Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters' Degree in Economics from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics.

The Impact of National and International Observers in Democratic Elections:

A Randomized Control Trial from the Mozambican Elections of 2009

Tiago Filipe de L. S. de Almeida

#610

Project carried out on the Economics course, under supervision of professor:

(Pedro Vicente)

3 of June 2013

Abstract

Mozambique's national elections in 2009 were paired with national and international monitoring programs, characterized by a randomized allocation. By assessing the impact of the observers on election outcomes we see evidence of electoral fraud. Moreover, national fixed observers were found to be highly capable of deterring fraud and a relation between observers and voters' behaviour was found. National and international have different effects on outcomes and we attribute this fact to the different impact on voters' and voting table staff's behaviour. [*]

Introduction

Electoral observation, in particular, international monitoring, is becoming the norm throughout the developing world. Development economists have recently started to focus on the impact of monitoring in election outcomes, mainly as a fraud-preventing mechanism. However, there isn't much literature about the effectiveness of national monitoring, and on the channels through which observers can have a direct effect on election-day outcomes. This paper tries to address these two issues using official data on the outcomes of the Mozambican elections of 2004 and 2009. In the latter both international and national observation took place under controlled environments. Both types of monitors were randomized making it possible to perform treatment-control analysis. There were national fixed monitors, sitting in a single voting table for the entire day, and international observers that were mobile, travelling by car and visiting a few number of polling stations during the day.

By assessing the impact of each monitor on the different outcomes we formulate a framework through which we try to explain how electoral observation is affecting fraudulent procedures,

---

so as to answer our proposed questions: Can national monitors be as effective as international monitors? Through which election-day mechanisms do observers change election outcomes?

We distinguish between two types of election-day effects of electoral observation: one affecting voters' behaviour, and the other one affecting ballot table staff's actions. Evidence is found that national and international (or fixed versus mobile) observers differ in their impact on voters and the staff. National monitors have a strong deterrence effect on fraud but little impact on voters. Whereas international voters have a measurable effect on voters but there was not enough evidence of an effect on actual fraud.

Literature Review

The interdependence of the economy and politics has become widely accepted among scholars. Downs (1957) successfully approaches elections using economic theory, revealing the importance of political accountability to maintain politicians' incentives in line with their constituencies. Empirical evidence of accountability importance has also been shown, Besley and Case (1995) compare U.S. governs with term limits with those without, to discover a relationship between political accountability and economic policies. Electoral observation is ultimately a way to improve accountability in the developing world, leaders have a higher incentive not to misbehave in order to please international donors who often condition aid on electoral observation Hyde and O'Mahony (2010), and to maintain voter support. International monitors have been found to influence outcomes even when elections are viewed as fair Hyde (2010), which is welcomed as appositive evidence of monitoring effectiveness. The same author finds again negative correlation between the incumbent and international observers in Armenia's 2004 elections, Hyde (2007). However evidence points that effects will differ across countries, as is seen in a poor monitoring performance in Zimbabwe's 2000

elections Laakso (2002). Disagreement is present on some key issues as Beaulieu and Hyde (2008) show a positive relation between observation and electoral boycott, while Kelley (2011) presents an alternative view where specific characteristics are required for boycotts to appear.

Mozambique is a South African nation that has been the stage for vicious political and military struggles during the last decades. Conflicts started in 1964 with the war for independence from Portugal that lasted until 1975. When sovereignty was proclaimed, Frelimo[2], backed by popular and military support, seized control of the nation. Soon after, a rival right-wing movement, Renamo[3] started to challenge Frelimo whose actions eventually led to a civil war in 1977. The two sides fought each other until a truce was signed in 1992 followed by the first democratic elections in 1994.

Politics in Mozambique are as a consequence marked by fierce competition and aggressiveness; it has been difficult for the two main factions to live together under a democratic regime after fighting each other for 14 years. As such, political struggle has been marked by constant complaints of corruption and fraud. Contesters, including electoral observers and the opposition, often accuse Frelimo of rigging elections and of misconduct in political affairs. Hanlon and Fox (2006) show strong evidence of fraud in the 2004 elections favouring the incumbent. I shall use the assumption that fraud is in favour of Frelimo throughout the paper. During the 1994 and 1999 elections Frelimo was headed by Joaquim Chissano, in 2004 and 2009 the current president Armando Guebuza replaced him. The party managed to win all of the four elections.

Table1 presents the results of the four presidential elections. We see a clear increasing trend favouring Frelimo and a decreasing trend for Renamo , which has been headed by Afonso Dhlakama since the first elections. The lack of disassociation between the party leader and the party is also

---

[2] *"Frente the Libertação de Moçambique"* or Mozambican Liberation Front, is a left-wing party and was one of the main armed movements during the war for independence. It has been the country's main political faction since the first democratic elections in 1994.
[3] *"Resistência Nacional Moçambicana"* or National Mozambican Resistance. Sponsored by South Africa and Rhodesia Renamo is characterized by a right-wing anti-communist ideology. After the truce in 1994 it was formed as a political party and is now the second biggest political faction in the country.

incredibly present in Mozambican politics. Voters act as if the presidential and parliamentary election were the same; in fact the correlation between votes for presidential and parliamentary voters for Renamo/Dhlakama and Frelimo/Guebuza was 0,94 and 0,91 respectively in the 2009 elections.

Table 1

Shares of votes in the Presidential election		
Year	Chissano/Guebuza	Dhlakama
1994	53%	35%
1999	51%	47%
2004	65%	32%
2009	75%	16%

Notes: Vote shares for the last four elections, where Chissano was the candidate for Frelimo in 1994 and 1999 and Guebuza was in 2004 and 2009. Dhlakama has always been the candidate for Renamo

Experimental Design

Mozambique's electoral system has been more or less the same throughout the different elections. Voters have to register so as to receive an electoral card granting them access to the polling stations. These registrations are kept in a register book that holds up to 1000 voters. Inside each polling station there will be a ballot table corresponding to a particular register. The voting stations are schools whenever possible but poor conditions may sometimes lead to the use of other locations.

Data on presidential and parliamentary official election results of 2009 and 2004 were provided by STAE, with entries per ballot table and information on turnout, blanks, nulls and the vote share of each candidate and party.

International and national observers were present in the 2009 election and allocated randomly across the country. This randomization is crucial to this study and allows us to isolate the direct impact of the observer arriving at a given polling station on election outcomes. We shall follow the

customary treatment-control terminology, whereby treatment areas are the ones visited by a monitor. Monitors were asked not to influence local events and to fill a form with their observations. Two types of monitors will be taken into account:

National fixed – Constituted by observers of the national observatory, "*Observatório Eleitoral*", hereafter denoted as OE-PVT. Their job was to sit in a particular table inside the ballot station and to stay there during the entire day. They received formation prior to the election day and were randomized per ballot table across the country by a national NGO called EISA.

International Mobile – International volunteers gathered from UNDP, who had a list of ordered locations to visit, randomly assigned by the NOVAFRICA research centre. After completing all tables in a given ballot station they should go the next location in the list. However, due to a restriction made by UNDP only certain districts could be covered. Randomization was done within districts, but even though they were spread from north to south, the nature of the UNDP restriction was biased towards more urban districts. We must take this into account when making comparisons between the different types of observers and proceed with care. The UNDP teams travelled by car and usually stayed around 15 minutes at each location, but were told to stay longer if necessary.

There will be two different types of impacts due to the presence of observers: a direct and an indirect effect. To properly understand how the direct impact will affect fraudulent actions it is important to think about the incentives to the agents involved, and how they interpret the arrival of the observer. Agents can be divided in two groups: the ballot station staff and the voters. If a team of observers arrives at one ballot station they give a signal to both agents that not only elections are being monitored but so is that station in particular. The impact of such a signal will surely depend on the current state of fraud and corruption in that locality.

If no fraud is taking place, the signal will have little to no impact, voters should vote as they always had, and the staff will perform their actions as before since they have no reason to fear the

observers. However, if fraud was to take place, or was thought to happen, two alternatives arise: either (1) the signal causes agents to change their behaviour, for example, the staff might try to decrease fraudulent actions or try to change them into less perceived ones, and voters could change their voting patterns due to a higher confidence in the election system, or (2) the signal has no effect on the agents.

I argue that if significant differences in results are found between observed, and non-observed, locations, we can infer that monitors altered the behaviour of agents.

The Data

Not all locations that have been assigned to be monitored beforehand have been visited in the end. Besides data on the randomization we also had access to the forms filled by each monitor. This can be used to distinguish the stations with intention to treat, allocated during randomization, hereafter denoted *apriori*, from the places that actually were treated and have a filled form, hereafter called *aposteriori*. It is important to point that it isn't a one to one comparison. During data cleansing there was a high number of cases with filling errors in the forms, from writing a completely different province to simple spelling errors. The forms were also very difficult to get, some were lost in transaction and not all of them were delivered, therefore when using *aposteriori* data we must be aware that we are using a sample with possible error, and smaller than the real one.

Table 2a shows the share of ballots allocated to the observers which had an associated filling form. Having similar results for *aposteriori* data can nevertheless provide a feeling of security. Differing results can be purely a result of the lack of forms and the biases associated with wrong filling. The following regressions were executed to check the balance of the randomized variables:

Table 1b		
Difference between *Apriori* and *Aposteriori*		
	Per table	Per Station
UNDP	0,274	0,508
PVT	0,421	0,494

Notes: Percentage of matched tables between intention to treat and treated ballot tables. The first column represents ballot tables with exact correspondence and second represents voting stations where at least one table was matched

$$(1)\ y_{2004,i} = \alpha_i + \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$(2)\ y_{2004,i} = \alpha_i + \beta x_i + \gamma Controls_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where $y_{2004,i}$ is the dependent variable, x_i is a dummy for whether or not the area was observed. Variables and notations are the same as specified later when we introduce our estimation strategy. If randomization was well implemented, then no relation between x_i and $y_{2004,i}$ should be found. In fact, when controlling for provinces effects, we see basically no effect. Table 2b provides the coefficients of these regressions.

The international observers were deployed by UNDP, and we can expect them to have performed their monitoring obligations. We should lack forms more due to incomplete access to the forms filled by the monitors rather than as a result of failure to observe the ballot station. Moreover, we see they visited around half the schools they were supposed to visit.

OE-PVT have a similar outline, as we see in table 1a around half of the ballot stations assigned have a corresponding filled form, if we take into consideration that some forms were lost and filled incorrectly it is reasonable to assume randomization was respected by the monitors.

Estimation Strategy

Having access to the ballot tables monitored allows us to perform standard treatment-control analysis, where treatment areas are the ones visited by a monitor.

As I argued previously significant differences in results indicate that agents as a whole altered their behaviour upon the arrival of an observer. The question remains as whether that change was due to a decrease in electoral fraud. To properly answer this question we must be able to isolate the effect on the outcomes through voters and through the ballot table staff.

Suppose a monitor arrives at a given location in which fraud was going to take place. The ballot station staff has now to make a decision, either they maintain their behaviour or they decrease the amount of fraud they were about to commit. If the second happens we can expect the incumbent to have a lower vote share than before. Moreover, according to a study on Mozambican national elections of 2004 (Hanlon and Fox 2006), some of the most common electoral day fraud techniques are Ballot-box stuffing[4] and the invalidation of opposition votes[5] . Another common fraud, which we can also test for is the manipulation of blank votes by changing them to your preference. These are good candidates to test for change in corruption. It is also likely that if fraud decreases, ballot box stuffing should decrease as well leading to a lower amount of votes, and lower turnout for that table. Invalidating opposition votes should also decrease leading to higher number of null votes. Finally writing on blank votes could also decrease leading to a higher number of blank votes. Overall if observers decrease corruption we should see a negative effect on the incumbent share and a positive impact on turnout, nulls and blanks.

The problem however is that observers may also affect voters, which by nature have different incentives than the ballot station staff. Voters will most likely interpret the presence of observers

---

[4] The insertion of phantom votes in the ballot box.
[5] The changing of votes in favour of the opposition in order for the votes to be considered invalid.

as a signal of trust and fairness of that election. It is quite hard to tell what would be the impact on different outcomes but if confidence in the election has increased it is plausible to expect an increase in turnout as well. We can only speculate what will be the effect on other outcomes, which could vary in different ways. In any case if voters' behavioural change affect the same outcomes as the station staff's behaviour, fraud-deterrence will be harder to find. This "blur" caused by voters behavioural change could, in theory, prevent us from observing an effect.

However, if the effect on fraudulent activities is strong enough, we should still find significant and coherent results. I argue that if there is an effect through voters, it will likely be in an opposite direction to the staff effect on turnout and of unpredictable fashion for the other variables, increasing the error term and making it harder to find statistical significance. Hill and Young (2007) discuss that compulsory voting increases informal votes. However, if self-selection exists in the sample, voters contributing to the increase in turnout are on average more informed or more educated. Then we could see a decrease in blanks and in nulls. In any case any hypothesis would remain highly speculative.

In order to test for differences across treatment and control four different specifications were used:

$$(1) \quad y_{2009,i} = \alpha + \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$(2) \quad y_{2009,i} = \alpha_i + \beta x_i + \gamma Control_i + \varepsilon_i$$

$$(3) \quad y_{2009,i} = \alpha_i + \beta x_i + \gamma Control_i + \omega y_{2004,i} + \varepsilon_i$$

$$(3) \quad y_{2009,i} - y_{2004,i} = \alpha_i + \beta x_i + \varepsilon_i$$

Where $y_{2009,i}$ is the outcome variable (turnout, percentage of nulls, percentage of blanks and election outcomes). The independent variable, x_i, is a vector dummy representing whether it is a treatment area (observed) or not by a given vector of observers. $Control_i$ is a vector of geographic dummy controls, being the province to which the ballot station belongs, and a variable of total registered voters in that locality. It is reasonable to expect party support to vary according to

these variables and including them should allow us to isolate better the effect of monitoring. The $y_{2004,i}$ is the value from the last election of the regressed outcome.

The first specification (1) is a simple OLS, the second one (2) allows to control for differences across provinces and more densely populated areas. Using these controls increases the chances of finding significance and to eliminate possible biases. The third specification (3) adds the lag of the regressed outcome. This variable allows us to control for the previous tendency of that locality, a location with a lower share for the incumbent could in theory behave differently than one with a higher share, etc. The fourth specification (4) is a basic differences-in-differences to control for fixed effects at each ballot location level. All regressions are done with clusters at the polling station level (since data is on polling table level). Each regression will be made for two specifications of the dependent variable, the first will be *per table* and it will have the values 1 for each observed table and 0 otherwise, and will give the impact of monitoring a single table, the second will be *per ballot* and will have the values 1 if at least one table was observed in that ballot station and 0 otherwise, this will allow us to see if there are spill overs from monitoring one table to the other tables of that polling station even if they were not observed directly.

As I stated before, if significant differences in results are found between observed, and non-observed locations, we can infer that observers affected agents' behaviour. But since we had different effects on voters and staff it would be hard to tell them apart. However we have different types of observers, which by their nature could have different effects on the agents.

International voters are much more likely to be noticed by voters. Since they arrive by car as outsiders, the chance that the population becomes aware of the fact that they came to the town is quite high. OE-PVT observers however, are seated in one or more tables and are Mozambicans, it would be hard for the population to differentiate them from other election officials present at the election day. I expect then that, if an effect on voters exists, it will be much higher for the UNDP

type monitors than for OE-PVT. The effect on the staff is harder to differentiate between the two different types of observers. The UNDP observers spent a small amount of time in the polling station, whereas the OE-PVT spent the whole day, but being an international observer could impose a higher threat than a national one. In any case, if national observers were not influenced or bribed by the incumbent then both should have a negative effect on corruption.

Results

Table 3a presents the impact of OE-PVT monitoring on the candidates/parties for the presidential and parliamentary elections. The results suggest that national monitors had decreased fraud since the vote shares decreased for the incumbent and increased for the opposition on a coherent basis.

The basic OLS gives hints on a negative correlation between monitored tables and incumbent's share but correcting for geographic fixed effects makes this effect non-significant. However if we include the lag variable or use a difference-in-differences specification we find a negative and significative effect on the incumbent share. Areas that systematically have higher or lower shares may have characteristics that would affect the effectiveness of monitoring differently, when we correct for these effects with specifications (3) and (4) we see that monitoring has strong and significative negative impacts on the incumbents vote share. It seems that monitoring decreases the vote share for Guebuza/Frelimo by 1-2%. Results for the opposition are not as strong. This could be a result of lower power (higher volatility of the opposition vote share) or evidence that corruption was not as harmful for the opposition as it was beneficial for the incumbent. In any case there is a positive correlation but it does not remain significative when we include controls.

Table 3a and 3b supports the claim of negative effect on fraud. Just as expected we see significant impacts in the other outcomes with a signal coherent with the theory. The monitoring

effect on turnout is significant at the 1% level for nearly all specifications and has a negative impact of about 2-4%. This is evidence for a decrease in ballot stuffing and shows that the OE-PVT effect on the staff is not diluted by a possible change in voters' behaviour. In addition we see that significance levels and coefficient values are similar, though a bit smaller, when using the dependent variable as per station instead of per table. A strong suggestion is that fixed monitors have coherent spillover effects to the other tables of same polling station.

The impact of observers on nulls is much less evident. Despite a negative correlation after controlling with the lag or for ballot table specific fixed effects, with the diff-in-diff significance disappears. Looking at table 3g we see that the differences between treatment and control (based on *apriori* or intention to treat) are very mild with respect to nulls. The lack of significance could be interpreted as not enough power in the data to untangle the effect. In any case, the results are inconclusive with respect to the nulls. Considering blank votes, we see something surprising. If we look only at the regressions with the dependent variable specified per table, we find a significant and strong effect for all types of regressions. However, using the dependent on a per station basis we get the opposite effects with apriori and aposteriori data. This could be the result of a complex mixture of different effects, which will be left unanswered during the present study.

Results so far suggest that national fixed observers decrease Election Day fraud. This finding is of particular importance since the literature is still vague on the effect of national monitoring of elections. National observers were able to remain unbiased and capable to withstand pressure from the national government contributing to a more fair and just election in 2009. When reviewing the effects of UNDP-observation we will include the tables with intention to treat for OE-PVT, this will allow us to compare coefficients which otherwise wouldn't be possible since the UNDP sample is restricted to UNDP approved districts.

Before any interpretation of the regressions using UNDP data, we should pay close attention to table 4a. The districts in which randomization took place are very much different from the rest of the country. Not only were they more urban than the rest but they also favour the incumbent in shares, have a higher turnout, nearly half the amount of nulls and less than half the amount of blanks.

Table 4a

	Presidential Election				
	Guebuza	Dhlakama	Turnout	Nulls	Blanks
UNDP Districts	0,769	0,098	0,447	0,032	0,035
Non-UNDP Districts	0,702	0,236	0,406	0,052	0,081
Pr(|T| > |t|)	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000

	Parliamentary Election				
	FRELIMO	RENAMO	Turnout	Nulls	Blanks
UNDP Districts	0,713	0,107	0,440	0,028	0,053
Non-UNDP Districts	0,602	0,202	0,400	0,044	0,102
Pr(|T| > |t|)	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000	0,000

Notes: Difference in means test between the districts chosen by UNDP to be monitored for the presidential and parliamentary election

It becomes evident that it is not wise to make hasty conclusions and expect them to be valid for the rest of the country. We should also be aware that due to the nature of mobile observations, results are likely to be more significant using the dependent variable at station level. Since forms were lost, chances are high that at least one of the tables remains in possession hence biases occur with a higher chance in per table configurations.

In table 3c and 3d we have the impact of UNDP and OE-PVT monitoring on the shares of main candidates and parties for the selected districts. Contrarily to what happens on a national level for OE-PVT, this type of monitors are no longer significant and international monitors appear to favour the incumbent for specifications (1), (2) and (3), and to disfavour in (4). This result is very difficult to explain. We know that the aposteriori data indicates that only half of the places were visited, implying that inconsistencies between intention-to-treat and treated areas shouldn't be sur-

prising. However accounting for inconsistencies for the same type of data is not expected. It will remain inconclusive what is the true effect of the observer. Looking at table 3e and 3f we can see more revealing data. OE-PVT remains overall significant when we do not control for ballot-table specific fixed effects and not so much if we try to control for it. Nevertheless it remains coherent with the idea that PVT reduces ballot-stuffing. For both the nulls and blank vote shares, national monitors have no effect using a 5% significance level.

UNDP observers seem to have a much higher, more significant impact on the nulls, with negative significant coefficients for nearly all the specifications at the station level, which as mentioned earlier are more trustworthy than table level ones.The effect on blanks is not as significant and is contrary to what we would expect (higher number of blanks in treated areas due to a decrease in fraud). Giving a higher weight to *aposteriori* data we consistent significance across most of the specifications is not present. We cannot conclude that fraud is being reduced with respect to the number of blank votes, as not only are they always significant but they also have opposite signs.

The effect on turnout is another surprise. We see no significance if we do not control for ballot table specific fixed effects but doing such controls leads to some positive and significative effects. Once again this is against the hypothesis that either they decreased fraud and we would see lower turnout due to lower values of ballot stuffing or we wouldn't see an impact at all.

Explaining these differences is a very hard task as multiple explanations can arise. However one explanation stands above the others. The effect on voters' behaviour was not being taken into account. According to my previous statement this effect should be more evident for UNDP monitors. In fact PVT monitoring has either no evidence of fraud reduction or a mild one in some of the outcomes such as the turnout. Contrarily to international voters, who show a possible positive turnout effect, together with a positive effect on voters' confidence in the electoral system. The negative impact on informal votes (nulls and blanks) is also be explained by voters' confidence.

Therefore we cannot conclude if UNDP monitors decrease corruption but we were able to find evidence that international and national observers affect the agents involved in the election, where international were able to have a stronger impact in voters' behaviour than national fixed observers.

Conclusions

In this paper we concluded that national fixed observers could perform better than international observers in certain occasions. We found evidence of two channels through which electoral observation changes election day results: (a) Through a change in voters' behaviour (b) Through a change in the ballot table staff's behaviour.

International observers were found to have a more evident impact on voters' behaviour than the national monitors, but this difference can also be attributed to the nature of the observation and not only to the nationality, i.e. international observers were mobile and arrived by car while nationals were fixed and were the entire day seated at one of the tables.

Both observers could have a fraud-deterrent effect but strong evidence is only found in favour of the national or fixed observers.

Further research should be performed in order to disentangle the two effects. Moreover, the discovery of fraud-deterrence effects from national monitors should also be developed further. The policy implications of such an effect are tremendous. Instead of funding and supporting international monitoring programs, donors could, as an alternative, support national political-independent monitoring programs.

The significance of national observers also increases our faith in Mozambique's democracy. Despite accusations of fraud and the usual problems associated with lack of conditions for elections in a poor and developing country, they are able to have a truly independent election commission, capable to send fraud-deterrent monitors into the field.

Table 2a

	UNDP		PVT				
	Ballot Stations Monitored	*Ballots Tables Monitored*	*Ballot Stations Monitored*	*Ballots Tables Monitored*	*Number of Stations*	*Number of ballots*	*Average Number of Voters per Ballot*
Cabo Delgado	3	-	60	72	533	1130	782,55
Gaza	19	-	28	30	494	864	732,241
Inhambane	21	-	37	42	461	868	755,1406
Manica	11	-	40	48	347	846	791,8605
Maputo Cidade	54	-	46	54	159	808	894,4614
Maputo Província	29	-	49	63	353	848	747,6722
Nampula	17	-	134	154	757	2113	828,1697
Niassa	16	-	41	46	431	761	707,4717
Sofala	18	-	59	68	295	962	843,9054
Tete	6	-	38	40	675	1038	691,1175
Zambézia	9	-	123	143	642	2059	877,9441

Notes: Tables 2a shows observer coverage per province for locations with intention to treat for each observer.

Table 2b

Balance - Presidential

	Turnout		Nulls		Brancos		Guebuza		Dhlakama	
	Per table	*Per Station*	*Per Station*	*Per table*	*Per table*	*Per Station*	*Per Station*	*Per table*	*Per table*	*Per Station*
UNDP - Apriori	-0,009	0,005	-0,001	-0,002	0,001	-0,000	-0,026**	-0,002	0,022**	0,002
	(0,009)	*(0,008)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,001)*	*(0,001)*	*(0,012)*	*(0,007)*	*(0,011)*	*(0,007)*
UNDP - Apost	-0,014	0,015	0,003	0,001	0,003	-0,001	-0,039**	0,005	0,030*	-0,005
	(0,012)	*(0,011)*	*(0,003)*	*(0,003)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,017)*	*(0,011)*	*(0,017)*	*(0,012)*
OE PVT - Apriori	0,002	0,006	-0,000	0,002	-0,003	0,001	0,048*	0,020*	-0,042*	-0,021**
	(0,010)	*(0,009)*	*(0,003)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,001)*	*(0,026)*	*(0,011)*	*(0,022)*	*(0,009)*
OE PVT - Apost	-0,004	-0,005	0,002	0,002	-0,003*	-0,001	0,102***	0,006	-0,096***	-0,008
	(0,014)	*(0,012)*	*(0,005)*	*(0,003)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,026)*	*(0,009)*	*(0,022)*	*(0,009)*
Control	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Balance Parliamentary

	Turnout		Nulls		Brancos		Guebuza		Dhlakama	
	Per table	*Per Station*	*Per Station*	*Per table*	*Per table*	*Per Station*	*Per Station*	*Per table*	*Per table*	*Per Station*
UNDP - Apriori	-0,014	0,002	-0,001	-0,002	0,002	-0,001	-0,025**	-0,001	0,021**	0,003
	(0,009)	*(0,008)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,011)*	*(0,007)*	*(0,010)*	*(0,006)*
UNDP - Apost	-0,019	0,011	0,006	0,001	0,003	-0,003	-0,042**	0,006	0,026*	-0,004
	(0,012)	*(0,011)*	*(0,004)*	*(0,004)*	*(0,003)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,016)*	*(0,011)*	*(0,015)*	*(0,010)*
OE PVT - Apriori	0,003	0,008	-0,001	0,002	-0,008	-0,002	0,050*	0,022*	-0,039*	-0,022**
	(0,010)	*(0,008)*	*(0,004)*	*(0,003)*	*(0,003)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,024)*	*(0,011)*	*(0,020)*	*(0,009)*
OE PVT - Apost	0,004	0,003	0,001	0,001	-0,006*	-0,004	0,098***	0,013	-0,088***	-0,008
	(0,015)	*(0,013)*	*(0,006)*	*(0,003)*	*(0,003)*	*(0,002)*	*(0,025)*	*(0,009)*	*(0,020)*	*(0,008)*
Control	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Notes: Coefficients from balance regressions. Standard errors are presented below between brackets for each coefficient. Simple OLS were made with or without controls. Significance levels are given by : *=p<0,1 ; **=p<0,05 ; ***p<0,001

Table 3a

PVT Obverservers effect on Final Outcomes

Guebuza

Apriori	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station
Apriori	**-0,027***	**-0,027***	-0,007	-0,001	**-0,013**	**-0,011**	-0,008	**-0,022**
	(0,008)	*(0,008)*	*(0,006)*	*(0,006)*	*(0,006)*	*(0,005)*	*(0,008)*	*(0,009)*
_cons	0,723	0,728	0,539	0,539	0,353	0,362	0,143	0,148
Lag of dependent variable	-	-	-	-	0,526***	0,529***	-	-
					(0,014)	*(0,014)*		
R2 Adjusted	12 275	12 275	12 275	12 275	7 673	7 673	7 673	7 673
N	0,001	0,003	0,437	0,437	0,639	0,639	-0,000	0,003
Aposteriori	**-0,031***	**-0,031***	0,002	0,009	-0,013	-0,009	-0,003	-0,012
	(0,012)	*(0,011)*	*(0,009)*	*(0,008)*	*(0,009)*	*(0,007)*	*(0,011)*	*(0,010)*
_cons	0,723	0,726	0,538	0,537	0,353	0,361	0,142	0,144
Lag of dependent variable	-	-	-	-	0,526***	0,529***	-	-
					(0,014)	*(0,014)*		
N	12 275	12 275	12 275	12 275	7 673	7 673	7 673	7 673
R2 Adjusted	0,001	0,002	0,437	0,438	0,637	0,640	-0,000	0,000
Controls	No		Yes		Yes		No	
Lag	No		No		Yes		No	
Diff	No		No		No		Yes	

Dhlakama

Apriori	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station
Apriori	**0,021***	0,008	0,006	-0,001	0,008	0,005	0,004	-0,009
	(0,008)	*(0,008)*	*(0,006)*	*(0,007)*	*(0,006)*	*(0,006)*	*(0,008)*	*(0,007)*
_cons	0,194	0,194	0,411	0,412	0,101	0,114	-0,119	-0,116
Lag of dependent variable	-	-	-	-	0,585***	0,587***	-	-
					(0,016)	*(0,016)*		
N	12 275	12 275	12 275	12 275	7 673	7 673	7 673	7 673
R2 Adjusted	0,001	0,000	0,416	0,416	0,635	0,635	-0,000	0,000
Aposteriori	**0,037***	**0,023**	-0,001	-0,010	0,013	-0,000	**0,021***	-0,000
	(0,012)	*(0,011)*	*(0,009)*	*(0,008)*	*(0,008)*	*(0,007)*	*(0,011)*	*(0,010)*
_cons	0,194	0,192	0,412	0,413	0,101	0,115	-0,119	-0,118
Lag of dependent variable	-	-	-	-	0,585***	0,586***	-	-
					(0,016)	*(0,016)*		
N	12 275	12 275	12 275	12 275	7 673	7 673	7 673	7 673
R2 Adjusted	0,001	0,001	0,416	0,417	0,635	0,635	0,000	-0,000
Controls	No		Yes		Yes		No	
Lag	No		No		Yes		No	
Diff	No		No		No		Yes	

Notes: Regressions of OE-PVT monitoring on the vote share of the presidential candidates. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geographical controls such as dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its cofficient and the correspond standard error between brackets below. Clusters were included by school. Constant was not provided with standard errors. Significance values are determined by: * = p<0,1 ; **=p<0,05 ; ***=p<0,01

Table 3b

PVT Obverservers effect on Final Outcomes

Apriori	Frelimo							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station
Apriori	**-0,026***	-0,011	-0,006	0,008	**-0,011***	**-0,008***	-0,010	**-0,015***
	(0,008)	(0,010)	(0,006)	(0,007)	(0,006)	(0,005)	(0,007)	(0,007)
_cons	0,635	0,636	0,430	0,428	0,253	0,250	0,095	0,099
Lag of dependent variable	-	-	-	-	0,584***	0,582***	-	-
					(0,013)	(0,013)		
N	12 104	12 104	12 104	12 104	7 542	7 542	7 542	7 542
R2 Adjusted	0,001	0,000	0,475	0,475	0,690	0,690	0,000	0,002
Aposteriori	**-0,041***	**-0,027***	-0,002	0,012	**-0,017***	-0,006	-0,015	-0,011
	(0,012)	(0,011)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,006)	(0,009)	(0,008)
_cons	0,635	0,637	0,429	0,428	0,254	0,249	0,142	0,144
Lag of dependent variable	-	-	-	-	0,584***	0,582***	-	-
					(0,013)	(0,013)		
N	12 104	12 104	12 104	12 104	7 542	7 542	7 673	7 673
R2 Adjusted	0,001	0,000	0,476	0,476	0,690	0,691	-0,000	0,000
Controls	No		Yes		Yes		No	
Lag	No		No		Yes		No	
Diff	No		No		No		Yes	

Apriori	Renamo							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station
Apriori	**0,018***	**0,013***	0,005	0,002	0,007	0,005	0,003	-0,005
	(0,006)	(0,007)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,004)	(0,007)	(0,007)
_cons	0,173	0,172	0,337	0,337	0,115	0,117	-0,109	-0,108
Lag of dependent variable	-	-	-	-	0,503***	0,504***	-	-
					(0,014)	(0,014)		
N	12 104	12 104	12 104	12 104	7 542	7 542	7 542	7 542
R2 Adjusted	0,001	0,001	0,423	0,423	0,616	0,616	-0,000	0,000
Aposteriori	**0,026***	**0,022***	-0,005	-0,008	0,007	-0,000	0,013	0,002
	(0,009)	(0,008)	(0,007)	(0,006)	(0,006)	(0,005)	(0,009)	(0,009)
_cons	0,174	0,172	0,337	0,338	0,115	0,118	-0,109	-0,109
Lag of dependent variable	-	-	-	-	0,503***	0,504***	-	-
					(0,014)	(0,014)		
N	12 104	12 104	12 104	12 104	7 542	7 542	7 542	7 542
R2 Adjusted	0,001	0,002	0,423	0,423	0,616	0,616	0,000	-0,000
Controls	No		Yes		Yes		No	
Lag	No		No		Yes		No	
Diff	No		No		No		Yes	

Notes: Regressions of OE-PVT monitoring on the vote share of the parliamentary main parties. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geographical controls such as dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its coefficient and the correspond standard error between brackets below. Clusters were included by school. Constant was not provided with standard errors. Significance values are determined by: * = p<0,1 ; **=p<0,05 ; ***=p<0,01

Table 3c

UNDP Observers effect on Final Outcomes

	Guebuza								Frelimo							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station
Apriori	**0,033***	**0,033***	**0,033***	**0,033***	**0,026***	**0,026***	-0,007	-0,007	**0,033***	**0,033***	**0,039***	**0,039***	**0,029***	**0,029***	-0,010	-0,010
	(0,011)	*(0,011)*	*(0,008)*	*(0,008)*	*(0,010)*	*(0,010)*	*(0,015)*	*(0,015)*	*(0,011)*	*(0,011)*	*(0,008)*	*(0,008)*	*(0,009)*	*(0,009)*	*(0,014)*	*(0,014)*
OE-PVT	-0,006	-0,006	0,011	0,011	0,012	0,012	0,031	0,031	-0,018	-0,018	0,001	0,001	0,002	0,002	0,015	0,015
	(0,018)	*(0,018)*	*(0,012)*	*(0,012)*	*(0,013)*	*(0,013)*	*(0,021)*	*(0,021)*	*(0,020)*	*(0,020)*	*(0,012)*	*(0,012)*	*(0,014)*	*(0,014)*	*(0,019)*	*(0,019)*
Lagged dependent variable	-	-	-	-	0,357***	0,357***	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,443***	0,443***	-	-
					(0,040)	*(0,040)*							*(0,035)*	*(0,035)*		
_cons	0,763	0,763	0,655	0,655	0,501	0,501	0,082	0,082	0,706	0,706	0,533	0,533	0,350	0,350	0,063	0,063
N	3 646	3 646	3 646	3 646	2 473	2 473	2 473	2 473	3 635	3 635	3 635	3 635	2 424	2 424	2 424	2 424
R2 Adjusted	0,006	0,006	0,554	0,554	0,638	0,638	0,001	0,001	0,006	0,006	0,576	0,576	0,683	0,683	0,000	0,000
Apriori	**0,053***	**0,046***	-0,003	-0,008	-0,007	**-0,015**	**-0,042***	**-0,077***	**0,071***	**0,073***	0,011	0,008	0,003	-0,003	**-0,022***	**-0,052***
	(0,011)	*(0,010)*	*(0,009)*	*(0,008)*	*(0,008)*	*(0,007)*	*(0,014)*	*(0,012)*	*(0,012)*	*(0,010)*	*(0,009)*	*(0,009)*	*(0,007)*	*(0,007)*	*(0,012)*	*(0,011)*
OE-PVT	-0,010	-0,009	0,010	0,009	0,012	0,013	0,034	**0,036***	-0,022	-0,022	-0,000	-0,000	0,002	0,002	0,016	0,017
	(0,018)	*(0,018)*	*(0,012)*	*(0,012)*	*(0,014)*	*(0,014)*	*(0,021)*	*(0,020)*	*(0,020)*	*(0,019)*	*(0,013)*	*(0,013)*	*(0,015)*	*(0,015)*	*(0,019)*	*(0,018)*
Lagged dependent variable	-	-	-	-	0,364***	0,365***	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,452***	0,452***	-	-
					(0,040)	*(0,041)*							*(0,035)*	*(0,035)*		
_cons	0,765	0,761	0,662	0,662	0,504	0,503	0,084	0,096	0,707	0,699	0,540	0,541	0,353	0,352	0,063	0,071
N	3 646	3 646	3 646	3 646	2 473	2 473	2 473	2 473	3 635	3 635	3 635	3 635	2 424	2 424	2 424	2 424
R2 Adjusted	0,008	0,011	0,549	0,549	0,635	0,636	0,006	0,041	0,014	0,029	0,568	0,568	0,679	0,679	0,001	0,022
Control	No		Yes		Yes		No		No		Yes		Yes		No	
Lag	No		No		Yes		No		No		No		Yes		No	
Diff	No		No		No		Yes		No		No		No		Yes	

Notes: Regressions of UNDP and OE-PVT monitoring on the vote share of the Guebuza/Frelimo in presidential and parliamentary elections. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geographical controls such as dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its cofficient and the correspond standard error between brackets below. Clusters were included by school. Constant was not provided with standard errors. Significance values are determined by: * = p<0,1 ; **=p<0,05 ; ***=p<0,01

Table 3d

UNDP Observers effect on Final Outcomes

Apriori	Dhlakama								Renamo							
	(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)		(1)		(2)		(3)		(4)	
	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station	Per table	Per station
Apriori	**-0,015***	**-0,015***	**-0,010***	**-0,010***	0,001	0,001	**0,026***	**0,026***	**-0,013***	**-0,013***	-0,005	-0,005	0,003	0,003	**0,022***	**0,022***
	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,006)	(0,006)	(0,006)	(0,006)	(0,014)	(0,014)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,013)	(0,013)
OE-PVT	0,023	0,023	-0,000	-0,000	-0,004	-0,004	-0,013	-0,013	0,021	0,021	-0,004	-0,004	-0,003	-0,003	-0,012	-0,012
	(0,016)	(0,016)	(0,010)	(0,010)	(0,010)	(0,010)	(0,022)	(0,022)	(0,013)	(0,013)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,009)	(0,009)	(0,021)	(0,021)
Lagged dependent variable	-	-	-	-	0,353***	0,353***	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,291***	0,291***	-	-
					(0,035)	(0,035)							(0,030)	(0,030)		
_cons	0,101	0,101	0,270	0,270	0,123	0,123	-0,148	-0,148	0,109	0,109	0,250	0,250	0,139	0,139	-0,128	-0,128
N	3 646	3 646	3 646	3 646	2 473	2 473	2 473	2 473	3 635	3 635	3 635	3 635	2 424	2 424	2 424	2 424
R2 Adjusted	0,003	0,003	0,442	0,442	0,595	0,595	0,003	0,003	0,003	0,003	0,512	0,512	0,649	0,649	0,002	0,002
Apriori	**-0,019****	**-0,031***	-0,002	-0,006	0,002	-0,002	**0,075***	**0,080***	-0,009	**-0,012***	0,001	-0,001	0,003	0,001	**0,078***	**0,084***
	(0,010)	(0,007)	(0,008)	(0,006)	(0,005)	(0,004)	(0,011)	(0,011)	(0,008)	(0,007)	(0,006)	(0,005)	(0,004)	(0,004)	(0,010)	(0,010)
OE-PVT	0,024	0,024	0,000	0,000	-0,004	-0,003	-0,016	-0,017	**0,022***	**0,022***	-0,004	-0,004	-0,003	-0,003	-0,017	-0,015
	(0,016)	(0,016)	(0,010)	(0,010)	(0,010)	(0,010)	(0,022)	(0,022)	(0,013)	(0,013)	(0,009)	(0,009)	(0,009)	(0,009)	(0,020)	(0,020)
Lagged dependent variable	-	-	-	-	0,353***	0,353***	-	-	-	-	-	-	0,290***	0,290***	-	-
					(0,035)	(0,035)							(0,030)	(0,030)		
_cons	0,099	0,104	0,269	0,269	0,123	0,123	-0,150	-0,159	0,108	0,109	0,249	0,249	0,140	0,140	-0,130	-0,140
N	3 646	3 646	3 646	3 646	2 473	2 473	2 473	2 473	3 635	3 635	3 635	3 635	2 424	2 424	2 424	2 424
R2 Adjusted	0,003	0,012	0,441	0,441	0,595	0,595	0,014	0,034	0,001	0,003	0,512	0,512	0,649	0,649	0,017	0,042
Control	No		Yes		Yes		No		No		Yes		Yes		No	
Lag	No		No		Yes		No		No		No		Yes		No	
Diff	No		No		No		Yes		No		No		No		Yes	

Notes: Regressions of UNDP and OE-PVT monitoring on the vote share of Dhakama/Renamo in presidential and parliamentary elections. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geographical controls such as dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its cofficient and the correspond standard error between brackets below. Clusters were included by school. Constant was not provided with standard errors. Significance values are determined by: * = p<0,1 ; **=p<0,05 ; ***=p<0,01

Table 3e
UNDP Observers effect on Final Outcomes

		Turnout Presidential				Nulls Presidential				Blanks Presidential			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Apriori	Per table	0,015	0,008	0,008	**0,021***	-0,002	-0,001	-0,001	-0,002	**-0,007***	**-0,004**	-0,003*	**-0,005**
		(0,009)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,011)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)
	PVT	**-0,056***	**-0,023***	**-0,019***	-0,033	**0,009***	**0,008***	0,010	0,005	0,009	0,004	0,001	0,004
		(0,015)	(0,009)	(0,011)	(0,024)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,007)	(0,007)	(0,007)	(0,005)	(0,004)	(0,005)
	Mean	0,445***	0,293***	0,237***	0,034***	0,033***	0,051***	0,042***	0,003**	0,036***	0,105***	0,084***	0,016***
	Per stati-on	0,015	0,008	0,008	**0,021***	-0,002	-0,001	-0,001	-0,002	**-0,007***	**-0,004**	-0,003*	**-0,005**
		(0,009)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,011)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)
	PVT	**-0,056***	**-0,023***	**-0,019***	-0,033	**0,009***	**0,008***	0,010	0,005	0,009	0,004	0,001	0,004
		(0,015)	(0,009)	(0,011)	(0,024)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,007)	(0,007)	(0,007)	(0,005)	(0,004)	(0,005)
	Mean	0,445***	0,293***	0,237***	0,034***	0,033***	0,051***	0,042***	0,003**	0,036***	0,105***	0,084***	0,016***
Aposteriori	Per table	0,009	**0,014***	**0,019***	**0,024***	**-0,006***	**-0,004**	-0,003	**-0,008**	**-0,006**	-0,003	0,001	-0,001
		(0,010)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,013)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)
	PVT	**-0,057***	**-0,024***	**-0,019***	-0,034	**0,010***	**0,008***	0,010	0,005	0,009	0,004	0,001	0,004
		(0,015)	(0,009)	(0,011)	(0,024)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,007)	(0,007)	(0,007)	(0,005)	(0,004)	(0,005)
	Mean	0,448***	0,294***	0,238***	0,037***	0,033***	0,051***	0,042***	0,003***	0,035***	0,104***	0,083***	0,015***
	Per stati-on	0,007	0,010	**0,014***	**0,022***	**-0,010***	**-0,004***	**-0,003***	**-0,005**	**-0,011***	-0,003	0,001	**-0,004**
		(0,009)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,011)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)
	PVT	**-0,056***	**-0,023***	**-0,019***	-0,034	**0,010***	**0,008***	0,010	0,005	0,009	0,004	0,001	0,004
		(0,015)	(0,009)	(0,011)	(0,024)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,007)	(0,007)	(0,007)	(0,005)	(0,004)	(0,005)
	Mean	0,447***	0,294***	0,239***	0,034***	0,034***	0,051***	0,042***	0,004***	0,037***	0,104***	0,083***	0,016***
N		3 643	3 643	2 472	2 472	3 646	3 646	2 473	2 473	3 646	3 646	2 473	2 473

Notes: Regressions of UNDP and OE-PVT monitoring on the outcomes for turnout, nulls and blanks in presidential elections. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geographical controls such as dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its cofficient and the correspond standard error between brackets below. Clusters were included by school. Constant was not provided with standard errors. Significance values are determined by: * = p<0,1 ; **=p<0,05 ; ***=p<0,01

Table 3f

		Turnout Parliamentary				Nulls Parlamiantary				Blanks Parliamentary			
	UNDP Observers effect on Final Outcomes												
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Apriori	Per table	0,013	0,006	0,010	**0,021***	-0,002	-0,001	-0,001	-0,001	**-0,010***	**-0,006***	-0,004	-0,003
		(0,009)	(0,007)	(0,008)	(0,011)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)
	PVT	**-0,053***	**-0,020**	-0,013	-0,016	0,004	0,003	0,007	0,003	0,012	0,005	-0,001	0,006
		(0,014)	(0,009)	(0,011)	(0,023)	(0,006)	(0,005)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,007)
	Mean	0,438***	0,287***	0,230***	0,027***	0,028***	0,038***	0,028***	-0,005***	0,055***	0,135***	0,117***	0,019***
	Per station	0,013	0,006	0,010	**0,021***	-0,002	-0,001	-0,001	-0,001	**-0,010***	**-0,006***	-0,004	-0,003
		(0,009)	(0,007)	(0,008)	(0,011)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)
	PVT	**-0,053***	**-0,020**	-0,013	-0,016	0,004	0,003	0,007	0,003	0,012	0,005	-0,001	0,006
		(0,014)	(0,009)	(0,011)	(0,023)	(0,006)	(0,005)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,007)
	Mean	0,438***	0,287***	0,230***	0,027***	0,028***	0,038***	0,028***	-0,005***	0,055***	0,135***	0,117***	0,019***
Aposteriori	Per table	0,009	0,014	**0,018**	0,013	**-0,007***	**-0,004**	**-0,004**	**-0,009**	**-0,003**	**-0,005***	-0,001	0,003
		(0,010)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,013)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,004)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,004)
	PVY	**-0,054***	**-0,021**	-0,014	-0,017	0,004	0,003	0,007	0,004	0,013	0,005	-0,001	0,005
		(0,014)	(0,009)	(0,011)	(0,023)	(0,006)	(0,005)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,007)
	Mean	0,440***	0,287***	0,232***	0,030***	0,028***	0,038***	0,028***	-0,005***	0,053***	0,134***	0,116***	0,018***
	Per station	0,004	0,009	0,012	0,014	**-0,010***	**-0,004***	**-0,003**	-0,004	**-0,010***	**-0,005***	-0,002	0,002
		(0,009)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,011)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,001)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,003)
	PVT	**-0,053***	**-0,020**	-0,013	-0,016	0,004	0,003	0,007	0,004	0,013	0,005	-0,001	0,006
		(0,014)	(0,009)	(0,011)	(0,023)	(0,006)	(0,005)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,008)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,007)
	Mean	0,440***	0,288***	0,232***	0,028***	0,030***	0,038***	0,028***	-0,005***	0,055***	0,134***	0,116***	0,018***
	N	3 630	3 630	2 399	2 399	3 577	3 577	2 382	2 382	3 577	3 577	2 382	2 382
Controls		No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Lag		No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Diff		No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Regressions of UNDP and OE-PVT monitoring on the outcomes for turnout, nulls and blanks in presidential elections. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geographical controls such as dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its cofficient and the correspond standard error between brackets below. Clusters were included by school. Constant was not provided with standard errors. Significance values are determined by: * = p<0,1 ; **=p<0,05 ; ***=p<0,01

Table 3g - OE - PVT Observers effect on Final Outcomes

		Turnout Presidential				Nulls Presidential				Blanks Parliamentary			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Apriori	Per table	**-0,045*****	**-0,026*****	**-0,026*****	**-0,033*****	**-0,003***	**-0,003***	-0,002	-0,001	**0,007*****	**0,004****	**0,006****	**0,008*****
		(0,006)	(0,005)	(0,006)	(0,009)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)
	Mean	0,421	0,293	0,226	0,030	0,047	0,063	0,051	0,007	0,067	0,117	0,093	0,034
	Per station	**-0,041*****	**-0,019*****	**-0,014*****	**-0,009**	**-0,006*****	**-0,004****	-0,003	0,001	**-0,006*****	**-0,004****	0,002	0,000
		(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,006)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)
	Mean	0,428	0,295	0,227	0,030	0,048	0,063	0,051	0,006	0,069	0,118	0,093	0,034
Aposteriori	Per table	**-0,047*****	-0,010	**-0,017****	**-0,032****	0,001	-0,001	-0,001	-0,001	**0,019*****	**0,007*****	**0,007****	**0,016*****
		(0,008)	(0,007)	(0,008)	(0,013)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,004)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,004)
	Mean	0,420	0,292	0,225	0,029	0,046	0,062	0,050	0,007	0,067	0,117	0,093	0,034
	Per station	**-0,057*****	**-0,015*****	**-0,010***	-0,013	**-0,004****	**-0,005****	**-0,005****	-0,001	**0,007***	0,000	0,001	**0,005***
		(0,007)	(0,005)	(0,006)	(0,008)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,002)	(0,003)
	Mean	0,425	0,294	0,226	0,030	0,047	0,063	0,051	0,007	0,067	0,117	0,093	0,034
	N	12 222	12 222	7 644	7 644	12 275	12 275	7 673	7 673	12 275	12 275	7 673	7 673

		Turnout Parliamentary				Nulls Parliamentary				Blanks Parliamentary			
		(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Apriori	Per table	**-0,045*****	**-0,026*****	**-0,028*****	**-0,033*****	-0,003	-0,003	-0,002	-0,001	**0,008*****	**0,005****	**0,007*****	**0,010*****
		(0,006)	(0,005)	(0,006)	(0,009)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,003)
	Mean	0,413	0,289	0,225	0,022	0,039	0,052	0,035	-0,009	0,088	0,137	0,107	0,032
	Per station	**-0,041*****	**-0,019*****	**-0,016*****	-0,010	**-0,005****	**-0,004***	-0,001	**0,004***	**-0,007*****	**-0,004***	0,001	0,002
		(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,005)	(0,006)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)
	Mean	0,419	0,291	0,227	0,022	0,040	0,052	0,035	-0,010	0,090	0,138	0,108	0,033
Aposteriori	Per table	**-0,049*****	**-0,013****	**-0,017****	**-0,031****	-0,001	-0,002	0,000	-0,004	**0,021*****	**0,008****	**0,008****	**0,017*****
		(0,008)	(0,006)	(0,008)	(0,012)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,004)	(0,004)	(0,003)	(0,004)	(0,004)
	Mean	0,412	0,288	0,224	0,021	0,039	0,052	0,035	-0,009	0,087	0,137	0,107	0,032
	Per station	**-0,058*****	**-0,017*****	**-0,014****	**-0,015***	**-0,004****	**-0,005****	-0,003	-0,001	**0,009****	0,002	0,003	**0,009*****
		(0,007)	(0,005)	(0,006)	(0,008)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,002)	(0,003)	(0,004)	(0,003)	(0,003)	(0,003)
	Mean	0,418	0,290	0,226	0,022	0,040	0,052	0,036	-0,009	0,087	0,137	0,107	0,032
	N	12 046	12 046	7 377	7 377	12 046	12 046	7 500	7 500	12 046	12 046	7 500	7 500
Controls		No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No
Lag		No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Diff		No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes

Notes: Regressions of OE-PVT monitoring on the outcomes for turnout, nulls and blanks in presidential elections. Specification (1) is a simple OLS, (2) includes geographical controls such as dummies for provinces and the number of registered voters in that locality, (3) includes the geographical controls plus a the lag of the dependent variable and (4) is a basic dif-in-dif where last period is considered to be the value fo elections of 2004. For each relevant variable we have its cofficient and the correspond standard error between brackets below. Clusters were included by school. Constant was not provided with standard errors. Significance values are determined by: * = p<0,1 ; **=p<0,05 ; ***=p<0,01

Bibliography

Beaulieu E, Hyde SD (2008) In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Strategic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts. *Comparative Political Studies* 42:392–415

Besley T, Case A (1995) Does electoral accountability affect economic policy choices? Evidence from gubernatorial term limits. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*

Downs A (1957) An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy. *Journal of Political Economy* 65:135–150.

Hanlon J, Fox S (2006) I DENTIFYING F RAUD IN D EMOCRATIC E LECTIONS : A Case Study of the 2004 Presidential Election in Mozambique.

Hill L, Young S (2007) Protest or Error? Informal Voting and Compulsory Voting. *Australian Journal of Political Science* 42:515–521

Hyde SD (2010) Experimenting in Democracy Promotion: International Observers and the 2004 Presidential Elections in Indonesia. *Perspectives on Politics* 8:511–527

Hyde SD (2007) The observer effect in international politics: Evidence from a natural experiment. *World Politics* 60:37–63.

Hyde SD, O'Mahony A (2010) International Scrutiny and Pre-Electoral Fiscal Manipulation in Developing Countries. *The Journal of Politics* 72:690–704

Kelley J (2011) Do International Election Monitors Increase or Decrease Opposition Boycotts? *Comparative Political Studies* 44:1527–1556.

Laakso L (2002) The politics of international election observation: the case of Zimbabwe in 2000. *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 40:437–464.