

Are Backbenchers Fighting Back? Intra-party Mobilisation in German Parliament Debates on the Greek Crisis

Caroline Bhattacharya and Achillefs Papageorgiou

Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Rethinking Intra-party Cohesion in Times of Party Transformation, 25–30 April 2017, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom.

Abstract:

Studies on the role of national parliaments in the EU have conventionally looked at the formal capabilities and activities of legislatures as collective actors. We aim to strengthen the bridge to the growing literature on the politicisation of the EU by examining individual-level mobilisation *within* the parliament. In order to enrich our understanding of the actors and inner workings that drive or impede the parliamentarisation of EU politics, we shift the focus from preferences to opportunity and incentive structures and levels of party control faced by different categories of MPs. Our case study of plenary debates on the Greek crisis in the German Bundestag (2010–2015) analyses three types of activity: legislative speech, voting defection and explanations of vote. Our results show that different thresholds of mobilisation translate into intra-party variance based on MPs' rank, experience, electoral mandate and gender. Here, the frontbencher–backbencher categorisation shows the most consistent effect.

Keywords: national parliaments; politicisation; parliamentary behaviour; party unity; euro crisis; Germany

In their article 'Backbenchers learn to fight back: European integration and parliamentary government', Raunio and Hix (2000) suggest that national parliaments in the European Union (EU) are claiming back some control of executive actors by redressing the information asymmetry and introducing scrutiny instruments. According to their argument, this parliamentarisation of EU

politics is driven by ‘the desire by non-governing parties and backbench parliamentarians’ (ibid.: 163). Yet, most research in this field analyses the increasing importance of national legislatures and their capabilities to hold the executives accountable and communicate EU affairs to the electorate at the collective level. In this article, we enquire whether backbenchers have indeed learned to fight back. More than two decades after the first milestone of parliamentary Europeanisation, namely the establishment of European Affairs Committees (EACs), it is time to test Raunio and Hix’s claim. The Eurozone crisis provides an exemplary case for testing whether it is no longer merely executive actors and a small number of frontbenchers and ‘Euro-wizards’ (Auel 2006: 262) who drive parliamentary mobilisation around EU issues. The euro crisis has shifted EU decision-making to the forefront of public debate and protest. This is even the case in Germany, where traditionally public support for European integration has been strong and where the lower house, the Bundestag, has been characterised by a solid pro-European cross-partisan consensus. During the crisis this consensus somewhat disintegrated, mainly due to dissent within parties rather than between parties. As Germany is the largest creditor country (contributing around 27 per cent to the crisis measures), the crisis also posed a challenge to the budget sovereignty of the Bundestag.

In this article, we place the individual level at the heart of our analysis in order to enhance our understanding of the actors and inner workings that drive or impede the parliamentarisation of EU politics. We empirically investigate intra-party variation in parliamentary activity in Bundestag debates on the Greek crisis. The Greek debt crisis allows us to examine patterns of intra-party mobilisation around one specific issue that has become increasingly controversial between 2010 and 2015. We focus on three types of individual-level activity that are visible to the public: (1) voting behaviour (especially defection), (2) plenary speeches and (3) explanations of vote (EoVs). Our analysis of roll-call votes (RCVs) suggests that voting unity only tells us part of the story because some parties enforce discipline more strictly than others and the incentive to toe the party line varies between different categories of members of parliament (MPs). In the case of the Bundestag, access to the plenary floor is tightly controlled by party leaders (Proksch and Slapin

2015a), which means that plenary debates may project disproportionate party cohesion as backbenchers and dissenting MPs are unlikely to receive speaking time. But any MP can deliver an EoV to provide justification for her voting decision and/or voice reservations. EoVs are therefore a very useful additional data source for the study of party cohesion.

Our comprehensive approach addresses some of the limitations faced by studies that focus solely on voting behaviour, primarily because we shift the focus from preferences to the incentive and opportunity structures of legislators and look at individual-level behaviour in the context of institutional constraints. Our analysis confirms the significance of party control in setting the room of manoeuvre for individual MPs. We test how an MP's electoral mandate, length of membership and rank affect her legislative behaviour. While we find some evidence that mandate, experience as well as gender matter, the distinction between frontbenchers and backbenchers shows the most consistent effect across all three types of activity. Another key finding is that EoVs, despite their limited visibility, provide a meaningful channel of expression for MPs with limited influence.

The first section defines politicisation in the parliamentary setting and conceptualises mobilisation as the third stage in the politicisation process. In the second section, we discuss the significance of party control in shaping individual-level behaviour and theorise its divergent effects on MPs depending on their mandate, experience, position or office, and gender. Here, we develop several expectations that structure our empirical analysis. Before presenting the results of our regression analysis, we introduce our case study, data set, methods and descriptive results. The final section summarises the contribution of this study and outlines directions for future research.

EU politicisation in national parliaments

In the course of European integration, as more and more competences have been shifted to the supranational level, national parliaments have gradually adapted to the political and legal realities of EU multilevel governance. Since the establishment of EACs, which accelerated in the 1990s, the

scholarly interest in the Europeanisation processes of national parliaments and their role as a source of legitimation for the EU polity has steadily increased. Comparative scholars (Karlas 2012; Raunio 2005; Winzen 2012; 2013) have classified and ranked national parliaments by measuring their legislative scrutiny capability and impact on the governments' negotiating position. Auel *et al.* (2015) recognise that previous comparative endeavours focused solely on the formal capabilities and legislative function of parliaments, and attempt to establish the link between institutional capacity and actual levels of parliamentary activity. While institutional strength¹ shows a strong correlation with the number of mandates and resolutions issued, the correlation with debating activity is very weak. This is an intriguing finding, especially when considering the recent shift in the literature from the legislative and oversight activities to the communicative role, that is, from the government-related function to the citizen-related function of member state legislatures (Miklin 2014; Rauh 2015; Wendler 2016). There is an increasing recognition of the importance of public parliament debates on EU issues, but we still lack a thorough understanding of the conditions, mechanisms and actors that drive these debates. The growing literature on politicisation can provide some insights into these questions.

Our understanding of politicisation draws on Mouffe's (2005: 8–34; 2014) definition of 'the political' as the site of conflict and antagonism, rather than liberty and common action. According to Mouffe (2005: 10), 'political questions are not mere technical issues to be solved by experts' but 'always involve decisions which require us to make a choice between conflicting alternatives'. Following this line of thought, politicisation is *the making visible of conflicting alternatives*. In the context of EU politics, the term politicisation has been used frequently, almost excessively, in recent years. Often, it is merely an umbrella term (deliberately placed in quotation marks) to describe a general intensification in the level of contention and the way the EU and its policies are publicly perceived and debated at the domestic level. There have been only few attempts to thoroughly conceptualise and operationalise politicisation as a process – or rather processes – of contestation. Neofunctionalists anticipated a politicisation of European integration for a long time:

Politicization ... refers initially to a process whereby the *controversiality* of joint decisionmaking goes up. This in turn is likely to lead to *a widening of the audience or clientele* interested and active in integration. ... The minimal threshold for politicization is a rise in the controversiality of the regional decisionmaking process. (Schmitter 1969: 166, italics in original)

Similarly to Schmitter, de Wilde (2011: 566–7) emphasises contentiousness when defining politicisation as ‘an increase in polarization of opinions, interests or values and the extent to which they are publicly advanced towards policy formulation within the EU’. This definition also implies the centrality of communication.

When it comes to operationalising politicisation, de Wilde and Zürn (2012) use three indicators: growing awareness, mobilisation and polarisation. This broad operationalisation can be adapted to the parliamentary setting. In fact, we argue elsewhere (Bhattacharya 2017) that these indicators can be regarded as three subsequent stages: (1) growing awareness among MPs, (2) an increase in controversiality² and (3) mobilisation. If MPs acknowledge that EU politics and domestic politics are mutually intertwined and are aware of their own role in the multi-level decision-making process, they possess the capacity to recognise the domestic implications and contentious nature of a given issue and their individual means of influence. Controversiality needs to not only be detected but also made visible, that is, communicated, to the public through mobilisation.

For de Wilde and Zürn (2012), who employ a much broader approach by referring to the activities of political parties, social movements, trade unions and civil society organisations, mobilisation is ‘an increase over time in the amount of resources spent *in conflict* on EU issues and the number of political actors engaged’ (140, emphasis added). In the parliamentary setting, mobilisation – or the lack thereof – has been studied empirically by measuring the time invested for debating EU issues in the plenary (Auel and Raunio 2014; Raunio 2015), while other scholars (García Lupato 2014; Rauh 2015) use EU references in legislative speeches as a ‘test’ for EU

politicisation. Both approaches focus on salience as the key determinant of adequate parliamentary communication, but it can be questioned to what extent salience actually reflects conflict, taking into account the power of agenda control. (When a party or coalition government is internally divided over an issue, party leaders have a strong incentive to keep this issue off the agenda.) Auel and Raunio (2014: 24) also conclude that ‘plenary debates are more frequent in the absence of strong party political conflict and Eurosceptic public opinion’.

For national parliaments to communicate divergent views on EU matters, it seems crucial that a diverse range of parliamentary actors is involved. Thus, this study shifts the focus from the collective level to the level of legislative parties and individual legislators. As Kröger and Bellamy (2016: 139) point out, it is key to distinguish ‘between the institutional structures national parliaments have developed to domesticate the EU, on the one hand, and the usage of those structures by individual MPs and political parties in ways that normalise debates on the EU, on the other’.

Legislative behaviour at the individual level

Conventionally, the literature on the role of national parliaments has looked at legislatures as collective entities. In order to get an insight into the internal workings that determine the content of parliamentary debates on the EU, we need to gain a comprehensive understanding of the type of legislators who are willing and in a position to invest resources, particularly time, and voice their opinion in EU debates. However, when shifting the focus to MPs as individual actors, we have to address the role of parliamentary parties in shaping individual-level behaviour.

The significance of party control

As is the case with parliaments, legislative parties are not unitary actors. They are internally divided, deeply hierarchical organisations, in which the leadership feels the responsibility to

maintain unity and possesses a significant amount of resources and disciplinary instruments to do so. Generally, party leaders control the assignment of committee seats, access to the plenary floor and, to some extent, the media access as well. Furthermore, they are in a position to distribute rewards such as attractive trips abroad, office space or tickets to popular events. (Bailer 2017) Hence, when we look at the behaviour of legislators in order to draw inferences about their preferences, we need to be aware that their room of manoeuvre is constrained by their membership in a parliamentary party. As Saalfeld and Strøm (2014: 372) aptly point out, ‘the world of legislative parties is one of considerable complexity, in which critical decisions are often unobservable or deliberately concealed’. Conceptually, we can make a distinction between party cohesion and party discipline, that is, between substantive agreement based on shared preferences, on the one hand, and cooperation under compulsion and anticipated sanctions, on the other hand (Hazan 2014). Empirically, however, we face a serious ‘observability problem’: ‘Absent direct measures of legislators’ policy preferences, one cannot identify whether a party is united because its members have similar preferences ... or because party leaders successfully impose discipline on outlying members’ (Kam 2014: 402). A third factor that might affect observed levels of party unity is agenda control, that is, the ability to avert votes on disputed issues (Carey 2007), but in the German Bundestag, agenda-setting powers do not vary significantly between government and opposition parties (Becher and Sieberer 2008: 295–6). This ‘black box’ makes it challenging to assess the impact of party control on legislative behaviour.

Our empirical analysis focuses on RCVs, legislative speech and EoVs. For each form of activity, the level of party control and public visibility differs, which means that the threshold of mobilisation varies as well. Proksch and Slapin (2015b: 25–7) argue that how legislators choose to voice their disagreement with the party leadership depends on the level of discontent. Defecting from party line on a recorded vote, ‘especially on one that is both high profile and whipped, constitutes the ultimate act of defiance’ (ibid.: 26). The act of defection may help MPs to raise their profile independent of the party label, but rebels risk to be punished by the party whips.

MPs who dissent less strongly or fear the potential sanctions for a defective vote may, at least in theory, choose to raise their concerns in a plenary speech instead. In the case of the German Bundestag, however, party leaders have formal control of the plenary floor by deciding who gets to speak on behalf of the parliamentary party group and for how long. Proksch and Slapin (2015a: 100–23) also show that in highly salient debates, German party leaders are more likely to speak themselves and MPs who are ideologically distant from the party leadership tend to give fewer speeches (whereas the opposite is the case in the House of Commons). Bailer (2017: 7) quotes a party group leader in the Bundestag: ‘Of course, you are only allowed to talk in the morning when Phoenix [public TV news channel] is reporting if you are a loyal party group member. The dissenters are only allowed at night.’ Therefore, dissenting speeches are extremely rare in the Bundestag. In February 2012, when the second aid package for Greece was passed, two dissenters from the governing parties (Klaus-Peter Willsch and Frank Schäffler) spoke on the plenary floor, but only because the president of the Bundestag allocated them extra speaking time.

Contrary to addressing the plenary assembly, every legislator in the German Bundestag has an equal opportunity to state the reasons for her voting decision in an EoV (Becher and Sieberer 2008: 296). EoVs are written statements signed by one or more MPs that are annexed to the official minutes and often published on MPs’ personal websites. Since there are no party political constraints for the usage of this instrument, it provides a channel to explain defection or voice reservations despite voting along party line (Sieberer 2015). Although its public visibility is relatively low, the usage of EoVs is a good measure of mobilisation across and within parliamentary party groups.

Theorising intra-party variance in mobilisation

The variety of control mechanisms and disciplinary measures do not affect legislators equally. The threshold of mobilisation is contingent upon the mandate, experience and rank of the individual MP. Previous studies suggest that personal characteristics such as gender could also be a relevant

factor. We would thus expect to find intra-party variance in legislative behaviour for different categories of MPs.

The German Bundestag employs a mixed-member proportional system, which makes it an interesting case to investigate whether behavioural differences exist between MPs elected from single-member districts and MPs elected via closed party lists. The existing literature on legislative behaviour in the Bundestag provides mixed results regarding this question (see e.g. Becher and Sieberer 2008; Degner and Leuffen 2016; Manow 2013; Ohmura 2014; Sieberer 2010; Zittel 2014). Those studies which do find behavioural differences tend to emphasise the explanatory power of the competition and strategy for re-election rather than the type of *electoral mandate* received in the previous election: Ohmura (2014) shows that MPs with a pure district candidacy strategy are significantly more likely to defect than MPs with a pure list or dual candidacy strategy, but, interestingly, this is not because of local concerns. Similarly, Sieberer (2010: 494) argues – on the basis of analysing the content of EoVs by party rebels – that ‘district MPs use their higher electoral independence to deviate from the party line for other reasons’ than ‘cross-pressure ... due to demands by the party and the local electorate as competing principals’. What could be the other reasons then? If district MPs seek the personal vote (Gschwend and Zittel 2015), they are prone to engage in constituency service and ‘feel the need to differentiate themselves from their parliamentary party by taking positions countering party stands or even by voting against their party on *issues that are salient to constituents* (especially when government survival is not at stake)’ (André *et al.* 2014: 87–8, emphasis added). The main point is that those issues that constituents attach most importance to are not necessarily local issues. In Germany, the euro crisis has certainly become a prominent issue, and public opinion towards financial aid for Greece has been hostile from the start. Given that political parties are generally more pro-European than their voters (Mattila and Raunio 2012), the question arises whether district MPs are more responsive to the electorate in EU affairs³. For the RCVs on the euro crisis in the Bundestag, we would expect defection to be driven by district MPs. It will be interesting to see to what extent list MPs make use

of other forms of activity.

The literature on parliamentary socialisation looks at how newly elected MPs find their own role, balance their new responsibilities and learn to manoeuvre in an institutional setting that is shaped by antagonistic cooperation, which means that newcomers need to learn how to cooperate with competitors inside and outside their own parliamentary party. Best and Vogel (2014: 60) conclude that ‘the ambition of newcomers to gain political influence and their lack of resources necessary to achieve this goal are the central incentives for these junior legislators to adapt to the internal rules and norms’. This being said, our expectation is that lack of *experience*, measured in years of membership in parliament, is correlated with conformist behaviour. Can we therefore assume that experienced MPs are more likely to express dissent? It depends on their *rank* within the party. According to Kam (2014: 404), ‘the most rebellious MPs are those who have been demoted from the front-bench (and who are unlikely therefore to be ministers again), or those who failed to secure a promotion early in their parliamentary careers (and who are likely therefore to languish on the backbenches throughout their careers)’. In his study on MPs of the Canadian Liberal Party, Kam (2009: 168) finds that ‘demotion was not a consequence of their dissent, but its principal cause’. In line with previous studies (e.g. Becher and Sieberer 2008), we hypothesise that German legislators in executive, parliamentary or party office are less likely than backbenchers to defect from party line in a RCV or publicly disagree with the position of their party. Hence, they should be allowed to speak more often.

While the existing literature does not indicate a significant *gender* effect with regards to party unity, a study by Bäck *et al.* (2014) suggests that gender could play a role in the allocation of floor time. Their analysis of plenary debates in the Swedish Riksdag, which has one of the highest shares of female MPs worldwide, shows that women give fewer speeches overall and their underrepresentation is particularly pronounced in debates on ‘harder’ policy issues such as macroeconomics, transportation, finance and energy. Although the reasons for female underrepresentation in specific policy areas are still subject to debate⁴, we expect some gender-

based division of labour, regardless of rank and experience, in debates on the euro crisis, which despite its complexity can be considered a predominantly macroeconomic and fiscal issue.

Individual-level mobilisation in German Bundestag debates on the Greek crisis

The German Bundestag is a comparatively strong chamber in terms of its institutional powers (Auel *et al.* 2015), but nonetheless, it is an unlikely case for politicisation. The Bundestag is typically described as a ‘working parliament’, meaning that there is a strong focus on legislative scrutiny in the standing committees rather than heated debates in the plenary. Despite strong opposition rights and a moderately strong EU scrutiny system, contestation of EU affairs is generally limited due to a solid pro-European consensus among the major parties (Auel and Raunio 2014). As Kröger and Bellamy (2016: 145) note, ‘EU issues have been most debated in [national parliaments] where consensus is greatest rather than where it is weakest [and] Germany in particular fits this pattern’. Hence, ‘Germany provides perhaps the best paradigmatic example of a system of limited contestation’ (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2008: 351). Case studies (see e.g. Auel and Raunio 2014; Miklin 2014) support the notion that before the euro crisis there have been only very few instances (most notably the Services Directive) when the disputed nature of EU policies has been recognised and publicly discussed in the Bundestag.

The events around the euro crisis presented German MPs with an unprecedented stimulus to demand a close involvement in the EU-level crisis management, not least because – as the Federal Constitutional Court pointed out on numerous occasions – the parliament’s budget authority was at stake and public opinion was highly sceptical about making loan commitments to other member states, particularly Greece. Between 2010 and 2015, the Bundestag passed twelve acts that were considered decisive for managing and resolving the crisis (see Table 1), and five of those decisions centred around aid packages for Greece.

Table 1. Bundestag RCVs on euro crisis measures and aid packages.

Date	Acts
<i>17th legislative term</i>	
7 May 2010	First aid package for Greece
21 May 2010	Creation of the EFSF
29 September 2011	Expansion of the EFSF
27 February 2012	Second aid package for Greece
29 June 2012	Creation of the ESM
19 July 2012	Rescue package for Spanish banks
18 April 2013	Aid package for Cyprus
	Aid package for Portugal
	Aid package for Ireland
<i>18th legislative term</i>	
27 February 2015	Extension of second aid package for Greece
17 July 2015	Government mandate for negotiations with Greece on third aid package
19 August 2015	Third aid package for Greece




Figure 1. Agreement Index for RCVs on euro crisis measures compared to average levels of the 17th term (Bergmann *et al.* 2016) by party group.

Over the course of the crisis, voting unity dropped well below average in all party groups with the exception of the Social Democrats (SPD), which became more united after joining the government in October 2013 (see Figure 1 for our visualisation of voting unity using the Agreement Index by Hix *et al.* 2003⁵). The Greek crisis has been debated for more than ten hours in the plenary assembly, amounting to 74 speeches and 15 interventions/questions. In total, MPs issued 418 EoVs regarding the euro crisis, out of which 248 EoVs (including eight oral statements) were in relation to RCVs on the Greek situation. This study analyses the voting results, paying particular attention to party rebels, and asks who gets to speak in the plenary assembly and who makes use of EoVs and why. The primary objective is to gain a comprehensive understanding of the patterns of parliamentary mobilisation, and the actors and mechanisms that drive or try to control it.

Data, variables and methods

We collected data of all MPs and their activities from May 2010 until August 2015. The period of observation stretches across two legislative periods and, in total, our data set comprises of 881 MPs. 394 of them have actively participated in the debates on the Greek crisis, which means they have at least once cast a defecting vote, delivered a plenary speech or issued an EoV. For those active MPs, we also collected data on the various positions and offices they hold in government, the parliamentary party group or central party organisation.

All votes related to euro crisis measures were recorded, which in itself tells us something about their public visibility and the level of importance attached to them. Historically, only around 5 per cent of votes in the Bundestag are recorded (Bergmann *et al.* 2016: 26). A RCV needs to be requested by one party group or a minimum of 5 per cent of total MPs. Party groups, especially on the opposition side, call for RCVs to increase public attention for their own position or to reveal internal divisions within their political opponents. Furthermore, RCVs can be used as a strategic measure to close ranks and deter potential dissenters. (*ibid.*: 31) When measuring defection as a form of individual-level mobilisation, we also take into account abstentions, because in our case an

abstention can be clearly distinguished from being absent. In fact, entire party groups occasionally choose to abstain. Hence, any vote that does not follow the party line is counted as deviant⁶.

First, we sort our data in a long format so that every observation corresponds to a different parliamentary action relevant to the Greek crisis, of which there were five (see Table 1 above). Our model specification is Generalized Linear Latent and Mixed Models (GLLAMMs) with adaptive quadrature (see Appendix 1). GLLAMMs are ‘a class of multilevel latent variable models for (multivariate) responses of mixed type’ (Rabe-Hesketh *et al.* 2004: 7) including, among others, dichotomous categorical responses as it is the case here. We specify three GLLAMMs, one for each type of individual-level activity: voting defection, plenary speech and EoV. To ‘relax the assumption of conditional independence among the responses for the same person’ (Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal 2012), we assume a two-level model with a random intercept for subjects – MPs of the 17th and 18th Bundestag.

Our ‘core’ independent variables are mandate, rank and experience. Mandate is assigned the value of 1 if an MP has been elected directly from a single-member district and 0 if she has been elected off the party list. Overall, 48 per cent of Bundestag MPs hold a district mandate, but there is a large variation across party groups (see Appendix 2). Rank is a combination of three variables: membership in the federal government, central party leader and leading role in the parliamentary party. It assumes the value of 1 if the MP was either a member of the government (Chancellor, Minister, Parliamentary secretary, Federal commissioner) or a member of the central party leadership (Party chair, Deputy party chair, General secretary, Treasurer, Member of executive board) or held a high-ranking position in the parliamentary party (President of Parliament, Vice President of Parliament, Parliamentary group chair, Deputy parliamentary group chair, (First) parliamentary manager); the value of 0 is assigned to all other cases. Experience reflects the years served in Bundestag until the year that each parliamentary action regarding the Greek aid programmes took place. Responses are grouped into four categories: MPs with experience of eight years and less, nine to 16 years, 17 to 24 years, and 25 years and more. Our analysis also controls

for gender (0: Male, 1: Female), government coalition and ideological family. Government coalition is coded as a dummy, where 1 stands for MPs whose party participated in the coalition of the 17th (CDU, CSU, FDP) or the 18th Bundestag (CDU, CSU, SPD). CDU, CSU, FDP are coded as right-wing parties, whereas the Greens, Left Party and SPD as left-wing ones.

Under Model 2, we add another variable in order to test whether longer-serving MPs are more rebellious than newly elected ones if they sit on the backbenches because they never had a high-ranking position or have been demoted from the frontbench (Kam 2009; 2014). Therefore, we use a dummy variable ('Exp-backbencher'), where backbenchers are MPs with no position of responsibility and experience means membership in the Bundestag for at least two terms (i.e. more than eight years).

Descriptive analyses

In the 17th legislative term, the Bundestag approved the first and second package (in May 2010 and February 2012 respectively). In the 18th term, the Bundestag voted on the extension of the second package (in February 2015), the government's mandate for negotiating the third package (in July 2015) and the adoption of the third package (in August 2015). In the previous term, 26.7 per cent of MPs became involved, meaning they gave a speech, defected and/or delivered an EoV in at least one of the two debates. For the three debates in 2015, the overall mobilisation rate has increased to 45.1 per cent. A partial explanation for the higher mobilisation in 2015 is the fact that Bundestag MPs had to return twice from summer recess only to debate and vote on the Greek crisis. If we exclude the usage of joint EoVs, for which the resources to be spent are rather low if a large number of fellow MPs co-sign, we still observe that the mobilisation rate doubled from 15.9 per cent to 30.2 per cent. This increase is mainly driven by the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), its Bavarian sister party Christian Social Union (CSU) and to a lesser extent the Greens, whereas mobilisation in the SPD has dropped since they joined the coalition government (see Appendix 3).

Table 2. Percentage of total MPs who mobilised by type of activity.

Legislative term	Speech	Defection	EoVs	
			Individual	Joint
17 th term	3.8	5.8	9.6	11.8
18 th term	4.1	16.8	17.0	19.5

Table 2 shows that the level of mobilisation also differs by the type of activity. Merely 4 per cent of MPs had the opportunity to address the plenary assembly. Even though in the 18th term the amount of plenary speeches has almost doubled (from 27 to 47 speeches), the total number of speakers remained stable, which is a first indication of party control. Defection saw a significant increase, when in 2015 one in six MPs voted against their own party. We need to keep in mind that the government majority is much larger in the 18th term, which means that government parties could ‘afford’ more deviant votes. In empirical reality, however, Bergmann *et al.*’s (2016: 47) longitudinal study does not provide convincing evidence of a majority size effect on voting unity after 1990.




Figure 2. Number of EoVs and EoV signatories for RCV on euro crisis measures and aid packages.

Individual and joint EoVs were issued by more MPs as well, indicating that German legislators felt a stronger need to communicate their views using the means available to them. We know from a recent study by Sieberer (2015: 289–90) that ‘the usage of EoVs ... constitutes non-standard behaviour’: in the 16th legislative term (October 2005–October 2009), there were on average 3.1 EoVs by 12.4 individual signatories per RCV. As illustrated in Figure 2, each single crisis-related vote exceeds this average significantly, and in February and July 2015 even every fifth MP gave an individual EoV or signed a joint one.

Table 3. Amount of EoVs by type for RCVs on Greek aid packages.

Roll-call vote	EoV type		Support	Yes-but	Defect	Total
Greece I adoption	Individual		8	17	10	35
	Joint	EoVs	0	3	1	4
		MPs	0	31	3	34
Greece II adoption	Individual		15	2	7	24
	Joint	EoVs	3	1	2	6
		MPs	39	6	4	49
Greece II extension	Individual		22	15	14	51
	Joint	EoVs	1	6	2	9
		MPs	2	76	8	86
Greece III negotiations	Individual		22	27	26	75
	Joint	EoVs	3	3	0	6
		MPs	28	21	0	49
Greece III adoption	Individual		8	7	12	27
	Joint	EoVs	1	0	2	3
		MPs	2	0	13	15
Total (EoVs)			83	81	76	240
%			34.6	33.7	31.7	100.0
Total (MPs)			146	202	97	445
%			32.8	45.4	21.8	100.0

According to Sieberer (2015), around one quarter of EoVs fully support the party line, another quarter explain defection and the other half are of the yes-but type, meaning that MPs voice their discontent despite voting along party line. Our analysis of 240 written EoVs that 445 MPs delivered for the five voting sessions on the Greek crisis reveals a fairly equal distribution across the three categories (see Table 3). Yet overall, MPs most commonly use EoVs to express some doubts or differences of opinion, while voting with their party. For the vote on the first aid package, 13 out of

14 dissenters gave an EoV in order to express their reasons for defecting. The number of MPs who defected grew between 2012 and 2015, but the percentage of dissenters giving an EoV dropped to as low as 29 per cent when the Bundestag adopted the third package in August 2015. Governing party MPs who give an EoV seem to be more prone to defect in a later vote. To give an example, almost every fourth of the 108 CDU/CDU MPs who issued a ‘support’ or ‘yes-but’ EoV in February 2015 voted against their own party later that year. In the next section, we test this relationship between EoVs and voting defection more systematically using a time series regression model.

Table 4. OR estimates of two-level random intercept logistic.

	Speech (95% CI)		Defection (95% CI)		EoV (95% CI)	
	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2	Model 1	Model 2
Rank	10.770*** (6.204)	47.028*** (41.995)	.327** (.135)	1.259 (.639)	.491*** (.079)	.530** (.124)
Mandate	1.607 (.719)	1.515 (.706)	1.459 (.457)	1.429 (.441)	.696** (.095)	.694** (.095)
Experience						
9–16	2.069 (1.123)	.728 (.495)	1.904* (.605)	.273* (.175)	.655** (.094)	.586 (.171)
17–24	2.868 (2.073)	1.023 (.826)	1.674 (.741)	.265 (.181)	.850 (.151)	.765 (.236)
25+	3.320 (2.270)	1.213 (1.110)	3.879* (2.397)	.686 (.546)	.650 (.218)	.588 (.231)
Gender	.1946** (.114)	.1881** (.115)	.997 (.317)	1.018 (.331)	1.419** (.166)	1.422** (.166)
Government coalition	1.051 (.687)	1.338 (.927)	.272* (.157)	.277* (.166)	.655* (.119)	.657* (.119)
Ideological family	1.479 (1.113)	1.645 (1.243)	.087*** (.056)	.080*** (.053)	.562** (.099)	.561** (.098)
Exp-backbencher	–	9.034* (9.598)	–	9.585** (6.838)	–	1.146 (.353)
Condition number	10.363	14.118	12.918	15.866	9.259	15.159
MP-level variance	3.841 (1.276)	4.187 (1.386)	2.154 (.683)	2.253 (.714)	7.370e-24 (1.774e-19)	2.783e-24 (8.906e-20)
log likelihood	-182.432	-179.520	-419.934	-414.566	-758.232	-758.149
N (level 1)	1240	1240	1240	1240	1240	1240
N (level 2)	401	401	401	401	401	401

Notes: Estimates have been computed using Stata programme: *gllamm*; Reference categories: ‘Backbencher’ (Rank); ‘Party list’ (Mandate); ‘Male’ (Gender); ‘<8 years’ (Experience); ‘Party does not participate in government’ (Government coalition); ‘Right wing’ (Ideological family); ‘Backbencher with >8 years of experience’ (Exp-backbencher); * p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001.

Regression analyses

In Table 4, we present the results of logit models in terms of odds ratio (OR), and robust standard errors are given in parentheses. A first observation is that the condition number is small in both Model 1 and Model 2 for all models. Although ‘large condition numbers do not necessarily imply poor identification’ (Rabe-Hesketh *et al.* 2004: 20), small numbers indicate that the Hessian matrix is not singular and the models are well identified. A second observation is that the variance of the intercept for different subjects (i.e. MPs) is virtually zero when EoV is the dependent variable. Therefore, in this case one would get the exact same estimates having had pooled the data together and run a simple logit model instead of specifying a multilevel analysis.

Regarding our ‘core’ independent variables, we see that only *rank* has a statistical significant effect in all three types of individual-level activity (with the exception of defection in Model 2). The odds to deliver a speech are 11 times larger (47 under Model 2) for frontbench MPs compared to lower-rank MPs. The opposite is true in reference to the other two regression models: the odds of delivering an EoV or casting a deviant vote are smaller for high-ranking MPs compared to backbenchers. These results make for intuitive logic, as MPs in a high-rank position are less likely to express grievances against the official party line.

Interestingly, the regression analysis shows that *mandate* has a significant effect only in reference to EoV. The odds of delivering an EoV appear to be smaller for an MP who has been elected from a single-member district compared to an MP who has been elected off the party list. This might seem surprising, as one would expect that district MPs are more likely to mobilise, but this result confirms that EoVs offer a channel of communication for MPs who find the threshold of defection too high or have more to lose.

Different years of *experience* appear to have a statistical significant effect somewhat in the case of deviant voting. The odds that the most experienced MPs (25 years and more) will vote against the party line are four times greater in comparison to MPs with little parliamentary

experience (less than nine years). In order to test Kam's (2009; 2014) argument that experienced MPs who sit on the backbenches, because they have either been demoted or never secured a frontbench position in the first place, are the most rebellious, we combine experience with rank in Model 2. We find that MPs with at least eight years of experience who hold a backbench position are more likely than less experienced MPs to defect and to deliver a speech. However the latter result does not necessarily imply support of Kam's argument, since a speech is not a 'rebellious act' in the same sense as casting a deviant ballot is.

Looking at *gender* effects, we find that female MPs are less likely to appear on the plenary floor but more likely to give an EoV compared to their male colleagues. As expected, the odds of casting a deviant vote and delivering an EoV are smaller for MPs whose party belongs to the government coalition than for opposition MPs. Lastly MPs that belong to left wing parties are less likely to vote against the party line and give an EoV in comparison to right wing MPs.

The analysis presented above is static in the sense that it does not take into account previous values of the dependent variable(s). Although there is a plethora of scholarly work on the positive impact of previous roll call votes on current ones (e.g. Hirano 2008; Degner and Leuffen 2016), to the best of our knowledge, there are no empirical findings in reference to legislative speech and EoVs. For example: shall we expect that previous occurrences of delivering a speech or EoV impact who delivers a speech or an EoV also in the future? To answer the question, we repeat the analysis (only for Model 1) adding the lagged value (*L.*) of the dependent variable in each of the three types of individual-level activity. Each activity is lagged by one or two time units (i.e. parliamentary actions). The lagged value of speech is added in the first regression model, the lagged value of voting in the second one and the lagged value of EoV in the third one.

A first observation is that *rank* maintains the same effect and its statistical significance in all three types of activities. Table 5 shows that the lagged value of the dependent variable significantly affects the dependent one the cases of defection and EoV. More precisely, defecting in a previous parliamentary action increases the odds of casting a deviant vote in the future by eleven times. This

effect also holds when lagging voting by two time units (Model B). The odds ratio of the lagged dependent variable decreases by three units. The effect remains strong, which can be explained by the fact that dissenters, especially from the governing parties, have little incentive to change their voting behaviour once they have crossed the threshold of defection, given that the issue at hand has become more contested while the government's official position remained largely unaltered. Secondly, we see that most other estimates are not reduced dramatically and also maintain their statistical significance (compare the results of Model B with those of Model 1 in Table 4).

Table 5. OR estimates of two-level random intercept logistic with lagged (*L.*) variables.

	Speech (95% CI)	EoV (95% CI)	Defection (95% CI)	Defection (95% CI) (Model B)	Defection (95% CI) (Model C)
<i>L.</i> Speech	3.119 (3.112)	–	–	–	–
<i>L.</i> Defection	–	–	11.245*** (3.100)	–	–
<i>L2.</i> Defection	–	–	–	8.321*** (4.466)	–
<i>L.</i> EoV	–	.590** (.105)	–	–	2.216* (.684)
Rank	8.550** (6.904)	.481** (.102)	.404** (.116)	.309* (.148)	.287** (.127)
Mandate	1.133 (.688)	1.261 (.256)	.974 (.273)	1.711 (1.203)	1.367 (.535)
Experience					
9–16	3.226 (2.320)	.636* (.114)	1.276 (.319)	.903 (.397)	1.689 (.650)
17–24	5.074 (4.542)	.872 (.185)	1.272 (.404)	1.151 (.652)	1.345 (.665)
25+	3.707 (3.320)	.585 (.197)	1.222 (.519)	.874 (.615)	2.643 (1.914)
Gender	.187* (.140)	1.466* (.248)	.742 (.194)	1.430 (.689)	.726 (.284)
Government coalition	1.064 (.745)	.595* (.146)	.394 (.251)	.113* (.104)	.243 (.180)
Ideological family	1.645 (1.350)	1.138 (.270)	.097*** (.062)	.027*** (.026)	.056*** (.046)
Condition number	12.985	8.906	14.875	14.70	12.615
MP-level variance	4.366 (3.201)	8.427e-18 (2.394e-15)	5.457e-14 (1.100e-13)	1.781 (.978)	3.049 (1.294)
log likelihood	-125.415	-507.606	-288.337	-169.809	-310.299
N (level 1)	842	842	842	452	842
N (level 2)	393	393	393	230	393

In the case of EoVs, we see an effect in the opposite direction: The odds that an MP will deliver an EoV are larger for MPs who did not do so in the previous parliamentary action. Whether drafted by a group of MPs or delivered by individuals, EoVs are meant to provide a concise reasoning behind the MPs' voting decision. Therefore, an MP who provided an EoV in the past does not have a strong motivation to explain her decision again if her opinion on the issue has remained unchanged. What is even more intriguing, our results (see Model C) show that an MP who explained her voting decision in the past is two times more likely to defect in a future vote compared to MPs who did not deliver an EoV. In other words, EoVs are a first step towards deviant voting and can function as a 'warning' mechanism for party leaderships.

To sum up, our results reveal a significant effect of a legislator's rank within his party. Also the years of experience as an MP and even gender are relevant in explaining mobilisation patterns in the German Bundestag. We find only limited evidence of a 'mandate divide', and yet it seems that dissenters were rewarded electorally. In the 17th term, there were 37 dissenters in total, of which 19 were district MPs and 18 list MPs. 16 of the rebellious district MPs were re-elected in the 2013 election and three retired. All but one district MP achieved a better result than in previous election, and 13 of them outperformed their party (in terms of net gain compared to their party's performance in the respective federal state). While defection may be rewarded electorally, especially when public opinion is more sceptical than the political elite, we do not find any supporting evidence that rebellious list MPs have been dropped down on the closed party list. (Then again, we have to bear in mind that only one list MP from the CDU, i.e. the only government party that has a significant share of district mandates, defected in the 17th term.)

Conclusion

When talking about the politicisation, meaning increasing contestation and domestication, of EU politics, we cannot simply assume that national legislatures would be a driving force in these

processes. Mobilisation in the parliamentary setting is both enabled and constrained by institutional conditions, which are to a large extent shaped by political parties. This study is premised on the argument that the German Bundestag is anything but an obvious case of EU contestation. Conventionally, the pro-EU cross-partisan consensus is named as the key factor. Since the onset of the euro crisis at the latest, cracks emerged in this consensus, and in line with earlier theoretical propositions dissent started to form within mainstream parties as least as much as between parties. As it is in the interest of the party leadership to maintain a cohesive party label and party discipline is generally strong in the Bundestag, we discuss the theoretical implications of party control and test how it affects individual-level mobilisation around the Greek crisis, a complex and contentious policy issue that has received more and more public attention over the years.

Overall, mobilisation rates have increased over the course of the crisis, but we find considerable intra-party variation in legislative speech, voting defection and the usage of EoVs. Party leaders exercise tight control of the Bundestag's plenary floor, resulting in plenary debates dominated by party leaders themselves and other experienced frontbenchers, who toe the party line. Party leaders also possess means to discipline legislators who defect from the party line in a recorded vote. We do not find clear evidence of a 'mandate divide' between district and list MPs, but our analysis confirms that backbenchers are much more likely to cast a deviant vote. The same is true for EoVs. Despite their limited visibility, EoVs provide an 'outlet', that is, a worthwhile exercise to raise their voice, for many legislators when controversiality is rising but this is not sufficiently reflected in the plenary debates due to party control. The fact that EoVs are even used quite extensively to express support for the party position is a meaningful indicator of widespread parliamentary mobilisation. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, our analysis establishes for the first time a link between EoVs and deviant voting, as we show that MPs who justify their voting decision are more likely to vote against their party in a future vote.

As summarised in Figure 3, the mobilisation patterns we identify highlight that when public visibility and accordingly the level of party control decreases, participation in general tends to

increase, as MPs sitting on the backbenches, MPs with little experience, MPs elected via party lists and – in ‘hard’ policy issues like this one – also female MPs are likely to get more involved.




Figure 3. Levels of public visibility, party control and mobilisation by type of activity.

At the beginning of this article we ask whether backbenchers, who tend to be more critical of, for instance, extending the EU’s competences any further, have learned to fight back and make their voices heard within parliament, as claimed by Raunio and Hix (2000). Out of all variables, our results show the most consistent effect regarding MPs’ rank. We can therefore conclude that when the controversiality and public attention towards an EU issue are rising, backbenchers in the German Bundestag will express their opinion making use of the channels available to them or even defect. Since the most prominent channel, namely legislative speech, is closed to them, it remains questionable though to what extent they can actually influence the public debate.

When examining the contestation of EU politics in national chambers of parliament, the consideration of institutional conditions is of utmost importance. This study discusses and empirically verifies how levels of party control affect what types of MPs participate in the debates. For future research, the next obvious step would be to analyse the impact on the actual content of the debate. We need to ask how the absence of certain actors shapes the parliamentary debate that is visible to the wider public. In other words, why does it matter who speaks for the party?

Notes

1. The OPAL score of institutional strength aggregates 11 indicators to measure access to information, the scrutiny infrastructure to process information and formal oversight and influence instruments.
2. We suggest that the notion of controversiality is to be preferred to polarisation, since polarisation may in fact mean a narrowing of the political space by reducing the political discussion to two opposing or extreme positions.
3. The German Politikbarometer survey from September 2011 revealed that when asked which party best represents their interests in managing the euro crisis 14 per cent of respondents said none and 28 per cent were not able to answer the question (http://www.forschungsgruppe.de/Umfragen/Politbarometer/Archiv/Politbarometer_2011/Oktob er_II/, accessed 4 March 2017).
4. According to Bäck *et al.* (2014: 507–8), there are three explanatory factors: (1) choices made on the basis of personal interests, (2) norms and gender stereotyping in society at large and in party organisations, and (3) hierarchies and strategic considerations within the parties.
5. The Agreement Index (Hix *et al.* 2003: 317) is calculated for each RCV as follows:

$$AI_i = \frac{\max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\} - \frac{1}{2}[(Y_i + N_i + A_i) - \max\{Y_i, N_i, A_i\}]}{(Y_i + N_i + A_i)}$$

where Y_i denotes the amount of ‘yes’ votes, N_i the number of ‘no’ votes and A_i the abstentions given by a party group i .

6. In July 2015, when the Bundestag voted on the government’s mandate for negotiating the third aid package, the Greens did not have a whipped party line and this was reflected in very low voting unity (as illustrated in Figure 1). In this case, we could not count any votes as deviant in order to avoid skewed results.

Funding

This work was supported by the Finnish Cultural Foundation.

Notes on contributors

Caroline Bhattacharya is a PhD candidate at the Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki. Her dissertation analyses the concurrent contestation and decontestation of the euro crisis in the German Bundestag. [caroline.bhattacharya@helsinki.fi]

Achillefs Papageorgiou is a post-doctoral researcher at the Department of Political and Economic Studies, University of Helsinki. His research interests are in political analysis, elections and quantitative methods. His research appeared in journals such as *Acta Politica*, *Electoral Studies*, *International Political Science Review* and *Scandinavian Political Studies*. [achillefs.papageorgiou@helsinki.fi]

References

- André, Audrey, André Freire, and Zsófia Papp (2014). 'Electoral Rules and Legislators' Personal Vote-seeking', in Kris Deschouwer and Sam Depauw (eds.), *Representing the People: A Survey among Members of Statewide and Sub-state Parliaments*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 87–109.
- Auel, Katrin (2006). 'The Europeanisation of the German Bundestag: Institutional Change and Informal Adaptation', *German Politics*, 15:3, 249–68.
- Auel, Katrin, and Tapio Raunio (2014). 'Debating the State of the Union? Comparing Parliamentary Debates on EU Issues in Finland, France, Germany and the United Kingdom', *Journal of Legislative Studies*, 20:1, 13–28.

- Auel, Katrin, Olivier Rozenberg, and Angela Tacea (2015). 'Fighting Back? And, If So, How? Measuring Parliamentary Strength and Activity in EU Affairs', in Claudia Heffler, Christine Neuhold, Olivier Rozenberg and Julie Smith (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 60–93.
- Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus, and Jochen Müller (2014). 'Who Takes the Parliamentary Floor? The Role of Gender in Speech-making in the Swedish Riksdag', *Political Research Quarterly*, 67:3, 504–18.
- Bailer, Stefanie (2017). 'To Use the Whip or Not: Whether and When Party Group Leaders Use Disciplinary Measures to Achieve Voting Unity', *International Political Science Review*, online first.
- Becher, Michael and Ulrich Sieberer (2008). 'Discipline, Electoral Rules and Defection in the Bundestag, 1983–94', *German Politics*, 17:3, 293–304.
- Bergmann, Henning, Stefanie Bailer, Tamaki Ohmura, Thomas Saalfeld, and Ulrich Sieberer (2016). 'Namentliche Abstimmungen im Bundestag 1949 bis 2013: Befunde aus einem neuen Datensatz', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen*, 47:1, 26–50.
- Best, Heinrich, and Lars Vogel (2014). 'The Sociology of Legislators and Legislatures', in Claudia Heffler, Christine Neuhold, Olivier Rozenberg and Julie Smith (eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of National Parliaments and the European Union*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 57–81.
- Bhattacharya, Caroline (2017). 'Towards A Dynamic Model of Reparliamentarisation of National Legislatures in the EU: The Centrality of Politicisation', Working paper.
- Carey, John M. (2007). 'Competing Principals, Political Institutions, and Party Unity in Legislative Voting', *American Journal of Political Science*, 51:1, 92–107.
- De Wilde, Pieter (2011). 'No Polity for Old Politics? A Framework for Analyzing Politicization of European Integration', *Journal of European Integration*, 33:5, 559–75.

- De Wilde, Pieter, and Michael Zürn (2012). 'Can the Politicization of European Integration be Reversed?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 50:S1, 137–53.
- Degner, Hanno, and Dirk Leuffen (2016). 'Keynes, Friedman, or Monnet? Explaining Parliamentary Voting Behaviour on Fiscal Aid for Euro Area Member States', *West European Politics*, 39:6, 1139–59.
- García Lupato, Fabio (2014). 'Talking Europe, Using Europe: The EU and Parliamentary Competition in Italy and Spain (1986–2006)', *Journal of Legislative Studies*, 20:1, 29–45.
- Gschwend, Thomas, and Thomas Zittel (2015). 'Do Constituency Candidates Matter in German Federal Elections? The Personal Vote as an Interactive Process', *Electoral Studies*, 39, 338–49.
- Hazan, Reuven Y. (2014). 'Candidate Selection: Implications and Challenges for Legislative Behaviour', in Shane Martin, Thomas Saalfeld and Kaare W. Strøm (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 213–30.
- Hirano, Shigeo (2008). 'Third Parties, Elections, and Roll-Call Votes: The Populist Party and the Late Nineteenth-Century U.S. Congress', *Legislative Studies Quarterly*, 33:1, 131–60.
- Hix, Simon, Amie Kreppel, and Abdul Noury (2003). 'The Party System in the European Parliament: Collusive or Competitive?', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 41:2, 309–31.
- Kam, Christopher (2009). *Party Discipline and Parliamentary Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kam, Christopher (2014). 'Party Discipline', in Shane Martin, Thomas Saalfeld and Kaare W. Strøm (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 399–417.
- Karlas, Jan (2012). 'National Parliamentary Control of EU Affairs: Institutional Design after Enlargement', *West European Politics*, 35:5, 1095–113.

- Kröger, Sandra and Richard Bellamy (2016). 'Beyond a Constraining Dissensus: The Role of National Parliaments in Domesticating and Normalising the Politicization of European Integration', *Comparative European Politics*, 14:2, 131–53.
- Lesaffre, Emmanuel, and Bart Spiessens (2001). 'On the Effect of the Number of Quadrature Points in a Logistic Random-Effects Model: An Example', *Applied Statistics*, 50:3, 325–35.
- Liu, Quing, and Donald A. Pierce (1994). 'A Note on Gauss-Hermite Quadrature', *Biometrika*, 81:3, 624–9.
- Manow, Philip (2013). 'Mixed Rules, Different Roles? An Analysis of the Typical Pathways into the Bundestag and of MPs' Parliamentary Behaviour', *Journal of Legislative Studies*, 19:3, 287–308.
- Mattila, Mikko and Tapio Raunio (2012). 'Drifting Further Apart: National Parties and their Electorates on the EU Dimension', *West European Politics*, 35:3, 589–606.
- Miklin, Eric (2014). 'EU Politicisation and National Parliaments: Visibility of Choices and Better Aligned Ministers?', *Journal of Legislative Studies*, 20:1, 78–92.
- Mouffe, Chantal (2005). *On the Political*. London: Routledge.
- Mouffe, Chantal (2014). 'Agonistic Democracy and Radical Politics', *Pavilion: Journal for Politics and Culture*, 29 December. Available at <http://pavilionmagazine.org/chantal-mouffe-agonistic-democracy-and-radical-politics/> (accessed 13 February 2017).
- Ohmura, Tamaki (2014). 'When Your Name Is on the List, It Is Time to Party: The Candidacy Divide in a Mixed-Member Proportional System', *Representation*, 50:1, 69–82.
- Proksch, Sven-Oliver, and Jonathan B. Slapin (2015a). 'Debate Participation: Germany and the United Kingdom', in *The Politics of Parliamentary Debate: Parties, Rebels and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 100–23.

- Proksch, Sven-Oliver, and Jonathan B. Slapin (2015b). 'A Theory of Parliamentary Debate', in *The Politics of Parliamentary Debate: Parties, Rebels and Representation*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 17–42.
- Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia, Anders Skrondal, and Andrew Pickles (2004). 'GLLAMM Manual', *UC Berkeley Division of Biostatistics Working Paper Series*, Paper 160, University of California, Berkeley.
- Rabe-Hesketh, Sophia, and Anders Skrondal (2012). *Multilevel and Longitudinal Modeling Using Stata*. College Station: Stata Press.
- Rauh, Christian (2015). 'Communicating Supranational Governance? The Salience of EU Affairs in the German Bundestag, 1991–2013', *European Union Politics*, 16:1, 116–38.
- Raunio, Tapio (2005). 'Holding Governments Accountable in European Affairs: Explaining Cross-National Variation', *Journal of Legislative Studies*, 11:3/4, 319–42.
- Raunio, Tapio (2015). 'The Role of National Legislatures in EU Politics', in Olaf Cramme and Sara B. Hobolt (eds.), *Democratic Politics in a European Union Under Stress*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 103–19.
- Raunio, Tapio, and Simon Hix (2000). 'Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back: European Integration and Parliamentary Government', *West European Politics*, 23:4, 142–68.
- Saalfeld, Thomas and Kaare W. Strøm (2014). 'Political Parties and Legislators', in Shane Martin, Thomas Saalfeld and Kaare W. Strøm (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 371–98.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. (1969). 'Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration', *International Organization*, 23:1, 161–6.
- Sieberer, Ulrich (2010). 'Behavioural Consequences of Mixed Electoral Systems: Deviating Voting Behaviour of District and List MPs in the German Bundestag', *Electoral Studies*, 29:3, 484–96.

- Sieberer, Ulrich (2015). 'Using MP Statements to Explain Voting Behaviour in the German Bundestag: An Individual Level Test of the Competing Principals Theory', *Party Politics*, 21:2, 284–94.
- Taggart, Paul, and Aleks Szczerbiak (2008). 'Conclusion: Opposing Europe? Three Patterns of Party Competition over Europe', in Aleks Szczerbiak and Paul Taggart (eds.), *Opposing Europe? The Comparative Party Politics of Euroscepticism, Volume 1: Case Studies and Country Surveys*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 348–63.
- Wendler, Frank (2016). *Debating Europe in National Parliaments: Public Justification and Political Polarization*, London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Winzen, Thomas (2012). 'National Parliamentary Control of European Union Affairs: A Cross-National and Longitudinal Comparison', *West European Politics*, 35:3, 657–72.
- Winzen, Thomas (2013). 'European Integration and National Parliamentary Oversight Institutions', *European Union Politics*, 14:2, 297–323.
- Zittel, Thomas (2014). 'Patterns of Personal Vote Seeking in Mixed Electoral Systems: The Politics of Retrenchment in German Defence Policy', *Representation*, 50:1, 41–53.

Appendix 1. GLLAMM with adaptive quadrature.

As the GLLAMM is calculated using adaptive quadrature, its accuracy also depends on the number of integration points. Initially we run the model with quadrature points set at default (Q -default=8). We store the vector of parameter estimates and then pass them as starting values to the new model increasing the number of integration points to $Q=12$. We find that differences between the estimates of the two specifications are larger than 0.01%, which is usually the acceptable threshold. Increasing each time the number of integration points we notice that estimates are not affected by the choice of quadrature when $Q=37$. Although this number is four times larger than Q -default still all models converge very fast (it only takes four iterations for convergence). Following we keep the same number of integration points employing this time a model specification (*xtlogit, re*) that uses Gauss-Hermite quadrature (Liu and Pierce 1994; Lessafre and Spiessens 2001). Using the same rule of thumb, that is ‘if coefficients do not change by more than a relative difference of 10^{-4} (0.01%), the choice of quadrature points does not significantly affect the outcome’ (<http://www.stata.com/manuals13/xtquadchk.pdf>, accessed 29 March 2017), we find that our model converges extremely well for the same number of quadrature points, that is $Q=37$. The reason that there is no difference found in the number of quadrature points between Gauss-Hermite quadrature and adaptive quadrature is probably due to the small cluster size. Results from the quadrature check between $Q=37$ and $Q_1=2\times Q/3$ and $Q_2=4\times Q/3$ are given in Table A (Here we only show the results when the response variable is speech). From Table A we see that the largest relative difference equals .00001, a number still smaller than the acceptable threshold.

Table A. Quadrature comparison: Relative differences.

	Fitted quadrature 37 points	Comparison quadrature 25 points ----- Relative difference	Comparison quadrature 49 points ----- Relative difference
Log Likelihood	-179.52022	-2.270e-07	1.077e-08
Rank	3.8507348	2.400e-10	-7.535e-08
Mandate	.41546041	-7.417e-09	1.261e-06
Experience: 9–16	-.31756756	-6.796e-09	8.602e-07
Experience: 17–24	.02322377	5.469e-09	.00001423
Experience: 25+	.19313256	-1.718e-08	3.268e-06
Gender	-1.6706918	-2.149e-09	-5.628e-07
Government coalition	.29099856	-4.790e-09	9.526e-07
Ideological family	.49781043	-7.549e-09	1.011e-06
Constant	1.4319236	-1.025e-09	-4.833e-07

Appendix 2. Count and percentage of district and list MPs by party group.

Legislative term	CDU/CSU				SPD				FDP				Left				Greens				Total			
	District		List		District		List		District		List		District		List		District		List		District		List	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
17 th term	218	91.2	21	8.8	64	43.8	82	56.2	0	0.0	93	100.0	16	21.1	60	78.9	1	1.5	67	98.5	299	48.1	323	51.9
18 th term	236	75.9	75	24.1	58	30.1	135	69.9	–	–	–	–	4	6.3	60	93.8	1	1.6	62	98.4	299	47.4	332	52.6

Appendix 3. Percentage of MPs who mobilised, including (Mob1) and excluding (Mob2) the usage of joint EoVs, by party group.

Legislative term	CDU		CSU		SPD		FDP		Left		Greens		Total	
	Mob1	Mob2	Mob1	Mob2	Mob1	Mob2	Mob1	Mob2	Mob1	Mob2	Mob1	Mob2	Mob1	Mob2
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
17 th term	12.2	11.7	24.4	20.0	36.7	12.0	22.1	22.1	29.9	26.0	50.0	9.7	26.7	15.9
18 th term	55.1	32.0	54.4	45.6	22.6	12.8	–	–	46.2	24.6	65.1	22.2	45.1	30.2