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# Polysemy in Traditional vs. Cognitive Linguistics

Éva Kovács

## 1 Introduction

Polysemy, the phenomenon whereby a linguistic unit exhibits multiple distinct yet related meanings is a very common feature of any language. In fact, almost all the words in language are polysemous to a greater or lesser extent. Consider such words in English as *get*, *face* and *nice*, etc. Polysemy is justly considered to be a necessary means of language economy. As Ullmann (1959:118) puts it, “polysemy is an indispensable resource of language economy. It would be altogether impracticable to have separate terms for every referent”.

No wonder polysemy is such a topic of interest in the study and description of natural languages, and poses special problems both in semantic theory and semantic applications, such as lexicography or translation. Nevertheless, except as a source of humour and puns, polysemy is rarely a problem for communication among people. In fact, language users select the appropriate senses of polysemous words “effortlessly and unconsciously” (Ravin & Leacock 2000:1).

A look at the entries for polysemous words in different dictionaries shows that polysemy presents a challenge to lexicographers. The traditional lexicographic practice is to list multiple dictionary senses for polysemous words and to group related ones as sub-senses. However, dictionaries differ in the number of senses they define for each word, the grouping into subsenses and the content of definitions. It seems that there is little agreement among lexicographers as to the degree of polysemy and the way in which the different senses are organised (Hollósy 2008:209).

The lexicographers’ disunity is mirrored in linguistically naive speaker’s judgement about polysemous words. Jorgenson (1990:187) asked speakers to distinguish senses of highly polysemous words, among others: *head* (21 dictionary senses), *life* (18), *world* (14), *way* (12), *side* (12) and *hand* (11). The author found that the subjects in the test consistently refused to recognise more than about three senses, even after being shown the dictionary entries for polysemous words that differentiated a dozen or more senses. In Jorgenson’s view (1990: 168), dictionary entries for some words “do inflate the number of sense categories beyond those normally distinguished by speakers”. One difficulty people will have in using the dictionary is in distinguishing major and

minor senses, since most dictionaries treat all senses as equally important, which is clearly misleading.

Being very complex, the concept of polysemy poses a challenge for lexical semanticists as well. As pointed out by Jackson and Amwela (2007:69), it involves a certain number of problems, such as the number of meanings, transference of meanings and difficulty in recognizing polysemy as opposed to homonymy.

Since one meaning cannot always be delimited and distinguished from another, we cannot determine exactly how many meanings a polysemous word has. Consider the verb *eat*, which has the following main meanings (Mayor 2009:535):

1. to put food in your mouth and chew and swallow it (She *was eating* an ice cream.)
2. to have a meal (Let's *eat* first and then go to the movie.)
3. to use a very large amount of something (This car *eats* petrol.)

However, besides its literal meaning, it is also used in idioms having a transferred meaning, such as *eat your words* (admit that what you said was wrong); *eat somebody alive* (be very angry with someone); *I'll eat my hat*; *I could eat a horse*; *have somebody eating out of your hand*; *eat somebody out of house and home*; and *you are what you eat*, etc. What is more, in the literal sense, we can also distinguish between eating nuts and eating soup, the former with fingers and the latter with spoons. If we push this analysis too far, we may end up deciding that the verb *eat* has a different meaning for every type of food we eat (Jackson & Amwela 2007:69). Even this example shows that a word may have both a 'literal' meaning and one or more 'transferred' meanings, although we cannot determine with precision how many different meanings a given word may have altogether.

Nevertheless, the most puzzling question both lexicographers and lexical semanticists are faced with is how to distinguish polysemy from homonymy. As generally defined in semantics (Leech 1981:227–229, Lyons 1981:43–47, Lyons 1995:54–60), homonymy refers to etymologically unrelated words that happen to have the same pronunciation and/or spelling (e.g. *bank* as a financial institution and the edge of a river). Conversely, polysemes are etymologically and therefore semantically related, and typically originate from metaphoric/metonymic usage (e.g. *bank* as a building and a financial institution). The distinction is, however, not always straightforward, especially since words that are etymologically related can, over time, drift so far apart that the original semantic relation is no longer recognizable, *pupil* (in a school) and *pupil* (of the eye).

Homonymy and polysemy often give rise to ambiguity, and context is highly relevant to disambiguate the meaning of utterances. Consider the oft-mentioned example from Lyons, in which the two phenomena appear together (Lyons 1977:397):

(1) *They passed the port at midnight.*

This utterance is lexically ambiguous. However, it would normally be clear in a given context which of the two homonyms, *port*<sup>1</sup> ('harbour') or *port*<sup>2</sup> ('kind of fortified wine'), is being used and also which sense of the polysemous verb 'pass' ('go past' or 'give') is intended.

Lexical ambiguity resulting from polysemy and homonymy has also attracted the attention of translators for a long time. It is generally assumed in translation theory that the disambiguation of contrastive polysemy often depends on information pertaining to the context of situation only (Catford 1965, Newmark 1988 and Nida 2001, etc.). Lyons (1977:235) also notes that context plays a central role in solving problems of translation which arise as a result of homonymy or polysemy. If the ambiguity is resolved by the context in which the sentence is uttered, it can be correctly interpreted by the hearer, and, in principle, correctly translated into another language.

Furthermore, it has also been demonstrated by some of the linguists mentioned above (e.g. Lyons 1977:551–552 and Lipka 1992:136, etc.) that there is subjective association involved in making a distinction between polysemy and homonymy as well. In other words, there is a good deal of agreement among native speakers as to what counts as the one and what counts as the other in particular instances. However, there are also very many instances about which native speakers will hesitate or be in disagreement.

Finally, as is referred to above, homonymy and polysemy are often the basis of a lot of word play, usually for humorous effects. In the nursery rhyme *Mary had a little lamb*, we think of a small animal, but in the comic version, *Mary had a little lamb, some rice and vegetables*, we think of a small amount of meat. The polysemy of *lamb* allows two interpretations. However, we make sense of the riddle *Why are trees often mistaken for dogs?* by recognising the homonymy in the answer: *Because of their bark* (Yule 2006:107–108).

In the light of all these problems related to polysemy it is understandable why it has been so widely discussed in the literature. In fact, we can make a distinction between two different approaches in their treatment. While traditional grammarians such as Lyons (1977, 1981, 1995), Leech (1981), Cowie (1982), Lipka (1992) and Jackson & Amwela (2007), etc. assume that polysemy is a characteristic of only word meaning, cognitive linguists (Lakoff 1987, Tyler & Evans 2003, Croft & Cruse 2004, Evans & Green 2006 and Evans 2007, etc.) challenged this view by regarding polysemy as a category of other areas of language, such as morphology, phonology and syntax. This paper sets out to compare these two opposing approaches. Thus the primary aim of this study is twofold. First, I will look at how polysemy is treated in traditional approaches showing primarily what attempts were made to differentiate polysemy from homonymy and what the drawbacks of the criteria suggested for this were. Second, I will highlight the new approach to polysemy in cognitive linguistics.

## 2 Polysemy in traditional approaches

The term *polysemy* is derived from the Greek *poly-* meaning ‘many’ and *sem-* meaning ‘sense’ or ‘meaning’. Thus the roots of the study of the complex relations between words and meanings lie in Greek philosophy. However, as was pointed out by Siblot (1995:24), Aristotle was highly critical of polysemy. “Words of ambiguous meanings”, he claimed, “are chiefly useful to enable the sophist to mislead his learners”. Later, the majority of philosophers denounced polysemy and considered it “a defect of language and a handicap to communication, understanding and even clear thinking” (Ullmann 1959:167).

Concrete research into the multiplicity of meaning only began in the 18th century and was continued into the 19th century by linguists interested in meaning from the point of view of etymology, historical lexicography or historical semantics (Nerlich & Clarke 1997:351). In fact, the origin of the term *polysemy* used in linguistics dates back to 1897 when Michel Bréal (1897:145) introduced it in his *Essai de Sémantique* as follows:

Le sens nouveau, quel qu’il soit ne met pas fin à l’ancien. Ils existent tous les deux l’un à côté de l’autre. Le même terme peut s’employer tour à tour au sens propre ou au sens métaphorique, au sens restreint ou au sens étendu, au sens abstrait ou au sens concret ... à mesure qu’une signification nouvelle est donnée au mot, il a l’air de se multiplier et de produire des exemplaires nouveaux, semblables de forme, différents de valeur. Nous appelons ce phénomène de multiplication la polysémie.

In this passage, Bréal argues that polysemy occurs when a word denotes a new sense together with the old one. The word usage will vary between a basic sense and a metaphoric sense, a restricted sense and an extended sense and between an abstract sense and a concrete sense. He adds that any new signification assigned to a particular word is more likely to produce, in turn, other new signification to be assigned to the same word. It is worth noting that in his description of polysemy, Bréal considers that polysemy is an open-ended and quite productive phenomenon in language.

In the course of the 20th century, the focus of linguistic studies, in general, changed from a diachronic perspective to a synchronic perspective. However, polysemy played only a minor role in the structuralist tradition. In the theory of semantics developed by Katz & Fodor (1963) and Katz (1972), the issue of polysemy did not receive much attention. For one thing, Katz (1972) did not distinguish polysemy from homonymy, more importantly, he took “the one form–one meaning approach” (Cuyckens & Zawada 2001:xii). Accordingly, polysemy was maximally restricted and bringing as many different senses under one semantic definition was given preference. In fact, polysemy was largely regarded as the unusual case, with monosemy and homonymy being regarded as the norm. Still several linguists (Leech 1981, Lyons 1977, 1981, 1995 and Lipka



1992, etc.) did explore polysemy focussing primarily on the differences between polysemy and homonymy. They recognised that the various senses of a polysemous word could be derived from a basic sense but did not go further than that. Besides, in these traditional approaches, polysemy is restricted to the study of word–meaning. The lexical semanticists mentioned above use it to describe words like *body*, which has a range of distinct meanings. Consider some of its different meanings (Mayor 2009:172):

- (2) a My fingers were numb and my whole *body* ached.
- b The dog found the *body* of a girl in the woods.
- c Nick had bruises on his face and *body*. The bird has a small *body* and long wings.
- d Workers at the factory are making steel *bodies* for cars.
- e The arguments are explained in the *body* of the text.
- f The British Medical Association is the doctors' professional *body*.

The word *body* is a typical example of polysemy as its different senses are related both semantically and historically. *Body* in the following examples can refer to the physical structure of a person or animal (a), a corpse (b), the central part of a person or animal's body not including the head, arms, legs, wings (c), the main structure of a vehicle not including the engine, wheels, etc. (d), the main or central part of something (e) or a group of people working together to do a particular job (f). Historically, it goes back to OE *bodig* (Onions 1966:104).

As is mentioned above, traditional linguists (e.g. Leech 1981, Lyons, 1981, 1995, Lipka 1992 and Jackson & Amwela, 2007, etc.) usually treated polysemy together with homonymy. In their view, although they have the same shape, homonyms are considered distinct lexemes, mainly because they have unrelated meanings and different etymologies. In fact, homonyms have two types: homographs (same spelling), e.g. *lead* (metal) and *lead* (dog's lead) and homophones (same sound), e.g. *right*, *rite* and *write*.

In traditional approaches, there have been several criteria suggested to distinguish between homonymy and polysemy (Lipka 1992:135–39, Lyons 1981:43–47, Lyons 1977: 550–552, Lyons 1995:54–60 and Jackson & Amwela 2007:68–71). They are as follows:

- 1. formal identity or distinctness
- 2. etymology
- 3. close semantic relatedness

However, as pointed out by the above linguists, none of these criteria seems to be satisfactory for distinguishing between polysemy and homonymy.

## 2.1 Formal identity or distinctness

As for their formal properties, polysemous words have the same form with a range of different but related meanings, e.g. *plain* (obvious, clear, simple, not

beautiful, etc.), while homonyms can show differences in spelling, e.g. *hoarse* (speaking in a low rough voice) and *horse* (animal) or *threw* (the past form of *throw*) and *through* (from one side to the other), and pronunciation, e.g. *tear* [tɛə] ~ ‘rip’, *tear* [tɪə] ~ ‘a drop of salty liquid that comes out of your eye when you are crying’ or *wind* [wɪnd] ~ ‘moving air’ and *wind* [waɪnd] ~ ‘turn something several times’ as well.

As for homonymy, some linguists, such as Lyons (1981:43–47, 1995:54–60) make a distinction between absolute homonymy and various kinds of partial homonymy. Absolute homonymy must satisfy the following three conditions:

1. their forms must be unrelated in meaning
2. all their forms must be identical
3. identical forms must be syntactically equivalent

Absolute homonymy is common enough: *bank*<sup>1</sup> (a financial institution), *bank*<sup>2</sup> (the edge of a river); *bark*<sup>1</sup> (the sound of a dog), *bark*<sup>2</sup> (the skin of a tree); *ball*<sup>1</sup> (a round object), *ball*<sup>2</sup> (a large formal occasion at which people dance). Obviously, in the above words there does not exist any semantic relationship between the two meanings, which is a necessary requirement of a polysemous lexeme.

In such cases, however, because of the sameness of shape of homonyms, there is a “danger of homonymous conflict or clash” in the sense that two homonyms with totally different meanings may both make sense in the same utterance, where the context plays a decisive role in identifying the relevant meaning of the homonym in question (Jackson & Amwela 2007:72):

- (3) a The *route* was very long.  
       The *root* was very long.  
 b Helen didn’t see the *bat*. (animal)  
       Helen didn’t see the *bat*. (long wooden stick)

Besides absolute homonymy, there are many different kinds of partial homonymy as well (Lyons 1981:43–47, 1995:54–60). One such kind of homonymy is illustrated by *found*. The form *found* is shared by ‘find’ and ‘found’, but they have different forms, such as *finds*, *finding* or *finds*, *founding*, etc. and *found* as a form of ‘find’ is not syntactically equivalent to *found* as a form of ‘found’. As pointed out by Lyons, it is particularly important to note the condition of syntactic equivalence. Although *found* as a form of ‘find’ is not syntactically equivalent to *found* as a form of ‘found’, it is in both cases a verb form. There are certain contexts in which *found* may be construed, syntactically, in either way. Consider the following example:

- (4) They *found* hospitals and charitable institutions.

This sentence is ambiguous, but its ambiguity is lexical: it depends upon a difference in the meaning of *found* (establish) and *find* (get by searching). This

example also shows that context is highly relevant to disambiguate the meaning of utterances.

However, in Lyons' view (1981:44), it is quite possible for partial homonymy never to result in ambiguity. For example, the partial homonymy of the adjective *last* (previous) and the verb *last* (continue to exist) rarely produces ambiguity. Consider the following example:

- (5) It happened *last* week.  
Bricks *last* a long time.

Lyons also refers to another kind of homonymy which is often not recognized in standard treatments. For example, the words *rung* and *ring* are partial homonyms as in

- (6) A *rung* of the ladder was broken.  
The bell was *rung* at midnight.

In Lyons' view (1981:44), it represents a kind of partial homonymy that "does not necessarily involve identity of either the citation-forms or the underlying stem-forms of the lexemes in question".

In some cases of homonymy, besides the difference in meaning and in spelling/pronunciation, the syntactic aspects must also be taken into consideration (Lyons 1981:43–47, 1995:54–60, Lipka 1992:136 and Jackson & Amwela 2007:72, etc.). Thus homonyms may also be kept apart by syntactic differences, i.e. they belong to different word classes. Consider the following examples (Mayor 2009:128–129):

- (7) a A *bear* is a large strong animal with thick hair.  
b Please don't leave me. I couldn't *bear* it.

In sum, there are various safeguards against any possibility of confusion between homonymous words: the difference in spelling, the difference in meaning, the difference in overall context and the difference in word class. In the case of homonymous words that belong to the same word class and have the same spelling, etymology might help as well.

## 2.2 Etymology

Consider *bat*, the homonymous noun mentioned in example (3), the two meanings of which have a different historical origin:

- (8) bat 1. (club, stick) OE. *batt*; 2. mouse-like winged quadruped ME. *backe*, *bakke* (Onions 1966:78)

Similarly, the word *ear* with the meanings 'organ of hearing' and 'head of corn' are distinguished as homonyms because they were formally distinct in Old English and thus have a different etymology: OE. *ēare* = organ of hearing; OE.;

*ēar* = spike of corn (Onions 1966:297). Consequently, *bat*<sup>1,2</sup> and *ear*<sup>1,2</sup> should be treated as two separate words in dictionaries, which is not always the case.

In contrast, on the basis of their shared etymology, the words *pupil*<sup>1</sup> (a child at school) and *pupil*<sup>2</sup> (the small black round area in the middle of your eye) should be treated as polysemes (Onions 1966:724):

- (9) pupil: (O)F. *pupille*, L. *pūpillus*, *-illa* orphan, ward, secondary dim. of *pūpus* boy, *pūpa* girl  
 pupil: (O)F. *pupille*, L. *pūpilla*, secondary dim. of *pūpa* girl, doll, pupil of the eye

Similarly, *flower* ‘part of a plant’ and *flour* ‘powder made by milling grain’ should also be treated as a single polysemous word. In fact, they are etymologically identical, since both go back to the same Middle English word *flour* (OF. *flour*): A) reproductive organs of plants B) pulverised form of a chemical substance (Onions 1966:346). In spite of the different spelling, both are pronounced identically in present-day English. They are considered as two different words not only by speakers but in dictionaries as well, i.e. they are homonyms.

As is noted by Lyons (1977:551–552), in practice, however, the etymological criterion is not always decisive. First of all, there are many words in English about whose historical derivation people are uncertain. Secondly, it is not always clear what is meant by etymological relationship in this context. The lexeme *port*<sup>1</sup> (meaning ‘harbour’) derives from the Latin ‘portus’. *Port*<sup>2</sup> (meaning ‘strong, sweet Portuguese wine’), on the other hand, came into English fairly recently and derives from the name of the city in Portugal from which the particular kind of wine it denotes was exported. But the name of this city *Oporto* derives in Portuguese from an expression (*O Porto*), which originally meant, simply, ‘the harbour’; and the Portuguese *porto* comes from the same Latin lexeme from which the English *port*<sup>1</sup> derives (Onions 1966:699–670). Thus, whether we say that *port*<sup>1</sup> and *port*<sup>2</sup> are etymologically related, depends on how far we are prepared to trace the history of words.

Lipka (1992:136) also refers to some other pairs of words with the same origin, such as *glamour* and *grammar*, *catch* and *chase*, *shirt* and *skirt*, etc., which are listed as different entries in dictionaries. Not surprisingly, most native speakers do not possess any etymological knowledge about them. Thus etymology is irrelevant for a purely semantic analysis of some English words:

- (10) *glamour* (magic, spell XVIII; magic beauty XIX. orig. Sc., alteration of GRAMMAR (Onions 1966:400)  
*catch* obsolete chase; capture, grasp, seize; take, get, receive XIII. ME. *cacche-n* ~ AN., ONF. *cachier* (Onions 1966:152)  
*shirt* undergarment for the trunk. OE *scýrte*, corr. formally to LG. *schörte*, MDu *schorte*, G. *schürze* apron, ON. *skyrta* (whence SKIRT), based on Germ. *skurt*–SHORT (Onions 1966:821)

As is evident from the above examples, the criterion of etymological relationship is not always as straightforward as it might appear at first sight. Furthermore, etymology can also be misleading as native speakers often consider two lexemes derived from different roots in an earlier stage of language as related.

### 2.3 Close semantic relatedness

Another criterion to distinguish homonymy from polysemy is the unrelatedness vs. relatedness of meaning, i.e. the native speakers' feeling that certain meanings are connected and others are not. In contrast to homonymous words, polysemous words are considered to be semantically related and we can witness a semantic transfer, i.e. metaphor or metonymy between them. Thus semantic relatedness is an important factor for identifying polysemous words. The words for parts of the body provide the best illustration of this (Mayor 2009:791–792, 605–606, 677–678, 996, 1860, 602):

- (11) *hand*: hand<sup>1</sup> (part of a body), hand<sup>2</sup> (help), hand<sup>3</sup> (control), hand<sup>4</sup> (worker), hand<sup>5</sup> (hand of a clock)  
*face*: face<sup>1</sup> (front of your head), face<sup>2</sup> (person: new/different/familiar face) face<sup>3</sup> (mountain/cliff: the north face of Mont Blanc, the cliff face), face<sup>4</sup> (clock: the face of a clock)  
*foot*: foot<sup>1</sup> (body part), foot<sup>2</sup> (bottom part: the foot of the stairs, mountain)  
*leg*: leg<sup>1</sup> (body part), leg<sup>2</sup> (meat: roast leg of lamb) leg<sup>3</sup> (furniture: the leg of the table), leg<sup>4</sup> (clothing: the legs of my jeans)  
*tongue*: tongue<sup>1</sup> (mouth), tongue<sup>2</sup> (language: mother tongue), tongue<sup>3</sup> (food: the tongue of a cow), tongue<sup>4</sup> (shoe: the tongue of a shoe)  
*eye*: eye<sup>1</sup> (body part), eye<sup>2</sup> (way of seeing/understanding: a critical eye), eye<sup>3</sup> (needle: the eye of the needle), eye<sup>4</sup> (camera: the eye of the camera)

Other good examples of the semantic relatedness of polysemous words are nouns denoting animals (Mayor 2009:691, 1163, 278, and 1140). Consider the following examples:

- (12) *fox*: fox<sup>1</sup> (wild animal), fox<sup>2</sup> (person as crafty as a fox) fox<sup>3</sup> (fur of a fox) and fox<sup>4</sup> (AmE Inf. someone who is sexually attractive).  
*snake*: snake<sup>1</sup> (an animal), snake<sup>2</sup> (someone who cannot be trusted)  
*chicken*: chicken<sup>1</sup> (a common farm bird), chicken<sup>2</sup> (meat), chicken<sup>3</sup> (informal coward)  
*mouse*: mouse<sup>1</sup> (small animal), mouse<sup>2</sup> (computer: a small object connected to the computer), mouse<sup>3</sup> (informal a quiet, nervous person)

Having a closer look at the different meanings of the above words, we can notice a transfer of meaning: part of a body can be extended to other objects and a

character of an animal can be extended to a person. In fact, metaphorical creativity is part of everyone's linguistic competence. However, people are generally not aware of the relation between the central and the extended meanings of polysemous words.

Nevertheless, as is generally accepted by traditional linguists (Lipka 1992:139, Lyons 1977:551–552, 1981:45 and Leech 1981:227), psychological criteria, i.e. subjective associations are also involved in determining semantic relatedness in polysemy. As Leech puts it (1981:227), relatedness of the senses can be “historical or psychological”. Accordingly, as is also mentioned above in 2.2, two meanings are historically related if they can be traced back to the same source, or if the one meaning can be derived from the other. Two meanings are considered to be psychologically related if present-day users of the language “feel intuitively that they are related, and therefore tend to assume that they are different uses of the same word” (Leech 1981:227).

Consider *mess* (old fashioned dish of food; dirty or untidy state of affairs) and *crane* (type of bird; machine for lifting), the meanings of which are historically related, but psychologically they are not (Onions 1966:571; 224):

- (13) *mess* – portion or serving of food, dish of food XIII; made dish XV; mixed food for an animal XVIII; medley, confused or shapeless mass XIX  
*crane* – large bird OE; machine for raising and lowering weights XIV.  
 OHG. *kran* (G. *kran* machine), OE. *cranoc* OHG *chranuch* (G. *kranich* bird)

Another much quoted example is the noun *sole*: *sole*<sup>1</sup> (the bottom surface of the foot), *sole*<sup>2</sup> (the flat bottom part of a shoe) and *sole*<sup>3</sup> (a flat fish) (Mayor 2009:1673). They are related to L. *solea* (sandal), from *solum* (bottom, sole of the foot) and French *sole*, with the fish being named so because of its shape (Onions 1966:844).

In contrast, according to Leech (1981:227), there are cases where historically unrelated forms are felt to be related psychologically. It, however, occurs less frequently. Consider *ear* (organ of hearing; ear of corn) or *weeds* (wild, useless plants; mourning garments worn by widows). In both these cases the etymologies of the two meanings are quite different (Onions 1966:297, 997):

- (14) a *ear* (organ of hearing) OE. *ēare* (compare Latin *auris* ‘ear’)  
*ear* (spike of corn) OE. *ēar* (compare Latin *acus*, *aceris* ‘husk’)  
 b *weed* (wild useless plant) OE. *wēod* (weed)  
*weeds* (mourning garments worn by widows) OE. *wæd* (garment)

Nevertheless, people sometimes see a metaphorical connection between certain words, and adjust their understanding of the words accordingly. Thus what from a historical point of view is an instance of homonymy, resulting from an accidental convergence of forms, becomes reinterpreted in the context of present-day English as a case of polysemy.

Lyons (1977:551–552, 1981:45) also refers to the less common converse situation, where “historically unrelated meanings are perceived by native speakers as having the same kind of connection as the distinguishable meanings of a single polysemous lexeme”. The example given by Lyons is the noun *shock*. He points out that today a number of people assume that *shock*<sup>1</sup> as in ‘shock of corn’ (a pile of sheaves of corn) is the same as *shock*<sup>2</sup> as in ‘shock of hair’ (a very thick mass of hair). Yet historically, they have different origins (Onions 1966:822). This example also demonstrates that what, from a historical point of view, is quite clearly homonymy will be sometimes reinterpreted by later generations of speakers as polysemy. Nevertheless, etymology supports the average native speaker’s intuitions about relatedness of meaning although they are often not knowledgeable about it.

All these problems led traditional linguists (Lipka 1992, Cowie 1982 Lyons 1977, 1981, etc.) to conclude that the reason why it is often not easy to distinguish clearly between homonymy and polysemy is due to the fact that they are not absolute opposites and there are various degrees of formal and semantic unity. Thus they must be regarded as “two end-points of a scale with a continuum in between” (Lipka 1992:139).

Cowie (1982:51) also formulated the distinction between polysemy and homonymy in a similar way:

Polysemous words can differ considerably according to the degree of relatedness and difference which their meanings display ..., homonymy (total distinctness of the meaning of identical forms) is properly seen as the end-point of the continuum.

Similarly, Lyons (1977:551–552, 1981:45) also argues that the border–line between polysemy and homonymy is sometimes “fuzzy as even native speakers often hesitate or are in disagreement about it in certain situations”. Some native speakers will claim to see a connection between the different senses of polysemous words, whereas other native speakers deny that any such connection exists.

All these views suggest that the native speaker’s intuitions of the relatedness of meaning in deciding between polysemy and homonymy seem not to be reliable. Although etymology in general supports the native speaker’s intuitions about particular lexemes, it is not uncommon for lexemes which the average speaker of the language thinks of as being semantically unrelated to have come from the same source.

All in all, these traditional approaches to polysemy provide a more or less successful analysis of what polysemy and homonymy are: what lexical items are polysemous and homonymous. Their major problem, however, is that they fail to address several fundamental issues: the reasons why these lexical items have several senses attached to them, how their meanings are structured, whether there is any motivation for the lexical item to convey specific meanings and

whether besides lexis, other areas of language exhibit polysemy as well. In fact, these issues neglected by traditional approaches are at the core of investigation in Cognitive Semantics.

### 3. Polysemy in cognitive linguistics

It is widely acknowledged that the advent of cognitive linguistics in the 1980s brought a new approach to polysemy as well (Lakoff 1987, Tyler & Evans 2003, Nerlich et al. 2003, Croft & Cruse 2004, Evans & Green 2006 and Evans 2007). In general, cognitive linguists place central importance on the role of meaning, conceptual processes and embodied experience in the study of language and the human mind and the way in which they intersect. With their focus on linguistic categorisation, as well as with its view that meaning is central to and motivates linguistic structure, the question of polysemy was placed centre-stage again.

This change in perspective was facilitated by new theories of how humans establish categories on the basis of prototypes and family resemblance. The word itself with its network of polysemous senses came to be regarded as a category in which the senses of the word are related to each other by means of general cognitive principles such as metaphor, metonymy, generalization, specification and image schema transformations.

Thus, within the cognitive framework, the main distinction between polysemy and homonymy is the systematic relationship of meanings that take place in polysemy. Cognitive linguists argue that the meanings of polysemous words are related in a systematic and natural way forming radial categories where one or more senses are more prototypical (central) while others are less prototypical (peripheral). It is assumed that the figurative senses of polysemous words are derived metaphorically from the more prototypical spatial senses (Lakoff 1987:418–439). In this view, metaphor is understood as an experientially-based mapping between a concrete source domain and an abstract target domain (Lakoff & Johnson 1980:5).

Furthermore, unlike traditional research into polysemy inside historical and lexical semantics, cognitive analyses go beyond words and polysemy is regarded as a cognitive organising principle shared by other areas of language, such as morphology, phonology and syntax (Lakoff 1987, Tyler & Evans 2003, Croft & Cruse 2004, Evans & Green 2006 and Evans 2007).

Next let us see how the distinct areas of language, such as the lexicon, morphology and syntax exhibit polysemy. As for word meaning, *over*, which has been widely discussed by cognitive linguists, can serve as evidence for polysemy at the level of lexical organisation (Taylor 2003:110–116, Lakoff 1987:418–439, Tyler & Evans 2003:724–765, Evans & Green 2006:328–361). Consider the following examples which illustrate various senses of *over*:

- |                                      |          |
|--------------------------------------|----------|
| (15) a The picture is over the sofa. | ABOVE    |
| b The picture is over the hole.      | COVERING |



c The ball landed over the wall.	ON THE OTHER SIDE
d The car drove over the bridge.	ACROSS
e The bath overflowed.	EXCESS
f The government handed over power.	TRANSFER
g She has a strange power over me.	CONTROL

As is argued by the cognitive linguists mentioned above, while each sense of *over* is distinct, they can all be related to one another; they all derive from a central ‘above’ meaning via metaphorisation. The TRANSFER sense suggests that not just physical objects but abstract notions such as power can be transferred and the CONTROL sense is licenced by the metaphor CONTROL IS UP.

Just as words like *over* exhibit polysemy, so do morphological categories. It can be illustrated by the diminutives (Taylor 2003, Lehrer 2003, Evans & Green 2006 and Kovács 2011, etc.). Diminutives are affixes denoting small size, such as young age and small quantity. In addition, there are extensions to meanings of affection and pejoration. As pointed out by the above authors, the meaning of small easily shifts to endearment – the affection we feel for small children and small animals and also to pejoration, since small can denote “lesser” importance. While it is a very productive feature of Hungarian and Italian, English has fewer diminutives and their productivity is much more limited. Although *booklet* can be glossed as a little book, *anklet* is not a little *ankle* (ankle chain, or ankle bracelet, is an ornament worn around the ankle). However, the suffix *-let* still connotes small size, e.g. a *hamlet* is a small town, but the base *ham* has no independent identifiable sense. *Starlet* refers to a young actress who plays small parts in films and hopes to become famous.

Besides having a diminutive meaning, the suffix *-ette* is a feminine marker as well. Consider *dinette* (a small space within a dwelling, usually alongside a kitchen, used for informal dining), *kichette* (a small area off the kitchen for casual dining), *kitchenette* (a small cooking area), *luncheonette* (a small restaurant serving light lunches, *statuette* (a small statue), *laundrette* (a self-service laundry) vs. *usherette* (a woman working in a cinema, showing people to their seats) and *majorette* (a girl who spins a baton while marching with a band).

Similarly, the suffix *-kin* can refer to smallness, such as in *napkin* (1. a piece of material (as cloth or paper) used at table to wipe the lips or fingers and protect the clothes, 2: a small cloth or towel), but also to endearment such as in *babykins* (a term of endearment, resulting from intense attachment to an individual and deep concern for their well-being, “How’s your cold, Babykins?”).

The suffix *-ling* can also mean smallness (*duckling*, *sapling*) but with the exception of *darling* meaning endearment, it is affectionately pejorative, such as in *weakling*, *giftling* (trivial gift), *witling* (one with small wit) and *trifling* (unimportant or of little value). However, *starling* refers to a very common bird with shiny black feathers that lives especially in cities.

The suffix *-y/ie* refers to both small size and is also used in babytalk, such as in *doggy*, *blankie*, *drinky*, *horsey* and *tummy*, etc. However, it is more productively used for nicknames, which suggest endearment, such as *Jimmy*, *Tommy* and *Susie*, etc.

In Taylor's view (2003:174) the extension of the diminutive to express an attitude of affection or pejoration is an instance of metonymic/metaphoric transfer. Thinking of entities with a small size can evoke a range of different attitudes. Small things can be regarded with affection or contempt.

Just as lexical and morphological categories exhibit polysemy, so do syntactic categories. Consider the ditransitive construction: SVOO, which has a range of abstract meanings associated with it as illustrated by the following examples (Evans & Green 2006:37–38):

- (16) a Mary gave John the cake.
- b Mary promised John the cake.
- c Mary refused John the cake.
- d Mary left John the cake.
- e Mary permitted John the cake.
- f Mary baked John the cake.

In (16)a AGENT successfully causes recipient to receive PATIENT; in (16)b conditions of satisfaction imply that AGENT causes recipient to receive PATIENT; in (16)c AGENT causes recipient not to receive PATIENT; in (16)d AGENT acts to cause recipient to receive PATIENT at some future point of time; in (16)e AGENT enables recipient to receive PATIENT; and in (16)f AGENT intends to cause recipient to receive PATIENT. While each of the abstract senses associated with ditransitive syntax are distinct, they are clearly related: they all concern volitional transfer although the nature of transfer varies from sense to sense.

It should be apparent from the foregoing discussion that cognitive linguists view polysemy as a key to generalisation across a range of 'distinct' phenomena and argue that polysemy reveals important fundamental commonalities between lexical, morphological and syntactic organisation. Scholars (Lakoff 1987, Taylor 2003, Nerlich et al. 2003, Tyler & Evans 2003, Lehrer 2003 and Evans & Green 2006, etc.) working in this area assume that polysemy is a conceptual rather than purely linguistic phenomenon, i.e. linguistic polysemy patterns reflect, and therefore reveal, systematic differences and patterns in the way linguistic units are organised and structured in the mind.

#### 4 Conclusion

Polysemy provides a problem that has attracted a great deal of attention in semantic analysis. In traditional approaches represented by Leech 1981, Lyons 1981, 1995, Lipka 1992 and Jackson & Amwela 2007, etc., polysemy is usually discussed in conjunction with homonymy. If two lexical items have either 1)

etymologically distinct meanings or 2) semantically unrelated meanings, they are regarded as homonyms. In contrast, if the meanings concerned are related by metaphorical extension – the most typical manifestation of semantic interrelationship – or via some other process of semantic development, they are considered to be one single lexeme with two senses. Several criteria have been suggested to distinguish polysemy from homonymy, such as the formal identity or distinctness, etymology and close semantic relatedness, but none of them seems to be satisfactory. Furthermore, in traditional approaches polysemy is assumed to be a property of lexical categories only.

In contrast, in cognitive linguists' view (e.g. Lakoff 1987, Tyler & Evans 2003, Taylor 2003, Nerlich et al. 2003, Croft & Cruse 2004 and Evans & Green 2006, etc.), the notion of polysemy is essentially extended and is applied to both lexical and grammatical language levels. It is argued that polysemy regulates and systematizes both lexis and grammar and may be considered as a factor which is organizing the language system. Thus polysemy is considered to be a fundamental feature of human language.

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# Computerised Text Analysis Tools and Translation Quality

Albert Vermes

This paper aims to show how computerised text analysis tools, along with the familiar word processing and spreadsheet applications, may aid the translator in identifying some key features of the source text before starting the translation and in producing and checking the target text. It is argued that such an approach may contribute to improving the quality of translations.

## 1. Introduction

Modern computerised translation tools like terminology management systems, translation memories or integrated translation environments can contribute a lot to improving the quality of translations, especially in a corporate or institutional setting. However, these tools are at present still relatively expensive, so it is not likely that many freelance translators with limited income are happy to invest in acquiring such tools. Fortunately, there are many free text analysis software tools available now, which can also be put to use in improving the quality of translation work. My aim in this paper is to sketch a translation workflow scenario that freelancers can use as a method of translation quality assurance. Apart from the tools that the translator is certain to have anyway, such as a word processor or a spreadsheet application, this method only involves the use of text analysis software that comes free of charge. This way I aim to prove that even part-time translators can do much to assure the quality of their translations with no extra investment required.

## 2. Aspects of translation quality

Based on the ISO 8402 standard, **translation quality** may be defined as the totality of characteristics of a target text that influence whether it can satisfy certain stated and implied needs. What this means, as Mossop (2001: 6) points out, is that the quality of a translation is always relative to the needs it is aimed to serve. One aspect of quality is the **adequacy** of the translation with respect to the target communication situation. But the definition above also means that these needs include not only those that are explicitly stated by the client but also

those that are merely implied by the task. The most important such implied need in translation is accuracy, because target readers will naturally assume that the translation is accurate. **Accuracy** in translation involves correctness of the target text with respect to the content and form of the source text and, also, the target language.

Accuracy of content (meaning) is commonly termed **equivalence**. But accuracy of content also depends on whether the target text has preserved all the information contained in the original. This requirement is referred to as **completeness** of content. Thirdly, accuracy also means that the translation preserves the **consistency** of the original on three levels: the terminology employed, the register of language use, including the phraseology used, and the style of language use with respect to the intended readership. Consistency can be thought of as an internal property of the text, but we can also talk about it as an external property, relating a text to other, similar texts (Kis and Mohácsi-Gorove 2008: 73).

Formal accuracy means two things. One is that the translation is divided into sections, paragraphs, often (though not necessarily) even sentences, in the same way as the original. This may be called the **conformity of division** requirement. The other is the requirement that translation and original should be characterised by **identity of typography**.

Accuracy with respect to the target language also involves two requirements. The first is that the translation is grammatically correct and the second is that it reads as easily as any target language text that is not a translation. These requirements may be referred to as **grammaticality** and **readability**. Readability of course is a rather fuzzy notion, but in general we can say that it depends on whether the text is written in clear, unambiguous, easy-flowing language.

To summarise, the target text, on the one hand, is expected to be adequate for a given purpose in a given situation and, on the other hand, it is also expected, implicitly if not explicitly, to satisfy the following accuracy requirements:

(1) Content

- Requirement of equivalence
- Requirement of completeness
- Requirement of consistency

(2) Form

- Requirement of conformity of division
- Requirement of identity of typography

(3) Language

- Requirement of grammaticality
- Requirement of readability



### 3. Method of quality assurance

Contrary to what many people think, translation quality assurance does not take place *after* the translation has been produced. It begins *before* the translation is started. The obvious first step is to read the source text (ST) to gain an understanding of its content. Second, technical terms in the text need to be identified and target language equivalents established. Third, recurring phrases need to be spotted that typify the given text or genre and their equivalents established. With these lists of terms and phrases ready, the actual translation process can begin.

When the first draft of the target text (TT) is done, it has to be revised. Following Mossop (2001: 165), **revision** in translation can be defined as the process of checking a draft translation for errors and making the appropriate amendments. Revision is mainly a bilingual operation consisting in a comparison of the first draft with the original. The reviser has to check whether the information in the original is carried through in the translation precisely and completely (nothing less and nothing more), the terminology and phraseology is accurate, numbers, measures, dates, etc. are precise, chapters, sections, paragraphs, tables, figures, etc. are all in order, the layout features of pages, paragraphs, fonts, tables, etc. are the same as in the source text, and the grammar, spelling and punctuation of the target text are all correct. As a final stage, the revised and amended translation can be edited stylistically, to ensure easy readability.

This process of quality assurance may be aided by simple text analysis software tools. They can be used to implement the procedures described above in the following steps.

Before translation:

- Looking for keywords to identify subject domain and topic of the ST
- Looking for technical terms in the ST
- Looking for recurring phrases to assess the internal homogeneity of the ST
- Producing a bilingual term list
- Producing a bilingual phraseology list
- Pretranslation in Word using the Find and Replace option

After translation:

- Checking the number of words (tokens) in the ST and TT
- Checking the number of paragraphs in the ST and TT
- Reading the TT and comparing it to the ST
- Spellchecking and grammar checking

#### 4. Tools and material

Only three software tools are used here: *Microsoft Word* for word processing, *Microsoft Excel* for preparing term and phrase lists, and a free concordance program, *AntConc 3.2.1*, written by Laurence Anthony, used for analysing the source text and extracting terms and phrases. *AntConc* can be downloaded from Laurence Anthony's website: <http://www.antlab.sci.waseda.ac.jp/software.html>.

The source text used for illustrating the process in this paper is a European Commission press release entitled "EU research and innovation funding: Commission consults on radical changes to create more growth and jobs", which was downloaded on 18 April 2011 from the webpage <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/138>.

The official Hungarian version of the text is available at <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/138&format=HTML&aged=0&language=HU&guiLanguage=en>. (Both texts are presented in the Appendix.)

#### 5. Keywords

The Word List function of *AntConc* can be used to produce a list of all the word forms that occur in the source text, along with frequency information on each word (number of tokens for each word form in the text). The aim of this is to identify keywords in the text. A **keyword** for our purposes here can be defined as an item which occurs with outstanding frequency in the text. Function words like "the", "and", "to" etc. should of course be ignored. (It is possible to filter them out from the search with the help of a predefined stop list, but we can do without this option here.) By studying the keywords, translators can familiarise themselves with the topic of the source text. The following table presents a selection of the results.

Rank	Frequency	Word
6	21	innovation
8	16	research
9	14	eu
10	13	funding
11	11	framework
15	9	commission

From this table it instantly becomes clear that the text is about innovation and research funding in the European Union.

## 6. Concordances

The next step can be looking at concordance lines of the highest frequency keywords in the text. A **concordance** provides a list of the tokens of the selected word form along with the words that occur in its neighbourhood within a range specified by the user. The aim of this is to become familiar with how the words selected combine with other words. A sample concordance of “innovation” is presented below.

H#	KWIC	File
1	y 9, 2011 EU research and innovation funding: Commission consu:	IP-11-138_EN.txt
2	vements to EU research and innovation funding to make participat	IP-11-138_EN.txt
3	), the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP)	IP-11-138_EN.txt
4	the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT). This	IP-11-138_EN.txt
5	truments, along the whole "innovation chain" starting from basic	IP-11-138_EN.txt
6	pporting non-technological innovation, for example in design and	IP-11-138_EN.txt
7	tribution of EU research and innovation funding to the Innovation	IP-11-138_EN.txt
8	innovation funding to the Innovation Union and the Europe 2020	IP-11-138_EN.txt
9	missioner for Research and Innovation Máire Geoghegan-Quinn said	IP-11-138_EN.txt
10	EU invests in research and innovation. We want EU funding to res	IP-11-138_EN.txt
11	nsibility for research and innovation, Vice-Presidents Kallas, I	IP-11-138_EN.txt
12	access to EU research and innovation funding In its Green Pa	IP-11-138_EN.txt
13	truments covering the full innovation chain, including basic res	IP-11-138_EN.txt
14	nd industry and firm-level innovation. Flexibility will be prom	IP-11-138_EN.txt
15	success of EU research and innovation funding. The Commission	IP-11-138_EN.txt
16	nd the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme. The	IP-11-138_EN.txt
17	proposal for research and innovation spending under the future	IP-11-138_EN.txt
18	) The Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme has a	IP-11-138_EN.txt
19	The European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) is a	IP-11-138_EN.txt
20	stimulating world-leading innovation, through the pioneering co	IP-11-138_EN.txt
21	concept of Knowledge and Innovation Communities. The EIT rece:	IP-11-138_EN.txt

This concordance makes it clear in the company of what other words the word form “innovation” typically occurs in this particular text. Such word companies are called collocations. Concordances can be sorted according to the n-th element to the left or right of the keyword, to bring out these patterns of use.

Below is a sorted version of the concordance above, arranged according to the second element to the left. This concordance of the word “innovation” alone enables us to find some of the key expressions of the text. But to produce a complete list of key terms and phrases, we can use the N-grams function of the program, which is part of the Clusters window.

Hit	KWIC	File
1	), the <b>Competitiveness</b> and <b>Innovation</b> Framework Programme (CIP)	IP-11-138_EN.txt
2	nd the <b>Competitiveness</b> and <b>Innovation</b> Framework Programme. The (	IP-11-138_EN.txt
3	) The <b>Competitiveness</b> and <b>Innovation</b> Framework Programme has a	IP-11-138_EN.txt
4	nd industry and <b>firm-level innovation</b> . Flexibility will be prom	IP-11-138_EN.txt
5	the European <b>Institute of Innovation</b> and Technology (EIT). This	IP-11-138_EN.txt
6	The European <b>Institute of Innovation</b> and Technology (EIT) is an	IP-11-138_EN.txt
7	concept of <b>Knowledge</b> and <b>Innovation</b> Communities. The EIT rece:	IP-11-138_EN.txt
8	pporting <b>non-technological innovation</b> , for example in design and	IP-11-138_EN.txt
9	y 9, 2011 EU <b>research</b> and <b>innovation</b> funding: Commission consu:	IP-11-138_EN.txt
10	vements to EU <b>research</b> and <b>innovation</b> funding to make participat	IP-11-138_EN.txt
11	tribution of EU <b>research</b> and <b>innovation</b> funding to the Innovation	IP-11-138_EN.txt
12	missioner for <b>Research</b> and <b>Innovation</b> Máire Geoghegan-Quinn saik	IP-11-138_EN.txt
13	EU invests in <b>research</b> and <b>innovation</b> . We want EU funding to res	IP-11-138_EN.txt
14	nsibility for <b>research</b> and <b>innovation</b> , Vice-Presidents Kallas, I	IP-11-138_EN.txt
15	access to EU <b>research</b> and <b>innovation</b> funding In its Green Pa	IP-11-138_EN.txt
16	success of EU <b>research</b> and <b>innovation</b> funding. The Commission	IP-11-138_EN.txt
17	proposal for <b>research</b> and <b>innovation</b> spending under the future	IP-11-138_EN.txt
18	truments, along the whole "innovation chain" starting from basic	IP-11-138_EN.txt
19	truments covering the full <b>innovation</b> chain, including basic res	IP-11-138_EN.txt
20	innovation funding to the <b>Innovation</b> Union and the Europe 2020	IP-11-138_EN.txt
21	stimulating <b>world-leading innovation</b> , through the pioneering co	IP-11-138_EN.txt

## 7. N-grams

An **n-gram** is a sequence of  $n$  consecutive running words in the text. The aim of looking for  $n$ -grams in the source text is twofold. The first is to identify possible technical terms, while the second is to find recurring phrases to assess the internal homogeneity of the source text. This is done by finding maximal  $n$ -grams in the text. A **maximal n-gram** can be defined as an XP that does not occur as part of another  $n$ -gram which itself is an XP. (Thus the phrase “European Institute of Innovation” is not a maximal  $n$ -gram because it occurs as part of “European Institute of Innovation and Technology”).

In *AntConc* we can set the minimum and maximum size of  $n$ -grams we are looking for, and can also define the minimum  $n$ -gram frequency for the search. Since a technical term can consist of a single word, the minimum size should be set to one. A convenient maximum size in this text seems to be 6. If we want to make sure we capture all possible technical terms, then the minimum frequency should be set to one. This will of course greatly increase the number of  $n$ -gram tokens found, which means the translator will need more time to browse through the list than in the case of a higher minimum frequency number. A fragment of the search results is presented below.

Rank	Freq	N-gram
132	2	current Framework
133	2	current Framework Programme
134	2	current Framework Programme for
135	2	current Framework Programme for Research
136	2	current Framework Programme for Research FP
137	2	efficiency
138	2	energy
139	2	EU funding to
140	2	EU research and innovation funding to
141	2	EUR billion
142	2	Europe
143	2	European Institute
144	2	European Institute of
145	2	European Institute of Innovation
146	2	European Institute of Innovation and
147	2	European Institute of Innovation and Technology
148	2	far
149	2	financial
150	2	food
151	2	food security
152	2	for research
153	2	for research and

The result of the search can then be saved into various file formats using the Save Output to Text File command. The simplest solution is to save the results in a .txt file, in which the n-grams are presented in a list, with rank and frequency numbers and n-grams separated by tabs. The next step is to browse through this list and weed out the irrelevant items. The result will be a clean list containing only technical terms and recurring phrases.

## 8. Processing data in Excel


Terminological and phraseological units can most easily be handled in a spreadsheet application such as MS Excel. First we can open a new Excel sheet and create a table of three columns with the headers “Frequency”, “English” and “Hungarian”. Rank information can be ignored. The data from the text file can now be imported and then the “Hungarian” column filled in, with the help of various terminological sources such as the EU’s IATE online database ([iate.europa.eu](http://iate.europa.eu)), as illustrated below.

	A	B	C
1	Frequency	English	Hungarian
2	1	academia	egyetemek
3	1	applicants	pályázók
4	1	applied research	alkalmazott kutatás
5	1	autonomous EU body	autonóm EU-szerv
6	2	basic research	alapkutatás
7	2	climate change	éghajlatváltozás
8	1	cohesion funding	kohéziós célú kifizetések
9	2	Commissioner	biztos
10	1	Commissioner for Research and Innovation	kutatásügyért és innovációért felelős biztos
11	3	Common Strategic Framework	közös stratégiai keret
12	3	Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme	versenyképességi és innovációs keretprogram
13	2	current Framework Programme for Research	jelenleg folyamatban lévő hetedik kutatási keretprogram
14	1	diversity	
15	1	economic impact	
16	3	EIT	
17	1	energy and food security	
18	1	energy efficiency	
19	3	EU research and innovation funding	
20	5	euro	
21	1	European Institute of Innovation and Technology	
22	2	Finance Facility	
23	1	financial control	

When the table is ready, the data can be used to produce a preliminary translation of the text, in which the English expressions that occur in the table are replaced by their Hungarian equivalents.

## 9. Pretranslation

The aim of the pretranslation process is to make sure that technical terms are translated correctly and that recurring phrases are translated consistently. (If this kind of rigid consistency is not desirable in the target text, it can be eliminated during the translation or the editing phase.) The first step is to create a copy of the source text by saving it under a different file name. We will work into this new file in order to keep the source file unchanged. Then the terms and recurring phrases of the source text can be substituted by their Hungarian equivalents using the Find and Replace function of MS Word, as illustrated below.



The result of the pretranslation process will be an essentially English text that contains Hungarian terms and phrases. This is the point where the actual translation begins. To put it simply, the task now is to remove all signs of the fact that the text was originally formulated in English.

## 10. Translation

There are two fundamentally good ways to do the translation using the pretranslated text. One way is to move the cursor to the beginning of a paragraph and then hit the enter key to open a new paragraph. This way the new paragraph will inherit all the basic formal properties of the original one. Now we can write the translation in the new paragraph, copying Hungarian pieces of text from the original. When the paragraph is finished, the original one can be deleted.

The other way is to write over the original text using the Correction tool of Word. With the help of the Track Changes feature the changes we make in the text can be traced, and when we are ready with a sentence (or a paragraph), we can accept or modify the changes in the text.

## 11. Revising the translation


When the translation is finished, it will have to be revised from several points of view. The primary requirement in most forms of translation is that the target text conveys the same information as the source text. Revision should thus principally involve a checking of the completeness of the translation and the elimination of mistakes of logical meaning. Such mistakes may be mistranslations, as a result of misinterpreting certain segments of the source text, or ambiguities, as a result of a careless formulation of the target text. It must also be checked that the internal and external consistency of the source text comes through properly in the translation. In our present project this is ensured by the pretranslation of the text.

Secondly, revision also involves checking that the formal features of the first draft follow those of the original. If we follow the translation procedure

described above, this requirement will almost certainly be fulfilled. However, even in this workflow scenario, we need to carefully check if bold or italicised segments appear as they should in the target text.

Thirdly, revision also involves correcting any mistakes of grammar, spelling and punctuation in the target language.

In revising the target text, we can apply the following procedure. First we need to open the source as well as the target text. Then we arrange them side by side on the screen, using the Parallel View feature of Word. Next we can check the number of words and paragraphs in the two texts, as illustrated by the following figure.



The point of checking the number of words is this. It has been observed that in English-to-Hungarian translation the number of target text words generally shows an up to 20% increase compared with the number of source text words. If translators are aware of such general tendencies, then the fact that the target text is within or over this limit may indicate to them whether the translation is likely to convey the same amount of information as the original. But we need to remember that this comparison is only of an indicative nature and it does not provide decisive information in any case.

Then we check the number of paragraphs in the two texts. Normally no change in this number is expected in specialised translation, unless the target text is intended to be a summary of the original.



It would also be useful to check the number of sentences in the two texts, and some concordance programs do make this possible, but *AntConc*, the program we are using here does not offer such an option and nor does *MS Word* in its present version.

The next step is to carefully compare the target text with the source text sentence by sentence. In general, a good method is to read one sentence of the target text first and then the corresponding sentence of the source text. This has the advantage that we will be able to see the translation from the target reader's point of view, uninfluenced by the original (Mossop 2001: 123). If we do not understand the translation right away, without the help of the source text, there is definitely a problem with it.

When the translator has read through the text and corrected all errors of content, it will still have to be checked for possible mistakes of spelling, grammar and punctuation. This can be done using the Spellchecking and Grammar Checking features of Word. However, we need to be cautious with these features because for various reasons they will often come up with incorrect suggestions. In the end, it is always the responsibility of the human applying the computer to a task to make sure that the results are correct.

## 12. Conclusion

The main aim of this paper was to show how computerised text analysis tools (concordancers) may be incorporated into the translation process to help the translator in identifying key features of the source text before starting the translation and also in producing and checking the target text. It is argued here that the use of such tools may considerably contribute to improving the quality of translations by making translation quality assurance more systematic. And since some of these simple programs can be acquired free of charge, the translator does not even have to invest money to make the translation quality assurance process more effective. Such tools thus are an ideal choice for part-time translators whose income is so limited that they cannot afford to buy more sophisticated CAT tools. Another potentially very useful area of their application is in translator training, where they can be used to raise the awareness of students of various textual features and also of the importance of quality assurance.

## References

- Mossop, B. 2001. *Revising and Editing for Translators*. Manchester: St. Jerome.  
Kis, B. and Mohácsi-Gorove, A. 2008. *A fordító számítógépe* [The translator's computer]. Bicske: Szak Kiadó.

## Appendix

**IP/11/138**

Brussels, February 9, 2011

### **EU research and innovation funding: Commission consults on radical changes to create more growth and jobs**

*The European Commission today launches a consultation on major improvements to EU research and innovation funding to make participation easier, increase scientific and economic impact and improve value for money. The proposed “Common Strategic Framework”, set out in a Green Paper, would cover the current Framework Programme for Research (FP7), the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme (CIP) and the European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT). This will create a coherent set of instruments, along the whole “innovation chain” starting from basic research, culminating in bringing innovative products and services to market, and also supporting non-technological innovation, for example in design and marketing. The Commission's Green Paper also provides the basis for far-reaching simplification of procedures and rules. The changes aim to maximise the contribution of EU research and innovation funding to the Innovation Union and the Europe 2020 Strategy. Stakeholders have until 20 May 2011 to respond.*

European Commissioner for Research and Innovation Máire Geoghegan-Quinn said: “Our aim is to maximise value from every euro the EU invests in research and innovation. We want EU funding to realise its enormous potential to generate growth and jobs and improve quality of life in Europe in the face of daunting challenges like climate change, energy efficiency and food security. By making our programmes more coherent and simpler, we will make life easier for researchers and innovators – especially SMEs – attract more applicants and get even better results. I look forward to an extensive and innovative debate, making use of the web and social media.”

Commissioner Geoghegan-Quinn is issuing the Green Paper in cooperation with the six other Commissioners with responsibility for research and innovation, Vice- Presidents Kallas, Kroes and Tajani, and Commissioners Vassiliou, Potočník and Oettinger.

### **Simpler access to EU research and innovation funding**

In its Green Paper, the Commission proposes a “Common Strategic Framework”, combining three key aspects.

First, a clear focus on three mutually reinforcing objectives: giving the EU a world-beating science base; boosting competitiveness across the board; and tackling grand challenges such as climate change, resource efficiency, energy and food security, health and an ageing population.

Second, making EU funding more attractive and easier to access for participants, for example through a single entry point with common IT tools or a

one-stop shop for providing advice and support to participants throughout the funding process. Furthermore, the Common Strategic Framework will allow a simpler and more streamlined set of funding instruments covering the full innovation chain, including basic research, applied research, collaboration between academia and industry and firm-level innovation. Flexibility will be promoted to encourage diversity and business involvement. Applicants should be able to apply for several different projects without repeatedly providing the same information.

Third, there will be much simpler and more consistent procedures for accounting for the use of the funds received. This may involve, for example, greater use of lump sum payments.

Greater simplicity will make financial control of EU taxpayers' money easier and more effective.

Other ideas in the Green Paper include: further steps to pool Member States' national research funding; better links with cohesion funding; using EU funding to stimulate public procurement; more use of prizes; further strengthening the role of the European Research Council and of financial instruments such as the Risk-Sharing Finance Facility (RSFF) and the loan guarantee and venture capital investments; and drawing up a set of performance indicators to measure the success of EU research and innovation funding.

The Commission will launch in the coming weeks a competition to find the most inspiring name for the new common framework.

The Commission's proposals take fully into account the interim evaluations of the current 7<sup>th</sup> Framework programme (see [IP/10/1525](#)) and the Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme. The Commission's response to the FP7 evaluation is also published today (available via link below).

### **Next steps**

The consultation is open for comments from today. The deadline for contributions is 20 May. On 10 June, the Commission will organise a major closing conference as a follow-up to the public consultation. The name for the new Strategic Framework will be announced there.

The Commission will then bring forward before the end of 2011 a legislative proposal for research and innovation spending under the future EU budget post-2013.

### **Background**

The current Framework Programme for Research FP7 has a budget of EUR 53 billion (2007–2013). More than 9,000 projects have so far been funded. A study has estimated that projects selected for funding in 2011 alone will create up to 165 000 jobs (see [IP/10/966](#))

The Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme has a budget of EUR 3.6 billion (2007–2013) and has supported more than 100,000 SMEs through loan guarantees alone as well as innovative ICT pilot projects.

The European Institute of Innovation and Technology (EIT) is an autonomous EU body stimulating world-leading innovation, through the

pioneering concept of Knowledge and Innovation Communities. The EIT received EUR 309 million from the EU Budget for the period 2007-2013.

### Links

[Consultation on the Green Paper](#)

[Innovation Union web page](#)

[European Institute of Innovation and Technology \(EIT\)](#)

[Seventh Framework Programme](#)

[Competitiveness and Innovation Framework Programme](#)

[European Research Council](#)

[Risk-Sharing Finance Facility](#)

[\(RSFF evaluation\)](#)

[Report of the FP7 interim evaluation expert group](#)

[Commission response on the interim evaluation report](#)

[April 2010 European Commission Communication on simplification](#)

### IP/11/138

Brüsszel, 2011. február 9

**Unió kutatás- és innovációfinanszírozás: A Bizottság gyökeres változtatásokról egyeztet a gazdasági növekedés és a munkahelyteremtés érdekében**

*Az Európai Bizottság ma nyilvános konzultációt kezdeményez az Európai Unió kutatás- és innovációfinanszírozási rendszerének jelentős továbbfejlesztése érdekében, amivel azt kívánja elérni, hogy könnyebbé váljék az érintett programokban való részvétel, nagyobb legyen az elvégzett munka tudományos és gazdasági hatása, és ugyanannyi ráfordítás több eredményt hozzon. Az ennek kapcsán közzétett zöld könyvben javasolt „közös stratégiai keret” a jelenleg folyamatban lévő hetedik kutatási keretprogramra, a versenyképességi és innovációs keretprogramra, valamint az Európai Innovációs és Technológiai Intézetre terjedne ki. Ezáltal az eszközrendszer egységes egészzé állna össze, és az alapkutatástól az innovatív termékek és szolgáltatások piaci hasznosításáig az „innovációs lánc” valamennyi elemére kiterjedne, miközben támogatná a nem technológiai jellegű, például a formatervezés vagy a marketing területén végrehajtott innovációt is. A Bizottság zöld könyvében foglaltak ezenkívül az eljárások és a szabályok radikális leegyszerűsítésére is lehetőségét adnak. A változtatásoktól a Bizottság azt reméli, hogy az Európai Unió kutatás- és innovációfinanszírozó programjai a jövőben erőteljesebben tudják majd támogatni az innovatív Unióra vonatkozó kezdeményezésben és az Európa 2020 stratégiában kitűzött célok teljesítését. A Bizottság 2011. május 20-ig várja az érdekeltek észrevételeit.*

Máire Geoghegan-Quinn, a Bizottság kutatásügyért és innovációért felelős tagja a következőket mondta: „Azt szeretnénk elérni, hogy az Európai Unió által kutatásra és innovációra költött minden egyes euró a lehető legnagyobb hasznot hajtja. Azt akarjuk, hogy az uniós finanszírozás beváltsa a hozzá fűzött óriási reményeket a gazdasági növekedést és a foglalkoztatási szint emelkedését illetően, és olyan súlyos kihívások közepette is hozzájáruljon az európai polgárok életminőségének javításához, mint amit az éghajlatváltozással, az energiahaté-

konysággal vagy az élelmiszer-ellátás biztonságával kapcsolatos kérdések ma jelentenek számunkra. Programjaink következetesebbé és egyszerűbbé tételével megkönnyítjük a kutatók és az innovációra kész vállalkozások – különösen a kis- és középvállalkozások – életét, több pályázót vonzunk magunkhoz, és még jobb eredményeket remélhetünk. Élénk, innovatív vitára számítok, melynek színteréül az internet és a közösségi médiumok szolgálnak majd.”

A zöld könyvet Máire Geoghegan-Quinn hat biztostársával: Siim Kallas, Neelie Kroes és Antonio Tajani alelnökökkel és Andrula Vasziliu, Janez Potočnik és Günther Oettinger bizottsági tagokkal közösen bocsátja ki.

### **Egyszerűbb hozzáférés az uniós kutatás- és innovációfinanszírozáshoz**

A zöld könyvben a Bizottság egy úgynevezett közös stratégiai keretre tesz javaslatot, amely három hangsúlyos elemből áll.

Egyrészt egyértelműen három, egymást kölcsönösen támogató célkitűzésre összpontosít: arra, hogy az EU tudományos bázisa világszerte legyen; a versenyképesség fellendítésére minden területen; valamint azoknak a legnagyobb kihívásoknak a megválaszolására, amelyek például az éghajlatváltozás, az erőforráshatékonyság, az energia- és az élelmiszer-ellátás biztonsága, az egészségügy és a népesség elöregedése területén előttünk állnak.

Másrészt vonzóbbá és könnyebben hozzáférhetővé kívánja tenni a résztvevők számára az uniós finanszírozást: egységes informatikai eszköztár alkalmazásával működő egyetlen belépési pont kialakítását és olyan „egyablakos ügyintézés” bevezetését javasolja, amelyen keresztül a résztvevők a finanszírozási folyamat valamennyi szakaszában értékes tanácsokhoz és támogatáshoz juthatnak. A közös stratégiai keret emellett lehetővé teszi a finanszírozási eszközök leegyszerűsítését és ésszerűsítését is a teljes „innovációs lánc” mentén, függetlenül attól, hogy alap kutatás, alkalmazott kutatás, egyetemek és ipari vállalkozások közötti együttműködés vagy vállalati szintű innováció támogatásáról van-e szó. A sokféleség és a vállalkozói szektor részvételének biztosítása érdekében rugalmasabbá válnak a finanszírozási rendszerek. A pályázóknak arra is lehetőségük lesz, hogy adataik egyszeri megadásával több elképzelésükkel is pályázzanak.

Harmadrészt jelentősen egyszerűbbé és következetesebbé válik a megkapott pénzekkel való elszámolás, és nagyobb tér nyílik például az átalányösszegek kifizetések előtt.

Az egyszerűbb szabályok könnyebbé és hatékonyabbá teszik az adóbefizetések felhasználásával kapcsolatos ellenőrzéseket is.

A zöld könyv más elképzeléseket is tartalmaz: további lépéseket irányoz elő a tagállamok nemzeti szintű kutatási előirányzatainak együttes felhasználása érdekében; javítaná a kohéziós célú kifizetésekkel fennálló kapcsolatokat; javasolja, hogy az uniós források a közbeszerzést is ösztönözzék; felveti a pénzdíjak létrehozásának lehetőségét; tovább erősítené az Európai Kutatási Tanács és olyan pénzügyi eszközök, mint a kockázatmegosztási pénzügyi mechanizmus, a hitelgaranciák és a kockázati tőkebefektetések szerepét; és olyan teljesítménymutatók kidolgozását javasolja, amelyekkel mérhető az uniós kutatás- és innovációfinanszírozás sikere.

A Bizottság szeretne gondolatébresztő elnevezést találni a közös stratégiai keret számára, ezért erről a következő hetekben ötletpályázatot fog hirdetni.

A Bizottság javaslatai teljes mértékben figyelembe veszik a folyamatban lévő hetedik keretprogrammal és a versenyképességi és innovációs keretprogrammal kapcsolatban elvégzett értékelések eredményeit (lásd [IP/10/1525](#)). A Bizottság ma hozta nyilvánosságra azt a közleményét is, amelyben a hetedik keretprogram időközi értékelésére adott választát fogalmazza meg (lásd lejjebb, a hivatkozások között).

#### **A következő lépések**

A konzultáció keretében a mai naptól lehet észrevételeket tenni. Az észrevételek benyújtásának határideje május 20. A konzultációs folyamatot egy június 10-én megrendezendő nagyszabású konferencia zárja, melyen a Bizottság bejelent a közös stratégiai keret új elnevezését is.

A Bizottság ezután 2011 végéig beterjeszti az uniós költségvetés következő, 2013 utáni ciklusában végrehajtandó kutatás- és innovációfinanszírozó programokra vonatkozó jogalkotási javaslatait.

#### **Háttér**

A jelenleg folyamatban lévő, 2007-től 2013-ig tartó hetedik kutatási keretprogram 53 milliárd euróból gazdálkodik. Eddig több mint 9000 projekt részesült finanszírozásban. Egy felmérés becslése szerint csak a 2011-ben finanszírozásra kiválasztott projektek mintegy 165 000 új munkahelyet fognak teremteni (lásd [IP/10/966](#)).

A versenyképességi és innovációs keretprogram – ugyancsak 2007-től 2013-ig – összesen 3,6 milliárd euró felett rendelkezik, és eddig csak hitelgarancia formájában több mint 100 000 kis- és középvállalkozásnak, valamint innovatív kísérleti IKT-projekteknek nyújtott támogatást.

Az Európai Innovációs és Technológiai Intézet (EIT) egy autonóm EU-szerv, mely az úttörő jellegű eszköznek számító úgynevezett tudományos és innovációs társulásokon keresztül a világszínvonalon is meghatározó innováció elősegítésére törekszik. Az EIT a 2007-től 2013-ig tartó költségvetési ciklusban 309 millió eurót kapott az Unió költségvetéséből.

#### **Hivatkozások**

[Konzultáció a zöld könyvben foglaltakról](#)

[Az „innovatív Unió” honlapja](#)

[Az Európai Innovációs és Technológiai Intézet \(EIT\)](#)

[A hetedik keretprogram](#)

[A versenyképességi és innovációs keretprogram](#)

[Az Európai Kutatási Tanács](#)

[A kockázatmegosztási pénzügyi mechanizmus](#)

[\(a mechanizmus értékelése\)](#)

[A szakértői csoport jelentése a hetedik keretprogram időközi értékeléséről](#)

[A Bizottság válasza az időközi értékelésről összeállított jelentésre](#)

[Az Európai Bizottság 2010. áprilisi közleménye az egyszerűsítésről](#)

## The Semantic Analysis of OE *munan*

Agnieszka Wawrzyniak

### 1. Introduction

According to Anglo-Saxon Dictionary (BT, sv. *munan*), OE *munan* is related to Goth. *ga-munan*, O Sax. *far-munan*, and Icel. *muna*. As Anglo-Saxon Dictionary (sv. *munan*) illustrates, the following senses can be distinguished in OE *munan*:

- 1) to remember, be mindful of, be careful of
- 2) to consider, think.

Before engaging in close analysis, it should be pointed out that no empirical investigations concerning the semantics of *munan* have been carried out. Hence, this verb, similar to other preterite-present verbs that did not survive, has not had due attention paid to it. With the exception of *witan*, which has been subject to investigation (Koivisto-Alanko 2000, Radden 2003), other lost preterite-present verbs have been neglected.

We should also emphasise that the concept of *gemunan*, whose semantics is interpreted in terms of *remember* (Campbell 1959: 345) was conceived of differently than its Present-Day English equivalent. The aim of this study will thus be to show differences in the conceptualisation between Old English *munan* and the Present-Day English corresponding sense – ‘remember’. However, the present analysis will not focus on the semantics of *remember*, but rather on the semantic path of *munan*. Therefore, the semantics of Present-Day English *to remember* will serve only as a background to illustrate better differences in the conceptualisation of the seemingly corresponding Old English equivalent. Moreover, the analysis will aim to distinguish between senses that could be referred to as root, hence, logically objective and epistemic ones, thereby subjective and individual. Furthermore, the study will illustrate a mechanism that could account for the development of epistemic senses, as well as the time when such senses were first recorded.

In the analysis of *munan*, three stages within the Old English period will be distinguished: 10th c., 10th/11th c. (the transition stage), and 11th c. The present analysis is based on the Toronto Corpus compiled by Antonette di Paolo Healey (1986) and presents a quantitative approach based on detailed statistics within the concept of *munan*. In order to achieve maximum accuracy, *munan* was analysed in all attested contexts from the Toronto Corpus. Nevertheless, one should take into account the fact that however detailed and accurate the corpus

is, it may not always reflect the semantic reality of the distant past. The data can thus be distorted as not all the texts that were written down in the Old English period are preserved in corpora. Consequently the semantic analysis may be more of a corpus artefact rather than a reflection of the actual semantics of *munan* in the Anglo-Saxon period. Nevertheless, corpora are valid sources of information. Therefore, one can hope that its contents reflect, to a certain extent, the semantic reality of *munan*. Still, the data should not be taken with statistical accuracy as they seem to be fragmentary. Moreover, some senses are scarcely documented as often happens with data from the distant past. Rather, the available figures should be treated as drawing the plausible path of change from the objective to a subjective sense by indicating which senses were most numerous in the three analysed stages.

It should also be emphasised that a path of a semantic change that can be seen in *munan* reflects a general tendency that accompanies other mental verbs. Such tendencies or paths of semantic changes have been vastly described (Traugott 1989, Sweetser 1990, Radden 2003). According to Traugott (1989), the directionality of semantic change reflects a path from the initial, root meaning, thus from the real-world domain, to the epistemic, abstract, logical one, which focuses on the internal world of a speaker's belief and knowledge status. Similarly, Sweetser (1990) claims that the internal self is understood in terms of bodily external self and hence described by the vocabulary connected with the external self. She highlights that these correspondences are not isolated but they are a part of a larger system, which involves our conceptualisation of one area of experience in terms of another. In other words, physical functions and states are metaphorically associated with mental functions and states. Sweetser sees the shift of meanings from the concrete to the abstract as a change from the socio-physical level to the abstract, logical, epistemic level. For her, it is the speaker's reasoning process that is a subject to metaphor. The path of a change from the concrete to the abstract has also been discussed by Radden (2003). In his study of verbs denoting perception, Radden analyses the shift from PIE *weid* (to see) to OE *witan* (to know). He claims that this process should be referred to as metaphor based on metonymy. The sequential ordering of the two events *I know it because I saw it* hence the Effect sanding for the Cause constitutes metaphorical basis for the metaphor in which the two domains of perception and cognition are mapped. A similar mechanism of the metaphor based on metonymy can also be observed in *munan*.

The paper will thus confirm the widely held assumption that meanings tend to move toward greater subjectivity, thereby reflecting the shift from a relatively objective control of some entity to a more subjective one.

Moreover, the purpose of the paper is also to show which morphological forms might have developed epistemic senses prior to other forms. This kind of distinction has been implemented by Aijmer (1985). She maintains that such changes come about by the gradual application of the form to more and more contexts. Such was the case, according to Aijmer (1985: 13), with the



development of the *volitional will* into a future being initiated in the 3rd person singular. The aim of the final part of my analysis is to juxtapose *munan* with *āgan* not to show the similarity in their semantic profiles but to indicate that in both verbs new senses developed in particular contexts in particular morphological forms and they spread to other forms only later.

## 2. Semantic analysis of *munan*

Before moving to an analysis of Old English *munan*, the aim of this section will be to compare it to its Present-Day English apparent equivalent: *remember*. According to the Oxford English Dictionary (1989), (sv. remember) *remember* is given the following senses:

- 1) to retain in, or recall to the memory; to bear in mind, recollect
- 2) to think of, recall the memory of
- 3) to record, mention
- 4) to have or bear in mind
- 5) to have mind, memory or recollection of something

Thus, the essential attributes in *remember* are related either to storing events/entities in one's memory or recollecting them. The semantic content imprinted in *remember* presupposes the individual keeping in mind events related either to his/her life or the life of others he/she has been directly or indirectly involved with. There are three main attributes that can be distinguished in the verb *remember*. Firstly, it is related to the individual and his/her mode of storing events. Secondly, it is subjective, as it presupposes how an individual keeps events in his/her mind. In other words, the semantics of *remember* implies that the event restored in memory and then retold is fragmentary and subjective rather than reflecting an actual reality. Moreover, there are frequently as many versions of past events as many people who can remember them. Finally, *remember* is a mental verb, as it is related to the process of either storing events in one's memory or recollecting them.

In examining the Old English sense of *munan*, one notices that its semantics implied different attributes when compared with the Present-Day English *remember*. To begin with, the original idea behind Old English *munan* was not to remember in the sense *to recollect* or simply *to keep in one's memory*. The available data from the Toronto Corpus indicate that this sense developed only in the 11th c. and was indicative of a high degree of subjectivity. The original sense of *munan* was *to be aware of*, *to be conscious of* and implied that one should implement in one's life what one should be conscious of. In other words, the semantics of *munan* was not mental but rather normative and social. It was directed toward principles, Christian norms rather than events related to the individual. Hence, the meaning of *munan* initially was objective and excluded

personal, subjective undertones. This sense of *munan* seems to be the only one in the 10th c.

Changes in the semantics of *munan* can be observed in further stages, as well. In the 10th/11th c. (II stage), subjective undertones start to emerge, yet the objective sense prevails. In the 11th c. (III stage), the subjective senses of *munan* seem numerous, and the verb can also perform a speech-act function. Nevertheless, objective senses are also present. Thus, in the 11th c., *munan* can express both an objective, root sense, and a subjective epistemic one.

In the present study, the following senses of *munan* will be taken into account:

- 1) to be aware of, to be conscious of, to realise (objective sense)
- 2) the sense ‘to remember’ behind *munan* becomes related to one’s personal life; (the sense of ‘being conscious of’ is still present but at this point becomes directed to an individual’s life)
- 3) the pure sense – ‘to remember’ (to keep in mind or recollect from memory)
- 4) the sense ‘to remember’ as a speech-act verb

Hence, the analysis of all morphological forms of *munan* will show the gradual semantic development from sense 1 (logical, objective) through the intermediate stage (sense 2) to the subjective, epistemic stage (senses 3, 4). Sense 1 is normative, collective and will be referred to as a root one. Sense 2 occupies the intermediate stage on the development to epistemicity as it focuses on individual events but with the old meaning – to be aware of – prevailing. Hence, at this stage, the meaning of *munan* is only partly subjective. Senses 3 and 4 are epistemic. The meaning of *munan* at stage 3 is ‘to remember’, ‘to recollect’, while the former sense ‘to be conscious of’ is no longer present. Thus, the activity behind *munan* is typically mental. The verb focuses on the internal world of the speaker’s belief and knowledge status, and is not underpinned by moral undertones but by the subjective capacity to recollect events as viewed by the speaker. Sense 4 marks *munan* as a speech-act verb in discourse situations, where it functions as a discourse marker, and its application is automatic. Its role is only introductory and used to invite a hearer to a discourse. The speaker, hence, does not intend to emphasise what he/she remembers but to state what happened at a particular time. *Munan* had already developed this function in Old English. At that point, *munan* is devoid of the sense ‘to remember’, ‘to recollect’, but rather permits an extension of meaning to involve the speaker’s attitude to the message. It is no longer a lexical item but a purely pragmatilised expression.

The following subsections will analyse the morphological forms of *munan* separately to show the path of semantic development of particular forms and to draw the differences in the conceptualisation of present and past forms of *munan*.

### 3. Semantic analysis of the infinitive of *munan*

An analysis of the infinitive *munan* based on the Toronto Corpus records the following senses:

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have in mind (objective sense)	5 cases, 100%	9 cases, 82%	14 cases, 45%
to have in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	2 cases, 18%	12 cases, 39%
to remember, recollect	–	–	5 cases, 10%
speech act verb	–	–	–

The analysis of the infinitive *munan* leads us to the following conclusions. *Munan* in the 10th c. was scarcely documented. The Toronto Corpus records only five cases of *munan*, and their meaning is objective, hence ‘to be aware of’, ‘be conscious of’. The concept of objectivity underlying *munan* in the 10th c. can be illustrated by the following sentences:

- (1) *Forþon we sculon a hycgende hælo rædes gemunan tone selestan sigora waldend.*  
 ‘Mindful of saving salvation from an ordinance, must we keep in mind the disposer of victories.’  
 (Vainglory: Krapp and Dobbie 1936, 147-9)
- (2) *Hwæs weneþ se þe mid gewitte nyle gemunan þa mildan meotodes lare.*  
 ‘What expects the one who in his wisdom will not keep the teaching of Christ.’  
 (Christ: Krapp and Dobbie 1936, 3-49)

Hence, *munan* in both sentences implies the idea of ‘keeping in mind’, being aware of, rather than the pure sense of remembering. Moreover, in sentence (2) *munan* is juxtaposed with the phrase *mid gewitte*. This phrase, *munan mid gewitte*, indicates that *munan* is applied here to the act of ‘being aware of’ rather than of ‘remembering’; otherwise, the above context would be tautological. The analysis records only one phrase with apparently tautological expression, other contexts with *munan* from the 10th c. record the concept of ‘keeping in mind’ as illustrated in sentence (1). These contexts use *munan* in the following phrases:

- *gemunan soþ and riht* ‘to keep in mind what is true and right’  
 (Christ and Satan: Krapp 1931, 135-58)
- *gemunan meotodes streng þo* ‘to keep in mind God’s strength’  
 (Christ and Satan: Krapp 1931, 135-58)
- *gemunan gastes bled* ‘to keep in mind the blood of Holy Spirit’  
 (Christ and Satan: Krapp 1931, 135-58)

### 3.1 Semantic analysis of *munan* in the 10th/11th c.

The data, though fragmentary, gives a hint as to which senses were the most numerous and which were scarcely documented. The most highly documented sense seems still the objective one (have in mind/be aware of) – 9 cases, (82%). Yet, at that time, there appears a tendency to use the concept *keep in mind personal events*. Hence, another sense emerges, which is partly subjective and which constitutes an intermediate stage to the epistemic sense. The objective sense of *munan* in the 10th/11th c. can be shown in the following examples:

- (3) *And ute gemunan þæt we sculon ealle deade beon.*  
 ‘Let keep in mind/be aware that we all shall be dead.’  
 (Third Sunday after Epiphany: Willard 1935, 38-56)
- (4) *Donne sceolon we nu gemunan þone eges fullan domes dæg se cumeþ nu ungeara.*  
 ‘We should keep in mind that the Judgement Day comes soon.’  
 (Morris 1874-80, Blicking Homily no. 8: Morris 1874-80, 97-105)

The partly subjective senses from the 10th/11th c. can be exemplified by the following contexts:

- (5) *Da reafaras geþencap swi þe oft hu micel hie sellap and swi þe seldon hie willap gemunan hu micel hie nimap.*  
 ‘Thieves think very often how much they give and very rarely they are willing to be aware how much they take.’  
 (Gregory the Great, Pastoral Care: Sweet 1871, 24-467)
- (6) *Gif he wile gemunan þa þe he o þrum monnum deþ.*  
 ‘If he were willing to realise what he does to other people.’  
 (Gregory the Great, Pastoral Care: Sweet 1871, 24-467)

The meaning of *gemunan* is still underpinned by the sense ‘to stick to’, ‘have in mind’ with normative connotations, yet an increase in subjectivity can be noticed, as the event in focus is personal and subjective, rather than universal.

### 3.2 Semantic analysis of *munan* in the 11th c.

Though the objective sense is still numerous, it is less common in comparison with previous stages. Moreover, the percentage of partly subjective senses seems higher than in previous stages (39%). Furthermore, in the 11th c. one can observe the emergence of a new sense – ‘to remember’, ‘recollect’, thus, an epistemic one, constituting 5 cases (16%) in the infinitive *munan*.

- (7) *Bide þinne drihten eadmodlice forgifnesse ealra þara synna þe þu wiþ Godes willan geworht hæbbe þara þe þu gemunan mæge and þara þe þu gemunan ne mæge.*  
 ‘Ask God for forgiveness for all the sins that you did against God’s will that you can and cannot remember.’  
 (Leofa man þe is mycel þearf þu þas drihtenlican tide georne geþence: Dictionary of Old English transcript, edited from Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Junius 121)
- (8) *Nu gyt syndon manige men lifigende þu þa þis gemunan magon.*  
 ‘There are many people still alive who can remember this.’  
 (Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Book 1: Hecht 1900-7, 11, 14-90).
- (9) *And on þis ylcan geare com se stranga winter mid forste and mid snawe þæt nan man þa on like þæt mihte gemunan swa strange winter.*  
 ‘That same year came a strong winter with snow and frost and there is hardly any man that can remember such a strong winter.’  
 (London, British Library, MS. Cotton Tiberius B. 1: Rositzke 1940)

One can see in these sentences that they have developed the sense of recollecting/remembering. Yet, even though these sentences are based on the concept of remembering/recollecting, it seems that sentence (7) could be also viewed as belonging to the intermediate stage, where the sense ‘to be aware of’ could equally fit. Hence, sentence (7) could be interpreted in two different ways:

- i. Ask God for forgiveness for sins that you can and you cannot remember, or
- ii. Ask God for forgiveness for all sins that you are, and you are not aware of.

The mechanism that is involved in the development of the sense ‘to remember’ seems to be the conventionalisation of conversational implicature. Hence, if a person is not aware of having committed a sin, he/she does not have this sin on his/her mind, thus he/she does not remember it. In other words, the consequence of not being aware of committing a sin is not to have this sin on one’s mind, which leads to the development of a new sense:

Ic *gemunan ne mæge* – I am not aware > I do not remember.

Although the positive senses ‘be aware of’ and ‘remember/recollect’ look distinct, with the former inviting the implications ‘to dwell on’, ‘to think of’, hence a broad insight, while the sense ‘to remember/recollect’ implies a process of focusing on something rather than dwelling on it, hence a narrower insight. In

the negative form these senses look much more similar. Thus, conceptually in a positive context, the following differences can be distinguished:

- to remember/recollect — focus on only one point, one specific instance, not deep process
- to be aware of — focus on many points, serial perspectives, deep process.

Yet, in negative form, these concepts look more similar:

- I am not aware of having committed a sin.
- I do not remember having committed a sin.

Both look like short, momentary processes. The speaker relies only on his/her memory and makes the following inferences. Thus, the new sense ‘to remember’ developed from a negative context via the mechanism of conventionalisation of conversational implicature. On the other hand, one can also claim that the sense ‘not be aware of’ and ‘not remember’ are similar, but only to a certain point. Namely, the sense ‘not be aware of’ can be viewed conceptually as a path, while the sense ‘not remember’ can be seen as a point. The sense ‘not be aware of’ at the end of the path looks similar to ‘not remember’. The example below illustrates this assumption:

- I am not aware of committing this sin (this implies I have been focusing on this problem thoroughly from many dimensions and cannot retain a trace of it in my memory).
- I do not remember having committed this sin (this implies I just cannot retain it in my memory).

Thus, ‘not be aware of’ implies a path where the subject starts the process, is in the middle of it, and ends it. The sense ‘not remember’ implies a point, as the subject instantly announces what he/she has on his/her mind.

However, it seems that a path and a point can only be analysed separately when the senses ‘not be aware of’ and ‘not remember’ are developed well enough and can be kept as distinct ones. Nevertheless, during the process of a new sense emerging – ‘remember’ – there have been degrees of overlapping when sentences could be interpreted as either ‘not be aware of’ or ‘not remember’. Thus, conceptually one can say that a point became part of a path, or that a path made a space for a point. From this perspective, the idea of ‘remembering’ is the final stage, the consequence of ‘being aware of’. Hence, the cause is ‘I am not aware of it’ and the consequence is ‘I cannot remember it’.

In these contexts, *munan* can be semantically analysed as a complete, last stage activity, which ends the initial, or opening stage of ‘be aware of’. Consequently, the development of the sense ‘to remember’ in *munan* can be attributed to the mechanism of conversational implicature based on a metonymic

relationship that includes sequential events, and which becomes the source of the emerging metaphor (Radden 2003: 98). These two events are temporally linked and can be described as PRECEDENCE PLUS CAUSE and SUBSEQUENCE PLUS RESULT, and may be interpreted as CAUSAL PRECEDENCE.

At this point Traugott's (1989) Tendency I can be tested:

*Meaning based in the external described situation > meaning based in the internal situation.*

When viewed from a certain perspective, the semantic change in *munan* seems metaphorical, yet the particular steps that lead to the final stage are metonymic. In other words, even though what takes place is an extension from the concrete field (objective sense) to the subjective one (mental recollection), the shift that triggers this extension is metonymic. Consequently, the above mechanism should be interpreted as a process of an emerging metaphor (Radden 2003: 98).

#### 4. Semantic analysis of *geman*

In analysing *geman*, a distinction needs to be drawn between the first and third person singular, as the semantic path in both forms proceeds differently.

*geman* (first person singular present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have in mind (objective sense)	1 100%	–	1 11%
to have in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	1 100%	–
to remember	–	–	6 67%
speech-act verb	–	–	2 22%

*geman* (third person singular present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have in mind (objective sense)	–	3 100%	4 80%
to have in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	–	1 20%
to remember	–	–	–
speech-act verb	–	–	–

The analysis of *geman* leads to the following conclusions. *Geman* in the 10th c. seems to be scarcely documented. The Toronto Corpus records only one instance of *geman* in the first person singular and no instances in the third person singular. Moreover, its meaning was objective, hence 'to have in mind' in the sense of 'to be aware of' or 'to be conscious of'.

(10) *Ne eom ic ana þæt on mode geman hu se maga fremde, godbearn on grundum.*

'I am not the only one who is aware in soul how Christ acted, divine child on Earth.'

(Andreas: Krapp 1932a, 3-51)

According to the available data, in the 10th/11th c., *geman* in the first person singular is recorded once but in the partly subjective sense, while in the third person singular the root objective form is still preserved. Thus, at this point, a gradual distinction in the development of the semantic path can be observed between the first and third person singular. The first person singular initiated the emergence of new subjective senses through the process of conventionalisation of conversational implicature, which later spread to other forms.

In the 11th c. one can see further consequences of this divergence. According to the available data, *geman* in the third person singular is recorded four times in the objective sense (80%) and only once in a partly subjective one (20%). *Geman* however, in the first person singular is documented mostly in epistemic senses. The sense ‘to remember’ constitutes 67% and the speech act function 22%. The objective sense is recorded only once:

– to have in mind (objective sense)

- (11) *Ic þine soþæstne geman, drihten.*  
 ‘I truly keep you mind, God.’

(The Paris Psalter: Krapp 1932b, 3-150)

– to remember

- (12) *Ic geman þæt þu swa sædest.*  
 ‘I remember that you said so.’

(Boethius: The Consolation of Philosophy: Sedgefield 1899, 7-149)

- (13) *Ic geman þæt gedon wæs nu for þrym gærum in minum mynstre.*  
 ‘I remember what was done in my monastery three years ago.’

(Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Preface and Book 4:  
 Hecht 1900-7, 260-350)

– speech act function

- (14) *Donne ic geman mines ærran lifes, þe ic on mynstre ær wunode, þonne asworette ic and ageomrige gelice þam, þe on lefan scipe neah lande gelæfaþ, and se storm uþ adrifað swa feor þæt hy æt necstan ne magon land geseon.*

‘I remember well my earlier life when I lived in a monastery. I experience real grief like they who travel on infirm ship near the land and the storm comes so far that those who are the nearest cannot see land.’

(Gregory the Great, Dialogues, Preface and Book 4: Hecht 1900-7, 1-9)

In sentence (14), one can see that *geman* performs the role of a speech-act verb. *Geman* in this context is purely introductory and encourages the hearer to a discourse. Its function is hence pragmatic. At this point, *geman* marks Traugott’s (1989) Tendency II:



*Meaning based in the external or internal situation > meaning based in the textual situation.*

Thus, by developing into a discourse marker, *geman* represents a change from a mental state to a speech-act verb meaning.

Another mechanism that can be observed during the semantic development of *geman* is divergence (Hopper and Traugott 1993: 113). According to Hopper and Traugott (1993: 113), when a lexical form undergoes pragmaticalisation, the original lexical form may remain as an autonomous lexical item. Apart from being a fixed item with a different set of attributes in analysed pragmatic expressions, *geman* behaves like an autonomous lexical item when found in other contexts.

### 5. Semantic analysis of *gemanst*

The Toronto Corpus records only two instances of *gemanst*, which are dated to the 11th c. They denote the sense ‘remember’ and speech-act function respectively:

– to remember:

- (15) *Gemanst tu hwæt wiþ ær spræcon?*  
 ‘Do you remember what we were talking about before?’  
 (Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*: Sedgefield 1899, 7-149)

– speech act function:

- (16) *Ðar þu gemanst broþer þin hæf þ ænig þincg ongean þe, forlaþ þær lac þine and ga gesibsumian broþer þinum.*  
 ‘If you remember/think your brother has something against you, abstain from your fight and reconcile with your brother.’  
 (Defensor, *Liber scintillarum*: Getty 1969)

Thus, the second person singular seems to have emerged in the 11th c., yet reflected the newly developed senses.

### 6. Semantic analysis of *gemunon*

In the analysis of *gemunon*, a distinction should be drawn between the first, second and third person plural. The study will show that the semantic path the first and third person plural *gemunon* underwent reflected the path underlying the first and third person singular *geman*.

*gemunon* (first person plural present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	3 100%	1 50%	–
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	1 50%	2 67%
to remember	–	–	1 33%
speech-act function	–	–	–

*gemunon* (second person plural present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	–	1 50%
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	–	1 50%
to remember	–	–	–
speech-act function	–	–	–

*gemunon* (third person plural present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	–	3 100%
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	–	–
to remember	–	–	–
speech-act function	–	–	–

The analysis of *gemunon* leads to the following conclusions. To begin with, one can see parallels in the semantic development of *geman* (first and third person singular) and *gemunon* (first and third person plural). These similarities should not be conceived in terms of the frequency of epistemic senses, but rather in terms of the mechanism that underlies the divergent development between the first and third person singular and plural. In terms of the first person plural *gemunon*, one notices parallels with first person singular *geman*. In the 10th c., the only meaning of *gemunon* is ‘to be aware of, to keep in mind’ as an objective sense, which can be exemplified by the following:

(17) *Gemunon we þone halgan drihten.*

‘Let us keep in mind the holy God.’

(Christ and Satan: Krapp 1931, 135-58)

In the 10th/11th c., a partly subjective sense emerges, hence a tendency towards subjectivity can be seen. Thus, in the 10th/11th c., the Toronto Corpus records two senses of *gemunon* (first person plural); one of them is objective, and the other partly subjective:

– objective sense

(18) *Gemunon we þæt we þa god don þe us Godes bec æraþ.*

‘Let us keep in mind that we should do good as God’s books teach us.’

(Palm Sunday: Morris 1874-84, 65-83)

– partly subjective sense

(19) *Gemunon we ure dæghwamlīcan synna.*

‘Let us keep in mind *our* every-day sins.’

(Quinquagesima Sunday: Morris 1874-80, 15-23)

In the 11th c., the recorded senses in *gemunon* (first person plural) are partly subjective ones (67%) and one that is epistemic (33%):

(20) *Gemunon we þæt se wītiga cwæþ, Hyrat Drihtere mid ege and mid hogum.*

‘Let us keep in mind what the wise man said, Listen to God with fear and care.’

(Chrodegang of Metz, Regula Canonicorum: Napier 1916, 1-99)

The sentence presupposes a group of people who met the wise man (individual experience) and keep in mind what he said. Thus, the partial subjectivity of the sentence is evoked due to the close relation between individual experience and abstract, normative values all are aware of:

– remember

(21) *We gemunon hu fela fixa we hæfdon on Egypta lande.*

‘We remember how many fish we had in Egypt.’

(Numbers: Crawford 1922, 304-32)

The analysis of the third person plural *gemunon* evokes a different semantic path when compared with first person plural *gemunon*, and a parallel one when compared with the third person singular *geman*. Thus, it appears that the only recorded sense of *gemunon* in the third person plural is an objective one, which is also the central one in *geman* in the third person. In other words, the above form shows no traces of subjectivity.

Objective sense:

(22) *Ic mingie þæt hi gemunon þæs preostlican regoles and hæbbon gebodu æfre æt foran eagan.*

‘I warn that they should be aware of priest’s principles and the prayer before their eyes.’

(Bury of St. Edmunds, Possessions, Rents and Grants: Robertson 1956, no. 104)

The semantic analysis of the second person plural *gemunon* points to a divergent path of development when juxtaposed with the second person singular *gemanst*. The study records two senses dated to the 11th c., one objective and the other

partly subjective. Even though the analysis of *gemanst* indicates only two senses, they are both epistemic. The apparent dichotomy between second person singular and second person plural can be accounted for by the discourse function. Namely, *gemanst* was used between two interlocutors, while *gemunon* in relation to a larger group of people. Consequently, it was the second person plural that evoked evaluative, normative associations and was applied in instruction and teaching. Thus, both forms *gemanst* and *gemunon* were used in different contexts; the former in more personal, informal ones, while the latter was used in social, normative, and hence more formal ones.

Objective sense:

(23) *Ge ne gemunon ne ongitap þone heofoncundan anweald and þone weorþscipe.*

‘You are not aware of nor you understand the power of heaven and its magnificence.

(Boethius, *The Consolation of Philosophy*: Sedgefield 1899, 7-149)

(24) *Ic myngie þæt ge synt Godes sacerdas and þæt ge gemunon hu mide byrþena ge habbaþ underfangen.*

‘I advise you/warn you that you are God’s priests and that you keep in mind what burden you have undertaken.’

(Chrodegang, of Metz, *Regula Canonicorum*; Napier 1916, 1-99)

## 7. Semantic analysis of *gemunde*

Similar to *geman* and *gemunon*, *gemunde* will be analysed with a distinction made between the first and third person.

*gemunde* (first person singular past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	–	–
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	3 100%	1 33%	2 50%
to remember	–	2 67%	1 50%
speech-act function	–	–	–

*gemunde* (third person singular past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	1...20%	3 9%
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	1 100%	4 80%	28 85%
to remember	–	–	2 6%
speech-act function	–	–	–

In looking at the past form *gemunde* and juxtaposing it with present forms, one notices differences in the semantic development of the past when compared to the present. To begin with, partly subjective senses seem to be recorded often. There are no traces of objective senses for *gemunde* in the first and third person. Yet, similarly to the present tense, the amount of epistemic senses in the first person appears to be higher than in the third. The Toronto Corpus records 67% in the 10th/11th c. and 50% in the 11th c. of the sense ‘remember’. In contrast, in the third person, this epistemic sense constitutes just 6%.

Remember:

(25) *Da gemunde ic hu ic geseah.*

‘I remembered it how I saw it.’

(Gregory the Great, *The Pastoral Care*: Sweet 1871, 3-9)

(26) *Ne gemunde þæt he ær þæs gespræc.*

‘He did not remember that he talked about it before.’

(*Beowulf*: Dobbie 1953, 3-98)

Moreover, *gemunde* in the first person is rarely documented, much less so than in the third one. Study of the third person *gemunde* indicates that partly subjective senses are frequently recorded. The above sense constitutes 100% in the 10th c., 80% in the 10th/11th c. and 85% in the 11th c. of all the senses of *gemunde*. Its general meaning is ‘to be aware of’, yet the subjects of awareness are events from one’s individual experience. Thus, while such senses are sporadic in present forms, they are numerous in past form *gemunde*.

## 8. Semantic analysis of *gemundest* and *gemundon*

The aim of this section is to analyse the semantics of other past indicative forms, hence *gemundest* (second person singular) and *gemundon* (first and third person plural). It should be emphasised that no contexts of *gemundon* in the second person plural were recorded.

*gemundest* (second person singular past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	–	–
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	1 100%	–	6 100%
to remember	–	–	–
speech-act function	–	–	–

*gemundon* (first person plural past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	–	–
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	–	–

to remember	–	–	1	100%
speech-act function	–	–	–	–
<i>gemundon</i> (third person plural past)				
	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.	
keep in mind (objective sense)	–	–	–	–
keep in mind (partly subjective sense)	–	1	100%	8 100%
to remember	–	–	–	–
speech-act function	–	–	–	–

The analysis indicates that the central meaning in the studied forms is partly a subjective sense, hence ‘to keep in mind’, when the subjects of awareness are events from one’s personal experience. It is the only sense of *gemundest* in the 10th c. and 11th c., and in the third person plural *gemundon* in the 10th/11th c. and 11th c. The analysis records only one context when *gemundon* referred to the first person plural, yet its meaning was subjective and epistemic. Thus, one should emphasise that the first person in the indicative developed epistemic senses prior to other persons.

The above senses can be exemplified by the following contexts:

– partly subjective

(27) *Lyt þu gemundest to hwan þirne sawle sittan wurde.*  
 ‘You were little concerned what happened to your soul afterwards.’  
 (Soul and Body: Krapp 1932a, 54-9)

(28) *Ne gemundest þu hwilc hit biþ on helle?*  
 ‘Why didn’t you keep in mind how it would be in hell?’  
 (Fourth Sunday after Epiphany: Assmann 1889, 164-9)

(29) *He þa gemunde Petrus þæt word þe Crist him ær cwæþ, þæt he him sceolde þriwa witsacan ær þam se hana creowe.*  
 ‘Peter kept in mind these words Christ told him that he would reject Him three times before the cock crows.’  
 (In Parasceve: Schaefer 1972, 285-314)

– remember

(30) *We gemundon þæt ofter flodas babilones þær we sæ þon.*  
 ‘We remember that we were sitting by the rivers of Babilony.’  
 (Psalms, London, British Library: Oess 1910, 26-231)

## 9. The juxtaposition of *munan* and *āgan*

The aim of this section is to juxtapose the development of OE *munan* and *āgan* to indicate that the development of new senses could be initiated by some

morphological forms, and only later these new senses were adopted by other morphological forms. *Munan* was not an isolated verb in which the development of the epistemic sense evolved in one particular morphological form (first person singular). My earlier analyses of OE *witan* (Wawrzyniak 2006), OE *āgan* (Wawrzyniak 2008) and OE *unnan* (Wawrzyniak 2010) as well as Aijmer's analysis of *will* (1985) lead to the assumption that a new sense may evolve in a specific context often tied with a certain morphological form and then gradually spread to more and more contexts. Hence, this section will not deal with the detailed analysis of *āgan*, which was presented in my earlier study (Wawrzyniak 2008), but instead it will attempt to show in which morphological forms the sense of obligation emerged, and which morphological forms were more prone to use the older sense of possession. The analysis of *āgan*, similarly to *munan*, has been based on the study of all contexts from the Toronto Corpus.

It should be emphasised that the development of the sense 'ought to' did not proceed at the same pace in all morphological forms but that some forms were more prone to the new sense than others. The distinction between the former sense of possession and the latter sense of obligation emerged in certain contexts, like Christian speeches, sermons, i.e., contexts emphasising community rather than individuals. Consequently, *āgan* evokes collective rather than individual undertones. The obligation sense emerged first in the present tense in the first person plural *wē* and in the third person singular *hē*, *hēo*, and then was spread analogically in the corresponding past forms. Therefore, the form *āg* / *āh* when linked with the first person pronoun, did not denote the obligation sense but the possession sense. Likewise, *āgon* related to the first person plural by implying a larger group (Christians, community) is attested to with the sense 'ought to'. Likewise, the obligation sense is also central in *āgon* (second person plural present) but not in *āhtest* (second person singular past), where the emphasis is put on the individual. Therefore, it should be emphasised that the pronouns referring to an individual retained the former sense in *āgan*, while those denoting a larger group or a community when linked with *āgan* developed the new obligation sense. Consequently, the meaning that emerged in this mode had a normative character.

*āh* / *āg* (first person singular present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	–	–	–
to have the need to	–	–	1 100 %
ought to	–	–	–

*āh* / *āg* (third person singular present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	5 100%	4 66%	4 23%
to have the need to	–	2 34%	9 54 %
ought to	–	–	4 23%

*āgon* (first person plural present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	–	–	1 10%
to have the need to	–	–	7 70 %
ought to	–	–	2 20%

*āgon* (third person plural present)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	1 100%	2 100%	1 100%
to have the need to	–	–	–
ought to	–	–	–

*āhte* (first person singular past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	4 100%	1 100%	1 100%
ought to	–	–	–

*āhte* (third person singular past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	2 100%	4 80%	3 75%
ought to	–	1 20%	1 25%

*āhtest* (second person plural past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	2 100%	–	2 100%
ought to	–	–	–

*āhton* (third person plural past)

	10th c.	10th/11th c.	11th c.
to have	1 100%	–	–
ought to	–	–	–

## 10. Conclusion

The aim of the present analysis was to present the semantic profile of OE *munan*. The study shows that the semantic development of *munan* was contingent on tense, mood and person. Hence, the epistemic function was the most frequently used in the first person singular indicative *geman*, which also developed a speech-act function. The subjective, epistemic sense then gradually spread to the first person plural indicative *gemunon*, as well as to the first person past forms, singular and plural – *gemunde*, *gemundon*. In contrast, the third person regardless of the tense and mood did not develop epistemic senses. Regarding the second person, the subjective sense developed in the singular present, *gemanst*, and the singular past, *gemundest*, in discourse, while the



second person plural present *gemunon* records no epistemic senses due to its normative character. Moreover, an epistemic function also emerged in the infinitive *munan*, yet the analysis shows no trace of a speech-act function in the infinitive. As for the past indicative forms, they record epistemic senses, yet only in a marginal number of instances and only in the first person. The semantic development in the third person singular did not proceed beyond the intermediate stage within Tendency I, thereby giving rise to partly subjective senses.

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## **Border Crossings – John Montague’s *The Dead Kingdom***

Péter Dolmányos

The motif of the journey occupies an important place in John Montague’s poetry. Though often recommended to be distrusted, biography offers a comfortable support for this – born in Brooklyn, raised in Northern Ireland, educated in Dublin and in the United States, the poet became acquainted with and accustomed to travel and its consequences from an early age (cf. Montague quoted by Dawe 15-16). The poetry, as a result, frequently involves a journey of some kind – often in the form of a literal one which in turn develops rich metaphorical dimensions that overwrite the original story and which offers a wide range of analogies for the contemplation of experience.

Journeys involve points of departure as well as destinations yet very often it is the process itself that acquires principal significance. The allegorical reading of life as a journey is an old idea resting on these old assumptions; its long history, however, does not diminish its potential powers of illuminating experience from less than usual perspectives, and it is also capable, by its very nature, of throwing light on the process of illumination by bringing ritualistic actions of remembering into the focus of conscious observations.

Journeys imply progress and process, consist of stations to pass and involve borders to cross. There are differences between stages of the journey which are observable from various perspectives; yet there is a paradoxical element involved in this phenomenon as there is continuous progress along the way and the successive stages are separated from each other by arbitrarily drawn interfaces comfortably called borders – change is observable but the exact end of one stage and the beginning of the next is a rather elusive concept. This can lead to the reconsideration and the reassessment of the category of the border, and the concept can be destabilised as a consequence, which in turn can further illuminate experience and its interpretation.

The occasion for John Montague’s collection *The Dead Kingdom* (1984) is the death of the mother of the poet and her funeral. The collection takes the frame of a journey from the south of the Republic to the North, her former residence and also the scene of the poet’s childhood. The poems charter a rich territory: the landscape, the concept of change, the troubled history of Ireland and the not any less troubled family history of the poet mark the field and the scope of the collection. Its principal genre is the elegy, one of the favourites of Montague: it is a genre that involves an imaginative reconstruction of the past

and a number of imaginative border crossings along the way. There is a crossing of a border in bringing to a present (textual) life past events, facts and persons (the motif of the “*nekiya*, the hero’s descent into the underworld” (Johnston 198)), and there is also an act of remembering, the crossing of a border from the present to the past.

Montague’s technique in *The Dead Kingdom* is similar to the one he employed earlier in his seminal *The Rough Field*: short lyrics are organised into a sequence of epic qualities, the individual poems thus acquire significant additional dimensions pointing beyond their usual lyric structure and the collection becomes more than a sum of its parts. The implications of the epic involve certain technical elements, and Montague favours a straight line of development in the structure rather than the circular patterns involved in *The Rough Field*. Chronology is consistent on the whole, and the journey’s progress in space is undisturbed by digressions as the persona observes his surroundings and conducts his meditations on the inescapable historical dimensions of the Irish landscape. Communal history intersects with personal history, and the last two sections of the collection focus on the imaginative recreation of the family circle, thus the journey across Ireland is simultaneously a journey back in time, yet in a curious way the vision remains stereoscopic as the persona retains his awareness of the present and also of the ‘pastness’ of the past. In this way borders are crossed, and borders are observed and kept intact at the same time. This inherent ambiguity is connected with the paradox of the elegy as a genre – that there is a process of falsification involved in recollecting the past, what is recollected is never identical with the experience itself.

The first instance of border crossing is the opening poem of the collection: the news of his mother’s death is communicated to the poet. On hearing the news he returns from the sea to the shore: he comes from water to land, from a fluid and changing world to the solid one; the sense of being kept comfortably afloat is replaced by a hard and clear sense of reality, of inevitable change. There is another contrast involved in this picture as the salmons’ annual northward journey to the source opens the account – the poet’s own northward journey to his ‘source’, the scene of his childhood and the figure of his mother, however, is not grounded in the notion of fertility but is occasioned by death.

The northward journey in the car with the cousin thus begins in a vaguely *in medias res* manner. The experience of moving past the landscape induces a parallel with the notion of the process of change – the poems explore not only the contemplated landscape but the concept of change intimated by elements in the landscape. All this is underwritten by another sense of change, one that involves a shift in the persona’s mental world, reflected in his interpretation of the landscape. The bogs of the central part of Ireland are waterlogged places of peace and memories; the peacefulness of the landscape repeatedly implies timelessness yet there are also concrete events recollected from the childhood of the persona, suggesting a tangible temporal dimension, which preserves the ambiguous tension of the journey. As the border between the Republic and the

North is approached the harsher elements of the Northern landscape take over: its glacial memories and memorials imply a less consoling sight and a corresponding mental atmosphere as the persona gets closer in both space and time to the event that has prompted the journey.

The memories evoked by the landscape and certain concrete places are private ones at first. They are apparently randomly recollected, yet they give the impression of a happy past, very much in contrast with the present in which the contemplated scenes are neglected and miss the order imposed upon them by human presence. This is what happens in the poem “Abbeylara”: the fond memories of a near idyllic past – “In the garden at Abbeylara / it was always summer” (Montague 131) – are replaced by images of a chaotic and overgrown garden in the present after the death of the inhabitants, “as if they had never been” (Montague 131). The conclusion of the poem implies the omnipresence of change with strong negative overtones as the futility of human endeavour for imposing patterns on the world is suggested by the closing line. The conditional, however, also implies a sense of ‘but’, an insistence on the fact that the people recollected indeed existed in the past.

The personal memories progressively give way to communal ones – myth, legend and ‘actual’ history replace the childhood episodes as the journey unfolds. The communal aspects imply a more profound and more serious concern with the past, yet the prominence of mythic and legendary elements at once point toward the importance of the extra-rational dimensions in that past and in its human assessment. The seemingly monotonous and peaceful landscape shelters surprising memories, and violence intrudes as Montague does not intend to romanticise the historical dimension. The tradition of *dinnseanchas*, the Irish lore of place is revised as personal nostalgia is inescapable along this particular journey yet communal history serves as a reminder of patterns beyond the individual and the omnipresence of the tragic in a wider national context.

The journey from the Republic to the North inescapably involves the crossing of the border between the two countries. The political border normally reads as a clear-cut physical location whose whereabouts are marked with utmost precision; in this case, however, the concept comes under thorough revision. The account of the crossing is given in the poem with the laconic title “Border”. The persona’s anxiety rises despite his frequent experience of the crossing of that border during his childhood as this particular instance is different due to the occasion itself. The most recent history of the North also contributes to the persona’s unease since the “sand-bagged / barracks of Rosslea, Derrylin” (Montague 154) indicate that the place of arrival is a land of ongoing conflict. As a result, the crossing becomes a nearly acrobatic manoeuvre:

Under Quilca Mountain  
 inching the car across  
 a half-bombed bridge,  
 trespassing, zigzagging  
 over potholed roads (Montague 154)

The short lines Montague chooses to employ reflect the claustrophobic conditions of the crossing yet at the same time they would also urge a quick downward movement in the stanza by their very brevity, which creates a tension that corresponds to the anxiety of the speaker.

The crossing is eventually completed, and the persona arrives at the land after a succession of alterations:

post-  
 boxes, now green, now red,  
 alternately halted by British  
 patrols, unarmed *gardai*,  
 signs in Irish and English,  
 both bullet-pierced (Montague 154)

The tactics of listing the two sets of distinct landmarks transforms alteration into alternation, thus the passage creates the impression of oscillation rather than that of straight and steady movement forward, which further undermines the usual expectations concerning the concept of the physical border. The transformation becomes complete with the persona's assessment of the destination – he steps

into  
 that shadowy territory  
 where motives fail, where  
 love fights death,  
 good falters before evil. (Montague 154)

The indicated destination is vague and general enough to be any place, and it is exactly this deliberate undermining of anything concrete and tangible that Montague needs for his further progress towards a reconsideration of his family history.

The event of the crossing in these particular circumstances initiates profound changes in the subsequent poems as Montague turns from the communal to the personal and private again. In “The Plain of Blood”, the first poem to follow “Border”, the change is already observable. This poem appears to continue the pattern laid down in the earlier sections of the collection as the landscape is read in terms of its mythic heritage encoded in its name. The

speaker, however, becomes rather pragmatic in dismissing myth and identifying “wise imperial policy” (Montague 155) as the more tangible cause of the conflict. Though a pair of poems, a curse and a blessing answering each other, follow, and there is a poem conducting a meditation on several deities, the communal and mythologizing drive is eventually renounced and the persona focuses his attention on his own family history in the last two sections of the collection.

The change in focus goes together with a change in perspective as the present is virtually dismissed and the account descends into the past. The exploration of the family history is centred around repeated visits to the North and the belated forming of relationships between son, father and mother. Chronology is handled in a less rigorous manner than so far, and the internal world of memory takes a more prominent role at the expense of the outside world of the landscape and of contemporary events.

The poem “Gravity”, which opens the penultimate section of the collection, is built on the temporal contrast of the persona’s wife expecting a child and his dying mother. This situation also implies borders – these are borders yet to be crossed, and the opposing emotional associations of childbirth and death suspend the poem in a state of tension. This tension is further upheld by the persona’s decision of not telling his mother about his new marriage after the disintegration of his previous one as he does not want to upset the mother’s beliefs resting on “an antique code” (Montague 162).

The sight of the weakening mother induces a series of poems which trace the mother’s life – from the perspective of the persona. The poem “Intimacy” is framed by the episodes of watching films together with his mother as the principal means of getting closer to each other. The first scene of this forming relationship is the cinema to which the grown son takes his mother; in the absence of the father she is “rigged out like a girlfriend / in her evening finery” (Montague 163), and they watch romances as these provide a comfortable escape from “real life” (Montague 163), both in the general and in their particular case. A brief reflection on the sad family history, and of the mother’s “melancholy destiny” (Montague 164) brings the father back into the picture, only to remove him again by referring to the brief family reunion which lasts until the father’s death. In accordance with the time shift the public world of the cinema is replaced by the private one of the home as the television offers similar comforts to those of the former scene, and the shift in location suggests a greater degree of intimacy between mother and son in the final and irreversible absence of the father. The picture, however, is once again one of ambiguity, as the retreat from the public scene to the private one is also an act of resignation, of the acceptance of a situation by circumstance rather than by choice.

The brief summing up of the mother’s “melancholy destiny” compels a more detailed reflection on the family history in the next poem of the collection (“Molly Bawn”). There is a set of pictures of the mother as a young woman, her courtship and marriage, and there is also the inevitable catastrophic intersection

of communal and personal histories as her brothers are traced in the family narrative. The abrupt end of the poem with the image of emigration, in their case to Brooklyn at the beginning of the Great Depression, is also the rather abrupt end of her potential happiness – the ironic phrasing (“making sure to land in / good time for the Depression!” (Montague 165)) gives the impression as if the occasion were ultimately responsible for her (and the family’s) miseries.

The end of the poem is at once the starting point of the next one, “A Muddy Cup”. The image of the cup is the mother’s experience of emigration – her decision to follow her husband with their children reaches a rather bitter climax in her unexpected arrival at the father’s lodgings, and the subsequent fight ends in a reconciliation involving the consumption of the persona. This appears to be one of the key moments of the family story, and it is followed by a similar one when the mother returns to Ireland with the three sons but refuses to take the youngest one (the persona) into her care, sending him away to the relatives of the father to a nearby yet distant farm.

The persona then directs his attention to the father, left behind in Brooklyn. Tellingly, Montague chooses a Christmas scene to evoke his father’s figure – he is seen as a man pulling his sons, all three of them, on a sleigh. The apparent harmony of the image is quickly dissolved, however, as his future is briefly outlined – vanishing family, loneliness, unemployment and drinking await him. At the end of the poem mutual confessions reduce the distance of father and son yet the eventual breaking down of unease between them is delayed until a special occasion, that of a broadcast made by the persona which merits the admiration of the father, however laconic that may be.

The restoration, or perhaps of the proper forming for the first time, of the normal relation between father and son marks the beginning of a wider family reunion. This takes the image of a silver flask which goes around as the family travels to Midnight Mass, and the picture is completed by the presence of the same set of decorations which embellished their last Christmas in Brooklyn. This scene, bordering on the melodramatic, however, is not maintained for long: the episode remains the only one of its kind in the family account. As such it is sharply contrasted with the succeeding poem of the collection which is entitled “Last Journey.” The persona, in spite of the specific temporal element of the title, refuses to provide the exact details of the journey just as he omits the definite article which usually accompanies the adjective “last” – neither time nor destination is specified. This decision freezes the moment and liberates the persona from the compulsion of a neat closure – there is an emphasis on the progress in the account, and there is a refusal of crossing that border which is suggested by “last.”

The last section of the collection begins with a piece focusing on the process of dying yet there are no personal details specified within it. Instead there is the intimation of another border, that of family secrets, which are threatened by the process itself and which may come under scrutiny by younger generations. The implications of this become clear when the persona’s tactics are



revealed – refusing to address his mother's death, he recalls the death of his maternal grandmother instead, thus making the previous generation the matrix of the one whose passing he is compelled to face. This refusal to discuss the mother's death is paralleled with his scrupulous avoidance of giving an account of the father's death, which appears to be the expression of a reluctance in crossing one inevitable border – or at least, of a reluctance of assessing it.

The persona's physical journey has its destination in the funeral of the mother. The account, corresponding in mood to the occasion, concentrates on cold and hostile details, and the old physical distance keeping son from mother is emblematically retained for the night preceding the event as the persona and his cousin spend the night in the childhood home of the poet, seven miles from the mother's home. The funeral embodies that ambiguity which underlies the whole collection, of the constant state of change and the simultaneous presence of continuity and discontinuity: inherited "old terrors" (Montague 178) and the seemingly unchanging world in which the mother lived in the same place where her mother had lived before reflect continuity, while the persona's exclusion from this world in childhood and his present refusal of joining "this narrowing world / of bigotry and anger" (Montague 179) represent the discontinuity in the process of change. In this stereoscopic vision, life is also seen in the duality of the continuity of consciousness and the constant change of the body through its cycles of seven years of full renewal. Bodily change is read as "minor deaths" (Montague 179), repeated over and over until the last one which is curiously understood as "a freedom" (Montague 179), finding its proper metaphor in "a light battling through cloud" (Montague 179), which points towards a profound belief in a superior world of transcendence.

The event of the funeral is recalled in the poem "Northern Lights". The account begins with the image of wild geese, imaginatively identified with the spirits of the newly dead, and concludes with a short passage on the phenomenon denoted by the title, echoing the popular superstition that "by whistling you could / bring them nearer" (Montague 179). The mystery is only partially dissolved by identifying Aurora Borealis as the interaction of magnetic particles in the upper atmosphere; the haunting vision of the lights remains "our sky's virid necklace" (Montague 179). The constantly changing play of light which is only visible at night becomes the proper image of Montague's mission: the mother's figure (and that of the father too, in its turn) is only possible to observe in its entirety when she is no longer around, it can only be fully possessed when it is no longer present.

The physical journey may end here but the metaphorical one still continues – the mother's funeral is not the final resting point of the narrative. The completion of the mother's image needs a final readjustment, one that soothes the tension created by the event of the funeral. The basic question echoes the painful paradox of a childhood without parents: "How can one make an absence flower, / lure a desert to sudden bloom?" (Montague 180) The consequences of the absence of the mother are distressing – a nearly unquenchable thirst for love,

speech impediment and repeated instances of humiliation; yet this situation occasions the persona's discovery of poetry as well, balancing the account to some extent.

The absence is also responsible for the unceasing interest of the persona in seeking explanation for his case of maternal rejection. The already grown man decides to meet his mother and to make himself known to her, though this is done solely on his initiative. The final reproach to the mother, however, is balanced by a nearly miraculous condition which is only learnt when she is dead: despite all her apparent rejection of him, she was still unable to part totally with him:

I never knew, until you were gone,  
that, always around your neck,  
you wore an oval locket  
with an old picture in it,  
of a child in Brooklyn. (Montague 183)

This closure is indeed somewhat melodramatic yet it possesses the power for the benevolent readjustment of the whole picture as a result. Questions still persist, though, since the mother's choice of the image instead of her son receives little attention in the end.

The last two poems of the collection focus on the notion of change and there is a brief account of the journey back. The return is made from the past to the present and there is also a hint at the future through the image of the cradled infant of the poet (whose birth is also omitted from the account), which restores the usual awareness of time and its inevitability. The persona, in a strongly Yeatsian manner, renounces his earlier nostalgia and concludes the sequence with an Inuit saying: "To walk away, without / looking back, or crying" (Montague 185), yet this retains the ambiguity which characterises the whole collection: the persona's insistence on retracing the family history stands opposed to this conclusion, but the picture has been completed and the return is now possible to make.

The poems of *The Dead Kingdom* repeatedly call attention to the natural parallel of moving North. References to the annual northward journey of the salmon and the wild geese recur, and the "wavering needle" of the compass is repeatedly evoked, as if all these formed an inescapable constituent of life. The North possesses a profound significance in Montague's own context due to his Northern upbringing and his mother's home, making it indeed something of a magnetic pole or a centre of gravity. The implications of the North as a location, however, are also strong: its cold, dark and increasingly hostile nature to human habitation form an inseparable association in the poet's mind in his vision of the journey and its conditions – the movement away from the comfortable and

happy present to the tormented world of the past is paralleled by the physical movement from the south to the north.

In the course of this journey the motif of the actual border crossing acquires special importance. The destabilised image of the border and the arrival in a metaphoric world of anywhere suggest the omnipresence and omnipotence of change and the impossibility of standing still. The still point is an illusion only, the construct of the human mind – just as the interpretation of character is a mental construct. The speaker’s reconstruction of the father and mother figures is also a process of creation, a constant rewriting and readjustment of their images, which has a range of implications with a strong sense of ambiguity: the lasting wound is perhaps also possible to heal and the broken family circle may be imaginatively completed, yet all this is tentative only.

Montague’s tactics of deliberately employing ambiguity in the course of his journey creates tension and suggests an honest acknowledgement of the simultaneous presence of two sides to every situation. The two sides hint at the presence of borders between them and the crossing of these borders facilitate the scrutiny of them. The concept of the border in general is also examined and its basically illusory nature is revealed: it is a category created for convenience yet it becomes evasive when put under closer scrutiny. From a more distant perspective the difference is seen, the border in between is observable yet when getting closer to the contemplated scene it becomes increasingly less concrete and tangible, giving way to a set of infinitesimal differences and eliminating the sense of neat interfaces and dividing lines. The present flows into the past, actual experience modulates into memory and life unfolds in the dichotomy of birth and death, the only borders which may be considered tangible – both of which remain essentially unaddressed in their actual occurrence in Montague’s account.

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## Ambiguity in *The French Lieutenant's Woman*

Tibor Tóth

IN MEMORIAM KATHLEEN DUBS

John Fowles' sense of humour, subtle irony and his admiration for the magic power of art generated ever new interpretations of ambiguity in his major works and in his non fiction. His *The French Lieutenant's Woman* is an excellent example in this respect and I would like to approach his presentation of ambiguity in the above novel in its relationship to the principle of the freedom that allows for other freedoms to exist, the thesis of the reality as real as but other, viz., more real than the reality that exists and the problematic meeting of pre-modernist, modernist and post-modern fiction in this novel.

John Fowles' interest in the individual's need for freedom results in characteristic modes of expression and technical solutions which help him rewrite both traditional stereotypes and contemporary theoretical, scientific or technical developments. John Fowles' books simultaneously reflect on contemporary non-literary aspects which influence the individual's possibilities in the twentieth century and stress the peripheral status of the existential in the context of the aesthetic alternatives described.

This authorial attitude directs attention to the inherent ambiguity clearly formulated in *The French Lieutenant's Woman*, where John Fowles declares that his main or 'principal' concern is not with authority but with freedom and that he is ready to sacrifice the exclusive quality of the two above categories and 'democratise' them: "The novelist is still a god, since he creates [...] in the new theological image, with freedom our first principle, not authority" (*F. L. W.*: 97).

In the same novel John Fowles actually declares that freedom and authority are not exclusive of one another, rather he asserts that they are inclusive of different interpretations, and thus can become the source of constant (dis)ambiguity. This is so because freedom is not defined qua freedom but it is declared to be a category that allows for other freedoms, which means that there is a 'central' if not a dominant form of freedom, which can give permission for other forms of freedom to exist. This formula also suggests that the author is ready to share his freedom with some of his characters and it even formulates the

possibility that the artist's freedom can benefit from the partial results of his characters' search for freedom.

The key formula could be that Sarah Woodruff has access to her author's creativity which translates that John Fowles and Sarah have the ambiguous, possibly interchangeable status of author-character or character-author in the novel. John Fowles not only stresses the centrality of ambiguity in this novel, but also obsessively questions its influence on the novel as a genre.

When John Fowles discusses freedom in the proximity of authority, he asserts that the novelist's authority is maintained with the modification that it allows for other authorities. This paradox is present in nearly all his works but *The French Lieutenant's Woman* is perhaps the best example in this respect. This is so as the novel is a vigorous 20<sup>th</sup> century variant of the Victorian novel, which presents its 'lead' against a realistically described nineteenth century social, philosophical and historical background which is occasionally reinterpreted and fragmented by the fictionally theoretical comments and two intrusions by the twentieth century novelist; thus we can say that one of the most important protagonists in the novel is the novel itself.

This also means that in *The French Lieutenant's Woman* the authorial intrusions, a series of theoretical sections, as well as the multiple endings, employ the Victorian material as the very subject and object of theoretical and practical, of fictional and real examination and experiment. This relatively complicated situation does not undermine the possibility of a 'perfect' Victorian novel, but John Fowles signals his conviction that this solution is merely one among many, as in his interpretation the author's dominance is just one of the numerous aspects that influence the fictional material.

Analysis, experiment, dissolving the boundaries between literary history, theory or fiction writing as well as the role and presence of the author become possibilities which are asserted, exercised and also questioned as fictional material in the novel and John Fowles even dedicates chapters thirteen and sixty-one to the theoretical discussion of the above aspects. The form could be termed fictional essay, or fictional theory.

The above paradox results from the very nature of John Fowles' interpretation of fiction, as in his concept the fiction of all periods has reflected on itself to a certain degree (Fowles 1977: 137). This introspection gains prominence and is made into a visible process in the so-called self-reflexive novel fashionable in the second half of the twentieth century (Waugh 1984: 162).

His characters are in an extremely difficult situation because they exist in an ambiguous world, a Victorian one which nevertheless is dominated by postmodern interpretations, and this ambiguity results in a double-voiced rhetoric and a dimension where the rules of the world 'as real as the world that is' make sense only for those protagonists who know that Victorian certainties are being challenged by the intrusion of postmodern avalanche of doubts.

To create this sort of useful ambiguity John Fowles employs different Victorian and earlier works of art, scientific or social approaches freely as a kind

of 'raw' material in *The French Lieutenant's Woman* and the author and the title character manipulate them freely so it does not surprise us that the title of the novel is not consistent with its plot. If I interpret the plot in a conventional way I have to admit that it is extremely, perhaps too simple. Ernestina Freeman, the only child of a rich businessman and Charles Smithson a young man of aristocratic extraction are walking on the beach when the young man catches sight of poor Tragedy, a mysterious woman. This meeting is going to change the fates of the three participants in the ménage. Charles proposes to Ernestina and even discusses the financial terms of their marriage with his would be father in law, but meetings with Sarah Woodruff motivate him to first try and help the desperate woman, an action which later leads him into an illicit affair with her. The conventional ending to this story reconciles Charles to Ernestina and Sarah Woodruff disappears from their happy Victorian married life. But the novel has other endings in store and this means that the ending both occurred and it did not....

John Fowles even apologizes for having offered his readers a flat ending and a collection of essays as a novel, but this is also an impossible possibility. The cause and effect principle remains intact and the somewhat ambiguous credibility of the story will stand the test of even the most critical reader in the end due to a series of technical subtleties John Fowles employs. The novel abounds in explicit authorial intrusions, which loosen the steady Victorian context and this narrative strategy allows for two more solutions to the conflict, which establish, and emphasise the central role of the French lieutenant's woman in the above-summarised first section.

This situation directs our attention to the liberal handling of the fictional material, which results in promises the novel does not honour. There is no seducer in the novel and for most of the novel we witness a young virgin's preparations to become somebody's woman rather than a fallen woman's struggle to fight against the attacks of Victorian society. In fact, all predictable interpretations are undermined because Sarah's status does not make sense, cannot make sense, to most of the nineteenth century characters in the novel.

The title promises to offer the life story of a tragic figure seduced and abandoned, or further abused, terrorised and humiliated by a merciless seducer. Yet, as I have just argued, in the novel there is no seducer, no acts that humiliate a weak innocent woman. On the contrary, we discover that the French lieutenant's woman is the result of Sarah's 'creativity' and she becomes a seductress who manipulates Charles Smithson. The harvest of the seeds of ambiguity is sweet and sour as our interpretation of her status is partly the result of expectations generated by our knowledge of the Victorian fictional variants of the theme, but the possibility of some sort of progress or deviation from these principles has been asserted by the time we try to make sense of the situation.

The above discrepancy between the promise formulated by the title and the actual events, which construct the plot, can be interpreted as a kind of warning addressed to the reader. The shocking revelation, that Sarah Woodruff is still a

virgin, and that her status as a fallen woman, is the result of her own ‘fiction’ created in the company of John Fowles alters the nature of the book considerably.

Her determination to confront a prejudiced and hostile Victorian environment is conventional enough, but it becomes the source of creative ‘play’ and the same can be said of the novel, which is and is not Victorian. Thus Sarah Woodruff’s career most notably demonstrates that she differs from other Victorian heroines through her, and her creator’s choice of the form of rebellion, and the same can be said about the novel itself.

With a bit of exaggeration we could say that she employs the power of tradition and stereotypes for her own benefit while projecting herself into a characteristic Victorian conflict she simultaneously amends the nature and character of the predictable fictional medium as well. The formula, the power of her ‘authorial’ will is fully justified, as in chapter thirteen John Fowles claims that he has no genuine control over his characters’ acts as once they achieve their own identity they enter into a dimension over which the artist has no control or has very limited authority:

I can only report – and I am the most reliable witness – that the idea seemed to me to come early from Charles, not myself. I must respect it, and disrespect all my quasi-divine plans for him, if I wish him to be real. [...] There is only one good definition of God: the freedom that allows other freedoms to exist. (*F.L.W.* 82)

Yet Sarah has an ambiguous status as although she lives in the Victorian period, her material existence is determined by the given physical and historical dimension of the novel and at the same time she is the ‘accomplice’ of the twentieth century novelist. The complexity of the novel stems partly from this first platform of ambiguity, suggested by the fact that the environment she exists in is one she manages to both inhabit and evade with the help of her creative power and the support of the twentieth century novelist. Of course her creative power is the product of John Fowles’ imagination, but the author insists on this sense of ambiguity.

The ambiguity element is essential at this point as she is a pariah, an outcast in the given microcosm, yet she is the only character who is aware of the nature of the situation and benefits from ambiguity and her career occasionally can be identified as near-identical with the process by way of which John Fowles imagines, plans, organises, writes and offers up his fictional material to the readers of his book.

This state of affairs constantly reminds us that we are discussing a novel, which is constructed on the principle of ambiguity as it is and it is not a Victorian one. Sarah’s dual existence, her ambiguous nature, is determined by the unavoidable shadow of tradition, as well as by her, her author’s and ‘their’ novel’s rebellion against a ‘once’ admittedly ideal world or mode of



presentation. Sarah gains her right to dismiss Victorian illusions in a Victorian world because she is at the same time, admittedly, the product of twentieth century imagination and thus John Fowles formulates his and her right to dismiss the limits of both Victorian and twentieth century fiction by demonstrating that fiction is centuries old and eternally fresh and young simultaneously.

Through this duality the novel extends the power of creative, artistic imagination to the domain of cultural dimensions other than literature to demonstrate that the illusion of art changing life has to and can be maintained. This illusion is clearly formulated by John Fowles in the very title of one of his essays, which announces in loosely Cartesian terms "I write therefore I am" (Fowles 1964: 5-12), which could be an excellent explanation of Sarah and the 'life' she is creating for herself and her consorts in the company of John Fowles.

Sarah Woodruff's greatest power stems from her creative manipulation of already existing social, moral and most notably fictional patterns and the tempting quality of the image she creates of herself is, as Pamela Cooper rightly puts it "a constant *fata morgana* of great influence" (Cooper 1991: 62).

The innocent woman who either falls in love with a man, or is simply seduced or raped by a man and thus becomes a pariah has been a common topic in world literature. Nathaniel Hawthorne's *Hester Prynne*, Thomas Hardy's *Tess d'Urberville* revealed already functioning social and moral stereotypes of the respective periods in America and Britain. These tragic figures were victims of hypocrisy, social and moral ignorance, but in John Fowles' novel the victim is a victimiser and relevantly she creates this ambiguity for reasons we have already discussed.

The above anachronistic elements, the underlying sense of ambiguity, become explainable and organic through the chapters of John Fowles' fiction, which discuss theoretical aspects concerning the novel and the novelist. Sarah's 'writing' of her own fate also enables the novel to reveal the process by way of which the 'dominant' character deconstructs the myth of both the pure woman and that of the fallen woman and thus the fallen woman can be interpreted as the pure woman and the pure woman can be equated with the fallen one. This is also the case in Thomas Hardy's *A Pure Woman* as well, but John Fowles' intention is to suggest that a mysterious and beautiful woman's version of her own miserable or dignified fate is a valid possibility.

This possibility belongs to the domain of illusions, but creating valid interpretations of reality as illusion is part of human nature and of fiction and functions as a perfect source of useful ambiguity. David W. Landrum writes that John Fowles employs this technique to help the reader assess his or her personal reactions to the events related:

As certainties crumble one after another, restoration and emancipation pattern that eventually extends from the characters in the novel to the author, the reader, and the text itself. Incessant shifting from one centre

to another, followed by the dislocation of each newly established centre, gives the novel much of its rhetorical energy and provides it with a unifying thematic dimension that substitutes for a formulaic thesis. (Landrum 1996: 103)

Occasional theoretical intrusions into the fictional material support the ambiguous nature of the material, and function in the sense suggested by Bradbury's idea that the novel imposes at least two readings from the perspectives of all three explicitly formulated endings (Bradbury 1993: 178).

We are quite often reminded that we are reading a text, which is different from traditional variants in that its achievements have to be assessed at a theoretical level as ambiguity if we are to employ the most relevant interpretations it suggests. One has to read the novel, simultaneously, as an exciting twentieth century interpretation of its Victorian grandfather and as the grandfather's critique of how his grandchildren are wasting the once praised, accepted stable values of the 'domain.'

Of course all the members of the extended 'family' of fiction (ethics, science, history, literary theory, contemporary fiction, or poetry) have a say, but none of them 'wants' to take the responsibility for anything that might or has gone wrong. Yet, *The French Lieutenant's Woman* is not a fictional comparative cultural study of the second half of the Victorian period and of the twentieth century. The most provocative aspect of the novel is that Sarah's art, or imagination makes of life an uglier existential dimension than it actually is because she builds up her official image of a multitude of possible roots of negative aesthetics. Yet the moral verdict of the Victorian world turns against the whole period as in its concept a young woman's love for a man is sin, her fidelity and longing to see him again is not compatible with Victorian morality, her tragedy is translatable as prostitution and the names given to her are Tragedy, the French lieutenant's woman, and ultimately the French lieutenant's whore.

She generates her 'public image' and when the underlying sense of ambiguity is revealed the result is a more flexible interpretation of the artificer's, that is her and her author's, possibilities. The above thesis is documented by the verifiable fictional fact brilliantly demonstrated by Katherine Tarbox, who states that the multiple endings of the novel mainly reflect on Sarah's possibilities (Tarbox 1988: 72).

The fact that Sarah is playing the role of a fallen woman and is determined to confront the hostile environment through the false image she designs and enacts highlights another relevant aspect regarding the insistence of the Fowlesian meta-realistic novel on the potential values of such ambiguity. Once Sarah's pretence is revealed the novel can start discarding its false interpretation as a traditional but limited Victorian novel and it directs our attention to its postmodern, willingly ambiguous 'identity'. This 'expertise' includes Ernestina

and Charles's marriage, the shocking meeting of Sarah and Charles, and the impossibility of any kind of meeting of Charles with either woman.

The gain is as obvious as the authorial intention 'written' in the novel because the reader also learns that fiction has the power to incorporate essay writing, philosophy, history, science, religion, literature, the theory of the novel and, more importantly, display its quality as an artistic process in progress where any conclusive, definite ending is false and only stems from too much respect for or abdication to stereotypes.

In "Hardy and the Hag" John Fowles justifies his option for the multiple ending solution not on the basis of objective critical reasons but writes that he considers it to be more fertile to his whole being as a writer. In the same essay John Fowles makes an interesting statement regarding Charles's status and the author's relationship with his male protagonist: "I wrote and printed two endings to *The French Lieutenant's Woman* entirely because from early in the first draft I was torn intolerably between wishing to reward the male protagonist (my surrogate) with the woman he loved and wishing to deprive him of her [...]" (Fowles 1977: 145).

The dangers of this kind of manipulation are also formulated in the novel. Charles Smithson, the 'clean angel' (Angel Clare) of the novel is in a more delicate and difficult situation than Sarah Woodruff because although he senses the 'mythic aura' that defends her against the whole world he cannot abandon his convention bound interpretation of a still acceptable pattern of behaviour. This means that the 'surrogate' is a Fowlesian projection of Victorian mentality still active in the mind of twentieth century artists. This is a reflection of the ambiguity John Fowles had been uneasy with all his life. It is easy to demonstrate that Charles' mentality is both Victorian (as he is ready to discuss the financial aspects of his marriage with his prospective father in law, or has no respect for Sam) and rebellious (his views, and his attitude towards Sarah).

These aspects are consistent with the ending suggested in chapter forty-four, but John Fowles simply calls this ending a work-hypothesis, a might have been solution and the fairly traditional ending is offered up only to be rewritten. John Fowles' sympathy for Charles is limited, the author shows his surrogate as the first existentialist following the coffin, which carries the corpse of his extinct Darwinist convictions yet he is not free to imagine and to create or to construct the world he would like to live in.

As the second and the third endings seem to suggest this 'authorial' ambition we may say that Charles, the 'surrogate', is enslaved by verifiable dimensions of the material world and is incapable of living in an illusion because he cannot sense the value of ambiguity relentlessly reformulated by Sarah and John Fowles. This is a very interesting sort of alliance between the author and his female protagonist against his surrogate. Charles Smithson revolts against art, very late in the novel, in the house of the Pre-Raphaelite artist and thus demonstrates that there is no hope for him to change, although he senses his status as a 'fossil'.

In fact, at the level of the plot Sarah Woodruff's strategy is successful because she refuses to accept the conventions of her contemporary society and she willingly disregards the spirit of the period. Sarah Woodruff pretends to be a fallen woman, a miserable victim of her uncontrolled passion, a possible mistress, a woman who is ready to marry the man who renounces the financial advantages offered up to him by life, a muse for artists, and finally a woman liberated by her status in all respects. This strategy generates her mobility as a fictional character and the transformation of her status is interpretable as freedom if her new possibilities are weighed against the lack of mobility of the other characters or of 'the world other than the world that is'.

First, of course she has to pretend that she is bad, because her status as a bad woman guarantees her the freedom to credibly suggest all the above 'unfulfilled promises' and to provoke discussion of related moral, ethical, social and aesthetic problems. She does not actually lie because Charles, similarly to the other characters, formulates questions, which comprise 'prefabricated' answers. She admits that she admired the lieutenant for his courage, but that she sometimes feels that he had nothing to do with the wreck and that he was the devil in the guise of a sailor. Her answer has to be considered, and can only be weighed in the light of Charles's question: "Miss Woodruff, I detest immorality. But morality without mercy I detest rather more. I promise not to be too severe a judge" (*F.L.W.* 136).

The question is not formulated in the interrogative; it is a statement, a verdict. Charles' text implies her 'immorality' and although he assures her of his sympathy, the cruelty against which he offers to defend her is comprised in the very formula he employs. As Sarah employs stereotypes to construct her image these discussions also strengthen her 'apartness' from the other character, whose verdicts she seems to justify through her acts and thus they can merely reflect on her assumed status.

Thus Sarah's decision to abandon Charles produces uncertainty as to her moral worth, but certainly not with regard to her aesthetic function, a formula made possible by her ambiguous status. Her illogical but possible solution to become an apprentice to a Pre-Raphaelite painter directs our attention to her fictional career as a kind of 'muse,' and its identifiable contribution to the novel's flexibility. Her status as a muse is compatible with Sarah's 'illogical' strategies and also explains why Charles, the scientist cannot understand her ambitions, actions and feelings.

Her impersonations, or masks contribute to the 'loopholes' in her career, - the fallen woman, mentor of the perplexed Darwinist, mistress of the first existentialist, apprentice to a Pre-Raphaelite painter and above all the secret ally to the author god. As we have seen this strategy is visible both at the level of the plot and with regards to her ambiguous status. The above series of pretence simultaneously broadens and limits the possibilities of the characters populating the novel and of the fictional material itself.

Even the concept of a chronologically interpretable, 'objective' definition of time is dislocated and her status assumes a timeless quality. This process of dislocation is an essential element of the novel and the weird sense of continuity as discontinuity is supported by at least three variants or reflections of John Fowles.

First, John Fowles is present as novelist-god who analyses both the form in which he writes and himself writing in this form. This novelist-god also tempts the 'hypocrite lecteur' into participation on the basis of the artist's argument that we are all novelists. Second, John Fowles actually becomes a character in the novel because in his last two conversations with the reader he is no longer a narrative voice, but is a physically described character who enters Charles's first-class railway carriage and has the look of an omnipotent god, a prophet. Later we see him loitering on the Chelsea embankment, he is rather 'foppish and Frenchified' and he is convinced that the world is his to possess. These variations compensate for Charles Smithson's deficiencies, who is after all, the 'surrogate' of the novelist, that is, he can be interpreted as the third variant of John Fowles in the novel.

The above reflections seem to contribute to Sarah Woodruff's superior status, whose freedom is reckoned to be of her own construction. When she explains her status to him Charles Smithson can only revolt against art and the New Woman. The curious thing about this situation is that she has been acting out her 'supremacy' through pretence, which is conventionally not a positive category but in chapter sixty, where she reveals the fact that she is a muse, she is honest. Charles Smithson's reaction suggests that this final meeting makes him realise that the two worlds they live in are incompatible.

Yet, in chapter thirteen and on various other occasions John Fowles makes it clear that he 'also' manipulates the Victorian world he is creating and thus, her right to pretend and create her fate and to manipulate those around her, Charles Smithson included, is asserted and approved by the author. The problem of honest direct communication between characters or characters and author is not settled in the novel.

The question of literary influences, which support the novel, has been discussed repeatedly, and most critics insisted on real, interpretable elements of 'identity' between John Fowles novel and the poetry of Matthew Arnold, Charles Dickens, Thomas Hardy and Jane Austen (Palmer 1975: 74). The spirit of the novel and John Fowles' interpretation of the nature of literary influence as discussed in his essay on Franz Kafka leads me to reinterpret the freedom of the novelist's fiction even with respect to the literary influences that admittedly shaped his material:

All I want, indeed, is to keep the choices open and not see would-be writers self-driven into some sort of creative (more accurately, imitative) process whereby they feel they must stake their little claim and then defend it for the rest of their days. Increasingly human

freedom lives in human art, and we cannot tolerate- it is the one and only thing we must never tolerate- any outer-imposed restriction on artistic methods and aims. That, after all, remains very possibly the deepest and most paradoxical moral in Kafka's haunting darkness. (Fowles 1970: 122)

Since Sarah challenges her existence in the present with an imaginary interpretation of her past, the 'outer-imposed' concept of any past is undermined. This manipulation is important for her as the past could oblige her to give up her status as a free woman and false dictates could turn her into a Tess-like victim. Thus she is granted the freedom to ignore social ties and expectations and she consciously assumes the invisible 'scarlet letter', which in the inverted logic of the novel becomes the source of her integrity, dignity and results in her self-conscious acts of freedom. In more pedestrian terms she understands too well that being bad can help her be different from other women of her social standing.

The context of the novel encourages me to assert that she wants to enjoy the advantages of being bad and this is another relevant cause, which leads her to enact the role of the fallen woman. Sarah Woodruff is a bad woman by Victorian standards, and she is not only aware of her sexuality, but as the French lieutenant's woman she also makes of it a symbol. Thus she deliberately contradicts the established social and moral attitudes of her time as a Victorian heroine, and also challenges the interpretation of her practices by twentieth century critics. I consider thus that John Fowles deliberately creates the symbol of the woman who has 'whole sight' (Fowles 1981: 35) because she is able to understand and manipulate the other both as the eternal man and as a member of the society of a given age. Her imaginative side endows her with the powerful talent of being humble and proud, miserable and happy, dominated and dominant, an emblem and a creative centre, simultaneously or alternatively.

When she makes of her sexuality an emblem, an act, which actually mystifies social and private longing for joy, she dismisses the static and irrelevant aspects of a conventional definition of happiness. John Fowles avoids marriage between Sarah and Charles as a narrative solution, because in the Victorian context marriage could be the source of a wife's misery. John Fowles' intention is to fictionalise the power of the private domain as opposed to the torture-room quality of an exterior world haunted by false principles.

It is also important to remember that, due to the emphatic role of ambiguity in the novel, when Sarah Woodruff projects her sexuality into a story about seduction she also casts herself in the role of the femme fatale. Thus she turns the prejudice of the world against the society that creates those prejudices and Charles Smithson cannot be an exception. The first existentialist is seduced by her and has to discover that what he understood as his free choice is actually the result of manipulation and Sarah is not a victim, but a seductress and ultimately a free woman. Her final apparition as a muse is compatible with the world of unhappy romance, which is the product of her creative imagination. She seems

to have gained new possibilities to fight against all the attacks coming from the exterior world because she wants to maintain the freedom provided by the fictional variant of her existence.

Due to the ambiguity principle at work Sarah also challenges the myth of the prostitute as she has an authentic status both as a pure woman and as a fallen woman. The image of the fallen woman is created by her and this means that she 'enacts' free authorial will. She is a character and the author's secret sharer and thus she challenges historical and contemporary imagination simultaneously with the result that she discards her authenticity.

This logic is an essential aspect on many accounts. First she is John Fowles' accomplice, a co-author, she inhabits the imaginary world of the novel and thus she discards the authenticity both of the Victorian novel and of its twentieth century rewriting.

Sarah can avoid becoming a victim because her figure embodies knowledge of earlier fictional experience and also because John Fowles is tempted to declare that the artist and the creative process could be interpreted as two interchangeable elements of freedom; the French lieutenant's woman, the creator of her own image, can perpetuate the illusion of other freedoms. Thus through her talent, creativity and her author's support Sarah Woodruff can evade the typical Victorian fate which awaits fallen women.

In *The French Lieutenant's Woman* ambiguity becomes a major influence and art becomes the dominant source of the conflict. John Fowles considers that the Victorian material should be as genuine as possible even at the level of style *The French Lieutenant's Woman* documents the authorial intention to write a Victorian novel as the artists of that period could not write it. John Fowles reveals his intentions with respect to the contemporary novelist's creative journey in the world of an old tradition:

To what extent am I being a coward by writing inside old traditions? To what extent am I being panicked into avant-gardism? Writing about 1867 doesn't lessen the stress; it increases since so much of the subject matter must of its historical nature be 'traditional.' There are apparent parallels in other arts: Stravinsky's eighteenth-century rehandlings, Picasso's and Francis Bacon's use of Velázquez. But in this context, words are not nearly so tractable as musical notes or brushstrokes. One can parody a rococo musical ornament, a baroque face. Very early on I tried, in a test chapter, to put modern dialogue into Victorian mouths. But the effect was absurd, since the real historical nature of the characters is hopelessly distorted. (Fowles 1969: 16-17)

The essentially Victorian dialogue coexists with the 'avant-garde' narrative and the result is a twentieth century author's experiment with nineteenth and twentieth century art. It really does not make any sense to try and impose any sense of hierarchy with respect to the relationship of the concepts and

accompanying technical and artistic solutions. It is exactly this unambiguously ambiguous character that gives vigour to the book. To reveal this twofold identity of the material John Fowles alternates the Victorian material with meta-fictional chapters like in chapters thirteen and the last two ones. John Fowles' discourse and register contribute to the dynamics of the fictional material by reproducing exactly the kind of tension he was writing about in the essay I quoted earlier.

In *The French Lieutenant's Woman*, Sarah Woodruff deceives Charles Smithson as she creates her own identity by way of fiction. She manages to manipulate all the characters of the novel aided by her mentor and creator which is possible in the novel through John Fowles' two explicit and numerous implicit intrusions into the fictional world of the novel. The novelist-god blends techniques earlier employed by Henry Fielding, William Makepeace Thackeray and Lawrence Sterne to reveal and explain the novelist's omnipotent status and at the same time John Fowles modifies them by promising a Victorian novel which is also 'nouveau roman' in style.

Mahmoud Salami makes an instructive inventory of the different critics' reactions to the presence of the Victorian element in the novel (Salami 1992: 103-108), Malcolm Bradbury, in his "The Novelist as Impresario" (Bradbury 1993: 174-191) explains that John Fowles' appearance as an impresario in the novel is a meaningful 'intrusion' and the fact that he appears on the stage to set the clock back in order to transform the futures of his two central characters leads to a loss of confidence on the reader's part and strengthens his awareness of the relevant status of ambiguity in the novel.

On the basis of experience provided by some later John Fowles novels I consider that he attempts to pass off a 'private mythology' of himself, primarily because Sarah gains uncensored authority over her fictional world and can be explained as the fictional variant of John Fowles writing his novel. She manipulates and abandons the author's surrogate and employs her possibilities discussed at a fictionally theoretical level by the novelist god. She 'rewards' Fowles as she contributes to her author's 'private' authority over tradition, literature, legend, and myth while creating the fiction within fiction dimension, the core of ambiguity in the novel. Her transformation from a fallen woman into a muse is supported by conventional technical elements characteristic of Victorian fiction. The first glimpse the reader and Charles catch of her establishes her as a near mythical figure, who is ready to confront the power of the waves, the storm and her loneliness and these easily identifiable symbols of coexistence of nature, man and spiritual power can be interpreted as very early foreshadowing of her metamorphosis into a muse.

Consequently, Sarah Woodruff can be interpreted as an artist figure who devises a new 'view and rule of life' by which she gains the right to rule not only her fictional existence but the fictionally real world as well. Yet, as John Fowles focuses on the primary importance of the human acts, conflicts and images in his novels, the theoretical and artistic themes formulated through self-reflexive



sections are subservient to his concern for the human characteristics of his characters.

The Victorian Age, especially from 1850 on, was highly existentialist in many of its personal dilemmas. One can almost invert the reality and say that Camus and Sartre have been trying to lead us, in their fashion, to Victorian seriousness of purpose and moral sensitivity. (Palmer 1975: 78)

In *The French Lieutenant's Woman*, John Fowles applies the fictional arsenal of the Victorian novel, to demonstrate that he can write the Victorian novel as the artists of the period could not write it. He sets out to demonstrate that the genre re-employed can preserve its full vigour and demonstrate its eternal youth, a thesis of great relevance for John Fowles' art beautifully written in *Mantissa*.

The principle of ambiguity is woven into the texture and the structure of the novel as the preserved integrity of the Victorian novel is visible in the style, the basic structure, the character realisation and the essentially realistic mode of the different sections of the novel, yet the overall structure contradicts the promise formulated by the parts. The flow of the plot proper is interrupted by the author's comments on the condition of fiction or the relationship between the author and his characters. John Fowles intrudes into the novel to provide a traditional Victorian ending to Sarah and Charles's story but at the same time he declares that other endings are possible.

I consider the exceptional quality of the novel to be produced by the inherent ambiguity which governs the novel, the cunning twentieth century authorial attitude implanted into the Victorian 'body'. The oft-quoted passage about the contemporary novelist's main or 'principal' concern being not with authority but with freedom is also quite telling in this respect as it results in 'interdisciplinary' diversity, which requires introspection. Sarah is the only authorial agent, who can guide writer, fictional writer, surrogate, the 'hypocrite lecteur' through the labyrinth, which hides the secret illusion of art writing life and life creating art.

Thus the self-reflexive narrative is made into a visible process and as a result John Fowles' 'Victorian' novel becomes a fine example of the so-called self-reflexive novel fashionable in the second half of the twentieth century.

John Fowles makes of Sarah a 'ghost' of the past and a living presence and similarly the difference between the authorial and the narrative 'I' becomes subject to, occasionally visible, manipulation and the world of this novel, the world as real as but other than the world that is, is shown as being "at a second remove from reality" (Fowles 1988: 47) due to the ambiguity inherent in the authorial intention to both manipulate the aesthetic distance and maintain the illusion that life can write life and life can write art.

However 'democratic' John Fowles may claim to be, the result is almost always that the artist's authority as the writer of the respective piece of fiction

remains intact. John Fowles explains his artistic dilemmas, shares his intentions with us, declares the autonomy of his characters yet he retains his status as the author of *The French Lieutenant's Woman*. Yet, conventional morality and art have no redemptive power in John Fowles' novel, the humiliations and failures of traditional literary discourse can lead to some character's (and implicitly individual's) imprisonment in mistaken interpretations of the role and possibilities of 'art and morality'.

Sarah Woodruff's metamorphosis from a fallen woman into the free woman is written into the metamorphosis of the Victorian novel into postmodern fiction which has the ambition to present both life and art in fiction, in a form of art Mantissa called very old and eternally young.

*The French Lieutenant's Woman* breaks with its openly declared and thoroughly constructed 'existence' as a Victorian novel and therefore it can assume the status of a novel freed of the limitations that might arise from the 'high art' because the author has managed to cut the roots.

The organising principles, which determine the structure of the plot of *The French Lieutenant's Woman*, are embedded in the plot of the novel and the structure, the design and the process by way of which it is written assumes the same importance, or role of a fictional character. The endings, the chapters which discuss theoretical aspects regarding the novel as a genre are convincing illustrations of this thesis with regards to *The French Lieutenant's Woman*.

John Fowles' novel assumes its status as fiction describing the value of ambiguity due to the 'co-operation' between author and character. The filming of the novel supports my thesis regarding the search for freedom, and the partial successes of this search for characters, author and fiction. John Fowles tells us that the novel was accepted as the basis of a Hollywood film after he managed to convince the producers that it is not exclusively a Victorian story. Following this 'incident' Harold Pinter wrote the script of the film and a studio publicity man turned up in London during the filming of the novel and "demanded to know why nothing had been done about the novelization of Harold Pinter's script" (Fowles 1981: 35). John Fowles found the studio publicity director's ignorance hilarious, but I consider the incident to demonstrate the flexibility, or freedom inherent in the novel, and the comprehensively articulated value of ambiguity.

Sarah Woodruff is a kind of secret sharer due to John Fowles' thesis that freedom and authority are not exclusive of one another and should be thought of as being inclusive of different interpretations. Let me finish by quoting D. H. Lawrence's essay on the morality of the novel for I consider his rationale supportive of my interpretation of the authorial and fictional situations I have discussed in this paper:

And that's what you learn, when you are a novelist. And that's what you are very liable not to know, if you are a person, or a philosopher, or a scientist, or a stupid person. ... As for the words and thoughts and sighs and aspirations that fly from him, they are so many tremulations

in the ether, and not alive at all. But if the tremulations reach another man alive, he may receive them into his life, and his life may take on colour, like a chameleon creeping from a brown rock on to a green leaf. ... The whole is greater than the part. And therefore, I who am man alive, am greater than my soul, or spirit, or body, or mind, or consciousness, or anything else that is merely a part of me. I am a man, and alive. ... For this reason I am a novelist. And being a novelist I consider myself superior to the saint, the scientist, the philosopher, and the poet, who are all great masters of different bits of man alive, but never get the whole hog. The novel is the book of life. (Lawrence 1936: 135)

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