According to this perspective, then, Turkish culture is not ready to join the EU – is not an economic or structural issue anymore; it is about the country's culture that has become, according to the academic, more conservative. Not materially conservative, but in terms of the ideology, which can become a problem in case this ideological conservatism is synonym with the reinforcement of religion and its entanglement with civil life, for example. In that case, democracy can be harmed.

In a discourse analysis study, Luis Garcia (2011) includes Nicholas Sarkozy's remarks on Turkish accession and highlights that the then French President, in the middle 2000s, emphasised not only geographical, but also cultural motives not to support Turkey's accession (Idem: 59-ff). Issues like identity, Christianity and Europe's unity are brought to the discussion by Sarkozy who believed the Turkish integration would dilute the European identity and make EU's borders indefinite. The French leader even stated that "making promises that you will never uphold is not to respect your friends" (Sarkozy cited in Garcia, 2011: 61), which can be interpreted, as Garcia wrote, that

"the EU, collectively, is not going to uphold its promises. In this sense, Sarkozy is introducing the following theme: most EU leaders are opposed to Turkish membership but do not say it, as they hope Turkey will give up at a certain point." (Garcia, 2011: 61).

What this comment (and other alike) do not take into account is what Robins (1996) believes to be important for Europe – "cultural interruption", i.e. the EU has to be ready to accept and integrate a society that is not so similar to all the previous ones that entered the Union – culturally speaking, as long as the main values of the organisation are respected, either by Christians or Muslims. But, as a Turkish diplomat put it, "Is the EU a Christian club? Then, they should write it in the Treaties" (Interview, 2013a).

Comments like these certainly give the impression that there is lack of political will among the European political elites – in fact, that was one of the major obstacles identified by both Turks and Europeans in the online survey. By promoting mechanisms

of identity divergence¹¹⁷, these strategies end up intensifying the existing differences and amplifying the gap between the two sides, harming not only the accession process, but also the country's democratisation. Identities and interests are mutable and, hence, these statements can contribute to their alteration, in a negative way.

11.2.3. Language, coherence and credibility

Sarkozy's remarks lead the investigation to another essential issue when attempting to find the underlying causes and the constitution of the phenomenon being studied: language. Although not all constructivists agree on the importance of this variable¹¹⁸, the fact is that language is a powerful mechanism to diffuse ideas, to convince and to promote change – change of perspectives, of interests and, ultimately, of identity. Muslim public opinion, as Fattah's study concluded, tends to be more easily influenced by opinion makers (Fattah, 2006: 7). Language is a powerful tool; in fact, it is more than a tool – it constitutes a reality *per se*.

Discursive Europeanisation was one of Diez's (2005) types of Europeanisation¹¹⁹ and was related to the adaptation of discourse to the European practices and standards. A practical example of that has been referred to by Madam Ambassador during her interview, when she acknowledged that some taboo issues in the country started to be talked about and discussed at various levels (Interview, 2013a); as also already mentioned, Professor Uzgel stated that, earlier, talking about Human Rights in Turkey would sound, for Turks, as Kurds' rights and their reaction would be based upon that (Interview, 2013e); however, EU's discourse – even though sometimes very tough – has changed those perceptions and has brought Turkish vision in line with the European patterns.

Language is the means individuals have at their disposal to make commitments; it is, therefore, the basis of any compromise. And the expected behaviour of the other is to comply with those commitments. Therefore, unsurprisingly, the constant postponing of Turkish accession and some other problems (referred to later on) make the Turkish side uncomfortable or even with the feeling of unfairness: President Gül, in the context

¹¹⁷ Cf. Chapter 2 and Subotic's notions of identity convergence and divergence.

¹¹⁸ Cf. Chapter 1 – section 1.3.1.2.

¹¹⁹ Cf. Chapter 4 – section 4.2.3.

of a brief visit of President Sarkozy to Ankara, said that the EU should respect the promises it made when it opened negotiations with Turkey (Rettman, 2011). Although the Turkish President did not specify what promises he was talking about, the idea is that, in Turks' minds, there is the feeling that the EU has not respected its commitments with the candidate country. It is also curious that in the same news, the comment under the picture in which Sarkozy and Erdoğan were sat face to face talking was that "Sarkozy chewed gum upon arrival, considered insulting by his hosts" (Idem). This fact that seemed, at the outset, something nobody would notice, became another example media used to show how Turkey is treated disrespectfully. It is important to notice here how the fact that Sarkozy was chewing gum, an improper behaviour for a diplomatic formal encounter, was interpreted by Turks according to their traditions and cultural premises, and has been used to provide an example of a certain (bigger, political and diplomatic) situation between the two countries.

A Turkish academic recognised the impact of these comments (and others like these) comments by European leaders, partially blaming them for having deteriorated Turkey-EU relations: "particularly the German and the French leaders, Sarkozy and Merkel, were making negative statements and within that context we lost our enthusiasm" (Interview, 2013h). Therefore, it came with no surprise that the Turkish Prime-Minister declared, during an official visit to Europe, that "obviously, developments in the accession process up till now give the impression of discrimination" (Rettman, 2011). This feeling of being discriminated against constitutes one of the problems that jeopardise Turkey-EU relations to the point that they are stuck (...) [and] the EU has been losing its appeal" (Interview, 2013a).

The fact that there is no perspective of full membership is harmful; as there is no timetable, the Turkish government does not feel pressured to make the necessary changes (Interview, 2013h). Besides, negotiations are also stuck, due to the considerable amount of chapters blocked. As the worker from the Ministry mentioned, "there are many forms, in theory, to block the process. One of them is not sending the screening projects to Turkey" (Interview, 2013f), which is the case of eight chapters, including chapters 23 and 24 (Judiciary and Fundamental Rights; Justice, Freedom and Security) (Idem). In these cases, the Ministry is not even aware of the opening and closing benchmarks, not allowing the country to pursue with any type of concrete measures to tackle its problems. "One of them is still even not prepared by the Commission and this

is chapter 31[Foreign, Security and Defence Policy]” (Idem). Besides, six chapters are blocked by Cyprus and the whole process of negotiations is, therefore, trapped.

The same interviewee also noted that France “said it is not a very good time for Turkey to open this field [chapter 17, Economic and Monetary Policy] when Turkey is in crisis. But, one week after, they opened this chapter with Iceland” (Idem). This situation creates, among the Turkish public, a sense of double standards applied by the EU: “the EU definitely has double standards, especially towards Turkey (...), but I don’t think it is necessarily related to religion itself. Religion is part of the story; it is more like a cultural thing” (Interview, 2013e). Possibly, this situation is prompted by internal problems within the EU; as another Turkish academic affirmed in relation to the attractiveness of Europe to other countries, “this is not a problem only for Turkey, it is more of a general problem. This is not only a Turkish problem. It is more the issues of democratisation and it is a critical problem within the EU” (Interview, 2013h), namely its own democratic deficit and other internal questions.

There are, therefore, visible problems in Turkey-EU relations that affect the outcome of the processes these two entities are involved in. First of all, there is the recently introduced open-ended character of negotiations; in other words, this legal clause entails the possibility of the European Union not to grant full membership even if Turkey fulfils with all the conditions. The existence of alternatives will, in the opinion of Tacar (2007: 128), “remain hanging over Turkey like a ‘sword of Damocles’ (...). This will have extremely serious psycho-sociological consequences creating an atmosphere of insecurity”.

The examples of meaningful events that undermine Turks’ trust in the European Union proliferate. The four examples below, more than their material or physical tangibility, may originate, for what they mean, an alteration in a society’s perceptions and interests, affecting the country’s democratic performance. The first example is brought by Tacar (Idem: 130), according to whom, Turks (possibly due to their religious mind-set) perceive treaties as forever binding documents that are never altered. Thus, when the Additional Protocol stated that the free flow of labour was to be implemented in November 1st 1986, Turks would not imagine that more than twenty years afterwards, the EU would have not complied with that condition, justifying its position with the changes in the labour market. From this conflict of perceptions, that derives from each one’s identity, some serious consequences can occur, such as the lack of identification

with the other or even a lack of trust in the partner's commitments, undermining their mutual confidence and generally worsening their relations. Mr Erkoçak (Interview, 2013i) complained about the same subject and, when talking about how the EU has treated Turkey unfairly in comparison to Cyprus at the time of the referendum, he stated:

“we want at least the EU side to observe the principle of *pacta sunt servanda*. I mean, Turkey is, if we continue with the Latin, ready to have a *tabula rasa*, but we are sick and tired because we are working here” (Idem)

– at this moment, Mr Erkoçak showed a 268-page report, the Ministry's Progress Report. Interestingly, when commenting about EU's double standards, Professor Uzgel also brought this subject to the conversation: “just consider the free movement of workers, it had to be started in 1997, but they said ‘we are not doing it’ – and that was a legal condition” (Interview, 2013e).

This event, certainly not the only one in the long history of Turkey-EU relations, is symptomatic of two further related issues: cultural arrogance and lack of coherence. The first idea relates to the question of the still present historical legacy of the ancient Europe-Ottoman Empire relations. Europe, being the model to be imitated and followed, at least gives the feeling that its cultural superiority entitles it to, to a certain extent, disregard some rules Europe itself determined, creating an unbalance with the partner, who, in order to achieve full membership, is not able to skip some of the conditions that were previously set. Conditionality process is specially criticised for the unequal conditions it creates and the lack of opportunity for the candidate to take part in the process of determining the changes and conditions that are expected from it. It is not this socio-political-cultural distance that is able to bring both sides together, diminishing their differences and promoting cooperation; on the contrary, they can widen that gap and make it harder for both to communicate. The official from the Directorate for Political Affairs gave an example of his own experience with European diplomats:

“I gave a presentation to COELA, the Committee for Enlargement and Countries Negotiating Accession to the EU, in the European Council. So, I saw that the member states' diplomacy (but you experience the same with Commission bureaucrats as well) tend to overemphasise their role. This is also not good for candidate countries, but also not something good for member states. They tend to know everything better, the Commission way. It's also a spread disease to the European Council. I think this is kind of a danger, because countries like Turkey can easily feel offended (...) if they are less strong economically and they are relying on the EU and at that time, if the European Commissioners put some austerity measures with an arrogant language can have some different effects on big countries” (Interview, 2013i).

This statement reveals the vision of someone who is used to work closely with the European institutions and bureaucrats and supports the argument provided above, as well as the relevance of language and of the actors' attitudes towards each other in the creation of further responses¹²⁰.

Concerning EU's lack of coherence, a second and concrete example can be provided in order to prove this point: when Erdoğan visited Europe in February 2011 and met with, among others, Chancellor Angela Merkel and President Nicolas Sarkozy, a diplomatic conundrum arose, because during the Turkish Prime-Minister's visit, both European leaders clearly reinforced their opposition to Turkey's accession. Sarkozy argued that Turkey would destabilise the EU if it joined and that therefore a privileged partnership was a better solution (Rettman, 2011) as Angela Merkel has defended for quite a long time. Erdoğan, during the same official travel, mentioned before a Turks' audience that xenophobia and Islamophobia were being felt in some European countries (Rettman, 2011). On the other hand, however, some months before, the then recently elected Prime-Minister David Cameron went to Ankara and declared his total support for Turkish membership, stating that the opponents of Turkey's accession were either protectionists or prejudiced (Público, 2010). Similarly, Italy considered that a "partnership" was not enough for Turkey (Reuters, 2010) and EU Enlargement Commissioner, Stefan Füle, said the EU was committed to allow Turkey to become a member: "There should be a zero doubt policy about our commitment. We have a very clear mandate from member states" (Füle *cited in* EurActive with Reuters, 2010). These contradictory opinions and statements coming from diverse parts and institutions of Europe are a clear sign of EU's lack of coherence, maybe a reflection of its own indecision regarding this issue or, more likely, the overlapping of some individual states' interests over the policies of the European Union.

The third example is provided by the EU's approach to the CEECs. For many authors, it was a clear case of positive discrimination with conditions that Turkey does not have. As Onis (1999: 108) asserts, the countries that ended up joining the EU in 2004 were relatively easily included in the Union, highlighting "the view that the EU is essentially a civilizational project" that created further obstacles to the pursuit of the accession process for Turkey, concluding that

¹²⁰ EU's officials have been questioned about this alleged approach by the Union, but they preferred not to comment on these more sensitive issues.

“the comparative evidence suggests that the incentives available to Southern and Eastern European countries exceeded by a significant margin the transitional costs for implementing the necessary measures of adjustment [whilst] in Turkey (...) the reverse has been the case” (Idem: 131).

Tacar (2007: 134) agrees with this position and adds the fact that, although many current member states did not fully comply with all the conditions in order to enter the Union, even small details in the Turkish process are used to delay it, leading the country to a feeling of frustration that results from this unfair double standards’ policy. Besides, Baracani (2009: 83) compared EU’s assistance to the field of Rule of Law between Romania, Serbia and Turkey (2001-2005) and despite the considerably bigger amounts transferred to Turkey in comparison with the other countries, the value *per capita* per year in the Turkish case (€1.01) was much lower than Romania’s €2.37 and Serbia’s €6.84.

Finally, the 2007 enlargement to Bulgaria and Romania also constitutes a relevant example for this list. These countries were not perceived by Turks as ready to full membership and, hence, their inclusion in the Union was regarded as unfair. Nicholas Sarokhanian and Yannis Stivachtis led a study exclusively based on a comparative approach regarding the European Commission Annual Progress Reports of Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania:

“In an effort to emphasize that Turkey has, so far, been unjustly left outside the European Union, many have argued that when compared to Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey scores better in its fulfilment of the Copenhagen political criteria than the other two, which joined the EU on 1 January 2007.” (Sarokhanian and Stivachtis, 2008: 279)

The authors compared the different chapters of the Reports individually and recognised that, among other things and in relation to both countries, Turkey needs some improvement in the fighting against corruption and transparency (Idem: 283) – two important features of the rule of law. However, it is noticed that the executive branch of the Turkish public administration is better than the one of Romania (Idem: 284). The criticisms regarding the implementation of the *acquis* in terms of the judicial system were similar to Romania’s and that, in this field, “at the time of accession of Bulgaria and Romania, Turkey was at least at the same level of meeting the criteria or even further along” (Idem: 286). In what comes to anti-corruption measures, the authors understood from the reports that, although there are some concerns with this area in Turkey, it is not comparable to the “major structural threat” that corruption represents in Bulgaria and Romania (Idem: 287).

Many other fields have been scrutinised by the authors: on the one hand, for instance, human rights are a weakness for Turkey (Idem: 288); on the other hand, in terms of civil and political rights, “Turkey shows greater advancements in most areas when compared to Romania and it is also farther advanced than Bulgaria in some realms” (Idem: 292), as it also happens in the domain of economic, social and cultural rights.

After having analysed the various chapters, the researchers recognised that, despite the need for some further changes in the Turkish society, this country fulfils the political Copenhagen criteria, concluding that “The progress shown is comparable to the relative statutes of Bulgaria and Romania when they acceded.” (Idem: 299)¹²¹.

Moreover, the *Bartelsmann Stiftung*, a German-based research institute, enables the creation of tools to compare the democratic performance between different countries and the conclusions are similar. In relation to Bulgaria, for example, most indicators have been better performed in this already EU-member: the socioeconomic level, the stability of the democratic institutions, Rule of Law, political participation and stateness are the ones in which the hiatus is more visible (and the ones more important in terms of democracy). Still, the difference is almost always about one point out of ten. However, in all the other indicators both countries are quite even. Regarding Romania, there is a similar situation, but the difference between the two neighbours is not as remarkable as in the previous case. Overall in the economic domain, Turkey performs as good as or better than Romania. In socio-political terms, except for the socioeconomic level, Turkey is very closed or even sometimes at the same stage (political and social integration, stability of democratic institutions and the rule of law are good examples)¹²². At the diplomatic level, there was also that same perception: according to the words of the Turkish Ambassador to Portugal, letting Bulgaria and Romania accede “was a political decision; not because they were technically ready” (Interview, 2013a).

Another debate concerning EU’s credibility and coherence is related to Progress Reports. Turkish officials have been quite critical at this level:

“every Progress Report was a good magnet for journalists and academicians and unfortunately not everything is very well written in these reports; it’s not

¹²¹ It is interesting to notice that, during a Conference these ideas have been presented at, the Turkish Ambassador to Canada, Mr. Amabassador Tuncay Babali, recognised that, although he has got a Bulgarian background, it is possible to realise Turkey is 20 years in advance of both Bulgaria and Romania in terms of democracy, economy, etc.

¹²² For more references to this study and the impact of the 2007 enlargement on Turkish democratisation, cf. Matos, 2012.

objective” (Interview, 2013i); “Up to then [2006], when we are reviewing the progress reports, you can see general criticisms about human rights; they were not detailed. (...) but, after that, the content of the progress reports in terms of political criteria changed; they became too demanding. Sometimes, they demand some steps which were not present in the EU states as well. The content of the progress reports became too detailed” (Interview, 2013j); “We now do the reforms for our citizens, because the EU reports are unfair and always critical. They don’t recognise Turkey’s efforts” (Anonymous declaration).

These three negative visions are not shared by the opinion of a Turkish academic, who believes that “they are quite fair” (Interview, 2013h); in fact, the criticisms conveyed by those documents represent the problems Turkey has been facing (Idem).

Thus, it is possible to take into consideration these question when studying Turkey-EU relations. Timing, language, credibility, coherence, and trust emerge as a set of mediating variables that are capable of reshaping the processes of accession and, consequently, of democratisation, also because they affect the perceptions of those who constitute the core and the real sovereigns of a state – its citizens.

11.3. What really happened?

The title of this section is more of a thought-provoking question, rather than a scientific inquiry to find out “true” answers to the initial interrogations. It is, however, the moment, to get together some of the findings presented throughout this chapter and also to compare them with the results of other academics’ work. The path travelled by this thesis helped disclose important considerations regarding Turkey-EU relations and their impact on the Turkish democratisation. For example, sending Turkey contradictory signs regarding the final outcome of its reforms towards Europeanisation can encompass heavy costs for the entire process. Turkish public opinion “about membership gives form, intensity and legitimacy to the direction of the relations” (Çarkoğlu, 2004: 21) and, therefore, constitutes a key element to consider in terms of political decision-making. Regarding its position in relation to EU membership, the instability of the process is reflected on the evolution of the population’s support. From one of the most enthusiastic supporters of accession, Turks became progressively less interested in the process¹²³.

¹²³ Cf. Figure 42 (Appendix 10).

How Turks perceive and interpret the signals sent by the European Union has much to do with their support or lack of it. And public opinion is fundamental for a successful process of accession and of democratisation, since their enthusiasm can give impetus to the reforms needed to be made by the political leaders, whereas if they are not keen on entering the Union, the resulting political costs force politicians to avoid the subject and, subsequently, the reforms and changes demanded by the EU.

Thus, historical alterity, socio-cultural constraints, EU’s cultural arrogance and lack of coherence – all of them based on the differences concerning identities and perceptions – result in an agitated process marked by discrimination and double standards, Turkey’s jeopardised pride and its lack of trust in the EU, as well as of motivation for further reforms. The feeling of frustration for not being considered an equal provokes on the Turkish side a sense of “isolation, rejection, disappointment, geopolitical exclusion [and a] constant sense of threat to national unity” (Onis, 1999: 134) that damages Turks’ pride, making their reaction in the long run unpredictable, possibly endangering all Turkey and EU’s efforts to democratise the country and to improve its social, cultural and economic performance during the last decades.

Turkish lack of motivation is one of the possible and very likely outcomes of this complex process. Although the Prime-Minister has already admitted that Turkey is undergoing these changes for its own sake and independently from EU’s demands, meaning that even if the Union definitely closes the door, the country would pursue those improvements in any case, EU’s pressure accelerates the pace of reforms and consolidates the process. Düzgit (2009: 57) believes that the credibility of EU conditionality and a real prospect of full membership would be two of the strongest incentives for Turkey to pursue with the needed reforms. On the contrary, insisting on the idea that negotiations are open-ended and that there are outcomes other than full membership will shadow the whole process.

Figure 47: Chain of the consequences of instability




Figure 47 above schematises the effects of instability in Turkey-EU relations. *Source: Author's elaboration.* First, instability in Turkey-EU relations is the result of a set of advances and retreats in negotiations, caused by particular events that originate enthusiasm or resentment,

respectively, between the two parts. Frequently caused by problems in communication or in understanding and accepting the other's differences, this instability changes Turks' perceptions. At a first moment, material conditions really matter (political decisions, military interventions, speeches, etc.), but then they are interpreted by both political elites and the public opinion; it is precisely how the actors read and perceive the material facts that shapes their answers. That is the reason why there are more or less enthusiastic phases. Thus, Turks, depending on the moment of the relationship, perceive the European Union either as an ally that helps the country following the modernisation process triggered by Mustafa Kemal or as an external actor that, besides interfering in internal affairs, does not have serious intentions to keep what it has initially promised.

In that sense, and if the latter reading of reality dominates the general public, there is a widespread lack of motivation to pursue with the changes – which already happen among the workers of the Ministry for EU Affairs, given the fact that the desired benefit of the efforts is not achievable. As a matter of fact, and borrowing concepts from Psychology, if there is an obstacle to reach something that is wanted, the individual develops a feeling of frustration and will consequently use mechanisms to avoid the pain or unhappiness of not getting what he desired. Moreover, if the public opinion does not show interest in the process, it becomes a politically costly subject that should be avoided not to lose votes for more nationalist parties, for example and, hence, their efforts to promote Europeanisation start to fade.

A reinterpretation of reality leads to a change in behaviour, which is adapted to the “new (perceived) reality”, redefining the priorities of the country, for example. The attitudes towards the European Union become less positive and other values and principles are highlighted and took up again, such as the Muslim origins or national traditions. In case democratic culture is not strongly rooted in the society, there may be risks of a democratic breakdown or the erosion of the quality of democracy.

As a consequence, all this chain ends up with different outcomes: the above mentioned weakening of democracy, a slower pace of reforms, the redefinition of the country's foreign policy, a separation from Europe, etc. Ultimately, it can not only redefine the politics of an entire region, but also affect individuals' real lives, due to the broader context and environment that surround them.

Açıkmeşe (2010), Börzel and Soyaltin (2012), Morlino and Magen (2009) and Usul (2011) have been pointed out as some of the works whose concerns have come

closer to the ones that guided this thesis. Therefore, a comparison with the reflections made here constitutes a positive way to analyse them with a new perspective given by the accumulated knowledge built in the meanwhile.

Açikmeşe (2010) stood for the inclusion of both domestic and European factors to explain Europeanisation. At that level, the interplay of these variables has also been used in this thesis. Above all, it has been stated that, in this interaction, domestic behaviour has been a response to external stimuli; not in the sense that the international dimension is more relevant, but because it seems that several alterations in EU's behaviour triggered a modification in Turks' behaviour as well. Açikmeşe's factors, such as EU's commitment, coherent strategies, societal support and government's commitment, have been taken into consideration to study this phenomenon and the author's conclusion that 2005 was the turning point in Turkey-EU relations is completely supported by the findings of this thesis too. The reasons behind the shift in the relationship provided by Açikmeşe also match the ones provided above: a more coherent, committed and with no double standards EU in the first phase against a loose Europeanisation caused by a change in EU's attitudes and the exclusion of the organisation from the national agenda; it has become, as Açikmeşe wrote, a "non-issue".

Moreover, the author wonders if some reforms in 2008 would begin a new era and the results of the model actually point out to a considerable improvement since in 2009. It gives the impression that a new stage could begin, but it is not possible to affirm that, because further years have not been analysed. Yet, in 2010 a new chapter has been opened under the Spanish Presidency of the Council, but it does not seem that represented a considerable improvement in Turkey-EU relations. However, to support that affirmation, further research would be required.

Börzel and Soyaltin (2012) focused their research on EU's transformative power in Turkey and believed the organisation promoted change, but with "significant variation". In fact, our findings agree with that statement: the division of the period into two (or three, possibly) main stages tries to reflect those variations. However, this thesis does not fully support their argument that the adoption of the *acquis* has been selective and decoupled from behavioural practices. Conclusions suggest that, first, *acquis* adoption depended on the phase of Turkey-EU relations (in a more positive environment, even difficult reforms have been taken) and, secondly, it is too early to

evaluate the internalisation of those changes by the population. Furthermore, when the authors argue that Europeanisation is used by national actors to legitimise their own political interests, even though that may have happened at an early stage, since 2005, it makes no sense to posit that, as the EU does not constitute, among the Turkish public opinion, an actor strong enough to reinforce the government's unpopular decisions.

When it comes to the conclusion that change in Turkey happened more due to the ruling elites' willingness to consolidate their power, rather than due to EU's pressure, the results show that it may only have happened at a later stage when the EU lost its impetus; the accession process, since the moment it has become irrelevant for Turks, was not able to exert the same influence it has done earlier: changes, when happened, were more of a domestic process. Therefore, their conclusion that "there is nothing special about Europeanization in Turkey" due to the lack of a credible perspective of membership (Idem: 16) is only partially supported by the findings of this thesis. As a matter of fact, the justification given by Börzel and Soyaltin is shared by this study, but their conclusions seem to be disproportionate: in the moments credibility existed, Europeanisation had results and worked in Turkey. Several major changes have been reached at this point – Human Rights' issues, death penalty, freedoms, civilian control over the military, etc. Yet, when that credibility, alongside with other positive factors, became to fade out, EU's pressure and influence has vanished as well. Thus, one is forced to conclude that Europeanisation worked in Turkey; however, when it started not to function properly, its results have been affected too.

The application of EUCLIDA model by Morlino and Magen (2009) allowed these academics to reach a set of conclusions and to apply them to their case studies (including Turkey). First, they supported the rationalist theory that stated that less financial incentives equalled weaker compliance. This thesis, through its own model, refuses this argument. If one takes 2005 as the breaking point at which Turkey-EU relations started to become more problematic and the country's democracy has been negatively affected, it is not possible to posit that it is due to the lack of financial incentives, since data reveals EU's contributions have not diminished; on the contrary, as negotiations have opened, the transferred values have been higher.

Secondly, Morlino and Magen provided some conditions that increased Turkey's resistance to change: a) the Sèvres syndrome. It is not supported by the findings either: Turks have been willing to change and to adopt Europeanising measures suggested (or

imposed) by the EU; they started not to accept them (or at least to ignore them) since the whole accession process has become stuck. Therefore, it is not wise affirm that they resisted to change because of their fear of being disintegrated as nation, since they have difficult improvements, namely in the field of Kurds' rights – which is a sensitive topic regarding their national integrity; b) when old regime's elites are targeted. This does not verify either. The most illustrative example are the military who have continuously lost power since 1999 and who, despite some displeasure, have tendentiously supported the European integration of their country; c) when Turks perceive changes to be a threat against a “symbolically charged collective memory”. This was an obstacle to some changes; however, there have been some reforms that threatened their values and memories and which, nonetheless, have taken place, namely, again, minorities' rights. The process was slow and very delicate, but has (at least partially) succeeded.

The same study supported “the hypothesis that external influence on rule adoption increases with the credibility of conditional promises and threats” (Idem: 239) and that there is a gap between rule adoption, implementation and internalisation, being the latter truly difficult to assess (Idem: 242). Our findings support these hypotheses as well. Besides, the authors believe that, when transition occurred more than ten years ago, there are some signs of habituation. It was not possible to test this hypothesis, but it matches the general idea of some considerations that regard democratic consolidation a very time-consuming and long process whose results in terms of internalisation can only be perceived at a later stage. In that sense, Morlino and Magen's study backed the argument that timing is a very important variable (Idem: 253) and the hypothesis that conditionality fails is not supported by their research – and by this thesis neither. At the same time, they also recognise the importance of socialisation as an effective mechanism of change promotion, even though it is particularly difficult to detect empirically (Idem: 255).

Finally, the authors wrote that:

“To understand better such an external-internal nexus, our research brought to light the salience of the emergence of opportunities created by external actors and perceived by domestic elites, and in few cases transmitted to citizens. Such an open, and in some cases collective, perception is easier when there is a determinate and credible conditionality. Analytically, we could make a distinction between the understanding on the part of a leader or group that there is an opportunity to exploit and the translation of the opportunity into a successful change. So the end result of this entire game is in the

complex, multifaceted relationships between change agents and veto players, where the public plays an indirect role that can become determining one at the time of elections” (Idem: 255).

It is not difficult to realise that this thesis also followed this premise: external actors create opportunities and domestic actors perceive them and conveyed them to their citizens who interpret them in the light of their experience, culture and identity and who, ultimately, internalise them in their habits, routines and cognitive structures. That is why Constructivism and Constructivist Institutionalism have been chosen to framework this study. Besides, as Morlino and Magen distinguish, there is the perception of an opportunity and then actors use it and transform it into a successful change. What this work has shown is that, in Turkey, there was no longer the perception of an opportunity given by the EU, and hence there is not the possibility to transform it into a change through the EU. Applying what the authors theorised, Turkish public opinion played an important role, as well as other agents did, in perceiving that lack of opportunity and all of them, also mediated by a set of other variables, acted accordingly.

Last but not least, Ali Usul (2011) also devoted much of his research to find out the role of the European Union’s on Turkish democracy, even though this theorist has chosen a different path to reach the same objective. Therefore, the major difference between the two works is that the former has focused on material and political incentives and on the conditionality process, rather than on other (more constructivist) aspects this thesis chose to highlight. Usul, following the contributions of several important authors, theorised democratisation as a complex, long-term, open-ended, not linear, with sudden advances and backslides process (Idem: 24, 25). This is exactly what has happened with Turkish democracy during the period between 1999 and 2009; this description matches the volatility and instability of the line graph that represents the evolution of Turkish democracy.

An important conclusion of Usul’s book, which the findings of this thesis partially subscribe to, is that

“although Turkish governments realized a number of substantial political reforms during the period and thus the quality of democracy in Turkey was relatively improved, the degree of effectiveness of EU conditionality was limited for various reasons (...), and thus the process of European integration with Turkey has not yet served to consolidate Turkish democracy” (Idem: 100, 101).

The question that this conclusion raises is not so much related to the fact that conditionality has been limited (because it was), but to the following of the reasoning

that discharges the European Union from consolidating the Turkish democracy. Maybe, and after having analysed all the data in the form of the quantitative model, the online survey, the interviews and the relevant literature, it is not wise to affirm that, despite the political reforms, the EU did not contribute to consolidate Turkey's democracy. It is true that author focuses only on the conditionality process (not embracing socialisation or even other mechanisms) and maybe Usul is referring to the implementation and internalisation of those changes; however, if the author decided to focus on material incentives, then it is particularly difficult to find the consequent internalisation, since those are not the most successful tools at this level – in other words, it is not merely through financial assistance that Turks embrace legal changes and introduce them in their cognitive structures; it requires more complex processes of habitation through interaction (socialisation).

Moreover, the author sets the boundary of the period of higher compliance with European standards in 2007 and this division has not been supported by the different sources and findings of the thesis, since a bit earlier the European leaders' remarks, the Cyprus issue and the lack of positive feedback from the EU had already created less positive responses and the tangibility of the lack of commitment to the accession process. On the other hand, it is also believed that, in accordance with what Ali Usul wrote (Idem: 141), EU's influence has been restrained by EU's own behaviour and choices. In the same line of thought, Usul recognised that, comparing Turkey now and in the pre-Helsinki period, certain serious reforms would not have been possible without EU's conditionality (Idem: 144). Therefore, he agrees with the conclusion that the EU has been an important factor but (due to its own changing approach) became more limited in its influence since a certain point in time.

Some other lack of common findings between this work and Usul's book are the author's conclusions regarding the improvement of certain fields in Turkey: for example, he posits that some significant reforms have been achieved in civil-military relations, but that "EU conditionality has not entirely sustained the mechanism of democratic control of the military" (Idem: 145). First, this is a statement very difficult to prove; secondly, it is also hard to realise whether civilian control has been achieved through the EU or not; thirdly, there are different models of civil-military relations in Europe and no single pattern, which makes it harder to assess the (mis)match of the Turkish case; and finally, some cases in this latter period have revealed that the military

started to accept the democratic division of powers and lowered their political interference, namely during the 2007 Presidential crisis.

It is also correct to conclude that Turkey's integration improved the relationship between the Turkish state and several types of organisations which are now more capable of pressuring the government towards action; however, Usul wrote that that shift "does not mean that the basic nature of state-society relations in Turkey has been radically transformed" (Idem: 163). However, in such a time period, should we expect it to change "radically"? Maybe, such change is progressive and time-consuming; besides, if those organisations are now able to put some pressure on politicians, and given the history of the country and its relations with NGOs, it reveals that something has changed and this improvement needs to be taken into account within the framework of mentalities' alterations, which is not something particularly quick and tangible.

Finally, this thesis' findings match, in general, the conclusions reached by Usul:

"the strength of EU conditionality depends largely on its credibility. The credibility of EU conditionality, on the other hand, depends on its meritocratic nature. (...) EU conditionality has not been so meritocratic as regards Turkey's situation and therefore its impact on Turkish democracy has been relatively limited and less than it could have been. It is also clear that Turkey's democratic future is closely related to its European orientation" (Idem: 178, 179).

The inclusion of credibility and meritocracy among the variables that affect Turkey-EU relations match the findings of this thesis; however, it is necessary to emphasise that those factors are essentially ideational – the fact that people perceive the relationship as unequal or unfair is what makes credibility and meritocracy so crucial for the understanding of its volatility. Moreover, it is also important not to ignore that EU's influence has not been the same during the entire period – as seen, there were different stages, meaning that different levels or degrees of leverage and influence are found depending on the timing. But, all together, and more importantly, Usul recognises, as this thesis does, that Turkish democratisation process is considerably connected to its relationship with the EU in general and the accession process in particular and that, therefore, if the country aims to keep improving its democracy, Turkey-EU relations need to overcome the obstacles that have hampered them in the past and to pursue their path with coherence, credibility and commitment.

CONCLUSION

The research question that based this whole thesis arose from the doubts about one specific dimension of a much debated and questioned international organisation: the promotion of democracy by the European Union. More than the policies behind this promotion, what is frequently questioned is its effectiveness and to what extent it does truly stimulate the establishment and consolidation of democracies among third countries. Therefore, ultimately this study wanted to find out whether the European Union has been successful in this endeavour through a case study: Turkey.

This inquiry led to a long and complex path: democracy (and other associated concepts) were defined and operationalised; a theoretical model was built and a case study was used to bring all these pieces together and (hopefully) to shed some light on the initial intellectual curiosities. The interesting results that came from it combined a set of different sources: a theoretical model, a quantitative survey, qualitative interviews, and literature review. They aimed to accomplish some objectives initially drawn to guide this research project: it is now time to check whether those have been successfully achieved or not.

First and foremost, this work attempted to overcome the lack of a systematic approach to the theme and to contribute to a set of ongoing debates around subjects like democracy definition and measurement, the assessment of EU policies and the analysis of Turkish democracy and its connection to the accession process. Secondly, it was also an important objective to frame this study within the broader discussion on the interaction between the domestic and the external spheres. However, these contributions sought to be provided through a less frequently used perspective of Constructivism, which tends to emphasise the role of ideas (and their interaction with materiality), as well as the possible impact of ideation aspects like identity, culture, perception and motivation. These concepts have been fundamental to strengthen the novelty of this approach, since the Constructivist thought has generated fresh hypotheses for the subject.

Following the research model, the concept of democracy has been object to a deep theoretical study and to the subsequent conceptualisation and operationalisation in three major principles, eight dimensions and thirteen attributes. The creation of the model comprised the allocation of over eighty different indicators from several sources that tried to encompass as broadly as possible this so complex concept. Through the application of the model, it was possible to reach an evaluation of the development of Turkish democracy in the period under study – 1999 to 2009. Those results have been combined and correlated with the presence of the EU in the country, so that any type of connection between the two processes (of democratisation and of accession) would not be missed. The construction of this model aimed to fulfil a gap in the literature in terms of combining different sources and data that are available for the country but which are rarely used in an aggregated manner. The purpose of the utilisation of such set of quantitative democratic evaluations is to reflect different theoretical perspectives and approaches and to reinforce (or even base) further hypotheses.

Yet, quantitative models are not enough as reality needs to be interpreted; in that sense, the continuation of the thesis has respected the hermeneutical tradition presented earlier and valued the interpretation of historical events, of social practices, opinions and perceptions. The Western linkages Turkey had developed since the Ottoman Empire were taken into consideration, as well as the European responses and the evolution of the Turkish state, its struggle to democratise and the ups and downs all the process entailed. The strategy of abduction, which implied a quest for the meanings and the motives beyond the quantifying results achieves were not disregarded either. The underlying dynamics of the processes under scrutiny have been brought to the surface and several options emerged to help clarify and understand the volatility of the results and the characteristics of those mechanisms.

Trying not to replicate the results and findings already disclosed, it is nevertheless necessary to present, in an organised and summarised way, the most relevant information and considerations that resulted from this study and which constitute its main contribution to the development and reinforcement of the knowledge on these issues.

Therefore, it is important to stress that the application of the theoretical model to the Turkish case revealed what literature has said about the country's democracy: the

decade under study constituted a very unstable period; there have been major advancements in terms of the quality of the Turkish political system (death penalty, for example, is one of the most illustrative changes), but some considerable weaknesses remained and contributed to the volatility of this period. As argued on the last chapter, Turkey can be said to represent a legitimate liberal democracy which is in the process of deepening its qualities; it means that the Turkish political system has overcome the phase of mere democratic transition and is in the moment of consolidating its own democratic records. Specially for sceptics, it is imperative to clarify that consolidating does not only mean that a country is constantly improving its democratic standards – even traditional, consolidated democracies can find themselves in some critical moments regarding their democracy. Therefore, it is hardly debatable that, given the results, Turkey has been working on the improvement of its democracy.

Nonetheless, a fundamental variable needs to be included in this equation: time. Turkey has not been committed and successful at the same level throughout all the ten years: in fact, the need to create a breaking point between two (possibly three) phases has been notorious – not only due to the quantitative results, but also due to the opinions of the interviewees and of academia in general. 2005 constitutes, thus, a consensual turning point in Turkey-EU relations with clear effects on the candidate's democratic evaluation. Before 2005, Turkey and both processes were performing positively; afterwards, that behaviour and both sides' approach have changed.

When one looks closer to the results and compares the levels of the democratic performance of Turkey in 1999 and 2009, the surprise is that the values are approximately the same; the difference lies in the fluctuations that have occurred in the meanwhile. Obviously, the natural conclusion is that Turkish democracy did not improve. However, that is not so linear, if one notices that it has, in fact, improved for some time and, then, worsened its performance. Another possible conclusion or inference that can be drawn from this reasoning is that the EU did not succeed in promoting democracy in Turkey and that, by generalisation, EU's democracy promotion mechanisms in other candidate countries are also meant to fail. Yet, this would constitute a dangerous oversimplification of both data and reality. Assessing EU's success pretty much depends on the phase one is looking at. Until 2005, EU was an active partner in Turkey and achieved important results in several domains, including

Human Rights and freedoms. However, since 2005, the leverage power of the Union started to reveal signs of stagnation or lack of effectiveness.

Furthermore, in neither of the phases was financial assistance a determinant condition, as proven by the absence of correlation between the variables. This not only proves that the role of material factors should not be overemphasised, but also that other types of dynamics needed to be uncovered, so that the motives behind these developments would become known. At this point, a set of intermediate variables has been proposed as a contribution to a deeper understanding of the phenomena involved. It became essential to realise what may be reasons that led to the existence of such a visible turning point both in Turkey-EU relations, but also in the country's democratisation process. The two partially lost their impetus and the results that characterised them in the previous phase since the opening of negotiations. These intermediate variables and all the interpretations that were achieved do not constitute an exhaustive list; probably some other factors and perceptions may be unveiled by other analysts. Yet, they are very likely not to be exclusively valid for the Turkish case; on the contrary, they may be applicable to other cases of consolidating democracies that search for membership in the EU – even though, the peculiarities of each candidate need to be taken into account too. The idea is that these (and other) variables got in the way of a theoretically plain and untroubled route that would be the accession process (mainly after the negotiations are opened, which should mean a technical and not political process) and they have nuanced and reshaped it.

Historical events are tangible phenomena that contributed to the existence of some twists in Turkey-EU relations: EU's internal problems (like the debate on its identity and frontiers, criticisms about enlargement or even the denial of the Constitutional Treaty) have prompted a negative environment for the healthy development of the process; besides, the 2004 enlargement brought to the Union a member-state whose relations with Turkey were not pacific and which originated several blockages of important chapters. Sarkozy's election (and his opposition to Turkish accession) and the Presidential crisis in Turkey epitomise a difficult external and internal context for the process' prosperous development.

In fact, a major shortcoming of the whole procedure was (and probably still is) internalisation. As a *sine qua non* condition for a real democratic consolidation, several

authors and stakeholders point out that democratic principles have not been fully internalised by the Turkish general population: a more active and engaged civil society lives alongside with meaningful social sects with reinforced religious feelings. This contradiction (together with others already mentioned) reflects that a democratic culture may have been growing in the country, but there is still a long course to go through in what comes to mature these concepts and frameworks. As they have not been truly and deeply internalised (also due to a not so old democratisation), affected relations with the EU meant a departure from an engagement with the improvement of their democracy as well. Therefore, insisting on internalisation and making formal changes meaningful and close to the general population much beyond the mere rule-adoption dynamic would be an important benefit brought by a European-led democratisation process.

Identity, culture and perceptions are three concepts whose analysis is the keystone of the Constructivist thought and they were able to suggest important clues about the whole question. It is not meaningless that, in the online survey, Turks considered all the obstacles to their integration to be caused by Europeans and that EU citizens were more critical and mostly blamed Turks for the problems in the concretisation of accession. Moreover, it has also been mentioned that the way Turks perceive freedom of expression and the way media should operate usually does not match the European standards, usually creating a gap when comparing both approaches. In the past, minority rights for Turks meant nothing else but Kurds' rights and only with several years of growing knowledge that resulted from interaction and learning were Turks able to overcome that misconception. In actual fact, misconceptions and lack of knowledge are also relevant problems – as written before, Turks are afraid of losing their identity, their language and their culture. Probably due to the “otherness” feelings consolidated over centuries of history, this fear may jeopardise Turkey-EU relations since it develops a sense of insecurity or discomfort that may produce distrust and reinforce isolation – instead of the necessary cultural and societal exchanges that foster socialisation and tighten the links between two peoples.

The impact of discourses, speeches and formal documents has also to be taken into account when studying these relations. Discrimination and double standards are easily felt by Turks since they still feel insecure in terms of their identity belongings. Therefore, when it is perceived that the conditions set for Turkey to accede are different from the ones given to other (Christian, more European-like) countries, the idea of

meritocracy is shaken; in that context, it is possible that Turks understand there is not special need to strive for the implementation of rather unpopular and unpleasant measures imposed by an external actor. Suggesting that negotiations are now an open-ended process and sending contradictory signs to the population arise meaningful issues of lack of coherence and of credibility. These, in a time of indigenisation, are likely to support the arguments of those who oppose to such relations and that would favour the reconnection of the country with Middle-Eastern neighbours. No timetable means no pressure; there is no point in making the necessary modification, since the final outcome of the process they are embedded in is not foreseeable. Thus, public opinion – also known as electors – have a word to say about the situation; hence, as soon as an issue becomes politically costly for a party, it needs to be dropped or forgotten, because internal dynamics demand so. A friendly approach and a coherent position by the EU would be much more successful in terms of convincing Turks to adhere to the European cause, as well as to the pursuit of the democratisation efforts.

Thus, it is possible to affirm that the process of accession to the EU and Turkish democratisation are two interconnected mechanisms, because, even though the Union may have not been yet completely successful at this level in this candidate, all the hypotheses support the idea that a closer relationship means more democratic efforts and, conversely, more problematic relations eventually lead to a lack of commitment to the improvement of the country's democratisation. These are not linear nor straightforward; different years mean different stages of the relationship and a whole new set of dynamics that reshape the process – different periods signify different degrees of leverage.

In fact, these are fundamental reflections since they may bring some light into the debate around the interaction between the domestic and the external fields. It is not a zero-sum influence over each other. As repeatedly argued, democratisation is an essentially internal process, which domestic stakeholders need to be involved in. However, in a country like Turkey, where society is polarised and whose heterogeneity makes commitments harder to achieve, the existence of an external (ideally objective and impartial) actor that works both as anchor and as a triggering force that drives the necessary centrifugal forces that foster the development and improvement of a country's democracy is of paramount importance. This role has been played by the EU principally

from 1999 to 2005; from that moment onwards, a set of phenomena occurred and it was no longer the same influential stakeholder in Turkey.

As a result, it is vital that the realities behind this change are paid attention to, so that the possible mistakes or weaknesses of this policy are improved in the sense that both the organisation and the candidate benefit from it. Time is a major variable; but the Union's coherence and credibility cannot be overlooked; it is through real commitment and involvement that the EU gets nearer the population and shows them that the role it pretends to play in the country is one of help and of respect, diminishing unpleasant feelings of hurt pride, inferiority or frustration for not being taken as seriously as other partners. Changing these perceptions is fundamental to alter the behaviour they tend to produce. And although democratisation is an internal issue, the European Union can work as an intermediary that reinforces the whole process through its own (obviously not perfect) example and through the serious fulfilment of all its obligations and compromises. Turks, on the other hand, would interpret these novelties and voluntarily decide to apply them in their daily lives, slowly internalising the democratic principles that are able to improve their freedoms and rights, granting them a more pleasant place to live.

Thus, this thesis aimed to bring a fresher perspective into this question and to highlight that merely focusing on material interests is clearly not enough to justify this volatility. The European Union's policies of democracy promotion are based on noble principles and on some pretty successful approaches; however, the Turkish case revealed that, when they are not properly applied, the results may be reversed, jeopardising the Union's efforts and the possibilities of democratic consolidation in the candidate countries.

LIST OF INTERVIEWS

Interview. (2013a) Ebru Barutçu Gökdenizler, Turkish Ambassador to Portugal, Lisbon, March, 4.

Interview. (2013b) Savaş Genç, University Professor and Academic Researcher, Fatih Üniversitesi, Istanbul, April, 26.

Interview. (2013c) Ergin Hava, Journalist and Business Editor, Today's Zaman, Istanbul, April, 26.

Interview. (2013d) Fatih Ceran, Assistant Director of the Foreign Relations Department, The Journalists and Writers Foundation, Istanbul, April 27.

Interview. (2013e) Ilhan Uzgel, University Professor and Academic Researcher, Faculty of Political Science, University of Ankara, Ankara, April, 30.

Interview. (2013f) Kamile Yüksel, Representative of the Directorate for Accession Policy, Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, April, 30.

Interview. (2013g) Sevna Somuncuoglu, General Coordinator, Flying Broom – Women NGO, Ankara, April, 30.

Interview. (2013h) Atila Eralp, University Professor and Academic Researcher/Director, Middle East Technical University / Centre for European Studies, Ankara, May, 2.

Interview. (2013i) Ege Erkoçak, Director of the Directorate for Political Affairs, Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, May, 3.

Interview. (2013j) Cagri Cakir, Coordinator of the Directorate for Political Affairs, Ministry for EU Affairs, Ankara, May, 3.

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APPENDIX 1 – INTERVIEWS

Table 1: Qualitative interviews – some details


Interviewee	Function	Institution	Group*	Duration
Ebru Gökdenizler	Turkish Ambassador to Lisbon	Turkish Embassy / Government	2	45 min.
Savaş Genç	Academic	Fatih Universitesi	1	60 min.
Ergin Hava	Business Editor	Today's Zaman	3	60 min.
Fatih Ceran	Assistant Director	The Journalists and Writers Foundation	3	90 min.
Ilhan Uzgel	Academic	Ankara Universitesi	1	60 min.
Kamile Yüksel	Representative of the Directorate	Ministry for EU Affairs – Directorate for Accession Policy	2	60 min.
Sevna Somuncuoglu	General Coordinator	Flying Broom	3	45 min.
Atila Eralp	Academic	Middle East Technical University	1	60 min.
Ege Erkoçak	Director	Ministry for EU Affairs – Directorate for Political Affairs	2	90 min.
Cagri Cakir	Coordinator	Ministry for EU Affairs – Directorate for Political Affairs	2	45 min.

* 1 – Turkish academics; 2 – Turkish Political Elite; 3 – Civil Society Representatives.

Source: Author's elaboration


APPENDIX 2 – ONLINE SURVEY

Figure 2: Respondents' Age




Source: Online Survey

Figure 3: Respondents' Gender




Source: Online Survey

Figure 4: Respondents' Nationality




Source: Online Survey

Figure 5: Respondents' Education



Source: Online Survey

Figure 6: Respondents' Affiliation



Source: Online Survey

APPENDIX 3 – DEMOCRACY (CONCEPT)

Table 3: Liberal Democracy’s Degrees according to Leonardo Morlino

Rule of Law	Accountability	Responsiveness	Freedom	Equality	
+					Effective
+	+				Responsible
+	+	+			Legitimate
+	+		+		Free
+	+	+		+	Egalitarian
+	+	+	+	+	Perfect

Source: Morlino, 2002: 20


“The ‘plus’ signs indicate a high presence of the dimension listed at the top of each respective column. This figure illustrates the various models of good democracy, making evident the possible transition from one result to another.”
Morlino, 2002: 20

Table 4: Democratic principles, Partial Regimes, Functions and Components

Principles	Partial Regimes	Functions	Components
<i>Equality</i>	Political Rights	Participation	Equal rights to participate
		Responsiveness	Freedom to associate Freedom of opinion
		Transparency	Open public sphere
<i>Freedom</i>	Civil Rights	Liberty	Individual rights
		Rule of Law	Equality before the law Equal access to the courts
<i>Control</i>	Electoral Regime	Vertical Accountability	Free and fair elections/votes
		Representation	Universal active suffrage Universal passive suffrage
	Horizontal Accountability	Constraint of executive autonomy	Checks and balances
			Independence of the judiciary
			Rule of law constraint
	Effective power to govern	Governmental autonomy	National territorial dimension
			National functional dimension
Global dimension			

Source: Abridged by the author from the original: Bühlmann, *et al.*, 2007: 47-51

Figure 10: Democratic Consolidation



Source: Schedler, 1998


APPENDIX 4 – MECHANISMS OF DEMOCRACY DIFFUSION

Table 5: Mechanisms of external diffusion: Fossati vs Magen & Morlino

Mechanisms of external democratic diffusion	
Fossati (2010)	Morlino & Magen (2009)
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Inertial emulation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Contagion (spontaneous) ▪ Convergence (intentional) ✓ Control <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Direct (military intervention) ▪ Indirect (military assistance) ✓ Political conditionality (sanctions) ✓ Rewards (to democratising states) 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ✓ Control (military) ✓ Conditionality (positive and negative) ✓ Socialisation ✓ Emulation/Example

Source: Author's elaboration.

Figure 11: Radaelli's Mechanisms of Europeanisation



Source: Radaelli, 2000

APPENDIX 5 – MODELS’ COMPARISON

Table 8: Conception of democracy by different authors

	Bühlman, et al., 2007	Bühlmann, et al., 2012	Morlino, 2002	Cruz, 2005¹²⁴	Magen & Morlino, 2009	IDEA¹²⁵	Proposed model
Dimensions/Regimes/Functions	Political rights ¹²⁶	Transparency	Responsiveness	Political Rights	Rule of Law	Participation	Political Rights
	Civil rights ¹²⁷	Participation	Equality	Rule of Law	Participation	Authorisation	Social Rights
	Vertical Accountability	Representation	Rule of Law	Electoral Rights	Competition	Representation	Rule of Law
	Representation	Rule of Law	Freedom	Democratic Control of the institutions	Electoral Accountability	Accountability	Civil Rights
	Horizontal Accountability	Individual Liberties	Accountability	Economic and Social democracy	Inter-institutional Accountability	Transparency	Economic Rights
	Effective power to govern	Public Sphere			Responsiveness	Responsiveness	Horizontal Accountability
		Competition			Freedom	Solidarity	Vertical Accountability
		Mutual Constraints			Equality/Solidarity		Responsiveness
		Government capability					

Source: Author’s elaboration

¹²⁴ Cruz presents what he believes to be the modern characterisation of the European type of democracy.

¹²⁵ International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (cfr. Beetham, et al., 2008)

¹²⁶ Includes: participation, responsiveness and transparency.

¹²⁷ Includes: individual freedoms and the rule of law.

APPENDIX 6 – PROPOSED MODEL

Table 9: Sources' Assessment

Source	Indicator	Orig. Scale	Geogr. Origin	No. years	Obs.	
CIRI	Disappearance	0-2	America	All	0-frequent;1-occasional;2-never Disappearances politically motivated.	1
CIRI	Extrajudicial killings	0-2	America	All	0-frequent;1-occasional;2-never Killings with no process of law; police abuse.	2
CIRI	Political Imprisonment	0-2	America	All	0-frequent;1-occasional;2-never Imprisonment politically motivated (opposition to govt., non-violent actions)	3
CIRI	Torture	0-2	America	All	0-frequent;1-occasional;2-never	4
CIRI	Freedom of Assembly and Association	0-2	America	All	0-severely restricted or denied to all groups;1-restricted or denied to some groups;2-virtually unrestricted	5
CIRI	Freedom of Foreign Movement	0-2	America	All	0-severely restricted; 1-somewhat restricted; 2-unrestricted Freedom to leave and return to the country	6
CIRI	Freedom of Speech	0-2	America	All	0-complete censorship; 1-some censorship; no censorship	7
CIRI	Electoral Self-Determination	0-2	America	All	0-inexistent; 1-limited; 2-free and open. Free and fair elections	8
CIRI	Freedom of Religion	0-2	America	All	0-severe restrictions; 1-moderate restrictions; 2-almost no restrictions Freedom to practice religion	9
CIRI	Worker's Rights	0-2	America	All	0-severely restricted; 1-somewhat restricted; 2-fully protected	10
CIRI	Women's Economic Rights	0-3	America	All	0-no rights; 1-some rights; 2-some rights effectively enforced; 3- all rights guaranteed and enforced. Job security, non-discrimination, equal pay, etc.	11
CIRI	Women's Political Rights	0-3	America	All	0-no rights; 1-some rights; 2-some rights effectively enforced; 3- all rights guaranteed and enforced. Right to vote, to run for office, etc.	12
CIRI	Women's Social Rights	0-3	America	7	0-no rights; 1-some rights; 2-some rights effectively enforced; 3- all rights guaranteed and enforced. Right to education, divorce, equality in marriage, etc.	13
CIRI	Independence of the	0-2	America	All	0-not independent; 1-partially independent; 2-generally independent.	14

	Judiciary					
DB	Constitutional Provisions for fair organisation of court system	-1-2	Europe	9	-1: Constitution allows civilians to be judged in military courts; 0: Constitution does not specify a ban on exceptional courts; 1: Constitution provides a ban, but vaguely; 2: Constitution provides a ban fully. No exceptional courts + well structuring of judicial system's hierarchy	15
DB	Constitutional provisions guaranteeing a public trial	0-2	Europe	9	0: Not mentioned in the Constitution; 1: Mentioned, but with exceptions; 2: Explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.	16
DB	Independence of the Judiciary	1-7	Europe	9	"The judiciary in your country is independent and not subject to interference by the government and/or parties to the dispute." 1: "Strongly disagree" to 7: "strongly agree".	17
DB	Confidence in the legal system	0-100	Europe	9	1: Low confidence; 100: High confidence.	18
DB	Confidence in the police	0-100	Europe	9	1: Low confidence; 100: High confidence.	19
DB	Freedom of Association	0-2	Europe	9	0: not mentioned in Constitution nor binding treaty; 1: mentioned with reservations; 2: mentioned with no reservations or binding treaty.	20
DB	Freedom of Assembly	0-2	Europe	9	0: not mentioned in Constitution nor binding treaty; 1: mentioned with reservations; 2: mentioned with no reservations or binding treaty.	21
DB	Trade Union density	0-100	Europe	9	0: low density; 100: high density.	22
DB	Membership in Humanitarian Organisations	0-100	Europe	9	% of the respondents that are members of/ active in humanitarian organisations.	23
DB	Freedom of Speech	0-2	Europe	9	0: not mentioned in Constitution nor binding treaty; 1: mentioned with reservations; 2: mentioned with no reservations or binding treaty.	24
DB	Freedom of the Press	0-2	Europe	9	0: not mentioned in Constitution nor binding treaty; 1: mentioned with reservations; 2: mentioned with no reservations or binding treaty.	25
DB	Number of newspapers	≥0	Europe	9	Number of (paid and free) newspaper titles per 1 million inhabitants.	26
DB	Neutral/Independent newspapers' circulation	0-100	Europe	9	Share of neutral / independent newspapers' circulation (weighted by frequency of publication) of a country's total newspaper circulation in %	27
DB	Checks and balances (legislative and executive powers)	0-100	Europe	9	0: unbalanced checks; 100: balanced checks.	28
DB	Balance between government and opposition	0-1	Europe	9	0: government or opposition controls the legislature; 1: full balance between government and opposition.	29
DB	Confidence in the government	0-100	Europe	9	0: Low confidence; 100: High confidence.	30

DB	Governmental stability	0-100	Europe	9	0: low stability; 100: high stability = a government does not change in the legislative period.	31
DB	Political interference by the military	0-6	Europe	9	0: high risk of interference; 6: low risk of interference.	32
DB	Political interference by religion	0-6	Europe	9	0: high risk of interference; 6: low risk of interference.	33
DB	Effective implementation of government decisions.	0-10	Europe	9	0: low implementation; 10: high implementation.	34
DB	Disclosure rules for contributions to political parties	0-1	Europe	9	0: no provision for disclosure of income; 1: rules on disclosure of income.	35
DB	Corruption within the political system	0-6	Europe	9	0: high risk; 6: low/no risk.	36
DB	Restriction of freedom of Information	0-3	Europe	9	0: no freedom of information legislation; 1: high restrictions; 2: considerable restrictions; 3: no restrictions.	37
DB	Effectiveness of Freedom of Information	0-4	Europe	9	0: no legislation; 1: Low effectiveness; 2: Quite considerable effectiveness; 3: Considerable effectiveness; 4: High effectiveness.	38
DB	Legal Environment of Press Freedom	0-30	Europe	9	0: best environment; 30: worst environment.	39
DB	Political Environment of Press Freedom	0-30	Europe	9	0: best environment; 30: worst environment. Political control over the media.	40
DB	Transparency of government policy	0-10	Europe	9	0: "The government does not often communicate its intentions successfully"; 10: "The government is transparent towards citizens".	41
DB	Registered voters as a percentage of voting age population.	0-100	Europe	9	% of registered voters in relation to voting age population	42
DB	Facilitation of electoral participation	0-5	Europe	9	0: voters can vote at specific polling station only; 1: voters can vote everywhere in the same district; 2: voters can vote everywhere in the country. Additional points (+1) if absentee ballot is possible; (+1) if there are mobile polling stations; (+1) if there is a possibility to vote in advance.	43
DB	Participation rate in % of registered electorate	0-100	Europe	9	% of registered electorate that votes	44
DB	Practice of non-institutionalized participation – petitions	0-100	Europe	9	% of respondents that indicated having signed petitions	45

DB	Practice of non-institutionalized participation – demonstrations	0-100	Europe	9	% of respondents that indicated having participated in legal demonstrations	46
DB	Congruence between distribution of left/right positions among voters and distribution of left/right positions among members of parliament	0-100	Europe	9	0: complete congruence; 100: complete incongruence.	47
DB	Proportion of female representatives in the parliament	0-100	Europe	9	% of all seats	48
EFW	Judicial Independence	1-7	America	10	1: heavily influenced; 7: entirely independent.	49
EFW	Impartial courts	1-7	America	10	1: inefficient and subject to manipulations; 7: efficient, clear and neutral processes.	50
EFW	Military Interference	0-10	America	10	0: high interference; 10: low interference.	51
EFW	Integrity of the Legal System	0-10	America	10	0: Low impartiality of the legal system and low observance of the law; 10: High impartiality of the legal system and high observance of the law	52
FH	Civil Liberties	1-7	America	10	1-2,5: Free; 3-5,5: Partly Free; 6-7: Not Free.	53
FH	Political Rights	1-7	America	10	1-2,5: Free; 3-5,5: Partly Free; 6-7: Not Free.	54
FH	Press Freedom Score	0-100	America	9	0-30: Free media; 31-60: partly free media; 61-100: not free media.	55
TI	Corruption Perceptions Index	0-10	Europe	6	0: highly clean; 10: highly corrupt.	56
OECD	Public Expenditure on Health	0-100	Global	9	% of GDP	57
OECD	Employment rate	0-100	Global	All	% of active labour force	58
OECD	Unemployment rate	0-100	Global	All	% of active labour force	59
OECD	Employment Rate of Women	0-100	Global	10	Share of employed women	60
AI	Political Terror scale	1-5	Global	All	1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.	61

USDS	Political Terror scale	1-5	America	All	1: Countries under a secure rule of law, people are not imprisoned for their view, and torture is rare or exceptional. Political murders are extremely rare. 5: Terror has expanded to the whole population. The leaders of these societies place no limits on the means or thoroughness with which they pursue personal or ideological goals.	62
UN	Education Index	0-1	Global	6	One of the three indices on which the Human Development Index is built. It is based on mean years of schooling (of adults) and expected years of schooling (of children).	63
UN	Human Development Index	0-1	Global	6		64
WB	Voice and Accountability	-2,5 - 2,5	Global	9	-2,5: weak governance performance; 2,5: strong governance performance. Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a free media.	65
WB	Political Stability	-2,5 - 2,5	Global	9	Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means.	66
WB	Government Effectiveness	-2,5 - 2,5	Global	9	Reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies.	67
WB	Regulatory quality	-2,5 - 2,5	Global	9	Reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.	68
WB	Rule of Law	-2,5 - 2,5	Global	9	Reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.	69
WB	Control of Corruption	-2,5 - 2,5	Global	9	Reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.	70
WEF	Public Trust in Politicians	1-7	Global	4	1: very low; 7: very high.	71
WEF	Reliability of police services	1-7	Global	4	1: cannot be relied upon at all; 7: can be completely relied upon	72
WEF	Quality of the educational system	1-7	Global	4	1: not good at all; 7: very good	73
WEF	Global Competitiveness Index	1-7	Global	4	1: not good at all; 7: very good	74
WEF	Macroeconomic Environment	1-7	Global	4	1: not good at all; 7: very good	75
Eurostat	Hospital Beds	>0	Europe	10	No. Per 100 000 inhabitants	76
Eurostat	Public Expenditure on	0-100	Europe	7	% of GDP	77

	Education					
Eurostat	Total R&D Expenditure		Europe	All	% of GDP	78
Eurostat	Foreign Direct Investment Intensity	0-100	Europe	8	% of GDP	79
Eurostat	GDP/capita growth	-100-100	Europe	All	% change on previous period	80
EBT	Trust in the government	0-100	Europe	6	% of respondents that tend to trust in the institution	81
EBT	Trust in the Parliament	0-100	Europe	6	% of respondents that tend to trust in the institution	82
EBT	Trust in the political parties	0-100	Europe	6	% of respondents that tend to trust in the institution	83
EC	Infant Mortality Rate	0-1000	Europe	10	deaths of children under one year of age per 1000 live births	84
EC	Early School Leavers	0-100	Europe	10	Share of population aged 18-24 with at most lower secondary education and not in further education or training	85

Legend:

CIRI: Cingranelli-Richards Human Rights Dataset

DB: Democracy Barometer

FH: Freedom House

OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

AI: Amnesty International

USDS: United States, Department of State

UN: United Nations

WB: World Bank

EST: Eurostat

EBT: Eurobarometer

EC: European Commission

WEF: World Economic Forum

TI: Transparency International

EFW: Economic Freedom of the World

*Source: Author's Elaboration
(Cf. Weblinks on the next page)*

All the sources indicated above and whose data has been used in the model can be found in the following weblinks:

- CIRI (Indicators 1 to 14): <http://www.humanrightsdata.org/>
- Democracy Barometer (15-48): http://www.democracybarometer.org/dataset_en.html
- Economic Freedom of the World (49-52): <http://www.freetheworld.com/reports.html>
- Freedom House (53-55): <http://www.freedomhouse.org/>
- Transparency International (56): <http://www.transparency.org/country>
- OECD (57-60): <http://stats.oecd.org/>
- AI + USDS (61-62): <http://www.politicalterrorsscale.org/>
- UN (63-64): <http://hdr.undp.org/en>
- World Bank (65-70): <http://data.worldbank.org/>
- World Economic Forum (71-75): <http://www.weforum.org/reports>
- Eurostat (76-80): http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/page/portal/statistics/search_database
- Eurobarometer (81-83): http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/index_en.htm
- European Commission (84-85): <http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/strategy-and-progress-report/>

Table 10: Indicators' distribution


	Dimension	Attribute	Indicator	Source
Democracy	Equality	Political Rights	Freedom of Assembly and Association	CIRI
			Electoral Self-Determination	CIRI
			Women's Political Rights	CIRI
			Freedom of Association	Democracy Barometer
			Freedom of Assembly	Democracy Barometer
			Disclosure rules for contributions to political parties	Democracy Barometer
			Congruence between left and right	Democracy Barometer
			Political Rights	Freedom House
		Social Rights	Worker's Rights	CIRI
			Women's Social Rights	CIRI
			Trade Union Density	Democracy Barometer
			Public Expenditure on Health	OECD
			Education Index	UN
			HDI	UN
			Hospital Beds	Eurostat
			Public Expenditure on Education	Eurostat
			Infant Mortality Rate	European Commission
			Early School Leavers	European Commission
	Quality of the educational system		World Economic Forum	
	Freedom		Economic Rights	Women's Economic Rights
		Employment rate		OECD
		Unemployment rate		OECD
		Employment rate of Women		OECD
		Macroeconomic Environment		World Economic Forum
		Global Competitiveness Index		World Economic Forum
		GDP/capita growth		Eurostat
		Expenditure on R&D		Eurostat
		Foreign Direct Investment		Eurostat
		Civil Rights	Politically motivated disappearances	CIRI
			Political Imprisonment	CIRI
Torture			CIRI	
		Freedom of Foreign Movement	CIRI	

			Freedom of Religion	CIRI
			Freedom of Speech	CIRI
			Freedom of Speech	Democracy Barometer
			Freedom of the press	Democracy Barometer
			Number of newspapers	Democracy Barometer
			Neutral newspapers' circulation	Democracy Barometer
			Restriction of Freedom of Information	Democracy Barometer
			Effectiveness of Freedom of Information	Democracy Barometer
			Legal Environment of Press Freedom	Democracy Barometer
			Political Environment of press freedom	Democracy Barometer
			Membership in Humanitarian Organisations	Democracy Barometer
			Civil Liberties	Freedom House
			Press Freedom Score	Freedom House
			Political Terror Scale	Amnesty International
			Political Terror Scale	US State's Department
		Rule of Law	Extrajudicial killings	CIRI
			Independence of the judiciary	CIRI
			Constitutional Provisions for fair organisation of court system	Democracy Barometer
			Constitutional Provisions guaranteeing public trial	Democracy Barometer
			Independence of the judiciary	Democracy Barometer
			Confidence in the legal system	Democracy Barometer
			Confidence in the police	Democracy Barometer
			Corruption within the political system	Democracy Barometer
			Transparency of government policy	Democracy Barometer
			Judicial independence	Economic Freedom of the World
			Impartial courts	Economic Freedom of the World
			Integrity of the legal system	Economic Freedom of the World
			Corruption Perception Index	Transparency International
			Rule of Law	World Bank
			Control of corruption	World Bank
			Reliability of police services	World Economic Forum

	Control	Horizontal Accountability	Checks and balances	Democracy Barometer
			Balance between the government and the opposition	Democracy Barometer
			Political interference by the military	Democracy Barometer
			Political interference by religion	Democracy Barometer
			Military interference	Economic Freedom of the World
			Regulatory Quality	World Bank
		Vertical Accountability	Registered voters as % voting	Democracy Barometer
			Facilitation of electoral participation	Democracy Barometer
			Participation rate of registered	Democracy Barometer
			Participation in petitions	Democracy Barometer
			Participation in demonstrations	Democracy Barometer
			Proportion of female representatives in Parliament	Democracy Barometer
			Voice and Accountability	World Bank
		Responsiveness	Confidence in the government	Democracy Barometer
			Governmental stability	Democracy Barometer
			Effective implementation of government decisions	Democracy Barometer
			Government Effectiveness	World Bank
			Political stability	World Bank
			Trust in the government	Eurobarometer
			Trust in the national Parliament	Eurobarometer
			Trust in political parties	Eurobarometer
			Public Trust in Politicians	World Economic Forum


Source: Author's Elaboration

Figure 13: Indicators' geographic distribution



Source: Author's Elaboration

Figure 14: Number of indicators by source



Source: Author's Elaboration

APPENDIX 7 – EU PROGRESS REPORTS

Table 12: EU’s Annual Progress Reports Analysis

Year	Field	Page	Progress					Comments
			P	SP	LP	NP	NM	
1999	Democracy and RoL	9-10					X	- amendment to Political Parties Law (more difficult to close party)
	<i>The Parliament</i>	9					X	- no change; its powers are respected; - 10% threshold = non-representation of 5 million votes
	<i>The Executive</i>	9					X	- “no particular development” - new selection process for civil servants = to avoid corruption
	<i>Judicial System</i>	9	X					- adoption of amendments to remove military judges from State Security Courts; - draft of Penal Code (limiting death penalty) - draft law to facilitate the prosecution of public officers - draft law to amend Code of Criminal Procedure: protection of witnesses, genetic analysis, etc. - government intention to train judges and prosecutors in HR
	<i>Anti-Corruption</i>	10				X		- no legislation introduced
	<i>NSC / CMR</i>	10					X	- military still influence political process
	HR and protect. min.	10-14			X			- HR under observation of Council of Europe - several important Conventions not signed yet
	<i>Civil and Pol. Rights</i>	11-13	X					- still exist: torture, disappearances and extra-judicial executions - impunity of law enforcement officials - “The situation described in the last Regular Report has therefore not substantially changed. Nevertheless, Turkey has taken some steps that clearly go in the right direction” - reduced the duration of police custody - new regulation on detention procedures - training courses for police already began

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - improvements against torture in the amendments of Penal Code Articles (243, 245, 354) - freedom of expression: worrying - -: detentions on freedom of expression - prohibition of dissemination of an NGO's report - freedom of the press: "situation has not substantially changed" - still reported cases of harassment and violence against journalists - conditions in prisons not improved - freedom of association and assembly: not changed; subject to limitations - freedom of religion: difference of treatment between minorities - women's rights: improvement with lifting reservations to a UN Convention on Discrimination against Women - death penalty: subject of debate
	<i>Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights</i>	14				X	- no particular development
	<i>Minority Rights</i>	14				X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - progress on Kurdish issue not made - broadcasting in Kurdish officially not allowed - emergency status active in 6 provinces - government intended to support socio-economic development of SE - right of asylum: positive changes in legislation
	Chapter 23	-----	---	---	---		-----
	Chapter 24	36-38				X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - immigration: increased number of people illegally transiting in Turkey (destination is Western Europe) - need to merge the control of all borders in the same unit - crimes against public order increased - Parliament adopted law to combat organised crime (brings Turkey closer to EU acquis) - signed several international agreements regarding fight against organised crime and drug trafficking - need to devote attention on drug trafficking; Turkey is a "major trafficking center"

	General Evaluation	46-47					X	-“Recent developments confirm that, although the basic features of a democratic system exist in Turkey, it still does not meet the Copenhagen political criteria. There are serious shortcomings in terms of human rights and protection of minorities. Torture is not systematic but is still widespread and freedom of expression is regularly restricted by the authorities. The National Security Council continues to play a major role in political life. Although there have been some improvements in terms of the independence of the judiciary the emergency courts system remains in place. In recent months there have been some more encouraging signs of democratisation. The government and Parliament have worked to adopt some keys laws regulating political life, the justice system and protection of human rights.” (p. 46)
2000	Democracy and RoL	12-14					X	- Constitution needs to be revised, namely regarding freedom of expression; - Committee already working on it.
	<i>The Parliament</i>	12			X			- Powers continue to be respected; - <u>Opposition plays a part in its activities.</u>
	<i>The Executive</i>	12	X					- +: internal coordination on EU matters - created the General Secretariat for EU Affairs
	<i>Public Administration</i>	12				X		
	<i>Judicial System</i>	12-13				X		- +: increasing number of judges and prosecutors; - no measures to improve efficiency; - long duration of judicial procedures; - +: adoption of the law on the prosecution of civil servants; - Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure still to be adopted; - No changes on State Security Courts; - Need to change legislation on the restoration of the rights of convicted; - No changes on modernisation of the legal provisions sanctions to young offenders; - +: several programmes to train judges; but further efforts required.
	<i>Anti-Corruption</i>	14			X			- Issue is in the agenda;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - still a widespread practise; - some conventions not signed.
	<i>NSC / CMR</i>	14				X		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Civilian control needs to be improved. - Chief of General Staff accountable to P-M - No change in the role of the NSC – still interfere in politics - Little accountability to Parliament
	HR and protect. min.	14-20					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> -Aug/2000: signed 2 important Covenants - Still some other HR instruments not acceded yet - HR still under observance by Council of Europe (no report yet)
	<i>Civil and Pol. Rights</i>	15-18					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - problems identified in the last report, mostly unchanged - death penalty not abolished yet - torture and ill treatment: largely unchanged (still complaints, light penalties, etc.) - +: HR education included in the curricula of police academies; - prison conditions: cause of concern (clashes, ill-treatment); - authorities in the process of restructuring the prison system; - serious problem of freedom of expression in political sphere (legislation leads room for interpretation that violates that freedom; - freedom of the media: 40 journalists in prison; several TV and radio suspended; - freedom of association and assembly: not fully respected – NGOs activities need official permission; forbidden from associating with other NGOs; are subject to pressures or are closed down; - major efforts required to improve freedoms of association and assembly; - freedom of religion: some signs of increased tolerance towards non-Muslims; - approach to Alevis kept unchanged; there should be an open debate.
	<i>Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights</i>	18-19					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - +: change to allow parents to freely choose their children's name; - however, not implemented; some personnel do not accept them; - problems remain with use of some minorities' languages (broadcasting

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> or education); - gender disparity still high (legal discriminations; higher rates of illiterate women, honour killings, etc.); - still difficulties regarding trade unions and right to strike; - still problems regarding children's rights and labour.
	<i>Minority rights</i>	19-20						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - important conventions not signed; - there still is denial of some ethnic groups' rights; - expression of pro-Kurdish thoughts is limited by the state; - state of emergency in several provinces and clashes with PKK; - further efforts required in respect to education, health and water supply.
	Chapter 23	-----	---	---	---	---	---	-----
	Chapter 24	63-64				X		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "Compared to the situation in 1999 no major progress has been made" - data protection and visa policy: no progress; - migration and border control: started efforts to train staff + stimulate dialogue; - asylum: started efforts to train staff + equipment upgraded; - police cooperation: no developments; - fight against fraud and corruption: ratified OSCE Convention but none of the Council of Europe's Conventions. - fights against drugs: no developments; - customs cooperation: no developments; - judicial cooperation: no developments.
	General Evaluation	70-72					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - "Overall, Turkey's alignment with the community <i>acquis</i> in the areas covered by the Customs Union is most advanced. However, since the last regular report, progress in transposition of legislation in these areas has been limited. As a candidate country, Turkey has to start making substantial progress in alignment with the <i>acquis</i> in all other fields."
2001	Democracy and RoL	15-19					X	
	<i>The Parliament</i>	16					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - October: 34 Constitutional Amendments; - Parliament worked effectively;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Broad party support; - -: unable to pass the law on parliamentary immunity; - between Oct 2000 and June 2001: 117 new laws adopted; - June 2001: CC dissolved Virtue Party – 2 other parties created (AKP and FP)
	<i>The Executive</i>	16					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - coalition in power for more than 2 years - President exercised his right of veto - General Secretariat for EU Affairs operational for a year (under responsibility of the Minister of State) - Secretariat is responsible for the implementation, coordination and monitoring of the NPAA - Established 9 inter-ministerial subcommittees (for the transposition and implementation of EU legislation)
	<i>Judicial System</i>	16-18					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - establishment of judges to analyse the complaints of prisoners; - set up 12 sections specialised in intellectual property rights; - created judicial sections dealing with consumer protection; - amendments regarding the State Security Courts entered into force (still some problems); - problems with military courts (sometimes involve civilians); - problems with the structure of juvenile courts; - still pressure on judges and prosecutors (namely in corruption cases) - Supreme Board of Judges and Prosec. Appointed by Minister of Justice, creating a problem of division of powers; - measures need to be incorporated in Tur's legislation to repair consequences of convictions contrary to ECHR; - several courses to train judicial staff took place; - some initiatives have improved the judicial system's efficiency.
	<i>Anti-Corruption</i>	18					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some measures foreseen in the government programme; - some initiatives are being taken (to increase independence of banks, to liberalise energy market with transparency,...);

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - started high-level anti-corruption investigations; - government created a committee on corruption to develop a strategy; - signed some conventions.
	<i>NSC / CMR</i>	19					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - no. of civilian members increased (5 to 9) against 5 military members; - emphasis on the advisory nature of the body; - government is required to evaluate the recommendations, rather than giving them “priority consideration”
	HR and protect. min.	19-30					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - amendments strengthened HR and freedoms - limited the restrictions on fundamental rights - introduced the principle of proportionality - but some restrictions on freedoms remain - some other changes being finalised - signed Protocol 12 of ECHR, but no progress on other HR instruments - Eur Court of HR found Turkey violated ECHR in 127 cases - established several bodies for the enforcement of HR (HR Presidency; High HR Board; etc.) - police officers training on HR continues to be given
	<i>Civil and Pol. Rights</i>	21-27					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - death penalty only in terrorism activities; - still moratorium working on the postponement of the executions; - +: decided to publish the Council of Europe’s report on torture and mistreatment; - Ministry of Interior issued a circular to forbid the use of torture and ill-treatment; - “In practice, the situation as regards torture and mistreatment has not improved since the last Regular Report and still gives serious grounds for concern.” – several cases of death and torture during detention; - no. of officials suspected of torture and ill-treatment increased, but sentences are too light; - reform of prison system – demonstrations and deaths due to disproportionate use of force;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some measures have been adopted on prison reform; - Amnesty Law was adopted – decrease of 23% of detainees; - freedom of expression: needed more laws to give content to the constitutional amendments; - still several problems in relation to the exercise of freedom of expression (articles 159 and 312 used to limit this freedom); - there are around 9000 prisoners for crimes related to freedom of expression (journalists, writers, intellectuals,...); - freedom of the press: needed more concrete laws to give content to the amendments; - some companies had to suspend their activities and books were seized; - it was forbidden the broadcasting of portraying Turkey in “a state of weakness”; - field of broadcasting: needed more concrete laws to give content to the amendments; - implementation of existing law = concern; - freedom of association and assembly: amended with some minor improvements; - function of NGOs still controlled by state – sometimes object to harassment and intimidation; - political parties: more proportionate sanctions defined, but reasons for banning them unchanged; - in June 2001: Faziet Party was banned due to anti-secular activities (supported by the Eur Court of HR); - freedom of religion: increased signs of tolerance towards some non-Muslim minorities; - some official positions more friendly towards them; - but still difficult to own property for Christian churches, for ex.; - no improvement in the situation of non-Sunni Muslim communities;
	<i>Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights</i>	27-29					X	- several amendments improved theses rights (right to work, gender

								<p>equality, trade unions);</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - children's rights: ratified conventions; - trade unions: more rights; - cultural rights: abolished prohibition to use other languages, but there is still missing protection for those who want to use them; - not improved for Armenians, Jews and Greeks (terms of education or broadcasting); - honour killings – concern.
	<i>Minority rights</i>	29-30					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “there has been no improvement in the ability of members of ethnical groups with a cultural identity and common traditions to express their linguistic and cultural identity” - some conventions not signed; - some positive initiatives towards the Roma; - celebrations of Kurdish New Year banned in some cities.
	Chapter 23	-----	---	---	---	---	---	-----
	Chapter 24	81-86					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Some progress has been achieved over the past year.” - data protection: no progress; - Shengen: no progress; - borders control: begun cooperation between different ministries + some measures; - migration: begun bilateral negotiations with several countries; several readmission agreements signed; - training sessions to prevent illegal border crossing; - concerns about illegal migrant flows (increasing); - no progress on ratifying conventions; - some improvement on asylum policies; - fight against organised crime: cooperation with Greece; - signed conventions on fight against fraud and corruption; - drugs: established an Academy against Drugs and Organised Crime +

								<p>some successful operations;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - money laundering: signed some conventions; - judicial co-operation in criminal and civil matters: no progress.
	General Evaluation	93-96					X	<p>“Turkey's alignment with the <i>acquis</i> is most advanced in the areas covered by the Customs Union. Since the last Regular Report, further alignment has taken place in these areas. (...)Major discrepancies between the <i>acquis</i> and Turkish legislation have remained. Progress in strengthening administrative capacity to implement the <i>acquis</i> has been limited. (...)The Accession Partnership with Turkey was adopted in March 2001 and Turkey has made substantial preparatory efforts for its implementation. . Turkey gained greater understanding of the <i>acquis</i> and the government has started an intensive process of preparation of new legislation.”</p>
2002	Democracy and RoL	18-25	-	-	-	-	-	---
	<i>The Parliament</i>	18-19					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - adopted 45 new laws (include a new Civil Code with 1030 articles) + 3 reform packages to implement the 2001 constitutional amendments; - changed its internal regulation to increase its efficiency; - Parliamentary Committee resumed its activities.
	<i>The Executive</i>	19-20					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some differences have emerged between the coalition partners; - some MPs resigned – minority government in power; - President vetoed several laws, namely the increase in salaries if MPs; - public administration: efforts to improve the quality of the staffing; - action plan on transparency and good governance in the public sector; - General Secretariat for EU Affairs reinforced its role in the implementation of the NPAA and the pre-accession strategy.
	<i>Judicial System</i>	20-23					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some changes; - new Civil Code adopted and entered into force; - State Security courts continue to work, but with differences (ex: fraud and organised crime do not fall into its competence; detainees are granted more rights) – but they still need to align with European practices;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - duration of judicial proceedings still long; - no progress in the establishment of intermediate courts of appeal; - some articles of the Penal Code used inconsistently, originating lack of clarity, transparency and legal certainty; - extension of Juvenile Courts, but slower than planned; - some reports: judiciary does not act independently and consistently; - concern: jurisdiction of military courts over civilians; - training programmes have continued.
	<i>Anti-Corruption</i>	23-24					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - remains a serious problem; - government has pursued anti-corruption measures; - created courts specialised in corruption; - transparency in political campaigns to be improved with the amendment of the political parties law; - some conventions not signed; - +: strategy to enhance transparency and good governances, but implementation should be taken into consideration as well.
	<i>NSC / CMR</i>	24-25					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NSC formally an advisory board; - in practice, still influential; - military members frequently express their opinion on several political issues; - Armed forces – high degree of autonomy in establishing the defence budget; - introduction of civilians in the NSC did not change the way it operates.
	HR and protect. min.	25-43					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - international conventions on HR: some progress (several not signed yet); - reduced the pre-trial detention period in provinces under emergency to a four days; - concern: Tur's failure to execute the judgment of Eur Court HR; - enforcement of HR: efforts to strengthen the mechanisms + increase the dialogue with civil society; - there are HR Boards in 81 provinces to lead work on the field

								(awareness campaigns, people’s complaints, etc.) – not all operational yet; all of them meet monthly and report to the HR Presidency quarterly; some NGOs reluctant to participate due to the composition of the Boards that often include security forces’ personnel.
	<i>Civil and Pol. Rights</i>	28-40					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - death penalty abolished in peacetimes; - relatives of the detainees have to be informed about the detention; - -: often it is delayed the access to a lawyer; - some issues warned the officials to be vigilant against mistreatment; interrogation rooms cannot be painted in black and there cannot be a light projected onto the face of the accused during interrogation; - report shows improvement in conditions, but complaints still frequent; - no disappearances reported in 2002; - sentences for the accused of torture and ill-treatment are light; - reform of the prison system continued; some concerns regarding the conditions of isolation; - prisoners’ right to use telephone and receive visits is improving; - 140 enforcement judges were appointed (prisoners’ conditions, disciplinary punishments, etc.) - projects to facilitate the integration of former inmates; - in May 2002 there were 60327 persons in prison: 29514 convicted prisoners and 30813 detainees; - freedom of expression: some changes with the reform package; - ex: abolished the fines for criticising Turkish Law; - but the word “intention” to insult institutions was kept and may be subject to several interpretations; - notion of incitement was added as an element of the offence; - introduced the notion of “propaganda in connection with terrorist organisations”; - between January and May 2002: 40 books were banned or subject to investigation;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - one problems: interpretation of the law which is usually not consistent with the ECHR; - freedom of the press: fines for “terrorist propaganda” increased to 3 billion Turkish Lira; - second reform package did not do much about the restrictions on freedom of the press; - Press Law continues to maintain restrictions on the freedom of the press; - broadcasting: first reform package: reduced the maximum closure period for radio and TVs for propaganda; - third reform package: allowed broadcasts in other languages; the problem was implementation; - narrowed the scope for bans on broadcasts; - re-transmission of foreign broadcasting became legal; - introduction of censorship of Internet content; - ex: TV channel was charged for broadcasting a Kurdish song; - freedom of association and assembly: with the 2nd reform package, lifted restrictions on contacts with foreign counterparts (organisations); - minimum age for an organiser of an association lowered from 21 to 18; - possibility for the authorities of exerting control over relations with international organisations was maintained; - still several restrictions on freedom of association; - 3rd reform package diminished the restrictions on freed. of association, but “discretionary powers for inspecting and auditing the facilities, books, accounts and transactions of the associations continue to be given to the authorities” (p. 36); - Amnesty International opened a branch in March; - civil society organisations became more active; - “the Civil Society Platform, which is made up of 175 civil society organisations, issued a notice urging politicians to commit themselves and take brave steps on the way to EU membership” (p. 36);
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							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NGOs conveyed the need for a closer relationship with the authorities; - 2nd reform package: public organisations gained the right to hold meetings and demonstrations; - 3rd reform package: participation of foreigners passed from the need of an “authorisation” to a mere “notification”; - yet, they require the identities, occupations, addresses and workplaces of the organising committees; - in practice remain several obstacles to hold marches and demonstrations; - amendment of article 101 made it harder to ban a political party; - freedom of religious: non-Muslim communities still feel many obstacles (no legal personality; lack of property rights, etc); - their property rights were eased by the 3rd reform package; - remains the ban on training the clergy for religious minorities; usually have problems with residence and visa; - religious courses include descriptions of all religions, but these are said to be inaccurate and subjective; - no improvements in the status of Alevis.
	<i>Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights</i>	40-42				X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - improved gender equality with the new Civil Code – no mention to the “head of the family”; - elimination of the ban that forbade women to wear trousers at work; - abolition of the requirement of virginity tests for applicants to the public nursing schools; - new Civil Code – more rights to children; - efforts to diminish juvenile efforts, but still 893000 children work in Turkey; - “no progress with the social and educational rights of disabled persons and legislation is not implemented properly”; - trade unions are subject to restrictions (freedom of association + right to strike); - some steps to grant social protection for unemployed;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 3rd reform package allowed children to learn different languages and dialects; - before 3rd package: parents who named their children in Kurdish were prosecuted; a bus driver listening to Kurdish songs was suspended.
	<i>Minority rights</i>	42-43					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “There has been limited improvement in practice in the ability of members of ethnic groups, with a cultural identity and common traditions, to express their linguistic and cultural identity.”; - some conventions not signed; - there is much prejudice against the Roma; - positive signs of cultural rights in the SE; - in SE, no bans on bands singing in Kurdish; - efforts continued to improve the situation of displaced people.
	Chapter 23	-----	---	---	---	---	---	-----
	Chapter 24	115-123					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - data protection: no progress; - visa policy: progress; - external borders: some improvements; - Schengen: some training activities; further changes; - migration: protocol on readmission between Tur and Greece ratified; - transit arrangements concluded with several member-states; - illegal migration flows continue to increase; - some progress regarding readmission (protocol with Greece + bilateral negotiations with other members); - increased number of staff working in borders; - established control checkpoints along borders; - more training of sniffer dogs for drug detection; - some conventions of illegal migration signed (not ratified); - asylum: a new strategy developed in accordance with the <i>acquis</i>; - training on asylum and refugees: successful; - fight against organised crime: amendments: greater penalties; - successful operations in the fight against trafficking;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - fight against terrorism: ratified Conventions; - fight against fraud and corruption: issued an Action Plan to combat corruption at the public and private levels; - drugs: revision of the national strategy is being completed; - money laundering: an unit concerned with the field; several cases opened; - judicial cooperation: with the new Civil and Civil Procedure Codes, State Security Courts' jurisdiction was limited; - impartiality and independence of the judiciary: no progress; - creation of further juvenile courts: no developments; - HR: conventions ratified.
	General Evaluation	133-136						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Overall, Turkey has achieved a good degree of legislative alignment in the areas covered by the Customs Union, while in other areas this alignment is less advanced. Major discrepancies between the acquis and Turkish legislation remain. Administrative capacity needs to be strengthened. Considerable further efforts are needed.” (p. 134) - “In the field of justice and home affairs, efforts have been made to raise awareness on the legislation and practices of the EU, in particular in areas such as asylum and illegal migration. Further steps have been taken to strengthen the fight against organized crime, drugs trafficking and corruption. The legal basis for combating trafficking in human beings has been established. Alignment with the acquis has started, in particular on visa policy, but substantial further efforts are needed. The fight against illegal migration needs to be drastically strengthened.” (p. 136).
	Democracy and RoL	16-22	--	--	--	--	--	-----
2003	<i>The Parliament</i>	16-17					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - elections in November, monitored by the European Parliament and the OSCE; 2 parties elected to the Parliament; - elections held in line with international standards + previous legal reforms improved framework for elections - adopted 2 Constitutional amendments: narrow the scope of the ban on

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> participation in elections to involvement in cases of terrorism + age limit for candidates lowered to 25; - President vetoed the first amendment but it was passed unchanged in the Parliament; - 143 new laws adopted apart from packages + ratified several conventions; - established Parliamentary Committee for EU integration, called EU Harmonisation Commission to check compliance of adopted laws with <i>acquis</i>; - Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights produced special reports on the human rights situation in the south-east.
	<i>The Executive</i>	17-18					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - single-party government took office in November; - led by Abdullah Gül and then by Erdoğan; - programme: political reforms + plans to draw a new Constitution; - “The goal of EU accession has been amongst the government's main priorities. On several occasions, the government reiterated its commitment to fulfil the Copenhagen political” (p. 18); - established a Reform Monitoring Group (effective implementation of reforms; weekly meetings).
	<i>NSC/CMR</i>	18-19					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “A number of fundamental changes have been made”; - confirmed the advisory nature of the NSC; - representative of the NSC removed from the Supervision Board of Cinema, Video and Music; - abolished the executive and supervisory powers of the NSC Secretary General; - post of Secretary General any longer reserved exclusively for a military; - frequency of the meetings: from once per month to once each two months; - new provisions to enhance transparency in defence expenditures; - the NSC and military exercise influence through informal means (media,

							statements on political and social matters); - important that measures are effectively implemented.
	<i>Judicial System</i>	19-22				X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “A number of structural changes have been made which have helped to strengthen the efficiency of the judiciary” (p. 20); - established family courts; - allowed re-trial in civil and criminal cases in which the ECtHR has found violations; - age to be tried at Juvenile Courts raised from 15 to 18; - changes to ensure proper notification for the accused or the condemned; - Law on Forensic Medicine amended to accelerate judicial processes; - amendment ending military jurisdiction over civilians; - trial period in juvenile courts decreased; - number of judges and prosecutors increased from 9020 to 9162; - “in 2002 and 2003 1 132 judges and prosecutors were trained on the implementation of the new Civil Code adopted in November 2001, 731 on the harmonisation of laws with EU law, 4 594 on human rights, 350 on forensic medicine applications and 519 on criminal matters and human rights” (p.21) - “The judiciary plays an important role in the implementation of political reforms. Courts have started to apply the reforms.” (p. 21) - still signs of inconsistent use of articles of the Penal Code (freedom of expression); - establishment of intermediate courts of appeal: no progress; - reports that judiciary does not always act impartially and consistently (due to links between judiciary and the executive); - problems with processing of evidence; - State Security Courts: progresses, but still not in line with European standards.
	<i>Anti-Corruption measures</i>	22-23		X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some progress, but still a serious problem; - conventions signed;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - legislation amended to criminalise bribery and money laundering; - established a parliamentary commission to study dimensions of corruption; - Action plan adopted in January, but many of its mechanisms not established yet.
	HR and protect. min.	23-41					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - 4th, 5th, 6th and 7th reform packages address several issues regarding HR and minorities' protection; - international conventions on hr: progress, but some remain to be signed; - still problems with the execution of judgements of ECtHR; - not taken all measures necessary to address the violations of the right to freedom of expression; - allowed retrials of ECtHR decisions; - enforcement of HR: structure of boards and committees strengthened; - several projects for training on HR; - not ratified convention on discrimination by public authorities.
	<i>Civil and Pol. Rights</i>	26-36						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - death penalty: only in wartime; all sentences commuted to life imprisonment; - torture and ill-treatment: "zero tolerance" policy = reinforced legislation; - implementation led to some results, but some cases persist; - amendments: sentences for torture and ill-treatment not able to be suspended or converted into fine; - access to lawyer and health checks now guaranteed when prisoner returns for policy custody for investigation purposes; - circulars were distributed to the authorities to inform them of the legislation changes and asking for their implementation; - concern: punishment of perpetrators of torture and ill-treatment; - still some flaws regarding access to lawyers and medical treatment; - doctors under pressure not to reveal cases of torture; - reform of the prison system: "the general situation has improved considerably" (p. 28);

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Penal Code reformed: introduced new offences (ex. Prevent prisoners from being fed); - number of “death fasts” diminished significantly with the reforms; - “as of 30 April 2003, there are 64173 persons in prisons and detention houses, of whom 32624 are convicted prisoners and 31549 are detainees.” (p.28); - lawyers and visitors having problems in meeting with prisoners + prisoners not receiving appropriate medical treatment; - freedom of expression: some restrictions have been lifted – some prisoners were released; - reduced penalties for insulting the state; - Amendments to the Cinema, Video and Music Works Law: narrowed the scope for suspending or banning works; - tendency to use alternative provisions of the Penal Code and of the Anti Terror Law to limit Freedom of Expression; - “interpretation and implementation of the amended legislation should be pursued in a consistent and systematic manner” (p. 30) - freedom of the press: some changes, but still concern; - amendment protects journalists from being forced to reveal the sources; - narrowed scope of motives to destroy publications; - implementation of amendments is not uniform – ex. Heavy penalties for authors that criticise state institutions and policies; - continued confiscation of publications; - censorship of internet content; - broadcasting: allowing broadcast in other languages with no concrete results; - continued heavy penalties on the grounds of separatist propaganda; - freedom of association: restrictions were eased, but several limitations; - difficulties in establishing an association on the basis of minority groups;
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							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - confiscation needs the confirmation by a judge within 48 hours; - Turkish associations can open branches abroad or join international bodies; - in practice, “still experience considerable difficulties in cooperating with foreign associations and international bodies” (p. 32) - HR organisations had many court cases against them; - freedom of assembly: restrictions have been eased; - reduced the minimum time to request to hold a demonstration (48 to 24h); - age limit to organise a demonstration reduced (21 to 18); - limited the possibility to postpone meetings; - cases of excessive force against demonstrators; - political parties: reforms to align with constitutional amendments; - possibility to impose sanctions rather than banning the party; - banning the party only in accordance with Constitutional principles; - freedom of religion: improvements in the property rights and construction of places of worship, but with limited effects; - non-Muslim communities with obstacles; - reform: possible to acquire properties only with the consent of the Directorate General of Foundations; - problem of confiscated properties not addressed yet; - the Directorate General of Foundations interferes in religious foundations; - 2001-2003: 406 foundations dissolved (ex. If elections are not held, they property confiscation may occur); - ban remains on the training of clergy for religious minorities; - Alevis: change: Union of Alevi and Bektashi Associations was granted legal status (it was banned).
	<i>Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights</i>	36-38					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - gender equality: increased sanctions for “honour killings”; - violence against women is widespread (>50% women subject to

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> violence within the family); - new Labour Law: equal treatment, but does not guarantee the prohibition of discrimination; - limited implementation of equal sharing of goods during marriage; - representation of women in elected bodies is low (24 women out of 550 MPs); - rights of the child: age limit for child labour increased (12 to 15), but many children under 15 employed; - ratified European Convention; - trade unions: no progress; - cultural rights: some changes: broadcast in other languages; parents can name their children as they wish; - learning of different languages and dialects: no progress – applications to establish courses rejected.
	<i>Minority rights</i>	38-41					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - OSCE for the first time permitted to visit Turkey due to minorities but no dialogue followed the visit; - limited the right of ethnic minorities to enjoy their own culture; - electoral system (10% threshold) makes it harder for minorities to be represented at the Parliament; - “Minorities have been subject to certain discriminatory practices by the authorities” (p. 38); - history books induce the feeling of hostility towards minority groups; - religious minorities not recognised by Lausanne Treaty not allowed to establish schools; - strong prejudice against the Roma; - state of emergency lifted in the two remaining provinces – positive psychological effects, some clashes, but increasing security; - cultural manifestations were authorised; - situation of internally displaced people is critical – very poor conditions; - Implementation of the Return to Village and Rehabilitation Project has

								continued, but very slowly and inconsistently; - many landmines in the region caused casualties.
	Chapter 23	-----	---	---	---	---	---	-----
	Chapter 24	110-119						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - visa policy: continued with the alignment of the EU visa list; - Schengen: no development; - external borders: increased and upgraded infrastructures; adoption of the new strategy; - migration and asylum: strategy for alignment with the EU acquis; - new law regarding working permits – secondary legislation necessary; - Law on Turkish Nationality was amended to prevent marriages of Convenience; - illegal migration via Turkey has shown a decrease, as a result of the intensified efforts and initiatives targeting illegal migration; - readmission agreements: some progress; - improved conditions for asylum-seekers and refugees; - continued intensive training activities on asylum issues; - police cooperation and fight against organised crime: conventions signed; - new law on combating smuggling of goods; - legislative amendments are being implemented with more arrests and more serious penalties; - training on the new anti-trafficking legislation; - recommendations of the Task Force for the fight against trafficking were adopted by the Prime-Ministry as a National Action Plan (hotlines, shelters for victims, etc); - drugs trafficking: successful operations; - fight against terrorism: signed protocol; - fight against fraud and corruption: new legislation that introduced new offences at this level; - notified the OECD that it was ready to receive its examiners regarding

							<p>the 1997 Convention;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - government announced an Emergency Action Plan (corruption and transparency); - fight against drugs: signed an agreement with the EU; - no progress regarding the completion of the national drug strategy; - money laundering: new regulation on customer identification; - number of reported cases increased significantly; - customs cooperation: continued upgrade in facilities and infrastructures; - judicial co-operation in criminal and civil matters: adopted a National Action Plan to implement the <i>acquis</i>; - improved cooperation in criminal matters; - created an organisation to train judges, public prosecutors and legal professions; - end of the jurisdiction of military courts over civilians; - HR instruments: some conventions signed.
	General Evaluation	128-131					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Turkey’s alignment has progressed in most areas but remains at an early stage for many chapters. It is most advanced in chapters related to the EC-Turkey Customs Union but in this respect it is not fully meeting its obligations. Alignment is also more advanced in areas where other international obligations exist which are similar to the <i>acquis</i>. Further legislative work is required in all areas, and Turkey should focus on implementing its National Programme for the Adoption of the <i>Acquis</i>, in line with the Accession Partnership priorities, more consistently across all chapters. Also, new legislation should not move away from the <i>acquis</i>.” (p. 128, 129); - “In many fields implementation is weak. Administrative capacity in different areas needs to be strengthened to ensure that the <i>acquis</i> is implemented and enforced effectively. In some cases, administrative reform should entail the establishment of new structures, for example in the field of state aid and regional development. Where new regulatory

								bodies have been set up, their autonomy should be assured and they should be provided with sufficient staff and financial resources.” (p. 131)
2004	Democracy and RoL	19-29	-	-	-	-	-	--
	<i>The Parliament</i>	19-20						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - activities dominated by political and economic reform; - strong consensus between the government and the opposition on EU process; - several laws adopted; - October 2003 and July 2004: 261 new laws.
	<i>The Executive</i>	20-21						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - government is committed to meet the Copenhagen criteria; - government gave priority to opening the negotiations; - Secretariat General for EU Affairs continues coordinating the works, but concern that staff is not enough; - President used his veto power 8 times; - June and July: set of Laws adopted to improve the division between and the performance of the four levels of administration to promote a decentralized, participatory, transparent, responsive and accountable system.
	<i>NSC / CMR</i>	21-23						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - civilian control strengthened since 1999; - January 2004 a new regulation implementing previous legislative changes; - Secretariat General of the NSC purely consultative; - previous special funds now under control of the P-M; - staff reduction + abolition of some units; - August 2004: the first civilian appointed as the Secretary General; - decrees governing the activities of the SG of the NSC no longer secret; - measures increased transparency of military and defence expenditure; - members chosen by the NSC to the Higher Education Board and High Audio-Visual Board were removed; - defence expenditure reduced, being overcome by education; - but the military still enjoy a degree of autonomy;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - depending on the interpretation of legislative texts, the military can have room for manoeuvre; - continue to exercise influence through informal mechanisms; - “Overall, reforms over the last year concerning the functioning of the NSC have further shifted the balance of civil-military relations towards the civilians and encouraged public debate in this area.” (p. 23).
	<i>Judicial System</i>	23-27						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - since 1999, important improvements have been made; - State Security Courts have been abolished and replaced by Regional Serious Felony Courts; - amendments improved the rights of defence; - training on international law and HR intensified – judges as important actors to implement measures; - recognised the supremacy of international and European treaties ratified over domestic legislation; - new Penal Code (September 2004) – with modern European standards, strengthening sanctions against HR violations and new offences; - the Justice Academy started to operate (judicial staff training); - approved the Law on Establishing the Intermediate Courts of Appeal – reduce the caseloads of other courts; - expert advisory mission: significant progress since first visit; recommendations followed by the Ministry; - Law on Notification was amended; - Regulation on Apprehension, Detention and Statement Taking was amended – to extend the rights of the detainees; - Law on Juvenile Courts was amended to establish more Juvenile Courts; - Commercial Code was amended to establish courts for maritime cases; - Law on Family Courts was amended; - Regulation on Legal Aid was adopted; - There has been a reduction in the average trial period; - number of judges and prosecutors are stable;

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - National Judicial Network Project has continued to progress; - all judges and prosecutors received training on the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR + several seminars around country on other issues; - Courts continue to apply the reforms; - some cases go to trial with no preparation due to the lack of supervision on the police officers during investigation; - judges are no longer prohibited from forming professional organisations; - independence of the judiciary is foreseen in the Constitution, but undermined by other principles – such as the link and dependence to the Ministry of Justice.
	<i>Anti-Corruption</i>	28-29					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - anti-corruption measures, but still a serious problem; - some conventions signed; - improved transparency with the adoption of the Law on the Foundation of an Ethical Board for Public Servants; - Anti-Corruption Committee proposed parliamentary inquiries to former ministers; - debate but no improvements on the Parliamentary immunity – considered one of the problems of Turkish corruption; - effectiveness of bodies created to fight corruption is cause of concern.
	HR and protect. min.	29-51					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - eradicated all remaining death penalty provisions; - strengthened gender equality; - broadened freedom of the press; - aligned the judiciary with European standards; - established the supremacy of international agreements in the area of fundamental freedoms over internal legislation; - progress on international conventions on HR; - Council of Europe lifted the monitoring procedure; - progress in relation to the execution of judgements of the ECtHR, but still some cases in which its decisions have not been implemented; - HR Presidency has intensified its work (promoting HR, awareness, etc.

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> but without a nation-wide impact); - several bodies working on HR; - fight against discrimination: limited progress.
	<i>Civil and Pol. Rights</i>	33-45						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - abolished death penalty in all circumstances; - prevention of torture and ill-treatment: “Turkey still needs to pursue vigorously its efforts to combat torture and other forms of ill-treatment by law enforcement officials.” (p. 33) - improved the rights of detainees; - “Pocket-sized cards setting out a suspect’s rights, including his right to see a lawyer, have been distributed to police officers, who have been instructed to read the rights to a suspect immediately upon arrest.” (p. 34) - policy of zero tolerance led to a decline in the cases of torture; - 2 454 law agents were tried in 2003 (for torture or ill-treatment): 1 357 were acquitted and of the 854 defendants that were convicted, 138 were imprisoned; - improvements in detention facilities and in treatment of detainees; - access to lawyers improved; - some procedures still not respected; - still reports of arbitrary detentions, disappearances, extra-judicial executions, etc.; - prison system: “the situation has improved significantly since 1999” (p. 36); - Dec,2003: 64296 prisoners (37056 convicted; 27240 detained on remand); - isolation of prisoners – a serious problem; - monitoring boards continue the inspections (several recommendations, some of them acted upon); - some visitors continue to face difficulties; - some prisoners do not receive proper medical treatment; - freedom of expression: issue was being addressed;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - there have been improvements and the number of people convicted for the expression of non-violent opinion has decreased, but still some people prosecuted; - broadcasting in other languages has begun; - “Overall the new Penal Code provides limited progress on freedom of expression” (p. 38) – some articles used to limit freedom of expression; - freedom of the press: “notable progress has been made, although further efforts are required to address outstanding issues” (p. 38); - amendments made it impossible to apprehend printing equipment under any circumstance; - strengthened journalists’ rights not to disclose their sources; - prison sentences largely replaced by fines; - foreigners became able to edit or own Turkish publications; - fines still excessive, mainly for local media (may contribute to self-censorship); - journalists and writers continue to be sentenced for reasons that disregard the ECHR; - 2003: banned 43 books; 37 writers + 17 publishers put on trial; - broadcasting: “significant progress and previously adopted measures were implemented” (p. 39) - first broadcasts in other languages aired; - private TV and radio channels allowed to broadcast in other languages; - broadcasting is limited to 4 (TV) or 5 (radio) hours per week; - children’s programmes in other languages are banned; - freedom of association: “several legislative reforms undertaken since 1999 have lifted a number of restrictions” (p. 40); - reduced the possibility of the state to interfere in the activities of the associations; - civil society organisations continue to face restrictions in practice; - adopted the new Law on Associations (but not in force due to the
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							<p>President's veto); (vetoed: - removed some limitations to the establishment of new associations; Vetoed; - removed the requirement to seek prior permission to open branches abroad); - NGOs reported that dialogue with authorities is more open, some changes need to be implemented still; - circular instructed the authorities to deal with marches and demonstrations in a way that would not attack rights of assembly; - Kurdish Writers' Foundation was established, but was charged against by the state due to meetings with the European Commission without previous request; - NGOs, HR defenders, etc. subject to considerable judicial harassment; - prohibited or postponed demonstrations: 2001: 141; 2002: 95; 2003: 41; - detentions related to demonstrations increased from 2003 to 2004; - political parties: no developments; - freedom of religion: obstacles to non-Muslim communities in their freedom of worship – lack of legal personality, not allowed to train clergy, limited property rights, etc; - religious foundations subject to interference of the Directorate General for Foundations; - technical requirements invoked to prevent construction of churches; - Christians often subject to police surveillance; - no change in the status of non-Sunni Muslim communities.</p>
	<i>Ec. & Social Rights</i>	45-47					<p>- gender equality: some reforms improved it; - Constitution and Penal Code improved to promote equality; - still some problems of discrimination and domestic violence in practice; - Penal Code: life imprisonment to crimes based on tradition and customs (like honour killings); - sexual assault within marriage can lead to prosecution;</p>

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - prison sentence for those who order or conduct virginity tests without court order; - increased awareness of domestic violence against women; - Law on the Protection of Family not implemented; - women still vulnerable to discriminatory practices; - rights of disabled people: increased number of disabled persons recruited; - children's rights: child labour still significant problem; - right to education not implemented, mainly with girls; - Conventions ratified; - school attendance particularly low in rural areas; - street children still a serious problem; - trade unions: significant constraints (collective bargaining, strikes, etc).
	<i>Minority rights, cultural rights and the protection of minorities</i>	48-51						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some Conventions not signed; reservations to some articles; - abolished a Committee for Minorities that aimed to carry out security surveillance on minorities; - school books still with prejudices against minorities; - some minorities not allowed to establish schools; - cultural rights: important progress since 1999; - broadcast in other languages, first private courses on other languages; - "There has been a greater tolerance towards the use of the Kurdish language and the expression of Kurdish culture in its different forms." (p. 49) – celebrations allowed, ex. - electoral system (10% threshold) not changed; - limitations on the use of other languages by political parties; - situation in E and SE of country has improved gradually; - some clashes have been reported; - situation of internally displaced persons still critical.
	Chapter 23	-----	---	---	---	---	---	-----
	Chapter 24	138-147	X					- " <i>Progress since the last Regular Report</i> . Further progress has been

							<p>made since the last Regular Report.” (p. 138);</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - data protection: not much progress; - visa policy: continued alignment with the EU; - Schengen: some development; - external borders: begun work on drawing up an Action National Plan; - protocol with Bulgaria on border control; - migration: begun work on drawing up an Action National Plan; - undertook negotiations agreements; - conventions ratified; - increased coast surveillance; - intensified efforts against illegal migration diverted the flows from Turkey; - illegal migrants apprehended: 2000 and 2001: around 100 000 each year; 2002: 83 000; 2003: 56 000; - asylum: begun work on drawing up an Action National Plan; - slight decrease in arrivals of asylum seekers; - continued training activities; - police co-operation and the fight against organised crime: ratified protocols; - enhanced cooperation; - training on HR; - agreements with NGOs to provide help to victims of trafficking; - directive adopted to exempt victims of trafficking from paying medical treatment; - fight against terrorism: improved international cooperation; - fight against fraud and corruption: signed and ratified Conventions; - established an Ethics Board (supervise ethical conduct of public officials); - Parliamentary Anti-Corruption Commission discussed at Parliament; - no development on parliamentary immunity;
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								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - law on the right of information adopted (transparency of public administration); - various investigations carried out, several convictions; - fight against drugs: several documents ratified; - some successful operations; - money laundering: several documents ratified; - new Banking Law; - several investigations; - customs cooperation: improving infrastructures at border gates.
	General Evaluation	160-164						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Turkey’s alignment has progressed in many areas but remains at an early stage for most chapters. Further work is required in all areas, new legislation should not move away from the <i>acquis</i>” (p. 160); - “Turkey has continued to make efforts to align with the <i>acquis</i> in the area of <i>justice and home affairs</i>. Nevertheless, progress is required in important areas such as the reform of the judiciary and the fight against corruption. Co-operation both at national level among all relevant administrative bodies and with the EU should be improved on issues such as illegal migration and trafficking, including through the negotiation of a readmission agreement. The geographic limitation to the Geneva Convention on refugees should be lifted and co-operation among the relevant institutions should be improved.” (p. 163); - “Implementation of legislation formally aligned with the <i>acquis</i> continues to be insufficient. Administrative capacity in most areas needs to be strengthened to ensure that the <i>acquis</i> is implemented and enforced effectively.” (p. 164).
2005	Democracy and RoL	10-18	-	-	-	-	-	---
	<i>The Parliament</i>	10-11						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some deputies from AKP and CHP changed their affiliations and created their own parties, increasing the number of parties in the Parliament to 6; - no change to the electoral system; - Oct,2004-Jun,2005: 166 new laws adopted;

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - since Oct 2004, President returned laws to Parliament 13 times + applied to the C.Court 8 times; - EU Harmonisation Committee continued its work; - established a new Committee on Violence Against Women and Children; - Parliamentary HR Investigation Committee continued its work, but its impact is limited by limited resources.
	<i>The Executive</i>	11					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the government has reiterated its commitment to the reform process on several occasions; - the opposition party, CHP, has also extended its support to the process; - relations with the EU at the forefront of the political agenda.
	<i>Public Administration</i>	11-12		X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some progress, but difficulties in adopting a comprehensive strategy, mainly at the central administration level; - central law to reform public administration was vetoed by the President (aimed to re-distribute the powers and duties of central and local government, to rationalise bodies, to increase responsiveness and transparency); - some laws adopted regarding local government (Law on Association of Local Government, Law on Metropolitan Municipalities, Law on Municipalities, Law on Special Provincial Administration, etc); - these laws will require secondary legislation to allow implementation; - no progress in establishing an Ombudsman; - 25, May, Ali Babacan appointed as EU Chief Negotiator and responsible for the Secretariat General for EU Affairs; - September: Erdogan and Babacan met with 85 NGOs to discuss ways to improve dialogue with civil society.
	<i>NSC/CMR</i>	12-15	X				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - more changes were introduced to align with the European practices; - the implementation of reforms of the NSC started to be implemented (Secretary General is a civilian, composed by 7 civilians and 5 military, staff decreased);

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - NSC meets every 2 months; - to increase transparency, a press briefing was organised; - defence expenditure increased (but still the 2nd biggest after education); - budgetary transparency and Parliamentary control improved; - new regulations promoted an ex-post audit of defence expenditure; - Secretary General was preparing a draft of the new National Security Policy Document; - no progress regarding the Military Criminal Code; - the civilian control over the Gendarmerie should be reinforced; - TAF continue to exercise political influence; - “Since 2002, Turkey has made good progress in reforming civil-military relations” (p.14); - Turkey needs to consolidate the changes + improve accountability and transparency in the security field + promote better public understanding of reforms at this level.
	<i>Judicial System</i>	15-17	X				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “The judicial system has been further strengthened via the adoption of structural reforms. Important progress was made (...)” (p. 15); - the Penal Code, the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Law on Enforcement of Sentences and the Law on the Establishment of the regional Courts of Appeal entered into force in June 2005; - the adoption of the Code of the Criminal Procedure was a fundamental step: introduced the cross examination of witnesses, plea bargaining, criminal investigations carried out by a judicial police force under the authority of the public prosecutor, etc.; - witnesses whose mother tongue is not Turkish are entitled an interpreter free of charge, but there are no people trained in legal interpretation, which should be addressed; - concern that juveniles are in adult prisons; - Intermediate Courts of Appeal were to be established in 2 years (the law came into force in June);

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - minor offences by juveniles to be tried by one judge instead of three; - 27 new Family courts established; - judicial independence is foreseen in the Constitution but undermined by several other provisions (judges attached to the Ministry, close relationship between judges and prosecutors, for ex.); - widened the scope of compulsory legal representation; - the number of detainees asking for a lawyer increased (although some reports state that they are discouraged); - Turkish law and ECHR are not interpreted consistently.
	<i>Anti-corruption</i>	17-18		X				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “In the last year, some progress has been achieved in adopting anti-corruption measures.” (p. 17); - but corruption continues to be a serious problem; - new Penal Code has more severe penalties; - 2 corruption-related commissions were established; - Turkey has no law on financing and auditing of political parties; - Ethical Board for Public Servants has started to operate + code of ethics for public employees; - no developments on the parliamentary immunity; - coordination and cooperation of polices on corruption are weak.
	HR and protect. min.	18-40	-	-	-	-	-	--
	<i>Observance of HR</i>	18-22	X					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Turkey has made further progress with regard to international human rights instruments.” (p. 18); - several conventions and documents signed and ratified; - not submitted the reports to the UN committees; - progress in the execution of the judgements of the ECtHR, but needs to ensure that its case-law is given effect; - lack of government cooperation with the ECtHR; - bodies to ensure the enforcement of HR continue to work, but need to be strengthened in their capacities (resources); - continued training on HR;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - fight against discrimination: no progress on new legislation on discrimination in employment.
	<i>Civil and Pol. Rights</i>	22-32						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - prevention of torture and ill-treatment: reports of torture and ill-treatment are still frequent, but the incidence is diminishing; - efforts are required to ensure full implementation of legislation (especially fight against impunity); - the new Codes strengthen the fight against torture and ill-treatment; - some legislative changes cause concern (ex. Transferring individuals from their prisons to other places to help onsite investigations); - overall implementation has improved; - fight against impunity: several cases against security forces on trial; - still several challenges: 1631 out of 1831 cases were acquittals; - not clear if detainees are made aware of their rights; - medical examinations: training continues, but neither quality or independence are ensured; - extra-judicial killings have increased; - prison system: new law introduced new concepts, such as community service and probation; - rehabilitation, cultural and social and educational activities are ongoing in prisons; - May 2005: 57 670 people in prison (out of which: 31812 convicted; 26858 detained on remand); - significant progress regarding prison conditions, but some are still overcrowded and under-resourced; - freedom of expression: significant number of people serving prison sentences for the expression of non-violent opinion were set free; - there has been a reduction in the number of prosecutions and convictions in cases related to freedom of expression; - amendments to Penal Code in May improved freedom of expression: aggravating sentences, excluding acts of expression with the aim to

							<p>inform or criticise not to be criminalised, slightly diminishing the scope of the article on defamation, deleting the reasoning associated with article 305 on offences against fundamental national interests;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - still some articles are used to limit freedom of expression and were not addressed (ex. Article 301, vaguely defined); - some progress on open and free debate; - publication of books on sensitive issues is easier, but some are still banned; - freedom of the press: some positive developments (acquittals and releases); - no journalists imprisoned because of their work; - some articles can still create a climate of self-censorship and should be addressed; - 60 writers, journalists and publishers under judicial processes; - journalists find it still hard to found a trade union; - broadcasting: limited progress; - strict time limits for broadcasting in other languages and dialects; - heavy penalties, monitoring by the police; - freedom of association: the new Law on Associations entered into force in November 2004; - reduced possibility of state interference in the activities of associations already brought positive results; - March 2005 legislation imposes some limits on the registration of associations whose objectives are considered to be contrary to the Turkish Constitution; - several technical requirements that make it difficult to register; - despite the restrictions, some associations based on different identities, races, etc. were able to register; - new legislation is not being uniformly implemented; - HR defender s continue to face judicial harassment in practice;
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							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - peaceful assembly: during a manifestation in women's day, police intervened with excessive force; - political parties: closure of 7 political parties was denied; - parties cannot use other languages but Turkish; - freedom of religion: very limited progress has been made; - improvements in the legislation, but still not able to have legal personality; - in practice, several restrictions and limitations; - Law on Foundations is under consideration, but, as it is, it will not improve the situation much; - some efforts were made to ensure other places of worship would be allowed; - religious foundations continue to be subject to the interference of the Directorate General for Foundations (to be dissolved, to be seized from their properties, etc); - ban on training clergy continued; - some non-Muslim communities have been violently harassed; - Alevis situation: no change.
	<i>Ec. & Soc. Rights</i>	32-35					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - women's rights: little progress; - new Penal Code = some important improvements concerning women's rights; - main problems: domestic violence, honour killings, high illiteracy rate, low participation in the Parliament, in local bodies and in the labour market; - created an Advisory Board on the Status of Women: composed by representatives from ministries, NGOs and academic institutions to provide advice on policies concerning women; - established two further committees for women's rights; - other problems: abuse within family, sexual abuse, early marriages, unofficial religious marriages, polygamy, etc.

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - courts are starting to apply legislation, but further training is required; - need for further shelters for women; - women remain vulnerable to discrimination; - women participation in workforce among the lowest in the OSCE; - children's rights: right to education not respected in some areas, mainly girls education; - shortcomings in the application of the law on child work; - new Law on Protection of Children adopted: framework to safeguard children's rights, well-being, etc. (but does not fully comply with international standards); - some articles of European Conventions not accepted yet; - some steps were taken to address the problem of street children (new Committee, new schemes...); - rights of disabled people: adopted the New Law on Disabled People; - Turkey has no mental health law and care for mentally disabled is scarce; - use of unnecessary institutionalisation, physical restraints, inadequate feeding, etc.; - trade unions: several constraints on the right to organise, to collective bargain and to strike; - Public Employee Trade Union Law – amended in 2004, has some shortcomings not addressed yet; - imprisonment is foreseen for those who force others regarding membership of and participation in trade union activities; - reports of workers being fired or moved because of their trade union activities; - Turkey falls short of ILO standards.
	<i>Minority rights</i>	35-40				X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Turkey’s approach to minority rights remains unchanged since last year’s report.” (p. 35); - HR Advisory Board’s Report: encouraged Turkey to align its policy on

							<p>minorities with international standards + revision of the Constitution to guarantee people from different identities and cultures to enjoy their rights – the report was object of lively debate, but its author and the chairman of the Board were investigated and ended up resigning; the Board has not been operating ever since;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Turkey’s reservations to some articles or conventions are of concern; - work on reviewing school books’ discriminatory language against minorities, but not used in schools yet; - Greek minority still with problems to teach and to inherit property; - Roma still prevented from entering the country as immigrants; - Roma with difficulties in accessing housing, education, health, etc.; - cultural rights: limited progress; - broadcasting in other languages is possible, but still several constraints; - teaching of Kurdish faced setback with the closure of the 5 remaining schools (due to lack of financial resources, restrictions on the appointment of teachers, the timetables and the attendees); - greater tolerance towards Kurdish culture in the last years, tension arose again; - situation in the East and Southeast: progress slow and uneven; - no comprehensive law has been established to address the socio-economic problems of the region; - level of violence has increased again; - the implementation of the <i>Law on Compensation of Losses Resulting from Terrorist Acts</i> has been delayed and uncertain; - situation of internally displaced people (IDP) continues critical; - no progress on addressing the problem of village guards (reported to have attacked IDPs).
	Chapter 23	103-110					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - independence and impartiality of the judiciary: several legal provisions foresee the judiciary’s independence, but there are others that attach the judiciary to the Ministry of Justice (financially dependent, appointed by

							<p>them, transfers, promotions, etc.), hampering its autonomy;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - law to establish and association of judges not adopted yet; - salaries increased, but still modest; - quality and efficiency of the judiciary: extensive training on the new Codes, on HR, money laundering, asylum law, etc.; - all judges and prosecutors are regularly evaluated; - budget of the Ministry of Justice increased 16,5%, but remains low when compared to other EU member-states; - progress on computerisation; - number of judges (5952) and prosecutors (3179) is stable; - legal guarantees including access to justice: arbitrary arrest: individual arrested is entitled to know the reason; - pre-trial detention maximum 24hours; - presumption of innocence to be applied in criminal trials; - Constitution guarantees the right to a fair and public trial; - Constitution guarantees the right of defence (during investigation and trial, the access to a lawyer, to an interpreter free of charge, etc.); - other principles also foreseen: legality of criminal offences, non-retroactivity of penalties, proportionality between the offense and the penalty, <i>ne bis in idem</i>. - fundamental rights: individual petition possible since 1987; - several institutions established to work in the area of HR (Reform Monitoring Group, HR Presidency, Parliamentary HR Investigation Committee); - torture and ill-treatment: legislation put in place and reports of cases decrease but full eradication implies further work; - prison system: improved significantly since 1999; - major development was the adoption of the new Law on the Execution of Sentences; - integrity of the person: new Penal Code criminalises trade in human
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							<p>organs;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - right to privacy enshrined in the Constitution; - data protection foreseen in the Penal Code; - right to marry, to found a family are foreseen; - freedom of conscience is foreseen in the Constitution, but some obstacles in practice; - Turkey does not recognise the right of conscientious objection regarding military service and has no alternative civilian service; - freedom of expression, of assembly and of association, non-discrimination, rights of the child: cfr. Above; - Conclusion: <p>“As regards the judiciary, substantial progress been made (...).However, considerable concerns remain regarding the independence of the judiciary, and in particular the influence of the Ministry of Justice over the recruitment of judges and prosecutors. Further steps also need to be taken to ensure equality of arms between prosecution and defence before the court and to ensure that all citizens enjoy access to justice. In the last year, some progress has been achieved in adopting anti-corruption measures (...)In general, the situation as regards fundamental rights in Turkey has improved significantly since 1999. However, the momentum of the reform process slowed in the reporting period and further progress is required, particularly in terms of the implementation of reforms” (p. 110).</p>
Chapter 24	110-114	X					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Further progress has been made” (p. 110); - Schengen and external borders: no developments, but work continued on the National Action Plan; - visa policy: continued alignment; - migration: National Action Plan adopted in March 2005 (training, family reunification, long-term residence, etc); - asylum: National Action Plan adopted in March 2005 and should now be implemented;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the number of new asylum seekers decreased significantly; - still some reports that state that some asylum seekers are prosecuted for illegal entry and deported; - sometimes difficulties in submitting asylum applications; - police cooperation and fight against organised crime: new Code of Criminal Procedure contains new powers and a law concerning organised crime was amended; - Ministry's circular sought to ensure better cooperation and coordination between the police, the gendarmerie and the coast police; - criminal investigation methods and forensic capacity need to be improved; - increased penalties for smuggling and trafficking persons; - several successful operations; - fight against money laundering: some progress regarding the alignment with the <i>acquis</i>; - fights against terrorism: signed conventions; - fight against drugs: signed an Agreement with the Council of Europe; - no further progress regarding the alignment with the <i>acquis</i>; - some successful operations; - customs cooperation: substantial increase in apprehension of smuggled goods and drugs (due to X-ray equipment, CCTV, etc.); - inter-agency cooperation needs to be enhanced; - judicial co-operation in criminal and civil matters: established the Courts of Appeal; - more judicial staff appointed; - Conclusion: " Turkey continued to make further progress in aligning its legislation with the <i>acquis</i> and EU practices in the area of justice, freedom and security, and the Turkish legislation is aligned to a certain extent with the EU <i>acquis</i>. Nevertheless, progress is needed in a number of important
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								areas, such as implementation of the National Action Plan for alignment with the acquis on migration and asylum, intensified and active co-operation with the European Union on illegal migration and in combating trafficking, as well as development of the national strategy against organised crime and the legislative framework for combating money laundering. Further steps should be taken to improve co-ordination and co-operation among relevant institutions.” (p. 114).
	General Evaluation	134-136						- “As regards Turkey’s ability to adopt and implement the EU legal order, there has been some, though uneven, progress since 2004.” (p. 134); - “In the areas covered by the <i>judiciary and fundamental rights</i> , Turkey has made progress in aligning with EU standards and practices concerning the judiciary and anti-corruption measures. However, further steps are needed to ensure the independence and efficiency of the judiciary. On corruption, further action is necessary to improve the efficiency of the relevant bodies established to combat corruption and to raise public awareness of corruption as a serious criminal offence. Turkey continued to align its legislation with the acquis in the area of <i>justice freedom and security</i> . Overall, the Turkish legislation is partly in line with the acquis. Further progress is necessary in a number of areas such as adoption of a law on protection of personal data, adoption and implementation of the National Action Plan on Border Management, implementation of the National Action Plan on Migration and Asylum, lifting the geographic limitation to the Geneva Convention and developing inter-agency co-operation.” (p. 135).
2006	Democracy and RoL	5-10	-	-	-	-	-	---
	<i>The Parliament</i>	5-6						- since October 2005, 148 laws adopted (of 429 draft bills presented); - EU Harmonisation Committee and HR Committee played an important role in addressing political criteria; - public debate about changing electoral regime (due to 10% threshold).
	<i>The Executive</i>	6						- the government has repeatedly confirmed its support for the EU process;

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the Chief Negotiator presented in October 2005 the negotiating team; - the Secretariat General for EU Affairs has coordinated the process (alignment, financial cooperation, etc.), but given its growing importance, it needs to be reinforced in terms of resources.
	<i>Public Administration</i>	6-7				X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ombudsman (established recently) will deal with petitions concerning administrative acts; - some progress regarding better regulation; - no progress on adopting the Framework Law on Public Administration (fiscal decentralisation not achieved); - no progress concerning the establishment of city councils; - amended the Law on the Associations of Local Governments (more local joint projects); - no progress concerning the drafting of the Civil Servant Law; - “Overall, there has been some legislative progress in public administration reform. The implementation of reforms adopted in previous years has continued. Further efforts are needed in the area of decentralisations.” (p. 7).
	<i>NSC/CMR</i>	7-8				X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - no civilian can be tried in a military court (unless the crime involves military personnel); - possibility of retrial in military courts was introduced; - National Security Policy Document was revised by the NSC and adopted by the government without Parliamentary discussion; - TAF continue to exert political influence expressing their opinions on several issues; - no measures taken to enhance civilian control over the gendarmerie; - revealed the existence of a protocol that foreseen the possibility of the military to carry out operations without civilian permission in case of internal threats; - reforms in defence expenditure started to be implemented; - parliamentary overseeing of military budgets: no progress;

								- “Overall, limited progress has been made in aligning civil-military relations with EU practices.” (p. 8).
	<i>Judicial System</i>	8-10	X					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - authorities focused on the implementation of the new legislation; - around 100 circulars issued by the Ministry of Justice aiming to create a clearer framework for the implementation of new legislation; - Courts continue to apply the ECHR; - 620 new judges recruited; - continued training activities; - article 301 used to restrict the expression of non-violent opinion; - some cases revealed inconsistency in the interpretation of legislation; - prosecutors report difficulties in supervising the judicial police (tension between both); - independence of the judiciary: some factors still undermine it; - “Overall, there was continued progress in the area of judicial reform. However, implementation of the new legislation by the judiciary presents a mixed picture so far and the independence of the judiciary still needs to be further established.” (p. 10).
	<i>Anti-corruption</i>	10					X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Law on Access to information was amended; - some reports reveal a wide range of corruption activities; - corruption remains widespread, despite all the efforts; - need to improve the legislation on financing and auditing political parties; - parliamentary immunity remains a serious problem; - corruption of investigations hampered by the need for hierarchical authorisation; - there should be an independent body that would coordinate and monitor the implementation of anti-corruption measures; - “Overall, there has been some limited progress in the fight against corruption, notably on increasing transparency in the public administration. However, corruption remains widespread and anti-

								corruption authorities and policies are still weak.” (p. 10)
	HR and protect. min.	10-23	-	-	-	-	-	--
	<i>Observance of HR</i>	10-13	X					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some international documents ratified; - some reservations held, some others were lifted; - during the first 8 months of 2006, ECtHR issued 196 judgements finding that Turkey violated the ECHR; - 2004 and 2005 reforms had positive consequences on the execution of the judgements of the ECHR; - several cases are pending before the Committee of Ministers; - continued training on HR and HR violations; - HR Presidency received 778 applications on HR violations, but it lacks independence from the government and is under-resourced; - HR Advisory Board continues not to operate since the report in October 2004; - Parliamentary HR Committee with an active role in collecting complaints; received 864 applications (Oct2005-Jun2006), conducted several investigations and published 3 reports, but has no legislative role and is not consulted on legislation; - “Overall, Turkey has made progress on the ratification of international human rights instruments and in the execution of ECtHR judgements. However, there is a need to further upgrade the human rights institutional framework.” (p. 14).
	<i>Civil and Pol. Rights</i>	13-17						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - torture and ill-treatment: comprehensive legislative framework in place; - decreasing trend in the number of reported cases; - reforms in detention procedures had positive results; - implementing legislation still a problem and there still are reported cases; - rights to notify a relative and to have access to a lawyer are not consistently applied; - concerns with the confidentiality and quality of medical examinations –

							<p>need to improve the autonomy of the Forensic Medicine Institute;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - HR situation in the SE is of particularly concern; - fight against impunity remains an area of concern; - access to justice: concerns regarding the lack of review of past sentences; - considerable increase in the appointment of legal aid lawyers; - prison system: regulations adopted to implement the legislation; - physical infrastructures improved; - training has been strengthened; - but there is still: lack of communal activities, limited interaction between custodial staff and prisoners, inadequate health-care and psychiatric resources, overcrowded cells; - reported cases of ill-treatment by prison staff; - prisons not open to independent monitoring; - solitary confinement too extensive; - freedom of expression and media: the Ministry of Justice issued a circular instructing prosecutors to take into consideration, regarding freedom of expression in the media, Turkish and ECHR legislation; - broadcasting in other languages: some progress; - the prosecutions and convictions due to the non-violent expression of opinion create a feeling of self-censorship that is cause of serious concern; - article 301 needs to be brought in line with European standards; - the impact of the anti-terror law on freedom of expression raises concerns; - the independence of the media regulatory body is dubious due to the appointment procedure; - freedom of assembly: fewer restrictions to demonstrations; - but security forces used excessive force against demonstrators; - freedom of association: legislation in line with international standards; - the impact of the legislation on the ground has been positive;
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							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - to notify the authorities in case of receipt of finances from abroad results in difficulties for the NGOs; - foundations need permission to apply to international projects or funds; - difficulties in registering an association; - some associations are subject to court proceedings; - no progress in aligning the law on political parties with EU practices; - civil society organisations: reforms led to positive results; - they became more vocal and better organised; - increasing variety of organisations; - freedom of religion: freedom of worship continues to be generally respected; - an official delegation met with the leaders of non-Muslim communities and discussed their problems and solutions; - ID-cards still include religious information about the individual and may lead to discrimination; - still problems with legal personality, owning property, restrictions on clergy training, ... - no developments in the situation of the Alevis; - no progress regarding the difficulties of non-Muslim communities.
	<i>Ec. & Social Rights</i>	18-20					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - women's rights: report by a Parliamentary Committee has been published and identified some problems; a circular followed the report and gave priority to the fight against violence; - the campaign "Stop domestic violence" entered the second phase and was supported by several entities, namely media, targeting girls education; - legislation is satisfactory, but the problem is implementation; - East and Southeast still many cases of honour crimes and suicides influenced by the family, often not object of criminal investigation; - several girls not registered at birth, hampering their tracing (and the fight against early marriages, for ex.);

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - need for more shelters; - women still vulnerable to discrimination; - participation of women in political bodies and the workforce still low; - the Directorate General for the Status of Women is under-resourced; - children's rights: the right to education (especially girls) remains a problem in some areas; - further implementation of legislation is requires; - rights of disabled people: legislation has been implemented; - need for decentralised structures and services for disabled people (namely in the access to education); - discrepancies in the quality of the services of mental health (mainly in rural areas); - no progress on trade union's rights; - there are two legislative proposals to amend legislation in this field, but no further progress; - the shortcomings (restrictions on the right to organise, to strike, etc) remain; - Turkey falls short of ILO standards.
	<i>Minority rights</i>	20-23				X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - approach to minority's rights unchanged; - some minorities not recognised; - OSCE visit was not followed up and no progress was made concerning dialogue with minorities; - deepening of the dialogue is necessary (education, languages, broadcasting, public life, etc); - some reservations towards international conventions; - limited progress concerning education (ex. Further efforts needed to remove discriminatory language from textbooks); - no progress in relation to Syriacs or Greeks; - cultural rights: permission given to two Kurdish channels, but still several restrictions (ex. Educational programmes not allowed; Turkish

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> subtitles mandatory, etc.); - public school system does not allow children to learn their mother tongue when it is no Turkish; - no other language but Turkish is allowed in political life; - situation in East and Southeast: progress made regarding the compensation of losses resulting from terrorist acts; - situation in the region has deteriorated (several attacks, riots, etc.); - difficult overall socio-economic situation; - almost no dialogue between the authorities and locally elected politicians; - internally displaced persons (IDP): issue of concern; - no progress on the establishment of a body responsible for implementing the policy on IDP return; - several factors still need to be tackled: infrastructures, capital, employment, etc.; - no progress on addressing the problem of village guards; - Roma: amended law improved discrimination against Roma, but some discriminatory provisions remain; - still face discriminatory treatment (housing, education, health, etc.); - “Overall, Turkey made little progress on ensuring cultural diversity and promoting respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with international standards.” (p. 23).
	Chapter 23	57-62					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - independence of the judiciary: several provisions of the Constitution ensure it, but some factors undermine it; - in June 2006 established an association, the “Union of Judges and Prosecutors”, to safeguard judicial independence and impartiality; - impartiality of the judiciary: some progress; - candidate judges and prosecutors now fall under the Ethical Board for Public Servants; - now all have a seminar on ethics;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - salaries increased in 40%; - professionalism and competence of the judiciary: extensive training on new legislation; - efficiency of the judiciary: continued progress; - the budget of the Ministry of Justice increased and is now 1% of the whole budget; - progress on computerisation; - <i>plea bargaining</i> was introduced by the new Code of Criminal Procedure; - judicial reform: progress; - fight against corruption: some progress; - no overall strategy and action plan to prevent and fight corruption; - corruption continues to be a widespread problem in Turkey; - Ethical Board for Public Servants not operating effectively due to lack of resources; - Law on Public Financial Management and Control not implemented properly; - fundamental rights: limited progress; - implementation continued, but legislative progress not; - no progress regarding institutions responsible for monitoring and promoting HR; - abolition of death penalty: Protocol 13 to the ECRH ratified in February 2006; - torture and ill-treatment: continued implementation, reported cases decreased, but there are still cases; - protection of personal data: no progress; - freedom of thought, religion and conscience: no progress addressing the problems of non-Muslim communities; - no progress regarding conscientious objection to military service; - article 301 restrictive interpretation raises problems with freedom of expression;
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							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freedom of assembly and association: diminishing restrictions on civil society continued, but excessive use of force by security forces; - right to education: further efforts needed (mainly girls); - right to property: no developments in the situation of non-Muslim minorities, Greeks and Syriacs; - anti-discrimination: no legislative developments; - gender equality and women's rights: growing public attention, satisfactory legal framework, but not protected in practice; - rights of the child: little change; - right to an effective remedy and a fair trial: criminal trial and civil proceedings average duration increased; - pending cases before criminal courts remained stable; - pending cases before civilian courts increased slightly; - right to legal aid: restriction introduced under the scope of the anti-terror law regarding access to legal aid; - right of defence: considerable increase in the appointment of lawyers for free legal aid – but fees to state lawyers are low, so it raises concerns on the quality of legal aid; - difficulties reported concerning the principle of cross-examination; - approach to minorities' rights unchanged; - no progress aligning practices with international and EU standards.
	Chapter 24	62-65		X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - external borders and Schengen: some progress; - National Action Plan was adopted and meant a progress in aligning with European practices; - Still some serious shortcomings: inter-agency cooperation at a very early stage and information exchange needs improvement; train and professionalism of border staff need to be improved, as well as some infrastructures; - visa policy: limited progress; - migration: limited progress has been made;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Action Plan is being implemented but does not provide details on the deadlines for the transposition of the <i>acquis</i>; - apprehension of illegal immigrants increased; - asylum: some progress with the introduction of some amendments to legislation; - but the capacity at reception centres needs improvements; - preparations for alignment at an early stage; - police cooperation: some progress; - fight against organised crime: limited progress; - trafficking in human beings: progress; - money laundering: limited progress; - fight against terrorism: some international conventions signed and an anti-terror law adopted; - fight against drugs: limited progress; - customs-cooperation: some progress; - judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters: limited progress; - “Overall, some progress can be reported, particularly in the areas of asylum, border management, fight against trafficking in human beings, customs and police cooperation. Alignment with the <i>acquis</i> in this chapter is underway but considerable and sustained efforts are required in areas such as migration, the fight against organised crime, money laundering and judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters.” (p. 65).
2007	Democracy and RoL	6-11	-	-	-	-	-	--
	<i>Constitution</i>	6						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In May, there was a set of Constitutional amendments; - introduced the election of the President by popular vote and a renewable term of 5 years + government’s term from 5 to 4 years + establishment of a quorum of one third for all sessions and decisions at the Parliament; - the October referendum endorsed these changes; - minimum age to be elected to Parliament lowered (30 to 25).
	<i>The Parliament</i>	6-7						- July 2007, elections – turnout 83%;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - OSCE + Council of Europe report: pluralism, public confidence, transparency and efficiency; - 3 parties overcame the 10% threshold (AKP, CHP, MHP); - 20 of the 26 independent candidates formed their own party; - desirable to lower the threshold.
	<i>The President</i>	7						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - election of the new President in April was boycotted by opposition in the first two rounds, leading to early elections; - Gül elected in the third round.
	<i>Government</i>	7-8						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the new government was endorsed on 5 September by the Parliament; - government programme continues its commitment to the reforms, especially aligning with international standards on HR + push forward the accession process; - need to strengthen Secretariat General for EU Affairs staff and resources.
	<i>Public Administration</i>	8		X				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public Financial Management and Control was amended in April; - a regulation adopted to establish city councils; - some progress on better regulation (circulars, simplification drive,...); - ombudsman law suspended by the CCourt and not implemented; - no progress on Framework Law on Public Administration (to reform central administration); - more financial resources to local administration: no progress; - draft law on Civil Service was not sent to Parliament.
	<i>NSC/CMR</i>	8-9	X					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - army tried to interfere in the President's election, but democratic practices were reaffirmed; - decreased the number of the staff in general and of the military staff; - but continue to exercise political influence (public comments, reactions to government decisions, publishing memorandum, etc); - several attempts by the military to restrict academic research and public debate on some issues + targeted the media; - no progress in enhancing civilian control over the Gendarmerie;

								- no progress in strengthening parliamentary control over the military budget.
	<i>Judicial System</i>	9-10		X				- some progress concerning the efficiency of the judiciary (due to the amendments of December 2006); - progress in the implementation in the area of probation; - continued efforts to modernise the judiciary; - increased funds for the judiciary (€409M in 2005; €482M in 2006; planned €865M in 2007); - concerns regarding the independence and impartiality of the judiciary (dismissals, tensions, etc.).
	<i>Anti-Corruption</i>	11			X			- for the first time, a military court sentenced a general to imprisonment for corruption; - no progress on the adoption of the Law on the Court of Auditors; - parliamentary immunity and transparency in political parties law remain to be addressed; - no progress on the development of an anti-corruption strategy; - institutions involved in the fight were not strengthened.
	HR and protect. min.	11-24	-	-	-	-	-	--
	<i>Observance of HR</i>	11-13						- progress on ratification: several documents ratified or signed; - 330 ECtHR judgements finding that Turkey had violated the ECHR; - progress on the execution of ECtHR judgements, but several are awaiting enforcement by Turkey; - need for better public awareness of the work of HR institutions; - further efforts are needed to improve the institutional framework for human rights.
	<i>Civil and Pol. Rights</i>	13-18						- torture and ill-treatment: legislative changes had positive effects; - confirmed the diminishing trend of reported cases; - continued efforts to strengthen the system for medical examination in cases of abuse; - the number of forensic medicine centres increased;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some cases still being reported (especially during arrest and outside detention centres); - no independent monitoring of detention centres; - need to strengthen the independence of the Council for Forensic Medicine and the quality of its reports; - fight against impunity of HR violations remains an area of concern; - judicial proceedings on allegations of HR violations are often delayed; - access to justice: some progress; - most detainees consulted lawyers after detention, but the access varies across the country; - amendments to the Criminal Procedure Code were adopted in December 2006; - prisons: improved physical infrastructures + continued training of staff; - problems: overcrowding, lack of consistent implementation of provisions, restrictions to correspondence, inadequate health resources; - freedom of expression: continued open debate in the media; - prosecution and conviction for the non-violent expression of opinions are cause of concern – number of individuals prosecuted almost doubled in 2006 compared with 2005; - further increase in the number of prosecutions in 2007; - article 301 needs to be brought in line with the relevant EU standards; - general climate of self-censorship; - freedom of assembly: broadly in line with European standards; - investigation into use of excessive force by police at the 1st May demonstration; - freedom of association: amendments had positive results; - increasing number of associations and membership; - positive developments in the registration of religious associations; - remains the obligation to notify the authorities in case of financial support from abroad;
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							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - civil society organisations have taken a more active role in shaping policy and address causes; - freedom of religion: freedom of worship generally guaranteed; - continued dialogue between the government and non-Muslim communities; - circular recognises that there has been an increase in the crimes against non-Muslim minorities and asks governors to take necessary measures; - ID-cards include and entry on religion that may be filled or left blank; - language to incite hatred against non-Muslim minorities has been unpunished; - non-Muslim communities still difficulties (legal personality, property rights, etc.); - local authorities differ on issuing construction permits for places of worship; - Alevis still with difficulties to open their places of worship; - restriction remain on the training of clergy; - “Overall, the environment as regards freedom of religion has not been conducive to the full respect of this right in practice. A legal framework has yet to be established in line with the ECHR so that all religious communities can function without undue constraints. No real progress can be reported on the major difficulties encountered by the Alevis and non-Muslim religious communities.” (pp. 17-18).
	<i>Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights</i>	18-21					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - women’s rights: amendments extended the Law on Protection of the Family to all individuals in the family; - continued campaigns to prevent violence against women; - number of shelters increased; - NGO’s campaign regarding women in politics was successful: in 2007 elections the number of women elected to Parliament almost doubled; - but violence against women still widespread, honour killings and early marriages continue to happen;

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Overall, progress has been achieved on protecting women from violence” (p. 18); - children’s rights: efforts to combat child labour continued; - gender gap in education decreased; - national strategy started to be developed against child poverty; - Law on Child Protection: strengthens children’s rights in courts and when taken into custody, for example; - efforts needed to reduce regional disparities in education; - ratio of children who die at birth still high; - issue of children not registered needs to be addressed; - the way children are treated in institutions is a cause for concern; - needed significant improvements of detentions centres and in the quality of care and protection provided to children by staff; - disabled people: directive issued to regulate the use of electro-convulsive therapy; - no progress regarding access to education, health, etc. for people with disabilities; - labour rights and trade unions: lifted the requirement to have worked at least for 10 years to manage bodies of trade unions; - restrictions on the exercise of full trade union rights remain; - “Overall, little progress has been achieved with regard to labour rights and trade unions” (p. 20); - anti-discrimination: enshrined in the Constitution, but no specific protection against discrimination on grounds of age and sexual orientation; - property rights: no progress in the situation of Syrians.
	<i>Minority rights</i>	21-24					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - law reconfirmed the of non-Muslims to hold schools; - minority rights: Turkish approach remains unchanged; - full respect for origin, language, etc. should be fully achieved; - OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities’ proposal to visit the

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - SE was not accommodated; - still some reservations regarding international conventions; - Greek minority still with problems; - “Overall, Turkey has made no progress on ensuring cultural diversity and promoting respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with European standards.” (p. 22); - cultural rights: new channels broadcasting in other languages allowed, but still several restrictions; - children with mother tongues different from Turkish cannot learn it at school; - there are no opportunities to learn Kurdish in public or private schools; - no measures to facilitate the access of non-Turkish speakers to public services; - use of other languages in political life not allowed; - no progress regarding the status of Roma; - “Turkey has made no progress in the area of cultural rights.” (p. 23); - situation in the East and SE: overall socio-economic situation difficult; - no comprehensive strategy to achieve economic and social development; - deterioration of the situation in terms of attacks by the PKK; - established three security zones; - landmines remain a security concern; - internally displaced persons: progress continued on the process of compensation; - IDPs in urban areas live in poverty with little or no access to basic services; - no progress on village guards.
	Chapter 23	58-63					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “Overall, some progress can be reported on the judiciary” (p. 58); - independence of the judiciary: YARSAV (association of judges and prosecutors) sought to limit the role of the Ministry of Justice in the selection of judges and prosecutors;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - YARSAV also sought other changes and improvements; - no progress on the composition of the High Council of Judges; - no progress on the reporting lines of the judicial inspectors; - concerns remain regarding impartiality of the judiciary; - professionalism and competence of the judiciary: continued training, but without an independent training provider; - efficiency of the judiciary: positive results of the National Judicial Network Project; - funds for the judiciary increased; - established new courts + others in construction; - mediation and cross-examination not used sufficiently; - no developments in the area of judicial reform; - “Limited progress can be reported in the area of anti-corruption.” (p. 59); - transparency in public administration: right of access to information increased; - no progress in strengthening the legal framework and institutional set to combat corruption; - no developments in limiting parliamentary immunity; - ethical principles for deputies and other groups are lacking; - no particular developments regarding the implementation of the Council of Europe’s recommendations on corruption; - corruption remains a widespread issue in the public sector; - lacking a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy; - “As regards, fundamental rights, there has been limited progress” (p. 60); - no developments regarding the institutions in charge of monitoring and promoting HR; - torture and ill-treatment: positive effects of legislation + decreasing number of cases, but still reports of cases and impunity remains;
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								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - respect for private life and family life and communications: needed alignment with Data Protection Directive; - freedom of thought, conscience and religion: (cfr above) improved dialogue between government and non-Muslim minorities; Alevis continued problems; - no progress regarding conscientious objection; - freedom of expression, pluralism and media: several cases of prosecutions and convictions of people for non-violent expression of their opinions (on Armenian and Kurdish issues, the role of the military, etc.); - climate of self-censorship; - freedom of assembly and association: citizens able to exercise these rights without interference, but there is a case under investigation due to excessive use of force by the police; - treatment of disabled people and non-discrimination: signed a UN Convention + new legislation on gender discrimination on labour market; - right to education: continued campaign to enrol girls in schools; - right to property: no developments regarding problems faced by non-Muslim communities; - gender equality and women's rights: improvements with the Law on the Protection of the Family adopted in April 2007; - alleviated the financial burden of legal proceedings for victims; - still low rates of political participation and high rates of violence; - rights of the child: decreasing proportion of working children; - national strategy against child poverty; - rates of unregistered children still high; - treatment in institutions is cause of concern; - liberty and security, and right to a fair trial: no progress on the establishment of an organised professional interpretation system in courts; - introduced the compulsory commissioning of a defence lawyer; - not enough time to hearings due to workload;
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							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Turkey’s position regarding minority and cultural rights unchanged; - no developments regarding EU citizens’ rights. - Conclusion (p.63): “As regards the judiciary, some progress can be reported, in particular, on its efficiency. However, concerns remain regarding its independence and impartiality. There is no overall National Reform Strategy for the Judiciary or a plan to implement it. As regards corruption, little progress has been made in developing a comprehensive anticorruption strategy and strengthening the legislative framework. There is still no overall strategy or action plan to prevent and fight corruption. As regards fundamental rights, there has been limited progress in legislation and in practice. No major issue has been addressed and significant problems persist. Finally, the atmosphere in the country in particular as regards issues related to minorities and religion has not been conducive to the full respect of fundamental rights and might <i>de facto</i> restrict their exercise.”
	Chapter 24	63-67					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - limited progress in the field of migration; - steps taken to implement the National Action Plan on migration; - number of apprehended illegal migrants declined; - ongoing readmission agreements with several countries; - asylum: limited progress in preparing for the decentralisation of procedures and for improved reception conditions; - number of asylum seekers rose; - new brochures in several languages were published; - children of applicants for asylum have the right to attend Turkish schools; - new legislation is required to ensure uniform implementation in this field; - visa policy: some progress; - further alignment was achieved; - external borders and Schengen: limited progress has been made;

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - judicial cooperation in criminal matters: no progress; - police cooperation: limited progress; - fight against organised crime: progress; - trafficking in human beings: progress; - fight against terrorism: progress; - fight against drugs: progress; - customs cooperation: some progress; - Conclusion (p. 67): “Turkey continued to make further progress in aligning its legislation with the <i>acquis</i> and EU practices in the area of justice, freedom and security, and the Turkish legislation is aligned to a certain extent with the EU <i>acquis</i>. Progress can be reported particularly in the areas of organised crime, drug trafficking and human trafficking. Considerable and sustained efforts are required in areas such as police cooperation and external borders. The same applies to migration and asylum, where there is a need to establish an asylum authority.”
2008	Democracy and RoL	6-11					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - In March, the C.Court received a request to dissolve the AKP and to ban from politics several of its members, including the Prime-Minister and the President of the Republic. Reason: party was a focal point for anti-secular activities. In July, the C.Court ruled that the party should not be banned, but recognised that it had carried out activities against the secular principles of the Republic; - in November, the DTP was also requested do be banned to engage in activities against the unity and integrity of the state; the case is pending; - an investigation started (Ergenekon) and led to the arrest of several people, including former military personnel; the charges: forming a terrorist organisation, attempting to overthrow the government, to undermine the government’s operation by use of violent means.
	<i>Constitution</i>	6-7					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - AKP gave a group of academics a mandate to revise the 1982 Constitution to align Turkey with international standards on HR; draft not

								presented; - articles amended to lift the headscarf ban for university students, but the Constitutional Court annulled the amendments to be contrary to the secular nature of the state.
	<i>The Parliament</i>	7						- adopted 116 bills; - in March, Law on elections was amended and Turkish citizens living abroad became entitled to participate in parliamentary elections; - the C.Court ruled that postal voting was unconstitutional.
	<i>The President</i>	7						- tried to play a conciliatory role; - good relationship with the government; - repeatedly called for the acceleration of the EU-related reforms; - active role in foreign policy; - paid a first-ever visit of a President to Armenia.
	<i>The government</i>	7-8						- expressed its commitment to the EU accession process and political reforms; - “However, despite its strong political mandate, the government did not put forward a consistent and comprehensive programme of political reforms” (p. 7); - announced a draft NPAA and started a consultation process, but it was not adopted yet; - staff and resources of the Secretariat General for EU Affairs remain weak; - adopted a Law on municipalities establishing new, merging or closing down districts and municipalities; - continued implementation of local administration laws; - Law on Municipalities is still under review in the C.Court; - city councils have worked efficiently in a limited number of cities; efforts are needed to strengthen city councils, transparency and accountability; - lack of dialogue and spirit of compromise between the main political

							parties had a negative impact on the functioning of political institutions.
	<i>Public Administration</i>	8			X		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a circular was issued to reduce red tape; - recruitment and promotion based on merit-based competitive examination; - politicisation of senior level appointments has been criticised; - several issues remain to be addressed: administrative burden, simplification, impact assessment, transparency, etc.; - strategy development units need to be strengthened; - not sent to Parliament a comprehensive draft law on Civil Service.
	<i>NSC/CMR</i>	8-9			X		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - control over the military applied in practice in the military operations in Iraq; - armed forces continue to exert political influence; - no change in some laws that provide the military room for manoeuvre; - no progress on civilian control over the gendarmerie; - secret protocol on security (to carry military operations without request from civilian authorities) remains unchanged; - no progress on strengthening parliamentary control over military budget; - Court of Auditors can only carry out ex-post audits of military expenditure; - “Overall, no progress has been made in ensuring full civilian supervisory functions over the military and parliamentary oversight of defence expenditure. Senior members of the armed forces have made statements on issues going beyond their remit.” (p. 9)
	<i>Judicial System</i>	9-10					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ministry of Justice has been working on a draft judicial reform strategy – a comprehensive document that covers several issues; - 846 judges and prosecutors appointed; - judges: 6785 in 2007; 6914 in 2008; prosecutors: 3744 in 2007; 3917 in 2008; - funds to the judiciary in 2007: 865€ million; - no progress on establishing courts of appeal;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - concerns about the impartiality of the judiciary; - “Overall, the work to date on the draft judicial reform strategy has been a positive development. The Ministry of Justice needs to continue and expand the consultations with all stakeholders, including civil society, and build the necessary broad support for the strategy. However, concerns remain as regards the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. Reforms in the area of the judiciary are a priority of the Accession Partnership.” (p. 10)
	<i>Anti-corruption</i>	10-11			X			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Turkey has implemented one third of the recommendations of GRECO’s report (and the most important ones were not addressed); - it made efforts to ensure implementation of legislation; - government failed to prepare a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy; - corruption cases frequently reported by the media; - no progress on limiting parliamentary immunity; - no progress regarding new legislation on the Court of Auditors; - no progress on strengthening Parliamentary oversight over public expenditure; - “Overall, there has been limited progress in the area of <i>anti-corruption</i>. Corruption remains a widespread issue. There has been limited progress towards strengthening the legal framework and institutional set-up to fight corruption.” (p.11)
	HR and protect. min.	11-28	-	-	-	-	-	--
	<i>Observance of HR</i>	11-13						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - no developments regarding ratification of HR instruments; - ECtHR delivered 266 judgements finding that Turkey violated ECHR (an increasing number); - Turkey abided by the final judgment of the ECtHR in the majority of cases, but several are waiting for enforcement; - progress on the execution of ECtHR judgements, but further efforts are needed; - several state-sponsored bodies have the task to ensure promotion and

								<p>enforcement of HR (HR Presidency, HR Investigation Committee, HR Advisory Board) – Ombudsman suspended by the C.Court;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - HR defender have faced criminal proceedings because of their work or threats from extremist groups; - overall, institutions lack independence and resources; fundamental the introduction of an Ombudsman.
	<i>Civil and Pol. Rights</i>	13-19						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - torture and ill-treatment: rights of the detainees protected by safeguards to prevent these cases in custody; - Ministry continued its work for establishing and independent mechanism to investigate complaints against law enforcement officers; - Council of Forensic Medicine is preparing for ISO quality accreditation; efforts to improve the quantity and quality of these centres; - number of people applying to NGOs for cases of torture and ill-treatment has increased; - law amendments: police not entitled to use force unless they face resistance; - medical reports inaccurate due to lack of resources and expertise; - in some cases, law enforcement officers were present even without the request of the doctor during medical examinations; - impunity for HR violations is cause for concern; - lack of prompt, impartial and independent investigation into allegations of HR violation; - “Overall, there have been limited efforts as regarding the prevention of torture and ill-treatment” (p. 14); - access to justice: in rural areas, there have been cases where defendants did not have access to a lawyer; - prison: physical infrastructures continued to improve; - staff training continued to improve; - greater transparency in the operations of the penal institutions and detention houses;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - restrictions on prisoners' correspondence and inadequate health resources; - reported cases of ill-treatment by prison staff; - "Overall, good progress was made on improving infrastructures and on training of staff. However, shortcomings as regards restrictions on prisoners' conditions, on solitary confinement and on occasional ill-treatment remain to be addressed." (p.15); - freedom of expression: open debates continue in the Turkish media on several issues; - Article 301 was amended: to strengthen the safeguards for freedom of expression, lowering the upper limit of the penalty, abolishing the higher penalty for insults in a foreign country, introducing a requirement for permission to be obtained by the Justice Minister to launch a criminal investigation + issued a circular on implementing the amended article; - however, the wording of the article remains largely the same; - other legal provisions that restrict freedom of expression (articles 215, 216, 217, 288, 318); - statements by senior figures criticising the press; - frequent and disproportionate website bans; - TAF deny access to receptions and briefings to journalists and media; - "Overall, with the amendment of Article 301 there has been some progress in the efforts to strengthen the safeguards for freedom of expression, which is a priority of the Accession Partnership. However, only a consistent track record of implementation will show whether or not the revised article is adequate. Moreover, further legislative reforms are needed to ensure full respect of freedom of expression, in law and in practice" (p. 16); - freedom of assembly: broadly in line with European standards; - problems with implementation (arbitrary limitations have been applied, for ex.);
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								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some investigations initiated into allegations of excessive use of force, but they depend on the authorisation of the Governor; - “Overall, further efforts are needed to ensure freedom of assembly in practice in line with European standards, as arbitrary limitations and disproportionate use of force against demonstrators still occur.” (p. 17); - freedom of association: legal framework improved with amendments; - conditions for establishing an association were relaxed and the framework for their activities was eased; - introduced tax incentives for donations to foundations; - foundations are represented in the Foundations Council; - remains the obligation to notify the authorities before receiving financial support from abroad; - “Overall, there were improvements to the legal framework on freedom of association. However, some associations faced disproportionate administrative difficulties or judicial proceedings” (pp. 17-18); - civil society organisations: governmental bodies regularly consult NGOs, but no coherent legal framework organising this cooperation (so, consultations are at a ad hoc basis); - the breadth and scope of civil society organisations need to be strengthened; - freedom of religion: freedom of worship continued to be generally respected; - Law on Foundations addresses the issue of property of non-Muslim minorities; - Alevis: announced an initiative to improve dialogue with this community, but this decision was not followed through and Alevis continue to face the same problems; - Alevis were refused plots to construct Cem houses; - reported attacks against non-Muslim clergy and places of worship; - still lack of legal personality;
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								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - restrictions on training of clergy remain; - continued judicial proceedings against conscientious objectors; - “Overall, there has been some progress, in particular as regards adoption of the Law on foundations. However, the implementation of the Law, together with the resolution of the outstanding property-related issues regarding non-Muslim minorities remains a challenge.” (p. 19)
	<i>Ec. & Soc. Rights</i>	19-24						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - women’s rights: circular helped improve cooperation between public institutions on the fights against violence and honour killings; - awareness-raising campaigns organised for members of the judiciary and law enforcement bodies; - the number shelters has increased; - examples of high-level presence of women in several fields; - gender gap in primary education decreased; - political representation of women still low; - women’s access to education is lowest among EU members and OECD; - domestic violence, honour killings and early forced marriages still a serious problem; - women are reluctant to have recourse to the police or the courts due to lack of confidence in provision of effective protection; - Gender Equality Body and a Parliamentary Committee on Gender Equality have to be established; - “Overall, the legal framework guaranteeing women's rights and gender equality is broadly in place. However, further significant efforts are needed.” (p. 21); - children’s rights: increase in primary enrolment; - increased number of pupils in pre-school; - e-school database was created to control children’s attendance; - mobile schools trying to reach out children working in agriculture; - decreased the proportion of children experiencing poverty; - minimum standards on care and protection for children living outside

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> parental care have been developed; - the number of specialised staff increased; - reception centres have been opened in some provinces; - but respect for and implementation of children’s rights continue to be a matter of concern; - some progress in the juvenile justice system; - “Overall, there has been progress on access to education, social services and the juvenile justice system. However, efforts need to continue in all areas related to children's rights, including administrative capacity, education, the juvenile justice system and child labour.” (p. 22); - persons with disabilities: increase in the resources allocated to care services; - progress on electro-convulsive therapy (in line with medical standards); - people with disabilities not receiving adequate public services (ex. accessing facilities); - labour rights and trade unions: Turkey needs to ensure these rights are in line with EU standards and ILO; - reported restrictions on trade unions rights; - social dialogue mechanisms are weak; - anti-discrimination: enshrined in the Constitution and other laws; - LGBT community refused to register for legal status; - homosexuals can be exempted from military service, but the verification of their orientation is made through degrading medical and psychological tests or demanding proof of homosexuality; - homophobia sometimes results in violence; - property rights: Law on Foundations was adopted in February; - new law allows foundations to own and manage property + some specificities for non-Muslim communities; - problems with Greek minority and property rights continue to be reported;
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							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Syrians continue to report problems of seizure of properties; - “Overall, adoption of the Law on foundations has been a welcome step forward. However, implementation of the Law will be crucial. The outstanding issues also need to be addressed. Finally, the quality of the dialogue between the authorities and the communities concerned will be instrumental in creating an environment conducive to achieving progress.” (p. 24).
	<i>Minority rights, cultural rights and protection of minorities</i>	24-27			X		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - minority rights: situation of Treaty of Lausanne unchanged; - Turkey should grant specific rights to certain Turkish citizens on the grounds of their origin, religion, etc. - Turkey has some reservations regarding rights of minorities in international treaties; - management of minority schools remains an issue; - Greek minority still problems with property and education rights; - “Overall, Turkey has made no progress on ensuring cultural diversity and promoting respect for and protection of minorities in accordance with European standards.” (p. 25); - cultural rights: following amendment, the public service broadcaster is allowed to broadcast nationally all day long in other languages; - a new radio channel was authorised to broadcast in Kurdish; - launching a channel broadcasting in other languages has been delayed; - educational programmes not allowed to be broadcasted in Kurdish + other restrictions; - children whose mother tongue is not Turkish cannot learn it in public schools; - no courses of Kurdish available; - no measures to improve the access to public services for non-speakers of Turkish; - using other languages but Turkish is forbidden in political life; - Roma: no steps have been taken to amend the Law on the Movement

								<p>and Residence of Aliens;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Roma face social exclusion and marginalisation; - “Overall, Turkey made some limited progress on <i>cultural rights</i>, but restrictions continue, particularly on the use of languages other than Turkish in broadcasting, in political life and when accessing public services. There are no opportunities to learn these languages in the public or private schooling systems. There has been no progress in the situation of the <i>Roma</i>” (p. 27).
	<i>Situation in the E and SE</i>	27						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - investments scheduled to develop the SE; - terrorist attacks by the PKK continued; - landmines continue to be a security concern.
	<i>Refugees and IDP</i>	27-28						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - progress on the process of compensation of losses due to terrorism; - shortcomings in the implementation of the Law (uneven and inequitable calculation of compensation); - IDPs situation in urban areas remain a cause for concern; - IDPs suffer from economic and social marginalisation + no overall strategy to address their situation; - no steps to abolish the system of village guards.
	Chapter 23	66-71						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “There has been some progress on the judiciary” (p. 66); - independence of the judiciary: improvement with the adoption of new laws that promote transparent scoring and specific selection criteria; - some criticisms: new selection criteria open to subjective interpretation; - recruited more judges and prosecutors; - no progress regarding the composition of the High Council of Judges; - impartiality of the judiciary: concerns remain; - professionalism and competence: continued training, but no independent training provider; - efficiency: positive results of the national judicial network project + software developed + increasing number of judges and prosecutors; - no developments on establishing courts of appeal;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - judicial reform: some developments; draft strategy was discussed with judges and prosecutors; - anti-corruption: limited progress; - fundamental rights: some legislative progress; - institutions monitoring and promoting HR: no developments; - torture and ill treatment: further efforts needed; - respect for private and family life: need to align legislation with data protection acquis; - freedom of thought, conscience and religion: progress; - freedom of expression and freedom of the media: some progress, but some issues remains as a cause for concern; - freedom of assembly and association: broadly in line with European standards, but sometimes excessive use of force + other restrictions on associations; - treatment of disabled persons and non-discrimination: progress has been made regarding mental health; difficulties in accession to public services, lack of legal protection on the grounds of sexual orientation; - right to education: gender gap diminished, primary school enrolment increased, e-school database contains information on school attendance; but children out of school remain a problem; - right to property: Law on foundations was an improvement, but does not address non-Muslim communities' problems; - gender equality and women's rights: some progress; - rights of the child: progress, but efforts need to continue; - liberty, security and right to a fair trial: rural areas do not have immediate access to lawyer, interpretation in other languages in courts is an issue of concern; - minorities rights: limited progress; - Conclusion (p. 71): "As regards the <i>judiciary</i>, there has been some progress, in particular on
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							<p>establishment of a judicial reform strategy. However, concerns remain about the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. The reform strategy is expected to address these issues. Limited progress can be reported on <i>anti-corruption</i>. The government has continued to implement its initiatives. However, there is no legislation in place that would guarantee transparency of election campaign financing. There has been no progress on the immunity of Members of Parliament. Codes of ethics and/or conduct for Members of Parliament and other groups of public officials are lacking and an anti-corruption strategy and action plan need to be developed and to receive the political support necessary for implementation. As regards <i>fundamental rights</i>, there has been some legislative progress, but vigorous further efforts need to be made to ensure full respect of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR”.</p>
	Chapter 24	71-75					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - migration: some progress; - management of irregular migrants in turkey: limited progress; - asylum: limited progress; - visa policy: no progress; - external borders and Schengen: limited progress; - judicial cooperation in criminal matters: no progress; - police cooperation: limited progress; - fight against organised crime: some progress; - trafficking in human beings: progress; - fight against terrorism: some measures taken; - fight against drugs: some progress; - customs cooperation: some progress; - Conclusion: (p.75) <p>“Overall, some progress can be reported, particularly to prevent drugs and human trafficking. Alignment with the <i>acquis</i> in this chapter is underway, but sustained efforts are required in areas such as visa policy and judicial</p>

								co-operation in criminal matters. The same applies to the fight against organised crime, which remains a serious concern. The capacity to manage asylum and migration needs to be improved. Efforts need to be stepped up to implement the national action plan on integrated border management. The negotiations for an EC-Turkey readmission agreement need to be re-launched.”.
2009	Democracy and RoL	6-13						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Ergenekon investigations continued; concerns about the effective judicial guarantees for all suspects; - the case for closure of the DTP is still pending before the C. Court; - “is an opportunity for Turkey to strengthen confidence in the proper functioning of its democratic institutions and the rule of law. It is important that proceedings in this context fully respect the due process of law, in particular the rights of the defendants.” (p. 7).
	<i>Constitution</i>	7						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - debate on constitution reform continued – growing awareness that the 1982 Constitution needs to be changed to further democratisation; - there is no consensus between political parties regarding the reforms.
	<i>The Parliament</i>	7						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - established a consultative Committee on Equal Opportunities for Men and Women; - work on improving parliament’s rules of procedure has yet to be completed.
	<i>President</i>	8						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - President made efforts to promote dialogue between political parties and civil society; - continued to promote and encourage EU-oriented reforms.
	<i>Government</i>	8						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - reaffirmed its commitment to the European process; - appointed a full-time EU Chief Negotiator with the status of State Minister; - EUSG placed under the EU Chief Negotiator + increased staff + wider and clearer responsibilities; - Reform Monitoring Group met more regularly; - “However, these efforts need to translate into more concrete progress.

							<p>Despite the government's strong popular mandate and large majority in parliament, overall limited concrete progress was made on political reforms.” (p. 8)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - local elections were free and fair; - no progress on transferring powers to local governments; - some problems regarding transparency and municipalities that should be addressed.
	<i>Public Administration</i>	9				X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - a regulation established the principles and procedures for the administration to improve its services; - key challenges that remain: reducing red tape, establishing administrative procedures, enhancing transparency, etc; - implementation of the Public Financial Management and Control Law remains cause for concern; - little progress has been made concerning the civil service system; - “Overall, little progress has been made on public administration reform. Considerable further efforts are needed, in particular on the modernisation of civil service. Reducing red tape and promoting administrative simplification, as well as further developing a professional, independent, accountable, transparent and merit-based civil service remain priorities.” (p. 9).
	<i>NSC/CMR</i>	9-11				X	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - new legislation passed allowing civilian courts to try military personnel; - amended the Regulation on the Organisation and Duties of the gendarmerie, clarifying the powers of the police and the gendarmerie; - allegations of senior members of the armed forces being involved in anti-government activities; - jurisdiction of military courts needs alignment with EU standards; - TAF continue to exercise political influence through direct and indirect means; - no changes to Turkish Armed Forces Internal Service Law or to the Law on the National Security Council;

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - no progress regarding the legislative oversight of the military expenditures; - Parliament has no mandate to develop security and defence policies; - “<i>Overall</i>, some progress has been made, in particular on limiting the jurisdiction of military courts.” (p.11).
	<i>Judicial system</i>	11-12			X		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - judicial reform strategy was adopted by the government – positive, as it is a comprehensive document; - hiring judicial staff: some progress (7081 judges, 4040 prosecutors); - independence of the judiciary: no progress on the composition of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors; - impartiality: some statements made put it at risk; - efficiency: regional courts of appeal have not been established; - high-profile cases raised concerns about the quality of the investigations; - need to improve the working relationship between the gendarmerie and the police, and the judiciary; - reports of violation of procedural rights of the accused and leaks of information in the Ergenekon case; - pre-trial detention does not limited to the necessary; - “<i>Overall</i>, some progress has been made in the area of the judiciary. The adoption by the government of the judicial reform strategy following a process of consultation with all stakeholders is a positive step. The measures taken to increase staff and funding are also positive. However, these efforts need to be continued, and concerns remain with regard to the independence, impartiality and effectiveness of the judiciary, such as the composition of the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors and the establishment of the regional courts of appeal.” (p. 12).
	<i>Anti-corruption</i>	12-13			X		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - fighting corruption: limited progress; - Penal Code and the Code of Misdemeanours were amended to follow international recommendations; - government developed a consultation with stakeholders (including

								<p>NGOs) to prepare the national anti-corruption strategy;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - the commission created to enhance transparency and good governance had almost no political initiative; - the Ethics Board for Civil Servants published four decisions for the first time; - no progress concerning extending the ethic rules to academics, military personnel and the judiciary; - no progress on limiting the immunity of the MPs regarding corruption-related cases; - no progress on the political parties' financing; - no progress on adopting the legislation on the Court of Auditors; - “Overall, the legislative framework designed to prevent corruption has been improved. However, corruption remains prevalent in many areas. Turkey needs to finalise an anticorruption strategy and to develop a track record of investigations, indictments, prosecutions and convictions.” (p. 13).
	HR and protect. min.	13-31	-	-	-	-	-	---
	<i>Observance of HR</i>	13-15		X				<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - some international documents signed and ratified; - ECtHR delivered 318 judgements finding that Turkey violated the ECHR; there were more applications to the ECtHR against Turkey; - continued progress on executing ECtHR judgements; - implementation of ECtHR judgements that required legislative measures is delayed; - several state bodies promote and enforce HR in Turkey: applications to these bodies increased; staff training continued; - HR defenders continue to face criminal proceedings; - adoption of the Ombudsman Law was annulled by the C. Court, which implies that the Constitution is changed, but that has not been met due to lack of agreement in the Parliament; - “Overall, there was some progress on observance of international human

								rights law. However, implementation of some ECtHR judgments requiring legislative amendments has been outstanding for several years. Further efforts are needed to strengthening the institutional framework on human rights, in particular as regards the establishment of an independent human rights institution and of an Ombudsman. The ratification of the OPCAT is overdue.” (p. 15).
	<i>Civil and Pol. Rights</i>	15-22						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - torture and ill-treatment: continued efforts to comply with the legal safeguards; - efforts continued in the training and in the improvement of equipment; - drafted the creation of an independent national mechanism to investigate the citizens’ complaints that will cover law enforcement officials; - Council of Europe carried out a mission to Turkey and paid attention to prisons, detainees, etc.; this report needs to be published; - forensic medical doctors only recognised if they belong to the Forensic Medicine Council, which creates a monopoly and harms independence and effectiveness; - fight against impunity: need to improve the efforts to reduce impunity for HR violations; - “Overall, while the Turkish legal framework includes a comprehensive set of safeguards against torture and ill-treatment, efforts to implement it and fully apply the government's zero tolerance policy have been limited. Allegations of torture and ill-treatment, and impunity for perpetrators are still a cause for great concern” (p. 16); - access to justice: easier in urban areas, but problems in rural areas; - “Overall, effective legal assistance is limited and a number of criminal defendants remain unrepresented. Defendants' awareness on the availability of free legal assistance needs to be raised.” (p. 16); - prison: reform programme brought improvements in prison conditions and infrastructures; - programme was implemented with the opening of new prisons and the

							<p>closure of outdated ones – but implementation is uneven;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - rapid growth of inmates led to overcrowding problems; - still high proportion of pre-trial detainees; - national framework for prison monitoring falls short of the requirements; - concerns regarding imprisoned juveniles; - restrictions on the use of other languages on the phone was eased; - healthcare resources are inadequate; - reported cases of ill-treatment by prison staff; - “<i>Overall</i>, some progress was made on improving training and infrastructure, and recruiting additional prison staff. However, the problem of overcrowding and the high proportion of prisoners in pre-trial detention remain to be addressed.” (p. 17); - freedom of expression: article 301 no longer used systematically to reduce freedom of expression – its revision led to a decrease in the prosecutions; - C.Court annulled the provisions of the Anti-Terror Law making media owners responsible for publishing terrorist propaganda; - intensive public debate took place about the Armenian genocide; - legislation often interpreted in a restrictive way that limits freedom of expression; - amendments to the Anti-Terror Law resulted in the suspension of several periodicals; - journalists face frequent prosecutions; - frequent website bans; - “<i>Overall</i>, there is an increasingly open and free debate in Turkish society, including on issues traditionally perceived as sensitive. Article 301 of the Turkish Criminal Code is no longer used systematically to restrict freedom of expression. However, there are prosecutions and convictions based on a number of other articles of the criminal Code.
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							<p>Turkish law does not sufficiently guarantee freedom of expression in line with the ECHR and the ECtHR case law. Political pressures on the media and legal uncertainties affect freedom of the press in practice.” (p. 19);</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - freedom of assembly: further efforts were made; - circular stressed the need for the correct implementation of detention and apprehension procedures (namely use of force); - need to improve the difficult working conditions of the police; - some demonstration took place peacefully, but some reports of video-taping of demonstrations and NGO’s activities; - freedom of association: number of associations and membership continued to increase; - relaxed the conditions for establishing a foundation; - annulled the restriction of university’s professors right of association; - some legal provisions place an undue burden on the operations of associations (high fines, notification of foreign financial support, etc.); - still problems with registration of associations and foundations (ex. local representations of international NGOs); - continued obstacles to trade unions; - “<i>Overall</i>, the legal framework on associations is broadly in line with European standards. However, considerable progress needs to be made as regards its implementation, as associations still face disproportionate scrutiny of their activities, which in some cases has led to judicial proceedings.” (p. 20); - civil society organisations: growing awareness of the role of civil society organisations; - difficulties with the consultation procedure reveal the lack of trust between the state and civil society organisations; - tax exemptions for NGOs need to be strengthened in line with EU practices to ease NGOs’ financial sustainability; - freedom of religion: freedom of worship continues to be generally
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								<p>respected;</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - implementation of the Law on Foundations proceeded smoothly - progress on obtaining working permits for foreign clergy; - Turkish authorities visited non-Muslim communities to discuss their problems; - Minister of Culture participated in the opening in the first Alevi Institute and apologised for past sufferings caused by the State; - the Prime Minister attended an Alevi fast-breaking ceremony; - government held workshops to discuss the problems and expectations of the Alevis; - 3 municipal councils recognised Cem houses as places of worship and granted them the same financial advantages as mosques; - administrative courts ruled that Alevi students should be exempted from attending the mandatory religion and ethics course; - but religious culture and ethics classes remain mandatory and the ECtHR demanded Turkey to bring its education system into line with the ECHR; - non-Muslim communities still face problems with their lack of legal personality; - restrictions on the training of clergy remain; - ID cards still contain information on religion; - non-Muslim communities report discrimination and administrative uncertainty regarding places of worship; - there are claims that minorities' worship activities are monitored and recorded by security forces; - reported attacks and threats against non-Muslim clergy and places of worship; - continued judicial proceedings against conscientious objectors on religious grounds; - <i>“Overall, implementation of the law on foundations has been smooth.</i>
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								<p>The Government has undertaken a dialogue with the Alevi and non-Muslim religious communities. However, their specific problems have yet to be addressed. Attacks against minority religions still occur. A legal framework in line with the ECHR has yet to be established, so that all non-Muslim religious communities and Alevi community can function without undue constraints, including as regards training of clergy. Further efforts are needed to create an environment conducive to full respect of freedom of religion in practice.” (p. 22).</p>
	<i>Ec. & Social Rights</i>	22-27						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - women’s rights: established a Parliamentary committee on Equal Opportunities (to monitor gender equality, give opinions, propose steps, etc.); - amendment ensures public servants are paid maternity leave for 16 weeks; - improvement in mother and child health indicators over the last five years, but still with regional differences; - awareness-raising activities and training programmes continued (to health personnel, judiciary staff, etc); - gender equality remains a major challenge; - political representation of women remains very low; - women’s participation in the labour market remains very low; - domestic violence, honour killings and early and forced marriages are still serious problems; - family courts take long time to issue restraining orders to protect women; - need for more shelters; - lack of an effective dialogue between the government and civil society organisations on gender issues; - “<i>Overall</i>, the legal framework guaranteeing women’s rights and gender equality is broadly in place. However, further significant efforts are needed to turn the legal framework into reality and to narrow the gap

							<p>between men and women in economic participation and opportunity, political empowerment and access to education. Domestic violence, honour killings and early and forced marriages remain serious problems in some areas of the country. There is a need for further training and awareness-raising on women's rights and gender equality, for both men and women." (p. 24);</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - children's rights: gender gap in primary education was halved; - children in pre-school increased by 14%; - number of pre-school teachers increased too; - e-school system allows the Ministry to identify children who are out of school; - infant, child and under-five mortality rates have decreased; - child courts need to be established in all provinces; - poverty rate of children increased; - regional disparities persist; - no progress on combating child labour; - juvenile justice: anti-Terror Law provides children between 15 and 18 years old can be tried as adults – the number of cases against them increased, there are reports of ill-treatment while in detention and convictions often based on police's statements rather than firm evidence; - physical conditions and quality of services provided in juvenile detention centres need to be improved; - "<i>Overall</i>, efforts need to be further stepped up in all areas related to children's rights, including administrative capacity, health, education, the juvenile justice system and child labour. Cases of juveniles tried as adults and facing disproportionate sentences raise serious concerns." (p. 25); - disabled people: conventions ratified; - mental health is cause for concern; - further efforts needed regarding treatment programmes, physical infrastructures and training;
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								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - no comprehensive data on persons with disabilities; - disabled persons not provided with accession conditions in the elections; - labour rights and trade unions: reinstatement of May 1st as public holiday + allow trade unions to demonstrate at Taksim Square two symbolic improvements; - efforts to reform trade union legislation did not bear fruit – legislation still not in line with EU standards and ILO Conventions; - reported cases of restricting trade unions’ rights and of dismissals due to trade union’s membership; - social dialogue in Turkey is weak; - anti-discrimination: enshrined in the Constitution and other laws; - government raised public awareness on anti-discrimination and decided that the first lecture of the school year should be this issue; - legal framework not aligned with the EU acquis; - several cases of discrimination at the workplace (ex. LGBT members fired due to their sexual orientation); - homophobia has resulted in cases of violence (courts often use the principle of “unjust provocation” in favour of perpetrators); - TAF consider homosexuality as a illness and demand photographic proof to exempt from military service or humiliating medical examinations; - property rights: implementation of the Law on Foundations occurred smoothly; - Turkish authorities met with members of non-Muslim community foundations to discuss property-related issues; - properties seized and sold to third parties and properties of foundations merged before the new legislation were not addressed yet; - Syriacs continue to face problems with property; - Greeks continue to report problems with inheriting and registering property;
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								<p>- “Overall, the Law on Foundations has been implemented smoothly over the reporting period. However, it does not address the issues of properties seized and sold to third parties or of properties of foundations merged before the new legislation was adopted. Turkey needs to ensure full respect of the property rights of all non-Muslim religious communities.” (p. 27).</p>
	<p><i>Minority rights & Cultural Rights</i></p>	<p>27-30</p>						<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - public debate on minorities has developed; several reports and studies published; - work under way to remove discriminatory language from school books; - approach to minorities rights remains restrictive; - still some reservations to or not signed international documents; - need for a dialogue between Turkey and the OSCE on minorities – that would improve the alignment with international standards; - Greek minority: still problems with education and property; - some hate speeches against the Jewish community (after the intervention in Gaza in 2008); - “Overall, full respect for and protection of language, culture and fundamental rights, in accordance with European standards have yet to be fully achieved. Turkey made limited efforts to enhance tolerance or promote inclusiveness vis-à-vis minorities.” (p. 28); - cultural rights: public service broadcaster started to broadcast in Kurdish 24h/day; - allowed an university-based institute for post-graduate education in Kurdish and other languages; - At the channel’s inauguration ceremony, the P-M spoke some words in Kurdish; - public radio network started to broadcast in Armenian; - during local election campaigns, some parties used Kurdish in political activities – it is still forbidden legally, but almost no legal action launched;

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - educational programmes in Kurdish not allowed; - Children whose mother tongue is not Turkish cannot learn their mother tongue in the Turkish public schools; - no measures taken to facilitate access to public services for non-speakers of Turkish; - Roma: no steps taken to amend the law on the Movement and Residence of Aliens; - Turkey needs to establish a strategy to address these issues with the Roma; - Roma face social exclusion, marginalisation and discrimination in several fields; - “Overall, Turkey has made some progress on cultural rights, especially in the form of starting the Kurdish-language TV channel TRT 6. However, restrictions remain, particularly on use of languages other than Turkish in private TV and radio broadcasting, political life, education and contacts with public services. The legal framework on the use of languages other than Turkish is open to restrictive interpretations and implementation is inconsistent. There has been no progress in the situation of the Roma, who frequently face discriminatory treatment. Demolitions of Roma districts without provision of alternative housing continue.” (p. 29-30).
	<i>Situation in the E and SE</i>	30-31					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - continuous terrorist violence – loss of lives; - President’s visit to Iraq created a more positive environment regarding a solution to the Kurish issue; - additional resources continued to be allocated to the SE to promote its socio-economic development; - Kurdish celebrations passed peacefully; - Parliament adopted a Law on the De-mining of the Turkish-Syrian Border (in part suspended by the C. Court); - use of anti-terror law resulted in restrictions to fundamental freedoms;

							<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - landmines remain a concern; - no steps to abolish the system of village guards; - “Overall, despite continuing terrorist violence, the government has opened a wide-ranging public debate -covering cultural, political and economic matters- on the Kurdish issue. It is crucial that this debate be followed by concrete measures. The Law on the de-mining of the Syrian Border is another positive step. However, the broad interpretation of anti-terror legislation has resulted in undue restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights. The village guard system still needs to be phased out.” (p. 31).
	<i>Refugees & IDPs</i>	31					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - process of compensation of losses continued to make progress; - situation of IDPs in urban areas remains a cause for concern: economic and social marginalisation, lack of access to health and education; - national strategy to address IDPs’ situation not finished yet; - asylum-seekers: several limitations on the access to procedural rights in detention.
	Chapter 23	69-73					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - “There has been some progress on the judiciary” (p. 69); - anti-corruption: limited progress; - “As regards fundamental rights, there has been some progress” (p. 71); - minorities rights and cultural rights: some progress; - Conclusion (p. 73): <p>“Overall, there has been some progress as regards the <i>judiciary</i>. The adoption by the government of the judicial reform strategy following a process of consultation with all stakeholders is a positive step. The measures taken to increase staff and resources are also positive and need to be continued. However, concerns with particular regard to the independence, impartiality and effectiveness of the judiciary have yet to be addressed.”.</p>
	Chapter 24	73-78					<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - migration and asylum: limited progress; - visa policy: little progress;

								<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - external borders and Schengen: limited progress; - judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters: no progress; - fight against organised crime: limited progress; - fight against drugs: some progress; - customs cooperation: some progress; - Conclusion (p. 78): <p>“Some, but uneven progress was made in the area of justice, freedom and security. Turkey has achieved limited progress on external borders and Schengen. Limited progress can also be reported in the field of migration and asylum. In the face of a sharp increase in asylum seekers efforts need to continue to reorganise the system. As to the EC-Turkey readmission Agreement, Turkey recently accepted to resume formal negotiations blocked since December 2006. Turkey has shown efforts with a view to conclude a working arrangement with FRONTEX. There has been little progress on visa policy and none on judicial cooperation in criminal and civil matters”.</p>
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Source: Author’s elaboration.

Legend: Democracy and RoL – Democracy and Rule of Law

HR and protect. min. – Human Rights and protection of minorities

Chapter 23: Judiciary and fundamental rights (only since 2005)

Chapter 24: Justice, Freedom and Security (in 1999: “Justice and Home Affairs”; 2000- 2005: “Co-operation in the field of justice and home affairs”)

NSC: National Security Council; CMR: Civil-military relations

Civil and Pol. Rights: Civil and Political Rights

Ec. Soc. Cul. Rights: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

P – Progress; LP – Limited Progress; NP – No Progress; NM – Not mentioned.

APPENDIX 8 – MODEL – DATA

Table 13: Turkey's democratic performance – absolute values

Attribute	Indicator	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Political Rights	Freedom of Assembly and Association	1	0	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0
	Electoral Self-Determination	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	1
	Women's Political Rights	2	2	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	2	2
	Freedom of Association	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
	Freedom of Assembly	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
	Disclosure rules for contributions to political parties	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
	Congruence between left and right	94.84	94.84	93.60	56.87	56.87	56.87	56.87	56.27	56.27		
	Political Rights	4		4	4	3	3	3	3	3	3	3
Social Rights	Worker's Rights	1	2	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
	Women's Social Rights	1	1	1	1	1	1			1		
	Trade Union Density	12.4	10.6	9.9	10	9.5	8.9	8.3	7.8	7.2		
	Public Expenditure on Health			5.6	5.9	5.3	5.4	5.4	5.8	6.0	6.1	
	Education Index		0.51					0.56	0.57	0.59	0.59	0.6
	HDI		0.65					0.68	0.69	0.70	0.7	0.71
	Hospital Beds		200.2	205.8	207.06	208.4	216.3	220.3	234.8	242.8	242.3	249.4
	Public Expenditure on Education	0.47	0.48	0.54	0.53	0.48	0.52	0.59	0.58	0.72	0.73	0.85
	Infant Mortality Rate		31.5	28.4	25.6	23.1	20.9	18.9	17.5	16.7	16.0	15.3
	Early School Leavers		58.1	58.1	55.1	52.9	52.2	50	49.1	47.2	45.7	44.6
Quality of the educational system								3.88	3.51	3.37	3.36	
Economic Rights	Women's Economic Rights	2	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	1	1
	Employment rate			47.8	46.7	45.5	46.1	44.4	44.6	44.6	44.9	44.3
	Unemployment rate			8.6	10.6	10.8	10.6	10.9	10.5	10.5	11.2	14.3
	Female employment rate			26.3	26.6	25.2	22.3	22.3	22.7	22.8	23.5	24.2
	Macroeconomic Environment								4.29	4.66	4.79	4.66
	Global Competitiveness Index								4.14	4.25	4.15	4.16

	GDP/capita evolution	-4.7	5.3	-7	4.8	3.9	8	7.1	5.6	3.4	-0.6	-6.1
	Expenditure on R&D	0.47	0.48	0.54	0.53	0.48	0.52	0.59	0.58	0.72	0.73	0.85
	Foreign Direct Investment				0.3	0.4	0.5	1.2	2	1.9	1.5	0.8
Civil Rights	Politically motivated disappearances	1	2	1	1	2	2	2	2	2	2	2
	Political Imprisonment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Torture	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Freedom of Foreign Movement	0	0	0	0	1	2	1	2	2	2	2
	Freedom of Religion	1	1	0	1	1	0	0	1	0	0	0
	Freedom of Speech [CIRI]	1	0	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1
	Freedom of Speech [Democracy Barometer]	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
	Freedom of the press	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	
	Number of newspapers	0.69	0.71	0.70	0.84	1.10	0.92	0.98	1.17	1.29		
	Neutral newspapers' circulation	42.26	42.11	42.11	42.11	41.37	40.62	39.88	39.88	40.82		
	Restriction of Freedom of Information	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2		
	Effectiveness of Freedom of Information	0	0	0	0	0	2	2	2	2		
	Legal Environment of Press Freedom	7	8	8	4	7	12	14	13	11		
	Political Environment of press freedom	16.67	23.33	23.33	17	17	17	19	20	21		
	Membership in Humanitarian Organisations	4.2	4.2	3.4	2.6	1.8	1.0	0.2	0.2	0.2		
	Civil Liberties	5		5	5	4	4	3	3	3	3	3
	Press Freedom Score				58	55	52	48	48	49	51	50
Political Terror Scale [Amnesty International]	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	4	4	3	3	
Political Terror Scale [US State Department]	4	3	4	4	3	3	4	3	4	4	4	
Rule of Law	Extrajudicial killings	0	0	1	1	1	1	0	1	1	0	0
	Independence of the judiciary [CIRI]	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	0	0	0

	Constitutional Provisions for fair organisation of court system	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
	Constitutional Provisions guaranteeing public trial	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
	Independence of the judiciary [DB]	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
	Confidence in the legal system	69.83	71.37	70.08	68.79	67.50	66.21	64.92	64.97	65.02		
	Confidence in the police	70.44	72.4	71.88	71.37	70.85	70.33	69.81	69.37	68.92		
	Corruption within the political system	2	2.58	2.83	2	2.33	2.5	2.5	2.5	2.5		
	Transparency of government policy	4.39	6.03	3.71	3.38	3.73	4.43	5	4.24	4.17		
	Judicial independence		5.3	3.3	4.5	4.5	4.3	5.3	5.7	5	4.5	4
	Impartial courts		6.5	2.8	3.5	3.8	3.9	4.7	4.5	3.8	4	4.2
	Integrity of the legal system		6.7	6.7	6.7	8.3	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5	7.5
	Corruption Perception Index					3.1	3.2	3.5	3.8	4.1	4.6	4.4
	Rule of Law		-0.06		-0.06	0.13	0.13	0.16	0.01	-0.01	0.06	0.09
	Control of corruption		-0.33		-0.71	-0.23	-0.17	-0.02	0	0.09	0.08	0.09
	Reliability of police services								4.24	4.55	3.96	3.63
Horizontal Accountability	Checks and balances	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75		
	Balance between the government and the opposition	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.96	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65	0.65		
	Political interference by the military	1	2	3	2.92	2.92	4	4	3	2		
	Political interference by religion	3.92	4	4	4	4.42	5	5	5	4.5		
	Military interference		5	5	5	6.7	6.7	6.7	5	3.3	3.3	3.3
	Regulatory Quality		0.36		0.09	0.03	0.07	0.27	0.29	0.32	0.27	0.32
Vertical Accountability	Registered voters as % voting	92.29	92.29	92.29	95.95	95.95	95.95	95.95	95.95	87.92		
	Facilitation of electoral participation	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1		
	Participation rate of registered	87.09	87.09	87.09	76.94	76.94	76.94	76.94	76.94	75.86		
	Participation in petitions	13.79	13.84	13.80	13.76	13.73	13.69	13.65	12.42	11.19		
	Participation in demonstrations	6.16	6.27	6.38	6.49	6.61	6.72	6.83	6.39	5.95		

	Proportion of female representatives in Parliament	4.2	4.2	4.2	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	4.4	9.1		
	Voice and Accountability		-0.44		-0.34	-0.12	-0.03	-0.04	-0.16	-0.14	-0.13	-0.14
Responsiveness	Confidence in the government	51.31	51.83	54.52	57.22	59.92	62.62	65.31	63.09	60.87		
	Governmental stability	68.72	68.72	68.72	93.85	93.85	93.85	93.85	93.85			
	Effective implementation of government decisions	3.84	5.56	4.18	4.16	4.55	5.14	5.78	4.98	5.22		
	Government Effectiveness		0.02		0.04	0.04	0.04	0.16	0.16	0.29	0.26	0.34
	Political stability		-0.84		-0.88	-0.82	-0.85	-0.6	-0.6	-0.82	-0.84	-1.06
	Trust in the government						72	76	67	71	47	57
	Trust in the national Parliament						72	73	64	74	47	58
	Trust in political parties						24	28	19	23	18	26
	Public trust in politicians								2.62	2.79	2.38	2.18

Source: Author's elaboration based on sources indicated on Table 9

Table 14: Turkey's democratic performance – converted values

Attribute	Indicator	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
Political Rights	Freedom of Assembly and Association	50	0	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0	0
	Electoral Self-Determination	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0	50
	Women's Political Rights	66.67	66.67	66.67	66.67	33.33	33.33	33.33	33.33	66.67	66.67	66.67
	Freedom of Association	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50		
	Freedom of Assembly	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50		
	Disclosure rules for contributions to political parties	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100		
	Congruence between left and right	94.84	94.84	93.60	56.87	56.87	56.87	56.87	56.27	56.27		
	Political Rights	50.01		50.01	50.01	66.68	66.68	66.68	66.68	66.68	66.68	66.68
Social Rights	Worker's Rights	50	100	50	0	0	0	0	0	50	0	50
	Women's Social Rights	33.33	33.33	33.33	33.33	33.33	33.33			33.33		
	Trade Union Density	12.4	10.6	9.9	10	9.5	8.9	8.3	7.8	7.2		
	Public Expenditure on Health			53.85	55.66	48.62	49.1	48.65	52.78	54.55	54.96	
	Education Index		51					56	57	59	59	60
	HDI		65					68	69	70	70	71
	Hospital Beds		21.96	22.84	23.34	23.83	25.22	26.02	28.3	29.47	29.5	30.27
	Public Expenditure on Education	14.83	14.33	16.27	15.77	13.95	15.07	16.95	16.67	20.75	19.73	21.57
	Infant Mortality Rate	64.8	68.5	71.6	74.4	76.9	79.1	81.1	82.5	83.3	84	84.7
	Early School Leavers		46.04	44.77	47.31	49.37	49.95	52.58	53.64	55.29	57.22	58.26
	Quality of the educational system								48.01	41.84	39.51	39.34
Economic Rights	Women's Economic Rights	66.67	33.33	66.67	66.67	66.67	66.67	33.33	33.33	66.67	33.33	33.33
	Employment rate			62.98	61.13	60.59	60.66	58.5	57.62	60.27	57.64	58.6
	Unemployment rate			93.08	91.79	92.63	93.61	93.3	03.23	92.84	91.55	88.99
	Female employment rate			35.78	36.24	34.62	30.97	31.02	30.93	31.15	31.71	33.29
	Macroeconomic Environment								54.84	61.01	63.18	61.01
	Global Competitiveness Index								52.34	54.18	52.51	52.68
	GDP/capita evolution	-47.47	51.46	-92.12	60	34.82	90.91	73.20	54.37	30.63	-8	-381.25
	Expenditure on R&D	14.83	14.33	16.27	15.77	13.95	15.07	16.95	16.67	20.75	19.73	21.57
	Foreign Direct Investment				1.97	2.78	4.67	8.51	13.99	10.05	14.71	6.84

Civil Rights	Politically motivated disappearances	50	100	50	50	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	Political Imprisonment	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Torture	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
	Freedom of Foreign Movement	0	0	0	0	50	100	50	100	100	100	100
	Freedom of Religion	50	50	0	50	50	0	0	50	0	0	0
	Freedom of Speech [CIRI]	50	0	50	50	0	0	0	0	0	0	50
	Freedom of Speech [Democracy Barometer]	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50		
	Freedom of the press	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50		
	Number of newspapers	5.95	6.2	4.42	6.25	8.28	5.19	4.82	5.84	6.23		
	Neutral newspapers' circulation	42.26	42.11	42.11	42.11	41.37	40.62	39.88	39.88	40.82		
	Restriction of Freedom of Information	0	0	0	0	0	66.67	66.67	66.67	66.67		
	Effectiveness of Freedom of Information	0	0	0	0	0	50	50	50	50		
	Legal Environment of Press Freedom	23.31	26.64	26.64	13.32	23.31	39.96	46.62	43.29	36.33		
	Political Environment of press freedom	55.51	77.69	77.69	56.61	56.61	56.61	63.27	66.6	69.93		
	Membership in Humanitarian Organisations	21.57	18.91	15.31	11.71	8.1	4.5	0.9	0.6	0.6		
	Civil Liberties	33.34		33.34	33.34	50.01	50.01	66.68	66.68	66.68	66.68	66.68
	Press Freedom Score				58	55	52	48	48	49	51	50
	Political Terror Scale [Amnesty International]	25	25	25	50	50	50	50	25	25	50	50
Political Terror Scale [US State Department]	25	50	25	25	50	50	25	50	25	25	25	
Rule of Law	Extrajudicial killings	0	0	50	50	50	50	0	50	50	0	0
	Independence of the judiciary [CIRI]	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	0	0	0
	Constitutional Provisions for fair organisation of court system	66.66	66.66	66.66	66.66	66.66	66.66	66.66	66.66	66.66		

	Constitutional Provisions guaranteeing public trial	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50	50		
	Independence of the judiciary [DB]	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
	Confidence in the legal system	69.83	71.37	70.08	68.79	67.5	66.21	64.92	64.97	65.02		
	Confidence in the police	70.44	72.4	71.88	71.37	70.85	70.33	69.81	69.37	68.92		
	Corruption within the political system	33.34	43.01	47.18	33.34	38.84	41.68	41.68	41.68	41.68		
	Transparency of government policy	43.9	60.3	37.1	33.8	37.3	44.3	50	42.4	41.7		
	Judicial independence		71.68	38.34	58.35	58.35	55.01	71.68	78.35	66.68	58.35	50.01
	Impartial courts		91.69	30	41.68	46.68	48.34	61.68	58.35	46.68	50.01	53.34
	Integrity of the legal system		67	67	67	83	75	75	75	75	75	75
	Corruption Perception Index					69	68	65	62	59	54	56
	Rule of Law		48.8		48.8	52.6	52.6	53.2	50.2	49.8	48.8	51.8
	Control of corruption		43.4		35.8	45.4	46.6	49.6	50	51.8	51.6	51.8
Reliability of police services								54.01	59.18	49.34	43.84	
Horizontal Accountability	Checks and balances	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75	75		
	Balance between the government and the opposition	96	96	96	96	65	65	65	65	65		
	Political interference by the military	16.67	33.34	50.01	48.68	48.68	66.68	66.68	50.01	33.34		
	Political interference by religion	65.35	66.68	66.68	66.68	73.68	83.35	83.35	83.35	75.02		
	Military interference		50	50	50	67	67	67	50	33	33	33
	Regulatory Quality		57.2		51.8	50.6	51.4	55.4	55.8	56.4	55.4	56.4
Vertical Accountability	Registered voters as % voting	92.29	92.29	92.29	95.95	95.95	95.95	95.95	95.95	87.92		
	Facilitation of electoral participation	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20	20		
	Participation rate of registered	87.09	87.09	87.09	76.94	76.94	76.94	76.94	76.94	75.86		
	Participation in petitions	13.79	13.84	13.8	13.76	13.73	13.69	13.65	12.42	11.19		
	Participation in demonstrations	19.20	19.22	23.07	25.05	26.92	28.93	31.19	28.84	26.54		
	Proportion of female representatives in Parliament	9.84	9.84	9.84	9.71	9.71	9.71	9.71	9.3	19.24		
	Voice and Accountability		41.2		43.2	47.6	49.4	49.2	46.8	47.2	47.4	47.2

Responsiveness	Confidence in the government	51.31	51.83	54.52	57.22	59.92	62.62	65.31	63.09	60.87		
	Governmental stability	68.72	68.72	68.72	93.85	93.85	93.85	93.85	93.85			
	Effective implementation of government decisions	38.4	55.6	41.8	41.6	45.5	51.4	57.8	49.8	52.2		
	Government Effectiveness		50.4		50.8	50.8	50.8	53.2	53.2	55.8	55.2	56.4
	Political stability		33.2		32.4	33.6	33	38	38	33.6	33.2	28.2
	Trust in the government						72	76	67	71	47	57
	Trust in the national Parliament						72	73	64	74	47	58
	Trust in political parties						24	28	19	23	18	26
	Public trust in politicians								27.01	29.84	23.01	19.67

Source: Author's elaboration based on Table 13

Table 15: Other variables

Domain	Indicator	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009
European Union	Pre-accession Aid/IPA ¹²⁸		209	219	126	144	236	276	500	497.2	538.7	566.4
European Union	Assistance allocated to political criteria ¹²⁹				2.04	9.5	21.02	48.24	9.79	25.65	52.14	30.92
OECD	ODA: Grants ¹³⁰	342.5	421.8	310.4	524.7	1302.9	408.9	393.0	645.3	657.8	686.6	716.0
OECD	ODA: Technical cooperation ³	110.2	80.9	90.2	91.0	124.4	144.0	111.9	230.3	146.0	235.6	135.1
Domestic	Constitutional amendments ¹³¹	3	0	29	2	0	10	7	1	6	0	0

¹²⁸ Source: European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement (in Million €).

¹²⁹ Source: 2002-2006: Baracani, 2009: 64; 2007-2009: European Commission, Directorate General for Enlargement, National Programme for Turkey, IPA Component I, Priority Axis 1: Political Criteria (in Million €).

¹³⁰ Source: OECD.StatExtracts. ODA: Official Development Assistance. The values were originally presented in million USD, but in the ones included in the table have been converted to EUR, according to the exchange rate on the 1st of January of each of the respective years (in million €).

¹³¹ Based on Kalaycioglu, 2011: 269, 270.

Domestic	Adopted Laws (harmonisation packages) ¹³²	0	0	0	73	107	70					
Domestic	Adopted Laws (excl. harmon. pack.) ¹³³			117	45	143	261	166	148		116	
European Commission	Progress Report ¹³⁴	51.35	22.39	33.33	54.34	57.41	66.51	48.45	46.32	46.38	51.33	42.76
Domestic	Public support for accession ¹³⁵						62	74	68		61	44
European Union	Public support for enlargement ¹³⁶	29.5	30	34	31			33	26		31	
Turkey-EU	Youth in Action ¹³⁷						2979	5186	8139	8478	9360	10031

Source: Several sources (indicated below)

¹³² Number of adopted laws in the scope of harmonisation packages. Based on Özbudun & Gençkaya, 2009: 128-133.

¹³³ Number of Laws adopted by the Parliament; these values do not include the laws adopted through the harmonisation packages. Source: Progress Reports, Section on “Democracy and the Rule of Law”.

¹³⁴ Proportion of “progress” or “some progress” in the Annual Progress Reports in relation to “limited progress” or “no progress”. The counting was made by the author.


¹³⁵ Source: Standard and Candidate Countries Eurobarometers. Percentage of Turkish citizens who are in favour of Turkey’s accession. When the Eurobarometer presents two results for one same year (the Spring and the Autumn Reports, usually), the average of the two values was calculated to represent the year in consideration.

¹³⁶ Source: Eurobarometer. Percentage of European Union citizens who are in favour of Turkey’s accession. When the Eurobarometer presents two results for one same year (the Spring and the Autumn Reports, usually), the average of the two values was calculated to represent the year in consideration.

¹³⁷ Number of beneficiaries of the Community Programme “Youth in Action”, “set up for young people. [with the aim] to inspire a sense of active European citizenship, solidarity and tolerance among young Europeans and to involve them in shaping the Union's future” (Delegation of the European Union to Turkey, 2010: 2)


APPENDIX 9 – MODEL – RESULTS

Figure 17: Political Rights indicators – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 18: Political Rights aggregated – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 19: Social Rights indicators – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 20: Social Rights aggregated – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 21: Economic Rights indicators – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 22: Economic Rights aggregated – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 23: Civil Rights indicators – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 24: Civil Rights aggregated – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 25: Rule of Law indicators – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 26: Rule of Law aggregated – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 27: Horizontal Accountability indicators – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 28: Horizontal Accountability aggregated – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 29: Vertical Accountability indicators – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 30: Vertical Accountability aggregated – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 31: Responsiveness indicators – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 32: Responsiveness aggregated – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 33: Attributes aggregated – annual evolution




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 36: Dimensions data aggregated – annual growth rate



Source: Author's elaboration


Figure 37: Democracy data aggregated – annual growth rate



Source: Author's elaboration


APPENDIX 10 – OTHER VARIABLES

Figure 40: Official Development Assistance to Turkey by type per year




Source: Author's elaboration based on OECD's values

Figure 41: Legislative change in Turkey




Source: Author's elaboration

Figure 42: Public support for Turkey’s accession



Source: Author’s elaboration based on Eurobarometer

Figure 43: Number of beneficiaries of the Community Programme “Youth in Action”



Source: Author’s elaboration

APPENDIX 11 – ÇARKOĞLU & TOPRAK'S (2007) SURVEY




Figure 44: Turks' religiosity according to their self-evaluation

Source: Abridged from Çarkoğlu & Toprak, 2007: 41

0 (Not religious at all) – 10 (Extremely religious).

APPENDIX 12 – ONLINE SURVEY’S RESULTS

Table 16: Online Survey – Questions 1 and 2

Q1+2: How would you classify Turkey’s democratic performance? [1- Extremely poor; 10 - Excellent]			
	1999	2009	Progress
Average	4,40	5,93	+ 1,53
Mode	5	6	
% of [1-5]	70%	40%	-30%
% of [6-10]	30%	60%	+30%
\bar{x} Turkish citizens	4,41	6	+1,59
\bar{x} EU citizens	4,25	5,75	+1,50

Source: Online Survey

Table 17: Online Survey – Questions 3 and 4

Q3+4: How important do you think democracy used to be for Turks? [1- Not important at all; 10 – Extremely important]			
	1999	2009	Progress
Average	6,60	7,17	+0,57
Mode	7	9	
% of [1-5]	33,33%	20%	-13,33%
% of [6-10]	66,66%	80%	+13,34%
\bar{x} Turkish citizens	6,88	7,24	+0,36
\bar{x} EU citizens	6,00	6,92	+0,92

Source: Online Survey

Table 18: Online Survey – Question 5

Q5: How do you perceive the link between the improvement of Turkish democracy and the country’s accession to the EU? [1-Nothing dependent; 10 - completely dep.]	
Average	6,83
Mode	8
% of [1-5]	20%
% of [6-10]	80%
\bar{x} Turkish citizens	6,41
\bar{x} EU citizens	7,92

Source: Online Survey

Table 19: Online Survey – Questions 6 and 7

Q6+7: How would you classify EU's presence in Turkey and its impact on Turkish democratization? [1-extremely low/absent;10-extremely high/present]			
	1999	2009	Progress
Average	5,00	5,73	+0,73
Mode	3	6	
% of [1-5]	63,33%	40%	-23,33%
% of [6-10]	36,67%	60%	+23,33%
\bar{x} Turkish citizens	4,53	5,88	+1,35
\bar{x} EU citizens	5,83	5,50	-0,33

Source: Online Survey

Table 20: Online Survey – Questions 8 and 9

Q8+9: How would you assess EU's strategies to improve Turkey's democracy? [1-completely ineffective;10-completely effective]			
	1999	2009	Progress
Average	4,87	5,63	+0,76
Mode	3	7	+4
% of [1-5]	60%	80%	+20%
% of [6-10]	40%	20%	-20%
\bar{x} Turkish citizens	4,71	5,71	+1
\bar{x} EU citizens	5,25	5,50	+0,25

Source: Online survey

Table 21: Online Survey – Question 10

Q10: How do you assess each of the following factors in relation to Turkey's accession to the EU between 1999 and 2009? [1 - Not an obstacle at all; 10 - A considerable obstacle]					
	Average	\bar{x} Turkish citizens	\bar{x} EU citizens	Turkish Ranking	EU Ranking
Turkish economy	4,70	4,41	4,92	12	9
Human Rights (include minorities)	7,60	6,76	8,75	6	1
Rule of Law	7,07	7,24	6,83	4	6
Civil-military relations	6,67	6,53	7,00	7	4
Cultural aspects/Identity issues	7,20	7,12	7,25	5	3
EU's absorption capacity	7,10	7,35	6,92	3	5
Lack of political will among Turkish elites	5,17	4,94	5,50	11	8
Lack of political will among European elites	8,20	8,00	8,75	2	1
Freedoms and Liberties in Turkey (include media issues)	6,60	6,12	7,42	8	2
European Public Opinion	7,63	8,18	6,92	1	5
Turkish Public Opinion	4,93	5,59	4,08	9	10
General state of Turkish democracy	6,10	5,59	7,00	9	4
Turkish general unpreparedness to join the EU	5,83	5,47	6,50	10	7


Source: Online Survey

Table 22: Online Survey – Question 11

Q11: How do you assess each of the following actors or stakeholders according to their relevance for the Turkish democratization process (1999-2009)? [1-Not important at all; 10-extremely important]					
	Average	\bar{x} Turkish citizens	\bar{x} EU citizens	Turkish Ranking	EU Ranking
Tur. economic actors/elite	7,50	7,65	7,67	1	1
Turkish civil society	7,17	6,88	7,67	3	1
Turkish NGOs	6,67	6,76	6,83	4	3
International NGOs	6,37	6,29	6,75	5	4
AKP	7,10	7,35	6,50	2	5
CHP	4,43	4,06	5,25	10	8
MHP	3,53	3,29	4,08	12	12
BDP	4,77	4,35	5,67	8	7
PKK	3,93	3,59	4,67	11	10
Military	4,70	4,18	5,75	9	6
EU	6,27	5,82	7,08	6	2
OSCE	4,53	4,06	4,92	10	9
USA	4,97	5,12	4,50	7	11
Japan	2,90	3,00	2,33	13	15
Sweden	3,23	3,59	2,75	11	14
Other individual countries	2,97	2,88	2,92	14	13


Source: Online Survey

Figure 45: Obstacles to Turkish accession



Source: Online Survey, Q10

Figure 46: Stakeholders' relevance for Turkish democratisation



Source: Online Survey, Q11